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-I 


A   TREATISE 


ON 


THE  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS 


INCLUDING  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  RES  JUDICATA 


By  HENRY  CAMPBELL  BLACK,  M.  A. 

Author  of  "* Black's  Law  Dictionary  "  and  of  Treatises  on  ""Tax  Titles," 
** Constitutional  i4iw,"  ** Interpretation  of  Laws,"  **Bankrupicy,"  eta 


SECOND    EDITION 

IN  TWO  VOLUMES 


VOLUME   I 


St.  Paul,  Minn. 
WEST  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

San  Francisco,  Cal 
BANCROFT-WHITNEY  CO. 

190a 


COFTBIGHT,  1891, 
BT 

WEST  PUBLISHING  COMPANY, 


Copyright,  1902, 

BT 

WEST  PUBLISHING  COMPANY. 


L   5529 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION, 


THE  work  now  given  to  the  public  is  one  which  has  engaged  the  au- 
thor's study  and  reflection,  more  or  less  constantly,  for  a  considerable 
number  of  years.  The  magnitude  and  importance  of  the  subject  are 
such  as  to  demand  the  most  patient  and  exhaustive  research,  the  most 
careful  collation  and  weighing  of  authorities,  and  the  most  impartial 
and  reasonable  discussion  of  its  disputed  points,  on  the  part  of  any  one 
who  attempts  a  comprehensive  and  systematic  treatment  of  it.  How 
far  the  author  has  fallen  short  of  the  fulfillment  of  these  conditions,  is 
for  the  judgment  of  those  who  shall  use  the  book.  But  the  fact  that 
he  has  constantly  kept  this  ideal  in  mind,  and  devoted  his  best  energies 
to  the  realization  of  it,  is  his  justification  for  the  hope  that  the  follow- 
ing pages  may  be  found  to  possess  some  interest  and  value  .for  his 
brethren  of  the  bar. 

The  law  of  judgments,  at  the  present  day,  aside  from  local  variations 
in  matters  of  practice,  may  be  regarded  as  tolerably  well  settled. 
There  are,  however,  certain  branches  of  the  law  of  estoppel  by  record 
which  still  present  themselves  to  many  a  puzzled  inquirer  as  a 
labyrinthine  confusion  of  apparently  irreconcilable  decisions.  This 
arises,  not  so  much  from  any  real  contradiction  or  obscurity  in  the 
authorities,  as  from  the  infinite  variety  exhibited  in  the  facts  of  the 
different  cases  and  the  necessity  of  making  nice  discriminations  in  the 
principles  to  be  applied.  At  such  places,  the  endeavor  has  been  made 
to  exhibit  the  result  of  the  decisions  in  a  clear  and  orderly  form,  by  a 
methodical  classification  of  the  cases,  and  by  a  logical  and  systematic 
arrangement  of  topics.  In  illustration  we  refer  to  the  discussion  of  the 
doctrine  of  merger  as  applied  to  inseverable  claims  founded  in  contract 
or  tort,  actions  for  continuing  damages,  for  distinct  trespasses,  for 
causes  of  action  distinct  though  founded  on  the  same  transaction,  for 
permanent  and  recurring  nuisances,  for  periodical  liabilities,  etc.  (vol 
"•  §§  73i'~7S3)-     Nor  is  our  general  subject  wholly  free  from  vexed 

(Hi) 


iy  PREFACE. 

questions,  upon  which  the  authorities  are  hopelessly  at  war.  In  such 
cases  it  has  been  the  author's  task  to  weigh  and  balance  the  conflicting 
decisions, — not  withholding  criticism  where  he  deemed  it  justified,  nor 
refraining  from  the  positive  expression  of  individual  opinion, — ^and  to 
present  what  he  considered  the  true  rule,  or- the  best  rule,  or  the  rule 
sustained  by  the  preponderance  of  authorities,  supporting  his  con- 
clusions as  well  by  the  reasoning  suggested  by  his  own  reflections  on 
the  subject,  as  by  quotations  from  the  opinions  of  the  courts.  Ex- 
amples of  such  topics,  so  treated,  may  be  seen  in  the  discussion  of 
"judgments  as  contracts"  (vol.  i.  §§  7-1 1),  the  definition  of  jurisdiction 
(§  215),  the  question  of  the  collateral  impeachment  of  judgments  for 
want  of  jurisdiction  (§§  270-276),  the  subject  of  the  conclusiveness  of 
foreign  judgments  in  personam  (vol.  ii.  §§  825-834),  and  the  matter 
of  jurisdictional  inquiries  in  actions  on  judgments  from  a  sister  state 
(§§  894-915)  and  the  plea  of  fraud  (§§  916-921). 

Throughout  the  work  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  preserve  an 
orderly  and  scientific  arrangement,  both  in  the  main  divisions  of  the 
subject  and  in  the  sequence  of  parts  and  sections  within  each  chapter. 
Such  a  plan,  it  is  believed,  if  perfectly  carried  out,  would  greatly  facili- 
tate the  use  of  a  text-book  so  voluminous  as  the  present.  As  to  the 
method  of  using  the  authorities,  it  may  be  observed  that  quotations 
from  the  opinions  of  the  courts  have  been  quite  freely  introduced, — 
not,  it  is  hoped,  to  the  extent  of  incumbering  the  pages  with  needless 
repetitions,  but  for  the  purpose  of  illustrating  and  re-inforcing  the 
legal  propositions  stated  by  the  apt  and  convincing  remarks  of  learned 
judges.  For  the  rest,  the  citations  will  be  found  to  cover  the  English 
and  Canadian  reports,  as  well  as  those  of  all  the  American  states,  with 
occasional  illustrations  from  the  Roman  law  and  other  foreign  systems. 
The  extent  of  the  author's  researches  will  be  apparent  from  the  fact 
that  more  than  ten  thousand  cases  are  cited  in  these  volumes.  But 
he  feels  confident  that  to  refer  to  a  profusion  of  authorities  is  to  err 
(if  at  all)  on  the  side  most  easily  pardonable  by  the  profession. 

In  view  of  the  wide  circulation  of  the  various  periodicals  constituting 
the  National  Reporter  System,  it  was  thought  that  convenience  in  the 
use  of  the  book  would  be  greatly  promoted  by  introducing  parallel 
references  in  the  case  of  all  decisions  reported  concurrently  in  an 
official  series  and  in  one  of  the  Reporters.     And  this  has  accordingly 


PREFACE.  V 

been  done.  Where  a  case  is  cited  from  one  of  the  Reporters  alone, 
it  is  because  it  was  omitted  from  the  official  series  of  reports  or  has 
not  yet  been  reached  by  that  series.  For  reasons  similar  to  the  fore- 
g^ing,  parallel  references  to  the  American  Decisions  and  the  American 
Reports  have  been  introduce^.  The  citations  have  been  brought  down 
to  the  time  the  work  goes  to  press.  H.  C.  B. 

WashiDgton,  D.  C,  January  1,  1891. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  SECOND  EDITION. 


DURING  the  twelve  years  which  have  elapsed  since  the  first  publica- 
tion of  this  treatise,  the  law  of  Judgments,  as  expounded  by  the  courts 
and  affected  by  statutory  enactments,  has  undergone  a  great  elabora- 
tion and  development,  though  without  much  change  in  the  cardinal 
principles  upon  which  its  most  important  rules  are  based.  In  the  same 
period  the  case-law  of  the  subject  has  enormously  increased.  It  there- 
fore seemed  to  the  author  that  a  new  edition  of  this  work  would  be 
acceptable  to  the  profession,  and  would  indeed  be  necessary  to  its  con- 
tinuance in  that  career  of  usefulness  of  which  he  has  many  gratifying 
testimonies.  Accordingly,  the  book  has  been  subjected  to  a  careful 
and  thorough  revision,  many  parts  of  it  have  been  wholly  re-written, 
much  new  matter  has  been  added,  and  the  later  decisions,  to  the  num- 
ber of  about  seven  thousand,  have  been  incorporated  in  the  notes.  It 
is  hoped  that  the  work,  as  thus  enlarged  and  brought  abreast  of  the 
current  of  judicial  decisions,  will  be  found  a  reliable  guide  to  the  rules 
and  principles  on  which  its  subject  rests,  and  a  complete  repertory  of 
the  precedents,  both  ancient  and  modern.  H.  C.  B. 

Washington,  D.  C,  October  1,  1902. 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 


VOLUME    I. 


CTTAPTEB  I. 

TMJfl  NATUKB  AND  CLASSIFICATION  OF  JUDGMENTS  AND  DBCRSB& 

Pabt  I.    Thb  Naturb  of  Judgmbnts. 

$       1.  DeflnitiODS  ot  Judgments,  Decrees,  and  Orders. 

2.  Tbe  Language  of  a  Judgment 

3.  Ifissentials  of  a  Judgment. 

4.  Consequences  of  a  Judgment 

5.  Judgment  is  not  an  Assignment 
ti.  Judgmmt  is  not  a  Specialty. 

7.  Judgments  sometimes  called  Contracts. 

8.  The  opposite  View. 

I).     Where  the  Cause  of  Action  is  in  Tort. 

10.  Judgments  are  not  Contracts. 

11.  Question  of  Statutory  Construction. 

Pabt  IL    Thb  Classification  of  Judgmbhii. 

12.  Methods  of  Classifying  Judgments. 

13.  Judgments  on  an  Issue  of  Law, 

14.  Judgments  upon  Verdict. 

15.  Judgments  without  Verdict. 
1<S.  Judgment  against  the  Verdict 

17.  Names  of  Judgments  In  certain  Special  Actions. 

18.  Cross-Classlflcatlons  of  Judgments. 

19.  Classification  of  Decrees. 

CHAPTER  IL 

FINAL  AND  INTERLOCUTORY  JUDGMENTS  AND  DEOREEa 

I    20.    Reasons  for  the  Distinction. 

21.  Definition  of  Final  Judgments. 

22.  Interlocutory  and  Intermediate  Orders. 

1  LAW  JUDG.  (vll) 


Vlll  TABLE  OF  CONTBNTa 

S    28.  Must  be  final  as  to  all  Parties. 

24.  Must  settle  all  tiie  Issues. 

25.  Uncertainty  of  the  Amount 

26.  Judi^ment  of  Nonsuit. 

27.  Dismissal  of  Suit. 

28.  Judgment  by  Default 
2U.  Judgment  on  Demurrer. 

30.  Judgment  on  Plea  in  Abatement 

31.  Judgment  for  Costs. 

31a.  Allowance  of  Claims  Against  Fund. 

32.  Granting  or  Refusing  Extraordinary  Remedies. 

33.  On  Motion  for  New  Trial. 

34.  Vacating  or  Reversing  former  Judgment. 

36.  Orders  as  to  Interpleader,  Intervention,  and  Joinder  of  Parties. 

36.  Dissolving  Attachments  and  Executions. 

37.  Order  removing  Cause. 

38.  Judgments  and  Orders  of  Probate  Oourti. 

39.  Judgment  in  Partition. 

40.  in  Condemnation  Proceedings. 

41.  Finality  of  Decrees. 

42.  i^'urtber  Action  necessary  to  settle  the  Equities. 

43.  Further  Action  necessary  to  execute  the  Decree^ 

44.  Decree  ordering  a  Reference. 

45.  Directing  an  Account. 

46.  Decree  suspending  Rights  until  further  Orders* 

47.  Decree  dissolving  Partnership. 

48.  Foreclosure  of  Mortgage. 

4tf.  Sending  issue  out  of  Chancery. 


,  JUDGMENTS  BY  CONFESSION. 

S    50.  Confession  of  Judgment  in  Pending  Suit. 

51.  Confession  of  Judgment  without  Action. 

52.  Authorized  by.  Statutes. 

53.  Court  must  have  Jurisdiction. 

54.  Who  may  confess  Judgment. 
56.  Confession  by  Married  Woman. 
56.  Married  Woman  as  Creditor. 
67.  Confession  by  Partner. 

58.  Joint  Defendants. 

59.  By  Officers  of  a  Corporation. 

60.  Consent  of  Creditor  is  necessary. 

61.  Requisites  of  Warrant  of  Attorney. 
61a.  Revocation  or  Expiration  of  W'ari^cmt 

62.  Affidavit  that  Debt  is  dae. 


■p* 


TABLB  OF  CONTENTS.  IX 

68.  Statement  of  the  Indebtedness. 

t^.  8i|rnature  to  Statement. 

m.  Verllication  of  Statement. 

<56.  Amendment  of  Statement. 

f57.  Judgement  voidable  for  Failure  to  comply  with  Statut«i 

W.  Valid  between  Parties. 

flM.  For  what  Judgment  may  be  confessed* 

70.  Debt  not  yet  due. 

71.  For  Future  Advances. 

72.  For  contingent  L.labllitle8. 

73.  Amount  of  the  Judgment. 

74.  LiquidatloD  of  Amount  by  Clerk. 

75.  inclusion  of  Attomey*8  Fees. 
7tS.  Recording  the  Judgment 

77.  Reversing  and  Vacating  Judgments  by  Ck>nfe8sion. 

7H.  Effects  of  confessed  Judgment. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

JUDGMK.NTS  BY  DEFAUI/T. 

79.  Judgment  of  NU  Dlcit 

7»a.  Judgment  for  Want  of  AtUdavit  of  Defense, 

80.  Judgment  by  Default. 

HI,  Against  Whom  may  be  taken. 

82.  Joint  Defendants. 

83.  Jurisdiction  of  the  Defendant. 

84.  Must  be  founded  on  good  Declaration. 

85.  Premature  Entry  of  Default. 

86.  Default,  when  proper. 

87.  Conclusiveness  of  Judgment  by  Default 

88.  Entry  by  the  Clerk. 

8V.  interlocutory  Judgment,  when  necessary. 

W»  Assessment  of  Damages. 

91.  Evidence  on  Assessment  of  Damages. 

92.  Amount  of  the  Recovery. 

U3.  Judgment  by  Default  not  aided  by  Presumptions. 

91.  Opening  and  Vacating  Judgments  by  Default 

05.  Review  of  Judgments  by  Default 

CHAPTEK  V. 

ARREST  OF  JUDGMENT. 

96.  Arrest  of  Judgment  at  Common  I^w. 

97.  When  the  Motion  should  be  made. 

98.  Grounds  for  Arrest  of  Judgment 


TABLE  OF  CONTBNTS. 


99.  Defect  of  Parties. 

IIX).  Jnsufflcient  or  Faulty  i'leadings. 

101.  Joinder  of  Good  and  Bad  Counts. 

102.  Misjoinder  of  Causes  of  Action. 

103.  Objections  to  tiie  Jury. 

104.  Irregular  or  Defective  Verdict. 

105.  Grounds  held  Insufficient. 


CHAFTES  VL 

THE  KEiNDlTlON  AND  ENTRY  OF  JUDGlfENTS. 

§  106.  Distinction  between  Rendition  and  Entry. 

107.  Power  and  Duty  of  the  Court  to  render  Judgment. 

108.  Application  and  Order  for  Judgnient 

109.  Signature  of  Judge. 

110.  Entry  by  the  Clerk. 

111.  Entry  In  wrong  Book. 

112.  Indexing  the  Judgment 

113.  Remedy  against  Clerk  for  improper  Entry. 

114.  Contents  of  the  Judgment. 

115.  Form  of  the  Judgment. 

116.  Designation  of  the  Parties. 

117.  Designation  of  the  Property. 

118.  Designation  of  Amount  of  Recovery. 

119.  Conditions  in  Judgment. 

120.  Joint  Defendants. 

121.  Time  of  entering  Judgment 

122.  Date  of  the  Judgment. 

123.  Construction  of  Ambiguous  Judgments. 

124.  The  Judgment-Roll,  or  Record. 

125.  Supplying  Lost  Records. 

125a.  Entry  of  Judgments  in  Federal  Courts. 

CHAPTER  Vn. 

THE  ENTRY  OF  JUDGMENTS  NUNC  PRO  TUNa 

§  126.  Origin  and  Nature  of  the  Power. 

127.  Delay  by  Act  of  the  Court. 

128.  Delay  by  Motions  or  Appeal. 

129.  Laches  of  Party. 

130.  Supplying  Entry  of  Judgment. 

131.  Correction  of  Clerical  Errors. 

132.  Not  a  proper  Means  of  changing  or  revi.'^fng  the  Judgment. 

133.  Only  proper  when  i^lnal  Judgment  could  be  entered. 


TABLB  OF  CONTENTS.  Xl 


i  1214,  Notice  of  AppllcaHon. 

135.  Kvidence. 

13t>.  HelatioD  back  of  Order. 

137.  Effect  upoD  Tiilrd  Persona, 


CHAPTER  Vm. 

AMOUNT  AND  CHARACTER  OF  RELIEF  GRANTBD. 

138u  Amount  greater  than  Plaintiff's  Demand. 

1^.  Assessment  of  Damages  on  Default. 

140.  Amount  Indorsed  on  Summons. 

141.  Prayer  for  Relief  as  Measure  of  Recovery. 

142.  Judgment  must  follow  the  Verdict. 

143.  Allowance  of  Credits. 

144.  Tender,  Counterclaim,  Offer  of  Compromise, 

145.  Joint  Parties. 

14«.  AffirmatlTe  Relief  to  Defendant 

147.  Interest. 

148.  Conditions  as  to  Payment 

149.  Statutory  Damages. 

150.  Designation  of  Amount. 

151.  Judgment  designating  Medium  of  Payment 

152.  Judgment  for  Coined  Money. 


THE  AMENDMENT  OF  JUDGMENTa 

f  15S.  Amendment  during  the  Term. 

154.  Amendment  afto*  the  Term. 

155.  Correction  of  Clerical  Errors. 

156.  Supplying  Omissions. 

157.  Reforming  and  Perfecting  the  Judgment 
15S.  Judicial  Errors  not  to  be  thus  Corrected. 
150.  Amendment  as  to  Amount  of  Judgment 
ItSO.  Amendment  in  Respect  of  Parties. 

101.  What  Courts  have  Power  of  Amendment 

162.  Time  of  making  Applicfttion. 

163.  Method  of  applying  for  Amendment 

164.  Notice  of  Application. 

165.  Evidence. 

166.  Method  of  making  Corrections. 

167.  Allowance  of  Amendment  is  discretionary. 
16H.  Jurisdiction  of  Equity. 

169.  Effect  of  Amendments  on  Third  Persons. 


Zii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTEB  X. 

THE  VAlADiTX  OF  JUDGMENTS. 

I  170.  Voidable  and  Void  Judgments. 

171.  Jurisdiction. 

172.  Character  and  Status  of  Parties. 

173.  Constitution  of  the  Oaiirt. 

174.  Disqualllied  Judge. 

175.  Acts  of  Judge  de  Facto. 

176.  Judge  out  of  Oltice. 

177.  Time  and  Place  of  holding  Court 

178.  Place  of  Trial. 

179.  Judgment  rendered  in  Vacation. 
ISO.  After  Expiration  of  Term. 

181.  Premature  Entry  of  Judgment. 

182.  Sundays  and  Holidays. 

.    183.  Judgment  must  be  supported  by  the  Pleadings. 

184.  Judgment  in  Action  not  at  Issue. 

185.  Findings  necessary  to  support  the  Judgment 

180.  Judgment  must  follow  Verdict. 


THE  VAUDITY  OF  JUDGMENTS  AS  AFFECTED  BY  THE  CHARACTKR 

OR   STATUS   OF   THE   PARTIES. 

{  187.  Against  what  Parties  Judgments  may  be  Rendered. 

188.  Judgments  against  Married  Women  at  Common  Law. 

189.  For  Debt  contracted  Dum  Sola. 

190.  Effect  of  Omission  to  plead  Coverture. 

191.  Under  partially  enabling  Statutes. 

192.  Statutes  removing  Disability  of  Coverture. 

193.  Judgments  against  Infants. 

194.  Service  of  Process  on  Infants. 

195.  Appearance  by  Attorney  or  Guardian. 

196.  Effect  of  Failure  to  plead  Infancy. 

197.  Decrees  in  lixiuity  against  Infants. 

198.  Infant  Plaintiffs. 

199.  Judgments  against  Deceased  Parties. 
2U0.  Judgment  against  Decedent  Voidable  only. 

201.  Death  of  One  of  Several  Defendants. 

202.  Entry  of  Judgment  against  Decedent  Nunc  pro  Tunc 

203.  Jurisdiction  must  be  acquired  before  Party's  Death. 

204.  Judgment  for  Deceased  Plaintiff. 

205.  Judgments  against  Insane  Persona. 


\ 
\ 


t 

r 


TABLB  OF  CONTENTB.  XllI 


206.  Joint  Parties  at  Common  Law. 

:*i>7.  In  Actions  of  Tort. 

208.  Joint  Debtor  Acts. 

201^.  One  Defendant  suffering  Default. 

210.  Judgment,  when  Several,  when  Joint. 

211.  Joint  Judgment  as  an  Entirety. 

212.  Confession  of  Judgment  by  Joint  Defendants. 

213.  Misnomer  of  Parties. 

214.  Descrlptlo  Personae. 


THE    VALIDITY    OF   JUDGMENTS   AS    DEPENDENT    UPON    JURISDIC- 
TION. 

S  215.  Jurisdiction  defined.    . 

216.  Sources  of  Jurisdiction. 

217.  Consent  cannot  confer  Jurisdiction. 

218.  Judgment  without  Jurisdiction  is  Void. 

219.  Judgment  against  One  not  a  Party. 

220.  Notice  to  Defendant. 

221.  Statutes  dispensing  with  Citation. 

222.  Statutes  regulating  Mode  of  Citation. 

223.  Defects  in  the  I^rocess. 

224.  Defects  In  the  Service. 

225.  Appearance  as  a  Waiver  of  Citation. 

226.  Defendant's  Right  to  be  heard. 

227.  Judgments  against  Non-Uesidents. 

228.  Extra-Terrltorial  Service  of  Process. 

229.  Jurisdiction  by  Attachment  of  Non-Resident's  Property. 

230.  What  Property  bound. 

231.  Service  by   Publication  without  Attachment. 

232.  Statutes  authorizing  Constructive  Service  to  be  strictly  construed* 
2:^3.  Joint  Defendants. 

234.  Joint  Judgment  as  an  Entirety. 

235.  Joint  Judgment  authorized  by  Statute. 

236.  Statutory  Several  Judgment. 

237.  Judgment  against  l'£lrtners. 

2:{8.  Appearance  for  Defendant  not  Served. 

2:i9.  Construction  of  Judgment  against  "Defendants'*  generally. 

240.  Jurisdiction  of  the  Subject-Flatter. 

241.  Sulliclency  of  Declaration. 

242.  Jurisdiction  of  Question  decided. 

243.  Ix^ss  of  Jurisdiction. 

244.  Jurisdiction  attaching,  Error  does  not  Vitiate, 


XIT  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


OHAFTEB  Xm. 

COl^LATEKAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS. 

Paut  I.    The  General  Rule. 

%  245.  Judgmeuts  not  to  be  Attacked  Collaterally. 

246.  To  what  Judgments  the  Rule  applies. 

247.  Tax  Judgments. 

248.  Adjudications  In  Bankruptcy. 

249.  Awards. 

250.  Judgments  of  Inferior  Courts. 

251.  Co-Ordlnate  Courts. 

252.  What  constitutes  a  Collateral  Attack. 

253.  I*roceedings  to  prevent  Execution  of  th§  Judgment. 
253a.  I^roceidiiig  to  Enforce  Judgment  by  Mandamus. 

254.  Habeas  Corpus  Proceedings. 

255.  Errors  and  Irregularities  not  Reviewable. 

256.  Jurisdiction  may  be  examined. 

257.  Constitutionality  of  Statutes. 

258.  Jurisdiction  to  render  the  I*articular  Scntencei 

259.  Sufficiency  of  Process  or  I'leadings. 

260.  To  what  Parties  the  Rule  applies. 

Part  II.    For  Errors  and  iRREouLARiTiBSi 

261.  Erroneous  and  Irregular  Judgments. 

262.  Mistakes  in  the  Judgment. 

263.  Irregular  or  Defective  Service. 

264.  Objections  as  to  Parties. 

265.  Legal  Disability  of  Parties. 

266.  Disqualification  of  Judge. 

267.  Judgment  for  Excessive  Amount. 

268.  InsutHclency  of  Evidence. 

269.  Illegal  or  Insufficient  Cause  of  Action. 

Part  III.    For  Want  op  Jurisdictobt. 

270.  Jurisdiction  of  Superior  Courts  presumed. 

271.  Silence  or  Incompleteness  of  the  Record. 

272.  Appearance  by  Attorney. 

273.  Jurisdictional  Recitals. 

274.  Decision  of  the  Court  upon  its  own  JurisdictloD. 

275.  Cases  denying  Conclusiveness  of  Record. 

276.  Arguments  on  the  Conclusiveness  of  Records. 

277.  No  Presumption  against  the  Record. 

278.  Judgment  Void  on  Its  Face  may  be  Attacked  Collaterally. 


TABLE  OP  CONTENTS.  XV 

Part  IIL    For  Want  op  Jukisdiction— Continued. 

f  279.  Superior  Courts  exercising  Special  Statutory  Powers. 

280.  Summary  l^roceedlngs. 

281.  Constructive  Service  of  Process. 

282.  Judgments  of  Inferior  Courts  not  aided  by  Presumptions. 

283.  Superior  and  Inferior  Courts  distinguished. 

284.  Probate  Courts. 

285.  Federal  Courts. 

28t5.  Justices  of  the  Peace. 

287.  Record  of  Inferior  Court,  showing  Jurisdiction,  is  Conclusiva 

288.  No  I'resumption  of  Validity  on  Direct  Attaclt. 
280.  Foreign  Judgments. 

Part  IV.    For  Fraud. 

2«0.  Whether  Parties  can  Impeach  Judgment  for  Fraud, 

291.  Fraud  in  Procuring  the  Judgment. 

2U2.  Fraud  in  the  Cause  of  Action. 

2^3.  Creditor  may  show  Fraud  in  a  Judgment. 

2M.  Fraud  must  affect  the  Creditors. 

2D6.  What  Creditors  allowed  to  allege  I<Yaud. 

286.  False  Testimony. 


VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUIXiMENTS. 

Part  I.    Thb  Power  to  Vacate  Judgmbkti. 

f  2Syi.     What  Courts  possess  the  Power. 
21f7a.  As  Between  Federal  and  State  Courts. 
2U8.    JL/eglslature  cannot  interfere. 

Part  IL    The  Method  of  ssekimo  Relief. 

2U9.  By  Audita  Querela. 

9UU.  By   Error   Coram   Nobis. 

301.  By  BiU  of  Review. 

302.  By  Direct  Action, 
aui.  By  Motion. 

'SH.    Indirect    Vacation   of   Judgment 
Other  Remedies  Available. 

Part  III.    The  Time  of  AppLTnra 


au5.    Daring  the  Term. 

306.  After  the   Term. 

307.  Void  Judgments. 


ZVi  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

Part  III.    The  Timb  of  Applting— Continued. 

§  308.  Interlocutory  Judgments. 

309.  i'ennsylvaula   Tractlce. 

310.  Judgment  carried  over  the  Term  by  Motion. 
iMl,  rnder  Statutes. 

'612.    Judgments  against  Non-Uesldeuts. 

313.  Laches  of  l»arty. 

Part  IV.    This  Parties  who  mat  Apply. 

314.  Successful  Party  may  Apply. 

315.  Joint  Defendants. 

31t5.    Legal  KepresentatiTes  of  l*arty. 

317.  Strangers. 

Part  Y     What  Judgments  mat  be  Vacateix 

318.  General  Kule. 

319.  Consent  Judgments. 

320.  Judgments   in   Divorce. 
320a.  Adjudications  in  Bankruptcy. 

PaBT  VI.      GUOUNDS  FOR  VACATING  JUDGMENTS 

821.  Fraud  and  Collusion. 

322.  Judgment  taken  contrary  to  Agreement 

323.  Perjury. 

324.  Want  of  Notice. 

325.  Unauthorized  Appearance  by  Attorney. 
32G.  Irregularities. 

32(;a.  Objections   to    Jury. 

327.  Judgments  against  Persons  under  Disabilities. 

328.  Unauthorized  Entries. 

329.  Judgment  not  Vacated  because  Erroneous. 

330.  Not  for  Grounds  which  might  have  been  pleaded  in  Defense. 

331.  Illegality  of  Cause  of  Action. 
:^32.  Newly-discovered  Evidence. 

333.  Judgment  on  reversed  Judgment. 

334.  Statutory   Grounds  for  Vacating  Judgments. 
3d5.     Mistake. 

33(J.  Surprise. 

337.  Casualty   or   Misfortune. 

338.  Sickness  of  Defendant 

339.  Sickness  of  Counsel. 

340.  Excusable    Neglect. 

340a.  Mistake,  Ignorance,  or  Erroneous  Advice  of  Counsel. 

341.  Negligence  of  Attorney. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS.  XYll 

Part  YL    Oroundjb  for  Yacatikg  j  cd jmbnts— ContlDued. 

342.  Misunderstanding  of  Counsel. 

343.  Unavoidable  Absence  of  Counsel. 

344.  Fraud  of  Attorney. 

345.  Misinformation  as  to  Time  of  Trial. 

34^.  Estoppel  to  Apply  for  Vacation  of  Judgment. 

Part  YIL    Practice  on  Yacating  Judgments. 

346.  Notice  of  Application. 

346b.  Requisites  of  Petition  or  Moving  Papers. 

347.  Affidavit  of  Merits. 

348.  Meritorious  Defense  must  be  Shown. 

349.  Technical  or  Unconscionable  Defense  not  Sufficient. 

350.  Opening  Judgment  to  admit  Defense. 

351.  Evidence. 

352.  Imposition  of  Terms. 

353.  Partial  Yacation  of  Judgment. 

354.  Allowance  of  Application  discretionary. 
354a.  Practice  on  Opening  Default. 

356.    Effect  of  Yacating  Judgment 


CHAPTER  XV. 

RELISF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT   luAW. 

Part  L    Jurisdiction  of  Equity  to  Enjoin  the  Enforcement  of  JunoMEim. 

f  350.  Origin  of  the  Power. 

357.  Nature  of  Relief  granted. 

358.  What  Adjudications  subject  to  the  Power. 

359.  What  Parties  may  Apply. 

360.  What  Ck)urts  exercise  the  Power. 

361.  Concurrent  Remedies. 

362.  Same;   ReUef  on  Motion. 

363.  Same;   Appeal,  Error,  or  Certiorari. 

364.  Same;    Cross-Actions  and  Actions  over. 

Part  II.    Grounds  for  Enjoining  Judgmentsl 

366.  General  Grounds  for  Equitable  Relief. 

366.  General  Rule  Stated. 

367.  Errors  and  Irregularities. 

368.  Fraud. 

369.  Fraud  In  Preventing  Defense. 

370.  Fraud  in  Procuring  the  Judgment 

371.  Deceit  and  Codcealment 
1  LAW  JUDG.— b 


XViii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

Part  IL    Groundb  for  ENjomiNO  Judgments— Continued. 

S  372.  Perjury. 

373.  Taking  Judgment  contrary  to  Agreement. 

374.  Unauthorized  Appearance  of  Attorney. 

375.  Negligence  or  Mistake  of  Counsel. 

376.  Want   of  Jurisdiction. 

377.  Judgment  founded  on  False  Return  of  Serylce. 

378.  Legal  Defense  not  Interposed. 
370.  Illegality  of  Consideration. 

380.  Excuses  for  not  defending  at  Law. 

381.  Same;  Mistake. 

382.  Same;    Surprise. 

383.  Same;   Accident  or  Misfortune. 

384.  Ignorance  of  Legal  Defense. 

385.  Discovery  must  have  been  sought 

386.  Newly-discovered   Evidence. 

387.  Negligence  of  Party  precludes  Relief. 

388.  Defense  not  available  at  Law. 

389.  Defense  available  either  at  Law  or  Ekiuity. 

390.  Satisfaction   or  Release  of   Judgment. 

391.  Injunction  as  a  Means  of  securing  Set-OfE. 

392.  Personal  Disability  of  Parties. 

Part  III.    Practice  on  Appltcatiok  to  Ekjoin  Judgment. 

398.  Nature  and  Requisites  of  Bill. 

393a.  Evidence. 

393b.  Joinder  of  Parties. 

394.  Conditions  on   Granting   Relief. 

395.  Effect  of  Enjoining  Judgment 
386.  Dissolution  of  Injunction. 


CHAFTEB  XVL 

THE  LIEN  OP  JUDGMENTS. 

Part  I.    Origin  and  Nature  of  Judgment- Liens. 

397.  Early  History  of  Judgment-Liens. 

398.  Judgment-Lien  is  Statutory. 

399.  Legislative  Control  of  Judgment-Liens. 

400.  Lien  gives  no  Property  in  Debtor's  I^nd. 

401.  Lien  is  General. 

402.  Courts  cannot  control  the  Lien. 

403.  Parties  cannot  change  Nature  of  Lieu. 

404.  Docketing  the  Judgment. 


TABLB  OF  CONTENTS.  ZlX 

Past  L    Orioik  and  Naturb  of  JuDGMBNT-LiBNS—CoDtinued. 

i  406.  Indexing  the  Judgment. 

406.  Certainty  required  in  Docket  and  Index  as  to  Nantes  of  PartieB. 

406a.  Same;  As  to  Amount. 

Part  XL    What  Judgments  crsatb  Libns. 

40T.  What  is  Necessary  to  Judgment-Liens. 

408.  Interlocutory  Judgments. 

400.  Judgments  against  Personal  Representatives. 

410.  Nunc  Pro  Tunc  Judgments. 

411.  Decrees  in  Chancery. 

41^  Judgments  of  Inferior  Courts. 

413.  Judgments  of  Federal  Courts. 

414.  Statutory  Basis  of  such  Liens. 

415.  Territorial  Extent  of  such  Liens. 
410.  Decrees  in  Admiralty. 

Part  III.    To  what  Property  the  Lien  attaches. 

417.  Territorial  Restriction  of  Lien. 

418.  Transfer  of  Judgment  to  Another  County. 

419.  Lien  binds  Real  Estate. 

420.  Actual  Interest  of  Debtor  bound. 

421.  Title  held  in  Trust 

422.  Inchoate  Title. 

423.  Land  Fraudulently  Conveyed. 

424.  Exempt  Property. 

425.  Homestead  Property. 

426.  Life-Estates. 

427.  Estates  by  Curtesy. 

428.  Reversions  and  Remaindera 

429.  Leasehold  Interests. 

430.  Land  held  by  Joint  Ownera 

431.  Partnership  Property. 

432.  After-Acquired  Property. 

433.  Equitable  Estates  and  Interests. 

434.  Equity  of  Redemption. 

435.  Judgment  against  Trustee. 

436.  Land  held  under  a  Power. 

437.  Judgment  against  Cestui  Que  Trust 

438.  Interest  of  Vendor  under  Executory  Contract. 

439.  Interest  of  Vendee  under  Executory  Contract. 
439a.  Sale  of  Land  After  Enti'y  of  Judgment 

440.  Estates  successively  conveyed. 


TABLB  OF  CONTENTS. 


Part  IY.    Date  of  the  Lien. 


S  441.  Oommon  Law  Rule. 

442.  Exceptions  to  tbe  Rule. 

443.  Present  Statutory  Rules. 

444.  Gases  in  which  Lien  relates  back. 


Pabt  y.    Priobitt  and  Prbcbdbncb  of  Judgment- Liens. 

445.  Lien  is  subject  to  Prior  Rights  and  Equities. 

446.  As  against  Prior  Unrecorded  CJonyeyance. 

447.  Precedence  of  Purchase-Money  Mortgage. 

448.  Priority  of  GoTernment  Claims. 

449.  Priority  by  Date  of  Entry. 

4o0.  Two  Judgments  entered  the  Same  Day. 

451.  Judgment  and  Gonyeyance  entered  the  Same  Day. 

452.  Judgment  given  to  secure  Future  Advances. 

453.  Prior  Undocketed  Judgment. 

454.  As  against  Subsequent  Dower  Right 

455.  Priority  by  Superior  Diligence. 

456.  Priority  by  Prior  Levy. 

457.  Postponement  by  Stay  of  Execution. 

458.  Postponement  by  Failure  to  Revive. 

459.  Sale  under  Junior  Judgment. 

460.  Order  of  Priority  on  After-Acquired  Lands. 

Part  VI.    Duration  of  the  Libn. 

461.  General  Rules. 

462.  Dormant  Judgment  Acts. 

463.  Legislative  Abridgment  of  the  Time. 

464.  Lien  of  Transferred  Judgment 

465.  Extension  of  Lien  by  Agreement  of  Parties. 

466.  Survival  against  Judgment-Debtor. 

467.  Death  of  Judgment-Debtor. 

468.  Remedies  of  Greditor  after  Expiration  of  Lien. 

Part  VII.    Suspension  and  Dibcharob  of  JudombnT'Libns 

469.  General  Principles. 

470.  Suspension  of  Lien  by  Injunction. 

471.  Stay  of  Proceedings. 

472.  Opening  or  Vacating  Judgment 

473.  Appeal  or  Error. 

474.  Bankruptcy. 

475.  Appointment  of  Receiver. 

476.  Taking  Defendant  on  Gapias. 

477.  Payment 


TABLE  OF  CONTBNTS.  ZZi 

Part  YIL    Suspxhsion  and  Dibchabob  of  Judgmbht-Libhs— Continued. 

i  478.  Oancellatlon  or  Entry  of  Satisfaction. 

479.  Sale  of  the  Land. 

480.  Acquisition  of  Title  by  Jndgment-Oreditor. 

481.  Release  of  Lien. 


CHAFTEB  XVn. 

RBVIVAL  OF  JTJDGMBNTS. 

§  482.  Bevlval  by  Motion  or  Snit 
482a.  Reyival  by  Scire  Facias. 

483.  Venue  of  the  Action. 

484.  Right  to  sne  out  Scire  Facias. 

485.  Time  of  Issuing  the  Writ 

486.  Pleadings. 

487.  BtfTlce  of  Writ 

488.  Parties  PlaintilT. 

489.  Parties  Defendant 

490.  Same;  Judgment  against  Decedent 

491.  Same;  Joint  Defendants. 

492.  Terre-Tenants. 

493.  Defenses. 

494.  Same;  Payment  Release,  Set-Oft. 

496.  Same;  Discharge  in  Bankruptcy. 

490.  Same;  Invalidity  of  Original  Judgment; 

497.  Same;  Oollateral  Agreements. 

498.  Judgment  on  Scire  Facias. 
^9.  Practice  in  Pennsylyania. 


TABLE  OF  CONTBNTS.  XXiii 


VOLUME    II. 


GHAFTKB  XVJLUL 

ESTOPPEL  BY  JUDGMENT,  AND  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  RES 

JUDICATA. 

PaBT  L     OrIGIK  and  GeNBBAL  FbINCIFLES  of  THB  DOCTftlNB  OF  RB8  Jctdigata. 

f  GOO.  Basis  of  tbe  Doctrine  of  Res  Judicata. 

501.  In  the  Roman  Law. 

502L  Modem  European  Systems. 

603.  In  Anglo-American  Jurisprudence. 

604.  The  Rules  Stated. 

506.    Judgment  can  be  Nothing  less  than  Condusiye. 

600.    Difference  between  Conclusiveness  of  Judgment  and  B^r  by  Former 

Recovery. 
607.    Scope  of  this  Chapter. 

Pabt  II.    What  Judgmbnts  are  ConoIjUSivb. 

508.  Character  of  the  Adjudication. 

609.  Judgment  must  be  Final. 

610.  Effect  of  Pending  Appeal. 

611.  Reversed  Judgment. 

612.  Not  affected  by  Motion  for  New  TriaL 

613.  Voidable  and  Void  Judgments. 

614.  Erroneous  Judgments. 

616.    In  Actions  to  Annul  Judgments. 

Part  III.    Organization  and  Chabactbr  of  thb  Court. 

616.  Judgment  must  be  rendered  by  a  validly  constituted  Court. 

617.  Courto  of  Equity. 

618L  Decrees  In  Equity  binding  at  Law,  and  Vice  Versa. 

619.  Probate  Adjudications. 

620.  Judgments  of  the  Federal  Courts. 

621.  Courts  of  Admiralty. 

622.  Inferior  Courts. 

1  LAW  JUDG. 


I 


TXIV  TABLB  OF  CONTENTS. 

Pabt  III.    Organization  and  Character  of  the  Coubt-— Continued. 

f  528.  Ecclesiastical  Courts. 

524.  Oourts-Martial. 

525.  Military  Tribunals. 

526.  Awards  of  Arbitrators. 

527.  Decisions  of  Appellate  Courts. 

528.  Judgment  given  by  Divided  Court 

529.  Criminal  Sentences  not  Evidence  In  Civil  Issues. 

530.  Decisions  of  U.  S.  Land  Department 

531.  Rulings  of  Government  Officials. 
582.  Boards  of  Municipal  Officers. 

533.  Judgments  conclusive  on  Habeas  Corpus. 

Part  IV.    Of  the  Persons  concluded  bt  Judombnts. 

534.  Parties  and  Privies. 

534a.  Judgment  as  Estoppel  against  United  States  or  State. 

535.  Persons  under  Disabilities. 

536.  Party  bound  only  in  the  Capacity  in  which  he  Appears. 

537.  Nominal  and  Real  Parties. 

538.  Use  Plaintiff. 

539.  Stranger  Promoting  the  Litigation. 

540.  Person  Assuming  the  Defense. 

541.  Person  Submitting  his  Interest  is  bound. 

542.  Witnesses. 

543.  Effect  of  Additional  Parties. 

544.  Effect  of  Severance  as  to  Parties. 

545.  One  Plaintiff  suing  in  Behalf  of  Many. 

546.  Unknown  Owners. 

547.  Evidence  to  Identify  Parties. 

548.  Estoppel  must  be  Mutual. 
•    549.  What  constitutes  Privity. 

550.  Purchaser  Pendente  Lite. 

551.  Mortgagor  and  Mortgagee. 

552.  Sheriff  and  his  Vendee. 

553.  Co-Tenants. 

554.  Remaindermen. 

555.  Parties  to  Negotiable  Paper. 

556.  Husband  and  Wife. 

557.  Guardian  and  Ward. 

558.  Decedent  and  Heirs. 

559.  Decedent  and  Representatives. 

560.  Administrator  and  Heir  or  Devisee. 

561.  Executor  and  Legatee. 

562.  Successive  Administrators. 

563.  Principal  and  Ancillary  Administrator. 

564.  Administrator  and  Probate  Purchaser. 


TABUE  OF  CONTENTS./  ZXY 

Past  IV.    Of  the  Pbbsons  cokcluded  by  Judgments— Continued. 

I  565.  Go-Heirs  or  Distributees.  , 

560.  SurYlving  Partners  and  Representative  of  Deceased. 

567.  Warrantor  and  Warrantee. 

5G8.  Defenses  Open  to  Warrantor. 

569.  Requisites  of  Notice  to  Warrantor. 

570.  Warrantor  must  have  Opportunity  to  Defend. 

571.  Effect  of  Judgment  when  Warrantor  not  Notified. 

572.  Warrantor  of  Personal  Property. 

573.  Indemnitors. 

574.  Persons  Responsible  Over. 

67S.  Judgment  against  City  as  Evidence  in  Action  against  Person  Liable 
Over. 

576.  Intervening  Claimants. 

577.  Landlord  and  Tenant 

578.  Principal  and  Agent 

579.  Master  and  Servant 

580.  Officer  and  Deputy. 

581.  BaUor  and  Bailee. 

582.  Successors  in  Office. 

583.  Cknporation  and  Stockholders. 
583a.  Corporation  and  Bondholders. 

584.  Municipal  Corporation  and  Tax-Payers. 

585.  Trustee  and  Cestui  Que  Trust 
585a.  Assignees  and  Receivers. 

586.  Principal  and  Surety. 

587.  Sureties  on  Bonds  given  in  Legal  Proceedings. 

588.  Sureties  of  Sheriffs  and  Constables. 

589.  Sureties  of  Elxecutors  and  Administrators. 

590.  Sureties  of  Guardians. 

591.  Actions  between  Sureties  for  Contribution. 

592.  Principal  and  Guarantor. 

598.  Conclusiveness  of  Judgment  against  Garnishee. 

591.  Not  Cbnclusive  as  to  Amount  of  Debt 

595.  Right  of  Garnishee  to  Question  Legality  of  Prior  Proceedings. 

596.  As  between  Garnishee  and  Assignee  of  Claim. 

597.  As  between  Garnishee  and  Stranger. 

598.  Foreign  Judgment  against  Garnishee. 

599.  Effect  of  a  Judgment  as  between  Co-Defendants. 

600.  Judgments  do  not  bind  Strangers. 

601.  Exception;   Courts  of  Exclusive  Jurisdiction. 

602.  Exception;  Judgments  In  Rem. 

608.  Exception;  Principle  of  Stare  Decisis. 

604.  Judgment  as  Evidence  of  its  own  Existence. 

605.  Judgment  as  Evidence  of  Relation  of  Debtor  and  Creditor. 

606.  Judgment  as  Evidence  of  Facts  Provable  by  General  Reputation. 

607.  Judgment  as  Linlc  in  Chain  of  Title. 

608.  Judgment  as  an  Admission. 


I 


ZXVl  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

Part  V.    What  Points  and  Questions  a2UI  OoHOLUDEDb 

S  600.  Scope  of  the  Estoppel. 

610.  The  Four  Identities. 

611.  Matters  Incidentally  Considered. 

612.  Inferences  from  the  Judgment. 

613.  Necessary  Conditions  to  the  Adjudication. 

614.  What  Constitutes  the  "Matter  in  Issue." 
-    615.  Points  Necessary  to  Warrant  the  Judgment. 

616.  Points  in  Issue  but  not  Decided. 

617.  Points  not  in  Issue. 

618.  Matters  which  could  not  have  been  Adjudicated. 

619.  Judgment  on  Matters  not  Presented. 

620.  Claims  Withdrawn  or  Withheld. 

621.  Entire  Demands  cannot  be  Severed. 

622.  Facts  Assumed  or  Admitted. 

623.  Evidence  to  Identify  Points  Adjudged. 

624.  Parol  Proof  Admissible. 

625.  Record  cannot  be  Contradicted. 

626.  Parol  Evidence  not  Admissible  to  Enlarge  the  BstoppeL 

627.  General  Declaration  or  General  Pleas. 

628.  Parol  Evidence  to  Escape  the  Estoppel. 

629.  Burden  of  Proof. 

630.  What  Species  of  Evidence  Receivable. 

631.  Questions  of  Law  or  Fact. 

632.  Inconsistent  Positions  in  Litigation. 

Part  VI.    Conclusiveness  of  Pbobatb  Ai>jUDiCATiOHa» 

633.  Probate  Decrees  binding. 

634.  When  Impeachable  for  Fraud. 

635.  Probate  of  a  Will. 

636.  Conclusiveness  of  Probate  as  to  Realty. 

637.  Effect  of  Rejection  of  Will. 

638.  Parties  bound  by  Probate. 
638a.  Construction  of  Will. 

639.  Appointment  of  Administrator.  i 

640.  Grant  of  Administration  no  Proof  of  Death.  I 

641.  Allowance  or  Rejection  of  Claims. 

642.  Order  for  Sale  of  Land.  ' 

643.  Decree  of  Distribution. 

644.  Settlement  of  Accounts. 

645.  Appointment  of  Guardian. 

646.  Order  for  Partition. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS.  JXVU 

Pabt  VIL    D18TINCTIYB  Rules  as  to  Ejecthbmt  and  Oxheb  Real  Actions. 

f  647.  Common  Law  Rules  as  to  Real  Actions. 

9i8.  Ck)mmon  RecoTery. 

64».  Writ  of  Entry. 

660.  Ejectment  at  Common  Law. 

651.  Ejectment  upon  an  Equitable  Title. 

652.  In  Action  for  Mesne  Profits. 

653.  Confession  of  Judgment  in  Ejectment. 

654.  Successive  Judgments  in  Ejectment  made  Oondusiye  by  Statutes. 

655.  Modem  Actions  Corresponding  to  Ejectment. 

656.  After-Acquired  Title  not  Barred. 

657.  Judgment  in  Trespass. 

658.  Whether  Judgment  in  Trespass  is  Conclusive  in  Subsequent  Eject- 

ment 
669.    Trespass  to  Try  Titles. 

660.  Judgment  in  Partition. 

661.  Parties  bound  by  Partition. 

661a.  Landlord's  Action  for  Recovery  of  Possession. 

662.  Action  for  Use  and  Occupation, 

663.  Forcible  Entry  and  Detainer. 

664.  Action  to  Quiet  Title. 

665.  Dower  Proceedings. 

666.  Foreclosure  Suits. 

667.  Award  of  Arbitrators  upon  Title  to  Land. 

668.  Bankruptcy  Proceedings. 

Pabt  VIIL    Judgicemts  in  Actions  concbrning  Chattblb. 

669.  Trespass. 

670.  Trover. 

671.  Replevin. 

672.  Detinue. 

CHAPTER  ZEZ. 

FORMER  RECOVERY  AS  A  BAR. 

Part  I.  Gbnbral  Prinoifles. 

673.  Estoppel  by  Former  Judgment. 

674.  Doctrine  of  Merger. 

675.  Merger  by  Decree  in  Equity. 

676.  Foreign  and  Sister  State  Judgments. 

677.  New  Debt  created  by  the  Judgment 

678.  Estoppel  by  Election. 


I 


jariii  table  of  contents. 

Part  IL    What  Judoubnts  Operate  as  a  Bab. 

§  679.  Oonstitution  of  the  Court 

G80.  There  must  be  a  Valid  Judgment 

681.  Erroneous  or  Irregular  Judgments. 
681a.  Judgment  Procured  by  Fraud. 

682.  Verdict  without  Judgment  no  Bar. 

683.  Judgment  Reversed  or  Vacated. 

684.  Effect  of  Granting  New  Trial 
085.  Pendency  of  Appeal. 

686.  Effect  of  Discontinuance. 

687.  Decision  of  Court  without  Jury. 

688.  Awards. 

689.  Judgment  in  Summary  Proceedings. 

690.  Lis  Pendens  and  Priority  of  Decision. 

691.  Judgments  on  Motions. 

692.  R^iewal  of  Motion  In  the  Same  Case. 

Part  IIL    Of  the  Rule  that  the  Judgment  must  hate  been  upqh  the 

Merits. 

693.  Merits  must  be  Adjudicated. 

694.  Meaning  of  the  Term  "Merita.'* 

695.  Judgment  must  be  Final. 

696.  Judgment  upon  Plea  in  Abatement 

697.  Judgment  by  Default. 

698.  Judgment  upon  Confession. 

699.  Nonsuit  no  Bar. 

700.  Judgment  on  Retraxit 

701.  Discontinuance. 

702.  Judgment  of  Non  Pros. 

703.  Dismissal  of  Complaint 

704.  Judgment  in  Test  Case. 

705.  Agreed  Judgments. 

706.  Dismissal  of  Suit  "Agreed." 

707.  Judgment  on  Demurrer. 

708.  General  Demurrer  to  Declaration. 

709.  Demurrer  to  Cause  of  Action  Stated. 

710.  Demurrer  Based  on  Several  Grounds. 

711.  Demurrer  to  Bill  for  Want  of  Equity. 

712.  Demurrer  to  Evidence.  I 

713.  Dismissal  for  Want  of  Jurisdiction.  • 

714.  Dismissal  of  Action  Prematurely  Brought  i 

715.  Dismissal  of  Misconceived  Action.  ! 

716.  Dismissal  on  Technical  Grounds. 

717.  Failure  of  Evidence. 

718.  Defects  in  the  Pleadings. 

719.  Dismissal  for  Defect  or  Want  of  Parties. 


TABLB  OF  CONTENTS.  ZXIX 

Pabt  UL    Of  thv  Rule  that  the  Jddoicbht  must  have  been  ufox  the 

MERiTS—Continued. 

f  720.  Dismissal  of  BiU  In  Equity. 

721.  Dismissal  "Withont  Prejudice." 

722.  Presumption  that  Merits  were  Oonsldered. 

723.  Dismissal  for  Want  of  Prosecution. 

724.  Evidence  to  Show  Consideration  of  Merits. 

Pabt  IV.    What  Causes  of  Action  are  Barreix 

725.  Causes  of  Action  must  be  the  Same. 

726.  Identification  of  Causes  of  Action. 

727.  In  Criminal  Cases. 

728.  Certainty  required  in  Estoppels. 

729.  Estoppel  Oannot  be  Avoided  by  Varying  Form  of  Action. 

730.  Limitations  of  this  Rule. 

731.  Judgment  Conclusive  of  Whatever  might  have  been  Litigated. 

732.  Restrictions  of  Foregoing  Rule. 

733.  Second  Action  Proceeding  on  Different  Theory, 
731.  Rule  against  Splitting  Causes  of  Action. 

735.  What  Demands  are  Inseverable. 

736.  Action  on  Running  Account. 

737.  Okiims  Omitted  by  Mistake. 

738.  Entire  Claims  founded  on  Tort 

730.  Recovery  in  Malicious  Prosecution  bars  Action  for  Slander. 

740.  Distinct  Injuries  from  same  Tortious  Act. 

74L  Distinct  Trespasses. 

742.  Continuing  Damages  from  Tort 

743.  Distinction  between  Permanent  and  Recurring  Trespass  or  Nuisance. 

744.  Plaintiff  not  Required  to  Join  Distinct  Demands. 

745.  Causes  of  Action  Distinct  though  Founded  on  Same  Facts. 

746.  Actions  on  Collateral  Securities. 

747.  Successively  Arising  Causes  of  Action. 

748.  Breach  of  Continuing  Covenant 

749.  Actions  for  Instalments. 

750.  Judgment  in  One  Such  Action  as  Evidence  in  the  Next 

751.  Successful  Defense  to  one  of  a  Series  of  Actions. 

752.  Suits  for  Wages. 

753.  Plaintiff  can  have  but  one  Satisfaction. 

Part  V.    Defenses  and  Counterclaims  Concluded  bt  Former  Judgmbht 

754.  Defenses  concluded  by  Judgment  for  Plaintiff. 

755.  Same;  Adverse  Title. 

756.  Same;   Fraud. 

757.  Same;  Agreement  to  Compromise. 

758.  Same;  Payment. 


I 


TABLE  OP  CONTENTS. 

Part  V.    Dbfbnbbs  akd  Countkrclaims  Concluded  bt  Formbb  Judqmbnt— 

Continued. 

i  759.  Same;  Usury. 

760.  Same;    Discharge  iu  Bankruptcy. 

761.  Matter  Available  as  a  Set-Off. 

762.  Submission  of  All  Matters  in  Difference. 

763.  One  Claim  cannot  be  Used  both  as  Set-Off  and  as  Cause  of  Action. 

764.  Counterclaim  not  Adjudicated. 

765.  Voluntary  Allowance  of  Credit  or  Counterclaim. 

766.  Equitable  Defenses  not  Concluded  by  Judgment  at  Law. 

767.  Cross-Actions. 

768.  Action  for  Price  of  Goods  and  Cross-Action  for  Breach  of  Warranty. 

769.  Action  for  Services  and  Cross-Action  for  Negligence. 

Part  VI.    Who  may  takb  Advantagb  of  the  Bab. 

770.  Joint  Contractors. 

771.  One  Joint  Contractor  a  Non-Resident 

772.  Effect  of  Joint  Debtor  Acts. 

773.  Successful  Defense  by  One  Joint  Debtor. 

774.  Joint  and  Several  Contractors. 

775.  Joint  Judgment  on  Joint  and  Several  Contract 

776.  Judgments  against  Partners. 

777.  Joint  Tort-Fcasors. 

778.  Joint  Trespassers;   English  Rule. 

779.  Joint  Trespassers;    American  Rule. 

780.  Election  between  Joint  and  Several  Action. 

781.  Successful  Defense  by  one  Joint  Trespasser. 

782.  Satisfaction  of  Judgment  against  One. 

Pabt  VIL    Pleading  an  Estoppel  of  Record. 

783.  Necessity  of  Pleading  Prior  Adjudication. 

784.  Where  there  is  no  Opportunity  to  Plead. 

785.  When  Admissible  under  General  Issue. 

786.  Waiver  of  Estoppel  by  Failure  to  Plead. 

787.  Conclusiveness  of  Judgment  when  not  Pleaded, 

788.  Arguments  on  the  Question. 

789.  Under  Code  Practice. 

790.  Requisites  of  Plea  of  Former  Judgment. 

791.  Judgment  recovered  after  Institution  of  Second  Suit 


JUDGMENTS  IN  REM. 
H  792.     Definitions. 

793.  Judgments  Quasi  in  Rem. 

794.  Jurisdiction. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS.  XXXi 

f  796.  Effect  of  Adjudications  in  Rem. 

TVtSw  Decrees  in  Admiralty. 

TUT.  Judgments  in  Prize  Cases. 

TU8.  Judgments  in  Collision  OaseS. 

TW.  Cbndemnation  of  Goods  Seized  under  Excise  or  Revenue  Laws. 

iHUO.  Acquittal  of  Goods  Seized. 

Wl.  Attachment  Proceedings. 

^02.  inquisitions  of  Lunacy. 

8U3.  Decrees  of  Divorce. 

804.  Orders  of  Naturalization. 

8U6.  Settlement  of  a  Pauper. 

806.  Questions  of  Identity,  Legitimacy,  and  Pedigree. 

80T.  Bankruptcy  and  Insolvency. 

808.  Probate  Adjudications. 

8U9.  Judgments  for  Taxes  and  Assessments. 

810.  Foreclosure  of  Liens. 

811.  Decrees  of  Sale. 

812.  Establishment  of  Roads  and  Boundaries. 


OHAFTEB  XXL 

FOREIGN  JUDGMENTS. 

Part  L    Foreign  Judgments  in  Rbic 

813.  Conclusiveness  of  Foreign  Judgments  in  Rem. 

814.  Decrees  in  Admiralty. 

815.  Conclusive  of  Grounds  of  Sentence. 

816.  Grounds  of  Condemnation  must  Clearly  Appear. 

817.  Not  Conclusive  of  Collateral  or  Incidental  Matters. 

818.  Impeachable  for  Want  of  Jurisdiction. 

819.  Not  Impeachable  for  Error. 

820.  Whether  Fraud  may  be  Shown. 

821.  Objections  to  Legality  bt  Court 

822.  Foreign  Decrees  of  Divorce. 

823.  Foreign  Probate  Decrees. 

82^    Foreign  Adjudications  in  Bankruptcy. 

Part  II.    FoRSiaN  Judgments  in  Personam: 

825.  Conclusiveness  on  the  Merits.    Early  English  Cases. 

826w  Distinction  between  Foreign  Judgment  as  a  Cause  of  Action  and 
as  a  Defense. 

827.  Later  English  Decisions. 

828.  Early  American  Decisions. 

829.  Recent  American  Decisions. 

830.  Arguments  on  the  Question. 

831.  Reason  of  the  Recognition  of  Foreign  Judgments. 


XXXii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

Pabt  IL    Fobeion  Judgmbkts  in  Personam— ContinuecL 

f  832.  Scotch  Law  of  Foreign  Judgments. 

833.  French  Law. 

834.  Oanadian  Doctrine  of  Foreign  Judgments. 

835.  Jurisdiction  may  be  Inquired  Into.  • 
83(5.  Judgments  against  Non-Residents. 

837.  Extra-Territorial  Service  of  Process. 

838.  Plea  Negativing  Jurisdiction. 

839.  Foreign  Judgment  in  Summary  Proceedings. 

840.  Kepugnance  of  Judgment  to  Natural  Justice. 

841.  Local  or  Police  Regulations  of  Foreign  Country  not  Enforced* 

842.  Mistake  of  Law  as  Ground  of  Impeachment. 

843.  Mistaken  Conception  of  Foreign  Law. 

844.  Whether  Impeachable  for  Fraud. 

845.  Judgment  must  be  Final. 

846.  Effect  of  Pendency  of  Appeal. 

847.  No  Merger  of  Original  Cause  of  Action. 

848.  Form  of  Action  on  Foreign  Judgment. 

849.  Pleading  and  Exhibiting  Foreign  Judgment 

850.  Plea  of  Statute  of  Limitations. 

851.  Judgments  of  Foreign  Courts  of  Inferior  Jurisdiction. 

852.  Foreign  Garnishment  Proceedings. 

CHAFTEB  XXn. 

JUDGMENTS  OF  COURTS  OF  A  SISTER  STATSL 

Part  I.    Conclusiveness  and  Effboi^ 

§  S53.  Before  the  Constitution. 

854.  Constitutional  and  Statutory  Provisions. 

855.  Early  Cases  on  the  Subject. 

850.  Mills  V.  Duryee,  and  Later  Decisions. 

857.  Judgment  Conclusive  on  the  Merits. 

858.  Chancery  Decrees  Equally  Conclusive. 

859.  "Full  Faith  and  Credit"  to  be  Given. 
800.  Validity  and  Effect  how  Ascertained. 

861.  No  Greater  Effect  to  be  Given  than  the  Judgment  has  at  Homeii 

862.  Judgment  not  Executory  in  Foreign  State. 

863.  Rank  and  Priority. 

864.  Original  Cause  of  Action  Merged. 

865.  Lis  Pendens  in  Another  State  no  Bar. 
806.  Judgment  for  Defendant  as  a  Defense. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS.  XXXIU 

Part  IL    Sistbr  State  Judgmbnt  as  a  Cause  of  Action. 

§  867.  JudgiDent  must  be  Valid,  Subsisting,  and  Final. 

S6S.  Judgments  uimii  Confession. 

SC9.  I^crees  in  Chancery. 

870.  Sentences  imposing  Penalties. 

871.  Police  Regulations  of  Another  State  not  Enforced. 
S72.  Judgments  affecting  Land  outside  the  State. 

873.  Form  of  Action  on  Sister  State  Judgment 

874.  Requisites  of  Declaration. 

875.  Averring  Jurisdiction. 

876.  Authentication  of  Record. 

877.  Completeness  of  Record. 

878.  Attestation  of  Clerk,  and  SeaL 

879.  Certificate  of  Judge. 

SSO.  Amount  of  Recovery;    Interest 

Part  IIL    Defenses  to  Actiok  on  Sibteb  State  Judgmbht. 

881.  Objections  to  Character  of  Judgment 

882.  Pendency  of  Appeal. 

883.  Defense  cannot  be  Taken  on  the  Merits. 
881.  Nil  Debet  not  a  Good  Plea. 

8*^5.  Xul  Tiel  Record. 

s8(>.  Incompleteness  of  Record. 

887.  Want  of  Jurisdiction. 

888.  Personal  Disability  of  Defendant 

889.  Error  and  Irregularity. 
800.  Payment. 

891.  Adjudication  in  Bankruptcy. 

892.  Statute  of  Limitations. 

893.  Aflldavit  of  Defense  Required. 

Part  IV.    Jurisdictional  Inquiries. 

891.  Want  of  Jurisdiction  destroys  Effect  of  Judgment 

895.  Want  of  Jurisdiction  apparent  on  the  Record. 

890.  Presumption  in  Favor  of  Jurisdiction. 

897.  Jurisdiction  may  be  Inquired  into. 

898.  Requisites  of  Plea  Denying  Jurisdiction. 

899.  Jurisdiction,  if  Impeached,  may  be  Supported  by  Evidence. 

900.  Cases  Refusing  to  Allow  Contradiction  of  Record. 

901.  Record  may  be  Contradicted. 

902.  Plea  Contradicting  Record  must  be  SpeciaL 

903.  Denying  Authoritj'  of  Attorney  to  Appear. 

904.  Jurisdiction  by  Attachment  of  Property. 
903.  Extra-Terrltorlal  Service  of  Process. 
906.  Constructive  Service  on  Non-Residents. 

1  LAW  Jl'DG.- 


ZZZlfr  TABLB  OF  CONTBNT8. 

Pabt  ly.    JuBxsDicTidVAL  Ikquirkwi— CoBtioued* 

I  907.  Constructive  Serrioe  os  Besidents. 

908.  Voluntary  Appearance  of  Non-Resident 

909.  Defendant  Decoyed  Into  Another  State. 

910.  Non-Resident  Corporations. 
910a.  Non-Resident  Stockholders  of  Domestic  CkNrpoirationt. 

911.  Irregularities  In  Service. 

912.  Continuation  of  Jurisdiction. 

913.  Judgment  against  Joint  Defendants. 

914.  Joint  Debtor  Acts. 

915.  Jurisdiction  of  Subject-Matter. 

Part  V.    Fraud  as  Ground  of  Impeachment. 

^916.  Cases  Allowing  Defense  of  Fraud. 

917.  Plea  of  Fraud,  when  Admissible. 

918.  Principles  Governing  the  Question.  , 

919.  En  joining  Action  on  Fraudulent  Judgment  j 

920.  False  Evidence  and  Conspiracy. 

921.  Fraud  Anterior  to  the  Judgment  ! 

■ 
■ 

Part  VI.    Sister  State  Judgments  in  Rem.  i 

922.  Probate  Adjudlcotions.  ! 

923.  Garnishment  Proceedings.  I 

924.  Decrees  In  Divorce.  ' 

925.  Divorce  Proceedings  are  in  Rem.  j 

926.  Both  Parties  Citizens  of  the. State.  1 

927.  Neither  Party  a  Domiciled  Citizen, 

928.  Domicile  of  one  Party  Suffldent  I 

929.  Domicile  must  be  Bona  Fide. 

980.  Conclusiveness  of  Findings  as  to  Residence.  I 

931.  Couslmctive  Service  of  Process. 

932.  Validity  of  Divorce  Granted  on  Constructive  Notice. 

933.  Matters  Incidental  to  Dissolution  of  Marriage. 

Part  VII.    Judgments  of  Inferior  Courts  op  Another  Statb. 

934.  Doctrine  that  such  Judgments  are  to  be  treated  as  Foreign  Judgments. 

935.  Conclusiveness  of  Justices'  Judgments. 

936.  Jurisdi<>tional  Inquiries. 

93T.    Authentication  of  Such  Judgments. 

Part  VIII.    Conclusiveness  of  Judgments  as  between  Federal,  State,  and 

Territorial  Courts. 

938.    Federal  Judgments  in  the  State  Courts. 
938a.  Authentication  of  Federal  Judgments. 


TABLfB  OF  00NT1BNT8.  XXXV 

Past  VIIL    Concldbiyenbss  of  Judouents  as  bbtwebn  Federal,  State,  and 

Tebbitobial  CouBTS—Continued. 

§  038b.  Judgment  of  Federal  Court  as  Foundation  for  Creditor's  BllL 
938c.  State  Judgments  In  Federal  Courts. 
d39.    Jurisdiction  May  be  Questioned. 
939a.  Lis  Pendens  and  Priority  of  Decision. 
939b.  Judgments  of  Territorial  Courts. 
939c  Judgments  of  Indian  Courts. 


^11 


CHAPTBR 

ASSIGNMENT  OP  JUDGMENTS. 

940.  E^ect  of  Assignment  at  Common  Law. 

911.  Parties  to  Assignment  of  Judgments. 

912.  What  Judgments  Assignable. 

943.  Agreement  to  Assign  Future  Judgment. 

944.  Asaignmeiit  of  Part  of  Judgment. 

945.  Mode  of  Assignment. 

94C.  Statutory  Mode  of  Assignment 

947.  Equitable  Assignment 

948.  Title  Passing  to  Assignee. 

949.  Bights  as  against  Assignor. 
9nO.  Notice  of  Assignment. 

951.  RIgbt  of  Assignee  to  Sue. 

952.  Rights  as  against  Judgment-Debtor. 

953.  Assignee  Takes  Subject  to  Equities. 

954.  Set-Off  of  Judgment  against  Judgement 

955.  Vnontlon  or  Ueversal  of  Judgment  In  Assignee's  Hands. 

956.  Latent  Equities  of  Third  Persons. 

957.  Priority'  between  Assignments. 


CHAFTEB  XXIV. 

ACTIONS  UPON  JUDGMENTS. 

958.  Judgment  as  a  Cause  of  Action. 

969.  Judgment  must  be  Final  and  in  Force. 

960.  Effect  of  Pending  Appeal. 

961.  Judgments  of  Inferior  Courts. 

962.  Suits  on  Decrees  in  Chancery. 

963.  Parties  to  Action  on  Judgment. 

964.  Requisites  of  Declaration. 

965.  Declaring  on  Judgment  of  Inferior  Court 

966.  Averments  of  Jurisdiction. 


XXXV]  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

I  967.  Statutes  Regulating  Jurisdictional  Ayerments. 

968.  Evidence. 

969.  Action  on  Lost  or  Destroyed  Record. 

970.  Defenses  to  Action  on  Judgment. 

971.  Plea  of  Nul  Tiel  Record. 

972.  Want  of  Jurisdiction  as  a  Defense. 

973.  Fraud  as  a  Defense. 

974.  Error  or  Irregularity  no  Defense. 

975.  Plea  of  Payment 

97(5.  Accord  and  Satisfaction  as  a  Defense. 

977.  Discharge  in  Bankruptcy. 

978.  Arrest  and  Imprisonment  of  Debtor. 

979.  Equitable  Defenses. 

980.  Amount  of  Recovery. 

981.  Interest  on  Judgments. 

•982.  Rate  of  Interest  how  Determined. 

983.  Interest  on  Decrees  in  Equity. 

984.  Compounding   Interest. 

985.  Limitation  of  Actions  on  Judgments. 

985a.  Mandamus  to  Enforce  Judgments  against  Municipal  Corporations. 

985b.  Same;  Power  of  Federal  Courts. 

♦  985c.  Same;  Prerequisites  to  Issuance  of  Writ 

,985d.  Same;  Defenses;  Impeachment  of  Judgment. 

985e.  Same,  Execution  of  Writ 

985f.  Same;  Effect  of  Limitation  of  Taxing  Power  of  Municipality. 


PAYMENT  AND  SATISFACTION  OF  JUDGMENTS. 

Part  I.    Payment  by  Judoicbnt-Dbbtob. 

I  986.  To  Whom  Payment  may  be  Made. 

987.  Medium  of  Payment. 

OSS.  Tender. 

989.  Payment  of  Less  than  Whole  Amount 

990.  Evidence  of  Payment. 

991.  Keeping  Judgment  Alive  after  Payment 

Part  II.    Presumption  of  Payment  from  Lapse  of  Timb. 

992.  Common  Law  Presumption. 

993.  Evidence  to  Rebut  Presumption. 

994.  Lapse  of  Less  than  Twenty  Years. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS.  XXXVll 

Part  III.    Payment  by  Joint  Party  ok  Third  Person. 

f  906.  Parties  Jointiy  Liable. 

906.  Payment  by  Surety. 

007.  Uelease  of  Garnishee  by  Payment  of  Principal  Judgment 

90S.  Payment  by  Sheriff. 

909.  Payment  by  Stranger. 

Part  IV.    8bt-0ff  of  Judgment  against  Judgment. 

1000.  Power  to  Order  Set-Off  of  Judgments. 

1001.  Judgments  of  Different  Courts  may  be  Set  Off. 

1002.  Where  the  Motion  should  be  Made. 

1003.  Moving  Party  must  be  Real  Owner  of  Judgment. 

1004.  Mutuality  of  Parties  Required. 

1005.  Requisites  of  Judgments  to  be  Set  Off. 

Pabt  y.    Saiisfaction  bt  Pbogebdinos  on  Final  Process. 

lOOa  Levy  on  Real  Estate. 

1007.  Levy  on  Personalty. 

1008.  Satisfaction  by  Levy  Is  not  Absolute. 

1009.  Release  of  Property  on  Forthcoming  Bond. 

1010.  Sale  on  Execution. 

lOU.    Taking  Defendant  on  Ga.  Sa. 

1012.  Discharge  of  Defendant  from  Custody. 

1013.  Cumulative  Judgments. 

Pabt  VL    Entbt  of  Satisfaction  on  the  Hbcori». 

1014.  Bntry  of  Satisfaction  when  Ordered. 

1015.  Nature  and  Effect  of  Entry. 

lOld.     Striking  <^  Mistaken  or  Fraudulent  Entry. 
1017.    Release  and  Discharge  of  Judgment 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED. 


VOLUMES  I.  AND  IL 


[The  references  are  to  sections.    Sections  1  to  499  inclusive  are  comprised  in  Volxune 
I ,  the  residue  in  Volume  IL] 


Aaron  y.  Wamer,  449. 
Abat  y.  Atkinson,  430.    . 
Abbe  V.  Marr,  84. 

V.  Rood,  989. 
Abbey  v.  Bank,  414. 

V.  Railroad  Co.*8  Receiyers,  585a. 
Abbott  V.  Bradstreet,  644. 

y.  Foote,  t>44. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  513. 

y.  Osgood.  1012. 

y.  Stevens,  765. 

V.  Zeiglo*,  36. 
Abdil  y.  Abdil,  194. 
Abeless  y.  Powell,  79a. 
AbeU  y.  Simon,  81,  593. 
Aber  y.  Clark,  802. 
Abington  y.  Lipscomb,  127. 
Abienian  y.  Booth,  265. 

y.  Roth.  367,  368,  393. 
Abouloff  y.  Oppenheimer,  844. 
Abraham  y.  Leyy,  179. 
Abram  French  Co.  y.  Marx,  349. 
A.  B.  Smith  Co.  v.  Bank,  253. 
Ach  V.  Carter,  183. 
Achey  y.  Creech,  731. 
Acker  y.  Ledyard,  G91. 
Ackerly  y.  Oabom,  29. 
Ackerman  v.  Ackerman,  1016. 
Ackerman'8  £r*r8  y.  Van  Houten,  760. 
Acklen  y.  Acklen,  137. 
Ackley  y.  Chamberlain,  425. 
Atwk  y.  Hal89y,  346. 
Acorn,  The,  29().  509. 
Adam  y.  Tolman,  446. 


Adams,  Ex  parte,  533. 

V.  Adams,  320,  617,  644,  75a 

V.  Barnes,  787. 

V.  Betz,  124. 

V.  Butts,  554. 

V.  Cameron,  722. 

V.  Conover,  567. 

V.  Crosby,  462. 

y.  Filer,  598,  597. 

V.  Grey,  327. 

V.  Hackett.  947. 

V.  HafPards,  741. 

y.  Harris,  439. 

y.  Hickman,  347. 

y.  Higgins,  132. 

y.  Lee,  946. 

y.  Leeds  Co.,  57. 

y.  Oaks,  84. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  275,  600«  612,  700, 
783. 

y.  Re  Qua,  135. 

y.  Rowe,  482,  912. 

y.  St  Leger,  585. 

y.  Smith,  1010. 

y.  Stake,  490. 

V.  Tlernan,  282. 

V.  Walker,  116. 

V.  White,  393. 
Adams*  Appeal,  350. 
Adams  County  v.  Grayes,  549. 
Adams  Exp.  Co.  v.  Hill,  225. 
Adams*  Heirs  v.  Adams,  633. 
A^dams'  Lessee  v.  Jeffries.  270.  279. 
Adams  School  Tp.  v.  Ir^iu,  393a. 
Addams  y.  Worden,  888,  841. 


1  LAW  JUDG. 


(xxxix) 


xl 


CASBS 


[References  to  sections.    {{  1  to 

Adderton  v.  Collier.  209. 

Adelbert  OoUege  v.  Railway  Co.,  545. 

Adickes  v.  Lowry,  438. 

Adkinson  v.  Keel,  125. 

Adler  V.  Anderson,  50. 

V.  Construction  Co.,  3(38,  705. 
Adrian  v.  Jackson,  118. 
iEtna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Aldrich,  333. 

V.  Confer,  574. 

V.  McCormick,  313. 
iEtna  I-ife  Ins.  Co.  v.  Com'rs,  305,  355. 

V.  Lyon  County,  228. 

V.  McCJormick,  318. 
Agard  V.  Valencia,  378. 
Agnew  V.  Adams,  513. 

V.  McElroy,  603,  729. 
Agricultural  Bank  v.  Fallen,  469. 
Agry  V.  Betts,  287. 
Ah  Jow,  In  re.  257. 
Ahl  V.  Ahl.  735,  749. 

V.  Goodhart,  729. 
Ah  Lee,  In  re.  175. 
Ah  Lep  V.  Gong  Choy,  208. 
AUrs  Estate,  In  re,  737. 
Alcardl  v.  Craig,  421. 

Y.  Robbins,  987. 
Aiken  V.  Peck,  624. 

V.  Stewart,  627. 
\iiislie  V.  Boynton,  1005. 

V.  Mayor  of  New  York,  534. 
Ains worth  v.  Trading  Co.,  67. 
Aislin  v.  Parkin.  504. 
Alabama  G.  &  N.  Co.  v.  State.  122.  443. 
Alabama  Gold  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Nichols, 

153. 
Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Blivens,  717. 
Alabama  Iron  &  R.  Co.  v.  Austin,  625. 
Alabama  Nat.  Bank  v.  Hunt  115. 
Alabama  Warehouse  Co.  v.  Jones,  518. 
Alabama  &  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Bolding,  306. 

V.  McCerren,  707. 
Alameda  County  v.  Crocker,  213. 
Albee  V.  Curtis,  461. 
Albert  V.  Hamilton,  541. 
Albin  V.  People,  486.  958. 
Albree  v.  Johnson,  191. 
Albright  V.  McTlghe,  207. 

V.  Oyster,  720. 

V.  Warkentln,  312. 
Albritton  v.  Bird.  :585. 
Alcott  T.  Hugus,  734. 
Alderson  y.  Bell,  261. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Aldricn  v.  JbLousn,  2U1. 

V.  Kinney,  227,  828,  856,  897,  903, 
906. 

V.  Maitland,  116. 
Alelx  V.  Derbigny,  576. 
Alexander  v.  Abbott,  299. 

V.  Arters,  961. 

V.  Bouton,  192. 

V.  Bridgford,  737. 

V.  Gill,  287. 

V.  Gould,  293. 

V.  Ling,  326. 

V.  McDow,  92. 

V.  Mortgage  Co.,  359. 

V.  Nelson,  251. 

V.  Polk,  1008. 

V.  Stern,  237. 

V.  Stewart,  86,  164. 

V.  Stokeley,  806. 

V.  Taylor,  579. 

V.  Walter,  600. 
Alford  V.  Hoag,  482. 

V.  Moore*s  Adm'r,  306. 
Alie  V.  Xadeau,  752. 
Alivon  V.  Furnlval,  842. 
Alklre  Grocery  Co.  v.  Richesln,  605, 
938b,  838c. 

V.  Tagart,  744. 
Alldritt  V.  Bank,  61a. 
Allebaugh  v.  Coakley,  628. 
Allegheny  Nat.  Bank  v.  Hays,  666. 
Allen,  Succession  of,  644. 

V.  Allen,  367,  368,  666. 

V.  Bank,  774. 

V.  Belches,  48. 

V.  Bradford,  132,  134. 

V.  Butman,  671. 

V.  Chadsey,  233. 

V.  Cla^-ton,  208. 

T.  City  of  Savannah,  510. 

V.  Coffman,  141. 

V.  Conrad,  1015. 

V.  Craig,  779. 

V.  De  Groodt,  554. 

V.  Dubois  Borough,  985a. 

V.  Dundas,  635. 

V.  Godfrey,  182. 

V.  HalL  1004. 

V.  Hoffman,  341. 

V.  Holden,  998. 

V.  Johnson,  1008. 

V.  Krlps,  326. 


OASES  CITED. 
[References  to  lectlons.    H  ^  to  499  in  vol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.] 


Xli 


Alien  T.  Lee,  22r>. 

▼.  Liggett,  485. 

T.  Lmuber  Co.,  90. 

y.  Lorman,  677. 

y.  Maclellan,  320. 

y.  ^lacpherson,  (h^,  636. 

y.  Martin,  250. 
.      T.  M1U8,  250. 

V.  Norton,  72. 

y.  Rogers,  324. 

y.  Sales,  131,  l(i6. 

y.  Sbepard,  tS38a. 

y.  Stone,  374. 

y.  Thompson,  248. 

y.  Watt,  92,  593,  li39a, 

V.  Wheatley,  782. 

y.  Wilson,  306. 

y.  Word,  100,  105. 
Aliens  y.  Andrews,  493. 
Alley  y.  Cbase,  518. 

y.  Ledbetter,  886. 

y.  Nott,  709. 
AUgood  y.  Wbltiey,  970. 
Alliance  Trust  Co.  y.  Barrett,  346. 
AUln  y.  Hairs  Heirs,  534. 
AJlinet  V.  His  Creditors,  (j99. 
Allin*s  Heirs  y.  Hall  s  Heirs,  540. 
Allis  y.  Dayldson,  <:09. 
AUlsoD  y.  Drake,  45. 

y.  Hess,  706. 

y.  Little,  536. 

y.  Rankin,  263. 

y.  Taylor,  193.  205. 

y.  Tbomas,  156. 

V.  Whlttier,  346. 
Allman  y.  Taylor,  197. 
Allston  y.  Bank,  428. 

y.  Sing,  127. 
Allured  y.  VoUer,  273. 
Alniy  y.  Daniels,  615. 
Alpers  y.  Schammel.  ir>0. 
Alsop  y.  Matber,  562. 

y.  Moseley,  415. 
Alston  y.  Munford,  560. 

y.  Roblnett,  248. 
Altbouse  y.  Hnnsberger,  213. 
Altman  y.  Gabriel.  313. 

y.  KUngensmith,  991. 

y.  School  Dist.,  261,  2('9. 
Amador  Co.  y.  Butterfield,  15. 
Amason  y.  Nash.  84. 
Ambler  y.  Whipple,  ^4,  892,  917. 


American  Aquol  &  Pyrodene  Paint  Co. 

V.  Smith,  325. 
American   Bell  Telephone  Co.  y.  Al- 
bright, 777. 
American  Brewing  Co.  y.  Jergens,  345, 

346a. 
Ajuerican    Building    &    L.    Ass'n    v. 

Stonemau,  586. 
American  Exch.  Bank  y.  Andrews,  550. 
American  Fire  Ins.  Co.  y.  Landfare, 

986. 
American  Grocery  Co.  y.  Plrkl,  768. 
American  Ins.  Co.  y.  Oakley,  272,  374. 
American  Inv.  Co.  v.  Nye,  48. 
American  Tube  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Crafts, 

899. 
Amerman  y.  Briggs,  522. 
Ames  y.  Ames,  39. 

y.  Bates,  1000. 

y.  Hoy,  958,  962,  969. 

y.  Wlnsor,  226. 
Ames  Iron  Works  v.  Chlnn,  335. 
Amesti  y.  Castro,  655. 
A.  M.  Holter  Hardware  Co.  y.  Mining 

Co.,  418. 
Amlck  y.  Bowyer,  371. 

y.  Oyler,  651. 
Ammerman  y.  State,  313. 
Ammons  y.  Whitehead,  367. 
Amory  y.  Amory,  703,  938c. 
Amrhein  y.  Dye  Works,  741. 
Amsbaugh  y.  Exchange  Bank,  907. 
Amsden  y.  Raihroad,  624,  631. 
Amy  y.  Amy,  271. 

y.  Barkholder,  985b. 

y.  City  of  Galena,  986a,  986d. 
Amyx  V.  Smithes  Adm'x,  204. 
Anaconda  Miu.  Co.  v.  Saile,  345,  352. 
Anders  y.  Anders,  526. 
Anderson  y.  Anderson,  290,  806,  642, 
891,  917,  918. 

y.  Amette,  237. 

y.  Beebe,  349. 

V.  Best,  1014. 

V.  Bigelow,  5(»7. 

y.  Binford,  2M2. 

y.  Bright,  (KM. 

y.  Brown,  220. 

V.  Carr,  262,  319. 

y.  Chilson,  206. 

V.  Clark,  891. 

y.  Commission  Co.,  154 


xlii 


CASES  CITED. 
[ReferrencM  to  Mctlons.    H 1  to  499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  S.] 


Anderson  t.  Elliott,  251. 

V.  Field,  ta,  321. 

V.  Fry,  857. 

V.  Gage,  494. 

V.  Gray,  209. 

V.  Green,  341,  035,  638. 

V.  Haddon,  839. 

V.  Hawhe,  220. 

V.  Hot^  Co..  170. 

V.  Kreidler,  629. 

V.  Matthews,  32. 

V.  Miller,  220. 

V.  Morris,  225. 

V.  Xagle,  44<5,  440. 

V.  Oldham,  393. 

V.  Perkins,  86. 

V.  Rogge,  764. 

V.  Settle,  994. 

V.  Studebaker,  3.51. 

V.  Thompson,  306. 

V.  Trimble,  714. 

V.  Trust  Ck).,  935. 

V.  Tuck,  443. 

V.  T3'dlngs,  427. 

V.  Watts,  566. 

V.  Williams,  493. 

V.  Young's  Ex'rs,  593,  596. 
Anderson's  Adm*r  v.  Irvine,  197. 
Anderson's  Appeal,  331. 
Anderson's  Succession,  981. 
Andover  Savings  Bank  v.  Adams,  747, 

749. 
Andres  v.  Krldler,  336. 
Andrew  ▼.  Schmitt,  745. 
Andrews  v.  Anderson,  560. 

T.  Andrews,  929. 

V.  Brown,  796. 

V.  Davison,  567. 

V.  Denlson,  567. 

V.  Fenter,  878. 

V.  Flack,  874,  878. 

V.  Foundry  &  Pipe  Works,  32,  540, 
583. 

V.  Harper,  487. 

V.  Herring,  600. 

V.  Herrlot  835. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  84. 

V.  Love,  32. 

V.  Matthews,  446. 

y.  Monilaws,  138,  326. 

V.  MontgomeiT,  522,  857,  916. 

V.  School  Dlst.,  703. 

V.  Swartz,  255,  257. 


Andrews  v.  Varrell.  690. 

V.  Wilkes,  413. 
Andrews'  Adm'r  v.  Bank,  135. 
Andrew^s  Bros.  Co.  v.  Coke  Co.,  609. 
Andrus  v.  Burke,  455. 
Angell  V.  Bobbins,  287,  288. 
Anglo-American    Land    Mortgage    & 

Agency  Co.  v.  Bush,  445,  941. 
Anheuser-Busch  Brewing  Ass'u  v.  Me- 

Gowau,  85,  261. 
Annett  v.  Terry,  589. 
Ansley  v.  Carlos,  604. 

V.  Robinson,  39. 
Antelope,  The,  841. 
Anthony  v.  Estes,  1C8. 

v.  Humphries,  496,  1006. 

V.  Taylor,  406. 
App  V.  Drelsbach,  644. 
Appel  V.  Brooks,  81. 
Appci'son  V.  Memphis,  985b. 
Appleby  v.  MuUaney,  442. 
Applegate  v.  Applegate,  409.  . 

V.  Dowell,  617. 

v.  Edwards,  465,  470. 

V.  Mason,  948. 
Appleton  V.  Marx,  644. 
Appling  V.  Stovall,  400. 
Archer  v.  Gulll,  245. 

v.  Mosse,  635. 

v.  Romalne,  875,  936. 
Ard  V.  Pratt,  530. 
Argall  v.  Pitts,  697. 
Arlington  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Mears,  31L 
Armfield  v.  Nash,  749. 
Aimington  v.  Rau,  455. 
Armistead  v.  Harramond,  589. 

V.  Ward,  384. 
Armroyd  v.  Williams,  814. 
Amistead  v.  Bllckman,  720. 
Armstrong  v.  Barton,  184. 

V.  Bridge  Co.,  104. 

V.  Carson,  855. 

v.  Elliott,  439a. 

V.  Harper,  1016. 

V.  Harshaw,  219. 

y.  Masten,  526. 

V.  Prewitt,  774. 

V.  Robertson,  165. 
Armstrong's  Appeal,  402. 
Armsworthy  v.  Cheshire.  376. 
Amdt  V.  Amdt  229,  904,  906. 

v.  Griggs,  793. 
Amegaard  v.  Arnegaard,  633. 


CASES 
[Reference*  to  aectlona.    H  1  to 

Arnett  v.  Cloud,  908. 

Arnetrs  Ex'r  v.  Arnett,  284,  683. 

Arnold  t.  Arnold,  ($47,  058. 

V.  Frazler,  879. 

y.  Fuller's  Heirs,  1010. 

T.  Griines,  713. 

V.  Harris,  600. 

y.  Hosiery  Co.,  335,  756. 

y.  Kelley,  298. 

V.  Kilchmann,  331. 

V.  Patrick.  445. 

y.  Roraback,  862. 

y.  Shields,  210. 

y.  Sinclair,  47. 
Arnold's  Devisees  y.   Arnold's  Bx'rs, 

it3o. 
Amott  y.  Redfem,  825,  827. 

y.  Webb,  835.  807. 
Arrington  y.  Conrey,  159,  163,  165. 
Axthur  y.  Mosby,  182. 

y.  Schrieyer.  127. 
Artisans'  Bank  y.  Treadwell.  110. 
Arundell  y.  Tregono,  529. 
Asay  y.  Hooyer,  636. 
Asbury  v.  Friss,  370. 
Ash  y.  McCabe,  211. 
Ashbridge,  Succession  of,  109. 
A<«bby  y.  Glasgow,  306. 
Asboraft  v.  Knoblock,  300,  905. 

y.  Powers,  326. 
Ashland    Land    &   Llye-Stock    Co.    y. 

Woodford,  144. 
Ashley  y.  Hyde.  305,  306,  310. 
Ashniead  v.  Hurt,  613. 
Ash  ton  y.  Ash  ton,  197. 

y.  Ass'n,  341. 

y.  City  of  Rochester,  260,  578. 

y.  Heydenfeldt,  967. 

y.  Slater,  400. 
Ashton's  Appeal,  601. 
Askren  y.  Squire,  84.  354. 
Aslin  y.  Parkin,  652. 
Aspden  y.  Nixon.  563.  600,  624. 
Atchison  Say.  Bank  y.  Means.  351. 
AtchJHon.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  y.  Brown, 
21. 

y.  Coni'rs,  584. 

y.  Elder,  319. 

y.  Nicbolls,  86. 
Atheam  y.  Brannan,  618. 
Athens  Leather  Mfg.  Co.  y.  Myers,  340. 
Atherton  v.  Atherton.  536,  032. 
Atkins  y.  Anderson,  696. 


CITED.  xliii 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.] 

Atkins  y.  Bally,  588. 

V.  Churchill,  1004. 

V.  Horde,  650. 

V.  Sawyer,  155. 
Atkinson  y.  Allen,  260,  296. 

V.  Dayies,  16. 

y.  Hancock,  421. 

y.  Harrison,  1014. 

y.  Parks,  604. 

y.  Railroad,  135. 

y.  White,  670. 

y.  Williams,  33.  « 
Atkison  y.  Dixon,  683. 
Atlanta  Eleyator  Co.  y.  Bag  Sc  Cotton 

Mills,  734. 
AtlanUc  Dock  Co.  y.  City  of  New  York, 

777. 
Atlantic  Dredging  Co.  y.  U.  S.,  534a. 
Atlantic  Lumber  Co.  y.  Lumber  Co.,  36. 
Atlantic  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.,  In  re, 

320a. 
Atlas  Nat.  Bank  y.  More,  293. 
Attica  State  Bank  y.  Benson,  682. 
Attorney-General  y.  Caryer,  697. 

y.  Eriche,  513. 

y.  Telegraph  Co.,  981. 
AttrlU  V.  Huntington,  870. 
Atwater  y.  Bank,  63.  246,  868. 
Atwood  y.  Bobbins,  627. 
Audubon  y.  Insurance  Co..  349,  699. 
Augenstein,  In  re,  320a.  ^ 
Augir  y.  Ryan,  751. 
Auld  y.  Butcher,  100,  892. 

y.  Smith,  687. 
AuU  V.  Day,  154. 

y.  Trust  Co.,  161. 
Aultman  y.  Mount,  751. 
Aultman  Miller  &  Co.  y.   Mills,  898. 
901. 

V.  Sloan,  600. 
Aultman  &  Taylor  Co.  v.  O'Dowd,  16. 
Aurand's  Appeal.  466. 
Aurora  Citj'  v.  West.  707,  790. 
Aurora  Hill  Con.  Min.  Co.  y.  Mining 

Co..  530. 
Austin  y.  Austin,  268. 

V.  Hamilton  County,  576. 

V.  Jordan,  167. 

y.  Nelson,  341. 

V.  Riley,  306. 

V.  Seminary,  193,  195. 
Auwerter  y.  Mathlot,  433.  439. 
Ayegno  y.   Schmidt,  558. 


xlir  CASES 

[Referencei  to  sectioni.    S§  1  to 

Avera  v.  Rice,  600. 
Averlll  V.  Loucks,  71,  091. 

V.  Smith,  796. 
Avery  v.  Ackart,  948. 

V.  Court,  652. 

V.  Fitch,    734,    736. 

V.  Fitzgerald,  650. 

V.  U.  S.,  299,  3J^. 
Axford  V.  Graham,  570. 
A:xman  v.  Dueker,  271. 
Axtel  V.  Chase,  761. 
Aydelotte  v.  Brlttain,  135. 
Ayer  v.  Ashmead,  779,  782. 

V.  Bailey,  233. 

V.  Termatt,  25. 
Ayers  v.  Waul,  471. 
Aylesworth  v.  Brown,  945. 
Aymar  v.  Chace,  181. 
Ayre  v.  Burke,  485. 
Ayres  v.  Findley,  592. 


B 


Babb  V.  Sullivan,  494. 
Babcock  v.  Brown,  341. 

V.  Camp,  504. 

V.  Jones,  432. 

V.  McCamant,  368. 

V.  Marshall,  861,  919. 

V.  Perry,  341. 

V.  Wolf,  176. 
Babcock  Hardware  Co.  v.  Bank,  310, 

370. 
Bach  V.  Burke,  27. 
Bache  V.  Pur  cell,  744. 
Baclielder  v.   Bean,  .36.5. 
Bach  man  v.  Schertz,  610. 

V.  Sepulveda,  183. 
Backer  v.  Eble,  179. 
Bacon  v.  Green,  236. 

V.  Howard,  892. 

y.  Johnson,  346a. 

V.  McBean,  838. 

v.  Raybould,  67,  68. 

v.  Schepflin,  714. 

V.  Thornton,  33. 
Baden  v.   Clarke,   100. 
Badger  v.  Badger,  720. 

v.  Tltcomb,  621,   73(5,    747.. 
Baggett  V.  Watson,  367. 
Baggott  V.  Boulger,  589. 
Bagley  v.  Cohen,  346a. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.1 

Bagot  v.   Williams,  734. 
Bailey  v.  Bailey,  446,  731. 

V.  Bank,  378. 

V.  Clayton,  352. 

V.  Crittenden,    213,   547. 

V.  Dilworth,  633. 

V.  Eder,  418. 

V.  Edmundson,  85. 

V.  Fairplay,  650,  652. 

V.  Hester,  986. 

V.  Irrigation  Co.,  84. 

V.  Laws,  609. 

V.  McGinniss,  193,  211,  265. 

V.  Martin,  877,  896. 

V.  Sloan,  88. 

V.  Snyder,  59. 

V.  Stevens,  363. 

V.    Sundberg,   640,   574,   579,  795. 
798. 

V.  Taaflfe,  340,  347,  352,  354. 

V.  Winn,  650. 
Bailey  Loan  Co.  v.  Hall,  209. 
Bailey*s  Adm'x  v.   Robinson,  600. 
Baily  V.  Doolittie,  118. 
Bain,  Ex  parte,  259. 

V.  Wells,   605. 
Bainbridge  v.  Burton,  585. 
Baines  v.  Babcock,  583. 

V.  Burbridge,  55. 
Baird,   In  re,  585a. 

V.  Klrtland,  433. 

V.  U.    S.,  734. 

V.  WlUiams,  421. 
Baker  v.  Baer,  87. 

T.  Bank,  23. 

V.  Barcllft,  307. 

V.  Byrn,  293. 

V.  Chandler,  417. 

V.  Cummings,  720. 

V.  Deliesseline.  604. 

V.  Frellsen,  709. 

Y.  Hess,  527. 

V.  Hoag,  1000. 

V.  Hummer,  959. 

V.  Hunt,  986. 

V.  Judges,  299. 

V.  Kerr,  225. 

V.  Lane,  719. 

V.  Lehman,  48. 

V.  Lukens,  55,  330. 

V.  Merrifield,  526. 

V.  Morgan,  367. 

V.  Morton,  414,  420. 


CASES 
[References  to  Bections.    H  1  to 

Baker  t.  O'RIordan,  301. 

V.  Palmer.  829. 

y.  People,  »32. 

T.  Preston,  586. 

T.  Bailroad  Ck>.,  536. 

T.  Rand,  504,  618,  729,  866. 

V.  Redd,  373. 

T.  Remington,  33. 

T.  Schoeneman,  38. 

▼.  Secor,  945,  949. 

V.  State,  2,  115. 

T.  Stincbfleld,  758,  764. 

y.  Stonebraker,  272.  867,  903,  946, 
994. 

T.  Wadsworth,  323. 

T.  Wyman,  807. 
Baker*s  Case,  255. 
Balch   T.   Sbaw,   155,   164. 
Baldridge  t.  Eason,  431. 

V.  Penland,  271. 
Baldwin  t.  Baer,  252. 

T.  Davidson,  363. 

V.  Engineering  Co.,  80L 

T.  Foss,  33. 

V.  Klmmel,  972. 

▼.  McClelland,  306. 

V.  McCrea,  51& 

V.  Wright,  36. 
Balfonr-Gnthrie   Iny.   Co.   y.   Oelger, 

308. 
Balio  y.  Wilson,  15-1. 
Balk  y.  Harris,  275. 
Ball   T.   Miller,  75. 

y.  Reese,  uo«>. 

y.  Sleeper,  299. 

y.  Trenholm,  682. 

V.  Warrington,   861. 
BaDance  y.   Forsyth,  530. 
Ballant^ne  y.  Mackinnon,  795,  796. 
Ballard  y.  Mitchell,  526. 

y.  Purcell,  305. 
Ballentine  y.  Ballentine,  721. 
Balliett  y.  Humphreys,  98. 
Ballin   v.  Loeb,  938b. 
Ballinger  y.  Sherron,  58. 

y.  Tarbell,  223. 
Ballon  y.  Ballon.  556. 
Ballow  y.  Hudson,  635. 
Baltimore  County  Dairy  Ass'n,  In  re, 

320a. 
Baltimore  Steam  Packet  Co.  v.  Garri- 
son,  572. 


CITED.  Xlv 

499  in  TOl.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.1 

Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Faulkner, 

y.  Fltzpatrlck,  986. 

y.  FlinJa,  340a. 

V.  May,  593. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  632.  • 
Baltimore  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Alsop, 

101. 
Baltimore  &  O.  &  C.  R.  Co.  y.  Rowan,. 

16. 
Baltzeil  V.  Hickman,  142. 

V.  Noeler,  903. 

y.  Randolph,  384,  .'(86. 
Bamka  y.  Railroad  Co..  740. 
Bancroft  y.  Wlnapear,  737. 
Bandon  y.  Becher,  293. 
Bangs  y.  Strong,  692. 
Banister  y.  Engine  Co.,  901. 
Bank  v.  Labitut,  306. 

y.  Morsel  1,  434. 

V.  Watson,  432. 
Bankers'  Life  Ins.  Co.  y.  Bobbins,  961, 

482a,  485. 
Bank  of  Australasia  y.  Harding,  827^ 
847. 

y.  Nias,  583,  827,  829,  844,  847. 
Bank  of  Belolt  v.  Beale,  1011. 
Bank  of  Carlisle  y.  Hopkins,  101. 
Bank  of  Chadron  y.   Anderson,   867, 

897,  917. 
Bank  of  China,  Japan  &  The  Straits 

V.  Morse,  836,  839. 
Bank  of  Colfax  y.   Richardson,   271^ 

281. 
Bank  of  Commerce  y.  City  of  Louis- 
ville. 545,  704. 

V.  Mayer,  860. 
Bank  of  Hamburg  v.  Howard,  440. 
Bank  of  Kentucky  v.  Stone,  534a,  578. 
Bank  of  Kinderhook  v.  GifTord,  349. 
Bank  of  Lewisburg  y.  Sheffey,  43. 
Bank  of  Maywood  y.  McAllister's  Es- 
tate, 703. 
Bank  of  Mobile  y.  Hall,  44. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  534. 
Bank  of  Monroe  y.  Widner,  107. 
Bank  of  Newburgh  v.  Seymour.  137. 
Bank  of  North  America  v.  Fitzslmons, 
466. 

y.  McCall,  821. 

y.  Wheeler,  690,  857,  804,  882,  8^. 
Bank  of  Pennsylvania  y.  Winger,  1010* 


Xlvi  CASVS 

[RoferenoM  to  ■(Bctloaf .   iSlto 

Bank  of  Priuceton  v.  Johuston,  338. 
Bank  of  RussellvUle  v.  Coke,  141. 
Bank  of  Saliua  v.  Abbot,  005. 
Bank  of  Santa  Fe  v.  Bank,  514. 
Bank  of  South  Carolina  v.  Bridget,  659. 

V.  Mosely,  995. 
Bank  of  StatesviUe  v.  Foote,  349. 
Bank  of  Stratton  v.  Dixon,  348. 
Bank  of  Tennessee  v.  Patterson,  168. 
Bank  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Ken- 
tucky V.  Hopkins,  706. 
Bank  of  U.  S.  v.  Bank,  690,  864,  875. 

V.  Beverley,  517. 

V.  Lougworth,  399. 

V.  Moss,  329. 

V.  Patton,  1009. 

V.  Ritchie,  197. 

V.  Voorhees,  245. 
Bank  of  Warren  County  v.  Kemble, 

991. 
Bank  of  Wooster  v.  Stevens,  269. 
Banks,  In  re,  807. 

V.  Evans,  477,  1008. 

V.  Speers,  589. 
Banning  v.  Sabin,  666. 

V.  Taylor,  333. 
Bannister  v.  Higglnson,  201. 
Bannon  v.  People,  278. 
Banta  v.  McClennan,  1008. 
Banton  v.  Campbell's  Heirs,  39. 
Baptist  Cliurch  v.  Wltherell,  523. 
Baragree  v.  Cronkhite,  394. 
Baragwanath  v.  Wilson,  204. 
Barbee  v.  Shannon,  U39c. 
Barber,  In  re,  257. 

v.  Bowen,  641. 

V.  aty  of  BUoxi,  154. 

v.  Graves,  193,  195,  299. 

V.  Kendall,  009,  616. 

V.  Lamb,  847. 

V.  Reynolds,  1007. 

V.  Root,  926,  927.  932. 

V.  Rutherford,  754. 
Barbour  v.  Bank,  1005. 

V.  White,  206. 
Barbour  County  Court  v.  O'Neal,  306. 
Barclay  v.  Kinsey,  SCO. 

v.  Plant,  173,  407. 
Bard  v.  Fort,  349. 
Barden  v.  Grady,  550. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  530. 
Bardonski  v.  Bardonskl,  375. 
Barelll  v.  Wagner,  229,  201. 


CITBD. 

mifiywLli  reilAiis in  vol.  tl 

Barger  v.  Hobbs,  624,  655. 
Baring  v.  Clagett,  815. 
Barkaloo's  Adm'r  v.  Emerick,  605. 
Barker  v.  Ayers,  206. 

V.  Cassidy,  555. 

T.  Olevelaod,  504,  729,  768. 

V.  Cocks,  208. 

V.  Crawford,  1014. 

V.  Elkins,  385. 

V.  Hamilton,  197. 

V.  Justice,  305. 

V.  Laney,  644. 

y.  Miller,  697. 

V.  Shepard,  225. 

V.  Walsh,  299. 
Earkley  v.  Com'rs,  U85e. 
Barkman  v.  Hain,  419. 

V.  Hopkins,  898,  ii06. 
Barksdale  v.  Greene,  330. 
Barlow  v.  Steel.  897. 
Barnard  v.  Ashley,  530. 

V.  Devine,  738. 

v.  Gibson,  32. 
Baru?s,  In  re,  38,  508* 

V.  Branch,  326. 

V.  Coal  Co.,  749. 

V.  Gibbs,  864. 

V.  Gill,  313. 

V.  Hale,  158. 

V.  Harris,  965,  966. 

V.  Hurd,  99. 

V.  Mott,  481. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  242. 

V.  Rodgers,  16. 

V.  Smith,  958. 

V.  \'incent,  635. 
Bamesley,  Ex  parte.  802. 

V.  Powell.  356,  634. 
Barnett  v.  Barnett,  370. 

v.Juday,  770. 

V.  Lynch,  359. 

V.  RaiU-oad  Co..  417. 

V.  Smart,  518,  681. 

V.  Squyres,  446. 
Barney  v.  Chittenden,  250. 

V.  Dewey,  572. 

V.  GoflP,  697. 

V.  Patterson's  Lessee.  828,  938. 

V.  White,  857,  862. 
Barnhart  v.  Eiiwards,  97. 
Baruum  v.  Green,  944. 
Baron  v.  Abeel,  (k)2. 
Barr  v.  Gratz,  607. 


CASS8 
OteCertneet  to  iftlnni     11 1  to 


Barr  v.  Uaseldon,  141. 

V.  Poet,  372,  387. 

T.  Simpson,  058. 
Barras  v.  Bidwell,  U17. 
BarreU  v.  Tllton,  153,  16G. 
Barret  v.  Thompson,  181. 
Barrett  v.  Cleydon,  487. 

V.  Cycle  Oo..  313,  34«a. 

T.  Falling,  616»  020,  »38. 

T.  Furnish,  4C7. 

V.  Garragan,  114. 

V.  Graham,  321. 

V.  Hopkins,  256,  6^ 

y.  Llngle,  101<5. 

V.  Oppenheimer,  887. 

y.  Vaughan,  299. 

y.  Wilkinson,  990. 
Barringer  v.  Boyden,  996. 

y.  King,  880,  896. 
Barroilhet  y.  Hathaway,  47L. 
Barron  y.  Frink,  84. 

V.  Paine,  583. 

y.  Thompson,  432. 
Barrow  y.  Bailey,  487. 

y.  Jones,  375. 

y.  Robichaus,  357, 

y.  West,  508.  852. 
Barrows  y.  Kindred.  656. 
Barry  y.  Carothers,  534. 

y.  Patterson,  279. 
Bartels  y.  ScheU,  731,  785. 

y.  Sonnenscheln,  30. 
Barth  y.  Burt,  708. 

y.  Loeffelholtz,  1013. 

y.  Makeeyer,  413,  415. 

y.  Bosenfeld,  35. 
Bartholomew  y.  Hook,  426* 

V.  Yaw,  385. 
Bartle  y.  Plane,  118. 
Bartlet  y.  Knight  828,  855. 
Bartlett  y.  Gaslight  CJo.,  577. 

y.  Gayle,  470. 

y.  Lang*s  Adm'rs,  109. 

y.  McNeil,  229. 

V.  Pearscm.  1000. 

y.  Russell,  268. 

y.  Spicer,  004. 

y.  Yates,  945,  986. 
Bartling  y.  Thielman,  138. 
Bartoe  y.  Guckert,  79a. 
Bartol  y.  Eckert,  485. 
Barton  y.  Allbright,  593,  594. 

V.  Anderson,  87,  697. 


CITBD.  zIyU 

tfeiayoLl;  rtsidiu  in  vol.  2.] 

Barton  y.  Bank,  153. 

y.  Ix>ng,  600. 

y.  Radcliffe,  979. 
Barton's  Appeal,  354. 
Bascom  y.  Manning,  768. 

V.  Young,  83. 
Basebe  y.  Matthews,  529. 
Basom  y.  Taylor,  680. 
Bass  y.  EstiU,  52. 

y.  Seyler,  553. 
Basset  y.  Mitchell,  140. 
Bassett  y.  Railroad  Co.,  744. 

y.  Sherrod,  600. 

V.  U.  S.,  687. 
Bass  Foundry  &  Machine  Works  y. 

Com'rs,  537. 
Bast  y.  Hysom,  92. 
Batchelder  v.  Batchelder,  926. 

y.  Robinson,  649. 
Bate  y.  Fellows,  699. 
Bateman  y.  Miller,  273. 

y.  Pool,  80. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  600. 

y.  Wllloe,  356,  378. 
Bates  y.  Bates,  337.    ' 

V.  Crowell,  618. 

y.  Cullum,  60,  77. 

y.  Delayan,  904. 

y.  Hamilton,  321. 

y.  Hinsdale,  450. 

y.  Kimball,  298. 

y.  Plonsky,  295. 

y.  Quattlebom,  734. 

y.  Spooner,  731. 
Battell  y.  Lowery,  3,  118. 
Battelle  y.  Brldgman,  77. 
Battey  y.  Holbrook,  080. 
Battle  y.  Jones,  836. 
Baudin  y.  RollflP,  699. 
Bauer  y.  Rlhs,  61a. 
Bnugert  y.  Blades,  599. 
Baugbn  y.  Baughn,  123. 
Baum  y.  Custer,  492. 
Bauserman  y.  Cbarlott,  802. 
Bausman  y.  Eads,  82. 

y.  Tilley,  351. 
Bayington  y.  Clarke,  430. 
Bawell  y.  Keusey,  734. 
Baxley  y.  Linah,  857,  8(14. 
Baxter  y.  Allen,  467. 

y.  Ass'n,  16. 

y.  Aubrey,  724. 

y.  Baxter,  635. 


xlviii  CASES 

[References  to  sections.    9S  1  to 

Baxter  v.  Carrol,  577. 

V.  Chute,  340a. 

V.  Dear,  403. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  815,  810. 

V.  .Myers,  540,  000,  OOU,  754. 

V.  I'eople,  182. 
Hayless  v.  Daniels,  233. 

V.  Jones,  97,  100. 
Bayley  v.  Buokland,  325,  374. 

V.  Edwards,  825,  847. 
Baylis  v.  Hayward,  41)3. 
Baylor's  Lessee  v.  Dejarnette,  564,  007. 
Baynard  v.  Harrity,  57S. 
Bay  or  v.  Ewart,  32. 
Bays  V.  Trulson,  783. 
Baze  y.  Arper,  654. 
BazlUe  v.  Murray,  655. 
Beach  v.  Beach,  346. 

V.  Beckwlth,  107. 

V.  Botsford,  52,  286. 

V.  City  of  Elmira,  609. 

V.  (^rain,  748. 

V.  McCann,  326. 

V.  Reed,  439a. 

V.  Vanderbergh,  998. 
Beadle  v.  Graham^s  Adm*r,  699. 
Beal  V.  Smith,  935. 
Beale  v.  Berryman,  884. 
Beale's  Adm'r  v.  Gordon,  614. 
l^eall  V.  Beck,  586. 

V.  Brown,  364. 

V.  Mill  Co..  343. 

V.  rearre,  504,  687,  787. 

V.  Powell,  300. 

V.  Price,  1010. 

V.  Slnquefleld,  174. 

V.  Territory  of  New  Mexico,  587. 

V.  Walker,  783. 
Keairs  Adm'r  v.  Taylor's  Adm'r,  8W. 
Beals  V.  Judge,  774. 
Beam  v.  Bridgers,  157. 

V.  Hayden,  139. 
Beams  v.  Denham,  373. 
Beam's  Appeal,  419. 
Bean  v.  HaflPendorfer,  337. 

V.  Seyfert,  1006. 
Bear  v.  Oom*rs,  253a,  584. 

V.  Youngman,  182. 
Beard,  Ex  parte,  128. 

V.  Beard,  227.  932,  933. 

V.  Deitz,  427. 

V.  Federy,  530. 

V.  Hall.  127. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Beard  v.  Milllkau.  986. 

V.  Roth,  200. 

V.  Shoe  Co.,  86. 
Beards  y.  Wheeler,  317. 
Beardsley  v.  Hilson,  217,  311. 
Bear  River  Valley  Orchard  Co.  v.  Han- 
ley,  33. 
Beattie  v.  Latimer.  208. 
Beatty  v.  Beatty's  Adm'r,  39. 

V.  O'Connor,  342. 
Beaty  v.  Bordwell.  350. 
Beaubien  v.  Hamilton,  :^00. 
Beaudrias  v.  Hogan.  282. 
Beaudrot  v.  Murphy,  278. 
Beaver  v.  Irwin,  660. 
Beazley  v.  Prentiss,  1006. 
Bechtel  V.  Brewing  Co.,  943. 
Beck  V.  Bellamy.  344. 

V.  Devereaux,  734, 

V.  Fransham,  360. 

V.  Juckett,  354a. 

V.  Kallmeyer,  560. 
Becker,  In  re,  196. 

V.  Huthsteiner,  345a,  348. 

V.  Sauter,  153,  154. 
Beckett  v.  Cuenin.  183. 
'      V.  Dean,  437. 

v.  Selover,  274,  641. 

V.  Stone,  099. 
Beckham,  Succession  of,  958. 
Beckley  v.  Xewcomb,  190. 
Beckneil  v.  Becknell,  958. 
Beckwith  v.  Boyce,  138. 
Beck  &  Pauli  Lith.  Co.  v.  Mining  Co., 

27,  771. 
BecQUet  v.  McCarthy,  227,  836.  842. 
Beet  on  v.  Becton,  198. 

v.  Ferguson,  945. 
Bedell  v.  Hayes,  252. 

v.  Stevens,  100. 
Bedon  v.  Davie,  554. 
Bedwell  v.  Ashton,  200. 

V.  Thompson,  86. 
Beebe  v.  Bank,  956. 

V.  Beebe  Co.,  85. 

V.  Bull,  764. 

V.  Elliott.  549.   784,  787. 

V.  Grlffing,    39. 

V.  Russell,  44,  45. 

V.  State.  298. 
Beecher  v.  Shirley,  700. 
Boekman  v.  Hamlin,  992.  993. 

V.  l»eck,  301. 


CASES 
CReferencea  to  BecUons.    H  1  to 

Beeler's  Heirs  t.  Bullitt's  Heirs,  195, 

197. 
Beer  v.  Simpson,  8G7,  892. 

V.  Tbomas,  660,  755. 
Beere  v.  Fleming,  720. 
Beers,  In  re,  1014. 

V.  Hendrickson,  989. 

V.  Pinney,   573. 
Beets  y.  Strobel,  10. 
Behl  y.  Schuette,  352. 
Bebrens  Drug  Co.  y.  Hamilton,  141. 
Behrens'  Estate,  In  re,  324. 
Belne,  In  re,  257. 
Beltber  y.  Zeigler,  28. 
Belcber  y.  Curtis,  264,  446. 

y.  She^an.  227. 
Belden  y.  Meeker,  287. 

y.  Seymour,  567. 

y.  State,  733. 
Belford  y.  Woodward,  151,  873,  968. 
Beliyean  y.  Mfg.  Co.,  50. 
Belkin  y.   Ubodes,   130,   135. 
Belknap  y.  Greene,  460. 

y.  Groover,  354a. 

V.  Stewart,  600. 
BeU  y.  Bell,  561,  897. 

y.  Dayis,  453. 

y.  Eyans,  446. 

V.  Gilmore,  411. 

y.  Hanks,  331. 

y.  McCoUoch,  729. 

V.  McDuffie,  438. 

V.  Merrifield,  733. 

V.  Otts,  186. 

y.  Perry,  995.  ' 

V.  Peterson,  549. 

y.  Raymond,  250,  787. 

y.  State,  206. 

y.  Thompson,  306. 

y.  Williams,   377,   493,  496. 

V.  Wilson,  548. 
Bellamy  v.  Bellamy,  41. 

y.  Woodson,  378. 
Bell  County  Coke  &  Imp.  Co.  y.  Board. 

754. 
Belles  y.  MUler,  261. 
Belleyllle  Nail  Co.  y.  People,  809. 
HelleviUe  A  St.  L.  R.  Co.  y.  Leatbe,, 

612,  627. 
Bellinger  y.  Crafgue,  769. 

y.  Tbonipscn,  580. 
Belloc  y.  Rogers,  644. 
Bellows  y.  Ingham,  908. 
1  LAW  JUDG.— d 


ciTBD.  xlii 

499  in  Yol.  1;  residue  in  yoI.  S.] 

Bellows  y.  Shannon,  16. 

y.  Sowles,  964,  976. 
Beirs  Adm'r  y.  Ayres,  641. 
Belmont  y.  Coleman,  583. 

V.  Ponyert,  25. 
Beloit  V.  Morgan,  506. 
Belt  V.  Davis,  21,  26,  34. 
Helton  V.  Fisher,  857. 

V.  Summer,  250. 
Beltzhoover  v.  Com.,  775. 
Bement  v.  Trust  Co.,  641. 
Bemis  v.  Stanley,  892. 
Bemmerly  v.  Woodward,  155. 
Benbow  v.  Boyer,  461. 
Bender  v.  Askew,  246. 

v.  Pennsylvania  Ca,  37. 
Bendernagle  v.  Cocks,  734,  736,  738, 

741,  744,  747,  749. 
Benedict  v.  Arnoux,  349,  351. 

v.  Auditor  General,  355. 

V.  Smith.  807. 
Benge  v.  Potter,  335. 
Benicia  Agricultural  Works  v.  Creigb- 

ton,  16. 
Benjamin  v.  Dubois,  30. 

v.  Early,  268. 
Benne  v.  Scbnecko,  951. 
Benner  v.  Marshall,  865. 
Bennet,  The,  814. 
Bennett,  Ex  parte,  179,  215. 

V.  Allen,  61a,  69,  77. 

v.  Bennett,  862. 

V.  Buttei-worth,  979. 

y.  Graham,  589. 

y.  Gray,   549. 

V.  Hanley,  1004. 

y.  Holmes,  600,   629. 

y.  Jackson,  336. 

v.  Leach,  577. 

V.  McGrade,  1008. 

v.  Morley,  902. 

V.  Townsend,  236. 

V.  Winter,  301. 
Bensen  v.  Railroad  Co.,  250,  284. 
Bensimer  v.  Fell,  439a,  466,  549,  605^ 

810. 
Benson  v.  Anderson,  306,  368,  370. 

V.  Arnold,  181. 

y.  Cahill,  265. 

V.  Haywood,  954. 

y.  Matsdortr,  052. 

V.  Maxwell,  423. 

T.  Paine,  774. 


1 


CA8HS  CITED. 


Ulto 


CRetereacM  to  MCtlon 

Bent  T.  Miranda,  308. 
Bentley  y.  Finch,  341. 

▼.  Gardner,  110. 

▼.  Goodwin,  2d5. 

V.  O'Bryan,  (517. 

V.  Wright.  i;J4. 
Beutiy  y.  Dillard,  378,  389. 
Benton  v.  Benton,  055. 

V.  Burgot,  828,  857,  884,  917. 

V.  Crowder,  1009. 
Benwell  v.  Black,  960. 
Benwood  Iron-Works  Co.  y.  Tappan, 

341. 
Benz  y.  Hines,  610. 
Berber  y.  Kerzinger,  544^ 
Berg  V.  Bank,  57. 

V.  Pohl,   352. 
Bergemann  y.  Backer,  259. 
Bergen  y.   Bolton,  239. 
Berger  y.  Williams,  583,  586. 
Bergeron,  In  re,  320a. 

y.  Richardott,  615. 
Bergin  y.  Haight,  252. 
Bering  y.  Burnet,  55. 
Berkey  y.  Judd,  200. 
Berkley  y.  Lamb,  420. 

y.  Wilson.  702. 
Berkowitz  y.  Brown,  220. 
Bemal  y.  Lynch,  250,  522. 
Bernard  y.  City  of  Hoboken,  750. 

y.  Douglas,  317. 

y.  Merrill,  740. 
Bernardi   y.    Motteux,  813,   814,  816, 

817. 
Bemeckcr  y.  Miller,  193. 
Bemert,  Ex  parte,  258. 
Bernhardt  y.  Brown,  260,  270. 
Beronlo  y.  Railroad  Co.,  738. 
Berry  y.  Anderson,  118. 

y.  Borden,  16. 

y.  Burgbard,  387. 

y.  Chamberlain,  576L 

y.  Clements,  451. 

y.  Foster,  271. 

y.  Shuler,  444. 
Berry  hill  y.   McKee,  44. 

y.  Potter,    438. 

y.  Wells,  981. 
Bersch  v.  Schneider,  282. 
Bertha  Zinc  &  Mineral  Co.  y.  Yanghan, 

297a. 
Herthold  v.  Fox,  134,  164. 
Bertliue  y.  Bauer,  335. 


tftlAYoLl:  rMidue  In  ToL  1] 

Bertrand  y.  Bingham*s  Adm%  715^ 
Bertron  y.  Stewart,  487. 
Berwick  y.  Duncan.  16^ 
Besecher  y.  Flory,  694. 
Best  y.  Hopple,  703. 

y.  Lawson,  1001. 

y.  Nix,  204. 
Betancourt  y.  Eberlin,  493,  496^ 
Bethel  v.  Bethel,  154. 
Bethlehem  y.  Watertown,  5(^. 
Betterton  y.  Roope,  746. 
Bettmau  y.  Cowley,  95& 
Eetts  y.  Bagley,  287. 

y.  Baxter,  83. 

y.  Johnson,  487. 

y.  Starr,  504,  729,  787. 

y.  Town  of  New  Hartfoid,  529* 
Beyen  y.  Chesire,  300. 
Beyer  y.  North,  567. 
Beyerley  y.  Brooke.  440. 
Beverley's  Case,  205. 
Beverly  v.  Burke,  218. 
Bevington  y.  Buck,  3.. 
Beyerle  y.  Haln,  179. 
Bibb,  Ex  parte,  298. 

y.  Allen,  206. 

y.  Avery,  173. 

y.  Jones,  1008. 
Bibend  y.  Insurance  Co.,  981. 

y.  Kreutz,  361,  362,  377,  381. 
Bible  V.  Voris,  62. 
Bick  y.  Seal,  31. 
Bickel  y.  Cleayer,  493% 

y.  Brskine,  193. 

y.  Kraus,  326a. 
BIcknell  y.  Field.  917. 
BIddle  y.  Bank,  992. 

y.  Dowse,  959. 

y.  Pierce,  246. 

y.  Wllkins,  677,  970. 
Biddle  &  Smart  Co.  v.  Bumbam,  548w 
BIdleson  y.  Whytel,  8. 
Bldwell  y.  Coleman,  406^ 

y.  Huff,  938b. 
Bierer  y.  Fretz,  754. 
Blerman  y.  Crecelius,  6i0. 
Blesecker  v.  Cobb,. 467. 
Biesenthall  y.  Williams,  907. 
Bllield  y.  Taylor,  585. 
Bigelow,  Ex  parte,   244,  255. 

y.  Bigelow,  245. 

y.  Chatterton,  273. 

T.  Preyost,  99& 


CA6B8 
[References  to  aoctieiM.    H  1  to 

BIgelow  T.  Stearns,  275. 

V.  Winsor,  518.  722. 
Blggam  V.  Merritt,  450. 
BIsge,  In  re.  38. 
Biggins  V.  Raisch,  588. 
Big  Goose  &  Beaver  Ditch  Go.  ▼.  Mor- 
row, 118. 
Bigle3'  V.  Jones,  715. 
BlgDold  V.  Carr.  WSS. 
Billan  v.  Hercklebrath.  417. 
Billing  V.  Gilmer.  (514,  093. 
BUUngs  V.  Russell,  245.  250.  286. 
BiUingslea  v.  Smith.  160. 
Blllnps  T.  Freeman,  300. 
Blloxi  Lumber  &  Export  Co.  y.  Sup- 
ply Co.,  86. 
Bilsland  v.  McManomy,  725. 
Bimeler  t.  Dawson.  828,  857,  887,  900, 

910. 
Blnck  T.  Wood.  G97,  758. 
Binford  v.  Alston.  1008. 
Bingham  v.  Honeyman.  620. 
Btnsse  v.  Barker,  322,  368. 
Birch  V.  Frantz,  340. 

V.  Fnnk,  693,  606,  707.  709. 
Bhrd,  In  re.  250. 

T.  Chaffln,  381. 

V.  Mfg.  Co.,  110. 

T.  Mitchell,  589. 

V.  Randall,  753,  778»  786,  787. 

T.  Smith,  970,  975. 
BIrdMell  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Fire-Sprinkler  Co.. 

115,  133. 
Birdseye  v.  Rogers,  117. 

T.  Srhneffer,  37. 

V.  ^haelTer,  631,  650. 
Bfnninghanoi  v.  I^ieonhardt  165. 
BiMhoff  V.  Weathered,  227,  836,  897, 

900. 
Blscoe  V.  Butts,  641. 

V.  Sandefnr.  1008. 
Bish  V.  Burns,  47A\. 

V.  Wnilar,  486. 
Bishop  T.  Abom.  158. 

V.  Camp.  14. 

T.  Carter,  182. 

y.  Donnell.  83. 

y.  McGillis.  706. 

T.  Perrln.  663. 
Bfsland  v.  Hewitt  454. 
Bismark   Bniidiug   &   Loan   Ass'n   y. 

Bolster,  429. 
Blssel  y.  Axtell,  356. 


ciTBrD.  li 

#9  in  TOl.  1;  TMltw  in  yrt.  Si] 

Bissell  y.  Briggs,  828,  867,  897. 

y.  Edwards,  879,  935. 

y.  Huntington,  581. 

y.  Jaudon,  903. 

y.  Kellogg,  614,  687. 

y.  Township,  707,  710,  761. 

y.  Wheelock,  896,  897. 
Bisson  V.  Curry,  530. 
Bitzer  y.  Klllluger,  681. 

V.  O'Bryan,  353,  718. 

y.  Shunk,  57. 
Bixby  V.  Whitney,  626. 
Black  y.  Black,  666,  600,  720,  754,  857, 
897,  901. 

y.  Caldweil,  666. 

y.  Epperson,  425. 

y.  Pattlson,  70. 

y.  Plunkett,  297. 

y.  Smith,  919. 
Blacklmm  y.  Traffic  Co..  ^1« 
Blackburn  y.  Beall,  498. 

V.  Crawford,  543. 

y.  Jackson,  896. 

y.  Knight,  305. 

y.  Squib,  994. 

y.  State,  175. 
Blackham*8  Case,  614. 
Black  Hills  Nat  Bank  y.  Kellogg,  209. 
Blackinton  y.  Blackinton,  720,  729. 
Blackman  y.  Joiner,  946. 

y.  Simpson,  782. 

y.  Wright.  872. 
Blackmer  y.  Greene,  66. 
Biackmore  y.  Gregg,  611. 
Black  Rlyer  Say.  Bank  y.  Edwards, 

750. 
Black's  Ex'r  y.  Black,  961. 
Blackwell  y.  Dlbbrell,  786. 

V.  State,  482. 

V.  WlUard,  173. 
Blackwood  y.  Brown,  542^ 
Blaln  y.  Blain,  927. 

y.  Shaffner,  340. 

y.  Stewart,  488. 
Blaine  y.  Briscoe,  324. 
Blair,  In  re,  255. 

V.  Bartlett,  769. 

y.  Caldwell,  877,  969,  1007. 

y.  Chamblin,  434. 

y.  McLean,  699. 

y.  Russell,  306. 
Blaisdell  v.  Harris,  127,  128. 

V.  Pray,  270, 


Ill  CASES 

CReterenoes  to  Mctioni.    §S  1  to 

Blake  ▼.  Blgelow,  807. 

▼.  Hurley,  807,  963. 

V.  Butler,  033. 

y.  Dodemead,  486. 

V.  Douglass,  193,  196. 

V,  Heyward,  411. 

V.  Mfg.  Co.,  270. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  613,  615. 
Blakely  v.  Calder,  601. 
Blakemore  v.  Wise,  440. 
Blakeslee  v.  Murphy,  080. 
Blakesley  v.  JoUnsou,  373,  953. 
Blalock  V.  DenLam,  43Ua. 
Blanc  V.  Mining  Co.,  900. 
Blanchard  v.  Hatch,  312. 

T.  Russell,  824. 
Blanck  v.  Medley,  57,  70,  74. 
Bland  v.  State,  306. 
Blandy  v.  Griffith,  787. 
Blankenship  v.  Douglas,  420,  445. 
Blann  v.  Cocherou,  779,  782. 
Blanque  v.  Peytavln,  815. 
Blanton  v.  Carroll,  277. 
Hlasdale  v.  Babcock,  572. 
Blattner  v.  Frost,  962. 
Blauvelt  v.  Kemon,  77. 
Blewett  V.  Tregonnlng,  127. 
Blight's  Heirs  v.  Tobin,  357, 
Blln  V.  Campbell,  680. 
Blindert  v.  Kreiser,  419. 
Bliss  v.  Clarke,  425. 

V.  Treadway,  313. 

V.  Weil,  747. 

V.  Wilson,  220. 
Bliase  v.  Castlio,  135. 
Bloch  V.  Trice,  541,  938c. 
Blodget  V.  Jordan,  857,  935. 
Blodgett  V.  Dow,  016. 
Blohme  v.  Lynch,  459. 
Blood  V.  Bates,  182. 
Bloom  V.  Burdick,  195,  220,  275, 
Bloomfield  v.  Humason,  433. 
Bloomfleld  R.  Co.  v.  Burress,  213. 
Bloomstock  v.  Duncan,  910,  1001. 
Blose  V.  Bear,  425. 
Bloss  V.  Hull,  380. 

V.  Plymale.  779. 
Blossom  V.  Barry,  113. 
Bludworth  v.  Poole,  107,  118,  201,  488, 

498. 
Blue  V.  Collins,  402. 
Blum  V.  Keyser,  405,  411. 
Blumke  v.  Dailey,  147. 


CITED. 

489  in  vol.  1;  reildue  In  vol.  S.] 

Blythe    v.   Hinckley,   297a,   308,    324, 

938c. 
BIythe's  Estate,  In  re,  085. 
Blytli  &  Fargo  Co.  v.  Svvenson,  233, 

312,  325. 
Boardman  v.  Acer,  782. 
V.  De  Forrest,  Ul;3. 
V.  Grocery  Co.,  9«0. 
V.  Patterson,  147. 
V.  Wlllard,  421. 
Board  of  Administrators,  In  re,  496. 
Board  of  Com*rs  of  Cheyenne  County  v. 

Com'rs,  982. 
Board  of  Com'rs  of  Custer  County  v. 

Moon,  118. 
Board  of  Com'rs  of  Grand  County  v. 

King.  985f. 
Board  of  Com'rs  of  Jackson  County  v. 

Nichols,  532. 
Board  of  Com'rs  of  Lake  County  v. 
Piatt,  253a,  270,  291,  097,  731. 
V.  Sutliff,  500. 
Board  of  Com'rs  of  Rio  Grande  County 

V.  Burpee,  2o3a. 
Board  of  Com'rs  of  Wells  County  v. 

Fahlor,  218. 
Board  of  Directors  of  Broadway  Ins. 

Co.,  In  re,  297. 
Board  of  Education  v.  Bank,  324. 

V.  Fowler,  683. 
Board  of  Public  Works  v.  Columbia 

College,  897,  913. 
Board  of  School  Directors  v.  Hernan- 
dez, 548. 
Board  of  Sinking  Fund  Com'rs  v.  Ma- 
son &  Foard  Co..  141. 
Board  of  Sup'rs  v.  Thompson,  rs.le. 
Board  of  Trustees  of  School  District 

No.  1  V.  Whalen,  538. 
Boarman  v.  Patterson,  147. 
Boas  V.  Heffron,  349. 

V.  Hetzsl,  807. 
Boasen  v.  State,  253a. 
Boatner  v.  Ventress,  530. 
Boaz  V.  Heister,  233. 
Bobb  V.  Bobb,  306. 

V.  (Jraham,  407,  000. 
Bobe's  Heirs  v.  Stickney,  758. 
Bobo  V.  State,  135. 
Eockover  v.  Ayres,  428. 
Bodkin  v.  Aniokl,  095. 
Bodurtha  v.  Goodrich,  901,  903. 
V.  Phelon,  708. 


CASES 
(References  to  sectloni.    H 1  to 

Boe  T.  Irish,  124. 
Boeing  Y.  McKinley,  312. 
Boenninghaiiseii,  Ex  parte,  257. 
Bogan  V.  Hamilton,  857,  8U0. 
Bogart,  In  re,  255,  256. 

V.  Perry,  433. 
Boggess  y.  Howard,  170. 
Boggs  V.  Douglass,  477,  953. 
Bogie  V.  Bloom,  1016. 
Boliannon  v.  Combs,  305. 
Bobn  V.  StlTers,  166. 
BoUeau  v.  Rutlin,  622. 
Boisse  Y.  Diclcson,  200. 
Boland,  Ex  parte,  266. 

Y.  BeDson,  100. 

T.  Spitz,  763. 
Bolen  Y.  Crosby,  948,  062. 
Bolen  Coal  Co.  y.  Briclc  Co.,  736. 
Boles  Y.  Smitli,  677. 
Bolinger  y.  Fowler,  491. 
BoUing  Y.  Speller,  lia 
Bolton  Y.  Brewster,  287. 

Y.  Gladstone,  815. 

V.  H?y,  681. 

Y.  Scliriever,  250. 
Bomar  y.  Ass'n,  541. 

Y.  Parker,  708. 
Bonar  y.  Gosney«  162,  1G3. 
Bond,  Ex  parte.  258. 

Y.  Banlc,  111. 

Y.  Billups,  754. 

Y.  Charieen,  36. 

Y.  Epley,  334. 

Y.  McXIder,  703. 

Y.  Markstrum,  629,  750,  754. 

Y.  Marx,  42. 

Y.  Neuscbwander,  327. 

Y.  Pacheoo,  89,  138»  267. 

Y.  Wilson,  288. 

Y.  Wycoff,  346a. 
Bone  T.  Torry,  574. 
Bones  y.  Aiken,  996. 
Bonested  y.  Gariingbouse,  1012. 

Y.  Todd,  770,  771,  853.  913. 
Bonnell  y.  Holt,  193. 

Y.  Pack,  000. 

Y.  Railroad  Co.,  337. 
Bonner,  In  re,  258. 

Y.  Martin,  298. 
Bonnet  y.  Ij^chman,  276. 
Bonsall  t.  Isett,  274,  278.  287. 
Bonta  Y.  Clay,  73. 
Booge  Y.  Railroad  Co.,  752. 


CITED.  liii 

499  in  ToL  1;  residue  in  toI.  2.] 

Book  V.  U.  S.,  699,  702. 
Booker  y.  Kennerly,  193. 
Booker's  Adm'r  v.  Bell's  Ex'rs,  671. 
Boon  Y.  Boon,  165. 
Boor  V.  Lowrey,  201. 
Boos  Y.  Morgan,  946. 

Y.  State.  159. 
Bootb,  Ex  parte,  257. 

Y.  Bank,  110,  949,  996. 

Y.  Campbell,  989. 

Y.  Kesler.  357. 

Y.  Koebler,  363. 
Bordages  y.  Higglns,  261. 
Borden  y.  Borden,  407. 

V.  Fltcb,  275,  278,  828,  836,  897, 
916,932. 
Borden  Mfg.  Co.  y.  Barry,  683. 
Boren  y.  McGebee.  998. 
Borer  y.  Cbapman,  136. 
Bore's  Bx'r  y.  Qulerry's  Ex'r,  093. 
Borgwald  y.  Fleming,  80. 
Bomgesser  y.  Harrison.  734,  736w 
Borrowscale  y.  Tuttle,  722. 
Borst  Y.  Baldwin,  953. 

y.  Nalle,  398. 
BosbyshcU  y.  Summers,  341. 
Boscb  Y.  Kassing,  84. 
Bosman  y.  Akeley,  181. 
Bosquett  y.  Crane,  611. 
Bostlc  Y.  LoYe,  262. 
Boston  Y.  Haynes,  366.  376. 
Boston  Blower  Co.  y.  Brown,  620. 
Boston  India  Rubber  Factory  y.  Holt, 

828,  873. 
Boston  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  y.  Organ, 

346a. 
Boston  Water  Power  Co.  y.  Gray,  520. 
Boston  &  C.  Smelting  Co.  y.  Reed.  783. 
Boston  &  W.  R.  Oo.  y.  Sparbawk,  290, 

291. 
Bostwick  Y.  Abbott,  703. 

V.  Benedict.  418. 

Y.  Perkins,  313. 

Y.  Van  Vleck,  167. 
Boswell  Y.  Coaks,  332. 

Y.  Dlckerson,  242. 

Y.  Otis,  232. 
Botkin  Y.  Com'rs,  164. 

Y.  Klelnschmldt,  267,  690. 
Botto  Y.  Vandament,  15. 
Bottorff  V.  Wise.  624,  628. 
Botts  Y.  Crenshaw.  173. 

Y.  Shields'  Heirs.  <]53. 


liv 


CASES  CITBD. 
[RaflBr«noes  to  sectloat.    H  1  to  499  in  toI.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 


Bouchaud  v.  Dias,  707,  751. 
Boucher  y.  Lawson.  825,  826. 
Bougher  v.  Scobey,  504. 
Boughton  V.  Bank  of  O^'laana,  439. 
Bouldin  v.  Miller,  252,  284,  290. 
Bourg  Y.  Gerdlng,  609. 
Bourgeois  y.  Jacobs,  090. 
Bourke  y.  Granberry,  816. 
Bourne  y.  Simpson,  195. 
BournonYiUe  y.  Goodall,  000. 
Boutel  Y.  Owens,  69. 
Boutin  Y.  Qatlin,  322,  %2. 

V.  lindsley,  617. 
Eowden  y.  Hatcher,  177. 
Bowdoin  College  y.  Merritt,  707. 
Bowdre  y.  Hampton,  16. 
Bowe  Y.  Arnold,  295. 

Y.  McNab,  607. 

Y.  Bdllk  Co.,  615,  747. 
Bowen  y.  Allen,  635. 

Y.  Clark,  390. 

Y.  Hastings,  770. 

Y.  Johnson,  922. 

Y.  Mill  Co.,  326. 
Bowers  v.  Boom  Co.,  742w 

V.  Chaney,  218. 

V.  Harner,  489. 
Bowersox  y.  Gitt,  861. 
Bowie  V.  Kansas  City,  27. 

V.  Xeale,  486. 
Bowler,  Ex  parte,  257. 

Y.  Ennls,  277. 

Y.  Huston,  237,  907,  913. 

V.  Palmer,  27. 
Bowles  Y.  Orr,  844. 
Bowling  Y.  Blum.  3i3. 

V.  Garrett  443. 
Bowman  y.  Field,  375. 

Y.  Forney,  1016. 

V.  Humphrey,  746. 

Y.  Insurance  Co.,  877. 

Y.  Noyes.  209. 

Y.  Silvus,  412. 

Y.  Wilson,  292. 
Kown  V.  Morange,  977. 
Bowne  y.  Joy,  865. 
Bowzer  y.  RIcketts,  320. 
Boyce  y.  Danz,  530. 
Boyd,  In  re,  255,  406a,  407. 

Y.  Baynham,  239. 

Y.  Blalsdell,  165. 

V.  Boyd,  720,  1)03,  904. 

V.  Caldw?li,  589. 


Boyd  Y.  Canal  Co.,  367. 

.Y.  Ellis,  233. 

Y.  Ernst,  186. 

Y.  Ghent,  430. 

V.  Hitchcock,  976. 

V.  Huffaker,  587. 

Y.  Mann,  1006. 

V.  Miller,  297. 

Y.  Munson,  315. 

Y.  Koane,  193. 

Y.  Robinson,  614. 

V.  Schott,  135. 

Y.  Wallace,  fi»40« 

Y.  WeaYer,  368. 

Y.  Whitfield,  567,  569.  572. 
Boyer  v.  Austin,  714. 

Y.  Bolender,  952. 

Y.  xteeB,  4o^. 

Y.  Robinson,  86. 

Y.  Schofield,  522. 
Boyer's  Estate,  451. 
Boyken  y.  State,  118. 
Boykin  y.  Buie,  906. 

V.  Cook,  558,  560. 
Boylan  y.  Anderson,  483. 

Y.  Whitney,  903. 
Boyland  y.  Boyland,  281. 
Boyla  Y.  Maroney,  454,  593. 

Y.  Wallace,  744. 
Boyles  v.  Chytraus,  68. 
Boynton  v.  Ball,  977. 

Y.  Foster,  243. 

Y.  Morrill,  573. 
Boys  Y.  Shawhan,  208. 
Bozarth  y.  McGillicuddy,  138. 
Bozzio  Y.  Vaglio,  311. 
Brace  y.  Duchess  of  Marlborough,  400. 
Bracey  v.  C'alderwood,  219. 
Brachtendorf  v.  Kehm,  32. 
Bracken  y.  Parkinson,  530. 

V.  Trust  Co.,  585,  617,  731,  790.    • 
Brackett  v.  Bauegas,  311. 

V.  Hoitt,  717. 

Y.  Norton,  986. 

Y.  People,  714. 

Y.  Winslow,  299. 
Bradbury  v.  Walton,  812. 
Braddee  y.  Browutield,  78,  298.  69a 
Bradeu  v.  Reitzeubergar,  366,  378. 
Bradfleld  v.  Newby.  418. 
Bradford  y.  Bradford,  493,  650. 

Y.  Bradley's  Adm'rs,  44. 

Y.  Burgess,  787. 


CASES  CITBD. 
OEUtarcncM  to  MCtiOM.    If  1  to  4M  in  yOI.  1;  rmMliM  ia  toI.  S.] 


Iv 


Bradford  v.  Colt,  ail. 

T.  Knowles,  (515. 

T.  I^arUn,  261. 

T.  Rice,  091. 
Bradiflh  v.  Gee,  356. 

V.  Grant,  720. 

▼.  State,  12*2,  443. 
Bradley,  In  re,  041. 

V.  Andrews,  740. 

▼.  Beetle,  583. 

V.  Bradley,  529,  710. 

V.  Burnett.  227. 

Y.  Clandon,  182. 

T.  Fowler.  227. 

T.  Glass,  66,  67. 

T.  Hefleman,  448. 

T.  Johnson,  548. 

Y.  McDaniel,  577. 

Y.  Sandllands,  83. 

Y.  Slater,  305. 

Y.  Township,  800. 

Y.  Welch,  807. 

Y.  West,  663. 
Bradley  Fertilizer  Go.  y.  Caswell,  16. 
Bradshaw  y.  Bank,  23,  359. 

Y.  Bratton,  1016. 

Y.  Hedge,  16. 
Bradshaw's  Appeal,  618. 
Bradstreet  y.  Insurance  Co.,  797,  814, 

815,  817,  818,  900. 
Bradwell  y.  Spencer,  586. 
Brady  y.  Ball,  779. 

Y.  Beadleston,  671. 

Y.  Beason,  155. 

Y.  Brady,  248,  540. 

Y.  Creditors,  458. 

Y.  Horvath,  398. 

Y.  Insurance  Co.,  300,  324,  346. 

Y.  Madden,  206. 

Y.  Murphy,  783. 

Y.  Palmer,  877. 

Y.  Pryor.  611. 

Y.  Reynolds,  770. 

Y.  Spurck,  568. 
Bragg  Y.  Lorio,  246. 

Y.  Railroad  Co.,  16. 

Y.  Thompson,  199. 
Bragner  y.  Langmead,  441. 
Brahan  y.  Ragland,  945. 
Braiden  y.  Mercer,  590. 
Brainard  y.  Fowler,  857,  884,  916. 
Brake  y.  Payne,  373. 


Brakke  v.  Hoskins,  258. 

Brakken  y.  Railroad  Co.,  742. 

Braly  y.  Seaman,  232. 

Bramblet's  Heirs  v.   Pickett's  Hehrs, 

154,  165. 
Bramlett  v.  McVey,  877. 
Branch  y.  Branch,  27. 

V.  Lowery,  415. 

Y.  Mfg.  Co.,  872. 
Branch  Bank  y.  Ford,  478. 
Brand  y.  Stafford,  340. 
Brandenburgh  y.  Beach,  986. 
Brandhoefer  y.  Bain,  261. 
Brandies  y.  Cochrane,  433,  434,  436. 
brandon  y.  Green,  373,  378. 
Brandt's  Appeal,  418. 
Branley  y.  Dambly,  411. 
Brannan  v.  Kelley,  483. 
Brannon  y.  Noble,  593. 
Branson  y.  Caruthers,  247,  273. 
Branstetter  v.  Rives,  326.  347. 
Brautingham  y.  Brautingham,  269. 
Braswell  v.  Downs,  857,  897. 

V.  Hicks,  536. 
Bratton  v.  Leyr«r,  1014. 
Brauer  v.  City  of  Portland,  982. 
Braunsdorff  y.  Fay,  184. 
Brawley  y.  Mitchell,  235. 
Bray  y.  Laird,  36. 
Brazee  v.  Bank,  456. 
Brazill  Y.  Isham,  526,  688,  789. 
Breading  v.  Boggs,  5,  115. 

V.  Slegworth,  597,  801. 
Breault  v.  Lumber  Co.,  541. 
Brebner  v.  Johnson,  421. 
Breckenridge  v.  Railroad  Co.,  614. 
Breckenridge  Co.  v.  Perkins,  326. 
Breden  v.  Gilllland,  306. 
Breed  v.  Gorham,  432. 

V.  Ketchum,  336. 
Breene  v.  Booth,  160,  162,  165. 
Breeze  v.  Doyle,  261. 
Bremen  Bank  v.  Umrath,  82. 
Brengle  v.  McCIellan,  863. 
Brennan  y.  Bridge  Co.,  91,  709. 
Brenner  v.  Gundershiemer,  85. 
Brent  y.  Bank,  448. 
Bresnahan  y.  Price,  368. 
Brett  V.  Marston,  689. 
Brettell  v.  Deffebach,  317. 
Brewer  v.  Beck  with,  652. 

Y.  Mock,  394. 


Ivi  CASES 

[References  to  lectioBa.    H 1  to 

Brewer  v.  Thomes,  992. 

Brewer  &  Hoffman  Brewing  Ck>.  y. 

Lonergan,  346a. 
BrewiB  y.  Lawsou,  500. 
Brewster  v.  Boyle,  34l>a. 

V.  Clamflt,  471. 

V.  Norfleet,  30(5. 
Brlce  V.  Taylor,  941. 
Bridge  y.  Ford,  906. 

y.  Gray,  627. 

y.  Johnson,  942. 

y.  Sumner,  699. 

y.  Ward,  426. 
Bridge  Co.  y.  Douglass,  534a. 
Bridgeport  Electric  &  Ice  Co.  t.  Im- 
provement Co.,  354. 
Bridgeport  Fire  &  Marine  Ins.  Co.  y. 

Wilson,  293,  573. 
Bridgeport  Say.  Bank  y.  Eldredge,  287, 

373. 
Bridges,  Ex  parte,  256. 

y.  Blalceman,  354. 

y.  McAlister,  548. 

y.  Nicholson,  245. 

y.  Smyth,  127.  200. 

y.  Thomas,  110. 
Bridgman  y.  McKissick,  455. 
Brlesch  y.  McCauley,  366,  378. 
Briggs  y.  Briggs,  425. 

y.  Clark,  270. 

y.  Dorr,  945. 

y.  Milburn,  071,  785. 

y.  Richmond,  87,  687,  766. 

y.  Sholes,  86. 

y.  Smith.  387. 

y.  Thompson,  1014. 

y.  Wells,  624,  630. 

y.  Yetzer,  63. 
Brigham  v.  Fayerweather,  638. 

y.  Henderson.  857. 
Bright  y.  Diamond,  330. 

y.  Smitten.  935. 

V.  State,  105. 
Brightman  y.  Brigbtman.  550. 
Bright's  Adm'r  v.  Sexton.  992. 
Brlgnardello  y.  Gray.  132. 
Brigot's  Heirs  y.  Brigot.  272,  367,  862. 
Brlley  y.  Sugg,  975,  996. 
Brill  V.  Shively,  666. 
Briukerhoff  y.  Marvin,  71. 

V.  Telford.  518. 
Brinkley  v.  Brinkley,  857,  867. 
Brinsmead  v.  Harrison,  778. 


CITBD. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  L] 

Brinton's  Estate.  633. 
Brisbin  y.  Newhall,  953. 
Briscoe  y.  Lomax.  606. 

y.  Stephens.  278.  680. 
Brister  v.  State.  103. 
Bristol  y.  Ross,  306. 
Bristor  y.  Galvin,  339. 
Brittain,  In  re,  254. 

v.  Mull,  205. 
Brittenham  v.  Robinson,  156,  162^ 
Brittin  v.  Wilder,  211. 
Britton  y.  State,  529. 

v.  Thornton,  654. 
Brizendiue  v.  Bridge  Co.,  543. 
Broaddus  v.  Broaddus.  373. 
Broadis  v.  Broadis,  376. 
Broadwater  v.  Foxworthy,  1014. 
Broas  v.  Mersereau,  204. 
Brock  v.  Garrett,  600. 

y.  Klrkpatrick,  958. 
Brockenbrough's     Ex'x    y.     Brocken- 

brough's  Adm'r,  441. 
Brockman  v.  McDonald.  211,  233. 
Brock's  Adm*r  v.  Frank.  635,  636. 
Brockway  v.  Kinney,  621. 
Broda  v.  Green wald/  375. 
Broder  v.  Conklin,  110,  266. 

V.  Court,  107. 
Broderick,  In  re,  625. 
Brodie  y.  Bickley.  563. 
Brodrib  v.  Brodrib.  590,  644. 
Bromley  v.  Littleton.  487. 
Bronson  v.  Railroad  Co.,  48* 

y.  Rodes.  152. 

y.  Schulten.  306. 
Bronzan  y.  Drobaz.  964,  967. 
Brooke  v.  Filer.  173. 

y.  Gregg.  790. 

y.  Phillips,  418. 
Brooker  v.  Sprague,  460. 
Brooking  v.  Dearmond,  536. 
Brooklyn  City  &  N.  R.  Co.  T.  Bank, 

774. 
Brooklyn,  W.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  In  re,  798. 
Brooks  V.  Ashbum,  779. 

v.  Brooks,  130. 

y.  aty  of  New  York,  261. 

y.  Harrison.  376,  377. 

T.  Hunt  299. 

y.  Johnson,  340a,  348. 

y.  Munoz,  666. 

y.  O'Hara,  754. 

y.  Powell.  245,  252. 


CASES 
(RflferMkeM  to  Mottaas.   H 1  to 

Brooks  T.  Whitson,  373,  383. 

T.  Wilson,  423. 
Brook's  Adm*r  v.  Love,  306. 
Broome  v.  Wooton,  778. 
Browiahan,  In  re,  257. 
Brothers  v.  Beck,  (120. 

T.  Uiggins,  703. 

T.  Hurdle,  052. 
Brougtaton  v.  Mcintosh,  758. 

▼.  Wlmberly,  44. 
Bronnker  v.  Atkyns,  582. 
Bronssard  v.  Broussard,  009. 
Browder  v.  Faulkner,  158. 
Brower  ▼.  Bowers,  545. 

T.  NeUis,  970. 
Brown,  In  re,  977. 

T.  Ayres,  950. 

Y.  Balde,  275. 

Y.  Barnes,  155. 

Y.  BarngroTer,  63,  421. 

Y.  Bartlett,  165. 

Y.  Bates,  938b. 

Y.  B^nett,  329. 

Y.  Birdsall,  771,  864. 

Y.  Bradford,  588. 

Y.  Brown,  352,  808. 

Y.  Butler,  438. 

Y.  Campbell,  3C3,  685,  783,  789. 

Y.  Oanal  Oo.,  486. 

Y.  Carraway,  33. 

Y.  Causey,  248. 

Y.  Chaney,  534,  574. 

Y.  Chapman,  80,  224,  362. 

Y.  Christie,  261. 

Y.  City  of  New  York,  87,  697,  729. 

Y.  Coal  Co.,  24. 

Y.  Cody,  684. 

Y.  Darrah,  641. 

Y.  Dudley,  593,  594. 

Y.  DufTus,  257. 

Y.  Baton,  920. 

Y.  Edgerton,  34. 

Y.  Bvans,  21. 

Y.  Feeter,  976. 

Y.  Gale,  42& 

Y.  Harley,  482,  486. 

Y.  Hearon,  245,  567. 

Y.  Howard,  536. 

Y.  Huber,  351. 

Y.  Hume,  52. 

Y.  Hyman,  412. 

Y.  Insurance  Co.,  248,  814,  816. 

T.  Kern,  989. 


CITED. 

499  in  Yol.  1;  rosldao  In  toI.  L] 

Brown  y.  King,  621. 
V.  Kirkbride,  70a 
Y.  Lanman,  250. 
Y.  Lawler,  159. 
Y.  Lee,  98. 
Y.  Luehrs,  384. 
V.  McCune,  167. 
Y.  McKinney,  191. 
Y.  McMullen,  572. 
V.  Mfg.  Co.,  22. 
Y.  Montgomery,  142. 
Y.  Moran,  729. 
Y.  Nichols,  225,  272. 
Y.  Nickle,  650. 
Y.  0*Connell,  175. 
Y.  Parker,  861,  892. 
Y.  Porter,  121. 
Y.  RaUroad  Co.,  103,  866. 
Y.  Reed,  659. 
Y.  Rhinehart,  318. 
Y.  Rice,  22. 
Y.  Roberts,  656. 
Y.  Scott,  948. 
Y.  Searle,  16. 
Y.  Smart,  807. 
Y.  Smyth,  160. 
Y.  Somerville,  593. 
Y.  Sprague,  704,  705. 
Y.  Squires'  Adm*r,  733. 
Y.  Stegemann,  351. 
Y.  Swann,  32,  384,  385. 
Y.  Taylor,  567. 
Y.  Telephone  Co.,  743. 
V.  Thornton,  308. 
V.  Tillman,  534,  783. 
V.  Todd's  Adm'r,  872. 
Y.  Toeirs  Adm'r,  379. 
Y.  Trulock,  970. 
Y.  Tucker,  229. 
Y.  Yandermeulen,  32. 
Y.  Wadsworth.  524. 
Y.  Walker,  360,  541. 
V.  Warren,  346a,  1000. 
Y.  Webb,  490. 
Y.  Wheeler,  127,  128,  648. 
Y.  White,  995. 
V.  Wiley,  589. 
Y.  Williams,  454. 
Y.  Wilson,  378,  380. 
Y.  Wootton,  778. 
Y.  Wuskoff,  464. 
Y.  Wygant,  487,  48a 
Y.  Wynkoop,  000. 


Ivii 


lyUi 


CABEB  CITBD. 
CftafiMaeM  to  Mctionp.   IS  1  to  409  la  toL  1;  rtsidva  la  vol.  1.] 


Browne  v.  Browne,  107. 

V.  Cassem,  57,  61. 

V.  French,  586. 

V.  Joy,  299. 
Browner  v.  Davis,  544. 
Browne  &  Mauzanares  Co.  y.  Canavez, 

484,  485. 
Brownfield  v.  Dyer,  281. 
Browning  v.  Uoane,  322,  326»  a47. 
Brownlee  v.  Com'rs,  135. 
Brown's  Adm'r  v.  Johnson,  770,  773. 
Brown's  Appeal,  466. 
Brownsville  Taxing  Dist.  v.  Loague, 

253a. 
Brozton  v.  Nelson,  734. 
Bruce  v.  Gloutman,  278,  959. 

V.  Conyers,  36. 

▼.  Dpollttle,  179. 

V.  Foley,  518,  726. 

V.  Osgood,  274,  506,  541. 

▼.  Sugg,  400. 

V.  Vogel,  450,  459. 
Bruce's  Ex'x  v.   Strickland's  Adm'r, 

307. 
Bruclcman  v.  Taussig,  835,  875,  966. 
Brumbaugh  v.  Schnebly,  363. 

V.  Stoclcnmn,  341. 
Brummagim  v.  Ambrose,  642. 
Brundred  v.  Egbert,  261. 
Brunner's  Appeal,  55. 
Bruno  v.  Oylatt,  493. 
Brunsden  v.  Humphrey,  740. 
Brury  v.  Smith.  616. 
Hruschke  v.  Der  Nord  Chicago  Schuet- 

zen  Vereln,  218. 
Brush  V.  Cook,  577. 

V.  Kaiiroad  Co.,  144. 

V.  Bobbins,  306. 

V.  Wilson,  586. 
Brush  Electric  Co.  v.  Electric  Co.,  509. 

V.  Improvement  Co.,  27. 
Brusie  V.  Peck  Bros.  &  Co.,  157. 
Bryan  v.  Alexander,  664. 

V.  Esiton,  408. 

V.  Kennett,  194,  246. 

V.  Miller,  63,  68. 
Bryant  v.  Allen,  633, 

V.  Harding,  293. 

V.  Hunter,  518. 

V.  Johnson,  299. 

V.  Keed,  782,  905. 

V.  Richardson,  346a. 


Bryar  v.  Bryar,  690. 

V.  Campbell,  786. 
Bryn  Mawr  Nat.  Bank  ▼.  JamM, 
Bryson  v.  St.  Helen,  783. 
Buchan  v.  Sumner,  420,  44& 
Buchanan  v.  Biggs,  799. 

V.  Kauffman,  572. 

V.  Plow  Co.,  57,  flO. 

V.  Port,  884. 

v.  Railroad  Co.,  613,  686. 

v.  Rucker,  220,  227,  836. 

V.  Springer,  750. 

V.  Thomason,  306. 
Buchegger  v.  Shultz,  152. 
Bucher  v.  Raihroad  Co.,  688. 
Buck  V.  Buck,  526. 

V.  Havens,  351. 

V.  Littie,  142. 

V.  Rhodes,  671. 

V.  Spofford,  694^ 

▼.  Wilson,  735. 
Buckingham,  Appeal  of,  661. 

y.  Ludlum,  566. 

V.  McCracken,  16. 
Bucki  &  Son  Lumber  Co.  T.  liUmber 

Co..  734. 
Buckland  v.  Jc^nson,  778. 
Buckles  v.  Bank,  154. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  691. 
Buckley  v.  Duff,  16.     . 
Buckmaster  v.  Carlin,  244. 

V.  Grundy,  632,  lOOll 
Buckueil  V.  Deering,  421. 
Buckner  v.  Finley,  8^. 

V.  Geodeker,  550. 

V.  I^ucaster,  510. 
Buck's  Appeal,  492. 
Budd  V.  Finley,  651. 

V.  Gamble,  374, 

V.  Shock,  57. 
Buddress  v.  Schafer,  733. 
Buehlcr's  Heirs  v.  Buffington,  499. 
Buell  V.  Emerlch,  324. 
Buena  Vista  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  345. 
Buena  Vista  Petroleum  Co.  y.  Mining 

Co.,  530. 
Buffington  y.  Cook,  599. 
Buffum  V.  Ramsdell,  211. 

V.  Stimpson,  896. 
Buford  y.  Adair,  54a 

y.  Buford,  916. 

y.  Rucker,  600. 


CRcCflrenew  to  flections.    K 1  to  199  In  vol.  1;  reeldue  In  vol.  2.] 


Uz 


Bnhl  ▼.  Wagner,  449. 

Building,  Light  &  Water  Go.  ▼.  Fray, 

e07. 
Bulger,  Ex  parte,  258. 
Balkley  t.  Andrews,  644. 

V.  Stewart  52B. 
Bulkly  T.  Healy,  609. 
BuU  V.  Mathews,  98,  102. 
Bullard  v.  Sherwood,  88. 
Bullene  ▼.  Hlatt,  425. 
Bullenkamp  y.  Bullenkamp,  188. 
BuUer  ▼.  Sidell,  979. 
BuUitt  T.  Taylor,  988b. 
Bullock  y.  BaUew,  970. 
y.  Bullock,  872,  933. 
y.  Winter,  359. 
Bump  y.  Butler  County,  270. 
Bumstead  y.  Read,  240. 
Bunding  y.  Miller,  412. 
Bundy  y.  Cunningham,  666. 

y.  Maginess,  121. 
Bunker  y.  Gilmore,  506. 
v.  Langs,  746. 
y.  Tufts,  729. 
Bunker  Hill  &  Sullivan  Mining  &  Con- 
centrating Co.  V.  Mining  Co.,  713. 
Bunn  y.  Lindsay,  4o3. 
Bunnel  y.  Pinto.  526,  736. 
Bunnell  y.  Bridge  Co.,  23. 
Bunnell  &  Eno  Inv.  Co.  y.  Curtis,  311. 
Buntain  v.  Blackburn,  393. 
Bunton  v.  Lyford,  374. 
Buntyn  y.  Holmes.  560. 
Burch  v.  Newburj-,  298. 
y.  Scott,  153,  368. 
v.  West,  361. 
Burcham  v.  Terry,  247. 
Burden  y.  Homsby,  33. 
Bnrdlck  y.  Cameron,  751. 
y.  Post,  609. 
y.  Railroad  Co.,  604. 
Burd's  Ex'rs  v.  McGregor's  Adm'r,  644. 
Borford  v.  Kersey,  731. 
Burge  y.  Gaudy,  124. 
Burgess  y.  Cave,  946. 
V.  Loyengood,  372. 
y.  Mortgage  Co.,  703. 
Y.  Kuggles,  34. 
V.  Souther,  962. 
Burghardt  y.  Van  Deusen.  646,  660. 
Burgwald  v.  Welppert,  101. 
Borbans  y.  Van  Zandt,  504. 

y.  Village  of  Norwood  Park,  352. 


Burk  V.  Hill,  19U. 
Burke  v.  Elliott,  522. 

v.  Miller,  609. 

y.  Stokely,  199,  201,  341. 

y.  Ward,  354. 

V,  Wheat,  367. 
Burldiam  v.  Van  Saun,  69. 
Burkhard  v.  Smith,  324. 
Burlen  y.  Shannon,  613,  615,  624,  657^ 

754,  803,  822,  928,  932. 
Burley  v.  Filby,  351. 
Burling  Y.  Goodman,  92,  152. 
Burllngham  y.  Vandevender,  546. 
Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  B.  Co.  y.  Sim- 
mons, 48. 
Burn  y.  Bletcher,  836. 
Burner  y.  Heyener,  69L 
Bumes  v.  Simpson,  966. 
Burnett,  Ex  parte,  257. 

y.  Ballund,  98. 

y.  Crandail,  944. 

y.  Milnes,  393a. 

y.  Smith,  763. 

V.  State,  130,  185. 
Bumey  v.  Boyett,  450. 

V.  Hunter,  1016. 
Bumham  v.  Bumham,  560,  641. 

V.  City  of  Chicago,  155. 

y.  Bailing,  127. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  la 

y.  Smith,  347. . 

V.  Webster,  828,  829. 
Burnley  v.  Rice,  373. 

V.  Stevenson,  857,  872. 
Burns  v.  Bangert,  948. 

V.  Gavin,  539. 

V.  Hodgdon,  656. 

y.  Monell,  615. 

y.  Scooffy,  343. 

y.  Simpson,  958. 

y.  Thornburgh,  1000. 
Bumside  v.  Bumside,  867. 

V.  Ennis,  346. 
Burns  &  Smith  Lumber  Co.  y.  Doyle, 

242. 
Burpee  v.  Smith,  368. 
Burr  v.  Mathers,  52,  57. 

v.  Mendenhall,  1007. 
Burrill  v.  West,  573. 
Burritt  v.  Belfy,  747,  749. 
Burrows  v.  Cox,  23. 

V.  Jemino,  820. 

y.  Niblack,  98,  101. 


IX  CASES 

CRefarencM  to  Mctlont.   ||  1  to 

Burson  y.  Blair»  962,  053. 
Burt  V.  Casey,  992,  993. 

y.    McBaiii,  197. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  173,  175. 

y.  Scranton,  85. 

y.  Sternburgh,  504,  657,  787. 

y.  Stevens,  211,  771. 
Burtls  y.  Cook,  953. 
Burton,  In  re,  760. 

v.  Barlow's  Estate,  617. 

y.  Burton,  510. 

y.  Gagnon,  646. 

y.  Hazzard,  600. 

y.  Huma,  664. 

y.  Hynson,  375,  389. 

y.  Lawrence,  50. 

y.  Perry,  219,  296. 

y.  Smith,  428. 

y.  Stewart,  970. 

V.  Township,  261. 

y.  WUey,  375. 
Burtt  y.  Barnes,  29. 
Burwell  y.  Jackson,  970. 
Busch  y.  Jones^  620. 
Buschlng  y.  Sunman,  326. 
Buse  y.  Bartlett,  281. 
Busenbark  y.  Busenbark,  359. 
Bush,  In  re,  320a. 

y.  Arnold,  938b. 
•     y.  Bush,  136. 

y.  Farris,  406a. 

V.  Glover,  173. 

y.  Hanson,  279. 

y.  Knox,  549. 

y.  Merriman,  766. 

y.  Monteith,  350. 

V.  O'Brien,  367,  691. 

v.  Sheldon,  633. 
Bushee  v.  Surles,  269. 
Bushong  v.  Taylor,  987. 
Busklrk,  Ex  parte,  256. 
Bussey  v.  Dodge,  607. 
Butcher  v.  Bank,  860,  875. 

V.  Taylor,  36. 
Bute  V.  Brainerd,  770. 
Butler  y.  Ashworth,  995. 

y.  Eaton,  511. 

y.  Fayer weather,  22. 

V.  Horwitz,  152. 

y.  James.  462. 

y.  Mitchell,  :)11,  347. 

y.  Morse,  341. 

V.  Owen,  908. 


CITBD. 

4M  in  voL  1;  residue  in  voL  2.] 

Butler  y.  Railroad  Co..  352. 

y.  Soule,  326. 

y.  Vineyard  Co.,  186. 
Butte  Butchering  Co.  v.  Clarke,  348, 

351. 
Butterfleld  v.  Smith,  644. 

v.  Town  of  Ontario,  747. 
Butterfield's  Appeal,  269. 
Buttrick  v.  Allen,  826,  828. 
Butts  v.  Armor's  Estate,  16. 

y.  Cruttenden,  405,  406. 
Butz  y.  Muscatine,  985b. 
Byers  v.  Butterfleld,  33. 

y.  Fowler,  285.  413,  416. 
Bynum  v.  Barefoot,  986. 
Byram  y.  McDowell,  232. 
Byrket  v.  State,  737. 
Byrne  v.  Hoag,  158. 

y.  Hudson,  27. 

v.  Hume,  643. 

V.  Prather.  510,  685. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  742. 


Cabell  y.  Given,  407. 

Cackley  v.  Smith,  680. 

Cadaval  v.  Collins,  758. 

Caddy  v.  Barlow,  529. 

Cade  v.  McFarland,  745. 

Cadmus  v.  Jackson,  247. 

Cadwallader  v.  McClay,  322,  361. 

Cadwell  v.  Dullaghan,  135. 

Cage  y.  Cassidy,  373. 

Cagger  v.  Gardiner,  313. 

Cahill  y.  Lilienthal,  347. 

Cahnmann  v.  Railroad  Co.,  740. 

Cahoon  y.  McCuUock,  770. 

Cairo  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Holbrook,  136. 

Cake  y.  Bhd,  1010. 

Cake's  Appeal,  447. 

Calderwood  v.  Brooks,  549. 

Caldwell  v.  Bryan,  23. 

y.  Carrington,  938c. 

y.  Carter,  349. 

v.  Fifleld,  321. 

y.  Harp,  236. 

y.  Jacob,  554. 

v.  Martin,  996. 

v.  Taggart,  585. 

V.  Walters,  5o,  293. 
Caledonia  Ins.  Co.  y.  Wenar,  866. 


CASES 
[References  to  sectiona.    §9 1  to 

Calef  v.  Parsons,  169. 
Caley  v.  Morgan,  68,  480,  945. 
Calboun  v.  Adams,  486. 

y.  Insurance  Co.,  814. 

V.  Pace,  152. 

▼.  Ross,  270. 

V.  Terry  Porter  Co.,  118. 
California  Beet  Sugar  Co.  v.  Porter, 

370. 
California    Dry    Dock    Co.    ▼.    Arm- 
strong, 740. 
California   Southern   R.   Co.   v.   Rail- 
road Co.,  109. 
California  &  O.  Land  Co.  y.  Worden, 

612, 
Calkins  y.  Allerton,  549. 
Call  y.  Cozart,  481. 
Callahan  y.  Fahey,  490. 

y.  Griswold,  245,  293. 

y.  Murrell,  737. 
Callahan's  Estate,  In  re,  3a 
Callan  y.  Lukens,  79a. 
Callanan  y.  Bank,  302,  339. 

y.  Votruba,  404. 
Callen  y.  £ailson,  190,  270,  273. 
CalUcott,  In  re,  257. 
Callis  y.  Cogbill.  567. 
Calloway  y.  Byram,  70. 

y.  Cooley,  250. 

y.  Glenit,  583,  859. 

y.  McElroy,  388. 
Calloway's  Heirs  v.  Eubank,  491. 
Calyerly  y.  Phelp,  585. 
Calyert  y.  Ash,  315. 

y.  Boyill,  816,  817. 

y.  Roche,  446. 
Camberford  v.  Hall,  513. 
Cambridge  Valley  Nat.  Bank  y.  Lynch, 

29. 
Camden  y.  Plain,  284. 
Came  y.  Brigham,  200,  583. 
Cameron  y.  Bennett,  27,  29. 

y.  Boyle.  261. 

y.  Cameron,  COO. 

y.  Hintou,  707. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  114,  703. 

y.  Wurtz's  Adm'r,  863. 
Cammell  y.  Sewell,  795,  813,  844. 
Camoran  y.  Thurmond,  135. 
Camp  y.  Baker,  493. 
y.  Forrest,  650,  059. 
y.  GaJn?r.  4J)8. 
y.  Phillips,  86,  313. 


CITBD.  1x1 

499  in  Tol.  1;  retidae  in  yol.  11 

Camp  y.  Ward,  372,  393. 

V.  Wood,  53. 
Campbell  y.  Ayres,  556. 

y.  Bank,  269. 

V.  Booth,  1015. 

V.  Brown,  220,  278. 

V.  Butts,  625. 

V.  Campl>ell,  31a. 

V.  Com.,  175. 

V.  Consalus,  617. 

V.  Cross.  657,  658,  790. 

V.  Donovan,  83,  354. 

V.  Edwards,  376. 

V.  Goddard,  75. 

V.  Hall,  551,  655. 

V.  Hays,  83,  224,  263. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  904. 

V.  Ketcham,  371. 

V.  McHarg,  209. 

V.  Mayhugh,  761. 

y.  Mesier,  127. 

y.  Nixon,  661a. 

V.  Phelps,  580. 

y.  Pope,  1007. 

y.  Potts,  703. 

y.  Spence,  417,  473,  1007. 

y.  Steele,  771. 

y.  Strong.  504,  641. 

y.  Swasey,  225. 

y.  Williamson,  816. 
Campbell  Printing  Press  &  Mfg.  Co.  y. 

Marder,  Luse  &  Co.,  263,  393. 
Campbell's  Appeal,  496,  957,  999. 
Campbell's  Registration,  In  re,  727. 
Campion  v.  Friedberg,  948,  988. 
Canady  y.  Detrick,  593. 
Canal  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Brown,  580. 
Canal  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  609. 
Candee  y.  Clark,  776. 

y.  Lord,  605. 
Candler  v.  Pettit,  349. 
Canjolle  y.  Ferrle,  633. 
Cannon  v.  Brame,  787. 

y.  Harrold,  338. 

y.  Hemphill,  39,  109. 

y.  McDaniel,  641. 

y.  Nelson,  584. 

y.  State,  693. 
Cannon  River  Manufacturers*  Ass'n  y. 

Rogers,  540. 
Cantrell  y.  Ford,  950. 
Capehart  v.  Cunningham,  220. 

V.  Etheridge,  391. 


fadi  CASKS 

OtMtfencMi  to  Mctlons.    §i  I  to 

Gapell  ▼.  Moses,  39. 

Capen  v.  Inhabitants,  157,  30G. 

Oaperton  y.  Hall,  646. 

T.  Schmidt,  504,  655. 
Capital  City  Dairy  Co.  v.   Pluumier, 

772. 
Capital    Lumbering   Co.    y.    Learned, 

941. 
Capital  Savings  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v. 

Swan,  335. 
Capllng  V.  Herman,  849. 
Captain   of  The  Mollie  Hamilton   v. 

Paschal,  116. 
Carberry  v.  Railroad  Co.,  720. 
Carbiener  y.  Montgomery,  609. 
Card  y.  Melneke,  110. 
Cardesa  y.  Humes,  493. 
Carey  v.  Browne,  338,  346a. 

y.  Giles.  707. 

T.  Rooseyelt,  536,  540,  561,  970. 

y.  Wilcox,  667. 
Carlt  y.  Williams,  677. 
Carkhuff  v.  Anderson,  433. 
Carl  y.  Coal  Co.,  16. 
Carland  v.  Custer  County,  175. 
Carleton   v.   Bickford,   227,   289,   835, 
897,  901,  906. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  270,  279,  906. 

y.  Lombard,  624. 
Carley  y.  Carley,  320. 
Carli  y.  Rhener,  176. 
Carlin  y.  Brackett,  708. 

y.  Taylor,  906. 
Carlisle  y.  Godwin,  398. 

y.  Howes,  615,  722. 

y.  Killebrew,  654. 

y.  Wilkinson,  311. 
Carlson  y.   Carlson,  691. 

y.  Phinney,  330. 
Carlton  v.  Davis,  671. 

y.  Patterson,  155. 

y.  Young,  483. 
Carmack  v.  Com.,  588. 
Cannichael  v.  Abrahams,  411. 

v.  Governor,  588. 
Cnrmody  v.  City  of  Rome,  521. 
Carraony  v.  Hoober,  6J)3. 
Carnarvon  v.  Viilebois.  006. 
Carnes  y.  Crandall,  48:^. 
Caraey  v.  Village  of  Marseilles.  378. 
Carolina  Inv.  Co.  v.  Kelly,  S(*. 
Carolina  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ass'u,  301. 
Carolus  v.  Koch,  384. 


CFTBD. 

4M  in  vol.  1;  residua  In  vol.  2.) 

Carondelet  Canal  Nav.  Co.  y.  City  of 

New  Orleans,  32. 
Carothers  v.  Lange,  153,  483. 
Carpenter  v.  Butler,  958. 

v.  Cameron,  635. 

y.  Canal  Co.,  545. 

y.  Dexter,  860. 

y.  AlcClure,  594. 

y.  Pier,  935. 

y.  Ritchie,  896,  898,  908. 

v.  Sheldon,  138. 

y.  Sherfy,  118. 

y.  SUlwell,  998. 

V.  Strange,   857,  872. 

V.  Thornton,  962. 
Cariientier  v.  Brenham,  141. 

V.  City  of  Oakland,  272,  973. 
Carr  v.  Bank,  324. 

v.  Brick,  514. 

y.  Dawes,  343. 

y.  Fife,  530. 

y.  Miner,  291. 

y.  School  Dist,  354. 

y.  Townsend's  Ex'rs,  200,  498. 

y.  U.  S.,  578. 

v.  Weld,  1008. 
Carrigan  v.  Semple,  563. 
Carrlngton  v.  Holabird,  357,  365,  368. 
Carroll  v.  Board,  532. 

y.  Carroll,  635. 

y.  Goldschmidt,  549. 

V.  Watkins,  413,  415. 
Carr's  Will,  In  re,  335. 
Carshore  v.  Huyck,  985. 
Carskadden  v.  McGhee,  160. 
Carson  v.  Clark,  693. 

V.  Machine  Co.,  504. 

y.  Moore,  491. 

y.  Taylor,  265. 
Carstarphen  v.  Holt,  682. 
Carter  v.  Adamson,  892. 

v.  Bennett,  357,  862. 

v.  Caldwell.  31a. 

y.  Carriger's  Adm'rs,  199,  482a. 

y.  Challen.  421. 

y.  Christie,  147. 

y.  Couch.  613. 

y.  Elmore,  114. 

y.  Eugles,  641. 

y.  Gibson,  242. 

y.  Hnuna.  701. 

y.  Kaiser,  324. 

V.  ^IcBroom,   135. 


CASBS  CITBO. 
[Referencei  t*  aecttoa*.    H I  to  4W  in  toI.  1;  reild««  in  toI.  2.] 


Ixiii 


Carter  ▼.  Paige,  904. 

▼.  Scaggai  663. 

T«  Torrance,  301. 
Garter,  Bice  &  Ca  t.  Howard,  556. 
Carthage  Turnpike  Co.  y.   Overman, 

106. 
Camth  y.  Grigsby.  586. 
Caruthers  y.  Corblu,  022. 

y.  Hartafiekl,  302,  377. 

y.  WlUlams,  000. 
Canrer  y.  Adams,  118. 

y.  Canrer,  103. 
Caryill  y.  Garrigues.  021,  734,  785. 
Cary  y.  Dixon,  100,  191. 

y.  State,  170. 
Case  y.  Bartliolow,  000. 

y.  Beauregard,  720. 

y.  Bridge  Co.,  013. 

y.  Case,  313. 

y.  Hawicins,  069. 

y.  Huey,  037. 

y.  Ingle,  28,  20. 

y.  Mannls,  164. 

y.  Plato,  118. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  720. 

y.  Rlbelln,  200. 

y.  State,  06. 
Casebeer  y.  Mowry,  684. 
Case  Threshing  Machine  Ca  y.  Peder- 

son,  063. 
Casey  y.  Galli.  531. 

y.  McFallB,  663. 

y.  People,  273. 
Cashman  v.  Henry.  102. 
Casoni  y.  Jerome,  580. 
Cass  y.  Adams,  1007. 
Cass  County  y.  Johnston,  065b. 
Cassel  y.  Scott,  367.   . 
Cassels  y.  Vernon,  635. 
Cassidy  y.  Leltch,  007. 

y.  Time-Stamp  Co.,  373,  374. 
Cassill  y.  Morrow,  766. 
Castellaw  y.  Guilmartin.  561. 
Casteiline  y.  Mundy,  3(M). 
Castle  v.  Noyes,  540,  570.  655. 
Castledine  y.  Mundy,  300. 
Castleman  y.  Templeman,  583. 
Castlio  y.  Bishop,  347. 
Oaston  y.  Perry.  755. 
Castriqne  v.  Behrens.  810. 

y.  Imrle,  814,  810,  827,  843. 
Castro  y.  lilies,  402. 


Caswell  y.  Caswell,  260. 

y.  Comstock,  44. 
Oatawba  Mills  y.  Hood,  734. 
Gates  y.  Riley,  264. 
Catbcart  v.  Peck,  100. 
Cathcart*s  Appeal,  1007. 
Catlin  y.  Latsou,  82. 

y.  Robinson,  430. 

y.  Underbill,  870. 
Catron  y.  Lafayette  County,  962. 
Catterlin  v.  City  of  Frankfort,  575. 
Cattlin  V.  Kemot,  1012. 
Caudle  y.  Dare,  1008. 
Caughey  v.  Eleyator  Co.,  343. 
Caughran  y.  Gilman,  877,  806^  000. 
Cauhape  y.  Parke,  713. 
Caujolle  y.  Curtiss,  683. 
C.  Aultman  &  Co.  y.  Wirth,  116e 
Oauthom  v.  Berry,  138,  155,  106. 

V.  King,  207. 
Cavan  v.  Stewart,  840. 
Cayanaugh  y.  Buehler,  611. 

y.  Peterson,  446. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  354. 

y.  Smith,  278. 
Cave  V.  City  of  Houston,  118. 
Cavender  v.  Guild.  880. 

y.  Smith's  Heirs,  211,  422. 
Cavln  V.  Williams,  145. 
Cawley  y.  Leonard,  301. 
Cayce  y.  Stoyall,  482,  400. 
Caylus  y.  Railroad  Co.,  674. 
Cecil  y.  Cecil,  584,  033,  635. 

y.  Johnson,  650. 
Central  Appalachian  Co.  y.  Buchanan, 

1005. 
Central  Bank  y.  Gibson,  218,  27a 

y.  Veasey,  064. 
Central  Baptist  Church  ft  Society  v. 

Manchester,  540. 
Central  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  y.  Bank,  406, 

406,  462,  475. 
Central  Irr.  Dist,  In  re,  282. 
Cantral  Nat  Bank  v.  Hazard,  540. 

y.  Stevens,  360. 
Central  R.  Co.  v.  Brinson,  740. 
Central  R.  R.  &  Banking  Co.  y.  Smith, 

flOS. 
Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Bridges,  508. 

V.  Clark,  616. 

v.- Condon,  583a. 

y.  Henuen,  583a. 


Ixiv 


CASES  CITED. 
IReferencei  to  sectloni.    §§  1  to  499  in  yoI.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.] 


Central  Trust  Co.  v.  McGeorge,  217. 

V.  Madden,  48. 

v.  Railroad  Co.,  .48. 

y.  Season  good,  251. 
C.  Graham  &  Sons  Co.  v.  Van  Horn, 

750. 
Chace  v.  Vasquez,  44. 
Chadbourn  t.  Johnston,  325. 
Chaddock  v.  Barry,  282. 
Chadrou   Building  &.  Loan   Ass'n  v. 

Hamilton,  445. 
Chaffe  V.  Morgan,  632. 
Chaffee  v.  Hooper,  138,  267. 
Chatliu  T.  Fulkerson,  335. 

V.  Kimball's  Heirs.  197. 
Chaboon  v.  Hollenback,  438. 
Chalfant  v.  Monros,  106. 
Challenor  v.  Nlles,  482a,  483.  488. 
Challis  V.  Headley,  326. 
Chamberlain  v.  Blodgett,  232. 

V.  Bradley,  607. 

V.  Carlisle,  788. 

V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  606. 

V.  Faris,  904. 

V.  Gaillard,  614. 

V.  Godfrey,  588. 

V.  Hopper,  661a. 

V.  Pierson,  529. 

V.  Preble,  567,  705. 

V.  Sutherland,  723. 
Chamberlin  v.  Murphy,  779. 

V.  Vance,  152. 
Chambers  v.  Bridge  Manufactory,  288, 
377. 

V.  Carson,  487. 

V.  Clearwatar,  174. 
.    V.  Denie,  61. 

V.  Hodges,  358. 

V.  Lapsley,  577. 

V.  McDowell,  967. 

V.  Xeal,  299. 

V.  I*rewitt,  585. 

V.  Bobbins,  373. 

V.  Upton,  210. 
Chamley  v.  Dusany,  145. 
Champ  V.  Kendrick,  23. 
Champion  v.  Sessions,  179. 
Champlin  v.  Bakewell,  216. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  41. 

V.  Smith,  713. 

V.  Tilley,  209. 
Chandler  v.  Drew,  1000. 

V.  Furbish,  1006. 


Chandler  v.  Higgins,  1008. 

V.  Nash,  282. 
Chandler's  Ez'r,  Appeal  of,  634. 
Chandler  &  Taylor  Co.  y.  Norwood,  90. 
Chaney  v.  Bryan,  901. 

V.  Ramey,  138. 
Chant  V.  Reynolds,  560,  577. 
Chapdelaine  v.  Handy,  346. 
Chapin  v.  Broder,  118,  411. 

V.  Curtis,  707. 

V.  McLaren.  60,  68. 

V.  Thompson,  52.  58^  77,  212. 
Chapman,  In  re,  255. 

V.  Armistead,  650. 

y.  Blakeman,  1016. 

y.  Brewer,  248. 

y.  Chapman,  462,  867. 

y.  Douglas  County,  892. 

y.  Hatt,  1011. 

y.  Holmes,  567. 

y.  Hughes,  611. 

y.  Nelson,  483. 

y.  Sloan,  975. 

y.  State,  182,  532. 

V.  Wells,  108. 
Chappel  V.  Chappel,  63. 
Chappell  V.  Comins,  36. 

V.  Pooling  Co.,  304a,  326. 
Chapron  v.  Cassaday.  432,  433. 
Chaquette  v.  Ortet,  9G4. 
Chard  v.  Holt,  549. 
Charles  v.  Haskins,  775,  942,  061. 
Charley  y.  Kelley,  247. 
Chase  y.  Christianson,  141. 

y.  Curtis,  938c. 

y.  Driver,  41. 

y.  Giknan,  122,  443. 

y.  Jefferson^  684. 

y.  Manhardt,  373,  381. 

y.  Miles,  504. 

y.  Swain,  504. 

y.  Tuckwood,  246,  293. 

y.  Walker,  784. 

V.  Whitten,  158. 

y.  Woodward.  954. 
Chase's  Case,  722. 

Chattanooga,  R.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Jack- 
son, 080. 
Chatterton  y.  Young,  190. 
Chauncey  y.  Wass,  247. 
Chautauqua   County  Bank  T.   Risley, 
42,S. 

y.  W-hite,  434. 


CASES 
CBeferences  to  sections,    tt  1  to 

Chavent  v.  Schefer,  731. 
Cbeairs  v.  Slaten,  593. 
Cheatham,  £x  parte,  213. 

V.  Morrison,  587. 
Cheek  v.  Pugh,  211,  219. 
i:heeseman  t.  Thome,  66L 
Cheever  v.  Mirrlck,  998. 

V.  Wilson,  932. 
Chemical  Bank  t.  Bulkley,  946. 
Chemung  Canal  Bank  v.  Judson,  275. 
Cheney  v.  Cooper,  699. 

V.  Cross,  538. 

V.  Hovey,  387. 

V.  Patton,  538,  790. 

V.  Stone,  716. 
(*heraw  &  0.  R.  Go.  v.  Marshall,  490. 
Cheriot  V.  Foussat,  818. 
Cherry  v.  Speight,  922. 

V.  York,  657,  786. 
Chesapeake  Bank  v.  Swain,  152. 
Che84ipi»ake,    O.    &   S.   W.   R.   Co.   v. 

Dyer  Co.,  529. 
Chesapeake   &  O.   Canal  Co.  v.  Git- 
tings,  614. 
Chesley  v.  St.  Clair,  581. 
Chesnut  v.  Marsh,  247. 
Chester  t.  Apperson,  375. 

V.  MUler,  225,  368,  376. 

Y.  Plalstow,  99a 
Chester  City  Presbyterian  Church  v. 

Gonlin,  682. 
Chesterfield  t.  Perkins,  524. 
Chew  V.  Bnimagim,  857,  862. 
Chezam  t.  Glaypool,  691. 
Chicago  T.  Bobbins,  575. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Hitchcock 
County,  272. 

V.  SchalTer,  743. 

V.  Wlngler,  135. 
rhlcago  City  R.  Co.  v.  Blanchard,  950. 
Chicago  Clock  Co.  v.  Tobin,  213. 
Chicago  Driving  Park  v.  West,  269. 
Chicago  Fire-Proofing  Co.  v.  Bank,  77. 
Chicago   Forge  &  Bolt  Co.  v.   Rose, 

C83. 
Chlcngo.   K.   &  W.  R.  Co.  v.   Black, 

731. 
Chicago,  M.  A  St  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoyt, 

718. 
Chicago  Opera  House  Co.  y.  Paquin, 

745. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Berg, 

ILAWJUDG.— e 


CITED.  IXV 

499  In  vol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.] 

Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Campbell,. 
859,  897. 

V.  Depot  Co.,  506. 

V.  Sturm,  859,  889. 
Chicago  Tip  &  T.  Co.  v.  Bank,  50,  591 
Chicago  Trust  &  Sav.  Bank  y.   Kin- 

nare,  57. 
Chicago   Waifs'    Mission   &  Training 

School  V.  Electric  Co.,  307. 
Chicago  &  A.  Bridge  Co.  v.  Fowler,. 
938b. 

V.  Provision  Co.,  938. 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Clausen,  97^ 

V.  Ferry  Co.,  251,  860,  938c. 

V.  Maher,   743. 

V.  Pearson,  97. 
Chicago  &  E.  I.  R  Co.  v.  Hines,  97.^ 

V.  State,  714. 
Chicago  &  E.   R.   Co.  v.   Harshman,. 
560. 

V.  Kreig,  16. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Andrews,  29. 

V.  Packet  Co.,  567,  568,  574. 
Chicago  &  S.  E.  R.  Co.  v.   Higgins, 
963,  967. 

V.  Spencer,  240. 

V.  Wheeler,  96.  100. 

V.  Yawger.  725. 
Chichester  v.  Cande,  130,  692. 
Chickaming  v.  Carpenter,  985c» 
Chickering  v.  Failes,  232. 
Child  V.  Morgan,  508. 

V.  Powder  Works,  864. 

V.  Whitman,  162. 
Childress  v.  Smith,  141. 
Childs  V.  Dlgby,  801. 

Y.  Hayman,  793. 

Y.  Lanterman,  196b 

Y.  ^IcChesney,  109. 

Y.  ^rfg.  Co.,  7. 

Y.  Railroad  Co.,  310. 
Chiles  V.  Champenols,  717. 
Chilton  Y.  Town  of  Gratton,  583a. 
China  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  y.  Force,  576,  796. 
Chinn  y.  Mitchell,  379. 
Chipman  y.  Emrick,  149. 

Y.  Fowle,  1000. 

Y.  Martin,  746. 

Y.  Montgomery,  284,  633. 
Chirac  v.  Reinecker,  600,  606,  652. 
Chlsholm  Y.  State,  333. 
Chisolm  Y.  Chittenden,  1008. 
Chlssom  V.  Barbour,  126, 


Ixvi 


CASES  CITED. 


[References  to  Bectioni.    9§  1  to  499  in  yoI.  1;  residue  in  toI.  2.1 


Giiittenden  v.  Society,  44. 
Ghoat  V.  Bennett,  52. 
Clioate  V.  People,  487. 
Cboppin  y.  Bank,  660. 
Chouteau  v.  Gibson,  527,  651. 

V.  Rice,  32,  225. 
Chrisman  v.  Dlvinla,  261. 
Clirismau*9   A(lm*x   y.    Harman,    624, 

629. 
Christal  v.  Kelly,  225. 
Christensen's  Estate,  In  re,  218. 
Christian,  Ex  parte,  367. 

V.  O'Neal,  83,  224. 

V.  Yarborough,  16. 
Christiansen,  In  re,  513. 

V.  Mendham,  671. 
Christian  &  Craft  Grocery  Co.  v.  Cole- 
man, 829,  835,  849. 
Christie  v.  Bishop,  558,  956. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  115,  509. 

V.  Secretan,   817. 
Christmas   v.    Russell,   290,   857,   859, 

8S4,  892,  917.  918,  973. 
Christner  v.  Hochstetler,  55. 
Christoflferson  v.  Pfennig,  269,  281. 
Christy  v.  Sherman,  57,  376. 

V.  Waterworks,  660. 
Chrysler  v.  Renois,  152. 
Chudleigh  v.  Railroad  Co.,  557. 
Church  V.  Chapin,  605,  615. 

r.  Cole.  958. 

V.  Grossman,  114. 

V.  Hubbart.  849. 

V.  Lacy,  341. 

V.  Leavenworth,  504,  623. 
Churchill  V.  Holt,  574. 

V.  Morse,  420. 

V.  Warren,  1008. 
Churchman  y.  Martin,  152. 
Cincinnati.  S.  &  C.  R.  Co.  y.  Sloan,  32. 

y.  Village  of  Belle  Centre.  274. 
Cincinnati,    U.    &    F.    W.    R.    Go.    v. 

Wynne.   829. 
Cist  y.  Zeigler,  729. 
Citizens'  Bank  y.  Brlgham,  609. 

V.  Brooks,  127. 

y.  Miller,  538. 
Citizens'  Loan  Ass'n  y.  Martin,  408. 
Citizens'  Trust  &  Surety  Co.  y.  Good- 
child,  309. 
City  and  County  of  San  Francisco  y. 
Burr,  213. 

y.  Le  Roy,  G18,  004, 


City  Bank  of  New  Orleans  y.  Walden, 

707. 
City  Block  Dhrectory  Co.  y.  App,  340. 
City  Building  &  Loan  Aas'n  y.  Nickey, 

482a. 
City  Council  of  Anderson  y.  Fowler, 

527. 
City  Ins.  Co.  y.  Bank,  872. 
City  Nat.  Bank  y.  Swink,  483.  493. 
City  of  Aurora  y.  West  683.  790. 
City  of  Bath  y.  Palmer,  20. 
City  of  Boston  y.  Robbing,  250. 

y.  Worthingtou,  574,  575. 
City  of  Broken  Bow  y.  Waterworks 

Co.,  366.  381. 
City  of  Burrton  y.  Bank,  982. 
City  of  Cairo  y.  Eyerett,  985c. 
City  of  California  v.  Harlan,  160. 
City  of  Carlyle  y.  Power  Co.,  538. 
City  of  Cincinnati  y.  Emerson,  754. 

y.  Hafer,  468. 

y.  Hosea,  609. 
City  of  Cohoes  y.  Morrison,  57ri. 
City  of  Dayenport  y.  Railroad  Co.,  750. 
City  of  Delphi  y.  Startzman,  274. 
City  of  Detroit  y.  Ellis,  938. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  232. 
City  of  Duluth  v.  Dibblee,  313. 
City  of  East  St.  Louis  y.  Canty,  968, 
971. 

y.  U.  S.,  985a. 
City  of  Elkhart  y.  Slmonton,  533. 
City  of  Fostoria  y.  Fox.  218. 
City  of  Galena  y.  Amy,  985b,  985f. 
City  of  Goliad  y.  Welsiger,  358. 
City  of  Guthrie  y.  Lumber  Co.,  89. 
City  of  Hammond  y.  Eyans.  964,  966. 
City  of  Helena  y.  U.  S..  246.  253a. 
City  of  Houston  y.  Emery,  985d. 
City  of  Johnstown  y.  Wade.  40. 
City  of  Lancaster  v.  Frescoln.  754. 
City  of  La  Porte  y.  Organ,  115,  641. 

707. 
City  of  Little  Rock  v.  Bullock,  306. 
City  of  Los  Angeles  y.  Baldwin,  743. 

y.  Melius,  708,  709. 
City  of  Louisville  y.  Muldoon.  107. 
City  of  Lowell  y.  Parker,  295,  588. 
City   of   New   Orleans   y.   Bank.    516, 
534a,  582,  610,  617,  750. 

y.  Gaiithreaux,  179. 

y.  Peake.  32. 

V.  Warner,  87,  583a. 


CASES 
IRflferencM  to  secUons.    IS  l  to 

City  of  New  Orleans  v.  Whitney,  200, 

745. 
City  of  Newport  v.  Com.,  750. 
City  of  New  York  v.  Brady,  332,  574, 
575. 

T.  CoDStantine,  735. 

V.  Smith,  325,  354. 
City  of  North  Muskegon  v.  Clark,  709, 

718,  939a. 
City  of  Oakland  v.  Water-Front  Co., 

715. 
City  of  f>gden  v.  Irrigation  Co.,  32. 
City  of  Olney  v.  Harvey,  318,  985a. 
City  of  Oskaloosa  v.  Piukerton,  575. 
City  of  I'ana  v.  Humphreys,  86. 
City  of  Parsons  v.  Lindsay,  182. 
City  of  Peterson  v.  Baker,  506. 
City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Dobson,  290. 

▼.  Railroad  Co.,  617. 

T.  Simon.  1016. 

V.  fc^tewart,  774. 

T.  Weaver,  351. 
City  of  Portland  v.  Kicliardson,  575. 
City  of  Providence  v.  Adams,  657. 
City  of  Roodhouse  v.  Christian,  777. 
City  of  St.  Joseph  v.  Railroad  Co.,  575. 
City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Bissell,  567. 

T.  Gleason,  211. 

T.  Lang,  697. 

V.  Schuienburg  &  Boeekler,  650. 
City  of  Sherman  v.  Langham,  9,  253a. 
City  of  Spokane  Falls  v.  Curry,  354. 
City  of  Syracuse  v.  Reed,  183. 
City  of  Texarkana  v.  Rodgers,  23. 
City  of  Troy  v.  Railroad  Co.,  573. 
City  of  Washington  v.  Calhoun,  96. 
City  of  Wetumpka  v.  Wharf  Co.,  518. 
City  Savings  Bank  v.  Whittle,  145. 
Ciaason's  Appeal,  450,  451. 
Clabby  v.  Sheldon,  32. 
Claflln  V.  Butterly,  208. 

V.  l>od8ou,  63. 

V.  Dunne,  200,  203. 

V.  Fletcher,  539. 

V.  Mcr>ermott,  862,  088b. 
Claflin  &  Kimball  v.  Electric  Co.,  734. 
Claggett  V.  Simes,  1,  108,  513,  692. 
Claghom*8  Estate,  In  re,  54. 
Clapp  V.  Bromagham,  660. 

V.  Ely,  72. 

V.  Graves,  223. 

V.  McCabe,  242. 

V.  Thomas.  699. 


ciTBD.  Ixvii 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Clapp*s  Ex'rs  v.  Branch,  505,  872. 
Clare  v.  Clare,  177. 

V.  Raih*oad  Co.,  740. 
Clarlday  v.  Reed,  509. 
Ciark  v.  Baiiey,  293. 

v.  Bank,  687. 

V.  Barnard,  149. 

V.  Bettelhelm,  560,  651. 

V.  Blair,  624. 

V.  Boyreau,  652. 

V.  Bryau.  261,  270,  273,  282. 

V.  Butler,  447. 

V.  Butts,  446. 

V.  Carrington,  574. 

V.  Cliarles,  348. 

v.  Child,  882. 

V.  Clark,  155,  183,  926. 

V.  demeut,  992. 

V.  Com.,  175. 

V.  Compton,  87. 

V.  Digges,  163.  951. 

V.  Douglass.  291,  294. 

V.  Duke,  451. 

V.  Dunnam,  47. 

V.  Dyer,  742. 

V.  Ewing,  339. 

V.  Finnell,  239. 

V.  Fitch.  32. 

V.  Flannery,  585. 

V.  Gallaher,  142. 

V.  Goodwin,  058,  978. 

V.  Irvin,  529. 

V.  Jones,  734. 

V.  Kern,  247. 

V.  Kingsland,  941. 

V.  Lamb,  135,  165. 

V.  Lanier,  743. 

V.  Lary.  154. 

V.  Lee,  378. 

V.  Little,  972. 

V.  Lyon,  341. 

V.  McComman,  286. 

V.  Mattress  Co.,  720. 

V.  Moss,  945. 

V.  yiunroe,  447. 

V.  Newman's  Adm'x,  589. 

V.  Nordholt,  7JK). 

V.  Norman,  591. 

V.  Ogilvie,  916. 

V.  Ovharzabai.  324. 

v.  Parsons,  934. 

V.  People,  181. 

V.  Perdue,  577. 


Ixviii  CASES 

[Referencea  to  aections.    H  1  to 

Clark  V.  Perry,  313. 

V.  Railroad  Co..  950. 

V.  Raymond,  32. 

V.  Rowling,  977. 

V.  Sayers,  381. 

V.  Story,  1000. 

V.  Thompson,  194. 

V.  Village  of  North  Muskegon,  29. 

V.  Whitaker,  103. 

V.  Willet,  963. 

V.  Withers,  1007. 

V.  Wolf,  584. 

V.  Young,  C9t5,  714. 
Clarke,  Appeal  of,  536,  872. 

Ex  parte,  257. 

V.  Clarke,  872. 

V.  Dunham,  205. 

V.  Hogeman,  957. 

V.  Perry,  644. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  308. 

V.  Witram,  354. 

V.  Yorke,  742. 
Clark's  Adm'r  v.  Stroud,  680. 
Clark's  Cove  Guano  Co.  v.  Steed,  304a. 
Clarkson  v.  Beardsley,  958. 

V.  Manson,  144. 
Clary  v.  Brick  Co.,  98. 
Clawson  v.  Eichbaum,  450,  451. 
Claxton  V.  Swift,  774. 
Clay  V.  Clay,  892. 

V.  DeskJus,  938c. 

V.  Fry,  379,  389. 

V.  Ilildebrand,  123,  315. 

V.  Hoysradt,  989. 
Clay  County  v.  McAleer.  985f. 
Clayton  v.  Gresham,  640. 

V.  West,  600. 
Cleaton  v.  Chambllss,  787. 
Cleavenger  v.  Felton,  420. 
Cleaves  v.  Lord,  857,  8(M,  908, 
Clegg  V.  Fithian,  326. 
Cleiman  v.  Murphy,  996. 
(^Iclnnd  V.  Trust  Co..  335. 
Clemens  V.  Murphy,  623. 
Clement  v.  Field,  763. 
Clements  v.  BeiTy,  28. 

V.  Collins,  571. 

V.  Davis.  606. 

V.  Gerow,  63. 
Clemmer  v.  Cooper,  859. 
Clemons  v.  demons'  Estate,  971. 

v.  Heelan,  183. 
Clester  v.  Gibson,  39. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Cleveland  y.  Cbambliss,  599. 

V.  City  of  Bangor,  777. 

y.  Heidenheimer,  539. 

y.  McCanna,  1000. 

y.  Rogers,  966. 

y.  Shannon,  446. 

y.  Spencer,  543,  600. 
aeveland,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  y. 
Jenkins,  97. 

y.  Nuttall,  742,  743. 
Cleveland  Co-Op.  Stove  Co.  y.  Grimes, 

140.  ^ 

Cleveland    I^eader    Printing    Co.    v. 

Green,  132. 
Clews  V.  Lee  County,  253a,  985b. 
Click  V.  Gillespie,  375. 
Clifford  v.  Gruelle.  340a. 
Clifton  v.  Livor,  388. 
Clinch  Valley  Coal  Co.  y.  Tonkin,  906. 
Clink  V.  Thurston,  784. 
Clinton  V.  City  of  PorUand,  247. 
Clinton  Bank  v.  Hart,  770,  774,  775. 
Clippinger  v.  Miller,  492. 
Clodfelter  y.  Hulett,  683. 
Clopton  v.  Carloss,  367. 

v^  Herring,  24. 
Close  v.  Close.  411. 

y.  Gillespey,  156. 

y.  Hancock,  79a. 
Cloud  v.  Inhabitants,  81. 

V.  Wiley,  510,  685. 
Clough  v.  Brown,  299. 
Clowes  y.  Dickenson,  440. 
Cluff  V.  Insurance  Co.,  529. 
Clune  V.  Qultzow,  81. 
Clute  y.  Emmerich,  213,  406. 

v.  Potter,  378. 
Coad  y.  Cowhick,  443. 
Coates  V.  Blush,  320a. 

v.  Roberts,  593,  597. 
Coats  V.  Barrett,  115,  144. 
Coats  worth  v.  Ray,  144. 
Cobb  y.  Arnold,  062. 

v.  Fogg,  618. 

V.  Gamer,  250. 
Cobbey  v.  Wright.  376. 
Coburn  v.  Currens,  593. 

V.  Palmer,  978,  1012. 
Cochran  v.  Couper,  722. 

V.  Eldridge,  350,  356. 

V.  Loring,  245. 

V.  Miller,  44. 

V.  Thomas,  272. 


CASES 
[References  to  sectlom.    SS 1  to 

Cochrane  v.  Pnrker,  205,  513. 
Cocke  V.  Jenner,  778. 
CockerUl  y.  Stafford,  620. 
Cocke's  Adm'r  v.  GUpin,  42,  47. 
Cockey  v.  Milne's  Lessee,  444,  eOO. 
Cockley  v.  Rehr,  282. 
C^udde  T.  Mahiat,  51& 
Codding,  In  re,  431. 

V.  Wood,  497. 
Coddrington  v.  Webb,  372. 
Codwise  t.  Field,  987. 

Y.  Gelston,  423. 
Cody  V.  Cody,  290. 
T.  Hough,  246. 
Cue,  In  re,  37. 
V.  Aiken,  370. 
V.  Erb,  122. 
T.  llallam.  449. 
V.  Hamilton,  206. 
T.  Bitter,  585. 
Coffee  V.  Ball,  378. 
T.  Hayues,  187. 
V.  Neely,  916. 
T.  Tevis,  995. 
Coffey  V.  Carter,  345a. 
V.  Coal  Co..  329. 
V.  U.  S.,  529. 
Coffin  T.  Bell,  200. 
T.  Cottle,  174. 
T.  Freeman,  260. 
V.  Heath,  197. 
V.  Hill,  151. 
▼.  Knott,   707. 

T.  McCullough*s  Adm'r,  367,  641. 
Coffinberry  v.  Horrill,  177. 
Coffman  t.  Brown,  144,  700. 
Coger  T.  Coger,  220. 
Ooggtns  V.  Balwlnkle,  745. 
C6h  T.  Bright,  119. 
Cobee  t.  Baer,  265. 
Coben  t.  Burgess,  70. 
T.  Camp,  1016. 
T.  Dubose,  367. 
Colt  T.  Beard,  703. 

T.  Haven.  270,  271,  278,  900,  901. 
T.  Tracy,  604. 
Coltbe  T.  Crane,  44. 
Colbum  T.  Pomeroy,  567. 

V.  Woodworth,  681. 
Colby  Y.  Parker,  680. 
Colcben  y.  NInde,  97. 
Colclongh  Y.  Hhodus,  976. 
Coldinn  y.  Shoe  Co.,  421. 


CITED. 

499  in  Yol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.1 

Cole  V.  Adams,  583. 

V.  Brewer,  957. 

Y.  Butler,  224,  263. 

V.  Conolly,  513. 

Y.  Cunningham,  862,  897. 

Y.  FaYorite,  549,  729. 

V.  Fllteraft,  865. 

Y.  Grigsby,  81. 

Y.  Hundley,  383. 

Y.  Mitchell,  958. 

Y.  Robertson,  1009. 
Coleman  y.  Dalton,  707. 

Y.  Davis,  549. 

Y.  EXiwards,  491. 

Y.  Floyd,  90,  328. 

Y.  Henderson,  182. 

Y.  McAnulty,  200,  ai6. 

Y.  McKnlght,  270. 

V.  McMurdo,  562. 

Y.  Reel,  117. 

Y.  Waters,  53,  868. 
Coleman's  Appeal,  230,  628. 
Colenburg  y.  Venter,  490. 
Coler  Y.  Com'rs,  583a. 
Coles  Y.  Carter,  785. 
Colhoun  Y.  Snider,  432. 
Collais  Y.  McLeod,  981. 
CoUard  y.  Railroad  Co.,  779. 
College  Street,  In  re,  307. 
Collier  Y.  Cunningham,  732,  744. 

Y.  Easton,  378. 

Y.  ^itzpatrlck,  340a. 

Y.  Jenks,  16. 
CoUlDgwood  Y.  Carson,  482a. 

Y.  Irwhi,  667,  671. 
Collins  Y.  Baker,  669. 

Y.  Bennett,  729,  764. 

Y.  Brook,  986. 

Y.  Butler,  362. 

Y.  Freas,  350. 

Y.  Goldsmith,  649,  665. 

Y.  Hydron,  636,  586. 

Y.  Hyslop,  116. 

Y.  Jennings,  509. 

Y.  Kammann,  286. 

Y.  Knight,  199,  201,  211. 

Y.  Lee,  389. 

Y.  Lemasters,  770. 

Y.  Lofftus,  586. 

Y.  Mitchell,  200. 

V.  Prentice,  127,  128. 

Y.  Scott,  369. 
Colman  y.  Watson,  169. 


Ixiz 


CASES  CITED. 
[References  to  sectionB.    SS  1  to  499  in  yol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 


Colorado    Central    Consolidated    Mln. 

Co.  V.  Tnrck,  142. 
Colorado  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  530. 
Colorado  Eastern  11.  Co.  v.  Railroad 

Co.,  21,  27. 
Colquitt  V.  Bonner,  1000,  1004. 
Colson  V.  Kennedy,  458. 
Colson'8  Ex'rs  v.  \Vade*s  Ex*rs,  199. 
Colt  V.  Colt,  2G5,  536. 

V.  Du  Bois,  420,  432,  441. 
Colton  V.  Onderdonk,  536. 

V.  Koss,  141. 

V.  Rupert,  232. 

V.  Smith,  660. 
Colton  Land  &  Water  Co.  v.  Swartz, 

124. 
Columb  V.  Mfg.  Co.,  731. 
Columbia  Real  Estate  Co.,  In  re,  248, 

320a. 
Columbus  Mut   Life  Ass*n  v.   Plum- 

mer,  347. 
Colusa  Co.  V.  De  Jamett,  532. 
Colvln  V.  Reed,  928. 
Cohvell  V.  Bleakley,  616. 

V.  Rockwell,  493. 

V.  Wehrly,  319. 
Colyer  v.  Langford's  Adm*r,  386. 
Combs  V.  Bentley,  346a. 

V.  Breathitt  County,  89. 

V.  Oil  Co.,  376,  393. 
Comegys  v.  Vasse,  530,  943. 
Commercial  Assurance  Co.  v.»  Insur- 
ance Co.,  573. 
Commercial  Bank  v.  Banking  Co.,  415. 

V.  Kendall,  490. 

V.  Sherwood.  511. 

V.  Yazoo  Co.,  459. 
Commercial  Union  Assur.  Co.  v.  Ever- 

hart's  Adm'r,  90. 
Commissioners  of   Brown    County   v. 

Butt  574.     • 
Commissioners    of    Lake    County    y. 

Piatt,  261. 
Commonwealth  v.  Adkins,  407. 

V.  Baldwin,  461. 

V.  Blatt,  32. 

V.  Blood,  875,  924. 

V.  Bollch,  901. 

V.  Burnett,  950,  953. 

V.  Cochran,  536. 

V.  Com'rs,  216. 

V.  Comrey,  508. 

V.  Ebert,  92Z 


Commonwealth  t.  Feldman,  529. 

V.  Gleim,  468. 

V.  Goddard,  707. 

V.  Gracey,  644. 

y.  Green,  856,  857. 

▼.  Horton,  529. 

V.  Hultz,  167. 

v.  Keeper  of  Jail,  255. 

V.  Kirkbride,  894. 

V.  Krause,  86. 

V.  McCleary,  28. 

V.  Mateer,  491. 

V.  Order  of  Solon,  613. 

V.  Patterson,  644. 

V.  Pease,  985a. 

V.  Rhodes,  590. 

V.  Smith,  589. 

V.  Steacy,  246. 
^  V.  Sutherland,  617. 
Commonwealth  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  t. 

Hayden,  857. 
Compton  Y.  Jesup,  545,   938c. 
Comstock,  In  re,  298. 

V.  Clemens,  377. 

V.  Crawford,  250,  287. 

V.  Davis,  13. 

v.  Holbrook,  482a,  487. 
Conable  v.  Bucklln,  1000. 
Conant  v.  Jones,  541,  613. 

V.  Van  Schaick,  583. 
Conard  v.  Insurance  Co.,  400,  415,  448. 
Condon  v.  Railroad  Co.,  721. 
Cone  V.  Cotton,  270. 

V.  Hooper,  857.  912. 
Coney  v.  Harney,  548. 
Conger  v.  Chllcote,  539. 
Conkliu  V.  Furman,  583. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  153. 
Conkling  v.  Ridgely,  179. 
Conley  v.  Buck,  462. 

V.  Chapman,  913. 
Conlin  V.  Iron  Co.,  141. 
Conn  V.  Bernheimer,  715. 
Connay  v.  Halstead,  74. 
Connecticut    Mut.    Life    Ins.    Co.    v. 
Jones,  674. 

V.  Smith,  707. 
Connecticut  Nat.  Bank  v.  Bayles,  985. 
Connell  v.  Brumback,  23. 

V.  Galllgher,  325,  600. 

V.  Stelson,  362,  377. 
Connelly  v.  Arnold,  ,^>26. 

V.  Connelly,  822. 


CASBS 
[References  to  Mctlona.    H  1  to 

t'oiiner  y.  Noff,  483. 

y.  Pennington,  975. 
Connltt  y.  Reformed  Gburcb,  523. 
Connolly  y.  Connolly,  633. 

y.  Edgerton,  185. 
<\mnoly  y.  Railroad,  93. 
Connor  y.  Corson,  707. 
Conn*8  Liessee  y.  Whiteside,  321. 
Conord  y.  Runnels,  33. 
Conrad  y.  Baldwin,  277. 

y.  Eyerlcb,  407. 
Consolidated  Canal  Co.  y.  Peters,  100. 
ConsoUdated  Coal  Co.  y.  Oeltjen,  327. 
Consolidated     Hand-Method     Lasting 

Mach.  Co.  y.  Bradley,  509,  574. 
Consolidated  Roller  MUl  Co.  y.  Smith 

Co.,  7513. 
Consolidatc'd  Wyoming  Gold  Min.  Co. 

V.  Mining  Co.,  938c,  93Ua. 
Contee  y.  Cooke,  357. 
Conyerse  y.  Colton,  621. 
y.  I>airy  Co..  398. 

y.  Davis,  541. 

v.  I^ngshaw,  157. 

V.  Sickles,  717. 
Conway  y.  Ellison,  889,  916. 

y.  Halstead,  74. 

y.  Town  of  Jefferson,  101. 
Conwell  y.  Hartsell,  006. 
Coogan,  In  re,  297. 
Cook  y.  Allen,  546,  661. 

V.  Brown,  909. 

V.  Cattle  Co.,  754. 

V.  Cook.  928.  932. 

y.  Cooi)er,  74. 

y.  Darling,  273. 

y.  Dillon,  4^4. 

V.  Doremus,  719. 

V.  Field,  5f«.  785. 

y.  Jones,  493. 

y.  Lasher,  549. 

y.  Litchfield,  865. 

y.  Mci'ahill.  953. 

V.  Moore,  985. 

y.  Mo8«ley,  768. 

y.  Parham.  551. 

y.  Phillips,  ;M7. 

y.  Rice,  510. 

y.  Rogers,  198. 

y.  Thomhill,  857. 

y.  Thurston,  958. 

y.  Town  of  Monis,  293,  600. 

y.  Vimont.  747,  785. 


CITED.  Ixxi 

499  in  YOl.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Cook  y.  Whipple,  65,  71. 

y.  Wood,  154,  164,  306. 
Cooke  y.  Avery,  406. 

v.  Burnham,  358. 

y.  Cook,  747. 

y.  Crawford,  13. 

y.  Sholl,  529,  800. 

y.  Smith,  1002. 
Cooksey  y.  Railroad  Co.,  674. 
Cook's  Heirs  v.  Bay,  41,  42. 
Coolbaugh  v.  Roemer,  68,  438. 
Cooley  y.  Beach  Co.,  89,  305. 

y.  Brayton,  787. 

y.  Gregory,  332. 

y.  Land   &   Imp.    Co.'s  Assignee, 
337. 

y.  Smith,  262. 
Coombs  V.  Jordan,  308,  420,  439,  445. 
Coon  V.  Jones,  376,  377. 
Cooper  y.  Borough  of  Kingston,  352. 

y.  City  of  Brooklyn,  747. 

V.  Cooper,  122,  153. 

V.  Cutshall,  439. 

V.  Dlsbrow,  326. 

y.  Duncan,  290,  326,  335,  644. 

y.  Hayes,  872. 

y.  Hunchin,  189. 

y.  Insurance  Co.,  177. 

y.  Mayfield,  273. 

y.  Metzger,  1. 

V.  Newell,  JK». 

y.  Reynolds,    216,    227,    229,    240, 
801,  004,  906. 

y.  Sunderland,  270,  274,  279,  282, 
287. 

y.  Tyler,  373. 
Co-operative  Savings  &  I>oan  Ass*n  v. 

Mcintosh,  281. 
Coos  Bay,  H.  &  E.  R.  &  Nay.  Co.  v. 

Endlcott,  335. 
Cope  V.  Humphreys,  992. 
Copenhaver,  In  re.  985b,  985e. 

V.  Stewart,  938. 
Copeland  v.  Todd,  958. 
Cope's  Appeal,  472. 
Copin  v.  Adamsou,  8.*]6. 
Corbet  v.  Barnes,  778. 

v.  Evans,  749. 
Corbett,  In  re,  256. 

V.  Wood,  5;i0. 
Corbin  v.  Adams,  52(). 

y.  Land  Co.,  360. 

y.  Westcott,  590. 


Ixxii 


CASES 
CReferences  to  sections.    8§  1  to 


CJorbltt  V.  Timmerman,  272. 
Oorbley  v.  Wilson,  529,  606. 
Corby  V.  Taylor,  744. 
Corcoran  v.  Canal  Oo.,  599. 

V.  Chesapeake  Co.,  536. 

V.  Doll,  984. 
Cordler  v.  Schloss,  63,  68. 
Cordray  v.  City  of  Galveston,  73. 
0>rey  v.  Gale,  758. 

V.  Morrill,  245. 

V.  Elpley,  248,  320a. 

V.  White,  995. 
Corley  v.  Anderson,  284. 

V.  McKeag,  367. 

V.  Renz,  453. 
Cornelius  v.  Burford,  1008. 

V.  Thomas,  388. 
Cornell  v.  Bai'nes,  9G5,  96a 

V.  Green,  536. 

V.  Hartley,  723. 
Cornells  v.  Shannon,  939c. 
<:ornell  University  v.  Hotel  Co.,  86. 

V.  Parkinson,  153. 
Corprew  v.  Corprew,  638a. 
Corrigan  v.  Bell,  190. 
Corry  v.  Lackey,  803. 
Cors  v.  Tompkins,  32. 
Corse  V.  Chapman,  643. 
Cortez  V.  Court,  482. 
Corthell  v.  Mead,  107. 
Corwin  V.  Bensley,  316. 
Corwin*s  Lessee  v.  Benham,  414. 
Corwith  V.  Bank,  718. 
Corwlthe  v.  Griffing,  368. 
Coryell,  Matter  of,  259. 
Cosby  V.  Powers,  271. 
Cosgrove  v.  Butler,  326. 

V.  U.  S..  317. 
Coskery  v.  Wood,  89(>. 
Cossitt  V.  Biscoe,  641. 
Coster  V.  Griswold,  360. 
Coster's  Ex'rs  v.  Bank,  445. 
Cottam  V.  Currie,  32. 
Gotten  V.  McGehee,  130,  306. 
Cotterell  v.  Koon,  291. 
Cottingham  v.  Weeks,  529. 
Cottle,  In  re,  174. 

V.  Cole,  973. 
Cotton  V.  Bank,  461. 

V.  Jones,  659. 
Cottrell  V.  Pierson,  448. 
Cottreirs  Appeal,  996. 
Cotzhausen  v.  Kerting,  372. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Couch  V.  Heffron,  307. 
Ooughanour  v.  Bloodgood,  1. 
Coughran  v.  Gilman,  896,  939b. 

V.  Gutcheus,  135,  154,  105 
CougiU  V.  Insurance  Co.,  867 
Coulter  V.  Davis,  617,  631. 

V.  Lumpkin,  407. 
Council  V.  Willis,  330. 
Council  Bluffs  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Jennings, 

302. 
Council  Bluffs  Sav.  Bank  v.  Griswold, 

211. 
Oountz  V.  Markling,  56. 
Courier-Journal   Job   Printing   Co.   v. 

Insurance  Co.,  609. 
Oourson  v.  Walker,  447. 
Court,  In  re,  320a. 
Courtnay  v.  Parker,  438. 
Court  of  Probate  v.  Sprague.  98. 
Coutts  V.  Walker,  437,  441. 
Covenant  Mut  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Clov- 
er, 211. 
Cover  V.  Black,  400. 
Covert  V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  742. 
Covey  V.  Wheeler,  317. 
Covhigton  V.  bhamblin,  368,  633. 

V.  Ingram,  246. 
Covington  &  C.  Bridge  Co.  v.  Sargent, 

729,  754. 
Covington  &  G.  Elevated  Railroad  & 
Transfer  &  Bridge  Co.  v.  Klelmeler, 
738. 
Cowan  V.  Anderson,  197. 

V.  Braidwood,  838. 

V.  Price,  378. 

V.  Wheeler,  518. 
Cowardin  v.  Anderson,  447. 
Cowin  V.  Toole,  368. 
Cowles  V.  Cowles,  84,  89,  340. 

V.  Hayes,  311,  326,  334. 
Cowley  V.  Railroad  Co.,  362. 
Cox  V.  Allen,  691. 

V.  Armstrong,  340a. 

V.  Barnes,  917. 

V,  Brackett,  306. 

V.  Capron,  86. 

V.  Cox,  320,  929,  9:33. 

V.  Davis,  261. 

V.  Hartranft,  671. 

V.  Jagger,  667. 

V.  Jerman,  371. 

V.  Mitchell,  847. 

V.  Moss,  103. 


CASES  CITED. 
IReferencM  to  sections.    SS  1  to  499  In  toL  1;  residue  in  toI.  2.] 


Ixxiii 


Cox  ▼.  Palmer,  $>I0,  956w 

Y.  Bailroad  Ck>.,  886. 

T.  Ratdiffe,  Id. 

Y.  Reed,  1009. 

Y.  Smith,  996. 

V.  Story,  194,  197. 

▼.  Strode,  567,  571. 

Y.  Thomas'  Adm'x,  606. 

▼.  Von  Ahlefeldt,  861. 
Cox*8  Adm'rs  y.  Uill,  599. 
Coy,  Ex  parte,  259. 

Y.  Lyons  City,  985f. 
Coyle  Y.  Ward,  751. 
Coyne  t.  Souther,  113. 
Crabb  y.  Larkin,  555. 
Crabtree  y.  Green,  526. 

Y.  WeUea,  714,  764. 
Craddock  v.  Croghan,  1. 

Y.  Tomer's  Adm'x,  589. 
Craft  Y.  Merrill,  991.  995. 
Crafts  Y.  Dexter,  376.  377. 
Cragin  y.  Carleton,  008. 
Craiff  Y.  Alcorn,  110. 

Y.  Brown,  878. 

▼.  Glass,  50. 

Y.  Herring,  587. 

Y.  InYestment  Co.,  340. 

Y.  Major,  340. 

Y.  Smith,  354. 

Y.  Ward,  550. 

Y.  Watson,  656. 

Y.  Wroth,  326. 
Craighead  y.  Dalton,  666. 

Y.  Wilson,  44. 
Craine  y.  Bdwards,  636. 
Crake  y.  Crake,  967. 
Cralle  y.  Cralle,  154. 
Cramer  y.  Mfg.  Co.,  540. 

Y.  Moore,  518,  720. 
Crandall,  Ex  parte,  258. 

Y.  Bacon,  180,  361,  377. 

Y.  Gallup,  561,  612,  790. 
Crane  y.  Barry,  318. 

Y.  Crane,  86,  156,  875. 

Y.  French,  57,  211. 

Y.  Knauf,  16. 

Y.  O'Connor,  429. 

V.  Penny.  400. 

Y.  Richardson,  472. 
Crank  y.  Flowers,  211,  271,  368. 
Cranor  y.  School  Dist,  980. 
Crapo  Y.  Township,  530. 
CraYen  y.  Railroad  Co.,  319. 


CraYens  y.  Duncan,  945. 

Y.  Jameson,  607. 
Craver  y.  Christian,  703. 
Crawford,  In  re,  977. 

Y.  Bank,  1009. 

Y.  Bergen,  529. 

Y.  Cheney,  299. 

Y.  Howard,  282. 

Y.  McDonald,  250,  252. 

Y.  Pyle,  592. 

Y.  Simonton's  Ex'rs,  754,  857,  889, 
971,  981. 

Y.  Summers,  099. 

Y.  Thomson,  206. 

Y.  Wilcox,  213. 

Y.  Word,  68a 
Crawford's  Adm'r  y.  Glass'  Bx'rs,  700. 
Crawford's  Ex'rs  y.  Ellison,  975. 
Crawley  v.  Isaacs,  840. 
Cray  v.  Wright,  600. 
Creager  y.  Walker,  687. 
Creath  v.  Sims,  379. 

V.  Smith,  197. 
Crebbin  v.  Bryce,  620. 
Crecelius  v.  Bierman,  954. 
Credit  Foncier  of  America  v.  Rogers. 

271. 
Credits  Conunutation  Co.  y.  XJ.  S.,  35. 
Creed  y.  Scruggs,  394. 
Creigh  v.  Hedrick,  120. 
Creighton  y.  Keith,  685. 

V.  Leeds,  400. 

V.  Murphy,  857. 
Crenshaw  v.  Julian,  55. 
Crescent  Brewing  Co.  y.  Gullins,  321. 
Crescent  Canal   Co.   y.   Montgomery, 
'  77,  347. 

Crescent  City  LiYe-Stock  Landing  & 
Slaughter-House    Co.    y.    Butchers* 
Union,  938. 
Cressey  y.  Kimmel,  555. 
Cresswell  y.  White,  343,  349. 
Creswell  y.  Slack,  963. 
Orews  Y.  Cleghorn,  703,  721. 

Y.  Lackland,  208. 
Crim  Y.  England,  589. 

V.  Haiidley.  375,  383,  388. 

Y.  Kessing,   109. 
Crippen  y.  Dexter,  633. 
Crisman  y.  Beasley,  384. 
Critchfleld  Y.  Porter,  325,  362,  374. 
Critten  v.  Vredenburgh,  63. 
Crittenden,  Ex  parte,  44. 


I 


IXXiv  CASES 

[References  to  sections.    H  1  to 

CroasdeU  y.  Tallant,  210. 
Crocker  v.  Allen,  362,  365. 

V.  Balch,  279. 

V.  Clements'  Adm'r,  983. 
Crockett  v.  Doriot,  191. 

V.  Drew,   193. 

y.  Lasbbrook,  650,  652b 

V.  Parkison,  280. 

V.  Routon,  726. 
Croft  V.  Steele,  620,  621. 
Crofut  V.  Aldrich,  69. 
Crogban  v.  Livingston,  661. 
Cromer  v.  Boinest,  176. 
Crompton  &  Knowles  Loom  Works  v. 

Brown,  750. 
Cromwell  v.   Sac   Co.,   506,   509.   610. 

614,  673,  697,  731,  750,  751,  754. 
Crook  V.  Hamlin,  326. 

V.  Tull,  982. 
Croom  V.  Winston,  214. 
Croop  V.  Dodson,  349. 
Cropper's  Case,  256. 
Cropsey  v.  Crandall,  413,  415. 
Crosby  v.  Baker,  716. 

V.  Jeroloman,  770. 

V.  Lang,   293. 

V.  Wood,  1017. 
Crosley  v.  Calboon.  633. 

V.  Hutton,  203. 
Cross  V.  Armstrong,  792,  903. 

V.  Birch,  o47. 

V.  Moffat,  Ola,  69. 

V.  Zane,  1010. 
Crossman  v.  Davis,  706. 
Crotbers  v.  Rcss'  Distributees,  306. 
Crouch  V.  Crouch,  320. 

V.  Grldley,  943. 

V.  Ha  nee,  99. 
Croudson  v.  Leonard,  797,  814,  815. 
Crouse  v.  Derbyshire,  50. 

V.  Holman,  747. 

v.  Johnson,  67. 

V.  Murphy.  406. 

V.  Reichert,  83. 
Crouse's  Appeal,  438. 
Crow  V.  Mortgage  Co.,  326. 
Crown  Coal  &  Tow  Co.  v.  Mining  Co., 

97. 
Cruger  v.  Douglas,  44. 

V.  Sullivan,  981. 
Cruikshank  v.  Cruikshank,  297. 

V.  Gardner,  211. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  16. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Crum  V.  Rea,  790. 

Crumlish's  Adm'r  v.  Improvement  Co.» 
897. 

v.  Railroad  Co.,  786. 
Criunpton  v.  State,  707. 
Cruse  V.   Cunningham,   345. 
Crutcher  v.  Com.,  169. 
Crutchfleld  v.  Robins,  987. 

V.  State,  513. 
Cryer  v.  Andrews,  646. 
Cucullu  V.  Insurance  Co.,  814,  815,  821. 
Culbreth  v.  Smith,  153. 
Cullum  V.  Casey,  376. 
Culver  V.  Brlnkerhoff,  324,  348. 

V.  Leovy,  179. 

V.  Rogers,  411. 
Cumberland  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Jef- 
fries, 522. 
Cumberland  Co.  v.  Boyd,  250. 
Cumming  v.  Eden's  Devisees  &  Terre- 

Tenants,  487. 
Cummings  v.  Banks,  828,  829. 

V.  Colgrove,    629. 

V.  Cummings,  633. 

V.  Harrison,  567,  569. 

V.  O'Brien,  896. 

V.  Powell,  530. 

V.  Ross,  326. 
Cummings'  Api)eal,  431. 
Cummins  v.  White,  369. 
Cummin's  Appeal,  1008. 
Cundlff  V.  Trimble,  958. 
Cunningham  v.  Ashley,  560. 

V.  Brown,  296. 

V.  Butler,  862. 

V.  City  of  Cleveland,  719. 

V.  Dixon,  236. 

V.  Foster,  628. 

V.  Harris,  549. 

V.  Hatch,  354. 

V.  Holt,   510,  685. 

V.  Hydraulic  Co.,  877.  910. 

V.  Mining  Co.,  156.  877. 

V.  Morris,  652,  738. 

V.  Schley,  15,  700. 

V.  Smith's  Adm*r,  040. 

V.  Squires,  283. 
Cupisino  V.  Perez,  521. 
Cureton  v,  Shelton,  589. 

V.  Stokes,  80. 
Curran  v.  Kerchner,  79. 
Currle  v.  Chowning,  504. 

v.  Franklin,  250. 


CASES 
[References  to  sections.    tS  1  to 

Curry  v.  Janicke,  324. 

Y.  Mack,  586. 

▼.  Bonndtree,  82,  8& 
Curds  ▼.  Ballagh,  341. 

V.  Bradley,  538. 

Y.  Bnrdick,  100. 

Y.  Donnell,  085. 

V.  Fox,  72. 

T.  Gooding,   677. 

y.  Hawn,  483. 

V.  Hubbell,  878. 

V.  Root,  432,  447,  473,  1008. 

r.  SI088OD,  350. 
rurtiss  Y.  Beardsley,  960. 
Curts  V.  Trustees,  722. 
Cuahlng  v.  Edwards,  540. 
Custer  V.  Detterer,  482a.  409. 

Y.  Russey,  508. 
Cutler  Y.  Button,  312. 

Y.  Cox,  729. 

V.  ( Humberts.  36. 

V.  Huston,  285. 
Cutter  V.  Butler,  635. 

V.  KYans,  587. 
l^yphert  y.  McClune,  315. 
Cyrus  V.  Hicks,  358. 
r.  &  C.  Electric  Motor  Co.  y.  Lewis, 
45. 


l>abbs  Y.  Dabbs,  49. 
Dabney  y.  Manning,  660. 
Da  by  v.  Ericsson,  994. 
Daggett  V.  Daggett,  671. 

Y.  Robins,  671. 
Dail  y.  Freeman,  400. 
Daily's  Adm*r  y.  Reid,  197. 
I>alngerfleld  y.  Smitli.  r)<:o. 
Daisy  Roller  Mills  y.  Ward,  482. 
Dakin  y.  Hudson.  96(;. 
Dalby  y.  Cronkhlte,  481. 
Dale  y.  Bugh,  347. 

V.  Doddrldg?,  663. 
Dalgleisb  y.  Hodgson,  816. 
Dalhoff  y.  Keenau,  362. 
DflUinger  y.  Richardson,  GliS. 
l>a]rymple  y.  Gamble,  922. 
DaltoD  y.  Bowker,  567. 

V.  Libby,  177. 
Daly  y.  Pennie,  363. 

y.  Thomiison,  348. 
Dame  y.  Wingate,  78i. 


CITED.  IXXV 

489  in  yol.  1;  residue  In  yol.  2.] 

Damm  y.  Mason,  551. 
Damouth  v.  Klock,  39,  44. 
Damp  Y.  Town  of  Dane,  217. 
Damport  v.  {Sj'uipgon,  296. 
Damix»n  v.  Ferguson,  33. 

V.  Smith.  439. 
Dana  v.  GUI,  699. 
Dancy  v.  Martin,  55. 
Dandridge  v.  Harris,  370. 
Dane  v.  Gilmore,  295,  588. 
Danfortb  y.  Morrlcal,  530. 

V.  Thompson,  935. 
Daniel  v.  Cooper,  28. 

V.  Gibson,  982. 

V.  Gum,  536,  613,  734. 

y.  Haynes,  462. 
Daniels  v.  Benedict,  291. 

y.  Daniels,  21,  31a. 

y.  Heidenreich,  744. 

Y.  Hendei'son,  550. 

y.  McGinnis,  159. 

y.  Southai-d,  297. 
Danielson  v.  Fuel  Co.,  21,  110. 
Danziger  y.  Williams,  7ol. 
Darcy  y.  Kelley,  612. 
D'Arcy  y.  Ketchum,  227,  897,  906. 
Darragh  v.  Bigger,  77. 
Darrah's  Ex*rs  y.  Bayard,  1004. 

V.  Watson,  229. 
Darrlngton  y.  Borland,  560. 
Darrow  y.  Calkins,  560. 

V.  Darrow,  1016. 
Dart  V.  Hercules,  86. 
Dartmouth  Say.  Bank  y.  Bates,  415. 
Dauberman  v.  Huln,  2(11. 
Dauchy  v.  Goodrich,  687. 
Daugherty  y.  Steel  Co.,  21. 
Dayenport  y.  Bamett,  543. 

y.  Bufflngton,  622. 

V.  Dodge  County,  «85c. 

y.  Hubbard,  761,  767. 

y.  KIrkland.  1(50. 

Y.  Moore,  207a,  360. 

V.  Mulr,  567.  568. 

y.  Wright,  54,  73. 
Dayenport  Mills  Co.  y.  Chambers,  57. 
Dayey's  Estate,  In  re,  490. 
Dayld  y.  Porter,  867. 
Dayid  Bradley  Mfg.  Co.  y.  Manufac- 
turing Co.,  509,  731,  787,  791. 
Dayidson  v.  Alexander,  63. 

y.  Bond,  20(J. 

y.  Burke,  468. 


IXXVi  CASES 

[References  to  sectlone.    SS  1  to 

Davidson  v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  615. 

V.  Frew,  454. 

V.  Gaston,  1006. 

V.  Geoghugau,  1000. 

V.  Hunter,  486. 

V.  Ivnox,  237. 

V.  ^klyers,  406. 

V.  Nebraker,  958. 

V.  Root,  417. 

V.  Sharpe,  860,  906. 

V.  Sbipman,  617. 

V.  Thornton,  261,  493,  496. 

V.  Weed,  759. 
Davie  V.  Davis,  694,  724. 

V.  McDaniel,  633,  642. 
Davies  v.  Coryell,  200,  306. 

V.  Davies,  127. 

V.  Lowndes,  607. 

V.  Thomson,  24. 
Daviess  County  Court  v.  Howard,  154. 
Davis,  EIx  parte,  257. 

V.  Aikin,  761. 

V.  Banlc,  192. 

V.  Barker,  130. 

V.  Bass,  362. 

V.  Beall,  462. 

V.  Beason,  255. 

V.  Benton,  432.  460. 

V.  Blevins,  635. 

V.  Bowker,  1017. 

V.  Bums,  938b. 

V.  Burt,  324. 

V.  Canal  Co.,  449. 

V.  Caswell,  780. 

V.  Clements,  367,  393. 

V.  Commonwealth,  927. 

V.  Connelly's  Ex'r,  896. 

V.  Comue,  360. 

V.  Davis,   39,   145,   227,  291,  312, 
358,  536,  924,  958,  9^. 

v.  D.  M.  Osbom  &  Co.,  253. 

V.  Fasig,  32. 

V.  Field,  152. 

V.  Fields,  329. 

V.  Fish,  182. 

V.  Foy,  190. 

V.  Hamilton,  275. 

V.  Harper,  402. 

V.  Havard,  667. 

V.  Headley,  860,  872,  919. 

V.  Hedges,  761,  768. 

V.  Hoopes,  1000. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.] 

Davis  V.  Jordan,  83. 

V.  Lane,  874,  884. 

V.  Lennen,  664. 

V.  McCary,  118. 

V.  Mason,  152. 

V.  Milburn,  735,  954. 

V.  Mlllaudon,  37L 

V.  Morris,  63. 

V.  Morris'  Ex'rs,  864. 

V.  Morton,  989a. 

V.  Murphy,  758. 

V.  Packard,  275. 

V.  Packer,  53. 

V.  Roberts,  308. 

V.  Schaffner,  624. 

V.  School  Tp.,  324,  34a 

V.  Sexton,  629. 

V.  Shaver,  135. 

V.  Smith,  574.  897,  9ia 

V.  Solomon,  ^7. 

V.  Steeps,  406. 

V.  Talcott,  623. 

V.  Tallcot,  768. 

V.  Taylor,  207. 

V.  Tlleston,  384. 

V.  Trump,  031,  681. 

V.  Vass.  439. 

V.  Village  of  Menasha,  298. 

V.  Wade,  261,  307. 

V.  Weibbold,  530. 

V.  Wilboume,  569. 

V.  Wimberly,  91. 

V.  Wood,  806. 
Davis'  Case,  259. 
Davis'  Estate,  In  re,  34,  340. 
Davison,  In  re,  256,  524. 

v.  Brown,  181. 

V.  Harmon,  770. 

V.  Heffron,  341. 
Davisson  v.  Mackay,  458. 
Davis  &  Rankin  Bldg.  &  Mfg.  06.  v. 

Creamery  Co.,  23. 
Davoue  v.  Fanning,  260. 
Dawes  v.  Shed,  589. 
Dawley  v.  Brown,  655,  726. 
Dawson  v.  Baum,  753. 

V.  Cunning,  412. 

V.  Daniel,  960. 

V,  Hardy,  204. 

V.  McCarty,  446. 

V.  Parham,  655. 

V.  Schloss,  207. 

V.  AVisner,  153* 


CASES  CITED. 
[Reference*  to  seotionB.    18 1  to  499  in  toI.  1;  residue  in  yoI.  2.] 


Ixxvii 


Day  T.  Bank,  261. 

V.  Crosby,  968,  993. 

V.  l)e  Jonge,  510. 

V.  Goodwin,  130,  346. 

y,  Hamburgh,  300. 

V.  Hill.  774. 

V.  Holland,  510. 

T.  Mertlock,  83,  86,  347,  692. 

V.  Patterson,  440. 

V.  Porter,  778. 

V.  Printing  Co.,  155. 

V.  Rubber  Co.,  534. 

V.  Vallette,  629. 

V.  Willy,  492. 

V.  Woolen  Co.,  138. 
Dayton  v.  Mlntzer,  284,  633. 
Dazey  v.  Pennington,  240,  307. 
Deadrick  y.  Harrington,  115. 
Deadwyler  v.  Bank,  23. 
De  Agrcda  y.  Mantel,  127. 
Dean  y.  Blount,  147. 

V.  Chapin,  799. 

Y.  BidsAvay,  716. 

Y.  Stone,  876. 

Y.  Thatcher,  67,  78,  698. 
Deane  y.  Ix)uek8,  346a« 
Dear  y.  Reed,  724. 
Hearing  y.  Bank,  906. 

Y.  Shepherd,  985a. 
I>e  Armond  y.  Adams,  293,  295. 
DeaYer  y.  Erwln,  378. 

Y.  JcMies,  319. 
Debbs  Y.  Dalton,  260. 
De  Brimont  y.  Penniman,  841. 
Debs  Y.  Dalton,  81. 
De  Camp  v.  Bates,  313. 

Y.  Miller,  685. 

Y.  Thompson.  1006. 

Y.  Thomson,  1005. 
De  Cnfftro  y.  Richardson,  153.  154, 165. 
De  Caters  y.  Le  Ray  De  Chaumont, 

156. 
Decatur  Gaslight  &  Coke  Co.  y.  How- 
ell. 743. 
Decatur  T^nd  Co.  y.  Cook,  45. 
Decatur  &.  X.  Imp.  Co.  v.  Crass,  90. 
De  Chambrun  y.  Campbell,  938c. 
De  Chanbmn  y.  Schermerborn,  938c. 
De  Chastellux  y.  Fairchild,  298. 
Deck  Y.  Deck,  822. 

Y.  Gerke,  («44. 

Y.  Johnson.  548. 
D.^ckard  y.  State,  256. 


Decker  v.  Decker,  754. 

Y.  Gilbert,  469. 

Y.  Graves,  337. 
Deck's  Estate  v.  Gherke,  216,  641. 
De  Cosse  Brissac  v.  Ratbbone,  827. 
Deegan  v.  Deegan,  252,  272,  590. 
Deem  y.  Grume,  971. 
De  Ende  v.  Wilkinson's  Adm*r,  857. 
Deering  y.  Poston,  972. 
Deerlng  Harvester  Co.  v.  Donovan,  330. 
De  Figanlere  v.  Young,  1005. 
De  Ford  v.  Green,  494. 
De  Forest  v.  Andrews,  082. 

v.  Thompson.  297a. 
Degelos  v.  Woolfolk,  534. 
De  Graaf  v.  Wycoflf,  764. 
De  Graf  v.  Navigation  Co.,  26. 
De  Graw  v.  Elmore,  183. 
De  Haven  v.  Covalt,  367. 
De  Hymel  v.  Mortgage  Co.,  159. 
Deickhart  v.  Rutgers,  25. 
Deldrich  v.  Nachtsheim,  961. 
Deisber  v.  Gehre,  663. 
De  La  Guerra  v.  Xewhall,  741, 
Deland  v.  Hlett,  089. 
Delaney,  Ex  parte,  257. 
De  Laney  v.  Blizzard,  100. 
Delaney  v.  Brown,  373. 

V.  Reade,  513,  693. 
Delano  V.  Jacoby,  543. 

V.  Jopling,  857,  912. 
Delap  V.  Hunter,  23. 
De  Lashmutt  v.  Sellwood,  600. 
De  La  Vergne  v.  Evertson,  477,  956. 
Delaware  v.  Ensign,  63. 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Brecken- 

ridge,  650. 
De  Leon's  Estate,  In  re,  554. 
Delk  V.  Yelton,  510. 
Deloach  v.  Myrick,  1006. 
De  I>ouIs  V.  Meek,  369,  373,  374. 
Delta  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  y.  Mc- 

Clune,  1016. 
De  Marco  v.  Mass,  341. 
Demens  v.  Poyntz,  3. 
Demerit  v.  Lyford,  372,  973. 

V.  Mills,  99. 
Demlng  v.  Storage  Co.,  219. 
Dempsey  v.  Bush,  996. 

v.  Insurance  Co.,  815. 

V.  Oswego  Tp.,  402. 

V.  Schawacker,  605. 


Ixzviii  CASES 

DUfbrenceB  to  lectionft.    SS 1  to 

Dempster  Mill  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Fltzwater, 

206. 
Den  V.  Tomlln,  128. 
Den  d.  Bray  v.  McSbane,  652. 
Denegre  v.  Haun,  482a,  498. 
Dengler  v.  Kiebner,  402. 
Denlke  t.  Deuike,  599,  609. 
Denison  v.  Lewis,  138. 

V.  Williams,  958. 
Dennett  v.  Cliick,  771. 
Denney  v.  State,  534a. 
Dennie  v.  Smith,  588. 
Denning  y.  Corwin,  279. 
Dennison  v.  Chapman,  352. 

V.  Hyde,  504,  600,  901,  93a 

V.  Leech,  138. 

V.  U.  S.,  609,  617. 
Denny  v.  Eddy,  993. 

V.  Mattoon.  218. 

V.  Reynolds,  671. 
Denslow  v.  Bush,  29. 
Densmore  v.  Tomer,  548. 
Dent  V.  Ashley,  563. 

V.  King,  599. 
Denton  v.  Baker,  359. 

T.  Bank,  313. 

V.  Denton,  320. 

V.  Noyes,  32r>. 
Denver  City  Irrigation  &  Water  Co. 

V.  Middaugh,  743. 
Denver  Consol.  Tramway  Co.  v.  Riley, 

740. 
Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  lies,  699. 
Denvrey  v.  Fox,  1008. 
Depriest  v.  Patterson,  338. 
Deputy  V.  Tobias,  357,  385. 
Depuy's  Estate,  In  re,  174. 
Dequlndre  v.  Williams,  274. 
Derby,  In  re,  320a. 

V.  Jacques,  87,  697,  699,  705. 

v.  Yale,  783. 
De  Riemer  v.  Cantillon.  77,  367. 
Dermott  v.  Carter,  417. 
Dernburg  v.  Tefft,  220. 
Derr  v.  Wilson,  261. 
De  Saussure  v.  Zeigler,  408. 
Deslonde  v.   Darrinjrton's  Heirs,  635. 
Des    Moines   Nat.    Bank    v.    Harding, 

617. 
Des  Moines  &  Ft.  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Bul- 

lard,  731. 
Desnoyers  v.  Dennison,  541,  731. 
De  Sollar  v.  Hauscome,  728. 


CITED. 

499  In  vol.  1;  residue  in  yol.  2.] 

Desribes  v.  Wilmer,  346. 

Dessauer  v.  Koppln,  237. 

Destrehan  v.  Scudder,  857. 

Desvergers  v.  Parsons,  41. 

De  Tar  v.  Boone  Co.,  83. 

Detrick  v.  Sharrar,  707, 

Detroit  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  McCammon, 

720,  790. 
Deuel  County  v.  Bank,  985b,  985t 
Deutermanu  v.  Pollock,  176. 
Devereaux    v.    City    of    Brownsville, 

985d,  985e. 
Devln  V.  City  of  Ottumwa,  599. 
Devlin  y.  Boyd,  335,  384. 
Devol  V.  Halstead,  770. 
Devon  V.  Scales,  370. 
De  Wandelaer  v.  Hager,  313. 
Dewees  v.  Richardson,  376. 
De  Weese  v.  Smith,  7o5. 
Dewey  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  227. 

V.  Humphrey,  16. 

v.  Latson,  473. 

V.  Moyer,  69. 

V.  Peck,  754. 

v.  Sugg,  406. 
Dewing  V.  Sears,  152. 
De  Wolf  V.  Crandall,  750. 
Dewsnap  v.  Davidson,  761. 
Dexter  v.  Clark,  703. 
Dexter,  Horton  &  Co.  v.  Sayward,  689. 
Dial  v.  Holter,  126-128. 
Diamond  v.  Law^rence  Co.,  550. 
Diamond  State  Iron  Co.  v.  Alex  K. 

Rarig  Co.,  807. 
Dibble  V.  Truluck,  363,  375. 
Dick  V.  McLaurln,  326. 

V.  Mahoney,  316. 

V.  Tolhausen,  190,  974. 

V.  Webster,  747. 

V.  Williams,  343,  691. 
Dickenson  v.  Codwise,  42,  44. 

V.  Gilliland,  691. 
Dickerson  v.  Chrisman,  211. 

V.  Corners,  381. 

V.  Davis,  205. 

V.  Powell,  655. 
Dickerson*s  Appeal,  487. 
Dickey  v.  Gibson,  156,  513. 
Dickinson  v.  Allison,  483. 

V.  Hayes,  611,  63S. 
Dickinson  v.  Price,  622. 
Dicks  V.  Hatch,  217.  278. 
Dickson  v.  Burke,  211. 


CASES  CITED. 
[References  to  eectlonft.    H 1  to  489  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 


Ixxix 


Dickson  t.  UolTs  Adm*r,  165. 

r.  Matbeson,  326. 

y.  Kichardson*  380. 

Y.  Wilkinson,  403. 
Dteffenbach  v.  Rooh.  1000. 
Diehl  T.  Marcliant,  609. 
Dietrich  Y.  Dietrich,  IIG. 
Dietz,  In  re,  320a. 

Y.  Transfer  Co.,  617. 
Dlgnan  t.  Dignan,  043. 
Dill  V.  White,  772. 
Dillard,  Ex  parte,  122,  443. 

V.  Iron  Co.,  277. 

Y.  Turner's  Adm'r,  236. 
Dilley  r.  McGregor,  576. 
Dnilng  ▼.  Murray,  296. 
DiUinger  y.  Kelley,  714. 
Dillon  Y.  Porter,  236. 

Y.  Railroad  Co.,  158,  461,  504. 

Y.  Rand,  83. 
Di  Lorenzo  y.  Dragone,  409. 
Dllwortb  Y.  Curts.  938b. 

Y.  Johnson,  900. 
Dimes  Y.  Canal  Co.,  174,  783. 
Dimmick  y.  Rcsenfeld.  421. 
Dinet  y.  Eigenmann,  375. 
Ding  Y.  Kennedy,  213. 
Dlngman  y.    Myers,  299. 
DInsmore  y.  Austin,  118. 

Y.  Boyd«   957. 
Dionne  y.  Matzenbaugb,  351. 
Dlrmeyer  y.  O'Hem,  191. 
District  of  Ck)lumbla  y.  Eaton,  100. 
District  Tp.  of  Newton  v.  White,  861. 
Ditch  Y.  People,  83. 
Dltson  Y.  DitsoQ,  822,  927.  928,  982. 
DiToIl  Y.  Atwood,  504. 
Dixon  Y.  Baxter,  297. 

Y.  Bropbey,  322. 

r.  Dixon,  433. 

Y.  I.yne,  342. 

Y.  Miller,  674. 

Y.  Sinclear,  694. 
Dixson  Y.  Warters.  (MK). 
D.  M.  Osborne  &  Co.  v.  Alliance  Corp., 
83. 

Y.  Machine  Co.,  30. 
Doak  V,  WIswell,  761. 
Doan  Y.  Holly,  326. 
Doane  y.  Glenn,  166,  346. 
Dobberstein  y.  Murphy,  513. 
I>obbins  Y.  McNamara.  348. 
lN>b8on  Y.  Pearce,  373,  857,  858,  973. 


Dodd  Y.  Bond,  421. 

V.  Brott,  950. 

V.  Groll,  875. 

Y.  Maylleld,  750. 

V.  Scott,  755. 
Doddridge's  Estate  y.  Doddridge,  618. 
Dodds  Y.  Blackstock,  098. 
Dodge  Y.  Coffin,  179,  889,  892,  896. 

Y.  Hubbell.  299. 

Y.  Williams,  369. 

Y.  Wright  141. 

V.  Zimmer.  537. 
Doe  V.  Calvert.  636. 

V.  Harlow,  650. 

V.  Huddart,  783. 

Y.  Jones,  436. 

Y.  Mining  Co.,  154. 

V.  Oliver,  843. 

V.  Riley,  642. 

Y.  Thomas,  650. 

V.  Watts,  530. 
Doe  d.  McMuIlen  v   Lank,  437. 
Doe  d.  Parrish  v.  Ferris,  720. 
Doescher  y.  Doescher,  749. 
DogUoni  Y.  Crispin,  823,  827. 
Dohner's  Assignees.  In  re,  487. 
Dole  V.  Boutwell,  593. 
Dolen  V.  Buchanan,  297. 
Dolphin  Y.  Robins,  822. 
Don  Y.  Lippmaun,  825,  835,  850. 
Donahue  y.  Johnson,  32. 
Donald  v.  Kell,  677. 
Donaldson  v.  Bank,  42. 

V.  Roberts,  363. 
Donham  y.  Hardware  Co.,  376. 
Donnell  y.  Hamilton,  306. 

V.  Wright,  616. 
Donnelly,  In  re,  320a. 

Y.  Graham,  211. 

Y.  McArdle,   297. 

V.  Wilcox,  705. 
Donner  v.  Palmer,  418. 
Donovan  y.  Finn,  367,  518. 

Y.  Simmons,  446. 
Donworth  v.  Coolbaugh,  583. 
Dooian  v.  Carr,  530. 
Dooley  v.  Dooley,  633. 

v.  Watklns,  641. 
Doollttle  V.  Don  Maus,  660. 

v.  Holton.  284. 
Dore  Y.  Thornburgh,  802. 
Dormitzer  v.  Society-,  272. 
Doman  y.  Furniture  Co.,  267. 


IXXX  CASES 

[References  to  sections.    88  1  to 

Dorr  V.  Blrge,  84. 

y.  Stockdale,  560. 
Dorrance  v.  Scott,  55. 
Dorrell  v.  State,  529. 
Dorris  V.  Erwln,  613. 
Dorr's  Adm'r  v.  Robr,  220. 
Dorsey  v.  Dorsey,  926,  932. 

V.  Kendall,  261,  278. 

V.  Maury,  853,  857,  938a. 

V.  Reese,  388,  389. 

V.  Thompson,  28,  34. 
Dortic  V.  Loekwood,  80. 
Doster  v.  Bank,  423. 
Doswell  V.  Adler,  420,  445. 

V.  Stewart,  125. 
Dotterer  v.  Harden,  453. 
Doty  V.  Brown,  504,  506,  029. 

V.  Caldwell,  160. 
Doub  y.  Mason,  963. 
Doud  Sons  &  Ck).  y.  Milling  Co.,  84. 
Dougherty,  In  re,  255. 

y.  Bank,  354. 

y.  Gummings,  763. 

y.  McManus,  214. 
Dougherty's  Estate,   In  re,  291,  294, 

483,  486. 
Doughty  y.  Meek.  130. 
Douglas  y.  Douglas,  349. 

y.  Forrest,  227,  836. 

y.  Twombley,  1009. 
Douglas  y.  Yost,  641. 
Douglass  y.  Brooks,  335. 

y.  Ferris,  590. 

y.  Rowland,  586,  592. 

y.  Joyner,  360. 

y.  Todd,  340a,  351. 
Douglass*  Lessee  y.  Massie,  211,  233. 
Douthit  y.  Douthit,  322. 
Doyer  y.  State,  255. 
Dow  y.  Blake,  43,  882,  933. 

y.  Jewell,  197. 

y.  March,  85. 

V.  Plainer,  63. 

y.  Whitman,  162. 
Dowdall  V.  Cannedy,  733. 
Dowdell  V.  Neal,  459. 
Dowell  y.  Applegate,  218,  271,  755. 

y.  Goodwin,  364.  377. 

y.  Grlswold.  981. 
Dowling  y.  McGregor,  491,  493. 

y.  Polack,  27. 
Downer  y.  Bank,  953,  956. 

V.  Crlpps,  682. 


CITED. 

499  In  vol.  1;  residue  in  yol.  t.] 

Downer  y.  Dana,  209. 

y.  Morrison,  600. 

y.  Shaw,  227,  896. 
Downey  y.  Forrester,  497. 
Downing  y.  Diaz,  536. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  627. 

y.  Still,  314,  326. 
Downs  y.  Fuller,  293. 
Dows  y.  McMichael,  543,  784. 
Doyle  y.  Com.,  533. 

V.  Gore,  529. 

y.  Hallam,  87,  664,  607. 

y.  Reilly,  758. 

y.  Smith,  184. 
'  y.  Wade,  415. 
Doyley  y.  White,  189. 
Dozler  y.  Lewis,  401. 

y.  Richardson,  275. 
Drake  y.  Brander,  865. 

y.  Duyenick,  270. 

y.  Hanshaw,   193,  367. 

y.  Iryine,  79a. 

y.  I^yons,  364. 

y.  Mitchell,  746,  770. 

V.  Ogden,  247. 

y.  Slmi)Son.  5-4,  61. 

V.  Smythe,  328. 

y.  Steadman,  303. 

y.  Water  Co.,  787. 
Draper  y.  Bishop,  347. 

y.  State,  211,  987. 
Draughan  t.  Bank,  135. 
Drenuan  y.  Bunn,  573. 
Dresser  v.  Wood,  237.    . 
Drew  y.  City  of  St.  Paul,  355. 

y.  Clarke,  381. 

y.  Towle,  594. 
Drexel  y.  Man,  652,  654. 
Drexel's  Appeal,  260,  317. 
Dreyer  y.  Goldy,  23. 
Dreyfuss  v.  Soale  &  Co.,  262. 

V.  Tompkins,  130,  155,  1G2. 
Drlggers  y.  Cassady,  247,  261. 
Driuger  y.  Raih*oad  Co.,  368. 
Drinkhouse  v.  Water-Works,  550. 
DriscoU  y.  Damp,  624. 
Driver  y.  White,  G50. 
Droham  y.  Norton,  315. 
Droz  y.  La  key,  121. 
Drumm  y.  Sherman,  950,  986. 
Drummond  y.  Matthews,  313. 

V.  Prestman,  586. 
Drydeu  v.  Dryden,  84. 


CASES 
[References  to  Metiona.    H 1  to 

Dryden  v.  Parrotte,  252. 

V.  Ballroad  Co.,  UUl. 
1  »u  Bay  V.  Ullne,  184. 
Du  Bois  V.  dark,  313,  324,  377. 

y.  Dubois,  869,  961. 

v.  Railroad  Co.,  G09. 
Du  Bose  V.  Marx,  779. 
i>uche8s  of  Kingston*s  Case,  283,  503, 

516,  UUO,  611,  783,  787. 
Ducker,  Succession  of,  958. 
Pnckwortb    t.    Duckworth's    Adm'r, 

284,  380.  033. 
Ducommuu  v.  Hyslnger,  878. 
Imden  t.  Maloy,  939a. 
Dudley  T.  Brinck,  352. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  344. 

Y.  Lindsey,  938,  968,  971. 
Duell  V.  Potter,  432. 
l>uer  V.  Thweatt,  246. 
Duff  V.  Carrier,  31a. 

V.  Wyncoop,  499. 
Duffey  V.  lioutz,  158,  46L 
Duffield  V.  Smith,  524. 
Duffy  V.  Gray,  745. 

V.  Lytle,  621.  791. 
I>ufo8sat  V.  Berens,  361. 
Dufour  V.  Camfranc,  273. 

T.  Lang.  32. 
Dugan  T.  McGlann,  321,  368. 

V.  Xorthcutt,  49. 
Dugas  T.  Mathews,  943,  946. 
Duggc  T.  Stumpe.  600. 
Dubaime  y.  Monast,  324w 
Duke  y.  Oark,  446,  956. 
I'ukesy.  Bowley,  118. 
intlaney  v.  Murphy*  32. 

V.  Payne,  747. 
Dull  y.  Blackman,  549,  793. 
Dullard  y.  Hardy,  641. 

T.  Phelan.  52,  63,  303. 
r>nlle  y.  Lally,  354a. 
DumbouM  y.  Bowley.  424. 
Dunagain  y.  State,  529. 
Dunbar  y.  Hallowell,  875. 
Duncan  r.  Asbcraft  406. 

y.  Bancroft.  613. 

y.  Flynn.  492. 

y.  Geidine,  83,  288. 

y.  Uargroye,  495. 

T.  Holcomb.  599,  OOO. 

T.  l4inkford.  247. 

y.  ryon.  386,  390. 

y.  McCall.  257. 
1  LAW  JUDG.— f 


CITED. 

409  in  YOl.  1;  residue  in  vol.  1] 

Duncan  y.  Stokes,  729. 
Dunckle  v.  Wiles,  657. 
Dunliam  v.  Bower,  767. 

V.  Carson,  701. 

V.  Cox,  423. 

y.  Doremus,  554. 

V.  Downer,  388,  389. 

y.  Dunham,  862. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  770. 

y.  Jones,  245. 

y.  Wllfong,  263. 
Duuham  Lumber  Co.  v.  Holt,  391. 
Duukin  v.  Vandenbergh,  1005. 
Dunklee  y.  Goodenougb,  696,  790. 
Dunklin  v.  Wilson,  376,  513. 
Dunlap  V.  Byers,  290. 

V.  Clements,  299. 

y.  Cody.  909. 

y.  Edwards,  628. 

V.  Gallatin  Co.,  44a 

y.  Glidden,  624. 

y.  Robinson,  682. 

y.  Southerlin,  241. 

y.  Steere,  324. 
Dnuleyy  y.  Ross,  487. 
Dunloyy's  Estate,  In  re,  680. 
Dunlop  y.  Schubert,  336. 
Dunn,  In  re,  938c. 

y.  Barton,  790. 

y.  Beaman,  996. 

V.  Dunn.  228. 

V.  Pish,  367. 

V.  Hall,  233. 

y.  Hughes,  83. 

V.  Murray,  752. 

V.  Pipes,  87,  697,  706. 

V.  Seymour,  585. 

y.  Snell,  945,  998. 

y.  Tillotson,  159. 
Dunns  v.  Batchelor,  3,  118w 
Dunn's  Ex*rs  y.  Renick,  122, 
Dunson  v.  Spradley,  174. 
Dunstan  y.  Higgins,  829. 
Duplelx  y.  De  Royen,  850,  802. 
Du  Pont  y.  Abel,  229. 

y.  Du  Bos,  22. 
Durand  y.  Trusdell,  905. 
Durant  y.  Abendroth,  795. 

y.  Comegys,  21. 

V.  Duchesse  D'Auxy,  301. 

V.  Essex  Co.,  528,   720,   721,  722. 
938. 

T.  Gabby,  986. 


IXXZii  CASES 

[R«f«renceB  to  MCtiooi.    ||  1  to 

Durden  y.  Garhart,  91. 
Duren  v.  Kee,  620. 
Durham  v.  Brown,  76. 

V.  Darby,  39. 

V.  Moore,  348. 

V.  Williams,  044. 
Durlnger  v.  Mosebino,  909,  973. 
Dumford,  Succession  of,  123. 
Durning  v.  Burkhardt,  158. 
Durousseau  v.  United  States,  216. 
Duryea  v.  Fuechsel,  158. 
Duryee  v.  Hale,  913,  914. 
Dusing  Y.  Nelson,  31. 
Dusy  V.  Prudom,  324. 
Dutcber  r.  Dutcber,  92a 
Dutll  V.  Pacheco,  389. 
Dutton  V.  Hobson,  263. 

V.  McReynolds,  446. 

V.  Mason,  953.  1000. 

V.  Sbaw,  734. 

V.  Smtth,  275,  691. 

V.  Woodman,  657. 
Duvall  V.  Fearsqn,  857. 
Duxbury  v.  Dable,  278. 
Dwigbt  V.  Newell,  445. 

V.  St.  Jobn,  1016. 
Dworak  v.  More,  879. 
Dwyer  v.  Wilgbt,  Go3. 
Dyckman  v.  City  of  New  York,  287. 
l>yer  v.  Print  Works,  609. 
Dy?r\ille  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Heller,  162. 
Dygert  v.  Dygert,  620. 
Dyke  v.  Bank,  118. 
Dynes  v.  Hoover,  250,  256,  524. 
Dysart  v.  Brandertb,  412. 
Dyson  v.  Leek,  659. 

y.  Simmons,  122,  443. 


Eager  v.  Stover,  903. 

Eagle  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Mfg.  Co.,  540. 

Eagles  V.  Kern,  588. 

Eakin  v.  McCraltb,  549. 

Eames  v.  Eames,  49. 

V.  German ia    Turn    Verein,    407, 
411. 
Ean  V.  Railroad  Co.,  336. 
Kans  V.  Sawyer,  612. 
Earl  V.  Bull,  768. 

V.  Mathenoy,  .^95. 

V.  Raymond,  865,  938c. 


CITED. 

496  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  1.] 

Earle  y.  Earle,  642. 

Earley  v.  Churcb  Soc,  1015. 

Earley's  Appeal,  354. 

Earll  V.  City  of  Chicago,  77. 

Earl  of  Bandon  v.  Becber,  508. 

Earls  y.  Earls,  179. 

Early  y.  Moore,  3,  118. 

Earnest  v.  Hoskins,  77,  683. 

Eartbman's  Adm'rs  y.  Jones,  279. 

Easley  v.  Camp.  330. 

V.  McClinton,  284. 
East,  The,  814. 
Eastern    Building   &   Loan    Ass'n   y. 

Welling,  510. 
Easterly  y.  Goodwin,  229. 
Eastern   Townships   Bank  y.   Beebe, 

847,  853. 
Eastbam  y.  Sallis.  21. 
Eastlick  y.  Wright,  141. 
Eastman  y.  Cooper,  611,  657,  658. 

y.  Porter,  732,  744. 

y.  Scbettler,  423. 

y.  Wadleigh,  230. 

y.  Waterman,  299. 
Eastmure  y.  Laws,  729,  763. 
Easton  y.  Plckersgill,  691,  692. 
East  Rlyerside  Irr.  Dist  y.  Holcomb, 

393b. 
East  Tennessee,   V.   &  Q.   B.   Co.   y. 
Kennedy,  923. 

y.  Mabiney,  619. 
East  Texas  Land  &  Imp.  Co.  y.  Gra- 
ham, 393. 
Eaton,  In  re,  255,  259. 

V.  Badger,  240,  906. 

y.  George,  699. 

y.  Harth,  592.  625. 

y.  Hasty,  482a,  857,  897,  916,  919. 

y.  Lyman,  570. 

V.  Ryan.   42.5. 

V.  Sanxter,   436. 
Eaton's  Appeal,  407,  448. 
Eaton   &   Hamilton   R.   Co.  v.   Hunt. 
216. 

y.  Varnum,  32. 
Eau  Claire  Lumber  Co.  y.  Anderson, 

155. 
Eaves  y.  Vial,  617. 
Eayrs  y.  Nason.  .560. 
Eboll  V.  Bursinger.  326. 
El)erle  y.  Bryant.  ."ilK). 
Efcles  V.  Daniels.  (j41. 
Eckart,  In  re,  255. 


CASBS 
[Reference*  to  Mctioni.    H 1  to 

Eeker  ▼.  First  Nat.  Bank,  182. 
Eckert  v.  Blnckley,  514. 

V.  BInkley,  T91. 
Eddie  ▼.  Eddie,  166. 
Eddleman  v.  McGlathery,  27. 
Eddy    &    Bissell    Live-Stock    Ck>.    v. 

Blackburn,  183. 
Edelln  t.  Lyon,  29. 
Eden  v.  Uartt,  629. 
Edgar  t.  Buck,  722. 

V.  Greer,  52,  67.  G83. 
EdgeU  v.  Slgerson,  750,  790. 
Edgerly  v.  Emerson,  100. 

T.  Stewart,  22. 
Edgerton  v.  Edgerton,  291. 

V.  Muse,  660,  705. 
Eklmanson  t.  Best,  380»  756. 
Bdmlston  y.  Edmiston,  279. 
Edmonds   ▼.    Montgomery,   903,    940, 

%1. 
£dmonson  v.  Moseby's  Heirs,  373. 
Edmunds  t.  Smith,  469. 
Rdmundson  t.-  School  District,  253fi, 

290. 
Edrlngton  y.  AUsbrooks,  232. 
Eklson  y.  Cumings,  368. 

y.  Edson,  320. 

y.  Munsell,  660.' 
Eklwards  y.  Bates  County,  751. 

y.  Carter,  233. 

y.  Edwards,  55. 

y.  Helllngs,  121,  236.  341,  461,  964.  ; 

V.  Jones,  857,  889. 

y.  McKay,  338. 

y.  Maupin,  22. 

y.  Osgood,  299. 

y.  Roys,  655. 

y.  Stevens,  526. 

y.  Stewart,  769. 

y.  Turner,  50. 

y.  Whlted,  190,  278. 
Edwards'  Appeal,  297. 
Egan  y.  Rooney,  340. 

y.  Sengpeil,  306. 
Egberts  v.  Dibble,  892. 

y.  Wood,  585. 
Eggleston  y.  Morrison,  48. 
Ehle  y.  Bingham.  631. 
Ebmgren  v.  Gronlund,  939b. 
Eioeman  v.  Finch,  454. 
Efchelberger  v.  Smyser,  968. 
EJchert  v.  Schaffer.  650. 
Kichboff  y.  Elcbhoff,  271. 


CITED.  Ixxxiil 

499  In  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Eickmau  v.  Uersker,  246. 
Eichoff  V.  Eichoflf,  376. 
Eikenberry  v.  Edwards,  544. 
Elmer  v.  Uiekards,  252. 
Einstein  v.  Davidson,  93,  307. 
Eisenhower  v.  School  Dlst.,  734,  752. 
Biseulord  v.   Clum,  600. 
Eiseumeuger  v.   Murphy,  196. 
Eltel  v.  Foote,  247. 
Ekel  V.  Snevily,  350. 

V.  Swift,  341. 
Ekey  v.  Inge,  050. 
Ela  V.  Edwards,  563. 
Elder  v.  Bank,  330. 

y.  City  of  New  Orleans.  329. 

y.  Grunsky,  88,  107. 

y.  McClaskey,  39. 

y.  Mining  Co.,  158,  271,  297a,  311, 
9380. 
Eldred  v.  Hazletf  s  Adm'r,  354,  482a, 
498. 

v.  White,  393. 
Eldredge  v.   Aultman,   Miller  &  Co., 

958. 
Eldridge  v.  Adams,  141. 

y.  Hill,   650. 

v.  Post,  430. 
Eleventh  School  Dlst.  In  Alburgh  v. 

Rodd,  299. 
Elgin  Watch  Co.  v.  Meyer,  730. 
Eliot  y.  McCormlck,  220. 

V.  Porter,  730,  770,  777,  779. 
Elizabethtown  Savings  Inst.   v.    Ger- 

ber,  862. 
Elkhart  Car- Works  Co.  v.  Bills,  718. 
Elkins  V.  Wolfe,  61. 
Elligood  y.  Cannon,  93. 
Ellinger's  Appeal.  349. 
Ellington  V.  Crockett,  699. 
Elliott  V.  Bastian,  200. 

V.  Bufflngton,  159. 

V.  Haydoii,  777,  779. 

V.  Hoi  brook,  57,  958. 

V.  Jordan,  115. 

V.  Ivnlght.  140. 

V.  Peirsol,  218,  245,  513. 

V.  Qiilmby,  526. 

V.  Wnrlng.  940. 

V.  Woodward,  555. 
Ellis  V.  Bonner.  313,  a46a. 

V.  Clarke.  1)70. 

V.  Crowl.  534.  738. 

V.  Duuu.  118. 


Ixxxiy  CASES 

[References  to  sectioiiB.    {{  1  to 

Bills  V.  Ellis,  124,  178,  876,  927. 

y.  Harrison,  300. 

T.  Insurance  Co.,  059. 

y.  Jameson,  608. 

y.  Jones,  213,  348. 

y.  Kelly,  291. 

y.  Kerr,  953,  955. 

y.  The  Lyceum,  632. 

y.  Mills,  87,  697. 

y.  Rademacher,  141. 

y.  Smith,  987. 

y.  Staples,  790. 

V.  White,  875. 
Ellis*  Estate,  In  re,  290. 
Ellis  H.  Roberts  &  Co.  y.  Buckley,  169. 
Ellison  V.  Bank,  183. 

V.  State,  211. 
Elliston  y.  Bank,  354. 
Ells  y.  Bone,  772. 

y.  Tousley,  421,  445. 
Elsworth  y.  Caldwell,  948. 
Ellsworth  y.  Cuyler,  439. 
Elmendorf  y.  Elmendorf,  278. 
Elsasser  y.  Haines,  912. 
Elsenrath  y.  Kallmeyer,  98. 
Elson  V.  Comstock,  584. 
Elston  y.  Robinson,  425. 
Elting  y.  Bank,  370. 
Elton  y.  Brettschneider,  345. 
Eltzroth  V.  Vorls,  93. 
El  well  V.  Gooduow,  22. 

y.  Hitchcock,  438. 

y.  Johnson,  29. 

y.  Security  Co.,  549. 
Ely  V.  Beaumont,  428. 

V.  Cooke,  954. 

y.  Lamb,  986. 

y.  Parkhurst,  72. 

y.  Tallman,  277. 
Elyton  Land  Co.,  Ex  parte,  44. 
Emanuel  v.  State,  259. 
Embry  y.  Palmer,  938,  939b. 
Embury  v.  Conner,  279,  621,  731. 
Emerlck  v.  Garwood,  450. 
Emerson  y.  Head,  158. 

y.  Knapp,  949. 

y.  Sansome,  656. 

y.  Udall,  366.  378. 
Emerson,  Talcott  &  Co.  v.  Skidmore, 

207. 
Emery  y.  Downin^c,  85. 

y.  Fowler,  578,  579,  784. 

y.  Nelson,  522. 


CITED. 

499  In  vol.  1;  residue  in  yoI.  2.] 

Emery  y.  Whltwell,  164. 

£2mig  y.  Medley,  114. 

Emlson  y.  Walker,  159. 

Emma  Sllyer  Mln.  Co.  y.  Emma  Mln. 

Co.,  578. 
Bnmel  v.  Hayes,  651. 
Emmons  v.  Dowe,  671. 
Emory  y.  Jolce,  941,  945. 
Empey  y.  Plugert,  530. 
Empire  State  Xail  Co.  y.  Button  Co., 

540,  615,  625. 
Empire  Tp.  v.  Darlington,  906. 
Emporia  Mut.  Loan  &  Say.  Ass'n  v. 

Watson,  442. 
Endicott  y.  Morgan,  897. 
Eneu  y.  Clark,  55. 
Enewold  v.  Olsen,  496. 
Engel  y.  Scheuerman,  916. 
England  v.  Garner,  193,  225. 
England  Mortgage  Security  00.  v.  Tar- 

yer,  50. 
English  T.  Aldrlch,  381,  666. 

V.  English,  721. 

y.  Miller,  360. 

y.  Mun*ay,  040. 

y.  Savage,  197,  383. 
English's  Adm'r  y.  Murray,  640. 
English's  Appeal,  77. 
Engstrom  y.  Sherburne,  296,  917,  920. 
Ennis  V.  Ass'n,  337. 

y.  Smith,  806. 
Eno  V.  Crooke,  995. 
Binos  y.  Capps,  107. 

V.  Smith,  220,  278, 

V.  Suthsrland,  44. 
Ensign  v.  Kindred,  878. 
Enslen  y.  Wheeler,  467, 
Ensley  y.  Wright,  352. 
Ensly  y.  Wright.  352. 
Entrekin  y.  Chambers,  232. 
Epling  y.  Dickson,  981. 
Eppinger  y.  Kirby,  118. 
Epprlght  V.  Kauffman,  793. 
Epstein  y.  Ferst,  721. 
Equator   Mining   &   Smelting   Co.   t. 

Hall,  654. 
Equitable  Securities  Co.  y.  iBloi-k,  265. 
Equitable  Trust  Co.  y.  Smith,  722. 
Erck  y.  Bank,  140. 
Erlcksou  y.  Quinn,  423. 
^Erlanger  v.  Ayegno,  118. 
Ernst's  Estate,  In  re,  488. 
Erwln  y.  Gamer,  536. 


-] 


:i 


GASBS 
DUfereneet  to  secUoiiB.   U 1  to 

flkrwln  ▼.  Lynn,  734. 

y.  Rutherford,  986. 

T.  Scotten,  772. 

▼.  Vint,  301. 
Esmond,  In  re,  524. 
Essex  V.  Berry.  308. 
Estelle  y.  Peacock,  540. 
Estep  y.  Hntchman,  682. 

V.  Larsb.  707,  724. 

y.  Watklns,  246. 
Esterly's  Appeal,  401. 
EBtes,  In  re,  420.  423. 

y.  NeU,  553. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  6G0. 
EstUl  y.  Tanl,  604,  714. 
Estls  y.  Patton,  377. 
Etherldge  y.  Middleton,  11& 
EtK  y.  Wheeler,  875. 
Eoreka  Clothes  Wringing  Machine  Co. 

y.  Machine  Co.,  531. 
Eureka  Iron  Works  y.  Bresnahan,  260. 
Erangelical  Synod  y.  Schoeneich,  585. 
Kvans  v.  Ashby,  261. 

y.  Barclay,  77. 

y.  Blrge,  612. 

y.  Bradley,  085a. 

y.  Breueman,  231. 

y.  Caiman,  392. 

y.  Chester,  189,  300. 

y.  Cleary,  802. 

y.  Commonwealth,  588. 

y.  Duim,  41,  47. 

y.  Eyans.  444. 

y.  FaU  River  County,  354. 

y.  Fearne,  61a. 

y.  Fisher.  132. 

y.  Gill,  233. 

y.  Instlne,  972. 

y.  Lipscomb,  189. 

v.  McGlasson,  446. 

V.  McMahan,  123,  700. 

y.  I^arks,  139. 

V.  Percifull.  27a 

V.  Uees,  126,  127,  606. 

y.  Schafer,  141. 

y.  Stokes,  585. 

V.  Tatem,  517,  720,  857,  869.  884, 
885,  962. 

y.  Trust  Co.,  363,  393a. 

V.  Watts,  57. 

y.  Wells,  976. 

y.  White,  699. 

T.  Young,  271« 


CITED.  IXXXV 

499  in  Tol.  1;  residue  in  toI.  2.] 

Evans*  Adm*r  v.  Clover,  34. 
EvansvUle,  S.  &  C.  Straight  Line  R.  Co. 

V.  City  of  Evansvllle,  287. 
Everett  v.  Printing  Co.,  750. 

v.  Reynolds,  303. 
Everill  y.  Swan,  754. 
Everling  y.  Holcomb,  571. 
Eyers  v.  Watson,  274,  285. 
Ewald  y.  Waterhout,  671. 
Ewell  y.  Pitman,  24a 
Ewen  y.  Terry,  1001. 
Ewer  y.  Cotfln,  905. 
Ewmg  y.  Fuller,  32. 

y.  Hatfield,  116. 

y.  Jennings,  964. 

V.  McXairy,  737. 

y.  Nickle,  378. 

y.  Wilson,  205. 
Excelsior  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Boyle,  456. 
Exchange  Bank  y.  Ault,  271. 

y.  Ford,  306,  776. 

y.  Oilman,  700. 

y.  Streeter,  306. 
Exchange  Nat.  Bank  y.  Allen,  162. 

y.  Clement,  229. 
Excise  Com*rs  y.  Holllster,  348. 
Exendine  y.  Pore,  939c. 
Exl?y  y.  Berryhill,  352. 
Ex-Mission    Land    &    Water    Co.    y. 

Flash,  356. 
Exposition    Building   &   Loan    Co.    v. 

Spiegel.  306. 
Expressman's  Mut.  Ben.  Ass'n  y.  Hur- 

loc:k,  906. 
Ex  ton  y.  Zule,  643. 
Eyre  v.  Cook,  208. 
Eyres  y.  Sedgewicke,  296. 
Ezzell  y.  Maltbie,  714. 


Faber  v.  Hovey,  510,  882,  960. 
Factors*   &  Traders'   Ins.   Co.   v.  De 

Blanc,  245. 
Fagan  y.  Barnes,  83. 
Fahey  y.  Mottu,  286. 
Fahs  y.  Taylor,  263. 
Fain  y.  Hughes,  707. 

y.  Miles,  663. 
Fairbanks  y.  Bank,  107. 

y.  Kraft,  57. 
Fairchild  y.  FalrchUd,  274 


IxXXVi  CASES 

[References  to  sectlonB.    {{  1  to 

Fairchlld  v.  Holly,  746. 

V.  Lyn(*h,  732. 
Fulres  v.  McLellan,  Oil. 
Fairfield  v.  McNauy,  761. 
Falconer  t.  Cochran,  604. 
Falken  v.  Railroad  Co.,  90. 
Falkuer  v.  Guild,  223. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  882. 
Fall  V.  Evans,  315. 
Fallbrook  Irrigation  Dist.  v.  Bradley, 

938c. 
Fallon.  In  re.  807. 

V.  Murray,  572. 
Falls  V.  Robinson,  384. 
Faun  V.  Atkinson,  441. 
Fanning  v.  Bank,  380. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  789. 

V.  Krapfl,  232. 
F.  A.  Poth  Brewing  Co.  v.  Bemd,  326. 
Faran  v.  Robinson,  560. 
Farber  v.  Iron  Co.,  714. 
Faris  v.  Durham,  293. 
Farlsh  v.  Austin,  J)58. 

V.  Corlies,  349. 
Farley,  Ex  parte,  256. 

V.  Cammann,  155. 

V.  Lea,  441. 

V.  McAlister,  446. 
Farmer  v.  Farmer,  565. 

The,  V.  McCraw,  581. 

V.  Sasseen,  1010. 

V.  Simpson,  593. 

V.  Wilson,  135. 
Farmers'  Hank  v.  Beaston,  596. 

V.  Collins,  357. 

V.  Groves.  976. 

V.  Hclghe.  417,  418. 

V.  Ijeonard,  992. 

V.  Steamboat  Co.,  583. 
Farmers'   Fire    Ins.   Co.   v.   Johnston, 

389. 
Farmers*  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hlghsmith,  274. 
Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Bank, 
375,  382. 

V.  Killlnger,  SoS, 

V.  McKinney,  278. 

V.  Schwenk,  425. 
Farmers'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Burns.  32. 
Farmers'  &  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Math- 
er, 7,  60. 

V.  Spear,  70. 
Famey  v.  Hamilton  County,  206. 
Farnham,  £x  parte,  255. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  toI.  2.] 

Farnham  v.  Mallory,  148. 

Farnsley  v.  Stillwell,  351. 

Famum  v.  Machine  Shop,  583. 

Fan-  V.  Ladd,  286,  900. 

Farrar  v.  Mining  Co.,  321. 

Farrel  v.  Bank,  585a. 

Farrell  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  754. 

Farrell    Foundry    &    Machine    Co.   v. 

Bank,  585a. 
FaiTington  v.  City  of  New  York,  246. 

v.  Payne,  (;21,  734,  738.    . 
Farris  v.  Hayes,  190. 

V.  People,  486. 

V.  Walter,  ^i. 
Farrow  v.  Dial,  321. 
Farson  v.  Gorham,  32. 
Farwell  v.  Huston,  70. 

v.  Raddin,  291. 
Fasholt  V.  Reed,  438. 
Fassett  v.  Tallmadge,  1011. 
Faucette  v.  Ludden,  89.  ' 
Faughnan  v.  City  of  Elizabeth,  966, 

989.  1016. 
Faulconer  v.  Stinson,  1005. 
Faulder  v.  Silk,  802. 
Faulk  V.  Kellums,  115. 
Faulkner  v.  Campbell.  378b 
Fauntleroy  v.  Lyle,  589. 
Faurot  v.  Bank,  86. 
Faver  v.  Briggs.  233.  237, 
Fawcett  v.  Vary,  156. 
Faxon  v.  Baxter,  299. 
Faj'  V.  Ames,  588. 

y.  Ednilston.  588. 

V.  Wenzell,  155. 
Fayerwcather  v.  Monson,  32. 

V.  Ritch,  616,  624,  731. 

y.  Tucker,  88. 
Fayette  City  Borough  v.  Huggins,  16. 
P'ayssoux  v.  Kendall  County,  252. 
Fears  v.  Riley,  321,  375. 
Feaster  v.  Woodflll,  295. 
Featherson  y.  Turnpike  Co.,  574. 
Featherston  v.  Small,  287. 
Feeter  v.  McCombs,  487. 
Feikert  v.  Wilson,  313. 
Felch  y.  Beaudry,  15. 
Fell  v.  Bennett,  543,  553,  734. 
Fellows  v.  Fellows.  926. 

v.  Hall,  248. 
Fels  y.  Raymond,  86. 
Felt  v.  Cook,  1014. 

V.  Turn u re,  707. 


CASES 
[References  to  Bectloni.    H  1  to 

Felter  v.  MuUiner,  115,  G82. 
Felton  V.  Railroad  Co.,  16. 

V.  Smith,  732.  751. 
FeltUB  V.  Starke,  006. 
IVndaU  v.  U.  S..  534a,  627. 
Fendir  v.  Stiles,  236. 
Fenn  v.  Dogdale,  555. 
Fenton  r.  Garllck,  904. 

V.  White,  38. 
Fenwlck  t.  ThorntOD,  536. 
Ferebee  v.  Doxey,  493. 
Ferguson  v.  Carter,  729. 

V.  Crawford,   275,  287,  901,  972. 

V.  Harw'ood,  877,  878. 

V.  Kuinler,  246. 

V.  Mahon,  827,  829,  835. 

V.  Mason,  29. 

V.  MlUaudou,  130. 

V.  Miller,  787. 

V.  Staver,  682. 

V.  Town  of  Sheffield,  680. 

V.  Yard,   284. 
Fernandez  v.  Da  Costa,  815. 
Ferrall  v.  Bradford,  770. 
Ferrea  v.  Chabot,  560. 

T.  Tubbs.   988. 
Ferrell  r.  Alder,  567. 

V.  Broadway,  806. 

T.  Hales,  127,  180,  410. 
Ferrers  v.  Arden,  715. 
Ferrer's  Case,  647. 
Ferriday  v.  Seleer,  388. 
Venis  v.  Coovei,  216. 

V.  Fisher.  660. 

V.  Udell,  511,  615,  684. 
Ferry  v.  Car- Wheel  Co.,  902 

V.  Street,   530. 
Festoraszi  r.   Church,  29. 
Fetter  v.  Beale,  734,  738. 
Fetterman  v.  Siurphy,  466. 
Fkkes  T.  Vlck,  376. 
Fidelity  Insurance  Trust  &  Safe  De- 
posit Co.  V.  Fridenberg,  518. 

v.  Gazzam,   74b 

T   Iron  Co.,  159. 
Fidelity  Trust  &  Safety-Vault  Co.  v. 

City  of  Louisville.  609. 
Fidelity  &  Deposit  Go.  v.  Bank,  419. 
FMler  v.  John,  423. 
Field  T.  Cain,  860. 

T.  Glbbs.  272,  903,  938c. 

V.  Liver  man,  455. 

V.  Mllburn.  456. 


CITED. 


Ixxxvii 


499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Field  V.  Sandei-son,  290,  890. 

V.  Sims,  958. 

V.  Slsson,  330. 

V.  Williamson,  197. 
Fielden  v.  Lahens,  208. 
Fields  V.  Brown,  331. 

V.  Mundy's  Estate,  892. 
Fifleld  V.  Edwards,  618. 
Fifth  Mut.  Bldg.  Soc.  v.  Holt,  541. 
Fifth  Nat.  Bank  v.  Judge.  329. 
Figge  V.  Rowlen,  269,  271. 
Filbert  v.  Hawk,  9.^3. 
Files  V.  Robinson,  88. 
Filley  v.  Cody.  179. 

V.  Duncan,  438. 
Fllson  V.  Greenspan.  77. 
Finance  Co.  v.  Hanlon,  206. 
Finch  V.  Earl  of  WInehelsea,  400,  445. 

V.  Galigher,  772. 
Flncher  v.  Malcolmson,  344. 
Flndley  v.  Johnson,  326. 

V.  Smith,  949. 
Finlayson  v.  Accident  Co.,  .140,  34L 
Finley  v.  Carothers,  981. 

V.  City  of  Tucson,  15. 

V.  Hanl>e6t  504,  631,  785,  791, 

V.  Houser,  292,  666. 

V.  Robertson,  193,  194. 
Flnley's  Appeal,  55. 
Finnagan  v.  Manchester,  116. 
Finnegan  v.  Campbell,  620. 
Flnnell  v.  Jones'  Ex'x,  165. 
Finneran  v.  Leonard,  272. 
Finney  v.  Boyd,  549. 

V.  Ferguson,  60. 
Fire  Ass'n  of  Philadelphia  v.  Ruby, 

r)88. 

Firebaugh  v.  Ward,  446,  449. 
Fireman's  Ins.  Co.  v.  McMillan,  588. 

V.  Thompson,  907. 
First  Baptist  Church  v.  Fort,  242. 

V.  Syms,  370,  561. 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Bennett,  429. 

V.  Burkhardt,  210. 

V.  Carleton,  63. 

V.  Clark.  415. 

V.  Clements,  576. 

V.  Cloud,  406a. 

V.  Crosby,  874. 

V.  Cunningham,     61a,     291,     861, 
897,  920: 

V.  Distining  Co.,  252. 

V.  Dry-Goods  Co.,  238,  307. 


Ixxx^ili 


GASES  CITfllO. 
[References  to  Mctloni.    §§  1  to  499  in  toL  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 


First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Duel  Gouuty,  862. 

V.  Dusy,  158. 

v.  Bwlng,  583a. 

V.  Finck,  770. 

y.  Garland,  53. 

y.  Garlinghouse,  55,  192. 

y.  Gibsou,  991. 

V.  Hanior,  971. 

V.  Hanua,  245,  270. 

V.  Hays,  439a. 

y.  Ileudrieks,  448. 

y.  Hostetter,  179. 

V.  Hyer,  2t)2. 

V.  Jaggers,  213. 

V.  Kowalsky,  155. 

y.  Lieberman,  304a. 

y.  Linville,  509. 

V.  Lumber  Co.,  78, 

y.  McKinney,  53. 

V.  Mfg.  Co.,  995. 

y.  Maxwell,  423. 

V.  Oldham,  005. 

y.  Prescott,  80. 

y.  Rogers,  1008. 

y.  Sloman,  938b. 

y.  Trout,  61. 

y.  Vander  Stucken,  186. 

y.  Wallis,   857,   889. 

y.  Williams,  315,  783. 

y.  Wolff.  121. 
Fischer  y.  Qulglcy,  745. 

y.  Stlefel,  313. 
Flscus  y.  Guthrie,  514. 
Fish  y.  Benson,  663. 

y.  Folley,  748. 

y.  Howland,  585. 

V.  Lane,  371. 

y.  Lightner,  611. 

y.  Wheeler,  86. 
Fishblate  y.  McGuUough,  351. 
Fish  Bros.   Wagon  Co.  y.   Mfg.  Co., 

504. 
Fishbume  y.  Engledove,  663. 
Fisher,  Bx  parte,  257. 

In  re,  321. 

y.  Fielding,  836,  844,  849,  874. 

y.  Fisher,  746. 

y.  Harnden,  218. 

y.  Holbrook,  393a. 

V.  Kelly.  790. 

V.  Ijongnecker,  278,  699. 

y.  McGirf,  257. 

V.  Ogle,  810,  817. 


Fisher  v.  Railroad  Co.,  300.  354a. 

y.  Scharadin,  16. 

V.  Sieyrea,  125. 

y.  Simon,  297. 

y.  Wineman,  600. 
Fish  Furniture  Co.  y.  Jenkins,  ?W6. 
Fishli  y.  Fishll,  926. 
Fishmongers  Co.  y.  Robertson,  129. 
Fisk  y.  City  of  Hartford,  725. 

y.  Miller,  296,  659. 

y.  Parker,  703,  721. 

y.  Thorp,  306,  346. 
Fiske  y.  Anderson,  230. 
Fisler  y.  Stewart,  1017^ 
Fitch  y.  Byall,  367. 

y.  Cornell,  195. 

y.  Meudenhall,  466. 

y.  Richard,  162. 

y.  Scot,  16. 

V.  Scoyel,  299. 
Fithlan  y.  Monks.  216,  242. 
Fitzgerald  y.  Salentine,  213. 

y.  Stewart,  128. 
Fitzhugh  y.  Blake,  482a. 

y.  Custer,  275. 

V.  McKinney,  761. 

V.  Orton,  367. 
Fltzpatrick  v.  Oampbell,  340. 

y.  Hoffman,  567. 

y.  Leake,  485. 
Fitzsimmons  y.  Insurance  Co.,  816, 817. 

y.  Johnson.  889,  922. 

y.  Marks,  864. 

V.  Munch,  115,  130. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  29. 
Flad  Oyen.  The,  818,  821. 
Flagg  V.  Flagg,  461. 

V.  Kirk,  991. 
Flake  y.  Carson,  206. 
Flanagan  y.  Insurance  Co.,  60. 

V.  Patterson,  338. 
Flanagin  v.  Daws,  437. 
Flanders  y.  Hall,  703. 
Flandreau  v.  Downey,  784,  787. 
Flanneken  v.  Wright,  363. 
Flannery  y.  The  Alexander  Barkley, 
798. 

V.  Fertilizer  Co.,  274. 
Flat  Top  Grocery  Co.  y.  McClaugherty, 

744. 
Flecktpn  y.  Spicer,  567. 
Fleece  y.  Russell,  27. 
Fleenor  v.  Drlsklll,  123,  660. 


0A8BS  CITBD. 


Izxsix 


[Raferencea  to  lectionB.    fiS  1  to 

Fleetwood  y.  Mortgage  Co.,  345. 
Fleischman  y.  Walker,  217. 
Fleitas  Y.  Meraux,  731. 
Fleming  y.  Beayer,  991,  996. 
Y.  Boiling,  25,  44. 
Y.  Freese,  235. 
y.  Hawley,  699. 
Y.  Improvement  Co.,  83. 
Y.  Insmrance  Co.,  719.     . 
Y.  Jencks,  331. 
Y.  McDonald,  779,  782. 
Y.  Seellgson,  200. 
Y.  Stansell,  953. 
Y.  Ttowsdale,  253a. 
Flemings  y.  Blddlck's  Ez*r,  683. 
Fletcher  y.  Coombe,  135. 
Y.  Ferrel,  857,  859. 
Y.  Holmes,  87,  411,  697,  705. 
Y.  Jackson,  591,  592. 
Y.  Rapp,  916. 
Y.  Warren,  367. 
Flewellen  y.  'Ft  Bend  County,  616. 
FUcklnger  y.  Hull,  394. 

Y.  Railroad  Co.,  153. 
Flint  Y.  Bodge,  756. 
Y.  Sheldon,  970. 
Flint  River  Steamboat  Ca  y.  Foster, 
221. 
Y.  Roberts,  220. 
Flippen  v.  Dixon,  616. 
Flitters  V.  Allfrey,  522. 
Florat  V.  Handy,  390. 
Florida  Cent  U.  Co.  v.  Schntte,  614. 
Florida  Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  707. 
Florshelm  Bros.  Dry-Goods  Co.  y.  Wil- 
liams, 324. 
Fkmrenoy  y.  Durke,  878w 
Floumoy  y.  Healy,  152. 
Flowers  v.  Alford,  3ia 

V.  Jackson,  83. 
Fkjyd  V.  Browne,  779. 
V.  Olark,  461,  466w 
V.  Harding,  445. 
V.  lion  Co.,  IG,  98. 
Fluker  v.  Herbert.  681. 
Flynn  v.  Hlte,  755. 
V.  Morgan,  409. 
F.  Mayer  Boot  &  Shoe  Co.  v.  Falk,  246. 
Foertsch  v.  Germulller,  191. 
Fogarty  v.  Sparks,  577. 
Fogg  V.  Glbbs.  271. 

v.  Plumer,  578,  607. 
Folan  Y.  Folan,  299. 


499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Foley  V.  Foley,  138,  l&i. 

Foley's  Bx'r  v.  GatUff,  77. 

Folger  Y.  Insurance  Co.,  228,  835,  897, 

905. 
Follansbee  v.  Paving  Co.,  25. 

V.  Walker,  537,  538,  624, 
Follett  V.  Alexander,  326^  346a. 

V.  Hall,  442. 
Folmar's  Appeal,  636,  638. 
l'\)lsom  V.  Ballard,  304a« 

V.  Blood,  878. 

V.  Carli,  425. 

V.  Chesley,  1008. 

V.  Clemence,  737. 

V.  Couuer,  299. 

V.  Howell,  707. 
Foltz  V.  Wert,  445,  956. 
Folz  V.  Nelke,  725. 
Fontaine  v.  Hudson,  109. 
Foot  V.  DlUaye,  407. 

V.  Sprague,  766. 
Foote  V.  Clark,  617. 

Y.  Glbbs,  722. 

Y.  Glenn,  360. 

Y.  Sllsby,  386. 
Footman  v.  Stetson,  7581 
Forbes  v.  Bringe,  233. 

Y.  Douglass,  560. 

Y.  Muxlow,  85. 

Y.  Navra,  130. 

Y.  Scanneil,  851. 

V.  Tiffany,  940. 
Forcey's  Appeal,  611. 
Ford  V.  Doyle,  213,  219,  692. 
.  V.  Elkln,  72. 

Y.  Ford,  381. 

V.  Ford's  Adm'r,  611,  642. 

V.  Hill,  59.  367. 

Y.  Land  Co.,  224. 

Y.  Newcomer,  641, 

Y.  Roberts,  706. 

Y.  Stuart,  'Mb, 

Y.  llgue,  346a. 
Forder  v.  Davis,  660. 
Fore  V.  Manlove,  957. 
Foreman  v.  Bibb,  1014. 

V.  Carter,  318,  326. 
Forgay  v.  Conrad,  42,  44. 
Forin  v.  City  of  Duluth,  347. 
Formby  v.  Shackleford,  4G2. 
Forquer  v.  Forquer,  156,  163,  165. 
Forrest  v.  0*Donnell,  948. 
Forrester  v.  Strauss,  70. 


XC  CASES 

[ReferencM  to  MctionB.    S8  1  to 

Forsyth  v.  City  of  Hammond,  938c 
Forsj'the  v.  McCralght,  378. 
Fort  V.  Battle,  1533. 

V.  Blagg,  9G1. 
Fortier,  Succession  of,  252. 
Fortman  y.  Ruggles,  222. 
Fortune  v.  Bartolomei,  61,  69. 
Forwood  V.  Dehoney,  952. 
I«'osliee  V.  McCreary,  366. 
Fosliier  v.  Narver,  898. 
Foss  V.  Hinlcell,  530. 

V.  Witliam,  299. 
Foster  v.  Andrews,  551. 

V.  Baiili,  378. 

V.  Bowman,  117. 

V/  Com.,  707. 

V.  Crawford,  252, 1008. 

V.  Derby,  549. 

V.  Evans,  650. 

V.  Foust.  438. 

V.  Glvens,  271.  273. 

V.  Glazener.  279. 

V.  Hunter,  994. 

V.  Jones,  205,  341,  593. 

V.  Undley,  29. 

V.  Martin,  ^47. 

V.  Milliner,  707. 

T.  Napier,  738. 

V.  Powers,  600. 

V.  Railroad  Oo.,  152. 

V.  The  Richard  Busteed,  501,  675, 
093. 

V.  Rutherford,  1006.  1008. 

V.  Smith,  91. 

V.  Wells,  504,  624,  715. 

y.  Wood,  378,  390. 
Foster's  Appeal,  4.39. 
Foster's  Estate,  In  re,  460. 
Foullc  V.  Collmm,  969. 
Foulke  V.  Thalmessinger,  754,  787. 
420  Mining  Co.  y.  Mining  Co.,  696. 
Four-Mile  Land  Co.  v.  Slusher,  123. 
Fourth  Nat.  Banic  y.  Neyhardt,  125a. 
Foust  V.  City  of  Huntington,  537. 

y.  Trice,  441. 
Foute  y.  Fairman,  400. 
Fowble  T.  Walker,  352. 
Fowle  y.  New  Haven  &  N.  Co.,  743. 

y.  Park,  760. 
Fowler  y.  Atkinson,  766. 

y.  Brooks,  174. 

V.  Brown,  227,  794. 

V.  Doyle,  123. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1 ;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Fowler  v.  Halt,  783.  785. 

y.  Lee,  365,  377. 

V.  Lewis'  Admr,  281. 

V.  Osborne,  543,  622. 

V.  Owen,  779. 

V.  Rlckerby,  491. 

y.  Roe,  382. 

y.  Savage,  007. 

V.  Shearer,  697,  758, 

y.  Simpson,  277. 

y.  Smith,  990,  991. 

y.  Succession  of  Gordon,  250. 
Fowlkes  V.  State,  785,  790. 
Fox  V.  Assu,  245,  261. 

y.  Bank.  321. 

y.  Hoyt,  286.  287. 

y.  McClay.  367. 

y.  McC^omb,  619. 

y.  Muller,  210. 

y.  Reed,  225. 
Foxcroft  v.  Baraes,  660,  661. 
Fox's  Appeal.  431. 
Foye  y.  Patch.  506,  785. 
Fraley  v.  Feather,  305. 
Francis  v.  Cox,  347,  351. 

y.  Insurance  Co.,  815. 

y.  Rand,  1004. 

v.  Steamer  Black  Hawk,  86. 
Francovlz  v.  Ireland,  312. 
Frank  v.  Brasket.  1007. 

y.  Jenkins,  671. 

y.  Myers,  585a. 

y.  Snow,  872, 

y.  State,  98. 

y.  Tatum,  24. 

y.  Thomas,  58. 

y.  Wadderin.  540. 
Franke  y.  Brewing  Co.,  406,  432. 

y.  Franke,  617. 
Frankel  y.  Satterfield.  278. 

V.  Stern,  996. 
Frankfurth  v.  Anderson,  84. 
Franklin  v.  Merida,  204. 
Franklin  County  v.  Bank,  615. 
Franklin   Sav.   Bank   v.   Taylor,   556, 

585. 
Frankovlz  y.  Smith,  347. 
Franks  v.  Lockey,  315. 
Franz  Falk  Brewing  Co.   v.    Hirsch, 

513,  905. 
Frary  v.  Frary,  926. 
Fraser  y.  District  of  Columbia,  31a. 
Frayes  v.  Worms,  845. 


CASES 
[Ref  erenccB  to  sections.    S9  1  to 

Frazer  v.  Barry,  (591. 

V.  Thatcher,  445. 
Frazier  v.  Bishop,  340. 

V.  Felton,  190. 

T.  Frazier's  Ex'rs,  600. 

T.  Griffie,  297. 

T.  McQueen,  1009. 

T.  Moore's  Adm*r,  847. 

V.  Williams,  211.  303. 
Frederich,  Ex  parte,  255. 
Fred  Miller  Brewing  Co.  v.  Insurance 

Co..  80,  859,  881,  889. 
Freedman's   Savings  &  Trust  Co.  r. 

Earle,  434,  437. 
Freel  v.  State,  1(52, 
I^eeland  v.  Sup'rs,  82. 

T.  Williams,  9.  11. 
Freeman,  Appeal  of,  857. 

V.  Alderson.   220,  792,  793,  004. 

T.  Baruum.  GOO,  613. 

Y.  Bass,  750. 

V.  Caldwell,  1010. 

V.  Camden,  97. 

T.  Hawkins,  606. 

T.  Menrs,  132. 

T.  Paul,  1016. 

V.  Preston.  227. 
Freer  v.  Stolen  bur,  577. 
Freiberg  v.  Collender  Co.,  186. 

V.  Le  Clair,  352. 
Fremont  v.  Seals,  86. 
French  v.  Edwards,  64,  683. 

V.  Eversole,  338. 

y.  Frazier*s  Adm^r,  640. 

T.  Goodnow,  138. 

T.  Howard,  750. 

T.  Ice  Co.,  42. 

V.  Xeal,  543. 

V.  Pease,  109.  857,  889. 

▼.  Savings  Inst..  29. 

V,  Shooniiiker.  32. 

V.  Shotwell,  359,  705. 

V.  Snjder,  1008. 

V.  Tumlin.  173. 
French  Lumbering  Co.   v.  Theriault, 
42:*,  445. 

Fresno  Milling  Co.  v.  Irrigation  Co., 

U81 
Frevert  v.  Henry,  183. 
Friar  v.  Ray,  443. 
tVIdge  V.  State,  245. 
Friedman  v.  Manley,  346a. 
T.  Shamblin,  252. 


CITED.  zci 

499  in  Tol.  1;  resiaue  in  vol.  2.] 

Friendly  v.  Lee,  16. 
Frlerson  v.  Moody,  379. 

V.  Travis,  193. 
Fries  V.  Fries,  301. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  683. 
Frlese  v.  Hummel,  372. 
Frink  v.  Frink,  135.  105. 
Frisbie  v.  McFarluue,  208. 
Frlsseli  v.  Haile,  950. 
Fritz  V.  Fisher,  902. 

V.  Iloney,  340. 

v.  Tompkins,  657,  787. 
Fromlet  v.  Poor,  671. 
Frost  V.  Dodge,  347. 

v.  Hull.  182. 

V.  Koon,  63. 
Frothingham  v.  Barnes,  901,  906,  918. 

V.  Stacker,  446. 
Fruchey  v.  Eagleson,  16. 
Fruits  V.  Elmore.  261. 
Fry  V.  Bank,  1006. 

V.  Malcolm,  9v>9. 

V.  Taylor,  808. 
Frybnrger  v.  Andre,  947. 
Frye  v.  Jones,  71. 
Fryer  v.  Myers,  872. 
Fuehs  &  Land  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Springer  & 

Welty  Co.,  352. 
Fuellhart  v.  Blood.  407,  467. 
Fuerman  v.  Ruble,  27. 
Fuher  v.  Vlllwock.  718. 
Fulbright  v.  Canuefox,  195,  225. 
Fullan  V.  Hooper,  376. 
Fuller,  In  re,  984. 

V.  .4.dnms,  32. 

V.  Boggs,  33. 

V.  Brownell,  534. 

y.  Cushman,  589. 

V.  Dry-Goods  Co.,  358. 

T.  Eastman,  758. 

V.  Hamilton  County,  938c. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  625. 

V.  Little.  375. 

V.  Nelson,  406. 

V.  Pease,  248. 

V.  Robb,  211. 

V.  Shattuck,  697,  758. 

V.  Smith,  193. 
Fullerton  v.  Kelliher,  118. 
Fuller  Watchman's  Electrical  Detect 

or  Co.  V.  Louis.  116. 
Fulliam  V.  Drake,  359,  365,  512,  754. 
Fullmer  v.  Pine  Tp.,  944,  958. 


xcu 


CASES 
[References  to  lectioni.    {{  1  to 


Fulton  V.  Fulton.  127. 

y.  Hanlow,  611,  619. 

V.  Harrington,  906. 

V.  State,  109. 
Fulton  Iron  Works  v.  Riggin,  866. 
Fulton's  ElBtate,  421. 
Funderburk  v.  Smith,  482a,  483,  489. 
Funk  V.  Mfg.  Ck).,  322,  375. 
Furber  v.  McCarthy,  981. 
Furgeson  y.  Jones,  278,  279. 
Furguson  y.  Glaze,  589. 
Furlong  y.  Banta,  536. 
Furman  y.  Furman,  315,  321,  352. 
Fumald  y.  Glenn,  358,  362,  387. 
Furneaux  y.  Bank,  751. 
Fumiss  y.  Ferguson,  940. 
Fursht  y.  Oyerdeer,  485. 
Fuselier  y.  Babineau,  590. 


Gaar  y.  Lockridge,  438. 
Gable  y.  Miller,  523. 
Gabrielson  y.  Waydell,  702. 
Gaddis  y.  Leeson,  1005. 
Oaehring  y.  Haedrlch,  317. 
Gaff  y.  Hutchinson,  146. 
Gaffleld  y.  Plumber.  638a. 
Gage  y.  Allen,  183. 

V.  Bailey,  809. 

y.  City  of  Chicago,  306. 

V.  Downey,  3,  178. 

V.  Eddy.  G55. 

y.  Eich,  29. 

y.  Ewlng,  720. 

y.  Goudy.  247.  607. 

y.  Hill,  278,  513. 

y.  Holmes,  624. 

y.  Judson,  115. 

y.  Parker,  549. 

y.  Pumpelly,  247,  809. 

y.  Rogers,  92. 
Gaiennie  v.  Akin's  Ex'r,  237. 
Gaines,  Succession  of,  685,  882. 

y.  Betts,  115. 

V.  Cyrus,  29. 

y.  Kennedy,  378,  655,  761. 

y.  Patton,  44. 

y.  Relf ,  2113. 

y.  Wedfi:eworth,  156. 
Gaines*  Will,  In  re,  829. 
Gains  y.  Johnston,  290. 


OITBD. 

499  in  Tol.  1;  residue  in  toI.  2.1 

Gainsborough  y.  Giff<H^  856. 
Gainty  y.  Russell,  357. 
Gairdner  v.  Tate,  5<X). 
Gaither  v.  Welch's  Estate,  560. 
Galbraith  y.  Barnard,  363. 

y.  Black,  522. 

y.  Martin,  378,  388. 

V.  Neville,  825. 

y.  Sidener,  100. 
Gale  y.  Best,  681. 
Gall  y.  Gall,  141. 
Gallagher  y.  Water  Co..  610,  750. 
Gallaher  y.  City  of  MoundsyUle,  606. 

y.  Pendleton,  954. 
Galley  y.  Baker,  356. 
Gallop  y.  Allen,  297. 
Galloway  y.  Bank,  271« 

y.  Galloway,  141. 

y.  McKeithen,  156. 
Gairs  Estate,  In  re,  588. 
Gallup  y.  Lichter,  709. 

y.  Smith,  250. 
Galpln  y.  Fishbume,  137. 

y.  Page,  194,   229,  277,  279,  281, 
289,  896,  897,  904.  938c  939. 
Gait  y.  Todd,  985. 
Galyeston,  H.  &  S.  A.  B.  Co.  r.  Katac, 

556. 
Galway  v.  Malchow,  420. 
Gambette  y.  Brock,  190. 
Gambia  y.  Howe,  61. 
Gamble  y.  Buffalo  County,  179. 

y.  Banking  Co.,  943. 

y.  Voll,  551. 
Gammon  y.  Knudson,  125. 
Gandell  y.  Pontigny,  752. 
Gandy  y.  Jolly,  263. 
Gannon  y.  Riel,  158. 
Ganzer  y.  Schiffbauer,  337. 
Gapen  y.  Bretternitz,  082. 

V.  Stephenson,  423. 
Garber  y.  Commonwealth,  589. 
Garden   City   Wire  &  Spring   Co.    v. 

Kause,  367. 
Gardenhire  y.  King,  462. 

y.  Vinson,  338. 
Gardiner  y.  Van  Alstyne,  368,  387,  973. 
(Gardner,  Ex  parte,  218. 

y.  Buckbee,  504,  729.  787. 

y.  Bunn,  68. 

y.  City  of  New  London,  91. 

y.  Bering,  156. 

y.  Henry,  958. 


GASBS 
[References  to  lectiona.    H 1  to 

ciardner  y.  Jenkins,  377. 

V.  Letson,  747. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  680,  946. 

y.  Balsbeck,  599. 

T.  Stratton's  Adm'r,  541. 
4  Pardon  ▼.  Chester.  44G. 
Oarey  t.  Saugston,  950. 
4:arfield  v.  rnlverslty,  299. 
iSaribaldi  v.  Carroll,  125. 
liarland  y.  Harrisou,  95G. 

V.  Tucker,  828.  873. 

V.  Wynn,  530. 
Garland  County  t.  Hot  Spring  Coun- 
ty. eOO.  938. 
<;arluck  y.  Calkins.  297. 
4 Earner  y.  Bank,  ()97. 

V.  Burleson,  77. 

y.  Carrol,  15. 

y.  Erlanger,  354. 

y.  Gamer,  905,  933. 

y.  Henzig.  782. 

y.  Prewltt,  44,  47. 

y.  State,  98,  185. 

V.  Wills,  790,  967. 
f  wnmett  y.  Macon,  560. 
4;arrard  y.  Dollar,  91,  697. 

V.  Hull,  549. 

V.  Webb,  44. 
Oarretson  y.  Ferrall,  696. 
i.arrett  y.  Beaumont,  16. 

V.  Greenwell,  696. 

V.  Lynch,  384. 
<;arrick  y.  Chamberlain.  720. 
Uarrigne  y.  Amott,  534. 
Uarrison  y.  Transportation  Co.,  574. 

y.  Cobb,  378. 

y.  City  of  New  York,  9,  11,  677. 

y.  People,  132. 

y.  Tlnley.  630. 
Carrott  y.  Johnson,  764. 
riarr.  Scott  &  Co.  y.  Spalding,  109. 
Uarry  y.  Jenkins,  44. 
Garth  y.  Campbell,  998. 
(;artbwaite  y.  Wentz,  089. 
Garton  y.  Botts,  644,  787. 
Garvey  y.  Janrls,  989. 
Garyie  y.  Greene,  349. 
Garrin  y.  Ganrin,  417,  430. 

y.  Hall.  945. 

V.  Squires,  391. 
Garwood  y.  Garwood,  547,  614,  633, 
«39. 


CITED.  xciii 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  toI.  2.] 

Gary  v.  Ass'n,  83. 
GaskeU  y.  Gaskell,  661. 
Gasklll  V.  Dudley,  87,  583,  697. 
Gassert  y.  Black,  714. 
Gassncr  v.  Sandford,  975. 
Gates  V.  Bennett,  161,  624. 

V.  Bucki,  939a. 

y.  Gorebam,  726. 

y.  Lane,  359. 

y.  McLean,  099. 

V.  Newman,  204,  761,  875. 

y.  Parmly,  612,  699. 

y.  Preston,  769. 

y.  Salmon,  39,  44. 

y.  Steele,  370. 

V.  Treat,  633. 
Gatewood  y.  Long,  734. 
Gatewood*s  Adm'r  v.  Goode,  41T.. 
Gaullagher  v.  Caldwell,  950. 
Gault  V.  Sickles,  641. 
Gauthier  y.  Rusicka,  347. 
Gautier  y.  English,  982. 
Gayin  y.  Curtin,  554. 

y.  Graydon,  787. 
Gay  y.  Cheney,  160,  165. 

y.  Gay.  349. 

y.  Grant,  183,  351. 

y.  Lloyd,  875. 

y.  Mantle  Co.,  761. 

y.  Minot,  174. 

y.  Rainey,  450. 

y.  Smith,  278. 

y.  Stancell,  665. 
Gayer  v.  Parker,  726.' 
Gayle  v.  Foster,  52. 
Gaylord  y.  Payne,  211. 
Gaynor  y.  Clements,  15Sw 
Gaytes  v.  Bank,  600. 
Gear  y.  Hart,  117. 
Geary  y.  Bangs,  733. 
Gebhard  y.  Gamier,  875. 
Gechter  y.  Gechter,  320. 
Gederholm  y.  Davies,  28. 
Gedney  v.  Gedney,  737,  744. 
Gedney's  Estate,  In  re,  646. 
Gedusky  y.  Rubinsky,  16. 
Gee  V.  Burt,  632. 
Geekie  y.  Carpenter  Co.,  680- 
Geer  v.  Com'rs,  253a. 
Geery  v.  Geery,  407. 
Gehrke  v.  Jod,  341. 
Geissiuger's  Appeal,  1016. 


XCIV 


CASES  CITED. 
[Referencei  to  sectloiu.    H  1  to  4d9  in  toI.  1;  residue  in  vol.  S.] 


Gelston  v.  Hoyt,  799,  800. 
Gemmell  t.  Hueben,  1005. 

V.  Elce,  270.  281. 
Genella  v.  McMurray,  560. 
General    Steam    Navigation     Ck>.    v. 

GouiUou,  827,  836. 
Genestelle  v.  Waugli,  69. 
Genet  v.  Cauai  Co.,  158. 
Geneva    Nat.    Bank   v.    School   Dist, 

609. 
Genobles  v.  West,  194. 
Gentle  v.  Ass'u,  388. 
Genties  v.  Fink,  732,  744. 
Gentry  v.  Allison,  439. 

V.  U.  S.,  138. 
George  v.  Belk,  186. 

V.  Gillespie,  624,  785. 
Y.  Middougb,  125. 
V.  Tutt,  383. 
George  P.   Steel   Iron  Oo.  t.  Jacobs, 

143. 
Georgetown  v.  Smith,  438. 
George  W.   McAJpln   Co.   v.   Flnster- 

wald,  57. 
Georgia  Home  Ins.  Oo.  v.  Goode,  138. 
Georgia  R.  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Harris, 
217,  227. 
V.  Pendleton,  89,  244. 
Gerald  v.  Burthee,  50. 
Gerault  v.  Anderson,  897. 
Gerber  v.  Gerber,  703. 
(Jere  v.  Sup'rs,  54. 
Cterhart  v.  Font,  95. 
Gerllng  v.  Insurance  Co.,  98. 
German-American  Bank  v.  Stickle,  82. 
German-American  Sav.  Bank  v.  Fritz, 

477. 
German-American  Title  &  Trust  Co.  v. 

Campbell,  70. 
(lerman  Bank  v.  Insurance  Co.,  541. 
German    Exchange   Bank    v.    Kroder, 

692. 
Ciernian  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Perry,  369. 
Germania  Iron  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  530. 
Germania  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Koehler,  900. 
(iennan  Ins.  Co.  v.  Frederick,  16. 
German  Reformed  Church  v.  Common- 
wealth, 523. 
German   Security  Bank  v.  Campbell, 

450. 
GeiTish  V.  Cummings,  120. 
V.  Hunt,  376. 
V.  Pratt,  709. 


Geriish  v.  Seatou,  376. 
Gerstein  v.  Fisher,  536w 
Geseirs  Appeal,  39. 
Getchell,  In  re,  248. 
Gettys  V.  Gettys,  929. 
Geyer  v.  Douglass,  367« 
Gheer  v.  Huber,  338. 
Gibbon  V.  Ass^n,  16. 
Gibbons  v.  Campbell,  851. 

V.  Ogden,  32. 
Gibbs  V.  Bryant,  770. 

V.  Jones,  699. 

V.  Southern,  247. 
Gibson,  Ex  parte,  255. 

V.  Beveridge,  208. 

V.  City  of  Chicago,  lia 

V.  Chouteau.  194,  700. 

V.  Chouteau's  Heirs,  130.  132,  139l 

V.  Cincinnati  Enquirer,  98L 

V.  Davis,  483,  486. 

V.  Emerson,  216. 

V.  Gibson,  701. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  939,  988b. 

V.  Mi  In,  724. 

V.  Moore,  378. 

V.  Parlin,  790. 

V.  Robinson,  589. 

V.  Templeton,  216. 

V.  Vaughan,  125. 

V.  Watts,  382. 

V.  Willis,  536. 
Giddlngs  v.  Steele,  200,  641. 

V.  Whittlesey,  881. 
Gideon  v.  Dwyer,  341. 
Gleseke  v.  Schrakamp,  1000. 
Gifford  v.  Thorn,  374,  705. 

V.  Whalon,  960. 
Glhon  V.  Fryatt,  1005. 
Gilbert  v.  Earl,  118. 

V.  Marrow,  348. 

V.  Thayer,  22. 

V.  Thompson,  611. 
Gilbreath  v.  Jones,  790. 
Gilchrist  v.  Bale,  729,  785.    • 
Gill  v.  Jones,  27. 

V.  Pelkey,  168. 

V.  Truelsen,  956. 

V.  U.  S.,  538. 
Cille  V.  Emmons,  307. 
Gillespie  v.  Campbell,  354. 

V.  Coleman,  29. 

V.  Hauenstein,  250. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  894,  907. 


CASES  CITED. 
(ReCerencet  to  aectioni.    SS 1  to  499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  toI.  2.] 


XCV 


Gillespie  t.  Rogers,  330. 

T.  Webster,  351. 

T.  Weiss,  351. 
GiUett  y.  Booth,  165. 

T.  Camp,  922. 

Y.  Landis,  604. 

v.  Sullivan,  388. 
GiUette-Herzog  Mfg.  Go.  t.  Asbton,  85. 
GilUam  v.  Ketldick,  173,  516. 
GinUan  Y.  Murphy,  270. 

v.  Spratt,  6U9. 
Giniland  y.  Bredin,  354. 

V.  Seller,  240. 
GiUim  Y.  DaYless  Count}',  619. 
Gillbigham  y.  Towboat  &  T.  Co.,  579. 
(Dillon  Y.  Wear,  273. 
Gillum  Y.  Case,  652. 

Y.  Railway  Co.,  208. 
Gitanan  y.  DonoYan,  204. 

Y.  Foote,  774. 

Y.  Gilman,  901,  903. 

Y.  HoYey,  407. 

Y,  Lewis,  227. 

Y.  Rives,  707,  708,  709. 
Gilixuin*n  Estate,  In  re,  313. 
Gilmer,  Ex  parte,  135. 

V.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  167,  713. 

Y.  Morris,  709.  718,  725. 
<>ilmore  v.  Ro<l jeers,  250. 

V.  Ward,  101. 

v.  Whltemau,  750. 

V.  Williams,  768. 
(tilmour  v.  Ewing,  939a. 
<:ilpin  V.  Railroad  C6.,  920,  1016. 
<;ilreath  v.  GiUiland,  146. 
GUmth  Y.  Gilrutb,  320. 
GllsoD,  In  re,  255.  • 

Y.  Bingham,  768. 
Giitinan  v.  Strong,  587. 
Gingrich  v.  Gingrich,  306. 
Oirardln  v.  Dean,  543,  725. 
c;iKller  Y.  Carter,  667. 
<;i«t  V.  Davis,  713. 

V.  McJunkin.  624. 
i'Avonn  V.  Campbell.  376. 

V.  Peake.  745. 
Givens*  Appeal,  379. 
<iladweU  v.  Hnme,  663. 
4;iae9er  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  324, 
Glanton  v.  Griggs,  596. 
Glaser  v.  Meyrovitz,  790. 
iilasner  y.  Weisberg,  543. 
Glaspie  Y.  Keator,  745. 


Glass  v.  Blackwell,  829,  935. 

v.  Gilbert,  260. 

Y.  Glass,  134. 

v.  Smith,  358. 
Glasscock  v.  Price,  406. 

V.  Stringer,  405,  406a,  453. 
Glaude  v.  Peat,  747,  7tS3. 
Gleason  v.  Dodd,  855,  901. 

v.  Peck,  299. 

Y.  Supply  Co.,  20a 

Y.  Wilson,  801. 
Glenn  v.  Brush,  510. 

Y.  Priest,  789. 

Y.  Savage,  620. 

v.  Shelbume,  84. 
Glickman  v.  Loew.  352. 
Glldden  v.  Packard,  83. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  530. 
Globe,  The,  791. 
Globe  Ace.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Reld,  84. 
Gloninger  v.  Hazard,  350. 
Glos  v.  Sankey,  896. 
Glover  v.  Flowers,  290. 

V.  Hedges,  386. 

Y.  Holman,  85,  181,  223. 

V.  Moore,  190,  192. 

V.  Stamps,  655. 
(ilyde  Y.  Keister,  55. 
Goar  Y.  Maranda,  271. 
Goble  Y.  Dillon,  751,  769. 
Godard   v.   Gray,   814,   820,   827,   843, 

0"1'1 . 

Godbold  V.  Klrkpatrick,  944. 
Goddard  v.  Benson.  790. 

V.  Bolster,  127,  204. 

V.  Coffin,  106. 

V.  Seidell,  621. 
Godding  V.  Decker,  206. 
Goebel  v.  Iffla,  554. 
Goenen  v.  Schroeder,  713. 
Goergen  v.  Schmidt,  318. 
Goetzinger  v.  Rosenfeld,  451. 
Goff  V.  Dabbs,  78,  698. 
Goggan  V.  Evans,  147. 
Gold  V.  Hutchinson,  347. 

V.  .Tohnson,  1006. 
Goldberg  v.  Fowler,  83. 
Goldsberry  v.  Carter,  347. 
Goldschmidt  v.  Mills,  599. 
Goldsmith  v.  Wilson,  29. 
Goldtree  v.  Allison,  643. 
(Solightly  v.  Jellicoe.  762. 
(Joniez  v.  Gomez,  246. 


XCTl  CASES 

[Reterencei  to  secUonB.    (fi  1  to 

Gonzales  v.  Batts,  260. 
Gooch  V.  Atkins,  1010. 
Good  V.  Good,  505. 

V.  Norley,  194. 
Goodale  y.  Cooper,  206. 
Goodall  V.  Harris,  122.  443. 

Y.  Marshall,  865. 
Goodell  V.  Blumer,  417,  418,  445. 

v.  Raymond,  161. 

V.  Starr,  274. 
Goodenow  v.  Litchfield,  751. 
Goodess  V.  Williams.  (iOl. 
Goodfellow,  In  re,  248. 
Goodhue  V.  Churchman,  347. 

T.  Daniels,  604. 

V.  Meyers,  338,  339. 
Goodin  v.  Newcomb,  542. 
Goodman  v.  Hailes,  577. 

V.  Malcolm,   703. 

V.  Pocock,  752. 

V.  Winter,  635. 
Goodness  y.  Railway  Co.,  352. 
Goodnow  V.  Hill,  192. 

Y.  Litchfield,  548. 

V.  Smith,  605. 

V.  Stryker,  540,  892. 
Goodrich  y.  Alfred,  50. 

Y.  Bodurtha,  683. 

Y.  City  of  Chicago,  521, 

V.  ColYin,  958. 

Y.  Jenkins,  857. 

Y.  StCYens,  878. 

Y.  Thompson,  633. 

Y.  WiUard,  299. 

Y.  Yale,  729,  734,  78a 
Goodwill  Y.  Elkius.  50. 
(Goodwin  Y.  Miller,  42. 

Y.  Richardson,  954. 

Y.  Wilson,  589. 
Goodwlne  y.  Hedrlck,  163. 
Goodyear    Dental    Vulcanite    Go.    y. 

Frlsselle,  958. 
Gordon  y.  Bodwell,  109. 

Y.  Downey,  183. 

Y.  Gilfoil,  939a. 

Y.  Johnson,  508. 

V.  Kennedy,  633. 

V.  Mackay,  897. 

▼.  Rixey,  404. 

Y.  State,  727. 

V.  WeaYer,  655. 
Gordonier  y.  Billings^  299. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  U 

Gore  Y.  Gore,  617. 

Y.  Poteet,  949. 
Gorgas  y.  Blackburn,  985e. 
Gorham  y.  Farson,  429. 
Gorman  y.  Young,  364. 
Gormully  &,  Jeflfery  Mfg.  Co.  y.  Cath- 
arine, 354a. 
Gorrill  v.  Whittier,  174,  245,  r»13. 
Goss  Y.  Singleton,  541. 

V.  Wallace,  600. 
Gott  V.  Carr,  369,  372. 
GotUieb  v.  Fred  W.  Wolf  Co.,  744. 

Y.  Thatcher,  473. 
Gonce  y.  McCoy,  1006. 
Goucher  v.  Clayton,  698, 
Goudy  V.  Hall,  274. 
Gough  Y.  McFall,  167. 

Y.  Pratt,  389. 
Gould  Y.  Crawford.  699. 

V.  Crow,  925,  932,  933. 

Y.  EleYator  Co.,  108. 

Y.  Hayden.  864,  958. 

Y.  Kelley,  100. 

Y.  Loughran,  180. 

Y.  Luckett,  454. 

V.  McFall,  191. 

Y.  Railroad  Co.,  693,  703,  707,  709. 

V.  Sternburg,  315,  683. 

Y.  Webb.  852. 
Gould's  Estate  y.  Watson,  154,  300. 
Goundle  y.  Water  Co.,  660. 
Goiurlay  y.  Hutton,  349. 
Gove  Y.  Lyford,  722. 
Governor  v.  Read,  986. 

V.  Shelby,  588,  689. 
Governor  and  Company  of  Bank  of 

Scotland  v.  Fenwick,  486. 
Govin  Y.  De  Miranda.  744.  745. 
Gowen  y.  Conlow,  355. 
Goyhlnech  v.  Goyhinech.  34. 
Grace  y.  Marble  Co.,  211. 
Grader  v.  Weir,  351. 
Qracy  v.  Coates,  81.  593. 
Grady  y.  Donahoo,  340. 
Graef  y.  Bernard,  314. 

Y.  Beraard,  511,  864. 
GraefP,  In  re,  32. 
Grafton  y.  Brigham,  661a. 
Grafton  &  G.  R.  Co.  y.  DaYlsson,  303. 

407. 
Gragg  Y.  Richardson,  567. 
Graham,  Ex  parte,  63,  76,  482. 


CASES 
[References  to  sections.    iS  1  to 

(Graham,  In  re,  533. 

T.  Bank,  366,  387. 

%  Dyer,  567. 

v.  Graham,  83. 

V.  Grigg,  934,  937. 
Graham  v.  Improvement  Co.,  252,  393. 

y.  Long,  55,  190. 

V.  Lynn.  135,  137. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  242,  248,  297a. 

T.  Reynolds,  280. 

V.  Roberts,  375,  381. 

V.  Scripture.  958. 

V.  Spencer,  230,  901,  903,  939. 

T.  Tankersley,  371,   567,  571. 
(frames  t.  Un wley,  306. 
(rraud  Gulf  Bank  v.  Henderson,  449. 
Grand  Island  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Ba- 
ker. 253a. 
Grand   Rapids    Sav.   Bank   y.    Wldd- 

comb,  157. 
Granger  v.  Clark,  273,  290,  917. 

T.  Singleton,  703. 
Graniee,  Ex  parte,  255. 
Granite  State  Provident  A88*n  v.  Mc- 

Hugh.  155. 
Grange  v.  Frihgs,  354. 
<;rant  v.  Bledsoe,  875. 

V.  Bnrgwyn,  674. 

V.  Easton,  848. 

V.  Harrell,  303. 

V.  Hill,  2S4,  295. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  41. 

V.  Lowe,  22. 

V.  McCatfgbin,  349. 

V.  McLachlin,  814. 

V.  Maclaren,  644. 

V.  Oliver.  530. 

V.  Quick.  361. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  41. 

V.  Ramsey,  504. 

V.  Schmidt,  145. 

V.  Spann,  250. 
Grantham  v.  Kennedy,  367. 
Graotland  v.  aty  of  Memphis,  489. 
Grant  Tp.  v.  Reno  Tp.,  540. 
Grass  T.  Hess.  376. 
Grattan  v.  Matteson,  65,  297. 
Graver  v.  Faurot,  372. 
Graves  V.  Bnlkley.  588. 

V.  Hebbron,  624.  665. 

V.  Joice,  652. 

▼.  Skeels,  490. 

V.  Whitney,  52. 
1  LAW  JL  DG. 


CITED.  XCVU 

4&d  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Graves  v.  Woodbury,  953,  954,  1004. 

Graves'  Adm'r  v.  Flowers,  562. 

Gravett  v.  Malone,  590. 

Gray  v.  Barton,  362. 

Gray  v.  Bicycle  Co.,  321^  804,  919. 

V.  Brignardello,  132,  245. 

V.  Canal  Co.,  923. 

V.  Daniels,  704. 

V.  Dougharty,  G93,  714. 

V.  Edwards,  G17. 

V.  Gates,  306,  324. 

V.  Glllllan,  304,  787. 

V.  Gray,  707. 

V.  Hlnes,  143. 

V.  Larrlmore,  281. 

V.  McNeal,  282,  287. 

V.  Palmer,  47. 

V.  ringiy,  729,  783,  784,  787. 

V.  Sabin,  343. 

V.  Smith,  554. 

V.  Stuart,  170,  211. 

V.  Thomas,  133,  803. 

V.  Thrasher,  482a. 

V.  Ward,  371. 

V.  Winder,  198. 
Graydon  v.  Hurd,  666. 

V.  Justus,  875. 
Gray's  Adm'r  v.  McDowell,  210,  491.    • 
Gray's  Adm'rs  v.  White,  206. 
Gray*s  Heirs  v.  Coulter,  118. 
Great  Falls  Co.  v.  Worster,  293. 
Greathouse  v.  Smith,  958. 
Great  Western  Tel.  Co.,  In  re,  320a. 

V.  Piwdy,  OlOa. 
Great  West  Mln.  Co.  v.  Mining  Co.,  83. 
(ireaves  v.  Middlebrooks,  069,  780. 
Greely  v.  Smith,  647,  609. 

V.  Townsend,  216. 
Green  v.  Association,  896,  907. 

V.  Ballard,  191. 

V.  Banks,  31,  32. 

V.  Barker,  530. 

V.  Beals,  211. 

T.  Bedell,  529. 

V.  Bogue,  509. 

V.  Branton,  190. 

V.  Brown,  213. 

V.  Burke,  1008. 

V.  Clark,  578,  581. 

V.  ClawBon,  680. 

V.  Cobden,  127. 

V.  Fisk,  39. 

V.  Foley,  857. 


XCYIU  CASES 

CBeterenOM  to  MCtloiii.   HI  to 

Green  y.  Fricker,  526. 

V.  Grant,  302. 

V.  Hamilton,  87. 

y.  Huggius,  562. 

y.  Jones,  86. 

y.  Marks,  425. 

y.  Massie,  385. 

y.  Plattsburg,  494. 

y.  Railroad  C^o.,  305,  806,  810. 

y.  Reagan,  179. 

y.  Sanbon,  866. 

y.  Sarmiento,  828. 

V.  Shaw,  236. 

V.  Starr,  864. 

y.  Taney,  199. 

y.  United  States,  718. 

y.  Van  Busklrk,  904. 
Greenabaiun  y.  Elliott,  758. 
Greene  v.  Darling,  526,  956. 

V.  Greene,  290,  296. 

V.  Halleubeck,  973. 

y.  Haskell,  368. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  733,  972. 
Greene  County  v.  Daniel,  985c. 
Greenlaw  y.  Williams,  569. 
Greenleaf  y.  Com'rs,  582. 

y.  Maher,  369. 
Greenlee  v.  Lowing,  630. 
Green  man  v.  Fox,  593. 
Greeno  v.  Barnard,  119. 
Green's  Appeal,  485. 
Greenstreet  v.  Thornton,  199. 
Greenway  v.  Cannon,  432. 
Greenwich  Bank  y.  Loomis,  411,  550. 
iJreeuwood  v.  City  of  New  Orleans, 
197,  706. 

V.  Marvin,  692. 

V.  Murray,  635. 

y.  Warren,  644. 
Greenzweig  y.  Strelinger,  897,  911. 
Greer  v.  Hale,  379. 

y.  Simrall,  556. 

y.  Bank,  491. 
Gregg  V.  Belting  Co.,  610. 

V.  Jamison,  175. 
Gregory  v.  Bovier,  287. 

y.  Clabrough's  Ex'rs,  549. 

y.  Cuppy,  954. 

y.  Ford,  377. 

y.  Gregory,  927. 

V.  Hnynes,  352,  550. 

V.  Ken  yon,  783. 

V.  riive,  504. 


CITED. 

4M  in  Tol.  1;  reiidue  In  yol.  2.] 

Gregory  y.  Stark,  1006. 

y.  Woodworth,  707. 
Grenell  v.  Sharp,  491. 
Gresham  y.  Ellis,  311. 
Greve  v.  Goodsou,  32. 
Grevemberg  y.  Bradford,  284. 
G rider  v.  Apperson,  865. 
Grldley  v.  College,  283. 

y.  Watson,  466. 
Griefswald,  The,  821. 
Griel  v.  Vernon,  341. 
Grier  v.  Jones,  346,  691. 
Griess  v.  Insurance  Co.,  88. 
G  riffle  v.  McClung.  779. 
Griffin  V.  Brewer,  340. 

y.  Camack,  945. 

y.  McGavin,  263. 

y.  Orman,  44. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  681. 

y.  Seymour,  696,  707,  710. 

V.  Smyly,  261,  378. 

V.  State,  255. 
Griffin's  Case,  175,  256. 
Griffin's  Ex'r  v.  Cunningham.  218.  298. 
Griffith  V.  Clarke,  188,  190,  392. 

y.  Fields,  728. 

y.  Furry,  206. 

y.  Griffith,  393. 

V.  Happersberger,  600. 

y.  Harvester  Co.,  213. 

y.  Maxwell,  158. 

y.  Ogle,  128. 

y.  Reynolds,  371. 
Griffiths  v.  Sears,  956.     ' 
Grigg  y.  Gilmer,  86. 
Griggs  y.  Becker,  867. 
Grignon  y.  Astor,  283. 
Grigsby  v.  Akin,  809. 
(Jrim  V.  School  District,  298. 
Grimes  v.  Barratt,  38. 

y.  Grosjean,  155. 

V.  HiUlary,  41. 

y.  Port  man,  425. 

y.  WMlliams'  Estate,  782. 
Grimes'  Estate  y.  Norris,  633. 
Grimke's  Ex'rs  v.  Mayrant,  483. 
Grimley,  In  re,  256. 
Grimmett  y.  Askew,  177. 
Grinnell  y.  Schmidt,  326. 
Griswold  v.  Hazard,  251,  380. 

y.  Hill,  127,  1013.    . 

y.  Pitcairn,  826. 

V.  Rutland,  299. 


CASES 
CR«f«reiioM  to  Mctioiis.    H 1  to 

Grlawold  y.  Stewart,  203,  260. 
Griswold  Unseed  Oil  Co.  y.  Lee,  822, 

351. 
Groat  y.  Pracht,  526. 
Groesbeck  v.  Golden,  603. 
GroDer  v.  Hield,  641. 

T.  Smith,  130. 
Gronfler  v.  Puyniirol,  194,  195. 
Groning  y.  Union  Ins.  Co.,  815. 
Groome,  In  re,  320a. 
Grootemaat  y.  Tebel,  340. 
Groshon  v.  Thomas,  548. 
Gross  y.  Railroad  Co.,  995. 
Grosyenor  y.  Cbesley,  958. 

y.  Doyle,  335. 
Grotenkemper  y.  Carver,  709. 
Groth  y.  Washburn,  556. 
(Sroondie  y.  Water  Co.,  578,  660. 
Groat  y.  Chamberlin,  568. 
Groye  y.  Bnsh,  343. 
G  rover  y.  Boon,  490. 
V.  Groyer,  87a 
Groyer  &  Baker  Co.  y.  Raddiffe,  894. 
Groves  y.  Brown,  694. 
Grovetf  Appeal,  398. 
Grahh  y.  Crane,  347. 
Gmbbs  y.  Blum,  61. 
Gnmd  v.  Tncker,  583. 
Gnmdy  y.  Kelley,  347. 
Gmner  y.  Westin,  473. 
Granert  y.    Spalding,   549,   600,   609, 

615^  629. 
Gmsenmeyer  y.  Logansport,  250. 
G.  8.  Congdon  Hardware  Co.  y.  Min- 
ing Co.,  340,  851. 
Guarantee  Co.  of  North  America  v. 

Tmst  Co.,  46. 
Guarantee  Tmst  &  Safe-Deposit  Co.  v. 

Railroad  Co.,  31a. 
Guaranty  Trust   &  Safe-Deposit  Co.  ' 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  232,  513.  , 

Guardian  Say.  Bank  v.  Reilly,  44.      | 
Gude  y.  Insurance  Co.,  875. 
Guerln  y.  Danforth,  550. 
Guernsey  v.  Carver,  734,  736. 

V.  Froude,  351. 
Guernsey   Branch   of   State   Bank  v. 

Kelley,  982. 
Guest  y.  Guest,  926. 
Guidiy  v.  Jeanneaud,  578. 
Guild  v.  Bonnemort,  30. 

v.  Phillips,  321. 
Guiles  V.  Murray,  986. 


CITED.  XCIZ 

499  in  vol.  1;  realdue  in  vol.  2.] 

Guille  y.  Swan,  770. 

Guinard  v.  Heysinger,  213,  970. 

Guinness  v.  Carroll,  827. 

Guise  y.  MiddletoD,  165. 

Guiteau  y.  Wisely,  440. 

Gulf  City   Street  Ry.   &  Real-Estate 

Co.  y.  Becker,  28. 
Gulf  City  Trust  Co.  v.  Hartley,  541. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Blankeu- 
heckler,  393b. 

y.  Henderson,  863,  393. 

y.  King,  363. 

y.  James,  084. 

y.  Moody,  529. 

y.  Stephenson,  24. 
Guliano  v.  Whitenack,  261. 
Gulick  v.  Lodei-,  892,  975. 
Gulickson  V.  Bodkin,  271. 
Gullett  Gin  Co.  v.  Oliver,  404-406. 
Gulley  V.  Thurston,  445. 
Gumbel  v.  Abrams,  152. 

y.  Pitkin,  576. 
Gum-Elastic    Roofing   Co.    y.    Mexico 

Pub.  Co.,  138. 
Gummer   v.   Trustees   of  Village   of 

Omro,  699. 
Gund  y.  Horrlgah,  130. 
Gundlhi  y.  Packet  Co.,  696. 
Gunn  y.  Black,  44. 

y.  Donoghue,  22. 

y.  Howell,  204,  246,  247,  279,  593. 
857,  875,  886. 

V.  Miller,  220. 

y.  Peakes,  721,  835,  849,  875,  877. 

y.  Plant,  110,  245,  513. 

v.  Railroad  Co.,  661. 
Gunnell  v.  Emerson,  141. 
Gunter  v.  Buckler,  404. 
Gurley  v.  Railroad  Co.,  29. 
Gumea  v.  Seeley,  682. 
Gurnee  v.  Maloney,  641. 
Gusman  v.  De  Poret,  386. 

V.  Hearsey,  681a. 
Gutchess  v.  Whiting,  746. 
Guthrie  v.  Bashlinc,  £^. 

y.  Doud,  372. 

v.  Havard,  190. 

v.  Lowry,  897. 

y.  Pierson,  576, 

v.  Reid.  1016. 
Gut  Luu,  In  re,  533. 
Gntzwiller  v.  Crowe,  118. 
Guy  V.  Ide,  312. 


C  CASES 

[References  to  secttOM.    H  1  to 

Guy  V.  Lumber  Co.,  GOO. 
Guyer's  Adm'r  v.  Guyer,  109. 
(iwinn  V.  Newton,  367. 

V.  Parker,  305. 
Gwj'nn  V.   Hamilton's   Adm'r,  548. 


H 


Haak  v.  Breidenbach,  (528. 
Haak's  Appeal,  455. 
Haas  V.  Taylor,  020,  764. 
Hacker,  In  re,  250. 
Hackett  v.  Connett,  713. 

V.  Jones,  18<). 

V.  Manlove,  203,  295. 
Hackley  v.  Draper,  i)73. 
Haddock  v.  Perham,  586. 
Haden  v.  Goppinger,  429. 

V.  Walker,  945. 
Hadley  v.  Mayor  of  Albany,  532. 
Hadwin  v.  Fisk.  402. 
Hagadorn  v.  Hart,  449. 
Hagan  v.  Cliapmau.  407. 
Hagar  v.  Reclamation  Dist.,  221. 

V.  Townsend,  141. 

V.  Wikoff,  354.     ' 
Ilageman  v.  Salisberry,  119. 
Hagerthy  v.  Bradford,  574. 
Haggart  v.  Morgan,  52(5. 
Haggerty  v.  Amory,  850,  891. 

V.  Phillips,  302. 
Haggln  V.  Ix)rentz,  341. 
Hagler  v.  Mercer.  118,  130. 
Hagood  V.  Aikin,  982. 
Hahl  V.  Sugo,  601. 
Hahn  v.  Gates,  340. 

V.  Hart,  358,  368. 

V.  Kelly,  270.  271,  273,  277,  278, 
.281,  283. 

V.  Miller,  742. 

V.  Mosely,  112. 
Haight  V.  City  of  Keokuk.  611. 

V.  Gay.  216. 

V.  Ilolley.  30. 
Halle  V.  Hill,  922. 
Hailey  v.  Boyd's  Adm'r,  590. 
Haines  v.  Christie,  3. 

V.  Lytle,  349. 
Hair  v.  Lowe,  368. 

V.  Moody,  306. 
Halrston  v.  Garwood,  336. 
Hake  v.  Coach,  24,  45. 


CITED. 

499  In  TOl.  1;  reildue  in  toI.  S.] 

Halbert  v.  De  Bode.  250. 
Haloombe  v.  Ijoudermilk,  lOlO, 
Haldeman  v.  Starrett,  89. 

V.  U.  S.,  690. 
Hale  v.  Angel,  958. 

V.  Bank.  141,  956. 

y.  Bozeman,  357. 

V.  Finch,  (KiO. 

V.  Hardon,  583. 

V.  Home,  434. 

V.  Lawrence,  13. 

V.  Robertson.  439a. 
Haley  v.  Bank.  90. 
Haleys  v.  Williams,  433.  449. 
HaU  V.  Calvert,  510. 

V.  C^aig,  064. 

V.  Cralge,  214. 

V.  De  Armond,  3. 

V.  Dodge.  518. 

V.  Green,  415. 

V.  Griffin,  382. 

V.  Hamlin.  290.  293. 

V.  Harrison,  677. 

V.  Harvey.  202. 

V.  Heffley,  245. 

V.  Henderson,  963. 

V.  Howd,  282. 

V.  Jones,  309. 

v.  Lanning,  237,  901. 

V.  Law,  238. 

V.  McKay,  874.  89(J. 

V.  Mercantile  Co..  305 

V.  Merrill,  157. 

V.  Odber,  825,  847. 

V.  Publishing  Co.,  326. 

y.  Richardson,  536. 

y.  gauntry.  245,  446,  1015. 

V.  SIgel,  583. 

V.  Taylor,  998. 

V.  Thayer.  174. 

y.  Warren.  802. 

y.  Williams,    211,    228,    884,    897. 
900,903. 

y.  Young,  217. 

y.  Zeller,  627. 
Hallack  v.  Gagnon,  749. 

V.  Loft,  t581a.  700. 
Halladay  v.  Underwood.  321. 
Hallberg  v.  Brosseau,  142. 
Halleck  v.  Moss.  250. 
Haller  y.  Parrott,  551. 

y.  Pine,  627. 
Hallett  y.  Righters,  281. 


CASES 
[BeferenceK  to  sections.    SI  1  to 

Hallock  V.  DomlDy,  522. 

V.  Jaudin,  84. 
Hallowell  v.  Brown,  491. 
Hallum  V.  DlckJuson,  099. 
Halstead  t.  Black,  875. 
Halter  v.  Soap-Works  Co.,  352. 
Hambel  v.  Davis,  270,  280. 
Bamberger  v.  Easter,  407. 
Uamberlin  v.  Teii->*,  2t)7. 
Hambleton  v.  Glenn,  917. 

V.  McGee,  2()7. 
Hamblln  v.  Kni|;ht,  376. 
Hambly  v.  Hnyden,  118. 
Hambrick  v.  Dent,  80. 
Hamburg-Bremen  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mfg. 

Co.,  357. 
Hamburger  v.  Easter,  407,  411. 
Hamer  v.  Cook,  271. 

V.  Kirk  wood,  981. 

V.  Sears,  182. 

V.  Trust  Co.,  130. 
llamill  V.  Talbott,  907,  926. 
Hamilton  v.  Adams,  305. 

V.  Burum,  282. 

V.  Cutts,  567,  574. 

T.  Dutch  East  India  Co.,  825. 

V.  Oilman,  197. 

V.  Mclean,  368* 

V.  Seitz,  167. 

V.  Ward,  114. 

V.  Wood.  373. 

V.  Wricht,  272. 
Hamilton  Bhig.  Ass'n  v.  Reynolds,  694. 
llamiltouK  Appeal,  406. 
Hamlin  t.  Railroad  Co.,  35. 
Hamlln*s  lessee  v.  Bevans,  449. 
Hamm  v.  Bascbe,  208. 

V.  Beaver.  740. 
Hamman  v.  I^wis.  115. 
Hammatt  v.  Wyman,  995. 
Hnmmer  v.  McConiiel,  130,  155,  160. 

V.  Woods,  661a. 
Hammergen  v.  Schurmeier,  099. 
Hammett  v.  Morris,  593,  997. 
Hammock  v.  McBride,  293. 
Hammon  v.  Smith,  855. 
Hammond  v.  Ass'n,  897, 

V.  Carter.  655. 

T.  Freeman,  181. 

T.  Hammond,  933. 

T.  Place,  974. 

T.  Wilder,  290. 
Hamner  y.  Boott,  36. 


CITED.  CI 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Hampson  v.  Edeleu,  438. 

V.  Weare,  245. 
Hampton  v.  Levy,  446. 

V.  McConnel,  275,  856,  857,  884. 
Hampton  Lumber  Co.  v.  Van  Ness, 

311. 
Hanchett  v.  Auditor  General,  664. 

v.  Kimbark,  956. 
llauchey  v.  Croskrey,  629. 
Hancock  v.  Bowman,  183. 

v.  Flynu,  513,  680. 

V.  Lopez,  660. 

V.  Mfg.  Co.,  750. 

V.  Welsh,  729. 
Hancock  Nat.  Bank  v.  Farnum,  910a, 

938. 
Hand  v.  Taylor,  588. 
Handley    v.    Jackson,    365,    374,    393, 
774. 

v.  Sydenstrlcker,  432. 
Handrahan  v.  Iron  Works,  583. 
Handy  v.  Smith's  Adm'r,  485. 
Haneman  v.  Pile,  691. 
Hanham  v.  Sherman,  697,  747. 
Hanika's  Estate.  In  re,  260. 
Hanks  v.  Harris,  944,  948. 

V.  Pearce,  462. 

V.  Thompson,  21. 
Hanley   v.    Donoghue,   211,   860,   914, 
917. 

V.  Foley,  632. 

V.  Hanley,  370,  808. 
Hauly  V.  Adams,  498. 
Hanua  v.  Morrow,  387. 

V.  Read,  506,  543,  682,  888. 

V.  Savage,  587,  1006. 

V.  Spotts'  Heirs,  197. 
Hannaford  v.  Huun,  783. 
Hanness  v.  Bonnell,  1008. 
Hannon  v.  O'Dell,  671. 
Hanover  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Tomlinson, 

42. 
Hanrick  v.  Gurley,  567,  659,  751. 
Hansbrough  v.  Fudge,  135. 
Hanscom  v.  Hewes,  87. 

V.  Tower,  907. 
Hansen  v.  Schlesinger,  165. 
Hansen's  Empire  Fur  Factory  v.  Tea- 
bout,  545. 
Hansford  v.  Van  Auken,  9G(J. 
Hanson  v.  Armstrong,  553,  577. 

V.  Bowyer,  36. 

V.  Buckner's  Ex'r,  571. 


Cll 


CASES  CITED. 


[References  to  sections.    SS  1  to 

Hanson  v.  Hanson,  354. 

y.  Jacks,  482a,  491. 

y.  Michelson,  341. 

V.  Wolcott,  288,  324. 
Hanthorn  v.  Oliver,  335. 
Harbaugb  v.  Water  Co.,  340a. 
Harbeck  v.  Pupin,  58. 

V.  Vanderbilt,  9U9. 
Harbin  v.  Chiles,  908. 

V.  Roberts,  567. 
Harbolt  v.  State,  83. 
Hard  v.  Shipman,  275. 
Hardaway  y.  Drummond,  560. 
Hardee  v.  Stovall,  128,  473. 
Harden  v.  Campbell,  970, 
Hardenbergh  v.  Converse,  448. 
Hardin  v.  Blackshear,  600. 

V.  Clark,  600. 

V.  Dickey,  714. 

V.  Melton,  110. 

V.  Palmerlee,  729. 

V.  Ray,  180. 
Harding  v.  Alden,  822,  926,  982,  933. 

V.  Cowing,  152. 

V.  Fiske,  357. 

V.  Hale,  618,  745. 

V.  Larkin,  567,  569. 

y.  R.  S.  Peale  Co.,  340. 

V.  Splvey,  441. 
Ilardwlck  v.  Hook,  604. 
Hardy  v.  Beaty,  227,  281. 

y.  Cathcart,  159. 

y.  Eagle,  548. 

y.  Gholson,  270. 

y.  Hardy,  709. 

v.  Nelson,  571,  574. 
Hare  y.  Hare,  920. 
Harford  y.  Street,  237. 
Hargns  y.  Goodman,  504,  658,  726. 
Harker  y.  Brink,  235. 
Harkness  y.  Hntcherson,  253a. 
Harlan  y.  Berry,  774. 

y.  Wlngate's  Adm'r,  389. 
Harlow  y.  Bartlett,  729. 
Harman  y.  Blackstone,  23. 

V.  Brotherson,  211. 

y.  City  of  Lynchburg,  288. 
Harmer  y.  Bell,  814. 
Harmon    y.    Auditor    of    Public    Ac- 
counts, 584. 

v.  Bynum,  43. 

y.  Dedrick,  484. 

y.  Hope,  i)4S. 


499  in  vol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.] 

Harmon  y.  Martin,  299. 

y.  Struthers,  509. 
Harms  y.  Coryell,  664. 

y.  Jacobs,  340. 
Hamer's  Appeal,  445. 
Harness  y.  Green's  Adm*r,  863. 
Hamsbarger's  Adm'r  v.  Kinney,  378. 
Harp  y.  Guano  Co.,  439. 
Harper  y.  Baruett,  307. 

y.  Biles,  85. 

V.  Campbell,  650. 

y.  Cunningham,   50,   52.   57,  218, 
496. 

V.  Drake,  308. 

V.  Graham,  f)89. 

y.  Harper,  622,  938c. 

y.  Harvey,  986. 

V.  Hill,  359. 

y.  Kean.  299. 

y.  Mallory,  341. 

y.  Nichol,  896. 
Harralson  v.  McArthur.  324,  339. 
Harriinan  y.  Swift,  299,  329. 
Harrington  y.  Bean,  1005. 

y.  Glenn,  981. 

y.  Harrington,  676,  864. 

V.  People,  275. 

V.  Sharp,  422,  432,  433. 

V.  Wadsworth,  604. 
Harris,  In  re,  257,  320a. 

y.  Barnhart,  512,  084,  685. 

y.  Bradford,  135. 
Harris  y.  City  of  Houston,  744. 

y.  Colquitt.  (333. 

V.  Guin,  225.  374,  377. 

V.  Hardeman,  324. 

V.  Harris,  183.  609. 

y.  Jenkins,  55. 

V.  Jones.  179. 

V.  Leonhardt,  770. 

V.  Lester,  245. 

V.  McClanaliau.  '^73. 

Y.  McDonald,  :.79. 

V.  Mfg.  Co.,  86. 

y.  Martin,  165. 

V.  Miner,  669. 

V.  Mulkem,  G."2. 

y.  Palmer,   1000. 

y.  Plant,  548. 

y.  Preston,  207,  700. 

V.  Keinhard,  55. 

y.  Sanders,  23. 

V.  Sargcant,  273. 


CASES 
LRef erencM  to  sections.    H  1  to 

Harris  t.  State,  153. 

T.  Stelner,  958. 

V.  Willis,  282. 

y.  Yonman,  197. 
Harrison  y.  Harrison,  157,  880,  932. 

V.  Heatbom,  127. 

y.  Insurance  Co.,  696,  707,  938. 

V.  Lourle,  829. 

V.  McHenry,  459. 

y.  Pender,  246,  269. 

y.  Roberts,  432. 

y.  Rosb,  32. 

y.  State.  154. 

y.  Trust  Co.,  162,  962. 

y.  Wanton's  Ex'r,  197,  898b,  664. 

V.  Walton's  Ex'r,  504. 

y.  Waterworks,  22. 

y.  Wilson,  1009. 
Harrison's  Ex'x  y.  Taylor,  117. 
Harryman  y.  Roberts,  729,  864,  907. 
Harsbey  y.  Blackmarr,  374,  377,  901, 

903 
Eiar^bman  y.  Court,  253a. 
Har*:  v.  Bank,  695,  714. 

V.  City    of    New    Orleans,    985a, 
985b. 

y.  Grigsby,  192. 

y.  Hiatt,  22. 

y.  Jewett,  513. 

y.  Lazaron,  361.  362. 

y.  McNamara,  799. 

y.  Moulton.  549,  600,  609. 

y.  O'Bourke,  307. 

y.  Plcard,  617. 

y.  Russell,  404. 

y.  Sansom,  906,  939. 

y.  Saryis,  50. 

y.  Steedman,  660. 

y.  Washburn,  352. 
Harteau  y.  Harteau,  928. 
liarter  y.  Harter,  958. 
Hartford  Pire  Ins.  Co.  y.  Green,  26. 
Hartigan  y.  Nagle,  321. 
Hartman,  Ex  parte,  255. 

y.  Hesserlcb,  201. 

y.  Ogbom,  190,  269,  273. 

y.  Olyera,  :i52. 

V.  Plane  Co.,  742,  750. 

y.  Smith,  530. 

V.  Stehl,  607. 

y.  Welland,  604. 
Hartrldge  y.  Wesson,  97,  121. 
Hart's  Lessee  y.  Johnson,  213. 


CITED.  cm 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  8.] 

Hartzell  y.  Com.,  644. 

y.  Relss,  497. 
Harvey  y.  Branson,  44. 

y.  Farnie,  822. 

y.  Foster,  260. 

y.  Head.  587. 

y.  HugglDS,  282. 

y.  McAdams,  121. 

y.  Osborn,  599. 

y.  Pollock,  318. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  754. 

y.  Tyler,  279. 

y.  Wilde,  560. 

y.  Wilson,  339. 
Harvie  v.  Turner,  577,  663. 
Harwood  v.  Railroad  Co.,  301. 
Haseltlne  v.  Thrasher,  724. 
Haskell  y.  Bowen,  102. 
Haskin  v.  Mayor,  750. 
Haskins  y.  Jordan,  954,  1005. 
Hass  v.  Billings,  323. 
Hassell  y.  Hamilton,  889. 
Hassler  y.  Hefele,  208. 
Hassler's  Appeal,  162. 
Hasted  v.  Dodge,  121. 
Hastie  y.  Aiken,  44. 
Hastings  v.  Cunningham,  154. 

V.  Land  Co.,  159. 
Hatch  V.  Arnault,  109. 

y.  Coddington,    729. 

y.  Eustls,  482a,  493. 

y.  Ferguson,  2G5,  297a. 

y.  Garza's  Ex'r,  292. 

y.  Spofford,  864,  865,  989a. 
Hatcher  v.  Dillard's  Adm*rs,  644. 
Hattteld  v.  Cummings,  100,  583. 
Hathaway  v.  Crocker,  206, 

y.  Hemingway,  143. 
Hattenback  v.  Hoskins,  179. 
Hauck  V.  Gundaker,  490. 
Hauer's  Appeal,  53,  496. 
Haug  V.  Railroad  Co.,  246,  286,  709. 
Haughey  v.  Strang,  389. 
Haupt  v.  Burton,  482,  488,  498,  892. 
Hauscheld  y.  Hauscheld,  329. 
Hauselt  y.  Patterson,  703. 
Hauser  y.  Harding,  16. 
Hayard  y.  Atkins,  530. 
Havemeyer  v.  Refining  Co.,  314. 
Hayen  y.  Baldwin,  958. 
Hayerty  y.  Haverty,  344. 
Hawes  y.  Hathaway,  974. 

y.  Hoyt,  349. 


CIV  CASES 

[References  to  sectloiui.    f S 1  to 

Hawes  v.  Petroleum  Co.,  583. 

V.  Water  Co.,  611. 
Hawk  T.  Evans,  689. 
Hawkes  v.  Phillips,  774. 
Hawkeye  Ins.  Co,  v.  Liickow,  986. 
Hawkins  v.  Depriest,  518. 

V.  Files,  446. 

V.  Glenn,   147,   583. 

V.  Hai-fllng,  388,  1014. 

V.  Hatton,  779. 

V.  McDougal.  261. 

V.  Ridenhour,  982. 

V.  Ringler  &  Co..  750. 

V.  Smith,  28. 

V.  Taylor.  541. 

V.  Wills.  412,  766. 
Hawkins'   I>essee  v.  Hayes,  650,  653. 

V.  Lambert,  543. 
Hawks  V.  Ti-uesdell,  682. 
Hawley,  Ex  parte,  32. 

V.  Dawson,  552. 

V.  Fairbanks,  985b. 

V.  Heyman,  220. 

V.  Mead,  299. 

V.  Simons,  655,  6JW- 

V.  Smeiding,  420. 

V.  Warner,  671. 
Haws  V.  Tiernan,  699. 
Hay  V.  Cole,  304a. 
Hay  del  v.  Roussel,  162. 
Hayden  v.  Boothe,  504. 

V.  Goppinger,  429. 

V.  Hayden,  321,  36a 

V.  Huff,  443. 

V.  Slaughter.  494. 

V.  Woods,  207. 
Hayden    Saddlery    Hardware    Co.    v. 

Ramsay,  92. 
Hayes  v.  Caldwell,  29. 

V.  Carr,  953. 

V.  Collier,  174. 

V.  Kerr,  275. 

V.  Reese,  737. 

V.  Seaver,  589. 

V.  Shattuck.  613. 

V.  Shaw,  200,  204. 

V.  Solomon,  101. 
Haygood  v.  McKoon,  513. 

V.  Tait,  84. 
Haynes  v.  Aultman,  Miller  &  Oo.,  496. 

V.  Baekman,  116. 

V.  Calderwood,  550. 

V.  Gates,  280. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.3 

Haynes  v.  Jackson,  699. 

V.  Meeks,  250. 

V.  Ordway,  510,  685,  769. 

V.  Wheat.  98(;. 
Hays  V.  Cage,  847. 

V.  May's  Heirs,  42. 

V.  Merkle.  857,  903. 

V.  Miller,  137. 

V.  Regar.  421. 

V.  lYyon.  408. 

V.  Ward,  996. 
Hays'  Appeal,  417. 
Hayton  v.  Hope,  138. 
Hayward  v.  Clark,  734. 

V.  Pimental,  247. 
Haywood  v.  Daves,  859. 

V.  Nooney,  447. 

V.  Shieve,  55. 
Hazard  v.  Durant,  133. 
Hazard's  Estate,  In  re,  460. 
Hazelett  v.  Ford.  522. 
Hazelrigg  v,  Wainwrlght,  349. 
Hazeltine  v.  Insurance  Co.,  910. 

V.  Reusch,  367. 
Hazen  v.  Bank.  721. 

V.  Reed,  751. 
Hazleburst  v.  Morris,  21. 
H.  B.  aaflin  Co.  v.  De  Vaughn,  518. 

534. 
H.  C.  Tack  Co.  v.  Ayres,  446. 
Head  v.  Daniels,  269. 

v.  Gervais,  941.  999. 
Headley  v.  Roby,  958. 
Heady  v.  Ass'n,  229. 
Heald  v.  Bennett,  987. 
Healey  v.  Ashbey,  430. 
Healy  v.  Root,  871. 
Heaps  V.  Hoopes,  342. 
Heard  v.  Lodge.  587.  589 

V.  Sack,  205. 
Hearfleld  v.  Bridges,  889. 
Hearn  v.  Railroad  Co..  575. 
Hearne  v.  Erhard,  117. 
Heath  v.  Banking  Co.,  158. 

V.  Cobb,  379. 

V.  Frackleton,  759. 

V.  Halfhill,  358. 

V.  Wallace,  530. 
Heathcote  v.  Haskins,  332. 
Heath's  Adm'r  v.  Ashley's  Adm'r.  197. 
Heaton  v.  Collins,  238. 

V.  Peterson,  339. 
Hebel  v.  Insurance  Co.,  232. 


CA8BS  CITED. 


CV 


[ReferenceB  to  sectloiiB.    IS  1  to 

Heberd  v.  Wines,  420. 
Hecht  V.  Motliner,  (381. 
Uockemann  v.  Young,  770. 
Hecker  v.  Haak,  191. 

V.  Mourer,  438. 
HeckUng  v.  Allen,  333. 
HeckBcher  v.  Mlddleton,  322. 
Iled^ecoxe  .v.  Conner,  158. 
Hedges  v.  Meyers,  32. 
Heegaard  v.  Trust  Ckx,  21,  27. 
lit?ert  V.  Cruger,  158. 
lieff  V.  Cox,  205,  407. 
H.»Cferfnan  v.  Porter,  525. 
lieffuer  v.  Day,  45. 

V.  Gunz,  224,  324. 
Heffron  v.  Knickerbocker,  534* 
Ilefliug  V.  Van  Zandt,  351. 
Hefner  v.  Insurance  Co.,  204. 
Ilegarty'H  Appeal,  635. 
Hegeler  v.  Henckell,  135. 
Heggle  V.  A8s*n,  583. 
Ueicliew  v.  Hamilton,  504. 
Heid.^nhelmer  v.  Johnston,  984. 
Heidritter  v.  Oil  doth  Co..  794. 
ilei^bway  v.  Pendleton,  223. 
Ileikes  v.  Com..  (598,  727. 
iiolll)ron  T.  Campbell,  330. 

lieSlig  V.  I^mly,  998. 

ilellman  v.  Krob.  (^1. 

Heilner  v.  Coal  Co.,  351. 

Ileil's  Appeal,  406. 

Ileim  T.  Butln.  373. 

lleimgartner  v.  Stewart,  330. 

Heine  t.  Corners,  985e. 

Heinemann  v.  I^  Clair,  322. 

Helnlen  v.  Phillips,  121. 

Helns  V.  WIcke,  92,  725. 

Heintz  v.  Pratt,  160. 

Ileisterhagen  v.  Garland,  337. 

Hekking  v.  Pfaff,  939. 

Helena,  The,  814. 

Heller  v.  Mfg.  Co.,  387. 

Hellman  v.  Schwartz,  186. 

Helm  V.  Gilroy.  32. 
T,  Hardin,  585. 
V.  Van  Vleet,  206. 

lif^lms  V.  Bell.  2ro. 
V.  KeaniK.  138. 

Helmoth  v.  Bell.  145. 

IlHprey  v.  Redi<  k.  (iOO. 

Ilelvete  r.  Rapp.  110. 

Hemmeus  v.  Bentley.  182. 

Hemmenway  t.  Hickes,  84. 


499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Hempstead  v.  Watkins,  378,  389. 
Hemstad  v.  Hall,  16. 
Henchman  v.  Roberts,  55. 
Henderson,  Ex  parte,  256. 

V.  Banks,  160. 

V.  Coke  Co.,  llJ9. 

V.  Harness,  747. 

V.  Henderson,  731,  829,  844,  962. 

V.  Heushali.   27. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  15,  26. 

V.  J.  B.  Brown  Co.,  206. 

V.  Lange,  340. 

V.  McPike,  152. 

V.  McVay,  954. 

V.  Moore,  362. 

V.  Moss,  757. 

V.  Stanlford,  227,  907. 

V.  Vanhook,  491. 

V.  Williams,  585. 
Hendrick  v.  Clouts,  699. 

V.  Thomas,  989. 

V.  Wblttemore,  224,  245,  270,  282, 
286. 
Hendricks  v.  Comstock,  892. 

V.  Decker,  789. 

V.  Wallls,  992.  994. 
Hendrickson  v.  Bradley,  357,  583. 

V.  Brown,  954,  1000.  1001. 

V.  Hinckley,  366.  378,  388. 

V.  Norcross'  Ex*rs,  518. 
Hendrlckson's  Appeal,  451.  956. 
Hendrix's  Heirs  v.  Clay,  165. 
Hendron  v.  Kiimer,  3()7. 
Hendry  v.  Benlisa.  086,  987. 

V.  Crandall,  116. 

V.  Cline,  173. 
Henkleman  v.  Petenson,  368. 
Henley    v.    Stone,    585. 
Henly  v.  Soper,  962. 
Hennessee  t.  Mills,  248. 
Hennessy  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  247, 
Henulng  v.  Insurance  Co.,  910. 
Henninger  v.  Heald,  693. 
Henrietta  Nat.  Bank  v.  BaiTett,  733. 
Henriques  ,v.  University,  697. 
Heniy  v.  Allen,  875,  896. 

V.  Brothers,  950. 

V.  Davis,  611. 

V.  Elliott,  364. 

V.  Estes,  282. 

V.  Ferguson,  671. 

V.  (Gibson,  206. 

V.  Henry,  463. 


CTl  CASES 

[References  to  eecUons.   H 1  to 

Henry  v.  lusuranee  Co.,  35. 

V.  Keys,  1010. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  536. 

y.  Sansom, .  759. 
Henry   Ulfelder  Clothing  Co.,   In  re 

611,  807. 
Henry  &  Coatsworth  Co.  v.  Halter, 

484,  991. 
Hensley  v.  Force,  884,  916. 
Henson  v.  Taylor,  745. 
Hentig  V.  Redden,  655. 
Hepburn  v.  Bank,  86. 

V.  Griswold,  152. 
Hepler  v.  Davis,  487,  892. 
Herald  v.  Hargis,  349. 
Herbert  v.  Cook,  825. 

V.  Hanrlck,  633. 

V.  Herbert,  309,  370,  383. 

V.  Lawrence,  344. 

V.  Rowles,  301. 
Herbster  v.  State,  174. 
Herbst  Importing  Co.  v.  Hogan,  338. 
Herdlc  v.  Woodward,  314. 
Hering  v.  Chambers,  270,  277. 
Herman  v.  Miller,  1000. 
Herman    Berghoff    Brewing    Co.     v. 

Przbylskl,  98. 
Hermance  v.  Cunningham,  340a. 
Hermann  v.  Commission  Co..  765. 
Herman's  Ex'x  v.  Martin,  8  i. 
Hernandez  v.  James,  358,  3(i2,  377. 
Herndon  v.  Hawkins,  177. 
Heroman  v.  Louisiana  Inst.,  104. 
Herr  v.  Herr,  646,  660. 
Herren  v.  Harraison,  354. 
Herrick  y.  Bank,  299. 

y.  Butler,  271. 

y.  Smith,    255. 
Herring  y.  Adams,  761. 

y.  Cherry,  135. 

V.  PoUey,   122. 
Herriter  y.  Porter,  734,  738. 
Herron  v.  Walker,  450. 
Hersey  v.  Long,  569. 

y.  Turbett  550. 
Hershey  y.  Bank,  511. 

V.  Dennis,  411. 
Heryey  y.  Edmunds,  179,  318,  326. 

y.  Rawson,   746. 
Herwick  y.  Supply  Co.,  394. 
Hess  y.  Bollnger,  530. 

y.  Cole,  326,  127,  272. 

y.  Heebie,  621. 


CITED. 

499  In  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Hesse  y.  Mann,  110,  111,  404. 
Hettrlck  y.  Wilson,  346. 
Heward  y.  State^  98. 
Hewetson  y.  City  of  Chicago,  154. 
Hewett  y.  Outland,  948. 

y.  Williams,  714. 
Hewitt  y.  Furman,  526. 

y.  Hazard,  345. 
Hewlett  y.  Pilcher,  551. 
Heydenfeldt  y.  Towns,  174. 
Heydenfeldfs  Estate,  In  re,  099. 
Heyfron  y.  Bank,  13. 
Heyl  y.  Donifelser,  536. 
Heyman  y.  Landers,  604. 
Heywood  y.  Thacher,  545. 
H.   Herman  Sawmill  Co.  y.   Martin, 

432. 
Hibbard  y.  Eastman,  366,  373. 

y.  Randolph,  953. 
HlbbeiHl  y.  Smith,  406.  411. 
Hibemia    Sayings    &    Loan    Soc    t. 
Court,  81,  593. 

V.  Matthai,  84,  88»  156. 

y.  Thornton,  141. 
Hibler  y.   Shipp,  695,  703. 
Hickey  y.  Smith,  233. 
Hicklin  y.  McClear,  340a. 
Hickman  y.  Barnes,  155. 

y.  Branson,  211. 

y.  Jones,  173. 

y.  Macon  Co.,  958. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  90. 
Hicks  y.  Ayer,  50. 

y.  Bank,  79a. 

y.  Riley,  213. 

V.  Ross,  1002. 

V.  Vann,  86. 
Hidden  y.  Saunders,  1012. 
Hidell  y.  Funkhouser,  541. 
Hiestand  y.  Williamson,  459. 
Higbee  y.  Bowers,  31. 
Higgen's  Case,  674. 
Higgins,   Ex  parte,   770,  776. 

T.  Bockwith,  228. 

V.  Bogan,  100. 

y.  Bordnges,  247,  270. 

y.  Brown,  34. 

V.  Bullock,   376,   378. 

V.  Curtis,  641. 

y.  Dunkleberger,  lOOS. 

y.  Peltzer,  188,  190. 
Higginson  y.  Martin,  965. 
High's  Estate,  In  re,  641. 


CASES 
[References  to  BectlooB.    U 1  to 

Higley  T.  PoUock,  86. 
Hildretb  v.  DaTis,  351. 

T.  Thompson,  200. 
km  V.  Armlstead,  173,  407. 

T.  Bain,  574. 

r.  Bowyer,  387. 

T.  Cab  Co.,  275. 

T.  City  of  St  Louis,  310. 

y.  Cooper,  655. 

T.  Coiirt,  253a,  983b. 

T.  Crump,  343,  346,  351. 

T.  Egan,  309. 

T.  Gordon,  376,  434,  446. 

T  Grant,  2&I. 

T.  Harris,  394. 

T.  Hoover,  134,  161,  164. 

V.  Hnckabee,  173,  407. 

T.  Joy.   735. 

V.  Keyes,  193. 

V.  Lancaster,    754. 

y.  Mendenball,  897,  902. 

y.  Morse,  773. 

y.  Town  ot  Sunderland,  298. 

V.  Transfer  Co.,  275,  973. 

y.  Tucker,  563. 

y.  U.  S.,  3o9. 

y.  Warren,  299. 

y.  Woodward,  270. 
Hillebrant  y.  Barton,  13a 
Htllens  y.  Brinstield,  137. 
Hills  T.  Sherwood,  706. 
HiU'g  Ex'x  T.  Rogers,  365. 
HUrs  Heirs,  In  re,  38. 
Hilton  y.  Bachman,  270. 

7   Quyot,  829,  836,  844. 

y.  Guyott,  829,  831,  840,  844. 
Hlmes  y.  Kiefal,  768. 
Himmelmann  v.  Sulliyan,  632. 
Hinckley  v.  Miles,  373. 
Hindman  y.  Mackall,  887. 
liiiids  y.  Allen,  567. 

V.  Hopkins,  61,  61a. 

V  Scott,  460. 

y.  Wallis,  240. 
Hinason  y  Weatherill,  634. 
HIne  y.  Hussey,  174. 
Hfnesly  v.  Hunn*s  Adm*r,  1006, 
Hinrlchaen  y.  Reinback,  391. 
Hinsdale  y.  Hawley,  317. 
IlinfK>n  y.  Wall,  860. 
illnton  y.  Bland's  Adm'r,  195. 

y.  Insurance  Co.,  104,  228,  278. 

y.  McNeil,  660. 


CITED. 


CVIJ 


499  in  vol.  1;  realdue  in  toI.  2.  ] 

Hlnton  y.  Odenheimer,  995. 

V.  Prltohard,  560. 

V.  Towues,  227. 
Hintrager  v.  Sumbargo,  362. 
Hbriart  v.  Ballon,  32. 
Hirsh  y.  Clawson,  86. 

y.  Welsberger,  34,  232,  312. 
mrshfeld  v.  Brown,  297,  318. 

V.  Franklin,  236. 
Hirth  y.  Pfelfle,  593. 
Hitcb  y.  Gray,  116. 
Hitchcock  V.  Aicken,  828,  855. 

V.  Frackelton,  771,  774. 

V.  Herzer,  347. 
Hitchiu  V.  Campbell,  119. 
Hlte  V.  Fisher,  340. 

V.  Long,  729,  734,  738. 
Hitt  V.  Lacey,  593. 
Hittle  V.  Zelmer,  339. 
Hittson  y.  Daveuport,  152. 
Hix  V.  Davis,  774. 
EUxBon  V.  Ogg,  504. 
Hoag  V.  Hatch,  101. 

V.  Society,  346a,  354. 
Hoagland  v.  Bell,  583. 

V.  Green,  443. 

y.  Hoagland,  271,  273,  281. 

y.  Way,  157,  163. 
Hoare  y.  Nlblett,  770. 
Hobart  v.  Frost,  217. 
Hobbs  V.  Beckwith,  21. 

y.  Duff,  761,  761,  953,  954,  1004. 

y.  Heming.  816. 

y.  McMakin,  500., 

V.  Mlddleton,  580.* 

y.  Parker,  C17. 

v.  Slmmonds,  471. 

V.  Staples,  21. 
HobBon  v.  Marksoo,  248. 

V.  Yancey,  589. 
Hoch  V.  Raibroad  Co.,  742. 
Hockaday  v.  Jones,  83,  362,  398. 

V.  Skeggs,  921. 
Hockman  y.  Hockman,  441. 
Hodgdon  v.  Hodgdon,  981. 
Hodge  y.  Hodge,  549. 

y.  Shaw,  743. 
Hodges  v.  Brett,  232. 

y.  Eastman,  236. 

y.  Bddy,  655. 

y.  Hodges,  526. 

y.  Kimball,  27. 

y.  McCabe,  454. 


<;V111  CASES 

[References  to  sectloiui.    SS  1  to 

Hodges  y.  Templer,  126. 
HodsoU  y.  Stallebrasse,  738. 
Hodson  y.  Tlbbetts,  232. 
Hoey  V.  Furman,  058. 

y.  Jacksou,  309. 
Hoffertbert  y.  Kllnkhardt,  123. 
Hofflieimer  y.  Stiefel,  902. 
Hoffield  y.  Board,  213. 
Hoffman   y.   Hoffman,   227,  906,  927, 
929. 

y.  Newell,  913. 

V.  Porter,  706. 

y.  Shupp,  188. 
Hoffmire  y.  Hoffmlre,  272,  374. 
Hogau  y.  SmMh,  050. 
Hogg  y.  Charlton,  804,  874. 

V.  Link,  370. 
Hoggatt,  Succession  of,  199. 
Hoggatt*s  Heirs  y.  Crandall,  515. 
Hoghtallng  y.  Osborn.  182. 
Hoglan  V.  Carpenter,  256. 
Hogshead  v.  Carruth,  1006. 
Hogton,  In  re,  197. 
Hogue  y.  Corbit,  155. 
Hoguet  y.  Wallace,  85. 
Hobner  v.  Gratz,  841. 
Hohorst  V.  Packet  Co.,  23. 
Hoitt  y.  Skinner,  83. 
Holbert'R  Estate,  In  re,  082. 
Hoibrook  v.  Brooks,  080. 

y.  Champlin,  1008. 

y.  Hoibrook.  320. 

y.  Murray,  211. 
Holcomb  V.  Tift.  110. 
Holden  v.  Dunn.'  ;H]0. 

y.  Garrett.  420. 

V.  Haserodt.  32. 

V.  Lathrop,  ()44. 

V.  O'Donohue,  029. 
Holderman  y.  Tedford,  360. 
Holdsworth  y.  Tucker,  33. 
Hole  y.  Page,  85,  320. 
Holland  v.  Assn.  201. 

y.  Hatch,  OJm. 

y.  Johnson,  218. 

y.  Kindrogan,  16. 

y.  Mining  Co.,  583. 

y.  Preston,  009. 

y.  Trotter,  373. 
Holland  Bank  y.  Lleuallen,  322. 
Hollander  v.  Fechheimer,  45. 
Hollenbeak  y.  McCoy,  303. 
Hollenbeck  y.  Stanberry,  990. 


CITED. 

499  in  Tol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Holley  V.  Acre,  589. 
HoUlda  y.  Shoop,  430. 
Holliday  y.  Bank,  442>  456,  459. 

y.  Coleman,  720. 

y.  Ward,  635. 
HoUiman  y.  Pearlstone,  338. 
Holllnger  y.  Reeme,  374.  .S87. 
Hollingsworth  y.  Barbour,  220l 

y.  Patten's  Adm'x.  448. 

V.  State,  203. 

y.  Thompson,  451. 
Hollis  y.  Morris,  029. 
HoUister  y.  Abbott,  504. 

y.  Barkley,  518. 

y.  Dillon,  1010. 

V.  HoHIster.  920,  967. 

V.  Judges,  105. 
HoUoway  y.  Holloway,  36. 

y.  Jones,  655.  057. 
Holly  V.  Cook,  954. 
Holman  y.  Furniture  Co.,  32,  201,  3<'3 

y.  Miller.  449. 
Holmes,  In  re.  407,  508. 

y.  Aery,  520. 

y.  Buckner,  286. 

y.  Campbell,  966. 

y.  City  of  Carondelet,  650. 

y.  Holmes,  228,  320,  929. 

y.  Honie,  127,  326. 

V.  Lewis,  89. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  039. 

y.  Renisen,  307,  503,  852. 

y.  Robinson,  1004. 

y.  Steele,  367. 

y.  Wilson,  742. 
Holmes'  Appeal,  422. 
Holmes*  Heirs  y.  Gay's  Heirs,  210. 
Holsworth  V.  O'Chander.  582. 
Holt  y.  Alloway,  227,  912,  916. 

y.  Johnson,  913. 

y.  Lamb,  638. 

y.  Schneider.   032. 

y.  Thadier,  200,  972. 
Holtby  y.  Hodgson,  100,  191. 
Holt  County  y.  Insurance  Co.,  253a. 
Holt   County   Bank   y.   Holt   County. 

271. 
Holtor  Lumber  Co.  y.  Insurance  Co., 

20. 
Holthausen  y.  Kells,  749. 
Holton  y.  Gleason,  009, 

V.  Towner,  211. 
Holyoke  Bank  y.  Mfg.  Co.,  583. 


CASES 
[Reference*  to  aectlont.    if  1  to 

Homan  t.  Fleniiug,  100. 

T.  Hellman,  ltJ9. 
Uome  Friendly  Soc.  v.  Tyler,  903. 
Uome  Life  lua  Co.  v.  Caulk,  303. 

T.  Dutiu,  37. 

V.  Morse,  217. 
Uome  Nat.  Hank  v.  Carpenter,  291. 
Homer  v.  Brown,  699. 

V.  Fish,  754. 
Hood  T.  Bank,  160. 

V.  Hood,  COO,  624,  803,  822,  926, 
932. 

V.  State,  927,  929. 
Hooe  V.  Barber,  200. 
Hook  T.  Ricbeson,  179. 

V.  Trust  Co.,  154,  576. 
Hooper  v.  Hardle,  197. 

T.  Hooper,  561. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  740. 
Hoopes*  Eistate,  In  re,  H40a. 
Hooeier   Stone    Go.    v.    Railroad   Co., 

725. 
Hooton  V.  Will,  441. 
Hoover  t.  Blnkley,  141. 

V.  Kilander,  751. 

V.  Mltcbell,  705,  706. 
Hope  V.  Everbart,  74. 
Hopkins  T.  Bowers,  119. 

V.  Cravey,   246. 

T.  Flynn,  161. 

T.  Hopkins,  354. 

V.  Howard,  77,  486, 

r.  J^dd,  80,  90. 

T.  Lee,  504,  611. 

T.  Orr,  118. 

▼.  Sbei^ard,  880. 

y.  Stockdale,  735,  944. 

V.  Woodward,  978. 
Hopper  T.  Da\ie8,  388. 

T.  Lucas,  57. 
Hopper's  Estate,  In  re,  81a. 
Hoppin  Y.  Arery,  537,  550,  754. 
Hoppock  ▼.  Cray,  78. 

▼.  Sbober,  448. 
Hoppock'B  Bx*r8  r.  Bamsey,  451. 
Horan  r.  Wabrenberger,  216,  270,  282. 
Horbacb  v.  Smiley,  425,  443,  462. 
Hord  y.  Dlsbman,  383. 
Horgan  v.  Pacific  Mills,  740. 
Horn  T.  Lockbart  173. 

y.  Queen,  386. 

y.  Ross.   1008. 
Home  y.  Seisel,  44Ck 


CITED.  CIX 

499  in  vol.  1;  reiidue  in  vol.  2.] 

Horner  v.  Bank,  220,  261,  271. 

v.* Doe,  278. 

V.  Dunnagan,  737. 

V.  Homer,  154,  158. 

V.  Nichols. n,  204. 
Homsby  v.  Bank,  585. 
Horn  thai  v.  Flnellte,  352. 
Hortou  V.  Clark,  484. 

V.  Crltchfleld,  835,  875. 

V.  Hamilton,  Oil. 

V.  Howard,  174. 

V.  Mining  Co.,  340a,  347. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  734. 
Hosklns  V.  Hatteuback,  357. 

T.  Joliiiii«ou,  431. 
Hosier  v.  Uursh,  16. 
Hosmer  v.  Hoitt,  86. 

V.  Wallace,  530. 
Hcspes  V.  O'Brien,  939a. 
Hos8ack  v.  Underwood,  948. 
Hostetter  v.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  526. 
Hotchkiss  V.  Cutting,  110,  274. 

V.  Nichols,  611. 
Hotham  v.  Somervllle,  436. 
Hottenstein  v.  Conrad,  32. 

V.  Haverly,  991. 
Hough  V.  Stover.  264. 

V.  Waters.  766. 
Honlditch  v.  Donegal,  825. 
House  V.  Lrckwood,  614,  786. 

V.  Reavis,  663. 

V.  Wright.  33. 
Housemire  y.  Moulton,  504. 
Houser  v.  Smith,  219. 
Housh  y.  People,  589. 
Houston  V.  Houston,  403,  440. 

V.  Moore.  34. 

T.  Musgrove,  513,  693. 

V.  Starr,  33. 

y.  Timmermau,  550. 

V.  Ward,  233. 
Houston,  E.  &  W.  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  BK 

lisor,  363. 
Hovey  y.  Elliott,  226,  939,  939b. 

y.  Middleton,  352. 

V.  Morrill,  954. 
How  y.  Dorscheimer,  68. 

V.  MorteU,   357,  373. 
Howard,  Ex  parte,  645. 

V.  City  of  Huron,  253a,  613,  697, 
754. 

y.  Coon,  905. 

V.  De  Cordova,  360. 


ex  CASES 

•  [References  to  Mettsiuk   IS  1  to 

Howard  y.  Howard,  860. 

V.  Iron  Co.,  207. 

y.  Johnson,  186. 

V.  KimbaU,  611. 

y.  Lock,  263. 

T.  Mitchell.  787. 

y.  North,  190,  430. 

y.  Smith,  903. 
Howard-Harrison  Iron  Co.,  Bz  parte, 

213. 
Howards  v.  Selden,  938c. 
Howe  V.  Bank,  617. 

V.  Coldreu,  352. 

V.  Harding^  747. 

y.  Klein.  1001. 

y.  Mining  Co.,  352. 

V.  Mortell,  357. 
HoweU  V.  Barrett  210, 

y.  Budd,  639. 

y.  Campbell,  83. 

y.  Goodrich,  769. 

V.  Gordon,  906. 

y.  Hale,  190. 

y.  McCracken,  746. 

y.  Aifg.  Co.,  59. 

V.  Morlan,  130. 

y.  Thomason,  362. 

y.  Withers,  1005. 
Howe  Mach.  Co.  v.  Hickox,  1004. 
Howes  y.  Austin,  699. 
Howeth  y.  Clark,  27. 
Howgate  y.  U.  S.,  586. 
Howie  y.   Lewis,  77. 
Howison  V.  Weeden,  245,  261. 
Howk  y.  KimbaU,  991. 
Howland  y.  Carson,  248. 

V.  Knox,   455. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  936. 
Howlett  V.  Tarte,  697. 
Howse  V.  Judson,  469. 
Hoxie  V.  Bank,  599. 

V.  Wright,  857. 
Hoyle  y.  McOrea.  1012. 
Hoyt  y.  Howe,  425. 

y.  Hudson,  1009. 

y.  :Macon,  83. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  718. 
Hoyt  Dry-Goods  Co.  y.  Thomas,  33. 
Hubbard  v.  Hobson.  3S4. 

V.  Hubbard,  635. 

V.  Investment  Co.,  908. 

V.  Martin.  381. 
Hubbart  v.  Phillips,  374. 


CITED, 

tf9  In  Yol.  1;  residue  in  toI.  2.] 

Hubbell  y.  Coudrey.  892. 

y.  Hubbell,  554,  926,  928,  982. 

y.  U.  S.,  512,  685,  708,  722.  733. 
Huber  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Sweny,  130,  305. 
Huckaby  y.  Sasser,  109,  905^ 
HuddeU,  In  re,  492. 
Hudelmeyer  y.  Hughes,  766b 
Hudgins  y.  White,  354. 
Hudson  v.  Breeding,  93. 

y.  Carman,  583. 

y.  Daily,  880. 

y.  Hudson,  135,  165. 

y.  Kline,  364. 

y.  McMahon,  50. 

y.  Morris,  W3. 

y.  Yost,  253. 
Huebschman  y.  Baker,  375. 

y.  Cotzhausen,  633. 
Huey's  Adm*r  v.  Redden's  Heirs,  491. 
Huir  y.  Hutchinson,  261. 

V.  Wright,  192. 
Huffman  y.  Knight,  671,  734. 
Huggins  y.  King,  369. 
Hugh  y.  HIggs,  962. 
Hughes  y.  Alexander,  750. 

y.  Blake,  504. 

V.  Cornelius.  797,  813,  814. 

y.  Cummin gs,  270. 

V.  Davis,  939b. 

y.  Frum.  100. 

y.  Helms,  63. 

y.  Housel,  346a. 

V.  Jones,  624,  672,  802. 

V.  Lindsey,  211. 

V.  Mendocino  Co.,  744. 

V.  Moody,  77. 

V.  Mortgage  Co.,  734. 

y.  Pipe  Lines,  581. 

y.  Rees,  783. 

V.  Shreve,  1. 

V.  Shingle  Co.,  161. 

y.  Trahem,  950,  953. 

y.  U.  S.,  693,  713. 

y.  Walker,  703. 
HuklU  y.  Guffey,  663. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  708. 
Hulett  V.  Hamilton,  362. 
Hull  y.  Blake,  598,  923. 

V.  Chaffln.  554. 

y.  Hull,  1)32. 

y.  Naumberg,  958. 

y.  Vining,  340,  354. 

V.  Webb,  800,  878,  806. 


CASES  CITBD. 


CXI 


[ReferaoMtOMOtlni.   If  1  to  489  in  toL  1;  naldiie  la  toL  tj 


Holme  y.  Janes,  211. 
Hulfle  T.  Mershon,  75. 
HulTersoQ  r.  Hutchinson,  286. 
Humboldt  Mill  &  Min.  Go.  Y.  Terry, 

115. 
flume  T.  Bank,  619. 

y.  Bowie,  33. 

y.  Schintz,  682. 
Hnmes  y.  Scniggs,  600. 
Homlston  t.  Smith,  482a. 

T.  Stainthorp,  32,  44. 
Hmmnel  v.  Bank,  562. 

y.  Lilly,  486. 
Hummer  y.  Lamphear,  958. 
Humphrey  y.  Persons,  7. 

y.  Thorn,  141. 

y.  Tozier,  345a. 
Humphreys  y.  Browne,  682. 

V.  Humphreys,  356. 

y.  Leggett,  390. 

y.  Lundy,  498. 

y.  Rawn,  321,  323. 
Humphreys'  Lessee  y.  Humphreys,  428. 
Hnmphreyyille  y.  Culyer,  154. 
Humphries  y.  Bartee,  241. 
Huner  y.  Doolittle,  63. 
Hungerford  y.  Oushing,  287. 

y.  SIgerson,  378. 
Hungerford's  Appeal,  627. 
Hnnstock  y.  Hunstock,  27. 
Hunt  y.  Anderson,  23a 

y.  Bates,  779. 

y.  Breading.  1007. 

y.  Brown,  757. 

y.  City  of  San  Francisco,  84. 

y.  Coachman,  367 

y.  Conrad,  1004. 

y.  Dutchcr,  967 

y.  Fisher,  297a. 

y.  Hayen,  549. 

y.  Hunt.  916,  92& 

y.  Jenney,  354. 

y.  Lucas,  80.  600. 

V.  Lyle,  227,  85a 

y.  Payne,  655. 

y.  Russ,  560. 

y.  Smith,  983. 

y.  Standart,  206. 

y.  Steyens,  311. 

y.  Swajze,  443,  446. 

y.  Terrn*s  Heirs,  618,  712,  773. 

V.  WaUis.  347. 

V.  Yeatman,  326. 


Hunter  y.  Bank,  367. 

y.  Bryant,  88,  326. 

y.  Carroll,  657. 

V.  Davis,  615. 

y.  Hunter,  25. 

y.  Ruff,  281. 
Hunter*8  Private  Road,  In  re,  40. 
Huntingdom  y.  Grantland.  422. 
Huntington- y.  Attrill,  870. 

V.  Crouter,  377. 

v.  Emery,  322,  348. 

y.  Finch,  326. 

y.  Meyer,  411. 

y.  Moore,  47. 
Himtley  y.  Baker,  907. 
Hunton  v.  Euper,  324,  354a. 
Huntt  y.  Townshend,  436. 
Hurd  y.  Eaton,  359. 

y.  Fogg,  1005. 

y.  McClellan,  540. 
Hurford  v.  City  of  Omaha,  182. 
Hurlburt  y.  Reed,  324. 
Hurlbutt  y.  Butenop,  545. 

v.  Thomas,  222. 
Hurley  y.  Hewett,  109. 

V.  Lamoreaux,  662. 
Hursey  y.  Marty,  588. 
Hurst  v.  Combs,  C09. 

y.  Everett,  695,  865. 

y.  Fisher,  300. 

y.  Means,  714. 

y.  Sheets,  954,  1004. 
Husky  y.  Maples,  994. 
Hussey  v.  Culver,  947. 
Husted  V.  Van  Ness,  242. 
Huston  v.  Ditto,  299,  378. 
Huston  Tp.  Co.  of  Mut  Fire  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Beale,  352. 
Hutcheson  v.  Grubbs,  397,  398,  468. 
Hutchings  v.  Bank,  82. 

V.  Weems,  99. 
Hutchins  v.  Gerrish,  879. 

v.  Riddle,  1004. 
Hutchinson  v.  Bank,  529. 

v.  Brown,  58,  121,  780,  950,  957. 

y.  Inhabitants,  96& 

v.  Ledlle,  318. 

y.  McLaughlin,  40. 
Hutsonplller's     Adm'r     v.      Stover's 

Adm'r,  993. 
Hutton  V.  Williams,  633. 
Huyck  V.  Graham,  262. 
Huyghe  v.  Briukman,  610. 


CXU  CASES 

[References  to  sections.    H  1  to 

Hyatt  y.  Bates,  504. 

V.  Challiss,  707,  938. 
Hyde  v.  Curling,  132,  135. 

V.  Lelsenring,  731. 

V.  Michelson,  120,  130,  137. 

V.  Noble,  745. 

V.  Piukard,  28. 

V.  Redding,  263. 
Hyder  v.  Smith,  269. 
Hyman  v.  Stadler,  776. 


I 


Iba  Y.  Association,  303. 

Ide  V.  Booth,  84. 

Iglehart  v.  Chicago  Ins.  Co.,  61. 

V.  Lee,  384,  386. 

V.  State,  589. 
•  Ihmsen  v.  Ormsby,  646,  660. 
lliorn  V.  Wallace,  950. 
liams  V.  Root,  271,  281. 
lies  V.  i^lledge.  904. 
Ilg  T.  Burbanli,  604. 
Illff  V.  Arnott,  180. 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  V.  Brown,  37. 

V.  City  of  Champaign,  534a. 

V.  Miller,   740. 

V.  People,  740. 

V.  jQuirk,  529. 

V.  Slater,  740. 

V.  Wilbourn.  743. 
Illinois     Conference     of     E^vangeUcaI 

Ass'n  V.  Plagge,  555. 
Illinois  Live  Stock  Ins.  Co.  y.  Kirk- 

patrick,  100. 
Illinois  Steel  Co.  v.  O'Donnell,  70. 

v.  Szutenbach,  326a. 
Illinois  Trust  &  Savings  Bank  y.  Rail- 
way Co.,  48,  270, 
Illinois   &   St.   L.   R.   &  Coal   Oo.   v. 

Cobb,  613.  657. 
Imlay  v.   Cai-pentier,  862. 
Imrie  v.  Castrique,  819. 
Independent  Ins.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  152. 
Independent  Order  y.  Paine,  97. 
Independent  School  Dist.  y.  Schreiner, 
311,  953. 

V.  Werner,  400. 
Indiana,  B.  &  W.  R.  Co.  y.  Allen,  664. 
Indiana  Farmers'  Liye  Stock  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Stratton,  761. 


I 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.} 

Indianapolis,    D.    &    W.    By.    Co.    v. 

Crockett,  303,  317. 
Indianapolis  &  C.  R.  Co.  y.  Clark,  617, 
726. 
y.  Risley,  970. 
Indianapolis  &  St  L.  Ry.  Oo.  y.  Harm- 
less, 972. 
Indiana  &  I.  S.  R.  Co.  y.  Sampson,  97. 
Ingalis  v.  Bank,  378,  394. 

V.  Morgan,   481. 
Ingersoli  v.   Dyott,   60. 
y.  Jewett,  793. 
V.  Mangam,  194. 
Ingle  V.  McCurry,  376,  377. 

V.  Thousand    Islands    Hotel    Co., 
948. 
Ingraham  v.  Champion,  482. 
V.  Gildemeester,  236,  237. 
V.  Hail,  734,  736. 
Ingram  v.  Beik.  346,  482a,  487. 
V.  Bray,  718. 
y.  Phillips,  513. 
V.  Bobbins,  65. 
Ingwaldson  v.  Olson,  235,  772. 
Ingwersen  y.  Buchholz,  380,  627. 
Inhabitants  of  Argyle  y.  Dwiuel,  430. 
Inhabitants  of  Brewer  y.  Inhabitants. 

583. 
Inhabitants  of  Dublin  y.  Chadboum, 

636. 
Inhabitants  of  Embden  y.  Lishemess. 

724, 
Inhabitants  of  Essex  County  y.  Berry. 

368. 
Inhabitants  of  Greenfield  y.  Wilson. 

745. 
Inhabitants  of  Jay  v.  Inhabitants,  G^S). 
Inhabitants  of   Knox   v.  Inhabitants. 

695). 
Inhabitants  of  Limerick,   In  re,   132% 

163. 
inhabitants  of  Lower  AUoways  Creek 

v.  Moore.  588. 
Inhabitants   of   Milford   y.   Holbrook. 

575. 
Inhabitants  of  Shrewsbury  y.  Inhab- 
itants, 574. 
Inhabitants  of  Springfield  y.  Inhabit- 
ants, 127. 
Inhabitants  of  Stetson  v.  Inhabitants. 

96. 
Inhabitants  of  Stockbridge  y.  luhnb- 
itants»  969. 


CASES  CIT£D. 
[Beferences  to  secUons.    §S  1  to  489  In  toL  1;  rMidue  In  vol.  X.] 


exiii 


IiiliabltantB  of  Sturbridge  v.  Fraukliu, 

600. 
Inhabitants  of  Veazie  y.  Raili'oad  (X»., 

574,  575. 
Inloe  y.  Harrey,  550. 
Inumn  v.  Jenkins,  785. 

V.  Jones,  331. 

V.  Mead,  G05. 
luos  V.  Winspear,  237. 
Inquirer  Printing  &  Publishing  Co.  y. 

Wehriy,  412. 
Inslee  y.  Hampton,  763. 
Insley  y.  U.  S.,  261. 
International  Bank  v.  Sherman,  187. 
International  &  G.  N.  Uy.  Co.  y.  Gie- 
selman,  743. 

y.  Moore,  274. 
Interstate  Commerce   Commission   y. 

Raibroad  Co.,  305. 
Iowa  Union  Tel.  Co.  y.  Boylan,  376. 
Irby  y.  Wilson,  228,  929,  932. 
Ireland  y.  Champueys,  127. 
Irish-American  Bank  y.  Ludlum,  609, 

624. 
Iroquois  Furnace  Co.  v.  Mfg.  Co.,  595. 
irvin  v.  Wright,  1005. 
Irvine  y.  Davy,  86. 

y.  Leyh,  356,  370. 

V.  Myers,  954,  1005. 

y.  Tarbot,  530. 
Irwin  y.  Backus,  589. 

V.  McKee,  986. 

y.  Nixon*s  Heirs,  482a. 
Isaacs  V.  Clark,  784,  787. 

y.  Mintz,  116. 

V.  Price,  83,  224. 
Isbell  V.  Fan-is,  525. 

y.  Stewart,  541. 
Isett  v.  Lucas«  953. 
Islmiel  y.  Potts,  84. 
Isler  V.  Brown,  107,  127,  471. 
Isley  y.  Boon,  273. 
Israel  y.  Arthur,  218,  232. 
Ives,  In  re,  248. 

Y.  Addison,  956. 

y.  Finch,  958. 

y.  Hulce,  130. 

y.  Niles,  567. 

y.  Phelps,  987. 
Ivey  v.  Gilder,  154. 

y.  McConnell,  387. 
Ivory  V.  Delore,  30. 
Ivy  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Bank,  406. 
1  LAW  JUDG.— h 


J 


Jaccard  y.  Anderson,  100. 
Jack  y.  Hudnall,  779. 
Jackson,  £x  parte,  255. 

y.  Allen,  425,  474. 

v.  Bell,  391. 

y.  Bowen,  10O7. 

y.  Brunor,  81,  196. 

y.  Ohapin,  433. 

y.  Crawfords,  909. 

v.  Cullum,  969. 

y.  Fletcher,  970. 

y.  Gould,  341. 

y.  Griswold,  586. 

y.  Holbrook,  423,  455. 

y.  Jackson,  927. 

y.  Lodge,  504,  784. 

y.  Lumber  Co.,  59. 

y.  Marsh,  567. 

y.  Mayor  of  Berwick,  127. 

v.  Mlddleton,  428. 

y.  Myrick,  600. 

y.  Nasou,  993. 

y.  Olmstead,  989. 

y.  Parker,  439. 

V.  Patrick,  378. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  27. 

y.  Stone,  550. 

y.  Summerville,  292. 

y.  Tift,  271. 

y.  Town,  420. 

V.  Vedder,  600. 

V.  West,  538. 

y.  Wood,  623,  787. 
Jackson  Co.  v.  GuUatt,  46. 
Jackson's  Lessee  y.  Williams,  422. 
Jacksonville,  T.  &  K.  W.  R.  Co.  y. 

Const.  Co.,  31a. 
Jacob  V.  Day,  009. 
Jacobi  V.  Schloss,  36. 
.Tacoble  y.  Mickle,  666. 
Jacobs  V.  Burgwyn,  135,  317. 

V.  Hill,  586,  588. 

V.  Insurance  Oo.,  20. 

y.  Kastholm,  319. 

V.  Marks,  861. 
Jacobs'  Appeal,  422. 
Jacobson  v.  Miller,  754. 

V.  Wernert,  360. 
Jacquette  v.  Hugunon,  884* 
Jaefror  v.  Koenig,  1003. 
Jakobl  V.  Gorman,  317. 


CXIV  CASES 

[References  to  sections.    }(  1  to 

Jamaica  Co.  v.  Chandler,  009. 
James,  Ex  parte,  311. 

In  re,  666. 

V.  Allen  County,  752. 

V.  City  of  Ix)uisville,  584. 

V.  Daniels,  146. 

V.  Hubbard,  440. 

V.  James,  822. 

V.  Markham,  999. 

V.  Smith,  261,  278. 

V.  Trust  Co.,  58:i. 
•lames'  Adm'r  v.  Neal's  Adm*r,  363. 
James  Clark  Co.  v.  Colton,  290. 
James'  Estate,  In  re,  228,  246,  929. 
James'  Ex'r  v.  Life,  994. 
Jameson  v.  Barber,  641,  774, 

V.  Smith,  23. 
Jamieson  v.  Pomeroy,  211. 
Jamison  v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  809. 

V.  May,  375. 

V.  Weaver,  324,  351,  376. 
Janes  v.  Bullard,  159. 

V.  Howell,  393. 
Janney's  Ex'r  v.  Stephen's  Adm'r,  450. 
Jansen  v.  Grlmshaw,  310. 

V.  Vamum,  207. 
Janson  v.  Bank,  138. 
Jaques  v.  M.  E.  Church,  41. 
Jarboe  v.  Brown,  123. 

V.  Saverin,  655. 

V.  Smith,  705,  706. 
Jartline  v.  Relchert,  911. 
Jariuan  v.  Saunders,  373,  1014. 
Jamlgan  v.  Fleming,  739. 
J.   A.   Roebling  Sous  Co.   v.   Electric 

Co.,  362,  394. 
Jarrell  v.  Brubaker,  534. 
Jarrett  v.  Andrews,  54. 

V.  Goodnow,  391. 
Jarrett'B  Estate,  In  re,  127. 
Jartman  v.  Insurance  Co.,  335. 
Jarvis  v.  Barrett,  231. 

V.  Drlggs,  697. 

V.  Fountain  Water  Co.,  526. 
Jasper  Mercantile  Cq.  v.  O'Rear,  115. 
Jay  V.  De  Groot,  ^41. 
Jaynes  v.  Brook,  371. 
J.  B.  Watkins  Land  Mortg.  Co.  y.  Mul- 
len, 278. 
Jean  v.  Hennessy,  345. 
Jefferies  v.  Allen,  632. 
Jefferson  y.  Bohemian  Ass'n,  32. 
Jefferson  Co.  Bank  y.  Bobbins,  354. 


CITED. 

499  in  Tol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.1 

Jeffersonian  Pub.  Co.  v.  Hilliard,  266. 
Jeffery  v.  Fitch,  376. 
Jeffords  v.  Hine,  630. 
Jeffrey  v.  Moran,  443. 
Jeffreys  v.  Yarborough,  483. 
Jeffries  v.  Aaron,  348. 

V.  Evans,  1004. 

y.  Morgan,  698. 

V.  Sherbum,  433. 
Jencks  v.  Smith,  288. 
Jenkins  v.  Anderson,  4:;4. 

V.  Davis,  157. 

v.  Fahey,  660,  661. 

V.  Go  wen,  432. 

V.  Harrison,  618. 

V.  Johnston,  720. 

V.  Long,  155. 

V.  Newman,  448. 

V.  Putnam,  853. 

V.  Robertson,  705. 

V.  Sup'rs,  985b. 

V.  Telegraph  Co.,  322,  347. 

V.  Wilkerson,  89. 
Jenkinson  v.  Hilands,  683. 

V.  Wysner,  609. 
Jenks  v.  Opp,  760. 
Jenners  v.  Spraker,  22.'», 
Jenness  v.  Jenness,  928. 
Jennings  v.  Ashley,  i:,3. 

v.  Bartels,  22. 

y.  Jones,  536. 

v.  Parsons,  79a, 

V.  Pearce,  346. 

v.  Shiner,  376. 

V.  Simpson,  200. 
Jennison  v.  Hapgood.  633. 

V.  Inhabitants,  611. 
Jensen  v.  Barbom\  340.  346,  691. 
Jepson  V.  International  Fraternal  Al- 
liance, 714. 
Jeter  v.  Fellowes,  921. 

V.  Hewitt,  503,  811. 
Jewett  V.  Davis,  30. 

V.  Land  Co..  218,  278. 

V.  Sundback,  287. 

V.  Wadleigh,  989. 
Jex  V.  Jacob,  749. 
Jilsum  V.  Stebbins,  367. 
Jil2,  Ex  parte,  681. 
Jinks  V.  Lewis,  550. 
Job  V.  Tebbetts,  247,  809. 

V.  Walker,  299. 
Jocelyn  y.  Dounel,  249. 


CASES 
I  References  to  sections.    H  1  to 

Jochumsen  y.  Bank,  &10. 

John  y.  Smith,  638a. 

John  A.  Tolman  Co.  y.  Savage,  142. 

Johns  y.  Frltchey,  110. 

y.  PaUee,  2&1. 
John  Sblllito   Co.,  The,   y.  McClung, 

534a. 
Johnson,  In  re,  258,  259. 

Y.  Baker,  223. 

T.  Bank,  155. 

V.  Beazley,  284,  633. 

Y.  Bleaching  Co.,  583. 

Y.  Block,  219. 

Y.  Boice,  949,  950. 

T.  Bonfield,  206. 

V.  Butler.  7,  11,  874. 

V.  Carrer,  119. 

V.  aty  of  New  Orleans,  699. 

v.  Coleman,  320,  377. 

v.  Delbridge,  83. 

V.  Dobbins,  917,  939b. 

V.  Dodge,  229. 

V.  Driver,  361. 

V.  Gdde,  450. 

V.  Eldred,  335. 

V.  Everett,  44,  45,  48, 

Y.  Fitzhugh.  977. 

Y.  Foreman.  158. 

v.  Foster,  5ri3. 

v.  Fry,  32G. 

v.  GiUett  115. 

y.  Girdwood,  529. 

Y.  Graves,  536. 

V.  Ha  thorn,  141. 

V.  Hess,  406. 

V.  HoUey,  290. 

V.  Hoover,  42. 

V.  Huber,  390,  968. 

v.  Jacob,  554. 

y.  Johnson,  218,  504,  620. 

V.  Jones,  306,  377,  697. 

v.  Logan,  680. 

y.  Lnmbering  Co.,  530. 

y.  Lyon.  378. 

y.  McCabe,  197. 

y.  ifcCnrry,  352. 

V.  Sklantz,  92. 

v.  Miller,  100,  115,  261. 

V.  Mining  Co.,  261. 

y.  Mitchell,  449. 

V.  Morse,  657,  658. 

V.  Parrotte,  3S, 

V.  Pate,  655,  707. 


CITED.  CXV 

499  In  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Johnson  v.  Pattersou,  232. 

V.  Polk  Co.,  29. 

V.  Pomeroy,  205.  . 

v.  Railway  Co.,  730. 

v.  Reed,  754. 

V.  Roberts,  299. 

V.  Robertson,  585. 

V.  Snyre,  524. 

V.  Sohlosser,  404. 

V.  Shnmway,  34. 

V.  Smith,  441,  628,  GC9. 

V.  Stockham,  092,  801. 

y.  Sweeney,  322. 

V.  Signal  Co.,  29. 

V.  Templetciu.  356. 

V.  TowHley,  530. 

y.  Tnttle,  iJ81,  993. 

v.  i:.  S.,  2.*)e3. 

y.  Vance.  (320. 

y.  Van  Doren,  138. 

y.  Vaughan,  120,  233. 

v.  White.  693. 

V.  Wright,  135,  156. 
Johnson  County  v.  Rugg,  191. 
Johnson's  Adm'rs  y.   Unversaw.   321, 

373. 
Johnson  Steel  Street  R.  Co.  v.  William 

Wharton  &  Co.,  508. 
Johnston  v.  Brown,  091. 

V.  Glasgow,  52. 

V.  Lemmonds,  434. 

V.  McAuslaud,  63. 

V.  Osmont,  617. 

V.  Panl  526. 

V.  Saving  Union,  541. 
Johnston's  Devisees  v.  Churchills,  537. 
John  V.  Farwell  Co.  v.  Lykins,  615. 
Jolce  v.  Scales,  802. 
JoUey  V.  Foltz,  282. 
Jones,  Ex  parte,  135. 

V.  Acre,  118. 

V.  Bank,  370,  377,  506. 

V.  Beamau,  624,  732,  737. 

V.  Belt,  117. 

V.  Blun,  252. 

V.  Brinker,  641. 

y.  Brlttan,  321. 

v.  Chalfant  108. 

y.  Chase,  644. 

y.  City  of  Petaluma,  747. 

V.  City  of  Seattle,  740. 

y.  Coffey,  262. 

V.  Commercial  Bank,  377.  506. 


CXVl 

CASES 

[References  to  sectlona.   f|lto 

Jones 

V.  Culleu,  240. 

V. 

De  Graffenreid,  650. 

V. 

Ellison,  701. 

V. 

Fenninoore,  10. 

V. 

George.  253,  487,  493. 

V. 

Glass,  1»2. 

V. 

Green,  437. 

V. 

Gregory,  034. 

V. 

Guthrie,  414. 

V. 

Hart,  154. 

V. 

Hillls,  726. 

V. 

Howard,  099. 

V. 

Hunter.  703. 

V. 

Insurance  Co.,  35,  300.  800,  884. 

V. 

Jamison,  829,  847. 

V. 

Jones,  197,  240,  313,  397,  905, 

970. 

V. 

Jones*  Heirs,  503. 

V. 

Kilbreth,  733. 

V. 

Kllgore,  384. 

V. 

I^avender,  742,  785. 

V. 

Leech,  341.  375. 

V. 

Lewis,  160. 

V. 

Lowell,  779. 

V. 

Mastin,  587. 

V. 

Merrill.  228. 

V. 

Mlnogup,  117. 

V. 

Myrlck's  Ex'rs.  440. 

V. 

Perkins,  626. 

V. 

Pharls,  218,  250. 

V. 

Quayle,  20. 

V. 

Ransom,  976,  989. 

V. 

Read,  15. 

V. 

Reed,  233. 

V. 

Reynolds,  662. 

V. 

Richardson,  673. 

V. 

Ritter's  Adm'r,  589. 

V. 

Russell,  347. 

V. 

Sander,  145. 

V. 

Schmidt,  1010.  1014. 

V. 

South's  Adni'i-8,  'MIS, 

V. 

Spencer,  004,  000. 

V. 

Taylor,  102. 

V. 

Tracy,  81,  503. 

V. 

Underwood,  620. 

V. 

Wasrgoner's  Adra*r,  567. 

V. 

Watkins,  3(57. 

V. 

Weathersbee,  785,  787. 

V. 

Webb,  15. 

V. 

Wetherbe?,  504. 

V. 

White,  520. 

V. 

Wllkey,  5<K),  800. 

V. 

Williamson,  374. 

CITED. 

499  in  Yol.  1;  residue  In  yol.  2.] 

Jones  y.  Wilson.  41,  908. 

V.  Word,  109. 

V.  W^rlght,  459. 
Jones*  Estate,  In  re,  406. 
Jones  &  Laughlins  v.  Sands,  35^ 
Jonsson  v.  Lindstrom,  338. 
Jordahl  v.  Berry,  769. 
Jordan  v.  Chester,  394. 

V.  Corley,  378. 

y.  Faircloth,  707. 

y.  Farthing,  055. 

y.  Ford,  555. 

V.  Huntington.  77. 

V.  John  Ryan  Co.,  86^  270. 

V.  Petty,  136. 

Y.  Robinson.  8. 

V.  Selfert,  696. 

y.  State.  109. 

V.  Tarver,  305.  346. 

V.  Thomas,  378.    \ 

y.  Van  Epps.  660. 
Jorgensen  v.  Griffin,  110,  349. 
Joseph  y.  Boldildge,  593. 
Josephi  y.  Clothing  Co.,  783. 
Jospe  y.  Lighte,  348. 
Jouett  y.  Gunn,  174. 
Jourden  y.  Meier,  635. 
Journe  y.  Hewes,  744. 
Joy  y.  College,  37. 

V.  Hill,  102. 

V.  Hull,  143. 
Joyce,  Ex.  parte,  256. 

V.  McAvoy,  197. 

y.  Moore,  735. 

y.  Perry,  423. 

y.  Whitney,  399. 
Joyes  y.  Hamilton,  189. 
J.  S.  Menken  Co.  v.  Brinkley,  935. 
Judah  y.  Stephenson,  220. 
Judd  y.  Downing,  299. 

V.  Patton,  347. 

y.  Ross,  500. 
Judd  Linseed  Sperm  Oil  Co.  v.  Hub- 
bell.  210. 
Judge  y.  Booge,  114. 

V.  Fillmore,  966. 
Judge  of  Probate  y.  Quimby,  589. 

y.  Robins,  643. 
Judklns  V.  Insurance  Co.,  884. 
Judson  V.  Gage,  115,  154. 

V.  Lake,  036. 
JuIUlard  y.  Gr3eimian,  152, 
Julian  y.  Beal,  434. 


CASES 
[References  to  sectlonv.    {ft  1  to 

Janeman,  Ex  parte,  182. 
Jaiiffnitach  y.  Iron  Co.,  738. 
Jnnkans  y.  Bergin,  278. 
JuBkin  y.  Dayis,  849. 
Justice  y.  Scott,  357. 
JiutuB,  Succession  ^f,  635. 
J.  W.  Reedy  Kleyator  Mfg.  Co.  y.  Pit- 
yowsky,  S3. 


Kager  y.  Vickery,  190. 
Kalm  y.  Casper,  349. 

y.  Kahn,  752. 

y.  Lesser,  58,  69,  903. 
Kalne,  Ex  parte,  533. 
Kal8»  y.  Brown,  89. 

y.  Lembeck,  447. 
Kallander  y.  Neldhold,  390,  987. 
Kalteyer  y.  Wipff,  252,  318. 
Kaminsky  y.  Trantham,  458. 
Kamm  y.  Stark,  357. 
Kamman  y.  Otto,  324. 
Kanawha  Lodge  No.  25  y.  Swann,  45. 
Kane  y.  Canal  Co.,  661. 

y.  City  of  Fond  du  Lac,  526. 

y.  Cook,  901,  906. 

y.  Dnlex,  662. 

y.  Fisher,  714,  749. 

y.  Hills,  128. 

y.  Morehouse,  737. 

T.  Whittick,  44. 
Kane  &  Co.  y.  School  Dist,  317. 
Kannally  y.  Renner,  393b. 
iCanne  y.  Minn.  &  St  L.  R.  Co.,  691. 
Kann's  Estate,  In  re,  449. 
Kansas  City  y.  Winner,  267. 
Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  M.  R.  Co.  y. 

Morgan,  198,  251,  291,  938c. 
Kansas  aty,  P.  &  G.  R.  Co.  y.  Moon, 

680. 
Kansas  aty,  St.  J.  &  C.  B.  R.  Oo.  y. 

Campbell,  194. 
Kansas  Pac.  Ry.   Co.  y.  McBratney, 
600. 

Kansas  Rolling  Mill  Co.  y.  Atchison, 

32. 
Kansas  &  A.  V.  Ry.  Co.  y.  Pltzhugh, 

363. 
Kapischke  y.  Koch,  738. 
Karnes  y.  Harper,  411. 

y.  Lloyd,  293. 
Kams  y.  Kunkle,  875,  967. 


CITED.  CXVll 

499  la  Yol.  1;  residue  hi  toI.  2.] 

Karr  y.  Barstow,  782. 

y.  Parks,  740. 
Kashman   y.  Parsons,   508,  613,   617, 

655. 
Kasson  y.  People,  1011,  1012. 
Kaster  y.  Welsh,  620. 
Katz  y.  Moore,  367,  378. 
Kauff  y.  Mesner,  765. 
Kauffman*s  Appeal,  182. 
Kaufman  y.  Schneider,  366,  691. 

y.  Shain,  326. 
Kaufmann  y.  Drexel,  307,  366,  374. 
Kaukauna  Water  Power  Co.  y.  Canal 

Co.,  938c. 
Kay  y.  Walter,  892. 
Kean  y.  McKinsey,  245. 

y.  Rice,  935. 

y.  Roby,  580. 
Keane  y.  Fisher,  587. 
Kearney,  Ex  parte,  ^5,  25G.  258,  259. 

y.  Denn,  806. 

y.  Snodgrass,  33. 
Keater  y.  Hock,  707,  733. 
Keating  y.  Craig,  448. 

y.  Korfbage,  191. 

V.  Springer,  663. 
Keaton  y.  Banks,  326,  327. 
Keator  y.  Case,  346a. 
Keck  y.  McEldowney,  86. 
Keech  y.  Beatty,  514,  G30. 
Keeler  v.  Elston,  373. 

y.  King,  958. 
Keen  y.  Coleman,  55. 

y.  Jordan,  125. 

V.  Kleckner,  69. 
Keenan  v.  Whitehead,  981. 

V.  Williams,  32. 
Keeue  y.  McDonough,  173,  255. 
Keener  y.  Goodson,  109 
Keep  y.  Leckie,  72. 
Kees  V.  Maxim,  100. 
Keesey  y.  Old,  614. 
Iveesling  y.  Doyle,  245. 
Kehler  y.  Insurance  Co.,  340. 
Kehoe  y.  Blethen,  21. 

y.  aty  of  Philadelphia,  740. 
Keifer  y.  Eldred  Tp.,  16. 

y.  Summers,  304. 
Keigher  y.  Mfg.  Co..  373. 
Keiper  y.  Helfrlcker,  55, 
Keirle  y.  Shriyer,  104. 
Keith  y.  BBtlll.  8. 

y.  Keith,  190. 


CXVlll  CASES 

[References  to  sections.    SS 1  to 

Keith  V.  McCaffrey,  340. 
Keith  Bros.  &  Ck).  v.  Stiles,  211,  776. 
Kelber  v.  Plow  Co.,  34,  352. 
Kellam  v.  Klppey,  (595. 

V.  Toms,  857. 
Kelleher  v.  Boden,  366,  378. 
Keller,  Succession  of,  645. 

V.  City  of  Mt.  Vernon.  537. 

y.  Jordan,  23. 

V.  Stevens,  97. 

V.  Stolzenbach,  718,  723. 
Kellerman  v.  Aultman,  425. 
Kelley  v.  Chapman,  000. 

V.  Kelley,  896,  924. 

V.  McKibben,  123. 

V.  Mfg.  Co..  306. 

V.  Mize,  290,  514,  081. 

V.  Stanbery,  41. 
Kellogg,  Ex  parte,  244. 

V.  Johnson,  633. 

V.  Keith,  52. 

V.  Linger,  286. 

V.  Schuyler,  JM3. 

V.  Sweeney,  152. 

V.  Window,  82. 
Kellogg,  Johnson  &  Co.  v.  Gilman,  208. 
Kelly  V.  Bandini,  236. 

V.  Church,  567. 

V.  Dill,  425. 

V.  Donlin,  642,  754. 

V.  Garvin,  1009. 

V.  Hamblen,  4-10,  543,  958. 

T.  Harrison,  203. 

V.  Hurt,  378,  388. 

V.  Lyons,  53. 

V.  Payne,  141. 

V.  Kailroad  Co.,  572. 

V.  Van  Austin,  88,  235. 

V.  Wlmberly,  3,  532. 
Kelsey  v.  Murphy,  720,  722. 

V.  Ward,  655. 
Kelty  V.  High,  305. 
Kemp  v.  Cook,  193,   297,  300,  313,  493. 

V.  Lyon,  135,  165. 

V.  Mundell,  884. 
Kempe's  Lessee  v.  Kennedy,  282,  283. 
Kempner  v.  Comer,  747. 
Kempton  v.  Burgess,  699. 
Kenan  v.  Miller,  513. 
Kenck  v.  Parchen,  589. 
Kendal  v.  Talbot,  693,  7ia 
Kendall  v.  Briley,  958. 

v.  Hamilton,  770. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Kendall  v.  Hardenbergh,  641. 

V.  O'Neal,  156. 

V.  Winsor,  380. 
Kendig  v.  Marble,  63. 

V.  North,  483.  , 
Kenedy  v.  Jarvis,  311. 
Kenmore  Shoe  Co.,  In  re,  793. 
Kenuard  v.  Alston,  985. 

V.  Carter,  770. 

V.  Mabry,  445. 
Kennedy  v.   Bam  brick,  496. 

V.  Baker,  263. 

V.  Bank,  2<0,  285. 

V.  Cassillis,  825. 

V.  Davisson,  701. 

V.  Evans,.  359. 

v.  I^we,  77. 

V.  Pickering,    204. 

v.  Scovil,  611. 

V.  Wachsmuth,  161. 
Kennell  v.  Abbott,  634. 
Kennerley  v.  Shepley,  412,  641. 
Keunery*s  Adm'r  v.  Railroad  Co.,  33. 
Kenney  v.  Greer,  270. 

V.  Howard,  790. 

V.  Phillipy,  660. 

V.  RaUroad  Co..  981. 
Kenn*8  Case,  320,  523.  . 
Kent  V.  Brown,  245. 

V.  Church,  564. 

V.  Iron  Co.,  251,  290. 

V.  Lashley,  577. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  504. 

V.  Ricards,  366,  308,  373. 

V.  Riley,  697. 

V.  West,  81. 
Kenum  v.  Henderson,  89. 
Kenypn  v.  Baker,  158. 

V.  Shreck,  325. 

V.  Woodruff,  782. 
Keokuk  County  v.  Alexander,  616.  737. 
Keokuk  &  H.  Bridge  Co.  v.  People. 

750. 
Keokuk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Missouri,  551, 

583a,  750. 
Kepler  v.  Loan  Co.,  492. 
Kerby  v.  Chadwell,  341. 
Kerchner  v.  McEachem,  319. 
Kern  v.  Chalfant,  63. 

V.  Maglnniss,  39. 

V.  Saul,  31. 

V.  Strausberger,  245,  375,  513. 

V.  Wilson,  616,  716. 


CASES 
IReferences  to  sections,    fifi  1  to 

Keman  v.  Railway  Co.,  33. 
Kerr  v.  Blodgett,  545.  585,  681a. 

y.  Chess,  658. 

V.  Kerr,  275,  835,  894,   897,   901, 
930,  1016. 

T.  Simmons,  747. 

Y.  Swallow,  229. 
Kerr's  Appeal,  452,  1015. 
Kerry  ▼.  Pacific  Marine  C5o.,  138. 
Kersey  v.  Rash,  356,  383.  388. 
Kessel  t.  Albetis,  942,  945. 
Kessler  v.  Vera,  85. 
Kester  v.  Stark,  661. 
Kesterson  v.  Tate,  450. 
Ketcham  y.  Elliott,  352. 
Ketchum  t.  Ghristman,  535. 

T.  Edwards,  252. 

V.  Thatcher,  510,  685. 
Key  V.  Dent.  604. 

V.  Goodwin,  127. 

V.  Hayden,  86. 

V.  Vaughn,  284. 
Keyes  v,  Mooney,  879. 

V.     U.  S.,  250. 
Keys  V.  Grannis,  967. 
Keyser  v.  Sutherland,  655,  65a 
Kibbe  V.  Howard,  687. 
Kibler,  Ex  parte,  205. 
Kidd  T.  Huff,  705. 

V.  McMillan,  306. 
Kllander  t.  Hoover,  751. 
Kllbum  T.  Woodworth,  904. 
Kilgore  v.  Kllgore,  634. 
Kllheffer  v.  Herr,  786,  787. 
Kille  v.  Ege,  652. 
Killlon  V.  Wright,  620. 
KUlough  ▼.  Alford,  152. 
Killpatrlck  t.  Rose,  154. 
KlUsa  T.  Shermond.  593. 
Kilpatrick  t.  Railroad  Ck).,  783. 

T.  StroEier,  711. 
Kimball  y.  Hilton,  657. 

T.  Hutchison,  378. 

V.  Merrick,  225,  899. 

y.  Randall,  209. 

y.  Tanner,  211. 
Kimble  v.  Cummins,  952. 

y.  Short,  370. 
Kimbro  y.  Railroad  Co.,  707. 
Khne  y.  Fenner,  297,  348. 
Klmmel  y.  Henna,  650. 

y.  Kimmel,  23& 
Kindel  y.  Lithographing  Co.,  159. 


CITED.  OZIX 

499  in  Tol.  1;  residue  in  yoI.  2.] 

Kindt,  In  re,  320a. 
Kindt's  Appeal,  492. 
King,  In  re.  255,  1008. 

y.  Aughtry,   996. 

V.  Baldwin,  388,  389. 

y.  Bank,  166. 

V.  Belcher,  463. 

V.  Briglmm,  611. 

V.  Brcoks,  309. 

y.  Burdett,   201. 

y.  Bumbam,  134. 

y.  Chase.  580,  614,  624. 

y.  Clarke,  563. 

y.  Eastou,  424. 

y.  Fnber.  .j97. 

y.  French,  110. 

y.  Goodwhi,  1012. 

y.  Green,  179. 

y.  Harris,  472. 

y.  HIgglns,  76. 

y.  Hoare.  674,  770,  774,  778. 

y.  Jones,  189.  300. 

y.  Kerr*s  Adm'rs,  567. 

y.  Molloban,  683. 

y.  Nimlck,  418. 

y.  Normau,  573,  f)SQ. 

y.  Poole.  220. 

y.  Portls,  417. 

y.  Robinson.  206. 

y.  Ross.  633. 

y.  Savory,  526. 

y.  Smith,  633. 

y.  Townshend,  650,  655. 

V.  Vance,  593,  596. 

y.  Van  Gilder.  829,  934. 
Kingen  y.  Stroh,  213. 
Kingman  y.  Cowles,  876. 

y.  Paulsen,  608. 
Kingman  y.  Paulson,  868. 
Kingsborough  y.  Tousley,  275,  902,  972. 
Kingsbury  y.  Kingsbury,  47. 

y.  Yniestra,  901. 
Elingsland  v.  Forrest,  958. 

y.  Koeppe,  206. 
Kingsland   &   Douglass   Mfg.   Co.   y. 

Mitchell,  209. 
Kingsley  y.  Gilraan,  22. 

V.  Miller,  284,  633. 
Kinkade  v.  Cunningham.  488. 
Kinkier  y.  Junlea.  207. 
Ellnney  y.  Degman,  530. 

V.  O'Baunon's  Ex'x,  312. 
Kinnler  y.  Klnnier,  889,  921,  930. 


CASES  CITED. 
[References  to  Beotloni.    N  1  to  489  in  voi.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.] 


Klnports  t.  BoyntoD,  434. 

V.  Ra^vson,  179. 
Klnsey  v.  Ford,  881. 
Kinsler  t.  Holmes,  094. 
Kinsley  y.  Rumbough,  879. 
Kinsman  v.  Page,  978. 
Kinter  v.  Jenks,  054. 
Klntz  T.  McNeal,  680. 
Kip  V.  Brlgham,  573,  574. 
Klpp  V.  Fullerton,  287. 
Kirby,  In  re.  510. 

V.  Ghilds,  191. 

V.  Fitzgerald,  63,  68,  78,  698. 

V.  Kirby,  290. 

V.  Runals,  411. 

V.  State,  255. 
Kirchuer  v.  Wood,  29. 
Kirk  V.  Dmen,  253. 

V.  Goodwin,  731. 

V.  Kirk,  554. 
Kirkbam  v.  Gibson,  346a. 
Kirklan  v.  Brown's  Adm'rs,  758. 
Kirkland  v.  Krebs,  482a. 

V.  Smitb.  878. 
Klrkpatrlck  v.  Stingley,  714,  726, 

775. 
Kirkwood  v.  Koester,  4.33. 
Kirscbner  v.  Kirsebner,  347. 
KIssam  v.  Hamilton,  127,  133. 
Klsterson  v.  Tate,  450,  460. 
Kistier  v.  Mosser,  498. 
Kitcben  v.  Bank,  53. 
KItcbenman  v.  Skeel,  101. 
Kitcbens  v.  Hutcblns,  211. 
Kite  V.  Lumpkin,  298. 
Kitsmiller  v.  Kitcben,  88,  223. 
Kitson  v.  Blake,  340. 
Kittle  V.  Bellegarde.  86,  88. 
Klttredgo  V.  Emerson,  251. 

V.  Holt,  715. 

V.  Martin,  972. 

V.  Stevens,  87,  697. 
Kitts  V.  Willson,  536. 
Klvett  V,  Wynne,  339. 
Klzer  V.  Caufleld.  273. 
Kizer  Lumber  Co.  v.  Mosely,  801. 
Klaes  v.  Klaes,  320. 
Kleiber  y.  McManus,  22. 
Klein  y.  Dennis,  957. 
Kleinbenz  v.  I*helps.  1010. 
Klemm  v.  Dewes,  225. 
Klenime  y.  McLay,  945. 
Kieyer  y.  Seawall,  24,  30a 


774, 


Kline  y.  Triplett  421. 
Kline's  Appeal,  643. 
Kllnk  y.  Tbe  Cusseta,  21. 
Kloke  y.  Gardels,  666,  <197. 
Klupfcr  y.  Ekis,  351. 
Knapp  y.  Abell,  211,  9ia 

V.  Knapp,  933. 

V.  Marsball,  29. 

y.  Town  of  Marllwro,  567,  571. 

V.  Valentine,  958. 
Knappen  v.  Freeman,  159. 
Knapp,  Stout  &  Go.  v.  Standley,  916. 
Knarr  y.  Elgren,  348. 
Knauber  y.  Watson,  313. 
Knauss*  Appeal,  464. 
Kneedler's  Appeal,  61. 
Knickerbocker  y.  Wilcox,  574,  5SG. 
Knickerbocker  Co.  y.  Roskopf,  29. 
Knifong  y.  Hendricks,  357. 
Knight  y.  Ass'u,  530. 

y.  Cberry.  989. 

y.  Church,  1010. 

y.  Macomber,  993. 
Knights  V.  Martin,  76. 
Knott  y.  Cunningham,  777,  779,  782. 

y.  Jarboe,  224. 

y.  Stephens,  747. 
Knowles,  Ex  parte,  216. 

y.  Coke   Co.,  227,   897,   899.  901. 
906. 

y.  Lawton,  550. 
Knowlton  y.  Hanbury.  720,  938. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  738. 
Knox  y.  Bank,  58»  212. 

y.  Clifford,  311. 

y.  Flack,  54. 

y.  Moore,  155. 

T.  Moser,  157. 

y.  Spratt,  600. 
Knox  County  y.  Asplnwall,  985b. 
Knox  County  Bank  v.  Doty,  326. 
Knudson  y.  Curley,  183. 
Koch,  y.  City  of  New  York,  29. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  137. 
Koebring  y.  Aultman,  Miller  &.  Co., 

540,  541. 
Koelscb  y.  Mixer,  599. 
Kohl  y.  Leblback,  259. 
Kohn  y.  Haas,  308,  896. 

y.  Johnson,  138. 

y.  Loyett,  863,  381. 
Kolb  V.  Raisor,  324,  351. 

y.  Swann,  608. 


CASES 
tResf erenow  to  ■ectlona.    Si  1  to 

Kollock  T.  Jackson,  400. 
Konigmaker  t.  Brown,  467. 
Koning  Y.  Bayard,  414. 
Konltzky  y.  Meyer,  573,  829. 
Koogler  y.  Huffman,  600. 
Koon  y.  lyey,  4»3. 
Koonce  y.  Butler,  903* 
Koons  y.  Bryson,  26. 
Kopf  y.  Huckins,  703. 
Kopp  y.  Blessing,  246. 
Kopperl  V.  Nagy,  118,  851,  8G0. 
Korea  y.  Roemheld,  604. 
Kraker  y.  Shields,  146. 
KraU  V.  Mfg.  Co.,  332. 
Kramer  v.  Breedlove,  271. 

y.  Gerlacb,  347. 

y.  Rebman,  1. 

y.  Schatzkln,   772. 
Krampb's  Ex*x  y.  natz\s  Bx'rs,  092. 
Kraner  y.  Chambers,  411. 
Krapp  y.  Eldridge,  714. 
Kratz  y.  Preston,  485,  487. 
Krause  y.  Stlcbtenoth,  29. 
Kranse's  Appeal,  429. 
Kreatz  y.  School  Dist,  16. 
Krebs  y.  Clark,  351. 
Kreite  y.  Kreite,  341. 
Krekeler  y.  Bitter,  787. 
Kremer  y.  Haynie,  194. 
Kress  y.  Woehrle,  183. 
Krencbi  y.  Debler,  729. 
Krickow  V.  Mfg.  Co..  68,  193. 
Kriess  y.  Faron,  799. 
KKMishage  y.  Bailroad  Co.,  744. 
Kronskl  y.  Bailroad  Go.,  213. 
Kmg,  In  re,  259. 

V.  Dayis,  253. 
Kabll  y.  Hawkett,  34. 
Kuchenbeiser  v.  Beckert.  197. 
KueiiUng  y.  Leberman,  824. 
Ktietme  y.  Goit,  61. 
Knhn  y.  Klhner,  213. 
Kimes  y.  McCloskey,  324. 
Knnze  y.  Kumse,  875. 
Kupferle  y.  Bank,  342. 
Kurtz  y.  Railroad  Co.,  284,  297a,  600, 

607. 
Kuykendall  y.  Coulter,  206. 


I^baree  y.  Colby.  192. 

La  Barre  y.  City  of  Waterbury,  80. 


CITBD.  CX2U 

499  In  ToL  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Lacassagne  t.  Chapuis,  520. 
I-acey  v.  Waples,  986. 
Lackey  y.  Seibert,  455. 
Lacock  V.  White,  297. 
Lacoste  y.  Eastland,  110. 
Lacroix  y.  Lyons,  540. 
Ladd  y.  Church,  497. 

V.  Durkin,  558,  559. 

y.  Jacobs,  593. 

y.  Mason,  307. 

y.  Stevenson,  334. 

V.  TuUy,  185. 

V.  Welskopf,  643. 
Ladley  y.  Creighton,  450,  451. 
I^dnier  v.  Ladnier,  118. 
La  Farge  y.  Herter,  976,  987. 

V.  Park,  661a. 
Lafayette  County  y.  Wonderly,  482a, 

484,  485,  403. 
Lafayette  Ins.  Co.  v.  French,  213,  910. 
Lafferty  y.  Lafferty,  197. 
Lafon's  Ex'rs  y.  Desessart,  366. 
Lagerquist  y.  Williams,  698.  759. 
Laidley  y.  Kline,  409,  560. 
Lalng  Y.  Rigney,  911. 
Lair  V.  Jelf,  983. 
Ijaird  y.  Campbell,  79a. 

y.  City  of  De  Soto,  506,  584. 

y.  Morris,  723. 
Laithe  v.  McDonald,  323. 
Lake  v.  Hancock,  737. 

V.  Jones,  346,  347. 
Lake  Eiie  &  W.  R.  Co.  y.  Purcell,  743. 

V.  Smith,  938c. 
Lakin  v.  C.  H.  McCormick  &  Bro.,  461. 
Lalor,  In  re,  320a. 
Lamar  v.  Knott,  655. 

V.  WiUiams,  208. 
Lamar  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gulick,  583. 

V.  Pennell,  548. 
Lamasti^r  v.  Lair,  713. 
Lamb  v.  Gatlin,  70G. 

V.  McConkey,  709. 

y.  Nelson,  347. 

V.  Shays,  423. 
Lambell  v.  Pettyjohn.  300. 
Lambert  v.  Ban-ett,  32. 

V.  Sanford,  91,  700,  702. 

y.  Smith,  817. 

V.  Wiltshire,  1012. 
Lamberton  v.  Bank,  446. 

V.  Grant,  862. 
Lambertvllie  Bank  v.  Boss,  459. 


CXXll  CASKS 

[References  to  section!.    8S  1  to 

I.amb*s  Appeal,  354. 
Lambson  v.  Moffett,  4S4. 
Lamey  v.  Coffman,  404,  40(;a. 
Lamme  v.  Schilling,  450. 
Lamon  v.  McKee,  22,  27,  35. 
Lamont  v.  Stimson,  530. 
La  Motte  v.  Harper,  504. 
Lampen  v.  Kedgewin,  718. 
Lamping  v.  Hyatt,  138. 
Lampkin  v.  Chisom,  208. 
Lamprey  v.  Xiidd,  205. 

V.  Pike,  439. 
Lampson  v.  Bradley,  299. 
Lampton  v.  Jones,  785. 
Lancaster,  In  re,  259. 

V.  Inhabitants,  971. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  640. 

V.  Snow,  274,  275.  541,  603. 

V.  Wilson,  245,  276,  513. 
Lancaster  County  Bank   t.  Stauffer, 

427. 
Lancaster  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Colgate,  704. 
Lance  v.  Dugan,  900. 

V.  Shanghnessy,  611,  687,  787. 
liand  V.  Elliot,  357. 

V.  Keirn,  611. 
Landa  v.  McGeliee,  340. 

V.  Obert,  529. 
Landa iier  v.  Kspenhain,  C04. 
Lander  v.  Arno,  536,  ^5. 
Landes  v.  Brant,  422. 
Landis  v.  Hamilton,  539. 
Landon  v.  Brown,  486,  402. 

V.  Bulkley,  731. 

V.  Burke,  313. 

V.  Towushend,  536. 
Landrum  v.  Farmer,  362,  377. 
Landry  v.  Bertrand,  304  a. 
Landsberg  v.  Lewis,  752. 
Lane  v.  Bank,  69. 

v.  Bommelmann,  118,  261. 

V.  Cook,  736. 

V.  EUinger,  153. 

V.  Gluekauf,  982. 

V.  Gover,  454. 

V.  Hardwicke,  107. 

V.  Inhabitants.  083. 

V,  Innes,  232. 

V.  Klngsberry,  304. 

y.  Lane,  518. 

V.  Leech,  225. 

V.  Ludlow,  438, 

V.  Nelson,  218. 


CITED. 

4d9  In  TOl.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Lane  t.  Welds,  540. 

V.  Wheless,  :W6. 
Laney  v.  Garbee,  277. 
Lang  v.  Holbrook,  843. 

V.  Zinc  Co.,  23. 
Langan's  Estate,  In  re,  313. 
Langdon  y.  Blackburn,  292. 

V.  Raiford,  455. 
Lange,  Ex.  parte,  170,  258. 
Langley  y.  Grill,  239. 
Langmead  y.  Maple,  624. 
Lang's  Heirs  y.  Waring,  600,  721. 
Langston  y.  Roby,  954,  1005. 
Lanier  y.  Blount,  62. 

y.  Gallatas,  298. 
Lanning  y.  Carpenter,  53,  62,  63,  401, 
403. 

y.  Pawson,  Ola,  199. 
Lansing  y.  Eddy,  :J90. 

y.  Quackenbush,  1010. 

y.  Woodworth,  71. 
Lantz  y.  Maflfett,  560. 
Lapham  y.  Briggs,  900. 
Larimer  y.  Clemmer,  223. 
Larimer's  Appeal,  446. 
Larison  y.  Hager,  773. 
Larkin  y.  Larkin,  33,  34. 
Larkins  y.  Bullard,  193,  194. 
Laroussini  y.  Werlein,  725. 
Lan-abee  y.  Baldwin,  8,  583. 

V.  Knight,  596. 
Larson  y!  Williams,  362,  368,  370. 
Lartliet  y.  Hogau,  445. 
I^rtigue  y.  Baldwin,  586. 
Ivarum  y.  Wilmer,  543. 
Lash  y.  Hardick,  446. 

y.  Warren,  85. 
Last  Chance  Min.  Co.  y.  Mining  Co., 

506,  508,  513,  600,  630,  697. 
Latham  y.  Chafee,  939a. 

y.  Delany,  901. 

y.  Edgerton,  218,  275,  27a 

y.  Wiswall,  811. 
Lathrop  y.  Brown,  433,  459. 

y.  O'Brien,  340a. 

y.  Stuart,  807,  966. 
Latimer  y.  Dean,  372. 
Latlne  y.  Clements,  563,  963. 
Latrobe   Building   &   Loan   Ass'n  y. 

Fritz,   73. 
Latta  y.  Griffith,  168. 

y.  Kll bourn,  45. 

V.  Visel,   744,   763. 


CASES 
[References  to  sections.    89  1  to 

Latterett  v.  Cook,  876. 
Lattimer  t.  Ryan,  306. 
Lattomus  v.  GarmaD,  953. 
Laucks  V.  Michael,  477. 
I^uer  V.  Bandow,  770. 

T.  Ketner,  493. 
I^aghlin  T.  Fairbanks,  950. 

V.  January,  81,  51)3. 

V.  Peckham,  179. 

v.  Vogelsong,  281. 
Laughton  V.  Atkins,  637. 

V.  Nadeau,  218. 
Ijiundry  License  Case,  257. 
Laur  V.  People,  675. 
Laval  V.  Kowley,  996. 
Laverty  v.  Sexton,  141. 
Law  V.  Groinmes,  270,  278. 

V.  Hansen,  834. 

V.  Jackson,  477. 
Lawler    y.     Bashford-Burmister    Co., 

346a. 
Lawler's  Heirs  v.  White,  271,  281. 
Lawless  T.  Hackett,  63. 

T.  Lawless,  610. 

T.  Reese,  357. 
I^wrance  v.  Borm,  80. 
I-awrence  v.  Belger,  413. 

T.  Englesby,  633,  639. 

r.  Fast,  118. 

V.  Gaultney,  934. 

V.  Haynes,  600. 

V.  Hunt,  M3,  600,  611. 

T.  Jarris,  867,  884,  897,  908,  916. 

v.  Lawrence,  320. 

y.  Martin,  943,  986. 

y.  Nelson,  225. 

y.  Pond,  95a 

y.  Steams,  506,  574. 

y.  Vernon,  726,  729. 

y.  Willoughby,  968. 
T.awrence  County  y.  Meade  County, 

27. 
I-awrence  Mfg.   Co.   v.  Cotton  Mills, 

508. 
Lawrence  Say.  Bank  v.  Stevens,  754. 
Lawrence's  Estate,  In  re,  758. 
Mwaon  y.  Bettison,  382. 

y.  Conaway,  769. 

y.  Moore,  33. 
Uwton  y.  Perry,  482,  482a,  509,  958, 

1013. 
Uwrer  y.  Walls,  699. 
Layton  y.  Prewitt,  36L 


CITED.  CXXIU 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Laznrus  v.  Btirrett,  141. 

V.  MoGiiIrk,  369. 
Lazier  v.  Westcott,  821),  849. 
Lea  y.  Hopkins,  432. 

y.  Lea,  624. 

V.  Yates,  118,  410. 
Leach  y.  Kohn,  227. 

V.  Linde,  896. 
Leadbetter  v.  Lake,  210. 
Leader  y.  Dunlap,  340,  354. 
League  v.  Scott,  901,  938. 
Lea  bey  v.  Klngon,  349. 
Leake  y.  Ferguson,  398,  476. 

V.  Gallogly,  352. 
Leayell  y.  Scale,  117. 
Leavens  y.  Ewins,  638a. 
Leavenson  v.   Lafontane,   1000. 
Leaverton  y.  Leaverton,  246. 
Leavitt  v.  Wolcctt,  599. 
Lebanon  v.  :Mead,  569,  575. 
Lebanon  Mut.  Ins.  Co.'s  Appeal,  378. 
Lebeck  v.  Bank,  585. 
Lebroke  v.  Damon,  250. 
Le  Cheveller  v.  Lynch,  852. 
Ledbetter  y.  Bmbree,  671. 

V.  Higbee,  200. 
Ledbetter  &  Co.  Land  &  Loan  Ass'n 

V.  Vinton,  89. 
Ledoux  y.  Bank,  605. 
Ledoux's  Heirs  v.  Lavedan,  614,  644. 
Le  Due  V.  Slocomb,  313,  322,  348,  956. 
Ledyard  y.  Brown,  959. 

v.  Henderson,  43. 

y.  Phillips,  954. 
Lee  y.  Delehanty,  950. 

V.  Flgg,  68. 

V.  Gardiner,  199. 

V.  Giles,  958. 

V.  Harmon,   370. 

V.  Hai-per,  30. 

y.  Houston,  155. 

y.  Johnson,  530. 

y.  Kingsbury,  245,  262,  614 

V.  Knapp,  91. 

V.  Lee,  1003. 

y.  McKoy,  754. 

V.  Mortgage  Co.,  183. 

V.  Oil  Co.,  1010. 

y.  Patten,  245. 

y.  Ryall.  191. 

y.  SaUada,  351. 

y.  Stone,  433. 

V.  Terbell,  967. 


CXXIV 


CASES  CITBD. 


[References  to  sectlona.    U  1  to 

Lee  V.  Wllklns,  96. 
Leedom  v.  Loiubaert,  2ri0. 
Lee*8  Adm'x  v.  Lee,  004. 
Leese  t.  Sherwood,  27. 
Leet  y.  Grant,  352. 

V.  Leet  3(>3. 
I^ee  Tong,  In  re,  257. 
Le  Favour,  In  re,  320a. 
Lefebvre  v.  De  Montllly.  000. 
Lefever  t.  Armstrong,  420. 
Lefferson  v.  Dallas,  438. 
Leftvvlch  Lumber  Co.  v.  Ass'n,  541. 
Legal  Tender  Gases,  152. 
Legatt  V.  ToUervey,  520. 
Leggett  Y.  Doremus,  426. 

V.  Llppincott,  735. 

y.  Morris,  3S4. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  536. 

y.  Ross,  543. 
Legrand  y.  Rixey*s  Adm*r,  630. 
Le  Grange's  I^essee  v.  Ward,  177. 
Le  Guen  y.  Gouverneur,  378,  380. 
Lehigh  Zinc  &  Iron  Co.  y.  Iron  Co., 

600. 
Lehman  v.  Bradley,  560. 

y.  Hinton,  810. 

y.  Stone,  605. 
Lehman  Mach.  Co.  y.  Rood,  57. 
Tjehmkuhl,  Ex  parte,  255. 
Lehr  y.  Hall,  968. 

y.  Vandeyeer,  80. 
Lelnkauff  y.  Adyanciug  Co.,  165. 
I^eiper  y.  Brden,  994. 
Leitch  V.  Wells,  550. 
Leith  y.  Lelth,  929. 
Leland  y.  Marsh,  747. 

y.  Tonsey,  052. 
I^emacks  v.  Glover.  153. 
Lemen  v.  Young,  I'W. 
Lemmon  v.  Herbert,  246,  269. 

v.  Osbom,  508. 
Lemon  v.  Staats'  Heirs,  450. 
Lendall's  Case,  778. 
L'Engle  v.  Gates,  898,  939. 
Lennon,   Ex  parte,  255. 
Lenoir  v.  Broadhead's  Adm'r,  88. 
Lenoir's  Adm'r  v.  Wilson.  745. 
Lenox  v.  Notrebe,  194,  600. 
Lente  v.  Clarke,  225. 
Lentllhon  v.  City  of  New  York,  111. 
Lentz  v.  Lamplugh,  444. 

v.  Wallace,  504,  611,  612,  614. 
Leonard  y.  Bryant,  298. 


499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Leonard  v.  Ferry  Co.,  432. 

v.  Hargis,  85. 

y.  Insurance  Co.,  360. 

y.  Bobbins,  183. 

y.  Simpson,  87,  007. 

V.  Sparks,  263,  522. 

y.  Townsend,  192. 

y.  Whitney,  614,  615. 
Leonard's  Appeal,  473. 
Ijeonis  y.  Leflingwell,  155. 
Leopold  y.  City  of  Chicago,  624. 
Le  rage  v.  McCrea,  97a 
Leslie  v.  Boaite,  555. 

V.  Fischer,  225. 
r^essert  v.  Sieberling,  419,  432,  439a. 
Lester  v.  Cloud,  138. 

y.  Hosklns,  306,  378. 

y.  Insurance  Co.,  100. 
Le  Strange  v.  State,  100.        ^ 
Le  Sutf  y.  Le  Suer,  822. 
Letney  v.  Marshall,  273. 
Levan  v.  MllhoUand,  264. 

V.  Patton,  386. 
Levering  v.  levering,  641. 
Levey  v.  Norton,  680. 
Levi  V.  Drudge,  160. 

y.  McCraney,  555. 

y.  Monroe,  86. 

v.  Thompson,  422. 
Levin  V.  Fashion  Co.,  752. 
I^vlston  y.  Swan,  160. 
Levy  V.  Gill.  363. 

y.  Levy,  107. 

V.  Stelnbach,  391. 

V.  Williams.  327. 

V.  Winter,  553. 
Levysteln  v.  O'Brien,  a92. 
Lewis,  Appeal  of,  611. 

v.  Adams,  857,  922. 

V.  Armstrong,  269. 

V.  Ash,  201. 

y.  Atherton,  446. 

v.  Baker,  508. 

y.  Blue,  989. 

y.  Campau,  32. 

V.  CockreU,  986. 

V.  Dunlop.  596. 

V.  Foard,  15. 

V.  Gunn,  192. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  378. 

v.  Kean,  086. 

V.  Lewis,  320,  720.  990. 

v.  McCabe,  32. 


OASBS  CTTtSD. 


[References  to  sections.    H 1  to 

Lewis  T.  Maulden,  206. 

T.  Billls,  588. 

T.  Nenzel,  756. 

V.  Perkins,  191. 

y.  Peterkin,  295. 

V.  Pier  C5o.,  ^527. 

Y.  Railroad  Co.,  35. 

V.  Uapelyea,  60. 

v.  Rogers,  204. 

V.  Ross,  156. 

V.  RowlaiMl,  261. 

Y.  SiiDontOD,  245. 

V.  Sloan,  807. 

V.  Smith,  73,  462,  467,  763. 

V.  Soper,  202. 

V.  Spann,  1008. 

V.  Tarns,  507. 

V.  Webb,  208. 

?.  Welch,  641. 

Y.  Williams,  Ul, 
I^x*B  Appeal.  284,  633. 
lAhby  y.  Rosekrans,  148. 
Liberty  Grotto  y.  Meade,  58. 
Llehtenberger  y.  Worm,  86. 
Lichton  y.  McDongald,  455. 
Liobtstein  y.  Insurance  Co.,  16. 
Liohty  y.  Hochstetler,  485. 

y.  Lewis,  556. 
Liddell  y.  Chidester,  752. 
Lieberman  y.  Railroad  Co.,  745. 
Lieserowltz  y.  Railroad  Co.,  196. 
Life  Ass'n  y.  Fassett,  199.  300. 
Ugare  y.  Railroad  Co.,  609. 
Liggett  y.  Glenn,  9S9a. 
LIghtcap  y.  Bradley,  539. 
Lightoer's  Estate,  In  re,  534. 
Lightsey  y.  Harris,  250,  286b 
Liglnger  y.  Field,  808. 
IJgon  y.  lJ$;on.  43. 

y.  McXeil.  058.  975. 

y.  Trtplett,  87,  697. 
IJgon's  Adm'rs  y.  Rogers,  169. 
Llle  y.  Hopkins,  949. 
Lilientbal  y.  Drucklleb,  826. 
LiUey  y.  Adams,  632. 
LlUis  y.  Ditch  Co.,  624,  728* 
Lilly  y.  Larkln,  136,  165. 
Linberg  v.  Finks,  659. 
Unck  y.  City  of  Litchfield,  981. 
Lincoln  y.  Flint,  290. 

y.  Tower,  220,  278,  896,  900. 
Lincoln  Nat  Bank  y.  Virgin,  242. 
Lincoln  Say.  Bank  v.  Ewing,  988. 


489  in  Tol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.] 

Lind  y.  Adams,  118. 

Linden  y.  Leggett,  617. 

LInder  y.  Monroe's  £r*rs,  118. 

Lindgren  y.  Lindgren,  725. 

Lindh  V.  Crowley,  963. 

Lindley  y.  Ross,  357. 

Lindsey  y.  Town  of  DanylUe,  506,  729. 

Lindsley  y.  Mining  Co.,  709. 

y.  Sparks,  321,  371. 

y.  Thompson,  731. 
Line  y.  Cranftll,  83. 

V.  McCall,  944. 
Lineberger  y.  Newkirk,  554. 
Liuehan  v.  Hathaway,  660. 
IJninger  y.  Glenn,  243,  393. 
Link  y.  Link,  368. 
Linn  y.  Carson's  Adm*r,  218. 

V.  Pntton,  411. 
Lluney  v.  Wood,  617. 
Linton  v.  Hurley,  058,  975. 

y.  Insurance  Co.,  504,  009. 
LIntz  y.  Thompson,  908. 
Lion  y.  Burtis,  652. 
Lippencott  y.  Wilson,  450. 
LIppman  y.  Campbell,  578. 
Lipscomb  y.  Grace,  1009. 

y.  Postell,  589. 
Lirette  y.  Carrane,  407. 
List  y.  Jockheck,  33. 
Lister  y.  Vowell,  138. 
LItch  V.  Clinch,  761,  764. 
Litchfield  y.  City  of  Brooklyn,  939a. 
Little  y.  Bnrlow.  787. 

V.  Blrdwell,  116. 

V.  City  of  Portland,  734. 

y.  Cook,  299. 

V.  Dyer,  50,  69. 

V.  Ferguson,  83. 

y.  Leiphton.  33. 

y.  McVey,  892. 

y.  Price,  365,  366. 

V.  ^^^lIte,  no. 

LIttletield  y.  Nichols,  459. 

LIttlejohn  y.  Arbogast,  127. 

Little   Rock   Junction   Ry.   v.   Burke^ 

207a. 
Little  Rook  &  Ft.  S.  R.  Co.  T.  Dyer, 
09. 

V.  Wells,  363. 
Littleton  y.  Richardson,  574,  675,  604. 

y.  Smith,  266. 
Llttster  V.  Llttster,  297,  327. 
Liveimore  y.  Herschell,  716,  729. 


CXXYl  CASES 

[References  to  sections.    §§  1  to 

liverpool  Marine  Credit  Co.  v.  Hunter, 

840. 
Liverpool  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Ca  v.  Per- 

rln,  341. 
Livesley  v.  O'Brien,  354. 
Livezly  v.  Pennock,  53. 
Livingston,  In  re,  197. 

V.  Allen,  250. 

V.  Bishop,  777,  778,  779. 

V.  Jordan,  173. 

V.  Morgan,  152. 

V.  Kendall,  200. 

V.  Van  Ingen,  285. 
Llano  Improvement  &  Furnace  Co.  v. 

Watkins,  982. 
Lloyd  V.  Ball,  560. 

V.  Bank,  1005. 

V.  Barr,  52C,  549,  599. 

V.  Klrkwood,  197. 

V.  Malone,  197. 

y.  Mansell,  356. 

V.  Tracy,  604. 
League  V.  Taxing  District  of  Browns- 
ville, 253a. 
Locke  V.  Hubbard,  110. 
Lockhart  v.  Gillis,  599. 

V.  Locke,  896. 

V.  State,  109. 
Lockridge  v.  Lyon,  358. 
Lockwood  V.  Bock,  34. 

V.  Mitchell,  369. 

V.  Nye,  939a. 

V.  Stradley,  197. 
Ix)eb  V.  Willis,  686. 
Loeber  v.  Moore,  493,  496. 
lioensnltz  v.  Seelinger,  584. 
Lofland  v.  Jefferson,  986. 

V.  McDaniel,  987. 
Logan  V.  Caffrey,  734. 

V.  Cloyd,  483. 

V.  Hale,  400. 

y.  Hillegass,  362,  367. 

V.  Ti-ayser,  539,  599. 
Logan's  Adm'r  v.  Pannill,  438. 
Logansport  Gaslight  &  Coke  Co.   v. 

Knowles,  857. 
Lohman  v.  Cox,  43,  85. 
Lomas  v.  Hilliard,  864. 
Lomax  v.  Besley,  324. 
Lombard  v.  Bayard,  413,  415. 

V.  Clark,  89. 
Lombard  Inv.  Co.  v.  Burton,  981. 
Lomison  v.  Faust,  351. 


CITED. 

499  In  vol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.] 

Loudon  Assur.  Corp.  v.  Lee,  86. 
London  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Lindsay, 

836. 
Lonergan  v.  Lonergan,  882. 
Loney  v.  Bailey,  87,  105,  236,  306. 
Long  y.  Behan,  699. 

y.  Burnett,  250. 

y.  Eisenbeis,  362. 

V.  Gamett,  211. 

V.  Gilbert,  371. 

V.  Hammond,  8o5. 

V.  Klein,  948. 

V.  Long,  721. 

V.  Maxwell,  43. 

V.  Miller,  492. 

V.  :^[ulford,  197. 

V.  Kuch,  346a. 

y.  Shackelford,  1014. 

V.  Smith,  363. 

y.  Stafford,  127,  134. 

y.  Thoi-mond,  482a. 

v.  Trexler,  742. 

V.  Yonge,  585. 
I^ongfeliow  V.  Quimby,  3,  532. 
Longinette  v.  Shelton,  532. 
Longman  v.  Bradford,  325. 
Longstreet  v.  Phile,  617. 

v.  Rea,  208. 
Longwell  v.  Bentley,  430. 
Longworth  v.  Screven,  299. 
Lonsdale  y.  Littledale,  ^56. 
Lookout  Mountain  R.  Co.  y.  Houston, 

939a. 
Loomis  v.  Lane,  36. 

y.  Pulver,  758. 

y.  Rice,  329. 

y.  Robinson,  944. 
Looney  v.  Reeves,  ^4. 
Loop  y.  Summers,  600. 
Lord  y.  Cannon,  5(i7. 

v.  Chadbourne,  792. 

y.  Thomas,  609. 
Lord  Mohun's  Case,  126. 
Lore's  Lessee  v.  Truman,  722. 
Lorillard  v.  Clyde,  682,  750. 
Lorimer  v.  Marshall,  425. 
Loring  v.  Arnold,  635. 

v.  Folger,  200,  203. 

V.  Hildreth,  793. 

v.  lUsIey,  1. 

V.  Mansfield,  758. 

y.  Steineman,  643. 

y.  Whittemore,  067. 


CASES 
[References  to  sectioxiB.    89  1  to 

Lorraine  y.  Long,  766. 

Lorziug  r.  Eisenberg,  313. 

Los  Angeles  Oounty  Bank  y.  Raynor, 

106,  lOD. 
Losey  v.  Neldig,  366. 
Lothian  y.  Henderson,  815. 
Loudenback  y.  CoUins,  722,  723. 
Lough  Y.  Thornton,  16. 
Louis  V.  Triscony,  641. 
Louisiana  y.  Mayor  of  New  Orleans,  9, 
11,  677. 

Y.  U.  S..  085f. 
Louisiana  LeYee  Co.  y.  State,  632. 
Louisiana  Nat.  Bank  y.  Whitney,  35. 
Louisiana  State  Bank  y.  NaYigation 

Co.,  617. 
LoQlSYille.  N.  A.  &  G.  B.  Co.  Y.  Creek, 
16. 

Y.  Johnson,  100. 

Y.  Nicholson,  225. 

T.  Parish,  d36. 

V.  WyUe,  703, 
LouisYille  Trust  Co.  y.  City  of  Cincin- 
nati, 360,  551.  615,  d38c. 

Y.  Springs  Co.,  750. 
LouisYUle  &  N.  B.  Co.  y.  BrinckerbofT, 
548. 

V.  Cbnley,  33. 

Y.  Mayfield,  16. 

Y.  Nash,  227. 

Y.  Orr,  617. 

Y.  Taylor,  174. 

Y.  Trustees,  179. 

V.  Ward,  100. 
Lounsbury  y.  Purdy,  421,  438. 
Louw  V.  DaYlB,  620. 
Ijore  T.  Allison,  493. 

Y.  Fah^eld,  944,  968. 

Y.  Gibson,  591,  604. 

Y.  Harper,  471. 

r.  Waltz,  750. 
Lorejoy  y.  Albee,  229. 

Y.  Locks  Co.,  354. 

Y.  Murray,  573,  777,  779,  782, 

V.  Webber,  299. 
T»velace  y.  LoYell,  306. 
I^orell  v.  Hammond  Co.,  671. 

T.  Habin,  105. 
Ix>vett  V.  Cowman,  349. 
Ix>rett*s  Ex'rs  y.  Mathews,  635. 
Lorins  Y.  Humplirles,  8. 
ljo\\tt  Y.  Bussell,  24a 
Low  V.  Bartlett,  503. 


CITED.  CXXVll 

499  In  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Low  V.  Duncan,  1000. 

V.  Graff,  116. 

V.  Low,  509. 

Y.  Mining  Co.,  24. 

y.  Mussey,  517,  866. 
Lowber  y.  Mayor  of  New  York,  317- 
Lowber  &  Wilmer's  Appeal,  200. 
Lowdon  Y.  Flsli,  118. 
Lowe,  In  re,  423. 

Y.  HamlltOB,  340. 

Y.  Morgan,  585. 

V.  Stringham,  272. 
Lowenstein  v.  Insurance  Co.,  34. 

V.  Mcintosh,  526. 
Lower  v.  U.  S.,  OSSb. 
Lower  Latham  Ditch  Co.  y.  Canal  Co., 

600. 
Lownsdale  y.  City  of  Portland,  540. 
Lowry  y.  Banli.  593,  598. 

Y.  Hall,  865. 

Y.  Inmau,  583. 

Y.  McMUlan,  700. 

Y.  McMurtry,  537. 
Loy  V.  Kennedy,  635. 
Loyd  V.  Waller,  250,  938c. 
Lublier  Y.  Plow  Co.,  185. 
Lublin  Y.  Stewart,  Howe  &  May  Co., 

617. 
Lucan  y.  Cadwallader,  32. 
Lucas,  Succession  of,  892. 

Y.  Cassaday,  1008. 

Y.  City  of  San  Francisco,  527. 

Y.  Governor,  588. 

Y.  Le  Compte,  735. 

Y.  Nichols,  379,  389. 

Y.  Spencer,  379. 

Y.  Todd,  261. 

Y.  Waul,  379. 
Luce  Y.  Dexter,  782. 
Luclcenbach  y.  Anderson,  909. 
Luckett  Y.  Trust  Co.,  705. 
Luco  Y.  Bank,  284. 
Ludeling  y.  Cbaffe,  754. 
Ludington  v.  Hand  ley,  384. 
Ludington*8  Petition,  549. 
Ludlow  V.  City  of  Norfolk,  40. 

Y.  Bamsey,  367. 

Y.  Township,  790. 
Ludlow*s  Heirs  y.  Johnston,  135,  136. 

279. 
Ludwick  V.  Fair.  522,  970. 
Ludwig  V.  Huck,  482. 

Y.  Ijnzarus,  363. 


CZZYIU  CASES 

[It«f«rencei  to  Metkms.    8S  1  to 

LuUe  D.»  The,  950,  98G. 
Lumbard  t.  Abbey,  420. 
Lumly  V.  Quarry,  814. 
Lumpkin  y.  Williams,  381. 
Lundberg  y.  Davidson,  1000. 
Luscomb  y.  Maloy,  338. 
Luse  y.  Rankin,  220. 
Lusk  v.  Dayidson,  492. 
Lustfleld  y.  Ball,  1008. 
Lutes  v.  Alpaugb,  2^1.* 
Luttrell  V.  Reynolds,  707. 
Lutz  V.  Kelly,  228. 
Lutz's  Appeal,  485. 
Lycan  y.  Miller,  644. 
Lyday  v.  Douple,  378. 
Lyford  y.  Demerritt,  296. 
Lyle  V.  Uorstman,  273. 
Lyles  V.  Belles,  240,  200. 

y.  Caldwell,  589. 
Lyman  y.  Browne,  847. 

V.  Harvester  Co.,  767. 
Lynch  v.  Baxter,  261,  808. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  865. 

v.  Kelly,  115. 

V.  Rooney,  252. 

v.  Swanton,  506. 
Lynch's  Ex'x  y.  Tunnell,  199. 
Lyode  v.  Lynde,  857. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  790,  872^ 
Lyne  v.  Sanford,  284. 
Lynn  v.  Gridley,  395,  470. 

V.  Lowe,  200. 
Lyon  V.  Barney,  86. 

y.  Bollvin,  325. 

y.  Boiling,  996. 

V.  Cleveland,  492. 

V.  Ford,  487. 

V.  Hampton,  1008. 

v.  Lyon,  929,  S)32. 

V.  Mfg.  Co.,  720. 

v.  Xorthrup,  587,  987. 

y.  Bobbins,  455. 

v.  Tallmadge,  783. 

V.  Vanatta,  274. 
Lyons  v.  Green,  313. 
Lysle  v.  Williams,  498. 
liythgoe  y.  Lytligoe.  110,  G14. 
Lytle  V.  Arkansas,  530. 

V.  Black,  446. 

V.  Colts,  326. 

V.  Custead,  86. 

V.  Fenn,  326. 

V.  Forest,  325. 


CITED. 

499  In  vol.  1;  residue  In  toI.  2.] 

Lytle  v.  Lytie,  933. 

v.  Railroad  Co.,  630. 

v.  Town  of  Lansing,  251,  989. 
Lyttleton  y.  Cross,  270. 


M 


McAfee  v.  Covington,  9. 

v.  Patterson,  491. 

V.  Reynolds,  467. 
McAleer  v.  Clay  County,  9Sod. 

V.  Lewis,  506. 
McAlexander  v.  Goopwood,  660. 

V.  Lee,  983. 
McAllister  v.  Brooks,  593. 

v.  Guggenheimer,  229. 

V.  Mfg.  Co.,  879,  970. 
McAllister's  App?al,  77. 
Mc Alpine  v.  Sweet ser.  294, 
McAnally  v.  Haynie,  43. 
McAnulty  v.  Association,  309,  355. 
McAithur  v.  Dane.  989. 

V.  Slauson,  343. 

V.  Smith,  434. 
McBane  v.  People,  261. 
McBrayer  v.  Dean,  1003. 
McBride  v.  Bank,  1008. 

V.  Fallon,  947,  954. 

V.  Harn,  228. 

V.  Wakefield,  366. 
McBrien  v.  Riley.  306,  346a. 
McBroom  v.  Gt'vemor,  588. 

V.  Sommerville,  375,  383. 
McBryde,  In  re,  977. 
McBurnie  v.  Seaton,  536. 
McCabe  v.  Sumner,  77. 
McCadden  v.  Slausen,  680,  867. 
McCaffrey  v.  Carter,  738. 
McCahan  v.  Elliott,  466. 
McCain  v.  Railroad  Co.,  731. 
McCall  V.  Harrison.  GOO. 

V.  Hitchcock,  34. 

V.  Jones,  719. 
'     V.  McCall,  354. 
McCalla  v.  Ely,  152. 
McCalla*s  Adm'r  v.  Patterson,  589. 

V.  Patterson,  491. 
McCalley  v.  Wilbum,  87,  697. 
McCallister  v.  Bridges,  511,  578. 
McCalmont  v.  Peters,  60. 
McCamant  v.  Roberts,  004. 
McCambridge  v.  Walraven,  291. 


CASES  CITED. 
[References  to  Bections.    |9  1  to  499  In  vol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.] 


cxxia 


McCampbell  v.  Durst,  252. 

Y.  McCampbell,  518. 

V.  Mason,  666. 
McCance  v.  Taylor,  474. 
McCandless  v.  Securities  Corp.,  632. 

y.  Smith,  269. 
McOann  v.  State,  103. 
McCardie,  Ex  parte,  21G. 
McCargo  y.  Chapman,  36. 
McCartee  y.  Chambers,  30. 
McOrter  v.  Neil,  247. 
McCarthy  y.  Marsh,  804. 
McCartney  y.  Osbum,  872. 
McCarty  y.  Ball,  461. 

y.  aty  of  New  Bedford,  923. 

y.  Kinsey,  680. 

y.  O'Bryan,  98. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  579. 

y.  Stock  Farm,  352. 
McCaskill  v.  Graham,  408,  439a. 
McCanley  y.  Fulton,  273. 

y.  Hargroyes,  857,  909. 

y.  Hanrey,  284. 
McCaolis  y.  Duyal,  386. 
McCelvey  y.  Noble,  714. 
McChesney.v.  City  of  Chicago,  306. 
McClain  y.  Dayls,  127. 
McClarin  y.  Anderson,  462. 
McClaskey  v.  Barr,  587. 
McCleary  y.  Brewing  Co.,  747. 

y.  Faber,  803. 

y.  Menke,  590. 
McCleary*8  Appeal,  499. 
McCleery  y.  Thompson,  67. 
McClellan  y.  Kennedy,  600. 

y.  Klnnalrd,  391. 
Mcaelland  y.  Moore,  200. 

y.  Patterson,  661a. 

V.  Pomeroy,  354. 
McClesky  y.  State,  270,  537. 
McClish  y.  Manning,  70. 
McCloskey  y.  Sweeney,  194. 

y.  Wingfield,  200. 
McCloud  y.  Meehan,  311. 
McOung  y.  Belme,  432,  440,  906. 

V.  Condit,  009. 

y.  Hobl,  709. 

V.  Murphy,  28. 

y.  Steen.  607. 
Mtdure  V.  Bowles,  53,  61. 

y.  Coldough,  588. 

y.  McClure.  6C0. 

y.  Thistle's  I'lx'rs,  446, 

ILAWJUDG.— i 


McClurg  V.  Schwartz,  317. 
McCluskey,  Ex  parte,  259. 
McCollum  y.  Prewitt,  383,  384. 

V.  Wood,  810. 
McComb  V.  EUett,  278. 

V.  Frlnk,  620. 
McConkey  v.  McCraney,  88. 
McConnell  y.  Day,  285,  556. 

y.  Downs,  567. 
McCord  y.  Well,  32. 
McCord-Brady  Co.  y.  Krause,  000. 
McCord-ColUns  Commerce  Co.  v.  Levi, 

609. 
McCormlck    y.    Alexander,    399.    432, 
463,  1005. 

y.  Belvin,  34. 

y.  Brnnnan,  534. 

y.  Uogan,  313. 

y.  McCormlck,  344. 

y.  Paddock,  200. 

y.  SulUvant,  270,  273,  285. 

y.  Webster,  263. 

y.  Wheeler,  137,  169. 
McCormlck  Harvesting  Mach.  Co.  y. 
Coe,  57. 

y.  Marchant,  240. 
McCotter  y.  Flynn,  514,  661a. 

y.  McCotter,  953,  956. 
McCown  y.  Macklin's  Ex'r,  384 
McCoy  y.  Hazlett,  987. 

y.  Jones,  16. 

y.  McCoy,  600. 

y.  Nichols,  560. 

y.  Porter,  161. 

v.  Van  Ness,  966.    . 
McCracken  v.  Swartz,  493. 
McCrady  y.  Jones,  44. 
McCrairy  y.  Ware,  52. 
McCravey  y.  Remson,  612. 
McCraw  y.  Williams,  175. 
McCray  v.  Clark,  492. 

V.  Freeman,  755. 
McCready,  Ex  parte,  257. 
McCreary  y.  Casey,  766. 

V.  Robinson,  24,  185. 
McCredy  v.  Thrush,  780. 

y.  Woodcock,  314,  340a. 
McCreery  v.  Davis,  897. 

v.  Everding.  199,  559,  577. 

v.  Fuller,  705. 
McCrillls  V.  Harrison  Co.,  514,  681. 
McCrory  v.  Parks,  599. 
McCroskey  v.  Parks,  193. 


cxxx 


CASFS  CITED. 
[References  to  sections.    99  1  to  499  In  yol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.] 


McCue  V.  Sharp,  117,  1U2. 
McCalloch  v.  Dodge,  34. 

y.  Tapp,  349. 
McCullougb,  Ex  parte,  255. 

V.  Franklin  Coal  Co.,  4»4,  976w 

y.  Hellman,  740. 

y.  Montgomery,  644. 

y.  Pence,  709. 
McCune  v.  Eaton,  15. 

V.  McCune,  449,  478. 
McCurdy  y.  Baugliman,  87,  190,  097. 
McCurry  y.  Robinson,  055. 
McCutcheon  v.  Allen,  1014. 

y.  Dougherty.  982. 
McDade  v.  Burch,  042. 
McDaniel  v.  Correll,  218. 

y.  Goodall,  994. 

y.  McLendon,  341. 
McDermott  y.  Clary,  229,  897,  899,  901, 

904. 
McDoel  V.  Cook,  233. 
McDonald  y.  Badger,  425. 

y.  Berry,  042. 

y.  Butler,  958. 

y.  Crandall,  425. 

y.  Dickson,  8,  968. 

y.  Drew,  917. 

y.  Falvey,  299. 

y.  Hannah,  004. 

y.  McCoy,  019. 

y.  McDonald,  38,  431. 

y.  Matney,  000. 

y.  Mobile  L.  Ins.  Co.,  517. 

y.  Pearson,  393. 

y.  Raincr,  032. 

y.  Refrigerating  Co.,  639. 

y.  Sellgmnn,  091. 

y.  Simcox,  250. 

y.  Stark,   740. 

y.  Tutty,  85. 

y.  Wilkie,  211. 
McDonough  y.  Nicholson,  83. 
McDougal  V.  Downey,  749. 
McDougald^s  Adm*r  v.  Rutherford,  041, 
MacDougall  y.  Hoes,  959. 

y.  Knight,  731. 

y.  Walling,  321,  323. 
McDowall  V.  McDowall,  307. 

y.  Daniels,  03. 

y.  Gibson,  071. 

y.  Langdon,  (;24. 

y.  McDowell  100,  176,  307. 

^.  Railroad  Co.,  707. 


Mace  y.  Gaddis,  107. 

y.  O'Reilly,   170. 
McEachern  y.  Brackett,  325. 

V.  Kerchner,  157. 
McElfatrick  y.  Taft,  9^4,  936,  937. 
McElmoyle  v.  Cohen,  850,  853,  857, 862, 

803,  884,  892. 
McElrath  v.  Butler,  223. 
McElroy  v.  Mumford,  083. 
McElwain  y.  Huston,  22. 
McElwee  y.  Jeflfries,  1008. 
McEvoy  V,  Bock,  747. 
McEwan  y.  Zimmer,  228,  829.  837. 
McEwen  y.  Bigelow,  705,  1001. 
Macey  y.  Stark,  250. 
McFadden  v.  Fritz,  071. 

y.  Geddis,  014. 

y.  liockhart,  490. 

y.  Ross,  071. 

V.  Schroeder.  703. 
McFaddin  v.  Garrett,  377. 

V.  Spencer,  370. 
McFall  y.  Association,  264^ 

V.  Dempsey,  580. 
McFarland  y.  Fish.  439. 

V.  Fricks,  870. 

y.  Hairs  Heirs,  42,  44. 

y.  Irwhi,  493. 

y.  Stone,  639. 

y.  White,  :to9. 
McFarland*s  Estate,  In  re,  381 
McFarlane  y.  Cushman,  714. 

y.  Derbisbire,  848. 
McFerran  v.  Davis,  434. 
McGaffigan  y.  Jenkins,  347. 
McGarvey  y.  Darnall,  872. 
McGaughey  y.  Woods,  213. 
McGavock  y.  Clark,  220. 
McGee  v.  Overby,  725. 
McGehee  v.  Gold,  380. 

y.  Shafer,  779. 

y.  Wllkins,  278.  282. 
McGhee  v.  Romatka.  '517. 
McGIll,  Ex  parte,  255. 

V.  Rothgeb,  98. 
McGillis  V.  Willis,  731. 
MoGilvray  v.  Avery,  8<)4,  865. 
McGiniss  v.  Lillard's  Ex'r,  1008. 
McGirk  v.  Chauvin,  270,  288. 
McGlaughlln  v.  O'Rourke,  191. 
McGoon  y.  Scales,  245. 

v.  Shirk,  152. 
McGourkey  y.  Railway  Co.,  500L 


CASES  CITED. 
[Referencei  to  sections.    SS  1  to  499  in  vol.  1;  reildne  in  vol.  2.] 


CXXXl 


McGowan  v.  Kreling,  322. 
HcGrady  v.  Monks,  625.  733. 
McQrath  t.  Maxwell.  l>58. 

V.  Seagrave,  124. 
McGregor  y.  McGregor,  616. 

V.  Tabor,  571. 
McGrew  v.  Insurance  Co.,  822. 
McGolre  v.  Campbell,  77. 

T.  Gallagher,  7. 
McGurry  v.  Wall,  153. 
McUenry  v.  Shephard,  63. 
Machon  v.  Handle,  100. 
McUugh  V.  Sparks,  363. 
Mcllrain  v.  James  L.  Leeds  Co.,  57. 
McUvoy  T.  AIsop,  107. 
Mclntlre  v.  Unehan,  619. 
Mclntosli  V.  Com'rs,  322. 

V.  Lown,  745. 
Mclntjre  v.  Storey,  616. 
McJilton  T.  Lore,  857,  865,  039a,  963, 

055. 
McJimsey  v.  Traverse,  526. 
McJunkin  t.  McJnnkin,  320. 
Mack  V.  Doty.  369,  383. 

V.  Levy,  508,  612,  786. 
MackaUey*s  Case,  182. 
Uacke  v.  Byrd.  22. 

V.  Ryan,  255. 
McKean  v.  Jones,  707. 

V.  Read,  384. 

V.  Smoyer,  663. 
McEee  v.  Gayle,  449. 

V.  Gilchrist,  423. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  742. 

V.  Wbitten,  633. 
McKellar  v.  Bowell,  586,  590. 

V.  Lamkin,  86. 
McKenna  v.  Van  Blarcom,  446. 
McKenzle.  EIk  parte,  317. 

V.  Budd,  (M3. 

V.  Donnell.  270. 

V.  Renshaw.  050. 
McKeown  v.  Officer,  45b 
Hackey  v.  Bell,  44. 

V.  Coxe,  9390. 

v.  Hyatt,  30. 

V.  Mackey.  042,  043. 
^lackey's  Adm'r  v.  Coates,  600. 
McKim  V.  Haley,  580. 

V.  Odom,  809,  873,  962. 
McKindley  v.  Buck,  300. 
McKlnUy  ▼.  TutUe,  213. 


McKlnley,  In  re,  320a. 

V.  Irvine,  44. 

V.  Tuttle,  342,  351. 
McKinuey  v.  May,  86. 

V.  Mehaffey,  486,  940. 

T.  Ralh-oad  Co.,  219. 
McKlnney's  Adm'r  v.  Davis,  641. 
McKlnnon  v.  McGown,  985. 
Mackintosh  v.  Smith,  516. 
McKlnzle  v.  Railroad,  578. 
McKlssack  v.  Voorhees,  24. 
McKissick  v.  McKissick,  747. 
McKnlght  V.  Devlin,  768. 

V.  Dunlop,  G29,  658. 

V.  Strong,  305. 

V.  Taylor,  50i. 
MacLachlan  v.  Pease,  268. 
McLaln  V.  Duncan,  154. 
McLane  v.  Bovee,  656. 

V.  Miller,  618. 

V.  Spence,  695. 
McLaran  v.  Wilhelm,  206. 
McLaren  v.  Kehler,  861,  867. 
McLaughlin  v.  Bank,  1014^ 

v.  Doane,  707. 

V.  HUl,  736. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  754. 

V.  McGee,  717. 

V.  Nichols,  875,  967. 
McLa  urine  v.  Monroe's  Adm*rs,  774. 
McLean  v.  Hansen,  537. 

y.  Hugarin,  681. 

y.  Meek,  563. 

y.  Rockey,  187,  429,  450. 

y.  Shields,  838. 

y.  State,  127. 

y.  Stewart,  154. 
McLelland  v.  Ridgway,  600. 
McLellan  Dry-Dock  Co.  v.  Steam-Boat 

Line,  159. 
McLemore  v.  Durlvage,  300. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  197. 
McLenachan  v.  Commonwealth,  644. 
McLendon  v.  Dodge,  889. 
McLennan  v.  McMonies,  674* 
McLsod  V.  Lee,  614,  624. 

V.  Nimocks,  90. 

y.  Power,  770. 

y.  Receveur,  250. 

V.  Williams,  493. 
Mcl^eran  v.  McNamara,  378it 
McLure  v.  Bencenl,  857. 


CXZXll 


CASES  CITED. 
CReferencei  to  lections.    ||  1  to  499  in  toI.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.] 


McMahan  v.  Geiger,  599. 
McMahon  v.  Ass'n,  896. 

V.  Macy,  583. 

V.  Perkins,  116. 

Y.  Smith,  589. 

V.  Tumey,  231. 
McManama  v.  Garnett,  306. 
McMechen  v.  Marman,  433. 
McManus  v.  Ennis,  157. 
McMaster  v.  Arthur,  513. 
McMlcken  v.  Commonwealth,  588. 

V.  Perln,  306. 
McMillan  v.  Baker,  299. 

v.  Hickman,  204. 

V.  Red,  490. 

V.  State,  37. 
McMillen  v.  Lovejoy.  876. 

V.  Scott,  983. 
McMlnn  v.  Whelan,  278. 
McMullen  v.  Richie,  756,  829. 

V.  Wenner,  438. 
McMurran  v.  Meek,  86. 
McMurrny  v.  Mfg.  Co.,  59. 

v.  Marsh,  944,  089. 
McMiirray's  Heirs  v.  City  of  Erie,  352. 
McMurtry  v.  State,  86. 
McNabb  v.  Cllpp,  16. 
McNair  v.  Ingraham,  993. 

V.  O'Fallon,  784. 
McXairy  v.  Castleberry,  164. 

V.  Eastland,  377. 
McNamara  v.  Logan,  740. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  127,  128,  410,  419. 
McNamee  v.  Morelaud,  541. 
McXaney  v.  Hall,  545. 
McXeal  v.  Banks,  351. 

V.  Hunt  1016. 
McNeel's  Ex'rs  v.  Auldrldge,  245. 
McNeely  v.  Hyde,  609. 
McNees  v.  Insurance  Co.,  714. 
McNeil  V.  McNeil,  356,  360. 
McNeill  V.  Carter,  434. 

V.  Edie,  "288. 
Macnevin  v.  Macnevln,  21. 
McNIcholas  v.  Lake,  620,  769. 
McNutt  V.  Trogdon,  536. 

V.  Wilcox,  1008. 
McPhall  V.  Hyatt,  506. 
McPherson  v.  Bank,  86. 

V.  Cunllff,  284.  G33,  634. 

V.  Hamilton,  644. 

V.  Wood,  300. 
MtPike  V.  Wells,  GOO. 


McQuean  v.  Fletcher,  902. 

V.  McQueen,  173. 
McQueen's  Appeal,  632. 
McQuillan  v.  Hunter,  313. 
McRae  v.  Adams,  342. 

y.  Davis,  390. 

V.  Mattoon,  227,  290,  917. 

V.  Purvis,  378. 
McReady  v.  Rogers,  682,  774. 

V.  Schenck,  587. 
McReynolds  v.  McReynolds,  5i4. 
McRoberts  v.  Lyon,  488. 
McSpadden  v.  Fanner,  284. 
McTavlsh  v.  Railroad  Co.,  115. 
McVeagh  v.  Little,  4M. 

V.  Old  Dominion  Bank,  486. 
McVey,  In  re,  524. 

V.  Man*att,  782. 
McVlcar  v.  Filer,  387. 

V.  Wolcott,  32. 
McVIcker  v.  Beedy,  229,  904.  906. 
McWhorter  v.  Norris,  703. 
McWilliams  v.  Kalback,  590. 
McWillle  V.  Martin,  317. 
Macy  V.  Lloyd,  367. 
Madden  v.  J^eldlng,  220. 
Maddock  v.  Stevens,  Ola. 
Maddox  v.  Summerlin,  242,  296.  975. 
Madison  Tp.  v.  Dunckle,  677. 
Magarlty  v.  Succop's  Adm'r,  1005. 
Magee,  In  re,  320a. 
Maglll  v.  lYust  Co..  721. 
Magnolia  Metal  Co.  v.  Supply  Co.,  882. 
Mngnusson  v.  Cronholm,  246. 
Magoou  V.  Callahan.  352. 
Mngoun  v.  Insurance  Co.,  814,  818. 
Magowan  v.  Magowan.  320,  930. 
Magrath  v.  Hardy,  783. 
Magruder  v.  Buck,  191. 
Maguire  v.  Maguire,  927.  932. 

V.  Wooila,  29. 
Magurn  v.  Magum.  929. 
Mahftflfcy  v.  Rogers,  54,  624,  693. 
Mahnn  v.  Ca vender,  321. 
Mahaney  v.  Pan  man,  225. 
Mahaska  County  State  Bank  v.  Christ 

22. 
Mahon  v.  Rosenkrantz,  986. 
Mahoney  v.  Prendergast,  599. 

V.  Van  Winkle,  656. 
Mahoning  Bank*s  Appeal,  1. 
>raliurln  v.  Blckford,  880,  034,  937. 
Mallhouse  v.  Inloes,  87,  326, 


CASES  CITED. 
[References  to  tections.    fiS  1  to  499  in  vol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.] 


CXXXlll 


Main  v.  Bosworth,  421,  43Da. 

V.  JohUKOD,   181. 

Matr  V.  Beck,  57. 
Maize  T.  Bowman,  747. 
Majors  v.  Cowell,  540. 
Malcareth  v.  Pollard,  9€o. 
Makepeace  t.  Ckmtee,  1000.  1004. 

y.  Lukens,  1(>5. 
Malek  y.  Kodad,  337. 
Maley  y.  Railroad  Co.,  23. 

T.  Sbattuck,  817. 
Mallett  y.  Butcher.  379. 

V.  Foxcrof  t,  612,  WiO. 

y.  Parham,  100. 
Mallock  y.  Krome,  734. 
Malloney  y.  Horan,  617. 
Mallory  y.  Clark,  54. 

y.    Xorton,  390. 

y.  Taylor,  26. 
Mally  y.  Mally,  754. 
Malona  y.  Schwing,  638a. 
Malone  y.  Marriott  48,  .'oO. 

y.  Mining  Co.,  316.  324. 
Maloney  y.  Dewey,  205. 
Mfllooy  y.  Horan,  732. 
MaUky  y.  Schumacher,  600. 
Man  y.  Drexel,  652. 
Mandeyille  y.  Ayery,  791. 

y.  Holey,  77. 

y.  Reynolds,  290,  909. 
Mandlebaum  y.  Gregovich,  958. 
Maneyal  y.  Township,  54,  349. 
Mangnno   &   Tomfocaro   Co.    y.   Cly- 

monts,  305. 
Manhattan  Co.  y.  Byertson,  413,  415, 

423. 
Manhattan  Life  Ins.  Co.  y.  Broughton, 

099. 
Manigault  y.  Deas*  Adm*rs,  559,  600. 

V.  Holmes.  536. 
Manker  y.  Sine,  1014. 
Mankhi  y.  Chandler,  792,  801. 
Manley  y.  Hunt  438. 

y.  Hickle,  514. 

y.  Tufts,  736. 
Manly  y.  Kidd,  537. 
Mann  y.  Edwards,  778i. 

y.  Martin,  183. 

y.  Peck,  666. 

y.  Poole,  981. 

y.  Rogers,  656w 

T.  Warde,  34& 


Manning  v.  City  of  Orl.^ans,  16. 

y.  Nelson,  158,  311,  321. 

y.  Norwood's  Adm'rs,  981. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  341,  613. 
Mannlon  y.  Railroad  Co.,  157. 
Manniz  y.  State,  291. 
Manns  y.  Bank,  677. 
Manny  y.  Harris,  623,  626. 
Mansel  y.  Castles,  166. 
Mansfield  y.  Gregory,  401. 

y.  Hoa  gland,  536. 

y.  Mclntyre,  932. 

y.  Manslield,  320. 
Mansfield's  Case,  205. 
Manson  y.  Duncanson,  193,  261,  585. 
Mansur  y.  Pratt,  195. 
Manufacturers'  &  Mechanics'  Bank  y. 
Bank,  446. 

y.  Boyd,  53. 

y.  St  John,  61a. 
Manyille  y.  Parks,  89. 
Manwaring  y.  Lippincott  836. 
Maple  y.  Beach,  600,  604. 

y.  Havenhill,  307. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  779. 
Maples  y.  Mackey,  273. 
Marble  y.  Keyes,  791. 
Marbury  y.  Pace,  52,  488. 
Marceau  y.  Insurance  Co.,  528. 
March  y.  McCardle,  191. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  227. 
Marchal  y.  Hooker,  109. 
Marchman  y.  Sewell,  370. 
Marder  y.  Wright  141. 
Marienthal  y.  Amburgh,  224. 
Marine  Bank  Co.  y.  Mailers,  157. 
Marine  Ins.  Co.  y.  Hodgson,  366,  378, 
384. 

y.  Young,  729. 
Marion  y.  Regenstein,  81. 
Marion  County  y.  Coler,  985a. 
Marion  County  Com'rs  y.  Welch,  664. 
Markham  y.  Angler,  373. 

y.  O'Conner,  576. 
Markle's  Estate,  In  re,  313. 
Markley  y.  People,  751, 

y.  Rand,  359. 
Marks  y.  Semple,  42. 

y.  Sigler,  87,  697. 

y.  Sullivan,  614. 

y.  Willis,  390. 
Marlatt  y.  Clary,  572. 


CXXXIV  CASES 

[Referencei  to  secUoni.    tt  1  to 

Marlow  v.  Barlew,  11)2. 

v.  Johnson,  434. 
Marquai'dt  v.  Hubner,  16. 
Marquez  v.  Frisbie,  530. 
Marquis,  In  re,  297. 
Marr  v.  Marr,  319. 

V.  Wetzel,  897. 
Marriner  v.  Smith,  359,  426. 
Marsh  v.  Berry,  779. 

V.  Edgerton,  378. 

v.  Uamux>nd,  699. 

V.  Haywood,  299. 

y.  Lasher,  349. 

v.  Mandeville,  700. 

V.  Masterson,  726,  733. 

Y.  Nordyke  &  Marmon  Co.,  350. 

V.  Pier,  726,  729,  787,  788. 

V.  Putnam,  824. 

V.  Synder,  115. 
Marshall  y.  Aiken,  754. 

V.  Charland,  264. 

V.  aothlng  Co.,  725,  749,  750. 

V.  Fisher,  195,  197. 

V.  Holmes,  372. 

V.  Moore,  457,  999. 

V.  Morris,  1007. 

V.  Otto,  706. 

V.  Rose,  041. 

y.  Itough's  Heirs,  600. 

y.  Shafter,  655. 

y.  Taylor,  130. 
Marshall  &  Ilsley  Bank  y.  Hyman,  181. 
Marshmnn  y.  Conklin,  183. 
Marsh  ton  y.  Sweet,  787. 

y.  Tryon,  1014. 
Martin  v.  Baldwin,  435,  939a. 

y.  Bank,  164. 

y.  Barnhill,  500. 

y.  Baugh,  315. 

y.  Bowie,  270. 

y.  Boyce,  632. 

y.  Burns,  271. 

y.  Charter,  1007. 

y.  Cowles,  567. 

y.  Crow,  23. 

y.  Curley,  335. 

y.  Darling,  794. 

y.  Ellerbe's  Adm'r,  562. 

y.  Evans,  722. 

y.  Gilmore,  21. 

y.  Hewitt,  173,  407. 

y.  Judd,  54,  225. 

V.  Kennedy,  726. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Martin  y.  McLean,  245. 

V.  Matfleld,  163. 

y.  Nicolls,  827. 

V.  Parsons,  376,  377. 

y.  Porter,  268,  590. 

V.  Price,  28. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  9L 

y.  Rex,  53,  Ola. 

y.  RobUison,  284. 

y.  Roney,  731. 

y.  Rutt,  607. 

y.  Skehan,  305. 

v.  Tally,  589. 

V.  Teal,  117. 

y.  Tobacco  Co.,  343. 

y.  AValker,  609. 

y.  Weyman,  193.  195,  197. 

y.  Williams,  233,  284. 
Martina  v.  Muhlke,  246. 
Martindalc  y.  Brown,  346. 

V.  Price,  16. 

y.  AVaas,  125a. 
Martinez  v.  Lindsey,  445. 
Marvel  v.  Manouyrler,  325,  374. 
Marvin  v.  Dennison,  655. 

y.  Hampton,  600. 

V.  Marvin,  121. 

y.  Welder,  516. 

V.  Wilklns,  299. 
Marx  v.  Fore,  901,  903,  916. 

v.  Logue.  884,  971. 

y.  Sanders,  498. 
Marj'  Anne,  The,  796. 
Maryland  Steel  Co.  v.  MsLvney,  323, 372. 
Marj'ott  V.  Gardner,  261. 
Mashburn  v.  Gouge,  190. 
Mason,  Ex  parte,  250. 

v.  Alston,  622. 

v.  Bair,  041. 

v.  Bull.  969. 

v.  Cronlse,  985. 

v.  Eldred,  770. 

v.  House,  365. 

y.  .Tones,  387. 

v.  Kellogg,  567,  569. 

v.  Knowlson,  1003. 

y.  McLean,  304. 

y.  McNamara,  352. 

v.  Messenger,  290. 

y.  Miles,  376. 

y.  Quinn,  370. 

v.  Railroad  Co.,  326. 

v.  Smith,  61. 


CASES  CITBD. 


cxxxv 


[RafereneeB  to  sections.    H 1  to 

Mason  County  y.  Dunbar,  29. 
Maisachusetts   Benefit  Life  Ass'n  v. 

LohmiUer,  393. 
Masser  v.  Dewart,  4S4» 

Y.  Strickland,  588. 
Massey  v.  McCoy,  715. 

Y.  Walker,  13. 

V.  Westcott.  420. 
Massle  y.  Mann,  3(X). 
Maasle's  Heirs  v.  Donaldson,  196,  197. 
MasHlnglll  Y.  Downs,  413,  415. 
Masten  v.  Foundry  Co.,  351. 

V.  Oieott,  U57. 
Masters  y.  Va mar's  Kx'rs,  607. 
Masterson  y.  Cundiff,  4S2a,  483. 

V.  Gibson,  8. 

Y.  Matthews,  173,  516,  966. 

Y.  Williams,  23. 
Mastick  Y.  Tborp,  366. 
Martin  y.  Gray,  275. 
Matheney  y.  Galloway,  260,  695. 
Matber  y.  Mather,  63. 
Matheson's  Adm'rs  y.  Grant's  Adm'r, 

165. 
Mathews  y.  Bishop,  322. 

Y.  llerron,  671. 

Y.  Lawrence,  782. 

Y.  Mosby,  80. 
)Uto,  Ex  parte,  257. 
Matson  y.  Burt,  285. 

Y.  Field,  362,  378. 

Y.  Swebson.  284. 
Mattalr  y.  Card,  754. 
Matter  y.  PhilUps,  986. 
Matthew  v.  Osborne,  652. 
Matthews  y.  l>aYis,  958. 

V.  Durj-ee,  617. 

Y.  Houghton,  106. 

Y,  Nance,  459. 

Y.  Noble,  174. 

Y.Uussell,  954,  1000,  1005. 
Matthews*  lessee  y.  Thompson,  52. 
Matthls  Y.  Inhabitants,  341. 
Mattingly  v.  Elder,  44. 

Y.  Lewlsohn,  511. 
Mattoon  y.  Hinkley,  86. 
Mattox  Y.  Helm,  647,  663. 
Matula  Y.  Lane,  455,  460. 
MatEenbaugh  v.  Doyle,  69,  351. 
Maolden  y.  Armlstead,  396. 
Maund  y.  Loeb,  91. 
Maurin  y.  Games,  110. 
Maury  v.  Roberts,  28. 


409  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Maury's  Trustee  v.  Fltzwater,  313. 
MaYlty  Y.  Ea8trldg9,  68. 
Mawhinney  y.  Doane,  958. 
Maxfield  v.  Carr,  980,  1016, 
Max  Meadows  Land  &  Imp.  Co.  y. 
McGaYock,  449. 

Y.  Mendenhall,  22. 
Maxton  y.  Mount,  989. 
Maxwell  y.  Bank,  510. 

V.  Clarke,  714. 

T.  Com*rs,  532. 

V.  DeYallnger,  992. 

Y.  Owen,  941. 

V.  Stewart,  801,  884,  917. 

V.  Vaught,  437. 
May  Y.  Ball,  48. 

Y.  Bank,  493. 

Y.  Lumber  Co.,  329. 
Maybee  y.  Avery,  529. 
Mayberry  y.  McClurg,  321. 
Mayer  y.  Blease,  941. 

Y.  Brensinger,  96. 

Y.  Lawrence,  97. 

V.  Mayer,  346a. 

V.  Nelson,  363. 

V.  Sparks,  1014. 
Mayes  y.  Woodall,  359. 
Maylleld,  Ex  parte,  OSOc. 

Y.  State,  114. 
Mayham  y.  Ooombs,  446. 
Maynard  y.  Ass'n,  185. 
Mayo  Y.  Ah  Loy,  247,  278,  809. 

Y.  Foley,  247.  809. 

Y.  Stoneum,  173,  516. 

Y.  Tudor's  Heirs,  660. 
Mayor  y.  Lord,  253a,  518. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  City  of  DaYenport  y. 

Lord,  985b. 
Mayor,  etc,,  of  City  of  Macon  y.  Trus- 
tees, 940. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  City  of  New  York  y. 
Brady,  332.  574,  575. 

V.  Schermerhom,  33. 
Mayor  of  New  Orleans  v.  IT.  S.,  253a. 
Mayor  of  Norwick  v.  Berry,  126,  127. 
Mayor  of  Wetumpka  y.   Wharf   Co., 

953. 
Mays  Y.  Compton,  600. 

v.  Hassell,  134. 
MaysYille  &  B.  S.  R.  Co.  y.  Ball,  972. 
MaysYille  &  Lexington  R.  Co.  y.  Pun- 

nett,  21,  32. 
Meacham  v.  Dudley,  341, 


CXXXVl  CASES 

CReferencei  to  soctions.    ||  1  to 

Mead  y.  City  of  Boston,  529. 

V.  Brown,  135. 

V.  Mitchell,  554.  661. 

V.  Weaver,  251. 
Meade,  In  re,  320a. 

V.  Bartlett,  271. 
Meader  v.  Norton,  530. 
Meador  v.  Rhyne,  HMJO,  1003. 
Meadowcroft  v.  Huguenln.  320. 
Meadows  v.  Duchess  of  Kingston,  320, 

523. 
Meagher  v.  Mfg.  Co.,  29. 
Means  v.  Hicks'  Adm*r,  589,  591. 

V.  Means,  164. 
Mebane  v.  Mebane,  585. 
Mechanics*  Bank  v.  Gorman,  450,  451. 

V.  Mayer,  70. 

V.  Mlnthorne,  159,  1(52. 
Mechanics'    Banking   Ass'n   y.   Marl- 

poosa  Co.,  703. 
Meckley's  Appeal,  291. 
Medart  v.  Fasnatch,  392. 
Medford  v.  Dorsey,  1014. 

V.  Harrell,  39. 
Medina  v.  Medina,  320. 
Meehan  v.  Valentine,  26. 
Meek  v.  Howard,  384. 

V.  Mathis,  44. 

v.  Meek,  892. 

V.  Thompson,  440. 
Meeker  v.  Sprague,  32. 
Meem  v.  Rucke}*,  381. 
Megee  v.  Beirne,  801. 
Megerle  v.  Ashe,  531. 
Mehaffy  v.  Dobba,  646. 

V.  Lytle,  573,  574. 
Mehlin  y.  Ice,  939c. 
Meily  y.  Wood,  431. 
Meiners  v.  Brewing  Co.,  349,  352. 
Melnweiser  y.  Hains,  492. 
Meiss  V.  Gill,  783. 
Meixell  y.  Klrkpatrick,  359. 
Melde  y.  Reynolds,  340a,  345. 
Melbop  y.  Doane,  904. 
Melick  y.  Bank,  321,  386. 
Mellin  y.  Horlick,  848. 
Mellon  y.  Guthrie,  418. 
Mellon's  Appeal,  446. 
Mellon  y.  Howard,  299. 

V.  Pace,  536. 
Melvln  V.  Proprietors.  649. 
Memmer  v.  Carey,  736. 
Memphis  v.  Brown,  153. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  toI.  2.] 

Memphis  y.  U.  S.,  985f. 
Memphis  City  Bank  y.  State  of  Ten- 
nessee, 609. 
Memphis  &  C.  R.  Co.  y.  Orr,  13. 
Memphis  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.  y.  State,  eOO. 
Menard  y.  Sydnor,  191. 
Mendenhall  y.  Robinson,  487. 

y.  Stewart,  207. 
Mendenhairs  Ex'rs  v.  Springer,  55. 
Menderback  y.  Hopkins,  998. 
Meng  y.  Coffee,  32. 
Mengis  y.  Railroad  CO.,  183. 
Menifee*s  Adm^rs  y.  Ball.  378. 
Mentzer  y.  Ellison,  279,  3:»9. 
Mercantile  Nat.  Bank  y.  Bank,  510, 
685. 

y.  Hubbard,  750. 
Mercantile  Trust  Co.  y.  Ralkoad  Co.. 

471. 
Mercer  y.  James,  211,  212. 

y.  Watson,  654. 
Merchants'  Ad-Sign  Co.  y.  BiU-Po8tins 

Co.,  322. 
Merchants'  Bank  y.  Ballon,  4,  399,  463. 

y.  Chandler,  583. 

y.  Kent,  32. 
Merchants'  Ins.  Co.  y.  Algeo,  745. 

y.  De  Wolf,  299. 
Merchants'    International   Steam-Boat 

Line  y.  Lyon,  630. 
Merchants'  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  y.  Hill,  486. 
Merchants'  Nat  Bank  y.  Braithwaite, 
482. 

y.  Construction  Co.,  938b. 

y.  Cotton  Mills,  61,  63,  67,  73. 

y.  EusUs,  439. 

y.  Gaslin,  958. 

y.  Good,  500. 

y.  Hagemeyer,  585a. 
Merchants'  &  Mechanics'  Bank  y.  Br- 
ans, 236. 
Mercler  y.  Chace,  270,  278,  284. 
Meredith  y.  Ass'n,  587,  617,  875. 
Meredith  Mechanic  Ass'n  y.  Drill  Co., 

715. 
Meriara  y.  Rundlett,  593,  598,  923. 
Meridian  Nat.  Bank  y.  McConica,  419. 
Merkleln  y.  Trapnall,  (U6. 
Merle  y.  Andrews,  44,  306. 
Merrlam  y.  Sewell,  807. 

y.  Whittemore,  50(?. 

y.  Woodcock,  729,  769. 
Merrick  y.  City  of  Baltimore,  328. 


CASES 
[Ref areneeft  to  Mellons.    H 1  to 

Merrick  y.  Hill,  699. 

V.  Merrick,  253. 
Merrifield  v.  Bell.  332. 
MerdU  v.  Bank,  200,  583. 

Y.  Com'rs,  710. 

y.  Harris,  Gi2, 

y.  Insurance  Co.,  5C3. 

y.  Roberts,  341. 

y.  Sherburne,  298. 

y.  Souther,  954. 
Merriman  v.  Barker,  771. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  45. 

V.  Walton,  362,  35J3b. 
Merrin  y.  Lewis,  663. 
Merritt  y.  Bagwell,  791. 

y.  Baldwin,  367. 

y.  Campbell,  706. 

y.  DafDn,  560. 

y.  Dearth,  100. 

y.  Fowler,  864. 

y.  Morse,  627. 

y.  Peirano,  615. 

y.  Putnam,  341,  354. 

y.  Riohey,  440. 

V.  White,  84. 
Merrftt's  Lessee  y.  Home,  274. 
Merry  v.  Hallet,  429. 
Mershon  y.  Williams,  610,  618,  652. 
Mertz  y.  Oonstniction  Co.,  183. 
Merrine  y.  Parker,  5(H,  754,  986. 
Messier  y.  Amery,  852. 
Messina  y.  Petrocochino,  820,  827. 
Messinger  y.  Insurance  Co.,  709. 

V.  Kintner,  271.  277. 
Messmore  y.  Williamson,  489. 
Mestier  y.  Railroad  Co.,  GOO. 
Metcalf  y.  Gilmore,  J)20. 

y.  Metcalf,  135,  165. 
Metcalfe  y.  Alter,  196. 
Methard  y.  State,  745. 
Methodist  Churches  of  New  York  y. 

Barker,  587. 
Methodist  Protestant  Church  y.  City  of 

Baltimore,  367. 
Metropolitan  £1.  R.  Co.  y.  Johnston,  27, 
384. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  509. 
Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.  y.  Bergen, 

311. 
Metropolitan  K.  Co.,  In  re,  619. 
Metropolitan   Washing   Mach.    Co.    y. 

Morris.  206. 
Metz  r.  Bank,  112,  405,  406. 


CITED.  cxxxvii 

499  in  Tol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.] 

Metzgar  y.  Metzgar,  1005. 
Metzler  y.  Kllgore,  450. 
Mexia  y.  Lewis,  556. 
Mayer  v.  Barth,  589. 

V.  Campbell,  407. 

y.  Hartman,  912. 

y.  Hearst,  199. 

y.  Kuhn,  211,  793. 

V.  Meyer,  517,  675. 
Meyers  v.  Field,  102. 

V.  Hill,  651. 

y.  Smith,  362,  372,  386. 
Miami  Co.  Nat.  Bank  v.  Barkalow,  691. 
Michael  y.  City  of  Ma: toon,  164. 

V.  Knapp,  .421,  439n. 
Michaelis  y.  Brawley,  205,  269. 
Michaels  y.  Boyd,  460. 

V.  Post,  248,  807. 
Michan  y.  Wyatt,  556. 
Michaux's  Adm'r  v.  Brown,  433. 
Michels  v.  Stork,  225. 
Michener  y.  Thrasher  Co.,  359. 
Michigan  Land&  Lumber  Co.  y.  Rust, 

600. 
Mickel  y.  Hicks,  633. 
Mickey  v.  Stratton,  229. 
Mickler  y.  Reddick,  307. 
MIckles  V.  Thayer,  358. 
Middlesex  Bank  y.  Butman,  829,  895. 
Middleton  y.  Thompson,  567.  568. 
Middleton's  Ex'rg  v.  Middleton,  490. 
Miehle  Printing  Press  &  Mfg.  Co.  v. 

Printing  Co.,  611. 
Mifflin   County   Nat.   Bank's   Appeal, 

956. 
Mikeska  y.  Blum,  269. 
Milam  Co.  v.  Robertson,  158,  200,  300. 
Milcreek  Road,  In  re,  109. 
Miles  y.  Caldwell,  627,  650,  654. 

y.  Goodwin,  225. 
Milhous  y.  Alcardi,  248. 
Millard  y.  Marmon,  193. 

y.  Parsell,  25. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  745. 
Millcreek  Tp.  v.  Reed,  812. 
Milleisen  y.  Sensemnn,  316. 
Miller  v.  Albright,  106. 

y.  Alexander,  347. 

y.  Allen,  141. 

y.  Bailey,  632. 

y.  Bank,  .59. 

y.  Barkeloo,  513. 

y.  Beck,  782. 


OXXXYIU  CASES 

[References  to  sections.    H 1  to 

Miller  V.  Bernecker,  375,  527, 

V.  Blackett,  553. 

y.  Breubam,  892. 

V.  Carr,  335. 

T.  Clarke,  63. 

V.  Covert,  734. 

V.  Cox,  445. 

V,  Deaver,  630. 

V.  Dugan,  949. 

y.  Dungau,  900,  904,  949,  972. 

y.  Earle,  68. 

V.  Bwlng,  273,  897. 

y.  Foster,  808. 

y.  Oilman,  1003. 

y.  Glass  Works,  58. 

y.  Qorman,  377. 

y.  Hardacre,  86. 

V.  Harrison,  373. 

y.  Hoc,  181. 

y.  Justice,  308. 

y.  Kosch,  63. 

y.  Langworthy,  719. 

y.  Leach,  916. 

y.  LfOngacre,  209. 

V.  Lovell,  973. 

y.  McGuckln,  703. 

y.  McGulre,  386. 

y.  Machine  Co.,  07. 

y.  Mnnlce,  621,  726,  729,  785,  787. 

y.  Mans,  G99. 

y.  Miller,  458, 

y.  Morse.  300. 

V,  Neidzielska,  321. 

y.  Peters,  116. 

y.  Preston,  986,  1016. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  29,  115,  950. 

y.  Khoades,  573. 

y.  Royce,  159. 

y.  Shackelford,  493. 

V.  Sherry,  423. 

y.  Signal  Co.,  022. 

y.  Smith's  Ex'ra,  902. 

V.  Snyder,  218,  250,  258. 

V.  State,  208. 

V.  Vaushan.  600. 

V.  White,  252,  583. 

y.  Wills,   549. 

V.  Wolf,  137,  410. 
Miller's  Adm'r  y.  Cook's  Adm'rs,  42. 

V.  :MIller,  906. 
Minor's  Estate,  In  re,  542. 
Miller's  Ex'rs  v.  Miller,  906. 
Mlllett  y.  Lagomarsluo,  657. 


CITBD. 

499  in  ToL  1;  residue  in  toI.  1] 

MilUgan,  Ex  parte,  256,  25S. 

y,  Browarsky,  744. 
Mllligan's  Appeal,  99L 
MllUkan  y.  City  of  La  Fayette^  578L 

V.  Werts,  655. 
MlUiken  y.  Lorlng,  596. 

y.  Whltehouse,  583. 
Mills  V.  Conner,  498. 

y.  Dennis,  197. 

y.  Dickson,  57,  318. 

y.  Duryee,  275,  856,  857,  884,  887. 

y.  Garrison,  744. 

y.  Hoag,  44. 

y.  I^umber  Co.,  119. 

y.  Martin,  524. 

y.  Miller,  39. 

y.  Pettlgrew,  691.  723. 

y.  Scott,  374, 

y.  Stewart,  593,  875,  896. 

V.  Terry,  273. 

y.  Van  Voorhls.  378,  386. 

y.  Witherlngton,  000. 
Mills  County  y.  Brown  County,  611. 
Mlllspaugh  y.  McBride,  301.  341. 
Milne  y.  Van  Busklrk,  888. 
Mllnor  y.  Banking  Co.,  358. 
MUtlmore  y.  Mlltlmore,  261. 
Milwaukee  Haryester  Co.  y.  Schroeder, 

322. 
Milwaukee  Mutual  Loan  &  Building 
Soc.  y.  Jagodzinski,  311,  340a,  354. 
Milwaukee  &  M.  R.  Co.  y.  James*  419. 
Mlmnaugh  y.  Partlln,  769. 
Miner  y.  Clark,  567,  569. 

V.  Pearson,  141. 
Mineral  Point  R.  Co.  y.  Keep,  225. 
Miners'* Ttust  Co.  Bank  y.  RosebenT; 

294. 
^flngay  y.  Lackey,  160. 
Mink  y.  Shaflfer,  875. 
Mlnkhart  y.  Hankler,  115. 
Minna  Craig  S.  S.  Co.  y.  Bank,  814. 
Minneapolis    Trust    Co.    y.    Verhulst, 

508. 
Minneapolis  &  St  L.  B,  Co.  y.  Wilson, 

438. 
Minnesota  Thresher  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Holz, 

953. 
Mlnnlch  y.  Shaffer,  439a. 
Minor  y.  Stone,  378. 

V.  Walter,  87,  513,  697,  765. 
Mlnter  y.  Green,  898,  972. 
Mintzer  y.  Trust  Co.,  31a. 


CASES 
[Referencei  to  sectionB.    H 1  to 

Mi88ls8inewa    Min.    Co.    t.    Andrews, 

20G. 
Mississippi  Valley  Ck>.  y.  Railroad  Co., 

446. 
Mississippi  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Green,  87. 

V.  Wynne,  3(Ki. 
Missouri  V.  Teidermaun,  544. 
Missouri  Glass  Co.  v.  Gregg,  877,  968. 
Missouri,  K.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoereth, 
361. 

y.  Holschlag,  135. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Fulmore, 
219. 

T,  Haber,  995. 

V.  McWherter,  721. 

T.  Warden,  253,  367. 
Missouri  Pac.  K.  Co.  v.  Fitzgerald,  37. 

▼.  Haynes,  158,  159. 

T.  Heldenhelmer.  000. 

T.  Levy,  671. 

T.  Railroad  Co.,  617. 

T.  Reld,  367. 

T.  Scamnion,  741. 

V.  Smith,  116. 

V.  Twlss,  574. 
Mitchell  Y.  Allen,  340. 

V.  A  ten,  83. 

V.  Bank,  252. 

V.  Brewster,  206,  770.  775. 

V.  Campbell,  349. 

T.  Cobb,  530. 

V.  Cook,  719. 

T.  Davis,  663. 

V.  French,  617. 

T.  Garrett,  897,  901,  906. 

Y.  Geisendorff,  142. 

Y.  Greenwald,  237. 

V.  Hamilton,  492. 

Y.  Hawley,  522,  076. 

Y.  Hockett,  W5,  956,  957.  987. 

Y.  Insley,  619.  687. 

Y.  Kinnaird,  321. 

Y.  Kintzer,  293. 

Y.  Klrby,  369. 

Y.  Knight,  322. 

Y.  Llbbey,  782. 

Y.  Lincoln,  165. 

Y.  Meuley.  271. 

Y.  Overman,  126,  127. 

Y.  Robertson,  650,  658.  659. 

Y.  Runklc.  279. 

v.  St  John,  179. 

V.  Sanford,  75& 


CITED.  CXXXIX 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Mitchell  V.  Schoonover,  200. 

V.  Wood.  398. 
Mitchell's  Adm'r  v.  Gray,  231. 
Mitchell's  Heirs  v.  Smith's  Ilelrs,  491. 
Mitchell  &  I^ewis  Co.  v.  Downing,  340. 
Mlze  V.  Mfg.  Co.,  320a. 
Moale  V.  HoUins,  770,  776. 
Mobley  v.  Mobley,  218,  261. 
Mock  V.  City  of  Snirta  Rosa.  208. 

V.  Cunditr,  383. 
Modawell  v.  Hudson,  159. 
Moercheu  v.  Stoll,  641. 
Moffett  v.  Blckle,  145. 
Moffitt  v.  Albert,  104. 

V.  Moffitt,  273,  282. 
Mogelberg  v.  Clevinger,  861. 
Mohler's  Appeal,  949. 
Moloney  v.  Nelson,  714. 
Molyneux  v.  Huey,  180. 

V.  Marsh,  995. 

V.  Seymour,  229. 
Monarch  v.  Brey,  130,  135. 
Monarch  Cycle  Mfg.  Co.  y.  Mueller^ 

752. 
Monarque  v.  Monarque,  661. 
Mondel  v.  Steel,  768. 
Money  v.  Dorsey,  438. 
Monger  v.  Jeffries,  38. 
Monks  Y.  McGrady,  568. 
Monroe  v.   Douglas,  813,  818,  829. 

V.  May,  425. 

v.  Monroe,  309,  691. 

V.  Paddock,  338. 
Mouson  V.  Kill,  136. 
Montague  v.  McDowell,  769. 

V.  Mitchell,  376. 
Monteith  v.  Gehrig,  661a. 
Montejo  v.  Owen,  970. 
Montesquieu  v.  Heil.  504. 
Montford  v.  Hunt,  938c. 
Montgomery  v.  Baruett,  77. 

V.  Carlton,  193. 

V.  McDermott,  938c. 

V.  McGimpsey,  473. 

V.  Road,  599. 

V.  Samory,  811. 

V.  Vickery,  995. 
Montgomery  County  v.  Auchley,  135. 
Montgomery  Nat.  Bank,  Appeal  of,  34. 
Montreal    Min.    Co.    v.    Cuthbertson, 

838. 
Montrose  v.  Wananinker,  734,  747,  790. 
Montross  v.  State,  216. 


€Xl  CASES 

[References  to  MoUom.    fiS  1  to 

Moody  y.  Grant,  165. 

V.  Harper,  201,  432,  460,  1008. 

T.  Lyles,  233. 

V.  reyton,  5lK). 
Moon  V.  Crowder,  550. 
Mooney  v.  Byrne,  20. 

V.  Hinds,  917. 
Moons  y.  De  Bemales,  040. 
Moon's  Adm'r  v.  Crowder,  550. 
Moor  y.  Roberts,  127. 

y.  Towle,  958. 
Moore  y.  Adie's  Adm'r,  869,  962. 

y.  Alexander,  590. 

y.  Barclay,  373. 

y.  Brltton,  367. 

y.  Byers,  438. 

y.  Carey,   992. 

y.  Cason,  600. 

V.  City  of  Albany,  648. 

V.  Consolidated  Co.,  44, 

y.  Council,  253a,  278. 

y.  Court.  311. 

y.  Cross,  98. 

y.  Dunn,  317.  709. 

y.  Easley,  204. 

y.  Ellis,  217. 

y.  Estes,  236. 

y.  Gamble,  368,  373. 

y.  Garner,  504. 

y.  Granger,  425. 

y.  Hill,  22. 

y.  Hillebrant,  641. 

y.  Hinnant,  306. 

y.  Holland,  399. 

y.  Horner,  341,  691. 

y.  Ireland,  940. 

y.  Jeffers,  938. 

y.  Johnston,    734. 

y.  Jordan,  460. 

y.  Kelly  &  Jones  Co..  335. 

y.  Kilgore,  75. 

y.  Letchford,  399. 

y.  McEwen.  193. 

y.  Maitin,  240. 

y.  Martin  &  Hoyt  Co.,  84. 

y.  Nowell,  11,  942,  951. 

y.  O'Barr,  513. 

y.  Pendergrasfs  Heirs,  988. 

y.  Terry,  263,  273. 

y.  Phillips,   836. 

y.  Pitts,  426. 

y.  Prince,  252. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  1016. 


CITED. 

499  in  ToL  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Moore  y.  Red,  986. 

y.  Richardson,  326. 

y.  Rittenhouse,  473. 

y.  Robbins,  530. 

y.  Robison,  244. 

y.  Rogers,  770,  774,  775. 

y.  Russell,   721. 

y.  Smith,  951. 

y.  Spackman,  593,  923. 

y.  State,  132. 

y.  Tanner,  261,  635. 

y.  Tanner*s  Adm'r,  635. 

y.  Thomas,  421. 

y.  U.  S.,  33. 

V.  Ware,  245,  513. 

y.  Watkins,  83. 

y.  Williams.  510,  685. 

y.  Woodside,  144. 
Moorehead  y.  McKinney,  432. 
Moorer  y.  Moorer,  951. 
Moores  v.  Peycke,  412. 
Moore^s  Appeal,  38,  506,  944. 
Moore  &  Handley  Hardware  Co.  t. 

Curry,  605. 
Mora  y.  Kuzac,  217. 
Moraga  y.  E  merle,  29. 
Moran  y.  Hagerman,  981. 

y.  Plankinton,  737. 
Morarity  y.  Calloway,  064,  761. 
Morch  y.  Raubitschek,  529. 
More  y.  Bagley,  378. 
Morehead  y.  Grisham,  873. 
Moreland  y.  Coke  Co..  549. 
Moreland  Tp.  y.  Gorduer,  699. 
Morenhout  y.  Hlguera,  660. 
Morey  y.  Homan,  100. 

V.  Hoyt,  261. 

y.  King,  509. 

y.  Lockhart,  37. 
Morgan,  Ex  parte,  167. 

y.  Bliss,  699. 

y.  Burr,  629. 

y.  Chester,  580,  774. 

y.  Flexner,  115. 

y.  Halsey,  638a. 

y.  McDonald,  347. 

y.  Mitchell,  624. 

y.  Morgan,  239,  897. 

y.  Neville,  593,  923- 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  308,  717. 

y.  Righetti,  208. 

y.  Scott,  376. 

y.  Simmons,  574. 


CASES  CITED. 
[Referencei  to  sections.    IS  1  to  499  In  voL  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 


cxli 


Morgan  v.  Sims,  442,  443. 

y.  Skidmore,  745. 

V.  Thorne,   U86. 

T.  Town  Clerk,  985b. 

T.  Winston,  572. 
Morgan's  Heirs  v.  Patton,  518. 
Moring  V.  Abies,  655. 
Morley  v.  Railroad  Co.,  4.  8,  11,  982. 

V.  Stevens,  995. 
Morning  Journal  Ass'n  v.  Rutherford, 

33. 
Morrell  Hardware  Co.  v.  Mining  Co., 

316. 
Morrill  y.  Mfg.  Co.,  615. 

y.  Morrill,  291. 

y.  Smith  County,  600. 
Morris  V.  Bailey,  894. 

y.  BarUett,    796. 

y.  Boomer,  970. 

y.  Coleman  County,  155,  163. 

y.  Creed,  248. 

y.  Curry,  970. 

y.  Edmonds,  196. 

y.  Garrison,  557. 

y.  Gentry,  245. 

y.  Hollls,  1004. 

y.  HorreU.  609. 

y.  Kahn,  347. 

y.  Lucas,  555. 

y.  Morange,  48. 

y.  Morris,  44,  376. 

y.  Mowatt,  420,  469. 

y.  Murpbey,  561. 

y,  Patchln,  878. 

V.  Slatery,  349. 

y.  Webber,  320. 
Moiris'  Adm*r  y.  Peyton's  Adm'r,  159, 

319. 
Morris*  Estote,  414. 
Morrison  y.  Austin,  261. 

y.  Bank,   180. 

y.  Beckey,  745. 

y.  Bernards  Tp.,  125a. 

y.  City  of  Chicago,  107. 

y.  Clark,  657. 

y.  Dapman,  165. 

y.  Deaderlck,  199. 

y.  De  Donato,  749. 

y.  L*Hommedleu,  138. 

y.  Loftin,  600. 

V.  Speer,  362. 

V.  Wurtz,  422. 
Morrison's  Adm'r  v.  Mullln,  600. 


Morrison's  Ex'r  v.  Ilart,  389. 
Morris  &  E.  R.  Co.  y.  City  of  Orange, 

40. 
Morrow  y.  Allison,  633. 

V.  Geeting,  163. 

y.  Robinson,  992. 

y.  Weed,  274. 
Morseh  v.  Besack,  186. 
Morse  y.  Bishop,  249. 

V.  Callantine,  315. 

v.  Elms,  609. 

V.  Godfrey,  807. 

V.  Marshall,  657. 

V.  Pearl,  958. 

y.  Presby,  240,  270,  273,  279. 

y.  Sadler,  585. 

y.  Toppan,  7,  10,  188,  190. 
Morsell  y.  Bank,  433,  434. 
Morton  y.  Adams,  407. 

V.  Palmer,  958. 

y.  Sweetser,  716. 

y.  Urquhart,  1005. 

V.  Walker.  1008. 
Morton's  Case,  778. 
Morton's    Ex'rs    y.    Crogan's    Terre- 
Tenants,  492. 

V.  Nunnelly,  375. 
Mosby  y.  Gisbom,  252,  360,  371. 

y.  Wall,  713,  766. 
Moseley  y.  Cocke,  219. 
Mosely  y.  Tuthlll,  173. 
Moses  y.  Bradley,  529. 

y.  Richardson,  190. 

y.  U.  S.,  586. 
Mosgrove  y.  HaiTis,  005. 
Mosher  y.  Small,  238. 
Mosley  v.  Mfg.  Co.,  200. 
Moss  y.  Ashbrooks,  32,  720. 

y.  Jerome,  208. 

y.  McCuUough,   560,   583,   686. 

V.  Oakley,  583. 
Moster  v.  Moster,  320. 
Motley  V.   Harris,   726. 

V.  Jones,   446. 
Mott  y.  Hospital,  409. 

V.  State,  267. 
Motter  V.  Welty,  893. 
Moulding  y.  Wllhartz,  586. 
Monlin  y.  Insurance  Cc,  898. 
Moulton  y.  Cornish,  48. 
Mount  y.  Manhattan  Co.,  248,  807. 

y.  Scholes,  681a,  790. 

y.  Slack,  644. 


CXlii  CASES 

CReterencM  to  sections.    8fi  1  to 

Mountain  y.  Rowland.  130. 
Mouser  ▼.  Harmon,  340a. 
Mousseau's  Will,  In  re,  193. 
Mowbray  v.  Railroad  Co.,  29. 
Mower  v.  Fletcher,  34. 

V.  Kip,  993. 
Mowry  v.  Chase,  227.  897,  899. 

v.  Cheesman,  8$r2. 

V.  Davenport,  (506. 

T.  Hill,  347. 

V.  Nunez,  326. 
Mpy  V.  Moy,  600. 
Moye  V.  Petway,  16. 
Moyer  v.  Hinman,  438. 

V.  Lobengeir,  593. 
M.  T.  Jones  Lumber  Co.  v.  Rhoades, 

203. 
Mudd  T.  Rogers,  8. 
Mudge  y.  Steinhart,  141. 
Mueller  v.  Henning,  664. 

V.  McCuUoch,  312. 

V.  Reimer,  316. 
Muffley  y.  Turner,  664. 
Muhle  y.  Railway  Co.,  754. 
Mulr  y.  Craig,  1010. 

y.  Leitch.  461. 
Muirhead  y.  Klrkpatrlck,  620. 
Mulcahey  y.  Dow,  393a,  80a 
Mulford  V.  Estudillo,  1007. 

y.  Peterson,  423. 

y.  Stratton,  62. 
Mulhollan  v.  Scoggin,  349. 
Mull  y.  McKnight,  700. 
Mullane  y.  Roberge,  340. 
Mullen  y.  Scott,  588. 

V.  Wine,  86. 
Mullendore  y.  Silvers,  326. 
Muller  V.  Post,  352. 
Mulligan  v.  Devlhi.  493. 
MuUlken  v.  Hull,  160. 
MuUins  v.  Johnson,  86. 
Mum  V.  Shannon,  631. 
Mumford  v.  Spragne,  953. 

v.  Stocker.  1013. 
Munday  v.  Leeper,  250. 

V.  Vail,  242. 
Mundine  v.  Brown,  462. 
Munford  v.  Overseers,  586,  588. 
Munn  V.  Cook,  845. 

v.  Won-all,  368. 
Munro  v.  Callahan,  332. 

V.  Meech,  724. 
Muusou  V.  Steamshii)  Co.,  508. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Munter  v.  Rogers,  152. 
Murdock  y.  De  Vries,  368. 

y.  Ganahl,  121. 

y.  Stelner,  326. 
Murfree's  Heirs  y.  Carmack,  443^  45L 
Muii)hree  v.  Bishop,  358. 
Murphy  v.  Cochran,  951. 

v.  Cuddlhy,  364. 

v.  De  France,  250. 

y.  Flood,  1016. 

y.  Gage,  210. 

v.  Granger,  521. 

y.  Klein,  462. 

v.  Lyons,  278. 

v.  Manning,  677. 

y.  O'Reiley,  211. 

y.  Orr,  211. 

v.  Ti-ust  Co..  994. 

y.  Smith,  373. 

v.  Swadner,   335. 

y.  TiUing,  29. 

y.  Winter,  227. 
Murray  v.  Ballon,  550. 

V.  Blackledge,  667. 

y.  Cooper,  130. 

y.  Derrick,  328. 

y.  Ebright,  20& 

y.  Green,  510. 

v.  Lylbum,  956. 

y.  Meade,  996,  1008. 

y.  Murray.  231.  290,  783. 

y.  Southerland,  15. 

y.  Stephens,  565. 

v.  Surety  Co.,  279. 

v.  Welgle,  263. 

v.  Yates,  39. 
Murray*s  Adm*r  v.  Baker,  491,  46%, 
Murrell  v.  Smith.  754. 
Murtland  v.  Floyd,  209. 
Mm-zynowskl  v.  Railroad  Co.,  250. 
Muscatine  v.  Railroad  Co.,  368,  370. 
liluse  y.  Bank,  701. 

v.  Wafer,  363. 
Musselman  v.  Com.,  588. 
Musser  v.  Gray,  987. 
Mussey  v.  Bates.  732. 

V.  White,  785. 
Mussleman's  Appeal,  284,  633. 
Mutual  Assur.  Soc.  v.  Stanard,  441. 
Mutual  Benefit  Co.,  In  re.  313. 
Mutual  Beu.  Life  Ins.  Co.  y.  Tisdale, 
600,  640. 


GASES  GITBD. 
[BtCerenees  to  MCtlona.    |(  1  to  4d9  in  yoI.  1;  residue  in  toI.  S.] 


oxliii 


Mutual  Fire  Ins.  Co.  ▼.  Furniture  Ck)., 

910a. 
Mutual  Goanmtee  Bldg.  &  Loan  A88*n 

T.  Fallen*  73. 
Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Anthony,  33. 

V.  Newton,  675,  9G2. 
Mutual  Nat  Bank  v.  Moore,  ^^il^a, 
Mutual  Nat  Bank  of  New  Orleans  y. 

Moore,  908. 
Myer  t.  Fegaly,  406. 

T.  Kuhn,  232. 
Myers  y.  Cochran,  79a. 

y.  Daniels,  376. 

y.  Hewitt  411. 

T.  Landrum,  34,  340. 

y.  McGavock,  541. 

y.  Manny,  48. 

y.  Miller,  293. 

y.  Sprenkle,  57. 

y.  iueeKy  vcn^ 


N 


Nabers'  Adm*r  y.  Meredith,  184. 
Nabors  y.  State,  182. 
Naft^ger  y.  Gregg,  085,  718. 
Nailer  y.  Stanley,  440. 
Napier  y.  Gldlere,  8,  857,  892. 
Napton  y.  Lea  ton,  9U1. 
Nardln  y.  Battle,  1012. 
Natb  y.  Church,  281,  546. 

y.  Cutler,  660. 

y.  Denton,  345. 

y.  Hunt  ^t82. 

y.  Whetmore,  841. 
Naahyille,  C.  &  St  L.  Ry.  y.  Jones, 
207. 

y.  Mattingly,  867. 

y.  U.  8.,  705. 
Nashua  &  L.  R.  Corp.  y.  Boston  &  L. 

R.  Corp.,  728. 
Nason  y.  Blalsdel],  600. 
Nathans  y.  Hope,  744. 
National  Bank  y.  Bryant  724. 

y.  Gilmer,  109. 

y.  Hansee,  692. 

y.  Heard,  963. 

y.  Iron  A  R.  Co.,  448. 

y.  Peabody.  904. 

y.  Peters,  801. 

V.  Smith,  23. 


Naticmal  Broadway  Bank  y.  Hutch, 

776. 
National  Docks  A  N.  J.  Junction  Con- 
necting Ry.  Co.  y.  Railroad  Co.,  270. 
National  Exchange  Bank  y.  Preston, 

491. 
National  Fertilizer  Co.  y.  Hinson,  345, 

393. 
National  Folding  Box  &  Paper  Co.  y. 

Box  Co.,  793. 
National  Foundry  &  Pipe  Works  y. 
Water  Co.,  583. 
y.  Water  Supply  Co.,  146. 
National     Horse     Importing     Co.     y. 

Noyak,  185. 
National  Mut   Bldg.   Ass'n  y.   Kon- 

drak,  351. 
National  Say.  Bank  y.  Creswell,  440. 

y.  Welcker,  486. 
National  Security  Bank  y.  Hunnewell, 

995. 
National  S.  S.  Co.  y.  Tugman,  981. 
National  Waterworks  v.  School  Dist, 

699. 
Nations  y.  Johnson,  232,  514,  858,  912, 

962. 
Nauer  y.  Benham,  340. 
Naye  ▼.   Adams,   535,  543,   599,   613, 
791. 
V.  Todd,  181. 
y.  WilBon,  763. 
Naylor  y.  Mettler,  604. 
Naylor's  Adm'r  y.  Moffatt,  689. 
Nazro  y.  Oil  Co.,  867. 
Neafie  y.  Neafie,  720. 
Neal  y.  Brockhan,  982. 
V.  Faggert  560. 
y.  Foster.  423. 
y.  Handley,  989. 
y.  Henderson,  378. 
y.  Pennington,  235. 
y.  Singleton,  239. 
y.  Sulliyan,  953. 
Neale  y.  Utz.  187,  200. 
Kealis  y.  Dicks,  373. 
Neall  y.  Hill,  44. 
Nealon  y.  Frisble,  29. 

y.  McNeal,  494. 
Near  v.  Donnelly,  749. 
Needham  y.  Bremmer,  682. 
y.  McAuley,  101. 
y.  Thayer,  275,  959. 


CXliv  CASBS 

[References  to  sectlonB.    {{  1  to 

Xeedham  v.  Wilsou,  246. 

Neely  v.  Buchanan,  247. 

Neenan  v.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  160,  315. 

NeesoD  v.  City  of  Troy,  556. 

Neff  V.  Barr,  53. 

y.  Beauchamp,  929. 

V.  Pennoyer,  281. 

V.  Stone  Co.,  117. 
Neidllnger  v.  Yoost,  33. 
Nell  V.  Col  well,  418. 

V.  McMillan,  127. 

V.  Slaten,  477. 
NelU  V.  Hodge,  641. 
Nellson,  In  re,  320a. 

V.  Oil  Co.,  614. 
Nell  V.  Dayton,  157,  169. 
Nelson  v.  Bank,  358. 

T.  BlalBdell,  321. 

V.  Bostwick,  235. 

V.  Cottingham,  159. 

V.  Couch,  731. 

V.  Donovan,  29. 

T.  Gill,  462. 

v.  Jenks,  439a, 

V.  Moon,  194. 

V.  Nelson,  651. 

V.  Potter,  922. 

V.  Rockwell,  363. 

V.  St.  Martin's  Parish,  985f. 

V.  Turner,  439. 
Xemetty  v.  Naylor,  661a,  689. 
Neppach  v.  Jones,  543. 
Ncsbit  V.  Independent  Dist.,  506,  744. 

V.  Manro,  486. 

V.  School  Dist.,  750. 
Nessler  v.  Neher,  420,  433. 
Nestlerode  v,  Foster,  493. 
Netzer  v.  City  of  Crookston,  16. 
Neuber  v.  Shoel,  655. 
Neusbaum  v.  Keim,  63,  68,  78,  698. 
Nevada   Nickel    Syndicate   t.    Nickel 

Co.,  250. 
Nevatt  V.  School,  260. 
Nevill  V.  Hancock,  773. 
Nevins  V.  McKee,  305,  366,  378. 
Nevitt  V.  Bacon,  721. 

V.  Bank.  292. 

V.  Woodburn,  21,  554. 
Newberry  v.  Hallway  Co.,  22. 
Newburg  v.  Munshower,  211. 
Newburp:h  Bank  v.  Seymour,  156. 
Xewby  v.  Caldwell,  720. 
Xewcomb  v.  Dewey,  288,  377. 


CITBD. 

499  In  vol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  S.] 

Newcomb  v.  Drummond,  969. 

V.  Peck,  110,  227,  884,  900,  906. 
Neweomb's  Ex'r  v.  Newcomb,  270. 
Xewcome  v.  Light,  174. 
New  Dunderberg  Mln.  Co.  t.  Old,  655. 
Newell  V.  Carpenter,  614. 
V.  Neal,  731. 
V.  Newton,  865. 
V.  Smith,  205. 
New  England  Bank  v.  Lewis,  714. 
New   England  Loan  &  Trust  Co.   v. 

Avery,  112,  118. 
New  England  Mortgage  Security  Co. 

V.  Tarver,  50. 
New    Hampshire    Strafford    Bank    t. 

Cornell,  443. 
New   Haven   Copper   Co.    v.    Brown, 

1005. 
New  Jersey  Franklinite  Co.  y.  Ames, 

585. 
Newlin  V.  Mm'ray,  395. 
Newlon  v.  Heaton,  237. 
Newman  v.  Bank,  861. 
V.  Bullock,  213. 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  247. 
V.  Crowls,  277. 
V.  Irwin,  945. 
V.  Jenkins,  640. 
V.  Manning,  282. 
V.  Mayer,  114. 
V.  Meek,  373. 
V.  Schueck,  378. 
V.  Taylor,  376. 
V.  Wildenstein,  22. 
New  Mexico  &  S.  P.  R.  Co.  T.  Mad- 
den. 116. 
New  nam's  Lessee  v.  City  of  Cincin- 
nati, 110,  245. 
Newnan  v.  Stuart,  373. 

V.  Wood,  526. 
New  Orleans  v.  Bank,  609. 

V.  Morris.  378.  985a, 
New  Orleans,  M.  &  C.  B.  Co.  v.  City 

of  New  Orleans,  630. 
New  Orleans,  M.  &  T.  R.  Ck).  y.  Cas- 

tello,  744. 
New  Orleans  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Bosworth, 

199. 
Newpcirt  &  C.  Bridge  Co.  v.  Douglass. 

737. 
Newsom  v.  McLendon,  1008. 
Newsom's  Adm'r  v.  Ran,  S40l» 
Newson  v.  Lycan,  600, 


CASES  CITBD. 
[References  to  leetloni.    (}  1  to  489  in  Tol.  1;  residue  In  yol.  2.] 


cxlv 


New  South  Bulldiug  &  Loan  A8s*n  v. 

Heed,  443. 
Newton,  In  re,  256. 
V.  Bronson,  872. 
T.  Egmont,  585. 
T.  Field.  388. 
▼.  Hook,  87,  697,  750. 
Newtou  Mfg.  Go.  t.  Wilgus,  624. 

V.  White,  624. 
New   York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Ck).  v. 

Brennan,  553. 
New  York  City  Baptist  Mission  Soc. 

T.  Church,  110. 
New    York,    C.   &   St    L.    R.    Co.    v. 
Doane,  21. 


Nicklin  v.  Robertson,  1G5,  311. 
Nickrans  v.  Wilk,  270. 
Nickum  V.  Dan  vers,  617. 
NicoU  V.  Karrick,  703. 

V.  NicoU,  1005. 
Nlday  v.  Hawey,  764. 
Nielsen,  Ex  parte,  256. 
Nightingale  t.  Scannell,  734. 
Niles  Y.  Parks,  310. 

V.  Totman,  787. 
Niller  y.  Johnson,  600. 
Nlmocks  v.  Shingle  Co.,  59. 
Nims  T.  Vaughn,  766. 
Nlspel  V.  Laparle,  707. 
Nivln  V.  Stevens,  742. 


New  York  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  De  Wolf, ;  Nixon  v.  Nichols,  154. 


815. 
New  York,  L.  B.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 

Henry,  829,  847. 
New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.  y.  Aitkin,  906. 

T.  Bangs,  194. 
New  York  Security  &  Trust  Go.  v. 

Upman,  161. 
New  York  &  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Kyle,  605. 
New  York  &  T.  Land  Co.  v.  Votaw, 

631.  6o9,  938. 
New  Zealand  Ina  Co.  v.  Maaz.  1006. 
Niagara  Ins.  Co.  t.  Rodecker,  341,  349. 
Niblett  V.  Scott,  938. 
Nicely  T.  Boyles,  660. 
Nichells  T.  Nichells,  344. 
Nichoi  y.  Dunn,  23. 
Nicholas  y.  Farwell,  86a 

y.  Maddox,  29. 

y.  Phelps,  467. 
Nicholes  y.  City  of  Chicago,  3ia 
Nichols.  In  re,  257. 

y.  Bnrton,  776^ 

y.  Day.  560. 

y.  DibreU,  755. 

T.  Hewit,  69. 

▼.  Kribs,  63. 

T.  Nkrhols,  313. 

T.  Stevens,  583. 

y.  Stewart  3. 

y.  Winimer,  252. 
Nicholson  v.  Nicholson,  313. 
Nichoifl  &  Shepard  Co.  v.  Wledmann, 

146. 
Nickell  y.  Fallen,  723. 
Nickelson  y.  Ingram,  707,  719. 
Nickerson  y.  Stage  Co.,  725. 
NicklesB  y.  Pearson,  733. 
1  LAW  JUDG.-J 


N.  K.  Fairbank  &  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co., 

16. 
Noble  V.  Bamer,  406,  406a. 

y.  Cullom,  407. 

y.  Gold,  855. 

y.  Merrill,  593,  970. 

y.  Oil  Co.,  593,  795,  897,  941,  950. 
953. 
Nodlne  v.  Greenfield,  646,  6G1. 
Noe  V.  Moutray,  446. 
Noel  y.  Modern  Woodmen,  205. 
Noell  V.  Wells,  634,  635. 
NolensviUe  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Quimby, 

279. 
Noll  y.  Chattanooga  Co.,  368,  372. 
Nolte  v.  Lowe,  753. 
Norcross  v.  Hudson,  600. 
Norfolk  Lumber  Co.  v.  Simmons,  782. 
Norfolk  State  Bank  v.  Murphy,  443. 
Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Compress  Co., 

236. 
Noi-mau  v.  Hooker,  86,  326. 
Norris  v.  Amos.  789. 

V.  Denton,  63. 

V.  Hume,  385. 
North  V.  Fisher,  850. 

V.  Moore,  220,  278. 

y.  Mudge,    58,    77,    78,    211,    212, 
698. 

y.  Pepper,  133, 

y.  Y^orke,  79a,  309. 
Northam  v.  Gordon,  955. 
North  British  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cohn. 

690. 
North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Ackley, 

043. 
Northcut  y.  Lemery,  279. 


C3dTi  OASES 

[Roferencea  to  Mctiona.    }( 1  to 

Northern  Bank  y.  Kocsa,  429. 
Northern  Bank  of  Kentucky  y.  Stone, 

634a,  541. 
Northern  Pac.   R.  Go.  y.  Kurtzman, 
360. 

y.  McCormlek,  530. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  721. 

y.  Smith,  656. 
Northern  Pac.  &  P.  S.  S.  R.  Ck).  y. 

Black,  34,  335. 
Northern  Trust  Co.  y.  Ass'n,  666,  607. 

y.  College,  92. 
North  Pacific   Cycle  Co.   y.  Thomas, 

260. 
North  Point  Irr.  Co.  y.  Canal  Co.,  32. 
Northwestern  Bank  v.  Hays,  261,  731. 
Northwestern  Brewing  Co.  v.  Manion, 

32,  750. 
Northwestern  Land  Co.  y.  Dewey,  446. 
Norton  y.  Doherty,  729. 

y.  Fruit-Packing  Co.,  549. 

y.  Hood,  32. 

y.  House  of  Mercy,  872. 

y.  Jamison,  190. 

y.  Jensen,  610. 

y.  McLaurin,  340,  341. 

y.  Meader,  190. 

y.  Norton,  600.  783. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  312,  324,  847,  351. 

y.  Sanders,  165. 

T.  Seaton,  320. 

y.  Wallace.  293,  589. 

y.  Wllliama,  446. 

y.  Woods,  385. 
Norton's  Estate,  In  re,  897. 
Noryell  y.  Lessuenr,  635,  636. 
Norwegian  Plow  Co.  y.  Boilman,  368. 
Norwich  Union  Fire  Ins.  Soc.  y.  Stang, 

362. 
Norwood,  In  re,  910. 

y.  Cobb,  879,  897,  901,  OlO, 

y.  Kirby's  Adm'r,  663. 

y.  Norwood,  1003. 

y.  Thorpe,  122,  442. 
Nougue  y.  Clapp,  297a. 
Nouvion  y.  Freeman,  845. 
Novelli  V.  Rossi.  83ri,  843. 
Novotny  y.  Danforth,  183. 
Nowack  y.  Knight,  548,  600. 
>Joyes  V.  Belding,  506. 

y.  Butler,  275,  809. 

y.  Hall,  GOO. 

¥.  Loeb.  321. 


CITED. 

189  in  TOl.  1;  reiidue  In  toI.  2.] 

Noyee  y.  Newmarch,  118. 

y.  Parker,  98. 

V.  Phipps,  36. 
Nuckolls  V.  Irwin,  163.  304,  34«, 
Nugent  y.  Railroad  Co.,  323. 

y.  Traction  Co.,  939a. 
Noll  y.  Moore,  999. 
Nunn  y.  Claxton,  486. 

y.  Sturges.  857,  896. 
Nusbaum  y.  Louchheim,  69. 
Nutt  y.  Cuming,  400. 
Nnttall  y.  Simls,  536. 
Nye  y.  Kellam,  282. 

y.  Liscombe,  225. 

y.  Moody,  405. 

y.  Sochor,  383. 

■y.  StUlwell,  156, 


Oades  t.  Oades,  16. 

Oakes  y.  Ward,  138. 

Oakley  y.  Asphiwall,  174»  772i  914. 

y.  Giles,  213. 

y.  Oakley,  644. 

y.  Pegler,  116. 
Oates  y.  Munday,  445. 

y.  Parish,  248. 
Obear,  In  re.  298. 
O'Beirne  y.  Lloyd,  735. 
Oberbeck  y.  Mayer.  586. 
Oberholtzer  y.  Hazen,  300. 
Oberkoetter  y.  Luebbering,  32. 
Oberlin    Loan,  Trust  &  Banking  Go. 

y.  Kitchen,  964. 
Oberly  y.  Oberly,  351. 
Obermeyer  y.  Einstein,  321, 
Obert  y.  Obert,  650. 
O'Brien  v.  Ballou,  214. 

y.  Browning,  545. 

y.  Manwaring,  614. 

y.  O'Brien,  157.  158. 

V.  Sylvester,  354. 

y.  Wheelock,  509,  985e, 

y.  Young,  8,  10. 
Oceanic  Steam  Nay.  Co.  y.  Compania 
Transatlatica    Espanola,    569,    574, 
938. 
Ocean  Ins.  Co.  y.  Francis,  814,  815w 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  923. 

V.  Rider,  1005. 
Ocean  Nat  Bank  y.  Olcott  24& 


CASES 
[RafereneM  to  leetionB.    99  1  to 

Ochi]tr«e  y.  Railroad  Co.,  947. 
Ocbflenbein  y.  Papelier,  844. 
Ockershausen  t.  Railruad  Co.,  91. 
Ocklngton  v.  Rlchey,  597. 
Ck!obock  T.  Baker,  443. 
Ocoee  Bank  t.  Hughes,  154. 
O'Conuell  v.  O'Connell,  320. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  584. 
O'Conner  v.  Mullen,  159. 
O'Connor  t.  Felix,  270. 

V.  Improvement  Co.,  590. 

y.  Irvine,  725. 

y.  Vnmey,  761,  763. 

V.  ^Yalter,  538. 
O'Dea  V.  O'Dea,  929. 
Odell  V.  Reynolds,  61.  69,  157. 

V.  Rogers,  638. 
Odes  V.  Woodward,  61a,  441. 
Odle  y.  Frost,  268. 
Odom  V.  Burch,  297. 

V.  Denny.  233,  771. 
Odorilla  y.  Baizley,  796. 
Oetgen  v.  Ross,  655. 
Off  V.  Trust  Co.,  376. 
Offutt  V.  John,  504,  787. 
Oyden  V.  Folllott  841. 

y.  Knepler,  428. 

V.  I^rraboe,  368. 
Ogden  City  v.  Irrigation  Co.,  82. 
Ogsbury  y.  La  Farge,  720. 
O'Hairen  v.  O'Hagen,  179. 
O'Haulon  v.  Scott,  770,  780. 
O'Uarn  v.  Baum,  326. 

V.  McConnelL  188,  193. 

V.  I»arker,  718. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  599,  938a. 
Ohio  V.  Beam,  155. 
Ohio  Falls  Car  Co.  v.  Sweet  &  Clark 

Co..  346a. 
Ohio,  I.  Sc  W.  R.  Co.  V.  Dooley,  742. 
Ohio  &  W.  Mortgage  &  Trust  Co.  y. 

Carter.  370.  378.  387,  393. 
Ohlemacher  v.  Brown.  824. 
Oil  Well  Supply  Co.  v.  Koen,  801. 
OKeefe  v.  Foster.  154. 

V.  Real-Estate  Co.,  721. 
Olander  v.  Tlghe,  438. 
Okinyer  v.  Blanchard.  152. 
Olcott  V.  Kohlsaat,  141. 

y.  UtUe,  771. 
Old  Dominion  Granite  Co.  y.  Clarke. 

112,  406. 
Oldham  y.  .Mclyer,  614« 


CITBD.  CXlvil 

499  in  ToL  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Oldham  y.  Stephens,  809. 
Olds  y.  Glaze,  889. 
Oleson  V.  Merrihew,  714. 
Oliphant  v.  Whitney,  326. 
Oliver  y.  French,  2a 

y.  Gerstle,  340. 

y.  Holt,  734,  736. 

v.  Lansing,  407,  701. 

V.  Riley,  368,  393. 

v.  Wilson,  32. 
Olmstead  v.  Bach,  752. 

v.  Hoyt,  255. 

y.  Webster,  770. 
Olney  v.  Angell,  922. 

v.  Boyd,  318. 
Olsen  V.  Newton,  29. 

v.  Whitney,  744. 
Olson  y.  Nnnnally,  355. 
Omaha   Coal,   Coke   &   Lime  Co.    v. 

Suess.  439a. 
Omaha  &  R.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Standen, 

743. 
Omaha  &  St  L.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Neill,  666. 
O'Malia  y.  Wentworth,  255. 
O'Malley  y.  Fricke,  278. 
O'Meara  v.  Bank,  46. 
O'Neal  y.  Brown,  621,  734,  73& 

y.  Clymer,  50. 

y.  Klttredge,  958,  964. 

y.  Rumley  Co.,  16. 
O'Neill's  Estate,  In  re,  321. 
Openheimer  v.  Robinson,  406. 
Oppenheimer  v.  Giershofer,  62,  67. 

v.  Robinson,  405. 
Orcutt  v.  Orms.  518. 

V.  Ranney,  227. 
Order  of  Solon  v.  Gaskill,  576. 
Ordinary  v.  McClure,  114. 
Ordinary  of  Charleston  Dist  y.  Con- 

dy,  589. 
Ordway,  In  re,  807. 

y.  Railroad  Co..  699. 

y.  Suchard,  308.  341. 
Oregonian  R.  Co.  v.  Navigation  Co., 

510,  708. 
Oregon  R.  Co.  y.  Railroad  Co.,  87. 
Orendorff  v.  Utz,  735. 
Orman  y.  Railroad  Co.,  28. 
Ormiston  y.  Trumbo,  33. 
Ormsby  y.  Conrad,  352. 
Oro  Fino  &  Morning  Star  Min.  Co.  y. 

Cullen,  358. 
O'Rourke  v.  Railroad  Co.,  599,  928. 


cxlyii^  CASES 

[References  to  sectioni.    8§  1  to 

Orr  V.  Insurance  Co.,  G98. 

V.  Morrow,  462. 

V.  Spocner,  954. 
Orthwein  v.  Thomas,  577, 
Orton  V.  Brown,  183. 
Orvis  V.  Curtiss,  121. 

T.  Elliott,  306,  30f. 
Ory  V.  Winter,  824. 
Osage  City  Bank  v.  Jones,  599. 
Osborn  v.  Cloud,  947. 

V.  Jaines,  892. 

V.  Lovell,  149. 

V.  U.  S.,  681. 
Osborne  v.  Atkins,  735. 

V.  Com'rs,  985c. 

v.  Graham,  284,  633. 

V.  Hill,  449. 

V.  LincMrom,  985. 

V.  Williams,  761. 
Osbun  V.  Bartram,  82. 
Osgood  V.  President  etc.,  560. 

V.  Thurston,  4a3. 
Osman  v.  Wisted,  324. 
Osprey  v.  Jenkins,  86. 
Osterhoudt  v.  Rigney.  532. 
Ostrander  v.  Hart,  599. 

V.  People,  175. 

V.  Walters,  1008. 
Oswald  V.  Kanipmann,  810. 
Otis  V.  The  Rio  Grande.  246,  274. 

V.  Sweeney,  631. 
Otterson  t.  Mlddleton,  290. 
Otto  V.  Halff,  32. 
Ouseley  v.  Safe  Deposit  Co.,  836. 
Outhwite  V.  Porter.  220,  906. 
Outram   v.   Morewood,   503,   504,   647, 

657.  729,  783,  787. 
Overall  v.  Pero.  115. 
Overby  v.  Gordon,  922, 

V.  Hart,  1006,  1008. 
Overland  Gold  Min.  Co.  v.  McMaster, 

32. 
Overstreet  v.  Davis,  219. 

v.  Shannon,  894. 
Overton  v.  Searcy,  518. 

V.  Stevens,  304. 
Owen  V.  Boenini,  526. 

V.  Conner,  208. 

V.  Gerson,  383. 

V.  Glover,  1012. 

V.  Land  Co.,  556. 
Owens  V.  Alexander,  600. 

V.  Flynn,  143. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  L] 

Owens  V.  Gotzian,  938c. 

V.  Love,  44. 

V.  Machinery  Co.,  379. 

V.  McCloskey,  487,  499,  892. 

V.  Ranstead,  377. 

y.  Raleigh,  729. 

v.  Sims,  320. 
Owensby  v.  Piatt,-  999. 
Owiugsville  &  Mt.  S.  Turnpike  Road 

Co.  V.  Hamilton,  541. 
Oyser  v.  Bank,  31a. 


Pabst  Brewing  Co.  y.  Jensen,  605. 
Pacific  Bank  v.  Hannah,  661. 
Pacific  Milt  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Williams, 

348. 
Pacific  Pneumatic  Gas  Co.  y.  Wheel- 

ock,  896. 
Packard  v.  Hill,  849,  1015. 

V.  Matthews.  229. 

y.  Smith,  317. 
Packer  v.  Owens,  36. 

V.  Roberts,  54,  61. 

V.  Thompson,  857,  921. 
Packer's  Appeal,  432. 
Packham  v.  Insurance  Co.,  731. 
Pacquette  v.  Pickness,  652. 
Paddleford  v.  Bancroft,  299. 
Paddock  v.  Insurance  Co.,  29,  152. 

V.  Palmer,  367. 

V.  Staley,  459. 
Padgitt  V.  Evans,  341. 
Page,  Ex  parte,  2.38. 

v.  Benson.  478,  950. 

y.  Chapin,  132. 

y.  Esty,  691. 

V.  Freeman,  779,  782. 

y.  Simpson,  69,  73. 

y.  Thomas.  431. 

V.  U.  S.,  285. 
Page's  Estate,  127. 
Pajret  v.  Melcher,  110. 
Pasrett  v.  Curtis,  227. 
Pahlnian  v.  Shumway,  434. 
Pain  V.  Kinney,  23. 

Paine  v.  Insurance  Co.,  510,  621,  800. 
864,   882. 

V.  Stone,  633. 
Paine's  Lessee  v.  Mooroland.  446. 
Palethorp's  Estate,  In  re,  38. 


CASES 
[References  to  sections.    §S  1  to 

Palmateer  v.  Meredith,  1000. 
Palmer  v.  Bank,  149,  32U. 

Y.  Carlisle,  585. 

T.  Crane,  29. 

Y.  Hayes,  539. 

T.  Hnssey,  615. 

Y.  Insurance  Co.,  543. 

Y.  Laberee,  399,  463. 

Y.  Malone,  363. 

Y.  Martindell,  293. 

Y.  Oakley.  639. 

Y.  Palmer,  867. 

Y.  Rogers,  347. 

Y.  Russell,  347. 

Y.  Sanger,  628. 
Panesi  y.  Boswell,  342. 
Panton  y.  Hall,  491. 
Papworth  v.  aty  of  Fitzgerald,  707. 
Paragon  Refining  Co.  t.  Lee,  144. 
Pard<m  v.  Dwire,  270,  273. 
Parish  Y.  Parish,  278,  320. 
Park  Y.  Edge,  206. 

Y.  Park,  95,  227. 
Parke  y.  Meyer,  208. 

Y.  WlUianis,  876. 
Parker  v.  Albee,  268,  761« 

Y.  Atwood,  248. 

Y.  Bacon,  945. 

Y.  Bank,  341. 

V.  Belcher,  326,  340. 
•       Y.  Grant,  349. 

Y.  Harden,  22. 

Y.  Home,  199. 

Y.  HotchkJss,  657. 

Y.  House,  87. 

Y.  Kane,  261,  518. 

Y.  Lamb  &  Sons,  910a* 

Y.  Leggett,  657,  658. 

V.  Linden,  85. 

Y.  Mill  Co..  859.  910a. 

Y.  Moore,  541,  548. 

Y.  Obenchain,  691. 

Y.  Parker.  635,  636. 

V.  Poole,  54. 

Y.  Roberts.  768. 

Y.  Shannon,  620. 

Y.  Spencer,  707. 

Y.  Stambaugh,  655. 

Y.  Standish,  657. 

Y.  Starr,  193. 

T.  State.  259. 

T.  Steed.  189. 

Y.  Straat,  543. 


CITED.  cxlix 

498  in  YoL  1;  residue  in  YOl.  2.] 

Parker  v.  Thompson,  628. 

V.  Wright.  681. 
Parker's  Adra'r  v.  Abrams,  100. 
Parkes  v.  CUf  t,  694,  707. 
Parkhurst  v.  Berdell,  510. 

Y.  Sumner,  586,  587. 
Parks,  Ex  parte,  255,  250. 

Y.  Coffey,  173.  407. 

Y.  Dunlap,  703. 

Y.  Jackson.  438. 

Y.  Moore.  628,  655. 
Parmele  y.  Schroeder,  48. 
Parmelee  y.  Dann,  952. 
Pamell  y.  Hahn,  609. 
Parr  y.  Lindler,  271. 

Y.  State,  540. 

Y.  Village  of  Greenbusb,  726. 
Parrish  v.  Ferris,  504. 
Parrott  v.  Den,  347,  349. 

Y.  Hodgson.  691. 

Y.  Insurance  Co..  905. 

Y.  McDevitt,  130. 
Parry  v.  Opera  Co.,  752, 

V.  Walser,  969. 

V.  Woodson,  218. 
Parsley  y.  Nicholson,  183. 
Parsons.  Ex  parte.  985b. 

Y.  Dennis,  979. 

Y.  Hoyt,  447. 

Y.  Johnson.  316. 

V.  Pierson,  363. 

Y.  Robinson,  44. 

Y.  Spencer,  190i 

Y.  Yenzke,  530. 
Partin  y.  Luterloh,  376. 
Partridge  y.  Harrow.  168,  381« 
Parzyk  y.  Mach,  92. 
Pasek  Y.  Vockroth,  1005. 
Pasewalk  y.  BoUman,  587. 
Pasley  y.  McConnell,  714. 
Pasour  Y.  Rhyne,  461. 
Passwater  y.  Edwards,  180. 
Pasteur  y.  Lewis,  938.  939. 
Pasthoff  Y.  Banendahl,  782. 
Patapsco  Guano  Co.  v.  Hurst,  549. 
Patrick  V.  Court,  620. 

V.  Littell,  192. 

Y.  Ridgaway,  91. 

Y.  Schaffer.  761. 

Y.  Shedden,  827. 
Patten  v.  Cllley.  37. 

Y.  Cunningham,  237. 

V.  Ray,  802. 


Ol  CASES 

rReferencei  to  Bectlona.    8S  1  to 

Patterson  v.  Baxley,  465. 

y.  Gaines,  606. 

V.  Hare,  308. 

V.  Indiana,  69. 

T.  Pressey,  256. 

V.  Swan,  1006. 

V.  Walton,  401. 

V.  Ward,  32,  1004.  1005. 
Patterson's  Estate,  In  re,  600. 
Pattlson  V.  Hughes.  321, 

v.  Jossel^ni,  306. 

V.  Smith,  227. 
Patton  T.  Allison,  806. 

T.  Hamner,  1009. 

V.  Hayter,  455. 

T.  Shanklln,  120. 

V.  Stewart,  55,  61,  191. 
Paul  V.  Eurich,  1016. 

T.  Hussey,  287. 

V.  Roy,  827,  845. 

T.  Smith,  245. 

V.  Witman,  569,  571. 
PauUlsseu  v.  Loock,  284. 
Pawling  V.  Willson,  229^  828,  856,  904, 

926. 
Paxton  V.  Boyce,  407. 
Payne  v.  Bank,  225. 

V.  Coles,  548. 

V.  O'Shea,  368,  904,  919. 

y.  Robinson,  61. 

V.  Taylor,  966. 

V.  Witberspoon,  229. 
Paynter  v.  Evans^  378. 
Pay  son,  In  re,  257. 

V.  Payson,  926. 
Payton  v.  McQuown,  375. 
Peabody  v.  Phelps,  179,  223. 

V.  Thatcher,  217. 
Peacock  v.  Pembroke,  941. 
Peagram  v.  King,  372. 
Peak  V.  Pricer,  196. 

V.  Shasted,  193. 
Peake  v.  Kedd,  329. 
Peale  v.  Bolton,  1006. 
Pearce  v.  At  wood,  182. 

y.  Chastaln,  384,   386. 

V.  Jackson,  660. 

V.  Olney,  368,  370,  373,  916,  919. 

V.  Rice,  592. 
Pearse  v.  Hill,  252. 
Pearson  v.  Fishing  CJo.,  341. 

V.  Post,  682. 
Pease  v.  Howard,  522,  985. 


CITED. 

499  in  YOl.  1;  roBldue  in  vol.  2.1 

Peatross  y.  McLaughlin,  390. 
Peay  v.  Duncan,  504. 

V.  Fleming,  1008. 
Peck  T.  Hibbard,  824. 

V.  Tiffany,  1008. 

v.  Vandenberg,  23,  39. 
Peddy  v.  Street,  125. 
Peel  V.  January,  909,  917,  973. 
Peerce  v.  Athey,  753. 
Peet  V.  Hatcher.  518,  754,  861. 
Peetsch  v.  Qulnn,  122. 
Pelrce  v.  Bent,  954,  1000. 

V.  Black,  465,  477,  991. 
Pelham  v.  Moreland,  357. 
Pell  V.  Lander,  394. 
Pells  V.  People,  511. 
Pelton  V.  Mott,  705,  720. 

T.  Platner,  857,  860,  875,  904,  935. 
Pelzer  Mfg.  Co.  t.  Insurance  Co.,  16& 
Pemberton  t.  Hughes,  827. 

T.  Johnson,  191. 

V.  Pollard,  412. 
Pence  v.  Armstrong,  677. 

V.  Cochran,  456. 
Pender  v.  Felts,  270. 
Pendergrass  v.  York  Mauuf  g  Co.,  689. 
Pendexter  v.  Cole,  246. 
Pendleton  v.  Weed,  275. 
Penfleld  v.  Harris,  577. 
Penfold  V.  Slyfleld,  82. 
Penhallow  v.  Doane,  797.  • 

Peninsular  Iron  Co.  y.  Eells,  681a. 
Peniston  t.  Somers,  3.  526. 
Penn,  In  re,  320a. 

y.  Edwards,  995. 

y.  Remsen,  1011. 

V.  Tollison,  173. 
Pennell  v.  Felch,  060. 
Pennie  v.  Visher,  86. 
Pennington  v.  Gibson,  517.  962.  966,. 
Pennington's  Adm'x  v.  Gibson,  349. 
Pennock  v.  Hart,  485. 

V.  Kennedy,  731. 
Pennoyer  v.  Neff,  220,  227,  228,  220, 
230,  231,  792,  803,  822,  901,  904,  905, 
90t),  928.  932,  938c,  939. 
Pennsylvania     Agricultural     &     Mfg. 

Bank  v.  Crevor,  458. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Smith,  16. 
Pennsylvania  F^re  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wagley, 

159. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co., 
93Sc. 


CASES 
[KeCerenGM  to  Motknis.   HI  to 

Penny  t.  Martin,  770. 

Pennywit  v.  Foote,  173,  853,  897,  901. 

PenolMoot  B.  Go.  y.  Weeks,  270,  277, 

278. 
Penrose  y.  McKenzie,  252. 
Pentecost  y.  Magahee,  32. 
PenU  Y.  Kuester,  660. 
Penyan  y.  Berry,  593. 
People  Y.  Bacon,  326,  967. 

Y.  Baker,  928,  929,  932. 

Y.  Bangs,  175. 

Y.  Barrett.  693. 

Y.  Beandry,  534a. 

Y.  Beebe,  477. 

Y.  BeeYers,  529. 

Y.  Brisbln,  809. 

Y.  Cassels,  275. 

Y.  Cavanagh,  258. 

Y.  ChlsholiD,  1007. 

Y.  Com'rs,  253a,  529. 

Y.  Common  Pleas,  1001. 

Y.  Council,  158,  253a. 

Y.  Court,  155,  165,  254,  407. 

Y.  Dalton,  733. 

Y.  Dawell,  897.  901,  930. 

Y.  Dewey,  860.  881. 

Y.  Dodge,  307. 

Y.  Downer,  107. 

Y.  Downing.  246w 

Y.  Dunn,  324. 

Y.  Easton,  479. 

Y.  Fleming,  945. 

Y.  Foster,  255. 

Y.  Graham.  107. 

Y.  Hagar,  287. 

Y.  Harrison.  770,  775. 

Y.  Holladny,  534a,  618,  684. 

Y.  Hopson.    1006. 

Y.  Hovlous,  417. 

Y.  Huber,  232. 

Y.  Irrigation  Dlst,  534a. 

Y.  Johnson,  609,  617,  619. 

Y.  Judge,  33,  185.  521. 

Y.  Judges,  313. 

Y.  Kenyon,  529. 

Y.  Lafarge.  311. 

Y.  Lease,  560. 

Y.  Leland,  529. 

Y.  Llngle.  247. 

Y.  Llacomb.  255,  256»  258. 

Y.  Loeffler.  534a. 

Y.  McLeod.  255. 

V.  Marsh,  985a« 


CITED.  Cli 

409  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

People  V.  Medart,  284. 

Y.  Mullan.  232. 

Y.  Murray,  107. 

Y.  O'Counell,  334,  362. 

Y.  Organ,  206. 

Y.  Plrfenbrlnk,  118. 

Y.  Preston,  531. 

Y.  Railroad  Co.,  981. 

Y.  Rains.  340a,  341,  347.  849. 

Y.  Reuter,   15. 

Y.  Rlckert,  685,  726. 

Y.  Rodgers,  793. 

Y.  SaYings  Union,  118. 

Y.  Smith,   703. 

Y.  Stephens,  710. 

Y.  Stevens,  256. 

Y.  Sturtevant,  962. 

Y.  Supers,  603. 

Y.  Temple.  302.  307,  824. 

Y.  Townsend.  644. 

Y.  Vilas,  699. 

Y.  Walters,  258. 

Y.  Warden,  256. 

Y.  Weber,  247. 

Y.  Welmer,  999. 

Y.  Zundel.  578. 
Peoples  V.  Norwood,  183. 
People's  Ice  Co.  y.  Schlenker,  347. 
People's  Mut.  Ben.  Soc.  v.  Frazer,  83. 
People's  Nat.  Bank  v.  McArthur,  160. 
People's  Pure   Ice  Co.   v.    Trumbull, 

663. 
People's  Sav.  Bank  y.  Hodgdon.  656. 
Peoria,  D.  &  E.  By.  Co.  v.  Duggan, 

377. 
Peoria  Savings.  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Eider, 

674.  1008. 
Pepin  Y.  Lachenmeyer.  173.  175,  877. 
Pepper  v.  Donnelly,  694. 
Percy  v.  Foote,  726. 
Perdue  v.  Bradshaw.  169. 
Perlne  v.  Dunn,  720. 
Perisho  v.  Perisho,  246. 
Perkins.  Ex  parte,  256. 

Y.  Brazos,  630. 

Y.  Cheney,  590. 

Y.  Coal  Co.,  414. 

Y.  Dunlavy,  132.' 

Y.  Fourniquet,  44. 

Y.  Hume.  482a. 

Y.  Jones.  182. 

Y.  Moore,  589,  693,  707,  708,  790. 

Y.  Oliver,  614. 


Clii  GASES 

[References  to  seoUoiUk    H 1  to 

Perkins  v.  Parker,  593,  628. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  387. 

V.  Walker,  613,  627,  784. 
Perrine  v.  Carlisle,  300. 
Perry  v.  Adams,  194. 

T.  Bassett,  228. 

▼.  Church,  29. 

V.  Dickerson,  752. 

T.  Fisher,  322. 

V.  Harrington,  747. 

y.  Insurance  Co.,  936w 

▼.  Johnston,  365. 

V.  Kearney,  357. 

V.  King,  273,  682. 

V.  Lewis,  729. 

V.  Meddowcroft,  293. 

V.  Morris,  418. 

V.  Pearee,  346. 

Y.  Roberts,  962. 

V.  Siter,  373. 

T.  WUson,  127. 
Perryman  v.  State,  261. 
Persinger  t.  Tinkle,  22. 
Persons  t.  Simons,  21. 
Perth  Amboy  Terra  Cotta  Co.'s  Ap- 
peal, 57. 
Peru  Plow  &  Wheel  Co.  t.  Enterprise 
Co.,  29. 

V.  Ward,  751. 
Petalka  v.  Fitie,  367,  393. 
Peterkln  v.  New  Orleans,  985a. 
Peterman  y.  Huliug,  651. 

T.  Watklns,  513. 
Peters,  Es  parte,  259. 

T.  Crittenden,  209. 

V.  Lawson,  990. 

V.  League,  392. 

y.  McWilliams,  996. 

y.  Peters,  284. 

y.  Warren  Ins.  Co.,  815i. 
Petersine  y.  Thomas,  614. 
Peterson  y.  Albach,  655. 

y.  Bank,  154. 

y.  Gittlngs,  968. 

y.  Lothrop,  534. 

y.  Sohl,  C17. 

y.  Warner,  543,  609. 

y.  Willard,  801. 
Petit  V.  Seaman,  290. 
Petley  y.  Carpenter,  311. 
Petray  y.  Howell,  412. 
Petrie  y.  Badenoch,  766. 

y.  Nuttall,  520. 


CITED. 

4M  In  Yol.  1;  residue  in  yd.  2.] 

Pettes  y.  Whitehall  Bank,  366,  367. 
Petticolas  y.  City  of  Richmond,  779. 
Pettigrew  y.  City  of  Sioux  Falls,  347, 

348. 
Pettit  y.  Shepherd,  466. 
Pettus  y.  Ass'n,  522. 

y.  McClannahan,  165,  307. 

y.  Smith,  756. 
Petty.  In  re,  255.  25a 
Pettys  y.  Marsh,  13. 
Peyton  y.  Scott,  206. 
Pfaff  y.  Thomas,  34. 
Pfau  y.  Lorain,  770. 
Pfeltz  y.  Pfeltz,  661. 
Pharr  y.  Reynolds,  383. 
Phelan  y.  Fitzpatrick,  768. 

y.  Gardner,  614. 

y.  Tyler,  655. 
Phelps  y.  Benson,  280. 

y.  Brackett,  190. 

y.  Brewer.  227,  901,  906.  91S. 

V.  Duffy.  857,  875. 

y.  Heaton,  346. 

y.  Holker,  229,  894,  904. 

V.  Peabody,  378. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  703. 

V.  Reeder,  1004. 
Phifer  y.  Insurance  Co.,  340a. 
Philadelphia  Bank  y.  Craft  40a 
Philadelphia  W.  &  B.  R.  Co.  y.  Trim- 
ble. 220. 
Philadelphia   &   R.   R.    y.    Snowdon. 

36,  304a. 
Philbrick  y.  Andrews,  407.  425. 
Philbrook  y.  Newman,  938c. 
Philip  y.  Dayis,  336. 
Philipowski  y.  Spencer.  790. 
Philipson  y.  Egreroout,  293. 
Phillips,  Ex  parte,  255. 

y.  Society,  348. 

V.  Bachelder,  91. 

V.  Behn,  990. 

V.  Berick,  628,  744. 

V.  Bossard,  737. 

T.  Collier,  341. 

T.  Dugan,  152. 

y.  Dusenberry,  193. 

y.  Eyans,    326. 

y.  Eyre,  174. 

V.  Godfrey,  859. 

y.  Hawley,  341. 

y.  Hellings,  28. 

y.  Hunter.  825,  826,  832. 


CASES 
[References  to  leetlona.    H  1  to 

PhlUlps  y.  Israel.  686. 

T.  Jamieson,  578. 

Y.  Knbn,  390. 

V.  Lewis,  514,  681. 

T.  McKaig,  406. 

y.  Mackay,  1001. 

y.  Kegley,  356. 

y.  PhiUlps,  273. 

y.  PuUen,  367. 

y.  Stewart,  189, 

y.  Thompson,  548. 

y.  Walt,  487,  40a 

y.  Ward,  773. 

y.  Winter,  660. 
Philpott  y.  Adams,  849. 

y.  Brown,  703.  723. 
Phillpotts  y.  Blasdel,  706. 
Phllson  y.  Bampfield's  Adm'r,  100. 
Pbinney,  In  re,  255. 
Pblpps  y.  Alford,  703. 

V.  Nye,  877. 
Phoenix  Bridge  Co.  y.  Street  318. 
Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  y.  Hedrlck,  87. 
Phoenix  Min.  &  Mill  Co.  y.  Scott,  422. 
Phoenix  Mut  Life  Ins.  Co.  y.  Landis, 

586. 
Phonoharp  Co.  y.  Stobbe,  86. 
Piatt  y.  Ollyer,  685. 

y.  St  CUir,  990. 
Pick  y.  GUckman,  346. 
Pickering  y.  Telephone  Co.,  100. 
Picket  y.  Morris,  363. 
Pickett  y.  Ferguson,  906,  913. 

y.  Handy,  92. 

y.  Throston,  52. 
Pickett's  Ex'rs  y.  Ford,  572. 
Pickett's  Heirs  y.  Legerwood,  300. 
Pl<toell  y.  Thompson,  44. 
Pico  y.  Cohn,  323. 

y.  Sonot  367. 

y.  Webster,  578,  588. 
Piedmont  Wagon  Co.  y.  Byrd,  576. 
Piedmont  &  A.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ray,  882. 
Pierce  y.  Bowers.  266. 

y.  Brown,  400,  413,  445, 

y.  Carletou,  260,  595. 

y.  Court  317. 

y.  Dayldson,  892. 

y.  Hilton,  703. 

y.  Ollyer,  660. 

y.  Strickland,  293. 

y.  Wlmberly,  406. 


CITED.  cliii 

499  In  YoL  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Piercy  v.  Sabln,  789. 

Pierpoint  v.  McGulre,  587. 

Pierro  v.  Railroad  Co.,  285.  735,  738. 

Pierson  y.  Benedict  329. 

V.  Catlin.  518. 

y.  Conley,  CtM),  755. 

V.  School  Dlst.,  100. 

V.  Hitchner,  195. 
Pierstofl  V.  Jorges,  790,  967. 
Pike  y.  Bright  945. 

y.  Hill,  299. 
Pilcher  v.  Graham,  909. 

y.  Ligon,  625,  734. 
Pile  V.  McBratney.  606. 
Pilger  V.  Torrence,  393. 
Pillsbury's  Lessee  y.  Dugan's  Adm'r. 

793. 
Pirn  y.  Curell,  606. 

y.  Grazebrook,  16. 
Pin  y.  Morris,  530. 
Pinckney's  Adm^r  y.  Singleton,  984. 
Pine  Momitain   Iron  &  Coal   Co.   y. 

Tabour,  354. 
Pinger  y.  Vanclick,  158. 
Pinkel,  In  re,  977. 
Pinkney  v.  Plnkney,  232. 
Pinney  y.  Barnes,  735. 

y.  Russell  &  Co.,  406. 
Plnson  y.  Puckett,  989. 
Pioneer  Land  Co.  y.  Maddux,  278. 
Pioneer  Say.  &  Loan  Co.  y.  Bartsch, 

599. 
Pionier  y.  Alexander,  143. 
Piper  y.  Aldrich,  340. 
Pipkin  y.  Adams,  461. 

y.  Allen,  39. 
Pirie  y.  Hughes,  77. 

V.  Stem,  53. 
Pishaway  y.  Runnells,  745. 
Pitkin  y.  Leavltt  567. 
Pitman  y.  Albany,  812. 

y.  Ijowe,  165. 

y.  Town  of  Albany,  812i 
Pitner  y.  Flanagan,  246. 
Pitt  y.  Freed,  864. 
Pittel  y.  Ass'n,  560,  790. 
Pitts  y.  Fugate,  102. 

y.  Spotts,  431. 
Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St  L.  B.  Co.  y. 
Beck,  157. 

y.  Trust  Co.,  038. 

y.  Volkert  944,  950. 


Cliv  CASES 

CBeferences  to  sectionB.    S8  1  to 

Pittsburg,  C.  &  St  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Mar- 
shall, 493. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  45. 
Pittsburg  Coal  Min.  Co.  v.  Greenwood, 

141. 
Pittsburg,  F.  W.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago, 118. 

V.  Reno,  683. 
Pittsburg  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Shaw,  121. 
Pittsburg  &  S.  L.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal,  872. 
Pittsford  V.  Chittenden,  805. 
Pitzele  T.  Lutkins,  343,  351. 
Pitzer  T.  Russel,  958. 
P.  J.  Willis  &  Bro.  T.  Sommerville, 

406a. 
Place  V.  Mfg.  Co.,  174. 
Placer  Co.  v.  Campbell,  532. 
Plant  V.  Carpenter,  709. 
Plate  V.  RaiU-oad  Co.,  742. 
Platner  t.  Best,  737. 

T.  Johnson,  206. 

V.  Patchin,  192. 
Piatt  V.  Harrison,  257, 

V.  Threadgill,  370. 

T.  Vermillion,  534a. 
Platte  Co.  V.  Marshall,  109. 
Pleak  V.  Chambers,  657. 
Pleasants  t.  Clements,  518. 
Plemmons  v.  Improvement  Co.,  27. 
Pleyte  v.  Pleyte,  162. 
Plowman  v.  Henderson,  174, 
Plume  V.  Beale.  635. 

V.  Saying  Inst,  640. 
Plummer  v.  Brown,  316,  530. 

V.  Douglas,  68, 

V.  Hatton,  231,  680. 

V.  Woodbume,  845. 
Plunkett  V.  Black,  360. 
Poe  V.  Darrah,  1013. 

V.  Decker,  371. 
Poindexter  v.  Waddy,  368,  369. 
Poirier  t.  Gravel,  351. 
Poledori  v.  Newman,  141. 
Poley  V.  Lacert,  567. 
Police  Jury  of  Jefferson  v.  U.  S.,  610, 

985d. 
Police   Jury   of   Lafourche   T.    Police 

Jury,  514,  630. 
Polk  V.  Pendleton,  492. 
Polk  Co.  V.  Nelson,  478. 
Polk  County  Bank  v.  Fleming,  898. 
Pollard  V.  Baldwin,  901. 

V.  Baylors,  650. 


CITED. 

499  m  vol.  1;  residue  in  VOL  1] 

Pollard  V.  Cocke,  413. 

V.  Eekford,  493. 

V.  King,  131. 

V.  Wegener,  277. 
Pollitz  V.  Schell,  682. 

V.  Trust  Co.,  583a. 
Pollock  V.  Boyd,  30a. 

T.  Buie,  268. 

V.  Cox,  536. 

Y.  Gilbert,  378,  386,  618L 

V.  Horn,  205. 
Pomeroy  v.  Betts,  232. 

V.  Burnett,  16. 

V.  Chandler,  939^ 

V.  Wells,  927. 
Ponce  V.  Underwood,  240,  90^ 
Pond  V.  Davenport,  63,  68,  7(K 

V.  Makepeace,  563,  680# 

y.  Simons,  52,  901. 
Ponder  v.  Cox,  364,  366. 

V.  Moseley,  513. 
Pool  V.  Loomis,  127. 
Poole  V.  McLeod,  164. 

V.  Seney,  517,  683. 
Poorman  v.  Crane*s  Adm*r,  912L 

V.  Mitchell,  970. 
Pope  V.  Brandon,  122,  442. 

V.  Dinsmore,  84. 
Porche  v.  Ledoux,  557. 
Porges  V.  Cohen,  723. 
Porman  v.  Frede,  108. 
Portage  Canal  Co.  v.  Crittenden,  77. 
Porter  v.  Bagby,  549,  953. 

V.  Bichard,  86. 

V.  Bishop,  530. 

y.  Bronson,  275. 

y.  Burton,  44. 

y.  Fralelgh,  709. 

V.  Gile,  245,  995. 

V.  Hitchcock,  485. 

V.  Hower,  85. 

y.  Insurance  Co.,  314. 

y.  Leache,  683. 

y.  Liscom,  953,  964. 

y.  Purdy,  287. 

y.  Rountree,  290. 

y.  Schendel,  740. 

y.  Vaughn,  723. 

y.  Wagner,  518,  720. 

V.  Waltz,  la 
Porterfleld  v.  Butler,  184. 
Porter's  Heirs  v.  Robinson,  195,  197. 
Porter's  Lessee  y.  Matthews,  667. 


CASES  CIT£D. 
IRdterencM  to  sectloiw.    H 1  to  4M  in  toL  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 


clv 


l*ortJ8  V.  Ennis,  987. 

T.  Talbot.  155,  157,  106. 
Portland  Const.  Co.  ▼.  O'Neil,  986. 
Portsmouth  Say.  Bank  v.  Judge,  513. 
Post  V.  Boardman,  382. 

V.  Carr,  340. 

Y.  Charleswortb,  325. 

T.  Neafle,  869,  902. 

V.  Pearson,  707. 

V.  SmlUe,  624. 

T.  Taylor  County,  986e, 
Postens  T.  Postens.  652. 
Poston  ▼.  Jones,  652. 
Potter  Y.  Baker,  611,  657. 

y.  Beal,  41. 

T.  Brown,  824. 

T.  Eaton,  115. 

y.  Hartnett,  967. 

y.  McCormack,  97,  104. 

y.  Parsons,  225. 

y.  Talkington,  24. 

y.  Webb,  635. 
Potts  y.  Ports,  29. 
Potyln  y.  McCoryey,  29. 
Potwin  y.  Oades,  118. 
Powe  y.  McLeod.  122,  127,  443. 

y.  State,  105. 
Powell  y.  Allred,  446. 

y.  Bennett  100. 

y.  Davis,  857,  883. 

y.  Geissendorff,  593. 

V.  Gott,  193,  195,  327. 

y.  Heckerman,  549. 

y.  Jopling,  308. 

y.  Knox,  433. 

y.  Redfield,  149. 

y.  Stewart,  383. 
Power  y.  Speckman,  589. 

y.  Washington,  200,  204,  339. 
Powers  y.  Bank,  518. 

y.  Council  Bluffs,  743. 

y.  Irish,  211. 

y.  Leith,  530. 

y.  People,  282. 

y.  Trenor.  325. 
P.  P.  Mast  Buggy  Co.  y.  Implement 

06.,  59. 
Pratt  y.  Jones,  958. 

y.  Kells,  351. 

y.  McLure,  992. 

y.  Xortham,  371. 

y.  Ratliff,  726. 

y.  Wertheimer,  943,  948. 


Piart  V.  Weyman,  518. 
Pray  y.  Hegeman,  614. 

v.  Jenkins,  292. 
Preachers'  Aid  Soc.  v.  England,  684. 
Predohl  v.  O'SuUlvan,  085. 
Preferred  Ace  Ins.  Co.  v.  Barker,  789. 
Prelss  y.  Cohen,  514. 
Premier  Cycle  Mfg.  Co.,  In  re,  513. 
Prendergast  y.  Searle,  609. 
Prentiss  v.  Farnham,  526. 

V.  Hinton.  1012. 

y.  Holbrook,  552. 

y.  Mellen,  83. 
Prescott  y.  Hull,  945. 
President  y.  City  of  Elizabeth,  985e. 
President,    etc.,    of  Bank   of   United 

States  y.  Bank,  864. 
President,  etc.,  of  Middlesex  Bank  y. 

Butmau,  828,  895. 
President,    etc.,    of    North    Bank    y. 

Brown,  864. 
President,  etc.,  of  Planters'  Bank  v. 

Calyit,  473,  987. 
President  of  O.  Ct.  y.  Groff,  634. 
Preslar  v.  Stallworth,  591,  995. 
Press  y.  Mfg.  Co.,  84. 
Preston  v.  Chadwick,  651. 

y.  Dunn,  194. 

y.  Fitch,  553. 

V.  Hutchinson,  777. 

y.  Klndrick,  367,  377. 

y.  Wright,  116. 
Prewett  y.  Caruthers,  206L 
Prewitt  y.  Perry,  378. 
Pricard  v.  Farrar,  574. 
Price  V.  Bank,  1013. 

y.  Boyd,  1010. 

V.  Dewey,  731. 

y.  Dewhurst,  844. 

y.  Dietrich,  641. 

y.  Gwin,  584. 

y.  Hickok,  227,  228,  904,  906. 

y.  Higgins,  1013. 

y.  Hopkln,  802. 

y.  Johnston,  872. 

y.  Nesbit,  25,  44. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  138. 

y.  Schaffer,  901. 

y.  Strange,  32. 

V.  Thrash,  398. 

V.  Avail's  Ex'r,  446. 
Pricket  y.  Legerwood,  300. 
Priest  V.  Deayer,  747,  749. 


CASES  CITED. 


clvi 

[References  to  sectioiM.    19 1  to 

Priest  V.  Glenn,  751. 
Prlestman  v.  Priestman,  311. 
Prlmm  y.  Ransom,  8^. 
Prince  v.  Fuller,  1004. 

V.  Quincy,  729. 
Prlngle  v.  Woolworth,  874,  896. 
Prltchard  v.  Henderson,  922. 
Pritchett  v.  Clark,  828,  857,  900. 
Proctor  V.  Cole,  686. 

V.  Lewis,  233. 

V.  Pettltt,  366. 
Produce  Bank  v.  Morton,  32. 
Prondzinski  t.  Garbutt,  326,  609,  721. 
Propeller  Commerce,  The,  796. 
Propst  V.  Meadows,  641. 
Prosser  v.  Warner,  933. 
Prost  V.  More,  15. 
Proulx  V.  Mill  Co.,  93. 
Prout  V.  Lomer,  32. 
Prouty  V.  Matheson,  643. 
Providence  Rubber  Co.   v.  Goodyear, 

531. 
Providence  Tool  Co.  v.  Prader,  88. 
Providence   Washington    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Morse,  796. 
Provident  Loan  Trust  Co.  v.  Marks, 

540,  551,  755. 
Provins  V.  Lovi,  346a. 
Provost  V.  Provost,  351. 
Prudam  v.  Phillips,  320. 
Prudential  Ins.  Co.  v.  Taylor,  121. 
Prugh  V.  Bank,  360. 
Pruitt  V.  Holly,  629. 
Pryor  v.  Downey,  218. 

V.  Emerson,  367. 

V.  Smith,  44. 
Publishing  House  of  £)vangelical  Ass'n 

V.  Heyl,  367. 
Pucket  V.  Johnson,  195. 
Puckett  V.  Investment  Co.,  790. 

V.  Pope,  898. 
Puffer  V.  Graves,  593,  594. 
Puget  Mill  Co.  V.  Brown,  530. 
Puget  Sound  Nat.  Bank  v.  Levy,  62, 

63. 
Pugh  V.  Good,  439. 

V.  Holt,  720. 

V.  Williamson,  731. 
Pulaski  Co.  v.  Stuart,  279. 
PuUiam  v.  Dillard,  351. 
PuUis  V.  Iron  Co.,  443. 
Pullman's  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Wash- 
bum,  261. 


499  In  VOL  1;  residue  In  vol.  S.] 

Purcell  V.  Kleaver,  77. 

V.  Payton,  26. 
Purdy  V.  Doyle,  565. 

V.  Upton,  64. 
Purity  Ice  Works  v.  Rountree,  330. 
Purser  v.  Cady,  510. 
Pursley  v.  Wlckle,  159. 
Purviance  v.  Edwards.  373. 
Puryear  v.  Taylor,  449. 
Puterbaugh  v.  Puterbaugh,  618. 
Putman  v.  Lewis,  39,  44. 
Putnam  v.  Capps,  945. 

v.  Clark,  518. 

V.  Crombie.  3,  115. 

V.  Man,  275. 
Putney  v.  0*Brien,  782. 
Putt  V.  Rawstern,  730. 
Pyke  V.  Crouch,  554. 
Pyle  V.  Piercy,  723. 


Quackenbush  v.  Ehle,  714. 
Quaid  V.  Cornwall,  186. 
Quarl  V.  Abbott  231. 
Queen  v.  City  of  Atlanta,  532. 
Queen  Anne's  Oo.  v.  Pratt,  454. 
Quick  V.  Bank,  351. 

V.  Durham,  1000,  1006. 
Quigley  v.  Birdseye,  159. 

V.  McEvony,  691. 

V.  Roberts,  198,  197. 
Quimby  v.  Boyd,  16. 
Quinby  v.  Conlan,  530. 
Quincy  v.  Foot.  349. 
Quinn  V.  Insurance  Co.,  29. 

V.  Jenks,  614. 

V.  Quinn,  604. 

V.  Wetherbee,  375. 

V.  Wiswall,  122,  443. 
Quinn's  Appeal,  55. 
Quinn*s  Succession,  260. 
Quivey  v.  Hall,  984. 


Rabb  V.  Aiken,  660. 
Rabe  v.  Heslip,  61. 
Raburn  v.  Shortridge,  378. 
Race  V.  Ass*n,  86. 
Rachal  v.  Smith,  5ia 


CASES  CITED. 
[ReferencM  to  lectlonB.    §§  1  to  189  In  yoL  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.1 


clvii 


Racke  y.  Ass'n,  661a. 

lUckley  v.  Fowlkes,  620,  659. 

Uadcllff  Y.  Insurance  Co.,  815. 

liadcljflTe  t.  Barton,  159. 

Kadford  v.  Folsom,  500. 

Uadzuweit  t.  Watkins,  362,  383. 

Kae  V.  Hnlbert,  8,  10,  800,  875. 

Raffanf,  In  re,  298. 

Rafferty  t.  Potter,  363. 

Kagland  v.  Calhoun,  589. 

Kagsdale  y.  Green,  306. 

Kahm  y.  Minis,  760. 

Kailroad  Equipment  Co.  y.  Blair,  607. 

Rains  y.  Ware,  165. 

Raisin  Fertilizer  Co.  y.  Grubbs,  22. 

y.  McKenna,  387. 
Rake's  Adm'r  y.  Vg^,  617,  624,  751. 
Ralston  y.  BeU,  417. 

y.  Field,  432,  439. 

y.  La  bee,  197*. 

y.  Lotbain,  306. 

y.  Wood,  589. 
Kamaley  y.  Ramaley,  110. 
Raimnelsberg  y.  Mitchell,  192. 
Ramsbottom  y.  Bailey,  618. 
Puiinsburg  y.  Kline,  32G. 
Ramsey  y.  Hemdon,  504,  621« 

y.  Hicks,  370. 

y.  Linn,  21& 

y.  Thomas,  982. 
Ramsey  County  Bldg.  Soc.  v.  Lawton, 

749. 
Ramsey's  Appeal,  954. 
Ramsonr  y.  Raper,  306. 
Rand  y.  Gamer,  439. 

y.  Hanson,  906. 

y.  Nutter,  771. 
Randal  y.  Wale,  487. 
Randall  y.  Ass'n.  351. 

V.  Howard,  297a. 

y.  Weld,  80. 
Randalls  y.  Wilson,  211. 
Randle  y.  Carter.  560. 
Rand,  McNally  &  Co.  v.  Hombarger, 

183. 
Randolph  y.  KeUer,  90a 

y.  King,  892. 

y.  Metcalf,  11& 

y.  Singleton,  13. 
Raney  y.  McRae.  236. 
Ransrely   y.   Webster,    211,    227,   864, 

906. 
Ranken  y.  Railway  Co.,  788. 


Rankin  y.  Barnes,  857,  807. 

V.  Goddard,  829,  844. 

y.  Kemp,  193. 

y.  Lawton,  305. 

V.  Scott,  459. 
Kaiisdell  v.  Threlkeld's  Adm'r,  210. 
Hansford  y.  Maryln,  152. 
Hiuisley  v.  Stott,  048. 
Ransom  v.  Brlnkerhoff,  600. 

y.  City  of  Pierre,  510,  578.  685. 

y.  Sargent,  447. 
Ransone  y.  Grist,  331. 
Rape  y.  Heaton,  860,  897,  901. 
Rapelye  y.  Prince,  573. 
Rapley  v.  Price,  53. 
Rappleye  y.  Bank,  423. 
Rarey  y.  Lee,  609,  742. 
Rasmussen  y.  Smith,  354a. 
Ratcliffe  y.  Anderson,  298. 
Rathbone  y.  Hooney,  536. 

V.  Terry,  857.  897,  906, 

y.  Warren,  389. 
Ratliff  y.  Baldwin,  345. 

V.  Stretch,  393. 
Raub  y.  Ass'n,  59. 
Ranch  y.  Young,  191. 
Raught  y.  Lewis,  399. 
Rauh  V.  Scholl,  176. 
Raun  y.  Reynolds,  982. 
Rauwolf  y.  Glass,  756. 
Rawdon  y.  Rapley,  306. 
Rawlings*  E[K*r  y.  Rawlings,  44 
Ruwlins  y.  Rawlins,  320. 
Rawson  y.  McJunklns,  953. 
Ray  y.  Connor,  156. 

V.  Law,  48. 

y.  Moore,  305. 

V.  Rowley,  270. 

y.  Thompson,  173,  309. 
Rayl  y.  Lapham,  807. 
Raymond  y.  Butterworth,  1011» 

y.  Rallrcad  Co.,  80,  90. 

y.  Raymond,  939c. 

y.  Richmond,  605. 

y.  Schoonover,  419. 

y.  Smith,  109,  135. 

y.  White,   749. 
Ray  nor  v.  Rayuor,  45. 
Rea  y.  Forrest,  Ola,  953. 

V.  Harrington,  100. 
Reab  y.  Sherman,  348. 
Read  y.  Allen,  553,  556,  577. 

Y.  City  of  Buffalo,  176. 


clviii 


CASES  CITED. 
CReferences  to  sectiong.    §§  1  to  499  In  yoI.  1;  residue  in  vol.  1] 


Bead  v.  French,  63,  83. 

V.  Jeffries,  210. 

V.  Sutton,  124. 
Keade  v.  Street,  141. 
Reading  v.  Price.  680. 

V.  Reading,  02. 
Read's  Appeal,  1016. 
Ready  v.  Smith,  26. 
Reagan  t.*  Fox,  100. 
Reagh  T.  Spann,  29. 
Real  Estate  Inv.  Go.  y.  Roop,  55. 
Realty  Inv.  Co.  v.  Porter,  36. 
Ream  y.  Lynch,  590. 
Reams  v.  Kearus,  174. 
Reast  Y.  Donald,  C24. 

y.  Hughes,  367. 
Reay  y.  Heazelton,  985. 
Reber  y.  Wright,  227,  877,  896,  905, 

906. 
Rector  y.  Gibbon,  530. 

y.  Morehouse,  994. 
Redden  y.  Metzger,  614. 

y.  Tefft,  577,  663. 
Reddick  y.  Bank,  197. 

y.  Meffert,  600. 
Redmond  y.  Coffin,  548,  561,  787. 

y.  Collins,  638. 

y.  Staton,  948. 
Redus  y.  Burnett,  897. 
Redwine  y.  Brown.  251. 
Reed,  Ex  parte,  250,  255,  256,  524. 

y.  Austin's  Heirs,  440. 

y.  Chllson,  680,  867,  892. 

y.  Cross,  615,  763. 

y.  Douglas,  664. 

y.  Eldredge,  7,  152. 

y.  Hamet,  52. 

y.  Jackson.  270,  606. 

y.  King,  191. 

V.  Lane,  122,  162,  174,  180. 

y.  Liston,  23. 

y.  McGregor,  540. 

V.  Nicholson.  261. 

y.  Orton,  573. 

y.  Pratt,  272. 

y.  Prescott,  362. 

y.  Proprietors,  682. 

y.  Pruyn,  098. 

y.  Ross,  520. 

y.  Vaughan,   285. 

V.  Whitlow.  691. 

V.  Wright,  216,  513. 
Reeder  y.  Lock  wood,  84. 


Reed*s  Appeal,  400. 
Reel  y.  Elder,  240,  897. 
Rees  y.  Bank,  92. 

y.  Richmond,  58. 

y.  Watertown,  985b,  985e. 
Reese  y.  Holmes,  660,  661. 

y.  Mahoney,  313,  347. 

y.  Meetze,  245. 

y.  Reese,  617. 

y.  Steams,  152. 
Reeser  y.  Brenneman,  321. 
Reeves  y.  Cooper,  394. 

V.  Plough,  691. 

V.  Townsend,  287. 
Reformed  Protestant  Dutch  Church  of 

Westfield  y.  Brown,  749. 
Reg.  y.  Drury,  511. 

y.  Fontaine  Ikf  orean,  529. 

y.  Haughton,  784. 

y.  Inhabitants,  805. 

y.  Leigh.  532. 
Regan  y.  Railroad  Co.,  91. 

V.  West,  655. 
Regester  y.  Iron  Co.,  346. 
Reich  V.  Cochran.  661a,  783. 
Reid  y.  Boj'd,  875,  892. 

y.  Coal  &  F.  Co.,  363. 

y.  Dunklin,   142. 

y.  Hibbard,  976,  989. 

y.  Holmes,  200,  203. 

y.  Morton,  126,  156. 

y.  O'Brien.  1014. 

y.  Ross,  040,  W9. 

y.  Southworth,  70. 

V.  Spoon,  250.  ' 
Reid,  Murdoch  &  Co.  v.  Ferris,  671. 

y.  Parks,  7^4. 
Reldy  v.  Blelstift,  92. 

V.  Scott,  347. 
Reilly  V.  Bader.  783. 

y.  Daly,  79a. 

y.  Paving  Co..  740. 
Relly  y.  Lancaster.  273. 
Reimers  y.  Druce.  826,  844. 
Reinach  v.  Improvement  Co.,  541. 

V.  Railroad  Co..  274,  278. 
Reiner  v.  Jones,  614. 
Relnhardt  v.  Nealis.  247. 
Relnhart  y.  Blackshear,  1. 

y.  Lugo,  83,  252,  315. 
Reinig  y.  Hecht.  270. 
Relfe  V.  Bibb.  440. 
I  y.  McComb,  400. 


CASES 
[References  to  sectionB.    H  1  to 

Remer  y.  Mackay,  2;U.  872. 
Remick  v.  Butterfleld,  169. 
Remington  v.  Cuiumings,  211. 
Remington  Paper  Co.  v.  O*  Dougherty, 

600. 
Rrainant  t.  Hoffman,  326. 
Renand  y.  Abbott  ^^59,  914. 
Renfroe  y.  Benfroe,  363. 
Renfcdc  V.  Ladington,  600. 
Renter  y.  Hurlbut,  923. 
Renkert  y.  EUiott,  785. 
Renner  y.  Marshall,  865. 
Renshaw  y.  Bank,  723. 
Renwlck  y.  Wbeeler,  994. 
Republic  Ins.  Co.,  In  re,  320a. 
Republic  Life  Ins.  Co.  y.  Swigert,  22. 
Respnblica  y.  DaYis,  586,  587. 
Resseqnie  ▼.  Byers,  769. 
Rengger  y.  Lindenberger,  99. 
ReYere  Copper  Co.  v.  Dimock,  891. 
Rer  ▼.  Butterly,  635. 

Y.  Carlile,  255. 

Y.  Chapman,  491. 

Y.  Grundon,  516. 

Y.  Inhabitants.  805. 

Y.  Lolley,  822. 

Y.  Vincent,  635. 
Reynertson  y.  Lumber  Co.,  328. 
Reynolds  y.  Barnard.  315. 

Y.  Bmmagim,  2M,  633. 

Y.  Cobb,  401. 

Y.  CoUier.  404. 

Y.  Crook.  482. 

Y.  Dunlap,  360. 

Y.  Fenton.  83a 

Y.  Fleming,  272. 

Y.  Franklin,  744. 

Y.  Gamer,  699. 

Y.  Harris.  955. 

Y.  Hennessy,  701,  721« 

Y.  Horine,  367. 

Y.  Insurance  Co.,  600. 

Y.  Lincoln,  713. 

Y.  Lumber  Co..  955. 

Y.  Lyon,  225,  975. 

Y.  Mandel,  504,  609. 

Y.  Orvls,  266. 
Reynolds  y.  Powers,  877,  880. 

Y.  Railroad  Co.,  770. 

Y.  Robertson,  971. 

Y.  Rogers*  Ex'rs,  1006. 

Y.  Silvers,  77. 

Y.  SUnsbury,  326,  785. 


CITED.  Clix 

499  in  TOl.  1;  residue  in  yoI.  2.] 

Reynolds  y.  Stockton,  242,  417,  915. 
R.  Frank  Williams  Co.  Y.  Baking  Co., 

32. 
Khea  v.  Preston,  998. 
Rhino  V.  Emery,  290. 
Rhoad  Y.  Patrick,  412. 
Rhoades  y.  Delaney,  680. 

Y.  Selin,  601. 
Rhoads  y.  City  of  Metropolis,  657. 

Y.  Bhoads,  196,  197. 
Rhode  V.  Green,  571. 
Rhode  Island  y.  Massachusetts,  215. 
Rhodes  v.  De  Bow,  297. 

Y.  Rhodes,  312. 

V.  Turner,  46. 

Y.  Williams,  47. 
Rlcardo  y.  Garcias,  624,  827,  829. 
Rlcaud  Y.  Tysen,  624. 
Rice  Y.  Aiken,  660. 

Y.  Bank,  380. 

Y.  Commission  Co.,  285,  930. 

V.  Coutant,  902. 

V.  Griffith,  347. 

V.  Groff,  1009. 

Y.  Holmes,  834. 

V.  King,  604,  658,  669,  T29. 

V.  Moore,  487.  892. 

V.  Rice,  600. 

V.  Sanger,  34. 

V.  Stone,  943. 

V.  Talmadge,  487. 

V.  Troup,  941. 

V.  Ward,  641. 

V.  West,  655,  657. 
Rice  County  Com'rs  v.  I^wrenee,  187. 
Rice's  Succession,  985. 
Rich  Y.  City  of  Chicago,  306. 

Y.  Husson,  209. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  27. 

y.  Thornton.  346. 
Richards  y.  Barlow,  868. 

Y.  McMillan,  67,  68. 

Y.  Rote,  218. 

V.  Walton,  211. 
Richardson  y.  Ainsworth,  950,  066. 

Y.  Ass'n,  346a,  352. 

Y.  Bank,  587. 

Y.  Boston,  742. 

Y.  Callihan,  663. 

V.  City  of  Baltimore,  ,357. 

Y.  aty  of  Eureka,  75a 

V.  Finney,  347. 

V.  Fuller,  57. 


dX  CASES 

[References  to  sections.    S§  1  to 

Uicliardson  v.  Greeii,  128. 

V.  Howk,  153. 

y.  Hunter,  217,  227,  278. 

v.  Jones,  208,  576. 

V.  Lanniug,  526. 

Y.  Larpeut,  585. 

V.  Loree,  359. 

V.  Machine  Works,  752. 

T.  Melllsh,  162. 

y.  Hlcliardson,  29. 

V.  Rogers,  118. 

V.  Smith,  229. 

V.  Stowe.  326. 

V.  Turner,  109. 

V.  Watson.  576. 
Richardson  Drug  Co.  v.  Dunagan,  348. 
Richardson's  Adm'r  v.  Justices,  385. 
Richardson's  Ex'r  v.  Jones,  80Q. 
Richman  v.  Baldwin,  660. 
Richmond  v.  Ames,  569. 

V.  Atwood,  32. 

V.  Bldch,  lOOi. 

V.  Hays,  624. 
Richmond  Bldg.  Ass'n  v.  Ass'n,  952. 
Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Gorman,  917. 
Richmond  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Shippen,  381, 

705. 
Rlchter  v.  Cummings,  486. 
Rickard  v.  Fisk,  299. 
Rickards  v.  Coon,  32. 
Rickets  V.  Hitchens,  358. 
Ricketson  v.  Richardson,  211. 
Rickey  v.  Hillman,  428. 
Riddle  v.  Baker,  587. 

V.  Hudgins,  48. 
Riddle's  Appeal,  438,  1014. 
Rider  v.  Alexander,  122,  906. 

V.  Alleyne,  82. 

V.  Kelso,  953. 

V.  Rubber  Co.,  733. 
Ridge  V.  Prather,  432. 
Ridgely  v.  Gartrell,  432. 

V.  Spenser,  683. 
Ridgely  Nat.  Bank  v.  Fairbank,  86. 
Ridgeway  v.  Bank.  376,  377. 

V.  Herbert,  650. 
Ridgley  v.  SUUwell,  611. 
Rldgway  V.  Homer,  86. 
Ridgway's  Appeal,  406. 
Ridley  v.  Railway  Co.,  352,  742,  748. 
Rlehl  V.  Vockroth.  1005. 
Rleker  v.  Doerr,  354, 
Riely  y.  Barton,  90. 


CITED. 

499  In  vol.  1;  residue  in  toI.  2.] 

Ries  V.  Rowland,  674. 
Riffle's  Appeal,  999. 
Rigg  V.  Banbridge,  768. 
Riggs  v.  Goodricli,  987. 

V.  Johnson  County,  360,  985b. 
Righter  v.  Thornton,  263. 
Riglesberger  v.  Bailey,  305. 
Riker  v.  Hooper,  529,  726. 
Riley  V.  Bank,  541. 

V.  Hale,  767. 

y.  Jaryis,  29,  183,  790. 

V.  Murray,  920. 

y.  Riley,  975. 
Riley's    Adm'r    y.    McCord's    Adm'r, 

493. 
Rinchey  v..  Stryker,   605. 
Ringgold  y.  Stone,  644. 
Ringle  y.  Railroad  Co.,  186. 
Rio  Grande,  The,  y.  Otis,  521,  795. 
Rio  Grande  Irr.  &  Colonization  Ca  t. 

Gildersleeye,  83,  387. 
Rio    Grande   W.    Ry.    Co.   v.   Power 

Transmission  Co.,  751. 
Riott  V.  Blackstone,  25. 
Rlsher  v.  Roush,  367. 
Risk  V.  Uffelman,  110. 
Risley  y.  Bank,  709,  942. 
Risser  y.  Martin,  57,  126. 
Ritch  y.  Eichelberger,  952,  955. 
Ritchey.y.  Buricke's  Adm'rs;  467. 

y.  Withers,  644. 
Ritchie  y.    McMuUen,   370,  829,  835, 
838,  S49. 

V.  Sayers,  277. 
Ritter  V.  Cost,  956. 

V.  Henshaw,   1010. 

y.  Hoffman,  859,  861,  868. 
Riyers  v.  Durr,  197. 

y.  Riyers,  714. 

y.  West,  321. 
Riyerside  Co.  y.  Townsend,  663, 
Riyerside  Land  &  Irr.  Co.  v.  Jensen, 

549. 
Rix  y.  McHeury,  425. 

y.  Nevius,  1001. 
Roach  y.  Bennett,  433. 

y.  Blakey,  116. 

y.  Garvan,  822. 

y.  Hix,  195. 

y.  Martin's  Lessee,  633,  635. 

y.  Privett  908. 
Roads  y.  Symmes,  432. 
Roane  y.   Baker,  447. 


CASES 
[References  to  sectloni.    89 1  to 

Roane  t.  Uamilton,  407. 
Robarge  v.  Railroad  Co.,  923. 
Robb  Y.  Anderson,  487,  892. 

V.  Irwin*8  Lessee,  194. 

T.  Robb,  a06. 

V.  Van  Horn,  009. 
Robbins  y.   Bacon,  493. 

Y.  Bunn,  530. 

V.  Chicago,  575. 

Y.  CoIUer,  518. 

Y.  Harrison,  761. 

Y.  Mount,  378. 

Y.  Robbins,  454. 

V.  Wells,  710. 

Y.  Wcrfcott,  100. 
Roberson  y.  Crow,  376. 
Robert  y.  Hodges,  857. 
Robert  E.  Lee  SUYer  Min.  Co.  y.  En- 

glebach,  854. 
Roberts,  In  re,  506. 

Y.  CaldweU,  003. 

Y.  Corby,  347. 

Y.  Dame,  16. 

Y.  Hamilton,  713. 

Y.  Hinkle,  802. 

Y.  Miles,  373. 

Y.  Moody,  614. 

Y.  Xorrls,  716. 

Y.  Pawley,  211,  235,  348. 

Y.  Railway  Co,,  243,  302,  825.  600. 

Y.  Roberts,  232. 

Y.  Robinson,  425. 

Y.  Sliarp,  70a. 

Y.  Stanton,  103. 

Y.  State,  38,  115. 

Y.  Stowers,  220. 

Y.  Yancey,  260. 
Robertson,  In  re,  16L 

Y.  Bergen,  335. 

Y.  Caw.  685. 

Y.  Hay,  157. 

Y.  Huffman,   260l 

Y.  King,  156. 

Y.  Lane,  206. 

Y.  Pharr,  135. 

Y.  PiciEreU,  636. 

Y.  Smith,  770,  776. 

Y.  Strath,  835. 

Y.  Van  CleaYe,  585. 

Y.  Winchester.  218. 

T.  Wright,  660. 
Robewon  y.  Roberts,  953,  956. 
Robk'haad  y.  Nelson,  880. 
1  LAW  JUDG.— k 


CITED.  Clxl 

499  In  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Robinson  y.  Allison,  063. 

Y.  Bank,  440. 

Y.  Belt,  29. 

Y.  Brown,  206. 

y.  City  of  Wilmington,  32. 

Y.  Com'rs,  305. 

Y.  Court,  29. 

Y.  Crownlnshield,  745. 

Y.  Dayls,  332,  336. 

Y.  Dickey,  617. 

V.  Floyd,  209. 

Y.  Govers,  115. 

Y.  Hodge,  589. 

V.  Howard,  707. 

Y.  Jones,  816. 

V.  Keys,  86. 

V.  Kruse,  671. 

Y.  Kuukleman,  1001. 

Y.  Lane,  592,  624. 

Y.  McDowell,  390. 

V.  Merrill,  352. 

Y.  Moore,  160. 

Y.  Morse,  526. 

Y.  Prescott,  934. 

Y.  Reld's  Ex'r,  376. 

Y.  Snyder,  770. 

Y.  Stevens'  Adm'r,  317. 

Y.  Thompson,   359. 

V.  Tonge,  441. 

Y.  Towns,  952. 

Y.  Ward's  Ex'rs,  904,  912. 

Y.  Weeks,  943,  950,  98G. 

V.  Wiley,  761. 

V.  Wilson,   425. 
Robinson's  Adm'r   y.   MUby's  Adm'r, 

992,  993. 
Robinson's  Adm'x  y.  White,  949. 
Robinson's  Case,  536. 
Robisson  y.  Miller,  420. 
Robostelll  Y.  Railroad  Co.,  142. 
Robrecht  y.  Robrecht,  82. 
Robson  Y.  Eaton,  374. 

V.  Shelton,  191. 
Robuck  Y.  Harklns,  867. 
Roby  Y.  Eggers,  539. 

V.  Rainsber^er,  773. 

V.  Updyke,  77. 
Rocco  Y.  Hackett,  «)7,  880.  897. 
Rochester  y.  Anderson,  210. 
Rocker  Spring  Co.  y.  William  D.  Gib- 
son Co.,  GIO. 
Rockford  Watch  Co.  v.  Manifold.  242. 
Rockhill  Y.  Hunna,  450,  476. 


Clxii  CASES 

CReferences  to  sections.    89  1  to 

Rock  Islaod  Nat.  Bank  t.  Thompson^ 

399,  415,  473. 
Rockland  Water  Co.  v.  Plllabury.  161, 

164. 
Rockwell  V.  Brown,  739. 

V.  CJourt,  692. 

T.  Langley,  629.  630. 

y.  Tupper,  214. 
Rockwood  V.  Davenport,  110. 
Roddy  T.  Elam.  439. 
Roderigas  v.  Savings  Inst.,  640. 
Rodgers  v.  Bonner,  401. 

V.  Evans,  513. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  910. 

V.  Levy,  719. 

V.  McCluer's  Adm'rs.  440,  469. 
Rodini   V.   Lytle,   58a 
Rodriguez  v.  Esplnosa,  321. 
Roe  V.  Roe,  803. 

V.  Swart,  468. 
Roenigk's  Appeal,  77. 
Rogan  V.  Walker,  513. 
Rogers  v.  Beauchamp.  273. 

V.  Brent  422.  530. 

y.  Brooks,  141. 

y.  Bums,  857.  913. 

y.  Coleman,  855,  857,  904,  906. 

y.  Cross.  383. 

y.  Denham's  Heirs,  486. 

y.  Felker,  174. 

y.  Grannis,  562. 

V.  Gwinn,  373,  916. 

y.  Haines,  537.  {\50. 

y.  Harrison.  233. 

y.  Hatch,  510.  882. 

y.  Higglns,  G14.  731. 

V.  Holden,  528. 

V.  Holllngsworth,  484,  40& 

y.  Johnson.  261. 

y.  Ubbey.  624. 

y.  McMillen,  327. 

V.  Miller,  274. 

y.  Moore,  89. 

V.  Odell,  864,  966. 

V.  Parker,  376. 

y.  Ratcllff,  657. 

y.  Rogers,  156,  162.  262,  894. 

y.  Russell,  27. 

y.  Tucker,  661. 

y.  Walker,  802. 

v.  Waller,  518. 

V.  Watrous,  ;]06. 

V.  Weil,  192. 


CITED. 

499  In,  vol.  1;  reiidue  in  vol.  2.J 

Rogers  v.  Welte,  999. 

V.  Wood,  173.  216.  278,  516. 
Roggenkamp  v.  Hargreaves,  208. 
Roh  V.  Vitera,  34. 
Rohm  V.  Borland,  529. 
Rohr  V.  Davis,  206. 
Rohrbacker  v.  Schultz.  34.'a. 
Roland  v.  Kreyenliiigen.  352. 
Rolfs  y.  Shallcross,  255. 
Roll  V.  Davison,  683. 

V.  Rea,  411. 
Roller  V.  Ried,  312,  383. 

V.  Wooldridge,  ;wr. 
Rollins,  Ex  parte,  255,  257. 

V.  Casket  Co.,  390. 

V.  Henry,  109,  260. 

V.  Thompson,  999. 
Remain  v.  Garth,  1016. 
Roman  Catholic  Archbishop  ▼.  Ship- 
man,  600. 
Rome  Eb[change  Bank  v.  ESames,  14t 
Rome  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Sibert,  31a. 
Rooks  v.  Williams,  3(18. 
Roosevelt  v.  Dale,  189. 

v.  Kellogg,  250. 
Root  V.  Bank,  36. 

y.  Curtis.  447. 

y.  Davis,  261. 

y.  Dill,  770. 

V.  Fellowes,  116. 

v.  Woolworth,  755. 
Roots  V.  Cohen,  387,  393. 
Roper  V.  Rowlett,  572. 
Ropes  V.  Eldridge,  26. 
Roraback  v.  Stebbins,  55. 
Rorer  v.  Ass'n,  83. 
Rork  V.  Smith,  809. 
Roscarla  v.  Thomas,  96. 
Rose  V.  City  of  Yonkers,  714. 

y.  Gibson,  29.  872. 

y.  Hawley,  716. 

y.  Himely,  516.  818,  835. 

y.  Insurance  Co.,  J)20,  970. 

V.  Turnpike  Co..  686. 
Rosebrough  v.  Ansley.  52. 
Rosenbaum  v.  Davis,  511. 
Rosenblatt.  "Ex.  parte,  257. 
Rosenberger  v.  Jones,  439. 
Rosenmueller  v.  Lampe,  735. 
Rosenow  v.  Gardner,  671. 
Rosenthal  v.  McMann,  716. 

v.  Renick,  503. 

y.  Roberson,  26. 


CASES  CITED. 


clxiii 


[Befcrences  to  sections.    ||  1  to  489  in  vol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.] 


Bottaia  V.  Trowbridge,  421. 
Iocs  Y.  Banta,  357,  S63,  549. 

▼.  City  of  Portland,  733. 

T.  finaut,  557. 

T.  Xoble,  90. 

y.  Pitts,  593. 

T.  Pleasants,  660. 

V.  Railroad  Co,,  337, 

T.  Koss,  132.  353. 

T.  Sims,  13. 

T.  Wait,  208. 

▼.  Watt,  526. 

T.  Wcidd,  372,  681a. 
Boss*  Apiieal,  432. 
Kosse  V.  Uust  723. 
Rossman  v.  Tilleny,  733. 
Retail's  Heirs  v.  Springer,  393. 
Botch  v.  Humboldt  College,  274. 
Botb  T.  ColYin,  526. 

y.  Roth,  822. 
Rothchild  V.  Link,  85. 

T.  Mannesovitch,*  63. 
Bother  r.  Monaban,  988. 
Bothrock  y.  Insurance  Co.,  897. 
Roalhac  v.  Brown,  092. 
Roulstou  V.  Hall,  549. 
Bounds  t.  Steamship  Co.,  938. 
BoQDdtree,  Ex  parte,  340,  344. 
Boandy  v.  Hunt.  70. 
BoonsariUe  v.  Haxen,  1017. 
Boantree,  Ex  parte,  336. 

T.  Lathrop,  99. 

V.  Walker,  363. 
Bouse  V.  Peoria  County,  97. 
Boosillon  V.  Ronsillon,  836. 
Boosset  T.  Boyle,  162. 
Boutiedge  v.  Hislop,  729. 
Bowan  v.  Daniel.  207. 
Bowe  V.  Blake.  9«2. 

V.  Coal  Co.,  323. 

y.  Parsons,  284. 

T.  Smith,  697.  758. 
Bowes  Adm'r  v.  Hardy's  Adm*r, 
903. 

Kowen  V.  RaUroad  Co.,  90. 
Rowland  v.  Day,  600. 

V.  Ryans,  636. 

V.  Harris.  491. 

T.  Hobby,  029. 

V.  Jones,  340,  387. 

T.  Vcale.  9G3. 
BowlandP  EasUtc,  317. 
UowlnndsoD.  Ex  parte,  775. 


985, 


Uowlett  V.  WlUiamson,  302. 
Rowley  v.  Carron,  935. 

V.  Howard,  224. 
Roy  V.  liowe,  194. 
Hoyall,  Ex  parte,  257. 
Royairs  Adm'rs  y.  Johnson,  23. 
Royal  Trust  Co.  y.  Bank,  306. 
Royalty  y.  Shirley,  783. 
Royer  y.  Wolf,  691. 
Royse  y.  May,  149. 
Royston  y.  Homer,  756. 
Rubel  y.  Busbnell,  188. 
Rubinsky  y.  Patrick,  473. 
Rubush  y.  State,  246. 
Ruch  y.  Jones,  86. 
Rucker  y.  Steelman,  609. 
Ruckman  y.  Cowell,  285. 

V.  Pitcher,  349. 
Rudd  y.  Bank,  214. 
Rudolph  y.  Underwood,  703. 
Ruegger  y.  Railroad  Co.,  754,  938. 
Ruehlmann  y.  Ass'n,  737. 
Ruenbuhl  y.  Heffron,  307. 
Rufe  y.  Bank,  943,  945. 
Ruff  V.  Doty,  756. 

y.  Elkin,  156. 

y.  Ruff,  593. 
Rufty  y.  Claywell,  772. 
Rugg  V.  Parker,  135,  163,  165. 
Rumsey  y.  Railroad  Co.,  742. 
Rundle  y.  Ettweln,  432. 
Runkel  y.  PhUlips,  566. 
Rupe  y.  Ass'n,  206. 
Rupert  y.  Martz,  348. 
Rupp  y.  Swartz,  1005. 
Ruppel  y.  Patterson,  549. 
Rush  y.  Rusb,  130,  320,  822. 

y.  Valentine,  530. 
Rusbwortb  y.  Pembroke,  554. 
Russ  V.  Gilbert,  91. 
Russel  y.  Field,  847. 

y.  Insurance  Co.,  817. 
Russell  y.  Brown,  810. 

y.  Butler,  899. 

T.  Conway,  1002,  1004. 

V.  Durham,  263. 

y.  Erwin's  Adm'r.  155,  160. 

V.  Grant.  200. 

V.  Hank,  170. 

y.  Hogan,  82. 

V.  Houston,  433. 

y.  Lathrop,  19,  28, 

y.  McCaU,  774. 


Clxlv  CASES 

[Referencei  to  MCtions.    |§  1  to 

Russell  T.  McDougall,  166. 

V.  Mcllvoy,  737. 

V.  Nail,  446. 

y.  Nelson,  1016. 

V.  Perry,  936. 

V.  Place.  624,  629,  72a 

T.  Pottawottamle  Co,,  325. 
Russell's  Appeal,  439. 
Russell  &  Ck).  y.  Lamb,  938c. 
Russell  &  Erwlne  Mfg.  O).  y.  Carpen 

ter,  774. 
Rust  V.  Faust  109. 

V.  Ware,  384,  386. 

V.  Waterworks  Co.,  34. 
Rutan  V.  Wolters,  214. 
Ruth  y.  Overbrunuer,  643. 

y.  Wells,  461. 
Ruthenberg  y.  Helberg,  39. 
Rutherford  v.  Crabb,  1004. 

y.  Crawford,  282. 

y.  Pope,  305. 
Ruth's  Appeal,  458. 
Rutledge  y.  Fogg,  525. 
Ryan  y.  Boyd.  370,  377. 

y.  Fulghum,  699. 

y.  Kingsberry,  754. 

y.  Moouey,  352. 

y.  Potwin.  611,  629. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  716. 

y.  Staples,  262. 

y.  Town  of  Sumner,  609. 
Ryan's  Adm'r  y.  McLeod,  44. 
Ryckmau  y.  Parkins,  083. 
Ryder  y.  Loom  Is,  649. 

y.  Twiss,  313. 
Ryerson  y.  Chapman,  571. 
Ryerss  y.  RIppey,  577. 
Ryghtmyer  y.  Dunham,  127. 
Ryhlner  v.  Frank,  443. 
Rynearson  v.  Parkhurst,  790. 
Ryon  y.  Thomas,  153. 


Sabater  y.  Sabater,  163. 
Sabine,  The,  792. 
Sablns  y.  McCJhee,  658. 
Sacket  y.  Ix)omIs,  758. 
Sackett  y.  Montgomery,  513. 

V.  Wilson,  189. 
Sacramento,  P.  &  N.  R.  Co.  y.  Har 
Ian.  40. 


I 


CITED. 

499  In  Yol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.} 

Sacramento    Say.    Bank    y.    Spencer, 

205. 
Saddler  y.  Apple.  738. 
Sadler  y.  Robblns,  b69,  9G2. 
Safe-Deposit  &  Trust  Co.  y.  Wright, 

252.  294. 
Saffold  y,  Nayarro,  211. 
SafTord  y.  Maxwell.  947. 
Sage  y.  Harpending.  510. 

y.  Matheney.  33a 
Sager  y.  Blaln,  715. 
y.  Mead.  293. 
y.  Moy,  995. 
Sagory  y.  Bayless,  305. 
Salnsbury  y.  Pringle,  491. 
St  Clair  y.  Cox,  220,  910.  939. 

y.  Smith,  193. 
St  John  y.  Holmes,  211,  237,  315. 

y.  St  Johns  Church,  574. 
St  Johnsbury  &  L.  C.  R.  Co.  y.  Hunt 

707. 
St  Joseph  Mfg.  "Co.  y.  Daggett  40a 
St  Joseph  Union  Depot  Co.  y.  Rail- 
road Co.,  615. 
St.  Joseph  &  G.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Steele. 

750. 
St  Louis,  A.  &  T.  n.  R.  Co.  y.  Todd, 

895. 
St  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  y,  Rey- 
nolds, 358. 
y.  Sweet  740. 
y.  Winfrey,  130. 
St.   Louis   Mut   Ins.   Co.   y.   Cravens. 

608. 
St  Louis  Nat.  Bank  y.  Bloch,  46. 
St.  I^ouls  Perpetual  Ins.  Co.  y.  Cohen. 

260,  595. 
St  Louis  Smelting  &  Refining  Co.  y. 

Kemp,  530. 
St  Louis  S.  W.  R.  vyO.  y.  Denson,  91. 

y.  Moss,  738. 
St.   Louis  Type  Foundry  y.  Jackson, 

867,  985. 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  y.  McBride, 
217. 
V.  Trimble,  745. 
St.  Louis  &  S.  Coal  Co.  v.  Mining  Co., 

218. 
St    Mary's   Hospital   y.    Benefit   Co., 

354. 
St.  Paul  Nat.  Bank  v.  Cannon.  541. 
St    Paul  &  D.   R.  Co.   V.   Blaekmar. 
349. 


CASES  CITED. 
[References  to  sections.    H 1  to  4M  In  YOl.  1;  residue  in  yoI.  2.] 


clxv 


St.  Romes  v.  Press  Co.,  719. 
Salaman  y.  Warner,  21. 
Sale  T.  Cburch,  516. 

7.  French,  801. 
Salinas  v.  C.  Aultman  &,  Co.,  620. 

Y.  State,  213. 
Salisbuy  y.  Morss,  560. 
Salladay  t.  Bainhill,  972. 
SaUe  T.  Light's  Ex'rs,  572,  574. 
Salliday  ▼.  Bainhill,  972. 
Salmon  y.  Wootton,  865. 
Salomon  y.  Hopkins,  206. 
Saloy  y.  CoIUns,  32,  109. 
Salter  y.  Hilgen,  306. 

y.  Salter,  197. 
Saltonstall  y.  Rllej,  261,  642. 
Salyer  y.  State,  589. 
Sam,  Ex  parte,  255. 
Sames'  Appeal,  492,  534. 
Sammis  y.  Wigbtman,  857,  860,  883, 

889,  807,   898,   963. 
Sample  y.  Bnmes,  379. 

y.  Conlson,  536. 
Sampson  y.  Ohleyer,  550. 
Samnel  y.  Casualty  Co.,  735. 

y.  Dinklns,  577. 
San  Antunio  &  A.  P.  K.  Co.  y.  Flato, 
745. 

y.  Glass,  363. 
Sanborn  y.  Fellows,  279. 

y.  Perry,  31,  922. 
Sanchez  y.  Carriaga,  358,  377. 
Sanders  y.  Fisher,  387. 

y.  Hall.  345. 

y.  McAfee,   459. 

y.  Peck,  538. 

y.  Price,  272,  290. 

y.  Soutter.  618. 
Sanderson  y.   Caldwell,  779. 

y.  Dox,  313. 

y.  Peabody,  614. 

y.  Voelcker.  >58,  373. 
Sandford  y.  McLean,  420,  454,  999. 
Sandoyal  y.  Rosser,  541. 
8andwi<^  Mfg.  Co.  y.  Earl,  251,  939. 
Sanford  y.  College,  504. 

y.  Ogden,  457. 

y.  Sanford,  530,  912,  917. 

y.  Weeks,  346a,  692. 
Banger  y.  Roberts,  117,  262. 
Sangnlimettl  y.  Roche,  191. 
San  Joaquin   I^nd  &  Water  Co.   y. 
West,  157,  98L 


San  Jose  Ranch  Co.  v.  Water  Co..  108. 
San  Juan  &  St.  L.  Mining  &  Smelting 

Co.  y.  Finch,  376. 
Sankey  y.  Reed,  497. 
San  Mateo  County  v.  Cobum,  250. 
Sanner  y.  Sayne,  98. 
San  Pedro  &  C.  Oo.  y.  U.  S.,  530. 
Sans  y.  City  of  New  York,  628. 

y.  People,   487. 
Santleben  v.  Cement  Co.,  536. 
Santon  v.  Ballard,  217. 
Sappington  y.  Lenz,  498. 
Sarchet  y.  The  General  Isaac  Dayis, 

Sargeant  y.  Bigelow,  378. 

V.  French,  211. 
Sargent  y.  Fitzpatrick,  763. 

y.  Hayne,  992. 

y.  Kindred,  311,  335,  347. 
Sargent  &  Co.  y.  Steamboat  Co.,  625. 
Sass  y.  Hlrschfeld,  155,  214. 
Sasscer  y.  Walker's  Efct'rs,  1008. 
Sasser  y.  OlUff,  375,  383. 
Sater  y.  Hunt,  28. 
Satterlee  y.  BUss,  549,  635. 
Satterwhite  y.  Sherley,  541. 
Sauer  y.  City  of  Kansas,  365. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  246. 

y.  Twining,  245. 
Sauerfield  y.  McNiemey's  Estate,  61a. 
Sauls  y.  Freeman,  584. 
Saulsbury  y.  Alexander,  100 
Saunders  y.  Albritton,  367. 

y.  Lipscomb,  52,  76. 
Sayage  y.  Allen,  388. 

y.  Benham,  639. 

y.  Eyerman,  976. 

y.  Gunter,  699. 

y.  Hussey,  267. 

y.  Stevens,  779,  782. 

y.  Walshe,  239. 
Sayeland  y.  Green,  570. 
Savery  v.  Sypher,  761. 
Sayin,  Ex  parte,  255. 
Sayings  &  Trust  Co.  y.  Irrigation  Oa. 

4^,  475. 
Sawln  y.  Kenny,  125a. 
Sawtelle  y.  Muncy,  86. 

V.  Weymouth,  423. 
Sawyer  y.  Boyle,  612. 

y.  Doane,  299. 

y.  Dozler's  Heirs,  &35. 

y.  Insurance  Co.,  818. 


clXVi  CASKS 

[References  to  sections.    §§  1  to 

Sawyer  v.  McAdle,  550. 

V.  Nelson,  627. 

V.  Vilas,  7. 

V.  White,  774. 

V.  Woodbury,  503,  504,  627,   629, 
657,  658. 
Sazton  v.  Smitli,  165. 
Sayers  y.  Auditor  General,  754. 

v.  Burkhardt,  300. 
Sayles  v.  Best,  428. 

V.  Briggs,  282. 

V.  Tibbitts,  608. 
Saylor  v.  Com.,  113. 

v.  Hicks,  682. 
Sayre  v.  Hewes,  72. 
Sayre*s  Adm'r  t.  Harpold,  857. 
Scamahom  v.  Scott,  81,  503. 
Seaman  v.  Galligan,  271. 
Scamman  t.  Bonslett,  162. 
Scanlan  v.  Campbell,  252. 

V.  Murphy,  967. 
Scanlon  v.  Suter,  26. 
Scarborough,  In  re,  789. 

V.  Dugan,  7,  11,  892. 

y.  Myrick,  312. 
Scarritt  Furniture  Co.  v.  Moser,  598. 
Schaefer  y.  City  of  Fond  du  Lac,  575. 
Schafer  y.  Buck,  473. 
Schaffer  y.  Cadwallader,  407. 
Schai£er*B  Estate,  In  re,  31a. 
Scharff  v.  Lisso,  13. 
Scharmaun,  In  re,  89. 
Schart  v.  Schart,  346. 
Schautz  V.  Kearney,  1001. 
Scheible  v.  Slagle.  510. 
Schell  y.  Stetson,  981. 
Scheuck.  In  re,  255. 

V.  Ellingwood,  585. 
Schenck's  Appeal,  321. 
Scherff  v.  Railroad  Co.,  707. 
Sohermerhom  v.  Scbermerhorn,  16. 
Scherr  y.  Uimmelmau,  1010. 
Schertz  y.  Bank,  583. 
Scblbsby  y.  Westeuholz.  227,  289,  835, 

836. 
Schindel  y.  Suman,  713. 
Schirling  y.  Scites,  S'JT). 
Schissel  y.  Dickson,  281. 
Schive  y.  Fausold,  651. 
Schloss  y.  White,  93,  237. 
Schmelzer  y.  Mfg.  Co.,  154,  206. 
Schmidt  V.  Glade,  695. 

V.  Rehwinkel,  154. 


CITED. 

4M  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Schmidt  y.  Thomas,  306w 

y.  Zahensdorf,  616. 
Sehmidtke  y.  Miller,  483. 
Schmidt's  Estate,  In  re,  260. 
Schnaufer  y.  Schnaufer,  926i 
Schneider  v.  Meyer,  987. 
Schneider^^avis  Co.  y.  Brown,  596L 
Schneprs  Appeal,  551. 
Schnitker  y.  Schuitker,  1000. 
Schnitzer  y.  Fox,  790. 
Sohnitzler  y.  Bank,  337. 
Sohoch  V.  Foreman,  742. 
Scboellkopf  y.  Ohmels,  100. 
School  Directors  y.  Xewman,  118. 

y.  Wright,  32. 
School  Dist.  No.  10  y.  Peterson.  446. 
School  Dist.  No.  13  v.  I-ovejoy,  337. 
School  Dist.  No.  15  y.  Brown,  32. 
School  Dist.  No.  28  y.  Stocker,  613. 
School  Dist  No.  46  y.  Lund,  16. 
Schoppenhast  y.  Bollman,  260,  595. 
Schott  y.  McFarland,  299. 

V.  Youree,  587,  770. 
Schreiner  y.  Court,  529. 
Schriver  y.  Eckenrode.  730. 
Schroeder  y.  Fromme,  50. 

y.  Gumey,  434,  446. 

y.  Lahrman,  540,  o42. 
Schroeder's  Estate,  In  re,  641. 
Schroer  v.  Pettibone,  370. 

y.  WesseU,  340,  341. 
Schuffert  y.  Grote,  32. 
Schulenburg  y.  Bank,  849. 
Scbuler  v.  Collins,  lUOO. 

y.  Israel,  674,  690. 
Schultz  y.  McLean.  23. 

V.  Meiselbar,  84,  341. 

V.  Schultz,  G35,  6:J7. 
Schurnieier  v.  Johnson.  682. 
Schuster  v.  Rader,  359,  600. 

V.  White's  Adm'r,  732,  744. 
Schwabacher  y.  Leibrook,  460. 
Schwan  v.  Kelly,  767. 
Schwartz,  Ex  parte,  255. 

V.  Schendel,  :i52. 
S<-hwarz  v.  Oppenheimer,  86,  31L 
Schweinfurter  v.  Schmahl,  321. 
Schweitzer  y.  Irwin's  Ex'x,  33. 
Schwenk  y.  Widemeyer,  671. 
Schwenke  y.  Railroad  Co.,  530. 
Sohweyer  y.  WAlbert,  330. 
Schwinger  v.  Ilickok,  229. 
Scoliold  y.  Bank,  32. 


CASES 
[References  to  uctionB.    IS  1  to 

Scofield  Y.  Moore,  940. 
iScogin  Y.  Perry,  419. 
Sconce  y.  Lumber  Co.,  671« 
Scotland  Oo.  y.  Uili,  581. 
Scott  Y.  Bogart,  237,  913. 

Y.  Burton,  31.  116. 

Y.  CUYlt,  636. 

Y.  Coleman,  875. 

Y.  Colmesnil,  776w 

Y.  Drennen,  549. 

T.  Duun,  469. 

Y.  Haines,  744. 

V.  Hall,  tK>4. 

T.  Harking,  953. 

Y.  Investment  Co.,  530. 

Y.  Mantouya,  69,  73. 

V.  Noble.  906,  913. 

T.  nikington,  827,  842,  843,  846. 

Y.  Pleasants,  247. 

Y.  Rivers,  1000. 

Y.  Rohman,  109. 

Y.  Seelye,  485. 

Y.  Seymour,  847- 

Y.  Shearman,  799. 

Y.  Smith,  340a. 

Y.  Wagner,  541. 

Y.  Ware,  660. 

Y.  Warren,  447. 
Scott's  Account,  In  re,  590. 
Scottish-American  Mortg.  Co.  T.  Fol- 

lansbee,  400. 
Sconton  y.  Bender,  423. 
Scriba  y.  Deane,  411. 
Scribner  y.  Rutherford,  16w 

Y.  York,  ti66. 
Scrimshire  v.  Scrimshire,  822. 
Scriven  y.  Hursh,  27,  373. 
Scroggin  v.  Grocer  Co.,  375. 
Scroggins  y.  Howorth,  378. 
Scudder  y.  Jones,  302. 
Scully  Y.  Lowenstein,  609,  6ia 

V.  RalU-oad  Co.,  720.  722. 
Seale  y.  McLaughlin,  325. 
Seals  V.  Weldon,  370. 
Seaman  y.  Clarke,  992. 

V.  Drake,  156. 
Seamster  y.  Blackstock,  242, 
Searcy  y.  Creditors,  644. 
Searles  y.  Christensen,  340a. 
Bears  y.  Dacey,  899. 

Y.  McGntw,  210. 

Y.  Stone  County,  508. 

V.  Terry,  279. 


CITED.  clxvii 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.} 

Sease  y.  Dobson,  'iB3. 
Seat  Y.  Cannon,  589. 
Seaton  y.  Hlxon,  714. 
Seattle  Nat  Bank  v.  School  Dist.,  609, 

697. 
Seattle  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  y.  Johnson,  157. 
Seaver  y.  Siegel,  77. 
Seay  y.  Fennell,  556. 
Scckler  y.  Delfs,  712. 
Secombe  y.  Railroad  Co.,  279,  287. 
Second  Nat.  Bank  y.  Haerliug,  691. 

Y.  ToTvnsend,   677. 
Second  Nat.  Bank's  Appeal,  252,  293. 
Second  Ward  Sav.  Bank  y.  Schranck, 

77. 
Secor  Y.  Sturgis,  744. 

Y.  Woodward,  376,  377. 
Secrlst  V.  Green,  245. 

Y.  Zimmerman,  78,  653,  698. 
Security  Abstract  of  Title  Co.  y.  Long- 
acre,  355. 
Security  Trust  Co.  v.  Sullivan,  44. 
Seddon  v.  Tutop,  620. 
Sedgwick  Y.  Dawkins,  98. 
Seeley  y.  City  of  Bridgeport,  80,  90. 
Seely  v.  Reid,  218. 
Seelye  y.  People,  100. 
Seeman  y.  Weippert,  191. 
Seevers  y.  Clement,  853,  865. 
Segee  y.  Thomas,  225. 
Seiberling  v.  Mortinson,  183. 

v.  Schuster,  338. 
Seibert  y.  Railroad  Co.,  313. 
Seifert  v.  Caverly,  83. 
Seiffert  v.  Gaverley,  354. 
Seitz  V.  McKenzie,  713. 
Seitzinger  v.  Ridg\<^ay,  651. 
Selders  y.  Boyle,  261,  482. 
Selleck  v.  City  of  Janesville,  556. 
Sellers  y.  Burk,  28,  408. 

V.  B^loyd,  480. 

v.  Lumber  Co.,  22. 
Seller's  Lessee  v.  Corwin,  413,  415. 
Sellick  V.  Addams,  667. 
Semler,  In  re,  255. 

Petition  of,  259. 
Semple  v.  Bank,  619,  680. 

V.  Eubanks,  406,  475. 

Y.  Glenn,  896. 

Y.  Hagar,  938. 

Y.  McGatagan,  378. 

V.  Mown.  433. 

Y.  Scarborough,  GIO. 


clxviii  CASES 

Uleferences  to  BectionB.    §S  1  to 

Senicbka  v.*  Lowe«  274. 
Sergeant's  Ex'rs  t.  Ewfng,  541. 
Sergeant's  Heirs  v.  Ewlng,  5U0. 
Sergeson  t.  Sealey,  802. 
Sessions  v.  Johnson,  770,  775,  777,  780, 
782. 

T.  Stevens,  593. 
Seventh  Day  Adventist  Pub.  Ass'n  y. 

Fisher,  761. 
Sever  v.  Russell,  633. 
Sevey  v.  Chick,  541. 
Sevier  v.  Roddle,  867. 

V.  Turner,  86. 
Sewall  V.  Scott,  729. 

V.  Sewall,  927,  929. 
Sewairs  Falls  Bridge  v.  Flsk,  100. 
Seward  v.  Clark,  197. 

V.  Heflin,  596. 
Sexton  V.  Bennett,  157. 

V.  Gee,  1003. 

V.  Mfg.  Co.,  329. 
Seymour  v.  Greenwood,  127. 

V.  Haines,  986. 

V.  Newman,  896. 

V.  Seymour,  284,  633. 

V.  Smith,  986. 

V.  Street,  248. 

V.  Sup'rs,  354. 

V.  Thomas  Harrow  Co.,  131 
Shackelford  v.  Levy,  135,  165. 

V.  Miller,  180. 

v.  Purket,  526. 
Shackleford  v.  Cunningham,  644. 
Shadbolt  v.  Flndeisen,  970. 
Shadrack's  Adm'r  v.  Woolfolk,  50,  68. 
Shaefer  v.  Gates,  194.  220,  534. 
Shaeffcr's  Appeal,  469. 
Shafer  v.  Bank,  982. 

V.  Bushnell,  932. 
Shafer  v.  Hewitt,  20a 
Shafer's  Appeal,  331. 
Shaffenburg,  Ex  parte,  255. 
Shaffer  v.  McCrackln,  990. 

V.  Scuddy,  755. 

V.  Sutton,  33b. 
Shalnwald  v.  Lewis,  962,  995,  1010. 
Shakman  v.  System  Co.,  127. 
Shall  V.  Blscoe,  611. 
Shallcross  v.  Deats,  293. 

V.  Smith,  55,   211. 
Shamlln  v.  HaU,  260. 
Shand  v.  Du  Boisson,  820. 
Shane  v.  Francis,  444. 


CITED. 

489  In  vol.  1;  residue  in  toI.  2.] 

Shank  v.  Woodworth,  701« 
Shanklln  y.  Francis,  714. 
Shanks  ▼.  Lancaster,  004. 
Shannon  y.  Dodge,  587. 

y.  Frost,  523. 

y.  Beese,  382. 

y.  Shannon,  508,  929. 

y.  Taylor,  660. 
Share  v.  Becker,  299. 
Sharkey  v.  Baukstou,  558. 
Sharman  v.  Morton,  883,  916. 
Sharon  v.  Hill,  510,  939a. 
Sharp  V.  Brunuings,  271,  273. 

V.  Mayor  of  New  York,  341,  875. 

y.  Momtt,  375. 
Sharpe  v.  Davis,  420. 

y.  Earl  of  Scarborough,  437. 

y.  Fowler,  157. 

y.  Freeman,  560. 
Shattuc  y.  McArthur,  15. 
Shattuck  y.  Bascom,  551. 
Shaul  V.  Duprey,  132. 
Shaver,  In  re,  449. 

V.  Shell,  522. 
Shaw,  Ex  parte,  255,  258. 

V.  Attorney-General,  822L 

V.  Broadbeut,  620,  680. 

y.  Clark,  999. 

y.  Dwlght,  390. 

y.  Gould,  822. 

V.  Hurd,  879. 

V.  Lindsay,  173. 

V.  McGregor,  306. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  586. 

y.  Shaw,  926. 
Shawhan  v.  Loffer,  223,  274,  287. 

V.  Wherritt,  807. 
Shaw's  Estate,  In  re,  639. 
Shay  V.  Clock  Co..  88,  340. 
Shaylor  y.  Parsons,  1014. 
Shean  v.  Cunningham,  118. 
Shearer  v.  Bank,  246. 

y.  Brlnley,  467. 
Shearman  v.  Jorgensen,  340a,  346a. 

V.  State,  182. 
Sheble  v.  Cummins,  56. 
Sheehy  v.  Chalmers,  152. 

V.  Duffy,   16. 

V.  Mandevllle,  770. 
Sheets  v.  Baldwin's  Adm'rs.  349. 

y.  Hawk,  248,   807. 

V.  Joyner,  577, 
Sheetz  v.  Baker,  76L 


CASES  CITED. 
[References  to  sections.    §§  1  to  499  in  yoL  1;  residue  in  Tol.  S.] 


clxix 


Sheets  ▼.  Hambest's  Ex'rs,  2^ 

y.  KIrtiey,  318,  633. 
Sheffield  ▼.  Murray,  29. 
Shelbina  Hotel  Ass'n  v.  Parker,  526. 
Sheldon  t.  Arnold,  410. 

T.  Carpenter,  739. 

T.  Edwards,  696. 

T.  Hopkins,  875,  966. 

T.  Kibbe,  777.  779,  782. 

T.  Patterson,  IS^ 

T.  QniDlen,  211. 

T.  Sheldon,  89. 

y.  Strj'ker,  67,  78,  69a 

y.  Van  Vleck.  6»l. 

y.  White,  600. 

V.  Wright,  287. 
Sheldon's  Lessee  t.  Newton,  215,  261. 
Shell  V.  Carter  Co.,  750. 
Shelley  y.  St  Charles  Co.,  985b. 
Shelly  y.  Dobbins,  160. 
Shelmire  y.  Thompson,  38i. 
Sbelton  y.  Alcox,  667. 

y.  Brown,  576. 

y.  GiU,  394. 

y.  Hadlock,  250. 

y.  Hamilton,  lOOa 

y.  Hurd,  953. 

y.  Ketan,  530. 

V.  Tiffin,  220,  272. 
Shenandoah  Nat  Bank  y.  Read,  176, 

587. 
Shepard  y.  Pebbles,  587. 

y.  Rowe,  1006,  1007. 

y.  Stockham,  614. 

y.  Wright.  829,  837. 
Sbepardson  y.  Cary,  614. 
Shephard  y.  Brenton,  121,  126,  130. 
Shepherd  y.  Haryey's  Adm*x,  107. 

y.  Maryel,  83,  345a. 

y.  Moodhe,  671. 

y.  Pepper,  721. 

y.  Willis,  609,  742. 

y.  Wood,  54,  70. 
Sbepley  y.  Cowan,  530. 
^beppard  y.  Kendle,  190. 
Sheppard  y.  Wilson,  179. 
i^berer  y.  Akers,  362. 

y.  lADgfoid,  744. 
Sheridan  y.  Andrews,  550,  66S. 

y.  City  of  Chicago,  154. 
y.  Fleming,  985a. 
Sherman  y.  Boyce,  99a 
y.  Brett,  995. 


Sherman  y.  Bnlck,  530. 

V.  Christy,  78,  098. 

y.  DlUey,  510,  614,  655,  685. 

y.  Grlunell,  37,  691. 

y.  Nlzon,  156,  159. 

y.  Sherman,  613. 
Sheriff  y.  Judge,  360. 
Sherrard  y.  Neylns,  903. 
Sherrill  y.  Hopkins,  824. 
Sherry  y.  Priest,  159. 
Sherwood  y.  Baker,  250. 

V.  Collier,  9€5. 
Shettlesworth  y.  Hughey,  657. 
Sheward  v.  Water  Co.,  32. 
Shickle  v.  Watts,  880. 
Shields  y.  Barden,  79. 

y.  Clement,  84. 

y.  Moore,  995. 

y.  Shiff,  558. 

y.  Stark,  985. 

V.  Taylor.  29. 

y.  Thomas,  225. 
Shlpman  y.  Fletcher,  158. 

V.  Fletcher's  Adm'r,  SeXk 

y.  BolUns,  561. 
Shlpp  V.  Wheeless,  378. 
Shirley  y.  Phillips,  137. 

y.  Shattuck,  914. 
Shlrtz  y.  Shirtz,  115. 
Shiyers  v.  Wilson,  279. 
Shober  y.  Robinson,  567. 

V.  Wheeler,  695. 
Shockey  v.  Akey,  135. 
Shoe  Machinery  Co.  y.  Cutlan,  609. 
Sboemake  y.  Finlayson,  540. 
Shoemaker  y.  Brown,  250,  641,. 644. 

y.  Pace,  208. 

y.  ^park-Arrester  Co.,  270. 
ShoUe  y.  Pino,  1002. 
Shores  y.  Hooper,  6(30. 
Short  y.  Galway,  872. 

y.  Kellogg,  135. 

V.  Prettyman,  GCO. 
Shorter  y.  Mims,  253. 
Shortz  V.  Qulgley,  351. 
Shottenkirk  v.  Wheeler,  367,  5ia 
Shotwell  V.  Murray,  4^)0. 
Shrew  v.  Jones,  413,  415. 
Shrlcker  y.  Field,  375,  380. 
Shriyer  v.  Lynn,  220. 
Shroyer  y.  Richmond,  284,  645. 
Shryock  y.  Buckmnn,  190. 

y.  Waggoner,  443. 


ClXX  CASES 

[References  to  MCtioni.    ||  1  to 

Shuck  y.  City  of  Lebanon,  750. 
Shufeldt  Y.  Gandy,  3G8. 
Shufeit  V.  Buckley,  936. 

V.  Shufeit,  69,  359. 
Shuford  V.  Cain,  211,  824. 
Shultz  y.  Shultz,  290. 
Shumake  y.  Nelms'  Adm'r,  662. 
Shumaker  y.  Reed,  331. 

y.  Stillman,  272,  856,  875,  884,  896, 
897,  898,  901,  908,  9ia 
Shute  y.  Keyser,  59. 
Sibley  V.  Alba,  666. 

V.  Ratliffe,  740. 
Slcard  y.  Railroad  Co.,  616. 
Sldener  y.  White,  440. 
Sldensparker  y.  Sidensparker,  260,  298, 

605. 
Sieber  v.  Frink,  179. 
Slebold,  Ex  parte,  255,  267. 
Sigafus  y.  Porter,  33. 
Slgle  y.  Selgley,  77. 
Slgmon  y.  Hawn,  666. 
Sigoumey  y.  Sibley,  174, 

y.  Stockwell,  493. 
Slkes  y.  Weatherly,  315. 
Silberman  y.  Shuklansky,  308. 
SUl  y.  Rood,  785. 

y.  Swackhammer,  400. 
Silner  y.  Butterfleld,  155. 
Silver  y.  Rhodes,  13. 
Silyer  Bow  Mln.  &  Mill.  Co.  v.  Clark, 

530. 
Silyer  Lake  Bank  y.  Harding,  935. 
Sllverthorn  v.  Townsend,  485,  494. 
Simcock  V.  Bank,  324. 
Siroes.y.  Zane,  763. 
Simkins  v.  Cobb,  589. 
Simmons,  Ex  parte,  255w 

y.  Church,  308. 

y.  Craig,  114,  163. 

y.  Garrett,  981. 

y.  Goodell,  197,  633. 

y.  Martin,  381. 

y.  McKay,  193,  194,  273. 

y.  Reid,  9M. 

V.  Saul,  251,  938c. 

V.  Shaw,  1004. 

V.  Titohe,  116. 
Simms  V.  Freiherr,  554. 
Simons  V.  De  Bare,  282. 
Simpson  y.  Alexander,  197. 

V.  Bailey,  2G1. 

y.  Brown,  340. 


CITED. 

ti»  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Simpson  y.  Cochran,  968L 

V.  Dugger.  755. 

y.  Fogo,  827. 

y.  Halt,  3G2,  378,  601.  1001, 

y.  Hombeck,  170,  365. 

y.  Huston,  1005. 

y.  Jones,  548,  600. 

y.  Mercer,  998. 

y.  XUes,  413. 

V.  Norton,  633. 

y.  Prather,  236. 
Sims,  Ex  parte,  306. 

V.  College,  193. 

V.  Dane,  101. 

y.  Hertzf eld,  964,  970. 

V.  Sims,  655,  870. 

y.  Smith,  655. 
Simson  y.  Hart.  691,  1000,  1001b 
Sinclair  y.  Frazer,  825. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  22. 

y.  Sinclair,  822. 

y.  Tallmadge,  526. 
Singer,  App3al  of,  434. 

y.  Hutchinson,  583. 

y.  Singer,  320. 
Singer  Mfg.  Co.  y.  Fleming,  860. 
Singleton  y.  Boyle,  288. 
Sintzenick  y.  Lucas,  614,  623. 
Sioux  County  y.  Jameson,  532. 
Sipe  V.  Copwell,  274,  939. 

V.  HoUiday,  009. 
Sipes  y.  Whitney,  868, 
Sipley  y.  Wass,  433. 
Sisk  y.  WoodruflP,  571. 
SIter*8  Appeal,  438. 
Sivers  v.  Sivera,  707. 
Skeeles  y.  Shearly,  436. 
Skeen  y.  Engine  &  Thresher  Go.,  738i. 
Skelly  y.  Jones,  607. 
Skidmore  y.  Bradford,  253. 

V.  Bricket,  529. 
SkiUman  v.  Greenwood,  88. 
Skhiker  y.  Smith,  954. 
Skinner,  In  re,  585a. 

y.  Bryce^  338. 

T.  Carter,  39. 

V.  Dayton,  707. 

V.  Deming,  378*  384. 

T.  Franklin  Co.,  546,  750. 

V.  Machine  Co.,  617. 

y.  Moore,   245. 

y.  Terry,  89,  297,  335,  346a. 


CASES 
[References  to  cecUons.    SS  1  to 

Skipw!th*8  Ex*r  v.  Cunuiughiim,  441, 
442. 

V.  Strother,  379. 
Kkirving  y.   Insnrance  Co.,  285,  36G. 
Sklower  t.  Abbott,  404,  453. 
8kolt  In  re,  729. 
Skripe  v.  Simmons,  lUOO. 
Skjm  T.  Consolidated  Co.,  138. 
Slack  v.  Perrine,  858,  881,  889,  922. 

V.  Wood,  307.  384. 
Slade  V.  Le  Page,  261. 
Slade*8  Case..  729. 
Slagie  V.  Bodmer,  29. 

T.  Entrekln,   589. 
Slappey  r.  Uodge,  381. 
Slater's  Appeal,  422. 
SUter  T.  Skirving,  91,  326,  506,  620, 

624,  627. 
»laUer  t.  Glover,  644. 
Siattery  v.  Jones,  423. 
Siauter  t.  Chenowitli,  677. 
Slarton  T.  SmlUe,  498. 
Sledge  T.  £lliott,  273. 
Slee  T.  Bloom,  583. 
Sievln  ▼.  Brown,  650. 
Slldell  T.  Bank.  252. 
Slie  V.  Finch.  1007. 
Sllnginff  y.  Slsler,  36. 
SiiTltzki  y.  Town  of  Wlen,  la 
Sloan  v.  Cooper,  109. 

V.  I^wis,  24a 

V.  McKinstry,  271. 

r.  Thompson,  273. 
Slocomb,  Ex  parte.  109. 

V.  I.izardi,  673. 
Slocum  y.  Wheeler,  939. 

y.  Wilbour,  714. 
Sloo  v.  Bank,  300. 

y.  Lea,  77(5. 
Slndor  y.  Graham,  311. 
Sly  y.  Hunt.  ««.•». 
SmaU  y.  Champeny.  802. 

y.  Douthltt  137. 

y.  Haskius,  510,  657. 

y.  Reeves,  337. 
Smalley  v.  Edey,  629.  718. 
SmaU's  Appeal,  444,  451,  511,  683. 
Smallwood  v.  Trenwlth,  321. 
Smead   Foundry   Co.   v.   Chesbrough, 

50. 
Rmedes  v.  llsley,  372,  917. 
Hmedley  v.  Tucker,  734. 
Smith,  Ex  parte,  2.'>5.  258. 


CITED. 

499  in  Yol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Smith  y.  Abbot,  291. 
y.  Adams,  34,  713. 
y.  Alexander,  998. 
y.  Alton,  301. 
y.  Armstrong,   154. 
y.  Ass  n,  443,  444. 
y.  Auld,  719. 
v.  Bank,  510. 
y.  Beard,  189. 
y.  Berry,  761. 
v.  Black,  351.  770,  776. 
v.  Bonsall,  636. 
v.  Borden.  188,  681. 
v.  Bowditch,  325. 
V.  Bowes,    168. 
y.  Bowker,  213. 
y.  Brannan.  165.  - 
y.  Briggs,  1005; 
V.  Butler,   367. 
v.  Chandler,  346. 
y.  Chapin,  604. 
V.  Chenault,    116. 
v.  Chichester,  180. 
v.  Chilton,  757. 
V.  City  of  Boston,  27. 
v.  City  of  Newbem,  317. 
y.  Coe,  181. 
y.  Compton,   507. 
y.  Condon,  958.  1008. 
y.  Coopers,  772. 
y.  Coray,  494. 
y.  Curry,  100. 
y.  Cuyler,  293. 
y.  Delanty,  472. 
v.  Deweese,  358. 
V.  Dodds,  105. 
V.  Durrett,  378. 
v.  Eaton,  493. 
V.  Elliott,  742,  783,  787. 
v.  Evans,  1005. 
y.  Everly,  395,  470. 
y.  Eyre,  417. 
y.  Ferris,  703. 
v.  P'loyd  County,  699. 
y.  Fowle.  279. 
V.  Fox,  158. 
y.  Frankfleld,  611,  683. 
y.  Frost,  968. 
y.  Gayle,  577. 
y.  Gould,  999. 
V.  Grady,  837. 
V.  Gray,   2r»5. 
V.  Hall,  3G0. 


clxxi 


ClXXii  GASES 

[References  to  sections.    §§  1  to 

Smith  Y.  Harrison,  8. 
V.  Hays,  368. 
y.  Henderson,  290. 
y.  Hess,  254. 
y.  Hogg,  442,  4G2. 
V.  Hood,  132,  137,  159. 
y.  Hughes,  1007. 
y.  Ingles,  433. 

y.  Inhabitants  of  Brunswick,  742. 
y.  Insurance  Ck).,  805. 
y.  Iron  Ck).,  958,  1>(J3. 
y.  Johnson,  33,  374,  162. 
y.  Jones,   734. 
y.  Kammerer,  3G2. 
y.  Kander,  859,  873. 
y.  Keen,  267. 
y.  Kennedy;  101. 
y.  Keruochen;  504. 
y.  Knowlton,  240. 
y.  Kreager,  810. 
y.  Lang,  99(i 

y.  Lathrop,  853,  865,  939a. 
y.  Lewis,  206,  644,  828. 
y.  Los  Angeles  &  P.  R.  Co.,  278. 
y.  Lowden,  1000. 
y.  Lowry,  372. 
y.  McClure,  351. 
y.  McGool,  682. 
y.  McEvoy,  29. 
y.  McCutchen,  231. 
y.  McDonald,  195,  197. 
y.  McLain,  378. 
y.  McNeil.  713. 
y.  May,  27. 
y.  Mayo,  54. 
y.  Meredith,  468. 
y.  Mill  Co.,  83. 
y.  Miller,  118,  321,  351,  992. 
y.  Moore,  107,  572.  867. 
y.  Morrill,  253,  35a 
y.  Morse.  423. 
y.  Mullins,   155. 
T.  Mumford,  958. 
y.  Myers.  220. 
y.  Nicolls,  838,  845.  847. 
y.  Noe.  324. 
T.  Ormsby,  253a. 
y.  Palmer,  291. 
V.  Peck,   945. 
y.  Perkins,  305. 
V.  Powell.  378. 
y.  Powers,  16. 
y.  Pringle,  70. 


CITED. 

489  in  TOl.  1;  residue  In  toI.  2.] 

Smith  y.  Quarles,  368. 

V.  Railroad  Co..  29.  664. 
V.  Ramsey.  248. 
y.  Redus,  160. 
V.  Reed,  1010. 
y.  Rhoades,  898. 
y.  Rice,  282. 
,y.  Richards,  425. 
y.  Rhies,  779.  780. 
y.  Robinson,  159.  346. 
y.  Rountree.  611,  761. 
y.  Sahler,  32. 
y.  Sayage,  446. 
y.  Saxton,  293. 
y.  Bchoenberger,  993. 
y.  Schreiner,  510,  685. 
y.  Schwartz,  458. 
y.  Schwed.  297a,  317. 
y.  Shaw,  245,  513. 
y.  Shawano  Co.,  34. 
y.  Sherwood,  623,  647,  650. 
y.  Simms,  50. 
y.  Sims,  641. 
y.  Singleton,  782. 
y.  Smith  [17  111.  482]  857. 
y.  Smith  [22  Iowa,  5161  290. 
y.  Smith    113   Gray    (Mass.)    209J 

803. 
y.  Smith  [20  Mo.  166]  320. 
y.  Smith  [51  N.  H.  5711  4. 
V.  Smith    [56   N.    J.   Eq.   222,   37 

Atl.  49]  504. 
y.  Smith  [40  App.  DIv.  251,  57  N. 

Y.  Supp.  1122]  158. 
y.  Smith  [2  Johns.  285]  824. 
y.  Smith  [2  Wend.  624]  16. 
y.  Smith  [4  Wend.  468]  16. 
y.  Smith  [117  N.  C.  348.  23  S.  E. 

270]  63. 
y.  Smith  [135  Pa.  48,  21  Atl.  168] 

497. 
y.  Smith  [55  S.  C.  507.  33  S.  K. 

583]  610. 
y.  Smith  [23  Tex.  Civ.  App.  304, 

55  S.  W.  541]  186. 
y.  So  RIU,  141. 
y.  State.  97.  177,  220. 
y.  Storage  Co..  343. 
y.  Talbot.  620,  621, 
y.  Tallapoosa  County.  985b. 
y.  Taylor.  368,  390. 
y.  Thomasou,  44. 
y.  Town  of  Ontario,  614. 


CASES  CITED. 
[ReferencM  to  secttona.    K  1  to  499  in  70l.  1;  residue  in  yoI.  2.] 


clxziii 


Smith  ▼.  Trust  Co.,  857,  806. 

T.  Timstead,  d41. 

T.  Tupper,  211,  237.  275. 

T.  Wachob,  330. 

T.  Walker,  6C8. 

Y.  Wallace,  3(rr. 

T.  Watson,  340a. 

T.  Way,  729,  738. 

T.  Weeks.  (J07,  75a 

V.  Wehrly,  412,  483. 

V.  Wells,  m. 

T.  Weston,  345a. 

T.  Whiting,  5(H.  726w 

T.  WUlard,  446. 

T.  WiUiams,  462. 

T.  Wilson.  155,  306,  319. 

T.  Wood,  152,  273. 
Soilth's  Adm*r  y.  Rollins,  211,  324. 
Smith's  Adm'rs  y.  Yanderborst,  960. 
Smith's  Appeal,  40a 
Smith's  Bstate,  In  re,  513. 
S^mith*s  Ex'r  y.  Miller,  992. 
Sodlth's  Lessee  y.  Trabue's  Heirs,  549. 
Smithson  y.  Dillon,  177. 

y.  Smithson,  297. 
Smock  y.  Dade,  299,  989. 
Smyth  y.  Balch,  374. 
Snapp  y.  Commonwealth,  588. 
Sneden,  In  re,  533. 
Sneed  y.  Sneed.  1001. 
Sneeden  y.  Harris,  35. 
Snen  y.  Dwigbt,  27. 

T.  Faussatt,  821. 

T.  Iryine,  139. 

y.  Maddox,  946. 
Snelling  y.  Kroger,  641. 

y.  Mortg.  Co.,  359.  585. 
Sneylly  y.  Wagner,  250. 
Snider  y.  Croy,  624. 

y.  Greatbouse,  574,  990. 

y.  Rinehart,  381,  386. 
Snow.  Kx  parte,  258. 

T.  Oarpenter.  128. 

T.  Conant  16. 

y.  Hawpe,  312. 

y.  Mitchell,  883.  970. 

T.  Rich,  512. 

T.  Russell,  600. 
Snowman  y.  Harford,  560. 
Snow  Steam  Pump  Co.  y.  Dunn,  744. 
Snyder  y.  Berger.  604. 

y.  Botkin,  438. 

y.  Crltchfield.  857.  868,  883.  916. 


Snyder  y.  Snyder,  206,  875. 
y.  Stafford.  401. 
V.  Yannoy.  378* 
Snyder's  Lessee  y.  Snyder.  642. 
Sobey  y.  Beiler,  549,  655. 
Sobolisk  y.  Jacobson,  617. 
Society  y.  Hartland,  504. 
Soden  y.  Roth,  663. 
Sohier  y.  Merrll,  365. 
Solomon  y.  C.  M.  Schneider  &  Co.,  59. 

y.  Fuller,  165. 
Somers  y.  Losey,  264. 

y.  Schmidt,  569. 
Someryille  y.  Brown,  597. 

T.  Donaldson,  654. 
Sommermeyer  y.  Sommermeyer,  271. 
Sonnenberg  y.  Stelnbach,  536. 
Sonnenthell  y.  Moody,  780. 
Soper  y.  Fry,  57. 

y.  Manning,  691,  718. 
S(HrreIl  y.  Samuels,  270. 
Soulard  y.  Oil  Co.,  801. 
Soursin  y.  Salorgne,  752. 
Souter  y.  Baymore,  510,  686. 
South  American  &  Mexican  Co..  In  le^ 

508.  705. 
South  Bend  Chilled  Plow  Co.  y.  Man- 

ahan.  224. 
Southern  Bank  y.  Humphreys,  246. 

y.  Ins.  Co.,  475. 
Southern  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  y.  Folsom^ 

549. 
Southern  Bell  Telephone  &  Telegraph 

Co.  y.  D'Alemberte,  138. 
Southern  Bldg.  &  Loan  Ass*n  y.  Brack- 

ett,  231. 
Southein  Ex.  Co.  y.  Craft,  376. 
Southern  Ins.   Co.   y.  Hardware  Co., 

897,  939. 
Southern  Kansas  Ry.  Co.  y.  Brown, 
155. 
y.  Showalter.  147. 
Southern   Minnesota   Railway   Exten- 
sion Co.  y.  Railroad  Co.,  504,  630, 
731. 
Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.  y.  U.  S.,  504,  606, 
600,  655,  787. 
V.  Wiggs,  530. 
Southern  R.  Co.  y.  Bouknlght,  004. 
V.  Brigman,  685,  790. 
V.  Cable  Co.,  40. 
V.  Raney,  745. 
Southgate  y.  Montgomery,  518,  548. 


clXXiv  CASES 

CReferences  to  sectloiiB.    S8  1  to 

South  Sail  Bernardino  Land  &  Imp. 

Co.  V.  Bank,  673. 
Southside  R.  Co.  y.  Daniel,  628. 
Southwestern  Telegraph  &  Telephone 

Co.  v.  Jennings,  339. 
South  &  North  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Donovan, 
740. 

V.  Henlein.  734.  769. 

v.  Railroad  Co.,  29. 
Soward  v.  Coppage,  549. 
Sowles  V.  Witters,  1000. 
Spafford  v.  Beach,  1006. 

V.  City  of  Janesville,  306. 
Spahr  V.  Nicklaus,  100. 
Spalding  V.  Congdon,  127,  12a 

V.  Crawford,  351. 

V.  Wathen,  190,  200. 
Spangler  t.  Rambler,  636. 
Spann  y.  Crummerford,  892. 
Spargur  v.  Romine,  790. 
Sparhawk  y.  Buell's  Adm'r,  644. 

V.  Wills,  609,  747. 
Sparks  y.  Bank,  446. 

y.  Etheredge,  536. 

y.  Walton,  651. 
Sparrow  y.  Strong,  162. 
Spaugh  y.  Huifei*,  941. 
Spaulding  y.  Baldwin.  700,  966. 

y.  Chamberlain,  522. 

y.  Swift,  299. 

y.  Thompson,  341. 
Spaur  y.  McBee,  655. 
Speake  y.  Richards,  1007. 
Spear  y.  Carter,  53. 

y.  Door  County,  723. 

y.  Flint,  299. 

y.  Tidball,  729. 
Specklemeyer  y.  Dailey,  875. 
Speed's  Bx'rs  y.  Hann,  155. 
Speer  y.  McPherson,  407. 
Spence  y.  Brown,  404. 

y.  Morris,  227. 

y.  Rutledge,  147. 
Spencer  y.   Brockway,  227,  677,  857, 
871. 

y.  Dearth,  504,  500,  574,  592,  604, 
729. 

y.  Haug,  461. 

T.  Johnston,  1005. 

y.  McGonagle,   262. 

y.  Parsons,   190. 

y.  Reynolds,  (J la. 

V.  BIppe,  399. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.] 

Spencer  y.  Thistle,  347. 

V.  ^'igneaux,  369,  371. 
Spicer  y.  United  States,  707. 

y.  Waters,  295. 
Spiedel  Grvicery  Co.  y.  Armstrong,  182 
Spiehler  y.  Asiel,  178,  319. 
Spier  y.  Corll,  897. 
Spilman  y.  Payne,  986. 
Spitley  y.  Frost,  691. 
Spofford  y.  Smith.  633. 
Sponsler*s  Appeal,  264. 
Spoouer  y.  Leland,  361,  362. 
'Spoors  y.  Co  wen,  619. 
Sprague  y.  .  Bond,   45. 

y.  Haiues,  194. 

y.  Jones,  160. 

y.  Locke,  32. 

y.  Tyson.    585. 

y.  Waite,  779. 
Spraker  y.  Bartlett  378. 
Spring  y.  Short,  445. 
Springer  y.  Blen,  619. 

y.  Gillespie,  340a. 

y.  Shavender,  680. 

y.  Westcott,  242. 
Springfield  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  ▼.  Hambgr» 

185. 
Spring  Run  Coal  Co.  y.  Tosier,  49S. 
Springfield  Mfg.  Co.  y.  West,  483. 
Springsteeue  y.  Gillett,  966. 
Sprott  y.  Reid,  7,  8,  11,  31. 
Spurgin  y.  A  dam  son,  600. 

y.  Bowers,  270. 
Spm'lock  y.  Noe,  205. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  609. 
Spurr  y.  Railroad  Co.,  782. 
Squler  y.  Squier,  57. 
Stackhonse  y.  Zuntz,  200. 
Stacy  y.  Thrasher.  563. 
Stadler  y.  Allen,  431. 
Stafford  y.  Clark,  785,  787. 

y.  Cronkhite,  655. 

V.  McMillan,  322. 

y.  Maddox,  742. 

V.  Nutt,  208. 
Stahl  y.  Mitchell.  283.  896. 

y.  Railroad  Co..  84. 

V.  Webster,  153. 
Stahlman  y.  Watson,  419. 
Stakke  y.  Chapman,  989. 
Stallcup  y.  City  of  Tacoma.  546,  613. 

754. 
Stallings  y.  Gully,  83. 


CASES  CITED. 


clxxv 


tReferencei  to  lectionB.    H  1  to 

Stammers  ▼.  McNaugbten,  195. 
Stamp  V.  Franklin,  556. 
Stanard  y.  Rogers,  387. 
Stanbrough  v.  Cook,  666,  683. 
StancUl  Y.  Gay,  193,  194. 

Y.  James,  785. 
Standard  Distilling  Co.  v.  Freyliau,  22. 
Standard  Foundry  Co.  v.  Schloss.  581. 
Standard  Steam  Laundry  v.  Dole,  21. 
Standish  y.  Parker,  657,  742. 
Standley  y.  Amow,  225. 

Y.  Manufactiu-iDg  Co.,  32. 

Y.  Roberts,  28.  ti39c. 
Stanford  y.  Connery.  957. 
Stanhilber  y.  GraYes,  446. 
Stanley  y.  Johnson,  577. 

Y.  Leahy,  782. 

Y.  McWhorter,  462. 

Y.  Stanley,  229.  275. 

Y.  SuUiYan,  425. 
Stannard  y.  Hubbell,  616. 
Stannis  y.  Nicholson,  122,  443. 
Stansell  y.  Comiog,  185. 
Stansfleid,  In  re,  977. 
Stanton  y.  Bmbry,  859. 

Y.  Embrey,  939a. 

Y.  Heard,  36. 
Stanton-Thompson  Co.  y.  Crane,  325, 

352. 
Staples  Y.  Goodrich,  734. 
Stapleton  y.  Dee,  657. 
Starbird  y.  Moore,  299. 
SUr  Brewery  v.  Otto,  279. 
Starbuck  y.  Dunklee,  22. 

Y.  Mnrray,  275,  276,  897,  901. 
Stark  Y.  BUllngs,  115. 

Y.  Ratcliff,  915. 

Y.  SUrr.  744. 
Starke  y.  Wilson,  560. 
Starkweather  y.  Loom  is.  985. 
Starling  y.  Plow  Co.,  609. 
Stames  y.  Loan  &  Banking  Co.,  378. 
Starr  y.  Barton,  255. 

Y.  Haskins,  9a3.  956. 

Y.  Stark,  664. 
Starr  Cash   &  Package   Car   Co.    Y. 

Starr,  87. 
Starry  y.  Johnson,  210. 
State  Y.  Addison,  98. 

Y.  Adler,  533. 

Y.  Allen,  34. 

Y.  AlUng,  173,  516. 

V.  Anderson,  541,  690. 


499  in  Tol.  1;  residue  in  yoI.  2.] 

St^te  Y.  Anone,  173,  516. 
Y.  Appleby,  985d. 
Y.  Armington,  927. 
V.  Bank,  16,  216,  307,  750,  973. 
Y.  Banks,  586. 
Y.  BatcheJder,  530. 
Y.  Batt,  584. 
Y.  Bechdel,  533. 
Y.  Berry,  282. 
Y.  Bierwirth,  691. 
Y.  Billings,  83. 
Y.  Bloom,  255,  256. 
Y.  Boiler,  609. 

Y.  Bowen,  641,  870,  871,  967. 
Y.  Boyce,  939a. 
Y.  Bradneck,  529. 
Y.  Brandhorst,  246b 
Y.  Brown,  483,  754. 
Y.  Burton,  584. 
Y.  Carroll,  173,  516. 
Y.  Casey,  340. 
Y.  Cason,  588. 
Y.  Castleberry,  174. 
Y.  Chamber  of  Commerce,  516. 
Y.  City  of  Jacksonville,  985c. 
Y.  City  of  Madison,  965a. 
Y.  City  of  New  Orleans,  9,  965a. 
Y.  Clark,  106. 

Y.  Com'rs,  240,  532,  583a,  783. 
Y.  Conoly,  2G1. 
Y.  Cooley,  697,  754. 
Y.  Cornell,  718. 
Y.  Coste,  589. 

Y.  Court,  21,  32,  297,  302,  324,  641. 
Y.  Currie,  113. 
Y.  Daniels,  283. 
T.  Daugherty,  153. 
Y.  Dickinson,  107. 
Y.  Donegan,  589. 
Y.  Douglass,  98. 
Y.  Duncan,  297,  346a, 
Y.  Elgin,  341. 
V.  Ely,  282. 
Y.  Falconer,  29. 
Y.  Fenderson,  255. 
Y.  Fleak,  897. 
Y.  Fosdlck,  217. 
Y.  Gachenhelmer,  282. 
Y.  George,  98. 
Y.  Georgia  Co.,  30. 
Y.  Gibson,  209. 
Y..  Gittings,  86. 
Y.  Gleason,  216. 


clxxyi  CASES 

[References  to  sections.    §S  1  to 

State  V.  Gloyd.  754. 

V.  Greeu,  US. 

V.  Harper,  154. 

y.  Harrington,  981« 

V.  Harris,  985a. 

y.  Headlee,  613. 

V.  Hearn,  996. 

V.  Helmer,  857,  871. 

V.  Herod,  29. 

y.  Hincliman,  860. 

y.  Hoeflluger,  804. 

y.  Holt,  589. 

y.  Horton,  329. 

V.  Hull,  590. 

y.  Hunter,  107. 

y.  Insurance  Co.,  609. 

y.  Intoxicating  Liquors,  529. 

y.  James,  98. 

y.  Johnson,  540,  790. 

y.  Jones,  216. 

V.  Judge,  27,  109,  157,  179. 

y.  Jumel,  109,  610,  750. 

V.  Justices,  29. 

V.  Kaye,  610. 

V.  Kennedy,  534a,  582. 

V.  Kibling,  97. 

V.  King,  163,  308. 

V.  Kinne,  483. 

V.  Klein,  107. 

V.  Knight,  180. 

y.  Leathers,  97. 

y.  Little,  290. 

T.  Loclchart,  346a. 

y.  Loye,  54. 

y.  McArthur,  1. 

V.  McBride,  758. 

y.  McGlynu,  635. 

y.  Mackin,  246. 

y.  Mangum,  698. 

V.  Metzger,  282. 

y.  Moran,  156. 

y.  Morton,  628. 

y.  Moss,  253a,  707. 

y.  Nutter,  586. 

y.  O'Neill,  340. 

y.  Ottlnger,  32. 

V.  Parlcer,  22. 

y.  Patterson,  86. 

y.  Penney,  804. 

y.  Perry,  33. 

y.  Porter,  173,  516. 

y.  Prinun,  156,  165. 

y.  RaUroad  CJo.,  107.  298,  584,  796. 


CITED. 

499  in  Yol.  1;  residue  in  yol.  2.] 

State  y.  Ralney,  584. 

y.  Hamsburg,  514. 

y.  Reigart,  641. 

y.  Richardson,  321. 

y.  Roberts,  177. 

y.  Robinson,  486i 

y.  Rogers,  261. 

y.  Ross,  266. 

y.  Roth,  708. 

y.  St.  Gemme,  261. 

y.  Schlachter,  932. 

y.  Schoonoyer,  740. 

y.  Shaw,  22. 

y.  Sheldon,  985f. 

y.  Smith,  165. 

y.  Sowders,  905. 

y.  Spikes,  576^  783. 

y.  Staylor,  707. 

y.  Steen,  981. 

y.  Stewart,  746i, 

y.  Stock,  584. 

y.  Sup'ra,  269. 

V.  Swift,  103. 

y.  Tate,  160,  311.  327. 

T.  Thompson,  268. 

y.  Torinus,  747. 

y.  Tow,  261. 

y.  Town  of  Beloit,  985a. 

y.  Town  of  Union,  2ia 

y.  Trammel,  938. 

y.  Treasurer,  305. 

y.  Trilling,  29. 

y.  Vogel,  982. 

V.  Wear,  261. 

V.  White,  157,  300. 

y.  Williams,  176,  209. 

y.  Works,  22. 

y.  Young,  1016. 
State  Bank  v.  Bartle,  599. 

y.  Carson,  417,  425. 

V.  CJoxe,  1001. 

y.  Green,  22. 

V.  Roddy,  27. 

y.  Rude,  729. 

y.  Stanton,  381. 
State  Board  of  Agriculture  ▼.  Meyerii 

347. 
State  Ins.  Co.  y.  Waterhouse,  376. 
State  Line  &  S.  R.  Co.,  Appeal  of, 

439a. 
State  Nat.  Bank  y.  Ellison.  284. 
States  y.  Cromwell.  321. 
State  Treasurer  y.  Foster,  482a. 


CASES 
[Reference!  to  sections.    93  1  to 

State  Trust  Co.  v.  Machine  Co.,  938c. 

r.  Mfg.  Co.,  830a. 
Stanffer  v.  Remick,  677. 
^^tau])ton  v.  Harris,  448. 
Staunton  Perpetual  Building  &  Loan 

Co.  V.  Hadeu,  83,  2U0. 
Steaui-Gauge  &  Lantern  Co.  y.  Mey- 

roso.  728, 
Steamship  Richmond  Ilill  Go.  v.  Sea- 

ger,  87. 
Steam  V.  Anderson,  660. 
Steams  v.  Lawrence,  585a.  630. 

V.  Steams'  Adm'r,  100. 

V.  Wlborg,    676. 

V.  Wright,  271. 
Stehbins  t.  Savage,  32. 
Stedman  v.  Patchin,  627. 

V.  Poterie,  605. 
Sited  V.  Knowles,  101. 
Steel  T.  Long.  540. 

Y.  Smith.  228,  004. 
Steele  v.  Bates,  909. 

r.  Dimcan,  315. 

T.  Hanna,  971. 

r.  Lineberger,  550,  560. 

Y.  I'almer.  184. 

Y.  Kenn,  635. 

Y.  Taylor,  432. 

Y.  Thompson,  945,  051. 
Steele  County  v.  Erskine,  683. 
sttN'lman  y.  Sites'  Ex'n,  620. 

V.  Watson,  86. 
Steen  y.  Bennett,  250. 

Y.  Steen.  220,  282. 
Steere  y.  lioagland,  038b. 

V.  Tenney,   173.  876. 
Steers  y.  Daniel,  420. 
St  elf  ens  y.  Cameron.  406. 
stettlns  Y.  (iumey,  inni. 
strbr  Y.  Ollbermann.  235. 
Stein  Y.  Burden,  376. 

y.  The  Prairie  Rose,  734. 

Y.  Railroad  Co.,  16. 
Steinbach  v.  Insurance  Co..  678. 
Steinbridge's    Appeal.    355. 
stMuer  V.  Bank,  23. 

Y.  I^nz.  :C»8. 

Y.  SchoU,  3.'>1. 

V.  Scholze.   050. 
Sr<Mnhanlt  v.  Baker.  273. 
Strinhatier  y.  Colniar.  268. 
SN'liiman  v.  Kwing.  55. 
Strinjion  Y.  Board,  715. 
I  LAW.irD<i.— I 


CITED.  clxxvii 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Stelle  V.  Shannon,  526. 
Steltzer  v.  Steltzer.  494. 
Stenberg  v.  State,  253a. 
Stenhbuse  y.  Bouum,  211. 
Stephen,  Ex  parte,  533. 
Stepliens  v.  Cherokae  Nation,  4. 

V.  Fox,  583. 

V.  Hewett,  252. 

V.  Howe,  403,  070. 

V.  Jack,  571,  OOi. 

V.  Motl,  538. 

V.  Koby,  874. 

Y.  Turner,  273. 

V.  Wilson,  les. 
Stephen's  BiX'rs  Appeal,  407. 
Stephenson  y.  Boody,  660. 
Stepp  V.  Ass'n,  107. 
Sterling  y.  Fleming,  62. 
Sterling  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Early,  112,  405. 
Stem  Y.  Bank,  620. 

Y.  Mayer,  63. 
Sternbergh  y.  Schoolcraft,  205. 
Sterner  v.  Gower,  740. 
Stems  Y.  Marks,  592. 
Stetson  Y.  City  of  Bangor,  248. 
Stettauer  y.  Trust  Co.,  306. 
SteYens  y.  Bank,  317,  449. 

V.  Briggs,  701. 

Y.  Brown,  248. 

V.  Damon,  737. 

V.  Deering,  190,  190. 

V.  Dubarr>',  55. 

V.  Fisher,  230.  071. 

V.  Fuller,  255. 

Y.  Hein,  010a. 

V.  Hertzler,  388. 

Y.  Hughes,  C'O.  057. 

V.  Lock  wood,  734. 

Y.  Man  gum,  286. 

V.  Miller,  253a,  763,  085a. 

V.  Pendleton,  586. 

Y.  Pierce,  738. 

V.  Reynolds,  281,  511. 

Y.  Ross,  d5. 

V.  Stevens,  510. 

V.  Stone,  058. 

Y.  Taft.  640. 

Y.  Thompson.  600. 

Y.  Wadlelgh,  506. 
Stevens'  Ex'rs  y.  Let»,  142. 
Stevenson  v.  Black,  467. 

Y.  Bonesteel,  261. 

V.  Kleppiuger,  611. 


clxxviii  CASES 

[References  to  sections.    §§  1  to 

Steveuson  v.  Virtue,  327. 
Stevlsou  V.  Earnest,  124. 
Stewart  v.  Anderson,  229,  281. 

V.  Aruiel,  1015. 

V.  Assurance  Co.,  906. 

V.  Bank,  16. 

V.  Beef  Co.,  214. 

V.  BocUoy.  -24. 

V.  Bryan,  8J). 

V.  Cannon,  ;i45. 

V.  Coder,  4:58. 

V.  Colwell.  495. 

V.  Dent,  735. 

V.  Gibson,  490. 

V.  Golden,  311. 

V.  Goode,  79. 

y.  Jones,  33. 

V.  Jury,  98of. 

V.  JusUeets,  485. 

V.  Lee,  942. 

V.  McHarry,  rj30. 

V.  Martin,  069. 

V.  Montgomery,  536,  500. 

V.  Parsons,  315. 

V.  Perkins.  439a. 

V.  Peterson's  Ex'rs,  484,  958. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  100,  415,  449,  600. 

V.  Register.  511. 

V.  Robinson.  396. 

V.  Schaeffer,  tX)7. 

V.  Scully,  :352. 

V.  Spaulding.  892. 

V.  Stebbins,  731. 

V.  Stewart,  154,  857,  890.  897. 

V.  Thomas,  573. 
•  V.  Thomson,   286. 

V.  Trust  Co.,  583. 

V.  Village  of  Ashtabula.  518. 

V.  Walters,  50. 

V.  Warner,  815,  820. 
Stiikney  v.  Davis.  204. 
Stifel  V.  Lynch,  747. 
Stlgers  V.  Brent.  205. 
Stiles  V.  Brown,  13S. 

V.  HlmnielwrlglU.   749. 

V.  Murphy,  432. 

V.  Stewart,  966. 
SUll  V.  liombardl.  674. 
Stille  V.  Wood,  484. 
Stillwell  V.  McNeely,  585. 

V.  Stillwell.  321. 
Still  weirs  Estate,  In  re,  284,  043. 


CITED. 

4D0  in  vol.  1:   residue  in  vol.  2.] 

StIIson  V.  Rankin,  347. 
Stllwell  V.  Carpenter.  367,  :.70. 

V.  StUw^ell,  158. 
r.timson  v.  Van  Pelt,  208. 
Stinerville  &  B,  Stone  Co.  v.  White. 

159. 
Stinnett  v.  Bank,  384. 
Stites  V.  M(.-(;ee.  319. 
Stilt  V.  Kurtenbach,  153.  ICl.  2  r.. 
Stivere  v.  Ritt,  352. 
Stockdale  v.  Johnson,  163,  165. 
Stocking  V.  Hanson,  200,  313. 
Stockton  V.  Brlggs,  367. 

V.  Ford,  737. 
Stockton  Combined  Harvester  &  Agri- 
cultural Works  V.  Insurance  Co.,  -*4. 
Stockton  Laundry  C:ise,  257. 
Stock  well  V.  Byrne.  716. 

v.  Coleman,  935. 

V.  McCracken.  8119. 

V.  Webster,  351. 
Stoddard  v.  Benton,  945,  950. 

V.  Mcllwain,  617. 

V.  Thompson,  576. 
Stoddard    Mfg.    Co.    t.    Mattice,  270. 

958. 
Stoddart  v.  Van  Dyke,  208. 
Stodghlll  V.  Railroad  Co..  743. 
Stoetzel  V.  Fullerton.  200. 
Stoff  V.  Mc(Jinn,  638a. 
Stokes  V.  Fraley,  658. 

V.  Knarr,  376. 

V.  Maxwell,  550. 

V.  Morrow,  553. 

V.  Pottery  Co.,  59. 

V.  Stokes,  617,  703. 
Stoll  V.  Mining  Co.,  21. 
Stoltz  V.  Coward,.  509. 
Stone  V.  Anderson,  141. 

V.  Bank,  534a.  537. 

V.  City  of  Augusta,  522. 

V.  Dickinson,  777.  779,  782. 

V.  Ellis,  284. 

V.  Lew  man,  373,  973. 

V.  Mooily,  383. 

V.  Myers,  229. 

V.  SkeiTy,  377. 

V.  Stamping  Co.,  750. 

V.  Tucker,  1008. 

V.  V.  S.,  529.  726. 

V.  Wri'-nwright  913,  914. 

V.  Williams,  68. 


CASES 
[References  to  sections.    §§  1  to 

Stone  V.  Wood,  412,  500,  Wl. 

Stony  Island   Hotel   Co.   v.    Johnson. 

165,  351. 
Stoops  V.  Wittier,  58C. 

V.  Woods,  5iiU. 
Stoppeubach  v.  Zohrlaut,  27. 
Storer  t.  Lane,  291. 
Storey  v.  Nichols,  79. 

T.  Weaver,  348. 
Story  V.  Goiiimercial  Co.,  G85. 

V.  Elliot  182. 

V.  Patten,  1000. 

V.  Ware.  80. 
Story  &  Clark  Organ  Co.  v.  Rendle- 

man.  97. 
Store  T.  Boyce.  996. 
Stotz  V.  Collins,  324. 
Stout  V.  Baker,  210. 

V.  Lewis,  339,  343. 

T.  Slocum,  367. 

V.  Stout,  677. 

T.  Taul.  577. 

V.  Van  Kirk,  953. 
Stoutenborough  v.  Board,  313. 
Stoutenburg  v.  Yandenburgh,  57. 
Stoutimore  v.  Clark.  549. 
StOTall  T.  Banks,  25,  586,  589. 

T.  Hibbs,  240. 

V.  OdeU.  446. 
StOYer  V.  Dureu,  993. 

V.  Hough,  312,  351. 
Stowell  V.  Chamberlain,  624,  693,  709, 

726. 
Strang  v.  Moog,  518.  720. 
Stntton  V.  iJewey,  43. 
Stranb  v.  Simpson,  364. 
Straus  V.  Bodeker*s  Ex*x,  447. 
Strause  v.  Braunreuter,  58. 
Strauss  t.  Ayres,  597. 

V.  Meertlef,  624,  752. 
Straw  V.  Murphy,  691. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  707. 
Strawsine  v.  Salisbury,  1012. 
Stmj-er  v.  Johnson,  552,  054. 

V.  Beckman,  501. 
Street  v.  Banking  Co.,  795,  798. 
Strickland  v.  Cox,  18. 
Strl«lde  V.  Saroul.  577. 
Strike,  In  re.  7M. 
Striker  v.  Kelly,  279. 
Stringer  v.  Adams.  618,  726. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  814. 
Strode  v.  Broadwell,  1012. 


CITED.  elxxix 

499  in  Yol.  1;   residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Strong  V.  Comer,  8G. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  787. 

V.  Lawrence,  605. 

V.  Wheaton,  583. 
Stroup  V.  Sullivan,  387. 
Strozier  v.  Howes,  360. 
St  ruble  v.  Maloue,  889,  898. 
Stuart  V.  Aumiller,  248. 

V.  City  of  Logansport,  155. 

V.  Hurt,  5J83. 

V.  Lander,  7,  058. 

V.  Palmer,  221,  226. 

V.  reay,  1016. 

V.  Saddlery  Co.,  720. 
Stubbletield  v.  McRavou,  644. 
Stubbs  V.  Leavitt,  376. 
Studdert  v.  Hassell,  80. 
Studebaker  Bros.   Mfg.   Co.   v.  Hunt 

169. 
Stufflebeam  y.  De  Lashmutt,  506. 
Stults  V.  Forst,  720. 
Stump  V.  Long,  319. 
Stupp  V.  Holmes,  193. 
Sturdy  V.  Jackaway,  655. 

V.  Jacoway,  250. 
Sturges  V.  Beach,  566. 
Sturgess  v.  Bank,  441. 
Sturgis  V.  Rogers,  252,  527. 
Sturglss  V.  Dart,  346. 
Sturm  V.  School  Dist,  317. 
Stuyvesant  v.  Weil,  277. 
Styles  V.  Harrison,  182. 

V.  McXeirs  Heirs,  950. 
.'iiarez  v.  City  of  New  York,  563. 
.Suber  V.  Chandler,  269. 
Sublette  V.  Railroad  Co.,  960. 
Suddarth  v.  Lime  Co.,  310. 
Suesenbach  v.  W^agner,  939b. 
Sugjr  V.  Thornton,  153. 
Sulleuberger  v.  Gest,  16. 
Sullivan  v.  Ball,  290. 

V.  Hendrickson,  425. 

V.  Lickle,  434. 

V.  Shell,  340,  378. 

v.  Sweeney,  309. 
Sullivan's  Sav.  Inst  v.  Clark,  166. 
Sully  v.  Campbell,  774. 
Summar  v.  Jarrett,  278. 

V.  Owen,  15. 
Summerlin  v.  Dowdle,  79. 
Summers  v.  Brewing  Co.,  529. 

v.  Dame,  447. 

V.  Oberndcrf,  595. 


ClXXX  CASBS 

[References  to  secttons.    89  1  to 

Summersett   v.    Summersett's   Adm'r, 

165. 
Summerslde  Bank  v.  Ramsey,  S92. 
Sumner  v.  Marcy,  359. 

V.  Whitley,  378,  391. 
Sumrall  v.  Smnrall,  G41. 
Suudberg  v.  Temple,  351. 
Sun  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sesligson,  505. 
Superior  Consol.  .Land  Co.  v.  Dxmphy, 

34<ja,  347. 
Supervisors  v.  Randolph,  985a. 

V.  U.  S.,  2o3a. 
Supervisors  of  Carroll  County  v.  U.  S., 

U8of. 
Supervisors  of  Lee  County  v.  Rogere, 

985e. 
Supervisors  of  Manitowoc  County  t. 

Sullivan.  179. 
SuperTioors  cf  Washington  County  v. 

Durant,  985b. 
Supplee  V.  Ilalfmann,  493. 
Supples  V.  Cannon,  624,  627. 
Supreme  Council  of  Royal  Arcanum  v. 

Carley,  917. 
Siu-get  V.  Newman,  683. 
Susquelianna   Mut.    Fire.  Ins.   Co.    y. 

Mardorf,  628. 
Suter  V.  Findley,  492. 
Sutherland  y.  De  Leon,  245,  261,  513. 
Sutter  V.  Cox,  213. 
Sutton  V.  Dameron,  650. 

V.  Pollard,  650. 

V.  Read,  530. 

V.  Sutton,  W7,  963. 

V.  Tyrrell,  299. 
Suydam  v.  Barber,  770,  861. 

V.  Hoyfs  Adm'rs,  960. 

V.  Pitcher,  225,  306. 
Swafford  v.  Howard,  985. 
Swaim  V.  U.  S.,  250,  524. 
Swain  v.   Naglee,   126,   130,   135,   155, 

im. 

v.  Smith,  151. 
Swamseot  Machine  Co.  v.  Walker,  541. 
Swan,  In  re,  255. 

V.  Horton,  193. 

V.  House,  641. 
Swank  v.  Railroad  Co.,  787. 
Swann  v.  Broome,  182,  441.*  442. 
Swanson  v.  Jordan,  358. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  701!. 
Swanstrom  v.  Marvin,  185. 
Swarts  V.  Stccs,  400. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.] 

Swartz  V.  D.  S.  Morgan  &  Co..  325. 
Swasey  v.  Antram,  200. 
Swayne  v.  Lyon,  55,  190,  191,  628. 
Swearengen  v.  Gulick,  271.  ' 

Sweeney  v.  Bailey,  1005. 

V.  Pratt,  439. 

T.  Smith,  191. 

V.  Stroud,  75. 
Sweeny  v.  Delany,  157. 
Sweesey  v.  Kitchen,  61,  354. 
Sweet  V.  Brack  ley.  ^.";v  MiKi,  802. 

Y.  Jacocks,    434,    445. 

V.  Maupin,  624,  irM. 

V.  Turtle,  616,  617. 
Sweetland  v.  Buell.  445. 

V.  Tuthill,  144. 
Sweetser  v.  Davis.  585a« 
Sweezy  v.  Jones,  429. 
Swenk  v.  Stout,  567. 
Swett  V.  Black,  579, 
Swift  V.  Allen,  164. 

V.  Calnan,  141. 

V.  Green,  233. 

V.  Meyers,  897,  904,  939. 

V.  Stark,  857,  914. 

V.  Yanaway,  274,  275,  557* 
Swift  &  Co.  V.  Fue,  101. 
Swlggart  V.  Barber,  218,  261. 
Swinford  v.  Teegarden,  754. 
Swing  V.  Woodruff,  55. 
Swinney  v.  Watkins,  253.     ^ 
Swope  V.  Schwartz,  541. 
Sydam  v.  Cannon,  99$). 
Sykes  v.  Anderson,  79a. 

V.  Bonner,  769. 

V.  Gerber,  734,  746. 

V.  Thornton,  32. 
Sylvester  v.  Downer,  101. 
Syme  v.  Trice.  193,  321. 
Symson  v.  Selheimer,  66. 
Szerlip  t.  Baier,  324,  ;;52. 


Tabler  v.  Mitchell.  230. 
Tabor  v.  The  Cerro  (iordo,  674. 

V.  Payne,  21. 
Tacoma  Grocery  Co.  v.  Draham,  261. 
Tacoma  Lumber  &  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Wolff. 

321,  348. 
Tadloek  v.  Eccles,  245. 
Taggart  v.  Wood,  365.  366. 


CASBS 
[Referencef  to  aections.    H 1  to 

Talbot  V.  rierce,  36. 

Talbott  V.  Suit.  248, 

Taliaferro  v.  Steele,  329. 

Taliaferro's  Adm^r  v.  Bank,  35U. 

Talley  v.  Curtin,  44. 

TaUmadge  v.  Sill,  436. 

Tallnian  v.  Farley,  445. 

Tally  T.  Reynolds,  9(>3. 

Talmage  v.  Chapel,  563,  677,  963. 

T:im  V.  Shaw,  571. 

Tarns  V.  BuUitt,  5W.  597. 

V.  Lewis,  611,  624. 
Tanguey  t.  O'Connell,  556. 
Tankerely  v.  Pettis,  681,  720. 
Tannenbaum  ▼.  Rosswog,  296. 
Tanner  v.  Irwin,  32. 
Tanton  v.  Keller,  154. 
Tapley  t.  Goodsell,  127.  587. 
Tappan  v.  Bruen,  771. 

V.  Heath,  970. 

T.  Tappan,  320. 
Tarbell  t.  Downer,  975,  1006. 

Y.  Griggs,  938b. 
Tarble,  In  re,  256. 
Tarbox  t.  Hays,  250,  252,  286, 
rarleton  v.  Allhnsen,  674. 

Y.  Cox,  199,  204. 

V.  Johnson,  547. 

V.  Tarleton,  826,  827. 
Tarplee  v.  Capp,  641. 
Tarpley  t.  Hamer,  399. 
Tarrant  Co.  t.  Lively,  34L 
Tanrer  v.  Ellison,  459. 

T.  Rankin,  1013. 

V.  Tarver,  367. 
Tate  V.  Bank,  700. 

V.  Carney,  530. 
Tatro  T.  French,  530. 
i'anb  y.  Commission  Co.,  784. 
lanziede  v.  Jumei,  543,  585. 
Taxpayers  v.  O'Kelley,  584. 
Tay  V.  Hawley,  963. 
Taylor  t.  Abbott,  651. 

T.  Barnes,  573. 

V.  Barron,  563,  790,  829,  853,  857, 
984. 

T.  Beck,  58,  82.  206. 

▼.  Bradshaw,  386. 

T.  Bryden.  829,  855. 

V.  Castle,  726,  729. 

T.  Claypool.  770. 

V.  Corley,  98. 


CITED.  clXXXi 

499  In  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Tayltr  v.  Cornelius,  434,  537. 

V.  Cougfalan,  348. 

V.  Dawson,  39. 

V.  Dustin,  627. 

V.  Ervln,  182. 

V.  Harris,  970. 

V.  Heitz,  734. 

V.  Hulme,  1009. 

V.  Hunt,  589.  ' 

V.  llutcbinson,  790. 

y.  Johnson,  588. 

V.  Larkin,  693. 

V.  Lewis,  377. 

V.  Levering,  205. 

V.  Lusk,  305. 

V.  McLaughlin,  79. 

V.  MacLee,  29. 

V.  McXairy,  86. 

y.  Mallory,  368. 

Y.  Matteson,  709. 

y.  Means,  604. 

y.  Megargee,  993. 

y.  Neither,  556. 

y.  Paper  Co.,  733. 

y.  Phelps,  598,  826,  828. 

y.  Place.  298. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  740. 

y.  Ranney,  1006. 

y.  Read,  44. 

y.  Richman,  138. 

y.  Root,  7,  677. 

y.  Rossiter,  83. 

y.  Rowland,  193. 

y.  Runyan,  115. 

y.  Shew,  882,  960. 

y.  SindaU,  321,  526. 

V.  Skrine,  175. 

y.  Smith,  33,  88.  683.  684,  857,  877. 

y.  State,  290. 

y.  Sutton,  384,  386. 

y.  Sweet,  32. 

V.  Syme,  284. 

y.  Taylor,  29,  116,  506,  729. 

V.  Trumbull,  305. 

y.  Walker,  194. 

y.  Williams.  1002. 

V.  Wynne,  429. 

V.  Yarbrough,  720,  722. 
Taylor's  Adm'r  v.  Spindle,  398. 
Teaff  V.  Hewitt,  44. 
Teague  v.  Corbitt.  560. 

y.  Whaley,  569. 


clXXXii  CASES 

[References  to  sections.    $$  1  to 

Toal  V.  Terrell,  (il(>,  (US. 

Teasdal?  ComnilsRlon  Co.  v.  Van  Hard- 

euberg,  «3. 
Toat  V.  Cocke,   181. 
Tebbets  v.  Tllton,  634. 
Tebbetta  v.  Tllton,  288. 
Tedlle  v.  Dill,  211. 
Teehan  v.  Bridge  Co..  IG. 
Teel  V.  Miles,  071. 

V.  Yost,  8U8. 
Teetor  v.  Abden,  M7. 
Telford  v.  Barney,  6<X). 

V.  Brinkerhoff,  357,  380. 
Tern  pel  v.  Dodge,  227. 
Temple  v.  Scott,  1000. 
Templeman  v.  Gibbs,  IG. 

V.  Steptoe,  39,  44. 
Tennessee  v.  Virgin,  992. 
Tennessee   Goal,    Iron    &   R.    Co.   y. 

Hayes,  681a. 
Tenney  v.  Taylor,  275. 

V.  Townsend,  875. 
Tenny  v.  Filer,  53. 
Terney  v.  Wilson,  954. 
Terre  Haute  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Baker,  936. 

V.  People,  740. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  360,  518,  731. 
Terr?ll  v.  Prestell,  433. 

V.  State,  86. 
Terreri  v.  Jutte,  744. 
Terrett  v.  Improvement  Co.,  03. 
Territory  y.  Hopkins,  G14. 

V.  I.ii8  Vegas  Grant,  28. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  731. 
Terry,  Ex  parte,  255. 

y.  Briggs,  12& 

y.  French,  213. 

V.  Hammonds,  707. 

y.  Hughes,  36. 
Terry's  Ex'r  y.  Drabenstadt,  567. 
Tessier  y.  Lockwood,  806. 

y.  Wyse,  iOO. 
Texas  Brewing  Co.  y.  Meyer,  186. 
Texas  Cent.  R.  Co.  y.  Stuart,  23. 
Texas  Land  &  Cattle  Co.  y.  Scott,  37. 
Texas  Land  &  Loan  Co.  y.  Winter,  29, 

130,  346. 
Texas  Land  &  Mortgage  Co.  y.  Wor- 

sham,  390. 
Texas-Mexican  R.  Co.  y.  Wright,  363. 
Texas,  S.  F.  &  N.  R.  Co.  y.  Saxton,  14, 

733. 
Texas  Say.  Loan  Ass'n  y.  Smith,  153. 


CITED. 

499  In  TOl.  1;  residue  in  toL  1] 

Texas  Trunk  R.  Co.  y.  Jackson,  510, 

085. 
Texas  &  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Cox,  217. 

V.  Nelson,  740. 

V.  Smith.  500. 
Teynham  y.  Tyler,  554. 
Thacker  y.  Chambers,  2-15. 

V.  Thacker,  335. 
Tharpe  y.  Crunipler,  10«). 
Thatcher  v.  Gammon,  87,  677,  697. 

y.  Ilaun,  349. 

y.  Lyons,  U85. 

y.  I^owell,  279. 

V.  Taylor,  148. 
Thaxton  v.  Smith,  513. 
Thayer  v.  Cabl?.  OOJ. 

V.  McGee,  123. 

y.  Mowry,  902,  9!J4. 

y.  Printing  Co.,  583. 

y.  Trust  Co.,  767. 

y.  Tyler,  493. 
Thelen  y.  Thelen,  275. 
Theller  y.  Hershey.  iMO.  790. 
Thelusson  y.  Smith.  448. 
Therkelsen  y.  Therkelsen,  22. 
Therme  v.  Bethenoid,  118. 
Thiele  y.  Axell.  567. 
Thigpen  y.  Mundlne,  S4. 
Third  Nat  Bank  y.  Hunsicker,  1014. 

V.  Stone,  750. 
Thiry  v.  Mining  Co..  15. 
Thisler  y.  Miller,  738. 
Thom  y.  Wilson's  Ex'r,  975. 
Thomas,  In  re,  320a. 

y.  Bland,  707. 

y.  Chambers,  341. 

y.  Cliurcblll,  250. 

y.  Desney,  40(). 

y.  Dunning,  585. 

V.  Fogarty,  177. 

y.  Glazener,  1010. 

y.  Hite,  610,  0U3. 

V.  Hubbell,  588. 

▼.  Hunsucker,  2t55. 

▼.  Ireland,  291. 

T.  Irrigation  Co.,  754. 

V.  Jones,  248. 

V.  Joelyn,  032. 

y.  Kennedy,  420,  4:«. 

y.  Lowry,  211. 

y.  McDanald,  610,  006. 

y.  McDaneld,  508. 

y.  Markmann,  .'88. 


CASES 
[References  to  Bections.    S§  1  to 

Tbomas  y.  Mohler,  770. 

y.  Morris,  HHj. 

V.  Morrlsott,  ^22. 

V.  Mortjjuge  Co.,  Si),  307. 

v.  Mueller,  50. 

V.  Xeel.   311. 

V.  Pendletou,  800. 

V.  PliHlIps,  378. 

V.  riatts,  1006. 

V.  Porter,  945. 

T.  Railroad  Co.,  29. 

V.  Stems,  5<>2. 

V.  Tanner,  878. 

T.  Thomae,  790. 

V.  Van  Meter,  462. 

V.  Williams,  493. 

T.  Wilson,  981. 
Tbomason  v.  Odum,  15,  123,  700,  730. 
Tbomasson  y.  KercbeYal,  802. 
Thomas*  WiU,  In  re,  612. 
Thompson  v.  AYery,  398,  407,  414. 

V.  Bank,  948. 

V.  Berry,  384. 

T.  Bickford,  111. 

T.  Brown.  585. 

V.  Chnrch,  182. 

V.  Clark,  549. 

Y.  Clay,  719.  720. 

Y.  Connell,  322,  091. 

Y.  Crosby,  610. 

Y.  Deknm,  589. 

Y.  Dickinson.  352. 

Y.  Donaldson,  640. 

Y.  Emmert.  775,  903,  904,  906. 

Y.  Fox.  90. 

Y.  Giffin,  510,  685. 

Y.  Goulding,  341. 

Y.  Hammond,  358. 

Y.  Harlow.  335. 

Y.  Hintgen,  77. 

Y.  Hubbard.  462. 

Y.  Jones,  957. 

Y.  Kimbrougb.  99. 

Y.  Laugblin,  357,  362,  390. 

Y.  McCorkle,  252,  260. 

Y.  McDermott,   197. 

Y.  Mc<;aw,  633. 

Y.  McMillan.  988. 

Y.  Mankin,  173. 

V.  Monrow,  880.  981. 

T.  Multnomnb  County,  260,  522. 

Y.  Myrlek,  620. 


CITED.  clxxxiii 

499  in  Yol.  1;  reeldue  in  vol.  2.] 

Thompson  v.  Noble,  956. 

V.  X.  T.  Bushnell  Co.,  Bl7,  629. 

V.  Parker,  483. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  544. 

Y.  Roberts,  543. 

V.  Saukey,  1)91. 

V.  Schuster,  703. 

V.  Skinner,  313. 

V.  State,  932. 

V.  Stetson,  84. 

V.  Thompson,  158,  509,  803. 

V.  Tolmie,  261. 

V.  Turner,  138. 

Y.  W^hitman,    227,    278,   289,    897, 
901,  903,  906. 

Y.  Wineland,  718. 
Thompson*s  Appeal,  291,  293,  294. 
Thorns  V.  King,  281,  924. 
Thomsen  v.  McCormIck,  577. 
Thomson  v.  Blanchard,  642. 

V.  Dean,  44. 

V.  Joplin,   587. 

V.  Lee  County,  938,  958. 
Thomson's  Adm'r  y.  Chapman's  Adm*r, 
.    473. 

Thoreson  y.  Hanrester  Works,  768. 
Thorn  v.  Salmonson,  835. 
Thornall  v.  Turner,  338,  347. 
Thomer  v.  Batory,  867. 
Thornfaill  y.  Bank,  55. 
Thornton  v.  Eppes,  504,  681. 

V.  Hogan,  248,  807. 

Y.  Lane,  54,  971. 

Y.  Perry,  115. 
Thorp  V.  Gordon,  261. 

V.  Piatt,  156. 
Thorpe  y.  Corwin,  180. 
Thouvenin  v.  Rodrlgues,  222,  261,  275. 
Thrall  y.  Waller,  962. 
Threadgill  v.  Railroad  Co.,  176. 
Thrift  Y.  Delaney,  656. 
Throne-Franklin  Shoe  Co.  v.  Gunn,  29. 
Thulemeyer  y.  Jones,  432. 
Thum  V.  Pike,  335. 
Thiurber  v.  Blackboume,  853. 
Thurmond  v.  Andrews,  248,  807. 

Y.  Bank,  874,  989. 
Thurston  v.  Spratt,  572. 

Y.  Thurston,  721,  722.  929. 
Thwing  V.  Doye,  86. 
TIbbetts  V.  Shapleigh,  771. 
Tidd  V.  Rines,  118. 


cl!xxxiy  CASBs 

[ReterencGB  to  sections.    U  1  to 

Tldloute  &  Tioua  Oil  Oo.  v.  Shear.  351. 
Tlerney  v.  Abbott,  719. 
Tiers  v.  Codd,  490. 
Tift  V.  Keaton,  3. 
Tilford  V.  Buruham,  450. 

V.  Oakley,  962. 
Tilles  V.  Albright,  63. 
Tillinghast  v.  McLeod,  16. 
TilUson  V.  Tllllson,  7«;. 
Tillotson  V.  Millard,  425. 
Tilman  y.  Johnson,  am, 
Tilson  V.  Davis,  518. 
Tilton  V.  BaiTell,  153. 

V.  Cofield,  518.  550. 

V.  Gordon,  758. 
Timber  lake  v.  Powell,  051. 
Timmons  v.  Dunn,  768. 
Tindall  v.  Carson,  483. 
Tinley  v.  Martin.  46. 
Tinney  v.  VVolston,  469. 
Tinsley  v.  Lee.  214. 
Tipton  V.  Wright,  225. 
Tisdale  y.  Insurance  Co.,  640. 
Title  Ins.,  Trust  &  Safe-Deposit  Co.  v. 

Rau,  70. 
Titlemore  v.  Wainwright,  299. 
Titus  V.  Larsen,  335. 

y.  Mabee,  32. 
Tobar  y.  Losano,  181. 
Tobias  V.  Dorsey,  199. 
Tobin  y.  Meyers.  992. 
Toby  y.  Brown,  674,  795. 
Tobyhanna  &  L.  Lumber  Co.  t.  In- 
surance Co.,  79a. 
Todd  y.  Badger,  16. 

y.  Crumb,  8,  892. 

y.  Fisk,  378. 

y.  Jackson,  363. 

y.  Kerr.  548. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  526. 

y.  Todd,  127. 
Toland  y.  Sprague,  225. 
Tolbert  y.  Harrison,  1000. 
Toledo,  W.  &  W.  R.  Co.  y.  Gates,  347. 

y.  Ingraham,  99. 

y.  McNulty,  967. 
Tolen  y.  Tolen,  822,  926,  928^  932. 
Toliver  y.  Brownell,  176. 
Tome  y.  Stump,  38. 
Tomkins  y.  Tomkins,  371. 
Tomlinson  v.  Litze.  121.  35a 
Tompkins  v.  Bank,  995. 

y.  Blakey,  91Ca. 


CITBD. 

499  in  Yol.  1:  residue  In  vol.  2.] 

Tompkins  y.  Cooper,  867. 

y.  Craig,  873. 

y.  Dreunen,  518,  766. 

y.  Hyatt,  44. 

y.  Lang,  3i;3.  393a,  394. 

y.  rurc-311,  9381). 

y.  Tompkins,  63(»,  S23. 
Tompson  v.  Lumber  Co.,  31a, 
Toney,  Ex  parte,  253. 
Tongue  y.  Morton,  tW2. 
Tooker  v.  Booth,  313. 
Toomey  y.  Rosansky.  252. 
Toope  y.  Prlgge,  632. 
Toothaker  y.  Greer,  246. 
Tootle  y.  Clifton.  16. 
Topliff  V.  TopUff,  626,  627. 
Topp  y.  Bank,  857,  995. 
Tdrbett  y.  Godwin,  583. 
Torrence  v.  Torrence,  432. 
Torrey  y.  Pond,  643. 
Toulmin  y.  Anderson,  127. 
Tourigny  y.  Houle,  826,  829. 
Tovey  v.  Young,  372. 
Towe  V.  Felton,  995. 
Towers  y.  Tuscarora  Academy,  549. 
Towle  V.  Gouter,  52. 

y.  Towle,  586,  587. 
Town  y.  Lamphere,  615. 

y.  Smith,  681,  737. 
Town  of  Andes  y.  Ely,  508,  681a. 
Town  of  Bethlehem  y.  Town  of  Watei*- 

town,  806. 
Town  of  Cabot  y.  Town  of  Washing- 
ton, 806. 
Town  of  Clay  y.  Hart  678,  719. 
Town  of  Cloyerdale  y.  Smith,  600. 
Town  of  Fletcher  y.  Blair,  209. 
Town  of  Haywaixi  y.  Pimental,  347. 
Town  of  Huntington  y.  Town  of  Char- 
lotte, 279,  443. 
Town  of  Jericho  y.  Town  of  Under- 
bill, 713. 
Town  of  Lyons  y,  Cooledge,  578. 
Town  of  Omro  y.  Ward.  337,  347. 
Town  of  Ontario  v.  Bank,  251. 
Town  of  Poplin  y.  Town  of  Hawke. 

635. 
Town  of  Poultney  y.  Treasurer.  295». 
Town  of  St.  Albans  y.  Bush.  938. 
Town  of  Storm  Lake  y.  Railroad  Co.. 

209. 
Town  of  Troy  v.  Rjiilroad  Co.,  743. 
Town  of  Walpole  v.  Mario w,  100. 


CASBS 

[Referencee  to  sectlonf.    H 1  to 

Towns  y.  Nims,  504,  014. 

V.  Springer,  218,  278. 
Townsand  v.  Townsand,  83. 
Towusend  v.  Cox,  197,  1)74. 

T.  Gordon,  644. 

V.  Riddle,  774. 

T.  Smith,  909,  1010. 
Townshend,  In  re,  717. 

V.  Chew,  SOIL 

v.  We68on,  110. 
Township  of  Hiawatha  v.  Judge,  156. 
Tozer  y.  Jackson,  635. 
Tracy  v.  Goodwin,  587,  588. 

V.  Kerr,  725. 

T.  Malonej,  587. 

V.  Merrill,  714. 

V.  Whitsett,  412. 
Trader  v.  Lawrence,  404. 
Traders*  Nat.  Bank  v.  Schorr,  425. 
Trafton  v.  United  States.  770. 
Tralttenr  t.  Levingston,  352. 
Trammel!  y.  Thurmond,  504. 

V.  Trammell,  156. 
Trapbagen  v.  Lyons,  953. 
Trapnall  y.  Richardson,  413,  415,  484, 

1006.  1006. 
Trapnairs  Adm'z  y.  Bank,  1!j3. 
Traak  y.  Green,  433. 

T.  Railroad  Co.,  738. 
Trautwein  y.  Iron  Works,  745. 
Trayelers*  Ins.  Co.  v.  Weber,  34. 
Travelers*  Protective  A8s*n  v.  Gilbert, 

271- 
Traver,  In  re,  388. 
Travis  v.  Waters,  41. 

V.  WUlis,  56,   180. 
Travis  County  v.  Mfg.  Co.,  332. 
Trawlck*s  Heirs  v.  Trawick's  Adm*rs. 

174. 
Trayhem  v.  Colbum,  614. 
Ttaicy  V.  Ellis,  263. 
Treadway  v.  E3a8tbum,  273. 
Treadwell  v.  Pitts,  576. 

v.  Temples,  588. 
Treasurers  of  State  v.  Bates,  588,  770. 

V.  Oswald's  Sureties,  745. 
Treat  v.  McCall.  2:^3. 
Trebilcock  v.  Wilson,  152. 
Tre!>noox  v.   MoAlpln?.   868. 
Treoothjck  v.  Austin,  ♦177. 
Trenary  v.  Cheever.  1(K)8. 
Trenholui.  Ex  parte.  42c). 

T.  Bumplicld,  $^81. 


CITED.  clXXXV 

499  In  vol.  1;   residue  In  vol.  2.] 

Trescott  v.  Barnes,  750. 

V.  Lewis,  (391. 
Trevino  v.  Fernandez,  846. 
Trevlvan  v.  Lawrence,  787. 
TTeweek  v.  Howard,  589. 
Trigg  V.  Harris,  987,  1007. 
Trimble  v.  Hunter,  434. 

V.  Longworth,  288. 

Y.  Miller,  19L 
Triplett  V.  Gill,  5ia 

V.  I^ke,  150. 

V.  Scott,  963. 
Tripp  Y.  Potter,  496* 

Y.  Saunders,  212. 

Y.  Vincent,  341. 
Trogdon  v.  Stone  Co.,  252. 
Troup  Y.  Horbach,  22,  26, 

Y.  Wood,  991. 
Trout  Y.  Marvin,  399. 
Troutman  v.  Vernon,  650,  655. 
Trow  V.  Messer,  13. 

y.  Thomas,  16,  oa 
Trowbridge  v.  Hays,  26L 

Y.  Spinning,  860,  867,  896. 
Troy  Y.  Smith,  605. 
Truby  v.  Case,  351. 
True  v.  True.  320. 
Trueheart  v.  Simpson,  314. 
Truesdall  v.  McCormick,  265. 
Truesdell  v.  Lehman,  433. 
Truly  V.  Wanzer,  378. 
Truman,  In  re,  255,  259. 
Trumbull  v.  Nicholson,  989. 
Truscott  y.  King,  71,  991. 
Trustees  of  Amherst  College  v.  Allen. 

363,  375. 
Trustees   of   Internal    Imp.    Fund    v. 

Bailey,  306. 
Trustees  of   Leake  &  Watts   Orphan 

House  Y.  Lawrence,  5<j6. 
Trustees   of   Tutnam    Free   School   v. 

Fisher,  600. 
Trustees  of  School  Distiict  No.  28  v. 

Stocker,  622. 
Trustees  of  Village  of  New  burgh  v. 

Oalatlan.  ."mS. 
Tucker  v.  Beau,  193,  197. 

Y.  Carr,  7.14. 

Y.  Gill.  73. 

v.  Rohrback,  693. 

Y.  Shade,  470. 

Y.  Stone,  34. 

Y.  Trading  Co.,  157. 


clxXXVi  CASES 

[References  to  aectlons.    §S  1  to 

Tucker  v.  Williams.  37G. 

V.  Wilson,  721. 
Tudor  V.  Taylor,  1010. 
Tuffree  v.  Stearns  Kanchos  Co.,  826. 
Tufts  V.  Tufts,  4G6. 
Tuggle  V.  Gilbert,  26. 
Tullis  V.  Scott,  340. 
Tunis  V.  Withrow,  232. 
Tunno  v.  Railroad  Co.,  20. 
Tunstall  v.  Robinson,  1)76. 

V.  Trappes,  436. 
Tuppery  v.  Hertung,  15. 
l\irley  v.  Dreyfus,  8C2,  922,  963. 

V.  Taylor,  916. 

V.  Turley,  683,  783. 
Tuman  v.  Temke,  1016. 
Turnbull  v.  Walker,  837. 
Turner  t.  Bank,  282. 

V.  Brock,  745. 

V.  Gates,  541,  720. 

▼.  Christy,  158. 

V.  City  of  Houston,  116. 

y.  Colson,  370. 

v.  Coughran,  318. 

V.  Crebill,  43. 

V.  Davis,  380. 

V.  Donnelly,  530. 

V.  Dupree's  Adm'r,  484. 

V.  Goodrich,  567. 

V.  Hitchcock,  777,  779. 

V.  Ireland,  286. 

V.  Jenkins,  197,  273. 

V.  Judge,  311. 

V.  Lambeth,  847. 

▼.  Leathern,  311. 

y.  Malone,  633. 

y.  Nachtsheim,  692. 

y.  Plowden,  26. 

V.  Roby,  966. 

y.  Satterlee,  1008. 
Turner's  Estate,  In  re,  46. 
Tumey  y.  Van  Gelder,  292. 
Turpln  y.  Brannon,  607. 
Turpln,   y.   Thomas*    RepresentatiyeB, 

367,  540. 
Turrell  y.  Warren,  285. 
Tuska  y.  O'Brien,  613. 
Tute  y.  James,  588. 
Tuthlll  Spring  Co.  v.  Smith,  290. 
Tutt  y.  Boyer,  641. 

y.  Ferguson,  384. 

y.  Trice.  631. 
Tuttle  y.  Clallin,  24,  31a. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  In  yoI.  2.] 

Tuttle  y.  Harrill,  766. 

V.  Scott,  349. 

y.  Town  of  Burlington,  299. 
Twambly  v.  Henley,  5i*»8. 
Twlgg  V.  Hopkins,  391. 
Twogood  V.  Pence,  78,  698. 
Twohig,  Ex  parte,  255.  269. 
Tyler  y.  Cartwright,  661. 

y.  Hamersley,  378. 

y.  Peatt,  220,  906. 

y.  Shea,  168. 
Tyler's  Kx'rs  v.  Winslow,  6. 
Tynan  v.  Weinhard,  l^o. 
Tyree  y.  Magness,  574. 
Tyres  y.  Kennedy,  551. 
TyiTell  y.  Baldwin,  540. 
Tyson  v.  Belcher,  250. 
T.  &  H.  Smith  &  Co.  y.  Taber,  923. 


u 


Ueland  y.  Johnson.  87. 

y.  Lynch,  352. 
Uhe  y.  Railway  Co..  181. 
Uhl  V.  May,  420,  4;iS. 
Ullman  y.  Herzberg,  745. 
UUmann  y.  Kline,  94S,  950. 
Ulmer  y.  Frankland,  496. 
Ulrich  y.  Drischell.  666. 
Ulshafer  y.  Stewart,  118. 
Umbria,  The,  984. 
Underiiill  v.  Collins,  749. 
Und3rwood,  In  re,  257. 

V.  French,  616. 

V.  Sledge,  305. 

V.  Smith,  747. 

V.  Underwood,  340a. 
Unfrled  y.  Heberer,  87. 
Unger  v.  Lelter,  407. 
Union  Associated  Press  y.  Heath,  779. 

y.  Publishing  Co.,  782. 
Union  Bank  y.  Com'rs,  (>99. 

y.  Hodges,  770. 

y.  Manard,  420. 
Union  Cent  Life  Ins.  Co.  y.  Lipscomb, 

91,  340,  349. 
Union  Guaranty  &  Trust  Co.  y.  Rolv 

inson,  586. 
Union  Lumbering  Co.  y.  Supers,  364. 
Union  MIU  &  M.  Co.  y.  Dangberg.  G(W. 
Union  Xat.  Bank  y.  Benjamin,  352. 

y.  Lane,  69. 


CASES 
rReferences  to  sectiona.    §}  1  to 

Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Baliv  r.  804. 
V.  Kelley,  719. 
T.  Railroad  Co..  787. 
L'nion  R.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Traube,  729.  730, 

738.  747.  749. 
Union   Sav.    Bank    &   Trust    Co.    v. 

LoQDge  Co..  857. 
Union  Terminal  R.  Co.  v.  Com'rs,  719. 
Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co..  882, 

Union  &  Planters*  Bank  v.  Allen,  611. 

V.  City  of  Memphis.  750. 
United  Security  Life  Ins.  &  Trust  Co. 
V.  Ott,  321. 

T.  Vaughn,  63. 
United  Society  of  Shakers  v.  Under- 
wood, 777,  7T9. 
U.  S.  V.  Ames,  770. 

T.  Arredondo.  215,  241. 

T.  Badger,  965e. 

T.  Beebe,  370,  371,  530. 

T.  Biebusch.  876. 

T.  Board,  085a,  985b.  985c. 

7.  Buchanan  County,  965c,  985e. 

T.  Budd,  530. 

T.  Chung  Shee,  292. 

T.  City  of  Key  West  985a. 

T.  Clark  County.  985f . 

T.  Council,  985b. 

T.  Cushman,  775,  963* 

T.  Dashiel,  1O08. 

T.  Devereux,  446. 

T.  Dewey.  930a. 

T.  Drainage  Dist.  986c 

V.  Duncan,  415. 

T.  Eisenbeis.  423. 

v.  Gayle,  273. 

V.  Gleeson.  823. 

V.  Grimley,  250.  524. 

V.  Griswold,  248.  1000. 

V.  Houston.  490.  • 

V.  Ingate,  586. 

r.  Jaedicke,  529. 

T.  Jefferson  County,  065b. 

T.  Judges.  965b. 

T.  Keokuk.  360. 

T.  King.  985a.  985b. 

T.  Land-Grant  Co..  530. 

T.  I^ee  County.  965b,  985e. 

Y.  Lewis,  448. 

T.  Lincoln  County,  965b. 

V.  McDowell,  531. 

T.  McKnight.  328. 


CITED.  clxxxvii 

409  In  vol.  1;   residue  In  vol.  2.  J 

U.  S.  V.  Macon  County,  985f. 

V.  MIniug  Co.,  580. 

V.  Minor,  530. 

V.  Montell,  149. 

V.  More,  216. 

V.  Morrison,  398. 

V.  Muscatine  County,  985b. 

V.  Xew  Orleans,  253a,  985b,  965f. 

V.  O'Grady,  5iMa. 

V.  Paiker,  700. 

V.  Patterson,  256. 

V.  Peters,, 216. 

V.  Port  of  Mobile,  965f. 

V.  Price,  774,  775. 

V.  Pridgeon.  2^8.  259. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  530,  537. 

V.  Rand,  713. 

V.  Rose,   530. 

V.  Samperyac.  940. 

V.  Schneider,  520. 

V.  Silverman.  987)6. 

V.  Sturgis,  414. 

V.  Throckmorton,    323,    370,    874. 
530. 

V.  Thompson,  493,  494. 

V.  Wlnstead,  18. 

V.  Tin  Co.,  530. 

V.  Township,  985a,  985d. 

V.  Treasurer,  98ob,  985e. 

V.  Wallace,  297,  341. 

V.  White,  530. 

V.  Williams,  297,  530. 
United  States  Bank  v.  Winston's  Bat'r. 

444. 
United  States  Electric  Lighting  Go.  v. 

Leiter,  246,  358. 
United  States  Exp.  Co.  v.  Smith,  585a. 
United  States  Mut.  Ace.  Ins.  Co.   v. 

Relsinger,  376. 
United  States  Nat  Bank  ▼.  Venner. 

213. 
United  States  Trust  Co.  v.  Territory, 
253a. 

V.  Trust  Co.,  247. 
United  Underwriters*  Ins.  Co.  v.  Pow- 
ell, 23. 
University  of  North  Carolina  v.  Lassi- 
ter,  325. 

T.  Maultsby,  747. 
Unknown  Heirs  v.  Kimball,  420,  433. 
Upchuivh  V.  Anderson,  R.")!. 
Uppfalt  V.  Wor?manu,  7G1. 
Upson  V.  Horn,  261. 


clXXXYlii  CASES 

[References  to  sections.    S9  1  to 

Upton  V.  Betts,  504,  G14. 

Urbana  Bank  v.  Baldwin,  443. 

Utah  Commercial  &  Savings  Bank  y. 

Trumbo,  344. 
Utah  Nat  Bank  v.  Sears,  67. 
Utley  V.  Cameron,  300,  306. 

V.  Fee,  064. 
Umle  V.  Vinson,  63,  302,  317. 


Vahle  y.  Brackensieok,  66d. 
Vail  V.  Arkell,  261. 

V.  Conant,  089. 

V.  Iglehart,  124. 

V.  Rinehart,  731. 
Vallance  v.  Sawyer,  483. 
Valentine  v.  Cooley,  211. 

V.  Duff,  206. 

V.  Mahoney,  548,  677. 

y.  Seiss,  445. 

y.  Sloss,  530. 
Valsain  v.  Oloutier,  560,  638. 
Van  Alen  y.  Rogers,  (i52. 
Van  Alstine  y.  McCarty,  577. 
Van  Alstyne,  In  re,  585a. 
Van  Arsdale  v.  King,  313. 
Vanarsdelen  v.  Whitaker,  367. 
Van  Beuren,  In  re,  958. 
Van  Blarcom  y.  Kip,  650. 
Van  Brough  y.  Cock.  356. 
Van  Busklrk  y.  Mulock,  962. 
Van  Camp  v.  Fowler,  548. 

V.  Peerenboom,  439. 
Vance  y.  Burbank,  530. 

y.  City  of  Franklin,  16. 

y.  Wesley,  582. 
Van  Court  v.  Moore,  568. 
Vandenheuvel  v.  United  Ins.  Co.,  815. 
Vanderheydeii  y.  Younp,  524. 
Vanderpoel  y.  Van  Valkenburgh,  635. 
Vanderpool  y.  Vanderpool,  328,  045. 
Vanderveere  y.  Gaston,  62. 
Van  Deusen  v.  Sweet,  2vS2,  802. 
Vandlyer  y.  Hammet,  958. 

V.  Roberts,  233. 
Van  Doren  v.  Horton,  522. 
Vandyke  v.  Johns.  250. 

y.  Wells,  1J:0. 
Van  Etten  v.  Kosters,  144. 

V.  Test,  130. 
Vanfleet'v.  Phillips,  63. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  In  vol.  2.1 

Van  Fossen  v.  State,  927. 
Van  Gunden  y.  Kane,  128. 
Van  Gundy  v.  Carrlgan,  96. 
Van  Hagan,  £x  parte,  258. 
Van  Horn  y.  Van  Horn.  707. 
Van  Home  y.  McLaren,  1010. 

V.  Montgomsry,  347. 
Van  Houteu  v.  Reily,  952. 
Van  Kleeck  y.  MeCabe,  600. 
Van  Koughnet  y.  Dennie,  541. 
Vanlandlngham  y.  Ryan.  603,  707. 
Van  Lriew  v.  Beverage  Co.,  644. 
Van  Loon  v.  Smith,  993,  994. 
Vanmeter's  P3x'rs  v.  Vanmeter,  41. 
Van  Metre  y.  Wolf,  192. 
Van  Ness  y.  Corklns,  208. 
Van  Norman  y.  Gordon,  53,  859,  8^. 

896. 
Vanquelin  y.  Bouard,  827,  816. 
Van  Renselaer  y.  Whiting,  211. 
Van  Rensselaer  y.  Wright,  992. 
Van  Sant  v.  Butler,  530. 
Vanscoy  y.  Stlnchcomb,  388. 
Vanstory  y.  Thornton,  449. 
Vantilburg  y.  Black,  190. 
Vanuxem  y.  Burr,  746. 
Van  Valkenburgh  v.  City  of  Milwa,: 

kee,  87,  629,  697. 
Van  Vechten  y.  Griffiths,  796. 

y.  Terry,  585. 
Van  Vliet  y.  Olin,  699. 
Van  Wagenen  v.  Carpenter,  279. 
Van  Wyck  y.  Seward,  650. 
Van  Zandt  y.  Gormley,  20. 
Vamer  v.  Johnston,  250. 
Vasse  y.  Ball,  816, 
Vastine  v.  Bast,  376. 
Vathir  y.  Zane.  383. 
Vaughan  v.  Campbell,  834. 

V.  Marshall,  993. 

y.  Morrison,  614. 

y.  O'Brien,  693,  699,  719. 

y.  Phebe,  606. 
Vaughn  v.  Drewry,  609. 

y.  Fuller,  378. 

y.  Johnson,  367,  389. 
Vaule  y.  Miller,  252,  261.  972. 
Vans?  V.  Templeton,  446. 
Vedder's  Estate,  In  re,  560. 
Veite  v.  McFadden,  896. 
Venable  v.  Curd,  177. 

V.  Dutch.  22S>. 

y.  McDonald,   270. 


CASBS  CITED. 
[RefereocM  to  sections.    18  1  to  499  in  ▼ol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 


clxxxix 


Vennum  v.  Davis,  3«ij. 
Verden  v.  ODleman.  32. 
Verdln  v.  Slocum,  -UiO. 
Verhein  v.  Scbultz,  aU3. 
Vermllye  v.  Vennllye,  22, 
Vermont  Loan  &  Ttust  Co.  v.  McGreg- 
or, 986. 
VenDont  Marble  Co.  v.  Black,  854. 
Verner  t.  Bookman,  461. 

T.  Canon,  2U0. 
Wrncuil  V.  Harper.  806. 
Verplanck  v.  Van  Buren,  537,  681a. 
Verree  v.  Hughes,  U^2. 
Verret  v.  Belanger,  589. 
Vwtal  V.  Wicko*,  WO. 
Vetterlein.  In  re,  509. 
Vlck  T.  Baker,  340. 

T.  Pope,  190. 
Vickery,  In  re,  977. 

T.  Scott,  246,  513. 
Vicksburg  Grocery   Co.   t.   Brennan, 

252. 
Vicksburg,  S.  &  P.  B.  Co.  v.  Scott  26. 
Vu-ksburg  &  M.  R.  Co.  t.  Ragsdale, 

141. 
Vij^eant  v.  Scully,  574. 
Vila  V.  Weston,  948. 
VlJas  y.  Jones,  366. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  313,  325. 
Village  of  Cellna  v.  Bank,  375. 
Village  of  Port  Jervls  v.  Bank.  975. 
VQlage  of  Seneca  Falls  y.  Zalinskl,  575. 
Village  of  Wayzata  y.  Railroad  Co., 

Vinal  V.  Improvement  Co.,  726* 
VIncennes,  The,  623. 
Vincent  y.  Davidson,  287. 
y.  Hansen,  551. 
y.  McXamara,  779. 
Virgin  Cotton  Mills  v.  Abemathy,  16. 
Virginia,  Ex  parte,  2r)5,  256. 
Virginia-Carolina  Chemical  Co.  v.  Kir- 

ven,  «13. 
Vit;:inia   &   T.   Coal   &   Iron   Co.   t. 

Klf  Ids,  58,  Jm. 
Virpo  v.  Vlriro.  520. 
Vimher  v.  VlHcher,  fl2f>,  1)32. 
Voell  V.  Kelly,    lOKJ. 
Vcigt  v.  Ticknor,  605. 
Voinet  y.  Barrett,  836. 
Volkenand  v.  Drum.  <il. 
\olland  v.  WUcox,  ZV.Tk 


Von  Hoffman  v.  Kendall,  5-3. 

V.  Quiucy,  98of. 
Von  Puhl  V.  Rucker,  402. 
Von  Stein  v.  Trexler,  406. 
Voogbt  y.  Winch,  783,  787. 
Voorhees  v.  Gros,  10(>8. 

v.  Jackson,  270. 

v.  Seymom*,  (505. 
Voorhies,  In  ra,  4 SO. 

V.  Hennessy.  121. 
Voorhis  V.  Gamble.  211. 
Voris  v.  Association,  icS. 
Vosburgh  v.  Brown,  192. 
Vose  V.  Morton,  260,  293,  000. 
Voss  V.  Lewis,  599. 
Vought  v.  Sober,  699. 
Vowell  y.  Railway  Co.,  703. 
Vredenbiirg  y.  Morris,  429. 
Vredenburgh  v.  Snyder,  493. 
Vroom  v.  Ditmus,  137. 


w 

Wabash,  St  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Ttust 

Co.,  551. 
Waddams  v.  Bumbam,  916. 
Waddell  y.  Klmendorf,  1008. 

y.  Wood,  340. 
Waddell's  Adm'r  v.^Elmendorre  Ad- 

m*r8,  903. 
Waddlll  y.  Cabell,  802. 

v.  Payne,  224. 
Waddle  y.  Ishe,  713. 
Wade  y.  Bryant  135. 

y.  De  Leyer.  313. 

y.  Howard,  7110. 

y.  Sewell,  421. 

y.  Watt  1008. 
Wadhams  v.  Gay,  705. 
Wadsworth  v.  Henderson,  8,  lO* 

y.  Marsh,  598. 

y.  Murray,  558. 
Wager  y.  Insurance  Co.,  .')21. 
Waghome  y.  Langmead,  441. 
Wagner  v.  Wagner.  729,  747. 
Wagner  Ca.ses.  The,  360. 
Wagstaff  y.  Marcy,  509. 
Wahle  y.  Wahle,  Oil. 
Waldner  v.  Paiily,  2'M\. 
AValte  y.  Coaracy,  312. 

V.  Kllis.  12.'i3. 


cxo 


CASES  CITED. 
[References  to  Bectiona.    §9  1  to  499  in  vol.  1 ;  residue  In  toI.  2.] 

Wall,  Ex  parte,  -^21. 

V.  Covington,  159. 

V.  Galvin,  86. 

V.  Heald,  88. 

V.  Wall,  201,  504.  638. 
Wallace,  In  re,  807. 

V.  Miller,  779. 

V.  Rli)iK>n,  55. 
Walla   Walla    Printing  &  Publishiir: 

Co.  V.  Budd,  347. 
Wnller  v.  Weston,  352. 
Wallis  V.  Stuart,  193. 

y.  Thomas.  164. 
Walls  V.  Endel,  GC3. 
Walpole  V.  Mario w,  100. 
Walrad  v.  Walrad,  320. 
Walrath  v.  Walrath.  980. 
Walraven  v.  Bank,  666. 
Walrod  v.  Shuler,  121. 
Walser  v.  Sellgman,  862,  938b. 
Walsh  V.  Diu'kln,  865,  939a. 

V.  Ostrander,  604. 

V.  Thomasson,  525. 
Walter  v.  Ass'n,  178. 

V.  Erdman,  203. 

V.  Fees,  77. 
Walters  v.  Defenbaugh.  434. 

V.  Oyster,  495. 

V.  Wood,  534. 
W^alton  V.  Bethuue,  814,  815. 

y.  Bonham,  371. 

y.  Campbell,  569. 

V.  Coulson,  197. 

V.  Cox,  571. 

V.  I.efever,  15. 

y.  McKesson,  909. 

y.  Sugg,  857,  859. 

V.  Walton,  317. 
Waifs  Adm'rs  v.  Swinehart,  418. 
Wampler  v.  Walker.  33. 
Wamsley  v.  Robinson,  240,  680. 
Wanborg  v.  Knrst.  663. 
W^andling  y.  Straw,  938. 
Wann  v.  MeXulty.  770,  775,  776»  7S3, 

785,  787. 
Wanzer  y.  De  Baun.  745. 

y.  Self,  721. 
Ward  y.  Bond,  574. 

y.  Boyce,  220,  894. 

y.  Chamberlain.  416. 

y.  Derrick,  3(8. 

y.  Fnunon.  297. 

V.  Green,  227,  '2J0, 


Waite 

V.  Teeters,  615. 

AVaifs 

Ex'r  y.  Savftge,  449. 

Wakeileld  y.  lyes,  932. 

y. 

Moore,  318. 

Walbridge  v.  Hall,  255,  282. 

V. 

Shaw,  716. 

Walden  v.  Bodley,  713,  720. 

V. 

Craig,  490. 

W^alden  Nat.  Bank  y.  Birch,  745. 

Waldo 

y.  Thweatt,  312,  363. 

Waldron  y.  Hendrickson,  752. 

Waldrop  y.  I^onard.  213. 

Wales 

V.  Bank.  384. 

y. 

Bogrue,  261,  432. 

y. 

Lyon,  504. 

y. 

Whitney,  255.  256,  524. 

Walke 

y.  Moody,  445. 

Walkenhorst  v.  Lewis,  193.  194. 

Walker,  In  re,  993. 

>. 

Abt,  146. 

V. 

Ames,  758. 

V. 

Armour,  246. 

y. 

Arthur,  452. 

y. 

Carey,  114. 

y. 

Chase.  787. 

y. 

City  of  Philadelphia.  556w 

y. 

Clay,  205. 

y. 

Crawford,  41. 

y. 

Cronklte,  273. 

y. 

Dayis,  715. 

y. 

Elledge,  398. 

y. 

Ensign,  77. 

y. 

Ferrln,  572,  574. 

y. 

Fuller,  142.  729. 

y. 

Gilbert,  377. 

V. 

Lathrop,  227. 

y. 

Leslie,  657. 

V. 

^IcDowell,  1008. 

y. 

Massey.  84. 

y. 

Ferryman,  553,  565. 

y. 

Pope,  206. 

V. 

Powers.  951,  1006. 

y. 

Head,  553. 

y. 

Uobbin.s,  377. 

y. 

Uobinson.  993. 

y. 

Sallada,  330. 

y. 

Sargeant  105. 

y. 

Villavaso,  3(>7. 

y. 

W^alker,   1.  13. 

V.  Witter,  825. 

y.  Wynne.  37(J. 
Walker's  Ex'r  v.  Page,  123. 
Walkley  v.  Muscatine,  985b. 


CASES 
[Referencea  to  secticns.    SS  1  to 

M'ard  T.  Hudspeth,  250. 

T.  Johnson,  770. 

T.  Joslin,  583. 

V.  Kenner,  1. 

Y,  McKenzie,  90L 

V.  Mfg.  Co.,  910. 

V.  Obenauer,  GG6. 

V.  PhUllps.  IG. 

T.  l»rather'8  Adm'r,  486. 

V.  Price.  898,  903. 

T.  Quinlivln,  844,  919. 

T.  Railway  Co.,  98. 

T.  Sire,  750. 

V.  Stanley.  233. 

V.  State,  633. 

T.  Tliomas,  2ia 

V.  Ward,  784. 

V.  White,  110,  273. 
Warden  v.  Eden,  95a 
Warder  v.  Patterson.  352^ 

T.  Talnter,  487. 
Ware  v.  Baldwin,  309. 

T.  Delaliaye,  460. 

Y.  Jackson,  438. 

T.  Kent,  135,  164. 

V.  ^fcCormack,  678. 

V.  Percival.  729,  738. 

Y.  Purdy,  460. 

Y.  Railroad  Co.,  951. 
Ware  Furniture  Co.,  Ex  parte,  53. 
Warfield,  In  re,  250. 

Y.  Brewer,  488. 

V.  DaYis,  57a 

Y.  Fox,  638. 

Y.  Warfield.  609. 
Warfleld's  Will,  In  re,  250.       • 
Wame  y.  Irwin,  393. 
Warner  y.  Bartle,  985. 

Y.  Comstoek.  578. 

Y.  Conant,  375,  387,  593. 

Y.  Crane,  299. 

Y.  George,  754. 

Y.  Helm,  1010. 

Y.  Mnllane,  547. 

Y.  Tomlinson,  29. 

Y.  Veltch,  434. 
Warren  y.  Bank.  252,  279. 

Y.  Cominj^H,  621,  735. 

Y.  Flagg.  934. 

Y.  Kennedy.  139. 

Y.  Lusk,  903. 

Y.  McCarthy.  869.  8S0,  9G2. 

V.  Prewett,  138. 


CITED.  CXCI 

499  In  vol.  1;   residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Warren  v.  Slade,  985. 

V.  Van  Brunt,   530. 

V.  Warren,  9oS. 
Warrender  v.  Warrender,  822. 
Warrener  v.  KingsniiU.  834,  &19. 
Warren  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Insurance  Co.,  83. 

853. 
Warren  Sav.  Bank  v.  Silverstein,  83. 
Warrington  v.  Ball,  917. 

V.  Mfg.  Co.,  22. 
Warwick  v.  Underwood,  7S7. 
Washbon  v.  Cope,  644. 
Washburn  v.  Osgood,  1010. 

V.  Palace  Car  Co.,  285,  587. 
Washington  v.  Hackett,  191. 
Washington,  A.  &  G.   Steam  Packet 

Co.  V.  Sickles,  624,  625,  630. 
Washington   Bridge    Co.    v.    Stewart. 

518. 
Washington  Gaslight   Co.   v.   District 

of  Columbia,  575. 
Washington  Ins.  Co.  v.  Price,  174. 
Washington   Park   Club    v.   Baldwin. 

147. 
Washington  &  B.  Turnpike  Road  y. 

State,  98. 
AA'ashington  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Tobrlner. 

981. 
Washington  .&  N.  O.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Hob- 
son,  99. 
Wassell  Y.  English.  54. 

V.  Heardon,  61a,  (»9. 
Water  Com'rs  of  City  of  New  Bruns- 
wick V.  Cramer,  783. 
Waterhouse  v.  Cousins,  287. 

V.  Mining  Co.,  33. 
Waterman  v.  Jones.  52. 

V.  Town  of  Waterloo.  985. 
Waters  v.  Dumas,  121. 

V.  Perkins,  766. 

V.  Spofford,  809. 
Waters'  Appeal,  432,  439. 
Water,  Supply  &  Storage  Co.  v.  Reser- 
voir Co..  618. 
Watkins,  Ex  parte,  255,'  259,  285. 

Y.  Abrahams,   55. 

V.  Davis,  286. 

v.  Lan<}on,  372. 

V.  Lewis,  250. 

v.  State,  493. 

V.  Wassell.  421. 

V.  Wortniaii,  M)2,  802. 
AVatson,  In  re,  255. 


CXCU  CASES 

[References  to  sections.    98  1  to 

Watson  V.  Adams,  199. 

V.  Bank,  903. 

V.  Cowdrey,  715. 

V.  Dodd,  428. 

V.  Garvin,  523. 

V.  Hahn,  271. 

V.  Hopkins,  514. 

V.  Miller  Bros.,  83, 

V.  Newsham,  347. 

V.  Owens,  776. 

V.  Railroad  Ck).,  152,  354,  740. 

V.  Richardson,  510,  600. 

V.  Skating  Rink  Co.,  154. 

V.  Steinan,  913. 

V.  Van  Meter,  738. 

V.  Watson.  720. 

V.  Williams,  251. 
AVatt  V.  Brookover,  204. 
Watts  V.  Everett,  958. 

V.  Frazer,  370. 

V.  Gayle,  366,  375. 

V.  Rice,  611. 

V.  Taylor's  Adm'r,  560. 

V.  Watts,  612,  633. 
Waits'  Case,  98. 
Way  V.  Howe,  248. 

V.  Lamb,  368. 

V.  iewls,  586,  587. 
Wayman  v.  Cochrane,  082. 
Wearen  v.  Smith,  36,  182. 
Wearne  v.  Smith,  182. 
Weatherbee  v.  Weatherbee,  320. 
Weatherford  v.  James.  44. 

V.  Van  Alstyne,  326. 
Weaver  v.  Brenner.  265. 

V.  Cressman,  862. 

V.  English,  967. 

V.  Gardner,  92. 

V.  Laps  ley,  7,  11,  298. 

V.  Leach,  353. 

V.  Poyer,  376. 

y.  Smith.  433. 

V.  Thornton,  590. 

V.  Toney,  269. 

V.  Wlble.  493. 
Webb  V.  Bailey.  749. 

V.  Buckelew,  509,  695. 

V.  Carr,  240. 

V.  Den,  607. 

V.  Elliott,  ir)8. 

V.  Wiltbank.  200. 
Webber  v.  Boom  Co.,  530. 

V.  llarshbargor,  4i>2. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1 ;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Webber  v.  Mackey,  504. 

V.  Randall,  45. 

V.  Stanton,  200,  204. 
Weber  v.  Couch,  989. 

V.  Detwiller,  496. 

V.  Lee  County,  985b. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  737. 

V.  Tschetter.  953,  955. 

V.  Yanc3%  958. 
W^ebster  v.  Adams,  593. 

V.  Daniel,  286. 

V.  Lee,  526,  621. 

V.  City  of  Lowell,  593. 

v.  Mann,  549. 

V.  McDaniel,  1001. 

v.  McMahan,  341. 

V.  Page,  193. 

V.  Reld,  290. 

V.  Trust  Co.,  106,  682. 
Weed  V.  Weed,  134.  135,  163,  164, 165. 
Weeks  v.  Downing.  565. 

V.  Edwards,  660. 

V.  Harriman,  892. 

V.  Lawrence,  299. 

V.  Ostrander,  565. 

V.  Pearson,  864. 
Wegg-Prosser  v.  Evans,  770. 
Wegman  Piano  Co.  v.  Irvine,  585. 
Wehn  V.  Fall,  438. 
Wehrly  v.  Morfoot  747. 
Weigley  v.  Coffman,  713. 

V.  Matson,  75. 
W'Cikel  V.  Long,  78.  698. 
Weil  V.  Casey,  445,  447. 

V.  Hill,  63. 

V.  f^wenthal,  228. 

V.  Simmons,  188.  190. 
Weiler  v.  Henarle,  749. 
Weill  V.  Fontanel,  752. 
Weinberger  v.  Insurance  Co.,  719. 
Weiuerth  v.  Trendley,  38. 
AVeingnrtner  v.  Mining  Co.,  701. 
Weinreich  v.  Hensley,  600. 
Weintraute  v.  Solomon,  58. 
Weir  V.  Pennington,  940,  945. 

V.  Vail,  857,  883,  920. 
W^eire  v.  CItj'  of  Davenport,  943. 
AVeis  V.  Aaron,  199. 

v.  Meyer,  725. 
Weisebcrger  v.  Nevil,  81)2. 
Welser  v.  Kling.  761. 

V.  AVoiser.  758. 
Woiss  v.  Binulan,  13. 


CASES 
[References  to  sectiont.    SS  1  to 

Welch  V.  Challen,  341. 
V.  Keene,  157. 
T.  HflDdeville,  700. 
T.  May,  313. 
V.  Murray.  442. 
V.  SL  Genevieve,  98oe. 
T.  Sargent,  583. 
V.  Sykes.  227.  857,  897,  898,  900, 

903,  906,  916. 
V.  Wadsworth,  87,  097. 
Weldy  V.  Young,  191,  297, 
Wellborn  V.  Carr,  813. 

V.  Sbeppard,  84. 
Weller  v.  Dickinson,  966,  967. 

V.  DlUey.  650. 
Wells,  In  re,  954. 
Kx  parte,  1000. 
r.  Atkins,  261. 
V.  Baird,  986. 
T.  Baldwin,  43a 
T.  Bank,  864. 
T.  Benton,  445. 
T.  Bower,  461. 
T.  Coyle,  555. 
V.  Graham,  488. 
V.  Hickox,  734. 
T.  Mathews,  86. 
T.  Moore,  603,  709,  7ia 
V.  Xeff.  922- 
V.  Smith.  195,  197,  35a 
T.  Stevens.  282. 
V.  Town  of  Mason,  985a. 
v.  Town  of  Salina,  733. 
V.  Vanderwerker,    161. 
Wells,  Fargo  St  Co.  v.  Clarkson,  964. 
V.  Van  Sickle,  152. 
V.  Wall.  332,  365,  366,  384. 
Wellshear  v.  Kelley.  247. 
^^>ll«-Stone  ^(ercantile  Co.  T.  Truax, 

WWsh  V.  Childs.  271.' 

V.  Kirkpatriok.  213. 

V.  Lamliert,  34. 

T.  Undo.  785. 

V.  Murray.  442. 
Wdsher  V.  Libby,  McNoIU  &  Llbby, 

l<«tl.  1002.  IbOo. 
W  elton  V.  Littlejohn,  34a 
Welty  T.  Roffner,  250. 
WVndel  V.  North,  567. 
Wfnroan  v.  Mackenzie,  548. 
WentAvorth  v.  Keazer.  9<»8. 

V.  Ha  cine  County,  50G. 
1  LAW  .TT'DG.— m 


CITED.  CXClll 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Wentz  V.  Bealor,  204. 

Werborn  v.  Piuney,  162. 

Werleln  v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  613, 

733. 
Werner  v.  Council,  29. 
Wemet's  Appeal,  354. 
Wernse  v.  McPike,  866. 
Wernwag  v.  Pawling,  857,  897. 
Wessell  v.  Gross,  489. 
Wesson,  In  re,  495. 

V.  Cllamberlain,  250. 
West  V.  Bagby,  21. 

V.  Carter,  379. 

V.  Cole.  609. 

V.  Fleming,  91. 

V.  Furbish,  771. 

V.  Galloway's  Adm'r,  165. 

V.  Irwin,  ^0. 

V.  Jordan,  200,  204. 

V.  Keeton,  111. 

V.  Magness,  36a 

V.  Miller,  348. 

V.  Moser,  628,  749. 

V.  Williamson,  85,  223. 
Westbay  v.  Gray,  246. 
Westbrook  v.  Thompson,  376,  638a. 
West  Buffalo  v.  Walker  Tp.,  805. 
West  Chester  &  W.   Plank-Road  Co. 

V.  Chester  Coimty,  159. 
West  Chicago  Park  Com'rs  v.  Farber, 

610. 
West  Chicago  St.  Ry.   Co.  v.  Annis, 

211. 
Westcott  V.  Brown,  897,  900. 

V.  Edmunds,  518,  787. 
Western  Assur.  Co.  v.  Klein,  346a. 
Western  Land  Co.  v.  English,  107. 
Western  Min.  &  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Coal  Co., 

518,  614. 
Western  Security  Co.  v.  Lafleur,  220. 

348. 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Griffin,  345. 
Western  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  At- 
lanta, 575. 

V.  Pitts,  343. 

V.  Youii^,  981. 
Westervelt  v.  Jones,  890. 
Westerwelt  v.  Lewis,  220,  884.  971. 
West  Feliciana   R.   Co.   v.   Thornton^ 

857. 
Westfleld  Gas  &  Milling  Co.  v.  Abor- 
natliey,  304. 

V.  Gravel-Road  Co.,  599. 


CXCIV  CASES 

[References  to  BectlonB.    9§  1  to 

Westheimer  v.  Craig,  208,  770. 
Westmoreland  v.  Richardson,  510, 663. 
West    New    York    SIlk-Mill     Co.    v. 

Laubsch,  518. 
Weston  V.  City  of  Cliarleston,  21. 

V.  Clark,  987,  995. 
Westphal  v.  Westphal,  551. 
West    Philadelphia    Pass.    R.    Co.    v. 

Turnpike-Road  Co.,  508. 
West's  Appeal,  417. 
Wetliered  v.  Mays,  693. 
Wetherill  v.  Stillman,  857,  900. 
Wetmore  v.  Wetmore,  461. 
Wetter  v.  Lewis,  583. 
Weyand  v.  Railroad  Co.,  713. 
Weyer  v.  Thomburgh,  770. 
Whaley  v.  Lawton,  707. 

V.  Stevens,  617,  717. 
Wharton  v.  Harlan.  328. 

V.  Wilson,  445. 
Wheaton  v.  Spooner.  944. 
Wheolberger  v.  Knights    41. 
Wheeler  v.  Aldrich,  597. 

V.  Dakin,  967. 

V.  Foster,  183. 

V.  GoflPe,  164. 

V.  Maillot,  33. 

V.  Mayher,  138. 

V.  Miller,  583. 

V.  Moore,  324,  34r>n,  347. 

V.  Raymond,  857. 

T.  Riif'kman.  699,  703,  719. 

V.  Sweet,  291. 

V.   L.  S.,  33. 

V.  Van  Hon  ten,  526. 
Wlieeler's  Estate,  995. 
Wheeler  &  Wilson  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Mona- 

han.  354. 
Wheeling  &   Belmont  Bridge   Co.    v. 

Bridge  Co.,  40. 
Wheelock  v.  Godfrey,  1013. 

V.  Svensgaard,  TM. 
Wheelwright  v.  Depeystor,  818. 
Whelan  v.  Wholan,  rxS."). 
Whelpley  v.  Nash,  958. 
Whereatt  v.  Ellis,  981. 
Wherry  v.  McCammon,  994. 

V.  Wherry,  488. 
Whetstone  v.  Colley,  152. 
Whidby  Land  &  Development  Co.  v. 

Xyo.  302. 
Whiley  v.  Broadway,  737. 
Whiliock  V.  Uiilc's  Heirs,  G;;0. 


CITED. 

499  In  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Whitaere  v.  Martin,  405. 
Whitaker,  Ex  parte,  259. 

y.  Bramson,  2,  682,  690,  605,  097, 
698. 

v.  Davis,  723,  790. 

V.  Gee,  23. 

v.  Merrill,  681a. 

V.  Smith,  318. 

V.  Sparkman,  38. 
Whitaker*s  Adm'r  v.  English,  779. 
Whitaker*8  Estate,  635. 
Whltbeck  v.  Railroad  Co.,  311. 
Whltcomb  V.  Hardy,  543,  790. 

V.  Whltcomb,  320. 

y.  Williams,  767. 
Whltcomb's  Case,  257, 
White,  Ex  parte,  182. 

In  re,  256,  524. 

v.  Alberteon,  261.  518. 

V.  Baillio,  191. 

V.  Bank,  375. 

V.  Bhrd,  190. 

y.  Cabal's  Adm*r,  378. 

V.  Caldwell,  98. 

V.  Cannon,  173. 

V.  Chase.  667,  658. 

V.  City  of  Decatur,  05C>a. 

V.  Clapp.  299. 

V.  Coatsworth,  787. 

V.  Conway,  42. 

V.  Crew,  618. 

V.  Crow,  59,  85,  2(i:i,  368,  393. 

V.  Cuthbert,  754. 

V.  Espey,  376,  412. 

V.  Gaines,   537. 

y.  Graves,  lOOJi. 

V.  Haffaker,  9S2. 

v.  Harden,  487. 

V.  Harvey,  33. 

v.  Henulon,^JW. 

V.  Hinton.  205.  rU8. 

v.  Kyl(»'s  Lessee,  650. 

V.  Levy,  13. 

y.  McClelian,  232. 

v.  Mfg.  Co.,  188. 

y.  Merritt,  291,  7«9. 

y.  Miller,   195. 

y.  Moseley,  741. 

v.  Pease,  33. 

y.  Philbrlck,  782. 

y.  Prigmore,  587. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  444. 

y.  Reagan,  80. 


CASES 
[References  to  sections.    99  1  to 

White  T.  Rcid,  916. 

v.  Savage,  (J07. 

V.  Savery.  719. 

V.  Simouds,  G2S). 

V.  Smith,  743,  740. 

T.  Siiow,  92,  340. 

T.  Stage  Co.,  354. 

y.  State,  58a 

y.  Sydenatiick^,   108. 

T.  TreoD,  87a 

V.  Trotter,  ©16. 

T.  Weatherbee,  589. 

V.  White,  31a. 

T.  Whiting,  717. 

T.  Whitman,  865. 

V.  Williams,  567. 
Whitehead  t.  Henderson,  260,  596. 

V.  Jessap,  954,  1000. 

V.  Latham,  399. 
WliitehlU  V.  Wilson,  1017. 
Whitehurst  v.  Rogers,  504,  G24. 

T.  Transportation  Co.,  297. 
White  River  Bank  v.  Downer,   958, 

075. 
White's  Adm'rs  v.  Williams.  810. 
Whitesell  V.  Peck,  989,  lOia 
Whiteselle  v.  Jones,  556,  598. 
White's  Estate,  In  re,  643, 
Whiteside  v.  Ass'n.  114. 

r.  Hoskins,  990. 
WTiltfleld  T.  Howard,  351. 
Whltfofd  V.  Crooks,  549. 
Whiting  T.  Bank,  48. 

V.  Bnrger,  864. 

V.  Johnson,  906. 
Whitley  V.  Electric  Co.,  874. 
Whitlock  T.  Appleby,  714. 

T.  Crew,  526. 
Whitman  v.  Willis,  359. 
Whitman  &  Barnes  Mfg.  Co.  t.  Ham- 
ilton, 85. 
Whltmore  t.  Johnson's  Heirs,  604. 
Whrtney  t.  Bayer,  682. 

T.  Bohlen.  52. 

T.  Daggett.  351. 

r.  Kelley,  3ia 

V.  Nelson.  558. 

T.  Porter.  194,  195. 

T.  Silver,  299. 

T.  Spearman.  35. 

r.  Townsend,  110. 

V.  Walsh,  799. 
W'hltney  Iron  Works  t.  Renss,  31. 


CITED.  cxev 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Whitney's. Adm'r  v.  Town  of  Claren- 
don, 738,  745. 
Whittaker  v.  Gee,  160. 

V.  Stone,  771. 

V.  West  Boylston,  33. 
Whittemore  v.  Carkln,  958. 

V.  Oil  Co.,  944. 

V.  Shaw,  (jGO. 

V.  Whittemore,  526.  628. 
W^hittier  v.  Collins,  745. 

V.  Ileminway.  998. 

V.  Wendell,  864,  906. 
Whlttlngton  v.  Christian,  652. 
Whittlesey  v.  Delaney,  368. 
Whitton  V.  Whitton.  52. 
Whitwell  V.  Emory,  1,  3,  115,  132. 
WJiltworth  V.  Lyons,  425. 
Whorley   v.    Railroad   Ca,    130.    15G, 

158. 
Whyte  V.  Rose,  278. 
Wiant  V.  Hays.  434. 
Wichita  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Beebe,  738. 
Wicke  V.  Lake,  340. 
Wickersham  v.  Comerford,  370. 

V.  Johnson,  790. 

V.  Whedon,  737. 
Wlckes'  Lessee  v.  Caulk,  282. 
Wlckllffe  y.  Bascom,  550. 
Wickmam  v.  Nalty.  36,  109. 
Wicks  V.  Ludwig,  177. 
Wieland  t.  Willcox.  752. 
Wierlch  v.  De  Zoya,  373. 
Wiethanpt  v.  City  of  St  Louis,  699. 
Wiggins  V.  Chance,  426. 

Y.  Klienhans,  58. 

V.  Mayer,  85. 

V.  Stelner,  329. 
Wiggins  Ferry  Co.  v.   Railroad  Co., 

707,  715.  859. 
Wight,  In  re,  165. 

V.  Mott,  63. 

T.  Warner,  279. 
Wigwall  V.  Mhiing  Co.,  593. 
Wilbur  V.  Abbot,  233,  859,  875,  96a 

V.  Abbott,  971. 

V.  Gilmore,  706. 
Wllcher  v.  Robertson,  278. 
Wilcox  V.  Balger,  720,  722. 

T.  Field,  89. 

V.  Gilchrist,  641,  731. 

T.  Jackson,  530. 

V.  Kassick,    690,    857,    865,    897, 
900. 


cxctI  cases 

[References  to  secUoniB.    Sfi  1  to 

Wilcox  V.  Lee,  714. 

V.  Morrisou,  ;)r>0. 

V.  WellB,  156. 

V.  WUcox,  38,  932. 
Wllcoxson  V.  Burton,  60. 

V.  Miller,  446. 
Wild  V.  iDstitution,  550. 
Wilday  V.  McConnel,  37(5. 
Wilde  V.  Trainor,  16. 
Wilder  V.  Ireland,  667,  571. 
Wildmau  v.  Munger.  31. 

V.  Wlldman,  734. 
Wiley  V.  Lewis,  116. 

V.  Pdvoy,  248,  261. 

V.  Pratt,  270,  272. 
Wilhelm  V.  Parker,  875,  896,  899. 
Wilhelmi  v.  Insurance  CJo..  714.       • 
Wllkerson  v.  Goldthwalte,  130. 

y.  Schoonmaker,  282. 
Wilkes  V.  Davles,  784. 

y.  Jackson,  779. 

y.  Perks,  129. 
Wilkie  V.  Howe,  600. 
Wilkin  V.  Wilkin,  141. 
Wllkins  y.  Bank,  116. 

V.  Bums,  138. 

y.  Dingley,  680,  588, 

y.  Sherwood,  323. 

y.  Wainwright,  202. 
Wilkinson  y.  Bayley,  83. 

y.  Brlnn,  615. 

y.  Daniel,  97. 

y.  Hall,  598. 

V.  Holloway,  986. 

y.  Klrby,  652. 

y.  Nebraska,  37. 

y.  Paddock,  455,  481. 

y.  Rewey,  361. 

y.  Vorce,  613. 

y.  Yale,  938b. 
Will  y.  Sinkwitz,  155. 

V.  Water  Co.,  326,  347. 
Willamette    Falls    Transportation    & 

Milling  Go.  y.  Smith,  86. 
Willamette  Real-Estate  Co.   v.   Hen- 

drix,  218,  231. 
Willard  y.  Fox,  1001. 

y,  Ostrander,  610,  686. 

y.  Sperry,  734. 
Willaume  v.  Gorges,  993. 
Willems  y.  WiUems.  386,  393. 
WlUett  y.  Clark.  951. 

y.  Millman,  354. 


CITBD. 

499  in  TOl.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Willett  y.  Otterback,  493. 
Willetts,  Appeal  of,  639. 
Willey  y.  Laraway,  654. 

y.  Paulk,  689. 

y.  Strickland,  966,  967. 
William  Deering  &  Co.  y.  CrelghtoD, 

306. 
Williams,  Ex  parte,  255. 

V.  Amory,  428. 

y.  Armroyd,  814,  819. 

y.  Ball,  280. 

y.  Bank,  880. 

y.  Benedict,  413. 

y.  Bowdon,   lOOa 

T.  Boyce,  1008. 

y.  Burg,  667,  569. 

V.  Butcher.  299. 

V.  Carr,  380. 

y.  Chalfant,  211. 

y,  Clouse,  732. 

V.  Cooper,  540,  551. 

V.  Eyans,  1000. 

y.  Fowler.  373. 

y.  Gibbs,  546. 

V.  Ooff.  207. 

V.  Harris,  92. 

V.  Hayes,  157. 

V.  Hollingsworth,  722. 

y.  Hutchinson,  36. 

V.  Ives.  810. 

V.  Johnson,  272. 

y.  Jones,   57,  378,  768,  814,   831, 
961. 

y.  Kitchen,  747. 

y.  Leblanc,  567. 

y.  Lee,  ovo. 

y.  Lockwood,  382. 

y.  Luckett,  750,  752. 

V.  Lumber  Co..  !>1. 

y.  Lumpkin,  321,  37a 

y.  McFall.  775. 

y.  McGrade,  781. 

y.  Martin,  290. 

V.  Merritt,  102. 

y.  Newcomb,  603. 

y.  Pile,  363. 
'  y.  Preston,  229,  813,  826,  S28,  857, 
869,  875,  904,  906,  mi2. 

y.  Railroad  Co.,  340,  915. 

y.  Reed,  633. 

y.  Renwlck,  888. 

y.  Rockwell.  89. 

y.  Row,  518. 


CASES 
CBflfereneoi  to  MCtlona.    tt  1  to 

Wmiains  T.  Saunders,  823. 

V.  Sharp,  250. 

T.  Sutton,  663,  777. 

V.  Terrell,  550. 

T.  Tomlln,  513,  558. 

T.  Tosser,  685. 

T.  Walt,  21. 

V.  Waldo,  8. 

V.  Walker,  48. 

V.  Wells,  39. 

V.  Whltaker,  282. 

T.  WUliams,    145,    185,    310,    612, 
877,  878,  906. 
Williams*  Appeal,  56. 
Willlamsburgta  Say.  Bank  ▼.  Town  of 

Solon,  501. 
Williamson,  In  re,  938. 

V.  Cllne,  192.  . 

T.  Cocke,  335. 

T.  DrlU  Co.,  354. 

T.  Hartman,  326l 

T.  Howtil,  589. 

T.  Mayer.  654. 

T.  Nicklln,  326. 

T.  Tnmio,  815. 

V.  White,  541. 

T.  Williamson.  567. 
Williamson's    Adm*r    v.    Appleberry, 

363. 
Williamson's  Case,  256,  533. 
Wm.  Wolff  &  Co.  T.  Railroad  Co.,  811, 

3ia 

Willlard  y.  WlUiard,  430. 
WlUingham  y.  Long,  992. 
wniiogs  y.  Consequa,  770. 
Wlllink  y.  Banking  Co.,  58B. 
Willis  y.  Downes,  406,  400. 

y.  Ferguson,  246,  513. 

y.  Heath,  445. 

y.  Marks,  29. 

T.  Morrison.  20a 

▼.  Sanger,  406a. 

y.  Smith,  406,  44^. 

y.  Toaer,  613. 
wnuts  y.  Walter,  966. 
Wnioughby  y.  Railroad  Co.,  604. 

y.  Stockyards  Co.,  583. 
Wills  y.  Chandler,  691,  986. 

y.  Pauly,  719. 

y.  Shide,  646.  661. 

y.  Spraggins.  197,  635. 
Willsie  y.  Horse^Ranch  Co.,  321.  419. 
Willson  y.  Cleav^and,  308. 


CITBD.  CXCVll 

119  in  TOl.  1 ;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Willson  V.  WUlson,  91. 
Wilmuus  V.  Bank,  147. 
Wllmarth  v.  Gatfleld,  3.30. 
Wilmer  v.  Brlce,  906. 

V.  Lewis,  8G2. 
Wilmington  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Alsbrook, 

506. 
Wllsle  V.  Rooney,  297. 
Wilson.  Ex  parte,  258.  259. 

V.  Boiighton,  168,  381. 

V.  Breyfogle,  15. 

V.  Brookshire,  577,  1014. 

y.  Buchanan,  362. 

V.  Buell,  770,  790. 

V.  Coal  Co.,  493,  583. 

V.  Collins,  77. 

V.  Coolidge,  190. 

y.  Cox,  77. 

y.  Davol,  549. 

y.  Dawsoo,  89. 

y.  Graham,  228. 

V.  Hatfield,  958,  975. 

y.  Herbert,  192. 

V.  HiUinrd,  903. 

y.  Hoffman,  652. 

y.  Jackson,  900. 

y.  Johnson,  220. 

y.  Kelly,  560. 

y.  Kiesel,  583. 

y.  King,  982. 

y.  Lowry,  707,  709. 

y.  McBlwee,  667. 

y.  Mfg.  Co.,  878,  879. 

y.  Marsh,  983. 

V.  Myers.  127.  166,  157. 

y.  Nance,  116. 

y.  Panne,  144. 

y.  Patton.  418. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  r>29. 

y.  Ray,  707. 

y.  Rodewald.  179. 

y.  Scott,  340a,  343. 

y.  Seymour,  583. 

y.  Smith,  200,  206,  840a,  846. 

T.  State,  577. 

y.  Stiiwcll.  1016. 

V.  Stripo.  611. 

y.  Tieman,  483. 

T.  Tompkins.  551. 

V.  Torbert.  308. 

V.  Trowbridge.  376. 

V.  Tucker,  958. 

y.  Tunstall,  847. 


CXCVlll  CASBS 

[References  to  sections.    SS  1  to 

Wilson  V.  Wadleigh,  941. 

V.  Wilson,  38C. 

V.  Zeigler,  225. 
Wilson  County  Gom*rs   v.  Mcintosh, 

691. 
Wilson's  Ex'r  v.  Deen,  624. 
Wilson's    Heirs    v.    Wilson's    Adm'r, 

270,  287. 
Wilson  S.  M.  Co.  V.  Curry,  366. 
Wilson  &  Toms  Inv.  Co.  t.  Hillyer, 

346a. 
Wilt  V.  Ogden,  785. 
Wilton  V.  Railroad  Co.,  740. 
Wimberley  v.  Collier,  567. 
AVinans  v.  Dunbam,  630. 

y.  Hassey,  152. 

y.  Rooecrans,  625. 
Winberry  y.  Koonce,  915. 
Winchester  y.  Beardln,  211,  239. 

V.  Coni'rs,  532. 

y.  Eyans,  855. 

y.  Gleayes,  388. 

y.  Grosyenor,  375. 
Windecker  v.  Insurance  Co.,  1004. 
Windee  y.  Barp,  308. 
AVlndett  y.  Hamilton,  310. 
AVindlsch  y.  Gussett,  152. 
Windsor  y.    McVeigh,    215,   220,   226, 

792,  790. 
Windwart  y.  Allen,  366. 
Winegard  y.  Fanning,  538. 
Winaeld  y.  Bacon,  388,  766, 
Wing,  In  re,  205. 

y.  De  La  Rionda,  461,  691. 

V.  Warner,  32. 
Wingate  y.  Haywood,  270,  366,  368, 

600. 
Wingfleld  y.  Cotton,  311. 
Wing  V.  Hooper,  002. 
Winham  y.  Kline.  693,  725.  857,  968, 
Winn  y.  Dry-Goods  Co.,  22. 

y.  Strickland,  872. 
AVinnebrenner  y.  Edgerton.  63. 
Winnlngham  y.  Tnieblood,  209,  281. 
Winona  &  St  P.  Land  Co.  y.  Minne- 
sota, 613. 
Winpenny  y.  Winpenny,  651. 
Winshlp  y.  Jewett,  347. 
Winslow  y.  Ancrum's  Assignees,  981. 

y.  Anderson,  83,  326. 

y.  Clark,  991. 

y.  Lambard,  82,  211. 

y.  Lelaud,  938b. 


CITED. 

499  in  TOl.  1;  residue  tn  vol.  2.] 

Winslow  y.  Newlan,  207. 

V.  Stokes,  737. 
Winston,  Ex  parte.  257 

y.  Browning.  411. 

y.  Hodges,  440. 

y.  Mc Alpine,  191. 

V.  McLendon,  194. 

V.  Miller,  83. 

V.  Starke.  600. 

y.  Taylor,  906. 

V.  AVestfeldt.  600. 
Winter  v.  Council,  190. 

y.  London,  260. 

y.  State,  336. 
Whiterson  y.  Hltchingg,  1005. 
Wlnthrop  Iron  Co.  y.  Meeker,  48. 
Wintcm's  Appeal,  956. 
Wlpff  y.  Heder,  252. 
WiTt  y.  Dinan,  36. 
Wisdom  y.  Memphis,  985b. 
Wise  y.  Hyatt,  211. 

y.  Loring,  946,  9^4. 

y.  Schloesser,  353. 

y.  Shepherd,  960. 

y.  Withers,  256. 
Wise's  Appeal,  350. 
Wissler  v.  Herr..898. 
Wistar  y.  McManes,  ni>l. 
W^iswall  y.  Sampson,  4i».%  537. 
WItcher  v.  Oldham,  716. 
Witherby  t.  Mann,  976. 
Witherow  v.  Keller,  299. 
Withers  t.  Carter,  442. 

y.  Patterson,  278. 
Witherspoon  y.  Spring,  1009. 

y.  Twitty,  498. 
Withington  y.  Warren,  615. 
Wlthnell  y.  Wagon  Co.,  421,  433. 
Witlirow  V.  Smithson,  206,  300. 
Witt  V.  Henge,  243. 
Wittemore  v.  Malcomson,  970,  971. 
Witter  y.  Bachman,  86. 

y.  Dudley,  110. 

y.  Fisher,  671. 
Witters  v.  Sowles,  208. 
Wlttick  y.  Traun,  3,  672. 
Wittstruck  y.  Temple,  494,  496. 
Wbcom  y.  Stephens,  680. 
Wixson  y.  Deyine,  789. 
Woelf el  y.  Hammer,  331. 
Woffenden  y.  Woffenden.  308. 
Wofford  y.  Booker.  376. 
Wohlford  V.  Compton,  706. 


CASES 
[References  to  sections.    §}  1  to 

Wdcott  T.  Ensign,  975. 

T.  Jones,  3!>1. 
Wo  Lee,  In  re,  257. 
Wolf  V.  Bank,  328,  35L 

T.  Butler,  321. 

T.  Hamberg,  89. 

▼.  Pounsford.  482a,  486. 

T.  Water-Power  Co.,  IIL 

T.  Yonbert,  280. 
Wolfe  V.  Davis,  170,  328w 

V.  Gardner.  481. 

T.  Wllsey,  148. 
Wolff  V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  985f. 

V.  Van  Metre,  191. 
Wolffe  ▼.  Eberlein,  8,  951. 
Wolff  &  Co.  V.  Railroad  Co.,  691. 
Wolford  T.  Borwen,  143. 
Wolf  River   Lumber  Co.   ▼.   Brown, 

671. 
WoUam  V.  Brandt,  439a. 
Wolmcrstadt  v.  Jacobs,  153. 
Wolverton  v.  Baker,  514.  518,  681. 

V.  Glasscock,  631. 
Womack  v.  Sanford,  134. 

V.  Womack.  633. 
Woman's  College  v.  Home,  42. 
Wonderly  v.  L4ifayette  County,  482a, 

481,  493,  M6,  985d. 
Wong  Yung  Qny,  In  re,  257. 
Wood  V.  Augustlns,  897. 

V.  Bagley.  78. 

V.  Bayard.  205.  24S. 

V.  Boyle,  204. 

V.  BuHens,  152. 

V.  Bylngton,  560. 

V.  CahiU,  020. 

V.  City  of  Mobile.  251.  939. 

V.  City  of  Xew  York,  989. 

V.  Conrad.   1006. 

V.  Corl,  <;2I). 

V.  Currey,  991. 

T.  Davis.  .548. 

V.  Ellis,  61. 

V.  Ensel.  540. 

V.  Faut,  724. 

V.  Gamble.  847. 

V.  Gary.  460. 

V.  Harmison,  41. 

V.  Jackson,  511.  Gil.  C14,  083.  784, 
785,  787. 

T.  Keyes,  126.  127. 

V.  I^nox.  383. 

V.  Mitchell,  Oa,  77. 


CITED.  CXCIX 

499  In  Tol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.] 

Wood  V.  Newberry,  958. 

V.  Olney,  211. 

V.  Partridge,  596. 

V.  Payea,  306. 

V.  Ramond,  609. 

V.  Reynolds.  404. 

V.  Smith,  211. 

V.  Stanberry,  242. 

V.  Wallace,  944,  945. 

V.  Ward,  187. 

V.  Walkinson,  861,  906. 

V.  Watson,  200. 

V.  Wood,  835,  901,  934. 
Woodbrldge  v.  Austin,  849. 

V.  Banning,  656. 
Woodbrldge    &    Turner    Engineering 

Co.  V.  Rltter,  882. 
Woodbume  v.  Plummer,  82d 
Woodbury  v.  Bowman,  510. 

V.  District  of  Columbia,  981. 

V.  Maguire,  274. 

V.  Perkins,  977. 

V.  Society,  504. 
Wood  Co.  V.  Berry  Co.,  79a. 
Woodfork  v.  Bromfleld,  487. 
Woodgate  v.  Fleet,  428. 
Woodbouse  v.  Duncan,  754,  938.' 

V.  PiUbates,  270,  271. 
Woodland  v.  Newhall's  Adm*r.  730. 
Woodlief  v.  Logan,  109. 
Woodman  v.  Smith.  245. 
Woodrow  V.  O* Conner.  296. 
Woodruff.  Ex  parte,  163. 

V.  Cook,  250. 

V.  Johnston,  372. 

V.  Matheney,  84. 

V.  Richardson,  103. 

V.  Rose,  36. 

V.  Sanders,  993,  994. 

V.  Taylor,  229,  635,  792,  801,  904, 

V.  Woodruff,  529. 
Woods,  Ex  parte.  220. 

V.  Ayres.  958. 

V.  Bryan,  03.  278. 

V.  Dickinson,  325. 

V.  Freeman,  118. 

V.  Irwin,  351. 

V.  Llndvall,  703. 

V.  State,  100. 

V.  White,  541. 

V.  Woo<ls,  61a. 

V.  Woodson,  58.'5a. 
Woodslde  v.  Wagg,  176. 


cc 


CASES 
[References  to  sectioni.    If  1  to 


Woodside  y.  Woodside,  49. 
Woodson  V.  Barrett.  379. 
Woodward  v.  Backus,  347. 

V.  Carson,  9(30. 

V.  Curtis,  284. 

V.  Dean,  438. 

V.  Hill,  758. 

y.  Jackson,  54S. 

V.  Mfg.  Co.,  304a. 

V.  Moore,  592. 

V.  Xewhall.  82,  206. 

y.  Pike,  362. 

y.  Thomas,  560. 

y.  Tremere,  906. 

V.  Woodward.  305,  461. 
Woodyard  v,  Polsley,  409. 
Wooldridge  v.  Brown,  86. 
Woolery  y.  Grayson,  289. 
Wooley  V.  U.  S.,  624. 
Woolfolk  y.  Degelos,  987. 
Woolley  V.  Sullivan,  270,  341. 

y.  Woolley.  32a 
Woolner  y.  Leyy,  445. 
Woolaey  y.  Order,  516. 
Woolyerton  y.  Baker,  726. 
Woolworth  y.  Parker,  433. 
Wooster  y.  Cooper,  725. 

y.  Fitzgerald,  536. 

y.  Gloyer,  164. 
Wooters  y.  Smith,  772. 
Wootters  y.  Hall,  653. 

y.  Kauffman,  206. 
Worden  y.  Jones,  995. 
Work  y.  Brown,  412. 

y.  Harper,  396,  470. 
Worley  y.  Hineman.  ,540. 
Worman's  Appeal,  498. 
Wornock  y.  Loar,  194. 
Worst  y.  Sgitcoylch,  723. 
Wort  V.  Flnley,  220. 
Worth  y.  Wetmore,  346,  346a,  351. 
Wortham  y.  Com.,  6J)9,  790. 
Worthlngton.  In  re,  182. 

y.  Campbell,   153. 

V.  Nelson,  478. 
Wortman  v.  Wortman,  320. 
W.  P.  Fuller  &  Co.  y.  Hull,  406,  411. 
Wray's  Adm'rs  y.  Furniss,  371. 
Wright  y.  Anderson,  763. 

y.  Andrews,    272,    542,    897,    901, 
913. 

y.  Bank,  409. 


CITED. 

499  in  vol.  1;  residue  In  toI.  2.] 

Wright  y.  Boynton,  884. 

V.  Broome,  671. 

V.  Bruschke,  42. 

y.  Butler,  5(H,  783.  784,  787. 

y.  Churchman.  353. 

y.  City  of  Cincinnati,  009. 

y.  Cobleigh,  1002,  1004. 

y.  Douglass,  275. 

y.  Durrett.  242, 

y.  Griffey,  537,  613. 

y.  Hazen,  280,  600. 

y.  Jones.  21. 

y.  I^throp,  779. 

y.  Leclaire,  758. 

y.  Leyy,  956. 

y.  McBride,  160i 

y.  Marsh,  245. 

y.  Miller,  197. 

y.  Mills,  122.  200. 

V.  Mooney.  1001. 

y.  Parks,  943,  947. 

y.  PhllUps,  500. 

y.  Roseben-y.  530. 

y.  Smith,  288. 

y.  Snell,  956. 

y.  Stanard,  548, 

y.  State,   109. 

y.  Tatham,  537. 

y.  Tileston,  744. 

y.  Wright,  246,  633,  822,  982. 

V.  Young,  1008. 
Wrightman  v.  Boone  County,  486. 
Wronkow  y.  Oakley,  473. 
Wuest  y.  .Tames,  462. 
W^urzberger  v.  Carroll,  498. 
W.  W.  Kimball  Co.  y.  Brown,  221 
Wyatt  V.  Burr,  641. 

V.  Fromme,  996. 
Wyche  v.  Ross,  349. 
Wyer  y.  Andrews,  986. 
Wygant  y.  Brown,  313. 
AVyler  v.  Railroad  Co..  305. 
Wyuinn  v.  Buekstaff.  155. 

V.  Campbell,  513. 

y.  DoiT.    715. 

y.  Ilallock,  242. 

y.  Hardwick.  363,  392. 

y.  Mitchell,  8. 
Wynn  y.  Frost.  341. 

V.  Garland,  .5.30. 

y.  Henlnger,  288. 

y.  Wilson,  375,   378. 


CASES 
[References  to  secttons.    99  1  to 

Wynne  t.  Bank,  445. 

y.  Newman's  Adni*r,  386. 

y.  Spiers,  705. 

V.  Wynne,  441. 
Wyoming  Mfg.  Co.  y.  Mobler,  917. 
Wyoming  Nat  Bank  y.  Browii,  4,  8. 
Wythe  y.  Salem,  790. 


Xlqoea  y.  Bnjac,  584. 


Vager  y.  Lemp,  29. 

Yakima  Water,  Ught  &  Power  Co.  v. 

Hathaway,  460. 
Yancey  y.  Downer,  357,  387. 
Yancy  y.  Teter,  346. 
Yaple  y.  Titus,  200,  245. 
Yarborough  y.  Fitzpatrick,  1005. 
Yarborongh's  Ex'r  y.  Scott's  Ex'r,  155. 
Yarbrougb,  Ex  parte,  255,  257. 
Yarnell  v.  Brown,  958. 
y.  Moore,  993,  994. 
Yates  y.  Robertson,  442,  443. 
Yeager  y.  Dayia,  466. 
Yeage^s  Appeal,  489. 
Yeates  y.  Mead,  1016. 
Yeatman  y.  Yeatman,  250. 
Yentzer  y.  Thayer,  85. 
Yeoman  y.  Younger,  245. 
Yerger,  Bz  parte,  255. 
Yerkes  y.  McHenry,  311. 

y.  Richards,  la 
Yetter,  In  re,  536. 
Yoakom  y.  Tilden,  986. 
Yocnm  y.  Bank,  562. 
Yoes  y,  Moore,  641. 
Yoho  y.  McGoyem,  771,  772. 
Yon  y.  Baldwin,  680. 
Yonge  y.  Broxaon,  135. 

y.  Shepperd,  894. 
Tongue  y.  Blllups,  378. 
Yonley  y.  Thompson,  99. 
York  Bank's  Appeal,  57,  58,  77,  211, 

212,  40a  ' 
York  Draper  Mercantile  Co.  y.  Hutch- 

iniion,  83. 
Yorke  T.  Yorke,  346. 


CITED.  CCl 

499  In  vol.  1;  residue  !n  vol.  2.] 

Yorks  V.  Steele,  542. 
Y'orton  y.  Railroad  Co.,  054. 
Yost  V.  Harvester  W^orks,  352. 

y.  Mensch,  351. 
Young  y.  Bank,  86. 

V.  Bircher,  352. 

V.  Black,  504,  785,  787. 

V.  Brehi,  512,  684. 

v.  Byrd,  644. 

V.  Cleveland,  1008. 

y.  Conklin,  346a. 

y.  Connelly,  118. 

y.  Devries,  438,  446. 

y.  Farwell,  518. 

V.  Harrison,  604. 

y.  Lorain,  247. 

•v.  Mackall,  25. 

V.  O'Neal,  677. 

v.  People,  106. 

V.  Pickens,  204. 

V.  Pritchard,  657. 

V.  Read,  1007,  1009. 

y.  Ross,  904. 

V.  RmnmeU,  624,  784,  785. 

V.  Shallenberger,  121. 

V.  Sigler,  297a,  360,  393. 

V.  Skipwith,  39. 

V.  Templeton,  400. 

V.  Watson,  261. 

V.  Wickliffe,  104. 

V.  Young,  194,  320,  449. 
Younger  v.  Massey,  439a. 
Young's  Guardian  v.  Sadler,  156. 
Youugstown   Bridge  Co.    v.   Railroad 

Co.,  261. 
Younkin  v.  Younkin,  509. 
Yung  Jon,  Bz  parte,  257. 


Zabel  y.  Harshman,  611. 

Zalesky  y.  Insurance  Co.,  680. 

Zander  y.  Coe,  216. 

Zapeda  y.  Rahm,  659. 

Zebley  y.  Storey,  313. 

Zecharie  y.  Bowers,  222. 

Zelders'  Appeal,  498. 

Zellerbach  v.  Allenberg,  321. 

Zepp  v.  Hager.  227,  857,  884,  897,  899. 

Zerbe  v.  Railroad  Co.,  1005. 


<C11 


CASES  CITED. 
tReferences  to  tectlons.    S9  1  to  499  In  ▼ol.  1;  residue  in  vol.  2.1 


Zerega  v.  Will,  750. 
Ziebold,  Ex  parte,  257. 
Ziegler  v.  Evans,  54,  332. 
Zimmerman,  In  re,  524. 

V.  Gaumer,  941. 

T.  Gerdes,  83. 


Zimmerman  v.  Helser.  STm.  Su2. 
Zinc  Carbonate  Co.  v.  Bank,  902. 
Zink  y.  aty  of  Buffalo,  594. 
Zinn  V.  Dawson,  391.  1000. 
Zoller  V.  McDonald,  27. 
Zumbro  y.  Stump,  498. 


THE  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS. 


CHAFTEBI. 

THIS  NATLKK  AND  CLASSIFICATION  OF  JUDGMENTS  AND  DECREBa 

Pakt  L    The  Natcrb  of  Judoments. 

f     1.  Definitions  of  Judgments,  Decrees,  and  Orders. 

Z.  The  Langnage  of  a  Judgment 

3.  Essentials  of  a  Judgment. 

4.  Consequmices  of  a  Judgment 

5.  Judgment  is  not  an  Assignment 
tt.  Judgment  is  not  a  Specialty. 

7.  Judgments  sometimes  called  Contracts. 

H.  The  opposite  View. 

U.  Where  tbe  Cause  of  Action  Is  In  Tort. 

10.  Judgments  are  not  Contracts.   . 

U.  Question  of  Statutory  Construction. 

Part  II.    The  Classification  of  Judomentb. 

12.  Methods  of  Classifying  Judgments. 

13.  Judgments  on  an  Issue  of  I«aw. 

14.  Judgments  upon  Verdict. 

15.  Judgments  without  Verdict 
l(i  Judgment  against  the  Verdict 

17.    Names  of  Judgments  in  certain  Special  Actions. 
Itl.    Cross-Classifications  of  Judgments. 
IV.    Classification  of  Decrees. 

Part  I.     The  Nature  of  Judgments. 

I  1.    DeflaitloAs  of  JudzatentUf  Deorees,  and  Orders. 

As,  in  logic,  judgment  is  an  affirmation  of  a  relation  between  a 
particular  predicate  and  a  particular  subject,  so,  in  law,  it  is  the 
affirmation  by  the  law  of  the  legal  consequences  attending  a  proved 
or  admitted  state  of  facts.    It  is  not,  however,  a  mere  assertion  of 

1  LAW  JUDG.-l 


§    1  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Cb.    1 

the  rules  of  law  as  applied  to  given  conditions,  nor  of  the  legal  rela- 
tions of  the  persons  concerned.  It  is  always  a  declaration  that  a 
liability,  recognized  as  within  the  jural  sphere,  does  or  does  not 
exist.  An  action  is  instituted  for  the  enforcement  of  a  right  or  the 
redress  of  an  injury.  Hence  a  judgment,  as  the  culmination  of  the 
action,  declares  the  existence  of  the  right,  recognizes  the  commission 
of  the  injury,  or  negatives  the  allegation  of  one  or  the  other.  But 
as  no  right  can  exist  without  a  correlative  duty,  nor  any  invasion  of 
it  without  a  corresponding  obligation  to  make  amends,  the  judgment 
necessarily  affirms,  or  else  denies,  that  such  a  duty  or  such  a  liability 
rests  upon  the  person  against  whom  the  aid  of  the  law  is  invoked. 
Further,  a  judgment  is  properly  neither  hortatory  nor  imperative. 
It  does  not  advise  or  recommend,  nor,  on  the  other  hand,  does  it 
prescribe  any  act  or  course  of  conduct.  In  respect  to  the  latter  par- 
ticular the  case  is  different,  of  course,  with  a  decree  in  equity,  but  we 
are  now  using  the  term  "judgment"  in  its  narrowest  sense.  In  gen- 
eral, therefore,  it  neither  counsels  nor  commands,  but  simply  asserts. 
Again,  although  it  is  the  affirmation  of  the  law,  it  is  necessarily  pro- 
nounced by  the  mouth  of  a  court  pr  judge.  And  the  decision  of  any 
arbiter,  self-constituted  or  chosen  by  the  litigants,  is  no  judgment. 
The  law  speaks  only  by  its  appointed  organs.  It  is  only  when  the 
deliverance  comes  from  a  true  and  competent  court  that  it  is  entitled 
to  be  called  a  judgment.  Finally  it  must  be  responsive  to  the  state 
of  facts  laid  before  the  tribunal.  It  is  elementary  law  that  no  court 
can  travel  outside  the  controversy  presented  to  it,  to  touch  other 
rights  or  relations  not  involved.  Hence  the  judgment  must  be  an 
affirmation  in  regard  to  the  matters  submitted  to  the  court  for  deci- 
sion. We  may  therefore  define  a  judgment  as  the  determination  or 
sentence  of  the  law,  pronounced  by  a  competent  judge  or  court,  as 
the  result  of  an  action  or  proceeding  instituted  in  such  court,  affirm- 
ing that,  upon  the  matters  submitted  for  its  decision,  a  legal  duty 
or  liability  does  or  does  not  exist.* 

1  "A  Judgment  is  the  final  consideration  and  determination  of  a  court  of 
^competent  jurisdiction  upon  tbe  matters  submitted  to  it"  Wbitwell  y.  Em- 
ory, 3  Mich.  84,  59  Am.  Dec.  220.  *'The  decision  or  sentence  of  the  law,  given 
:by  a  court  of  justice  or  other  competent  tribunal,  as  tbe  result  of  proceedings 
Instituted  therein  for  the  redress  of  an  injury."    Bout.  Law  Diet.  voc.  **jQd|^- 

(2) 


Gil.   1)  MATURE   AND   CLA68IPICATIOR   OF   JUDGMENTS.  §    1 

This  is  the  definition  of  a  judgment  in  its  narrow  and  technical 
sense;  that  is,  as  it  is  understood  at  common  law,  as  distinguished 
irom  the  modified  significance  of  the  term  as  used  in  the  codes  of 
procedure,  and  also  as  distinguished  from  the  definitive  sentences  of 
courts  of  equity,  admiralty,  arbitration,  and  others.*  The  term 
which,  in  equity  practice,  corresponds  to  judgment  at  common  law 
is  "decree."  But  there  are  important  differences  between  judgments 
and  decrees,  such  as  to  require  a  distinct  definition  of  the  latter ;  and 
these  we  now  proceed  to  consider. 

A  decree,  then,  is  the  determination,  sentence,  or  judgment  of 
equity,  pronounced  by  a  competent  court,  upon  the  controversy  sub- 
mitted for  its  decision.  Or  more  specifically,  it  is  "a  sentence  or 
order  of  the  court,  pronounced  on  hearing  and  understanding  all  the 
points  in  issue,  and  determining  the  rights  of  all  the  parties  in  the 
suit  according  to  equity  and  good  conscience."  •  But  a  decree  dif- 
fers from  a  judgment  both  in  the  process  which  precedes  and  deter- 
mines it  and  in  its  contents.  Aside  from  the  differences  in  the 
courts, — in  their  organization,  process,  remedial  machinery,  rules 
and  methods  of  investigation,  principles  of  decision,  and  the  scope 
of  their  competence, — it  is  to  be  noted  that  while  a  judgment  at  law 
is  usually,  at  least  in  contested  cases,  determined  by  the  verdict,  the 
conclusion  of  law  following  inevitably  as  soon  as  the  facts  are  found, 
a  judge  in  equity  is  called  upon  to  decide  upon  the  whole  merits  of 
the  controversy  as  it  addresses  itself  to  his  conscience  and  sense  of 
fairness,  of  course  within  the  established  rules  of  equity.  Hence 
while  a  decree  is,  equally  with  a  judgment,  the  deliverance  of  the  law, 

ment.*'  "The  conclnsion  of  law  upon  facts  found,  or  admitted  by  the  parties, 
or  apon  their  default  in  the  course  of  the  suit."  2  Tldd,  Prac.  930.  "A  judg- 
ment is  the  determination  of  the  law  as  the  result  of  proceedings  instituted 
fa  a  court  of  Justice.  A  final  judgment  is  such  as  at  once  puts  an  end  to  the 
action,  by  determining  tbat  the  plaintiff  is  or  is  not  entitled  to  recover,  and 
the  amount  in  debt  or  damages  to  be  recovered."  Thompson,  J.,  in  Mahoning 
Bank's  Appeal,  32  Pa.  160. 

2  A  judicial  sentence  may  be  designated  by  a  different  term  than  judg- 
ment. In  the  case  of  Cooper  v.  Metzger,  74  Ind.  544,  It  was  held  that  the 
words  '^filial  adjustment,*'  as  used  in  a  statute,  were  equivalent  in  meaning  to 
**flnal  judgment.'* 

•  2  DanieU,  Ctu  Prac.  MMS.    "A  decree  in  chancery  is  the  Judgment  of  the 

(3) 


S   1  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  1 

it  IS  also,  to  a  considerable  degree,  the  decision  of  the  man  who 
frames  it,  as  the  interpreter  of  that  moral  standard  which  equity  sets 
up.  Another  important  particular  in  which  they  differ  is  that  a  de- 
cree is  more  pliable  than  a  judgment.  The  latter  proceeds  upon  the 
determination  of  a  narrow  issue,  of  law  or  fact,  and  merely  decides 
upon  the  existence  of  an  alleged  liability  as  between  two  contending 
persons  or  groups  of  persons.  A  decree  may  be  adjusted  to  meet 
all  the  exigencies  of  the  litigation,  and  to  settle  all  t!ie  conflictinr; 
rights  and  claims,  however  numerous  and  complicated  may  be  the 
interests  involved.  Further,  a  judgment  has  in  general  nothing 
whatever  to  do  with  the  means  of  enforcing  the  liability  which  it  de- 
clares. Certain  consequences  do  indeed  flow  from  it, — ^as  the  right 
to  issue  execution,  the  attaching  of  a  lien  upon  land, — ^but  these  arc 
no  part  of  the  judgment,  nor  is  it  concerned  with  directions  for  mak- 
ing its  sanction  effective.  It  is,  as  already  stated,  a  bare  assertion. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  decree  may,  and  frequently  does,  contain  more 
or  less  minute  and  specific  directions  for  effectuating  its  object 
Also  it  may  prescribe  or  forbid  a  specific  act  or  course  of  conduct, 
which  a  judgment  never  does.  Hence  it  will  be  perceived  that  the 
orbit  of  a  decree  in  chancery,  so  to  speak,  is  much  wider  than  that 
of  a  judgment  at  law. 

This  distinction  between  decrees  and  judgments  has  not  always 
been  strictly  preserved  in  American  practice.  In  some  of  the  states 
there  is  a  sort  of  border-land  where  equitable  relief  is  administered 
through  common  law  forms,  the  amalgamation  having  occurred 
through  the  lack  of  separate  chancery  courts.  Thus  in  Pennsyl- 
vania, where  an  action  of  ejectment  may  be  brought  to  enforce  the 
specific  performance  of  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  land,  the  sentence 
pronounced  is  not  regarded  as  an  ordinary  judgment  at  law,  but  as 
containing  the  substance  of  a  decree  in  equity,  since  it  directs  the 
payment  of  money  by  one  party  and  the  conveyance  of  the  land  by 
the  other.* 

In  those  states  which  have  adopted  codes  of  retormed  procedure, 

chancellor  upon  the  facts  ascertained  and  should  be  signed  by  him  and  entered 
on  the  minutes  of  the  court."    Code  Ga.  §  4212. 
«Coughanour  r.  Bloodgood,  27  Pa.  286, 


Ch.    1)  NATURE    AND   CLASSIFICATION    OF  JUDGMENTS.  §    1 

all  distinction  between  law  and  equity,  so  far  as  relates  to  pleading 
and  practice,  is  abolished,  and  of  course  the  difference  between  judg- 
ments and  decrees  is  also  swept  away.  There  being  but  one  form  of 
civil  action,  the  plaintiff  may  ask  therein  for  any  relief  which  either 
law  or  equity  would  accord  him,  and  the  decision  in  his  favor  may 
award  him  damages,  specific  performance,  an  injunction,  foreclosure 
of  a  mortgage,  or  any  other  legal  remedy.  Hence  the  final  deter- 
mination of  any  suit,  whether  by  the  proceedings  formerly  known  as 
equity,  or  at  common  law,  is,  under  these  codes,  a  judgment.**  The 
most  usual  definition  is  "the  final  determination  of  the  rights  of  the 
parties  in  an  action  or  proceeding."  •  And  the  term  "decree'*  is  no 
'.onger  used,  except  colloquially.  It  will  be  observed  that  the  defi- 
nition quoted,  while  it  enlarges  the  scope  of  the  word  by  making  it 
include  decisions  which  were  not  formerly  called  judgments  but  de- 
crees, also  restricts  it  by  the  exclusion  of  those  determinations  which 
are  elsewhere  known  as  interlocutory  judgments. 

It  is  also  necessary  to  distinguish  judgments  and  decrees  from 
orders.  An  order  is  the  mandate  or  determination  of  the  court  upon 
some  subsidiary  or  collateral  matter  arising  in  an  action,  not  dis- 
posing of  the  merits,  but  adjudicating  a  preliminary  point  or  direct- 
ing some  step  in  the  proceedings.  It  is  defined  by  the  supreme  court 
of  California  as  "a  decision  made  during  the  progress  of  the  cause 
either  prior  or  subsequent  to  final  judgment,  settling  some  point  of 
practice  or  some  question  collateral  to  the  main  issue  presented  by 
the  pleadings  and  necessary  to  be  disposed  of  before  such  issue  can 
be  passed  upon  by  the  court,  or  necessary  to  be  determined  in  car- 
rying the  execution  into  effect."  ^     It  will  be  observed  that  orders, 

■  SUte  V.  McArthur,  5  Kan.  280;  Hughes  v.  Shreve,  3  Mete.  (Ky.)  547; 
Kramer  v.  liebmaD,  9  Iowa,  114. 

•  Code  Civ.  Froc.  Oal.  §  577;  Code  Civ.  Proc.  N.  Y.  §  1200;  Code  Kan. 
i  ay6;  Code  Or.  §  240.  MUler's  Code  Iowa.  §  2849,  declares  that  "ever^ 
final  adjudication  of  the  rights  of  the  parties  In  an  action  is  a  Judgment" 
iSee  Walker  v.  Walker.  93  Iowa,  643,  61  N.  W.  930.  In  Tennessee,  the  word 
'-judgment"  is  usually  applied  to  a  determination  of  the  rights  of  the  parties 
in  an  action  at  law,  and  the  word  '"decree"  to  a  similar  determination  in 
iy]iiJty;  but  the  words  are  declared  to  be  interchangeable  as  used  in  the 
Cocl«>.     Ward  v.  Kenner  (Teim.)  37  S.  W.  707. 

7  Loring  ▼.  lUsley,  1  Cal.  27. 

(5) 


§    2  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (CI).   I 

under  the  codes,  thus  include  the  judgments  formerly  called  inter- 
locutory. An  order  is  granted  upon  an  application  to  the  court 
called  a  motion.®  The  term  seems  to  be  practically  synonymous 
(except  for  its  including  interlocutory  judgments)  with  "rule."  But 
the  latter  is  more  commonly  used  in  those  states  adhering  to  the 
common  law  practice,  while  order  is  generally  employed  in  those 
which  have  adopted  codes.* 

i  2.    The  I*a]i«iiase  of  a  Jndgment. 

"A  judgment,  though  pronounced  or  awarded  by  the  judges,  is 
not  their  determination  and  sentence,  but  the  sentence  and  determi- 
nation of  the  law,  which  depends,  not  upon  the  arbitrary  opinion  of 
the  judge,  but  the  settled  and  invariable  principles  of  justice,  and  is 
the  remedy  prescribed  by  law  for  the  redress  of  injuries,  and  the  suit 
or  action  is  the  vehicle  or  means  of  administering  it ;  and  therefore 
the  style  of  the  judgment  is  not  that  *it  is  ordered  or  resolved  by  the 
court,'  for  then  the  judgment  might  be  their  own,  but  *it  is  consid- 
ered'— 'consideratum  est  per  curiam,'  which  implies  that  the  judg- 
ment is  none  of  their  own,  but  the  act  of  the  law,  pronounced  and 
declared  by  the  court  upon  determination  and  inquiry.''  ^®  At  the 
same  time  there  is  no  magic  in  this  formula;  nor  is  it  a  conclusive 
criterion  whether  a  definitive  judgment  has  been  rendered  that  the 
entry  employs  or  omits  the  usual  phrase,  "it  is  considered."  A  judg- 
ment may  be  final  and  subject  to  review  on  writ  of  efror,  as  well 
when  entered  without  as  with  that  clause.*^     The  usual  style  of  a 

8  Code  Civ.  Froc.  Cal.  §  1003;   Code  Qv.  Proc.  N.  Y.  §  767. 

»  The  refusal  of  a  court  to  Issue  the  writ  of  mandamus  Is  neither  a  judg- 
ment nor  a  decree.  Craddock  v.  Croghan,  1  Sneed  (Ky.)  100.  Neither  is  a 
decision  made  by  the  court  upon  a  matter  addressed  to  its  dlscretiouary  au- 
thority; as,  an  application  to  have  a  cause  brought  forward  on  the  docket 
and  to  vacate  a  certain  Judgment  therein  rendered.  Claggett  v.  Siraes,  25 
X.  H.  402.  But  in  Georgia,  it  is  said  that  an  order  passed  by  a  judge  of 
the  superior  court,  whether  in  term  or  at  chambers,  granting  an  application 
presented  by  a  trustee  for  leave  to  sell  the  trust  property,  has  all  the  sanctity 
of  a  formal  judgment  of  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction,  and  will  be  sup- 
ported by  the  same  presumptions.  Reinhart  v.  Blackshear,  105  Ga.  799,  31 
S.  K.  748. 

10  Baker  v.  State,  3  Ark.  491.  Dickinson,  J. 

11  Whitaker  v.  Bramson,  2  Paine,  201),  Fed.  Cas.  No.  17,r.2G 

(6) 


Ch.  1)  NATURE   AND    CLASSIFICATION    OF   JUDGMENTS.  §   3 

decree  is  "it  is  ordered,  adjudged,  and  decreed ;"  and  of  an  order  or 
rule,  "it  is  ordered,"  eta 


i  3.    EMPentialfl  of  a  Jadememi. 

We  are  not  at  present  concerned  with  the  tests  by  which  the  va- 
lidity of  a  judgment  is  to  be  determined,  such  as  the  question  of  ju- 
risdiction, the  status  of  the  parties,  the  time,  place,  and  manner  of 
its  rendition.  But  the  object  of  this  section  is  to  indicate  the  essen- 
tial characteristics  which  must  appear  on  the  face  of  the  decision  in 
order  to  entitle  it  to  be  called  a  judgment  for  any  purpose,  even  as  a 
preliminary  to  investigating  its  validity.  And  first,  it  must  appear 
to  be  the  sentence  of  a  court.  As  already  stated,  the  award  of  arbi- 
trators or  of  any  self-constituted  tribunal  is  not  a  judgment.  The 
decision  must  purport  to  emanate  from  some  court  of  justice  known 
tu  and  organized  under  the  laws  of  the  particular  sovereignty.  At 
the  same  time,  it  is  usual  to  recognize  the  determinations  of  certain 
bodies  invested  with  minor  administrative  powers,  and  acting  in  a 
judicial  capacity  in  reference  to  their  exercise,**  as  equivalent  to 
judgments  of  the  courts.  But  it  is  only  by  analogy  that  these  deci- 
sions can  be  called  judgments.  And  in  general,  a  paper  purporting 
to  be  a  judgment,  but  not  stating  by  what  court  rendered,  nor  when, 
nor  for  what  cause  of  action,  is  a  nullity.*'  Again,  unless  in  the 
case  of  purely  ex  parte  proceedings,  it  must  appear  to  have  been  ren- 
dered between  adverse  parties,  or,  in  a  certain  class  of  actions,  be- 
tween a  party  plaintiff  and  some  res  which  stands  in  place  of  a  de- 
fendant.**    The  case  of  a  proceeding  against  "unknown  owners"  is 

1*  Such  as  road  commissioners,  In  adjudicating  upon  the  necessity  of  a 
road,  and  in  locating  and  making  assessments  for  the  same.  Lon^ellow  y. 
t^uimby,  */»  Me.  196,  48  Am.  Dec.  525.  Or  a  town  council,  in  auditing  and 
allowing  a  claim  for  a  certain  and  ascertained  amount  Kelly  v.  Wimberly, 
01  Miss.  548.     Bee,  infra,  §  532. 

IS  BeviDgton  y.  Buck,  18  Ind.  414. 

i*'nie  action  of  a  county  court  incorporating  a  town,  under  the  statute 
in  Missonri,  is  not  a  judgment  or  cHrder,  within  the  meaning  of  the  act 
allowing  appeals.  Mali  y.  De  Armond,  46  Mo.  App.  596.  But  a  decree  ad- 
judging against  certain  persons  certain  amounts  and  ordering  the  same  paid 
into  court  to  the  credit  of  an  estate,  and  proyiding  for  the  distribution  of  the 
fund  to  designated  persons  in  fixed  amounts,  is  such  a  final  judgment  as  will 

(7) 


§   3  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  {Ch.   1 

no  real  exception  to  this  rule,  for  there  is  always  a  thing  or  right 
claimed,  which  may  be  personified  as  the  plaintiff's  adversary.     And 
the  judgment  must  of  course  appear  to  be  in  favor  of  one  party  and 
against  the  other.  Again,  the  judgment  must  be  definitive.   Itmustpur- 
port  to  be  the  actual  and  absolute  sentence  of  the  law,  as  distin- 
guished from  a  mere  finding  that  one  of  the  parties  is  entitled  tc  a 
judgment,  or  from  a  direction  to  the  effect  that  a  judgment  may  be 
entered.     "An  order  for  a  judgment  is  not  the  judgment,  nor  does 
the  entry  of  such  order  partake  of  the  nature  and  qualities  of  a  judg- 
ment record."  ^*     It  has  been  held  that  an  order  of  court  allowing 
the  plaintiff's  attorney  to  enter  up  judgment  for  the  plaintiff  is  in  it- 
self a  sufficient  judgment  for  the  plaintiff  for  the  amount  sued  fcnr.^' 
But  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  this  would  hold  good  for  all  the 
purposes  of  a  judgment.     Where  an  interlocutory  judgment  is  ren- 
dered by  default,  upon  a  claim  for  unliquidated  damages,  its  amount 
may  be  left  for  ascertainment  by  proper  proceedings.     But  we  may 
say  in  general  that  if  a  judgment  purports  to  be  final,  and  is  given 
upon  a  money  demand,  the  amount  of  the  recovery  must  be  stated  in 
it  with  certainty  and  precision.     If  the  amount  remains  to  be  deter- 
mined by  a  future  contingency,  or  ascertained  by  referees,  or  dimin- 
ished by  the  allowance  of  an  unliquidated  credit,  or  is  otherwise  in- 
definite and  uncertain,  it  is  no  proper  judgment. ^^     It  remains  to  be 
stated  that,  in  case  of  ambiguity,  a  judgment  should  be  construed 
with  reference  to  the  pleadings,  and  when  it  admits  of  two  construc- 
tions, that  one  will  be  adopted  which  is  consonant  with  the  judg- 
ment which  should  have  been  rendered  on  the  facts  and  law  of  the 

support  a  writ  of  error,  though  not  in  favor  of  any  person  acting  Individually 
or  In  a  representative  capacity.    Haines  v.  Christie,  27  Colo.  288.  60  Pao.  567. 

15  Whit  well  V.  Emory,  3  Mich.  84,  59  Am.  Dec.  220.  A  written  memo- 
randum by  tlie  judge,  of  certain  couchisious  of  fact,  with  a  formal  order  for 
more  evidence  on  certain  points,  is  not  a  judgment.  Putnam  v.  Crombie,  34 
Barb.  (N.  1.)  232.  An  entry:  "I  find  for  the  plaintiflC  and  assess  his  dam- 
ages at,"  stating  the  amount  is  not  a  final  judgment,  but  simply  a  finding 
under  the  statute  regulating  the  practice  before  referees.  Demens  v.  Poyntz, 
25  Fla.  054,  6  South.  261. 

10  Tift  V.  Keaton,  78  Ga.  235,  2  S.  B.  690. 

17  Battell  V,  liowery,  46  Iowa,  49;  Dunns  v.  Batchclor,  20  X.  C.  46;  Early 
T.  Moore,  4  Munf.  (Va.)  262;  Mudd  v.  Rogers,  IJ  La.  Ann.  048;  Xichols 
V.  Stewart,  21  111.  106.    See  infra,  $  118. 

(8) 


Cb.   1)  NATURE   AND   CLASSIFICATION    OF   JUDGMENTS.  §    i 

case,**  But  where  a  court  inadvertently  determines  two  matters 
standing  in  such  opposition  as  to  be  incapable  of  harmonious  con- 
struction^ as,  for  instance,  that  the  same  property  belongs  absolutely 
to  each  of  two  persons,  the  decision  is  of  no  effect.** 

i  4.    Conseqnenoes  of  a  Jndsment. 

The  first  and  most  obvious  consequence  of  a  judgment  is  that  it 
establishes  an  indisputable  obligation  and  confers  upon  the  success- 
ful party  the  right  to  issue  execution  or  other  process  of  the  court 
for  its  enforcement.  But  this,  it  must  be  repeated,  is  not  an  in- 
tegral part  of  the  judgment.  The  judgment  is  merely  the  affirma- 
tion of  a  liability.  The  right  to  use  the  process  of  the  court  for  its 
enforcement  is  a  consequence  which  the  law  attaches  to  it.  A  decree 
may  direct  a  particular  act  to  be  done;  a  judgment  in  rem  may 
specify  the  property  out  of  which  satisfaction  is  to  be  made ;  a  judg- 
ment in  replevin  may  require  a  return  of  the  goods ;  in  certain  cases 
a  judgment  may  be  entered  for  a  sum  payable  in  a  particular  kind 
of  money.*®  But  with  these  exceptions,  the  general  principle  holds 
good  that  the  judgment,  after  performing  its  office  of  declaring  the 
existence  of  a  certain  liability,  leaves  the  party  to  pursue  the  reme- 
dies which  the  law  provides. 

Another  important  consequence  of  a  judgment  is  that  it  creates  a 
lien  upon  real  estate  owned  by  the  debtor,  which  endures  for  a  cer- 
tain period,  follows  the  land  into  the  hands  of  purchasers  or  other 
lienors,  and  may  be  enforced  by  seizure  and  sale  of  the  property  sub- 
ject to  it.  A  separate  chapter  will  be  devoted  to  the  consideration  of 
this  subject. 

A  further  consequence  of  a  judgment  is  that  it  creates  an  estop- 
pel upon  the  litigants ;  so  that  a  judgment  rendered  upon  the  merits 
will  bar  any  further  suit  upon  the  same  cause  of  action,  between  the 
same  parties  or  their  privies;   and  a  point  which  was  once  actually 

!•  Peniston  v.  Somers,  15  La.  Ann.  679.  In  detinue  for  several  slaves, 
a  Judgment  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  for  all  of  them  except  one.  as  to  whom 
tile  judgment-entry  is  entirely  silent,  is  a  Judgment  In  favor  of  the  defendant 
for  Uiat  one.     WIttIck  v.  Traun,  25  Ala.  317. 

»»Gage  V.  Downey,  94  Cal.  241,  29  Tac.  035. 

-^iiee,  Infra,  S  1&2. 

(0) 


§   4  IJkW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  1 

and  necessarily  litigated  and  decided  cannot  again  be  drawn  in  ques- 
tion, by  the  same  parties  or  their  privies,  in  any  future  controversy 
upon  the  same  or  a  different  cause  of  action.  These  topics  also  will 
be  discussed  in  later  chapters  of  this  work. 

Another  consequence  flowing  from  the  rendition  of  a  judgment  is 
that  it  may  constitute  either  an  evidence  or  a  source  of  title.  This 
may  be  illustrated  by  the  result  of  a  real  action,  by  the  case  of  a  pur- 
chaser at  execution-sale  under  a  judgment,  by  a  decree  quieting  title 
to  lands  or  enforcing  specific  performance  of  a  contract  for  their  con- 
veyance. Also  in  relation  to  chattels,  it  is  held  that  satisfaction  of 
a  judgment  recovered  in  an  action  of  trespass  for  their  conversion 
passes  property  in  such  chattels  to  the  defendant,  and  that  his  title 
thus  acquired  takes  effect  by  relation  from  the  time  of  the  conver- 
sion.** 

It  has  also  been  said  that  a  judgment  constitutes  a  vested  right 
of  property  in  the  creditor,  which  cannot  lawfully  be  diminished  or 
destroyed  by  the  legislature.*-  Within  limits  this  is  no  doubt  true. 
But  it  appears  that  the  right  to  receive  interest  on  the  amount  of  a 
judgment,  at  the  rate  fixed  by  law  at  the  time  the  judgment  was  ren- 
dered, is  not  such  a  vested  right  of  property  as  to  be  beyond  the 
control  of  the  legislature;  and  consequently  a  statute  reducing  the 
rate  of  interest  on  judgments  may  validly  apply  to  those  in  force  at 
the  date  of  its  enactment,  and  interest  on  such  existing  judgments 
can  be  recovered  only  at  the  reduced  rate  from  the  time  of  the  pas- 
sage of  the  statute.*^  Again,  although  there  was  no  law  allowing 
an  appeal  from  a  particular  judgment,  at  the  time  of  its  rendition,  it 
cannot  be  said  that  the  successful  party  has  any  vested  right  that 
his  judgment  shall  not  be  made  subject  to  review  by  subsequent  leg- 
islation.** 

21  Smltn  V.  Smith,  51  N.  H.  571. 

22  Merchants'  Bank  v.  BaUou,  98  Va.  112.  32  S.  E.  481,  44  L.  R.  A.  306. 
81  Am.  St.  Rep.  715. 

28  Money  V.  l^ke  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  146  U.  S.  162,  13  Sup.  Ct.  54, 
3G  U  Ed.  925:    Wyoming  Nat.  Bank  v.  Brown.  9  Wyo.  153.  61  Pac.  -iiiTy, 

2  4  Stephens  v.  Cherokee  Nation,  174  U.  S.  445,  19  Sup.  Ct  722,  43  L.  Ed. 
KMl. 

(10) 


Cb.  1)  IIATURE    AMD   CLABSIFIGATIUII   0¥   JUDGMENTS.  §  7 


i  5.    Jndsmeat  is  not  an  Aislcnn&ent. 

Thus  far,  in  discussing  the  nature  of  judgments,  we  have  spoken 
only  of  their  essential  characteristics.  It  now  becomes  necessary  to 
distinguish  them  from  certain  other  legal  transactions  to  which  they 
bear  a  resemblance.  And  first,  since  the  result  of  a  judgment  may 
be  to  deprive  the  debtor  of  his  property  and  transfer  it  (or  its  pro- 
ceeds) to  the  creditor,  it  has  been  thought  that  the  judgment,  espe- 
cially where  it  was  confessed,  might  be  construed  as  an  assignment. 
There  is,  however,  no  validity  in  this  position.  As  has  been  said: 
"A  judgment  is  not  an  assignment.  One  is  the  act  of  the  party, 
the  other  the  act  of  the  law ;  in  the  one  case  the  debtor  surrenders 
the  dominion  to  another,  in  the  other  he  submits  without  opposition 
to  the  course  prescribed  by  law."  ** 

i  6.    Jndgment  is  not  a  Specialty. 

A  judgment  of  a  domestic  court  of  record  is  not  a  specialty,  within 
the  meaning  of  a  statute  which  provides  for  the  limitation  of  "actions 
upon  the  case,  covenant,  and  debt;  founded  upon  a  specialty,  or  any 
agreement,  contract,  or  promise  in  writing,  within  fifteen  years."  *• 

§  7.    JndgmBJktB  sometinies  called  Contracts. 

The  notion  that  a  judgment  is  to  be  considered  as  a  contract  ap- 
pears to  have  originated  with  Blackstone.^^     At  any  rate,  the  pres- 
tnt  writer  has  been  unable  to  discover  any  authority  for  such  a  prop- 
s'HreflcUng  T.  Bogf?0,  20  Pa.  33,  Lewis,  J. 
=•  Trier's  Kx'rs  v.  VVinslow.  15  Ohio  St.  3W. 

-•  3  BL  Comm.  1(K).  In  speaking  of  such  contracts  as  are  Implied  by  law, 
l\^  says:  "Of  this  nature  are,  first,  such  as  are  necessarily  implied  by  the 
fuuuamental  constitution  of  government,  to  which  every  man  is  a  contracting 
Uarty.  And  tlius  it  Is  that  every  person  is  bound  and  hath  virtually  agreed 
to  psy  such  particular  sums  of  money  as  are  charged  on  him  by  the  sentence, 
<'r  assessed  by  the  interpretation,  of  the  law.  For  it  is  a  part  of  the  original 
coDtnct,  entered  into  by  all  mankind  who  partake  the  benefits  of  society, 
to  submit  in  aU  points  to  the  municipal  constitutions  and  local  ordinances 
of  that  state  of  which  each  individual  is  a  member.  Whatever,  therefore, 
th4'  laws  order  any  one  to  pay,  that  becomes  instantly  a  debt,  which  he 
hath  beforehand  contracted  to  discharge." 

(11) 


§    7  LAW  OP  JUDQMBNTS.  (Ch.  1 

osition  in  the  earlier  reports  or  text-books.  But  the  statement  of 
the  learned  commentator,  to  that  effect,  has  been  accepted  without 
question  or  demur  by  many  of  the  succeeding  text-writers,  and  put 
forward  as  a  recognized  principle  of  law  in  numerous  American 
cases.*®  Thus  in  New  York  it  is  said:  "A  judgment  is  a  contract 
of  the  highest  nature  known  to  the  law.  Actions  upon  judgment 
are  actions  on  contract.  The  cause  or  consideration  of  the  judg- 
ment is  of  no  possible  importance;  it  is  merged  in  the  judgment. 
When  recovered,  the  judgment  stands  as  a  conclusive  declaration, 
that  the  plaintiff  therein  is  entitled  to  the  sum  of  money  recovered. 
No  matter  what  may  have  been  the  original  cause  of  action,  the  judg- 
ment forever  settles  the  plaintiff's  claim  and  the  defendant's  assent 
thereto.  This  assent  may  have  been  reluctant,  but  in  law  it  is  an 
assent,  and  the  defendant  is  estopped  by  the  judgment  to  dissent 
Forever  thereafter  any  claim  on  the  judgment  is  setting  up  a  cause 
of  action  on  contract."  *•  So,  in  a  Massachusetts  decision,  in  hold- 
ing that  a  judgment  by  default  against  a  married  woman,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  an  enabling  statute,  was  void,  the  court  said:  "A  judgment 
is  in  the  nature  of  a  contract;  it  is  a  specialty  and  creates  a  debt; 
and  to  have  that  effect,  it  must  betaken  against  one  capable  of  con- 
tracting a  debt."  ^®  But  in  this  country  the  question  has  chiefly 
arisen  in  the  construction  of  statutory  provisions  requiring  certain 
formaHties,  or  prescribing  limitations,  in  actions  "founded  on  con- 
tract," and  in  the  interpretation  of  that  clause  of  the  federal  con- 
stitution which  prohibits  to  the  states  any  legislation  impairing  the 
obligation  of  contracts.  In  regard  to  the  former  class  of  cases,  it 
has  been  held  that  a  judgment  is  a  contract  within  the  meaning  of  a 
statute  which  provides  that  several  causes  of  action  may  be  united 
when  they  arise  out  of  contract  express  or  implied,  and  hence  an 
action  upon  a  judgment  may  be  joined  with  an  action  for  the  breach 

2  8  sawyer  v.  Vilas,  19  Vt.  43;  Morse  ▼.  Toppan,  3  Gray  (Mass.)  411;  Mo- 
Gulre  V.  Gallagher,  2  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  402;  Humphrey  ▼.  Persons,  23  Barb.  (X.  Y.) 
313;  Taylor  v.  Koot,  •43  N.  Y.  344;  Johnson  v.  Butler,  2  Iowa,  535;  Farmers' 
Bank  V.  Mather,  3U  Iowa,  283;  Heed  v.  Eldredge,  27  Cal.  348;  Stuart  t.  Lander, 
1(5  Cal.  372,  76  Am.  Dec.  538;  Childs  v.  Harris  Manufg  Co.,  68  Wi&  231,  32 
M.  W.  43;  Weaver  v.  Lapsley,  43  Ala.  224;  1  Pars.  Cent  7. 

28  Taylor  v.  Koot,  '43  N.  Y.  335,  Woodruff,  J. 

«o  Morse  V.  Toppan,  3  Gray,  411,  Shaw,  C.  J. 

(12) 


Ch.   1)  NATUKK    AND    CLASSIFICATION    OP   JUDGMENTS.  §   8 

of  an  express  contract.'*  In  regard  to  the  latter  class  of  cases, 
there  are  decisions  to  be  found  tnai  judgments  are  covered  by  the 
prohibition  against  laws  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts.** 


i  8.    The  Opposite  View. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  carefully  considered  English  case,  subse- 
quent in  date  to  Blackstone,  holds  that  a  judgment  is  not  in  any 
sense  a  contract;  and  this  view  is  supported  by  numerous  and  re- 
spectable American  authorities.'*  Thus  a  learned  judge  has  re- 
marked: ''The  obhgation  of  a  debt  on  a  judgment  does  not  arise 
from  any  express  contract  made  by  the  party  charged  by  it.  *J"^^" 
cium  redditur  in  invitum.'  Upon  a  refined  and  artificial  view  of  the 
obligations  imposed  by  law  upon  every  individual,  they  may  be  re- 
solved into  a  contract  which  he  makes  with  society  to  obey  the  laws 
by  which  he  is  protected.  And  the  force  of  legal  obligation  has,  by 
some  elementary  writers,  been  attempted  to  be  strengthened  upon 

»i  CdUds  v.  Harris  Aianufg  Co.,  68  Wis.  231,  32  N.  W.  43.  For  other  illus- 
iratKms  under  this  liead,  see  Sawyer  v.  Vilas,  19  Vt.  43;  McGiiire  v.  Gallagher, 
•^  S^andf.  (N.  y.)  402. 

»2  Sc-arborough  v.  Dugan,  10  Cal.  305;  Weaver  v.  Lapsley,  43  Ala.  224.  But 
In  the  latter  c&se  the  question  was  upon  the  constitutionality  of  a  certain  stat- 
ute entitled  "an  act  to  declare  void  certain  judgments  and  to  grant  new  trials 
in  certain  cases  therein  mentioned.''  And  the  original  cause  of  action  in  this 
litigation  (the  judgment  in  which  came  under  the  act)  was  a  contract.  So 
that  the  true  ground  of  the  Invalidity  of  the  statute  was,  not  that  it  impaired 
ttie  obligation  of  the  judgment  obtained  on  such  contract,  but  that,  by  vacating 
the  judgment,  it  canceUed  the  remedy  on  the  original  contract  itself,  and  so 
impaired  its  obligation.  See  Black,  Ck>nst  Prohib.  §  197.  And  see  Sprott  Y. 
Keid.  3  Iowa,  481^,  56  Am.  Dec.  549. 

ss  Hidleson  v.  W'hytel,  3  Burrows,  1548;  Morley  y.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  14«  U.  8.  lb"2,  13  Sup.  Ct.  54,  36  L.  Bd.  925;  Wadsworth  v.  Henderson 
(C  C.)  1«  Fed.  447;  Todd  v.  Crumb,  5  McLean,  172,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  14,073;  Jor- 
dan V.  Koblnson,  15  Me.  168;  Wyman  v.  Mitchell,  1  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  316;  O'Brien 
V.  Young.  tl5  N.  Y.  428.  47  Am.  Rep.  64;  McDonald  v.  Dickson,  87  N.  C.  404; 
Napier  v.  GIdiere,  Speers,  *>i.  (S.  C.)  215,  40  Am.  Dec.  613;  Keith  v.  Estill.  9 
I'ort.  <Ala.)  069;  Smith  v.  Harrison,  33  Ala.  700;  Masterson  v.  Gibson,  56  Aln. 
:»<*;  Lovlns  V.  Humphries.  67  Ala.  437;  Wolffe  v.  Eberlein,  74  Ala.  99,  49  Am. 
Krp.  WW;  WiUiams  v.  Waldo,  3  Scam.  (111.)  269;  Rae  v.  Hulbert,  17  111.  572; 
Sprott  V.  Keid,  3  Iowa.  489,  56  Am.  Dec.  549;  Larrnbee  v.  Baldwin,  35  Cal. 
ir.i;:  Wyoming  Nat  Bank  v.  Brown,  7  Wyo.  494,  53  Pac.  291,  75  Am.  St.  Rep. 

(13) 


§    9  LAW  OF  JUDQMENTa  (Ch.  1 

this  principle.  (3  Bl.  Comm.  160.)  But  contracts  of  this  descrip- 
tion are  not  barred  by  this  part  of  the  statute  [of  limitations]."** 
So  again :  "A  cause  of  action  on  contract  or  tort  loses  its  identity 
when  merged  in  a  judgment,  and  thereafter  a  new  cause  of  action 
arises  out  of  the  judgment  whenever  it  becomes  necessary  to  enforce 
the  obligation  by  suit.  The  liability  of  the  debtor  no  longer  rests 
upon  his  voluntary  agreement,  but  upon  the  adjudication  of  the 
court  into  which  the  former  has  passed."  ••  The  last  sentence  is  es- 
pecially significant. 

f  9.    Where  tke  Cause  of  Action  Is  in  Tort. 

Whatever  may  be  said  in  regard  to  a  judgment  which  is  rendered 
upon  the  actual  contract  of  the  parties,  it  must  be  perfectly  appar- 
ent that  a  judgment  upon  a  cause  of  action  sounding  in  tort  cannot 
be  considered  as  in  any  sense  a  contract.  True,  the  judgment 
merges  the  cause  of  action.  But  that  means  that  the  plaintiff  can- 
not afterwards  sue  upon  the  original  claim  or  use  it  otherwise.  It 
does  not  mean  that  it  is  metamorphosed  into  something  diametrical- 
ly opposite  to  what  it  was  before.  And  it  is  held,  upon  the  highest 
authority,  that  a  judgment  in  an  action  for  a  tort  is  not  a  contract 
within  the  meaning  of  that  provision  of  the  federal  constitution 
which  forbids  the  states  to  pass  any  law  impairing  the  obligation  of 
contracts.'*  "A  judgment  for  damages,  estimated  in  money,  is 
sometimes  called  by  text-writers  a  specialty  or  contract  of  record, 
because  it  establishes  a  legal  obligation  to  pay  the  amount  recovered, 
and,  by  a  fiction  of  law,  a  pfomise  to  pay  is  implied  where  such  legal 
obligation  exists.  But  this  fiction  cannot  convert  a  transaction  want- 
ing the  assent  of  parties  into  one  which  necessarily  implies  it.  Judg- 
ments for  torts  are  usually  the  result  of  violent  contests,  and,  as  ob- 
served by  the  court  below,  are  imposed  upon  the  losing  party  by  a 
higher  authority  against  his  will  and  protest.    The  prohibition  of  the 

84  Jordan  v.  Koblnson,  16  Me.  108. 

8  5  McDonald  v.  Dickson,  87  N.  C.  404. 

88  Garrison  v.  City  of  New  York,  21  Wall.  196,  22  L.  Ed.  612;  McAfee  T.  Cot- 
inprton,  71  (ia.  272,  51  Am.  Rep.  263;  Freeland  v.  Williams,  131  U.  S.  405,  9 
Sup.  Ct.  703,  33  Lr.  Kd.  193;  City  of  Slieiman  v.  Langham,  02  Tex.  13,  42  S. 
VV.  IHil. 

(U) 


Ch.   1)  MATURE   AND  CLASSIFICATION   OF   JUDGMENTS.  §   10 

itderal  constitution  was  intended  to  secure  the  observance  of  good 
faith  in  the  stipulation  of  parties  against  any  state  action.  Where 
a  transaction  is  not  based  upon  any  assent  of  parties,  it  cannot  be 
said  that  any  faith  is  pledged  with  respect  to  it,  and  no  case  arises 
for  the  operation  of  the  prohibition."  '^ 

S  10.  Jvdsinents  are  not  Contrsets* 

Upon  the  whole  question,  we  are  unable  to  concede  that  judg- 
ments can  properly  be  considered  contracts  under  any  circumstances 
whatever.  So  far  as  concerns  the  authority  of  Blackstone,  it  is  not 
difficult  to  perceive  that  in  dividing  contracts  into  three  classes,  be- 
ginning with  "contracts  by  record,"  he  was  misled  by  that  same  love 
of  a  neat  classification  which  more  than  once  led  him  into  error. 
The  mistake  lies  in  grouping  under  the  same  technical  term  things 
which  properly  belong  there  and  things  which  belong  there  only  by 
a  remote  analogy.  Further,  his  whole  argument  upon  this  point 
rests  upon  the  assumption  of  an  original  "social  contract" — a  theory 
long  since  exploded.  Admit  that  society  is  a  natural  organism,  not 
a  compact,  and  we  look  in  vain  for  the  implied  promises  supposed 
to  have  been  made  by  each  person  on  entering  into  the  social  state. 

Of  the  American  decisions  sharing  this  view  (not  very  numerous 
or  very  well  considered),  some  have  been  content  to  take  the  state- 
ment  for  granted,  without  probing  the  arguments  advanced  in  its 
support.  Others  have  followed  the  same  specious  reasoning  which 
deceived  the  originator  of  the  theory.  And  others,  begging  the 
question,  have  decided  that  a  particular  judgment  could  not  be  valid 
because  it  did  not  answer  to  the  requirements  of  a  contract,  as  in 
respect  to  the  capacity  of  the  person  to  make  a  contract  or  incur  a 
debt.**  But,  as  we  have  seen,  there  is  a  preponderance  of  authority 
in  favor  of  the  proposition  that  judgments  are  not  contracts. 

•T  i*lel<l,  J.,  In  Louisiana  v.  Mayor  of  New  Orleans,  109  U.  S.  285,  3  Sup.  Ct. 
'Zlh  ^7  U  J'^d.  U36.  See  State  v.  New  Orleans,  32  La.  Ann.  70U,  bolding  tiint 
claims  arising  from  a  tort,— as  a  city's  statutory  obligation  to  make  good 
damages  done  by  a  mob,~are  not  protected  by  this  clause  of  the  federal  con- 
stltutfoD,  though  reduced  to  Judgment. 

ss  As  lA  Morse  v.  Toppan,  3  Gray  (Mass.)  411,  a  decision  which  is  probably 
wrong,  and  which  certainly  furnishes  an  illustration  of  loolclng  at  a  legal  ques- 
tion npaide  down. 

(15) 


§    10  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  1 

But  in  point  of  fact,  the  most  distinctive  mark  of  a  contract  is 
wanting,  viz.:  the  assent  of  both  parties.**  To  this  there  are  two 
apparent  exceptions,  the  case  of  judgments  by  confession  and  judg- 
ments by  default.  But  in  the  former  instance,  the  agreement  of  the 
debtor  is  that  the  creditor  may  take  a  particular  means  of  securing 
his  claim.  The  judgment  is  not  the  agreement;  it  is  the  act  of  the 
law,  ir\voked  by  the  parties,  in  executing  the  agreement.  In  the  lat- 
ter case,  the  defendant  merely  submits  to  what  would,  presumably, 
be  done  with  or  without  his  assent.  Nor  will  the  theory  of  an  im- 
plied assent  fill  the  gap.  If  we  admit  the  assumption  which  lies  at 
the  base  of  this  doctrine,  it  is  not  difficult  to  transform  any  imagina- 
ble right  of  action  into  a  contract.  For  instance,  it  is  the  duty  of 
every  good  citizen  to  pay  his  taxes ;  yet  no  one  thinks  that  the  entry 
on  the  asscssor*s  book  is  a  contract  which  he  has  made.  If  the  duty 
of  every  member  of  society  to  pay  the  debts  which  are  charged 
against  him  as  the  result  of  legal  proceedings  can  be  construed  into 
his  agreement  to  pay  them,  it  is  illogical  to  stop  at  causes  of  action 
which  are  strictly  and  properly  ex  contractu.  It  is  just  as  true  that 
he  impliedly  undertakes  to  make  reparation  for  any  delict  which  he 
may  commit,  as  it  is  that  he  impliedly  promises  to  pay  judgments 
against  him.  But  it  would  be  rash  to  conclude  that  a  tort  is  a  con- 
tract.*® Some  of  the  cases  speak  of  this  implied  assent  as  a  "reluc- 
tant assent.'*  But  this  is  practically  a  contradiction  in  terms.  The 
submission  which  is  wrung  from  a  party  who  has  made  his  best  de- 
fense and  can  no  longer  help  himself  is  not  the  movement  of  will 
which  goes  to  the  making  of  a  contract. 

Another  indispensable  requisite  to  a  contract  is  that  the  parties 
should  be  legally  capable  of  forming  a  binding  agreement.     And  yet 

80  "Tiie  most  Important  elements  of  a  contract  are  wanting.  There  is  no 
aggregatio  mentium.  The  defendant  has  not  voluntarily  assented."  O^Brien 
V.  I'oung.  U5  X.  Y.  428,  47  Am.  Kep.  G4. 

*o  **A  Judgment  is  no  more  a  contract  than  is  a  tort.  In  one  sense  it  is  true 
thnt  every  member  of  society  impliedly  agrees  to  pay  all  Judgments  which  may 
be  regularly  rendered  against  him;  and  in  the  same  sense  does  he  impliedly 
agree  to  make  amends  for  all  torts  whicli  he  may  commit  No  one  will  pre- 
tend tliat  actions  for  torts  are  within  the  spirit  and  intent  of  the  statute  [In 
regard  to  actions  upon  'any  contract  or  agreoment'l,  and  yet  they  certainly  are 
as  much  so  as  are  actions  ux)on  Judgments."  Kae  v.  Hulbert,  17  111.  572, 
Caton,  J. 

(16) 


Oh.  1)  NATURB   AND  CLASilFIGATION    OF   JUDGMENTS.  §    1  i 

the  immense  majority  of  the  cases  hold  that  judgments  rendered 
against  infants,  lunatics,  and  other  persons  who  are  in  law  disabled 
from  contracting,  are  valid  and  conclusively  binding  until  vacated  or 
reversed.**  To  push  this  argument  one  step  further:  "It  is  not 
true  that  a  judgment  rests  either  upon  the  will  or  the  capacity  to 
contract  of  the  party  against  whom  it  is  rendered.  If  a  judgment 
is  a  contract,  and  can  only  be  rendered  against  one  who  is  then 
capable  of  contracting  by  the  laws  of  the  forum,  there  could  not  be  a 
judgment  on  a  contract  made  in  another  state  [nor  on  a  judgment 
rendered  in  another  state],  unless  by  the  law  of  the  forum  that  con- 
tract would  be  valid.  This  would  destroy  the  rule  of  comity  and 
international  law  which  makes  the  validity  of  a  contract  and  the 
capacity  of  the  contractor  depend  on  the  place  where  the  contract 
is  made  or  is  to  be  performed,  or  the  domicile  of  the  contractor,  as 
the  case  may  be,  and  not  upon  the  law  of  the  forum."  ** 

i  11.    ^e  Qmestlon  oonsidered  bm  one  of  Statwtorj  Comstniotion. 

As  already  stated,  the  chief  importance  of  this  question  arises  in 
connection  wth  the  construction  of  constitutional  and  statutory  pro- 
visions. And  we  are  now  prepared  to  formulate  the  rules  which 
reason  and  principle  seem  to  point  out. 

In  the  first  place,  a  judgment  is  not  a  contract  within  the  meaning 
of  the  prohibition  against  law^s  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts. 
The  cases  which  hold  that  it  is,*'  proceed  upon  a  misapprehension  of 
the  constitutional  principle.*  It  is  true  that  statutes*  have  been  de- 
clared invalid,  as  obnoxious  to  this  inhibition,  which  vacated  judg- 
ments, granted  new  trials,  enacted  shorter  statutes  of  limitation,  ex- 
empted the  debtor's  property,  gave  stay  of  execution,  and  so  on. 
But  it  was  not  because  they  attacked  the  judgment,  but  because  they 
destroyed  or  desiccated  the  remedy  on  the  original  contract,  which, 
on  the  authorities,  is  vital  to  the  maintenance  of  its  obligation.**     If 

*i  O'Brien  v.  Young,  96  N.  Y.  428.  47  Am.  Rep.  64. 

"  WadBworth  v.  Henderson  (C.  (\)  16  Fed.  451,  Barr,  J. 

««8ee  Weaver  v.  Lapsley.  43  Ala.  224;  Scarborough  v.  Dugan,  10  Cal.  305. 
But  Me  Sprott  v.  Held,  3  Iowa,  480,  56  Am.  Dec.  549.  Compare  Morley  v. 
IJike  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  146  U.  S.  162,  13  Sup.  Ct.  54,  36  L.  £d.  1)2.-). 

««  Blacky  Const.  Proliib.  H  152,  157,  163, 197,  199. 

1  LAW  JUDG.— 2  (IT) 


§12  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.    1 

the  cause  of  action  was  in  tort,  the  constitutional  clause  does  not 
apply.* ^  But  it  is  impossible  to  hold  that  view  if  every  judgment  is 
a  contract. 

In  the  next  place,  if  a  statute — for  example,  in  prescribing  limita- 
tions of  actions — manifestly  intends,  on  its  face,  to  divide  all  causes 
of  action  into  two  classes,  actions  on  "contract"  and  actions  on 
"tort,"  then  a  judgment  must  be  considered  as  falling  within  the  for- 
mer class.  Strictly  it  belongs  to  neither.  But  if  the  words  are  used 
in  this  extended  sense,  then  "contract"  must  include  "quasi-contract." 
And  a  judgment  may  reasonably  be  called  a  quasi-contract ;  for  al- 
though it  lacks  some  or  all  of  the  elements  of  a  true  contract,  it  is 
more  nearly  assimilated  thereto  than  it  is  to  a  delict.*'  It  is  the 
conclusive  evidence  of  a  fixed  and  ascertained  debt,  and  that  is  suffi- 
cient to  distinguish  it  from  a  claim  in  tort. 

Finally,  if  the  statute  relates  only  to  "contracts  express  or  im- 
plied," or  intends  to  divide  possible  causes  of  action  into  a  larger 
number  of  classes  than  those  mentioned  above,  a  judgment  cannot 
be  considered  as  coming  under  the  denomination  of  a  "contract." 
In  such  a  case,  it  must  stand  in  a  class  by  itself,  and  if  not  specific- 
ally mentioned,  it  is  not  within  the  purview  of  the  act. 

Part  II.     The  Classification  of  Judgmknts. 

§  12.    Methods   of   Clasiifyliis  Judgments. 

Several  methods  of  classifying  judgments  have  been  proposed, 
none  of  which,  perhaps,  is  strictly  scientific  or  perfectly  accurate. 
The  difficulty  is  that  so  many  complications  arise  in  pleading  and 
practice  that  an  entirely  regular  classification  cannot  well  be  made 
without  extending  the  number  of  groups  beyond  convenient  limits. 
However,  as  the  chief  thing  is  to  obtain  an  orderly  arrangement  and 
enumeration  of  the  different  varieties  of  judgments,  the  scientific 
nature  of  the  method  pursued  is  not  of  prime  importance.  Aban- 
doning the  division  commonly  acquiesced  in,  as  being  too  unwieldy, 

*5  Garrison  v.  City  of  New  York,  21  Wall.  196^  22  L.  Ed.  612;  Louisiana  v. 
Mayor  of  Xew  Orleans,  109  U.  S.  285,  3  Sup.  Ct.  211,  27  L.  Ed.  986;  Freelaud 
V.  Williams,  131  U.  S.  405,  9  Sup.  Ct  763,  33  L.  Ed.  193. 

46  Moore  y.  No  well,  94  N.  C«  265;  Johnson  v.  Butler,  2  Iowa,  54^ 

(18) 


Ch.  1)  NATURE   AND   CLASSIFICATION    OF   JUDGMENTS.  §    13 

we  propose  to  arrange  judgments  under  the  four  following  heads: 
I.  Judgments  on  an  issue  of  law.  2.  Judgments  upon  a  verdict.  3. 
Judgments  without  a  verdict.    4.  Judgments  against  a  verdict. 

S  13.    Jvdsments  on  an  Itume  of  Law* 

These  judgments  are  given  upon  the  decision  of  a  demurrer. 
They  are  either  for  the  plaintifl  or  defendant,  as  the  case  may  be, 
and  are  of  the  following  sorts : 

1.  For  the  plaintiff,  when  the  issue  raised  by  a  demurrer  to  any 
of  the  pleadings  is  decided  in  his  favor.  This  judgment  is  final  and 
definitive  and  concludes  the  right  of  action.  Its  style  is  "quod  re- 
cuperet," that  is,  "that  the  plaintiff  do  recover."  *^ 

2.  For  the  plaintiff,  when  the  issue  raised  by  his  demurrer  to  a 
dilatory  plea  or  plea  in  abatement  is  found  in  his  favor.  This  is 
called  judgment  of  "respondeat  ouster,"  that  is,  that  the  defendant 
"do  answer  over"  or  further.  It  is  not  final,  since  the  plea  did  not 
go  to  the  merits,  but  requires  the  defendant,  beaten  on  a  preliminary 
point,  to  present  a  more  substantial  defense.*® 

3.  For  the  defendant,  when  the  issue  raised  by  a  demurrer  is  de- 
termined in  his  favor.  This  is  a  final  judgment,  and  disposes  of  the 
case,  unless  leave  be  granted  to  amend  the  pleading  or  withdraw  the 
demurrer,  as  the  case  may  be.*' 

4.  For  the  defendant,  when  the  plaintiff's  demurrer  to  a  plea  in 
abatement  is  overruled,  and  the  plea  consequently  sustained.  The 
language  of  this  judgment  is  "quod  cassetur  breve,"  or  "billam,"  that 
is,  that  the  writ  or  declaration  be  quashed. 

«T  Hale  v.  Lawrence,  22  N.  J.  Law.  72;  Silver  v.  Rhodes,  2  Har.  (Del.)  360; 
Pettys  V.  Marsh.  24  Fla.  44»  '6  South.  577.  But  where  defendant  demurred 
for  a  variance  between  declaration  and  writ,  and  pending  the  demurrer  leave 
was  granted  to  amend,  whereupon  the  demurrer  was  overruled,  held,  that  the 
judgment  should  be  respondeat  ouster,  and  not  quod  recuperet  Walker  v. 
Walker.  6  Uow.  (Miss.)  500. 

««  Trow  V.  Messer,  32  N.  H.  361;  Massey  v.  Walker,  8  Ala.  167;  Hej-fron  v. 
Bank.  7  Smedes  «  M.  (Miss.)  4.34;  Randolph  v.  Singleton,  20  Miss.  430;  O)oke 
T.  Crawford,  1  Tex.  0,  46  Am.  Dec.  98. 

<•  Hale  y.  Lawrence,  22  N.  J.  I-aw,  72;  Scharfif  v.  Lisso,  63  Miss.  213;  Roks 
r.  Sim8.  27  Miss.  359;  Memphis  &  Charleston  R.  Go.  v.  On*,  52  Miss.  541;  Com- 
stock  V.  Davis,  51  Mo.  501^;  Weiss  v.  Binnian,  178  lU.  241.  52  N.  B.  960;  White 
r.  Levy,  ua  Ala.  481,  0  SouUi.  104. 

(19) 


§   15  liAW  OF  JUDOMBNTB.  (Oil.   1 


§  14.    Jndsments  vppn  Verdiot. 

We  come  next  to  such  judgments  as  are  rendered  after  the  deter- 
mhiation  of  an  issue  of  fact  by  the  verdict  of  a  jury.  They  may  be 
either  for  the  plaintiff  or  defendant,  and  are  iii  all  cases  final  and 
conclusive,  if  entered  according  to  the  verdict. 

1.  For  the  plaintiff,  the  judgment  is  "quod  recuperet."  ** 

2.  For  the  defendant,  if  upon  the  merits,  the  judgment  is  "nil 
capiat  per  breve"  or  "per  billam,"  that  is,  that  the  r'  '-^tiff  "take 
nothing"  by  his  writ  or  declaration.  If  the  plea  was  in  ..-atement, 
the  judgment  is  "cassetur  breve,"  as  above. 

S  16« '  JvdKsnents  without  Verdict* 

This  class  of  judgments  includes  numerous  varieties.  Those 
which  may  be  rendered  for  the  plaintiff  are  as  follows : 

1.  Judgment  by  default.  This  is  a  judgment  entered  in  conse- 
quence of  the  non-appearance  of  the  defendant.  Where  the  defend- 
ant omits  to  plead  within  the  time  required,  the  judgment  taken 
against  him  for  that  cause  is  more  properly  called  "nil  dicit,"  but  the 
term  "default"  is  usually  extended  to  cover  this  case  also.  And  in 
the  code  states,  the  judgment  entered  upon  the  defendant's  failure  to 
serve  or  file  an  answer  within  the  prescribed  period  is  called  a  judg- 
ment by  default. 

2.  Judgment  by  nil  dicit,  which  is  rendered  against  a  defendant 
for  his  failure  to  plead  to  the  declaration. 

3.  Judgment  by  "non  sum  informatus."  This  is  a  judgment  which 
is  rendered  when,  instead  of  pleading,  the  defendant's  attorney  de- 
clares that  he  "is  not  informed"  of  any  answer  or  defense  to  be  made. 

4.  Judgment  by  confession.  This  is  a  judgment  which  is  entered 
for  the  plaintiff  in  case  the  defendant,  instead  of  entering  a  plea, 
confesses  the  action,  or  at  any  time  before  trial  confesses  the  action 
and  withdraws  his  plea  and  other  allegations.     This  is  called,  in  full, 

50  See  Texas,  S.  F.  &  N.  R.  Co.  r.  Saxton,  3  N.  M.  282  (Johns.)  6  Pae.  200. 
Wbere  issue  has  been  joined  on  a  plea  in  abatement  (the  only  plea  in  the 
case),  and  the  issue  submitted  to  a  jury,  resulting  in  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff, 
the  court  should  award  a  peremptory  judgment  quod  recuperet,  and  not  a  de- 
fault for  want  of  a  plea.    Bishop  y.  Camp,  39  Fla.  517,  22  South.  735. 

(20) 


Ch.    1)  NATUKiS   AND   CLASSiyiCATION   OF   JUDGMENTS.  §    15 

a  judgment  by  confession  "relicta  verificatione."  A  more  usual  form 
oi  judgment  by  corfession  is  that  which  is  entered  where  the  debtor, 
without  suit  brought,  gives  a  written  instrument  confessing  that  he 
is  indebted  to  the  creditor  in  a  certain  sum,  and  authorizing  an  at- 
torney to  appear  for  him.  and  enter  judgment  against  him  in  a  court 
of  record. 

5.  Judgment  on  motion;  a  judgment  authorized  by  statute  in  cer- 
tain kinds  of  summary  proceedings,  rendered  ex  parte  and  without 
trial.  This  remedy,  being  in  derogation  of  the  common  law,  must 
be  strictly  pursued,  and  the  judgment  must  show  on  its  face  all  facts 
necessary  to  give  jurisdiction.*^ 

6.  Judgment  on  the  pleadings.  This  is  a  form  of  judgment  not 
infrequently  used  in  the  practice  of  the  code  states.  It  is  rendered, 
on  motion  of  the  plaintiff,  when  the  answer  admits  or  leaves  undenied 
all  the  material  facts  stated  in  the  complaint.**  It  cannot  be  entered, 
in  a  suit  for  unliquidated  damages,  over  an  answer  stating  matters  in 
mitigation.'* 

Of  this  class  of  judgments,  those  which  may  be  rendered  for  the 
defendant  are  as  follows : — 

I.  Judgment  of  nonsuit.  This  judgment,  given  against  the  plain- 
tiff, is  either  voluntary  or  involuntary.  It  is  the  former,  when  the 
plaintiflf  throws  up  his  case  and  consents  to  a  judgment  for  defend- 
ant for  costs.  It  is  the  latter,  when  the  plaintiff,  on  being  called  or 
demanded,  at  the  instance  of  the  defendant,  to  be  present  while  the 
jury  give  their  verdict,  fails  to  appear.  Also,  where  the  court  decides 
that  the  plaintiff  has  given  no  evidence  on  which  the  jury  could  find  a 

51  Garner  v.  Carrol,  7  i'erg.  (Tenn.)  365;  Jones  v.  Read,  1  Humph.  (Tenn.) 

Si  Kotto  v.  Vandament,  67  Cal.  332,  7  Pac.  753;  Amador  Co.  v.  Butterfield, 
51  Cal.  526;  Sbattuc  v.  McArthur  (U.  C.)  25  Fed.  133;  Felch  v.  Beaudry,  40  Cal. 
4»l;  Finley  v.  City  of  Tucson  (Ariz.)  60  Pac.  872.  But  where  facts  showing 
the  illegality  of  a  contract  sued  on  are  sufficiently  alleged  in  the  answer,  the 
plaintiff  cannot  recover  upon  the  pleadings,  although  such  facts  are  not  pleaded 
or  insisted  on  as, a  defense.  Prost  v.  More,  40  Cal.  347.  And  where  an  issue 
is  distinctly  raised  by  the  answer,  and  submitted  to  the  jury  without  objec- 
tion, and  a  verdict  given  for  defendant,  it  is  then  too  late  for  plaintiff  to  move 
for  Judgment  on  the  pleadings.     Lewis  v.  IToard,  112  N.  C.  402,  17  S.  E.  9. 

•>  tthattuc  T.  McArthur  (C.  C.)  25  Fed«  133. 

(21) 


§    15  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   1 

verdict  in  his  favor,  an  involuntary  nonsuit  is  entered  against  him.** 

2.  Judgment    of    nolle   prosequi.     This    is    a   judgment    entered 

against  the  plaintiff  where,  after  appearance  and  before  judgment, 
he  declares  that  "he  will  not  further  prosecute  his  suit."  It  is  used 
as  a  means  of  abandoning  one  or  more  counts  in  a  declaration  or 
parts  of  a  cause  of  action,  or  releasing  one  or  more  of  the  joint  de- 
fendants, while  holding  to  the  rest. 

3.  Judgment  of  non  prosequitur,  or  "non  pros."  A  judgment 
given  against  the  plaintiff  for  his  default  or  neglect  to  take  any  of 
those  steps  in  the  proceedings  which  he  is  required  to  take  in  due 
time ;  as,  a  failure  to  file  a  declaration  or  other  pleading.** 

4.  Judgment  of  retraxit.  This  is  a  judgment  given  against  the 
plaintiff  when,  after  appearance,  he  voluntarily  goes  into  court  and 
enters  upon  the  record  a  statement  that  "he  withdraws  his  suit."  It 
is  an  open  and  voluntary  renunciation  of  his  claim  in  court ;  wherein 
it  differs  from  a  nonsuit,  which  is  merely  his  neglect  or  default ;  and 
by  a  retraxit  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  is  forever  barred.** 

In  this  class  of  judgments  there  is  one  which  may  be  entered  for 
either  party,  viz.:  judgment  by  consent.  It  is  well  known  in  prac- 
tice. Tbe  attorneys  of  the  respective  parties  to  a  suit,  it  is  said,  have 
undoubtedly  the  right  to  agree  upon  terms  and  what  kind  of  judg- 
ment shall  be  entered;  but  the  judgment  must  be  one  authorized 
by  law.*^ 

84  Where  plaintiff's  evidence  Is  excluded  from  the  Jury,  the  proper  Judgment 
is  one  of  nonsuit.  Wilson  v.  Breyfogle,  11  C.  C.  A.  248,  63  Fed.  379.  Also 
where  the  court  holds  that  plaintiff  cannot  recover  on  his  pleadings.  Murray 
V.  JSoiitherland,  125  X.  C.  175,  34  S.  E.  270.  But  a  nonsuit  does  not  warrant 
a  Judgment  dismissing  the  complaint  on  the  merits.  Thlry  v.  Taylor  Brewing 
&  M.  Co.,  37  App.  Dlv.  391,  56  X.  Y.  Supp.  85;  McCune  v.  Eaton,  77  Minn.  404, 
»0  N.  VV.  355. 

6B  A  Judgment  of  non  pros,  is  in  effect  a  Judgment  by  default  for  laches. 
Walton  V.  Lcfever  (Pa.)  17  Lane.  Law  Rev.  203;  People  v.  Reuter,  88  111.  App. 
58(>.  A  plea  being  bad,  so  that  demurrer  thereto  is  improperly  overruled, 
plaintiff  is  not  in  default  for  not  replying,  and  therefore  a  Judgment  of  noo 
pros,  for  want  of  replication  is  error.  Henderson  v.  Maryland  Home  Fire  Ins, 
Co.,  90  Md.  47,  44  Atl.  1020. 

Be  Thomason  v.  Odum,  33  Ala.  108,  68  Am.  Dec.  159;  3  Bl.  Comm.  296;  Cun- 
ningham V.  JSchley,  68  Ga.  105;  infra,  §  700. 

67  Tuppery  v.  llertung,  40  Mo.  135.  See  Jones  v.  Webb,  8  S.  C.  202;  Summar 
V.  Owen.  62  Teun.  26. 

(22) 


Ch.   1)  *     KATURB   AND   CLASSIFICATION    OF   JUDGMEr.TS.  §    16 


I   16.    JndKHient  agalutt  tlie  Verdiot* 

Where  the  plea  to  the  declaration  confesses  a  cause  of  action  in 
the  plaintiff  and  sets  up  matter  in  avoidance,  and  such  matter,  though 
found  true  by  the  verdict  of  the  jury,  is  insufficient  in  law  to  consti- 
tute a  bar  or  defense  to  the  action,  the  court  will  enter  a  judgment 
for  the  plaintiff  non  obstante  veredicto,  that  is,  notwithstanding  the 
verdict.**  For,  "the  plea  being  substantially  bad  in  law,  of  course 
the  verdict  which  merely  shows  it  to  be  true  in  point  of  fact  cannot 
avail  to  entitle  the  defendant  to  judgment;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  plea,  being  in  confession  and  avoidance,  involves  a  confession  of 
the  plaintiff's  declaration,  and  shows  that  he  was  entitled  to  main- 
tain his  action."  ^*  For  example,  a  plea  of  tender  of  rent  after  the 
day  of  its  falling  due  is  insufficient,  and  after  a  verdict  on  such  plea 
in  favor  of  the  defendant,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  judgment  non  ob- 
stante veredicto.*®  But  in  order  that  this  judgment  may  be  given,  it 
is  essential  that  the  plea  should  distinctly  imply  an  admission  of  the 
plaintiff's  right  or  title.** 

There  are  other  cases  beside  the  foregoing  in  which  a  judgment 
non  obstante  veredicto  may  be  rendered,  or  an  analogous  species  of 
judgment.  Thus,  in  some  of  the  states,  in  cases  where  the  special 
findings  of  the  jury  are  in  direct  conflict  with  the  general  verdict,  it 
is  the  practice  to  grant  a  judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict.*^ 

»•  Flm  y.  Grazebrook,  2  C.  B.  429;  Atkinson  v.  Davies,  11  Mees.  &  W.  230; 
Berwick  v.  Duncan,  3  Kxch.  644;  Roberts  v.  Dame,  11  N.  H.  22G;  Fitch  v. 
Scot  1  Koot  (Conn.)  351;  Bellows  v.  Shannon,  2  Hill  (X.  Y.)  86;  Move  v.  Pet- 
way,  7«  N.  C.  327;  Ward  v.  Phillips,  89  N.  C.  215;  State  v.  Commercial  Bank, 
0  Smede«  &  M.  (Miss.)  218,  45  Am.  Dec.  280;  Garrett  v.  Beaumont,  24  Miss. 
377;  SoUenberger  v.  Gest,  14  Ohio,  204;  Tootle  v.  Clifton,  22  Ohio  St.  247,  10 
AnL  Rep.  732;  Berry  v.  Borden,  7  Blackf.  (Ind.)  384;  Pomeroy  v.  Burnett,  8 
Blackf.  (Ind.)  142;  Jones  v.  Fennlmore,  1  G.  Greene,  134;  Oades  v.  Oades,  6 
.Neb.  3(M;  Houser  v.  Harding,  126  N.  C.  295,  35  S.  E.  586;  O'Neal  v.  Rumley  Co., 
iKy.)  53  S.  W.  521;  Friendly  t.  I^e,  20  Or.  202,  25  Pac.  300.  See  Collier  v. 
Jenks,  19  R.  1.  493,  34  Atl.  998. 

»•  Hour.  Law  Diet.,  "Judgment." 

••  Dewey  v.  Humphrey,  5  Pick.  (Mass.)  187. 

•1  Pim  V.  Grazebrook,  2  C.  B.  429. 

e«  Felton  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  B.  Co.,  69  Iowa,  577,  29  N,  W.  618;  Tx)uls- 

(23) 


§16  LAW  OF  TUDQMENTS.  (Ch.  1 

But  unless  the  special  findings  "are  so  irreconcilably  in  conflict  with 
the  general  verdict  as  that  both  cannot  stand,  the  motion  must  be 
overruled  without  regard  to  the  evidence."  ®*  And  the  motion  for 
this  judgment  can  be  made  only  by  the  party  against  whom  the  ver- 
dict goes ;  hence,  if  the  general  verdict  is  in  his  favor,  but  the  special 
findings  do  not  correspond  with  it,  a  motion  in  that  behalf  will  not 
avail  him.** 

Another  instance  in  which  this  form  of  judgment  may  be  rendered, 
is  where  the  decision  on  a  "point  reserved"  negatives  the  verdict 
of  the  jury.  If  a  point  of  law  is  ruled  provisionally  at  the  trial,  but 
subject  to  the  further  consideration  of  the  court,  and  if  its  ultimate 
decision  shows  that  the  party  in  whose  favor  the  verdict  goes  is  not 
entitled  to  judgment,  the  court  may  enter  judgment  notwithstanding 
the  verdict.  But  the  record  must  show  the  point  of  law  reserved  and 
the  specific  facts  on  which  it  arises.**  In  Pennsylvania,  when  the 
court  has  reserved  the  question  whether  there  is  any  evidence  en- 
titling the  plaintiff  to  recover,  and  the  evidence  has  been  submitted 
to  the  jury,  and  a  verdict  has  been  returned  for  the  plaintiff,  the  court 

ville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Creek.  130  Ind.  lol>,  29  N.  K.  481,  14  L.  R.  A.  733; 
School  District  No.  46  v.  Lund,  51  Kan.  731,  33  Pac.  51)3;  X.  K.  Falrbank  & 
Co.  V.  Cincinnati,  X.  O.  &  T.  P.  R.  Co.  (C.  C.)  66  Fed,  471. 

«3  Porter  v.  Waltz,  108  Ind.  40,  8  X.  E.  705;  Cox  v.  Ratchffe,  105  Ind.  374,  3 
X.  E.  5;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Smith,  98  Ind.  42;  Baltimore  &  O.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Rowan,  lOi  Ind.  88,  3  N.  E.  627;  McXabb  v.  Cliip,  5  Ind.  App.  204,  31  X.  E. 
858;  Vance  v.  City  of  Franklin,  4  Ind.  App.  515,  30  X.  E.  149;  Todd  v.  Bad;jer. 
134  Ind.  204,  33  X.  E.  963;  Fruchey  v.  Eagleson,  15  Ind.  App.  88,  43  X.  E. 
146;  Stein  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  Ry.  Co.,  41  111.  App.  38. 

64  Krown  v.  Searle,  104  Ind.  218,  3  X.  E.  871. 

06  Wilde  V.  Italnor,  .'9  Pa.  442;  Fayette  City  Borough  v.  Hug-ins,  112  Pa. 
1,  4  Atl.  927;  Buckley  v.  Duff,  111  Pa.  223,  3  Atl.  823;  Keifer  v.  Eldivd  Town- 
ship, 110  Pa.  1,  20  All.  592.  Where,  aftel-  reserving  a  point  on  certain  facts, 
the  court  submits  other  evidence  to  the  jury,  a  judgment  non  obstante  cannot 
be  entered  if  it  is  uncertain  whether  the  Jury  found  on  tlie  facts  on  which  the 
reservation  was  made  or  on  the  other  evidence.  Keifer  v.  Eldred  Township, 
supra.  On  a  verdict  in  trespass  awarding  the  plaintiff  a  specified  amount  of 
damages  as  compensation  and  a  specified  amount  of  punitive  damages,  the 
court,  on  appeal,  may  enter  judgment  for  the  amount  of  the  compensatory 
damages  and  Judgment  non  obstante  for  the  defendant  as  to  the  punitive  dam- 
ages, although  no  point  was  reserved  on  the  record.  Gedusky  v.  Rubinsky,  8 
i'a.  DM.  R.  10. 

(2i) 


Ch.  1)  NATURE    AND   CLASSIFICATION   OF   JUDGMENTS.  §  16 

may  tlien,  on  the  reservation,  enter  judgment  for  the  defendant  non 
obstante  veredicto." 

At  the  common  law,  a  defendant  is  not  entitled  in  any  circumstan- 
ces to  move  for  judgment  non  obstante  veredicto ;  if  the  verdict  is 
for  the  plaintifl,  and  the  state  of  the  pleadings  is  such  that  the  latter 
might  have  asked  for  this  judgment  had  their  positions  been  reversed. 
the  only  proper  course  for  the  defendant  is  to  move  that  the  judgment 
be  arrested,*^  or,  in  case  of  conflict  between  the  general  verdict  and 
the  special  findings,  to  move  for  judgment  on  such  findings.*®  But 
in  a  number  of  the  states,  this  rule  has  been  relaxed,  either  by  statute 
or  by  the  decisions  of  the  courts,  so  as  to  admit  of  the  entry  of  judg- 
ment notwithstanding  the  verdict,  in  proper  cases,  in  favor  of  the 
defendant.**  Thus,  in -Nebraska,  the  code  of  procedure  provides 
that  "where,  on  the  statements  in  pleadings,  one  party  is  entitled 
by  law  to  judgment  in  his  favor,  judgment  shall  be  so  rendered  by  the 
court,  although  a  verdict  has  been  found  against  such  party."  This 
will  entitle  the  defendant  to  a  judgment  notwithstanding  a  verdfct 
for  the  plaintiff,  if  the  plaintiff's  own  pleadings  show  that  he  ought 

••  nsber  V.  Scharadin,  186  Pa.  5«5,  40  Atl.  lOl^l.  Compare  Butts  v.  Armor's 
tjBt&te,  IW  Fa.  73,  30  Atl.  357.  26  U  R.  A.  213;  Yerkes  v.  Richards,  170  Pa. 
346.  32  Atl.  10«9;  Hosier  v.  Hursh,  151  Pa.  415,  25  Ati.  52. 

•7  German  lU8.  Co.  v.  Frederick,  7  C.  C.  A.  122,  58  Fed.  144;  Smith  v. 
I'owere,  15  X.  H.  546;  Bradley  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Caswell,  65  Vt.  231,  26  Atl. 
U56;  Trow  t.  ITioraas,  7U  Vt.  580,  41  Atl.  652;  TlUinghast  v.  McLeod,  17  R.  I. 
2UH.  21  AU.  345;  Burnhnm  v.  New  York,  P.  &  B.  R.  Co.,  17  R.  I.  544,  23  Ati. 
638;  Smith  v.  8mith,  4  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  468;  Schcrmerhom  v.  Schermerhorn.  5 
Wend.  (X.  Y.)  513;  Bellows  v.  sJhannon,  1i  Hill  (X.  Y.)  86;  Christian  v.  Yar- 
twroueb.  124  X.  C.  72,  32  S.  E.  383;  Bowdre  r.  Hampton.  (5  Rich.  Law  (S.  C.) 
2tl»;  Barnes  v.  Rodgers,  54  S.  Q  115,  31  S.  E.  885;  Buckingham  v.  McCracken, 
•J  Ohio  St.  287;  Bradshaw  v.  Hedge,  10  Iowa,  402;  Lough  v.  Thornton,  17 
Mlun.  253  (Gil.  1'30);  Shee)i5'  v.  Duffy,  89  W\s.  6,  (51  X.  W.  205;  Quimby  v. 
Boyd,  8  Colo.  104,  6  I'ac.  462;  Floyd  v.  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co.,  10  Colo.  App. 
51.  50  l^ac.  864. 

«•  Tei'han  v.  Union  Bridge  Co..  84  111.  App.  532. 

••  Martindale  v.  Price,  14  Ind.  115;  Carl  v.  Granger  Coal  Co.,  60  Iowa,  510, 
'Jlf  X.  W.  437;  Holland  v.  Kindregan,  155  Pa.  156,  25  Atl.  1077.  A  Judgment 
for  defendant  non  obstante  veredicto  will  not  be»  granted  where  the  defense  is 
a  general  denial.  Virgin  Cotton  Mills  v.  Abernathy,  115  X.  0.  402,  20  S.  E. 
r»2:i.  Xor  where  the  pleadings  and  evidence  raise  questions  of  fact  proper  for 
f  1  p  Jury.  Sli>itzkl  v.  Town  of  Wien,  93  Wis.  400,  67  X.  W.  7oO.  See  Temple- 
ii:an  v.  Gibbs  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  25  S.  W.  736. 

(25) 


§    16  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ctu   I 

not  to  recover;  but  not  merely  on  the  ground  that  the  verdict  is 
contrary  to  the  weight  of  the  evidence.'^®  In  Minnesota,  the  law 
allows  an  entry  of  judgment  for  the  defendant,  notwithstanding  a 
verdict  for  the  plaintiff,  in  cases  where  the  facts  stated  in  the  plain- 
tiff's pleadings  are  not  sufficient,  in  point  of  substance,  to  constitute 
a  legal  cause  of  action;  but  not  on  the  ground  of  such  a  failure  of 
evidence,  in  weight  or  detail,  as  would  warrant  the  court  in  ordering  a 
new  trialJ^  A  similar  rule  obtains  in  Oregon.^*  In  Pennsylvania, 
where  the  plaintiff's  evidence  is  so  weak  as  to  amount  but  to  a  scintilla, 
judgment  may  be  rendered  for  the  defendant  non  obstante  vere- 
dicto.^' In  Kentucky,  in  an  action  for  damages  caused  by  defend- 
ant's negligence,  where  a  plea  of  contributory  negligence  is  not  con- 
troverted, defendant  is  entitled  to  judgment  notwithstanding  a  ver- 
dict for  the  plaintiff.''* 

A  motion  for  judgment  non  obstante  veredicto  is  founded  on  the 
record  alone,  and  its  determination  cannot  be  influenced  by  affida- 
vits or  extrinsic  evidence.''*  In  some  states,  it  is  held  that  a  party 
will  not  be  entitled  to  have  a  judgment  of  this  kind  entered  in  his 
favor,  unless  he  has  moved  to  direct  a  verdict  at  the  close  of  the 
testimony ;  and  moreover,  after  judgment,  he  must  specifically  move 
for  judgment  non  obstante  veredicto,  a  mere  motion  for  a  new  trial 


70  Code  Civ.  Proc.  Neb.  §  440;  Manning  v.  City  of  Orleans,  42  Neb.  712,  GO 
N.  W.  953;  Gibbon  v.  American  Bldg.  &  Loan  Ass'n,  43  Neb.  132.  61  N.  W. 
1*J6;  Stewart  v.  American  Exchange  Nat.  Bank,  64  Neb.  4G1,  74  N.  W.  865. 

71  Cniikshank  v.  St.  Paul  Fire  &  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  75  Minn.  206,  77  N.  W. 
l>58;  Kreatz  v.  St.  Cloud  School  Dlst.,  79  Minn.  14,  81  N.  W.  533;  Marquanlt 
V.  Hubuer,  77  Minn.  442,  80  N.  W.  617;  Bragg  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.. 
81  Minn.  130,  83  N.  W.  511.  Compare  Baxter  v.  Covenant  Mut.  life  Ass'n,  81 
Minn.  1,  83  N.  W.  459. 

72  Benicia  Agricultural  Works  v.  Creighton,  21  Or.  495,  28  Pac.  775. 
78  Holland  v.  Kindregan,  155  Pa.  156,  25  Atl.  1077. 

7*  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Maj^lield  (Ky.)  35  S.  W.  924. 

78  Snow  v.  Conant.  8  Vt.  309;  Smith  v.  Smith,  2  Wend.  (N.  X.)  624;  Chi- 
cago &  E.  R.  Co.  V.  Kreig,  22  Ind.  App.  393,  53  N.  E.  1033;  Lichtstein  v. 
Northwestern  Nat.  Ins.  Co.,  23  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  471.  In  Ohio,  the  statute  cou- 
tines  the  court  to  a  consideration  of  the  statements  in  the  pleadings,  and  the 
record,  outside  of  such  statements,  should  not  be  considered  in  disposing  of  the 
motion.  McCoy  v.  Jones,  61  Ohio  St,  119,  55  N.  E.  219;  Beetz  v.  Strobel  <5 
Ohio  Dec.  143. 

(20). 


Cb.  1)  HATURE   AND  CLASSIFlCATIOM   OV   JUDGMENTS.  §    17 

not  being  sufficient  to  authorize  the  judgment.''*  The  motion,  in  the 
absence  of  an  agreement  by  the  parties  that  it  may  be  filed  and  con- 
sidered in  vacation,  cannot  be  considered  by  the  court  when  so  filed.^" 
And  where  one  judge  presided  at  the  trial  of  an  action,  another  judge 
has  no  authority,  on  motion  for  judgment  notwithstanding  the  ver- 
dict, to  make  findings  of  fact  on  evidence  not  heard  by  him.''® 

There  is  one  other  form  of  judgment,  entered  in  disregard  of  a 
verdict,  which  must  be  mentioned  in  this  connection.  It  is  the  judg- 
ment "quod  partes  replacitent"  (that  the  parties  replead),  or  judg- 
ment of  repleader.  This  is  entered  in  a  case  where  issue  has  been 
taken  upon  a  point  so  immaterial  that,  notwithstanding  the  verdict, 
the  court  is  unable  to  decide  which  party  should  recover  upon  the 
merits.  It  requires  the  parties  to  frame  their  pleadings  anew,  from 
the  fault  which  first  occasioned  the  immaterial  issue,  taking  issue 
upon  a  substantial  ground.  A  repleader  differs  from  a  judgment 
non  obstante  veredicto  in  this,  that  the  latter  is  granted  in  a  case 
where  the  pica  is  good  in  form  though  the  matter  pleaded  is  not  avail- 
able as  a  defense,  w^hile  the  former  is  only  proper  where  the  plead- 
ings do  not  bring  the  merits  within  the  issue.  Hence  the  latter  kind 
of  judgment  is  always  upon  the  merits,  and  never  granted  but  in 
a  very  clear  case ;  a  repleader  is  upon  the  form  and  manner  of  plead- 
ing.'• 

S  IT.    Names  of  Jndsmentfl  in  oertain  Special  Actions. 

Before  completing  our  enumeration  of  the  different  kinds  of  judg- 
ments, it  is  necessary  to  mention  the  special  names  given  to  the  judg- 
ments in  certain  actions.  In  the  action  for  partition,  the  interlocu- 
tory judgment  whereby  it  is  directed  that  partition  be  made,  is  called 
judgment  "quod  partitio  fiat;"  while  the  style  of  the  final  judgment  in 
the  same  action,  confirming  the  partition  made,  upon  the  return  of 
the  writ,  is  "quod  partitio  facta  firma  et  stabilis  in  perpetuum."  ®*^ 

7«»tzer  V.  City  of  Oookston.  66  Minn.  355,  68  N.  W.  1099;  Ilemstad  v. 
UaU.  m  Minn.  136,  66  N.  W.  306;  Crane  v.  Knaut  65  Minn.  447,  68  N.  W.  79. 

"  Soribner  v.  Rutherford.  65  Iowa,  551,  22  N.  W.  670. 

TSAiiltman  &  'lYiylor  Co.  v.  O'Dowd,  73  Minn.  58,  75  N.  W.  756,  72  Am. 
St  Uep.  6rj3. 

'»  2  'ndd,  Frac.  922. 

••  5  ISac.  Abr.  292,  cited  Freem.  Judgiu.  §  8. 

(27) 


§    18  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNTa  (^«  1 

The  interlocutory  judgment  in  an  action  of  account,  whereby  it  is 
directed  that  "the  defendant  do  account,"  is  called  judgment  "quod 
computet." 

S  18.    Cnws-ClassilLeations  of  Jndsments. 

There  are  certain  methods  of  classifying  judgments  and  decrees, 
without  regard  to  the  mode  of  trial,  stage  of  entry,  or  rendition  of  a 
verdict,  and  hence  running  across  the  division  above  adopted,  which 
are  important  to  be  named.  And  first,  they  are  either  final  or  inter- 
locutory. A  final  judgment  or  decree  is  one  which  puts  an  end  to 
the  whole  action,  leaving  nothing  further  to  be  done  or  determined 
by  the  court.  It  is  interlocutory,  if  it  merely  settles  some  preliminary' 
or  subordinate  point,  without  reaching  the  merits,  or  if,  though  di- 
rected to  the  main  controversy,  it  does  not  dispose  of  the  whole  case, 
but  leaves  something  for  the  further  action  or  consideration  of  the 
court  before  the  rights  of  the  parties  are  definitely  fixed.  This  dis- 
tinction will  form  the  subject  of  the  next  chapter. 

Judgments  and  decrees  are  also  either  domestic  or  foreign.  A 
judgment  is  called  domestic  when  it  was  rendered  by  a  court  organ- 
ized by  the  same  state  or  sovereignty  within  whose  territory  it  is 
sought  to  be  enforced  or  is  invoked  as  a  defense.  It  is  called  foreign 
when  rendered  by  another  or  independent  state  or  sovereignty. 

In  Louisiana,  a  judgment  rendered  by  default  is  distinguished  from 
a  "contradictory  judgment  •/'  the  latter  being  one  which  is  given  after 
the  parties  have  been  heard  either  in  support  of  their  claims  or  in 
their  defense. 

Judgments  and  orders  may  further  be  classed  as  absolute  or  nisi. 
At  common  law  a  judgment  nisi  was  one  entered  on  the  return  of 
the  nisi  prius  record  with  the  postea  indorsed,  which  would  become 
absolute  according  to  the  terms  of  the  postea,  unless  the  court  out 
of  which  the  nisi  prius  record  proceeded  should,  within  the  first  four 
days,  otherwise  order.®^  It  is  otherwise  defined  as  "one  that  is  to 
be  valid  unless  something  else  should  be  done  within  a  given  time  to 
defeat  it."  ®*     A  rule  or  order  nisi  is  one  which  is  to  be  confirmed  or 

81  Bout.  Law  Diet,  sub  voce. 

82  United  States  v.  VViiistead  (i>.  C.)  12  Fed.  50.  See  Strickland  v.  Cox,  102 
N.  C.  411,  9  S.  ifi.  414. 

(28) 


Ch.   1)  NATURE    AND  CLASSIFICATION    OF  JUDGMKNTS.  §    19 

made  absolute,  unless  cause  be  shown  to  the  contrary,  or  something 
be  done  which  has  been  required,  within  a  specified  time. 

Adjudications  are  also  classed  as  either  in  rem  or  in  personam. 
This  distinction  is  one  of  difficulty  and  importance,  and  the  former 
kind  of  judgments  will  form  the  subject  of  a  later  chapter,  to  which 
the  reader  is  referred  for  the  definitions. 

f  19.    GlaisiilcAtion  of  Deoreei* 

In  addition  to  the  divisions  indicated  in  the  preceding  section, 
decrees  in  equity  are  classed  as  **by  default,"  "by  consent,"  "on  the 
hearing,"  and  "pro  confesso."  The  last  named — a  decree  that  the 
bill  be  taken  as  confessed — is  entered  where  the  defendant,  by  not 
appearing  within  the  time  prescribed,  is  under  tood  to  admit  the  case 
made  by  the  bill.  It  is  intended  to  prepare  the  case  for  final  decree ; 
and  its  effect  is  like  that  of  a  default  at  common  law,  by  which  the 
defendant  is  deemed  to  have  admitted  all  that  is  well  pleaded  in  the 
declaration.^*  A  decree  nisi  is  one  entered  upon  the  defendant's 
failure  to  appear  when  the  case  is  called  for  hearing,  granting  the 
relief  asked,  but  coupled  with  a  condition  that  the  defendant  is  to 
have  a  certain  time  within  which  to  show  cause  against  the  decree. 

•9  Rnmell  v.  LAtbrop,  122  Mass.  302. 

(29) 


§   20  LAW  OF  JUDQMENTa.  (Ch.   2 


CHAPTER  n. 

FINAL  AND  INTERLOCUTORY  JUDGMENTS  AND  DECREES. 

S    20.  Reasons  for  the  Disttnction. 

21.  Definition  of  Final  Judgments. 

22.  Interlocutory  and  intermediate  Orders. 

23.  Must  be  final  as  to  all  Parties. 

24.  Must  settle  all  the  Issues. 

25.  Uncertainty  of  the  Amount. 

26.  Judgment  of  Nonsuit. 

27.  Dismissal  of  Suit. 

28.  Judgment  by  Default 
2U.  Judgment  on  Demun'er. 

30.    Judgment  on  Flea  In  Abatement 
.31.    Judgment  for  Costs. 
31a.  Allowance  of  Claims  Against  Fund. 

32.  Granting  or  Refusing  Extraordinary  Remedies. 

33.  On  Motion  for  New  Trial. 

34.  Vacating  or  Reversing  former  Judgment. 

36.  Orders  as  to  Interpleader,  Intervention,  and  Joinder  of  Parties. 
3t>.  Dissolving  Attachments  and  Executions. 

37.  Order  removing  Cause. 

38.  Judgments  and  Orders  of  Probate  Courts. 

39.  Judgment  in  Partition. 

40.  In  Condemnation  Proceedings. 

41.  Finality  of  Decrees. 

42.  Further  Action  necessary  to  settle  the  Equities. 

43.  Further  Action  necessary  to  execute  the  Decree, 

44.  Decree  ordering  a  Refereoce. 

45.  Directing  an  Account. 

46.  Decree  suspending  Rights  until  further  Orders. 

47.  Decree  dissolving  Partnership. 

48.  Foreclosure  of  Mortgage. 

49.  ISending  Issue  out  of  Chancery. 

§  20.    Reaiont  for  the  Dlitinotion. 

The  distinction  between  final  judgments  and  decrees  and  such  as 
are  merely  interlocutory,  is  one  of  considerable  importance,  both  as 
a  matter  of  practice  and  in  respect  to  the  consequences  which  follow 
the  entry  of  a  final  adjudication.  As  a  general  rule,  it  is  only  a  final 
judgment  which  has  the  efTect  of  creating  a  lien  upon  the  debtor's 
realty.  So  also,  with  certain  minor  exceptions,  it  is  only  a  final  judg- 
(30) 


Ch.  2)        FINAL    AND  INTERLOCUTORY   JUDGMENTS    AND   DECREES.  §   21 

ment  or  decree  upon  the  merits  which  will  sustain  the  plea  of  res 
judicata.  At  common  law,  a  writ  of  error  could  not  be  brought 
until  the  last,  or  final,  decision  in  the  cause.  In  many  of  the  states, 
it  is  provided  by  statute  that  appeals  may  be  taken  to  their  courts  of 
last  resort  only  from  the  final  judgments  of  the  trial  courts  or  the 
final  decrees  of  the  courts  of  chancery.*  By  the  federal  judiciary 
act  •  it  is  enacted  that  error  may  be  brought  to  the  final  judgments 
at  law  or  decrees  in  equity  of  the  highest  courts  in  the  several  states 
for  the  purpose  of  their  re-examination  by  the  supreme  court  of  the 
United  States  in  certain  prescribed  cases.  Thus,  for  these  various 
reasons,  it  is  often  necessary  to  distinguish  final  decisions  from  the 
interlocutory  class  of  adjudications.  The  cases  in  which  such  a  dis- 
tinction is  drawn  are  numerous,  illustrating  the  wide  range  of  in- 
stances in  which  the  question  may  arise,  and  not  always  harmonious ; 
for  the  practice,  or  the  statute-law,  in  some  jurisdictions,  ascribes 
the  character  of  finality  to  judgments  ox  orders  which  elsewhere  are 
considered  as  merely  interlocutory. 

f  21.    Definition  of  Final  JndKmentfl* 

A  final  judgment  is  such  a  judgment  as  at  once  puts  an  end  to 
the  action  by  declaring  that  the  plaintiff  has  or  has  not  entitled  him- 
self to  recover  the  remedy  for  which  he  sues.^  It  is  sometimes  said 
that  it  is  the  award  of  the  judicial  consequences  which  the  law  at- 
taches to  the  facts,  and  which  determines  the  subject-matter  of  the 
controversy  between  the  parties.*  It  is  evident,  however,  that  this 
description  is  too  narrow.  For  a  final  judgment  means  not  a  final 
determination  of  the  rights  of  the  parties  with  reference  to  the  sub- 
ject-matter of  the  litigation,  but  merely  of  their  rights  with  reference 
to  the  particular  suit.*    In  other  words,  it  is  not  at  all  necessary  that 

1  l^nno  v.  Jutematlonal  K.  &  S.  Co.,  34  Fla.  300,  16  South.  180;  Van  Zandt 
▼.  Gormley,  (M$  111.  App.  588;  City  of  Bath  v.  Palmer,  90  Me.  407,  38  Atl.  305. 
«  Kev.  St.  U.  S.  S  700. 

•  3B1.  Comm.  398. 

*  West  V.  Bagby,  12  Tex.  34,  02  Am.  Dec.  512,  following  Hanks  t.  Thomp- 
son, 5  Tex.  6.   And  see  Uobbs  v.  Staples,  19  Me.  219. 

»  Belt  V.  Davia,  1  Cal.  134;  Weston  v.  City  of  Charleston,  2  Pet.  440,  7  L. 
Kd.  481;  Klink  t.  The  Cusseta,  30  G a.  504;  Williams  v.  Wait,  2  S.  D.  210,  49 
S,  W.  2UM,  3U  Am.  St  Hep.  768;    State  y.  Superior  Court  of  Jefferson  County, 

(31) 


§21  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  C^h.  2 

the  judgment  should  be  upon  the  merits,  if  it  definitely  puts  the  case 
out  of  court.®  A  judgment  of  nonsuit  or  dismissal  is  final,  though  it 
does  not  reach  the  merits.  It  is  the  termination  of  the  individual 
action  which  marks  the  finality  of  the  judgment.  But  there  must 
be  an  actual  judgment.  An  order  for  judgment  is  not  a  final  judg- 
ment; it  is  final  only  when  it  contains  the  decision  or  sentence  of 
the  law  upon  the  matter  contained  in  the  record;  the  order  must 
be  followed  by  the  sentence  of  the  law  declaring  that  the  party  may 
recover  the  sum  adjudged.^  On  the  other  hand,  a  judgment  is  as 
final  when  pronounced  by  the  court  as  when  entered  and  recorded  by 
the  clerk.  *  Where  a  motion  for  new  trial  has  been  made  and  enter- 
tained by  the  court,  the  judgment  in  the  case  does  not  become  final 
and  effectual,  for  purposes  of  review,  until  the  date  of  the  overruling 
of  such  motion.* 

A  judgment  which  is  not  final  is  called  "interlocutory."  That  is, 
an  interlocutory  judgment  is  one  which  determines  some  prelimi- 
nary or  subordinate  point  or  plea,  or  settles  some  step,  question,  or 
default  arising  in  the  prpgress  of  the  cause,  but  does  not  adjudicate 

the  ultimate  rights  of  the  parties  or  finally  put  the  case  out  of  court. 

• 

3  Wash.  St.  696,  29  Pac.  202.  A  Judgment  in  a  contest  to  determine  whether 
a  homestead  Is  subject  to  sale  on  execution  is  a  final  Judgment  from  which 
an  appeal  will  lie.  Wright  T.  Jones,  103  Ala.  539,  15  South.  852,  To  constitute 
a  final  Judgment  for  pm*po8e  of  appeal,  it  is  not  essential  that  It  should 
be  a  bar  to  another  suit.  Colorado  Eastern  R.  Co.  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  36  C. 
C.  A.  263,  94  Fed.  312. 

«  Where  a  verdict  is  returned  in  favor  of  plaintiff,  and  the  court  sustains  a 
motion  in  arrest  of  judgment,  and  subsequently  orders  the  cause  stricken  tnun 
the  docket,  the  case  has  reached  such  an  end  that  an  appeal  wlU  lie.  Daugh- 
erty  v.  Midland  Steel  Co.,  23  Ind.  App.  78,  53  X.  E.  844.  W^hen  a  controversy 
between  two  parties  is  ended,  so  far  as  the  court  before  which  It  Is  pending 
can  end  It,  the  Judgment  is  then  final,  regardless  of  mere  matter  of  form. 
Heegaard  v.  Dakota  Loan  &  Trust  Co.,  3  S.  D.  569.  54  N.  W.  656. 

7  Alacnevin  T.  Macnevin,  63  Cal.  186;  Eastham  v.  Sallis,  OQ  Tex,  576;  Duraut 
v.  Comegys,  2  Idaho,  809,  26  Pac.  755,  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  267. 

8  Kehoe  V.  Blethen,  10  Nev.  445. 

•  Brown  V.  Evans  (C.  C.)  18  Fed.  56;  Danielson  v.^  Northwestern  Fuel  Ca 
(C.  C.)  5o  Fed.  49;  New  York,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Doane,  105  Ind.  92,  4 
N.  E.  419;  StoU  v.  Daily  Min.  Co.,  19  Utah.  271,  57  Pac.  295.  So  where  judg- 
ment rendered  against  a  party  not  pei-sonally  served  is  liable,  by  statute,  to  be 
vacated  within  three  years,  it  does  not  become  final  until  after  that  time. 
Martin  v.  Gilmore,  72  la  193. 

(32) 


Ch.  2)        FINAL    AND   INTERLOCUTORY   JUDGMENTS    AND    DECREES.  §   22 

Thus  a  judgment  or  order  passed  upon  any  provisional  or  accessory 
claim  or  contention  is,  in  general,  merely  interlocutory,  though  it 
may  finally  dispose  of  that  particular  matter.^® 

Under  the  common  law  system,  an  order,  made  in  the  progress 
of  a  suit  and  before  judgment,  will  be  considered  final  if  it  deter- 
mines the  action  and  prevents  a  judgment.^ ^  But  an  order  which 
docs  not  settle  and  conclude  the  rights  involved  in  the  action,  and 
does  not  deny  to  the  party  the  means  of  further  prosecuting  or  de- 
fending the  suit,  is  not  so  far  final  as  to  be  a  proper  subject  of 
appeal.** 

I  22.    Interlooutory  and  Intermediate  Orders. 

The  codes  of  procedure  adopted  in  several  of  the  states  define  a 
judgment  as  "the  final  determination  of  the  rights  of  the  parties  in 
an  action  or  proceeding."  Under  this  system,  therefore,  there  is  no 
such  thing  as  an  interlocutory  judgment  in  a  cause,  the  only  judg- 
ment authorized  being  one  which  finally  disposes  of  the  rights  of  the 
parties."  And  the  office  of  an  interlocutory  judgment  at  common 
law  is,  under  the  code  practice,  filled  by  various  orders.     But  as, 

10  But  It  has  been  held  that  a  decree  allowing  temporary  alimony  and 
eounsel  fees  is,  to  aU  legal  intents  and  purposes,  a  final  •judgment,  from  which 
an  appeal  may  be  taken.  Daniels  v.  Daniels,  9  Colo.  VdS,  10  Pac.  657.  Condi- 
tional judgments  may  be  final  if  they  dispose  of  the  case  as  to  all  parties  be- 
fore the  court  and  as  to  the  entire  subject-matter  of  the  litigation.  Thus,  a 
Ju(]|?ment  for  the  sale  of  a  certain  tract  of  land  to  satisfy  a  sum  adjudged  to 
be  a  lien  thereon,  in  the  event  that  another  tract  ordered  to  be  sold  shall  not 
be  sufllcient  for  that  purpose,  is  a  final  order  from  which  an  appeal  can  be 
pitwecuted.  Talwr  v.  Payne  (Ky.)  41  S.  W.  557.  Compare  Standard  Steam 
Laundry  t.  Dole,  20  Utah,  469,  58  Pac.  1109. 

11  Uobba  ▼.  Beckwith,  6  Ohio  St.  252;  Maysville  &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Punnett,  15 
B.  M.  (Ky.)  47.  An  unconditional  order  for  the  payment  of  money  within  a 
certain  time  la  a  final  order,  from  which  an  appeal  lies.  Nevitt  v.  Woodburn, 
45  lll«  App.  417.  In  England,  it  is  said  that  an  order  is  final  only  where 
it  is  made  upon  an  appUcation  or  proceeding  which  must  in  any  event,  whether 
It  fiucoeeds  or  fails,  finally  determine  the  rights  of  the  parties.  Salaman  v. 
Warner  |1«>1J  1  Q.  B.  734. 

i2Hazleburst  v.  Morris,  28  Md.  67.  An  order  refusing  an  application  for 
judgment  on  the  special  findings  of  the  jury,  contrary  to  the  general  verdict,  is 
not  Una]  or  appealable.  Persons  v.  Simons,  1  N.  D.  243,  46  N.  W.  960;  Atchi- 
son, T.  St  8.  F.  B.  Co.  V.  Brown,  57  Kan.  785,  48  Pac.  31. 

19  Sellers  v.  Union  Lumbering  Co..  36  Wis.  398.  Under  this  definition,  an 
order  that  a  petition  be  treated  as  if  it  had  not  been  filed  is  appealable.  Ilar- 
1  LuVW  JUDG.-3  i^y^) 


§    22  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  2 

among  the  various  orders  which  may  be  made  in  the  progress  of  a 
cause,  there  may  be  some  which,  without  finally  adjudicating  "the 
rights"  of  the  parties,  may  determine  some  claim  or  contention  which, 
from  its  independence  and  meritorious  nature,  ought  to  be  the  sub- 
ject of  an  appeal,  therefore  in  these  states  the  statutes  usually  allow 
appeals  from  "an  order  affecting  a  substantial  right"  of  one  of  the 
parties.^*  The  qualifying  adjective  is  used  to  exclude  rulings  on 
merely  formal  or  technical  points.  The  code  practice  is,  generally 
speaking,  more  liberal  in  allowing  appeals  than  the  common  law. 
Thus  in  California,- "an  appeal  may  be  taken  *  *  ♦  from  an  or- 
der granting  or  refusing  a  new  trial,  from  an  order  granting  or  dis- 
solving an  injunction,  from  an  order  refusing  to  grant  or  dissolve  an 
injunction,  from  an  order  dissolving  or  refusing  to  dissolve  an  at- 
tachment, from  an  order  granting  or  refusing  to  grant  a  change  of  the 
place  of  trial."  ^' 

An  order  setting  aside  a  sale  of  property  made  in  disregard  of  an 
injunction  issued  in  the  same  suit  is  a  final  order  and  appealable.** 
So  also  is  an  order  in  an  equity  cause  committing  a  witness,  not  a 
party  to  the  suit,  for  contempt  in  refusing  to  testify ;  ^^  and  an  order 
confirming  a  sale;  **  and  an  order  vacating  an  arrest;  *•  and  an  or- 
der directing  a  sheriff  who  has  possession  of  warrants,  by  virtue  of 

rlson  V.  Lebanon  Waterworks,  91  Ky.  255,  15  S.  W.  522,  34  Am.  St.  Rep.  180. 
In  South  Carolina,  the  statute  gives  the  supreme  court  appellate  Jurisdfcti(m 
of  **any  intermediate  Judgment,  order,  or  decree  Involving  the  merits,"  Code 
av.  Proc.  S.  C.  §  11.  See  Du  Pont  v.  Du  Bos,  33  S.  C.  389,  11  S.  E.  1073.  An 
order  void  as  an  act  in  excess  of  the  court's  jurisdiction  is  final  in  its  legal 
significance,  so  as  to  be  appealable.  Therkelsen  v.  Therkelsen,  35  Or.  75,  54 
Pac.  885.  In  Pennsylvania,  the  act  allowing  appeals  from  interlocutory  orders 
was  Intended  to  reach  only  clear  cases  of  error  in  law,  and  thus  prevent  the 
delay  of  a  trial.  Max  Meadows  Land  &  Imp.  Co.  v.  Mendenhall,  4  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  398. 

i«  For  Illustrations  of  orders  affecting  substantial  rights,  see  Gllb^t  v. 
Thayer,  104  N.  Y.  200.  10  N.  E.  148;  State  Bank  of  Nebraska  v.  Green,  8  Neb. 
297.  1  N.  W.  210;  Starbuck  v.  Dunklee,  10  Minn.  168  (Gil.  136),  88  Am.  Dec. 
68;  KIngsley  v.  Oilman,  12  Minn.  515  (Gil.  425);  Vermilye  v.  VermUye,  32 
Minn.  499,  18  N.  W.  832. 

IB  Code  Civ.  Proc.  Cal.  §  939. 

16  Grant  v.  Lowe,  32  C.  C.  A.  379,  89  Fed.  881. 

17  Butler  V.  Fayerweather,  33  C.  C.  A.  625.  91  Fed.  45& 

18  Edwards  v.  Maupiu,  7  Mackey  (D.  C)  39. 

io  Kaisin  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Grubbs,  114  X.  C.  470,  19  S.  E.  597. 

.         (31) 


Ol.   2)        FINAL   AND   INTERLOCUTORY   JUDGBHSNTS    AND   DECREES.  §    22 

certain  replevin  proceedings,  to  deliver  them  to  a  certain  person, 
made  in  another  suit  to  which  the  sheriff  is  not  a  party.**  An  appeal 
will  also  lie  from  a  judgment  sustaining  exceptions  to  a  referee's 
report,  and  an  order  thereafter  overruling  a  motion  for  a  new  trial;  *^ 
and  from  an  order  directing  the  receiver  of  an  insolvent  corporation 
to  sue  the  stockholders.--  An  order  of  the  trial  court,  refusing  to 
proceed  with  the  trial  of  a  case,  is  an  interlocutory  judgment.*' 
And  an  order  overruling  a  motion  to  correct  the  date  of  a  judgment 
is  a  final  order  and  appealable.^^ 

But  an  order  quashing  the  service  of  process  in  a  case  is  not  con- 
sidered final  in  such  sense  as  to  be  appealable.*"*  Nor  can  an. appeal 
be  taken  from  an  order  granting  or  refusing  leave  to  amend  the 
pleadings ;  *•  nor  from  a  judgment  allowing  a  garnishee  to  file  an 
answer  after  default ;  *^  nor  from  an  order  granting  a  change  of 
venue ;  **  nor  from  a  refusal  to  grant  a  continuance.*^  An  order 
denying  a  motion  to  set  aside  an  order  contained  in  the  judgment, 
that  execution  issue  as  well  against  the  defendant's  person  as  against 
his  property,  is  not  final  nor  appealable.**    And  the  same  is  true  of 

«o  KlweU  V.  Goodnow,  71  Minn.  390,  73  N.  W.  1095. 

ai  Hart  V.  Hlatt,  2  Ind.  T.  245.  48  S.  W.  1038. 

22  UepnbUc  Life  ins.  Co.  ▼.  Swlgert,  135  lU.  150,  25  N.  E.  680,  12  U  R.  A. 


«a  Kleiber  v.  McManus,  66  Tex.  48,  17  S.  W.  240. 

«*  Warrington  t.  Upham  Manuf  g  Co.,  18  Ohio  Clr.  Ct.  R.  311. 

«»  Winn  T.  Carter  Dry-Goods  Co.,  102  Ky.  370,  43  S.  W.  436;  Brown  v. 
Kice.  ;J0  Neb.  236,  46  N.  W.  480;  Persinger  v.  Tinltle,  34  Neb.  5.  51  N.  W.  209; 
8tandard  DlstUllng  Co.  T.  Freyhan,  34  Neb.  434,  51  N.  W.  976.  But  In  Kansas, 
sucb  an  order  is  final  and  appealable.  Newberry  v.  Arkansas,  K.  &  G.  Ry.  Co., 
S2  Kan.  613,  35  Pac.  210. 

2«  Sinclair  v.  Western  N.  C.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  507,  16  S.  E.  336;  State  v.  Cara- 
leigb  Phosphate  &  Fertilizer  Works,  123  N.  C.  162,  31  S.  E.  373;  Parker  v. 
Harden,  122  N.  C.  Ill,  28  S.  E.  902;  Gunn  v.  Donoghue,  135  lU.  479,  25  N.  E. 
75U;  Lamon  v.  McKee,  7  Mackey  (D.  C.)  446;  Troup  v.  Horbach,  57  Neb.  644, 
71*  N.  W.  286;  McElwaiu  v.  Huston,  1  Wash.  St.  359,  25  Pac.  465.  But  iu 
Iowa,  an  order  striking  out  a  cross  bill  is  appealable.  Mahaska  County  State 
Bank  v.  Christ.  82  Iowa.  56,  47  N.  W.  886. 

«T  Moore  v.  Hill,  87  Ga.  91,  13  S.  E.  259. 

«•  Edgerly  v.  Stewart,  86  Iowa,  87,  52  N.  W.  1121;  State  v.  Shaw,  21  Nev. 
222.  21>  I'ac.  321.    Compare  Code  Civ.  Proc.  Cal.  §  939. 

:•  Newman  y.  Wildenstein,  42  La.  Ann.  925,  8  South.  607, 

*•  Jennings  ▼.  Bartels,  2  W^ash.  T.  306,  24  Pac.  678. 

(35) 


§   23  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  2 

an  order,  appointing  an  assignee  in  insolvency  in  place  of  the  one 
named  by  the  assignor  in  his  deed.'^  Nor  will  an  appeal  lie  from  an 
interlocutory  judgment  reassigning  a  homestead  and  appointing  com- 
missioners to  admeasure  the  same ;  •'  nor  from  an  order  in  insol- 
vency proceedings,  provisionally  passing  upon  the  amount  a  creditor 
is  entitled  to  pay  on  a  purchase  of  the  insolvent's  assets.** 

I  23.    Mnit  be  final  as  to  »11  Partiei. 

As  a  general  rule,  a  judgment  must  possess  the  character  of  finality 
in  disposing  of  the  rights  of  all  the  parties  concerned,  before  it  can 
be  considered  final  with  respect  to  any  of  them.**  Thus  when  suit 
is  instituted  against  two  or  more  defendants,  and  judgment  is  entered 
for  or  against  all  of  them  except  one,  who  is  not  mentioned  or  refer- 
red to  in  the  decision,  there  is  no  final  judgment  from  which  an  ap-  . 
peal  can  be  taken,  no  order  appearing  for  the  disposal  of  the  cause 
as  to  the  defendant  omitted  from  the  judgment.***  For  the  same 
reason,  a  decree  dismissing  a  bill  in  equity  as  to  one  of  several  de- 

»i  State  V.  Parker,  6  Wash.  411,  34  Pac.  149. 

«2  Macke  V.  JByrd,  109  Mo.  487,  19  S.  W.  70. 

«8  Brown  v.  Minnesota  Thresher  Manuf'g  Co.,  44  Minn.  322,  46  N.  W.  560. 

»4  Baker  v.  Old  x\at.  Bank,  33  C.  C.  A.  570,  91  Fed.  449;  Deadwyler  v.  Bank 
of  the  University,  110  Ga.  511,  35  S.  E.  779;  Martin  v.  Crow,  28  Tex.  614: 
Whltaker  v.  Gee,  61  Tex.  217;  Gulf  City  Street  Ry.  &  Real-Estate  Co.  y.  Beck- 
er (Tex.  Oiv.  App.)  23  S.  W.  1015;  Reed  v.  Liston,  8  Tex.  Civ.  App.  118,  27  S. 
W.  913;  Caldwell  v.  Bryan  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  37  S  W.  335;  Burrows  v.  Cox 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.)  38  S.  W.  50;  Delap  v.  Hunter,  1  Sneed  (Tenn.)  101;  Champ  v. 
Kendrick,  130  Ind.  545,  30  N.  E.  635;  Keller  v.  Jordan,  147  Ind.  113,  46  N.  E: 
343;  Sater  v.  Hunt,  1  Mo.  App.  Kep'r,  365,  61  Mo.  App.  228;  Harman  v. 
Blackstone,  1  Mo.  App.  Rep'r,  391,  61  Mo.  App.  254;  Peek  v.  Vandenberg,  30 
Cal.  11.  But  in  Georgia,  by  statute,  an  order  is  final  and  appealable  If  it  is 
"final  as  to  some  material  party"  to  the  action;  and  this  allows  an  appeal 
by  such  a  party  when  his  rights  are  finally  adjudged,  though  the  action  re- 
mains pending  as  to  others.  United  Underwriters'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Powell,  94  Ga. 
359,  21  S.  E.  565;  Deadwyler  v.  Bank  of  the  University,  110  Ga.  511.  35  S.  E. 
779.    And  see  Connell  v.  Brumback,  18  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  R.  502. 

«5\vhitaker  v.  Gee,  61  Tex.  217;  Masterson  v.  Williams  (Tex.)  11  S.  W. 
531;  Cit>'  of  Texarkana  v.  Rodgers  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  20  S.  W.  447;  Maley  v. 
Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.,  84  111.  App.  55;  Case  v.  Ingle,  2  Ind.  T.  309,  51  S. 
VV.  958;  JSchuitz  v.  McLean,  76  Cal.  606,  18  Pac.  775.  In  Connecticut,  the  prac- 
tice act,  by  authorizing  one  action  against  defendants  with  adverse  inter- 
ests, and  authorizing  the  court  in  such  cases  to  order  separate  trials,  permits 
of  the  entry  of  a  final  and  appealable  Judgment  as  to  one  defendant,  although 
(3G) 


Ch.   2)       FINAL    AND    INTERLOCUTORY   JUDGMENTS    AND    DECREES.  §   24 

fendants  sought  to  be  jointly  charged  is  not  a  final  decree  from 
which  an  appeal  may  be  taken.**  But  these  rules  do  not  apply  where 
there  are  parties  who  are  merely  formal  parties  to  the  record,  or  as 
to  whom  there  are  separable  controversies.  For  example,  an  order 
dismissing  an  interpleader,*^  or  discharging  a  garnishee,**  may  be 
final  and  appealable.  So,  the  right  of  appeal  is  not  affected  by  the 
fact  that  there  is  no  decree  against  one  of  the  respondents,  who  was 
not  served  with  process,  and  who,  though  a  proper,  was  not  a  neces- 
sary, party  to  the  suit.**  And  a  judgment  in  an  action  by  an  infant 
for  personal  injuries  may  be  final,  though  it  does  not  in  express  terms 
dispose  of  his  next  friend.**  The  same  is  true  of  a  judgment  against 
one  of  the  members  of  a  firm  separately  sued  on  the  firm  indorsement 
of  a  note.*^  And  where  several  actions  to  enforce  mechanics'  liens 
ag^ainst  the  same  defendant  are  consolidated,  a  judgment  against  one 
of  the  plaintiffs  is  final  as  to  him  and  may  be  appealed.*' 

f  24.    Muit  fettle  all  the  Iiiuei* 

It  is  also  requisite  that  a  judgment,  in  order  to  be  final,  should 
determine  all  the  issues  involved  in  the  cause.  The  decision  on  an 
issue  of  law  which  does  not  put  the  case  out  of  court  is  not  of  this 
character.  So  if  there  are  several  issues  of  fact  in  the  same  contro- 
versy, the  decision  of  one  of  them,  leaving  the  others  undetermined, 

tbe  action  remains  pending  as  to  tbe  other  parties.     Bunnell  v.  Berlin  Iron 
Bridge  Co..  06  Conn.  24,  33  AU.  'y'.iS. 

«•  Holioret  T.  Hamburg-American  Packet  Co.,  148  U.  S.  262,  13  Sup.  Ct.  500, 
37  Ll  Kd.  443;  National  Bank  of  Rondout  v.  Smith,  156  U.  S.  330,  15  Sup.  Ct. 
:«58.  39  L.  Kd.  441;  Dreyer  v.  Goldy,  171  111.  434,  4l>  X.  E.  560;  Lang  v.  IngaUs 
Zinc  Co.,  119  Tenn.  476.  42  S.  W.  198.  In  Illinois,  it  appears  that  an  appeal  may 
be  allowed  in  such  a  case  If  it  is  shown  that  "peculiar  hardship*'  would  result 
from  refusing  to  allow  it.  See  Pain  v.  Kinney,  73  111.  App.  115,  affirmed,  175 
JU.  2IH,  51  X.  E.  621,  And  see  Royall's  Adm'rs  v.  Johnson.  1  Rand.  (Va.)  421; 
Nir-hol  V.  Dunn.  25  Ark.  129. 

37  standley  v.  Roberts,  8  C.  C.  A.  305,  50  Fed.  836. 

a«  Steiner  v.  l-lrst  Sat  Bank.  115  Ala.  379.  22  South.  30. 

>»  Bradsbaw  v.  Miners*  Bank,  26  C.  C.  A.  673,  81  Fed.  902.  See  Harris  v. 
i«andert  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  45  S.  W.  29;  Davis  &  Rankin  Bldg.  &  Manufg  Co. 
r.  UJIlsboro  Cteamery  Co.,  9  Ind.  App.  553,  37  N.  E.  294. 

*•  Texas  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stilhrt,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  642,  20  S.  W.  962. 

«i  Jameson  v.  Smith,  19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  90,  46  S.  W.  804. 

4a  urman  t.  Crystal  Klver  Ry.  Co.,  5  Colo.  App.  4t):j,  39  Pac.  434. 

(37) 


§    25  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   2 

is  not  a  final  •adjudication.  For  there  cannot  be  two  final  judgments 
in  the  same  action.**  But  this  rule  does  not  apply  where  several  dis- 
tinct causes  of  action  are  united  in  the  same  suit,**  or  where  subordi- 
nate or  ancillary  matters  arise  in  the  course  of  the  action,  each  capa- 
ble of  final  determination  by  itself  and  independently  of  the  main 
controversy.** 

S  26.    TJnoertainty  of  the  Amount. 

An  uncertainty  as  to  the  amount  of  the  recovery  will  often  prevent 
a  judgment  from  becoming  final  until  such  amount  is  liquidated  and 
declared.*®  The  test  in  these  cases  seems  to  be,  whether  the  judi- 
cial action  of  the  court  is  necessary  to  be  directed  to  the  question 
before  the  amount  of  the  judgment  can  be  settled,  or  whether,  though 
at  present  uncertain,  it  can  be  determined  or  computed  without  the 
intervention  of  the  court.  Thus  a  judgment  by  default  is  interlocu- 
tory if  the  damages  remain  to  be  ascertained  by  writ  of  inquiry  or 
other  judicial  proceeding.     So  a  decree  which  settles  the  rights  of  the 

48  Brown  v.  Cranberry  Iron  &  Coal  Cp.,  25  U.  S.  App.  107,  13  C.  C.  A.  66,  65 
Fed.  636;  Frank  v.  Tatum  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  20  S.  W.  869;  Stockton  Combined 
Harvester  &  Agricultural  Works  v.  Glen*s  Falls  Ins.  Co..  98  Cal.  557,  33 
l»ac.  633;  McKissack  v.  Voorhees,  119  Ala.  101,  24  South.  523;  Potter  v.  Talk- 
iugton  (idabo)  49  Pac.  14;  Low  v.  Crown  Point  Min.  Co.,  2  Xev.  75.  Compare 
Hake  v.  Coach,  105  Mich.  425,  63  N.  W.  306.  A  judgment  for  plaintiff  is  not 
final  unless  it  disposes  of  matters  pleaded  by  way  of  cross-bill  or  counterclaim. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  V.  Stephenson  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  26  S.  W.  236;  Cloplon  v. 
Herring  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  26  S.  W.  1104. 

*4  Klever  v.  Seawall,  12  C.  C.  A.  653,  65  Fed.  373.  In  an  action  for  the 
recovery  of  real  estate,  of  personalty,  and  of  moneys  received,  a  judgment  for 
the  recovery  of  a  certain  sum  is  final  and  appealable,  though  no  disi)osition  of 
the  real  estate  is  made  therein.  Davies  v.  Thomson,  92  Tex.  391,  49  S.  W. 
215. 

*B  A  decree  entered  in  a  proceeding  by  attorneys  to  enforce  a  lien  for  their 
fees,  which  adjudges  that  they  are  entitled  to  compensation  to  a  definite 
amount  and  have  a  lien  therefor  on  a  fund  in  court,  and  directs  payment  there- 
of, is  a  final  and  appealable  decree,  although  the  residue  of  the  fund  may  not 
have  been  finally  disposed  of.  inittle  v.  Clafiin,  31  C.  C.  A.  419,  88  Fed.  122,  A 
judgment,  in  an  action  to  establish  plaintiff's  right  under  a  will,  fixing  an  al- 
lowance for  his  support  during  the  pendency  of  the  suit,  and  ordering  execution 
therefor,  is  final;  and  an  appeal  may  be  prosecuted  during  the  pendency  of  the 
suit.    McUreary  v.  Robinson,  92  Tex.  408,  49  iS.  W.  212. 

46  Millard  v.  Parsell,  57  Neb.  178,  77  X.  W.  390;  Riott  v.  Blackstone,  10 
I'a.  Super.  Ct.  591. 

(38) 


Ch.   2)        PINAL.    AND    INTERLOCUTORY  JUDGMENTS   AND   DECREES.        .   §    26 

parties,  but  does  not  find  the  amount  to  be  paid,  leaving  that  for 
iuttire  determination,  is  not  final.*^     The  same  is  true  of  a  decree 
which,  after  finding  the  equities  to  be  in  one  of  the  parties,  sends  the 
case  to  a  referee  or  master  to  ascertain  and  report  the  sum  which  he 
is  entitled  to  recover.**     For  the  report  must  be  examined  and  con- 
firmed by  the  court,  before  there  is  a  final  judgment  for  such  sum. 
On*  the  other  hand,  where  a  judgment  is  entered  against  one  of  the 
parties,  to  be  released  on  payment  of  such  sum  as  a  third  person  shall 
say  is  due,  it  is  a  final  judgment ;  because,  to  make  it  absolute  so  far 
as  regards  the  amount,  no  further  action  of  the  court  is  necessary, 
but  only  the  certificate  of  the  referee."**     So  a  decree  in  chancery 
which  adjudges  a  certain  sum  of  money  to  be  due  from  the  defendant, 
and  awards  execution  to  collect  it,  is  a  final  decree,  notwithstanding 
it  also  allows  as  payment  to  be  deducted  from  the  amount  therein 
adjudged  any  note  held  by  the  defendant  against  the  complainant.*® 
Also,  a  decree  is  final,  although  an  order  is  added  to  it  suspending 
the  decree  as  to  one  item  of  the  account,  until  the  decision  of  another 
suit,  in  which  that  item  is  in  litigation.*** 

S  26.    JudKmeiit  of  If  oniiili. 

This  species  of  judgment  is  clearly  final,  since  it  completely  dis- 
poses of  the  action,  though  without  passing  upon  the  merits.  "By 
a  final  judgment  is  to  be  understood  not  a  final  determination  of  the 
rights  of  the  parties,  but  merely  of  the  particular  suit.  Thus,  for 
instance,  a  judgment  of  nonsuit,  other  than  where  the  plaintiff  sub- 
mits to  a  voluntary  nonsuit,  is  a  final  judgment,  even  though  no  costs 
be  awarded  against  the  plaintiff,  inasmuch  as  he  is  aggrieved  by  being 
(fcfeated  of  his  right  of  action  in  that  suit  and  of  his  costs  in  prosecut- 

41  Follansbee  v.  Ballard  Fa  v.  Co..  154  U.  S.  051,  14  Sup.  Ct.  1189,  25  L. 
t'ja.  8U2;  Hunter  v.  Hunter.  100  111.  519. 

*•  BelmoDt  T.  Ponvert.  3  Rob.  (N.  Y.)  693;  Price  v.  Nesbit,  1  Hill,  Eq.  (S. 
<;.)  445:  Tuggle  v.  (Jilbert,  1  Duv.  (Ky.)  340;  Delckhart  v.  Rutgers,  45  Mo. 
132.    But  see  Ayer  v.  Termatt.  8  Minn.  90  (Gil.  71). 

*•  Turner  v.  Plowdcn,  5  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  52,  23  Am.  Dec.  596;  Young  v. 
Mackail,  3  Md.  Ch.  Dec.  398. 


»o  stovaA  V.  Banks.  10  Wall.  583.  19  L.  Ed.  1036. 
•1  Fleming  v.  Boiling,  8  Grat.  (Va.)^292. 


(39) 


§    27     .  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  2 

ing  it."  °*  For  similar  reasons  a  judgment  of  non  pros,  is  appealable, 
being  final  as  to  the  plaintiff.*®  But  no  appeal  is  ordinarily  allowed 
from  the  plaintiff's  voluntary  entry  of  a  nonsuit,***  nor,  unless  the 
statute  specially  grants  it,  from  an  order  setting  aside  a  nonsuit.'* 

§  27.    DUmiMal  of  Suit. 

The  dismissal  of  a  bill  in  chancery  or  of  a  suit  at  law,  since  it  fully 
disposes  of  that  action,  is  a  final  judgment ;  it  is  a  final  decision  of 
the  case  as  against  all  claims  made  by  it,  although  it  may  not  be 
a  final  determination  of  the  rights  of  the  parties,  as  they  may  be 
presented  in  some  other  action. °®    Thus  a  judgment  dismissing  a 

52  Belt  V.  Davis,  1  Cal.  134;  Meehan  v.  Valentine,  145  U.  S.  611,  12  Sup. 
Ct.  972,  36  L.  Ed,  835;  Koona  v.  Bryson,  16  C.  C.  A.  227,  69  Fed.  207;  Vlcks- 
burg,  8.  &  P.  R.  Ck).  v.  Scott,  47  La.  Ann.  706,  17  South.  249;  Hoiter  Lumber 
Uo.  V.  Fireman's  Fund  Ins.  Co.,  18  Mont.  282,  45  Pac.  207;  De  Graf  v.  Seat- 
tle &  T.  Nav.  Ck).,  10  Wash.  468,  38  Pac.  1006.  But  In  Pennsylvania,  under 
Act  March  11,  1875,  providing  for  a  review  by  the  supreme  court  where  a 
nonsuit  has  been  entered  and  a  motion  to  set  aside  the  Judgment  of  nonsuit 
has  been  denied,  error  does  not  lie  to  the  entry  of  a  Judgment  of  nonsuit,  but 
only  to  a  refusal  to  set  such  Judgment  aside.  Scanlon  y.  Suter,  158  Pa.  275, 
27  Atl.  963. 

B3  Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Green,  52  Miss.  332;  Henderson  v.  Maryland 
Home  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  90  Md.  47,  44  Atl.  1020;  Purcell  v.  Payton,  58  Mo.  App.  442. 

54  Mallory  v.  Taylor,  90  Va.  348,  18  S.  E.  438i  Rosenthal  v.  Roberson,  114 
N.  C.  594,  19  S.  E.  667;  Ropes  v.  Eldridge.  39  Fla.  47,  21  South.  570.  An  order 
refusing  a  party  permission  to  dismiss  his  action  Is  not  final  so  as  to  be  ap- 
pealable.   Troup  v.  Horbach,  57  Neb.  644,  78  N.  W.  286. 

66  Ready  v.  Smith,  141  Mo.  305,  42  S.  W.  727. 

60  Dowling  V.  l*olack,  18  Cal.  625;  ZoUer  v.  McDonald,  23  Cal.  130;  Leese 
V.  Sherwood,  21  Cal.  151;  Stoppenbach  v.  Zohrlaut,  21  Wis.  385;  Bowie  v.  Kan- 
sas City,  51  Mo.  454;  Gill  v.  Jones,  57  Miss.  367;  Scriven  v.  Hursh,  35» 
Mich.  98;  Snell  v.  Dwipht,  121  Mass.  348;  Bowler  v.  Palmer,  2  Gray  (Mass.) 
5.j3;  Eddleman  v.  McCilathery,  74  Tex.  280,  11  S.  W.  1100;  Rogers  v.  Rus- 
sell, 11  Xeb.  361,  9  X.  W.  547;  Brush  Electric  Co.  v.  Electric  Imp.  Co.,  7  U. 
S.  App.  208,  2  0.  C.  A.  373,  51  Fed.  557;  Hodges  v.  Kimball,  .34  C.  C.  A. 
103,  91  Fed.  845;  Colorado  i^Iastem  K.  Co.  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co..  36  C.  C.  A. 
2{JS.  94  Fed.  312;  Huns  took  v.  Huiistock,  43  La.  Ann.  375,  8  South.  922: 
Howeth  V.  Clark  (Tex.)  16  S.  W.  175;  Fuerman  v.  Ruble  (Tex.)  16  S.  W.  53G: 
Hecgaard  v.  Dakota  Loan  &  T.  Co.,  3  S.  D.  569,  54  N.  W.  656;  Lawrence 
County  V.  Meade  County,  6  S.  D.  026,  62  N.  W.  957;  Byrne  v.  E^udson,  127 
Cal.  254,  59  Pac.  597;  Smith  v.  Mayor  oi  Boston,  1  Gray  (Mass.)  72.  Where 
one  of  several  defendants  pleads  to  the  action  and  the  plaintiff  replies,  and  on 
motion  of  a  co-defendant  the   original   writ  of   summons  is   quashed,   and 

(40) 


Ch.   2)        riNAL    AND   INTERLOCUTORY   JUDGMENTS   AND    DECREES.  .         §   28 

suit  for  want  of  prosecution,  in  which  a  temporary  injunction  had 
been  granted,  amounts  to  a  determination  by  the  court  that  the  in- 
junction was  improperly  granted,  and  is  in  effect  a  final  judgment  in 
favor  of  the  defendant.*^  So  a  judgment  discharging  a  garnishee  is 
a  final  and  complete  disposition  of  the  cause,  and  the  court  has 
thereafter  no  jurisdiction  over  it;  so  that  a  judgment  against  the 
garnishee  for  costs,  at  a  subsequent  term,  is  void.*^*  But  an  appeal 
does  not  lie  from  an  order  directing  the  dismissal  of  the  suit,  but 
only  from  the  judgment  entered  on  such  order.^*  Nor  is  a  judg- 
ment appealable  which  dismisses  the  suit  only  as  to  some  among 
the  defendants,**  nor  one  which  dismisses  it  conditionally,*^  nor  an 
order  dismissing  a  cross-bill  in  equity.**  Where  a  motion  to  dismiss 
is  denied,  this  does  not  constitute  such  a  final  judgment  as  will  be 
appealable.**  Nor  can  plaintiff  appeal  from  an  order  refusing  to 
reinstate  an  action  which  he  has  himself  dismissed.**  It  has  also 
been  held  that  the  action  of  replevin  is  an  extraordinary  remedy,  and 
that  in  such  action  a  judgment  dismissing  the  suit  is  not  final,  and 
error  cannot  be  assigned  upon  such  an  order  until  after  final  judg- 
ment.** 

i  28.    Jndsment  by  Default. 

The  rule  in  regard  to  a  judgment  by  default  is,  that  if  such  a  judg- 
ment is  rendered  for  a  fixed  and  liquidated  sum,  or  if  the  amount 
can  be  ascertained  by  mere  calculation  from  the  pleadings,  it  is  final ; 
but  if  the  amount  of  the  recovery  or  damages  remaiqs  to  be  ascer- 


jiidgment  "that  he  go  hence,"  that  is  no  final  Judgment  In  favor  of  the  de- 
fendant pleading.    State  Bank  v.  Koddy,  15  Ark.  401. 

67  DowUng  V.  Polack,  18  Cal.  625. 

»•  Jackson  v.  St.  Louts  &  S.  F.  K.  Co.,  m  Mo.  104,  1  S.  W.  224. 

»•  Metropolitan  Kl.  Ky.  Co.  v.  Johnston,  84  Hun,  83,  32  X.  Y.  Supp.  49. 

••  Beck  &  I'auli  LIth.  Co.  v.  Wacker  &  Birk  B.  &  M.  Co.,  22  C.  C.  A.  11,  70 
Fed.  10. 

•1  KIch  T.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  138  X.  Y.  668,  34  X.  E.  402. 

•«  Lamon  v.  McKee,  7  Mackey  (D.  U.)  440;  Fleece  v.  Russell,  13  111.  31.  Sec 
SState  T.  Judge  of  Civil  District  Court,  35  La.  Ann.  705. 

«»  Flenimons  v.  Southern  Imp.  Co.,  108  X..C.  614,  13  S.  E.  188;  Cameron  v. 
Beooett  110  N.  C.  277.  14  S.  E.  779;  Bach  v.  Burke,  141  Pa.  049,  21  Ati.  779. 
Compare  Henderson  v.  Henshall,  4  C.  C.  A.  357,  54  Fed.  320. 

««  Smith  V.  May,  20  D.  C.  07. 

«3  Branch  ▼.  Branch,  5  Fhi.  447. 

(41) 


§    28  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Cfa.  2 

tained  by  a  writ  of  inquiry  or  other  judicial  method  of  computation, 
then  the  judgment  is  merely  interlocutory,  until  such  amount  is  set- 
tled and  entered  on  the  record.®*  "A  judgment  by  default  is  inter- 
locutory or  final.  When  the  action  sounds  in  damages,  as  covenant, 
trover,  trespass,  etc.,  it  is  only  interlocutory,  that  the  plaintiff  ought 
to  recover  his  damages,  leaving  the  amount  of  them  to  be  after- 
wards ascertained.  But  where  the  amount  of  the  judgment  is  en- 
tered by  the  calculation  of  the  clerk,  no  further  steps  being  necessary, 
by  a  jury  or  otherwise,  to  ascertain  the  amount,  the  judgment  is 
final."  '^  Where  suit  is  brought  against  two  defendants  who  are 
jointly  and  severally  liable,  and  one  suffers  a  default,  and  the  other 
puts  in  a  plea  and  goes  to  trial,  the  judgment  entered  against  the 
former  defendant,  on  his  default,  is  merely  interlocutory  until  the 
case  is  disposed  of  as  to  the  other.*' 

"An  order  that  a  bill  be  taken  pro  confesso  is  interlocutory  and  in- 
tended to  prepare  the  case  for  a  final  decree.  Its  effect  is  similar 
to  that  of  a  default  in  an  action  at  common  law,  by  which  the  defend- 
ant is  deemed  to  have  admitted  all  that  is  well  pleaded  in  the  dec- 
laration. The  defendant  has  lost  his  standing  in  court,  and  is  not 
entitled  to  notice  of  its  further  proceedings,  but  the  matters  set  forth 
in  the  bill  do  not  pass  in  rem  judicatam  until  the  final  decree."  •• 

«•  Sellers  v.  Burk.  47  Pa.  844;  McClun^  v.  Murphy,  2  Miles  (Pa.)  177;  Belt- 
ler  V.  Zeigler,  1  Pen.  &  W.  (Pa.)  135;  Martin  v.  Price,  Minor  (Ala.)  68;  Manty 
V.  Roberts,  27  Miss.  225;  Hyde  v.  Pinkard,  25  Ark.  163.  See  Dorsey  v. 
Thompson,  37  Md.  25;  Daniel  v.  Cooper,  2  Houst  (Del.)  506;  Phillips  v.  Hel- 
lings,  5  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  44.  In  New  York,  no  appeal  can  be  taken  from  a 
Judgment  by  default  Code  Civ.  Proc.  X.  Y.  §  1294;  Oliver  v.  French,  80  Hun, 
175,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  52;  Hawkins  v.  Smith,  91  Hun,  299,  36  N.  Y.  Supp.  333. 
in  Minnesota,  no  appeal  lies  from  a  Judgment  by  default,  until  an  applica> 
tion  for  relief  has  been  made  in  the  court  below.  G«derholm  v.  Davies,  59 
Minn.  1,  60  X.  W.  676.  An  order  setting  aside  a  default  and  allowing  defend- 
ant to  plead  is  not  appealable.  Territory  v.  Las  Vegas  Grant,  6  N.  M,  87,  27 
Pac.  414. 

e7  aements  v.  Berry,  11  How.  398,  13  L.  Ed.  745,  McLean,  J. 

•8  Commonwealth  v.  McCleary,  92  Pa.  188. 

«o  liusseU  V.  Lathrop,  122  Mass.  300. 

(42) 


Ch.  2)        FIKAIi    AND   INTERLOCUTORY  JUDGMENTS   AND   DECREES.  §   29 


S  29.    Judgment  on  Demurrer. 

When  the  issue  of  law  raised  by  a  demurrer  is  decided  in  favor  of 
the  plaintiflF,  and  judgment  is  entered  quod  recuperet,  such  judgment 
is  of  course  final  if  the  amount  of  the  recovery  is  fixed.  Similarly, 
where  such  an  issue  is  found  for  the  defendant,  and  judgment  for 
his  discharge  is  given,  it  is  final ;  ^®  for  the  decision  has  the  eflfect  of 
disposing  of  that  particular  suit.  But  all  the  authorities  agree  that 
a  decision  or  order  of  the  court  sustaining  or  overruling  a  demurrer, 
but  not  entering  judgment  thereon  so  as  to  dispose  of  the  case,  is 
merely  interlocutory.^*  Hence  no  appeal  will  lie  from  an  order  sus- 
taining a  demurrer,  where  leave  is  granted  to  the  party  to  amend 
his  pleading,  or  to  plead  to  the  merits,  as  the  case  may  be,  unless 
he  elects  to  stand  upon  his  pleading  as  it  is,  or  unless  the  time  limited 
for  amendment  or  new  plea  elapses  without  action  on  his  part,  and 
judgment  is  entered  accordingly.^*     Nor  can  an  appeal  be  taken  from 

T  rem  Plow  &  Wheel  Co.  v.  Sandwich  Enterprise  Co.,  77  lU.  App.  653; 
Mctiolas  T.  Maddox.  52  La.  Ann.  490,  2G  South.  994.  A  Judgment  for  defend- 
ant on  demurrer  to  part  of  the  counts  of  a  declaration  is  not  reviewable  on 
error  l)efore  the  case  is  determined  as  to  the  remaining  counts.  Riley  v.  Jar- 
via,  43  W.  Va.  43,  26  S.  E.  366. 

11  Warner  t.  Tomllnson,  1  Root  (Conn.)  201;  Paddock  v.  Springfield  Fire 
^  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  12  N.  Y.  591 ;  Elwell  v.  Johnson,  74  N.  Y.  80;  Johnson  v. 
I'olk  Co..  24  Fla.  28,  3  South.  414;  Rose  v.  Gibson,  71  Ala.  35;  Shields  v.  Tay- 
lor. IIJ  Snedes  A  M.  (Miss.)  127;  State  v.  Falconer  (Ark.)  5  S.  W.  193;  Slagle 
V.  Bodmer,  58  Ind.  465;  Hayes  v.  Caldwell,  5  Gllman  (111.)  33;  Knapp  v.  Mar- 
ahaU,  2«  111.  6:i;  Gage  v.  Elch,  56  111.  297;  Palmer  v.  Crane,  8  Mo.  619;  Rob- 
in«ni  T.  County  Court,  32  Mo.  428;  State  v.  Justices,  58  Mo.  583;  Kirchner 
\,  Wood,  48  Mich.  199,  12  N.  W.  44;  Moraga  v.  Emerlc,  4  Cal.  308;  Miller  v. 
Burlington  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Xeb.  227;  Cambridge  Valley  Nat.  Bank  v.  Lynch, 
7«  N.  Y.  514:  Sheffield  v.  Murray,  80  Hun,  555,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  799;  Denslow 
T.  Busb,  9  Misc.  Rep.  :«7,  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  705;  State  v.  Herod,  21  Ind.  App. 
177.  51  N.  K.  952;  Murphy  v.  Tilling,  2  App.  D.  C.  130;  Gillespie  v.  Coleman, 
««8  Va.  276,  36  S.  E.  377;  State  v.  Trilling  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  57  S.  W.  311; 
Olnon  V.  Xewton,  3  Wash.  St.  429,  30  Pac.  450;  Potvin  v.  McCorvey,  1  Wash. 
Ht.  38y.  25  Pac.  330;  Smith  v.  Seattle  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  6  Wash.  295,  32  Pac. 
1U73.    Compare  Willis  v.  Marks,  29  Or.  493,  45  Pac.  293. 

Ts  Cambridge  Valley  Xat.  Bank  v.  Lynch,  76  N.  Y.  514;  Taylor  v.  MacLec, 
1»  av.  Proc.  R.  429,  11  N.  Y.  Supp.  (MO;  Knickerbocker  Co.  v.  Roskopf,  19 
>'.  y.  Supp.  391;  Mooney  v.  Byrne.  1  App.  Div.  316,  37  >V  Y.  Supp.  388; 
Koch  V.  City  of  New  York,  5  App.  Div.  276,  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  164;  Potts  v.  Potts, 

(43) 


§    29  LAW  OP  JUDOMBNTS.  (Oh.  2 

an  order  overruling  a  demurrer  with  leave  to  plead.  There  is  no 
finality  in  such  an  order,  though  there  would  be  in  a  judgment  entered 
upon  the  demurrant's  election  to  stand  upon  his  demurrer  or  on  his 
failure  to  plead,  and  finally  disposing  of  the  case.'*  It  is  to  be  noted 
that  the  general  rule  is  subject  to  certain  exceptions  depending  on 
the  peculiar  nature  of  the  action  or  the  local  rules  of  practice.  Thus, 
a  final  judgment,  in  an  action  to  recover  a  penalty  imposed  by  stat- 
ute, to  be  recovered  "on  conviction,"  cannot  be  entered  on  demur- 
rer, but  only  on  a  trial  upon  the  merits.'*  So,  in  Mississippi,  it  is 
said  that,  under  the  statute,  judgments  on  demurrers  are  not  final 


«8  Md.  (MO,  42  Atl.  214;  Throne-Franklin  Shoe  Co.  v.  Gunn.  123  Ala.  040,  20 
South.  ll>8;  Texas  Land  &  Loan  Co.  v.  Winter  (Tex.  Sup.)  57  S.  W.  39;  Fergu- 
son V.  Mason  (Ky.)  50  S.  W.  15;  Gnrley  v.  Newport  News  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.,  91 
Tenn.  480,  19  S.  W.  571;  Thomas  v.  Chicago  &  E.  Ry.  Co.,  139  Ind.  402.  39 
N.  K,  44;  Maguire  v.  Woods,  33  111.  App.  638;  Peru  Plow  &  Wheel  Co.  v. 
^Sandwich  Knterprlse  Co.,  77  111.  App.  G53;  Clark  v.  Village  of  North  Muskegon, 
86  Mich.  29,  48  N.  W.  647;  Perry  v.  Church,  107  Mich.  480.  65  N.  W.  273; 
Mowbray  v.  Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.,  2  Colo.  App.  128,  29  Pac.  1016;  Yager  v. 
Lemp,  39  Neb.  93.  58  N.  W.  285;  Mason  County  v.  Dunbar,  10  Wash.  163,  38 
Pac.  1003;  Case  v.  Ingle.  2  Ind.  T.  309,  51  S.  W.  958.  See  Johnson  v.  Union 
Switch  &  Signal  Co.,  125  N.  Y.  720,  26  N.  E.  455.  It  has  been  hrfd  that  an 
order  sustaining  a  demurrer  to  a  petition  for  the  removal  of  an  assignee  is 
appealable,  as  it  affects  a  substantial  right  of  both  the  petitioners  and  the 
assignee.    Biirtt  v.  Barnes,  87  Wis.  519,  58  N.  W.  790. 

T8  Mengher  v.  Minnesota  Thresher  Mfg.  Co.,  145  U.  S.  608.  12  Sup.  Ct.  876. 
36  L.  Ed.  834;  Werner  v.  City  Council  of  Charleston.  151  U.  S.  360,  14  Sup. 
Ct.  356,  38  L.  Ed.  192;  Robinson  v.  Belt.  5  C.  C.  A.  521.  56  Fed.  328;  Bdelin 
V.  Lyon,  1  App.  D.  C.  87;  Richardson  v.  Richardson,  193  Pa.  279.  44  Atl,  445: 
Ncalon  v.  Frisbie,  9  Misc.  Rep.  GOO,  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  551;  Ackerly  v.  Osborc, 
13  Misc.  Rep.  323,  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  459;  Cameron  v.  Bennett  110  N.  C.  277,  14 
«.  E.  779;  Festorazzl  v.  St.  Joseph's  Catholic  Church,  96  Ala.  178,  10  South. 
521;  Krause  v.  Stichtenoth,  15  Oliio  Cir.  Ct.  R.  199;  Foster  v.  Lindley,  2i) 
Ind.  App.  155,  50  N.  E.  367;  French  v.  Bellows  Falls  Sav.  Inst.,  67  111.  App. 
179;  Chicago  &  N.  \V.  Ky.  Co.  v.  Andrews,  148  III.  27,  35  N.  E.  617;  Gold- 
smith V.  Wilson,  82  Iowa,  720,  47  N.  W.  1016;  Quinn  v.  (^apital  Ins.  Co.,  S2 
Iowa,  550,  48  N.  W.  935;  Taylor  v.  Taylor,  87  Mich.  G4.  49  N.  W.  510:  Fits- 
Simmons  v,  Milwaukee,  L,  S.  &  W.  Ky.  Co.,  98  Mich.  257,  57  N.  W.  127: 
Nelson  v.  Donovan,  14  Mont.  78,  35  I*ac.  227;  (Raines  v.  Cyrus,  23  Or.  403.  31 
l*ac.  8:^3:  Smith  v.  McEvoy,  8  Utah,  58,  29  Pac.  10:30;  Jones  v.  Quayle  < Idaho) 
32  l*ac.  1134.  See  South  &  N.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Highland  Ave.  &  B.  R.  Co.,  liM 
Ala.  233,  16  South.  112. 

T4  Keagh  v.  Spanu,  3  Stew.  (Ala.)  100. 

(44) 


Ch.   2)        FINAL   AND   INTERLOCUTORY  JUDGMENTS    AND   DECREES.  §   3l 

until  the  end  of  the  term,  until  which  time,  on  proper  showing,  they 
may  be  set  aside.'' • 


S  30.    Jndcmest  on  Plea  Ia  Abaten&ent. 

Where  issue  is  joined  upon  a  matter  of  a  plea  in  abatement  and 
found  against  the  defendant,  the  judgment  for  the  plaintiff  is  final.^' 
It  is  different  in  regard  to  the  decision  of  a  preliminary  question  of 
jurisdiction.  Thus,  in  a  litigation  respecting  the  distribution  of  a 
testator's  property,  a  question  arose  as  to  his  domicile,  and  after  hear- 
ing testimony  the  court  decided  that  "his  domicile  was  in  the  city  of 
W.,"  and  "this  court  has  original  jurisdiction  in  the  matter  of  his 
estate/'     It  was  held  that  this  was  not  a  final  judgment.' * 

S  31.    Jndement  for  Costa. 

A  judgment  which  merely  awards  costs  to  the  defendant,  without 
more,  is  not  a  final  judgment.' ■  In  order  to  have  that  character,  it 
must  profess  to  terminate  and  completely  dispose  of  the  action. 
Hence,  if  for  the  defendant,  the  final  judgment  must  state  that  he  is 
dismissed  without  day,  or  that  it  is  considered  that  the  plaintiff 
take  nothing  by  his  suit,  or  otherwise  refer  to  the  disposition  made  of 

T»  ShieldB  V.  l^ylor,  13  Smedes  &  M.  127;  Jacobs  v.  New  York  Life  Ins.  Co., 
71  Mills.  ($56,  658»  15  South.  639. 

»«  Jewett  V.  Davis.  «  X.  H.  518;  McCartee  v.  Chambers.  6  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  649. 
21!  Am.  Dec.  556;  Halght  v.  Holley,  3  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  258;  Guild  v.  Bonne- 
mort,  156  Mass.  522,  31  X.  E.  645.  Compare  Lee  v.  Harper,  90  Ala.  548.  8 
tkrath.  685.  For  the  rule  In  Missouri,  see  Mackey  v.  Hj-att,  42  Mo.  App.  443; 
D.  M.  Osborne  ik  Co.  v.  Farmers*  Mach.  Co.,  114  Mo.  579,  21  S.  W.  837.  No 
appeal  lies  from  an  order  orerruling  a  plea  in  abatement.  Bartels  v.  Son- 
Denschein,  54  Xeb.  68,  74  X.  W\  417. 

T7  Benjamin  v.  Dubois.  118  U.  S.  46,  6  Sup.  Ct.  925,  30  L.  Ed.  52;  ftate  v. 
Georgia  Co..  109  X.  C.  310,  13  S.  E.  861. 

7>  Scott  V.  Burton.  6  Tex.  322,  55  Am.  Dec.  782;  Green  v.  Banks,  ^  Tex. 
ihTi:  Whitney  Iron  Works  Co.  t.  Heuss,  40  La.  Ann.  112.  3  South.  500;  Dusing 
T.  Xeison,  7  Colo.  184,  2  Pac.  922;  Higbee  v.  Bowers,  9  Mo.  354;  Bick  v.  Seal, 
39  Mo.  App.  567;  Kern  v.  Saul,  14  Ind.  App.  72,  42  X.  E.  496.  Compare 
Hantwm  v.  I'erry.  86  Wis.  361,  66  X.  W.  337;  Sprott  v.  Reid,  3  G.  Greene 
aowa>  489.  56  Am.  Dec.  549.  An  order  denylnj?  a  motion  for  costs,  on  the 
ground  that  the  cause  had  been  withdrawn  before  the  return  day,  and  before 
it  had  been  entered  on  tlie  docket  of  the  court,  is  a  final  and  appealable 
Jndgment.     Wlldraan  t.  Munger,  70  Conn.  380,  39  Atl.  599. 

(45) 


§    31a  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   2 

the  subject-matter.  "The  form  of  the  judgment,"  say  the  court  in 
Texas,  "is  immaterial,  but  in  substance  it  must  show  intrinsically 
and  distinctly,  and  not  inferentially,  that  the  matters  in  the  record  had 
been  determined  in  favor  of  one  of  the  litigants,  or  that  the  rights  of 
the  parties  in  litigation  had  been  adjudicated.  The  costs  are  regulat- 
ed by  statute,  and  are  an  incident  or  appendage  of  the  judgment,  and 
generally  are  recoverable  by  the  victor  in  the  contest.  But,  as  an 
incident,  they  cannot  be  substituted  for  the  principal;  and  a  judg- 
ment for  their  recovery  is  not  a  decision  of  the  matter  at  issue ;  and 
it  is  therefore  no  such  final  judgment  as  can,  by  law,  come  within 
the  revisory  power  of  this  court."^* 

§  31a.    Allowance  of  Claims  aKainst  Fund. 

An  application  for  the  allowance  of  a  claim  against  a  fund  which 
is  before  the  court,  or  for  a  distributive  share  of  such  fund,  is  gen- 
erally so  far  separable  from  the  main  controversy  as  to  constitute  a 
distinct,  though  subordinate,  proceeding.  Where  this  is  the  case, 
the  decision  of  the  court  on  such  an  application  is  to  be  regarded  as 
final,  quoad  hoc,  and  therefore  appealable.  This  rule  applies  to  a 
decree  or  order  allowing  attorneys'  fees  out  of  a  fund  in  course  of 
administration  by  the  court,*®  to  an  order  granting  or  denying  ali- 
mony or  an  allowance  pending  the  suit,'^  to  an  order  fixing  the  com- 
pensation of  a  receiver,®^  or  directing  him  to  pay  certain  claims  out 
of  the  proceeds  of  a  sale  of  the  property,**  or  to  pay  a  certain  rate 
of  wages  to  his  employes.**  Again,  an  order  of  a  court  of  bank- 
ruptcy allowing  a  claim  in  bankruptcy  is  a  final  decision  and  appeal- 
able,** and  the  same  is  true  of  an  order  of  the  probate  court  fixing 

7»  Scott  V.  Burton,  6  Tex.  322,  55  Am.  Dec.  782. 

80  Jacksonville,  T.  &  K.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  American  Const  Ca,  6  C.  C.  A. 
249.  67  Fed.  66;  Tuttle  v.  Clafiln,  31  C.  Q  A.  419,  88  Fed.  122;  Oyster  t. 
Bank,  107  Iowa,  39.  77  N.  W.  523.  Compare  Fraser  v.  District  of  Columbia, 
7  Alackey  (D.  C.)  150. 

81  Daniels  v.  Daniels,  9  Colo.  133,  10  Pac.  657;  White  t.  Wliite,  86  CaL 
212,  24  Pac.  1030;    CampbeU  v.  Campbell    (Ky.)  50  S,  W.  849. 

82Tomp8on  v.  Huron  Lumber  Co.,   5  Wash.  527,   32  Pac.   536. 
88  Rome  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Sibert,  97  Ala.  393,  12  South.  69. 

84  Guarantee  'lYust  &  Safe-Deposit  Co,  v.  Philadelphia,  R.  &  N,  E.  R.  Co.. 
69  Conn.  709,  38  Atl.  792,  38  L.  R.  A.  804. 

85  Duff  V.  Carrier,  5  C.  C.  A.  177,  55  Fed.  433. 
(46) 


Ch.  2)       FINAL    AKD  INTERLOCUTORY   JUDGMENTS    AND    DECREES.  §   82 

and  determining  the  rights  and  estate  of  a  surviving  husband  or  wife 
in  the  homestead.'*  But  it  seems  that  the  refusal  of  a  court  to  dis- 
tribute a  fund  before  it,'^  or  to  strike  off  a  mechanic's  lien,**  is,  at 
least  in  some  states,  not  an  appealable  order. 

S  32.    OrABtiiic  or  Refvsins  Eztraordliutry  Beatedieo. 

According  to  the  general  consensus  of  judicial  opinion,  an  order 
or  decree  granting  a  provisional  or  temporary  injunction,  with  a 
reference  to  ascertain  facts,  or  directing  a  trial  at  law,  or  otherwise 
reserving  the  merits ,  or  a  decree  refusing  to  grant,  or  dissolving,  a 
temporary  injunction  which  is  merely  an  incident  of  the  relief  sought, 
is  interlocutory  only,  not  final.**  But  a  decree  in  favor  of  the  com- 
plainant for  a  perpetual  injunction,  with  costs,  is  final ;  for  that  com- 
pletely adjudicates  the  relief  asked  and  speaks  the  last  word  in  the 
case.**    And  so,  generally,  is  a  decree  dissolving  an  injunction,  or 

•«  Mintxer  t.  St.  Faul  Trust  Co.,  45  Minn.  323.  47  N.  W.  973. 

•Y  ui  re  Hopper's  Estate,  192  Pa.  287.  43  Atl.  1020. 

••  Carter  v.  CaldweU,  147  Pa.  370,  23  Atl.  575.  And  see  In  re  Schalfer's 
Instate,  155  Pa.  250,  25  Atl.  607. 

••Gibbons  v.  Ogden,  0  Wbeat  448,  5  L.  Ed.  302;  Barnard  y.  Gibson, 
7  «ow.  tS50,  12  Ia  Kd.  857;  Verden  t.  Coleman,  18  How.  86,  15  L.  Ed.  272; 
Norton  v.  Hood  ((;.  C.)  12  Fed.  763;  Hmniston  v.  Stalnthorp,  2  Wall.  106, 
17  U  Kd.  «U5;  Price  v.  Strange,  2  Hen.  ft  M.  (Va.)  615;  Ewing  t.  FnUw, 
7  U.  C.  3;  Duianey  v.  Murphy  (Ky.)  15  S.  W.  7;  Cottam  v.  Currie,  42  La. 
Ann.  875,  8  Sonth.  000;  Otto  v.  Halff  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  32  S.  W.  1052;  Green 
▼.  Hanks,  24  Tex.  522;  Ex  parte  Hawley,  24  Ark.  586;  Moss  t.  Ashbrooks, 
15  Arte.  IW;  Pentecost  v.  Magahee,  4  Scam.  (111.)  326;  Lucan  y.  Cadwallader, 
114  lU.  285.  7  N.  E.  286;  Jefferson  t.  Bohemian  Ass'n,  5  III.  App.  230; 
Greve  r.  Goodson,  142  lU.  355,  31  X.  E.  677;  School  Directors  v.  Wright, 
43  ItL  App.  270;  Keenan  y.  Williams,  45  111.  App.  530;  Clabby  y.  Sheldon, 
47  Ul.  App.  166;  Harrison  y.  Uush,  15  Mo.  175;  Tanner  y.  Irwin,  1  Mo. 
65;  Wing  y.  Warner,  2  Doug.  (Mich.)  288;  Chouteau  y.  Rice,  1  Minn.  24 
IGIL  8):  School  Dist.  y.  Brown,  10  Neb.  440,  6  N.  W.  770;  Smith  y.  Sahler, 
1  Neb.  31o:  Scofleld  y.  State  Nat.  Bank.  8  Neb.  IG;  Clark  y.  Fitch,  32  Neb. 
511,  49  N.  W.  374;  Mcng  y.  Coffee,  52  Neb.  44,  71  N.  W.  975;  Schufferl 
V.  Grote.  83  Mich.  263,  47  N.  W.  254;  State  V;  First  Judicial  District  Court, 
.'•2  Miuu.  283.  53  N.  W  1157;  North  Point  Irr.  Cto.  y.  Utnh  &  S.  L.  Onnal 
I'o.,  14  LTtah,  155,  46  Pac.  824.  But  where  the  court  not  only  refuses  a 
preliminary  injunction,  bnt  enters  a  decree  settling  the  rights  of  the  parties, 
an  appeal  lies.     Helm  y.  Gilroy,  20  Or.  517,  26  Pac.  851. 

•♦French  v.  Shoemaker,  12  Wall.  86,  20  L.  Ed.  270;  Merchants*  Bank 
▼.  Kent,  43  Mich.  292,  5  N.  W.  627;    Rickards  y.  Coon,  13  Neb.  419.  14  N. 

(47) 


§   32  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  2 

refusing  to  dissolve  it,  where  that  is  the  sole  or  the  main  object  of 
the  bill.®^  It  must  be  noted,  however,  that  these  rules  may  not  apply 
in  some  of  the  states  where  the  code  practice  obtains.  In  those 
jurisdictions,  orders  granting  or  dissolving  an  injunction,  or  overrul- 
ing a  motion  to  that  effect,  are  frequently  found  in  the  enumerated 
classes  of  appealable  orders ;  •^  or  they  may  be  considered  as  orders 
"affecting  a  substantial  right"  and  hence  subject  to  the  revisory 
power  of  the  upper  courts. 

On  analogous  principles,  it  must  be  held  that  an  order  of  the  court 
granting  or  refusing  the  writ  of  mandamus  in  the  alternative,  is  not 
a  final  judgment.  But  its  action  in  allowing  or  denying  a  peremptory- 
mandamus,  or  in  making  the  interlocutory  writ  absolute,  is  final  to  all 
legal  intents  and  purposes.**  And  so  where  the  parties  to  a  proceed- 
ing for  this  writ  dispense,  by  agreement,  with  a  return  or  answer 
and  other  formal  pleadings  authorized  by  statute,  and  submit  the 
case  upon  the  petition  and  an  agreed  statement  of  facts  in  lieu  of 
such  pleading,  and  the  case  is  heard  as  an  application  for  a  peremp- 
tory mandamus,  and  a  judgment  is  rendered  thereon  dismissing  the 
petition,  this  is  a  final  judgment  reviewable  on  error.** 

W.  1U2;  Klchmond  v.  Atwood,  2  C.  C.  A.  596,  52  Fed.  10,  17  L.  R.  A. 
tJlO;  Carondelet  Canal  Nav.  Co.  v.  City  of  New  Orleans.  44  La.  Ann.  3JM. 
10  SSouth.  871;  Davis  v.  Faslg,  128  Ind.  271,  27  N.  E.  726;  Sheward  v. 
Citizens'  Water  Co.,  90  Oal.  635,  27  Pac.  439;  Sprague  v.  Locke,  1  Colo. 
App.  171,  28  rac.    142.     But  see  Brown  v.  Swanu,  9  Pet.  1,  9  L.  Ed.  29. 

oiJSaloy  V.  CoIUns,  30  La.  Ann.  63;  Titns  v.  Mabee,  25  lU.  257;  Front 
V.  Lomer,  79  111.  331;  Hedges  v.  Meyers,  5  111.  App.  347;  Obrrkoetter  v. 
Luebberlng,  4  Mo.  App.  481;  McVlckar  v.  Wolcott,  4  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  510; 
Cors  V.  Tonapklns,  46  111.  App.  322;  Northwestern  Brewing  Co.  v.  Manion. 
67  111.  App.  316;  Donahue  v.  Johnson,  »  Wash.  187,  37  Pac.  322.  But  see 
Uirlart  v.  Ballon,  9  Pet.  156,  9  L.  Ed.  85. 

0  2  See  Code  Civ.  Proc.  Cal.  §  939;  Code  Civ.  Proc.  Kan.  §  &42;  Andrexrs 
V.  Love,  46  Kan.  26i,  20  Pac.  746.  The  act  of  congress  establishing  the 
circuit  courts  of  appeals  (Act  March  3,  1891,  §  7)  authorizes  an  appeal  to  those 
courts  from  an  "interlocutory  order  or  decree  granting  or  contiimfng  an 
injunction."  On  the  construction  of  this  clause,  see  Richmond  t.  Atwood, 
2  C.  C.  A.  Syc,  52  Fed.  10,  17  L.  R.  A.  615;   Robinson  v.  City  of  WllmlugtOD, 

9  C.  C.  A.  84,  60  Fed.  469;    Andrews  v.  National  Foundry  &  Pipe  Works, 

10  C.  C.  A.  60,  61  Fed.  782. 

88  Holden  v.  Hnscrodt,  2  S.  D.  220,  49  X.  W.  07;    Oliver  v.  Wilson.  8  N. 
D.   590,  80  N.   W.   757,   73  Am.   St.   Rep.   784. 
»4  State  V.  Ottinger,  43  Ohio  St.  457,  3  N.  E.  298. 

(48) 


Cb.  2}       FINAL   AND   INTERLOCUTORY  JUDGMENTS    AND  DECREES.  §   32 

A  judgment  or  decree  appointing  a  receiver,  to  take  charge  of  the 
property  in  litigation,  or  to  administer  the  revenues  of  the  defend- 
ant, subject  to  the  direction  of  the  court,  during  the  pendency  of  the 
suit,  is  not  considered  a  final  judgment."'  And  an  order  removing 
a  receiver  is  likewise  interlocutory. •*  In  a  few  states,  nevertheless, 
it  is  held  that  orders  appointing  receivers  are  final  and  appealable.*^ 
This  is  a  variance  of  local  practice.  But  in  the  system  of  procedure 
under  the  codes,  where  proceedings  of  this  character  are  classed  as 
"special  proceedings,"  and  an  order  made  in  such  proceedings  which 
affects  a  substantial  right  is  final  and  appealable,  it  seems  reason- 
able that  a  decision  granting  or  refusing  a  receiver  should  be  con- 
sidered as  final  for  this  purpose,  since  it  does  not  turn  upon  a 
formal  or  technical  point,  but  goes  to  the  claim  of  the  party  to  secure 
the  property  in  litigation  in  the  most  efficacious  manner.**  An  order 
confirming  a  sale  of  property  made  by  a  receiver  is  final  and  appeal- 
able,**  and  so  is  an  order  granting  or  denying  an  application  for 
leave  to  sue  the  receiver,*®**  an  order  authorizing  receiver's  certificates 
to  issue  for  past  and  future  expenses  and  making  them  a  lien  superior 


•sjf'nller  t.  Adams.  12  Ind.  559;  Produce  Bank  v.  Morton,  40  N.  Y.  Super. 
Ct  328;  KatOD  &  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Vamum,  10  Ohio  St  622;  Hottenstein  v.  Con- 
rad, 5  Kan.  249;  MaysvlUe  &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Punnett,  15  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  47; 
Kansas  HoUing  Mill  Co.  t.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  31  Kan.  90,  1  Pno. 
Zi4;  i>ewi«  V.  McCabe,  16  Mo.  App.  398;  Stebbins  y.  Savage,  5  Mont.  253, 
5  Fac.  :r78;  Bayor  v.  Ewart,  37  ill.  App.  318;  Braehtendorf  v.  Kehm,  72 
lU.  App.  228;    Robrecht  v.  Robrecht,  46  W.  Va.  738,  34  S.  K  801. 

••Farson  v.  Gorham,  117  111.  137,  7  N.  B.  104;  Dufour  v.  Lang,  4  C. 
C.  A.  663,  54  Fed.  913. 

•»  Lewis  V.  Campau,  14  Mich.  458,  90  Am.  Dec.  245;  Taylor  v.  Sweet, 
40  Mich.  736;  In  re  Graeff,  30  Minn.  3o8,  16  X.  W.  396;  Clark  v.  Raymond, 
W  Iowa.  251,  50  N.  W.  1068;  City  of  Ogden  v.  Bear  Lake  &  River  Water- 
Works  A  Irrigation  Co.,  16  Utah,  440,  52  Pac.  697,  41  L.  R.  A.  305.  Com- 
jwre  Brown  t.  Vandermeulen,  41  Mich.  418,  49  N.  W.  920.  In  ^laryland. 
Use  statute  allows  an  appeal  from  an  order  appointing  a  receiver,  but  not 
from  an  order  refusing  to  rescind  the  api)ointment.  R.  Frank  Williams  Co. 
V.  t'Dited  States  Baking  Co.,  86  Md.  475,  38  Atl.  990. 

•«  Cincinnati,  8.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Sloan,  31  Ohio  St.  1;  McCord  v.  Weil, 
33  Xeb.  8tt8»  51  N.  W.  300;  Anderson  v.  Matthews,  8  Wyo.  307,  57  Pac. 
156. 

••City  of  New  Orleans  v.  Peake,  2  U.  8.  App.  403,  2  C.  C.  A.  626,  52 
ppd.   74. 

100  >'oekor  v.  Simiguo,  5  Wash.  242,  31  Pac.  628w 

1  L.\W  JUDG.— 4  ^49) 


§   33  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   2 

to  the  claims  of  interveners/***  and  an  order  requiring  payment  of 
the  receiver's  compensation  and  other  expenses  out  of  funds  in  his 
hands.*®^  An  order  settling  the  accounts  of  the  receiver,  which 
embraces  all  the  transactions  of  the  receivership  during  the  entire 
period  of  his  appointment,  is  in  the  nature  of  a  final  judgment;*** 
but  not  an  order  merely  directing  the  receiver  to  make  a  partial  dis- 
tribution of  the  funds  in  his  hands.**** 

An  order  of  a  superior  court  granting  a  writ  of  certiorari  is  not 
appealable,*®'  but  if  the  court,  on  such  writ,  dismisses  the  case  and 
orders  execution  and  a  writ  of  procedendo,  this  is  a  final  and  ap- 
pealable judgment.*®*  So,  also,  an  appeal  will  lie  from  a  judgment 
of  a  superior  court  dismissing  an  application  for  a  writ  of  prohibi- 
tion.*®^ But  an  order  denying  an  application  for  the  writ  of  habeas 
corpus  is  not  a  final  judgment  from  which  an  appeal  may  be  taken.*** 

f  33.    On  Motion  for  New  Trial* 

It  IS  generally  held  that  a  judgment  or  order  granting  a  new 
trial  in  an  action  at  law  is  not  a  final  judgment,  and  an  appeal  can- 
not be  taken  until  the  judgment  is  rendered  which  terminates  the 
suit.*®*     So  also,  an  order  overruling  a  motion  to  set  aside  the  vcr- 

101  Standley  v.  Hendrle  &  Bolthoff  Mfg.  Co.,  25  Colo.  376,  55  Pae.  723. 

102  Ogden  City  v.  Bear  Lake  &  River  Waterworks  &  Irrigatton  Co^  18 
Utah,    279,    55    Pac.    385. 

108  Patterson  v.  Ward,  «  X.  D.  359,  71  N.  W.  543. 
lOiSykes  V.  Thornton,  152  Pa.  94,  25  Atl.  174. 

105  Bank  v.  Burns,  107  N.  C.  465,  12  S.  E.  252. 

106  Holman  v.  G.  A.  Stowers  Furniture  Co.  (Tex.  Qv.  App.)  30  S.  W,  1120. 
lOT  Fayerweather  v.   Monson,   61  Conn.  431,  23  Atl.   878;    Overland  Gold 

Min.  Co.  V.  McMaster,  19  Utah,  177,  56  Pac.  977. 

108  Lambert  v.  Barrett,  157  U.  S.  697,  15  Sup.  Ct  722.  39  L.  Ed.  865. 
See  Commonwealth  v.  Blatt,  165  Pa.  213,  30  Atl.  674, 

109  Hume  v.  Bowie,  148  U.  S.  245,  13  Sup.  Ct.  582,  37  L.  Ed.  438;  Morn- 
ing Journal  Ass'n  v.  Rutherford,  1  U.  S.  App.  296,  2  C.  C.  A.  354,  61  Fed, 
513,  16  U  R.  A.  803;  Baker  v.  Remington,  45  N.  Y.  323;  Lawson  Y.  Moore, 
44  Ala.  274;  Fuller  v.  Boggs,  49  Ala.  127;  Wheeler  v.  Maillot,  15  La.  Ann 
059;  Brown  v.  Carraway,  47  Miss.  668;  Houston  v.  Starr,  12  Tex.  424: 
tStewart  v.  Jones,  9  Tex.  469;  Wampler  v.  Walker,  28  Tex.  598;  Schweitaer 
T.  Irwin's  Ex'x,  101  Ky.  401,  41  S.  W.  265;  Hennery's  Adm'r  y.  LoulsYille 
JSc  N.  R.  Co.,  21  Ky.  Law  Rep.  532,  51  S.  W.  804;  State  v.  Perry,  4  Baxt. 
tTenn.)  438;    Louisville  &  N,  R.  Co.  v.  Conley,  10  Lea  CToul)  631;    Hoyt 

(50) 


Gh.  2)        FINAL   AND  INTERLOCUTORY   JUDGMENTS   AND   DECREES.  §  83 

diet  of  a  jury  and  refusing  to  grant  a  new  trial,  is  interlocutory  only, 
and  an  appeal  or  writ  of  error  must  be  addressed  to  the  judgment  en- 
tered on  the  verdict.^ ^^    The  same  remark  is  true  of  an  order  denying 
an  application  for  a  rehearing.^ ^^    And  in  a  case  where  the  report  of 
a  referee  appointed  by  the  special  term  to  take  proofs  and  determine 
as  to  rival  claims  to  surplus  money  in  foreclosure  had  been  confirmed 
at  special  term,  and  that  adjudication  was  reversed  at  general  term, 
the  latter  court  ordering  a  new  hearing  before  another  referee  to  be 
appointed  by  the  special  term,  it  was  held  that  such  order  of  the 
general  term  was  not  a  final  order,  and  therefore  not  appealable  to 
the  court  of  appeals.^**     But  in  a  few  states,  it  is  held  that  an  appeal 
may  be  maintained  from  an  order  refusing  a  new  trial,  although  no 
judgment  has  been  entered  on  the  verdict.**'     And  in  some  other 
states,  it  is  provided  by  statute  that  an  appeal  may  be  taken  from  an 
order  granting  or  refusing  a  new  trial.***     But  where  an  order  re- 
fusing a  new  trial  and  dismissing  the  motion  therefor  is  itself  appeal- 
Dry  Goods  Co.  T.  Tbomas,  19  Ohio  Cir.  Ct,  E.  638;  House  v.  Wright,  22 
iDd.  383;    AVhite  r.  Harvey,  23  Ind.  55;    By  era  v.  Bntterfidd,  33  Mo.  376; 
McDonough  r.  Nicholson,  46  Mo.  35;  Burden  v.  Homsby,  50  Mo.  238;   People 
T.  Judge  of  Circolt  Court,  41  Mich.  5,  2  N.  W.  181;    Johnson  v.  Parrotte, 
4«  Neb.  51,  m  N.  W.  363;    Bear  niv&c  Valley  Orchard  Oo.  y.  Hanley,  15 
Utah.  506,  50  Pac.  611. 

110  Waterhouse  v.  Kock  Island  Alaska  Mln.  Co.,  38  C.  0.  A.  281,  97  Fed. 
466;  NeldUnger  t.  Yoost,  39  G.  a  A.  494,  99  Fed.  240;  Moore  t.  United 
States.  150  U.  S.  57,  14  Sup.  Ct.  26^  37  L.  Ed.  996;  Wheeler  y.  United 
SUtes.  159  U.'  8.  523,  16  Sup.  Ct.  93,  40  L.  Ed.  244;  SIgafus  v.  Porter,  51 
U.  8.  App.  693.  28  C.  C.  A.  443,  84  Fed.  430;  Whlttaker  y.  West  Boylston, 
yn  Mass.  273;  Holdsworth  y.  Tucker,  147  Mass.  572,  18  N.  E.  430;  Taylor  v. 
Smith,  24  App.  Diy.  519,  49  N.  Y.  Supp.  41;  Damron  y.  Ferguson.  32  W. 
Va.  33.  9  8.  E.  39;  Roberts  v.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  47;  Conord  v.  Runnels, 
23  Ohio  8t  601;  J.  W.  Reedy  Elevator  Manuf'g  Co.  y.  Pitvowsky,  35  111. 
App.  361:  Little  y.  l^elghton.  46  Minn.  201,  48  N.  W.  778;  Smith  v.  John- 
son, 37  Neb.  675.  56  X.  W.  323;  Kearney  v.  Snodgrass,  12  Or.  311,  7  Pac. 
3UU;  White  V.  Pease,  15  Utah,  170,  49  Pac.  416;  Bacon  v.  Thornton,  16 
ttah,   138,  51  Pac.   153. 

1"  Mayor  of  New  York  y.  Schermerhorn,  1  N.  Y.  423. 

ii»3fntual  Ufe  Ins.  Co,  v.  Anthony,  106  N.  Y.  57,  11  N.  E.  281. 

in  Baldwin  v.  Foss,  71  Iowa,  3W),  32  N.  W.  389;  Atkinson  v.  Williams, 
ir»l  ind.  431.  51  N.  E.  721.  And  see  Keman  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  64 
Miiin.  312,  67  N.  W.  71. 

11*  Code  Civ.  l*roo.  (>nl.  §  {KJO:  Code  Civ.  Proc.  Kan.  S  542;  List  y.  Jock- 
heck,  45  Kau.  349,  748,  27  Vac,  184;   Ormiston  y.  Trumbo,  77  Mo.  App.  310. 

(51) 


§  34  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  2 

able,  no  appeal  will  lie  from  an  order  refusing  to  revoke  a  prior  order 
to  that  effect."* 


S  34.    Vaoatinc  or  RoTersiiis  former  Jndement. 

Where,  under  the  code  system  of  procedure,  an  independent  action 
is  brought  for  the  purpose  of  vacating  a  former  judgment  between 
the  same  parties  and  procuring  a  new  trial  of  the  action,  and  the  re- 
lief is  granted  as  asked,  it  seems  that  the  judgment  to  that  effect 
must  be  considered  as  final  and  appealable.  For  the  issues  in  the 
independent  suit  having  been  determined  and  the  reHef  accorded,  the 
decision  puts  an  end  to  that  controversy.^^*  But  where  the  applica- 
tion comes  in  the  form  of  a  motion  made  in  the  same  cause,  and 
the  court  grants  an  order  opening  or  vacating  the  judgment  already 
entered,  it  is  clear  that  such  an  order  is  no  final  judgment;  on  the 
contrary,  it  merely  suspends  the  finality  of  the  original  judgment  un- 
til the  case  has  been  heard  and  decided  anew.^^^  Nor  is  the  case 
otherwise  where  the  court  denies  the  application.  A  refusal  to  open 
a  judgment  is  not  a  judgment,  sentence,  or  decree ;  it  concludes  noth- 

iiBLarkin  y.  LArkin,  76  Gal.  323,  18  Pac.  396;  Griess  y.  State  Iny.  & 
Ins.  Co.,  «3  Cal.  411,  28  Pac.  10«. 

iieMcCall  V.  Hitchcock,  7  Bush  (Ky.)  615;  Belt  y.  Dayla,  1  Oal.  134; 
State  y.  Allen,  92  Mo.  20,  4  S.  W.  414.  A  Judgment  of  a  federal  circuit 
court  denying  a  petition  of  a  receiver  of  a  corporation  against  which  Judg- 
ment was  entered,  to  have  the  Judgment  opened  and  for  leave  to  answer, 
is  reviewable  on  error.  Rust  v,  United  Waterworks  Co.,  17  C.  C.  A,  3r., 
70  Fed.  129.  And  so  Is  a  decree  taking  from  one  party  the  right  of  re- 
demption given  to  him  by  a  former  decree  in  the  same  suit,  and  conferriDg 
such  right  on  another  party.  Biu*gess  y.  Ruggles,  146  IlL  506,  34  N.  K. 
1036. 

117  McCulloch  y.  Dodge,  8  Kan.  476;  Hlgglns  y.  Brown,  5  Colo.  34r»- 
Brown  v.  Edgerton,  14  Neb.  453,  16  N.  W.  474;  Dorsey  y.  Thompson,  37 
Md.  25;  Koh  v.  Vitera,  38  Neb.  333,  56  X.  W.  977;  Hirsh  y.  Welsberger.  44 
Mo.  App.  506.  In  i'ennsj'lvania,  under  the  act  of  May  20,  1891,  an  appeal 
may  be  taken  from  an  order  of  the  court  opening  a  Judgment.  Pfaff  v. 
Thomas,  3  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  419;  Kelber  v.  Pittsburg  Nat.  Plow  Co.,  146  Pa. 
485,  23  Atl,  335.  But  not  from  an  order  refusing  to  vacate  a  former  order. 
Lowenstein  y.  North  Schuylkill  Ins.  Co.,  132  Pa.  410,  20  Atl.  688.  Nor  from 
an  order  of  the  orphans'  court  opening  a  decree  of  confirmation  of  tiie 
sale  of  land  and  setting  aside  the  sale,  since  that  Is  a  matter  of  Judicial 
discretion.  Appeal  of  Montgomery  Nat.  Bank,  140  Pa.  187,  21  Atl.  242. 
(52) 


Oh.  2)       FINAL   AND   INTKRLOCUTORY   JUDQMENTS    AND   DECREES.  §   86 

ing,  and  is  not  assignable  for  error.^^'  "It  is  settled  that  when  a 
judgment  or  order  is  itself  appealable,  the  appeal  must  be  taken  from 
such  judgment  or  order,  and  not  from  a  subsequent  order  refusing  to 
set  it  aside."  *^*  A  writ  of  error  cannot  be  taken  from  the  supfeme 
court  of  the  United  States  to  the  appellate  court  of  a  state  on  a  judg- 
ment of  the  latter  court  which  merely  reverses  that  of  the  trial  court 
and  orders  a  new  trial,  such  judgment  not  being  final.***  But  a 
judgment  of  a  superior  court  remanding  a  case  to  an  inferior  court 
for  entry  of  judgment,  and  leaving  no  judicial  discretion  in  the  latter 
as  to  further  proceedings,  is  final.*** 

I  35.    Orders  as  to  Interpleader,  Interrentton,  and  Joinder  of  Parties. 

An  order  of  court  requiring  parties  to  interplead  is  in  general 
merely  interlocutory,  since  it  settles  no  rights,  and  merely  serves 
to  prepare  the  case  for  examination  and  decision.***  So  an  order 
directing  the  payment  into  court  of  a  garnishee  fund  claimed  by  a 
third  person,  pending  the  determination  of  the  right  to  it,  is  not  a 
final  judgment.***  An  order  refusing  leave  to  intervene  in  a  pending 
suit,  where  such  intervention  is  not  essential  to  the  preservation  of 
the  petitioner's  rights,  but  such  rights  may  be  asserted  in  an  inde- 

"•  Evans*  Adm'r  v.  Clover,  1  Grant,  Cas.  (Fa.)  Itt4;  Lowensteln  v.  North 
SchuylkiJl  Jns.  Co.,  132  Pa.  410.  20  Atl.  688;  Lockwood  v.  Bock,  46  Minn. 
73.  48  N.  W.  458;  Smith  v.  Shawano  Co.,  77  Wis.  672,  47  N.  W.  95;  Travel- 
ers' Ins.  Co.  V.  Weber,  2  X.  D.  239,  50  N.  W.  703;  Kubli  v.  Hawkett,  80 
Cai.  638,  27  Pae.  57;  Welsh  v,  Lambert,  18  Utah,  1,  54  Pac.  975.  But 
compare  McConnIck  v.  Belvin,  96  Cal.  182,  31  Pac.  16;  Northern  Pac.  & 
F.  8,  s.  K,  Co.  V.  Black,  3  Wash.  St.  327,  28  Pac.  538;  Myers  v.  Landrum, 
4  Wash.  St.  702,  31  Pac.  33;  In  re  Davis*  Estate,  11  Mont.  196,  28  Pac. 
C4r>;  Tuoker  v.  Stone,  92  Mich.  298,  52  N.  W.  302.  In  Vermont,  where  an 
application  to  set  aside  a  Judgment  is  denied  as  a  matter  of  law,  the  pro- 
<*e«Hling8  may  be  reviewed  on  appeal.  Johnson  v.  Shmnway,  65  Yt  389,  26 
AU.  .Vju. 

i»»Coyhinech  v.  Goyhinech,  80  Cal.  409,  410,  22  Pac.  175. 

1 20  Houston  V.  Moore.  3  Wheat.  433,  4  L.  Ed.  428;  Smith  v.  Adams,  130 
r.  .s.  167.  9  Sup.  Ct.  5UG.  32  L.  Ed.  895;  Rice  v.  Sanger,  144  U.  S.  197,  12 
Sup.  Ct.  WW.  36  L.  Ed.  403. 

121  Mower  V.  Kletrher.  114  U.  S.  127,  5  Sup.  Ct.  799.  29  L.  Ed.  117. 
»"  Barth  v.  Uoscnfeid.  36  Md.  604. 

i23LouiKiana  Nat  Bank  y.  Whitney,  121  U.  S.  284,  7  Sup.  Ct  897,  30 
U  Kd.  9UL 

(53) 


V 


§    36  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  2 

pendent  suit,  is  not  a  final  order  from  which  an  appeal  lies.*=*  Nor 
is  an  order  permitting  a  party  to  intervene/**  nor  an  order  striking 
out  a  petition  of  intervention  because  not  filed  in  time.^**  Nor  can 
an  appeal  be  taken  from  an  interlocutory  order  joining  parties  de- 
fendant in  a  cause.^*^ 

S  36.    "Dimuolvine  Attaelunents  and  Ezeovtlonfl. 

It  IS  held,  by  the  almost  universal  agreement  of  the  authorities, 
that  judgments,  orders,  or  decrees,  quashing  or  dissolving  attach- 
ments, or  refusing  to  do  so,  are  merely  interlocutory.^**  For  an 
attachment  is,  in  general,  only  an  incident  of  the  suit,  and  a  decision 
upon  its  validity  or  applicability  is  no  more  than  the  settlement  of  a 
preliminary  and  subordinate  question,  leaving  untouched  the  ultimate 
rights  of  the  parties  and  not  disposing  of  the  main  controversy.  Still, 
in  one  state  at  least,  a  contrary  view  is  maintained,  and  it  is  thought 
that  a  judgment  dismissing  an  attachment  is  in  its  nature  final,  and 
error  will  lie  on  it,  notwithstanding  the  cause  may  still  be  pending 
below  on  the  declaration  to  have  a  recovery  on  the  merits,  as  if  the 
suit  had  been  brought  by  ordinary  process.^ ^®     There  is  something 

124  Credits  Commutation  Co.  v.  United  States,  34  C.  C.  A.  12,  01  Fed 
570;  Liewis  v.  Baltimore  &  L.  R.  Co.,  10  a  C.  A.  446,  62  Fed.  218;  Jones 
&  JLauglilins  v.  Sands,  25  C.  C.  A.  233,  79  Fed.  913;  Hamlin  v.  Toledo.  St. 
L..  &  K.  C.  R.  Co.,  24  C.  C.  A.  271,  78  Fed.  6^4,  36  L.  R.  A.  826.  Compare 
Henry  v.  lYavelers'  Ins.  Co.,  16  Colo.  179,  26  Pac.  318. 

125  Jones  V.  New  York  Life  Ins.  Co..  11  Utah,  401,  40  Pac.  702. 

126  Whitney  v.  Spearman,  50  Neb.  617,  70  N.  W.  240. 

i27jsneeden  v.  Harris,  107  X.  C.  311,  12  S.  E.  205;  Lamon  v.  McKee.  7 
Mackey  (D.  C.)  446. 

128  Hamner  v.  Scott,  8  C.  C.  A.  655,  60  Fed.  343;  Atlantic  Limiber  Co.  t. 
Bucki  &  Son  Lumber  Co.,  35  C.  C.  A.  59.  92  Fed.  8t>4;  Philadelphia  &  R. 
K.  K.  V.  Snowdon,  161  Pa.  201,  28  Atl.  1067;  Sllngluff  v.  Sisler.  1^5  Pa. 
264,  44  Atl.  423;  Stanton  v.  Heard,  100  Ala.  515,  14  South.  359;  Realty  Inr. 
C3o.  V.  Porter,  58  Kan.  817,  50  Pac.  879;  Noyes  v.  Phipps,  9  Kan.  App.  887, 
58  I'ac.  1007;  Wirt  v.  DInan,  41  Mo.  App.  230;  Root  v.  State  Bank.  30 
Neb.  772,  47  N.  W.  82;  Jacobl  v.  Schloss,  7  Cold.  (Tenn.)  385;  Cutter  v, 
Gumberts,  8  Ark.  449;  Butcher  v.  Taylor,  18  Kan.  558;  Abbott  v.  Zei^ler. 
9  Ind.  611;  Woodruff  v.  Rose,  43  Ala.  382;  Bray  v.  Laird,  44  Ala.  295; 
Wearen  v.  Smith,  80  Ky.  216;  Baldwin  v.  Wright,  3  Gill  (Md.)  241;  Talbot 
V.  Pierce,  14  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  11>5;  Hanson  v.  Bowyer.  4  Mete.  (Ky.)  108; 
WIckman  t.  Nalty,  41  I^.  Ann.  284,  6  South.  123. 

120  Bruce  V.  Couyers,  54  Ga.  678.  And  see  Chappell  v.  Comins,  44  Kan. 
(54) 


Ch.  2)      FINAL   AND   INTEBLOCUTORY  JUDGMENTS   AND   DECREES,  §   37 

to  be  said  for  this  position.  For,  as  the  court  observed,  the  whole 
attachment  element  is  disposed  of  by  the  order  for  its  dismissal.  Any 
judgment  which  may  be  thereafter  recovered  will  have  no  aid  from 
the  levy  of  the  attachment.  Its  lien  will  rank  only  from  the  date 
of  the  judgment,  and  the  security  of  the  replevy  bond  will  be  lost. 
'To  maintain  his  attachment,  it  was  the  right  of  the  plaintiff  to  have 
the  judgment  dismissing  it  reviewed  by  a  separate  writ  of  error."  ^'® 
Similarly  it  has  been  held  that  a  decision  of  the  court  upon  a  rule  or. 
motion  to  quash  an  execution  is  merely  interlocutory,  not  a  final 
judgment."*     But  this  view  also  has  been  denied.*** 

f  37.    Order  remoTing  Cause. 

An  order  for  the  removal  of  a  cause  from  a  state  court  to  the  cir- 
cuit court  of  the  United  States,  for  trial,  under  the  various  acts  of  con- 
gress in  that  behalf,  is  without  question  a  final  order.**'  "An  order 
removing  or  refusing  to  remove  a  cause,  civil  or  criminal,  to  another 
court  for  trial,  finally  adjudicates  a  constitutional  right  of  the  party 
affected  by  the  order.  And  it  is  regarded  as  a  judgment,  from  which, 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  case,  an  appeal  or  writ  of  error  may 
be  immediately  prosecuted."  *'*  Conversely,  the  decision  of  the  fed- 
eral court  upon  a  motion  to  remand  the  cause  to  the  state  court 
from  which  it  came,  on  the  ground  of  its  irregular  or  improper  re- 
moval, or  for  want  of  jurisdiction,  is  in  its  nature  final  and  appealable. 
But  the  right  of  appeal  in  such  cases  was  taken  away  by  the  act  of 
congress  of  March  3,  1887,  which  provides  that  "whenever  any  cause 
shall  be  removed  from  any  state  court  into  any  circuit  court  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  circuit  court  shall  decide  that  the  cause  was 
improperly  removed,  and  order  the  same  to  be  remanded  to  the 
state  court  from  whence  it  came,  such  remand  shall  be  immediately 

T43,  25  Pac.  216;  WiHIams  v.  Hutchinson,  20  Fla.  513,  7  South.  852;  Code 
Ut,  Ptoc.   CaL   S   SXJD. 

»»•  Bmoe  T.  Conyers,  54  Ga.  678. 

isi  McOargo  v.  Chapman,  20  How.  555,  15  L.  Ed.  1021;  Terry  v.  Hughes, 
W  Ala.  432,  8  South.  086;    Bond  v.  Charleen,  1  Dak.  224,  46  X.  W.  585. 

"*  Loomis  V.  Lane,  29  Pa.  242,  72  Am.  Dec.  625;  Pucker  v.  Owens,  164 
i*t.   1H5.   30   Atl.    314. 

"a  Home  Wfe  Inn.  Co.  v.  Dunn.  20  Ohio  St.  175,  5  Am.  Rep.  642. 

»**  McAlilUiu  V.  State,  68  Md.  307,  12  Aa  8. 

(55) 


g    88  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  2 

carried  into  execution,  and  no  appeal  or  writ  of  error  from  the  deci- 
sion of  the  circuit  court  so  remanding  such  cause  shall  be  al- 
lowed." ^**  Nor  will  any  appeal  lie  when  the  circuit  court  denies  the 
motion  to  remand,  and  decides  to  retain  jurisdiction;  for  this,  it  is 
considered,  is  not  a  final  judgment  or  decree,  but  merely  an  interlocu- 
tory decision.^** 

S  38.    Judgments  and  Orders  of  Probate  Conrto* 

Orders  made  by  a  surrogate  or  probate  court,  in  the  course  of  tbc 
administration  or  settlement  of  an  estate  before  it,  such  as  an  order 
appointing  or  removing  an  executor,  administrator,  guardian,  or 
trustee,  are  interlocutory  in  their  nature  and  not  generally  appeal- 
able.^^^  But  when  the  final  stage  of  the  case  is  reached,  and  a  decree 
is  made  for  the  distribution  of  the  funds  or  estate  under  the  control 
of  the  court,  and  the  discharge  of  the  executor  or  trustee,  this  is  a 
final  judgment,  from  which  an  appeal  is  generally  allowed.^**    An 

1SB24  IStat.  553;  Black,  Dill.  Rem.  Causes,  §  223;  Sherman  t.  GrinnelU 
123  U.  S.  679,  8  Sup.  Ct  260,  31  L.  Ed.  278;  Morey  v.  Lockhart.  123  U. 
S.  56,  8  Sup.  Ct.  03,  31  L.  Ed.  68;  Wilkinson  v.  Nebraska.  123  U.  S.  28a 
8  Sup.  Ct.  120,  31  L.  Ed.  152;  Blrdseye  v.  Schaeffer,  140  U.  S.  117,  11 
Sup.  Ct.  885,  35  L.  ^.  402;  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Fitzgerald.  160  U.  S. 
556,  16  Sup.  Ct.  389.  40  L.  Ed.  536;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  156  U. 
S.  386,  15  Sup.  Ct.  656,  39  L.  Ed.  461.  A  later  statute  (25  Stat.  603>  al- 
lowed an  appeal  from  a  "final  Judgment  or  decree"  .of  a  circuit  court  in- 
volving the  question  of  its  jurisdiction.  But  it  is  held  that  an  order  of  the 
circuit  court  remanding  a  cause  to  the  state  court  on  the  ground  of  want 
of  Jurisdiction  is  not  a  **final  judgment  or  decree,"  and  hence  this  statute 
does  not  help  the  party  objecting  to  tbe  remand  to  procure  a  review  of  the 
order.  Texas  Land  &  Cattle  Co.  v.  Scott,  137  U.  S.  436,  11  Sup.  Ct  140. 
34  L.  Ed.  730;  Joy  v.  Adelbert  College.  146  U.  S.  355.  13  Sup.  Ct  186,  36 
L.  Ed.  1003.  The  act  a*eating  the  circuit  courts  of  appeals  does  not  give 
those  courts  jurisdiction  to  review,  on  appeal  from  a  circuit  court,  an  order 
of  the  latter  court  remanding  a  cause  to  a  state  coiu-t.  In  re  Coe,  5  U.  S. 
App.  6,  1  C.  C.  A.  326.  49  Fed.  481. 

136  Bender  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  148  U.  S.  502,  13  Sup.  Ct  640,  37  L. 
Ed.  537;    Tatten  v.  Cilley,  1  C.  C.  A.  522.  50  Fed.  337. 

137  Mon^'or  v.  Jeffries,  62  Ohio  St.  149.  56  N.  E.  654;  Grimes  v.  Barratt. 
60  Kan.  2o9.  56  Fac.  472.  Compare  Tome  v.  Stump.  89  Md.  264.  42  Atl. 
902.  An  order  of  the  probate  court  amercing  a  sheriflC  is  a  final  and  ap- 
pealable judgment     Fenton  v.  White,  4  Okl.  472,  47  Pac.  472. 

i3«  NViiitaker  v.  Spnrknian,  30  Fla.  347,  11  South.  542;  In  re  McFarland's 
Estate,   10  Mont   445,  26  Pac.  185. 


Ch.  2)        PINAL   AND   INTERLOCUTORY  JUDGMENTS   AND   DECREES.  §   39 

I 

order  of  such  a  court  merely  requiring  a  personal  representative, 
guardian,  or  trustee  to  file  an  account,  is  not  in  its  nature  final,^'** 
nor  is  an  order  settling  and  allowing  an  annual  or  partial  account  of 
an  executor  or  administrator.**®  But  the  case  is  otherwise  when 
settlement  is  made  of  the  final  accounts  of  such  fiduciaries,  especially 
vehen  distribution  is  ordered  and  the  discharge  of  the  trustee  allowed. 
This  is  such  a  final  decree  as  will  be  the  proper  subject  of  an  ap- 


141 


S  30.    Judgment  in  Partition. 

According  to  the  usual  practice  in  proceedings  for  partition  of  land, 
a  preliminary  judgment  or  decree  is  rendered,  directing  that  partition 
be  made,  quod  partitio  fiat,  and  nominating  certain  persons  to  effect 
a  division  and  report  to  the  court.  When  the  report  is  confirmed,  or 
the  method  of  apportionment  otherwise  fixed,  and  all  the  rights  of  the 
parties  adjusted  and  settled,  another  judgment  is  entered  declaring 
that  the  partition  shall  stand  as  approved.  Now  the  first  decree  in 
these  proceedings,  establishing  the  existence  of  a  co-tenancy,  order- 
ing that  partition  be  made,  and  appointing  commissioners,  is  gener- 
ally interlocutory.***  But  the  first  decree  in  partition  may  be  final, 
and  it  will  have  that  character,  if  it  settles  all  the  rights  of  the  parties 

!«•  In  re  CaUahan's  Estate,  139  X.  Y.  51,  34  N.  E.  756;  Wilcox  v.  Wilcox, 
«3  Vt  137,  21  Atl.  423;  In  re  Palethorp's  Estate,  160  Pa.  316,  28  Atl.  689. 

1*0  iiaker  V.  S?<?hoeneman,  41  Mo.  392;  In  re  Barnes,'  43  Mo.  App.  295. 
Hot  if  a  partial  distribution  is  ordered,  it  seems  the  decree  may  be  con- 
sidered Una!   quoad  hoc.     McDonald   v.   McDonald,   68  Miss.    689,    9   South. 


1*1  Moore's  Appeal,  10  Pa.  435;  Weinerth  v.  Trendley,  39  Mo.  App.  333; 
In  re  Hlirg  Ueirs,  7  Wash.  421,  35  Pac.  131;  In  re  Blgge,  52  Kan.  184,  34 
Pac.  782. 

1*2  Green  v.  Flsk,  103  U.  S.  518,  26  L.  Ed.  485;  Id.,  154  U.  S.  668.  14 
Sup.  Ct.  1193,  26  I..  Bd.  486;  Elder  v.  McClaskey.  17  G  C.  A.  251,  70  Fed. 
529:  Beebe  v.  Gritting,  6  N.  Y.  465;  Gesells  Appeal,  84  Pa.  238;  Temple- 
man  V.  Stoptoe,  1  Munf.  (Va.)  339;  Young  v.  Skipwith,  2  Wash.  (Va.)  300; 
i'utman  v.  Liewls.  1  FIbl.  455;  Medford  v.  Marrell,  10  N.  C.  41;  Clester  v. 
Gibfton,  15  Ind.  lO;  Davis  v.  Davis,  36  Ind.  160;  Kern  t.  Maglnniss,  41 
ind.  'Jim;  Pipkin  v.  Allen,  29  Mo.  229;  Durham  v.  Darby,  34  Mo.  447;  Ivory 
V.  Delore,  26  Mo.  505;  Gates  v.  Salmon,  28  Cal.  320;  Peck  t.  Vandenberg, 
30  Cal.  11;  311118  v.  Miller.  2  Neb.  299;  Murray  v.  Yates.  73  Mo.  13.  Com- 
pare CapeU  V.  Moseft.  36  S.  G.  559,  15  S.  E.  711;  Skinner  v.  Garter,  108  X. 
<:.   100,   12  2$.  E.  908. 

(57) 


§   40  LAW  OP  JUDOMBNT8.  (Oh.  2 

and  leaves  nothing  for  the  future  consideration  or  judicial  action  of 
the  court.^**  Thus  a  decree  declaring  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled 
to  one  undivided  third  of  the  land  in  question,  and  appointing  com- 
missioners to  make  partition,  is  held  to  be  a  final  decree  and  appeal- 
able before  the  subsequent  proceedings  are  had.^**  And  so,  where 
a  judgment  was  passed  for  the  partition  of  realty  among  the  heirs 
who  were  entitled  to  it,  and  commissioners  were  appointed  to  make 
the  division  without  further  orders  of  the  court,  it  was  considered  to 
be  a  final  determination  of  the  rights  of  the  parties  and  therefore 
appealable.^*"  But  an  unauthorized  declaration,  in  the  order  for  par- 
tition, that  the  plaintiff's  share  of  the  rents  and  profits  received  by 
defendant  as  tenant  in  possession  shall  constitute  a  special  lien,  and 
that  a  special  execution  shall  issue  therefor,  cannot  have  the  effect 
to  convert  an  otherwise  interlocutory  order  into  a  final  and  appealable 
judgment.*** 

§  40.    In  Condemmttioii  Prooeedlnso. 

A  judgment  rendered  in  proceedings  for  the  condemnation  of  land 
under  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  where^  adversary  proceedings 
have  been  had  between  the  petitioner  and  the  parties  whose  interests 
are  to  be  affected,  and  the  court  has  confirmed  a  report  of  commis- 
sioners appointed  to  assess  the  value  of  the  land  taken,  and  it  is 
adjudged  that  the  petitioner  has  complied  with  the  statutory  require- 
ments, is  a  final  judgment.**^  And  so,  it  seems,  is  a  judgment  for 
condemnation,  wliere  the  right  to  condemn  is  contested,  although  the 
amount  of  compensation  remains  still  to  be  determined.***  But 
an  order  in  condemnation  proceedings  merely  appointing  commis- 

i*8An8ley  v.  Robinson,  16  Ala.  793;  Banton  v.  GampbelFs  Heirs,  2  Dana 
(Ky.)  421;  Damouth  v.  Klock,  28  Mich.  163;  Ruthenberg  v.  Uelberg,  43  La. 
Ann.  410,  9  South.  99. 

1**  Williams  v.  Wells,  62  Iowa,  740,  16  N.  W.  513.  See  Cannon  t.  Hemp- 
hill, 7  Tex.  184;    Taylor  v.  Dawson,   65  III.  App.   232. 

i*oBeatty  y.  Beatty's  Adm'r  (Ky.)  5  S.  W.  771;  Ames  v.  Ames,  148  111. 
321,   30  N.   E.   110. 

1*0  HoUoway  v.  Holloway,  97  Mo.  628,  11  S.  W.  233,  10  Am.  St.  Rep,  339. 

1*7  Sacramento,  F.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Harlan,  24  Gal.  337;  Hutchinson  t. 
McLaughlin,  15  Colo.  492,  25  Pac.  317,  11  L.  R.  A.  287.  See  City  of  Johns- 
town V.  Wade,  157  N.  Y.  50.  51  N.  B.  397. 

1*8  Wheeling  &  Belmont  Bridge  Oo.  v.  Wheeling  Bridge  Co.,  138  U.  S. 
287,  11  Sup.  Ct  301,  <^4  U  Ed.  967. 

(58) 


Ch.  2)        FINAL   AND   INTERLOCUTORY  JUDGMENTS   AND   DECREES.  §   41 

sioners  to  assess  the  damages  is  not  a  final  or  appealable  order.^** 
On  similar  principles,  a  decree  of  confirmation  of  a  report  of  viewers 
laying  out  a  road  is  final  until  reversed  on  certiorari;  ^"®  and  so  is 
a  judgment  setting  aside  the  award  of  commissioners  for  the  assess- 
ment of  damages  upon  the  opening  of  a  highway.^** 

i  41.    FiBAlity  of  Decrees* 

In  drawing  the  distinction  between  final  and  interlocutory  adjudi- 
cations, the  greatest  difficulty  has  been  experienced  in  the  case  of 
decrees  in  equity,  the  confusion  arising  principally  from  the  peculiar 
nature  of  these  decisions  and  the  wide  range  of  means  which  chancery 
possesses  both  for  informing  the  mind  of  the  judge  and  for  acting 
upon  the  parties  concerned.  Many  tests  of  finality  have  been  pro- 
posed, some  proceeding  upon  opposite  principles,  some  viewing  the 
same  principle  in  different  aspects.  Thus,  several  cases  hold  that  a 
decree  is  final  when  it  terminates  the  litigation  between  the  parties 
on  the  merits  of  the  case,  and  leaves  nothing  to  be  done  but  to  en- 
force by  execution  what  has  been  determined.*"*  This  is  perhaps  a 
little  too  broad.  For,  as  we  shall  see,  it  does  not  impair  the  finality 
of  a  decree  that  it  has  to  pass  through  the  hands  of  a  master,  for  min- 
isterial acts  to  be  done  in  relation  to  it,  before  it  is  ready  for  execu- 
tion. Other  cases  define  a  final  decree  as  that  which  is  made  when 
all  the  material  facts  in  the  cause  have  been  ascertained,  so  as  to 
enable  the  court  to  understand  and  decide  on  the  merits  of  the  case.**^* 
According  to  another  authority,  any  decree  is  final  which  renders 
the  equities  incapable  of  change  in  the  further  progress  of  the 
cause.***     Or  where  nothing  remains  to  be  done  which  may  be  the 

i4»  Southern  R.  Co.  t.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  35  C.  C.  A.  360,  93  Fed. 
3KJ;    L«dlow  T.  City  of  Norfolk,  87  Va.  319,  12  S.  E.  612. 

!*•  In  re  Hunter's  Private  Koad,  46  Pa.  'SiO, 

»»i  Morris  &  K.  K.  Co.  v.  City  of  Orange,  63  N.  J.  Law,  252,  43  Atl. 
TJO,  47  AU.  3<S3. 

i»«  Kallroad  Co.  v.  Southern  Exp.  Co.,  108  U.  S.  24,  2  Sup.  Ct.  6,  27  L.  Ed. 
<S8:  Grant  y.  Phoenix  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  106  U.  S.  429,  1  Sup.  Ct.  414,  27 
1^  Jbld.  237;  Cook's  Heirs  v.  Bay,  4  How.  (Miss.)  485;  Vanmeter's  Ex'rs  v. 
Vttjuneter,  3  Grat.  (Va.)  148. 

> »» JnMues  v.  Methodist  Episcopal  Church,  17  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  548,  8  Auk 
I><H*.    447. 

&»«  Jones  V.  Wilson,  54  Ala.  50. 

(59) 


§   42  LAW  OF  JUDOMENT&  (Ch.   2 

subject  of  exception  or  appeal.^'*  Or  where  the  decree  "completely 
and  finally  disposes  of  some  branch  or  part  of  the  cause  which  is 
separate  and  distinct  from  the  other  parts  of  the  case."  ^**  Another 
case,  coming  much  nearer  to  a  satisfactory  definition,  holds  that  the 
final  decree  is  not  necessarily  the  last  decree  rendered,  by  which  all 
proceedings  in  the  case  are  terminated,  and  nothing  is  left  open  for 
the  future  judgment  or  action  of  the  court ;  but  it  is  a  decree  which 
determines  the  substantial  merits  of  the  controversy, — all  the  equities 
of  the  case, — ^though  there  may  remain  a  reference  to  be  had,  or  the 
adjustment  of  some  incidental  or  dependent  matter.^'^ 

The  difficulty  appears  to  arise  in  relation  to  those  decrees  which, 
while  settling  the  general  equities  of  the  cause,  leave  something  for 
future  action  or  determination.  And  the  true  rule  seems  to  be,  that 
if  that  which  remains  to  be  done  or  decided  will  require  the  action 
or  consideration  of  the  court  before  the  rights  involved  in  the  cause 
can  be  fully  and  finally  disposed  of,  the  decree  is  interlocutory;  but 
it  is  none  the  less  final  if,  after  settling  the  equities,  it  leaves  a  neces- 
sity for  some  further  action  or  direction  of  the  court  in  execution  of 
the  decree  as  it  stands.^  "^^ 

I  42.    Further  Action  neceiiary  to  settle  tlie  Equltios. 

Adopting  the  rule  set  forth  in  the  preceding  section,  it  will  now  be 
desirable  to  give  some  illustrations  of  cases  in  which  the  decree  has 
been  held  interlocutory  merely,  because  some  further  act  or  decision 
was  necessary  before  the  equities  could  be  completely  settled  and 

IBB  Bellamy  v.   Bellamy,  4  Fla.  242. 

166  Kvans  v.  Dunn,  2G  Ohio  St.  439.  See  Grant  v.  East  Sc  West  R  Co., 
1  C  C.  A.  GSl,  50  Fell.  TDo.  Where  discovery  by  answer  is  the  only  relief 
prayed  in  the  bill,  a  rule  to  answer  is,  in  effect,  a  final  decree,  and  is  there- 
fore appealable.     Grimes  v.  Hilliary,  38  111.  App.  246. 

1B7  Walker  v.  Crawford,  70  Ala.  567.  See  Travis  v.  Waters,  1  Johns.  C3l 
UN.  X'.)  8o;   Champlin  v.  Memphis  &  O.  R.  Co.,  9  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  683. 

188  Kelley  v.  Stanbery,  13  Ohio,  408;  Desvergers  v.  Parsons.  8  O.  C.  A. 
526,  60  Fed.  143;  Chase  v.  Driver,  34  C.  C.  A.  668,  92  Fed.  780;  Wood  t. 
HarmiBon,  41  W.  Va.  376,  23  S.  E.  500;  Wheelberger  v.  Knights,  71  111. 
App.  331.  The  question  whether  a  decree  is  final  and  appealable  is  not  de> 
termiued  by  the  name  which  the  court  below  gives  It,  but  is  to  be  decided  by 
the  appellate  court  on  a  consideration  of  the  essence  of  what  Is  done  by  the 
decree.     Potter  v.  Beal,  2  a  0.  A.  60,  50  Fed.  860. 

(60) 


Ch.  2)        FINAL    AND    INTERLOCUTORY   JUDGMENTS    AND   DECREES.  §  42 

disposed  of.  And  first,  when  the  further  action  of  the  court  in  the 
cause  is  necessary  to  give  completely  the  relief  contemplated  by  the 
court,  the  decree  upon  which  the  question  arises  is  not  to  be  regarded 
as  final.***  Thus,  a  judgment  of  foreclosure,  directing  the  sale  of 
the  mortgaged  premises,  and  the  payment  by  the  defendant  of  any 
deficiency  which  may  arise  on  such  sale,  is  not  such  a  final  judgment 
as  that  an  action  will  lie  upon  it,  because,  on  such  a  judgment,  fur- 
ther proceedings,  such  as  the  confirmation  of  the  referee's  report, 
etc.,  must  be  had  before  a  personal  judgment  can  be  entered.^ •^ 
So  a  judgment  dissolving  a  partnership,  ascertaining  the  sum  of 
money  due  by  the  copartners  to  the  plaintiff,  ordering  a  sale  of  the 
copartnership  property  and  effects,  and  decreeing  payment  therefrom 
of  the  amount  due  plaintiff,  but  providing  that  in  case  the  amount 
realized  from  such  sale  is  not  sufficient  to  pay  the  judgment,  that  the 
plaintiff  shall  be  entitled  to  a  personal  judgment  against  the  individ- 
ual members  of  the  firm  for  the  deficiency,  is  not  a  final  judgment,  but 
merely  an  interlocutory  decree.^**  So  also,  a  reservation  of  the  ques- 
tion of  costs,  in  a  decree  which  in  other  respects  disposes  of  the  sub- 
ject-matter of  the  suit,  renders  such  decree  interlocutory.^**  Again, 
a  decree  ordering  an  act  to  be  done  before  the  decree  itself  can  be 
effectual  is  interlocutory. *••  And  a  decree  which  decides  definitely 
in  favor  of  the  complainant  in  respect  to  one  of  the  claims  presented, 
but  reserves  the  consideration  of  another  claim,  constituting  an  in- 
tegral part  of  the  case,  is  not  final. ^•^     So  if  it  directs  an  act  to  be 

i5»Mnier'8  Adni'r  t.  Cook's  Adm'rs.  77  Va.  806;  Cocke's  Adm'r  v.  Gilpin, 
1    Hob.    (Va.)  2U. 

!«•  Hanover  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Tomllnson,  3  Hun  (N.  Y.)  630. 

16 1  White  T.  Conway.  66  Cal.  383,  5  Pac.  672. 

i«a  Dickenson  v.  Cod  wise,  11  Talge  (N.  Y.)  189;  Johnson  v.  Hoover,  75 
Md.  48«».  :a  Atl.  U03.  Compare  McFarland  v.  HaH's  Heirs,  17  Tex.  691.  An 
order  directing  a  receiver  to  turn  over  money  collected  by  him,  with  leave 
to  apply  to  the  (t>urt  for  the  payment  of  his  charges,  and  to  have  the  same 
taxed  as  costs  against  the  complainant.  Is  not  a  final  determination  of  his 
rights,  and  is  not  appealable.  French  y.  Genoa  Junction  Ice  Co.,  82  III. 
App.   318. 

i«»Hays  V.  May's  Heirs,  1  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  497. 

»««Bond  V.  Marx,  ^^S  Ala.  177;  Woman's  College  v.  Home  (Tenn.  Ch.) 
Q3  »,  \V.  WO:  Marks  v.  Semple.  Ill  Ala.  637,  20  South.  791.  Compare 
M'rfght  ▼.  Bmsctake^  62  111.  App.  35& 

(61) 


§   43  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS,  (Ch.  2 

done,  but  requires  a  report  to  be  made  of  the  manner  of  its  per- 
formance; as  where  the  decree  authorizes  an  executor  to  sell  the 
real  estate  of  his  testator  for  the  payment  of  debts,  and  to  report  his 
proceedings  in  execution  thereof  to  the  court.^**  But  it  has  been 
held,  by  a  high  authority,  that  when  a  decree  passes  for  a  certain 
sum  of  money,  and  the  complainant  is  entitled  to  have  it  immediately 
carried  into  execution,  it  must  be  regarded  as  final  to  that  extent,  and 
appealable,  although  so  much  of  the  bill  is  retained  in  the  court  be- 
low as  is  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  adjusting  by  a  further  decree 
the  accounts  between  the  parties  pursuant  to  the  decree  passed.* •* 

i  43.    Further  Action  neceisary  to  ezeovte  the  Deoree. 

The  second  branch  of  the  rule  above  stated  is,  that  although  fur- 
ther acts  or  directions  may  be  necessary  to  carry  the  decree  into 
effect,  it  is  still  final  if  it  settles  the  equities.  Thus,  a  decree  that 
defendants  should  assign  a  certificate  of  lands  to  the  plaintiff,  pro- 
vided he  should,  before  a  given  day  and  after  a  tender  of  the  assign- 
ment, pay  a  certain  sum  of  money  to  them,  is  a  final  decree.**^  So 
where  certain  of  the  stockholders  in  a  corporation  filed  their  bill  in 
equity,  praying  that  the  proceedings  of  a  meeting  of  stockholders, 
and  of  the  directors  in  accordance  therewith,  might  be  set  aside  as 
void  for  fraud,  and  for  the  appointment  of  a  receiver,  and  the  court 
granted  the  relief  prayed  in  the  bill,  but  added  a  clause  to  the  decree 
reserving  such  further  directions,  as  to  costs,  etc.,  as  might  be  neces- 
sary to  carry  the  decree  into  execution,  it  was  held  that  this  was  a 
final  decree.^ ••    Again,  a  decree  which  ascertains  the  sum  in  the 

i«B  Goodwin  v.  Miller,  2  Munf.  (Va.)  42.  And  see  Donaldson  v.  Fhrmere" 
&  Kxcbange  Bank,  4  S.  C.  106. 

166  Forgay  v.  Conrad,  6  How.  201,  12  L.  Ed.  404. 

i«7  Turner  v.  CreblU,  1  Hammond  (Ohio)  308.  And  see  Harmon  v.  Bynum. 
40  Tex.  324.  But  the  general  rule  appears  to  be  that  a  decree  which  makes 
the  relief  granted  conditional  upon  the  performance  of  certain  acts  by  the 
successful  party  is  not  final  unless  It  is  shown  that  the  conditions  have  been 
complied  with.  See  Stratton  v.  Dewey,  24  C.  C.  A.  435,  79  Fed.  32;  Ugon 
V.  l.igou,  105  Ala.  460,  17  South.  89;  McAnally  v.  Haynle,  17  Tex.  Civ. 
A  pp.  521,  42  S.  W.  1049.  Compare  Dow  v.  Blake,  148  111.  76.  35  N.  E.  761. 
3l>  Am.  St.  Rep.   ir)6. 

los  wiuthrop  Iron  Uo.  v.  Meeker,  109  U.  S.  180,  3  Sup.  Ct  111,  27  L.  Kd. 

CIJ2) 


Ch«  2)       FINAL   AND   INTERLOCUTORY   JUDGMKNTS    AND    DECBEEB.  §   44 

hands  of  a  party  to  be  accounted  for,  and  those  who  are  entitled  to 
it,  and  orders  it  to  be  paid  over  to  the  parties  entitled,  and  directs  the 
costs  of  the  suit  to  be  paid  first  out  of  the  fund,  and  makes  no  refer- 
ence to  a  master,  and  seeks  to  ascertain  no  new  fact,  but  assumes  that 
the  court  is  in  full  possession  of  all  the  facts,  so  as  to  adjudicate  be- 
tween the  contestants  according  to  equity  and  conscience,  is  a  final 
decree,  although  it  also  requires  the  accountant  to  report  to  the  court 
his  distribution  and  dealing  with  the  fund.^**  It  is  also  held  that  a 
decree  for  specific  performance,  requiring  a  conveyance,  is  final, 
although  it  directs  the  submission  of  the  conveyance  to  the  judges 
for  their  approval.^^* 

I  44.    Deeree  orderins  a  Ref  erenee* 

The  most  difficult  cases  in  which  to  draw  the  line  between  final 
and  interlocutory  decrees,  are  those  in  which  the  decree,  after  find- 
ing the  general  equities,  orders  a  reference  to  a  master  for  some  spe- 
cific purpose.  Yet  there  are  not  wanting  principles  upon  which  to 
base  a  reasonable  and  accurate  distinction  in  these  cases.  As  the 
condensed  result  of  the  numerous  authorities  on  the  subject,  we  may 
formulate  the  following  specific  rules.  First,  where  a  decree  is  made 
disposing  of  the  general  equities  of  the  case,  but  ordering  a  reference 
to  a  master  to  ascertain  damages,  or  to  find  certain  facts,  or  to  do 
anything  else  necessary  to  be  done  before  a  final  adjustment  of  the 
rights  of  tlie  parties  can  be  had,  if  the  functions  of  the  master  are  to 
be  judicial,  and  not  merely  ministerial,  and  the  provisions  depending 
on  his  report  are  not  already  incorporated  in  the  decree,  then  the  de- 
cree is  interlocutory  and  not  final.^^*     Second,  where  a  decree  ascer- 

• 

i«*L«dyarcl  v.  Henderson,  46  Miss.  260;  Bank  of  Lewisburg  y.  Sheffey, 
140  U.  S.  445,  11  Sup.  Ct.  755,  35  L.  Ed.  493;  Lohman  y.  Cox,  9  N.  M. 
903,  56  Fac.  286. 

!?•  Long  y.  MaxweU,  8  G.  C.  A.  410,  59  Fed.  948. 

i»i  Cbace  ▼.  Vasqnez,  11  Wheat.  429,  6  L.  EH.  511;  Perkins  y.  Fonmiqnet, 
e  Uow.  2U6,  12  L.  Ed.  406;  Craighead  y.  Wilson,  18  How.  199,  15  L.  Ed. 
'J32;  Uomlston  y.  Stainthorp,  2  Wall.  106,  17  L.  Ed.  905;  Beebe  y.  Russell, 
IV  Uow.  283,  15  U  Ed.  668;  Parsons  y.  Robinson,  122  U.  S.  112,  7  Sup. 
Ct  1153.  30  U  Ed.  1122;  Talley  y.  Curtain,  7  C.  C.  A.  1,  58  Fed.  4;  Gunn 
y.  BUudi,  8  a  C.  A.  542,  60  Fed.  159;  Security  Trust  Co.  y.  Sullivan,  23  C. 
O.  A.  45H,  77  Fed.  778;    PIckrell  y.  Thompson,  12  App.  D.  C.  449;    Kane 

(68) 


§44  LAW  OF  JUDGMBNTS.  (Ch.  2 

tains  and  fixes  all  the  rights  of  the  parties,  but  a  reference  is  ordered 
to  a  master  to  do  or  ascertain  something  that  is  necessary  to  carry 
the  decree  into  effect,  if  the  functions  of  the  master  are  to  be  merely 
ministerial  and  not  judicial,  or  if  all  the  consequential  directions  de- 
pending on  the  result  of  the  proceedings  before  him  are  giv^n  in 
the  decree  itself,  then  the  decree  is  final  and  not  interlocutory.*^* 

V.  Whlttlck,  8  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  219;  Johnson  v.  Everett,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.)  636: 
Chittenden  v.  Missionary  Society  of  Methodist  Episcopal  Church,  8  How. 
Frac.  (xN.  Y.)  327;  Cruger  v.  Douglass,  2  N.  Y.  571;  Tompkins  v.  Hyatt, 
19  N.  Y.  534;  Moore  v.  Lincoln  Park  &  Steamboat  Gousol.  Ck>.,  196  Pa. 
519,  46  Atl.  857;  Templeman  v.  Steptoe,  1  Munf.  (Va.)  339;  Ryan's  Adm'r 
V.  McLieod,  32  Grat.  (Va.)  367;  Maekey  v.  Bell,  2  Munf.  (Va.)  523;  Price  v. 
Nesblt,  1  Hill,  Eq.  (S.  C.)  445;  McCrady  v.  Jones,  36  S.  C.  136,  15  S.  E.  430; 
Smith  V.  Thomason,  2G  S.  C.  607,  12  S.  E.  96;  Putman  v.  Lewis,  1  Fla.  455; 
Griffin  v.  Orman,  9  Fla.  22;  Owens  v.  Love,  9  Fla.  325;  Garrard  v.  Webb, 
4  Port.  (Ala.)  73;  Garner  v.  Prewltt,  32  Ala.  13;  Broughton  v.  Wimberly, 
65  Ala.  649;  Cook's  Heirs  v.  Bay,  4  How.  (Miss.)  4S5;  Pryor  v.  Smith,  4 
Bush  (Ky.)  379;  BerryhlU  v.  McKee,  3  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  157;  Porter  v.  Burton. 
10  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  584;  Gaines  v.  Patton,  8  Ark.  67;  Morris  v.  Morris,  5 
Mich.  171;  Caswell  v.  Comstock,  6  Mich.  391;  Enos  v.  Sutherland,  9  Mich, 
148;   Gates  v.  Salmon,  28  Cal.  320. 

i72Forgay  v.  Conrad,  6  How.  201,  12  L.  Ed.  404;  Beebe  v.  Russell,  19 
How.  283.  15  L.  Ed.  668;  Thomson  v.  Dean,  7  WnU.  342,  19  L.  Ed.  94: 
Mills  V.  Hoag,  7  Paige  (N.  Y.)  18,  31  Am.  Dec.  271;  Taylor  v.  Read,  4  Paige 
(X.  Y.)  561;  Dickenson  v.  Cod  wise,  11  Paige  (N.  Y.)  189;  Coithe  v.  Crane, 
1  Barb.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  21;  Harvey  v.  Branson.  1  Leigh  (Va.)  108;  Rawlings* 
Ex'r  V.  Rawlings,  75  Va.  76;  Fleming  v.  Boiling,  8  Grat.  (Va.)  292;  Weather- 
ford  V.  James,  2  Ala.  170;  Bank  of  Mobile  v.  Hall,  6  Ala.  141,  41  Am.  Dee.  41; 
McKinley  v.  Irvine,  13  Ala.  681;  Hastie  v.  Aiken,  67  Ala.  313;  Bradford  v. 
Bradley's  Adm'rs,  37  Ala.  453;  Cochran  v.  Miller.  74  Ala.  50;  Ex  parte 
Elyton  Land  Co.,  104  Ala.  88,  15  South.  939;  Garry  v.  Jenkins.  109  Ala. 
471,  20  South.  8;  Mattiugly  v.  Elder  (Ky.)  44  S.  W.  215;  McFarland  v.  HalPs 
Heirs,  17  Tex.  676;  Merle  v.  Andrews,  4  Tex.  200;  Meek  v.  Mathls,  1  Heisk. 
(Tenn.)  534;  Ex  parte  Crittenden,  10  Ark.  333;  Tejiff  v.  Hewitt,  1  Ohio  St. 
511,  59  Am.  Dec.  634;  Guardian  Savings  Bank  v.  Reilly,  8  Mo.  App.  514; 
Damouth  v.  Klock.  28  Mich.  163;  Neall  v.  Hill,  16  Cal.  145,  76  Am.  Dec. 
508.  The  distinction  above  formulated  is  well  brought  out  in  a  decision  of 
Chancellor  Walworth,  from  which  we  quote  as  follows:  "A  decree  never  can 
be  said  to  be  final  when  it  is  Impossible  for  the  party  in  whose  favor  the 
decision  is  made  ever  to  obtain  any  benefit  therefrom  without  again  setting 
the  cause  down  for  hearing  before  the  court,  upon  the  equity  reserved,  upon 
the  coming  in  and  confirmation  of  the  report  of  the  master,  to  whom  it  is 
referred  to  ascertain  certain  facts  which  are  absolutely  necessary  to  be  as- 
certained before  the  case  is  finally  disposed  of  by  the  com"t,  or  which  the 
chaucellor  thinks  proper  to  have  ascertained  before  he  grants  any  relief  what- 
(G4) 


Ch.  2)       FINAL   AND   INTERLOCUTORY  JUDGMENTS    AMD   DECREES.  §   45 

To  take  a  single  illustration, — the  reference  of  a  case  to  a  master,  to 
take  an  account  upon  evidence,  and  for  the  examination  of  the  par- 
ties, and  to  make  or  refuse  allowances  affecting  the  rights  of  the  par- 
ties, and  to  report  his  results  to  the  court,  is  not  a  final  decree.  For 
his  report  is  subject  to  exceptions  from  either  side,  which  must  be 
brought  to  the  notice  of  the  court  before  it  can  be  available.  It  can 
only  be  made  so  by  the  court's  overruling  the  exceptions,  or  by  an 
order  confirming  the  report,  with  a  final  decree  for  its  appropriation 
and  payment.*'* 

i  45.    Dlreotias  an  Aooonnt. 

According  to  the  rules  just  stated,  a  decree  directing  an  account 
to  be  taken  is  generally  interlocutory;  *^*  that  is,  unless  all  the  steps 

ever  to  the  complainant.  But  if  the  decree  not  only  settles  the  rights  of  the 
ptrties,  bnt  gives  all  the  consequential  directions  which  will  be  necessary 
to  a  final  disposition  of  the  cause,  upon  the  mere  confirmation  of  the  report 
of  the  master  by  a  common  order  in  the  register's  otUce,  it  is  a  final  decree 
and  may  he  em*oiled  at  the  expiration  of  thirty  days,  although  the  amount 
to  which  the  complainant  may  be  entitled  under  such  decree  is  still  to  be  as- 
certained upon  a  reference  to  a  master  for  that  purpose.  Thus,  in  the  ordi- 
nary case  oi  a  bill  for  the  foreclosure  of  a  mortgage,  if  the  decree  merely 
decides  or  declares  the  rights  of  the  complainant  by  virtue  of  his  bond  and 
iDortfage,  and  refers  it  to  a  master  to  compute  and  ascertain  the  amount 
due  to  him,  reserving  ail  further  questions  and  directions  until  the  coming 
in  and  confirmation  of  the  master's  report,  it  is  an  interlocutory  decree  merely, 
as  the  complainant  cannot  obtain  the  benefit  of  his  suit  until  he  brings  the 
cause  on  to  be  heard  again  upon  the  equity  reserved  and  for  further  di- 
rections as  to  a  sale  of  the  mortgaged  premises  and  the  payment  of  his  debt 
tnd  costs  oat  of  the  proceeds  of  such  sale.  But  if  the  decree,  in  addition 
to  the  reference  to  the  master  to  compute  the  amount  due  upon  the  bond 
and  mortgage,  proceeds  further  and  gives  the  usual  directions  in  such  cases, 
that  upon  tlie  coming  in  and  confirmation  of  the  report  of  the  master,  the 
premises  shall  be  sold,  and  that  the  master  who  makes  such  sale  shall  pay 
the  amoont  so  r^)orted  due,  together  with  the  interest  and  costs,  out  of  the 
proceeds  of  such  sale,  and  directing  the  mortgagor  to  pay  the  deficiency  re- 
ported dne  upon  such  sale,  the  decree  is  final,  although  the  mortgagor  may 
have  the  right  to  exc^t  to  the  master's  report  of  the  amount  due.  For  the 
questions  arising  upon  the  exceptions  to  the  master's  report,  in  such  a  case, 
are  merely  incidental  to  the  carrying  of  the  final  decree  in  the  cause  into 
full  effect."    Johnson  v.  Everett,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.)  U3«. 

iTtBeebe  v.  RusseU,  19  How.  283,  15  L.  Ed.  668. 

iTiLstta  V.  Kilboum,  150  U.  8.  524,  14  Sup.  Ct.  201,  37  L.  Ed.  1160; 
Motlander  v.  Fechheimer,  162  U.  B.  826,  16  Sup.  Gt.  705,  40  L.  Ed.  9S5; 
Ouarantee  Co.  of  North  America  v.  Mechanics'  Savings  Bank  &  Trust  Co., 

ilawjcdg:-5  (05) 


5  46  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  2 

to  be  taken  after  the  account  is  ascertained  are  specifically  prescribed 
in  the  decree,  with  no  equities  or  questions  reserved  and  no  further 
directions  needed.^'*  Thus,  where  a  judgment  appointed  a  referee 
who  was  to  take  an  account  of  rents  and  profits  and  improvements 
upon  land,  and  ascertain  the  present  value  of  dower,  and  upon  pay- 
ment by  the  plaintiff  of  a  certain  sum  to  be  ascertained  by  the  referee 
in  the  mode  specified  in  the  judgment,  the  referee  was  to  admeasure 
her  dower,  and  he  was  to  report  the  evidence  taken  by  him  with  his 
findings  thereon  to  the  court,  and  all  other  questions  were  reserved 
until  the  coming  in  of  such  report  and  the  final  hearing  thereon,  it 
was  held  that  this  was  not  a  final  but  an  interlocutory  judgment.*'* 

§  46.    Decree  suipendliic  Bishtg  until  further  Orders. 

Another  class  of  interlocutory  decrees  comprises  those  which  pro- 
hibit a  certain  act  to  be  done,  or  hold  the  rights  of  the  parties  in 
statu  quo,  until  the  court  shall  give  further  orders  or  directions.*'^ 
Thus  an  order  that  a  party  is  not  to  pay  a  sum  adjudged  against 
him  "until  further  ordered"  is  not  final.*'*  So  a  decree  rendered  by 
the  probate  court,  upon  the  application  of  an  executor,  by  which  a 
certain  amount  is  ascertained  to  be  in  his  hands,  a  portion  of  which 
he  is  ordered  to  pay  over  to  those  entitled  to  it,  and  to  retain  the 
balance  until  the  further  order  of  the  court,  is  not  a  final  decree.*'* 

• 

173  U.  S.  582,  1»  Sup.  Ot.  551,  43  L.  Ed.  818;  Pittsburg,  C.  &  St  Lw  R.  Co. 
V.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  10  C.  C.  A.  20,  61  Fed,  705;    Merriman  ▼.  Chicago 

6  E.  1.  R.  Co.,  12  C.  C.  A.  275,  64  Fed.  535;  McKeown  v.  Officer,  127  X. 
Y.  687,  28  N.  E.  401;  C.  &  C.  Electric  Motor  Co.  v.  Lewis,  47  IlL  App. 
576;  Kanawha  Lodge  No.  25  v.  Swann,  37  W.  Va.  176,  16  S.  E.  462;  Heffner 
V.  Day,  54  Ark.  79,  14  S.  W.  1000.  Compare  Sprague  v.  Bond,  113  N.  C. 
551,  18  8.  E.  701. 

iTo  Webber  v.  Randall,  80  Mich.  531,  50  N.  W.  877;  Hake  ▼.  Coach,  lOo 
Mich.  425,  63  N.  W.  306;  Decatur  Land  Co.  v.  Oook  (Ala.)  27  South.  559: 
AlUson  y.  Drake,  145  111.  500,  32  N.  E.  537. 

1T6  Raynor  v.  Raynor,  04  N.  Y.  248.  And  see  Jackson  County  v.  Gullatt. 
M  Ala.  243,  3  South.  906;  Beebe  v.  Russell,  19  How.  283,  15  L.  Ed.  66S: 
Johnson  v.  Everett,  9  Paige  (X.  Y.)  636. 

ITT  In  re  Turner's  Estate,  183  Pa.  543,  38  Atl.  1040;  O'Meara  v.  First  Xat 
Bank  (i<^y.)  37  S.  W.  266.  See  St.  Louis  Nat  Bank  T.  Bloch,  44  La.  Ann. 
^93,  11  South.  466. 

iTSTlnley  v.  Martin,   80  Ky.  463. 
[     1T9  Khodes  V.  Turner,  21  Ala.  210. 


Ch.  2)         FINAL    AND  INTERLOCUTORY  JUDGMENTS   AND   DECREES.  §  48 


§  47.    Deereo  dlssolTins  PavtaerBlUp. 

Where  a  bill  in  equity  is  brought  for  an  accounting  between  part- 
ners and  for  a  termination  of  the  partnership,  the  first  decree,  dis- 
solving the  partnership  and  directing  accounts  to  be  taken,  is  gen- 
erally only  interlocutory.^**  But  a  decree  dissolving  a  partnership, 
which  directs  an  accounting  and  a  sale  of  the  firm's  assets,  and  specif- 
ically states  the  manner  of  their  distribution,  is  final.***  Where, 
upon  a  bill  for  the  settlement  of  partnership  accounts,  the  decree 
leaves  unsettled  the  equities  as  to  two  items  of  account,  as  to  which 
a  reference  is  ordered,  it  cannot  be  considered  a  final  decree.*** 

i  48.    Foreclosure  of  Morts^Be. 

Upon  a  bill  for  the  foreclosure  of  a  mortgage,  if  the  decree  ascer- 
tains the  validity  of  the  mortgage  and  the  amount  of  the  debt,  orders 
a  sale  of  the  mortgaged  premises,  describing  them,  for  satisfaction 
of  such  debt,  directs  that  the  sum  due  on  the  mortgage  with  interest 
and  costs  be  paid  over  to  the  mortgagee  out  of  the  proceeds  of  the 
sale,  and  adjudges  that  the  defendant  make  good  any  deficiency 
which  may  be  found  to  exist  after  the  sale,  then  the  decree  is  final 
and  complete ;  for  it  leaves  nothing  to  be  adjudicated  or  reviewed  by 
the  court.*"  But  if  the  decree  does  not  ascertain  the  amount  due; 
or  if  it  orders  a  sale  but  does  not  give  any  direction  as  to  the  dispo- 
sition of  the  proceeds ;  or  if  it  reserves  the  question  of  the  distribu- 
tion of  the  fund,  in  order  to  adjust  conflicting  claims  or  liens;  or  if, 

without  ordering  a  sale,  it  directs  the  cause  to  stand  continued  for 

• 

iBOGray  v.  Palmer.  9  Cal.  616;  Kingsbury  v.  Kingsbury,  20  Mich.  212; 
Ktiodes  V.  WllUaius.  12  Xev.  20;  Huntington  v.  Moore,  1  N.  M.  471;  Cocke's 
Admr  y.  GUpln,   1   Rob.   (Va.)  20. 

1*1  Clark  v.  I>unnam,  46  Cal.  204;  Evans  v.  Dunn,  26  Oliio  St.  439;  Ar- 
nold v.  Sinclair,  11  Mont.  556,  29  Pac.  340,  28  Am.  St  Rep.  489. 

i»«  Gamer  v.  l»rewltt,  32  Ala.  13. 

i»»Myer«  v.  Manny.  63  111.  211;  Morris  r.  Morange,  38  N.  Y.  172;  Baker 
T.  Lehman,  Wrlgbt  K>hlo)  522;  Ray  v.  Law,  3  Crancb,  179,  2  L.  Ed.  4(M; 
wnitlng  V.  Bank  of  United  States,  13  Pet.  6,  10  L.  Ed.  33;  Bronson  y.  La 
Crosse  Sc  M.  U.  R.  Co.,  2  Black,  524,  17  L.  Ed.  347;  Jobnson  v.  Everett, 
»  Paige  iS.  y.)  636:  May  v.  Ball  (Ky.)  56  S.  W.  7.  Compare  Allen  v. 
BHclies,  2  Uen.  Hl  M.  (Va.)  595;   Malone  v.  Marriott,  64  Ala.  486. 

(67) 


§  49  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch    2 

further  order  and  decree  upon  the  coming  in  of  a  master's  report, 
then,  and  in  any  such  case,  it  is  merely  interlocutory.^®*  It  is  to  be 
observed  that  the  judgment  for  the  deficiency  arising  on  a  sale  of  the 
property,  and  directing  that  execution  may  issue  therefor,  is  not  final, 
so  as  to  be  appealable,  until  there  has  been  a  judicial  determination 
of  the  amount  of  the  deficiency  after  the  sale.*®*  But  where  a  peti- 
tion of  intervention  is  filed,  claiming  priority  over  the  mortgage  or 
other  rights  in  the  property,  a  decree  which  settles  the  rights  of  the 
intervener,  and  directs  provision  to  be  made  for  their  satisfaction 
in  the  sale  or  in  the  distribution  of  the  proceeds,  is  final  and  appeal- 
able, although  the  main  suit  has  not  reached  a  final  decree.*** 

§  49.    Sendins  Iisue  out  of  Chancery. 

An  order  in  equity  sending  an  issue  of  fact  to  be  tried  in  the  law 
court  is  of  course  interlocutory.  In  itself  it  determines  nothing.  It 
is  merely  preparatory  to  a  final  decree.*®^  And  the  same  is  true  of 
a  judgment  rendered  on  a  feigned  issue  directed  out  of  chancery.*** 
And  on  similar  principles,  an  order  of  a  probate  court  adjudging  that 
parties  have  the  right  to  have  issues  to  determine  the  validity  of  a  will 
transmitted  to  a  law  court  for  trial  by  jury,  and  framing  and  trans- 
mitting such  issues,  is  not  a  final  order.*** 

18*  Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Simmons,  123  U.  S.  52,  8  Sup.  Ct. 
58,  31  U  Ed.  73;  Johnson  v.  Everett,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.)  636;  WilUams  v. 
Walker,  107  N.  C.  334,  12  S.  E.  43;  Illinois  Trust  &  Savings  Bank  v.  Pacific 
Ry.  Co.,  y»  Cal.  407,  33  Pac.  1132.  An  order  denying  an  application  for  the 
appointment  of  a  special  master  to  sell  mortgaged  premises  is  not  appealable 
before  rendition  of  a  linal  decree  of  foreclosure.  American  Inv.  Co.  v.  Xye, 
40  Neb.  720,  59  N.  W.  355,  42  Am.  «t.  Rep.  692.  See  Riddle  v.  Hudgins, 
7  C.  C.  A.  335,  58  Fed.  490. 

185  Kggieston  V.  Morrison,  185  111.  577,  57  N.  B.  775;  Parmele  ▼.  Schroeder, 
59  Neb.  553,  81  N.  W.  506. 

i8«  Central  lYust  Co.  v.  Marietta  &  N.  G.  R.  Co.,  1  C.  O.  A.  116,  48  Fed. 
850;  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Madden,  17  C.  C.  A.  236,  70  Fed,  451;  Moulton 
V.  Cornish,  138  N.  Y.  133,  33  N.  E.  842,  20  L.  R.  A.  370. 

18T  Dabbs  V.  Dabbs,  27  Ala.  646;  Eames  v.  Eames,  16  Pick.  (Mass.)  141. 

laswoodside  v.  Woodslde,  21  111.  207. 

189  Dugan  V.  Northcutt,  7  App.  D.  C.  351. 

^68) 


Oh.  3)  JUDGMENTS   BY   OONFESBIOM.  S  50 


JUDGMENTS  BY  CONFESSION. 

i    50.  Confession  of  Judgment  in  Pending  Suit 

51.  Confession  of  Judgment  without  Action. 

52.  Authorized  by  Statutes. 

53.  Court  must  have  Jurisdiction. 
M.  Who  may  confess  Judgment. 

'   55.  Confession  by  Married  Woman. 

56.  Married  Woman  as  Creditor. 

57.  Confession  by  Partner.  • 
5H.  Joint  Defendants. 

59.  By  Officers  of  a  Corporation. 

tiO.  Consent  of  Creditor  is  necessary. 

()1.  Requisites  of  Warrant  of  Attorney. 

«la.  Revocation  or  Expiration  of  Warrant. 

(&!.  Affidavit  that  Debt  is  due. 

(53.  Statement  of  the  Indebtedness. 

64.  Signature  to  Statement. 

65.  Verification  of  Statement. 
66i  Amendment  of  Statement 

67.  Judgment  voidable  for  Failure  to  comply  with  Statute. 

68.  Valid  between  Parties. 

69.  For  what  Judgment  may  be  confessed. 

70.  Debt  not  yet  due. 

71.  For  Future  Advances. 

72.  For  contingent  Lriabilities. 

73.  Amount  of  the  Judgment. 

74.  Liquidation  of  Amount  by  Cleric. 

75.  inclusion  of  Attorney's  Fees. 

76.  Recording  the  Judgment. 

77.  Reversing  and  Vacating  Judgments  by  Confession. 

78.  Effects  of  confessed  Judgment 

i  50.    Conf  euion  of  Jvdsment  in  Pendins  Suit* 

All  judgments  rendered  upon  the  confession  of  the  defendant  may 
be  divided  into  two  classes :  I.  Those  entered  in  an  action  regularly 
commenced  by  the  issuance  and  service  of  process;  2.  Those  en- 
tered upon  the  confession  of  the  defendant,  or  his  warrant  of  attor- 
ney, without  the  institution  of  an  action.  The  former  class  of  judg- 
ments are  well  known  to  the  common  law  and  must  be  tested  and 

(69) 


' 


§   50  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  3 

sustained  by  rules  and  principles  existing  independently  of  statutes, 
while  judgments  of  the  latter  class  derive  all  their  efficacy  from  posi- 
tive law  and  must  conform,  in  order  to  be  valid,  to  all  the  requirements 
and  formalities  set  up  by  the  legislature.     It  is  frequently  a  matter 
of  importance  to  determine  whether  a  particular  judgment  belongs 
to  one  class  or  the  other,  because,  if  not  covered  by  the  statute,  it 
is  not  impeachable  for  lack  of  an  affidavit,  statement  of  indebtedness, 
or  other  support  required  by  the  act.     This  distinction  is  recognized 
by  the  authorities.     Thus  a  statute  which  provides  that  any  person 
may,  without  process,  appear  in  person  or  by  attorney  and  confess 
judgment  for  any  bona  fide  debt,  but  in  such  case  a  petition  shall  be 
filed,  and  other  acts  be  done,  does  not  apply  to  cases  where  the  part}' 
is  regularly  cited,  but  only  to  cases  of  voluntary  appearance  without 
process.*     So  where  a  defendant  accepts  service  of  process  and  after- 
wards confesses  judgment,  the  plaintiff's  affidavit  of  the  justness  of 
the  claim,  required  in  the'  case  of  confession  without  action,  is  held 
to  be  unnecessary.^     Now  judgments  entered  for  the  plaintiff  upon 
the  defendant's  admission  of  the  facts  and  law,  as  the  same  are 
known  to  the  common  law  and  exist  independently  of  statutes,  are 
of  two  varieties;   first,  judgment  by  cognovit  actionem,  and  second, 
by  confession  relicta  verificatione.     In  the  former  case  the  defendant, 
after  service,  instead  of  entering  a  plea,  acknowledges  and  confesses 
that  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  is  just  and  rightful.     In  the  lat- 
ter case,  ^fter  pleading  and  before  trial,  the  defendant  both  confesses 
the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  and  withdraws  or  abandons  his  plea  or 
other  allegations,  whereupon  judgment  is  entered  against  him  with- 
out proceeding  to  trial.^     In  order  to  sustain  a  judgment  of  either  of 
these  sorts,  it  is  essential  that  process,  regularly  issued,  should  have 
been  served  upon  the  defendant  (though  he  may  accept  service  with 
the  same  effect  as  if  the  writ  had  been  served  as  it  usually  is  *) ;  and 
an  agreement  in  w-riting  made  out  of  court,  authorizing  the  clerk  to 

1  Schroeder  v.  PYomme,  31  Tex.  602,  And  see  Grouse  v.  Derbyshire.  10 
Mich.  479,  82  Am.  Dec.  51;  Goodwill  v.  Elkins.  51  I^.  Ann.  521,  25  South,  317. 

2  Gerald  v.  Burthee,  29  Tex.  202. 

8  Bouv.  Law  Diet.  voc.  Judgment.  As  to  judgments  by  consent,  see  Ed- 
wards V.  inimer  (Tenn.)  47  S.  W.  144;  Goodrich  v.  Alfred,  72  Conn.  257,  43 
Ati.  1041. 

4  Gerald  v.  Burthee,  29  Tex.  202;  Hart  v.  Sarvis,  3  Ohio  N.  P.  316w 

(70) 


Ch.  3)  JUDGMENTS   BY    CONFESSION.  §   51 

enter  up  such  a  judgment,  will  not  sustain  it,  where  there  has  been 
no  appearance  by  the  defendant.*  A  judgment  by  cognovit,  after 
process  has  been  served,  may  be  entered  in  vacation,  without  a 
judge's  or  commissioner's  order,  and  without  affidavits.*  The  other 
species  of  judgment  by  confession,  relicta  verificatione,  is  also  not 
unknown  to  modern  practice.  Thus,  where  a  judgment  recited  that 
**the  defendants,  by  leave  of  court,  withdraw  their  pleas  and  say  that 
they  cannot  deny  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  against  them,  for  debt 
and  interest  in  plaintiff's  petition  claimed,"  it  was  held  that  this  was 
in  effect  a  confession  of  judgment,  and  a  jury  was  not  required  to 
ascertain  the  amount.^  It  is  also  said  that  where  a  party  confesses 
judgment  against  himseff  under  a  mistake  of  fact  as  to  what  the 
pleadings  contain,  he  may,  upon  discovering  his  error,  retract  the 
confession,  provided  it  has  not  been  recorded.* 

i  kl.    Confession  of  Jndsment  withovt  Action* 

One  method  of  confessing  a  judgment  without  action  or  process  is 
by  a  warrant  of  attorney.  This  is  an  authority  given  by  the  debtor 
to  a  named  attorney,  or  to  any  attorney  of  a  given  court  or  in  a  given 
jurisdiction,  empowering  him  to  appear  for  the  defendant  and  con- 

»  Craig  V.  Glass,  Smith  (Ind.)  27.  See  O'Neal  v.  Clymer,  21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  3»G, 
52  S.  W.  «19;  Hudson  v.  McMahon  (Ky.)  50  S.  W.  259.  Compare  Shadrack's 
Adm'r  v.  WoolfoUE,  32  Grat.  (Va.)  707. 

•  Stewart  v.  Walters,  38  N.  J.  Law,  274.  A  Judgment  by  agreement  may 
be  entered  In  open  oourt  by  the  judge  on  consent  of  the  attorney,  orally  ex- 
pressed, or  may  be  entered  on  the  record  without  express  sanction  of  the  court 
from  the  written  agreement  between  counsel,  duly  filed,  in  which  latter  case 
tbe  court's  assent  Is  presumed.  Beliveau  v.  Amoskeag  Mfg.  Co.,  68  N.  H. 
:J25,  40  Atl.  734,  44  L».  R.  A.  167,  73  Am.  St.  Rep.  577.  Where  a  Judgment 
is  confessed  In  open  court,  it  must  be  presumed  that  the  authority  to  confess 
was  Judicially  passed  upon  by  tbe  court.  Chicago  Tip  &  T.  Co.  v.  Chicago 
Nat.  Hank,  74  111.  App.  430.  As  to  presumption  of  authority  on  the  part  of 
defendant's  attorney  to  confess  Judgment,  see  Harper  v.  Cunningham,  5  App. 
11.  C.  2U3. 

T  Burton  r.  Lawrence,  4  Tex.  373.  And  see  Hicks  v.  Ayer,  5  Ga.  298.  The 
wltbdrawal  of  a  plea  In  abatement  on  the  day  set  for  trial,  and  the  filing  of 
an  answer  admitting  plaintiff*s  claim,  and  consenting  to  Judgment,  does  not 
render  tbe  Judgment  entered  one  by  confession.  Adler  v.  Anderson,  42  Ma 
App.  180. 

«  tfmith  r.  Kimms«  9  Ga.  418.  But  see  New  EIngland  Mortgage  Security  Co. 
y.  Tarrcr,  0  C.  C.  A.  100,  GO  Fed.  660;  Little  v.  Dyer,  35  111.  App.  85. 

(71) 


§   62  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   3 

fess  judgment  for  a  designated  amount.  This  differs  from  a  cognovit 
in  that  an  action  must  be  commenced  before  a  cognovit  can  be  given, 
but  not  before  the  execution  of  a  warrant  of  attorney.*  In  so  far  as 
this  procedure  may  be  regulated  by  statute  in  any  jurisdiction,  it 
must  of  course  comply  strictly  with  the  requirements  of  the  law.  But 
in  most  of  the  states  there  are  statutes  which  authorize  a  judgment 
to  be  entered  upon  the  confession  of  the  defendant,  without  action, 
upon  the  filing  of  a  verified  statement  showing  the  facts  out  of  which 
the  indebtedness  arose,  and  an  affidavit  that  the  debt  is  just  and 
actual,  and  sometimes  upon  the  observance  of  certain  additional  for- 
malities. This  is  by  far  the  most  usual  method  of  confessing  judg- 
ments,  and  therefore  will  principally  engage  our  attention  in  this 
chapter. 

§  52.    Authorised  by  Statutes. 

Inasmuch  as  the  proceeding  last  adverted  to  depjends  entirely 
upon  statute  for  its  validity,  it  is  evident  that  a  strict  construction 
must  be  applied  to  the  statute  and  that  its  provisions  must  be  strictly 
complied  with  in  using  the  authority  it  grants.^®  But  on  the  other 
hand,  the  judgment  must  stand  or  fall  by  the  statute  alone,  and  for- 
malities not  therein  required  are  not  essential  to  its  validity.  For 
instance,  it  is  not  necessary  to  sustain  such  a  judgment  that  a  decla- 
ration should  have  been  filed ;  the  statement  required  by  the  statute 
is  sufficient.^^  Again,  neither  a  citation  of  the  defendant  nor  a  pre- 
vious judgment  of  default  is  needed  as  a  preliminary  to  the  entry  ot 
judgment  on  his  confession."  But  in  some  states  it  is  required  that 
an  office  confession  of  judgment  be  confirmed  by  the  court  before  it 
becomes  a  judgment ;  and  under  this  rule  its  incidents  as  a  judgment 

9  Bouv.  Law  Diet,  voc.  "Judgment." 

10  Kdgar  v.  Greer,  7  Iowa,  13G;  Cliapin  v.  Thompson.  20  Cal.  G86;  Mf- 
Crairy  v.  Ware,  G  Kan.  App.  155,  51  Pac.  293;  Burr  v.  Mathers,  51  Mo.  App. 
470;  Harper  v.  Uimningham,  5  App.  D.  C.  203.  In  Virginia,  the  statute  provid- 
ing for  Judgments  by  confession  being  merely  declaratory  of  the  common  law, 
only  substantial  compliance  therewith  is  required.  Saunders  y.  Lipscomb,  SK> 
Va.  (U7,  19  S.  El  450. 

11  Johnston  v.  Glasgow,  5  Ark.  311;  Choat  v.  Bennett  11  Ark.  313;  Gayle  r. 
Foster,  Minor  (Ala.)  i:i5;  Matthews'  Lessee  v.  Thompson.  3  Ohio,  272. 

12  Marbury  v.  Pace,  29  La.  Ann.  557.  A  power  of  attorney  given  with  a 
note,  authorizing  Judgment  thereon  by  confession  without  process,  is  valid. 
Wliitton  V.  Whitton,  04  lU.  App.  53. 

(72) 


Ch.  8)  JUDGMENTS    BY   CONFESSION.  §  53 

do  not  attach  until  the  date  of  such  confirmation.^*  So,  again,  a 
provision  that  the  confession  must  be  signed  by  the  party  and  by 
witnesses  does  not  admit  of  evasion.^*  And  the  same  is  true  of  a 
requirement  that  the  debtor  shall  appear  in  person  and  confess  the 
judgment.*'  Since  a  judgment  upon  confession  is  not  in  the  nature 
of  an  adversary  proceeding,  it  is  theoretically  immaterial  whether  it 
is  entered  during  a  session  of  the  court  or  in  vacation.  And  it  may 
be  stated  as  the  rule,  unless  modified  by  the  particular  statute,  that 
a  judgment  of  this  character  may  as  well  be  entered  in  vacation  as  in 
term-time.**  So  a  warrant  of  attorney  attached  to  a  note  authorizing 
confession  of  judgment  thereon  at  any  time  after  its  date,  will  sup- 
port a  judgment  entered  in  vacation  before  the  note  was  due.*^  And 
a  judgment  confessed  in  the  clerk's  'office  on  the  morning  of  the 
first  day  of  the  term  of  court,  before  the  court  was  opened,  is  a  valid 
judgment** 

i  53.    Court  must  ItAve  Jnriidiotloii* 

Although  a  judgment  by  confession  is  to  a  certain  extent  founded 
on  the  agreement  of  the  parties,  instead  of  a  direct  adjudication  by 
the  court,  it  is  none  the  less,  on  that  account,  a  judicial  act.  And 
since  their  consent  cannot  create  a  jurisdiction  in  excess  or  contra- 
vention of  that  conferred  by  law,  it  is  equally  essential  to  the  validity 
of  a  judgment  of  this  character  as  to  any  other  that  it  be  entered  in  a 
court  having  jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter.     As  it  is  to  have  all 

IS  Bass  T.  Kstlil,  50  Miss.  300.  Miner's  Code  Iowa.  S§  176,  177,  providing 
that  judgments  by  confession  shall  be  signed  by  the  judge,  is  merely  directory, 
and  a  failure  to  sign  does  not  vitiate  the  judgment.  Dullard  v.  Phelan,  83 
Iowa,  471,  50  N.  \V.  204. 

1*  Beach  v.  Botsford,  1  Doug.  (Mich.)  199,  40  Am.  Dec.  145. 

laRonehrough  v.  Ansley,  35  Ohio  St  107.  See  Reed  v.  Hamet.  4  Watts 
(Pa.)  441. 

!•  Pickett  v.  Thruston.  7  Ark.  397;  Kellogg  v.  Keith,  4  111.  App.  380.  Com- 
pare Pond  V.  Simons,  17  Ind.  App.  84,  45  N.  E.  48.  A  power  of  attorney  au- 
thorizing confession  of  judgment  "as  of  any  term"  does  not  authorize  the  entry 
of  judgment  In  vacation.  Graves  v.  Whitney,  49  111.  App.  435;  Whitney  v. 
Bohlvn,  157  111.  571,  42  N.  E.  162. 

17  Towle  V.  Gonter,  5  IlL  App.  409.  But  it  is  said  that  a  judgment  cannot  be 
roof(>«iHed  on  the  day  a  warrant  of  attorney  and  note  bear  date,  although  the 
note  is  payable  on  demand.     Waterman  v.  Jones,  28  111.  54. 

I*  Brown  v.  Hume,  1«  Grat  (Va.)  45tJ. 

(73) 


§  53  LAW  OP  JUDOMBNT8.  (Ch.  3 

the  incidents  and  consequences  of  any  other  judgment,  and  to  have 
the  sanction  of  the  law  and  the  authority  of  the  couft  behind  it,  it 
will  be  invalid  unless  the  court  where  it  is  entered  might  lawfully 
have  rendered  the  same  judgment  in  a  contested  action.^*  And 
where  the  authority  of  an  inferior  court,  as  that  of  a  justice  of  the 
peace,  to  enter  judgments  upon  confession,  is  limited  by  law  or 
hedged  round  with  prescribed  formalities,  it  must  clearly  appear  upon 
the  face  of  his  record  that  the  particular  confession  came  within  the 
limitations  and  that  the  requirements  of  the  statute  were  distinctly 
met  and  complied  with.*®  Yet  after  a  confession  of  judgment  with- 
out exception  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  particular  court  (the  subject- 
matter  being  within  its  general  competence),  the  judgment  rendered 
is  valid.*^  And  a  judgment  entered  in  the  district  court,  by  virtue  of 
a  warrant  of  attorney  authorizing  the  entry  of  such  judgment  in  the 
court  of  common  pleas,  those  courts  having  concurrent  jurisdiction, 
cannot  be  set  aside  as  erroneous  at  the  instance  of  a  subsequent  judg- 
ment-creditor.** Such  authority,  however,  will  not  run  into  another 
state.  Thus  a  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  a  judgment,  executed 
in  one  state  between  parties  residing  there  and  by  its  terms  to  be  ren- 
dered there,  will  not  support  a  judgment  entered  in  another  state.** 

i»  Lanning  v.  Carpenter,  23  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  402.  So  where  it  is  required  by 
law  that  the  execution  of  a  power  of  attorney  to  confess  Judgment  be  proved 
before  the  Judgment  Is  confessed,  such  proof  must  affirmatively  appear  of 
record;  otherwise  the  court  would  have  no  Jurisdiction  of  the  person  of  tbe 
maker,  and  the  Judgment  would  be  invalid.  Rapley  v.  Price,  9  Ark.  428.  In 
some  states  it  is  held  that  a  Judgment  by  confession  can  be  entered  only  in  a 
court  having  Jurisdiction  of  the  county  or  district  where  the  defendant  resides^ 
and  where  alone  a  personal  Judgment  might  be  recovered  against  him  In  a 
contested  action.  Ex  parte  Ware  Furniture  Co.,  49  S.  C.  20,  27  S.  K  9;  Mc- 
Clure  V.  Bowles,  5  Ohio  N.  P.  327.  But  elsewhere  the  doctrine  prevails  that  a 
confessed  Judgment  is  valid  if  entered  in  a  court  having  Jurisdiction  of  the 
subject-matter,  and  within  the  state  where  the  note  and  warrant  were  made, 
without  regard  to  the  defendant's  place  of  residence*  and  even  though  he 
may  have  removed  from  the  state.  Kitchen  v.  Bellefontaine  Nat.  Bank,  5& 
Kan.  242,  36  Pac.  344,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  282. 

20  Spear  v.  Carter,  1  Mich.  19,  48  Am.  Dec.  688;  Tenny  v.  Filer,  8  Wend, 
(N.  y.)  569;  Camp  v.  Wood,  10  Watts  (Pa.)  118. 

21  Kelly  V.  Lyons,  40  La.  Ann.  498,  4  South.  480. 

22  Hauer's  Appeal,  5  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  473. 

28  Manufacturers*  &  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Boyd,  3  Denio  (N.  Y.)  257.     Bnt  a 
Judgment  upon  the  confession  of  the  defendant  which  is  valid  In  the  state 
(74) 


Ch.  3)  JUDGMENTS   BY  CONFESSION.  §  54 

Authority  to  confess  judgment  under  a  power  of  attorney  is  not  ex- 
hausted by  a  confession  of  a  judgment  which  is  subsequently  re- 
versed, but  another  may  be  confessed  under  the  same  power.  "The 
intention  of  the  power  had  not  been  carried  out,  consequently  the 
object  was  not  accomplished,  and  the  authority  was  not  exhausted 
by  the  first  act."  **  A  more  difficult  question  arises  in  the  case  where 
a  judgment  by  confession  is  entered  upon  a  bond  and  warrant  of  at- 
torney in  one  county,  and  afterwards,  such  judgment  remaining  in 
force  and  unsatisfied,  a  second  judgment  upon  the  same  bond  and 
warrant  is  entered  in  another  county.  Here  it  would  seem  that  the 
authority  conferred  by  the  warrant  was  fully  satisfied  by  the  first 
confession  and  nothing  remained  to  sustain  the  second.  But  since 
this  would  not  appear  upon  the  face  of  the  proceedings,  the  second 
judgment  would  not  be  absolutely  void,  but  at  most  irregular.  It 
would  be  vacated  or  set  aside  upon  application  to  the  court  in  which 
it  was  entered,  but  the  want  of  authority  to  enter  the  second  judg- 
ment could  not  be  taken  advantage  of  on  a  writ  of  error.  In  the 
meantime,  if  a  sheriff's  sale  was  had. under  the  second  judgment,  the 
purchaser  would  no  doubt  take  a  good  title ;  but  in  that  case  the  at- 
torney who  entered  the  judgment,  or  the  obligee  of  the  bond,  if  it 
was  entered  bv  him,  would  be  answerable.** 

S  54.    WHo  Miaj  oonfeu  Judgment. 


As  a  general  rule,  any  person  may  give  a  confession  of  judgment 
against  whom  the  same  judgment  might  lawfully  have  been  pro- 
nounced by  the  court  as  the  result  of  a  suit  regularly  instituted  and 

where  it  Is  entered  Is  equally  valid  in  every  other  state.  Coleman  v.  Waters, 
13  W.  Va.  278.  And  a  warrant  of  attorney  may  be  so  drawn  as  to  authorize 
a  confession  of  judgment  in  a  foreign  state.  Van  Norman  v.  Gordon,  172 
Mass.  57(5,  53  N.  E.  2(J7,  44  L.  R.  A.  840,  70  Am.  St.  Rep.  304.  Thus,  it  is 
held  that  if  the  authority  is  to  confess  judgment  **in  any  court  of  record," 
it  may  be  executed  in  any  state  in  the  Union.  Pirie  v.  Stem,  97  Wis.  :150,  72 
X.  W.  370.  «5  Am.  St.  Rep.  103;  First  Nat  Bank  v.  McKinney.  16  Ohio  Cir. 
(\,  R.  80.  See  First  Xat.  Bank  v.  (larland,  109  Mich.  515.  67  N.  W.  5r)9,  33 
L.  R.  A,  83,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  697.  Compare  Davis  v.  Packer,  8  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 
R.  107. 

«•  Uuner  v.  i>oolittle,  3  (}.  (ireene  (Iowa)  76,  54  Am.  Dec.  489. 

»  Martin  v.  Rex,  H  Serg.  &  R.  (l»a.)  296;  Neff  v.  Barr,  14  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.) 
KjU;  and  see  also  Livezly  v.  Pennock,  2  Browne  (Pa.)  321. 

(75) 


§   54  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  3 

contested.  The  only  difficulty  occurs  in  the  case  of  persons  who  are 
under  disabilities ;  and  here  it  must  be  remarked  that  if  the  disability 
of  infancy  or  coverture  is  merely  a  personal  privilege  which  may  be 
waived,  then  the  confession  of  a  judgment  is  as  explicit  a  waiver  as 
could  well  be  imagined,  but  if,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  regarded  as 
an  absolute  incapacity  to  contract  debts,  or  certain  kinds  of  debts, 
then  a  confession  of  judgment  is  merely  a  futile  attempt  to  give  valid- 
ity to  that  which  by  law  can  have  none.  It  has  been  said  that  a  war- 
rant of  attorney  to  confess  judgment  executed  by  a  minor  is  under 
all  circumstances  entirely  void.**  But  this  statement  U  probably  too 
strong.  The  marked  tendency  of  the  authorities,  as  we  shall  see 
hereafter,*^  is  to  regard  a  judgment  agaiilst  an  infant  duly  before  the 
court  as  valid  and  effectual  for  all  purposes,  unless  indeed  time  is 
given  to  him  to  show  cause  against  it  after  his  majority.  And  if  his 
defense  of  infancy  is  taken  away  by  his  failure  duly  to  plead  it  when 
sued,  it  is  certain  that  it  is  equally  waived  by  his  voluntary  confession 
of  judgment.  The  case  of  confessions  by  married  women  we  reserve 
for  the  succeeding  section. 

In  regard  to  parties  plaintiff  in  confessions  of  judgment  the  parallel 
rule  appHes.**  In  cases  where  the  debtor  is  an  officer  of  the  court 
in  which  the  confession  is  entered,  no  difficulty  has  been  experienced 
in  sustaining  the  judgment.  Thus,  under  a  statute  providing  that 
judgments  may  be  confessed  in  the  clerk's  office,  and  when  recorded 
by  him  shall  be  valid,  the  clerk,  acting  as  a  ministerial  officer,  may 
enter  a  judgment  by  confession  against  himself.**  And  it  is  even 
held  that  a  judge,  in  a  suit  in  his  own  court  to  which  he  is  a  party, 

26  Knox  v.  Flack,  22  Pa.  337.  Compare  Ziogler  v.  Evans,  8  Kulp  (Pa.) 
ISO. 

27  See  infra,  §§  193,  196. 

28  A  warrant  of  attorney  In  a  note  to  confess  judgment  In  favor  of  the  payee 
Is  available  to  his  administrator.  Drake  v.  Simpson  (Ohio)  30  Wkly.  Law 
Bui.  23G.  If  the  warrant  does  not  specify  the  person  in  whose  favor  Judg- 
ment is  to  be  entered,  it  may  be  in  favor  of  the  legal  holder  of  the  note  at  the 
time  of  entry.  Shepherd  v.  Wood,  73  111.  App.  486.  A  a  to  confessions  in 
favor  of  partners,  see  Mahaffey  v.  Rogers,  10  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  R.  24.  A  person 
may  confess  Judgment  for  money  due  the  state  as  well  as  to  an  IndlviduaL 
State  V.  Love,  23  X.  C.  264. 

2»  Smith  V.  Mayo,  83  Va.  910,  5  S.  E.  276w 

(7G) 


Ch.  8}  JUDGMENTS   BY   CONFESSION.  §   55 

may  confess  a  judgment  against  himself. •^  Of  course  any  person 
who  may  himself  give  a  valid  confession  of  judgment  may  delegate 
his  power  to  that  intent  to  another.  Such  authorization  of  a  third 
person  is  commonly  seen  in  warrants  of  attorney,  but  may  also  be 
otherwise  conferred.  The  authority  of  an  attorney  appearing  in 
open  court,  it  is  said,  will  be  presumed  to  be  regular  until  the  con- 
trary is  shown,  but  in  vacation  his  authority  to  confess  judgment 
must  affirmatively  appear  and  no  presumption  will  be  indulged  in 
favor  of  it.*^  On  the  same  general  principle,  an  agent,  within  the 
scope  of  his  authority,  may  confess  judgment  against  his  principal.'* 
If  the  agent  transcends  his  authority  and  confesses  judgment  for  a 
sum  greater  than  is  actually  due,  it  may  be  a  question  whether  the 
principal  is  bound  at  all.  But  it  has  been  held  that  in  such  a  case, 
the  judgment  is  valid  for  the  real  debt  and  void  only  as  to  the  ex- 
cess.'* It  is  also  held  that  a  trustee  cannot  bind  the  trust  estate  by 
a  confession  of  judgment.** 

{  55.  Conf eflitoB  bj  Married  Womuiii* 


In  regard  to  the  power  of  a  married  woman  to  bind  herself  by  a 
confession  of  judgment,  we  find  the  greatest  difference  of  opinion  in 
the  authorities.  In  fact  it  is  impossible  to  formulate  a  general  rule ; 
the  question  must  ultimately  be  referred  to  the  statutes  in  the  several 
states  regulating  her  status  and  rights.  In  proportion  as  the  feme 
covert  is  emancipated  from  the  rigors  of  the  common  law,  her  power 
to  confess  judgment  increases  in  respect  to  the  variety  of  obligations 
upon  which  it  may  be  exercised.    The  only  safe  generalization  seems 

8*  Hiomton  T.  Lane,  11  Ga.  459. 

^i  Martin  v.  Judd,  dO  lU.  78.    See  Jarrett  v.  Andrews,  19  Ind.  403. 

<3  Parker  v.  Poole,  12  Tex.  86.  A  municipal  officer,  liable  to  suit  on  a  con- 
tract made  by  him  on  behalf  of  the  public,  may  confess  Judgment  for  the 
amount  due.  Gere  v.  Cayuga  County  Sup'rs,  7  How.  Prac.  237;  Maneval  v. 
Jackson  Tt>..  9  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  28.  A  Judgment  against  a  vessel  as  a  sub- 
ttantive  party  and  her  owners,  by  confession  of  the  master  of  the  boat,  Is 
erroneous.    Waas^  v.  English,  17  Ark.  480. 

«»  Davenport  v.  Wright,  51  Pa.  292. 

»*  Malloiy  V.  Clark,  20  How.  Prac.  418.  As  to  confessions  by  executors,  see 
In  re  (lagbom*s  Estate,  181  Pa,  600,  37  Atl.  918,  59  Am.  St.  Rep.  680.  By 
attignees  for  benefit  of  creditors,  see  Packer  v.  Roberts,  140  lU.  9,  671,  29 
N.  E.  668t 

(77) 


§   65  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  3 

to  be,  that  she  cannot  confess  a  judgment  for  any  debt  for  which  she 
could  not  be  made  liable  by  judgment  rendered  in  invitum.  In  Penn- 
sylvania, the  bond  of  a  married  woman,  though  she  join  in  it  with  her 
husband,  is  held  to  be  absolutely  void,  and  a  judgment  entered  on 
such  bond  by  virtue  of  a  warrant  of  attorney  annexed  thereto,  ex- 
ecuted by  the  wife  together  with  her  husband,  is  also  void  as  respects 
the  wife  and  her  estate."  According  to  the  late  authorities,  there 
is  but  one  exception  to  this  rule,  viz.:  In  the  case  where  the  note 
upon  which  the  judgment  is  confessed  is  given  for  the  purchase- 
money  of  land  conveyed  to  her,  and  forms  part  of  the  transaction; 
the  judgment  will  then  be  a  valid  lien  against  the  land,  though  not  a 
charge  against  the  woman  personally.'*  On  the  other  hand,  where 
a  statute  gives  to  married  women  the  right  to  sue  and  be  sued  in  the 
same  manner  as  if  sole,  a  married  woman  may  confess  a  judgment 
to  secure  a  debt  contracted  by  her,  and  for  her  use  and  benefit,  in 
carrying  on  her  separate  business.*^     In  other  jurisdictions,  the  stat- 

8  6  Dorrance  v.  Scott,  3  Whart.  (Pa.)  309.  31  Am.  Dec.  509;  Graham  v.  Long. 
65  Pa.  383;  Caldwell  v.  Walters.  18  Pa.  79,  55  Am.  Dec.  592;  Helper  v, 
Helfricker,  42  Pa.  325;  Keen  v.  Coleman,  39  Pa.  299,  80  Am.  Dee.  524;  Bnin- 
ner's  Appeal,  47  Pa.  67;  Finley's  Appeal,  67  Pa.  453;  Swayne  v.  I-yon,  67 
Pa.  436;  Steinman  v.  Ewlng,  43  Pa.  63;  Glyde  v.  Kelster,  32  Pa.  85: 
8hallcros8  t.  Smith,  81  Pa.  132.  But  now  in  Pennsylvania  by  the  Act  of 
June  3,  1887,  {  2  (P.  L.  p.  333),  "a  married  woman  shall  be  capable  of  enter- 
ing into  and  rendering  herself  liable  upon  any  contract  relating  to  any  trade 
or  business  in  which  she  may  engage,  or  for  necessaries,  and  for  the  use, 
enjoyment,  and  improvement  of  her  separate  estate,  and  for  suing  and  being 
sued,  either  upon  such  contracts  or  for  torts  done  to  or  committed  by  her, 
in  all  respects  as  if  she  were  a  feme  sole,  and  her  husband  need  not  be 
Joined  with  her  as  plaintiff  or  defendant,  or  be  made  a  party  to  any  ac^ 
tion,  suit,  or  legal  proceeding  of  any  kind  brought  by  or  against  her  in  her 
Individual  right."  This  statute  is  construed,  with  reference  to  confessicMis 
of  Judgment,  in  Real-Estate  Inv.  Co.  v.  Roop,  132  Pa.  496,  19  Atl.  278,  7  I* 
R.  A.  211.     And  see  Harris  v.  Reinhard,  165  Pa.  36,  30  Atl.  510. 

aoChrlstner  v.  Hochstetler,  109  Pa.  27;  Quiuu's  Appeal  80  Pa.  447;  Brun- 
ner's  Appeal,  47  Pa.  67.  See,  also,  Tbornhill  v.  State  Nat.  Bank,  34  La.  Ann. 
1171. 

3T  First  Xat.  Bank  v.  Oarllnghouse,  53  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  615.  See  Code  Civ. 
Proc.  N.  Y.  §  1273.  Compare  Watkins  v.  Abrahams,  24  X.  Y.  72.  A  Judg- 
ment confessed  by  a  married  woman  Is  not  void  but  voidable  merelj%  and 
her  husband,  if  he  assented  to  the  sale  of  property  under  an  execution  there- 
on, is  estopped  from  afterwards  claiiuiug  it  adverselj*.  Roraback  v.  Steb- 
bins,  4  Abb.  Dec.  100,  33  How.  Prac.  278. 

(78) 


Oh.  3)  JUDGMENTS   BY   CONFESSION,  §   55 

utc,  while  enabling  a  married  woman  to  enter  into  certain  classes  of 
engagements,  forbids  her  to  make  agreements  or  contract  debts  of 
other  kinds.  Under  this  system,  "if  the  contract  of  the  married 
woman  be  such  as  a  married  woman  is  still  incapacitated  from  enter- 
ing into,  her  warrant  of  attorney  to  enter  judgment  upon  it  is  a  nul- 
lity, because  the  obligation  to  which  the  warrant  of  attorney  is  an- 
nexed is  invalid,  and  judgment  entered  in  pursuance  of  it  will  be  va- 
cated.**  But  if  the  contract  be  one  that  the  married  woman  is  en- 
abled to  make,  and  on  which  she  may  be  sued  at  law,  I  think  a  differ- 
ent result  must  be  reached.  With  respect  to  such  contracts,  any  ac- 
tion, suit,  or  proceeding  which  is  adopted  for  the  enforcement  of  the 
obligation  is  within  the  reason  and  spirit  of  the  statutes  which  confer 
the  capacity  to  contract  and  impose  liability  to  actions  at  law  thereon. 
The  obligation  being  valid,  the  warrant  of  attorney  is  simply  a  part 
of  the  procedure  to  enforce  it — ^as  much  so  as  a  suit  by  summons  or  a 
cognovit."  ••  A  confession  of  judgment  by  a  married  woman,  which 
condemos  her  to  pay  her  husband's  debt,  is  void.  Such  a  confession 
is  but  the  complement  or  consummation  of  a  pontract  which  the  law 
prohibits,  and  which  was  consequently  null.*® 

It  has  been  held  that  although  a  judgment  entered  upon  the  con- 
fession of  a  married  woman  may  be  invalid,  yet  it  is  too  late  to  raise 
that  objection  to  the  judgment  after  the  same  has  been  duly  revived 
by  proper  proceedings.  For  the  defendant  had  an  opportunity  to 
show  cause  against  the  judgment  at  the  time  of  its  revival,  and  its 
validity  was  impliedly  adjudicated  in  that  proceeding;  for  there  can 
be  no  judgment  of  revival  until  it  is  determined  that  there  is  a  valid 
judgment.**  This  proposition,  however,  has  been  denied.**  And 
indeed,  if  the  particular  judgment  was  one  which  the  woman  had  ab- 

••  Swiiis  ▼.  Woodmff,  41  X.  J.  Law,  460. 

»•  Haywood  v.  Shreve,  44  N.  J.  Law,  94.  See  further  Stevens  v.  Dubarry, 
Minor  (Ala.)  370;  Baines  v.  Burbrldge,  15  La.  Ann.  628;  Dancy  v.  Martin, 
23  La.  Ann.  323;  Henchman  v.  Roberts,  2  Har.  (Del.)  74;  Mendenhall's  £x*rs 
T.  Springer,  3  Har.  (Del.)  87;  Patton  v.  Stewart,  19  Ind.  233;  Harris  T.  Jen- 
Wna.  72  N.  C.  183;  WaUace  v.  Rippon,  2  Bay  (S.  C.)  112. 

«•  Baines  ▼.  Burbrldge,  15  La.  Ann.  628;  £dwards  v.  Edwards,  29  La.  Ann. 
£07. 

«i  Crenshaw  t.  Julian,  26  S.  C.  283,  2  S.  E.  133,  4  Am.  St.  Rep.  719. 

«>  Dormnce  ▼.  Scott,  3  Whart  (Pa.)  300,  31  Am.  Dec.  509. 

(79) 


§    66  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  3 

solutely  no  power  to  confess,  so  that  it  must  be  held  to  be  a  mere 
nullity,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  any  vitality  could  be  imparted  to  it 
by  the  mere  fact  of  revival.  No  action  will  lie  upon  a  void  judgment. 
And  a  judgment  of  revival,  passed  upon  a  nugatory  cause  of  action, 
is,  equally  with  the  judgment  revived,  merely  void. 

Another  question  not  without  difficulty,  which  arises  in  reference 
to  this  subject,  is  in  relation  to  a  judgment  entered  against  both  hus- 
band and  wife  upon  a  warrant  of  attorney  executed  by  them  jointly. 
It  has  been  held  that  such  a  judgment,  though  void  as  to  the  wife, 
will  stand  valid  as  against  the  husband.*'  But  there  are  numerous 
cases  holding  that  a  judgment  is  an  entirety,  and  if  void  as  to  one 
defendant  is  void  as  to  all ;  **  and  these  decisions  would  seem  to  ap- 
ply with  equal  weight  whatever  may  be  the  ground  of  the  invalidity. 
It  seems  certain,  however,  that  a  married  woman  may  confess  a 
judgment  for  a  valid  ante-nuptial  debt,  and  such  judgment  will  be 
conclusive  and  enforceable  against  her  as  if  rendered  by  default  or 
upon  a  verdict.**^  And  a  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  judgment, 
given  by  a  feme  sole,  is  not  revoked  by  her  subsequent  marriage,  and 
after  such  marriage  judgment  may  be  entered  up  on  it  against  the 
husband  and  wife  jointly,  leave  being  obtained  on  motion.** 

§  56.    Married  Woman  ai  Creditor* 

A  married  woman  may  take  a  cor.'ession  of  judgment,  as  sole 
plaintiff,  in  any  case  where  she  could  sue  for  the  debt  alone,  or  joint- 
ly with  her  husband  in  a  case  where  they  have  a  joint  right  of  action. 
Thus,  where  a  bond  and  warrant  of  attorney  was  given  to  a  woman 
dum  sola,  and  she  afterwards  married,  the  court,  upon  affidavit  of 
the  fact,  allowed  judgment  to  be  entered  in  favor  of  husband  and 
wife  together.*^  The  indebtedness  of  a  husband  to  his  wife,  by  note 
or  for  money  or  property,  is  a  sufficient  consideration  to  support  a 

48  Sliallcross  v.  Smith,  81  Pa.  132;  Wallace  v.  Rippon,  2  Bay  (S.  C.)  112. 

4«  See  infra,  §  211.  And  see,  as  to  Judf^meuts  by  confession,  specifically, 
Mendenhall's  Ex*rs  v.  Springer,  3  Har.  (Del.)  87. 

45  Travis  V.  Willis,  55  Miss.  557. 

4«  Baker  v.  Lultens,  35  Pa.  146;  Bneu  v.  Clark,  2  Pa.  234,  44  Am.  Dec 
VJl;  Bering  v.  Burnet,  2  Clark  (Pa.)  399. 

*T  sheble  v.  Cummins,  1  Browne  (Pa.)  253. 

(80) 


Ch.  3)  JUDGMENTS   BY   CONFESSION.  §   57 

judgment  confessed  by  him  in  the  wife's  favor  as  against  his  other 
creditors,  when  not  impeached  for  fraud,*®  And  such  a  judgment, 
admitted  to  be  honest,  will  not  be  treated  as  void  in  law  or  equity 
because  of  the  legal  unity  of  the  parties;  and  the  relation  not  ap- 
pearing in  the  record,  the  court  will  n^t,  at  the  instance  of  creditors, 
inquire  into  the  fact  of  coverture,  when  no  fraud  is  alleged.** 

f  57.    Confession  bj  "Pmrtner, 

A  member  of  a  firm  has  no  authority,  by  virtue  of  his  mere  rela- 
tion to  the  partnership  or  his  general  power  to  act  as  its  agent,  to 
confess  a  judgment  against  the  firm;  and  if  judgment  be  entered  on 
such  a  confession,  it  will  be  void  as  against  his  co-partners,  though 
binding  as  a  personal  charge  upon  himself. ^'^     And  a  confession  of 

"Thomas  v.  Mueller,  106  111.  36.  Per  contra,  Countz  v.  Markling,  30 
Ark.  17. 

^•WUUains'  Appeal,  47  Pa.  307. 

50  Biteer  v.  Shunk,  1  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  340,  37  Am.  Dec.  460;  York  Bank's 
Appeal,  3(S  Pa.  458;  Myers  v.  Sprenkle,  13  York  Leg.  Rec.  181;  Squier  v. 
Squler,  1  Lack.  Leg.  N.  103;  Williams  v.  Jones,  7  Kulp  (Pa.)  386;  Lehman 
Mach.  Co.  T.  Rood,  8  Kulp  (Pa.)  264;  Crane  v.  French,  1  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
311;  8toutenburgh  v.  Vandenburgh,  7  How.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  220;  Harper  v. 
Omningham,  8  App.  D.  C.  430;  Mills  v.  Dickson,  6  Rich.  Law  (S.  C.)  487; 
EUlott  V.  Holbrook,  33  Ala.  650;  Hopper  v.  Lucas,  86  Ind.  43;  Davenport 
Mills  Co.  V.  Chambers,  146  Ind.  156,  44  N.  B.  1100;  Chicago  Trust  &  Sav. 
Bank  t.  Kinnare,  67  HI.  App.  186;  Christy  v.  Sherman,  10  Iowa.  535;  Risser 
V.  Martin.  86  Iowa.  302,  53  X.  W.  270;  Fairbanks  v.  Kraft,  43  Mo.  App. 
m;  Burr  v.  Matbei-a,  51  Mo.  App.  470;  Soper  v.  Fry,  37  Mich.  236;  Rich- 
ardson V.  FuUer,  2  Or,  170;  Buchanan  v.  Scandia  Plow  Co.,  6  Colo.  App.  34, 
30  Pac.  800.  In  some  states,  however,  the  late  decisions  show  a  tendency 
to  relax  this  rule.  Thus,  in  Pennsylvania,  while  a  Judgment  confessed 
against  a  tlrm  by  one  partner  without  explicit  authority  from  his  copartners 
wriU  not  bind  the  other  members  of  the  firm  personally,  yet  an  execution 
issued  under  it  may  be  levied  on  property  of  the  partnership.  Adams  v. 
James  L.  Leeds  Co.,  105  Pa.  70,  45  Atl.  666;  Mcllvain  v.  James  L.  Leeds  Co., 
180  Pa.  638,  42  AU.  307;  Budd  v.  Shock,  11  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  480.  And  the 
debt  for  which  a  judgment  is  confessed  by  one  of  the  partners  in  the  name 
of  the  firm  will  be  presumed  to  be  that  of  the  firm.  Evans  v.  Watts,  102 
Ta.  112,  43  Atl.  461.  In  Illinois  and  Ohio,  a  Judgment  against  a  firm  con- 
fessed by  one  partner  without  authority  can  be  impeached  or  questioned 
only  by  the  other  partners,  not  by  creditors  of  the  firm,  unless,  perhaps, 
where  the  judgment  is  fraudulent.  McCormick  Harvesting  Mach.  Co.  v. 
«'oe.  ?»  111.  App.  488;  Browne  v.  Cassem,  74  111.  App.  305;  Berg  v.  Com- 
luercial  Xat.  Bank.  HI  111.  App.  614;  George  W.  McAlpin  Co.  v.  Finsterwald, 
1I-AWJUDG.-6  ijai) 


§   58  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  3 

judgment  under  seal,  in  the  name  of  a  partnership  and  of  a  member 
of  the  firm,  is  binding  only  upon  such  member.'^  So  a  confession 
pf  judgment  by  a  former  partner  against  the  firm,  while  good  as 
against  the  partner  confessing  it,  will  not  bind  property  assigned  by 
the  firm  to  a  remaining  partner  under  terms  of  agreement  to  pay 
firm  debts.'* 

§  58.    Joint  Defendants. 

In  a  pending  action  against  two  defendants,  one  of  them  cannot 
in  the  absence  of  the  other,  confess  judgment  against  both;  and  a 
judgment  rendered  against  both  on  the  confession  of  one  only,  with- 
out evidence,  will  be  set  aside.''  And  where  one  of  several  joint 
defendants  confesses  judgment  so  far  as  concerns  himself,  such  judg- 
ment is  only  interlocutory  until  the  final  decision  of  the  cause  as  to 
the  rest ;  and  the  confessing  defendant  must  ultimately  receive  the 
same  judgment  as  his  co-defendants."*  In  the  case  of  a  confession 
of  judgment  v^ithout  action,  a  question  has  sometimes  arisen  as  to 
the  effect  of  an  authority  for  such  judgment — whether  a  warrant  of 
attorney  or  a  statement  of  indebtedness — ^which  i«  signed  by  only  a 
part  of  the  defendants  against  whom  it  directs  the  judgment  to  be 
entered.  As  against  those  not  signing  the  authority,  the  judgment 
is  certainly  of  no  force  whatever.**^     But  whether  it  may  stand  as  a 

57  Ohio  St.  524,  49  N.  E.  784.  When  a  warrant  of  attorney  expressly  ath 
thorizes  any  attorney  of  any  court  of  record  to  appear  for  the  maker  of  a 
note  and  confess  Judgment,  the  fact  that  one  member  of  a  firm  signs  the 
declaration,  and  the  other  the  cognovit,  does  not  render  the  judgment  void. 
Blanck  v.  Medley,  63  111.  App.  211. 

61  Appeal  of  Jb'erth  Amboy  Terra-Cotta  Co.,  124  Pa.  367.  17  Ati.  4. 

82  Mair  v.  Beck  (Pa.)  2  Atl.  218;  McCleery  v.  Thompson,  130  Pa.  443,  18 
Atl.  735. 

68  Wiggins  V.  Klienhans,  9  N.  J.  Law,  249;  Ballinger  v.  Sherron.  14  N. 
J.  Law,  144;  Hutchinson  v.  Brown,  19  D.  C.  136;  Rees  v.  Richmond.  iTJ 
Law  T.  (N.  S.)  427.  Compare  Virginia  &  T.  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Fields. 
94  Va.  102,  26  S.  E.  426. 

84  Taylor  v.  Beck,  3  Rand.  (Va.)  316;  Strause  v.  Braunreuter,  21  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  K.  228.  In  New  York,  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  (section  1278).  provides 
that  a  judgment  by  confession  against  one  joint  debtor  shaU  not  bar  an 
:action  against  all  the  joint  debtora  upon  the  same  demand.  See  Harbeck 
V.  Pupln,  123  N.  Y.  115.  25  X.  E.  311. 

A5  A  joint  judgment  cannot  be  entered  on  a  several  warrant  of  attorney. 
Welntraute  v.  Solomon,  2  Marv.  (Del.)  371,  43  Atl.  267;  Liberty  Grotto  v. 

(82) 


Ch.  3)  JUDGMENTS   BY   CONFESSION.  §  59 

valid  obligation  against  those  who  did  sign,  is  not  so  clear.  In  one 
state  it  is  held,  on  the  principle  that  a  judgment  is  an  entirety,  that 
if  the  warrant  authorizes  the  entry  of  judgment  against  a  certain 
number,  no  judgment  can  be  entered  against  a  less  number,  and  it 
is  void  as  to  all.**  But  other  cases  hold,  and  we  think  with  better 
reason,  that  the  judgment  entered  will  bind  those  who  subscribed 
the  warrant,  though  nugatory  as  to  the  others.*^ 

{  59.    Bj  OAoeri  of  a  Oorporation, 

A  private  corporation  has  a  right  to  confess  judgment,  as  an  inci- 
dent to  its  power  to  sue  and  be  sued.'**  But  the  trend  of  the  modern 
decisions  is  to  the  effect  that  no  officer  of  such  a  corporation — 
whether  it  be  the  president,  secretary,  treasurer,  or  manager — has 
authority,  merely  4>y  virtue  of  his  office,  to  confess  a  judgment 
against  the  company  or  sign  a  warrant  of  attorney  for  that  purpose. 
To  do  this,  he  must  receive  authority  from  the  board  of  directors, 
or,  according  to  some  of  the  cases,  from  a  majority  of  the  stock- 
holders at  a  regular  meeting.**  But,  in  special  circumstances,  such 
authority  may  be  inferred  from  the  knowledge  and  acquiescence  of 

Mettde.  11  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  340.  And  under  a  Joint  warrant  of  attorney  an- 
nexed to  a  joint  note,  a  Judgment  cannot  be  entered  against  one  of  the 
makers  alone.  Kahn  v.  Lesser,  97  Wis.  217,  72  N.  W.  739.  See  Frank  v. 
Thomas,  35  lU.  App.  547. 

'•Chapin  y.  Thompson,  20  Cal.  681. 

»» North  V.  Mudge,  13  Iowa,  496^  81  Am.  Dec.  441;  Knox  t.  Wlnsted  Sav. 
Bank,  57  111.  330;  York  Bank's  Appeal,  36  Pa.  458.  The  statute  In  Penn- 
vylTania,  requiring  the  prothonotary  to  enter  a  Judgment  by  confession  on 
a  warrant  of  attorney  "against  the  person  or  persons  who  executed  the 
same,**  does  not  restrict  him  to  the  names  appearing  In  full  on  the  face 
of  the  warrant,  but  he  may  Inquire  who  are  the  legal  makers  of  the  In- 
ffUnment  liable  thereon,  though  they  did  not  put  their  own  hands  to  it,  and 
their  names  do  not  appear  on  its  face.  Miller  v.  Royal  Flint  Glass  Works, 
172  Pa.  70,  33  Atl.  350. 

*»Shute  V.  Ke3'8er  (Ariz.)  29  Pac.  386;  Solomon  v.  C.  M.  Schneider  &  Co., 
TMJ  Xeb.  «JSr).  77  X.  W.  Cm. 

••Stokes  V-  Xew  Jersey  I'ottei-y  Co.,  46  N.  J.  Law,  237;  Raub  v.  Blairs- 
town  Creamery  Ass'n,  56  X.  J.  I^w,  262,  28  Atl.  384;  McMurray  v.  St.  Louis 
<H1  Mamifg  Co..  33  Mo.  377;  Jackson  v.  Cartwrlght  Lumber  Co.,  2  Pa.  Dist. 
U.  m);  Ximocks  v.  Cape  Fear  Shingle  Co.,  110  N.  C.  20,  14  S.  B.  622;  P. 
I*.  Mast  Buggy  Co.  v.  Litchfield  Furniture,  Hardware  &  Implement  Co.,  55 
lU.  App.  U8;  Bailey  v.  Snyder,  61  111.  App.  472;  Howell  v.  Gilt-Edge  Manuf  g 

(83) 


1 


§   60  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  3 

the  directors/'  or  the  action  of  the  officer  signing  the  confession 
may  be  ratified  by  a  subsequent  vote  of  the  directors  or  stockhold- 
ers.®^ If  a  judgment  note  executed  by  an  officer  of  a  corporation 
is  otherwise  valid  and  binding  on  the  company,  it  is  not  avoided  by 
the  fact  that  the  corporate  seal  is  not  attached.**  Upon  a  confes- 
sion of  judgment  by  a  corporation,  the  court  in  which  the  action  is 
pending  must  judge  of  the  authority  of  the  person  appearing  for  the 
corporation  in  that  behalf ;  and  its  decision  on  the  point  is  final  and 
conclusive.** 

S  60.    Consent  of  Creditor  ti  neeessary. 

A  judgment  based  upon  a  confession  made  without  any  request 
on  the  part  of  the  creditor,  and  without  his  knowledge  and  consent, 
or  against  his  consent,  and  entered  at  the  instance  of  the  debtor 
alone,  will  have  no  effect  in  advance  of  the  creditor's  acceptance  of 
it;  it  is  voidable,  it  will  not  bar  an  action  brought  by  the  creditor, 
nor  will  it  estop  the  debtor  from  denying  the  facts  set  forth.**  This 
rule  proceeds  upon  the  very  obvious  consideration  that  if  the  assent 
of  the  creditor  were  not  necessary  to  a  confessed  judgment,  the  debt- 
or might,  by  confessing  for  only  a  part  of  the  real  debt,  preclude  his 
creditor  from  recovering  the  residue.  For  a  judgment  by  confes- 
sion is  as  conclusive  as  any  other ;  **  and  if  it  include  only  a  portion 
of  an  indivisible  demand,  no  action  will  lie  for  the  balance.  A  judg- 
ment so  entered,  unknown  to  the  creditor  or  against  his  will,  is  there- 
fore voidable  at  hfs  option,  and  will  be  vacated  on  his  motion.**  But 
on  the  other  hand,  he  may  ratify  the  debtor's  action  and  accept  the 
judgment,  and  when  he  does  this,  it  will  have  the  effect  to  validate 

Co..  32  Xeb.  G127,  49  N.  W.  701.  Compare  Miller  v.  Bank  of  British  Co- 
lumbia^ 2  Or.  291. 

00  Ford  V.  HiU,  92  Wis.  188,  66  N.  W.  115,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  902;  Chicagro 
Tip  &  T.  Co.  V.  Chicago  Xat.  Bank,  74  111.  App.  439. 

«i  Smead  Foundry  Co.  v.  Chesbrough,  18  Ohio  Glr.  Ct.  R.  783. 

•2  Chicago  Tip  &  T.  Co.  V.  Chicago  Nat.  Bank,  74  111.  App.  439. 

08  White  V.  Crow  (C.  C.)  17  Foil.  08. 

04  Wllcoxson  v.  Burton,  27  Cal.  228,  87  Am.  Dec.  66;  Farmers*  &  Mechau- 
ics'  Bank  v.  Mather,  30  Iowa.  283;  IngergoH  v.  Dyott  1  Miles  (PjW  24o; 
Cliapin  V.  McLaren,  105  Ind.  563,  5  N.  E.  688. 

05  See  infra,  vol.  2.  §  698. 

00  Farmers*  &  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Mather,  30  Iowa,  283. 

(84) 


Ch.  3)  JUDGMENTS    BY    CONFESSION.  §    61 

the  judgment  and  place  it  on  the  same  footing  in  all  respects  with 
one  sanctioned  by  his  previous  knowledge  and  consent.  The  vali- 
dation of  the  judgment,  however,  dates  only  from  its  acceptance  by 
the  creditor,  and  it  will  not  affect  the  priority  of  other  creditors  who 
came  in  between  the  entry  of  the  judgment  and  its  ratification.®^ 
The  creditor's  assent  to  the  entry  of  judgment  may  also  be  con- 
structive. Thus  it  is  sufficient  if  done  with  the  knowledge  and  con- 
sent of  his  attorney  in  whose  hands  he  has  placed  the  matter.*'  So 
also,  if  an  action  is  already  pending.  Where  the  creditor  has 
brought  suit  for  a  specified  sum  of  money  upon  a  certain  claim,  and 
the  debtor  appears  in  court  and  confesses  judgment  for  the  amount 
claimed  and  costs,  the  assent  of  the  plaintiff  will  be  presumed ;  and 
to  entitle  him  to  have  the  judgment  set  aside,  he  must  make  it  ap- 
pear to  the  court  that  he  has  been  prejudiced  by  such  confession.' ° 
It  is  held  that  the  confession  of  a  judgment  by  the  defendant  in  a 
pending  suit,  after  the  death  of  the  plaintiff  and  before  substitution 
of  his  representatives,  is  void,  both  as  regards  the  representatives  of 
the  plaintiff  and  any  third  person  who  may  be  collaterally  interested 
in  the  payment  of  the  same.^® 

§  61.    Reqntsttei  of  Warrant  of  Attomej. 

As  already  stated,  it  is  the  practice  in  some  states  to  enter  con- 
fessed judgments  upon  a  written  authority,  called  a  warrant  or  letter 
of  attorney,  by  which  the  debtor  empowers  an  attorney  to  enter  an 
appearance  for  him,  waive  process,  and  confess  judgment  against 
him  for  a  designated  sum.  This  warrant  should  contain  the  grant  of 
authority  clearly  and  distinctly  given,  and  a  designation  of  the  per- 
son by  whom  it  is  to  be  exercised,  either  by  name  or  description.^^ 
It  is  usual,  however,  to  confer  the  authority  upon  "any  attorney"  of 

•TWilcoxson  V.  Burton.  27  Cal.  228,  87  Am.  Dec.  66;  Buchanan  v.  Scaudla 
Plow  Co.,  6  Colo.  App.  34,  30  Pac.  890. 

«»  Chapln  V.  Mcl^ren,  105  Ind.  563,  5  N.  E.  688. 

«» I-lanagan  v.  Continental  lus.  Co.,  22  Neb.  235,  34  N.  W.  367;  McCalmont 
T.  Peters,  13  Serg,  &  R.  (Pa.)  106. 

'•  Finney  v.  Ferguson,  3  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  413.  Compare  Ijewis  v.  Rapelyea, 
1  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  2J). 

"»  Rabe  v.  llcslip.  4  Pa.  139.  See  Grubbs  v.  Blum,  62  Tpx.  426.  Au- 
thority to  confess  a  Judgment  on  a  note,  or  waive  the  benefit  of  excmp- 

(So) 


§61  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  3 

a  particular  court  or  "any  attorney  of  any  court  of  record"  in  the 
particular  state.^"  Where  the  warrant  authorizes  A.,  or  any  other 
attorney  of  the  court  in  which  the  judgment  is  to  be  confessed,  to 
appear  and  make  the  confession,  and  A.  and  B.,  both  attorneys  of 
that  court,  appear  together,  the  judgment  will  be  valid.^'  The  war- 
rant should  name  or  describe,  with  reasonable  certainty,  the  person 
in  whose  favor  judgment  is  to  be  entered,^*  and  state  the  time  of 
entry,  though  this  is  usually  done  by  authorizing  a  confession  **at 
any  term"  of  court,  or  "at  any  time." '"  The  warrant  should  spe- 
cifically state  its  purpose.  But  the  words  used  are  not  of  the  least 
importance,  and  it  is  held  that  a  warrant  to  "enter"  judgment  will 
be  considered  as  equivalent  to  a  warrant  to  "confess"  judgment.'* 
And  in  a  case  where  the  warrant  was  written  upon  a  printed  form  of 
a  judgment-note,  and  the  blanks  in  that  part  of  the  note  which  re- 
lated to  the  entry  of  judgment  were  not  filled  out,  but  the  note  was 
otherwise  regular,  it  was  held  that  the  warrant  was  not  void.^^  It 
also  appears  that  a  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  judgment  need 
not  be  under  seal/®  Of  course  if  the  warrant  is  annexed  to  or  in- 
corporated in  a  note  or  bond,  the  debt  on  which  it  is  based  will  be 

tlon  or  inquisition  laws,  cannot  be  implied  from  authority  to  execute  tlie 
note.    Payne  v.  Robinson,  11  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  544. 

72  See  McClure  v.  Bowles,  5  Ohio  N.  P.  327. 

78  Patton  V.  Stewart,  19  lud.  233;  Kuehne  v.  Goit,  54  111.  App.  596. 

7  4  See  Packer  v.  Roberts,  140  111.  9,  071,  29  N.  E.  668;  McClure  v.  Bowles, 
5  Ohio  X.  P.  327.  Where  a  note  and  warrant  of  attorney  are  written  to- 
gether, over  one  signature,  the  warrant,  though  not  stating  in  whose  favor 
Judgment  may  be  confessed,  is  not  void  for  uncertainty,  but  the  Instrument 
as  a  whole  will  be  construed  to  authorize  confession  In  favor  of  the  payee. 
Drake  v.  Simpson,  30  VVkly.  Law  Bui.  (Ohio)  236. 

7  6  Where  a  warrant  of  attorney  authorizes  a  confession  of  Judgment  ui)on 
a  note  **at  any  time,"  Judgment  may  be  confessed  at  any  time  after  the  de- 
livery of  the  note.  Elkins  v.  Wolfe,  44  111.  App.  376.  This  is  true  eveu 
though  the  note  is  postdated.    Volkcnand  v.  Drum,  143  ^a.  525,  22  Atl.  8i^l. 

7  6  Mason  v.  Smith,  8  Ind.  72. 

7  7  Sweesey  v.  Kitchen.  80  I'a.  100.  As  to  the  effect  of  failure  to  fill  out 
blanks  in  the  warrant,  see,  further,  t^rst  Nat.  Bank  v.  Trout,  58  Ohio  St. 
347,  51  N.  E.  27;  Packer  v.  Roberts,  140  111.  9,  671,  29  X.  E.  608.  The  cap- 
tion of  a  cognovit  upon  which  a  Judgment  is  confessed  in  vacation  is  not 
an  essential  part  of  the  instrument,  and,  if  defective,  may  be  treated  as 
surplusage.     Browne  v.  Cassem,  74  111.  Ai)p.  305. 

7  8  Kneedler's  Appeal,  92  Pa.  428. 

(8©) 


Ch.  3)  JUDGMENTS    BY    CONFESSION.  §   61a 

sufficiently  disclosed.  But  in  any  other  case  the  cause  of  action 
must  be  described  either  in  a  declaration,  a  sworn  statement,  or  in 
the  warrant  of  attorney  itself.^*  This  is  required  as  an  evidence  of 
good  faith  and  for  the  information  of  other  creditors.  A  judgment 
so  confessed  is  not  necessarily  void  although  the  warrant  of  attor- 
ney be  void;  and  such  a  judgment,  it  is  held,  after  it  has  been  re- 
vived against  the  debtor's  administrator,  cannot  be  set  aside  for  that 
cause,  although  the  defect  in  the  warrant  might  have  been  pleaded  in 
avoidance  or  given  in  evidence  under  a  plea  of  nul  tiel  record.*® 
The  warrant  of  attorney,  as  the  basis  of  the  judgment,  must  also  be 
placed  on  file  in  the  clerk's  office,  and  no  judgment  can  be  entered 
on  it  before  it  is  actually  so  filed.®*  In  some  of  the  states,  it  is  nec- 
essary that  proof  should  have  been  made  of  the  execution  of  the 
warrant  of  attorney  before  the  judgment  is  confessed,  and  in  the 
case  of  a  confession  out  of  court,  this  must  affirmatively  appear  of 
record,  but  where  the  confession  is  in  open  court,  the  evidence  of 
that  fact  need  not  be  presented  in  the  record,  but  it  will  be  presumed 
to  have  been  done  unless  it  appears  to  have  been  omitted.®' 

S  61a.    ReTOoation  or  Ezptration  €»f  Warrant. 

A  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  a  judgment  is  not  revocable  at 
the  pleasure  of  the  principal ;  though  he  endeavors  to  revoke  it,  yet 
the  court  will  grant  leave  to  the  plaintiff  to  enter  up  the  judgment.®^ 
But  no  judgment  can  be  entered  on  such  a  warrant  after  the  death 

7*  Gambia  v.  Howe,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  133.  Where  several  obligations  or 
installments,  all  between  the  same  parties  and  all  due,  are  covered  by  sep- 
arate warrants  of  atti)mey,  or  by  one  warrant  authorizing  confession  of 
judgment  "from  time  to  time,"  a  single  Judgment  may  be  entered  by  con- 
fession for  the  gross  amount  then  due.  Odell  v.  Reynolds,  17  C.  C.  A.  317, 
70  Fed.  65(J;  Fortune  v.  Bartolomel,  104  111.  31,  45  N.  E.  274. 

••  Wood  V.  Kills.  10  Mo,  382. 

•1  Chambers  v.  Denle,  2  Pa.  421.  But  compare  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Newton  Cotton  Mills,  115  N.  C.  507,  20  S.  E.  765. 

•»Iglehart  v.  Chicago  Marine  &  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  35  111.  514;  Anderson  v. 
Field,  6  m.  App.  307;  Uambia  v.  Howe,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  133. 

"Odes  V.  Woodward,  2  Ld.  Raym.  849;  WasseU  v.  Reardon,  11  Ark. 
7<l5.  44  Am.  Dec.  245.  But  in  Evans  v.  Fearne,  16  Ala.  G89,  50  Am.  Dec. 
l<'7.  It  is  said  that  a  simple  power  from  a  principal  to  his  attorney  to 
•-onfera  Judgment  In  favor  of  a  tlilrd  person,  which  Is  not  supported  by 
t  consideration  and   Is  not  given  as  a  security  for  a  debt,   or  to  render 

(S7) 


§    61a  LAW  OF*  JUDGMENTS.      ,  (Ch.  3 

of  the  defendant.  While  the  latter  event  may  not  operate  exactly 
as  a  revocation  of  the  power,  yet  there  can  be  no  valid  judgment 
rendered  against  a  dead  man.®*  Entry  of  the  judgment,  however, 
is  not  prevented  by  the  supervening  insanity  of  the  defendant;  for 
this  disability  does  not  revoke  any  power  of  attorney  which  the  prin- 
cipal could  not  have  revoked  had  he  remained  sane.'* 

It  was  the  settled  practice  under  the  common  law,  founded  on  a 
rule  of  the  court  of  King's  Bench  (and  still  operative  in  this  country 
except  where  changed  by  statute  or  a  rule  of  court),  that  a  judgment 
could  not  be  confessed  on  a  warrant  of  attorney  executed  more  than 
a  year  and  a  day  before,  unless  an  affidavit  was  filed  showing  that 
the  maker  was  alive,  and  that  the  debt  or  some  portion  of  it  was  still 
due,  and  a  rule  of  court,  or  order  of  a  judge  in  vacation,  must  be 
obtained  granting  leave  to  enter  judgment.^®  But  entry  of  the  judg- 
ment will  not  be  prevented  by  the  fact  that  the  statute  of  limitations 
has  run  against  the  debt  (or  which  the  confession  was  made,  since 
the  subject-matter  of  the  power  is  hot  extinguished  by  the  limita- 
tion.®^    But  payment  of  the  debt  will  cancel  the  power,    A  warrant 

a  security  effectual,  is  not  properly  speaking  a  warrant  of  attorney,  and  is 
revocable  at  the  pleasure  of  the  maker,  so  long  as  it  remains  unexecuted. 

8  4  Lanning  v.  Pawson,  38  Pa.  480;  Sauerfleld  v.  McXierney's  Pllstate.  30 
Pittsb.  Leg.  J.  (N.  S.)  283.  In  New  York,  this  rule  is  establisheil  by  statute. 
Code  Civ.  Proc.  N.  Y.  §  1275;  Maddock  v.  Stevens,  15  Civ.  Proc.  R.  248.  3 
X.  Y.  Supp.  528. 

8  5  Spencer  v.  Reynolds,  0  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  249. 

86  Hinds  V.  Hopkins,  28  111.  344;  Alldritt  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  22  111.  App. 
24;  Manufacturers'  &  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  St.  John,  5  Hill  (X.  Y.)  497.  in 
Pennsylvania,  a  rule  of  court  provides  that  **if  a  warrant  of  attorney  to  con- 
fess judgment  be  above  ten  years  [old]  and  under  twenty,  the  court,  or  a 
judge  thereof  in  vacation,  must  be  moved  for  leave  to  enter  judgment. 
which  motion  must  be  grounded  on  an  atfidavlt  that  the  warrant  was  duly 
executed  and  that  the  money  is  unpaid  and  the  party  living.  When  the  war- 
rant is  above  twenty  years  old,  there  must  be  a  rule  to  show  cause  serveJ 
on  the  defendant,  if  he  can  be  found  within  the  county.'*  But  the  court 
may,  in  a  proper  case,  after  the  entry  of  judgment,  grant  leave  to  file  the 
required  affidavit  nunc  pro  tunc.     Woods  v.  Woods,  126  Pa.  396,  17  Atl.  662. 

8  7  Wassell  V.  Reardon,  11  Ark.  705,  44  Am.  Dec.  245;  Cross  v.  Moffat,  II 
Colo.  210,  17  Pac.  771.  But  a  judgment  on  a  judgment  note  not  under  seal. 
entered  more  than  six  years  after  the  execution  of  the  note,  may  In*  opened 
to  allow  a  plea  of  the  statute  of  limitations.  Bennett  v.  Allen,  10  I'a.  Co. 
Ct.  I{.  256.     See,  infra,  §  69. 

(88) 


Cb.  8)  JUDGMENTS    BY   CONFESSION.  §   62 

of  attorney  contained  in  a  note  to  confess  judgment  thereon,  for 
example,  remains  in  force  only  so  long  as  the  note  remains  unpaid ; 
and  where  the  payee,  after  receiving  satisfaction  thereof,  fraudulent- 
ly conceals  the  fact,  and  procures  an  attorney  to  appear  and  con- 
fess judgment  without  the  maker's  knowledge  or  consent,  such  ap- 
pearance confers  no  jurisdiction  on  the  court,  and  the  judgment  is 
void."*  It  is  held,  however,  that  judgment  may  be  entered  on  a  note 
under  a  warrant  of  attorney  duly  executed,  but  lost  or  stolen.*® 
Strictly  speaking  the  authority  of  the  warrant  is  exhausted  by  the 
entry  of  one  judgment;  yet  if  another  judgment  is  entered  on  the 
same  obligation  under  the  same  warrant,  in  another  county,  it  will 
not  be  absolutely  void,  but  merely  irregular,  insomuch  that  a  pur- 
chaser at  a  judicial  sale  under  the  second  judgment  may  acquire  a 
good  title.** 

I  62.    Affidavit  tl&at  Debt  is  due. 

Under  the  various  statutes  regulating  the  practice  in  confessing 
judgments,  it  is  almost  invariably  required  that  the  debtor's  confes- 
sion be  accompanied  by  an  affidavit  showing  the  bona  fides  of  the 
transaction.  In  some  jurisdictions  this  is  directed  to  be  incorpo- 
rated in  the  statement  which  forms  the  basis  of  the  judgment;  in 
others  it  is  to  be  a  separate  document.  The  statute  usually  pre- 
scribes the  form  of  words,  as  that  the  debt  is  "justly  due  and  owing," 
or  is  '^justly  due  or  to  become  due."  A  provision  of  this  character, 
howc\  er,  is  satisfied  by  a  substantial  compliance  with  the  meaning  of 
the  law,  and  if  the  affidavit  details  facts  which  show  that  the  debt  is 
really  just  and  actually  due,  it  is  enough,  though  the  words  of  the 
statute  be  not  employed.  Thus,  the  affidavit  is  sufficient  in  form  in 
stating  that  Jhe  debt  is  "justly  and  honestly  due,"  instead  of  "due 
and  owing"  in  the  words  of  the  statute,  when  a  present  indebtedness 
is  shown.**     Nor  is  it  required  that  the  affidavit  go  beyond  the  stat- 

«•  First  Xat  Bank  v.  Cunningham  (C.  C.)  48  Fed.  510;  Rea  v.  Forrest,  88 
IIL  276. 

•  »  Bauer  r.  Rihs,  4  Pa.  Dist.  R.  583. 

•0  Martin  v.  Rex,  6  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  296;  supra,  §  53.. 

•1  Mulford  V.  Stratton,  41  N.  J.  Law,  460;  Reading  v.  Reading,  24  N.  J. 
Ijw.  35S.  The  requirement  of  an  atlidavlt  that  the  debt  is  "justly  and 
booestly  doe  and  owing*'  will  prevent  an  accommodation  indorser  of  notes, 

(89) 


§   63  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  3 

ute.  Hence  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  debtor  to  deny,  in  specific 
terms,  that  the  debt  has  been  paid,  released,  barred,  or  discharged.** 
A  judgment  entered  upon  confession  without  the  afHdavit  required 
by  statute  is  voidable  only,  not  void,  and  it  cannot  on  that  ground  be 
collaterally  attacked  by  a  stranger  to  the  record.**  Where  the  stat- 
ute requires  an  affidavit  to  the  justness  of  the  debt  only  upon  a  con- 
fession of  judgment  without  process,  it  does  not  apply  where  the 
defendant  files  an  answer  admitting  the  debt,  and  consents  to  the 
judgment.** 

§  63.    Statement  of  the  Indebtedness. 

In  many  of  the  states,  statutes  require  a  person  confessing  a  judg- 
ment to  file  a  written  statement,  signed  and  sworn  to,  designating 
the  amount  for  which  the  judgment  is  to  be  entered,  and  "stating 
concisely  the  facts  out  of  which  the  indebtedness  arose."  This  re- 
quirement is  imperative.**  The  designation  of  the  amount  of  the 
debt,  in  particular,  is  a  vital  part  of  a  valid  confession;  it  must  be 
set  forth  explicitly  and  not  be  left  to  inference;  and  the  omission 
of  it  is  a  fatal  defect.**     The  requirement  that  the  facts  be  stated  is 

secured  by  bond  and  warrant  of  attorney,  from  entering  up  Judgment  be- 
fore he  has  paid  the  notes,  although  he  has  assumed  their  payment,  when 
the  payee  has  not  released  the  maker.  Sterling  y.  I^leming,  53  X.  J.  Law, 
052,  24  Atl.  1001. 

»2  Lanning  v.  Carpenter,  20  N.  Y.  447.  See  Oppenheim«  v.  Giershofer, 
54  Ul.  App.  38. 

83  Vauderveere  v.  Gaston,  24  N.  J.  Law,  818;  Bible  v.  Voris,  141  Did. 
5G»,  40  N.  E.  070.  Compare  Fuget  Sound  Nat  Bank  v.  Levy,  10  Wash.  499, 
39  Pac.  142,  45  Am.  St.  Rep.  803. 

04  Lanier  v.  Blount  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  45  S.  W.  202. 

»5  Winnebrenner  v.  Edgerton,  30  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  185;  Lanning  v.  Carpenter, 
20  N.  Y.  447;  Smith  v.  Smith,  117  N.  C.  348,  23  S.  E.  270.  Compare 
Hughes  v.  Helms  (Teun.)  52  S.  W.  4G0.  A  judgment  confessed  without  such 
a  statement  is  voidable  at  the  instance  of  other  creditors  (Puget  Soiuid  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Levy,  10  Wash.  499,  39  Pac.  142,  45  Am.  St.  Rep.  803),  and  cannot 
be  validated  as  to  one  not  a  party  or  privy  by  renewals  of  execution  thereon, 
or  by  revival  of  the  judgment.  Woods  v.  Bryan,  41  S.  C.  74,  19  S.  E.  218^ 
44  Am.  St.  Rep.  (>88.  A  warrant  of  attorney  reciting  a  bond  which  is  on 
the  same  sheet  of  paper,  may  be  detached  from  the  bond,  and  entered  up 
without  any  statement.  United  Security  Life  Ins.  &  Tnist  Co.  v.  Vaughn, 
22  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  167.      • 

»6  Clements  v.  Gerow,  30  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  325.  A  statement  tlisU  no  part  of 
the  note  or  interest  has  been  paid,  and  that  the  full  amount  tlioreuf,  with 

(90) 


Ch.  3)  JUDGMRNTS    BY    C0.NF£SS10N.  §   63 

intended  to  enable  other  creditors  to  test  the  bona  fides  of  the  trans- 
action by  which  a  particular  debt  is  preferred;  and  it  is  said  tjiat 
ihe  statement  is  sufficient  if  it  sets  forth  a  consideration  such  as  the 
law  recognizes  as  valuable;  and  is  definite  enough  to  prevent  the 
parties  from  shifting  it,  and  to  furnish  other  creditors  with  a  basis 
for  inquiry  if  they  desire  to  attack  it."'  To  come  to  specific  illus- 
trations, it  is  held  that  a  recital  in  the  statement  that  the  indebted- 
ness accrued  for  "borrowed  money"  or  "money  loaned,"  to  the  debt- 
or, sufficiently  states  the  facts  out  of  which  the  indebtedness  arose.** 
Another  authority,  drawing  the  line  more  strictly,  holds  that  a  state- 
ment that  the  indebtedness  "is  for  a  debt  justly  due  from  me  to  said 
plaintiff  for  moneys  to  that  amount  loaned  and  advanced  to  me  by 
said  plaintiff,"  is  sufficient  as  between  the  parties,  though  it  might 
be  voidable  at  the  instance  of  a  junior  judgment-creditor  or  bona 
fide  purchaser.**  Probably  it  is  necessary  to  state  the  date  of  the 
loan.  But  if  the  whole  sum  is  made  up  of  various  items  advanced  at 
different  times,  the  cases  rule  that  the  statement  is  sufficiently  ex- 
plicit in  describing  the  money  as  loaned  to  defendant  at  divers  times 
after  a  specified  day.*°^  A  confession  of  judgment  for  a  certain 
sum  for  **goods,  wares,  and  merchandises"  of  a  specified  value,  is 
held  by  some  of  the  authorities   to  be  too  indefinite ;  it  should  state 

Inten^t  since  the  date  of  the  note,  Ib  due  and  owing  thereon,  is  sufficleDt  to 
include  interest.  Kothchild  v.  Mannesovltch,  29  App.  Dlv.  580,  51  N.  Y. 
Snpp.  253.     See  Tilles  v.  AlbriKbt.  (53  Hun,  633,  18  X.  Y.  Siipp.  493. 

•^Teasidale  Commission  Co.  v.  Van  Hardenberg,  53  Mo.  App.  326;  At- 
watcr  V.  Manchester  ?av.  Banlc,  45  Minn.  341,  48  N.  W.  187,  12  L.  R.  A. 
741;  McDowell  v.  Daniels,  38  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  143;  Wight  v.  Mott,  Kirby  (Conn.) 

ir»2. 

•-Kern  v.  Chalfaut,  7  Minn.  487  (Gil.  393);  Kendig  v.  Marble,  58  Iowa, 
r»29.  12  X.  W.  584.  citing  Van  Fleet  v.  PhiUips,  11  Iowa,  558;  Miller  v. 
Clarke.  37  Iowa.  325. 

»»  Terrett  t.  Brooklyn  Imp.  Co.,  18  Hun,  6;  Miller  v.  Kosch,  74  Hun,  50, 
2«  X.  Y.  Supp.  183.  .See  Wood  v.  Mitchell,  117  X.  Y.  4»),  22  X.  E.  1125. 

looKrost  V.  Koon,  30  X.  Y.  428;  Johnston  v.  McAiislaml,  9  Abb.  Prac. 
iS.  Y.»  214.  See  Davis  v.  Morris,  21  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  152.  A  statement  that 
plaintiff  performed  services  for  and  loaned  money  to  defendant,  and  tliat 
thereafter,  at  a  certain  time,  tliere  was  an  adjustment  of  accounts  betNveen 
them  concerning  said  matters,  and  a  certain  sum  was  found  due  plaintiff. 
which  defendant  promised  to  pay,  sntticiently  shows  an  account  staterl,  so 
ns  to  sustain  an  entry  of  a  judgment  by  confession.  Crltten  v.  Vredenbiirgh, 
4  App.  DiT.  210,  38  X,  Y.  Supp.  542. 

(91) 


« 


§  H3  law  op  judgments.  ifih.  3 

the  nature  and  quantity  of  the  goods  sold,  the  time  of  sale,  and  the 
aggregate  price,  if  not  even  the  price  of  the  several  items.^*^     But 
in  New  York  a  much  looser  rule  obtains.     It  is  there  held  to  be  well 
enough  if  the  indebtedness  is  stated  to  be  for  goods,  wares,  and  mer- 
chandise sold  and  delivered,  with  an  approximate  description  of  the 
period  at  or  within  which  the  sale  took  place.****     A  statement  is  not 
sufficient  if  it  merely  states  and  sets  out  a  promissory  note  executed 
by  the  defendant  to  the  plaintiff  as  the  consideration  of  the  indebt- 
edness ;  for  the  facts  out  of  which  the  indebtedness  evidenced  by  the 
note  arose  should  be  clearly  stated.*®*     But  a  statement  which  sets 
out  the  execution  and  delivery  "for  value"  of  a  negotiate  note  for 
$1500,  "for  money  which"  the  creditor  "then  and  there  gave"  the 
debtor  "for  said  note,  as  a  loan,  which  sum  of  $1500  is  justly  due 
and  owing  according  to  the  tenor  and  effect  of  said  note  herein  de- 
scribed," is  sufficient  to  satisfy  the  statute.*®*     But  a  statement  that 
the  note  was  "given  for  goods  sold  and  delivered  and  money  had 
and  received"  is  not  sufficient.*®*    And  an  allegation  that  the  consid- 
eration of  the  judgment  is  a  promissory  note  given  by  the  debtor  for 
value  received,  but  not  specifying  the  amount  or  consideration  of  the 

101  Nichols  V.  Krlbs,  10  Wis.  76,  78  Am.  Dec.  2»4;  Lawless  v.  Hackett, 
16  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  149;  Bryan  v.  Miller,  28  Mo.  32,  75  Am.  Dec.  107.  Com- 
pare Ex  parte  Graham,  54  S,  C.  163,  32  S.  E.  67. 

102  Kead  v.  French,  28  N.  Y.  285;  Neusbaum  v.  Kelm,  24  N.  Y.  325; 
Delaware  v.  Ensign,  21  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  85;  Weil  v.  Hill,  71  Hun,  133,  24 
N.  Y.  Snpp.  521. 

108  Chappel  v.  Chappol,  12  N.  Y.  215,  6i  Am.  Dec.  496;  Davidson  v.  Alex- 
ander, 84  N.  0.  621;  Pond  v.  Davenport,  44  Cal.  481;  McHenry  v.  Shephard. 
2  Mo.  App.  378;  Woods  v.  Bryan,  41  S.  C.  74,  19  S.  E.  218,  44  Am.  St.  Rep. 
688.  But  a  confession  stating  the  amount  of  Indebtedness,  and  anthorizing 
entry  of  judgment  therefor,  with  interest  from  a  certain  date,  and  further 
stating  that  it  is  for  the  amount  due  on  a  bond  under  seal  executed  by  de- 
fendant on  a  given  date,  and  that  it  is  justly  due  for  borrowed  money,  is 
sufficient.     Uzzle  v.  Vinson,  111  N.  C.  138,  16  S.  E.  6. 

104  Stem  V.  Mayer,  19  Mo.  App.  511. 

105  Cordier  v.  Schloss,  18  Cal.  576.  But  compare  Merchants'  Xat  Bank 
V.  Newton  Cotton  Mills,  115  X.  C.  507,  20  S.  E.  765.  Where  the  state- 
ment sets  out  that  the  promissory  note  annexed  was  given  "for  value  re- 
ceived in  one  Sweepstakes  separator,"  the  judgment  Is  not  invalid  for  want 
of  a  showing  as  to  how  the  Indebtedness  arose.  Brown  v.  Barngrover,  ^ 
Iowa,  204,  47  X.  W.  1082. 

(92) 


Ch.  3)  JUDGMENTS    BY   WNFESSION,  §   M 

• 

note,  is  defective.***"  So  if  it  is  merely  stated  that  the  note  was  for 
''money  due,"  the  judgment  entered  upon  it  is  prima  facie  fraudu- 
lent as  to  the  creditors  of  the  defendant,  though  not  so  fatally  de- 
fective as  to  be  void.***^  On  the  other  hand,  a  statement,  in  effect, 
that  the  defendant  had  purchased  of  the  plaintiff  a  certain  indebted- 
ness (describing  it),  due  to  the  plaintiff,  for  which  he  had  given  to 
the  plaintiff  the  promissory  notes  (describing  them)  upon  which  and 
for  the  amount  of  which  he  confessed  the  judgment,  is  a  sufficient 
statement.*®'  So  the  statement  is  sufficient  if  it  sets  forth  that  the 
judgment  is  confessed  to  secure  the  plaintiff  for  a  debt  justly  to  be- 
come due  upon  his  indorsement,  as  the  surety  of  the  defendant  and 
for  his  benefit,  of  bills  and  notes  which  are  fully  described  as  to 
names,  dates,  amounts,  and  times  of  payment.*®* 

I  64.    Sicnatnre  to  Statement. 

The  statutes  require  the  statement  of  indebtedness  and  confession 
of  judgment  to  be  "made  and  signed  by  the  defendant."  This  is  con- 
strued to  mean  a  signature  by  the  debtor  in  person.  A  signature  by 
the  defendant's  attorney  in  the  case  is  not  sufficient;  and  where  a 
judgment  was  entered  upon  a  statement  signed  by  two  of  the  defend- 
ants in  person  and  by  the  attorney  of  the  third,  it  was  held  that  the 
consent  of  those  signing  was  only  that  judgment  might  be  entered 
ag^ainst  all;  and  as  there  was  no  authority  to  enter  judgment  as  to 
the  third  party,  the  judgment  was  unauthorized  and  void  as  to  all.**® 
In  another  case,  where  the  defendant  had  signed  the  verification, 
but  not  the  statement,  which  was  written  upon  the  same  page,  this 

!•«  Norrifl  v.  Denton,  30  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  117. 

!•?  Fond  V.  Davenport.  44  Cal.  481.  But  see  Mather  v.  Mather,  38  App. 
Dtv.  32,  55  X.  y.  Supp.  973;  Claflin  v.  Dodson,  111  Mo.  195,  19  S.  W.  711. 

!•«  Klrby  v.  Fitzgerald,  31  N.  Y.  417. 

!••  Dow  V.  Platner.  16  X.  Y.  562;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Carleton,  43  App. 
IHt.  G.  Z»  N.  Y.  Supp.  635;  Dullard  v.  Phelan,  83  Iowa,  471,  50  N.  W.  204.  A 
statement  which  sets  out  a  eertlflcnte  of  deposit  and  then  states  that  on  the 
tnck  of  the  certificate  Is  the  following,  "We  hereby  guaranty  payment  of 
tlie  within,"  is  sufficient  to  support  a  judgment  against  the  guarantors.  Briggs 
▼.  Tetzer,  103  Iowa,  342,  72  N.  W.  647. 

"•French  v.  Edwards,  5  Sawy.  206,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  5,098. 

(93) 


§    67  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  3 

was  considered  sufficient,  as  being  a  substantial  compliance  with  the 
law.*  11 

I  65.    Verifloation  of  Statement. 

The  requirement  of  the  statute,  that  the  statement  of  facts  accom- 
panying a  judgment  by  confession  be  properly  verified  by  the  oath 
of  the  party,  intends  that  in  so  far  as  it  relates  to  things  within  his 
own  knowledge,  he  should  affirm  it  to  be  true  in  unequivocal  terms. 
In  regard  to  other  matters  he  may  disclose  his  information  and  add 
a  declaration  of  his  belief  in  its  truth.  But  where  the  party  merely 
swears  that  he  ^'believes  the  above  statement  of  confession  is  true/' 
the  affidavit  is  insufficient,  and  the  judgment,  if  entered  thereon,  will 
be  vacated.^**  The  jurat  of  the  notary  should  also  be  in  due  form; 
but  a. formal  defect  in  the  jurat  will  not  so  far  invalidate  the  judg- 
ment as  to  lay  it  open  to  collateral  attack.* *'  The  verification  of  the 
statement,  if  faulty  but  not  wholly  void,  is  susceptible  of  amend- 
ment.*** 

S  66.    Amendaient  of  Statement. 

A  motion  by  plaintiff  to  amend  the  statement  of  a  confession  of 
judgment  is  addressed  to  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court.  It  is  not 
an  amendment  which  he  has  a  legal  right  to  demand,  but  is  one 
which  the  court  may  in  its  discretion  refuse  or  grant  upon  such 
terms  as  to  it  may  seem  to  be  just.***  If  the  defect  in  the  statement 
arose  through  mere  inadvertence,  an  amendment  may  be  permitted 
as  against  creditors  who  have  not  sought  to  vacate  the  judgment;  **• 
but  not  against  a  creditor  who  has  taken  steps  to  have  it  set  aside.**' 

§  67.  Judgment  Toidable  for  Failure  to  comply  with  Statute. 

A  judgment  upon  confession,  though  it  does  not  conform  exactly 
to  the  statutory  requirements,  is  at  most  voidable,  and  not  absoluie- 

111  Purdy  V.  Upton,  10  How.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  494. 

112  lugrarn  v.  Kobbins,  33  X.  X,  40«,  88  Am.  Dec.  3U3. 

113  Grattan  v.  Matteson,  54  Iowa,  229,  6  N.  W.  298. 
11*  Cook  V.  Whipple,  55  N.  Y.  150,  14  Am.  Rep.  202. 
115  Symson  v.  Selheimer,  105  N.  Y.  600,  12  X.  E.  31. 

110  Bradley  v.  CJlass,  20  App.  Div.  200,  4G  X.  Y.  Supp.  790. 

117  Blackmer  v,  Greene,  4  N.  Y.  Ann.  Cas.  395,  47  X.  Y.  Supp.  113. 


Ch.  3)  JUDGMENTS   BY   OOKFESSIuN.  §   67 

\y  void  as  against  creditors.^"  Thus,  if  it  fails  to  set  out  all  the  facts 
required  by  the  statute,  it  is  for  that  reason  irregular  and  prima  facie 
fraudulent,  but  it  is  not  a  nullity ;  the  presumption  of  fraud  may  be 
rebutted  by  proof  that  the  judgment  was  fair  and  for  a  bona  fide 
debt."*  It  has  also  been  held  that  such  a  judgment  is  not  void  be- 
cause it  does  not  appear  that  an  affidavit,  as  required  by  the  statute, 
had  been  made.**^  But  the  true  rule  appears  to  be,  that  if  there 
has  been  an  attempt  to  fulfil  all  the  requirements  of  the  law,  the 
judgment  is  at  most  only  voidable,  although  the  execution  of  such 
attempt  be  informal  or  defective;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  total 
omission  of  any  of  the  steps  prescribed  by  the  statute  (as  where  no 
statement  at  all  is  filed)  will  render  the  judgment  entirely  inoper- 
ative and  void.^** 

lis  Sheldon  v.  Stryker,  34  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  116.  But  in  some  other  decisions 
It  is  held  that  a  judgment  by  confession  which  does  not  conform  to  the  re- 
quirements of  the  statute  is  absolutely  void  and  a  mere  nullity.  Edgar  ▼. 
Greer,  10  Iowa,  279;  Utah  Nat.  Bank  v.  Sears,  13  Utah,  172,  44  Pac.  832. 
And  see  Aiosworth  y.  Mobile  Fruit  &  Trading  Co.,  102  Ga.  123,  29  S.  E.  142. 

11*  Richards  ▼.  McMUlan,  6  Cal.  419,  65  Am.  Dec.  521;  Grouse  T.  Johnson, 
65  Hnn,  337,  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  177.  That  a  judgment  by  confession  fails  to 
state  the  facts  out  of  which  the  indebtedness  arose,  or  to  show  that  the  sum 
confessed  is  Justly  due,  is  a  defect  of  which  a  subsequent  judgment  creditot- 
mty  STail  himself.    Bradley  v.  Glass,  20  App.  Dlv.  200,  46  N.  Y,  Supp.  790. 

"•  Dean  v.  Thatcher,  32  N.  J.  Law,  470. 

i»  Irregularities  in  a  judgment  by  confession,  which  do  not  make  It  void, 
may  be  amended.  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank  y.  Newton  Cotton  Mills,  115  2^. 
C.  507,  20  S.  E.  765.  In  imnois,  it  is  said  that,  without  proof  of  the  execu- 
tion of  the  power  of  attorney  to  enter  judgment  by  confession,  the  clerk  ac- 
quires no  jurisdiction  of  the  debtor,  and  therefore  the  judgment,  being  void, 
may  be  attacked  collaterally.  Oppenheimer  v.  Giershofer,  54  111.  App.  38.  In 
Bacon  r.  Raybould,  4  Utah,  357,  10  Pac.  481,  Boreman,  J.,  observed:  "The 
aotiiorities  go  to  the  extent  of  holding  that  where  there  is  an  incomplete  or 
insufficient  statement  of  such  facts  [the  facts  out  of  which  the  indebtedness 
arose),  the  failure  to  make  a  complete  statement  will  be  only  prima  facie 
evidence  of  fraud  as  to  creditors,  and  that  it  cannot  be  attacked  collaterall3^ 
But  no  case  has  been  called  to  our  attention  where  a  court  has  held  that  a 
uoofession  of  judgment  is  merely  prima  facie  fraudulent  as  to  creditors, 
uid  not  liable  to  be  attacked  collaterally,  where  there  was  a  total  absence 
of  the  statement  of  any  facts  whatever.  We  know  of  no  instance  in  which 
norfa  a  case  has  reached  an  appellate  court  The  statement  of  such  facts  is 
a  prerequisite  to  the  confession  of  judgment— it  is  not  a  confession  of  judg- 
ment without  It"  Compare  Utah  Nat  Bank  v.  Sears,  13  Utah,  172,  44 
Pte   832. 

(95) 


§   68  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  3 


S  68.    Valid  between  Partiei. 

A  judgment  upon  confession,  founded  on  a  statement  of  facts 
which  is  defective  or  insufficient  to  answer  the  requirements  of  the 
statute,  will  nevertheless  be  valid  and  effectual  as  between  the  par- 
ties to  it,  though  voidable  at  the  instance  of  other  creditors.***  The 
judgment-debtor  himself  cannot  avoid  it,  nor  can  one  do  so  who 
claims  rights  of  property  under  him,  but  whose  interests  are  not 
prejudiced  thereby.^*^  And  such  a  judgment,  upon  proof  of  its 
honesty  and  good  faith,  authorizes  the  creditor  to  impeach  a  fraud- 
ulent transfer  made  by  the  debtor,  for  the  purpose  of  making  the 
lien  of  the  judgment  effectual.^**  Where  the  property  of  the  de- 
fendant has  been  sold  under  an  execution  upon  a  judgment  con- 
fessed without  a  sufficient  statement,  the  purchaser's  title  cannot  be 
impeached  by  a  creditor  having  no  judgment  or  lien  on  the  prop- 
erty at  the  time  of  the  levy.***  At  the  same  time,  if  another  creditor 
attacks  a  confessed  judgment  founded  upon  a  defective  or  insuffi- 
cient statement,  it  devolves  upon  the  plaintiff  therein  to  negative  the 
idea  of  fraud  or  collusion,  and  to  show  that  the  judgment  is  war- 
ranted by  facts  actually  existing,  although  such  facts  were  not  in- 
cluded in  the  statement.**'  The  same  rule  holds  true  of  a  judg- 
ment confessed  without  the  affidavit  to  the  justness  of  the  debt  re- 
quired by  statute;  it  is  valid  between  the  parties,  though  void  or 
voidable  as  to  other  creditors.**^ 

122  Coolbangh  v.  Koemer,  30  Minn.  424,  15  N.  W.  869;  Miller  t.  Earle.  24 
N.  Y.  110;  Xeusbaum  v.  Keim,  24  N.  Y.  325;  Kirby  v.  Fitzgerald,  31  N.  X. 
417;  Biyaii  v.  Miller,  28  Mo.  32,  75  Am.  Dec.  107;  How  v.  Dorscheimer,  31 
Mo.  340;  Lee  v.  Figg,  37  Cal.  328,  09  Am.  Dec.  271;  Pond  v.  Davenport,  44 
Cul.  481;  Plummer  v.  Douglas,  14  Iowa,  69,  81  Am.  Dec.  456.  See,  also, 
bhadrack's  Adra'r  v.  Woolfolk,  32  Grat.  (Va.)  707. 

128  Coolbaugh  v.  Roemer,  30  Minn.  424,  15  X.  W.  869;  Boyles  v.  Chytraus, 
175  111.  370,  51  N.  E.  563;  Krickow  v.  Pennsylvania  Tar  Manuf'g  CJo.,  87  lU. 
App.  (;o3. 

124  Neusbaum  v.  Keira,  24  N.  Y.  325. 

125  Miller  v.  Earle,  24  X.  Y.  110. 

126  Cordier  v.  Schloss,  18  Cal.  576.  See  Bacon  v.  Raybould,  4  Utah,  357.  10 
Pac.  481;  Richards  v.  McMillan,  6  Cal.  419,  65  Am.  Dec.  521. 

i27Mavity  v.  Eastridge,  67  Ind.  211;  Chapiu  v.  McLaren,  106  Ind.  563,  5 
X.  E.  688;  Caley  v.  Morgan.  114  Ind.  350,  16  X.  B.  790;  Gardner  v.  Bonn  (IIL) 
21  X.  E.  614;  Stone  v.  Williams,  40  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  322. 

(96) 


Ch.  3)  JUDGMENTS   BY   CONFESSION.,  §   69 


§  69.    For  irhat  Judgrnient  may  be  oonf  eised. 

The  statutes  commonly  provide  that  the  debtor  confessing  judg- 
ment shall  make  oath  that  the  debt  is  '*justly  due  or  to  become  due." 
It  follows  of  course  that  if  the  judgment  is  for  a  purely  fictitious 
debt,  or  is  in  excess  of  the  real  debt  so  far  as  to  interfere  with  the 
rights  of  other  creditors,  it  is  fraudulent  and  cannot  stand.  Thus, 
where  a  judgment  is  confessed  and  execution  levied  for  such  an 
amount  that  subsequent  judgment  creditors  find  nothing  to  levy  on, 
a  combination  between  the  parties  having  been  proved,  fraud  will  be 
established.***  It  is  also  essential  that  the  debt  be  a  legal  debt, — 
that  is,  one  which  would  not  be  rejected  by  a  court  on  account  of  its 
illegal  consideration.  Yet  it  appears  that  the  defendant  in  the  judg- 
ment and  those  claiming  under  him  (for  instance,  a  subsequent  mort- 
gagee of  his  land)  are  estopped  from  denying  the  validity  of  the 
judgment,  although  the  demand  might  not  have  been  recoverable  at 
law.'**  The  word  "due,"  as  used  in  these  statutes,  must  not  be 
taken  in  too  narrow  a  sense.  It  does  not  necessarily  import  a  debt 
which  might  be  recovered  in  an  action  at  law  against  any  defenses 
which  the  debtor  might  set  up.  There  are  certain  defenses  which 
the  debtor  has  the  option  of  waiving  if  he  chooses,  and  he  does 
waive  them  by  confessing  judgment.  For  example,  such  a  judg- 
ment is  not  invalidated  by  the  fact  that  a  part  of  the  claim  for  which 
it  is  given  would  be  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations,  provided  the 

issNustMinm  y.  I^onchhelm  (Pa.)  1  Atl.  391.  A  Judgment  coufessed  on  a 
note  given  as  secnrity  for  Indorsements  is  not  fraudulent  because  confessed 
for  more  than  the  amount  of  the  notes  indorsed,  the  party  not  having  at  liand 
at  the  time  the  means  of  determining  tlieir  amount,  and  notliing  more  than 
«a»  due  ever  having  been  claimed  or  received  on  the  Judgment.  Page  v. 
SlmpMu,  188  I*a.  303,  41  Atl.  638.  It  is  error  to  render  Judgment  on  Judgment 
notes  authorizing  entry  of  Judgment  on  default  in  payment  of  the  interest 
notm.  in  the  absence  of  proof  of  such  default,  or  production  by  the  payee  of 
the  hiterest  notes,  as,  in  their  absence,  there  would  be  no  presumption  of  their 
nonpeyuieiit.  Crofut  v.  Aldrich,  54  111.  App.  541.  A  Judgment  note  may  be 
legally  given  as  security  for  a  pre-existing  debt  and,  when  so  given,  is  not 
open  to  the  objection  of  want  of  consideration.  Lane  v.  ITnion  Nat.  Bank, 
TTi  III.  App.  299;  Union  Nat.  Bank  v.  Lane,  177  111.  171,  o2  N.  E.  3(n.  (;i)  Am. 
St.  Rep.  2Uk 

i'>  SLn'elt  V.  KItufelt.  0  Paige  iX.  Y.)  137,  37  Am.  Dec.  381. 

lLA\VJUIXl.-7  (07) 


§   70  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS  (Ch.  3 

debt  be  an  honest  one.**®  So  where  a  bankrupt,  subsequent  to  his 
discharge,  confesses  judgment  upon  an  old  debt,  the  debt  is  a  good 
consideration  for  the  judgment,  and  the  latter  is  not  affected  by  the 
discharge.***  It  is  further  necessary  that  a  confession  of  judgment 
be  for  a  certain  and  specific  sum.  A  judgment  entered  by  a  jus- 
tice, on  the  confession  of  a  defendant,  for  such  sum  as  A.  and  B. 
shall  award,  before  the  award  is  declared,  is  invalid.***  Where  sev- 
eral powers  of  attorney  are  given  to  confess  judgment  on  several 
debts  in  favor  of  and  against  the  same  parties,  it  is  proper  and  com- 
petent for  the  court  to  consolidate  them  and  enter  but  one  judg- 
ment.*'* A  judgment  cannot  be  confessed  for  a  claim  arising  ex 
delicto.  A  statute  which  allows  confession  of  judgment  "for  money 
due  or  to  become  due"  should  not  be  construed  as  authorizing  the 
confession  of  a  judgment  for  damages  growing  out  of  a  tort*** 

§  70.    Debt  not  yet  due* 

Where  the  language  of  the  statute  is  that  judgment  may  be  con- 
fessed for  a  debt  "justly  due  and  owing,"  it  applies  only  to  a  debt 
payable  at  the  time  of  the  confession,  for  these  terms  import  an 
immediate  liability.  But  where  it  authorizes  a  confession  "for  mon- 
ey due  or  to  become  due,"  this  may  well  include  a  claim  founded 
upon  an  obligation  now  existing  but  not  yet  demandable.    Thus  the 

130  Keen  v.  Kleckner,  42  Pa.  529;  Wassell  v.  Reardon,  11  Ark.  705,  44  Am. 
Dec.  245;  Cross  v.  Moflfat,  11  Colo.  210,  17  Pac.  77L  Compare  Kahn  ▼.  Leaser. 
97  Wis.  217,  72  N.  W.  739;  Matzenbaugh  v.  Doyle,  156  111.  331,  40  N.  K 
935.  In  Pennsylvania,  the  court  may,  ill  Its  discretion,  open  a  judgm^t  en- 
tered by  confession  on  a  note  not  under  seal,  where  it  appears  on  the  face 
of  tlie  note  that  the  statute  of  limitations  had  run  against  the  debt  at  the 
time  the  judgment  was  entered.  Bates  v.  CuUum,  183  Pa.  234,  29  Atl.  870; 
Bennett  v.  Allen,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct  R.  256.    See,  supra,  §  61a. 

J«i  Dewey  v.  Moyer.  72  N.  Y.  70. 

"2  Nichols  V.  Hewlt,  4  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  423.  But  a  power  of  attorney  to  con- 
fess Judjrment  "for  an  amount  that  may  be  found  due"  on  the  note  therein 
described,  and  sufficient  to  give  the  court  Jurisdiction,  is  adequate.  Patterson 
V.  Indiana,  2  G.  Greene  (Iowa)  492.  See  Little  v.  Dyer,  138  111.  272,  27  K,  K. 
905,  32  Am.  St.  Kep.  140;  Scott  v.  Mantonya,  164  111.  473,  45  N.  E.  977. 

138  Genestelle  v.  Waugh,  11  Mo.  367.  See  OdeU  v.  Reynolds,  17  C,  C.  A. 
517,  70  Ked.  656;  Fortune  v.  Bartoloraei.  1C4  111.  51,  45  N.  E.  274. 

i84Burkham  v.  Van  Saun,  14  Abb.  Prac.  N.  S.  (N.  Y.)  163;  Boutel  ▼. 
Owens,  2  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  055. 

(98) 


Ch.  3)  JUDGMENTS   BY   CONFESSION.  §  70 

fact  that  a  nafe  upon  which  a  confession  of  judgment  was  taken  was 
not  due  when  the  judgment  was  rendered  does  not  deprive  the  court 
of  jurisdictioQ,  and  the  judgment  will  not  be  vacated  on  that  ac- 
count."* "The  fact  that  a  note  may  not  be  due  at  the  time  of  a 
confession  upon  it,  might  be  a  suspicious  circumstance  in  a  contest 
with  other  creditors  of  the  debtor,  but  it  would  not  render  the  judg- 
ment void  in  the  proper  sense  of  that  term."  ^'*  So  a  judgment  is 
not  void  as  to  creditors  because  the  action  is  commenced  before  the 
maturity  of  the  note  which  was  the  cause  of  action,  and  the  defend- 
ant confesses  judgment  without  service  of  process.^*^  Authority 
may  be  given  by  a  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  judgment  for  a 
debt  not  yet  due,  but  it  must  be  given  in  clear  and  precise  terms.^^® 
Thus  where  the  warrant,  attached  to  a  promissory  note  given  in 
extension  of  others,  authorized  the  attorney  to  appear  for  the  maker 
at  any  time  thereafter  and  confess  judgment  "for  such  amount  as 
may  appear  to  be  unpaid  thereon,"  it  was  held  that  the  authority 
given  was  to  confess  judgment  only  for  the  amount  actually  due,  not 
that  accruing."'  When  a  warrant  of  attorney  confers  authority,  in 
a  certain  contingency,  to  confess  judgment  on  a  note  before  it  is 
due,  the  record  must  show  that  the  specified  contingency  had  hap- 
pened, otherwise  the  judgment  is  unwarranted.*** 

itft  Black  T.  Pattlson,  61  Miss.  599;  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Mayer,  93  Mo.  417. 
6  S.  W.  237:  McClish  v.  Manning,  3  6.  Greene  (Iowa)  223;  Shepherd  v.  Wood, 
73  Dl.  App.  48G;  Illinois  Steel  Go.  v.  0*Donnell,  156  HL  624,  41  N.  E.  185,  31 
I^  R.  A.  265,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  245. 

is«  Callorway  t.  By  ram,  95  Ind.  423;  Farmers'  &  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Spear, 
48  IIL  App.  509.  See  Forrestw  v.  Stranss,  21  Civ.  Proc.  R.  166,  18  N.  Y.  Supp. 
41. 

1S7  Pond  y.  Davenport,  45  Gal.  225. 

i»«  Tide  Ins.,  Trust  &  Safe  Deposit  Go.  v.  Ran,  153  Pa.  488,  26  Atl.  220; 
iJermfln-Amerfcan  Title  &  Trust  Go.  v.  Gampbell,  184  Pa.  541,  39  Atl.  291; 
FarweU  v.  Huston,  151  111.  239,  37  N.  E.  864,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  237;  Gohen  v. 
BargesBy  44  IIL  App.  206;  Blanck  v.  Medley.  63  III.  App.  211. 

liP  Keld  V.  Southworth.  71  Wis.  288,  30  N.  W.  860.  And  see  Smith  v.  Prin- 
ze. 100  Pa.  275. 

!<•  Roundy  v.  Hunt.  24  111.  598. 

(09) 


§72  lAW  OP  JUDGMENTS,  (Ch.'3 


§  71.    For  Future  AdTanoes. 

A  judgment  by  confession  may  be  taken  to  secure  future  advances 
of  notes  or  other  commercial  paper  to  be  made  by  the  creditor  to  the 
'  debtor;**^  or  to  secure  both  existing  and  future  indorsement?  for 
his  accommodation.^*^  "A  judgment  or  other  security  may  be  taken 
and  held  for  future  responsibilities  and  advances,  to  the  extent  of  the 
amount  of  the  judgment  or  security.  But  to  enable  a  creditor  to 
hold  a  judgment  or  other  security  for  future  responsibilities  and  ad- 
vances, it  must  be  a  part  of  the  original  agreement  that  the  judg- 
ment, or  security,  should  be  a  security  for  such  respcmsibilities  and 
advances.  It  cannot,  as  against  third  persons,  be  held  to  meet  and 
cover  new  and  distinct  engagements  subsequently  entered  into  by  the 
parties."  ^**  And  it  seems  that  advances  made  or  responsibilities 
incurred,  after  a  subsequent  judgment  has  intervened,  will  not  be 
covered  by  the  confessed  judgment.^** 

§  72.    For   oontinsent   Liabllitiefl. 

In  those  jurisdictions  where  the  more  liberal  statute  is  in  force,  a 
judgment  may  be  confessed  to  secure  a  future  or  contingent  liability. 
Thus  a  judgment  confessed  as  an  indemnity  for  liabilities  incurred 
by  another  is  good  at  law  against  subsequent  judgments,  and  may  be 
enforced  before  the  party  assuming  the  liabilities  has  discharged 
them.^***  A  judgment  on  confession  may  be  enforced  by  execution, 
apd  is  sustained  by  the  same  presumptions  as  other  judgments,  not- 
withstanding it  was  recovered  on  a  contingent  liability.^**  In  those 
states,  however,  where  a  judgment  can  only  be  confessed  for  a  debt 

1*1  Cook  V.  Whipple,  55  N.  Y.  150,  14  Am.  Rep.  202. 
.    M2  i,ar.siug  v.  VVoodworth,  1  J^aiulf.  (;h.  (N.  Y.)  43. 

143  AverlU  v.  Loucks,  6  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  19;  Tiniscott  v.  King,  6  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
340.     See  Frye  v.  Jones,  78  111.  G27. 

m  Brinkerhoff  v.  Marvin,  5  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  320.- 

1*0  Ford  V.  Elkln,  2  Speers  (S.  C.)  14(5.  And  see  Ely  v.  Parkhurst.  25  N. 
J.  Law,  188.  Where  two  persons  have  exchanged  accouimodation  notes, 
which  have  not  been  paid,  there  is  a  valid  consideration  for  one  of  them  to 
confess  judgment  to  the  other,  though  they  are  not  due,  and  the  liability  is 
contingent.     Curtis  v.  Fox,  191  Pa.  044,  43  Atl.  1093. 

1*6  Allen  V.  Norton,  6  Or.  344.    A  confession  is  valid  though  the  Jadgment 

(100) 


Ch.  3)  JUDGMENTS    BY   CONFESSION.  §   73 

that  is  "due  and  owing,"  the  rule  is  different  in  this  respect.  Thus, 
in  a  New  Jersey  case  the  learned  vice-chancellor  said:  "I  think  I 
am  bound  to  consider  the  doctrine  as  settled,  so  far  at  least  as  this 
court  is  concerned,  that  a  judgment  on  bond  and  warrant  of  attofi 
ney,  under  our  statute,  can  only  be  entered  for  a  debt  actually  exist- 
ing at  the  time  of  its  entry,  and  that  a  simple  liability  as  indorser  or 
surety  does  not  constitute  such  a  debt."  ^*^ 

f  73.    Amount  of  tl&e  Judsment. 

Where  a  judgment  is  entered  on  a  warrant  of  attorney  and  in- 
cludes a  greater  sum  than  was  actually  confessed,  it  is  held  to  be 
void  only  as  to  the  excess,  not  in  toto,  unless  the  excess  was  fraud- 
ulently  included.^*®  Upon  a  confession  of  judgment  in  a  pending 
action,  if  the  plaintiff's  demand  is  in  the  nature  of  a  debt  which  may 
be  ascertained  by  calculation,  it  is  sufficient  to  enter  judgment  gen- 
erally. The  judgment  is  supposed  to  be  for  the  amount  of  damages 
laid  in  the  declaration  and  execution  may  issue  accordingly."®  But 
if  the  plaintiff  should  indorse  upon  the  declaration  the  actual  amount 
of  the  debt,  and  if  the  defendant  complains  that  injustice  has  been 
done,  the  court  on  motion,  upon  a  proper  case  being  made  out,  will 
grant  immediate  relief.**^®  Where  the  confession  of  judgment  does 
not  determine  the  extent  of  the  recovery,  and  it  is  not  ascertainable 

Is  not  to  t>e  entered  up  except  upon  the  happening  of  a  contingency.  Keep 
T.  Leikie.  S  Rich.  Law  <S.  C.)  I(j4. 

!*•  Sayri*  v.  Hewes,  32  X.  J.  Eq.  652.     See  Clapp  v.  Ely,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  178. 

"*  Davenport  v.  Wright.  7>i  Pa.  292.  Compare  Tucker  v.  Gill,  (31  111.  236. 
Where  the*  power  of  attorney  in  a  bond  limits  the  sum  for  which  judgment 
may  l)e  entrrotl,  the  attorney  has  no  authority  to  enter  judgment  for  a  sum 
oxi'eedlutf  such  limit.  Mutual  Guarantee  Bldg.  &  Lioan  Ass'n  v.  Fallen,  21 
Pa.  Co.  Ct.  K.  017.  But  judgment  on  a  note  is  not  vitiated  because  confessed 
for  a  greater  rate  of  interest  than  the  note  bears  (Merchants*  Nat.  Banlc  v. 
Xewton  Cotton  Mills.  115  X.  C.  507.  20  S.  B.  7(>5),  nor  because  the  prothono- 
tary  made  an  entry  for  interest  from  the  date  of  the  note,  uo  claim  for  inter- 
c?«t  iiaving  been  made  by  the  plaintiff,  and  none  ever  received  by  him  on  the 
jud^iuent.  Page  v.  Simpson,  188  Pa.  310,  41  Atl.  638.  As  to  inclusion  of 
liitereiit,  »ee,  further,  Cordray  v.  City  of  Galveston  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  2C  S.  W. 
245. 

J*»See  Ijitrohe  Pldg.  ^c  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Fritz,  152. Pa.  224,  25  Atl.  558. 

"o  Lewis  V.  .^mith,  2  Si  rg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  142. 

(101) 


§   75  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  3 

by  mere  calculation,  it  must  be  liquidated  by  the  court  and  not  by 
the  clerk."^ 

I  74.    Iiiquidation  of  Axaoiint  by  Clerk. 

In  the  case  of  a  confession  of  judgment  without  action,  the  stat- 
utes sometimes  authorize  the  prothonotary  or  clerk  of  the  court  to 
enter  up  judgment  on  a  warrant,  without  the  actual  intervention  of 
an  attorney  appearing  for  the  defendant.  But  such  a  statute,  it  is 
held,  does  not  give  him  all  the  powers  of  an  attorney.  He  can  enter 
judgment  only  when  the  amount  due  appears  on  the  face  of  the  in- 
strument, or  is  ascertainable  by  calculation  from  its  face.** ^  Thus 
where  judgment  was  confessed  for  the  value  of  certain  land  at  the 
rate  of  $io  per  acre,  the  quantity  to  be  ascertained  by  survey,  it  was 
held  that  the  prothonotary  had  no  power  to  enter  a  judgment.*** 
Such  a  power  must  also  be  exercised  by  the  officer  without  unneces- 
sary delay.  Where  a  judgment  was  confessed  "amount  to  be  ascer- 
tained by  the  prothonotary/'  and  no  amount  was  ascertained  for 
fourteen  years,  and  the  plaintiff  and  principal  defendant  were  dead, 
the  court  refused  to  make  an  order  for  ascertaining  the  amount 
against  the  surety.*** 

§  75.    Inolusion   of   Attorney's    Feet. 

A  judgment  entered  by  confession  upon  a  warrant  of  attorney  may 
include  fees  to  the  attorney  appearing  in  the  case  (nominally  for  the 
debtor,  really  in  behalf  of  the  creditor),  if  that  be  authorized  by  the 
power.***     And  it  is  altogether  usual  to  incorporate  a  stipulation  for 

iBi  Bonta  V.  Clay,  1  Lltt.  (Ky.)  27.  Where  a  power  of  attorney  authorizes 
a  ooiifessiou  of  Judgment  for  any  rent  due  by  the  terms  of  n  lease  whlcb 
fixes  the  amount  of  rent,  a  judgment  In  accordance  with  such  power  may 
properly  be  entered,  though  the  lease  also  binds  the  lessee  to  pay  damages  for 
waste  of  water  and  other  items,  thereby  rendering  the  amount  due,  aside 
from  rent,  uncertain.    Scott  v.  Mantonya,  GO  III.  App.  481. 

152  Hope  V.  Everhart,  70  Pa.  231;  Connay  v.  Halstead,  73  Pa.  354. 

IBS  Connay  v.  Halstead,  73  Pa.  354.  The  maker  of  a  note  authorizing 
judgment  by  confession  and  the  payment  of  attorneys'  fees  cannot  question 
the  attorneys*  fees  on  the  ground  that  he  was  insolvent  when  he  made  tlie 
note.    Blanck  v.  Medley.  63  111.  App.  211. 

IS*  Cook  V.  Cooper,  4  JHar.   (Del.)  189. 

150  Ball  V.  Miller,  38  lU.  110. 

(102) 


Ch.  3)  JUDGMENTS    BY   CONFESSION.  §   76 

such  fees  in  the  warrant.  Such  a  provision  rests  upon  a  valid  con- 
sideration and  is  not  fraudulent  as  to  other  creditors ;  ^*'  unless  the 
amount  designated  as  attorney's  fees  is  grossly  in  excess  of  any  rea- 
sonable amount,  in  which  case  the  judgment,  at  least  to  the  extent 
of  such  fees,  is  fraudulent  and  void  as  against  the  other  creditors  of 
the  defendant.*'^  And  the  attorney's  commissions  authorized  in  a 
judgment-note  cannot  be  collected  as  part  of  the  debt  due  when  the 
debtor  was  ready  to  pay  at  the  maturity  of  the  note.^*®  It  is  cus- 
tomary to  specify  in  the  warrant  or  note  the  sum  which  may  be  in- 
corporated in  the  judgment  as  a  fee  for  the  attorney.  But  cases 
have  sometimes  come  before  the  courts  in  which  the  provision,  in- 
stead of  being  explicit,  merely  designated  a  "reasonable  attorney's 
fee."    This  language,  it  is  held,  gives  to  the  court  in  which  the  con- 

a 

fession  is  made  the  right  to  determine  what  is  a  reasonable  fee;  it 
does  not  leave  it  to  the  option  or  the  conscience  of  the  attorney ;  it 
contemplates  a  judicial  proceeding  by  the  court  for  the  purpose  of 
ascertaining  the  amount  which  may  reasonably  be  charged  up. 
Hence  if  the  attorney  himself  fixes  the  sum  of  his  fees,  under  a  power 
so  worded,  and  confesses  judgment  for  the  whole,  he  acts  in  excess 
of  his  authority,  and  the  judgment  so  entered,  without  the  interven- 
tion of  the  court,  is  void.^** 

I  76«    Reoordine  tlie  Judsment. 

Under  a  statute  relating  to  judgments  by  confession,  which  re- 
quires the  plaintiff  to  file  a  sworn  statement,  and  enacts  that  the 
clerk  shall  indorse  the  judgment  upon  the  statement  and  enter  it  in 
the  judgment-book,  the  two  entries  should  be  deemed  to  have  the 
force  of  duplicate  copies,  each  having  the  effect  of  an  original.^*® 
The  power  of  attorney  confessing  the  judgment  should  be  filed  as  a 
part  of  the  record.*'*     In  Illinois,  wherfe  judgment  is  confessed  be- 

"•  Weigley  v.  Matson,  125  111.  64,  16  N.  E.  881,  8  Am.  St.  Rep.  3:^5. 
i^'Hulae  V.  Mershon,   125  111.  52,  17  N.  E.  50.    See  Sweeney  v.   Stroud, 
55  X.  J.  Law,  97,  25  Atl.  273. 
"«  Moore  v.  Kligore,  110  Pa.  433,  1  Atl.  593. 
"•CampbeU  v.  Goddard,  123  111.  220,  14  N.  E.  261. 
>«<»K1ng  T.  HigRlng,  3  Or.  406. 
i«»  Durbam  v.  Brown,  24  111.  93. 

(103) 


§77  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch,  3 

fore  the  clerk  in  vacation,  the  formal  writing  up  of  the  judgment  in 
the  court  records  is  held  to  be  essential;  and  an  execution  issued 
before  it  is  so  written  up  is  invalid.^®^  But  in  some  other  states,  it 
appears  that  the  statutory  requirements  as  to  the  recording  of  such 
judgments  are  merely  directory,  the  statement,  affidavit,  and  other 
papers  accompanying  the  confession  constituting  the  judgment  roll 
and  serving  as  the  basis  for  an  execution.^®* 


§  77.    Beversiiis  and  Vaoatins  Judgments  by  Confession. 

In  what  circumstances  a  judgment  entered  upon  the  confession  of 
the  defendant  may  be  reviewed  in  the  appellate  court,  or  opened  or 
vacated  in  the  court  below,  at  the  defendant's  own  instance,  is  a 
question  involved  in  much  doubt.  The  difficulty  arises  from  the  fact 
that  the  debtor,  by  his  voluntary  action  in  the  matter,  must  be  con- 
sidered to  have  waived  his  strict  technical  rights  to  some  extent,  and 
yet  he  should  be  protected  from  injustice  and  from  errors  sufficient 
to  vitiate  the  whole  proceeding.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  held  in  sev- 
eral states  that  a  confession  of  judgment  operates  as  a  release  of  all 
errors  in  the  record,  and  consequently  it  cannot  be  carried  to  the 
appellate  court  either  by  appeal  or  certiorari.***  On  the  other  hand, 
it  is  elsewhere  held  that  a  confession  of  judgment,  although  a  waiver 
of  formal  errors,  does  not  prevent  the  defendant  from  procuring  the 
reversal  of  the  judgment  for  errors  of  substance.*®'  In  regard  to 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  below,  it  seems  to  be  conceded  that  it 
has  power  to  give  equitable  relief  in  cases  calling  for  its  interposi- 
tion.*®*    "The  power  of  the  courts  to  open  judgments  entered  by  con- 

162  Knights  V.   Martin,  155  111.  486,  40  X.    E.  358. 

183  SjuiiKlers  V.  Lipscomb,  UO  Va.  (i47,  19  S.  E.  450;  Ex  parte  Graham, 
54  S.  C.  llxi,  32  S.  E.  67. 

164  (Jarner  v.  Burleson,  26  Tex.  348;  Maiideville  v.  Holey.  1  Pet.  l^l 
7  L.  E<1.  85;  Wilson  v.  Collins,  9  Ala.  127.  See  De  Riemer  v.  Cantilloiu 
4  Johns.  Ch.  (X.  Y.)  85. 

105  Bat  telle  v.  Bridgman,  1  Morris  (Iowa)  363;  Portage  Canal  Co.  y.  Crit- 
tenden, 17  Ohio.  4'M).  See  Montgomery  v.  Baruett,  8  Tex.  143;  Kennedy 
V.  Lowe,  9  Iowa,  580;   Hopkins  v.  Howard,  12  Tex.  7. 

106  McAllister's  Appeal,  59  Pa.  204;  Walker  v.  Ensign,  1  111.  App.  IV): 
Wilson  V.  Cox,  170  Va.  3:^1,  33  Atl.  79:  Seaver  v.  Siegel,  54  lU.  App.  (ECi: 
Jordan  v.  Huntington.  58  III.  App.  646;  Second  Ward  Sav.  Bank  v.  Schranck. 
97  Wis.  250,  73  X.  W.  31,  39  L.  li.  A.  569.     Where,  in  a  suit  against  a  city 

(104) 


Ch.  S)  JUDGMENTS    BY    CONFESSION.  §   77 

iession,  or  in  default  of  an  appearance  or  plea,  is  not  denied ;  and  it 
is  the  duty  of  the  courts  to  exercise  such  power  wherever  it  is  satis- 
iactorily  shown  that  in  equity  the  judgment  ought  not  to  be  collect- 
ed." *•'  In  order  to  prevent  any  question  of  this  kind,  the  parties 
sometimes  incorporate  a  release  of  errors  in  the  confession  or  war- 
rant of  attorney,  the  effect  being,  of  course,  to  waive  any  formal  ob- 
jections or  irregularities.  But  where  this  is  not  done,  it  is  proper  to 
examine  with  care  any  irregularity  in  the  proceeding,  and  to  vacate 
the  judgment  if  substantial  injustice  may  have  been  done  to  the  de- 
fendant.**' The  opening  of  such  a  judgment  is  therefore  a  matter 
of  sound  discretion,  and  whether  such  a  sound  discretion  has  been 
exercised  by  the  court  below  depends  upon  the  whole  evidence,  in 
which  the  burden  of  proof  is  to  show  a  defense.***  The  judgment 
should  not  be  opened  and  the  defendant  let  in  to  defend,  except  up- 
on evidence  of  such  weight  and  clearness  as  would  be  sufficient  to 
warrant  a  chancellor  in  decreeing  that  the  instrument  upon  which 
the  confession  was  founded  was  void,  or  should  be  reformed  for  fraud 

to  quiet  title  to  land  claimed  as  a  street,  a  decree  Is  entered  by  confession, 
the  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  in  view  of  the  public  interests  involvetl, 
open  the  ca»?  and  allow  an  aiiswer  to  be  tiled.  Earll  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
13«  111.  277,  28  N.  E.  370. 

J«7  Earaest  v.  Hosklns,  100  Pa.  551. 

i«s  Mci'abe  v.  Sunmer,  40  Wis.  386.  Thus,  a  judgment  by  confession  may 
be  opened  where  it  is  alleged  to  be  usurious  (MciJuire  v.  Campbell,  58  111. 
App.  188),  or  to  let  In  a  plea  of  the  statute  of  limitations.  Bates  v.  CuUum, 
1«3  Pa.  2:14.  21)  Atl.  870;  Bennett  v.  Allen,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  256.  But 
there  Ih  no  abuse  of  discretion  In  refusing  to  open  the  Judgment  where  the 
only  defense  is  a  counterclaim,  which  is  denied  by  the  plaintiff.  Walter 
T.  Ftes,  155  Pa.  55,  25  Atl.  829.  And  see  Evans  v.  Barclay,  38  111.  App. 
496.  Where  it  appears  that  a  judgment  purporting  to  have  been  entered  by 
agreement  was  entered  without  authority.  It  may  be  set  aside.  Foley's  Ex*r 
V.  Gatliff  <Ky.)  43  S.  W.  100.  But  a  judgment  admitted  to  be  just  will  not 
be  set  aside  in  equity  for  the  mere  reason  that  the  attorney  confessing  It 
under  a  warrant  was  not  formally  admitted  to  practice  in  the  court  wlicre 
the  judgment  was  taken,  nor  for  defective  verification  of  the  complaint. 
Pnrcell  v.  Kleaver.  08  Wis.  102,  73  N.  W.  322.  In  Illinois,  it  is  held  that 
where  the  defendant  in  a  confessed  judgment  asks  for  and  obtains  leave  to 
plejid,  he  thereby  waives  all  technicalities  and  objections  to  the  judgnioiit. 
Koby  V.  Updyke.  61  111.  App.  328. 

»«»R«cnIgk'8  Appeals  (l*a.)  3  Atl.  09;    Howie  v.  Lewis,   196  Pa.   558.   4(; 

AU.  8:x>. 

(105) 


§77  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  3 

or  mistake.*^*  Whether  a  judgment  against  two  persons,  entered 
by  confession  on  a  warrant  of  attorney,  may  be  set  aside  as  to  one  of 
them  and  stand  good  as  to  the  other,  is  an  unsettled  point  It  de- 
pends upon  whether,  in  the  particular  state,  a  joint  judgment  is  con- 
sidered as  an  entirety  or  as  severable.^'^  When  the  application  to 
set  aside  the  judgment  proceeds  from  another  creditor  of  the  defend- 
ant, there  is  less  doubt  as  to  the  power  of  the  court.  It  may  clearly 
vacate  the  judgment  for  fraud  or  collusion  between  the  parties,  or  for 
a  substantial  failure  to  comply  with  the  statutory  requirements.^^* 
Where  an  application  to  open  a  confessed  judgment  is  based  on 
grounds  going  to  the  merits,  and  is  contested,  the  issues  raised 
should  ordinarily  be  tried  by  a  jury ;  but  in  Pennsylvania,  it  is  held 
that  the  court  to  which  such  an  application  is  made,  though  there  is 
a  conflict  of  testimony,  may  pass  on  the  weight  of  evidence  and  the 
credibility  of  the  witnesses,  without  sending  the  case  to  a  jury.*'* 
Terms  may  be  imposed  upon  the  defendant,  on  granting  his  applica- 
tion to  open  the  judgment;  but  it  is  not  proper  to  require  that  the 
money  supposed  to  be  due  should  be  brought  into  court,  though  the 
judgment  may  be  allowed  to  stand  as  security  to  abide  the  result*'* 

170  Englishes  Appeal,  119  Pa.  533,  13  Atl.  479,  4  Am.  St.  Rep.  656.  A 
court  ought  not  to  open  a  confessed  judgment  on  the  ground  of  fraud  if. 
upon  all  the  testimony,  the  evidence  of  fraud  is  nat  distinct  Slgle  v. 
Seigley,  9  Kulp  (Pa.)  471.  Affidavits  filed  in  support  of  a  motion  to  open 
a  Judgment  by  confession  are  to  be  construed  most  strongly  against  the 
party  making  the  motion.  Chicago  Fire-Proofing  Co.  v.  Paj'k  Xat  Bauk« 
145  111.  481,  32  N.  E.  534. 

171  See  Reynolds  v.  Silvers,  17  N.  J.  Law,  275;  York  Bank's  Appeal  36 
Pa.  458;  North  v.  Mudge,  13  Iowa,  496,  81  Am.  Dec.  441;  Chapin  v.  Thomp- 
son, 20  Cal.  681;  supra,  §§  58,  64.  As  to  opening  the*  Judgment  for  the 
benefit  of  one  of  two  Joint  defendants,  who  alleges  that  his  signature  was 
forged,  see  Darragh  v.  Bigger,  172  Pa.  89,  33  Atl.  273. 

17  2  Crescent  Canal  Co.  v.  Montgomery,  124  Cal.  134,  56  Pac.  797;  Filson 
V.  Greenspan,  194  Pa.  546,  45  Atl.  330.  See  Thompson  v.  Hintgen,  11  Wis. 
112;  Pirie  v.  Hughes,  43  Wis.  531.  In  the  absence  of  fraud.  Judgments  by 
confession  will  not  be  set  aside  simply  because  they  were  given  by  defend- 
ant after  obtaining  from  plaintiff  an  extension  of  time  to  answer  in  an 
action  then  pending.     Wood  v.  Mitchell,  63  Hun,  629,  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  782. 

178  Blauvelt  v.  Kemon,  196  Pa.  128,  46  Atl.  416.  Compare  Hughes  t. 
Moody,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  305. 

17  4  McGuire  v.  CampbeU,  58  111.  App.  188. 

(IOC) 


Ch.  3)  JUDGMENTS   BY   CONFESSION.  §  78 


i   78.    Effects  of  Confessed  JTiidgmeiit. 

"In  contemplation  of  law,  a  judgment  on  a  warrant  of  attorney  is 
as  much  an  act  of  the  court  as  if  it  were  formally  pronounced  on  nil 
dicit  or  a  cognovit,  and  till  it  is  reversed  or  set  aside,  it  has  all  the 
qualities  and  effects  of  a  judgment  on  a  verdict."  ^^*  A  judgment 
upon  confession  is  therefore  just  as  conclusive,  between  the  parties 
and  their  privies,  of  the  facts  and  points  necessarily  involved  in  and 
determined  by  it,  and  as  final  a  bar  to  the  maintenance  by  the  cred- 
itor of  another  suit  for  the  same  demand,  as  any  other  judgment.^^* 

»7*Braddec  v.  Srownfield,  4  Watts  (Pa.)  474.  A  Judgment  confessed  upon 
terms,  duly  entered,  is  in  effect  a  conditional  judgment,  and  the  court  will 
take  notice  of  tlie  terms  and  enforce  them.    Wood  t.  Bagley,  34  N.  C.  83. 

>7«Braddee  v.  Erownfield,  4  Watts  (Pa.)  474;  Sheldon  v.  Stryker,  34 
Barb.  (X.  Y.)  116:  Neusbaum  v.  Kelm,  24  X.  Y.  325;  Dean  v.  Thatcher,  82 
X.  J.  Law,  470;  Xorth  t.  Mndge,  13  Iowa,  496.  81  Am.  Dec.  441;  Twogood 
T.  Pence,  22  Iowa,  543;  Sherman  v.  Christy,  17  Iowa,  322;  Secrist  v.  Zim- 
merman, 55  Pa.  446;  Kirby  v.  Fitzgerald,  31  N.  Y.  417;  Weikel  v.  Long, 
55  Pa.  238;  GolT  v.  Dabbs,  4  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  300.  See  Hoppock  v.  Cray 
(X.  J.)  21  Atl.  624.  The  confession  of  a  Judgment  by  the  maker  of  a  note, 
in  faTor  of  the  bolder,  does  not  discharge  sureties  or  indorsers  who  are  not 
parties  thereto.     First  Xat.  Bank  y.  Eureka  Lumber  Co.,  123  N.  C.  21,  31  S. 

(107) 


§   79  I<AW  OF  JUDQHBNTa.  (Cb.  4 


CHAPTEB  IV. 

JUDGMENTS  BY  DEFAULT. 

79.  Judgment  of  Nil  Diclt 

79a.  Judgment  for  Want  of  Ailidavit  of  Defense. 

80.  Judgment  by  Default. 

81.  Against  Wbom  may  be  taken. 

82.  Joint  Defendants. 

83.  Jurisdiction  of  the  Defendant 

84.  Must  be  founded  on  good  Declaration, 

85.  Premature  Entity  of  Default. 

86.  Default,  when  proper. 

87.  Conclusiveness  of  Judgment  by  Default 

88.  Entry  by  the  Clerk. 

89.  interlocutory  Judgment,  when  necessary. 

90.  Assessment  of  Damages. 

91.  Evidence  on  Assessment  of  Damages. 

92.  Amount  of  the  Recovery. 

9iJ.    Judgment  by  Default  not  aided  by  Presumptfons. 

94.  Opening  and  Vacating  Judgments  by  Default 

95.  Review  of  Judgments   by  Default 

S  79.    Jndgment  of  NU  Dicit. 

When  a  defendant  puts  himself  in  default  by  failing  to  plead  or 
file  an  answer  within  a  time  prescribed,  although  he  may  have  en- 
tered an  appearance  in  the  action,  the  judgment  given  against  him 
is  technically  called  judgment  of  nil  dicit,  that  is,  that  he  "says  noth- 
ing" in  opposition  to  the  plaintiff's  claim,  and  therefore  the  latter  is 
entitled  to  recover.^  But  if  the  defendant  has  put  in  his  plea,  and 
issue  has  been  joined,  and  he  then  fails  to  appear  when  the  case  is 
called  for  trial,  this  species  of  judgment  cannot  properly  be  entered, 
for  he  is  not  in  default  for  want  of  an  answer.^  However,  the  dis- 
tinction betw^een  this  judgment  and  the  other  varieties  of  judgment 

1  Stewart  v.  Goode,  29  Ala.  476;  SummerHn  v.  Dowdle,  24  Ala.  428.  See 
supra.   §   15. 

2  Taylor  v.  McLaughlin,  2  Colo.  375.  In  an  action  on  two  notes,  each  set 
out  as  a  distinct  cause  of  action,  where  defendant  answers  only  as  to  one 
of  the  notes,  Judgment  should  be  given,  on  motion,  on  the  other  note.  Off- 
ran  v.  Kerchner,  117  N.  C.  2G4,  23  S.  E.  177. 

(108) 


Cll.  4)  JUDGMENTS  BY  DEFAULT.  §  79a 

against  the  defendant  for  failure  to  take  a  required  step  in  the  action 
is  no  longer  strictly  observed,  and  when  the  judgment  is  nil  dicit 
when  it  should  have  been  by  default,  it  is  merely  informal  and  will 
not  be  reversed  on  that  account.*  But  in  Texas  it  is  said  that  while 
the  proceeding  to  ascertain  the  amount  of  damages  is  the  same  on 
judgments  by  nil  dicit  as  on  judgments  by  default,  **in  other  respects, 
a  judgmcr.:  by  nil  dicit  is  held  by  this  court  to  possess  a  stronger  im- 
plication in  favor  of  the  plaintiff's  claim  than  an  ordinary  judgment 
by  default ;  it  is  regarded  as  partaking  of  the  nature  of  a  judgment 
by  confession  as  well  as  by  default."  *  The  distinction,  however,  is 
not  of  practical  value,  nor  is  it  generally  recognized. 

I  79a.    Jndcnent  for  Want  of  AiBdavit  of  Defense. 

According  to  the  practice  at  common  law  in  some  of  the  states, 
where  an  action  is  brought  upon  an  obligation  for  the  payment  of  a 
sum  certain  in  money,  if  the  defendant  means  to  contest  it,  he  is 
required  to  file,  within  a  limited  time  after  notice  of  the  plaintiff's 
statement,  an  affidavit  setting  forth  the  facts  on  which  he  means  to 
rely  as  a  defense ;  if  he  fails  to  do  this,  judgment  may  be  taken 
against  him  **for  want  of  an  affidavit  of  defense."  ^  If  such  an  affi- 
davit is  filed,  but  the  plaintiff  deems  it  inadequate  in  law  to  consti- 
tute a  defense  to  the  action,  he  may  have  a  rule  on  the  defendant  "to 
show  cause  why  judgment  should  not  be  entered  against  him  for 
want  of  a  sufficient  affidavit  of  defense."  •  A  motion  for  judgment 
on  this  ground,  being  in  the  nature  of  a  demurrer,  admits  the  facts 
averred  in  the  affidavit,  and  denies  their  sufficiency  as  an  answer  to 

>  Shields  Y.  Barden.  B  Ark.  4r)D. 

*  »torej  V.  Mchols,  22  Tex.  S7. 

^Tobybanna  &  L.  I^umber  ("o.  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  167  Pa.  231.  31  Atl. 
'*U:  2  Bright.  Purd,  Dig.  (Pa.)  13r>6.  1357;  Laws  Pa.  1887,  p.  271,  §  5;  Act 
I'a.  May  31,  18S«  (P.  L.  18o).  Plaintiff's  right  to  a  default  judgment  for 
want  of  an  affidavit  of  defense  within  the  required  time  is  not  affected  by 
■n  appeamn<*e  of  defendant  by  attorney  within  such  time.  North  v,  Yorlte, 
174  Pa.  :My,  'M  Atl.  020. 

*  Such  a  judgment,  it  is  said,  is  not  a  Judgment  by  default  or  confession. 
Abeles  v.  Powell,  (5  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  123.  It  is  error  to  gfve  judgment  on  ac- 
connt  of  the  Insuffleiency  of  an  affidavit  of  defense  flled,  when  the  ease  is  not 
one  in  which  such  an  affidavit  can  legally  be  required.  Bartoe  v.  Guokert, 
158  Pa.  124,  27  AU.  845. 

(109) 


§  79a  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  4 

the  claim.^  And  if  the  court  decides  that  the  allegations  of  the  affi- 
davit are  not  adequate  to  constitute  a  defense  to  the  actkm,  Judg- 
ment will  be  given  for  the  plaintiff,  unless,  for  ^)ecial  reasons,  leave 
should  be  granted  to  file  a  new  or  sup|rfemental  affidavit  of  defense.* 
If  the  defense  alleged  is  good  as  to  part  of  the  claim,  but  insuffi- 
cient as  to  the  balance,  the  court  may  direct  judgment  for  the  part 
insufficiently  denied,  and  allow  the  plaintiff  to  try  the  case  as  to  the 
remainder.*  And  a  statute  in  Pennsylvania  provides  that,  where  an 
affidavit  of  defense  is  filed  to  a  part  of  the  claim  sued  for,  the  plain- 
tiff may  take  judgment  for  the  amount  admitted  to  be  due,  and  pro- 
ceed to  trial  for  the  balance.^®  This  applies  to  any  action  in  which 
a  part  of  the  claim  is  admitted  to  be  due,  irrespective  of  how  the 
amount  is  ascertained  or  the  balance  computed,^ ^  but  not  to  a  case 
where  the  affidavit  applies  to  the  whole  of  the  plaintiff's  claim,  though 
it  may  be  insufficient  in  law  as  to  a  part  of  it.^*  In  Connecticut,  a 
statute  provides  that,  in  causes  where  ah  attorney  appears  for  the 
defendant,  the  plaintiff  may  require  him  to  state  to  the  court  whether 
he  believes  a  bona  fide  defense  exists  to  the  action,  whether  such  de- 
fense will  be  made,  and  whether  there  will  be  a  trial,  and  that  if  such 
attorney  refuses  to  disclose  as  required,  or  shall  not  satisfy  the  court 
that  such  defense  will  be  made  or  such  trial  had,  the  court  may  or- 
der judgment  for  the  plaintiff.  Where  this  rule  is  complied  with, 
the  court  has  no  authority  to  pass  on  the  legal  sufficiency  of  the  de- 

7  Hicks  V.  National  Banli,  168  Pa.  038.  32  Atl.  63.  On  such  a  motion,  the 
correctness  of  an  averment  in  the  affidavit  as  to  the  law  of  another  state 
cannot  be  tested  by  reference  to  the  statutes  of  that  state.  Wood  Oo.  t. 
Berry  Co.,  4  Fa.  Dlst.  R.  141. 

8  Sykes  v.  Anderson,  14  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  K.  329;  JLaIrd  v.  CampbeU,  itt  !*«. 
475;  Callan  v.  Lukens,  89  Pa.  134.  Where  leave  has  been  ^ven  to  tile  a 
supplemental  athdavit  It  must  be  tiled  within  a  reasonable  time,  or  else  the 
court  may  enter  Judgment  without  a  new  rule  or  further  notice  to  the  de- 
fendant.   Close  V.  Hancock,  3  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  207. 

»  Drake  v.  Irvine,  10  l»a.  Co.  Ct.  K.  48G. 

10  Act  Pa.  May  31,  1893  (P.  L.  185). 

11  Roberts  v.  Sharp,  14  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  186,  affirmed  161  Pa.  185,  :»  Ati. 
1023. 

12  Reilly  v.  Daly,  159  Pa.  tK)5.  28  Atl.  493;  Myers  v.  Cochran,  3  Pa.  Dlst. 
Jt.   135.  33   VVkly.  ^otes  Cas.  250. 

(110) 


Cb.  4)  JUDGMENTS    BY    DEFAULT.  §   80 

fense,  and  render  judgment  because  it  deems  such  defense  insuffi- 
cient." 

S  80.    JTvdsiBeAt  by  Default. 

Properly  speaking,  a  judgment  by  default  is  one  taken  against  a 
defendant  when,  having  been  duly  summoned  or  cited  in  an  action, 
he  fails  to  enter  an  appearance.  But  the  term  is  frequently  (and 
indeed  commonly)  used  in  a  much  wider  sense,  in  which  it  includes 
judgments  given  against  the  defendant  for  want  of  a  plea,  answer, 
affidavit  of  defense,  etc.,  as  well  as  for  want  of  an  appearance.  The 
latter  is  the  signification  of  the  word  as  used  in  this  chapter.  The 
characteristic  feature  of  a  judgment  by  default  is  that  it  follows  upon 
the  negligence  or  omission  of  the  defendant,  passing  over  the  steps 
that  would  otherwise  be  taken,  trial  and  verdict,  and  adjudging 
against  him  immediately  upon  his  failure  to  defend.**  In  respect  to 
its  effects  and  consequences, — as  the  foundation  of  a  suit,  as  a  lien, 
as  a  bar  or  estoppel, — a  judgment  by'default  does  not  differ  from  one 
rendered  upon  a  verdict.**  There  are,  however,  certain  distinctive 
rules,  particularly  in  reference  to  its  rendition  and  entry,  which  re- 
quire separate  treatment  and  which  will  form  the  subject-matter  of 
the  following  pages.  The  rendition  of  a  judgment  by  default,  it  is 
held,  is  no  violation  or  abridgment  of  the  constitutional  right  of  trial 
by  jury.**     The  right  is  one  which  (at  least  in  a  civil  action)  may  be 

!•  Jennings  ▼.  Farsons,  71  Conn.  413,  42  Atl.  76. 

i«A  judgment  is  by  default  where  there  has  been  no  appearance  by  the 
defendant,  even  though  he  was  not  legally  summoned.  Brown  v.  Chapman, 
W)  Va.  174«  17  S.  K.  855.  But  a  Judgment  rendered  by  a  justice  of  the  peace 
when  the  defendant  Is  present  by  attorney,  who,  however,  takes  no  part  in  the 
trial,  is  not  a  judgment  **by  default."    Borgwald  v.  Fleming,  (fi>  Mo.  212. 

i>  Where  judgment  by  default  is  entered  against  defendant,  a  final  judg- 
ment cannot  afterwards  be  rendered  in  his  favor  without  first  setting  aside 
the  default.    Bateman  v.  Pool,  84  Tex.  406,  19  B.  W.  552. 

^•Cureton  t.  Stolces,  22  SS.  C.  583;  Lawrance  v.  Borm,  86  Pa.  226;  Ran- 
dall v.  Weld*  86  Pa.  357;  Hunt  v.  Lucas,  U9  Mass.  409;  Dortlc  v.  Lockwood, 
to.  Ga.  2i33,  The  right  of  trial  by  jury  is  not  impaired  by  a  law  giving  to 
the  court  the  right  to  assess  damages  without  a  jury  in  case  of  default.  Hop- 
kins ▼.  lAdd,  35  ill.  178;  8eeley  v.  City  of  Bridgeport,  53  Conn.  1,  22  Atl. 
lifil;  Baymond  v.  Danbury  &  N.  K.  Co.,  43  Conn.  51H>,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  11.593; 
Fred  Miller  Brewing  Co.  v.  Capital  Ins.  Co.,  Ill  Iowa,  590,  82  N.  W.  1023, 
tfi£  Am.  »t.  Hep.  529. 

(Ill) 


§81  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  4 

waived  by  the  party,  and  the  defendant  cannot  claim  that  the  privi- 
lege is  denied  to  him  if  he  presents  no  defense  to  be  tried  by  a  jury. 

S  81.    Ag^aimst  Wbom  may  be  taken. 

As  a  general  rule,  a  default  may  be  taken  against  any  natural  per- 
son against  whom  the  same  judgment  might  have  passed  as  the  re- 
sult of  contested  proceedings.  But  there  are  certain  exceptions  to 
this  statement.  Thus,  in  California,  a  person  summoned  as  a  gar- 
nishee may  be  punished  for  contempt  for  disobeying  ah  order  where- 
by he  is  required  to  disclose  his  indebtedness  if  any,  but  a  judgment 
by  default  cannot  be  taken  against  him,  and  such  judgment  is  with- 
out jurisdiction  and  void.*^  In  some  other  states,  however,  where 
the  court  has  regularly  obtained  jurisdiction  of  the  garnishee  and 
there  is  no  answer  on  his  part,  it  is  held  that  a  judgment  by  default 
may  be  entered  against  him,  and  such  judgment  will  be  sufficient  to 
protect  the  garnishee  if  no  defense  on  the  merits  could  have  been 
made.*®  Judgments  by  default  may  be  entered  against  non-resi- 
dents and  against  persons  under  disabilities ;  but  the  validity  of  such 
judgments  must  be  tested  by  rules  which  belong  to  later  sections  of 
this  book.**  A  default  judgment  may  also  be  rendered  against  a 
corporation ;  but  in  order  to  support  it,  it  must  appear  of  record 
that  the  person  who,  as  shown  by  the  rcvcirn  of  the  officer,  was  served 
with  process,  has  such  a  relation  to  the  corporation  that  service  on 
such  person  was  tantamount  to  service  on  the  corporation.*®  Un- 
der statutes  allowing  such  a  course  of  procedure,  a  defendant  may 
proceed  with  the  case  upon  the  failure  of  the  plaintiff  to  appear,  and 
judgment  may  be  rendered  on  the  merits.*^     But  one  who  is  origi- 

iT  Hibfrnia  fc'avings  &  l^an  Soo.  v.  Superior  Court.  56  Cal.  265. 

isscamahom  v.  Scott,  42  Iowa,  529;  Abell  v.  Simon.  49  Mel.  318;  Oracy 
V.  Coates,  2  McCord,  224;  Jones  v.  Tracy,  75  Ta.  417;  Lflughlin  v.  Jan- 
uary, 59  Mo.  3«3;    Debs  v.  Dalton,  7  Ind.  App.  84,  :U  N.  E.  23(5. 

i»  See,  infra,  §§  227-232,  §§  190,  196.  Particularly  as  to  the  vaUdity  of  de- 
fault judgments  against  Infants,  luiiatie8,  and  married  women,  see  Jacksoo 
V.  Krunor,  17  Misc.  Hep.  339,  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  1080;  Appel  v.  Brooks.  4  Misc. 
Kop.  626.  24  ^.  Y.  Supp.  100;  Kent  v.  West,  22  Misc.  Hip.  403,  50  X  X. 
Supp.   339;    Marion   v.   Kegensteln,   98  Ala.  475,   13   Soutb.  3H4. 

20  tioud   V.   Inliabitants  of  Town  of  I'ierce  (Mty,  86  Mo.  357. 

«i  Clune  V.  Qultzow,  125  Cat  213,  57  I'ae.  886w 

(112) 


Ch.  4)  JUDGMENTS    BY    DEFAULT.  §   82 

nally  a  defendant,  but  afterwards,  by  leave  of  court,  tecomes  a  plain- 
tiff and  files  a  cross  bill,  is  not  entitled  to  a  default  judgment  against 
his  co-defendants,  if  they  had  no  notice  of  his  cross  bill  or  that  he 
had  changed  his  status  in  the  case.*^ 

S  82.    Joint  Defendants. 

The  rule  of  the  common  law,  in  regard  to  actions  in  which  sev- 
eral persons  were  joined  as  defendants,  was  that  judgment  must  be 
givtn  against  all  or  none  of  them.  The  plaintiff  could  not  recover 
against  a  part  of  the  defendants  and  be  defeated  of  his  claim  against 
the  rest,  except  in  the  single  case  where  one  of  them  set  up  and 
succeeded  in  establishing  a  defense  entirely  personal  to  himself,  as 
his  release  or  discharge  or  his  personal  disability  to  contract.  Con- 
sequently, except  in  so  far  as  the  rule  is  changed  by  statute,  where 
several  persons  are  summoned  as  defendants,  and  one  of  them  pleads 
and  the  other  suffers  a  default,  final  judgment  cannot  be  entered  up- 
on the  default  until  the  issue  as  to  the  other  defendant  is  disposed  of, 
and  not  even  then  unless  the  plaintiff  had  a  verdict  on  the  issue  or 
the  defendant  pleading  had  set  up  a  merely  personal  defense.^^  But 
this  has  been  changed,  in  several  of  the  states,  by  the  statutes,  w^hich 
provide  that  in  actions  regularly  commenced  against  several  joint 
defendants  the  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  and  whenever  a-  several 
judgment  would  be  proper,  render  judgment  against  one  or  more  of 

"  Cole  v.  Grigsby  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  35  SS.  W.  680. 

2s  Russell  y.  Hogan,  1  Scam,  (ill.)  552;  CatUn  y.  Latson,  4  Abb.  Prac.  (N.  Y.) 
:!48;  I^yior  v.  Beck,  3  Kand.  (Va.)  316;  Woodward  v.  Newhall,  1  Tick.  (Mass.) 
^JU;  Uutcbings  y.  Heal  Kstate  Bank,  4  Ark.  517.  See  Curry  y.  Uoundtree, 
'>1  Cal.  IM.  if  three  defendants  demur,  and,  after  the  demurrer  is  with- 
drawn, two  of  them  plead,  a  Judgment  nil  dicit  should  be  entered  against 
the  party  not  pleading,  and  the  Jury  should  assess  the  damages  against  all. 
U  but  two  plead  and  the  other  abide  by  his  demuiTer,  he  cannot  be  regarded 
as  going  to  trial  with  the  others.  I'Yeeland  v.  Board  of  Supers  of  Jasper 
County,  Zi  HI.  303.  Where  one  of  several  defendants  answers,  he  is  not  in 
default  for  failure  to  answer  an  amended  peUtlon  which  does  not  change 
the  effect  of  the  original  as  to  him.  Bremen  Bank  y.  Umrath,  55  Mo.  App. 
^^  In  an  action  against  several  defendants  on  a  Joint  demand,  where  one 
defendant,  not  served,  appears  and  tiles  and  serves  his  plea,  he  is  entitled 
to  DoUce  of  trial;  and  until  -such  notice  is  given  the  court  (*annot  legally 
«*nter  Judgment  by  default  against  the  remaining  defendants.  I'eiifold  y. 
S^ljtteld,   110  Allch,   343.   (58  ^.    W.   220, 

1  LAW  JUDG.~8  (lilJj 


§   83  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  4 

them,  leaving  the  action  to  proceed  against  the  others.  Under  a 
law  of  this  character,  it  would  be  proper  to  render  a  judgment 
by  default  against  the  defendant  not  pleading,  where  the  cause  of 
action  was  joint  and  several.  But  if  the  claim  were  upon  a  joint 
contract,  such  a  judgment  would  necessarily  remain  interlocutory 
until  the  issues  raised  were  finally  disposed  of,  for  in  that  case  the 
defendants  must  stand  or  fall  together.  We  shall  recur  to  this  sub- 
ject at  a  later  point.**  It  is  also  held  that  where  process  is  served 
on  only  one  of  two  defendants,  judgment  cannot  be  rendered  against 
both  by  default.*'  But  it  seems  to  be  otherwise  under  the  "joint 
debtor  acts,"  existing  in  several  of  the  states,  in  actions  upon  a  joint 
contract.** 

f  63.    Jnrifldiotion  of  the  Defendaat. 

In  order  to  the  validity  of  a  judgment  by  default,  as  in  the  case  of 
any  other  judgment,  it  is  essential  that  the  court  should  have  ac- 
quired jurisdiction  .of  the  person  of  the  defendant.*^  A  judgment 
entered  by  default  against  a  party  who  has  not  been  served  with  pro- 
cess and  who  has  not  appeared  in  the  action,  is  irregular  and  void," 

24  iSee,  infra,  $S  208,  20».  Where  a  number  of  defendants  are  Jointly  sued 
on  a  Joint  iiabiiity,  and  a  joint  Judgment  is  asked,  it  is  error  for  the  court 
to  render  a  several  Judgment  on  default  against  one  defendant,  without 
tirst  trying  and  determining  the  liability  of  aU  the  defendants.  Osbun  y. 
Bartram,  15  Ohio  Cir.  Ot  K.  224.  Compare  German-American  Bank  v.  Stickle, 
59  Meb.  321,  80  N.  W.  910.  A  grantor  of  realty  by  warranty  deeds,  soed  with 
his  grantees  in  an  action  to  set  aside  the  titie  which  he  assumed  to  oonrey* 
may  defend  in  his  own  name  for  the  defendants  served  but  not  answering. 
Bausman  v.  Kads,  4t$  Minn.  148,  48  N.  W.  7($U,  24  Am.  iSt.  Rep.  201. 

2  0Kider  v.  AUeyne,  2  Scam.  (111.)  474;  Winslow  v.  Lambard,  57  Me.  356. 
in  an  action  against  three  defendants,  service  on  one  only  does  not  authorise 
Judgment  by  default  against  the  others,  where  no  facts  are  aUeged  maktuj; 
service  on  one  valid  as  to  all.  Tilman  v.  Johnson  (Tex.)  16  S.  W.  788.  See 
Kellogg  V.  Window,  lUO  iowa,  552,  ««  N.  W.  875. 

26  See,  infra,  H  235,  230. 

27  On  the  general  subject  of  Jurisdiction  as  essential  to  the  validity  of  a 
Judgment,  see,  infra,  U  215-244. 

28  Warren  Manuf  g  Co.  v.  .Etna  Ins.  Co.,  2  Paine,  501,  Fed.  Obb,  Xo. 
17,20(5;  Graham  v.  Graham,  4  Munf.  (Va.)  205;  Staunton  Perpetual  Bldg. 
&  l^oan  Co.  V.  Haden,  92  Va.  201,  23  S.  E.  285;    Rorer  v.  People's  Bldg.  U 

.&  S.  Ass'n,  47  VV.  Va.  1,  34  S.  E.  758;  Stallings  v.  GuUy,  48  N.  O.  344;.  Wins- 
low  V.  Anderson,  20  >'.  C.  1,  32  Am.  Dec.  (551;  Duncan  v.  Gerdine,  59  Miss. 
.550;    Prentiss  v.  Mellen,  1  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  521;   State  v.  BUUngs,  23 

(114) 


Cb.  4)  JUDGMENTS    BT   DEFAULT.  §   83 

And  due  and  proper  service  must  appear  upon  the  record  before  the 
court  is  authorized  to  render  a  judgment  by  default ;  *•  though  here 
it  is  necessary  to  recollect  the  presumptions  of  jurisdiction  by  which 
any  judgment  of  a  superior  court  is  sustained  when  assailed  col- 
laterally or  made  the  basis  of  a  new  suit.  It  being  necessary,  there- 
fore, that  the  court  should  have  jurisdiction  in  the  case,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  a  defect  or  failure  in  this  respect  may  arise  either  from 
some  peculiarity  in  the  process  itself  or  from  the  manner  of  its  serv- 
ice. Now,  to  be  duly  served  with  a  summons  is  said  to  imply  that 
the  defendant  has  been  duly  served  with  a  summons  notifying  him 
to  appear  and  answer  in  the  court  where  the  judgment  is  sought  to 
be  taken.*'  Assuming  these  to  be  the  essentials  of  a  proper  notice, 
it  follows  that  the  writ,  although  properly  served,  may  be  so  defect- 
ive in  itself  as  to  confer  no  jurisdiction  over  the  defendant.  Such 
would  be  the  case  if  it  omitted  to  apprise  him  of  the  court  in  which 
the  action  had  been  commenced  or  the  day  on  which  he  was  re- 
quired to  appear.**  It  is  not  true,  however,  that  any  irregularities 
in  the  process,  short  of  this,  may  be  entirely  disregarded.  The  rule 
is,  that  if  the  notice  is  defective  or  irregular,  but  not  to  the  extent 
of  being  substantially  worthless,  a  judgment  by  default  entered  there- 
on will  be  irregular  and  liable  to  be  corrected  or  set  aside  on  mo- 
tion, or  reversed  above,  but  not  absolutely  void,  and  hence  not  open 
to  collateral  attack.**     In  the  next  place,  the  process,  sufficient  in 

La.  Ann.  798;  Townsaud  v.  Townsand,  21  ill.  540;  Moore  y.  Watkins,  1 
Ark.  2»8;  Shepherd  v.  Marvel,  16  Ind.  App.  417,  45  N.  E.  526;  IMtch  v. 
Fwpte,  »1  111.  App.  368;  Uoitt  v.  Skinner,  im  Iowa,  360,  68  N.  W.  788;  York 
Draper  Mercantile  Co.  v.  Hutchinson,  2  Kan.  App.  47,  43  Pac.  315;  Johnson 
T.  l>elbrldge.  35  Mich.  436;  Baseom  v.  Young,  7  Mo.  1;  Zimmerman  v. 
Gerdes.  106  Wis.  608,  82  N.  W.  532;  D.  M.  Osborne  &  Co.  v.  Columbia 
County  Farmers'  AUIance  Corp.,  »  Wash.  666,  38  Pac.  160. 

"  \\  ilkinson  v.  Bayley.  71  Wis.  131,  36  N.  W.  836;  Zimmerman  v.  Gerdes, 
lOK  Wis.  608.  82  N.  W.  532;  People's  Mut.  Ben.  Soc.  v.  lYazer,  97  Mloh. 
UlfT.  :»6  N.  W.  tH4;  Campbell  v.  Donovan,  111  Mich.  247,  69  N.  W.  514.  A 
mere  re<Mtal  in  a  default  Judgment  that  process  was  served  Is  not  sutticlent 
evidence  of  that  fact.     Herman's  Kx'x  v.  Martin  (Ky.)  55  S.  W.  429. 

>«  Smith  V.  iiilendale  Mill  Co.,  4  Or.  70. 

siKitsnUUer  t.  Kitchen.  24  lews.   163. 

S3  Bishop  V.  iionnell.  171  Mass.  5<>3,  51  N.  E.  170;  Dunn  v.  Hughes  (Tex. 
CIV.  App.>  36  S.  U.  10J«;  Harl)Olt  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  R.  639.  40  S.  W. 
Iftfl*;   Day  v.  Mcrllock,  87   Wis.  577,  58  X.  W.  1037;    De  Tar  y.  Boone  Co., 

(115) 


f  83  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNTa  C^h-  4 

itself,  must  be  duly  served  upon  the  party  or  upon  some  person  au- 
thorized to  receive  service  in  his  stead."  But  here  also,  slight  ir- 
regularities, not  fatal  in  themselves,  will  not  have  the  effect  of  de- 
priving the  court  of  jurisdiction.  **If  the  court  to  which  the  process 
is  returnable  adjudges  the  service  to  be  sufficient  and  renders  judg- 
ment thereon,  such  judgment  is  not  void,  but  only  subject  to  be  set 
aside  by  the  court  which  gave  it,  upon  seasonable  and  proper  ap- 
plication, or  reversed  upon  appeal."  **  A  voluntary  appearance  by 
the  defendant  will  of  course  be  sufficient  to  confer  jurisdiction,  and 
will  amount  to  a  waiver  of  formal  and  technical  defects  in  the  process 
or  its  service.'*  But  a  default  obtained  without  proper  service  and 
on  an  unauthorized  appearance,  is  an  absolute  nullity.**  The  de- 
fendant may  also  acknowledge  service  of  the  writ,  and  thereby  fore- 

M  Iowa,  488;  Betts  ▼.  Baxter,  58  Miss.  334;  Christian  v.  O'Neal  46  Miss. 
U«>;  CampbeU  v.  Hays,  41  Miss.  561;  Isaacs  v.  l»rice.  2  Dill.  351,  Fed.  Cas. 
No.  7,0«T.  A  Judgment  by  default  against  defendant  is  valid,  notwltbstand- 
ing  a  mistake  in  ttie  summons  in  the  Ciiristian  name  of  the  plaintiff.  Brad- 
ley V.  8andiland8,  60  Minn.  40,  68  N.  W.  321,  61  Am.  St.  Rep.  386.  But  a  cita- 
tion not  authenticated  by  the  seal  of  the  court  will  not,  on  appeal,  support 
a  Judgment  by  default.  Line  v.  CranlUl  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  37  S.  W.  184.  And 
where  the  copy  of  the  notice  delivered  to  the  defendant  fails  to  show  that 
the  original  notice  was  signed  by  the  plaintiff  or  his  attorney,  as  required 
by  statute,  the  service  is  not  sufficient  to  give  the  court  Jurisdiction  to  enter 
a  default  Judgment.  Hoitt  v.  Skinner,  99  Iowa,  360,  68  N.  W.  788.  In  New 
York,  plaintiff  cannot  take  a  Judgment  by  default  if  a  copy  of  the  complaiut 
is  not  served  with  the  summons.  See  Grouse  v.  Keichert,  61  Htm,  4a  15  N. 
Y.  Supp.  369. 

"  A  Judgment  by  default  on  service  of  a  summons  on  the  attorney  of  de- 
fendant, when  the  latter  in  no  manner  'voluntarily  submits  himself  to  the 
Jurisdiction  of  the  court,  is  void.  Goldberg  v.  Fowler.  29  Misc.  Rep.  32^ 
GO  N.  Y.  Supp.  475.  As  to  service  of  papers  by  mall,  see  Selfert  v.  Caverly. 
63  Hun,  604,  18  N.  Y.  Supp.  327. 

3*  Isaacs  V.  Frice,  2  Dill.  351,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  7,097.  Compare  Reinhart  t. 
Lugo,  86  Cal.  395,  24  Fac.  1089,  21  Am.  St.  Hep.  52. 

3  6  The  entry  of  an  order  that  the  cause  "is  hereby  continued  by  conseut" 
does  not  show  such  an  appearance  and  waiver  of  service  as  will  support  a 
Judgment  by  default.    Flowers  v.  Jackson,  66  Ark.  458.  51  S.  W.  462. 

86  Fleming  v.  Boulevard  Highlands  Imp.  Co.,  12  Cclo.  App.  187,  54  Fac, 
859;  Great  West  Min.  Co.  v.  Woodmas  of  Alston  Min.  Co.,  12  Oolo.  46,  20 
Fac.  771,  13  Am.  St.  Rep.  204;  Dillon  v.  Rand,  15  Colo.  ;{72.  25  Pac.  IJw: 
Howell  V.  Campbell,  53  Kan.  742,  37  Pac.  120.  An  attidavit  for  continuance 
tiled  by  defendant  is  not  such  an  appearance  as  will  warrant  Jud^rmeut  hy 
default.    Hoyt  v.  Macon,  2  Colo.  113.    Mor  la  service  of  notice  of  a  motion 

(116) 


Ch.  4)  JUDGMENTS   BY    DEFAULT.  §   88 

go  his  objections  to  the  manner  of  service  or  the  person  executing  it. 
But  it  is  held  in  some  states  that  an  indorsement  upon  the  process, 
of  a  written  acknowledgment  of  service,  purporting  to  be  signed  by 
the  party,  is  not  sufficient,  without  proof  of  the  authenticity  of  such 
indorsement  and  signature,  to  authorize  the  entry  of  default  for  want 
of  an  appearance. ^^  This  rule,  however,  is  probably  too  severe  to 
find  general  acceptance.  On  similar  principles,  in  a  state  where  the 
law  is  that  a  j'udgment  by  default  cannot  be  entered  except  upon 
proof  of  the  personal  service  of  the  summons  and  complaint,  an  ad- 
mission of  ''service,"  not  stating  the  mode  in  which  the  service  was 
made,  is  not  sufficient.'®  To  warrant  entering  a  judgment  against 
one  who  has  been  made  a  defendant  upon  his  own  motion,  there 
must  be  notice  and  proof  of  no  answer,  the  same  as  in  the  ordinary 
case  of  a  defendant  who  has  been  served  and  has  appeared.'*  In 
fact,  the  cardinal  principle  is  that  a  defendant  cannot  be  put  in  de- 
fault without  due  notice  of  everj^thing  which  requires  him  to  take 
affirmative  action.  Thus  in  a  case  where  judgment  by  default  was 
rendered  on  a  substituted  petition,  the  substitution  having  been  made 
without  notice  to  the  defendant  or  any  one  authorized  to  represent 
him,  the  judgment  was  held  to  be  erroneous.*® 

• 

to  dissolve  an  attaciiment  on  account  of  irreguiarity,  made  by  defendant's 
auorney.  Glidden  t.  Fackard,  26  Cal.  (H9.  So  where,  in  foreign  .attach- 
ment, defendant  appears  merely  to  move  for  a  rule  on  plaintiff  to  show  his 
cause  of  action,  for  the  purpose  of  securing  a  release  of  the  property,  it 
is  a  special  appearance,  ahd  not  sutticient  to  authorize  a  Judgment  by  default. 
Warren  Sav.  Bank  v.  JSilversteln,  15  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  K.  584.  On  the  withdrawal 
of  his  appearance  for  defendant  by  the  attorney  entering  the  same,  though 
without  leave  of  court,  a  valid  judgment  by  default  may  be  entered  against 
the  defendant.  Klo  (Irande  Irrigation  &  Colonization  Co.  v.  Gilderaleeve, 
174  t.  »,  till;:.  ll>  Sup.  Ct.  7G1,  43  Lr.  Ed.  1103.  But  if  the  defendant  was 
personally  served,  it  is  immaterial,  as  affecting  a  judgment  by  default  against 
him,  whetlier  or  not  an  attorney  who  appeared  for  him  was  authorized  to 
do  so,  since  in  either  event  the  judgment  is  proper.  Hunter  y.  Bryant,  98 
Cal.  252,  :«  Pac.  55. 

«"  Johnson  v.  Delbridge,  35  Mich.  .436;  Davis  v.  Jordon,  5  How.  (Miss.) 
2U5.  Wh<-rc  H  judgment  by  default  recited  that  service  of  the  writ  in  the 
case  was  acknowledged  by  the  defendant,  it  was  held  sutticient  to  sustain 
the  judgment.     Winston  v.  Miller,  20  Miss.  550. 

3«  Kejul  V.  rrcncii.  28  .\.  Y.  285. 

»*l^ii»;;i   V.   KjiniCH,    14   Fla.   53. 

*o\\at^<Jn   V.  Miller  Bros.,  W  Tex.  175,   5   8.    \V.   ($80.    But  a  judgment 

(117) 


§   84  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  4 

Thus  far  we  have  not  spoken  of  judgments  by  default  rendered  up- 
on constructive  service  of  process.  This  proceeding  is  authorized 
by  statute  in  many  of  the  states,  in  actions  against  non-resident  de- 
fendants, and  cases  involving  the  vaHdity  of  such  judgments  arc  by 
no  means  infrequent.  The  subject  properly  belongs  to  another  part 
of  this  work,  and  in  this  connection  it  is  onlv  necessary  to  remark 
that  the  statutes  authorizing  the  entry  of  such  judgments  are  strictly 
construed  and  the  prescribed  procedure  must  be  st^Jctly  followed, 
and  that  such  judgments  have  no  extraterritorial  validity  and  are  not 
binding  on  the  defendant  out  of  the  state  where  rendered,  except  in 
actions  in  rem  and  quasi  in  rem  (as  in  divorce),  and  in  cases  where 
the  jurisdiction  is  based  on  attachment  of  the  defendant's  property 
found  within  the  state,  in  which  latter  instance  the  judgment  is  uni- 
versally valid  in  so  far  as  it  affects  to  dispose  of  such  property.*^ 

§  84.    Must  be  f  ovnded  on  good  Deelxrmtivn. 

A  judgment  entered  by  default  will  be  irregular  and  erroneous 
unless  it  rests  upon  a  good  and  sufficient  declaration  or  complaint 
duly  filed  in  the  action.**     Hence  if  the  plaintiff's  pleading  sets  out 

by  default  Is  not  void  where  it  appears  that  summons  upon  the  petition  as 
amended  was  duly  served  on  the  defendant.  Little  v.  Ferguson  (Ky.)  55 
S.   W.  554. 

*i  See  Gary  v.  Northwestern  Masonic  Aid  Ass'n  (Iowa)  50  X.  W.  27; 
Taylor  v.  Kosslter,  6  Houst.  (Del.)  485.  And  see,  infra,  §|  227-232.  A 
Judgment  by  default  on  constructive  service  by  publication,  there  being  no 
personal  service  and  no  appearance  by  defendant,  Is  void,  where,  at  the 
commencement  of  such  action,  and  at  the  time  of  the  mailing  of  such  publi- 
cation, the  defendant  was  a  resident  within  the  jurisdiction,  and.  by  doe 
diligence,  service  could  have  been  made  upon  him  personally.  Hockaday  v. 
Jones,  8  Olil.  156,  56  Pac.  1054. 

*2  Amason  v.  Nash,  19  Ala.  1(H;  Wellborn  v.  Sheppard,  5  Ala.  674;  Mer- 
ritt  V.  White,  37  Miss.  438;  Glenn  v.  Shelburne,  29  Tex.  125;  Stahl  v.  Chi- 
cago, St.  1'.,  M.  &  O.  K.  Co.,  94  Wis.  315,  68  X.  W.  954.  Compare  Hibeniia 
SSav.  &  Lroan  Soc.  v.  Matthai,  116  Cal.  424,  48  Fac.  370.  Plaintiff  cannot 
talie  a  default  where  there  is  no  declaration  or  complaint  on  file.  Wood- 
ruff V.  Matheney,  55  111.  App.  350;  l*ress  v.  KIdgway  Refrigerator  Manufg 
Co.,  37  111.  App.  269;  Haygood  v.  T^it.  126  Ala.  264,  27  South.  842.  But 
a  judgment  by  default  is  not  invalidated  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  the  de- 
fendant's attorney  had  taken  the  papers  from  the  flies  before  judgment 
was  rendered,  and  then  had  them  In  his  possession.  SSchultz  v.  Meiselbar,  144 
111.   26,   32   N.    K.    500. 

(118) 


Ch.  4)  JUDGMENTS    BY    DEFAULT.  §    84 

no  cause  of  action,  a  judgment  by  default  thereon  cannot  stand.*' 
"A  default  is  an  admission  of  the  cause  of  action  stated  in  the  peti- 
tion, and  that  something  is  due  to  the  plalntiflF.  But  where  no  cause 
of  action  is  stated  in  the  petition  a  default  can  have  no  such  effect. 
It  is  true  that  a  defendant  may  be  concluded  by  a  default  where  the 
facts  stated  in  the  petition  do  not  constitute  a  good  cause  of  action 
in  law,  or  where  the  petition  is  so  defective  as  to  be  vulnerable  to  a 
demurrer.**  But  where  the  petition  omits  the  necessary  averment 
to  show  liability  against  the  defendant,  the  court  may  and  should, 
even  upon  default,  refuse  to  enter  judgment."  *'  A  view  opposite  to 
that  here  stated  has  been  taken  in  some  of  the  New  York  cases,*® 
on  the  ground  that,  if  the  complaint  is  defective  in  this  particular, 
the  remedy  by  demurrer  is  open  to  the  defendant,  and  if  he  neg- 
lects to  avail  himself  of  it,  he  waives  any  objections  which  he  might 
thus  present,  and  cannot  ask  to  have  the  judgment  set  aside  or  re- 
versed. But  the  very  obvious  answer  to  this  is,  that  an  objection  to 
the  complaint,  on  the  score  of  its  failure  to  state  a  cause  of  action, 
like  an  exception  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  is  never  waived; 
that  a  default  admits  nothing  more  than  the  plaintiff  has  chosen  to 
allege,  and  the  silence  of  the  defendant  should  not  be  made  to  help 
him  out;  and  that  if  the  plaintiff  has  not  stated  a  case  sufficient  to 
justify  the  intervention  of  the  law  in  his  behalf,  he  is  not  entitled  to 

«>Tfaigpen  v.  Mundlne,  24  Tex.  282;  Abbe  v.  Marr,  14  Cal.  210;  Barron 
T.  FrlnK  30  CaJ.  4«e;  HaUock  v.  Jaudln,  34  Cal.  167;  Andrews  v.  Union 
t)ent  IJfe  Ina.  Co.,  ^2  Tex.  5»4,  50  S.  W.  572;  Ide  v.  Bootn,  8  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
U.  4UU. 

*^Hut  some  of  tlie  cases  hold  that,  in  order  to  support  a  Judgment  by 
(lefanlt  the  declaration  or  complaint  must  be  sulficient  to  withstand  a  gen- 
wii  demurrer.  Globe  Ace.  ins.  Co.  v.  Reld,  10  Ind.  App.  203,  47  N.  E.  047; 
Uhmei  V.  FottB  (Tex.   Olv.  App.)  44   8.  W.  615. 

«  Bosch  V.  Kassing,  64  iowa,  312,  20  N.  W.  454.  See  Walker  v.  Massey, 
lu  Ala.  30.  in  an  action  to  protect  a  water  right,  if  the  complaint  states 
a  good  title,  it  will  support  a  decree  taken  by  default.  Bailey  v.  Malheur 
Ac  H.  U  lir.  Co.,  36  Or.  54,  57  Pac.  010. 

*«  Adams  v.  Oaks,  20  Johns.  282;  Dorr  v.  Birge,  8  Barb.  351;  Pope  v. 
JHnsmore,  8  Abb.  Prac.  420;  Keeder  v.  Lockwood,  30  Misc.  Rep.  531,  62 
N.  Y.  8upp.  713.  See,  also,  Frankfurth  v.  Anderson,  61  Wis.  107,  20  X.  W. 
»iKi;  Aftkren  v.  Squire,  20  Or.  228,  45  Pac.  770;  Cowles  v.  Cowles,  121  N. 
C.  272,  28  8.  K  476. 

(119) 


§  85  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (CSl.  4 

any  judgment,  wliether  the  defendant  answers  or  not.*^  A  petition, 
for  instance,  which  does  not  allege  an  assignment  of  the  claim  sued 
on,  when  it  is  not  in  the  plaintiff's  name  and  no  assignment  is  proved, 
will  not  sustain  a  judgment  by  default.**  The  question  is  diflFerent 
where  the  judgment  is  rendered  on  a  declaration  containing  both 
good  and  bad  counts.  Here  it  is  said  that  the  insufficiency  of  one  count 
to  sustain  a  judgment  will  not  impair  the  plaintiff*s  right  to  recover 
on  the  other,  and  hence  the  judgment  will  be  allowed  to  rest  on  the 
cause  of  action  well  pleaded  and  will  not  be  reversed.**  There  arc 
cases,  however,  holding  that  the  damages  being  general,  and  noth- 
ing appearing  to  show  that  they  were  in  fact  assessed  upon  the  good 
count  only,  there  is  no  authority  to  presume  that  they  were  so  as- 
sessed, and  hence  (just  as  in  the  case  of  a  verdict  and  general  dam- 
ages, upon  a  declaration  containing  a  count  bad  in  substance)  the 
judgment  will  be  erroneous.**® 

^     ')     ^  LI  ^  ^^'    ^'®''^'^^^'®   Entry    of   Default. 

A  judgment  rendered  by  default  against  a  defendant  before  the 
expiration  of  the  time  allowed  to  him  for  filing  a  plea  or  answer,  is 
irregular  and  voidable  at  his  instance.**  He  has  the  whole  of  the 
last  day  in  which  to  plead,  and  cannot  be  said  to  be  in  default  until 

«7  The  failure  of  defendant  to  appear  or  answer  Is  an  admission  onlj  as 
to  tlie  facts  which  are  properly  pleaded  by  the  plaintiff.  Doud  Sons  &  Co.  v. 
DuUith  Milling  Co.,  55  Minn.  53,  5(J  N.  W.  4(j;{. 

4  8  Thompson  v.  JStetson,  15  Seb.  112,  17  N.  W.  3(58.  So,  a  default  Juds- 
iuent  for  fraudulent  representations  cannot  stand,  unless  the  intent  to  dt»- 
fraud  was  alleged  In  the  complaint.  Shields  v.  Clement,  12  Misc.  Rep.  j/Oil 
33  A.  i.  Supp.  b'7(i.  But  it  is  said  that  a  default  Judgment  is  not  void  merely 
because  the  complaint  falls  to  show  whether  the  plaintiff  (described  as  a 
••company")  is  a  corporation  or  a  partnership.  Moore  v.  Martin  &  Hoyt  Co.. 
IL'4    Ala.    2yi,    27    South.    252. 

*o  Hunt  V.  City  of  San  l^Yancisco,  11  Cal.  2.10. 

no  Hemmeuway  v.  Hickes,  4  IMck.  (Mass.)  497;  Dryden  ▼.  Dryden,  9  Pick. 
(Mass.)   54(J. 

61  Parker  v.  Linden,  59  Hun,  6*23,  13  N.  Y.  Supp.  787;  I^sh  ▼.  Wanvn 
(Tex.)  14  S.  \V.  (UM;  Hole  v.  Page,  20  Wash.  208,  54  Fac.  1123:  Forbes  v. 
Muxlow,  IS  av.  Proc.  K.  231),  13.  N.  Y.  Supp.  797;  GIllotte-Herzog  Manufg 
Co.  V.  Ashton,  55  Minn.  75,  5(J  N.  W.  576.  As  to  Judgment  by  default  in  a 
justices  court,  rendered,  in  the  absence  of  defendant  and  his  counsel,  prior 
to  the  hour  sot  in  the  citation,  see  Yentzer  v.  Thayer,  10  Colo.  63,  14  Pac. 
(120) 


Ch.  4)  JUDGMENTS    BY    DEFAULT.  §  85 

that  day  has  fully  expired ;  **  and  if  the  last  day  falls  upon  a  Sun- 
day or  a  holiday,  he  is  entitled  to  the  whole  of  the  next  succeeding 
day.**  But  a  judgment  thus  prematurely  entered  is  not  absolutely 
void ;  if  the  defendant  takes  no  steps  to  correct  the  error,  he  is  pre- 
sumed to  have  waived  it/*  The  time  limited  is  given  for  the  benefit 
of  the  defendant,  and  he  may  waive  it  and  consent  that  a  judgment 
be  entered  against  him  before  its  expiration.^"  So  if,  after  due 
service  of  summons,  judgment  by  default  is  entered  one  day  sooner 
than  the  statute  allows,  but  the  defendant  is  informed  of  the  date  of 
the  entry,  both  by  an  attachment  served  on  him  shortly  thereafter 
and  by  a  scire  facias,  duly  served,  to  revive  the  judgment,  several 
years  later,  but  takes  no  action  until  after  the  judgment  has  been 
revived,  the  irregularity  will  be  regarded  as  waived,  and  a  motion  to 
strike  off  the  judgment  will  be  denied. '•  A  decree  pro  confesso, 
signed  after  the  time  for  answering  has  expired,  is  regular,  though 
an  order  for  further  time  to  answer  be  signed  and  filed  on  the  same 
day  with  the  signing  of  the  decree.*'     In  case  of  a  default,  judg- 

TkJ.  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  563.  And  see  Dow  v.  March,  80  Me.  408,  15  Atl.  2U. 
Where  a  municipal  court  orders  an  answer  to  be  filed,  and  adjourns  to  n 
rabsequent  day,  It  cannot  In  the  interim  render  a  legal  judgment  by  default 
on  failure  to  file  an  answer.  Whitman  &  Barnes  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Hamilton, 
27  Misc.  Kep.  1»8,   57  N.   Y.   Supp.   7«6. 

"  Porter  v.  Hower,  9  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  283;  Lohman  v.  Cox,  9  N.  M.  503, 
5tf  Paa  286. 

••Kothchlld  V.  Unk,  29  App.  Div.  580,  51  N.  Y.  Supp.  253.  But  where 
the  time  to  plead  Is  limited  to  a  certain  number  of  days,  Sundays  and  holi- 
days are  to  be  counted,  except  where  the  last  day  is  dies  non,  Bailey  v. 
KdmuDdson,  lt>8  Mass.  2U7,  46  N.  E.  1061. 

»«  White  V.  Crow,  110  U.  S.  183,  4  Sup.  Ct.  71,  28  L.  Kd.  113;  Burt  v. 
8<Tantom,  1  Cal.  416;  Mitchell  v.  Aten,  37  Kan.  33,  14  Pac.  497,  1  Am.  St. 
Rep.  231:  West  r.  Williamson,  1  Swan  (Tenn.)  277;  Glover  v.  Holman,  3  Helsk. 
(Tenn.)  519. 

•sHoguet  V.  Wallace,  28  N.  J.  Law,  523;  Beebe  v.  George  H.  Beebe  Co.. 
64  N.  J.  Law,  497,  46  Atl.  168;  Wiggins  t.  Mayer,  91  Ga.  778,  18  S.  B.  430; 
MclVmald  V.  Tutty,  99  Ga.  184,  27  S.  K  157.  But  an  acceptance  of  service 
and  waiver  of  citation  will  not  authorize  Judgment  by  default  before  the 
expiration  of  the  time  allowed  for  pleading.  Anheuser-Busch  Brewing  Ass'n 
V.  McGowan,  49  La.  Ann.  630,  21  South.   766. 

••Harper  v.  Biles,  115  Pa.  594,  8  Atl.  446. 

•7  Emery  t.  Downing,  13  ^\  J.  Kq.  59. 

(121) 


§   86  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNT8.  (Gh.  4 

ment  may  be  entered  before  the  case  is  reached  in  its  regular  order 
on  the  docket."® 

§   86.  Default,  when  proper* 

When  an  answer  or  other  pleading  of  a  defendant,  raising  an  is- 
sue of  law  or  fact,  is  properly  on  file  in  the  case,  no  judgment  by 
default  can  be  entered  against  him;  to  authorize  a  default,  the  an- 
swer or  other  pleading  must  be  disposed  of  by  motion,  demurrer,  or 
in  some  other  manner.*^*     The  authorities  do  not  go  to  the  extent 

58  Brenner  v.  GundersWemer.  14  Iowa,  82.  Wliere  an  answer  is  due  after 
the  commencement  of  a  term  of  court,  and  no  pleading  is  Illed  nor  appearance 
made  by  tlie  defendant,  tlie  case  may  be  docketed,  and  judgment  by  default 
rendered  at  any  time  thereafter  during  sucli  term.  JLeonard  y.  Hargis,  50 
Kan.  40,  48  Fac.  586.  See  Kessler  v.  Vera;  25  Misc.  Kep.  763,  S»  N.  1. 
Supp.  142. 

08  Plionoliarp  Co.  v.  Stohbe,  20  Misc.  Rep.  698,  46  N.  Y.  Supp.  678;  Com. 
V.  Krause,  23  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  K.  511;  Carolina  In  v.  Co.  v.  Kelly.  123  N.  C.  388, 
31  S.  E.  671;  Green  v.  Jones,  102  Ala.  303,  14  Soutb.  630;  Taylor  v.  Me- 
>airy,  42  Miss.  276;  Beard  v.  Orr  &  Lindsey  Shoe  Co.  (Miss.)  8  South.  512; 
aambrick  v.  Dent.  70  Miss.  59,  11  South.  608;  Blloxi  Lrumber  &  Export 
Co.  V.  New  Orleans  Railway  &  MiU  Supply  Co.  (Miss.)  28  South.  21;  Bed- 
well  V.  'J'^hompson,  25  Tex.  Supp.  245;  Sevier  v.  Turner  (Tex.  Civ.  App.) 
33  S.  W.  294;  Hepburn  v.  Danville  Nat.  Bank  (Tex.  av.  App.)  34  S.  W. 
988;  Hicks  v.  Vann,  4  Ark.  526;  Boyer  v.  Robinson,  6  Ark.  552;  Alexander 
v.  Stewart,  23  Ark.  18;  White  v.  Reagan,  25  Ark.  622;  HaiTis  v.  Muskingum 
Manuf'g  Co.,  4  Blackf.  267,  29  Am.  Dec.  372;  Young  v.  State  Bank,  4  Ind. 
IKM;  Terrell  v.  State,  68  Ind.  155;  WaU  v.  Galvin,-80  Ind.  447;  Lyon  v. 
Baraey,  1  Scam.  (111.)  387;  Faurot  v.  Park  Nat.  Bank,  37  111.  App.  322;  City 
-  of  Pana  v.  Humphreys,  39  ill.  App.  641;  Wells  v.  Mathews,  70  111.  App. 
r)04;  Keck  v.  McKldowney,  73  111.  App.  159;  Miller  v.  Hardacre,  1  G.  Greene 
(Iowa)  154;  Levi  v.  Monroe,  11  lo\va,  453;  Ruch  v.  Jones.  33  Mo.  393:  Nor- 
man v.  Hooker,  35  Mo.  366;  McMurtry  v.  State,  19  Neb.  147.  26  N.  W.  915: 
Strong  V.  Comer,  48  Minn.  66,  50  N.  W.  936;  Porter  v.  Richard.  1  Ariz.  87. 
25  Pac.  530.  Under  a  statute  providing  that  either  party  to  a  civil  actloD 
may  propound  interrogatories  to  the  other,  which  must  be  answered  fully, 
and  that  If  the  answers  are  not  full  and  clear,  the  court  may,  on  motion, 
compel  them  to  be  made  so,  or  default  or  nonsuit  the  answering  party,  tlie 
court  cannot,  without  further  proceedings,  default  the  answering  party  be- 
cause the  answers  are  deemed  insufficient  or  evasive.  Fels  v.  Raymond.  139 
Mass.  98,  28  N.  E.  691.  In  some  states,  the  mere  filing  of  an  answer  will  not 
prevent  a  judgment  by  default,  but  thpre  must  also  be  a  subsequent  appear- 
ance by  defendant  to  protect  his  rights.  Lytle  v.  Custead,  4  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
490,  23  S.  \\\  451.  And  see  Schwarz  v.  Oppenheimer,  90  Ala.  462,  8  South. 
36. 

(11>2) 


Ch.  4)  JUDGMENTS   BY    DEFAULT.  §   86 

of  holding  that  such  a  judgment  would  be  absolutely  void,  but  it 
Hrould  be  set  aside  on  motion  of  the  defendant  or  reversed  on  ap- 
peal. There  appears  to  be  some  doubt  as  to  whether  the  plea  should 
be  actually  on  file,  in  order  to  prevent  a  default,  or  whether  it  is 
sufficient  if  duly  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  plaintiff  or  his  attor- 
ncy.**  The  question  will  be  governed  to  some  extent  by  the  local 
practice,  and  in  those  jurisdictions  where  the  defendant's  answer  is 
to  be  served  on  the  plaintiff's  attorney  within  a  specified  time,  an 
entry  of  default  would  probably  be  regarded  as  erroneous  if  made 
after  such  service,  although  the  pleading  were  not  filed  in  court.  In 
a  case  where  judgment  by  default  was  entered  against  a  defendant, 
who  filed  an  answer  on  the  same  day  the  judgment  was  rendered,  but 
it  did  not  appear  affirmatively  that  the  answer  was  filed  before  the 
judgment,  or  that  the  attention  of  the  court  was  called  to  the  answer 
before  giving  judgment,  it  was  held  to  be  the  legal  presumption  that 
the  judgment  was  first  given. '^  Even  though  the  plea  filed  by  the 
defendant  be  bad  in  form  or  substance,  yet,  if  it  does  not  admit  the 
plaintiff's  case,  the  latter  cannot  have  judgment  for  want  of  a  plea; 
the  proper  practice  is  either  to  move  to  strike  out  the  plea,  or  to 
answer  it  by  demurrer  or  otherwise.**  And  especially  after  replying 
to  a  plea  filed  in  proper  time  the  plaintiff  cannot  take  judgment  by 
nil  dicit;  if  the  plea  is  bad,  he  should  withdraw  his  replication  and 
dcmur.^* 

••  Id  an  early  New  i'ork  ease,  where  a  plea  was  delivered  to  the  plaintiff's 
attorney,  wlio  searclied  tlie  olerk*s  otnce,  and,  finding  no  plea  on  tile,  entered 
11  <l«*faiiJt  for  want  of  a  plea,  the  court  considered  the  default  as  a  nullity; 
ttie  porty  is  to  be  governed  by  the  pleadings  delivered  to  him,  and  not  search 
ttie  ottice  to  see  whether  the  originals  are  filed.  Smith  Y.  Wells,  6  Johns. 
:»U.    Bnt  compare  Wall  v.  Galvln,  80  Ind.  447. 

•1  Wooidridge  v.  Brown,  1  Tex.  478.  See,  per  contra,  Lyon  v.  Barney, 
1  Scam,  (ill.)  387. 

•2Brigg8  T.  Sholes,  14  N.  H.  262.  Where  the  admissions  in  an  answer 
negative  its  general  denials,  the  latter  may  be  disregarded,  and  if  the  com- 
piamt  be  verified,  judgment  may  be  asked  on  the  former,  li'temont  v.  Seals, 
lb  Cai.  433.  In  Texas,  to  defeat  a  judgment  by  default  for  want  of  an  an- 
swer. defendaDt  must  file  an  answer  consisting  of  a  written  pleading;  It  is 
ncrt  suUicient  for  him  to  request  orally,  on  the  appearance  daj'.  that  the  ac- 
tion be  dismlHsed  because  of  its  being  brought  in  the  wrong  county.  State 
r.  I'atterson  <Tex.  Civ.  App.)  40  S.  W.  224. 

«3  Cox  T.  Capron,  10  Mo.  01)1. 

(123) 


§   86  LAW  OF  JUDGMBNTa.  (Ch.  4 

On  similar  principles,  it  is  erroneous  to  render  a  judgment  by  de- 
fault against  a  defendant  who  has  filed  a  demurrer  to  the  declara- 
tion, when  the  same  remains  unanswered  and  not  disposed  of  in  any 
way,  and  he  has  not  taken  any  subsequent  step  in  the  cause  amount- 
ing to  a  waiver  of  the  demurrer."*  And  a  judgment  by  default,  en- 
tered while  exceptions  are  pending  and  undetermined,  is  erroneous 
and  irregular."'  So,  pending  the  question  whether  a  suit  can  be 
maintained  in  the  court  where  it  is  brought,  by  reason  of  the  alleged 
non-residence  of  the  defendant,  there  can  be  no  judgment  against 
him  for  want  of  a  plea.""  When  a  demurrer  to  the  answer  is  sus- 
tained, in  the  absence  of  defendant  and  his  counsel,  an  opportunity 
must  be  accorded  to  the  defendant  to  elect  whether  he  will  plead 
over  or  stand  on  the  demurrer."^  But  of  course,  after  the  defend- 
ant's demurrer  is  overruled  and  judgment  of  "respondeat  ouster*' 
given,  he  may  be  put  in  default  for  failure  to  answer  further  within 
the  proper  time."* 

For  the  same  reasons,  a  default  cannot  be  entered  while  a  motion 
is  pending."*^  Thus,  while  an  application  for  the  removal  of  a  cause 
from  the  state  court  to  a  federal  court  remains  undetermined,  it  is 
irregular  to  enter  a  default  against  the  party  making  the  application, 
and  a  motion  to  set  aside  the  default  in  such  case  should  be  al- 
lowed.'" So  of  a  motion  to  dismiss,  for  want  of  security  for  costs  by 
a  non-resident  plaintiff,  made  in  due  time.'*  A  motion  to  quash  the 
return  or  the  summons  is  no  waiver  of  the  right  to  plead,  and  in  such 

fl*  Steelman  v.  Watson,  5  Gllman  (Ul.)  249;  McKlnney  ▼.  M'^v,  1  Scam.  (HI.) 
534;  Key  v.  Hayden,  13  Iowa,  602;  WHlamette  Falls  Transportation  &  Milling 
Co.  V.  Smith,  1  Or.  181;  Hlrsh  v.  Clawsou,  106  Ind.  329,  6  N.  K.  919;  Fisli  v. 
Wheeler,  31  111.  App.  596;  Race  v.  Irving  Park  Hall  Ass'n,  50  Ul.  App.  131. 

«5  Francis  v.  Steamer  Black  Hawk,  18  La.  Ann.  029. 

ce  state  v.  Gittings,  35  Md.  169. 

6  7  Thwing  V.  Doye,  2  Okl.  608,  44  Pac.  381. 

« 8. Jordan  v.  John  Ryan  Co.,  35  Fla.  259,  17  South.  73. 

6  0  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  NifhoUs.  8  Colo.  188,  6  Pac.  512;  Bld?- 
way  V.  Horner,  55  N.  J.  Law,  84,  25  Atl.  386;  Hosmer  v.  Hoitt,  161  Mass.  1T.1 
36  N.  E.  835. 

7  0  ^lattoon  V.  Hinkley,  33  111.  208.  As  to  the  effect  of  the  pendency  of  an 
application  for  a  change  of  venue,  as  preventing  a  default,  see  Anderson  v. 
Perkins,  52  Mo.  App.  527;   Pennie  v.  A'isher,  94  Cal.  323,  29  Pac.  TIL 

71  The  Osprey  v.  Jenkins,  9  Mo.  613. 

(124) 


Ch,  4)  JUDGMENTS   BY   DEFAULT.  §    86 

case  a  refusal  to  allow  the  defendant  to  plead,  and  an  entry  of  judg- 
ment as  upon  default,  is  error.'*     If  the  defendant's  plea  is  with- 
<\T2LVfT\,  the  case  then  stands  precisely  as  if  no  plea  had  been  filed. 
An  appearance  is  entered  and  a  want  or  defect  of  service  is  waived 
by  filing  a  plea  in  bar  in  the  action,  and  if  the  plea  is  subsequently 
withdrawn,  that  does  not  operate  as  a  withdrawal  of  the  appearance, 
and  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  judgment  of  nil  dicit  at  any  time  be- 
fore another  plea  is  filed.' ^     And  in  general,  if  the  defendant  aban- 
dons, or  fails  to  establish,  any  preliminary  motion  or  plea,  he  must 
seasonably  avail  himself  of  the  opportunity  accorded  to  answer  to 
the  merits,  or  he  will  be  liable  to  be  defaulted.'*     Thus,  where  a  de- 
fendant filed  a  motion  to  quash  a  summons,  which  was  overruled, 
and  refused  to  appear  further  in  the  action,  it  was  held  that  a  judg- 
ment against  him,  without  showing  an  entry  of  default,  would  not 
be  disturbed.'*     Leave  to  the  plaintiff  to  amend  his  declaration,  and 
to  the  defendant  for  time  to  plead,  is  an  abandonment  of  all  exist- 
ing issues,  and  if  the  plaintiff  amends  his  declaration,  and  no  plea  is 
filed  to  such  amended  declaration,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  judg- 
ment by  default.' •     Still  it  is  irregular  to  enter  judgment  as  for  want 
of  an  answer,  where  the  complaint  is  amended  after  answer  but  no 
amended  answer  filed,  if  the  original  answer  states  a  defense  to  the 

"Story  V.  Ware,  35  Miss.  31)9,  72  Am.  Dec.  125;  Farrls  v.  Walter,  2  Colo. 
App.  450.  31  Pac.  231.     Compare  Higley  v.  Pollock,  21  Nev.  198,  27  Pac.  895. 

"» Dart  V.  Hercules,  M  111.  395;  Grigg  v.  Gilmer,  54  Ala.  425.  When  de- 
fendant has  withdrawn  his  appearance,  he  is  not  entitled  to  notice  of  an  appli- 
cation for  Judjnnent  by  default.    Day  v.  Mertlock,  87  Wis.  577,  58  N.  W.  1037. 

'**  Such  is  the  case  where  defendant's  answer  is  stricken  out  as  sham  and 
frtrolous,  and  he  unwarrantably  neglects  to  file  an  amended  pleading.  Mc- 
Mnrran  t.  Meek.  47  Minn.  245,  49  N.  W.  983. 

's  McPherson  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  12  Neb.  202.  10  N.  W.  707.  And  see  Mc- 
Krtlar  v.  Lamkin,  22  Tex.  244;  London  Assur.  ::orp.  v.  Lee,  66  Tex.  247,  18 
».  W.  508. 

^«  Robinson  t.  Keys,  9  Humph.  (Tenn.)  144;  La  Barre  v.  City  of  WaterbmT, 
«9  Conn.  554,  37  Atl.  1068.  Compare  Mulllns  v.  Johnson  (Ky.)  52  S.  W.  MS. 
In  California,  the  rule  is  that  an  amendment  of  the  complaint  in  matter  of 
nihstance  opens  a  default.  Witter  v.  Bachman,  117  Cal.  318,  49  Pac.  202.  As 
to  the  effect  of  the  death  of  the  plaintiff  and  the  substitution  of  his  executor, 
extending  the  time  to  answer,  when  the  defendant  is  already  in  default,  see 
KiUie  T.  Bellegarde,  80  Cal.  556,  25  Pac.  55. 

(125) 


§   87  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  4 

cau^e  of  action  shown  by  the  amended  complaint/^  Judgment  by 
default,  without  a  rule  to  answer,  should  not  be  entered  against  a 
defendant  where  a  motion  to  strike  out  a  portion  of  the  complaint 
has  been  allowed.  "We  think  the  defendant  should  be  regarded  as 
standing  in  the  same  position  as  though  he  had  successfully  attacked 
the  complaint  by  demurrer.  Even  if  the  order  of  the  court  and  the 
circumstances  of  the  cage  required  no  formal  amendment  of  the 
complaint,  the  necessity  for  a  rule  to  answer  would  remain  the 
same."  ^®  When  a  default  has  actually  been  entered  against  the  de- 
fendant, he  cannot  escape  its  consequences  by  filing  a  plea  or  an- 
swer, unless  by  consent  of  the  plaintiff  or  leave  of  court.'*  But  a 
default  may  be  waived ;  and  it  will  be  considered  that  this  is  done,  if 
the  plaintiff  subsequently  permits  the  defendant,  without  objection, 
to  participate  in  the  proceedings,  as,  by  filing  an  answer  or  a  de- 
murrer.*® 

S  87.    CoBoli&ilTeneM  of  Ji&dsinent  by  Def  avlt* 

A  judgment  taken  by  default  is  conclusive,  by  way  of  estoppel,  in 
respect  to  all  such  matters  and  facts  as  were  well  pleaded  and  prop- 
erly raised  and  material  to  the  case  made  by  the  declaration,  or  oth- 
er pleadings,  and  such  issues  cannot  be  relitigated  in  any  subse- 
quent action  between  the  parties  or  their  privies.*^     But  while  a  de- 

77  First  Nat.  Bank  y.  Prescott  ^  Wis.  016.  Where,  In  an  action  of  assumpsit, 
the  general  issue  has  been  pleaded,  and  an  amendment  to  the  declaratlOD  to 
aUowed,  it  is  error  to  enter  Judgment  by  default  against  the  defendant  for 
failure  to  answer  the  amended  declaration.  Itidgely  Nat.  Bank  ▼.  Fairbaiik, 
54  in.  App.  296. 

76  Mullen  V.  Wine,  9  Colo.  167,  11  Pac.  54. 

7»  Irvine  v.  Davy,  88  Cal.  495,  20  Pac.  500;  Camp  v.  PhiUtps,  88  Ga.  415, 
14  S.  E.  580.  As  to  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court  in  granting  defendant 
lejive  to  answer  after  the  time,  see  Lichtenberger  v.  Worm,  41  Neb.  856,  60  N. 
W.  93.    And  see  Crane  v.  Crane,  121  Cal.  99,  53  Pac.  433. 

^0  Cornell  University  v.  Denny  Hotel  Co.,  15  Wash.  433,  40  Pac.  654;  Saw- 
telle  v.  Muncy,  110  Cal.  435,  48  Pac.  387. 

81  I^ouard  v.  Simpson,  2  Bing.  N.  C.  170;  Oregon  Ry.  Co.  v.  Oregon  Ry.  & 
Nav.  Co.  (C.  C.)  28  Fed.  505;  Derby  v.  Jacques.  1  Cliff.  425,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
3,817;  Thatcher  v.  Gammon,  12  Mass.  208;  Briggs  v.  Richmond,  10  Pick. 
(Mass.)  391,  20  Am.  Dec.  520;  Minor  v.  Walter,  17  Mass.  237;  GaskiU  t.  Dud- 
ley, 6  Mete.  (Mass.)  540,  39  Am.  Dec.  750;  Newton  v.  Hook.  48  N.  Y.  07(5: 
Brown  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  City  of  New  York,  00  N.  Y.  385;  McCalley  v.  Wil- 
burn,  77  Ala.  549;    Ellis  v.  Mills,  2S  Tex.  584;   Dunn  v.  Pipes,  20  La.  Ann. 

(12G) 


Ch.  4)  JUDGMENTS    BY   DEFAULT.  §   87 

fault  18  conclusive  of  all  that  is  properly  alleged  in  the  complaint,  it 
is  conclusive  of  nothing  more,  and  as  a  general  rule  it  binds  the 
defendant  only  in  the  character  in  which  he  is  sued.**     "As  applica- 
ble, however,  to  a  suit  to  foreclose  a  mortgage,  or  other  kindred 
suits  in  the  nature  of  a  proceeding  in  rem,  where  a  party  is  made  a 
defendant  to  answer  as  to  his  supposed  or  possible,  but  unknown  or 
undefined,  interest  in  the  property,  we  think  that,  as  against  him,  a 
default  ought  to  be  construed  as  an  admission  that,  at  the  time  he 
failed  to  appear  as  required,  he  had  no  interest  in  the  property  in 
question,  and  hence  as  conclusive  of  any  prior  claim  of  interest  or 
title  adverse  to  the  plaintiff."  *•     Further,  a  judgment  by  default, 
regularly  entered,  is  as  binding  as  any  other,  as  far  as  respects  the 
power  and  jurisdiction  of  the  court  in  declaring  the  plaintiff's  right 
to  recover,  although  the  amount  of  the  recovery,  in  some  cases,  may 
remain  to  be  ascertained  by  the  assessment  of  damages.®^    A  judg- 
ment by  default  will  also  operate  as  a  merger  of  the  cause  of  action 

276;  Ugon  v.  Triplett,  12  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  283;  Marks  v.  Slgler,  3  Ohio  St  358; 
McOnrdy  ▼.  Baughman,  43  Ohio  »t  78,  1  N.  E.  93;  Fletcher  y.  Holmes,  25 
Ind.  458;  Van  Valkenburgh  v.  City  of  Milwaukee;  43  Wis.  574;  Doyle  v.  Hal- 
Itm,  21  Minn.  515;  Kittridge  v.  Stevens,  16  Cal.  381.    Infra,  $  697. 

^'Unfried  ▼.  Heberor,  63  Ind.  67.  Such  a  judgment.  In  an  notion  to  en- 
force stockholders*  liabiUty,  la  conclusive  that  a  defendant,  duly  summoned 
and  failing  to  answer,  was  a  stockholder.  Ueland  v.  Johnson,  77  Minn.  548, 
flO  X.  W.  700,  77  Am.  St.  Rep.  698.  But  it  la  said  that  a  judgment  by  default 
tgainst  defendants  in  an  action  wherein  they  were  alleged  to  be  partners, 
does  not  establish  the  existence  of  the  partnership.  Baker  v.  Baer,  59  Ark. 
503,  28  S.  W.  28w  Where  a  default  is  taken  in  a  suit  on  a  contract  entered 
Into  irith  a  foreign  corporation,  its  capacity  to  make  the  contract  is  admitted. 
Starr  Cash  &  Padsage  Car  Go.  v.  Starr,  69  Conn.  440,  37  Atl.  1057.  Judgment 
by  default  in  an  action  for  assessments  upon  property  for  public  improvements 
Is  conclusive  that  such  property  was  subject  to  assessment,  and  after  the 
lapse  of  20  years  will  be  binding  even  where  the  defendant  was  a  municipal 
eorporatioD.  City  of  New  Orleans  v.  Warner,  175  U.  S.  120,  20  Sup.  Ct.  44, 
44  L.  Ed.  96.  So  also,  the  allegation  that  money  sought  to  be  recovered  was 
received  by  defendant  in  a  fiduciary  capacity  is  admitted  by  a  default  and 
Med  not  be  proved.  Steamship  Richmond  Hill  Co.  v.  Seager,  31  App.  Div. 
288,  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  985.  In  fact,  as  stated  in  an  lUinois  decision,  the  entire 
canae  of  action,  except  the  amount  of  damages  as  stated  in  the  declaration, 
is  admitted  by  a  default.    Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hedrick,  73  lU.  App.  601. 

•s  Barton  v.  Anderson,  104  Ind.  578,  4  N.  E.  420. 

•«  Mailhoose  v.  Inloes,  18  3Id.  328;  Green  v.  Hamilton,  16  Md.  317,  77  Am. 
Dec  295;  Loney  v.  Bailey,  43  Md.  10;  Clark  v.  Compton,  15  Tex.  32;   Missis- 

(127) 


§    88  LAW  OF  JUDQMBNTfl.  (Oh.  4 

or  bar  to  another  suit  for  the  same  demand.  Thus,  where  the  de- 
fendant offers  to  be  defaulted  for  a  given  sum,  and  judgment  is  ac- 
cordingly entered  for  the  plaintiff  for  that  amount,  such  judgment  is 
a  bar  to  a  subsequent  action  between  the  same  parties  for  the  same 
claim.*"  But  this  effect  is  attributable  only  to  the  final  judgment  in 
the  action.  A  judgment  by  default  merely  admits  a  cause  of  action; 
but  while  the  precise  character  of  the  cause  of  action,  and  the  extent 
of  the  defendant's  liability,  remains  to  be  determined  by  a  hearing 
in  damages  and  final  judgment  thereon,  the  cause  of  action  is  not 
merged  in  the  judgment,  and  the  rights  of  the  parties,  beyond  the 
mere  admission  of  a  cause  of  action,  are  neither  strengthened  nor 
impaired  thereby.®* 

§  88.    Entry  by  the  Clerk. 

Where  the  defendant  makes  default,  and  the  nature  of  the  action 
and  of  the  plaintiff's  demand  is  such  that  there  is  no  necessity  for 
judicial  action  in  determining  the  relief  to  be  granted  or  the  amount 
of  the  recovery,  the  statutes  generally  provide  that  a  judgment  may 
be  entered  by  the  clerk  of  the  court,  without  application  to  the 
judge.*^  But  in  so  entering  judgment  by  default  the  clerk  acts 
merely  in  a  ministerial  capacity,  no  intendments  can  be  made  in  sup- 
port of  the  validity  of  his  acts,  and  unless  he  conforms  strictly  to 
the  provisions  of  the  statute,  his  proceedings  will  be  irregular  and 

sippi  &  T.  It.  Co.  V.  Green,  0  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  588;  Parker  ▼*  House,  66  N.  0. 
374. 

86  riansc'om  v.  Hewes,  12  Gray  (Mass.)  334. 

•«  Welch  V.  Wadsworth,  30  Conn.  149,  79  Am.  Dec.  239. 

97  See  Bullard  v.  Shei-wood,  85  N.  Y.  253;  Skillman  v.  Greenwood,  15  Mlna 
102  (Gil.  77);  Bailey  v.  Sloan,  65  Cal.  387,  4  Pac.  349;  Wall  v.  Heald,  »5 
Cal.  304,  30  Pac.  551;  KitUe  v.  Bellegarde,  86  Cal.  556,  25  Pac.  55.  On  failure 
of  a  defendant  properly  served  to  appear  within  the  time  allowed,  the  court 
may  enter  judgment  against  him  without  a  prior  formal  entry  of  default  by 
the  clerk.  Hibernia  Sav.  &  Loan  Soc.  v.  Matthai,  116  Cal.  424,  48  Pac.  370. 
Where  the  statute  provides  that,  if  tliere  is  an  allegation  of  fraud,  the  plain- 
tiff cannot  recover  unless  he  proves  the  fraud  at  the  trial.  Judgment  by  de- 
fault cannot  be  entered  by  the  clerk  without  the  intervention  of  the  court 
when  the  action  is  predicated  on  certain  acts  of  defendant  which  are  alleged 
to  have  been  done  with  a  fraudulent  intent  Fayei-weather  v.  Tucker,  25 
Abb.  N.  C.  395,  11  N.  Y.  Supp.  39. 

(128) 


Ch.  4)  JUDGMENTS   BY   DEFAULT.  §  89 

not  binding.**  For  instance,  under  a  statute  providing  that  the 
flerk  may  enter  in  vacation  a  judgment  by  default  upon  proof  of 
personal  service  of  a  summons  on  the  defendant,  a  judgment  en- 
tered out  of  term  by  the  clerk,  unless  there  is  such  proof,  is  void.** 
But  where  the  jurisdiction  of  the  clerk  to  enter  the  judgment  is  not 
denied,  it  may  be  made  a  question  how  far  his  mistakes,  misprisions, 
or  irregular  actions  will  impair  the  validity  of  the  judgment.  The 
anthorities  would  not  warrant  the  statement  that  the  judgment  in 
such  case  would  be  entirely  void.  On  the  contrary,  they  hold  that  it 
wottM  be  merely  erroneous,  and  that  the  error  could  be  cured  by 
motion  in  the  court  below  or  corrected  on  appeal.  This  is  the  posi- 
tion taken  with  reference  to  cases  in  which  the  clerk,  by  mistake, 
has  entered  judgment  for  an  amount  in  excess  of  the  real  recovery.** 

f  89.    Interloeiitorj  Ji&dsinent,  when  neoeiiary* 

It  is  important  to  be  noted  that  the  entry  of  a  default  is  not  nec- 
essarily, or  not  always,  the  final  judgment  in  the  action.  In  the 
language  of  the  supreme  court  of  Vermont,  "the  mere  entry  of  a 
default  does  not  involve  and  amount  to  the  rendering  of  a  final  judg- 
ment. The  default  is  an  incident,  which  entitles  the  plaintiff  to  a 
judgment,  but  does  not  determine  either  the  kind  or  amount  of  such 
judgment.  The  rendering  of  the  judgment  is  to  supervene  upon  and 
succeed  the  entry  of  the  default,  and  may  require  intervening  pro- 
ceedings in  th€  case,  in  order  to  enable  the  court  to  render  such  a 
judgment  as  to  law  appertains."  **  And  the  general  rule  is  that  if 
the  action  is  brought  on  a  contract  or  promise  for  a  liquidated  sum 
of  money,  or  if  the  amount  to  be  recovered  can  be  ascertained  by  a 

**Kflly  V.  Van  Austin,  17  Cal,  564;  Providence  Tool  Co.  v.  Prader,  32  Cal. 
«H.  91  Am.  Dec.  598;  Curry  v.  Roundtree,  51  Cal.  184;  Files  v.  Robinson,  30 
Ark.  487;  Taylor  v.  Smltli  (Tenn.  Ch.)  30  S.  W.  970.  Where  the  statute  em- 
ptiwens  the  clerk  to  enter  judgment  in  actions  on  contracts  to  recover  money 
or  damages,  if  defendant  falls  to  answer,  this  does  not  authorize  him  to  enter 
Judginent  by  default  In  an  action  for  trespass.  Shay  v.  Chicago  Clock  Co., 
Ill  Cal.  549,  44  Pac.  237. 

»*  MeConkey  v.  McCraney,  71  Wis.  576,  37  N.  W.  822;  Elder  v.  Gnmsky, 
m  Cal.  07.  59  Pac.  »00. 

••  Lenoir  v.  Broadhead's  Adm'r,  50  Ala.  6S;  Bond  ▼.  Pacheco,  30  Cal.  530. 

•«  Sheldon  v.  Sheldon,  37  Vt  162, 

1  LAW  jrDG.-9  (129) 


§    89  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  4 

mere  matter  of  calculation,  then  a  final  judgment  may  be  at  once 
entered  for  such  amount;  but  if  the  action  sounds  in  tort,*'  or 
claims  specific  relief,  or  if  the  damages  must  be  computed  or  liqui- 
dated otherwise  than  by  simple  calculation,*'  or  depend  upon  evi- 
dence, then  an  interlocutory  judgment  will  first  be  entered,  and  the 
case  proceed  to  the  assessment  of  damages  in  some  method  known 
to  the  law,  after  which  a  final  judgment  will  be  rendered  for  the 
amount  so  assessed.  In  a  case  of  the  latter  kind,  the  prior  entry  of 
an  interlocutory  judgment  is  important  to  the  regularity  of  the  pro- 
ceedings, though  its  omission  would  probably  not  be  absolutely  fatal. 
In  a  case  where  the  record  disclosed  the  fact  that  the  court  referred 
the  matter  to  the  clerk  for  the  assessment  of  damages  without  first 
rendering  an  interlocutory  judgment  against  the  defendants  for  want 
of  a  plea,  as  the  law  required,  the  appellate  court  said :  **In  this  we 
think  there  is  manifest  error."  •*  An  action  upon  an  open  account 
for  goods  sold  and  delivered,  for  services  rendered,  or  the  like,  is 
not  upon  a  liquidated  demand  such  that  final  judgment  may  be  en- 
tered for  the  amount  claimed,  upon  failure  to  answer.**  Nor  can  a 
final  judgment  by  default  be  rendered  in  an  action  of  detinue.*'  Nor 
is  such  judgment  proper  upon  a  note  pa3rable  in  Confederate  money. 
**A  jury  should  have  assessed  the  value  of  the  contract  [note],  upon 

»2  Stewart  v.  Bryan,  121  N.  0.  46,  28  S.  B.  18;  Studdert  v.  HasseU,  6 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  137;  Wilson  v.  Dawson,  96  Va.  687,  32  S.  B.  461. 

08  Holmes  y.  Lewis,  2  Wis.  83;  Kenum  y.  Henderson,  6  Ala.  132:  Gooley 
v.  Tybee  Beach  Co.,  99  Ga.  290,  25  S.  E.  691;  Paucette  y.  Ludden.  117  N.  C. 
170,  23  S.  E.  173;  In  re  Scharmann,  49  App.  Diy.  278,  63  N.  Y.  Supp.  267; 
City  of  Guthrie  v.  T.  W.  Harvey  Lumber  Co.,  5  Okl.  774,  50  Pac.  84. 

0*  Wilcox  v.  Field,  1  Colo.  3.  But  In  a  later  ease  it  is  said  that  a  default 
may  be  recited  and  entered  against  a  defendant  who  does  not  plead,  as  well 
at  the  time  of  the  rendition  of  the  final  Judgment  as  before.  Manvllle  v. 
Parks,  7  Colo.  128,  2  Pac.  212.  In  lUinols,  where  no  plea  is  filed  in  an  action 
of  assumpsit,  and  the  defendant  Is  absent,  It  Is  error  to  impanel  a  Jury  and 
assess  damages  without  default  first  taken  and  entered.  Lehr  y.  Vandeveer, 
48  III.  App.  511. 

»o  Woif  y.  Hamberg,  8  S.  C.  82;  Rogers  y.  Moore,  86  N.  0.  85;  Jenkins  v. 
WMlkerson,  76  Miss.  368,  24  South.  700.  Where  the  cause  of  acticm  Is  for 
fiervices  rendered  as  an  attorney,  but  no  fixed  sum  Is  alleged  to  have  been 
iigreed  on,  an  Inquiry  of  damages  must  be.  had  upon  defendant's  default 
Skinner  y.  Terry,  107  N.  C.  103,  12  S.  E.  118. 

»«  Studdert  y.  HasseU,  6  Humph.  (Tenn.)  137. 

;  (130) 


Ch.  4)  JUDGMENTS   BY   DEFAULT.  S  ^^ 

a  writ  of  inquiry,  before  the  judgment  was  made  final."  '^  On  the 
other  hand,  a  demand  founded  upon  a  simple  promissory,  note  for 
a  sum  certain,  not  expressed  to  be  payable  otherwise  than  in  lawful 
money,  will  warrant  a  final  judgment  upon  defendant's  default.®* 
And  the  same  is  true  of  a  claim  for  sums  alleged  to  have  been  ex- 
pended by  a  mortgagee  to  protect  his  security,  as,  for  taxes,'*  and 
of  a  claim  by  a  municipal  corporation  against  a  tax  collector  and  his 
sureties  upon  the  official  bond.**' 

In  some  of  the  states,  under  statutes  authorizing  constructive  serv- 
ice of  process  by  publication  in  certain  cases,  it  is  provided  that  an 
interlocutory  judgment  by  default  shall  be  entered  upon  the  defend- 
ant's failure  to  appear,  which  can  only  be  made  final  at  the  succeed- 
ing term  of  court.^**  There  is  one  other  instance  in  which  an  inter- 
locutory judgment  should  precede  the  entry  of  final  judgment  by  de- 
fault in  an  action,  viz:  upon  the  overruling  of  defendant's  demurrer 
(in  certain  cases)  or  dilatory  plea.  Here  the  practice  is  to  give  judg- 
ment that  he  "answer  over,"  after  which,  and  on  his  failure  to  plead 
to  the  merits,  he  may  be  defaulted.  But  if  the  record  shows  that 
the  defendant  had  an  opportunity  to  answer  over  and  refused  to  do 
so,  judgment  by  nil  dicit  is  good,  without  an  entry  of  a  formal  judg- 
ment of  respondeat  ouster.^** 

§  90*    Aflieiiment    of   Dainas^** 

After  the  interlocutory  judgment  by  default  has  been  entered  in 
an  action  for  unliquidated  damages  or  an  unascertained  sum,  the 
next  step  is  to  assess  the  plaintiff's  damages.  This  process,  as  fol- 
lowed at  common  law,  consisted  of  the  execution  of  a  writ  of  in- 

•7  WUUams  v.  RockweU,  64  N.  C.  32S. 

••  Georgia  Railroad  &  Banking  Co.  y.  Pendleton,  87  Ga.  751,  13  8.  E.  822. 
Compare  Kaiser  v.  Brown,  98  Ga.  10,  25  S.  E.  925;  Tbomas  v.  American  Free- 
bold  Land  &  M.  Co.  (C.  C.)  47  Fed.  550,  12  L.  R.  A.  GSl.  A  note  containing 
a  stipulation  for  attorney's  fees  will  support  a  Judgment  by  default  which  in- 
cludes such  fees,  without  a  writ  of  inquiry.  Ledbetter  &  Co.  Land  &  Loan 
Ass'n  T.  Vinton,  108  Ala.  014,  18  South.  692. 

»•  Cbwles  V.  CowJes.  121  X.  C.  272,  28  S.  E.  476. 
*    !••  Combs  T.  Breathitt  County  (Ky.)  38  S.  W.  13a» 

101  Lombard  v.  Clark.  33  Mo.  308.  • 

i«s  llsildeuian  t.  Starrett,  23  ill.  393. 

(131) 


§   90  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  4 

quiry,  whereby  the  sheriff  was  directed  to  summon  a  jury  of  twelve 
men,  over  which  he  should  himself  preside,  and  proceed  to  assess 
the  amount  of  damages  sustained  by  the  plaintiff.  The  verdict  be- 
ing given,  the  sheriff  returned  the  inquisition,  which  was  entered 
on  the  roll  in  the  manner  of  a  postea,  and  thereupon  judgment  was 
rendered  that  the  plaintiff  should  recover  the  exact  sum  of  damages 
so  assessed.*®'  This  common-law  metjiod  is  greatly  modified,  in  the 
different  states,  by  variations  of  local  practice.  In  few,  if  any,  is 
the  writ  of  inquiry  still  executed  by  the  sheriff;  in  some,  no  such 
writ  issues,  but  the  order  for  assessing  damages  is  executed  in  court, 
by  the  judge,  with  or  without  the  aid  of  a  jury,  or  by  a  referee  or 
auditor.^**  The  important  question  is  as  to  the  constitutional  right 
of  trial  by  jury.  Under  the  clause  found  in  many  of  the  state  con- 
stitutions, providing  that  in  suits  at  common  law,  where  the  value 
jn  controversy  exceeds  a  certain  sum,  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall 
be  preserved,  it  has  been  held  that  the  defendant  has  an  absolute 
and  indefeasible  right,  guarantied  by  the  constitution,  to  demand  that 
the  question  of  damages  be  tried  by  a  jury.*®'  There  is,  however, 
reasonable  ground  for  the  theory  that  the  defendant,  by  suffering  a 
default  in  the  first  instance,  has  voluntarily  renounced  his  right  to 
have  a  jury  called  in  any  of  the  proceedings  in  the  action.*®* 

io«  See  Hickman  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  30  W.  Va.  290,  4  S.  E.  654. 

104  For  the  practice  In  the  several  states,  and  particularly  as  to  the  assess- 
ment being  made  by  the  court  or  by  a  Jury,  see  Rowen  v.  New  York,  N.  H. 
&  H.  R.  Co.,  59  Conn.  3G4,  21  Atl.  1073;  Falken  v.  Honsa tonic  R.  Co..  6:i 
Conn.  258,  27  Atl.  1117;  Thompson  v.  Fox.  21  Misc.  Rep.  2t)S.  47  N.  Y.  Supp. 
17G;  Commercial  Union  Assur.  Co.  v.  Everhart's  Adni'r,  88  Va.  952,  14  S.  E, 
.S3C;  McLeod  v.  Nimocks,  122  N.  C.  437,  29  S.  E.  577;  Allen  v.  Lftthrop- 
Hatton  Lumber  Co..  90  Ala.  490,  S  Sonth.  129;  Decatur  &  N.  Imp.  Co.  v. 
Crass.  97  Ala.  524,  12  South.  41;  Ross  v.  Noble,  G  Kan.  App.  361,  51  Pac.  7trJ; 
Coleman  v.  Floyd,  131  Ind.  330,  31  N.  E.  75;   Haley  v.  Eureka  County  Bank. 

21  Nev.  127,  26  Pac.  64.  12  L.  R.  A.  815.  Where  defendant  is  dlssattefied 
with  the  assessment  of  damages  on  a  default,  his  remedy  is  by  motion  to 
correct  the  assessment.     Riely  v.  Barton,  32  111.  App.  524. 

106  Hickman  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  30  W.  Va.  296,  4  S.  E.  f.54. 

106  Hopkins  V.  Ladd,  35  III.  178;   Seeley  v.  City  of  Bridgeport.  53  Conn.  1, 

22  Atl.  1017;   Raymond  v.  Danbury  &  N.  R.  Co..  43  Conn.  596,  Fed.  Cas.  No, 

ii..m^. 

(132) 


Ch.  4)  JUDGMKNIS  BY   J>fif  AULT.  &  91 


I  01.    Erideiuye  on  AiieMinent  of  Damasei* 

A  default  admits  the  cause  of  action  and  the  material  and  travers- 
able averments  of  the  declaration,  although  not  the  amount  of  dam- 
ages; and  upon  the  proceeding  for  their  assessment,  the  amount  of 
damages  is  all  that  the  plaintiff  is  required  to  prove  or  the  defendant 
is  permitted  to  controvert.*®'  The  former  must  produce  whatever 
evidence  is  necessary  to  fix  the  amount  of  his  claim  with  precision. 
Thus  a  judgment  by  default  in  assumpsit,  where  an  account  is  filed 
in  the  declaration,  is  an  admission  of  indebtedness  for  the  articles 
charged,  but  the  value  of  the  articles  and  the  amount  of  the  items 
require  to  be  proved.*®*  As  for  the  defendant,  he  may  offer  any 
evidence  which  is  confined  to  the  question  of  damages  solely  or 
which  goes  in  mitigation  or  reduction  of  damages ;  but  evidence 
tending  to  deny  the  cause  of  action,  or  to  show  that  a  right  of  action 
does  not  exist,  or  to  avoid  the  alleged  contract,  is  irrelevant  and 
inadmissible.*** 

lOT  WiUflon  V.  Willson,  25  N.  H.  229,  57  Am.  Dec.  320;  Rufis  v.  GHbert,  19 
Fk.  54;  Maund  v.  Loeb,  87  Ala.  374,  6  South.  376;  Union  Cent  Life  Ins. 
Ca  v.  Lipbcomb  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  307;  Slater  v.  Skirvlng,  51  Neb. 
loa  70  X.  W.  493.  66  Am.  St'Rep.  444;  Martin  y.  New  Yoik  &  N.  E.  B.  Co., 
62  Conn.  331,  25  Atl.  239.  But  In  Florida,  it  is  said  that  it  is  error  to  render 
fiiuil  judgment  after  a  default  entered  in  a  suit  on  a  bond  without  production 
of  the  bond  or  proper  evideuce  of  It.  West  v.  Fleming,  36  Fla.  298,  18  South. 
087. 

io»  Patrick  v.  Kidgawny,  4  Har.  &  J.  (^£d.)  312;  Durden  v.  Carhart,  41  Ga. 
76w 

i**The  defendant  has  the  right  to  cross-examine  the  plaintiff's  witnesses 
and  interpoise  objections  to  evidence.  St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Denson  (Tex. 
CiT.  App.)  26  S.  \V.  265;  Davis  v.  Wimberly,  86  Ga.  46,  12  S.  B.  208.  He  may 
aliK)  offer  any  evidence  which  goes  In  mitigation  or  reduction  of  damages,  but 
cjinnot  have  the  benefit  of  a  set-off  or  counterclaim,  or  other  ground  for  the 
reduction  of  damages,  unless  it  necessarily  arises  from  the  facts  pleaded  by 
tlie  plaintiff.  Regan  v.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.,  60  Conn.  124,  22  Atl.  503, 
25  Am.  St.  Rep.  306.  And  he  cannot  introduce  evidence  controverting  the 
plaintiff*?  entire  cause  of  action,  or  tending  to  avoid  it,  or  to  show  that  no 
right  of  action  existed.  Phillips  v.  Bachelder,  47  Mo.  App.  52;  Garrard  v. 
Dollar,  49  N.  C.  175,  67  Am.  Dec.  271;  Foster  v.  Smith,  10  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  377; 
Umbert  v.  Sanford,  55  Conn.  437,  12  Atl.  519;  Lee  v.  Knapp,  90  N.  C.  171. 
Thus,  be  cannot  defend  on  the  ground  that  the  contract  was  within  the  stat- 
ute of  frauds.  Williams  v.  Crosby  Lumber  Co.,  118  N.  C.  928,  24  S.  E.  800. 
But  in  Connecticut,  a  statute  permits  the  defendant  to  notify  the  plaintiff  of  any 

(133) 


§   92  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  4 


I  02«    Amoimt  of  tli'9  Heeoverj. 

A  judgment  by  default  for  a  sum  greater  than  that  prayed  for  in 
the  complaint  is  irregular  and  erroneous.**®  And,  generally  speak- 
ing, where  the  prayer  is  for  specific  relief,  the  plaintiff  is  confined 
to  a  recovery  in  strict  accordance  with  what  he  has  asked  for.*"  If 
a  plea  admits  a  part  of  the  debt  sued  for,  without  a  tender,  the 
plaintiff  may  take  judgment  by  nil  dicit  for  such  amount.***  A 
judgment  by  default  on  a  note,  upon  which  is  an  indorsement  of  a 
credit  by  the  plaintiff,  ought  to  be  entered  subject  to  such  credit."' 
In  an  action  against  joint  defendants,  where  one  suffers  default,  but 
the  other  proceeds  to  trial  and  secures  a  general  verdict  against  the 
plaintiff,  this  is  equivalent  to  a  finding  that  nothing  is  due  from  the 
defaulted  defendant,  and  no  judgment  can  be  entered  against  him.*" 

special  defense  to  be  set  up  on  a  hearing  in  damages  on  default;  and  tbis 
enables  him  to  avail  himself  of  the  defense  of  res  judicata.  Brennan  v.  Ber- 
lin Iron-Bridge  Co..  73  Conn.  479.  42  Atl.  625.  See.  also.  Ockershnusen  v.  New 
York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.,  71  Conn.  617,  42  Atl.  650;  Gardner  v.  City  of  New 
Loudon,  63  Conn.  267,  28  Atl.  42. 

110  Gage  V.  Rogers,  20  Cal.  91;  White  v.  Snow,  71  N.  C.  232;  Johnson  v. 
Mantz,  69  Iowa,  710,  27  N.  W.  467;  Northern  Trust  Co.  v.  Albert  I^ea  College, 
68  Minn.  112,  71  N.  W.  9:  Reidy  v.  Bleistift,  31  Misc.  Rep.  181.  63  X.  Y.  Supp. 
974;  Bast  v.  Hysom,  6  Wash.  170.  32  Tac.  997.  Where  the  complaint  de- 
mands judgment  for  the  principal  of  a  debt  and  the  costs^  a  judgiuent  which 
includes  interest,  as  well  as  the  debt  and  costs.  Is  erroneous.  Pickett  v. 
Handy,  9  Colo.  App.  357,  48  Pac.  820.  But  the  clerk  has  authority  to  add  to 
the  amount  due  on  a  note  the  sum  therein  stipulated  to  be  paid  for  attorneys' 
fees,  if  within  the  amount  demanded  in  the  summons.  Alexander  y.  McDow. 
108  Cal.  25,  41  Pac.  24. 

111  Burling  v.  Goodman,  1  Nev.  314;  Nortliern  Trust  Co.  v.  Albert  Lea 
College,  68  Minn.  112,  71  N.  W.  9;  Parszyk  v.  Mach,  10  S.  D.  555,  74  X.  W. 
1027.  Where  the  complaint  only  seeks  subrogation  of  plaintiff  to  the  right  of 
another  defendant  in  a  Judgment,  plaintiff  is  not  entitled,  on  default  of  the 
defendant,  to  a  personal  judgment  against  him.  Heins  v.  Wicke,  102  Iowa. 
396,  71  X.  W.  345.  But  it  has  been  held  that,  where  the  action  is  on  a  note 
and  mortgage,  the  court  may,  on  default,  give  judgment  for  foreclosure  of 
the  mortgage,  though  plaintiff  has  only  asked  for  a  personal  judgment  for  the 
amount  due.    Weaver  v.  Gardner,  14  Kan.  347. 

112  Williams  v.  Harris,  2  How.  (Miss.)  627.     See  Allen  v.  Watt,  69  111.  655. 
118  Rees  V.  Conococheague  Bank,  5  Rand.  (Va.)  326.  16  Am,  Dec.  755. 

11*  Hay  den  Saddlery  Hardware  Co.  v,  Ramsay,  14  Tex.  Civ.  App.  185,  36 
S.  W.  505. 

(134) 


I 

Cb.  4)  JUDGMENTS   BY    DEFAULT.  §  94 


i  93.    Jvdsmeiit  by  Default  not  aided  by  Preswptioiit. 

In  several  states  it  is  held  that  on  appeal  from  a  judgment  by 
default,  nothing  will  be  presumed  in  its  favor ;  the  record  must  show 
afiinnatively  the  existence  of  every  material  fact  to  give  the  court 
jurisdiction,  and  that  all  the  proceedings  were  in  accordance  with 
law.*"  "It  is  a  well  settled  rule  of  practice  that  where  a  judgment 
is  taken  by  default  against  a  defendant  in  ^n  action,  the  record  must 
affirmatively  show  that  process  had  been  duly  served  the  required 
length  of  time  before  the  default  was  taken."  *^* 

i  94.    OpeaiitK  and  VaeatinK  Jndgineiits  by  Default. 

A  judgment  taken  against  a  defendant  by  default  will  be  opened 
or  set  aside,  on  his  motion,  in  the  court  wherein  it  was  entered,  for 
a  failure  of  jurisdiction  or  for  certain  classes  of  errors  and  irregu- 
larities ;  and  also,  by  statute  in  some  of  the  states,  when  it  was  given 
in  consequence  of  his  "mistake,  inadvertence,  surprise,  or  excusable 
neglect."  But  in  respect  to  the  exercise  of  this  power,  judgments 
by  default  are  not  differentiated  from  any  other  species  of  judg- 
ment, except  in  so  far  as  certain  special  statutes  are  applicable  to 
them,  and  except  that  practically  they  constitute  by  far  the  largest 
class  of  cases  in  which  applications  for  such  relief  are  made.  And 
for  this  reason  it  is  not  proposed  to  examine  the  subject  in  detail 
in  this  connection,  but  the  reader  is  referred  to  the  later  chapters 
of  this  work  in  which  the  vacating  and  opening  of  judgments  in 
general  will  be  fully  discussed.**^ 

"5  Hudson  V.  Breeding,  7  Ark.  445;  Elligood  v.  Cannon,  4  Har.  (Del,)  17«; 
Tonuoly  t.  Alabama  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  29  Ala.  373;  Schloss  v.  White,  16  Cal. 
•-"n  But  in  Proulx  v  Stetson  &  Post  Mill  Co.,  6  Wash.  478,  S3  Pac.  1067, 
it  is  said  that  the  ordinary  presumption  of  regularity  in  the  proceedings  of 
a  court  (ft  general  Jurisdiction  applies  in  the  case  of  a  Judgment  by  default. 
And  lu  Florida,  it  appears  that,  -where  a  final  Judgment  entered  by  the  cler\i: 
on  a  default  is  not  void  on  its  face,  but  voidable  only,  because  of  matters 
dehors  the  judgment,  it  becomes  an  absolute  verity  after  the  lapse  of  60  days 
frum  the  entry  of  the  default,  unless  set  aside  or  reversed  by  an  appellate 
court.    Einstein  v.  Davidson,  35  Fla.  342,  17  South.  563. 

1"  E]t2Totb  V.  VoriB,  74  Ind.  459. 

iH  jsee  infra,  ««  2U7-355. 

(135) 


§   9d  LAW  OP  JUDOMENTfl.  (Ch.  4 


S  95.    Review  •£  Jvdcments  ¥y 


An  appeal  will  lie  from  a  judgment  entered  upon  the  default  of 
the  defendant,  in  a  proper  case,  as  well  as  from  any  other  judgment. 
**There  may  be  error  in  a  judgment  by  default,  as  well  as  in  a  judg- 
ment rendered  upon  issue  joined  in  the  pleadings  and  tried  by  a 
jury,  and  in  the  former,  as  well  as  in  the  latter  case,  the  error  may 
be  corrected  on  appeal."  ^^®  We  have  already  seen  that  such  a  judg- 
ment will  be  reversed  when  founded  upon  a  pleading  which  docs 
not  state  a  cause  of  action.^^*  And  it  remains  to  be  stated  that  the 
appellate  court  has  power  to  deal  with  it  and  to  correct  or  reverse 
it  on  acco  int  of  a  failure  to  comply  with  the  statutory  directions, 
or  mistakes  of  the  cour-  c:  clerk,  or  any  errors  or  irregularities 
whicH  would  vitiate  a  judgment  otherwise  rendered. 

118  Stevens  v.  Ross,  1  Cal.  94;  Gerhart  t.  Fout  72  Mo.  App.  138.  Bnt  In 
New  York,  the  statute  restricts  the  right  of  appeal  to  parties  not  in  default: 
and  consequently  the  remedy  of  one  aggrieved  by  an  invalid  judgment  by 
default  is  by  motion  to  have  it  corrected.  Park  v.  Park,  24  MIbc.  Bep.  3?A 
33  N.  Y.  Supp.  677. 

11 »  Supra,  §  84. 

(136) 


Cb.  5}  ARsuuT  ov  jv0eifBiit»  S  96 


CHAPTEB  V. 

AUKESX  OP  JUDGMENT. 

i    SW.^  Arrest  of  Judgment  at  Common  I^w. 

\9^.  Wbeu  the  Motion  slioold  be  mnde. 

U8.  <vroundft  (or  Arrest  of  Judgment 

W.  Defect  of  Parties. 

11)0.  insntllclent  or  Faulty  Pleadings. 

101.  Joinder  of  Good  and  Bad  Counts. 

1U2.  Misjoinder  of  Causes  of  Action. 

103.  Objections  to  the  Jury. 

104.  Irregular  or  Defective  Verdict 

105.  Grounds  held  insufficient 

I  96b    Araesi  of  Judgammmt  at   Common  I«aw. 

The  arrest  of  judgment  is  defined  as  the  withholding  or  staying 
of  judgment,  notwithstanding  a  verdict  has  been  given,  on  the  ground 
that  there  is  some  error  appearing  on  the  face  of  the  record  which 
vitiates  the  proceedings.^  But  the  errors  which  will  justify  a  motion 
in  this  behalf  must  be  errors  of  substance,  and  not  merely  clerical  or 
formal  mistakes.  .  If  they  belong  to  the  latter  class,  they  will  be 
cured  by  the  statutes  of  amendments  and  jeofails,  which  have  intro- 
duced a  much  more  liberal  practice  in  this  respect  than  had  formerly 
obtained.  According  to  Blackstone,  "arrests  of  judgment  arise  from 
intrinsic  causes,  appearing  upon  the  face  of  the  record."  And  he 
enumerates  the  grounds  which  will  be  sufficient  to  prompt  this  action 
of  the  court,  as  follows : — where  the  declaration  varies  totally  from 
the  original  writ ;  where  the  verdict  materially  differs  from  the  plead- 
ings and  issue  thereon ;  and  where  the  case  laid  in  the  declaration  is 
not  sufficient  in  point  of  law  to  found  an  action  upon."  In  this 
countr)',  motions  in  arrest  of  judgment,  at  least  in  civil  cases,  are  not 
especially  favored.     The  liberality  of  the  statutes  and  the  indulgence 

»BouT.  Law  Diet.;  Brown,  f-aw  Diet.,  citing  Steph.  PI.  106;  Roscarla  v. 
lliomas.  a  Jur.  U2U. 

»3  Bl.  Comm.  :iU3.  Also,  the  ohjectlcn  that  thp  Judfnnent  Is  not  in  con- 
ft'imitj  with  the  verdict  may  he  made  by  motion  In  arrest.  Lee  v.  Wilkins, 
<^  Mo.  App.   ITj^. 

(137) 


§   97  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTB.  (Ch.  5 

of  the  courts,  in  permitting  amendments,  and  in  taking  defects  as 
cured  by  the  verdict  if  not  duly  objected  to,  have  taken  away  most  of 
the  grounds  on  which  a  motion  of  this  character  could  be  predicated, 
and  this  reduction  is  still  further  promoted  by  the  facility  of  obtaining 
new  trials.^  Indeed,  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  is  now  usually 
coupled  with  a  motion  for  a  new  trial,  the  latter  being  the  real  and 
important  object  of  the  application.  And  hi  some  of  the  states  the 
practice  of  arresting  judgments  is  entirely  abolished.  In  Maine,  for 
example,  it  is,  provided  by  law  that  no  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment 
in  any  civil  action  shall  be  sustained  in  the  courts  of  that  state.*  It 
is  of  course  only  the  defendant  who  can  move  in  arrest  of  judgment. 
If  the  defendant  has  obtained  a  verdict  upon  a  plea  which  confesses 
the  cause  of  action  and  does  not  sufficiently  avoid  it,  the  proper 
course  for  the  plaintiff,  as  we  have  already  seen,  is  to  move  for  judg- 
ment non  obstante  veredicto.'  A  joint  motion  by  several  defendants 
in  arrest  of  judgment  cannot  be  sustained  as  to  a  part  only.'  A  mo- 
tion in  arrest  of  judgment  need  not  be  in  writing,  nor  point  out  the 
grounds  therefor,  nor  need  it  be  brought  into  the  record  by  bill  of 
exceptions^ 

I  97*    When  the  Motion  should  be  made* 

By  the  English  practice,  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  may  be 
made  at  any  time  before  judgment  is  actually  entered  up.  In  the 
absence  of  statutes,  it  is  probable  that  a  similar  rule  would  be  applied 
in  our  own  courts.  But  at  all  events  it  seems  clear  that  a  motion  of 
this  kind  cannot  be  granted  after  the  rendition  and  entry  of  a  final 
judgment  in  the  cause ;  at  that  stage  the  only  remedy  is  by  motion 
to  vacate  or  set  aside  the  judgment.®     But  where  the  law  provides 

«  See  Virginia  &  T.  Coal  &  Iron  (3o.  v.  Fields,  94  Va.  102,  26  S.  E.  426. 

*  Inhabitants  of  Stetson  v.  Inhabitants  of  Corrlna,  44  Me.  29;  Rev.  8t. 
Me.  c.  £j2.  §  31.  In  Illinois,  a  statute  provides  that  Judgments  shall  not 
be  arrested  because  of  any  mispleading,  discontinuance,  or  misjoining  of  the 
issue,  or  any  default  or  negligence  by  which  neither  party  has  been  preju- 
diced. Kev.  St.  111.  c.  7,  §  (5.  See  Mayer  v.  Brensiuger,  180  111.  110,  M  X 
E.   159,   72   Am.   St.   Rep.    19«. 

B  Supra,  §  16. 

•  Van  Gundy  v.  Cm  ripan,  4  Ind.  App.  333,  30  N.  E.  933. 

7  Chicago  &  S.  E.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wheeler,  14  Ind.  App.  02.   '2  N.  E.  45D. 

8  State  V.  Kibling,  03  Vt  636,  22  AtL  613;   Keller  v.  Stevens,  66  Md.  132. 

(138) 


Ch.  5)  ARREST  OF  JUDGMENT.  §   98 

that  the  motion  may  be  made  at  any  time  before  the  adjournment  of 
the  term  at  which  the  case  is  finally  disposed  of,  it  is  held  that  the 
defendant's  right  to  so  move  will  not  be  defeated  by  the  entering  up 
of  a  judgment  by  the  plaintiff  on  the  record  before  the  adjournment  of 
such  term.'  In  some  states  it  is  provided  that  a  motion  in  arrest 
shall  be  made  within  four  days  of  the  rendition  of  the  judgment ;  and 
when  this  is  the  case,  the  motion  is  too  late  if  filed  after  the  final 
adjournment  of  the  term  at  which  the  judgment  is  entered.^®  It  is 
held  to  be  the  correct  rule  of  practice  not  to  entertain  a  motion  in 
arrest  of  judgment  after  the  overruling  of  a  demurrer  to  the  declara- 
tion, at  least  where  the  motion  is  based  on  any  exceptions  which 
might  have  been  considered  on  the  demurrer ;  **  and  clearly,  mai- 
ler which  was  objected  to  by  demurrer  and  decided  upon  cannot 
afterwards  be  urged  in  arrest  of  judgment. ^^  But  a  motion  of  this 
character  may  be  received  after  a  decision  on  a  motion  for  a  new 

trial.** 

I  98.    Oronndfl  for  Arrest  of  Jndgineiit* 

As  a  general  rule,  a  judgment  can  be  arrested  only  for  some  mat- 
ter appearing,  or  the  omission  of  some  matter  which  ought  to  ap- 
pear, on  the  face  of  the  record  itself.**    And  for  the  purpose  of  such 

6  AtL  533;  Colchen  v.  Ninde,  120  Ind.  88,  22  N.  R  94;  Potter  v.  McCk)rmack, 
127  Ind.  439,  26  N.  E.  883;  Bay  less  y.  Jones,  10  Ind.  App.  102,  37  N.  E.  421; 
Smitli  V.  State.  140  Ind.  343,  39  N.  E.  lOGO;  Barnhart  v.  Edwards  (Cal.)  57 
I'ac.  1004. 

•  Hartridge  v.  Wesson,  4  Ga.  lOL 

Instate  y.   JLeatbers,  61  Mo.  381. 

"  Rouse  V.  Peoria  County,  2  Oilman  (111.)  99;  Independent  Order  of  Mutual 
Aid  V.  Paine,  122  111.  625,  14  N.  E.  42;  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Oo.  v.  Hines,  132 
IlL  i61,  23  N.  E.  1021,  22  Am.  St  Rep.  515;  Indiana  &  I.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Samp- 
son, 31  111.  App.  513;  Crown  Coal  &  Tow  Co.  v.  Yoch  Coal  Mln.  Co.,  57 
IlL  App.  66C;  Mayer  y.  Lawrence,  58  lU.  App.  194;  Story  &  Clark  Organ 
Co.  y.  Uendleman,  63  lU.  App.  123;  Miller  y.  McCormick  Harvesting  Mach. 
Co..  lA  llL  App.  571. 

«  Oeeman  y.  Camden,  7  Mo.  298;  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  y.  Clausen,  173 
111  100,  50  N.  E.  680;  Qeveland,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jenkins,  70  111. 
Ai»p.  415;  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Pearson,  82  lU.  App.  605. 

n  Wilkiiiflon  y.  Daniel,  Wright  (Ohio)  368. 

i«  Burrows  y.  Mblack,  28  a  C.  A.  130,  84  Fed.  Ill;  Xoyes  y.  Parker,  64 
Vt  379^  24  Atl.  12;  Ward  v.  Lakeside  Ry.  Co..  20  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  494;  Burnett 
y.  K»nund,  2  .Nott  &  McC.  (S.  C.)  4'^;  Watt's  Case,  4  Leigh  (Va.)  672:  Gerllug 

(139) 


« 


§   98  LAW  OF  JUDOMENTS.  (Cb.  5 

a  motion,  the  evidence  does  not  constitute  a  part  of  the  record." 
"A  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  reaches  only  such  defects  as  arc 
apparent  on  the  face  of  the  record,  and  as  are  not  cured  by  the  verdict 
or  some  statute  of  amendments,  or  waived  by  failing  to  demur."  " 
This  motion,  in  other  words,  *'does  not  perform  the  office  of  calling 
the  attention  of  the  court  to  rulings  which  constitute  matters  of  ex- 
ception. It  can  not,  therefore,  be  used  as  a  substitute  for  a  motion 
for  a  new  trial.  It  reaches  only  those  defects  which  are  apparent  on 
the  face  of  the  record  proper,  and  does  not  reach  such  as  require 
to  be  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  court  by  proof  aliunde."  *^  Much 
less,  of  course,  can  such  a  motion  be  supported  by  matter  which  be- 
comes part  of  the  record  after  the  motion  has  been  overruled." 
It  is  stated  to  be  an  invariable  rule,  with  regard  to  the  arrest  of  judg- 
ment, that  whatever  is  alleged  for  this  purpose  must  be  such  matter 
as  would,  upon  demurrer,  have  been  sufficient  to  overturn  the  action 

V.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co.,  39  W.  Va.  689,  20  S.  B.  691;  State  v.  George,  30  N. 
C.  324,  49  Am.  Dec.  3J>2;  State  v.  Douglass,  63  N.  C.  500;  Brown  v.  Lee, 
21  Ga.  159;  Gamer  ▼.  State,  42  Ga.  203;  Frank  y.  State.  39  Miss.  705;  State 
V.  Addison,  15  La.  Ann.  185;  State  v.  Green,  43  La.  Ann.  402,  9  South.  42; 
Case  y.  State,  5  Ind.  1;  McGiU  v.  Rothgeb,  45  111.  App.  511;  McCarty  y. 
O'Bryan,  ""7  Mo.  5H4,  38  S.  W.  456;  Elsenrath  y,  Kallmeyer,  61  Mo.  App. 
430;    Floyd  v.  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co.,  10  Colo.  App.  54,  50  Pac  864. 

"Burrows  v.  Mblack,  28  C.  C.  A.  130,  »4  Fed.  Ill;  Clary  y.  Hardeeville 
Briok  Co.  (C.  C.)  100  Fed.  915;  Ward  y.  Lakeside  Ry.  Co.,  20  Pa.  Co.  Ct 
K.  494;  lYow  v.  Thomas,  70  Vt.  580,  41  Atl.  652.  After  verdict  on  a  moUoa 
in  arrest  of  judgment,  the  court  will  presume  that  every  material  fact  al- 
leged in  the  declaration,  or  fairly  inferable  from  what  is  alleged,  was  proved 
on  the  trial.    Herman  Berghoff  Brewing  Co.  y.  Przbylski,  82  111.  App.  361. 

i«  Balllett  y.  Humphreys,  78  Ind.  388.  See  Sanner  y.  Sayne,  78  Ga.  467, 
3  S.  E.  651;    Court  of  Probate  v.  Sprague,  3  R.  I.  205. 

17  White  y.  Caldwell,  17  Mo.  App.  691.  In  passing  upon  a  motion  in  ar- 
rest, .it  is  not  allowable  for  the  judge  to  inyoke  his  recollection  as  to  what 
occurred  at  the  trial.  City  of  Washington  y.  Calhoun,  103  Ga.  675,  30  S.  E. 
434.  r^or  can  a  motion  in  arrest  be  aided  by  statements  of  the  adverse 
party's  counsel.  Taylor  y.  Corley,  113  Ala.  oSO,  21  South.  404.  In  an  action 
to  rescind  a  deed  for  fraudulent  representations  as  to  incumbrances,  the 
fact  that  the  incumbrance  has  been  paid  off  before  trial  cannot  be  consid- 
ered on  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment.  Moore  y.  Cross,  87  Tex.  557,  29  S. 
W.  1051. 

18  Heward  T.  State,  21  Miss.  261;  Bull  y.  Mathews,  20  B.  L  100,  37  AtL 
536. 

(140) 


Ch.  5)  ARREST   OF  JUDGMENT.  f   99 

or  plea.**  That  is,  motions  in  arrest  are  governed  in  general  by  the 
principles  applicable  to  demurrers,  and  no  greater  indulgence  is 
shovni  to  the  defendant,  in  respect  to  his  objections  thus  urged,  than 
if  they  had  taken  the  shape  of  a  demurrer.  In  fact,  as  a  consequence 
of  the  statutes  of  amendments  and  the  doctrine  of  cure  by  verdict, 
much  greater  severity  is  shown  to  motions  in  arrest.  So  that  it  is 
by  no  means  true  that  any  thing  which  would  have  supported  a 
demurrer  will  be  good  ground  for  arresting  the  judgment.  "Excep- 
tions that  are  moved  in  arrest  of  judgment  must  be  much  more  mate- 
rial and  glaring  than  such  as  will  maintain  a  demurrer,  or,  in  other 
words,  many  inaccuracies  and  omissions,  which  would  be  fatal  if 
early  observed,  are  cured  by  a  subsequent  verdict,  and  not  suffered, 
in  the  last  stage  of  a  cause,  to  unravel  the  whole  proceedings."  *• 

i  09.    Defect  of  Partiefl. 

The  objection  that  there  is  a  defect  of  parties  cannot  be  raised  by 
motion  in  arrest  of  judgment,  but  only  by  demurrer  or  answer,  and 
it  is  waived  by  going  to  trial  without  exception.**  So  a  misjoinder 
of  parties  as  plaintiffs  is  no  ground  for  arresting  the  judgment.** 
Neither  is  an  objection  that  some  of  the  defendants  are  non-resi- 
dents.** And  where  an  action  was  pending  in  the  name  of  a  firm, 
as  plaintiffs,  in  the  style  of  L.  &  Co.,  and  L.  died  before  the  trial, 
and  the  names  of  the  other  partners  did  not  appear  of  record,  it  was 

1*  Washington  &  B.  Tompike  Koad  t.  State,  19  Md.  239;  State  v.  James, 
2  Bay  (8.  C.)  *21o;    Sedgwick  v.  Dawklns,  18  Fla.  335. 

>•  3  Bl.  Comm.  3&M. 

*»  RonfiCger  ▼.  Lindenberger,  53  Mo.  304;  Yonley  v.  Thompson,  30  Ark. 
3yj»:  Thompson  v.  Kimbrough,  23  Tex.  Civ.  App.  350,  57  S.  W.  328;  Crouoh 
T.  Uance,  «2  Mo.  App.  25;  Chandler  &  Taylor  Oo.  t.  Norwood,  14  App.  D. 
C   357. 

"  Little  Rock  &  Ft.  Smith  R.  Co.  v.  Dyer,  35  Ark.  300;  Demerltt  v.  Mills, 
69  X.  H.  18.  But  In  an  early  Massachusetts  case.  In  case  by  husband  and 
wife  against  defendant  for  driving  his  horse  and  chaise  against  the  plain- 
tilTa  chaise,  by  which  the  wife  was  thrown  out  and  injured,  it  was  alleged 
that  the  husband  had  lost  the  labor  and  comfort  of  his  wife,  and  had  been 
pat  to  great  expense  in  her  cure,  etc.,  and  after  verdict  for  the  plaintiff, 
judgment  was  arrested,  because  injuries  were  charged  in  the  action  for  which 
huKband  and  wife  coul^  not  be  joined.    Barnes  v.  Hurd,  11  Mass.  59. 

ss  Washington  &,  S.  U.  Tel.  Co.  T.  Hobson,  15  Grat.  (Va.)  122. 

(141) 


S    100  LAW  OP  JUDaMENT&  (Ch.  5 

considered  that  this  furnished  no  ground  for  a  motion  in  arrest  of 
judgment,  the  death  itself  not  being  shown  by  the  record.'*  Xor 
will  judgment  be  arrested  because  of  an  ordinary  mis-spelling  of  a 
party's  name.*'  On  the  other  hand,  where  an  objection  of  this  char- 
acter is  supported  by  the  face  of  the  record,  it  may  in  some  instances 
be  adequate  ground  for  arresting  the  judgment.  Thus,  where  the 
law  requires  that  suits  shall  be  brought  in  the  name  of  the  real  party 
in  interest,  a  motion  to  arrest  a  judgment  in  favor  of  the  assignor  of 
a  note  "to  the  use  of"  the  assignee  should  prevail.** 

i  100.    Insiiffloieiit  or  Faulty  Pleadlnc^ 

A  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  must  be  founded  on  matter  of  rec- 
ord ;  and  if  the  declaration  or  complaint  contains  a  substantial  cause 
of  action,  the  judgment  will  not  be  arrested  on  account  of  an  irregu- 
larity or  defect  which  is  amendable,  or  which  has  been  waived  by 
appearance  or  going  to  trial.*^  In  other  words,  if  the  plaintiffs 
manner  of  stating  his  title  or  setting  out  his  cause  of  action  be  objec- 
tionable and  defective,  though  the  title  itself  appears  to  be  good  in 
law,  advantage  must  be  taken  of  the  defect  before  a  verdict  is  ren- 
dered. But  if,  giving  him  the  benefit  of  all  intendments  and  infer- 
ences, the  title  or  cause  of  action  itself  appears  from  the  declaration 
to  be  defective  and  bad  in  law,  so  that  his  averments  do  not  make  out 
a  substantial  ground  of  suit,  then  judgment  will  be  arrested  on  the 
defendant's  motion ;  because  such  a  defect  cannot  be  cured  by  verdict, 
and  the  court  cannot  presume  that  a  cause  of  action  was  proved 
where  aone  was  stated.**    An  admirable  illustration  of  this  rule  is 

«*  RouDtree  v.  Lathrop,  69  G a.  53t). 

25  Toledo,  W.  &  W.  Ky.  Co.  v.  Ingraham,  77  Ul.  309. 

seHutchings  v.  Weems,  35  Mo.  285. 

S7  Parker's  Adm'r  y.  Abrams^  50  Ala.  35;  Lester  v.  Piedmont  &  Arlin^on 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  55  Ga.  475;  Bpahr  v.  Nicklaus,  61  Ind.  221;  Merritt  v.  Dearth, 
48  Vt.  65;   Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Ward,  10  C.  0.  A.  166,  61  PW.  827. 

"  Bedell  v.  ^5tevens,  28  N.  H.  118;  Gould  v.  KeUey,  16  N.  H.  551;  Jaccard 
V.  Anderson,  32  Mo.  188;  Smith  v.  Curry,  16  lU.  147;  Pbllaon  v.  Bamp- 
field's  Adm'r,  1  Brev.  (S.  C.)  202;  Seelye  v.  People,  40  lU.  App.  449;  Illinois 
Live-^tock  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kirkpatriek,  61  111.  App.  74;  Plerson  y.  ladependeot 
School  Dist.,  106  Iowa,  695,  77  N.  W.  49i;  Johnson  v.  MUler,  82  Iowa,  693. 
48  X.  W.  1081,  31  Am.  St  Rep.  614;  Consolidated  Canal  Co.  v.  Peten  (Arix.> 
4U  I'ac.  74.  In  Town  of  Walpole  v.  Marlow,  2  N.  H.  385,  the  role  is  thus 
(142) 


Cb.  5)  ARREST  OF   JUDGMENT.  §    100 

furnished  by  a  recent  decision  in  Indiana,  where  an  action  was 
brought  under  a  statute  which  provided  that  the  personal  representa- 
tive of  one  killed  by.  the  wrongful  act  of  another  might  maintain  an 
action  therefor  in  his  own  name  for  the  benefit  of  the  widow  and  chil- 
dren, or  next  of  kin,  of  the  deceased.  The  petition  in  this  case  failed 
to  allege  the  existence  of  any  widow,  children,  or  next  of  kin,  and  it 
was  held  that  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  was  properly  sustained, 
because  the  existence  of  persons  beneficially  interested  was  essential 
to  the  plaintiff's  suit,  and  without  that  allegation  his  petition  did  not 
disclose  a  cause  of  action.^*  But  in  stating  that  a  judgment  will  be 
arrested  if  the  petition  fails  to  disclose  a  cause  of  action,  reference 
is  of  course  made  to  substantial  and  not  formal  omissions.  The  lat- 
ter are  supplied  by  intendment,  and  will  be  presumed  after  verdict  to 
have  been  proved.  If  the  defects  are  merely  of  omission,  and  if,  when 
supplied,  a  complete  case  would  be  made  out,  the  omission  being  of 
facts  which  the  jury  must  have  found,  then  the  judgment  is  a  legiti- 
mate sentence  of  the  law.**    Thus  judgment  will  not  be  arrested, 

ttited  by  CHief  Justice  Richardson:  If  tbe  titie  stated  In  the  declaration 
be  defective,  the  Judgment  must  be  arrested;  but  if  the  title  be  defectively 
ttated,  the  defect  is  cured  by  verdict.  The  true  distinction  between  tbe 
two  is  this:  When  any  particular  fact  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  the 
pltlDtiirs  title,  if  such  fact  is  neither  expressly  stated  in  the  declaration,  nor 
necessarily  impUed  from  the  facts  which  are  stated,  the  title  must  be  con- 
sidered as  defective  and  Judgment  must  be  arrested;  but  if  such  fact,  al- 
tliongh  not  expressly  stated,  be  necessarily  impUed  from  what  is  stated,  the 
title  must  be  considered  as  only  defectively  stated,  and  the  defect  is  cured 
by  verdict 

>•  Stewart  v.  Terre  Uaute  &  L  K.  Co.,  IQS  Ind.  44,  2  N.  E.  208.  So  also, 
in  an  action  against  a  railroad  company  for  klUing  a  horse,  the  jurlsdic- 
tlonal  defect  of  failing  to  allege  that  it  was  kiUed  in  the  county  where  the 
action  is  brought  may  be  reached  by  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment.  Louis- 
Tine;  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v..  Johnson,  11  Ind.  App.  328,  36  N.  E.  766;  Chi- 
ctgo  ft  S.  E.  Ky.  Co.  V.  Wheeler,  14  Ind.  App.  62,  42  N.  E.  489. 

••Saulsbnry  v.  Alexander,  50  Mo.  142;  SewaU's  Falls  Bridge  v.  Fisk, 
25  X.  U.  171;  Uugoes  v.  Fnim,  41  W.  Va.  445,  23  S.  E.  604.  A  motion  in 
Mmtt  of  Judgment  will  not  extend  to  such  defects  in  the  complaint  as  are 
cored  by  verdict  or  the  finding  of  the  court.  Powell  v.  Bennett,  131  Ind. 
465,  80  N.  E.  618;  Bayless  v.  Jones,  10  Ind.  App.  102,  37  N.  E.  421.  An 
cmlsBloa  of  the  fonnal  concluding  words  of  a  pleading  cannot  be  taken  ad- 
vantage of  by  a  motion  in  arrest  of  Judgment.  Stearns  v.  Steams'  Adm*r, 
^^  Vt  978;  District  of  Columbia  v.  Eaton,  13  App.  D.  a  182. 

(143) 


§    100  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNTB.  (Ch.  5 

after  verdict,  for  any  defect  in  pleading  which  would  not  hare  been 
fatal  on  general  demurrer ;  nor  then,  if  the  court  can  presume  the 
defect  to  have  been  supplied  by  proof  before  the  jury.**  Further, 
upon  a  motion  of  this  kind,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  any 
legitimate  inference  or  intendment  that  can  be  brought  to  bear  upon 
the  allegations  of  his  declaration.  Hence  the  rule  that  judgment  will 
not  be  arrested  for  lack  of  an  essential  averment  in  the  declaration 
which  is  contained  by  implication  in  the  averments  used,  or  which 
may  be  considered  to  have  been  proved  as  a  part  of  what  is  al- 
leged." On  a  motion  in  arrest  the  whole  record  is  before  the  court, 
and  where  a  defect  in  the  petition  is  waived  of  record  by  the  defend- 
ant, the  motion  will  not  be  granted  on  account  of  such  defect.'* 
Aside  from  the  question  of  omissions,  the  general  rule  also  jM'escribes 
that  irregularities  or  informalities  m  the  manner  of  setting  out  the 
cause  of  action  are  not  open  to  exception  after  verdict.  As  an  illus- 
tration of  this,  it  is  held  that  an  objection  that  the  complaint,  in  an 
action  for  damages  for  breach  of  contract,  treats  each  breach  as  a 
separate  and  independent  cause  of  action,  and  sets  forth  the  same  in 
a  distinct  count,  is  not  available  upon  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judg- 
ment.'* Nor  need  the  plaintiff  anticipate  defenses;  it  is  no  cause 
for  arresting  judgment  that  the  declaration  on  its  face  shows  the 
cause  of  action  to  have  been  barred.**  Nor  that  the  complaint  only 
warrants  a  recovery  of  nominal  damages.**  So  again,  a  traverse  by 
one  party  of  matter  not  alleged  by  the  other,  in  addition  to  the  mat- 
ter properly  in  issue,  is  mere  surplusage  and  not  a  ground  of  arrest.*' 

31  Hippins  v.  Boffan,  4  Har.  (Del.)  »aO;  Woods  v.  State,  10  Mo.  eW;  Machon 
V.   Handle,  «($  Tex.  282,   17  S.  W.  477. 

32  Rea  V.  Harrington,  58  Vt.  181,  2  Atl.  457,  56  Am.  Rep.  561  (citfng  Mowy 
V.  Homan,  10  Vt.  7Ai^;  Curtis  v.  Burdlck.  48  Vt.  166);  IBedell  v.  Stevens. 
28  N.  H.  118;    Edpciiy  v.  Kinerson,  23  N.  H.  555,  55  Am.  Dec.  207. 

ssAuld   V.   Butcher,   2  Kan.   135. 

3*  Pickering  v.  MlssiRsIppl  Val.  Nat.  Tel.  Co.,  47  Mo.  457.  And  see  Baden 
V.  Clarke,  1  GUI  (Md.)  165.  So  the  fact  that  the  praecipe  Is  In  trespass  and 
the  declaration  In  rase  Is  no  ground  for  arrest  of  Judgment.  Homan  ▼•  Flem- 
ing,  51    111.  App.   572. 

8  8  Allen  V.   Word.  6  Humph.   (Tenn.)  284. 

3«  Reagan  v.   Fox.  45  Iml.   8. 

•7  Robhins  v.  AVolcott,  lU  Conn.  356, 
(144) 


Ch.  5)  ARREST   OF  JUDGMENT.  §    101 

Nor  can  the  question  of  the  propriety  of  allowing  an  amendment  to 
be  made  in  the  pleadings  be  reached  on  motion  in  arrest.*' 

S   101.    Joinder  of  Good  aj&d  Bad  Countfl. 

In  regard  to  the  misjoinder  of  counts  in  a  declaration,  or  the  join- 
der of  good  and  bad  counts,  the  English  rule  is  stated  to  be  as  fol- 
lows:   Where  general  damages  are  found  on  a  declaration  consist- 
ing of  several  counts,  which  are  good  but  cannot  be  joined,  the 
proper  course  is  to  arrest  the  judgment ;  where  some  of  the  counts 
are  good  and  others  bad,  a  venire  de  novo  issues ;   but  in  the  case 
of  a  single  count  containing  good  and  bad  causes  of  action,  the  court 
will  neither  arrest  the  judgment  nor  grant  a  venire  de  novo,  inasmuch 
as  it  will  be  intended  that  the  damages  were  given  in  respect  of  the 
good  cause  of  action  only.**     And  a  similar  rule  obfains  in  some 
of  the  American  states,  viz.,  that  if  a  general  verdict  for  the  plaintiff 
be  taken  upon  several  counts  in  a  declaration,  and  one  of  the  counts 
is  fatally  defective,  judgment  will  be  arriested  on  motion,  though  other 
counts,  not  liable  to  objection,  were  covered  by  the  verdict.**     As 
wc  have  already  seen,  some  of  the  American  authorities  manifest  a 
decided  reluctance  (though  this  disposition  is  not  universal)  to  pre- 
sume in  favor  of  the  validity  of  a  judgment  which  may,  for  aught  that 
appears  on  the  record,  be  composed  in  part  of  damages  given  in 
respect  of  a  bad  count.*^     Still,  in  several  of  the  states,  it  is  appar- 
ently settled  law  that  where  a  general  verdict  is  returned,  the  judg- 
ment will  not  be  arrested  unless  all  the  counts  of  the  declaration,  or 
paragraphs  of  the  complaint,  are  so  defective  as  not  to  have  been 
cured  by  the  verdict  or  finding.**    Thus  in  New  Hampshire,  judg- 

••Le  Strange  y.  IState,  58  Md.  26.  And  see  Hatfield  v.  Cummings,  152 
Ind.  587,  58  N.  K.  701. 

••  Kitcbenman  v.  Skeel,  3  Uxcb.  4». 

*•  SylTester  v.  Downer,  18  Vt.  32;  Needham  v.  McAuley,  13  Vt.  68;  Bank 
of  CarUBle  y.  Hopkins,  1  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  245,  15  Am.  Dec.  113. 

«i  8apra,  f  84. 

42Hoag  T.  Hatch,  23  Conn.  585;  Sims  v.  Dame,  113  Ind.  127,  15  N.  E. 
217;  Gllmore  v.  Ward,  22  Ind.  App.  10«,  52  X.  E.  810;  Burrows  v.  Nlblack, 
28  a  C.  A.  130,  84  Fed.  Ill;  Swift  ik  Co.  v.  Fue,  167  111.  443,  47  N.  E.  761; 
BaltJnoore  &  O.  S.  W.  Ky.  Co.  v.  Alsop,  176  Xll.  471,  52  N.  K.  253;  Hayes  v. 
Solomon,  UO  Ala.  520,  7  Kontb.  U21. 

1  LAW  JUDG.-IO  (145) 


ft 

§    108  lULW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  5 

ment  will  not  be  arrested  because  the  declaration  may  contain  some 
claims  that  are  illegal,  if  it  also  contains  others  upon  which  the  plain- 
tiflf  may  properly  recover.** 

I  102.    HlflJolBder  of  Oavses  of  Aetioa* 

A  misjoinder  of  counts  and  causes  of  action,  apparent  upon  the 
declaration,  with  damages  assessed  entire,  is  good  cause  for  arrest- 
ing the  judgment  on  motion  after  verdict,  or  for  reversing  the  judg- 
ment by  writ  of  error.**  Thus  a  motion  in  arrest  will  be  granted 
when  the  petition  contains  matters  of  equitable  jurisdiction  mixed  and 
blended  with  matters  of  legal  cognizance,  in  the  states  where  the 
distinction  is  still  observed.*^  And  in.  Missouri,  where  several  causes 
of  action  are  united  in  the  same  petition,  the  verdict,  if  found  for 
the  plaintiff,  Inust  be  rendered  and  the  damages  assessed  upon  each 
cause  of  action  separately,  otherwise  judgment  will  be  arrested.** 

I  103.    Objootions  to  tlie  Jury. 

An  objection  to  the  mode  of  drawing  and  impaneling  the  grand 
jury  cannot  be  made  the  ground  of  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment*^ 
Nor  will  any  objection  to  an  individual  juror,  which  would  not  be 
sufficient  ground  for  a  principal  challenge,  be  good  cause  for  arrest- 
ing the  judgment/*  It  appears,  however,  that  when  a  cause  is  tried 
in  a  court  of  record  before  a  less  number  of  jurors  than  a  party  is 
entitled  to,  and  his  consent  to  such  a  trial  does  not  expressly  appear 
of  record,  he  may  take  advantage  of  the  objection  by  motion  in  ar- 
rest ;  and  in  such  case  no  exceptions  to  the  panel  need  be  saved  at 
the  trial.**    It  is  generally  held — ^in  accordance  with  the  rule  that  judg- 

4»  Conway  v.  Town  of  Jefferson,  46  N.  H.  621. 

**  Haskell  v.  Bowen,  44  Vt.  57U.  "Objection  to  the  Joinder  of  a  count  In  tort 
with  one  on  contract  may  be  taken  In  arrest  of  Judgment.  Joy  T.  Hill,  36 
Vt  33a;    Bull  V.  Mathews,  20  R.  I,  100,  37  AU.  636. 

*B  Meyers  v.  Field,  37  Mo.  434. 

«6  Pitts  v.  Jb\igate,  41  Mo.  406. 

*T  state  V.  Swift,  14  La.  Ann.  827. 

*«  Chapman  v.  Welles,  Kirby  (Conn.)  133. 

*»  Cox  V.  Moss,  53  Mo.  432;  Brown  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co.,  37  Mo.  29S; 
3rown  y.  St.  Louis  &  8.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  6»  Mo.  App.  418. 
(146) 


Ch.  5)  ABBEST  OF  JUDGMENT.  §   105 

mcnt  will  be  arrested  only  for  matter  of  record — that  misconduct  of 
the  jury,  or  improper  influence  brought  tp  bear  upon  them,  after 
they  have  retired  to  make  up  a  verdict,  is  no  ground  for  a  motion  in 
arrest,  although  it  may  furnish  cause  for  granting  a  new  trial.^®  So 
the  fact  that  the  jury,  when  out,  were  under  the  charge  of  an  unsworn 
officer,  is  not  technically  ground  for  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment, 
though  it  may  be  for  a  new  trial/* 

i  104«    Xrresnlar  or  DefeotlTe  Verdict. 

At  common  law,  one  of  the  principal  grounds  for  arresting  a  Judg- 
ment is  the  objection  that  the  verdict  is  not  responsive  to  the  issues, 
or  that  it  differs  in  a  material  respect  from  the  pleadings  and  the 
issue  formed  thereon.^'  So  if  the  verdict  is  upon  an  insufficient 
count,  or  finds  a  fact  which  disaffirms  the  plaintiff's  right  to  recover, 
or  omits  to  find  a  material  issue  joined  in  the  cause^  the  judg:ment 
will  be  arrested  •• 

I  105*    Grovndfl  lield  lasiiffleieiat. 

A  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  on  a  verdict,  based  solely  upon  the 
ground  that  the  evidence  adduced  at  the  trial  was  not  sufficient  to 

••Brister  v.  State,  26  Ala.  107.  Connecticut  apparently  stands  alone  In 
permitting  a  different  practice.  It  is  there  held  that  on  a  motion  In  ar- 
rest of  judgment  for  misconduct  of  a  juror,— as,  conyersing  with  one  not 
a  the  jury  upon  the  merits  of  the  cause,— it  must  be  averred  that  the  party 
mtldjig  the  motion  was  ignorant  of  such  misconduct  until  after  the  verdict  was 
rendered,  otherwise  the  motion  wUl  not  prevaU.  Woodruff  v.  Richardson, 
20  Conn.  238.  And  In  another  case,  where  the  jury  took  with  them  a  paper 
whicb  nad  been  used  on  the  trial  to  refresh  the  memory  of  a  witness,  but 
which  was  not  read  or  offered  in  evidence,  nor  were  its  contents  communicated 
to  the  other  side,  and  had  the  same  before  them  in  aU  their  deliberations,  and 
the  paper  was  calculated  to  affect  the  verdict,  it  was  held  that  this  was  a 
toffident  ground  for  arresting  the  judgment  Claric  v.  Whitaker,  18  Conn. 
513,  i»  Am.   Dee.  337. 

viHcOum  T.  State,  17  Miss.  466. 

»s  Xoong  T.  Wickliffe,  7  Dana  (Ky.)  447;  8  Bl.  Gomm.  393.  But  in  some 
states,  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  wUl  not  reach  a  defective  verdict. 
i'otter  T.  McCormack,  127  Ind.  43»,  26  N.  E.  883;  Westfield  Gas  &  Milling? 
Co.  V.  Abemathey,  8  ind.  App.  73,  35  N.  E.  399.  Inconsistency  between 
a  special  finding  and  the  general  verdict  cannot  be  taken  advantage  of  by 
moUoD  in  arrest.    Moflltt  v.  Albert,  97  Iowa,  213,  66  N.  W.  162. 

MKelrle  T.  Shriver,  11  UiU  6l  J.  (Md.)  406. 

(147) 


I   105  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  5 

make  out  the  plaintiff's  case,  will  not  be  sustained ;  ■*  nor,  in  general, 
a  motion  based  on  any  matters  which  took  place  on  the  trial.'*  Nor 
can  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  reach  a  defect  in  the  form  of  the 
judgment,  for  the  obvious  reason  that  the  motion  must  precede  the 
rendition  of  the  judgment.^*  And  the  failure  to  serve  the  defendants 
in  an  action  with  copies  of  the  declaration,  as  required  by  the  rules 
and  practice  of  the  court,  constitutes  no  ground  for  arresting  the 
judgment*' 

B4  LoveU  V.  Sabln,  15  N.  H.  29;  Bright  v.  State,  90  Ind.  348;  Powe  t. 
State,  48  N.  J.  Law,  34,  2  Atl.  062.  But  In  Allen  v.  Word.  6  Humph.  (Tenn.) 
284,  it  \a  held  that  a  judgment  will  be  arrested  on  the  ground  of  a  yariance 
between  the  pleadings  and  the  proof. 

B»  Walker  v.  Sargeant,  11  Vt  327. 

B«  Smith  y.   Dodds,  35  Ind.  452. 

»T  Loney  y.  Bailey,  43  Md.  10. 

(148) 


Ch.  6)  RENDITION  AND  BNTBT  OF  JUDGMBNTa  §   106 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THK  RENDITION  AND  ENTRY  OF  JUDGMENTS. 

f  108.  Distinction  between  Rendition  and  Entry. 

107.  Power  and  Duty  of  tbe  Court  to  render  Judgment. 

108.  Application  and  Order  for  Judgment 
lUU.  Signature  of  Judge. 

110.  Entry  by  tbe  Clerk, 

ill.  Entry  In  wrong  Book. 

112.  Indexing  tbe  Judgment 

113.  Remedy  against  Clerk  for  improper  Entry. 

114.  Contents  of  tbe  Judgment 
113.  Form  of  tbe  Judgment. 

116.  Designation  of  tbe  Parties. 

117.  Designation  of  tbe  Property. 

118.  Designation  of  Amount  of  Recovery, 
lltf.  Conditions  in  Judgment 

120.  Joint  Defendants. 

121.  Time  of  entering  Judgment 

122.  Date  of  tbe  Judgment. 

123.  Construction  of  Ambiguous  Judgments. 

124.  Tbe  Judgment-Roll,  or  Record. 

125.  Supplying  l»8t  Records. 

125a.  Entry  of  Judgments  in  Federal  Courts. 

f  106.    Distinotion  between  Rendition  and  Entry. 

The  rendition  of  a  judgment  is  the  judicial  act  of  the  court  in 
pronouncing  the  sentence  of  the  law  upon  the  facts  in  controversy 
as  ascertained  by  the  pleadings  and  the  verdict.^  The  entry  of  a 
judj^ment  is  a  ministerial  act,  which  consists  in  spreading  upon  the 
record  a  statement  of  the  final  conclusion  reached  by  the  court  in 
the  matter,  thus  furnishing  external  and  incontestable  evidence  of 
I  he  sentence  given,  and  designed  to  stand  as  a  perpetual  memorial 

1  '"i'lie  M'bole  question,  tben,  appears  to  resolve  itself  into  tbis— whether 
tlM'  rendition  of  judgment  is  a  judicial  act,  to  which  the  direct  agency  of 
tbf>  court  is  indispensable,  and  to  which  tbe  mind  of  the  court  is  to  be  judi- 
eialiy  applied,  or  whether,  after  verdict  has  been  rendered,  it  is  a  ministerial 
■et.  which  may  be  performed  by  the  clerk  without  an  order  by  the  court 
When  presented  In  tbla  elementary  fcorm,  the  question  appears  to  me  exceed- 

(149) 


§    106  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  6 

of  its  action.*  It  is  the  former,  therefore,  that  is  the  effective  result 
of  the  litigation.  In  the  nature  of  things,  a  judgment  must  be  ren- 
dered before  it  can  be  entered.  And  not  only  that,  but  though  the 
judgment  be  not  entered  at  all,  still  it  is  none  the  less  a  judgment. 
The  omission  to  enter  it  does  not  destroy  it,  nor  does  its  vitality 
remain  in  abeyance  until  it  is  put  upon  the  record.  The  entry  may 
be  supplied,  perhaps  after  the  lapse  of  years,  by  an  order  nunc  pro 
tunc.  But  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  this  proceeding  is  required 
to  give  existence  and  force,  by  retrospection,  to  that  which  before 
had  none.  As  is  said  by  the  supreme  court  of  California:  "The 
enforcement  of  a  judgment  does  not  depend  upon  its  entry  or  docket- 
ing. These  are  merely  ministerial  acts,  the  first  of  which  is  required 
to  be  done  for  putting  in  motion  the  right  of  appeal  from  the  judg- 
ment itself,  or  of  limiting  the  time  within  which  the  right  may  be 
exercised,  or  in  which  the  judgment  may  be  enforced;  and  the 
other,  for  the  purpose  of  creating  a  lien  by  the  judgment  upon  the 
real  property  of  the  debtor.  But  neither  is  necessary  for  the  issu- 
ance of  an  execution  upon  a  judgment  which  has  been  duly  ren- 
dered. Without  docketing  or  entry,  execution  may  be  issued  on 
the  judgment  and  land  levied  upon  and  sold,  and  the  deed  executed 
by  the  sheriff,  in  fulfillment  of  the  sale,  not  only  proves  the  sale, 
but  also  estops  the  defendant  from  controverting  the  title  acquired 
by  it."  •  And  it  follows,  a  fortiori,  that  if  the  entry,  though  attempted 
to  be  made  in  due  form,  does  not  correctly  record  the  sentence  of 
the  court,  or  is  defective  or  ambiguous  or  otherwise  exceptionable, 
still  this  will  not  weaken  the  force  of  the  judgment  as  a  judgment. 

ingly  clear  and  free  from  doubt.  If  there  be  any  one  thing  done  In  the 
progress  of  a  cause,  from  its  commencement  to  its  conclusion,  that  is  pe- 
culiarly and  emphatically  a  judicial  act,  it  is  the  rendition  of  judgmeDt" 
Ware,  Dist.  J.,  in  Goddard  v.  Coffin,  2  Ware  (Da v.  381)  3KJ,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
5,490.    And  see  Matthews  v.  Houghton,  11  Me.  377. 

2  Miller  v.  Albright,   12  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  R.  533. 

»  Los  Angeles  County  Bank  v.  Kaynor,  61  Cal.  145.  A  judgment  ordered 
by  the  judge  to  be  entered  for  a  certain  amount,  though  not  yet  witered  or 
signed,  is  a  debt  to  the  judgment  creditor  capable  of  being  attached.  Holtby 
V.  Hodgson,  24  Q.  B.  Div.  103.  Where  counsel  on  both  sides  have  treated  the 
verdict  as  serving  the  office  of  a  judgment  as  well  as  of  a  verdict  objec- 
tions on  account  of  the  failure  to  enter  judgment  are  waived-  Webster  t. 
Dundee  Mortg.  He  Itust  Co.,  U3  Ga.  278,  20  S.  E.  310. 

(150) 


Ch.  6)  RENDITION  AND  ENTRY  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §  107 

There  are  certain  purposes,  however,  for  which  a  judgment  is  re- 
quired to  be  duly  entered  before  it  can  become  available  or  be  at- 
tended by  its  usual  incidents.  Thus,  as  above  remarked,  this  is  a 
prerequisite  to  the  right  to  appeal.  And  so  a  judgment  must  com- 
monly be  docketed  before  it  can  create  a  lien  upon  land,  and  in 
some  of  the  states  (though  not  all)  the  priority  among  different 
bens  is  determined  by  their  respective  dates  of  docketing.*  And 
again,  the  record  entry  of  a  judgment  is  indispensable  to  furnish  the 
evidence  of  it,  when  it  is  made  the  basis  of  a  claim  or  defense  in 
another  court.*  But  with  these  exceptions,  a  judgment  is  independ- 
ent of  the  fact  of  its  entry.  And  in  all  cases,  the  distinction  between 
rendition  and  entry  is  substantial  and  important. 

f  107.    Power  and  Ihktj  of  the  Court  to  render  Jndement* 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  court,  when  the  necessary  facts  have  been 
lawfully  determined  by  regular  proceedings,  to  render  the  proper 
judgment,  and  to  refrain  from  any  re-opening  of  the  issues.*  The 
performance  of  this  duty  by  the  court  may  be  enforced  by  the  writ 
of  mandamus.  But  to  make  this  remedy  available  it  must  appear 
that  the  court  had  jurisdiction  in  the  premises,  that  regular  and 
sufficient  proceedings  were  had,  that  the  case  is  ripe  for  judgment, 
and  that  the  complainant  has  an  absolute  right  to  the  judgment 
sought,  no  constraint  upon  the  judicial  discretion  of  the  court  being 
permissible.'' 

«8ee   infra,  i  44S. 

>Tbe  claim  of  res  judicata  cannot  be  made  on  the  showing  of  a  minute 
on  the  clerk's  doclcet,  tills  not  being  a  judgment.  Young  t.  People,  171  III. 
:5I9,  49  N.  £.  503. 

•  Isler  v.  Brown,  t57  N.  O.  175.  There  Is  no  judgment  In  fact  upon  a 
renlict  until  tbe  motion  for  a  new  trial  Is  decided.  City  of  Louisyille  v. 
MnldooD  (Ky.)  43  S.  W.  867. 

7  People  v.  Murray,  2  Misc.  Kep.  152,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  160;  Fairbanks  v. 
Amoskeag  Nat.  Hank  (C.  C.)  32  Fed.  572;  Smith  v.  Moore,  38  Conn.  105; 
State  T.  Klein,  140  Mo.  502,  41  S.  W.  805;  Broder  v.  Superior  Court  103 
CaL  121,  37  Pac.  143;  Elder  v.  Grunsky,  127  Cal.  67,  59  Pac.  300;  State 
V.  Dickinson,  59  Neb.  753,  82  N.  W.  16;  People  t.  Graham,  16  Colo.  347,  26 
Pac  936;  l'e<^le  v.  Downer.  18  Colo.  500,  33  Pac.  162;  Corthell  v.  Mead, 
19  Cola  386,  35  Pac  741;  State  Y.  Hunter,  4  Wash.  St  651,  30  Pac.  642. 

(151) 


§107  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  6 

The  failure  of  the  trial  court  to  enter  judgment  for  the  plaintiif 
for  an  amount  admitted  by  the  defendant  to  be  due  and  tendered  m 
court,  is  error  for  which  the  judgment  will  be  reversed.*  And  a 
second  final  judgment  or  decree  cannot  be  rendered  between  the 
same  parties  upon  the  same  pleadings  and  subject-matter,  until  the 
first  hafi  been  reversed,  or  opened  and  vacated.*  The  authority  of 
the  court  to  render  a  judgment  does  not  always  depend  upon  the 
fact  that  regular  proceedings  have  taken  place  and  culminated  in  a 
verdict ;  it  may,  in  some  cases,  rest  upon  the  consent  or  agreement 
of  the  parties.  Thus  a  stipulation  by  the  parties  that  when  judg- 
ment is  entered  in  a  certain  cause  pending  in  another  county,  and  a 
transcript  thereof  forwarded  to  the  district  court  of  defendant's  coun- 
ty, where  other  causes  involving  the  same  question  are  pending,  the 
judge  of  the  latter  court  may  order  similar  judgments  in  the  other 
causes,  is  valid,  and  the  judgments  may  be  entered  in  vacation.** 
Where  issues  are  sent  from  one  court  to  another  to  be  tried,  it  be- 
longs to  the  court  in  which  the  main  litigation  is  pending  to  enter 
any  judgment  that  may  be  necessary  in  the  case.  Thus,  where  is- 
sues are  sent  by  the  probate  court  to  a  court  of  law,  a  judgment 
for  costs  should  be  entered  by  the  former  court  upon  receiving  the 
certificate  of  the  verdict,  and  not  by  the  court  in  which  the  issues 
were  tried.** 

s  Mace  V.  Gaddls,  3  Wash.  T.  125.  13  Pac.  545. 

» State  V.  JacksonviUe,  F.  ik  M.  K.  Co.,  16  Fla.  708;  Morrison  y.  City 
of  Chicago,  142  ill.  (500,  32  N.  B.  172.  See,  also,  Shepherd  v.  Harvey's  Adm'x 
(Ky.)  43  S.  \V.  45<i;   Biudworth  v.  Poole,  21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  551,  53  S.  W.  717. 

10  Western  Land  Co.  v.  English,  75  Iowa,  507,  3S>  N.  W.  719.  So  of  an 
agreement  of  parties  that  a  case  shall  be  beard  before  a  Judge  at  chambers 
in  the  same  manner  and  with  the  same  effect  as  though  it  were  tried  by  faim 
in  court  without  a  Jury.  JBeach  v.  Beck  with.  13  Wis.  21.  So  of  an  agree- 
ment to  refer  a  pending  suit  to  an  arbitrator,  and  that  a  judgment  in  the 
cause  shall  be  entered  according  to  his  decision.  Bank  of  Monroe  v.  Widntf. 
11  I'alge  (N.  Y.)  529,  43  Am.  Dec.  7«8.  It  is  no  ground  for  the  reversal  of 
a  Judgment  that  the  decree  is  prepared  by  the  attorneys  of  the  succespfal 
party,  where  the  decision  as  prepared  Is  adopted  by  the  trial  Judge.  Stepp 
V.  National  Life  &  Maturity  Ass'n,  37  S.  C.  417,  16  S.  E.  134. 

11  Levy  V.  Levy,  28  Md.  25;    Browne  v.   Browne,  22  Md.   103. 

(152) 


Gh.  6)  &BNPITION  AND  ENTRT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §    108 


I  108«    Applioation  and  Order  for  Jvdsiiieiit. 

Where  judgment  follows  as  the  result  of  contested  proceedings 
and  the  finding  of  a  verdict,  it  is  usually  not  necessary  for  the  suc- 
cessful party,  in  modern  practice,  to  take  active  measures  to  secure 
the  rendition  of  judgment.^'  But  an  application  for  judgment  is  in 
some  instances  required  by  statute,  and  is  probably  always  necessary 
in  case  of  default.  In  California,  a  statute  provides  that  an  action 
may  be  dismissed,  or  judgment  of  nonsuit  entered,  "when,  after  ver- 
dict or  final  submission,  the  party  entitled  to  judgment  neglects  to 
demand  and  have  the  same  entered  for  more  than  six  months."  ^' 
But  this  does  not  cause  the  party  to  lose  his  judgment  when  the 
lapse  of  the  time  mentioned  was  caused  by  the  delay  of  the  court  or 
the  negligence  of  the  clerk."  It  is  held  that  a  judgment  which  has 
been  entered,  and  to  which  the  judgment  creditor  was  clearly  en- 
titled upon  the  pleadings,  will  not  be  disturbed  for  failure  to  give 
notice  of  the  application  for  the  judgment,  or  for  failure  of  the  clerk 
to  enter  in  his  minutes,  as  required  by  the  court  rules,  a  statement 
of  the  application.**  When  the  court  gives  to  the  clerk  an  order 
for  a  judgment,  that  is  his  authority  for  entering  the  same,  and  by 
that  alone  he  must  be  guided.  Hence  a  judgment  entered  by  the 
clerk  in  pursuance  of  an  express  order  of  the  court,  will  not  be 
void  and  a  mere  nullity,  although  the  court,  by  a  subsequent  order 
not  noticed  by  the  clerk,  have  directed  the  case  to  be  continued, 
although  such  a  judgment  would  be  irregular  and  voidable,  and  lia- 
ble to  be  set  aside  upon  seasonable  application  to  the  court.** 

ISA  formal  motion  for  judgment  on  a  special  verdict  is  not  necessary. 
CartUage  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Overman,  19  Ind.  App.  309,  48  N.  E.  874.  See 
Voris  v.  Star  City  Bldg.  &  Loan  Ass'n,  20  Ind.  App.  630,  50  N.  E.  779. 

"Code  av.  Proc.  Cal.  S  581. 

i«  Jones  V.  Cbaifant  (Cal.)  31  Pac.  257;  San  Jose  Ranch  Co.  v.  San  Jose 
Land  &  Water  Co.,  126  Cai.  322,  58  Pac.  824. 

isPormann  v.  Freae,  72  Wis.  226,  39  N.  W.  385.  See,  as  to  defective  no- 
tice of  a  motion  for  a  judgment,  White  v.  Sydenstricker,  0  W.  Va.  46.  Ap- 
pUcaUon  for  an  order  directing  the  entry  of  a  judgment  may  be  made  ex 
parte;  and  no  notice  is  necessary  unless  a  stay  exists,  or  the  court,  for  some 
special  reason,  directs  that  notice  be  given.  Gould  v.  Duluth  &  D.  Elevator 
Co.,  3  N.  D.  96,  54  N.  W.  316. 

i«  Claggett  V.  Simes,  31  N.  H.  56. 

.     (153) 


§   109  LAW  OF  JUDQMSNTa.  (Ch.  6 

S  109.    SisBatiure  of  Jndse. 

The  impression  not  uncommonly  prevails  that  at  common  kw  a 
judgment  required  the  signature  of  the  court  in  order  to  be  valid. 
This  notion — arising  probably  from  an  ambiguous  use  of  the  phrase 
"signing  judgment" — ^is  erroneous;  and  the  ancient  practice  fur- 
nishes but  slight  aid  in  determining  the  same  question  in  modem 
law.*^  Now  in  some  of  the  states  the  statutes  require  that  the 
judgment  itself,  or  the  record  in  which  it  is  entered  up,  shall  be 
signed  by  the  judge ;  and  in  these  states  some  of  the  decisions  hold 
that  unless  this  direction  is  complied  with,  the  judgment  will  be  en- 
tirely invalid  and  of  no  force  or  effect.^®  Still,  these  statutes  re- 
quire the  signature  only  of  final  and  definite  judgments  which  pass 
upon  the  merits  of  a  controversy  and  may  constitute  res  judicata; 
interlocutory  orders,  made  in  the  progress  of  a  cause,  have  their 
eflfect  without  being  signed  by  the  judge.^*  And  some  of  the  au- 
thorities show  a  tendency  to  construe  such  statutes  in  a  liberal  man- 
ner, instead  of  requiring  an  exact  compliance  with  their  terms.  Thus 
a  judgment  which  the  court  was  competent  to  render  without  the 
verdict  of  a  jury  will  be  upheld  if  found  entered  on  the  minutes  of 
the  day's  proceedings,  the  minutes  of  the  day  being  regularly  signed 
by  the  judge,  though  the  judgment  itself  bears  only  the  signature  of 
counsel.  Such  a  judgment,  it  is  said,  is  irregular  but  not  void,  and 
can  be  amended.*®     So  the  signature  of  the  judge  affixed  by  consent 

IT  French  v.  Fease,  10  Kan.  51. 

18  isuccesslon  of  Asbridge,  1  Lot.  Ann.  206;  Hatch  ▼.  Arnault,  3  La.  Ann. 
482;  »aloy  y.  ColUns,  80  La.  Ann.  63;  State  v.  Jumel,  30  La.  Ann.  421;  Sloan 
V.  Cooper,  54  Ga.  486;  Raymond  v.  Smith,  1  Mete.  (Ky.)  65,  71  Am.  Dec 
458;  Galbraith  t.  Sidener,  28  Ind.  142.  Until  a  judgment  Is  signed  by  the 
judge,  It  cannot  acquire  a  Uen,  although  recorded.  Marchal  v.  Hooker,  27 
La.  Ann.  454.  in  Louisiana,  a  statute  requires  judgments  to  be  read  in 
open  court.  It  is  held  that  this  requirement  is  jurisdictional,  and  that  a  judg- 
ment not  so  read,  or  which  is  signed  in  chambers,  is  invalid.  Woodlief  t. 
Logan,  50  La.  Ann.  438,  23  South.  716;  State  v.  Judges  of  Fourth  Orcuit 
Court  of  Appeals,  48  La.  Ann.  905,  19  South.  932;  Richardson  v.  Turner. 
52  La.   Ann.   1613,   28  South.   lo8. 

i»  Wickmam  v.  Nalty.  41  La.  Ann.  284,  6  South.  123;  State  v.  Judge  of 
Fifth  District,  12  La.   Ann.  455. 

aoTharpe  v.  Crumpler,  63  Ga.  273;    Huckaby  T.  Sasser,   69  Ga.  603.    A 

(154) 


Ch.  S)  BBNDinON  AND  KNTKY  OF  JXTDaMBNTS.  -§    109 

in  vacation  is  a  sufficient  authentication  of  a  decree  in  an  ordinary 
action  to  authorize  an  execution.*^  Another  group  of  cases  goes 
much  further  than  this,  and  holds  that  the  requirement  that  a  judge 
shall  sign  all  judgments  rendered  in  his  court  is  merely  directory, 
and  consequently  that  his  omission  to  do  so  will  not  avoid  the  judg- 
ment as  to  strangers,  although  it  might,  in  connection  with  other 
evidence,  be  a  proof  that  the  judgment  was  fraudulent  or  had  not 
been  in  fact  rendered  by  him.^^  In  harmony  with  these  decisions 
it  is  also  held  that  an  irregularity  in  the  signature  of  the  judge — as, 
in  his  placing  it  in  the  body  of  the  decree  instead  of  at  the  foot,^^  or 
his  signing  it  while  he  is  in  another  county,** — is  immaterial.  And 
where  the  court  is  composed  of  several  judges,  its  orders  are  suffi- 
ciently authenticated  by  the  signature  of  either.** 

In  several  of  the  other  states,  there  being  no  statutory  require- 
ment of  this  character,  it  is  held  to  be  entirely  unnecessary  to  the 
validity  of  a  judgment  that  it  be  signed  by  the  judge ;  the  presump- 
tion is,  that  if  it  is  entered  by  the  clerk,  it  was  so  directed  and  au- 
thorized by  the  court.**    And  a  valid  judgment  will  support  an  exe- 

jDdgment  signed  "by  the  court,  H.,  plalntifTs  attorney/'  which  was  put  on  the 
minutes,  signed  by  the  judge,  was  held  valid  in  Jones  v.  Word,  61  Ga.  26. 

tiKust  V.   i«^ust,  15  La.  Ann.  477. 

ssKoUins  V.  Henry,  78  N.  U.  342;  Keener  T.  Goodson,  89  N.  C.  273;  Bart- 
lett  y.  Lang's  Adm'rs,  2  Ala.  161;  Cannon  v.  Hemphill,  7  Tex.  184;  Cath- 
cart  y.  Peck,  11  Minn.  45  (Gil.  24);  Chiids  v.  McChesney,  20  Iowa,  431,  89 
Am.  Dec.  545.  The  omission  of  the  Judge  to  sign  the  record  at  the  close 
of  the  term  will  not  invalidate  judgments  or  decrees  of  the  term,  although 
such  omission  would  be  gross  neglect.    Ex  parte  Slocomb,  9  Ark.  375. 

«»  Hurley  v.  Hewett,  89  Ale.  100,  35  AU.  1026. 

s«  National  Bank  of  Greensboro  v.  Gilmer,  118  N.  C.  668,  24  S.  E.  423. 

t»ln  re  Mllcreek  Road,  9  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  592. 

«•  Califcnila  Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Southern  Pac.  R  Co.,  67  Cal.  59,  7  Pac. 
123:  Crim  v.  Kessing,  89  Cal.  478,  26  Pac.  1074,  23  Am.  St.  Rep.  491;  Catli- 
cart  V.  Peck,  11  Minn.  45  (Gil.  24);  Fontaine  v.  Hudson,  93  Mo.  62,  5  S.  VV. 
€02,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  515;  Platte  County  v.  MarshaU,  10  Mo.  345;  Fulton  v. 
State,  103  Wis.  238,  79  N.  W.  234;  Lockhart  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  R.  149,  22 
S.  W.  413;  Scott  V.  Rohman,  43  Neb.  618,  62  N.  W.  46;  Gordon  v.  Bodwell, 
o5  Kan.  131,  39  Pac.  104i.  Judgments  are  not  invalidated  by  the  failure  of 
the  judge  to  sign  the  minutes  of  tlie  term.  Jordan  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  R. 
222.  38  8.  W.  780.  Nor  is  it  necessary  to  the  validity  of  orders  entered  at  a 
Fp  cial  term  of  court  that  the  minutes  of  said  term  be  signed  by  the  judge. 
Wright  T.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  R.  3,  38  S.  W.  81L 

(155) 


§110  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  6 

cution  issued  in  conformity  therewith,  although  the  formal  record 
evidence  of  its  rendition  may  not  have  been  in  existence  at  the  time 
execution  issued.*^  In  New  York  It  is  said :  "There  is  no  provi- 
sion of  the  present  law  requiring  such  signing.  The  judge  is  to 
make  his  'decision  in  writing/  and  this,  it  is  presumed,  he  must  sign 
by  way  of  authentication.*®  The  judgment  itself  is  to  be  entered  in 
the  judgment-book,  and  is  in  theory  entered  by  the  clerk."  *•  The 
practice  in  Kansas  is  thus  described: — ^the  clerk  by  order  or  per- 
mission of  the  court  enters  the  judgment  in  all  cases  in  full  upon 
the  journal,  and  this  judgment  (as  well  as  every  other  proceeding) 
is  valid,  and  has  force  and  effect,  as  soon  as  it  is  entered  on  the 
journal,  whether  it  is  ever  signed  by  the  judge  or  not,  and  whether 
it  is  ever  transcribed  into  the  complete  record  or  not.*®  And  it  is 
believed  that  a  practice  more  or  less  closely  analogous  to  this  is  in 
vogue  in  a  majority  of  the  states ;  so  that  only  in  a  few  jurisdictions 
can  the  judge's  signature  be  regarded  as  an  indispensable  requisite 
to  the  validity  of  the  judgment. 

S  110.    Entry  hy  the  Clerk. 

When  a  judgment  has  been  rendered  in  a  cause,*^  it  becomes  the 
duty  of  the  clerk,  according  to  the  usual  practice,  to  make  a  record 
entry  of  it  in  an  official  book  kept  for  that  purpose.*"     In  some 

37  Fontaine  v.  Hudson,  93  Mo.  62,  5  S.  W.  692,  3  Am.  St  Rep.  515.  And 
see  Los  Angeles  County  Bank  v.  Raynor,  61  Cal.  145. 

2  8  Where  a  "decision  in  writing"  is  required,  an  entry  by  the  clerk  at  the 
end  of  the  trial  of  the  amount  for  which  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  does 
not  constitute  a  juclgment.  Crim  v.  Kessing,  89  Cal.  478.  26  Pac.  1074,  23 
Am.  St.  Rep.  491.  If  the  court  does  not  file  the  written  decision,  and  a  judge- 
ment is  rendered  and  entered  without  it,  the  remedy  is  by  motion  in  the  court 
below  to  set  the  judgment  aside.  Garr,  JScott  &  Co.  y.  Spalding,  2  H,  D. 
414,  51  N.  W.  8G7. 

20  De  Laney  v.  Blizzard,  7  Hun,  66. 

»o  French  v.  Pease,  10  Kan.  51. 

»i  In  New  York,  when  an  action  is  referred  to  a  referee  to  hear  and  de- 
termine, and  bis  report  directs  a  judgment  to  be  entered,  it  stands  as  a  de- 
cision of  the  court,  and  the  clerk  must  enter  judgment  upon  it  when  its  form 
has  been  settled  by  the  referee.  Paget  v.  Melcher,  26  App.  Div.  12,  49  N.  Y. 
Supp.  922.    And  see  Bentley  v.  Gardner,  27  Misc.  Rep.  674,  58  N.  Y.  Supp.  S-'i. 

»«  The  clerk  must  enter  the  judgment  In  accordance  with  the  verdict,  or 
finding  of  the  court,  and  the  order  for  judgment;  be  has  no  authority  to  io- 

(156) 


Ch.  6)  RENDITION  AND  ENTRY  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  1 10 

States,  he  is  required,  at  this  stage,  to  make  up  a  complete  record 
of  the  case  from  its  inception  to  its  close,  or  a  "judgment-roll ;"  in 
others,  he  merely  adds  an  entry  of  the  judgment  to  the  brief  history 
of  the  case  contained  in  his  docket  and  which  consists  of  consecu- 
tive statements  of  the  steps  taken  in  the  cause  from  the  issue  of  the 
writ  on.  The  object  of  this  entry  is  to  furnish  an  enduring  memorial 
and  incontestable  evidence  of  the  judgment,  and  to  fix  its  date  for 
purposes  of  appeal  or  creating  a  lien.  But,  as  was  stated  in  the 
beginning  of  this  chapter,  this  proceeding  is  ministerial  only,  and  is 
not  essential  to  the  validity  of  the  judgment  itself.  It  is  none  the 
less  the  judgment  of  the  court  because  not  entered  by  the  clerk.*^' 
And,  except  for  certain  special  purposes,  it  does  not  remain  inchoate 
or  unfinished  until  so  entered.  Hence  the  neglect  or  failure  of  the 
clerk  to  make  a  proper  entry  of  record  of  the  judgment,  or  his  de- 
fective or  inaccurate  entry  of  it,  will  not,  as  between  the  parties,, 
operate  to  invalidate  the  judgment."*  "The  fact  that  the  clerk  did 
not  perform  his  entire  duty  in  making  up  the  record  cannot  deprive 
parties  of  their  rights.  Even  although  he  should  entirely  fail  to 
make  up  a  record,  such  neglect  would  not  affect  those  interested  in 
the  matter  decided,  if  sufficient  could  be  found  upon  the  files  and 
books  of  the  court  to  show  what  had  been  done.  What  we  call  the 
complete  record  of  a  case  is  nothing  but  the  history  of  what  has 

wrt  any  additional  clansea,  as^  that  the  case  was  dismissed  on  the  merits, 
wbei  the  court  did  not  so  state.  Card  v.  Meinelse,  70  Hun,  8d2,  24  N.  Y. 
Sopp.  375;  llamaley  ▼.  Ramaley,  69  Minn.  491,  72  N.  W.  6^.  A  judgment 
entered  by  a  derlt  of  court  who  has  no  authority  to  enter  the  same  is  void. 
Lacoste  v.  Eastland,  117  Cal.  673,  49  Pac.  1046. 

ss  Unt  In  California,  a  Judgment  does  not  become  elf  ective  until  filed  with 
the  clerk,  and  is  of  no  effect  if  liled  after  the  expiration  of  the  Judge's  term, 
no  matter  when  prepared  and  signed.  Broder  v.  Conklin,  98  Cal.  360,  33 
Pac  211.    And  see  Danielson  v.  Northwestern  Fuel  Co.  (C.  C.)  55  Fed.  49. 

»*  Craig  V.  Alcorn,  46  Iowa,  560;  Bridges  v.  Thomas,  50  Ga.  378;  Bird  v. 
McQelland,  Stumpf  &  Pelzer  Brick  Manuf'g  Co.  (C.  C.)  45  Fed.  458;  Risk 
T.  Uffelman,  7  Misc.  Rep.  133,  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  392;  New  York  City  Baptist 
llisslon  8oc.  V.  Tabernacle  Baptist  Church,  10  App.  Div.  288,  41  N.  Y.  Supp. 
976.  See  Helvete  v.  Rapp,  7  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  306.  Omission  properly  to  re- 
cord the  verdict  is  a  mere  irregularity  which  does  not  destroy  the  validity  of 
the  Judgment,  at  least  until  it  be  set  aside.  Gunn  v.  Plant,  94  U.  S.  664,  24  h. 
Ed.  304. 

(157) 


§110  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  6 

been  done  in  the  case,  copied  by  the  clerk  into  a  bo  -  called  the 
'book  of  records/  It  is  not  the  writing  of  those  things  in  this 
book  that  gives  them  validity.  It  is  the  previous  action  of  the  court 
upon  the  subject-matter.  The  record  is  but  evidence  of  this  action, 
and  if,  in  copying,  the  clerk  makes  a  mistake,  that  mistake  will  be 
corrected  by  entries  made  from  time  to  time  of  the  action  of  the 
court,  and  which  entries,  made  in  other  books  of  the  court,  lay  the 
foundation  for  the  complete  records,"  **  The  docket  of  a  judgment, 
it  is  held  in  New  York,  is  no  part  of  the  record  of  the  court;  the 
entries  upon  the  docket  are  directed  to  be  made  by  the  clerk,  who, 
in  making  them,  acts  in  a  ministerial  capacity,  and  his  erroneous  or 
false  entries  cannot  conclude  the  parties,  whatever  might  be  the 
effect  of  an  entry  which  he  was  authorized  by  law  to  make.'*  In 
some  of  the  states  it  is  required  by  la^  that,  before  a  docket  entry 
is  made  of  a  judgment,  there  shall  be  filed  a  "judg^ent-roU"  con- 
taining all  the  papers  necessary  to  be  attached  according  to  the  pro- 
visions of  the  statute.  It  appears  that  unless  this  provision  is  com- 
plied with,  the  docketing  of  the  judgment  is  an  unauthorized  and 
illegal  act.*^  But  it  is  also  held  that  an  order  denying  a  motion  to 
set  aside  a  judgment  because  of  the  failure  to  file  a  proper  judgment- 
roll  is  not  reviewable  in  the  appellate  court.  If  what  was  done 
amounts  to  a  legal  nullity,  no  substantial  rights  of  the  defendant 
are  impaired  by  the  denial ;  and  if  the  roll  is  not  in  due  form,  or  the 
filing  for  any  reason  is  irregular,  the  granting  or  refusing  the  ap- 
plication is  discretionary."*  According  to  the  law  and  practice  ob- 
taining in  other  states,  to  constitute  a  judgment  for  the  purpose  of 
docketing,  it  must  first  be  entered  in  the  "judgment-book."    And  a 

»B  Kewnam's  Lessee  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  18  Ohio,  323,  331,  Hitchcock,  a  J. 

3e  Booth  V.  Farmers'  &  Mechanic's  Nat.  Bank,  4  Lens.  301.  If  the  mis- 
takes or  defects  In  docketing  the  Judgment  do  not  impair  the  substantial  ac- 
curacy and  fulness  of  the  recced  required,  as  notice  to  persons  interested,  tbey 
'Will  not  prevent  the  judgment  from  becoming  a  Uen.  Hesse  t.  Mano,  40 
Wis.  560. 

87  Townshend  v.  Wesson,  4  Duer,  342.  But  compare  Ward  v.  White,  66 
III.  App.  155. 

38  Whitney  v.  Townsend,  67  N.  Y.  40.  And  see  Hardin  v.  Melton,  28  S.  C. 
38,  4  S.  E.  S05. 

(158) 


Ch.  6)  RENDITION  AND  ENTRY  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §   111 

docketing  without  such  entry  is  of  no  avail,  even  though  a  judgment- 
roU  be  filed  with  what  purports  to  be  a  copy  of  a  judgment  in  it.** 

The  general  principle  pointed  out  in  this  chapter — ^that  an  unre- 
corded judgment  is  valid  between  the  parties,  though  it  may  not  be 
notice  to  strangers — ^is  illustrated  by  an  Alabama  decision,  in  which 
it  is  held  that  a  statute  which  requires  decrees  of  the  chancery  court 
vesting  the  title  to  property  in  either  of  the  parties  to  a  suit,  to  be 
recorded  in  the  office  of  the  clerk  of  the  county  in  which  the  land  is 
situated,  does  not  make  the  vesting  of  the  title  dependent  on  the 
recording  of  the  decree,  but  the  decree  is  affected  by  a  failure  to  have 
it  so  recorded  just  as  a  deed  would  be  under  the  registration  laws.*® 
That  a  judgment  duly  entered  in  the  judgment-book  was  not  signed 
by  the  clerk  is  an  irregularity  and  a  deviation  from  the  ordinary 
practice,  but  it  does  not  vitiate  the  judgment  as  to  third  persons  in 
collateral  proceedings/^ 

I  111.    Eiitrjr  in  wrons  Book. 

When  the  clerk  is  directed  by  law  to  keep  certain  books  for  the 
entry  of  judgments,  or  to  record  judgments  in  a  book  specially  des- 
ignated by  statute  for  that  purpose,  and  deviates  from  the  course 
prescribed,  then  in  either  case,  for  reasons  sufficiently  stated  in  the 
preceding  section,  the  validity  of  the  judgment  is  not  thereby  im- 
paired as  between  the  parties.**    As  concerns  third  persons  the  case 

••Rockwood  T.  Davenport,  37  Minn.  533,  35  N.  W.  377,  5  Am.  St  Rep.  872; 
Manrln  v.  Carnes,  71  llinn.  300,  74  N.  W.  139.  See  Locke  v.  Hubbard,  9  ». 
D.  364,  G9  N.  W.  58& 

«•  Witter  V.  Dudley,  42  Ala.  616.  lliere  are  some  cases  which  seem  to 
indicate  that  confessed  judgments  are  regarded  as  an  exception  to  the  general 
principle  above  stated.  But  this  is  too  much  a  matter  of  statutory  regula- 
tion to  be  here  discussed  In  detail.  See  King  y.  French,  2  Sawyer,  441,  Fed. 
Cas.  Na  7,793;  Johns  v.  Fritchey,  39  Md.  258. 

*i  Artisans*  Bank  v.  Treadwell,  34  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  553;  Hotchkiss  v.  Cut- 
ting, 14  Minn.  542  (Gil.  408);  Jorgensen  v.  Griffin,  14  Minn.  400  (GU.  340); 
Lythgoe  t.  Lythgoe,  75  Hun,  147,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  1003. 

43  Wolf  V.  Great  Falls  Water-Power  Co.,  15  Mont.  49,  38  Pac.  115;  West 
y.  Keeton,  17  Tex.  Ciy.  App.  139, 42  S.  W.  1034.  In  Minnesota,  notwithstanding 
the  adoption  of  a  code  of  procedure  merging  legal  and  equitable  forms  in  one 
form  of  action  and  providing  only  for  a  "Judgment"  as  the  determination  of 
inaea,  the  clerk  of  a  certain  court  kept  two  books,  one  labelled  "Judgment- 

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1 


I 


\ 


§113  LAW  OF  JUDGMBN^S.  (Ch.  6 

might  be  different.  Probably  one  would  not  be  bound  by  notice  of 
a  judgment  which  did  not  appear  in  the  book  designated  by  law  as 
the  proper  quarter  in  which  to  direct  his  inquiries,  although  it  might 
be  recorded  in  a  book  regularly  kept  by  the  clerk  but  not  recognized 
by  law.*'  Still,  this  would  not  impair  the  right  to  issue  execution. 
So,  under  the  laws  of  Maryland,  the  entry  of  judgment  in  the  "per- 
manent judgment-record"  in  the  first  instance,  and  without  any  pre- 
vious entry  thereof  in  the  "trial-docket,"  as  required  by  the  ordinary 
practice  of  the  trial  courts,  does  not  render  the  judgment  illegal  or 
so  irregular  as  to  require  it  to  be  stricken  out.** 

I  112.    ladesdiis  the  Jvdgineiit* 

In  some  of  the  states,  the  index  to  the  record  of  judgments  is 
made,  by  the  effect  of  the  statute,  a  part  of  the  record ;  and  a  judg- 
ment is  not  a  lien  on  real  property  until  properly  indexed,  as  against 
a  purchaser  who  has  searched  the  index  with  due  care ;  and  third 
persons  cannot  be  charged  with  constructive  notice  of  a  judgment 
unless  the  same  is  correctly  indexed.*'  In  Virginia,  however,  an 
exactly  opposite  doctrine  prevails ;  the  index  is  no  part  of  the  record 
and  is  not  essential  to  the  creation  of  a  valid  lien.**  We  shall  re- 
turn to  this  subject  in  a  later  chapter.*' 

S  113.    BemedF  against  Glerk  for  latproper  Entry. 

There  is  no  question  that  the  owner  of  a  judgment  may  maintain 
an  action  for  damages  against  the  clerk  of  the  court  for  neglecting 

book,"  the  other  "decree-book,"  and  was  accustomed  to  enter  causes  of  1*15** 
cognizance  In  the  former,  and  equity  causes  in  the  latter.  Held,  that  a  Jadg- 
ment  of  foreclosure  was  not  impaired  by  the  fact  that  it  was  entered  in  the 
•*decree-book'*  only.  The  error  in  the  label  was  a  mere  Irregularity,  which 
could  not  affect  the  riphts  of  parties.  Thompson  v.  BIckford,  10  Mhin.  IT 
(Gil.  1).     See  Lentllhon  v.  City  of  New  York,  3  Sandf.  721. 

48  See  Hesse  v.  Mann,  40  Wis.  5tiO.     See  infra,  §§  404-40G. 

44  Bond  V.  Citizens'  Nat  Bank,  G5  Md.  498,  4  Atl.  89:5. 

48  Metz  V.  State  Bank,  7  Neb.  105;  Sterling  Manuf  g  Co.  v.  Early,  «9  lo^^ 
94.  28  N.  W.  458.  See  Hahn  v.  Mosely,  119  N.  C.  73.  25  S.  B.  713;  New 
England  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Avery  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  41  S.  W.  673. 

4«  Old  Dominion  Granite  Co.  V.  Clarke,  28  Grat.  617. 

47  See  infra,  §  405. 

(IGO) 


Ch.  6)  RENDITION  AND  BNTRT  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §    IH 

to  make  a  proper  entry  of  it,  provided  he  shows  an  absolute  loss  of 
his  judgment  in  consequence  of  such  neglect."*®  And  the  rule  that 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  creditor  to  see  that  his  judgment  is  properly 
entered  applies  only  as  between  the  parties  and  those  affected  by 
the  want  of  constructive  notice,  but  has  no  reference  to  the  question 
of  the  liability  of  the  clerik  to  the  plaintiff  whose  judgment  was 
wrongly  entered.** 

f  114.    Gontenti  of  the  Judgment. 

No  particular  form  of  words  is  usually  considered  necessary  to 
show  the  rendition  of  a  judgment.  The  record  of  the  judgment  is 
sufficient  if  the  time,  place,  parties,  matter  in  dispute,  and  the  re- 
sult, with  the  relief  granted,  are  clearly  stated.^®  So,  under  the 
ordinary  practice,  it  is  not  required  to  set  out  in  the  judgment  itself 
the  facts  on  which  it  is  founded;  it  is  sufficient  if  they  are  stated 
in  the  pleadings  and  ascertained  by  the  judgment."^  And  under 
those  systems,  of  practice  which  assimilate  the  legal  and  equitable 
jurisdiction,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  facts  on  which  a  decree  in 
equity  is  based  should  be  recited  therein.  The  case  is  preserved  in 
the  same  manner  as  in  an  action  at  law,  and  all  the  material  evi- 
dence must  be  incorporated  in  the  bill  of  exceptions."*     But  it  is 

«*Blo8tt>in  V.  Barry,  1  Lans.  190.  If  the  entry  ie  incorrect,  the  party  af- 
fected should  first  avail  himself  of  his  remedy  by  application  to  the  court  to 
correct  it     State  t.  Currie,  72  Minn.  403.  75  N.  W.  742. 

*•  Saylor  v.  Com.  (Pa.)  6  Atl.  227;   Coyne  v.  Souther,  61  Pa.  455. 

••Barrett  v.  Garragan,  16  Iowa,  47;  Church  v.  Grossman,  41  Iowa,  373; 
Ordinary  v.  McClure,  1  Bailey  (S.  C.)  7,  19  Am.  Dec.  G48.  For  judgment 
entries  held  sufficient,  though  Irregular  in  form,  see  Simmons  v.  Craig,  137  N. 
Y.  550.  33  N.  E.  76;  Cameron  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  8  N.  D.  124,  77  N. 
W.  1016;  Whiteside  v.  Noyac  Cottage  Ass'n,  68  Hun,  565,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  63. 
For  entries  held  not  sufficient  to  constitute  a  judgment,  see  Bmig  v.  Medley, 
m  III  App.  190;  Carter  v.  Elmore,  119  N.  C.  296,  26  S.  E.  35. 

*i  HauUlton  v.  Ward,  4  Tex.  356.  But  in  New  Yorlj,  the  code  requires  that 
the  decision  shall  state  concisely  the  grounds  on  which  the  issues  have  been 
decided;  and  a  decision  merely  directing  judgment,  without  any  statement  of 
the  grounds,  wiU  not  support  a  judgment.  Newman  v.  Mayer,  7  N.  Y.  Ann. 
Cas.  497,  65  N.  Y.  Supp.  294. 

*2  Judge  y.  Booge,  47  Mo.  544.  But  in  Illinois  it  is  considered  the  proper 
practice  to  preserre  the  evidence  by  recitals  in  the  decree.  Wallier  v.  Carey, 
u3  lU.  470. 

1  LAW  JUDG.-ll  (161) 


§    J  15  LAW  OF  JUDGMBNT&  (Cll*  ^ 

held  that  a  judgment  of  conviction  should  contain  the  facts  judicially 
ascertained,  together  with  the  manner  of  ascertaining  them,  and  the 
recorded  declaration  of  the  court  pronouncing  the  legal  consequences 
of  those  facts.'* 

I  115.    Form    of   the    Jndsment. 

"The  judgment  is  the  remedy  prescribed  by  law  for  the  redress 
of  injuries,  and  the  suit  or  action  is  the  vehicle  or  means  of  adminis- 
tering it.  What  that  remedy  may  be,  is  indeed  the  result  of  de- 
liberation and  study  to  point  out,  and  therefore  the  style  of  the 
judgment  is,  not  that  it  is  decreed  or  resolved  by  the  court,  for 
then  the  judgment  might  appear  to  be  their  own,  but  *it  is  consid- 
ered,' 'consideratum  est  per  curiam,'  that  the  plaintiff  do  recover 
his  debt,  his  damages,  his  possession,  and  the  like;  which  implies 
that  the  judgment  is  none  of  their  own,  but  the  act  of  law,  pro- 
nounced and  declared  by  the  court,  after  due  deliberation  and  in- 
quiry." **  This  being  the  theory  and  practice  of  the  common  law, 
there  was  at  one  time  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  some  of  our  courts 
to  be  very  strict  in  requiring  the  use  of  this  exact  formula,  and  to 
hold  that  nothing  could  be  substituted  for  the  word  "considered" 
without  fatal  consequences."'  But  a  more  liberal  view  now  obtains, 
and  the  cases  hold  that  the  terms  "decreed,"  "resolved,"  "ordered," 
"judgment  rendered,"  etc.,  are  fully  equivalent  to  the  original  tech- 
nical term,  provided  the  entry  shows  an  actual  giving  of  judgment 
and  exhibits  what  it  is  required  to  specify  with  clearness  and  pse- 
cision/*     It  may  therefore  be  stated  as  the  modern  rule  that  the 

»«  Mayfield  v.  State,  40  Tex.  289. 

»*  3  Bl.  Comm.  396. 

58  Baker  v.  State,  3  Ark.  491. 

5«  Johnson  v.  GiUett.  52  lU.  360;  Minkhart  v.  Hanklcr,  19  III.  47;  Johnson 
V.  MUler,  50  III.  App.  60;  Coats  v.  Barrett,  49  III.  App.  275;  Deadrick  v. 
Harrington,  Hempst  50,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  3,694b;  Taylor  v.  Runyan,  3  Clarke 
(Iowa)  474;  City  of  La  Porte  v.  Organ,  5  Ind.  App.  369.  32  N.  E.  342:  Thorn- 
ton V.  Perry,  101  Ga,  608,  29  S.  B.  24;  Marsh  v.  Synder,  14  Neb.  8,  14  N.  W. 
:804.  In  Pennsylvania,  the  entry  "Judgment  on  verdict**  may,  in  a  sdre 
facias  upon  It,  be  considered  as  the  judgment  which  the^  plaintiff  was  entitled 
to  have.  Shirtz  v.  Shirtz,  5  Watts,  255.  To  constitute  a  sufficient  Judgment  on 
.a  demurrer,  there  should  be  a  formal  entry  of  the  submission  on  demurrer  to 
JEL  specified  pleading,  a  recital  of  consideration  thereof  by  the  court,  and  t 
(102) 


Gb.  6)  BBNDITIOK  AND  BNTRT  OF  JUDOMBNTa  §115 

form  of  the  ^'udg^ent  is  not  very  material,  provided  that  in  substance 
it  shows  distinctly  and  not  inferentially  that  the  matter  had  been 
determined  in  favor  of  one  of  the  litigants,  or  that  the  rights  of  the 
parties  in  litigation  had  been  adjudicated."  In  other  words,  the 
sufficiency  of  the  writing  claimed  to  be  a  judgment  should  always 
be  tested  by  its  substance  rather  than  its  form.**  But  while  this 
IS  so,  there  are  certain  requisites  of  a  judgment  which  cannot  be 
dispensed  with.  In  the  first  place,  the  entry  must  purport  to  be  an 
actual  judgment,  conveying  the  sentence  of  the  law,  as  distinguished 
from  a  mere  memorandum,  note,  or  recital  that  a  judgment  had 
been  or  would  be  rendered.**'  In  a  case  where  the  record  stated  as 
follows:  '*This  cause  coming  on  to  be  heard  on  the  demurrer  to 
the  plaintiff's  petition  heretofore  filed,  the  court,  after  hearing  the 
argument  of  counsel  thereon,  and  after  due  consideration,  sustained 
said  demurrer  and  rendered  judgment  for  the  defendant  and  against 
the  plaintiff  for  the  costs  of  this  action  taxed  at  $11.20,"  it  w^s  held 
that  this  was  no  judgment,  but  a  mere  recital  that  one  had  been 
rendered  for  costs.**     In  the  next  place,  a  true  judgment  must  be 

formal  adjudication,  Bucb  as,  "It  is  therefore  considered  and  adjudged  by  the 
court  that  the  demurrer  be^  and  it  is  hereby,  overruled"  or  sustained,  as  the 
case  may  be.  Jasper  Mercantile  Go.  v.  O'Rear,  112  Ala.  247,  20  South.  583; 
Alabama  Nat.  Bank  y.  Hunt  125  Ala.  512,  28  South.  488.  A  record  in  the 
foUowIuff.  language,  "It  is  therefore  ordered  by  the  court  that  Judgment  en- 
ter herein  on  the  verdict  of  the  Jury,  formerly  entered  hi  this  cause,'*  is  not 
a  Judgment.    Fitzsimmons  y.  Munch,  74  111.'  App.  259. 

*^  8cott  V.  Burton,  6  Tex.  322,  55  Am.  Dec.  782;  Hamman  v.  Lewis,  34 
Tex.  474. 

»•  Humboldt  MiU  &  Min.  Ca  v.  Terry,  11  Nev.  237. 

»•  Hobinsou  t.  Govera.  G7  Hun,  317.  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  249;  Whitwell  v.  Emory. 
3  Mich.  Si^  59  Am.  Dec.  220;  Putnam  y.  Gromble,  34  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  232.  A 
finding  of  facts,  together  with  conclusions  of  law  filed  by  a  trial  Judge  with 
the  clerk,  is  not  a  Judgment  untU  actually  spread  on  the  court  records. 
Christie  v.  Iowa  Life  Ins.  Co.,  Ill  Iowa,  177,  82  N.  W.  499.  So.  a  memoran- 
dum on  the  minute  bools  of  the  Judge,  to  the  effect  that  an  award  of  arbi- 
trators in  a  certain  sum  is  approved  and  accepted,  does  not  constitute  a  Judg- 
ment. Gage  V.  Judson  {D.  C.)  92  Fed.  545.  An  orally  expressed  opinion  or 
finding  of  a  Judge  in  a  case  not  tried  to  a  Jury  does  not,  according  to  the 
practice  of  the  federal  courts,  constitute  a  Judgment.  Judson  v.  Gage,  39 
C.  C.  A.  156,  98  Fed.  640.  So  also,  in  Ohio,  under  Rev.  St.  f  5310,  the  de- 
cision of  the  court  must  be  in  writing  and  entered  on  the  minutes,  to  consti- 
tute a  Judgment.     Wiley  v.  Le^yis,  (\  Ohio  Dec.  242. 

••MiUer  y.  Burlington  &  M.  li.  Co.,  7  ^'eb.  227.    An  entry  thus:— "Judg- 

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f   115  .    LAW  OF  JUDOMENT&  (Ch.  6 

distinguished  from  a  mere  order,  or  direction,  or  permission  to  the 
clerk  to  enter  a  judgment.  A  document  of  the  latter  kind  has  not 
the  force  or  the  characteristics  of  a  judgment,  and  will  not  support 
an  execution.*^  It  is  further  to  be  noted,  in  connection  with  mat- 
ters of  form  in  judgments,  that  a  much  less  degree  of  technicality 
and  formality  is  required  in  the  judgments  of  justices  of  the  peace 
and  other  inferior  courts,  than  is  exacted  in  respect  to  the  judgments 
of  courts  of  record.  In  the  case  of  judgments  of  the  former  order, 
it  is  generally  held  sufficient  if  the  books  and  papers  disclose  with 
reasonable  certainty  that  a  judgment  was  in  fact  rendered  for  one 
of  the  parties>  and  for  what  amount,  or  even  that  a  verdict  was  re- 
turned on  which  no  judgment  was  actually  entered.**  It  is  also  to 
be  remarked  that  irregularities  and  defects  of  form,  in  judicial  pro- 
ceedings, can  be  taken  advantage  of  by  parties  and  privies  only; 
third  persons  have  no  right  to  interfere.** 

ment  accordingly  taxing  all  costs  against  deft,"  is  not  a  Judgment  Boberts 
V.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  47.  And  see  Birdsell  Manufg  Co.  v.  Independent  Fire- 
Sprinkler  Co.,  87  111.  App.  443.  An  entry  of  Judgment  as  foUows:  "Where- 
upon the  court  enters  Judgment  upon  the  iinding,"  is  insufficient.  Faulk  t. 
KeUuins,  54  111.  188. 

«i  Morgan  v.  Flexner,  105  Ala.  356,  16  South.  716.  An  order  for  Judgment 
entered  in  the  Judgment  book  does  not  constitute  a  Judgment  unless  the  word- 
ing is  such  that  It  expresses  the  final  sentence  of  the  court  on  the  matters 
contained  in  the  record,  and  at  once  ends  the  case,  and  contemplates  no  fur- 
ther Judicial  action.  McTavish  v,  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  8  N.  D.  333,  79  N. 
W.  443.  The  following  entry  in  the  minutes  of  a  court,  **verdict  for  plaintiff, 
let  writ  issue,"  is  not  a  Judgment,  and  execution  thereon  Is  void.  Stark  t. 
Billings,  15  Fla.  318.  But  where  the  record  in  a  cause,  after  reciting  the 
trial  and  verdict,  proceeded:  "Therefore  it  is  considered  and  adjudged  by 
the  court  that  the  plaintiff  in  this  action  have  Judgment"  etc.,  held,  that  ihU 
was  a  Judgment  and  not  merely  an  order  for  Judgment,  and  the  court  did 
not  err  in  refusing  to  set  aside  the  docketing  thereof,  and  subsequent  pro- 
ceedings thereon,  on  the  ground  that  there  was  no  Judgment.  Potter  y.  Eaton, 
26  Wis.  382. 

6«  Elliott  V.  Jordan,  7  Baxt  (Tenn.)  376;  Gaines  v.  Betts,  2  Doug.  (Mich.) 
98:  Overall  v.  Pero,  7  Mich.  315;  Lynch  v.  Kelly,  41  CaL  232;  Felter  T. 
Mulliner,  2  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  181. 

es  Breading  v.  Boggs,  20  Pa.  33. 

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CtU  6)  RENDITION  AND  ENTRY  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §    IIB 


§  116.    Desisnation    of   the    Parties. 

"To  constitute  a, valid  judgment,  the  record  of  it  must  contain 
sufficient  certainty  and  precision  to  enable  the  clerk  to  issue  an  exe- 
cution by  inspection  of  the  entry,  without  reference  to  other  entries/' 
In  the  case  from  which  this  quotation  is  taken,  the  judgment  was 
against  "the  Captain  and  Master  of  the  Steamboat  MoUie  Hamilton," 
and  there  was  nothing  in  the  record  to  disclose  the  name  of  the 
captain  or  master.  It  was  accordingly  held  that  the  judgment  was 
void.**  The  decision  was  undoubtedly  correct  on  the  facts  of  the 
case,  but  the  general  rule  announced  must  not  be  understood  as 
declaring  that  the  judgment  itself  cannot  be  aided  in  this  respect  by 
reference  to  other  parts  of  the  same  record.  For  numerous  au- 
thorities hold  that  a  judgment  expressed  to  be  merely  for  or  against 
the  "plaintiff"  or  the  "defendant"  will  be  sufficient,  if  the  names  of 
the  parties  thus  designated  can  be  ascertained  without  ambiguity 
from  other  parts  of  the  record.*"  And  in  a  suit  against  two  de- 
fenflants,  a  judgment  against  "the  defendant,"  instead  of  "the  de- 
fendants," is  not  so  defective  as  to  be  void  for  uncertainty,  where 
the  record  clearly  shows  that  it  is  in  fact  a  judgment  against  both 
of  the  parties  defendant.**  So  in  a  case  where,  although  the  com- 
plaint states  no  cause  of  action  .against  any  but  the  defendant,  a 
third  person  is  permitted  on  his  own  petition  to  appear  and  answer, 
and  a  verdict  is  found  against  "the  defendant,"  the  use  of  the  plural 

•^Captain  of  The  Mollie  Hamilton  v.  Paschal,  9  Helsk.  (Tenn.)  203.  A 
Judgrneut  tbat  "It  Is  considered  by  this  court  have  and  recover  of  said  de- 
fradant*'  a  sum  stated  Is  void  for  uncertainty  as  to  the  plaintiff.  Pull^ 
Watchman's  Electrical  Detector  Co.  v.  Louis,  50  111.  App.  428. 

•sAldrlch  v.  Maltland,  4  Mich.  206;  Smith  v.  Chenault,  48  Tex.  455;  Lit- 
Ue  v.  Bird  well.  2T  Tex.  C88;  Collins  v.  Hyslop,  11  Ala.  506;  Wilson  v.  Nance, 
11  Humph.  (Tenn.)  189;  Boiling  v.  SpeUer,  90  Ala.  2G9,  11  South.  300;  Hendry 
V.  Crandiill.  i:U  Ind.  42,  30  N.  E.  789.  But  a  judgment  ordered  for  "pUiin- 
tiff/'  after  overniling  a  motion  for  a  new  trial,  without  specifying  which  of 
the  two  plaint UTa.  where  the  verdict  was  rendered  for  "plaintiffs,"  is  fatally 
defective.     C.  Aultman  &  Co.  v.  Wirth,  45  111.  App.  614. 

«•  Roach  v.  Blakey,  89  Va.  767.  17  S.  B.  228;  McMahon  v.  Perkins.  22  R. 
I.  116.  4G  Atl.  405;  New  Mexico  &  S.  P.  R.  Ca  v.  Madden,  7  N.  M.  215,  34 
Pac  50;  Turner  v.  City  of  Houston  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  43  S.  W.  69.  See  Mis- 
iwari  Pac.  By.  Co.  y.  Smith  (Tex.)  16  S.  W.  803. 

(165) 


§   116  LAW  (HT  JUDGMSNTB.  (Ch.  6 

"defendants"  in  the  judgment  will  be  treated  as  a  merely  clerical 
error,  and  the  judgment  be  held  as  one  against  the  original  defend- 
ant only.*^  So  a  judgment  for  a  definite  amount  should  not  be  set 
aside  because  it  fails  to  state  that  it  is  for  the  plaintiff  against  the 
defendant,  where  the  declaration  sets  forth  a  cause  of  action  and 
the  parties  thereto.**  Nevertheless,  a  patent  ambiguity  on  the  face 
of  the  judgment  cannot  be  thus  cured  or  aided.  In  an  Ohio  de- 
cision the  court  said:  "The  order  of  the  court  was  that  these  in- 
stalments should  be  paid  by  the  parties  in  partition  'or  their  repre- 
sentatives or  assigns,'  and  in  default  that  execution  should  issue 
therefor.  This  order  is  void  for  uncertainty.  A  judgment  against 
A.  or  B.  is  no  valid  judgment  against  either  A.  or  B.,  and  is  simply 
void."  •^  On  the  other  hand,  in  a  suit  to  enforce  a  resulting  trust  on 
payment  of  money  due  the  holders  of  the  legal  title,  a  decree  re- 
quiring such  holders  to  convey  to  "the  heirs  at  law  of  W.  B."  is 
proper,  without  requiring  that  the  persons  intended  be  individually 
named.^®  So  a  judgment  rendered  against  a  defendant  omitting  his 
Christian  name  cannot  be  considered  void,  but  an  action  max  ^ 
maintained  against  him  on  such  judgment,  averring  his  identity,  and 
the  plaintiff  may  prove  by  parol  that  he  is  the  person  against  whom 
the  judgment  was  rendered."^ ^  It  is  sufficient  if  the  memorandum 
of  the  style  of  a  cause,  made  by  the  clerk,  indicate  with  reasonable 
certainty  to  what  suit  it  relates.  The  description  of  the  parties  by 
the  name  of  their  firm  is  sufficient,  and  a  judgment  in  favor  of  the 

«7  Taylor  v.  Taylor,  64  Ind.  356.  And  see  Holcomb  v.  Tift,  54  Mich.  647. 
20  N.  W.  627;  Finnagau  y.  Manchester,  12  Iowa,  521;  Hayues  v.  Backman 
(Cal.)  31  Puc.  746. 

68  Adams  v.  Walker,  59  Ga.  506. 

e»  Miller  v.  Peters,  25  Ohio  St.  270. 

»oLow  V.  Graff,  80  111.  360.  And  see  Dietrich  v.  Dietrich,  154  Pa.  92,  2j 
Atl.  lUSO. 

71  Newcomb  v.  Peck,  17  Vt  302,  44  Am.  Dec.  340;  Root  v.  Fellowes.  6 
Ciish.  (Mass.)  29.  See  Preston  v.  Wright,  60  Iowa,  351,  14  N.  W.  352.  Where 
a  defendant  Is  in  the  habit  of  signing  checks,  and  doing  business  at  banks 
and  other  places,  by  the  initials  of  his  Christian  name,  these  initials  will  be 
treated  as  his  business  name,  and  a  Judgment  recovered  against  him  by  tbat 
name  Is  not  subject  to  collateral  attack.  Oakley  y.  Pegler,  30  Neb.  628,  46 
N.  W.  920.  And  where  a  debtor  Is  equally  well  known  by  two  names,  a 
Judj;meut  against  him  in  either  name  is  good  as  to  him  and  as  to  his  receiver. 
Isaacs  V.  Mlntz,  11  N.  Y.  Supp.  423, 

(160) 


Cb«  6)  RENDITION  AND  BNTRT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  117 

plaintiffs  against  the  defendants  is  sufficient,  as  the  pleadings  show 
who  they  are.'*  In  Ohio  it  is  required  by  statute  that  the  judg- 
ment shall  certify  which  of  the  defendants  is  principal  and  which 
stircty ;  but  this,  it  is  held,  only  applies  where  they  are  sued  jointly, 
and  if  judgment  is  recovered  in  an  action  against  the  surety  alone, 
it  is  not  necessary  to  its  validity  that  it  should  specify  the  fact  of 
his 'suretyship.'*  The  title  of  a  case  is  matter  of  form  only,  and  a 
clerical  error  therein  will  not  vitiate.'* 

f   117.    Desisnatioii  of  tlie  Property. 

WTien  a  judgment  has  to  do  with  specific  property,  it  is  essential 
that  the  property  be  designated  in  the  judgment  with  such  a  degree 
of  certainty  that  it  can  be  identified  without  reasonable  opportunity 
for  mistake.^'  Thus  a  decree  for  the  distribution  of  an  estate  should 
set  out  specifically  the  property  to  be  distributed.'*  So  a  judgment 
of  recovery  in  trespass  to  try  title  is  void  if  it  does  not  describe  the 
land  with  sufficient  certainty  to  identify  it."  But  because  there  is  a 
want  of  certainty  in  the  description  of  land  ordered  to  be  sold  to 
satisfy  a  judgment,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  judgment  is  otherwise 
bad.  Though  such  want  of  certainty  renders  void  what  it  refers  to, 
unless  the  plaintiff  in  the  execution  be  dissatisfied  no  other  person 
has  cause  of  complaint.'*  But  here  also,  as  in  respect  to  the  desig- 
nation of  the  parties,  the  judgment  may  be  aided  by  intendments 
and  additional  data  drawn  from  the  pleadings  and  other  parts  of  the 

TsGollIiifl  T.  Hyslop,  11  Ala.  506.  But  if  the  judgment  entry  does  not  set 
forth  the  indlvidnal  names  of  the  members  of  a  firm,  those  names  must  be 
disclosed  by  other  parts  of  the  record.  If  the  action  was  brought  by  seyerai 
liersons  as  partners,  but  without  setting  forth  their  Individual  names  any- 
where in  the  cause,  a  Judgment  rendered  in  the  firm  name  is  fataUy  defective. 
Hitch  V.  Gray,  1  Marv.  (Del.)  400,  41  Atl.  91;  Simmons  v.  TItche,  102  Ala. 
317, 14  South.  786. 

v>  Wilkfns  y.  Ohio  Nat.  Bank,  31  Ohio  St  565. 

»*  Ewing  T.  Hatfield,  17  Ind.  513. 

f  •  Whether  the  description  of  land  in  a  judgment  is  sufiiciently  definite  to 
identify  the  land  is  a  question  for  the  jury.  Birdseye  y.  Rogers  (Tex.  Civ. 
A  pp.)  26  8.  W.  841. 

TcJcmes  y.  Minogue,  29  Ark.  637. 

T»  neame  v.  Erhard,  33  Tex.  60. 

v»  Gear  y.  Hart,  31  Tex.  135. 

(167) 


§    118  LAW  OF  JUDQMBNTS.  (Ch^  6 

record.  Thus  a  decree  is  not  void,  nor  incompetent  as  evidence, 
because  it  contains  no  description  of  the  land  thereby  decreed  to  be 
conveyed,  if  it  refers  to  the  petition  in  the  action,  or  other  pleadings 
or  documents,  for  such  description,  in  apt  and  sufficient  words." 
Indeed  the  authorities  go  even  further  than  this.  For  it  has  been 
held  that  a  judgment  that  plaintiff  recover  "the  property  in  con- 
troversy," or  in  default  thereof  a  sum  fixed  as  its  value,  will  not  be 
reversed  for  uncertainty  in  the  recovery,  where,  although  the  peti- 
tion claims  several  articles,  the  record  shows  that  the  controversy 
was  reduced  to  two  of  them.*® 

^  f  118.    Detisnation  of  Amount  of  Reoorerj. 

The  amount  of  a  judgment  must  be  stated  in  it  with  certainty 
and  precision.  All  judgments  must  be  specific  and  certain;  they 
must  determine  the  rights  recovered  or  the  penalties  imposed,  and 
be  such  as  the  defendant  may  readily  understand  and  be  capable  of 
performing.**  A  judgment,  it  is  said,  must  be  so  certain  that  the 
clerk  can  issue  an  execution  by  inspection  of  it,  without  reference 
tQ  other  entries.*'  Hence  a  judgment  which  is  uncertain  as  to  the 
amount  which  it  awards  is  invalid.®*  For  example,  a  judgment 
against  a  garnishee  "for  the  amount  of  his  answer  or  so  much  there- 

T»  Foster  v.  Bowman,  55  Iowa,  237,  7  N.  W.  513:  Jones  v.  Belt.  2  GIU  (Md.) 
106;  Martin  v.  Teal  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  29  S.  W.  691;  Sanger  v.  Roberts,  92 
Tex.  312,  48  S.  W.  1.  A  decree  describing  the  property  to  be  sold  as  "a  lot 
with  a  livery  stable  thereon"  situated  on  a  certain  street,  and  naming  the 
person  who  conveyed  It  to  defendant,  is  sufficient.  McCue  v.  Sharp  (Ky.)  45 
S.  W.  770.  It  will  be  presumed  that  the  land  described  in  the  judgmeit  is 
the  same  as  that  In  the  petition,  there  being  no  contradiction  In  the  descrip- 
tion, though  that  In  the  judgment  is  fuller.  Leavell  v.  Seale  (Tex.  Civ.  App.l 
45  S.  W.  171.  But  in  Kentucky,  it  is  said  that  a  judgment  should  be  eeriain 
as  to  tlie  description  of  real  property  ordered  to  be  sold;  and  it  is  not  suttl- 
clent  that  the  property  may  be  identified  by  a  reference  to  the  pleadlnps. 
Neff  V.  Covington  Stone  Co.  (Ky.)  56  S.  W.  723;  Harrison's  Ex'x  v.  Taylor 
(Ky.)  43  S.  W.  723. 
80  Coleman  v.  Keel,  75  Iowa,  304,  39  N.  W.  510,  9  Am.  St.  Rep.  484, 
SI  People  V.  Plrfenbrink,  96  111.  ijS;  Etheridge  v.  Mlddleton,  1  Marv.  (Del.) 
130,  40  Atl.  714. 

82  Boyken  v.  State,  3  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  426. 

83  Jones  T.  Acre,  3klinar  (Ala.)  5.    A  judgment  for  the  recovery  of  money, 
not  stating  the  amount  for  which  it  was  rendered,  is  void,  where  nothing  ap* 

(1G8) 


Ch.  (>>  RENDITION  AND  ENTRY  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §    118 

of  as  will  satisfy  the  plaintiflF's  debt  and  costs"  has  been  held  void 
for  uncertainty.**  And  a  finding  that  a  garnishee  was  liable  for  one 
of  two  amounts,  which  are  to  be  determined  by  a  future  contingency, 
was  not  considered  a  judgment  at  all.*" 

Nevertheless,  "id  certum  est  quod  certum  reddi  potest;"  and  we 
are  unable  to  discover  any  good  reason  why  this  maxim  should  not 
apply  to  the  amount  of  a  judgment  as  well  as  in  any  other  case. 
An  obscure  or  ambiguous  designation  of  the  parties  or  the  subject- 
matter  involved  may  be  construed,  as  we  have  seen,  with  reference 
to  the  other  parts  of  the  record.  And  if  the  pleadings,  or  the  ver- 
dict, show  the  actual  amount  of  the  recovery,  without  any  doubt  or 
room  for  mistake,  it  would  seem  that  the  judgment  should  not  be 
considered  invalid,  at  least  as  between  the  parties,  for  its  failure  to 
specify  the  sum  awarded  with  precision.  It  must  be  admitted  that 
the  authorities  hardly  go  to  the  length  of  sanctioning  the  rule  here 
suggested,  although  the  general  principle  of  construing  a  judgment 
by  the  record  is  not  disputed.  But  the  cases  certainly  justify  the 
statement  that  if  the  judgment-entry  itself,  without  naming  the 
amount  of  recovery,  contains  data  which  permit  its  calculation,  a 
sufficient  degree  of  certainty  is  attained.  Thus  a  judgment  for  in- 
terest from  a  day  mentioned  is  sufficiently  certain  without  fixing  the 
amount.**  So  also,  if  a  verdict  be  found  for  a  fixed  and  definite 
amount,  and  the  judgment  refers  to  the  verdict  in  explicit  terms  (as 
if  it  is  expressed  to  be  **for  the  said  sum  assessed  as  aforesaid"),  it 
is  considered  to  be  sufficiently  precise.*^     But  it  is  error  to  render 

p«»  in  the  record  to  eupply«the  defect  Bludworth  v.  Poole,  21  Tex.  Oiv. 
App.  r^l,  53  S.  W.  717;  Board  of  Ck)m'rs  of  Custer  County  v.  Moon,  8  Okl. 
206.  57  Pac.  161. 

•*  Berry  t.  Anderson,  2  How.  (Miss.)  649. 

••Batten  V.  Ix)wery,  46  Iowa,  49.  See  Early  v.  Moore,  4  Munf.  262.  An 
entry,  upon  the  rendition  of  a  verdict  for  plaintiff,  that  "defendant  is  entitled 
to  a  credit  to  be  ascertained  by  A.  and  B.,  and  the  clerk  is  then  authorized 
to  enter  a  remittitur.  Judgment  of  the  court  accordingly  and  for  costs,*'  is  not 
a  judgment  then  rendered,  but  an  agreement  for  a  Judgment  to  be  rendered 
subsequently,  upon  the  ascertainment  by  the  referees  of  the  credit  to  which 
the  defendant  is  entitled.    Dunns  v.  Batchelor,  20  N.  C.  46. 

••  Dinsmore  v.  AnstiU.  Minor  (Ala.)  89. 

•7  Ellis  V.  Dunn.  3  Ala.  632.  A  Justice's  Judgment  "that  the  plaintiff  re- 
corer  the  sum  as  claimed  In  the  alx)ve  case/'  will  be  sustained,  notwithstand- 

(169) 


§118  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNTSL  (Ch.  6 

judgment  on  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff  which  fails  to  state  how 
much  he  should  recover,  when  all  debt  is  denied  by  the  defendant. 
In  such  case  the  jury  should  have  been  requested  to  retire  and  find 
how  much  the  plaintiff  ought  to  recover.** 

If  there  are  blanks  in  the  judgment,  instead  of  a  statement  of  its 
amount,  this  will  destroy  its  force  and  effect  for  most  purposes,  or 
at  least  leave  it  incomplete  until  the  blanks  are  filled.    For  instance, 

a  judgment  that  the  party  recover  "costs  of  suit  taxed  at ^,"  the 

amount  of  costs  not  being  inserted  in  the  record,  will  not  support  a 
declaration  upon  the  judgment  as  for  a  fixed  sum,  nor  can  the  de- 
fect in  the  record  be  supplied  by  resorting  to  an  entry  upon  the 

clerk's  docket.*®     So  a  confession  of  judgment  for  " dollars," 

and  so  entered,  creates  no  lien  on  the  property  of  the  judgment 
debtor  while  it  remains  in  that  condition."**  In  Pennsylvania,  how- 
ever,  it  appears  to  be  the  rule  that  a  judgment  entered  for  an  un- 
liquidated sum  will  sustain  an  execution  and  a  sheriff's  sale  thereon, 
if  the  actual  amount  of  the  judgment-debt  be  indorsed  on  the  exe- 
cutipn."*  When  the  clerk  enters  a  judgment,  leaving  blanks  for 
the  amount  of  damages  and  costs,  the  case  being  one  where  such 
amount  can  be  ascertained  by  mere  calculation,  the  court  has  power 
to  order  the  blanks  to  be  filled  up  at  the  next  term,  the  clerk  hav- 
ing died  during  the  session ;  •*  or  if  the  clerk  himself  fills  tip  the 
blanks,  after  the  lapse  of  more  than  a  year  from  the  judgment,  his 

ing  its  Informality,  Tvhen  the  record  shows  tliat  the  action  was  assumpsit  for 
1^81,  and  defendant  appeared  and  contested  the  claim.  Ladnler  v.  Ladnier, 
C4  Miss.  3C8,  1  South.  492.  On  overruling  a  frivolous  demurrer  to  a  com- 
plaint for  a  specific  sum  for  goods  sold  and  <lelivered,  and  no  answer  over, 
judgment  for  the  sum  claimed  is  proper,  without  taking  proof  of  the  amount 
of  damages.    Adrian  v.  Jackson,  75  N.  C.  536. 

88  Bartle  v.  Plane,  G8  Iowa,  227.  26  N.  W.  88. 

80  Noyes  v.  Newmarch,  1  Allen  (Mass.)  51. 

•0  Lea  V.  Vates.  40  G  a.  56.     So,  a  Judgment  for  " dollars,"  based  upon 

a  verdict  expressed  in  the  same  way,  is  a  nullity,  and  will  not  bar  a  subs^ 
queut  suit  upon  the  same  cause  of  action.  School  Directors  v.  Newman,  47 
111.  App.  3G4.  The  judgment  record  in  a  case  left  the  amount  of  the  Judg- 
ment blank,  except  as  to  $4.95  costs.  In  the  docket  it  was  entered  as  $iWS 
damages  and  $16.95  costs  with  10  per  cent,  interest.  Held,  good  as  a  Judg- 
ment for  $4.95  only.     Case  v.  Plato,  54  Iowa,  64.  6  N.  W.  128. 

•1  See  Ulshafer  v.  Stewart,  71  Pa.  170;  Gray's  HehB  v.  Coulter,  4  Pa.  IbS. 

•2  Hagler  v.  Mercer,  6  Fla.  721. 

(170) 


Ch.  6)  BJSNDITION  AND  ENTRY  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §    118 

doing  so  will  not  invalidate  the  judgment  so  far  as  to  expose  it  to 
collateral  impeachment,  although  it  may  be  ground  for  a  writ  of 
error.**  Another  question  arises  in  the  case  of  a  judgment  where  a 
blank  is  left  for  the  costs  alone.  Undoubtedly  the  judgment  is  not 
perfect  until  this  blank  is  filled.  But  it  is  held  that  the  record  of  a 
judgment  which  is  regular  in  all  respects,  except  that  the  costs  are 
left  blank  until  they  are  taxed  by  the  court,  and  then  inserted,  is 
admissible  in  evidence  in  an  action  of  debt  on  that  judgment.**  A 
distinction  is  taken,  in  one  of  the  recent  cases,  which  we  believe  to 
be  well  founded.  It  is  held  that  as  respects  the  lien  or  the  validity 
of  a  judgment  informally  entered  and  docketed  without  the  taxation 
and  insertion  of  costs  therein,  the  omission  is  to  be  treated  as  a 
mere  irregularity;  but  for  the  purposes  of  an  appeal,  the  prevail- 
ing party,  seeking  to  limit  the  rights  of  his  adversary,  is  to  be  held 
to  strict  practice,  and  the  judgment  is  not  to  be  deemed  perfected 
until  the  costs  to  which  he  is  entitled  are  duly  taxed  and  inserted 
in  the  judgment.** 

An  judgments  rendered  in  this  country  should  be  expressed  in 
the  American  denominations  of  money.  A  judgment  given  by  the 
court  for  a  certain  amount  in  francs  is  therefore  erroneous,  and  will 
be  amended  on  appeal  so  as  to  express  the  amount  in  dbllafs  and 
cents.**  It  has  sometimes  been  made  a  question  whether  the  state- 
ment of  the  amount  of  a  judgment  in  figures  merely,  instead  of  the 
sum  being  written  out,  would  impair  its  validity.  There  are  cases 
which  hold  a  judgment  so  expressed  to  be  defective  to  the  point  of 
invalidity.*^  Other  authorities  seem  reluctant  to  admit  that  this 
alone  would  absolutely  avoid  the  judgment  so  as  to  render  it  open 

»«  LInd  T.  Adams,  10  Iowa,  398,  77  Am.  Dec.  123. 

•*  GaUioon  T.  Terry  Porter  Co.,  21  Conn.  52a  See,  also.  Big  Goose  &  Beaver 
Ditch  Co.  T.  Morrow,  8  Wyo.  537,  59  Pac.  159,  80  Am.  St  Rep.  955;  Young 
r.  CouieUy,  112  N.  C.  616,  17  S.  B.  424.  In  California,  the  clerk  has  no  right 
to  insert  coats  after  the  Judgment  Is  entered  and  the  record  completed.  The 
remedy  In  such  case  to  by  a  motion  to  the  court  for  amendment.  Chapiu  y. 
Broder,  16  CaL  403. 

•>  Ricbaidaon  t.  Rogers,  87  Minn.  461,  35  N.  W.  270. 

••  Erlanger  t.  Aregno,  24  La.  Ann,  77. 

•7  8niith  V.  Miner,  S  N,  J.  Law,  175,  14  Am.  Dec.  418;  Lindcr  v.  Monroe's 
Exrs,  33  IlL  390. 

(171) 


§    1 18  ULW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  6 

to  collateral  attack.*'  While  the  practice  is  undoubtedly  loose  and 
irregular,  it  is  difficult  to  see  in  it  any  sufficient  ground  for  con- 
sidering the  judgment  entirely  void.  If  the  amount  of  recovery 
stated  in  figures  in  a  judgment  differs  from  that  stated  in  writing, 
but  the  recitals  in  the  judgment  itself  show  the  former  to  be  the 
true  amount,  the  error  is  not  sufficient  cause  for  the  reversal  of  the 
judgment.*®  If  the  amount  of  the  judgment  is  written  out,  the 
designation  "dollars"  (or  "cents,"  or  both,  as  the  case  may  be)  must 
be  appended  to  it.  Thus  a  judgment  for  "four  hundred  and  sixty- 
one  and  53-100  damages"  is  not  for  any  sum  of  money  and  is  there- 
fore a  nullity.***  But  it  has  also  been  held,  and  by  a  very  hi5:h 
authority,  that  the  omission  of  the  word  "dollars"  in  a  verdict  for 
the  plaintiff  in  an  action  of  assumpsit  does  not  affect  the  validity  of  a 
judgment  entered  thereon  according  to  the  manifest  intent  of  the 
jury.***  If  the  amount  of  the  judgment  is  expressed  in  figures, 
the  dollar-mark,  or  some  other  appropriate  sign  must  be  used  to 
show  the  sum  intended.  The  necessity  for  a  statement  of  this  kind 
arises  from  the  loose  manner  of  keeping  the  records  of  tax-judg- 
ments which  formerly  prevailed  in  some  of  the  states,  and  was  often 
brought  to  the  notice  of  the  courts.  The  rule  is  that  a  judgment 
for  taxes  is  fatally  defective  if  it  does  not  show  the  amount  of  the 
tax  for  which  it  was  rendered;  and  the  use  of  numerals  simply, 
without  any  words,  marks,  or  signs  to  indicate  that  they  stand  for 
money,  and  for  what  denominations  of  money,  is  not  sufficient.*** 

»»  FuHerton  v.  Kelllher,  48  Mo.  542;  Kopperl  y.  Xagy,  37  lU.  App.  23;  Da- 
vis V.  McCary,  100  Ala.  545,  13  South.  665. 
»»  Cave  V.  City  of  Houston,  65  Tex.  619. 

100  Carpenter  v.  Sherfy,  71  111.  427.  The  court  said:  "We  have  no  right 
to  indulge  in  presumptions  as  to  what  was  found  by  the  court;  'we  must  take 
the  record  as  it  reads.  A  Judgment  should  be  for  a  certain  and  definite  sum 
of  money." 

101  Hopliins  V.  Orr,  124  U.  S.  510,  8  Sup.  Ct.  590.  31  L.  Ed.  523. 

102  Woods  V.  Freeman,  1  Wall.  398,  17  L.  Ed.  543;  Lawrence  T.  Past  20 
111.  338,  71  Am.  Dec.  274;  Lane  v.  Bommelmann,  21  lU.  143;  Gibson  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  22  111.  572;  Eppinger  v.  Kirby,  23  111.  521.  76  Am.  Dec.  709;  Dukes 
V.  Kowlcy,  24  111.  210;  Baily  v.  Doolittle,  24  lU.  577;  Potwin  y.  Oadea.  45 
111.  367;  People  v.  San  Francisco  Savings  Union,  31  Cal.  135;  Randolpli  ▼• 
Metcalf,  6  Cold.  (Tenn.)  400;  Tidd  v.  Khies,  26  Minn.  201,  2  N.  W.  497;  Black. 
Tax  Titles  c2d  Ed.)  §  180. 

(172) 


Ch.  6)  RENDITION  AND  ENTRY  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §    1 1  ^ 

This  rule  governs  also  in  case  of  a  judgment  for  a  special  assess- 
ment.***  It  may  be  conceded,  however,  that  the  use  of  the  dollar- 
mark  is  not  indispensable,  if  the  amount  can  be  indicated  with  cer- 
tainty by  any  other  device  or  contrivance.* *** 

An  entry  of  judgment  for  the  right  sum,  but  inaccurately  named 
"damages"  instead  of  "debt," — or  so  much  debt  and  so  much  dam- 
ages,— ^is  not  reversible  error.*^*  And  where  the  record  of  a  judg- 
ment does  not  show  of  what  the  judgment  was  made  up,  it  is  com- 
petent to  show  that  fact  by  extraneous  evidence.*®* 

S  119.    Conditions  in  Jndsment. 

In  an  ordinary  action  at  law,  the  court  cannot  render  a  conditional 
judgment.*"'  But  "when  a  judgment  is  recovered  according  to  the 
terms  and  conditions  of  a  written  obligation  for  the  payment  of 
money,  and  those  terms  and  conditions  expressly  either  limit  the 
lien  of  any  judgment  which  may  be  recovered  upon  it,  or  waive 

"*  l^iltsburgh,  t\  W.  A  .C.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Chicago,  53  111.  80. 

i»*In  the  case  of  Gutzwiller  v.  Crowe,  32  Mimi.  70,  19  N.  W.  344,  It  ap- 
peared that,  in  the  entry  of  a  tax- judgment  on  the  official  boolcs,  there  was  a 
column  headed  "Total  amonat  of  judgment,"  and  in  this  column  appeared 
three  Arabic  numerals,  the  first  separated  from  the  others  by  a  short  per- 
pendleulnr  line;  it  was  held  that,  in  reasonable  intendment,  this  must  denote 
money,  and  that  it  was  a  sufficient  designation  of  the  amount  of  the  judg- 
luent.  This  decision  was  declared  to  be  consistent  with  Tidd  y.  Rines,  2(> 
MloxL  201,  2  N.  W.  407;  because  one  of  the  grounds  on  which  that  case  was 
ruled  was  that  the  figures  were  not  separated  by  any  line  or  decimal  mark. 
And  see  New  England  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Avery  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  41  S.  W. 
673;  Dyke  v.  Bank  of  Orange,  00  Cal.  307,  27  Pac.  3(M;  Therme  v.  Bethenoid, 
106  Iowa,  G07,  77  N.  W.  407.  A  clerical  mistake  made  in  wrltlug  a  judgment 
with  an  additional  cipher  is  rendered  immaterial  by  a  remittitur.  Lowdon 
V.  Fisk  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  180. 

»•»  Carver  v.  Adams,  40  Vt.  552.  In  a  suit  for  the  recovery  of  land  and 
damages  for  detention,  the  judgments  for  the  land  and  for  the  rents  are  as 
distluct  as  if  separate  judgments  were  rendered  in  different  suits.  Shean  v. 
CaDnlDgkam,  6  Bush  (Ky.)  123. 

>•«  Gilbert  v.  Earl,  47  Vt.  0.  Where  judgment  is  recovered  for  compen- 
satory and  punitive  damages,  the  court  is  not  required  to  specify  how  much 
i«  for  the  one  and  how  much  for  the  other.  Hambly  v.  Hayden,  20  R.  I. 
558.  40  AU.  417. 

loWobnson  v.  Carver,  175  Pa.  200,  34  Atl.  627;  Hopkins  v.  Bowers,  111 
N.  C.  175.  16  S.  E.  1;  Coh  v.  Bright,  2  Mo.  App.  Rep'r,  1101,  66  Mo.  App.  417. 

(173) 


§120  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  6 

the  benefit  of  all  laws  exempting  property  from  levy  and  sale  on 
any  execution,  or  waive  the  right  of  inquisition  upon  the  delinquent's 
real  estate,  and  in  the  entry  of  the  judgment  this  is  set  forth  upon 
the  docket,  it  must  be  held  to  be  a  part  of  the  record  of  the  judg- 
ment," and  therefore  will  affect  subsequent  purchasers.***  But  a 
judgment  on  an  ordinary  promissory  note,  though  given  for  the 
purchase-money  of  real  estate,  should  not  contain  provisions  de- 
claring it  a  lien  on  such  real  estate  and  ordering  that  the  same  be 
sold  to  satisfy  it.  It  should  be  an  ordinary  personal  judgment 
against  the  defendant,  authorizing  an  ordinary  execution  to  be  is- 
sued against  the  property  in  general  of  the  debtor.*®"  In  an  action 
of  replevin,  where  the  plaintiff  obtains  possession  of  the  property 
and  retains  the  same,  and  is  in  possession  of  the  property  at  the 
time  the  judgment  is  rendered,  it  is  neither  necessary  nor  proper  to 
render  a  judgment  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  for  the  value  of  the  prop- 
erty in  Case  a  return  thereof  cannot  be  had.***  As  a  general  rule, 
a  judgment  has  properly  nothing  to  do  with  the  means  of  its  enforce- 
ment; it  merely  pronounces  the  sentence  of  the  law  upon  the  facts 
ascertained  in  the  case. 

9  120.    Jolat  DefesdAata. 

At  the  common  law,  it  was  an  inflexible  rule  that  if  an  action  was 
brought  against  two  or  more  defendants  jointly,  the  plaintiff  could 
have  judgment  only  against  all  of  them  or  none  of  them ;  the  single 
exception  being  in  the  case  where  one  of  the  defendants  succeeded 
in  establishing  a  defense,  such  as  his  personal  disability,  peculiar  to 
himself.  If  one  defendant  suffered  default,  no  final  judgment  could 
be  given  against  him,  as  we  have  already  stated,***  until  the  case 
was  disposed  of  as  to  the  others,  and  not  even  then  unless  the  ver- 
dict was  in  the  plaintiff's  favor.  Under  this  practice,,  therefore,  it 
was  error  to  give  judgment  against  one  of  the  defendants  sued  vnth- 

108  Hngoioan  v.  Snlisberry,  74  Ta.  280.    And  see  Little  v.  White,  3  Ind-  MA. 

109  Greeno  v.  Barnard,  18  Kan.  518. 

110  Mills  V.  Kansas  Lumber  Co.,  26  Kan.  574. 

111  Supra,  §  82.  In  an  action  of  trover  against  two,  one  of  whom  ia  de- 
faulted and  the  otlier  found  guilty  by  the  jury,  there  Is  but  one  assessment 
of  damages  and  a  joint  judgment.    Gerrish  y.  Cummlngs,  4  Gush.  (Mass.)  39L 

(17A) 


Cb.  6)  RENDITION  AND  ENTRY  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  121 

out  disposing  of  the  suit  as  to  the  other  defendant;  a  final  con- 
clusion must  be  reached  as  to  all  of  them,  one  way  or  the  other,  at 
the  same  time.^^*  But  now  it  is  provided  by  statute  in  some  of  the 
states  that  "in  an  action  against  several  defendants,  the  court  may, 
in  its  discretion,  render  judgment  against  one  or  more  of  them,  leav- 
ing the  action  to  proceed  against  the  others,  whenever  a  several 
judgment  is  proper."  *^*  In  a  case  where  this  law  was  to  be  ap- 
plied, the  court  said:  "As  no  order  was  made  as  to  the  other  de- 
fendant, the  action  is  still  pending  against  him,  and  the  court  had  a 
right  to  render  a  judgment  against  one,  and  continue  the  action  as 
to  the  other ;  although  no  order  of  continuance  seems  to  have  been 
entered,  yet  the  action  stood  continued  by  operation  of  law."  *** 

I  121.    Tiate  •£  entevias  Jndsatest. 

By  the  rule  of  the  common  law,  if  a  judgment  was  not  stayed  by 
a  motion  in  arrest,  or  for  a  new  trial,  or  other  appropriate  proceed- 
ing, within  the  first  four  days  of  the  next  term  after  the  trial,  it  was 
then  to  be  entered  upon  the  roll  or  record.  Statutes  fixing  the  time 
of  entering  a  judgment  upon  verdict  exist  in  some  of  the  states,  and 
require  notice  in  this  connection.  Thus  the  New  York  Code  pre- 
scribes the  lapse  of  four  days  after  the  verdict  before  the  rendition 
of  judgment ;  but  it  is  held  that  judgment  may  be  entered  upon  the 
verdict  immediately,  and  relief  may  be  had  against  the  verdict  within 
four  days  afterward,  if  there  be  ground  for  it,  notwithstanding  the 
judgment.***  But  the  case  is  different  under  a  statute  which  de- 
dares  that  judgments  on  the  decision  of  the  court  may  be  entered 
"after  the  expiration  of  four  days  from  the  filing  of  the  decision  and 
the  service  upon  the  attorney  of  the  adverse  party  of  a  copy  there- 
of, but  not  before."  Here,  it  is  held,  four  full  calendar  days  must 
elapse  after  the  filing  of  a  decision  and  notice  thereof  before  judg- 
ment can  be  properly  entered;   and  here  the  rule  of  interpretation 

"*  Johnson  v.  Vaagban,  9  B.  Men.  (Ky.)  217.  See  Creigh  y.  Hedrlck,  5 
W.  Va.  140. 

i»»  Code  N,  Y.  f  274;  Code  Wis.  §  184;  Code  Civ.  Prac.  Ky.  §  370;  Code 
Civ.  Pn>c  Cat  I  57& 

ii«  Patton  V.  Shanklin.  14  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  15. 

lis  DrocB  T.  Lakey,  2  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  QSL 

(175) 


§    121  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  6 

which,  in  computing  time,  excludes  the  first  and  includes  the  last 
day,  has  no  application,  the  provision  being  clear  and  explicit."' 
In  Pennsylvania,  a  law  requires  **^  that  judgment  shall  not  be  en- 
tered on  the  report  of  a  referee  until  after  the  expiration  of  thirty 
days.  But  in  a  case  where  the  prothonotary  entered  a  judgment 
on  the  same  day  on  which  the  report  was  filed,  it  was  considered 
that  this  should  not,  on  error,  be  treated  as  material,  where  it  ap- 
peared that  exceptions  to  the  report  were  subsequently  filed  and 
acted  upon,  and  no  attention  paid  to  the  mistake.^^'  On  the  other 
hand,  the  California  Code  provides  that  "when  trial  by  jury  has 
been  had,  judgment  must  be  entered  by  the  clerk,  in  conformity  to 
the  verdict,  within  twenty-four  hours  after  the  rendition  of  the  ver- 
dict, unless  -the  court  order  the  case  to  be  reserved  for  argument  or 
further  consideration,  or  grant  a  stay  of  proceedings."  **•  But  the 
failure  of  the  clerk  to  enter  judgment  within  the  prescribed  time 
does  not,  according  to  the  authorities,  affect  the  validity  of  the  judg- 
ment afterwards  entered ;  for  the  injunction  of  the  statute  is  merely 
directory  and  not  mandatory.^*®  And  reading  this  statute  in  con- 
nection with  another  law,  which  provides,  as  a  penalty,  that  the 
action  shall  be  dismissed  when  the  judgment  is  not  entered  within 
six  months  after  verdict,  it  is  held  that  the  court  does  not  lose  juris- 
diction of  the  cause  if  judgment  is  entered  within  six  months  after 
the  verdict  is  rendered.^*^     In  other  states  it  appears  to  be  required 

m 

ii«  Marvin  v.  Marvin,  75  N.  Y*.  240,  construing  Code  Civ.  Proc.  N.  Y.  S  1228. 
And  see  Hutchinson  v.  Brown,  8  App.  D.  0.  157.  Where  a  justice  of  tiie 
peace  decided  a  cause  before  him,  and  made  upon  the  papers  in  the  suit  a 
memorandum  of  his  Judgment  within  four  days  after  the  final  submission  to 
him,  hold,  tliat  the  judgment  was  regular  and  valid,  although  no  entry  thereof 
was  made  in  his  docket  until  after  the  lapse  of  four  days.  Walrod  y.  Shuler, 
2  N.  Y.  134. 

117  Act  Va.  May  14.  1874. 

118  Pittsburgh  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Shaw  (Pa.)  14  Atl.  323. 

11  n  Code  Civil  l*roc.  Cal.  §  6(i4.  A  similar  statute  is  in  force  in  Ohio  (Kev. 
St.  §  5o2G);  and  it  is  hold  that  the  clerk  may  enter  judgment  immediately  on 
rendition  of  the  verdict,  and  before  the  expiration  of  the  time  for  moTing 
for  a  new  ti'ial.    Young  v.  Shallenberger,  53  Ohio  St.  291,  41  N.  E.  518. 

120  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  WollT,  79  Cal.  69,  21  Pac.  551;  Bundy  v.  Maghiess. 
7G  Cal.  5.'J2,  18  Pac.  608;  Hehilen  v.  Phillips,  88  Cal.  557,  26  Pac  366;  Ed- 
wards v.  Hellings,  103  Cal.  204,  37  Pac.  218. 

lai  Waters  v.  Dumas,  75  Cal.  563,  17  Pac.  685. 

(176) 


Ch.  6)  BENDITION  AND  BNTRT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §   121 

that  the  judgment  be  entered  at  the  same  term  at  which  the  verdict 
is  rctjimed.  But  the  cases  rule  that  if  this  is  omitted,  it  is  com- 
petent for  the  court  to  enter  the  judgment  at  a  subsequent  term, 
both  parties  appearing  and  being  heard.**" 

Rules  of  the  former  class — those  requiring  a  certain  time  to  inter- 
vene between  verdict  and  judgment — probably  obtain  in  a  majority 
of  the  states,  either  by  statute  or  as  the  settled  practice  of  the  courts. 
Their  design  is  to  afford  the  parties  an  opportunity  of  proceeding 
against  the  verdict,  either  by  a  motion  for  judgment  non  obstante 
veredicto,  motion  in  arrest,  or  motion  for  new  trial,  as  the  case  may 
be.  But  since  the  right  of  a  party  so  to  move  will  not  be  prejudiced 
by  a  premature  entry  of  judgment,**^  and  since  the  judgment  itself 
can  be  stayed  or  set  aside  as  well  as  the  verdict,  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  is  the  right  of  the  prevailing  party  to  have  his  rights  fixed 
by  a  judgment  as  soon  as  he  is  entitled  to  it,  it  is  conducive  to  jus- 
tice not  to  regard  a  judgment  entered  in  advance  of  the  time  as 
entirely  invalid,  but  to  consider  the  rule  as  merely  directory. 

In  some  jurisdictions,  while  judgment  may  be  entered  immediately 
upon  the  verdict,  the  court  may  stay  the  proceedings  for  a  certain 
number  of  days,  for  the  purpose  of  giving  time  for  a  motion  for 
new  trial.  Where  this  is  done,  and  judgment  is  entered  up  before 
the  expiration  of  the  stay,  still  it  is  not  void.  The  judgment  is  only 
provisional,  and  it  does  not  deprive  the  losing  party  of  the  right  so 
to  move."*  And  even  where  it  appeared  that  judgment  was  en- 
tered up  while  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  was  actually  on  file,  which 

12S  Shepbard  y.  Brenton,  20  Iowa,  41.  And  see  Murdock  y.  Ganahl,  47  Mo. 
135;  Prudential  Ins.  Co.  y.  Taylor,  59  N.  J.  Law,  352,  35  Atl.  798;  Voorhiee 
y.  Uennessy,  7  Wash.  243,  34  Pac.  931.  A  judgment  not  entered  within  the 
time  provided  by  law  Is  not  for  that  reason  V9id.  Brown  v.  Porter,  7  Wash. 
327,  34  Pac.  1105.  But  in  New  York,  it  is  held  that  a  judgment  rendered  by 
a  Justice  of  the  district  court  wiU  be  reversed  where  it  was  rendered  after 
the  time  limited  by  law.  OrvJs  y.  Curtlss,  8  Misc.  Rep.  681,  28  N.  Y.  Supp. 
728.  And  in  Iowa,  under  a  statutory  provision  that,  where  a  verdict  is  ren- 
tiered  by  a  Jury  in  a  Justice's  court,  the  Justice  shall  enter  Judgment  thereon 
"forthwith,"  it  Is  held  that  a  Judgment  entered  more  than  90  days  after  the 
return  of  the  verdict  is  void  for  want  of  Jurisdiction.  Toralinsou  v.  LiUe,  82 
Iowa,  32,  47  N.  W.  1015,  31  Am.  St  Rep.  468. 

"»  Hartrldge  v.  Wesson,  4  Ga.  101. 

is«  Harvey  v.  McAdnms,  32  Mich.  472. 

1  LAW  JUDG.-12  (177) 


{122  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  6 

motion  was  afterwards  overruled,  and  all  the  proceedings  occurred 
at  the  same  term  of  court,  it  was  held  that  the  fact  that  judgment 
was  so  entered  was  no  ground  for  reversing  the  decision  on  the 
motion.^  ^° 

S  122*    Date  of  the  Jndcment. 

The  rule  of  the  common  law  was,  that  all  judgments  were  pre- 
sumed to  have  been  rendered  on  the  first  day  of  the  term,  unless 
the  contrary  appeared.  And  it  is  also  a  patt  of  the  English  practice 
to  consider  all  judicial  proceedings  as  taking  place  at  the  earliest 
period  of  the  day  on  which  they  are  done.^**  It  is  still  the  rule,  in 
some  of  the  American  states,  that  all  judgments  docketed  during 
the  term  shall  be  deemed  to  be  docketed  on  the  first  day  of  the 
term;  and  this,  it  is  held,  makes  them  relate  to  the  first  day  even 
where  the  judge  fails  to  open  court  on  that  day.**^  But  in  some 
other  states,  principally  in  New  England,  an  exactly  opposite  rule 
is  in  force,  and  a  judgment  is  regarded  as  rendered  on  the  last  day 
of  the  term,  unless  the  contrary  is  shown.^*®  But  in  a  majority  of 
the  states,  a  judgment  takes  effect  from  the  day  it  is  actually  ren- 
dered or  entered.  ^**    "The  term  of  the  court  is  not  with  us  regarded 

128  Hasted  t.  Dodge  (Iowa)  35  N.  W.  402. 

120  Wright  y.  Mills,  4  Hurl.  &  N.  488.  In  this  case,  Judgment  was  signed 
at  the  opening  of  the  office  at  its  usual  hour,  eleven  a.  m.,  and  the  defendant 
died  at  half  past  nine  a.  m.  on  the  same  morning.  It  was  held  that  the  judg- 
ment was  regular.  For  a  similar  case,  see  Peetsch  v.  Quinn,  6  Misc.  Rep. 
50,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  728. 

"7  Norwood  V.  Thorp,  04  N.  C.  682.  See  Coe  v.  Erb,  59  Ohio  St  250,  52 
N.  E.  040,  69  Am.  St.  Rep.  704.  But  if  a  case  was  not  ready  for  trial,  ao  that 
no  judgment  could  be  given  on  the  first  day  of  the  term,  the  judgment  does 
not  relate  back  to  that  date.  Dunn's  Kx'rs  v.  Renlck,  40  W.  Va.  349,  22  S. 
E.  06. 

128  Bradish  v.  State,  35  Vt.  452;  Herring  v.  Polley,  8  Mass.  113;  Chase  v. 
Oilman,  15  Me.  64;  Goodall  v.  Harris,  20  N.  H.  363.  Accordingly,  the  time 
within  which  a  motion  for  new  trial  must  be  made  (which  is  limited  to  two 
years)  must  be  computed  from  the  last  day  of  the  term.  Bradish  v.  State. 
.35  Vt.  452.  Taxation  of  additional  costs  incident  to  a  suit,  with  award  of 
execution  therefor,  at  a  term  subsequent  to  that  of  the  recording  of  the  judg- 
ment, cannot  be  considered  as  making  the  Judgment  a  judgment  of  the  later 
term.     Klder  v.  Alexander,  1  D.  Chip.  (Vt.)  274. 

120  A  judgment  is  not  void  merely  because  it  la  not  dated.  Beed  t.  Lane,  96 
Iowa,  454.  05  N.  W.  380. 

(178) 


Cb.  6)  RENDITION  AND  ENTRY  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §    123 

as  one  day,  and  though  until  the  term  expires  the  orders  made  and 
judgments  rendered  are  largely  under  the  control  of  the  court,  and 
may  be  altered,  modified,  or  vacated,  yet  they  have  been  generally 
regarded  as  taking  effect  from  the  day  on  which  they  were  made  or 
rendered,  subject  to  the  power  of  the  court,  and  not  from  the  day 
the  term  closes/*  *••  And  the  date  of  a  judgment  may  be  fixed  by 
reference  to  the  record  of  the  proceedings  in  the  case.***  We  shall 
have  occasion  to  discuss  this  topic  more  fully  in  connection  with  the 
subject  of  priority  among  judgment-liens.*'* 

fi   123.    Construction  of  Amblsnovs  Judgments. 

The  rule  for  the  construction  of  ambiguous  judgments  is  clearly 
stated  by  the  supreme  court  of  Kansas  in  the  following  language : 
**Wherever  the  entry  of  a  judgment  is  so  obscure  as  not  to  clearly 
express  the  exact  determination  of  the  court,  reference  may  be  had 
to  the  pleadings  and  the  other  proceedings ;  and  if,  with  the  light 
thus  thrown  upon  such  entry,  its  obscurity  is  dispelled  and  its  in- 
tended signification  made  apparent,  the  judgment  will  be  upheld  and 
carried  into  effect  in  the  same  manner  as  though  its  meaning  and 
intent  were  made  clear  and  manifest  by  its  own  terms."  *'*  This 
rule  also  applies  to  decrees  in  equity.  The  meaning  and  effect  of  a 
decree  may,  in  case  of  doubt,  be  ascertained  by  reference  to  the  bill 
and  other  proceedings,  particularly  when  these  are  referred  to  in 
the  decree  itself.*'*  And  for  this  purpose,  recourse  may  be  had  to 
duly  attested  stipulations  between  the  parties.*'*  But  where  a  judg- 
ment refers  to  the  findings  for  certain  data,  and  the  findings  do  not 

!••  Ex  parte  Dillard,  GS  Ala.  594;  Alabama  C.  &  N.  Co.  y.  State,  54  Ala. 
36;  Quinn  v.  Wlswall,  7  Ala.  645;  Powe  v.  McLeod,  76  Ala.  418;  Pope  v. 
Bniidon,  2  Stew.  (Ala.)  401,  20  Am.  Dec.  49;  Dyson  v.  Simmons,  48  Md. 
207;  Stannls  ▼.  Nicholson,  2  Or.  332. 

»»i  Cooper  v.  Cooper,  14  La.  Ann.  665. 

1"  See  infra,  H  441--444. 

"«  Clay  V.  Hlldebrand,  34  Kan.  694,  9  Pac.  466,  Valentine,  J.  See,  to  the 
Mme  effect  Fleenor  v.  Drisklll,  97  Ind.  27;  Hofferbert  v.  KUnkhardt,  58  111. 
iT4K  Saccessioii  of  Dumford,  1  La.  Ann.  92;  Fowler  y.  Doyle,  16  Iowa,  534; 
Konr-Miie  Land  Co.  v.  Blusher  (Ky.)  55  S.  W.  555. 

"*  Walker's  Ex'r  v.  Page,  21  Grat  (Va.)  636. 

i»»  Thayer  v.  McGee,  2U  Mich.  195. 

(179) 


I    124  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  6 

contain  the  data,  but  refer  again  to  the  pleadings,  which  are  also 
uncertain,  the  judgment  will  be  reversed  for  uncertainty.^*^  A  mis- 
take apparent  on  the  face  of  a  judgment,  amounting  to  an  impossi- 
bility, will  not  destroy  the  judgment,  if  enough  remains,  after  it  is 
corrected  or  eliminated,  to  disclose  the  actual  judgment  rendered. 
Thus,  where  a  judgment  entry  recites  a  demurrer  (sustained)  as 
having  been  interposed  by  the  defendant  to  his  own  plea,  the  ap- 
pellate court  will  intend  the  recital  to  have  been  a  clerical  mistake 
and  that  it  was  the  plaintiff  who  demurred."^  But  a  judgment  must 
follow  the  verdict ;  and  in  a  case  wher6  the  jury  returned  two  ver- 
dicts, as  follows :  "We  the  jury  find  for  the  plaintiff  and  assess  his 
damages  in  the  sum  of  $800,"  and,  "We  the  jury  find  for  the  de- 
fendant on  the  counterclaim  and  set-off  and  assess  the  damages  in 
the  sum  of  $300,"  it  was  held  to  be  error  in  the  court  to  overrule  a 
motion  for  a  venire  de  novo,  and  render  judgment  for  the  plaintiff 
for  $500.*"  The  presumption  in  support  of  the  judgment  extends 
to  inferring  the  presence  of  the  plaintiff  in  court,  for  the  purpose  of 
an  act  which  he  only  could  perform,  although  the  entry  only  recites 
the  presence  of  his  ^ttorney.^'* 

fi  124.    Tbe  Jndsment-Boll,  or  Record* 

It  seems  appropriate,  in  this  connection,  to  give  some  account  of 
the  judgment-roll  or  record  of  the  judgment.  At  common  law  the 
judgment-roll  was  a  roll  of  parchment  upon  which  all  the  proceed- 
ings in  the  cause,  up  to  the  issue,  and  the  award  of  venire  inclusive, 
together  with  the  judgment  which  the  court  awarded  in  the  cause, 
were  entered.  It  included  as  well  the  pleadings  and  process  as  the 
signing  of  judgment.^**     In  our  modern  practice,  the  proceedings 

i»«  Kelley  v.  McKlbben,  53  Cal.  13. 

i»7  Evans  v.  McMaban,  1  Ala.  43. 

las  Baugbn  v.  Baugbo,  114  Ind.  73,  17  N.  E.  181.  See  Jarboe  ▼.  Brown,  »» 
lud.  549. 

1311  Tbomason  v.  Odum,  31  Ala.  108,  68  Am.  Dec.  I.*j9. 

140  Brown,  Law  Diet:  Vall  v.  Iglebart,  69  111.  332.  Brown  says  that  to 
modem  English  practice  '*the  making  up  and  depositing  the  Judgment-ro!!  is 
generally  neglected,  unless  in  cases  wh«re  it  becomes  absolutely  necessary  to 
do  so,  as  when,  for  Instance,  it  is  required  to  give  the  proceedings  In  the 
cause  in  evidence  in  some  other  action,  for  in  such  case  the  Judgment-roU 

(180) 


Ch.  6)  RENDITION  AND  BNTRT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  S  ^24 

arc  not  thus  transcribed,  although  in  some  states  they  are  required 
to  be  copied  with  more  or  less  detail  into  books  kept  for  that  pur- 
pose, and  in  others  a  "judgment-roll,"  consisting  of  the  writ,  plead- 
ings, and  other  papers  in  the  cause,  must  be  on  file  when  the  clerk 
enters  judgment.  And  for  the  purpose  of  an  appeal,  or  other  similar 
use,  the  "record"  comprises  a  full  copy  of  all  the  papers  and  pro- 
ceedings in  the  cause.  The  following  account  of  the  practice  ob- 
taining in  Illinois  will  be  found  applicable  in  many  of  the  states. 
"Under  our  practice,  while  the  pleadings,  process,  etc.,  are -not,  as 
at  common  law,  required  to  be  copied  on  a  parchment  roll,  nor  in 
the  record  book  in  v/hich  final  judgment  is  entered,  they  are  re- 
quired to  be  filed  in  the  office  of  the  clerk ;  and  when  a  copy  of  the 
record  of  the  judgment  is  required,  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  the 
case  by  appeal  or  writ  of  error  into  this  court,  or  bringing  suit  upon 
it  in  another  state,  or  as  evidence  under  an  issue  of  nul  tiel  record, 
or  to  establish  a  former  adjudication  of  the  same  subject-matter  be- 
tween the  same  parties,  and  indeed  in  all  cases  where  it  is  essential 
to  have  a  complete  record  of  a  judgment,  the  pleadings  and  process 
are  an  indispensable  part  of  it.  And  the  general  rule  is,  that  where 
the  copy  of  a  record  of  a  judgment  is  required,  it  must  be  of  the 
whole  record,  so  that  the  court  may  determine  the  legal  effect  of  the 
whole  of  it,  which  may  be  quite  different  from  that  of  a  part."  ^*^ 
In  Massachusetts,  the  clerk's  docket  is  the  record  of  the  court,  until 
the  record  is  fully  extended,  and  every  entry  upon  it  is  the  state- 
ment of  an  act  of  the  court,  which  is  presumed  to  be  made  by  its 
direction,  in  pursuance  either  of  an  order  for  the  particular  entry, 
or  of  a  general  order,  or  of  a  general  usage  pre-supposing  such  an 
order.***  A  record,  it  will  be  remembered,  imports  absolute  verity, 
must  be  tried  by  itself,  and  cannot  be  contradicted.**' 

or  an  examined  copy  thereof,  Is  The  only  eyidence  of  them  that  wiU  \ye  ad- 
mitted.'*   And  gee  Steph.  PI.  24. 

1*1  Vail  T.  I$rlebart,  G8  111.  332;  Stevison  v.  Earnest,  80  111.  513.  And  see 
Barjje  t.  Gandy,  41  Neb.  149,  59  N.  W.  359;  Boe  v.  Irish,  09  Minn.  493,  TJ 
K.  W.  812. 

'*»  liead  T.  Sutton,  2  Cush.  116.  A  Judgment  recovered  before  a  magistrate 
may  be  proved  by  his  memoranda  upon  his  docket  and  upon  the  original  writ, 


'«>  8ee  note  143  on  following  page. 

(181) 


§126  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  6 


I  125.  Smpplyimc  Iiost  Heoords. 

The  power  of  supplying  a  new  record,  where  the  original  has  been 
lost  or  destroyed,  is  one  which  pertains  to  courts  of  general  juris- 
diction independent  of  legislation,  and  if  the  statute  also  confers  a 
power,  and  prescribes  a  practice,  in  that  behalf,  it  does  not  mcr^ 
the  inherent  authority  of  the  courts.***  Hence  if,  for  example,  the 
notice  of  a  motion  for  leave  to  substitute  a  new  record  is  explicit  in 
describing  a  judgment  and  papers  alleged  to  be  lost,  it  is  sufficient, 
although  it  does  not  conform  to  a  statute  which  provides  for  such  a 
proceeding.***  The  destruction  of  the  record  book  in  which  judg- 
ments are  written,  does  not  destroy  the  judgment-debts,  and  though 
the  judgments  are  wrongfully  restored  by  the  court  without  notice 
to  the  debtors,  yet  when  the  judgments  are  revived  by  scire  facias 
with  notice  to  the  debtors,  they  should  make  their  objection  by  plea 
of  nul  tiel  record.***  On  a  motion  to  supply  a  lost  record,  the 
proper  practice  is  as  follows.  The  notice  of  the  motion  must  specify 
when  the  ntotion  will  be  made,  and  must  contain  a  copy  of  that 
which  the  plaintiff  will  move  the  court  to  enroll  as  the  substance  of 
the  lost  record,  and  the  defendant  must  have  reasonable  personal 
service  of  the  notice,  and  also  of  the  affidavits  by  which  it  will  be 
supported,  which  affidavits  may  be  controverted  by  counter-affi- 
davits. If  the  court,  on  hearing  the  affidavits,  is  fully  satisfied  of  the 
loss  or  destruction  of  the  original  record  and  of  the  correctness  of 

and  by  the  production  of  the  original  papers  in  the  case,  Terifted  by  the  te^ 
timony  of  the  magistrate,  if  these,  taken  together,  show  clearly  all  the  essen- 
tial particulars  of  a  valid  judgment,  and  no  extended  record  has  been  macJA 
Mc-Grath  v.  Seagrave,  2  Allen,  443,  79  Am.  Dec.  797. 

143  Adams  v.  Betz,  1  Watts  (Pa.)  42o,  2G  Am.  Dec.  79;  Ellis  t.  EUls,  55 
Minn.  401,  56  N.  W.  lOuC.  Where  a  judgment  roll  offered  in  evidence  con- 
tains two  judgments,  the  last  in  point  of  time  will  be  treatetl  as  the  true  and 
final  Judgment,  and  the  other  disregarded.  Colton  Land  &  Water  Co.  v. 
Swartz,  99  Cal.  278,  33  Tac.  878. 

i**  Doswell  V.  Stewart  11  Ala.  629;  Gammon  v.  Knudson,  46  Iowa.  455; 
George  v.  Middough,  62  Mo.  549;  Keen  v.  Jordan,  13  Fla.  327;  Garibaldi  t, 
Carroll,  33  Ark.  568. 

i*c  Doswell  V.  Stewart,  11  Ala.  629. 
'     1*8  George  v.  Middough,  62  Mo.  549.    And  see  Gibson  v.  Vaughan,  61  Mo. 
418. 

(182) 


Ch.  6)  RENDITION  AND  ENTRY  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  125a 

the  proposed  substitute,  it  will  order  the  substitute  to  stand  enrolled 
as  and  for  the  original.**'  The  application  must  be  made  to  the 
court  in  which  the  record  originally  remained.  The  courts  of  chan- 
cery will  not  entertain  jurisdiction  of  a  bill  to  restore  to  the  judg- 
ment-creditor the  benefit  of  his  judgment,  for  the  reason  that  there 
is  an  adequate  remedy  at  law,  by  motion  in  the  court  in  which  the 
judgment  was  rendered.***  "The  inherent  power  of  courts  to  con- 
trol their  own  records,  and  to  supply  losses  therein,  is  antagonistic 
to  the  power  of  any  other  court  to  interfere  and  make  records  for 
them.  By  this  proceeding,  one  court  of  special  jurisdiction  is  in- 
voked to  take  cognizance  of,  and  to  supply  to  another  court  of  gen- 
eral jurisdiction,  a  record,  in  lieu  of  one  which  has  been  destroyed. 
Ihis  power,  once  admitted,  will  place  the  records  of  the  courts  of 
common  law  at  the  mercy  of  the  court  of  chancery,  and  might  leaid 
to  absurd  conflict  between  the  law  and  equity  side  of  the  court  over 
the  records  of  the  common  law.  *  *  *  There  is  nothing  here 
requiring  the  exercise  of  the  conscience  of  the  court  which  may  not 
be  attained  by  a  simple  proceeding,  according  to  the  course  of  the 
common  law,  and  therefore  chancery  has  no  office  to  perform.'*  **• 

I  125a.    Entry  of  JvdKments  in  Federal  Covrts. 

An  act  of  congress  provides  that  "the  practice,  pleadings,  and 
forms  and  modes  of  proceeding  in  civil  cases,  other  than  equity  and 
admiralty  causes,  in  the  circuit  and  district  courts  [of  the  United 
States],  shall  conform,  as  near  as  may  be,  to  the  practice,  pleadings, 
and  forms  and  modes  of  proceeding  existing  at  the  time  in  like 
causes  in  the  courts  of  record  of  the  state  within  which  such  circuit 
or  district  courts  are  held,  any  rule  of  court  to  the  contrary  notwith- 
standing." *••  This  law,  it  is  held,  extends  to  the  mode  of  entering 
and  recording  judgments,  and  requires  the  judgments  of  the  federal 

147  Adkinson  ▼.  Ke^,  25  Ala.  551. 

»<•  Fluher  t.  Slevres,  05  HI.  90. 

»*•  Keen  v.  Jordan,  13  Pla.  327.  On  a  motion  to  substitute  the  record  of  a 
d^vtroyed  judgment,  the  defendant  cannot  contest  the  truth  of  the  recitals 
of  the  proposed  record,  though  he  may  show  that  the  lost  record  contained  no 
micb  recitals.     Peddy  v.  Street,  87  Ala.  2U9,  6  South.  3. 

!»•  Her.  St  U.  S.  f  U14. 

(183) 


§  12oa  LAW  OP  JUDGMB3rTa.  (Ch.  6 

circuit  and  district  courts,  in  actions  at  law,  to  be  entered  and  re- 
corded in  the  same  manner  as  those  of  the  courts  of  the  state  wh6^^ 
in  such  United  States  courts  sit.^*^  Thus,  if  the  state  practice  au- 
thorizes the  entry  of  a  judgment  upon  the  report  of  a  referee,  with- 
out any  application  to  the  court,  no  application  will  be  considered 
necessary  in  an  action  in  a  federal  court  in  such  state.^"  But  a 
state  law  requiring  a  judge  to  give  his  decision  in  writing  upon 
every  issue  made  by  the  pleadings  is  not  binding  on  the  federal 
courts.*** 

i»i  Morrison  t.  Beniards  Township  (G.  C.)  35  Fed.  400;  Sawin  t.  KeoDj, 
9S  U.  S.  289,  23  L.  Ed.  a26w 

i»  Fotntli  Nat.  Bank  t.  Neyliardt  13  Blatchf.  383,  Fed.  Gas.  No.  iML 
i«s  Martindale  t.  Waas  (G.  G.)  U  Fed.  551. 

•       (184) 


Oh.  7)         ENTRY  OF  JUDGMENTS  NUNC  PRO  TUNC.  §  126 


OHAFTEB  Vn. 

THE  ENTRY  OF  JUDGMENTS  NUNC  PRO  TUNC. 

i  126.  Origin  and  Nature  of  the  Power, 

urr.  Delay  by  Act  of  the  Court. 

12H.  Delay  by  Motions  or  AppeaL 

U9.  Laches  of  Party. 

190.  Supplying  Entry  of  Judgment 

ISl.  Correction  of  Clerical  Errors. 

132.  Not  a  proper  Means  of  changing  or  revising  the  Judgment. 

133.  Only  proper  when  Mnal  Judgment  could  be  entered. 
1S4.  Notice  of  Application. 

135.  Evidence. 

136.  Reladon  back  of  Order. 

137.  Effect  upon  Third  Persons. 

§   126.    Origiiii  and  Nature  of  tlie  Powev. 

The  phrase  "nunc  pro  tunc/'  "now  for  then,"  is  used  to  indicate 
that  something  which  was  omitted  to  be  done  at  the  proper  time  is 
afterwards  performed  with  a  retroactive  effect ;  that  is,  it  is  to  have 
the  same  force  and  virtue,  and  be  attended  by  the  same  consequences 
as  if  it  had  been  regularly  done.  In  relation  to  judicial  proceedings, 
the  performance  of  acts  nunc  pro  tunc  may  take  place  in  the  various 
stages  of  the  progress  of  a  suit,  and  instances  are  not  uncommon  of 
affidavits  or  other  papers  filed  in  this  manner.  But  in  this  connec- 
tion we  are  only  concerned  with  th^  entry  and  the  amendment  of 
judgments  nunc  pro  tunc,  and  in  this  chapter  only  with  the  former. 
The  power  of  the  courts,  whether  of  law  or  equity,  to  make  entries 
of  judgments  or  decrees  nunc  pro  tunc,  in  proper  cases  and  in  fur- 
therance of  the  interests  of  justice,  is  one  which  has  been  recognized 
and  exercised  from  ancient  times,  and  as  a  part  of  their  common  law 
jurisdiction.*     This  power  therefore  does  not  depend  upon  statute; 

» Lord  Mohun*s  Oase,  6  Mod.  59;  Hodges  v.  Templer,  6  Mod.  191;  Mayor 
of  .Vorwlck  v.  Berry.  4  Burrows,  2277;  Evans  v.  Rees,  12  Adol.  &  E.  167,  175; 
Mitchell  v.  Ovemmn,  103  U.  S.  62,  26  L.  Ed.  369;  Wood  v.  Keyes,  6  Paige 
»X.  Y.)  478;  Hess  v.  Cole,  23  N.  J.  Law,  116;  Dial  v.  Holter,  6  Ohio  St.  228; 
i^waln  t.  Naglee,  19  Cal  127;  Reid  v.  Morton,  119  111.  118,  6  N.  E.  414;   Shep- 

(185) 


§127  LAW  OF  JUDQMBNT8.  (Gh.  7 

it  is  inherent.*  It  rests  partly  upon  the  right  and  duty  of  the  courts 
to  do  entire  justice  to  every  suitor,  and  partly  upon  their  control 
over  their  own  records  and  authority  to  make  them  speak  the  truth. 
When  a  judgment  is  allowed  to  be  thus  entered  in  order  that  the 
party  may  not  suffer  for  what  has  transpired  during  a  delay  caused 
by  the  court,  it  exhibits  a  practical  application  of  the  maxim  "Actus 
curiae  neminem  gravabit."  But  the  authority  is  much  wider  than 
this,  and  the  power  must  not  be  confounded  with  the  illustration  of  it 
The  cases  calling  for  the  exercise  of  this  power  of  the  courts  are 
chiefly  of  two  kinds ;  first,  where  no  judgment  was  actually  rendered, 
although  one  might  or  ought  to  have  been ;  second,  where  a  judg- 
ment was  actually  rendered,  but  never  entered  or  put  upon  the  rec- 
ords.   We  shall  first  consider  the  former  class  of  cases. 

§  127.    Delay  by  Act   of  tlie    Covrt. 

In  any  instance  where  a  party  has  brought  his  case  to  trial  and 
proceeded  to  present  it  on  the  merits  and  submit  the  decision,  and 
before  any  judgment  is  rendered  one  of  the  parties  dies,  the  court, 
in  order  that  the  time  consumed  by  it  in  deliberation,  without  laches 
of  the  party  who  was  successful  in  the  suit,  may  not  operate  to  his 
disadvantage,  will  not  allow  the  action  to  abate,  but  instead  will 
enter  judgment  nunc  pro  tunc,  as  of  the  time  of  the  submission.*    Or, 

hard  v.  Breiiton,  20  Iowa.  41.  Statutory  provisions  requiring  a  proceeding  to 
vacate  or  modify  a  judgment  to  be  brouglit  within  a  certain  time  after  the 
judgment  is  pronounced  do  not  apply  to  a  motion  for  an  entry  of  judgment 
nunc  pro  tunc.  Hyde  v.  Michelseii.  52  Xeb.  (J80,  72  N.  W.  1035,  66  Am.  St. 
Kep.  533.     And  see  Risser  v.  Martin,  80  Iowa,  302,  53  N.  W.  270. 

2  Cliissom  V.  Barbour,  100  Ind.  1. 

3  Mayor  of  Norwicli  v.  Berry,  4  Burrows,  2277;  Toulmin  v.  Anderson,  1 
Taunt.. 385;  Bridges  v.  Smyth,  8  Bing.  21>;  Blewett  v.  Tregonning,  4  Adol.  & 
E.  1002;  Green  v.  Colxlen,  4  Scott's  Cas,  480;  Key  v.  Goodwin,  1  Moore  &  S. 
020;  Harrison  v.  Heathorn,  1  Dowl,  &  L.  529;  Evans  v.  Rees,  12  Adol.  &  K. 
167;  Moor  v.  Roberts,  3  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  844;  Seymour  v.  Gre?nwood.  30  I-aw 
J.  Exch.  ISO;  Abington  v.  Lipscomb,  11  T-aw  J.  Q.  B.  15;  Da  vies  v.  Da  vies. 
0  Ves.  401;  Neil  v.  McMillan,  27  T'.  C.  Q.  B.  257:  Mitchell  v.  Overman,  103 
IT.  S.  62,  26  L.  Ed.  309;  City  of  New  Orleans  v.  Warner.  176  U.  S.  92,  2> 
Sup.  Ct.  280,  44  L.  Ed.  385:  Griswold  v.  Hill,  1  Paine.  483,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
5,834;  Goddard  v.  Bolster,  0  ^le.  427,  20  Am.  Dec.  320:  Blalsdell  v.  Harris, 
52  N.  II.  101;  Collins  v.  PrenUce,  15  Coim.  423;  Brown  v.  Wheeler.  18  Ct>nn. 
199;  Perry  v.  Wilson,  7  Mass.  393;  Tapley  v.  Goodsell,  122  Mass.  170;  RygUt- 

(180) 


Gh.  7)  ENTRY  OF  JUDGMENTS  NUNC  PRO  TUNG.  §  127 

if  justice  so  require,  the  judgment  may  be  entered  as  of  the  day  in 
the  term  when  the  last  of  the  evidence  was  submitted.*  And  a 
judgment  may  be  entered  nunc  pro  tunc  against  one  of  several  de- 
fendants, as  well  as  against  a  sole  defendant,  when  death  takes  place 
after  verdict  and  before  judgment*  The  same  practice  obtains,  un- 
der tlM  same  oonditiofis,  in  chancery.  Thus,  a  party  in  interest  hav- 
ing died  since  the  argument  and  before  the  signing  of  a. decree,  the 
decree  and  orders  in  the  cause  should  be  signed  and  filed  as  of  the 
date  of  the  argument.*  The  case  may  also  be  put  in  an  irregular 
position  by  reason  of  the  death  of  the  plaintiff  after  a  verdict.  And 
here  also  the  salutary  power  of  giving  judgment  retrospectively  may 
be  invoked.  By  the  common  law  practice,  since  the  delay  of  the 
court  must  not  be  allowed  to  prejudice  the  parties,  if  the  plaintiff  die 
during  the  time  the  case  is  under  advisement,  judgment  will  be 
entered  for  him  nunc  pro  tunc  as  of  the  time  of  the  return  of  the 
postea.^  But  in  English  practice  (and  probably  the  rule  is  general) 
the  power  so  to  enter  judgment  does  not  extend  to  suits  in  tort.® 
But  it  is  not  only  the  death  of  a  party  that  will  justify  the  exercise  of 
this  power.  It  may  be  employed  to  overreach  any  event  happening 
while  the  case  is  in  the  hands  of  the  court,  and  which  would  otherwise 

myer  t.  Durham,  12  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  245;  Spalding  v.  Congdon,  18  Wend.  (N. 
r.)  Ma;  Holmes  v.  Honle,  8  How.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  383;  De  Agreda  v.  Mantel, 
I  Abb.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  130;  Campbell  v.  Mesier,  4  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  334,  8  Am. 
Dec.  570;  Wood  v.  Keyes,  6  Paige  (N.  Y.)  478;  Klssam  v.  HamUton,  20  How. 
Prac,  (N.  Y.)  3(50;  Fulton  v.  Fulton,  8  Abb.  N.  C.  (N.  Y.)  210;  Long  v.  Stafford, 
103  N.  Y.  275,  8  N.  E.  522;  Arthur  v.  Sohriever,  60  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  59,  16  N. 
Y.  gupp.  610;  He&s  v.  Cole,  23  N.  J.  Law,  116;  Wilson  v.  Myers,  11  N.  C.  73, 
13  Am.  Dec.  510;  Isler  v.  Brown,  60  N,  C.  556;  Beard  v.  Hall,  79  N.  O.  506; 
Allston  V.  Sing.  Riley  (S.  C.)  199;  Powe  v.  McIvCod,  70  Ala.  418;  McLean 
T.  State,  8  Heisk.  <Tenn.)  22;  Pool  v.  Loomis,  5  Ark.  110;  Dial  v.  Holter,  6 
Ohio  St.  228;  In  re  Jarrett's  Estate,  42  Ohio  St.  199;  In  re  Page's  Estate,  oe 
Gal.  40.  The  same  rule  applies  where  the  defendant  is  a  corporation,  and  is 
disflolTed  after  the  action  has  been  tried  and  the  case  taken  under  advise- 
ment by  the  court  Sliakman  v.  United  States  Credit  System  Co.,  92  Wis. 
368,  06  N.  W.  528,  32  L.  R.  A.  383,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  920. 

4  Citizens'  Bank  t.  Brooks  (C.  C.)  23  Fed.  21. 

»  Harrison  v,  Heathom,  1  Dowl.  &  L.  529. 

•  Bamham  v.  Dalling,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  310. 

^  Jackson  v.  Mayor  of  Berwick,  1  Mod.  36. 

•  Ireland  v.  Champneys,  4  Taunt  884.    But  see  Brown  v.  Wheolcr.  IS  Conn. 

isa 

(187) 


§128  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  7 

rob  the  successful  suitor  of  his  judgment.*  Thus,  in  a  case  in  Mass- 
achusetts, where  the  action  was  upon  a  statute  which  was  afterwards 
repealed,  but  before  the  repealing  statute  went  into  operation  the  ac- 
tion was  tried  and  verdict  rendered  for  the  plaintiff,  and  questions  of 
law  were  reserved,  which,  after  the  repeal  took  effect,  were  decided 
in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  the  court  ordered  judgment  to  be  entered 
on  the  verdict  as  of  a  day  previous  to  the  going  into  operation  of  the 
repealing  act.^® 

I  128.    Delay  by  Motions  or  AppeaL 

The  principle  that  a  party  shall  not  be  prejudiced  by  the  act  of 
the  court,  or  the  delay  incident  to  legal  proceedings,  applies  equally 
where  the  successful  litigant  finds  his  progress  obstructed,  after  ver- 
dict, by,  the  pendency  of  a  motion  or  appeal,  during  which  his 
adversary  dies.  Hence,  where  the  defendant,  after  a  verdict  is  given 
against  him,  moves  for  a  new  trial,  and  dies  before  the  decision  of 
the  motion,  and  the  motion  is  subsequently  overruled,  the  judgment 
may  be  entered  up  for  the  plaintiff,  nunc  pro  tunc,  as  of  the  term 
when  the  verdict  was  returned.^ ^  And  conversely,  if  a  verdict  be 
found  for  the  plaintiff,  and  a  motion  is  made  in  arrest  of  judgment, 
during  the  pendency  of  which  the  plaintiff  dies,  the  judgment  will  be 
entered,  the  motion  being  denied,  as  of  the  day  of  the  verdict,  or  as 
of  a  term  after  the  verdict  when  the  plaintiff  was  still  alive;  and  in 
such  a  case,  it  is  held,  it  makes  no  difference  whether  the  cause  of 
action  would  or  would  not  survive.^*  So  also  if  the  plaintiff  dies  dur- 
ing the  pendency  of  a  motion,  and  the  motion  is  subsequently  decided 

»  The  general  principle  is  tliat,  whenever  delay  in  entering  a  judgment  is 
caused  by  the  action  of  the  court,  Judgment  nunc  pro  tunc  will  be  allowed  as 
of  the  time  when  tlie  party  would  otherwise  have  been  entitled  to  it.  If  Justice 
requires  it  McNamara  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  56  N.  J.  Law.  56, 
28  Ati.  313;  Ferrell  v.  Hales,  119  N.  C.  199,  25  S.  E.  821;  Todd  v.  Todd,  7 
S.  D.  174,  63  N.  W.  777.  Compare  McClain  v.  Davis,  37  W.  Va.  330,  16  S.  K 
629,  IS  L.  R.  A.  634;  Llttlejohn  t.  Arbogast,  86  111.  App.  506. 

10  Inhabitants  of  Springfield  y.  Inhabitants  of  Worcester,  2  Cuah.  (Mass.)  51 

11  Den  V.  Toralin,  18  N.  J.  Law,  14,  35  Am.  Dec.  525;  McNamara  v.  New 
Yorlc,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  56  N.  J.  Law,  56,  28  Atl.  318;  Terry  v.  Briggs,  12 
Cush.  (Mass.)  319;  Dial  v.  Holter,  6  Ohio  St  228;  Fitzgerald  v.  Stewart,  5? 
Pa.  343;  Brown  v.  Wheeler,  18  Conn.  199;  Collins  v.  Prentice,  15  Conn.  423. 

la  Griffith  v.  Ogle^  1  Bin.  (Pa.)  172;   Brown  v.  Wheeler,  18  Conn.  199. 

(188) 


Ch.  7)  ENTRY  OF  JUDGMENTS  NUNC  PRO  TUNC.  §  129 

in  favor  of  the  defendant,  the  latter  may  enter  up  his  judgment  as  of 
a  term  before  the  decease  of  the  plaintiff.^'  Where  an  appeal  has 
been  taken,  and  one  of  the  parties  dies  before  hearing  in  the  appellate 
court,  the  proper  practice  is  to  affirm  or  reverse  the  judgment  below 
nunc  pro  tunc.^*  So  in  a  case  where  the  cause  was  transferred  for 
consideration  by  the  court  in  banc,  upon  exceptions  taken  by  the 
defendant,  and  while  it  was  there  pending  the  defendant  died,  and 
afterwards  the  exceptions  were  overruled,  it  was  held  that  the  plain- 
tiff should  have  judgment  as  of  the  term  when  the  verdict  was  ren- 
dered.** Where  an  appeal  is  taken  and  final  judgment  not  entered, 
and  the  appeal  is  afterwards  withdrawn  or  set  aside  for  irregularity, 
the  judgment  may  be  entered  nunc  pro  tunc  on  the  verdict.*®  And 
in  a  case  in  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States,  where  the  appel- 
lee died  after  the  argument  of  a  motion  to  dismiss  the  appeal,  the 
order  on  the  motion  was  entered  nunc  pro  tunc  as  of  the  day  of  the 
argument.*^ 

I  129.    Iiaolies  of  Party. 

If  a  delay  in  the  entering  of  a  judgment,  after  verdict  or  submis- 
sion, is  not  attributable  to  the  act  of  the  court  in  holding  the  case 
under  advisement,  or  the  pendency  of  a  motion  or  other  interruption, 
but  is  caused  by  the  laches  of  the  party  entitled  to  judgment,  and 
during  the  interval  a  party  dies,  judgment  nunc  pro  tunc  will  not  be 
allowed.**  There  is,  of  course,  no  room  here  for  the  application  of 
the  maxim  above  quoted,  and  the  ends  of  justice  do  not  require  that 
the  law  should  restore  to  a  party  an  advantage  which  he  may  have 
lost  through  his  own  negligence  or  hesitation. 

"  Spalding  v.  Congdon,  18  Wend.  (N.  T.)  543. 

*«Snow  v.  Carpenter,  54  Vt.  17. 

i>  Blaisdell  t.  Harris,  52  N.  H.  191.  Where  the  defendant  In  a  criminal 
cause  has  been  found  guilty  by  the  verdict  of  a  Jury,  and  appeals  before  an 
entry  of  final  judgment  against  him,  the  district  court  may  enter  final  Judg- 
ment nunc  pro  tunc  after  a  term  has  intervened  since  the  verdict.  Ex  parte 
Beard.  41  Tex.  234. 

>•  Kane  t.  HIUs,  R.  M.  Charlt.  (Ga.)  103;  Hardee  v.  Stovall,  1  Ga.  «2;  Van 
Gmiden  ▼.  Kane,  88  Va.  591,  14  S.  E.  334. 

3  7  Richardson  v.  Green,  130  U.  S.  104,  9  Sup.  Ct.  443,  32  L.  Ed.  872. 

!•  Fishmongers'  Co.  T.  RobertscA,  8  C.  B.  970;  Willies  y.  Perks.  5  Man.  ^ 
G.  370. 

(189) 


§   130  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Oh.  7 

I  130.    Suyplying  Entry  of  Jmdgment. 

We  come  now  to  the  second  class  of  cases  mentioned  above— 
those  where  a  judgment  was  actually  rendered  by  the  court,  but  was 
never  put  upon  the  records.  And  the  rule  is,  that  in  any  case  where 
the  court  did  actually  render  a  formal  judgment,  but  the  same  has 
not  been  entered  on  the  record,  in  consequence  of  any  accident  or 
mistake,  or  through  the  neglect  or  misprision  of  the  clerk,  the  court 
has  power  to  order  that  the  judgment  once  pronounced  be  entered 
nunc  pro  tunc,  upon  the  production  of  proper  evidence  to  establish 
the  fact  of  the  judgment  and  to  show  jts  terms  and  character  and  the 
relief  granted ;  and  this  may  be  done  after  the  expiration  of  the  term 
at  which  the  judgment  was  originally  given.^*  Thus,  where,  on  a 
plea  of  nul  tiel  record,  the  court  decided  that  there  was  such  a  rec- 
ord, but  in  consequence  of  the  mistake  of  the  prothonotary  judgment 
was  omitted  to  be  entered,  after  which  the  defendant  died,  it  was  held 
that  the  court  might,  in  order  to  do  justice,  enter  judgment  as  of  the 
time  when  it  ought  to  have  been  entered,  although  nearly  eight  years 
had  elapsed,  provided  third  persons  were  not  injured  thereby.**  The 
rule  applies  equally  to  cases  of  judgment  by  confession,**  and  to 
judgments  by  default.**     It  may  be  invoked  in  proceedings  in  a 

i»  Chichester  v.  Cande,  3  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  39.  15  Am.  Dec.  238;  Hagler  ▼.  Mer- 
cer, 6  Fla.  721;  Wilkerson  v.  Goldthwalte,  1  Stew.  &  P  (Ala.)  159;  Whoriey 
V.  Memphis  &  C.  R.  Co.,  72  Ala.  20;  Gotten  v.  McOehee,  54  Miss.  021;  Forbe« 
V.  Navra,  63  Miss.  1;  Hammer  v.  McCbunei,  2  Ohio,  31;  Howell  v.  Morlan. 
78  111.  162;  Ives  v.  Hulce,  17  111.  App.  30;  Shephard  v.  Brenton,  20  Iowa.  41; 
(Mbsoii  V.  Chouteau's  Heirs,  45  Mo.  171,  100  Am.  Dec.  366:  Groner  r.  SmltH. 
49  Mo.  31S;  Belkln  v.  Rhodes,  76  Mo.  643;  Swain  v.  Nagrlee,  19  Cal.  127: 
Drey  fuss  v.  Tompkins,  67  Cal.  339,  7  Pac.  732;  St  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Ca 
V.  Winfrey  (Ark.)  16  S.  W.  572;  Fitzsimmons  v.  Munch,  79  111.  App.  538:  Day 
V.  Goodwin,  104  Iowa,  374,  73  N.  W.  864,  65  Am.  St  Rep.  465;  Van  Etten 
V.  Test,  49  Neb.  725,  68  N.  W.  1023;  Hamer  v.  McKinley-Lanning  L.  &  T. 
Co.,  51  Neb.  496,  71  N.  W.  51;  Hyde  v.  Michelson,  52  Neb.  680,  72  N.  W.  lOSTi. 
66  Am.  St.  Rep.  533;  Guud  v.  Horrigan.  53  Neb.  794,  74  N.  W.  257;  Marshall 
V.  Taylor,  97  Cal.  422,  32  Pac.  515;  Parrott  v.  McDevitt,  14  Mont.  203,  36 
Pac.  193. 

«o  Murray  v.  Cooper,  6  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  126. 

21  Davis  V.  Barker,  1  Ga.  559;  Doughty  v.  Meek,  105  Iowa.  16,  74  N.  W. 
744,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  282.     See,  also,  Mountain  y.  Rowland,  30  Ga.  929. 

«a  Monarch  v.  Brey  (Ky.)  51  S.  W.  191. 

(190) 


Ck.  7)         ENTRY  OF  JUDGMENTS  NUNC  PRO  TUNC.  §  131 

probate  court,*'  and  in  actions  for  divorce,**  as  well  as  in  other  cases. 
Afld  its  application  is  not  confined  to  final  judgments,  but  extends 
also  to  orders  of  the  court.  Entry  of  an  order  sustaining  a  demur- 
rer to  the  petition  may  be  thus  supplied ;  *"  and,  genially  speaking, 
if  it  shall  be  made  to  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court  that  any 
given  order  was  actually  made  at  a  former  term  and  omitted  to  be 
entered  by  the  clerk,  it  may,  at  any  term,  direct  such  order  to  be 
entered  on  the  record  as  of  the  term  when  it  was  made.'* 


§  131.    Conreetion  of  Clerical  Errors. 

'That  a  court  has  a  right,  at  a  term  subsequent  to  one  at  which  a 
judgment  is  rendered,  to  correct,  by  an  order  nunc  pro  tunc,  a  clerical 
error  or  omission  in  the  original  entry,  is  indisputable.  The  error, 
whether  of  commission  or  omission,  must  appear  from  the  record  of 
the  proceedings  in  which  the  entry  of  judgment  is  made."  *^  Thus 
a  judgment  is  not  rendered  void  by  an  omission  to  sig^  it,  but  may 
be  amended,  even  after  the  lapse  of  ten  years,  by  an  order  to  supply 
the  proper  signature  nunc  pro  tunc.**  And  even  during  the  pen- 
dency of  an  appeal  a  judgment  may  be  amended  nunc  pro  tunc,  in 
respect,  for  example,  to  proof  of  acknowledgment  of  service  of  pro- 
cess and  to  the  waiver  of  exemptions,  at  a  subsequent  term  of  the 
trial  court,  and  when  properly  certified  to  the  appellate  court,  the 
amendment  is  before  such  court  for  consideration,  and  will  relate 
back  and  sustain  the  judgment.**  When  the  clerk  is  ordered  by  the 
court  at  a  subsequent  term  to  supply  a  clerical  omission  in  the  rec- 
ord of  a  judgment  by  an  entry  nunc  pro  tunc,  the  proper  course  for 
him  to  pursue  would  be  to  enter  anew  in  the  proceedings  of  that  term 
the  entire  judgment  as  corrected;  and  the  action  of  the  clerk  in  sup- 

*s  Brooks  T.  Brooks,  52  Kan.  562,  35  Pac.  215. 

«*  Rush  v.  Kush,  d7  Tenn.  279,  37  S.  W.  13. 

«»  Texas  Land  &  Loon  Ck).  t.  Winter,  93  Tex.  560,  57  S.  W.  39. 

<•  Burnett  ▼.  State,  14  Tex.  455,  65  Am.  Dec.  131;  Ferguson  v.  Millandon, 
12  La.  Ann.  348;  Huber  Mannfg  Co.  v.  Sweny,  57  Ohio  St.  169,  48  N.  B.  879. 

ST  AUen  t.  Sales,  56  Mo.  28. 

3*  Pollard  T.  King,  62  Ga.  103.  As  to  the  necessity  of  signing  a  judgment, 
■ee  fi  109  supra. 

>•  Seymour  t.  Thomas  Harrow  Co.,  81  Ala.  250, 1  South.  45. 

(191) 


§182  LAW  OF  JT7DOMENTS.  (Ch.  7 

plying  the  omitted  part  of  the  judgment,  by  an  interlineation  in  the 
record  of  the  preceding  term,  is  considered  as  loose,  irregular,  and 
reprehensible.  Nevertheless  such  improprieties  of  the  clerk  would 
probably  not  have  the  eflfect  of  rendering  the  judgment  a  nullity." 

S   132.    Not  a  proper  Means  of  chansins  or  revlsins  the  Judsment* 

The  power  of  courts  to  order  the  entry  of  judgments  nunc  pro 
tunc  is  not  to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  correcting  errors,  omis- 
sions, or  mistakes  of  the  court ;  it  cannot  direct  a  proper  judgment 
to  be  thus  entered  when  the  fault  is  that  the  first  judgment  is  one 
which  should  not  have  been  entered  in  the  case,  or  is  imperfect  or 
improper.*^  The  object  and  effect  of  an  amendment  nunc  pro  tunc 
of  a  judgment  is  to  furnish  proper  evidence  of  acts  properly  done  by 
the  court,  but  not  properly  exhibited  by  its  record ;  and  such  evi- 
dence IS  furnished  in  this  manner,  for  the  purpose  of  supporting  those 
acts  which,  although  the  proper  consequences  of  a  judgment,  would 
seem  to  be  irregular  and  void  because  there  was  no  proper  evidence 
of  a  judgment.'^  Hence  the  court  cannot  at  a  subsequent  term 
change  its  judgment  to  one  which  it  neither  rendered  nor  intended 
to  render ;  '*   nor  supply  an  order  which  it  might  or  ought  to  have 

t.o  Allen  V.  Sales,  56  Mo.  28. 

»i  Brlgnardello  v.  Gray,  1  Wall.  627,  17  L.  Ed.  692;  In  re  Inhabitants  of 
Limerick,  18  Me.  183;  Smith  v.  Hood,  25  Pa.  218.  64  Am.  Dec.  692;  PerkiDS 
V.  Dunlary,  61  Tex.  241;  Hyde  v.  Curling,  10  Mo.  359;  Gibson  v.  Choateaas 
Heirs,  45  Mo.  171,  100  Am.  Dec.  366;  Evans  v.  Fisher,  26  Mo.  App.  541;  Whit- 
well  V.  Emory,  3  Mich.  84,  59  Am.  Dec.  220. 

32  Adams  v.  Higgins,  23  Fla.  13,  1  South.  321.  'The  »itire  purpose  of  en- 
tering orders  or  judgments  as  of  some  prior  date,  Is  to  supply  matters  of  evi- 
dence. The  failure  of  a  court  to  act  does  not  authorize  the  entry  of  a  nanc 
pro  tunc  order  or  Judgment.  If  no  order  or  Judgment  was  In  fact  rendered, 
the  court  cannot  treat  such  defect  as  a  clerical  error.  But  when  It  is  dear 
that  an  order  or  Judgment  was  in  fact  rendered,  but  was  not  entered  upon 
the  Jom'nal  through  the  inadvertence  or  negligence  of  the  clerk,  the  court  la? 
authority  to  order  it  to  be  supplied.  In  such  a  case,  the  record  is  merdy 
amended  by  inserting  in  the  memorial  of  the  proceedings  of  the  coort  that 
which  has  been  omitted  therefrom."  Maxwell,  J., 'in  Garrison  v.  People,  *> 
Neb.  274,  281. 

«3  Ross  v.  Ross,  83  Mo.  100;  Cleveland  leader  Prhiting  Co.  v.  Green,  ^ 
Ohio  St.  487,  40  N.  E.  201,  49  Am.  St  Rep.  725;  Page  T.  Chapin,  80  Mo.  App. 
159. 

(192) 


Ch.  7)  ENTRY  OF  JUDGMENTS  NUNC  PRO  TUNC.  §  133 

made,  but  wholly  omitted  to  make.^*  Nor  can  such  an  entry  be 
made  by  the  court  for  the  purpose  of  reversing  its  action  in  respect 
to  what  it  formerly  refused  to  do  or  assent  to.'**  Yet  the  cases  hold 
that  if,  in  an  action  by  two  or  more  plaintiffs,  or  against  two  or  more 
defendants,  judgment  has  been  mistakenly  entered  for  one  plaintiff 
only,  or  against  one  defendant  only,  as  the  case  may  be,  a  proper 
judgment  nunc  pro  tunc  may  be  subsequently  entered,  without  no- 
tice, if  the  record  furnishes  sufficient  ground.'* 

I  133.    Oaly  yroper  ivlieii  Final  Jndsmeiit  oould  be  entered. 

The  rule  that  a  judgment  may  be  entered  nunc  pro  tunc,  when 
such  action  is  necessary  in  order  to  save  a  party  from  being  un- 
justly prejudiced  by  a  delay  caused  by  the  act  of  the  court  or  the 
course  of  legal  procedure,  must  be  taken  with  an  important  restric- 
tion, viz.,  that  such  an  entry  is  not  proper  unless  the  case  was  in  such 
a  condition,  at  the  date  to  which  the  judgment  is  to  relate  back,  that 
a  final  judgment  could  then  have  been  entered  immediately.  If  it 
were  otherwise,  the  death  of  one's  adversary,  for  example,  might 
operate  to  one's  positive  advantage.  But  this  is  not  the  object  of 
the  practice.  It  is  intended  merely  to  secure  that  one  shall  not  suf- 
fer for  an  event  which  he  could  not  avoid.  As  it  has  been  said,  "a 
judgment  nunc  pro  tunc  in  case  of  death  is  proper  only  when  a  party 
dies  after  hearing,  while  the  case  is  under  advisement,  or  after  the 
case  has  proceeded  so  far  that  judgment  can  be  entered,  if  not  as  a 
merely  formal  act,  at  least  without  the  need  of  further  inquiry  or 
evidence  into  matters  of  fact  involved  in  the  controversy."  *^  Hence 
if  there  is  no  verdict  in  the  record,  the  court  cannot  at  a  subsequent 
term  order  a  verdict  and  judgment  to  be  entered  nunc  pro  tunc ;   if 

»*  Hyde  t.  Curling,  10  Mo.  359. 

»•  Moore  v.  State,  63  Ga.  165. 

»•  Alien  v.  Bradford,  3  Ala.  281,  37  Am.  Dec.  689.  It  Is  held  In  Arkansas 
that  If,  on  appeal  from  a  Justice  of  the  peace,  Judgment  is  recovered  against 
the  appellant  and  his  sureties  in  the  appeal  bond,  and  the  clerk  omits  to  in< 
dude  the  sureties  in  the  entry  of  Judgment,  a  nunc  pro  tunc  Judgment  may 
be  entered  against  them  at  a  subsequent  term  without  notice  to  them.  Free- 
man T.  Mears,  36  Ark.  278;  Shaul  v.  Duprey.  48  Ark.  331,  3  S.  W.  366. 

•T  Haard  v.  Durant,  14  R.  I.  25.  And  see  BlrdseU  Manurg  Co.  v.  Inde- 
pcDdent  Fire-Sprinkler  Co.,  87  111.  App.  443. 

1  LAW  JUDO.— 13  (193) 


§135  LAW  OF  JUBCOnSNTB.  (Ch.  7 

the  record  does  not  show  that  a  verdict  was  rendered,  it  cannot  be 
supplied  at  a  subsequent  term  of  the  court.** 

S  134.    N«Hioe  of  ApplloatloB. 

In  Alabama  it  is  the  settled  practice  of  the  courts  that  a  judgment 
nunc  pro  tunc  may  be  entered  at  a  subsequent  term  without  noticf 
to  the  opposite  party,  if  there  is  any  order  or  memorandum  of  record 
to  warrant  the  entry.**  In  New  York,  also,  it  is  held  that  an  entry 
of  judgment  nunc  pro  tunc  may  be  ordered  without  notice,  and  an 
improper  notice  is  a  mere  irregularity,  not  a  fatal  defect.**  But  in 
some  other  states  the  view  holds,  that  although  a  judgment  may  be 
entered  on  a  verdict  without  notice,  yet  an  application  to  aineiid  a 
judgment  after  the  term  at  which  it  was  rendered,  must  be  made 
upon  notice  to  the  adverse  party.*^  In  general,  we  may  say  that  flie 
necessity  of  notice  of  such  an  application  must  depend  upon  the 
sources  which  are  to  furnish  the  evidence  of  the  judgment  to  be  en- 
tered. If  the  examination  is  to  be  confined  to  the  records,  the  pres- 
ence of  the  defendant  could  not  affect  the  result,  nor  would  he  have 
room  to  contest  it.  But  if  it  is  to  be  based  on  extraneous  proof,  it 
is  but  just  that  he  should  have  the  opportunity  to  prepare  counter- 
vailing testimony. 

S  135.    £vid«]iott» 

It  is  held  in  several  of  the  states  that  the  evidence  which  will  jus- 
tify the  court  in  entering  a  judgment  nunc  pro  tunc  must  be  record 
evidence;  that  is,  that  such  entry  can  only  be  made  upon  the  pro- 
duction of  some  note,  entry,  or  memorandum  from  the  records  or 

> 8  Gray  v.  Thomas,  12  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  Ill;  Jennings  y.  Ashley,  6 
Ark.  128.  And  see  North  v.  Pepper,  20  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  677;  Kissam  ▼.  Ham- 
ilton, 20  How.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  375. 

»»  Mays  V.  HasseU,  4  Stew.  &  P.  222,  24  Am.  Dec.  750;  Bentley  r.  Wright 
3  Ala.  e07;  Allen  v.  Bradford.  3  Ala.  281,  37  Am.  Dec.  68»;  Glass  v.  Gte«, 
24  Ala.  468;  Nabers'  Adm'r  v.  Meredith,  67  Ala.  333.  Compare  Womack  ▼. 
Sanford,  37  Ala.  445. 

♦0  Long  V.  Stafford,  103  N.  Y.  274,  8  N.  B.  522. 

41  Berthold  v.  Fox,  21  Minn.  51;  Hill  v.  Hoover,  5  Wla  386,  68  Am.  Dec 
70;  Weed  y.  Weed,  25  Conn.  337;  King  y.  Bumham,  12d  Mass.  508.  See  in- 
fra, f  164. 

(194) 


Ql  7)  BNTBY  OF  JtrOGMSlfrt  mjNC  1»R0  TUNC.  }  135 

quasi  records  of  the  court,  which  shows  in  itself,  without  the  aid  of 
parol  evidence,  that  the  alleged  judgment  was  rendered,  alnd  what 
were  its  character  and'  terms.**  "We  think,'*  said  the  court  in  Ala- 
bama, "that  no  judgment  can  be  amended,  or  one  rendered  nunc  pro 
tunc,  unless  such  amendment  or  rendition  of  judgment  be  authorized 
by  matter  of  record,  or  by  some  entry  made  by  or  under  the  author- 
ity of  the  court,  which  entry  must  be  shown  by  the  record  of  the 
caise,  or  at  the  least  by  some  book  belonging  to  the  office  of  the  court 
»d  required  to  be  there  kept  by  law."  *•  It  is  somewhat  difficult  to 
ascertain  from  the  authorities  what  will  be  .considered  record  evi- 
dence for  this  purpose.  But  it  is  held  that  the  entry  may  be  based 
OB  the  judge's  minutes  or  the  clerk's  entries,  or  some  paper  on  file 
in  the  case,  but  cannot  be  made  upon  the  judge's  recollection  of  what 
took  place  at  the  trial  or  upon  outside  evidence.**  So  entries  on  the 
court  and  bar  docket,  which  are  quasi  records,  are  admissible  evi- 
dence; and  a  recital  in  the  amending  judgment  that  the  court  "is  of 

«s  Adams  v.  Re  Qua,  22  FIs.  250,  1  Am.  St  Rep.  191;  Drauglmn  y.  Tom- 
be^bee  Bank,  1  Stew.  (AJa.)  66,  18  Am.  Dee.  38;  Andrews'  Adm*r  v.  Branch 
Bank,  10  Ala.  375;  Hudson  y.  Hudson,  20  Ala.  364,  56  Am.  Dec.  200;  Met- 
caJf  V.  Metcalf.  19  Ala.  319,  54  Am.  Dec.  188;  Yonge  y.  Broxson,  23  Ala.  681; 
8x  parte  Joees,  61  Ala.  399;  Ex  parte  GUmer,  64  Ala.  234;  Lilly  y.  Larkln,  t» 
Ala.  123;  Herring  v.  Cherry,  75  Ala.  376;  Kemp  y.  Lyon,  76  Ala.  212;  Shack- 
elford y.  Levy.  GS  .Ilss.  125;  Raymond  v.  Smith,  1  Mete.  (Ky.)  65,  71  Am. 
Dec.  458;  Ludlow*8  Heirs  y.  Johnston,  3  Ohio,  553,  17  Am.  Dec.  609;  Goughran 
▼.  Gutcbeua,  38  IlL  390;  Cairo  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  y.  Holbrook,  72  111.  419;  Hyde 
y.  Curling,  10  Mo.  359;  Gibson  y.  Chouteau's  Heirs,  45  Mo.  171,  100  Am.  Dec. 
306;  Fletctaer  ▼.  Coombs,  58  Mo.  430;  Atkinson  y.  Atchison,  T.  A  S.  F.  R. 
Co..  81  Mo.  50;  Bllze  y.  Castlio,  8  Mo.  App.  290;  Swain  y.  Naglee,  19  Cal. 
127;  Hegeler  y.  Henckell.  27  Cal.  491;  Ware  y.  Kent,  123  Ala.  427,  26  South. 
208,  82  Am.  St.  Rep.  132;  Montgomery  County  y.  Auchley,  103  Mo.  492,  15  S. 
W.  626;  Boyd  v.  Schott  (Ind.)  50  N.  B.  379;  Tynan  y.  Weinhard,  153  lU.  598, 
38  X.  E.  1014.  An  oral  announcement  of  the  court's  decision  is  not  a  suffi- 
cient bosis  for  an  entry  of  judgment  nunc  pro  tunc.  Boyd  y.  Schott,  152  Ind. 
161,  52  N.  E.  752. 

*»  Hudson  y.  Hudson,  20  Ala.  364,  56  Am.  Dec.  200. 

««  Belkln  y.  Rhodes,  76  Mo.  643;  Graham  y.  Lynn,  4  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  17,  39 
Am.  Dec.  493;  Short  y.  Kellogg,  10  Ga.  180;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  y.  Wlng- 
Ut.  165  ni.  634,  46  N.  E.  712.  The  presumption  of  the  yerlty  of  the  record 
vill  control  where  the  eyidence  afforded  by  the  papers  and  flies  in  the  case 
iff  in  conflict  with  that  furnished  by  the  minute  book  and  the  judge's  docket. 
Missouri,  BL  &  E.  Ry.  Co.  y.  Holschlag,  144  Mo.  253,  45  S.  W.  1101,  66  Am. 
8t  Rep.  417.    But  in  Kansas,  it  is  said  that  the  minutes  on  the  court's  docket 

(195) 


I   136  LAW  OF  JXJDOMBNTa.  (Ch.  7 

opinion"  from  an  inspection  of  said  docket,  etc.,  is  equivalent  to  an 
averment  that  the  court  deemed  the  evidence  satisfactory,  and  is 
sufficient  to  sustain  the  amendment,  unless  the  entries  themselves 
are  shown  to  be  insufficient.**  And  where  an  order  approving  the 
report  of  commissioners  in  partition,  although  informal,  taken  in 
connection  with  the  report  itself,  affords  sufficient  data,  there  is  no 
error  in  the  entry  at  a  subsequent  term  of  a  judgment  nunc  pro  tunc 
ratifying  and  giving  effect  to  the  report.**  So  a  memorandum  writ- 
ten by  the  presiding  judge  across  a  motion  entered  on  the  motion- 
docket  will  authorize  a  nunc  pro  tunc  order.*^ 

On  the  other  hand  there  are  numerous  cases  which  hold  that  an 
entry  nunc  pro  tunc  may  be -ordered  on  any  evidence  that  is  suffi- 
cient and  satisfactory,  whether  it  be  parol  or  otherwise.*'  But  the 
general  balance  of  authority  seems  to  be  with  the  cases  holding  that 
so  far  as  concerns  the  question  whether  a  judgment  was  ever  ren- 
dered, that  fact  must  be  established  by  record  evidence  and  cannot 
be  proved  by  parol, — a  rule  which,  if  conservative,  is  also  entirely 
safe.  Thus,  when  a  case  stands  on  the  docket  as  not  disposed  of,  and 
no  entry  on  the  papers  or  elsewhere  is  produced  indicating  any  dispo- 
sition of  it,  a  final  judgment  cannot  be  entered  nunc  pro  tunc  on  parol 
testimony  alone,  unaided  by  the  judge's  recollection,  especially  where 
counsel  for  one  of  the  parties  denies  on  oath  all  knowledge  of  the 
alleged  judgment,  and  there  is  no  positive  affirmative-  evidence  but 
that  of  the  adverse  counsel.**     But  when  the  fact  that  a  judgment 

and  the  testimony  of  the  presiding  judge  are  ordinarily  controlling.  Shocfcey 
v.  Akey,  6  Kan.  App.  920,  49  Pac.  G94.  An  entry  in  the  clerk's  minutes,  giving 
the  style  of  the  case  and  the  case  number,  followed  by  the  abbreviation 
"Judgt,"  is  a  sufficient  basis  for  the  entry  of  a  Judgment  nunc  pro  tane. 
Monarch  v.  Brey  (Ky.)  51  S.  W.  191. 

45  Farmer  v.  Wilson,  34  Ala.  75. 

*e  Mead  v.  Brown,  G5  Mo.  552.    And  see  Wade  v.  Bryant  (Ky.)  7  S.  W.  3»7. 

47  Harris  v.  Bradford,  4  Ala.  214.  Where  the  flies  of  the  court,  the  motion. 
the  enti-y  of  its  filing,  its  purpose,  and  the  entry  of  simUar  orders  in  the  same 
cause,  show  that  tlie  order  was  made,  a  nunc  prq  tunc  entry  may  be  made, 
Hanebrough  v.  Fudge,  80  Mo.  307. 

*8  Frink  v.  Frink,  43  N.  H.  508,  80  Am.  Dec.  189,  82  Am.  Dec.  172;  Rugg 
V.  Parker,  7  Gray  (Mass.)  172;  Weed  v.  W^eed,  25  Conn.  337;  Jacobs  v.  Burg- 
wyn,  63  N.  C.  193;  Aydelotte  V.  Brittaln,  29  Kan.  98;  Bobo  v.  State,  40  Art 
224;  BrowDlee  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Grant  Co.,  101  Ind.  401. 

*»  Itobeitson  v.  Pharr,  5G  Ga.  245;  Cadwell  v.  Dullaghan,  74  Iowa,  23^,  3T 
(19G) 


Ch.  7)  ENTRY  OF  JUDGMENTS  NUNC  PRO  TUNa     '      §  136 

was  formerly  rendered  is  established  by  record  evidence,  it  seems 
entirely  reasonable  to  admit  parol  proof  for  the  purpose  of  showing 
its  date,  character,  and  terms,  and  the  relief  granted.  And  it  is  so 
held  by  many  respectable  authorities.*®  In  order  to  entitle  a  party 
to  have  a  judgment  entered  on  the  minutes  nunc  pro  tunc,  he  must 
show  when  it  was  rendered ;  certainly  at  what  term  of  the  court,  if 
not  on  what  day  of  the  term.**^ 

S  136.    Relation  back  of  Order. 

A  nunc  pro  tunc  entry  of  judgment  is  made  as  of  the  time  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  court  actually  took  place,  and  becomes  a  part  of  the 
entry  of  that  date  the  same  as  if  entered  then.'*  Hence  the  entry, 
by  its  relation  back,  will  cure  any  variance  between  the  judgment  as 
originally  (defectively)  entered  and  the  execution  issued  thereon.*' 
**There  can  be  no  doubt  that  such  an  entry  may  operate  so  as  to  save 
proceedings  which  have  been  had  before  it  is  made.  For  instance,  a 
judgment  is  actually  made  at  one  term,  but  through  mistake  or  neg- 
ligence is  not  entered  of  record.  Subsequent  to  the  term,  the  plain- 
tiff, under  the  impression  that  the  business  had  all  been  correctly 
transacted,  prays  out  execution.  The  property  of  the  judgment- 
debtor  is  levied  upon  and  sold  to  a  bona  fide  purchaser,  who  parts 
with  his  money  in  good  faith.  In  such  case  the  court  may  with  pro- 
priety enter  a  judgment,  to  be  considered  of  the  term  in  which  it  was 
actually  rendered  and  should  have  been  entered.  Such  proceedings 
should  be  for  the  furtherance  of  justice.  It  would  do  no  injury  to 
the  parties  concerned,  and  would  secure  the  rights  of  an  innocent 

N.  W.  178.  Such  entry  should  not  be  ordered  by  a  Judge  other  than  the  one 
who  is  claimed  to  have  made  the  original  order,  upon  the  mere  statement 
ot  counsel,  excepted  to  by  opposing  counsel,  that  such  order  was  made.  Car- 
ter T.  McBroom.  Ho  Tenn.  377,  2  S.  W.  803. 

••Camoron  v.  Thurmond,  56  Tex.  22;  Burnett  v.  State,  14  Tex.  455,  65 
Am.  Dec.  131;  Johnson  v.  Wright,  27  Ga.  555;  Weed  v.  Weed,  25  Conn.  337; 
Krink  t.  Frink,  43  N.  H.  508,  80  Am.  Dec.  180,  82  Am.  Dec.  172;  Rugg  ▼. 
I'arker,  7  Gray  (Mass.)  172;  Clark  v.  Lamb,  8  Pick.  (Mass.)  415,  10  Am.  Dec. 
332;  Darls  v.  Shaver,  61  N.  C.  18,  91  Am.  Dec.  92. 

*i  Robertson  v.  Pharr.  56  Ga.  245. 

»3  Bush  V.  Buah.  46  Ind.  70. 

»«  Jonlau  T.  Petty.  5  Fla.  326. 

(197) 


§   137  ULW  OF  JUDOMBNT8.  (Ch.  7 

purchaser."  •*  But  it  is  held  that  for  the  purpose  of  a  statute  of  lim- 
itations, the  date  of  the  entry  of  a  judgment  nunc  pro  tunc  is  the 
date  of  the  order  of  such  entry,  and  not  the  day  as  of  which  the  judg- 
ment is  ordered  to  take  effect.  •• 

S  137.    Elfe<»t  upon  Tlilrd  PeraoiLB. 

When  a  judgment  is  entered  nunc  pro  tunc,  its  effect,  so  far  as  it 
operates  by  relation  back  to  the  earlier  date,  must  be  confined  to  the 
rights  and  interests  of  the  original  parties;  at  least  it  will  not  be 
allowed  to  work  detriment  to  the  rights  of  innocent  third  persons  ac- 
quiring interests  without  notice  of  the  rendition  of  any  judgment." 
Thus  a  purchaser  of  real  estate  takes  it  charged  with  the  lien  of  only 
such  judgments  as  are  actually  existing  at  the  time  of  the  purchase, 
and  it  is  not  comp^etent  for  a  court  to  bind  by  a  lien  the  land  of  a 
third  person  by  the  rendition  of  a  nunc  pro  tunc  judgment  against 
his  grantor.'^  So  an  entry  nunc  pro  tunc  of  a  probate  decree  of  in- 
solvency of  the  estate  of  a  decedent  takes  effect,  as  against  claims 
filed  by  creditors  thereof,  from  the  date  of  actual  entry.'*  In  order 
that  such  an  entry  of  judgment  may  bind  a  person  who  is  not  a  party 
thereto  (such  as  a  surety  in  a  supersedeas  bond  given  on  appeal 

»«  Ludlow's  Heirs  v.  Johnston,  3  Ohio,  558,  575,  17  Am.  Dee.  009.  Enter- 
ing a  decree  nunc  pro  tunc,  and  thereby  restricting  the  time  for  appeal,  is  not 
prejudicial  error,  where  the  defeated  party  succeeds  in  perfecting  his  appeal. 
Monson  v.  KiU,  144  111.  248,  33  N.  E.  43. 

»«  Borer  v.  Chapman,  119  U.  S.  587,  7  Sup.  Ct.  342,  30  L.  Ed.  532. 

60  Banlt  of  Newburgh  v.  Seymour,  14  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  219;  Vroom  v.  Ditmas, 
5  Paige  (N.  Y.)  528;  Smith  v.  Uood,  25  Pa.  218,  W  Am.  Dec.  092;  Gaipin  t. 
Fishbume,  3  McCord  (S.  C.)  22,  15  Am.  Dec.  614;  Acklen  v.  Acklen,  45  Ala. 
609;  Graham  v.  Lynn,  4  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  18,  39  Am.  Dec.  493;  Small  v.  Douth- 
Itt,  1  Knn.  335;  Shirley  v.  Phillips,  17  111.  471;  McCormick  v.  Wbeeler,  »5 
in.  114,  Ho  Am.  Dec.  388;  Koch  v.  Atlantic  &  P.  R.  Co.,  77  Mo.  354;  Hays  v. 
Miller,  1  Wash.  T.  143.  But  on  motion  to  enter  nunc  pro  tunc  a  judgment 
already  rendered,  a  stranger  cannot  intervene  and  question  the  judgment. 
Hillens  v.  Brinsfleld,  113  Ala.  304,  21  South.  208. 

5T  Miller  v.  Wolf,  63  Iowa,  233,  18  N.  W.  880.  But  a  party  to  an  action  can- 
not prevent  the  court  from  entering  nunc  pro  time  the  Judgment  pronounced 
by  it,  by  showing  tliat  some  third  person,  not  a  party  to  the  suit  has  acquired 
an  Interest  in  the  property  involved  since  the  rendition  of  the  original  Judg- 
ment.    Hyde  v.  Michelsen,  52  Neb.  680,  72  N.  W.  1035,  06  Am.  St.  Rep.  SSS, 

5«  Acklen  v.  Acklen,  45  Ala.  609. 

(198) 


Ch.  7)  ENTRY   OF  7UDG«n»NT8   KVffC  PRO   TUNC.  §   137 

from  the  judgment  as  first  entered),  it  must  appear  that  he  had  notice 
of  the  judgment  really  rendered  at  the  time  his  rights  were  acquired 
or  his  liability  fixed  thereunder,  or  that  he  had  notice  of  the  applica- 
tion to  have  the  nunc  pro  tunc  entry  made  and  an  opportunity  to 
appeal  therefrom.** 

••  Koch  y.  Atlantic  A  P.  R.  Co.,  77  Mo.  354. 

(1»9) 
i 


§   138  LAW  OF  JUDQMENTflL  (Ch.  8 


CHAPTEB  VnL 

AMOUNT  AND  CHARACTER  OF  RBUEF  GRANTED. 

8  138.  Amount  greater  than  JPlalntifTs  Demand. 

139.  Assessment  of  Damages  on  Default. 

140.  Amount  indorsed  on  Summons. 

141.  l^ayer  for  Relief  as  Measure  of  Recovery. 

142.  Judgment  must  follow  tbe  Verdict 

143.  Allowance  of  Credits. 

144.  Tender,  Counterclaim,  Offer  of  Compromise. 

145.  Joint  Parties. 

14(>.  Affirmatlye  Relief  to  Defendant 

147.  Interest. 

148.  Conditions  as  to  Payment 

149.  Statutory  Damages. 

150.  Designation  of  Amount. 

151.  Judgment  designating  Medium  of  Payment 

152.  Judgment  for  Coined  Money. 

S   138.    Amomit  greater  thaii  Plaintiire  Demaiid. 

Since  judgments  are  usually  rendered  for  a  definite  sum  of  money, 
and  are  intended  either  to  enforce  the  payment  of  a  legal  debt,  or  to 
establish  the  existence  of  a  legal  right  and  give  compensation  for  its 
infraction  by  an  award  of  damages,  it  becomes  important  in  this 
connection  to  consider  the  amount  and  character  of  the  relief  which 
may  be  granted,  the  mode  of  its  ascertainment,  and  the  question  of 
designating  the  medium  of  payment.  These  matters  will  constitute 
the  subject  of  the  present  chapter.  And  first,  it  is  an  undisputed 
rule  that  if  a  judgment  be  rendered  for  a  greater  sum,  whether  by 
way  of  debt  or  damages,  than  is  laid  in  the  ad  damnum  clause,  or 
claimed  in  the  declaration,  petition,  or  complaint,  or  notified  to  the 
defendant  by  the  demand  in  the  summons,  then  the  judgment  will 
be  erroneous  and  liable  to  reversal.^    Thus,  where  a  complaint  con- 

1  Chaffee  v.  Hooper,  54  Vt  513;  Andrews  v.  Monllaws.  8  Hun,  65;  Dennison 
V.  Leeeli,  »  Fa.  164;  Jobnson  v.  Van  Doren,  2  X.  J.  Law,  374;  Lester  v. 
Cloud,  67  Ga.  770;  Hillebrant  v.  Barton,  39  Tex.  5U9;  Janson  v.  Bank  of 
the  Republic,  48  Tex.  SHU;  Price  v.  Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R.  Co.,  18  Ind.  137; 

(200) 


Ch.  8)  AMOUNT   AND   CHARACTBR  OF   RELIEF   GRANTED.  §    138 

tains  two  paragraphs,  and  there  is  a  special  finding  of  facts  by  the 
court,  and  the  facts  found  support  all  the  material  allegations  of  one 
of  the  paragraphs,  but  not  of  the  other,  judgment  must  be  rendered 
as  upon  the  paragraph  that  is  supported  by  the  findings,  and  it  can- 
not be  for  an  amount  greater  than  is  claimed  therein  to  be  due.^ 
Xor  is  the  application  of  this  rule  confined  to  contested  actions.  It 
is  equally  true,  in  cases  where  the  defendant  suflfers  a  default,  that 
a  judgment  for  more  than  the  plaintiff  has  claimed  is  erroneous,  and 
may  be  set  aside,  modified  on  motion,  or  reversed  on  appeal.'  And 
a  judgment  for  a  greater  sum  than  that  laid  in  the  declaration  can- 
not stand,  even  though  the  defendant  confesses  judgment  for  the 
larger  amount.*  Nor  will  the  defendant's  withdrawal  of  his  pleas 
authorize  or  sustain  a  judgment  for  a  sum  in  excess  of  that  warranted 
by  the  cause   of  action   stated  in  the  petition.*     But   it  must  be 

Oak«  V.  Ward,  19  111.  46;  Taylor  v.  Richman,  87  111.  App.  419;  Stiles  v. 
Brown,  3  G.  Greene  (Iowa)  589;  Hayton  v.  Hope,  3  Mo.  53;  Beckwith  v. 
Boyce,  12  Mo.  440;  Cautliom  v.  Berry,  09  Mo.  App.  404;  Wheeler  v.  Mayher, 
iColo.  App.)  «1  Fac.  623;  Lamping  v.  Hyatt,  27  Cal.  99;  Bond  v.  Pacheco, 
30  Cal.  530;  Foley  v.  Foley,  120  Cal.  33,  52  Pac.  122,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  147; 
Gentry  v.  United  States,  41  C.  C.  A.  185,  101  Fed.  51;  Morrison  v.  KHomme- 
dien,  15  App.  Div.  623,  44  N.  Y,  Supp.  79;  Denison  v.  Lewis,  5  App.  D. 
C.  328;  Sontheru  Bell  Teleplione  &  Telegraph  Co.  v.  D'Alemberte,  39  Fla.  25, 
21  South.  570;  Wilkins  v.  Bums  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  25  S.  W.  431;  Warren  v. 
Prewett  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  25  S.  W.  647;  Chaney  v.  Ramey  (Ky.)  43  S.  W. 
^235.  It  is  immaterial  that  the  evidence  may  prove  a  greater  debt,  or  a 
jn^ater  amount  of  damage,  than  was  alleged  by  the  plaintiff  in  his  deelara- 
rion.  Denison  v.  Lewis,  5  App.  D.  C.  328;  Cauthorn  v.  Berry.  69  Mo.  App. 
-KM;  Uster  v.  Vowell.  122  Ala.  264,  25  South.  564.  And  where  the  dec- 
laration specially  alleges  the  items  of  damage,  in  precise  and  deflnite  sums, 
there  can  be  no  greater  recovery  than  their  aggregate,  notwithstanding  that 
the  ad  damnum  clause  claims  a  greater  amount  in  a  lump  sum.  Kerry  v. 
Pacific  Marine  Co.,  121  Cal.  564,  54  Pac.  89,  66  Am:  St.  Rep.  63.  But  In 
Indiana,  It  appears  that,  where  the  complaint  demands  a  money  Judgment 
in  a  speolHed  sum,  and  defendant  has  answered,  Judgment  may  be  rendered 
for  a  greater  sum  than  that  demanded,  should  the  case  Justify  it.  Bozarth 
V.  McGlllicuddy,  19  Ind.  App.  26,  47  N.  E.  397.  And  see  Code  Civ.  Proo.  Cal. 
f  58(J. 

2  Helms  V.  Keams,  40  Ind.  124. 

>  Andrews  v.  Monilaws,  8  Hun,  65;  Bond  v.  Pacheco,  30  Cal.  530.    See 
lHompson  T.  Turner,  22  111.  389. 

*  Lester  v.  Cloud,  67  Ga.  770. 

•  Janiion  v.  Bank  of  the  Kepubllc,  48  Tex.  599. 

(201) 


§    1  39  lAW  OF  JVDOMBNT8.  (Cb.  8 

observed  that  a  judgment  so  rendered  for  an  excessive  amount  is  not 
void.*  Relief  may  be  had  against  it,  or  it  may  be  corrected  or  set 
aside,  in  any  appropriate  mode ;  nevertheless  it  is  not  a  mere  nullity. 
Consequently  it  will  stand  as  a  valid  adjudication  until  the  proper 
steps  are  taken  against  it,  and  will  be  binding  upon  the  parties  and 
not  c^en  to  collateral  attack.  And  where  this  is  the  only  error  in 
flie  judgment,  it  may  be  rectified  without  the  necessity  of  entirely  va- 
cating it.  For  if  a  judgment  is  entered  for  too  great  an  amount,  it 
may  be  reformed  by  remitting  the  excess.^  Again,  if  the  plaintiff 
amends  his  petition,  and  issue  is  joined  thereon,  his  recovery  will 
not  be  limited  to  the  amount  claimed  in  the  original  petition.*  Or, 
in  proper  cases,  the  complaint  will  be  deemed  to  have  been  amended 
so  as  to  demand  judgment  for  the  amount  actually  recovered.*  It 
also  appears  that  it  is  not  error  to  render  judgment  for  an  amount 
of  damages  exceeding  the  ad  damnum  in  the  writ,  after  the  action, 
together  with  other  claims  of  the  plaintiff  against  the  defendant,  has 
been  referred  to  arbitrators  under  a  rule  of  court.**  It  should  also 
be  remarked  that  the  rule  prohibiting  a  judgment  for  a  greater  sum 
than  that  demanded  by  the  plaintiff  does  not  apply  to  the  addition  of 
costs  to  the  amount  of  the  recovery,  though  the  total  may  exceed  the 
ad  damnum,^ ^  but  it  does  prevent  the  addition  of  attorneys'  fees  in 
excess  of  the  sum  claimed  in  the  complaint.** 

I  139.    AMeasment  of  Damac®*  om  Default. 

We  have  already  seen,  in  the  chapter  on  judgments  by  default, 
that  if  the  amount  which  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  is  defi- 

«  Chaffeo  v.  Hooper,  54  Vt  513;  Bond  v.  Pacheco,  30  Cal.  530;  Gum-Elastic 
Rooflng  Co.  V.  Mexico  Pub.  Co.,  140  Ind.  158,  39  X.  K.  443,  30  L.  R.  A.  700. 

T  Anthony  v.  Estes,  101  X.  C.  541,  8  S.  E.  347;  Lister  v.  Vowell,  122  Ate. 
204,  25  South.  504.  In  case  of  remittitur,  the  Judgment  previously  entered 
should  first  be  set  aside,  and  a  remittitur  entered,  and  this  should  then  be 
followed  by  judgment  for  the  amount  remaining.  Bartling  v.  Thielman,  183 
lU.  88,  55  N.  ifl.  077. 

8  Kohn  V.  Johnson  (Iowa)  80  N.  W.  543. 

»  Carpenter  v.  Sheldon,  22  ind.  259. 

10  Day  V.  Berkshire  Woolen  Co.,  1  Gray  (Mass.)  420. 
i  11  French  v.  Goodnow,  175  Mass.  451,  56  N.  E.  719.    And  the  same  Is  troe 

of  interest.     Georgia  Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Goode,  95  Va.  751,  30  S.  K.  360. 

"  Skym  V.  Weske  Consolidated  Co.  (Cal.)  47  Pac.  110. 

(202) 


Ch.  8)  AMOUNT   AND   CiiAKACTEK   OF    BELIEF   GRANTED.  §    141 

nitely  fixed  by  the  contract  or  other  instrument  on  which  he  sues,  a 
final  judgment  may  at  once  be  entered,  upon  the  defendant's  defauh, 
for  such  amount;  and  that  the  same  is  true  if  the  amount  can  be 
ascertained  by  a  matter  of  simple  calculation.  But  in  other  cases,  an 
interlocutory  judgment  must  first  be  entered,  fixing  the  plaintiff's 
right  to  recover,  and  then  the  damages  assessed  by  a  writ  of  inquiry 
or  some  other  proper  method.^*  It  is  therefore  erroneous  for  the 
court,  in  an  action  on  an  unliquidated  claim,  to  proceed  to  render 
final  judgment  for  a  specific  sum,  without  the  preliminary  assessment 
of  damages.^^  And  in  an  action  on  an  open  account,  in  which  the 
defendant  was  defaulted,  the  judgment  will  be  set  aside  if  the  record 
does  not  disclose  in  what  manner  and  upon  what  proofs  the  amount 
of  the  judgment  was  ascertained.^' 

S  140.   Aateiiiit  imdorsed  on  Svnunoajk 

In  some  of  the  states,  where  the  code  practice  is  established,  it  is 
required  by  law  that  in  all  civil  actions  for  the  recovery  of  money 
only,  the  amount  for  which  judgment  will  be  taken,  if  the  defendant 
fails  to  appear,  shall  be  indorsed  on  the  summons.  When  such 
indorsement  is  made,  the  defendant  has  a  right  to  rely  upon  it  as  fix- 
ing a  limit  beyond  which  the  court  cannot  go  in  rendering  judgment, 
in  case  he  chooses  to  make  no  appearance  in  the  action,  and  it  is 
error  to  exceed  it.** 

f   141.    PrAFer  fer  Relief  mm  Measure  of  ReooTery. 

According  to  the  settled  practice  in  equity,  the  rule  in  regard  to  de- 
crees is  similar  to  that  just  stated  as  governing  judgments  at  law, 

IS  Bupra,  (^  8». 

»*  Beam  v.  Hayden,  5  Bosh  (Ky.)  426;  Evans  v.  Parks,  10  Ark.  306;  War- 
ren T.  Kennedy,  1  Ueiak.  (Tenn.)  437. 

iftSneU  V.  Irvine,  17  FU.  234. 

i«  Cleveland  Co-op.  Stove  Co.  v.  Grimes,  9  Neb.  123,  2  N.  W.  345;  Basset 
V.  Mitchell  (Kan.)  19  Fac.  671.  But  a  recovery  for  an  amount  greater  than 
the  sum  indorsed  on  the  summons  is  lawful  where  the  excess  is  for  Interest 
Accroed  since  the  commencement  of  the  suit.  Elliott  v.  Knight,  64  111.  App. 
V7.  And  the  fact  that  the  Judgment  exceeds  the  sum  indorsed  on  the  sum- 
moDB  is  unimportant  where  the  defendant  appears  and  answers  to  the  merits. 
Krck  V.  Omaha  Nat  Bank,  43  Neb.  613,  62  K.  W.  67. 

(203) 


§    141  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  8 

viz.,  that  it  is  error  to  decree  relief  not  sought  in  the  bill,  in  other 
words,  if  the  complainant  has  prayed  for  specific  relief  in  the  prem- 
ises, or  relief  as  to  a  specific  subject-matter,  no  more  extensive  relief 
can  properly  be  accorded  to  him.^^  But  it  is  usual  to  join  with  the 
demand  for  specific  relief  a  prayer  for  general  relief  also,  and  where 
this  is  done,  the  court  is  not  limited,  in  its  dealing  with  the  matters 
in  litigation,  to  the  orders  or  decrees  particularly  asked  for,  but  may 
take  such  other  action  as  may  be  necessary  to  fully  adjust  the  equi- 
ties, provided  it  be  not  inconsistent  with  the  allegations  of  the  bill 
and  the  facts  in  evidence.*'  So  where  there  are  prayers  for  both 
specific  and  general  relief,  the  court,  if  it  refuses  the  specific  relief 
asked,  may  still  grant  any  other  appropriate  relief  under  the  general 
prayer.**  But  it  is  the  settled  rule  in  equity  that  a  party  must  re- 
cover according  to  the  case  made  by  his  bill  or  not  at  all, — secundum 
allegata  as  well  as  secundum  probata.  Hence,  even  under  a  prayer 
for  general  relief,  the  court  cannot  go  outside  the  case  made  by  the 
pleadings,  and  decree  in  favor  of  the  plaintiflF  on  grounds  not  stated 
in  his  complaint,  or  grant  relief  for  matters  not  charged,  although 
they  may  appear  from  other  parts  ol  the  pleadings  and  be  improp- 
erly in  evidence.*®  But  the  fact  that  more  extensive  relief,  of  the 
same  general  nature,  is  prayed  in  the  bill  than  is  warranted  by  the 

IT  Dodge  v.  Wright,  48  111.  382;  Smith  v.  So  RiU  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  54  S.  W.  38. 

18  Laverty  v.  Sexton,  41  Iowa,  435;  Galloway  v.  Galloway,  61  Tenn.  328; 
Colton  V.  Ross,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.)  39(5,  22  Am.  Dec.  648;  Wilkin  v.  Wilkin,  1 
Johns.  Ch.  (x\.  Y.)  Ill;  Kelly  v.  Payne,  18  Ala.  371;  Stone  v.  AndersoD,  2G 
X.  H.  506;  Allen  v.  Coffmau,  1  Bibb  (Ky.)  469;  Barr  v.  Haseldon,  10  Rich, 
fcki.  (S.  C.)  53. 

i«  Rogers  V.  Brooks,  30  Ark.  612. 

20  Rome  Exchange  Bank  v.  Eames,  4  Abb.  Dec.  (N.  Y.)  83;  Rogers  t. 
Brooks,  30  Ark.  612;  Carpentier  v.  Brenham,  50  Cal.  549;  Miller  v.  AUen, 
104  Ky.  114,  46  S.  W.  523.  For  example,  where  plaintiff  seeks  to  recover  for 
a  conversion,  a  Judgment  for  foreclosure  of  an  alleged  lien  on  the  same 
property  cannot  be  granted  under  his  prayer  for  general  relief.  Behrens 
Drug  Co.  V.  Hamilton  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  45  S.  W.  622.  So,  wh»e  plaintiffs 
pleadings  asked  for  a  lien  only  on  personal  property  of  defendant  a  Judg- 
ment giving  him  in  addition  a  lien  on  defendant's  realty.  Is  erroneous.  Cod- 
lln  V.  Lamont  Iron  Co.,  116  Mich.  626,  74  X.  W.  1004.  In  an  action  to 
enforce  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  land,  where  both  parties  allege  a  sale,  but 
differ  as  to  the  consideration,  a  decree  cancelling  the  contract  as  Inequi- 
table is  erroneous.    Hoover  y.  Binkley,  66  Ark.  645,  51  S.  W.  73. 

(204) 


Ch.  8)  AMOUNT    AND    CHARACTER   OF   RELIEF   GRANTED.  §141 

proofs  does  not  preclude  giving  so  much  as  the  evidence  will  sus- 
tain. Thus  if  the  bill  asks  relief  on  an  allegation  of  an  abandonment 
of  twenty-six  acres  of  land,  and  the  proof  is  that  sixteen  acres  only 
were  abandoned,  the  complainant  may  be  relieved  as  to  the  sixteen.^* 
Under  the  code  practice,  where  the  forms  of  action  are  abolished, 
and  either  a  legal  or  an  equitable  remedy,  or  both,  may  be  prosecuted 
under  the  same  method  of  procedure,  the  rules  already  stated  will 
still  hold  good,  though  modified  by  certain  statutory  provisions, 
which  we  now  proceed  to  notice.  The  codes  generally  provide  that  if 
there  be  no  answer,  the  relief  granted  cannot  exceed  that  which  the 
plaintiff  shall  have  demanded  in  his  complaint.^^  A  recent  decision 
in  California,  construing  the  phrase  "cannot  exceed,"  holds  that,  in 
case  of  default,  it  is  improper  to  grant  the  plaintiff  any  other  relief 
tlian  that  prayed  for.^'  Whence  it  would  appear  that  if  the  plaintiff 
has  mistaken  his  remedy,  or  otherwise  failed  to  demand  the  relief 
appropriate  to  his  case,  it  would  be  beyond  the  power  of  the  court 
10  enter  the  proper  judgment.  But  this  view  runs  counter  to  that 
held  in  New  York,  where,  the.language  of  the  statute  being  the  same, 
the  courts  say :  "The  relief  demanded  by  no  means  necessarily  char- 
acterizes the  action  or  limits  the  plaintiff  in  respect  to  the  remedy 
which  he  may  have.  If  there  be  no  answer,  the  relief  granted  can- 
not exceed  that  which  the  plaintiff  shall  have  demanded  in  his  com- 
plaint But  the  fact  that  after  the  allegation  of  the  facts  relied  upon 
the  plaintiff  has  demanded  judgment  for  a  sum  of  money  by  way  of 
damages  does  not  preclude  the  recovery  of  the  same  amount  upon 
ihc  same  state  of  facts  by  way  of  equitable  relief.  The  relief  in  the 
two  cases  would  be  precisely  the  same ;  the  difference  would  be  form- 
al and  technical.  If  every  fact  necessary  to  the  action  is  stated,  the 
plaintiff  may,  even  when  no  answer  is  put  in,  have  any  relief  to  which 
the  facts  entitled  him  consistent  with  that  demanded  in  the  com- 
plaint."'* Rut  under  this  clause,  where  a  complaint  contains  no 
prayer  for  damages,  a  judgment  on  default  awarding  damages  is  erro- 

•1  VIckgburg  &  M.  K.  Co.  v.  Kagsdale.  54  Miss.  200. 
"  Code  N.  Y.  f  275;  Code  Civ.  Proc.  Cal.  $  5«0. 
«» Mudge  V.  Steinhart,  78  Oil.  34,  20  Pac.  147,  12  Am.  St  Rep.  17. 
»« Uale  V.  Omaba  Nat.  Bank,  49  N.  Y.  628;  Hagar  v.  Townsend  (C.  C.)  67 
F^  433.    Compare  UaU  v.  Gall,  17  App.  Div.  812,  45  N.  Y.  Supp.  248. 

(205) 


§    141  LAW  OF  JUDOMENTa  j(Ck.  8 

-neoiis,  althot^h  the  complaint  states  facts  sufficient  to  sustain  such 
a  jiKigincnt.**  However,  under  the  codes,  the  extent  of  the  relief  to 
be  granted  by  a  judgment  is  restricted  to  that  prayed  for  in  the  com- 
plaint only  in  cases  where  there  is  no  answer;  in  all  other  cases  any 
relief  may  be  granted  which  is  consisteirt  with  the. case  made  by  the 
pleadings.**  Thus,  for  example,  where  the  complaint  in  an  action 
relating  to  land  contains  proper  averments  to  entitle  the  |rfaintiffs 
to  possession,  and  a  general  prayer  for  relief,  and  there  are  an  ap- 
pearance, trial,  and  finding  that  the  plaintiffs  are  owners  and  entitled 
to  possession,  and  defendant  is  in  unlawful  possession,  judgment 
for  possession  is  proper,  though  there  is  ^lo  specific  prayer  therefor.*^ 
So,  in  a  case  where  the  plaintiff,  in  an  action  to  recover  a  street  as- 
sessment, asked  for  a  judgment  against  the  defendant's  lot  but  not 
for  a  personal  judgment,  and  the  court  rendered  judgment  against 
the  lot  and  also  ordered  that  if  the  lot  shotiM  not  seH  for  the  fall 
am!Ount  of  the  plaintiff's  claim,  then  a  personal  judgment  for  the  bal- 
ance should  be  docketed  against  the  defendant,  it  was  held  that  the 
action  of  the  court  was  proper,  it  having  jurisdiction  of  both  the 
subject-matter  and  the  person  of  the  defendant.**  Again,  where  the 
plaintiff  alleges  facts  entitling  him  to  both  legal  and  equitable  relieh 
and  demands  both,  the  court  may  award  either  that  is  appropriate  to 

20  Pittsburgh  Coal  Min.  Co.  ▼.  Greaiwood,  38  Cal.  71.  See  Miner  ▼.  Peir- 
Bon,  Id  Kan.  27;  Olcott  ▼.  Koliteaat,  56  Hun,  e07,  8  N.  Y.  Supp.  117. 

26  Marder  v.  Wright,  70  Iowa,  42,  29  N.  W.  799;  Humphrey  v.  Thoni,  63 
Ind.  2y«;  Bank  of  Kusseliville  v.  Coke  (Ky.)  45  S.  W.  867;  Poledori  t.  Xew- 
man,  11(5  Cal.  375,  48  Pac.  32o;  Ellis  v.  Rademacher,  125  Cal.  556,  58  l?ac. 
178.  The  tillDg  of  a  demurrer  is  not  the  making  of  a  defense  within  tbe 
meaning  of  these  statutes.  Board  of  Sinkiug  Fund  Com'rs  v.  Mason  A  Foard 
Co.  (Ky.)  41  S.  W.  548.  In  Missouri,  it  is  said  that,  where  a  petition  con- 
tains a  plain  statement  of  the  cause  of  action,  it  is  immaterial  what  tbe  prayer 
is;  and  the  trial  court  may  direct  such  Judgment  as  the  averments  and  facts 
of  the  case  will  warrant.  Gunnel!  v.  E^merson,  80  Mo.  App.  322.  And  in 
North  Carolina,  there  is  a  ruling  that,  where  a  Judgment  is  Justified  by  tbe 
pleadings  and  proof,  it  is  immaterial  that  It  is  not  in  conformity  with  the 
prayer  of  the  complaint.     Keade  v.  Street,  122  N.  C.  301,  30  S.  E.  124. 

2  7  Evans  v.  Schafer,  119  Ind.  49,  21  N.  E.  448.  And  see  Eldridge  T.  Adams, 
54  Barb.  417. 

28  Chase  v.  Christianson,  41  Cal.  258.  See  Conlin  v.  Lamont  Iron  Co..  W 
Mich.  UL'(i.  74  xN.  W.  1004.  Compare  Childress  v.  Smith  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  3T 
S.  W.  1070. 

(206) 


Ch.  8)  .  AMOUNT    AND   CHARACTER   OF    RStlEF   GRANTED.  §    142 

the  case  made  by  the  proof.'*  Nevertheless  this  equitable  power  in 
the  courts  will  not  justify  them  in  awarding  to  the  plaintiff,  upon  a 
replication,  an  entirely  different  judgment  from  that  prayed  for  in  his 
petition.** 

i   142.    Jndsment  must  follow  the  Verdict. 

The  judgment  must  follow  the  verdict,  and  if  the  jury  have  found 
a  verdict  for  a  specified  sum  of  money,  the  court  cannot  render  judg- 
ment for  any  greater  amount ;  if  the  verdict  is  wrong,  the  remedy  is 
by  a  new  triaL*^  Or  a  judgment  entered  for  a  sum  in  excess  of  what 
the  vetdict  authorized  may  be  reformed  so  as  to  bring  it  within  the 
verdict.**  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  verdict  is  excessive,  being  for  a 
greater  amount  of  damages  than  are  laid  in  the  declaration,  it  is  said 
that  judgment  may  be  given  only  for  the  amount  so  laid.**  But  this 
would  appear  to  be  adequate  ground  for  a  motion  in  arrest  and  for 
new  trial;  although  it  would  undoubtedly  be  good  practice  to  enter 
a  remittitur  for  the  excess  and  take  judgment  for  the  balance.*^  Ac- 
cording to  the  practice  of  the  United  States  courts,  the  clerk  has  no 

>•  Johnson  v.  UathOTn,  2  Abb.  Dec.  406. 

»•  Marder  v.  Wright,  70  Iowa,  42,  2»  N.  W.  799;  Eastllck  v.  Wright  121 
CaL  3U9,  53  Pac.  654;  Hib^nia  Savings  &  Loan  Soc.  v.  Thornton,  123  Gal. 
ez,  56  Pac  702;  Lazarus  v.  Barrett,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  5,  23  S.  W.  822.  But 
in  Iowa,  nnder  MiUer^s  Code,  §  2514,  \^bich  provides  for  a  change  into  the 
proper  proceedings  in  case  a  wrong  proceeding  is  adopted,  a  proper  judgment 
at  law  for  the  amount  of  the  claim  will  be  given,  though  the  proceeding  was 
erraneonsly  commenced  in  equity  to  establish  a  mechanic's  lien.  Swift  v. 
Catalan,  102  i«wa,  206,  71  N.  W.  23S,  37  L.  R.  A.  462,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  443. 

SI  Buck  T.  LitUe,  24  Miss.  463;  R^d  v.  Dunklin,  5  Ala.  205;  MitcfaeU  v. 
GeiaendorC,  44  Ind.  358;  John  A.  Tolman  Ck).  v.  Savage,  5  S.  D.  496,  59  N. 
W.  8K!;  dark  t.  Gallaher,  3  Tex.  Civ.  App.  541,  22  S.  W.  1047.  But  the 
judgment  mmj  inclnde  interest  accrued  since  the  verdict  Hallberg  v.  Bros- 
Man,  6i  IlL  App.  520.  And  it  is  said  that  a  trifling  excess  in  the  judg- 
ment <sach  as  ten  cents)  will  not  invalidate  it,  especially  where  the  decree 
oiders  a  sale  in  the  exact  amount  of  the  verdict.  Brown  v.  Montgomery  (Tex. 
Or.  App.)  31  &  W.  1079.  The  fact  that  the  court,  in  entering  final  judgment 
in  ejectment,  did  not  award  to  the  plaintiff  all  the  premises  to  which  he 
wai  entitled  under  the  verdict,  affords  no  ground  of  complaint  to  defendant. 
CoUxrado  Central  ConsoUdated  Min.  Go.  v.  Turck,  2  O.  O.  A.  67,  50  Fed.  888. 

»«  Stevens'  Kx'rs  v.  Lee,  70  Tex.  279,  8  S.  W.  40. 

•*  BaltseU  V.  Ulckman,  4  Utt  (Ky.)  265. 

•«  Walka  T.  Fuller,  29  Ark.  448. 

(207) 


§144  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  8 

authority  to  enter  judgment  for  any  other  sum  than  the  verdict  and 
statute  (the  action  being  statutory)  call  for;  hence  where  the  stat- 
ute requires  interest  to  be  added  to  the  verdict,  the  clerk  cannot  enter 
a  judgment  for  the  amount  of  the  verdict  without  interest,  even 
though  the  plaintiff  waives  the  interest.* • 

S  143.    AUowanoe  of  Credits. 

In  an  action  on  an  obligation  for  the  payment  of  money,  on  which 
credits  are  indorsed,  the  judgment  should  be  rendered  for  the  real 
balance  due,  deducting  the  indorsements.*'  But  where  the  judgment 
on  a  promissory  note,  on  which  there  was  a  payment  indorsed,  was, 
by  mistake,  rendered  for  the  amount  of  the  note  apparent  on  its  face, 
without  deducting  the  payment  indorsed,  it  was  held  that  this  did  not 
invalidate  the  judgment  and  render  void  the  proceedings  under  an 
execution  issued  thereon,  but  relief  must  be  afforded  to  the  party 
injured  in  some  other  mode.*^  It  is  also  held  that  payments  made 
pending  the  suit  iare  to  be  deducted  in  making  up  the  judgment*' 
But  where  the  plaintiflf  is  entitled  to  the  entire  amount  sued  for  or 
nothing  at  all,  a  judgment  in  his  favor  for  part  of  such  amount  cannot 
stand.** 

§  144.    Tender,  Coimter claim,  Offer  of  Compromise. 

If  a  verdict  is  returned  for  a  sum  less  than  the  amount  tendered 
in  court,  it  would  be  erroneous  to  render  judgment  on  the  verdict 

86  RobostelU  V.  New  lork,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.  (C.  O.)  34  Fed.  507. 

80  Gray  v.  Mines,  4  Mimf.  (Va.)  437.  Attorney's  commissions  stipulated  for 
by  a  judgment  note  will  be  computed  on  the  balance  due  on  tbe  note,  for 
which  Judgment  Is  entered,  unless  it  is  shown  that  previous  payments  credited 
on  the  note  were  secured  by  the  services  of  the  attorney.  George  P.  Steel 
Iron  Co.  V.  Jacobs,  y  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  122. 

8  7  Hathaway  v.  Hemingway,  20  Conn.  191.  The  court,  In  this  case,  was 
Inclined  to  think  the  remedy  was  by  application  to  a  court  of  chancery.  But 
a  mistake  of  this  kind  could  probably  be  cured  by  amendment  in  the  court 
rendering  the  judgment;  and  it  has  been  held  that  failure  to  credit  sodi  a 
partial  payment  in  the  entry  of  the  Judgment  will  be  cured  by  crediting  it  on 
the  execution.     Woiford  v.  Bowen,  57  Minn.  267,  59  N.  W.  195. 

38  Joy  V.  Hull,  4  Vt  455,  24  Am.  Dec.  ($25. 

89  Pionier  v.  Alexander,  7  Allsc.  Kep.  709,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  157;  Owens  r. 
Flynn,  7  Misc.  Kep.  171,  27  JS.  1.  JSupp.  330. 

(208) 


Ch.  8)  AMOUNT    AND   CHARACTER  OF   RELIEF   GRANTED.  §    145 

and  order  the  residue  to  be  refunded,  inasmuch  as  the  tender  admits 
the  whole  to  be  due.*^  The  proper  practice  in  such  a  case  would  be 
to  set  aside  the  verdict  and  enter  judgment  for  the  amount  tendered, 
the  plaintiff  being  entitled  to  that  much  on  the  pleadings."  If 
the  defendant  succeeds  in-  establishing  a  counterclaim,  judgment 
should  of  course  be  given  in  his  favor,  either  for  the  whole  amount 
or  for  its  excess  over  the  claims  proved  by  the  plaintiff,  according  as 
the  case  may  be.**  So  a  claim  for  damages  for  a  breach  of  warranty, 
interposed  by  answer  to  a  petition  to  recover  the  price  of  the  goods, 
is  in  effect  a  counterclaim,  and  the  court  can  render  judgment  for  the 
undisputed  portion  of  the  price,  and  allow  the  action  to  proceed  as 
to  the  sum  in  dispute.**  An  offer  of  settlement  made  by  the  plain- 
tiff before  the  commencement  of  the  action,  will  not  preclude  him 
from  recovering  a  larger  sum  than  that  contemplated  by  his  offer.** 

§   146.    Joint   Fartiei. 

£mbarrassing  questions  sometimes  arise  in  regard  to  the  amount 
and  character  of  the  judgment  in  cases  where  there  are  numerous 

«•  Sweetland  v.  TutbUl,  54  HI.  215.  It  is  equally  error  to  render  judgment 
for  tlie  plaintiff  upon  the  pleadings,  without  evidence,  for  a  larger  sum  than 
tlie  answer  admits  to  be  due  to  him.  Van  Etten  v.  Kosters,  48  Neb.  152,  66 
N.  W.  HOG.  If  defendant  becomes  entitled  to  costs,  because  of  plaintiff's  fail- 
ore  to  recover  a  more  favorable  judgment  than  defendant  has  offered,  a  single 
judgment  should  be  entered  for  the  plaintiff  for  the  amount  recovered,  less 
defendant's  costs.    Coatsworth  v.  Ray,  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  498. 

"  Coffman  v.  Brown,  7  Colo.  147,  2  Pac.  905. 

«*BDt  defendant  Is  not  entitled  to  recoupment  for  an  amount  larger  than 
that  claimed  In  his  plea.  Paragon  Refining  Oo.  v.  Lee,  98  Tenn.  613,  41  S. 
W.  d^SL  A  judgment  for  plaintiff  in  an  action  in  which  a  set-off  is  pleaded 
need  not  specilieally  show  what  disposition  was  made  of  the  set-off.  Coats 
T.  Barrett,  49  111.  App.  275.  Where  a  counterclaim  is  well  pleaded  and  the 
plaintiff  Interposes  no  reply,  he  cannot  recover  more  than  the  sum  claimed  in 
bis  petition,  less  the  amount  of  the  counterclaim;  and  a  verdict  in  his  favor 
for  more  than  this  should  be  set  aside.  Ashland  Land  ft  Live-Stock  Co.  v. 
Woodford,  50  Neb.  118,  69  N.  W.  769. 

«•  Moore  ▼.  Woodside,  26  Ohio  St.  537.  And  see  Clarkson  v.  Manson,  60 
How.  Prac.  48. 

««  Brush  T.  S.  A.  &  D.  R.  Co.,  43  Iowa,  554.  An  agreement  between  the 
parties  as  to  the  amount  of  the  recovery  will  support  a  judgment  for  such 
amoimt,  altbongh  the  pleadings  were  not  amended  to  correspond  with  the 
agreement.     Wilson  v.  Panne,  1  Kan.  App.  721,  41  Pac  984. 

1  LAW  JUDO.-14  (209) 


§    146  .  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  8 

parties  on  one  side  or  the  other.     And  first,  in  regard  to  joint  plain- 
tiflFs,  it  is  the  rule  that  several  persons  having  distinct  claims  against 
the  same  defendant  cannot  make  one  suit  the  vehicle  for  carrying  all 
their  demands  into  judgment.     Their  recovery  is  limited  to  what 
concerns  them  jointly.     For  instance,  all  persons  whose  property  is 
affected  by  a  nuisance,  though  they  own  the  property  in  severalty 
and  not  jointly,  may  unite  in  an  action  to  abate  the  nuisance;  but 
in  such  action  they  cannot  have  judgment  for  the  damages  done  to 
the  property  of  each,  but  only  such  relief  as  is  common  to  all  the 
plaintiffs,  e.  g.,  an  injunction  against  the  nuisance.**     Conversely, 
one  of  a  class  of  plaintiffs  cannot,  in  suing  alone,  procure  an  adjudi- 
cation which  will  be  binding  upon  all,  unless  the  others  come  in 
as  joint  plaintiffs  or  otherwise  connect  themselves  with  the  action. 
Thus,  where  only  one  of  ten  distributees  sued  the  administrator  in 
the  probate  court,  it  was  held  irregular  for  that  court  in  its  judgment, 
without  making  the  other  persons  interested  parties,  to  do  more  than 
adjudicate  the  rights  of  the  plaintiff  and  the  administrator.**    Where 
proceedings  are  taken  concurrently  by  several  persons  against  the 
same  fund,  it  seems  they  stand  on  an  equal  footing.     Thus,  in  a 
Massachusetts  case,  where  two  trustee  processes  were  served  at  the 
same  time,  and  judgment  was   recovered  in  each  for  an  amount 
greater  than  the  sum  held  by  the  garnishee,  it  was  considered  that 
each  of  the  creditors  was  entitled  to  one-half  of  the  fund,  though 
their  claims  were  unequal.*^     Where  several  defendants  are  sued 
jointly  in  an  action  on  contract,  the  rule  at  common  law  was  that 
the  plaintiff  could  only  recover  judgment  against  all  or  none  of  them. 
But  this  has  been  changed  by  statute  in  many  of  the  states,  so  that 
now,  in  such  an  action,  a  judgment  may  be  rendered  in  favor  of  one 
of  the  defendants  and  against  the  other,  if  the  facts  warrant  it" 
In  equity,  a  decree  between  co-defendants,  grounded  on  the  pleadings 
and  proofs  between  the  plaintiff  and  defendants,  is  regular,  and  in 
fact  the  court  is  bound  to  make  such  a  decree  in  order  to  avoid  a 

*»  Grant  v.  Schmidt,  22  Minn.  1.     See  Helmutb  v.  Bell,  150  liL  263,  37  K. 
E.  2ao. 
*«  Williams  v.  Williams,  74  N.  C.  1.   ' 
-47  Davis  V.  Davis,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  111. 
*8  Supra,  H  «2,  120;  Moffett  v.  Blckle,  21  Qrat  280. 
(210) 


i 


Cb.  8}  AMOUNT    AND  CHARACTRR   OF   RELIEF   GRANTED.  §    147 

muhiplicity  of  suits.***  But  at  law  one  defendant  to  a  suit  cannot 
ordinarily  recover  a  judgment  against  a  co-defendant  without  a  cross- 
pleading  and  service  of  process  or  an  appearance  to  the  cross-plead- 
ing by  the  defendant  thereto.*^  In  New  Hampshire,  damages  may 
be  apportioned  among  several  defendants  by  separate  judgments,  if 
justice  will  be  promoted  by  such  procedure.'^ 

I   146.    AflnatiTe   BeUef  to   BefoaiUiit. 


In  some  of  the  states  the  code  provides  that  "if  a  counterclaim, 
established  at  the  trial,  exceed  the  plaintiff's  demand,  judgment  for 
the  defendant  must  be  given  for  the  excess ;  or  if  it  appear  that  the 
defendant  is  entitled  to  any  other  affirmative  relief,  judgment  must 
be  given  accordingly."  '*  And  aside  from  statutes  of  this  character, 
courts  possessing  equitable  powers  are  disposed  to  complete  the 
adjudication  of  controversies  brought  before  them  by  awarding  to 
defendants  any  relief  justified  by  the  facts.  In  equity,  a  decree  may 
be  rendered  in  favor  of  a  defendant  where  he  proves  to  be  the  cred- 
itor and  the  plaintiff  the  debtor."  So  on  the  foreclosure  of  a  deed 
of  trust,  the  decree  directing  the  surplus  remaining  after  paying  the 
plaintiff  to  be  paid  to  the  co-defendant,  there  being  no  cross-bill,  need 
not  find  the  precise  amount  due  such  co-defendant,  but  only  that 
there  is  due  him  more  than  the  surplus.'* 

I  147.    latereit. 

Accrued  interest  on  the  demand  in  suit  is  of  course  a  legal  part  of 
the  plaintiff's  claim  and  should  be  included  in  the  judgpment.     But  a 

«*Cbainley  t.  Dunsany,  2  iSchoales  &  L.  690,  718.  See  Jones  y.  Sander,  2 
Wash.  St.  3*JU,  26  Pac.  2*^. 

•♦  CaviD  V.  WilHams,  8  Bush   (Ky.)  343. 

»i  City  Sav.  Bank  v.  Whittle,  63  N.  H.  587,  3  Atl.  645. 

"  Code  ClvU  I'roc.  Cal.  |  666.  See  Gaff  v.  Hutchinson,  38  Ind.  341;  James 
▼.  Daniels  frex.  Civ.  App.)  43  S.  W.  26;  National  Foundry  &  Pipe  Works  v. 
<ktmto  City  Water  Supply  Co.,  106  Wis.  48,  81  N.  W.  125;  Nichols  &  Shepard 
To.  T.  Wledmann,  T2  Minn.  344,  75  N.  W.  208.  As  to  the  propriety  of  ad- 
Judiring  afttrmatlTely  for  defendant,  where  he  has  not  asked  for  afBrmatiye 
rplier.  see  (iilreath  y.  GiUiland,  ^  Tenn.  383,  32  S.  W.  250. 

»»  Kraker  v.  Shields,  20  Grat.  (Va.)  377. 

•«  Walker  v.  Abt,  83  lU.  226. 

(211) 


§147  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  8 

judgment  for  the  gross  sum  of  principal  and  interest  made  up  to  a 
certain  day,  with  interest  on  such  gross  sum,  is  erroneous.*'  The 
statutes  sometimes  require  that  the  debt  and  the  interest  shall  be 
separately  specified.  This  being  the  case,  it  is  erroneous  to  enter 
the  judgment,  in  an  action  of  debt,  for  an  aggregate  sum,  including 
the  debt,  interest,  and  damages,  without  distinguishing  the  amount 
of  either.*'*  Where,  in  rendering  judgment  by  default  on  a  demand 
ascertained  by  writing,  too  much  interest  is  calculated  and  mcluded 
in  the  judgment,  the  error  will  be  corrected  on  motion/ oi  it  may  be 
amended  in  the  appellate  court  at  the  cost  of  the  plaintiff  in  error." 
It  is  immaterial  that  the  judgment  recites  that  the  money  recoverable 
bears  interest  from  an  erroneous  date,  where  it  appears  that  the 
amount,  with  interest,  for  which  judgment  is  rendered  does  not 
exceed  the  amount  for  which  the  party  complaining  is  legally  liable." 
In  some  states,  the  statutes  provide  that,  when  judgment  is  rendered 
upon  a  verdict,  interest  shall  be  computed  from  the  date  of  the 
verdict  to  the  time  of  rendering  the  judgment  on  the  same,  and  made 
a  part  of  the  judgment.  But  a  judgment  is  not  void  for  uncertainty 
because  the  interest  is  not  so  computed.'*  It  also  appears  that 
where  the  verdict,  in  an  action  on  an  implied  contract,  does  not  men- 
tion interest,  the  court  cannot  allow  interest  in  entering  the  judg- 
ment.*® 

»»  Boarman  v.  Patterson,  1  Gill  (Md.)  372. 

s«  WUmans  v.  Bank  of  Illinois,  1  Gilman  (lU.)  667. 

»T  Bpence  v.  Rutledge,  11  Ala.  590.  But  It  Is  held  by  the  United  States 
supreme  court  that  the  objection  that  too  large  an  amount  of  Interest  bas 
been  included  in  a  judgment  cannot  be  raised  for  the  first  time  in  that  coart. 
Hawkins  v.  Glenn,  131  U.  S.  319,  9  Sup.  Ct.  739.  33  L.  Ed.  18i. 

68  Dean  v.  Blount,  71  Tex.  270,  9  S.  W.  168;  Washington  Park  Club  t. 
Baldwin,  59  111.  App.  61. 

B»  Blumke  v.  Dalley,  67  HI.  App.  381.  It  Is  error  to  compute  interest  on 
the  amount  of  a  verdict  for  a  period  prior  to  the  date  of  its  rendition,  and 
render  judgment  therefor,  when  the  verdict  neith^  includes  such  interest  nor 
afTords  data  for  its  computation.  Southern  Kansas  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sbowalter,  57 
Kan.  681,  47  Pac.  831. 

•0  Carter  v.  Christie,  1  Kan.  App.  604,  42  Pac.  256.  See  Goggan  v.  Evans. 
12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  256,  33  S.  W.  891. 

(212) 


Ch.  8}  AMOUNT   AND   CHARACTER   OF   RELIEf   GRANTED.  §   149 


S   148.    Conditloni  «■  to  Paymeat. 

In  certain  classes  of  cases  it  is  customary  for  the  judgment  .to  con- 
tain conditions  or  directions  as  to  the  time  or  manner  of  payment. 
Thus  a  judgment,  directed  by  the  court,  in  an  action  upon  a  contract 
for  the  sale  and  purchase  of  lands,  which  ascertains  the  amounts 
which  will  become  due  to  the  plaintiff,  for  principal  and  interest,  at 
the  several  times  stipulated  in  the  contract,  may  further  direct  that, 
in  case  the  same  should  at  those  periods  remain  unpaid,  the  plaintiff 
shall  have  judgments  for  their  recovery  and  executions  for  their  col- 
lection.**    So  a  judgment  on  a  bond  for  the  payment  of  a  debt  by 
instalments  should  be  for  the  debt  in  the  declaration  mentioned,  to 
be  discharged  by  payment  of  the  sum  due  at  the  time  of  suit  brought, 
reserving  liberty  to  the  plaintiff  to  resort  to  scire  facias  to  recover 
such  other  damages  as  might  thereafter  arise  upon  the  condition  of 
the  bond.**     Again,  in  an  action  of  covenant  upon  a  guaranty  by 
which  the  covenantor  became  surety  for  the  punctual  payment  of  the 
bond  of  another,  and  undertook  that  if  the  obligor  made  default,  he 
would  pay  the  mortgage  mentioned  in  the  bond,  the  judgment  upon 
such  default  should  not  be  that  he  should  pay  absolutely  to  the  plain- 
tiff the  amount  due,  but  that  he  should  pay  or  cause  to  be  paid  and 
satisfied  of  record  the  mortgage  mentioned,  within  thirty  days  from 
the  date  of  the  judgment,  or,  in  the  event  of  his  not  doing  so,  then 
that  he  pay  the  amount  to  the  plaintiff.** 

S  149.    Statutory  Damases. 

Where  a  statute  imposes  a  penalty  for  the  commission  or  omission 
of  a  certain  act,  the  judgment,  if  for  the  plaintiff,  must  be  for  the 
full  amount  of  the  penalty;  the  courts  have  no  power  to  mitigate  it, 
for  in  so  doing  they  would  contravene  the  expressed  legislative  will.** 

«» tribby  V.  Rosekrans,  55  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  202.  Upon  proof  of  a  claim  against 
■n  estate  for  money  payable  In  installmenta,  some  of  which  are  not  yet  due, 
Jcd^meot  may  be  rendered  for  Its  payment  at  different  times  as  the  Install- 
meutu  fan  doe.    Wolfe  v.  Wllsey,  2  Ind.  App.  549,  28  N.  B.  1004. 

•2  Thatcher  v.  Taylor,  3  Munf.  (Va.)  249. 

•»  Famham  v.  Mallory,  2  Abb.  Dec.  (N.  Y.)  100. 

•«  Powell  T.  Redfleld,  4  Blatchf.  47,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  11»859;   United  States  ▼. 

(213) 


§151  LAW  OP  nJDOMENTB.  (Ch.  h 

In  cases  where  the  statutes  give  double  or  treble  damages  for  a  cer- 
tain kind  of  injury,  the  jury,  if  they  find  for  the  plaintiff,  should  in- 
crease the  damages  which  they  find  by  the  statutory  multiple;  but 
if  the  verdict  in  terms  finds  only  single  damages,  the  court  will  per- 
form the  multiplication  and  direct  judgment  to  be  entered  for  the 
increased  amount.*"  Under  a  declaration  containing  a  count  for  a 
common  law  trespass  and  a  count  for  the  statutory  trespass,  where 
a  general  verdict  of  guilty  is  returned,  it  is  not  competent  for  the 
court  to  apply  the  verdict  to  the  count  under  the  statute,  and  proceed 
to  render  judgment  for  treble  the  damages  returned.'* 

• 

f  150.    Deaigiiatioa    of   Aa&ount. 

The  amount  of  a  judgment  must  be  stated  in  it  with  certainty  and 
precision ;  an  incurable  ambiguity  in  this  respect  will  be  sufficient  to 
invalidate  the  judgment.  But  the  judgment  is  to  be  construed  with 
reference  to  the  pleadings  and  other  parts  of  the  record,  and  if  these 
furnish  data  from  which  the  amount  of  the  recovery  can  be  ascer- 
tained with  certainty,  it  is  probably  sufficient.  All  judgments  ren- 
dered in  this  country  should  also  be  expressed  in  the  American  de- 
nominations of  money;  and  the  amount  should  be  written  out,  or 
at  least,  if  expressed  in  figures,  should  be  accompanied  by  some  ap- 
propriate mark  or  sign  to  indicate  what  denominations  of  money  arc 
meant.*^ 

§  161.    JndKuent  deiignatine  Medium  of  Payment. 

As  a  general  rule,  a  judgment,  being  merely  the  sentence  of  the 
law  upon  the  facts  shown  by  the  pleadings  and  proof,  has  nothing  to 
do  with  the  means  or  the  medium  of  satisfying  the  debt  which  it 
establishes.  Hence,  where  a  suit  is  for  a  money  demand,  the  court 
has  no  power  (with  exceptions  to  be  noted  in  the  next  section),  after 

MonteU,  Taney,  47,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  15,798;  Clark  v.  Barnard,  108  U.  S.  -ISft  2 
Sup.  Ct.  878,  27  L.  Kd.  780. 

0  5i»almer  v.  York  Bank.  18  Me.  1(56,  36  Am.  Dec.  710;  Royae  r.  Maj.  93 
Pa.  4.^)4;  Shrewsbury  v.  Bawtlltz,  57  Mo.  414;  Osborn  v.  LoveU,  36  Mich.  246; 
Chipman  v.  Knierick,  5  Cal.  23l>:  Sedg.  Dam.  588. 

«a  Osborn  v.  LoveU,  36  Mich.  246. 

•7  Supra,  ^  118. 

(214) 


Ch.  8)  AMOUNT   AND   CHARACTER  OF    RELIEF   GRANTED.  §    152 

giving  judgment  for  the  amount  claimed,  to  specify  in  what  kind  of 
money  it  shall  be  paid ;  when  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  a  judgment, 
the  law  determines  how  it  shall  be  satisfied.'®  But  where  a  promis- 
sory note  was  made  payable  **in  the  currency  of  the  country  but  not 
in  Confederate  notes,"  it  was  held  that  the  recovery  should  be  for 
such  notes  as  were  actually  in  circulation  at  the  maturity  of  the  note, 
although  greatly  depreciated  in  value.®* 

f  162.    Jndcment    for    Coined    Money. 

When  the  "legal  tender  act"  (Act  Cong.  Feb.  25,  1862)  first  came 
before  the  supreme  federal  tribunal  for  interpretation,  it  was  held 
to  be  unconstitutional.^*  But  this  decision  was  afterwards  overruled, 
and  the  act  was  held  to  be  constitutional  and  valid,  both  as  applied 
to  contracts  made  before  its  passage  and  as  to  those  entered  into 
since;  and  it  was  further  decided  that  the  treasury  notes  were 
equally  a  legal  tender  when  reissued  by  authority  as  upon  their  orig- 
inal issue.**  At  the  same  time,  the  court  held  that  the  legal  tender 
act  applied  only  to  debts  which  were  payable  in  money  generally,  not 
to  obligations  solvable  in  commodities,  nor  to  debts  or  contracts  as 
to  which  the  parties  had  agreed  that  they  should  be  payable  only  in 
a  specified  kind  of  money.  Hence,  where  a  contract  for  the  payment 
of  money  is  by  its  terms  made  payable  "in  specie,"  "in  coin,"  "in 
coined  money,"  or  "in  gold  coin,"  it  cannot  be  satisfied  by  a  tender 
in  treasury  notes ;  and  when  a  contract  so  worded  is  put  in  suit,  the 
judgment  rendered  upon  it  should  specify  "coined  dollars"  or  "gold 
coin,"  or  otherwise  as  the  case  may  be,  as  the  medium  of  its  satisfac- 
tion.^* Notwithstanding  these  decisions,  some  of  the  cases,  refusing 
to  accept  this  construction  of  the  act,  or  preferring  to  abide  by  the 
rule  that  the  courts  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  manner  in  which  a 
judgment  or  execution   shall  be   satisfied,  held   that   it   would   be 

««  8waln  V.  Smith.  05  N.  C.  211;  Belford  v.  Woodward,  158  ni.  122,  41  N. 
K  imi,  29  L.  R.  A.  593. 

••  Comn  Y.  Hill,  1  Uelgk.  (Tenn.)  385. 

'•  ^epbllm  T.  Uriswold,  8  Wall.  603,  19  U  Ed.  513. 

Ti  Legal  Tender  Cases,  12  Wall.  457,  20  L.  Ed.  287;  Jullllard  v.  Greenman, 
HO  i;.  8.  421,  4  Sup.  Ct.  122.  28  Lr.  Ed.  204. 

7«TreWloook  v.  WHson,  12  WaH.  087,  20  L.  Ed.  400;  Bronson  v.  Rodes,  7 
Wali  229,  19  U  Ed.  141;  BuUer  v.  Horwitz,  7  WaU.  258,  19  L.  Ed.  149. 

(215) 


§    152  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  8 

entirely  erroneous  to  enter  judgment  for  a  particular  kind  of  moncy.^* 
But  in  a  majority  of  the  states  the  courts  have  followed  the  lead  of 
the  federal  decisions,  and  maintained  the  rule  that  if  the  contract 
specified  gold  or  silver  as  its  medium  of  payment,  the  judgment  upon 
it  must  do  likewise."'*  It  is  also  held  that  if  the  contract  was  only 
solvable  in  coin  it  would  be  improper  to  render  judgment  for  the 
market  value  of  that  amount  of  coin  calculated  in  terms  of  the  treas- 
ury notes :  the  judgment  must  simply  be  for  so  much  gold  or  silver/* 
Also  it  is  considered  that  interest  on  the  debt  can  only  be  paid  in 
coined  money.^*  But  the  costs  of  the  action  may  be  paid  in  legal 
tender  notes. ^^  However,  it  is  only  in  respect  to  contracts  expressly 
stipulating  for  payment  in  coin  that  judgments  for  coin  can  be  en- 
tered. In  suits  for  unliquidated  damages,  such  judgments  are  not 
permissible.^*     Nor  can  they  be  rendered  in  actions  of  tort.^'    So 

T8  Davis  V.  Field,  43  Vt.  221;  Munter  v.  Rogers,  50  Ala.  283;  WIndisch  ▼. 
Gussett,  30  Tex.  744;  Flournoy  v.  Healy,  31  Tex.  61K>;  Olanyer  y.  Blanchanl 
18  La.  Ann.  616;  Whetstone  v.  CoUey,  36  111.  328;  Hurling  v.  Goodman,  1  Nev. 
314;  Buchegger  v.  Shultz,  13  MicH.  420;  Wood  v.  Bullens,  6  Allen  (Mass.)  518; 
Killough  V.  Alford,  32  Tex.  467,  5  Am.  Rep.  241);  Reed  v.  Eldredge,  27  Cal.  ^46. 

74  Independent  Ins.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  104  Mass.  192;  Paddock  v.  Commercial 
Ins.  Co.,  lOi  Mass.  521;  Chrj'sler  v.  Renols,  43  N.  Y.  209;  Kellogg  v.  Sweeney. 
46  N.  Y.  291,  7  Am.  Rep.  333;  Ransford  v.  Marvin,  8  Abb.  Prac,  (X.  S.)  432: 
McCalla  v.  Ely,  64  Pa.  254;  Chesapeake  Bank  v.  Swain,  29  Md.  483;  Phinips 
V.  Diigan,  21  Ohio  St.  466,  8  Am.  Rep.  66;  Foster  v.  Atlantic  &  P.  R.  Co.,  1 
Mo.  App.  390;  Uardlng  v.  Cowing,  28  Oai.  212;  Reese  v.  Stearns,  29  Cal.  273; 
Whians  v.  Hassey,  48  Cal.  634;  McGoon  v.  Shirk,  54  111.  408,  5  Am.  Rep.  122: 
Hittson  V.  Davenport,  4  Colo.  169;  Smith  v.  Wood,  37  Tex.  620. 

T6  Dewing  V.  Sears,  11  Wall.  379,  20  L.  Ed.  189;  Davis  v.  Mason,  3  Or.  154: 
Foster  v.  Atlantic  &  P.  R.  Co.,  1  Mo.  App.  390;  PhiUips  v.  Dugan,  21  Ohio 
St.  466,  8  Am.  Rep.  66.  In  an  action  on  a  promissory  note  made  payable  in 
gold,  a  judgment  was  rendered  for  the  face  of  the  note  and  interest  thereon, 
together  with  40  per  cent,  on  account  of  the  depreciation  of  the  currency.  It 
was  held  that  this  was  error,  whether  the  act  making  treasury  notes  a  legal 
tender  is  constitutional  or  not.  In  the  first  case,  the  currency  and  gold  arc 
of  equal  value  before  the  law.  In  the  second  case,  the  plaintiff  has  the  right 
to  refuse  the  notes,  no  matter  in  what  quantity  offered,  and  to  demand 
payment  of  his  debt  in  gold.    Henderson  v.  McPike,  35  Mo.  255. 

70  Cliesapeake  Bank  v.  Swain,  29  Md.  483;  Chrysler  v.  Renois,  43  N.  Y.  2<U 

7T  Phillips  V.  Dugan,  21  Ohio  St  466,  8  Am.  Rep.  66;  Chrj'Sler  v.  Reuois,  43 
N.    Y.   209. 

T8  Calhoun  v.  Pace,  37  Tex.  454. 

7  0  Livingston  v.  Morgan,  53  Cal.  23;  Chamborlin  v,  Vance,  51  Cal.  75. 
Where  there  is  no  allegation  in  the  complaint  that  there  was  an  agreement  to 

(21G) 


Cb.  8)  AMOUNT    AND   CHARACTER   OF   RELI?:F  GRANTED.  §   152 

a  person  who  deposited  gold  with  a  banker  is  only  entitled  to  recover 
the  amount  in  dollars  and  cents  in  the  circulating  medium  of  the 
country.**  But  a  judgment  on  a  promissory  note  expressed  to  be 
payable  "in  gold  coin  or  its  equivalent  in  United  States  legal  tender 
notes,"  rendered  simply  for  gold  coin,  would  be  erroneous.  The 
judgment  should  follow  the  contract,  fixing  the  amotmt  to  be  paid  if 
paid  in  gold,  and  the  amount  to  be  paid  if  paid  in  legal  tender  notes.*^ 
A  condition  in  a  note  expressed  to  be  payable  in  gold  coin,  that  "if 
it  IS  paid  at  maturity  or  before  suit  brought,  it  shall  be  payable  in 
lawful  money,"  does  not  impair  the  right,  in  case  it  is  necessary  to 
bring  suit,  to  recover  judgment  in  gold  coin.'* 

In  California,  and  perhaps  some  other  states,  the  statutes  provide 
that  judgments  in  suits  on  contracts  or  obligations  in  writing  for 
the  direct  payment  of  money  may  be  made  payable  in  the  kind  of 
money  specified  therein ;  and  under  such  a  law,  a  judgment  expressed 
to  be  payable  in  "U.  S.  gold  coin"  is  not  erroneous  where  the  note 
on  which  it  is  rendered  is  worded  in  the  same  manner.®^ 

pay  In  gold  coin,  the  court  cannot  render  a  Judgment  payable  in  gold  coin, 
even  if  the  verdict  ot  ttie  Jury  is  for  gold.  The  verdict  cannot  go  beyond  the 
issues  in  the  case.    Watson  v.  iSan  Francisco  &  H.  B.  R.  Co.,  50  Cal.  523. 

8«  Gombel  v.  Abrams,  20  La.  Ann.  508,  96  Am.  Dec.  426. 

•1  Wells,  Fargo  A  Co.  v.  Van  Sicltle,  6  Nev.  45. 

•s  Churchman  v.  Martin,  54  Ind.  380. 

•»  Sheehy  v.  Chalmers  (CaL)  36  Pac.  514;  Code  Civ.  Proc.  Cal.  i  667. 

(217) 


§153  UIW  OF  JUDGMBNTii  (Ch.  9 


THK  AME.NDM112NT  OF  JUDGMBNTB. 

8  168.  Amendment  during  the  Term. 

154.  Amendment  aft^  tlie  Term. 

155.  Ck)rrection  of  Clerical  Krrora. 

156.  Supplying  Omissions. 

157.  Reforming  and  Perfecting  tbe  Judgment. 

158.  Judicial  Errors  not  to  be  thus  Corrected. 

159.  Amendment  as  to  Amount  of  Judgment. 
1(S0.  Amendment  in  Respect  of  Parties. 

IttL  What  Courts  have  Power  of  Amendment 

1(52.  Time  of  making  Application. 

ltS3.  Method  of  applying  for  Amendment 

104.  Notice  of  Application. 

165.  Evidence. 

166.  Method  of  making  Corrections. 

167.  Allowance  of  Amendment  Is  discretionary. 

168.  Jurisdiction  of  Equity. 

169.  Effect  of  Amendments  on  Third  Persons. 

f  163.  Amendnient  dnriac  the  Term. 

A  judgment  may  be  incorrect,  imperfect,  or  erroneous,  and  there- 
fore stand  in  need  of  revision  oj  amendment,  from  either  of  two 
causes ;  that  is,  either  because  the  entry  fails  to  correspond  with  the 
judgment  actually  intended  to  be  given,  in  consequence  of  some  omis- 
sion, mistake,  or  inadvertence;  or  because  the  judgment  actually 
rendered  was  one  that  ought  not  to  have  been  given,  the  error  being 
due  to  misinformation  or  a  wrong  apprehension  of  the  law.  The 
principles  of  justice  obviously  require  that  what  has  been  done  amiss 
should  be  set  right.  But  in  order  to  secure  stability  to  the  formal 
and  solemn  records  of  the  courts,  the  rules  of  practice  have  estab- 
lished important  limitations  upon  the  power  of  a  court  to  correct  or 
revise  its  own  sentences.  These  limitations  rest  mainly  upon  a  dis- 
tinction which  originated  in  the  common  law,  and  was  there  consid- 
ered of  the  greatest  consequence.  During  the  whole  of  the  term 
in  which  any  judicial  act  was  done  the  proceedings  were  considered 
to  continue  in  fieri,  and  even  after  a  judgment  was  rendered,  the 
(218) 


Cb.  9)  AMENDMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §    158 

record  was  said  to  remain  "in  the  breast  of  the  judges  of  the  court 
and  in  their  remembrance,"  and  therefore  the  judgment  was  subject 
to  such  amendment  or  alteration  as  they  might  direct.     But  after 
the  term  had  passed,  the  record  no  longer  remained  in  this  nebulous 
condition.     It  was  then  spread  at  large  upon   the  judgment-roll, 
and  thereupon  acquired  an  inalterable  and  indisputable  character, 
passed  beyond  the  control  of  the  court,  and  admitted  of  no  alteration, 
modification,  or  contradiction.^     The  distinction  between  power  to 
act  during  the  term  and  power  to  act  after  the  term  has  survived 
in  many  points  of  modern  practice.     And  in  regard  to  the  first  part 
of  the  common  law  rule,  as  above  stated,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
it  still  stands  as  sound  law.    The  authorities  all  hold  that  a  court 
has  plenary  control  of  its  judgments,  orders,  and  decrees  during  the 
term  at  which  they  are  rendered,  and  may  amend,  correct,  modify, 
or  supplement  them,  for  cause  appearing,  or  may,  to  promote  jus- 
tice, revise,  supersede,  revoke,  or  vacate  them,  as  may  in  its  discre- 
tion seem  necessary.*    Thus  an  order  of  record  setting  aside  a  ver- 
dict may  be  corrected  by  the  court  at  any  time  during  the  term  at 
which  it  was  rendered.'     And  the  court  may  allow  a  judgment  to  be 
amended  as  to  the  name  of  a  member  of  a  firm,  so  as  correctly  to 
describe  the  firm  against  which  the  judgment  is  given.*     Nor  is  it 

» Co.  Litt.  lieoa;  3  BI.  Comm.  407. 

«  Barrel!  t.  TUton.  119  L'.  S.  637,  7  Sup.  Ct.  332,  30  L.  Ed.  511;  Alabama  Gold 
Ufe  ina.  Co.  v.  Mchols,  10»  U.  S.  232,  3  Sup.  Ct.  120,  27  L.  Ed.  915;  Memphis 
r.  Brown,  94  V.  S.  715,  24  U  Ed.  244;  Tllton  v.  Barrell  (C  C.)  17  Fed.  59;  Burch 
t.  Scott  1  Bland  (Md.)  112;  Lemaeks  v.  Glover,  1  Rich.  Eq.  (S.  C.)  141;  Worth- 
ingtotx  T.  CampbeU  (Ky.)  1  S.  W.  714;  Lane  v.  Ellinger,  32  Tex.  3G9;  Rlchard- 
*jn  T.  Howk,  45  lud.  451;  Stahl  v.  Webster,  11  111.  511;  Becker  v.  Sauter,  89 
IIL  5915;  Harris  r.  State,  24  Neb.  803,  40  N.  VV.  317;  De  Castro  v.  Richardson, 
r»  Cal.  49;  Cooper  v.  Cooper.  51  App.  DIv.  595,  (J4  N.  Y.  Supp.  1)01;  Conklln 
T.  Xew  York  -El.  K.  Co.,  18  Civ.  Froc.  R.  366,  13  N.  Y.  Supp.  782;  aUbreth 
V.  Smith,  124  X.  C  289,  32  S.  E.  714;  Barton  v.  American  Nat.  Bank,  8  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  223,  29  S.  W.  210;  Texas  Savings  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Smith  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.)  32  S.  W.  38U;  McGurry  v.  Wall,  122  Mo.  614,  27  S.  W.  327;  Stltt  v.  Kur- 
tenbaoh,  83  111.  App.  38.  But  while  the  court  ha.s  control  of  its  Judgments 
flaring  the  entire  term  at  which  tliey  are  rendered,  this  rule  wHl  not  be 
appliHl  so  as  to  enable  a  party  to  take  advantage  of  his  own  negligence  or 
miscoDdnot.  to  the  Injury  of  other  parties.  Cornell  University  v.  Parkinson, 
99  Kan.  3Ur>,  53  Pac.  138. 

s  Pawfion  V.  Wlsner,  11  Iowa,  6. 

«  Sugg  V.  Thornton,  73  Tex.  666,  9  S.  W.  145. 

(219) 


§   154  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  9 

only  in  respect  to  clerical  misprisions  or  omissions  that  this  power 
of  amendment  during  the  term  may  be  exercised ;  it  also  extends  to 
the  errors  of  the  court.  Thus,  where  a  court  makes  an  erroneous 
order  under  a  mistaken  view  of  the  law,  it  may,  during  the  term,  of 
its  own  motion,  correct  the  mistake  by  expunging  such  order  and 
entering  an  order  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  the  case.'  Thus, 
where  an  action  was  tried  by  the  court  without  a  jury,  the  judge  has 
power,  during  the  same  term,  to  reduce  the  amount  of  the  judgment 
if  satisfied  that  it  is  too  great.'  So  a  final  decree  which  is  incorrect 
in  regard  to  an  item  of  costs,  which  error  was  caused  by  the  court's 
hot  being  correctly  informed,  will  be  corrected  in  that  particular  on 
motion  made  during  the  term.^  Again,  where  a  receiver  has  been 
ordered,  by  mistake,  before  a  final  settlement,  to  pay  out  more  money 
than  is  liable  to  come  into  his  hands  as  such  receiver,  the  order  may 
be  amended  and  modified,  either  upon  direct  and  summary  proceed- 
ings, or  by  the  court  upon  its  own  motion.'  It  is  even  held  that  the 
court,  in  a  criminal  action,  may  set  aside  a  judgment  made  in  regu- 
lar course,  imposing  on  the  defendant  a  fine  and  the  costs  of  the 
proceedings,  during  the  same  term  in  which  the  judgment  was  ren- 
dered, and  before  any  part  of  it  has  been  performed,  and  may  impose 
a  greater  fine  than  was  imposed  by  the  first  judgment.' 

f  164.    Aa&endnieat  after  the   Ternt. 

That  part  of  the  common  law  rule  which  declares  that  no  judgment 
can  be  amended  after  the  term  at  which  it  was  rendered,  can 
scarcely  be  said  to  survive,  in  this  country,  in  all  its  original  inflexi- 
bility. Divided  between  the  policy  of  administering  justice  liberally 
and  equitably  and  the  habit  of  ascribing  the  utmost  sanctity  to  a 
record  once  completed,  the  courts  have  suffered  exceptions  to  be 
introduced  which  are  of  such  importance  as  to  require  the  rule  to  be 

»  Wolmerstadt  v.  Jacobs,  61  Iowa,  372,  16  N.  W.  217;  Carothers  v.  Langc 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.)  55  8.  W.  580. 

e  Flicklnger  v.  Omaha  Bridge  &  Terminal  Ry.  Co.,  08  Iowa,  368,  67  N\  W. 
372. 

7  Bishop  v.  Abom,  16  R.  I.  568,  18  Atl.  203. 

8  Ryon  V.  Thomas,  104  Ind.  59,  3  N.  B.  653. 

•  State  V.  Uaugherty,  70  Iowa,  43»,  30  N.  W.  685. 

(220) 


Ch.  9)  AMENDMENT  OP  JUDGMENTa  §    154 

much  modified  before  it  will  apply  to  contemporary  practice.  A 
conservative  statement  of  the  rule  as  at  present  observed,  and  one 
fully  supported  by  the  authorities,  would  be  as  follows :  After  the 
expiration  of  the  term  at  which  a  judgment  or  decree  was  rendered, 
it  is  out  of  the  power  of  the  court  to  amend  it  in  any  matter  of  sub- 
stance or  in  any  matter  affecting  the  merits.^®  It  is  said  by  the 
supreme  court  of  Illinois,  "The  general  rule  is  that  courts,  while  a 
cause  is  pending  and  the  parties  before  them,  have  control  over  the 
record  and  proceedings  in  the  cause,  and  that  they  have  jurisdiction 
over  their  judgments  and  final  orders  of  a  pending  term,  and  may, 
during  the  term  or  while  the  cause  is  depending,  and  the  parties  in 
court,  for  cause  appearing,  amend  or  set  them  aside.  But  after 
the  expiration  of  the  term,  unless  the  cause  is  still  depending  and  the 
parties  are  in  court,  their  power  over  the  record  is  confined  to  errors 
and  mistakes  of  their  officers ;  and  these  may  at  any  time,  upon  notice 
to  the  parties  in  interest,  and  saving  such  rights  as  in  the  interval 
of  time  may  have  accrued  to  third  persons,  be  corrected  so  as  to 
make  the  record  conform  to  the  action  or  judgment  of  the  court."  ^^ 
In  the  following  sections  we  shall  endeavor  to  show  that,  beside 
the  correction  of  clerical  errors,  the  courts  have  power,  after  the 

!•  Harrison  v.  State,  10  Mo.  (J86;  Botkln  v.  Pickaway  County  Com'rs,  1 
Ohio,  375,  13  Am.  Dec.  630;  Bramblet's  Heirs  v.  Pickett's  Heirs,  2  A.  K. 
Marsli.  (Ky.)  10,  12  Am.  Dec.  350;  Becker  v.  Santer,  89  111.  596;  Humphrey- 
TlUe  T.  Culver,  73  lU.  485;  Smith  v.  Armstrong,  25  Wis.  517;  aark  v.  Lary, 
3  Sneed  (ITenn.)  77;  Cook  v.  Wood,  24  lU.  295;  Balio  v.  Wilson,  12  Mart.  O.  S. 
(U.)  358.  13  Am.  Dec.  376;  McLean  v.  Stewart,  14  Hun,  472;  Daviess  County 
Court  V.  Howard,  13  Bush  (Ky.)  101;  Ocoee  Bank  v.  Hughes,  2  Oold.  (Tenn.) 
52;  KiUpatrlck  v.  Rose,  9  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  78;  Coughran  v.  Gutcheus,  18  111.  390; 
IfOuld*8  Estate  v.  Watson,  80  111.  App.  242;  Schmelzer  v.  Chicago  Ave.  Sash 
ft  Door  ManuTg  Co.,  85  lU.  App.  596;  Schmidt  v.  Rehwinkel,  86  III.  App.  267; 
Hook  V.  Mercantile  Trust  Co.,  32  C.  C.  A.  238,  89  Fed.  410;  Foley  v.  Foley, 
15  App.  Dlv.  276,  44  N.  Y.  Supp.  588;  Stewart  v.  Stewart,  40  W.  Va.  65,  20 
».  H  862;  Ivey  v.  Gilder,  119  Ala.  495,  24  South.  715;  McLain  v.  Duncan,  57 
Art.  49,  20  S.  W.  597;  Mxon  v.  Nichols,  10  Ind.  App.  1,  37  N.  E.  421;  State 
T.  Harper,  66  Mo.  App.  611;  Anderson  v.  McCloud-Love  Live-Stock  Com- 
mission Co.,  58  Neb.  670,  79  N.  W.  613.  An  amendment  of  a  decree  from  one 
7D  the  merits,  tinal  in  its  character,  to  one  dismissing  the  bill  for  want  of 
(urifldictloii,  and  leaving  the  merits  for  determination  in  an  action  at  law,  is 
Rbfitantial  and  material,  and  cannot  be  made  after  the  term  at  which  it  was 
rendered.    Homer  v.  Homer,  37  111.  App.  199. 

ti  Coughran  y.  Gutcheus,  18  111.  390. 

(221) 


§    164  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS,  (Ch.  9 

term,  to  supply  omissions  in  a  judgment,  and  to  reform  and  perfect 
it,  so  as  to  make  it  conform  exactly  to  the  judgment  intended  to  be 
given  in  the  case ;  but  that  they  cannot  use  the  power  of  amendment 
to  correct  judicial  errors  or  to  enter  a  judgment  which  was  neither 
in  fact  rendered  nor  intended  to  be  rendered.  Taken  with  these 
corollaries,  the  rule  as  above  stated  will  be  found  to  express  the 
common  opinion  of  the  authorities  on  this  point  at  the  present  time. 
In  illustration  of  the  rule,  the  proposition  may  be  cited  that,  after 
the  term,  the  power  of  the  court  to  amend  its  own  record  is  limited 
to  such  corrections  or  changes  as  are  in  affirmance  of  the  judgment 
originally  rendered ;  it  has  no  authority  to  strike  out  the  judgment, 
to  enlarge  or  diminish  it,  to  change  its  whole  nature,  or  to  render 
another  and  different  judgment  upon  the  same  record.**  So,  after 
a  judgment  was  rendered  and  the  court  had  adjourned,  it  was  con- 
sidered that  an  error  therein  could  not  be  cured  by  the  entry  of  a 
remittitur  of  an  excess  of  damages.^"  A  decision  in  Virginia  holds 
that  a  decree  for  alimony,  affirmed  on  appeal  as  to  the  date  at  which 
payments  should  commence,  is  final,  and  when,  in  subsequent  pro- 
ceedings in  the  trial  court  to  ascertain  its  amount,  payment  is  fixed 
as  beginning  at  a  different  date,  such  action  is  erroneous  and  will  be 
reversed.^*  In  California,  the  court  has  no  power  to  amend  an 
order  made  at  a  previous  term,  unless  a  motion  was  made  or  some 
proceedings  instituted  at  such  term  to  procure  the  amendment  to  be 
made  and  the  motions  or  proceedings  were  continued,  or  unless  the 
record  discloses  that  the  order  as  entered  was  not  the  one  made  by 
the  court.^°     It  follows  also  that  a  judgment  cannot  be  expunged  at 

12  Gould's  Ii^tate  v.  Watson,  80  lU.  App.  242;  Bethel  ▼.  Bethel,  6  Bush  (Ky.J 
C6,  W  Am.  Dec.  655.  Alter  the  term,  the  court  caoDot  enlarge  Its  Judgment 
so  as  to  Include  a  recovery  against  bondsmen  not  originally  included  thereiu. 
Barber  v.  City  of  Biioxl,  7tt  Miss.  578,  25  South.  298.  Again,  after  the  terai 
at  which  a  final  Judgment  in  replevin  was  rendered,  the  court  cannot  amend 
that  Judgment  by  entering  a  further  Judgment  for  damages  and  a  retonio 
habendo.  I'eterson  v.  Metropolitan  Nat.  Bank.  88  111.  App.  190.  Mistake  of 
counsel  in  entering  a  decree  which  does  not  conform  to  the  opinion  of  the 
court  cannot  be  corrected  after  the  term  expires.  Doe  v.  Waterloo  Mia.  Ca 
(C.  U.)  60  Fed.  643. 

18  Buckles  V.  Northern  Bank  of  Kentucky,  (33  111.  2G8. 

1*  a-alle  V.  Cralle.  84  Va.  198,  6  S.  K.  12. 

15  i)e  Castro  v.  Richardson,  25  Cal.  49, 
(222) 


Ch.  9)  AMENDMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §   155 

a  tenn  subsequent  to  that  of  its  rendition,  on  the  ground  that  neither 
the  judge's  docket  nor  the  clerk's  minutes  show  the  rendition  thereof. 
In  such  case  the  record  of  the  judgment  imports  absolute  verity  and 
cannot  be  assailed  for  the  lack  of  such  vouchers.^®  But  the  rule 
that  the  court  has  no  power  over  its  judgments  after  the  expiration 
of  the  term,  applies  only  to  final  judgments,  not  to  judgments  which 
are  still  in  fieri,  as  an  order  for  a  partition.^^  And  it  appears  that 
the  rule  which  prevents  the  court  from  interfering  with  its  judg- 
ments after  the  term  does  not  apply  to  such  action  as  may  be  taken 
in  that  behalf  with  the  consent  of  the  parties  concerned,  or  at  their 
request.**  And  further,  a  judgment  may  be  carried  over  the  term 
by  motion;  that  is  to  say,  if  a  motion  to  amend  or  correct  it,  or 
a  petition  for  a  rehearing,  is  filed  during  the  term  at  which  the  judg- 
ment was  rendered,  its  operation  will  be  so  far  suspended  that  the 
matter  may  be  heard  and  determined  at  the  ensuing  term.*^ 

I  165.    CTreetion  of  ClevioAl  Erron. 

As  regards  mere  clerical  errors,  mistakes  arising  from  inadvertence, 
or  formal  misprisions  of  clerks  or  other  officers,  it  is  always  in  the 
power  of  the  court,  even  after  the  adjournment  of  the  term,  to  make 
such  corrections  or  amendments  as  truth  requires.*®    HencQ  a  mis- 
is  Jones  T.  Uart,  (K>  Mo.  351. 

"  Hastings  v.  Cunningham,  35  Cal.  549;  AuU  v.  Day,  133  Mo.  337,  34  S.  W. 
57H.  A  court  lias  jurisdiction  to  set  aside  a  judgment  rendered  at  a  previous 
term,  requiring  a  party  to  pay  tlie  costs  of  the  term.  Tanton  v.  Keller,  78 
Ul.  App.  31. 

11  Sheridan  v.  City  of  Chicago,  175  lU.  421,  51  N.  B.  898;  Hewetson  v.  City 
of  Cblcago,  172  liL  112,  49  N.  E.  992. 

»»  CTKeefe  v.  Foster,  5  Wyo.  343,  40  Pac.  525;  Watson  v.  lie  Grand  Roller 
Skating  Kink  Co.,  177  lU.  203,  52  X.  E.  317.  Where  a  formal  written  Judg- 
ment Is  not  made  and  signed  until  the  term  succeeding  the  one  at  which  the 
matter  was  orally  determined,  the  Judgment  comes  into  existence  only  at  the 
later  term,  and  remains  subject  to  the  control  of  the  court  until  the  close  of 
moh  term.    Judson  y.  Gage,  39  a  C.  A.  156,  98  Fed.  510. 

'•Balcb  Y.  Bbaw,  7  Cush.  (Mass.)  282;  Fay  v.  Wenzeil,  8  Cush.  (Mass.)  315; 
IVUmo  t.  Myers,  11  N.  C.  73,  15  Am.  Dec.  510;  Speed's  Ex'rs  v.  Hann,  1 
r.  a  Mon.  (Ky.)  Itt,  15  Am.  Dec.  78;  Smith  v.  MuUins,  3  Mete.  (Ky.)  182; 
Krady  v.  Beason,  28  N.  C.  425;  Portis  ▼.  Talbot,  33  Ark.  218;  RusseU  v. 
Erwin'i  Adm*r,  41  Ala.  292;  Johnson  v.  Bank  of  Kentucky,  2  Duv.  521;  Ham- 
mer T.  McOannel,  2  Ohio,  31;  Ohio  ▼.  Beam,  3  Ohio  St  608;  Silner  v.  But- 

(223) 


§    155  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  9 

take  in  entering  a  decree,  which  is  manifestly  a  clerical  error,  which 
cannot  mislead,  and  which  does  not  prejudice  the  appellant,  is  no 
ground  for  reversal.*^  A  court  may,  upon  motion  of  one  party  and 
due  notice  to  the  other,  amend  a  docket  entry  by  inserting  the  true 
date  of  the  rendition  of  the  judgment,  where  a  wrong  date  appears  of 
record.^*  So  a  misnomer  of  the  term  of  the  court  in  the  entry  of  a 
judgment  is  a  clerical  error  and  amendable.^'  And  the  same  is  true 
of  a  misnomer  of  one  of  the  parties,^*  or  a  misdescription  of  the 
property  involved.*"  So  also,  a  judgment  entered  against*a  party  in 
a  representative  capacity,  when  it  should  have  been  against  him  indi- 
vidually, or  vice  versa,  or  a  personal  judgment  against  an  executor 
which  should  have  been  against  the  goods  of  the  estate,  may  be 
amended  by  other  parts  of  the  record,  on  motion,  when  the  mistake 
is  plainly  that  of  the  clerk.*'  Again,  where  a  judgment  in  attach- 
ment gives  the  right  of  execution  to  the  defendant,  instead  of  to  the 
plaintiff,  this  is  manifestly  a  clerical  error  and  may  be  corrected  at 
a  subsequent  term.*'     And  so  also  where  there  have  been  two  trials 

terfield,  2  Ind.  24;  iSberman  y.  Nixon,  37  Ind.  153:  Jenkins  v.  Long,  23  Ind. 
400;  Smitli  v.  Wilson,  26  111.  186;  Hickman  v.  Barnes,  1  Mo.  156;  State  t. 
Frimm,  01  Mo.  106;  Swain  v.  Naglee.  19  Cal.  127;  Will  v.  Sinkwitz,  41  Cal. 
588;  Drcyfuss  v.  Tompkins,  67  Cal.  339,  7  Pac.  732;  Granite  State  ProTident 
Ms'n  V.  McHugh,  88  Hun,  617,  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  341;  Knox  v.  Mowe,  41 
S.  U.  355,  19  S.  iiX  683;  Birmingham  v.  Leonhardt,  2  Kan.  App.  513.  43 
Pac.  996;  Brittenham  v.  Kobinson,  22  Ind.  App.  536,  54  N.  E.  133;  Canthom 
r.  Berry,  09  Mo.  App.  404;  Farley  v.  Cammann,  43  Mo.  App.  168;  People  v. 
'Jounty  Court  of  Arapahoe  County,  9  Colo.  App.  41,  47  Pac.  469. 

»i  Eau  Claire  liumber  Co.  v.  Anderson,  13  Mo.  App.  429. 

22  Grimes  v.  Grosjean,  24  Neb.  700,  40  N.  W.  137;  Carlton  v.  Patterson, 
29  N.  H.  580;  Clark  v.  Clark.  138  N.  Y.  653,  34  K.  B.  513;  Day  v.  Aigm 
Printing  Co.,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  594,  ^2  Atl.  1066. 

28  Buraham  v.  Chicago,  24  111.  496. 

24  Southern  Kansas  Ky.  Co.  v.  Brown,  44  Kan.  681,  24  Pac.  1100;  Brown 
V.  Barnes,  93  Ala.  58.  9  South.  455;  First  Nat.  Bank  y.  Kowalsky  (CaL)  31 
Pac.  1133. 

26  Wilcox  V.  WeUs  (Idaho)  51  Pac.  985. 

2«  Bemmerly  v.  Woodward,  124  Cal.  5(>8,  57  Pac.  561;  Atkins  r.  Sawyer,  1 
Pick.  (Mass.)  351,  11  Am.  Dec.  188;  Yarborough's  Ex'r  v.  Scott's  Bx^,  5 
Ala.  221;  Speed's  Ex*rs  v.  Hann,  1  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  16,  15  Am.  Dec.  78; 
Wyman  v.  Buckstaff,  24  Wis.  477.  But  compare  Sass  v.  Hlrachfeld,  23  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  1,  56  S.  W.  602;  Leonis  v.  LeffingweU.  126  Cal.  369,  68  Pac.  940. 

2T  Hogue  V.  Corbit,  150  111.  540,  41  X.  E.  219,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  232. 

(224) 


Ch.  9) 


AMENDMENT  07  JUDOMENTS. 


S    156 


of  a  case,  and  the  record  shows  that  judgment  was  rendered  on  the 
second  verdict,  but  the  clerk  entered  it  for  the  amount  of  the  first 
verdict."  So  again,  where  it  is  shown,  on  motion  to  correct  the 
entry  of  a  judgment  of  dismissal  of  an  action  as  to  a  party  thereto, 
that  the  order  was  not  intended  or  understood  by  either  party  to  in- 
clude a  dismissal  of  the  cause  of  action  against  such  party,  the  error 
may  be  corrected.**  In  some  states,  the  courts  have  authority,  by 
statute  to  amend  a  judgment  at  any  time  within  three  years  after 
its  rendition,  by  the  correction  of  any  clerical  error  or  mistake,  where 
there  is  sufficient  matter  apparent  on  the  record  to  amend  by.'"  And 
in  others,  the  judge  in  vacation  may  correct  any  miscalculation  or 
misrecital  of  any  sum  of  money  in  a  judgment.** 

i 

S   156.    Svpplyiiig    OmiMiom. 

In  regard  to  the  power  of  amending  judgments  by  supplying  omis- 
sions, it  is  necessary  not  to  lose  sight  of  the  principle  that  amend- 
ments can  only  be  allowed  for  the  purpose  of  making  the  record  con- 
form to  the  truth,  not  for  the  purpose  of  revising  and  changing  the 
judgment.  Hence  if  anything  has  been  omitted  from  the  judgment 
which  is  necessarily  or  properly  a  part  of  it,  and  which  was  intended 
and  understood  to  be  a  part  of  it,  but  failed  to  be  incorporated  in  it 
through  the  negligence  or  inadvertence  of  the  court  or  the  clerk, 
then  the  omission  may  be  supplied  by  an  amendment  after  the 
term.'*  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  proposed  addition  is  a  mere  after- 
thought, and  formed  no  part  of  the  judgment  as  originally  intend- 


«•  Gaynor  v.  Clements.  10  Colo.  209.  26  Pac.  324. 

*•  Stuart  v.  City  of  Logansport,  87  Ind.  584. 

»•  Lee  V.  Houston,  20  Ala.  301;  Code  Ala.  1886,  §  288tt. 

»» Morris  V.  Coleman  County  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  35  S.  W.  29;  Sayles'  Civ.  St. 
Tex.  art.  1355. 

"Lewis  V.  Koss,  37  Me.  230,  69  Am.  Deo.  49;  State  v.  Moran,  24  Neb 
KO.  38  X.  W.  29;  Galloway  v.  McKeithen,  27  N.  a  12,  42  Am.  Dec.  153 
Gaines  v.  Wedgeworth,  19  Ga.  31;  Keld  v.  Morton,  119  111.  118,  «  X.  E.  414 
ITiorp  V.  l*Jatt,  34  Iowa.  314;  Trammell  v.  Trammell,  25  TIbx.  Supp.  2G1 
Rogers  v.  Rogers,  1  Paige  (X.  Y.)  188;  Xewburgh  Bank  v.  Seymour,  14  Johns 
•X.  Y.)  5a9;  Gardner  v.  Derlng,  2  Kdw.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  131;  Ray  v.  Connor,  3 
Kdw.  Ch.  (X.  Y.)  478;  Nye  v.  Stlllwell,  Blerce,  Smith  &  Valle  Co.,  12  Ohio 
nr.  Ct.  R.  40;  Kendall  v.  (TNeal,  16  Mont.  303,  40  Fac.  599. 

1  LAW  JUDG.~15  (225) 


§   156  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  9 

ed  and  pronounced,  it  cannot  be  brought  in  by  way  of  amendment 
For  example,  in  the  entry  of  a  final  judgment  against  a  garnishee,  it 
is  the  duty  of  the  clerk  to  recite  the  fact  and  the  amount  of  the  orig- 
inal judgment  against  the  defendant,  but  his  failure  to  do  so  is  a 
clerical  error  which  may  be  corrected  nunc  pro  tunc  at  a  subsequent 
term.**  So  a  judgment  in  favor  of  A.  "administrator"  may  be 
'amended  so  as  to  show  that  it  was  recovered  by  A.  as  administrator 
of  B.,  deceased.'*  The  omission  of  the  clerk's  signature  to  a  judg- 
ment filed  and  docketed,  where  that  is  required,  may  be  supplied  in 
like  manner.**  Where  a  decree  orally  announced  as  dismissing  a  bill 
without  prejudice,  is  drawn  and  enrolled,  omitting  the  phrase  "with- 
out prejudice,"  these  words  may  be  afterwards  supplied  by  amend- 
ment.** And  in  like  manner,  where  a  decree  in  foreclosure  pro- 
ceedings, by  inadvertence  or  mistake,  omits  a  fractional  part  of  the 
land  described  in  the  mortgage  and  the  findings,  the  court  may 
amend  the  decree  by  including  such  land.*'  And  the  power  of  or- 
dering amendments  of  this  character  extends  as  well  to  other  parts 
of  the  record  as  to  the  judgment  itself.  Thus,  when  the  court  had 
in  fact  jurisdiction  of  the  defendant,  but  the  return  of  the  constable 
failed  to  show  that  fact,  the  record  may  be  amended  after  judgment 
so  as  to  show  jurisdiction,  if  there  are  no  intervening  rights  to  be 
affected.**  So  where  the  Christian  name  of  an  appraiser  was  omit- 
ted in  drawing  up  a  decree  for  the  appraisement  and  sale  of  trust 
property,  the  court  directed  it  to  be  inserted  in  the  original  decree 
in  the  register's  minutes,  it  being  a  merely  formal  matter.**  Again, 
where  a  guardian  ad  litem  was  appointed  at  the  proper  term,  but  no 

88  W^horley  v.  Memphis  &  C.  R.  Co.,  72  Ala.  20. 

8*  Crane  v.  Crane,  51  Ark.  2«7,  11  S.  W.  1. 

38  Seaman  v.  Drake,  1  Calnes  (N.  Y.)  9. 

8«  Township  of  Hiawatha  v.  Schoolcraft  County  Circuit  Judge,  90  Mich. 
270,  51  N.  W.  282. 

8T  Dickey  v.  Gibson,  118  Cal.  26,  45  Pac.  15,  54  Am.  St.  Kep.  321.  Bnt 
compare  Ruff  v.  Klkln,  40  S.  C.  00,  18  S.  E.  220.  .  See,  also,  Young's  Guardian 
V.  Sadler  (Ky.)  24  S.  W.  877. 

88  Allison  v.  Thomas,  72  Cal.  562,  14  Pae.  300,  1  Am.  St  Rep.  89:  Fiw- 
cett  V.  Vary,  59  N.  Y.  597;  Hibemla  Savings  &  Loan  Soc.  v.  Matthal,  116 
Cal.  424,  48  Pac.  370;  Cunningham  v.  Spokane  fiydranUc  Mln.  Co.,  20  Wash. 
450,  56  Pac.  756,  72  Am.  St.  Rep.  113. 

«»  De  Caters  v,  Le  Ray  De  Chaumont,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.)  17a 
(226) 


Gh.  9)  AMBNDMBNT  OF  JX7DOHBNT8.  §   167 

entry  made  on  the  docket,  the  entry  may  be  subsequently  supplied.** 
And  in  another  case,  where  the  omission  occurred  through  the  in- 
advertence of  the  plaintiff's  attorney,  and  it  was  necessary  that  it 
should  be  supplied  in  order  to  perfect  the  record,  although  it  would 
not  vary  the  judgment,  the  learned  judge,  in  allowing  the  amend- 
ment, said :    "I  cannot  discover  any  difference,  as  to  the  allowing  of 
an  amendment,  whether  the  mistake  has  happened  through  the  omis- 
sion of  an  attorney  or  by  that  of  the  clerk.     Both  are  equally  officers 
of  the  court."  **     But  on  the  other  hand,  as  already  stated,  the  pow- 
er of  amendment  cannot  be  made  the  means  of  adding  to  a  judg- 
ment or  decree  something  not  originally  contemplated  by  it  or  which 
is  foreign  to  its  intended  scope  and  purpose.    Thus,  in  an  Illinois 
case,  it  appeared  that  a  decree  had  been  drawn  up  by  the  plaintiff's 
solicitor  and  accepted  and  signed  by  the  judge  as  the  decree  of  the 
court;  afterwards  it  was  discovered  that  the  solicitor  had  omitted 
from  the  decree  a  clause  which  he  had  intended  to  make  a  part  of  it, 
and  application  was  made  to  have  it  added.     But  it  was  considered 
to  be  no  proper  case  for  an  amendment,  inasmuch  as  it  did  not  ap- 
pear that  the  court  had  intended  to  insert  the  clause  in  question,  and 
consequently  to  add  it  by  amendment  would  be  to  change  the  sen- 
tence pronounced  and  revise  its  own  decree.**    On  the  same  prin- 
ciple, plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  an  amendment  of  a  judgment  in  his 
favor,  so  as  to  include  the  sureties  on  an  appeal  bond,  where  the 
judgment,  as  entered,  followed  the  minutes  of  the  court  and  was 
properly  rendered  against  defendant  alone,  and  where  any  judgment 
against  the  sureties  would  necessarily  have  been  for  a  different 
amount  *• 

f  157.    Reformiiis  aad  Perfeotliis  tlie  Judgment* 

A  judgment  entry  may  be  amended  at  any  time  to  make  it  corre- 
spond with  the  judgment  actually  rendered.**    And  for  this  pur- 

«•  Johnson  v.  Wright,  27  Ga.  555. 
«i  Close  T.  GiUespey,  3  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  526. 
**  Forquer  v.  Forquer,  19  111.  68. 
4*  Robertson  v.  King,  120  Ala.  459,  24  South.  »29. 

««  Gilmer  v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids  (C.  C.)  16  Fed.  708;  Tucker  v.  New  Bruns^ 
irick  Ttadlng  Co.,  44  Ch.  Dlv.  249;  Capen  y.  Inhabitants  of  Stougbton,  16 

(227) 


S   157  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Oh.  9 

pose  either  additions  or  elisions  may  be  made.  In  a  case  where  the 
judgment  pronounced  by  the  court  upon  motion  of  the  defendant  was 
"that  the  complaint  be  dismissed  with  costs,"  and  the  judgment  en- 
tered by  the  clerk  was  that  the  complaint  be  dismissed  **upon  the 
merits"  with  costs  to  the  defendant,  it  was  held  that  the  insertion  of 
the  words  quoted  was  a  material  addition  to  the  judgment  which  the 
clerk  had  no  authority  to  make,  and  was  properly  stricken  out  on 
motion.**  So  an  amendment  may  be  made  where  a  judgment  of  dis- 
missal failed  to  include  a  judgment  for  costs  properly  chargeable  to 
the  plaintiff,**  or  where  a  judgment  is  confessed  in  open  court,  and 
the  clerk  improperly  enters  it  as  a  judgment  by  default,*^  or  where, 
on  a  nonsuit  for  failure  of  proof,  at  the  close  of  plaintiif^s  case,  the 
judgment  is  erroneously  made  to  recite  a  dismissal  on  the  merits," 
or  where,  by  the  terms  of  a  judgment  confessed,  it  purports  to  be  for 
the  benefit  of  the  "several  creditors"  of  the  debtor,  but  there  is  un- 

Gray,  364;  Robertson  v.  Hay,  12  Misc.  Rep.  7,  33  N,  Y.  Supp.  31;  Sexton  v. 
Bennett,  63  Hun,  624,  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  437;  Gough  v.  McFaU,  52  N.  Y.  Supp. 
221;  Portis  v.  Talt)ot,  33  Ark.  218;  Sharpe  v.  Fowler  (Ky.)  Lltt  SeL  Cas. 
446;  Beam  v.  Brldgers,  111  N.  C.  269,  16  S.  E.  391;  Converse  t.  Langshaw, 
81  Tex.  275.  16  8.  W.  1031;  State  v.  White,  75  Mo.  App.  257;  Hoagland  t. 
Way,  35  Neb.  387,  53  N.  W.  207;  Hall  r.  Merrill,  47  Minn.  260.  49  N.  W. 
980;  Nell  V.  Dayton,  47  Minn.  257.  49  N.  W.  981;  Bostwick  v.  Van  Vleck. 
106  Wis.  387.  82  N.  W.  302;  San  Joaquin  Land  &  Water  Co.  v.  West  9» 
Oal.  345,  33  Pac.  928.  Where  a  party  moves  for  and  obtains  an  amendment 
of  a  judgment  against  him,  he  thereby  waives  all  erroneous  rulings  of  the 
court  preceding  the  Judgment.  Pittsburg,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Beck  tind.) 
52  N.  E.  399.  And  after  an  order  entered,  as  dictated  by  the  Judge,  has  been 
construed  and  affirmed  by  the  supreme  court,  an  amendment  cannot  be  al- 
lowed on  the  ground  that  the  construction  placed  on  it  was  not  what  the 
judge  intended.  Harrison  v.  Harrison.  114  N.  C.  219,  19  S.  E.  232.  I'nder 
the  statute  law  of  Louisiana,  a  strict  rule  prevails;  and  the  judge,  after  bar- 
ing by  mistake  signed  a  judgment  in  favor  of  defendant,  cannot  of  his  own 
accord  substitute  therefor  a  judgment  for  the  plaintiff,  although  the  latter  w.ns 
the  judgment  orally  given  by  him.  State  v.  Judge  of  CivU  District  Court. 
43  La.  Ann.  1169,  10  South.  294. 

46  Williams  v.  Hayes,  68  Wis.  248,  32  N,  W.  44.  Further  as  to  striking 
out  words  Improperly  inserted  by  the  clerk,  see  Brusie  v.  Peck  Bros.  &  Ca, 
62  Hun,  248,  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  645. 

40  Marine  Bank  Co.  v.  Mailers,  58  lU.  App.  232.. 

4  7  cirand  Rapids  Sav.  Bank  v.  Widdcomb,  114  Mich.  639.  72  N.  W.  615. 

4  8  Mannion  v.  Broadway  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.,  18  Civ.  Proc.  R.  40,  13  X.  Y.  Supp. 
759. 

(228) 


Ch.  9)  AMENDMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §    157 

disputed  evidence  that  it  was  intended  only  for  his  unsecured  "busi- 
ness creditors,"  **^  or  where  a  cognovit  was  filed  by  an  attorney  at 
law  as  such,  but  the  judgment  erroneously  recites  that  it  was  filed 
by  defendant's  ''attorney  in  fact."  *^  And  where  a  judgment  is  er- 
roneous on  its  face  by  reason  of  not  conforming  to  the  verdict,  no 
other  objection  being  made,  it  may  be  corrected  on  motion.'^*  This 
power  of  amendment  may  also  be  used  to  clear  up  ambiguities. 
Thus  it  is  held  that  the  court  has  power  to  amend  a  judgment  for  a 
specified  quantity  of  water,  "miners'  measurement,"  so  as  to  relieve 
it  of  the  imcertainty  of  that  term,  the  amendment  being  made  on 
the  uncontradicted  testimony  in  the  case,  made  a  part  of  the  motion 
papers.  The  court  remarked:  "We  do  not  doubt  the  soundness 
of  the  rule  that  the  trial  court  cannot  at  a  subsequent  time  so  modify 
a  judgment  that  the  modification  is  in  eflfect  a  reversal.  That  is  the 
province  of  the  appellate  court.  But  the  trial  court  has  the  power 
to  modify  or  correct  the  judgment  or  record  to  such  an  extent  that 
the  relief  granted  may  be  such  as  was  intended  to  be  granted."  *' 
On  similar  principles,  the  court  may  amend  its  record  by  transfer- 
ring the  proceedings  to  the  proper  suit  when  by  mistake  they  have 
been  filed  in  a  suit  to  which  they  do  not  belong."'  In  this  connec- 
tion, the  following  observations  of  the  court  in  North  Carolina  will 
be  found  instructive.  "As  a  general  rule,  it  is  unquestionably  true 
that  no  act  of  the  court,  as  contradistinguished  from  the  act  of  its 
officers  or  of  the  parties,  can  be  allowed  to  be  amended,  but  during 
the  term  at  which  it  was  done.  During  the  term  the  record  is  said 
to  be  in  the  breast  of  the  judge ;  after  it  is  over  it  is  upon  the  roll. 
But  this  rule  applies  to  such  amendments  as  call  into  action  the  judg- 
ment or  discretion  of  the  court,  and  not  to  such  as  are  a  matter  of 

*•  Jenkins  v.  Davis,  141  I'a.  206,  21  Atl.  5U2. 

•«<)dell  V.  Keyiiolds,  17  U.  C.  A.  317,  70  Fed.  656. 

*»  Seattle  &  M\  Ky.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  7  Wash.  »7,  34  Pac.  567.  But  where 
the  court  has  lost  Jurisdiction  by  entering  a  final  decree  In  divorce,  the  sub- 
wNiuent  appearance  of  defendant  to  contest  a  motion  for  aUmony  does  not 
JTive  the  court  jurisdiction  to  amend  the  decree  by  adding  an  order  reserving 
the  qnestion  of  alimony  for  further  consideration.  O'Brien  v.  O'Brien,  124 
Cal.  422.  57  Pac.  225. 

«  Welch  V.  Keene,  8  Mont.  305,  21  Pac.  25. 

"  Sweeny  v.  Delany,  1  Pa.  320,  44  Am.  Dec.  136. 

(229) 


§158  LAW  OP  JUDGMBNT8.  (Ch.  9 

course.  In  such  cases,  the  reasons  of  the  rule  no  longer  operate; 
for,  as  much  as  the  law  confides  in  the  integrity  of  the  court,  it  ad- 
mits a  possibility  of  its  being  corrupt,  and  therefore  guards  it  from 
temptation."  '*  It  is  held  that  a  judgment  by  consent  cannot  be  cor- 
rected by  the  court  without  the  consent  of  all  parties  to  it.  It  is  not 
the  judgment  of  the  court  except  in  the  sense  that  it  is  recorded  and 
has  the  effect  of  a  judgment.  In  such  case,  the  court  can  only  cor- 
rect its  own  errors  in  making  the  entries,  as,  for  instance,  the  mis- 
prision of  its  clerk. '• 

$  158.    Judicial  Error*  not  to  be  tlius  Corrected. 

The  allowance  of  an  amendment  should  never  be  used  by  the  court 
as  a  means  of  reviewing  its  judgments  on  the  merits,  or  correcting 
its  own  judicial  mistakes,  or  substituting  a  judgment  which  it  nei- 
ther in  fact  rendered  nor  intended  to  render.'*  "The  power  of  courts 
to  amend  judgments  after  the  close  of  the  term  extends  to  all  omis- 
sions to  enter  the  judgments  pronounced  by  the  court,  and  to  clerical 
errors  in  the  form  of  the  entry,  whether  by  introducing  a  fact  which 
ought  to  appear  on  the  record,  or  by  striking  out  a  statement  of  a 
fact  improperly  introduced,  and  when  the  record  affords  sufficient 
evidence.  But  when  the  defect  consists  in  the  failure  of  the  court  to 
render  the  proper  judgment,  or  arises  from  a  want  of  judicial  action, 
the  record  cannot  be  corrected  after  the  term  has  closed,  the  cause 
being  no  longer  sub  judice.     The  purpose  of  amendment  is  to  make 

5*  Wilson  V.  Myers,  11  N.  C.  73,  15  Am.  Dec.  510. 

8B  McEachern  v.  Kercliner,  90  N.  C.  177.  And  see  Knox  v.  Moser,  72  Iowa, 
154,  33  N.  VV.  017.  A  judgment  entered  by  consent  of  defendant,  but  whicb 
was  broader  than  the  consent  authorized,  will  not  be  vacated  where  plain- 
tiff agrees  to  its  moditication  to  conform  to  the  real  intention  of  the  parties. 
McManus  v.  Ennis,  1  App.  Div.  30,  3tJ  N.  Y.  Supp.  1049. 

68  Elder  v.  Richmond  Gold  &  Silver  Min.  Co.,  7  C.  C.  A.  3o4,  58  Fed.  636; 
Duffey  V.  Houtz,  105  Pa.  90;  Gannon  v.  Kiel,  '3  Lack.  Leg.  N.  68;  Heert  v. 
Cniger,  14  Misc.  Kep.  508,  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  1063;  Shipman  v.  Fletcher,  W 
Va.  473,  22  S.  E.  458;  Milam  Co.  v.  Robertson,  47  Tex.  222;  Missouri  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Haynes,  82  Tex.  448,  18  S.  W.  605;  Horner  t.  Horner,  37  111.  kW- 
199;  Webb  v.  Elliott,  75  Mo.  App.  557;  Turner  v.  Cliristy.  50  Mo.  145:  Darn- 
ing V.  Burkhardt,  34  Wis.  585;  Pinger  v.  Vandick,  36  Wis.  141:  Dillon  v.  Chi- 
cago, K.  ^fe  N.  K.  Co.,  58  .Neb.  472,  78  N.  W.  927, 

(230) 


Ch.  9)  AXBNDMBMT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  158 

the  judgment  conform  to  what  the  court  intended  it  should  be,  to  set 
right  the  record  and  make  it  speak  the  truth,  so  that  omissions  or 
clerical  error  shall  not  prejudice  parties  litigant.  The  power  to 
amend  nunc  pro  tunc  is  not  revisory  in  its  nature,  and  is  not  intended 
to  correct  judicial  errors.  Such  amendments  'ought  never  to  be  the 
means  of  modifying  or  enlarging  the  judgment,  or  the  judgment  rec- 
ord, so  that  it  shall  express  something  which  the  court  did  not  pro- 
nounce, even  although  the  proposed  amendment  embraces  matter 
which  ought  clearly  to  have  been  pronounced.'  However  erroneous, 
the  express  judgment  of  the  court  cannot  be  corrected  at  a  subse- 
quent term."  *^ 

A  judgment,  therefore,  cannot  be  amended  so  as  to  vary  the  rights 
of  the  parties  as  fixed  by  the  original  decision  of  the  court  and  the 
judgment  entered  thereon.**  Thus,  it  is  error  to  amend  a  judg- 
ment by  reducing  its  amount,  where  the  reason  for  the  alteration  is 
that  the  court  has  changed  its  mind ;  such  action  may  be  taken  as 
the  means  of  correcting  a  miscalculation  or  other  clerical  error,  but 
not  to  set  right  a  judicial  mistake.'*  Again,  the  power  of  amend- 
ment cannot  be  used  as  a  means  of  enlarging  the  judgment  originally 
given,  by  decreeing  additional  relief  to  the  successful  party,*®  or  by 
adding  judgments  against  parties  not  originally  included  in  the  judg- 
ment, or  giving  a  personal  judgment  in  addition  to  the  decree  of  fore- 

»T  Browder  v.  JOaulkner,  82  Ala.  267,  3  South.  30,  citing  Wborley  v.  Memphis 
ft  U.  K.  Co.,  r2  Ala.  20;  Kmerson  v.  Head,  81  Ala.  443,  1  South.  197. 

"  Smith  V.  Smith,  40  App.  Dlv.  251,  67  N.  Y.  Supp.  1122;  Stilwell  T.  Stil- 
weU,  81  Hun.  »«.  30  x\.  Y.  Supp.  9«1. 

•»  Griffith  V.  Maxwell,  19  Wash.  614,  54  Pac.  35;  Heath  v.  New  York  Build- 
ing Loan  Banking  Co.,  84  Hun,  302,  32  N.  Y.  Supp.  454. 

••riFBt  Nat.  Bank  v.  Dusy,  110  Cal.  «>,  42  Pac.  476.  In  foreclosure  on 
default  in  payment  of  the  first  of  several  instalments  of  interest  contracted 
to  be  paid,  a  decree  directing  a  sale  to  satisfy  said  instalment  alone,  which 
was  duly  signed  and  entered,  cannot  be  amended  so  as  to  provide  for  fur- 
ther sales  on  subsequent  defaults.  Byrne  v.  Hoag,  116  Gal.  1,  47  Pac.  775. 
^.  where  the  question  of  alimony  is  raised  by  the  pleadings  in  a  divorce 
i-ase,  the  failure  to  find  on  that  issue  is  a  judicial  error,  and  not  a  clerical 
mistake;  and  hence  the  judgment  cannot  be  amended  by  adding  an  order  re- 
wrvlng  the  question  of  alimony  for  further  consideration.  O'Brien  v.  O'Brien, 
ll'4  Cal.  422,  67  Pac  226.    And  see  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  73  Wis.  84,  40 

X  w.  tni, 

(231) 


§   159  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  {Ch-  9 

closure  originally  pronounced,*^  or  releasing  from  the  operation  of 
the  judgment  parties  or  property  originally  affected  by  it.'*  Nor 
has  the  court  power  or  jurisdiction  to  correct  a  valid  and  final  judg- 
ment, after  the  term,  by  readjudging  the  question  of  costs  and  tax- 
ing them  in  a  different  amount,  or  distributing  them  in  a  different 
manner,  from  that  originally  fixed. •'  So  also,  a  judgment  dismiss- 
ing the  complaint,  entered  after  trial,  cannot  be  amended  by  ap- 
'  pointing  a  referee  to  pass  on  plaintiff's  claim,  unless  the  dismissal  is 
vacated.®* 

S   159.    Amendment  as  to  Amovnt  of  Judgment. 

If  there  has  been  obvious  clerical  error  on  the  part  of  the  clerk  or 
the  court  in  the  entry  of  the  amou::t  recovered  by  a  judgment,  the 
entry  may  be  amended  to  conform  to  the  truth.**  Thus  if,  through 
an  error  of  the  clerk,  a  judgment  by  default  has  been  entered  for  a 

01  Konyon  v.  Baker,  82  Iowa,  724,  47  N.  W.  977;  Barnes  v.  Hale,  44  Neb.  355. 
62  \.  W.  10t>3;  Smith  v.  Fox  (Tex.)  15  S.  W.  1W5. 

«2  Johnson  v.  Foreman,  24  Ind.  App.  93,  56  X.  E.  254.  But  where,  in  an 
action  to  set  aside  a  sale  on  foreclosure,  the  court,  by  mere  Inadvertence,  goes 
further  than  the  relief  asked  and  also  adjudges  the  mortgage  to  be  void,  tbis 
mistake  can  be  corrected  by  an  amendment  striking  out  the  proTislou  as  to 
the  mortgage.     Chase  v.  Whitten,  62  Minn.  498,  65  X.  W.  84. 

63  Hetlgecoxe  v.  Conner  (Tex.  LUv.  App.)  43  S.  W.  322;  People  v.  Common 
Council  of  Buffalo,  9  Misc.  Kep.  403,  29  X.  Y.  Supp.  1071;  Manning  v.  Xelson. 
107  Iowa,  34,  77  X.  W.  503;  Genet  v.  Delaware  &  U.  Canal  Co.,  136  X.  Y. 
217,  32  X.  E.  851. 

«4  Duryea  v.  Fuechsel,  76  Hun,  4(M,  27  X.  Y.  Supp.  1037. 

66  Smith  V.  Hood,  25  Pa.  218,  64  Am.  Dec.  692;  Wall  v.  Covington.  83  X. 
C.  144;  Sherry  v.  Priest,  57  Ala.  410;  Modawell  v.  Hudson,  Id.  75;  Arriujrton 
V.  Courey,  17  Ark.  100;  Emlson  v.  Walker  (Ky.)  31  S.^  W.  461;  De  Hymel  v. 
Scottish-American  Mortgage  Co.,  80  Tex.  493,  16  S.  W.  311;  Miller  v.  Royce, 
60  Ind.  189;  Daniels  v.  McGinnis.  97  Ind.  549;  Knappen  v.  Freeman.  47  Minn. 
491,  50  X.  W.  533.  But  an  amendment  cannot  be  used  to  correct  a  judicial 
mistake,  as  distinguished  from  a  mere  clerical  error.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry 
Co.  V.  Hayncs,  82  Tex.  448,  18  S.  W.  605;  Pursley  v.  Wickle,  4  Ind.  App. 
382,  30  X.  K.  1115.  And  see  section  158,  supra.  And  so.  when  the  error 
complained  of  in  a  consent  decree  is  the  Insertion  of  a  particular  amount 
as  the  result  of  a  calculation  by  one  of  the  parties  upon  a  basis  which  the 
other  parties  do  not  regard  as  In  accordance  with  the  agreement  It  is  not  a 
clerical  error,  but  a  mistake  of  parties,  and  it  can  be  wrrected  only  by  original 
bill.     .Morris'  Admr  v.  Peyton's  Adm'r,  29  W.  Va.  201,  11  S.  E.  954. 

(232) 


Ch.  9)  AMENDMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  159 

sum  too  small,  as  appears  on  the  face  of  the  papers,  the  judgment 
may  be  corrected  on  motion  at  a  subsequent  term,  even  although  the 
amount  for  which  it  was  erroneously  entered  has  been  paid.*®  So 
also,  a  clerical  error  in  the  calculation  of  interest,  or  in  fixing  the 
date  from  which  interest  shall  run,  may  be  corrected  by  an  amend- 
ment.*^ Again,  if  the  clerk,  by  mistake  or  inadvertence,  enters  up 
a  judgment  for  a  sum  in  excess  of  that  found  by  the  verdict  or  or- 
dered by  the  court,  the  entry  may  be  corrected  so  as  to  correspond 
with  the  verdict  or  findings.®*  On  the  same  principle,  a  court  ren- 
dering a  judgment  in  excess  of  the  amount  which  its  jurisdiction 
allows  may  reduce  it  to  such  limit.*®  And  where  a  judgment  by  de- 
fault is  too  large,  and  the  plaintiff  remits  the  excess,  the  court  may 
correct  the  judgment  to  conform  to  the  remittitur.'^  But  the  fact 
that  the  evidence  fails  to  support  the  full  amount  of  the  judgment  is 
properly  ground  for  a  new  trial,  rather  than  a  motion  to  modify  the 
judgment.'*  If  a  judgment  is  erroneously  rendered  for  a  sum  great- 
er than  the  amount  of  the  plaintiff's  claim,  it  may  be  corrected  on 

••  Sberman  r.  Mxon,  37  Ind.  153;  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Mlnthorne,  19  Johns. 
(>*.  \.)  244.  But  where  judgment  by  default  has  been  properly  entered,  the 
court  cannot,  on  mere  motion,  vacate  the  judgment  at  a  subsequent  term, 
aUow  an  amendment  increasing  the  ad  damnum,  and  enter  a  new  judgment 
tor  a  larger  sum.     Uadclyffe  v.  Barton,  154  Mass.  157,  28  N.  E.  148. 

•T  Fidelity  Ins.,  Trust  &  Safe-Deposit  Co.  v.  Koanoke  Iron  Co.  (C.  0.)  84 
F«L  744;  West  Chester  &  W.  Flank-Koad  Co.  v.  Chester  County,  21  Pa. 
ro.  a.  U.  86;  Hastings  v.  Alabama  State  Land  Co.,  124  Ala.  008»  26  South. 
«81;  lYIplett  V.  Lake,  43  VV.  Va.  428,  27  S,  E.  363. 

"Alpers  V.  Schammel,  75  Cal.  590,  17  Pac.  708;  Klndel  v.  Beck  &  Pauli 
Lithographing  Co..  19  Colo.  310,  35  Pac.  538,  24  L.  R.  A.  311;  Ellis  H.  Rob- 
erta &  Co.  V.  Buckley.  145  >'.  1.  215,  39  X.  E.  966;  Quigley  v.  Birdseye,  11 
MoDt.  439,  28  Pac.  741.  Where  a  petition  claimed  "part"  of  certain  lands, 
and  the  finding  gave  plaintiff  the  lands  **sued  for  and  described  in  the  i)eti- 
tlon,"  but  the  clerk  inadyertently  entered  judgment  for  the  whole  of  the 
lands  mentioned,  it  was  held  an  amendable  mistake.  Elliott  v.  Buffington, 
149  Mo.  663,  51  8.  W.  408.  An  error  of  the  clerk  in  inserting  in  a  decree 
the  amount  of  the  costs  claimed  by  the  plaintiff,  before  they  had  been  as- 
<*ertain6d  or  taxed,  did  not  render  it  void,  and  was  cured  by  the  subsequent 
taxing  by  the  court,  and  collection  by  the  sheriff,  of  only  the  actual  costs 
in  the  case.    Janes  v.  BuUard,  107  Cal.  130,  40  Pac.  108. 

••StinervlUe  &  B.  Stone  Co.'v.  White,  25  Misc.  Rep.  314,  54  N.- Y.  Supp. 
oil, 

'•  Pennsylvania  If^re  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wagley  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  36  S.  W.  997. 

Ti  Boos  V.  State,  11  Ind.  App.  257,  39  N.  £.  197. 

(233) 


§    160  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  9 

motion.''*  The  same  rule  applies  also  if  there  is  a  manifest  fault  in 
the  verdict  itself.  Thus  if  the  jury  bring  in  a  verdict  for  a  sum  which 
is  less  than  that  admitted  to  be  due  on  the  face  of  the  pleadings,  the 
judgment,  if  entered  according  to  the  verdict,  may  afterwards  be  rc- 
formed.'^'  Again,  in  an  action  of  debt,  where  the  judgment  was  er- 
roneously entered  for  damages  alone,  it  was  held  that  the  defendant 
in  error  might,  on  application  to  the  court  in  which  the  judgment 
was  rendered,  amend  the  entry  so  as  to  make  it  a  judgment  for  the 
debt  in  the  declaration  mentioned,  to  be  discharged  on  payment  of 
the  damages  found  by  the  jury.'*  And  in  an  English  case,  the  rec- 
ord in  a  penal  action,  where  the  jury  by  mistake  gave  damages,  be- 
ing carried  by  writ  of  error  to  the  King's  Bench,  it  was  held  that  the 
plaintiff  might  enter  a  remittitur  of  the  damages  on  the  record,  and 
the  transcript  might  be  m^de  conformable  thereto.''* 

fi  160.    Ameiidmeiit  in  Respect  of  Pariiei. 

If  the  entry  of  a  judgment  is  open  to  objection  because  the  par- 
ties are  incorrectly  named  or  erroneously  described  in  it,  it  may  be 
amended  on  motion  so  as  to  conform  to  the  other  parts  of  the  rec- 
ord.''* This  is  also  true  if  the  entry,  in  this  respect,  is  not  sufficient- 
ly definite  or  precise.  Thus,  where  a  judgment  as  first  entered  was 
defective  in  not  designating  the  defendants  who  were  personally  Ka- 
ble  for  the  debt,  but  the  record  showed  who  they  were,  it  was  held 
that  the  court  had  power  to  amend  the  judgment  at  any  time  by  add- 
ing a  clause   specifying  the   defendants   so  liable.^'      Also,  if  the 

T2  Dunn  V.  llUotson,  9  Port.  (Ala.)  272;  Smith  v.  Robinson,  11  Ala.  270: 
Nelson  V.  CottlngJtiam,  152  Ind.  135,  52  N.  E.  702;  McLellan  Dry-Dock  Oo.  t. 
liYirmers'  Alliance  ^^team-Boat  Line,  43  La.  Ann.  258,  &  Soutb«  630. 

78  Brown  v.  Lawler,  21  Minn.  327. 

74  0'Conner  v.  Mullen,  11  111.  57. 

76  Hardy  v.  Cathcart,  1  Marsh.   C.  P.  180. 

7fl  Wright  V.  McBrlde,  42  Ga.  234;  Smith  v.  Redns,  9  Ala.  99.  44  Am. 
Dec.  42y;  Shelly  v.  Dobbins,  31  La.  Ann.  530;  Davenport  v.  Kirkland,  15<> 
III.  169,  40  N.  E.  304.  But  a  Judgment  against  a  party  sued  by  a  i^Tong 
name,  and  not  appearing  in  the  action,  is  a  nfillity  and  incapable  of  amend- 
ment.    Schoellkopf  V.  Ohmels,  11  Misc.  Rep.  253,  32  N.  Y.  Supp.  736. 

7 '  Leviston  v.  Swan,  33  Cal.  480.  But  a  judgment  rendered  against  several 
defendants  cannot  be  amended  so  as  to  stand  as  a  personal  Judgment  agaiQ^t 
(234) 


Ch.  9)  AMENDMENT  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §  160 

• 

judgment  is  irregular,  as  embracing  more  parties  than  the  record 
justifies.  It  is  proper  practice  to  correct  the  judgment  in  the  trial 
court."  Thus  if  process  issues  against  two  defendants,  and  one 
only  is  served,  and  the  pleadings  are  against  that  one,  but  verdict 
and  judgment  against  both,  the  entry  may  be  amended  at  a  subse- 
quent term  by  striking  out  the  name  of  the  defendant  not  served.^* 
So  where  a  firm  consisting  of  three  partners  was  sued,  and  one  ac- 
cepted service  and  appeared  for  all,  and  judgment  went  against  the 
three  individually,  and  the  two  defendants  not  served  then  moved  for 
a  new  trial  on  the  ground  that  the  other  had  no  authority  to  appear 
or  plead  for  them,  it  was  held  to  be  in  the  discretion  of  the  court  to 
reform  the  judgment,  so  as  to  award  execution  against  the  firm  and 
against  the  individual  property  of  the  partner  served,  instead  of 
granting  a  new  trial.®^  Again,  where  a  judgment  is  rendered  against 
several  defendants,  one  of  whom  dies  previous  to  its  rendition,  it 
may  be  amended,  on  motion,  by  vacating  it  as  to  the  deceased  de- 
fendant and  continuing  its  vitality  as  against  the  others.®*  If  a  judg- 
ment may  be  corrected  by  striking  out  the  name  of  a  party  improp- 
erly inserted  in  it,  so  also  may  it  be  amended,  after  the  term,  by 
inserting  the  name  of  one  of  the  parties,  omitted  through  mistake, 
when  there  is.  sufficient  record  evidence  by  which  to  make  the  cor- 
rection.**    But  if  a  suit  is  brought  in  the  name  of  A.  "and  others," 


ooe  as  principal,  and  against  tbe  others  as  sureties,  if  no  such  issue  was 
raised  on  the  trial.    Levi  v.  Drudge,  139  Ind.  458,  39  N.  E.  45. 

T«MuUlken  V.  Hull,  &  Cai.  245;  Robinson  v.  Moore,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  93, 
ai)  8.  W.  9U4. 

'•  Hammer  v.  McConnel,  2  Olilo,  32;  Lemen  v.  Young,  14  tnd.  3;  People's 
Nat  Bank  v.  McArthur,  82  N.  C.  107;  Heintz  v.  Pratt,  54  lU.  App.  616; 
City  of  Cftlifomia  V.  Harlan,  75  Mo.  App.  506.  A  judgment  is  not  such  an  en- 
Urety  as  not  to  be  amendable  in  respect  to  one  of  the  parties  alone,  unless 
the  substantial  rights  of  the  others  would  be  injuriously  affected  thereby. 
.Neenan  v.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  126  Mo.  89,  28  S.  W.  9G3. 

••Henderson  t.  Banlss,  70  Tex.  398,  7  S.  W.  815;  Breene  v.  Booth,  6 
Cdo.  App.  140.  40  Pac.  193. 

•1  Hood  Y.  Branch  Bank  of  State,  9  Ala.  335;  State  v.  Tate,  109  Mo.  265, 
18  8.  W.  1088.  32  Am.  St.  Rep.  664.  The  rule  is  the  same  where  there  are 
flevend  plaintiffs,  one  of  whom  dies.  BiUingsIea  v.  Smith,  77  Md.  504,  2G 
AU.  1077;    Mingay  v.  Uickey,  142  N.  Y.  449,  37  N.  E.  471. 

**  Whlttaker  v.  Gee,  63  Tex.  435;  Russell  v.  Erwin*s  Adm'r,  41  Ala.  292; 
Doty  v.  CaldweU  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  38  S.  W.  1025.    But  It  seems  the  court 

(235) 


§    161  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch,  9 

it  is  held  that  the  record  cannot  be  amended  by  striking  out  the 
word  *'others"  and  inserting  the  name  of  another  party,  more  espe- 
cially when  the  cause  had  previously  been  referred  to  arbitrators, 
from  whose  award  there  had  been  an  appeal.*'  Nor  has  the  court 
power  to  modify  its  own  judgment,  rendered  at  a  former  term,  by 
changing  it  from  a  judgment  against  the  plaintiff  (who  brought  the 
suit,  in  his  official  capacity,  upon  an  assignee's  bond)  to  a  judgment 
against  the  person  for  whose  benefit  the  suit  was  brought.®*  But 
in  another  case,  where,  by  mistake,  a  judgment  had  been  entered  up 
in  favor  of  a  former  administratrix,  whose  letters  had  abated  by  mar- 
riage, it  was  considered  proper  for  the  court  to  amend  the  judgment 
so  as  to  make  it  read  in  favor  of  the  administrator  de  bonis  non,  if 
he  had  been  duly  made  a  party  and  was  the  real  plaintiff  when  the 
judgment  to  be  corrected  was  entered.®* 

fi   101.    What  Courts  lia^e  Power  of  Amoadiiieat. 

All  courts,  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  whose  proceedings  arc 
preserved  in  any  species  of  record  or  memorial,  have  the  power  and 
authority  to  make  such  corrections  therein  as  truth  and  justice  re- 
quire and  the  rules  of  law  permit;  and  this  power,  being  inherent, 
belongs  to  a  court  merely  as  such,  and  does  not  depend  upon  a  stat- 
utory grant  of  jurisdiction.  An  appellate  court  may  modify  and 
change  its  orders  and  decrees  before  they  become  final,  and  may, 
even  at  a  subsequent  term,  amend  its  records  in  respect  of  clerical 
errors  and  mistakes.®*  And  its  power  extends  even  further  than 
this.  For  if,  on  an  appeal,  the  only  error  assigned  is  a  clerical  mis- 
prision in  regard  to  the  amount  of  the  judgment,  such  mistake,  being 

» 
cannot  allow  an  amendment  of  a  judgment  confessed  severally  on  a  joint  bond, 
by  adding  the  name  of  the  co-obligor.    Brown  v.  Smyth,  4  Har.  (Del.)  20L 
And  see  Sprague  v.  Jones,  9  Paige,  31)3. 

88  Uarslvadden  v.  McGhee,  7  Watts  &  S.  140. 

84  Boland  v.  Benson.  54  Wis.  387.  11  N.  W.  911.  But  where  a  judgment 
Is  entered  in  the  name  of  the  next  friend  of  an  Infant  without  showing 
the  capacity  In  which  he  sues,  it  may  be  amended  by  inserting  the  infant's 
name.     Kees  v.   Maxim,  99  Mich.  493,  58  N.  W.  473. 

8  6'(iay  V.  Cheney,  58  Ga.  304. 

86  iiiii  V.  Hoover,  5  Wis.  38G,  (i8  Am.  Dec.  70;  McCk)y  v.  Porter,  17  Serg. 
&  K.  59;    Hopkins  V.  Flynn,  7  Cow.  vN.  Y.)  526. 

(230) 


Ch.  9)  AMENDMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  162 

amendable  on  motion  in  the  court  below,  will  be  amended  by  the 
appellate  court  at  the  cost  of  the  appellant,  and  the  amended  judg- 
ment affirmed.®^  A  court  of  probate  jurisdiction  may  amend  its  pro- 
ceedings in  a  proper  case ;  **  e.  g.,  after  a  sale  by  an  administrator 
under  its  order,  by  adding  to  the  administrator's  account  exhibited 
his  affidavit  that  the  same  was  just  and  true,  formerly  taken  in  court 
but  not  filed.*®  So  also  a  justice  of  the  peace  may  correct  a  judg- 
ment rendered  by  his  predecessor  in  office,  by  a  nunc  pro  tunc  order, 
to  make  it  conform  to  the  truth. ••  And  an  arbitrator,  it  is  held, 
after  the  delivery  of  his  award,  may  correct  a  mere  clerical  error 
not  affecting  the  merits.'*  But  there  are  decisions  to  the  effect  that 
a  motion  to  amend  or  correct  a  judgment  cannot  be  made  before  a 
judge  other  than  the  one  whose  judgment  is  sought  to  be  modified.*^ 
And  the  clerk  of  the  court  has  no  ex  officio  right,  without  an  express 
order  of  the  court  to  that  effect,  to  complete,  alter,  or  amend  the 
record  kept  by  a  predecessor  in  that  office  whose  term  has  expired.* • 

S   102.    Tiaie  of  maklBs  Applioatloa. 

An  application  for  the  amendment  of  a  judgment  should  be  made, 
by  the  party  in  whose  interest  the  correction  is  required,  within  a 
reasonable  time  after  he  has  discovered  the  error.  If  he  suffers  an 
undue  period  to  elapse,  the  court  may  refuse,  on  account  of  his 
laches,  to  accord  the  relief  asked,  and  especially  if  rights  have  be- 
come vested  under  the  judgment  which  would  be  disturbed  by  its 
alteration.**  At  the  same  time,  the  inherent  power  of  a  court  to 
correct  or  amend  its  own  records  in  the  interests  of  justice  is  not  lost 
by  the  mere  lapse  of  time,***  unless,  as  is  the  case  in  some  states,  the 

•Y  Smltb  T.  Kennedy,  63  Ala.  334. 

«•  AuU  V.  St.  Louis  Trust  Co.,  149  Mo.  1,  50  S.  W.  289;  In  re  Robertson, 
51  App.   Div.   117,  04  N.   Y.   Supp.   385. 

»» Kennedy  v.  Wachsmuth.  12  Serg.  &  R.  171.  14  Am.  Dec.  676. 

••Gates  T.  Bennett,  33  Ark.  475. 

•^GoodeU  V.  Raymond,  1  wmiams  (Vt.)  241. 

•2  New  York  Security  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Llpman.  83  Hun,  569,  32  N.  T.  Supp. 
05;  Wells  v.  Vanderwerker,  45  App.  Div.  155,  60  X.  Y.  Supp.  1089;  Hughes 
T.  Edlsto  Cypress  Shingle  Co.,  51  S.  C.  1.  28  S.  E.  2. 

»» Rockland  Water  Co.  v.  PiUsbury,  60  Me.  425. 

•4  Rogers  v.  Rogers,  1  Paige,'  188;  Bonar  v.  Gosney  (Ky.)  30  S.  W.  602. 

•'Breene  y.  Booth,  6  Colo.  App.  140,  40  Pac.  193.    A  judgment  which, 

(237) 


§    162  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  9 

fime  within  which  such  action  may  be  taken  is  limited  by  statute.** 
The  amendment  is  generally  discretionary  with  the  court,  but  the 
circumstances  are  sometimes  such  that  justice  and  right  rather  de- 
mand the  refusal  of  the  correction  than  its  allowance.  Thus,  after 
money  has  been  paid  under  an  erroneous  decree,  it  cannot  be  so  al- 
tered or  amended  as  to  make  a  party  to  it  liable  to  pay  the  money  a 
second  time;  *'  although  if,  in  satisfying  the  face  of  the  judgment, 
he  has  paid  only  a  part  of  that  which  was  really  awarded  against  him, 
the  judgment  may  afterwards  be  amended  so  as  to  make  him  liable 
for  the  true  balance.** 

So  long  as  the  record  remains  with  the  court  which  rendered  the 
judgment,  it  is  of  course  under  its  control  for  proper  purposes  and 
in  proper  cases.  But  it  may  be  otherwise  when  the  record  has  been 
removed  to  an  appellate  court.  "Although  there  is  some  conflict  of 
opinion  as  to  whether  an  inferior  court  can  amend  the  record  whilst 
a  case  is  pending  upon  writ  of  error  in  a  higher  court,  we  are  in- 
clined to  think  that  the  weight  of  authority  is  in  favor  of  the  prop- 
osition that  the  pending  of  such  writ  does  not  prove  an  impediment 
to  the  action  of  the  court  below."  **  And  in  California  it  is  held 
that  the  amendment  may  be  made  even  after  the  judgment  has  been 

though  dormant,  still  survives  as  a  debt  of  record,  enforceable  by  suit  tomj 
be  so  amended  as  to  cure  a  mere  irregularity  therein.  WUllams  v.  Merritt, 
lOD  Ga.  217,  34  SS.  E.  1012.  PlalntlfTs  delay  for  two  years  to  apply  to  cor- 
rect a  clerical  omission  in  a  Judgment  is  not  ground  for  denying  the  ai^Ii- 
cation,  where  it  was  made  upon  the  discovery  of  the  omission.  BritteD- 
ham  v.  Robinson,  22  Ind.  App.  536,  54  N.  E.  133. 

oe  See  Code  Civ.  Froc.  Cal.  §  473;  Dyerville  Manufg  Co.  v.  HeUer,  102 
Cal.  615,  36  Pac.  928;  Scamman  v.  Bonslett,  118  Oal.  93,  50  Pac.  272,  62 
Am.  St.  Kep.  226;  Code  Civ.  Proc.  Colo.  §  75;  Pleyte  v.  Pleyte,  15  Colo. 
44.  24  Pac.  579;  Child  v.  Whitman,  7  Colo.  App.  117,  42  Pac.  601;  Miller's 
Code  Iowa,  §9  2837,  3154;  Reed  v.  Lane,  96  Iowa,  454,  65  N.  W.  3S0.  In 
Rhode  Island,  a  decree  cannot  be  amended  after  a  year  has  lapsed  since  tbe 
entry  thereof  on  simple  motion  to  amend,  or  petition,  or  even  petiti(m  for  a 
rehearing.    Fitch  v.  Richard,  18  R.  I.  617,  29  Atl.  689. 

87  Hassler's  Appeal,  ^  Watts,  176. 

»8  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Minthorne,  19  Johns.  244.  See  Harrison  v.  Union 
Trust  Co.,  80  Hun,  463,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  443. 

»•  Sparrow  v.  Strong,  2  Nev.  362;  Richardson  v.  Melllsh,  3  Bing.  346: 
Freel  v.  State,  21  Ark.  226;  Exchange  Xat.  Bank  v.  Allen,  68  Mo.  474; 
Dow  V.  Whitman,  36  Ala.  604.  But  compare  Haydel  v.  Roussel,  1  La.  Ann. 
35. 

(238) 


Ch.  9)  AMENDMENT  OF  JUDQMENTS.  §   168 

affirmed  on  appeal.^**®  But  in  Alabama,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  con- 
sidered that  when  a  judgment  or  decree  is  affirmed  on  appeal,  the 
decree  or  judgment  of  the  court  below  is  merged  in  the  judgment  of 
affirmance,  and  that  court  cannot  afterwards  make  any  order  modify- 
ing or  altering  it.***  And  this  seems  the  more  reasonable  view,  un- 
less in  cases  where  the  error  was  not  discovered  until  after  the  ap- 
pellate proceedings  were  had. 

§  163.    Method  of  Applyinc  f  or  AaieBdiiiei&t. 

A  judgment  once  entered  must  be  corrected,  if  irregular  or  erro- 
neous, by  some  proper  proceeding  for  that  purpose;  it  cannot  be 
merely  disregarded  and  the  proper  judgment  entered  anew.*®^  Dur- 
ing the  term  at  which  the  judgment  was  rendered,  the  correction  may 
be  made  by  an  order  of  the  court  upon  a  mere  suggestion  of  the 
error.***  But  after  the  term  is  ended,  according  to  the  practice  in 
many  of  the  states,  the  amendment  can  only  be  made  upon  the 
presentation  of  a  formal  petition  and  motion,  setting  forth  the  mis- 
take and  the  alteration  prayed  for,  and  after  proper  notice  to  the 
adverse  party  to  appear  and  show  reasons  why  the  correction  should 
not  be  made.***  In  Indiana,  an  application  to  correct  a  mistake  in  a 
judgment  should  be  made  by  motion,  and  though  made  in  the  form 
of  a  complaint  it  will  be  treated  as  a  mere  motion  and  not  demurra- 
ble,**'  It  is  also  to  be  observed  that  a  motion  to  amend  a  judg- 
ment cannot  be  allowed  in  an  action  of  scire  facias  upon  the  judg- 
ment, but  must  be  made  in  the  original  cause.***     If  a  judgment  is 

^••Dreyfuss  r.  Tompkins,  67  Cal.  33»,  7  Pac.  732;  Rousset  v.  Boyle,  45 
Oal  6i. 

^•iWerbom  y.  Plnney,  76  Ala.  291, 

!•«  NuckoUs  v.  Irwln,  2  Neb.  60. 

!••  Weed  V.  Weed.  25  Conn.  337. 

i«*In  re  Inliabitants  of  Limerick,  18  Me.  183;  Rugg  v.  Parker,  7  Gray 
OiatB.)  172;  Weed  v.  Weed,  25  Conn.  337;  State  v.  King.  27  N.  C.  203; 
Koniner  y.  Forquer,  1»  Ul.  68;  Stockdale  v.  Johnson,  14  Iowa,  178;  Ar- 
rlngton  y.  Conrey,  17  Ark.  100;  Morrow  y.  Geeting,  23  Ind.  App.  494.  55 
N.  K.  787.  The  proper  remedy  to  correct  a  judgment  which  contains  an 
mumthorized  proyision  is  a  motion  to  strike  out  Sabater  y.  Sabater,  7 
App.  IMy.  70,  39  N.   Y.   Supp.  958. 

!••  Latta  y.  Grlttith,  57  Ind.  329:    Good  wine  y.  Hedrick,  29  Ind.  383. 

^•e  Clark  y.  Dlgges,  5  GIU  (Md.)  109. 

(239) 


§    164  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  9 

Other  than  that  resulting  from  the  conclusions  of  law  arrived  at  by 
the  court,  it  cannot  be  corrected  by  an  appeal  from  an  order  grant- 
ing or  denying  a  new  trial,  but  must  be  reached  by  an  appeal  from 
the  judgment.*^®^ 

If  the  judgment  is  objectionable  in  form,  the  remedy  is  by  motion 
to  correct  it  in  the  court  below,  and  an  appeal  may  be  taken  from  a 
denial  of  the  motion ;  but  an  appeal  without  making  such  motion  is 
not  proper.^*^*  A  defendant  in  a  foreclosure  proceeding,  who  desires 
the  correction  of  a  mistake  in  the  record  entry  of  the  decree,  does 
not  waive  his  right  to  apply  therefor  by  taking  a  stay  of  the  order 
of  sale.^®'  If  the  motion  for  correction  or  amendment  is  denied, 
the  remedy  is  by  appeal,  and  not  by  renewing  the  motion,^  ^®  nor  by 
applying  for  a  new  trial  or  rehearing  of  the  motion.**^  When  the 
application  is  granted,  the  costs  of  the  motion  are  properly  taxed 
against  the  party  who  resisted  the  application.***  Mandamus  will 
not  lie  to  control  the  judicial  action  of  an  inferior  court  to  correct  a 
decree  which  it  had  full  authority  and  jurisdiction  to  render,  where 
the  petitioner  has  a  full  and  adequate  remedy  to  correct  it  on  appeal 
on  the  final  determination  of  the  cause.*** 

§  164.    Notice  of  AppUeatioii* 

The  general  rule  is  well  established  that  a  judgment  cannot  be 
amended,  after  the  term  at  which  it  was  rendered,  upon  an  ex  parte 
application.  Due  and  proper  notice  must  be  given  to  the  opposite 
party  of  the  application  and  the  relief  asked,  that  he  may  have  an 
opportunity  to  appear  and  show  cause  against  the  proposed  correc- 
tion.***    Nevertheless  if  the  amendment  is  to  be  based  upon  matter 

107  Martin  v.  Mattteld,  -^9  Cal.  43. 

108  Simmons  v.  Craig,  137  N.  Y.  550.  33  N.   E.  70. 

109  Hoagland  v.  Way,  35  Neb.  387,  53  X.  W.  207. 
iioBonar  v.  Gosney  (Ky.)  30  S.  W.  602. 

111  Morrow  v.  Goeting,  23  lud.  App.  41)4,  55  N.  E.  787. 

112  Morris  v.  Coleman  County  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  35  S.  W.  29. 
lis  Ex  parte  Woodruff,  123  Ala.  99,  26  SoutH.  509. 

ii*Wallis  V.  Thomas,  7  Ves.  292;  Rockland  W^ater  Co.  v.  Pinsbnrj,  00 
Me.  427;  Weed  v.  Weed,  25  Conn.  337;  Wooster  v.  Glover,  87  Qodjl  315; 
Poole  y.  McLeod,  1  iSmedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  391;  McNalry  v.  Castleberry.  6 
Tex.  286;   Wheeler  v.  Goffe,  24  Tex.  669;   Martin  y.  Bank  of  State^  20  Ark. 

(240) 


Ch.  9)  AMENDMENT  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §    165 

of  record  only,  the  necessity  of  giving  notice  to  the  adverse  party  is 
not  so  evident.  In  that  case,  any  evidence  against  the  amendment 
which  he  might  produce,  if  drawn  from  extraneous  sources,  would 
be  inadmissible  and  unavailing;  and  it  is  not  at  once  apparent  how 
liis  rights  could  be  prejudiced  by  his  ignorance  of  the  proceedings. 
It  seems  that  the  same  rule  should  here  obtain  as  in  the  case  of  nunc 
pro  tunc  entries, — that  notice  is  requisite  only  when  evidence  dehors 
the  record  will  be  consulted.^**  And  indeed  it  has  been  held  that  if 
the  amendment  relates  only  to  a  matter  of  form,  the  notice  may  be 
dispensed  with.^^'  And  the  court  in  Michigan  considered  the  omis- 
sion of  notice  as  immaterial,  in  a  case  where  the  amendment  was  not 
calculated  to  change  the  effect  of  the  judgment,  but  merely  to  bring 
its  terms  into  more  perfect  expression  of  the  meaning  which  would 
have  been  ascribed  to  it  by  a  proper  construction  of  its  language  be- 
fore the  amendment. *^^  For,  as  the  court  observed,  any  person  who 
was  interested  in  the  judgment,  or  acted  on  the  faith  of  it,  was 
chargeable  with  knowledge  of  all  that  a  proper  construction  of  it 
would  have  taught  him,  and  the  amendment  did  not  change  its  mean- 
ing. 

§  165.    Erldenee. 

In  the  matter  of  amending  records,  the  rule  of  English  practice 
forbids  the  correction  of  any  judgment  or  decree  unless  there  is  suf- 
ficient record  evidence,  or  evidence  quasi  of  record,  to  amend  by, 
and  strictly  excludes  all  parol  testimony  offered  for  that  purpose. 

636;  Alexander  v.  Stewart,  23  Ark.  18;  Cook  v.  Wood.  24  111.  295;  Means 
V.  MeflDS,  42  in.  50;  Michael  v.  City  of  Mattoou,  172  111.  31M.  50  X.  E.  loo; 
Hinton  v.  Ufe  Ins.  Co.  of  Virginia,  IIG  N.  C.  22,  21  S.  E.  201;  Case  v. 
Mannis,  57  Han,  5W,  11  N.  Y.  Supp.  243;  Bertliold  v.  Fox,  21  Minn.  51; 
Hill  T.  Hoover.  5  Wis.  386,  68  Am.  Dec.  70.  \\  here  a  final  decree  dismissing 
a  bill  in  equity  was  at  a  subsequent  term  amended  so  as  to  purport  to  be  a 
dismissal  without  prejudice,  but  the  amendment  was  made  upon  a  verbal 
notice  to  the  solicitor  of  one  defendant  only  and  a  notice  posted  upon  the 
coart-bonse  door,  held,  that  as  there  was  no  sufficient  notice,  the  amend- 
ment was  absolnt^y  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction,  and  could  be  assailed 
In  a  coUateral  proceeding.    Swift  v.  Allen,  55  111.  308. 

"•Supra,  f  1:m.  And  see  Ware  v.  Kent.  123  Ala.  427,  26  South.  208, 
h2  Am.  St  Rep.  132. 

i>«  Baloh  V.  Shaw,  7  Cush.  (Mass.)  282. 

"'  Emery  v.  Whitwell,  6  Mich.  41)1. 

ILAW  JLDG.-16  (241) 


§165  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  9 

And  this  rule  has  been  adopted,  either  expressly  or  tacitly,  in  many 
of  the  United  States,  and  has  become  too  firmly  settled  in  their 
jurisprudence  to  admit  of  contradiction.^^*  It  hjis  been  concisely 
stated  in  the  following  language : '  **We  think  that  no  judgment  can 
be  amended,  or  one  rendered  nunc  pro  tunc,  unless  such  amendment 
or  rendition  of  judgment  be  authorized  by  matter  of  record,  or  by 
some  entry  made  by  or  under  the  authority  of  the  court,  which  entry 
must  be  shown  by  the  record  of  the  cause,  or  at  the  least  by  some 
book  belonging  to  the  office  of  the  court  and  required  to  be  there 
kept  by  law."  ^^*  Where  this  rule  obtains  it  is  held  that  a  judg- 
ment cannot  be  amended  by  the  notes  or  minutes  of  the  judge  made 
upon  the  docket ;  they  are  not  considered  a  part  of  the  record  nor 
evidence  for  any  purpose.^*®  Nor  can  the  amendment  be  made  from 
the  judge's  memory  or  knowledge  of  the  fact  omitted. ^*^  Nor  by 
his  affidavit  in  regard  to  the  error  to  be  corrected.*-*  And  certainly 
amendments  cannot  be  made  from  the  recollections  of  witnesses  tes- 
tifying ex  parte.*^*     It  is  also  the  rule,  in  the  states  mentioned,  that 


118  Pitman  v.  Lowe,  24  Ga.  429;  Gay  v.  Cheney,  58  Ga.  304;  Armstrong 
Y.  Robertson,  2  Ala.  164;  Brown  v.  Bartlett  2  Ala.  29;  Rains  v.  Ware,  1(> 
Ala.  623;  Metealf  v.  Metcalf,  19  Ala.  319.  54  Am.  Dec.  188:  Hudson  v.  Hud- 
son, 20  Ala.  3(M,  56  Am.  Dec.  200;  West  v.  Galloway's  Adinr,  33  Ala.  3t)6: 
Harris  v.  Martin,  39  Ala.  556;  Summersett  v.  i$ummersett*s  Adm'r,  40  Ala. 
596,  91  Am.  Dec.  494;  Pettus  y.  McClannaban.  52  Ala.  55;  Lilly  v.  Larkln, 
66  Ala.  122;  Guise  y.  Mlddleton,  Smedes  &  M.  Ch.  (Miss.)  89;  Moody  t. 
Grant,  41  Miss.  565;  Russell  y.  McDougall,  3  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  234: 
Shackelford  y.  LeYy,  63  Miss.  125;  Hendrlx's  Heirs  y.  Clay,  2  A.  K.  Marsh. 
(Ky.)  462;  Norton  y.  Sanders,  7  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  12;  Stephens  v.  WIlsoo, 
14  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  88;  FinneU  v.  Jones*  Ex'x,  7  Bush  <Ky.)  359;  Makepeace 
Y.  Lukens,  27  Ind.  435,  92  Am.  Dec.  263;  Hansen  v.  Schlesinger.  125  lU.  230, 
17  N,  E.  718:  State  y.  Clark,  18  Mo.  432;  Saxton  v.  Smitli,  50  Mo.  490. 
Bohn  V.  StiYers.  75  Mo.  App.  291;  I^einkauff  y.  Tuscaloosa  Sale  &  Ad- 
vancing Co.,  105  Ala.  328,  16  ?outh.  891;  De  Castro  y.  Richardson,  25  CaL 
49;  Morrison  y.  Dnpman,  3  Cal.  255;  Swain  y.  Naglee,  19  CaL  127;  Solomwi 
V.  Fuller.  14  NeY.  63. 

110  Hudson  Y.  Hudson,  20  Ala.  364,  56  Am.  Dec.  200, 

120  Dickson  y.  Hoff's  Adm*r,  3  How.  (Miss.)  Km:  Boon  v.  Boon.  8  Smedos 
&  M.  (Miss.)  318;  Shackelford  Y.  LeYy,  63  Miss.  125. 

121  State  V.  Smith,  1  Nott  &  McC.  16;  Stony  Island  Hotel  Co.  y.  Johnson, 
.67   111.   App.    608. 

122  Smith  Y.  Brannan,  13  Cal.  107. 
issCoughran  v.  Gutcheus,  18  lU.  390. 

(242)     • 


Ch.  9)  AMENDMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  S    ^^^ 

a  decree  in  chancery,  equally  as  a  judgment  at  law,  cannot  be  amend- 
ed at  a  subsequent  term  upon  parol  testimony,  but  only  upon  evi- 
dence which  is  matter  of  record  or  quasi  record.^**  Further,  it  is 
held  that  where  the  judgment  is  sought  to  be  amended,  after  the 
term,  for  clerical  errors  or  formal  defects,  it  is  necessary  that  the 
error  or  defect  should  be  apparent  on  the  record ;  it  cannot  be  point- 
ed out  by  affidavit.*-* 

On  the  other  hand,  in  contravention  of  the  rule  that  a  judgment 
can  only  be  amended  by  matter  of  record,  in  several  of  the  states  it 
is  decisively  held  that  it  may  be  amended  on  any  evidence,  properly 
admissible,  and  satisfactory  in  its  weight  and  character,  showing  it 
to  differ  from  the  judgment  really  rendered  by  the  court.***  In  the 
language  of  the  supreme  court  of  New  Hampshire:  "We  think  it 
clear  upon  the  authorities  that  the  court  may  make  such  amend- 
ments upon  any  competent  legal  evidence,  and  that  they  are  the 
proper  judges  as  to  the  amount  and  kind  of  evidence  requisite  in 
each  case  to  satisfy  them  what  was  the  real  order  of  the  court,  or 
the  actual  proceeding  before  it,  what  was  the  proper  entry  to  be 
made  on  the  docket,  and  how  the  record  should  be  extended. 
*  *  *  Where  there  is  nothing  more  to  rely  on  than  mere  mem- 
ory, the  court  will  act,  if  at  all,  with  great  caution."  **^  In  a  recent 
Indiana  decision  it  was  held  that  parol  evidence  was  sufficient  as  a 
foundation  for  the  correction  of  a  clerical  error  in  the  amount  of  a 
judgment,  the  court  observing  that  this  was  a  different  matter  from 
making  a  nunc  pro  tunc  entry  of  something  that  had  been  entirely 

»"  Kemp  T.  Lyon.  76  Ala.  212. 

»"  BramblefB  .Heirs  v.  Pickett's  Heirs.  2  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  10,  12 
Am.  Dec.  ;«0;  Solomon  v.  tXiUer,  14  Nev.  63;  State  v.  Primm,  61  Mo.  166; 
Portia  V.  Talbot.  33  Ark.  218. 

22€  ^Uithetion's  AdmYs  v.  (Jrant's  Adm'r,  2  How.  263,  11  L.  Ed.  261;  Frink 
T.  Frink,  43  N.  H.  508,  80  Am.  Dec.  189,  82  Am.  Dec.  172;  Clark  v.  Lamb, 
«  Pick.  LMaas.)  415,  19  Am.  Dec.  332;  Kugg  v.  Parker,  7  Gray  (Mass.)  172; 
Weeil  V.  Weed,  25  Conn.  337;  Arrlngton  v.  Conrey.  17  Ark.  100;  HoUlster 
T.  Judges  of  Lucas  County  District  Court,  8  Ohio  St.  201,  70  Am.  Dec.  100; 
Forqoer  v.  Korquer,  19  111.  68;  Stockdale  v.  Johnson,  14  Iowa,  178;  Doane 
T.  laeun.  1  Colo.  454;  Breene  v.  Booth,  6  Colo.  App.  140,  40  Pac.  193;  People 
T.  Arapahoe  County  Court,  9  Colo.  App.  41,  47  Pac.  469.  See,  also,  In  re 
Wight.  i:«  U.  8.  i:i6.  10  Sup.  Ct.  487,  33  L.  Ed.  865. 

«'  Frink  ▼.  Frink,  43  N.  H.  508. 

(243) 


S    166  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  9 

omitted,  In  which  case  it  might  well  be  that  parol  evidence  would 
not  be  admissible,  but  only  the  record  itself.*-*  The  distinction, 
however,  does  not  appear  to  rest  upon  any  plausible  basis;  and  the 
decision  cited  is  a  departure  from  the  earlier  rulings  in  the  same 
state.* *•  If  parol  evidence  is  to  be  admitted,  the  notes  and  min- 
utes made  by  the  judge  upon  the  trial  docket  will  of  course  be  prop- 
er sources  from  which  to  obtain  information  as  to  the  action  really 
taken  by  the  court.*'®  And  indeed  they  will  naturally  be  consulted 
in  the  first  instance.  But  since  such  memoranda  are  not  a  part  of 
the  record,  and  therefore  not  of  controlling  authority,  it  will  be  pos- 
sible that  they  may  be  overborne  by  other  evidence ;  and  the  court 
cannot  be 'compelled  to  correct  its  journal  from  such  minutes.*" 

In  Illinois,  the  present  rule  appears  to  be  that  the  court,  upon 
notice  to  the  parties  in  interest,  may  amend  its  record  at  a  subse- 
quent term,  if  evidence  to  support  the  amendment  can  be  drawn 
from  the  record,  or  from  some  minute  or  memorial  paper,  or  notes 
taken  by  a  stenographer,  or  other  document  in  the  nature  of  a 
record,  made  in  connection  with  the  case  or  upon  the  trial  or  hear- 
ing; but  that  an  amendment  cannot  be  based  on  oral  evidence 
alone.*'* 

The  rule  that  "a  record  can  onlv  be  amended  bv  matter  of  record" 
seems  to  rest,  in  the  last  analysis,  upon  the  rule  that  "a  record  im- 
ports absolute  verity."  Without  losing  sight  of  the  extreme  impor- 
tance of  securing  stability  and  authority  to  the  solemn  memorials  of 
the  courts,  we  may  still  conceive  that  this  rule,  if  applied  with  full 
rigor  and  severity,  might  in  many  cases  produce  the  greatest  hard- 
ship and  injustice.  But  it  is  evident  to  a  student  of  American  case- 
law,  that  we  are  gradually  working  away  from  the  'old  standards  in 
this  respect.  The  courts  are  more  and  more  disposed  to  a  liberal 
practice  and  to  look  to  the  full  and  perfect  administration  of  justice, 
rather  than  to  buttress  up  the  sanctity  of  records  by  forbidding  in- 

128  MitcheU  V.  Uncoln,  78  Ind.  531. 

i2»See  Makepeace  v.  Lukens,  27  Ind.  435,  92  Am.  Dec.  2G3;  Boyd  t. 
Blaisdell,   15  Ind.  73. 

iBOGiUett  v.  Booth,  95  111  183;  Nlcklln  v.  Robertson,  28  Or.  278,  -12  I*ac. 
1^93,   52  Am.   St.   Rep.   790. 

181  SuHlvan's  Sav.  Inst.  v.  Clark,  12  Neb.  578.  12  N.  W.  103. 

182  stitt  V.  Kurtenbach,  85  lU.  App.  38;   (ilUett  v.  Booth,  05  lU.  183. 
(244) 


Ch.  9)  AMENDMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  166 

quiry  into  their  truth.  Hence  it  is  not  improbable  that  the  policy 
of  permitting  judgments  to  be  amended  upon  cause  shown  by  any 
proper  and  satisfactory  evidence,  will  ultimately  prevail.  Certainly 
it  is  a  policy  that  is  commended  by  reason  and  justice,  and  still  more 
by  the  loose  way  in  which  the  records  of  our  courts  are  but  too  fre- 
quently made  up.  To  shut  out  any  light  which  could  help  to  make 
the  records  accurate,  complete,  and  right  in  themselves,  appears  tc 
show  a  too  superstitious  reverence  for  the  litera  scripta. 

%  166.    Method  of  making  Correotions. 

"An  amendment  should  not  be  made  by  simply  noting  the  order  to 
amend,  but  it  should  be  actually  made  by  turning  back  to  the  min- 
utes of  the  former  term,  and  making  the  proper  correction  and  entry 
there,  so  that  the  entry  will  stand  and  be  read  as  if  no  amendment 
or  correction  had  ever  been  necessary."  ^**  If  the  correction  con- 
sists merely  in  adding  a  word  or  phrase,  or  adding  or  substituting  a 
name  or  date,  or  altering  an  amount,  or  the  like,  it  may  be  well 
enough  simply  to  make  the  change  upon  the  face  of  the  original  en- 
try. But  in  general,  interlineations  are  to  be  avoided ;  and  the  more 
re;;ular  mode  of  making  amendments,  after  the  term,  is  by  an  order 
of  court  reversing  the  defective  entry,  followed  by  a  new  order  nunc 
pro  tunc.*'*  Where  a  decree  already  made  in  a  cause  is  tacitly  re- 
voked, during  the  same  term,  and  a  second  decree  is  made  on  the 
same  subject-matter,  it  would  be  more  orderly  and  convenient,  in 
making  the  second  decree,  to  refer  to  the  first  one,  and  state  in  what 
particulars  the  later  is  intended  to  modify,  supplement,  or  supersede 
the  former;  but  this  is  not  essential  if  a  comparison  of  the  two  de- 
crees discloses  the  changes  or  modifications  made.  On  the  contrary, 
it  is  to  be  presumed  that  a  second  decree  made  within  the  term  is  in- 

'^" McDowell  r.  McDowell,  &2  N.  C.  227,  229.  The  court  has  power  at  any 
tuno  to  11  mend  its  records  nunc  pro  tunc,  and  the  clerk  is  bound  not  only  to 
ivc«  id  the  amendment,  but  also  actually  to  alter  the  original  record.  Jones 
r.  K«'wls.  30  N.  C.  70,  47  Am.  Dec.  338. 

»'*  King  V.  State  Bank,  9  Ark.  185,  47  Am.  Dec.  739.  See  Mansel  v.  Castles, 
f*3  Ti\.  414,  5.">  S.  W.  559.  Interlineal  corrections  of  clerical  omissions  In  a 
rw-ord,  althouj^h  Irregular  and  reprehensible,  do  not  necessarily  invalidate  the 
JiuUnieuu    Allen  v.  Sales,  56  Mo.  2a 

(245) 


§    J  68  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  9 

tended  to  modify  a  former  one  just  so  far  as  it  differs  from  it,  either  in 
length  or  breadth.^*' 

%  167.    AUowanee  of  AjnendineBt  is  discretioiiary. 

An  application  to  amend  a  judgment  or  decree  is  addressed  to  the 
discretion  of  the  court,  and  its  denial  is  not  the  subject  of  exception 
or  review.**®  Hence  an  appellate  court  will  not  issue  its  writ  of  man- 
damus to  compel  an  amendment  of  the  record  of  an  inferior  court. 
The  question  of  amending  is  wholly  a  matter  for  the  judicial  discre- 
tion of  the  court  having  the  custody  of  the  record.  And  while  man- 
damus is  a  proper  means  of  compelling  a  judge  to  proceed  to  his 
duty,  yet  it  cannot  be  used  as  a  means  of  deciding  for  him  what  that 
duty  is.*'^  It  is  also  true  that  the  regularity  of  an  amendment  made 
by  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction  cannot  be  inquired  into  col- 
laterally.*" 

S   168.    JnrisdiotioB   of   Eqvltj. 

It  is  held  in  some  of  the  states  that  the  judgments  of  courts  of 
record  are  of  such  high  verity  that  their  existence  cannot  be  im- 
peached, nor  their  contents  contradicted,  falsified,  or  corrected  by 
parol  proof,  and  consequently  that  a  bill  will  not  lie  in  equity  to 
correct  a  judgment,  purporting  to  be  rendered  upon  the  verdict  of 
a  jury,  by  showing  by  parol  that  the  judgment  was  in  reality  by  nil 
dicit  without  a  jury,  and  should  have  been  rendered  for  a  larger  sum 
than  that  specified  on  its  face.^'*  On  the  other  hand,  in  Iowa**' 
and  Missouri,***  it  is  held  that  if  judgment  is  by  mistake  entered  for 
a  sum  less  than  the  amount  actually  recovered,  so  that  the  creditor, 

i«s  Barrel!  v.  Tilton,  119  U.  S.  637,  7  Sup.  Ct.  332,  30  L.  Ed.  511;  RWIe  t. 
Eddie,  138  Mo.  599,  39  S.  W.  451. 

130  Brown  v.  McCune,  5  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  224;  Austin  v.  Jordan,  5  Tex.  1»K 

i»7  Commoitwealth  v.  Hultx,  6  Pa.  469;  Ex  parte  Morgan,  114  U.  S.  174. 
5  Sup.  Ct.  825,  29  L.  Ed.  135. 

13  8  Hamilton  v.  Seltz,  25  Pa.  226,  64  Am.  Dec.  (ttH. 

i8»Bank  of  Tennessee  v.  Patterson,  8  Humph.  (Tenn.)  302,  47  Am.  De*'- 
618;   Smith  v.  Bowes,  38  Md.  463.    . 

140  Partridge  v.  Harrow,  27  Iowa.  96,  99  Am.  Dec.  643. 

1*1  Wilson  V.  Boughton,  50  Mo.  17.    And  see  Pelzer  Manuf'g  Co.  t.  Ham- 
burg-Bremen Fire  Ins.  Co.  (C.  C.)  71  Fed.  826;  GUI  v.  Pelkey,  54  Ohio  St  34». 
43  N.  K.  991;  Tyler  v.  Shea,  4  N.  D.  377,  61  N.  W.  468,  50  Am.  St  Rep.  6fl0. 
(246) 


Cb.  9)  AMENDMBKT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §    169 

without  fault,  loses  a  part  of  his  judgment,  equity  will  assist  him,  if 
he  cannot  obtain  relief  otherwise.  But  since  the  cases  must  be  of 
very  infrequent  occurrence  in  which  the  law  court  could  not  correct 
a  mistake  of  this  kind  on  motion,  there  will  seldom  be  an  opportunity 
for  chancery  to  exercise  this  power.  Besides,  its  well  known  re- 
luctance to  interfere  with  the  records  of  otlier  courts  will  preclude 
action  of  this  kind,  unless  in  a  case  of  very  palpable  hardship  and 
entire  inadequacy  of  any  remedy  at  law. 

§  169.    Effect  of  Amendmeiiti  on  Third  Persons. 

An  amendment  of  a  judgment  or  decree  will  never  be  allowed  to 
prejudice  the  rights  of  third  persons — such  as  subsequent  judgment- 
creditors,  purchasers,  or  mortgagees — who  have  acquired  interests 
for  value  and  without  notice.^ *^  It  is  proper  to  insert,  in  the  order 
allowing  an  amendment,  a  saving  of  the  intervening  rights  of  third 
persons,  but  the  law  will  make  the  reservation  whether  it  is  ex- 
pressed  or  not.***  During  the  term,  however,  at  which  the  judgment 
was  rendered,  or  decree  made,  the  court  has  power  to  amend  or  cor- 
rect it,  and  a  person  who  acquires  an  interest  in  property  involved, 
on  the  faith  of  the  judgment. or  decree,  but  with  notice  of  the  pro- 
ceedings, takes  it  subject  to  the  possibility  that  the  judgment  or  de- 
cree may  be  corrected  or  vacated.*** 

»«»  Cmtcher  v.  Commonwealth,  6  Wbart.  (Pa.)  a40;  Remick  v.  Butterfleld, 
31  N.  H.  70,  64  Am.  Dec.  316:  Colman  v.  Watson,  54  Ind.  65;  Ligon's  Adm'rs 
T.  Rogerm  12  Ga.  281;  Perdue  v.  Bradshaw,  18  Ga.  287;  Calef  v.  Parsons, 
48  III.  App.  233;  Roman  v.  Hellman,  35  Neb.  414,  53  N.  W.  300;  Nell  v. 
l>a7ton.  47  Minn.  257,  49  N.  W.  981. 

>»»  McCormick  v.  Wheeler,  36  111.  114,  85  Am.  Dec.  388. 

><«  Henderson  v.  Carbondale  Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  140  U.  S.  25.  11  Sup.  Ct. 
^1.  35  L.  Ed.  332;  Studebaker  Bros.  Manufg  Co.  v.  Hunt  (Tex.  Civ.  App.) 
38  8.  W.  1134. 

(247) 


§   170  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  10 


THE  VALIDITY  OF  JUDGMK^TS. 

S  170.  Voidable  and  Void  Judgments. 

171.  Jurisdiction. 

172.  Character  and  Status  of  Parties. 

173.  Constitution  of  the  Court. 

174.  DisqualiHed  Judge. 

175.  Acts  of  Judge  de  Facto. 
17(5.  Judge  out. of  OtHce. 

177.  Time  and  Place  of  holding  Court 

178.  Place  of  Trial. 

179.  Judgment  rendered  in  Vacation. 

180.  After  Expiration  of  Term. 

181.  Premature  Entry  of  Judgment. 

182.  Sundays  and  Holidays. 

183.  Judgment  must  be  supported  by  the  Pleadings. 

184.  Judgment  in  Action  not  at  issue. 

185.  Findings  necessary  to  support  the  Judgment. 
180.  Judgment  must  follow  Verdict. 

§   170.    Voidable  and  Void  Jvdements. 

Before  proceeding  to  a  detailed  examination  of  the  questions  which 
may  affect  the  validity  of  judgments,  it  is  necessary  to  point  out  the 
important  distinction  between  judgments  which  are  void  and  such  as 
are  merely  voidable.  The  differences,  though  real  and  fundamental, 
are  not  always  marked  with  sufficient  sharpness  in  juristic  writing, 
and  courts  have  been  known  to  speak  of  a  judgment  as  *Void"  when 
they  meant  no  more  than  that  it  was  liable  to  be  overturned  if  prop- 
erly attacked.  Now  a  "void"  judgment  is  in  reality  no  judgment  at 
all.  It  is  a  mere  nullity.  It  is  attended  by  none  of  the  consequences 
of  a  valid  adjudication,  nor  is  it  entitled  to  the  respect  accorded  to 
one.  It  can  neither  affect,  impair,  nor  create  rights.  As  to  the 
person  against  whom  it  professes  to  be  rendered,  it  binds  hini  in  no 
degree  whatever,  it  has  no  effect  as  a  lien  upon  his  property,  it  does 
not  raise  an  estoppel  against  him.  As  to  the  person  in  whose  favor 
it  professes  to  be,  it  places  him  in  no  better  position  than  he  occupied 
before ;  it  gives  him  no  new  right,  but  an  attempt  to  enforce  it  will 
place  him  in  peril.  As  to  third  persons,  it  can  neither  be  a  source 
(248) 


Gh.  10)  VALIDITY  OP  JUDQMENTS.  §    170 

of  title  nor  an  impediment  in  the  way  of  enforcing  their  claims.  It 
is  not  necessary  to  take  any  steps  to  have  it  reversed,  vacated,  or 
set  aside.  But  whenever  it  is  brought  up  against  the  party,  he  may 
assail  its  pretensions  and  show  its  worthlessness.  It  is  supported 
by  no  presumptions,  and  may  be  impeached  in  any  action,  direct  or 
collateral.  On  the  other  hand,  a  "voidable"  judgment  is  one  which, 
though  not  a  mere  nullity,  is  liable  to  be  made  void  when  a  person 
who  has  a  right  to  proceed  in  the  matter  takes  the  proper  steps  to 
have  its  invalidity  declared.  It  always  contains  some  defect  which 
may  become  fatal.  It  carries  within  it  the  means  of  its  own  over- 
throw. But  unless  and  until  it  is  duly  annulled,  it  is  attended  with 
all  the  ordinary  consequences  of  a  legal  judgment.  The  party  against 
whom  it  is  given  may  escape  its  effect  as  a  bar  or  an  obligation,  but 
only  by  a  proper  application  to  have  it  vacated  or  reversed.  Until 
that  is  done,  it  will  be  efficacious  as  a  claim,  an  estoppel,  or  a  source 
of  title.  If  no  proceedings  are  ever  taken  against  it,  it  will  continue 
throughout  its  life  to  all  intents  a  valid  sentence.  If  emanating  from 
a  court  of  general  jurisdiction,  it  will  be  sustained  by  the  ordinary 
presumptions  of  regularity,  and  it  is  not  open  to  impeachment  in 
any  collateral  action.  When  is  a  judgment  void  and  when  merely 
voidable?  The  answer  to  this  question  will  form  the  subject  of  this 
and  the  two  following  chapters.  It  may  be  here  stated,  however, 
that  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  a  judgment  can  ever  be  considered 
entirely  void  except  in  the  single  case  where  there  was  a  total  want 
of  jurisdiction  to  render  it.  And  even  then,  in  the  case  of  a  domestic 
judgment,  it  is  a  serious  question  whether  the  lack  of  jurisdiction 
must  not  appear  on  the  face  of  the  record  in  order  to  entitle  the 
courts  to  treat  it  as  a  nullity.*  But  there  are  many  possible  defects 
and  irregularities  which  will  render  a  judgment  voidable. 

Before  leaving  the  subject  it  is  necessary  to  advert  to  two  words, 
often  used  in  this  connection,  and  which  must  be  distinguished  from 
those  already  explained.  These  are  "irregular"  and  "erroneous.'' 
.•\n  irregular  judgment  is  one  which  is  rendered  contrary  to  the 

1  See  infra,  S  21«.  The  validity  of  a  Judgment  Is  to  be  determined  by  the 
laws  iji  force  when  it  is  rendered,  and  is  not  affected  by  subsequent  chunfrt's 
tlit-reia.    Anderson  v.  Uygeia  Hotel  Co.,  »2  Ya.  OtTT,  *M  iS.  E.  2UU. 


§    170  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  C^h-   1^ 

course  of  law  and  the  practice  of  the  courts.  The  meaning  of  the 
term  is  therefore  not  exactly  coextensive  with  that  of  "voidable," 
although  the  two  are  often  used  interchangeably.  For  while  every 
irregular  judgment  is  also,  and  for  that  reason,  voidable,  there  may 
be  other  causes  besides  irregularity  sufficient  to  avoid  it.  An  erro- 
neous judgment  is  one  which,  though  regularly  rendered,  is  contrary 
to  law,  and  therefore  liable  to  be  reversed  by  an  appellate  tribunal 
Irregular  and  erroneous  judgments  cannot  be  attacked  collaterally. 
But  the  former  can  be  vacated  by  the  court  which  rendered  them 
or  by  a  court  of  review,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  irregularity; 
the  latter  only  by  an  appellate  court.  These  distinctions  are  noted 
in  an  opinion  of  the  supreme  court  of  New  York,  from  which  we 
quote  as  follows :  "Although  a  void  judgment,  or  one  that  is  void- 
able for  irregularity,  will  not,  after  being  set  aside,  justify  the  acts 
of  the  party  done  under  it  before  it  was  set  aside,  this  principle,  I 
apprehend,  has  never  been  applied  to  a  judgment  merely  erroneous 
and  reversed  for  error  by  a  court  of  review.  An  irregular  judgment 
is  called  voidable,  and  when  set  aside  is  treated  as  though  void  from 
the  beginning,  for  the  party  himself  is  held  chargeable  with  the 
irregularity;  while  a  judgment  pronounced  by  the  court,  although 
upon  an  erroneous  view  of  the  law,  and  subject  therefore  to  be  re- 
versed by  an  appellate  tribunal,  is  never  treated  as  void,  but  valid 
for  all  purposes  of  protection  to  the  party  acting  under  it  before  re- 
versal. The  fact  that  in  the  one  case  the  party  is  responsible  for  the 
irregularity,  and  in  the  other  whatever  of  error  there  is  in  the  judg- 
ment is  the  error  of  the  court,  seems  to  be  the  ground  of  the  dis- 
tinction between  the  two,  and  it  is  manifestly  a  just  and  proper  dis- 
tinction. While  it  may  well  be  held  that  a  party  is  not  justified  by  a 
judgment  which  is  subsequently  set  aside  for  an  irregularity  in  enter- 
ing it  up,  which  is  his  own  act,  it  would  seem  unjust  to  hold  that  a 
judgment  duly  rendered  by  the  court  shall  fail  to  protect  a  party 
acting  under  it  before  reversal,  because  reversed  for  error  committed 
by  the  court."  * 

«  Simpson  V.  Hombeck,  3  Lans,  53.  See,  also,  Gray  v.  Stuart,  33  Gnt 
(Va.)  358;  Boggess  v.  Howard,  40  Tex.  153;  Kz  parte  Lange,  18  WaU.  175,  21 
U  ifld.  «72;  Wolfe  v.  Davis,  74  N.  C.  599. 

(250) 


Ch.  10)  VALIDITY  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §    173 


I   171.    JnrUdiotioii. 

The  first  and  fundamental  requisite  to  the  validity  of  a  judgment 
is  that  it  should  have  been  rendered  by  a  court  having  jurisdiction. 
Without  jurisdiction  the  courts  can  do  nothing,  and  a  judgment  given 
forth  without  jurisdiction  is  a  mere  nullity.  The  jurisdiction  required 
is  of  three  sorts :  (i)  jurisdiction  of  the  parties ;  (2)  jurisdiction  of 
the  general  subject-matter ;  (3)  jurisdiction  of  the  particular  matter 
which  the  judgment  professes  to  decide.  But  the  subject  of  juris- 
diction is  of  such  importance  and  intricacy  as  to  require  treatment  in 
a  separate  chapter,  and  is  mentioned  here  only  for  the  sake  of  logical 
completeness. 

%  172.    Cliavaeter  and  Statni  of  Parties. 

The  validity  of  a  judgment  may  also  depend  in  many  instances  on 
the  character  or  status  of  the  party  against  whom  it  is  rendered. 
And  in  the  case  of  persons  who  are  under  legal  disabilities,  judg- 
ments may  be  irregular  and  voidable  for  the  failure  to  comply  with 
statutory  formalities,  or  to  protect  the  defendants  in  the  ways  pre- 
scribed by  law,  or  may  even  be  considered  void  for  the  want  of 
power  of  the  courts  over  them.  This  subject  will  be  examined  in 
detail  in  the  next  chapter. 

§  173.    Constitution  of  the  Conrt. 

In  order  that  a  judgment  should  be  recognized  as  valid,  it  is  of 
course  necessary  that  it  should  have  been  rendered  by  a  lawful  and 
duly  constituted  court ;  otherwise  it  is  not  "the  sentence  of  the  law*' 
and  is  not  entitled  to  carry  its  sanction.*  But  on  principles  of  pubHc 
policy  and  for  the  security  of  rights,  it  is  held  that  the  regular  judg- 
ments of  a  de  facto  court,  whose  existence  has  afterwards  been  pro- 
nounced unconstitutional  and  void,  are  nevertheless  valid  and  con- 
clusive.*   Thus,  in  a  case  before  the  supreme  federal  tribunal,  it  was 

*  Koften  T.  Wood.  2  Bam.  ft  Adol.  245. 

•State  V.  CarroU.  38  Conn.  449,  »  Am.  Rep.  409:  Burt  v.  Winona  &  St. 
P.  It  Co.,  31  Minn.  472,  18  N.  W.  285;  State  v.  Anone,  2  Nott  &  McC.  (S.  C.) 
•T;  GiUiam  y.  Reddick,  26  N.  C.  868;   State  y.  Porter,  1  Ala.  688;   Mayo  y. 

(251) 


§173  LAW  OP  JUDQMBNTS.  (Ch.  10 

held  that  an  adjudication  made  by  a  Spanish  court  in  Louisiana  was 
not  void  because  made  after  the  cession  of  that  territory  to  the 
United  States.  "For  we  know  historically,"  said  Thompson,  J.,  "that 
the  actual  possession  of  the  territory  was  not  surrendered  until  some 
lime  after  these  proceedings  took  place.  It  was  the  judgment,  there- 
fore, of  a  competent  Spanish  tribunal,  having  jurisdiction  of  the  case, 
and  rendered  whilst  the  country,  although  ceded,  was  de  facto  in  the 
possession  of  Spain  and  subject  to  Spanish  laws.  Such  judgments, 
so  far  as  they  affect  the  private  rights  of  the  parties  thereto,  must  be 
deemed  valid."  • 

In  regard  to  the  validity  of  judgments  rendered  by  the  courts  of  the 
states  which  attempted  to  secede  from  the  Union  in  1861,  there  has 
been  a  great  fluctuation  of  opinion,  and  it  is  only  of  late  that  the 
authorities  have  come  to  a  substantial  agreement.  At  first,  and  par- 
ticularly in  some  of  the  reconstructed  states,  there  was  a  strong  dis- 
position to  treat  all  such  judgments  as  mere  nullities.  This  view  was 
based  on  the  theory  that,  the  government  of  a  state  organized  under 
the  Confederacy  being  an  usurpation  and  being  erected  in  hostility  to 
the  lawful  government  of  the  country,  all  its  acts  were  void;  and  the 
same  objections  which  might  be  urged  against  its  laws  would  be  suf- 
ficient to  overturn  its  judgments,  both  being  parts  of  one  whole.* 
But  after  a  time,  impressed  with  the  idea  that  some  sort  of  govern- 
ment existed  in  those  states  during  the  war,  and  that  the  courts 
created  or  recognized  by  it  were  at  least  considered  lawful  tribunals 
by  that  government,  real  or  pretended,  and  that  respect  was  paid  to 
their  adjudications  by  the  persons  who  acknowledged  that  govern- 
ment as  rightful,  the  authorities  were  inclined  to  put  such  judgments 
upon  the  footing  of  quasi  foreign  judgments.  That  is,  they  were  not 
to  receive  the  full  faith  and  credit  due  to  a  domestic  judgment,  but 
neither  were  they  to  be  treated  as  entirely  void.  They  were  consid- 
ered as  prima  facie  evidence,  but  cause  might  be  shown  against  their 

Stoneura,  2  Ala.  390;  Mastcrson  v.  Matthews,  CO  Ala.  2G0;  Slate  v.  Ailing.  1- 
Ohlo,  IG. 

n  Keene  v.  McDonongh,  8  Pet.  308,  8  L.  Ed.  955. 

6  Penn  v.  Tollisou,  26  Ark.  545;  Thompson  v.  Mankhi.  26  Ark.  5S6,  7  Am. 
Rep.  628;  Ray  v.  Thompson,  43  Ala.  454,  04  Am.  Dec.  UOG. 

(252) 


Ch.  10)  VALIDITY  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §    173 

being  carried  into  effect.^  The  position  was  anomalous  in  the  ex- 
treme, and  the  theory  itself  quite  untenable.  For,  as  pointed  out  by 
Dr.  Wharton,*  in  suing  upon  such  a  judgment  it  would  be  necessary 
to  declare  as  upon  a  judgment  in  a  state  not  belonging  to  the  United 
States,  and  therefore  virtually  foreign.  But  a  foreign  judgment, 
rendered  in  the  courts  of  a  state  whose  independence  bur  own  gov- 
ernment has  never  acknowledged,  cannot  be  recognized  as  a  judg- 
ment on  which  suit  can  be  brought.  At  a  still  later  period,  a  view 
came  to  be  recognized  which  was  the  exact  opposite  of  that  first 
adopted,  viz.,  that  the  judgments  rendered  by  the  Confederate  courts 
during  the  war  were  in  all  respects  legal  and  conclusive.  It  was  held 
that  the  state  government,  as  organized  and  existing  in  all  its  de- 
partments in  one  of  those  states  during  the  continuance  of  hostilities, 
was  its  rightful  de  jure  government ;  and  accordingly  that  judgments 
and  proceedings  of  its  courts,  which  during  that  time  formed  a  por- 
tion of  that  government,  not  violative  of  the  constitution  and  laws  of 
the  United  States,  nor  infringing  upon  the  state  constitution,  were 
valid  and  binding.*  In  the  meantime  the  suprenie  court  of  the  United 
States  had  been  called  upon  to  consider  these  questions,  and  had 
ruled  that  an  act  of  the  "Confederate  Congress"  creating  a  court  was 
void,  and  that  the  court  itself  was  a  mere  nullity  and  could  exercise 
110  rightful  jurisdiction.**  There  is  no  difficulty  in  accepting  this  po- 
sition if  we  deny  to  that  body  the  rights  and  powers  of  a  government. 
For  of  course  a  mere  assemblage  of  private  persons,  acting  in  re- 
bellion against  the  law  of  the  land,  cannot,  create  a  court  of  law,  and 
the  acts  of  such  pretended  court  would  be  destitute  of  any  authority. 
But  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  insurrectionary  authorities  had  no  power 
to  create,  they  had  no  power  to  destroy.     By  no  act  or  proceeding 

'  Pepin  V.  Laohenmeyer,  45  N.  Y.  27;  Martin  v.  Hewitt,  44  Ala.  418;  Mo8e- 
!y  V.  Tuthlll,  45  Ala.  621,  6  Am.  Rep,  710;  Shaw  v.  Lindsay,  46  Ala.  290; 
liURli  T.  Glover,  47  Ala.  167;  Barclay  v.  Plant,  50  Ala.  509;  Bibb  v.  Avery,  45 
Ala.  G91. 

•  1  Whart.  Ev.  $  807. 

•Parks  v.  Coffey,  52  Ala.  32;  Hill  v.  Huckabee,  52  Ala.  155;  McQueen  v. 
McQneen,  55  Ala.  433;  Steere  v.  Tenney,  50  N.  H.  461;  Hill  v.  Armistead, 
."16  Ala.  118;  Hendry  v.  Cline,  29  Ark.  414.  See  BlackweU  v.  Willard,  65  N. 
C.  555.  6  Am.  Rep.  749. 

i«  Hi(  knian  v.  Jones,  9  Wall.  197,  19  L.  Ed.  551. 

(253) 


§    173  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (C3l.  10 

could  they  strip  a  lawful  pre-existing  tribunal  of  its  power  and  juris- 
diction or  terminate  its  existence.  Their  law§,  being  altogether  void, 
had  no  effect  whatever  upon  the  courts  which  had  been  duly  organ- 
ized before  the  rebellion  began.  And  still  less  could  any  change  in 
the  judicial  system  be  efTected  by  the  mere  declaration  of  secession. 
"The  objection  that  the  judgment  of  tfie  supreme  court  of  Louisiana 
is  to  be  treated  as  void  because  rendered  some  days  after  the  passaj3;c 
of  the  ordinance,  of  secession  of  that  state,  is  not  tenable.  That  ordi- 
nance was  an  absolute  nullity,  and  of  itself  alone  neither  affected  the 
jurisdiction  of  that  court  or  its  relation  to  the  appellate  power  of  this 
court."  ^^  These  two  decisions  outline  the  view  which  has  prevailed 
in  the  supreme  federal  court  and  which  must  now  be  regarded  asi 
the  accepted  doctrine.  Courts  organized  by  the  Confederate  authori- 
ties for  distinctively  national  purposes,  and  as  a  part  of  what  was 
intended  to  be  a  national  judicial  system,  had  no  legal  existence,  and 
all  their  acts  were  mere  nullities.  But  the  courts  of  the  several  states, 
in  their  individual  capacities,  had  a  lawful  existence,  notwithstanding 
the  usurpation  of  the  state  governments  by  the  insurrectionary  au- 
thorities, and  even  though  they  professed  to  derive  their  powers  from 
those  who,  de  facto,  had  possession  of  the  state  government.  Ac- 
cordingly, their  judgments,  so  far  as  they  did  not  tend  to  impair  the 
supremacy  of  the  federal  authority  or  the  just  rights  of  citizens  under 
the  constitution,  are  to  be  treated  as  valid  and  binding.*^  But  this 
is  subject  to  an  important  qualification,  viz.,  that  such  judgments 
could  have  no  effect  as  against  defendants  who  were  residents  of 
other  states  not  sharing  in  the  rebellion.  This  exception  is  established 
by  a  noteworthy  decision' in  Ohio,  where  it  was  held  that  as  between 

11  White  V.  Cannon,  6  Wall.  443,  18  L.  Ed.  023. 

12  Horn  V.  Lockhait,  17  Wall.  570,  21  L.  Ed.  657.  In  this  case  the  court 
said:  **The  existence  of  a  state  of  insurrection  and  var  did  not  loosen  the 
bonds  of  society,  or  do  away  with  civil  government  or  the  regular  adminis- 
tration of  the  laws.  Order  was  to  be  preserved,  police  regulations  maintained, 
crimes  prosccuttxl.  property  protected,  contracts  enfori*ed,  marriages  cele- 
brated, estates  settled,  and  the  transfer  and  descent  of  property  regulateit 
precisely  as  In  times  of  peace.  No  one  that  we  are  aware  of  seriously  ques- 
tions the  validity  of  judicial  or  legislative  acts  in  the  insurrectionary  slates 
touching  these  and  kindred  subjects,  where  they  were  not  hostile,  in  their 
purpose  or  mode  of  enforcement,  to  the  authority  of  the  national  gov^mmeot, 
and  did  not  Impair  the  rights  of  citizens  under  the  constitution." 

(254) 


Ch.  10)  VALIDITY  OF  JUDGMENTS.        ^  §    174 

parties  residing  in  the  state  of  Arkansas  and  within  the  rebel  lines, 
and  a  citizen  of  Ohio,  resident  within  the  Union  lines,  between  whom 
the  war  made  intercourse  impossible,  there  could  be  no  jurisdiction 
in  a  Confederate  court  in  Arkansas  by  which  the  rights  of  non-resi- 
dents could  be  injuriously  affected.  Neither  could  such  jurisdiction 
be  acquired  by  the  consent  or  waiver  of  an  attorney  practicing  in 
said  court,  who  was  employed  and  appeared  for  the  non-resident 
defendants  before  the  war  commenced.  His  general  authority  as  an 
attorney,  before  the  war,  though  not  revoked  by  the  clients,  did  not 
authorize  him  to  waive  any  of  their  rights,  nor  could  such  consent  or 
waiver  confer  on  the  court  jurisdiction  over  the  case  or  over  the  de- 
fendants." Questions  have  arisen  as  to  the  validity  of  judgments 
rendered  by  a  tribunal  created  by  a  military  commander  in  a  district 
of  insurrectionary  territory  held  by  him  in  belligerent  occupation. 
But  as  these  questions  chiefly  relate  to  the  effect  of  such  judgments 
as  res  judicata,  the  consideration  of  them  is  postponed  to  another 
place."- 

I  174.    Diflqvalilled  Judse. 

The  validity  of  a  judgment  may  often  depend  upon  considerations 
personal  to  the  judge  who  rendered  it.  He  may  be  disqualified  from 
acting  in  the  particular  case  by  reason  of  his  being  concerned  as  a 
party,  or  otherwise  interested  in  the  event  of  the  suit,  or  on  account 
of  his  relationship  or  affinity  to  one  of  the  litigants,  or  because  he  is 
not  qualified  for  the  office  in  accordance  with  the  statutory  require- 
ments. And  first,  in  regard  to  his  interest  in  the  suit ;  it  is  a  maxim 
of  the  common  law  that  "nemo  potest  esse  judex  in  propria  causa."  *' 
And  indeed  natural  justice,  as  well  as  a  regard  for  the  integrity  and 
impartiality  of  the  judiciary,  sanction  the  same  rule.  Accordingly 
it  is  held,  under  statutes  forbidding  a  judge  to  act  in  a  cause  in  which 
he  is  interested,  that  if  he  should  assume  to  decide  a  case  where  his 
personal  interest  might  come  in  conflict  with  his  judicial  indifference, 

i»  Pennywit  v.  Foote,  27  Ohio  St.  GOO,  22  Am.  Rep.  340.  See,  also,  Botts 
r.  Creoaliaw,  Ctiase,  227,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  1,600;  Livingston  v.  Jordan,  Chase,  454, 
i->d.  Cas.  No.  8.415;  Brooke  y.  Filer,  35  Ind.  402;  French  y.  Tumlin,  Fed. 
Cag.  Xo.  5,104. 

>«  See  infra,  voh  2,  |  525. 

"  12  Co.  113. 

(255) 


§174  -  LAW  OP  JUDOMENT&  (Ch.  10 

the  judgment  so  rendered  would  be  entirely  null  and  void.**  So  a 
judgment  pronounced  by  a  judge  who  was  disqualified  on  account 
of  his  having  been  of  counsel  in  the  case,  is  void  and  not  conclusive 
on  the  parties.*^  It  does  not  appear  that  this  would  have  been  so  at 
common  law,  for  the  doctrine  seems  rather  to  have  been  that  the  acts 
of  a  disqualified  judge  were  not  merely  nullities,  but  were  liable  to  be 
avoided  or  reversed  on  a  proper  application,  although  the  parties 
might  admit  their  binding  force  by  acquiescence.**  In  the  next  place, 
the  relationship  of  the  judge  to  any  of  the  parties  in  the  cause  is 
made  a  ground  of  his  disqualification,  by  statute  in  many  of  the  states ; 
and  there  are  cases  holding  that  a  judgment  attempted  to  be  ren- 
dered by  one  who  was  disqualified  by  reason  of  his  consanguinity  with 
a  litigant,  is  utterly  void  and  incapable  of  being  made  good  by  any 
waiver  or  consent.**  But  the  rule  obtaining  in  a  majority  of  the 
states  is  that  such  a  judgment  is  voidable  and  liable  to  be  set  aside 
on  proper  proceedings  for  that  purpose,  but  is  not  absolutely  void ; 
it  is  a  sufficient  protection  to  persons  lawfully  acting  under  it  while 
it  stands,  and  it  cannot  be  attacked  collaterally.**     Some  of  these  de- 


i«In  re  Cottle.  5  Pick.  (Mass.)  483;  Colfin  t.  CotUe.  9  Pick.  (Mass.)  287: 
Slgourney  t.  Sibley,  21  Pick.  (Mass.)  101,  32  Am.  Dec.  2iS;  Gay  v.  Minot.  :i 
Cnsh.  (Mass.)  3o2;  Wasliington  Ins.  Co.  v.  Price,  1  Hopk.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  1;  Place 
V.  Butternuts  Woolen  &  Cotton  Manuf  g  Co.,  28  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  503;  State  t. 
Castleberry,  23  Ala.  85.  But  in  Texas,  it  is  said  that  an  alleged  disqualifica- 
tion of  the  trial  judge  can  be  reviewed  by  appeal,  and  Is  no  ground  for  en- 
joining proceedings  on  the  judgment.  Dunson  v.  Spradley  (Tex.  Civ.  Ajjp.) 
40  S.  W.  327. 

17  Xowcome  v.  Light,  58  Tex.  141,  44  Am.  Rep.  QOi;  Jouett  v.  Gnnn.  13 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  84,  35  S.  W.  194.  Compare  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Taylor, 
93  Va.  220,  24  S.  E.  1013. 

18  Dimes  v.  Grand  Junction  Canal  Co.,  17  Jur.  73;  Gorrill  v.  Whittier,  3  N. 
H.  2GS. 

19  Chambers  v.  Clearwater.  MO  N.  Y.  310;  Oakley  v.  Aspinwall,  3  X.  T. 
547;  Hall  v.  Thayer.  105  Mass.  219,  7  Am.  Rep.  513.  See  Reams  v.  Keams. 
5  Cold.  (Tenn.)  217;  Horton  v.  Howard,  79  Mich.  W2,  44  N.  W.  1112,  19  Am. 
St.  Kep.  198:   In  re  Depuy'a  Estate,  5C  Hun,  639,  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  12L 

2  0  Fowler  v.  Brooks.  64  N.  H.  423,  13  Atl.  417,  10  Am.  St.  Rep.  425  (cltlnjf 
Phillips  V.  Eyre,  L.  R.  6  Q.  B.  1,  22);  Trawick's  Heirs  v.  Trawick's  Adm'rs.  f.T 
Ala.  271  (citing  Hine  v.  Hussey,  45  Ala.  496;  Hayes  v.  Ck)llier.  47  Ala.  r*V>: 
Plowman  v.  Henderson,  59  Ala.  559;  Heydenfeldt  v.  Towns,  27  Ala.  4'S^K 
Itogers  V.  Felker,  77  Ga.  46;  Matthews  v.  Noble,  25  Mlse.  Rep.  674,  65  N.  ^ . 
Supp.  100. 

(25G) 


Ch.  10)  VALIDITY  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §    175 

cisions  were  rendered  under  statutes  providing  that  the  parties  in- 
terested might  waive  the  disqualification  by  consenting  to  the  action 
of  the  judge.  And  when  this  is  the  case,  it  is  entirely  reasonable  to 
hold  that,  if  no  express  objection  appears,  the  judgment  will  be  void- 
able at  most,  not  void.  "These  disqualifications  may  be  unknown, 
or  so  obscure  as  to  require  a  judicial  decision  to  determine  their 
existence.  It  is  a  serious  thing  to  annul  the  judgments  of  the  courts, 
and  it  ought  not  to  be  done  where  the  consent  of  the  parties  alone  is 
requisite  to  their  validity,  and  its  entry  on  the  record  is  the  only  ad- 
missible evidence  that  it  was  given."  ^*  The  disqualification  may  also 
arise  from  omission  of  statutory  requirements  on  the  part  of  the 
person  assuming  to  act  as  judge.  Thus,  a  judgment  rendered  by  an 
attorney  orally  appointed  judge  and  acting  by  consent  of  parties,  but 
without  having  taken  the  prescribed  oath,  is  void  for  want  of  juris- 
diction.** 

f  176.    Aotfl  of  Jndffe  de  Faoto. 

This  brings  us  to  the  consideration  of  acts  done  by  a  judge  de 
facto,  A  person  may  be  entitled  to  this  designation  who,  although 
he  is  not  a  true  and  rightful  incumbent  of  the  office,  yet  is  no  mere 
usurper,  but  holds  it  under  color  of  lawful  authority.  And  there  can 
be  no  question  that  judgments  rendered  and  other  acts  performed  by 
such  a  person  are  valid  and  binding.  If  a  contested  election,  for 
example,  should  result  in  the  ouster  of  the  person  who,  being  entitled 
on  the  face  of  the  returns,  was  commissioned  and  qualified  as  judge, 
Ihis  would  not  retrospectively  invalidate  the  judgments  he  may  have 
rendered  while  in  actual  possession  of  the  office.  So  judges  elected 
and  duly  qualified,  and  who  exercise  the  functions  of  their  office,  are 
de  facto  officers,  although  the  act  under  which  they  were  elected  was 
unconstitutional.**     And  a  person  who  is  ineligible  to  a  judgeship, 

**  HIne  V.  Hussey,  45  Ala.  496.  513.  A  judgment  is  not  void  because  the 
judi^e  rendering  it  is  related  in  equal  degree  to  both  the  parties  litigant,  es- 
pecially when  no  objection  was  made  at  the  hearing  on  this  ground.  Beall  v. 
Wnquelield.  73  Ga.  48. 

2»  HorbAer  v.  State,  80  Ind.  484.  The  fact  that  one  judge  presided  when 
the  cause  was  beard,  and  another  when  judgment  was  rendered,  does  not  in- 
validate the  Judgment    Ueed  v.  Lane,  96  Iowa.  454.  65  N.  W.  38(). 

St  Campbell  v.  Commonwealth,  96  Pa.  344;  Burt  v.  Winona  &  St.  P.  R. 
Co.,  81  Minn.  472.  18  N.  W.  285;  In  re  Ah  Lee  O).  C.)  6  Sawy.  410,  5  Ftnl. 
1  LAW  JUDG.— 17  (257) 


§176  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  lO 

but  who  has  nevertheless  been  duly  appointed,  and  who  exercises  the 
powers  and  duties  of  the  office,  is  a  de  facto  judge,  and  his  acts  are 
valid  until  he  is  properly  removed.^*  Again,  one  duly  elected  to  a 
judgeship,  and  commissioned  a  judge  by  the  governor,  and  dischar- 
ging the  functions  of  the  office,  is  a  judge  de  facto,  although  the 
supreme  court  afterwards  decides  that  the  term  of  his  predecessor 
had  not  expired.**  So  also  the  acts  of  a  de  facto  judge  cannot  be 
attacked  collaterally,  by  showing  that  he  has  taken  no  oath  of  office, 
or  that  he  has  taken  an  oath  to  support  a  power  in  insurrectionary 
hostility  to  the  federal  goverhment.*'  These  rules  are  founded  upon 
sound  principles  of  public  policy  and  justice,  and  are  generally  whole- 
some in  their  practical  operation. 

I  176.    Jndse  out  of  Oflloo. 

It  IS  generally  held  that  a  judgment  or  decree  rendered,  or  order 
made,  by  a  judge  whose  term  of  office  has  expired,  but  who  continues 
in  possession  and  exercise  of  the  functions  of  the  office,  is  valid  and 
binding  as  the  act  of  a  de  facto  officer.*^  Thus,  in  a  recent  case,  the 
action  was  tried  on  November  30th  and  a  decree  rendered  December 
6th,  the  term  of  court  having  begun  on  November  8th  and  con- 
tinued till  December  6th,  on  which  day  the  decree  was  dated  and  filed. 
It  transpired  that  the  term  of  office  of  the  judge  who  signed  the 

899;  Cailand  v.  Custer  County,  5  Mont.  579,  6  Pac  24;  Taylor  v.  Skrine,  3 
Brev.  (S.  C.)  516;  Bro\\Ti  v.  0*Connell,  36  Conn.  432,  4  Am.  Kep.  89;  Clark 
V.  Commonwealth,  29  Pa.  129;  People  v.  Bangs,  24  111.  184.  And  see  Griffin's 
Case,  Chase,  364,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  5,815. 

24  Ostrander  v.  People,  29  Hun  (N.  Y.)  513;  Blackburn  v.  State,  3  Head 
iTenn.)  690;  Gregg  v.  Jamison,  55  Pa.  468. 

2  5  McCraw  v.  Williams,  33  Grat.  (Va.)  510. 

26  Pepin  V.  Lachenmeyer,  45  N.  Y.  27. 

27  Read  V.  City  of  Buffalo,  4  Abb.  Dec.  (N.  Y.)  22;  CarU  v.  Rhener,  27  Minn, 
292,  7  N.  W.  139;  State  v.  Williams,  5  Wis.  308,  68  Am.  Dec,  65;  Gary  t. 
State,  76  Ala.  78;  ThreadglU  v.  Carolina  Cent  Ry.  Co.,  73  N.  C.  178;  Wood- 
side  V.  Wagg,  71  Me.  207;  Deutermann  v.  Pollock,  30  App.  Div.  378,  51  N. 
Y.  Supp.  928.  Where  the  term  of  office  of  the  Judge  who  tried  the  ease  has 
^xphred,  Judgment  may  be  rendered  by  hlg  successor.  Raub  v.  Scholl.  1^ 
Wash.  30,  52  Pac.  332.  But  where  the  docket  of  a  Justice  of  the  peace  shows 
that  a  judgment  was  entered  on  a  day  on  which  he  was  not  within  the  state, 
«uch  judgment  is  Toid  for  want  of  jurisdiction.  TollTer  y.  BrowneU,  94  Mich. 
577,  54  N.  W.  302. 

(258) 


Ch.   10)  VALIDITY  OP  JUDOMBNTS.  §    177 

decree  expired  on  December  2d.  But  it  was  held  that  the  judge  was 
an  officer  de  facto  and  his  decree  valid  as  a  decree  of  the  court.*® 
So  in  another  case,  a  judge  whose  office  was  vacated  by  his  taking 
a  seat  in  the  legislature,  but  who  continued  to  exercise  the  functions 
of  a  judge,  was  considered  to  be  a  de  facto  officer  and  his  acts  conse- 
quently valid.**  If  a  judgment  or  decree  was  actually  rendered  before 
the  judge's  term  expired,  it  is  of  course  immaterial  that  it  was  not 
docketed  or  filed  until  afterwards.  Thus,  where  a  cause  was  sub- 
mitted to  a  judge  to  be  determined  in  vacation,  and  he  made  his 
decision  and  deposited  it,  with  the  papers,  in  the  express  office  the 
day  before  his  term  of  office  expired,  directed  to  the  clerk  of  the 
proper  county,  it  was  held  that  the  decision  was  then  complete  and 
it  was  not  invalidated  because  it  was  not  filed  it!  the  clerk's  office 
before  the  expiration  of  the  judge's  term.** 

(    177.    Time  and  Place  of  l&oldinc  Conrt. 

It  is  held  in  several  of  the  cases,  that  it  is  indispensable  to  the 
validity  of  a  judgment  that  it  be  rendered  at  the  time  and  place  pre- 
scribed by  law.'*  And  the  holding  of  a  court  at  a  time  or  place 
other  than  that  ordained  or  authorized  by  law,  and  all  proceedings 
thereunder,  are  coram  non  judice  and  void.'*  Perhaps  the  rule  is  too 
broadly  stated  in  these  decisions.  But  it  may  be  admitted  that  the 
fact  that  a  term  of  court  was  not  held  at  the  time  prescribed  by  law 
will  constitute  a  ground  for  the  reversal  of  a  judgment  rendered  in 
such  term."  But  if  there  was  reasonable  mistake  in  regard  to  the 
time  fixed  by  law,  and  color  of  authority  for  the  time  actually  se- 
lected, there  is  authority  for  the  view  that  a  judgment  so  rendered  is 

••Cromer  v.  Bolnest.  27  S.  C.  436,  3  S.  E.  849.  But  compare  Mace  v. 
O'Rellley,  70  Cal.  231,  11  Pac.  721. 

2»  Woodside  v.  Wagg,  71  Me.  207. 

«•  Babcock  v.  Wolf,  70  Iowa,  670,  28  N.  W.  490;  Shenandoah  Nat.  Bank 
T.  Read,  86  Iowa.  136,  53  N.  W.  96;   McDoweU  v.  McDowell,  92  N.  C.  227. 

«>  State  T.  Roberts.  8  Nev.  239;  Dalton  v.  Llbby,  9  Nev.  192;  Cooper  v. 
American  Central  Ins,  Co.,  3  Colo.  318;  Wicks  v.  Ludwig,  9  Cal.  173. 

»»  Grimniett  v.  Askew,  48  Ark.  151,  2  S.  W.  707. 

"  Smitbson  v.  Dillon,  16  Ind.  160.  See  Cofflnberry  v.  Horrill,  5  Cal.  49:i; 
Bowden  y.  Hatcher,  83  Ga.  77,  9  S.  E.  724« 

(259) 


§    177  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  10 

perfectly  valid.  Thus,  in  a  case  in  Tennessee,  it  appeared  that  an  act 
of  the  legislature  had  changed  the  times  for  the  sitting  of  the  circuit 
court  for  a  certain  county.  This  change  was  not  known  to  the 
ofKcers  of  the  court,  the  act  having  been  passed  but  a  short  time 
before  a  term  was  to  be  held.  The  court  was  held  by  the  presiding 
judge  at  the  time  before  fixed  by  law,  but  at  a  different  time  from  that 
required  by  the  law  then  in  force.  A  judgment  was  rendered  by  the 
court  thus  sitting,  the  justice  of  which  was  not  controverted.  And 
it  was  held  that  the  judgment  was  valid ;  that  the  acts  of  a  judge 
regularly  in  office  are  valid,  if  he  hold  his  court  under  color  of  law, 
although  the  law  may  be  repealed  or  invalid.'*  On  similar  prin- 
ciples, and  by  an  even  stronger  reason,  a  judgment  is  valid  when 
rendered  at  a  term  which  was  commenced  at  the  day  fixed  by  law, 
although,  in  the  middle  of  the  term  and  before  the  judgment,  a  new 
statute  changes  the  time  for  holding  the  court,  because  the  later  act 
will  not  affect  a  term  already  lawfully  commenced.'*  And  where, 
in  the  absence  of  the  judge,  the  sheriff  adjourned  the  court  without 
authority,  the  adjournment  was  held  to  be  a  nullity,  and  a  judgment 
entered  by  the  court  two  days  afterwards  was  held  valid.'*  In  regard 
to  the  place  of  holding  a  court,  compliance  with  the  law  is  of  course 
important,  and  perhaps  essential  to  the  perfect  validity  of  the  judg- 
ments rendered.  But  it  does  not  appear,  from  the  authorities,  to  be 
so  indispensable  that  deviation  from  the  law  in  this  respect  will  of 
itself  be  sufficient  to  render  such  judgments  absolutely  void.*'  H 
it  appears  by  the  record  of  a  judgment  that  the  court  which  pro- 
nounced it  had  jurisdiction  of  the  person  of  the  defendant  and  of  the 
subject-matter  of  the  suit,  such  judgment  will  not,  in  a  collateral  pro- 
ceeding, be  held  void  upon  proof  being  made  that  it  was  rendered 
at  a  place  other  than  the  established  seat  of  justice  of  the  county, 
when  it  is  shown  that  all  the  houses  at  the  latter  place  had,  before 
the  rendition  of  the  judgment,  been  destroyed  by  fire,  and  that  the 

«*  Venable  v.  Curd.  2  Head,  582. 

85  Clnre  v.  Clare,  4  Greene  (Iowa)  411. 

««  Thomas  v.  Fogartj',  19  Cal.  G44. 

37  Le  Grange's  Lessee  v.  Ward,  11  Ohio,  257;    Smitli  v.  State,  9  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  10. 

(2G0) 


Ch.   10)  VALIDITY  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §    178 

county  court  had  accepted,  as  a  temporary  seat  of  justice,  the  place 
at  which  the  judgment  was  rendered.'® 

§  178.    Flaoe   of   Trial. 

That  a  judgment  was  rendered  in  a  county  other  than  that  in 
which  the  venue  was  laid  is  a  mere  irregularity,  and  does  not  avoid 
the  judgment.**  And  the  same  is  true  of  the  fact  that  the  judge  made 
and  signed  a  decree  in  a  county  other  than  that  where  the  trial  was 
had.*''  So  also,  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  is  not  affected  by  the 
fact  that  the  action  was  tried  in  a  county  which  was  not  the  one  de- 
clared by  statute  to  be  the  proper  county  for  its  trial.**  Thus,  in 
Lalifornia  it  is  held  that  where  a  cause  is  transferred,  because  of  the 
disqualification  of  the  judge,  to  an  adjoining  judicial  district,  under 
authority  of  statute,  the  judgment  therein  is  not  void  or  subject  to 
collateral  attack  because  the  county  to  which  the  cause  was  trans- 
ferred was  not  the  nearest  one,  as  required  by  the  statute.  "We 
cannot  see,"  said  the  court,  "how  it  can  be  law  that  a  judgment 
can  be  impeached  collaterally  and  held  void,  because  a  judge  has 
made  an  inconsiderable  mistake  in  computing  distances,  or  had  se- 
lected a  county-seat  more  readily  accessible  than  the  other  in  coming 
from  L.,  and  holding  it  to  be  really  the  nearer  on  that  account.  The 
judge  had  jurisdiction  to  make  this  order  under  the  statute  then  in 
force.  He  must  determine  what  is  the  nearest  court  in  administering 
the  law.  This  determination  was  undoubtedly  within  his  power,  and 
if  he  sent  it  to  a  county  some  distance  further  than  another,  by  error 
of  a  miscalculation  of  distances,  it  would  be  nothing  more  than  an 
error,  and  should  not  render  the  judgment  void.  Conceding  that  this 
judgment  might  have  been  reversed  on  appeal,  still  it  would  not  be 
void  on  collateral  attack."  **  This  decision  illustrates  the  difference 
between  void  judgments  and  such  as  are  merely  erroneous.    In  gen- 

»  Herndon  v.  Hawkins,  65  Mo.  2(5."). 
"  J^pit  bier  v.  Aslel,  83  Hun,  223,  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  584. 
••  Walter  t.  Merced  Academy  Ass'n,  126  Cal.  582,  59  Pac.  136. 
*»  EUis  V.  KHis,  55  Minn.  401,  56  N.  W.  1056,  23  L.  R.  A.  287,  43  Am.  Bt 
Hep.  514. 
*2  Gage  V.  Downey,  79  Cal.  140,  21  Pac.  527. 

(261) 


§  179  IjAW  op  JtJDaMBNTs.  (Ch.  10 

eral,  as  already  stated,  a  judgment  is  not  void  except  for  a  total  failure 
of  jurisdiction. 


I  179.    Judgment  rendered  in  Vaoation. 

When  the  law  provides  for  the  holding  of  regular  terms  of  a  court, 
it  is  only  during  term-time  that  the  judges  are  invested  with  their 
full  judicial  character.  Necessary  rules  and  orders,  ministerial  acts, 
and  some  matters  which  go  as  of  course,  may  fall  within  the  powers 
of  the  court  in  vacation.  But  in  general  all  judicial  functions  are 
suspended  during  that  interval.  Hence,  unless  under  statutor}'  au- 
thority, a  judgment  cannot  be  pronounced  in  vacation.  The  rendition 
of  judgment,  in  a  court  of  record,  is  essentially  a  judicial  act,  and  if 
performed  when  the  court  is  not  in  session,  that  is,  out  of  term,  it  is 
open  to  a  fatal  jurisdictional  objection;  the  judgment  is  absolutely 
void,  creates  or  affects  no  rights,  and  will  even  be  disregarded  on 
appeal.*'  "The  judge  of  the  court  below  had  no  power  to  render 
any  judgment  or  decree  in  vacation.  The  statute  provides  for  regular 
terms  of  the  court  to  be  held  for  the  trial  of  causes,  and  it  does  not 
provide  for  the  rendering  of  judgments  or  decrees  at  any  time  except 
during  the  term."  **  And  again :  "With  a  few  exceptions,  all 
matters  of  a  judicial  character  must  be  heard  and  determined  by  the 
court  at  a  term  fixed  by  and  held  in  accordance  with  law.  The 
motion  under  consideration  [to  discharge  a  garnishee]  does  not  con- 
stitute one  of  the  exceptions."  *'  While  this  is  the  case,  it  is  also  held 
in  several  of  the  states  that  the  parties  may  consent  to  the  rendition 
of  a  judgment  during  the  vacation  of  the  court,  which  judgment  is 

*8  Kinports  v.  Rawson,  29  W.  Va.  487,  2  S.  E.  85;  State  v.  Judge  of  FiWi 
District  Court,  26  La.  Ann.  119;  Culver  v.  Leovy,  21  La.  Ann.  30G;  Dodge  t. 
Coffin,  15  Kan.  277;  Bruce  v.  Doolittle,  81  111.  103;  Sheppard  v.  Wilson,  1 
Morris  (Iowa)  448;  Peabody  v.  Phelps,  7  Cal.  53;  Filley  v.  Cody,  4  Colo.  W. 
Cliauipion  v.  Sessions,  1  Nev.  478;  Backer  v.  Eble,  144  Ind.  287,  43  N.  E.  '-^'^ 
Gamble  v.  Buffalo  County,  57  Neb.  1C3,  77  N.  W.  341.  But  a  Judgment  en- 
tered in  vacation  as  of  the  last  day  of  the  previous  term  has  the  same  effect 
when  signed  by  the  judge  at  the  next  term,  as  If  entered  in  term-time.  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  Co.  V.  Trustees  of  Ellzabethtown  DIst.  Public  Schools  (Sj.)  ^s* 
S.  W.  34. 

44  Earls  v.  Earls,  27  Kan.  538. 

45  Laughlln  y.  Peckham,  66  Iowa,  121,  23  N.  W.  294. 

(2G2) 


Ch,  10)  VALIDITY  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §    179 

then  to  be  entered  as  of  the  preceding  term,*®  or  the  ensuing  terrii,*^ 
and  will  be  perfectly  valid  as  between  the  parties,*®  and  even  against 
third  persons  in  the  absence  of  fraud  or  collusion.*®  Nor  is  the  main 
rule  of  quite  universal  application.  In  some  states,  either  in  accord- 
ance with  the  established  practice  of  the  courts,"*  or  by  express  statu- 
tory authority,**  the  courts  are  empowered  to  make  decrees  or  orders 
or  render  judgments  in  vacation.  And  when  this  power  is  given, 
it  of  course  includes  the  jurisdiction  necessary  to  make  a  decision 
in  vacation  upon  a  cause  proved  and  submitted  in  term-time.  In  this 
connection  we  must  notice  a  certain  class  of  statutes  authorizing 
cases  to  be  "taken  under  advisement"  by  the  court.  In  Mississippi 
it  is  considered  that  a  statute  of  this  character  does  not  authorize  the 
rendition  of  a  judgment  in  vacation,  but  the  judgment  must  be  given 
by  the  court  upon  the  delivery  of  the  judge's  opinion  in  writing  at  the 
next  term  after  the  submission  of  the  case.'*  In  Illinois,  however, 
under  a  similar  statute,  it  is  held  that  a  decree  may  be  rendered  in 
vacation,  but  that  it  will  remain  in  fieri  and  subject  to  modification, 
and  not  become  final,  until  after  the  expiration  of  the  succeeding 
term,  and  then  only  as  approved  at  that  term.'* 

The  rendition  of  a  judgment,  it  will  be  remembered,  is  an  entirely 
distinct  thing  from  the  entry  of  it.  The  former  is  the  act  of  the  law 
through  the  mouth  of  the  judge;  the  latter  the  act  of  the  clerk. 
The  former  gives  force  and  efficacy  to  the  judgment ;  the  latter  pre- 
serves a  memorial  of  it.  The  former  is  a  judicial  act ;  the  latter  a 
ministerial  act.  A  judgment  is  none  the  less  a  sentence  of  the  law 
because  it  is  erroneously  entered  or  not  entered  at  all.     Hence  it 

«•  King  y.  Green,  2  Stew.  (Ala.)  133,  19  Am.  Dec.  46. 

«7  Herrey  v.  Edmunds,  68  N.  G.  243. 

<•  City  of  New  Orleans  v.  Gauthreaux,  32  La.  Ann.  1126;  Green  v.  Reagan, 
32  La.  Ann.  974;  Herrey  v.  Edmunds,  68  N.  C.  243;  King  v.  Green.  2  Stew. 
(Ala.)  133,  19  Am.  Dec.  46;  Hattenback  v.  Hoskins,  12  Iowa,  109;  O'Uagen 
▼.  O'Hagen,  14  Iowa,  264. 

«»  City  of  Xew  Orleans  v.  Gauthreaux,  32  La.  Ann.  1126. 

»•  Beyerle  v.  Hain,  61  Pa.  226. 

»i  Ex  parte  Bennett,  44  Cal.  85.  And  see  Harris  y.  Jones,  96  Va.  G58,  32 
8.  E.  45o;  RnaseU  t.  Hank,  9  Utah,  309,  34  Pac.  245. 

»>  Wilson  T.  Rodewald,  61  Miss.  228.  And  see  Abraham  y.  Leyy,  18  G.  C. 
A.  469,  72  Fed.  124. 

»»  Hook  V.  Blcheson,  115  UL  431,  5  N.  E.  9& 

(263) 


S    180  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  10 

follows  that  if  a  judgment  is  duly  rendered  during  term-time,  it  is 
then  complete,  and  its  validity  is  in  no  wise  affected  by  the  fact  that 
the  clerk  does  not  enter  it  until  the  vacation.**  It  is  also  to  be  here 
noted  that  the  meaning  of  the  word  "vacation,"  as  used,  for  example, 
in  a  statute  which  authorizes  the  confession  of  judgments  during 
vacation,  may  not  be  the  same  as  that  known  to  the  common  law, 
viz.,  "all  the  time  between  the  end  of  one  term  and  the  beginning  of 
another,''  °°  but  it  may  cover  a  recess  caused  by  the  adjournment 
over  of  the  court  for  a  number  of  days.*** 

f   180.    After  Expiration  of  Term. 

As  a  corollary  of  the  rule  stated  in  the  preceding  section,  it  is  held 
that  a  judgment  of  a  court  holding  regular  terms,  if  rendered  after 
the  time  fixed  by  law  for  its  adjournment,  is  invalid  and  will  be  re- 
versed on  appeal."^  But  where  the  trial  of  a  cause  is  commenced  in 
a  term  with  the  bona  fide  expectation  and  belief  that  it  will  be  con- 
cluded before  the  day  shall  arrive  when  the  judge  is  directed,  but  not 
imperatively  required,  to  hold  court  in  another  county,  he  may  re- 
main, conclude  the  trial  of  that  case,  receive  the  verdict,  and  pass 
judgment,  even  though  this  may  happen  to  be  done  on  a  day,  or  at  a 
time,  when  regularly  he  would  be  holding  court  in  another  county." 
And  if  a  judgment  be  ordered  and  its  terms  prescribed  by  the  court 
during  a  term,  it  is  a  judgment  rendered  in  term-time  although  the 
entry  thereof  be  not  in  fact  prepared  and  transcribed  on  the  journal 
until  after  the  close  of  the  term.*"  On  principles  analogous  to  those 
obtaining  in  the  case  of  courts  of  record,  it  is  held  that  if  a  justice  of 

B4  Sicber  v.  lYlnk,  7  Colo.  148,  2  Pac.  901;  Earls  v.  Earls.  27  Kan.  538. 
Supervisors  of  Manitowoc  Co.  v.  Sullivan,  51  Wis.  115,  8  N.  W.  12.  But  in 
Indiana  it  is  held  that  a  judgment  duly  pronounced  in  term,  but  entered  tn 
vacation,  and  the  entry  never  seen  by  the  judge  nor  signed  by  him,  though 
his  name  was  signed  by  an  attorney,  is  Invalid,  and  its  execution  will  be  en- 
joined. Mitchell  V.  St.  John,  98  Ind.  598.  And  st^,  also,  First  Nat.  Bank  ot 
Mc<^regor  v.  Hostetter,  Gl  Iowa,  395,  IG  N.  W.  289. 

»5  Jacobs,  Law  Diet.;  Bouv.  Law  Diet 

06  Conkling  v.  Ridgely,  112  111.  36,  1  N.  E.  2G1,  54  Am.  Kep.  "WH. 

67  Smith  v.  Chichester,  1  Cal.  409;  Passwater  v.  Edwards,  44  Ind.  343;  Fer< 
rell  V.  Hales,  119  X.  C.  199,  25  S.  E.  821. 

0  8  State  V.  Knight,  19  Iowa,  94. 

5J»  Iliff  V.  Arnott,  31  Kan.  G72,  3  Pac.  525. 

(L>G4) 


Ch.  10)  VALIDITY  OP  JUDQMBNTS.  §   181 

the  peace  adjourns  a  cause  without  specifying  the  hour  of  the  day 
or  the  place  to  which  it  is  adjourned,  he  loses  jurisdiction  and  his  sub- 
sequent judgment  is  void.*®  But  in  several  of  the  states  it  is  held 
that  while  judgments  should  be  signed  and  entered  during  the  term, 
yet  if  the  parties  consent  that  the  cause  be  taken  under  consideration 
by  the  judge,  and  a  judgment  rendered  and  signed  after  the  term 
shall  have  expired,  and  entered  as  of  the  term,  it  will  not  be  irreg- 
ular.** And  a  party  to  the  action  who  fails  to  interpose  an  objection 
to  this  procedure,  at  the  proper  time,  waives  his  right,  which  amounts 
to  an  implied  consent  and  concludes  him.**  The  decision  of  a  cause 
may  be  carried  over  the  vacation  by  a  proper  entry ;  but  if  a  judg- 
ment be  continued  by  "curia  advisari  vult,'*  and  be  not  given  until  the 
terra  succeeding  that  at  which  the  verdict  was  rendered,  the  judgment 
must  be  entered  and  signed  as  of  such  succeeding  term,  not  of  the 
former  term.*' 

(   181.    Premature  Entry  of  Jndsment* 

The  rendition  of  judgment  at  a  term  before  that  fixed  by  statute 
is  considered  not  as  a  mere  formal  defect  which  may  be  remedied 
by  an  amendment  in  the  court  below,  but  as  a  radical  error.**  Thus, 
the  entry  of  final  judgment  at  the  same  term  with  a  default,  when  the 
statute  provides  that  the  former  shall  be  entered  at  the  next  term 

••CrandaU  v.  Bacon,  20  Wis.  639,  91  Am.  Dec.  451.  But  in  Nebraska, 
«"li«Te  a  Justice  of  the  peace  has  Jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter  and  of  the 
parties,  a  Judgment  rendered  by  him  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  fixed 
l>y  statute  must  be  corrected  by  a  direct  proceeding  for  that  purpose,  and  wlil 
not  be  enjoined  upon  that  ground  alone.  Gould  v.  Loughran,  19  Neb.  392,  27 
N.  W.  397. 

•I  Shackelford  t.  MiUer,  91  N.  C.  181;  Hardin  v.  Ray,  89  N.  C.  3(54;  Mor- 
rison V.  Citizens'  Bank.  27  La.  Ann.  401.  Where  motions  and  demurrers  are 
fiubuiitted  for  deci.siou  during  the  term  or  in  Tacation,  the  coui-t,  by  failure  to 
determine  the  questions  until  the  next  term,  does  not  lose  Jurisdiction  so  as 
to  require  a  resubmission.     Reed  v.  Lane,  9G  Iowa,  454,  Go  N.  W.  380. 

«  Molyneux  v.  Huey,  81  N.  C.  IOC. 

•»  Thorpe  v.  Corwin,  20  N.  J.  Law,  311. 

•♦Teat  V.  Cocke,  42  Ala.  336.  But  while  such  a  premature  entry  constitutes 
an  Irregularity,  the  later  cases  hold  that  it  does  not  go  to  the  Jurisdiction  of 
the  court,  and  does  not  render  the  Judgment  entirely  void.  Marshall  &  Ilsley 
J*nnk  V.  Hyman,  84  Wis.  23,  53  N.  W.  1120;  Tobar  v.  I^sano,  6  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  C88,  25  S.  W.  973;  Main  v.  Johnson,  7  Wash.  321,  35  Pac.  67. 

(205) 


§    182  UiW  OF  JUDOMBNTB.  (Ch.  10 

after  the  default,  is  an  irregularity,  although,  in  this  instance,  it  ap- 
pears that  the  error  may  be  corrected  on  motion  at  a  subsequent 
term.®*  So  also  an  order  of  court  which  bears  date  as  of  a  day  not 
yet  arrived  is  absolutely  without  effect,  at  least  until  that  day  shall 
arrive.**  In  this  connection  also  must  be  mentioned  the  rule  that 
final  judgment  cannot  properly  be  rendered  in  any  case  while  there 
are  issues  of  law  or  fact  remaining  undisposed  of  or  undetermined,*' 
or  while  an  order  staying  all  proceedings  in  the  case  remains  still  in 
force.** 

I  182.    Sundays  aad  Holidays* 

It  is  a  maxim  of  the  common  law  that  "dies  dominicus  non  est 
juridicus."  Accordingly  no  valid  judgment  can  be  rendered  upon 
Sunday.  ''That  courts  have  no  right  to  pronounce  a  judgment  or  do 
any  other  act  strictly  judicial  on  Sunday,  unless  expressly  authorized 
by  statute,  seems  to  be  too  well  settled  to  admit  of  a  doubt  by  the 
decisions  in  England  and  in  this  country.  The  cases  all  show  that  a 
judgment  entered  of  record  on  Sunday  is  not  only  erroneous,  but  is 
absolutely  void."  **  But  in  some  of  the  states,  by  the  operation  of 
statutes  authorizing  or  requiring  the  rendition  of  a  judgment  im- 

•5  Nave  V.  Todd,  83  Mo.  601.  A  judgment  rendered  by  a  Justice  of  the 
peace  before  the  return  day  of  the  warrant  is  erroneous  but  not  void.  Glover 
V.  Holman,  3  HeislL.  (Tenn.)  519. 

«e  Smith  V.  Coe.  7  Rob.  (N.  Y.)  477. 

67  Bosman  v.  Alieley,  39  Mich.  710,  33  Am.  Rep.  447;  Aymar  v.  Cbace,  VI 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  301;  Barret  v.  Thompson,  5  Ind.  457;  Miller  v.  Hoc,  1  Fla.  1»»: 
Clark  V.  People,  15  111.  213;  Benson  v.  Arnold,  75  111.  App.  610;  Hammond 
V.  Freeman,  9  Ark.  62;  Davison  v.  Brown,  93  Wis.  85,  67  N.  W.  42. 

08  Uhe  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co..  3  S.  D.  563,  54  N.  W.  601;  Id..  4  S. 
D.  505,  57  N.  W.  484. 

«o  Baxter  v.  People,  3  GUman  (111.)  368,  384;  MackaUey's  Case.  5  C<Ae,  66: 
Swann  v.  Broome,  3  Bmrows,  1595;  Pearce  v.  Atwood,  13  Mass.  347;  Chap- 
man V.  State,  5  Blackf.  (Ind.)  Ill;  Nabors  v.  State,  6  Ala.  200;  Frost  v.  Hull, 
4  N.  H.  158;  Arthur  v.  Mosby,  2  Bibb  (Ky.)  589;  Story  v.  Elliot.  8  Cow.  (N. 
Y.)  27,  18  Am.  Dec.  423;  Davis  v:  Fish,  1  (J.  Greene  (Iowa)  406,  48  Am.  Dec. 
387;  Blood  v.  Bates,  31  Vt.  147;  City  of  Parsons  v.  Lindsay.  41  Kan.  336.  21 
Pac.  227,  3  L.  R.  A.  658,  13  Am.  St.  Rep.  290;  AUen  v.  Godfrey,  44  N. 
Y.  433;  Coleman  v.  Henderson,  Litt.  Sel.  Cas.  (Ky.)  171,  12  Am.  Dec  290; 
Hoghtaling  v.  Osborn,  15  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  119;  Ex  parte  White,  15  Nev.  14ft,  3» 
Am.  Rep.  4G6;  Hemmens  v.  Bentley,  32  Mich.  89;  Ex  parte  Juneman.  28  TW. 
App.  486,  13  S.  W.  783:  Shearman  v.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  215,  28  Am.  Kep. 
402;  Styles  v.  Harrison.  99  Tenn.  128,  41  S.  W.  333,  63  Am.  St  Rep.  824. 
(2GG) 


Ch.  10)  VALIDITY  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §    182 

mediately  upon  the  reception  of  a  verdict,  it  is  held  that  if  a  verdict 
is  returned  on  Sunday,  a  judgment  entered  upon  it  the  same  day  will 
be  valid.^*  Since  the  entry  of  a  judgment,  as  distinguished  from  its 
rendition,  is  a  merely  ministerial  act,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  it 
will  not  be  invalidated  by  the  fact  that  it  was  put  upon  the  record  or 
the  docket  by  the  clerk  on  a  Sunday.  But  in  that  case  it  should  not 
appear  to  have  been  rendered  on  Sunday.^*  However,  the  court  is 
not  bound  to  accept  as  true  a  docket-entry  that  a  judgment  was 
rendered  on  that  day  when  there  is  extraneous  evidence  that  in  fact 
it  was  not.'* 

In  regard  to  other  legal  holidays,  the  general  rule  is  that  unless 
the  statutes  recognizing  or  creating  them  expressly  prohibit  the  exer- 
cise of  judicial  functions  upon  them,  the  courts  may  validly  render 
judgments  and  transact  their  other  usual  business.^'  And  even  if 
they  are  declared  non-juridical  days,  this  will  not  hinder  the  perform- 
ance of  ministerial  acts.  Thus  the  statute  in  Georgia,  declaring  the 
fourth  of  July  a  holiday,  does  not  inhibit  the  courts  from  sitting  on 
that  day,  or  make  a  judgment  rendered  on  that  day  void,  except 
when  the  day  falls  on  Sunday.'*  So  it  is  held  that  a  judgment  ren- 
dered by  a  justice  of  the  peace  on  Thanksgiving  Day  is  not  void.'" 
And  in  another  case  it  was  considered  that  in  the  absence  of  an  ex- 
press statute,  the  ministerial  act  of  a  clerk  in  filing  a  transcript  of 

TO  Thomiison  v.  Church,  13  Neb.  287,  13  N.  W.  626;  Hurford  v.  City  of 
Omaha.  4  Neb.  336;  Tajlor  v.  Ervin,  119  N.  C.  274,  25  S.  E.  875.  See,  also, 
Perkins  v.  Jones,  28  Wis.  243;   Wearae  v.  Smith,  32  Wis.  412. 

71  Where  a  confession  of  Judgment  and  order  for  execution  Trere  handed 
by  the  plaintiff  to  the  prolhonotary  on  Sunday,  and  the  next  day  the  latter 
entered  Judgment  and  issued  execution,  it  was  held  that  the  judgment  was 
valid.  The  prothonotary  was  not  bound  to  receive  the  papers  on  Sunday; 
bis  acceptance  of  them  was  not  an  official  act,  but  be  receiyed  them  merely  as 
agent  of  the  plaintiff.    Kauff man's  Appeal,  70  Pa.  261. 

»*  Ecker  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  64  Md.  292,  1  Atl.  849;  In  re  Worthlngton, 
7  Bias.  455,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  18,051.  To  avoid  a  Judgment,  regular  on  its  face, 
on  the  ground  that  it  was  rendered  after  midnight  on  Saturday,  the  evidence 
fihoQld  eetabllsb,  beyond  the  doubt  naturally  arising  from  the  difficulty  of 
determining  the  precise  time  of  a  particular  transaction,  that  it  was  thus 
rendered.    Bishop  v.  Carter,  29  Iowa,,  165. 

7»  Pee  Spiedel  Grocery  Go.  v.  Armstrong,  8  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  R.  489. 

»« Ilamer  v.  Seam,  81  Ga.  288,  6  S.  E.  810. 

Yft  Bear  v.  Youngman,  19  Mo.  App.  41. 

(207) 


§    183  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  10 

a  judgment  is  not  void  because  done  on  Christmas  Day,  but  is  a 
valid  docketing  of  the  judgment  and  will  confer  a  valid  lien  upon  the 
real  estate  of  the  debtor  in  the  county  where  it  is  filed.'* 

S   183.    Jndement  miuit  be  supported  by  the  Fleadingi. 

A  judgment  must  accord  with  and  be  warranted  by  the  pleadings 
of  the  party  in  whose  favor  it  is  rendered.  A  judgment  not  sup- 
ported by  the  pleadings  is  as  fatally  defective  as  one  not  sustained 
by  the  verdict  or  finding.^^  Hence  the  code,  although  it  abolishes 
the  forms  of  actions  as  they  existed  at  common  law,  does  not  author- 
ize a  recovery,  where  the  complaint  alleges  facts  showing  a  cause  of 
action  in  tort,  by  proving  upon  the  trial  a  cause  of  action  in  con- 
tract.^' Again,  under  the  common  count  for  goods  sold  and  deliver- 
ed, no  recovery  can  be  had  for  money  advanced,  or  personal  services 
rendered  for  defendant."'*  In  an  action  for  money  obtained  from 
plaintiff  by  fraud,  it  is  error,  on  finding  no  fraud  shown,  to  give  judg- 
ment as  for  money  loaned.***  Where  the  complaint  alleges  that  the 
fall  of  plaintiff's  wall,  for  which  he  claims  damages,  was  caused  by 
defendant's  negligent  excavation  of  land  "adjacent''  to  plaintiff's 
land,  but  the  evidence  shows  that  the  excavation  was  "beneath"  the 
plaintiff's  building,  the  latter  cannot  recover.**  So  also,  where  the 
petition  alleges  tiiat  two  defendants  are  jointly  indebted  to  plaintiff 
as  a  banking  firm,  he  is  not  entitled  to  recover  a  judgment  against 

f  In  re  Worthlngton,  7  BIss.  455,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  18,051.  In  lUinols,  a  judg- 
ment by  confessfou  entered  on  the  25th  of  December  is  not  void.  Bradley  v. 
Claudon,  45  111.  App.  320. 

7  7  BiKhman  v.  Sepulveda,  39  Cal.  688;  Marshman  v.  Conklin,  21  N.  J.  Eq- 
540;  Parsley  v.  Nicholson.  05  N.  C.  207;  Frevert  v.  Henry.  14  Nev.  191;  Lee 
V.  British  &  American  Mortg.  Co.,  16  Tex.  Civ.  App.  671,  40  S.  W.  1041: 
Clark  v.  Clark,  21  Tex.  CIt.  App.  371.  51  S.  W.  337;  Wheeler  v.  Foster.  82 
111.  App.  153;  demons  r.  Heelan,  52  Neb.  287,  72  N.  W.  270:  SeiberUng  ▼. 
Mortiuson,  10  S.  D.  644,  75  N.  W.  202. 

7  8  Degraw  v.  Elmoro.  50  N.  Y.  1. 

7i»Rand,  McNally  &  Co.  t.  Hombarger,  82  111.  App.  34L  But  defendant 
cannot  complain  of  a  Judgment  based  on  a  contract  as  it  is  alleged  in  his 
answer,  though  it  differs  from  that  alleged  by  plaintiff.  Ach  v.  Carter,  21 
Wash.  140,  57  Pac.  344. 

»o  Kress  v.  Woehrle,  23  Misc.  Rep.  472.  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  628. 

»i  Novotny  v.  Danforth,  9  S.  D.  301,  68  N.  W.  74». 
(2G8) 


Ch.   10)  VALIDITY  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §    183 

one  of  them  as  a  city  treasurer.**  Where  an  action  is  brought  to 
foreclose  a  mechanic's  lien,  and  the  lien  is  shown  to  have  been  dis- 
charged by  the  giving  of  a  bond,  the  court  has  no  power  to  render 
a  personal  judgment  against  the  defendant.®'  On  the  same  prin- 
ciple, where  the  theory  of  the  complaint  and  of  the  trial,  as  well  as 
of  the  entire  evidence,  was  that  a  deed  was  not  intended  as  a  mort- 
gage, but  as  a  conveyance,  a  judgment  based  on  the  theory  that  the 
deed  was  a  mortgage  cannot  be  upheld.®*  And  although,  under 
modern  systems,  courts  of  law  may  enforce  equitable  rights,  the 
proof  must  agree  with  the  pleadings,  and  the  relief  granted  must  be 
within  the  prayer  for  relief  and  the  grounds  relied  on.®*  So  where 
the  declaration  is  defective  in  substance  to  the  extent  of  failing  to 
show  a  cause  of  action,  no  judgment  can  be  entered  upon  it.®*  This 
would  be  good  ground  for  a  motion  in  arrest,  but  if  a  judgment  were 
nevertheless  entered,  it  would  be  reversed  for  error.  And  if  the 
complaint  docs  not  state  facts  sufficient  to  constitute  a  cause  of  ac- 
tion, a  finding  "that  the  allegations  of  the  complaint  are  true,"  is 
not  sufficient  to  support  a  judgment  for  the  plaintiff.®^  But  where 
a  verdict  is  returned  for  the  plaintiff  on  two  counts  in  a  declaration, 
one  of  which  contains  no  cause  of  action,  the  court  will  render  judg- 
ment upon  the  other,  if  legally  sufficient.®®  But  the  fact  that  the 
defendant,  at  the  trial,  makes  no  objection  to  the  form  of  action  (as 
that  one  joint  action  is  improperly  brought  instead  of  two  several 
suits),  cannot  enable  the  court  to  enter  a  judgment  which  the  law 

•»  City  of  Ssrracuse  v.  Reed,  5  Kan.  App.  806,  49  Pac.  259. 

»»  Mertz  V.  Mapes-Reeve  Const.  Co.,  30  Misc.  Rep.  343,  6;3  N.  Y.  Supp.  455. 

«*  Bullenkamp  v.  Bullenkamp,  43  App.  Div.  510,  60  N.  Y.  Supp.  84. 

•»  Eddy  &  Bls«en  Live-Stock  Co.  v.  Blackburn,  17  C.  C.  A.  532,  70  Fed.  949. 

••  Harris  v.  Harris,  10  Wis.  467. 

«7  Knudson  v.  Curley,  30  Minn.  433,  15  N.  W.  873.  A  Judgment  is  not  void 
or  erroneous  because  the  name  of  plaintiff's  attorney  attached  to  the  complaint 
is  printed  instead  of  being  written.     Hancock  v.  Bowman,  49  Cal.  413. 

••Gordon  v.  Downey,  1  Gill  (Md.)  41.  In  California,  it  Is  said  that  if  any 
material  issue  Is  raised  by  the  pleadings,  a  verdict  in  favor  of  a  party  supports 
a  judji^ent  in  his  favor.  Orton  v.  Brown,  117  Cal.  oOl,  49  Pac.  583.  But  in 
Wistonsin,  the  court  declares  that  a  judgment  which  Is  based  on  only  one  of 
two  issues  raised  by  the  pleadings,  and  which  leaves  the  other  undisposed  of. 
Is  erroneous.  Gage  v.  Allen,  84  Wis.  323,  54  N.  W.  027.  And  if  there  Is  no 
count  in  the  declaration  on  the  cause  of  action  shown  by  the  evidence,  there 
can  be  no  recovery.    Riley  v.  Jarvls,  43  W.  Ya.  43,  26  S.  E.  306. 

(269) 


§184  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  10 

does  not  warrant.®*  In  any  action,  process  and  pleadings  are  gen- 
erally necessary,  but  where  the  parties  are  voluntarily  before  the 
court,  and  by  agreement,  consent,  or  confession  (which  are  the  same 
in  substance)  a  judgment  is  rendered,  such  judgment  is  valid,  al- 
though not  granted  according  to  the  regular  course  of  procedure.** 
So  a  judgment  rendered  without  any  complaint  having  been  filed,  is 
valid  if  entered  by  agreement  or  if  ratified  by  subsequent  consent.** 
A  judgment  or  decree  based  upon  incompetent  e\ddence  is  never, 
for  that  reason  alone,  void."*  And  in  general,  mere  error  in  a  judg- 
ment, though  it  may  be  ground  for  its  reversal,  will  not  have  the 
effect  to  make  it  absolutely  void,  or  lay  it  open  to  collateral  impeach- 
ment, or  impair  its  efficacy  while  it  stands. 

8  184.    Judcment  in  Action  not  at  Israe. 

It  has  been  held,  in  several  cases  in  Mississippi,  that  judgments 
rendered  without  issues  to  be  determined  by  them  are  nullities.** 
And  in  some  other  states  there  are  expressions  to  the  effect  that, 
before  a  cause  is  at  issue,  either  expressly  or  tacitly,  no  final  judg- 
ment can  be  validly  rendered."*  Undoubtedly  a  judgment  so  pro- 
nounced would  be  irregular  and  erroneous,  as  being  contrary  to  the 
course  of  law  and  the  usual  practice  of  the  courts,  and  would  there- 
fore be  liable  to  reversal.  But  whether  it  should  be  regarded  as  en- 
tirely void,  a  mere  nullity,  is  a  question  involved  in  more  difficulty. 
That  no  such  result  could  properly  follow  is  contended  by  Mr.  Free- 
man, on  the  general  principle  that  "when  jurisdiction  over  both  the 
parties  and  subject-matter  is  once  obtained,  no  error  committed  in 

80  Ellison  V.  New  Bedford  Five  Cent.  Sav.  Bank,  130  Mass,  48;  Leonard  v. 
Bobbins,  13  ^Ulen  (Mass.)  217. 

»o  Peoples  v.  Norwood,  JM  N.  C.  167.  And  see  Mengis  v.  Fifth  Ave.  By. 
Co.,  81  Hun,  480,  30  N.  Y.  Snpp.  999. 

01  Gay  V.  Grant,  101  N.  C.  20G,  8  S.  E.  99.  But  without  such  consent  a 
judgment  recovered  in  a  court  of  record  will  be  set  aside  "where  no  complaint 
or  written  statement  of  the  cause  of  action  was  filed  therein.  Beckett  v.  Cu^ 
nin,  15  Colo.  281,  25  Pac.  167,  22  Am.  St  Rep.  399. 

02  Mann  v.  Martin,  14  Bush  (Ky.)  763. 

9  3  Steele  v.  Palmer,  41  Mips.  88;  Armstrong  v.  Barton,  42  Miss.  506;  Porter- 
field  V.  Butler,  47  Miss.  170,  12  Am.  Rep.  329. 

0*  Braunsdorff  v.  Fay,  18  La.  Ann.  187;  Du  Bay  v.  Ullue,  (J  Wis.  oSS:  Balti- 
more &  O.  R.  Co.  V.  Faulkner,  4  W.  Va.  180. 
'  (270) 


Ch.  10)  VALIDITY  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §   186 

the  exercise  of  that  jurisdiction  can  make  the  proceedings  or  judg- 
ment of  the  court  void."  •*  This  may  readily  be  conceded.  And  yet, 
in  no  proper  sense  can  a  court  of  law  be  said  to  have  jurisdiction  if 
there  is  no  specific  question  or  controversy  submitted  for  its  deter- 
mination. It  is  not  enough  that  the  parties  are  properly  in  court. 
That  does  not  give  the  tribunal  power  to  adjudicate  any  and  all  mat- 
ters of  difference  between  them.  When  we  speak  of  "jurisdiction 
of  the  subject-matter,"  we  do  not  mean  merely  cognizance  of  the 
general  class  of  actions  to  which  the  action  in  question  belongs,  but 
wc  also  mean  legal  power  to  pass  upon  and  decide  the  particular 
contention  which  the  judgment  assumes  to  settle.  And  how  can  a 
court  acquire  jurisdiction  of  the  particular  contention,  except  it  be 
clearly  marked  out  and  precisely  defined  by  the  pleadings  of  the  par- 
ties? And  how  can  that  be  done,  in  any  mode  known  to  the  law, 
save  by  the  formation  of  a  regular  issue  ?  There  is  therefore  plausi- 
ble ground  for  holding  that  if  the  record  fails  to  show  an  issue  to  be 
determined,  the  judgment  will  be  void  on  its  face. 

8  186.    Findlnsfl  aeeesflary  to  support  the  Jndsmeiit* 

In  some  of  the  states  there  are  statutes  requiring  a  finding  of 
facts  and  conclusions  of  law  to  be  filed  in  the  action,  to  serve  as  a 
ba&is  for  the  judgment.  But  the  disposition  is  to  regard  this  re- 
quirement as  not  vitally  necessary  to  the  validity  of  the  judgment. 
As  to  parties  before  the  court,  and  respecting  a  matter  within  its 
jurisdiction,  the  cases  hold  that  a  judgment  without  a  finding  of  facts 
to  support  it  is  not  void,  but  at  most  merely  erroneous  and  subject 
to  reversal  by  a  suitable  proceeding  in  a  tribunal  having  authority 
to  review  it.**     So  where  a  court  of  record,  having  jurisdiction,  ren- 

••FVeem.  Judgm.  8  135a.  And  In  Doyle  v.  Smith,  1  Cold.  (Tenn.)  15,  it 
l8  held  that  the  want  of  a  plea  or  issue  constitutes  at  most  but  an  error  in 
the  Judgment,  but  does  not  make  it  void,  or  affect  the  authority  of  the  sheriff 
to  execute  writs  which  may  be  issued  upon  it. 

••  ConnoUy  v.  Edgerton,  22  Neb.  82,  34  N.  W.  76;  Lubker  v.  Grand  Detour 
Plow  Co.,  53  Neb.  Ill,  73  N.  W.  457;  Springfield  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hamby, 
65  Ark.  14,  45  8.  W.  472;  McCreary  v.  Robinson  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  57  S.  W.  682. 
Bat  In  Michigan  It  is  considered  that  such  a  judgment  has  no  greater  validity 
than  a  Judgment  rendered  upon  a  Jury  trial  without  a  verdict.  Stans&ll  v. 
Coming,  21  Mich.  242.    And  see  Texas  Brewing  Co.  v.  Meyer  (Tex.  Civ.  App.) 

(271) 


I   186  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  10 

ders  a  judgment  upon  a  petition  filed  before  it  against  a  defendant 
upon  default  of  answer,  and  the  statute  requires  the  court  in  the  par- 
ticular proceeding  to  take  evidence  and  make  special  findings,  and 
the  court  fails  to  comply  with  the  statutory  requirement,  the  judg- 
ment may  be  erroneous  but  is  not  void.*^  And  where  a  court,  at 
the  conclusion  of  a  trial,  has  ordered  judgment,  but  omits  to  make 
and  file  findings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of  law,  as  prescribed  by 
statute,  such  findings  and  conclusions  may  be  made  and  filed  by  the 
court  after  judgment  nunc  pro  tunc.®'  But  in  Michigan  it  is  held 
that  a  judgment  entered  up  before  the  findings  are  finally  completed 
and  filed  is  premature,  and  is  to  be  regarded  as  provisional  action 
merely,  which  only  becomes  perfected  when  the  findings  are  com- 
pleted and  filed.**  If  the  findings  are  required  to  be  specific,  a  gen- 
eral finding  for  the  plaintiff  will  not  support  a  judgment  in  his  fa- 
vor.^«<» 

8  186.    Judsmeiit  miut  follow  Verdlet* 

If  the  defendant  in  an  action  has  recovered  a  verdict  upon  a  plea 
which  confesses  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  and  does  not  suffi- 
ciently avoid  it,  judgment  should  be  entered  for  the  plaintiff  not- 
withstanding the.  verdict.*®^  Again,  if  the  verdict  is  clearly  wrong, 
this  may  furnish  ground  for  arresting  the  judgment  or  granting  a 
new  trial.^°*  But  if  no  such  reasons  exist  for  disregarding  or  set- 
ting aside  the  verdict,  the  judgment,  to  be  valid,  must  follow  it  and 
accord  with  it.  We  have  already  seen  that  this  is  an  established 
rule  in  respect  to  the  amount  of  the  judgment.^®*  And  it  may  also 
be  stated  as  a  general  principle  that  the  judgment  must  conform  to 
the  verdict,  not  only  as  to  the  amount,  but  also  as  to  the  measure 

38  S.  W.  2(13;  Maynard  v.  Locomotive  Engineers'  Mat.  life  &  Accident  Im. 
Ass*n,  14  Utah,  458,  47  Pac.  1030;  Williams  v.  Williams.  104  Cal.  85.  37  Pac 
784;   National  Horse-Importing  Co.  v.  Novak,  95  Iowa,  696,  64  N.  W.  6ML 

07  Garner  v.  State,  28  Kan.  790. 

es  Swaiistrom  v.  Marvin,  38  Minn.  350,  37  N.  W.  455. 

•0  People  V.  Judge  of  Circuit  Court,  34  Mich.  62, 

100  i,udd  V.  Tiilly,  51  Cal.  277. 

101  Supra,  §  16. 

102  SriJra,  §  104. 
108  Supra,  §  142. 

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Cb.  10)  VALIDITY  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §   186 

of  relief  and  as  to  the  parties  against  whom  the  finding  is  made.^®* 
Moreover  the  judgment  cannot  go  beyond  the  verdict  in  settling  the 
rights  of  the  parties,  or  admeasuring  the  recovery,  or  declaring  or 
foreclosing  liens.^®*  In  cases  where  the  statutes  provide  for  the 
returning  of  special  verdicts,  and  enact  that  "if  a  general  and  a  spe- 
cial verdict  are  inconsistent,  judgment  shall  be  rendered  pursuant 
to  the  latter,"  it  is  held  that  a  judgment  should  be  rendered  pursuant 
to  the  general  verdict  in  all  cases  where  the  facts  constituting  the 
special  finding  are  not  inconsistent  with  the  general  verdict.*®' 
Where  the  court  has  permitted  the  jury  to  amend  its  verdict,  it  is 
error  to  enter  judgment  on  the  original  verdict,  rejecting  the  amend- 
ment.^*^ It  is  also  error  to  render  a  judgment  upon  a  verdict  which 
finds  upon  a  part  only  of  the  issues.*®*  Finally,  where  the  verdict 
is  for  the  plaintiff,  subject  to  a  question  of  law  reserved,  a  subse- 
quent judgment  for  him  should  be  entered,  not  on  the  point  reserved, 
but  on  the  verdict.*®* 

JO*  Morsch  v.  Besack,  52  Neb.  502,  72  N.  W.  953;  Bell  v.  Otts,  101  Ala. 
186,  13  South.  43,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  117;  Hellman  v.  Schwartz,  44  111.  App.  84. 
In  an  action  agalnat  two  defendants,  who  seek  no  afflrmatlve  relief,  a  verdict 
for  *Hhe  defendant**  will  support  a  judgment  that  plaintiff  take  nothing,  and 
that  defendants. (by  name)  recover  their  costs.  Butler  v.  Estrella  Raisin  Vine- 
yard Co.,  124  Cal.  230,  56  Pac.  1040.  So  where,  in  an  action  against  principal 
and  surety,  the  latter  alone  defends,  and  the  verdict  is  against  the  principal 
only,  the  legal  effect  is  a  finding  in  favor  of  the  surety,  and  a  Judgment  ac- 
cordingly is  not  erroneous.    Howard  y.  Johnson,  01  Ga.  319,  18  S.  E.  132. 

»••  Freiberg  v.  Brunswick-Balke-Collender  Co.  (Tex.)  16  S.  W.  784;  Boyd 
r.  Ernst,  36  lU.  App.  583.  But  where  the  evidence  authorizes  the  court  to 
direct  a  verdict,  the  court  may,  in  rendering  judgment,  go  further  than  the 
verdict  in  adjusting  the  equities  of  the  parties.  Smith  v.  Smith,  23  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  304.  55  S.  W.  541. 

i««Quaid  V.  ComwaU.  13  Bush  (Ky.)  601. 

J»T  George  v.  Belk,  101  Tenn.  625,  49  S.  W.  748. 

»•«  Haekett  v.  Jones,  34  111.  App.  562.  When  the  jury  fail  to  pass  upon  an 
issue,  the  court  has  no  right  to  render  a  judgment  thereon,  however  clear  and 
undisputed  the  evidence  may  be.  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Vander  Stucken  {Tex. 
Civ.  App.)  37  S.  W.  170. 

*••  Ringle  V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.,  164  Pa.  529,  30  Atl.  492,  44  Am.  St.  Rep. 
628. 

1  I^AW  JUDG.— 18  (273) 


§    187  LAW  OF  JDDQMBNTS,  if^'  ^^ 


THE  VALIDITY  OF  JUDGMENTS  AS  AFFECTED  BY  THE  CHARAOTBB 

OR  STATUS  OF  THE  PARTIES. 

I  387.  Against  what  Parties  Judgments  may  be  Rendered. 

188.  Judgments  against  Married  Women  at  Common  Law. 

389.  For  Debt  contracted  Dum  Sola. 

190.  Effect  of  Omission  to  plead  Coverture. 

19L  Under  partially  enabling  Statutes. 

192.  Statutes  removing  Disability  of  Ooverture» 

193.  Judgments  against  Infants. 

194.  Service  of  Process  on  Infants. 

195.  Appearance  by  Attorney  or  Guardian. 

196.  Effect  of  Failure  to  plead  Infancy. 

197.  Decrees  in  Equity  against  Infants. 

198.  Infant  Plaintiffs. 

199.  Judgments  against  Deceased  Parties. 

200.  Judgment  against  Decedent  Voidable  only. 

201.  Death  of  One  of  Several  Defendants. 

202.  Entry  of  Judgment  against  Decedent  Nunc  pro  Tunc 

203.  Jurisdiction  must  be  acquired  before  Party's  Death. 

204.  Judgment  for  Deceased  Plaintiff. 

205.  Judgments  against  Insane  Persons. 

206.  Joint  Parties  at  Common  Law. 

207.  In  Actions  of  Tort 

208.  Joint  Debtor  Acts. 

209.  One  Defendant  suffering  Default. 

210.  Judgment,  when  Several,  when  Joint 

211.  Joint  Judgment  as  an  Entirety. 

212.  Confession  of  Judgment  by  Joint  Defendants. 

213.  Misnomer  of  Parties. 

214.  Descriptio  Personse. 

§  187.    Against  what  Parties  Jndsments  may  be  Rendered. 

Normally,  all  persons,  natural  or  artificial,  may  be  made  defend- 
ants in  a  judgment.  In  theory  of  law,  all  persons  who  live  under  the 
protection  of  a  particular  sovereignty  are  subject  to  its  laws  and  are 
within  the  power  and  authority  of  its  courts,  so  far  as  their  actions 
come  within  the  jural  sphere.  But  the  theory  is  modified  to  a  cer- 
tain extent  by  the  technical  rules  relating  to  abnormal  conditions  of 
.status.  Persons  who  are  under  the  various  legal  disabilities,  thougn 
(274) 


Ch.  11)  VAUDITY.  AS  AFFECTBD  BY  STATUS  OP  PARTIES.  §   187 

not  exempt  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts,  are  protected  by  spe- 
cial provisions  as  to  the  cases  and  the  manner  in  which  proceedings 
may  be  had  against  them.    Their  full  and  free  personality,  and  there- 
fore their  accountability,  is  thus  abridged  by  the  peculiarity  of  their 
condition.    The  same  is  true,  in  even  greater  degree,  of  those  whose 
personality  is  suspended,  for  juristic  purposes,  by  natural  or  civil 
death.    In  respect  to  the  latter,  it  no  longer  occupies  a  prominent 
place  in  the  law,  though  there  are  still  circumstances  in  which  a  man 
may  be  considered,  strictly  or  by  analogy,  as  civiliter  mortuus.    And 
where  this  doctrine  still  survives,  it  will  always  incapacitate  the  man 
from  suing  or  being  sued,  and  of  course  from  being  a  debtor  by  judg- 
ment.   Thus  a  judgment  obtained  against  a  man  after  the  filing  of 
his  petition  in  bankruptcy  could  not  create  a  lien  upon  his  estate. 
"The  court  will  inquire  whether  in  fact  the  judgment  was  not  entered 
after  the  petition  was  filed,  and  if  so,  will  treat  the  judgment  as  of 
no  more  validity  than  if  entered  against  a  deceased  person.     So  far 
as  regards  the  disposition  of  his  property,  or  the  control  of  suits 
pending  against  him,  the  bankrupt,  from  the  time  his  petition  is 
filed,  may  be  considered  as  civiliter  n^ortuus."  *     In  some  of  the  states, 
the  same  suspension  of  personality,  or  civil  death,  is  predicated  of 
a  felon  confined  in  the  penitentiary.     Being  dead  in  law,  he  cannot 
be  sued,  and  if  his  conviction  takes  place  and  his  sentence  begins 
while  an  action  is  pending  against  him,  a  judgment  afterwards  ren- 
dered therein  is  null.'     And  during  the  existence  of  slavery,  the  law 
denied  any  juristic  personality  to  the  beings  so  held  in  bondage. 
Consequently,  a  judgment  entered  against  a  slave  was  considered  as 
entirely  destitute  of  any  legal  efficacy  or  validity.* 

1  McLean  v.  Hockey,  3  McLean,  235,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  8,891.  And  see  Inter- 
national Bank  v.  Sherman,  101  U.  8.  406,  25  L.  Ed.  866. 

2  Rice  County  Com'rs  v.  Lawrence,  2D  Kan.  158;  Neale  v.  Utz,  75  Va. 
48a.  But  see  Coffee  v.  Haynes,  124  Cal.  561,  57  Pac.  482,  71  Am.  St.  Rep. 
90. 

»  Wood  v.  Ward,  2  Flip.  336,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  17,966. 

(275) 


I   188  hkW  OF  JUDOMBNTS.  (Gh.  11 

i  188.    Jvdgmenta  asainat  Married  Women  at  Comatom  Iaw. 

At  common  law,  on  account  of  the  merger  of  the  wife's  personaKty 
in  that  of  the  husband,  she  was  incapacitated  for  almost  every  species 
of  juristic  action ;  and  theref  re,  being  unable  to  bind  herself  by  en- 
gagements, the  breach  of  which  would  give  rise  to  a  cause  of  action, 
she  could  not,  at  law,  be  prosecuted  to  judgment.  It  is  true  that 
husband  and  wife  might  be  sued  jointly  for  the  wife's  tort.  But  this 
does  not  in  reality  change  the  rule,  because  the  addition  of  the  wife 
was  (at  common  law)  a  matter  of  form  only,  the  husband  being  the 
party  who  would  be  looked  to  for  satisfaction  of  the  judgment.  Ac- 
cordingly it  is  held,  on  common  law  principles,  that  a  personal  judg- 
ment against  a  married  woman  is  void  and  a  mere  nullity.*  A  prom- 
issory note,  for  example,  signed  by  a  feme  covert  cannot  be  enforced 
against  her  by  any  proceeding  at  law,  and  a  judgment  by  default 
against  her  on  such  note  is  a  nullity,  and  equity  will  enjoin  the 
enforcement  of  it  against  her  separate  estate.*  The  doctrine  is  stated, 
in  its  most  strict  and  uncompromising  form,  in  a  West  Virginia 
decision,  as  follows :  A  judgment  rendered  by  a  court  of  common 
law  against  a  married  woman,  either  in  her  own  name  or  in  the 
name  of  a  company,  under  which  she  doe§  business,  upon  a  contract 
made  during  her  coverture,  is  absolutely  void,  and  an  execution  or 
suggestion  sued  out  upon  such  judgment  is  invalid  and  ineffectual 
for  any  purpose,  and  the  judgment  may  be  attacked  in  any  collateral 
proceeding.*  It  was  otherwise  in  equity.  For  there  the  wife  was 
considered  to  have  a  separate  personality  for  some  purposes,  and 
consequently  she  might  be  sued  in  chancery  in  respect  to  her  sepa- 
rate estate.  But  even  in  those  courts  she  could  not  walk  with  per- 
fectly free  foot,  and  safeguards  were  provided  for  her  analogous  to 
those  obtaining  at  common  law.^ 

*  Morse  v.  Toppan,  3  Gray  (Mass.)  411;  HIggins  v.  Pritzer,  49  Ma  152: 
Weil  V.  Simmons,  66  Mo.  617;  Griffith  v.  Clarke,  18  Md.  457;  Robe!  v. 
Bushnell,  91  Ky.  251,  15  S.  W.  520.  See  Smith  v.  Borden,  17  R.  L  220,  21 
Atl.  351,  11  L.  R.  A.  585,  33  Am.  St.  Rep.  867. 

»  Griffith  v.  Clarke,  18  Md.  457;  Hoffman  v.  Shupp.  80  Md.  611.  31  Atl.  5(Ci. 

•  White  V.  Foote  I^umbcr  &  Manuf'g  Co.,  29  W.  Va.  385,  1  S.  E.  5?i. 
«  Am.   St.  Rep.  650. 

T  See  O'Hara  v.  McConneU,  93  U.  S.  150,  23  L.  Ed,  840. 

(270) 


Ch.  11)  VALJDITT,  AS  AFFECTED  BY  STATUS  OF  PARTIES.  |  189 

{   189.    For  Debt  oontrmoted  Dmii  SoIa* 

If  a  suit  is  begun  against  a  woman  while  she  is  sole,  she  cannot 
deprive  the  plaintiff  of  his  remedy  or  abate  the  action,  even  at  com- 
mon law,  by  marrying ;  but  the  suit  will  proceed  without  any  regard 
to  her  coverture,  and  a  personal  judgment  may  be  rendered  against* 
her.*  The  same  is  true  if  the  suit,  though  not  instituted  until  after 
marriage,  is  upon  her  debt  contracted  while  single.  That  is,  if  the 
declaration  shows  that  the  contract  was  made  while  the  defendant 
was  a  widow  or  sole,  her  coverture  at  the  time  of  the  suit  is  no 
obstacle  to  the  recovery  of  such  a  judgment  against  her  as  might  be 
rendered  against  any  other  defendant.*  This  case  is  also  specifically 
covered,  in  several  of  the  states,  by  statutes  which  provide  for  and 
authorize  a  personal  judgment  against  a  married  woman  upon  her 
contract  made  before  marriage,  to  be  enforced,  however,  only  against 
her  separate  property.*®  And  in  some  others,  the  law  provides  that 
an  action  upon  the  wife's  debt,  contracted  before  the  marriage,  must 
be  brought  against  the  husband  and  wife  jointly.**  Dissolution  of 
the  marriage  of  course  restores  both  parties  to  their  former  status. 
A  judgment  against  a  divorced  wife  for  her  debt,  and  also  against 
the  husband  as  to  any  property  received  by  the  marriage,  if  void  as 
to  him,  cannot  prejudice  her  and  is  not  void  as  to  her.**    ' 

•  Uoyley  t.  White,  Cro.  Jac.  323;  King  v.  Jones,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1525;  Evans 
T.  Chester,  2  Mees.  &  W.  847;  Cooper  v.  Hunchln,  4  East,  521;  Roosevelt 
T.  Uale.  2  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  581;  PhlHIps  v.  iStewart,  27  Ga.  402;  Evans  v.  Lips- 
comb. 28  (Ja.  71;  Sackett  v.  Wilson,  2  Biackf.  (Ind.)  85;  Parker  v.  Steed, 
1  Lea  (Tenn.)  206. 

•  Travis  T.  Willis,  55  Miss.  557. 

»«  Kev.  St.  Me.  1883,  c.  61,  §4;  Acts  N.  Y.  1853,  c.  576,  S  1;  Acts  Md. 
1*^M>.  p.  233;  Acts  Va.  1875,  c.  359.  §  3;  Rev.  St.  W.  Va,  1878,  c.  122.  §  10; 
Code  N.  C.  f  1823;  Gen.  St.  Colo.  §  2275;  Comp.  Laws  Wyo.  c.  82,  §  7;  2 
Rev.  St.  Ind.  §  5127,  construed  in  Smith  v.  Beard,  73  Ind.  159. 

u  Pub.  St.  R.  I.  c.  166,  §  16;  2  Rev.  St.  Ind.  9  5127;  Acts  Md.  1880.  p.  253; 
Acta  Va.  1875,  c.  359.  $  3;  Rev.  St.  W.  Va.  1878,  ۥ  122,  8  10;  Gen.  St. 
Colo.  8  2275;    Comp.  Laws  Wyo.  c.  82,  5  7. 

i2Joye8  V.   UamUton,  10  Hush   (Ky.)  544. 

(277) 


§'  190  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  11 


I  190.    Effeoi  of  Omlsflion  to  plead  Corertiire. 

The  most  difficult  question  which  has  arisen  in  connection  with 
this  subject,  and  the  one  which  has  chiefly  engaged  the  attention  of 
the  courts,  is  this :  What  effect  is  to  be  given  to  a  personal  judgment 
rendered  against  a  married  woman,  by  default,  in  an  action  to  which 
her  coverture,  if  pleaded,  would  have  been  a  complete  defense?  Is 
it  a  mere  nullity,  or  is  it  voidable  on  motion,  or  is  it  merely  errone- 
ous ?  In  some  of  the  states,  the  doctrine  is  firmly  held  that  such  a 
judgment  is  absolutely  void  and  may  be  so  treated  whenever  it  is 
brought  in  question.**  These  decisions  proceed  upon  the  ground  of 
the  total  disability  of  a  feme  covert  tp  contract  the  species  of  debt 
assumed  by  the  hypothesis,  her  incapacity  to  retain  an  attorney  to 
appear  and  plead  for  her,  and  the  consequent  want  of  jurisdiction  in 
the  court  for  lack  of  a  juristic  person  to  act  upon.  Some  of  the  de- 
cisions cited  are  ably  considered  and  well  reasoned. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  held  by  a  long  line  of  authorities  (includ- 
ing some  English  cases)  that  such  a  judgment  against  a  married 
woman  is  not  void,  and  even  though  erroneous  or  voidable,  by  rea- 
son of  the  absence  of  enabling  statutes,  is  still  valid  and  binding 
upon  her  in  any  collateral  proceeding  and  until  set  aside  or  reversed 
in  some  proper  manner.**    The  practical  importance  of  the  question, 

i«  Morse  V.  Toppan,  3  Gray  (Mass.)  411;  Norton  v.  Meader,  4  Sawy.  003. 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  10,351;  Hartman  v.  Ogborn,  54  Pa.  120,  93  Am.  Dee.  679: 
Graham  v.  liong,  65  Pa.  383;  Swayne  v.  Lyon,  (57  Pa.  439;  Vandyke  v.  Well?, 
103  Pa.  49;  Griffith  v.  Clarke,  18  Md.  457;  Davis  v.  Foy,  15  Miss.  6i;  Gary 
V.  Dixon,  51  Miss.  593;  Mallett  v.  Parham,  52  Miss.  921;  White  t.  Bird.  20 
LSL.  Ann.  281;  Parsons  v.  Spencer,  83  Ky.  305;  Stevens  v.  Deering  (Kv.) 
9  S.  W.  292;  Higgfns  v.  Peltzer,  49  Mo.  152;  WeU  v.  Simmons,  66  Mo.  617: 
Corrlgan  v.  Bell,  73  Mo.  53. 

1*  Dick  V.  Tolhausen,  4  Hurl.  &  N.  695;  Moses  v.  Richardson.  8  Bare. 
&  C.  421;  Frazier  v.  Felton,  8  S.  C.  231;  Green  v.  Branton.  16  X.  C.  504; 
Vick  V.  Pope,  81  N.  C.  22;  Glover  v.  Moore,  60  Ga.  189;  Mashbum  t.  Gouge, 
61  Ga.  512;  Howard  v.  North,  5  Tex.  290,  51  Am.  Dec.  769;  Phelps  v.  Brack- 
ett,  24  Tex.  236;  Spalding  v.  Wathen,  7  Bush  (Ky.)  659;  Chatterton  t. 
Young,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  768;  HoweU  v.  Hale,  5  Lea  iTenn.)  405;  Sheppard  v. 
Kendle,  3  Humph.  (Tenn.)  81;  Keith  v.  Keith,  26  Kan.  26;  Callen  t.  EUison, 
13  Uliio  St.  446,  82  Am.  Dec.  448;  McCurdy  v.  Bau?hman,  43  Ohio  St.  lis 
1  N.  E.  93;  Burk  v.  Hill,  55  Ind.  419;  Wilson  v.  Coolidge,  42  Mich.  112,  3 
(278) 


Ch.  11)  VALIDITY,  AS  AFFBCTBD  BY  STATUS  OP  PARTIES.  §   1^0 

it  will  be  observed,  comes  to  light  when  we  inquire  whether  such  a 
judgment  may  be  impeached  collaterally,  and  what  is  its  effect  upon 
third  persons.  For  this  will  depend  entirely  upon  whether  it  is  void ' 
or  voidable.  And  the  decisions  which  hold  it  to  be  merely  voidable 
generally  support  their  conclusion  by  a  species  of  argument  ab  in- 
convenienti,  namely,  the  harm  that  might  accrue  to  innocent  stran- 
gers if  such  judgments  were  to  be  treated  as  mere  nullities.  Thus 
the  supreme  court  of  California  says :  "There  would  be  no  safety  in 
purchasing  at  judicial  sales,  under  judgments  rendered  after  due 
service  of  process  on  female  defendants,  if  the  title  of  the  purchaser 
could  be  defeated  by  proof,  in  a  collateral  action,  that  the  defendant 
in  the  judgment  was  a  married  woman  at  the  time  of  the  institution 
of  the  suit,  or  that  she  was  incapable  in  law  of  contracting  the  debt 
for  which  the  judgment  was  rendered."*"  In  order  to  reach. this 
result  it  is  necessary  to  agree  that,  no  matter  what  the  status  of 
the  woman  may  have  been,  if  she  was  duly  served  with  process,  she 
was  fully  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  so  that  the  judgment, 
though  upon  a  contract  which  she  had  no  power  to  make,  would  be 
at  most  erroneous  as  a  matter  of  law.  And  this  is  the  ground  of 
the  decision  in  the  recent  important  case  of  McCurdy  v.  Baugh- 
raan,**  where  the  court,  after  a  critical  and  exhaustive  review  of  the 
authorities,  announced  the  doctrine  stated  at  the  beginning  of  this 
paragraph,  and  added:  "Indeed,  this  is  but  to  reassert  the  doctrine 
constantly  maintained  in  this  court,  that  'the  judgment  or  final  or- 
der of  a  court  having  jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter  and  parties, 
however  erroneous,  irregular,  or  informal  such  judgment  or  order 
may  be,  is  valid  until  reversed  or  set  aside.' "'  In  Alabama  it  is  held 
that  in  the  absence  of  fraud  in  its  procurement,  or  other  special  cause 
shown,  a  consent  decree  is  as  binding  on  a  married  woman  as  on  a 
person  who  is  sui  juris.*^  In  another  state  it  is  considered  that  as  a 
judgment  against  a  married  woman  may  be  valid  (for  it  may  be  for 
her  tort  or  for  a  debt  contracted  before  marriage),  in  a  proceeding 

N.  W.  285;    Vantllburg  v.  Btack,  3  Mont.  459;    Gnmbette  v.  Brock,  41  CSal. 
78;  Guthrie  v.  Howard,  32  Iowa,  54;   Farrls  v.  Hayes,  9  Or.  81. 

isGambette  v.  Brock,  41  Cal.  78. 

»«  43  Ohio  St  78,  1  N.  E.  93. 

IT  Winter  v.  City  CouncU  of  Montgomery,  79  Ala.  481. 

(279) 


§190  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  11 

to  enforce  such  a  judgment  it  should  not  be  held  conclusively  to  be 
void,  but  neither  should  the  defendant  be  estopped  from  showing 
'that  it  is  void.^*  And  in  Pennsylvania  the  court  has  lately  held — 
though  without  departing  from  its  earlier  rulings — ^that  a  judgment 
by  default  against  a  married  woman,  in  an  action  to  which  she  might 
have  pleaded  coverture,  is  impervious  to  collateral  attack,  and  void- 
able at  most,  when  the  proceeding  was  in  rem,  as,  for  the  enforce- 
ment of  a  mechanic's  lien.^* 

The  solution  of  this  vexed  question  must  depend  upon  the  view 
which  we  are  to  take  of  the  common  law  status  of  a  married  woman. 
If  it  is  merely  a  protection, — a  barrier  which  she  may  raise  in  the 
path  of  one  who  pursues  her  at  law,  and  which  the  courts  are  bound 
to  erect  in  her  behalf, — then  it  may  readily  be  conceded  that  she 
may  be  brought  within  the  juri'sdiction  by  a  proper  service  of  process, 
so  that  the  subsequent  proceedings  will  at  any  rate  not  be  void, 
although  the  court,  to  save  itself  from  error,  should  not  give  a  per- 
sonal judgment  against  her  on  a  debt  she  could  defend  against  by 
coverture.  This  theory,  however,  is  far  from  satisfactory  as  an  ac- 
count of  the  common  law  notion.  The  doctrine  seems  rather  to 
have  been  that  marriage,  except  for  certain  special  purposes,  put  the 
personality  of  the  wife  entirely  in  abeyance.  And  therefore,  in  the 
generality  of  cases,  her  contracts  and  business  transactions  could 
have  no  validity  whatever ;  for  it  is  only  a  juristic  person  whose  acts 
can  have  the  effect  of  creating  or  transferring  rights.  For  the  same 
reason  she  would  be  beyond  the  authority  of  the  courts, — as  much  so 
•  as  the  sovereign  himself, — and  no  court  could  acquire  jurisdiction  of 
her  (in  the  cases  falling  within  our  hypothesis),  because  process  can- 
not issue  except  against  a  person  known  to  the  law  as  an  individual. 
If,  then,  a  suit  was  instituted  against  her,  and  she  suffered  a  default, 
still  no  valid  judgment  could  be  given.  The  whole  proceeding  would 
be  void  ab  initio  and  could  result  in  nothing  effectual.  It  seems  to 
us  that  the  vital  point  is  clearly  indicated  in  the  following  remark 
of  the  court  of  appeals  of  Kentucky :  "If,  as  is  unquestionably  true, 
a  judgment  is  void  if  the  court  rendering  it  had  no  jurisdiction  for 
/  want  of  service  of  process,  then  it  seems  to  us  that  it  should  be 

18  I'arsons  v.  Spencer,  83  Ky.  305. 

18  Sliryock  v.  Buckman,  121  Pa.  248,  15  AU.  480,  1  U  R.  A.  533, 

(280) 


Ch.  11)  VALIDITY.  AS  AFFECTED  BY  STATUS  OF  PARTIES.  §  191 

equally  so  if  the  one  served  with  process  is  incapacitated  by  law  from 
retaining  an  attorney,  or  has  no  such  legal  existence  as  authorizes  a 
personal  liability.  In  the  one  case  the  court  has  no  jurisdiction,  and 
in  the  other  there  is  nothing  within  its  jurisdiction  which  has  a  legal 
existence,"  *• 

I  191.    Under  P»rtially  eaablins  Statutes. 

Thus  far  we  have  considered  the  validity  of  judgments  against 
married  women  at  common  law.  It  is  now  necessary  to  consider  the 
enabHng  statutes  which,  both  in  England  and  in  most  of  the  states, 
have  introduced  the  most  important  changes  in  their  legal  powers 
and  relations.    These  statutes   may  be  broadly  divided  into   two 

i«  Parsons  r.  Spencer,  83  Ky.  305.  On  another  appeal  In  the  same  case 
iSpencer  v.  Parsons,  89  Ky.  577,  13  S.  W.  72,  25  Am.  St  Rep.  555),  the 
coort  sustained  its  ruling  by  the  following  convincing  line  of  argument: 
''(ienerally,  a  feme  coTert  has  no  personality  In  law.  She  is  not  recognized 
by  it  sare  in  a  few  excepted  cases,  so  that  a  personal  judgment  can  be  taken 
against  her.  The  contracts  of  an  infant  are  in  general  voidable  only,  while 
those  of  a  married  woman  are  void.  True,  she  may,  under  certain  circum- 
8taoc*«,  bind  her  separate  estate,  but  not  herself  personally;  the  reason  be- 
ing that  she  has  no  personal  identity  in  law.  It  does  not  follow  because,  as 
an  exceptional  case,  a  personal  judgment  may  go  against  her  for  tort,  or 
upon  a  contract  made  by  her  when  single,  the  reason  being  that  her  status 
at  the  making  of  it  is  regarded  as  following  it  to  its  completion,  that  there- 
fore all  personal  judgments  against  her  are  merely  erroneous,  and  not  void. 
If  Rbe  has  no  legal  status  In  court,  certainty  it  should  have  no  jurisdiction 
to  render  a  judgment  binding  her  personally.  Uer  existence  is  merged  in  that 
of  the  husband,  and  she  can  make  no  contract  binding  herself  personally, 
or  suhjeoting  her  to  a  judgment  in  personam.  Her  contract  is  void  in  law. 
In  equity,  it  may  be  enforced  against  her  separate  estate,  if  she  so  intended; 
hut  she  Incurs  no  personal  liability  by  it,  oecause  she  has,  legally  speaking, 
no  personal  existence,  and  it  must  be  satislied  out  of  her  estate  by  in  rem 
proceedings.  She  is  by  law  incapacitated  from  retaining  an  attorney,  and 
no  personal  liability  arises,  because  she  has  no  legal  existence.  There  is, 
therefore,  so  far  as  she  is  concerned,  no  person  within  the  court's  Juris- 
diction*  If  a  personal  judgment  be  rendered  upon  a  claim,  the  alleged  lia^ 
bility  is  merely  placed  upon  an  advanced  footing,  and  if  originally  it  was  void 
as  to  her.  then  the  unauthorized  judgment  should  not  estop  her  from  resiRting 
It  from  the  fact  that  she  was  not  sui  juris,  and  had  no  such  legal  existence 
as  authorized  a  personal  judgment.  We  are  aware  there  is  a  conflict  of 
authority  in  this  country  upon  this  question;  but  the  views  above  advanced 
j«w»m  to  OS  not  only  supported  by  reason,  but  we  know  they  are  sustained 
t>y  such  high  authority  as  the  supreme  courts  of  Penus^ivania,  Missouri, 
and  other  states." 

(-'SI) 


§    191  LAW  OF  JUDQMBNT&  (Ch.  11 

classes,  those  which  fully  emancipate  the  wife,  and  those  which  re- 
lease her  only  partially  from  the  common  law  disabilities.  Statutes 
of  the  latter  class  usually  give  the  married  woman  power  to  make 
contracts  with  respect  to  her  separate  estate,  to  incur  debts  for  its 
repair  and  improvement,  to  make  herself  liable  for  supplies  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  family,  and  to  sue  and  be  sued  in  respect  to  such 
contracts  and  debts.  It  is  generally  held,  under  an  enabling  statute 
allowing  a  married  woman  to  charge  her  separate  estate  by  certain 
kinds  of  contracts  beneficial  to  herself  or  the  estate,  that  a  judgment 
against  her,  founded  on  such  a  contract,  will  be  erroneous  (or  void, 
according  to  the  doctrine  prevailing  in  the  particular  state),  unless 
the  record  itself  shows  that  the  debt  is  one  for  which  her  separate 
estate  is  liable.'^  Thus,  under  a  law  in  Pennsylvania,  that  a  judg- 
ment against  a  wife  in  a  joint  action,  so  as  to  bind  her  separate 
estate,  shall  not  be  rendered  unless  it  shall  be  proved  that  the  debt 
sued  for  was  contracted  by  the  wife  for  necessaries  for  the  family,  a 
default  judgment  which  does  not  show  that  any  testimony  was  taken 
is  void.**  And  in  any  case  no  general  judgment  can  be  given;  it 
must  be  limited  to  the  separate  property  of  the  wife  in  reference  to 
which  the  contract  was  made.*'  In  Alabama,  the  judgment  must 
specify  the  property  to  be  bound.  "A  general  judgment,  or  a  judg- 
ment which  pretermits  the  ascertainment  of  the  estate  of  the  wife  con- 
demned to  its  satisfaction  cannot  be  rendered.  *  *  *  There  can 
be  no  personal  judgment  against  the  wife;   the  only  judgment  that 

81  Lewis  V.  Perkins,  30  .\.  J.  Law,  133;  Swayne  v.  Lyon,  67  Pa.  436: 
Hecker  t.  Haak,  88  I'a.  238;  Magruder  v.  Buck,  56  Miss.  314;  Gary  t. 
Dixon,  51  Miss.  5U3;  Albree  v.  Johnson.  1  Flip.  341,  Fed.  Cas.  Xo.  146;  \\Tilte 
r.  Ballllo,  12  La.  Ann.  6(>3;  Kobson  v.  Shelton,  14  La.  Ann.  712;  TrimWe  v. 
Miller,  24  Tex.  214;  Menard  v.  SSydnor,  29  Tex.  257;  McGlaughlln  v.  0*Roarke, 
12  Iowa,  459;  March  v.  MeCardle,  1  Pa.  Dist.  R.  677;  Green  v.  Ballard.  116 
X.  C.  144,  21  S.  E.  192.     Compare  Weldy  v.  Young.  21  Pa.  Co.  Ct  R.  15. 

2  2  (Jould  V.  McFall,  111  Pa.  66.  2  Ati.  403;  Brown  v.  McKinney.  130  Pa. 
365,  18  Atl.  642;    Kauch  v.  Young,  9  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  416. 

23  Crockett  v.  Dcrlot,  85  Va.  240,  3  S.  E.  128;  Foertsch  t.  Germnlller, 
9  App.  D.  C.  351;  Holtby  v.  Hodgson,  24  Q.  B.  Div.  103.  In  an  action  on  an 
English  judgment  against  a  married  woman,  containing  a  provision  limiting 
its  execution  to  her  separate  estate,  it  is  erroneous  to  enter  a  general  per- 
sonal Judgment  against  the  defendant,  without  adding  thereto  the  limitation 
imposed  by  tlie  Knglish  Judgment  )Sangulnuettl  v.  Roche,  60  Huu,  5SI. 
15  X.   Y.    Supp.    185. 

(282) 


Ch.  11)  VALIDITY,  AS  APFBCTBD  BY  STATUS  OP  PARTIES.  §   192 

can  be  rendered  is  a  judgment  in  rem,  a  judgment  of  condemnation 
of  the  statutory  estate  described  in  the  complaint."**  So  where  an 
enabling  statute  allows  her  to  bind  her  separate  real  estate,  a  judg- 
ment against  the  land  is  valid,  but  not  a  personal  judgment  against 
the  woman.**  And  in  an  action  against  a  married  woman  to  dispos- 
sess her  of  lands,  no  personal  judgment,  either  for  damages  or  costs, 
can  be  rendered  against  her.**  But  her  coverture  does  not  prevent 
the  rendition  of  a  decree  against  lands  descended  to  her,  for  contri- 
bution to  the  other  heirs  on  account  of  a  debt  of  the  ancestor  which 
they  have  paid.*^  Where  a  married  woman  is  allowed  to  mortgage 
her  separate  estate,  but  there  is  no  statute  allowing  her  to  sue  and  be 
sued  as  a  feme  sole,  the  remedy  is  by  charging  the  property  in  equity ; 
but  a  personal  judgment  against  her  on  the  mortgage  note  is  erro- 
neous.** According  to  the  law  in  Louisiana,  a  judgment  against  a 
married  woman  is  void  and  of  no  effect  when  her  husband  has  not 
been  cited  with  her,  and  she  is  not  authorized  by  him  or  by  the  judge 
to  defend  the  suit.**  As  to  confessions  of  judgment  by  married 
women,  under  these  enabling  statutes,  the  reader  is  referred  to  sec- 
tion 55  of  this  volume. 

I  192.    Statutes  removing  Disability  of  Coverture. 

In  many  of  the  states  there  are  statutes  which  abolish  all  disa- 
bilities from  coverture  and  allow  a  wife  to  sue  and  be  sued  in  like 
manner  as  if  she  were  sole.*®     In  these  states  it  is  universally  held 

>«  Lee  T.  Ryall,  68  Ala.  354. 

»» Sweeney  v.  Smith,  15  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  325,  61  Am.  Dec.  188, 

2«  Steed  T.  Koowles,  84  Ala.  205,  3  South.  8i)7. 

«T  Winston  T.  McAlpine,  65  Ala,  377. 

*•  Johnson  County  v.  Kugg,  18  Iowa,  137;  Wolff  v.  Van  Metre,  19  Iowa,, 
m;  Beed  v.  King,  23  Iowa,  500;  Patton  v.  Stewart,  19  Ind.  233;  Kirby 
T.  Chlldii,  10  Kan.  U39;  Femberton  v.  Johnson,  46  Mo.  342;  Keating  v. 
Korfhage,  88  Mo.  524.  The  same  Is  true  of  actions  on  mechanics'  liens. 
Borgwald  v.  Weippert,  49  Mo.  60;   Seeman  v.  W'eippert,  49  Mo.  61. 

2»D!nneyer  v.  O'Hern,  39  La.  Ann.  961,  3  South.  132;  Washington  v. 
Uackett,  19  t.a.   Ann.  146. 

»•  Pub.  St.  Mass.  c.  147,  §  7;  Gen.  Laws  N.  H.  c.  183,  §  12;  Acts  Vt.  1884, 
Xo.  140.  S  1;  Code  Civ.  Proc.  N.  Y.  S  450;  Kev.  St.  N.  J.  "Married  Women,"' 
10.  11:  Act  Pa.  June  3,  1^87,  S  2  (P.  L.  333);  Kev.  St.  Ohio,  §  4900:  Hev. 
8t  IIL  c.  68»  I  1;  Bey.  Code  Iowa,  8  2562;   Gen.  St.  Minn.  c.  66,  §  29;   Comp. 

(283) 


§    193  liAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  11 

that  a  personal  judgment  against  a  married  woman,  if  otherwise 
regular,  is  as  valid  and  binding  as  any  other.* ^  Thus,  where  the 
property  of  a  married  woman  is  levied  upon  by  her  husband's  cred- 
itors as  his  property,  and  *he  interposes  a  claim,  she  is  bound,  just 
as  any  other  suitor  would  be,  by  the  judgment  in  the  claim  case." 
So  where  she  prefers  a  suit  against  her  trustee  to  enforce  the  trust, 
or  to.  charge  the  trustee  with  maladministration,  she  is  concluded  by 
a  judgment  against  her.'* 

i  103.    Judgments  against  Infants. 

In  respect  to  their  legal  disabilities,  infants  occupy  a  position 
analogous  to  that  of  married  women.  But  the  courts  have  shown  a 
much  stronger  disposition  to  sustain  judgments  given  against  the 
former  than  those  rendered  against  the  latter.  Assuming  that  an 
infant  defendant  has  been  brought  before  the  court  by  a  proper  serv- 
ice of  process,  it  is  regular  and  orderly  to  appoint  a  guardian  ad  litem 
for  him,  who  then  assumes  the  defense  of  the  action  and  protects 
the  interests  of  the  minor.  But  if  a  judgment  is  rendered  by  a  court 
having  jurisdiction  of  the  parties  and  subject,  it  is  held,  by  the  great 
preponderance  of  authorities,  that  it  will  not  be  void  because  the 
defendant  was  an  infant  and  no  guardian  ad  litem  was  appointed, 
although  it  will  be  irregular  and  liable  to  reversal,  or  voidable  on  a 

Laws  Kan.  c.  62,  §  3;  Comp.  St.  Neb.  pt.  1,  c.  52,  §  3;  Acts  Md.  18S2,  c. 
265;  Laws  Or.  1878,  p.  93,  $  7;  Gen.  St.  Colo.  §  2279;  Code  Wash.  S  2396: 
Code  Civ.  Froc.  Dak.  |  77;  Comp.  Laws  Wyo.  1882,  c.  68;  Code  Miss,  i 
1167;    Comp.  Laws   Ctah,   $  1021. 

»i  Labaree  v.  Colby,  99  Mass.  559;  Goodnow  v.  HUl,  123  Mass.  587;  Voa- 
burgh  V.  Brown,  66  Barb.  421;  Cashman  v.  Henry,  75  N.  Y.  103.  31  Am. 
Rep.  437;  Mrst  Nat.  Bank  v.  Garlinghouse,  53  Barb.  615;  Wilson  v.  Her- 
bert, 41  N.  J.  Law,  454,  32  Am.  Rep.  243;  Huff  v.  Wright,  39  Ga.  41;  Glover 
V.  Moore,  60  Ga.  189;  Hart  v.  Grigsby,  14  Bush  (Ky.)  542;  McCue  v.  Sharp 
(Ky.)  45  S.  W.  770;  Williamson  v.  CUne,  40  W.  Va.  194,  20  S.  E.  917;  Jones 
v.  Taylor,  7  Tex.  240,  56  Am.  Dec.  48;  Patrick  v.  Uttell,  36  Ohio  St  79. 
38  Am.  Rep.  552;  Van  Metre  v.  Wolf,  27  Iowa,  341;  Jones  v.  Glass,  48 
Iowa,  345;  Davis  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  of  Cheyenne,  5  Neb.  242,  25  Am.  Kep. 
484;  Rogers  v.  Weil,  12  Wis.  6W;  Plainer  v.  Patchin,  19  Wis.  333;  Leonard 
V.  Townsend,  26  Cal.  435;  Marlow  v.  Barlew,  53  CaL  456;  Alexander  v. 
Bouton,  55  Cal.  15. 

82  Lewis  V.  Gunn,  63  Ga.  542. 

as  Rammelsberg  v.  MitcheU,  29  Ohio  St  22. 


Ch.  11)  VALIDITY,  AS  AFFECTED  BY  STATUS  OP  PARTIES.  §    193 

proper  proceeding  for  that  purpose.'*  The  theory  is,  that  the  ap- 
pointment  of  a  guardian  is  not  a  prerequisite  to  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  court ;  it  attaches  upon  due  service  of  the  process  being  made. 
Consequently,  the  omission  to  appoint  a  guardian  does  not  impair  the 
authority  of  the  court  to  proceed  in  the  case,  but  is  at  most  an  irreg- 
ularity in  the  exercise  of  its  lawful  jurisdiction,  which,  on  settled 
principles  of  law,  may  impregnate  its  judgment  with  error,  but  can- 
not render  it  absolutely  null.  Very  important  results  follow  from  the 
placing  of  such  sentences  in  the  category  of  voidable  judgments,  as 
distinguished  from  those  which  are  entirely  void.  For,  first,  the 
judgment  will  stand  as  a  valid  adjudication,  against  the  infant  and 
all  others  who  may  be  interested,  until  it  is  set  aside  or  reversed."^ 
Again,  the  omission  to  appoint  a  guardian  ad  litem  will  not  vitiate 
the  judgment  on  a  collateral  attack ;  it  is  only  voidable  by  a  direct 
proceeding.**  And  if  it  is  set  aside,  the  interest  of  a  bona  fide  pur- 
chaser under  the  judgment  without  notice  will  not  be  affected.*^ 

•^C^Hara  v.  McConnell,  »3  U.  S.  150,  23  L.  Ed.  840;  Tucker  v.  Bean; 
«  Me.  352;  Barber  v.  Graves,  18  Vt.  292;  Q-ockett  v.  Drew,  5  Gray  (Mass.) 
'J^;  Austlii  T.  Charleston  Fem.  Sem.,  8  Mete.  (Mass.)  196,  41  Am.  Dec.  497; 
Swan  y.  Horton,  14  Gray  (Mass.)  179;  Hill  v.  Keyes,  10  Allen  (Mass.)  258; 
Sims  ▼.  New  York  College  of  Dentistry,  35  Hun  (N.  Y.)  344;  Moore  v.  Mc- 
Kwen,  5  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  373;  Kemp  v.  Cook,  18  Md.  130,  79  Am.  Dec.  681; 
KobertB  y.  Stanton,  2  Munf.  (Ya.)  129,  5  Am.  Dec.  463;   Larking  y.  BuUard. 

88  N.  C.  35;  StancIU  y.  Gay,  92  N.  C.  462;  England  v.  Garner,  90  N.  C.  197; 
FiDley  V.  Robertson,  17  8.  C.  435;  Cook  y.  Rogers,  64  Ala.  406;  Taylor  v. 
RowlaDd,  26  Tex.  293;  Montgomery  y.  Carlton,  56  Tex.  361;  Martin  y.  Wey- 
man,  26  Tex.  400;  WaUls  v.  Stuart,  92  Tex.  568,  50  S.  W.  567;  Booker  v. 
Kennerly,  96  Ky.  415,  29  S.  W.  323;  Simmons  y.  McKay,  5  Busb  (Ky.) 
25;  AlUson  y.  Taylor,  6  Dana  (Ky.)  87,  32  Am.  Dec.  68;  Walkenhorst  v. 
Lewis,  24  Kan.  420;  TrapnalFs  Adm'x  v.  State  Bank,  18  Ark.  53;  Boyd  v. 
Roane,  49  Ark.  397,  5  S.  W.  704;  St.  Clair  y.  Smith,  3  Ohio,  355;  Blake  v. 
Douglass,  27  Ind.  416;  Carver  v.  Carver,  64  Ind.  195;  Peak  v.  Shasted,  21 
lit  137.  74  Am.  Doc.  83;    Quiglej'  v.  Roberts,  44  111.  503;    Bonnell  v.  Holt, 

89  lU.  71;  Millard  y.  Marmon,  116  111.  W9,  7  N.  E.  468;  Webster  v.  Page! 
54  Iowa.  461,  6  N.  W.  716;  Drake  y.  Hanshaw,  47  Iowa,  291;  Powell  y. 
Gott  13  Mo.  458,  53  Am.  Dec.  153;  Stupp  v.  Holmes,  48  Mo.  89;  Bailey 
y.  McGinniss,  57  Mo.  362;    I'arker  v.  Starr,  21  Neb.  680,  33  N.  W.  424. 

••Bngland  y.  Gamer,  90  N.  C.  197;  Bemecker  v.  Miliar,  44  Mo.  102; 
SUnmons  y.  McKay,  5  Bush  (Ky.)  25;  Frierson  v.  Travis,  39  Ala.  150. 

*«  Millard  y.  Marmon.  116  111.  649,  7  N.  E.  468;  Manson  v.  Duncanson, 
106  U.  S.  533,  17  Sup.  Ct.  647,  41  L.  Ed.  1105. 

•T  England  t.  Garner,  90  N.  C.  197. 

(285) 


§194  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Oh.  11 

And  further,  the  avoidance  of  the  judgment  is  at  the  election  of 
the  defendant;  upon  attaining  his  majority,  he  may  execute  a  writ- 
ten release  of  errors,  which  will  have  the  effect  to  confirm  the  judg- 
ment.'® And  while  the  courts  will  always  be  careful  of  the  rights 
of  infants,  they  will  not  in  all  cases  set  aside  irregular  judgments 
against  them  as  of  course ;  they  will  refuse  to  do  so  where  it  appears 
from  the  record  or  otherwise  that  the  infant  suffered  no  substantial 
injustice.**  As  respects  proceedings  to  probate  a  will,  no  appoint- 
ment of  a  guardian  ad  litem  for  any  minor  interested  in  the  testator's 
estate  is  necessary,  and  the  probate  is  valid,  notwithstanding  the 
omission  of  such  appointment.*® 

i  104.    Senioe  of  Process  on  Tafowta, 

It  is  indispensable  to  the  validity  of  a  judgment  against  an  infant 
that  the  record  should  show  that  he  was  made  a  party  in  some  legal 
and  effectual  mode.**  Ordinarily  the  statute  requires  that  personal 
service  be  made  upon  the  infant,  if  over  the  age  of  fourteen  years 
(and  sometimes  upon  the  guardian  also),  and  upon  a  parent,  guard- 
ian, or  person  having  charge  of  the  minor,  if  under  that  age.  This 
requirement  is  jurisdictional ;  the  law  must  be  strictly  followed ;  and 
neither  the  infant  nor  his  guardian  can  accept  service,  or  waive  the 
due  service  of  process.**    The  service,  as  stated,  should  be  personal. 

88HU1  V.  Keyes,  10  AUen  (Mass.)  258. 

«»  Syme  v.  Trice,  96  x\.  C.  243,  1  S.  E.  480;  McCrosky  v.  Parks,  13  S. 
U.  UO;  Phillips  V.  Dusenberry,  8  Hun  (N.  Y,)  348;  Bickel  v.  Erskine.  43 
Iowa,  213;  Fuller  v.  Smith,  4«  Vt.  253;  Rankin  v.  Kemp,  21  Ohio  St.  651: 
Kemp  V.  Cook,  18  Md.  130,  79  Am.  Dec.  681;  Krickow  v.  Pennsylvania  Tar 
Manuf  g  Co.,  87  111.  App.  653. 

40  In  re  Monsseau's  Will,  30  Minn.  202,  14  N.  W.  887. 

*i  Shaefer  v.  Gates,  2  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  453,  38  Am.  Dec.  164;  Abdil  v.  AbdU. 
26  Ind.  287;    Winston  v.   McLendon,  43  'mIss.  254. 

*2  l^enox  V.  Xotrebe,  1  Hemp.  251,  Fed.  Cas.  Xo.  8.246c;  Genobles  t.  West 
23  S.  C.  154;  Young  v.  Young,  91  N.  C.  359;  Winston  v.  McLendon,  43  Miss. 
254;  Taylor  v.  \>'alker,  1  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  734;  Armstrong  v.  Wyandotte 
Bridge  Co.,  1  McCahon,  166;  Abdil  v.  Abdil,  26  Ind.  287;  Clark  v.  Thompson. 
4Y  111.  25.  95  Am.  Dec.  457;  Good  v.  Xorley,  28  Iowa,  188;  Kansas  City.  St 
J.  &  C.  B.  R.  Co.  V.  Campbell,  02  Mo.  585.  "The  mode  of  making  infants 
parties  to  an  action  in  a  court  of  record  is  clearly  and  expressly  prescribed 
by  statute,  and  a  due  and  tender  regard  for  the  rights  and  welfare  of  infants 
requires  that  this  statute  shaa  be  strictly  followed.  An  infant  is  incapable 
(2SG) 


Ch.  11)  VA^iIDITT,  AS  /^FECTED  BY  STATUS  OP  PARTIES,  §    194 

But  it  is  held  in  Kentucky,  that  a  judgment  against  an  infant  con- 
structively served,  without  the  appointment  of  a  guardian  ad  litem, 
is  not  void,  but  will  stand  good  until  set  aside  or  reversed.*'  And 
where  the  statute  provides  for  service  on  non-resident  defendants  by 
publication,  service  may  be  made  in  that  manner  upon  non-resident 
infants.**  It  is  clearly  irregular  to  appoint  a  guardian  ad  litem  until 
after  the  defendant  has  been  duly  brought  before  the  court.  Yet 
numerous  cases  hold  that,  although  the  infant  was  never  personally 
served,  or  although  the  service  was  not  in  compliance  with  the  stat- 
ute, or  was  otherwise  defective,  still,  if  a  guardian  ad  litem  was 
appointed  and  an  answer  filed  and  the  action  defended,  the  judgment 
will  not  be  void,  though  the  defendant  may  have  it  reversed  or  set 
aside.**  But  some  other  authorities  maintain  the  rule  that  where 
infant  defendants  are  not  served  with  process  and  do  not  appear, 
the  court  has  no  authority  whatever  to  appoint  a  guardian  ad  litem 
for  them,  and  no  jurisdiction  as  to  them,  and  a  judgment  against 
them  is  utterly  void.**  There  is  something  to  be  said  in  favor  of 
this  position,  but  both  the  preponderance  of  the  cases  and  the  drift 
of  judicial  thinking  appear  to  be  against  it.  In  Illinois,  it  is  held  that 
if  service  is  made  upon  the  infant  personally,  instead  of  upon  his 
guardian,  as  required  by  the  statute,  and  no  guardian  ad  litem  ap- 
pointed, the  court  is  without  jurisdiction.*'  Similarly,  when  the 
infant  is  under  the  age  of  fourteen  years,  and  the  summons  is  not 

of  making  himself  or  herself  a  party  to  an  action  by  accepting  service,  so 
as  to  be  bound  by  a  judgment  therein.  All  the  formalities  prescribed  by 
statute  must  be  complied  with."    Finley  v.  Robertson,  17  S.  C  435. 

«s  Simmons  v.  McKay,  5  Bush  (Ky.)  25. 

««  Bryan  v.  Kennett,  113  U.  S.  179,  5  Sup.  Ct.  407,  28  L.  Ed.  908;  Walken- 
horat  V.  Lewis,  1«  Kan.  420. 

^'Ueroman  v.  Louisiana  Institute  of  Deaf  and  Dumb,  34  La.  Ann.  805; 
Kobb  V.  Irwin's  Lessee,  15  Ohio,  689;  Pi-eston  v.  Dunn,  25  Ala.  507;  Nel- 
son T.  Moon,  3  :^IcLean,  319,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  10,111;  Larkins  v.  BuUard,  88 
N.  a  35;  Grontier  v.  Puymiroi,  19  Cal.  629;  Cox  v.  Story,  80  Ky.  Gi;  Gib- 
son ▼.  Chouteau,  39  Mo.  536;   Kremer  v.  Haynie,  67  Tex.  450,  3  S.  W.  676. 

<•  Roy  V.  Rowe,  90  Ind.  54;  New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bangs,  103  U.  S. 
435,  26  U  Ed.  58U;  AVhitney  v.  Porter,  23  111.  445.  See  Galpin  v.  Page, 
18  WalL  350,  21  U  Ed.  959;  Sprague  v.  Haines,  68  Tex.  215,  4  S.  W.  371; 
MrCloskey  v.  Sweeney,  66  Cal.  53,  4  Pac.  943;  IngersoU  v.  Manga  m,  84  N.  Y. 

t;22. 

«T  Whitney  ?.  Porter,  23  III.  445. 

(287) 


§    VJO  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  11 

served  on  his  father,  mother,  guardian,  or  other  person  having  charge 
of  him,  as  the  statute  prescribes,  it  has  been  held  that  a  judgment 
against  him  is  void,  and  a  sale  of  his  land  thereunder  should  be  set 
aside.*' 

Summarizing  the  conclusions  reached  in  this  and  the  preceding  sec- 
tions as  sustained  by  the  majority  of  the  decisions,  we  may  say  that, 
in  order  that  a  judgment  against  an  infant  may  be  entirely  regular 
and  valid,  both  due  service  of  process  and  the  appointment  of  a 
guardian  for  the  suit  are  necessary.  But  if  (i)  no  service  is  had 
upon  the  defendant,  but  a  guardian  is  appointed  and  defends,  or  if 
(2)  the  infant  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  by  personal  cita- 
tion, but  no  guardian  is  appointed  for  him, — ^in  either  of  these  cases, 
the  judgment  will  be  irregular  and  voidable,  but  not  a  mere  nullity. 
If  neither  of  these  requisites  is  complied  with,  the  judgment  will 
ordinarily  be  utterly  void.  To  the  last  statement,  however,  there  may 
be  exceptions  in  peculiar  circumstances.  In  a  case  in  North  Carolina, 
where  it  appeared  that  there  was  no  service  of  process  upon  infant 
defendants,  and  no  guardian  appointed  to  protect  their  rights,  but 
they  were  brought  in  by  an  order  directing  them  to  be  made  parties 
with  leave  to  answer,  it  was  held  that  a  judgment  taken  against  them 
was  irregular  and  might  be  set  aside  at  any  time,  but  it  was  not 
treated  as  a  nullity.**  But  here  we  approach  the  great  principle,  ap- 
plicable to  all  persons  alike,  that  jurisdiction  over  them  is  only  ac- 
quired by  service  of  process  in  some  regular  and  recognized  mode. 

f   105.    Appearaaoe  by  Attorney  or  Gnardlaji* 

Although  the  law  does  not  regularly  permit  an  infant  to  defend 
his  case  in  person  or  by  attorney,  yet  a  judgment  against  an  infant 
for  whom  no  guardian  was  appointed,  but  who  appeared  by  attorney, 
is  voidable  only  and  not  void ;  it  may  be  set  aside  on  motion  after  he 

*8  Wornock  v.  Loar  (Ky.)  11  S.  W.  438;  Civ.  Code  Kj.  |  52. 

*9  Larkins  v.  Bullard,  88  N.  C.  35;  StancUl  v.  (Jay,  92  N.  C.  462.  Tbe 
Code,  8  387,  making  valid  judgments  against  infants  and  certain  other  per- 
sons, in  cases  where  being  parties  defendant,  they  are  not  personally  served, 
does  not  apply  to  cases  where  there  has  never  been  any  service  upon  the 
infant,  nor  upon  any  person  representing  him.  Id.;  Ferry  t.  Adamii  98 
N.  C.  167,  3  S.  E.  729,  2  Am.  St.  Rep.  32(5. 

(288) 


Ch.  11)  VALIDITY,  AS  AFFECTED  BY  STATUS  OP  PARTIES.  §    196 

attains  majority,  or  may  be  reversed  on  error. "^®  In  a  case  in  Cali- 
fornia, where,  in  a  suit  against  infants,  there  was  no  personal  service 
i:pon  them,  but  their  general  guardian  appeared  and  defended  for 
them,  it  was  held  that  such  appearance  gave  the  court  jurisdiction 
of  their  persons.^*  And  in  many  of  the  states  a  general  guardian, 
already  appointed,  may  appear  for  the  minor,*^^  though  in  others  a 
guardian  ad  litem  must  in  all  cases  be  appointed.*** 

i  106.    Effeet  of  Failure  to  plead  Infancy* 

The  general  disposition  of  the  authorities  is  to  regard  the  plea  of 
infancy  as  a  personal  privilege,  which  may  be  waived,  and  if  it  is  not 
pleaded,  a  judgment  against  the  infant  is  binding  upon  him.**  Still 
there  are  some  cases  which  hold, — on  analogy  to  the  rule  obtaining 
in  equity, — that  a  judgment  by  default  cannot  properly  be  rendered 
in  any  case  against  an  infant. °°     But  the  better  doctrine  is  that  a 

••Powell  v.  Gott,  13  Mo.  458,  53  Am.  Dec.  153;  Heeler's  Heirs  v.  Bullitt's 
Heirs,  3  A.  K.  Marsh  (Ky.)  280,  13  Am.  Dec.  161;  Porter's  Heirs  v.  Rob- 
iOMD,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  253,  13  Am.  Dec.  153;  Bourne  v.  Simpson,  0 
B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  454;  Austin  y.  Charleston  Fem.  Sem.,  8  Mete.  (Mass.)  196, 
41  Am.  Dec.  4»7;  Bloom  v.  Burdick,  1  Hill  (X.  Y.)  130,  37  Am.  Dec.  299; 
Barter  t.  Graves,  18  Vt.  290;  Martin  v.  Weyman,  26  Tex.  460;  Fulbrlght 
T.  Cannefox,  30  Mo.  425;  MarahaH  v.  Fisher,  46  N.  C.  Ill;  Whitney  v.  Por- 
ter, 23  111.  445.  Infants  are  not  estopped,  as  against  their  submission  of 
their  rights  to  the  protection  of  the  court,  by  the  consent  of  a  solicitor  to 
the  entry  of  a  decree,  when  it  does  not  appear  by  formal  entry,  or  by  proofs, 
that  such  solicitor  was  in  fact  employed  to  represent  them.  White  v.  Miller. 
158  U.  ».  128.  15  8up.  Ct.  .788,  39  L.  Ed.  921. 

Bi  Smith  T.  McDonald,  42  Cal.  484. 

ft*  Wells  V.  Smith,  44  Miss.  296;  Mansur  v.  Pratt,  101  Mass.  60;  Plerson 
y,  Ultchner,  25  N.  J.  Kq.  130;  Pucket  v.  Johnson,  45  Tex.  550;  Gronfier 
T.  Poymirol,  19  Oal.  629;    Hinton  v.  Bland's  Adm'r,   81  Va.  588. 

uKoach  ▼.  Uix,  57  Ala.  576;  Stammers  v.  McXaughten,  57  Ala.  277; 
Fitch  V.  Cornell,  1  Sawy.  157,  Fed.  Gas.  Xo.  4,834. 

'« Blake  t.  Douglass,  27  Ind.  416.  One  against  whom,  when  of  full  age, 
a  default  judgment  was  rendered  on  debts  incurred  while  an  infant,  cannot, 
in  a  proceeding  on  such  Judgment,  set  up  his  infancy.  Cauthorn  v.  Berry, 
W  Mo.  App.  404. 

»*Rfaoads  V.  Khoads,  43  111.  239;  Peak  v.  I^ricer,  21  111.  1(U;  Lieserowitz 
T.  West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.,  80  111.  App.  248;  Chalfant  v.  Monroe,  3  Dana 
<Ky.)  35;  Massie's  Heirs  v.  Donaldson,  8  Ohio,  377;  Metcalfe  v.  Alter,  31 
La.  Ann.  389.  A  counterclaim  to  the  suit  of  an  Infant  prosecuted  by  next 
friend  cannot  be  taken  as  confessed  for  want  of  a  reply.  A  guardian  ad 
1  LAW  JUDG.— 19  (289) 


§    197  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  11 

judgment  rendered  upon  default  against  an  infant,  after  due  and 
proper  service  of  a  summons  upon  him,  though  without  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  guardian  ad  litem,  is  erroneous  and  voidable,  but  not  void. 
And  it  is  incumbent  upon  the  infant,  within  a  reasonable  time  after 
he  attains  his  majority,  having  knowledge  of  the  judgment,  to  take 
steps  to  avoid  it,  or  he  will  be  bound  by  his  own  acquiescence.** 

i  107.    Deorees  la  Equity  affttinst  Infanta, 

In  the  courts  of  equity  the  rights  and  privileges  of  an  infant  are 
generally  governed  by  the  same  rules  as  at  law,  except  that  chancery 
possesses,  and  will  employ,  larger  and  more  diversified  means  of 
ascertaining  and  protecting  his  interests.  In  order  to  make  a  decree 
against  a  minor,  the  court  must  acquire  jurisdiction  of  his  person  in 
some  legal  and  regular  manner.  Thus  where  a  decree  was  rendered 
against  an  infant  whose  guardian  was  an  individual  party  to  the  bill, 
but  not  in  his  capacity  as  guardian,  it  was  considered  that  the  infant 
was  not  bound  by  the  decree.*^^  So  also,  a  guardian  ad  litem  should 
be  appointed,  just  as  at  law.  But  though  infant  defendants  may  not 
have  a  guardian  to  protect  their  interests,  yet  a  decree  made  against 
them  is  not  for  that  reason  void,  but  it  will  stand  as  valid  until 
reversed.**^  However,  if  the  decree,  under  such  circumstances,  is  in 
favor  of  the  infants,  it  is  valid  and  cannot  be  attacked  collaterally.** 
An  important  and  invariable  rule,  which  must  be  here  noticed,  is  that 
equity  will  require  an  investigation  of  the  merits  in  every  case  where 
infants  are  concerned ;  it  will  not  rest  satisfied  with  the  fact  that  no 
defense  is  set  up ;  neither  will  it  suffer  a  guardian  to  admit  away  the 

litem  must  be  appointed  for  him  and  a  reply  filed,  denying  every  matmal 
allegation  in  the  counterclaim,  and  the  circuit  court  should  see  that  this  i> 
done.    Morris  v.  Edmonds,  43  Ark.  427. 

86  Eisenmenger  v.  Murphy,  42  Minn.  84,  43  N.  W.  784,  18  Am.  St  Rep. 
493;  Beckley  v.  Ne^vcomb,  24  N.  H.  359;  Childs  v.  Lanterman.  103  CaL 
387,  37  l»ac.  382,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  121;  Jackson  v.  Brunor.  16  AUsc  Bep. 
294,  38  X.  Y.  Supp.  110;  In  re  Becker,  28  Hun  (N.  Y.)  207. 

B7  Salter  v.  Salter,  80  Ga.  178,  4  S.  E.  391,  12  Am.  St.  Rep.  249. 

58  Porter's  Heirs  v.  Robinson,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  2.'>3.  13  Am,  Deo. 
153;  Beeler's  Heirs  v.  Bullitt's  Heirs,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  280,  13  Am. 
iUec.   101. 

69  Hanna  y.  Spotts'  Heirs,  5  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  362,  43  Am.  Dec  132. 

(290) 


Ch.  11)      VALIDITY.  AS  AFFECTED  BY  STATUS  OF  PARTIES.        §  197 

rights  of  the  ward.  Kence  a  decree  cannot  pass  pro  confesso  against 
an  infant.*®  A  similar  rule  governs  the  case  of  consent  decrees. 
**Where  infants  are  concerned,  the  court  will  not  make  a  decree  by 
consent,  without  first  referring  it  to  the  master  to  ascertain  whether 
it  is  for  their  benefit.  But  when  once  a  decree  has  been  pronounced 
without  that  previous  step,  it  is  considered  as  of  the  same  authority 
as  if  it  had  been  referred  to  the  master,  and  he  had  made  a  report 
thereupon  that  it* would  be  for  their  benefit."*^  According  to  the 
practice  followed  in  many  jurisdictions,  a  decree  against  an  infant  is 
first  entered  nisi ;  and  a  day  is  given  him,  after  he  shall  attain  full 
age,  to  come  in  and  show  cause  against  making  the  decree  absolute. 
If  he  omits  to  do  so,  the  decree  becomes  final  and  he  is  conclusively 
bound  by  it.**  But  whether  the  omission  of  the  court  to  secure  this 
privilege  to  the  infant  will  invalidate  the  decree,  wholly  or  in  part,  is 
not  so  clear  upon  the  authorities.  The  cases  seem  to  agree  that  a 
decree  made  absolute  in  the  first  instance  would  not  be  void,  although 
it  might  be  voidable.**     And  there  are  decisions  to  the  effect  that 

••  Lane  v.  Hardwicke,  9  Beav.  148;  Bank  of  U.  S.  v.  Ritchie,  8  Pet.  128, 
«  L.  Ed.  890;  Walton  v.  Coulson,  1  McLean,  120,  Fed.  Gas.  No.  17,132; 
Tucker  v.  Bean,  65  Me.  352;  Dow  v.  Jewell,  21  N.  H.  470;  Mills  v.  Dennis. 
3  Jolins.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  367;  Wright  v.  Miller,  8  N.  Y.  9,  59  Am.  Dec.  438;  Thomp- 
son T.  McDermott.  19  Fla.  852;  Jones  v.  Jones,  56  Ala.  612;  Daily's  Adm'r 
r.  Reid,  74  Ala.  415;  Hooper  y.  Hardie,  80  Ala.  114;  Wells  v.  Smith,  44  Miss. 
2U6;  Mcllvoy  v.  Alsop,  45  Miss.  365;  Johnson  y.  McCabe,  42  Miss.  255; 
Greenwood  v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  12  La.  Ann.  426;  Massie*s  Heirs  v. 
Donaldson,  8  Ohio,  377;  ChatUn  y.  Kimbairs  Heirs,  23  III.  36;  Reddick  y. 
8Ute  Bank,  27  ill.  145;  Knos  y.  Gapps,  12  111.  255;  Hamilton  y.  Oilman, 
12  IIL  260;  Turner  y.  Jenkins,  79  HI.  228;  Quigley  y.  Roberts,  44  lU.  503; 
Kboads  y.  Rhoads,  43  111.  239;  Hanna  y.  iSpotts'  Heirs,  5  B.  Mon.  •(Ky.) 
362,  43  Am.  Dec.  132;  Cowan  y.  Anderson,  7  Cold.  (Tenn.)  284;  Heath's 
Adm'r  y.  Ashley's  Adm'r,  15  Mo.  393;  English  v.  Savage,  5  Or.  518;  Burt  v. 
McBain.  29  3kfich.  260;  Barker  y.  Hamilton,  3  Colo.  291. 

•1  Dow  y.  JeweU,  21  N.   H.  470,  487. 

•MVright  y.  MUler,  1  Sandf.  Cb.  (N.  Y.)  103,  59  Am.  Dec.  447;  Ralston 
y.  Lahee,  8  Iowa,  17,  74  Am.  Dec.  21>1;  Long  v.  Mulford,  17  Ohio  St.  484, 
«J  Am.  Dec.  638;  Cox  y.  Story,  80  Ky.  64;  Kucheubelser  v.  Beckert,  41 
Hi  172;  Seward  y.  Clark,  67  Ind.  289;  Simpson  y.  Alexander,  6  Cold.  (Tenn.) 
619;  Coffin  v.  Heath,  6  Mete.  (Mass.)  76;  Dow  y.  Jewell,  21  N.  H.  470; 
Lafferty  v.  l^fferty.  42  W.  Va.  783,  26  S.  E.  262. 

•»  Lookwood  y.  Stradley,  1  Del.  Ch.  296,  12  Am.  Dec.  97;  Anderson's 
Adm*r  T.  Irvine,  11  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  341;   Creath  y.  Smith,  20  Mo.  113:   Hanna 

(291) 


§    198  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  11 

such  a  decree  would  be  set  aside  on  the  application  of  the  infant, 
after  his  majority,  as  by  bill  of  review ;  on  the  ground  that  the  infant 
defendant  has  an  absolute  and  indefeasible  right  to  show  cause 
against  the  decree.**  But  the  weight  of  the  authorities  is  against 
this  contention.  The  general  disposition  is  to  regard  such  a  decree 
as  valid  and  conclusive.  "An  infant  defendant  is  as  much  bound 
by  a  decree  in  equity  against  her  as  a  person  of  full  age ;  and  there- 
fore if  there  be  an  absolute  decree  against  a  defendant  who  is  under 
age,  she  will  not  be  permitted  to  dispute  it,  unless  upon  such  grounds 
as  an  adult  might  have  disputed  it,  as  fraud,  collusion,  or  error.*'  ** 

I  198.    Infant   Plaintiffs. 

Regularly  an  infant  can  sue  only  by  his  guardian  or  by  next  friend. 
But  it  is  held  that  a  minor  who  has  commenced  and  prosecuted  an 
action  to  judgment  is  bound  by  the  result.*'  And  as  a  general  rule 
infant  plaintiffs  are  as  much  bound  by  a  decree  as  persons  of  full 
age.  But  they  are  not  so  bound  in  a  proceeding  by  an  ofHcial  plain- 
tiff, though  they  are  styled  relators,  without  the  intervention  of  a 
prochein  ami.*^ 

V.  Spotts'  Heirs,  5  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  362,  43  Am.  Dec.  132:  Joyce  v.  McAvoy. 
31  Cal.  273,  89  Am.  Dec.  172;   Field  v.  WUliamson,  4  Sandf.  Ch.  cN.  Y.)  613. 

«*Be€ler  v.  Bullitt,  4  Bibb  (Ky.)  11;  Wright  v.  Miller,  4  Barb.  (N.  V> 
.600;  Harris  v.  Youman,  1  Hoff.  Ch.  (X.  Y.)  178;  Townsend  v.  C03C  45  Mo. 
401;  Comn  V.  Heath,  6  Mete.  (Mass.)  76;  Loyd  v.  Malone,  23  IlL  43,  76  Am. 
Dec.   179. 

«B  Ralston  v.  Lahee,  8  Iowa,  17,  74  Am.  Dec.  291;  English  v.  Savasre. 
5  Or.  518;  In  re  Hogton,  L.  R.  18  Eq.  573;  In  re  Livingston,  34  N.  Y.  uTvl: 
.  Rivers  v.  Durr,  46  Ala.  418;  McLemore  v.  Chicago,  St  I*.  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.. 
58  Miss.  514;  Marshall  v.  Fisher,  46  N.  C.  Ill;  Smith  v.  McDonald,  42  Cal. 
484;  Wills  v.  Spraggins.  3  Grat.  (Va.)  567;  Harrison  v.  Wallton's  Ex'r. 
95  Va.  721,  30  S.  E.  372,  41  L.  R.  A.  703,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  830;  MarUn  v. 
Weyman,  26  Tex.  460;  Allman  v.  Taylor,  101  III.  185;  Lloyd  v.  Khrkwood. 
112  111.  32i);  Simmons  v.  Goodell,  63  N.  H.  458,  2  Atl.  897;  Ashton  T.  Ash- 
ton,    35   Md.   496. 

66  Gray  v.  Winder,  77  Cal.  525,  20  Pac.  47.  An  infant  who  sues  by  bis 
next  friend  is  as  much  bound  by  the  judgment  (the  court  having  jurisdictl<»  i« 
as  If  of  full  age.  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Morgan,  21  C.  CL  A. 
468,   76  Fed.   429. 

67  Beeton  v.  Becton,  56  N,  C.  419. 

(292) 


Ch.  11)  VALIDITY,  AS  AFFECTED  BY  STATUS  OF  PARTIES.  §   199 

S   100.    Judgments  •galmt  Deceased  Parties. 

At  the  common  law  an  action  was  abated  by  the  death  of  a  sole 
plaintiff  or  defendant.  And  in  some  of  the  states  the  doctrine  ap- 
pears to  be  irrevocably  settled  that  a  judgment  against  a  person  who 
was  dead  at  the  time  of  its  rendition  is  absolutely  null  and  void.'® 
It  is  said  in  a  recent  case  in  Illinois :  "A  careful  examination  of  the 
authorities  clearly  shows  that  a  judgment  by  the  common  law,  in  the 
absence  of  any  statutory  provisions  on  the  subject,  against  a  dead 
person,  either  natural  or  artificial,  is  absolutely  void,  and  the  fact 
that  service  may  have  been  obtained,  or  the  suit  commenced,  before 
the  death  of  the  party,  makes  no  difference  in  this  respect."  ••  So  in 
the  practice  of  the  appellate  courts ;  an  order  or  judgment  rescind- 
ing an  order  of  appeal  previously  obtained  by  a  party  to  a  suit  will 
be  annulled  and  set  aside,  as  void,  if  it  appears  that  the  rescinding 
order  was  rendered  after  the  death  of  the  party  who  had  obtained 
the  appeal.'^  Nor  is  the  judgment  saved  by  the  fact  that  the  defend- 
ant's sole  executor  was  also  a  defendant  in  the  same  action,  if  he 
was  joined  in  his  individual  capacity.'^  In  Pennsylvania  the  courts 
have  not  committed  themselves  to  this  extreme  view.  Still  they  hold 
that  a  judgment  against  a  defendant  who  was  dead  at  the  time  of  its 
entry, — this  fact  appearing  of  record, — will  be  stricken  off.'*  And  so 
a  judgment  entered  on  a  warrant  of  attorney  after  the  death  of  the 

•«New  Orleans  &  C.  K.  Co.  v.  Bosworth,  8  La.  Ann.  80;  Norton  v. 
Jamison,  23  La.  Ann.  102;  Edwards  v.  Whited,  29  La.  Ann.  (W7;  Lee  v. 
iJarrtlner,  2«  Miss.  521;  Parker  v.  Home,  38  Miss.  215;  Tarleton  v.  Cox, 
45  Miss.  430;  Colson's  Ex'rs  v.  Wade's  Ex'rs,  5  N.  C.  43;  Burke  v.  Stokely, 
«w  X.  C.  509;  Carter  v.  Carriger's  Adm'rs,  3  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  411,  24  Am.  Dec. 
rkK".:  Morrison  v.  Deaderick,  10  Humph.  (Tenn.)  342;  Collins  v.  Knight,  3 
Tcnn.  Ch.  187;  McCreery  v.  Everdlng,  44  Cal.  284;  Lynch's  Ex'x  v.  Tunnell, 
4  Har.  (Del.)  284;  Meyer  v.  Hearst,  75  Ala.  390;  Guyer's  Adm'r  v.  Guyer, 
«  Houst.  (Del.)  430;  Greenstreet  v.  Thornton,  60  Ark.  369,  30  S.  W.  347, 
'JT  L,  R.  A.  735;  Wels  v.  Aaron,  75  Miss.  138,  21  South.  763,  65  Am.  St. 
Uoi).  594;  Watson  v.  Adams,  103  Ga.  733,  30  S.  E.  577;  Kager  v.  Vlckery. 
01  Kan.  342,  59  Pac.  628,  49  L.  K.  A.  153,  78  Am.  St.  Rep.  318. 

••'  Life  Association  v.  Fassett,  102  111.  315,  325. 

"<>  .Succession  of  Hoggatt,  36  La.  Ann.  337.  See  Green  v.  Taney,  16  Colo. 
31W,  27   Pac.   249. 

'*  Bragg  V.  Thompson.  19  S.  C.  572. 

'>  Tobias  y.  Dorsey,  2  Wkly.  Motes  Cas.  16b 

(203) 


§   200  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  11 

defendant  should  be  stricken  off.^'  The  consequences  of  holding  the 
doctrine  of  the  absolute  nullity  of  the  judgment,  in  these  circum- 
stances, are  most  important.  For  in  the  first  place,  no  one  would  be 
imperilled  by  entirely  disregarding  it.  It  would  be  unnecessary  for 
the  representatives  of  the  decedent,  or  his  creditors,  or  any  other 
persons  interested,  to  take  any  measures  to  have  the  judgment  va- 
cated or  reversed.  Whenever  it  came  in  question,  directly  or  col- 
laterally, for  whatever  purpose  presented,  it  might  be  attacked  and 
overturned  by  proof  of  the  defendant's  death  before  its  rendition. 
Neither  could  it  operate  as  a  source  or  support  of  any  title  or  right, 
nor  as  the  means  of  divesting  any  interest.  Neither  would  it  be 
binding  as  an  adjudication  of  rights.  No  person  could  be  estopped 
or  concluded  by  its  findings.  And  this  is  logically  the  state  of  the 
law  in  those  jurisdictions  where  this  view  is  adopted.  But,  as  will 
appear  from  the  following  section,  it  is  by  no  means  universal. 

S  200.    Judgment  asainit  Deeedent  Voidable  only. 

The  great  preponderance  of  authority  is  to  the  effect  that,  where 
the  court  has  acquired  jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter  and  the 
persons,  during  the  lifetime  of  a  party,  a  judgment  rendered  against 
him  after  his  death  is,  although  erroneous  and  liable  to  be  set  aside, 
not  void  nor  open  to  collateral  attack.'*     A  late  important  case  de- 

TBLanning  v.   Pawson,  38  Pa.  480. 

74  City  of  New  Orleans  v.  Whitney,  138  U.  S.  595,  11  Sup.  CL  428,  34 
L,  Ed.  1102;  Loring  v.  Folger,  7  Gray  (Mass.)  505;  Reld  v.  Holmes.  127 
Mass.  326;  West  v.  Jordan,  62  Me.  4Hi;  Holt  v.  Thacher,  52  Vt.  592;  Yaple 
V.  Titus,  41  Pa.  195,  80  Am.  Dec.  604;  Carr  v.  Townsend's  Ex'rs,  63  Pa. 
202;  Livingston  v.  Kendall,  59  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  493;  Hooe  v.  Barber,  4  Hen. 
&  M.  (Va.)  439;  Xeale  v.  Utz,  75  Va.  480;  Collins  v.  Mitchell,  5  Flii.  3«: 
PoweU  V.  Washington,  15  Ala.  803;  Wood  v.  Watson,  107  N.  C.  52,  12  S. 
E.  49,  10  L.  K.  A.  541;  Wilson  v.  Smith,  17  Tex.  Civ.  App.  188.  43  S.  W. 
1086;  Ledbetter  v.  Hlgbee,  13  Tex.  Civ.  App.  267,  35  S.  W.  801;  Milam 
Co.  V.  Kobertson,  47  Tex.  222;  McClelland  v.  Moore,  48  Tex.  355;  Giddings 
V.  Steele,  28  Tex.  732,  91  Am.  Dec.  336;  Fleming  v.  Seeligson,  57  Tex.  524: 
Spalding  v.  Wathen,  7  Bush  (Ky.)  659;  Case  v.  Rlbelln,  1  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.) 
30;  Swasey  v.  Antram,  24  Ohio  St.  87;  Stoetzell  v.  Fullerton,  44  111.  W: 
Clallin  V.  Dunne,  129  111,  241,  21  N.  E.  834,  16  Am.  St.  Rep.  263;  Davies 
V.  Coryell,  37  111.  App.  505;  Coleman  v.  McAnulty,  16  Mo.  173,  57  Am.  Dec. 
229;  Webber  v.  Stanton,  1  Mich.  N.  P.  97;  Jennings  v.  Simpson.  12  NeK 
558,  11  N.  W.  880;   Hayes  v.  Shaw,  20  Minn.  405  (Gil.  355);    Bcrkey  v.  JudJ. 

(294) 


Ch.  11)  VALIDITY.  AS  AFFECTED  BY  STATUS  OF  PARTIES.  §   200 

clares  that  "the  decided  weight  of  authority  seems  to  be  to  the  effect 
that  if  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction,  or  a  court  which  has  acquired 
full  jurisdiction  over  the  cause  and  over  the  parties,  renders  a  judg- 
ment for  or  against  a  party  after  the  death  of  such  party,  the  judgment 
is  not  for  that  reason  void.  It  may  be  erroneous,  but  until  reversed 
by  some  appropriate  proceeding,  it  is  valid."  ^*  So  in  Minnesota: 
"While  the  court  ought  to  cease  to  exercise  its  jurisdiction  over  a 
party  at  his  death,  the  neglect  to  do  so  is  an  error  to  be  corrected 
by  some  proceeding  in  the  action  in  which  the  error  occurs,  and  the 
judgment  rendered  after  the  party's  death,  though  erroneous,  is  not 
on  that  account  to  be  attacked  in  a  collateral  action.  In  other  words 
the  judgment  is  voidable  when  properly  assailed,  but  not  void."  ^* 
For  illustration,  where  the  accounts  of  an  administrator  are  settled 
and  filed  in  the  proper  court  in  his  lifetime,  showing  a  balance  due  the 
estate,  the  court  thereby  acquires  personal  jurisdiction,  and  a  judg- 
ment rendered  after  his  death,  confirming  the  report  and  directing 
payment  of  the  sum  in  his  hands,  is  not  void  when  attacked  collaterally 
in  a  suit  against  the  surety  on  his  bond,  though  the  judgment  might 
have  been  reversed  on  appeal.'^  So  a  judgment  rendered  when  both 
the  plaintiff  and  defendant  are  dead  is  erroneous ;  but  relief  can  only 
be  had  by  petition  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of  review,  or  for  a  new  trial, 
or  by  motion  to  set  aside  the  judgment.'®  A  judgment  may  be  en- 
tered up,  after  the  defendant's  death,  on  an  agreement  for  judgment 
made  by  him  in  his  lifetime,  but  execution  cannot  issue  without  a 
sdre  facias  to  his  executors.*^*  On  similar  principles,  a  judgment 
rendered  against  a  corporation  after  its  dissolution  by  an  act  of  the 
legislature  is  erroneous  but  not  void.®®  The  English  statute  provides 
that  judgment  may  be  entered  up  on  a  verdict  within  two  terms  after 
the  death  of  the  party  against  whom  the  verdict  was  given.     But  it 

n  UUUL  475,  8  N.  VV.  383;  Elliott  v.  Bastlan,  11  Utah,  452,  40  Pac.  713; 
Mosley  v.  Southern  Manurg  Co.,  4  Okl.  492,  46  Pac.  508. 

"  MitcheU  V.  Schoonover,  16  Or.  211,  17  Pac.  867,  8  Am.  St.  Rep.  282. 

••  Stocking  T.  UansoD,  22  Minn.  542;    Hayes  y.  Shaw,  20  Minn.  405  (GU. 

77  Beard  y.  Roth  (C.  C.)  35  Fed.  397. 

TsjJcCIeUand  v.  Moore,  48  Tex.  355. 

'•Webb  V.  Wiitbank,  1  Clark  (Pa.)  324. 

••  MerriU  y.  Suffolk  Bank,  31  Me.  57,  1  Am.  Rep.  649. 

(295) 


§   200  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  11 

IS  held  that  a  judgment  is  valid,  although  not  entered  within  that 
time,  if  the  verdict  was  returned  during  the  life  of  the  party,  and  the 
delay  was  occasioned  by  a  motion  touching  an  award.*^ 

The  object  of  setting  aside  a  judgment  rendered  against  a  party 
who  died  before  the  verdict,  is  to  give  his  representatives  an  oppor- 
tunity to  resist  a  recovery.  For  otherwise  the  plaintiff  might  profit 
by  the  accidental  circumstance,  and  the  consequent  cessation  of  oppo- 
sition, to  secure  a  judgment  to  which  he  was  not  entitled."  The 
method  of  avoiding  the  effect  of  the  judgment  will  depend  somewhat 
upon  the  state  of  the  record,  and  will  also  vary  in  the  different  juris- 
dictions. The  rule  established  by  the  supreme  court  of  Nebraska, 
however,  commends  itself  as  both  reasonable  and  practical.  There 
a  judgment  rendered  against  a  person  (and  equally  so  of  one  ren- 
dered in  his  favor)  after  his  death,  is  reversible  if  the  fact  and  time 
of  death  appear  on  the  record,  or  in  error  coram  nobis ;  if  the  fact 
must  be  shown  aliunde,  it  is  voidable  and  not  void  and  cannot  be 
impeached  collaterally.®*  The  writ  of  error  coram  nobis  has  fallen 
into  desuetude  in  most  of  the  states.  But  probably  a  motion  in  the 
court  where  the  record  remains,  with  due  notice,  and  supported  by 
affidavits,  would  be  everywhere  recognized  as  a  proper  proceeding  to 
procure  the  vacating  of  a  judgment  objectionable  on  this  ground  but 
not  disclosing  the  fact  of  death. 

It  is  also  to  be  observed  that  the  validity  of  judgments,  in  these 
circumstances,  will  sometimes  be  helped  by  the  fiction  of  relation. 
In  an  English  case,  where  a  judgment  was  signed  at  the  opening  of 
the  office  at  its  usual  hour,  ii  A.  M.,  and  the  defendant  died  at  9:30 
on  the  same  morning,  the  judgment  was  held  regular,  on  the  prin- 
ciple that  judicial  proceedings  are  to  be  considered  as  taking  place 
at  the  earliest  period  of  the  day  on  which  they  are  done.**  And  in  an 
early  Massachusetts  decision  it  was  said:  "By  the  common  law,  all 
proceedings  in  a  suit  at  law  are  stopped  by  the  death  of  one  of  the 
parties.     If  either  of  them  die  before  judgment,  no  judgment  can  be 

81  Bridges  v.  Smyth,  8  Bing.   29. 

82  Lynn  v.  l^we,  88  N.  C.  478. 

88  Jennings  v.  Simpson,  11!  Neb.  558,  U  N.  W.  580;    McCormick  t.  Tad- 
docli,  20  Neb.  486,  30  N.  W.  002. 
84  Wrlglit  V.  Mills,  4  11ml.  &  N.  488. 

(290) 


Ch.  11)  VALIDITY,  AS  AFFECTED  BY  STATUS  OF  PARTIES.  §   20 1 

entered ;  if  after  judgment,  no  execution  can  issue.  But  to  avoid 
the  inconvenience  of  this  principle,  the  doctrine  of  relation  has  been 
resorted  to ;  so  that  if  judgment  be  not  actually  entered  in  court,  or 
signed  in  vacation,  as  is  the  practice  in  England,  and  either  party 
die,  the  judgment  shall  be  considered  as  entered  on  the  first  day  of 
the  term,  and  an  execution  may  issue  bearing  teste  of  that  day,  so  as 
to  save  the  fruits  of  a  judgment  to  the  party  entitled  to  it.  But  this 
practice  proves  the  general  principle  as  first  stated,  and  that  it  was 
necessary  to  resort  to  fiction  in  order  to  avoid  the  effect  of  that  prin- 
ciple." ••  It  must  be  added  that  if  the  personal  representatives  of  a 
deceased  defendant  were  duly  made  parties  to  the  proceeding  previ- 
ous to  the  judgment,  it  is  not  enough  to  vitiate  the  judgment  that  it 
is  entered  against  the  dead  man  by  name,  instead  of  against  the  rep- 
resentatives, for  the  error  is  merely  clerical.*'  , 

§  201.    Deatli  of  One  of  Several  Defendant!. 

By  an  extension  of  the  principles  stated  in  the  preceding  section, 
it  is  held  that  where,  in  a  joint  action,  one  defendant  dies  before  judg- 
ment, and  his  death  is  not  suggested  on  the  record,  and  judgment  is 
rendered  against  all  the  defendants,  the  judgment  is  voidable  only, 
not  void,  and  is  not  open  to  collateral  attack,  although  it  may  be 
vacated  on  motion.'^  However,  in  some  of  the  states,  where  the 
strict  rule  prevails  in  the  case  of  a  sole  defendant,  it  is  also  held  that 
a  judgment  against  several,  one  of  whom  was  dead  at  its  rendition,  is 
void  and  a  nullity.'*  Whether  the  judgment  is  void  or  merely  void- 
able in  respect  to  the  deceased  defendant,  an  important  and  difficult 
question  arises  as  to  its  effect  upon  the  surviving  defendants.  If  void 
as  to  one,  is  it  void  as  to  all?     If  voidable  as  to  one,  must  it  be 

«BHUdreth   v.   Thompson.   16  Mass.   lUl. 

*<  Stackliouse  v.  Zuntz,  41  La.  Ann.  415,  6  South.  G66. 

"King  V.  Burdett,  28  W.  Va.  tJOl,  57  Am.  Rep.  687;  Boor  v.  Tx)wrey, 
KG  ind.  4t>8,  8  N.  K.  151,  53  Am.  Rep.  51U;  Burke  v.  Stokely,  G5  N.  C. 
5C»;  Uolman  v.  G.  A.  iStowers  Furniture  Co.  (Tex.  Qv.  App.)  30  S.  W.  1120. 
A  judgment  which  passes  by  operation  of  law  upon  the  return  of  a  forfeited 
forthcoming  bond  is  not  vitiated  by  the  fact  that  one  of  the  obligors  Is  dead 
and  incapable  of  suffering  a  Judgment,  but  is  valid  as  to  the  surviving  obligors. 
Moody  V.  JUarper.  38  Miss.  51K). 

••McCioskey  v.  Winglield,  29  La.  Ann.  141. 

(207) 


§   202  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNTS.  (Ch.  11 

vacated  as  to  all  ?  Some  of  the  cases  hold  that  although  a  judgment 
or  decree  taken  against  a  person  by  name,  then  dead,  jointly  with 
others,  may  be  void  as  to  the  decedent,  it  would  prima  facie  be  good 
as  to  the  other  defendants.**  But  there  are  also  decisions  to  the 
eflfect  that  such  a  judgment  cannot  be  permitted  to  stand  even  against 
the  survivors.*®  The  solution  of  this  question  must  ultimately  de- 
pend upon  whether  a  joint  judgment  is  to  be  considered  an  entirety 
or  not, — a  point  which  will  be  discussed  in  a  subsequent  section.** 
For  obviously,  if  the  judgment  is  an  entire  thing  and  not  susceptible 
of  division,  the  fact  that  one  of  the  defendants  is  dead  is  error  which 
must  cause  it  to  be  entirely  set  aside. 

I  202.    Entry  of  JudBmemt  agnlmt  Deoedemt  Niuic  pro  Tvae. 

There  is  one  case  in  which  a  judgment  against  a  dead  man  is  of 
unquestionable  validity,  namely,  where  it  is  entered  nunc  pro  tunc 
as  of  a  time  when  he  was  alive.  The  power  to  make  such  entries 
is  within  the  common  law  authority  of  the  courts,  and  it  may  be 
exercised  in  cases  where  the  defendant  dies  in  the  interval  between 
the  finding  of  a  verdict  and  the  entry  of  judgment  upon  it,  provided 
that  the  delay  was  not  caused  by  the  laches  of  the  other  party,  but 
was  attributable  to  the  act  of  the  court,  in  advising  or  deliberating 
upon  the  case  after  its  submission,  or  to  its  being  tied  up  by  a  mo- 
tion for  a  new  trial  or  similar  proceeding.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, in  furtherance  of  justice,  and  to  prevent  the  successful  party 
from  being  deprived  of  the  fruits  of  the  judgment  to  which  he  is  en- 
titled, the  court  will  order  it  to  be  entered  as  of  the  time  when  the 
verdict  was  returned  or  the  cause  submitted.**  So  where  a  garnishee 
has  answered,  and  the  cause  is  continued,  and  he  dies  before  the  en- 
try of  judgment,  judgment  may  be  rendered  against  him  as  of  the 

8  0  Collins  V.  Knight,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  183.    And  see  Aldrlch  ▼.  Honsh,  71  IB. 
App.   GOT. 

»o  Lewis  v.  Ash,  2  Miles   (Pa.)   110.    Compare  Uartman   v.   Hesserich,  8 
Wkly.  Notes  Cas.  483. 

»i  Infra,  §  211. 

82  Wllklns  V.  Waiuwright,  173  Mass.  212,  53  N.  E.  397.    Where  the  death 
of  either  partj-  Is  suggested  after  verdict,  Judgment  may  be  entered  as  of 
the  term  when  the  verdict  was  rendered.    Lewis  v.  Soper.  44  Me.  72. 
(208) 


Ch.  11)  VALIDITY,  AS  AFFECTED  BY  STATUS  OF  PARTIES.  §  204 

term  when  he  made  his  disclosure.*'    This  subject  has  already  been 
considered  in  detail.** 


S  203.    Jvrifldietion  miist  be  acquired  before  Party's  Deatb. 

If  the  court  has  jurisdiction  of  the  parties  and  the  subject-mat- 
ter, and  the  defendant,  after  having  appeared  and  pleaded,  dies,  the 
judgment  subsequently  entered  against  him  will  at  most  be  voidable, 
and  may  in  some  cases  be  made  entirely  valid  by  retroactive  entry. 
But  it  is  essential  that  jurisdiction  should  have  attached  during  the 
defendant's  life ;  and  if  the  action  is  commenced  against  one  already 
dead,  the  judgment  will  be  absolutely  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction.*'^ 

§  204.    Judcmeiit  for  Deeeased  Plaintiff. 

In  regard  to  the  validity  of  a  judgment  rendered  in  favor  of  a  plain- 
tiff, after  his  death,  the  books  contain  contradictory  expressions. 
Some  cases  hold  that  such  a  judgment  is  not  void,  but  voidable  at 
most,  cannot  be  collaterally  impeached,  and  is  valid  until  reversed  or 
vacated.*'  Other  decisions  regard  it  as  a  mere  nullity,  invalid  for 
ever}'  purpose,  and  liable  to  be  overturned  whenever  and  wherever 
brought  in  question.*'  In  order  to  arrive  at  just  conclusions  on  this 
point,  it  is  necessary  to  take  into  account  the  time  or  stage  of  the 
cause  at  which  the  decease  of  the  plaintiff  occurs.     And  first,  if  an 

•»  Han  V.  Harvey,  3  N.  H.  61. 

»*  Supra,  Si  126-130. 

•>Reid  v.  Holmes,  127  Mass.  326;  M.  T.  Jones  Lumber  Co.  v.  Rhoades,  17 
Tei.  CiT.  App.  (MJo,  41  8.  W.  102;  Loring  v.  Folger,  7  Gray  (Mass.)  505; 
tJrtewold  v.  Stewart,  4  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  457;  Crosley  v.  Hutton,  98  Mo.  196,  11 
J5.  W.  613;   daflin  v.  Dunne,  129  111.  241,  21  N.  E.  834,  16  Am.  St  Rep.  263. 

»« Hayes  v.  Shaw,  20  Minn.  405  (Gil.  355);  Walter  v.  Erdman,  4  Pa.  Super, 
rt.  5M«;  Best  v.  Nix,  6  Tex.  Civ.  App.  349,  25  S.  W.  130;  Kennedy  v.  Pick- 
ering, Minor  (Ala.)  137;   Webber  v.  Stanton,  1  Mich.  X.  P.  97. 

•'Young  V.  Pickens,  45  Miss.  553;  Tarleton  v.  Cox,  45  Miss.  430.  Where 
a  sole  plaintiff  dies  during  the  pendency  of  the  suit,  a  Judgment  rendered  in 
iJl«  name  is  a  nullity,  and  the  court  in  which  it  was  rendered  may  set  It 
aside  at  a  subsequent  term  and  re-instate  the  cause  on  the  docket.  Moore 
T.  Ea.<(ley,  18  Ala.  619.  An  order  of  revivor  upon  the  plaintiff's  death  must 
lw»  served  upon  the  defendant  like  an  original  summons,  or  the  subsequent 
Judgment  wUl  be  void.    Amyx  v.  Smith's  Adm'x,  1  Mete.  (Ky.)  529. 

(299) 


§    204  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  11 

action  is  commenced  in  the  name  of  a  person  already  dead  (as  where 
the  decedent  is  the  nominal  plaintiff,  and  the  one  for  whose  benefit 
the  suit  is  prosecuted  is  the  real  party  in  interest),  or  if  one  of  sev- 
eral joint  claimants  is  dead  before  action  brought,  it  is  held  that  the 
defendant  must  take  advantage  of  the  fact  by  plea  in  abatement,  at 
the  peril  of  being  estopped  by  his  silence,  and  the  judgment  for  plain- 
tiff will  not  be  disturbed.®*  But  it  may  also  happen  that  the  plain- 
tiff dies  during  the  pendency  of  the  suit  and  before  verdict.  In  this 
case,  supposing  the  cause  of  action  to  be  one  which  survives,  the  reg- 
ular practice  is  to  revive  the  action  in  favor  of  his  personal  repre- 
sentatives. But  if  this  is  omitted,  and  the  suit  proceeds  to  judgment 
in  the  name  of  the  decedent,  it  is  more  reasonable  to  hold  it  voidable 
only  than  to  consider  it  entirely  null.  For  the  case  cannot  be  dis- 
tinguished in  principle  from  that  of  a  defendant  dying  while  the  ac- 
tion is  pending,  where,  as  already  shown  (section  200),  the  great  pre- 
ponderance of  authority  sustains  the  rule  that  the  judgment  is  at 
least  impervious  to  collateral  attack  and  must  be  vacated  or  re- 
versed by  proper  proceedings.  Both  cases  are  equally  governed  by 
the  principle  that  when  once  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  has  attach- 
ed, no  subsequent  error  or  irregularity  in  the  exercise  of  that  juris- 
diction can  make  its  judgment  void.  Yet  it  would  be  too  much  to 
predicate  entire  validity  of  the  judgment  in  the  case  supposed.  Un- 
doubtedly it  would  be  irregular,  and  the  court  would  vacate  it  on  a 
proper  application.**  If  the  plaintiff  dies  after  a  verdict,  or  after 
trial  and  submission  to  the  court,  it  is  proper  to  enter  judgment  nunc 
pro  tunc  as  of  the  date  of  the  verdict  or  submission.  But  if  the 
judgment  is  entered  as  of  the  actual  date  when  rendered,  it  is  not 
void,  and  suit  may  be  brought  upon  it  by  the  personal  representative 

»8  Baragwanath  v.  Wilson,  4  111.  App.  80;  Powell  v.  Washington.  15  Ala. 
803.  In  West  Virginia,  it  is  held  that  a  Judgment  so  rendered  wHI  be  e^ 
roneous,  but  not  void.  Watt  v.  Brookover,  .35  W.  Va.  323.  13  S.  B.  1007, 
29  Am.  St.  Rep.  811;   McMillan  v.  Hickman,  35  W.  Va.  705,  14  S.  E.  227. 

99  Wentz  V.  Bealor,  14  Fa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  337.  In  Broas  v.  Merserean,  IB 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  653,  it  was  held  that  a  verdict  may  be  taken  after  the  death 
of  a  sole  plaintiff,  where  the  death  happens  on  the  first  day  of  the  circait 
This  on  the  theory  that  "the  whole  time  of  the  circuit  relates  to  the  first 
day,  so  that  if  the  party  die  on  any  day  during  the  circuit,  though  before 
the  trial,  this  is  regarded  as  a  death  after  verdict." 

(300> 


Ch.  11)  VALIDITY.  AS  AFFECTED  BY  STATUS  OF  PARTIES.  §  204 

of  the  deceased  plaintiff.**®  "As  to  rendering  judgment  on  a  verdict 
found  before  the  death  of  the  plaintiff,"  says  the  court  in  Missouri, 
"our  statute  expressly  authorizes  it,  notwithstanding  his  subsequent 
death,  and  the  statute  is  merely  a  codification  of  the  common  law, 
which  never  allows  a  delay  occasioned  by  the  court  to  change  the 
condition  of  a  suit."  *®*  Still,  the  better  practice  clearly  is  to  enter 
the  judgment  as  of  the  term  in  which  the  verdict  was  returned.^^* 
It  is  also  to  be  remarked  that  a  judgment  may  be  amended  so  as  to 
show  that,  instead  of  being  rendered  in  favor  of  the  deceased  plain- 
tiff, it  was  really  rendered  in  favor  of  his  personal  representatives, 
and  this  may  be  done  without  notice  to  the  defendant,  or  after  his 
death.***  Finally,  if  the  court  renders  judgment  during  the  lifetime 
of  the  plaintiff,  the  clerk  may  perform  the  ministerial  act  of  entering 
and  recording  it  after  his  death.^** 

i«o  Webber  v.  Stanton,  1  Mich.  X.  P.  97;  Wood  v.  Bojle.  177  Pa.  620, 
35  AU.  «53,  55  Am.  St.  Rep.  747.  See  Gllman  v.  Donovan,  53  Iowa,  362, 
5  N.  W.  560.  After  a  verdict  was  found  for  the  plaintiff  in  an  action,  cer- 
tBln  questions  of  law  were  reserved,  but  upon  a  hearing  Judgment  was  ren- 
dered on  the  verdict.  In  the  meantime  the  plaintiff  had  died,  but  this  fact 
being  unknown  to  his  counsel,  the  execution  was  issued  In  his  favor.  The 
court,  upon  the  execution  being  returned  unexecuted  and  cancelled,  vacated 
the  judgment  and  permitted  the  administrator  to  come  In  and  prosecute  the 
action.  It  appearing  that  the  rights  of  third  persons  would  not  be  affected 
thereby.    Stickney   v.   Davis,   17   Pick.   (Mass.)    169. 

^•lUomerv.  Nicholson,  56  Mo.  226,  clUng  Wag.  St.  p.  1050,  §  7.  But 
this  view  does  not  go  uncontradicted.  In  the  case  of  West  v.  Jordan,  62 
Me.  4M,  it  appeared  that  plaintiff  and  her  husband  brought  case  for  per- 
sonal injuries  to  her,  there  was  a  verdict  for  plaintiff,  the  defendant  moved 
to  set  aside  the  verdict,  then  the  plaintiff  died.  The  motion  was  overruled, 
and  the  clerk  entered  up  Judgment  as  of  the  then  current  term.  Afterwards 
tile  husband  took  out  administration  on  the  plaintiff's  estate,  and  moved 
the  court  to  bring  forward  the  action  ''that  the  proper  Judgment  may  be 
made  up."  The  court  then  made  an  entry  reciting  the  death  of  the  plaintiff, 
withdrawal  and  discontinuance  as  to  the  husband,  his  appearance  as  admiu- 
latrator.  and  judgment  on  the  verdict.  The  defendant  objected  that  there  was 
already  one  Judgment  standing  against  him,  and  he  might  be  doubly  liable. 
But  it  was  held  that  the  first  Judgment  was  absolutely  invalid,  and  at  any 
rate  the  old  record  was  effectually  vacated  by  the  allowance  of  the  motion 
to  bring  forward. 

»«2<Joddard  v.  Bolster,  6  Me.  427,  20  Am.  Dec.  320. 

»«'J(;unn  r.  Uowell,  35  Ala.  144,  73  Am.  Dec.  484;  Dawson  v.  Hardy,  33 
Tex.  im. 

i«4  Franklin  t.  Merida,  00  Cal.  28i>. 

(301) 


§   205  *  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  11 


I  206.    Judgmeiits  asainit  Iiisaae  Pert 

An  insane  person  may  be  sued  and  jurisdiction  over  him  acquired 
by  the  like  process  as  if  he  were  of  sound  mind.  But  when  it  is 
made  to  appear  to  the  court  that  a  party  to  the  suit  is  insane,  it  is 
the  duty  of  the  court  to  appoint  a  guardian  ad  litem  for  him,  or  to 
have  his  committee  or  conservator  made  a  party.  "And  no  doubt 
it  is  the  duty  of  a  plaintiff  who  sues  an  insane  person,  if  he  has  knowl- 
edge of  the  insanity,  to  inform  the  court  thereof.  But  the  failure  to 
perform  any  of  these  duties  does  not  affect  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
court,  but  only  the  regularity  of  the  proceedings.  Therefore  it  is, 
that  the  judgment  of  a  court  having  jurisdiction  of  the  subject-mat- 
ter of  the  suit,  and  of  the  person  of  such  a  party,  notwithstanding 
such  irregularity,  is  not  absolutely  void."  ^•^  On  this  principle,  it  is 
held  by  all  the  courts  that  a  judgment  against  a  person  who  was  non 
compos  mentis  at  the  time  of  its  rendition,  though  without  joining 
his  legal  guardian,  is  binding  and  conclusive  upon  him,  is  not  to  be 
impeached  in  any  collateral  action,  and  stands  as  a  valid  adjudica- 
tion until  annulled  or  reversed  in  some  direct  proceeding  for  that 
purpose.^®*  "The  only  question  presented  in  this  case  is,  whether  a 
judgment  by  default  against  a  lunatic,  upon  service  of  process  on  him 
alone,  be  void  because  his  committee  was  not  a  party ;  and  it  is  our 
opinion    that,   though   evidently    erroneous,    the   judgment   is   not 

lOBjoiinson  v.  I'omeroy,  31   Ohio  St.  247. 

loe  Beverley's  Case,  4  Coke,  123;  Mansfield's  Case,  12  Coke,  124;  King  v. 
Kobinson,  33  Me.  114,  54  Am.  Dec.  614;  Lamprey  v.  Xudd,  29  X.  H.  29H: 
Steriibergii  v.  Schoolcraft,  2  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  153;  Wood  v.  Bayard,  63  Pa.  32H; 
Stigers  v.  Brent,  50  Md.  214,  33  Am.  Rep.  317;  Brittain  v.  Mull,  99  X.  C. 
483,  6  S.  E.  382;  Foster  v.  Jones,  23  Ga.  1($8;  XeweU  v.  Smith,  23  Ga.  1T<»: 
Walker  v.  Clay,  21  Ala.  807;  Ewlng  v.  Wilson,  63  Tex.  88;  Johnson  v.  Pom- 
eroy,  31  Ohio  St.  247;  Dickerson  v.  Davis.  Ill  lud.  433,  12  X.  E.  145:  Ma- 
loney  v.  Dewey,  127  111.  395,  19  N.  K.  848,  11  Am.  St.  Rep.  131;  Heanl  r. 
Sack,  81  Mo.  610;  Sacramento  Sav.  Bank  v.  Spencer,  53  Cal.  737;  Wiihrww 
V.  Smithson,  37  W.  Va.  757,  17  S.  E.  316,  1»  L.  R.  A.  762:  Spurlock  v.  Noe 
(Ky.)  43  S.  W.  231,  39  U  R.  A.  775;  Xoel  v.  Modem  Woodmen  of  America. 
61  111.  App.  597;  Pollock  v.  Horn,  13  Wash.  626,  43  Pac.  885,  52  Am.  St. 
Rep.  66;  White  v.  Hinton,  3  Wyo.  753.  tW  Pac.  953,  17  L.  R.  A.  66.  But 
compare  Ex  parte  Kibler,  53  S.  C.  461,  31  S.  E.  274;  In  re  Wing,  83  Hun. 
284,  31  X.  1.  Supp.  \ni;  Heff  V.  Cox,  5  Ohio  X.  P.  413. 
(302) 


Ch.  11)  VALIDITY,  AS  AFFBCTED  BY  STATUS  OP  PARTIES.  §  205 

void."*®^  So  in  New  Hampshire:  "The  fact  that  a  person  against 
whom  a  suit  is  commenced  is,  at  the  service  of  the  process  upon  him, 
a  person  of  insane  mind,  and  that  he  so  continued  until  judgment 
rendered,  and  that  he  appeared  in  person  or  by  attorney,  or  not  at 
all,  is  good  cause  to  reverse  the  judgment  upon  a  writ  of  error; 
though  for  reasons  which  we  think  inapplicable  and  without  force 
here,  and  perhaps  little  creditable  to  the  jurisprudence  of  an  enlight- 
ened country,  it  seems  not  to  have  been  so  held  in  England.  But  in 
such  case  the  defect  in  the  proceedings  renders  them  only  voidable 
and  not  void."  *®®  That  a  person  of  unsound  mind  should  be  irrev- 
ocably bound  by  proceedings  of  which  he  could  have  no  intelligent 
consciousness  seems  a  legal  anomaly.  It  is  true  a  court  may  acquire 
jurisdiction  of  his  person,  but  only  in  the  sense  that  it  obtains  juris- 
diction of  a  chattel,  for  example,  by  its  attachment.  And  the  unfor- 
tunate defendant  lacks  those  means  of  defending  himself  and  of  chal- 
lenging the  claims  asserted  against  him  which  justice  dictates  as  the 
inviolable  right  of  every  person.  We  should  therefore  expect  that 
a  judgment  against  him  would  be  regarded  at  least  as  voidable  by 
the  court  which  pronounced  it.  And  this  is  undoubtedly  the  better 
doctrine,  and  the  one  prevaiHng  in  most  of  the  states,^^*  although 
there  are  some  cases  which  hold  that  such  a  judgment  is  not  even 
voidable,  and  that  no  relief  can  be  had  against  it  except  by  an  appli- 
cation to  chancery  for  an  injunction  against  its  enforcement.*^*  And 
it  will  be  remembered  that  a  court  of  equity  would  in  such  a  case 
inquire  into  the  merits  of  the  judgment,  and  would  not  enjoin  it  on 
account  of  the  defendant's  lunacy,  but  only  because  its  execution 
should  appear  to  be  against,  conscience  and  inequitable.  If  the  fact 
of  lunacy  appeared  anywhere  in  the  record,  we  are  much  inclined  to 

• 

i«TAlU8on  v.  Taylor,  6  Dana  (Ky.)  87,  32  Am.  Dec.  68.  An  Insane  de- 
fendant Blionld  not  be  defaulted  for  want  of  appearance  and  answer.  Taylor 
V.  LoTering,  171  Mass.  30»,  50  N.  E.  012. 

«•«  Lamprey  v.  Nudd,  29  N.  H.  2U9. 

!•»  Dlckerson  v.  Davis,  111  Ind.  433,  12  N.  E.  145. 

"•Clarke  v.  Dnnham.  4  Denio  (N.  Y.)  262;  Sternbergh  y.  Schoolcraft 
2  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  153;  Robertson  v.  Lain,  19  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  650.  Though  a 
Judgment  confessed  by  a  lunatic  may  be  set  aside,  the  rights  of  a  third  per- 
son, buying  at  execution  sale  thereunder,  without  notice,  before  proceedings 
to  set  it  aside,  cannot  be  disturbed.  Crawford  y.  Thomson,  161  111.  161, 
43  N.  K.  617. 

(303) 


§   206  LAW  OF  JUDQMBNTS.  (Ch.  11 

think  that  it  would  be  within  the  province  of  an  appellate  court  to 
reverse  the  judgment  on  error. 

S  S(P6.    Joint  Parties  at  Cominoii  Law. 

At  common  law,  if  several  defendants  were  joined  in  an  action  ex 
contractu,  and  all  were  brought  before  the  court  by  service  or  appear- 
ance, it  was  absolutely  essential  to  the  plaintiff's  recovery  that  he 
should  establish  a  joint  liability;  in  other  words,  he  must  recover 
against  all  or  none;  it  was  not  competent  to  enter  a  judgment  in 
favor  of  one  defendant  and  against  another.^**  And  this  rule  still 
obtains  in  many  of  the  states  which  have  not  departed  widely  from 
the  common  law  practice.  The  rule,  however,  is  subject  to  one  im- 
portant exception.  Though  the  obligation  in  suit  is  joint,  or  joint 
and  several,  yet  if  one  defendant  pleads  matter  which  goes  to  his 
personal  discharge,  such  as  bankruptcy,  or  to  his  personal  disability 
to  contract,  such  as  infancy,  or  any  other  matter  which  does  not  go 
to  the  nature  of  the  writ,  or  pleads  or  gives  in  evidence  matter  which 
is  a  bar  to  the  action  as  against  himself  only,  and  of  which  the  others 
could  not  take  advantage,  judgment  may  be  rendered  for  such  defend- 
ant against  the  rest.*^*  "That  rule  was  always  adopted,"  says  the 
court  in  Massachusetts,  "with  this  exception, — ^that  when  one  defend- 
ant pleaded  in  his  discharge  some  matter  personal  to  himself,  as  a 
discharge  under  a  bankrupt  act  or  insolvent  law,  and  upon  such  plea 
had  a  verdict,  the  other  defendants  were  still  liable.  The  reason  of 
the  distinction  is  obvious,  and  it  is  this ;  that  such  a  special  personal 
defense  does  not  falsify  the  averment  of  an  original  joint  promise,  but, 

111  Metropolitan  Washing  Mach.  Co.  v.  Morris,  39  Vt  393;  Platner  v.  John- 
son, 3  Hill  (N.  y.)  476;  Earlier  v.  Ayers.-S  Md.  202;  Rohr  v.  Davis,  9  Leigh 
(Va.)  30;  Park  v.  Edge,  42  Ala.  (531;  Helm  v.  Van  Vleet,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.)  342, 
12  Am.  Dec.  248;  People  v.  Organ.  27  lU.  27,  79  Am.  Dec.  391;  Griffith  t. 
Furry,  30  111.  251,  83  Am.  Dec.  186;  Flake  v.  Carson,  33  lU.  518;  Goodale  v. 
Cooper,  6  m.  App.  81;  Kingsland  v.  Koeppe,  137  lU.  344,  28  N.  E.  48,  13  L.  K.  A. 
649;  Stitt  v.  Kurtenbach,  85  111.  App.  38;  Schmelzer  v.  Chicago  Ave.  Sash  & 
Door  Manurg  Co.,  Id.  596;  Bedwell  v.  Ashton,  87  111.  App.  2T2;  Finance  Co.  v. 
Hanlon,  75  111.  App.  188;  Brady  v.  Madden,  67  111.  App.  637;  Anderson  t.  Chil- 
son,  8  S.  D.  64,  65  N.  W.  435;  Rupe  v.  New  Mexico  Lumber  Ass*n,  3  X.  M. 
(Johns.)  201,  5  Pac.  730. 

J 12  snydtr  v.  Snyder,  9  W.  Va.  416;  Coe  v.  HamUton,  1  Morris  (Iowa)  319; 
Robinson  v.  Brown,  82  111.  279, 

(204) 


Ch.  11)  VALIDITY,  AS  AFFECTED  BY  STATUS  OF  PARTIES.  §  206 

admitting  it,  avoids  it  by  the  averment  of  matter  subsequent."  ^^* 
But,  supposing  the  exception  not  to  arise  in  the  particular  case,  so 
strictly  was  the  rule  enforced  that  not  even  the  most  conclusive  proof 
or  unqualified  admission  of  the  liability  of  one  defendant  would  enti- 
tle the  plaintiff  to  a  verdict  against  him  alone. ^**  It  has  been  held, 
however,  that  the  rule  has  no  proper  application  to  an  action  against 
administrators  as  such.^**  And  it  should  be  observed  that  the  rule 
applies  only  where  all  the  defendants  are  brought  before  the  court  or 
named  as  parties  in  the  writ.  A  judgment  against  one  of  several 
makers  of  a  note,  without  process  against  the  others,  releases  those 
who  are  not  sued.^^*  And  in  some  of  the  states,  in  derogation  of 
the  common  law  rule,  a  distinction  is  taken  between  joint  contracts 
and  such  as  are  joint  and  several,  the  courts  holding  that  in  an  action 
upon  the  latter  species  of  obligation  the  plaintiff  may  enter  a  nol.  pros, 
against  one  of  the  defendants  and  proceed  to  judgment  against  the 
others.**'  But  where  the  plaintiff  insists  that  he  is  entitled  to  judg- 
ment against  all  the  defendants  or  none,  and  it  proves  that  he  is  not 
entitled  to  judgment  against  some  of  them,  he  waives  his  right  to  the 
determination  of  the  question  as  to  whether  he  is  entitled  to  judgment 
against  any.***  A  judgment  otherwise  joint  in  form  is  not  rendered 
several  by  a  finding  as  to  which  of  the  defendants  is  the  principal 
debtor,  and  which  are  the  sureties.***  And  though  one  of  two  de- 
fendants sued  as  individuals  on  a  note  to  which  their  names  were 
signed  as  such  did  not  in  fact  sign  the  note,  judgment  should  go 
against  both  on  proof  of  their  liability  as  partners.**®  Under  the 
main  rule  here  considered  it  is  plainly  erroneous  to  render  a  final 

"«  Hathaway  v.  Crocker,  7  Mete.  262. 

>i«  Barker  v.  Ayera,  5  Md.  202. 

"•Gray's  Adm'rs  v.  White,  6  Ala.  490. 

»«•  MitcheU  v.  Brewster,  28  lU.  163;  Bell  v.  State,  7  Blackf.  and.)  33. 

'"Peyton  v.  Seott,  2  How.  (Miss.)  870.  Where  all  the  defendants  are 
l)roiight  into  court,  judgment  rendered  by  agreement  against  one  is  tanta- 
mount to  a  dismissal  as  to  the  others.    Henry  v.  Gibson,  55  Mo.  570. 

lis  Valentine  v.  Duff  (Ind.  App.)  33  N.  B.  52t>. 

"•Famey  v.  Hamilton  County,  54  Neb.  797,  75  N.  W.  44.  Where  the 
surety  on  an  appeal  bond  is  dead,  judgment  in  an  action  on  the  bond  is  not 
void  because  it  is  entered  against  the  principal  alone.  Lewis  v.  Maulden,  93 
Ga.  768,  21  8.  E.  147. 

120  Johnson  v.  Bonlirld  (Ky.)  40  &•  W.  607. 

1  LAW  JUDQ.-20  (305) 


§   206  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  11 

judgment  against  a  part  of  several  defendants  while  the  cause  remains 
undisposed  of  as  to  the  others."*  Hence  if  one  of  the  defendants 
suffers  a  default,  and  an  interlocutory  judgment  is  entered  up  against 
him,  it  cannot  be  made  final  until  the  case  is  finally  concluded  as  to 
the  other  defendants ;  and  even  then,  if  they  should  succeed  in  main- 
taining a  defense  which  went  to  the  whole  right  of  action,  the  verdict 
in  their  favor  will  enure  to  the  benefit  of  the  defaulted  party,  and 
judgment  must  be  given  for  him,  equally  with  the  rest,  notwithstand- 
ing the  default."*  And  in  a  case  in  Texas,  where  the  court  declined 
to  enter  judgment  against  one  defendant,  and  continued  the  case  as 
to  him,  this  was  held  to  make  the  judgment  entered  against  the  other 
defendant  void.*^' 

At  common  law,  there  is  also  a  rule  (converse  to  that  above  stated) 
that,  in  a  joint  action  by  several  plaintiffs,  there  can  be  no  recovery 
by  any  of  them  unless  all  are  entitled  to  a  judgment."*  But  this  is 
applicable  only  where  the  cause  of  action  is  joint,  and  does  not  apply 
to  an  action  in  which  a  number  of  creditors  unite  to  set  aside  a  fraud- 
ulent conveyance  or  attachment  of  their  debtor*s  property.***  And 
this  rule  also  has  been  changed  or  modified  by  statute  in  some  of  the 
states.  Thus,  in  Indiana,  under  a  law  authorizing  the  court  to  deter- 
mine the  ultimate  rights  of  the  parties  on  each  side,  or  between  them- 
selves, where  justice  requires  it,  the  court  may  order  judgment  in 
favor  of  the  one  plaintiff  who  shows  himself  entitled  to  recover, 
though  the  cause  of  action  is  joint  and  breaks  down  as  to  the  other 
plaintiffs."* 

121  Davidson  v.  Bond,  12  lU.  84;  Barbour  v.  White,  37  lU.  1G4:  Prewett 
V.  Caruthers,  7  How.  (Miss.)  304;  Godding  v.  Decker,  3  Colo.  App.  198,  32  Pac. 
832. 

122  Taylor  v.  Beck,  3  Rand.  (Va.)  316;  Rohr  v.  Davis,  9  Leigh  (\'a.)  30; 
Woodward  v.  Newhall,  1  Pick.  (Mass.)  500;  supra,  S  82. 

128  Wootters  v.  Kaultman,  67  Tex.  488,  3  S.  W.  465. 

124  Walker  v.  Pope,  101  Ga.  665,  29  S.  E.  8;  McLaran  v.  WiUielm,  50  Ma 
App.  658;  Dempster  Mill  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Fitzwater,  6  Kan.  App,  2A,  49 
Pac.  624. 

126  Henderson  v.  J.  B.  Brown  Co.,  125  Ala.  566,  28  South.  79. 

126  Mlssissinewa  Min.  Co.  y.  Andrews,  22  Ind.  App.  523,  54  N.  B.  140. 

(306) 


Ch.  11)  VALIDITY,  AS  AFFBCTBD  BT  STATUS  OF  PARTIES.  §   207 


S  207.    In  Aotions  of  Tort. 

The  ru!e  stated  in  the  preceding  section  must  be  restricted  in  its 
application  to  actions  ex  contractu ;  it  does  not  govern  in  the  case  of 
actions  ex  delicto.     In  a  suit  founded  upon  tort,  against  several  de- 
fendants, the  plaintiff  may  recover  against  as  many  and  only  such 
defendants  as  he  proves  to  be  guilty,  and  any  defendant,  as  against 
whom  the  proof  fails,  is  entitled  to  a  verdict."^     In  Maryland,  in  an 
action  of  this  kind,  if,  at  the  conclusion  of  the  plaintiff's  case,  there 
is  no  evidence  against  one  of  the  defendants,  he  is  considered  entitled 
to  be  acquitted ;  and  this  practice  is  necessary,  as  the  court  observes, 
for  otherwise  the  plaintiff  could  deprive  the  defendant  of  material 
and  competent  witnesses  by  joining  them  as  parties  to  the  action.**® 
So  if  a  verdict  is  returned  against  all  the  defendants  sued  jointly  in 
tort,  but  in  respect  to  one  of  the  defendants  it  is  not  sustained  by  the 
evidence,  it  will  be  set  aside,  as  against  that  defendant,  upon  his 
proper  application,  and  the  judgment  be  permitted  to  stand  as  against 
the  party  proven  guilty  of  the  injury  complained  of.*^*     If  the  jury 
find  a  verdict  against  one  of  the  joint  defendants,  without  mentioning 
the  other,  this  will  justify  the  entry  of  a  judgment  against  the  former 
and  in  favor  of  the  latter.**®     In  Tennessee,  it  is  said  that  joint  tort 
feasors  sued  jointly  are  not  entitled  to  have  the  damages  assessed 
against  them  severally.***     But  in  other  states,  it  appears  to  be  no 
ground  of  complaint  that  judgments  are  rendered  separately  against 
the  defendants  for  separate  and  different  amounts.***    And  if  one  of 
the  defendants  obtains  a  new  trial,  a  judgment  for  a  less  amount  may 

i«T  Albright  v.  McTiffhe  (C.  C.)  49  Fed.  817;  Winslow  v.  Xewlan,  45  111. 
345;  Harris  v.  Preston,  10  Ark.  201;  Jausen  v.  Varnum,  89  111.  100;  Howard  v. 
Dayton  Coal  &  Iron  Co.,  94  Ga.  416,  20  S.  E.  386;  Emerson,  Talcott  &  Co. 
r.  Skldmore,  7  Tex.  av.  App.  641,  25  S.  W.  671;  Williams  v.  (Joff  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.)  54  S.  W.  428;  Mendenhall  v.  Stewart,  18  Ind.  App.  262,  47  N.  E.  ?M3. 

i»8  Hambleton  y.  McGee,  19  Md.  43. 

"•  Uayden  v.  Woods,  16  Neb.  306,  20  N.  W.  345.  And  see  Cauthorn  v. 
King,  8  Or.  138. 

!»•  Kinkier  v.  Junicn.  84  Tex.  116,  19  S.  W.  359.  A  Judgment  against  a 
rcirtloD  of  the  defendants  in  an  action  of  tort  amounts  to  a  dismissal  of  the 
<:tu8e  as  against  tbe  other  defendants.    Davis  v.  Taylor,  41  111.  406. 

»a«  NafthvHle.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  v.  Jones,  100  Tenn.  512,  45  S.  W.  681. 

i<2  Uowan  y.  Daniel,  20  Tex.  ClT.  App.  321,  49  S.  W.  686w 

(307) 


§  208  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  11 

be  rendered  against  him,  while  the  original  judgment  remains  in  force 
against  the  other.*** 

I  208.    Joint  Debtor  Acts* 

In  many  of  the  states,  the  common  law  rule  in  respect  to  the 
recovery  in  actions  against  several  defendants  has  been  changed  by 
statutes.  These  statutes— -commonly  called  "joint  debtor  acts" — ^pro- 
vide that  judgment  may  be  given  "for  or  against  one  or  more  of 
several  plaintiffs,  and  for  or  against  one  or  more  of  several  defend- 
ants," and  usually  contain  a  further  provision  that  "in  an  action 
against  several  defendants,  the  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  render 
judgment  against  one  or  more  of  them,  leaving  the  action  to  pro- 
ceed against  the  others,  whenever  a  several  judgment  is  proper."  "* 
Under  these  statutes,  if  a  plaintiff  commences  an  action  against  two 
or  more  defendants  upon  a  joint  obligation,  he  is  no  longer  com- 
pelled to  establish  a  joint,  cause  of  action  against  all,  but  a  judgment 
may  be  taken  against  the  party  or  parties  shown  to  be  liable,  when 
the  others  are  not  liable."*  Thus,  when  two  defendants  are  sued 
jointly  on  a  contract  which,  on  its  face,  is  the  joint  contract  of  both, 
but  which  in  legal  effect  was  at  all  times  the  contract  of  one  only,  a 
judgment  may  be  rendered  against  the  party  liable  and  in  favor  of  the 

i»»  Dawson  v.  Schloss,  U3  Cal.  194,  29  Pac.  31. 

i»*  Rev.  St.  Me.  c.  82,  §  84;  Gen.  St.  Conn.  §  1108;  Code  Civ.  Proc.  X.  T. 
S  1204;  Code  Md.  art.  50.  §  12;.  Code  Va.  1887,  §  3395;  Code  S.  a  I  2J>6: 
Code  Ark.  §S  4701,  4704;  Code  Civ.  Free.  Ohio,  S  371;  Burns'  Rev.  St.  Ind. 
1894,  S  679;  Code  Iowa,  §  1815;  Wag.  St.  Mo.  p.  1019,  §  32;  Code  Wis.  S  ISi: 
Code  Civ.  Proc.  Cal.  §§  578,  579;  Hill's  Code  Or.  §§  244,  245;  Comp.  Laws  S. 
D.  §  4901.  By  virtue  of  Rev.  St.  U.  S.  S  914.  where  the  law  .of  the  state  con- 
tains a  provision  of  this  sort,  the  same  practice  will  be  adopted  by  the  federal 
courts  sitting  within  that  state.    Witters  v.  Sowles  (C.  C.)  34  Fed.  119. 

18  0  Gleason  v.  Sanitary  Milk-Supply  Co.,  ««  Me.  644,  45  Atl.  825.  74  Am,  St 
Rep.  370;  Owen  v.  Conner,  11  N.  Y.  Supp.  352;  Stlmson  v.  Van  Pelt  66  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  151;  Westheimer  v.  Craig,  76  Md.  399,  25  Atl.  419;  Longstreet  ▼.  B«, 
62  Ala.  195;  Kuykendall  v.  Coulter,  7  Tex.  Civ.  App.  399,  26  S.  W.  748;  Lamp- 
kin  v.  Chisom,  10  Ohio  St.  450;  Hunt  v.  Standart,  15  Ind.  33,  77  Am.  Dec. 
79;  Murray  v.  Ebright,  50  Ind.  362;  Stafford  v.  Nutt,  51  Ind.  535;  Ricbard- 
son  V.  Jones,  58  Ind.  240;  Eyre  v.  Cook,  9  Iowa,  185;  Roggenkamp  v.  Ear- 
greaves,  39  Neb.  &40,  58  N.  W.  162;  Mock  v.  City  of  Santa  Rosa,  120  Cal.  SHi^. 
68  Pac.  826;  Hamm  v.  Basche,  22  Or.  513,  30  Pac.  501;  Ah  Lep  v.  Gong  Cboj. 
13  Or.  205,  9  Pac.  483;  Ross  v.  Wait,  4  S.  D.  584,  57  N.  W.  497. 

(308) 


Ch.  11)  VALIDITY,  AS  AFFECTBD  BT  STATUS  OF  PARTIBS.  §  208 

Other."'    So  where  several  persons  are  sued  as  partriers  on  a  note 
signed  by  one,  and  the  evidence  shows  that  there  was  no  partnership, 
judgment  may  be  rendered  against  the  one  who  signed,  and  a  nonsuit 
may  be  ordered  as  to  the  others.^'^     Or  a  plaintiff,  suing  several  as 
partners  for  a  breach  of  a  contract,  may  recover  against  such  as  he 
can  prove  to  be  parties  to  the  contract,  without  proof  of  the  part- 
nership.*"   And  where  an  action  is  brought  against  two  or  more 
upon  a  joint  contract,  an  equitable  defense  peculiar  to  one  defendant 
Being  set  up  by  him,  the  court  may  g^ve  judgment  for  the  plaintiff 
against  the  other  defendants,  and  for  the  one  defendant  against  the 
plaintiff."*    And  a  recovery  may  be  had  against  one  defendant  alone, 
in  a  proper  case,  notwithstanding  another  of  the  debtors  has  been 
released  by  the  plaintiff  upon  a  compromise.^*®     And  it  is  held  that 
a  statute  of  the  character  above  described  is  a  provision  as  applicable 
to  suits  by  attachment  as  to  suits  in  any  other  form;    and  hence, 
where  an  attachment  is  sued  out  against  two  persons  jointly,  it  may 
be  sustained  as  against  the  separate  property  of  one  alone.***     It  is 
a  further  consequence  of  acts  of  this  nature,  that  where  the  verdict 
is  in  favor  of  a  part  of  the  defendants  and  against  the  others,  the 
judgment  thereon,  if  entered  against  "the  defendants"  generally,  will 
not  be  erroneous ;   for  the  judgment  will  be  construed  with  reference 
to  the  verdict,  and  will  be  held  to  be  against  only  those  defendants 
against  whom  the  verdict  was  given.***     But  if  the  verdict,  or  the 
finding  of  the  court,  is  against  all  the  defendants  jointly,  it  would  be 

*»•  Claflln  V.  Butterly,  6  Duer  (X.  Y.)  327. 

*"Stoddart  v.  Van  Dyke,  12  Cal.  437;  WiUis  v.  Morrison,  44  Tex.  27; 
nelden  v.  Ijiliens,  2  Abb.  Dec.  (X.  Y.)  111. 

*««  Crews  V.  J^ackland,  C7  Mo.  619;  Bibb  v.  Allen,  149  U.  S.  481,  13  Sup. 
Ct  950.  37  L.  Ed.  819;  Salomon  v.  Hopkins,  61  Conn.  47,  23  Atl.  716;  Morgan 
V.  Rlghettl  (Cal.)  45  Pac.  200;  Shafer  v.  Hewitt,  6  Colo.  App.  374,  41  Pac.  509. 

"•Barker  v.  Cocks,  50  N.  Y.  689.  But  a  statute  allowing  Judgment  to  be 
^d  against  one  or  more  defendants  In  an  action  on  contract,  according  to 
the  rights  of  the  case,  has  no  application  where  the  defendants  file  a  Joint 
plea  of  non-assumpsit,  and  there  is  nothing  to  indicate  that  the  defense  is 
merely  personal  as  to  one  defendant.  Gibson  v.  Beveridge,  90  Ya.  696,  19 
S.  E.  785. 

"•  Moss  V.  Jerome.  10  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  220. 

>«J  Allen  V.  Clayton  a\  C.)  11  Fed.  73* 

i«>  Lamar  t.  U  illiams,  39  Miaa.  842. 

(309) 


§    209  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNT8.  (Ch.  11 

error  to  render  a  judgment  thereon  against  a  part  only,  dismissing 
the  action  as  to  the  others.^'*  Under  that  clause  of  the  joint  debtor 
acts  which  provides  that  the  court  may  render  judgment  against  one 
of  the  defendants,  leaving  the  action  to  proceed  as  to  the  others, 
whenever  a  several  judgment  would  be  proper,  the  cases  hold  that 
the  true  test,  as  to  whether  a  separate  judgment  may  be  had,  is 
whether  a  separate  action  could  have  been  maintained.^**  As  these 
statutes  are  framed  in  some  of  the  states  they  permit  a  plaintiff,  suing 
upon  a  joint  cause  of  action  against  two  defendants,  to  recover  a 
separate  judgment  against  each  for  one-half  of  the  claim."*  And 
where  the  statute  also  permits  the  court  to  grant  affirmative  relief  to 
defendant,  it  may  give  judgment  for  one  of  the  defendants  as  against 
another,  if  that  can  be  done  without  injury  to  the  plaintiff."*  But  a 
judgment  against  a  garnishee,  when  there  has  been  no  judgment 
against  the  defendant  in  the  suit  to  which  the  garnishment  is  ancil- 
lary, is  void.^*^  And  the  fact  that  persons  have  been  improperly 
joined  as  parties  defendant  does  not  warrant  the  entry  of  a  judgment 
in  their  favor,  but  the  action  should  be  dismissed  as  to  them."* 

(  209.    One  Bef  endant  sidlerinK  Bef  anlt. 

In  an  action  of  contract  against  several  defendants,  if  one  of  them 
suffers  default,  and  another,  under  the  general  issue,  sets  up  and 
maintains  a  defense  which  negatives  the  plaintiff's  right  to  recover 
against  either  of  the  defendants  and  shows  that  he  had  no  cause  of 
action,  the  plaintiff  will  not  be  entitled  to  judgment  against  the  one 
who  was  defavilted,  but  on  the  contrary  the  successful  defense  will 
enure  to  the  latter's  benefit,  and  judgment  must  be  rendered  for  both 
the  defendants.***     So  if  one  defendant  interposes  an  objection  by 

1"  Kellogg,  Johnson  &  Co.  v.  Gilman,  a  N.  D.  538,  58  X.  W.  339:  Boys 
V.  Shawhan,  88  Cal.  Ill,  25  Pac.  1063.  The  verdict  having  been  rendered 
Jointly  against  both  plaintiffs,  and  the  Judgment  against  one  of  them  alone, 
he  is  entitled  to  a  reversal.     Frisble  v.  McFarlane,  190  Pa.  110,  46  AtL  359. 

144  Van  Ness  v.  Corkins,  12  Wis.  186;  Parke  v.  Meyer,  28  Ark.  28L 

14  5  Hassler  v.  Hefele,  151  Ind.  391,  50  N.  E.  361. 

i4«  Beattie  v.  Latimer,  42  S.  C.  313,  20  S.  E.  53. 

147  Shoemaker  v.  Pace  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  41  S.  W.  408. 

148  (Jiilum  V.  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  622.  23  S.  W.  HG. 
14 O.Bowman  v.  ^'oyes,  12  N,  H.  302;  Adderton  v.  UolUer,  32  Mo.  507;  State 

(310) 


Ch.  11)  VALIDITY.  AS  AFFECTED  BY  STATUS  OF  PARTIES.  §  209 

way  of  demurrer,  going  to  the  plaintiff's  right  to  recover,  and  not 
merely  a  personal  matter  of  discharge,  which  is  sustained,  and  judg- 
ment rendered  on  it  in  his  favor,  it  will  enure  to  the  benefit  of  his 
co-defendant.**®  But  this  rule  also  is  modified  by  the  joint  debtor 
acts.  Thus,  under  a  provision  that  judgment  may  be  given  for  or 
against  one  or  more  of  several  defendants,  it  is  held  that,  where 
three  persons  are  sued  as  partners,  and  two  of  them  suffer  default, 
but  the  other  answers,  denying  that  he  was  a  member  of  the  firm, 
judgment  may  be  entered  against  those  in  default,  though  it  is  ren- 
dered in  favor  of  the  answering  defendant.*'**  So  an  action  on  a 
joint  and  several  obligation  against  two  defendants,  only  one  of 
whom  appeared  and  answered,  can  be  tried,  and  verdict  and  judgment 
rendered  for  or  against  the  party  answering,  without  regard  to  the 
proceedings  against  his  co-defendant.*** 

On  the  other  hand,  if  one  of  the  defendants  makes  default  and 
the  other  goes  to  trial,  the  effect  is  to  suspend  the  judgment  against 
the  defaulting  defendant  until  the  result  of  the  trial  is  ascertained, 
and  if  the  plaintiif  obtains  a  verdict,  he  is  then  entitled  to  a  joint 
judgment  against  all  the  defendants.**'  Nor  is  there  any  necessity, 
in  such  a  case,  of  having  previously  taken  an  interlocutory  judgment 
by  default  against  the  party  failing  to  answer.***     Where,  in  a  joint 

V.  Gibson,  21  Ark.  140;  Rich  v.  Uusson,  4  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  115;  Miller  v.  Long- 
acre,  26  Ohio  St.  291;  Champlln  v.  Tilley,  3  Day  (Conn.)  303,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
2,5M>;  Campbell  v.  McHarg,  9  Iowa,  354.  Compare  Town  of  Storm  Lake  v. 
Iowa  t  aUs  &  S.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  62  Iowa,  218, 17  N.  W.  489. 

»•  State  V.  WiUiams,  17  Ark.  371. 

191  Bailey  Loan  Co.  v.  Uall,  110  Cal.  490,  42  Pac.  962.  And  see  Kings- 
land  &  Douglass  Manurg  Co.  v.  MiteheU  (Tex.  av.  App.)  36  S.  W.  757. 

"•Black  Hills  Nat.  Hank  v.  Kellogg,  4  S.  D.  312,  56  N.  W.  1071.  In 
Illinois,  it  is  said  that  where,  in  an  action  against  two  defendants,  of  whom 
only  one  has  been  served,  judgment  is  entered  by  default  against  the  defendant 
cenred,  and  the  action  continued  as  to  the  other,  such  Judgment,  though  er- 
roneous. Is  not  void.  Anderson  v.  Gray,  134  111.  550,  25  N.  E.  843,  23  Am. 
St  Rep.  606. 

»»  Town  of  Fletcher  v.  Blair,  20  Vt.  124. 

«»*  Peters  v.  Crittenden,  8  Tex.  131.  But  in  an  action  on  a  joint  debt, 
plaintiff,  after  joining  all  the  debtors  as  defendants,  so  as  to  avoid  a  plea  of 
nonjoinder,  cannot,  by  neglecting  to  take  Judgment  against  some  of  them  who 
are  in  default,  throw  the  burden  of  the  common  debt  on  one  of  them,  against 
wbom  alone  he  enters  judgment.  Robinson  y.  Floyd,  153  Pa.  98,  25  Atl.  1040; 
MurUand  v.  l^loyd,  153  Pa.  99,  25  Ati.  1038. 

(311) 


§210  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  11 

action  ex  contractu  against  two  defendants,  one  of  them  is  defaulted, 
and  the  other  appears,  and  separate  judgments  are  rendered  against 
both  of  them,  if  the  defendant  who  appeared  enters  a  review,  the 
effect  is  to  vacate  the  judgment  as  to  both  defendants  and  to  carry 
the  whole  case  to  the  next  succeeding  term,  notwithstanding  a  sepa- 
rate judgment  may  have  been  entered  on  the  record  against  the  de- 
fendant who  was  defaulted.^'* 

S  210.    JiidKmeiit,  wl&en  Several,  wl&en  Joiat. 

In  general,  where  an  action  is  brought  upon  a  joint  contract  or 
obligation  against  several  defendants  who  plead  and  defend  jointly, 
the  judgment  must  be  joint,  and  it  is  error  to  render  several  judg- 
ments against  them  for  several  damages.^*'  But  where,  for  example 
in  an  action  against  partners  on  a  partnership  obligation,  separate 
judgments  are  entered  against  each  of  the  defendants,  instead  of  a 
joint  judgment  against  all,  this  is  considered  merely  an  irregularity, 
which  may  be  corrected  on  motion  within  the  statutory  time.**'  But 
where  there  are  several  defendants,  and  the  items  of  damages  are  dis- 
tinct, a  joint  judgment  cannot  be  entered  unless  each  defendant  is 
liable  to  the  full  extent  of  the  verdict.***  And  where  the  action  is 
upon  a  joint  and  several  contract,  a  several  judgment  would  be 
proper,  as  the  defendants  might  have  been  sued  alone  in  such  case; 
hence  a  judgment  may  be  rendered  against  one  or  more  without 
waiting  the  filial  trial.* ^"  So  where,  of  two  defendants,  one  is  liable 
individually,  and  the  other  in  his  representative  character,  the  judg- 

« 

18  B  Downer  v.  Dana,  22  Vt.  22. 

io«  Holmes'  Heirs  v.  Gay's  Heirs,  6  Bush  (Ky.)  47:  Rochester  v.  Ander- 
son, 1  Bibb  (Ky.)  439;  Starry  v.  Johnson,  32  Ind.  438;  HoweU  y.  Barrett.  3 
GUman  (HI.)  433.  A  joint  Judgment  in  favor  of  defendants  for  costs  is 
proper  where  they  are  sued  Jointly,  though  they  answered  separately.  Lead- 
better  V.  Ijike,  118  Cal.  515,  50  Pac.  686. 

157  Judd  Linseed  Sperm  OU  Co.  v.  Hubbell,  76  N.  Y.  543.  See,  also,  Murphy 
V.  Gage  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  21  S.  W.  396. 

188  Chambers  v.  Upton  (C.  C.)  34  Fed.  473.  Judgment  may  be  entered  for 
different  sums  against  several  defendants,  where  plaintiff  Is  entitled  to  re- 
cover more  costs  as  against  some  of  them  than  against  the  others.  F\>x  r. 
Muller,  31  Misc.  Rep.  470,  64  N.  Y.  Supp.  388. 

169  Sears  v.  McGrew,  10  Or.  48.  See,  also,  Croasdell  v.  lYillant,  83  Pa.  193; 
Fh-st  Nat.  Bank  v.  Burkhardt,  71  Mimi.  185,  73  N.  W.  858. 

(312) 


Ch.  11)  VALIDITY,  AS  AFFECTED  BY  STATUS  OF  PARTIES.  §   211 

ment  against  them  should  be  several.***  And  in  an  action  to  subject 
assets  descended  to  several  heirs  to  a  debt  of  their  ancestor,  the  judg- 
ment, if  for  the  plaintiff,  should  be  several  against  each  of  the  heirs 
for  the  amount  received  by  him  from  the  ancestor,  not  to  exceed, 
however,  the  amount  to  which  the  plaintiff  is  entitled.***  But  al- 
though a  judgment  be  rendered  against  two  parties  jointly,  yet  it  must 
be  remarked  that  the  judgment  itself  is  a  joint  and  several  obligation, 
and  consequently  an  action  can  be  maintained  upon  it  against  either 
of  the  judgment-debtors  separately,  and  it  can  in  like  manner  be  useo 
as  a  set-off  against  either.*** 

§  211.    Joint  JudKineiit  as  an  Entirety* 

There  are  numerous  expressions  in  the  books  to  the  effect  that  a 
judgment  is  an  entirety,  and  that  if  it  is  rendered  against  several 
defendants  jointly,  it  is  not  susceptible  of  division  or  apportionment,  so 
as  to  be  purged  of  the  error  or  irregularity  it  may  contain  as  to  one 
of  them,  while  standing  good  against  the  rest.  Accordingly  it  is  held 
in  a  number  of  the  states,  that  if  the  judgment  is  void  as  against  one 
defendant,  for  want  of  jurisdiction  over  him,  it  must  be  considered  as 
void  as  to  all  the  defendants,  and  therefore  a  mere  nullity.***  This 
question  might  arise,  for  example,  in  a  case  where  two  persons  were 
named  as  defendants,  but  only  one  was  served  with  process,  the  other 
being  a  non-resident  or  not  found,  and  where  after  a  contest  by  the 

"•Gray's  Adm'r  v.  McDoweU,  6  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  501. 

Ki  RansdeU  v.  Threlkeld's  Adm'r,  4  Bush  (Ky.)  347. 

">Uead  y.  Jeffries,  16  Kan.  534.  And  see  Stout  v.  Baker,  32  Kan.  113,  4 
rac  141. 

!•»  Shuford  V.  Cain.  1  Abb.  U.  S.  302,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  12,823;  HaU  v.  WiUlams, 
6  Pick.  (Mass.)  232.  17  Am.  Dec.  356;  Richards  v.  Walton,  12  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  434; 
Holbrook  v.  Murray,  5  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  161;  Rangely  v.  Webster,  11  N.  H.  299; 
Knapp  Y.  Abell,  10  Allen  (Mass.)  485;  Buffum  v.  Ramsdell,  55  Me.  252,  92  Am. 
Dec  589;  Diekerson  v.  Chrisman,  28  Mo.  134;  Hulme  v.  James,  6  Tex.  242.  55 
Am.Dec.774:  Long  v. Garnet^ 45  Tex.  400;  Thomas  v.  Lowry,  GO  111.  512;  Brock- 
man  T.  McDonald,  16  Ul.  112;  WMUiams  v.  Chalfant,  82  111.  218;  Roberts  v.  Paw- 
ley,  50  S.  C.  491,  27  S.  E.  913;  Grace  v.  Casey-Grimshaw  Marble  Co.,  62  111.  App. 
149;  West  Chicago  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Annis,  Id.  180;  Meyer  v.  Kuhn,  13  C.  C.  A. 
298,  65  Fed.  705;  Van  Renselaer  v.  Whiting,  12  Mich.  449;  Hughes  v.  Lind- 
»ey,  10  Ark.  555;  Smith's  Adm'r  v.  Rollins,  25  Mo.  408;  Winslow  v.  Lam- 
bard,  57  Me.  356;  Burt  v.  Stevens,  22  X.  H.  229;  Donnelly  v.  Graham,  77 
i'a.  274;  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Gleason,  15  Mo.  App.  25. 

(313) 


§211  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNIU  (Ch.  11 

defendant  served,  judgment  should  be  rendered  against  both.  Ac- 
cording, then,  to  the  foregoing  rule,  the  judgment  could  have  no 
more  effect  against  the  defendant  who  was  served  than  against  the 
other.  Hence,  to  carry  the  supposition  a  step  further,  if  the  judg- 
ment were  made  the  basis  of  an  action,  whether  in  a  domestic  or 
foreign  tribunal,  against  the  defendant  served,  he  might  show  the 
irregularity  of  the  proceedings  in  respect  of  his  co-defendant,  and 
that  would  be  sufficient  to  defeat  a  recovery  against  himself.  The 
result  seems  scarcely  consonant  to  reason  and  justice.  Yet  some  of 
the  decisions,  arguing  from  the  entirety  of  the  judgment,  have  felt 
obliged  to  hold  precisely  that  position.***  But  there  are  many  other 
authorities  which  hold  that  although  a  judgment  may  be  void  as 
against  one  of  the  defendants,  for  lack  of  jurisdiction,  still  it  maybe 
valid  and  binding  upon  the  others,  or  at  most  voidable,  but  not  void 
in  toto.**"  And  if  this  view  is  adopted,  it  is  evident  that  the  judgment 
will  be  attended  by  its  usual  incidents,  as  against  the  defendant  over 
whom  jurisdiction  attached,  until  it  is  regularly  reversed  or  vacated. 
Until  that  time  an  action  will  lie  upon  the  judgment  against  him,  and 
he  will  not  be  permitted  to  attack  it  collaterally.  There  are  other 
grounds  on  which  the  judgment  may  be  void  as  to  one  of  several  de- 
fendants, such  as  legal  disability  or  his  previous  decease.  But  the 
same  principle  is  understood  to  govern  these  cases  also,  and  there 

i«4  Hanley  v.  Donoghue,  59  Md.  239,  43  Am.  Rep.  554;  HoUirook  ▼.  Mur- 
ray, 5  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  1(51. 

icoNewburg  v.  Munshower,  29  Ohio  St.  617,  23  Am.  Rep.  7«9;  Douglass* 
Lessee  ▼.  Massle,  1(5  Ohio,  271,  47  Am.  Dec.  375;  Ash  ▼.  McCabe,  21  Ohio 
St.  181;  Jamleson  v.  Pomeroy,  9  Pa.  230;  ShaUcross  v.  Smith,  81  Pa.  132; 
Kitchens  v.  Hutchlns,  44  Ga.  020;  Green  v.  Reals,  2  Calnes  <N.  Y.)  2M: 
Crane  v.  French,  1  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  311;  Rrlttin  v.  Wilder,  6  HIU  (N,  Y.) 
242;  St.  John  v.  Holmes,  20  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  609,  32  Am.  Dec.  603;  York 
Rank's  Appeal,  36  Pa.  4(50;  North  v.  Mudge,  13  Iowa,  498,  81  Am.  Dec. 
441;  Winchester  v.  Reardin,  10  Humph.  fPenn.)  247,  51  Am.  Dec.  702; 
Collins  V.  Knight,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  183;  Mercer  v.  ^ James.  6  Neb.  406;  Conwil 
RluflTs  Sav.  Rank  v.  Griswold,  50  Neb.  753,  70  N.  W.  376;  Keith  Rros.  & 
Co.  V.  Stiles,  92  Wis.  15,  65  N.  W.  860;  Wise  v.  Hyatt,  68  Miss.  7W.  10 
South.  37;  Rurton  v.  Perry,  146  111.  71,  34  N.  B.  60;  Remington  v.  Cummlnss. 
5  Wis.  138;  Ralley  v.  McGinniss,  57  :^fo.  362;  Cheek  v.  Pugh,  19  Ark.  574: 
Murphy  v.  Orr,  32  111.  489;  Valentine  v.  Cooley,  Meigs  (Tenn.)  618,  33  Am. 
Dec.  166;  Crank  v.  Flowers,  4  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  629;  Smith  V.  Topper,  4 
Smedes-  &  M.  (Miss.)  261,  43  Am.  Dec.  483. 
(314) 


Ch.  11)  VALIDITT,  AS  AFFECTED  BY  STATUS  OF  PARTIES.  §  211 

exists  the  same  diversity  of  opinion  in  regard  to  them.  Some  of  the 
cases  bold  that  if  a  joint  judgment  is  void  as  to  one  defendant,  be- 
cause that  defendant  was  a  slave,  an  infant,  a  married  woman,  or  was 
dead  before  its  rendition,  it  is  void  as  to  all ;  or,  if  an  incapacity  of 
that  kind  is  conceived  as  rendering  the  judgment  voidable  only  as 
against  the  person  affected,  these  cases  hold  it  to  be  equally  voidable 
as  against  the  co-defendants. *••  But  other  decisions  take  the  ground 
that  a  judgment  rendered  jointly  against  a  married  woman  (for  in- 
stance) and  others  who  are  sui  juris  is  not,  as  to  the  latter,  void  and 
collaterally  assailable,  although  as  to  the  married  woman  it  is  a 
nullity,  and  although,  also,  it  is  an  entirety  for  the  purooses  of  review 
on  appeal  or  error,  and  would  be  reversed  as  to  all  the  defendants  if 
thus  directly  assailed.**'  When  we  inquire  as  to  the  proper  disposi- 
tion to  be  made  of  a  joint  judgment  against  several  defendants,  which 
is  void  as  to  one  of  them,  when  it  is  brought  before  a  court  of  review 
by  writ  of  error  or  appeal,  we  find  the  authorities  more  nearly  har- 
monious. In  general,  they  agree  that  it  cannot  be  affirmed  as  to 
one  defendant  and  reversed  as  to  another,  but  must  be  reversed  as 
an  entirety.**'  And  conversely,  if  in  favor  of  the  defendants,  inva- 
lidity as  to  one  will  vitiate  it  as  to  all.  "The  judgment,  being  joint 
in  favor  of  all  the  defendants  and  erroneous  as  to  one,  will  have  to 
be  reversed  as  to  all.  A  judgment  jointly  entered  in  favor  of  several 
defendants,  whether  in  an  action  upon  contract  or  for  tort,  cannot 
be  affirmed  as  to  one  and  reversed  as  to  another.  Such  a  judgment 
is  an  entirety,  and  must  stand  or  fall  together."  *••    The  acceptance 

"•Stenhouae  v.  Bonum,  12  Rich.  Law  (S.  C.)  620;  TedUe  v.  Dill,  3  Ga.  104; 
Randans  ▼.  Wilson,  24  Mo.  76. 

»«T  Helton  v.  Towner,  81  Mo.  360;  ShaUcross  v.  Smith,  81  Pa.  132. 

"•Sargeant  v.  I'Yench,  10  N.  H.  444;  Sheldon  v.  Qulnlen,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.) 
441;  Hickman  v.  Branson.  1  Honst.  (Del.)  429;  Murphy  v.  O'Reiley,  78  Ky. 
I'©;  Draper  v.  State,  1  Head  (Tenn.)  282;  Ellison  v.  State,  8  Ala.  273;  Wood 
V.  8mlth,  11  Tex.  367;  Dickson  v.  Burke,  28  Tex.  117;  Frazler  v.  Williams, 
IM  Ohio  St.  eS25;  Cavender  v.  Smith's  Heirs,  5  Iowa,  157;  P^iUer  y.  Robb, 
2B  IIL  246;  KimbaU  v.  Tanner,  63  111.  519;  Covenant  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
riorer.  36  Mo.  392;  Powers  v.  Irish,  23  Mich.  429. 

»•»  McDonald  v.  Wilkie,  13  111.  22,  54  Am.  Oec.  423,  citing  Harman  v. 
Brotherson,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.)  537;  Cruikshank  v.  Gardner,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.) 
3:«:  Sheldon  v.  Qulnlen,  5  Hill  (X.  Y.)  441;  Gaylord  v.  Payne,  4  Conn.  190; 
Bac.  Ahr^  tit  "Krror,"  M. 

(315) 


§    Jill  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  11 

of  this  rule,  however,  is  not  quite  universal.  It  is  said  to  have  no 
application  under  the  statutes  and  system  of  practice  in  Nevada."* 
And  in  California,  if  one  of  several  defendants  appeals  from  a  judg- 
ment which  is  erroneous  as  to  him,  on  account  of  insufficient  service, 
the  court  will  not  reverse  the  judgment  as  to  the  other  defendants, 
but  will  only  reverse  it  as  against  the  appellant.*'*  In  Virginia  it  is 
held  that  although  at  common  law  a  joint  judgment  which  is  erro- 
neous as  to  one  defendant  must  be  reversed  as  to  all,  yet  if  the 
alleged  judgment  against  one  is  not  merely  erroneous  but  absolutely 
void  and  a  mere  nullity,  this  rule  does  not  apply.*'*  Before  leaving 
the  subject,  it  is  necessary- to  remark  that  if  the  judgment  is  several 
as  to  the  parties,  there  may  well  be  cases  in  which  it  will  be  good  as 
to  one  though  invalid  as  against  another,  and  in  which  an  appellate 
court  would  reverse  it  in  part  and  affirm  it  in  part.*''  Further,  the 
rule  that  a  judgment  void  as  to  one  defendant  is  void  as  to  all  is  con- 
sidered to  apply  only  to  judgments  at  law  and  not  to  decrees  in  eq- 
uity.*'* 

It  will  be  obvious  from  the  foregoing  review  of  the  authorities  that 
the  cases  on  this  topic  cannot  be  reconciled.  But  it  will  also  appear 
that  some  of  the  courts  holding  the  entire  invaUdity  of  a  joint  judg- 
ment, which  is  void  as  to  one  defendant,  have  been  forced  to  an  ex- 
treme length  in  the  matter  by  the  highly  technical  conception  of  such 
a  judgment  as  an  ideal  entirety.  Sound  legal  reason  appears  to 
suggest  that  while  such  a  judgment  is  undoubtedly  erroneous  and 
liable  to  be  reversed  on  appeal,  yet,  while  unreversed,  it  ought  not 
to  be  open  to  impeachment,  by  the  debtor  as  to  whom  no  irregularity 
exists,  in  any  collateral  proceeding.  It  also  seems  consonant  to  jus- 
tice that  judgments  of  this  character  should  not  be  vacated  or  set 
aside  on  the  application  of  the  party  legally  bound,  because,  pre- 
sumably, it  is  the  other  only  who  has  been  deprived  of  his  rights  or 
injured  by  an  irregular  or  erroneous  practice.    As  to  the  former, 

170  Wood  v.  Olney,  7  Nev.  109. 

171  Ricketson  v.  Richardson,  26  Cal.  149.    And  see  Saffold  v.  Navarro.  15 
Tex.  7(5. 

1T2  Gray  v.  IStuart,  33  Grat.  351. 

17  8  i»owers  v.  Irish,  23  Mich.  429,  438;  Buff  urn  v.  RamsdeU,  65  Me.  252, 
92  Am.  Dec.  589. 
174  Voorhis  v.  Gamble,  6  Mo.  App.  1;  Dlckerson  y.  Qirisman,  28  Mo.  1^ 

(316) 


Ch.  11)  VALIDITY.  AS  AFFECTED  BY  STATUS  OF  PARTIES.  §   212 

the  judgment  should  not  be  shorn  of  its  usual  consequences,  and 
there  seems  to  be  no  adequate  reason  why  it  should  not  constitute  a 
good  cause  of  action  against  him.  Finally,  it  is  too  much  to  say 
that  the  judgment  supposed  would  be  absolutely  void  as  to  both  or 
all  the  defendants.  For  a  void  judgment  is  a  mere  nullity  and  binds 
no  one,  and  no  one  can  acquire  any  rights  under  it ;  whereas  many 
of  the  cases  (even  those  which  use  the  expression  "void*'  in  applica- 
tion to  such  judgments)  hold  that  a  purchaser  under  such  a  judg- 
ment will  be  protected,  that  the  record  may  be  amended,  that  such 
a  judgment  merges  the  cause  of  action,  that  execution  may  be  di- 
rected against  one  defendant  and  restrained  as  to  the  other,  and  so 
on,  none  of  which  consequences  could  follow  if  the  judgment  were 
merely  null  and  void. 

I  212.    ConfeMioB  of  Judgmemt  by  Joint  Defendants. 

A  judgment  cannot  be  confessed  by  one  of  several  joint  debtors  so 
as  to  bind  those  not  joining  in  the  confession.^^'  But  a  more  9if!i- 
cult  question  arises  in  regard  to  the  validity  of  a  judgment  by  con- 
fession entered  upon  a  warrant  or  statement  signed  by  a  part  only  of 
those  who  are  named  in  the  judgment.  Clearly  it  is  nugatory  as  to 
any  defendant  not  signing.  But  will  it  stand,  notwithstanding  this, 
as  a  good  and  valid  judgment  against  those  who  did  sign  or  execute 
the  authority?  Some  of  the  decisions  answer  this  question  in  the 
affirmative.*^*  And  their  position  seems  to  be  supported  by  sound 
reason  and  justice.  In  California,  however,  on  the  principle  of  the 
entirety  of  a  judgment,  it  is  held  that  if  the  warrant  authorizes  the 
'entry  of  judgment  against  a  certain  number,  no  judgment  can  be  en- 
tered against  a  less  number,  and  it  will  be  void  as  to  all.*^^ 

"i  Tripp  V.  Saunders,  59  How.  Pmc.  (N.  Y.)  379. 

"•North  V.  Mudgc,  13  Iowa,  4iK>,  81  Am.  Dec.  441;  Mercer  v.  James, 
6  Xeb.  406;  York  Bank's  Appeal,  36  Pa.  458;  Knox  v.  Wlnsted  Sav.  Bank, 
57  111.  330. 

1"  Ctaapin  y.  Tbompson,  20  Cal.  681. 

(317) 


§213  LAW  OF  JUDQMBNTS.  (Ch.  11 


§  213.    Mlmomer  of  Parties. 

It  is  a  well  established  rule  that  if  process  in  an  action  is  served 
upon  the  person  really  intended  to  be  sued,  although  a  wrong  name 
is  given  him  in  the  writ  and  return,  and  he  suffers  a  default,  or,  after 
appearing,  omits  to  plead  the  misnomer  in  abatement,  and  judgment 
is  taken  against  him,  he  is  concluded  thereby,  and  in  all  future  liti- 
gation he  may  be  connected  with  the  suit  or  judgment  by  proper 
averments.^^'  "The  point  of  the  objection  to  the  judgment  of  the 
lower  court  is,  that  the  defendant  having  been  sued  and  served  wth 
process  by  a  wrong  name,  the  court  acquired  no  jurisdiction  of  him, 
and  could  render  no  valid  judgment  against  him.  The  objection 
gives  the  name  quite  too  much  importance.  A  name  is  a  means  of 
identity,  but  the  change  of  the  name  or  the  application  of  a  wrong 
name  does  not  change  the  thing  identified.  It  is  not  the  name  that  is 
sued  but  the  person  to  whom  it  is  applied.  Process  served  on  a  man 
by  a  wrong  name  is  as  really  served  on  him  as  if  it  had  been  ser\'ed 
on  him  by  his  right  name,  and  if  in  such  case  he  fails  to  appear,  or, 
appearing,  fails  to  object  that  he  is  sued  by  the  wrong  name,  and  the 
judgment  be  rendered  against  him  by  such  name,  he  is  as  much 
bound  by  the  judgment  as  if  it  had  been  rendered  against  him  by  his 
right  name."  ^^*  Exactly  the  same  rule  applies  in  the  case  of  a  cor- 
poration ;  though  sued  by  a  wrong  name,  it  is  bound,  if  duly  serv- 
ed.^*® But  in  California,  and  probably  in  other  states  having  sim- 
ilar statutory  provisions,  a  judgment  against  a  defendant  served  by 
a  fictitious  name,  who  appears  and  answers  in  his  real  name,  cannot 
be  supported  unless  the  complaint  is  amended  by  inserting  the  true 

1T8  Oakley  v.  Giles,  3  East,  168;  Lafayette  Ins.  Co.  v.  French,  18  How. 
40a  15  L.  Ed.  451;  Smith  v.  Bowker,  1  Mass.  76;  fltzgerald  v.  Saleotiiie, 
10  Mete.  (Mass.)  486;  First  Xat.  Bank  v.  Jaggers,  31  Md.  38y  100  Am.  Dec.  53: 
Althoiise  V.  Hunsbcrger,  6  Fa.  Super.  Ct.  160;  Waldrop  v.  Leonard,  12  S.  C 
118;  Bloomfield  K.  Co,  v.  Burress,  82  Ind.  83;  Kingen  v.  Stroh.  136  Ind. 
010,  36  N.  E.  510;  Griffith  v.  Milwaukee  Harvester  Co.,  92  Iowa,  OW.  61 
X.  W.  243,  54  Am.  St.  Rep.  573;  ParrV  v.  Woodson,  33  Mo.  347,  84  Am. 
Dec.  51;  Welsh  v.  Kirkpa trick,  30  Cal.  202,  89  Am.  Dec.  85;  Suttw  T.  Cox. 
6  Cal.  415;  Guiuard  v.  lleysinger,  15  111.  288. 

179  l>arry  v.  Woodson,  33  Mo.  347,  84  Am.  Dec.  51. 

180  Hoffleld  V.  Board  of  Education,  33  Kan.  044,  7  Pac.  21S. 

(318) 


Ol.  11)  VALIDITY,  AS  AFFECTED  BT  STATUS  OF  PARTIES.  §  213 

name,  as  required  by  the  code.*®*  Moreover,  it  is  essential  to  the 
plaintiff's  recovery  that  it  shoulcl  be  proved,  not  only  that  the  real 
person  was  sued,  but  that  he  was  duly  served  with  process  though 
under  a  mistaken  name.*®*     In  a  case  where  the  complaint  was 

against  " Doyle"  and  others,  and  a  summons  was  issued  but 

there  was  no  evidence  that  it  was  served,  and  John  Doyle  answered, 
and  judgment  was  rendered  against  James  Doyle,  it  was  held  to  be 
void,  because  the  party  against  whom  it  was  given  did  not  appear  to 
be  a  party  to  the  suit.*®' 

Similar  principles  apply  to  the  case  of  a  misnomer  in  the  judgment 
itself,  where  the  defendant  was  correctly  named  in  the  writ  or  the 
pleadings.  The  judgment  will  not  be  avoided  by  such  misnomer,  if 
the  record  contains  data  by  which  the  judgment  can  be  amended, 
or  if  the  record  and  the  judgment  together  point  out  the  persons  to 
be  bound  by  the  judgment,  with  unmistakable  certainty.*®*  Further, 
a  misnomer  in  a,  judgment  may  be  cured,  in  a  proper  case,  by  the 
principle  of  "idem  sonans.*'  Thus,  where  a  bill  is  filed  to  set  aside 
a  decree  on  the  ground  that  the  complainants  were  sued  by  a  wrong 
name  and  therefore  were  not  before  the  court,  if  the  names  given 
are  idem  sonantes,  the  bill  will  be  dismissed.*®*  So  where  a  judg- 
ment is  rendered  and  execution  issued  against  "Rosina  Coons,"  it 
is  not  sufficient  reason  for  setting  aside  a  sale  of  real  estate  made  on 
such  execution  that  the  right  name  of  the  defendant  is  shown  to  be 
''Rosina  Kuhn.''  *®®  It  may  also  happen  that  the  process  will  contain 
a  misnomer  of  the  plaintiff.    And  some  of  the  cases,  having  a  regard 

»•!  MeKinlay  v.  TotUe,  42  Cal.  571;  City  and  County  of  San  Francisco  v. 
Burr  <Cal.)  3«  Pac  771;  Alameda  County  v.  Crocker,  125  Cal.  101,  57  Pac.  766. 

Its  Fitzgerald  v.  Valentine,  10  Mete.  (Mass.)  436. 

"»  Ford  V.  Doyle,  37  Cal.  346. 

"*  Ohleago  Clock  Co.  v.  Tobin,  123  Cal.  377,  55  Pac.  1007;  Ex  parte  How- 
ard-Harrison Iron  Co.,  119  Ala.  484,  24  South.  516,  72  Am.  St  Rep.  928.  A 
mlsrccital  In  a  decree,  to  tbe  effect  that  an  intervener,  who  resisted  plaintiff's 
cUilm,  was  a  defendant,  is  not  fatal.  Newman  v.  Bullock,  23  Colo.  217,  47  Pac. 
379. 

»»5  Rol)ertson  v.  Winchester,  85  Tenn.  171,  1  S.  W.  781.  Where  a  Judgment 
on  a  forfeited  bond  signed  with  the  Christian  name  "Noberto"  was  entered 
against  "Norberto,"  it  was  held  not  to  be  a  fatal  variance.  Salinas  v.  State, 
39  Tex.  Or.  R.  319,  45  S.  W.  900. 

!••  Kuhn  T.  Kilmer,  16  Neb.  699,  21  N.  W.  443. 

(319) 


§213  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Oh.  11 

to  the  defendant's  right  to  be  fully  informed  as  to  the  person  whose 
demand  he  is  required  to  answer,  have  held  that  if  the  process  mis- 
names the  plaintiff  it  does  not  give  sufficient  notice  of  the  suit  to  the 
defendant,  the  court  acquires  no  jurisdiction,  and  a  judgment  against 
the  defendant  by  default  is  null  and  void.     It  was  so  ruled  in  a  case 
where  one  Cunningham,  plaintiff  in  the  action,  was  described  as 
"Cunnington."  ^•^     But  the  better  reason  is  with  the  cases  which 
hold  that  service  of  process  in  favor  of  the  right  party  by  a  wrong 
name  is  good,  and  a  judgment  in  favor  of  the  right  party  by  his 
proper  name  will  after  trial  cure  a  misnomer  in  the  complaint,  the 
summons,  or  the  other  proceedings.**®     So  a  judgment  and  execu- 
tion in  the  name  of  the  treasurer  of  a  township,  instead  of  the  trus- 
tees as  directed  by  law,  cannot  be  held  void,  but  voidable  only.*** 
A  judgment  for  or  against  a  partnership  is  not  rendered  invalid  by 
the  fact  that  it  incorrectly  names  the  partnership,  if  it  also  gives  cor- 
rectly the  names  of  the  individuals  composing  the  firm.***    The 
'-jmission  of  the  initial  letter  of  the  middle  name  of  a  defendant,  in 
the  entry  and  docketing  of  a  judgment  recovered  against  him,  does 
not  render  it  invalid  or  prevent  its  becoming  a  lien  upon  his  real  es- 
tate as  against  subsequent  purchasers  from  him  in  good  faith.    As 
observed  by  Daniels,  J.:    "It  was  enough  that  one  Christian  name 
was  properly  added  to  the  surname  of  the  defendant,  for  in  legal  pro- 
ceedings the  law  recognizes  but  one  Christian  name,  and  where  a 
party  is  sued  by  that  alone,  the  proceedings  taken  may  regularly  be 

18T  Ex  parte  Obeatham,  6  Ark.  531,  44  Am.  Dec.  525. 

188  ivronski  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.»  77  Mo.  362;  McGaughey  v.  Woods, 
106  Ind.  H80,  7  N.  E.  7;  Terry  v.  French.  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  120,  23  S.  W.  91 L 
A  judgment  In  favor  of  "The  United  States  National  Bank"  is  sufficient  to 
support  an  action  thereon  by  "The  United  States  National  Bank  of  New  York, 
N.  Y."  United  States  Nat.  Bank  y.  Venner,  172  Mass.  449.  52  N.  E.  W3.  But 
where  an  amended  petition  states  the  plaintiff's  name  differently  ftom  the 
original  petition,  a  Judgment  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  by  the  name  given  in 
the  original  petition  is  not  a  final  judgment  to  which  a  writ  of  error  will  Ue. 
Green  v.  Brown  (Tex.)  15  S.  W.  37. 

189  Hart's  Lessee  v.  Johnson,  6  Ohio,  87. 

i»o  Bailey  v.  Crittenden  (Tex.  Olv.  App.)  44  S.  W.  404.  See,  also,  MUs  v. 
Jones.  51  Mo.  180.  Where  a  person  does  bushiees  individually  under  a  firm 
name,  and  as  such  firm  becomes  a  joint  lessee,  a  judgment  against  him  indi- 
vidually for  rent  Is  proper.    Ding  y.  Kennedy,  7  Colo.  App.  72,  41  Pac  1112. 

(320) 


Ch.  11)  VALIDITT,  AS  AFFECTED  BY  STATUS  OF  PARTIES.  §   214 

continued  to  judgment  in  that  name,  and  the  fact  that  he  may  have 
one  or  more  other  names  between  his  first  Christian  name  and  his 
surname  will  in  no  way  affect  their  validity.  This  is  an  old  and  well 
established  rule  of  the  common  law  that  has  in  no  manner  been 
changed,  either  by  legislation  or  the  rulings  of  the  courts,  in  this 
state."  *^*  So  there  is  no  material  variance  where  a  judgment  is  en- 
tered in  favor  of  "Laura  Wilcox,  guardian  of  W.  L.  Wilcox/'  when 
the  correct  name  of  the  infant  is  W.  B.  Wilcox.^ ®^ 

f  214.    Desoriptio  Personse. 

The  fact  that  a  descriptive  word  or  phrase  is  added  to  a  party's 
name  in  a  judgment  neither  affects  the  validity  of  the  judgment  nor 
changes  the  legal  rights  and  relations  which  it  engenders.  Thus  the 
addition  of  the  word  "executor"  to  a  defendant's  name  in  a  decree, 
without  more,  does  not  prevent  the  decree  from  binding  his  own 
property;  the  addition  is  mere  surplusage.^*'  So  a  judgment 
against  "D.,  treasurer,"  is  a  personal  judgment,  the  word  "treasurer" 
being  merely  descriptio  personae.*"* 

"» Clute  V.  Emmerich,  26  Hun  (N.  Y.)  la 

1"  Crawford  v.  Wilcox,  68  Tex.  109,  3  S.  W.  695;  Hicks  v.  Riley,  83  Ga. 
332,  9  8.  E.  771. 

»•*  Tfnsley  v.  Lee,  51  Ga.  482;  Hall  v.  Oralge,  68  N.  C.  305.  In  determining 
whether  a  judgment  against  one  as  executor  was  obtained  against  him  In  his 
representntive  capacity,  or  Individually,  the  pleadings  in  the  action  In  which 
it  was  rendered  may  be  considered.  Groom  v.  Winston,  18  Tex.  Civ.  App.  1,  43 
S.  W.  1072.  In  an  action  against  one  as  agent  for  an  estate,  on  a  bill  accepted 
by  him  as  such  agent,  a  judgment  against  him  as  agent  Is  proper,  as  execu- 
tion thereon  will  not  go  against  his  Individual  property,  but  be  levied  on  as- 
sets In  his  hands  as  agent.    Rudd  v.  Deposit  Bank  (Ky.)  49  S.  W.  207. 

»•*  Dougherty  v.  McManus,  36  Iowa,  657;  Rockwell  v.  Tupper,  7  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  174;  Sass  v.  Hlrschfeld,  23  Tex.  Civ.  App.  306,  56  S.  W.  941.  Where  a 
defendant,  sued  for  a  tort  as  an  Individual,  defended  in  a  representative  ca- 
pacity as  assignee  of  an  insolvent,  the  effect  of  a  judgment  against  him  in 
terms  both  as  an  Individual  and  as  assignee  is  simply  to  hold  him  liable  In- 
dividually. O'Brien  v.  Ballon,  116  Cal.  318,  48  Pac.  130.  So,  a  personal  Judg- 
ment against  a  tax  collector  is  not  vitiated  by  the  addition  of  the  words  "tax 
t-ollector'*  to  defendant's  name.  Stewart  v.  Atlanta  Beef  Co.,  93  Ga.  12,  18 
S.  E.  981,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  119.  See,  also,  Rutan  t.  Wolters,  116  Cal.  40;{,  48 
Pac.  385. 

II4AWJUDG.— 21  (32 1) 


§215  LAW  OF  JUD0B1ENT8.  (Ch.  12 


CHAPTER  XIL 

THE    VALIDITY   OF  JUDGMENTS   AS    DEPENDENT    UPON  JURISDIC- 
TION. 
f  215.    Jurisdiction  definecl. 

216.  Sources  of  Jurisdiction. 

217.  Consent  cannot  confer  Jurisdiction. 

218.  Judgment  without  Jurisdiction  is  Void. 

219.  Judgment  against  One  not  a  Party. 

220.  Notice  to  Defendant. 

*  221.  Statutes  dispensing  with  Citation. 

222.  Statutes  regulating  Mode  of  Citation. 

223.  Defects  in  the  Process. 

224.  Defects  in  the  Service. 

225.  Appearance  as  a  Waiver  of  Citation. 

226.  Defendant's  Right  to  be  heard. 

227.  Judgments  against  Non-Kesldents. 

228.  Extra-Territorial  Service  of  Process. 

229.  Jurisdiction  by  Attachment  of  Non-Resldent*8  Property. 

230.  What  Property  bound. 

231.  Service  by  Publication  without  Attachment. 

232.  Statutes  authorizing  Constructive  Service  to  be  strictly  construed. 

233.  Joint  Defendants. 

234.  Joint  Judgment  as  an  Entirety. 

235.  Joint  Judgment  authorized  by  Statute. 

236.  Statutory  Several  Judgment. 

237.  Judgment  against  Partners. 

238.  Appearance  for  Defendant  not  Served. 

239.  Construction  of  Judgment  against  '^Defendants"  generally. 

240.  Jurisdiction  of  the  Subject-Matter. 

241.  Sufficiency  of  Declaration. 

242.  Jurisdiction  of  Question  decided. 

243.  Loss  of  Jurisdiction. 

244.  Jurisdiction  attaching,  Error  does  not  Vitiate. 

§  215.    JnrisdIotioA  defined. 

Etymologically  the  word  "jurisdiction"  signifies  the  power  or  duty 
of  "declaring  right,"  that  is,  of  declaring,  in  the  official  character 
of  a  judge,  what  is  the  law  applicable  to  a  given  state  of  facts,  or 
what  are  the  respective  rights  of  parties,  as  determined  by  the  ap- 
plication of  law  to  the  facts  before  the  tribunal.  Technically,  it  may 
Jt>e  defined  as  the  power  and  authority  constitutionally  conferred  upon 
(322) 


Ch.  12)  VAUDITT.  AS  DEPENDENT  UPON  JURISDICTION.  §  216 

(or  constitutionally  recognized  as  existing  in)  a  court  or  judge  to 
pronounce  the  sentence  of  the  law,  or  to  award  the  remedies  pro- 
vided by  law,  upon  a  state  of  facts,  proved  or  admitted,  referred  to 
the  tribunal  for  decision,  and  authorized  by  law  to  be  the  subject  of 
investigation  or  action  by  that  tribunal,  and  in  favor  of  or  against 
persons  (or  a  res)  who  present  themselves,  or  who  are  brought,  be- 
fore the  court  in  some  manner  sanctioned  by  law  as  proper  and  suf- 
ficient.* If  this  definition  appears  complicated,  it  is  because  of  the 
necessity  of  grouping  three  very  different  elements.  For  jurisdic- 
tion naturally  divides  itself  into  three  heads.  In  order  to  the  validity 
of  a  judgment,  the  court  must  have  jurisdiction  of  the  persons,  of  the 
subject-matter,  and  of  the  particular  question  which  it  assumes  to 
decide.  It  cannot  act  upon  persons  who  are  not  legally  before  it, 
upon  one  who  is  not  a  party  to  the  suit,  upon  a  plaintiff  who  has 
not  invoked  its  arbitrament,  or  upon  a  defendant  who  has  never  been 
notified  of  the  proceeding.  It  cannot  adjudicate  upon  a  subject 
which  does  not  fall  within  its  province  as  defined  or  limited  by  law. 
Neither  can  it  go  beyond  the  issues  and  pass  upon  a  matter  which 
the  parties  neither  submitted  nor  intended  to  submit  for  its  deter- 
mination. These  several  elements  of  jurisdiction  will  be  taken  up 
and  considered  in  their  orden 

§216.    Soiiroes  of   JnrisdiotloA. 

Since  the  administration  of  justice  is  a  part  of  the  business  of 
government,  and  since  judicial  tribunals  are  the  agencies  devised  for 
eflFecting  this  purpose,  their  jurisdiction  must  ultimately  depend  upon 
their  institution  by  the  sovereignty  of  the  particular  state  or  country. 
Hence  the  validity  of  their  judgments  may  sometimes  require  to  be 
tested  on  public  or  political  grounds.  We  have  elsewhere  seen  that 
the  courts  of  a  de  facto  government,  or  the  de  facto  courts  of  a  law- 
ful government,  are  generally  recognized  as  having  jurisdiction.^ 
But  jurisdiction  cannot  be  predicated  of  any  voluntary  or  self-consti- 

X  See  Windsor  t.  McVeigh,  03  U.  S.  277,  23  L.  Ed.  914;  United  States  v. 
ArrodoDdo,  6  Pet  700,  8  I..  Ed.  547;  Rhode  Island  v.  Massachusetts,  12  Pet. 
71S.  9  L.  Ed.  1233;  Sheldon's  Lessee  t.  Newton,  3  Ohio  St  494;  Ex  parte 
Boniiett.  44  Cal.  84. 

s  Supra,  §  173. 

(323) 


t   216  LAW  OF  JUDGMBNT3.  C^h.  12 

tuted  tribunal,  lacking  the  color  of  governmental  authority.  Its  pro- 
ceedings must  at  least  appear  to  be  had  under  the  authority  and 
sanction  of  the  sovereign.'  But  supposing  a  legally  constituted 
court,  we  are  told  that  "by  jurisdiction  over  the  *  subject-matter'  is 
meant  the  nature  of  the  cause  of  action  or  relief  sought ;  and  this  is 
conferred  by  the  sovereign  authority  which  organizes  the  court,  and 
is  to  be  sought  for  in  the  general  nature  of  its  powers  or  in  the  au- 
thority specially  conferred.  Jurisdiction  of  the  'person'  is  obtained 
by  the  service  of  process,  or  by  the  voluntary  appearance  of  the  party 
in  the  progress  of  the  cause.  Jurisdiction  of  the  'res'  is  obtained 
by  seizure  under  the  process  of  the  court,  whereby  it  is  held  to  abide 
such  order  as  the  court  may  make  concerning  it."  *  By  way  of  sup- 
plement to  the  above  description  we  may  add  that  the  jurisdiction  of 
a  particular  court,  in  respect  to  the  matters  of  which  it  may  take 
cognizance,  may  be  defined  in  the  constitutional  or  statutory  enact- 
ment which  creates  it,  or  may  be  left  to  be  inferred  from  the  general 
nature  of  the  court  or  the  absence  of  specific  limitations  upon  its 
powers,  or  may  be  enlarged  or  abridged  by  subsequent  legislation. 
But  where  the  constitution  establishes  a  particular  court  and  fixes  its 
jurisdiction,  it  is  not  competent  for  the  legislature  to  pass  any  stat- 
ute abolishing  the  court,  or  either  enlarging  or  abridging  its  juris- 
diction.*    And  conversely  if  the  constitution  organizes  a  court  and 

«  Rogers  v.  Wood,  2  Barn.  &  Adol.  245. 

*  Cooper  V*,  Reynolds,  10  WaU.  316,  19  L.  Ed.  931;    Fithlan  v.  Monks,  43 
Mo.  515. 

6  Commonwealth  v.  Allegheny  County  Com'rs,  37  Pa.  237;  Gibson  v.  Temple- 
ton,  62  Tex.  555;  State  v.  Biink  of  East  Tennessee,  5  Sneed  (Tenn.)  573;  Ward 
V.  Thomas,  2  Cold.  (Tenn.)  565;  Gibson  v.  Emerson,  7  Ark.  172;  State  v.  Jones. 
22  Ark.  331;  Haight  v.  Gay,  8  Cal.  297,  68  Am.  Dec.  323;  Decks  Estate  v. 
Gherke,  6  Cal.  6(J6;  Zander  v.  Coe,  5  Cal.  230.  See  2  Story,  Const,  ft  177S, 
1774;  Duroiisseau  v.  United  States,  6  Cranch,  307,  3  L.  Ed.  232;  United  States 
V.  More,  3  Cranch,  159,  2  L.  Ed.  397;  Ex  parte  McOardle.  7  WaU.  506,  19  L. 
Ed.  204;  United  States  v.  Peters,  5  Cranch,  115,  3  L.  Ed.  53;  Ex  parte  Knowles, 
5  Cal.  3r)0;  Fen-is  v.  Coover,  11  Cal.  175;  Greely  v.  Townsend,  25  Cal.  ei>4. 
Thus,  where  the  constitutional  jurisdiction  of  the  supreme  court  Is  appellate 
only,  the  legislature  cannot  confer  upon  it  original  Jurisdiction  in  any  case. 
Ward  V.  Thomas,  2  Cold.  (Tenn.)  565;  State  v.  Bank  of  East  Tennessee.  5 
Sneed  (Tenn.)  573.  The  legislature  cannot  confer  upon  courts  created  by 
statute  Jurisdiction  exclusive  of  that  which  the  constitution  gives  to  conns 
established  by  the  constitution  Itself.  Montross  v.  State,  61  Hiss.  42a  5:>ee 
Eaton  &  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Hunt,  20  Ind.  457. 
(3^) 


Ch.  12)  VALIDITY.  AS  DEPENDENT  UPON  JURISDICTION.  §  217 

confers  powers  upon  it,  it  does  not  require  the  aid  of  legislation  to 
enable  it  to  exercise  those  powers.**  But  if  the  alleged  jurisdiction  of 
a  court  to  take  any  particular  action  is  derived  from  a  statute,  and 
that  statute  is  shown  to  be  unconstitutional,  the  proceedings  of  the 
court  must  be  considered  void ;  for  as  the  stream  cannot  rise  higher 
than  its  source,  no  jurisdiction  can  be  derived  from  a  void  act.''  The 
question  of  the  validity  of  a  judgment,  if  depending  on  jurisdiction, 
must  be  determined  by  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  as  existing  at 
the  time  when  the  judgment  was  rendered.' 

§  217.    CoBseiit  oannot  ooiifer  Jurisdiotion* 

As  jurisdiction  is  given  by  the  law,  the  consent  of  the  parties  can- 
not confer  the  right  to  adjudicate  upon  any  cause  which  the  law  has 
withheld  from  the  cognizance  of  the  particular  court.®  This  rule 
may  apply  to  cases  where  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the  court  is 
limited.  Thus,  under  a  constitutional  provision  that  all  civil  suits 
shall  be  tried  in  the  county  wherein  the  defendant  resides,  a  judg- 
ment obtained  in  a  county  other  than  that  of  the  defendant's  resi- 
dence, by  an  agreement  between  the  plaintiff  and  defendant,  the  lat- 
ter agreeing  to  acknowledge  the  jurisdiction,  is  considered  to  be  void 
as  against  the  rights  of  subsequent  judgment-creditors  who  obtain 
their  judgments  in  the  manner  and  place  prescribed  by  law.*®     But 

•  State  T.  Gleason,  12  Fla.  190. 

"  Horan  v.  Wahrenberger.  0  Tex.  313,  58  Am.  Dec.  145;  Reed  ▼.  Wright  2 
<-.  Greene  (Iowa)  13.  Compare  Arnold  v.  Shields,  5  Dana  (Ky.)  18,  30  Am. 
Dee.  600. 

■^  I'kamplin  v.  Bakewell,  21  La.  Ann.  353. 

•Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Morse,  20  Wall.  451,  22  L.  Ed.  365;  Santom  v.  BaHard. 
1:3  Mass.  465;  State  v.  Fosdiek,  21  La.  Ann.  258:  Mora  v.  Kuzac,  21  La.  Ann. 
754;  Richardson  v.  Hunter,  23  La.  Ann.  255;  Flelschman  v.  Walker,  91  111. 
.^IS:  Dieks  v.  Hatch.  10  Iowa,  380;  Mooi-e  v.  Ellis,  18  Mich.  77;  Damp  v. 
Town  of  Dane,  29  Wis.  419;  Peabody  v.  Thatcher.  3  Colo.  275. 

i«  Georgia  K.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Harris,  5  Ga.  527,  But  under  the  ac^  of  congress 
of  March  3,  1887.  §  1  (25  Stat.  433),  providing  that  "no  civil  suit  shall  be 
brought  before  either  of  said  courts  [United  States  circuit  or  district  courts] 
against  any  person  ♦  •  ♦  in  any  other  district  than  that  wihereof  he  is 
an  inhabitant,"  it  la  held  that  the  right  to  be  sued  only  in  the  district  of  his 
rwldence  Is  a  personal  privilege,  which  the  defendant  may  waive;  and  he 
do«j  waive  it  by  pleading  to  the  merits.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  McHride, 
141  U.  S.  127,  11  Sup.  Ct.  082,  35  K  Bd,  659;   Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Cox,  145 

(325) 


§    218  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   12 

a  more  familiar  application  of  the  rule  is  in  the  case  of  an  attempt 
to  bring  within  the  cognizance  of  the  court  a  subject-matter  of  which 
by  law  it  has  no  jurisdiction.  Indeed  we  are  told  that  it  is  only 
when  a  judge  or  court  has  no  jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter  of 
the  proceeding  or  action  in  which  an  order  is  made  or  a  judgment 
rendered,  that  such  order  or  judgment  is  wholly  void,  and  that  the 
maxim  applies  that  consent  cannot  give  jurisdiction.  In  all  other 
cases  the  objection  to  the  exercise  of  the  jurisdiction  may  be  waived, 
and  IS  waived  when  not  taken  at  the  time  the  exercise  of  the  juris- 
diction is  first  claimed.*^  And  there  is  certainly  good  ground  for 
doubting  the  applicability  of  the  rule  to  the  matter  of  jurisdiction  of 
the  person.  For  a  defendant  may  cure  a  defective  service  of  process, 
or  waive  the  want  of  it,  by  appearing  without  exception.  And  this 
he  appears  also  to  do  in  confessing  a  judgment  without  action.**  So 
there  are  many  cases  holding  that  a  person  under  legal  disabilities 
may  consent  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  or  waive  an  objection  to 
it,  by  suffering  a  default,  at  least  so  far  that  the  judgment  will  not 
be  entirely  void,  though  it  may  be  erroneous  or  voidable.**  And  it 
has  even  been  held  that  a  judgment  in  a  state  court  against  a  consul 
of  a  foreign  nation,  taken  upon  default,  is  valid ;  on  the  ground  that 
his  not  appearing  and  pleading  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  is  a 
waiver  of  the  want  of  jurisdiction  over  him.** 

§  218.    Judgmeiit  without  JurisdiotioA  !■  Void. 

It  is  a  familiar  and  universal  rule  that  a  judgment  rendered  by  a 
court  having  no  jurisdiction,  of  either  the  parties  or  the  subject-mat- 
ter, is  void  and  a  mere  nullity,  and  will  be  so  held  and  treated  when- 
ever and  wherever  and  for  whatever  purpose  it  is  sought  to  be  used 

U.  S.  593,  12  Sup.  Ct.  905,  36  L.  Ed.  829;  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  MeGoorgte,  lot 
U.  S.  129,  14  Sup.  Ct.  286,  38  I^  Ed.  98. 

11  Hobart  v.  Frost,  5  Duer  (N.  Y.)  672. 

12  A  decree  purporting  to  be  rendered  by  consent  of  parties  Is  not  void  on  its 
face  because  it  declares  the  title  to  the  premises  in  controversy  to  l)e  iu  a  per- 
son other  than  one  of  the  parties  to  the  record,  wlien  it  appears  that  such 
person  was  a  purchaser  pendente  lite  from  one  of  the  parties.  Beardslej-  t. 
Ililson,  94  Ga.  50,  20  S.  E.  272. 

13  Supra,  §§  190,  196. 

14  Hall  V.  Young,  3  Pick.  (Mass.)  80.  15  Am.  Dec  180. 
(326) 


Ch.  12)  VAUDITT.  AS  DEPENDENT  UPON  JURISDICTION.  §  218 

or  relied  on  as  a  valid  judgment.*'*  The  effect  of  a  want  of  jurisdic- 
tion is  clearly  stated  in  an  early  decision  of  the  United  States  supreme 
court  in  the  following  language:  "Where  a  court  has  jurisdiction, 
it  has  a  right  to  decide  every  question  which  occurs  in  the  cause,  and 
whether  its  decision  be  correct  or  otherwise,  its  judgment,  until  re- 
versed, is  regarded  as  binding  in  every  other  court.  But  if  it  act 
without  authority,  its  judgments  and  orders  are  regarded  as  nullities. 
They  are  not  voidable  but  simply  void,  and  form  no  bar  to  a  recovery 
sought,  even  prior  to  a  reversal,  in  opposition  to  them.  They  con- 
stitute no  justification ;  and  all  persons  concerned  in  executing  such 
judgments  or  sentences  are  considered  in  law  as  trespassers."  *" 
Hence,  for  example,  if  a  judgment  is  merely  erroneous,  the  title  ac- 
quired by  a  sale  under  it  is  valid  and  cannot  be  impeached  collaterally ; 
bat  if  it  is  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction,  the^  vendee  takes  no  title 
whatever,  and  the  sheriff's  deed  does  not  even  create  a  cloud  on  the 
title  which  a  court  of  equity  can  remove.*^  So,  although  a  judgment 
upon  a  note  rendered  by  a  court  having  no  jurisdiction  of  the  case  is 
void,  the  note  is  still  a  valid  security ;  it  is  not  merged  in  the  judg- 
ment.**  But  in  connection  with  this  rule  it  is  necessary  to  remem- 
ber the  legal  presumptions  in  favor  of  the  judgments  and  proceed- 
ings of  courts  of  general  jurisdiction  and  the  rule  against  collateral 
attacks  upon  such  judgments.     The  result  deducible  from  a  majority 

15  Fisher  t.  Hamden,  1  Paine,  55,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  4,819;  Towns  v.  Springer, 
9  Ga.  130;  Mobley  v.  Mobley.  Id.  247;  Beverly  v.  Burke,  Id.  440,  54  Am.  Dec. 
351;  Central  Bank  y.  Gibson,  11  Ga.  453;  Johnson  v.  Johnson,  30  111.  215;  St. 
Louis  &  S.  Coal  Co.  t.  Sandoval  Ck)al  &  Mining  Co.,  Ill  111.  32;  Swiggart  ▼. 
Harber.  4  Scam.  (lU.)  364,  39  Am.  Dec.  418;  Miller  v.  Snyder,  6  Ind.  1;  Seely 
T.  Held,  3  G.  Greene  (Iowa)  374;  Bruschke  v.  Der  Nord  Chicago  Schuetzen 
Vereln,  145  111.  433,  34  N.  B.  417;  Dowell  v.  Applegate,  24  Or.  440,  33  Pae. 
037;  Ex  parte  Gardner.  22  Nev.  280,  39  Pac.  570.  Some  of  the  eases  discrim- 
inate In  favor  of  judgments  for  the  defendant,  where  there  was  Jurisdiction 
of  the  Bubjeet-matter,  though  not  of  defendant's  person.  See  City  of  Fostoria 
V.  Fox,  60  Ohio  St  340,  54  N.  E.  370. 

"Elliott  V.  Pelrsol.  1  Pet.  328,  340,  7  L.  Ed.  164,  Trimble.  J.  See,  also, 
Latham  v.  Edgerton,  9  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  227.  A  person  against  whom  judgment 
has  been  rendered  without  serylce  of  process  Is  not  precluded  by  any  lapse  of 
time  from  contesting  Its  validity;  he  can  wait  until  It  Is  sought  to  be  enforced 
against  him.    Harper  v.  Cunningham,  8  App.  D.  0.  430. 

"  Bowers  t.  Chaney,  21  Tex.  363;  Holland  v.  Johnson,  80  Mo.  34. 

It  Linn  V.  Carson's  Adm'r,  32  Grat  (Va.)  170. 

(327) 


§218  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  12 

of  the  cases  seems  to  be  that  it  is  only  when  the  judgment  appears 
upon  its  face  to  have  been  rendered  without  jurisdiction  that  it  can 
be  considered  a  mere  nullity  for  all  purposes.  This  will  be  shown 
more  fully  in  the  succeeding  chapters. 

It  has  been  held  that  a  void  judgment  may  be  accepted  as  valid  by 
the  consent  of  the  parties,  so  the  rights  of  third  persons  be  not  preju- 
diced. "All  the  parties  interested  may  lawfully  agree  to  confirm  an 
invalid  transcript,  or  nugatory  judgment,  provided  the  confirmation 
is  to  be  efficacious,  and  give  a  lien,  only  from  the  time  of  the  agree- 
ment properly  appearing."  *®  But  other  authorities  maintain  that 
proceedings  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction  cannot  be  cured  by  ratifica- 
tion or  waiver.^**  And  it  is  clear  that  a  void  judgment  cannot  be 
validated  by  citing  the  party  against  whom  it  was  entered  to  show 
cause  why  it  should  not  be  declared  valid,**  nor  by  the  court's  ap- 
proval of  a  sale  on  execution  under  it,**  nor  by  the  subsequent  taking 
and  dismissing  of  an  appeal  from  such  judgment.*^  And  a  void  judg- 
ment does  not  fall  within  the  class  of  subjects  upon  which  a  legis- 
lature may  operate  retroactively  by  a  curative  or  confirmatory  stat- 
ute. An  act  of  the  legislature  undertaking  to  validate  a  judgment  of 
a  court  which  was  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction,  would  be  an  attempted 
exercise  of  judicial  power  by  the  legislature,  since,  the  proceedings  in 
court  having  been  void,  it  would  be  the  statute  alone  which  should 
constitute  an  adjudication  upon  the  rights  of  the  parties ;  and  it  would 
also  be  objectionable  as  contravening  the  constitutional  provision 
which  secures  to  every  man  the  enjoyment  of  his  property  except  as 
the  same  may  be  taken  from  him  by  "due  process  of  law,"  for  this 
last  phrase  includes  the  attaching  of  jurisdiction,  due  notice,  and  an 
opportunity  to  be  heard.**     So  when  property  has  been  attempted  to 

19  Ramsey  v.  Linn,  2  Rawle  (Pa.)  229. 

20  Laughtou  V.  Nadeau  (C.  C.)  75  Fed.  789. 

21  JeAvett  V.  Iowa  Land  Co.,  64  Miun.  531,  67  N.  W.  639,  58  Am.  St  RfP- 
555. 

22  Willamette  Real-Estate  Co.  v.  Hendrix,  28  Or.  485,  42  Paa  514,  52  Am. 
St.  Rep.  800. 

23  Joues  V.  Pilaris,  59  Mo.  App.  254. 

2*  Richards  v.   Rote,  (38  Pa.  248;    Lane  v.  Nelson,  79  Pa.  407:    Pryor  t. 
Downey.  50  Cal.  388,  19  Am.  Rep.  656;  Griffin's  Ex'r  v.  Cunningham.  JO  (Jrat 
(Va.)  109:  McDauiel  v.  Correll,  19  111.  220,  G8  Am.  Dec.  587;  Denny  v.  MattooD, 
(328) 


(%.  12)  VAX.IDITY.  AS  DEPENDENT  UPON  JURISDICTION.  §  219 

be  taken  by  a  judicial  proceeding  which  is  void  for  want  of  jurisdic- 
tion, the  legislature,  for  similar  reasons,  cannot  validate  it."^  But 
if  the  judgment  is  merely  defective,  erroneous,  or  irregular,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  non-observance  of  some  formality  which  the  legis- 
lature might  have  dispensed  with  in  advance,  but  is  not  objectionable 
on  jurisdictional  grounds,  then  it  may  be  confirmed  or  validated  by  a 
retroactive  statute.** 

§  219.    JudKineiit  asainat  One  not  a  Party. 

A  judgment  rendered  against  one  who  was  not  made  a  party  to 
the  suit,  or  who  does  not  appear  from  the  record  to  have  been  pro- 
ceeded against  in  the  action  or  to  have  had  his  day  in  court,  cannot 
be  regarded  as  in  any  sense  a  vaUd  judgment.*^  So  a  judgment 
against  a  defendant  named  in  the  writ,  but  not  made  a  party,  is 
merely  void.*®  A  judgment  cannot  pass  against  a  person  who  is  not 
mentioned  in  the  proceedings  and  who  has  not  joined  issue  or  made 
himself  a  party ;  and  a  mere  citation  served  on  such  person  does  not 
compel  his  appearance  or  justify  a  judgment  by  default.**  Thus,  in 
a  suit  on  the  bond  given  by  the  defendant  in  an  attachment,  to  ob- 
tain a  return  of  the  property  attached,  it  appeared  that  the  judgment 
ill  the  original  action  was  rendered  against  the  sureties  in  the  bond, 
who  were  not  parties,  as  well  as  against  the  attachment-defendant ; 

2  AUen  Olass.)  361.  79  Am.  Dec.  784;  Israel  v.  Arthur.  7  Colo.  5,  1  Pac.  438; 
In  re  ChristHnsen's  Estate,  17  Utah,  412,  53  Pac.  1003,  41  L.  R.  A.  504.  70 
Am.  St.  Kep.  7»4;  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Wells  Co.  v.  Fahlor.  132  Ind.  426,  31 
N.  E.  1112. 

"  Richards  v.  Bote,  68  Pa.  248. 

»«  Lane  v.  Xelson.  79  Pa.  407;  State  v.  Town  of  Union,  33  N.  J.  Law,  350; 
Blark,  Const.  Law  (2d  Ed.)  632. 

"  Ford  V.  Doyle.  37  Oal.  346;  Overstreet  v.  DaTis,  24  Miss.  393;  Moseley  v. 
<^ocke.  7  Leigh  (Va.)  225;  Deming  v.  Merchants*  Cotton-Press  &  Storage  Co., 
iK)  Tenn.  300,  17  S.  W.  89,  13  L.  R.  A.  518;  McKinney  v.  Frankfort  &  State 
Line  R.  Co.,  140  Ind-  95,  38  N.  B.  170;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Fulmore 
<Tex.  Civ.  App.)  26  S.  W.  238;  Johnson  v.  Block  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  46  S.  W.  85; 
Houser  v.  Smith.  19  Utah,  150,  5(J  Pac.  083.  A  decree  rendered  by  default 
against  the  unknown  heirs  of  a  person  supposed  to  be  dead  is  void  where 
Huch  person  is  in  fact  alive  and  is  not  a  party  to  the  suit  Burton  v.  Perry. 
U(\  111.  71,  34  N.  K.  60. 

'"•Armstrong  v.  Ilarshaw.  12  N.  O.  187. 

"  Bracey  v.  Calderwood,  36  La.  Ann.  796. 

(329) 


§   220  LAW  OF  JUDQMBNTB.  (CSl.  12 

and  it  was  held  that  the  judgment  was  a  mere  nullity  as  to  the  sure- 
ties, although  it  was  not  void  as  to  the  defendant.** 

§  220.    Notice  to  Defendant, 

It  is  an  unquestioned  principle  of  natural  justice  that  a  man  should 
have  notice  of  any  legal  proceeding  that  may  be  taken  against  him, 
and  a  full  and  fair  opportunity  to  make  his  defense.  The  law  never 
acts  by  stealth ;  it  condemns  no  one  unheard.  It  is  true  that  in  pro- 
ceedings in  rem  the  notice  may  be  constructive  only,  but  here  the 
action  is  directed  against  the  thing  itself,  and  there  is  no  attempt  to 
fasten  a  personal  liability  upon  the  parties  concerned.'^  It  is  true 
also  that  constructive  service  of  process  is  authorized  in  some  other 
cases,  but  not  for  the  purpose  of  a  personal  judgment.  A  personal 
judgment  rendered  against  a  defendant  without  notice  to  him,  or  an 
appearance  by  him,  is  without  jurisdiction  and  is  utterly  and  entirely 
void.'^     "We  think  it  may  be  regarded  as  settled,  that  a  judgment  of 

*»o  Cheek  v.  Pugh,  19  Ark.  574. 

>i  A  late  case  holds  that  notice  and  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  are  essential 
to  the  Jurisdiction  of  all  courts,  even  in  proceedings  in  rem.  Dorr's  Adm*r  v. 
Rohr,  82  Ya.  359,  3  Am.  St  Rep.  100.  Where  a  suit  was  commenced  by  at- 
tachment, but  no  property  was  attached  or  garnished,  and  there  was  no  per- 
sonal service  on  the  defendant,  held,  that  a  Judgment  recorered  In  such  suit 
was  a  nullity.  Judah  v.  Stephenson,  10  Iowa,  493.  See  Demburg  v.  Tefft,  63 
111.  App.  33. 

8  2  Hollings worth  v.  Barbour,  4  Pet.  466,  7  L.  Ed.  922;  Philadelphia,  W.  & 
B.  R.  Ck).  V.  Trimble,  10  WaU.  367,  19  L.  Ed.  948;  Windsor  v.  McVeigh.  93  U. 
S.  277.  23  L.  Ed.  914;  Pennoyer  V.  Neff,  95  U.  S.  727,  24  L.  Ed.  565;  St  Clair 
V.  Cox,  106  U.  S.  353,  1  Sup.  Ct  354,  27  L.  Ed.  222;  Freeman  v.  Alderson,  119 
U.  S.  188,  7  Sup.  Ot.  165,  30  L.  Ed.  372;  Ward  v.  Boyce,  80  Hun,  499.  30  N.  Y. 
Supp.  491;  Berkowitz  v.  Brown,  3  Misc.  Rep.  1,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  792;  McGavock 
v.  Clark,  93  Va.  810,  22  S.  E.  864;  Ooger  v.  Coger,  48  W.  Va.  135,  35  S.  E.  823: 
Gunn  V.  Miller  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  26  S.  W.  278;  Luse  v.  Rankin,  57  Neb.  632, 
78  X.  W.  258;  Eliot  v.  McCormick,  144  Mass.  11,  10  N.  E.  7a");  Steen  v.  Steen. 
25  Miss.  513;  Smith  v.  State,  13  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  140;  Enos  t.  Smith.  7 
Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  85;  Flint  River  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Roberts,  2  Fla.  102.  48 
Am.  Dec.  178;  Madden  v.  Fielding,  19  La.  Ann.  505;  Wilson  v.  Johnson.  30 
Tex.  490;  Capehart  v.  Cunningham,  12  W.  Va.  750;  Hawley  v.  Heyman.  2S 
La.  Ann.  347;  Roberts  v.  Stowers,  7  Bush  (Ky.)  295;  North  v.  Moore,  8  Kan. 
143;  Ex  parte  Woods,  3  Ark.  532;  Anderson  v.  Miller,  4  Blackf.  (Ind.)  417: 
Smith  V.  Myers,  5  Blackf.  (Ind.)  223;  Wort  v.  Finley,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  SSo: 
Anderson  v.  Hawhe,  115  111.  33,  3  N.  E.  566;  Anderson  v.  Brown,  9  Mo.  6W>: 
Tyler  v.  Peatt,  30  Mich.  63.    But  It  Is  not  essential  to  the  validity  of  a  decree 

(330) 


Ch.  12)  VALIDITT,  AS  DEPENDENT  UPON  JDAXOSICTION.  §  221 

any  court,  in  a  suit  requiring  ordinary  adversary  proceedings,  that 
appears  upon  its  face  or  may  be  shown  by  evidence  (in  a  case  where 
it  may  be  shown)  to  have  been  rendered  without  jurisdiction  having 
been  acquired,  by  notice,  of  the  person  of  the  defendant,  or  without 
jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter,  is  void,  and  may  be  treated  as  being 
so  when  it  comes  in  question  collaterally.'*  •■  Nor  is  this  rule  con- 
fined to  judgments  at  law.  A  decree  in  chancery  against  a  defend- 
ant who  was  never  served  with  process  and  did  not  appear,  is  void 
and  may  be  set  aside  although  not  appealed  from.**  And  if  the  court 
has  not  acquired  jurisdiction  of  the  person  of  the  defendant,  as  in  the 
case  that  no  sufficient  process  has  been  served  upon  him,  no  judg- 
ment, even  of  abatement,  can  be  rendered  against  the  plaintiff ;  for 
the  defendant  must  become  a  party  before  the  court  before  he  can 
have  a  judgment."* 

I  221.    Statutes  dispenslns  with  Oltation. 

It  may  be  made  a  question  whether  the  legislature  of  a  state  can 
entirely  dispense  with  notice  or  citation  to  the  defendant  in  an  action. 
That  thi*  would  be  withm  its  competence,  is  strongly  intimated  in  an 
early  decision  of  the  supreme  court  of  Georgia.  "It  is  contended," 
said  Lumpkin,  J.,  "that  the  defendant  must  have  notice,  actual  or 
constructive,  otherwise  no  valid  judgment  could  be  rendered  against 
him.  We  are  not  inclined  to  controvert  this  general  rule.  On  the 
contrary  we  believe  it  to  be  well  established  by  the  authorities. 
There  are  several  suggestions  to  make,  however,  as  regards  this 
principle.  First,  that  it  only  obtains  in  the  absence  of  positive  law. 
The  legislature  may  unquestionably  authorize  a  judgment  to  be  ren- 

or  Judgment  that  it  should  be  served  upon  any  party  to  the  cause  after  it  is 
iiled.    Western  Security  Co.  v.  Lafleur,  17  Wash.  406,  49  Pac.  1061. 

ss  Homer  v.  State  Bank,  1  Ind.  130,  48  Am.  Dec.  355,  citing  Bliss  v.  Wilson, 
4  Blackf.  (Ind.)  I(i9;  Smith  v.  Myers.  5  Blackf.  (Ind.)  223;  Wort  v.  Finley,  8 
Blackf.  and.)  335;  Bloom  v.  Burdick,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.)  130,  37  Am.  Dec.  299; 
Buchanan  v.  Rucker,  9  East,  192;  Shaefer  v.  Gates,  2  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  453,  38 
Am.  Dec.  164;  Shriver  v.  Lynn,  2  How.  43,  11  L.  Ed.  172;  Westerwelt  v.  Lew- 
is. 2  McLean,  511.  Fed.  Cas.  No.  17,446;  Lincoln  v.  Tower,  2  McLean,  473, 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  8,ai5;  Hollingsworth  v.  Barbour,  4  Pet.  466,  7  L.  Ed.  922;  Camp- 
bell V.  Brown,  6  How.  (Miss.)  106;  Sheilton  v.  Tiffin,  0  How.  103,  12  L.  Ed.  387. 

»« Outhwite  V.  Porter.  13  Mich.  533. 

•s  King  V.  Poole,  36  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  242. 

(331) 


§  222  LAW  OF  JUDQMBNT8.  (Ch.  12 

dered  against  a  party  without  notice.  If  the  expression  used  in  the 
statute  will  admit  of  a  doubt,  it  will  not  then  be  presumed  that  a  con- 
struction dispensing  with  notice  can  be  agreeable  to  the  intention  of 
the  legislature,  the  consequences  of  which  are  so  unreasonable.  But 
where  the  signification  is  manifest,  there  is  no  power  of  dispensation 
in  the  courts."  ••  It  may  be  strongly  doubted,  however,  whether  this 
is  not  ascribing  an  excessive  power  to  the  legislature.  All  our  con- 
stitutions guarantee  the  rights  and  property  of  the  individual  against 
invasion  except  by  "due  process  of  law,"  which,  according  to  an 
eminent  writer,  means,  "in  each  particular  case,  such  an  exertion  of 
the  powers  of  government  as  the  settled  maxims  of  law  permit  and 
sanction,  and  under  such  safeguards  for  the  protection  of  individual 
rights  as  those  maxims  prescribe  for  the  class  of  cases  to  which  the 
one  in  question  belongs."  '^  We  are  unable  to  discover  any  possi- 
bility of  bringing  a  judgment,  rendered  without  any  species  of  notice 
to  the  defendant,  within  the  terms  of  this  definition.  The  question 
is  different  in  regard  to  the  constructive  service  of  process.  For 
this,  as  will  appear  hereafter,  can  in  general  only  be  used  in  a  pro- 
ceeding in  rem,  or  one  analogous  to  a  proceeding  in  rem,  and  is  not 
usually  recognized  as  giving  jurisdiction  for  a  personal  judgment, 
against  the  defendant,  but  only  for  an  adjudication  upon  the  res  or 
status  involved  or  for  a  decree  which  avails  only  against  the  property 
attached  or  found  within  the  territorial  jurisdiction. 

§  222.    Statutes  resnlAtins  Mode  of  Cttatioii. 

"It  is  competent  for  each  state  to  prescribe  the  mode  of  bringing 
parties  before  its  courts.  Although  its  regulations  in  this  respect 
can  have  no  extra-territorial  operation,  they  are,  nevertheless,  bind- 
ing on  its  own  citizens.  For  in  respect  to  its  own  resident  citizens, 
it  is  undoubtedly  competent  for  the  legislature  to  prescribe  such 
modes  of  judicial  proceeding  as  it  may  deem  proper,  to  direct  the 
manner  of  serving  process,  the  notice  which  shall  be  g^ven  to  de- 
fendants, and  to  declare  the  effect  of  a  judgment  rendered  in  pur- 

««  Flint  River  Steamboat  Co.  v,  Foster,  5  Ga.  202,  48  Am.  Dec.  24& 
87  Cooley,  Oonst.  Lim.  356.    And  see  Stuart  v.  Palmer,  74  X.  Y.  190,  30  Am. 
Rep.  289;   Ex  parte  Wall,  107  U.  S.  2C5,  2  Sup.  Ct.  560.  27  L.  Ed.  552;  Hagar 
V.  Reclamation  Dlst  No.  108,  111  U.  S.  707,  4  Sup.  Ct  663,  28  L.  Ed,  568. 
(332) 


Ch.  12)  VALIDITY.  AS  DEPENDENT  UPON  JURISDICTION.  §   22.*^ 

suance  of  such  notice."  •"  Hence  a  judgment  rendered  in  accordance 
with  the  requirements  of  the  statute,  though  without  actual  notice  to 
the  defendant  of  the  pendency  of  the  suit,  but  upon  such  citation  as 
the  law  authorizes  (e.  g.,  leaving  a  copy  of  the  summons  at  his  last 
usual  place  of  abode,  though  he  is  then  out  6f  the  state),  is  conclusive 
upon  the  parties  until  set  aside  by  some  direct  proceeding  for  that 
purpose.'*  But  statutes  allowing  other  than  personal  service  of  pro- 
cess must  be  strictly  complied  with  to  give  the  court  jurisdiction,  and 
it  is  held  that  this  compliance  must  appear  affirmatively  in  the  pro- 
ceedings.** 

S  223.    Defeets  in  the  Prooeis. 

If  the  defendant  is  to  be  notified  of  the  pendency  of  an  action 
against  him,  it  is  obvious  that  the  notice  must  be  in  itself  sufficient 
to  bring  him  properly  before  the  court.  Jurisdiction  is  dependent 
on  the  form  and  nature  of  the  process  to  the  extent  that  it  can  only 
arise  from  a  proper  service  of  a  notice  substantially  sufficient  to 
apprise  the  party  of  everything  which  he  is  then  entitled  to  know. 
If  this  requirement  is  met,  although  there  may  be  a  defect  in  the  no- 
tice such  as  to  render  the  subsequent  judgment  irregular,  there  will 
not  be  such  a  want  of  jurisdiction  as  to  make  it  void.  Mere  cog- 
nizance of  the  existence  of  the  action  is  not  a  notice  in  the  legal 
sense,  upon  which  a  valid  judgment  can  be  rendered.  To  be  avail- 
able,  the  notice  must  inform  the  party  whose  rights  are  to  be  aflPected 
of  what  is  required  of  him  and  the  consequences  which  may  follow 
if  he  neglects  to  defend  the  action.*^  Hence  a  judgment  rendered 
upon  service  of  a  notice  which  does  not  state  the  time  or  place  at 
which  the  defendant  is  required  to  appear  and  defend,  is  void.**  But 
where  it  appears  that  there  was  notice,  though  defective,  and  serv- 
ice, though  imperfect,  a  decision  of  the  court  to  which  the  process 

*»ThoTivenin  v.  Rodrlgues,  24  Tex.  4()8. 

»»  HurJbut  V.  Thomas.  55  Ccnn.  181,  10  Atl.  556,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  43. 

loZecharie  v.  Bowera.  1  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  5M,  40  Am.  Dec.  111.  A 
Judgment  rendered  against  lands  for  delinquent  taxes,  without  the  statutory 
notk-e.  Is  invalid.     Fortraan  v.  Ruggles,  58  111.  207. 

"  I'eabody  v.  Phelps,  »  Cal.  213. 

*»  Kltsmiller  r.  Kitchen,  24  Iowa,  163.  Acceptance  of  service  Is  no  waiver 
of  defects  in  a  summons  which  gave  no  notice  of  any  time  of  appearance. 
Kalkner  v.  GuUd,  10  Wis.  563. 

(333) 


§   224  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  12 

was  returnable  that  such  notice  and  service  were  sufficient,  will  not 
be  held  void  in  a  collateral  proceeding.**  Thus  if  a  judgment  is  ob- 
tained on  unsealed  process,  and  is  afterwards  revived  without  objec- 
tion, the  want  of  the  seal  does  not  impair  the  validity  of  the  judg- 
ment.** So  where  the  ftScer's  return  upon  mesne  process  is  not 
signed.**  And  a  judgment  is  not  invalidated  by  the  fact  of  an  un- 
necessary indorsement  of  the  amount  upon  the  summons.*'  Again, 
a  judgment  in  an  action  in  which  the  required  number  of  days'  notice 
was  not  given  to  the  defendant  is  erroneous,  but  not  void,  and  can- 
not be  questioned  in  a  collateral  proceeding.*^  So  a  long  summons 
issued  by  a  justice's  court  against  a  non-resident  of  the  county  is 
not  a  nullity,  though  the  statute  declares  that  in  such  case  the  justice 
shall  have  no  jurisdiction ;  the  defendant  waives  the  irregularity,  and 
gives  jurisdiction  as  to  his  person,  if  he  appears  and  pleads  to  the 
complaint  without  objection  to  the  process.** 

§  224.    Defeota  in  the  Service* 

Although  the  service  of  process  in  an  action  may  have  been  char- 
acterized by  some  defect  or  irregularity,  it  does  not  necessarily  fol- 
low that  the  ensuing  judgment  will  be  void.  For  if  the  party  would 
take  advantage  of  such  a  matter,  he  must  do  so  in  the  action  itself  by 
some  proper  motion  or  proceeding.  It  is  only  when  the  attempted 
service  is  so  irregular  as  to  amount  to  no  service  at  all,  that  there 
can  be  said  to  be  a  want  of  jurisdiction.  In  any  other  case,  there 
may  be  error  in  the  subsequent  proceedings,  but  they  will  be  sus- 
tained against  a  collateral  attack.**     But  a  judgment  recovered  by 

• 

*8  iSbawban  v.  Loffer,  24  Iowa,  217. 

**  Helghway  v.  Pendleton,  15  Obio,  735. 

*5  McElrath  V.  Butler,  29  X.  C.  2118. 

46  Larimer  v.  Clemmer,  31  Ohio  St.  4in). 

*7  Ballinger  v.  Tarbell,  lt>  Iowa.  491,  85  Am.  Dec.  527.  See  Glover  T. 
Holman,  3  Helsk.  (Tenn.)  519;  West  v.  Williamson,  1  Swan  (Teoa)  277. 
Compare  Johnson  v.  Baker,  38  111.  98,  87  Am.  Dec.  293. 

48  ciapp  V.  Graves,  26  N.  Y.  418. 

4»CampbeU  v.  Hays,  41  Miss.  561;  Christian  v.  O'Neal,  46  Miss.  669: 
Stewart  v.  Bodley,  46  Kan.  397,  26  Pac.  719,  26  Am.  St  Rep.  105;  W.  W. 
KimbaU  Co.  v.  Brown,  73  Minn.  167.  75  N.  W.  1043;  Ford  v.  Delta  &  Pine 
Land  Co.  (C.  C.)  43  Fed.  181.  Where  the  writ  Is  directed  to  an  officer  of 
another  county  than  that  where  the  action  is  brought,  in  vlolatton  at  & 

(334) 


Ch.  12)  VALIDITY.  AS  DEPENDENT  UPON  JURISDICTION.  §  225 

default,  upon  service  of  the  summons  by  delivery  of  a  copy  to  a  third 
person  who  is  not  a  resident  at  the  "house  of  defendant's  usual 
abode,"  is  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction.^®  And  so  a  citation  ad- 
dressed to  and  served  upon  a  stranger,  although  he  is  the  author- 
ized agent  of  the  defendant,  is  not  binding  upon  the  latter  and  will 
not  authorize  a  judgment  against  him.'^  So  a  judgment  by  default 
is  void,  when  the  service  had  upon  the  defendant  consisted  only  ot 
the  handing  to  him  by  plaintiff's  attorney  of  a  copy  of  the  declaration 
on  the  day  before  the  original  declaration  was  filed.'*  And  the  same 
consequences  were  held  to  result  in  a  case  where  the  return  to  the 
summons  was  made  in  the  name  of  a  deputy-sheriff  instead  of  in  the 
name  of  the  sheriff  himself.***  And  it  is  said  that  where  the  sheriff 
who  serves  the  writ  is  himself  the  plaintiff,  the  judgment  in  the  suit 
so  begun  is  a  nullity,  and  the  defendant  may  restrain  it  by  injunc- 
tion." 

§  225.    Appearance  as  a  Waiver  of  Citation* 

A  defendant  who  voluntarily  enters  a  general  appearance  in  an  ac- 
tion thereby  cures  a  want  of  citation,  or  waives  any  objections  which 
he  may  have  to  defects  or  irregularities  in  the  notice,  process,  or 
service,  so  that  the  court  acquires  full  jurisdiction  over  his  person.*^ 

statute,  the  judgment,  though  erroneous,  Is  not  void.  Brown  v.  Chapman. 
W  Va.  174,  17  SS.  E.  855.  "A  distinction  Is  to  be  made  between  a  case 
where  there  is  no  service  whatever,  and  one  which  is  simply  defective  or 
Irregular.  In  the  lirst  case,  the  court  acquires  no  Jurisdiction  and  its  Judg- 
ment 18  void;  in  the  other  case,  if  the  court  to  which  the  process  is  re- 
tiunable  adjudges  the  service  to  be  sufficient,  and  renders  Judgment  thereon, 
such  Judgment  Is  not  void,  but  only  subject  to  be  set  aside  by  the  court 
which  gave  it,  upon  seasonable  and  proper  application,  or  reversed  upon 
tppfeaL"  Isaacs  v.  Price,  2  Dill.  351,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  7,097.  See  Cole  v.  But- 
ler, 43  Me.  401;  Hcndrick  v.  Whittemore,  105  Mass.  23. 

»•  Heffner  v.  Gunz,  29  Minn.  108,  12  N.  W.  342. 

»i  Waddill  V.  Payne,  23  La.  Ann.  773.  In  an  action  against  a  firm,  the  error 
of  rendering  Judgment  against  the  members,  upon  mere  service  at  their  place 
of  business,  Is  not  waived  by  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  made  in  the  firm 
name,  but  subsequently  withdrawn.  Marienthal  v.  Amburgh,  2  Disney  (Ohio) 
58B. 

•2  South  Bend  Chilled  Plow  Co.  v.  Manahan,  62  Mich.  143,  28  N.  W.  768. 

••  Rowley  v.  Howard,  23  Cal.  401. 

•*  Knott  V.  Jarboe,  1  Mete.  (Ky.)  50i. 

ii  Shields  V.  Thomas,  18  How.  253,  15  L.  Ed«  368;  Toland  v.  Sprague,  12 

(335) 


§    225  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  12 

"While  it  is  true  that  a  judgment  without  personal  service  has  no 
extra-territorial  force,  it  is  equally  true  that  an  appearance,  either 
in  person  or  by  attorney,  has  the  same  force  and  effect  as  personal 
service,  and  a  judgment  rendered  against  a  party  who  appears  by  at- 
torney would  have  the  same  validity  in  any  state  of  the  Union  as 
where  it  was  rendered."  "•  And  it  is  held  that  a  defendant  who  vol- 
untarily appears  and  answers,  although  the  answer  in  terms  reserves 
the  right  to  object  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  is  precluded  thereby 
from  objecting  that  the  court  has  not  acquired  jurisdiction  of  his  per- 
son ;  for  a  voluntary  appearance  is  equivalent  to  personal  service  of 
the  summons.®^  But  it  is  necessary  that  he  should  actually  enter  an 
appearance  to  the  action  or  do  some  act  equivalent  thereto.  A  re- 
cital in  the  record,  by  the  clerk,  at  the  time  of  rendering  judgment, 
that  the  defendant  had  appeared  at  a  previous  term,  is  not  sufficient 
evidence  of  an  appearance  to  warrant  a  judgment  as  by  default.** 
And  a  general  entry  that  the  parties  appeared  means  only  that  those 
who  were  served  appeared. ••  It  is  also  to  be  remarked  that,  in  or- 
der to  have  this  effect,  the  appearance  must  be  general.  In  the  nature 
of  things,  a  special  appearance,  entered  for  the  sole  purpose  of  taking 
advantage  of  defects  or  irregularities  in  the  process  or  service,  can- 
not be  construed  as  a  waiver  of  those  objections. ••  So  an  appear- 
ance by  motion  to  set  aside  a  default,  entered  against  several  defend- 
ants served,  is  not  such  an  appearance  as  will  cure  a  want  of  service 

Pet.  300,  9  L.  Ed.  1093;  Segee  v.  Thomas,  3  Blatchf.  11,  Fed.  Ca».  No.  12.633; 
Payne  v.  l^^rmere'  &  Citizens'  Bank,  29  Conn.  415;  Christal  v.  KeUy,  88  X. 
y.  285;  Fox  v.  Reed,  3  Grant,  Cas.  (Pa.)  81;  Reynolds  v.  Lyon,  20  Ga.  225; 
Tipton  V.  Wright,  7  Bush  (Ky.)  448;  Mineral  Point  R.  Co.  v.  Keep,  22  fll 
9,  74  Am.  Dec.  124;  Miles  v.  Goodwin,  35  111.  53;  Baker  v.  Kerr,  13  lowt, 
384;  Jenners  v.  Spraker,  2  Ind.  App.  100,  27  X.  E.  117;  Adams  Exp.  Co.  v. 
Hill,  43  lud.  157;  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  r.  Nicholson,  00  Ind.  158; 
Fulbright  v.  Cannefox,  30  Mo.  425;  Suydam  v.  Pitcher,  4  CaL  280;  Harris 
V.  Gwin,  18  Miss.  503;  Choteau  v.  Rice,  1  Minn.  192  (Gil.  166);  Anderson  t. 
Morris,  12  Wis.  (>89;  Lane  v.  Leech,  44  Mich.  163,  6  N.  W.  228. 

66  Wilson  V.  Zeigler,  44  Tex.  657. 

B7  Mahaney  v.  Penman,  4  Duer  (N.  Y.)  603. 

88  Kimball  v.  Merrick,  20  Ark.  12. 

B»  Chester  v.  Miller,  13  Cal.  558.  ^See  Barker  v.  Shepard,  42  Miss.  277. 

eo  Ames  v.  >\insor.  19  Pick.  (Tenn.)  207;  Allen  v.  Lee,  6  Wis.  478;  Camp- 
bell V,  Swasey,  12  Ind.  70;  Nye  v.  Liscombe,  21  Pick.  (Tenn.)  263;  Standley 
V.  Arnow,  13  Fla.  361;  Mlchels  T.  Stork,  44  Mich.  2,  5  N.  W.  1034. 

(336) 


Ch.  12)  VALIDITY,  AS  DEPENDENT  UPON  JURISDICTION.  §   226 

upon  Others,  and  it  is  error  to  render  a  final  judgment  pending  such 
a  motion.'*     But  where  a  defendant,  after  appearing  specially  and 
obtaining  an  order  setting  aside  the  service  of  an  original  process, 
submits  the  cause  for  decision  on  a  demurrer  to  the  bill,  such  sub- 
mission constitutes  a  voluntary  appearance  and  gives  the  court  juris- 
diction of  the  person.'*    The  defendant  may  also  appear  by  his  au- 
thorized attorney,  and  this  is  equally  efficacious,  in  waiving  irreg- 
ularities and  conferring  jurisdiction,   as   an  appearance  in  person. 
Questions  may  sometimes  arise  as  to  the  right  of  an  attorney  to  ap- 
pear for  the  defendant,  but  usually  such  an  appearance  will  be  pre- 
sumed to  have  been  entered  with  authority.**     And  the  record  show- 
ing that  complainants  appeared  by  attorneys,  it  will  be  presumed  that 
the  attorneys  had  authority  to  appear  for  all  the  complainants.'* 
There  are  also  cases  holding  that  a  judgment  recovered  against  a 
defendant  who  was  not  served  with  process  and  had  no  knowledge 
of  the  suit,  but  for  whom  an  attorney  appeared  without  authority, 
cannot  be  attacked  for  want  of  jurisdiction  in  any  collateral  proceed- 
ing and  is  binding  upon  the  defendant.**     We  shall  consider  this 
point  in  a  later  section,  in  connection  with  the  rule  against  the  col- 
lateral impeachment  of  judgments.**     But  however  it  may  be  in  regard 
to  domestic  judgments,  it  is  very  well  settled  that  when  the  record 
comes  from  another  state,  a  recital  in  it  that  the  defendant  appeared 
by  attorney  is  conclusive  of  the  fact  of  such  appearance,  but  not  that 
the  attorney  was  authorized  to  appear,  and  the  latter  allegation  may 
be  controverted  by  the  defendant.*^     It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  add 
that  if  the  court  has  not  jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter,  that  ob- 

•1  Klemm  ▼.  Dewes,  28  lU.  317. 

«s  Lente  v.  Clarke,  22  Fla.  515,  1  Sontb.  149.  And  where  a  defendant,  after 
the  entry  of  a  decree  against  him  In  a  contested  action,  flies  a  bill  of  review, 
alleging  want  of  jurisdiction  over  him  personally,  he  thereby  submits  to  the 
ooart  the  question  of  the  binding  force  of  the  decree,  and  its  decision  thereon 
li  conclnaive.  Lawrence  v.  Nelson,  143  U.  S.  215,  12  Sup.  Ct  440,  36  L.  Ed. 
130. 

•B  ^fartln  t.  Judd,  00  lU.  78;  LesUe  y.  Fischer,  62  lU.  118. 

•*  Potter  V.  Farsons,  14  Iowa,  28«. 

•i  Brown  y.  Nichols,  42  X.  Y.  26;  England  y.  Garner,  90  N.  C.  197. 

••Infra,  i  272. 

•1  Infra,  toI.  2,  «  903. 

1  LAW  J  UDG.-22  (337) 


§   227  LAW  OP  JXTDOMENTa.  (Ch.  12 

jection  is  not  waived  by  appearing  to  the  action.     For  here  the  rule 
applies  that  "consent  cannot  confer  jurisdiction." 


S  226.    Defendant's  Bli^t  to  be  heard. 

It  has  been  declared  by  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States 
that  "a  sentence  of  a  court  pronounced  against  a  party  without  hear- 

m 

ing  him  or  giving  him  an  opportunity  to  be  heard,  is  not  a  judicial 
determination  of  his  rights,  and  is  not  entitled  to  respect  in  any  other 
tribunal."  In  the  case  at  bar,  the  trial  court  had  caused  the  appear- 
ance of  the  defendant  to  be  stricken  out,  but  had  nevertheless  pro- 
ceeded with  the  case  arid  passed  a  judgment  affecting  his  rights. 
This,  in  the  opinion  of  a  majority  of  the  court,  was  equivalent  to  deny- 
ing him  the  benefit  of  the  citation.  For  jurisdiction,  it  was  said, 
was  the  right  to  hear  and  determine,  not  to  determine  without  hear- 
ing. And  where,  as  in  that  case,  no  appearance  was  allowed,  there 
could  be  no  hearing  or  opportunity  of  being  heard,  and  therefore 
there  could  be  no  exercise  of  jurisdiction.  By  the  action  of  the  court 
the  defendant  was  excluded  from  its  jurisdiction.*"  And  this  doc- 
trine derives  some  support  from  the  cases  holding  that  opportunity 
to  be  heard  is  absolutely  essential  to  the  guarantee  of  "due  process 
of  law."  *•  Nevertheless,  for  the  reasons  stated  in  the  beginning  of 
this  chapter,  in  defining  jurisdiction,  we  are  not  convinced  that  irreg- 
ularities in  the  action  of  the  court,  even  so  gross  as  those  mentioned, 
can  properly  be  said  to  deprive  it  of  all  jurisdiction  and  make  its  de- 
cision a  mere  nullity. 

§  227.    JvdKnients  agalnat  Non-Residents. 

It  IS  a  principle  of  law,  too  well  settled  to  require  the  citation  of 
authorities  in  its  support,  that  the  sovereignty  of  a  state  or  country, 
for  judicial  as  well  as  other  purposes,  extends  only  to  its  own  citi- 
zens, or  resident  aliens,  or  persons  temporarily  within  its  borders, 
and  to  property  within  its  territory,  but  not  to  absent  non-residents. 
In  many  of  our  states,  however,  there  are  statutes  authorizing  the 

68  Windsor  v.  McVeigh,  93  U.  S.  274,  23  Lu  Ed.  914;  Hovey  v.  fiaUott,  169 
U.  S.  409,  17  Sup.  Ct.  841,  42  L.   Ed.  215. 

69  Stiiart  V.  Palmer,  74  N.  Y.  190,  30  Am.  Bep.  280. 

(338) 


Ch.  12)  VALIDITY.  AS  DEPENDENT  UPON  JURISDICTION.  S  227 

• 

commencement  of  certain  classes  of  actions  by  a  merely  constructive 
service  of  process,  and  these  acts  apply  almost  exclusively  to  pro- 
ceedings against  non-residents.  The  validity  of  judgments  rendered 
under  them  has  been  much  in  question  before  the  courts,  and  prin- 
cipally in  cases  where  a  judgment  so  given  in  one  state  has  been 
sought  to  be  enforced  in  another.  This  aspect  of  the  subject  will  be 
fully  considered  in  the  chapter  on  judgments  of  a  sister  state,  to 
which  the  reader  is  referred.  But  there  are  certain  divisions  of  the 
topic  which  must  be  treated  in  this  connection.  And  first,  a  distinc- 
tion must  be  carefully  noted  between  the  jurisdiction  over  the  state's 
own  citizens  and  that  over  aliens.  Every  sovereignty  has  plenary 
control  over  its  own  subjects,  and  it  may  authorize  a  judgment  to  be 
rendered  against  one  of  its  citizens,  upon  a  constructive  notice  only, 
and  although  he  is  temporarily  absent  from  its  dominions,  and  such 
a  judgment  must  be  everywhere  recognized  as  valid  and  of  binding 
force  and  effect.^*  This  much  being  premised,  the  contrary  rule  may 
be  stated,  viz. :  that  a  personal  judgment  (as  distinguished  from  an 
adjudication  upon  status  or  an  adjudication  which  is  substantially  in 
rem)  rendered  against  a  non-resident  upon  a  species  of  constructive 
service  only,  in  an  action  to  which  he  did  not  appear,  is  limited  in 
its  effects  to  the  state  or  country  where  rendered,  and  elsewhere  is  a 
mere  nullity  J*     For  example,  while  tax  assessments  may  be  enforced 

f «  Board  v.  Beard,  21  Ind.  321;  Douglas  v.  Forrest,  4  Bing.  686;  Becquet 
T.  McCarthy,  2  Bam.  &  Adol.  U51;  McRae  v.  Mattoon,  13  Pick.  (Mass.)  53; 
Henderson  v.  Staniford,  105  Mass.  504,  7  Am.  Rep.  551;  Orcutt  v.  Ranney, 
10  CTOh.  (Mass.)  183;  Welch  v.  Sykes,  3  Gilman  (lU.)  197,  44  Am.  Dec.  689; 
Price  V.  HJckok,  39  Vt.  292;  Spencer  v.  Brockway,  1  Ohio,  259,  13  Am.  Dec. 
«irj;  Rangely  v.  Webster,  11  X.  H.  299;  Hinton  v.  Townes,  1  Hill  (S.  C.) 
439;  Hunt  V.  Lyle,  8  Vcrg.  (Term.)  142;  Gilman  v.  Lewis,  24  N.  J.  Law,  246, 
note. 

Ti  Schibsbr  v.  Westenholz,  L.  R.  6  Q.  B.  155;  Buchanan  v.  Rucker,  0  East, 
192;  I'ennojer  v.  Xeff,  95  U.  S.  714,  24  L.  Ed.  565;  Blschoff  v.  Weathered, 
9  WaU.  812,  19  L.  Ed.  829;  Cooper  v.  Reynolds,  10  Wall.  308,  19  L.  Ed.  931; 
llioDipson  V.  Whitman.  18  Wall.  457,  21  L.  Ed.  897;  Knowles  v.  Logansport 
CJagilght  &  Coke  Co..  19  Wall.  58,  22  L.  Ed.  70;  D'Arcy  v.  Ketehum,  11  How. 
165,  13  L.  Ed.  VAH;  l»helj)8  v.  Brewer,  9  Cush.  (Mass.)  390,  57  Am.  Dec.  56; 
Xewcomb  v.  I'eck,  17  Vt.  302,  44  Am.  Dec.  340;  Carleton  v.  Blckford,  13 
Gray  (Mass.)  5ta,  74  Am.  Dec.  652;  Hoffman  v.  Hoffman,  46  N.  Y.  30,  7  Am. 
Rep.  299;  Zepp  v.  Hager,  70  111.  223;  Aldrich  v.  Kinney,  4  Conn.  380,  10  Am. 
Uec.  151;  Beber  v.  Wright,  68  Pa.  471;  Pagett  v.  Curtis,  15  La.  Ann.  461; 

(339) 


§  227  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Oh.  12 

against  the  property  liable,  without  regard  to  the  residence  of  the 
owner,  yet  a  statute  attempting  to  make  a  nonresident  property 
owner  personally  liable  for  assessments  for  local  improvements  is  an 
attempt  to  take  property  without  due  process  of  law,  and  a  personal 
judgment  against  such  owner  would  be  void.^^  Again,  in  a  suit  to 
foreclose  a  mortgage  or  vendor's  lien,  where  the  defendant  is  a  non- 
resident and  is  cited  by  pubHcation  only  and  does  not  enter  an  appear- 
ance, the  court  has  no  jurisdiction  to  render  a  personal  judgment 
against  him.''*  And  where,  in  an  action  for  the  specific  performance 
of  a  contract  for  the  conveyance  of  lands,  defendant  is  served  only 
by  publication,  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  damages  for  breach  of  the 
contract.''*  Nor  can  a  personal  judgment  for  costs  be  rendered  in 
an  action  for  partition,  as  against  non-residents  who  were  not  served 
with  process,  except  constructively,  and  who  did  not  voluntarily  ap- 
pear.''* 

But  if  a  non-resident  defendant,  being  within  the  state,  is  there  per- 
sonally served  with  process,^*  or  if  he  appears  in  the  action  by  a  duly 
authorized  attorney,^ ^  in  either  case  the  court  has  jurisdiction  over 
him  and  the  subsequent  judgment  is  universally  to  be  regarded  as 
valid.  And  error  in  rendering  a  personal  judgment  on  default  against 
a  defendant  who  is  a  non-resident,  and  had  notice  only  by  publica- 

Park  v.  Park,  24  Misc.  Rep.  372,  53  N.  Y.  Supp.  677;  Belcher  v.  Sheehan.  171 
Mass.  513,  51  N.  E.  19;  LoulsvUle  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Nash,  118  Ala.  477,  23 
South.  825,  41  L.  R.  A.  331,  72  Am.  St.  Rep.  181;  Bradley  v.  Burnett  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.)  40  S.  W.  170;  Fowler  v.  Brown.  51  Neb.  414,  71  X.  W,  54. 

T2  Dewey  v.  City  of  Des  MoiDes,  173  U.  S.  193,  19  Sup.  Ct  379.  43  L.  Ed. 
(K>5. 

73  Ward  V.  Green  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  28  S.  W.  574;  Spence  v,  Morris  (Tex,  Civ. 
App.)  28   S.    W.  405. 

74  Tempel  v.  Dodge,  11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  42,  31  S.  W.  686.  See  Hardy  t. 
Beaty,  84  Tex.  502,  lt>  S.  W.  778,  31  Am.  St.  Rep.  80. 

T5  Freeman  v.  Preston  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  29  S.  W.  495. 

7«  Mowry  v.  Chase,  100  Mass.  79;  Downer  v.  Shaw,  22  N.  H.  277;  Murphy 
▼.  Winter,  18  Ga.  090. 

77  Holt  V.  AHoway,  2  Blackf.  (Ind.)  108;  Walker  v.  Lathrop,  6  Iowa,  516; 
Davis  V.  Davis.  9G  Ga.  136.  21  S.  B.  1002.  A  court  has  jurisdiction  to  render 
a  valid  judgment  against  a  corporation  of  a  foreign  state,  whenever  the  cor- 
poration appears  generally  by  attorney,  or  when  legal  service  has  been  made 
upon  it  according  to  the  laws  of  the  state  where  the  court  sits.  Mardi  v. 
Eastern  R.  Co.,  40  N.  H.  548,  77  Am.  Dec  732, 

(3^0) 


Ch.  12)  VALIDITY.  AS  DEPENDENT  UPON  JURISDICTION.  §  228 

tion,  IS  not  available  on  behalf  of  a  co-defendant  who  appeared.^'  In 
some  of  the  states  there  are  also  statutory  provisions  that  an  action 
can  be  commenced  and  judgment  rendered  only  in  the  county  in 
which  the  defendant  resides.  And  it  has  been  held  that  this  requisite 
is  so  jurisdictional  in  its  character  that  a  judgment  rendered  in  an- 
other county  is  void  and  incapable  of  ratification."'*  But  the  better 
view  appears  to  be  that  the  defendant  may  waive  this  objection.'** 

§  228.    ZhEtra-Terrltorial   Serrioe  of  Process. 

It  is  a  recognized  rule  of  international  law  that  "no  sovereignty 
can  extend  its  process  beyond  its  own  territorial  limits  to  subject 
either  persons  or  property  to  its  judicial  decisions.  Every  exertion 
of  authority  of  this  sort  beyond  this  limit  is  a  mere  nullity,  and  inca- 
pable of  binding  such  persons  or  property  in  any  other  tribunals."  '^ 
And  this  principle  is  fully  adopted  by  the  American  cases.  "Process 
from  the  tribunals  of  one  state  cannot  run  into  another  state  and 
summon  parties  there  domiciled  to  leave  its  territory  and  respond  to 
proceedings  against  them.  Publication  of  process  or  notice  within 
the  state  where  the  tribunal  sits  cannot  create  any  greater  obliga- 
tion upon  the  non-resident  to  appear.  Process  sent  to  him  out  of 
the  state,  and  process  published  within  it,  are  equally  unavailing  in 
proceedings  to  establish  his  personal  liability."  •*  Therefore  if  a 
summons  is  sent  by  mail  to  a  non-resident  defendant  and  comes  to 
his  hands,  or  is  served  upon  him  at  his  own  domicile  by  an  officer  of 
the  law,  although  it  does  actually  apprise  him  of  the  suit  against  him, 
yet  it  has  no  greater  or  other  effect  than  a  purely  constructive  or 
fictitious  service.  It  fails  for  lack  of  authority  in  the  sovereignty 
whence  it  emanated.  It  does  not  bind  him  to  appear,  and  no  judg- 
ment can  be  rendered  on  it  which  will  be  recognized  as  valid  beyond 
the  limits  of  the  state  which  rendered  it.'*     In  some  of  the  states, 

»•  Pattlfion  y.  Smith.  03  Ind.  447. 

^»  Rk-banlson  v.  Hunter,  23  La.  Ann.  255;  Georgia  Railroad  &  Banking  Co. 
T.  Harris.  5  <;«.  ri27. 

••  Leach  v.  Kohn,  36  Iowa.  144. 

•1  Story.  Ooiifl.  I.aw«.  i  539. 

•»  Pennoyer  t.  Xeff.  05  U.  S.  714,  727,  24  L.  Ed.  565. 

»»  Wnson  V.  (Iraham.  4  Wash.  C.  C.  53.  Fed.  Cas.  No.  17.804;  Hall  v.  WIl- 
Uams,  6  Pick.  (Mass.)  232,  17  Am.  Dec.  356;  Folger  y.  Columbian  Ins.  Co..  09 

(341) 


§   229  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  12 

however,  an  attempt  is  made  to  discriminate  between  the  two  species 
of  service,  and  to  attach  a  slightly  higher  value  to  actual  service, 
though  extra-territorial,  than  to  service  by  published  advertisement, 
probably  in  view  of  the  fact  that,  by  the  former  method,  it  is  certain 
that  the  defendant  will  at  least  be  informed  of  the  proceedings  against 
him.  Thus  in  Iowa,  under  a  statute  providing  that  "when  a  judg- 
ment has  been  rendered  against  a  defendant  or  defendants,  served 
by  publication  only,  and  who  do  not  appear,"  such  defendant  may 
appear  within  two  years  and  move  the  court  for  a  retrial,  it  is  held 
that  this  provision  does  not  apply  to  the  case  of  a  defendant  who 
was  personally  served  outside  the  state  and  did  not  appear  in  the 
action.** 

fi  220.    JurUdiotlon  by  AttaohmeBt  of  Non-Resident's  Property. 

Although  a  person  may  not  reside  in  a  particular  state,  it  fre- 
quently happens  that  he  may  have  property  there,  either  real  or  per- 
sonal. And  this,  it  is  said,  will  give  the  courts  of  that  state  juris- 
diction of  actions  against  him.  Accordingly,  there  are  statutes  in 
most  of  the  states  providing  for  the  institution  of  suits  against  non- 
residents by  the  attac'  *-^ent  of  their  property  within  the  territory. 
But  it  must  be  carefu.  ^  noted  that  the  jurisdiction  is  in  realty  over 
the  property,  not  the  person.  The  existence  of  property  within  a 
state  gives  its  courts  power  and  authority  to  adjudicate  upon  that 

Mass.  267,  96  Am.  Dec.  747;  Price  v.  Hlckok,  39  Vt  292:  Steel  v.  Smith,  7 
Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  447;  Holmes  v.  Holmes,  4  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  388;  Drnn  v.  Dunn. 
4  Paige  (N.  Y.)  425;  Lutz  v.  Kelly,  47  Iowa.  307;  Irby  v.  Wilson,  18  N.  C.  5*W: 
Weil  V.  Lowenthal,  10  Iowa,  575;  .a^tna  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lyon  Coimty  (G  C) 
95  Fed.  325;  In  re  James*  Estate,  78  Hun,  121,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  992;  Hinton 
V.  Penn  Mut  Life  Ins.  Co.,  120  N.  C.  18,  35  S.  E.  182,  78  Am.  St.  Rep.  tS3«; 
Perry  v.  Bassett,  16  Tex.  Civ.  App.  288.  41  S.  W.  523;  Higgins  v.  Beokwitli. 
102  Mo.  456, 14  S.  W.  981.  The  rule  applies  also  as  between  one  of  tlie  United 
States  and  any  foreign  country.  The  Judgment  of  a  Canadian  or  any  foreign 
court,  upon  service  of  its  process  made  in  Michigan,  is  not  binding  on  a  de- 
fendant who  refused  to  recognize  its  jurisdiction,  and  it  will  not  support  an 
action  in  the  courts  of  Michigan.  McEwan  v.  ZImmer,  38  Mich.  765,  31  Am. 
Rep.  332.  But  Jurisdiction  over  one  outside  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the 
court  is  conferred  by  his  acceptance  of  "due  personal  service"  of  the  writ 
Jones  V.  Merrill,  113  Mich.  433,  71  N.  W.  838.  67  Am.  SL  Rep.  475. 
8*  McBride  v.  Ham,  52  Iowa.  79,  2  N.  W.  962. 

(342) 


Ch.  12)  VALIDITY.  AS  DEPENDENT  UPON  JURISDICTION.  §  229 

property  and  to  cause  it  to  be  applied  in  satisfaction  of  the  debts  of 
its  owner,  whoever  and  wherever  he  may  be.  But  if  they  assume  to 
investigate  the  owner's  duties  and  determine  his  obHgations,  their 
authority  to  do  so  is  merely  incidental  to  their  jurisdiction  over  his 
property,  and  because  such  an  inquiry  is  a  necessary  preliminary  to 
a  right  disposition  of  the  property,  but  not  because  they  have  any 
control  over  his  person.  Consequently,  "when  the  person  is  not 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  and  his  property  is  within  its 
jurisdiction,  a  judgment  against  him  will  be  effectual  only  as  a  judg- 
ment in  rem  acting  upon  that  property."  *•  Hence,  also,  if  the  de- 
fendant was  beyond  the  jurisdiction  and  was  only  constructively  noti- 
fied of  the  action,  though  his  property  was  attached  within  the  state, 
there  is  no  warrant  for_a-PC£sonal  judgment  agfainst  himj.  and  if  the 
judgment  is  expressed  in  general  language,  it  cannot  be  considered 
or  treated  as  a  judgment  in  personam,  but  only  as  a  judgment  in 
rem.**  Further,  a  judgment  founded  upon  this  species  of  jurisdic- 
tion will  have  no  force  or  eflfect,  beyond  the  state  where  it  was  ren- 
dered, further  than  to  bind  the  property  attached  and  disposed  of.'^ 
For  the  further  elucidation  of  this  subject  we  quote  the  following 
from  an  opinion  of  the  supreme  court  of  Minnesota.  "Such  a  judg- 
ment, though  in  form  a  judgment  in  personam,  is  in  eflfect  only  a 
judgment  in  rem.     It  is  a  judgment  for  no  other  purpose  than  to 

•»  Lorejoy  v.  Albee,  33  Me.  414,  54  Am.  Dec.  630;  Molyneux  v.  Seymour, 
30  Ga.  440,  76  Am.  Dec.  662;  Du  Pont  v.  Abel  (C.  C.)  81  Fed.  634;  McAUister 
T.  Gnicj^enhelmer,  91  Va.  317,  21  S.  E.  475;  Exchange  Nat.  Bank  y.  Olement, 
109  Ala.  270,  19  8outh.  814. 

••  Johnson  ▼.  Dodge,  19  Iowa,  106;  Payne  v.  Witherspoon,  14  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 
270;  Mickey  v.  Stratton,  5  Sawy.  475,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  9,530;  Packard  v.  >Iat- 
thewe,  9  Gray  (Mass.)  311.  See  Brown  y.  Tucker,  7  Colo.  30,  1  Pac.  221.  The 
fact  that  the  court  rendered  a  personal,  and  therefore  yold,  judgment  against 
a  non-resident  defendant  not  seryed,  will  not  yitlate  so  much  of  the  Judgment 
as  Unds  the  amount  due  to  the  plaintiff  and  orders  the  sale  of  attached  prop- 
erty.   Barelli  v.  Wogner,  5  Tex.  Ciy.  App.  445,  27  S.  W.  17. 

»T  Phelps  r.  Holker,  1  Dall.  (Pa.)  261,  1  L.  Ed.  128;  Galpin  v.  Poge,  18  Wall. 
35a  21  L.  Ed.  959;  Cooper  v.  Reynolds,  10  Wall.  308,  19  L.  Ed.  931;  Pen- 
Doyer  v.  Neff.  95  IJ.  S.  725,  24  L.  Ed.  505;  Pawling  v.  Willson,  13  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
192;  McDermott  t.  Clary,  107  Mass.  501;  Amdt  v.  Amdt,  15  Ohio,  33;  Wood- 
ruff T.  Taylor,  20  Vt  65;  McVlcker  v.  Beedy,  31  Me.  314,  1  Am.  Rep.  606; 
WiUlams  t.  Preston,  3  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  600,  20  Am.  Dec.  179;  Story,  Confl. 
Laws,  i  549.    See  infra,  yol.  2,  §  904. 

(343) 


§   229  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  12 

reach  the  property  which  a  non-resident  may  have  in  the  state,  but 
who  is  not  personally  served  with  process  therein.  It  is  confined 
exclusively  to  such  property,  and  is  of  no  further  force  when  that  is 
exhausted.  Beyond  this  it  is  evidence  of  nothing ;  nor  does  it  bind 
or  conclude  the  defendant  in  anything.  An  action  could  not  be 
maintained  on  it  in  any  other  court  here  or  elsewhere ;  nor,  in  my 
opinion,  would  the  party  in  whose  favor  it  was  rendered  be  pre- 
cluded thereby  from  still  bringing  another  action  on  the  original  con- 
sideration, for  any  balance  that  might  be  due  to  him  after  exhausting 
the  property  which  was  in  the  state  at  the  time  jurisdiction  attached. 
To  hold  that  a  judgment  thus  rendered  has  any  vitality  after  ex- 
hausting the  only  thing  over  which  the  court  rendering  it  had  juris- 
diction, is  violative  of  a  principle  inherent  in  all  free  governments  and 
which  constitutes  an  inflexible  rule  at  common  law,  viz.,  that  no  one 
can  be  condemned  unheard."  **  Very  important  consequences  fol- 
low from  considering  a  judgment  of  this  character  as  one  in  rem 
only.  Thus  it  cannot  be  rfiade  the  basis  of  an  action  of  debt.** 
Nor  can  proceedings  be  taken  against  the  defendant  to  compel  him 
to  submit  to  an  examination  concerning  his  property;  nor  can  the 
plaintiff  have  a  warrant  for  his  arrest,  as  prescribed  by  the  code,  on 
account  of  his  refusal  to  apply  property  in  satisfaction  of  such  judg- 
ment.®®  So  again,  the  power  of  a  court  to  render  a  personal  judg- 
ment against  the  mortgagor  for  a  deficiency,  in  an  action  for  the 
foreclosure  of  the  mortgage,  does  not  extend  to  a  case  where  the 
mortgagor  is  a  non-resident  and  has  neither  appeared  in  the  action 
nor  been  served  with  process  within  the  state.  The  remedy  of  the 
plaintiff  in  such  case  is  Hmited  to  the  foreclosure  and  sale  of  the 
equity   of   redemption   in   the   mortgaged   premises.**      In   a  case^ 

88  stone  V.  Myers,  9  Minn.  303  (Gil.  287),  86  Am.  Dec.  104. 

80  Easterly  v.  Goodwin,  35  Conn.  273.  Where  a  Judgment  Is  rendered  In 
rem,  and  the  property  attached  is  exhausted,  service  of  a  summons  to  renew 
the  execution,  and  an  order  of  court  granting  a  renewal,  do  not  make  the 
Judgment  one  in  personam.    Stanley  v.  Stanley,  35  S.  O.  M,  14  S.  E.  675. 

90  Bartlett  v.  McNeil,  GO  N.  Y.  53. 

91  Schwlnger  v.  Hlckok,  53  N.  Y.  280;  Heady  y.  Bexar  Bldg.  &  Loan  Ass'n 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.)  26  S.  W.  468;  Ward  v.  Green  (Tex.  dv.  App.)  28  8.  W.  574. 
Where  a  plaintiff  in  possession  of  land  obtained  a  Judgment  against  a  defend- 
ant a  non-resident  of  the  state,  upon  service  by  publicaticm  only,  and  without 
bis  appearance  in  court,  and  after\vai*ds  the  defendant  in  such  action  brougbt 

(344) 


Ch.  12)  VALIDITY,  AS  DEPENDENT  UPON  JURISDICTION.  §   230 

where,  after  attachment  of  property  and  publication  of  a  citation, 
the  plaintiff  filed  an  amended  petition,  setting  up  an  entirely  new 
cause  of  action,  on  which  judgment  by  default  was  rendered  without 
any  further  citation  being  published  or  service  had,  it  was  held  that 
the  court  acquired  no  jurisdiction  and  the  judgment  was  entirely 
void.**  But  after  an  appearance  and  plea  by  the  defendant  in  a 
suit  commenced  by  attachment,  in  which  there  has  been  only  con- 
structive service  by  publication,  the  suit  becomes  one  in  personam, 
and  a  personal  judgment  may  properly  be  rendered  against  him.** 
So  where  the  non-resident  defendant  acknowledges  service  of  the 
writ  and  waives  the  benefit  of  the  statutes  respecting  absent  defend- 
ants.** 

f  230.    Wliat   Propiertjr  bound* 

There  are  numerous  intimations  in  the  books  (though  perhaps  no 
direct  decision)  to  the  effect  that  a  judgment  against  a  non-resident, 
founded  upon  constructive  service  and  attachment  of  property,  will 
be  valid  and  enforceable,  not  only  against  the  property  actually 
seized,  but  also  against  any  other  property  of  his  within  the  state. 
In  other  words,  that  any  property  of  the  defendant  found  within  the 
territorial  jurisdiction  may  be  subjected  to  execution  under  the 
judgment,  although  it  is  not  a  personal  obligation  against  him.  And 
a  case  in  New  York  holds  that  such  a  judgment  is  effectual  against 
any  property  within  the  jurisdiction  during  the  pendency  of  the  ac- 
tion and  which  was  or  might  have  been  seized  under  attachment 
therein.**  That  these  views  are  entirely  untenable  will  be  at  once 
apparent  if  we  consider  the  real  nature  of  such  a  proceeding.     It 

Bootber  action,  as  plaintiff,  against  the  former  plaintiff,  as  defendant,  in  the 
coutg  of  another  state,  held,  that  in  the  trial  of  such  subsequent  action,  the 
judgment  in  the  first  action  was  conclusive  of  the  rights  of  said  parties  to  the 
land  in  dispute.  Venable  v.  Dutch,  37  Kan.  515,  15  Pac.  520,  1  Am.  St  Uep. 
260. 

»«  Stewart  v.  Anderson,  70  Tex.  588,  8  S.  W.  295. 

•»  Kerr  v.  Swallow,  33  111.  379;  Darrah  v.  Watson,  36  Iowa,  116. 

*«  Rlchardiion  v.  Smith,  11  Allen  (Mass.)  134. 

»» Fiske  V.  Anderson,  33  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  71.  And  in  Vermont  it  is  held  that  a 
Judgment  against  a  non-resident  defendant,  rendered  without  notice,  will  not 
•'♦»  adjudged  invalid  as  a  matter  of  law,  because  the  property  returned  as  at- 
tached was  of  merely  nominal  value.    Stevens  v.  Fisher,  30  Vt  200. 

(345) 


§   231  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS  ((%.  l2 

was  shown  in  the  preceding  section  to  be  substantially  a  proceeding 
in  rem.  But  in  a  proceeding  in  rem  jurisdiction  is  acquired  only  by 
seizure  of  the  res,  and  the  judgment  is  enforceable  only  against  the 
res.  It  is  therefore  contrary  to  fundamental  principles  to  attempt 
to  extend  its  operation  against  property  which  was  not  seized,  al- 
though, being  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  state,  it  might  have 
been  attached.  And  many  well  considered  cases  are  explicit  in  de- 
claring that  such  a  judgment  has  no  other  force  or  validity  whatever 
than  to  justify  the  disposition  made  of  the  property  which  was  actu- 
ally attached  upon  mesne  process  in  the  action.** 

i  231.    Serrioe  hj  PnbUoatioa  witkont  Attm«]uii6Bt. 

Some  of  the  decisions  hold  that  constructive  service  by  publica- 
tion, without  attachment  of  property,  will  give  the  court  such  juris- 
diction over  a  non-resident  that  its  judgment,  though  not  enforce- 
able beyond  the  state,  may  be  satisfied  out  of  any  property  of  the 
defendant  found  within  the  borders  of  the  state ;  '^  or  any  property 
which  was  within  the  state  at  the  time  the  order  for  publication  was 
made,  and  which  is  not  removed  or  sold  to  a  bona  fide  purchaser  be- 
fore the  judgment."*  But  this  position  was  successfully  contro- 
verted in  the  important  and  leading  case  of  Pennoyer  v.  NeflF,**  and 
the  rule  established  that  such  a  judgment  (except  in  an  action  for 
divorce,  which  is  governed  by  special  rules,  to  be  considered  here- 
after ^^^)  is  simply  and  entirely  void  for  all  purposes'.  The  correct 
view  is  so  clearly  and  ably  stated  in  this  decision  that  we  quote  at 
some  length  from  the  opinion.     "The  want  of  authority,"  said  Field, 

»«  Pennoyep  v.  Neff,  95  U.  S.  714,  24  L.  Ed.  565;  Graham  v.  Spencer  (C.  C.) 
14  Fed.  608;  Eastman  v.  Wadleigh,  65  Me.  251,  20  Am.  Rep.  695;  ColemaD*s 
Appeal,  75  Pa.  441;  Tabler  v.  MitcheH,  62  Miss.  437;  Johnson  T.  Holley.  27 
Mo.  594. 

•7  Quarl  V.  Abbett,  102  Ind.  233,  1  N.  E.  476,  52  Am.  Rep.  662. 

»8  Jarvis  v.  Barrett.  14  Wis.  591. 

»»  95  U.  S.  714,  24  L.  Ed.  5C5. 

100  infra^  vol.  2,  §§  924r-933.  In  an  action  for  maintenance  without  dlTorce. 
against  a  non-resident  husband,  who  is  served  by  publication  and  does  not  ap- 
pear, a  provision  of  the  Judgment  requiring  him  to  give  bond  to  comply  with 
a  condition  of  the  judgment  as  to  alimony  Is  invalid.  Murray  v.  Murray,  11^ 
Cul.  2(;n,  47  Vac,  37,  37  L.  R.  A.  020,  oO  Am.  St  Rep.  97. 

(340) 


Ch.  12)  VAUDITY.  AS  DEPENDENT  UPON  JURISDICTION.  §  231 

J.,  "of  the  tribunals  of  a  state  to  adjudicate  upon  the  obligations  of 
non-residents,  where  they  have  no  property  within  its  limits,  is  not 
denied  by  the  court  below ;  but  the  position  is  assumed  that,  where 
they  have  property  within  the  state,  it  is  immaterial  whether  the 
property  is  in  the  first  instance  brought  under  the  control  of  the 
court  by  attachment  or  some  other  equivalent  act,  and  afterwards 
applied  by  its  judgment  to  the  satisfaction  of  demands  against  its 
owner;  or  such  demands  be  first  established  in  a  personal  action, 
and  the  property  of  the  non-resident  be  afterwards  seized  and  sold 
on  execution.  But  the  answer  to  this  position  has  already  been 
given  in  the  statement  that  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  to  inquire 
into  and  determine  his  obligations  at  all  is  only  incidental  to  its  ju- 
risdiction over  the  property.  Its  jurisdiction  in  that  respect  cannot 
be  made  to  depend  upon  facts  to  be  ascertained  after  it  has  tried 
the  cause  and  rendered  the  judgment.  If  the  judgment  be  previ- 
ously void,  it  will  not  become  valid  by  the  subsequent  discovery  of 
property  of  the  defendant,  or  by  his  subsequent  acquisition  of  it. 
The  judgment,  if  void  when  rendered,  will  always  remain  void;  it 
cannot  occupy  the  doubtful  position  of  being  valid  if  property  be 
found  and  void  if  there  be  none.  Even  if  the  position  assumed  were 
confined  to  cases  where  the  non-resident  defendant  possessed  prop- 
erty in  the  state  at  the  commencement  of  the  action,  it  would  still 
make  the  validity  of  the  proceedings  and  judgment  depend  upon  the 
question  whether,  before  the  levy  of  the  execution,  the  defendant 
had  or  had  not  disposed  of  the  property.  If  before  the  levy  the 
property  should  be  sold,  then  according  to  this  position,  the  judg- 
ment would  not  be  binding.  This  doctrine  would  introduce  a  new 
element  of  uncertainty  in  judicial  proceedings.  The  contrary  is  the 
law;  the  validity  of  every  judgment  depends  upon  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  court  before  it  is  rendered,  not  upon  what  will  occur  subse- 
quently." ^0* 

i«i  Pennoyer  v.  Neff.  05  U.  S.  714,  24  L.  Ed.  565.  And  see  Mltcheirs  Adm'r 
T.  Gray.  18  Ind.  123;  Smith  v.  McCutclien,  38  Mo.  415;  Remer  v.  McKay  (O. 
C.)  54  Fed.  432;  SouUiern  Bldg.  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Brackett  (Tex.  CM  v.  App.)  39 
8.  W,  610;  Evans  ▼.  Breneinan  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  46  S.  W.  80;  McMahon  v. 
Tumey.  45  Mo.  App.  103;  Plummer  v.  Hatton,  51  Minn.  181,  53  N.  W.  460; 
WilUmette  Ueal-Estate  Co.  y.  Hendrix,  28  Or.  485,  42  Pae.  514,  52  Am.  St 
Rep.80a 

(347) 


§  232  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  12 


§  8S2.    Statutes  antliorisiiis  OonstmctiTe  Service  to  be  ttrietly 

eonitrued* 

All  exceptional  methods  of  obtaining  jurisdiction  over  persons, 
natural  or  artificial,  not  found  within  the  state,  must  be  confined  to 
the  cases  and  exercised  in  the  way  precisely  indicated  by  the  stat- 
ute.^®* Hence  the  statutory  provisions  for  acquiring  jurisdiction 
of  a  defendant  by  publication  of  the  summons,  in  the  stead  of  a  per- 
sonal service,  must  be  strictly  and  exactly  pursued.^®'  As  it  has  been- 
well  said,  "no  principle  is  more  vital  to  the  administration  of  justice 
than  that  no  man  should  be  condemned  in  his  person  or  property 
without  notice  and  an  opportunity  to  make  his  defense.  And  every 
departure  from  this  fundamental  rule,  by  a  proceeding  in  rem,  in 
which  a  publication  of  notice  is  substituted  for  a  service* on  the 
party,  should  be  subjected  to  a  strict  legal  scrutiny.  Jurisdiction  is 
not  to  be  assumed  and  exercised  in  such  cases  upon  the  general 
ground  that  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit  is  within  the  power  of  the 
court.  This  would  dispense  with  the  forms  of  law,  prescribed  by 
the  legislature  for  the  security  of  absent  parties.  The  inquiry 
should  be,  have  the  requisites  of  the  statute  been  complied  with,  so 
as  to  subject  the  property  in  controversy  to  the  judgment  of  the 
court,  and  is  such  judgment  limited  to  the  property  named  in  the  bill? 
If  this  cannot  be  answered  in  the  affirmative,  the  proceedings  of  the 
court  beyond  their  jurisdiction  are  void."  *•*  Thus,  defendants  can- 
not be   summoned   by   publication   unless   shown  to   be   non-resi- 

102  Hebel  v.  Amazon  Ins.  Co.,  33  Mich.  400. 

108  People  V.  Huber.  20  Cal.  81;  Pinkney  t.  Pinkney,  4  G.  Greene  (lowt) 
324;  Hodges  v.  Brett.  Id.  345;  Edrington  v.  Ansbrooks,  21  Tex.  ISo;  Israel  v. 
Arthur,  7  Colo.  5,  1  Pac.  438;  Myer  v.  Kuhn,  25  U.  S.  App.  174.  U  Q  C  A. 
208,  65  Fed.  705;  Guaranty  Trust  &  Safe-Deposit  Co.  v.  Green  Cove  Springs 
&  M.  R.  Co.,  139  U.  S.  137.  11  Sup.  Ct.  512.  35  L.  Ed.  116.  Thus,  it  to  essen- 
tial that  the  published  notice  shall  correctly  state  the  parties  to  the  suit  and 
their  names.  Myer  v.  Kuhn,  supra;  City  of  Detroit  v.  Detroit  City  R.  Oo.  iC 
C.)  54  Fed.  1;  Colton  v.  Rupert,  60  Mich.  318,  27  N.  W.  520;  Entrekin  ▼. 
Chambers,  11  Kan.  3G8;  Chamberlain  v.  Blodgett,  96  Mo.  482.  10  S.  W.  44. 
As  to  trifling  misnomers  and  minor  mistakes  which  do  not  necessarily  Titrate, 
see  Hirsh  y.  Weisberger,  44  Mo.  App.  506;  White  y.  McClellan,  62  Md.  ^7; 
Fanning  y.  Krapfl,  61  Iowa,  417,  14  Xt  W.  727;  Lane  y.  Innea,  43  Mino.  137. 
45  N.  W.  4. 

104  BosweU  y.  Otis,  9  How.  336,  350,  13  L.  Ed.  164. 

(34S) 


Ch    12)  VALIDITY,  AS  DEPENDENT  UPON  JURISDICTION.  §   282 

dents.***  And  where,  under  the  statute,  a  summons  and  return  are 
necessary  to  give  the  court  jurisdiction,  an  indorsement  on  the  writ 
acknowledging  service  is  not  sufficient,*®'  So  a  judgment  follow- 
ing a  service  of  summons  purporting  to  be  by  publication,  but  which 
was  made  without  affidavit  and  order,  is  void.*®^  And  so  if  the  affi- 
davit upon  which  the  order  for  publication  issued  was  substantially 
defective,  there  is  no  jurisdiction  of  the  defendant.*®'  Again,  a 
judgment  which  is  invalid  because,  service  being  made  by  publica- 
tion, it  was-  not  shown  that  a  copy  of  the  petition  and  notice  was 
mailed  to  the  defendant,  or  that  his  residence  was  unknown  (that 
being  required  by  the  usual  wording  of  the  statute),  cannot  be  cured 
by  giving  such  proof  afterwards.*®*  In  case  of  notice  by  publica- 
tion, the  court  acquires  no  jurisdiction  until  proper  proof  of  a  com- 
pliance with  the  statute  requisitions  is  made  to  appear  of  record.**® 
And  an  order  of  the  court  directing  non-resident  defendants  to  be 
notified  by  publication,  will  not  authorize  a  judgment  against  resi- 
dent defendants  who  have  not  been  duly  served  with  process.^** 

Before  leaving  the  subject  of  constructive  service  of  process,  it 
must  be  remarked  that  a  non-resident  may  be  brought  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  an  appellate  court  by  mere  publication  of  the  notice, 
when  it  appears  that  he  was  personally  cited  or  duly  appeared  in 
the  action  in  the  trial  court.  This  is  not  a  real  exception  to  the  rule 
of  jurisdiction,  but  is  based  upon  the  consideration  that  the  whole 
controversy,  from  its  inception  in  the  court  below  to  its  final  deter- 
mination by  the  court  above,  is  but  one  suit.  "Actual  notice  ought 
to  be  given  in  all  cases  where  it  is  practicable,  even  in  appellate  tri- 
bunals ;  but  whenever  personal  service  has  been  rendered  impossible 
by  the  removal  of  the  appellee  or  defendant  in  error  from  the  juris- 

!•»  Johnson  v.  Patterson,  12  Ind.  471. 

!••  Ohickering  v.  Failes,  26  IH.  507. 

!•?  People  V.  MuHan,  65  Cal.  306,  4  Pac.  34& 

!••  Braly  V.  Seaman,  30  Cal.  610. 

"•  Hodflon  V.  Tlbbetts,  16  Iowa.  97. 

!»•  Tania  v,  Withrow,  10  Iowa,  305,  77  Am.  Dec.  117;  Byram  t.  McDowell, 
^  Lea  (Tenn.)  581.  Parol  evidence  tending  to  show  defendant's  knowledge 
of  the  salt  will  not  validate  a  Judgment  which  must  rest  on  proof  of  a  strict 
compliance  with  the  statute  in  regard  to  service  by  publication.  Roberts  v. 
Koberts,  3  Colo.  App.  6,  31  Pac.  941. 

Ill  Pomeroy  t.  Betts,  31  Mo.  419. 

(349) 


5   233  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  12 

diction,  service  by  publication  is  sufficient  to  give  the  appellate  tri- 
bunal jurisdiction  of  the  subject  and  the  person,  provided  it  appears 
in  the  record  that  personal  notice  was  g^ven  in  the  subordinate 
court,  and  that  the  party  there  appeared  and  litigated  the  merits  of 
the  controversy."  ^** 

f  233.    Joint   Befemdaats. 

By  the  common  law,  where  process  issued  against  two,  on  a  joint 
cause  of  action,  and  only  one  appeared,  the  other  must'be  outlawed 
before  there  could  be  any  further  proceedings.^**  And  in  this 
country, — independently  of  statutes, — where  a  suit  is  instituted 
against  several  defendants  jointly,  and  one  is  not  served  with  pro- 
cess, and  the  court  assumes  jurisdiction  and  proceeds  to  render 
judgment  against  them  all,  such  judgment  is  absolutely  void,  so  far, 
at  least,  as  concerns  the  defendant  not  served.***  Thus,  where  suit 
is  brought  against  three  and  process  issued  to  all,  but  it  appears  to 
have  been  served  upon  two  only,  there  being  no  return  as  to  the 
third,  and  none  of  the  three  answer,  judgment  should  not  be  en- 
tered by  default  generally,  without  amendment,  discontinuance,  or 
some  other  action  taken  in  regard  to  the  defendant  not  served.*" 
So  where  there  are  several  defendants,  and  part  are  served  in  time 

112  Nations  v.  Johnson,  24  How.  105,  16  L.  Ed.  628. 

113  Edwards  v.  Carter,  1  Strange,  473. 

11*  Wilbur  V.  Abbot,  60  N.  H.  40;  Odom  v.  Denny,  16  Gray  (Mass.)  114; 
McDoel  V.  Oook,  2  N.  Y.  110;  Jones  v.  Reed,  1  Johns.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  20;  Bo«i  v. 
Heister,  6  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  18;  Vandiver  v.  Roberts,  4  W.  Va.  493;  Martin 
V.  wnUams,  42  Miss.  210,  97  Am.  Dec.  456;  Moody  v.  Lyles,  44  Miss.  121; 
Ayer  v.  Bailey,  5  How.  (Miss.)  688;  Faver  v.  Briggs,  18  Ala.  478;  Houston 
V.  Ward,  8  Tex.  124;  Bayless  v.  Daniels,  Id.  140;  Johnson  v.  Vaughan,  9  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)  217;  Illckey  v.  Smith,  6  Ark.  456;  Dunn  v.  HaH,  8  Blackf.  (lo^iJ 
32;  Allen  v.  Chadsey,  1  Ind.  399;  Brockman  v.  McDonald.  16  lU.  112;  Swift 
V.  Green,  20  111.  173;  Treat  v.  McCall,  10  Qil.  511;  Proctor  v.  Lewis,  50  Mich. 
329,  15  N.  W.  495.  In  Ohio,  it  is  said  that  a  Judgment  against  all  of  several 
defendants,  where  only  a  part  are  served  with  process,  is  erroneous  but  not 
void.  Douglass'  Lessee  v.  Massie,  10  Ohio,  271,  47  Am.  Dec.  375.  And  soe 
Forbes  v.  Bringe,  32  Xeb.  757,  49  X.  W.  720;  Ward  v.  Stanley.  41  lU.  App. 
417;  Blyth  &  Fargo  Co.  v.  Swenson,  15  Utah,  345,  49  Pac.  1027;  Boyd  T.  Ellis, 
107  Mo.  394,  18  S.  W.  29. 

115  Ro^^ers  v.  Harrison,  44  Tex.  1G9. 

(350) 


Ch,  12)  VALIDITY,  AS  DEPENDENT  UPON  JURISDICTION.  §   235 

and  others  are  not,  judgment  cannot  be  entered  against  any  at  the 
return  term,  but  the  case  must  be  continued.^^* 


i  234.    Joint  Jndsmeat  as  an  Ii]itiret7« 

Supposing  a  judgment  to  be  entered  in  violation  of  the  common 
law  rule  just  stated — that  is,  a  joint  judgment  where  some  of  the 
defendants  were  not  served — ^it  becomes  important  to  determine 
whether  it  must  be  regarded  as  void  for  all  purposes  and  in  respect 
to  all  parties,  or  merely  voidable  as  against  those  who  were  not 
notified.  This  question  has  been  considered  in  a  preceding  section ; 
and  it  was  there  shown  that,  notwithstanding  a  great  conflict  of 
authorities,  the  better  opinion  was'  that  such  a  judgment  is  at  most 
voidable  as  to  the  defendant  not  served,  while  it  ought  to  stand  as  a 
perfectly  valid  adjudication  against  the  other  until  reversed,  but  that, 
if  carried  up  by  appeal  or  writ  of  error,  it  must  be  reversed  as  to 
both  the  defendants.^*^  In  case  of  a  purely  joint  liability  there  may 
be  justice  in  adhering  to  the  stricter  view ;  but  otherwise  the  con- 
ception of  a  judgment  as  an  entirety  appears  to  be  highly  technical 
and  ill  adapted  to  the  purposes  of  justice. 

* 

f  235.    Joint  Judgment  antl&orlsed  by  Statnto. 

In  order  to  escape  the  rigor  of  the  common  law  rule  above  stated, 
several  of  the  states  have  passed  statutes  which  provide  that  where 
an  action  is  instituted  against  two  or  more  defendants  upon  an  al- 
leged joint  liability,  and  some  of  them  are  served  with  process,  but 
jurisdiction  is  not  obtained  over  the  others,  the  plaintiff  may  still 
proceed  to  trial  against  those  who  are  before  the  court,  and  if  he  re- 
covers, may  have  judgment  against  all  the  defendants  whom  he 
shows  to  be  jointly  liable,  but  it  must  be  so  entered  as  to  be  enforce- 
able only  against  the  joint  property  of  all  and  the  separate  property 
of  those  served.*^*     But  this  statute  must  be  strictly  followed;   the 

"•  Evans  v.  GUI,  25  lU.  11(5. 

X17  Supra,  f  211. 

ii»Code  N.  Y.  §  136;  Code  Clv.Proc.  Cal.  S  413;  Code  S.  C.  §  157;  Laws 
UL  1895  (Act  June  4th)  f  5;  Rev.  St  Wis.  §  28^.  On  the  construcUon  and 
application  of  these  statutes,  see  Roberts  v.  Fawley,  50  S.  C.  491,  27  S.  R  013; 

(351) 


§  236  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  12 

judgment  must  be  in  form  against  both;  and  a  judgment  against 
the  one  served  alone  is  erroneous  in  substance.^**  Nor  can  the 
clerk,  upon  the  application  of  the  plaintiff,  enter  judgment  upon  de- 
fault against  the  party  served  only;  a  judgment  so  entered  is 
void.^*®  And  if  it  should  appear  upon  the  trial  that  the  contract  in 
suit  was  not  joint,  but  was  made  with  one  of  the  defendants  only, 
then  of  course  the  statute  does  not  apply,  and  the  plaintiff  should  be 
nonsuited.***  Further,  if  the  defendant  who  was  not  served  was  a 
non-resident  of  the  state,  and  did  not  appear  in  the  action,  the  judg- 
ment, so  far  as  concerns  him,  can  have  no  extra-territorial  validity 
nor  be  enforced  against  him  in  the  state  of  his  domicile.  And  it  is 
held  that  even  in  the  courts  of  the  state  which  rendered  the  judg- 
ment he  would  be  allowed  to  show,  in  avoidance  of  the  judgment, 
that  he  was  not  a  joint  contractor,  as  it  is  that  fact  alone  that  makes 
such  judgment  binding  upon  him.*** 

f  236.    Statutory  Soreral   Jndsa^eat. 

In  a  number  of  the  states,  according  to  the  statute  law,  or  the 
practice  prevailing  in  the  courts,  and  in  derogation  of  the  common 
law,  if  two  or  more  persons  are  sued  in  a  joint  action,  the  plaintiff 
may  proceed  against  any  one  or  more  of  them  upon  service  of  pro- 
cess on  them,  notwithstanding  there  may  be  others  not  served,  and 
if  his  contention  is  successful,  he  may  have  judgment  against  those 
served,  excluding  the  others.***     In  Vermont,  in  a  case  where  pro- 

Neal  v.  PenniniTtOD,  65  III.  App.  68;  Brawley  v.  Mitchell,  92  Wis.  671,  68  N.  W. 
790.  A  statute  of  Minnesota  (Gen.  St  1894,  §  5436)  provides  that,  when  a 
judgment  is  rendered  against  one  of  several  persons  jointly  indebted,  those 
who  are  not  originally  summoned  to  answer  the  complaint  may  be  summoned 
to  show  why  they  should  not  be  bound  by  the  judgment;  but  the  derk  oumot 
enter  judgment  against  parties  so  sought  to  be  held  on  default,  or  without  ex- 
press authority  from  the  court  Ingwaldson  v.  Olson,  79  Minn.  2S2,  82  K.  W. 
579. 

!!•  Nelson  v.  Bostwick,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.)  37,  40  Am.  Dec.  310;  Stehr  T.  OUbe^ 
mann.  49  N.  J.  iJiw,  633,  10  Ati.  547. 

120  Kelly  V.  Van  Austin,  17  Cal.  564. 

m  Fleming  v.  Freese.  26  N.  J.  Law,  263. 

122  Marker  v.  Brink,  24  N.  J.  Law,  333. 

128  ingraham  v.  Gildemeester,  2  Cal.  88;  Hlrsehfield  v.  Fhinklln,  6  GsL  W; 
Kelly  y.  Bandinl,  50  Cal.  530;  Simpson  y.  Prather,  5  Or.  86;  Loney  T.  Bailej, 

(3»52) 


Ch.  12)  VALIDITY.  AS  DEPENDENT  UPON  JURISDICTION.  §    287 

cess  was  sued  against  two  persons,  who  were  declared  against  as 
joint  promisors,  and  service  was  made  upon  one  only,  the  other 
not  becoming  a  party  in  court,  and  evidence  was  given  showing  that 
the  person  served  alone  made  the  promise  declared  on,  it  was  held, 
under  the  law  of  that  state  relating  to  such  cases,  that  a  judgment 
might  be  recovered  against  the  person  so  making  the  promise.^** 

i  237.    Jndsment  as^^st  Partners. 

At  the  common  law,  where  a  partnership  is  sued,  each  member  of 
the  firm  must  be  brought  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  by  due 
citation.  Hence  where  an  action  is  instituted  against  several  per- 
sons constituting  a  partnership,  either  before  or  after  its  dissolution, 
and  one  partner  is  not  served  with  process,  and  judgment  is  ren- 
dered against  them  all,  such  judgment  will  be  voidable  so  far  as  con- 
cerns the  partner  who  was  not  served.**"  On  similar  principles,  and 
since  one  partner  cannot  bind  his  co-partner  by  a  forthcoming  bond 
to  which  he  has  signed  the  latter's  name  without  authority,  a  statu- 
tory judgment  on  such  bond  is  void  as  to  the  partner  not  signing, 
for  want  of  jurisdiction.**'  In  those  states,  however,  where  the 
"joint  debtor  acts''  are  in  force,  if  not  all  the  partners  are  served  with 
process,  still  a  judgment  may  be  rendered  against  the  firm,  to  be 

43  Md.  10;  Hunt  ▼.  Anderson,  83  Miss.  559;  Raney  v.  McRae,  14  Ga.  589, 
m  Am.  Dec.  WW;  Moore  v.  Estes,  79  Ky.  282;  CaldweU  v.  Harp,  2  McCord  (S. 
C.)  275;  Merchants*  &  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Evans,  9  W.  Va.  373;  Norfolk 
ft  W.  R.  Co.  r.  Shippers'  Compress  Co.,  83  Va.  272,  2  S.  E.  139;  Fender  v. 
Styles,  31  UL  4W;  DUlon  v.  Porter,  36  Minn.  341,  31  N.  W.  56;  Bennett  v. 
I\>wn8aid,  1  Meb.  460;  Cunningham  v.  Dixon,  1  Mary.  (Del.)  163,  41  Atl.  519; 
Waldner  v.  Pauly,  141  lU.  442,  30  N.  B.  1025;  Green  v.  Shaw,  66  111.  App. 
74;  Bacon  t.  Green,  36  Fla.  325,  18  South.  870;  Edwards  y.  Helllngs,  103  Cal. 
204, 37  Pac.  218;  DiUard  y.  Turner's  Adm*r,  87  Va.  660,  14  S.  E.  123. 

is«  Hodges  y.  Eastman,  12  Vt.  358. 

It*  UaU  y.  Lannlng,  91  U.  S.  160,  23  L.  Ed.  271;  Ingraham  y.  Glldemeester, 
2  Cat  88;  Schloss  y.  White,  16  Cal.  68;  Inos  y.  Wlnspear,  18  Cal.  897;  St. 
John  y.  Holmes,  20  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  609,  32  Am.  Dec.  603;  MltcheU  y.  Green- 
wald,  43  MlsB.  167;  Dresser  y.  Wood,  15  Kan.  344;  Harford  y.  Street,  46 
Iowa,  CM;  Bowler  y.  Huston,  30  Grat.  (Va.)  266,  32  Am.  Rep.  673;  Faver  v. 
Brlggs,  18  Ala.  478;  Anderson  y.  Arnette,  27  La.  Ann.  237;  Gaiennie  y.  Akln*8 
Efr,  17  La.  42,  36  Am.  Dec.  604;  Dessauer  y.  Koppin,  8  Colo.  App.  115,  32  Pac. 
182. 

<:•  Smith  y.  Tnpper,  4  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  261,  48  Am.  Dec.  483. 

1  LAW  JUDG.-23  (:^53) 


§  238  I4AW  OP  iUDOiiVNTi.  (Ch.  12 

enforced  against  the  ^rtnership  property  and  the  individual  prop- 
erty of  the  partners  served.*"^  But  such  a  judgment  will  have  no 
extra-territorial  validity  against  any  partner  who  was  not  served  and 
did  not  appear,***  the  case  being  governed  by  the  same  rules  which 
api^y  in  any  other  action  against  joint  defendants.  And  in  Cali- 
fornia it  is  held  that,  where,  in  an  action  against  a  partnership  on  a 
joint  liability,  the  complaint  and  summons  designate  the  defendants 
individually,  with  a  description  that  they  are  partners  doing  business 
under  a  firm  name,  the  judgment  can  only  be  against  the  parties 
served,  and  not  against  a  defendant  not  served  with  summons  or 
who  does  not  appear,  though  he  be  a  member  of  the  partnership. 


ii» 


i  238.    Appearance  for  Bef endaat  not  SerreiL 

In  an  action  upon  •  contract  against  several  defendants,  where 
only  a  part  are  served  with  process,  but  others  voluntarily  appear, 
a  judgment  for  the  plaintiff  must  be  against  ail  the  defendants  ap- 
pearing.**® But  where  an  attorney  appears  specially  for  one  de- 
fendant in  an  action  against  two,  and  afterwards,  as  attorney  for 
"the  defendant,"  acknowledges  judgment  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  it 
is  a  good  judgment  only  as  to  the  defendant  for  whom  such  attor- 
ney appeared,  and  a  joint  execution  is  erroneous."* 

i«7  Newlon  v.  Heaton,  42  Iowa,  593;  Patten  v.  Ganningham.  63  Tex.  6Wl 
A  Judgment  to  the  effect  that  plaintiff  do  recover  of  the  member  aerred  a 
certain  sum  **for  which  let  execution  iaaue,  to  be  levied  upon  the  gooda  and 
chattela  of  the  firm  and  upon  the  individual  property  of  the  defoidant 
served  with  citation,"  is  a  valid  judgment  against  the  partnership*  un- 
der which  the  partnership  property,  real  as  well  as  personal,  may  be  seised 
and  sold.    Alexander  v.  Stern,  41  Tex.  103. 

128  Hall  V.  Lanning,  91  U.  S.  ItK),  28  U  Ed.  271;  Scott  t.  Bogart.  U  La. 
Ann.  261. 

i2»  Davidson  v.  Knox,  67  Oal.  143,  7  Pac.  413. 

isoMosher  v.  Small,  6  Pa.  221;  Heaton  v.  Collins,  7  Blackf.  (Ind.)  414: 
Hall  V.  Law,  2  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  121.  But  a  judgment  entered  against  one 
who  has  not  been  served,  on  an  appearance  by  an  unauthorised  attorney, 
which  has  not  been  ratified  or  confirmed,  is  absolutely  void  as  against  such 
defendant.  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Wm.  B.  Grimes  Dry  Gooda  06^  45  Kan.  SIO. 
2ii  Pac.  56. 

isi  Klmmel  v.  Klmmel,  5  Serg.  &  U.  (Pa.)  2^ 

(354) 


Gb«  IS)  VALIDITY,  AS  DBPIINDBNT  UPON  lURISDICTION.  |  340 


Where  process  is  served  only  on  a  part  of  the  defendants  named 
in  the  writ,  and  judgment  is  taken  against  "the  defendants,"  with- 
out naming  them,  and  without  any  appearance  of  those  not  served, 
the  judgment  will  be  understood  to  be  only  against  those  who  were 
duly  served.***  In  some  of  the  states,  the  rendition  of  a  judgment 
against  a  defendant  who  was  not  served  and  who  did  not  appear*  is 
considered  to  be  a  mere  clerical  mistake  which  may  be  amended  on 
motion  in  the  trial  court.*** 

i  240.    JnvUidiotioa  of  tlu  Sabjeot-llattov. 

Thus  far  we  have  been  considering  the  questions  connected  with 
the  acquiiition  of  jurisdiction  over  the  defendant's  person.  We  turn 
now  to  the  equally  important  subject  of  the  validity  of  judgments 
as  dependent  upon  jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter.  And  first,  it 
is  an  inflexible  rule  that  any  judgment  rendered  by  a  court  upon  a 
matter  not  within  its  jurisdiction  is  null  and  void,  incapable  of  rati- 
fication, and  subject  to  collateral  impeachment.***  The  principles 
which  govern  this  point  have  been  well  stated  in  the  following  lan- 
guage: "i.  Where  the  judicial  tribunal  has  general  jurisdiction  of 
the  subject-matter  of  the  controversy  or  investigation,  and  the  spe- 
cial facts  which  give  it  the  right  to  act  in  a  particular  case  are  aver- 
red and  not  controverted,  upon  notice  to  all  proper  parties,  juris- 

• 

!•«  Morgan  t.  Morgan,  2  Bibb  (Ky.)  38»;  Clark  T.  Flnnell,  16  B.  Mon. 
(Ky.)  329;  Boyd  v.  Baynbam,  5  Uumph.  (Tenn.)  386,  42  Am.  Dec.  438;  V71n- 
cbester  t.  Beardln,  10  Uumph.  (Tenn.)  247,  51  Am.  Dec.  702;  Neal  v.  Single- 
ton, 26  Ark.  491.    Per  contra,  Langley  v.  GrlU,  1  Colo.  71. 

iss  lavage  v.  Walsbe,  26  Ala.  619;  Bergen  y.  Bolton,  10  Mo.  658. 

iS4  Smith  T.  Knowlton,  11  N.  H.  191;  Morse  v.  Presby,  25  N.  H.  299;  Eatou 
▼.  Badger,  33  N.  U.  228:  Beel  v.  Elder,  62  Pa.  308,  1  Am.  Rep.  414;  Vylea 
T.  BoUes,  8  iS.  C.  258:  Ponce  v.  Underwood,  55  Ga.  601;  Wamsley  v.  Rob* 
Inaon,  28  La.  Ann.  793;  Gilllland  v.  Seller,  2  Ohio  St.  223;  Webb  v.  Carr,  78 
iQd.  455.  Wh€re  a  complaint  aUeges  two  causes  of  action,  the  fact  that  the 
court  bad  jurladlctlon  of  one  of  them  wUl  not  support  a  Judgment  upon 
liotb,  where  It  had  no  Jurisdiction  of  the  other.  Chicago  &  S.  E.  Ry.  Co. 
T.  Spencer,  23  Ind.  App.  605,  55  N.  H  882.  Compare  StovaU  y.  Hibbs  (Ky.) 
o2  8.  W«  1087. 

(355) 


S   240  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNTS.  (Ch.  12 

diction  is  acquired  and  cannot  be  assailed  in  any  collateral  proceed- 
ing. 2.  Where  the  judicial  tribunal  has  not  general  jurisdiction  of 
the  subject-matter  under  any  circumstances,  no  averment  can  sup- 
ply  the  defect,  no  amount  of  proof  can  alter  the  case,  no  consent 
can  confer  jurisdiction.  3.  Where  the  judicial  tribunal  has  not  gen- 
eral jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter,  but  may  exercise  it  under  a 
particular  state  of  facts,  those  facts  must  be  specially  averred  and 
established,  and  when  so  established  on  a  hearing  of  all  proper  par- 
ties, cannot  be  impeached  in  any  collateral  proceeding."^'*  If  we 
inquire  more  particularly  into  the  meaning  of  the  terms  here  em- 
ployed, the  answer  is,  that  "by  jurisdiction  over  the  subject-matter 
is  meant  the  nature  of  the  cause  of  action  or  of  the  relief  sought; 
and  this  is  conferred  by  the  sovereign  authority  which  organizes  the 
court,  and  is  to  be  sought  for  in  the  general  nature  of  its  powers,  or 
in  authority  specially  conferred."  ^'^  Now  the  powers  to  be  exer- 
cised by  a  court  may  be  prescribed  and  defined  in  several  diflFerent 
ways,  though  always  emanating  from  the  sovereign  authority  of 

m 

the  state.  First,  the  constitution  or  statute  which  creates  the  court 
may  specifically  enumerate  the  classes  of  actions  or  subjects  of  con- 
troversy to  which  its  jurisdiction  shall  extend.  This  is  usually  the 
case  in  respect  to  the  original  jurisdiction  of  the  supreme  courts, 
and  in  respect  to  probate  and  similar  courts.  Or  else  the  power 
may  be  conferred  in  general  language ;  as  where  a  court  of  record 
is  invested  with  "general  original  jurisdiction  in  all  cases,  civil  or 
criminal,  at  law  or  in  equity,"  or  where  a  separate  chancery  court 
is  given  general  equity  powers.  And  here  no  subject  will  be  in- 
tended to  be  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  unless  clearly 
shown  to  be  so  by  law.  Or  the  power  to  hear  and  determine  a  par- 
ticular class  of  actions  or  proceedings  may  be  granted  to  a  tribunal 
specially  organized  for  that  purpose  or  to  one  of  the  usual  courts 
in  addition  to  its  common  law  powers.  Or  finally,  the  limitations 
of  the  jurisdiction  may  be  introduced  by  way  of  exception  or  res- 
ervation from  the  general  powers  granted.  And  this  may  be  either 
by  withdrawing  certain  classes  of  actions  from  the  cognizance  of  the 
court,  as  where  a  justice  of  the  peace  is  forbidden  to  try  any  suit 

186  Bumstead  v.  Head,  31  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  669. 

1S0  Cooper  V.  Keynolds,  10  WaU.  308,  19  U  Ed.  931. 

(356) 


Ch.   12)  VALIDITY.  AS  DEPENDENT  UPON  JURISDICTION.  §   241 

involving  the  title  to  real  estate ;  or  by  fixing  a  money  limit  below 
which  the  jurisdiction  shall  not  attach,  as  is  the  case  in  respect  to 
most  controversies  before  the  circuit  courts  of  the  United  States; 
or  by  designating  the  amount  above  which  the  jurisdiction  shall  ter- 
minate, as  is  usual  in  regard  to  justices'  and  other  inferior  courts. ^'^ 
But  in  every  case,  where  jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter  is  chal- 
lenged, recourse  must  be  had  to  the  sources  of  jurisdiction,  whether 
constitution  or  statute,  and  if  they  show  a  want  of  authority  in  the 
court  to  adjudicate  upon  the  particular  controversy,  its  judgment 
must  be  considered  incurably  void.  And  an  unconstitutional  stat- 
ute, it  will  be  remembered,  can  have  no  avail  as  a  source  of  jurisdic- 
tion; a  judgment  rendered  under  it  is  entirely  without  validity.*'* 

f  841.    Svflloieacy  of  Deolaratioii. 

In  one  of  the  early  cases  before  the  supreme  court  of  the  United 
States  it  was  said,  "if  the  petitioner  states  such  a  case  in  his  peti- 
tion that  on  a  demurrer  the  court  would  render  a  judgment  in  his 
favor,  it  is  an  undoubted  case  of  jurisdiction."  **®  But  probably  this 
was  not  meant  as  equivalent  to  saying  that  if  the  petition  were  de- 
murrable there  would  be  no  jurisdiction.  Indeed  it  would  be  im- 
possible, on  any  rational  theory,  to  make  the  jurisdiction  depend 
upon  the  validity  of  the  case  stated  by  the  plaintiff.    For  the  court 

isT  Where  tbe  plaintlff^s  demand  exceeds  the  Jurisdiction  of  the  Inferior 
coun  in  which  his  suit  is  brought,  it  should  dismiss  the  cause  and  transfer 
it  to  a  court  of  competent  Jurisdiction;  no  other  judgment  or  order  can 
validly  he  made.  Dazey  v.  Pennington,  10  Tex.  CLv.  App.  326,  31  S.  W. 
312.  But  the  fact  that  a  Justice  of  the  peace  erroneously  allows  interest, 
which  makes'  the  total  amount  exceed  his  jurisdiction,  does  not  deprive 
him  of  original  jurisdiction,  so  as  to  render  the  judgment  void.  McCk>r- 
mick  Harvesting  Mach.  Co.  v.  Marchant,  11  Utah,  68,  39  Pac.  483.  In 
Jones  V.  Jones.  14  N.  C.  300,  it  was  held  that  a  Judgment  of  a  magistrate 
for  a  sum  above  his  jiu'isdiction  being  void,  no  action  could  be  maintained 
on  it.  But  some  other  canes  hold  that  a  Judgment  of  a  court  of  record,  founded 
n\wn  a  judgment  of  a  justice  of  the  peace  which  is  In  excess  of  his  jurisdic- 
tion and  consequently  void,  is  erroneous  but  not  void,  and  will  stand  good 
against  collateral  attacks.  Moore  v.  Martin,  38  Gal.  428;  Hinds  v.  Wallis, 
13  Serg.  &  U.  (Pa.)  213.  But  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  a  nullity  can  be 
made  the  basis  of  an  action. 

iss  Supra,  $  216. 

!<•  United  States  v.  Arredondo,  6  Pet  700,  8  L.  Ed.  547* 

(357) 


§  242  LAW  OF  JUDOMBin^  (Cb.  IS 

must  piss  upon  the  sufikkncy  of  the  declaration,  and  jurisdiction  to 
proceed  at  least  so  far  must  be  acquired  by  the  mefe  filing  of  the 
pleading  and  service  of  process.  But  it  is  equally  certain  that  a 
court  cannot,  in  ordinary  cases,  initiate  a  proceeding  sua  sponte. 
Its  jurisdiction  and  power  remain  at  rest  until  called  into  activity  by 
the  application  of  a  suitor.  Jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter, 
therefore,  dynamically  considered,  depends  upon  the  act  of  the  par- 
ties in  invoking  the  aid  of  the  law,  in  some  regular  manner,  for  the 
determination  of  their  controversy.  A  court  has  no  more  power, 
until  its  action  is  called  into  exercise  by  some  sort  oi  pleading,  to 
render  a  judgment  in  favor  of  a  party,  than  it  has  to  enter  a  judg- 
ment against  him  until  he  has  been  brought  wttliin  its  jurisdiction 
by  some  method  known  to  the  law.*** 

i  242.    Jurisdictioa  of  Qvestioii  d«oldeiL 

Besides  jurisdiction  of  the  person  of  the  defendant  and  of  the  gen- 
eral subject-matter  of  the  action,  it  is  necessary  to  the  validity  of  a 
judgment  that  the  court  should  have  had  jurisdiction  of  the  precise 
question  which  its  judgment  assumes  to  decide,  or  of  the  particular 
remedy  or  relief  which  it  assumes  to  grant.  In  other  words  a  judg- 
ment which  passes  upon  matters  entirely  outside  the  issue  raised  in 
the  record  is  so  far  invalid.  "Jurisdiction  may  be  defined  to  be  the 
right  to  adjudicate  concerning  the  subject-matter  in  the  given  case. 
To  constitute  this  there  are  three  essentials.  First,  the  court  must 
have  cognizance  of  the  class  of  cases  to  which  the  one  to  be  ad- 
judged belongs.  Second,  the  proper  parties  must  be  present.  And 
third,  the  point  decided  must  be,  in  substance  and  effect,  within  the 
issue.  That  a  court  cannot  go  out  of  its  appointed  sphere,  and  that 
its  action  is  void  with  respect  to  persons  who  are  strangers  to  its 
proceedings,  are  propositions  established  by  a  multitude  of  authori- 
ties. A  defect  in  a  judgment  arising  from  the  fact  that  the  matter 
decided  was  not  embraced  within  the  issue  has  not,  it  would  seem, 
received  much  judicial  consideration.  And  yet  I  cannot  doubt  that, 
upon  general  principles,  such  a  defect  must  avoid  a  judgment.     It  is 

i*oDunlap  v.  SoutlierUn,  tS3  Tex.  38.    And  see  Humphries  t.  Bartee,  IS 
Miss.  2»2. 

(358) 


*Cb.  12)  VALIDITY,  AS  DBPSNDfiNT  UPON  JURISDICTION.  §   242 

impossible  to  concede  that  because  A.  and  B.  are  parties  to  a  suit,  a 
court  can  decide  any  matter  in  which  they  are  interested,  whether 
such  matter  be  involved  in  the  pending  litigation  or  not.  Persons 
by  becoming  suitors  do  not  place  themselves  for  all  purposes  under 
the  control  of  the  court,  and  it  is  only  over  those  particular  interests 
which  they  choose  to  draw  in  question  that  a  power  of  judicial  deci- 
sion arises.  If,  in  an  ordinary  foreclosure  case,  a  man  and  his  wife 
being  parties,  the  court  of  chancery  should  decree  a  divorce  between 
them,  it  Would  require  no  argument  to  convince  everyone  that  such 
decree,  so  far  as  it  attempted  to  affect  the  matrimonial  relation,  wds 
void;  and  yet  the  only  infirmity  in  such  a  decree  would  be  found, 
upon  analysis,  to  arise  from  the  circumstance  that  the  point  decided 
was  net  within  the  substance  of  the  pending  litigation.  In  such  a 
case  the  court  would  have  acted  within  the  field  of  its  authority,  and 
the  proper  parties  would  have  been  present ;  the  single  but  fatal  flaw 
havmg  been  the  absence  from  the  record  of  any  issue  on  the  point 
determined.  The  invalidity  of  such  a  decree  does  not  proceed  from 
any  mere  arbitrary  rule,  but  it  rests  entirely  on  the  ground  of  com- 
mon justice.  A  judgr--nt  upon  a  matter  outside  of  the  issue  must 
of  necessity  be  altogether  arbitrary  and  unjust,  as  it  concludes  a 
point  upon  which  the  parties  have  not  been  heard.  And  it  is  upon 
this  very  ground,  that  the  parties  have  been  heard,  or  have  had  the 
opportunity  of  a  hearing,  that  the  law  gives  so  conclusive  an  effect 
to  matters  adjudicated.  And  this  is  the  principal  reason  why  judg- 
ments become  estoppels."  *** 

On  this  principle,  where  a  widow  brought  suit  for  the  sole  purpose 
of  having  dower  assigned  her  in  her  deceased  husband's  lands,  the 
heirs  at  law,  who  were  infants,  being  made  defendants,  and  the 
court  not  only  directed  an  assignment  of  dower,  but  of  its  own  ac- 
cord decreed  a  sale  of  the  residue  of  the  land  belonging  to  the  heirs, 

141  Monday  y.  Vail,  34  N.  J.  Law,  418.  To  the  same  effect  see  Hejnolds 
T.  Stfx^ton,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  211,  10  Atl.  385,  3  Am.  St  Rep.  305;  Husted  v. 
Van  Ness,  158  N.  Y.  104,  52  N.  £.  645;  Burns  &  Smith  Lumber  Co.  v.  Doyle, 
71  Uonn.  742,  43  Atl.  483,  71  Am.  St.  Rep.  235;  .Wright  v.  Durrett  (Tenn. 
Ch.  App.)  52  8.  W.  710;  Maddox  v.  Summerlln,  92  Tex.  483,  50  S.  W.  567; 
Uncdn  Nat.  Bank  t.  Virgin,  36  Neb.  735,  55  N.  W.  218,  88  Am.  St.  Rep. 
747;  Carter  v.  Glbron,  47  Neb.  655,  66  N.  W.  631;  Barnes  v.  Chicago,  M- 
*  8t  P.  B.  Co.,  122  U.  S.  1,  7  Sup.  Ct  1043,  30  L.  Ed.  1128. 

(359) 


§  242  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Cb.  12  * 

it  was  held  that,  the  court  having  exceeded  its  jurisdiction,  the  de- 
cree of  sale  was  void  and  open  to  collateral  impeachtnent.^**  Again, 
where  the  issues  in  a  suit  in  chancery  are  so  framed  as  to  present  a 
controversy  between  the  complainant  on  the  one  side  and  the  de- 
fendants on  the  other,  the  court  should  not  go  beyond  the  plead- 
ings and  decree  relief  as  between  the  co-defendants ;  and  though  the 
language  of  the  decree  may  be  broad  enough  to  embrace  the  deci- 
sion of  questions  disputed  by  the  defendants  inter  sese,  yet  it  will  be 
construed  in  the  light  of  the  pleadings,  and  restricted  to  the  issues 
raised  thereby.^*'  So  again,  in  an  action  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  on 
premises  described  in  the  complaint,  a  decree  directing  the  sale  oi 
lands  not  mentioned  in  the  pleadings  is  void,  though  the  owner  of 
such  other  lands  was  made  a  party.^**  And  in  an  action  between  a 
mortgagor  and  certain  mortgagees  of  chattels,  the  court  has  no 
power  to  declare  void  a  mortgage  not  attacked  by  the  pleadings, 
and  of  which  the  holder  was  not  a  party  to  the  action.***  A  judg- 
ment foreclosing  a  trust  deed  on  church  property  cannot  be  entered 
in  a  suit  between  different  factions  of  the  church  for  the  possession 
of  the  property,  where  neither  party  sought  a  foreclosure  or  sale  of 
'  the  property.***  Again,  upon  a  motion  to  discharge  an  attachment, 
the  court  has  no  power,  besides  allowing  such  discharge,  to  order 
the  undertaking  to  be  cancelled,  that  question  not  being  submit- 
ted.**^ And  where  a  ground  of  liability  not  suggested  by  the  plead- 
ings is  submitted  to  the  jury,  and  they  render  a  general  verdict  for 
the  plaintiff,  the  judgment  thereon  cannot  be  sustained  unless  the 
other  ground  of  liability  is  so  clearly  established  that  a  verdict  might 
have  been  directed.**® 

In  these  cases  the  court  lacked  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  or  ques- 
tion which  it  assumed  to  pass  upon  because  such  matter  was  not  sub- 
mitted to  it  by  the  parties.  But  the  same  result  will  follow  if,  being 
invested  with  jurisdiction  for  a  single  purpose  in  a  special  statutory 

1*2  Seamster  v.  Blackstock,  83  Va.  232,  2  S.  E.  36,  5  Am.  St  Rep.  262. 
1*3  Graham  v.  La  Crosse  &  M.  K.  Co.,  3  WaU.  704,  18  U  Ed.  247. 
"*  Clapp  V.  McCabe,  84  Hun,  379,  32  N.  Y.  Supp.  425. 
1*8  Kockford  Watch  Co.  v.  Manifold,  36  Neb.  801,  55  N.  W.  236. 
i*«  First  Baptist  Church  v.  Fort,  93  Tex.  215,  54  S.  W.  892,  49  L.  R  A.  617. 
i*7Wymaii  v.  Hallock,  4  S.  D.  469,  57  N.  W.  197. 
1*8  Springer  v.  Westcott,  87  Hun,  190,  33  N.  Y.  Supp.  805. 
(360) 


Ch.  12)  VALronT,  as  dependent  upon  jurisdiction.  §  243 

proceeding,  it  transcends  the  limit  and  attempts  to  exercise  its  pow- 
ers for  other  purposes  also.  Thus  where  a  statute  provides  for  an 
action  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  against  a  non-resident  defendant, 
upon  publication  of  summons,  and  authorizes  a  decree  to  be  made 
for  the  sale  of  the  mortgaged  premises  to  satisfy  the  debt  secured 
thereby,  the  court  exhausts  its  jurisdiction  in  making  the  decree 
contemplated,  and  if,  in  addition  thereto,  it  proceeds  to  award  a  per- 
sonal judgment  for  a  sum  of  money  against  the  defendant,  such 
judgment,  being  beyond  its  power,  is  void.^** 

I  243.    Ikim  of  Jnrifldiotioii. 

In  general,  when  jurisdiction  has  once  fully  attached  in  a  cause, 
it  will  continue  until  the  final  disposition  of  the  controversy.  But 
this  is  not  invariably  the  case,  and  a  court  may  lose  the  jurisdiction 
which  it  has  once  rightfully  acquired,  after  which  it  can  make  no 
further  order  or  judgment.  Such  is  the  case  when  the  cause  has 
been  taken  up  on  appeal  or  error,  and  especially  after  the  court  of 
review  has  pronounced  its  judgment.^*®  So  where  a  pending  liti- 
gation is  removed  from  the  state  court  to  a  federal  court  under  the 
act  of  Congress  in  that  behalf.  Upon  the  filing  of  a  proper  peti- 
tion, in  a  removable  cause,  the  rightful  jurisdiction  of  the  state  court 
ceases  instantly,  and  every  subsequent  exercise  of  jurisdiction  by  it, 
including  its  judgment  if  one  is  rendered,  is  erroneous,  if  not  abso- 
lutely void.**^  The  same  result  would  follow,  we  apprehend,  if  a 
statute  should  deprive  a  court  in  which  an  action  was  pending  of 
jurisdiction  over  that  class  of  suits  and  transfer  it  to  another  tri- 
bunal, provided  the  law  were  explicitly  made  applicable  to  pending 
cases.  And  sometimes  it  may  happen  that  jurisdiction  is  lost  by 
the  expiration  of  the  term,  without  judgment  rendered  and  without 
a  proper  continuance.^"* 

"•  Wood  V.  Stanberry,  21  Ohio  St  142;  Flthlan  v.  Monks,  43  Mo.  502;  Bos- 
weU  V.  Dlckerson,  4  McLean,  262,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  1,683. 

»»•  BoyntoD  v.  Foster,  7  Mete.  (Mass.)  415.  See  Linlnger  v.  Glenn,  33  Neb. 
204.  49  N.  W.  1128. 

"1  Black,  Dill.  Rem.  Causes,  §  102;  Roberts  v.  Chicago,  St  P.,  M.  &  O. 
Ry.  Oo.,  48  Minn.  521,  61  N.  W.  478. 

1*2  See  supra,  H  179,  180.    In  Wisconsin,  the  faUure  of  a  justice  to  enter 

(361) 


I  244  SAW  or  JVDQUXHTM.  (Cai.  12 


I  t44.   JwMUetiOTi  attMUstf,  E»w  d«M 


In  any  case  where  the  court  has  jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter 
of  the  action,  and  the  parties  are  before  it  by  due  service  of  proper 
process,  the  jurisdiction  is  never  ousted  by  the  erroneous  exercise  of 
the  power  which  it  confers,  and  the  judgment  in  the  case,  thottgh  it 
may  be  marked  by  error  which  will  cause  its  reversal  by  a  higher 
court,  is  not  for  that  reason  void.^'* 

In  his  docket  the  place,  as  well  as  the  time,  to  wbich  a  cause  pending  be- 
fore him  is  adjourned,  defeats  his  Jurisdietion  (unless  the  parties  voioDtarilr 
appear  in  the  action  subsequently)  and  renders  all  subsequent  xiroceedlngs 
therein  void*    Witt  v.  Ueoge,  58  Wis.  244,  Id  N.  W.  009. 

iB«  Ex  parte  Bigelow,  113  U.  S.  828,  5  Sup.  Ot  642,  28  L.  Ed.  1006;  Ex 
parte  Kellogg,  6  Vt.  609;  Moore  v.  Robison,  6  Ohio  St.  302;  Buckmaster  t. 
Carlin,  3  Scam.  (Itt.)  104;  Georgia  R.  A  Banidng  Go.  v.  Pendleton,  87  Gs. 
761,  13  S.  E.  K22. 

(362) 


(Sl  18)  OOLLATEBAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDQMENTCL  §  345 


^11 


COLLATERAL  XMFEACHMJiINT  OP  JUDGMENTS. 
PaKT  I     ThB  QSNlfeltAL  RtTLS. 

i  245w  JuOgments  not  to  be  Attacked  Collaterally. 

24^  To  wbat  JudgmeDts  the  Rule  applies. 

247.  Tax  Judgmoits. 

248.  AdJudicatioDB  In  Bankruptcy. 
2I»,  Awards. 

250.  Judgments  of  Inferior  Courts. 

2$L  Co-Ordinate  Courts. 

252.  Wbat  constitutes  a  Collateral  Attack. 

253.  Proceedings  to  prevent  Execution  of  tbe  Jidgment 
253a.  Proceeding  to  l«^force  Judgment  by  Mandamus. 

254.  Habeas  Cbrpus  Proceedings. 

285.  Errors  and  Irregularities  not  Reylewable. 

25ft.  Jurisdiction  may  be  examined. 

257.  Constitutionality  of  iSUtutes. 

25K.  Jurisdiction  to  render  the  Particular  Sentence. 

250.  Sufficiency  of  Process  or  Pleadings. 

200.  To  what  Parties  the  Rule  applies. 

Part  IL    For  Errors  and  Irrboularitibs. 

261.  Erroneous  and  Irregular  Judgments. 

2lfil  Mistakes  in  the  Judgment. 

203.  Irregular  or  Defective  Service. 

2»4.  Objections  as  to  Parties. 

2«6.  Legal  DisabiUty  of  Parties. 

206.  Disqualilication  of  Judge. 

267.  Judgment  for  Excessive  Amount. 

268.  Insufficiency  of  Evidence. 

260.  illegal  or  Insufficient  Cause  of  Action. 

Part  III.    For  Want  of  Jurisdictioh* 

270.  Jurisdiction  of  Superior  Courts  presumed. 

271.  Silence  or  Incompleteness  of  the  Record. 

272.  Appearance  by  Attorney. 

273.  Jurisdictional  Recitals. 

274.  Decision  of  the  Court  upon  its  own  Jiurisdiction. 

275.  Cases  denying  Conclusiveness  of  Record. 

276.  Arguments  on  tbe  Conclusiveness  of  Records. 

277.  Ho  Presumption  against  the  Record. 

(363) 


§   245  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  13 

Part  III.    For  Want  of  J[7Bisdiction — Con  tin  tied. 

278.  Judgment  Void  on  Us  Face  may  be  Attacked  Collaterally. 

279.  Superior  Courts  exercising  Special  Statutory  Powers. 

280.  Summary  Proceedings. 

281.  Constructive  Service  of  Process. 

282.  Judgments  of  Inferior  Courts  not  aided  by  PresumpUona. 

283.  Superior  and  Inferior  Courts  distinguished. 

284.  Probate  Courts. 

285.  Federal  Courts. 

286.  Justices  of  the  Peace. 

287.  Record  of  Inferior  Court,  showing  Jurisdiction.  Is  Conclusive. 

288.  No  Presumption  of  Validity  on  Direct  Attack. 

289.  Foreign  Judgments. 

Part  IV.    For  Fraud. 

290.  Whether  Parties  can  Impeach  Judgment  for  Fraud. 

291.  Fraud  In  Procuring  the  Judgment. 

292.  Fraud  In  the  Cause  of  Action. 

298.  Creditor  may  show  Fraud  in  a  Judgment. 

291.  Fraud  must  affect  the  Creditors. 

296.  What  Creditors  allowed  to  allege  l^Yaud.  . 

296.  False  Testimony. 


Part  I.     The  General  Kut.e. 

(  245.    Judgments  not  to  be  Attaeked  Collaterally. 

Where  the  court  has  jurisdiction  of  the  parties  and  the  subject- 
matter  in  the  particular  case,  its  judgment,  unless  reversed  or  an- 
nulled in  some  proper  proceeding,  is  not  open  to  attack  or  impeach- 
ment, by  parties  or  privies,  in  any  collateral  action  or  proceeding 
whatever.^     "The  doctrine  of  this  court,  and  of  all  the  courts  of  this 

1  Elliott  V.  Plersol,  1  Pet.  340,  7  L.  Ed.  1«4;  Gray  v.  Brlgnardello.  1  Wall 
(527,  17  Li.  Ed.  692;  Secrlst  v.  Green,  3  Wall.  744.  18  L.  Ed.  153;  Gunn  t. 
Plant,  94  U.  S.  064,  24  L.  Ed.  304;  Bank  of  United  States  v.  Voorhees,  1  Mc- 
Lean, 221,  Fed.  Oas.  No.  939;  Dunham  v.  Jones,  159  U.  S.  584,  16  Sup.  (X 
108,  40  1m  Ed.  267;  Woodman  v.  SmltH,  37  Me.  21;  Gorrlll  v.  Whittier,  3 
N.  H.  265;  Porter  v.  Glle,  47  Vt  620;  Corey  v.  MorrlU,  71  Vt.  51,  42  AU.  976: 
fleudrlck  v.  Whlttemore,  105  Mass.  23;  Smith  v.  Shaw,  12  Johns.  (N.  Y) 
256;  People  v.  Downing,  4  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  189;  Kean  v.  McKinsey. 
2  Pa.  30;  Billings  v.  Russell,  23  Pa.  189.  62  Am.  Dec.  330;  Yaple  v.  Titus. 
41  Pa.  195,  80  Am.  Dec.  604;  Wood  v.  Bayard,  63  Pa.  320;  Fridge  v.  State, 
8  GIU  &  J.  (Md.)  103,  20  Am.  Dec.  463;  McNeers  Ex'rs  v.  Aoldridge,  34  W. 
Va.  748,  12  S.  E.  851;  Lancaster  v.  Wilson,  27  GraL  (Va.)  624;  Howteon  t. 

(364) 


Ch.  18)  COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §   245 

country,  is  firmly  established,  that  if  the  court  in  which  the  pro- 
ceedings took  place  had  jurisdiction  to  render  the  judgment  which 
it  did,  no  error  in  its  proceedings  which  did  not  affect  the  jurisdic- 
tion will  render  the  proceedings  void,  nor  can  such  errors  be  con- 
sidered  when  the  judgment  is  brought  collaterally  into  question."  * 
This  principle  is  not  merely  an  arbitrary  rule  of  law  established  by 
the  courts,  but  it  is  a  doctrine  which  is  founded  upon  reason  and 
the  soundest  principles  of  public  policy.  "It  is  one,"  says  the  court 
in  Virginia,  "which  has  been  adopted  in  the  interest  of  the  peace  of 
society  and  the  permanent  security  of  titles.  If,  after  the  rendition 
of  a  judgment  by  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction,  and  after  the 
period  has  elapsed  when  it  becomes  irreversible  for  error,  another 
court  may  in  another  suit  inquire  into  the  irregularities  or  errors  in 
such  judgment,  there  would  be  no  end  to  litigation  and  no  fixed 
established  rights.  A  judgment,  though  unreversed  and  irreversi- 
ble, would  no  longer  be  a  final  adjudication  of  the  rights  of  litigants, 
but  the  starting  point  from  which  a  new  litigation  would  spring  up ; 
acts  of  limitation  would  become  useless  and  nugatory;  purchasers 
on  the  faith  of  judicial  process  would  find  no  protection ;  every  right 

Weeden,  77  Va.  704;  Fox  v.  Cottage  Building  Ass'n,  81  Va.  677;  Skinner 
T.  Moore,  1»  N.  C.  138,  ao  Am.  Dec.  155;  Morris  v.  Gentry,  8l>  N.  O.  248; 
Reese  v.  Meetze,  51  S.  C.  333,  29  S.  E.  73;  Bridges  v.  Nicholson,  20  6a.  90; 
Vickery  v.  Scott,  20  Ga.  798;  Archer  v.  GuUl.  67  Ga.  195;  Moore  v.  Ware, 
51  Mi88.  206;  Factors'  &  Traders'  Ins.  Co.  v.  De  Blanc,  31  La.  Ann.  100; 
Kent  V.  Brown,  38  La.  Ann.  802;  Lee  v.  Patten,  34  Fla.  149,  15  South.  775; 
Brown  v.  Hearon,  66  Tex.  63,  17  S.  W.  395;  Brooks  v.  Powell  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.)  29  S.  W.  809;  Sutherland  v.  De  Leon,  1  Tex.  250,  46  Am.  Deo.  100; 
Lee  T.  Kingsbury,  13  Tex.  68,  62  Am.  Dec.  546;  Tadiock  y.  Eccles,  20  Tex. 
782.  T6  Am.  Dec.  213;  Willis  v.  Ferguson,  46  Tex.  496;  Paul  v.  Smith,  82 
Ky.  451;  Tbacker  v.  Chambers,  5  Humph.  (Tenn.)  313,  42  Am.  Dec.  431;  Hall 
r.  Hellley,  6  Humph.  (Tenn.)  444;  Lewis  y.  Simon  ton,  8  Humph.  (Tenn.) 
185;  Bigelow  v.  Blgelow,  4  Ohio,  138»  19  Am.  Dec.  591;  Cochran  v.  Loring, 
17  Ohio,  409;  Newnam  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  18  Ohio,  323;  Sauer  v.  Twin- 
log,  81  Ind.  366;  Keesling  v.  Doyle,  8  Ind.  App.  43,  35  N.  E.  126;  First 
Xat  Bank  v.  Hanna,  12  Ind.  App.  240,  39  X.  E.  1054;  Cody  v.  Hough,  20 
IIL  43;  Kern  v.  Strausberger,  71  111.  303;  Harris  v.  Lester,  80  111.  307;  Wright 
y.  Marsli,  2  Greene  (Iowa)  91;  Hampson  v.  Weare,  4  Iowa,  13,  66  Am. 
Dec.  116;  Callahan  v.  Grlswold,  9  Mo.  775;  Martin  v.  McLean,  49  Mo.  361; 
Teoman  v.  Younger,  83  Mo.  424;  Hall  v.  Sauntry,  72  Minn.  420,  75  N.  W. 
720,  71  Am.  St.  Rep.  497. 
>  McGoon  r.  Scales,  9  VVaU.  23, 19  L.  Ed.  545,  Miller,  J. 

(3G5) 


§   246  LAW  OP  JXTDGMBNTS.  (Cb-  18 

established  by  a  judgment  would  be  insecure  and  uncertain ;  and  a 
cloud  would  rest  upon  every  title."  •  If  the  sentence  last  quoted 
seems  somewhat  extravagant,  at  least  it  will  serve  to  show  the  sub- 
stantial reasons  upon  which  the  rule  rests  and  the  inflexibility  with 
which  it  is  held  by  the  courts.  According  to  the  supreme  court  of 
Massachusetts,  the  rule  obt^iins  "not  because  of  an  apparent  author- 
ity in  the  court  to  render  the  judgment,  but  because  the  remedy  by 
review  or  writ  of  error  is  held  to  be  more  appropriate."  *  This  may 
be  sufficient  as  a  technical  reason,  but  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the 
motives  which  have  led  to  the  establishment  of  the  rule  rather  spring 
from  the  considerations  of  public  policy,  and  the  necessary  finality 
of  judicial  decisions,  indicated  in  the  opinions  previously  quoted. 

§  246.    To  what  J«d«memts  tlM  KvU  avpliM. 

The  rule  against  collateral  impeachment  applies  to  every  judg- 
ment, order,  decree,  or  judicial  proceeding,  of  whatever  species,  that 
is  not  absolutely  void.  If  the  judgment  is  void  on  its  face  it  is  of 
course  a  mere  nullity  and  of  no  avail  for  any  purpose,  and  this  may 
be  urged  against  it  whenever  it  is  brought  in  question.*  But  other- 
wise, whether  it  be  regular  or  irregular,  correct  or  erroneous,  valid 
or  voidable,  it  is  not  subject  to  collateral  attack.  This  rule  has  been 
held  applicable  to  a  judgment  in  rem,  where  the  court  had  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  res ;  •  to  a  judgment  condemning  property  in  confisca- 
tion proceedings ;  ^  to  decrees  of  divorce  rendered  by  courts  of  com- 
petent jurisdiction ;  •  to  an  order  of  naturalization ;  •  to  decrees  ren- 
dered by  a  court  of  equity,  when  sought  to  be  assailed  in  the  same 
or  another  court ;^®  to  a  judgment  in  attachment;*^  to  orders  and 

8  Lancaster  v.  Wilson,  27  Grat.  (Va.)  624,  629. 
4  Hendrick  v.  Wliittemore,  105  Mass.  23. 
8  See   supra,  §  170;  Infra,  §  278. 

6  Otis  V.  The  Rio  Grande,  1  Woods,  279,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  10,613;  Shearer  t. 
City  Xat.  Bank,  115  Ala.  352,  22  South.  151. 

7  Bragg  V.  Lorio,  1  Woods,  209,  Fed.  Cas.  Xo.  1,800. 

8  In  re  James'  Estate,  99  Cal.  374,  33  Pac.  1122,  37  Am.  St  Rep.  60. 

»  State  V.  Brandhorst,  156  Mo.  457,  56  S.  W.  1094,  79  Am.  St  Rep.  53& 

10  Bryan  v.  Kennett  113  iJ.  S.  179,  5  Sup.  Ct  407,  28  L.  Ed.  908;  Estep 


11  HaiTison  v.  Pender,  44  N.  G.  78,  57  Am.  Dec.  573;  Needham  v.  Wilson 
<C.  C.)  47  Fed.  97. 
(366) 


Ch.  13)        COLLATERAL.  IMP8ACHMBNT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  246 

judgments  in  eminent  domain  proceedings;**  to  judgments  of  fore- 
closure ;  *'  to  orders  of  courts  calling  special  elections,  under  statu- 
tory authority  for  that  purpose ;  **  to  a  decree  confirming  an  au- 
ditor's report  on  the  distribution  of  the  estate  of  an  assignor  for 
the  benefit  of  creditors;  **  to  a  judgment  forfeiting  a  recognizance, 
that  being  within  the  competence  of  the  court ;  *•  to  an  order  allow- 
ing a  certain  sum  to  the  clerk  for  costs  in  insolvent  criminal  cases ;  *^ 
to  an  order  of  court  approving  the  act  of  an  administrator  in  allow- 
ing a  claim  against  the  estate;  **  to  an  order  granting  an  allowance 
for  the  support  of  the  widow  and  children ;  *•  to  a  decree  author- 
izing the  receiver  of  an  insolvent  corporation  to  levy  an  assessment 
on  the  stockholders  to  pay  the  debts ;  **  to  an  order  setting  aside  a 
judgment  by  default ;  **  and  to  a  decree  vacating  a  former  decree 
upon  a  petition  to  be  let  in  to  a  defense.**  Moreover,  the  rule 
against  collateral  impeachment  applies  not  only  to  judgments  in 
contested  actions,  but  also  to  judgments  by  default,  provided  the 
court  had  jurisdiction,**  and  to  judgments  dismissing  the  action,** 
as  also  to  judgments  by  confession,*"  and  compromise  and  consent 

T.  Watklns,  1  Bland  (Md.)  486;  Covington  v.  Ingram,  04  N.  C.  123;  Lem- 
mon  ▼.  Herb^t,  U2  Ya.  653,  24  8.  E.  249;  Gomez  v.  Gomez,  81  Uud,  566, 
81  N.  T.  Bupp.  206;  Sauer  v.  Cincinnati  St.  Ry.  Co.,  5  Ohio  N.  P.  108. 

It  Fairington  v.  City  of  New  York,  88  Uun,  124,  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  371;  Lovltt 
T.  Russell,  138  Mo.  474,  40  S.  W.  123;  Hopkins  v.  Cravey,  85  Tex.  189, 
19  8.  W.  1067. 

itTooUiaker  v.  Greer,  92  Me.  546,  43  Atl.  498;  Kopp  v.  Blessing,  121 
Mo.  391,  25  S.  W.  757;  Martina  v.  Muhlke,  88  lU.  App.  12. 

t«  Jones  y.  CuUen,  142  Ind.  335,  40  N.  E.  124;  State  y.  Mackin,  51  Mo.  App. 
289. 

tfOom.  y.  Steacy,  100  Pa.  613. 

!•  Bulmali  y.  State,  312  Ind.  107.  13  N.  E.  877. 

IT  Doer  y.  Thweatt,  39  Ga.  578.  See  State  y.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Lander 
County,  22  Nev.  71,  35  Fac.  300. 

!•  Fitner  y.  Flanagan,  17  Tex.  7. 

f  Lieayerton  y.  Leayerton,  40  Tex.  218. 

i«  Kichman  y.  Hersker,  170  Pa.  402,  33  Atl.  229. 

91  Bender  y.  Askew,  14  N.  C.  150,  22  Am.  Dec.  714. 

39  Southern  Bank  y.  Humphreys,  47  111.  227. 

<t  Fendexter  y.  Cole,  66  N.  U.  270,  20  Atl.  331. 

sAWestbay  y.  Gray,  116  Cal.  660,  48  Pac.  800;  Hang  y.  Great  Northern 
Ry.  Oo.,  42  C.  O.  A.  167,  102  Fed.  74. 

i»  P.  Mayer  Boot  &  Shoe  Co.  y.  Falk,  89  Wis.  216»  61  N.  W.  562;  United 

(367) 


§    2i7  LAW  OF  JUDQMBNT8.  (Ch.  13 

judgments.**  Also  it  is  said  that  if  an  execution  sale  is  merely  void- 
able, none  but  parties  to  the  proceeding  can  question  it,  and  then 
only  in  the  same  action  or  by  appeal  or  writ  of  error.' ^ 

The  entry  of  a  judgment  in  the  judgment-book,  it  is  said,  includ- 
ing the  date  of  the  judgment  and  the  date  of  the  docketing  in  the 
judgment-docket,  while  standing  as  a  part  of  the  court's  record,  can- 
not be  impeached  collaterally.*'  And  while  affidavits  may  be  read 
or  proof  heard,  to  show  that  words  have  been  improperly  stricken 
from  a  judgment,  they  cannot  be  received  to  falsify  a  record  by 
showing  that  an  alteration,  correcting  it,  was  improperly  made.** 

(  247.    Tax  Jiid«memt«. 

The  principle  that  a  record  cannot  be  impeached  collaterally  for 
mere  errors  or  irregularities  is  equally  applicable  to  a  statutory  judg- 
ment against  land  for  taxes  as  to  any  other  decree.  "It  is  no  objec- 
tion," said  the  supreme  court  of  Alabama  in  a  recent  case,  "to  the 
application  of  this  principle  that  the  present  proceeding  is  to  enforce 
the  collection  of  deHnquent  taxes.  While  great  accuracy  is  exacted 
in  all  such  proceedings,  and  strict  rules  are  applied  for  the  protection 
of  the  tax  payer,  this  principle  forbidding  the  collateral  assailment 
of  judgments  has  often  been  invoked  successfully  in  actions  of  this 
nature.  It  has  accordingly  been  decided  that  there  is  no  sound  rea- 
son why  judicial  proceedings  for  the  enforcement  of  taxes  should  be 
exempted  from  its  influence."  •*    And  it  is  no  reason  for  departing 

states  Electric  Lighting  Co.  v.  Leiter,  19  D.  C.  675;  Atwater  T.  American 
Kxcn.  Xat.   Bank,   152  ill.   eH>5,  38  N.  E.   1017;  Perisho   v.  Perisho,  H  DL 
App.  222;  Chase  v.  Tuck  wood,   86  lU.  App.   70;  City  of  Heloia  v.  United 
States,  43  C.  C.  A.  429,  104  Fed.  113;  Wright  v.  Wright  (C.  C.)  103  Fed.  680. 
20  Biddle  V.  Pierce,  13  Ind.  App.  239.  41  N.  E.  475. 

27  Magnusson  v.  Cronholm,  51  111.  App.  473. 

28  Ferguson  v.  Kuniler,  25  Minn.  183. 
«»  Walker  v.  Armour,  22  111.  658. 

so  Driggers  y.  Cassady,  71  Ala.  529;  United  States  Trast  Co.  T.  Meretn- 
tile  Trust  Co.,  31  C.  C.  A.  427,  88  Fed.  140;  Newman  ▼.  City  of  Chicigo. 
153  111.  469,  38  N.  E.  1053;  People  y.  Weber,  164  m.  412,  46  N.  B.  723; 
Young  y.  Lorain,  11  ill.  637,  52  Am.  Dec.  463;  Job  y.  Tebbetts,  6  Gibnan 
(111.)  376;  Chesnut  y.  Marsh,  12  111.  173;  Reinhardt  y.  Nealis,  101  Tenn.  1(8. 
46  S.  W.  446;  McCarter  v.  Neil,  50  Ark.  188,  6  S.  W.  731;  Bnrcbsm  ▼. 
TeiTy,  55  Ark.  398,  18  S.  W.  458,  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  42;  Scott  T.  Fleutnt^  n 

(368) 


Ch.  13)  COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §   247* 

from  this  rule  that  the  property  owner  was  a  non-resident,  if  the 
conrt  had  jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter  and  the  usual  construct- 
ive notice  to  the  owner  was  given.' ^  Nor  can  the  judgment  be  im- 
peached because  it  embraces  also  a  personal  judgment  against  the 
owner  of  the  land  beside  the  proper  judgment  against  the  land  it- 
self; for  that  part  of  the  judgment  which  is  directed  against  the 
owner  will  be  regarded  as  mere  surplusage.**  The  cases  even  go  to 
the  length  of  holding  that  it  cannot  be  shown  against  such  a  judg- 
ment, collaterally,  that  the  taxes  on  the  particular  land  had  been  in 
fact  paid  before  the  suit,'*  or  that  no  assessment  was  made  for  the 
year  in  question,**  although  delinquency  is  the  very  f^ct  upon  which 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  must  be  based.  And  it  is  not  even  per- 
mitted to  show,  in  any  collateral  proceeding,  that  the  assessment  on 
which  the  taxes  were  based  was  illegal  and  void,  or  that  the  statute 
or  ordinance  authorizing  the  assessment  was  unconstitutional  or  in- 
valid.** In  Illinois,  it  was  at  one  time  the  settled  rule  that  a  judg- 
ment by  default,  in  a  proceeding  under  the  statutes  of  that  state  for 
the  condemnation  and  sale  of  land  for  taxes,  was  not  conclusive 
upon  the  tax  payer,  and  might  be  collaterally  impeached.*®  But 
this  rule  has  been  very  much  narrowed  by  an  amendment  to  the 
revenue  law  providing  that  the  tax  judgment  shall  estop  all  parties 
from  raising  objections  which  existed  at  or  before  the  rendition  of 
the  judgment  and  could  have  been  presented  in  defense  thereto,  and 

Ark.  3tf4;  Dimcan  v.  Lankford,  145  iDd.  145,  44  N.  E.  12;  Gibbs  v.  Southern, 
116  Mo.  204,  22  B.  W.  713;  V^ellsbear  v.  Kelley,  69  Mo.  343;  Hennessy  v. 
City  of  Bt  Paul,  54  Minn.  219.  55  N.  W.  1123;  Eitel  v.  Poote,  39  Cal.  439; 
Branson  v.  Carotliers,  49  Cal.  375;  Mayo  v.  Foley.  40  Gal.  281;  Town  of 
Haywaia  v.  mmental.  107  Cal.  386,  40  Pac.  545;  Gunn  y.  Howell,  27  Ala. 
663,  62  Am.  Dee.  785;  Cadmus  v.  Jackson,  52  Pa.  295;  Clinton  v.  City  of 
Portland,  26  Or.  410,  38  Pac.  407;   Black,  Tax  Titles  (2d  Ed.)  §  177. 

»i  Neely  v.  Bucbanan  (Tenn.  Cb.)  54  S.  W.  905;  Charley  v.  Kelley,  120  Mo. 
134,  25  8.  W.  571;  aark  v.  Kern,  146  111.  348,  35  N.  E.  60. 

«»Chesnut  v.  Marsh,  12  111.  173. 

<sCtaauncey  v.  Wass,  35  Minn.  1,  30  N.  W.  826;  Cadmus  v.  Jackson,  52 
Pa.  295;  Black,  Tax  Titles  (2d  Ed.)  §  1G9. 

«*  Gibbfl  V.  Southern,  116  Mo.  204.  22  S.  W.  713. 

^•Mayo  V.  Ah  Loy,  32  Cal.  477,  91  Am.  Dec.  595;  Mayo  v.  Foley,  40  Cal. 
281;  People  v.  Ungle,  165  111.  65,  46  N.  E.  10.  And  see  Higgin*  v.  Bordages 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.)  28  S.  W.  350. 

3«  Gage  V.  Fnmpelly.  115  U.  S.  454,  6  Sup.  Ot  136,  29  L.  Ed.  449. 

1  LAW  JUDG.~24  (3G9) 


§  248  LAW  OF  JUD0MSNT8.  (C9l.  13 

making  the  judgment  conclusive  evidence  of  its  own  regularity  and 
validity  in  all  collateral  proceedings,  except  where  the  tax  had  been 
paid  or  the  land  was  not  liable  for  it.*^ 

I  048«    Adjndioations   la   Baakrvptoy* 

An  adjudication  of  bankruptcy,  made  by  a  court  having  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  subject-matter  and  of  the  person  of  the  defendant,  is  con- 
clusive of  the  fact  decreed,  and  cannot  be  attacked  collaterally,  for 
any  error  or  irregularity,  in  controversies  between  the  trustee  in 
bankruptcy  and  persons  claiming  an  adverse  interest  in  the  prop- 
erty of  the  bankrupt,  or  otherwise.**  On  the  same  principle,  a  dis- 
charge in  bankruptcy  remains  valid  and  binding  until  set  aside  or 
annulled  in  a  suit  brought  for  that  purpose  in  the  court  where  it  was 
granted ;  it  cannot  be  impeached  collaterally  for  fraud,  irregularity, 
or  want  of  notice  in  the  proceedings  in  which  it  was  obtained.*  •  A 
state  court,  for  example,  can  neither  annul  nor  disregard  a  dis- 

87  Drake  v.  Ogden.  128  III.  608,  21  N.  B.  611;  Gage  v.  Goudj,  141  lU.  216,  30 
N.  E.  320;  Black,  Tax  TlUes  (24  Ed.)  1 177. 

ss  Graham  v.  Boston,  U.  &  E.  R.  Co.,  118  U.  8.  lei,  6  Sup.  Ct  1008,  SO 
L.  Ed.  196;  Ohapman  y.  Brewer,  114  U.  S.  168,  6  Snp.  Ct  799,  29  L.  Ed. 
83;  Michaels  y.  Foet,  21  Wall.  398,  22  L.  Ed.  620;  Sloan  y.  Lewis,  22  WalL 
160,  22  L.  Ed.  832;  Graham  y.  Boston,  H.  &  Ew  R.  Go.  (C.  C.)  14  Fed.  753; 
In  re  Columbia  Keal  Estate  Co.  (D.  C.)  101  Fed.  966;  Hobson  y.  Markson. 
1  Dm.  421,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  6,555;  In  re  GetcheU,  8  Ben.  266,  Fed.  Cas.  Na 
5,371;  In  re  lyes,  5  DiU.  146,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  7,115;  Mount  y.  Manhattan  Cb.. 
41  N.  J.  Eq.  211,  3  Atl.  726.  As  to  questionins  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
court,  the  foregoing  cases  show  that  this  cannot  be  done,  If  the  objec- 
tion to  the  Jurisdiction  concerns  the  character  or  number  of  creditors  Join- 
ing in  the  petition,  the  sufficient  allegation  of  an  act  of  bankruptcy,  or 
the  amount  of  debts  owed  by  the  bankrupt  But  there  are  authorities  to 
the  effect  that  a  total  want  of  Jurisdiction  oyer  the  person  of  the  bankrupt 
may  be  shown,  eyen  collaterally.  In  re  Goodfellow,  1  Low.  610,  Fed.  Cas. 
No.  5,636;  Fellows  y.  Hall,  3  McLean,  487,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  4723;  Stnart  v. 
Aumlller,  37  Iowa,  102,  8  N.  B.  R.  541. 

89  United  States  y.  Griswold  (C.  G.)  7  Sawy.  311,  8  Fed.  656.  The  pre- 
scribed notice  to  creditors  Is  so  far  essential  to  the  Jurisdiction  of  tbe  court 
to  grant  a  discharge  in  bankruptcy  that  the  want  of  it  wiU  be  ground  for 
setting  the  discharge  aside  In  a  direct  proceeding  for  that  purpose:  though. 
Id  any  collateral  proceeding,  the  certiiicate  of  discharge  is  itself  coodu- 
:Bive  eyldence  of  Jurisdiction  to  grant  it  Allen  y,  Thompson  (D.  &>  10  Fed. 
116. 

(370) 


Ch.  13)  COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JX7DGMENTS.  §  249 

charge  duly  granted  by  a  court  of  bankruptcy  having  jurisdiction, 
nor  allow  it  to  be  impeached  in  any  collateral  proceeding  for  any 
cause  which  would  authorize  the  bankruptcy  court  to  revoke  or  set 
it  aside ;  it  can  be  impeached  only  in  a  direct  proceeding  for  that 
purpose  in  the  bankruptcy  court  itself.** 

§  249.    Awards, 

An  award  of  arbitrators,  like  a  judgment  at  law,  concludes  the 
parties,  and  cannot  be  impeached  in  a  collateral  proceeding,  even 
although  erroneous,  if  it  was  fairly  made.*^  If  it  appears  to  be 
good  on  its  face,  none  of  the  various  grounds  which  might  be  urged 
against  its  justice  or  legality  in  a  direct  proceeding  to  set  it  aside 
will  avail  collaterally.  Thus,  it  was  said  in  an  early  case:  "An 
award  good  upon  the  face  of  it  cannot  be  impeached  but  upon  ob- 
jections which  go  to  the  misbehavior  of  arbitrators.  If  the  recep- 
tion of  illegal  evidence  appear  upon  the  award,  it  may  be  set  aside, 
or  if  a  mistake  of  fact  appear  upon  the  face,  or  by  confession  of  the 
referees,  it  should  be  recommitted;  but  the  court  cannot  inquire 
by  extrinsic  testimony  into  the  justice  of  the  award,  for  that  would 
be  to  try  the  matters  in  dispute  de  novo."  ** 

«•  Corey  v.  Kipley,  57  Me.  W,  2  Am.  Rep.  19;  Stetson  t.  City  of  Bangor, 
56  Me.  28t>;  Parker  v.  Atwood,  52  N.  H.  181;  FuUer  v.  Pease,  144  Mass. 
3«U,  11  N.  K.  C94;  Way  v.  Howe,  10«  Mass.  502,  11  Am.  Rep.  386;  Sheets 
T.  tiawk,  14  Serg.  &  U.  (Pa.)  173,  16  Am.  Dec  486;  Ocean  Nat.  Bank 
T.  Ulcott,  46  iN.  Y,  12;  Talbott  v.  Suit,  68  Md.  443,  13  Atl.  356;  Brady  v. 
Brady,  71  Ga.  71;  Gates  v.  Parish,  47  Ala.  157;  Milhous  v.  Aicardi,  51  Ala. 
SM;  Stevens  v.  Brown,  49  Miss.  597;  Alston  v.  Robinett,  37  Tex.  56;  Brown 
T.  Causey,  56  Tex.  340;  EweU  v.  Pitman  (Ky.)  27  S.  W.  870;  Morris  v. 
Gk«ed,  11  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  155;  Hennessee  v.  Mills,  1  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  38;  Thur- 
mond y.  Andrews,  10  Bush  (Ky.)  400;  Smith  v.  Ramsey,  27  Ohio  St  339; 
Uowland  v.  Carson,  28  Ohio  St.  625;  Wiley  v.  Pavey,  61  Ind.  457,  28  Am. 
Kep.  677;  Brown  y.  Coyenant  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  86  Mo.  51;  Thornton  y. 
Uogan,  63  Mo.  143;  Seymour  y.  Street,  5  Neb.  85;  Thomas  v.  Jones,  39 
V\  is.  124. 

«i  Morse  y.  Bishop,  55  Yt  231. 

«2  Jocelyn  t.  Donnel,  Peek  (Tenn.)  274,  14  Am.  Dec.  753. 

(371) 


S   250  X^W  OF  JUDGMENTS  (Ch.    13 


(  250.    Judcmentfl  of  Inferior  Courts* 

We  shall  have  occasion,  in  a  later  part  of  this  chapter,  to  discuss 
the  important  distinction  between  superior  and  inferior  courts,  in 
respect  to  the  presumptions  by  which  the  judgments  of  the  former 
are  sustained  against  collateral  attacks  upon  their  jurisdiction,  and 
the  requirement  that  judgments  of  the  latter  must  show  jurisdiction 
on  their  face.  But  it  belongs  to  the  present  connection  to  advert  to 
the  well  recognized  rule  that  the  judgments  and  decisions  of  an  in- 
ferior court  can  in  no  case  be  assailed  indirectly  on  account  of  er- 
rors or  irregularities  not  affecting  the  jurisdiction.**  Thus  the  reg- 
ularity or  legality  of  a  judgment  rendered  by  a  justice  of  the  peace, 
in  a  case  falling  within  his  competence  and  in  which  he  had  juris- 
diction of  the  parties,  so  long  as  it  is  not  reversed  or  annulled  in 
some  proper  proceeding,  is  not  open  to  collateral  attack  or  impeach- 
ment.** On  similar  principles,  an  order  or  decree  of  a  surrogate,  or 
probate  or  orphans'  court,  jurisdiction  having  attached,  is  not  exam- 
inable in  any  collateral  proceeding.**  In  fact,  the  orders  and  judg- 
ments of  probate  courts  concerning  matters  over  which  they  have 

*»  Comstock  V.  Crawford,  3  Wall.  396,  18  L.  Ed.  34;  Grusenmeyer  v.  City  of 
Logansport,  76  Ind.  549;  Bell  v.  Raymond,  18  Conn.  100;  Long  v.  Burnett,  13 
Iowa,  28,  81  Am.  Dec.  40;  Roosevelt  v.  Kellogg,  20  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  208;  Bernal 
V.  Lynch,  36  Oal.  135;  Thompson  v.  Multnomah  Co.,  2  Or.  34;  Shoemaker  t. 
Brown,  10  Kan.  383. 

44  gearbox  v.  Hays,  6  Watts  (Pa.)  398,  31  Am.  Dec.  478;  BUlings  v.  Russell, 
23  Pa.  189,  02  Am.  Dec.  330;  McDonald  v.  Simcox,  98  Pa.  619;  Cumberland 
Oo.  V.  Boyd,  113  Pa.  52.  4  Ati.  346;  Allen  v.  Martin,  10  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  300,  25 
Am.  Dec.  564;  AVesson  v.  Chamberlain,  3  N.  Y.  331;  Lightsey  v.  Harris,  20 
Ala.  409;  Reid  v.  Spoon,  66  N.  C.  415;  Allen  v.  Mills,  26  Mich.  123;  Nevada 
Nickel  Syndicate  v.  National  Nickel  Co.  (C.  C.)  103  Fed.  391;  Livingston  v. 
Allen,  83  Mo.  A  pp.  294.    Compare  Jones  v.  Pharis,  59  Mo.  App.  254. 

45  Welty  V.  Ruffner,  9  Pa.  224;  Gilmore  v.  Rodgers.  41  Pa.  120;  Leedom  v. 
Lombaert,  80  Pa.  381;  City  of  Boston  v.  Bobbins,  126  Mass.  384;  Van  Dyke 
V.  Johns,  1  Del.  Ch.  93,  12  Am.  Dec.  76;  Ward  v.  Hudspeth,  44  Ala.  215;  Grant 
V.  Spann,  34  Miss.  2€K4;  Ourrle  v.  Franklin,  51  Ark.  338,  11  S.  W.  477;  Barney 
V.  Chittenden,  2  G.  Greene  (Iowa)  165;  Halleck  v.  Moss,  22  Cal.  266;  Haynes 
V.  Meeks,  10  Cal.  110,  70  Am.  Dec.  703.  Error  of  judgment  by  a  surrogate, 
however  palpable,  does  not  render  proceedings  under  it  void,  and  advantage 
can  be  taken  of  it  only  on  appeal;  It  cannot  be  passed  upon  in  a  collateral 
suit  or  action.    Woodruff  v.  Cook,  2  Edw.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  259. 

(372X 


Ch.  13)  COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  07  JUDGMENTS.  |   250 

jurisdiction  are  no  more  open  to  collateral  attack  than  are  the  or- 
ders and  judgment  of  other  courts  of  general  jurisdiction ;  they  must 
have  accorded  to  them  the -same  intendments  and  favorable  pre- 
sumptions which  attend  the  judgments  of  courts  of  general  com- 
mon-law jurisdiction.**  This  rule  applies  to  an  order  admitting  a 
will  to  probate ;  *^  to  orders  appointing  or  removing  executors,  ad- 
ministrators, or  guardians ;  *®  to  orders  allowing  claims  against  the 
estate  of  a  decedent ;  *•  to  orders  authorizing  the  sale  of  land  to 
pay  debts  of  the  estate,  or  confirming  sales  made  by  the  exec- 
utor ;  ••  and  to  decrees  of  partition  made  by  a  probate  court  having 
jurisdiction.*^ 

The  rule  is  by  no  means  confined  to  the  two  species  of  inferior 
courts  already  mentioned.  It  extends  equally  to  many  varieties  of 
judicial  bodies  and  special  tribunals,  all  being  protected,  as  to  their 
judgments,  in  collateral  inquiries,  except  as  to  jurisdiction,  and,  in 
some  cases,  fraud.  For  example,  where  a  court-martial  has  cogni- 
zance of  the  charges  made,  and  has  jurisdiction  of  the  person  of 
the  accused,  its  sentence  is  valid  and  not  impeachable  collaterally, 
although  irregularities  or  errors  are  alleged  to  have  occurred  in  its 

*•  Bensen  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  164  N.  T.  659.  58  N.  B.  1085;  Murzynowski 
r.  Delaware,  I^  &  W.  R.  Co..  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  841;  Macey  v.  Stark,  116  Mo.  481, 
21  S.  W.  1088;  Sherwood  v.  Baker,  105  Mo.  472,  16  S.  W.  938,  24  Am.  St  Rep. 
360;  Gallup  v.  Smith,  59  Oomi.  354,  22  Ati.  334,  12  L.  R  A.  353. 

*Uii  re  Warfleld'B  WUl,  22  Cal.  51,  83  Am.  Dec.  40;  Bolton  v.  SchrJever,  135 
X.  T.  65,  31  N.  B.  1001,  18  L.  R.  A.  242;  Varner  v.  Johnston,  112  N.  O.  570, 
17  S.  E.  483;  Belton  v.  Summer,  31  Fla.  139,  12  South.  371,  21  L.  R.  A.  146; 
CaUoway  v.  Cooley,  50  Kan.  743,  32  Pac.  372;  Halbert  v.  De  Bode  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.)  28  S.  W.  58. 

*9  Steen  v.  Bennett,  24  Vt.  303;  Loyd  v.  Waller,  20  C.  C.  A.  548,  74  Fed.  601; 
Winter  v.  London,  99  Ala.  263.  12  South.  438;  Gillespie  v.  Hauenstein,  72 
Miss.  838,  17  South.  602. 

*•  Yeatman  v.  Yeatman,  3.j  Neb.  422,  53  N.  W.  385;  Shelton  v.  Hadlock,  62 
Oonn.  143.  25  Atl.  483;  Munday  v.  Leeper,  120  Mo.  417.  25  S.  W.  381;  Murphy 
T.  De  France,  105  Mo.  r>3,  16  S.  W.  861. 

»•  Williams  v.  Sharp,  2  Ind.  101;  Sturdy  v.  Jacoway,  19  Ark.  499;  Tyson 
V.  Belcher.  102  N.  C.  112,  9  S.  E.  634;  Brown  v.  Lanman,  1  Conn.  467;  Le- 
broke  v.  Damon,  89  Me.  113,  35  Atl.  1028;  Watklns  v.  Lewis,  153  Ind.  648,  55 
X.  E.  83;  Cobb  v.  Garner,  la"*  Ala.  467,  17  South.  47,  53  Am.  St  Rep.  136; 
Crawford  v.  McDonald,  88  Tex.  026,  33  S.  W.  325. 

51  SnevUy  y.  Wagner,  8  Pa.  306;  Fowler  v.  Succession  of  Gordon,  24  La. 
Ann.  27a 

(373) 


§   251  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  13 

proceedings.'^  So,  where  a  board  of  land  commissioners  has  once 
acquired  jurisdiction  of  a  matter,  its  subsequent  proceedings  there- 
in cannot  be  collaterally  questioned.**  The  same  rule  applies  to 
the  proceedings  of  a  board  of  county  officers  exercising  their  statu- 
tory authority  in  proceedings  for  the  laying  out  of  a  public  high- 
way or  the  location  of  a  private  way.'*  Again,  as  a  state  board  of 
equalization  acts  judicially  in  determining  what  property  is  to  be  as- 
sessed for  taxation,  and  in  fixing  the  amount  of  the  assessment,  its 
judgment  therein  cannot  be  collaterally  impeached.'* 

§  261.    Oo-Ordiaate  Courts. 

A  judgment  at  law  cannot  be  impeached  collaterally  in  equity." 
And  conversely,  the  validity  of  a  decree  rendered  by  a  court  of 
equity  cannot  be  impeached  in  a  collateral  action  at  law.'^  A  judg- 
ment of  a  state  court,  no  question  as  to  its  jurisdiction  being  in- 
volved, cannot  be  overhauled  or  corrected  in  a  collateral  proceeding 
in  a  federal  court."    The  courts  of  the  United  States  cannot  law- 

82  Bz  parte  Reed,  100  U.  S.  13.  25  L.  Ed.  538;  Bx  parte  Mason,  106  U.  S. 
G96»  26  L.  Ed.  1213;  Keyes  T.  United  States,  109  U.  S.  336,  8  Sup.  Ct  202.  27 
L.  Ed.  954;  Dynes  Y.  Hoover,  20  How.  65,  15  L.  Ed.  838;  Swaim  v.  United 
States,  165  U.  S.  553, 17  Sup.  Ct  448,  41  L.  Ed.  823;  United  States  ▼.  Grimley. 
337  U.  S.  147,  11  Sup.  Ct  54,  34  L.  Ed.  636. 

B«  Bernal  v.  Lyneh,  36  Cal.  135. 

B«  San  Mateo  County  v.  Cobum.  130  Cal.  631,  63  Pae.  78;  Helms  v.  Bdl,  125 
Ind.  502,  58  N.  E.  707;  Thomas  y.  Chmx^hUl,  84  Me.  446,  24  AtL  890. 

BB  Mclieod  T.  Receveur.  18  C.  a  A.  188,  71  Fed.  455. 

«•  Redwine  v.  Brown,  10  Ga.  311. 

87  Watson  V.  Williams,  43  N.  C.  232;  Alexander  v.  Nelson,  42  Ala.  4C2. 

B8  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Wiggins  Ferry  Co.,  108  U.  S.  IB,  1  Sup.  Ct  614, 
27  L.  Ed.  636;  Oenti-al  Trust  Co.  y.  Seasongood,  130  U.  S.  482,  9  Sup.  Ct  57a. 
32  L.  Ed.  985;  Simmons  y.  Saul,  138  U.  S.  439,  11  Sup.  Ct  369.  34  L.  Ed.  1054; 
Griswold  y.  Hazard,  141  U.  S.  260,  11  Sup.  Ct.  972,  35  L.  Ed.  678;  Lytle  ▼. 
Town  of  Lansing,  147  U.  S.  59,  13  Sup.  Ct  254,  37  L.  Ed.  78.  Federal  courts 
can  determine  whether  or  not  a  state  court  had  Jurisdiction  of  the  parties  to 
or  subject-matter  of  a  cause  in  which  it  has  rendered  Judgment  and  for  this 
purpose  they  may  look  beyond  the  record  and  hear  other  eyldence;  bat  it 
cannot  be  shown  by  parol  or  extrinsic  evidence  that  the  subject-matter  In  the 
record  was  not  that  which  was  adjudicated.  Kansas  City,  Ft  S.  &  M.  R.  Co. 
y.  Morgan,  21  C.  O.  A.  468,  76  Fed.  429.  A  decree  of  a  state  court  can  be  col- 
laterally attacked  in  a  federal  court  only  when  it  is  entirely  void,  either  for 
want  of  legal  organization  of  the  court,  or  want  of  Jurisdiction  orer  the  par- 
(374) 


Ch«  13)  COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §   252 

fully  treat  as  nullities  the  judgments  of  the  courts  of  the  several 
states,  rendered  in  suits  where  the  latter  have  jurisdiction  of  the 
cause  and  the  parties,  even  if  they  are  founded  upon  an  erroneous 
construction  of  the  bankrupt  act  or  any  other  statute  of  the  United 
States;  the  remedy  for  the  correction  of  the  error  is  by  a  writ  of 
error  in  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States."*  And  it  is  equally 
clear  that  the  reverse  of  this  rule  must  hold  good.  That  is,  that 
the  judgments  and  decrees  of  the  federal  courts,  in  cases  where  their 
jurisdiction  is  not  disputed,  must  be  impervious  to  collateral  assail- 
ment  in  the  courts  of  the  states,  although,  for  example,  they  may 
proceed  upon  an  erroneous  construction  of  a  state  constitution  or 
statute.*® 

I  262.    Wluit  ooiuitltiitef  a  OpUateral  Attaok. 

We  are  next  to  inquire  what  constitutes  a  collateral  attempt  to 
impeach  a  judgment  within  the  meaning  of  the  rule  prohibiting  such 
endeavors.  And  here  we  shall  find  that  the  word  "collateral"  is 
always  used  as  the  antithesis  of  "direct,"  and  it  is  therefore  wide 

enough  to  embrace  any  independent  proceeding.    To  constitute  a 

• 

direct  attack  upon  a  judgment,  it  is  said,  it  is  necessary  that  a  pro- 
ceeding be  instituted  for  Jhat  very  purpose."^  If  an  appeal  is  taken 
from  a  judgment,  or  a  writ  of  error,**  or  if  a  motion  is  made  to  va- 

ties  or  the  subject-matter.  But  the  fact  that  such  decree  is  void  on  its  face, 
because  uncertain  and  incomplete,  does  not  render  it  subject  to  collateral  at- 
tack; the  remedy  must  be  sought  in  the  court  which  rendered  it,  by  proceed- 
ings for  its  vacation,  or  by  appeal.    Wood  v.  City  of  Mobile  (0.  C.)  09  Fed.  615. 

»»  Klttredge  v.  Emerson,  15  N.  H.  227. 

«o  Kent  y.  Lake  Superior  Ship  Canal  Ry.  &,  Iron  Co.,  144  U.  S.  75,  12  Sup. 
Ct  650,  36  L.  Ed.  352;  Anderson  v.  Elliott,  41  C.  C.  A.  521,  101  Fed.  609; 
Town  of  Ontario  v.  First  Nat  Bank,  59  Hun,  29,  12  N.  Y.  Supp.  434;  Sandwich 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  Earl,  56  Mhm.  390,  57  N.  W.  938;  Mead  v.  Weaver,  42  Neb.  149, 
00  N.  W.  385. 

•I  Nichols  V.  Wimmer  (Tex.  Sup.)  19  Reporter,  475. 

•s  An  appeal  or  writ  of  error  by  infants  after  attaining  their  majority,  to 
reverse  a  judgment  irregularly  rendered  against  them,  is  a  direct  attack  on 
the  Judgment,  not  collateral.  Moore  v.  Prince,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  352,  23  S.  W. 
1113;  Warren  v.  Union  Bank  of  Rochester,  157  N.  Y.  259,  51  N.  E.  1036,  43  L. 
R.  A.  256,  68  Am.  St.  Rep.  777.  So  of  an  appeal  from  a  judgment  by  a  third 
person,  legally  entitled  to  appeal  because  aggrieved  by  the  judgment.  Succes- 
sion of  Fortler,  51  La.  Ann.  15G2,  26  South.  554. 

.      (375) 


§  252  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNTS.  ((3l.  13 

cate  or  set  it  aside  on  account  of  some  alleged  irregularity,**  the  at- 
tack is  obviously  direct,  the  sole  object  of  the  proceeding  being  to 
deny  and  disprove  the  apparent  validity  of  the  judgment.  But  if 
the  action  or  proceeding  has  an  independent  purpose  and  contem- 
plates some  other  relief  or  result,  although  the  overturning  of  Ac 
judgment  may  be  important  or  even  necessary  to  its  success,  then 
the  attack  upon  the  judgment  is  collateral  and  falls  within  the  rule. 
Thus,  whether  a  judgment  is  irregular  or  erroneous  is  not  a  legiti- 
mate inquiry  in  a  suit  brought  for  its  enforcement.**  So  in  the  dis- 
tribution of  a  fund,  the  court  cannot  inquire  into  the  validity  of  a 
judgment  regular  on  its  face,  or  into  the  consideration  on  which  it 
was  founded.'"  Again,  in  an  action  of  trespass  to  try  title,  any 
attack  upon  a  judgment  which  forms  the  basis  of  the  title  of  one  of 
the  parties,  or  enters  into  his  title,  will  be  considered  a  collateral  im- 
peachment of  such  judgment.'*    And  in  a  suit  on  an  appeal  bond, 

«s  An  action  or  motion*  to  vacate  a  judgment  for  want  of  service  of  procesfi 
on  the  defendant  is  not  a  collateral  attack,  but  direct.  Vaule  v.  MUler,  W 
Minn.  440.  72  N.  W.  452;  Keinhart  v.  Lugo,  86  Cal.  395,  24  Pac  1060,  21  Am. 
St.  Rep.  52.  The  same  is  true  of  a  bUl  to  set  a  Judgment  aside  on  the  ground 
that  it  was  procured  by  fraud.  Mosby.v.  Gisbom,  17  Utah,  257,  54  Pae  121; 
Thompson  v.  McCorlsIe,  136  Ind.  4&1,  34  N.  E.  813,  43  Am.  St.  R^.  334.  Or 
because  it  was  rendered  against  a  minor  plaintiff^ who  was  not  represented  bj 
a  guardian.     Stephens  v.  Hewett,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  304,  54  S.  W.  301. 

64  Rogers  v.  Rogers,  15  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  3G4;  Pearse  v.  Hill,  163  Mass.  493,  40 
.N.  E.  765.  Nor  in  an  action  on  a  promissory  note  given  in  satisfaction  of  the 
Judgment.  Mitchell  v.  State  Bank,  1  Scam.  (111.)  526.  A  proceeding  to  re- 
vive a  Judgment  is  collateral,  and  cannot  be  made  the  means  of  impeaching 
the  original  Judgment  for  error.  Foster  v.  Crawford  (C.  C.)  80  Fed.  WL 
And  the  same  is  true  of  a  suit  in  equity  to  enforce  the  lien  of  a  Judgment 
against  real  estate  of  the  debtor.  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Huntington  DistflUng 
Co.,  41  W.  Va.  530,  23  S.  E.  792,  56  Am.  St.  Rep.  878;  Baldwin  v.  Baer,  10 
Wash.  414,  39  Pac.  117.  Unless  a  Judgment  is  void  on  its  face,  it  cannot  be 
collaterally  attacked  in  proceedings  after  execution  on  exemplification  filed 
in  anotlier  county.  Toomey  v.  Rosansky,  11  Pa,  Super.  Ot  506.  Nor  can  the 
correctness  of  a  decree  giving  a  party  a  lien  on  property  be  inquired  into  on  a 
motion  to  vacate  a  sale  made  in  conformity  with  such  decree.  Dryden  v. 
Parrotte,  61  Neb.  339,  85  N.  W.  287. 

es  Second  Nat.  Bank's  Appeal,  85  Pa.  528;  Safe-Deposit  &  Trust  Ca  v. 
Wright,  44  C.  C.  A.  421,  105  Fed.  155. 

»e  Lee  v.  Kingsbury,  13  Tex.  68,  62  Am.  Dec.  546;  Crawford  v.  McDonald. 
88  Tex.  626,  33  S.  W.  325;  Bouldin  v.  Miller  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  26  S.  W.  133. 
Compare  Fayssoux  v.  Kendall  County  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  55  S.  W,  5S3;  <;rab!im 
V.  East  Texas  I-and  &  Imp.  CJo.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  50  S.  W.  579;    Scanlan  v. 

(370) 


Ch.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  252 

the  valicMty  of  the  judgment  appealed  from  and  affirmed  cannot  be 
drawn  in  question.*^  The  same  is  true  of  a  suit  on  a  recognizance 
entered  in  an  attachment  suit;  no  allegations  can  be. heard  against 
the  regularity  of  the  judgment  in  attachment.**  Nor  can  a  judg- 
ment be  attacked  in  a  proceeding  to  punish  defendant  for  contempt 
in  disobe3nng  it,**  nor  when  it  is  offered  in  evidence  collaterally  in 
another  suit/*  nor  when  an  action  is  brought  to  recover  land  sold 
under  an  execution  on  the  judg^ent.^*  Similarly,  where  a  receiver 
of  an  insolvent  sues  to  recover  assets  of  his  estate,  defendant  can- 
not assail  the  validity  of  the  judgment  under  which  the  receiver 
was  appointed.^*  And  in  an  action  by  a  guardian  on  the  bond  of  a 
former  guardian  who  had  been  removed,  an  objection  by  defendants 
that  the  court  had  no  jurisdiction  to  remove  such  former  guardian, 
and  appoint  the  plaintiff,  cannot  be  sustained,  being  a  collateral  at- 
tack on  the  judgment.^*  So  where  a  sheriff  is  sued  for  failure  to  re- 
turn an  execution,  he  cannot  impeach  the  judgment  on  which  the 
writ  issued.'^* 

On  the  other  hand,  a  complaint  alleging  that  a  judgment  is  abso- 
lutely void  on  its  face,  and  yet  is  apparently  a  lien  on  plaintiff's 
land,  and  asking  a  decree  annulling  and  avoiding  such  judgment,  is 
not  a  collateral  attack  upon  it.^*  And  it  has  been  held  that  no  im- 
proper impeaching  of  a  judgment  collaterally  is  involved  in  a  cred- 
itor intervening,  in  a  suit  brought  by  heirs  against  their  mother  to 
enforce  payment  for  their  interest  in  the  deceased  father's  estate, 

CampbeU,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  505.  55  S.  W.  501.  A  cross  bill  attacking  the  va- 
lidity of  a  decree  of  a  probate  court  in  ordering  sale  of  land  of  an  insolvent 
decedent  to  pay  debts,  in  a  suit  to  quiet  title  to  the  land,  is  a  collateral  attack. 
Friedman  v.  Shamblin.  117  Ala.  454,  23  South.  821. 

«T  Sturjds  V.  Rogers,  26  Ind.  1;  Bostlc  v.  Love,  16  Cal.  69;  Trogdon  v. 
Cleveland  Stone  Co.,  53  lU.  App.  206. 

•»  Elmer  v.  Richards,  25  lU.  289.  See  Tarbox  v.  Hays,  6  Watts  (Pa.)  398, 
31  Aiu.  Dec.  478. 

•»  Ketchum  v.  Edwards,  6  App.  Div.  100,  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  1012. 

70  Miller  v.  White,  46  W.  Va.  67,  33  S.  E.  332,  76  Am.  St  Rep.  791. 

Ti  Brooks  V.  Powell  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  29  S.  W.  809. 

72  Jones  V.  Blun,  145  N.  Y.  333,  39  X.  E.  954. 

7 a  Deegan  v.  Deegan,  22  Nev.  185,  37  Pac.  360,  58  Am.  St.  Rep.  742. 

74  Vicksburg  Grocery  Co.  v.  Brennan  (Miss.)  20  South.  845. 

7  6  Penrose  v.  McKenzie,  116  Ind.  35,  18  N.  E.  384.  See  McCampbell  v. 
Durst,  73  Tex.  410,  11  S.  W.  380. 

(377) 


§  268  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  13 

which  she  has  purchased,  for  the  purpose  of  opposing  the  daims  d! 
the  heirsy  although  their  claims  are  founded  on  a  probate  decree 
confirming  the  sale,  agreed  on  by  the  parties^*  And  an  action  by 
heirs  to  quiet  the  title  of  property  of  the  decedent,  fraudulently  sold 
to  pay  his  debts,  is  not  a  collateral  attack  on  the  decree  confirm- 
ing the  sale.''^  In  Texas,  under  a  statute  allowing  persons  inter- 
ested in  the  estate  of  a  decedent  to  have  the  proceedings  in  the 
county  court  corrected  on  certiorari  from  the  district  court,  where 
the  cause  shall  be  tried  de  novo,  the  proceeding  is  direct,  and  not 
collateral.^* 

I  263.    Prooeedinsf  to  preveiit  Exeontioii  of  tlie  JvdsatoBt. 

A  bill  in  equity  seeking  to  enjoin  the  enforcement  of  a  judgment 
at  law,  by  execution  or  otherwise,  constitutes  a  collateral  attack 
upon  the  judgment,  and  cannot  be  maintained  on  account  of  any 
mere  errors  or  irregularities,  but  only  upon  a  showing  that  the  judg- 
ment is  void/®  There  are  cases,  however,  holding  that  a  suit  to 
enjoin  the  enforcement  of  a  judgment  on  the  ground  of  a  total  want 
of  jurisdiction  over  the  person  of  the  defendant, — ^as,  where  no  pro- 
cess was  ever  served  on  him, — ^is  a  direct  attack  on  the  judgment, 
and  not  collateral.*®  And  the  same  is  said  to  be  true  where  the 
ground  set  up  for  enjoining  the  judgment  is  that  it  has  been  satisfied 
and  released.*^     The  validity  of  a  judgment  cannot  be  impeached 

76  Bedell  v.  H&jes,  21  La.  Ann.  643.  See  Slidell  v.  Germanla  Nat  Bank,  27 
La.  Ann.  354. 

7  7  Bergin  v.  Halght,  90  Oal.  52,  33  Pac.  760.  Compare  I^ynch  v.  Rooney, 
112  Cal.  279.  44  Pac.  565. 

78  Wlpff  V.  Heder,  6  Tex.  Civ.  App.  685.  26  S.  W.  118;  Kalteyer  ▼.  Wlpff 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.)  49  S.  V7.  1055. 

7»  Davis  V.  D.  M.  Osborn  &  Co.,  156  Ind.  86,  59  N.  E.  279;  Kmg  t.  DaTis. 
85  Ind.  309;  A.  B.  Smith  Co.  v.  Bank  of  Holmes  County  (Miss.)  18  South.  817: 
Kirk  V.  Duren,  45  S.  C.  597,  23  S.  E.  954;  Hudson  v.  Yost,  88  Va.  347,  13  S. 
E.  436. 

80  Smith  V.  MorriU,  12  Colo.  App.  233,  55  Pac.  824;  Waite  v.  Ellis,  5  Ohio 
N.  P.  415.  But  a  suit  to  enjoin  a  judgment  on  the  ground  merely  that  th<> 
summons  which  was  served  was  insufficient  is  a  collateral  attack.  Missouri. 
K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Warden,  73  Mo.  App.  117. 

81  Smith  V.  Morrill,  11  Colo.  App.  284,  52  Pac  1110;  Brakke  T.  Hoekins,  98 
Iowa,  233,  67  N.  W.  235. 

(378) 


Ch.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.         §  253a 

on  a  motion  to  quash  an  execution  issued  on  it.  Such  a  motion 
cannot  be  based  on  the  ground  of  mere  error  or  irregularity  in  the 
judgment.  The  jurisdiction  not  being  questioned,  and  the  judg- 
ment not  having  been  reversed,  vacated,  or  set  aside,  such  a  motion 
would  constitute  a  collateral  attack  upon  it.'* 

I  253a.    Prooeedins  to  Enf  oroe  Judgment  Tby  Mandamus. 

When  a  judgment  has  been  recovered  against  a  municipal  cor- 
poration, and  application  is  made  for  a  writ  of  mandamus  to  com- 
pel the  proper  municipal  officers  to  provide  funds  for  its  paypient 
by  the  levy  and  collection  of  a  tax,  it  is  not  permissible  for  the  re- 
spondents, in  opposition  to  the  motion  for  mandamus,  or  in  answer 
to  the  alternative  writ,  to  set  up  any  matters  impeaching  the  correct- 
ness of  the  judgment;  as  against  any  such  collateral  attack,  the 
judgment  is  impregnable,  and  it  is  conclusive  of  all  defenses  which 
were,  or  might  have  been,  urged  in  the  original  action.®*  For  ex- 
ample, if  the  suit  was  upon  bonds  of  the  municipality,  it  is  no  de- 
fense to  the  proceeding  for  mandamus  that  such  bonds  were  ille- 
gally issued,  or  were  invalid  for  any  other  reason.**  Nor  can  the 
municipality  contend  that  the  indebtedness  on  which  the  judgment 

ss  Jones  v.  George,  80  Md.  294,  30  Atl.  635;  Merrick  v.  Merrick,  5  Mo.  App. 
123,  citing  Swinney  v.  Watkins,  22  Ga.  570;  Shorter  v.  Miins,  18  Ala.  658; 
Skldmore  v.  Bradford,  4  Pa.  296. 

•«  Supervisors  v.  United  States,  4  Wall.  435,  18  L.  Ed.  419;  Mayor  v.  Lord,  9 
Wall  409.  10  L.  Ed.  704;  United  States  v.  New  Orleans,  98  U.  S.  381.  25  L.  Ed. 
225;  Harshman  v.  Knox  County  Court,  122  U.  S.  306,  7  Sup.  Ct.  1171,  30  L. 
Ed.  1152;  Mayor  of  New  Orleans  v.  United  States,  2  U.  S.  App.  125,  1  O.  C. 
A.  148,  49  Fed.  40;  Fleming  v.  Trowsdale,  29  C.  C.  A.  106,  85  Fed.  189;  Cflews 
T.  Lee  County,  2  Woods,  474,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  2,892;  Hill  v.  Scotland  County 
Court  (C.  C.)  32  Fed.  716;  Loague  v.  Taxing  District  of  Brownsville  (a  0.) 
36  Fed.  149;  People  T.  Common  Council  of  Buffalo,  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  598;  Bear 
V.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Brunswick  County,  122  N.  C.  434,  29  S.  E.  719,  65  Am. 
St  Rep.  711;  Harkness  v.  Hutcherson,  90  Tex.  383,  38  S.  W.  1120;  City  of 
Sherman  v.  Langham,  92  Tex.  13,  42  S.  W.  961;  Stevens  v.  Miller.  3  Kan.  App. 
192.  43  Pac.  439;  Stenberg  v.  State,  48  Neb.  209,  67  N.  W.  190;  People  v. 
Board  of  Gom'rs  of  Rio  Grande  County,  7  Colo.  App.  229,  42  Pac.  1032;  Id., 
11  Colo.  App.  124,  52  Pac.  748i  State  v.  Moss,  13  Wash.  42,  42  Pac.  622. 

»*  Mayor  v.  Lord,  9  WaU.  409,  19  L.  Ed.  704;  Fleming  v.  Trowsdale,  29  C. 
C.  A.  106,  85  Fed.  189;  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Rio  Grande  County  v.  Burpee,  24 
Cblo.  57,  48  Pac  539;  Stenberg  v.  State,  48  Neb.  209,  67  N.  W.  190. 

(379) 


§    254  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  18 

was  based  was  in  excess  of  the  amount  fixed  by  the  constitution  as 
the  limit  of  the  debt  which  it  might  lawfully  incur.'*  Neither  can  it 
be  alleged  in  the  proceedings  for  mandamus  that  the  judgment  was 
entered  by  consent  of  the  officers  of  the  city,  notwithstanding  there 
was  a  valid  defense  to  the  action,  the  judgment  not  being  void  on 
its  face.*'  But  it  has  been  declared  by  the  supreme  court  of  the 
United  States  that  when  application  is  made  to  collect  judgments 
by  process  not  contained  in  themselves, — ^as,  by  mandamus, — and 
requiring,  in  order  to*  be  sustained,  reference  to  the  alleged  cause  of 
action  on  which  they  are  founded,  the  aid  of  the  court  should  not  be 
granted  when  upon  the  face  of  the  record  it  appears,  not  that  mere 
error  superventd  in  the  rendition  of  such  judgments,  but  that  they 
rest  upon  no  cause  of  action  whatever.*^  And  it  is  competent  for 
the  respondents  to  the  writ  of  mandamus  to  show  that  the  original 
judgment  was  entirely  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction.*?  The  same 
principles  apply  in  an  action  to  enjoin  the  collection  of  a  tax  levied 
to  j^ay  a  judgment  against  a  municipal  corporation.  The  validity  of 
the  claim  on  which  the  judgment  rests  cannot  be  questioned;  the 
judgment  being  conclusive  against  collateral  attack  by  the  munici- 
pality or  by  any  individual  taxpayer.** 

I  264.    Habeas  Corpus  Prooeedimcs* 

The  writ  of  habeas  corpus  is  very  frequently  sued  out  to  obtain 
the  release  of  a  person  held  in  custody  under  the  judgment  or  sen- 

9 

8B  Harshman  v.  Knox  CJounty  Court,  122  U.  S.  306,  7  Sup.  Ct  1171,  25  L.  Ed. 
225;  Board  of  Ctom'rs  of  Lake  County  v.  Piatt,  25  C.  C.  A.  87,  79  Fed.  5G7; 
Holt  County  v.  National  Tlfe  Ins.  Co..  25  C.  C.  A.  460.  80  Fed.  686;  Geer  v. 
Board  of  Corners  of  Ouray  County,  38  C.  C.  A.  250,  97  Fed.  435;  aty  of  Helena 
V.  United  States.  43  0.  C.  A.  429.  104  Fed.  113;  Edmundson  v.  Independent 
School  District,  98  Iowa,  639,  67  N.  W.  671,  60  Am.  St  Rep.  224;  Howard  r. 
City  of  Huron,  5  S.  D.  539,  59  N.  W.  833,  26  L.  R.  A.  493;  Smith  v.  Ormsby. 
20  Wash.  396,  55  Pac.  570,  72  Am.  St  Rep.  110. 

86  City  of  Helena  v.  United  States.  43  C.  C.  A.  429.  104  Fed.  113.  And 
see  United  States  Trust  Co.  v.  Territory  (X.  M.>  62  Far.  987. 

8T  BrownsYille  Taxing  Dlst  v.  Loague,  129  U.  S.  493,  9  Sup.  Ct  327,  32  L. 
Ed.  780. 

88  Moore  v.  Town  Council  of  Edgefield  (O.  C.)  32  Fed.  498.  Compare  Boasen 
V.  State,  47  Neb.  245,  66  N.  W.  303. 

89  Grand  Island  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  y.  Baker,  6  Wyo.  309,  45  Pac.  494,  34  L.  B. 
A.  835.  71  Am.  St  Rep.  920. 

(380) 


Ch.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  255 

tence  of  a  court,  and  in  a  great  many  instances  the  attempt  has  been 
made  to  impeach  such  judgment  on  grounds  going  to  its  legaUty 
or  regularity,  or  even  upon  objections  to  the  anterior  proceedings. 
But  the  courts  have  resolutely  set  their  faces  against  this  practice, 
refusing  to  look  beyond  the  judgment  itself,  except  in  the  single 
case  where  a  want  of  jurisdiction  is  alleged.    A  proceeding  of  this 
nature  is  undoubtedly  a  collateral  attack  upon  the  judgment;   and 
exceptional  as  the  remedy  is,  and  beneficent  as  is  the  purpose  it 
subserves,  there  is  no  good  reason  for  permitting  it  to  be  made 
the  vehicle  for  objections  to  the  judgment  or  sentence  which  could 
not  be  urged  against  it  in  any  other  collateral  proceeding.*®    Ac- 
cordingly the  authorities  declare  that  the  writ  will  not  be  issued  when 
it  appears  on  the  face  of  the  petition  that  the  petitioner  is  detained 
by  virtue  of  the  final  judgment  of  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction ;  •^ 
and  that  such  a  judgment,  valid  on  its  face,  is  an  unanswerable  re- 
turn to  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus.®*     But  while  errors  or  irregulari- 
ties will  not  be  thus  inquired  into,  the  subject  of  jurisdiction  is  legiti- 
mately open  to  investigation,  including  both  jurisdiction  of  the  per- 
son and  subject-matter  and  of  the  particular  order  or  sentence  as- 
sumed to  be  passed,  as  well  as  the  sources  of  jurisdiction  when 
founded  on  statute  or  ordinance.    The  several  points  will  be  dis- 
cussed in  detail  in  the  next  following  sections. 

§  255.    Erron  wad  Irresnlazitieg  not  Reviewalile* 

If  the  question  is  upon  the  judgement  of  a  court  of  competent 
jurisdiction,  the  petitioner  in  habeas  corpus  cannot  impeach  it  on 
the  ground  of  any  error  or  irregularity  in  the  proceedings  or  sen- 
tence of  the  court  which  does  not  go  to  the  extent  of  impairing  or. 
taking  away  its  power  or  jurisdiction  to  act  in  the  case.*'    The  rea- 

••  People  v.  District  Court.  22  Colo.  422,  45  Pac.  402. 

•I  In  re  Brittain,  93  N.  C.  587. 

»2  Smith  v.  Hess,  91  Ind.  424. 

•»  Ex  parte  Kearney,  7  Wheat  38.  5  L.  Ed.  391;  Ex  parte  Watkins,  3  Pet 
193,  7  L.  Ed.  650;  Ableman  v.  Booth.  21  How.  506,  16  L.  Ed.  196;  Ex  parte 
Yerger,  8  Wall.  85,  19  L.  Ed.  332;  Ex  parte  Parks,  93  U.  S.  18,  23  L.  Ed.  787; 
Ex  parte  Reed,  100  U.  S.  13,  25  L.  Ed.  538;  Ex  parte  Virginia,  100  U.  S.  339, 
25  L.  Ed.  676;  Ex  parte  Siebold,  100  U.  S.  371,  25  L.  Ed.  717;   Ex  parte  Tar- 

(381) 


{   255  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Cfa.  l3 

son  is  this.  If  any  such  erroneous  or  irregular  action  has  occurred, 
he  has  his  remedy  by  appeal,  error,  or  certiorari.  And  although, 
on  a  review  by  an  appellate  court,  the  objections  presented  might 
be  amply  sufficient  to  procure  a  reversal  of  the  judgment,  yet  he 
cannot  make  the  proceeding  by  habeas  corpus  a  short  cut  to  the 
same  result,  because  that  would  be  twisting  the  extraordinary  rem- 
edy away  from  its  proper  object  to  make  it  subserve  an  entirely  dif- 
ferent purpose.®*  The  importance  of  this  rule  justifies  its  illustra- 
tion by  a  number  of  examples.  Thus  the  investigation  on  habeas 
corpus  will  not  be  allowed  so  wide  a  range  as  to  include  the  nature, 

brough,  110  U.  S.  651,  4  Sup.  Ot.  152.  28  L.  Ed.  274;  Bx  parte  Blgelow,  113  U. 
S.  328,  5  Sup.  Ot  542,  28  L.  Ed.  1005;  Wales  v.  Whitney,  114  U.  S.  5W,  5  Sap. 
Ot  1050,  29  L.  Ed.  277;  Ex  parte  Terry,  128  U.  S.  289,  9  Sup.  Ot.  77,  32  L.  Ed 
405;   Ex  parte  Savin.  131  .U.  S.  267,  9  Sup.  Ct  699,  33  L.  Ed.  150;  Davis  ▼. 
Beason,  133  U.  S.  333,  10  Sup.  Ot  299.  33  L.  Ed.  637;   Stevens  v.  PnUer,  13G 
U.  S.  468,  10  Sup.  Ct  911,  34  L.  Ed.  461;   Ex  parte  Frederich,  149  U.  S.  70,  13 
Sup.  Ct  793.  37  L.  Ed.  653;  In  re  Eckart,  166  U.  S.  481,  17  Sup.  Ct  638,  41  L. 
Ed.  1085;  Ex  parte  Lennon,  166  U.  S.  W8.  17  Sup.  Ot  658,  41  L.  Ed.  1110:  In 
re  Boyd,  4  U.  S.  App.  73,  1  O.  0.  A.  156,  49  Fed.  48;  In  re  King  (Q  0.)  51  Fed. 
434;  Ex  parte  Shafifenburg,  4  Dill.  271.  Fed.  Oas.  No.  12,696;   Ex  parte  rark^. 
1  Hughes.  6(M.  Fed.  Cas.  No.  10,764;  Ex  parte  Williams,  1  Wash.  T.  240;  In  re 
Phinney,  32  Me.  440;  CMalia  v.  Wentworth.  65  Me.  129;  In  re  Dougherty.  27 
Vt  325;  Walbrldge  v.  HaU,  3  Vt  114;   Olmsted  v.  Hoyt,  4  Day  (Conn.)  436: 
Herrlci^  v.  Smith,  1  Gray  (Mass.)  1,  61  Am.  Dee.  381;  People  v.  liscomb,  Oil 
N.  Y.  559,  19  Am.  Rep.  211;  People  v.  McLeod,  1  HiU  (N.  X.)  377,  37  Am.  Dec. 
328;   Baker's  Case,  11  How.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  418;    Commonwealth  v.  Keeper  of 
Jail,  26  Pa.  279;  WUliamson's  Case.  26  Pa.  9,  67  Am.  Dec.  374;  Ex  parte  Rol- 
lins, 80  Va.  314;    In  re  Schenck,  74  N.  O.  607;    Dover  v.  State.  75  Ala.  40; 
Kirby  v.  State,  62  Ala.  51;  Ex  parte  Simmons,  62  Ala.  416;  Ex  parte  Sam.  51 
Ala.  34;  Keene  v.  McDonough,  8  La.  185;  State  v.  Fenderson,  28  La.  Ann.  82: 
Ex  parte  Schwartz.  2  Tex.  App.  74;   Ex  parte  McGlU,  6  Tex.  App.  408;  Ex 
parte  Boland,  11  Tex.  App.  159;  Ex  parte  Shaw.  7  Ohio  St.  81,  70  Am.  Dec.  oo: 
Patterson  v.  Pressey.  70  Ind.  94;   People  v.  Foster,  104  111.  156;  In  re  Truman, 
44  Mo.  181;   Ex  parte  Toney.  11  Mo.  661;    Rolfs  v.  Shallcross.  30  Kan.  758.  1 
I'ac.  523;  In  re  Petty,  22  Kan.  477;  In  re  Eaton.  27  Mich.  1;   In  re  Semler,  41 
Wis.  517;   In  re  Blair,  4  V^s.  522;  Ex  parte  Gibson.  31  Cal.  619.  91  Am.  Dec. 
546;   Ex  parte  Hartman,  44  Cal.  32;  Ex  parte  Granice,  51  Gal.  375;  Ex  parte 
McCuUougli,  35  Cal.  98;  Ex  parte  Lehmkuhl,  72  Cal.  53.  13  Pac.  148;  Ex  parte 
Farnham.  3  Colo.  545;   Ex  parte  Smith,  2  Nev.  338;  Ex  parte  Twohig,  13  Ner. 
302;  Rex  v.  Carlile,  4  Oar.  &  P.  415. 

»*  "We  reiterate  what  has  so  often  been  said  before,  that  the  writ  of  ha- 
beas corpus  cannot  be  used  to  perform  the  office  of  a  writ  of  error  or  appeal: 
but  when  no  writ  of  error  or  appeal  will  lie.  If  a  petitioner  is  ImprisoDfd  under 
a  Judgment  of  the  circuit  court  which  had  no  jmisdlcUon  of  the  peraoo  or  of 

(382) 


Oh.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMFBACHMBNT  OF  JUDGMBNT8.  §  255 

weight,  or  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  on  which  the  judgment  was 
rendered,  or  the  reasons  on  which  it  was  based.*  •  Nor  can  ad- 
vantage be  taken  in  this  manner  of  a  defect  in  the  verdict,  although 
it  would  be  sufficient  to  cause  the  reversal  of  the  judgment  on  ap- 
peal  or  writ  of  error  ;••  nor  of  any  errors  made  by  the  court  in 
granting,  modifying,  or  setting  aside  orders  in  criminal  cases ;  •'  nor 
of  any  errors  alleged  to  have  been  committed  in  the  determina- 
tion of  questions  arising  on  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment,  these 
not  being  jurisdictional  defects,  although  the  question  determined 
was  whether  an  act  charged  in  an  indictment  was  or  was  not  a  crime.*' 
It  is  the  same  of  irregularities  in  the  proceedings.  On  habeas  corpus 
there  can  be  no  inquiry  into  a  defective  or  irregular  selection  of  the 
grand  jury ;  ••  nor  whether  the  indictment  upon  which  the  judgment 
was  given,  being  regular  on  its  face,  was  ever  in  fact  found  by  a 
grand  jury.**®  Neither  can  advantage  be  taken  of  the  fact  that  the 
judgment  does  not  specifically  describe  the  offense  of  which  the 
petitioner  was  convicted ;  *•*  nor  of  the  fact  that  only  one  officer 
was  present  at  the  returning  of  the  verdict,  instead  of  two  as  re- 
quired by  law;^®*  nor  of  the  fact  that  the  court  pronounced  judg- 
ment upon  a  verdict  on  a  charge  of  felony  during  the  enforced  ab- 
sence of  the  petitioner  in  jail;^*'  jior  of  the  fact  that  the  record 

the  Bubject-matter,  or  authority  to  render  the  judgment  complained  of,  then 
reUef  may  be  accorded."  In  re  Swan,  150  U.  S.  637,  14  Sup.  C?t  225,  37  L.  Ed. 
1207;  In  re  Chapman.  156  U.  S.  211,  15  Sup.  Ct  331,  39  L.  Ed.  401;  Andrews 
V.  Swartz,  156  U.  S.  272,  15  Sup,  Ct  389,  39  L.  Ed.  422. 

•s  Macke  v.  Ryan,  31  Kan.  54,  1  Pac.  785;  In  re  GUson,  34  Kan.  641,  9  Pac. 
763;  In  re  Watson,  30  Kan.  753,  1  Pac.  775;  Ex  parte  Jackson,  45  Ark.  158; 
Starr  v.  Barton,  34  Ga.  99;  State  v.  Bloom,  17  Wis.  521;  Griffin  v.  State,  5 
Tex.  App.  457;  In  re  Bogart,  2  Sawy.  396,  Fed,  Cas.  No.  1,596;  Ex  parte  Phil- 
Ups,  57  Miss.  357. 

»•  Dover  v.  State,  75  Ala.  40. 

•f  Ex  parte  Hartman,  44  Cal.  34. 

••  Ex  parte  Parks,  93  U.  &  18,  23  L.  Ed.  787;  Ex  parte  Shaflfenburg,  4  DUl. 
271,  Fed.  Ca8«  No.  12,696. 

••  State  T.  Fcnderson,  28  La.  Ann.  82. 

100  Ex  parte  Twohig,  13  Nev.  302. 

101  Bx  parte  Gibson,  31  Gal.  619,  91  Am.  Dec.  546;  Ex  parte  Smith,  2  Nev. 
338. 

102  Rex  T.  CarUle,  4  Car.  &  P.  415. 
!••  £x  parte  Famham,  3  Colo.  545. 

(383) 


§   256  LAW  OF  JUDQMBNTS.  (Cb.  13 

shows  affirmatively  that  there  was  no  interval  of  time  between  the 
plea  of  guilty  and  the  sentence,  although  the  statute  requires  an  in- 
terval of  at  least  two  days.^** 


^  eG6.    JvrUaictlos  may  be 


In  order  that  a  judgment  may  be  valid,  it  is  necessary  that  the 
court  should  have  had  jurisdiction  both  of  the  person  and  the  sub- 
ject-matter; the  want  of  such  jurisdiction  may  be  shown  on  habeas 
corpus ;  and  if  either  element  is  proved  to  be  wanting,  the  judgment 
is  void  and  an  imprisonment  under  it  is  lUegal.*^^  But  it  is  to  be 
observed  that  in  criminal  cases  the  question  of  jurisdiction  of  the 
subject-matter  may  frequently  become  a  fact  in  issue,  and  in  that 
event  its  determination  by  the  verdict  will  preclude  a  fresh  investiga- 
tion of  the  subject  on  proceedings  by  habeas  corpus.  This  is  the 
case  where  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  over  the  place  where  the 
alleged  offense  was  committed  is  traversed  by  the  defendant,  and 
the  jury  find  that  the  locus  in  quo  is  within  the  limits  of  the  court's 
territorial  jurisdiction.  After  such  a  finding,  the  petitioner  cannot 
impeach  the  judgment  by  showing  that  the  place  was  without  such 
limits.^®"     It  must  also  be  remarked  in  this  connection  that  there  is 

104  Ex  parte  Smith,  2  Nev.  33a 

106  Ex  parte  Nielsen,  131  U.  S.  176,  9  Sup.  Ct.  672,  33  L.  Ed.  118;  Ex  parte 
Virginia,  100  U.  S.  330,  25  L.  Ect  676;  Ex  parte  Busklrk,  18  C.  C.  A.  410,  72 
Fed.  14;  United  States  v.  Patterson  (C.  0.)  29  Fed.  775;  Ex  parte  FerldxiB,  Id. 
000;  Ex  parte  Farley  (C.  C.)  40  Fed.  66;  Ex  parte  Bridges,  2  Woods,  42&,  Fed. 
Cas.  No.  1,862;  Johnson  v.  United  States,  3  McLean,  89,  Fed.  Ga&  No.  7,41S: 
Miller  v.  Snyder.  6  Ind.  1;  Reynolds  v.  Orvis,  7  Cow.  (N.  T.)  260;  Cropper's 
Case,  2  Rob.  (Ya.)  842.  On  habeas  corpus,  a  court  has  the  power  to  reriew 
Its  own  former  Judgment,  so  far  as  to  determine  whether  It  exceeded  its 
power  in  passing  a  Judgment  claimed  to  be  illegal.  Ex  parte  Joyce,  25  Plttsb. 
Leg.  J.  17,  Fed.  Oas.  No.  7,556.  As  regards  the  nature  and  effect  of  a  Judg- 
ment void  for  w^ant  of  Jurisdiction,  and  the  right  of  every  court  to  trat 
such  Judgment  as  a  nullity,  when  drawn  collaterally  in  queatioo,  there  Is  no 
substantial  difference  between  the  case  of  an  imprisonmoit  under  such  a 
Judgment,  and  one  of  any  other  illegal  imprisonment  under  pretease  of  au- 
thority from  the  United  States,  in  respect  to  the  right  of  a  state  court  to  In- 
quire in  the  first  instance  by  habeas  corpus  into  its  legality.  In  re  Tarble« 
25  Wis  300.  3  Am.  Rep.  85. 

106  In  re  Newton,  16  C.  B.  07;  People  v.  Liscomb,  60  N.  X*  571.  11>  Am. 
Rep.  211;  Deckard  v.  State,  38  Md.  186. 

(384) 


Ch«  13)  COLL.ATERAL  IMPBACHMBNT  OF  JUDOHBNTS.  §   256 

a  material  difference  in  the  authorities,  as  to  the  circumstances  in 
which  a  judgment  may  be  impeached  for  want  of  jurisdiction,  when 
it  is  not  void  on  its  face.  This  topic  will  be  treated  in  the  third  part 
of  the  present  chapter.  In  the  meantime,  we  call  the  reader's  notice 
to  the  fact  that  the  collateral  investigation  of  a  judgment  on  habeas 
corpus  is  only  a  special  application  of  the  general  rule.  And  if  a 
majority  of  the  states  refuse  to  allow  parties  or  privies  to  attack  -a 
judgment,  in  general,  for  want  of  jurisdiction,  unless  the  record  itself 
shows  where  the  jurisdiction  failed,  there  is  nothing  in  the  nature  of 
this  special  case  to  take  it  out  of  the  rule.  A  word  must  be  added 
in  regard  to  a  particular  class  of  courts  whose  sentences  have  some- 
times been  thought  to  be  open  to  revision  on  habeas  corpus,  viz., 
courts-martial.  It  is  now  well  settled  that  while  the  jurisdiction  of 
such  a  court  may  be  challenged  and  examined  in  such  a  proceeding, 
its  judgment  cannot  be  disregarded  or  annulled,  or  the  prisoner  dis- 
charged, unless  it  is  absolutely  void.  "The  question  of  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  a  general  court-martial  may  always  be  inquired  into  upon 
the  application  of  any  party  aggrieved  by  its  proceedings,  and  so 
may  that  of  every  other  judicial  tribunal ;  but  the  range  and  scope 
of  the  inquiry  is  controlled  by  the  same  rules  and  limitations  in  both 
cases.  There  must  be  jurisdiction  to  hear  and  to  determine,  and 
to  render  the  particular  judgment  or  sentence  imposed.  If  this  ex- 
ists, however  erroneous  the  proceedings  may  be,  they  cannot  be  re- 
viewed collaterally  upon  habeas  corpus.  It  would  be  as  indecorous 
and  as  wanton  a  stretch  of  judicial  power  to  assume  in  advance  that 
a  general  court-martial  will  erroneously  convict  an  accused  person 
of  a  military  offense,  as  it  would  be  to  indulge  such  a  presumption  con- 
cerning a  common-law  court."  **^     Finally,  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus 

»•»  Ex  parte  MlUigan.  4  Wall.  2,  18  L.  Ed.  281;  Dynes  v.  Hoover,  20  How. 
78,  15  L.  Ed.  838;  Wise  v.  Withers,  3  Oranch,  331,  2  L.  Ed.  457;  Ex  parte 
Kearney,  7  Wlieat  38,  6  L.  Ed.  391;  Ex  parte  Reed,  100  U.  S.  13.  25  L.  Ed. 
538;  Wales  v.  Whitney,  114  U.  S.  664.  6  Sup.  Ct  1050,  29  L.  Ed.  277;  In  re  Davi- 
son (C.  C.)  21  Fed.  620;  Barrett  v.  Hopkins  (C.  C.)  7  Fed.  312;  In  re  White 
(a  C.)  17  Fed.  723,  9  Sawy.  49;  In  re  Grimley  (C.  O.)  38  Fed.  8i;  In  re  Bird, 
2  Sawy.  33»  Fed.  Cas.  No.  1.428;  In  re  Oorbett.  9  Ben.  274.  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
3.219;  In  re  Bogart,  2  Sawy.  396,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  1.596;  Ex  parte  Henderson, 
Fed.  Caa.  No.  6,349;  People  y.  Warden  of  Ck>unty  Jail,  100  N.  Y.  20,  2  N.  E. 
870. 

1  LAW  JUDG.-25  (;j85) 


§  257  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (CSl.  IS 

cannot  be  used  as  substitute  for  quo  warranto.  "One  convicted  by 
a  jury  and  sentenced  in  court  by  a  judge  de  facto,  acting  colore 
officii,  though  not  de  jure,  and  detained  in  custody  in  pursuance  of 
his  sentence,  cannot  properly  be  discharged  on  habeas  corpus.  The 
validity  of  the  appointment  or  election  of  an  officer  de  facto,  before 
whom  a  prisoner  has  been  convicted  of  crime,  will  not  be  inquired 
into  on  habeas  corpus."  ^•^ 

I  267.    GonfltitvtioBality  of  Btatvtes. 

Applications  for  release  on  habeas  corpus  are  not  infrequently 
made  on  the  ground  that  the  law  under  which  the  prosecution  and 
conviction  were  had  was  unconstitutional,  and  there  is  much  conflict 
of  authority  upon  the  question  whether  an  inquiry  into  the  validity  of 
such  law  is  proper  in  a  proceeding  of  this  nature.  In  several  of  the 
states  it  is  apparently  the  accepted  rule  that  the  constitutionality  of 
a  statute  or  ordinance  cannot  be  examined  on  habeas  corpus,  and  if 
no  other  groimd  is  presented  for  the  petitioner's  discharge,  the  court 
will  refuse  to  interfere.*®*  It  may  be  urged  in  support  of  this  view 
that  the  trial  court  has  always  the  right  to  pass  upon  the  question 
of  its  own  jurisdiction,  and  that  if  it  assumes  to  act  in  the  matter  and 
to  proceed  to  judgment,  it  necessarily  affirms  the  validity  of  the  stat- 
ute under  which  its  action  is  taken,  which  finding  should  be  respected 
in  every  other  court.  This  argument  is  not  without  weight.  But  on 
the  other  hand,  it  cannot  be  too  strongly  insisted  that  an  unconstitu- 
tional law  is  no  law  at  all.  It  cannot  make  that  a  crime  which  was 
not  so  before.  It  cannot  confer  jurisdiction.  A  proceeding  taken 
under  it  is  void,  not  merely  erroneous.  A  person  convicted  under  it 
is  innocent,  and  is  held  in  custody  illegally.  Hence  if  the  validity  of 
the  law  could  not  be  tested  on  habeas  corpus,  we  should  have,  sup- 

108  9  Am.  &  Eiig.  Enc.  Law,  p.  236  (a  source  from  which  I  have  derlvM 
much  assistance  in  prepariu;?  these  sections);  Griffin*s  Case,  1  Chase.  ^M- 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  5,81.5;  State  v.  Bloom,  17  Wis.  521;  People  v.  Stevens.  5  Hill 
(N.  Y.)  630;   Hoglan  v.  Carpenter.  4  Bush  (Ky.)  89. 

109  Ex  parte  Boenninghausen,  91  Mo.  301.  1  S.  W.  761;  Ex  parte  Bowler. 
16  Mo.  App.  14;  In  re  Harris.  47  Mo.  164;  Piatt  v.  Harrison,  6  Iowa.  79.  71 
Am.  Dec.  380;  In  re  Under>vood,  30  Mich.  502:  Ex  parte  Fisher.  6  Xeb.  3»S»: 
Ex  parte  Winston,  9  Nev.  71;  In  re  CaUicot,  8  BUtchf.  89,  Fed.  Cas.  Na 
5.323;  Ex  parte  Booth,  3  Wis.  145. 

(38(5) 


Gh.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  257 

m 

posing  it  to  be  in  fact  unconstitutional,  a  most  anomalous  case,  viz., 
a  person  unlawfully  restrained  of  his  liberty,  and  that  too  in  the  most 
unwarrantable  circumstances,  whose  relief  is  the  sole  object  of  this 
writ,  and  yet  to  whom  relief  must  be  denied.  We  are  decidedly  in- 
clined to  agree  with  the  numerous  cases  which  hold  that  the  alleged 
unconstitutionality  of  the  act  or  ordinance  under  which  the  petitioner 
is  held  is  always  a  proper  subject  of  inquiry  on  habeas  corpus,  and 
that  if  the  court  finds  it  to  be  invalid,  it  is  justified  in  releasing  the 
prisoner.**®  The  federal  courts  uniformly  hold  that  the  imprison- 
ment of  a  person  under  an  invalid  ordinance  of  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion is  such  a  case  of  unlawful  restraint  as  will  justify  their  releasing 
him  on  habeas  corpus,  because,  being  without  "due  process  of  law," 
it  is  in  violation  of  the  fourteenth  amendment  to  the  constitution  of 
the  United  States.***  But  the  circuit  court  will  not  overrule  the  sol- 
emn judgment  of  the  supreme  court  of  the  state  upon  the  question  of 
the  validity  of  such  ordinance,  where  there  is  reasonable  ground  for 
doubt ;  in  such  cases  the  ultimate  decision  should  be  referred  to  the 
supreme  court  of  the  United  States.***  And  there  is  authority  to  the 
point  that  the  federal  courts  have  no  jurisdiction  to  discharge  a  pris- 
oner held  under  a  state  statute,  on  the  ground  that  such  statute  is  in 
violation  of  the  constitution  of  the  state,  or  in  excess  of  the  powers 


110  Ex  parte  Slebold,  100  U.  S.  371,  25  L.  Ed.  717;  Ex  parte  Clarke,  100 
U.  S.  399,  25  L.  Ed.  715;  Ex  parte  Yarbrough,  110  U.  S.  651,  4  Sup.  Ct.  152, 
28  L.  Ed.  274;  Ex  parte  Koyall,  117  U.  S.  241,  6  Sup.  Ct.  734,  29  L.  Ed.  SCkH; 
In  re  Brosoahaii  (C.  C.)  4  McCrary,  1.  18  Fed.  62;  In  re  Lee  Tong  (D.  C.)  9 
Sawy.  335.  18  Fed.  253;  Stockton  Laundi-y  Case  (C.  C.)  26  Fed.  611;  la.Tje 
Zlebold  (C.  C.)  23  Fed.  791;  Ex  parte  McCready.  1  Hughes,  598,  Fed.  Cas. 
No.  8,732;  In  re  Wong  Yung  Quy  (C.  0.)  6  Sawy.  237.  2  Fed.  624;  Ex  parte 
Davis  (C.  C.)  21  Fed.  396;  Ex  parte  Yung  Jon  (D.  C.)  28  Fed.  308;  In  re 
Barber  (C.  C.)  39  Fed.  641;  In  re  Beine  (C.  O.)  42  Fed.  545;  In  re  Wong  Yung 
Quy  (C.  C.)  47  Fed.  717;  In  re  Nichols  (C.  C.)  48  Fed.  164;  Fisher  v.  McGirr, 
1  (tray,  1,  61  Am.  Dec.  381;  WhitcomVs  Case,  120  Mass.  118,  21  Am.  Rep. 
502;  Ex  parte  Rosenblatt,  19  Nev.  439,  14  Pac.  298,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  901; 
Brown  r.  Duffus.  (K5  Iowa,  193,  23  N.  W.  396;  Ex  parte  Burnett,  30  Ala.  461; 
In  re  Payson,  23  Kan.  757;  Ex  parte  Delaney,  43  Cal.  478;  Ex  parte  Rollins, 
80  Va.  314;   Ex  parte  Mato,  19  Tex.  App.  112. 

HI  In  re  Lee  Tong  (D.  C.)  9  Saw^.  335,  18  Fed.  253;  Stockton  Laundry  Case 
fC.  r.)  26  Fed.  611;  In  re  Ah  Jow  (C.  C.)  29  Fed.  181;  Laundry  License  Case 
(C.  C.)  22  Fed.  705;   Ex  parte  Yung  Jon  (D.  C.)  28  Fed.  308. 

112  In  re  Wo  Lee  (C.  0.)  26  Fed.  471. 

(387) 


$  258  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  13 

which  the  people  of  the  state  have  conferred  on  their  legislature;  if 
it  does  not  violate  the  federal  constitution,  the  question  is  for  the 
state  courts.*** 

I  268.    Jnrifdiotion  to  render  the  Parttevlar  BoBtemee* 

In  the  case  of  Ex  parte  Shaw,***  the  supreme  court  of  Ohio  ex- 
pressed the  following  views.  "The  question  presented  in  this  case 
is,  whether,  conceding  that  the  sentence  is  for  horse-stealing,  and 
that,  by  statute,  the  sentence  must  be  for  a  period  not  less  than  three 
years,  the  commitment  is  lawful.  The  courts  are  required  by  stat- 
ute, upon  conviction,  to  sentence  for  a  period  not  less  than  three 
years.  The  sentence  in  this  case  is  for  one  year.  Does  this  render 
the  sentence  void  and  the  commitment  of  the  relator  unlawful?  The 
question  is  one  simply  of  jurisdiction.  The  court  had  jurisdiction 
over  the  offense  and  its  punishment.  It  had  authority  to  pronounce 
sentence;  and  while  in  the  legitimate  exercise  of  its  power,  com- 
mitted a  manifest  error  and  mistake  in  the  award  of  the  number  of 
years  of  the  punishment.  The  sentence  was  not  void,  but  errone- 
ous." And  accordingly  the  court  refused  to  release  the  prisoner  on 
habeas  corpus.  And  a  number  of  other  cases  agree  with  this  doc- 
trine.**" But  the  argument  is  far  from  satisfactory.  It  involves  the 
error  of  overlooking  the  fact  that  jurisdiction  to  render  the  particu- 
lar sentence  imposed  is  equally  as  essential  to  its  validity  as  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  person  or  the  subject-matter.  If  either  of  these  three 
elements  is  wanting,  the  judgment  is  a  nullity.  Now  in  respect  to 
tlie  sentence,  the  court  has  precisely  the  jurisdiction  which  the  stat- 
ute gives  it,  no  more  and  no  less.  And  if  the  statute  prescribes  that 
the  sentence  shall  be  for  not  less  than  three  vears,  the  court  is  uttcrlv 
without  power  to  sentence  for  one  year.  This  seems  too  plain  for 
argument.     And  indeed  the  great  preponderance  of  authority  sus- 

118  In  re  Brosnahan  (C.  C.)  4  McCrary,  1,  18  Fed.  62;  Duncan  v.  McCall. 
139  U.  S.  449,  11  Sup.  Gt.  573,  35  L.  Ed.  219;  Andrews  y.  Swartz,  156  U.  & 
2T2,  15  Sup.  Ct.  380,  39  L.  Ed.  422. 

114  7  Ohio  St.  81,  70  Am.  Dec.  55. 

iiBKx  parte  Van  Hagan,  25  Ohio  St.  432;  People  T.  Cavanagb.  2  Abh. 
ITac.  (M.  1.)  89;  Ex  parte  Bond,  9  S.  a  80,  30  Am.  Rep.  20;  Ex  parte 
Crandall.  34  Wis.  177. 

(388) 


Ch.  13)  COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMSNT  OF  JUDQMBNT8.  $   259 

tains  the  proposition  that  if  the  couft  had  not  jurisdiction  to  render 
the  particular  sentence, — if  the  sentence  is  different  from  that  pre- 
scribed by  the  law,  or  is  below  the  minimum  or  above  the  maximum, 
— that  is  good  ground  for  releasing  the  prisoner  on  habeas  corpus.^^* 

S  259.    Sufieiency  of  PriMsess  or  Pleadlnss* 

A  person  tried  and  convicted  on  a  criminal  charge,  and  sentenced 
to  imprisonment,  without  any  indictment  or  presentment  by  a  grand 
jury,  is  entitled  to  be  discharged  on  habeas  corpus.^^'  But  upon 
proceedings  by  habeas  corpus,  the  court  from  which  the  writ  issues 
has  no  power  to  inquire  into  the  sufficiency  of  the  indictment  or  in- 
formation on  which  the  trial  was  had  that  resulted  in  the  judgment 
under  which  the  prisoner  is  detained;  nor  can  it  undertake  to  de- 
cide whether  such  pleadings  state  an  indictable  offense.  And  al- 
though the  indictment  be  defective  or  irregular,  or  fail  to  disclose  any 

"•Ex  parte  1-ange,  18  WaU.  163,  21  L.  Ed.  872;  Bx  parte  MUUgan,  4  WaU. 
2,  18  I*  EA  281;  Ex  parte  WUson,  114  U.  S.  417,  5  Sup.  Ct  ©35,  29  L.  Ed. 
8(>;  Kx  parte  Snow,  120  U.  S.  274,  7  Sup.  Ct.  556,  30  D.  Ed.  658;  In  re 
JBonner,  151  U.  S.  242,  14  Sup.  Ct.  323,  38  L.  Ed.  149;  In  re  Johnson  (O. 
1'.)  46  Fed.  477;  Ex  parte  Bernert,  7  Pac.  Coast  Law  J.  460;  Ex  parte  Page, 
49  Mo.  291;  People  v.  Walters,  15  Abb.  N.  C.  (N.  Y.)  461;  People  v.  Liscomb, 
GU  N.  X.  559,  19  Am,  Kep.  211;  Ex  parte  Kearny,  55  Cal.  212;  In  re  Petty, 
22  Kan.  477;  Ex  parte  Bulger,  60  Cal.  438;  Miller  v.  Snyder,  6  Ind.  1;  Ex 
parte  Smith,  2  Nev.  338.  The  point  Is  illustrated  In  the  following  clear 
and  forcible  manner,  in  Ex  parte  Lange,  supra:  "If  a  Justice  of  the  peace, 
baying  jurisdiction  to  line  for  a  misdemeanor,  and  with  the  party  charged 
properly  before  him,  should  render  a  judgment  that  he  be  hung,  it  would 
simply  be  void.  Why  void?  Because  he  had  no  power  to  render  such 
a  judgment.  So  if  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction  should,  on  an  indict- 
ment for  libel,  render  a  judgment  of  death,  or  confiscation  of  property, 
it  would  for  the  same  reason  be  void.  Or  if,  on  an  indictment  for  treason, 
the  court  should  render  a  judgment  of  attaint,  whereby  the  heirs  of  the 
criminal  could  not  inherit  his  property,  which  should,  by  the  judgment  of 
the  court,  be  confiscated  to  the  state,  it  would  be  void  as  to  the  attainder, 
because  In  excess  of  the  authority  of  the  court,  and  by  the  constitution." 
But  a  sentence  for  an  offense  punishable  by  imprisonment  cannot  be  held 
void  on  hat>eas  corpus  because  it  imposes  hard  labor  during  the  imprison- 
ment. United  States  y.  Pridgeon,  153  U.  S.  48,  14  Sup.  Ct.  746,  38  L.  Ed. 
631. 

»"Kx  parte  Wilson,  114  U.  S.  417.  5  Sup.  Ct  935,  29  L.  Ed.  89;  Ex 
parte  Bain.  121  U.  S*.  1,  7  Sup.  C^  781,  30  L.  Ed.  849;  Ex  parte  Mc- 
Ciuskey  (C.  C.)  40  Fed.  71. 

(389) 


§   260  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  13 

crime  known  to  the  law,  yet  that  is  no  reason  for  discharging  the 
petitioner,  and  he  must  be  remanded.^**  The  rule  rests  upon  the 
fact  that  such  a  defect  is  not  jurisdictional.  If  the  court  has  general 
jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter,  and  the  party  is  properly  before 
it,  its  judgment  is  conclusive  and  binding  and  cannot  be  attacked 
collaterally,  and  if  error  or  irregularity  supervenes,  such  as  in  the 
case  supposed,  it  is  error  or  irregularity  in  the  exercise  of  the  court's 
jurisdiction,  and  does  not  make  its  sentence  a  nullity.  Further,  if 
there  is  any  power  which  a  court  possesses  beyond  question  or  cavil, 
it  is  the  power  to  judge  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  indictment  or  com- 
plaint and  to  determine  whether  or  not  the  offense  charged  is  legally 
punishable.  If  it  should  come  to  a  mistaken  conclusion  in  regard 
to  these  matters,  there  would  undoubtedly  be  error  in  the  technical 
sense.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  habeas  corpus  cannot  be 
made  to  discharge  the  functions  of  a  writ  of  error  or  of  an  appeal. 
A  view  contrary  to  that  here  expressed  is  held  by  the  supreme  court 
of  California.^^* 

§  260.    To  what  Parties  the  Rule  applies. 

The  rule  prohibiting  the  collateral  impeachment  of  a  judgment 
applies  only  to  the  parties  to  the  action,  and  those  in  privity  with 
them,  and  who  are  entitled  to  take  proceedings  to  have  the  judg- 
ment opened,  vacated,  or  reversed;^'**  it  does  not  extend  to  stran- 

118  jflx  parte  Watkins,  3  I'et.  193,  7  L.  Ed.  650;  Ex  parte  Parks.  93  V. 
S.  20,  23  U  Ed.  787;  In  re  Lancaster,  137  U.  S.  393.  11  Sup.  Ct.  117.  M 
U  Ed.  713;  Ex  parte  Coy,  127  U.  S.  731,  8  Sup.  Ct.  1263,  32  L.  Ed.  274; 
United  States  v.  Pridgeon,  153  U.  S.  48,  14  Sup.  Ct.  746,  38  L.  Ed.  a31;  Berge- 
mann  v.  Backer,  157  U.  S.  655,  15  Sup.  Ct.  727.  39  L.  Ed.  845;  Kohl  v.  Lehl- 
back,  160  U.  S.  2lKi,  16  Sup.  a.  304,  40  U  Ed.  432;  Ex  parte  Peters  (C.  C.) 
12  Fed.  461;  In  re  Johnson  (C.  C.)  46  Fed.  477;  In  re  Hacker  (U.  C.l  73 
Fed.  464;  In  re  Krug  (C.  C.)  TJ  Fed.  308;  Petition  of  Seuiler.  41  Wis.  517; 
Davis*  Case,  122  Mass.  324;  Matter  of  Eaton,  27  Mich.  1;  Emnniiel  v.  State, 
36  Miss.  627;  Parker  v.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  579;  In  re  Trunian,  44  Mo. 
181;  Ex  parte  Whitaker,  43  Ala.  323;  Ex  parte  Twohig,  13  Nev.  302. 

110  Matter  of  Coryell,  22  Cal.  178;  Ex  parte  Kearney,  55  Cal.  212. 

120  Vose  V.  Morton,  4  Cush.  (Mass.)  27,  50  Am.  Dec.  750;  (iHswold  t. 
Stewart,  4  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  457;  Davoue  v.  Fanning,  4  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  S.)  199; 
Cotttn  V.  Freeman,  84  Me.  535,  24  Atl.  986;  Ashton  v.  City  of  Rochester, 
133  X.  Y,  187,  ;iO  N.  E.  965,  28  Am.  St.  Kep.  619;  Harvey  v.  Foster,  64  Cal 
296,  30  I'ac.  849. 

(390) 


Ch.  13)  COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §   260 

gers.^^^  For  instance,  a  stockholder  in  a  corporation  against  which 
a  judgment  has  been  recovered,  who  may  be  made  liable  for  its  pay? 
ment,  is  so  far  a  privy  in  law  that  he  may  bring  error  to  reverse  the 
judgment;  but  for  that  very  reason  he  cannot  attack  the  judgment 
collaterally.^**  So,  persons  claiming  land  under  an  assignee  for 
creditors  cannot  collaterally  assail  a  judgment  rendered  against  the 
assignee  subjecting  the  land  to  the  payment  of  a  creditor's  claim.^*' 
A  judgment  against  an  executor  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  debt, 
as  against  the  heirs  of  the  decedent,  and  cannot  be  attacked  by  them 
collateral!}'  save  on  the  ground  of  fraud.***  Even  in  the  case  of 
strangers  to  the  litigation,  it  is  not  every  one  who  may  impeach  the 
judgment  in  a  collateral  proceeding.  The  law  does  not  permit  wan- 
ton or  unnecessary  attacks  upon  its  judgments,  and  they  will  stand 
as  valid  against  any  third  person  who  fails  to  show  that  he  has  a  real 
and  substantial  interest  in  avoiding  the  judgment,  and  one  which  the 
law  is  bound  to  protect.  As  the  cases  express  it,  the  rule  against 
collateral  attacks  upon  judgments  does  not  apply  to  such  third  per- 
sons or  strangers  to  the  record  as  would  be  prejudiced  in  regard  to 
some  pre-existing  right  if  the  judgment  were  given  full  effect.***^  In 
regard  to  garnishees,  the  rule  approved  by  the  best  authorities  is  that 
a  garnishee  may  impeach  the  validity  of  the  judgment  against  the 
principal  debtor  on  the  ground  of  a  want  of  jurisdiction  over  such 


121  Atkinson  v.  Allen,  12  Vt  619,  36  Am.  Dec.  361;  Eureka  Iron  Works 
V.  Bresnahan,  66  Mich.  489,  33  N.  W.  834;  Caswell  v.  Caswell,  28  Me.  232, 
8ncee88iDn  of  Qnlnn,  30"  1-a.  Ann.  \H7;  Thompson  v.  McCorkle,  136  Ind.  484, 
34  X.  E.  813,  43  Am.  St.  Rep.  334;  Shamlin  v.  HaU,  123  Ala.  541,  26  South.  285. 

122  Came  v.  Brlgham,  39  Me.  35. 

i2«  Gonzales  v.  Hatts,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  421.  50  S.  W.  403. 

124  In  re  Schmidt's  Estate,  4  Pa.  Dist.  R.  161. 

12ft  Eureka  Iron  Works  v.  Bresnahan,  66  Mich.  489,  33  N.  W.  834;  Staun- 
ton Perpetual  Building  &  L.  Co,  v.  Haden,  92  Va.  201,  23  S.  E.  285;  Russell 
V.  Grant,  122  Mo.  161,  26  S.  W.  958,  43  Am.  St.  Rep.  563;  Wolf  v.  You- 
tjert.  45  Lsi.  Ann.  1100,  13  South.  806,  21  L.  R.  A.  772.  The  validity  of  a 
judgment  foreclosing  a  mortgage  cannot  be  questioned  by  one  not  connected 
with  the  mortgagor's  title,  as  grantee,  mortgagee,  judgment  creditor,  etc. 
(rlass  V.  Gllbei't,  58  Pa.  266.  But  a  judgment  under  which  land  has  been 
sold,  if  void  for  want  of  due  service  of  process,  may  be  collaterally  attacked 
by  one  who  has  purchased  under  a  junior  judgment.  Bernhardt  v.  Brown, 
118  S.  C.  700.  24  S.  E.  527,  36  L.  R.  A.  402;  Coffin  v.  Bell,  22  Nev.  169,  37 
Pac.  240,  58  Am.  St  Rep.  738. 

(391) 


§261  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  13 

debtor,  but  will  not  be  permitted  to  assail  it  on  the  ground  of  any 
mere  errors  or  irregularities.^**  Again,  admitting  that  the  particu- 
lar individual  has  the  right  to  allege  cause  against  the  judgment  in 
a  collateral  proceeding,  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  every  possible 
objection  is  open  to  him  for  this  purpose.  It  is  stated,  in  Maine, 
that  a  stranger  whose  rights  are  affected  may  impeach  a  judgment 
collaterally  on  three  grounds  only,  viz.,  that  the  court  rendering  it 
had  no  jurisdiction  of  the  case ;  that  the  judgment  was  obtained  by 
fraud  or  collusion;  or  that  the  judgment  was  irregularly  or  unlaw- 
fully rendered,  to  his  prejudice.^*^  But  this  rule, — in  respect  to  the 
third  ground  stated, — is  probably  too  liberal  to  be  everywhere  ac- 
cepted as  sound.  The  Pennsylvania  courts  hold  that  a  stranger  has 
no  right  to  interfere  with  a  judgment,  however  irregular,  except 
where  it  is  founded  in  collusion.***  And  it  is  said  that  only  a  de- 
fendant can  avoid  a  judgment  for  irregularity  (that  is,  by  writ  of 
error  or  motion  to  vacate),  and  as  long  as  he  is  content  to  waive  the 
irregularity,  strangers  cannot  avail  themselves  of  it  collaterally.*** 

Part  II.     For  Errors  and  Irregularities. 

S  261.    Erroneous  and  Irregular  Jndcatentfl. 

No  principle  of  law  is  more  firmly  settled  than  that  the  judgment 
of  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction,  so  long  as  it  stands  in  full  force 
and  unreversed,  cannot  be  impeached  in  any  collateral  proceeding 
on  account  of  mere  errors  or  irregularities,  not  going  to  the  juris- 
diction,^'®    Thus  defective  findings,  or  the  absence  of  any  findings 

120  IMerce  v.  Carleton,  12  111.  858,  54  Am.  St.  Rep.  405;  Wbitehesd  t. 
Henderson,  4  Smedes  &,  M.  (Miss.)  704;  Matheney  v.  Galloway,  12  SmedM 
&  M.  (Miss.)  475;  St  Louis  Perpetual  Ins.  Co.  v.  Coben,  9  Mo.  421;  Schop- 
penliast  v.  Bollman,  21  ind.  285;  Xevatt  v.  Springfield  Xormal  School,  79 
Mo.  App.  198;    Debbs  v.  Dalton  (Ind.  Sup.)  32  N.  E.  570. 

127  sidensparker  v.  Sldensparker,  52  Me.  481,  83  Am.  Dec.  527.  See  I^'ks 
y.  Holies,  8  S.  C.  258;   Bolsse  v.  Dickson,  31  La.  Ann.  741. 

i28Drexel's  Appeal,  6  I'a.  272.  And  see  Lowber  and  Wilmer's  Appeal. 
8  Watts  &  S.  387,  42  Am.  Dec.  302;  In  re  Uanika's  Estate,  138  I'a.  330.  22 
Atl.  00.  21  Am.  St.  Rep.  907. 

i2»KolllnB  V.  Henry,   78  N.  C.  342. 

130  Huff  V.  llutcblnson,  14  How.  580,  14  L.  Ed.  553;  Parker  t.  Kane. 
22  How.  1,  10  L.  Ed.  28G;    Thompson  v.  Tolmie,  2  TeL  157,  7  L.  Ed.  3SU 


Ch.  13)  COLLATERAL.  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §   261 

of  fact  in  a  trial  by  consent  by  the  court,  do  not  render  the  judg- 
ment a  nullity,  and  it  cannot  be  attacked  collaterally  therefor.^*^  So 
obvious  clerical  errors  in  the  judgment-roll  which  could  not  deceive 
a  person  accustomed  to  such  documents  are  no  ground  for  im- 
peaching the  judgment  collaterally.^'*  And  generally,  a  judgment 
cannot  be  attacked  collaterally  for  any  defect  which,  in  a  direct  pro- 
ceeding, might  be  cured  by  amendment.^"  Nor  will  a  judgment 
be  open  to  this  kind  of  impeachment  merely  because  it  was  pre- 
maturely rendered, — as,  before  the  expiration  of  the  defendant's  time 

Mangon  v.  Duncanson,  166  U.  S.  533,  17  Sup.  Ct.  647,  41  L.  Ed.  1105;  Com'rs 
of  Lake  County  v.  Piatt,  25  C.  C.  A.  87,  79  Fed.  567;  Pullman's  Palace  Car 
Co.  V.  Washburn  (U.  C.)  66  Fed.  790;  Morey  v.  Koyt,  62  Conn.  542,  26  Atl. 
127,  19  U  K.  A.  611;  Dauberman  v.  Haln,  196  Pa.  435,  46  AU.  442;  Trow- 
bridge T.  Hays.  21  Misc.  Rep.  234,  45  N.  Y.  Supp.  635;  Brooks  v.  City  of 
xNew  York,  57  Hun,  104,  10  N.  Y.  Supp.  773;  Bludworth  v.  Poole,  21  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  551.  53  8.  W.  717;  Thorp  v.  Gordon  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  43  S.  W. 
323;  Bradford  v.  Larkln,  57  Kan.  90,  45  Pac.  69;  Selders  v.  Boyle,  5  Kan. 
App.  461,  49  Pac.  320;  Hawkins  v.  McDougal,  126  Ind.  539,  25  N.  E.  820; 
State  V.  Tow,  5  Ind.  App.  261,  31  N.  E.  1120;  Chrlsman  v.  Dlvinla,  141 
Mo.  122,  41  S.  W.  920;  State  v.  Wear,  145  Mo.  162,  46  S.  W.  1099;  Vaule 
T.  MlUer,  64  Minn.  485,  67  N.  W.  540;  Bannister  v.  Higginson,  15  Me.  73, 
32  Am.  Dec.  134;  Davidson  v.  Thornton,  7  Pa.  128;  Miltlmore  v.  MUtl- 
more,  40  Pa.  151;  Clark  v.  Bryan,  16  Md.  171;  Howison  v.  Weeden,  77 
Va.  704;  Fox  v.  Cottage  Building  Ass'n,  81  Va.  677;  State  v.  Conoly,  28 
N.  C.  243;  Den  dem.  White  v.  Albertson,  14  N.  C.  241,  22  Am.  Dec.  719; 
Upson  V.  Horn,  3  Strobh.  108,  49  Am.  Dec.  633;  James  v.  Smith,  2  S.  C. 
183;  Mobley  v.  Mobley,  9  Ga.  247;  Cox  v.  Davis,  17  Ala.  714,  52  Am.  Dec. 

199;  Doe  ex  dem.  Saltonstall  v.  RUey,  28  Ala.  164,  65  Am.  Dec.  334;   Wall  v. 

Wall,  28  Miss.  409;  Sulherland  v.  De  Leon,  1  Tex.  250,  46  Am.  Dec.  100;  Lynch 

T.  Baxter,  4  Tex.  431,  51  Am.  Dec.  735;  Thouvenin  v.  Rodrlgues,  24  Tex.  468; 

Driggcrs  V.  Ca£sady,  71  Ala.  529;  Moore  v.  Tanner,  5  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  42,  27 

Am.  Dec.   35;    Dorsey  v.   Kendall,  8  Bush    (Ky.)   294;    Derr  v.   Wilson,   84 

Ky.  14;    Sheldon  v.  Newton,  3  Ohio  St.  494;    Horner  v.  State  Bank,  1  Ind. 

130,  48  Am.  Dec.  355;    Evans  v.  Ashby,  22  Ind.   15;    Wiley  v.   Pavey,   61 

Ind.  457,  28  Am.  Rep.  677;    Lane  v.  Bommelmann,  17  111.  95;    Swiggart  v. 

Harber,  4  Scam.  (lU.)  364,  39  Am.  Dec.  418;    Wales  v.  Bogue,  31  lU.  464; 

McBane  v.  People,  50  lU.  503;    Cameron  v.  Boyle,  2  G.  Greene  (Iowa)  154; 

Burton  v.  District  of  Warren  Tp.,  11  Iowa,  166;    Perryman  v.  State,  8  Mo. 

208;    State  v.  St.  Gemme,  31  Mo.  230;    Lucas  v.  Todd,  28  Cal.  182. 
"1  Breeze  v.  Doyle,   19  Cal.  101;    Maryott  v.   Gardner,   50  Neb.   320,    69 

X.  W.  837;    Fruits  v.  Elmore,  8  Ind.  App.  278,  34  N.  E.  829;    Root  V.  Davis, 

51  Ohio  St  29.  36  N.  E.  669,  23  L.  R.  A.  445. 
132  Morrison  v.  Austin,   14  Wis.   601. 
i*i  Holland  y.  Laconia  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n,  68  N.  H.  480,  41  Atl.  178. 

(393) 


§    261  *  LAW  OP  JUDOMBNT8.  C^h.  13 

to  plead,  or  pending  a  stay  of  proceedings,  or  before  •the  hearing  on 
a  demurrer, — such  an  irregularity  not  making  the  judgment  5j>solutely 
void.^'*  It  may  also  be  stated  that  the  judgment  of  a  court  having 
jurisdiction  is  not  rendered  void,  or  open  to  a  collateral  attack,  be- 
cause it  is  wrong  in  law,  being  based  upon  an  erroneous  application 
of  legal  principles  or  upon  insufHcient  evidence,^*'  nor  because  the 
form  of  action  or  remedy  selected  was  one  not  properly  admitting 
of  the  specific  relief  which  the  judgment  grants,^'*  nor  because  of 
the  failure  to  file  a  bond  in  an  injunction  suit,^*'  or  an  affidavit  in  a 
proceeding  by  attachment,**®  nor  because  the  relief  granted  by  the 
judgment  was  not  wholly  within  the  authority  of  the  court,  if  the 
judgment  may  stand  as  valid  for  so  much  as  was  within  the  com- 
petence of  the  court,***  nor  because  it  gives  costs  in  a  replevin  suit 
where  costs  are  not  granted  by  the  statute.**®  A  sale  under  order 
of  the  orphans'  court  is  not  subject  to  collateral  attack  because  made 
on  application  of  the  administrator  on  behalf  of  creditors,  instead 
of  being  made  on  the  application  of  the  creditors  themselves,***  nor 
because  not  made  at  the  time  required  by  law,  if  it  is  afterwards 
,  confirmed  by  the  court.***  Again,  it  is  no  ground  for  collateral  im- 
peachment of  a  judgment  that  the  claim  in  suit  was  directly  passed 

134  Alderson  v.  BeH,  9  Oal.  315;  Belles  v  MlUer,  10  Wash.  239,  38  P««-- 
1050;  Reed  v.  JNlcholson.  158  Mo.  624,  59  S.  W.  977;  Davis  v.  Wade.  .%*< 
Mo.  App.  641;  WeUs  v.  Atkins,  68  Vt.  191,  34  Ati.  694,  54  Am.  St  Rep. 
880;  Anheuser-Busch  Brewing  Ass'n  v.  McGowan,  49  La.  Ann.  630,  21  South. 
766;    Altman  v.  School  District,  35  Or.  85,  56  Pac.  291.  76  Am.  St.  Rep.  4t;s. 

lao  Stevenson  v.  Bonesteel,  30  Iowa,  286;  Bordages  v.  Higglns,  1  Tex,  Civ. 
App.  43,  19  S.  W.  446;  State  v.  Rogers,  131  Ind.  458,  31  N.  E.  199:  Vail  v. 
Arkell,  146  111.  363,  34  N.  E.  937;  Rogers  v.  Johnson,  125  Mo.  202.  28  S.  W. 
(«5;   Brandhoefer  v.  Bain,  45  Xeb.  781,  64  N.  W.  213. 

i8«  Insley  v.  United  States,  150  U.  S.  512,  14  Sup.  Ct.  158,  37  L.  Ed.  116:;: 
Brundred  v.  Egbert,  164  Pa.  615,  30  Atl.  503;  Johnson  v.  MiUer,  55  IIL  Ai  i». 
168. 

187  Lewis  V.  Rowland,  131  Ind.  103,  29  X.  E.  922. 

lasBarelU  v.  Wagner,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  445,  27  S.  W.  17;  Slade  v.  Ia- 
l»age,  8  Tex.  Civ.  App.  403;  27  S.  W.  952.  Compare  Tacoma  Grocery  »'". 
v.  Draham,  8  Wash.  263,  36  Pac.  31,  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  907. 

130  Johnson  v.  Iron  Belt  Mln.  Co.,  78  Wis.  159,  47  N.  W.  363. 

140  Lutes  V.  Alpaugh,  23  N.  J.   Law,  165. 

1*1  Simpson  v.  Bailey,  80  Md.  421,  30  Atl.  622. 

1*2  Brown  v.  Christie,  27  Tex.  73,  84  Am.  Dec.  GOT, 
(394) 


Ch.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  262 

on  by  the  court,  instead  of  being  referred  to  a  master  in  chancery, 
or  that  a  receiver  appointed  by  a  court  in  another  state  was  allowed 
to  intervene.^*'  Nor  can  a  person  affected  by  a  judgment  dispute  its 
validity  collaterally  on  the  ground  of  a  want  of  authority  in  the 
attorney  on  the  other  side  to  prosecute  the  action,^**  or  of  his  own 
attorney  to  consent  to  the  entry  of  a  judgment.**'  Again,  in  a  case 
admitting  of  doubt  as  to  whether  there  should  be  a  verdict,  or  wheth- 
er judgment  should  be  entered  without  a  verdict,  a  judgment  ren- 
dered upon  a  verdict  is  not,  after  the  expiration  of  the  term,  open 
to  collateral  attack.***  So,  an  order  requiring  a  garnishee  to  pay 
money  into  court  cannot  be  attacked  by  the  judgment-debtor  in  a 
collateral  proceeding,  although  the  property  in  controversy  may  be 
exempt.**^  And  where  a  decree  in  chancery  erroneously  authorizes 
execution  to  issue  on  the  foot  of  the  decree,  the  error  may  be  cor- 
rected by  an  appeal  or  other  direct  proceeding,  but  the  decree  can- 
not be  impeached  collaterally.* *• 

f  262.    Mistakes  in  the  Jndgmsnt* 

Closely  allied  to  the  principle  just  discussed  is  the  rule  that  a 
mistake  in  the  rendition  or  entry  of  a  judgment  can  be  taken  ad- 
vantage of  only  in  a  direct  proceeding.  A  final  judgment  cannot  be 
collaterally  impeached  because  the  opinion  of  the  court  shows  that 
a  diflFerent  judgment  should  have  been  entered.***  So  a  judgment 
ordering  the  delivery  of  all' the  property  of  an  intestate  to  his  widow, 
instead  of  to  her  in  trust  for  his  minor  children,  as  provided  by  the 
statute,  though  palpably  erroneous,  is  proof  against  collateral  at- 
tack.* ••  So.  again,  in  an  action  to  recover  from  a  purchaser  part 
of  certain  lands  sold  under  a  decree  of  court,  the  plaintiff,  if  a  party 

»*»  Youngstown  Bridge  Co.  v.  North  Galveston,  H.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co.   (Tex. 
Civ.  App.)  31  S.  W.  420. 

1**  Gullano  v.  Whitenaclc,  30  X.  Y.  Supp.  415,  24  Civ.  Proc.  R.  55. 

"6  Young  V.  Watson,  155  Mass.  77,  28  N.  E.  1135. 

i*«C;ritfln  V.  Sniyl3%   105  Ga.  475,  30  S.   E.  41«. 

1*7  Day  V.  First  Nat.  Bank,  G  Kan.  App.  821,  49  Pac.   05)1. 

i*HXorth western  Bank  v.  Hays,  37  W.  Va.  475,  16  S.  E.  561. 

i4»CooIey  V.   Smith,   17   Iowa,  UU;    Huyck   v.   (Jrahain,   82   Mich.   353,  4^ 
.\.  W.  781;    Anderson  v.  Carr,  65  Hun,  179,  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  992. 

ISO  Spencer  t.  McGonagle,  107  Ind.  410,  8  N.  E.  266. 

(395) 


§    263  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  13 

to  the  suit  in  which  the  decree  of  sale  was  made,  cannot,  in  answer 
to  the  defense  of  res  judicata,  attack  the  decree  of  sale  collaterally 
by  showing  that  that  part  of  the  lands  was  included  in  the  decree  by 
inadvertence  and  mistake.*"^  Nor  is  a  judgment  subject  to  col- 
lateral attack  because,  though  it  purports  to  be  by  default,  the  de- 
fendant had  in  fact  duly  answered  and  tendered  material  issues."* 
Nor  can  a  vendee  collaterally  assail  a  decree  foreclosing  the  vendor *s 
lien  as  containing  an  irregular  description.^'* 

S  263.    Irregiular  or  Dcfeotive  Serriee. 

We  have  already  seen  that  defects  or  irregularities  in  the  process, 
or  in  the  manner  of  its  service,  are  not  sufficient  to  render  the  judg- 
ment void,  unless  the  flaw  or  omission  is  so  serious  as  to  make  the 
process  equivalent  to  no  process  at  all,  or  the  service  entirely  nuga- 
tory, in  which  case  the  judgment  fails  for  want  of  jurisdiction.***  It 
follows  that  the  judgment  of  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction  cannot 
be  attacked  collaterally  when  there  has  been  some  service  of  notice, 
although  such  service  of  notice  may  be  materially  defective.***  The 
rule  as  stated  by  the  court  in  Nebraska  is  that  where  there  is  an  at- 
tempt at  service  reaching  the  defendant,  a  defect  in  the  manner  of 
the  service  or  form  of  the  return  is  a  mere  irregularity,  and  is  not 
ground  for  collateral  attack  on  the  judgment;  but  where  the  at- 
tempted service  does  not  reach  the  defendant  at  all,  a  judgment 

181  Jones  V.  Coffey,  »7  N.  C.  347,  2  S.  E,  1(J5.  And  see  First  Nat  Bank 
V.  Hyer,  46  W.  Va.  13,  32  S.  E.  lOOO.  The  fact  tliat  a  decree  for  the  sale 
of  several  pieces  of  property,  to  satisfy  lleDS  against  them,  permits  a  lien 
which  only  attached  to  one  piece  to  share  pro  rata  in  the  proceeds  of  all, 
does  not  render  the  decree  void,  but  only  reversible  for  error.  Ryan  t. 
Staples,  23  C.  C.  A.  541,  76  Fed.  721. 

152  Drej'fuss  v.  Charles  Seale  &  Co.,  41  N.  Y.  Supp.  875,  18  Misa  Rep.  55L 

188  Sanger  v.  Roberts,  92  Tex.  312,  48  S.  W.  1. 

1B4  Supra,    §§    223,   224. 

iBBMcCormick  v.  Webster,  89  Ind.  105;  Murray  v.  Welgle,  118  Pa.  158^ 
11  Atl.  781;  Allison  v.  Rankin,  7  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  2Gl>;  Hollingsnrortli  t. 
State,  111  Ind.  289,  12  N.  E.  490;  Treacy  v.  Ellis.  45  App.  Dlv.  492,  61  N. 
y.  Supp.  600;  Kelly  v.  Harrison,  69  Miss.  856,  12  South.  261;  Moore  t. 
Perry,  13  Tex.  Civ.  App.  204,  35  S.  W.  838;  Howard  v.  I^ek  (Ky.»  22  8. 
W.  332;  Gandy  v.  Jolly,  35  Neb.  711,  53  N.  VV.  658.  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  M: 
iMmn  V.  McGavin,  117  Mich.  372,  75  N.  W.  1061,  72  Am.  St  Rep.  561 

(396) 


Ch.  13)  COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §   26S 

founded  thereon  is  absolutely  void.^'*  Thus,  a  judgment  cannot  be 
impeached  in  a  collateral  proceeding  on  the  ground  that  the  return 
of  service  of  process  was  not  made  in  a  formal  manner,**'^  nor  be- 
cause the  service  of  the  writ  did  not  conform  to  the  requirements  of 
the  statute,^***  nor  because  service  of  the  summons  was  made  upon 
the  return  da}-,"*  nor  because  service  was  made  by  reading  the  sum- 
mons to  the  defendant,  instead  of  serving  him  with  a  copy,*'®  nor 
because  the  writ  was  not  served  the  requisite  number  of  days  before 
the  hearing  or  judgment,* •*  nor  because  service  was  made  on  the 
defendant  as  an  adult  while  he  was  an  infant,  if  the  records  do  not 
show  the  latter  fact,*"^  nor  because  the  summons  was  issued  to  and 
served  by  the  coroner,  when  the  statutes  authorize  him  to  act  in 
certain  cases  in  the  place  of  the  sheriff/ •'  nor  because  the  citation 
lacked  a  seal.****  So  a  judgment  against  a  corppration,  where  pro- 
cess was  served  on  individuals  who  are  not  called  officers,  is  errone- 
ous, and  would  probably  be  reversed  on  error ;  nevertheless  it  can' 
not  be  impeached  by  a  stranger,  in  a  suit  in  equity  to  which  the  cor- 
poration, the  stockholders,  and  the  persons  so  served  are  parties, 
when  they  make  no  objection,  and  no  fraud  or  collusion  is  char- 
ged.*** It  is  held  that  a  recital  in  a  judgment  that  the  defendant 
was  legally  served  with  process  cuts  off  all  inquiry  in  a  collateral 
proceeding  as  to  the  legality  of  the  service.***  But  on  the  other 
hand,  where  the  affidavits  of  service  in  an  action  were  wholly  insuffi- 
cient to  authorize  the  court  to  enter  judgment,  and  such  defect  ap- 
peared upon  the  face  of  the  judgment-roll,  it  was  held  that  the  judg- 
es* Campbell  Printing  Press  &  Manufacturing  Go.  v.  Marder,  Luse  &  Co., 
50  Xeb.  283,  «9  N.  W.  774,  61  Am.  St.  Rep,  573. 

"TCampbeU  v.  Hays,  41  Miss.  561. 

»•  Cole  V.  Butter,  43  Me.  401. 

"•Dutton  v.  Hobson,  7  Kan.  196. 

ito  Gandy  v.  Jolly,  35  Neb.  711,  53  N.  W.  658,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  460. 

"1  Leonard  v.  Sparks,  117  Mo.  103,  22  S.  W.  899,  38  Am.  St  Rep.  646; 
Rlghter  t.  Thornton,  30  Wkly.  Law  Bui.  (Ohio)  32. 

1"  Kennedy  v.  Baker,  159  Pa.  146,  28  Atl.  252. 

"«  Russell  V.  Durham  (Ky.)  29  S.  W.  16. 

!•*  Moore  v.  Perry,  13  Tex.  Civ.  App.  204,  35  B.  W.  838. 

ie»Fahs  v.   Taylor,   10   Ohio,  104. 

lee  Dunham  v.  Wllfong,  69  Mo.  355. 

(397) 


§    264  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  13 

ment  might  be  impeached  collaterally.^'^  Where  the  court  has  juris- 
diction of  the  subject-matter  and  the  parties,  and  no  fraud  is  shown, 
if  judgment  is  confessed  before  the  time  for  answering  expires,  this 
will  not  overthrow  the  judgment  on  a  collateral  attack,  but  all  neces- 
sary  presumptions  will  be  entertained  to  support  it.^** 

§  264.    Objections  as  to  Parttes. 

As  a  general  rule,  any  irregularity  in  regard  to  the  number,  charac- 
ter, or  joinder  oi  the  parties  to  an  action  must  be  objected  to  at  a 
proper  time  and  manner  in  the  progress  of  the  suit,  and  will  not 
justify  a  collateral  impeachment  of  the  judgment.  For  instance, 
where  jurisdiction  is  not  disputed,  a  misjoinder  of  parties  is  a  mere 
error  of  practice,  and  cannot  be  taken  advantage  of,  in  an  action  of 
ejectment,  to  defeat  the  title  of  a  purchaser  at  a  sheriff's  sale  under 
the  judgment.**®  So,  "multifariousness  as  to  subjects  or  parties, 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  of  equity,  cannot  be  taken  adx'antage 
of  by  a  defendant  except  by  demurrer,  plea,  or  answer  to  the  bill, 
although  the  court  in  its  discretion  may  take  the  objection  at  the 
hearing,  or  on  appeal,  and  order  the  bill  to  be  amended  or  dismissed. 
A  fortiori  it  does  not  render  a  decree  void,  so  that  it  can  be  treated 
as  a  nullity  in  a  collateral  action.''  *^®  A  judgment  entered  in  favor 
of  a  plaintiff,  against  himself  and  others,  and  revived  to  the  use  of  one 
to  whom  it  has  been  assigned,  is  valid  as  against  a  creditor  of  the 
plaintiff  whose  judgment  is  rendered  after  the  revival.*^*  On  similar 
principles,  a  judgment  in  an  action  for  delinquent  taxes,  being  ap- 
parently regular,  cannot  be  attacked  collaterally  on  the  ground  that 
the  suit  should  have  been  brought  in  the  name  of  a  different  official 
plaintiff.*'^  Nor  is  it  any  ground  for  the  collateral  impeachment  o\ 
a  judgment  that  the  plaintiff  was  not  the  real  party  in  interest,'"' 

167  Hyde  V.'  Kedding,  74  Cal.  4<ja,  10  l»ac.  :«<). 
i«8  White  v.  Crow,  110  U.  S.  1«3,  4  Sup.  Ct.  71,  28  L,  Ed.  113, 
looj^evan  v.  MiUliolland,   114  I'a.  49,   7   Atl.   VM:    (;ates   v.  Newman.  1^ 
Iiul.    App.    aU2,    40   N.    K.    VkA. 

170  Hefner  v.  Northwestern  Mut  IJfe  Ins.  Co.,  12a  U.  S.  747,  8  Sup.  Ci. 
;ja7,  31  b.   Kd.  309. 

171  Sponsler's  Appeal,  127  Pa.  410,  17  Atl,   1097. 

172  Somers  v.  Losey,  48  Mich.  294,  12  N.  W.  188. 

173  cates  V.  Kiley  (Tex.  Cir.  App.)  55  S.   W.  979. 
(398) 


Ch.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  265 

or  was  a  foreign  administrator  who  had  not  filed  copies  of  his  letters 
in  the  clerk's  office  before  bringing  suit/^*  or  that  the  plaintiff,  being 
a  corporation,  had  failed  to  aHege  the  fact  of  its  incorporation.*^* 
So  again,  it  is  no  ground  for  collateral  attack  upon  a  judgment  ren- 
dered in  an  action  against  a  partnership  that  the  judgment  was  en- 
tered against  one  partner  only,*'*  or  was  rendered  on  the  confession  • 
of  only  one  of  the  partners.*' ' 

§  265.    Lecml  DlMbiUty  of  PArtlefl. 

In  an  earlier  chapter,  we  discussed  at  some  length  the  validity  of 
judgments  against  married  women,  infants,  lunatics,  and  deceased 
persons.  In  regard  to  the  former  class  of  persons,  it  appeared  to 
be  the  settled  doctrine  in  many  of  the  states  that,  in  the  absence  of 
enabling  statutes,  a  judgment  against  a  feme  covert  is  absolutely 
void.*"  If  this  position  is  taken,  it  inevitably  follows  that  such  a 
judgment  may  be,  on  that  ground,  impeached  and  avoided  in  any 
collateral  proceeding.  But  it  was  shown  in  the  same  connection 
that  numerous  courts  prefer  to  consider  such  judgments  as  voidable 
only,  especially  where  the  defense  of  coverture  is  not  set  up,  but  the 
defendant  suffers  a  default.*'^  It  is  unnecessary  to  repeat  the  dis- 
cussion in  this  place.  But  the  reader,  in  considering  the  sections 
cited,  should  keep  in  mind  the  rule  that  it  is  only  when  a  judgment 
is  absolutely  void  that  it  can  be  impeached  collaterally,  not  when  it 

174  Marshall  v.  Charlaud,  109  Ga.  306,  84  8.  E.  671. 

»7»McFall  V.  Buckeye  Grangers'  Warehouse  Ass'n,  122  Cal.  468,  55  Pac. 
253,   68  Am.   St.    Kep.   47. 

"e  Uongh  t.  Stover,  46  Neb.  588,  65  X.  W.  18JJ. 

17  T  Belcher  v.  Curtis,  119  Mich.  1,  77  N.  W.  310,  75  Am.  St.  Rep.  376. 

ITS  Supra,  §9  188-192. 

»7»  In  rennsylvanla,  while  it  is  true  that  the  mortgage  of  a  maiTied  woman 
18  Invalid  miless  separately  acknowledged  by  her,  and  the  absence  of  such 
acknowledgment  may  be  set  up  as  a  defense  to  a  recovery  on  the  mortgage, 
yet  if  Judgment  be  recovered  on  a  scire  facias  issued  on  such  mortgage, 
the  Judgment  is  conclusive  tliat  the  mortgage  was  properly  executed,  and 
the  validity  thereof  cannot  be  questioned  in  a  collateral  action  of  ejectment. 
Mlcbaelis  v.  Brawley,  109  Fa.  7.  And  see  Benson  v.  Cahill  (Tex.  Civ.  App.) 
37  8.  W.  1088;  Carson  v.  Taylor,  19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  177,  47  S.  W.  395;  Trues- 
dalJ  V.  Mccormick,  126  Mo.  39,  28  S.  W.  886;  Equitable  Securities  Co.  v. 
Block,  51  La.  Ann.  478,  25  South.  271. 

(399) 


§   266  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  13 

is  merely  voidable.*®^  And  a  further  suggestion  may  be  added, — 
that  the  real  question  is  one  of  jurisdiction ;  for  if  the  court  may  take 
jurisdiction  of  a  married  woman,  a  judgment  rendered  against  her 
may  be  erroneous  on  account  of  her  abnormal  status,  but  will  not  be 
null.  What  is  here  said  of  married  women  will  apply,  with  some 
•  modifications,  to  the  case  of  infants.*"^  But,  by  the  general  con- 
sensus of  authority,  a  judg^nent  against  a  lunatic  is  not  to  be  consid- 
ered as  entirely  void,  and  therefore  it  will  be  protected  from  col- 
lateral attacks.^**  It  is  a  different  question  in  regard  to  the  validity 
of  judgments  against  joint  defendants,  a  part  of  whom  were  persons 
under  legal  disabilities  or  were  not  served  with  process.  Whatever 
may  be  thought  of  the  effect  of  such  judgment  upon  the  defendant 
who  was  incapacitated  or  not  within  the  jurisdiction,  it  seems  but 
reasonable  to  hold  it  binding  upon  the  other,  supposing  no  similar 
objection  to  exist  in  his  case.  It  might,  as  to  him,  be  erroneous  or 
voidable,  but  it  should  not  be  open  to  him,  or  to  any  other  person 
in  respect  to  him,  to  impeach  it  collaterally.  This  view  was  shown, 
in  a  preceding  section,  to  be  consonant  to  sound  legal  reason  and 
supported  by  many  weighty  decisions.^'* 

S  266.  Disqnalifieation  of  Jvdce*' 

Notwithstanding-  some  difference  of  opinion,  it  seems  to  be  the 
more  generally  accepted  doctrine  that  a  decision  rendered  by  a  judge 
who  was  disqualified  by  reason  of  his  interest  in  the  subject-matter 
of  the  controversy  is  null  and  void,  and  that  this  may  be  shown 
against  it  in  a  collateral  proceeding;  *■*  but  that  if  the  objection  goes 

180  For  the  difference  between  voidable  and  void  Judgments,  Bee  §  170. 

181  Supra,  H  1U3-198.  As  to  coUateral  attacks  upon  judgments  because  one 
of  tbe  parties  was  an  Infant,  see  Colt  v.  Ck>lt  111  U.  S.  566,  4  Sup.  Ct  563. 
28  U  Ed.  520;  Id.  (U.  C.)  48  Fed,  385;  Cohee  v.  Baer.  134  Ind.  375,  32  N. 
K.  920,  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  270;  Smltb  v.  Gray,  116  N.  C.  311,  21  S.  EL  200. 
Compare  Hatch  v.  Ferguson,  15  C.  C.  A.  201,  68  Fed.  43,  33  L.  R.  A.  759. 

i«2  Supra,  S  205.  And  see  Weaver  v.  Brenner,  145  Pa.  299,  21  Aa  1010: 
Thomas  v.  Hunsucker,  108  N.  C.  720,  13  S.  E.  221.  Loss  of  Jurisdictton  to 
render  a  particular  Judgment  because  of  the  death  of  a  party  does  not  make 
It  subject  to  collateral  attack  as  being  wholly  void,  unless  the  fact  appears  oC 
record.    Cochrane  v.  Parker,  12  Colo.  App.  ltJ9,  54  Pac.  1027. 

1 83  Supra,  S  211.    See  Bailey  y.  McGimiiss,  57  Mo.  ^2. 

184  Supra,  i  174. 

(400) 


I 


Ch.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  268 

to  the  competence  of  the  judge,  on  account  of  his  relationship  to  one 
of  the  parties  litigant,  it  will  have  no  greater  effect  than  to  make  the 
judgment  erroneous  or  voidable,  not  laying  it  open  to  indirect  im- 
peachment.*"" Especially  is  this  the  case  where  the  statutes  author- 
ize the  parties  to  waive  an  objection  of  this  character.  The  judg- 
ments and  orders  of  a  de  facto  judge,  as  we  have  already  seen,  are 
everywhere  recognized  as  valid  and  binding,  and  of  course  they  can- 
not be  attacked  collaterally  on  any  allegation  against  the  title  of  the 
person  acting  as  judge.*"* 

§  267.    Judgment  for  Ezoesiive  Amount. 

If  judgment  is  rendered  for  a  sum  exceeding  the  amount  laid  in 
the  ad  damnum  clause  of  the  writ,  or  claimed  in  the  declaration  or 
complaint,  or  notified  to  the  defendant  by  the  indorsement  on  the 
summons,  it  is  irregular  and  Erroneous  and  is  liable  to  reversal,  but 
it  is  not  void,  and  it  cannot  be  impeached  collaterally.*"^ 

• 

§  268.    InsnAelenoy  of  Erldenoo. 

When  a  judgment  is  rendered  in  a  cause  by  a  court  whose  juris- 
diction over  the  subject-matter  and  the  person  of  the  defendant  is 
not  questioned,  it  cannot  be  attacked  in  any  collateral  proceeding 
by  a  showing  that  the  evidence  on  which  it  was  based  was  illegal, 
improperly  received,  or  insufficient  to  sustain  the  judgment.*""     This 

"•Supra,  §  174.  And  sec  WllBon  t.  Smith  (Ky.)  38  S.  W.  870;  State 
▼.  Ross,  118  Mo.  23,  23  S.  W.  196;  Jeffersonlan  Pub.  Oo.  v.  Hilliard,  105  Ala. 
57e,  17  Soutli.  112;  Broder  v.  Conklln,  98  Cal.  3(50,  33  Pae.  211.  Compare 
Pierce  y.  Bowers,  8  Baxt.  (Temi.)  353. 

is«  Supra,  a  175.  When  a  judgment  has  been  rendered  by  a  court  of  gen- 
eral jurisdiction  against  a  person  over  whom  It  had  acquired  jurisdiction. 
It  cannot  be  attacked.  In  a  proceeding  to  enjoin  its  collection,  by  a  party 
to  the  judgment,  on  the  ground  that  tlie  special  Judge  appointed  by  agi'ee- 
ment  was  not  regularly  appointed  and  qualified.  Littleton  v.  Smith,  119 
Ind.  230,  21  N.  K.  880. 

i«T  Smith  v.  Keen,  20  Me.  411;  Chaffee  v.  Hooper,  54  Vt.  513;  Bond  v. 
I'aclieco,  30  Cal.  530;  SaTage  v.  Uussey,  48  N.  C.  149;  Kansas  City  v.  Win- 
ner, 58  Mo.  App.  299;  Mott  y.  State,  145  ind.  353,  44  N.  £.  548;  Dornan 
T.  Benham  l^'urnltupe  Cd.,  102  Tenn.  303,  52  S.  W.  38;  Botkin  v.  Klelnschmldt, 
21  Mont.  1,  52  Pae."  503,  09  Am.  St.  Rep.  041;    supra,  §  138. 

i8«Udle  T.  Krost,  59  Tex.  684;  Martin  v.  Porter,  4  Helsk.  (Tenn.)  407; 
1  LAW  JUDG.— 20  (401) 


§    269  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  13 

very  clear  and  sensible  rule  rests  on  several  principles.  In  the  first 
place,  an  objection  of  that  sort  does  not  go  to  the  jurisdiction,  and 
consequently  the  judgment  cannot  be  void,  although  it  may  be  er- 
roneous. Again,  the  legality  and  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  is  a 
question  for  the  court  to  determine,  and  its  decision  should  be  ac- 
cepted as  final  and  conclusive,  unless  in  an  appellate  court.  Finally, 
if  such  re-opening  of  the  cause  were  allowed,  the  doctrine  of  res 
judicata  would  be  despoiled  of  its  very  salutary  effect. 

f  269.    niesal  or  InsuiBeient  Cause  of  Actioa. 

A  judgment  cannot  be  impeached  collaterally  on  account  of  any 
illegality  or  insufficiency  in  the  cause  of  action  on  which  the  suit  is 
brought ;  these  are  matters  \^hich  must  be  set  up  in  defense  to  the 
action,  and  which  are  concluded  by  the  judgment.*"*  Thus,  where  a 
judgment-creditor  seeks  to  enforce  his  judgment  against  equities, 
the  judgment-debtor  cannot  show  that  the  contract  upon  which  the 
judgment  was  rendered  was  infected  with  usury  or  other  illegality. '** 
Nor  will  a  judgment  be  considered  open  to  collateral  impeachment 
because  the  petition  or  complaint,  in  the  action  in  which  it  was  ren- 
dered, did  not  state  a  cause  of  action,^**  nor  because  the  remedy  H'a> 
at  law,  while  the  suit  was  in  equity,  or  vice  versa,***  nor  because  the 
action,  when  commenced,  appears  to  have  been  barred  by  some  stat- 
ute of  limitations,***  nor  because  the  claim  in  suit  had  been  satisfies! 

i'ollock  V,  Biiie,  43  Miss.  140;  Bartlett  v.  Russell,  41  Ga.  19(J:  Parker  ▼.  Albee, 
86  Iowa.   4(5.   n2  X.   W.   r)33;   SteinUauer  v.   Colmar,    11   Colo.   App.  41>l.  V* 
I'ac.  2U1;    MacLaehlan  v.  I'ease,  6e  111.  App.  (534;    Benjamin  v.   Early.  rs\ 
Mich.  93,  81  N.  W.  973;   Austin  v.  Austin,  43  111,  App.  4i<8;    State  y.  Tbonij 
son,  28  Or.  2U0.  42  I'ac.  1002. 

18©  state  V.  Supervisors  of  Town  of  Beloit,  20  Wis.  79;  Lewis  t.  Anii 
strong,  45  Ga.  131;  Busliee  v.  Surles,  77  X.  C.  02;  Figge  v.  Rowlei,  84  in 
App.    2:^8. 

100  Knnk  of  Wooster  v.  Stevens,  1  Olilo  St.  2:«,  59  Am.  Dec.  019. 

i»i  Winnlngham  v.  Trueblood,  149  Mo.  572,  51  S.  W.  390:  Altnwn  v 
Scliool  District,  35  Or.  85,  50  Pac.  291,  70  Am.  St  Rep.  408;  Xortli  Vacif.* 
Cycle  Co.  v.  Thomas.  20  Or.  ;^1,  38  Pac.  307,  40  Am.  St  Rep.  (36. 

102  Lemmon  v.  Herbert  IftJ  Va.  053,  24  8.  IS.  249;  Weaver  v.  Toney  tKy  « 
54   8.    W.    732,    50   L.    K.   A.    105. 

193  Head  v.  Daniels,  38  Kan.  1,  16  Pac.  911;    Chrlstofferson  t.  Pfenn.c 
JLO   Wash.   491,   48   I'ac.   204. 

(402) 


(3l.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  270 

prior  to  the  rendition  of  the  judgment/***  nor  because  the  note  on 
which  Ihe  judgment  was  recovered  was  without  consideration,* *°  nor 
because  the  claim  on  which  the  judgment  was  rendered  was  based 
on  a  wager  or  a  gambling  transaction.^**  A  judgment  rendered  in 
a  suit  founded  on  an  obHgation  before  its  maturity,  is  not  subject 
to  collateral  attack,**^  And  a  judgment  in  an  attachment  suit  can- 
not be  impeached  indirectly  by  showing  that  the  creditor  had  no 
such  demand  against  the  defendant  in  attachment  as  would  sustain 
that  species  of  process.****  Again,  where  a  judgment  is  entered  on 
a  mortgage,  the  judgment  will  conclusively  establish  the  due  ex- 
ecution of  the  mortgage,  although  the  latter  may  have  been  in  fact 
void;  the  mortgage  is  merged  in  the  judgment,  which  cannot  be 
collaterally  impeached  except  for  fraud.**** 

Part  III.     For  Want  of  Jurisdiction. 

§  270.    Jnriidiction  of  Superior  Conrti  presumed* 

Before  proceeding  to  consider  in  detail  the  permissibility  of  col- 
laterally attacking  judgments  and  decrees  on  an  allegation  of  want 
of  jurisdiction,  it  is  necessary  to  advert  to  the  presumption  of  law  by 
which  the  acts  and  proceedings  of  courts  of  record  are  supported. 
It  is  a  maxim,  "omnia  praesumimtur  rite  et  solemniter  esse  acta."  **** 

i»4  Hyder  v.  Smith  (Tenn.  Cli.)  52  S.  W.  8H4. 

"ssuber  v.  Chandler,  3«  S.  i\  344,   15   S.   E.  426.  , 

!»•  Chicago  Driving  I»ark  v.  West.  35  HI.  App.  41K5;  McCanless  t.  Smith. 
51  X.  J.  Kq.  505,  25  Atl.  211.  But  In  Mississippi,  under  a  statute  which 
renders  void  a  judgment  on  a  wager,  It  is  a  good  plea  to  an  action  on  a 
judgment  that  it  was  rendered  on  a  note  made  In  settlement  of  a  wager. 
Campheli  v.  New  Orleans  Nat.  Bank,  74  Miss.  526,  21  South.  400.  And  In 
Kentucky,  under  a  statute  providing  that  neither  party  to  a  champertous 
contract  shall  have  anj'  right  of  action  thereon,  it  is  held  that  a  judgment 
may  be  attacked,  l>ecause  of  champerty,  in  a  collateral  proceeding.  Roberts 
V.  Yancey.  ?)4  Ky.  243,  21  S.  W.  1047,  42  Am.  St.  Kep.  357. 

»»7  Mikct>ka  v.  Blum,  («  Tex.  44;    Robertson  v.  Huffman,  92  Ind.  247. 

1D9  Harrison  v.  i'cnder,  44  N.  C.  79,  57  Am.  Dec.  573;  Brantingham  v. 
Brantfngham,   12  X.  J.  Eq.  IW). 

i9»Butterfleld'8  Appeal,  77  l»a.  197;  Michaells  v.  Brawley,  109  Pa.  7; 
Hartmau  v.  Ugbom,  .>4  I'a.  120,  93  Am.  Dec.  679;  Woolery  v.  Grayson,  110 
Ind.    149.  10  N.  E.  935. 

««o  Co.  Litt.  232;    Broom,  Leg.  Max.  942. 

(403) 


I   270  LAW  OF  JUDOMENTa  (Ch.  13 

And  this  maxim,  while  often  applied  to  transactions  between  private 
persons,  has  a  special  and  peculiar  applicability  to  the  proceedings 
of  public  officers,  and,  more  than  in  any  other  case,  to  the  acts  of  the 
courts. ^^^  It  is  presumed  that  the  doings  of  a  court  of  record  are 
regular  and  proper,  that  its  jurisdiction  was  properly  acquired,  that 
its  proceedings  are  legal  and  valid,  and  that  its  decisions  are  well- 
founded  and  free  from  error.  "There  is  no  principle  of  law  better 
settled  than  that  every  act  of.  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction  shall 
be  presumed  to  have  been  rightly  done,  until  the  contrary  appears; 
this  rule  applies  as  well  to  every  judgment  or  decree  rendered  in  the 
various  stages  of  their  proceedings,  from  the  initiation  to  their  com- 
pletion, as  to  their  adjudication  that  the  plaintiff  has  a  right  of  action. 
Every  matter  adjudicated  becomes  a  part  of  their  record,  which 
thenceforth  proves  itself,  without  referring  to  the  evidence  on  which 
it  has  been  adjudged."  ***  Hence,  jurisdiction  having  been  once  ac- 
quired over  the  parties  and  the  subject-matter,  every  presumption  is 
in  favor  of  the  legality  of  the  judgment.*®* 

Coming  now  to  the  matter  in  more  immediate  contemplation,  it  is 
a  part  of  this  principle  that  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  cannot  be 
collaterally  denied.  And  the  rule  in  this  connection  rests  partly  upon 
the  maxim  already  quoted,  and  partly  upon  the  peculiar  doctrine 
which  attaches  the  utmost  conclusiveness  to  judicial  records,  and 
partly  upon  considerations  of  public  policy  which  will  be  adverted  to 
hereafter.  But  the  rule  must  be  taken  with  certain  very  important 
modifications.  For  first,  it  applies  in  its  fullness  only  to  the  acts 
and  judgments  of  courts  of  general  jurisdiction  or  courts  of  record. 

201  Reed  v.  Jackson,  1  East.  355;    Lryttleton  v.  Cross,  3  Barn.  &  C.  327. 

202  Voorhees  v.  Jackson,  10  Pet.  44U,  472,  9  L.  Kd.  490,  Baldwin.  J.: 
Hughes  V.  Cummings,  7  Colo.  138,  2  Pac.  289.  All  presumptions  are  In  favor 
of  tne  regularity  of  the  proceedings  of  courts  of  record  when  coUateraUj 
assailed,  and  where  a  decree  contains  the  finding  of  a  fact  specially  whicb  i< 
pleaded  In  the  petition,  it  must  be  presumed  that  sufficient  evidence  wa^ 
suhmittod  to  the  court  to  Justify  such  tindiug.  Hilton  ▼.  Bachman,  24  NeK 
490,  39  X.   W.  419. 

208  Blake  v.  Lyon  &  Fellows  Manurg  Co.,  77  X.  Y.  626;  Jordan  t.  John 
Ryan  Co.,  35  Fla.  259,  17  South.  73.  The  test  of  Jurisdiction  is  whether 
the  court  had  power  to  enter  upon  the  inquiry;  not  whether  its  conchxslon 
was  right  or  wrong.  Board  of  Com'ra  of  Lake  County  v.  Piatt,  25  C.  f 
A.   87,   79   Fed.   5t57. 

(404) 


Ch.  13)  COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  07  JUDGMENTS.  §    270 

We  are  told  that  nothing  is  intended  to  be  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of 
a  superior  court  but  what  specially  appears  to  be  so,  and  nothing  is 
intended  to  be  within  the  jurisdiction  of  an  inferior  court  but  what 
is  specially  alleged.^®*  This  point  will  be  discussed  in  a  later  section. 
Again,  in  the  case  of  foreign  judgments,  the  presumption,  though 
recognized,  is  not  of  great  weight,  and  is  always  liable  to  be  rebutted 
by  evidence  to  the  contrary.  Finally,  the  presumption  is  not  abso- 
lutely conclusive.  For  it  may  be  contradicted  by  the  face  of  the  rec- 
ord. Whether  it  may  be  rebutted  by  extraneous  evidence  is  a  moot 
question,  which  we  reserve  for  discussion  in  a  subsequent  connection. 
But  there  is  no  question  that  want  of  jurisdiction,  if  shown  by  the 
record  itself,  may  be  urged  against  the  judgment  at  any  time  and 
in  any  proceeding.  Thus  guarded  against  undue  breadth  of  state- 
ment, we  are  prepared  to  formulate  the  rule  which  is  recognized  and 
accepted  by  all  the  authorities,  viz.,  the  judgment  of  a  domestic  court, 
having  general  and  superior  jurisdiction,  is  always  to  be  presumed 
regular  and  valid  and  founded  upon  jurisdiction  properly  and  duly 
acquired,  until  the  contrary  is  definitely  made  to  appear  in  some 
.permis5ible  manner.*®*     Hence,  when  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction 

204Kenney  v.  Greer,  13  lU.  482,  54  Am.  Dec.  439. 

206  vocrhees  v.  Jackson,  10  Fet.  449,  9  L.  Ed.  490;  Kennedy  v.  Georgia 
Stete  Bank,  »  How.  680,  12  L.  Ed.  1209;  McCormick  v.  SuUivant,  10  Wheat. 
192.  6  Lu  Ed.  300;  Bump  v.  Butler  County  (C.  C.)  93  Fed.  290;  BlaisdeU 
V.  Fray,  08  Me.  209;  Penobscot  R.  Co.  v.  Weeks,  52  Me.  456;  Morse  v. 
I'resby,  25  N.  H.  299;  Carleton  v.  Washington  Ins.  Co.,  35  N.  H.  162;  Wln- 
^te  V.  Haywood,  40  N.  H.  437;  Mercier  v.  Chace,  9  AUen  (Mass.)  242; 
Hendrick  v.  Whittemore,  105  Mass.  23;  Coit  v.  Haven,  30  Conn.  190,  79 
Am.  Dec.  244;  Kay  v.  Kowley,  4  Thomp.  &  C.  43;  O'CJonnor  v.  Felix,  87 
Hun,  179,  33  N.  Y.  Supp.  1074;  Hering  v.  Chambers,  103  Pa.  175;  National 
Docks  ik  S.  J.  Junction  Comiectlng  Ky.  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  52  N. 
J-  Eq.  58,  28  Atl.  71;  Clark  v.  Bryan,  16  Md.  171;  Woodhouse  v.  Flllbates, 
77  Va.  317;  Hill  v.  Woodward,  78  Va.  765;  Bernhardt  v.  Brown,  118  N.  C. 
700,  24  S.  E.  527,  36  D.  K.  A.  402;  Martin  v.  Bowie,  37  S.  C.  102,  15  S. 
E.  736;  Wilson's  Heirs  v.  Wilson's  Adro'r,  18  Ala.  176;  Pender  v.  Felts, 
2  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  535;  Hardy  v.  Gholson,  26  Miss.  70;  Briggs  v.  Qark, 
7  How.  (Miss.)  457;  Horan  v.  Wahrenberger,  9  Tex.  313,  58  Am.  Dec.  145; 
Hambel  v.  Davis,  89  Tex.  256,  34  S.  W.  439,  59  Am.  St.  Rep.  46;  WooUey 
V.  Sullivan,  92  Tex.  28,  46  S.  W.  629;  McCleskey  v.  State,  4  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
322,  .a  S.  W.  518;  HIggins  v.  Bordages  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  28  S.  W.  350; 
Venable  v.  McDonald,  4  Dana  (Ky.)  336;  Sorrell  v.  Samuels  (Ky.)  49  S.  W. 
762;    ^ewcomb'8  Ex'r  v.  Newcomb,  13  Bush   (Ky.)  544,   26  Am.   Rep.   222; 

(405) 


§271  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  13 

pronounces  judgment,  the  presumption  is  in  favor  of  its  jurisdiction, 
and  it  is  not  incumbent  upon  one  who  bases  a  right  upon  such  judg- 
ment to  aver  facts  essential  to  the  existence  of  jurisdiction.*'*  And 
whatever  is  upon  the  records  of  such  a  court  is  presumed  to  be  right- 
fully there.*"^  It  is  therefore  important  to  consider  the  various  con- 
ditions which  the  record  may  present  in  a  given  case, — as,  whether  it 
be  complete  or  deficient,  and  whether  it  contain  recitals  as  to  juris- 
diction or  not, — and  ascertain  how  the  presumption  will  apply  in  the 
various  circumstances.     And  this  will  now  engage  our  attention. 

§  271.    Silence  or  Inoompletenest  of  tlie  Reoord. 

The  presumption  in  favor  of  the  jurisdiction  of  superior  courts  is 
most  frequently  invoked  in  aid  of  their  judgments  in  cases  where  the 
record  is  silent  on  the  subject  of  jurisdiction.  It  may  be  defective 
or  incomplete  in  consequence  of  the  loss  or  absence  of  parts  of  the 
record  or  from  the  omission  of  proper  recitals.  Or  the  record, 
though  apparently  complete  and  regular,  may  say  nothing  on  the 
subject  of  jurisdiction.  Or  its  deliverances  may  be  obscure  and  am- 
biguous.    For  any  of  these  reasons  the  record  may  fail  to  show 

Adams'  Lessee  v.  Jeffries.  12  Ohio,  253.  40  Am.  Dec.  477;  OaUen  v.  Ellison. 
13  Ohio  St.  446,  82  Am.  Dec.  448;  Wiley  v.  Pratt,  23  Ind.  028;  First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Hanna,  12  Ind.  App.  240,  39  N.  E.  1054;  Pardon  v.  Dwlre.  23  IIL 
572;  Kenney  v.  Greer,  13  111.  432.  54  Am.  Dec.  43U;  Law  v.  Grommes.  55 
lU.  App.  312;  Calhoun  v.  Ross,  GO  111.  App.  309;  Cooper  v.  Sunderland.  3 
Iowa,  114,  m  Am.  Dec.  52;  iSpurgln  v.  Bowers,  82  Iowa.  187.  47  X.  W. 
1021);  Coleman  v.  McKnight,  4  Mo.  83;  McGirk  v.  Chauvin.  3  Mo.  237: 
(iemmell  v.  Kice,  13  Minn.  400  (Gil.  371);  Reinig  v.  Hecht,  58  Wis.  212.  !♦» 
N.  VV.  548;  Hahn  v.  KeUy,  34  Cal.  31>1,  iH  Am.  Dec.  742;  IlUnois  Trust  & 
Savings  Bank  v.  Pacific  Ry.  Co..  115  Cal.  285,  47  Pac.  (30;  Stoddard  Manufg 
Co.  V.  Mattice,  10  S.  D.  253,  72  N.  W.  8D1;  GUIilau  t.  Murphy.  41)  Xeb.  7?J. 
tR>   X.    W.   98. 

206  Jackson  v.  Dyer,  104  Ind.  510,  3  X.  E.  803.  For  example,  a  state  court 
of  general  jurisdiction,  in  the  absence  of  a  showing  in  the  record  to  the  con- 
trary, will  be  presumed  to  have  had  Jurisdiction  of  an  action  involving  con- 
tiicting  claims  to  letters  i>atent,  when  its  judgment  Is  collaterally  attacke^l: 
since,  where  a  cause  of  action  In  relation  to  letters  patent  depends  primarily 
on  some  contract  of  the  parties,  jurisdiction  exists  in  tlie  state  couns,  thousb 
the  validity  of  the  patent  may  incidentally  arise.  Shoemaker  v.  South  Bend 
Spark-Arrcster  Co.,  135  Ind.  471,  35  X.  E.  280,  22  U  R.  A.  332, 

2  07  Drake  v.  Duvenick,  45  Oal.  455. 

(406) 


Ch.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §  271 

affirmatively  that  the  court  had  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  and  per- 
sons, while  yet  it  does  not  distinctly  show  a  want  of  jurisdiction.  In 
any  of  these  cases  the  weight  of  authority  sustains  the  rule  that  the 
judgment,  if  rendered  by  a  superior  domestic  court,  will  sustain  itself 
against  any  collateral  attack  by  parties  or  privies  on  account  of  any 
alleged  want  of  jurisdiction.**^*  The  rule  is  equally  applicable  in 
cases  where  there  are  numerous  parties ;  the  fact  that  the  record  is 
silent  upon  some  matter  touching  the  jurisdiction  oyer  some  of  the 
defendants  does  not  aflfect  the  presumption  in  its  favor.^®*  So  where 
two  defendants  are  sued  ex  contractu  and  one  confesses  judgment  for 
both,  the  authority  to  do  so  need  not  appear  in  the  record,  nor  can 
the  judgment  of  the  court  be  collaterally  impeached  for  this  supposed 
defect.*^*  Where  the  record  does  not  show  that  a  default  was  not 
properly  entered,  the  presumption  arises  that  the  required  notice  was 
given.*^*  And  in  general,  a  judgment  is  not  open  to  collateral  im- 
peachment merely  because  the  record  fails  to  shcAv  the  service  of  the 
process  by  which  the  court  acquired  jurisdiction  of  the  defendant; 
if  the  record  is  silent  on  this  point,  it  will  be  presumed  that  lawful 
and  sufficient  process  was  duly  served.*^*  Similarly,  when  the  judg 
ment  is  against  a  non-resident,  and  jurisdiction  was  acquired  by  pub- 
lication of  notice,  the  judgment  is  not  impeachable  collaterally  be- 

»•«  Travelers*  ITotectlve  Ass'n  v.  Gilbert,  41  C.  C.  A.  180,  101  Fed.  46; 
Onlickson  v.  Bodkin,  78  Minn.  33,  80  N.  W.  783,  7^  Am.  St.  Rep.  352;  Parr 
V.  Undler,  40  S.  C.  193,  18  8.  B.  636;  liams  v.  Root,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  413, 
W  S.  W.  411;  Seaman  v.  Galligan,  8  8.  D.  277,  66  N.  W.  458;  Axman  v. 
Dneker,  45  Kan.  179,  25  Pac.  582;  Horner  v.  State  Bank,  1  Ind.  130,  48 
Am.  Dec.  355;  Coit  v.  Haven,  30  Conn.  190,  79  Am.  Dec  244;  Lawler's 
Heirs  V.  White,  27  Tex.  250;  Mitchell  v.  Meuley,  32  Tex.  460;  Messinger 
V.  Kintner,  4  Blnn.  97;  Swearengen  v.  Guilck,  67  111.  208;  Goar  v.  Maraiida, 
57  Ind.  339;  Fogg  v.  Gibbs,  8  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  464;  Hahn  v.  Kelly,  34  Cal. 
.JUl,  W  Am.  Dec.  742;    Sharp  v.  Brunnings,  35  Cal.  528. 

2o«  Kramer  v.  Breedlove  (Tex.)  3  S.  W.  561;  Stearns  v.  Wright,  13  S.  D. 
.'44,   83   N.    W.    587. 

210  Jackson  v.  Tift,  15  Ga.  557. 

211  Evans  v.  Young,  10  Colo.  316,  15  Pac.  424,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  583.     . 

212  Sommermeyer  v.  Sommermeyer,  89  Wis.  66,  61  X.  W.  311;  Elder  v. 
Richmond  Gold  &  Silver  Min.  Co.,  7  C.  C.  A.  354,  58  Fed.  536;  Galloway 
V.  State  Nat.  Bank  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  56  S.  W.  236;  Hamer  v.  CJook,  118  Mo. 
476.  24  S.  W.  180;  Eichhoff  v.  Eichhoff,  101  Cal.  6(K),  36  Pac.  11;  Bank 
of  Colfax  V.  Richardson,  34  Or.  518,  54  Pac.  359,  75  Am.  St.  Rep.  664. 

(407) 


§    27 1  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  s  (Ch,  13 

cause  the  record  does  not  show  compliance  with  all  the  requirements 
of  the  statute  authorizing  that  manner  of  citation,  or  directing  the 
mode  of  its  execution ;  a  full  compliance  will  be  presumed.*" 
Therefore  when  a  party. seeks,  in  any  collateral  action,  to  impeach 
the  judgment  or  decree  of  a  court  of  superior  jurisdiction,  on  the 
ground  that  he  had  no  legal  notice  of  the  pendency  of  the  action,  it 
is  necessary  that  his  pleading  should  set  forth  what,  if  anything,  is 
shown  by  the  record  in  relation  to  the  issue  and  service  of  process, 
because,  unless  the  record  itself  shows  that  the  court  never  acquired 
jurisdiction  of  him,  it  will  be  conclusively  presumed  that  the  juris- 
diction  did  attach.*^*  Nor  is  it  enough  to  overcome  this  presump- 
tion that  the  judgment-roll  is  defective,  or  that  some  of  the  papers 
which  should  properly  constitute  a  part  of  it  are  wanting.'**  Thus, 
where  the  papers  in  a  case  are  all  lost,  and  the  record  states  that  the 
judgment  was  taken  by  default  without  a  jury,  the  court  will  pre- 
sume that  it  was  a  case  where  such  would  have  been  the  proper  pro- 
ceeding.*^® So  where  only  part  of  the  record  is  given  in  evidence, 
that  part. of  it  which  relates  to  process  and  appearance  being  by 
agreement  of  parties  withheld,  it  will  be  presumed  that  all  parties  who 
are  named  as  such  in  the  pleadings  and  judgment  were  properly  be- 
fore the  court.*^^  Again,  where  the  docket  showed  a  summons  "re- 
turned on  oath,"  but  not  that  it  had  been  served,  it  was  held  that 
the  judgment  was  merely  irregular  and  could  not  be  impeached  col- 
laterally.^^® Where  the  record  fails  to  state  that  the  judgment  was 
rendered  at  a  regular  term  of  the  court,  but  states  that  it  was  en- 
tered on  May  6,  1885,  it  will  be  presumed,  in  the  absence  of  contran* 

2i3Figge  V.  Kowlen,  185  111.  234,  57  N.  E.  1U5;  Martin  v.  Buma.  80  Tex. 
67t),  lt$  S.  W.  1072;  Meade  v.  BarUett,  1  Tex.  Qv.  App.  342.  23  S.  W,  ISC: 
Hoaglaiid  v.  Hoagland,  19  Utah,  103,  57  Pac.  20;  Amy  v.  Amy.  12  Utah, 
278,  42  l»ac.  1121. 

21*  Exchange  Bank  v.  Ault,  102  Ind.  322,   1  N.   E.  5C2. 

«i8Herrick  v.  Butler,  30  Minn.  156,  14  N,  W.  75)4;  Gullekson  t.  Bodkin. 
78  Minn.  33,  80  N.  W.  783.  79  Am.  St.  Kep.  352;  Berry  v.  Foster,  22  Kjr. 
Law  Kfp.  745,  58  S.   W.   700. 

2i«  Fogg  V.  Gibbs,  8  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  404. 

S17  Welsh  V.  Childs,  17  Ohio  St  319.  And  see  Cosby  v.  Powers.  137  IikK 
«H,  37  N.  E.  321;  Holt  County  Bank  v.  Holt  County,  53  Neb.  827,  74  >. 
W.  259;    Crank  v.  Flowers,  4  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  029. 

«i8  Sloan  V.  McKiustry,  18  I'a.  120. 

(408) 


Ch.  13)  COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §    271 

evidence  in  the  record,  that  the  judgment  was  rendered  at  a  regular 
term  duly  fixed  by  law.***  ''Where  nothing  whatever  is  shown,  if 
evidence  were  necessary  to  have  authorized  the  particular  decision 
complained  of,  it  will  be  presumed  that  the  evidence  was  before  the 
court  and  that  it  fully  justified  the  conclusion  reached.  If  a  party 
rely  upon  the  fact  that  th^e  was  no  evidence  in  a  case,  where  evi- 
dence was  necessary,  he  must  establish  it  by  a  proper  bill  of  excep- 
tions, or  he  will  fail.'*  ***  So  also,  if  the  record  in  a  case  does  not 
show  the  situation  of  land  aflfected  by  the  decree,  it  will  be  presumed, 
in  a  collateral  attack  upon  the  judgment,  that  the  land  was  within 
the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the  court.*** 

The  same  rule  governs  the  case  of  an  ambiguity  or  obscurity  in 
the  record.  Thus,  where  two  demurrers  to  a  declaration  were  on 
file,  and  the  judgment  of  the  court  refers  to  the  "said  demurrer," 
>\ithout  specifying  which  of  them,  it  will  be  presumed  that  the  court 
passed  upon  both.***  So  where,  by  reason  of  the  loss  of  the  record 
or  any  part  of  it,  there  is  difficulty  in  discovering  the  ground  upon 
which  jurisdiction  was  taken  in  the  particular  case,  if  there  be  any 
ground  upon  which  the  court  could  rightfully  have  taken  cognizance 
of  the  case,  it  will  be  presumed  that  it  assumed  jurisdiction  on  that 
ground,  unless  it  be  made  to  appear  affirmatively  by  the  record  tha- 
xt  was  taken  on  some  other  ground.**'  It  is  also  a  rule  that  the  fact 
that  the  record  of  a  cause  in  a  federal  court  fails  to  show  affirma- 
tively a  ground  of  federal  jurisdiction  will  not  make  its  judgment  a 
nullity,  or  render  it  subject  to  collateral  attack ;  and  this  is  true  when 
the  court  assumes  jurisdiction  because  it  holds  that  the  suit  involves 
a  federal  question,  such  as  the  construction  of  an  act  of  congress, 
even  if  it  is  mistaken  in  so  holding.*** 

«!•  Baldrldge  v.  Fenland,  68  Tex.  441,  4  S.  W.  SOT). 

«2o  Credit  Fonder  of  America  v.  Kogers.  10  Neb.  1»4,  4  X.  W.  1012. 

«2i  Foster  V.  Glvens,  14  U.  C.  A.  (5:^5,  07  Fed.  684. 

222  Watson  T.  Hahn,  1  Colo.  385. 

22a  v^oodhouse  v.  FUlbates,  77  Va.  317. 

224  DoweU  V.  Applegate,  152  U.  S.  327.  14  Sup.  Ct.  611,  38  L.  Ed.  463. 

(409) 


§272  LAW  OF  JVDQMBNTa.  (Cb.  13 


f  272.    Appeamaee  by  AttonMy* 


It  has  been  made  a  question  whether  the  presumption  in  favor  of 
jurisdiction  should  be  extended  to  the  case  where  the  record  shows 
an  appearance  by  attorney,  which  is  apparently  regular  but  was  in 
fact  unauthorized.  Many  of  the  cases  lay  down  the  rule,  in  the  most 
uncompromising  terms,  that  a  judgment  recovered  against  a  defend- 
ant who  was  not  served  with  process  and  had  no  knowledge  of  the 
suit,  but  for  whom  an  attorney  appeared,  although  without  authority, 
can  by  no  means  be  attacked  for  want  of  jurisdiction  in  any  collateral 
proceeding,  and  is  binding  upon  the  defendant.^^*  But  on  the  other 
hand,  there  is  not  wanting  authority  for  the  view  that  the  authority 
of  the  attorney  may  always  be  controverted.***  The  best  and  safest 
rule,  in  our  judgment,  is  that  formulated  in  a  recent  case  in  Kansas, 
where  it  is  said  that  while  a  judgment  resting  upon  the  unauthorized 
appearance  of  an  attorney  is  void,  yet  an  attorney's  appearance,  for  a 
defendant  whom  he  professes  to  represent,  is  presumed  to  be  au- 
thorized until  the  contrary  is  shown;  and  it  devolves  upon  the  de- 
fendant impeaching  this  authority  to  show  by  positive  proof  that 
such  appearance  is  invalid ;  and  all  the  presumptions  are  in  favor  of 

225  Brown  v.  Mchols,  42  N.  Y.  2«;  Hamilton  v.  Wrlj^ht,  37  N.  Y.  9K: 
Keed  v.  I'ratt  2  HUl  (N.  Y,)  HA;  Hoffmlre  r.  Hoffmlre,  3  Edw.  Ch.  <N.  Y* 
174;  American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Oakley,  9  Paige  <X.  Y.)  41WJ.  38  Am.  Dec  561: 
Flnneran  v.  Leonard,  7  Alien  (Mass.)  54,  83  Am.  Deo.  (i65:  I^we  t.  String- 
ham,  14  Wis.  222;  Baker  v.  Stonebraker.  34  Mo.  175;  Cochran  v.  Tbomaft. 
131  Mo.  258,  33  S.  W.  6;  Carpentier  v.  City  of  Oakland,  30  Cal.  439;  Field 
V.  Gibbs,  1  Pet.  C.  C.  155,  *  Fed.  Cas.  Xo.  4,766;  Brigofs  Heirs  t.  Brigot. 
47  La.  Ann.  13U4,  17  t^oiith.  825;  Deegan  v.  Deegan.  22  Xev.  202,  37  Pac. 
;^(iO;  Williams  t.  Johnson.  112  X.  C.  424.  17  S.  E.  496,  21  L.  R.  A.  848,  34 
Am.  8t.  Uep.  513.  Certain  other  cases  hold  that,  while  a  Judgment  is  voidable 
if  obtained  by  an  attorney  acting  without  authority,  yet  it  cannot  be  attacked 
collaterally.  Its  validity  may  be  assailed  in  a  direct  proceeding;  bat  It  re- 
mains valid  until  set  aside  or  vacated  in  a  proper  proceeding  for  tliat  purpose. 
Sanders  v.  l*rice.  56  8.  C.  1,  ;«  8.  E.  731;  Corbitt  v.  Timmerman,  95  Mli-h. 
581.  55  X.   W.  437,  35  Am.  St  Rep.  586. 

226  Wiley  V.  Pratt,  23  Ind.  (528;  Hess  v.  Cole.  23  X.  J.  Law,  125;  Shmn- 
way  V.  Stillman,  6  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  453;  Shelton  v.  Tittin,  6  How.  163,  12  L.  Ed. 
:{ST;  Wright  v.  Andrews.  IIM)  Mas.s.  149;  Chicago.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  r.  Hft«-b- 
cock  County,  tH>  Xob.  722,  84  X.  W.  «7;  Dormltzer  v.  German  Suvin^  & 
Loan  Soc.  23  \\  ash.  132,  62  Pac.  862. 

^410) 


Ch.  13)  COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OP  JUDGMENTS.  '  §    273 

a  finding  of  the  trial  court  that  the  appearance  of  the  attorney  is 
binding  upon  the  defendant.'*^  If  the  case  is  that  of  a  judgment  ren- 
dered in  another  state,  a  recital  in  the  record  that  the  defendant  ap- 
peared by  attorney  is  conclusive  of  the  fact  that  the  attorney  did  ap- 
pear, but  not  that  he  had  authority  to  appear.^** 

i  273.    Jnrifldiotional  Reoltals. 

It  commonly  happens  that  the  record  itself  will  furnish  evidence 
on  the  question  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court.  And  notwithstand- 
ing some  vigorous  dissent,  the  great  majority  of  the  decisions  hold 
(in  the  case  of  a  domestic  as  distinguished  from  a  foreign  judgment) 
that  if  the  record  shows  the  facts  necessary  to  confer  jurisdiction,  or 
recites  that  jurisdiction  did  in  fact  attach,  its  averments  are  final  and 
conclusive  in  every  collateral  proceeding,  and  cannot  be  contradicted 
by  any  extraneous  evidence. ^^"  This  is  in  consequence  of  the  great 
sanctity  attached  to  judicial  records  by  the  common  law  and  their 
"uncontrollable  verity."  It  is  said :  "If  upon  inspection  of  the  rec- 
ord it  appears  that  no  notice  has  been  given,  the  judgment  or  decree 
is  void.  On  the  other  hand,  if  it  be  a  judgment  or  decree  of  a  domes- 
tic court  of  general  jurisdiction,  and  the  record  declares  that  notice 
has  been  given,  such  declaration  cannot  be  contradicted  by  extrinsic 
proof.    In  such  cases  the  judgment  or  decree  is  sustained,  not  be- 

"7  Reynolds  v.  Fleming,  30  Kan.  106,  1  Pac.  01,  46  Am.  Rep.  86. 

«« Infra,  vol.  2,  $  903. 

22»  McCormIck  v.  SulliTant.  10  Wheat.  192,  6  L.  Ed.  300;    Walker  v.  Cron- 
kite  (C.  C.)  40  Fed.  133;   Granger  v.  Clark,  22  Me.*  128;   Morse  v.  Presby,  25^ 
N.  H.  299;    Cook  v.  Darling,  18  Pick.  (Mass.)  393;    Coit  v.  Haven,  30  Conn. 
190,  79  Am.  Dec.  244;  Hartraan  v.  Ogborn,  54  Pa.  120,  93  Am.  Dec.  G79:    Ma- 
ples V.  Mackey,  89  X.  Y.  146;   Clark  v.  Bryan,  16  Md.  171;   Miller  v.  Ewing, 
8  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  421;   Dufour  v.  Camfranc,  11  Mart.  O.  S.  (La.)  607,  13 
Am.  Dec.  360;  Smitli  v.  Wood,  37  Tex.  616;   Simmons  v.  McKay,  5  Bush  (Ky.) 
2.1;  Callen  v.  Ellison,  13  Ohio  St.  446,  82  Am.  Dec.  448;  Rogers  v.  Beauchamp, 
102  Ind.  33,  1  X.  E.  185;  Moffitt  v.  Moffltt,  69  IH.  641;  Hahn  v.  Ivelly,  34  Cal. 
'«91.  W  Am.  Dec.  742;   McCauley  v.  Fulton,  44  Cal.  355;   Bigolow  v.  Chatter- 
ton,  10  U.  S.  App.  207.  2  C.  C.  A.  402,  51  Fed.  614;    United  States  v.  Gayle 
(D,  C.)  45  Fell.  107;    Letney  v.  Marshall,  79  Tex.  513.  15  S.  W.  5S6:    Perry 
V.  King.  117  Ala.  533,  23  South.  783:   Wanl  v.  White,  66  111.  App.  155:    Hoag- 
land  V.  Hoagland.  19  Utah,  103,  57  Pac.  20;   Phillips  v.  Phillips,  13  S.  D.  231, 
83  X.  W.  94. 

(411) 


§    273  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNTS.  (Ch.  13 

cause  a  judgment  rendered  without  notice  is  good,  but  because  the 
law  does  not  permit  the  introduction  of  evidence  to  overthrow  that 
which  for  reasons  of  public  policy  it  treats  as  absolute  verity.  The 
record  is  conclusively  presumed  to  speak  the  truth,  and  can  be  tried 
only  by  inspection.  This  results  from  the  power  of  the  court  to 
pass  upon  every  question  which  arises  in  the  cause,  including  the 
facts  necessary  to  the  exercise  of  its  jurisdiction,  and  as  to  which, 
therefore,  its  judgment,  unless  obtained  by  fraud  or  collusion,  is 
binding,  until  reversed,  on  every  other  court."  *'®  Hence  a  recital 
in  a  judgment  that  the  original  process  was  served  on  the  defend- 
ant, or  that  publication  (when  allowed  in  lieu  of  service  of  process) 
was  made,  or  that  the  party  appeared  by  attorney  or  by  answer,  is 
conclusive  when  the  record  is  collaterally  put  in  issue,  unless  the 
recftal  is  positively  contradicted  by  the  record  itself.*'^  We  proceed 
to  illustrate  the  rule  here  stated  by  an  account  of  certain  typical  cases. 
In  Reily  v.  Lancaster,^'^  the  validity  of  a  tax  judgment  was  col- 
laterally involved.  It  contained  a  recital  that  "all  the  owners  and 
claimants  of  the  property  above  described  have  been  duly  summoned 
to  answer  the  complaint  herein  and  have  made  default  in  that  behalf." 
It  appeared,  however,  that  the  name  of  one  of  the  owners  was  omitted 
from  the  printed  summons,  which  was  served  by  publication.  Yet 
the  judgment  was  sustained,  the  court  indulging  the  presumption 
that  there  was  adequate  proof  of  service  on  that  defendant  although 
it  did  not  appear  in  the  record.  In  an  important  Ohio  decision  the 
record  of  a  judgment  declared  that  "the  defendants,  by  C,  their  attor- 

280  wilcher  v.  Robertson;  78  Va.  602. 

231  Foster  v.  Givens,  14  C.  C.  A.  625,  67  Fed.  684;  Stelnhardt  ▼.  Baker.  20 
Misc.  Rep.  470,  46  N.  Y.  Supp.  707;  Isley  v.  Boon,  113  N.  O.  249.  18  S.  E.  174; 
Sledge  V,  EHiott,  116  N.  O.  712,  21  S.  E.  797;  Sloan  v,  Thompson,  4  Tex.  Or. 
App.  419.  23  S.  W.  613;  GUlon  v.  Wear,  9  Tej.  Civ.  App.  44,  28  S.  W.  1014; 
Lyle  V.  Horstman  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  25  S.  W.  802;  Moore  v.  Perry,  13  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  204,  35  S.  W.  838;  Mills  v.  Terry.  22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  277,  54  &  W. 
780;  Cooper  v.  May  field.  W  Tex.  107,  58  S.  W.  827;  Harris  v.  McClanahaB. 
11  Lea  (Tenn.)  181;  Law  v.  Groromes.  55  111.  App.  312;  Casey  v.  People.  l& 
111.  49,  46  N.  E.  7;  Allured  v.  Toiler,  112  Mich.  357,  70  N.  W.  1037;  Klaer  f. 
Caufleld,  17  Wash.  417,  49  Pae.  1064. 

232  30  Cal.  354.  And  see  Sharp  v.  Brunnings.  35  Cal.  528;  Hahn  v.  KeUy. 
34  Cal  391,  94  Am.  Dec.  742;  Branson  v.  Carutbers,  49  Cal.  373;  Batenutn 
V.  Miller,  118  Ind.  345.  21  N.  E.  292. 

(412) 


Ch.  13)  COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §    27 S 

ney,  came  into  court,  and  by  virtue  of  his  power  of  attorney  filed  in 
this  case,  confessed  judgment,"  etc.  It  was  sought  in  a  collateral 
proceeding  to  show  that  the  only  power  of  attorney  among  the 
papers  in  the  case,  and  which  was  marked  with  the  proper  number  of 
the  case,  did  not  appear  to  be  signed  by  some  of  the  defendants,  and 
that  such  defendants  were  at  the  time  married  women,  and  thereby 
to  show  that  the  judgment  was  rendered  without  jurisdiction  and 
was  void.  But  it  was  held  that  evidence  of  such  facts  could  not  be 
received  to  impeach  the  validity  and  effect  of  the  judgment.^'' 

But  while  it  is  inadmissible  to  contradict  the  record  by  extrinsic 
evidence,  it  is  always  open  to  the  party  to  show  that  one  part  of  the 
record  contradicts  another  part.  Thus  the  recital  of  service  in  a 
judgment  may  be  contradicted  by  producing  the  original  summons 
and  return.***  But  the  contradiction  must  be  explicit  and  irreconcil- 
able. It  is  not  enough  that  the  recital  seems  to  be  contradicted  by 
inferences  drawn  from  other  parts  of  the  record.  For  example^ 
where  the  service  of  a  summons  to  the  September  term  of  court  was 
defective,  and  the  cause  was  continued  without  any  steps  being  taken, 
and  at  the  ensuing  term  a  decree  was  rendered  which  recited  that 
the  defendants  "were  duly  served  ten  days  before  the  first  day  of  the 
October  term,"  and  the  record  contained  only  the  summons  to  the 
September  term,  it  was  held  that  there  was  nothing  appearing  in  the 
record  to  rebut  the  presumption  in  favor  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
court  as  indicated  by  its  finding  in  the  decree."'*^  So  in  an  action 
against  two  defendants  jointly,  on  a  promissory  note,  personal  service 
was  had  on  one  of  them  and  the  other  was  served  by  publication ; 
the  record  did  not  show  that  the  latter  had  filed  any  pleadings  in  the 
case,  but  the  judgment  of  the  court  recited  that  "both  parties  waived 
a  jury,  and  submitted  the  cause  to  the  court  upon  the  law  and  facts ;" 

23*  Callen  v.  EIl!son,  13  Ohio  St.  446,  82  Am.  Dec.  448. 

«»4  Pardon  v.  Dwire,  23  lU.  572;  Harris  v.  Sargeant,  37  Or.  41,  60  Pac. 
606. 

*»»  Turner  v.  Jenkins,  79  111.  228.  So,  where  the  return  set  out  in  a  docket 
shows  that  the  citation  was  served  before  its  issuance,  and  the  original  cita- 
tion and  return  have  been  destroyed,  the  date  shown  in  the  record  being  an 
impossible  one,  it  will  be  presumed,  on  collateral  attack,  that  service  was  had 
on  a  date  which  would  render  the  Judgment  valid.  Stephens  v.  Turner,  9 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  623,  29  S.  W.  937. 

(413) 


§274  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   13 

and  it  was  held  that  the  record  disclosed  a  personal  appearance  of 
both  defendants,  and  the  recitals  of  the  judgment  were  conclusive.*^' 
A  very  strong  application  of  this  rule  of  ascribing  absolute  verity  to 
the  record  was  made  in  a  recent  case  in  Texas.  It  was  a  collateral 
attack  upon  the  judgment  of  a  domestic  court  of  general  jurisdiction, 
and  the  nullity  of  the  judgment  for  want  of  jurisdiction  over  the  per- 
son of  the  defendant  was  insisted  on,  because  the  return  upon  the 
writ  of  citation  showed  that  the  alleged  publication,  as  therein  re- 
cited, could  not  have  been  made.  The  judgment,  however,  recited 
that  the  defendant  failed  to  appear  and  answer  "but  wholly  made 
default,  although  duly  cited  with  process."  It  was  held  that,  to  de- 
termine whether  the  record  shows  affirmatively  that  there  was  proper 
service,  the  whole  of  it  must  be  considered  together,  and  that  the 
recital  in  the  judgment,  which  was  the  last  act  of  the  court  in  the 
case,  that  the  defendant  was  "duly  cited,*'  imported  absolute  verity 


231 


I  274.    Decision  of  the  Conrt  upon  its  own  Juritdietion. 

The  fact  of  its  own  jurisdiction  may  become  a  matter  in  issue  be- 
fore the  court,  or  a  question  which  it  must  determine  beiore  pro- 
ceeding with  the  case,  and  then  its  decision  that  it  has  jurisdiction  is 
generally  considered  final  and  conclusive  in  all  collateral  inquiries. 
When  the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  depends  upon  a  fact  which  it  is 
required  to  ascertain  in  its  decision,  such  decision  is  binding  until 
reversed  in  a  direct  proceeding.**^  Where  a  statute  confers  general 
jurisdiction  over  a  class  of  cases  upon  a  particular  tribunal,  its  de- 
cision upon  the  facts  essential  to  the  existence  of  jurisdiction  in  a 
particular  case  belonging  to  the  class  will  be  conclusive  as  against 
collateral  attack.*^'*     So  when  a  notice  which  is  defective,  or  the 

236  Smith  V.  Wood,  87  Tox.  61G. 

237  Treiulway  v.  Eastburn,  57  Tex.  209. 

238  Otis  V.  The  Kio  Graude.  1  AVoods,  279.  Fed.  Cas.  No.  10,613;  Reinach 
V.  Atlantic  &  G.  W.  K.  (^o.  (C.  C.)  TkS  Fed.  33;  Menitt's  Lessee  v.  Home,  5 
Otiio  St.  307,  07  Am.  Dec.  2t)8:  Faircliild  v.  Falrcbild,  53  N.  J.  Kq,  078,  M 
Atl.  10,  51  Am.  St.  Kep.  Gop;  Bruce  v.  Osgood,  154  Ind.  375,  50  X.  E.  25: 
Swift  V.  Yanaway,  153  111.  197,  38  N.  E.  589;  Lancaster  v.  Snow.  184  111. 
534,  50  X.  E.  813;  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore  (Tex.  Civ.  App )  32 
S.  W.  379. 

230  City  of  Delphi  v.  Startzman,  104  Ind.  313,  3  X.  E.  037;    Dequludi'e  v. 

(414) 


' 


Ch.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  274 

service  of  which  is  informal,  has  been  adjudged  sufficient,  the  judg- 
ment rendered  thereunder  will  not.be  held  void  in  a  collateral  pro- 
ceeding.**® And  in  case  of  an  insufficient  service  of  notice,  if  the 
court  decides  the  question  of  jurisdiction  erroneously,  the  judgment 
will  be  voidable  but  binding  until  reversed  on  appeal.***  The  deter- 
mination of  the  question  of  the' sufficiency  of  the  affidavits  presented 
to  the  court  as  proof  of  the  service  of  a  summons  and  the  failure  of 
the  defendant  to  answer,  is  a  judicial  determination  of  the  question 
of  jurisdiction,  and  therefore  binding  until  set  aside  or  reversed.**' 
But  in  California,  the  decision  of  the  probate  court  upon  jurisdictional 
facts  in  a  particular  case  is  not  conclusive  upon  parties  not  actually 
before  the  court,  and  can  be  questioned  in  a  direct  suit  in  the  same 
court.**'  And  it  is  said  that  when  the  record  discloses  the  evidence 
of  jurisdiction  on  which  the  court  acted,  its  finding  that  it  had  juris- 
diction is  not  conclusive  unless  the  facts  shown  support  it.*** 

WiUiamg,  31  Ind.  444;  Plannery  v.  Baldwin  Fertilizer  Co.,  94  Ga.  606,  21 
S.  E.  587.  1*1108,  the  decision  of  a  federal  judge  that  the  interests  of  the 
only  defendant  who  Is  a  citizen  of  the  same  state  with  the  plaintiff  are  Iden- 
tical with  those  of  the  plaintiff,  and  that,  therefore,  the  suit  Is  removable 
as  one  between  citizens  of  different  states.  Is  not  reviewable  collaterally. 
Evers  v.  Watson.  156  U.  S.  527,  15  Sup.  Ct.  430,  39  L.  Ed.  520. 

«*«  Farmers'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hlghsmlth,  44  Iowa,  330;  Shawhan  v.  Loffer,  24 
Iowa,  217;  Cooper  v.  Sunderland,  3  Iowa,  114,  66  Am.  Dec.  52;  Morrow  v. 
Weed,  4  Iowa,  77,  66  Am.  Dec.  122;  Lyon  v.  Vanatta,  35  Iowa,  525;  AVood- 
bury  V.  Magulre.  42  Iowa.  339;  Cincinnati,  S.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Village  of  Belle 
Centre,  48  Ohio  St.  273,  27  N.  E.  464;  Goodell  v.  Starr,  127  Ind.  198,  26  N.  E. 
793;  Rogers  v.  Miller,  13  Wash.  82,  42  Pac.  525,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  20;  Rotch 
V.  Humboldt  College,  89  Iowa,  480,  56  N.  W.  658. 

«*i  BonsaU  v.  Isett,  14  Iowa,  309.  Thus,  a  Judgment  by  a  state  court,  sus- 
taining the  validity  of  personal  service  made  while  the  defendant  (a  non- 
resident) was  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  solely  for  the  purpose  of 
trying  another  suit  in  such  court,  to  which  he  was  a  party,  cannot  be  collat- 
erally attacked  in  a  federal  court  on  the  ground  that  such  service  was  void. 
SJpe  V.  Copwell,  8  C.  C.  A.  419,  59  Fed.  970. 

242  Hotchkiss  V.  Cutting,  14  Minn.  537  (Gil.  406). 

243  Beckett  v.  Selover,  7  Cal.  215,  68  Am.  Dec.  237. 

24  4  Senichka  v.  Lowe,  74  111.  274.  Goudy  v.  Hall,  30  111.  109,  holds  that, 
on  the  question  of  jurisdiction,  the  findings  of  the  court  are  not  conclusive. 
If  the  necessary  notice  has  not  been  given,  or  if  process  has  not  been  served, 
the  court  has  no  authority  to  act,  and  all  its  proceedings  are  absolutely  void. 
The  finding  of  the  court  as  to  proper  notice  having  been  given,  or  process 
stfved.  Is  prima  facie  sufficient  to  establish  the  fact,  and  would  not  be  dlsre- 

(415) 


§  275  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNTa  (Ch.  13 


S  275.    CAses  denyliis-  ConolustTenets  of  Record* 

The  preceding  sections  show  the  immense  preponderance  of  au- 
thority to  be  in  favor  of  the  rule  that  a  judgment  of  a  superior  court 
can  never  be  impeached  collaterally  for  want  of  jurisdiction  not  ap- 
pearing on  its  face.  This  rule,  as  we  stated,  is  limited  to  domestic 
judgments.  For  in  the  case  of  a  judgment  coming  from  a  sister  state 
or  a  foreign  country,  it  is  agreed  on  all  hands  that  want  of  jurisdic- 
tion may  always  be  shown  against  it.  But  this  is  a  special  and  pecul- 
iar question,  and  must  be  carefully  separated  from  the  point  now 
under  consideration.  That  being  done,  we  still  find  a  certain  num- 
ber of  cases  squarely  denying  the  generally  accepted  rule.  It  is  held 
in  Texas  that  the  doctrine  of  the  absolute  verity  of  a  record  does  not 
apply  when  the  want  of  jurisdiction  is  made  a  question.  "This  may 
always  be  set  up  when  a  judgment  is  sought  to  be  enforced  or  any 
benefit  is  claimed  under  it;  and  this  is  not  inconsistent  with  the 
principle  which  ordinarily  forbids  the  impeachment  or  contradiction 
of  a  record."  ***  So  in  New  York.  "The  want  of  jurisdiction  in  a 
court  rendering  a  judgment  may  be  shown  collaterally  whenever  any 
benefit  or  protection  is  sought  under  the  judgment."  '*•  And  the 
same  rule  is  approved  in  several  other  states.'*^  In  a  recent  Massa- 
chusetts decision  it  was  held  that  a  domestic  judgment  may  be  im- 
peached, in  an  action  thereon,  by  evidence  that,  at  the  time  the  suit 

garded  without  very  clear  and  satisfactory  proof  to  the  contrary.  But  see 
the  later  cases  of  Swift  v.  Yanaway,  153  111.  197,  38  N.  E.  589.  and  Lancaster 
V.  Snow,  1&4  111.  534,  56  N.  E.  813. 

2<5  i^itzhugh  V.  Custer,  4  Tex.  391,  51  Am.  Dec.  728;  Thouvenin  r.  Rod- 
rigues,  24  Tex.  408;  Smith  v.  Tupper,  4  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  261,  43  Am. 
Dec.  483;   Brown  v.  Balde,  3  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  283. 

24e  Putnam  v.  Man,  3  Wend.  202.  20  Am.  Dec.  686;  Ferguson  t.  CrawfonJ, 
70  X.  Y.  253,  26  Am.  Rep.  589;  Bonnet  v.  Lachman,  66  Hun.  554,  20  X.  Y. 
Supp.  514;  Dutton  t.  Smith,  10  App.  Div.  566.  42  N.  Y.  Supp.  80.  Bat  a 
Judgment  cannot  be  collaterally  attacked  by  showing  that  there  to  a  doubt 
about  the  jurisdiction;  the  want  of  Jurisdiction  must  be  made  to  appear 
clearly  by  a  fair  preponderance  of  the  evidence.  Hayes  v.  Kerr,  19  App.  DIt, 
91,  45  N.  Y.  Supp.  1050. 

247  Tenney  v.  Taylor,  1  App.  D.  C.  223;  Thelen  t.  Thelen,  75  Minn.  433.  7S 
X.  W.  108;  Balk  v.  Harris,  122  N.  C.  64,  30  S.  E.  318,  45  L.  R.  A.  257;  Kings- 
borough  V.  Tousley,  56  Ohio  St  450,  47  N.  £.  541;  Davis  ▼.  Hamilton,  55  DL 
App.  94. 

(416) 


Ch.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §  275 

was  brought,  the  defendant  therein  was  a  non-resident  of  the  state 
and  had  no  notice  of  its  commencement  or  pendency.^*®  So  in  Kan- 
sas it  is  held  permissible  to  attack  a  judgment  collaterally  by  proof 
that  the  sheriff's  return  of  personal  service  is  false  and  that  defend- 
ant in  reality  never  had  notice  of  the  action.***  In  another  state,  a 
recital  in  an  order  that  a  party  appeared  does  not  prevent  him  from 
showing  at  all  times  that  he  neither  was  served  nor  appeared.**® 

But  the  most  important  decision  on  this  side  of  the  question  is 
that  of  Ferguson  v.  Crawford.*'^  In  this  case  the  well-considered/ 
and  well-reasoned  opinion,  by  Judge  Rapallo,  contains  such  a  dis- 
criminating review  of  the  authorities,  and  such  pertinent  observa- 
tions on  the  merits  of  the  issue,  that  we  find  it  necessary  to  quote 
from  it  at  some  length.  "After  considerable  research,"  says  the 
learned  judge,  "I  have  been  unable  to  find  a  single  authoritative  ad- 
judication, in  this  or  any  other  state,  deciding  that  in  the  case  of  a 
domestic  judgment  of  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction,  want  of  juris- 
dictiofi  over  the  person  may  be  shown  by  extrinsic  evidence,  while 
there  are  a  great  number  of  adjudications  in  neighboring  states  hold- 
if^  that,  in  the  case  of  such  judgments,  parties  and  privies  are  es- 
topped in  collateral  actions  to  deny  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  over 
the  person  as  well  as  the  subject-matter,  unless  it  appear  on  the  face 
of  the  record  that  the  court  had  not  acquired  jurisdiction ;  and  that 
in  such  cases  there  is  a  conclusive  presumption  of  law  that  jurisdic- 
tion was  acquired  by  service  of  process  or  the  appearance  of  the 
party.  The  cases  are  very  numerous,  but  the  citation  of  a  few  of 
them  will  suffice."  He  then  proceeds  to  review  and  comment  upon 
the  principal  cases  holding  this  rule,  and  continues :  "It  is  quite  re- 
markable, however,  that  notwithstanding  the  formidable  array  of 
authority  in  its  favor,  the  courts  of  this  state  have  never  sustained 
this  doctrine  by  any  adjudication,  but  on  the  contrary  the  great 
weight  of  judicial  opinion,  and  the  views  of  some  of  our  most  dis- 
tinguished jurists,  are  directly  opposed  to  it.    As  has  been  already 

>««  Needliam  v.  Thayer,  147  Mass.  536,  18  N.  E.  429.    And  see  Stanley  v. 
Stanley,  35  S.  O.  94,  5S4,  14  S.  E.  675. 

240  Mastin  t.  Gray,  19  Kan.  458,  27  Am.  Rep.  149. 
2M  DoEier  v.  Richardson,  25  6a.  90. 
2»i  70  N.  Y.  253,  26  Am.  Rep.  589. 

1  LAW  JUDG.— 27  (417) 


§    275  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  13 

Stated,  our  courts  have  settled  by  adjudication  in  regard  to  judgments 
of  sister  states,  that  the  question  of  jurisdiction  may  be  inquired  into, 
and  a  want  of  jurisdiction  over  the  person  shown  by  evidence,  and 
have  further  decided  (in  opposition  to  the  holding  of  courts  of  some 
of  the  other  states)  that  this  may  be  done  even  if  it  involves  the 
contradiction  of  a  recital  in  the  judgment-record.  In  stating  the 
reasons  for  this  conclusion,  our  courts  have  founded  it  on  genera! 
principles,  quite  as  applicable  to  domestic  judgments  as  to  others, 
and  save  in  one  case,***  have  in  their  opinions  made  no  discrimina- 
tion between  them.***  When  we  come  to  consider  the  effect  of  these 
authorities,  it  is  difficult  to  find  any  solid  ground  upon  which  to  rest 
a  distinction  between  domestic  judgments  and  judgments  of  sister 
states  in  regard  to  this  question,  for  under  the  provisions  of  the  con- 
stitution of  the  United  States,  which  requires  that  full  faith  and 
credit  shall  be  given  in  each  state  to  the  public  acts,  records,  and 
judicial  proceedings  of  every  other  state,  it  is  now  well  settled  that 
when  a  judgment  of  a  court  of  a  sister  state  is  duly  proved  in  a  court 
of  this  state,  it  is  entitled  here  to  all  the  effect  to  which  it  is  entitled 
in  the  courts  of  the  state  where  rendered.  If  conclusive  there,  it  is 
equally  conclusive  in  all  the  states  of  the  Union ;  and  whatever  pleas 
would  be  good  to  a  suit  thereon  in  the  state  where  rendered,  and 
none  others,  can  be  pleaded  in  any  court  in  the  United  States,*** 
In  holding,  therefore,  that  a  defense  that  the  party  was  not  sensed 
and  did  not  appear,  although  the  record  stated  that  he  did,  was  good, 
our  courts  must  have  held  that  such  was  the  law  of  this  state  and 
the  common  law,  and  consequently  that  in  the  absence  of  proof  of 
any  special  law  to  the  contrary  in  the  state  where  the  judgment  was 
rendered,  it  must  be  presumed  to  be  also  the  law  of  that  state.  The 
judgments  of  our  courts  can  stand  on  no  other  logical  basis.  The 
distinction  which  is  made  in  almost  all  the  other  states  of  the  Union 
between  the  effect  of  domestic  judgments  and  judgments  of  sister 

2  52  Kerr  v.  Kerr.  41  N.  Y.  272. 

283  Citing  Borden  v.  Fltcli,  15  Johns.  121.  8  Am.  Dec.  225;  Starbnck  v. 
Murray.  5  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  148,  21  Am.  Dec.  172;  Koyee  v.  Butler.  6  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  G13,  and  eases  cited. 

264  Citinp  Hampton  v.  McConnel,  3  Wheat.  234,  4  L.  £}d.  378;  Story,  Comm. 
Const.  §  183;  Mills  v.  Duryee,  7  Cranch,  481,  3  L.  Ed.  411. 

(^18) 


Ch.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  275 

states,  in  regard  to  the  conclusiveness  of  the  presumption  of  juris- 
diction over  the  person,  is  sought  to  be  explained  by  saying  that  in 
regard  to  domestic  judgments  the  party  aggrieved  can  obtain  relief 
by  application  to  the  court  in  which  the  judgment  was  rendered,  or 
by  writ  of  error,  whereas  in  the  case  of  a  judgment  rendered  against 
him  in  another  state  he  would  be  obliged  to  go  into  a  foreign  juris- 
diction for  redress,  which  would  be  a  manifestly  inadequate  protec- 
tion; and  therefore  the  constitution  may  be  construed  so  as  to  apply 
only  where  the  persons  affected  by  the  judgment  were  within  the 
operation  of  the  proceeding.  This  explanation,  however,  does  not 
remove  the  difficulty  in  making  the  distinction ;  for  if  there  is  a  con- 
clusive presumption  that  there  was  jurisdiction,  that  presumption 
must  exist  as  well  in  one  case  as  in  the  other.  The  question  whether 
or  not  the  party  is  estopped  cannot  be  made  to  depend  upon  the 
greater  inconvenience  of  getting  rid  of  the  estoppel  in  one  case  than 
in  another.  But  aside  from  this  observation  as  to  the  effect  of  the 
authorities,  an  examination  of  them  shows  that  our  courts  did  in  fact 
proceed  upon  a  ground  common  to  both  classes  of  judgments."  The 
learned  judge  here  proceeds  to  examine  the  New  York  authorities 
at  some  length,  citing  and  quoting  from  those  mentioned  in  the 
margin.^"*  The  pith  of  the  argument  extracted  from  them  (and 
which  is  truly  as  applicable  to  one  class  of  judgments  as  to  the  other) 
is  that,  to  say  that  the  paper  relied  on  is  a  record  because  it  recites 
the  defendant's  appearance,  and  that  he  cannot  deny  the  jurisdiction 
over  him  because  the  paper  is  a  record,  is  reasoning  in  a  vicious  cir- 
cle; and  that  unless  a  court  has  jurisdiction,  it  can  never  make  a 
record,  such  as  to  import  absolute  verity,  and  the  party  ought  not  to 
be  estopped,  by  any  allegation  in  a  supposed  record,  from  proving 
any  fact  which  goes  to  establish  the  truth  of  a  plea  alleging  want  of 
jurisdiction.     The  conclusion  of  the  learned  judge's  investigation  is 

2"5Starbuck  v.  Murray.  5  Wend.  148,  21  Am.  Dec.  172;  Bigelow  v.  Stearns, 
19  Johns.  41,  10  Am.  Dee.  181);  Latham  v.  Edgcrton,  9  Cow.  227;  David  v. 
Packard,  6  Wend.  327;  Bloom  v.  Burdick,  1  Hill,  130,  37  Am.  Dec.  299;  Peo- 
ple V.  Cassels,  5  Hill,  164;  Harrington  v.  People,  6  Barb.  607;  Noyes  v.  But- 
ler, 6  Barb.  613;  Hard  v.  Slilpman,  6  Barb.  621;  Wright  v.  Douglass,  10 
Barb.  97;  Obeniung  Canal  Bank  v.  Judson,  8  N.  Y.  254;  Adams  v.  Saratoga 
&  W.  R.  Co.,  10  N.  Y.  328;  Pendleton  v.  Weed.  17  N.  Y.  75;  Porter  v.  Bron- 
json,  29  How.  Prac.  292. 

(419) 


S   275  hXW  OF  JUDOMBNT3.  (Cfa.  13 

as  follows :  "In  Bolton  v.  Jacks,  6  Rob.  (N.  Y.)  198,  Jones,  J.,  says 
that  it  is  now  conceded,  at  least  in  this  state,  that  want  of  jurisdic- 
tion will  render  void  the  judgment  of  any  court,  whether  it  be  of 
superior  or  inferior,  of  general,  limited,  or  local  jurisdiction,  or  of 
record  or  not,  and  that  the  bare  recital  of  jurisdictional  facts  in  the 
record  of  a  judgment  of  any  court,  whether  superior  or  inferior,  of 
general  or  limited  jurisdiction,  is  not  conclusive,  but  only  prima  facie 
evidence  of  the  truth  of  the  fact  recited,  and  a  party  against  whom 
a  judgment  is  offered  is  not  by  the  bare  fact  of  such  recitals  estopped 
from  showing  by  af&rmative  proof  that  they  were  untrue  and  thus 
rendering  the  judgment  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction.  It  thus  ap- 
pears that  the  current  of  judicial  opinion  in  this  state  is  very  strong 
and  uniform  in  favor  of  the  proposition  stated  by  Jones,  J.,  in  6  Rob. 
(N.  Y.)  198,  and  if  adopted  here  is  decisive  of  the  present  case.  It 
has  not  as  yet,  however,  been  directly  adjudicated,  and  if  sustained 
it  must  rest  upon  the  local  law  of  this  state,  as  it  finds  no  support  in 
adjudications  elsewhere.  There  are  reasons,  however,  founded  upon 
our  system  of  practice,  which  would  warrant  us  in  so  holding.  The 
powers  of  a  court  of  equity  being  vested  in  our  courts  of  law,  and 
equitable  defenses  being  allowable,  there  is  no  reason  why,  to  an  ac- 
tion upon  a  judgment,  the  defendant  should  not  be  permitted  to  set 
up,  by  way  of  defense,  any  matter  which  would  be  ground  of  relief  in 
equity  against  the  judgment ;  and  it  is  conceded  in  those  states  where 
the  record  is  held  conclusive,  that  when  the  judgment  has  been  ob- 
tained by  fraud,  or  without  bringing  the  defendant  into  court,  and 
the  want  of  jurisdiction  does  not  appear  upon  the  face  of  the  record, 
relief  may  be  obtained  in  equity.  The  technical  difficulty  arising: 
from  the  conclusiveness  of  the  record  is  thus  obviated."  A  recent 
case  in  California,  without  going  so  far  as  to  admit  that  it  is  regular 
or  proper  practice  to  permit  the  collateral  impeachment  of  a  judg- 
ment for  want  of  jurisdiction,  yet  holds  that  if  the  party  docs  in  fact 
so  assail  the  judgment,  and  the  result  of  the  investigation  is  the  dis- 
covery that  it  was  not  actually  founded  upon  proper  jurisdiction, 
then  the  nullity  of  the  judgment  must  be  declared,  and  its  conclusive 
effects  done  away  with,  just  as  if  it  were  void  upon  its  face.'** 

"«  HHl  V.  City  Cab  &  Transfer  Co.,  79.  Cal.  188,  21  Pac.  728, 
(420) 


Ch.  13)  COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDOMBNTB*.  }   270 

§  276.    Argwaaentm  on  the  OonolnsiTeiftess  of  Reeordf. 

From  an  examination  of  the  authorities  cited  in  the  preceding 
sections,  it  will  be  discovered  that  many  of  them  have  been  chiefly 
influenced,  in  refusing  to  hear  extraneous  evidence  on  a  plea  of  want 
of  jurisdiction,  by  the  traditional  regard  which  has  always  been 
shown  to  judicial  records.  From  the  earliest  times,  the  written  me- 
morials of  courts  have  been  held  to  import  the  most  absolute  and 
"uncontrollable  verity.''  That  records  "always  speak  the  truth,"  and 
cannot  be  contradicted,  that  they  can  be  tried  only  by  inspection,  and 
are  evidence  of  the  highest  nature,  are  legal  commonplaces  of  almost 
legendary  antiquity.  Yet  if  we  consider  the  present  methods  of  per- 
petuating the  accounts  of  legal  proceedings, — the  loose,  careless,  and 
irregular  manner  in  which  records  are  but  too  often  made  up, — it  is 
difficult  to  find  satisfactory  reasons,  in  the  thing  itself,  for  attributing 
such  sanctity  to  a  judgment-roll.  In  so  far  then  as  this  rule  rests 
only  upon  the  inviolable  character  of  the  record,  it  seems  to  evince 
a  too  superstitious  reverence  for  the  notions  of  the  early  English 
law.  But  there  is  a  broad  and  very  serious  consideration  of  public 
policy  underlying  the  rule,  upon  which  the  best  considered  cases  ul- 
timately base  their  position.  The  stability  of  judicial  records  is 
requisite  for  the  peace  and  comfort  of  society,  and  for  the  protection 
of  all  persons  who  may  deal  with  rights  or  property  in  reliance  upon 
their  conclusiveness.  As  it  has  been  said  by  a  certain  high  court,  if 
judgments  were  always  open  to  collateral  attacks,  they  would  "no 
longer  be  a  final  adjudication  of  the  rights  of  litigants,  but  the  start- 
ing point  from  which  a  new  litigation  would  spring  up ;  acts  of  lim- 
itation would  become  useless  and  nugatory;  purchasers  on  the  faith 
of  judicial  process  would  find  no  protection ;  every  right  established 
by  a  judgment  would  be  insecure  and  uncertain ;  and  a  cloud  would 
rest  upon  every  title."  *°^  Now  while  it  may  be  conceded  that  the 
considerations  here  adduced  are  amply  sufficient  to  sustain  the  rule 
against  impeaching  judgments  collaterally  for  errors  or  irregularities, 
it  is  still  a  question  whether  they  apply  with  equal  force  where  the 
objection  goes  to  the  very  jurisdiction  of  the  court.     But  it  must 

2*T  Lancraster  v.  Wilson,  27  Grat  (Va.)  629, 

(421) 


§    276  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  13 

be  admitted  that  the  necessity  of  protecting  innocent  third  persons, 
who  may  acquire  rights  or  alter  their  legal  relations  on  the  faith 
of  judicial  records,  is  of  grave  importance. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  arguments  for  permitting  want  of  juris- 
diction to  be  shown  collaterally,  may  be  divided  into  two  heads. 
First,  there  is  the  question  of  natural  justice  to  the  individual.  To 
puffer  a  man  to  be  condemned  unheard,  to  permit  him  to  be  deprived 
of  his  property  or  his  rights  by  proceedings  of  which  he  had  no  no- 
tice  or  in  which  he  had  no  opportunity  to  be  heard,  is  repugnant 
to  every  sentiment  of  fairness  and  right  dealing,  as  well  as  wholly 
alien  to  the  spirit  of  our  jurisprudence.  To  sacrifice  the  individual 
to  the  welfare  of  the  community  is  no  doubt  a  very  high  principle  of 
political  ethics,  but  it  is  scarcely  at  home  in  the  body  of  our  law, 
except  in  matters  of  police.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  the  guarantee 
which  the  law  gives  of  the  inviolability  of  every  man's  rights  and 
estate  that  constitutes  its  best  title  to  the  respect  and  confidence 
of  the  people.  True,  it  is  said  that  a  defendant  who  is  injured  by 
the  rendition  of  a  judgment  against  him  without  jurisdiction  of  his 
person,  may  procure  its  reversal  in  an  appellate  court,  or  move  to 
vacate  it  in  the  court  which  rendered  it,  or  go  to  equity  with  an  appli- 
cation for  an  injunction.  But  this  is  no  adequate  safeguard.  These 
remedies  are  often  illusory.  For  it  is  very  possible  that  he  may  remain 
entirely  ignorant  of  the  adjudication  against  him  until  long  after 
his  rights  are  irrevocably  lost.  In  the  second  place,  if  the  court  had 
no  jurisdiction,  its  proceedings  are  void ;  and  if  the  action  of  the  court 
was  void,  its  memorial  of  that  action  is  no  record.  This  argument 
is  put  in  a  very  clear  light  in  an  early  New  York  case,  where  the 
learned  judge,  speaking  of  an  alleged  record,  used  the  following  lan- 
guage: "It  imports  perfect  verity,  it  is  said,  and  the  parties  to  it 
cannot  be  heard  to  impeach  it.  It  appears  to  me  that  this  proposi- 
tion assumes  the  very  fact  to  be  established,  which  is  the  only  ques- 
tion in  issue.  For  what  purpose  does  the  defendant  question  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  court  ?  Solely  to  show  that  its  proceedings  an<l 
judgments  are  void,  and  therefore  the  supposed  record  is  not  in  truth 
a  record.  If  the  defendant  had  not  proper  notice  of,  and  did  not 
appear  to,  the  original  action,  all  the  state  courts,  with  one  excep- 
tion, agree  in  opinion  that  the  paper  introduced  as  to  him  is  no  record ; 
(422) 


Ch.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  277 

but  if  he  cannot  show,  even  against  the  pretended  record,  that  fact, 
on  the  alleged  ground  of  the  uncontrollable  verity  of  the  record,  he  is 
deprived  of  his  defense  by  a  process  of  reasoning  that  is  to  my  mind 
little  less  than  sophistry.  The  plaintiffs  in  effect  dejclare  to  the  de- 
fendant: The  paper  declared  on  is  a  record,  because  it  says  you 
appeared,  and  you  appeared  because  the  paper  is  a  record.  This 
is  reasoning  in  a  circle.  The  appearance  makes  the  record  uncon- 
trollable verity,  and  the  record  makes  the  appearance  an  unimpeach- 
able fact.  The  fact  which  the  defendant  puts  in  issue  is  the  validity 
of  the  record,  and  yet  it  is  contended  that  he  is  estopped  by  the  unim- 
peachable credit  of  that  very  record  from  disproving  any  one  allega- 
tion contained  in  it.  Unless  a  court  has  jurisdiction,  it  can  never 
make  a  record  which  imports  uncontrollable  verity  to  the  party  over 
whom  it  has  usurped  jurisdiction,  and  he  ought  not  therefore  to  be 
estopped,  by  any  allegation  in  that  record,  from  proving  any  fact  that 
goes  to  establish  the  truth  of  a  plea  alleging  want  of  jurisdiction."  ^^^ 
On  the  whole,  therefore,  we  must  conclude  that,  as  a  matter  of 
strict  law  and  logic,  the  authorities  which  permit  the  collateral  im- 
peachment of  judgments  for  want  of  jurisdiction  have  the  better  of 
the  argument;  but  that  the  considerations  of  public  policy  which 
demand  the  conclusiveness  of  the  record  are  of  such  importance 
and  gravity  that  they  will  be  likely  always  to  overbalance  the  claims 
of  strict  legal  consistency, 

§  277.    No  Presumptioift  asainat  tlie  Record. 

The  general  rule,  as  stated,  is  that  every  presumption  will  be  in- 
dulged in  favor  of  the  records  of  superior  courts.  An  important 
corollary  to  this  rule  is  that  there  can  be  no  presumption  against 
the  record.  For  if  the  record  imports  absolute  verity,  its  recitals  must 
be  equally  as  conclusive  when  they  make  against  the  jurisdiction  as 
when  for  it.  If  the  record  is  silent  as  to  jurisdictional  facts,  it  will 
be  aided  by  presumptions.  But  if  it  recites  such  facts,  and  the  facts 
recited  are  not  sufficient  to  confer  jurisdiction,  there  can  be  no  pre- 
sumption that  the  recital  is  incorrect  or  incomplete.^'*     "Where  the 

«»«  Starbuck  v.  Murray,  5  Wend.  148,  21  Am.  Dec.  172. 

S5»  Galpin  v.  Page,  18  Wall.  350,  366,  21  L.  Ed.  950;   Messinger  v.  Kintner. 

(423) 


§    277  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNTS.  (Cb.  13 

existence  of  any  jurisdictional  fact  is  not  affirmed  upon  the  record 
in  a  court  of  superior  jurisdiction,  it  will  be  presumed  upon  a  col- 
lateral attack  that  the  court  acted  correctly  and  with  due  authority, 
and  its  judgment  will  be  as  valid  as  though  every  fact  necessary  to 
jurisdiction  affirmatively  appeared.  But  no  presumptions  in  sup- 
port of  a  judgment  are  allowed  in  opposition  to  any  statement  made 
in  the  record.  •  If  it  appear  that  process  was  served  in  a  particular 
mode,  no  other  and  different  service  can  be  presumed,  for  such  pre- 
sumption would  contradict  the  record,  which  imports  verity."  *••  But 
the  record  must  be  taken  as  a  whole.  And  if  separate  recitals  of 
jurisdictional  facts  are  found  in  different  parts  of  it,  which  may  rea- 
sonably stand  together,  they  must  all  be  considered  together.  And 
if  the  aggregate  of  information  thus  obtained  shows  jurisdiction  right- 
ly attaching,  the  judgment  will  not  be  void,  though  any  one  of  the 
recitals,  taken  alone,  would  not  be  sufficient.***  One  other  possible 
case  remains;  viz.,  where  recitals  in  different  parts  of  the  record 
flatly  contradict  each  other,  and  one  would  show  jurisdiction  and 
the  other  not.  Here,  since  one  recital  must  be  false,  it  seems  rea- 
sonable to  assume  the  truth  of  that  one  which  would  support  the 
jurisdiction.  Thus  in  a  case  in  Iowa,  the  record  stated  in  one  place 
that  the  answer  was  filed  April  8th,  and  in  another  place  that  it  was 
filed  April  i6th ;  and  it  was  presumed,  in  favor  of  the  validity  of  the 
judgment,  that  the  former  statement  was  the  true  one.*** 

4  Bin.  (Pa.)  97;  Blanton  ▼.  Carroll.  86  Va.  530,  10  S.  E.  329:  Penobscot  R. 
Co.  V.  Weeks.  52  Me.  456;  Dillard  v.  Central  Virginia  Iron  Co.,  S2  Va.  734. 
1  S.  E.  124:  Pollard  v.  Wegener,  13  Wis.  500;  Hahn  v.  Kelly.  34  Cat.  391.  W 
Am.  Dec.  742. 

26  0  Heriug  v.  Chambers,  103  Pa.  175;  Ely  v.  Tallraan.  14  Wis.  28.  And 
see  Newman  v.  Growls.  8  C.  C.  A.  577.  60  Fed.  220;  Ultchle  v.  Sayen  {C  C.) 
100  Fed.  520;  Bowler  v.  Ennis,  46  App.  Dlv.  309,  61  N.  Y.  Supp.  686;  Stuyre- 
sant  V.  Well,  41  App.  Dlv.  551.  58  N.  Y.  Supp.  697;  Fowler  v.  Simpson,  79 
Tex.  611,  15  S.  W.  682,  23  Am.  St.  Rep.  370;  Laney  v.  Garbee,  105  Ho.  353, 
16  S.  W.  831,  24  Am.  St.  Rep.  391. 

201  Hahn  v.  Kelly,  34  Cal.  391,  94  Am.  Dec.  742. 

«»2  Conrad  v.  Baldwin.  3  Iowa,  207. 

(424) 


Ch.  13)  COLLATERAL  IHPBACHMCNt  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §   278 


}  278.    Judgmeiit  Toid  on  its  Face  iiiay  be  Attacked  ooUaterally. 

When  the  record  itself  discloses  the  fact  that  the  court  had  no 
jurisdiction  of  the  controversy,  or  that  jurisdiction  of  the  person  of 
the  defendant  did  not  attach  in  the  particular  case,  the  judgment  is 
a  mere  nullity,  and  may  be  collaterally  impeached,  by  any  person 
interested,  whenever  and  Wherever  it  is  brought  in  question.*'* 
Thus  when  the  defendant  against  whom  a  judgment  was  entered  had 
no  notice,  and  that  appears  from  the  proceedings,  the  judgment  is 
void  on  its  face.***  It  is  equally  true  of  want  of  jurisdiction  of  the 
subject-matter.  Orders  and  judgments  which  the  court  has  not  the 
power  under  any  circumstances  to  make  or  render  are  null  and  void, 
and  their  nullity  can  be  asserted  in  any  collateral  proceeding  where 

*•»  Briscoe  v.  Stephens,  2  Bing.  213;  Rogers  v.  Wood,  2  Bam.  &  Adol.  245; 
WTiyte  V.  Rose,  3  Q.  B.  493;  Thompson  v.  Whitman,  18  Wall.  457,-21  L.  Ed. 
897;  Lincoln  v.  Tower,  2  McLean,  473,  Fed.  Oas.  No.  8,355;  Moore  v.  Town 
ConncU  of  Edgefield  (C.  O.)  32  Fed.  498;  Penobscot  R.  Co.  v.  Weeks,  52  Me. 
4o6;  Gay  v.  Smith,  38  N.  H.  171;  Mercler  v.  Chace,  9  Allen  (Mass.)  242;  Bor- 
den V.  Fitch.  15  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  121,  8  Am.  Dec.  225;  Latham  v.  Edgerton,  9 
Cow.  (X.  Y.)  227;  Gage  v.  Hill,  43  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  44;  Fisher  v.  Longnecker,  8 
Pa.  410;  James  ▼.  Smith,  2  S.  C.  183;  Towns  v.  Springer,  9  Ga.  130;  Central 
Bank  v.  Gibson,  11  Ga.  453;  Parish  v.  Parish,  32  Ga.  653;  Campbell  v.  Brown, 
6  How.  (Miss.)  IOC;  Enos  v.  Smith,  7  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  85;  McComb  v. 
Ellett.  8  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  505;  Richardson  v.  Hunter,  23  La.  Ann.  255; 
Edwards  v.  Whited,  29  La.  Ann.  647;  Dorsey  v.  Kendall,  8  Bush  (Ky.)  294; 
Summar  v.  Jarrett,  62  Tenn.  23;  North  v.  Moore,  8  Kan.  143;  Evans  v.  Perci- 
fall,  5  Ark.  424;  Oavanaugh  v.  Smith,  84  Ind.  380;  Bannon  v.  People,  1  111. 
App.  496;  Dicks  v.  Hatch,  10  Iowa,  380;  Bonsall  v.  Isett,  14  Iowa,  309;  Mayo 
V.  Ah  Loy,  32  Cal.  477,  91  Am.  Dec.  595;  McMinn  v.  Whelan,  27  Cal.  300; 
Mnrphy  v.  Lyons,  19  Neb.  689,  28  N.  W.  328;  Furgeson  v.  Jones,  17  Or.  204, 
20  Pac.  842,  3  L.  R.  A.  620,  11  Am.  St.  Rep.  808;  Homer  v.  Doe,  Smith  (Ind.) 
10;  Frankel  v.  Satterfield,  9  Houst.  (Del.)  201,  19  Atl.  898;  Elmendorf  v.  El- 
mendorf.  58  N.  J.  Eq.  113,  44  Atl.  164;  Hinton  v.  Penn  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co., 
126  N.  C.  18,  35  S.  E.  182,  78  Am.  St  Rep.  toO;  Woods  v.  Bryan,  41  S.  C. 
74,  19  S.  E.  218.  44  Am.  St  Rep.  688;  McGehee  v.  Wilkins,  31  Fla.  83,  12 
South.  228;  Jewett  v.  Iowa  Land  Co.,  64  Minn.  531.  07  N.  W.  639,  58  Am. 
St  Rep.  555;  Duxbury  v.  Dahle,  78  Minn.  427,  81  N.  W.  198,  79  Am.  St.  Rep. 
408;  0*Malley  v.  Frlcke,  104  Wis.  280,  80  N.  W.  436;  Junkans  v.  Bergin,  64 
Cal.  208,  30  Pae.  627;  Smith  v.  Los  Angeles  &  P.  R.  Ck).  (Oal.)  34  Pac.  242; 
Pioneer  I-and  Co.  v.  Maddux,  109  Cal.  633,  42  Pac.  295,  50  Am.  St  Rep.  67. 

2«*  Farmers'  Loan  &  T.  Co.  v.  McKInney,  6  Mcl.win,  1,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  4,667; 
Bruce  v.  CI  out  man,  45  N.  H.  37,  84  Am.  Dec.  111. 

(425) 


§   278  ULW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  13 

they  are  relied  on  in  support  of  a  claim  of  right.*'*  But  it  must  be 
remarked  that  a  want  of  jurisdiction  seldom,  if  ever,  appears  on  the 
face  of  a  judgment  except  in  the  insufficiency  of  the  jurisdictional 
recitals.  "What  do  the  cases  mean,"  asks  the  supreme  court  of  Cal- 
ifornia, "when  they  speak  of  a  want  of  jurisdiction  appearing  upon 
the  face  of  the  record?  Do  they  mean  a  positive  and  direct  state- 
ment to  the  effect  that  something  which  must  have  been  done,  in  order 
to  give  the  court  jurisdiction,  was  not  done?  Or  do  they  mean  that 
a  want  of  jurisdiction  appears  whenever  what  was  done  is  stated,  and 
which,  having  been  done,  was  not  sufficient  in  law  to  give  the  court 
jurisdiction?  If  the  former,  they  are  a  delusion.  For  we  venture 
to  say  that  no  case  can  be  found,  or  will  arise  hereafter,  where  the 
conditions  contemplated  by  such  a  rule  will  be  found  to  exist.  No 
court  has  ever  yet  so  far  stultified  itself  as  to  render  a  judgment 
against  a  defendant,  and  at  the  same  time  deliberately  state  that  it 
had  not  acquired  jurisdiction  over  his  person."  *•*  In  the  generality 
of  cases,  therefore,  a  judgment  will  be  void  on  its  face  only  where  the 
record  recites  the  jurisdictional  facts  (for  if  it  is  silent  jurisdiction 
will  be  presumed),  and  the  facts  as  so  recited  are  plainly  insufficient 
to  have  conferred  jurisdiction. 

It  is  also  to  be  remarked  that  there  is  a  clear  distinction  between 
those  facts  which  involve  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  over  the  par- 
ties and  the  subject-matter,  and  those  quasi  jurisdictional  facts,  with- 
out allegation  of  which  the  court  cannot  be  set  in  motion,  and  with- 
out proof  of  which  a  decree  should  not  be  pronounced.  In  the  ab- 
sence of  the  former,  the  judgment  of  the  court  is  void  and  may  be 
attacked  in  collateral  proceedings,  while,  in  respect  to  the  latter,  it  is 
conclusive,  and  cannot  be  questioned  except  on  a  direct  proceed- 
ing.^" 

205  Withers  v.  Patterson,  27  Tex.  401.  86  Am.  Dec.  043;  J.  B.  Watkio* 
I^^nd  Mortg.  Co.  v.  MuHen,  8  Kan.  App.  705,  54  Pac.  921;  Beaudrot  v.  Mur- 
phy. 53  S.  0.  118,  30  S.  E.  825. 

266  Hahn  v.  Kelly,  34  Cal.  :i91.  VH  Am.  Dec.  742. 

267  Relnach  v.  Atiantlc  &  G.  W.  R.  CJo.  (C.  C.)  58  Fed.  Sa. 

(42G) 


Ch.  13)  COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  279 


§  279.    Superior  Courts  ejEeroislns  Special  Statutory  Poirere* 

m 

So  far  we  have  confined  our  attention  to  the  presumptions  of  juris- 
diction in  the  case  of  a  superior  court  exercising  its  ordinary  com- 
mon law  powers.  It  remains  to  speak  of  the  exercise  of  peculiar 
statutory  powers,  and  then  of  the  judgments  of  inferior  tribunals. 
And  first,  it  is  an  established  rule  that  when  a  court  of  general  juris- 
diction has  special  and  statutory  powers  conferred  upon  it,  which  are 
wholly  derived  from  statute,  and  not  exercised  according  to  the 
course  of  the  common  law,  or  are  not  part  of  its  general  jurisdiction, 
it  is  to  be  regarded  as  quoad  hoc  an  inferior  or  limited  court,  and 
its  judgments  to  be  treated  accordingly,  that  is,  its  jurisdiction  must 
appear  on  the  record  and  cannot  be  presumed.***  It  is  said,  in  a 
New  Hampshire  decision,  that  whenever  a  tribunal  possesses  quali- 
fied and  limited  powers,  authorizing  them  to  act  in  certain  specified 
cases  only,  and  by  special  modes  of  proceeding,  and  the  law  has  pro- 
vided no  mode  by  which  these  proceedings  can  be  revised,  then  the 
proceedings  may  be  impeached  collaterally  by  showing  that  the  court 
or  magistrates  have  acted  in  a  case  where  they  have  no  jurisdiction, 
or  by  modes  of  procedyre  which  they  are  not  authorized  to  adopt.*** 
The  same  principle,  under  a  slightly  different  aspect,  is  stated  in  a 
Connecticut  case  as  follows:    Where  a  statute  confers  upon  a  tri- 

2««Tbatcher  v.  Powell,  6  Wheat.  119,  5  L.  Ed.  221;  Secombe  v.  MUwaukee 
&  St.  P.  R-  Co.,  23  Wall.  108,  23  L.  Ed.  67;  Murray  v.  American  Surety  Co., 
17  C.  C.  A.  138,  70  Fed.  341;  Warren  v.  Union  Bank,  157  N.  Y.  259,  51  N.  E. 
1(136,  43  L.  R.  A.  256,  68  Am.  St.  Rep.  777;  Morse  v.  Presby,  25  N.  H.  299; 
Carleton  r.  Wasliln^ton  Ins.  Co.,  35  N.  H.  162;  Town  of  Huntington  v.  Town 
of  Charlotte,  15  Vt.  46;  Striker  v.  Kelly,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.)  24;  Denning  v.  Corwin, 
11  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  647;  Smith  v.  Fowle.  12  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  9;  Embury  v.  Con- 
ner, 3  N.  Y.  511,  53  Am.  Dec.  325;  Shivers  v.  Wilson,  5  Har.  &  J.  (Md.)  130, 
9  Am.  Dec.  497;  Gunn  v.  Howell,  27  Ala.  663,  62  Am.  Dec.  785;  Foster  v. 
Glazener,  27  Ala.  391;  Mitchell  v.  Runkle,  25  Tex.  Supp.  132;  Earthman's 
Admr*8  v.  Jones,  2  Yercj.  (Tenn.)  493;  Barry  v.  Patterson,  3  Humph.  (Tenn.) 
313;  Edmiston  v.  Edmlston,  2  Ohio.  251;  Ludlow's  Heirs  v.  Johnston,  3  Ohio, 
553.  17  Am.  Dec.  609;  Adams*  Lessee  v.  Jeflfries,  12  Ohio,  253,  40  Am.  Dec. 
477;  Cone  v.  Cotton,  2  Blackf.  (Ind.)  82;  Cooper  v.  Sunderland,  3  Iowa,  114, 
C6  Am.  Dec.  52;  Wight  v.  Warner,  1  Doug.  (Mich.)  384;  Xorthcut  v.  Leni- 
ery,  8  Or.  317;  Furgeson  v.  Jones,  17  Or.  204,  110  Pac.  842,  3  L.  R.  A.  620, 
11  Am.  St.  Rep.  808. 

s«<»  Sanborn  v.  Fellows,  22  N.  H.  473,  489. 

(427) 


§279  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   13 

bunal  of  limited  and  statutory  jurisdiction  a  special  power,  to  be  ex- 
ercised under  particular  circumstances  and  in  a  particular  manner, 
it  is  indispensable  to  the  valid  exercise  of  the  power  that  such  cir- 
cumstances exist  at  the  time  and  that  the  court  proceed  in  the  exact 
manner  prescribed;  and  where  the  record  of  such  court  finds  the 
existence  of  those  circumstances,  and  that  su^h  manner  of  proceed- 
ing was  adopted,  the  finding  is  only  prima  facie  proof  of  those  facts 
and  they  may  be  disproved  by  parol  evidence.^^^  But  the  most 
satisfactory  and  reasonable  statement  of  the  rule  that  we  have  en- 
countered in  the  books  is  expressed  by  the  court  of  appeals  of  Vir- 
ginia, in  the  following  language :  "When  a  court  of  general  jurisdic- 
tion has  conferred  upon  it  special  powers  by  special  statute,  and  such 
special  powers  are  exercised  judicially,  that  is,  according  to  the 
course  of  the  common  law  and  proceedings  in  chancery,  such  judg- 
ment cannot  be  impeached  collaterally.  But  where  a  court  of  gen- 
eral jurisdiction  has  conferred  upon  it  special  and  summary  powers, 
wholly  derived  from  statutes,  and  which  do  not  belong  to  it  as  a  court 
of  general  jurisdiction,  and  when  such  powers  are  not  exercised  ac- 
cording to  the  course  of  the  common  law,  its  action  being  ministerial 
only  and  not  judicial,  in  such  case  its  decision  must  be  regarded  and 
treated  like  those  of  courts  of  limited  and  special  jurisdiction,  and 
no  such  presumption  of  jurisdiction  will  attend  the  judgment  of  the 
court.  But  in  such  cases  the  facts  essential  to  the  exercise  of  the 
special  jurisdiction  must  appear  upon  the  face  of  the  record."  *^* 
But  we  must  guard  against  the  supposition  that  everything  beside  an 
ordinary  adversary  proceeding  is  of  this  special  and  statutory  char- 
acter. For  example,  a  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  judgment  is  a 
familiar  common-law  security,  and  the  fact  that  the  mode  of  pro- 
cedure, in  entering  judgment  thereon,  is  regulated  by  a  statute  does 
not  convert  the  proceeding  into  one  of  such  a  special  character  that 
the  same  presumptions  do  not  obtain  as  in  the  case  of  any  ordinary 
judgment.^'*     So  the  proceeding  by  writ  of  ad  quod  damnum  to  as- 

aio  Sears  v.  Terry,  26  Ck)nu.  273. 

2T1  Pulaski  Co.  V.  Stuart,  28  Grat  872.  And  see  Harrey  v.  Tyler,  2  Wall. 
^^42.  17  L.  Ed.  871;   Galpin  v.  Page,  18  WaU.  350,  21  L.  Ed.  959. 

27  2  Bush  V.  Hanson,  70  111.  480.  The  same  Is  true  of  proceedings  com- 
meneod  by  attaehment  Van  Wageuen  v.  Oarpenter,  27  Colo.  444,  61  Pac. 
(428) 


Ch.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  281 

sess  damages  for  land  taken  under  its  charter  by  a  turnpike  company 
is  not  in  derogation  of  the  common  law.^^*  Where  the  action  is 
one  for  the  collection  of  delinquent  taxes,  there  is  much  difference 
of  opinion  as  to  whether  or  not  the  court  exercises  its  jurisdiction 
in  a  special  or  summary  manner,  the  majority  of  the  cases  inclining 
to  the  opinion  that  judgments  in  tax  cases  are  not  entitled  to  the 
same  presumptions  which  attend  ordinary  judgments  at  law,  but  that 
all  the  facts  essential  to  the  jurisdiction  must  appear  on  the  face  of 
the  record.*'* 

§  280.    Smnmary    Proeeedins** 

It  is  well  settled  that  a  judgment  in  a  summary  proceeding  must 
show  upon  its  face  everything  that  is  necessary  to  sustain  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court  rendering  it.*'*  Thus,  in  a  judgment  on  motion 
against  a  tax-collector  and  his  sureties,  rendered  by  nil  dicit,  the 
judgment  entry  must  show  the  liability  of  the  defendants  for  the  debt 
or  penalty  sought  to  be  recovered,  and  that  the  facts  were  proved 
necessary  to  give  the  court  jurisdiction.*'' 

§  281.    Conatr votive  8«rrlo«  of  Process* 

Whether  a  proceeding  in  which  service  of  process  is  made  upon  a 
non-resident  defendant  by  publication  of  the  summons,  or  attacn- 
ment  of  his  property,  without  an  appearance  by  him,  is  entitled  to 
be  supported  by  the  ordinary  presumptions  of  the  rightful  acquisi- 
tion of  jurisdiction  by  superior  courts,  is  a  question  of  much  impor- 
tance, but  upon  which  the  authorities  are  by  no  means  agreed.    A 

U98.  Compare  Mentzer  v.  Ellison,  7  Colo.  App.  315,  43  Pac.  464;  Star  Brew- 
erj  V.  Otto,  G3  III.  App.  40.  And  of  an  action  in  partition.  Nickrans  v. 
Wilk.  161  III.  76.  43  N.  E.  741.  Probate  courts,  though  their  authority  to 
appoint  guardians  for  insane  persons,  to  confirm  the  adoption  of  a  child, 
and  the  like,  is  derived  from  statute,  yet  exercise  a  general  jurisdiction  in 
such  matters,  and  their  orders  and  judgments  therein  are  upheld  by  the 
usual  presamptions  of  validity.  McKenzie  v.  Donnell,  151  Mo.  431,  52  S. 
W.  214;   Crocker  v.  Balch,  104  Tenn.  6,  55  S.  W.  307. 

2TS  NolensTille  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Quimby,  8  Humph.  (Tenn.)  476. 

2T*  See  Black,  Tax  Titles  (2d  Ed.)  §  178,  and  the  cases  there  cited. 

275  Crockett  v.  Parklson,  3  Cold.  (Tenn.)  219;  Haynes  v.  Gates,  2  Head, 
(Tenn.)  598. 

27 «  Graham  v.  Reynolds,  45  Ala.  578^ 

(429) 


§    281  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  13 

majority  of  the  earlier  cases  hold  that  such  proceedings  are  contrar>- 
to  the  course  of  the  common  law,  are  wholly  dependent  for  their 
validity  upon  an  exact  compliance  with  the  statutes  authorizing  them, 
are  to  be  strictly  scrutinized,  and  therefore,  within  the  rule  just  stated, 
are  not  favored  with  any  presumption  unless  the  record  does  af- 
firmatively show  that  everything  necessary  to  the  jurisdiction  was 
actually  and  rightly  done.*''  A  very  eminent  judge  has  said  that 
whenever  "it  appears  from  an  inspection  of  the  record  of  a  court  of 
general  jurisdiction  that  the  defendant,  against  whom  a  personal  de- 
cree or  judgment  is  rendered,  was,  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  seizure, 
without  the  territorial  Umits  of  the  court,  and  thus  beyond  the  reach 
of  its  process,  and  that  he  never  appeared  in  the  action,  the  presump- 
tion of  jurisdiction  over  his  person  ceases,  and  the  burden  of  estab- 
lishing the  jurisdiction  is  cast  upon  the  party  who  invokes  the  bene- 
fit or  protection  of  the  judgment  or  decree."  *'•  But  on  the  other 
hand,  most  of  the  later  decisions  contend, — and  with  much  show  of 
reason, — ^that  such  a  rule  is  arbitrary  and  illogical.  For,  say  they, 
the  court  is  none  the  less  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction  because  in 
this  instance  the  legislature  prescribes  a  special  mode  for  the  exercise 
of  its  powers.  The  process  is  special  and  statutory,  but  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  court  depends  upon  the  constitution  or  general  laws. 
And  the  presumption  in  favor  of  the  validity  of  judgments  rests  upon 
considerations  of  public  policy,  and  upon  the  high  character  of  tl« 
courts  of  record,  and  the  fact  that  the  judges  are  men  learned  and 
skilled  in  the  law, — reasons  which  are  not  affected  by  the  circum- 
stance that  in  the  cases  supposed  a  peculiar  method  of  executing^ 
their  process  is  adopted.  According  to  this  view,  in  cases  of  con- 
structive service,  the  record,  if  silent  or  incomplete,  should  be  aidcil 
by  the  same  presumptions  which  obtain  in  the  case  of  ordinary  judg- 
ments founded  upon  personal  service.^'*    Thus,  it  is  not  nccessar}. 

2TT  Galpin  V.  Page,  18  Wall.  350,  21  L.  Ed.  9wj0;  Xeflf  t.  Pennoyer,  3  Sawy. 
•J08,  Fed.  Cas.  Xo.  10,0S3;  Gray  v.  Larrimoi-e.  2  Abb.  U.  S.  W2,  Fed.  Cas.  Nu. 
5,7-Jl;  Brownfield  v.  Dyer,  7  Bush  (Ky.)  505;  Hallett  v.  Rlghters,  13  Hu». 
Prac.  (X.  Y.)  43;  Boyland  v.  Boyland,  18  IlL  552.  And  see  Schlssel  v.  Dick- 
son, 129  Ind.  139,  28  X.  fi.  540;  Wlnnlngham  v.  Tnieblood,  149  Mo.  572.  51 
S.  W.  399;   Fowler  v.  Lewis*  Adm'r,  36  W.  Va.  112,  14  S.  E.  447. 

»78  GalpiQ  T.  Page,  18  Wall.  3(H.  21  L.  Ed.  959.  per  Field,  J. 

2T9  Kqwler'B  Heirs  v.  White.  27  Tex.  250;  Stewart  v.  Anderson,  70  Tex. 
(130) 


Ch.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDQMBNTS.  §  282 

in  order  to  support  a  judgment  on  service  by  publication,  to  show 
that  an  affidavit  for  publication  was  made,  since  the  law  will  presume 
that  much  in  aid  of  the  judgment.-*®  Nor  will  the  judgment  be 
open  to  collateral  impeachment  although  the  affidavit  was  defective, 
insufficient,  or  false.^** 

I  282.    Judsnteats  of  Inferior  Courts  not  aided  hj  Prefnmptionf« 

In  respect  to  the  subject  now  under  discussion,  there  is  a  funda- 
mental distinction  between  superior  and  inferior  courts.  In  the  case 
of  judgments  rendered  by  the  latter,  the  rules  already  stated  as  ap- 
plying to  the  former  are  directly  reversed.**^  Courts  of  inferior  or 
limited  powers  must  not  only  act  within  the  scope  of  their  jurisdic- 
tion, but  it  must  appear  on  the  face  of  their  proceedings  that  they  so 
acted ;  the  record  or  minutes  or  papers  in  the  case  must  affirmatively 
show  the  existence  of  every  fact  necessary  to  give  jurisdiction  in  the 
particular  cause ;  otherwise  the  judgment  may  be  impeached  collat- 
erally, no  presumptions  are  indulged  in  its  support,  and  want  of 
jurisdiction  may  be  shown  by  evidence  aliunde.^**     "Where  one  seeks 

588,  8  S.  W.  295;  Buse  v.  Bartlett.  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  335,  21  S.  W.  52;  Hams 
V.  Root,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  413.  55  S.  W.  411;  Gemmell  v.  Rice,  13  Minn.  400 
(GIL  371);  Hahn  v.  Kelly,  34  Cal.  391.  94  Am.  Dec.  742;  Nash  v.  Church.  10 
Wis.  312,  78  Am.  Dec.  678;  Thorns  v.  King,  95  Tenn.  60,  31  S.  W.  983;  Hun- 
ter v.  Ruff,  47  8.  C.  525,  25  S.  E.  05,  58  Am.  St  Rep.  907;  Bank  of  Colfax 
V.  Richardson,  34  Or.  518,  54  Pac.  359,  75  Am.  St.  Rep.  664;  Co-operative 
Savhigs  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Mcintosh,  105  Iowa,  697,  75  N.  W.  520;  Hoagland 
T.  Hoagland,  19  Utah,  103,  57  Pac.  20. 

««oiiams  V.  Root,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  413^  55  S.  W.  411;  Hardy  v.  Beaty, 
W  Tex.  562,  19  S.  W.  778,  31  Am.  St  Rep.  80. 

2«x  Stevens  v.  Reynolds.  143  Ind.  467,  41  N.  E.  931,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  422; 
Langhlin  v.  Vogelsong,  5  Ohio  Oir.  Ot  407;  Chrlstofferson  v.  Pfennig,  10 
Wash.  491.  48  Pac.  2(M. 

««2  See,  supra,  §§  270-273. 

«»»  Harris  v.  Willis,  15  C.  B.  710;  Turner  v.  Bank  of  North  America.  4 
Dall.  11,  1  L.  Ed.  718;  Kempe  v.  Kennedy,  5  Cranch,  173,  3  L.  Ed.  70;  Craw- 
ford V.  Howard,  30  Me.  422;  Walbridge  v.  Hall,  3  Vt  114;  Nye  v.  Kellara, 
18  Vt  591;  Smith  v.  Rice.  11  Mass.  513;  Sayles  v.  Briggs,  4  Mete.  (Mass.) 
421;  Wells  t.  Stevens,  2  Gray  (Mass.)  115;  Hendrick  v.  Whittemore,  105 
Mass.  23;  Henry  v.  Estes,  127  Mass.  474;  Hall  v.  Howd,  10  Conn.  514,  27 
Am.  Dec.  696;  Powers  v.  People,  4  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  292;  Simons  v.  De  Bare, 
4  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  547;  Wlckes'  Lessee  v.  Caulk,  5  Har.  &  J.  (Md.)  36;  Clark 
V.  Bryan,  16  Md.  171;  Harvey  v.  Huggins,  2  Bailey  (S.  C.)  267;  Gray  v.  Mc- 

(431) 


§   282  LAW  OP  JUDGMSNTS.  (C3l«  13 

to  enforce  the  judgment  of  a  court  of  limited  and  special  jurisdiction, 
its  organization  is  open  to  inquiry,  and  its  jurisdiction  must  be  estab- 
lished." ^**    There  are  general  expressions  iij  the  books  which  seem 
to  indicate  that,  unless  the  jurisdiction  of  an  inferior  court  appears 
fully  and  affirmatively  on  the  record  of  its  proceedings,  the  judgment 
will  be  absolutely  void.     And  in  that  case  there  could  be  no  question 
of  introducing  extraneous  evidence  either  to  support  or  contradict  it. 
It  has  been  held,  in  fact,  that  evidence  extrinsic  to  the  record  cannot 
supply  facts  requisite  to  the  jurisdiction.'*^     But  while  it  is  undoubt- 
edly the  rule  that,  the  record  of  such  a  court  being  silent  on  the  sub- 
ject  or  defective  in  its  showings,  there  is  no  presumption  to  aid  it, — 
while  we  may  even  concede  that  under  such  circumstances  it  would 
be  presumptively  invalid, — ^there  seems  to  be  no  good  reason  for  re- 
fusing to  hear  proper  evidence  tending  to  show  actual  jurisdiction. 
And  in  some  of  the  states  the  decisions  are  positive  to  the  effect  that 
jurisdictional  requisites  may  be  shown  by  outside  evidence,  except  in 
the  case  of  those  facts  which  the  law  expressly  directs  the  court  to 
spread  upon  its  records.'**     It  is  further  to  be  remarked  that  al- 
though a  court  may  be  an  inferior  or  limited  tribunal,  yet  if  it  has 
general  jurisdiction  of  any  one  subject,  its  proceedings  and  judgments 
in  respect  to  that  subject  will  be  sustained  by  the  same  liberal  pre- 
sumptions as  to  jurisdiction  which  obtain  in  the  case  of  the  superior 
courts.**^ 

Neal,  12  Ga.  424;  Rutherford  v.  Crawford,  53  Ga.  138;  State  ▼.  Bay.  43  Ala. 
C<>8;  Steen  v.  Steen,  25  Miss.  513;  Horau  v.  Wabrenberper,  9  Tex.  313,  58  Am. 
Dec.  145;  Adams  v.  Tiernan,  5  Dana  (Ky.)  3^;  Hamilton  t.  Burum,  3  Ter^. 
(Tenn.)  355;  State  v.  Gacbenbelmer,  30  Ind.  63;  Xewman  ▼.  Mannins*  89 
lud.  422;  State  y.  Berry,  12  Iowa,  58;  Cooper  v.  Sunderland,  3  Iowa,  114,  66 
Am.  Dec.  52;  Bersch  v.  Schneider,  27  Mo.  101;  State  v.  Metzger,  26  Mo.  65; 
Ctiandler  v.  Nash.  5  Mich.  400;  Beaudrias  v.  Hogan.  16  App.  DIt.  38,  44  N. 
y.  Siipp.  785;  Cockley  v.  Rehr,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ot.  R.  343;  McGehee  t.  WUklns. 
31  Fla.  83,  12  South.  228;  Williams  v.  AMiltaker,  110  N.  C.  393,  14  S.  E.  ^24: 
Wilkerson  v.  Schoonmaker.  77  Tex.  615.  14  S.  W.  223,  19  Am.  St  Rep.  808; 
In  re  Central  Irr.  Dlst..  117  Cal.  382,  49  Pac.  354;  Ohaddock  v.  Barry,  93  Mich. 
542,  53  N.  W.  785. 

2  84  Crawford  v.  Howard,  30  Me.  422. 

288  Anderson  v.  Binford,  61  Tenn.  310. 

286  Jolley  V.  Foltz,  34  Cal.  321;  Van  Deusen  ▼.  Sweet,  51  N.  Y.  881;  Beau- 
drias V.  Hogan,  23  App.  Dlv.  83,  48  N.  Y.  Supp.  468. 

2  87  Moffltt  V.  Moffitt.  GO  lU.  041. 

(432) 


Cb.    13)  COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §    283 


I  283.    Superior  and  Inferior  Courts  distinsuished* 

To  draw  a  clear  line  of  demarcation  between  superior  and  inferior 
courts  is  rendered  almost  impossible  by  the  great  differences  in  the 
judicial  systems  of  the  several  states,  as  also  by  the  fact  that  courts 
possessing  similar  powers  are  very  differently  regarded  in  different 
states.     Practically,  the  question,  in  regard  to  any  specific  court,  must 
be  determined  by  the  laws  and  decisions  of  the  jurisdiction  where  it 
exists.     But  it  has  several  times  been  attempted  to  formulate  a  dis- 
tinction in  general  terms,  and  such  expressions,  though  necessarily 
vague,  may  be  of  some  assistance  in  prosecuting  the  inquiry.     The 
United  States  supreme  court,  at  an  early  day,  observed  that  "the  true 
line  of  distinction  between  courts  whose  decisions  are  conclusive  if 
not  removed  to  an  appellate  court,  and  those  whose  proceedings  are 
nullities  if  their  jurisdiction  does  not  appear  on  their  face,  is  this, — z 
court  which  is  competent  by  its  constitution  to  decide  on  its  own 
jurisdiction,  and  to  exercise  it  to  a  final  judgment,  without  setting 
forth  in  their  proceedings  the  facts  and  evidence  on  which  it  is  ren- 
dered, whose  record  is  absolute  verity,  not  to  be  impugned  by  aver- 
ment or  proof  to  the  contrary,  is  of  the  first  description ;  there  can  be 
no  judicial  inspection  behind  the  judgment  save  by  appellate  power.    A 
court  which  is  so  constituted  that  its  judgment  can  be  looked  through 
for  the  facts  and  evidence  which  are  necessary  to  sustain  it,  whose 
decision  is  not  evidence  of  itself  to  show  jurisdiction  and  its  lawful 
exercise,  is  of  the  latter  description ;   every  requisite  for  either  must 
appear  on  the  face  of  their  proceedings,  or  they  are  nullities."  **®    But 
this,  it  will  be  perceived,  does  not  so  much  answer  the  question  as 

288  Grlgnon  v.  Astor,  2  How.  319,  341,  11  L.  Ed.  283,  per  Baldwin,  J.  See, 
also,  Kempe  v.  Kenuedy,  5  Cranch,  185,  3  L.  Ed.  70;  Hahn  v.  KeUy,  34  Cal. 
391,  94  Am.  Dec.  742.  ''What  tests  are  to  be  applied  in  determining  tlie  ques- 
tion of  inferiority?  It  may  be  solved  by  showing  that  the  court  is  either 
placed  under  the  supervisorj-  or  appellate  control  of  those  named,  or  that 
the  jurisdiction  conferred  upon  it  is  limited  and  confined.  Conceding  that 
the  act  in  question  does  not  place  the  court  which  it  creates  under  the  super- 
visory control  of  the  circuit  court,  and  only  allows  appeals  and  writs  of  error 
to  be  prosecuted  directly  to  the  supreme  court,  yet  it  will  still  be  an  inferior 
tribunal  if  its  Jurisdiction  is  limited  and  inferior.  (leneral  jurlsdietiou  is 
that  which  extends  to  a  great  variety  of  matters.  Limited  Jurisdiction,  also 
1  LAW  JUDG.-28  (433) 


§    283  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Cll.    13 

State  it  in  new  terms.  We  must  conclude  that  the  difference  between 
superior  and  inferior  courts  is  one  of  relative  rank  and  authority  and 
not  of  intrinsic  quality.  Nor  will  the  common  distinction  between 
"courts  of  record"  and  "courts  not  of  record"  aid  us  in  framing  a  gen- 
eral rule,  because  a  particular  tribunal  may  be  regarded  in  one  state 
as  a  record  court  while  an  exactly  similar  court  in  another  state  will 
not  possess  that  character.  In  all  the  states  there  are  courts  hav- 
ing original  jurisdiction  of  every  (or  nearly  every)  species  of  action 
or  proceeding  known  to  the  common  law,  unlimited  in  respect  to 
the  amount  or  the  character  of  the  controversy.  And  these  are  un- 
questionably "superior"  courts  within  the  meaning  of  the  rule.  And 
the  same  is  true  of  courts  possessing  general  equity  powers.  In  most 
of  the  states  there  are  certain  tribunals  whose  authority  is  wholly 
derived  from  statute,  who  are  authorized  to  take  cognizance  only  of 
a  particular  class  of  actions  or  proceedings,  or  to  act  only  in  certain 
specified  circumstances,  whose  course  of  procedure  is  precisely  mark- 
ed out,  and  whose  minutes  or  memorials  are  not  dignified  with  the 
character  of  a  record.  And  these  are  undoubtedly  "inferior"  courts 
within  the  meaning  of  the  rule.  But  between  these  two  classes  lie 
a  considerable  number  of  courts,  whose  jurisdiction  has  a  maximum 
money-limit,  or  which  have  general  jurisdiction  of  a  special  class  of 
cases,  or  are  otherwise  differentiated  from  both  the  foregoing  types. 
And  as  to  these  it  is  useless  to  attempt  a  universal  classification.     We 

called  specific  aud  inferior,  is  that  which  extends  only  to  certain  specified 
causes."     State  v.  Daniels,  66  Mo.  200. 

A  court  of  record  which  has,  by  statute,  all  the  power  that  any  court  could 
hare  over  a  certain  subject  of  Jurisdiction,  especially  if  It  be  a  subject  of 
Jurisdiction  under  the  general  rules  of  law  or  equity,  is  to  be  regarded  (as 
to  cases  within  that  class)  as  a  court  of  superior  Jurisdiction,  within  the  role 
which  presumes  the  Jiu'isdiction  of  such  courts  to  render  a  particular  Jud|c- 
nient.  Stahl  v.  Mitchell,  41  Minn.  325,  43  N.  W.  385.  And  see  Gridley  v.  Col- 
lege of  St.  Francis  Xavier,  137  N.  Y.  327.  33  N.  E.  321. 

"A  tiibunal  which  is  not  a  common  law  court,  which  does  not  prix-eed 
according  to  the  course  of  the  common  law,  a  newly  created,  limited,  and 
special  Jurisdiction  from  which  no  appeal  is  allowed  by  statute,  nor  writ  of 
error  b^'  the  comuiou  law,  yet  determining  In  a  summary  way  the  most  ini« 
poitaut  rights  aud  franchises,  both  as  respects  the  people  and  private  per- 
sons,  is  and  cannot  be  otherwise  than  an  inferior  tribunal  in  the  strk'^test 
sense  of  the  word."    Cunningham  v.  Squires,  2  W.  Va.  422,  dS  Am.  Dec  77U. 

(434) 


Ch.  13)  COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OP  JUnGVVTS.  §   284 

shall  proceed  to  ascertain  how  these  courts  are  regarded  in  the  sev- 
eral states. 

§  284.    Prolmte  Courts. 

In  Pennsylvania,  the  orphans'  court  is  a  court  of  record  of  equal 
dignity  with  the  common  law  tribunals,  and  its  decrees,  as  to  matters 
within  its  jurisdiction,  are  conclusive  on  parties  and  privies  against 
all  collateral  attack  and  impeachment  except  for  fraud. "*•  In  Ohio, 
the  probate  courts  are  in  the  fullest  sense  courts  of  record ;  they  be- 
long to  the  class  whose  records  import  absolute  verity,  that  are  com- 
petent to  decide  on  their  own  jurisdiction,  and  to  fexercise  it  to  final 
judgment,  without  setting  forth  the  facts  and  evidence  on  which  it  is 
rendered.'®^  In  Missouri  also,  the  judgments  and  orders  of  probate 
courts,  in  matters  within  their  jurisdiction,  have  the  same  import  of 
verity  as  those  of  courts  of  general  jurisdiction,  and,  like  them,  are 
not  to  be  impeached  in  collateral  proceedings.'*^  And  the  same  rule 
obtains  in  Illinois,'*^  in  Louisiana,'**'  in  South  Dakota,'**  in  Ver- 
mont,'*^ in  Alabama,'*®  in  Arkansas,'*^  in  Minnesota,'*®  and  in  Cal- 
ifornia.'** In  Texas,  it  seems  to  have  been  held  at  one  time  that 
the  proceedings  of  a  probate  court  must  show  every  fact  necessary 
to  give  jurisdiction,  and  could  not  be  sustained  by  any  presumption 

2«o  McPherson  v.  Cunliff,  11  Serg.  &  R.  422,  14  Am.  Dec.  642;  Mussleman's 
Appeal,  65  Pa.  485;  Lex's  Appeal,  97  Pa.  289;  Ferguson  v.  Yard,  164  Pa. 
586,  30  Atl.  517. 

2»o  Shroyer  v.  Richmond,  16  Ohio  St  455;  Woodward  v.  Curtis.  19  Ohio  Clr. 
Ct  R.  15;   State  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ellison  (C.  C.)  75  Fed.  354. 

*»i  Camden  v.  Plain,  91  Mo.  117,  4  S.  W.  86;  Johnson  v.  Beazley,  65  Mo. 
250,  27  Am.  Rep.  276. 

»»2  People  v.  Medai-t,  106.111.  348,  46  N.  E.  1095;  Paulllssen  v.  Loock,  38 
111.  App.  510. 

«»3  Grevemberg  v.  Bradford.  44  La.  Ann.  400.  10  South.  786. 

2»4  Matson  v.  Swenson,  5  S.  D.  191,  58  N.  W.  570. 

*»5  Doolittle  V.  llolton,  28  Vt.  819,  67  Am.  Dec.  745. 

*»•  Key  V.  Vaughn,  15  Ala.  497;  Arnett's  Ex*r  v.  Arnett,  33  Ala.  273;  Duck- 
worth V.  Duckworth's  Adm'r,  35  Ala.  70. 

2»"  Osborne  v.  Graham,  30  Ark.  67. 

»»»  Dayton  v.  Mintzer,  22  Minn.  39;^;  Kurtz  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  61 
Minn.  18,  63  N.  W.  1. 

*»»  Luco  V.  Commercial  Bank,  70  Cal.  339,  11  Pac.  650;  McCauley  v.  Har- 
vey, 40  Cal.  497;  Kiugsley  v.  Miller,  45  Cal.  95;  Reynolds  v.  Brumagim.  54 
Cal.  254. 

(435) 


§   285  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  13 

of  validity.*®*  But  the  latest  decisions  are  to  the  effect  that  if  the 
record  of  such  a  court  shows  that  the  steps  necessary  to  clothe  it 
with  power  to  act  in  the  given  case  were  taken,  or  if  the  record  be 
silent  upon  this  subject,  its  judgment  must  be  held  conclusive  in 
any  other  court  of  the  same  sovereignty  when  called  in  question  col- 
laterally.*®^ On  the  other  hand,  in  Mississippi,  it  is  held  that  a  de- 
cree of  a  probate  court  for  the  sale  of  real  estate  by  an  executor  or 
administrator  is  invalid  unless  the  record  shows  affirmatively  a  com- 
pliance with  all  the  requirements  of  the  statute  under  which  the  land 
was  decreed  to  be  sold.'®*  And  in  Massachusetts,  if  a  probate  court 
exceeds  its  jurisdiction  and  makes  a  decree  in  a  matter  over  which  it 
has  no  power,  the  want  of  jurisdiction  may  be  shown  against  such 
decree  in  any  collateral  proceeding,  and  it  will  then  be  treated  as 
utterly  void.'®*  In  New  York,  if  a  surrogate's  decree  shows  juris- 
diction on  its  face,  its  recitals  are  presumptive  evidence  of  its  validity 
when  the  question  arises  in  a  collateral  proceeding.*®* 

§  285.    Federal  Courts. 

The  circuit,  district,  and  territorial  courts  of  the  United  States, 
though  of  limited  jurisdiction,  are  not  inferior  courts  in  the  technical 
sense  of  the  term;  their  judgments  and  decrees  stand  on  the  same 
footing  as  those  rendered  by  state  courts  of  general  jurisdiction,  anJ 
their  authority  and  jurisdiction  are  always  to  be  presumed.*®*    It  is 

»oo  Easley  v.  McCllnton,  33  Tex.  288. 

»oi  Martin  v.  Robinson,  67  Tex.  368,  3  S.  W.  550;  Lyne  v.  Sanford,  82  Tex. 
58.  19  S.  W.  847,  27  Am.  St  Rep.  852;  Bouldin  v.  Miller,  87  Tex.  359.  2S  s^. 
W.  940;  McSpadden  v.  Farmer  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  23  S.  W.  814;  Oorley  v.  An- 
derson, 5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  213.  23  S.  W.  839;  CJrant  v.  Hill  (Tex.  Civ.  Apn.) 
30  S.  W.  952;  Stone  v.  Ellis  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  40  S.  W.  1077;  HUl  v.  Grant 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.)  44  S.  W.  1016. 

•02  Martin  v.  Williams,  42  Miss.  210.  97  Am.  Dec.  456. 

808  Mercier  v.  Chace,  9  Allen,  242;   Peters  v.  Peters.  8  Cush.  529. 

80*  Rowe  V.  Parsons,  6  Hun,  338.  And  see  Seymour  v.  Seymour,  4  Johns. 
Ch.  400;  aiipman  v.  Montgomery,  63  N.  Y.  230;  In  re  StlUweH's  Estate,  i;5> 
N.  Y.  337,  34  N.  E.  777;  Bensen  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  14  App.  Div.  442.  43  X. 
Y.  Supp.  914;   Taylor  v.  Syme,  17  App.  Div.  .■)17,  45  X.  Y.  Supp.  707. 

805  McCormick  v.  SulUvant,  10  Wheat.  192,  6  L.  Ed.  300;  Ex  parte  AVat- 
klns,  3  Pet.  193,  7  L.  Ed.  650;  Kennedy  v.  (leorgia  State  Bank.  8  Hoir.  tUl. 
12  L.  Ed.  1209;   Page  v.  United  States,  11  Wall.  268,  20  L.  Ed.  135;  Evers  v. 


Ch.  13)        COLLATKRAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  286 

said:  "The  courts  of  the  United  States,  though  possessing  a  limited 
jurisdiction,  yet,  in  the  intendment  of  law,  stand  upon  the  same  foot- 
ing as  courts  of  record  of  general  jurisdiction.  All  the  presump- 
tions which  are  indulged  in  favor  of  superior  tribunals  of  general 
jurisdiction  are  equally  extended  to  the  courts  of  the  United  States. 
In  pleading  a  judgment  or  decree  of  one  of  those  courts,  there  is  no 
more  necessity  for  showing  the  facts  which  confer  jurisdiction  than 
in  a  plea  of  a  judgment  of  tlie  highest  tribunal  known  to  the  law. 
Their  judgments  cannot  be  impeached  for  irregularity  or  error  in  a 
collateral  proceeding;  they  can  only  be  vacated  on  motion,  in  the 
courts  in  which  they  are  rendered,  or  reversed  for  error  in  an  appel- 
late jurisdiction."  ^^^  Thus,  a  judgment  obtained  in  a  federal  circuit 
court  cannot  be  treated  as  a  nullity  or  as  being  open  to  collateral 
impeachment,  although  the  record  fails  to  show  a  ground  of  federal 
jurisdiction,  such  as  diverse  citizenship  of  the  parties.'®^  So,  a  judg- 
ment rendered  in  a  federal  court,  in  an  action  removed  thereto  from 
a  state  court,  cannot  be  collaterally  attacked  for  want  of  proper  juris- 
dictional allegations  in  the  petition  for  removal.*®* 

§  286.    Jnstiees   of   the    Peaee. 

It  IS  not  universally  true  that  the  courts  of  justices  of  the  peace 
are  inferior  tribunals,  within  the  rule  in  regard  to  presuming  juris- 
diction. In  Texas,  for  example,  such  courts  are  created  by  the  con- 
stitution, and  exercise,  within  the  limits  therein  defined,  general  ex- 
clusive jurisdiction;  and  accordingly  their  judgments,  though  not 
showing  all  the  facts  necessary  to  give  jurisdiction,  cannot  be  at- 

Wataon,  156  U.  S.  527,  15  Sup.  Ct.  430,  39  L.  Ed.  520;  Skirving  v.  National 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  8  C.  C.  A.  241,  59  Fed.  742;  Livingston  v.  Van  Ingen,  1  Paine. 
48.  Fed.  Cas.  No.  8,420:  McOonnell  v.  Day.  61  Ark.  464,  33  S.  W.  731;  Ruck- 
man  V.  Cowell,  1  N.  Y.  505;  Matson  v.  Burt,  9  Hun,  470;  Byera  v.  Fowler,  12 
Ark.  218.  44  Am.  Dec.  271;  Reed  v.  Vaughan,  15  Mo.  137,  55  Am.  Dec.  133; 
Turrell  v.  Warren,  25  Minn.  9;  Plerro  v.  St.  Paul  &  N.  P.  R.  Co..  37  Minn. 
314.  34  N.  W.  38. 

ao«  Reed  v.  Vaughan,  15  Mo.  137,  55  Am.  Dec.  133. 

«•-  Cutler  V.  Huston,  158  U.  S.  423,  15  Sup.  Ct.  868,  39  L.  Ed.  1040;  Rice 
T.  Adler-Ooldman  CommLssion  Co.,  38  C.  C.  A.  15,  71  Fed.  151. 

«o*  Washburn  v.  Pullman  Palace-Car  Co.,  21  C.  C.  A.  598,  76  Fed.  1005; 
Haug  V.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  42  0.  C.  A.  107,  102  Fed.  74. 

(437) 


§   286  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   13 

tacked  collaterally  as  void  therefor.*^'  And  in  several  other  states, 
the  judgments  of  such  magistrates  are  considered  as  entitled  to  all 
the  presumptions  of  vahdity.  This  is  the  case  in  Connecticut,*" 
Vermont,'"  Pennsylvania,^**  Mississippi,'**  Tennessee,***  and  Ala- 
bama.**" And  in  Massachusetts  it  is  said  that  "the  rule  which  makes 
the  judgment  of  a  court  of  record  binding  upon  the  parties,  until 
reversed  by  proper  proceedings  therefor,  aithoiygh  jurisdiction  of  the 
person  was  not  properly  obtained,  is  applicable  as  wcfl  t»  m  fiwt^icr 
of  the  peace  as  to  one  of  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction."  **•  But  on 
the  other  hand,  in  Maryland  and  some  other  states,  judgments  ren- 
dered by  justices  will  hot  be  allowed  to  stand  where  the  record  fails 
to  show  affirmatively  that  a  summons  had  been  issued  and  served 
upon  the  defendant;  such  defect  in  the  proceedings  is  fatal  to  the 
validity  of  the  judgment  and  may  be  called  in  question  in  a  collateral 
action.**^  And  in  Michigan  a  judgment  entered  by  a  justice  by  vir- 
tue of  a  statutory  authority  must  show  that  the  requirements  of  the 
statute  have  been  complied  with,  and  if  it  fails  in  this  it  is  void.**' 

809  WilllamB  V.  Ball,  52  Tex.  603,  36  Am.  Rep.  730;  WatkJns  v.  Davis,  61 
Tex.  414;  Holmes  v.  Buckner,  67  Tex.  107,  2  S.  W.  432;  Hambel  v.  Darts 
(Tex.  Cly.  App.)  33  S.  W.  251. 

«io  Fox  V.  Hoyt,  12  Conn.  491,  31  Am.  Dec.  7C0. 

811  Wright  V.  Hazen,  24  Vt.  143;   Farr  v.  Ladd,  37  Vt.  158. 

812  Billings  v.  Russell,  23  Pa.  189,  62  Am.  Dec.  330;  Clark  v.  McCommau. 
7  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  469;  Tarbox  v.  Hays,  6  Watts  (Pa.)  3©S,  31  Am.  Dec.  47& 

813  Stevens  v.  Mangum,  27  Miss.  481. 

814  Turner  v.  Ireland,  11  Humph.  (Tenn.)  447. 
81B  Lightsey  v.  Harris.  20  Ala.  411. 

816  Hendrick  v.  Whittemore.  105  Mass.  28. 

817  Fahey  v.  Mottu,  67  Md.  250,  10  Atl.  68.  In  Missouri,  while  there  Is 
no  presumption  that  a  justice  of  the  peace  had  Jurisdiction  of  an  action,  yet 
if  it  has  been  appealed  to  a  court  of  superior  Jurisdiction,  there  is  a  presump- 
tion that  the  latter  court  had  Jurisdiction,  though  such  court  would  have 
none  If  the  Justice  had  none.  Kellogg  v.  Linger,  1  Mo.  App.  Rep'r,  235.  «X» 
Mo.  App.  571.  It  Is  sufficient  to  the  validity  of  a  Judgment  of  a  Justice  If 
the  Jurisdictional  facts  appear  anywhere  on  the  face  of  the  .proceedinps; 
they  need  not  appear  in  his  docket  entries.  Collins  v.  Kammann,  55  Mo. 
App.  464.  In  Kentucky,  a  Judgment  of  a  Justice  of  the  peace,  relied  on  as 
a  defense,  must  be  shown  to  have  been  within  his  Jurisdiction.  Stewart  v. 
Thomson,  97  Ky.  575,  31  S.  W.  133.  In  Arkansas,  a  Judgment  rendered  by 
a  Justice  of  the  peace  cannot  be  attacked  collaterally  for  mere  irregularities 
in  process.     Webster  v.  Daniel,  47  Ark.  131,  14  S.  W.  550. 

818  Beach  v.  Botsford,  1  Doug.  (Mich.)  199,  40  Am.  Dec.  145, 

(438) 


Ch.  13)  COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §    287 

9  287.    Record  of  Inferior  Court,  el&owing  Jnrisdiotion,  is  GonelnsiTe. 

It  is  important  to  be  observed,  in  considering  the  effect  of  judg- 
ments rendered  by  inferior  courts,  that  if  the  record  does  affirma- 
tively show  the  facts  necessary  to  confer  jurisdiction,  then  the  same 
presumptions  are  indulged  in  favor  of  the  regularity  and  validity  of 
its  proceedings  as  are  extended  to  the  superior  courts,  and  they  can- 
not be  collaterally  impeached  for  errors  or  irregularities.**'     "Once 
it  appears  that  it  had  jurisdiction  to  proceed,  and  did  proceed,  the 
same  presumptions  prevail  in  favor  of  the  action  and  record  of  the 
inferior  as  of  the  superior  court,  and  the  verity  of  its  record,  and  the 
presumptions  which  support  it,  are  alike  indisputable  in  any  col- 
lateral way."  '^^     Whether  evidence  would  be  heard  in  contradiction 
of  the  record  of  an  inferior  court  on  the  subject  of  jurisdiction,  where 
that  record  shows  fully  and  affirmatively  all  that  is  necessary  on  the 
point,  is  a  different  question.     Some  of  the  authorities  indicate  that 
the  jurisdiction  could  not  be  inquired  into,  in  direct  opposition  to  the 
face  of  the  record,  at  least  in  the  courts  of  the  same  state  where  the 
judgment  was  rendered.***     But  in  New  York  such  recitals  are  con- 
sidered to  be  only  prima  facie  evidence  and  subject  to  be  contra- 
dicted, though  sufficient  to  uphold  the  proceeding  if  not  disprov- 
ed.***    In  that  state,  however,  it  will  be  remembered,  want  of  juris- 
diction may  be   shown   collaterally   against  the   judgment   of   any 
court.***     But  it  appears  to  be  undisputed  that  if  the  jurisdiction  of 
an  inferior  court,  in  any  case,  depends  upon  the  existence  of  a  certain 
fact  or  state  of  facts,  and  it  is  shown  by  the  record  that  there  was 
evidence  tending  to  prove  such  facts,  and  that  such  evidence  was  ad- 

•i»  Comstock  V.  Crawford,  3  Wall.  396,  18  L.  Ed.  34;  Oooper  v.  Sunderland. 
3  Iowa.  114,  66  Am.  Dec.  52;  Reeves  v.  Townsend.  22  N.  J.  Law.  396;  Wil- 
son's Heirs  v.  Wilson's  Adm'r,  18  Ala.  176;  Paul  v.  Hussey,  35  Me.  97;  Fox 
V.  Hoyt,  12  Conn.  491,  31  Am.  Dee.  760;  Gray  v.  McXeal,  12  Ga.  424;  Vincent 
V.  Davidson,  1  Kan.  App.  606.  42  Pac.  390;  Alexander  v.  Gill.  130  Ind.  485, 
30  N.  E.  525;  Jewett  v.  Sundback.  5  S.  D.  Ill,  58  N.  W.  20. 

320  Featherston  v.  Small,  77  Ind.  143. 

•21  Gregory  v.  Bovier,  77  Cal.  121,  19  Pac.  232;  Secombe  v.  Milwaukee  & 
St.  P.  R.  Co.,  23  Wall.  108,  23  L.  Ed.  67. 

S2  2  Belden  v.  Meeker,  2  Lans.  470. 

•  23  Ferguson  y.  Crawford,  70  N.  Y.  253,  26  Am.  Rep.  589.    See  supra,  | 


(439) 


§288  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   13 

judged  sufficient,  and  the  court  judicially  determined  that  such  facts 
existed,  then  the  judgment  camiot  be  collaterally  impeached  or  con- 
tradicted.'** 

S  288.    No  PresvmptlciB  of  Validity  cm  Direct  Atta«lu 

"The  rule  that  a  record  is  conclusive  evidence  of  its  own  verity 
is  not  applicable  in  a  direct  proceeding  instituted  for  the  purpose  of 
showing  its  falsity  as  to  a  matter  which,  if  false,  shows  that  the  court 
pronouncing  it  as  a  judgment  had  no  jurisdiction  of  the  person  of 
the  defendant,  and  consequently,  that  what  purports  to  be  a  record 
is  in  fact  no  record  at  all."  •**  Thus,  although  a  judgment  recites 
that  the  defendant  was  "duly  and  legally  served  with  notice,"  yet, 
in  a  direct  proceeding  in  the  same  court  to  set  the  judgment  aside, 
the  contrary  may  be  shown.***  So  an  officer's  return  of  service  of 
process  may  be  impeached  in  a  direct  proceeding  after  judgment, 
where  the  return  states  facts  which  do  not  come  within  the  personal 
knowledge  of  the  officer.**^  But  while  jurisdiction  is  not  presumed 
on  a  direct  attack,  and  there  is  likewise  no  conclusive  presumption 
that  the  record  is  free  from  irregularities  or  errors,  yet,  on  appeal, 
error,  or  bill  of  review,  it  is  incumbent  on  the  party  to  overcome  the 
prima  facie  correctness  of  the  judgment.    The  judgment  of  a  court 

824  Sheldon  v.  Wright,  5  N.  Y.  497;  Dyckman  v.  City  of  New  York,  5  N. 
Y.  434;  Porter  v.  Piirdy,  29  N.  Y.  106.  8G  Am.  Dec.  283;  Bolton  v.  Brewster, 
32  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  389;  Agry  v.  Bettfl,  12  Me.  415;  Waterhouse  v.  Cousiofi,  40 
Me.  333;  Betts  v.  Bagley,  12  Pick.  (Mass.)  572;  Angell  v.  Bobbins,  4  R.  I. 
493;  Bridgeport  Savings  Bank  v.  Eldredge,  28  Conn.  556,  73  Am.  Dec.  6SS: 
Eyansville,  S.  &  0.  Straight  Line  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  EvansvlUe,  15  Ind.  421 : 
Shawhan  v.  Loffer,  24  Iowa,  217;  Bonsall  y.  Isett,  14  Iowa,  300;  Hungerford 
V.  Cashing,  8  Wis.  324;  Kipp  v.  FuUerton,  4  Minn.  473  (Gil.  366);  People  t. 
Hagar.  52  Cal.  182. 

82  5  Duncan  v.  Gerdine,  59  Miss.  550.  **The  distinction  between  cases  where 
the  validity  of  the  record  of  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction  Is  drawn  in  ques- 
tion collaterally,  and  tliose  in  which  such  record  is  directly  impeached  by 
wilt  of  error  or  bill  of  review,  is  broad  and  well  defined.  In  the  one  case 
Jurisdiction  is  presumed  prima  facie  unless  the  record  disproves  It  while  in 
the  other,  if  it  is  denied,  its  existence  must  be  proved  by  the  reconl  Itsf  If." 
Trimble  v.  Longwortli,  13  Ohio  St.  431,  439. 

3  20  Newcomb  v.  Dewey,  27  Iowa,  381. 

827  McNeill  V.  Edie,  24  Kan.  108;  Bond  v.  Wilson,  8  Kan.  229.  12  Am.  Rep. 
40G;  Chambers  v.  King  Wrought-Iron  Bridge  Manufactory,  16  Kan.  270;  Hau- 
Bou  v.  Woloott.  19  Kan.  207. 

(440) 


Gh.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  289 

of  competent  jurisdiction,  it  is  said,  is  always  presumed  to  be  right, 
and  a  party  in  the  appellate  court  alleging  error  in  the  court  below 
must  show  it  in  the  regular  way  in  the  record,  or  the  presumption 
in  favor  of  the  correctness  of  the  judgment  will  prevail.'*®  Thus  the 
findings  and  judgment  of  a  court  of  record  will  always  be  presumed 
to  rest  upon  sufficient  evidence  unless  the  contrary  be  clearly  shown 
from  the  record.^'^  In  regard  to  the  rule  that  the  record  imports 
absolute  verity,  an  important  observation  is  made  by  the  New  Hamp- 
shire court,  to  the  following  effect :  *'lt  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that 
the  record  may  be  true,  while  the  matters  recorded  are  false,  and 
may  even  be  shown  to  be  so  by  the  record  itself.  Thus  the  record 
may  recite  that  a  particular  plea  was  filed;  it  is  conclusive  evidence 
of  that  fact,  but  the  record  furnishes  no  evidence  that  the  facts  stated 
in  the  plea  are  true,  for  they  may  even  in  the  same  record  be  found 
to  be  false  by  the  verdict  of  a  jury.  The  allegations  of  parties  de- 
rive no  credit  from  their  forming  part  of  the  record  of  a  court.  So 
far  as  this  point  is  concerned,  the  record  imports  the  truth  of  what 
occurred  in  the  court  and  was  there  recorded."  '*• 

§  289.    Foreign   Jndsments. 

In  respect  to  the  collateral  impeachment  of  judgments  for  want 
of  jurisdiction,  there  is,  as  we  have  already  intimated,  a  radical  dif- 
ference between  foreign  judgments  and  such  as  are  rendered  by 
the  courts  of  the  state  where  the  collateral  inquiry  is  prosecuted. 
The  discussion  of  the  effect  of  foreign  judgments  belongs  to  another 
part  of  this  work.  But  it  may  be  here  briefly  stated  that  if  a  judg- 
ment or  decree,  coming  from  a  foreign  country,  is  regular  on  its 
face,  its  jurisdiction  will  be  taken  for  granted  unless  denied,  but  it 
may  always  be  shown  by  evidence  that  in  fact  the  foreign  court  had 
no  jurisdiction.'^^     A  similar  rule  obtains  in  the  case  of  judgments 

«»  Harman  v.  City  of  Lynchburg,  33  Grat.  (Va.)  37;  Wright  v.  Smith,  81 
Va.  777;  Wynn  v.  Heninger,  82  Va.  172;  Jencks  v.  Smith.  1  N.  Y.  90;  Mc- 
Girk V.  Chauvin,  3  Mo.  237. 

»2»  Singleton  v.  Boyle,  4  Neb.  414. 

«o  Tebbetts  v.  Tilton,  31  N.  H.  273,  286. 

»3iSchib8by  v.  Westenholz,  L.  R.  G  Q.  B.  155;  Carleton  v.  Bicliford,  13 
Gray  (^tass.)  591,  74  Am.  Dec.  652.    And  see  infra  vol.  2,  §§  818,  835-838. 

(441) 


§   290  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   13 

of  one  of  the  American  states  when  called  in  question  in  the  courts 
of  another.  If  the  judgment  proceeds  from  a  court  of  general  pow- 
ers, the  jurisdiction  will  be  presumed  (so  far  as  that  the  party  rely- 
ing on  the  adjudication  need  not  plead  the  jurisdiction  or  set  out 
the  facts),  but  the  party  against  whom  it  is  offered  may  always  deny 
and  disprove  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  rendering  the  judgment.*** 

Part  IV.  For  Fraud. 

§  290.    Whetl&er  Parties  oaii  laipttack  Judsmeat  for  Frs«A» 

It  is  an  unsettled  question  whether  a  judgment  may  be  collaterally 
impeached  for  fraud  by  parties  or  privies.  There  are  numerous  ex- 
pressions in  the  books  which  have  more  or  less  relation  to  this  point, 
but  we  shall  not,  in  this  discussion,  attempt  to  cite  all  the  dicta  bear- 
ing upon  the  subject  or  attach  particular  weight  to  any  but  direct 
adjudications  of  the  question.  In  a  majority  of  the  states  the  rule 
is  well  settled  that  it  is  not  permissible  for  a  party  or  privy  to  attack 
a  judgment  in  a  collateral  proceeding  on  account  of  fraud.*'*    The 

S82  Thompson  v.  Whitman,  18  Wall.  457,  21  L.  Ed.  897;  Galpin  v.  Page,  18 
Wall.  350,  21  L.  Ed.  950.    And  see  infra  vol.  2.  §§  897-901. 

838  Christmas  v.  Russell,  5  Wall.  290,  18  L.  Ed.  475;  Kent  v.  Lake  Superior 
Slilp  Canal,  Ry.  &  Iron  Co.,  144  U.  S.  75,  12  Sup.  Ct  650.  36  L.  Ed.  332; 
Rhino  V.  Emery  (C.  C.)  65  Fed.  826;  Granger  v.  Clark,  22  Me.  128;  Hammond 
V,  Wilder,  25  Vt.  342;  McRae  v.  Mattoon,  13  Pick.  53;  Boston  &  W.  R.  Corp. 
V.  Sparhawk,  1  Allen,  448,  79  Am.  Dec.  750;  Greene  v.  Greene,  2  Gray,  361. 
61  Am.  Dec.  454;  Taylor  y.  State,  73  Md.  208.  20  Atl.  914,  11  L.  R.  A,  852; 
James  Clark  Co.  v.  Colton,  91  Md.  195,  46  Atl.  386.  49  L.  R.  A.  698;  Sanders 
V.  Price.  56  S.  O.  1,  33  S.  E.  731;  Williams  v.  Martin.  7  Ga.  378;  Porter  t. 
Rountree.  Ill  Ga.  369.  36  S.  E.  761;  Smith  v.  Henderson.  23  La.  Ann.  640: 
Bouldin  v.  Miller.  87  Tex.  359,  28  S.  W.  940;  Gains  v.  Johnston  (Ky.)  15  S. 
W.  246;  Kelley  v.  Mize,  3  Sneed.  59;  Anderson  v.  Anderson.  8  Ohio,  100; 
Shultz  V.  Shultz.  136  Ind.  323.  36  N.  E.  126,  43  Am.  St.  Rep.  320;  Welwtir  v. 
Reld.  1  Morris  (Iowa)  467.  Mason  v.  Messenger.  17  Iowa.  261:  Smith  t. 
Smith.  22  Iowa,  516;  Edmundsou  v.  Independent  School  DIst..  98  Iowa,  639. 
07  X.  W.  671,  60  Am.  St.  Rep.  224;  Field  v.  Sanderson,  34  Mo.  542,  86  Am. 
Dec.  124;  Cooper  v.  Duncan,  58  Mo.  App.  5;  Dunlap  v.  Byers.  110  Mich.  lOflL 
67  N.  W^  10G7;  Cody  v.  Cody.  98  Wis.  445.  74  N.  W.  217;  In  re  Ellis*  Estate, 
55  Minn.  401. '56  N.  W.  1050,  23  U  R.  A.  287,  43  Am.  St.  Rep.  514.  Thus. 
stockholders  cannot  set  up  as  a  defense  to  an  action  by  a  judgment  cretlitor 
of  the  corporation  for  unpaid  subscriptions  that  the  Judgment  was  obtained 
in  a  federal  court  by  one  to  whom  the  claim  was  coUusively  assigned  for  the 

(442) 


CI).  13)  COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDOMENTS.  §   291 

decisions  are  based  upon  the  ground  of  the  general  conclusiveness 
of  records,  and  the  policy  of  the  law  which  forbids  their  indirect  con- 
tradiction or  impeachment,  and  on  the  consideration  that  it  is  the 
business  of  a  litigant  to  be  on  his  g^ard  against  fraud  and  trickery, 
and  that  if  his  rights  are  nevertheless  infringed,  he  has  his  proper 
remedy  by  action  or  motion  to  procure  the  annulment  of  the  judg- 
ment or  by  application  to  equity  for  relief.  In  Pennsylvania  and 
South  Carolina,  however,  it  is  allowed  to  a  party  to  show  fraud  against 
a  j/ofigmtnt  coUatecally;^'^  aiid  the  .same  dwtr^M^  is  a^forefftly  hxM. 
in  New  Hampshire.**"  This  is  also  true  in  New  York,  although  the 
rule  in  the  latter  state  is  founded  rather  upon  the  peculiarities  of  the 
code  system  of  pleading  and  practice  than  upon  general  principles  of 
law.***  There  are  also  decisions  to  the  effect  that  where  one  party 
is  allowed  to  offer  a  judgment  in  evidence  without  having  pleaded  it, 
the  other  ought  to  be  allowed  to  impeach  it  by  evidence  of  fraud, 
without  being  put  to  a  direct  suit  to  annul  it,  and  notwithstanding 
it  is  regular  upon  its  face.**^ 

S  291.    Fraud  in  Proevrinc  tl&e  JudpneAt* 

In  the  preceding  section  we  considered  fraud  in  general  as  a  ground 
for  impeaching  judgments.  It  is  convenient,  for  the  purposes  of  our 
further  inquiry,  to  distinguish  between  fraud  practised  in  the  procur- 
ing of  the  judgment  and  fraud  as  affecting  the  original  cause  of  ac- 
tion. The  former  topic  is  illustrated  by  several  important  cases,  to 
be  now  considered,  as  well  as  by  many  of  those  already  cited.  "The 
parties  to  an  action,"  it  is  said,  "cannot  impeach  the  judgment  ren- 
dered therein,  in  any  collateral  proceeding,  on  the  ground  that  it  was 

purpose  of  giving  Jurisdiction  to  that  court.  Tutbill  Spring  Co.  v.  Smith.  90 
Iowa,  331.  57  N.  W.  853. 

"<Hali  V.  Hamlin.  2  Watts,  354;  Verner  v.  Carson,  66  Pa.  440;  Phelps 
T.  Benson,  161  Pa.  418.  29  Atl.  80;  Sullivan  v.  Ball,  55  S.  C.  343,  33  S.  E. 
486.  Compare  Otterson  v.  Middieton,  102  Pa.  78;  City  of  Philadelphia  v. 
Dobson,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  S4.  See,  also.  Kirby  v.  Kirby,  142  Ind.  419,  41  N.  B. 
S>i9. 

"6  State  V.  LltUe.  1  N.  H.  257. 

»»«  Mandeville  v.  Reynolds,  68  N.  Y.  528. 

>*7  Murray  y.  Murray,  6  Or.  17.  And  see  Glover  v.  Flowers,  101  N.  C.  134, 
7  8.  E.  5T9. 

(443) 


§    291  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  13 

obtained  through  their  fraud  or  collusion.  It  is  their  business  to  see 
that  it  is  not  so  obtained.  Even  if,  without  any  fault  or  neglect  of 
one  party,  his  adversary  succeeded  by  fraud  in  obtaining  an  unjust 
or  unauthorized  judgment,  he  must  through  some  prescribed  mode 
reverse  or  annul  the  judgment  before  he  can  claim  to  treat  it  as 
invalid."  •*•  But  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  between  judgments 
entered  by  the  collusion  or  fraud  of  both  parties  and  such  as  arc 
obtained  by  the  fraud  of  the  plaintiff.  The  former  are  void  as  to 
creditors  only,  not  against  the  defendant,  and  may  be  attacked  in 
any  collateral  proceeding  by  them,  whilst  the  latter  can  be  attacked 
by  the  defendant  alone,  directly,  and  in  the  proper  court.*'*  Thus, 
where  a  party  by  some  act  or  declaration  out  of  the  record  lulls  his 
opponent  into  a  false  security,  or  by  any  other  means  deceives  him, 
and  thereby  obtains  a  judgment  or  decree  to  his  prejudice,  it  is  fraud- 
ulent and  may  be  impeached  upon  that  ground.**®  A  person  against 
whom  judgments  have  been  obtained  cannot  maintain  an  action  for 
damages  against  the  parties  who  obtained  them,  the  attorney  who 
prosecuted  and  the  officer  who  served  the  writ,  for  fraudulently  con- 
spiring together  to  injure  and  defraud  him  in  those  proceedings, 
while  the  judgments  remain  unreversed,  for  such  action  would  con- 
stitute a  collateral  attack  upon  them.**^  But  on  the  other  hand  an 
action  to  recover  damages  for  the  breach  of  a  special  contract,  to  dis- 
continue an  action  by  the  defendant  against  the  plaintiff,  in  conse- 

88  8  Davis  V.  Davis,  61  Me.  398.    See  Boston  &  W.  R.  Corp.  v.  Sparhawk, 

I  AUen  (Mass.)  448,  79  Am.  Dec.  750;  Kansas  City.  Ft  S.  &  M.  R.  Co.  r. 
Morgan,  21  C.  C.  A.  468,  76  Fed.  429;  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Lake  County  t. 
Piatt,  25  0.  C.  A.  87,  79  Fed.  567;   Morrill  v.  MorrlU,  20  Or.  96,  25  Pac.  362. 

II  L.  R.  A.  155.  23  Am.  St.  Rep.  95;  Bdgerton  v.  Edgerton,  12  Mont.  122.  ja 
Pac.  966,  16  L.  R.  A.  94,  33  Am.  St.  Rep.  557.  Compare  Oarr  v.  Miner.  42  IIL 
179. 

889  Meckley's  Appeal,  102  Pa.  536;  In  re  Dougherty's  Estate,  9  Watts  &  S. 
<Pa.)  189,  42  Am.  Dec.  326;  Thompson's  Appeal,  57  Pa.  178;  Clark  v.  Dong- 
lass,  62  Pa.  415;  McCambridge  v.  Walraven,  88  Md.  378,  41  Atl.  928;  Cot- 
terell  v.  Koon,  151  Ind.  182,  51  N.  E.  235;  Storer  v.  Lane,  1  Tex.  Or.  App. 
250,  20  S.  W.  852. 

34  0  Ellis  V.  Kelly,  8  Bush  (Ky.)  621;  First  Xat.  Bank  v.  Cunningham  (C 
O.)  48  Fed.  510;  Daniels  v.  Benedict  (C.  C.)  50  Fed.  347;  Wheelo*  ▼.  Sweet 
16  N.  Y.  Supp.  836.     See  Thomas  v.  Ireland  (Ky.)  11  S.  W.  653. 

841  Smith  V.  Abbott,  40  Me.  442;  White  v.  Merritt,  7  N-  Y.  352,  57  Am. 
Dec.  527. 

(444) 


Ch.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  292 

quence  of  which  the  defendant  had  judgment  in  his  favor  and  the 
plaintiff  was  compelled  to  satisfy  an  execution  issued  thereon,  is  not 
liable  to  the  objection  that  it  seeks  to  impeach  the  judgment  collat- 
erally.'*^ A  composition  in  bankruptcy,  under  the  federal  statutes 
on  the  subject,  cannot  be  impeached  collaterally  in  an  action  at  law 
in  a  state  court,  by  a  creditor  who  was  a  party  to  the  proceedings,  by 
showing  that  the  composition  was  obtained  by  the  fraudulent  acts  of 
the  bankrupt.'^*'  On  principles  analogous  to  the  foregoing,  it  is  held 
that,  after  judgment  in  an  election  contest,  rendered  by  agreement 
between  the  claimants  and  giving  possession  to  the  relator,  the  de- 
fendant, in  his  answer  to  the  relator's  alternative  writ  of  mandate 
demanding  possession,  cannot  assail  the  judgment  on  the  ground  that^ 
being  rendered  by  agreement  and  in  consideration  of  a  sum  paid  to 
defendant,  it  was  corrupt  and  fraudulent  and  therefore  void.'** 

§  292.    Fraud  In  the  Cause  of  Action. 

As  a  general  rule,  fraud  in  the  contract  recovered  on  should  be 
set  up  as  a  defense  in  the  action,  and  therefore  is  no  ground  for 
subsequently  impeaching  the  judgment.***  And  a  judgment  is  not 
generally  open  to  collateral  attack  because  based  on  a  fraudulent 
instrument  or  on  perjured  testimony.'**  But  in  a  Pennsylvania  deci- 
sion it  was  held  that  where  actual  fraud  has  been  practised  by  a  party 
in  obtaining  a  deed,  and  the  deed  is  used  as  a  means  of  obtaining  a 
judgment,  the  judgment  will  be  void  to  the  extent  of  the  fraud,  as 
to  the  party  defrauded,  although  it  may  be  valid  as  to  other  inter- 
ests not  involved  in  the  fraud;  and  hence  a  collateral  attack  upon 
it,  as  to  such  fraud,  is  perfectly  permissible;    because  the  question 

«*2  Smith  V.  Palmer,  6  Gush.  (Mass.)  513. 

»*»  Farwell  v.  Raddin,  129  Mass.  7;  Home  Nat.  Bank  v.  Carpenter,  Id.  1. 

»"  Mannix  v.  State,  115  Ind.  245,  17  N.  E.  505. 

«"  Hatch  V.  Garza's  Ex'r,  22  Tex.  170;  Nevitt  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  91  Hun, 
43,  36  X.  Y.  Supp.  294;  Turney  v.  Van  Gelder,  63  Hun,  634,  18  N.  Y.  Supp. 
547;  Langdon  v.  Blackburn,  100  Cal.  19,  41  Pac.  814;  Bowman  v.  Wilson,  64 
111.  App.  73. 

3«  rulted  States  v.  Chung  Shee  (D.  C.)  71  Fed.  277;  Finley  v.  Houser,  22 
Or.  562,  30  Pac.  494. 

(445) 


§   293  LAW  09  JUDOMBNTCL  (Ch.    13 

of  the  fraudulent  character  of  the  deed  had  never  been  legally  before 
the  court  and  never  adjudicated.^*^ 

« 

I  1M3.    Cseditor  nay  sliow  Fraud  in  a  JndcateAt. 

However  the  rule  may  be  in  regard  to  parties  and  privies,  it  is 
very  well  settled  that  any  third  person,  a  stranger  to  the  judgment, 
whose  rights  would  be  injuriously  affected  if  it  were  allowed  to  stand 
as  against  him,  may  show,  in  a  collateral  proceeding,  that  it  was 
procured  through  the  fraudulent  contrivance  of  the  debtor  or  the 
collusion  of  both  parties,  with  a  design  to  hinder  or  defraud  him, 
and  so  have  it  considered  and  treated  as  void  as  to  him.***  "A  col- 
lusive judgment  is  open  to  attack  whenever  and  wherever  it  may 
come  in  conflict  with  the  rights  or  the  interest  of  third  persons. 
Fraud  is  not  a  thing  that  can  stand,  even  when  robed  in  a  judg- 
ment." '*•  Or,  as  the  rule  is  sometimes  more  broadly  stated,  a  judg- 
ment which  is  not  founded  on  an  actual  debt  or  other  legal  liability. 
due  or  enforceable  at  the  time  of  its  entry,  will  not  be  upheld  against 
the  creditors  of  the  judgment-debtor."*®  Hence  a  judgment  con- 
fessed without  any  consideration  and  with  fraudulent  intent,  may  be 

84  7  Jackson  v.  Summery iUe,  13  Pa.  350.    And  see  Pray  v.  Jenkins,  47  Kan. 
C09,  28  Pac.  710. 

34  8  Duchess  of  Kingston's  Case.  20  How.  St.  Tr.  544;  Perry  v.  Meddow. 
croft.  10  Beay.  122;  Phillpson  v.  Egremont.  6  Q.  B.  605;  Crosby  v.  Lani?.  12 
East,  409;  Bandon  v.  Becher.  3  Clark  &  F.  479;  Gaines  v.  Relf,  12  How.  472. 
13  L.  Ed.  1071:  Pierce  v.  Strickland.  26  Me.  277;  Sidensparker  v.  Siclen- 
jjparker.  52  Me.  481,  83  Am.  Dec.  527;  Great  Falls  Manufg  Co.  v.  Worst er. 
4.")  N.  H.  110;  Atkinson  v.  Allen,  12  Vt  619,  36  Am.  Dec.  HOI;  Alexander  t. 
Gould,  1  Mass.  165;  Smith  v.  Saxton,  0  Pick.  (Mass.)  483;  I^onard  v.  Bry- 
ant, 11  Mete.  (Mass.)  370;  Downs  v.  Fuller.  2  Mete.  (Mass.)  i:i5,  35  Am.  Dec. 
393;  Vose  v.  Morton,  4  Cush.  (Mass.)  27,  50  Am.  Dec,  750;  Cook  v.  Town  of 
Morris,  06  0)nn.  137,  33  Atl.  504;  Baker  v.  Bym,  89  Ilun,  115.  ai  X.  Y.  Supp. 
55;  Bridgeport  Fire  &  Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wilson.  34  X.  Y.  281:  Hall  v.  Ilaui- 
liu,  2  Watts  (Pa.)  354;  Mitchell  v.  Kintzer.  5  Pa.  216.  47  Am.  De<-.  4i*v:  f\iW 
well  V.  Walters,  18  Pa.  79,  55  Am.  Dec.  592;  Thompson's  Appeal,  57  Pa,  175; 
Second  Xat.  Bank's  Appeal,  85  Pa.  528;  Sager  v.  Mrad.  1G4  Pa.  125,  »>  AtL 
284;  Xorton  v.  Wallace,  2  Kich.  Law  (S.  C.)  4ri0;  Hammock  v.  McBrMt\  « 
(;a.  178;  Faris  v.  Durham,  5  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  397,  17  Am.  Dec.  77:  I>e  Ar- 
mond  V.  Adams,  25  Ind.  455;  Callahan  v.  Griswold.  9  Mo.  775;  Myers  v.  Mil- 
ler, 55  Mo.  App.  33S;  Hackett  v.  Manlove,  14  Cal.  85. 

849  Smith  V.  Oiiyler,  78  Ga.  654,  3  S.  E.  406. 

8B0  Palmer  v.  Martindell,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  90,  10  Atl.  802. 
(446) 


Cb.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  294 

questioned  by  other  judgment  and  execution-creditors  of  the  defend- 
ant, and,  as  to  them,  the  judgment  and  execution  thereon  will  be 
vacated  and  set  a'side.'*^  But  a  confession  of  judgment  for  the  ex- 
press purpose  of  enabling  the  creditor  to  redeem  from  a  sale  under 
a  prior  judgment  is  not  fraudulent  as  against  the  purchaser;  for 
the  policy  of  the  law  is  to  encourage  redemptions,  in  order  that  the 
property  of  the  debtor  may  discharge  as  many  of  his  liabilities  as 
possible.'**  For  another  example,  in  an  action  by  a  creditor  to  set 
aside  a  deed  as  fraudulent,  the  grantee  therein  may  show,  although 
his  deed  is  fraudulent  as  to  creditors,  that  the  complainant's  judg- 
ment was  obtained  by  fraud  and  artifice  practised  by  him  upon  the 
grantor.'**  But  inasmuch  as  the  law  always  favors  the  stability  and 
finality  of  judgments,  it  is  held  that  a  stranger  who  thus  seeks  to 
impeach  a  judgment  as  a  fraud  upon  his  rights  must  show  the  fraud 
by  clear  and  satisfactory  proof."^* 

I  294.    Fraud  must  affect  the  Creditors. 

A  very  important  element  in  the  rule  just  stated  is  that  the  fraud 
alleged  must  be  such  as  directly  affects  the  party  seeking  to  impeach 
the  judgment.  It  is  no  ground  for  the  intervention  of  third  persons 
that  fraud  has  been  practised  upon  the  debtor ;  it  must  be  fraud  prac- 
tised by  the  debtor,  either  alone,  or,  as  is  more  commonly  the  case, 
in  collusion  with  the  plaintiff  in  the  judgment.  For  instance,  upon 
the  distribution  of  the  proceeds  of  a  sheriff's  sale,  a  subsisting  judg- 
ment can  be  attacked  by  other  creditors  collaterally  only  on  the 
ground  of  collusion,  not  because  it  is  a  fraud  on  the  debtor.'*^*     "The 

«»i  Shallcross  v.  Deats,  43  X.  J.  Law,  177;  Bryant  v.  Harding,  29  Mo.  347: 
Atlas  Nat.  Bank  v.  More,  40  111.  App.  336;  Chase  v.  Tuckwood,  86  111.  App.  70. 

»02  Karnes  v.  Lloyd,  32  111.  113. 

»»•  Paris  V.  Durham,  5  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  397.  17  Am.  Dec.  77. 

»M  Clark  V.  Bailey,  2  Strob.  Eq.  143;  Hiilverson  v.  Hutchinson,  39  Iowa, 
316. 

»55  Sheetz  v.  Hambesfs  Ex*rs,  81  Pa.  100;  Miners'  Trust  Co.  Bank  v.  Rose- 
berry.  81  Pa.  300;  In  re  Dougherty's  Estate,  9  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  180,  42  Am. 
Dec.  326;  Lewis  v.  Rogers,  16  Pa.  18;  Thompson's  Appeal,  57  Pa.  175.  So. 
wbUe  the  holder  of  a  Junior  Judgment  may  collaterally  impeach  a  senior 
judgment  for  fraud  against  himself,  to  the  extent  of  defeating  the  priority 
of  lien,  he  cannot  do  so  on  the  ground  merely  that  the  Judgment  was  fraud- 

(447) 


§   295  ^     LAW  OF  JUDQMENT&  (Gfa.  13 

fraud  which  will  authorize  a  creditor  to  impeach  a  judgment  obtained 
by  another  against  his  debtor  must  be  a  fraud  against  the  creditor, 
not  a  mere  overreaching  of  the  debtor  in  his  litigation.  There  must 
be  collusion."  ''•  Nor  can  creditors  thus  set  up  any  matter  of  de- 
fense original  or  subsequent.'*^  Fraudulent  judgments,  it  is  said, 
like  fraudulent  deeds,  are  good  against  all  but  the  interests  intended 
to  be  defrauded.  Hence  those  parties  whose  interests  arc  affected  can- 
not require  the  court  to  vacate  the  judgment  on  the  record,  for  that 
would  have  the  effect  to  annul  it  as  against  the  whole  world.*** 

S  295.  Wliat  Creditor!  allowed  to  aUege  Fraud* 

The  privilege  of  impeaching  a  judgment  collaterally  for  fraud  is 
extended  only  to  those  third  persons  whose  rights  would  be  impaired 
or  prejudiced  if  it  were  allowed  full  force  and  effect  as  against 
them.'**  In  New  York  it  was  formerly  held  that  none  but  a  judg- 
ment-creditor could  impeach  the  bona  fides  of  a  judgment  confessed 
by  the  debtor  to  a  third  person ;  an  attaching  creditor,  whose  attach- 
ment was  levied  after  such  confession,  could  not  do  so.***  But  later 
rulings  in  the  same  state  have  modified  this  doctrine  so  far  that  now, 
if  the  attaching  creditor's  process  has  been  levied  upon  tangible 
property  (i.  e.,  property  capable  of  manual  delivery),  he  is  permitted 
to  assail  the  good  faith  of  a  prior  confessed  judgment  which  stands 
in  his  way.'°^  At  any  rate,  it  seems  clear  that  the  party's  claim  must 
have  been  in  existence  at  the  date  of  the  judgment,  other^'ise  it 
could  not  properly  be  called  a  fraud  upon  his  rights.  Thus  a  judg- 
ment of  separation  of  property,  duly  rendered  in  favor  of  a  wife 

ulent  as  against  the  defendant.  Fafe-Beposlt  &  Trust  Co.  ▼.  Wright,  44  C 
C.  A.  421,  105  Fed.  155. 

350  McAlplne  v.  Sweetser,  70  Ind.  78. 

»87  Lewis  V.  Rogers,  16  Pa.  IS;  Johns  V.  Pattee.  53  Iowa,  683,  8  X.  W.  GfZi. 

3  58  Thompson's  Appeal,  57  Pa.  175.    And  see  Clark  v.  Douglass,  62  Pa.  40*. 

868  Spictr  V.  Waters.  05  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  227;  De  Armond  v.  Adams,  25  Ind. 
455;  Hackctt  v.  Manlove,  14  Cal.  a>;  Gnmt  v.  Hill  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  30  S-  W. 
952. 

360  Bentley  v.  Goodwin,  38  Barb.  633.  In  Indiana,  by  statute,  subsequent 
as  well  as  existing  creditors  can  collaterally  Impeach  tor  fraud  a  Judgment 
entered  on  confession.    Feasler  v.  WoodflU,  23  Ind.  493. 

301  See  Bates  v.  Plonsky,  28  Hun.  112;  Bowe  v.  Arnold,  31  Hun,  256;  Xm- 
neubaum  t.  Rosswog,  22  Abb.  N.  a  346,  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  57& 

(448) 


Cb.  13)        COLLATERAL  IMPEACHMENT  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  296 

against  her  husband,  cannot  be  inquired  into  or  attacked  collaterally 
by  a  creditor  of  the  husband  whose  claim  had  not  yet  arisen  when  the 
judgment  was  rendered.'***  Privies,  as  well  as  parties  to  the  judg- 
ment, are  precluded,  according  to  the  majority  of  the  decisions,  from 
the  collateral  impeachment  of  it  for  fraud.  But  it  is  held  that  a  judg- 
ment against  a  sheriff  for  his  default  is  not  so  far  conclusive  on  the 
sureties  on  his  official  bond  but  that  they  may  attack  it  for  fraud 
and  collusion  when  it  is  made  the  basis  of  a  suit  against  them.'** 

§  206.    False  Testimony. 

It  is  the  unquestioned  doctrine  of  the  cases  that  a  party  to  a  judg- 
ment cannot  impeach  it  collaterally  on  the  ground  that  false  testi- 
mony was  given  at  the  trial,  on  which  testimony  the  judgment  was 
rendered.***  Neither  will  any  action  lie  against  a  witness  for  com- 
mitting perjury,  whereby  the  plaintiff  lost  a  former  action,  because 
its  trial  would  necessarily  involve  a  re-examination  of  the  matters 
controverted  and  determined  in  the  former  action,  and  would  consti- 
tute an  attack  upon  the  correctness  of  the  former  adjudication.**' 
Thus,  where,  in  a  process  of  foreign  attachment,  judgment  has  been 
rendered  discharging  the  trustee  on  his  disclosure,  the  plaintiff  in 
that  process  cannot  maintain  an  action  on  the  case  against  the  trus- 
tee for  obtaining  his  discharge  by  falsehood  and  fraud  in  his  dis- 
closure and  by  fraudulent  collusion  with  the  principal  defendant.*** 
In  an  early  New  York  case  it  was  held  that  an  action  would  not  lie 
against  a  person  in  that  state  for  suborning  a  witness  to  swear  falsely 
in  a  cause  then  pending  in  the  courts  of  another  state,  in  consequence 
whereof  a  judgment  was  given  against  the  defendant  in  such  cause, 

«•«  Lewis  V.  Peterkln,  39  La.  Ann.  780,  2  South.  677. 

«•»  Dane  v.  Gllmore,  61  Me.  544;  City  of  Lowell  v.  Pai'ker,  10  Mete.  (Mass.) 
315,  43  Am.  Dec.  436. 

»«*Dilllng  V.  Murray,  6  Ind.  324.  (»  Am.  Dec.  385;  Fisk  v.  MiUer,  20  Tex. 
5T9;  The  Acorn,  2  Abb.  U.  S.  434,  Fed.  Oas.  No.  29;  Greene  v.  Greene,  2 
Gray  (Mass.)  361.  61  Am.  Dec.  454;  Burton  v.  Perry,  146  111.  71,  34  N.  E.  60; 
Maddoz  y.  Sumnaerlln,  92  Tex.  483;  40  S.  W.  1033. 

«•»  Cunningham  v.  Brown,  18  Vt.  123,  46  Am.  Dec.  140;  Smith  v.  Lewis,  3 
Johns.  (X.  T.)  157,  3  Am.  Dec.  469;  Damport  v.  Sympson,  Cro.  Eliz.  520;  Eyres 
V.  Sedgewieke,  Cro.  Jac.  601. 

««•  Lyford  v.  Demerritt,  32  N.  H.  234. 

1  LAW  JUDG.-29 .  (4^9) 


§   296  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  13 

contrary  to  the  truth  and  justice  of  the  case;  the  decision  being 
rested  by  Chancellor  Kent  on  the  ground  that  the  merits  of  the  orig- 
inal cause  could  not  be  thus  overhauled  in  a  collateral  proceeding."* 
It  is  also  held  that  an  award,  Hke  a  judgment,  cannot  be  collaterally 
impeached  by  evidence  that  one  party  introduced  false  testimony."* 
Where  judgments  are  recovered  in  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction, 
and  the  defendant  appeared  and  had  an  opportunity  to  defend,  which 
judgments  are  still  in  full  force  and  unreversed,  he  cannot  maintain 
an  action  against  a  defendant  for  fraud  and  conspiracy  in  procuring 
such  judgments  against  him.*** 

«eT  Smith  y.  Lewis,  3  Johns.  157,  3  Am.  Deo.  469. 
a«8  Woodrow  v.  O'Conner,  28  Vt  776. 
809  Engstrom  v.  Sherburne,  137  Mass.  153. 

(450) 


I 


Ch.  14)  YACATINQ  AND  OPBNING  JUDOMBNT8.  §  297 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS. 

Pakt  I.    Thk  Power  to  Vacate  Judomemtb. 

f  ia>7.     What  Courts  possess  the  Power. 
297a.  As  Between  Federal  and  State  Courts. 

298.  Liei^slature  cannot  interfere. 

Part  II    The  Method  of  sEBKUve  Relief. 

299.  By  Audita  Querela. 

300.  By    Error    Coram   Nobis. 

301.  By  Bill  of  Review. 

302.  By  Direct  Action. 
3U».  By  Motion. 

304.     Indirect    Vacation    of   Judgment. 
304a.  Other  Remedies  ATailable. 

Part  III.    The  Time  of  ArPLYiNQ. 

'Mi5.  During  the  Term. 

306.  After   the   Te^-m. 

307.  Void  Judgments. 

308.  Interlocutory  Judgments. 

309.  Pennsylvania   Practice. 

310.  Judgment  carried  over  the  Term  by  Motion. 
311..  Under   Statutes. 

312.  Judgments  against  Non- Residents. 

313.  Laches  of  Party. 

Part  IV.    The  Parties  who  mat  Apply. 

314.  Successful  Party  may  Apply. 

315.  Joint  Defendants. 

310.     Uegal  Representatives  of  Party. 

317.  Strangers. 

Part  V.    What  Judgments  mat  be  Vacated. 

318.  (Jeneral  Rule. 

319.  Consent  Judgments. 

320.  Judgments   in   Divorce. 
320a.  Adjudications  In  Bankruptcy. 

(451) 


§   297  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNT8.  (Ch.  14 


Part  VI.    Grounds  for  Vacating  Judgments. 

321.  Fraud  and  Collusion. 

322.  Judgment  taken  contrary  to  Agreement. 

323.  Perjury. 

324.  Want  of  Notice. 

325.  Unauthorized  Appearance  by  Attorney. 

326.  Irregularities. 

326a.  Objections   to   Jury. 

327.  Judgments  against  Persons  under  Disabilities. 

328.  Unauthorized  Entries. 

329.  Judgment  not  Vacated  because  Erroneous. 

330.  Not  for  Grounds  which  might  have  been  pleaded  in  Defense. 

331.  Illegality  of  Cause  of  Action. 
*332.  Newly-discovered  Evidence. 

333.  Judgment  on  reversed  Judgment. 

334.  Statutory  Grounds  for  Vacating  Judgments. 
355.    Mistake. 

336.  Surprise. 

337.  Casualty  or  Misfortune. 

338.  Sickness  of  Defendant. 

339.  Sickness  of  Counsel. 

340.  Excusable   Neglect. 

340a.  Mistake,  Ignorance,  or  Erroneous  Advice  of  Counsel. 

341.  Negligence  of  Attorney. 

342.  Misunderstanding   of    Counsel. 

343.  Unavoidable  Absence  of  Counsel. 

344.  Fraud  of  Attorney. 

345.  Misinformation  as  to  Time  of  Trial. 

345a.  Estoppel  to  Apply  for  Vacation  of  Judgment. 

Part  VII.    Pkactice  on  Vacating  Judgments. 

346.  Notice   of   Application. 

346a.  Requisites  of  Petition  or  Moving  Papers. 

347.  Affidavit  of  Merits. 

348.  Meritorious  Defense  must  be  Shown. 

349.  Technical  or  Unconscionable  Defense  not  Sufficient. 

350.  Opening  Judgment  to  admit  Defense. 

351.  Evidence. 

352.  Imposition  of  Terms. 

353.  Partial  Vacation  of  Judgment. 

354.  Allowance  of  Application  discretionary. 
354a.  Practice  on   Opening   Default 

355.  Effect  of  Vacating  Judgment 
(452) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  297 

Part  I.     The  Power  to  Vacate  Judgmknts. 

§  207.    Wliat  Courts  possess  the  Power. 

The  power  to  vacate  judgments  is  an  entirely  different  matter  from 
the  power  to  reverse  judgments.  It  is  a  power  inherent  in  and  to 
be  exercised  by  the  court  which  rendered  the  judgment,  and  to  that 
court  and  no  other  the  application  to  set  aside  the  judgment  should 
be  made.*  As  between  courts  of  co-ordinate  jurisdiction,  such  as  two 
county  courts  or  circuit  courts  of  the  same  state,  the  rule  is  that 
neither  has  power  to  vacate  or  set  aside  a  judgment  rendered  by 
the  other  which  is  not  void  upon  its  face ;  relief  must  be  sought  in 
the  court  where  the  judgment  was  entered.*  The  power  to  vacate 
or  open  a  judgment,  or  to  set  it  aside,  is  a  common  law  power  pos- 
sessed by  the  court  as  a  part  of  its  necessary  machinery  for  the  ad- 
ministration of  justice,  and  hence  might  be  exercised  without  the 
grant  of  special  statutory  authority.  In  many  of  the  states,  however, 
this  power  is  regulated  by  law,  either  in  respect  to  the  grounds  upon 
which  it  may  be  put  in  operation,  the  time  within  which  it  may  be 
invoked,  the  manner  of  calling  it  into  play,  or  the  practice  upon  an 
occasion  for  its  exercise.  And  such  regulations  may  either  enlarge 
or  abridge  its  common  law  scope,  or  otherwise  transform  it.     But 

1  Grattan  v.  Matteson,  51  Iowa,  622,  2  N.  W.  432. 

2  Dixon  V.  Baxter,  106  Ga.  lSt>,  32  S.  E.  24;  Odom  v.  Burch,  52  S.  C. 
3()5,  29  S.  E.  726;  Wilsle  v.  Rooney,  62  Hun,  618,  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  471;  Smith- 
son  V.  Smithson,  37  Xeb.  535,  56  N.  W.  300,  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  504;  Black  v. 
Plunkett,  132  Ind.  580,  31  N.  E.  567;  Skinner  v.  Terry,  107  N.  C.  103,  12 
S.  E.  118.  In  New  York,  it  is  said  that  a  court  exercising  Jurisdiction  con- 
current with  that  of  another,  by  which  an  order  has  been  made,  is  not  with- 
out power  to  modify  it  or  set  it  aside  on  new  papers,  or  relieve  from  an  oraer 
which  has  proved  oppressive,  where  leave  has  been  given  to  renew.  The 
question  is  not  one  of  power,  but  of  practice  and  orderly  procedure.  UruiK- 
shank  v.  Cruikshank,  30  App.  Div.  381,  51  N.  Y.  Supp.  1126.  A  change  lu 
the  constitution  of  a  court  does  not  preclude  a  consideration  of  the  question 
whether  a  Judgment  entered  by  the  court  before  the  change  should  be  va- 
cated. State  V,  Superior  Court,  18  Wash.  277,  51  Pac.  365.  And  where  a 
court  has  two  or  more  Judges,  an  application  to  vacate  a  Judgment  may  be 
heard  by  whichever  Judge  is  sitting  at  the  time  the  application  is  made. 
Dolen  V.  Buchanan,  43  Xeb.  8M.  62  X.  W.  233.  But  a  Judge  at  chambers 
has  no  Jurlsd'Ciicn  to  vacate  or  modify  orders  or  judgments  of  the  district 
court    Kime  v.  Fenner,  54  Xeb.  476,  74  N.  W.  869. 

(45^) 


§   297  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Oh.  14 

Still  the  power  remains  essentially  inherent  in  the  nature  and  con- 
stitution of  the  court,  not  derivative.  The  power  to  vacate  judgments 
is  said  to  be  incident  to  all  courts  of  record,  and  to  be  usually  exer- 
cised under  restraints  imposed  by  their  own  rules.*  It  is  not  com- 
monly possessed  by  the  inferior  tribunals — courts  not  of  record — 
such  as  the  courts  of  magistrates  or  justices  of  the  peace,  though 
in  some  of  the  states  it  may  be.*  But  it  is  generally  considered 
that  probate  courts  have  the  power,  upon  a  proper  showing,  to  va- 
cate an  order  or  decree  irregularly  or  improvidently  entered.'  An 
auditor,  appointed  to  make  distribution  of  a  fund,  has  no  power  to 
go  behind  the  record  and  declare  a  particular  judgment  to  be  void 
and  no  lien,  on  account  of  any  irregularity;  for  that  would  be  as- 
suming the  power  of  the  court  to  .review  its  own  judgments.* 

•  Kemp  V.  Cook,  18  Md.  130,  79  Am.  Dec.  681;  DonneUy  v.  McArdle,  14 
App.  Dlv.  217,  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  560;  In  re  Board  of  Directors  of  Broadway 
Ins.  Co.,  23  App.  Div.  282,  48  N.  Y.  Supp.  299.  This  power  belongs  inherently 
to  the  courts  of  the  United  States,  as  well  as  to  those  of  the  states.  United 
States  V.  Williams,  14  C.  C.  A.  440,  67  Fed.  381;  Fisher  v.  Simon,  14  C.  C. 
A.  443,  67  Fed.  387;   United  States  v.  Wallace  (D.  C.)  46  Fed.  569. 

•  See  Frazier  v.  Griffle,  8  Md.  50;  Rhodes  v.  De  Bow,  5  Iowa,  260;  GaUop 
v.  AUen,  113  N.  C.  24,  18  S.  E.  55;  State  v.  Duncan,  37  Neb.  631,  56  X.  W. 
214.  In  Pennsylvania,  the  court  of  common  pleas  has  no  power  to  open  a 
Judgment  entered  on  a  transcript  of  a  judgment  by  a  justice  of  the  peace, 
tiled  in  the  court  for  purposes  of  lien,  and  let  the  defendant  in  to  a  defen.^. 
For  all  purposes  except  lien,  the  judgment  still  remains  before  the  justice, 
and  there  only  can  it  be  attacked.  Boyd  v.  Miller,  52  Pa.  431;  Lacoc*k  v. 
White,  19  Pa.  495;  Littster  v.  Llttster,  151  Pa.  474,  25  Atl.  117.  As  to  the 
power  of  the  court  to  strike  the  judgment  from  the  record  if  void  uiK>n  its 
face,  see  Weldy  v.  Young,  21  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  15;  Ward  v.  Fannon,  7  Kulii, 
488.  A  similar  rule  obtains  in  North  Carolina  and  South  Dakota.  See  White- 
hurst  V.  Merchants'  &  Farmers'  Transp.  Co.,  109  N.  C.  342.  13  S.  E.  987: 
Garlock  v.  Calkins,  14  S.  D.  90,  84  N.  W.  393.  As  to  the  practice  in  New 
York,  see  Daniels  v.  Southard,  23  Misc.  Rep.  235.  51  N.  Y.  Supp.   1136. 

» Hamberlin  v.  Terry,  1  Smedes  &  M.  Ch.  (Miss.)  589;  In  re  Marquis. 
85  Mo.  615;  In  re  Coogan,  27  Misc.  Rep.  563,  59  N.  Y.  Supp.  Ill;  Hirshfeld 
V.  Brown  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  30  S.  W.  962; 

•  Edward's  Appeal,  66  Pa.  89. 

(454) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTa  S   298 


S  207a«    As  Between  Federal  and  State  Courts. 

The  federal  courts  have  no  jurisdiction  of  an  action  or  proceeding 
to  vacate  or  set  aside  a  judgment  rendered  by  a  state  court,  on  the 
ground  that  the  same  is  void  for  want  of  jurisdiption,  or  is  erroneous 
or  irregular ;  for,  in  such  case,  the  proper  and  sufficient  remedy  is 
by  motion,  appeal,  or  bill  of  review  in  the  courts  of  the  state.^  But 
a  federal  court  (where  the  jurisdictional  requirements  as  to  diverse 
citizenship  and  the  amount  involved  are  met)  has  power  to  entertain 
a  suit  and  enter  a  decree  which,  as  between  the  parties,  shall  set 
aside  and  vacate  a  judgment  of  a  state  court,  and  any  proceedings 
taken  or  rights  acquired  thereunder,  when  the  ground  of  objection 
is  that  the  judgment  was  procured  by  fraud.®  But  the  federal  court 
should  not  act  in  such  cases  where  the  party  injured  has,  or  had, 
an  opportunity  to  apply  for  relief  to  the  state  courts.®  Similar  rules 
govern  an  application  to  a  state  court  for  relief  against  a  judgment 
of  a  federal  court ;  it  may  be  attacked  as  fraudulent,  but  cannot  be 
reviewed  as  to  any  alleged  errors  or  irregularities,  or  annulled  for 
an  alleged  want  of  jurisdiction.* 


0  I 

I 


§  208.    Legislature   oannot   Interfere* 

The  power  to  open  or  vacate  judgments  is  essentially  judicial. 
Therefore,  on  the  great  constitutional  principle  of  the  separation  of 
the  powers  and  functions  of  the  three  departments  of  government,  it 
cannot  be  exercised  by  the  legislature.  While  a  statute  may  indeed 
declare  what  judgments  shall  in  future  be  subject  to  be  vacated,  or 

T  Little  Rock  Junction  Ry.  v.  Burke,  13  C.  C.  A.  341,  66  Fed.  83;    Elder 
V,  Richmond  Gold  &  Silver  Mln.  Co.,  7  C.  C.  A.  354.  58  Fed.  536;    Smith  v 
Sihwed  (C.  C.)  9  Fed.  483;  Klythe  v.  Hinckley  (C,  C.)  84  Fed.  246. 

•Davenport  v.  Moore  (C.  C.)  74  Fed.  945;  Hatch  v.  Ferguson  (C.  C.)  52 
Fed.  833;  Young  v.  Sigler  (C.  C.)  48  Fed.  182;  De  Forest  v.  Thompson 
(C.  C.)  40  Fed.  375;  Bertha  Zinc  &  Mineral  Co.  v.  Vaughan  (C.  C.)  88  Fed. 
r)66;  Little  Rock  Junction  Ry.  v.  Burke,  13  C.  C.  A.  341,  66  Fed.  83;  Hunt 
V.  Fisher  (C.  C.)  29  Fed.  801. 

•Graham  v.  Boston,  H.  &  E.  R.  Co.,  118  U.  S.  161,  6  Sup.  Ct.  1009,  30 
L.  Ed.  196;  Xougue  v.  aapp,  101  U.  S.  551,  25  L.  Ed.  1026;  Randall  v. 
Howard,  2  Black  (U.  S.)  585,  17  L.  Ed.  269. 

"  See  Kurtz  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.,  187  Pa.  59,  40  Atl.  988. 

(455) 


§    *^^3  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  14 

when  or  how  or  for  what  causes,  it  cannot  apply  retrospectively  to  a 
judgment  already  rendered  and  which  had  become  final  and  unalter- 
able by  the  court  before  its  passage.  Such  an  act  would  be  unconsti- 
tutional and  void  on  two  grounds;  first,  because  it  would  unlaw- 
fully impair  the  fixed  and  vested  rights  of  the  successful  litigant; 
and  second,  because  it  would  be  an  unwarranted  invasion  of  the  prov- 
ince of  the  judicial  department.  It  is  therefore  held  by  a  majority 
of  the  decisions  that  a  statute  vacating,  or  directing  the  courts  to 
vacate,  a  particular  judgment  or  class  of  judgments,  already  ren- 
dered and  become  final  before  the  enactment  of  the  statute,  and 
granting  new  trials  in  such  actions,  is  unconstitutional  and  invalid.*' 
A  contrary  rule  obtains,  however,  in  the  state  of  Alabama.**  And  in 
Georgia,  it  is  said  that  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  pass  acts  allow- 
ing the  opening  of  existing  judgments,  and  new  trials  thereunder, 
should  be  confined  to  allowing  cross-actions,  equitable  defenses,  and 
rights  which  have  accrued  since  the  judgment,  to  be  set  up;  and 
that  it  does  not  extend  to  matters  which  were  or  by  law  should  have 
been  heard  before  the  court  by  which  the  judgment  was  rendered." 
At  an  early  period,  the  supreme  court  of  Pennsylvania  ruled  that  a 
statute  directing  a  particular  judgment  to  be  opened,  and  the  de- 
fendant let  in  to  a  defense  upon  the  plea  of  payment,  was  remedial 
in  its  character,  and  though  the  power  thus  exercised  was  partly 

11  Merrill  v.  Sherburne.  1  N.  H.  199,  8  Am.  Dec.  52;  Lewis  ▼.  Webb,  3 
Me.  32(5;  Bates  v.  Kimball,  2  D.  Chip.  (Vt.)  77;  State  v.  New  York.  N.  H. 
&  H.  R.  Co.,  71  Conn.  43,  40  Atl.  925;  De  ChasteUux  v.  FalrcWld,  15  Pa. 
18.  53  Am.  Dec.  570;  Tayior  v.  Place,  4  R.  I.  324;  MUler  v.  State,  8  (Jill 
(Md.)  145;  Ratcllffe  v.  Anderson,  31  Grat.  (Va.)  105.  31  Am.  Rep.  71(5;  Grlfflna 
Ex*r  V.  Cunningham.  20  Grat.  (Va.)  31;  Weaver  v.  Lapsley,  43  Ala.  224;  Lanlpf 
V.  Gallatas,  13  La.  Ann.  175;  Beebe  v.  State.  6  Ind.  515.  G3  Am.  Dec.  SiH: 
Davis  V.  Village  of  Menasha.  21  Wis.  491;  Arnold  v.  Kelley,  5  W.  Va.  44i;: 
Burch  V.  Newbury,  10  N.  Y.  374;  Hill  v.  Town  of  Sunderland.  3  Vt.  507.  An 
adjudication  in  bankruptcy,  being  a  decree  of  the  court.  Is  beyond  legislative 
control;  so  that  congress  could  not  invalidate  or  set  aside  an  adjudication 
once  made,  by  any  retroactive  legislaUon  establishing  new  or  different  re<nil- 
Kites  to  its  validity.  In  re  Raffauf,  6  Biss.  150,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  11,525:  In  re 
Comstock,  3  Sawy.  128,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  3,077;  In  re  Obear,  3  DIU.  37,  Fed.  ('as. 
No.  10,395. 

"Kx   parte   Bibb,   44   Ala.   140. 

1  a  White  V.  Herudon,  40  Ga.  493;   Bonner  v.  Martin,  Id.  501;   Kite  ▼.  Lump- 
kin.   Id.    506. 

^450) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  299 

judicial,  it  was  not  in  violation  of  the  constitution.**  But  this  doc- 
trine, so  inconsistent  with  the  rights  and  independence  of  the  judi- 
ciary, and  so  subversive  of  the  fundamentals  of  constitutional  law, 
was  afterwards  vigorously  repudiated  by  the  same  court,  when  it 
felt  itself  better  able  to  withstand  the  encroachments  of  the  legis- 
lative body.^*  As  remarked  by  Chief  Justice  Gibson:  "It  is  not 
more  intolerable  in  principle  to  pronounce,  an  arbitrary  judgment 
against  a  suitor,  than  it  is  injurious  in  practice  to  deprive  him  of  a 
judgment,  Which  is  essentially  his  property,  and  to  subject  him  to 
the  vexation,  risk,  and  expense  of  another  contest."  *• 

Part  II.     The  Method  of  seeking  Relief. 

* 

§  200.    By  Audita    Querela* 

"Audita  querela"  is  the  name  of  a  writ  constituting  the  initial  pro- 
cess in  an  action  brought  by  a  judgment-defendant  to  obtain  relief 
against  the  consequences  of  the  judgment,  on  account  of  some  mat- 
ter of  defense  or  discharge  arising  since  its  rendition,  and  which 
could  not  be  taken  advantage  of  otherwise.*^  It  is  a  regular  suit 
with  its  usual  incidents,  pleadings,  issues  of  law  and  fact,  trial,  judg- 
ment, and  error.*®  The  writ  must  be  directed  to  the  court  which 
rendered  the  judgment  and  retains  the  record,*®  and  all  the  parties 
to  the  judgment  against  which  relief  is  sought  must  join  in  the  writ 
or  be  duly  and  regularly  served.***  Upon  the  inquiry  under  the  writ 
of  audita  querela,  the  record  of  the  judgment  is  not  conclusive  by 
way  of  estoppel  (the  attack  upon  it  being  direct  and  not  collateral), 
and  hence  the  truth  and  justice  of  the  whole  matter  is  open  to  ex- 

1*  Braddee  v.  Brownlleld,  2  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  271. 

IB  For  the  history  of  this  change  of  attitude,  see  remarks  of  Sharswood, 
J.,  in  Grim  v.  Weissenberg  School  District,  57  Pa.  48G,  98  Am.  Dec.  237. 
le  De  ( hastellux  v.  Fairchiid,  15  Pa.  18,  53  Am.  Dec.  570. 

17  1  Am.   &   Eng.    Enc.    Law,    1005. 

18  Brooks  V.  Hunt,  17  Johns.   (N.  Y.)   484. 

i»  Harper  v.  Kean.  11  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  299;  Town  of  Poultney  v.  Treasurer 
of  State,  25  Vt  168;    Warner  v.  Crane.  16  Vt.  79. 

20  Melton  V.  Howard,  7  How.  (Miss.)  103;  Herrick  v.  Orange  County 
Bank,  1  Williams  (Vt.)  584;  Gleason  v.  Peck,  12  Vt.  56,  36  Am.  Dec.  329; 
Tltlemore  v.  Waiuwrlght,  16  Vt  173;    Starbird  v.  Moore,  21  Vt.  529. 

(457) 


§    299  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  14 

amination.**  The  judgment  in  this  action  cannot  properly  include 
affirmative  relief  to  the  defendant.'*  An  appeal  or  writ  of  error 
will  lie  from  it.**  In  regard  to  the  grounds  on  which  audita  querela 
may  be  brought,  it  must  be  observed  that  this  is  a  remedial  process 
which  bears  solely  upon  the  wrongful  acts  of  the  opiK>site  party, 
and  not  upon  the  erroneous  judgments  or  acts  of  the  court ;  it  is  a 
writ  in  which  the  plaint  sounds  in  tort.**  Hence  injury,  actual  or 
apprehended,  is  essential* to  the  right  to  bring  this  writ.  If  the  mat- 
ter complained  of  is  simply  nugatory  and  void,  the  party  can  have 
no  need  of  this  process.*'  It  will  lie  to  vacate  a  judgment  rendered 
against  a  non-resident  defendant  on  constructive  service  of  process, 
where  the  statutory  prerequisites  were  omitted.**  But  not  where 
an  attorney,  although  without  authority,  has  entered  an  appearance 
for  such  defendant.*^  It  will  also  lie  to  procure  the  setting  aside  of 
a  judgment  which  was  irregularly  entered  after  a  discontinuance, 
or  taken  in  violation  of  an  agreement  for  a  continuance ;  **  or  which 
was  given  against  an  infant  who  was  not  represented  by  his  guard- 
ian ;  *"  or  against  a  lunatic  under  similar  circumstances.*^  So  when 
a  foreign  judgment  against  the  defendant  has  been  reversed  by  the 
foreign  appellate  tribunal,  but  in  the  meantime  he  has  been  sued 
here  on  that  judgment,  he  may  have  relief  by  audita  querela.*^     This 

»i  Folsom  V.  Connor,  49  Vt.  4;  Paddleford  ▼.  Bancroft,  22  VL  529;  HUI 
V.   Warren,   54   Vt.   73. 

2«  Fobs  v.   Wltham,  9  Allen   (Mass.)  572. 

23  Fitch  V.  Scovel.  1  Root  (Conn.)  56;  White  v.  Clapp,  8  Allen  (Mass.^ 
283;    Gordonier  v.  Billings,  77  Pa.   498. 

24  Little  V.  Cook.  1  Aikons  (Vt.)  363,  15  Am.  Dec.  698;  liovejoy  v.  Webber, 
10  Mass.  103;    Brackett  v.  Winslow,  17  Mass.  159. 

2  6  Bryant  v.   Johnson,    24  Me.   304. 

2«  Folan  V.  Folan,  50  Me.  506;  Dinpman  v.  Myers,  13  (;ray  (Mass.)  1: 
Marvin  v.  Wllkliis,  1  Aikens  (Vt.)  107;  Alexander  v.  Ablwtt.  21  Vt.  476; 
Whitney  v.  Silver,  22  Vt.  034;  Eastman  v.  Waterman,  20  Vt.  494,  Harmon 
V.  Martin,   52   Vt.   255. 

27  Spaulding  v.  Swift,  18  Vt.  214. 

28  Crawford  v.  Cheney.  12  Vt.  567;  Pike  v.  Hill.  15  Vt.  183;  Paddleford 
V.  Bancroft,  22  Vt.  529;  Hawley  v.  Mead.  52  Vt.  343;  Kimball  V.  Randall, 
56  Vt.  558. 

2BJiidd  V.  Downing,  Brayt.  (Vt.)  27;    Starbird  v.  Moore.  21  Vt  529.     See 
Barber  v.  Graves,  18  Vt.  290. 
30  IJiicoln  V.  Flint,  18  Vt.  247. 

«i  Merchants*  Ins.  Co.  v.  De  Wolf,  33  Pa.  45,  75  Am.  Dec.  577. 
(45S) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  '  §  299 

writ  may  also  be  brought  when  the  debtor  has  been  discharged  in 
bankruptcy  subsequent  to  the  judgment ;  **  or  to  set  aside  a  judg- 
ment from  which  an  appeal  was  wrongfully  denied  by  the  inferior 
court."  So  where  two  suits  are  brought  at  the  same  time  for  the 
same  cause  of  action,  and  proceed  pari  passu  to  judgment  and  exe- 
cution, a  satisfr-rtion  of  either  judgment  may  be  shown,  upon  audita 
querela,  in  discharge  of  the  other.'*  But  on  the  other  hand,  the 
writ  of  audita  querela  will  not  lie  in  any  case  where  the  defendant 
had  a  legal  opportunity  to  avail  himself,  before  judgment,  of  the 
same  matters  which  he  now  sets  up,,  or  where  his  own  negligence 
has  brought  about  the  injury  complained  of.**^  Npr  can  it  be  brought 
where  the  matter  alleged  would  be  a  proper  subject  for  a  writ  of 
error;'"  nor  in  respect  to  matters  which  constitute  an  equitable 
defense,  not  cognizable  at  law ;  '^  nor  for  irregularities  which  do 
not  affect  the  substantial  validity  of  the  process  in  the  action  or  the 
merits  of  the  controversy;'®  nor  on  account  of  an  erroneous  tax- 
ation of  costs  or  allowance  of  excessive  interest.'"  In  a  majority 
of  the  states,  the  proceeding  by  audita  querela  has  fallen  into  com- 
plete disuse,  being  superseded  by  the  more  summary  method  of 
applying  for  relief  hy  motion,  upon  notice.*®    For,  as  a  general  rule, 

»» Petit  V.  Seaman,  2  Root  (Conn.)  178;  Williams  v.  Butcher,  1  Wkly. 
Notes  Cas.  (Pa.)  304;  Baker  v.  Judges  of  Ulster  Common  Pleas,  4  Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  191. 

38  Edwards  v.  Osgood,  33  Vt.  224;   Harriman  v.  Swift,  31  Vt.  385. 

»*  Browne  v.  Joy,  9  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  221. 

»«  Avery  v.  U.  S.,  12  Wall.  304,  20  L.  I«>i.  405;  Love  joy  v.  Webber,  10  Mass. 
101;  Barker  v.  Walsh,  14  Allen  (Mass.)  175;  Jb^xon  v.  Baxter,  11  C:n8h. 
(ilass.)  35;    Barrett  v.  Vaughan,  6  Vt.  243;    Griswold  v.  Rutland,  23  Vt.  324. 

3«  Weeks  v.  I^wrence,  1  Vt  433;  Dodge  v.  Hubbell,  Id.  491;  Eleventh 
School  Dist.  In  Alburgh  v.  Rood,  1  Williams  (Vt.)  214;  Sutton  v.  Tyn-ell,  10 
Vt.  87.  Nor  does  It  change  the  rule  that  the  writ  of  error  is  taken  away 
by  statute.  Tuttle  v.  Town  of  Burlin*?ton,  Brayt.  (Vt.)  27;  Dodge  v.  Hub- 
bell.  1  Vt.  491;    Spear  v.  Flint,  17  Vt.  497. 

s^Schott  T.  Mcl<"arland,  1  Phila.  (Pa.)  58;  Garfield  v.  Vermont  University, 
10  Vt.  536. 

»^  Sawyer  v.  Doane,  19  Vt.  598;  Lampson  v.  Bradley,  42  Vt.  165;  Ball  v. 
Sleeper,  23  Vt.  573. 

38  Johnson  v.  Roberts,  58  Vt.  599,  2  Atl.  482;  (Goodrich  v.  WlUard,  11 
Cray,  380;  Clough  v.  Brown,  38  Vt.  179.  See  Kiekard  v.  Flsk,  G6  Vt.  G75,  30 
Atl.  93. 

*»Job  V.   Walker,  3  Md.   129;    Huston   v.  Ditto,   20  Md.   305;    Smock   v. 

(459) 


§    300  LAW  OP  JUDOMBNT8.  (Ch.  14 

wherever  this  writ  would  lie  at  common  law,  the  courts  may  now 
relieve  on  motion.**  In  two  states,  however, — ^Vermont  and  Massa- 
chusetts,— the  writ  of  audita  querela  is  still  in  use,  and  is  applied 
to  a  great  variety  of  purposes,  as  will  appear  from  the  cases  cited 
in  this  section. 

f  300.    By  Error  Coram  KoMs. 


Another  common  law  method  of  obtaining  relief  against  a  judjj- 
ment  in  the  court  which  rendered  it  was  by  writ  of  error  coram 
nobis.  This  writ  was  so  called  from  the  technical  words,  which 
recited  that  error  was  alleged  to  exist  in  a  certain  record  remain- 
ing "before  us,"  that  is,  before  the  court  which  had  pronounced  the 
judgment.  It  lay  for  the  correction  of  an  error  of  fact  (not  an  error 
of  law)  ir^  respect  to  a  matter  affecting  the  validity  and  regularity 
of  the  proceedings,  such  as  the  death  of  one  of  the  parties  at  the 
beginning  of  the  suit,  or  the  infancy,  insanity,  or  coverture  of  the 
defendant,  and  which  was  not  brought  into  the  issue.**  But  if  the 
court  was  fully  informed  of  and  rightly  apprehended  the  facts  in 
the  case,  its  error  in  applying  the  law  to  such  facts  is  not  such  an 
error  as  could  be  rectified  in  this  proceeding.     Nor  will  this  writ 

Dade,  5  Rand.  (Va.)  639,  16  Am.  Dec.  780;  Dongworth  v.  Screven,  2  UlU 
(S.  C.)  208,  27  Am.  Dec.  381;  Dunlap  v.  Clements,  18  Ala.  778;  Chaml)er!» 
V.  Neal,  13  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  256;  Marsh  v.  Haywood,  6  Humph.  (Tenn.)  210; 
McMillan  v.  Baker,  20  Kan.  50;  McDonald  v.  Falvey,  18  Wis.  571. 

41  Share  v.  Becker,  8  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  239;  Wltherow  v.  Keller.  11  Serg. 
&  R.  (Pa.)  274;  Baker  y.  Judges  of  Ulster  Common  Pleas,  4  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
191. 

*«  Kemp  V.  Oook,  18  Md.  130.  79  Am.  Dec.  681;  Mississippi  &  T.  R.  Co. 
V.  Wynne,  42  Miss.  315;  Milam  Co.  v.  Robertson,  47  Tex.  222;  Hurst  v. 
Fisher,  1  \N'atts  &  S.  (Pa.)  438;  Beall  v.  Powell,  4  Ga.  523;  Day  v.  Ham- 
burgh, 1  Browne  (Pa.)  75;  McLemore  v.  Durivage,  92  Tenn.  482.  22  8.  W. 
207;  Brady  v.  Washington  Ins.  Co.,  82  IH.  App.  380;  Holden  v.  Dunn.  144 
111.  413,  33  N.  E.  413,  19  L.  R.  A.  481;  CasUedlne  v.  Mundy,  4  Barn.  &  AdoL 
90;  Beren  v.  CJheshlre,  3  Dowl.  70;  King  v.  Jones,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1525;  Krans 
V.  Chester,  2  Mees.  &  W.  847.  In  West  Virginia,  it  is  said  that  a  writ  of 
error  coram  nobis  Is  not  a  proper  process  to  reverse  a  judgment  because  of 
defendant's  insanity  at  the  time  of  its  rendition,  as  the  Judgment  can  be  at- 
tacked for  such  cause  only  in  equity.  Withrow  v.  Smithson,  37  W.  Va- 
757,  17  S.  E.  316,  19  L.  R.  A.  762.  Entering  an  order  of  default  without 
first  passing  upon  a  pending  demurrer  is  an  error  of  law.  which  cannot  be 
rerisea  on  a  writ  of  error  coram  nobis.  Utley  ▼.  Cameron,  87  111.  App.  71. 
(460) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  301 

fie  to  contradict  or  put  in  issue  any  fact  that  has  been  already  ad- 
judicated in  the  action.**  Thus,  if  the  record  states  that  the  defend- 
ant appeared  and  confessed  judgment,  he  cannot  controvert  that  fact 
after  the  expiration  of  the  term  for  the  purpose  of  setting  aside  the 
judgment.**  The  writ  of  error  coram  nobis,  like  the  proceeding  by 
audita  querela,  has  now  fallen  into  practical  desuetude,  being  almost 
entirely  superseded  by  the  more  speedy  and  efficacious  remedy  by* 
motion  in  the  same  court.* •*  In  any  case,  the  writ  will  not  lie  after 
affirmance  of  the  judgment  in  the  appellate  court.** 

S  301.    By  Bill  of  Review. 

In  those  jurisdictions  where  the  ancient  forms  of  chancery  plead- 
ing and  practice  remain  in  force,  unmodified  by  statutes,  the  only 
proper  method  of  obtaining  the  vacation  or  annulment  of  a  decree 
in  equity,  after  the  term,  is  by  bill  of  review.  And  this  species  of 
bill  lies  in  cases  of  error  apparent  on  the  face  of  the  record,  for  frauds 
and  on  account  of  matters  subsequent  to  the  decree  and  which  could 
not  have  been  urged  in  defense.*^  But  the  rule  that  a  decree  once 
enrolled  cannot  be  opened  except  by  a  bill  of  review,  or  by  an  original 
bill  for  fraud,  "is  subject  to  well  founded  exceptions,  arising  in  cases 
not  heard  upon  the  merits,  and  in  which  it  is  alleged  that  the  decree 
was  entered  by  mistake  or  surprise,  or  under  such  circumstances  as 

"Gould's  Estate  v.  Watson,  80  lU.  App.  242. 

44  Richardson's  Ex*x  v.  Jones,  12  Grat.  (Va.)  53.  But  in  Missouri,  If  a 
court  commits  an  error  of  fact  Tital  to  its  Jurisdiction,  such  as  llndlng  de- 
fendant a  nonresident,  and  making  an  order  of  publication  against  him,  when 
In  fact  he  is  a  resident.  It  will,  on  error  coram  nobis,  set  aside  the  Judg- 
ment rendered  on  such  publication.    State  v.  White,  75  Mo.  App.  257. 

*»  Pickett's  Heirs  v.  Legerwood,  7  Pet.  144,  8  L.  Ed.  638;  Sloo  v.  State 
Bank,  1  Scam.  (111.)  428;  McKindley  v.  Buck,  43  111.  -488;  Ufe  Association 
V.  Fassett,  102  lU.  315;  Beaubien  v.  Hamilton,  3  Scam.  (111.)  213;  Billups 
y.  Freeman  (Ariz.)  52  Pac.  367.  In  Illinois,  this  writ  has  been  abolished,  and 
a  remedy  by  motion  substituted;  but  the  latter  can  reach  only  such  mistakes 
of  fact  as  might  have  been  corrected  by  error  coram  nobis  before  it  was 
abrogated.    McPherson  v.  Wood,  52  111.  App.  170. 

*«  LambeU  v.  Pretty  John,  1  Strange,  690. 

*7  See  Fries  v.  Fries.  1  MacArthur  (D.  0.)  291;  Durant  v.  Duchesse 
D'Auxy.  107  Ga.  456,  33  S.  E.  478;  Kizer  I/umber  Co.  v.  Mosely,  56  Ark. 
544,  20  S.  W.  409;  Carolina  Xat.  Bank  v.  Homestead  Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n,  56  S.  C.  12,  33  S.  E.  781. 

(4G1) 


§    302  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  14 

shall  satisfy  the  court,  in  the  exercise  of  a  sound  discretion,  that  the 
decree  ought  to  be  set  aside."  *•  To  a  bill  to  vacate  a  decree  the 
plaintiff  in  such  decree  is  a  necessary  party  defendant.  The  omission 
of  him  as  a  party  is  a  fatal  defect.^* 


S  302.    By  Direct  Aetioiu 

In  some  of  the  states,  instead  of  the  somewhat  summary  method 
of  vacating  judgments  on  notice  and  motion,  a  practice  prevails  by 
which  it  is  necessar>'  to  bring  a  direct  action  for  this  purpose,  in  the 
form  of  a  regular  suit,  with  plenary  proceedings,  in  which  the  relief 
denmnded  is  the  annulment  of  the  judgment  complained  of."  And 
in  some,  after  the  expiration  of  the  statutory  time  for  moving  to 
vacate  a  judgment,  the  defendant  may  still  proceed  by  an  inde- 
pendent action,  the  ground  of  objection  to  the  judgment  being  want 
of  jurisdiction  or  fraud  in  obtaining  it.*^  In  other  respects,  the  law 
and  practice  in  these  states,  on  the  topic  under  consideration,  does 
not  differ  materially  from  the  rest.     It  must  be  remarked  that  all  the 

«8Cawley  y.  Leonard,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  467;  Smith  t.  Alton,  22  N.  J.  Eq.  5?J: 
Beekman  v.  Peck,  3  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  415;  Bennett  v.  Winter,  2  Johns. 
Ch.  (N.  Y.)  205;  Miljspaugh  v.  McBride,  7  Paige  (N.  Y.)  509,  34  Am.  Dec. 
300;  Herbert  v.  Bowles,  30  Md.  271;  Erwln  v.  Vint,  6  Munf.  (Va.)  267: 
Carter  v.  Torrance,  11  Ga.  664. 

*»  Harwood  v.  Cincinnati  &  C.  Airline  B.  B.  Co.,  17  Wall.  78,  21  I*  EcL 
558. 

50  See  Hiirs  Code  Wash.  §fi  1393-1397;  Whidby  Land  &  Development  Co. 
V.  Nye,  5  Wash.  St.  301,  31  Pac.  752;  State  v.  Superior  Court,  19  Wa.^ 
128,  62  Pac.  1013,  67  Am.  St.  Bep.  724;  Boberts  v.  Shelton  8.  W.  B.  Co.,  21 
Wash.  427,  58  Pac.  576.  In  North  Carolina,  a  Judgment  sought  to  be  vii 
cated  on  the  ground  of  fraud  cannot  be  attacked  by  motion  in  the  cause,  but 
only  by  an  independent  action.  Uzzle  v.  Vinson,  111  N.  C.  138,  16  8,  E.  <t 
And  in  Indiana,  where  a  flnal  judgment  is  assailed  for  want  of  Jurisdictioa 
it  is  proper  to  attack  the  proceedings  by  a  complaint.  Scudder  v.  Jones.  1»M 
Ind.  547,  32  N.  E.  221.  An  application  for  the  vacation  of  a  Judgment  tboogfa 
in  the  form  of  a  motion,  may  properly  be  treated  as  by  petition,  where  it 
contains  averments,  statements,  and  demands  proper  In  a  petitloiv  Council 
Bluffs  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Jennings,  81  Iowa,  470,  46  N.  W.  1006;  Callanan  t. 
Aetna  Nat.  Bank,  84  Iowa,  8.  50  N.  W.  69. 

Bi  People  V.   Temple,   103  Cnl.  447,  37   Pac.  414;    Zinc   Carl>onate  Co.  v. 
First  Nat,  Bank,  103  Wis.  125,  79  N.  W.  229,  74  Am.  St  Bep.  845. 
(4G2) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  304 

parties  to  the  former  suit  must  be  made  parties  to  an  action  to  annul 
the  judgment.'* 

S  303.    By  Motioiu 

The  method  of  procuring  the  vacation  of  judgments  which  is  by 
far  the  most  commonly  used,  at  the  present  day,  is  the  proceeding  by 
appHcation  to  the  court  which  rendered  the  judgment,  in  the  form  of 
a  motion,  with  notice  to  the  adverse  party.**  This  practice,  being 
simple,  speedy,  and  effective,  is  well  calculated  to  promote  the  inter- 
ests of  justice  with  the  least  cost  and  trouble  to  suitors.  The  time 
within  which  such  applications  must  be  made,  the  parties  who  may 
apply,  the  grounds  upon  which  an  application  may  be  based,  and  the 
practice  in  proceedings  of  this  character,  are  the  subjects  which  will 
engage  our  attention  in  the  remaining  part  of  this  chapter. 

f  304.    Indirect  Vacatien  of  JndKment. 

It  has  been  held  that  the  entry  of  a  second  judgment,  in  the  same 
action,  is  riot  a  vacation  of  the  first  judgment,  if  there  is  nothing 
further  to  show  that  such  former  judgment  was  regularly  cancelled 
or  set  aside.  "When  a  judgment  is  once  entered  of  record,  it  must 
stand  as  the  judgment,  until  it  is  vacated,  modified,  or  disposed  of 
by  some  means  provided  by  law;  entering  additional  judgment 
entries  is  not  one  of  them."  **     But  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  said  that 

»2See  Haggerty  v.  Phillips,  21  La.  Ann.  729;  Green  v.  Grant,  108  Ga. 
751,  32  S.  E.  846. 

"As  to  the  circumstances  under  which  an  application  for  the  vacation 
of  a  Judgment  should  be  made  by  motion,  rather  than  by  an  independent 
action,  or  any  other  form  of  proceeding,  see  Frazier  v.  Williams,  18  Ind. 
41(5;  Grant  v.  Harrell,  109  N.  C.  78,  13  S.  E.  718;  Everett  v.  Reynolds,  114 
X.  C.  36t>,  19  8.  E.  233;  Drake  v.  Steadman,  40  S.  C.  474,  24  S.  E.  458;  SUber- 
man  v.  Shnklansky,  172  Pa.  77,  33  Atl.  272;  PoUock  v.  Boyd,  36  Neb.  369. 
54  N.  W.  560;  Iba  v.  Central  Ass'n  of  Wyoming,  5  Wyo.  355,  40  Pac.  527. 
An  application  by  a  wife  to  set  aside,  as  rendered  in  fraud  of  her  rights,  a 
judgment  by  confession  entered  against  her  husband,  pending  her  suit  for 
diTorce  and  alimony,  Is  a  suit  for  equitable  relief,  which  cannot  be  granted 
on  motion.  Dullard  v.  Phelan,  83  Iowa,  471,  50  N.  W.  204.  Statutes  au- 
thorizing the  yacation  of  Judgments  on  motion  Intend  that  the  motion  shall 
be  in  writing,  and  not  made  orally.  Indianapolis,  D.  &  W.  Ry.  Go.  y.  Crock- 
ett, 2  Ind.  App.  136,  28  X.  B.  222. 

•*  Nuckolls  V.  Irwin,  2  Neb.  60.    A  decree  declaring  the  rights  of  certain 

(463) 


§   304a  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (ph.  14 

although  after  a  judgment  has  been  entered  up  on  a  verdict,  such 
judgment,  strictly,  should  be  set  aside  before  a  new  trial  is  had,  yet 
if,  on  motion,  the  verdict  is  set  aside  and  a  new  trial  granted  and 
had,  the  judgment  will  be  deemed  to  have  been  set  aside/* 

§  304a.    Other  Remedies  ATAllable. 

A  motion  to  vacate  or  set  aside  a  judgment  will  not  be  entertained 
by  the  cou^  when  the  proper  remedy  of  the  party  aggrieved  is  by 
an  appeal,**  or  by  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  in  the  court  rendering 
the  judgment,*^  or  by  mandamus  requiring  the  court  to  take  some 
action  which  would  give  the  party  what  he  seeks,**  or  by  an  inde- 
pendent action  for  damages.*"  Sometimes  also,  the  case  is  such  that 
chancery  is  the  only  forum  competent  to  afford  adequate  relief ;  and 
then  the  party  must  seek  his  redress  there,  and  not  by  motion  to  set 
aside  the  judgment.*®  And  pending  a  suit  in  equity  to  restrain  pro- 
ceedings on  a  judgment,  and  have  it  declared  void,  the  court  in  which 
it  was  rendered  has  no  jurisdiction  of  a  rule  to  set  it  aside.**  Again, 
a  defendant  cannot  move  to  set  aside  a  judgment  at  the  same  time 
an  action  by  him  for  the  same  purpose  is  pending  in  another  court.** 

persons  in  an  action  is  not  vacated  by  a  subsequent  decree  declaring  tbe 
rights  of  such  persons  to  be  as  stated  in  the  form^  decree,  except  as  to  a 
person  who  has  since  intervened;  and  hence,  the  sabseqaent  decree  beinir 
itself  afterwards  vacated,  the  former  is  revived.  Mason  v.  McLean,  6  Wash. 
31,  32  Pac.  1006. 

68  Lane  v.  Klngsberry,  11  Mo.  402. 

»«  Landry  v.  Bertrand,  48  La.  Ann.  48,  19  South.  126;    Philadelphia  &  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Snowdon,  161  Pa.  201,  28  Atl.  1067. 

ftTFolsom  v.  BaUard,  16  C.  C.  A.  ri03,  70  Fed.  12;    Clark's  Cove  Guano 
Co.   V.  Steed,  02  Ga.  440,  17  S.  E.  967. 

»8  ChappeU  v.  Real-Estate  Pooling  Co.,  91  Md.  754.  46  Ati.  982. 

»»  ChappeU  v.  Real-Estate  Pooling  Co..  91  Md.  754,  46  Ati.  982. 

•0  Woodward   v.    Arlington   Mills   Manuf'g   Co.,   2   PennewlU   (Dd.)   m 
44  Atl.  620. 

•1  First  Nat  Bank  v.  Lieberman,  1  Marv.  (Del.)  367,  41  AtL  9a 
•2  Hay  V.  Cole,  90  Hun,  258,  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  950. 
(464) 


Ch*  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JinDOMENT&  §  305 

Part  III.     The  Time  op  Applying. 

§  305.    Dvrinc  tl&e  Term. 

It  IS  universally  held  that  judgments  are  tinder  the  plenary  con- 
trol of  the  court  which  pronounces  them  during  the  entire  term  at 
which  they  are  rendered  or  entered  of  record,  and  they  may,  during 
such  term,  ^be  set  aside,  vacated,  modified,  or  annulled  by  that  court 
for  cause  shown.*'  It  is  commonly  said  that  judgments  and  decrees 
remain  in  the  breast  of  the  court  during  the  term  of  their  rendition ; 
and,  for  the  purpose  of  modifying  or  vacating  them,  the  whole  term 
may  be  considered  as  one  day.**  This  power  may  be  exercised  dur- 
ing the  term  on  the  court's  own  proper  motion,  as  well  as  on  appli- 
cation by  a  party,  when  there  is  a  manifest  error  or  inadvertence  to 
be  corrected,  and  even,  in  proper  cases,  without  notice  to  the  par- 
ties.** Its  exercise  is  not  prevented  by  the  fact  that  a  bill  of  excep- 
tions has  been  taken  or  an  appeal  bond  filed.**  It  is  a  power  inherent 
in  all  courts  of  general  jurisdiction,  and  is  not  dependent  upon,  or 

•s  Aetna  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.Com'rs  of  Hamilton  Comity,  25  C.  C.  A.  94,  79 
Fed.  575;    Wyler  v.  t'nion  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (C.  C.)  89  Fed.  4;    Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  r.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  101  Fed.  146;  Fraley  v.  Feather, 
46  X.  J.  Law,  429;  Robinson  v.  Harford  County  Com'rs,  12  Md.  132;  Ruther- 
ford v.  Pope,  15  Md.  579;    Townshend  v.  Chew,  31  Md.  247;   Green  v.  Pitts- 
burgh, W.  &  K.  R.  Co..  11  W.  Va.  686;    Ketty  v.  High,  29  W.  Va.  381,  1  S. 
E.  561;   Gwlnn  y.  Parker,  119  N.  C.  19,  25  S.  E.  705;   Cooley  v.  Tybee  Beach 
Co.,  99  Ga.  290.  25  S.  E.  691;    Blackburn  v.  Knight,  81  Tex.  326.  16  S.  W. 
1075;    Manguno  &  Tomfocaro   Co.   v.   Clymonts.   19  Ohio   Cir.    Ct.   R.   237; 
Sagory  v.  Bayless,  13  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  153;    Barker  v.  Justice,  41  Miss. 
240;    Pattfson  v.  Josselyn,  43  Miss.  373;    Ashley  v.  Hyde,  5  Ark.  100;    Mc- 
Knfght  V.  Strong,  25  Ark.  212;    Underwood  v.  Sledge,  27  Ark.  295;    Ralston 
V.  Lotbain,   18  Ind:  303;    Gingrich  v.  Gingrich,  146  Ind.  227,  45  N.  E.  101; 
Taylor  v.  Ltisk,  9  Iowa,  444;    State  v.  Callaway  County  Treasurer,  43  Mo. 
228;    Rankin   v.  Lawton,  17  Mo.  App,  574;    Smith  v.  Perkins,  124  Mo.  50, 
27  8.  W.  574;    VoUand  v.  Wilcox,  17  Neb.  46,  22  N.  W.  71;   Tiiylor  v.  Trum- 
baU,  32  Xeb.  506,  49  N.  W.  375;    Bradley  v.  Slater,  58  Neb.  554,  78  N.  W. 
1069;    Ballard  v.  Purcell,  1  Nev.  342;   Martin  v.  Skehan,  2  Colo.  614;   State 
T.  Sowders,  42  Kan.  312,  22  Pac.  425. 

a<  Jordan   v.  Tarver,  92  Ga.  879,  17  S.  B,  351;  Woodward  y.  Woodward, 
84  Mo.  App.   328. 
es  Raj  Y.  Moore,  19  Ind.  App.  090,  49  N.  B.  1083. 

••Blackburn  v.  Knight,  81  Tex.  326,  16  S.  W.  1075;    Huber  Manufg  Co. 
T.  Sweny,  57  Ohio  St.  169,  48  N.  E.  879. 

1  LAW  JUDG.-30  (465) 


§   306  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTa  (Ch    14 

derived  from,  statutes.*^  Thus,  a  statute  requiring  applications  for 
a  new  trial  to  be  made  within  three  days  after  the  verdict  or  decision 
has  no  application  to  a  motion  to  set  aside  a  default,  made  at  the 
same  term.'* 

§  306.    Aft^r  the  Term. 

It  was  the  rule  of  the  common  law, — and  it  is  still  adhered  to  with 
more  or  less  consistency  in  most  of  the  states, — that  after  the  expira- 
tion of  the  term  the  court  loses  control  of  its  judgments  rendered 
during  that  term ;  they  become  final,  and  the  court  has  no  longer  the 
power  to  vacate  or  modify  them  or  to  set  them  aside.'"     The  supreme 

«7  Bradley  v.  Slater,  58  Neb.  554,  78  N.  W.  10G9;  Manguno  &  Tomfocaro 
Co.  V.  Clymonts,  19  Ohio  Clr.  Ct.  R.  237. 

68  Hall  V.  Houghton  &  Upp  Mercantile  Co.,  8  C.  C.  A.  G61.  60  Fed.  3o0: 
Bradley  v.  Slater,  58  Neb.  554,  78  N.  W.  lObD;  KIglesberger  v.  Bailey  mjj 
44  S.  W.  118.  The  sustaining  of  an  application  to  open  a  default  Judgment 
though  in  the  form  of  an  ordinary  motion  for  a  new  trial,  where  made  after 
the  time  for  granting  a  new  trial,  will  be  presumed  to  have  been  done  in 
pursuance  of  the  inherent  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  and  not  as  a  demandable 
statutory  right.    Bradley  y.  Slater,  supra. 

68Bronson  v.  Shulten,  104  U.  S.  410,  26  L.  Ed.  U97;  Bmsti  T.  Bobbins. 
3  McLean,  486,  Fed.  Gas.  No.  2,059;  Bank  v.  I^bltut,  1  Woo<!s,  11,  Fed.  Caa. 
No.  842;  Grames  v.  Hawley  (O.  C.)  50  Fed.  319;  Loney  v.  Bailey.  43  Md.  10: 
Green  v.  Pittsburgh,  W.  &  K.  R.  Co.,  11  W.  Va.  685:  Barbour  County  Court 
V.  O'Neal,  42  W.  Va.  295,  26  S.  E.  182;  Ramsour  v.  Baper,  29  N.  C.  a46; 
Moore  y.  Hinnant,  90  N.  0.  163;  Trustees  of  Internal  Imp.  Fund  ▼.  Bailey. 
10  Fla.  238;  Ex  parte  Sims,  44  Ala.  248;  Buchanan  v.  Thomason,  70  Ala.  401: 
Orothers  v.  Ross'  Distributees,  15  Ala.  800;  Gotten  v.  Mc€}ehee,  54  Miss.  621; 
Alabama  &  V.  Ry.  Co.  y.  Bolding,  69  Miss.  255,  13  South.  844,  30  Am.  St  Rep. 
541;  Brewster  y.  Norfleet,  3  Tex.  Qy.  App.  103,  22  S.  W.  226;  Merle  t.  An- 
drews, 4  Tex.  200;  Rogers  y.  Watrous,  8  Tex.  62,  58  Am.  Dec.  100;  Ragsdale 
Y.  Green,  36  Tex.  193;  Anderson  y.  Anderson,  18  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  95;  McManama 
Y.  Garnett,  3  Mete.  (Ky.)  517;  LoYelace  y.  LoYell  (Ky.)  55  S.  W.  549;  Johnson 
Y.  Jones,  58  Kan.  745,  51  Pac.  224;  Rawdon  y.  Rapley,  14  Ark.  208,  58  Am. 
Dec.  370;  Ashley  y.  Hyde,  6  Ark.  92,  42  Am.  Dec.  685;  Exposition  Building 
&  Loan  Co.  Y.  Spiegel,  12  Ohio  Gir.  Ct  R.  761;  Blair  y.  Russell,  1  Smith  (Ind.) 
287;  Bland  y.  State,  2  Ind.  608;  Rich  y.  City  of  Chicago,  187  RL  396,  58  N.  E. 
306;  Cook  y.  Wood,  24  111.  295;  Cox  y.  Brackett,  41  111.  222;  Smith  y.  Wilson. 
26  111.  186;  Schmidt  y.  Thomas,  33  111.  App,  109;  DaYles  ▼.  Coryell,  37  IlL 
App.  505;  Baldwin  y.  McClelland,  152  111.  42,  38  N.  E.  143;  McChesney  y.  City 
of  Chicago,  161  111.  110,  43  N.  E.  702;  Stettauer  y.  Chicago  TiUe  &  Trust  Co^ 
62  111.  App.  31;  Kelley  y.  Heath  &  MilUgan  Manufg  Cb.,  66  111.  App.  52$: 
Bristol  Y.  Ross,  79  111.  App.  261;  Fish  Furniture  Co.  y.  Jenkins,  82  IlL  App. 
^1;  Utley  y.  Cameron,  87  111.  App.  71;  Ashby  y.  Glasgow,  7  Mo.  £90;  Orris 

(466) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JX7DGMBNT&  §  306 

court  of  the  United  States  has  stated  the  rule  concisely  in  the  fol- 
lowing language:  "It  is  a  general  rule  of  the  law  that  all  the  judg- 
ments, decrees,  or  other  orders"  of  the  courts,  however  conclusive  in 
their  character,  are  under  the  control  of  the  court  which  pronounces 
them  during  the  term  at  which  they  are  rendered  or  entered  of  rec- 
ord, and  ihey  may  then  be  set  aside,  vacated,  modified,  or  annulled 
by  that  court.  But  it  is  a  rule  equally  well  established,  that  after 
the  term  has  ended  all  final  judgments  and  decrees  of  the  court  pass 
beyond  its  control,  unless  steps  be  taken  during  that  term,  by  motion 
or  otherwise,  to  set  aside,  modify,  or  correct  them;  and  if  errors 
exist,  they  can  only  be  corrected  by  such  proceeding  by  a  writ  of 
error  or  appeal  as  may  be  allowed  in  a  court  which  by  law  can  review 
the  decision."  '®  And  the  federal  circuit  courts  agree  that  they  have 
no  power  to  vacate  or  reverse  their  judgments  or  decrees,  after  the 
term,  except  in  the  cases  specified  in  the  decision  of  the  supreme  court 
just  quoted.^*  In  California,  after  the  adjournment  of  the  term,  the 
court  loses  all  control  over  its  decisions,  unless  its  jurisdiction  is 
saved  by  some  motion  or  proceeding  at  the  time,  except  when  the 
summons  has  not  been  served,  in  which  case  a  party  may,  within  six 
months,  move  to  set  aside  the  judgment.^^  In  Massachusetts,  a 
court  which  by  statute  holds  weekly  terms,  has  no  authority,  on  mo- 
tion at  one  of  such  terms,  to  vacate  a  final  judgment  duly  entered 

T.  ElUott,  65  Mo.  App.  96;  McBrlen  v.  RUey,  38  Neb.  561,  57  N.  W.  385;  Flsk 
T.  Thorp,  51  Neb.  1,  70  N.  W.  496;  Spafford  v.  City  of  Janes vllle,  15  W^ls.  474; 
Gray  v.  Gates,  37  Wis.  614;  Salter  v.  Hllgen,  40  Wis.  363;  Suydam  v.  Pitcher, 
4  Cal.  280;  Bell  v.  Thompson.  19  Cal.  706;  Lattimer  v.  Ryan,  20  Cal.  628; 
WlUiam  Deering  &  Co.  v.  Orelghton,  26  Or.  556,  38  Pac.  710;  Exchange  Bank 
T.  Ford.  7  Colo.  449,  3  Pac.  449;  Jones  v.  New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.,  14  Utah, 
215,  47  Pac.  74;  Benson  v.  Anderson,  14  Utah,  334,  47  Pac.  142. 
TO  Bronson  v.  Schulten,  104  U.  S.  410,  26  L.  Ed.  997. 

TiKlever  v.  Seawall,  12  C.  C.  A.  053.  65  Fed.  373;  Austin  v.  Riley  (C.  C.) 
55  Fed.  833;  Allen  v.  Wilson  (0.  C.)  21  Fed.  881.  The  practice  of  a  state 
court  in  opening  Judgments  or  decrees  by  default  after  the  term  at  which 
they  became  absolute  will  not  be  observed  in  a  suit  in  equity  in  a  federal 
court  in  that  state,  under  Rer.  St  U.  S.  §  914,  which  requires  the  practice  of 
the  federal  courts  to  conform  to  that  of  the  state  courts  only  in  *'civil  cases 
other  than  equit>'  and  admiralty  causes."  Austin  v.  Riley  (C.  C.)  55  Fed.  833. 
72  Shaw  V.  McGregor,  8  Cal.  521;  Robb  v.  Robb,  6  Cal.  21;  Bell  v.  Thomp- 
son, 19  Cal.  706. 

(467) 


i  306  LAW  OP  JUDOMBNTft  (Ch.  \i 

at  a  pre'^^ous  term.**  In  Alabama  and  some  other  states,  while  the 
general  rule  is  followed,  it  is  considered  that  if,  by  agreement  of  the 
parties,  the  court  sets  aside  a  judgment  after  the  term  and  again  tries 
the  cause,  the  judgment  afterwards  entered  is  not  void  for  want  of 
jurisdiction,  though  the  court  is  not  bound  to  retry  ^  cause  even 
if  the  parties  consent.^*  But  in  some  other  states  it  is  held  that, 
notwithstanding  the  agreement  of  parties,  all  the  proceedings  sub- 
sequent to  the  first  judgment  are  coram  non  judice  and  void."  And 
this  indeed  seems  the  more  logical  position.  In  Wisconsin,  where  a 
judgment  entered  is  not  void  but  simply  irregular,  the  court  has  no 
power  to  vacate  it  after  the  term  at  which  it  was  entered,  or  if  entered 
by  the  clerk  in  vacation,  after  the  term  next  succeeding  its  entr}\'* 
The  rule  stated  applies  to  decrees  in  equity  as  well  as  judgments  at 
law.  In  general,  chancery  cannot  open  a  final  decree  after  the  end 
of  the  term  at  which  it  was  made,  unless  upon  a  bill  of  review,  or  bill 
in  that  nature,  or  bill  or  petition  impeaching  the  decree  for  fraud." 
But  here,  as  we  have  already  said,^'  an  exception  must  be  made  in 
the  case  of  equity  causes  not  heard  upon  the  merits  and  in  which  the 
decree  was  entered  by  fraud,  mistake,  surprise,  or  other  exceptional 
circumstances.  If  the  rule  applies  to  any  courts  it  applies  to  all 
The  court  of  last  resort  in  a  state  cannot  set  aside  a  judgment  or 
decree  rendered  by  it,  after  the  expiration  of  the  term  at  which  it  was 
rendered,  unless  the  same  is  void  on  its  face.''* 

Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  in  many  of  the  states  there  is  a  strong 
disposition  not  to  depart  widely  from  the  common  law  rule  on  this 
point.  The  reasons  of  the  rule  are  obvious  and  weighty.  The  inter- 
ests of  the  individual  as  well  as  of  the  community  demand  that  there 
should  be  a  definitive  end  of  every  litigation;  and  nothing  could  be 

T8  Wood  V.  Payea,  138  Mass.  61. 

74  Kidd  V,  McMillan,  21  Ala.  325;  Hair  v.  Moody,  9  Ala.  399;  Gage  t.  City 
of  Chicago,  141  111.  642,  31  N.  E.  163;  Royal  Trust  Oo.  t.  Exchange  Bank.  .Vi 
Neb.  663,  76  N .  W.  425. 

» 5  City  of  Dlttle  Rock  v.  Bullock,  6  Ark.  282;  Anderson  v.  Thompson.  7 
LesL  (Tenn.)  250. 

»•  Egan  v.  Sengplel,  46  WJ.s.  703,  1  N.  W.  467. 

ft  Brooks'  Adm'r  v.  Love,  3  Dana  (Ky.)  7;  Bobb  v.  Bobb.  2  A«  K.  Marsh. 
(Ky.)  240;   McMIcken  v.  Peyin.  18  How.  507,  15  L.  Ed.  504. 

T«  Supra,  §  301. 

T»  Donnell  v.  Hamilton,  77  Ala.  610. 
(468) 


Cb.  14.)  VACATING  AND  OPBNINO  JUDGMENTS.  §  307 

more  impolitic  than  to  leave  it  in  the  discretion  of  every  court  to 
revise  and  review  and  reconsider  its  judgments  without  limit.  Yet 
it  is  very  necessary  to  observe  that  this  rule  does  not  by  any  means 
obtain  in  all  its  rigor  in  every  state  and  jurisdiction.  The  practice 
varies  so  much  from  state*  to  state  that  it  is  most  difficult  to  formulate 
general  principles.  But  we  shall  find,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  rule 
is  almost  everywhere  subject  to  certain  well-recognized  exceptions; 
as  where  the  judgment  in  question  is  entirely  void,  or  was  entered 
without  the  authority  of  the  court,  or  is  vitiated  by  some  substantial 
irregularity.  These  instances  will  be  discussed  in  succeeding  sec- 
tions under  their  appropriate  titles.  In  the  second  place,  it  will  be 
discovered  that  in  some  few  states  the  rule  is  not  observed  at  all, 
the  courts  exertising  the  power  to  vacate  or  open  judgments  in 
proper  cases,  without  any  limitation  as  to  time.®^  Finally,  in  a  con- 
siderable number  of  states,  the  statutes  both  prescribe  the  grounds 
on  which  judgments  may  be  vacated  and  fix  an  arbitrary  limit,  usually 
six  months  or  a  year,  within  which  the  application  may  be  made. 

§'307.    Void  Judgment!* 

It  was  intimated  in  the  last  section  that  a  judgement  which  is  en- 
tirely void  may  always  be  set  aside  at  a  subsequent  term.  And  this 
is  the  general  doctrine  of  the  cases.  Every  court  possesses  inherent 
power  to  vacate  entries  in  its  record  of  judgments,  decrees,  or  orders 
rendered  or  made  without  jurisdiction,  either  during  the  term  at 
which  the  entries  are  made  or  after  its  expiration.**     This  rule  ap- 

80  See  Breden  v.  Giiniand,  67  Pa.  36;  Capen  v.  Inhabitants  of  Stoughton,  16 
Gray  (Mass.)  365. 

>»i  Thomas  v.  American  Freehold  Land  &  Mortg.  Co.  (O.  C.)  47  Fed.  550,  12 
L.  R.  A.  681;  Couch  v.  Heffron,  15  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  636;  In  re  CoUege  Street, 
11  R.  I.  472;  Ladd  v.  Mason,  10  Or.  308:  Bruce's  Ex'x  v.  Strickland's  Adm*r, 
47  Ala.  192;  Baker  v.  Barclift,  76  Ala.  414;  Dazey  v.  Pennington,  10  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  326,  31  S.  W.  312;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Wm.  B.  Grimes  Dry-Goods  Co.,  45 
Kan.  510,  2(»  Pac.  56;  People  v.  Temple,  103  Gal.  447,  37  Pac.  414;  Kaufmann 
V.  Drexel,  5(5  Xeb.  221),  76  X.  W.  550.  But  a  judgment  which  is  merely  void- 
able, for  errors  or  irregularities,  must  be  attacked  in  due  time,  by  motion  to 
vacate  or  by  appeal.  Kinsteln  v.  Davidson,  35  Fla.  342,  17  South.  563.  And 
where  Jurisdiction  is  duly  acquired  by  service  of  process,  a  judgment  errone- 
ously entered  by  default  is  not  void,  and  the  court  cannot  set  it  aside  at  a 
subsequent  term.    Maple  v.  Havenhill,  37  111.  App.  311. 

(409) 


§    308  ULW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Gh.   14 

plies  not  only  where  there  is  a  want  of  jurisdiction  over  the  parties, 
but  also  where  jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter  is  lacking.  A  judg- 
ment which  is  outside  of  the  issues,  and  on  a  matter  not  submitted 
for  determination,  is  a  nullity,  and  may  be  set  aside  at  any  time.*' 
It  is  also  said  that  the  trial  court  has  inherent  power  to  vacate,  after 
the  term,  a  judgment  obtained  by  fraud,  or  which  is  not  in  accord 
with  that  intended  to  be  entered,®'  or  one  entered  by  the  clerk  with- 
out authority  and  in  violation  of  law,®*  or  one  which  has  been  ren- 
dered contrary  to  the  course  of  law  and  practice."  But  in  some 
states  it  is  held  that,  to  authorize  the  setting  aside  of  a  void  judgment 
after  the  expiration  of  the  term,  the  invalidity  of  the  judgment  must 
appear  on  the  face  of  the  record,  and  not  from  matter  outside  of  it, 
except  in  cases  of  fraud,  and  where  the  judgment  was  rendered  after 
the  death  of  a  party.** 

§  308.    Interloeutory  JndKatents. 

An  interlocutory  judgment  or  decree,  made  in  the  progress  of  a 
cause,  is  always  under  the  control  of  the  court  until  the  final  decision 
of  the  suit,  and  it  may  be  modified  or  rescinded,  upon  sufficient 
grounds  shown,  at  any  time  before  final  judgment,  though  it  be  after 
the  term  in  which  the  interlocutory  sentence  was  given.*^     And  in 

82  GiHe  v.  Emmons,  58  Kan.  118,  48  Pac.  569,  62  Am.  St  Rep.  009.  Bat  in 
Wisconsin,  a  final  judgment  in  the  court  of  last  resort  cannot  be  vacated  after 
a  year  from  its  rendition  on  the  ground  that  the  court  had  no  jurisdiction  of 
the  subject-matter.    State  v.  Waupaca  County  Bank,  20  Wis.  640. 

•8  Harper  v.  Barnett  (Miss.)  16  South.  533;  Ruenbuhl  v.  Heffron  (Tex-  CIt. 
App.)  38  S.  W.  1028. 

84  Mlckler  v.  Reddick.  38  Fla.  341,  21  South.  286. 

8B  Or  vis  V.  Elliott.  65  Mo.  App.  96. 

89  Pcttus  y.  McGlannahan,  52  Ala.  55;  Kohn  v.  Haas,  95  Ala.  478,  12  Sooth. 
577;   People  v.  Dodge,  104  Oal.  487,  38  Pac.  203. 

87  Blythe  v.  Hinckley  (C.  C.)  84  Fed.  228;  Miller  v.  Justice,  86  X.  C.  2«^: 
Davis  V.  Roberts.  Smedes  &  M.  Ch.  (Miss.)  543;  State  v.  King,  46  La.  Ann. 
163,  15  South.  283;  Patterson  v.  Hare,  74  Hun.  2C9,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  626;  Brat 
v.  Miranda,  8  N.  M.  78,  42  Pac.  91.  This  is  the  case,  for  example,  with  an 
order  merely  sustaining  a  demurrer,  or  striking  out  a  count  Clarke  r.  Ohio 
River  R.  Co.,  39  W.  Va.  732,  20  S.  E.  696.  Or  an  order  appointing  a  receiver  to 
take  charge  of  mortgaged  property  pending  foreclosure,  Balfour-Guthrie  In  v. 
Co.  V.  Gelger,  20  Wash.  579,  56  Pac.  370.  Compare  Morgan  v.  Ohio  River  R. 
Co.,  39  W.  Va.  17,  19  S.  E.  588:  WoflPonden  v.  Woflfenden,  1  Ariz.  328.  25  Pac 
666:  Wliides  v.  Kai-p,  150  Mo.  600,  51  S,  W.  1044. 

(470) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  309 

some  states  it  is  held  that  mere  office  judgments  (such  as  are  entered 
of  course)  are  under  the  control  of  the  court  in  succeeding  terms 
and  can  be  modified  or  set  aside  on  cause  shown,  even  after  judg- 
ment has  been  perfected;  but  it  is  within  the  discretion  of  the  courts 
and  their  decision  cannot  be  appealed  from.*®  And  it  seems  that  a 
mere  naked  default,  on  which  no  judgment  or  decree  has  ever  been 
entered,  may  be  set  aside  at  any  time  on  proper  grounds;  in  this 
case  the  discretion  of  the  court  is  not  limited  as  to  time.®*  In  Cali- 
fornia, a  motion  to  vacate  a  default  entered  by  the  clerk  may  be  made 
at  any  time  before  final  judgment  is  entered,  although  the  court  may 
have  adjourned  for  the  term  at  which  the  default  was  entered  before 
the  motion  is  made.'® 

§  309.    PejuisylTania  Praetioe. 

In  the  state  of  Pennsylvania  the  practice  in  regard  to  opening 
judgments  has  been  developed  by  a  long  line  of  cases,  and  has  set- 
tled in  a  form  different  from  that  found  in  most  other  jurisdictions. 
In  the  language  of  Judge  Sharswood :  "Every  court  has  power  to 
open  a  judgment  in  order  to  give  the  parties  a  hearing  or  trial.  In 
the  case  of  judgments  by  confession  or  default,  there  is  no  limit  of 
lime  to  the  exercise  of  this  power,  but  in  the  case  of  judgments  en- 
tered adversely  after  a  hearing  or  trial,  it  is  settled  that  it  must  be 
done  before  the  end  of  the  term  at  which  they  are  entered."  "^    And 

««  PoweU  V.  JopIiDg.  47  N.  C.  400;  WUson  v.  Torbert.  3  Stew.  (Ala.)  206,  21 
Am.  Dec.  632. 

«»Urdway  v.  guchard,  31  Iowa,  487;  Simmons  v.  Church.  Id.  284;  Harper 
V.  Drake.  14  Iowa,  533. 

•0  Willson  V.  deaveland.  30  Cal.  192. 

•1  King  V.  Brooks.  72  Pa.  364.  And  see  Bradley  v.  Towanda  Tp..  133  Pa. 
Ml,  20  Atl.  1060;  HHl  v.  Egan,  2  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  596.  A  judgment  may  be  set 
aside  for  fraud,  after  the  term  at  which  it  was  rendered,  but  the  petition  must 
net  forth  the  essential  facts  of  the  fraud  alleged,  so  that  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  court  may  appear.  Fisher  v.  HestonvUle.  M.  &  F.  Pass.  Ry.  Co..  185  Pa. 
♦JfC,  40  Atl.  97.  The  power  to  open  or  set  aside  judgments  Is  an  equitable 
power,  and  should  be  based  upon  the  exercise  of  a  sound  legal  discretion  by 
the  court,  not  a  mere  arbitrary  exercise  of  power.  Fisher  v.  HestonvUle,  M. 
&  F.  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  supra;  Sullivan  v.  Sweeney,  189  Pa.  474,  42  Atl.  45.  The 
IK'titioner  must  show  adequate  grounds  for  such  action  on  the  part  of  the 
court,  and  mere  denial  of  the  indebtedness  charged  against  him  will  not  gen-" 
erally  be  sufHcient    Ware  v.  Baldwin,  7  Kulp,  278.    It  has  been  remarked 

(471) 


§    810  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  {Ch.   14 

a  judgment  may  be  opened,  for  proper  cause,  notwithstanding  it  may 
have  been  several  times  revived  by  scire  facias.  "If  the  original 
judgment  was  obtained  by  fraud  and  misrepresentation,  and  the  sub- 
sequent revivals  were  but  a  continuation  gf  such  fraud  and  misrepre- 
sentation, it  is  difficult  to  see  how  such  revivals  could  add  anything 
to  the  validity  of  the  orijrinal  judgment."  •* 

§  310.    Jndcrment  carried  OTer  il&e  Term  by  Motiiim* 

Whatever  abridges  or  suspends  the  final  character  of  a  judgment 
will  save  it  from  the  operation  of  the  rule  under  consideration.  A 
motion  to  vacate  a  judgment,  made  at  the  same  term  at  which  the 
judgment  was  rendered  and  continued  to  a  subsequent  term,  may  be 
allowed  at  such  subsequent  term.'*  But  it  is  held  that  leave  granted 
at  the  term  in  which  the  judgment  is  entered,  to  move  in  the  next 
term  to  set  it  aside,  is  irregular  and  void.'*  Where  a  motion  for  a 
new  trial  is  continued  over  the  term,  the  proceedings  are  still  in  the 
breast  of  the  judge,  and  he  has  jurisdiction  to  set  aside  the  judgment 
for  informality,  and  let  the  verdict  stand.'*  So  where  a  judgment  is 
entered  by  default  against  two  joint  defendants,  and  at  the  same  time 

that  the  practice  of  opening  a  judfi^ment  to  let  the  defendant  in  to  a  defensp 
is  not  peculiar  to  Pennsylvania,  although  it  is  unknown  to  the  common  law. 
It  is  an  appeal  to  the  equitable  powers  of  the  court  to  allow  a  hearing  on  the 
merits  from  which  the  defendant,  by  adherence  to  the  strict  forms  of  law. 
would  otherwise  be  precluded.  McAnulty  v.  National  Life  ABS*n«  6  Lack. 
Leg.  N.  128.  A  somewhat  similar  practice  obtains  in  Illinois,  in  regard  to 
Judgments  entered  by  confession.  See  Hall  v.  Jones.  32  III.  38.  A  judgment 
by  default,  regular  and  valid  in  fact,  cannot  be  stricken  from  the  record;  tli<* 
remedy  is  by  motion  to  open  the  Judgment  and  let  the  defefldtuit  in  to  a  de> 
fense.     North  v.  Yorke,  174  Pa.  349.  34  Atl.  620. 

8  2  Monroe  v.  Monroe,  93  Pa.  520.    See  GStizens'  Trust  &  Surety  Co.  t.  Good- 
child.  VJo  Pa.  80.  45  Ati.  6G2. 

03  Windett  V.  Hamilton,  52  111.  180;  Green  v.  Pittsburgh,  W.  A  K.  R,  Ca, 
11  W.  Va.  685;  Niles  v.  Parks,  49  Ohio  St.  370,  34  N.  E.  735;  Childa  r.  Kansas 
City,  St.  J.  &  C.  B.  R.  Co.,  117  Mo.  414,  23  S.  W.  373;  Babcock  Hardware  Co. 
V.  Farmers*  &  Drovers*  Bank,  50  Kan.  G4S,  32  Pac.  377.  Compare  Ashley  v. 
Hyde,  6  Ark.  92,  42  Am.  Dec.  685.  In  Kentucky,  a  court  of  continuous  session 
cannot,  by  continuing  from  time  to  time  a  motion  to  set  aside  a  Judgment  re- 
tain control  over  such  Judgment  beyond  00  days  after  its  rendition.  WUliams 
V.  Williams  (Ky.)  54  S.  W.  716. 
•    »4  Hill  V.  aty  of  St.  Louis,  20  Mo.  584. 

•6  Suddnrth  v.  Empire  Lime  Co.,  79  Mo.  App.  585. 
(472) 


Gh.   14)  VACATINQ  AND  OPENING  iiJDOMENTS.  §  811 

the  cause  is  removed  to  the  federal  court  on  motion  of  a  third  de- 
fendant, after  it  is  determined  that  the  removal  was  erroneous  and  the 
cause  is  sent  back  to  the  state  court,  the  latter  court  has  the  power 
at  the  first  term  thereafter,  on  plaintiff's  motion,  to  strike  off  the 
judgment,  although  a  term  had  intervened  after  it  was  entered;  the 
rule  (in  Illinois)  that  a  judgment  may  be  set  aside  or  amended  only  at 
the  same  or  the  next  term  after  its  entry  not  applying  while  the 
cause  is  pending  in  the  federal  court.'* 

I  811.    Under  Btatniefi. 

In  many  of  the  states,  statutes  have  been  enacted  which  provide 
that  the  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  relieve  a  party  from  a  judg- 
ment taken  against  him,  on  certain  enumerated  grounds,  within  a 
prescribed  time  from  the  rendition  of  the  judgment,  usually  six 
months  or  a  year,  or  in  some  jurisdictions  two  years,  or  within  a 
similar  period  from  notice  of  the  judgment.'^  Our  chief  interest  in 
these  statutes  is  in  connection  with  the  causes  which  they  specify 
as  sufficient  to  warrant  the  vacation  of  the  judgment,  and  in  this 
regard  they  will  be  fully  considered  hereafter.  But  there  are  cer- 
tain observations  to  be  made  on  the  time  limit  which  they  establish. 
In  the  first  place,  it  is  generally  considered  that  the  control  of  the 
court  over  the  judgment  absolutely  ceases  upon  the  expiration  of 
the  time  limited.  Thereafter  it  is  no  longer  within  the  discretion, 
or  even  the  jurisdiction,  of  the  court  to  vacate  or  modify  the  judg- 
ment; the  right  to  apply  for  such  relief  is  lost,  and  any  order  of 
the  court  setting  the  judgment  aside  or  rendering  a  new  judgment 
will  be  null  and  void.'*     In  the  next  place,  the  common-law  power 

••  Jansen  v.  Grlmshaw,  125  111.  468,  17  N.  E.  850. 

»T  For  citatloDS  to  these  statutes,  see,  intra,  section  334.  And  see  Carlisle 
T.  Wilkinson,  12  Ind.  91;  Hunt  v.  Stevens,  26  Iowa,  399;  Kenedy  v.  Jar\'i8 
(Tex.)  1  S.  W.  191;  People  v.  ^farge,  3  Cal.  130. 

»8  Elder  v.  Richmond  Gold  &,  Silver  Mln.  Co.,  7  C.  C.  A.  354,  58  Fed. 
536;  Beardsley  v.  Hilson,  94  Ga.  50,  20  S.  E.  272;  Schwarz  v.  Oppenheimer, 
90  Ala.  462,  8  South.  36;  Thomas  v.  Neel  (Tex.  App.)  18  S.  W.  138;  Winglield 
V.  Cotton  (Ky.)  56  S.  W.  813;  Gresham  v.  Ellis,  92  Tenn.  471,  22  S.  W.  1; 
Priestman  v.  Priestman,  103  Iowa,  320,  72  N.  W.  535;  Manning  v.  Nelson, 
107  Iowa,  34,  77  N.  W.  503;  Petley  v.  Carpenter,  124  Mich.  14,  82  N.  W.  666; 

(473) 


§    311  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   14 

of  a  ccmrt  of  record  to  set  aside  its  judgments  at  the  same  term  at 
which  they  were  rendered  is  not  abrogated  by  these  statutes.  Dur- 
ing the  term,  the  court  may  vacate  a  judgment  for  any  cause  which 
would  be  sufficient  at  common  law,  without  regard  to  the  grounds 
specified  in  the  statute ;  •"  but  after  the  close  of  the  term,  the  rem- 
edy of  a  party  aggrieved  by  the  judgment  must  be  sought  under 
the  statute,  and  is  confined  to  the  grounds  therein  enumerated.*** 
In  some  states,  however,  the  courts  exercise  authority  to  set  aside 
judgments  for  causes  (such  as  fraud)  not  specified  in  the  statutes, 
and  without  regard  to  the  lapse  of  the  term  in  which  the  judgment 
was  rendered.  Where  this  practice  obtains,  it  may  be  remarked 
that  the  two  elements  of  the  statute,  the  specified  causes  and  the 
time  limit,  are  mutually  dependent;  that  is,  if  the  application  is 
based  upon  a  ground  not  enumerated  in  the  statute,  but  otherwise 
recognized  as  sufficient,  it  is  not  necessary  that  it  be  made  within 
the  statutory  time.*®*  Again,  while  unexcused  delay  will  generally 
tell  against  an  application  of  this  sort,  it  is  considered  that  laches 
cannot  be  imputed  to  a  party  who  takes  all  the  time  which  the  stat- 
ute allows  him  to  bring  his  motion  or  application.**'  Where  the 
statutory  time  begins  to  run  from  "notice"  of  the  judgment,  this  is 

Whitbeck  v.  Montana  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  21  Mont.  102,  52  Pac.  1008;  Moore  t. 
Superior  Court,  86  Cal.  495,  25  Pac.  22;  Brackett  t.  Banegas,  »9  Cat  622. 
34  Pac.  344;  BunneU  &  Eno  In  v.  Co.  v.  Curtis  (Idaho)  51  Pac.  767.  Bnt  tii 
C^eorgia,  it  is  held  that  Code,  §  2014a,  declaring  that  all  proceedings  to  set 
aside  judgments  must  be  had  within  three  years  from  the  rendition  of  the 
Judgment,  is  merely  a  statute  of  limitations,  which  must  be  raised  at  tiie 
Uial  to  be  available.  Stewart  v.  Golden.  08  (Ja.  470.  25  S.  E.  528. 
»»  Arlington  Manuf  g  Co.  v.  Mears,  65  Vt  414,  26  Atl.  587. 

100  Milwaukee  Mutual  Loan  &  Bidg.  Soc.  ▼.  Jagodzinski,  84  Wis.  35.  ^ 
X.  W.  102;  Hampton  Lumber  Co.  v.  Van  Ness,  64  Neb.  185,  74  N.  W. 
r^7;  State  v.  Tate,  109  Mo.  265,  18  S.  W.  1088,  32  Am.  St.  Rep.  664:  Turner 
V.  Ottawa  Circuit  Judge,  123  Mich.  617,  82  N.  W.  247;  Yerkes  v.  McIIenry. 
6  Dak.  5,  no  N.  W.  485. 

101  Cowles  V.  Hayes,  69  N.  C.  406;  McCloudv.  Meehan,  30  Misc.  Rep.  67. 
62  N.  Y.  Supp.  852. 

102  Independent  School  Dist  v.  Schrelner.  46  Iowa,  172;  Bozdo  v.  Vaglio, 
10  Wash.  270.  38  Pac.  1042;  Wm.  Wolff  &  Co.  v.  Canadian  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  8» 
Cal.  332,  26  Pac.  825.  Where  the  time  is  limited  to  a  certain  number  of  days, 
and  the  last  day  is  Sunday,  the  party  must  present  his  application  or  mutiou 
on  the  day  previous.    Ex  parte  James,  125  Ala.  119.  28  South.  69. 

(474) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §   312 

construed  to  liiean  knowledge  of  the  rendition  of  such  judgment^ 
and  the  notice  thereof  need  not  be  in  writing.*"'  And  where  the 
time  is  limited  to  one  year,  it  is  held  that  it  is  not  enough  that  a 
motion  for  relief  against  the  judgment  be  made  within  the  year, 
but  it  must  be  brought  to  a  hearing  within  that  time.*"* 

§  312.    Judgments  against  Non-Retldeiitfl* 

The  statutes  in  some  of  the  states  provide  that  a  non-resident  de- 
fendant who  has  been  constructively  served  by  publication  of  sum- 
mons, and  against  whom  a  judgment  is  given,  may  appear  and  have 
the  judgment  vacated  and  be  admitted  to  defend  the  action,  at  any 
time  within  a  limited  period  after  the  rendition  of  the  judgment, 
which  period  varies,  in  the  different  states,  from  six  months  to  five 
years.*"'  And  the  right  thus  given  entitles  the  defendant,  if  he 
comes  in  within  the  prescribed  time,  to  assert  his  rights  as  fully  in 
every  respect  as  he  could  have  done  if  personally  served  before  judg- 
ment, saving  the  intervening  rights  of  third  persons.*""  And  the 
right  of  a  defendant,  under  these  statutes,  to  be  let  in  to  a  defense 

!•»  Butler  v.  Mitchell,  17  Wis.  52;  Turner  v.  Leathern,  84  Wis.  633,  54 
X.  W.  1001.  Notice  to  the  defendanfs  attorney  of  the  entry  of  Judgment 
against  such  defendant  is  notice  to  the  defendant,  within  the  meaning  of 
such  a  statute.  Sargent  v.  Kindred,  5  N.  D.  472,  67  N.  W.  826.  A  plain- 
tiff will  be  charged  with  notice  of  judgment  in  his  action,  entered  at  a 
regular  term  of  the  court,  as  of  the  time  of  the  entry.  Sluder  v.  Graham,  118 
X.  C.  835,  23  S.  E.  924. 

104  Knox  V.  Clifford,  41  Wis.  458;  Nicljlin  v.  Robertson,  28  Or.  278,  42 
Pac.  903,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  790;  Sargent  v.  Kindred,  5  N.  D.  472,  67  N.  W.  826. 

io»  See  Kinney  v.  O'Bannon's  Ex*x,  6  Bush  a\y.)  6D2;  Blanchard  v.  Hatch, 
32  Mo.  261;  Hirsh  t.  Weisberger,  44  Mo.  App.  506;  Albright  v.  Warljentin, 
31  Kan.  442,  2  Pac.  614;  Davis  v.  Davis,  24  Tex.  187;  Snow  v.  Hawpe,  22 
Tex.  168;  Guy  v.  Ide,  6  Cnl.  99,  65  Am.  Dec.  490;  Waldo  v.  Thweatt,  64 
Ark.  126,  40  S.  W.  782;  Scarborough  v.  Myrick,  47  Neb.  794,  66  N.  W.  867; 
Norton  V.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  97  Cal.  388,  32  Pac.  452,  33  Am.  St. 
Rep.  198;  Blyth  &  Fargo  Co.  v.  Swenson,  15  Utah,  345,  49  Pac.  1027.  But 
in  some  states,  It  must  be  shown,  by  a  preponderance  of  evidence,  that 
the  defendant  had  no  actual  notice  of  the  pendency  of  the  action  In  time 
to  appear  therein^  and  make  his  defense.  Stover  v.  Hough,  47  Neb.  789, 
66  N.  W.  825;  Roller  v.  Ried  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  24  S.  W.  655. 

lofl  Rhodes  V.  Rhodes,  125  N.  C.  191,  34  S.  E.  271. 

(475)  ' 


§   813  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNT8.  (Ch.   14 

IS  an  absolute  right  if  he  brings  himself  within  the  statute;  the 
court  has  no  discretion  in  the  matter,  but  must  grant  his  applica- 
tion.^" 

§  313.    ZiadliM  of  Party. 

Aside  from  cases  in  which  the  time  of  applying  for  relief  from 
the  judgment  is  regulated  by  statute,  and  aside  from  cases  in  which 
the  motion  can  only  be  made  at  the  same  term,  we  are  now  to  in- 
quire how  the  party's  application  will  be  affected  by  his  delay  or 
want  of  diligence.  And  first,  delay  in  moving  to  have  a  judgment 
vacated,  so  long  as  the  party  has  no  notice  of  the  judgment  or  of 
the  action,  will  not  bar  his  right,  even  though  innocent  strangers 
may  have  taken  titles  in  reliance  on  the  judgment.***'  Again,  lapse 
of  time  will  not  aflfect  the  right  to  vacate  a  judgment  on  the  ground 
that  the  court  never  had  jurisdiction  to  enter  it.***  But  if  the  party 
actually  knows  that  a  judgment  has  been  rendered  against  him,  and 
the  judgment  is  not  simply  and  merely  void,  it  is  the  undoubted 
rule  that  he  must  exercise  reasonable  diligence  in  procuring  its  va- 
cation, and  that  his  unexcused  laches  or  delay,  unduly  protracted, 
will  preclude  him  from  obtaining  the  relief  sought.***     "In  deciding 

107  Albright  y.  Warkentln,  81  Kan.  442,  2  Pac.  614;  FrancoTlz  t.  Irdand* 
35  Minn.  278,  28  N.  W.  608;  Boeing  v.  McKinley,  44  Minn.  3^2,  46  X.  W. 
766.  But  later  cases  in  Minnesota  hold  that,  while  it  is  presumed  that 
the  defendant  has  been  diligent  after  recelTlng  actual  notice  of  tlie  peodencj' 
of  the  action,  still  this  presumption  may  be  rebutted;  and  that  an  on- 
explained  delay  of  several  months  in  making  the  appUcation  for  leare  to 
defend  the  action  after  judgment  will  justify  the  court  in  refusing  the 
same,  though  the  application  is  made  within  the  year.  Mueller  v.  McC^uUocb. 
59  Minn.  4<.J9,  61  N.  W.  455;  Cutler  v.  Button.  51  Minn.  550,  63  N.  W.  872.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  court  has  a  discretion  to  set  aside  the  Judgment  and  allow 
a  defense  to  be  made,  good  cause  being  shown,  although  more  than  a  year 
may  have  elapsed  since  the  rendition  of  the  judgment  Waite  v.  Ooaracy,  45 
Minn.  159,  47  N.  W.  537. 

108  Stocking  v.  Hanson,  35  Minn.  207,  28  N.  W.  507;  Maury*s  Trustee  v. 
Fitzwater  (C.  a)  88  Fed.  768;  Stoutenborough  y.  Board  of  Education,  IM 
Cal.  664,  38  Pac.  441);  Du  Bois  v.  Clark,  12  Colo.  App.  220.  55  Pac.  750. 

io»  Felkert  v.  Wilson,  38  Minn.  341.  37  N.  W.  585. 

iioCagger  v.  Gardner.  1  How.  Prac.  (X.  Y.)  142;  Nichols  v.  Nichols,  10 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  560;  Bliss  v.  Treadway,  1  How.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  245;  I>e  Wan- 
delaer  v.  Ilager,  Id.  63;  McQuillan  y.  Hunter,  1  Phila.  49;  L«  Due  t.  iUo- 

•(476) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  "§  313 

upon  an  application  to  strike  out  a  judgment  after  the  term  is  past, 
for  fraud,  irregularity,  deceit,  or  surprise,  the  court  acts  in  the  exer- 
cise of  its  quasi-equitable  powers,  and  in  every  such  case  requires 
the  party  making  the  application  to  act  in  good  faith  and  with  ordi- 
nary diligence.  Relief  will  not  be  granted  if  he  has  knowingly  ac- 
quiesced in  the  judgment  complained  of,  or  has  been  guilty  of  laches 
or  unreasonable  delay  in  seeking  his  remedy."  *^*  So  far  the  law 
is  clear.  But  the  moment  we  endeavor  to  ascertain  what  laches  or 
delay  will  bar  this  right,  we  are  involved  in  a  sea  of  difficulties  which 
invariably  overflows  the  attempt  to  define  "diligence"  or  "reasonable 
time."  It  is  impossible  to  lay  down  general  rules.  Every  case 
must  be  governed  by  its  own  facts  and  the  decisions  in  the  particular 
state.  It  may  be  profitable,  however,  to  mention  some  of  the  prin- 
cipal cases  in  which  the  question  has  actually  been  decided.  And  to 
begin  with  the  clearest, — "after  the  lapse  of  twenty  years  no  judicial 
proceeding  whatever  ought  to  be  set  aside  for  irregularity."  ***  In 
another  case  in  the  same  state,  where  fourteen  years  had  elapsed 
since  the  entry  of  judgment,  and  no  satisfactory  excuse  or  reason 
for  the  delay  was  shown,  the  motion  was  held  properly  denied  on 
the  ground  of  laches.^*'     It  is  also  held  that  an  unexplained  delay 

comb,  124  N.  C.  347,  32  S.  E.  726;  Camp  v.  Phinips,  88  Ga.  415,  14  S.  K. 
580;  Knauber  v.  WatsoD,  50  Kan.  702,  32  Pae.  349;  Ammerman  y.  State, 
98  Ind.  165;  Ryder  v.  Twlss,  3  Scam.  (lU.)  4;  l^lscher  v.  Stlefel,  179  111. 
59.  53  N.  E.  407;  Barrett  v.  Queen  City  Cycle  Co.,  179  lU.  68,  53  N.  E.  550; 
Altmann  v.  Gabriel,  28  Minn.  132,  9  N.  V^.  633;  Seibert  v.  Minneapolis  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.,  58  Minn.  72,  59  N.  W.  828;  Sanderson  v.  Dox,  C  Wis.  164;  Welch 
V.  May,  14  Wis.  200;  JEtna  Ins.  Co.  v.  McCormick,  20  Wis.  2S5;  Landon  v. 
Bnrke,  33  Wis.  452;  Reese  v.  Mahoney,  21  Cal.  305;  Wm.  Wolff  &  Co.  v. 
Canadian  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  123  C^l.  535,  56  Pac.  453;  Clark  v.  l*erry,  17  Colp. 
56,  28  Pac.  329.  Mere  delay  in  moving  to  have  a  judgment  vacated  will  not 
preclnde  relief  as  against  a  party  who  knew  of  defendant's  equities,  and  who, 
being  obliged  to  pay  the  Judgment,  took  an  assignment  of  it.  Vilas  v.  Platts- 
burgh  &  M.  R.  Co.,  123  N.  Y.  440,  25  N.  E.  941,  9  L.  R.  A.  844,  20  Am.  St 
Bep.  771.  The  rule  of  diligence  In  making  application  to  set  aside  a  default 
does  not  control  the  subsequent  proceedings.  If  the  motion  is  filed  in  due 
time.  It  may  be  heard  at  such  time  as  the  court  may  direct  Wm.  Wolff  & 
Co.  v.  Canadian  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  123  Cal.  535,  56  Pac.  453. 

111  McCormick  v.  Hogan,  48  Md.  404. 

112  Thompson  v.  Skinner,  7  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  556. 
118  Wade  Y.  De  Leyer,  40  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct  641. 

(477) 


§313  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   14 

of  seven  years,^**  or  five  years,^*'  or  two  years/**  or  seventeen 
months,**^  or  one  year/"  or  eleven  months,"*  will  be  sufficient 
to  justify  the  court  in  refusing  the  relief  asked.  Where  an  applica- 
tion to  have  a  decree  of  divorce  set  aside  was  not  made  until  the 
lapse  of  more  than  four  years  after  the  plaintiflf  had  been  fully  in- 
formed of  the  alleged  fraudulent  decree,  and  no  excuse  was  shown 
for  the  delay  other  than  that  proceedings  to  review  the  decree  had 
been  instituted,  and  an  action  brought  to  set  it  aside  in  another 
court,  it  was  held  that  the  plaintiflf's  right  was  barred.***  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  held  in  Pennsylvania  that  a  nonsuit  may  properly 
be  taken  off  even  three  years  after  its  entry,  where  cause  for  its  re- 
moval appears;  such  action  lies  within  the  sound  discretion  of  the 
court,  and  is  not  reviewable  by  writ  of  error.***  The  case  is  slightly 
different  where  a  judgment  has  been  irregularly  entered  against  an 
infant.  The  question  here  is,  what  time  should  reasonably  be  al- 
ii ^Reeee  y.  Mahoney,  21  Gal.  305.  Or  six  years.  De  Camp  v.  Bates 
<Tex.  Civ.  App.)  37  S.  W.  644;  Tooker  v.  Booth,  7  Mtec.  Kep,  421,  ZI  N.  Y. 
Supp.  974. 

iiBBostwlck  v.  Perkins,  4  Ga.  47;  In  re  Markle's  Estate,  187  Pa.  639,  41 
Atl.  304;  Van  Arsdale  v.  King,  87  Hun,  617,  33  N.  Y.  Supp  858;  Dnun- 
mond  v.  Matthews  (N.  Y.)  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  726.  Or  four  years.  Case  y. 
Case,  137  Ind.  526,  37  N.  E.  337;  Bowling  y.  Blum  CTex.  dr.  App.)  52  S. 
W.  97. 

lie  People  y.  Judges,  1  Doug.  (Mich.)  417;  Wygant  v.  Brown,  7  N.  Y.  Supp. 
490;  In  re  Gilman's  Estate  (N.  Y.)  17  X.  Y.  Supp.  494. 

117  Ammerman  y.  State,  98  Ind.  165.  And  see,  for  cases  in  which  a  delay 
of  14  or  15  months  was  held  too  long.  City  of  Duluth  y.  Dibblee,  62  Minn. 
18,  63  N.  W.  1117;  Denton  y.  Merchants*  Nat.  Bank,  18  Wash.  387,  51  Pac. 
473;  Jones  y.  Jones,  71  Hun,  519,  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  1031. 

116  Sanderson  y.  Dox,  6  Wis.  164;  In  re  Mutual  Benefit  Oo.,  190  Pa.  355. 
42  Atl.  706. 

119  Altmann  y.  Gabriel,  28  Minn.  132,  9  N.  W.  633. 

120  Nicholson  y.  Nicholson,  113  Ind.  131,  15  N.  E.  223. 

121  Zebley  y.  Storey,  8  Wkly.  Notes  Cas.  212.  And  see  Lyons  ▼.  Ureeo. 
68  Ark.  205,  56  S.  W.  1075.  An  application  to  open  a  default  made  In 
good  faith,  and  showing  a  meritorious  defense,  should  not  be  denied  for  laches 
where  made  within  two  months  of  the  entry  of  Judgment.  Lorzln^  y.  Eis- 
enberg,  5  Misc.  Rep.  358,  25  N.  Y.  Supp.  750.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  a 
motion  to  open  a  default,  made  19  days  after  the  denial  of  two  former 
motions,  was  held  properly  denied  where  no  excuse  or  reason  was  giTen 
why  the  ground  therefor  was  not  sooner  presented  to  the  court.  Ellis  y. 
Bonner,  7  Tex.  Civ.  App.  539,  27  S.  W.  (W7. 

(478) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  314 

lowed  to  him,  after  he  comes  of  age,  in  which  to  take  proceedings 
against  the  judgment.  It  has  been  held  that  six  years  is  an  undue 
delay.^*'  And  in  a  New  York  case  it  was  said  that  there  must  be  a 
limitation  to  the  time  when  such  a  motion  could  be  made,  and  the 
old  limitation  of  two  years,  after  attaining  his  majority,  was  suffi- 
ciently liberal  and  would  prevail.^^*  In  California,  it  is  considered 
that  ten  days  after  a  judgment  is  entered  in  the  superior  court,  which 
has  no  terms,  is  a  reasonable  time  within  which  to  move  to  set  aside 
such  judgment.^**' 

Part  IV.     The  Parties  who  may  Apply. 

i  314.    SnooeMfvl  Party  mmj  Apply. 

The  courts  have  power,  in  a  proper  case,  to  set  aside  a  judgment 
at  the  instance  of  the  party  in  whose  favor  it  is  rendered.^**  The 
propriety  and  necessity  of  this  rule  are  obvious.  For  the  plaintiff's 
rights  may  be  compromised,  or  not  adequately  recognized  or  pro- 
tected, by  the  judgment  as  it  stands,  and  without  his  own  fault.  If 
there  are  such  irregularities  in  the  judgment  that  he  would  be  pre- 
vented from  reaping  its  fruits,  or  if  an  excusable  mistake  has  put 
him  upon  a  wrong  course  of  proceedings,  or  if  the  fraud  or  trickery 
of  the  defendant  has  prevented  him  from  getting  the  full  measure  of 
relief  to  which  he  is  entitled,  it  is  but  right  to  vacate  the  judgment 

Its  Kemp  T.  Cook,  18  Md.  130,  79  Am.  Dec.  G81. 

i«»  Barnes  v.  GIU,  13  Abb,  Prac.  (N.  S.)  1G9. 

it4  In  re  Langan's  Estate,  74  Cal.  353,  16  Pac.  188. 

i*5Herdlc  v.  Woodward,  75  Pa.  479;  Downing  v.  Still,  43  Mo.  309;  Graef 
T.  Bernard,  7  Misc.  Rep.  246,  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  263;  McCredy  v.  Woodcock.  41 
App.  Div.  626,  58  N.  Y.  Supp.  656.  See  Porter  v.  Orient  Ins.  CJo..  72  Conn.  519, 
46  AtL  7.  Where  a  plaintiff  has  suffered  a  default.  In  consequence  of  acci- 
dent, mistake,  or  excusable  neglect,  or  by  reason  of  the  negligence  or  misun- 
derstanding of  his  counsel,  and  thereupon  a  Judgment  for  affirmative  relief 
has  been  rendered  in  favor  of  the  defendant,  it  may  be  set  aside  on  plaintiff's 
motion  and  a  new  trial  granted,  for  the  plaintiff's  situation  should  be  gov- 
emed  by  the  same  rules  which  are  applicable  to  defaults  of  defendants. 
Trueheart  v.  Simpson  (Tex.  Oiv.  App.)  24  S.  W.  842.  But  where  defendant  is 
satisfied  with  an  Interlocutory  Judgment  rendered  against  him  in  an  action, 
the  Judgment  will  not  be  vacated  on  plaintiff's  motion,  based  merely  on  the 
ground  that  defendant's  time  to  answer  had  not  expired.  Havemeyer  y. 
Brooklyn  Sugar  Refining  Co.,  26  Abb.  N.  C.  157,  13  N.  Y.  Supp.  873. 

(479) 


§   316  LAW  OP  JUDOMBNTS.  (Ch.   14 

on  his  motion,  and  afford  him  the  opportunity  to  proceed  anew  with 

a  more  just  and  satisfactory  result. 

I  315.    Joint  BefeAdantg. 

Where  a  judgment  is  rendered  against  several  defendants  jointly, 
but  is  irregular  or  void  as  to  one  of  them, — as  for  want  of  authority 
or  want  of  jurisdiction  over  him, — it  will  be  vacated  on  the  applica- 
tion of  that  defendant.^*'  So  where  an  attorney  confesses  judg- 
ment against  several  partners,  under  an  authority  derived  from  only 
one,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  others  to  make  prompt  application  to  the 
court  to  open  the  judgment.^*^  Whether,  in  such  a  case,  it  would 
be  deemed  necessary  to  vacate  the  judgment  as  to  all  the  defend- 
ants, or  only  as  to  the  moving  defendant,  would  depend  somewhat 
upon  the  nature  of  the  cause  of  action,  but  principally  upon  whether 
or  not,  in  the  particular  jurisdiction,  a  joint  judgment  is  considered 
as  an  entirety, — a  question  which  will  be  found  fully  treated  in  an- 
other connection.*  *• 

I  316.    liesal  ReprefeiitatiT«f  of  Party. 

Some  of  the  statutes  on  this  subject  provide  that  when  a  judg- 
ment by  default  is  taken  on  constructive  service  by  publication,  the 
defendant  "or  any  person  legally  representing  him"  (or  "his  legal 
representatives"),  may  apply,  within  a  limited  time,  to  have  it  opened 
and  the  case  retried ;  and  others  give  the  courts  power  to  relieve  a 
party,  or  his  "legal  representatives"  from  a  judgment  taken  ag^ainst 

126  St.  John  V.  Holmee,  20  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  600,  32  Am.  Dec.  603;  Frtoks  v. 
Lockey,  45  Vt  395;  Fall  v.  Evans.  20  Ind.  210;  Drobam  Y.  Norton,  1  Mtec. 
Rep.  486.  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  579;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  WiUiams,  126  Ind.  423.  26 
N.  E.  75;  Slkes  v.  Weatherly,  110  N.  C.  131,  14  S.  E.  511;  Reinhart  ▼.  Lugo* 
86  Cal.  395,  24  Pac.  1089,  21  Am.  St.  Rep.  52;  Stewart  y.  Parsons,  5  N.  D.  273* 
65  N.  W.  672;  Morse  v.  Callantine.  19  Mont  87.  47  Pac.  685. 

127  Cyphert  v.  McClune,  22  Pa.  195. 

12S  Supra,  §  211.  And  see  Furman  y.  Furman,  153  N.  Y.  309,  47  N.  B.  877, 
60  Am.  St.  Re)).  629;  Calvert  Y.  Ash,  47  W.  Va.  480,  35  S.  R  887;  Reynolds  ▼. 
Barnard,  36  111.  App.  218;  Gould  y.  Sternburg,  69  III.  531;  C3ay  y.  Hildebfand, 
44  Kan.  481,  24  Pac.  962;  Steele  y.  Duncan,  47  Kan.  511,  28  Pac.  206;  Xardn 
Y.  Baugh.  1  Ind.  App.  20,  27  N.  E.  110;  Neenan  y.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  126  Mcl 
89,  28  S.  W.  963;  Boyd  Y.  Hanson,  56  Neb.  269,  76  N.  W.  658L 

(480) 


Cb.   14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §   3l7 

him  through  his  mistake,  inadvertence,  surprise,  or  excusable  neg- 
lect. Under  this  clause  it  is  held  that  one  who  was  not  a  party  to 
the  proceeding  in  which  the  judgment  was  rendered,  and  who  ap- 
pears in  his  own  right,  is  not  entitled  to  have  the  judgment  set 
aside.***  But  parties  who  have  acquired  the  entire  interest  of  a 
defendant  in  the  subject-matter  of  an  action  are  his  "legal  repre- 
sentatives" within  the  meaning  of  such  clause,  and  the  court  may, 
upon  such  terms  as  may  be  just,  relieve  them  from  a  default  taken 
against  him  through  their  mistake,  inadvertence,  surprise,  or  ex- 
cusable neglect.*'*^  And  if  a  motion  is  made  by  persons  other  than 
the  plaintiff,  claiming  to  be  his  legal  representatives,  to  set  aside  a 
judgment  and  to  be  substituted  as  plaintiffs,  the  parties  making  such 
motion  must  show  a  state  of  facts  which  would  have  supported  such 
an  application  by  the  plaintiff  in  the  judgment.*'*  Without  doubt 
the  phrase  above  used  is  broad  enough  to  include  the  executor  or 
administrator  of  a  deceased  party  if  a  proper  case  for  his  interven- 
tion should  arise.*'* 

S  317.    Stransera. 

As  a  general  rule,  a  judgment  will  not  be  vacated  or  set  aside  at 
the  motion  of  a  third  person,  not  a  party  to  the  action.*"     It  will 

"»  Parsons  v.  Johnson,  66  Iowa,  455,  23  N.  W.  921. 

i»o  piummer  y.  Brown,  64  Cal.  420,  1  Pac.  703;  Malone  v.  Big  Flat  Gravel 
Min.  Co.,  96  Cal.  384,  28  Pac.  1063;  Thomas  v.  Morris,  8  Utah,  284,  31  Pac. 
446.  Compare  Mueller  v.  Beimer,  46  Minn.  314,  48  N.  W.  1120.  The  grantee 
in  a  deed  purporting  to  convey  land  then  in  possession  of  defendant,  under  a 
judgment  in  favor  of  defendant  against  the  grantor,  rendered  in  an  action  to 
which  such  grantee  was  not  a  party,  cannot  sue  to  set  aside  the  judgment. 
Whitney  v.  Kelley,  94  Cal.  146.  29  Pac.  624,  15  L.  B.  A.  813,  28  Am.  St  Bep. 
106.  And  one  purchasing  land  subject  to  the  lien  of  a  judgment  cannot,  in 
Pennsylv^pia,  have  the  judgment  vacated  for  mere  irregularities.  Milleisen 
y.  Senseman,  4  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  455. 

i«i  Corwln  V.  Bensley,  43  Oal.  253. 

1S3  The  administrator  of  one  against  whom  judgment  on  an  unsealed  judg- 
ment note  has  been  entered  may  have  the  judgment  opened  and  interpose  the 
defense  of  the  statute  of  limitations.  DiclE  v.  Mahoney,  21  Pa.  Co.  Ct  B.  241. 
As  to  the  right  of  heirs  to  move  for  the  vacation  of  a  judgment  talcen  by  de- 
fault against  their  ancestor  after  his  death,  see  Nlcholes  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
184  ni.  43,  56  N.  E.  351. 

i»»  Oosgrove  v.  United  States.  33  Ct  CI.  167;  Drexel's  Appeal,  6  Pa.  272; 
In  re  Rowland's  Estate,  4  Clarke  CTa.)  190;  Gaehring  v.  Haedrich,  8  Pa. 
1  LAW  JUDG.-^l  USI) 


§   317  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   i4 

be  remembered  that  such  persons  have  the  right  to  impeach  a  judg- 
ment collaterally,  whenever  and  wherever  it  comes  in  conflict  with 
their  rights,  if  it  was  founded  in  fraud  and  collusion.***  And  this 
will  generally  be  an  adequate  protection  to  them.  But  there  may 
be  cases  in  which  right  and  equity  require  that  other  persons  should 
have  the  privilege  of  proceeding  directly  for  the  annulment  of  a 
judgment  which  fraudulently  abridges  their  own  rights  or  remedies. 
Accordingly  the  rule  is  stated  that  persons  who  were  strangers  to 
the  record  will  have  a  standing  to  apply  for  the  vacation  of  the  judg- 
ment when  the  same  was  obtained  by  fraud  or  collusion,  and  they 
bear  such  a  relation  thereto,  or  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  case, 
that  their  rights  may  be  affected.*"  An  invalid  judgment  by  con- 
fession may  be  set  aside  at  the  instance  of  a  junior  judgment-creditor 
after  notice  to  the  plaintiff.**'  And  if  the  purpose  of  a  creditor  in  ob- 
taining a  judgment  is  not  to  collect  his  debt,  but  to  help  the  debtor 
cover  up  his  property,  his  judgment  will  be  set  aside,  though  it  be 

Super.  Gt.  507;  Robinson  v.  Stevens*  Adm*r,  63  Vt.  555,  22  AU.  80;  Smith  t. 
City  of  Neiftbem,  73  N.  C.  303;  Hinsdale  v.  Hawley,  89  N.  C.  87;  Walton 
V.  Walton,  80  N.  C.  26;  Jacobs  v.  Bur^rwyn,  63  N.  C.  196;  Uzzle  v.  Vinaon,  111 
X.  C.  138,  16  S.  E.  0;  McGhee  v.  Romatka,  18  Tex.  Olv.  App.  436,  44  &  W. 
700;  8.  c,  47  S.  W.  282;  Indianapolis,  D.  &  W.  Ry.  Oo.  v.  Crockett,  2  Ind. 
App.  13G,  28  N.  E.  222;  Ex  parte  McKenzle,  162  HI.  48,  44  N.  E.  413;  Packard 
V.  Smith,  9  Wis.  184. 

i«*  See  supra,  H  293-295. 

186  Covey  V.  Wheeler.  23  Pa.  Co.  Ct  R.  467;  BretteU  ▼.  Deffebach,  6  S.  D. 
21,  60  N.  W.  167.  Thus,  where  Judgment  in  an  action  against  a  municipal 
corporation  is  entered  by  collusion  between  plaintiff  and  one  of  defendant's 
officers,  the  court  may,  on  the  proper  application  of  another  officer,  set  the 
Judgment  aside  and  allow  an  answer  on  the  merits  to  be  interposed.  Stunu 
V.  School  District  45  Minn.  88,  47  N.  W.  462;  Lowber  v.  Mayor  of  New  York. 
26  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  262.  Or  the  judgment  in  such  a  case  may  be  set  aside  at  the 
suit  of  tax-payers  of  the  municipality.  Kane  &  Co.  v.  Independent  School 
District,  82  Iowa,  5,  47  N.  W.  1076.  Again,  bondholders  secured  b/a  raUroad 
mortgage,  who  were  not  parties  to  an  action  by  other  bondholders  to  forecliKse 
the  mortgage,  may  sue  to  set  aside  the  proceedings  in  such  action  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  not  a  representative  action,  but  was  fmadulently  brought 
Stevens  v.  Central  Nat.  Bank,  144  N.  Y.  50,  39  N.  E.  68.  Where  a  sheriff,  in- 
demnified as  to  property  levied  on,  makes  wilful  default  in  replevin,  so  that 
Judgment  is  taken  against  him,  the  default  may  be  set  aside  on  motion  of  the 
Indemnitor.    Jakobi  v.  Gorman,  2  Misc.  Rep.  190,  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  762. 

i««  Bernard  v,  Douglas,  10  Iowa,  37a 
(482) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  318 

shown  that  this  debt  was  genuine.^ *^  So  where  a  husband  gives  a 
mortgage,  and  suffers  judgment  on  it,  purposely,  to  defeat  the  wife  of 
her  dower,  and  the  mortgagee  has  constructive  notice  of  her  rights, 
she  may  intervene  and  have  a  rule  to  open  the  judgment  and  let  her 
in  to  defend  to  the  extent  of  her  dower.*'*  It  is  also  proper  to  vacate 
a  judgment  against  an  administrator,  at  the  instance  of  the  heirs,  when 
the  former's  conduct  has  been  so  negHgent  as  to  leave  the  latter  no 
other  remedy  and  there  is  a  good  defense  not  presented  by  the  defend- 
ant*'*  And  the  proper  financial  officer  of  a  municipal  corporation  may 
move  to  vacate  a  judgment  against  it  procured  by  the  fraud  or  collu- 
sion of  the  other  officers.***  In  New  York,  when  a  judgment-creditor 
seeks  by  motion  to  set  aside  a  prior  judgment  on  the  ground  of 
fraud,  it  is  within  the  discretion  of  the  trial-court  whether  to  de- 
termine the  matter  on  motion,  or  to  require  the  creditor  to  bring 
an  action,  and  its  determination  is  not  appealable.*** 

Part  V.     What  Judgments  may  be  Vacated, 

S  318.    General    Rule. 

In  general,  the  equitable  power  of  the  courts  now  under  consider- 
ation is  unlimited  in  respect  to  the  judgments,  rules,  orders,  and 
decrees  upon  which  it  may  be  exercised.  At  first  sight,  it  might 
« appear  inconsistent  to  speak  of  setting  aside  a  judgment  which  is  a 
mere  nullity.  Yet  the  courts  hold  that  even  though  the  judgment 
be  entirely  void,  the  party  against  whom  it  exists  has 'the  right  to 
have  it  vacated,  and  thus  clear  away  any  cloud  that  it  may  cast  upon 
his  right  to  alienate  his  property  so  long  as  it  remains  of  record 
against  him.***    The  power  is  most  commonly  exercised  in  cases 

■ 

i»T  Smith  V.  Schwed  (C.  C.)  9  Fed.  483.  See  Moore  v.  Dunn,  147  Pa.  8o9,  23 
Ati.  50G. 

i3«  McChirg  V.  Schwartz,  87  Pa.  521. 

i3»  McWiUie  V.  Martin,  25  Ark.  55G.  See  Pierce  v.  Pi-obate  Court.  19  R.  I. 
472,  34  Ati.  902. 

i4«  Lowber  v.  Mayor  of  New  York,  26  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  262, 

141  Boards  v.  Wheeler,  76  N.  Y.  213. 

i«  Crane  v.  Barry,  47  Ga.  476;  Mills  v.  Dickson,  6  Rich.  Law  (S.  C.)  487; 
n.reman  v.  Carter,  9  Kan.  674;  Ilervey  v.  EdniuDds,  68  N.  C.  ^3;  City  of 
< Miuy  V.  Harvey.  ."lO  ill.  4^,3,  99  Am.  Dec.  530;  Phoenix  Bridge  Co.  v.  Street,  9 
Ukl.  422,  60  Pac.  221. 

(483) 


I  819  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.    14 

of  judgments  entered  by  default/*'  but  it  is  equally  applicable,  proper 
grounds  being  shown,  to  such  as  are  rendered  upon  trial  and  ver- 
dict.*** Relief  may  be  granted  in  this  manner  against  judgments  by 
confession,***  and  against  probate  orders  and  decrees/**  and  final 
settlements  of  administrators  and  trustees.**^  Under  the  code  prac- 
tice, on  a  motion  to  vacate  a  judgment  in  an  equitable  action,  the 
same  rules  should  be  applied  as  in  case  of  other  judgments.***  A 
rule  absolute  against  a  sheriff  is  not  final  and  conclusive  like  a  judge- 
ment between  parties  litigant ;  it  may  be  vacated  on  motion  at  the 
same  or  a  subsequent  term.*** 

i  319*    CoBflent  Judgm^ntm, 

A  court  has  power  to  vacate  and  set  aside  a  consent  judgment  on 
the  ground  of  fraud,  mutual  mistake,  or  surprise,  but  it  cannot  alter 
or  correct  it,  except  with  the  consent  of  all  the  parties  affected  by 
it.*"®    And  where,  in  compromise  of  a  claim,  judgment  has  been 

148  It  is  said  that  the  laws  relating  to  the  opening  of  Judgments  by  default 
should  be  liberally  constraed,  in  order  that  cases  may  be  disposed  of  on  tbeir 
merits.  Turner  v.  Coughran,  8  a  D.  419,  66  N.  W.  810.  In  PennsylTanUi, 
there  is  no  authority  for  a  rule  to  open  a  Judgment  of  nonsuit,  such  a  Judg- 
ment not  being  within  the  meaning  of  the  statutes;  but  the  proper  and  only 
practice  is  to  apply  to  the  court  to  take  off  the  nonsuit.  Harvey  t.  FoUock* 
148  Pa.  534,  23  Atl.  1127. 

i4«  But  in  North  Oarolina,  it  is  said  that  the  statute  authorizing  the  courts' 
to  relieve  a  party  from  a  Judgment  taken  against  him  through  his  mistake, 
surprise,  inadvertence,  or  excusable  neglect,  has  no  appUcatlon  where  the 
Judgment  is  entered  on  a  verdict,  as  the  verdict  would  stand  even  If  the 
Judgment  were  set  aside,  and  the  relief  would  therefore  be  worthless  if  grant- 
ed. Flowers  v.  Alford,  111  N.  C.  248,  16  S.  E.  319;  Brown  v.  Bhinehart,  112 
N.  C.  772,  16  S.  E.  840. 

i«c  Hutchinson  v.  Ledlie,  36  Pa.  112;   Goerg^  v.  Schmidt,  69  m.  App.  53S. 

i««  Whltaker  v.  Smith,  33  Ga.  237;  Hirshfeld  v.  Brown  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  00 
S.  W.  962;  Kalteyer  v.  Wipff,  92  Tex.  673,  52  S.  W.  63. 

14T  Sheetz  V.  Klrtley,  62  Mo.  417. 

148  Mtna,  Life  Ins.  Go.  v.  McCormick,  20  Wis.  266. 

i4»  Wakefield  v.  Moore,  65  Ga.  268. 

150  Kerchner  v.  McEachem,  98  N.  C.  447;  Stump  v.  Long,  84  N.  C  616; 
Deaver  v.  Jones.  114  N.  C.  649.  19  S.  E.  637;  Morris'  Adm'r  v.  Peyton's  Adm'r. 
29  W.  Va.  201,  11  S.  E.  954;  Oolwell  v.  Wehrly,  150  Pa.  523.  24  AU.  737; 
Splehler  v.  Aslel,  83  Hun,  223,  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  584;  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  P.  R. 
Co.  V.  Elder,  149  Ul.  173,  36  N.  B.  565;  Stites  v.  McGee.  37  Or.  574,  61  Pao. 
1129. 

(484) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  S20 

rendered  against  the  defendant  with  his  consent,  he  cannot,  in  the 
absence  of  proof  of  fraud,  have  it  vacated  on  the  ground  that  he 
acted  on  the  erroneous  advice  of  counsel.*"*  So,  a  judgment  regu- 
larly entered  pursuant  to  an  agreement  of  the  attorneys,  filed  in  the 
case,  cannot  be  opened,  after  final  adjournment  of  the  term,  on  the 
ground  that  the  agreement  was  not  authorized.*  °* 

S  380.    Jvdsnentf  in  DiToroe. 

It  was  the  dotrine  and  rule  of  the  ecclesiastical  courts  in  England 
that  "sententia  contra  matrimonium  nunquam  transit  in  rem  judi- 
catam."  ^^^  That  is  to  say  that  a  sentence  or  judgment  against  the 
validity  of  a  marriage, — either  annulling  a  merely  voidable  marriage, 
or  declaring  that  a  pretended  marriage  was  absolutely  void, — was 
never  final,  but  was  forever  open  to  revision  and  reversal.**^*  Never- 
theless this  maxim  was  not  universally  assented  to,  for  we  find  oc- 
casional expressions  of  a  contrary  opinion  on  the  part  of  eminent 
ecclesiastical  judges.***^  Now  in  this  country,  there  are  several  cases 
holding  that  the  statutes  which  authorize  courts  to  ppen  judgments 
or  decrees  within  a  certain  time  after  their  rendition,  on  proper  ap- 
plication, where  there  was  no  other  service  than  that  by  publication, 
or  on  other  specified  grounds,  do  not  include  decrees  of  divorce; 
proceeding  generally  on  the  theory  that  policy  requires  judgments 
of  this  character  to  be  regarded  as  more  stable  and  unassailable  than 
any  other  species.* *•    There  are  undoubtedly  excellent  reasons  for 

i»i  Anderson  t.  Carr,  54  Hun,  634,  7  N.  Y.  Supp.  281.  A  voluntary  settle- 
ment of  a  usurious  loan  by  a  debtor,  and  a  confession  of  Judgment  by  him 
for  the  amount,  will  not  bar  him  from  subsequently  having  the  Judgment 
opened  so  as  to  enable  him  to  set  up  the  defense  of  usury.  Marr  v.  Marr, 
110  Pa.  60,  20  Ati.  592. 

152  Craven  v.  Canadian  Pacific  R.  Co.  (C.  C.)  62  Fed.  170;  Jacobs  v.  Kast- 
holm.  33  lU.  App.  164.     See  Smith  v.  Wilson,  87  Wis.  14,  57  N.  W.  1115. 

i5«  Kenn*s  Case,  7  Coke,  43b. 

i5*Bowzer  v.  Ricketts,  1  Hagg.  Consist.  213;  Morris  v.  Webber,  2  Leon. 
109;  Meadows  v.  Duchess  of  Kingston,  Amb.  756;  Poynt.  Mar.  &  Dlv.  157; 
Shelf.  Mar.  &  Div.  474;  2  Bish.  Mar.  &  Dlv.  §§  748  et  seq.,  where  all  the 
learning  on  this  point  Is  collected. 

i»8  Norton  v.  Seaton,  3  Phlllim.  Ecc.  .Tudgm.  162;  Meadowcroft  v.  Huguenin, 
8  Curt.  403;  Prudam  v.  Pliillips,  2  Amb.  703. 

!»•  Parish  V.  Parish,  9  Ohio  St  534,  75  Am.  Dec.  482;  Cox  v.  Cox,  19  Ohio 

(485) 


§    320  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  14 

this  distinction.*^^  And  it  has  at  times  seemed  so  important  to  leg- 
islative bodies  as  to  cause  the  enactment  of  clauses  explicitly  except- 
ing adjudications  in  divorce  from  the  operation  of  such  statutes,  as 
will  appear  from  the  cases  just  cited.  But  unless  such  decrees  are 
thus  specifically  withdrawn  from  the  general  class,  it  is  difficult  to 
see  how  they  can  be  considered  as  an  exception  to  the  terms  of  a 
statute  plainly  extending  to  all  judgments,  on  any  right  principles 
of  interpretation.*"*  And  aside  from  legislation,  the  courts  will  gen- 
erally hear  motions  to  vacate  divorce  judgments  on  the  same  grounds 
and  conditions  as  any  other  judgments,  except,  perhaps,  that  they 
proceed  with  greater  caution  and  with  more  anxious  care  for  the 
intervening  rights  of  strangers.  Thus,  where  a  decree  of  divorce 
has  been  obtained  by  fraud  or  deceit, — as  where  the  complainant 
has  practised  fraud  or  trickery  to  prevent  the  defendant  from  having 
notice  of  the  suit,  or  from  appearing  in  the  action,  or  from  answer- 
ing and  defending  the  same, — ^the  innocent  party,  thus  deceived,  may 
undoubtedly  obtain  the  opening  or  vacating  of  the  decree,  by  mak- 

St.  502,  2  Am.  Rep.  415;  Owens  v.  Sims,  3  Cold.  (Tenn.)  544;  McJunkln  t. 
McJunkin,  3  Ind.  30;  WooUey  v.  Woolley,  12  Ind.  663;  Lewis  v.  Lewiii.  15 
Kan.  181;  O'Connell  v.  O'Connell,  10  Neb.  390,  6  N.  W.  467*;  GUruth  v.  GUruth. 
20  Iowa,  225;  Whltcomb  v.  Whitcomb,  46  Iowa,  437;  Moster  y.  Moster,  53 
Mo.  326;  Tappan  v.  Tappan,  6'01ilo  St  64. 

167  "There  are  excellent  reasons  why  Judgments  in  matrimonial  causes, 
whether  of  nullity  or  divorce,  should  be  even  more  stable,  certainly  not  less. 
than  in  others.  The  matrimonial  status  of  the  parties  draws  with  and  after 
it  so  many  collateral  rights  and  interests  of  third  persons,  that  uncertainty 
and  fluctuation  in  it  must  be  greatly  detrimental  to  the  public  interests.  And 
especially  to  an  innocent  person  who  has  contracted  a  marriage  on  faith  of 
the  decree  of  the  court,  the  calamity  of  having  the  decree  reversed  and  the 
marriage  made  void  is  past  estimation."  2  Bish.  Mar.  &  Div.  S  750.  **The 
statutory  provision  is  nothing  more  than  a  legislative  recognition  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  public  policy,  which  had  been  repeatedly  aflirmed  by  the  courts,  that 
a  Judgment  or  decree  which  affects  directly  the  status  of  married  persons 
by  sundering  the  matrimonial  tie,  and  thereby  enabling  them  to  contract  new 
matrimonial  relations  with  other  and  innocent  persons,  should  never  be  re- 
opened. Such  a  course  would  endanger  the  peace  and  good  order  of  society, 
and  the  happiness  and  well-being  of  those  who.  innocently  relying  upon  the 
stability  of  a  decree  of  a  court  of  competent  Jurisdiction,  have  formed  a  con- 
nection with  the  person  who,  wrongfully  perhaps,  procured  its  promulgation.'* 
Parish  v.  Parish,  9  Ohio  St.  537. 

iB«  LawTence  v.  Lawrence,  73  111.  577;  Smith  v.  Smith.  20  Mo.  166;  Medina 
V.  Medina,  22  Colo.  146,  43  Pac.  1001;  Walrad  v.  Wairad,  55  lit  App.  Ulfflw 
(486) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  J  320a 

ing  a  timely  and  proper  application  and  showing  good  cause.*"*  And 
this  is  especially  the  case  where  both  parties  to  be  affected  by  the 
vacation  of  the  judgment  have  been  parties  to  the  fraud.*'*  So  also 
it  is  well  settled  that  a  decree  of  divorce  may  be  vacated  which  is 
void  for  want  of  jurisdiction  in  the  court  which  rendered  it.*®*  But  a 
decree  will  not  be  vacated  because,  since  the  decree,  the  petitioner 
has  been  made,  by  a  change  in  the  law,  an  admissible  witness  to 
testify  to  his  own  innocence.*** 

I  320a«    Adjndioatioiif  in  Bankruptcy. 

An  adjudication  in  bankruptcy,  like  other  judgments,  may  be  va- 
cated or  set  aside  by  the  court  which  rendered  it,  upon  a  motion 
made  in  due  season  by  a  competent  party  and  based  upon  adequate 
cause.  As  to  the  parties  who  may  move  in  this  behalf,  it  is  of  course 
the  right  of  an  involuntary  bankrupt  to  ask  for  the  vacation  of  an 
adjudication  against  him.  But  where  the  adjudication  passed  by 
default,  it  will  not  be  opened  to  allow  the  bankrupt  to  file  an  answer 
and  contest  the  petition,  where  the  answer  proposed  does  not  deny 
the  act  of  bankruptcy  charged,  but  merely  denies  that  the  petitioners 
are  creditors,  or  denies  that  they  are  sufficient  in  number  or 
amount.**'  Again,  any  creditor,  whether  he  has  proved  his  debt  in 
bankruptcy  or  not,  may  move  to  set  aside  an  adjudication  of  his 
debtor'as  a  bankrupt,  whenever  such  adjudication  injuriously  aflfects 

1B9  Holmes  v.  Holmes,  63  Me.  420;  Adams  v.  Adams,  51  N.  H.  388,  12 
Am.  Rep.  134;  Carley  v.  Carley,  7  Gray  (Mass.)  545;  Edson  v.  Edson,  108 
Mass.  590,  11  Am.  Rep.  393;  Allen  v.  Maclellan,  12  Pa.  328,  51  Am.  Dec. 
008;  Gechter  v.  Gechter,  51  Md.  187;  Rawlins  v.  Rawlins,  18  Fla.  345;  Whlt- 
comb  v.  Whitcomb,  46  Iowa,  437;  Rush  v.  Rush,  46  Iowa,  049,  26  Am.  Rep. 
179;  Mansfield  v.  Mansfield,  26  Mo.  163;  Johnson  v.  Coleman,  23  Wis.  452, 
99  Am.  Dec.  193;  Crouch  v.  Crouch,  30  Wis.  667;  True  v.  True,  6  Minn.  458 
t(5U.  315);  Young  v.  Young,  17  Minn.  181  (Gil.  153);  Singer  v.  Singer,  41  Barb. 
(X.  Y.)  139;  Klaes  v.  Klaes,  103  Iowa,  689,  72  N.  W.  777;  Magowan  y.  Mag- 
owan,  57  N.  J.  £q.  195,  39  Atl.  364. 

leo  Denton  v.  Denton,  41  How.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  221. 

!•!  Holmes  ▼.  Holmes,  63  Me.  420;  Edson  v.  Edson,  108  Mass.  590,  11 
Am.  Rep.  398;  True  v.  True,  6  Minn.  458  (Gil.  315);  Wortman  v.  Wortman, 
17  Abb.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  06;  AUen  v.  Maclellan,  12  l*a.  328,  51  -4jn.  Dec.  608: 
Crouch  V.  Crouch,  30  Wis.  667;  Weatherbee  y,  Weatherbee,  20  Wis.  499. 

!•>  Holbrook  v.  Holbrook,  114  Mass.  568. 

i«f  In  re  Le  Favour,  8  Ben.  43,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  8,208. 

(487) 


§  320a  LAW  OF  JUDOMENT3.  (Ch.  14 

his  interests.^'*  Such  a  motion,  for  example,  may  be  made  by  an 
attaching  creditor  whose  lien  will  be  dissolved  by  the  adjudication,** • 
or  by  the  receiver  of  a  bankrupt  corporation,  appointed  under  the 
laws  of  the  state.^** 

Any  person  seeking  to  have  an  adjudication  in  bankruptcy  vacated 
or  set  aside  must  make  his  application  therefor  with  due  diligence 
and  promptness  upon  being  informed  of  the  facts;  if  he  delays  for 
so  long  a  time  as  to  be  chargeable  with  laches,  his  motion  will  not 
prevail,  more  especially  where  the  rights  of  others  have  meanwhile 
become  fixed.^*^  Notice  must  be  given  to  the  bankrupt  of  an  appli- 
cation to  annul  the  adjudication  in  an  involuntary  proceeding,  as  the 
bankrupt  has  an  interest  in  the  continuance  of  the  proceeding  which 
may  result  in  his  discharge.^®*  As  to  the  grounds  which  will  justify 
the  court  in  revoking  the  order  of  adjudication,  it  may  be  stated  that 
such  a  course  is  warranted  by  proof  of  fraud  and  collusion  between 
the  bankrupt  and  the  petitioning  creditors,^**  or  where  the  adjudica- 
tion was  made  upon  a  waiver  by  the  attorney  of  the  alleged  bankrupt 
of  important  rights  of  his  client,*'^  or  even  upon  proof  of  the  assent 
of  all  known  creditors  that  the  adjudication  may  be  vacated  and  pub- 
lication of  the  notice  of  the  application  for  the  annulment*^*  It  is 
also  held  that  the  court  of  bankruptcy  may  open  its  order  of  adjudi- 

16^  In  re  Derby,  6  Ben.  232,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  3,815.  But,  to  be  entitled  to 
move  for  the  vacation  of  the  adjudication,  the  creditor  must  own  a  isrovable 
debt  or  claim  against  the  banl^rupt.  In  re  Columbia  Real  Estate  Co.  (D. 
C.)  101  Fed.  965.  But  It  Is  said  that  when  such  a  motion  Is  based  on  a 
want  of  jurisdiction,  It  may  be  made  by  a  stranger  to  the  proceedings, 
appearing  as  amicus  curise.    Id. 

i«6In  re  Donnelly  (D.  C.)  5  Fed.  783;  In  re  Bergeron,  12  N.  B.  U.  38Sw 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  1,342. 

166  In  re  Atlantic  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.,  9  Ben.  270,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  ($28. 

i«T  In  re  Meade,  19  N.  B.  R.  335,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  9,370;  in  re  Republic  Ins. 
Co.,  8  N.  B.  R.  317,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  11,706;  In  re  Neilson,  7  N.  B.  R.  505, 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  10,090;  In  re  Court,  17  N.  B.  R.  555,  Fed.  Cas.  No,  3,281; 
In  re  Thomas,  11  N.  B.  R.  330,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  13.891;  In  re  Lalor,  19  N. 
B.  R.  253,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  8,001;  In  re  Groome  (D.  C.)  1  Fed.  4(H;  In  re 
Peun,  4  Ben.  99,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  10,926;  In  re  Baltimore  County  Dairy  Ass'n, 
2  Hughes,  250,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  828. 

i«8  In  re  Bush,  6  N.  B.  R.  179,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  2,222. 

io»  In  re  Lalor,  19  N.  B.  R.  253,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  8.001. 

1  TO  In  re  Republic  Ins.  Co.,  8  N.  B.  R.  317,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  11,700. 

iTi  In  re  Magee,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  8,941. 

(48.S) 


Ch.   14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §   321 

cation  and  grant  a  re-hearing  in  case  of  newly  discovered  evidence.*^* 
But,  generally  speaking,  an  adjudication  in  bankruptcy  made  upon 
due  service  of  process,  is  final  and  will  not  be  set  aside  on  motion 
of  the  bankrupt,  or  of  creditors,  or  of  both,  disputing  the  allegations 
of  the  petition,  when  no  fraud  or  collusion  is  shown  and  they  merely 
desire  to  retry  the  case.*^'  The  earlier  cases  held  that  the  question 
of  jurisdiction  could  not  be  raised  on  a  motion  to  vacate  the  adjudi- 
cation, creditors  having  an  opportunity  to  dispute  the  jurisdiction 
when  an  application  for  discharge  should  be  made.^^*  But  the  later 
authorities  favor  the  rule  that  an  alleged  want  of  jurisdiction  is  a 
question  which  the  court  should  consider  whenever  and  however  it 
is  raised.^^' 

A  discharge  in  bankruptcy  may  be  revoked  or  vacated  when  it  is 
made  to  appear  that  it  was  procured  by  the  fraud  of  the  bankrupt.^ ^* 
This  action  can  be  taken  only  by  the  court  which  granted  the  dis- 
charge ;  the  authority  conferred  by  the  bankruptcy  law  upon  the  fed- 
eral courts,  in  that  behalf,  is  incompatible  with  the  exercise  of  a  like 
power  by  any  state  court.*^^ 

Part  VI.     Grounds  for  Vacating  Judgments. 

S  321.    Trmud  and  Collnfion. 

The  power  to  set  aside  judgments  for  fraud  or  collusion,  though 
expressly  granted  by  statute  in  many  of  the  states,  is  not  dependent 
upon  legislative  recognition.  It  is  a  common  law  power,  inherent  in 
all  courts  of  record,  and  may  be  exercised  after  the  expiration  of  the 
term  at  which  the  judgment  was  rendered,  on  the  application  of  the 
party  injured.*'®     It  is  specifically  regulated  in  some  of  the  states, 

172  In  re  Great  Western  Tel.  Co.,  5  Biss.  359,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  5,73». 

172  In  re  McKinley,  7  Ben.  562,  Fed.  Cas.  Xo.  8,8t>i. 

174  In  re  Penn,  4  Ben.  99,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  10,926;  In  re  Harris,  6  Ben.  375, 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  6,111. 

17  8  In  re  Columbia  Real  Estate  Co.  (D.  C.)  101  Fed.  965.  See  In  re  Kindt 
<D.  C.)  98  Fed.  867. 

176  Bankruptcy  Act  1808,  §  15;  In  re  Dletz  (D.  C.)  97  Fed.  5G3;  In  re  Augen-. 
«teln,  2  MacArthur  (D.  C.)  322;  Coates  v.  Blush,  1  Cush.  (Mass.)  564. 

177  Corey  v.  Ripley,  57  Me.  69,  2  Am.  Rep.  19. 

"8  Taylor  r.  Slndall,  34  Md.  38;  Humphreys  v.  Kawn,  8  Watts  (Pa.)  78; 

(489) 


§   321  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Cb.   14 

by  laws  which  give  the  courts  power  to  vacate  judgments  on  the 
ground  of  "fraud  practised  by  the  successful  party."  *^*  In  some 
jurisdictions,  it  is  thought  that,  when  a  judgment  is  attacked  and 
sought  to  be  set  aside  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  it  must  appear  that 
the  fraud  was  practised  in  the  very  act  of  obtaining  the  judgment; 
for  any  fraud  anterior  to  that  is  a  defense  available  at  law  and  there- 
fore concluded  by  the  judgment.**®  But  this  rule  should  not  be 
taken  without  qualifications.  For  there  may  well  be  cases  of  fraud 
in  the  cause  of  action,  or  in  the  manner  of  procuring  the  instrument 
in  suit,  where  the  courts  would  not  withhold  relief  on  motion;  as, 
where  the  complainant  was  kept  in  ignorance  of  the  fraud  until  it 
was  too  late  for  him  to  plead  it  in  defense  and  could  not  have  discov- 
ered it  by  due  diligence,  or  where  he  was  fraudulently  prevented 
from  setting  it  up  at  the  proper  time.***  One  of  the  strongest 
grounds  on  which  to  base  an  application  for  the  vacation  of  a  judge- 
ment is  fraud  practised  upon  the  court  in  its  procurement ;  as,  where 
the  court  is  deceived  or  misled  as  to  material  circumstances,  or  its 
process  is  abused,  resulting  in  the  rendition  of  a  judgment  which 

Mayberry  v.  McClurg,  51  Mo.  256;  Melick  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  52  Iowa,  ^  2  N. 
W.  1021;  Oonn's  lessee  v.  Whiteside,  6  Humph.  (Teim.)  47;  In  re  Fisber.  15 
Wis.  511;  Farrow  v.  Dial,  1  McMul.  (S.  0.)  2tt2,  3tt  Am.  Dec.  2«7. 

170  Code  Iowa,  S  3154;  Manning  v.  Nelson,  107  Iowa,  34,  77  N.  W.  503; 
2  Ballinger's  Ann.  Codes  &  St.  Wash.  §  5153,  subd.  4;  McDougaU  ▼.  Wallinic, 
21  Wash.  478,  58  Pae.  669,  75  Am.  St.  Rep.  84U;  Mansf.  Dig.  Ark.  S  3SIW. 
subd.  4.  In  some  states,  a  Judgment  may  be  vacated  for  fraud,  accident,  or 
mistake,  unmixed  with  the  negligence  or  fault  of  the  complaining  party,  by- 
decree  in  chancery,  or  In  a  court  of  law  by  an  independent  action,  wltti 
appropriate  pleadings,  but  cannot  be  set  aside  on  either  of  these  grounds  on 
motion.  Dugan  v.  McGlann,  60  Ga.  353;  Syme  v.  Trice,  »6  N.  C.  243,  1 
S.  B.  480. 

180  zellerbach  v.  AUenberg,  67  Gal.  296,  7  Pac.  908;  Fears  v.  KUey,  14H 
Mo.  49,  49  S.  W.  836. 

181  See  Furman  v.  Furman,  153  N.  Y.  309,  47  N.  E.  577,  60  Am.  8t.  Rep, 
029;  Bates  v.  Hamilton,  144  Mo.  1,  45  S.  W.  641,  66  Am.  St.  Kep.  4U7: 
Schweinfurter  v.  Schmahl,  69  Minn.  418,  72  N.  W.  702.  In  Tennessee,  it 
is  said  that  when  a  Judgment  is  to  be  set  aside  because  of  fraud,  complainant 
must  aver  facts  showing  an  intentional  contrivance  by  one  or  more  of  the 
parties  to  the  suit  to  keep  complainant  and  the  court  in  ignorance  of  tlie 
real  facts  touching  the  matter  in  litigation,  whereby  a  wrong  conclusion 
was  reached,  and  positive  injury  done  to  complainant's  rights.  Smith  v. 
MUler  (Tenn.  Ch.  App.)  42  S.  W.  18X 

(490) 


Ch.  14)  VACATINO  AND  OPENING  JUDGMBNTS.  {  S21 

would  not  have  been  given  if  the  whole  conduct  of  the  case  had  been 
fair.^®^  But  fraud,  sufficient  to  taint  the  judgment,  may  also  be 
practised  by  one  of  the  parties  upon  the  other.  Thus,  a  judgment 
should  be  annulled  or  vacated  if  it  is  shown  that  the  instrument  or 
the  claim  on  which  it  is  founded  had  been  pa}d  or  satisfied  before  the 
institution  of  the  suit  and  the  fact  of  payment  concealed.**'  So 
also,  where  the  defendant  was  tricked  into  signing  a  judgment  note, 
supposing  it  to  be  a  simple  promissory  note,  or  was  secretly  made  to 
assume  obligations  towards  third  persons  which  he  had  no  intention 
of  incurring,  and  thereupon  judgment  was  entered  up  against  him.*®* 
Again,  where  judgment  is  recovered  upon  an  instrument  to  which  the 
defendant's  name  was  forged,  it  will  be  vacated  on  his  motion,  pro- 
vided he  is  not  chargeable  with  lack  of  diligence  in  failing  to  allege 
the  forgery  in  defense  to  the  action.***  Again,  fraud  practised  by 
one  of  the  parties  upon  the  other,  and  sufficient  to  warrant  the  vaca- 
tion of  the  judgment,  may  coiisist  in  deceit  as  to  the  cause  of  action 
sued  on,  or  as  to  the  nature  of  the  relief  sought,  or  as  to  defendant's 
rights  in  the  subject-matter  of  the  litigation,  whereby  he  is  lulled  in- 
to a  fancied  security  and  wronged  by  the  judgment  which  is  obtained 
against  him.***     And  the  same  principle  applies  where  the  successful 

182  Rivers  v.  West,  103  Ga.  582,  30  S.  E.  555.  A  false  allegation  by  tlie 
plaintiff  as  to  his  residence  is  not  ground  for  setting  aside  the  Judgment. 
Fears  v.  Riley,  148  Mo.  49,  49  S.  \V.  83«.  The  joining  of  a  defendant 
merely  for  Jurisdictional  purposes  may  or  may  not  be  a  fraud  on  the  court. 
Id.  Taking  a  Judgment  while  a  motion  for  security  for  costs  was  pending 
is  not  a  fraud  on  the  court  so  as  to  authorize  the  setting  aside  of  the  Judg- 
ment, since  the  court  takes  Judicial  notice  of  the  status  of  a  case  as  shown 
by  Its  own  records.  Id.  Bringing  a  defendant  to  a  county  under  a  crim- 
inal warrant,  in  order  to  have  him  there  served  with  civil  process,  is  not  a 
fraud  on  the  court,  in  this  sense.     Id. 

i8»  Noyes  v.  Loeb,  24  La.  Ann.  48;  Halladay  v.  Underwood,  75  111.  App. 
96.    See  Mitchell  v.  Kinnaird  (Ky.)  52  S.  W.  830. 

i«*  Anderson  v.  Field,  6  111.  App.  307;  United  Security  Life  Ins.  &  Trust 
Cto.  V.  Ott  (N.  J.  Eq.)  26  Atl.  923. 

i«»  State  V.  Richardson,  1  Marv.  (Del.)  372,  41  Atl.  75;  Reeser  v.  Brenne- 
man,  4  Pa.  Dist.  R.  143;  Lindsley  v.  Sparlis,  20  Tex.  Ci*'.  App.  56,  48  S. 
W.  204;   Fox  v.  lAma  Nat.  Bank,  25  Wkly.  Law  Bui.  (Ohio)  28. 

"•In  re  0*Kelirs  Estate,  90  Wis.  480,  63  N.  W.  1042;  Guild  v.  Phillips 
(C.  C.)  44  Fed.  461;  Small  wood  v.  Trenwith,  110  N.  C.  91,  14  S.  E.  505. 
Where  a  decree  of  foreclosure,  obtained  by  default,  fraudulently  included 
the  mortgagor's  homestead,  the  decree  will  be  vacated  as  to  the  homesteads 

(491) 


§321  LiLW  OF  JUDOMBNT8.  (Ch.    li 

party  has  taken  means  to  prevent  proper  service  being  made  upon 
the  other,  or  has  procured  the  service  of  false  or  misleading  papers, 
or  a  false  return  of  service,  or  has  made  false  representations  as  to 
the  status  of  the  case  or  the  time  of  its  trial.^'^ 

Collusion  between  some  of  the  parties,  working  injury  to  the  just 
rights  of  the  others,  will  also  be  ground  for  setting  aside  the  judg- 
ment. Thus,  where  suit  is  brought  against  a  corporation,  and  the 
director  or  officer  upon  whom  process  is  served  covinously  agrees 
with  the  plaintiff  for  the  rendition  of  a  judgment,  it  is  a  fraud  upon 
the  corporation  which  will  warrant  the  vacation  of  the  judgment,  if  it 
is  shown  that  there  was  a  good  defense,  or  otherwise  that  injustice 
has  been  done.^®*  •  So,  where  attorneys  for  one  of  the  parties  are 
induced  to  withdraw  their  appearance  and  suffer  a  judgment,  with- 
out authorization  from  their  client,* ••  or  where  there  was  collusion 
between  the  counsel  on  the  two  sides  of  the  case,  and  a  wrongful  judg- 
ment is  consequently  entered.*^**  But  there  is  no  fraud  in  a  judi^^- 
ment   authorizing  its  annulment  merely  because  the   defendant   fa- 

where  the  mortgagor  was  not  culpably  negligent.  Williams  v.  Lumpkin  (Tex. 
€lT.  App.)  26  S.  W.  103.  So,  where  a  decree  declaring  that  certain  heirs 
have  no  interest  in  the  property,  and  enjoining  them  from  setting  up  title 
thereto,  was  procured  by  the  fraudulent  practices  and  misrepresentations  of 
the  widow,  it  will  be  set  aside  tn  equity,  and  the  rights  of  the  heirs  estab- 
lished, even  against  purchasers,  if  they  had  notice.  Hayden  v.  Uaydeo, 
46  Gal.  332.  But  mere  failure  by  defendant  voluntarily  to  disclose  evidence 
which  would  tend  to  defeat  his  defense  does  not  constitute  such  fraud  as 
would  authorize  the  vacation  of  a  Judgment.  McDougaU  t.  Walling,  21 
Wash.  478,  58  Pac.  669,  75  Am.  St.  Rep.  «4». 

187  StiUweU  V.  StiUwell,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  275,  20  AU.  060,  24  Am.  St.  Kep. 
4<IS;  Miller  v.  Neidzielslca,  176  Pa.  400,  35  Atl.  225;  Pattlson  v.  liugbes,  ^ft» 
Md.  559,  31  Atl.  320;  Rodriguez  v.  Espinosa  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  25  S.  W.  660: 
Wolf  V.  Butler,  81  Tex.  86,  16  S.  W.  704.  Where  A.  brought  ejectment  against 
B.,  the  tenant  of  C,  and  B.  reported  to  C,  whose  counsel  put  In  a  demurrer 
and  began  to  prepare  a  defense;  but  pending  this  preparation,  and  before 
argument  on  the  demurrer,  R  fraudulently,  and  collusively  with  A.,  wi tit- 
drew  the  demurrer.  It  was  held  proper  to  set  aside  a  Judgment  taken  by 
default  by  A.,  and  to  admit  C.  to  a  defense.    Barrett  v.  Graham.  10  Cal.  6X2. 

188  Farrar  v.  Consolidated  Apex  Min.  Co..  12  S.  D.  237,  80  N.  W.  1070: 
Willsle  v.  Rapid  Valley  Horse-Ranch  Co.,  7  S.  1).  114,  63  N.  W.  546;  Nelson 
V.  Blaisdell,  23  Or.  507,  32  Pac.  391. 

180  Crescent  Brewing  Co.  v.  Cuilins,  125  Ind.  110.  25  N.  E.  150. 
100  Smith  V.  Miller  (Tenn.  Ch.  App.)  42  S.  W.  182. 

(492) 


.^ 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AKD  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  321 

vored  other  creditors,  whereby  it  proved  worthless.***  A  judgment 
by  default,  Entered  by  fraud  and  collusion,  may  be  opened  after  the 
death  of  the  judgment-debtor,  so  as  to  allow  his  administrator  to 
defend.*" 

But  a  judgment  or  decree  will  not  be  declared  void  for  fraud 
because  there  may  be  suspicious  circumstances  connected  with  its 
rendition.  Fraud  will  not  be  presumed;  it  must  be  satisfactorily 
shown.**'  It  has  been  said  that  it  would  require  a  strong  case  to 
authorize  the  setting  aside  of  a  judgment  taken  by  default  on  the 
ground  that  the  same  was  procured  through  false  representations.*** 
And  the  fact  that  there  was  usury  in  the  original  mortgage  debt,  on 
which  a  judgment  is  founded,  is  not  alone  sufficient  to  establish  fraud 
which  will  give  another  creditor  the  right  to  have  the  judgment  set 
aside.**^ 

In  this  connection  it  must  be  remarked  that,  in  an  action  to  set 
aside  a  judgment  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  neither  the  judgment  thus 
sought  to  be  vacated,  nor  an  order  refusing  to  set  aside  a  default  and 
permit  an  answer  in  that  case,  can  be  set  up  as  a  bar  to  the  action.* •• 
The  right  to  have  a  judgment  set  aside  on  the  ground  of  fraud  is  one 
that  admits  of  being  waived,  and  the  defendant,  by  his  subsequent 
conduct,  may  be  estopped  to  avail  himself  of  it.**^  In  a  case  where 
one  of  several  defendants  had  a  good  defense,  and  by  the  fraudulent 
device  of  the  plaintiff  was  prevented  from  making  it,  and  was  also 
prevented  from  making  his  motion  within  the  time  limited  by  law  to 
set  aside  the  judgment,  it  was  held  that,  as  against  such  defendant, 
the  plaintiff  was  estopped  to  enforce  the  judgment.**' 

i»i  Gray  v.  Richmond  Bicycle  Co.,  26  Misc.  Rep.  1«5,  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  787. 

i»t  Hartlgan  v.  Nagle,  11  Misc.  Rep.  449.  32  N.  Y.  Supp.  220. 

i»<Tacoma  Lumber  &  Manufg  Co.  v.  Wolff,  7  Wash.  478,  35  Pac.  115; 
Jones  V.  Brittan,  1  Woods,  667,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  7,455;  Caldwell  v.  Flfield,  24  N. 
J.  Law,  150. 

!•*  Obermeyer  v.  Einstein,  62  Mo.  341. 

i»»  Mahan  v.  Oa vender,  77  Ga.  118. 

!••  States  V.  Cromwell  (N.  Y.)  14  N.  E.  448. 

»»T  Scfaenck's  Appeal,  04  Pa.  37. 

198  Johnson's  Adm'rs  t.  Unversaw,  30  Ind.  485. 

(493) 


§   322  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Oh.  14 

§  322.    Jndsment  t«k«n  ooatrwry  to  Afpte^ntewit, 

Where  a  plaintiff  or  his  counsel  prevents  an  appearance  and  defense 
in  an  action  by  representations  and  promises,  he  is  guilty  of  a  spe- 
cies of  fraud  if,  in  violation  of  such  promises  or  representations,  he 
takes  a  default  in  a  case  where  he  knows  there  is  a  defense.***  Con- 
sequently, where  it  is  shown  that  there  was  an  honest  agreement  be- 
tween the  parties  that  the  case  should  be  continued,  or  that  defend- 
ant's time  to  answer  should  be  extended,  or  that  the  action  should 
be  dismissed,  as  the  result  of  a  compromise,  and  yet  the  plaintiff, 
without  notice  to  the  defendant  and  in  violation  of  the  agreement, 
enters  up  a  default,  or  proceeds  to  trial  and  procures  a  judgment 
against  the  defendant  in  his  absence,  this  is  good  ground  for  setting 
aside  the  judgment.^®®  So  where  the  plaintiff  has  previously  filed  a 
bill  in  equity  concerning  the  same  matter  in  litigation  at  law,  and  has 
obtained  the  defendant's  consent  for  the  case  at  law  to  stand  con- 
tinued until  the  bill  has  been  heard,  but  afterwards  takes  judgment 
by  default  while  the  bill  is  still  pending.^^*  But  the  court  will  not  on 
this  ground  set  aside  a  judgment  unless  the  alleged  agreement  was 
definite  and  specific,  or  unless  the  promises  or  representations  of 
the  plaintiff  were  such  that  the  defendant  could  rely  upon  them  and 
remain  inactive,  without  being  chargeable  with  any  lack  of  diligence 
or  vigilance  in  guarding  his  own  interests.'®*     And  in  some  of  the 


i»»  Douthlt  V.  Douthlt,  133  Ind.  26.  32  N.  E.  715. 

2ooBinsse  v.  Barker,  13  N.  J.  Law,  263.  23  Am.  Dec.  720;  Mcintosh  t. 
Crawford  County  Com'rs.  13  Kan.  171;  Perry  v.  Fisher  (Ky.)  44  S.  W.  37S; 
Mitchell  V.  Knight,  7  Ohio  Cir.  Ct  R.  2(M;  Cadwallader  v.  McQay,  37  Neb. 
359,  55  N.  W.  1054,  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  496;  Milwaukee  Harvester  Oo.  v.  Schroe- 
der,  72  Minn.  393,  75  N.  W.  606;  Heinemann  v.  Le  Clair,  82  Wis.  135,  51  N. 
W.  1101;  Stafford  v.  McMillan,  25  Wis.  566;  Boutin  v.  CatUn.  101  Wis.  545,  77 
N.  W.  910;  Oris  wold  Linseed  Oil  Co.  v.  Lee,  1  S.  D.  531,  47  N.  W.  955,  36  Am. 
St.  Rep.  761;  McGowan  v.  Kreling,  117  Cal.  31.  48  Pac.  980;  Merchants'  Ad- 
Slgn  Co.  V.  Los  Angeles  Bill-Posting  Co.,  128  Cal.  619,  61  Pac.  277.  Such  a 
case  is  within  the  statutes  authorizing  the  vacation  of  a  judgment  taken 
against  the  defendant  through  his  "surprise  or  excusable  neglect"  Thomp- 
son v.  Connell,  31  Or.  231,  48  Pac.  467,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  81& 

201  Browning  v.  Roane.  9  Ark.  354,  50  Am.  Dec.  218. 

202  Jenkins  v.  Gamowell  Fire  Alarm  Tel.  Oo.  (Cal.)  31  Pac.  570;  Huntington 
V.  Emerj'.  74  Md.  67,  21  AtL  495;  Funk  v.  Kansas  Manurg  Co.,  53  Neb.  450, 

(494) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §   323 

States  it  is  the  rule  that  a  mere  oral  agreement  between  the  parties 
to  postpone  the  trial  of  a  cause  beyond  the  day  set  for  trial,  or  to 
dismiss  the  action,  which  is  not  reduced  to  writing  and  filed,  or  not 
communicated  to  the  court  whose  action  it  is  to  govern,  will  not  be 
suiHcient  to  justify  the  vacation  of  the  judgment.'^®* 

f  323.    PevJury. 

Another  species  of  fraud  which  the  plaintiff  may  practise  in  pro- 
curing a  judgment,  and  which  will  be  sufficient  to  cause  its  vacation, 
is  his  own  wilful  perjury.  "A  defendant  failing  to  defend  cannot 
have  the  judgment  vacated  on  account  of  any  innocent  mistake  or 
want  of  recollection  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  or  other  witness,  nor 
even  on  account  of  the  perjury  of  the  other  witnesses,  provided  the 
plaintiff  himself  is  wholly  guiltless.^^*  Nor  can  he  have  the  judgment 
vacated  on  account  of  any  mistake  or  error  on  the  part  of  the  court 
or  jury,  unless  the  record  affirmatively  shows  such  mistake  or  error. 
All  such  mistakes  or  errors  each  party  is  bound  to  anticipate,  and  to 
prepare  for  by  extraordinary  diligence.  But  no  party  is  bound  to 
anticipate  or  to  suppose  that  the  other  party  will  commit  wilful  and 
corrupt  perjury,  and  no  party  is  bound  to  exercise  extraordinary  dili- 
gence in  preparing  to  meet  such  perjury."  '®*     In  Minnesota,  a  stat- 

73  N.  W.  931;  Holland  Bank  v.  Ueuollen  (Idaho)  58  Pac.  3d8.  A  judgment 
entered  upon  a  cognovit  will  not  be  opened  because  of  a  verbal  promise,  al- 
leged to  have  been  made  at  the  time  of  giving  the  cognovit  that  the  Judgment 
would  never  be  enforced.  Heckscher  v.  Middleton,  54  N.  J.  Law,  312,  23  Atl. 
913. 

ao»  Dixon  v.  Brophey,  29  Iowa,  460;  Le  Due  v.  Slocomb,  124  N.  C.  347,  32 
S.  B.  726;  Mathews  v.  Bishop,  106  Ga.  564,  32  S.  E.  631.  See  Johnson  v. 
Sweeney,  95  Gal.  301,  30  Pac.  540. 

204  A  decree  will  not  be  vacated  merely  because  the  prevailing  party  ob- 
tained it  by  bribing  a  witness  to  swear  falsely.  Pico  v.  Gohn,  91  Gal.  129,  27 
Pac.  537,  13  K  R.  A.  336,  25  Am.  St  Rep.  159;  Maryland  Steel  Co.  v.  Mamey, 
91  Md.  360,  46  Atl.  1077.  But  in  New  York,  a  Judgment  may  be  vacated  if 
shown  to  be  based  on  perjured  testimony  inspired  and  manufactured  by  an 
attorney  for  the  successful  party,  who  conspired  with  the  witnesses  to  ob- 
tain the  judgment  Nugent  v.  Metropolitan  St.  Ry.  Go.,  46  App.  Div.  105,  61 
N.  Y.  Supp.  476. 

SOB  Laithe  v.  McDonald,  12  Kan.  340;  Humphreys  v.  Rawn,  8  Watts  (Pa.) 
78;  Rowe  v.  Chicago  Lumber  &  Goal  Co.,  50  La.  Ann.  125S,  24  South.  235. 
Compare  Baker  v.  Wadsworth,  67  Law  J.  Q.  B.  301.    The  courts  of  the  United 

(495) 


/ 


§  824  LAW  OP  JUDOMBNTS.  (Ch.  H 

ute  provides  an  action  to  set  aside  a  judgment  obtained  by  means  of 
the  "perjury,  subornation  of  perjury,  or  any  fraudulent  act,  practice, 
or  representation  of  the  prevailing  party."  *••  But  it  is  held  that 
an  action  cannot  be  maintained,  under  this  section,  upon  the  bare 
allegation  that,  upon  an  issue  of  fact  squarely  made,  so  that  each 
party  knows  what  the  other  will  attempt  to  prove,  and  where  neither 
has  a  right,  or  is  under  any  necessity,  to  depend  on  the  other  to 
prove  the  fact  to  be  as  he  himself  claims  it,  there  was  false  or  perjured 
testimony  by  the  successful  party  or  his  witnesses.'^^ 

r    1^  §  324.    Want   of    Ilotio«« 

It  is  in  general  good  ground  for  setting  aside  a  judgment  that 
there  was  no  service  of  process  on  the  defendant,  or  that  the  service 
was  materially  irregular  or  defective,  provided  there  has  been  no 
waiver  of  such  defects  by  appearance  or  otherwise.***    Thus  where 

• 

States  wiU  not  entertain  a  suit  to  vacate  or  annul  a  Judgment  of  a  court  har- 
ing  Jurisdiction  to  render  It,  solely  on  the  ground  that  it  was  procured  by 
means  of  the  perjured  testimony  of  the  party  whom  it  benefits.  United 
States  V.  Throckmorton,  98  U.  S.  60,  25  L.  Bd.  93;  United  States  r.  Gleeson. 
33  C.  C.  A.  272.  90  Fed.  778. 

soo  Gen.  St.  Minn.  1878,  c.  66,  f  285. 

SOT  Haas  v.  Billings,  42  Minn.  63,  43  X.  W.  797;  Wilkins  v.  Sherwood,  56 
Minn.  154,  56  N.  W.  591.  In  Washington,  perjury  does  not  constitute  such 
fraud  as  will  authorize  the  vacation  of  a  Judgment,  except  under  circumstan- 
ces which  deeeive  the  opposite  party  as  to  the  nature  of  the  testimony,  and 
relieve  him  of  the  implication  of  want  of  diligence  in  dlscoTering  Its  falsity. 
McDougall  V.  Walling,  21  Wash.  478,  58  Pac.  609,  75  Am.  St  Rep.  ^10. 

S08  Harris  v.  Hardeman,  14  How.  334,  14  L.  Ed.  444;  Shuford  r.  Cain,  1 
Abb.  U.  S.  302,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  12,823;  Duhalme  y.  Monast  20  B.  I.  5M.  40 
Atl.  377;  Kunes  v.  McCloskey,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ot.  R.  542;  Szerlip  y.  Baler,  21  Mlse. 
Rep.  331,  47  N.  Y.  Supp.  133;  People  y.  Dunn,  54  N.  Y.  Supp.  194;  Fhvrahebn 
Bros.  Dry-Goods  Co.  y.  Williams,  45  La.  Ann.  1196,  14  South.  120;  Slmco^c  y. 
First  Nat.  Banlc,  14  Kan.  529;  Hanson  y.  Wolcott,  19  Kan.  207;  Honlon  y. 
Euper,  63  Ark.  323,  38  S.  W.  517;  Brady  y.  Washington  Ins.  Co.,  67  DL  App. 
159;  Davis  v.  Burt,  7  Iowa,  56;  Allen  v.  Rogers,  27  Iowa,  106;  Jamison  v. 
Weaver,  84  Iowa,  611,  51  N.  W.  G5;  In  re  Behrens'  Estate,  104  Iowa,  29,  73  N. 
W.  351;  Hurlburt  v.  Reed,  5  Mich.  30;  Carr  v.  Commercial  Bank.  16  Wis.  50; 
Heffner  v.  Gunz,  29  Minn.  106,  12  N.  W.  342;  Smith's  Adm'r  v.  RolUna,  25 
Mo.  408;  Dunlap  v.  Steere,  92  Cal.  344,  28  Pac.  563,  16  L.  R.  A.  361.  27  Am. 
St.  Rep.  143;  Norton  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  97  Oil.  888,  32  Pac.  432, 
33  Am.  St.  Rep.  108;  People  v.  Temple,  103  Cal.  447,  37  Pac.  414;  Lomax  t. 
Besley.  1  Colo.  App.  21,  27  Pac.  167. 

(496) 


Ch.  14)  YACATINQ  AND  OPENINQ  JUDQMENTa.  §   324 

the  return  of  the  sheriff  showed  a  service  of  the  summons  on  Mon- 
day, but  the  proofs  on  a  motion  to  set  aside  a  default  showed  that 
the  service  was  in  fact  made  on  Sunday,  it  was  held  that,  although 
the  return  CQuld  not  be  impeached  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that 
the  default  was  irregular,  yet  the  fact  might  be  proved  for  the  pur- 
pose of  excusing  the  default  as  a  condition  to  obtaining  relief.^*^"* 
So  a  judgment  may  be  set  aside  at  the  instance  of  a  defendant  who 
shows  that,  although  the  summons  was  left  at  his  residence,  he  was, 
at  the  time,  absent  or  sick,  and  had  no  actual  knowledge  of  the 
suit,  or  that  it  was  forwarded  to  him  by  mail  but  never  reached  his 
hands-*^®  A  joint  verdict  and  judgment  against  several  defendants, 
some  of  whom  were  never  served  and  have  not  waived  service  by  ap- 
pearance, may  be  set  aside  on  motion.^ ^*  So,  in  the  case  of  a  corpo- 
ration, it  will  be  good  ground  for  vacating  a  judgment  agfainst  it  that 
the  person  upon  whom  service  was  made  was  not  an  officer  of  the 
corporation,  or  not  authorized  to  accept  service,  or  that  he  failed, 
through  negligence  or  forgetfulness,  or  with  a  sinister  motive,  to  give 
notice  of  the  action  to  those  charged  with  the  duty  of  defending  the 
action  in  behalf  of  the  corporation.***  It  should  be  observed  that 
the  rule  as  to  the  presumptions  in  favor  of  the  validity  and  regularity 
of  proceedings  had  before  judgment  is  applicable  only  in  cases  of 
collateral  attack,  and  cannot  be  invoked  to  cure  defects  in  the  service 
of  process,  upon  an  application  to  set  aside  a  default  and  permit  a 
defense  on  the  merits.**'  But  it  has  been  held  that  the  appearance 
of  a  party  against  whom  a  judgment  has  been  rendered,  to  move  that 
it  be  opened  and  for  leave  to  answer,  is  a  general  appearance  to  the 

merits  and  waives  all  defects  in  the  service  of  process  and  other  pro- 

> 

so»  Smith  v.  Noe,  30  Ind.  117. 

«io  Kolb  V.  Ralsor,  17  Ind.  App.  551.  47  N.  E.  177;  Burkhard  v.  Smith,  19 
Misc.  Bep.  31,  42  N.  Y.  Supp.  638;  Osman  v  Wlsted,  78  Minn.  295,  80  N.  W. 
1127;  Malone  t.  Big  Flat  Gravel  Mln.  Co.,  93  Cal.  384,  28  Pac.  1003. 

211  Harralson  v.  McArthur,  87  Ga.  478,  13  S.  E.  594,  13  L.  R.  A.  689;  Carter 
▼.  Kaiser  (Tenn.  Ch.)  48  S.  W.  265. 

«i2  Wheeler  v.  Moore,  10  Wash.  309,  38  Pac.  1053;  Board  of  Education  v. 
National  Bank  of  Commerce,  4  Kan.  App.  438,  46  Pac.  36;  Glaeser  v.  Citj'  of 
St  Paul,  67  Minn.  368,  60  N.  W.  1101.  Compare  Davis  v.  Steuben  School  Tp., 
19  Ind.  App.  694,  50  N.  E.  1. 

2i«  Blythe  v.  Hinckley  (C.  C.)  84  Fed.  228. 

1  LAW  JUDG.-32  (497) 


%  824  UKW  1^  JVD«MENTa  (Ch- 14 

ceedings  preliminary  to  the  judgment."**  A  judgment  based  on  a 
false  return  of  service  may  be  attacked  by  motion  in  the  same  pro- 
ceeding."** And  where  the  return  of  process  is  defective  in  not 
showing  a  due  and  legal  service,  this  will  also  be  ground  for  setting 
aside  the  judgment,  though  the  court  may,  in  a  proper  case,  allow 
the  return  to  be  amended  and  dismiss  the  motion  to  vacate."** 

But  want  of  notice,  as  a  ground  for  vacating  a  judgment,  means 
want  of  notice  of  the  institution  of  the  action, — ^want  of  that  notice 
which  is  essential  to  give  the  court  jurisdiction  over  the  person  of 
the  defendant.  When  a  defendant  has  been  legally  served  with 
proper  process,  he  is  in  court  for  every  purpose  connected  with  the 
action.  It  is  then  his  duty  to  follow  up  his  case,  and  take  notice  of 
the  filing  of  subsequent  papers  in  the  action,  such  as  demurrers,  cross- 
petitions,  and  motions  of  various  sorts;  and  he  must  ascertain  for 
himself  when  the  case  is  put  on  the  calendar  or  docket  for  trial,  or 
set  down  for  hearing,  and  when  it  is  likely  to  be  reached.  If  he  fails, 
through  his  own  carelessness  or  lack  of  vigilant  attention,  to  obtain 
notice  of  the  various  steps  in  the  action,  or  of  the  time  of  trial,  and 
consequently  suffers  a  judgment,  it  will  not  be  vacated  merely  on  that 
ground."*^ 

»»4  Gray  v.  Gates,  37  Wis.  614. 

215  Du  Bols  V.  Clark.  12  Colo.  App.  220,  55  Pac.  750. 

216  Stotz  V.  Collins,  83  Va.  423,  2  S.  E.  737.  But  a  Judgment  will  not  he 
vacated  years  after  Its  rendition  because  the  record  shows  that  the  affidavit 
of  service  of  summons  therein  was  not  sworn  to,  where  it  Is  not  shown  ttut 
the  summons  was  not  in  fact  served,  as  such  a  defect  will  not  affect  the  Ju- 
risdiction of  the  court  to  render  a  Judgment.  State  v.  Superior  Court  of 
Pierce  County,  19  Wash.  128,  52  Pac.  1013,  67  Am.  St  Rep.  724. 

»i7  Curry  v.  .Tanicke,  48  Kan.  168,  29  Pac.  319;  Kamman  v.  Otto  (Ky.)  ^ 
S.  W.  1070;  Culver  v.  Brinkerhoff,  180  111.  548,  54  N.  E.  585;  Blaine  v.  Brine  e. 
16  Mont.  582,  41  Pac.  1002.  In  California,  it  Is  held  that,  even  If  the  defendant 
is  a  non-resident,  he  is  bound  to  know  the  day  fixed  for  setting  cases  for  trial, 
and  if  there  is  no  such  day  fixed  he  must  ascertain  the  day  of  trial  from  tlH' 
proceedings  of  the  court  or  otherwise;  and  he  cannot  have  a  Judgment  va- 
cated merely  on  the  ground  that  neither  he  nor  his  attorney  had  notice  thai 
the  case  was  set  for  trial.  Dusy  v.  Prudom,  95  Cal.  646,  30  Pac  798.  Oom- 
pare  Buell  y.  Emerlch,  85  Cal.  116,  24  Pac.  644;  Clark  y.  Oyharzabal,  129  CaL 
.328,  61  Pac.  1119. 

(498) 


CSu  14)  YACATINO  AND  OPENINQ  JUDGMENTS.  §   S25 


I  826.    Unauthox&ud  ApipearaiiAe  by  Arttoriiity. 

By  the  English  rule,  where  a  defendant  has  been  served  with  pro- 
cess, and  an  attorney  without  authority  appears  for  him,  the  court 
will  not  interfere  to  set  aside  the  proceedings,  if  the  attorney  be  sol- 
vent, but  will  leave  the  defendant  to  his  remedy  by  summary  applica- 
tion against  the  attorney.  If  the  attorney  be  insolvent,  the  court 
will  relieve  the  defendant  on  equitable  terms  if  he  has  a  defense  on 
the  merits.  But  where  a  plaintiff,  without  serving  a  defendant,  ac- 
cepts the  appearance  of  an  unauthorized  attorney  for  the  defendant, 
the  court  will  set  aside  the  judgment  as  irregular,  with  costs,  and 
leave  the  plaintiff  to  recover  those  costs  and  the  expense  to  which 
he  has  been  put  from  the  delinquent  attorney  by  summary  proceed- 
ings.*^* It  is  the  prevailing  doctrine  of  the  American  cases  that  a 
judgment  obtained  against  a  party  uppn  whom  no  process  was 
served,  and  for  whom  an  attorney  has  entered  an  appearance  with- 
out authority,  may  be  set  aside,  even  at  a  subsequent  term.'^^*     In 

a  18  Bajley  v.  Buekland,  1  Exch.  1. 

21S  American  Aquol  &  Pyrodene  Paint  Co.  v.  Smith,  90  Hun,  009.  35  N.  Y. 
Supp.  723;  Post  v.  Charlesworth,  66  Hun,  256,  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  108;  Woods  v. 
Dickinson,  7  Mackey,  301;  Longman  v.  Bradford,  108  6a.  572,  33  S.  B.  916; 
Marvel  t.  Manouvrier,  14  La.  Ann.  3,  74  Am.  Dec.  424;  Gritchfield  v.  Porter,  3 
Ohio,  518;  Lyon  v.  Boilvin,  2  Oilman  (111.)  629;  Russell  v.  Pottawattamie  Co., 
*»  Iowa,  256;  Stanton-Thompson  Oo.  v.  Crane.  24  Nev.  .171,  51  Pac.  116;  Mc- 
Eachem  v.  Brackett,  8  Wash.  652,  36  Pac.  690,  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  922.  In  Penn- 
sylvania, where  Judgment  is  entered  against  a  defendant  in  an  action  of 
which  he  had  no  notice,  service  of  the  writ  having  been  accepted  for  him  by 
an  attorney  who  had  no  authority  to  act  for  him,  it  is  proper  for  the  court, 
on  defendant's  motion,  to  strike  off  the  Judgment  Bryu  Mawr  Nat.  Bank  v. 
James,  152  Pa.  304,  25  Atl.  823.  But  if  it  is  not  admitted  that  the  attorney's 
appearance  for  defendant  was  unauthorized,  then  the  Judgment  cannot  be 
Ktricken  off,  but  can  only  be  opened,  and  tlic  disputed  facts  sent  to  a  Jury. 
Swartz  V.  D.  S.  Morgan  &  Co.,  163  Pa.  195,  29  Atl.  975,  43  Am.  St.  Rep.  786. 
Defendant  must  act  promptly;  If  he  was  aware  that  an  attorney,  though  un- 
anthorized,  had  appeared  for  him,  a  default  Judgment  will  not  be  vacated 
after  the  lapse  of  10  years.    Lytle  v.  Forest,  16  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  239. 

In  New  York,  it  appears  to  be  settled  that  relief  against  a  Judgment  ren- 
dered against  one  not  served  with  process,  on  the  unauthorized  appearance 
of  an  attorney  in  his  name,  may  be  sought  and  obtained  by  motion  in  the 
case  in  which  such  appearance  was  entered;  that  if,  at  the  time  of  such  mo- 
tion, the  attorney  who  entered  such  appearance  is  insolvent.  It  Is  no  reason 

(499) 


§   325  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.    14 

some  of  the  states,  however,  there  is  still  a  disposition  to  base  a  dis- 
tinction on  the  question  of  the  attorney's  solvency,  and  to  hold  that 
the  judgment  should  not  be  vacated,  if  he  is  able  to  respond  in  dam- 
ages, though  he  was  entirely  without  authority  to  appear.***  At 
any  rate,  the  claim  of  a  party  for  whom  an  appearance  has  been  en- 
tered, to  deny  the  authority  of  the  attorney  and  ask  relief,  is  viewed 
with  great  disfavor  by  the  courts  wherever  innocent  third  persons 
have  acquired  rights  under  the  judgment  or  decree  sought  to  be  an- 
nulled.*** And  relief  will  be  denied  where  the  fact  of  the  attorney's 
authority  is  not  fully  negatived,  but  left  in  doubt  under  the  testimony, 
and  there  is  no  allegation  of  a  meritorious  defense  to  the  action.*** 
Applications  for  relief  against  a  judgment  on  this  ground  are  more 
commonly  made  by  bill  in  equity  for  an  injunction  against  the  en- 
forcement of  the  judgment  than  by  motion  to  vacate  it,  and  the  point 
will  receive  further  consideration  in  connection  with  the  former 
species  of  remedies.*** 

for  denying  the  motion  that,  at  the  time  the  judgment  was  given,  the  attomej 
was  able  to  respond  in  damages;  that  it  rests  in  the  discretion  of  the  court, 
according  to  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  case,  either  to  racate  the 
judgment  entirely  or  to  allow  it  to  stand  as  security,  with  leave  to  the  defend- 
ant to  come  in  and  defend;  but  that  if  the  defendant  was  a  non-resident,  and 
was  not  served,  he  is  entitled  to  have  the  judgment  set  aside  absolutely. 
Vilas  V.  Plattshurgh  &  M.  R.  Co.,  123  N.  Y.  440,  25  N.  R  Wl,  9  L.  R.  A.  8*4, 
20  Am.  St  Rep.  771;  City  of  New  York  v.  Smith,  61  X.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  374,  -Jii 

X.  Y.  Supp.  eee. 

220  University  of  North  Carolina  v.  Lassiter,  83  N.  C.  38;  Chadbourn  r, 
Johnston,  119  N.  C.  282,  25  S.  E.  705.  And  see  Denton  v.  Noyes,  6  Johns.  4X. 
Y.)  296,  5  Am.  Dec.  237;  Seale  v.  McLaughlin.  28  Oal.  668;  Schhrling  v.  Seller. 
41  Miss.  644;  Smith  v.  Bowditch,  7  Pick.  (Mass.)  137;  Powers  v.  Trenor.  3 
Hun,  3. 

221  Kenyon  v.  Shreck.  52  111.  382. 

222  Russell  V.  Pottawottamie  Co.,  29  Iowa.  256.  When  the  record  sbowK 
that  a  defendant  appeared  by  his  attorney,  it  is  conclusive  of  the  appearance. 
but  only  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  authority  of  the  attorney  to  act,  which 
may  be  denied  and  rebutted  by  proof.  Blyth  &  Fargo  Co.  v  Swenaon,  15 
Utah,  345.  49  Pac.  1027.  The  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  party  denying  the  at- 
torney's authority  to  appear.  Connell  v.  Galligher,  36  Neb.  749.  55  N.  W.  229. 
And  a  party  to  an  action  cannot  retry  the  question  of  the  authority  of  an  at- 
torney to  represent  him  therein,  by  a  petition  to  vacate  the  judgment,  whf n 
such  question  was  adjudicated  in  the  original  action  on  a  motion  to  di«mi<s. 
Roberts  v.  Shelton,  S.  W.  R.  Co.,  21  Wash.  427,  58  Pac.  576. 

223  See,  infra.  (  374. 

(500) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  326 


S  326.    IrreKiilarlti««. 

It  is  a  general  rule  that  the  court  in  which  a  judgment  was  ren- 
dered may  vacate  it,  on  motion,  at  the  same  or  a  subsequent  term, 
on  proof  that  it  was  entered  irregularly  and  not  according  to  the 
course  of  the  court.^**  Thus  a  judgment  entered  in  favor  of  the 
plaintiff,  before  the  time  for  answering  has  expired,  may  properly  be 
set  aside ;  **'  and  so  may  a  judgment  entered  while  there  was  an 
answer  or  demurrer  on  file  and  not  yet  disposed  of.**®  So  a  judg- 
ment in  a  suit  in  equity,  entered  through  inadvertence  by  the  clerk 
on  a  special  advisory  verdict,  while  other  issues  of  fact  remain  to 
be  determined  by  the  court,  may  be  set  aside,  and  a  new  judg- 
ment entered,  after  the  adoption  of  the  special  verdict  by  the  court 
and  its  findings  on  other  issues.**^  On  similar  principles  a  judg- 
ment will  be  vacated  which  was  rendered  on  issue  joined  without 

224  O'Hara  v.  Baum,  82  Pa.  416;  Murdock  v.  Stelner,  45  Pa.  349;  Craig  v. 
Wroth,  47  Md.  281;  Keaton  v.  Banks.  32  N.  C.  381,  51  Am.  Dec.  393;  Dick  v. 
Mcl^urin,  63  N.  C.  185;  Cowles  v.  Hayes.  69  N.  O.  410;  Winslow  v.  Anderson, 
20  N.  C.  9,  32  Am.  Dec.  661;  Hervey  v.  Edmunds,  68  N.  C.  243;  Wolfe  v.  Da- 
vis, 74  N.  C.  597;  Foreman  v.  Carter,  9  Kan.  674;  Reynolds  v.  Stansbury,  20 
Ohio,  344.  55  Am.  Dec.  459;  Hunt  v.  Yeatman,  3  Ohio,  16;  Huntington  v. 
Finch,  3  Ohio  St.  445;  Branstetter  v.  Rives.  34  Mo.  318;  Downing  v.  Still,  43 
Mo.  309;  Doan  v.  Holly,  27  Mo.  256;  Kaufman  v.  Shaln,  111  Cal.  16,  43  Pae. 
3d3,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  139;  Butler  v.  Soule,  124  Cal.  69,  56  Pac.  601.  But  some 
of  the  cases  hold  that  if  the  alleged  irregularity  is  not  apparent  on  the  face 
of  the  record,  it  cannot  be  vacated  on  motion,  unless  during  the  term  at 
which  the  Judgment  was  rendered.  Phillips  v.  Evans,  64  Mo.  17;  Hall  v. 
West  Chester  Pub.  Co.,  180  Pa.  501,  37  Atl.  106;  Tuffree  v.  Steams  Ranchos 
Co.  (Cal.)  54  Pac.  826;  Busching  v.  Sunman,  19  Ind.  App.  683,  49  N.  E.  1091. 
As  to  raising  questions  of  jurisdiction  in  this  manner,  see  Parker  v.  Belcher, 
87  Ga.  110,  13  S.  E.  314;  Richardson  v.  Stowe,  102  Mo.  33,  14  S.  W.  810. 

2  25  Remnant  v.  Hoffman  (Cal.)  11  Pac.  319;  Browning  v.  Roane,  9  Ark.  354, 
.*i0  Am.  Dec.  218;  Mailhouse  v.  Inloes,  18  Md.  329;  Hole  v.  Page,  20  Wash. 
208.  54  Pac.  1123.  See  supra,  §  85.  But  compare  Williamson  v.  Nicklin,  34 
Ohio  St.  123.  The  fact  that  certain  creditors  in  insolvency  proceedings  were 
adjudged  in  default,  when  they  were  not  so  in  fact,  and  thereby  denied  a  re- 
covery to  which  they  were  entitled,  is  sufficient  reason  to  set  aside  the  Judg- 
ment    O)oper  V.  Disbrow,  106  Iowa,  550,  76  N.  W.  1013. 

22«  Norman  v.  Hooker,  35  Mo.  366;  Ollpbant  v.  Whitney,  34  Cal.  25;  Fol- 
lett  V.  Alexander,  58  Ohio  St.  202,  50  N.  E.  720. 

127  Cummlngs  v.  Ross.  90  Cal.  68,  27  Pac.  62. 

(501) 


§   326  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  14 

any  notice  of  trial  or  appearance  at  the  trial,**®  or  where  a  default 
was  taken  and  final  judgfment  entered  on  the  first  day  of  the  term,-** 
or  where  an  amendment  was  allowed  which  introduced  an  entirely 
new  cause  of  action,  and  the  defendant  was  defaulted  without  having 
had  a  proper  opportunity  to  defend,**®  or  where  the  judgment  was 
taken  before  the  case  regularly  came  up  for  hearing.***  So  also,  a 
judgment  obtained  on  a  complaint  or  petition  which  does  not  con- 
tain any  averments  showing  liability  on  the  part  of  the  defendant 
will  be  set  aside.***  And  the  same  course  may  be  taken  if  the  ver- 
dict and  judgment  are  for  an  amount  in  excess  of  the  damages  laid 
in  the  writ  or  claimed  in  the  declaration  or  complaint,  unless  the 
plaintiff  remits  the  excess,  or  unless  the  judgment  can  be  corrected, 
in  this  particular,  from  matter  of  record.***  It  will  also  be  proper 
to  set  aside  a  judgment  which  was  entered  after  the  death  of  a 
party,***  or  which  was  rendered  on  a  joint  contract  against  a  part 
only  of  the  defendants,  when  it  should  have  been  against  all,***  or 
when  a  default  was  wrongly  taken  in  consequence  of  a  misnomer 
of  the  defendant.***    A  judgment  entered  on  a  declaration  reciting  a 

288  People  V.  Bacon,  18  Mich.  247;  Aslicraft  v.  Powers,  22  Wash.  440,  61 
Pac.  161. 

220  Clegg  V.  Flthian,  32  Ind.  90. 

2»o  Weatherford  v.  Van  Alstyne,  22  Tex.  22. 

2»i  Beach  v.  MeOann,  1  Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  256;  Findley  t.  Johnson,  1  Overt. 
(Tenn.)  344.  A  Judgment  for  plaintiff  in  assompsit.  after  trial,  should  be  set 
aside,  and  a  new  trial  granted,  if  there  was  no  plea  by  defendant.  Johnson 
V.  Fry.  88  Va.  695,  14  S.  E.  183. 

2»2  Mason  v.  Kansas  City  C.  Ry.  Co.,  58  Kan.  817,  51  Pac.  284.  But  where 
an  amended  complaint,  on  which  judgment  is  rendered,  is  unobjectionable,  tbe 
Judgment  will  not  be  set  aside  because  the  original  complaint  did  not  state  a 
cause  of  action.    Hunter  v.  Bryant,  98  Cal.  247,  33  Pac.  51. 

233  Barnes  v.  Branch,  3  McCord  (S.  C.)  19;  Andrews  v.  Monilaws,  8  Han, 
65.  See  F.  A.  Poth  Brewing  Co.  v.  Bemd  (X.  J.)  36  Atl.  664;  Dickson  t. 
Matheson,  12  Wash.  196,  40  Pac.  725;  supra,  §  138.  When  the  proper  remedy 
is  by  appeal,  see  Palmer  v.  Bank  of  Zumbrota,  65  Minn.  90,  67  X.  W.  SKI 
Adjudging  interest  on  notes  from  the  date  they  were  due,  instead  of  the  last 
day  of  grace,  is  not  such  error  as  warrants  setting  aside  tlie  Judgment,  the 
amount  being  small.     Ramsburg  v.  Kline,  96  Va.  465,  31  S.  K  608. 

284  Bowen  v.  Troy  Portable  Mill  Co.,  31  Iowa,  460;  Holmes  t.  Honie,  8 
How.  Prac.  384;   supra,  f  199. 

235  Muliendore  v.  Silvers,  34  Ind.  08. 

286  Will  V.  Lytle  Creek  Water  Co.,  100  Cal.  344,  34  Pac.  83a 

(502) 


Ch.  14)  YACATINQ  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  326 

bond  and  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  judgment,  but  without  any 
appearance  for  the  defendant  or  formal  confession  of  judgment,  will 
be  set  aside  as  irregular;**^  and  so  will  a  judgment  taken  by  de- 
fault when  it  appears  that  the  real  party  in  interest  was  not  made  a 
party  to  the  action.^'*  But  a  defendant  cannot  have  a  judgment 
against  him  opened  because  the  suit  was  brought  in  the  name  of  a 
iiwong  person,  if  that  person  is  authorized  to  receive  satisfaction  of 
the  judgment  and  to  give  a  valid  discharge.*'*  It  is  also  proper  to 
vacate  a  judgment  entered  where  no  findings  of  fact  or  law  were 
made  or  filed  by  the  court,  as  required  by  law,  and  findings  were 
not  waived,*^*  and  inconsistency  between  the  findings  of  fact  and 
conclusions  of  law  in  the  judgment  of  a  referee,  confirmed  by  the 
court,  is  sufficient  ground  for  setting  the  judgment  aside.**^ 

But  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  not  every  trivial  or  inconsiderable 
irregularity  that  will  support  an  application  to  vacate  the  judgment. 
The  principles  which  should  govern  the  exercise  of  this  remedial 
power  of  the  courts  have  been  well  stated  by  the  supreme  court  of 
North  Carolina  in  the  following  language :  "A  motion  in  the  action 
to  set  aside  the  judgment  for  irregularity  will  be  entertained  by  the 
court,  if  it  should  be  made  within  a  reasonable  period  after  it  was 
granted  [rendered].  This,  however,  does  not  imply  that  every  judg- 
ment affected  in  any  degree,  directly  or  indirectly,  by  some  or  any 
irregularity  in  the  course  of  the  action  leading  to  it,  will  be  set  aside. 
Some  irregularities  are  unimportant  and  do  not  affect  the  substance 
of  the  action  or  the  proceedings  in  it;  there  are  others  of  more  or 
less  importance  that  may  be  waived  or  cured  by  what  may  take  place 
or  be  done  in  the  action  after  they  happen ;  and  there  are  yet  others 
so  serious  in  their  nature  as  to  destroy  the  efficacy  of  the  action  and 
render  the  judgment  in  it  inoperative  and  void.     Whether  the  court 

«»'  Lytle  V.  Colts,  27  Pa.  193.  See,  also,  Knox  Co.  Bank  v.  Doty,  9  Ohio 
St.  505,  75  Am.  Dec.  479. 

»»»  Ebell  V.  Bursinger,  70  Tex.  120,  8  S.  W.  77.  Where,  In  ejectment,  Judg- 
ment by  default  was  rendered  against  a  tenant  without  the  knowledge  of  his 
landk)rd,  a  motion  to  vacate  is  proper.  Mo  wry  v.  Nunez  (Cal.)  33  Pac.  1122. 
Compare  Chappell  ▼.  Real-Estate  Pooling  Co.,  91  Md.  754,  46  Atl.  982. 

2»«  Grinnell  v.  Schmidt,  2  Sandf .  Ch.  706. 

«40  Prondzlnskl  v.  Garbutt,  9  N.  D.  239,  83  N.  W.  23. 

s«i  Moore  v.  Richardson,  5  S.  0.  142. 

(503) 


§   32Ca  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Cll-   14 

will  or  will  not  grant  such  a  motion  in  any  case  must  depend  upon  a 
variety  of  circumstances,  and  largely  upon  their  peculiar  application 
to  the  case  in  which  the  motion  shall  be  made.  Generally  a  judg- 
ment will  be  set  aside  only  when  the  irregularity  has  not  been  waived 
or  cured,  and  has  been  or  may  be  such  as  has  worked,  or  may  yet 
work,  serious  injury  or  prejudice  to  the  party  complaining  interested 
in  it,  or  when  the  judgment  is  void.  The  court  will  always,  upon 
motion,  strike  from  its  record  a  judgment  void  for  irregularity/*  *** 
Although  the  irregularity  might  have  defeated  the  proceeding,  if  ob- 
jection had  been  timely  and  properly  made,  yet  if  it  is  such  as  must 
be  deemed  waived  by  the  failure  to  object,  it  will  not  be  ground  for 
vacating  the  judgment.^**  A  failure  to  give  security  for  costs,  un- 
der the  general  rule  of  the  court,  is  no  cause  for  setting  aside  the 
judgment.***  It  is  also  held  that  if  any  portion  of  a  judgment  is 
regular  and  valid,  it  will  not  be  set  aside  as  irregular  and  invalid 
upon  motion.***  An  affidavit  is  not  required  to  support  a  rule  to 
strike  off  a  judgment  which,  on  the  face  of  the  record,  appears  to 
have  been  unlawfully  and-improvidently  entered.*** 

§  326a.    Objections  to  Jury. 

A  motion  to  vacate  or  set  aside  a  judgment  will  not  generally  be 
granted  on  the  ground  that  one  or  more  of  the  jury,  upon  whose 
verdict  the  judgment  was  rendered,  was  incompetent  or  disqualified, 
or  on  account  of  his  alleged  bias  or  hostility  against  the  unsuccess- 
ful party,  or  by  reason  of  any  alleged  misconduct  on  the  part  of 
the  jury,  the  proper  remedy,  in  such  a  case,  being  by  challenge  duly 
interposed  at  the  trial,  or  by  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment,  or  by  a 

142  w'lniamson  v.  Hartman,  92  N.  C.  236.  And  see  Alexander  v.  Llnp,  31 
Or.  222,  50  Pac.  915;  Crook  v.  Hamlin.  140  N.  Y.  297,  35  N.  R  499.  A  Jud^ 
nieut  is  not  void,  and  subject  to  a  motion  to  vacate,  because  the  Judgment 
roll,  as  made  up,  did  not  contain  all  the  proper  papers,  the  remedy  being  liy 
motion  to  have  such  papers  inserted.  Breckenridge  Co.  t.  Perkins,  14  AppL 
Dlv.  G29,  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  800. 

24  3  Cosgrove  v.  Butler,  1  S.  C.  241;  Crow  v.  American  Mortgage  Co^  92  Ga. 
815, 19  S.  E.  31;  Slater  v.  Skirvlng,  45  Neb.  594,  63  N.  W.  Wa 

a*4  Lytle  v.  Fenn,  3  McLean,  411,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  8,651. 

»*ft  Challiss  V.  Headley,  9  Kan.  684. 

«4«  Allen  V.  Krips,  119  Pa.  1,  12  Atl.  759. 

(504) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPBNINO  JUDGMENTS.  §  327 

motion  for  a  new  trial,  according  to  the  circumstances.^*^  But  it 
has  been  ruled  that  a  verdict  not  rendered  by  the  persons  designated 
and  selected  according  to  law,  but  participated  in  by  others,  who,  by 
fraudulent  practices,  obtained  seats  in  the  jury  box,  heard  the  evi- 
dence, and  returned  a  verdict,  having  no  right  or  authority  to  do 
so,  and  a  judgment  entered  in  pursuance  of  such  verdict,  should  be 
set  aside  upon  the  motion  of  the  injured  party,  if  he  was  innocent 
of  the  fraud,  without  inquiry  as  to  whether  or  not  it  was  just  as 
between  the  parties.*** 

S  327.    Judgments  asainit  Persons  imder  IMsabllities. 

We  have  already  seen  that  a  judgment  against  a  married  woman, 
rendered  in  an  action  to  which  her  coverture,  if  pleaded,  would  have 
been  a  good  defense,  is  certainly  voidable,  if  not  absolutely  void;  **• 
and  that  the  same  is  true  of  a  judgment  against  an  infant  for  whom 
no  guardian  was  appointed  or  appeared.* *^^  It  follows,  of  course, 
that  such  judgments  may  be  set  aside,  upon  a  proper  and  timely 
application  by  motion,  by  the  court  which  rendered  them.  Where. a 
statute  provides  that  judgments  shall  not  be  set  aside  on  motion, 
for  irregularities,  after  the  lapse  of  a  certain  time,  this  does  not 
apply  to  cases  where  the  motion  is  based  on  errors  of  fact;  and  it 
is  held  that  the  entry  of  a  judgment  against  an  infant  or  a  person 
under  other  disabilities,  or  a  dead  man,  is  not  an  irregularity  but 
an  error  of  fact;  and  the  statute  does  not  affect  the  power  of  the 
court  to  vacate  it  on  motion.**^^ 


24T  Blckel  V.  Kraus,  100  Ky.  728,  39  S.  W.  414;  Mize  v.  Americus  Manufg 
&  Imp.  Co.,  109  6a.  359,  34  S.  E.  583;  supra,  §  103. 

248  Ulinois  Steel  Co.  v.  Szutenbach,  67  lU.  App.  280. 

24»  Supra,  §  190.  Compare  Littster  v.  Llttster.  151  Pa,  474,  25  Atl.  117; 
Adams  y.  Grey,  154  Pa.  258,  26  Atl.  428. 

250  Supra,  §§  193-196. 

251  Powell  V.  Gott,  13  Mo.  458,  53  Am.  Dec.  153;  Levy  v.  Williams,  4  S.  C. 
515;  Keaton  y.  Banks,  32  N.  C.  381,  51  Am.  Dec.  393;  Bond  y.  Neusch wander, 
86  Wis.  391.  57  N.  W.  54;  Consolidated  Coal  Co.  v.  Oeltjen,  189  111.  85,  59  N. 
E.  600;  Bogers  v.  McMillen,  G  Colo.  App.  14,  39  Pac.  891;  State  v.  Tate.  109 
Mo.  2^.  18  S.  W.  1088,  32  Am.  St  Bep.  664.  In  Pennsylvania,  it  is  said  that 
the  case  of  a  judgment  entered  against  a  dead  man  is  an  exception  to  the  rule 
that  a  motion  to  strike  off  a  Judgment  must  be  on  the  ground  of  irregularity 

(505) 


§  329  XJLW  OP  JXTDOMBNTS.  (Ch.   14 


I  328.    BBMitkMPlced  SmtHM. 


A  judgment  which  was  inadvertently  or  irregularly  entered  by  the 
judge  or  the  clerk  of  the  court  without  any  authority,  may  be  va- 
cated at  any  time.^'*  In  a  case  in  Iowa,  after  an  appeal  had  been 
perfected  and  a  supersedeas  bond  filed,  it  was  agreed  between  the 
parties  to  the  action,  without  the  consent  of  the  sureties,  that  a 
judgment  should  be  entered  in  the  supreme  court  against  the  ap- 
pellants and  sureties,  and  a  judgment  of  affirmance  was  accordingly 
entered.  It  was  held  that  upon  a  motion  made  at  the  following 
term,  at  the  instance  of  the  sureties,  the  court  had  jurisdictioa  to  set 
aside  the  judgmenL*"* 

S  329.    Judcmemt  not  Vaeated  beoauio  Erromeovfl. 

The  power  to  vacate  judgments,  on  motion,  is  confined  to  cases 
in  which  the  ground  alleged  is  something  extraneous  to  the  action 
of  the  court  or  goes  only  to  the  question  of  the  regfularity  of  its  pro- 
ceedings. It  is  not  intended  to  be  used  as  a  means  for  the  court  to 
review  or  revise  its  own  final  judgments,  or  to  correct  any  errors 
of  law  into  which  it  may  have  fallen.  That  a  judgment  is  erroneous 
as  a  matter  of  law  is  ground  for  an  appeal,  writ  of  error,  or  certiorari, 
according  to  the  case,  but  it  is  no  ground  for  setting  aside  the  judg- 
ment on  motion.***    Thus,  the  reception  of  secondary  or  illegal  cvi- 

appearing  on  the  face  of  the  record,  and  it  may  be  stricken  off.  Stevenson  t. 
Virtue,  21  Pa.  Co.  Ct  R.  229. 

2  82  Merrick  v.  City  of  Baltimore.  43  Md.  219;  Wharton  v.  Harlan,  68  Cal 
422,  9  Pac.  727;  United  States  v.  McKnlght,  1  Cranch,  C.  0.  84,  Fed.  Ca«.  Xo, 
15,005;  Murray  v.  Derrick,  101  Ga.  113,  28  S.  E.  616;  AVolf  v.  Shenandoah  Xat. 
Bank,  84  Iowa,  138,  50  N.  W.  561;  Ooleman  ▼.  Floyd,  131  Ind.  330,  31  N.  E. 
75;  Yanderpool  v.  Vanderpool,  162  Pa.  394,  29  Atl.  910.  But  in  niinois.  It  i» 
said  that  a  Judgment  entered  for  a  bona  fide  debt,  pant  due.  will  not  be  set 
aside  at  a  subsequent  term,  although  entered  without  authority.  Reynertson 
V.  Central  Lumber  Co.,  69  111.  App.  131. 

26S  Drake  v.  Smythe,  44  Iowa,  410. 

284  State  V.  Horton,  89  N.  C.  581;  May  v.  Stimson  Lumber  Co.,  119  N.  C. 
90,  25  S.  E.  721;  Hauschold  v.  Hauscheld.  33  App.  Div.  296.  53  N.  Y.  Snpp. 
831;  Taliaferro  v.  Steele,  14  La.  Ann.  656;  Harriman  v.  Swift  31  Vt.  38%; 
Peake  v.  Redd,  14  Mo.  79;  Bank  of  United  States  v.  Moss,  6  How.  31.  12  L 
liki.  331;  AViggins  v.  Steiuer,  103  Ala.  G55,  1(J  South.  8;  Coffey  v.  Proctor  Coal 

(506) 


Ql  14}  TACATOW  MfD  OPSNINO  JUDGEMENTS.  §   830 

dence  in  proof  of  a  fact  is  no  groiftid  to  annul  the  judgment  rendered 
in  the  case.***  The  statutes  enacted  in  many  of  the  states,  granting 
power  to  vacate  judgments  rendered  against  a  party  through  his 
''mistake,  inadvertence,  surprise,  or  excusable  neglect,"  do  not  au- 
thorize the  court  at  a  subsequent  term  to  set  aside  a  judgment  duly 
rendered  for  mere  errors  of  law  committed  by  the  court.***  So  the 
decree  of  a  court  of  equity  cannot  be  set  aside,  on  motion,  for  de- 
fective allegations  in  the  bill  or  for  defective  pleadings;  the  proper 
remedy  is  by  bill  of  review.**^ 

%  330.    Hot  f «r  Oromida  wUob  aiislit  hxw  bciem  pteltded  la  DefewM. 

A  motion  or  proceeding  to  vacate  or  set  aside  a  judgment  cannot 
be  sustained  on  any  grounds  which  might  have  been  pleaded  in  de- 
fense to  the  actior>,  and  could  have  been  so  pleaded  with  proper 
care  and  diligence.***  So  where,  in  an  action  regularly  commenced 
and  prosecuted,  without  any  fraud  or  fraudulent  representations, 
judgment  is  rendered  by  consent  against  the  defendants,  they  cannot 
thereafter  have  the  judgment  set  aside  and  a  new  trial  granted,  on 
the  ground  of  the  existence  of  a  complete  legal  defense  to  the  action, 
the  nature  and  extent  of  which  they  were  aware  of  at  the  time  of  the 
entry  of  judgment.***  A  judgment  will  not  be  stricken  off  because 
the  warrant  of  attorney  on  which  it  was  entered  appears  to  be  dated 

Co.  (Ky.)  20  S.  W.  286;  Sexton  v.  Rock  Island  Lumber  &  Manuf  g  Oo.,  49 
Kan.  153,  30  Pac.  104;  Piereon  v.  Benedict,  5  Kan.  App.  790,  48  Pac.  996; 
Davis  v.  Fields,  9  Wash.  78,  37  Pac.  281.  But  a  trial  court,  being  satisfied 
tliat  itfl  order  for  the  distribution  of  a  fund  is  not  In  accordance  with  the 
direction  of  the  supreme  court  relative  thereto,  may  vacate  the  order,  to  the 
end  that  the  direction  may  be  carried  out.  Fifth  Nat.  Bank  v.  Clinton  Circuit 
Judge,  100  Mich.  67,  58  N.  W.  648. 

255  Elder  v.  City  of  New  Orlean.s,  31  La.  Ann.  500. 

256  Loomis  V.  Klce,  37  Wis.  262. 
t57  Brown  v.  Bennett,  55  Ga.  189. 

tis  Robichaud  v.  Nelson,  28  La.  Ann.  578;  Barksdale  y.  Greene,  29  Ga.  418; 
Easley  v.  Camp,  40  Ga.  698;  Field  v.  Sisson,  40  Ga.  67;  Purity  Ice  Works  v. 
Rountree.  104  Ga.  676,  30  S.  E.  885;  Smith  v.  Wachob,  179  Pa.  260,  36  Atl. 
221;  Peering  Harvester  Co.  v.  Donovan,  82  Minn.  162,  84  N.  W.  745,  a*i  Am. 
St.  Rep.  417. 

2ft»  Elder  v.  National  Bank,  12  Kan.  242:  Carlson  v.  Phinney,  56  Minn.  476, 
58  N.  W.  38;  Gillespie  v.  Rogers,  184  Pa.  488,  39  Atl.  290. 

(507) 


§   331  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (CIl.    14 

oh  Sunday;  courts  will  not,  on  iuch  grounds,  interfere  with  an 
executed  contract.*"®  Where  a  judgment  was  obtained  in  a  court 
of  law,  and  an  injunction  was  afterwards  issued  to  restrain  the  col- 
lection of  it,  which  injunction  was  dissolved  and  judgment  entered 
on  the  injunction  bond,  it  was  held  that  a  motion  to  vacate  the  lat- 
ter judgment,  upon  an  allegation  that  the  original  judgment  had  been 
satisfied  by  payment  to  the  sheriff,  could  not  be  entertained;  the 
proper  course  would  have  been  to  plead  such  payment  or  have  satis- 
faction entered  on  the  record.*"^  But  in  Pennsylvania,  a  judgment 
by  confession  on  a  warrant  of  attorney  may  be  opened  and  the 
defendant  let  in  to  a  defense,  where  it  appears  that  the  defendant 
was  entitled  to  certain  credits  which  should  have  been  deducted 
from  the  amount  of  the  judgment,  or  set  off  against  it.'** 

S  331.    Illegality  of  Cause  of  Aotios. 

An  apparent  exception  to  the  rule  stated  in  the  preceding  section 
is  that  in  some  jurisdictions  the  courts  exercise  the  power  to  open 
or  vacate  judgments  in  cases  where  the  consideration  on  which  they 
are  founded  is  tainted  with  illegality.  Usury  has  been  considered  a 
good  ground  for  calling  this  power  into  operation.**'  But  the  gen- 
eral rule  is  wise  and  salutary,  and  exceptions  of  this  kind  should 

2«o  Baker  v.  Lukens,  35  Pa.  146. 

201  Coiinc!!  V.  Willis,  66  N.  0.  359. 

2e«  Bright  v.  Diamond,  180  Pa.  476.  42  Atl.  45;  Heimgartner  v.  Stewftrt 
180  Pa.  500,  37  Atl.  d3.  So,  where  a  bond  with  warrant  of  attorney  is  given 
with  a  mortgage  for  the  purchase  money  of  land.  Judgment  entered  thereon 
may  he  opened  to  permit  the  defendant  to  show  a  contemporaneous  ond 
agreement  that  the  bond  should  be  collectible  only  out  of  the  property  con- 
veyed. Schweyer  v.  Walbert,  190  Pa.  334.  42  Atl.  694.  A  judgment  entered 
by  the  assignee  of  a  judgment  note  will  be  opened  where  it  appears  that  the 
defendant  had  paid  the  note  to  the  payee  without  notice  of  the  assignment. 
Walker  v.  Sallada,  17  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  371. 

2«8  Anderson's  Appeal  (Pa.)  1  Atl.  32U;  Fleming  v.  Jencks.  22  III.  475.  Bnt 
if  usurious  interest  has  been  paid  on  a  judgment  note  after  judgment  has 
been  entered  on  it,  that  does  not  make  it  necessary  to  open  the  judgment 
in  order  to  give  the  debtor  proper  relief.  The  payment  will  be  considered 
as  an  equitable  payment  on  the  judgment  itself  to  the  amount  of  the  excess 
of  interest,  and  the  court  may  stay  execution,  as  in  any  other  case  of  alleged 
payment,  until  the  facts  can  be  ascertained  and  the  just  amount  applied  to 
the  judgment  Shafer's  Apijcal,  89  Pa.  24G. 
(508) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §   332 

not  be  received  with  any  degree  of  favor  where  the  party  objecting 
(as  will  usually  happen)  was  not  prevented  from  setting  up  the 
illegality  as  a  defense  to  the  action.  In  Georgia^  it  was  held  that  a 
constitutional  provision  that  the  courts  should  not  render  or  enforce 
any  judgment  for  a  demand  founded  on  slave  property  as  the  con- 
sideration^ did  not  authorize  them  to  vacate  a  judgment  already  ren- 
dered on  such  a  demand.^**  And  in  general,  in  accordance  with 
the  rule  that,  where  both  parties  have  eiqually  participated  in  an 
immoral  or  illegal  transaction  the  courts  will  refuse  to  aid  either 
of  them,  but  will  leave  them  where  they  stand,  it  is  held  that  a  judg- 
ment taken  by  confession  or  default  will  not  be  opened  or  vacated 
to  allow  the  defendant  to  escape  from  liability  on  an  unlawful  or 
immoral  transaction  in  which  he  knowingly  participated.*®' 

I  332.    Newly-disooTered  XSTidenoe. 

Where  facts  occur  after  judgment  (or  before  judgment  but  after 
the  time  when  the  party  can  avail  himself  of  them  in  the  action) 
showing  that  the  judgment  ought  not  to  be  enforced,  in  whole  or  in 
part,  relief  may  be  given  on  account  thereof,  on  motion  to  vacate 
the  judgment,  to  order  it  satisfied,  or  to  stay  proceedings  on  it,  ac- 
cording to  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  case.***  But  the 
party  must  be  prompt  and  diligent.  A  judgment  will  not  be  vacated 
on  the  ground  of  newly-discovered  evidence,  when  it  appears  that 
the  defendant,  knowing  that  the  claim  sued  for  was  paid,  and  that 
there  were  receipts  for  its  payment,  yet  neglected  to  appear  and 
make  efforts  to  procure  evidence  of  the  same.**^  And  where  a  mo- 
tion for  a  new  trial  has  been  overruled,  on  the  ground  that  the 

264  Ilansone  y.  Grist,  40  Ga.  241;  Inman  y.  Jones,  44  Ga.  44;  Bell  y.  Hanks, 
55  Ga.  274. 

265  Fields  y.  Brown.  80  111.  App.  287;  Shiimaker  y.  Reed,  13  Pa.  Go.  Ct 
R.  547;  Woelfel  y.  Hammer,  lu9  Pa.  446,  28  Atl.  14C. 

28*  Cooley  y.  Gregory,  16  Wis.  303;  WeUs,  Fargo  &  Co.  y.  Wall,  1  Or.  295; 
Mumo  y.  Callahan,  55  Neb.  75,  75  N.  W.  151,  70  Am.  St.  Rep.  366;  Krall  v. 
Campbell  Printlng-Press  &  Manuf'g  Co.,  79  Tex.  556,  15  S.  W.  565.  Compare 
Zlegler  y.  Evans,  8  Kulp  (Pa.)  ISO. 

s«7  Heathcote  y.  Haskins,  74  Iowa,  566,  38  N.  W.  417.  And  see  Merrlfleid 
v.  Bell.  60  Hon,  576,  14  N.  Y.  Supp.  322;  Robinson  y.  Davis,  66  Ark.  429,  51 
S.  W.  60. 

(509) 


§  339  hAW  OF  JUDOMBNT8.  (CC3l.   1 4 

newly-discovered  evidence  on  which  the  agpliciition  is  based  is  not 
of  sufficient  importance  for  that  purpose,  the  same  evidence  cannot 
be  made  the  basis  of  a  direct  action  to  set  aside  the  judgement.*** 


I  333.    JndsneBt  on  Rereraed  JvdsmMit. 

Where  suit  is  brought  in  one  state,  say  Colorado,  on  a  judgment 
rendered  by  a  trial  court  in  another  state,  say  Illinois,  and  judg- 
ment  recovered  thereon,  and  subsequently  the  Illinois  judgment,  the 
case  being  removed  by  writ  of  error  to  the  appellate  court  of  that 
state,  is  reversed,  these  facts,  being  properly  brought  before  the 
court,  constitute  good  ground  for  vacating  the  judgment  in  Colo- 
rado.***  Similarly,  where  a  judgment  is  entered  on  a  warrant  of 
attorney,  and  a  transcript  of  it  taken  to  another  county,  and  after- 
wards the  original  judgment  is  stricken  off  for  cause,  the  judgment 
in  the  other  county  falls  with  it.'^*^  On  analogous  principles,  when 
the  defendant  in  a  criminal  case  is  tried,  and  a  fine  imposed  on  him, 
and  judgment  entered  thereon  for  the  amount  of  the  fine  and  costs, 
and  afterwards  the  governor  remits  the  fine,  the  court  should,  on 
motion,  vacate  the  judgment  as  to  the  fine,  leaving  it  subsisting  as 
to  the  costs. *^* 

«•«  Mayor,  etc..  of  City  of  New  York  v.  Brady.  115  N.  Y.  599,  22  N.  E.  237. 
In  England,  where  It  is  sought  to  reschid  a  valid  and  final  judgment  on  the 
ground  of  the  discovery  of  new  evidence,  it  must  be  shown  that  such  evidence 
is  both  new  and  material;  although  evidence  may  have  been  withheld  from 
the  court  at  the  original  trial  by  one  of  the  parties  to  the  suit,  with  an 
improper  intention,  such  conduct  Is  not  sufficient  to  set  aside  the  Judgment 
unless  the  evidence  withheld  would  have  had  a  material  effect  upon  the  deci- 
sion of  the  court.  Boswell  v.  Goaks.  G  Rep.  167.  A  change  in  the  interpre- 
tation of  a  law  applicable  to  a  cause  prosecuted  to  judgment  does  not  entit]«> 
the  unsuccessful  party  in  the  suit  to  reopen  the  controversy.  Travis  County 
v.  King  Iron  Bridge  &  Manuf'g  Oo..  34  C.  C.  A.  620.  92  Fed.  090. 

2e»  Heckling  v.  Allen  (C.  C.)  15  Fed.  196;  Aetna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Aldrlch,  38  Wte. 
107. 

«T0  Banning  v.  Taylor,  24  Pa.  297. 

«Ti  Chisholm  v.  State.  42  Ala,  527. 

(510) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OFBNINO  JUDQMENTa  f   834 


I  334.    Statutory  C^romids  for  Taoativs  Judgments* 

Hitherto  we  have  been  considering  what  may  be  called  the  com- 
mon law  grounds  for  vacating  judgments, — ^those  causes  which,  in- 
dependent of  statute,  are  recognized  as  sufficient  to  call  into  play 
the  inherent  power  of  courts  of  record  to  grant  relief  of  this  nature. 
In  many  of  the  states,  however,  the  matter  is  regulated  by  statutes, 
which  empower  the  courts  to  set  aside  judgments  for  certain  enumer- 
ated causes  within  a  limited  time.  Thus  in  several  states,  the  laws 
authorize  the  court,  in  its  discretion  and  upon  such  terms  as  may 
be  just,  to  relieve  a  party  from  a  judgment  or  order  taken  against 
him  through  fraud  or  through  his  "mistake,  inadvertence,  surprise, 
or  excusable  neglect,"  provided  the  application  be  made  within  a 
certam  time  after  the  rendition  or  entry  of  judgment  (or  "after  no- 
tice thereof")  usually  six  months  or  a  year.*''*  In  several  others 
the  purport  of  the  statute  is  substantially  the  same,  though  expressed 
in  somewhat  different  language,  the  causes  specified  being  "unavoid- 
able casualty  or  misfortune  preventing  the  party  from  prosecuting 
or  defending,"  "fraud  practised  by  the  successful  party  in  obtaining 
the  judgment,"  mistake  of  the  clerk,  death  of  a  party,  etc.*^'  In 
Connecticut,  the  statute  authorizes  the  vacation  of  a  judgment  for 
mistake,  accident,  or  other  reasonable  cause.*^*  In  Georgia,  a  judg- 
ment by  default  may  be  opened  where  the  defendant  was  prevented 
by  "providential  cause"  or  "excusable  neglect"  from  filing  his  de- 
fense at  the  proper  time.*^*  In  Vermont,  similar  action  may  be 
taken  when  the  defendant  was  unjustly  deprived  of  a  hearing  by 

«Ti  CJode  dv.  Proc.  N.  Y.  §  724;  CJode  Oiv.  Proc.  N.  O.  §  274;  Code  Proc. 
S.  C.  §  195;  Rev.  St.  Ind.  1894,  §  399  (Rev.  St  1881.  §  396);  Rev.  St.  Wis. 
i  2832;  Code  Civ.  Proc.  Dalt.  §  143;  Comp.  Laws  N.  D.  §  4939;  Oomp.  Laws 
S.  D.  §  4939;  Code  Civ.  Proc.  Cal.  §  473;  Code  Civ.  Proc.  Colo.  §  75;  1  Hill's 
Ann.  Laws  Or.  §  102;  Code  Civ.  Proc.  Mont  §  774;  2  Ballinger's  Ann.  Codes 
&  St  Wash.  §  5153;  2  HiU's  Code  Wash.  §  221;  Gen.  St  Nev.  1885,  §  3217; 
Rev.  St  Idaho  1887,  §  4229;  Comp.  Laws  Utah,  §  3256. 

2T3Rev.  St  Ohio,  §  5354;  Miller's  Code  Iowa,  §  3154;  Civ.  Code.Ky.  §  518; 
Gen.  St  Kan.  1889,  par.  4669;  Code  Civ.  Proc.  Keb.  §  602;  Sand.  &  H.  Dig. 
Ark.  §  4197;  Code  Civ.  Proc.  Okl.  §  588. 

274  Gen.  St  Conn.  1888,  §  1126. 

«T5  Civil  Code  Ga.  §  5072. 

(511) 


§   335  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  {fJh.   14 

fraud,  accident,  or  mistake.^^*  In  Minnesota,  a  judgment  may  be 
set  aside  which  was  obtained  by  means  of  perjury,  subornation  of 
perjury,  or  any  fraudulent  act,  practice,  or  representation  of  the 
prevailing  party.^^^  In  Ohio,  a  judgment  may  be  vacated  for  "ir- 
regularity in  obtaining  it."  "*  The  construction  of  these  terms  will 
mainly  occupy  our  attention  through  the  succeeding  sections.  But 
before  passing  on,  it  is  necessary  to  observe  that  these  statutes  are 
exclusive  with  respect  to  the  causes  which  they  enumerate  but  not 
as  to  other  possible  causes.  That  is,  if  a  party  seeks  relief  on  the 
ground  of  one  of  the  causes  specified  in  the  statute,  he  must  bring 
himself  well  within  its  terms  and  his  application  must  be  made  within 
the  time  limited.  But  the  fact  that  such  and  such  causes  are  pro- 
vided by  statute  does  not  prevent  the  courts  from  acting  on  other 
causes,  just  and  reasonable  in  themselves  and  good  at  common  law, 
and  where  an  application  is  based  on  such  a  ground,  outside  the 
statute,  it  is  not  governed  by  the  statute,  in  respect  to  the  time  of 
moving  or  otherwise.*'* 

I  336.    Mistake. 

When  statutes  authorize  the  vacation  of  a  judgment  entered  against 
a  party  through  his  "mistake,"  it  is  to  be  understood  that  they 
mean  a  mistake  of  fact.  Mistake  of  law — ^that  is,  the  party's  igno- 
rance of  the  law,  or  mistake  as  to  his  legal  rights  or  duties  in  the 
premises — will  not  warrant  the  setting  aside  of  the  judgment."* 
And  even  when  the  mistake  is  one  of  fact,  there  must  be  some  rea- 
sonable and  valid  excuse  for  its  having  occurred,  so  that  it  cannot 

«T«  R.  L.  Vt.  §  1422. 

«"  Gen.  St.  Minn.  1878.  c.  66.  §  285;  Gen.  St  Minn.  1804,  |  5434. 

*78  Kev.  St.  Ohio,  §  5357. 

«7»  Ladd  V.  Stevenson,  112  N.  Y.  323.  19  N.  B.  W2,  8  Am.  St  Rep.  748: 
Cowlea  v.  Hayes,  69  N.  C.  406;  Bond  v.  Epiey.  48  Iowa,  600.  See  People 
V.  O'Connell,  23  Cal.  281. 

"0  Skinner  v.  Terry,  107  N.  C.  103,  12  S.  E.  118;  Chaffln  v.  Fnlkenon,  96 
Ky.  277,  24  S.  W.  1066;  Jartman  v.  Pacific  Fire  Ins.  06.,  69  Conn.  355.  S7 
AU.  070;  Thompson  v.  Harlow.  150  Ind.  450.  50  N.  E.  474;  In  re  Can't  Will, 
64  Hun,  CSO.  19  N.  Y.  Siipp.  647;  Thacker  v.  Thacker,  125  Ind.  489.  25  N.  £. 
595.  Compare  Arnold  v.  Norfolk  &  New  Brunswick  Hoeiery  Ca,  65  Hon, 
621,  19  X.  Y.  Supp.  957. 

(512) 


CI).  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  335 

be  said  to  be  due  merely  to  the  party's  heedlessness  or  indifference^ 
and  he  must  show  a  defense  to  the  action  and  due  diligence  in  seek- 
ing to  vacate  the  judgment  after  discovering  his  mistake.  These 
conditions  being  met,  the  judgment  may  be  set  aside  on  the  ground 
of  a  mistake  as  to  the  identity  of  the  suit,  as  where  the  party  hon- 
estly became  confused  between  different  suits  brought  against  him, 
or  between  a  civil  and  a  criminal  action  touching  the  same  subject- 
matter  and  pending  at  the  same  time;^®^  or  a  mistake  as  to  the 
capacity  in  which  he  is  sued,  as,  if  he  supposes  the  action  to  be 
against  him  in  an  official  capacity  when  it  was  really  the  intention 
to  sue  him  as  an  individual ;  -®*  or  a  mistake  as  to  the  time  when 
he  is  required  to  plead  or  answer,  or  as  to  the  time  of  the  trial.^®* 
But  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  said  that  an  affidavit  that  the  party  de- 
faulted mistook  the  court  in  which  his  case  was  pending  docs  not 
show  sufficient  ground  for  setting  aside  the  judgment.*®*  And  courts 
are  not  much  disposed  to  vacate  judgments  on  the  ground  of  mis- 
understandings between  parties  and  their  counsel.  Thus,  it  is  held 
that  a  party's  mistaken  belief  that  he  had  retained  an  attorney  to 
take  charge  of  the  case  does  not  entitle  him  to  have  a  default  judg- 
ment vacated,  where  the  facts  did  not  justify  that  belief.*®*^     But 

a«i  Bertllne  v.  Bauer,  25  Wis.  486;  MartJn  v.  Curlej%  70  Minn.  489.  73  X. 
W.  4a'>.  See  Devlin  v.  Boyd,  69  Hun,  328,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  523.  One  wlio 
Buffers  Judgment  by  default  in  a  suit  to  foreclose  a  mortgage,  to  which  his 
name  was  forged,  cannot  afterwards  have  the  judgment  set  aside  on  the 
ground  that  his  failure  to  appear  and  defend  was  due  to  the  fact  that  he 
thought  the  suit  was  to  foreclose  another  mortgage  given  by  him  to  a  third 
person.      Gleland  v.  Hamilton  Loan  &  Trust  Co.,  55  Neb.  13,  75  N.  W.  239. 

282  Ciipital  Savings  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Swan,  100  Iowa,  718,  69  N.  W. 
1065.  But  one  who  Is  sued  as  administrator  and  individually,  and  who,  when 
the  summons  is  shown  to  him,  says  he  knows  all  about  It,  walks  away  from 
the  officer  before  it  is  read  to  him,  and,  supposing  he  is  sued  only  as  admin- 
istrator, makes  no  defense,  cannot  have  a  judgment  by  default  set  aside. 
WilllamBon  v.  Oocke,  124  N.  C.  585,  32  S.  E.  963. 

2«3  Johnson  v.  Eldred,  13  Wis.  482;  Manwaring  v.  Lipplncott,  52  App.  Div. 
526.  65  N.  Y.  Supp.  428;  Hanthorn  v.  Oliver,  32  Or.  57,  51  Pac.  440,  67  Am. 
St  Rep.  518;  Titus  v.  Larsen,  18  Wash.  145,  51  Pac.  351;  Miller  v.  Carr,  116 
Cal-  378»  48  Pac.  32i,  58  Am.  St.  Rep.  180;  Coos  Bay,  R.  &  E.  R.  &  Nav.  Co. 
V.  Endlcott,  W  Or.  573,  57  Pac.  61.  Compare  Grosvenor  v.  Doyle,  50  111. 
App.  47. 

s«4  Robertson  v.  B?rgen,  10  Ind.  402. 

MB  Ames  Iron  Works  v.  Chinn,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  382,  49  S.  W.  665;  North- 
1  LAW  J  UDG.-n33  ^513^ 


§   336  ULW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Cb.   14 

a  mistake  or  misunderstanding  as  to  the  terms  or  effect  of  an  agree- 
ment between  the  two  parties  to  the  suit  may  justify  the  opening 
of  a  default,  or  the  modification  of  the  judgment.'**  In  an  action 
to  set  aside  a  judgment  on  the  ground  of  mistake,  if  the  complaint 
fails  to  make  explanation  of  the  mistake  or  the  causes  which  pro- 
duced it,  it  fails  to  set  forth  facts  sufficient  to  constitute  a  cause  of 
action.^*^ 

The  "mistake"  which  will  justify  the  vacation  of  a  judgment  may 
also  be  the  mistake  of  the  court  or  the  judge.  For  instance,  a 
mistake  in  the  transmission  of  a  telegram  by  the  judge  of  the  court, 
for  which  the  party  is  in  no  way  responsible,  whereby  he  is  de- 
prived of  a  hearing  on  the  trial,  is  ground  for  vacating  the  judg- 
ment.-** But  "wherever  it  may  be  found  that  inadvertence  or  mis- 
take is  held  to  be  a  ground  for  setting  aside*  a  judgment,  it  will  be 
noticed  that  it  is  not  a  mistake  of  the  law,  or  an  inadvertent  con- 
clusion by  the  court  as  to  what  the  law  is,  but  a  mistake  or  inad- 
vertence in  doing  something  not  intended  to  be  done."  **•  And  where 
the  judgment  entered  on  the  journal  is  different  from  what  was 
intended  by  the  court,  but  is  shown  to  be  such  as  ought  to  have 
been  rendered,  it  will  not  be  vacated  or  modified  as  entered  by  mis- 
take."* 

§  336.    Snrprifle. 

Under  a  statute  which  empowers  the  court,  within  a  year  after 
notice  of  a  judgment,  to  relieve  a  party  therefrom  on  the  ground  of 
"surprise,"  the  fact  that  the  party  was  surprised  by  a  ruling  of  the 
court,  refusing  to  continue  the  cause  on  his  motion,  is  not  suffi- 
cient.'*^    Nor  is  it  enough  that  he  was  surprised  by  a  decision  hold- 

ern  Pac.  &  P.  S.  S.  R.  Oo.  v.  Blnck,  3  Wash.  St.  327,  28  Pac.  53S.  See  Moore 
V.  Kelly  &  Jones  Co.,  109  Ga.  798,  35  S.  E.  168. 

28«  BeDge  V.  Potter  Qvy.)  55  S.  W.  431. 

28T  Douglass  V.  Bro6ks.  38  Cal.  C70. 

a88  Thum  v.  Pike  (Idaho)  55  Pac.  864. 

28»  Cooper  V.  Dimcan,  20  Mo.  App.  355;  Sargent  v.  Kindred,  5  X.  D.  8.  ^ 
N.  W.  151. 

280  Murphy  v.  Swadner,  34  Ohio  St  672. 

2»i  Breed  y.  Ketchum,  51  Wis.  161,  7  N.  W.  550.  See  Winter  v.  State,  18 
Qa.  275. 

(514) 


Ch.   14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  |   836 

ing  a  complaint  bad  on  other  grounds  than  those  urged,***  nor 
that  he  was  surprised  by  evidence  produced  at  the  trial,  unless  he 
asked  for  a  continuance  to  procure  testimony  to  meet  it,'**  nor  be- 
cause he  was  absent  from  the  trial  in  consequence  of  his  belief  that 
the  case  could  not  possibly  be  reached  for  trial  that  day,  although 
it  was  reached  only  through  the  unexpected  continuance  of  some  of 
the  preceding  cases.***  Nor  can  a  party  claim  that  he  was  legally 
"surprised"  by  the  transfer  of  his  case  to  a  different  court,  though 
he  was  actually  ignorant  of  it,  if  he  might  have  discovered  the  fact 
by  due  diligence.***  On  the  other  hand,  in  a  case  in  West  Virginia, 
it  appeared  that  an  action  was  brought  in  a  county  court,  and  two 
years  later  was  transferred  to  the  circuit  court,  no  order  except 
continuances  being  made  in  it  after  such  transfer.  The  judge  of 
the  circuit  court  could  not  preside  at  the  trial,  and  twelve  years 
later  the  plaintiff,  in  the  absence  of  the  defendant  and  his  counsel, 
caused  a  special  judge  to  be  elected,  and,  without  the  knowledge 
of  the  defendant,  the  case  was  tried,  and  a  verdict  and  judgment 
rendered  for  the  plaintiff.  The  defendant,  being  notified  of  such 
judgment,  moved  the  court  to  set  the  same  aside  because  of  the 
facts  above  stated,  and  upon  his  affidavit  alleging  surprise  and  the 
full  payment  of  the  debt  sued  on  the  circuit  court  set  aside  the  judg- 
ment and  awarded  the  defendant  a  new  trial.  In  this,  it  was  held, 
there  was  no  error.***  So,  again,  where  the  respondent  to  a  peti- 
tion for  a  writ  of  prohibition  files  a  demurrer  and  answer,  and  the 
demurrer  is  overruled,  and  judgment  absolute  given  against  him  on 
the  insufficiency  of  his  answer,  where,  in  the  absence  of  a  motion 
for  judgment  on  the  pleadings,  he  expected  that  only  the  demurrer 
would  be  passed  on,  a  motion  to  vacate  the  judgment  for  surprise 
will  be  granted.**^  But  it  is  probable  that  the  species  of  "surprise" 
primarily  contemplated  by  the  statutes  is  that  which  results  from 
the  taking  of  a  judgment  contrary  to  an  agreement  or  understand- 

«»2  Kan  ▼.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  101  Wis.  166.  76  N.  W.  329. 

»»3  Robinson  v.  Davis,  (JG  Ark.  429,  51  S.  W.  G6. 

f*  Andres  v.  Krldler,  49  Xeb.  535,  68  N.  W.  938. 

«»*  Philip  V.  Davis  (Iowa)  78  N.  W.  810. 

a»«  Bennett  v.  Jackson.  M  W.  Va.  62,  11  S.  K.  734. 

«»THellbron  v.  Campbell  (Cal.)  23  Pac.  1032. 

(515) 


I   837  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   14 

ing  that  the  case  should  be  continued  or  not  pressed,  or  not  brought 
to  trial,^*'  though  that  is  also  a  kind  of  fraud.  It  seems  that  there 
may  also  be  legal  "surprise"  in  the  unexpected  withdrawal  from  the 
case  of  a  party's  attorney,***  though  not  where  the  judgment  was 
given  by  consent  of  the  party's  attorney,  and  the  contention  merely 
is  that  he  exceeded  his  authority.'®* 

I  337.    Gasiaalty  or  Misfortime. 

In  several  of  the  states,  as  we  have  already  stated,  the  statutes 
specify  "unavoidable  casualty  or  misfortune  preventing  the  party 
from  defending  or  prosecuting"  as  a  ground  for  vacating  judgments. 
Decisions  under  this  clause  are  of  general  importance;  for  it  can- 
not be  doubted  that  failure  to  appear  in  consequence  of  an  unavoid- 
able casualty  or  misfortune  would  be  a  case  of  "excusable  neglect" 
within  the  statutes  in  other  states.  That  the  defendant  was  pre- 
vented from  reaching  the  place  of  trial  by  a  railroad  accident,  or  by 
the  impassable  condition  of  the  roads,  or  by  storms  or  other  insuper- 
able obstacles,  is  a  sufficient  ground  for  vacating  a  default  judg- 
ment against  him,  if  he  shows  a  good  defense.'*^  So  also,  the 
judgment  should  be  vacated  where  it  appears  that  the  summons  was 
served  at  his  residence  while  he,  with  all  the  members  of  his  family, 
was  absent  on  a  vacation,  and  that  he  had  no  knowledge  of  the 
action  until  he  was  requested  to  pay  the  judgment,'**  or  where  the 
civil  docket  was  disarranged  by  the  trial  of  the  criminal  docket,  and 
defendant's  case  was  disposed  of  while  his  attorney  was  temporarily 
absent  from  the  court  room,'**  or  where,  shortly  before  the  trial, 
defendant's  attorney  absconded,  without  the  knowledge  of  his  cli- 
ent.***    But  the  mere  fact  that  the  party  wrote  to  an  attorney  to 

«••  See,  supra,  |  322.    And  see  Dunlop  v.  Schubert,  ©7  Wis.  135,  72  N.  W. 
350. 

2«»  Ex  parte  Rountree,  51  S.  O.  405,  29  S.  E.  W. 

•00  Halrston  v.  Garwood.  123  N.  a  845,  81  S.  B.  653. 

»oi  Town  of  Oiiiro  v.  Ward,  19  Wis.  232;    Decker  v.  Grares,  10  Ind.  App. 

25,  37  N.  E.  550.    Compare  Malek  v.  Kodad,  92  Iowa.  763.  GO  N.  W.  491. 

«02  Schnltzler  v.  Fourth  Nat  Bank,  1  Kan.  App.  674.  42  Pac.  406. 

«08  Cooley  v.  BarbourvIUe  Land  &  Improvement  Co.'s  Assignee  (Ky.)  43  S. 
W.  404. 

•04  Ennis  v.  Fourth  St  Bldg.  Ass'n,  102  Iowa.  520.  71  N.  W.  426w 
(51G) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMBNTB.  §   338 

appear  for  him,  though  without  disclosing  his  defense,  and  had  no 
knowledge  that  his  letter  was  not  delivered  to  the  attorney  until 
after  the  judgment  was  rendered  and  the  court  had  adjourned,  is 
not  a  sufficient  excuse.'®"  Nor  is  it  sufficient  that  the  party  failed 
to  appear  at  the  time  his  case  was  called  in  consequence  of  misunder- 
standing his  attorney's  statement  as  to  when  the  court  met,'®*  nor 
that  his  absence  from  home  on  a  business  trip  prevented  him  from 
receiving  notices  sent  to  him  by  his  counsel,  as  to  the  progress  of 
the  case  and  the  time  of  its  trial.*®^  On  the  other  hand,  mental 
unsoundness  is  such  a  "misfortune,'*  within  the  meaning  of  the  stat- 
utes, as  will  authorize  the  court  to  vacate  or  modify  a  judgment.'®' 
And  if  a  party  is  deprived  of  the  opportunity  to  interpose  a  meri- 
torious defense  by  being  detained  as  a  convict  in  the  penitentiary, 
the  court  may,  on  a  proper  application  after  his  release,  open  the 
default  and  vacate  the  judgment.'®'  But  mere  ignorance  of  the 
English  language  is  not  a  sufficient  ground  for  such  relief,  if  the 
defendant  knew  that  a  suit  had  been  commenced  against  him.'^® 

I  338.    Sickness  of  Defendant. 

In  some  of  the  states,  it  is  held  that  the  illness  of  a  party,  oc- 
curring on  or  continuing  through  the  day  of  trial,  and  so  severe  as 
to  confine  him  to  his  house  and  prevent  him  from  attending  the 
court  and  trying  his  suit,  is  such  an  "unavoidable  casualty  or  misfor- 
tune" as  entitles  him  to  have  the  judgment  against  him  set  aside.'^* 
And  in  other  states,  this  is  considered  a  case  of  "excusable  neg- 
lect." '^^     But  in  some  few  jurisdictions  there  is  a  manifest  reluctance 

306  School  District  No.  13  v.  Lovejoy  (C.  0.)  16  Fed.  323;  Ganzer  v.  Schiff- 
bauer.  40  Neb.  633,  59  N.  W.  98. 

3o«  Ross  V.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  92  Ky.  583,  18  S.  W.  456. 

»07  Bates  v.  Bates,  66  Minn.  131,  68  N.  W.  845. 

308  Bean  y.  Haffendorfer,  84  Ky.  G85.  2  S.  W.  556,  3  a  W.  138;  SmaU  v. 
Reeves,  104  Ky.  289,  46  S.  W.  726. 

5  09  Bonnell  v.  Rome,  W.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  12  Hun  (N.  Y.)  218. 

sio  Helsterhagen  v.  Garland,  10  Mo.  66. 

«ii  Gheer  v.  Huber,  32  Kan.  319,  4  Pac.  290;  Luscomb  v.  Maloy,  26  Iowa, 
444;  French  v.  Eversole  a^y.)  32  S.  W.  211. 

312  Sage  V.  Matheney,  14  Ind.  369;  Flanagan  v.  Patterson,  78  Ind.  514; 
Monroe  v.  Paddock,  75  Ind.  422;   Depriest  v.  Patterson,  85  N.  C.  376;   Good- 

(517) 


I  839  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   14 

to  admit  sickness  as  a  sufficient  excuse.  In  Georgia,  a  motion  to 
set  aside  a  judgment  by  default,  on  the  ground  that  the  defendant 
was  sick  when  it  was  rendered  and  could  not  put  in  his  plea,  was 
overruled,  no  reason  being  shown  why  the  plea  was  not  filed  before 
the  trial  term.*^*  And  in  Indiana,  the  latest  rulings  decide  that  a 
judgment  should  not  be  vacated  because  the  defendant  was  too  sick 
to  be  present  at  the  trial,  as  he  might  have  appeared  by  attorney.*** 
This  seems  to  be  the  doctrine  also  in  Illinois.'**  In  one  case  the 
defendant  showed  that  he  was  confined  to  his  house,  during  the 
pendency  of  the  action,  by  a  wound  in  the  foot,  but  the  court  refused 
to  open  the  judgment.**'  The  sickness  of  a  member  of  the  de- 
fendant's family  may  be  a  ground  upon  which  the  judge  may  grant 
a  continuance,  but  it  is  not  a  reason  for  setting  aside  a  default.**' 

§  339.    Siokness   of   Govnseli 

It  is  held  by  several  very  respectable  authorities  that  the  illness 
of  defendant's  counsel,  so  severe  as  to  prevent  him  from  appearing 
and  trying  the  case,  is  a  good  ground  for  vacating  the  judgment.*** 
This,  however,  has  been  fairly  denied.***  It  seems  reasonable  to 
hold  that  such  an  excuse  would  not  be  sufficient  if  the  party'  had 
any  opportunity  to  retain  other  counsel,  or  otherwise  to  escape  the 

Ime  V.  Meyers,  58  Tex.  405;  HoUiman  v.  Pearlstone  (Tex.  dv.  App.)  29  S. 
W.  542;  Carey  v.  Browne.  G7  Hun,  516,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  521;  In  re  Tniver.  9 
Misc.  Rep.  621,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  851;  Bank  of  Princeton  v.  Johnston,  41  W- 
Va.  550,  23  S.  E.  517. 

818  Cannon  v.  Harrold,  61  Ga.  158. 

81*  Jonsson  v.  LIndstrom,  114  Ind.  152,  16  N.  E.  400. 

81 B  Shaffer  v.  Sutton,  49  111.  506;  Edwards  v.  McKay,  73  HI.  570. 

8i«  Gardenhire  v.  Vinson,  39  Ark.  270. 

817  Skinner  v.  Bryce,  75  N.  C.  287;  Seiberling  v.  Schuster,  83  Iowa,  747. 
49  X.  W.  844;  Herbst  Importing  Co.  v.  Hogan,  16  Mont.  384,  41  Par.  1:Uk 
Compare  Thornall  v.  Turner,  23  Misc.  Rep.  363,  51  N.  Y.  Supp.  214. 

3i8Wilmai:th  v.  Gatfield,  1  How.  Prac.  52;  Bristor  y.  Galrin,  tKJ  Ind.  352; 
Stout  V.  Lewis,  11  Mo.  438;  Harralson  v.  McArthur,  87  Ga.  478,  13  S.  E.  55M, 
13  L.  R.  A.  689;  Callanan  v.  Aetna  Nat.  Bank.  84  Iowa,  8,  50  X.  W,  e9: 
Southwestern  Telegraph  &  Telephone  Co.  v.  Jennings  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  51  S. 
W.  288. 

81  p  Clark  V.  Ewing,  93  111.  572;  McFarland  v.  White.  13  La.  Ann.  .-CM.  See 
Ilittle  V.  Zeiraer,  164  111.  64,  45  N.  E.  419;  Heatou  v.  l»eteison,  G  Ind.  App.  1. 
31  N.  E.  1133. 

(518) 


Cb.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §   340 

default  or  verdict.  But  if  the  attorney's  illness  was  so  sudden  that 
there  was  no  time  to  employ  other  counsel,  or  if  it  was  unknown 
to  the  defendant,  or  he  was  unable  to  act  in  the  matter,  or  no  one 
was  present  to  ask  for  a  continuance,  it  would  be  manifestly  unjust 
to  visit  the  misfortune  upon  the  defendant  who  was  guilty  of  no 
carelessness  or  lack  of  diligence.  And  indeed  the  cases  hold  that  if 
both  the  attorney  and  the  defendant  were  sick,  whereby  the  former 
was  prevented  from  attending  to  the  case  and  the  latter  was  pre- 
vented from  retaining- other  counsel,  the  judgment  should  be  va- 
cated.*'^  Whether  the  illness  or  death  of  a  member  of  the  attor- 
ney's family  occurring  at  such  a  juncture  as  to  draw  him  away  from 
the  case,  is  a  sufficient  ground  for  relief,  is  an  unsettled  question."^^ 
But  without  doubt  it  should  be  decided  on  the  lines  above  laid  down 
with  respect  to  the  counsel  himself.  In  a  case  where  the  defend- 
ant employed  a  prominent  attorney,  who  died  three  weeks  before 
the  return  term,  and  whose  death  was  conspicuously  noticed  in  the 
newspapers,  and  the  defendant  then  neglected  to  employ  other  coun- 
sel, and  suffered  a  default,  it  was  held  that  he  was  not  entitled  to 
have  the  judgment  vacated.*'* 

f  340.    Excusable  Neglect. 

The  "excusable  neglect"  of  the  defendant  is  specifically  mentioned, 
in  the  statutes  of  several  states,  as  one  of  the  grounds  upon  which 
judgments  may  be  set  aside.'"*  And  under  this  designation  may 
be  classed  the  unavoidable  absence  of  the  party,  when  he  is  kept 
away  from  the  trial  of  his  case  by  the  performance  of  duties  which 
he  cannot  legally  postpone  or  escape.*"*  Thus,  it  is  a  good  excuse 
for  failure  to  attend  if  he  was  compelled,  at  that  time,  to  appear 

1 20  Harvey  v.  Wilson,  44  Ind.  231;   Goodhue  v.  Meyers,  58  Tex.  405. 

aai  Compare  Powell  v.  Washington,  15  Ala.  803,  with  Stout  v.  Lewis,  11 
Mo.  438. 

•22  Kivett  V.  Wynne,  80  N.  C.  39. 

82»  Supra,  §  334.  See  Egan  v.  Rooney,  38  How.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  121;  Keith  v. 
McCaflfrey.  145  Mass.  18,  12  N.  E.  419. 

324  But  the  fact  that  defendant  was  a  milkman,  delivering  milk  every  day 
In  a  city,  and  had  no  one  to  attend  to  his  duties  in  his  absence,  is  not  suffi- 
cient excuse  for  his  neglect  to  appear  and  defend  an  action  against  him. 
Landa  T.  McGehee  (Tex.)  19  S.  W.  516, 

(519) 


§   340  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   14 

before  a  grand  jury,'*"  or  before  another  court,***  or  if  he  was 
necessarily  absent  in  the  actual  military  service  of  the  United 
States.'*^  Again,  it  is  a  case  of  "excusable  neglect"  if  the  party's 
failure  to  plead,  or  to  follow  up  his  case,  or  to  be  present  at  its 
trial,  was  due  solely  to  his  reliance  upon  assurances  given  him  by 
those  upon  whom  he  had  a  right  to  depend  (as,  the  adverse  party, 
or  counsel  retained  in  the  case,  or  a  competent  business  adviser) 
that  it  would  not  be  necessary  for  him  to  take  an  active  part  in  the 
case,  or  that  the  suit  would  not  be  prosecuted.***  But  the  fact  that 
the  defendant  supposed  a  summons  which  was  served  on  him  to  be  a 
paper  in  another  cause  pending  between  himself  and  the  plaintiff, 
and  for  that  reason  took  no  measures  to  answer  it,  is  not  excusable 
neglect.***  But  where  the  officer  did  not  read  or  give  a  copy  of  the 
summons  to  the  defendant,  but  told  him  it  was  a  subpoena  for  him 
as  a  witness  in  a  case  pending  in  another  court,  and  the  defendant 
did  not  learn  the  truth  until  too  late,  this  was  held  a  sufficient  ex- 
cuse.*** 

An  application  to  open  or  vacate  a  judgment  on  this  ground  must 
show  the  cause  of  the  party's  neglect  of  the  case,  and  that  it  was 

325  Frazier  v.  Bishop,  29  Mo.  447. 

s26Tullis  y.  Seott,  38  Tex.  537.  Compare  Kitson  r.  Blake,  GO  Hun,  579. 
14  N.  Y.  Supp.  446. 

»27  Piper  V.  Aldrich,  41  Mo.  421. 

sssWicke  V.  Lake,  21  Wis.  410,  94  Am.  Dec.  552;  Rowland  v.  Jones,  2 
Heisk.  (Tenn.)  321;  Birch  v.  Frantz,  77  Ind.  199;  Hull  v.  Vinlng.  17  Wash. 
352,  49  rac.  537;  City  Block  Directory  Co.  v.  App,  4  Colo.  App.  350,  3o  Pae 
985;  Craig  v.  San  Bernardino  Inv.  Co.,  101  Cal.  122,  35  Pac.  558;  Ilendenoo 
V.  Lange,  71  Minn.  468,  74  N.  W.  172.  Compare  State  t.  Casey,  9  S.  D.  436* 
69  N.  W.  585;  Craig  v.  Major,  139  Ind.  624,  35  N.  E.  1098.  The  fact  that 
defendant  relied  on  the  assurance  of  a  constable,  who  had  no  autfaortty  to 
give  such  assurance,  that  the  suit  would  be  abandoned,  does  not  excuse  bis 
neglecting  the  case.    Harding  v.  R.  S.  Peale  Co.,  44  111.  App.  344. 

329  White  V.  Snow,  71  N.  C.  232.    See  State  v.  O'Neill,  4  Mo.  App.  221. 

33oHIte  y.  Fisher,  76  Ind.  231.  See  Lowe  y.  Hamilton,  132  Ind.  406C  SI 
N.  E.  1117.  Where  a  summons  was  served  on  a  director  of  a  corporatSoo. 
who  neglected  to  notify  the  managing  officers  or  attorneys  until  after  the 
entry  of  a  judgment  by  default,  and  they  had  no  knowledge  of  the  suit,  and 
showed  a  defense  to  part  of  the  claim,  it  was  held  that  the  default  should 
he  oponiMl.  6.  S.  Congdon  Hardware  Co.  v.  Consolidated  Apex  Mln.  Co.,  U 
S.  D.  376,  77  N.  W.  102:i. 

(520) 


Ch.  14)  VA<3ATINa  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  |   340 

excusable.'**  If  the  papers  disclose  mere  carelessness,  lack  of  at- 
tention, or  indiflference  to  his  rights,  on  the  part  of  the  applicant  or 
his  counsel,  he  cannot  expect  an  opportunity  to  redeem  the  past. 
The  law  exacts  diligent  attention  from  all  suitors.  If  the  party's 
negligence  is  without  excuse  or  justification,  he  must  abide  the  con- 
sequences.*'^ And  as  indicating  the  kind  and  amount  of  diligence 
required  of  him,  it  may  be  stated,  first,  that  unless  he  means  to  try 
his  own  case,  it  is  his  duty  to  retain  an  attorney,  more  especially 
where  the  party  himself  is  a  non-resident.'*'  He  must  see  to  it  that 
the  attorney  understands  and  accepts  the  retainer.  It  will  not  be 
sufEcient  excuse  for  a  default  that  a  letter  sent  to  an  attorney,  ask- 
ing him  to  appear  in  the  case,  was  not  delivered  until  after  the  trial, 
if  there  was  time  to  secure  counsel  by  telegraphing."*  If  an  attor- 
ney employed  to  represent  the  defendant  dies  or  withdraws  from  the 
case,  an  effort  to  supply  his  place  in  due  season  must  be  shown.'" 

SSI  Mitchell  y.  AHen,  110  Ga.  282,  34  S.  B.  851.  The  mere  fact  that  de- 
fendant reached  the  court  half  an  hour  too  late,  and  after  the  case  had  been 
disposed  of,  constitutes  no  excuse  for  the  default.  Mullane  y.  Roberge,  21 
Misc.  Rep.  342,  47  N.  Y.  Supp.  155. 

S82  Brand  v.  Stafford,  28  La.  Ann.  51;  Fritz  v.  Roney.  9  Pa.  Dist.  R.  27; 
Griffin  y.  Brewer,  96  Ga.  758,  22  S.  E.  284;  Athens  Leather  Manuf'g  Co.  y. 
Myers,  98  Ga.  396,  25  S.  E.  503;  Harms  y.  Jacobs,  160  111.  589,  43  N.  E.  745; 
Nauer  v.  Benham,  43  Minn.  252,  47  N.  W.  796;  Shay  y.  Chicago  Clock  Co., 
Ul  Cal.  549,  44  Pac.  237;  Myers  y.  Landrum,  4  Wash.  St.  762,  31  Pac.  33. 
It  is  gross  negligence  to  pay  no  attention  to  an  action  for  18  months  after 
service  of  process.  Grootemaat  y.  Tebel,  39  Wis.  576.  In  a  case  in  North 
Carolina,  where  defendant  retained  counsel  and  fully  informed  him  of  his 
defense,  and  subpoenaed  witnesses,  but  thought  his  own  presence  at  the  trial 
would  not  be  necessary,  and  therefore  did  not  attend,  but  the  witnesses  did 
not  appear  and  there  was  no  one  to  ask  for  a  continuance,  and  Judgment 
was  taken  against  him,  It  was  held  that  his  negligence  was  inexcusable,  and 
the  judgment  should  not  be  opened.  Waddell  y.  Wood,  64  N.  C.  624.  And 
see  Oliyer  y.  Gerstle,  58  111.  App.  615. 

«3»  Union  Cent.  Life  Ins.  Co.  y.  Lipscomb  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  307. 

»34  Finlayson  v.  American  Ace.  Co.,  109  N.  C.  196,  13  S.  E.  739.  It  is  no 
ground  for  opening  a  Judgment  that  the  attorney'  did  not  receiye  the  letter 
aaking  him  to  appear  and  defend  the  suit  in  time  to  do  so,  where  the  defend- 
ant himself,  though  several  times  in  the  town  where  the  attorney  lived,  failed 
to  inquire  for  him  or  seek  information  regarding  the  suit.  Post  y.  Carr, 
42  W.  Va.  72.  24  S.  E.  583. 

3SB  Simpson  y.  Brown,  117  N.  C.  482,  23  S.  E.  441.  Compare  Grady  v.  Donii- 
faoo,  106  Cal.  211,  41  Pac.  41. 

(521) 


§  340  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNT8.  (Ch.    14 

Having  retained  counsel,  it  is  the  client's  duty  to  inform  him  fully 
of  the  nature  and  grounds  of  his  defense,  to  assist  him  in  the  prepara- 
tion of  the  case,  and  to  attend  at  the  trial,  unless  advised  by  his 
counsel  that  his  presence  is  not- necessary.  If  he  fails  in  these  par- 
ticulars, his  negligence  cannot  be  held  to  be  excusable.'**  Un- 
doubtedly a  party  has  a  right  to  depend  on  his  attorney's  keeping 
him  informed  of  the  progress  of  the  case ;  and  a  judgment  may  be 
vacated  for  excusable  neglect  or  surprise,  although  the  defendant 
was  represented  by  counsel.'*^  But  it  is  not  sufficient  excuse  for  a 
default  that  defendant's  counsel  did  not  notify  him  of  the  time  of 
the  trial,  if  the  defendant  himself  had  actual  notice  that  the  case 
would  probably  be  tried  at  a  given  term,  at  which  it  actually  was 
tried.*" 

But  in  all  these  cases,  the  party's  failure  to  take  the  steps  required 
of  him  was  due  to  his  own  want  of  diligence  or  attention.  The 
situation  is  entirely  different  where,  in  the  exercise  of  all  due  vig- 
ilance and  activity,  he  was  prevented  from  filing  a  pleading  or  at- 
tending the  trial  by  an  accident  or  chain  of  accidents  which  he  could 
not  have  controlled,'**  or  by  a  genuine  and  excusable  mistake  or 
miscalculation.**®  It  is  not,  however,  a  case  of  excusable  neglect 
when  the  only  reason  for  not  filing  an  answer  in  time  was  that  the 
peculiar  nature  of  the  case  required  more  than  the  usual  time  in  the 
preparation  of  an  answer,  and  the  attorney  could  not  give  it  his  un- 
divided attention.'**  And  a  judgment  will  not  be  set  aside  on  the 
ground  that  the  defendant  was  prevented  from  being  represented  at 
the  trial  and  making  his  defense,  when  the  defense  set  up  in  the  affi- 

'••Cowles  V.  Cowles,  121  N.  C.  272,  28  S.  E.  476;  SulUvan  v.  Shell.  3« 
S.  C.  578,  15  S.  E.  722,  31  Am.  St.  Rep.  8J>4;  Habn  v.  Gates.  IfiO  IlL  290.  48 
N.  E.  398;  Parker  v.  Belcher.  87  Ga.  110,  13  S.  E.  314;  Schroer  v.  WefiwU, 
80  111.  113;   Norton  v.  McLaurin.  125  N.  C.  185,  34  S.  E.  260. 

»»T  Ex  parte  Roundtree,  51  S.  C.  405.  29  S.  E.  66. 

»3 8  Leader  v.  Dunlap.  C  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  243.  And  see  Vick  v.  Baker,  122 
X.  C.  98,  20  S.  E.  64. 

38»  Fitzpa trick  v.  Campbell.  58  Minn.  20.  59  N.  W.  620:  MitcheU  A  Lewis 
Co.  V.  Downing.  23  Or.  448,  32  Pac.  394;  Blain  v.  Shaflfner.  37  IlL  App.  3JW: 
Williams  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co..  110  X.  C.  466.  15  S.  E.  97. 

340  .Jensen  v.  Barbour.  12  Mont  566,  31  Pac.  592.  See,  also.  In  re  Davis* 
Estate,  15  Mont.  347,  30  Pac.  202. 

a*i  Bailey  v.  Taaflfe,  29  Cal.  422, 

(r»22) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  34Ca 

davit  in  support  of  his  motion  is  entirely  new  and  not  disclosed  by 
the  original  pleadings.*** 


I  340a.    Mistake,  Isnoranoe,  or  Erroneoiu  Adviee  of  Oounsel. 

Certain  of  the  cases  lay  down  a  broad  general  rule  that  the  mis- 
take or  ignorance  of  a  party's  counsel  will  not  relieve  him  from  a 
judgment  rendered  against  him.'**  But  a  majority  of  the  decisions 
favor  the  principle  that  a  mistake  of  the  party's  attorney  may  war- 
rant the  vacation  oi  the  judgment,  as  well  as  a  mistake  made  by  the 
party  himself,  provided  it  was  a  mistake  of  fact,  and  not  of  law> 
and  provided  it  was  such  as  might  reasonably  and  genuinely  have 
occurred.  Thus,  we  find  authorities  justifying  the  grant  of  such  re- 
lief where  the  judgment  was  entered  in  consequence  of  the  attorney's 
mistake  or  misapprehension  as  to  the  real  facts  of  the  case,  or  the 
circumstances  of  the  transaction  out  of  which  the  suit  arose,***  or 
his  mistake  or  miscalculation  as  to  the  time  for  pleading  or  for  the 
trial,  or  as  to  the  case  being  set  for  trial  or  placed  on  the  calendar.***^ 

3  *2  Kehler  v.  New  Orleans  Ins.  Co.  (C.  O.)  23  Fed.  709. 

•4s  AVilson  V.  Smith,  17  Tex.  Civ.  App.  188,  43  S.  W.  1086. 

»44  xrnderwood  v.  Underwood,  87  Cal.  523,  25  Pae.  1065;  McCredy  v.  Wood- 
cock, 41  App.  Div.  526.  58  N.  Y.  Supp.  656. 

3-15  Melde  v.  Reynolds,  129  Cal.  308,  61  Pac.  932;  Springer  v.  Gillespie  (Tex. 
riT.  App.)  56  S.  W.  369;  Lathrop  v.  O'Brien,  47  Minn.  428,  50  N.  W.  530; 
Hermance  v.  Cunningham,  49  Xeb.  897,  69  N.  W.  311;  Horton  v.  New  Pass 
Gold  &  S.  Min.  Co.,  21  Nev.  184,  27  Pac.  376;  Scott  v.  Smith,  133  Mo.  618,  34 
S.  W.  864;  CoUier  v.  Fitzpatriclj,  22  Mont.. 553,  57  Pac.  181.  But  no  suffi- 
cient excuse  is  shown  by  an  affidavit  of  counsel  that  he  had  forgotten  on 
what  day  the  term  began,  when  he  admits  receiving  the  summons  before  the 
term,  and  the  summons  Itself  showed  when  the  term  began.  Baltimore  & 
O.  R.  Co.  V.  Flinn,  2  Ind.  App.  55,  28  X.  E.  201.  Nor  is  it  sufficient  ground 
for  opening  a  judgment  that  a  clerk  in  the  office  of  defendant's  attorneys 
inadvertently  placed  the  cause  on  the  office  diary  for  the  January  term  in- 
stead of  the  December  term,  when  the  attorneys  knew,  when  the  suit  was 
begun,  that  the  answer  would  have  to  be  filed  at  the  December  term.  Bar- 
rett V.  Queen  City  Cycle  Co.,  179  111.  68,  53  N.  E.  550.  A  custom  in  one  sec- 
tion of  the  state  for  circuit  courts  not  to  try  cases  on  the  first  day  of  the 
term  is  no  excuse  for  the  absence  of  an  attorney  whose  case  is  set  for  trial 
on  that  day,  where  it  Is  not  shown  that  the  custom  is  invariable.  Wilson  v. 
Scott,  50  Mo.  App.  329.  And  see,  as  denying  that  the  attorney's  mistake  or 
miscalculation  of  time  is  ground  for  vacating  a  judgment,  Smith  v.  Watson, 
28  Iowa,  218;   People  v.  Rains,  23  Cal.  127. 


§341  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.    14 

So,  a  showing  that  defendant,  after  receiving  service,  engaged  an 
attorney  to  conduct  his  defense,  and  that  the  latter  failed  to  find 
the  case  because  it  was  docketed  in  a  wrong  name,  and  for  that 
reason  omitted  to  make  any  defense,  is  sufficient  to  warrant  the  set- 
ting aside  of  a  default.'**  And  the  same  rule  applies  where  the  at- 
torney mistakenly  advised  his  client  that  the  action  had  been  dis- 
continued.**^ 

But  if  the  mistake  made  by  the  attorney  was  a  mistake  of  law, 
such  relief  cannot  be  granted.  This  principle  is  applied  not  only 
where  he  was  in  error,  legally  speaking,  as  to  the  rights  or  duties  of 
his  client,  or  as  to  the  legal  effect  of  substantive  facts  in  the  case, 
but  also  where  the  attorney  takes  a  wrong  course  or  fails  to  take 

m 

the  right  course  in  consequence  of  his  ignorance  or  misunderstand- 
ing of  the  rules  of  procedure.'*'  Where  a  defendant  who  really  has 
a  good  defense  to  the  action  is  dissuaded  from  setting  it  up  and 
contesting  the  suit,  and  suffers  a  default,  by  reason  of  erroneous 
advice  from  his  attorney,  it  is  thought,  in  several  of  the  states,  that 
this  will  constitute  a  sufficient  ground  for  vacating  the  judgment 
rendered  against  him.'*'  But  elsewhere,  on  the  ground  that  such  a 
mistake  is  one  of  law,  it  is  ruled  that  an  application  to  open  or 
vacate  the  judgment  cannot  be  based  on  such  grounds."* 

S  341.    Hesliceaoe  of  AtUnemmf^ 

In  a  majority  of  the  states,  the  courts  have  steadily  refused  to  set 
aside  a  judgment  on  the  sole-  ground  of  the  neglect  or  carelessness 
of  the  attorney  for  the  party  against  whom  it  was  rendered.     The 

»*e  aifford  V.  GnieUe  (Ky.)  32  S.  W.  937. 

»*T  Searles  v.  Christensen,  6  S.  D.  650,  60  N.  W.  29. 

»*«  In  re  Hoopes'  Estate,  185  Pa.  167.  39  Atl.  840;  HIcklin  v.  McClear,  19 
Or.  508,  24  Pac.  902;  Phifer  v.  Travellers'  ins.  Co.,  123  X.  C.  -KX),  31  S.  R. 
715;  Brooks  v.  Johnson,  122  Cal.  569,  55  Pac.  423;  Harbaugh  ▼.  Honey  Lake 
Valley  Land  &  Water  Co.,  109  Cal.  70,  41  Pac.  792;  Shearman  ▼.  Jorgensen, 
106  Cal.  483,  39  Pac.  863. 

3*»  Baxter  v.  Chute,  60  Minn.  164,  52  N.  W.  379,  36  Am.  St  R^.  633:  Dons- 
lass  V.  Todd,  96  Cal.  655,  31  Pac.  623,  31  Am.  St.  Rep.  247. 

>»o  Mouser  v.  Harmon,  96  Ky.  591,  29  S.  W.  448:  Oox  r.  Armstrong  (Ky,) 
43  S.  W.  189;  MUwaukee  Mut.  Loan  &  Bldg.  Soc.  v.  Jagodzlnskl,  84  Wis.  Xi. 
54  N.  W.  102. 

(524) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  >     §   341 

act  or  omission  of  the  attorney  is  the  act  or  omission  of  the  client, 
and  no  negligence  will  be  excusable  in  the  former  which  would  not 
be  excusable  in  the  latter.*'**  This  view  has  recently  found  ex- 
pression in  a  case  in  Kansas,  of  which  the  circumstances  were  so 
unusually  severe  as  to  deserve  somewhat  detailed  mention.  It  ap- 
peared that  the  plaintiff  resided  in  Kansas  and  the  defendants  in 
another  state;  that  the  defendants  employed  an  attorney  in  Kansas 
to  file  an  answer  and  attend  to  the  case;  that  the  attorney  never 
filed  such  answer,  but,  before  the  time  for  filing  it  had  expired,  he 
left  the  state,  and  never  returned,  and  no  answer  was  ever  filed  in 
the  case;  that  after  more  than  four  months  had  elapsed  since  the 
defendants  made  default  by  not  filing  an  answer,  a  judgment  was 
rendered  against  them  in  accordance  with  the  prayer  of  the  plain- 
tiff's petition;  that  the  defendants  had  no  knowledge  of  the  negli- 
gence of  their  attorney,  or  of  the  rendition  of  such  judgment,  until 
a  long  time  after  both  had  occurred ;  that  the  attorney  was  insolvent ; 
and  that  the  defendants  had  a  good  defense  to  the  action.  It  was 
held  that  neither  of  these  circumstances,  nor  all  combined,  could  be 
considered  such  an  "unavoidable  casualty  or  misfortune  preventing 
the  party  from  defending"  the  action,  that  the  defendants  could  have 
the  judgment  vacated  and  be  let  in  to  defend.'"*      It  is  generally 

«»i  Babcock  v.  Brown,  25  Vt  550,  60  Am.  Dec.  200;  Davison  v.  Heffron. 
31  Vt  687;  Burke  v.  Stokely,  65  N.  0.  560;  Foster  v.  Jones.  1  MeOord  (S.  C.) 
116;  Tarrant  CJo.  v.  Lively,  25  Tex.  Supp.  399;  Welch  v.  Challen,  31  Kan. 
C96,  3  Pac.  314;  Kreite  v.  Kreite,  93  Ind.  583;  Spauldlng  v.  Thompson,  12 
Ind.  477,  74  Am.  Dec.  221;  Jones  v.  Leech,  46  Iowa,  186;  Niagara  Ins.  Go. 
▼.  Rodecker,  47  Iowa,  162;  Ordway  v.  Suchard,  31  Iowa,  481;  State  v.  Elgin, 
11  Iowa,  216;  Bosbyshell  v.  Summers,  40  Mo.  172;  Austin  v.  Nelson,  11  Mo. 
192;  Gehrke  v.  Jod,  59  Mo.  522;  Kerby  v.  Chadwell,  10  Mo.  392;  Matthis  v. 
Inhabitants  of  Town  of  Cameron,  62  Mo.  504;  Merritt  v.  Putnam,  7  Minn.  493, 
(Gil.  399);  Smith  v.  Tunstead,  56  Gal.  175;  People  v.  Rains,  23  Gal.  127;  Ekel 
V.  Swift,  47  Cal.  020:  Harper  v.  Mallory,  4  Nev.  447;  United  States  v.  Wal- 
lace (D.  0.)  46  Fed.  569;  Phillips  v.  GolUer,  87  Ga.  66,  13  S.  E.  260;  Merrill 
V.  Roberts,  78  Tex.  28,  14  S.  W.  254;  Woolley  v.  Sullivan  (Tex.  Giv.  App.) 
43  S.  W.  919:  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bergen,  64  HI.  App.  685;  Moore 
▼.  Horner,  146  Ind.  287,  45  N.  E.  341;  Parker  v.  Indianapolis  Nat.  Bank,  1 
Ind.  App.  462,  27  N.  K.  650;  Jackson  v.  Gould,  06  Iowa,  488,  65  N.  W.  406; 
Church  V.  Lacy,  102  Iowa,  235.  71  N.  W.  338:  Anderson  v.  Green  (Ky.)  55 
a  W.  420;   Wynn  v.  Frost,  6  Okl.  89,  50  Pac.  184. 

tsa  Welch  v.  GhaUen,  31  Kan.  696,  3  Pac.  314. 

(525) 


§341  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.    14 

held  that  the  attorney's  neglect  to  file  a  plea  or  answer  in  the  action 
will  not  justify  the  setting  aside  of  a  judgment  by  default.***  But  a 
case  in  New  York  holds  that  where  the  defendant's  counsel  omitted 
to  enter  a  plea,  and  the  neglect  of  the  client  to  examine  the  records 
to  see  whether  his  plea  was  on  file  was  excusable,  there  was  good 
ground  to  open  the  judgment.***  Where  a  party  had  time  to  give 
his  personal  attention  to  the  defense  of  the  action  before  a  default 
was  entered,  and  he  failed  to  do  so,  it  was  held  that  the  fact  that 
counsel,  whom  he  supposed  he  had  engaged  to  make  his  defense, 
omitted  to  do  so,  did  not  make  it  imperative  on  the  court  to  set 
aside  the  default.'**  Moreover,  it  is  the  duty  of  an  attorney  to  fol- 
low up  with  diligence  the  cases  in  which  he  is  retained,  to  watch 
the  progress  of  each  cause  with  vigilance,  to  note  carefully  the  vari- 
ous steps  taken  by  his  adversary  or  by  the  court,  and  to  secure  due 
notice  of  every  successive  development  in  the  action  which  requires 
movement  on  his  part.  His  carelessness  or  inattention  in  these  re- 
spects is  not  excusable.  If  the  client  suffers  a  default,  or  otherwise 
loses  his  case,  because  of  the  failure  of  his  attorney  to  pursue  and 
follow  up  the  action  with  due  care  and  watchfulness,  it  will  not  be 
ground  for  vacating  the  judgment.*** 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  held  in  a  few  states  (and  notably  in  New 
York)  that  the  negligence  of  the  attorney  is  a  sufficient  ground  for 
setting  aside  the  judgment,  provided  the  client  himself  was  not  di- 

1 68  Austin  V.  Nelson.  11  Mo.  192;  Kerby  v.  Chadwell,  10  Mo,  392;  Harper 
V.  Mallory,  4  Nev.  447;  Butler  v.  Morse,  CG  N.  H.  429.  23  Atl.  90;  Bentley 
V.  Finch,  86  Ga.  800,  13  S.  E,  ir>5;  Schultz  v.  Mei8en>ar.  144  III.  20,  32  X.  E. 
550;  Thomas  v.  Chambers,  14  Mont.  42.3.  3G  Pac.  814;  Edwards  v.  Hellings; 
103  Cal.  204.  37  Pac.  218;  Tarrant  Co.  v.  LIvel3%  25  Tex.  Supp.  399;  Jones 
V.  Leech,  46  Iowa,  186. 

804  Clark  v.  Lyon,  2  Hilt.  91. 

sBB  Schroer  v.  Wessell,  80  111.  113.  Ne;;ligence  of  counsel  Is  not  excusable 
neglect,  for  which  a  judgment  will  be  set  aside,  where  the  client  took  no 
interest  In  the  case,  did  not  attend  the  court,  gave  no  instructions  to  bis 
attorney,  nor  aslved  any  from  him.  Norton  v.  McLaurln,  125  N.  C.  1S5.  :!4 
S.  E.  209. 

8  66  Brumbaugh  v.  Stockman,  83  Ind.  583;  Norton  v.  McLaurln,  125  N.  r. 
185,  34  S.  E.  269;  McDauiel  v.  McLendon,  85  Ga.  614,  11  S.  E  869;  Padjcitt 
V.  Evans  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  51  S.  W.  513;  Pearson  v.  I>robaz  Fishing  Co..  lO 
Cal.  425.  34  Pac.  76;  Ilaggin  v.  Lorentz,  13  Mont.  406,  34  Pac  ti07;  liTer- 
pool  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  V.  I»errin  (N.  M.)  61  Pac.  124. 

(526) 


Ch.   14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  i  341 

rectly  in  fault.* *^  A  party  may  be  relieved  from  a  judgment  ob- 
tained against  him  by  reason  of  the  negligence,  ignorance,  or  fraud 
of  his  attorney,  without  compelling  him  to  resort  to  an  action  against 
the  attorney  or  show  the  latter  to  be  insolvent.'**  And  even  in 
the  states  which  generally  adhere  to  the  stricter  rule,  there  is  a 
disposition  to  relax  it  somewhat  under  exceptional  circumstances. 
Thus,  where  an  attorney  overlooked  the  case  on  the  trial-calendar, 
by  reason  of  its  being  placed  thereon  under  a  title  calculated  to 
mislead,  and  the  case  was  called  and  defaulted,  and  there  was  a 
meritorious  defense,  it  was  held  that  the  default  and  judgment  ren- 
dered thereon  might  be  set  aside,  application  being  made  at  the 
same  term."*  So  where  it  was  made  to  appear  by  affidavit  of  de- 
fendant's attorneys  that  the  reason  why  they  did  not  appear  and 
file  an  answer  was  on  account  of  an  accidental  misplacement  of  the 
petition  and  notice  handed  to  them  by  the  plaintiff,  whereby  the 
case  was  overlooked  by  them  in  examining  their  papers  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  term,  in  order  to  ascertain  what  cases  they  had 
to  attend,  it  was  considered  that  setting  aside  the  default  was  no 
abuse  of  discretion.**®  So  it  is  proper  to  vacate  an  order  of  dis- 
missal, on  motion  of  the  plaintiff's  attorney,  supported  by  his  state- 
ment that  he  had  consented  to  the  dismissal  improvidently,  and  ac- 
companied by  his  offer  to  refund  the  costs  paid  by  the  defendant 

a»T  Nash  v.  Whetmore,  33  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  159;  Curtis  v.  Ballagh,  4  Edw.  Ch 
(N.  Y.)  639;    Clark  v.  Lyon,  2  Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  91;   Phillips  v.  Hawley,  6  Johns 
(N.  Y.)  129;   Tripp  v.  Vincent,  8  Paige  (N.  Y.)  180;   Millspaugh  v.  McBrlde,  7 
Paige  (N.  Y.)  509.  34  Am.  Dec.  3(50;  Meacham  v.  Dudley.  6  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  514 
Gideon  v.  Dwyer,  17  Misc.  Rep.  233,  40  N.  Y.  Supp.  1053;  De  Marco  v.  Mass 
31  Misc.  Rep.  827,  64  N.  Y.  Supp.  768.    And  see,  also,  Thompson  v.  Goulding 
5  Allen  (Mass.)  82;   Bradford  v.  Coit,  77  N.  C.  72;    Oriel  v.  Vernon,  65  N.  C 
76;    Hanson  v.  Mlchelson,  19  Wis.  498;   Babcock  v.  Perry.  4  Wis.  31;    Ash 
ton  V.  Dashaway  Ass'n  (Cal.)  33  Pac.  440.    But  the  mere  fact  that  the  defend 
ant  wrote  to  an  attorney  requesting  him  to  enter  an  appearance  for  him 
which  the  attorney  failed  to  do,  In  consequence  of  which  judgment  was  en 
tered  by  default,  does  not  make  out  such  a  case  of  ^'excusable  neglect"  as 
would  justify  the  court  in  vacating  the  judgment.    Burke  v.  Stokely,  65  N. 
C.  569. 

«58  Sharp  V.  Mayor  of  City  of  New  York.  31  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  578. 

»»•  AUen  V.  Hoffman,  12  IH.  App.  573. 

««o  Ordway  v.  Suchard,  31  Iowa,  481. 

(527) 


§342  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  14 

after  notice  of  the  motion.'**  The  negligence  of  any  person  who  is 
delegated  or  employed  by  the  attorney  to  attend  to  the  case  or  take 
his  place  is  of  course  imputable  to  the  attorney  himself,  and  will 
not  be  excusable  in  the  one  unless  it  would  have  been  in  the  other.*** 
And  where  an  attorney  is  engaged  simply  to  employ  counsel  to  ap- 
pear at  another  place^  he  is  a  mere  agent,  and  his  negligence  in  fail- 
ing to  employ  counsel  is  the  negligence  of  his  principal.***  The 
burden  is  on  a  party  seeking  to  be  excused  by  the  neglect  of  coun- 
sel to  show  that  he  employed  counsel  practising  habitually  in  the 
particular  court  or  who  specially  agreed  to  attend  to  the  case*** 

S  342.    Mlsimclerstancliiis  of  CovaaeL 

A  misunderstanding  between  the  defendant  in  an  action  and  an 
attorney,  as  to  whether  the  latter  had  been  retained  or  not,  in  con- 
sequence of  which  the  judgment  goes  by  default,  will  be  good  ground, 
provided  the  mistake  was  genuine,  for  setting  aside  the  judgment.*** 
So  where,  in  consequence  of  a  misunderstanding  between  a  defend- 
ant and  his  attorney,  attributable  to  the  negligence  of  a  third  per- 
son, the  real  defense  is  not  interposed,  and  he  does  not  discover  the 
fact  until  after  judgment  has  been  recovered  against  him,  it  is  no 
abuse  of  discretion  to  vacate  the  judgment.***  So  in  a  case  where 
the  defendant  in  a  judgment  by  default  applied  to  the  court  to  open 
the  same,  and  showed  in  his  affidavit  that  he  believed  the  case  was 
being  defended  in  his  behalf  by  the  attorneys  who  represented  his 
co-defendants,  and  the  record  entries  in  the  early  stages  of  the  cause 

»«i  Benwood  Iron-Works  Co.  v.  Tappan,  56  Miss.  659. 

862  Davison  v.  Heffron,  31  Vt.  687;  Webster  v.  McMahan,  13  Mo.  582. 

303  Fiulayson  v.  American  Ace.  Co..  109  N.  O.  196.  13  S.  K  739. 

384  Manning  v.  Roanolce  &  T.  R.  Co..  122  N.  C.  428,  28  S.  E.  963. 

865  Panesl  v.  Boswell,  12  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  323;  MelOnley  v.  Tuttle,  34  CaL 
235;  Bcatty  v.  O'Connor.  106  Ind.  81,  5  N.  E.  880.  But  see  section  340.  supra, 
as  to  the  duty  of  the  defendant  to  see  to  it  that  his  attorney  understands 
and  accepts  the  retainer.  It  is  said  that  the  fact  that  defendant's  counsel. 
through  a  misunderstanding,  failed  to  appear  at  the  trial,  is  no  ground  for 
setting  aside  a  default,  where  defendant's  only  complaint  Is  that  the  Judg- 
ment is  for  more  than  he  thinks  it  ought  to  be.  McRae  v.  Adam8»  85  UL 
App.  528. 

»e«  Dixon  V.  Lyne  (Ky.)  10  S.  W.  469. 

(528) 


Ch.   14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMBNT&  S  348 

showed  that  those  attorneys  appeared  for  "the  defendants"  generally, 
and  there  was  shown  to  be  a  good  defense  on  the  merits,  it  was 
held  that  good  cause  appeared  for  opening  the  judgment.**^ 

i  343.    UnaToidable  Absenoe  of  CoiinseL 

Where,  in  the  unavoidable  absence  of  the  defendant's  attorney  (as, 
when  he  is  engaged  in  trying  a  case- in  another  court,  which  was 
begun  before  the  plaintiff's  case  was  called,  and  is  unexpectedly  pro- 
tracted) a  judgment  is  entered  for  the  plaintiff,  if  all  appears  to  have 
been  done  in  good  faith,  and  the  defendant  could  not  proceed  with- 
out his  counsel,  and  there  is  a  meritorious  defense,  the  cases  gen- 
erally hold  that  this  will  be  good  ground  for  vacating  the  judg- 
ment.**'  Similar  rulings  have  been  made  in  cases  where  the  attor- 
ney's absence  was  caused  by  the  sudden  and  dangerous  illness  of  a 
near  relative,***  or  by  his  necessary  attention  to  the  duties  of  a 
public  office  which  he  holds.*^®  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  de- 
cisions to  the  effect  that  it  is  not  a  sufficient  excuse  for  the  attor- 
ney's absence  that  he  was  "detained  by  important  legal  business 
elsewhere,"  or  that  he  was  in  attendance  upon  the  legislature  as  a 
member  of  that  body.*^*  But  the  rule  which  appears  to  rest  upon 
the  surest  foundation  of  sound  legal  reason  is  that  which  requires 
proof  that  the  attorney's  absence  was  truly  unavoidable,  in  the  sense 
that  he  could  not  have  prevented  judgment  going  against  his  client, 
in  his  absence,  by  any  vigilance,  or  precaution  on  his  part.  Accord- 
ing to  the  decisions  favoring  this  rule,  if  counsel  has  cases  coming 
on  in  two  different  courts  at  the  same  time,  he  must  obtain  leave 

aeiKupferle  v.  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank,  32  Ark.  717.  And  see  Heaps  v. 
Hoopes,  68  Md.  383,  12  Atl.  882. 

3«8  McArthur  v.  Slauson,  GO  Wis.  293,  19  N.  W.  45;  BeaU  v.  Marietta  Pa- 
per MUl  Co.,  45  Ga.  28;  Stout  v.  Lewis,  11  Mo.  438;  Smith  v.  Moreton  Truck 
&  Storage  Oo..  19  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  R.  628. 

3«o  Martin  v.  St  Charles  Tobacco  Co.,  53  Mo.  App.  655;  Burns  v.  Scooffy, 
98  Cal.  271,  33  Pac.  86.  Compare  Cresswell  v.  White,  3  Ind.  App.  306,  29 
N.  B.  612. 

•TO  Hill  V.  Crump,  24  Ind.  291. 

ail  Wilson  v.  Scott,  50  Mo.  App.  329;  Dick  v.  Williams,  87  Wis.  651,  58 
N.  W.  1029;  Carr  v.  Dawes,  46  Mo.  App.  351,  698;  Butte  Butchering  Co.  v. 
Clarke,  19  Mont.  306,  48  Pac.  303. 

1  LAW  JUDG.-^  (529) 


§  344  LAW  OF  JUDGMBNTa.  (Ch.  14 

of  absence  from  one  or  other  of  the  courts  and  arrange  that  his 
case  shall  not  be  proceeded  with  there  in  his  absence.*'*  If  he  is 
likely  to  be  detained  elsewhere  by  business  of  importance,  legal  or 
otherwise,  he  must  apply  to  the  opposing  counsel  for  a  continuance 
or  an  extension  of  time.*'*  If,  starting  from  a  distant  point,  he 
finds  that  he  cannot  reach  the  place  of  trial  in  due  season,  he  should 
telegraph  to  the  judge  and  ask  to  have  the  case  held  until  his  ar- 
rival.*'* And  it  is  quite  clear  that  a  judgment  should  not  be  set 
aside  on  this  ground  when  no  explanation  or  excuse  for  the  attor- 
ney's absence  is  offered,  or  when  it  appears  that  he  was  guilty  of 
carelessness  or  lack  of  attention,  or  that  he  withdrew  from  the  court 
room  in  the  mistaken  belief  that  his  case  would  not  be  reached  be- 
fore his  return.*'' 

S  344.    Fraud  of  Attorney* 

If  an  attorney  corruptly  sells  out  his  client's  interest  to  the  other 
side,  a  judgment  thus  obtained  may  be  set  aside  on  the  charge  of 
fraud.  So  also,  if  a  plaintiff  is  guilty  of  so  influencing  the  attorney 
of  the  defendant  by  the  payment  of  money  without  the  knowledge 
or  consent  of  his  client,  as  to  make  it  the  interest  of  such  attorney 
that  the  plaintiff  should  obtain  a  judgment  against  his  client,  and 
such  attorney,  in  the  absence  of  his  client,  does  not  make  any  oppo- 
sition to  the  rendition  of  the  judgment  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  a 
new  action  may  be  maintained  by  the  defendant  to  set  aside  such 
judgment  and  open  the  case  for  a  new  and  fair  hearing.*^*  It  has 
even  been  held  that,  where  an  attorney  withdraws  from  the  case, 
and  judgment  goes  against  his  client,  the  mere  fact  that  the  latter 
did  not  consent  to  the  withdrawal  or  know  of  it,  will  enable  him  to 

^T2  Western  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Pitts,  79  Ga.  532,  4  S.  E.  021. 

378  Grove  v.  Bush,  86  Iowa,  94.  53  N.  W.  88. 

374  Oaughey  v.  Northern  Pac.  Elevator  Co.,  51  Mhin.  324,  53  N.  W.  545. 

sTspitzele  V.  Lutkins,  85  111.  App.  662;  Huntington  v.  Emery,  74  Md.  tu. 
21  Ati.  495;  Gray  v.  Sabin,  87  Cal.  211,  25  Pac.  422. 

37«Haverty  v.  Haverty,  ai  Kan.  438,  11  Pac.  364;  Beck  v.  Bellamy,  93  N. 
•C.  129.  But  in  Iowa,  a  Judgment  cannot  be  vacated  for  fraud  and  negligence 
•of  attorneys  in  not  interposing  a  valid  defense,  under  Oode,  f  4091,  author- 
izing vacation  of  Judj?ment  for  fraud  in  obtaining  it  McCormick  v.  Ilc- 
(Cormlck.  109  Iowa,  700,  81  N.  W.  172. 

(630) 


Ch.  14)  VACATINQ  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  845 

haye  the  judgment  opened.*'^  A  stronger  case  for  such  relief  is.  of 
course  made  out  where  it  is  shown  that  the  attorney's  withdrawal 
was  caused  by  hostility  to  his  client  for  alleged  nonpayment  of  his 
fees.*^*  If  the  client  consents  to  the  withdrawal  of  his  attorney's 
appearance,  he  precludes  himself  from  moving  for  the  vacation  of 
the  judgment.'^* 

S  345.    Misinformation  mm  to  Time  of  Trial* 

Where  a  party  who  seeks  the  vacation  of  a  judgment  rendered 
against  him  in  the  absence  of  his  counsel  and  himself  explains  their 
failure  to  attend  the  trial  by  showing  that  they  relied  on  a  state- 
ment made  by  the  judge  of  the  court  that  the  case  would  not  be  tried 
at  the  current  term,  or  that  it  could  not  be  reached  before  a  dis- 
tant date,  or  that  nothing  further  would  be  done  without  notifying 
counsel,  notwithstanding  which  a  default  was  taken,  it  is  generally 
held  to  be  a  case  of  "excusable  neglect,"  such  as  will  warrant  the 
opening  of  the  judgment.'***  And  a  similar  rule  is  applied  where 
counsel  was  misled  by  information  or  assurances  given  him  by  the 
clerk  of  the  court,  as  to  the  time  when  the  case  would  be  reached  in 
its  order,  or  as  to  the  time  when  the  court  would  proceed  with  the 
business  before  it.*'*     But  some  of  the  authorities  maintain  the  rule 

»T7  Utah  Ctoinmercial  &  Savings  Bank  v.  Trumbo,  17  Utah,  108,  53  Pac. 
J063.  In  South  Carolina,  it  is  not  necessary  to  show  fraud  and  collusion  be- 
tween an  attornej'  who  filed  a  demurrer  for  defendant  and  afterwards  with- 
drew it,  and  allowed  Judgment  by  default,  and  the  plaintiff,  in  order  to  au- 
thorize the  court  to  set  such  Judgment  aside,  since  there  was  no  trial.  Ex 
imrte  Roundtree,  51  S.  C.  405,  29  S.  E.  G6. 

378  Mchells  V.  Nichells,  5  N.  D.  125,  64  N.  W.  73.  33  L.  R.  A.  515,  57  Am. 
St  Rep.  540;    Herbert  v.  Lawrence,  21  Cir.  Proc.  R.  336,  18  N.  Y.  Supp.  96. 

»T»F!ncher  v.  M^lcolmson,  96  Cal.  38.  30  Pac.  835;  Dudley  v.  Broadway 
Ins.  Co.,  42  App.  Div.  555,  59  N.  Y.  Supp.  668. 

»»«  Ratiiff  V.  Baldwin,  29  Ind.  16.  92  Am.  Dec.  330;  Cruse  v.  Cunningham. 
79Ind.  402;  Sanders  v.  Hall,  37  Knn.  271,  15  Pac.  197;  Jean  v.  Ilennessy,  74 
Iowa,  348,  37  X.  W.  771,  7  Am.  St.  Rep.  488;  Buena  Vista  Co.  v.  I.  F.  &  S. 
a  R.  Co..  49  Iowa.  657;  Melde  v.  Reynolds.  129  Cal.  308,  61  Pac.  932;  Fleet- 
wood V.  Eciuitable  :Mortg.  Co.,  108  Ga.  811.  33  S.  E.  1014. 

»»i  Hewitt  V.  Hazard.  33  App.  Div.  630,  53  N.  Y.  Supp.  340;  Xash  v.  Den- 
Ion,  59  Kan.  771.  51  Pac.  896;  Anaconda  Min.  Co.  v.  Salle,  16  Mont.  8,  39 
Pac.  909,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  472.  But  the  fact  that  Judgment  is  rendered  in 
tbe  absence  of  defendant's  counsel,  because  he  relied  on  the  clerk  of  the  court 

(531) 


§  345a  L.AW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  14 

that  even  such  official  assurances  will  not  relieve  litigants  (or  their 
counsel)  from  the  duty  of  exercising  thie  utmost  vigilance  in  watch- 
ing the  progress  of  their  causes.'"* 

f  345a.    Estoppel  to  Apply  for  Vaemtion  of  JvdKinemt. 

A  party,  against  whom  a  judgment  has  been  taken  under  circum- 
stances which  would  ordinarily  entitle  him  to  apply  for  its  vacation, 
may  be  estopped  by  his  conduct  to  ask  for  such  relief.  This  is  held 
to  be  the  case  where  he  has  been  guilty  of  fraud  in  attempting  to 
elude  execution  on  the  juH'^ment  by  setting  up  a  claim  under  a  fic- 
titious name  to  the  goods  ^ought  to  be  levied  on,'*'  or  where  he 
has  made  a  "declaration  of  no  defense"  to  the  note  on  which  the 
judgment  was  entered  and  offered  to  pay  it  to  the  present  holder 
before  maturity,'**  or  where  a  judgment  by  default,  barring  redemp- 
tion, has  been  rendered  against  a  junior  incumbrancer  through  his 
excusable  neglect,  and  he  learns  of  the  judgment  while  the  period  of 
redemption  is  running,  but  fails  to  redeem.'"  On  the  other  hand, 
it  is  said,  in  New  York,  that  a  defendant  is  not  estopped  to  apply  to 
have  a  default  opened  and  for  leave  to  set  up  a  meritorious  defense, 
unless  the  plaintiff  has  been  prejudiced  by  the  loss  of  some  substan- 
tial advantage  which  he  would  have  had  if  the  defense  had  been  in- 
terposed at  the  proper  time."*  And  it  seems  that  the  fact  that  a 
default  judgment  has  been  satisfied  by  a  sale  of  the  defendant's  prop- 
erty does  not  deprive  him  of  relief,  unless  it  is  shown  that  some  one 
was  misled  by  his  failure  to  prevent  the  sale."^ 

to  inform  him  of  the  day  of  tiial,  which  the  latter  failed  to  do,  does  not  make 
a  case  of  "excusable  neglect."  Western  Union  Tel.  Go.  v.  Griffin,  1  Ind.  App. 
40.  27  N.  E.  113. 

8«2  National  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Hinson,  103  Ala.  532,  15  South.  844;  Wilson 
V.  Smith,  17  Tex.  Civ.  App.  188.  43  S.  W.  1086;  Stewart  v.  Cannon,  06  Minn. 
64.  68  N.  W.  604;  Elton  v.  Brettscbneider.  33  111.  App.  355;  American  Brew- 
ing Co.  V.  Jergens,  21  Ind.  App.  595,  52  N.  E.  820. 

888  Rohrbacker  v.  Schultz.  10  Pa.  Co.  Ot.  R.  282. 

8  84  Humphrey  v.  Tozler,  154  Ta.  410,  26  Atl.  542. 

8  86  Becker  v.  Hutbsteiner.  142  Ind.  09,  41  N.  E.  323. 

88e  Smith  V.  Weston.  81  Hun.  87.  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  649. 

887  Shepherd  v.  Marrel.  16  Ind.  App.  417,  45  N.  E.  526.    Compare  Coifey 
V.  Carter,  47  Kan.  22,  27  Pac.  128. 
(532) 


Cb.  14)  VA^CATINO  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  34G 

Part  VII.  Practice  on  Vacating  Judgments. 

§  346.    Notioe   of   Applloatton. 

Where  the  power  to  vacate  judgments  depends  upon  such  statu- 
tory provisions  as  we  have  been  considering,  it  is  generally  requisite 
that  notice  of  the  application  be  given  to  the  other  party.  But  at 
common  law  this  is  not  always  necessary.  It  is  not  irregular  for  a 
court  to  set  aside  during  the  term  a  judgment  rendered  by.  it,  with- 
out notice  to  the  defendant.  It  cannot  be  assumed  that  the  want  of 
notice  was  prejudicial  to  him,  the  court  having  authority  to  set  aside 
such  judgment  despite  any  objections  he  could  make.'"®  And  in  one 
case  this  was  done,  without  notice,  although  the  docket  had  been 
closed,  the  plaintiff's  counsel  had  left  the  court,  and  a  similar  mo- 
tion had  been  previously  refused.*'®  But  after  the  term  the  case  is 
different.  Then  the  parties  are  no  longer  before  the  court,  actually 
or  constructively,  and  a  judgment  cannot  be  set  aside  on  motion 
without  notice  to  the  adverse  party  or  his  representatives.'"®  The 
notice  should  in  general  be  addressed  to  and  served  upon  the  party 
himself.  But  it  is  held  that  the  authority  of  an  attorney  so  far  con- 
tinues after  final  judgment  that  service  on  him  of  notice  of  a  mo- 
tion to  vacate  the  judgment  for  fraud  in  obtaining  it  or  for  want  of 

»8s  Smith  V.  Robinson,  11  Ala.  270;  Rich  v.  Thornton,  60  Ala.  473;  Desrlbes 
V.  Wilmer,  GO  Ala.  25,  44  Am.  Rep.  501;  Lake  v.  Jones,  40  Ind.  207;  Burn- 
side  V.  Ennls,  43  Ind.  411;   Yancy  v.  Teter,  30  Ind.  305. 

8«>  AlUson  V.  Whlttier,  101  N.  C.  400,  8  S.  E.  338. 

3*0  Ingram  v.  Belk.  2  Rich.  Law  (S.  C.)  Ill;  Martlndale  v.  Brown,  18  Ind. 
2H4;  Smith  v.  Chandler,  13  Ind.  513;  Lake  v.  Jones,  40  Ind.  207;  Burnside 
r.  Ennis,  43  Ind.  411;  Yancy  v.  Teter,  30  Ind.  305;  Lane  v.  Wheless,  46 
Miss.  666;  Coleman  v.  McAnulty,  16  Mo.  173,  57  Am.  Dec.  220;  Nuckolls  v. 
Irwin,  2  Neb.  60;  Hettrick  v.  Wilson,  12  Ohio  St.  130,  80  Am.  Dec.  337;  Regester 
V.  Woodward  Iron  Co.,  82  Md.  645.  33  Atl.  320;  Chapdelalne  v.  Handy,  18 
R.  I.  706,  30  AU.  342;  Texas  Land  &  Loan  Co.  v.  Winter,  03  Tex.  560,  57  S. 
W.  30;  Alliance  Trust  Co.  v.  Barrett,  6  Kan.  App.  689,  50  Pac.  465;  Brady 
V.  Washington  Ins.  Co.,  67  lU.  App.  150;  Fisk  v.  Thorp,  51  Neb.  1,  70  N.  W. 
408.  Where  a  motion  to  vacate  a  Judgment  is  filed  during  the  trial  term, 
but  no  notice  thereof  is  given  to  the  adverse  party  until  after  the  commence- 
ment of  a  subsequent  term,  it  will  be  considered  as  made  during  the  subse- 
quent term.  Morrell  Hardware  Co.  v.  Princess  Gold  Min.  Co.  (Colo.  App.) 
e:?  Pac.  807. 

(5,33) 


§   346  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.    14 

jurisdiction  will  bind  his  client.*®*  And  no  notice  to  the  adverse 
party  of  such  a  motion  is  necessary  when  he  is  present  by  his  coun- 
sel at  the  time  the  motion  is  made,*®*  or  when  he  appears  by  his 
counsel  and  takes  part  in  the  hearing  on  the  motion.***  If  the  party 
is  dead,  his  personal  representative  should  receive  the  notice.  The 
proper  practice  is  to  take  an  order  reciting  the  judgment,  the 
grounds  relied  on,  the  death  of  the  party,  and  the  qualification  of  the 
representative,  and  calling  upon  him  to  show  cause  why  the  judg- 
ment complained  of  should  not  be  set  aside,  and  this  order  should 
be  served  as  others  are.***  Generally  speaking,  all  the  parties  to  a 
judgment  should  be  made  parties  to  a  proceeding,  either  in  equity  or 
at  law,  under  the  statute,  to  annul  it.***  But  a  defendant  mort- 
gagor need  not  be  served  with  notice  of  a  motion  by  his  co-defend- 
ant, a  prior  mortgagee,  to  set  aside  a  default  judgment  in  the  fore- 
closure proceedings,  under  which  the  property  was  sold  to  the  plain- 
tiff.***  And  where  a  judgment  which  had  been  standing  for  several 
terms,  and  upon  which  an  execution  had  issued,  resulting  in  the  sale 
of  defendant's  land,  had  been  set  aside  on  motion  of  the  defend- 
ant, it  was  held  that  no  notice  of  a  motion  on  the  part  of  the  plain- 
tiff to  revoke  the  order  setting  the  judgment  aside,  and  to  reinstate 
the  same  and  the  execution  on  the  docket,  was  necessary.**' 

«»i  Phelps  V.  Heaton.  70  Minn.  476,  82  N.  W.  090;  Jordan  v.  TarT»,  92 
Ga.  379,  17  S.  E.  351;  Pick  v.  Glickman,  54  111.  App.  G46.  Where  an  attor- 
ney has  appeared  for  a  party  In  an  action,  and  has  prosecuted  it  to  judgment, 
he  remains  attorney  for  the  party  until  he  has  secured  a  Judgment  not  liable 
to  vacation  for  any  cause  provided  by  statute  or  established  practice,  and 
hence  a  motion  made  by  a  defendant  to  vacate  a  judgment,  on  the  ground 
that  no  summons  had  been  served  on  him,  or  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  maj 
properly  be  served  on  the  attorney  of  record  for  the  plaintiff.  Sturgias  v. 
Dart,  23  Wash.  244,  62  Pac.  8o8;  Beach  v.  Beach,  6  Dak.  371.  43  N.  W.  YOl; 
Yorke  v.  Yorke,  3  N.  D.  343,  55  N.  W.  1095. 

3  92  Hill  V.  Crump,  24  Ind.  201;  Jensen  v.  Barbour.  12  Mont.  566,  31  Pae. 
102. 

8»3  Worth  V.  Wetmore.  87  Iowa.  62.  54  N.  W.  56;   Acock  ▼.  Ilalsey.  90 
215,  27  Pac.  103;  Jennings  v.  Pearce.  101  Ala.  438,  14  South.  319. 

894  Grier  v.  Jones,  54  G a.  154. 

896  Day  V.  Goodwin,  lOi  Iowa,  374,  73  N.  W.  864,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  403. 

896  Schart  v.  Schart,  116  Oal.  01,  47  Pac.  027. 

897  porry  v.  Pearce.  68  N.  C.  367. 

(5:]4) 


_  ^ 

Cti,  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENINO  JUDGMENTS.  §  346a 


S  340a.    Beqnialtes  of  Petitioii  or  MoTing  Papevi. 

Where  the  statute  authorizes  the  vacation  of  judgments  for  cer- 
tain causes  "on  complaint  or  motion  filed  within  two  years,"  a  writ- 
ten complaint  or  motion  must  be  filed,  in  order  to  obtain  the  relief 
desired.**'  The  papers  must  show  the  existence  of  one  of  the  stat- 
utory causes  for  setting  aside  the  judgment,  or  must  aver  such  facts 
as  will  be  sufficient  to  warrant  the  court,  in  the  exercise  of  its  gen- 
eral jurisdiction,  in  taking  such-  action.*®*  It  is  not  sufficient  to  al- 
lege, in  the  words  of  the  statute,  that  the  applicant  was  prevented 
from  defending  the  suit  by  "unavoidable  casualty  or  misfortune,"  or 
that  the  judgment  was  taken  against  him  through  his  "inadvertence" 
or  "excusable  neglect;"  but  the  facts  constituting  the  casualty  or 
misfortune,  or  relied  on  as  excusing  the  inadvertence  or  neglect, 
must  be  fully  set  forth.**®  Furthermore,  the  applicant  must  show 
that  he  has  a  valid  and  meritorious  defense  to  the  action;  and  this 
must  be  made  to  appear,  not  by  a  mere  averment  that  he  has  such  a 
defense,  but  by  setting  forth  fully  the  facts  which  constitute  the  pro- 
posed defense.***     And  in  some  of  the  states,  it  is  provided  by  stat- 

soa  Oh!o  Falls  Car  Go.  v.  Sweet  &  Clark  Co.,  7  Ind.  App.  163,  34  N.  E.  533. 

8»»  Klrkham  v.  Gibson,  52  Neb.  23,  71  N.  W.  960. 

400  Shearman  v.  Jorgensen,  106  Cal.  483,  39  Pac.  863;  American  Brewing 
Co.  T.  Jergens,  21  Ind.  App.  595,  52  N.  E.  820;  Combs  v.  Bentley  (Ky.)  41 
S.  W.  8;  Deane  y.  Loucks,  58  Hun,  555,  12  N.  Y.  Supp.  903.  A  statement 
tbat  the  defendant  had  reason  to  believe  that  his  counsel  would  attend  to 
the  case,  which  the  latter  failed  to  do,  is  fatally  defective  in  not  setting  forth 
the  facts  on  which  such  belief  was  founded.  Brown  v.  Warren,  17  Nev.  417, 
30  Pac.  1078.  Statements  that  the  court  was  not  legally  in  session  when  the 
Judgment  was  rendered,  and  had  no  authority  to  hold  a  term  at  that  time, 
are  of  conclusions  of  law,  merely,  and  unavailing.  Long  v.  Ruch,  148  Ind. 
74,  47  N.  E.  156. 

*•!  Mayer  v.  Mayer,  27  Or.  133,  39  Pac.  1002;  Young  v.  Oonklin,  3  Misc. 
Bep.  122,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  993;  Ellis  v.  Bonner,  7  Tex.  Civ.  App.  539,  27  S.  W. 
687;  Provlns  v.  Lovl,  6  Okl.  94,  50  Pac.  81;  State  v.  Lockhart,  18  Wash.  531, 
52  Pac.  315;  Sanford  v.  Weeks.  50  Kan.  339,  31  Pac.  1088;  Brewster  v. 
Boyle,  64  Hun.  636,  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  146;  Hughes  v.  Ilousel.  33  Neb.  703,  50 
N.  W.  1127;  Keator  v.  Case  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  31  S.  W.  1099.  An  affidavit 
which  merely  states  that  the  defense  "Is  purely  one  of  law,*'  without  setting 
oat  the  facts,  is  not  sufficient.  Brewer  &  Hoffman  Brewing  Co.  v.  Lonergan, 
63  111.  App.  28.  A  judgment  entered  on  a  Judgment  note  will  not  be  opened 
on  a  petition  by  defendant  alleging  that,  if  he  signed  the  note.  It  was  when 

(535) 


§   34t3a  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  14 

ute  that  a  judgment  shall  not  be  vacated  until  it  is  adjudged  that 
there  is  a  valid  defense  to  the  action,  or,  if  the  plaintiff  seeks  its  vaca- 
tion, that  there  is  a  valid  cause  of  action.*®*  Where  this  provision 
is  in  force,  it  is  error  for  the  court  to  render  a  judgment  of  vaca- 
tion before  it  has  adjudged  that  there  is  a  valid  defense.*®*  Again, 
in  some  states,  it  is  required  that  the  applicant  for  the  vacation  of 
a  judgment  shall  file  with  his  moving  papers  a  copy  of  the  answer 
which  he  proposes  to  put  in,  in  case  the  judgment  is  opened;  and 
it  is  held  that  this  provision  is  mandatory,  and  that  such  an  appli- 
cation should  by  no  means  be  granted  unless  the  statute  is  complied 
with  in  this  particular.*®*  In  New  York,  however,  it  has  been  said 
that  where  the  moving  papers  show  the  nature  of  the  defense  and 
the  good  faith  of  the  applicant,  it  is  not  absolutely  necessary  to  serve 
the  proposed  answer  with  the  motion.*®' 

In  general,  it  may  be  stated  that  while  good  practice  requires  a 
strict  compliance  with  the  statutes  in  these  applications,  mere  irreg- 
ularities in  the  method  of  obtaining  the  vacation  of  a  judgment, — ^as 
where  the  showing  in  support  of  the  motion,  and  the  motion  itself, 

he  was  drunk,  the  indebtedness  not  being  denied.  Ford  v.  Tissue,  8  Kulp 
(Pa.)  428. 

*o2  Oode  Neb.  §  606;  Miller's  Code  Iowa,  §  3159. 

*o8  Bond  V.  Wyeoflf.  42  Neb.  214,  60  N.  W.  5G4;  Western  Aasur.  Co.  t. 
Klein.  48  Neb.  904,  07  N.  W.  873;  Follett  v.  Alexander,  58  Ohio  St  202,  50 
N.  B.  720.    Compare  State  v.  Puncan,  37  Neb.  631,  56  N.  W.  214. 

«04  Richardson  v.  Sun  Printing  &  Publishing  Ass'n,  20  App.  Div.  329.  46  N. 
y.  Supp.  814;  Worth  v.  Wetmore,  87  Iowa,  62.  54  N.  W.  56;  McBrien  t. 
Riley,  38  Neb.  561.  57  N.  W.  385;  Lawler  v.  Bashford-Burmister  Co.  (Arlx.) 
46  Pac.  72.  There  is  no  difference  between  legal  and  equitable  actions  in 
respect  to  this  requirement  of  the  statute.  Superior  Consol.  Land  Co.  v. 
Dunphy,  03  Wis.  188,  67  N.  W.  428.  A  demurrer  does  not  satisfy  a  rule  re- 
quiring the  applicant  to  file  a  copy  of  his  proposed  "answer."  Bagley  v. 
Cohen,  121  Cai.  60i,  53  Pac.  1117.  But  he  is  not  precluded  from  afterwards 
obtaining  leave  of  court  to  file  an  additional  paragraph  to  his  answer.  Bry- 
ant y.  Richardson,  126  Ind.  r45,  25  N.  E.  807.  In  Washington,  the  party  need 
not  tender  his  answer  until  after  the  determination  of  the  merits  of  his  appli- 
cation. Wheeler  v.  Moore,  10  Wash.  309,  38  Pac.  1053.  And  in  Indiana,  the 
rule  is  complied  with  by  filing  the  answer  at  the  time  of  entry  of  the  order 
opening  the  Judgment.    Brj'ant  v.  Richardson,  126  Ind.  145.  25  N.  E.  8UT. 

408  Carey  v.  Browne,  67  Hun,  516,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  521.  And  see  Worth  t. 
Wetmore.  87  Iowa.  62.  54  N.  W.  56.  But  compare  Richardson  t.  Sun  Print- 
ing &  Publishing  Ass*n,  20  App.  Div.  329,  46  N.  Y.  Supp.  814. 

(536) 


(%.  14)  YACATINO  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  347 

are  not  strictly  in  conformity  with  the  statute, — will  not  defeat  the 
order  vacating  the  judgment.**^*  The  motion  should  not  be  denied 
upon  the  particular  grounds  assigned  thereby,  and  the  mover  left 
to  make  another  motion  for  the  same  purpose,  simply  assigning  in 
its  support  a  ground  not  before  specified,  but  which  plainly  appears 
in  the  record/®^  If  the  judgment  has  been  affirmed  on  appeal,  it 
will  not  be  vacated  on  the  application  of  the  losing  party,  based  on 
the  same  grounds  which  he  urged  in  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  in  the 
original  suit.**^®  If  the  motion  is  denied,  the  court  should  find  the 
facts  on  which  it  bases  its  conclusion  that  no  just  and  reasonable 
cause  has  been  shown  for  the  setting  aside  of  the  judgment.*®* 

f  347.    AAdATlt'  of  Merits. 

In  order  to  justify  the  opening  or  vacation  of  a  judgment,  it  is  not 
sufficient  to  show  that  the  applicant  did  not  have  an  opportunity  to 
be  heard  in  the  case ;  but  there  must  also  be  a  prima  facie  showing 
that,  if  he  had  presented  his  defense,  it  would  have  prevailed,  so  that 
the  judgment,  as  it  stands,  works  injustice.  In  addition,  therefore, 
to  setting  forth  some  one  of  the  statutory  grounds  for  setting  aside 
a  judgment,  and  the  nature  of  the  cause  which  prevented  a  defense 
being  made,  or  the  party's  excuse  for  not  defending,  as  stated  in  the 
preceding  section,  the  application  must  be  supported  by  an  affidavit 
alleging  a  good  and  meritorious  defense  to  the  action  on  the  merits, 
called  an  ''affidavit  of  merits."  This  is  imperatively  required  under 
the  statutes  authorizing  the  vacation  of  judgments  for  specified 
causes.**®    And  independently  of  statutes,  it  has  always  been  the 

406  Boston  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Organ,  53  Kan.  386,  36  Pac.  733;  Wilson 
&  Toms  Inv.  Oo.  v.  HiUyer,  .50  Kan.  446,  31  Pac.  10G4;  Hoag  v.  Old  People's 
Mat.  Ben.  Soc.,  1  Ind.  App.  28,  27  N.  E.  438. 

401  Skinner  v.  Terry.  107  N.  C.  103,  12  S.  E.  118. 

408  Friedman  v.  Mauley,  21  Waah,  675,  59  Pac.  490. 

*o9  Bacon  v.  Johnson,  110  N.  C.  114,  14  S.  E.  508. 

410  Van  Horne  v.  Montgomery,  5  How.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  238;  Hunt  v.  Wallls, 
6  Paige  (N.  Y.)  371;  Gold  v.  Hutchinson,  26  Misc.  Rep.  1.  5o  N.  Y.  Supp.  575; 
Cross  T.  Birch,  27  Misc.  Rep.  295,  58  N.  Y.  Supp.  438;  OahiU  v.  Lilienthal, 
:M)  Misc.  Rep.  429,  62  X.  Y.  Supp.  524;  Thomall  v.  Turner,  23  Misc.  Rep.  363, 
Ol  N.  Y.  Supp.  214;  Draper  v.  Bishop,  4  R.  I.  489;  Richardson  v.  Finney,  6 
Dana  (Ky.)  319;  Grundy  v.  Kelley  (Ky.)  41  S.  W.  20;  Foster  v.  Martin,  20 
Tex.  118;    Coolr  v.  PhillJp«.  18  Tex.  31;   Watson  v.  Newsham,  17  Tex.  437; 

(537). 


§   847  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNT8.  (Ch.   14 

practice  of  our  courts,  from  the  very  earliest  times,  on  an  application 
to  open  or  set  aside  a  judgment,  to  require  some  sort  of  showing,  by 
affidavit  or  otherwise,  that  the  judgment  is  unjust  as  it  stands  and 
prejudicial  to  the  party  complaining,  and  that  he  has  a  meritorious 
defense.**^  It  may  therefore  be  regarded  as  a  universal  requirement. 
But  the  rule  is  subject  to  a  few  well-defined  exceptions  in  peculiar 
cases.*^-  Thus  a  judgment  by  default,  entered  before  the  court  has 
acquired  jurisdiction  in  the  case,  may  be  set  aside  without  an  affidavit 
of  merits.*'*  So  the  rule  does  not  apply  where  it  was  grossly  irreg- 
ular for  the  default  to  have  been  entered;  ***  or  where  the  defendant 
complains  of  irregularity  amounting  to  denial  of  his  substantial 
rights;***  or  where  the  judgment  is  alleged  to  have  been  procured 
by  fraud.***  But  in  all  cases  wheYe  the  application  is  not  based  upon 
want  of  jurisdiction  or  irregularity,  but  upon  something  presented  as 
an  excuse  by  the  defendant,  he  must  make  an  aHidavit  of  merits. 
And  nothing  else  can  take  its  place  and  serve  its  purpose.  An  an- 
swer to  the  complaint,  already  on  file  or  which  the  defendant  pro- 
poses to  file,  is  not  equivalent  to  an  affidavit  of  merits,  although  it 

Frost  y.  Dodge,  15  Ind.  139;  D^le  v.  Bugh,  16  Ind.  233;  Lake  v.  Jones.  49 
Ind.  297;  Grubb  v.  Crane,  5  111.  153;  Lamb  v.  Nelson,  34  Mo.  501;  Palmer 
v.  Russell,  34  Mo.  470;  Adams  v.  Hickman,  43  Mo.  168;  Butler  r.  Mitchell. 
15  Wis.  355;  People  v.  Rains,  23  Cal.  127;  Bailey  v.  Xaaffe,  29  Cal.  422; 
Reese  v.  Malioney,  21  Oal.  305;  Parrott  v.  Den,  34  Cal.  79;  Gautliler  v. 
Ruslcka,  3  N.  D.  1,  53  N.  W.  80;  Sargent  t.  Kindred.  5  N.  D.  8,  63  K.  \r. 
161;  Judd  V.  Patton,  13  S.  D.  648,  84  N.  W.  199. 
*ii  Miller  V.  Alexander,  1  N.  J.  Law,  400. 

412  In  Washington,  no  affidavit  of  merits  is  required  of  a  defendant  peti- 
tioning for  the  vacation  of  a  judgment  by  default,  and  for  leave  to  answer, 
since  the  petition  must  state  the  facts  and  be  verified.  Wheeler  v.  Moore, 
10  Wash.  309,  38  Pac.  1053.  In  Colorado,  it  is  said  that  an  affidavit  of  merits 
is  not  a  necessity  to  the  setting  aside  of  a  judgment  by  default,  though  good 
l)ractice  requires  it.  State  Board  of  Agriculture  v.  Meyers.  13  Colo.  App.  500, 
58  Pac.  879. 

413  Rice  v.  Griffith,  9  Iowa,  539;  Branstetter  v.  Rives,  34  Mo.  318;  Norton 
V.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  97  Cal.  388,  32  Pac.  452,  33  Am.  St,  Rep.  196. 
Compare  Kramer  v.  Gerlach,  28  Misc.  Rep.  525,  59  N.  Y.  Supp.  855. 

*  I*  Browning  v.  Roane,  9  Ark.  354,  50  Am.  Dec.  218. 

*iB  Walla  Walla  Printing  &  Publishing  Co.  v.  Budd.  2  Wash.  T.  336,  5  Pac. 

602. 

*i«  Crescent  Canal  Co.  v.  Montgomery,  124  Cal.  134,  50  Pac.  797;  Morris  v. 
Kahn,  31  Misc.  Rep.  25,  G2  N.  Y.  Supp.  1040. 

(538) 


Cb,  14)  YACATINO  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  347 

discloses  a  defense  apparently  complete  and  meritorious^  and  al- 
though it  is  verified.*^  ^  In  several  of  the  states  the  authorities  hold 
that  this  affidavit  is  not  sufficient  if  it  merely  states  that  the  defendant 
has  a  meritorious  defense  to  the  action;  but  it  must  contain  a  full 
statement  of  the  facts  constituting  the  proposed  defense,  in  order  that 
the  court  may  judge  whether  it  is  a  good  and  meritorious  defense  or 
not.***  And  the  facts  must  be  stated  positively  and  affirmatively; 
allegations  mereiy  on  "information  and  belief"  are  not  sufficient.*'® 
But  in  some  other  states,  it  is  a  rule  established  by  statute,  or  by 
the  settled  practice  of  the  courts,  that  the  affidavit  of  merits  is  suffi- 
cient if  it  sets  forth  that  the  defendant  has  fully  and  fairly  stated  the 
case  to  his  counsel  and  that  he  is  advised  by  him,  and  believes,  that 
he  has  a  full,  perfect,  and  meritorious  defense  to  the  action.***  But 
an  afiidavit  framed  under  this  rule  must  be  very  full  and  explicit,  and 
must  not  omit  any  of  the  particulars  just  mentioned.**^     And  it 

*iT  Mowry  v.  Hill,  11  Wis.  140;  Jones  v.  Russell,  3  How.  Prac.  324.  Com- 
pare Town  of  Omro  v.  Ward,  19  Wis.  232.  See  Spencer  v.  Thistle,  13  Neb. 
227,  13  N.  W.  214.  Where  the  court  allowed  a  party  to  file  an  intervention,. 
and  afterwards  an  answer  and  cross-complaint,  to  authorize  the  opening  of 
a  Judgment  against  such  party  an  affidavit  of  merits  Is  not  required.  Orescent 
Canal  Co.  v.  Montgomery,  124  Cal.  134,  56  Pac.  797.  An  order  opening  a  de- 
fault will  not  be  reversed  solely  because  of  the  Insufficiency  of  the  affidavit 
of  merits  or  of  the  answer,  unless  the  answer  is  such  that  it  could  be  stricken 
out  on  motion.    Forln  v.  City  of  Duluth,  66  Minn.  54,  68  N.  W.  515. 

*i8  Palmer  v.  Rogers,  70  Iowa,  3Sl,  30  N.  W.  645;  Lamb  v.  Nelson,  34  Mo. 
501;  Gastllo  v.  Bishop,  51  Mo.  162;  Foster  v.  Martin,  20  Tex.  118;  Roberts 
T.  Corby,  86  111.  182;  Frost  v.  Dodge,  15  Ind.  139;  Toledo,  W.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Gates,  32  Ind.  238;   Goldsberry  v.  Carter,  28  Ind.  59. 

419  Columbus  Mut.  Life  Ass'n  v.  Plummer,  86  111.  App.  446;  Jenkins  v. 
Gamewell  Fire  Alarm  Tel.  Co.  (Cal.>  31  Pac.  570;  Superior  Consol.  Land  Co. 
V.  Dunphy,  93  Wis.  188,  67  N.  W.  428. 

*20Burnham  v.  Smith,  11  Wis.  258;  Woodward  v.  Backus,  20  Oal.  137; 
Reldy  v.  Scott,  53  Cal.  69;  Francis  v.  Cox,  33  Cal.  323;  Klrschner  v.  Kirsch- 
ner,  7  N.  D.  291,  75  N.  W.  252. 

421  The  affidavit  must  allege  that  the  party  has  stated  the  **case"  or  "the 
facts  of  the  case"  to  his  counsel;  if  it  merely  shows  that  he  has  stated  the 
•*faet8  of  his  defense"  to  his  counsel  it  is  not  sufficient.  Morgan  v.  McDon- 
ald, 70  Cal.  32,  11  Pac.  350;  Burnham  v.  Smith.  11  Wis.  258.  An  affidavit 
that  deponent  is  advised  by  his  counsel  that  he  has  a  good  and  sufficient 
defense,  but  without  stating  that  he  has  fulb'  and  fairly  stated  the  case  to 
Ills  counsel,  will  not  answer.  Gold  v.  Hutchinson,  26  Misc.  Rep.  1,  55  N.  Y. 
Supp.  575.    And  see  Day  v.  Mertlock,  87  Wis.  577,  58  N.  W.  1087. 

(530) 


§  348  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  14 

seems  that  this  manner  of  averring  merits  will  not  answer  at  all  in 
chancery.  Such  an  affidavit  is  not  sufficient  to  authorize  a  court  of 
equity  to  set  aside  a  re^^ilar  default  or  decree,  but  the  affidavit  should 
state  the  substance  of  the  defense,  or  it  should  be  stated  under  oath 
in  some  form,  so  that  the  court  may  judge  whether  it  is  meritori- 
ous.*-- The  affidavit  should  be  made  by  the  applicant  himself,  unless 
good  reasons  exist  for  having  it  made  by  another  person.*-'  It  may 
be  made  by  an  attorney  if  he  has  personal  knowledge  of  the  facts  to 
be  sworn  to  in  it.***  But  the  aEidavit  of  an  attorney,  that  from  his 
client's  statement  of  the  case  to  him  he  beUeves  that  the  client  has  a 
good  and  substantial  defense  upon  the  merits,  is  not  sufficient.*** 
Nor  is  an  affidavit  which  states  that  from  an  examination  of  the  de- 
fendant's case,  so  far  as  he  has  made  such  examination,  he  verily  be- 
lieves that  it  is  better  than  the  plaintiff's.*'*  It  is  also  considered 
necessary,  when  the  affidavit  is  made  by  the  defendant's  attorney,  to 
set  forth  some  good  and  sufficient  reason  why  the  party  himself  does 
not  make  it.**'  An  affidavit  of  an  attorney,  upon  information  and 
belief,  as  to  a  defense  on  the  merits,  but  containing  no  statement  of 
the  facts  on  which  the  .same  is  based,  and  alleging  as  an  excuse  an 
unsuccessful  search  for  the  papers  by  a  third  person,  who  makes  no 
affidavit  to  that  effect,  is  insufficient.*'* 

S  348.    Meiitoiiovfl  Defence  mvst  lie  sliown. 

The  defense,  it  is  said,  must  be  meritorious.  By  this  we  mean  that 
it  must  be  substantial  and  not  merely  technical,  fair  and  honest  and 
not  unconscionable.*'*     It  is  considered  in  Pennsylvania  that  an  ap- 

4«t  Goodhue  v.  Churchman.  1  Barb.  Ch.  596;  Winship  v.  Jewett  W.  1T3; 
McGaffigan  v.  Jenkins,  1  Barb.  31. 

428  Bailey  v.  Taaffe,  29  Cal.  422. 

*2*  Frankoviz  v.  Smith,  35  Minn.  278,  28  N.  V^'.  508;  Horton  ▼.  New  Pass 
Gold  &  Silver  Min.  Co.,  21  Xev.  184,  27  Pac.  376;  Pettigrew  v.  City  of  Sioux 
Falls,  5  S.  D.  646,  60  N.  W.  27;  WiU  v.  Lytle  Creek  Water  Co^  100  CaL 
:U4»  34  Pac.  830. 

4  55  Stllson  V.  Rankin,  40  Wis.  527. 

4  2«  Bailey  v.  Taaffe,  29  Cal.  422. 

42  7  Davis  V.  Solomon.  28  Civ.  Proc.  R.  420,  56  N.  Y.  Supp.  80;  People's  Ice 
Co.  V.  Schlenker,  50  Minn.  1,  52  N.  W.  219. 

*««  HitchtH)ck  V.  Ilerzer,  90  111.  543. 

♦!•  Welton  v.  Littlejohn,  103  Pa,  205,  29  Atl.  871;    Daly  v.  Thomii*>n,  5 

(540) 


Ch.   14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §    348 

plication  to  open  a  judgment  is  in  effect  a  demand  for  equitable  relief, 
and  the  applicant  must  make  out  a  case  which  would  justify  a  chan- 
cellor in  entering  a  decree.*'®  Where  the  complaint,  in  an  action  to 
set  aside  a  judgment,  does  not  attempt  to  show  that  the  plaintiff  had 
or  has  any  valid  defense  to  the  original  action,  a  demurrer  to  the 
answer,  whether  good  or  bad,  is  properly  overruled.  "A  bad  answer 
is  sufScient  for  a  bad  complaint."  *'^  In  another  case,  where  it  was 
proposed  to  set  aside  a  default  and  reinstate  the  case  that  the  defend- 
ant might  plead  to  the  merits,  and  it  appeared  that  substantially  the 
same  matters  proposed  to  be  pleaded  had  been  determined  against 
the  defendant  in  a  former  litigation,  it  was  held  that  the  motion  was 
properly  denied.**'  But  where  a  default  has  been  taken  against  a 
person  upon  whom  there  was  no  service  of  process,  and  over  whom 
the  court  acquired  no  jurisdiction,  he  is  entitled  to  have  the  judgment 
annulled  without  showing  a  meritorious  defense  to  the  action.****  A 
defendant  who  seeks  to  open  a  judgment  which  he  has  suffered  vol- 
untarily and  under  the  advice  of  counsel,  must  show  the  court  specifi- 
cally in  what  his  defense  consists;   general  allegations  will  not  suf- 

Pa.  Dist.  B.  749;  Jospe  v.  Lighte,  22  Misc.  Rep.  146,  48  N.  T.  Supp.  645; 
Phillips  Y.  Equitable  Life  Assur.  Soc.,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  522;  Jeffries  v.  Aaron, 
120  N.  C.  167,  26  S.  E.  696;  Le  Due  v.  Slocomb.  124  N.  0.  347,  32  S.  B.  726; 
Reab  v.  Sherman,  93  Ga.  792,  20  S.  E.  642;  Pacific  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Go.  v.  Wil- 
liams, 79  Tex.  633,  15  S.  W.  478;  Durham  t.  Moore,  48  Kan.  135,  29  Pac. 
472;  Becker  v.  Huthsteiner,  142  Ind.  99,  41  N.  B.  323;  West  v.  MiUer.  125 
Ind.  70,  25  N.  E.  143;  Davis  v.  Steuben  School  Tp.,  19  Ind.  App.  694,  50  N. 
EL  1;  Culver  v.  Brinkerhoff,  76  Hi.  App.  679;  Mann  v.  Warde,  64  111.  App. 
108;  Kime  y.  Fenner,  54  Neb.  476,  74  N.  W.  869;  Gilbert  v.  ^klarrow,  54  Neb. 
77.  74  N.  W.  420;  Clark  v.  Charles,  55  Neb.  202,  75  N.  W.  563;  Pettigrew  v. 
City  of  Sioux  Falls.  5  S.  D.  640,  60  N.  W.  27;  Tacoma  Lumber  &  Manuf'g 
Co.  V.  Wolff,  7  Wash.  478,  35  Pac.  115;  Western  Security  Co.  v.  Lafleur,  17 
Wash.  406,  49  Pac.  1061;  White  v.  Hinton,  3  Wyo.  753,  30  Pac.  953,  17  L.  R. 
A.  06.  The  rule  is  sometimes  stated  in  this  form;  that  a  Judgment  will  not 
be  set  aside  where,  on  a  ne^*  trial,  the  judgment  must  be  the  same.  Rich- 
ardson Drug  Oo.  V.  Dunagan,  8  Colo.  App.  308,  46  Pac.  227;  Brooks  v.  John- 
son, 122  Cal.  569,  55  Pac.  423. 

*»o  Knarr  v.  Elgren  (Pa.)  9  Atl.  875. 

431  Rupert  v.  Martz,  116  Ind.  72,  18  N.  E.  381. 

*•«  Storey  v.  Weaver,  66  Ga.  296. 

*»»  Dobbins  v.  McNamara,  113  Ind.  54,  14  N.  E.  887,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  626; 
Roberts  v.  Pawley,  50  S.  C.  491,  27  S.  E.  913;  Taylor  v.  Coughlan,  73  111.  App. 
378. 

(541) 


§   349  LAW  OF  JUDQMSNTS.  (Ch.  14 

fice.***  But  on  a  motion  to  open  a  default  the  court  will  not  deter- 
mine absolutely  whether  the  defense  interposed  will  be  sufficient  at 
the  trial,  but  merely  see  that  it  is  not  frivolous.  If  set  up  in  good 
faith,  and  with  a  sufficient  excuse  for  the  party's  negligence  in  not 
having  presented  it  at  the  proper  time,  he  will  be  let  in  to  answer  as 
of  course.*** 

S  349.    TeoluUeal  or  UaeoBsoiomable  Defease  mot  SvAeteat. 


The  privilege  of  vacating  judgments  is  to  be  used  only  in  the  fur- 
therance of  justice,  and  a  judgment  should  not  be  set  aside  unless  it 
is  unjust  as  it  stands.  Hence,  if  it  is  regular  on  its  face,  it  will 
never  be  opened  up  merely  for  the  purpose  of  letting  in  an  uncon- 
scionable, dishonest,  or  purely  technical  defense.*'*  That  usury  is  to 
be  regarded  as  a  defense  of  this  character  is  settled  beyond  question. 
The  court  will  not  open  a  judgment  merely  to  allow  the  plea  of  usury 
to  be  set  up,  or,  if  it  opens  the  judgment  on  other  grounds,  may  for- 
bid the  defendant  to  interpose  that  defense.*'^  In  regard  to  a  plea  of 
the  statute  of  limitations,  there  is  room  for  more  doubt.  Some  of 
the  cases  hold  that  such  defense  is  not  sufficient  to  justify  the  court 

4S4  EUls  V.  Jones,  6  How.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  296. 

436  Excise  ComYs  v.  HoUister,  2  Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  588.  Before  the  court  will 
set  aside  a  Judgment  on  a  money  Judgment  it  must  be  shown  that  the  peti- 
tioner was  not  Indebted  to  the  Judgment  plaintiff:  the  defense  of  nol  iM, 
record  is  not  sufficient  Banic  of  Stratton  t.  Dixon,  105  Iowa,  148,  74  N.  W. 
019. 

43«  Parrott  v.  Den,  34  Cal.  79:  Thatcher  v.  Haun.  12  Iowa,  303:  Niagara 
Ins.  Co.  V.  Rodecker,  47  Iowa,  102;  Bank  of  Statesville  v.  Foote,  77  N.  C.  131; 
Mulhollnn  v.  Scoggin,  8  Neb.  202:  Anderson  v.  Beebe,  22  Kan.  768;  Jorgen- 
sen  y.  Griffin.  14  Minn.  464  (Gil.  34($);  Pennington^s  Adm*x  t.  Gibson.  6  Ark. 
447;  Hazelrigg  v.  Wainwright,  17  Ind.  215;  Marsh  v.  Lasher,  13  X.  J.  E«i. 
253:  AiidulKin  v.  Excelsior  Ins.  Co.,  10  Abb.  Prac.  (S.  Y.)  64;  Bard  v.  Fort, 
3  Barb.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  632;  Gay  v.  Gay.  10  Paige  (X.  Y.)  374;  Gourkiy  t.  Hat- 
ton.  10  Weud.  (N.  Y.)  5U5:  St  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Blackmar.  44  Minn.  r»l4. 
47  N.  W.  172;  Wyche  v.  Uoss,  119  X.  C.  174,  25  S.  E.  878;  Herald  v.  HarpU 
(Ky.)  54  S.  W.  958.  Compare  Benedict  v.  Arnoux,  85  Hun.  283,  32  X.  Y. 
Supp.  9CK). 

4«7  Farish  v.  Corlies,  1  Daly  (X.  Y.)  274:  Lovett  v.  Cowman,  6  HUl  (X.  Y.» 
226;  Candler  v.  Pettit  1  Paige  (X.  Y.>  427;  Marsh  t.  lusher.  13  X.  J.  Eq.  2.%:?: 
Morris  v.  Slatery,  <l  Abb.  Prac.  (X.  Y.)  74:   Grant  v.  McCaughin.  4  How.  Pnir. 
(X.   Y.)  JUl:    Quincy  v.  Foot  1  Rirb.  Ch.   (X.  Y.)  49i5;    Hazelrigg  T.  Wain 
Wright  17  Ind.  215. 
(542) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  349 

in  opening  the  judgment,  at  least  if  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  the 
debt  is  not  still  morally  and  honestly  due/'®  Indulgence,  it  is  said, 
should  not  be  granted  for  the  defendant's  laches  merely  to  enable' 
him  to  deny  the  like  indulgence  to  the  laches  of  his  adversary.  In 
Ohio  the  decisions  are  that  this  plea  is  one  not  to  be  favored,  and 
where  an  issue  has  been  made  up,  or  the  defendant  is  in  default,  he 
will  not  be  allowed  to  put  in  the  plea  of  the  statute,  unless  under 
peculiar  circumstances.***  But  on  the  other  hand,  in  some  states  it 
is  held  that  the  statute  of  limitations  is  a  good  and  meritorious  plea, 
that  it  is  sufficient  ground  for  opening  the  judgment,  and  that  if  the 
trial  court  refuses  to  set  aside  the  judgment  unless  the  defendant 
will  agree  to  waive  this  defense,  it  is  a  manifest  abuse  of  discretion.**^ 
A  set-oflF  may  perhaps  be  considered,  in  some  instances,  as  a  meri- 
torious defense  within  this  rule,  but  a  judgment  should  not  be  opened 
to  the  prejudice  of  the  plaintiff  merely  to  enable  the  defendant  to 
interpose  a  counter-claim  which  he  may  enforce  by  action,  where 
there  is  no  doubt  as  to  the  plaintiff's  responsibility.***  So  again,  the 
court  will  not  open  up  a  default  to  permit  a  defense  of  the  statute  of 
frauds  to  be  made  either  by  demurrer  or  plea,  unless  under  special 
and  peculiar  circumstances.**^  In  equity,  a  decree  fairly  and  reg- 
ularly obtained  by  default,  for  want  of  an  answer,  will  not  be  set 
aside  to  let  in  a  defense  founded  on  a  fraudulent  speculation  unde- 
serving of  the  favor  of  the  court.***  A  judgment  should  not  be  open- 
ed where  the  only  defense  set  up  is  a  technical  objection  to  the 
plaintiff's  capacity  to  sue,  such  objection  not  appearing  on  the  face 

*»»  Pennington's  Adm'x  v.  Gibson,  6  Ark.  447;  Hawes  v.  Hoyt,  11  How. 
Prac.  (N.  Y.)  454;  Haines  v.  Lytle,  4  West.  Law  J.  1;  Douglas  v.  Douglas, 
3  Bdw.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  390;  Meiners  v.  Frederick  Miller  Brewing  Co.,  78  Wis. 
364,  47  N.  W.  430,  10  L.  B.  A.  58C. 

4s»  Sheets  v.  Baldwin's  Adm'rs,  12  Ohio,  120;  Newsom's  Adm'r  v.  Ran, 
18  Ohio,  240. 

4*0  ElUnger's  Appeal,  114  Pa.  505,  7  Atl.  180;  Mitchell  v.  CampbeU,  14  Or. 
454,  13  Pae.  190;  Garvie  v.  Greene,  9  S.  D.  608,  70  N.  W.  847.  See,  also,  Goui- 
lay  V.  Hutton,  10  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  595. 

*4i  Leahey  v.  Kingon,  22  How.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  209;  Croop  v.  Dodson,  7  Kulp 
(Pa.)  13;  Cresswell  v.  White,  3  Ind.  App.  30(5,  29  N.  E.  612;  Boas  v.  Heffron, 
40  ni.  App.  652. 

44*  McCulloch  V.  Tapp,  4  West.  Law  Month.  575. 

44»  Parker  v.  Grant,  1  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  630. 

(543) 


§   350  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   14 

of  the  complaint.***     So  where  the  judgment  was  entered  on  a  me- 
chanic's lien,  and  the  defense  offered  is  that  the  lien  was  defective 
as  being  for  a  lump  sum,  instead  of  setting  out  the  articles  furnish- 
ed.**'*    Where  municipal  officers  are  sued  on  a  warrant  drawn  by 
them,  a  judgment  by  confession  will  not  be  struck  off  at  the  suit 
of  a  tax  payer  on  the  mere  ground  that  the  action  should  have  been 
on  the  original  debt,  instead  of  on  the  warrant,  where  it  is  not  denied 
that,  the  debt  was  just.***    Again,  a  judgment  by  default  on  a  policy 
of  insurance  should  not  be  set  aside  where  the  defense  is  a  forfei- 
ture of  the  policy,  unless  it  is  shown  that  the  alleged  forfeiture  has 
not  in  any  way  been  waived,  and  that,  on  a  trial,  the  result  would 
probably  be  different.**^     But  on  the  other  hand,  a  plea  of  a  dis- 
charge in  bankruptcy  or  insolvency  is  not  technical,  but  goes  to  the 
merits  as  a  plea  in  bar.***     And  the  same  is  true  of  a  plea  of  res 
judicata.    To  prohibit  the  defendant  from  pleading  a  former  judg- 
ment in  bar  of  the  present  action,  as  a  condition  to  lifting  a  default 
against  him,  is  error.***     And  so,  where  the  action  is  on  a  note,  the 
defense  that  it  was  given  for  money  lost  in  gaming  is  a  defense  to  the 
merits,  and  should  be  allowed.**^®     In  California,  it  is  said  that  the 
statement  that  the  defense  appears  on  the  face  of  the  complaint  shows 
it  to  be  of  a  technical  character  merely  and  therefore  insufficient,*'* 

S  350.    Openins  Judgment  to  admit  Defeuo. 

In  Pennsylvania,  the  usual  and  favorite  practice,  upon  a  proper 
and  timely  application  for  relief  against  a  judgment  by  confession  or 
default,  is  to  open  the  judgment,  but  without  vacating  it  and  without 
impairing  its  lien,  and  let  the  defendant  in  to  a  defense  on  the  raer- 

***  Abram  Fiencli  Co.  v.  Marx»  8  Misc.  Rep.  490.  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  749. 

44B  Caldwell  v.  Carter,  153  Pa.  310.  25  Atl.  831. 

440  Maneval  v.  Jackson  Tp.,  141  Pa.  426.  21  AU.  G72.  28  Wkly.  Notea  Oi#. 

130. 

4*7  Union  Cent.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lipscomb  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S,  W.  307. 

448  Kalin  V.  Casper,  51  App.  Dlv.  540,  64  X.  Y.  Supp.  838;  Tuttle  t.  Scott. 
119  Cal.  586.  51  Pac.  849. 

449  Audubon  v.  Excelsior  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  10  Abb.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  C4. 

460  Kuckman  v.  Pitcher,  1  N.  Y.  392;  Bank  of  Kinderbook  v.  Gifford,  40 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  659;  Grant  v.  McCaughin,  4  How.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  216. 

461  People  V.  Rains,  23  JDal.  127. 

(544) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPBNINQ  JUDGMENTS.  §  350 

its.***  It  is  in  the  light  of  this  statement  that  we  are  to  understand 
the  remark  that  to  open  a  judgment  is  not  to  set  it  aside,  and  that 
when  it  is  closed  by  the  action  of  the  court  it  takes  its  place  as  if  it 
had  never  been  disturbed.***  Thus,  for  example,  a  judgment  entered 
on  a  warrant  of  attorney  should  be  opened  to  let  the  defendant  plead 
his  discharge  in  bankruptcy,  when  he  acts  immediately  upon  notice.*** 
On  opening  a  judgment,  in  accordance  with  this  practice,  the  judg- 
ment itself  may  be  regarded  as  standing  in  the  place  of  a  declaration, 
and  the  entry  of  a  non  pros,  for  want  of  a  declaration  is  irregular.*** 
But  the  opening  of  the  judgment  leaves  the  burden  and  the  mode 
of  proof  exactly  the  same  as  if  the  judgment  had  never  been  entered. 
Hence  if  the  defendant  pleads  non  est  factum  as  to  the  instrument 
on  which  it  was  founded,  the  record  of  the  judgment  is  not  even 
prima  facie  evidence  for  the  plaintiff.***  When  a  judgment  is  thus 
opened,  the  defenses  which  may  be  set  up  are  limited.  For  instance, 
it  does  not  become  subject  to  set-off  generally.  If  the  defendant  has 
a  valid  claim  against  the  plaintiff  exceeding  the  amount  of  the  judg- 
ment, he  cannot  recover  a  verdict  for  the  excess.  He  may  be  per- 
mitted to  attack  the  validity  of  the  claim  on  which  the  judgment  is 
founded,  or  the  good  faith  of  the  transaction  connected  with  the 
consideration,  or  to  show  subsequent  payment  of  the  debt  or  equita- 
ble discharge  therefrom.  But  in  some  manner,  either  in  law  or  eq- 
uity, the  subject-matter  of  defense  must  have  attached  to  the  judg- 
ment or  the  consideration  on  which  it  rests.**^  The  defendant  can 
urge  defenses  existing  at  the  time  of  the  rendition  of  the  judgment, 
but  not  those  accruing  subsequently.***  If  a  judgment  be  opened 
upon  an  affidavit  of  defense,  and  the  defendant  let  in  to  a  defense 
upon  the  merits,  he  will  not,  upon  the  trial,  be  permitted  to  take 
advantage  of  a  technical  exception  to  the  form  of  action.***  And, 
generally,  the  rules  stated  in  the  preceding  section  will  apply  to  this 

*»2  Oochran  v.  Eldridge,  49  Pa.  365. 

*»»  Glonlnger  v.  Hazard.  4  Phlla.  (Pa.)  354. 

4B4  Wise'8  Appeal,  09  Pa.  193;  Adam's  Appeal,  101  Pa.  471. 

4»6  Bush  V.  Monteith,  2  Wkly.  Notes  Cas.  (Pa.)  112. 

*»•  West  V.  Irwin.  74  Pa.  258;   Collins  v.  Freas,  77  Pa.  493. 

457  Beaty  v.  Bordwell,  91  Pa.  4.38. 

458  Curtis  V.  SIoBson,  6  Pa.  265. 

459  Ekel  V.  Snevily.  3  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  272,  88  Am.  Dec.  76& 

1  LAW  JUDG.~35  (545) 


§351  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   14 

manner  of  practice.  So  where  a  judgment  on  a  note  is  opened,  with 
leave  to  the  defendant  to  defend  on  matters  stated  in  his  petition,  he 
cannot  set  up  a  breach  of  contract  not  alleged  in  the  petition.^** 

S  351.    Eridemee. 

The  party  who  seeks  the  opening  or  vacation  of  a  judgment  must 
sustain  the  burden  of  proof,  and  must  establish  his  right  to  the  re- 
lief asked  by  clear  and  satisfactory  evidence.***  Where  the  ground 
alleged  is  irregularity  or  want  of  jurisdiction,  there  are  some  author- 
ities showing  a  reluctance  to  permit  contradiction  of  the  record.*** 
But  the  rule  obtaining  in  the  majority  of  the  states  is  that  the  re- 
citals of  the  recorcf  (as,  for  instance,  a  recital  that  the  defendant  was 
duly  served  with  process)  are  presumed  to  be  correct  and  will  prevail 
in  the  absence  of  sufficient  countervailing  evidence;  but  that  the 
defendant  may  contradict  and  overthow  such  recitals,  the  only  ques- 
tion being  upon  the  strength  and  clearness  of  his  evidence.***  Of 
course  it  is  equally  open  to  the  adverse  party  to  present  affidavits 
sustaining  the  record  and  showing  jurisdiction,  and  the  issue  will 
then  be  determined  upon  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence.***  Where 
it  is  sought  to  have  a  judgment  or  decree  set  aside  on  the  ground  of 
fraud  in  procuring  it,  the  evidence  must  be  clear  and  cogent,  so  as 
to  convince  the  court  that  the  facts  alleged  to  constitute  the  fraud 
existed,  and  were  operative  in  procuring  the  decree.***    If  the  evi- 

4«o  Marsh  t.  Nordyke  &  Marmon  Co.  (Pa.)  15  Atl.  875. 

*«i  Smith  V.  Black,  51  Md.  247. 

««2  PuUiam  v.  DiUard,  71  Ga.  598;  Stony  Island  Hotel  Co.  ▼.  Johnson,  57 
111.  App.  608;   Arnold  t.  Kilchmann,  80  111.  App.  229. 

<«8  Shortz  v.  Quigley,  1  Bin.  (Pa.)  222;  Guernsey  v.  Froude,  13  Pa.  Super. 
Ct  405;  Gay  v.  Grant.  101  N.  C.  206,  8  S.  E.  90;  Atchison  Sav.  Bank  v. 
Means,  61  Kan.  857,  58  Pac.  989;  Kolb  v.  Ralsor,  17  Ind.  App.  551.  47  N.  K. 
177;  Wolf  y.  Shenandoah  Nat.  Bank,  84  Iowa,  138,  50  N.  W.  561;  Jamison 
V.  Weaver,  84  Iowa,  611,  51  N.  W.  65;  Farnsley  v.  StillweU,  107  Iowa,  631, 
78  N.  W.  678;  Whitney  v.  Daggett,  108  (>il.  232.  41  Pac.  471;  McKlnlej  t. 
Tuttle,  34  OaJ.  235;  Norton  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  P.  R.  Co.,  97  Cal.  3S8,  BO 
Pac.  585,  33  Am.  St  Rep.  198;  Whitfield  v.  Howard,  12  S.  D.  355,  81  X.  W. 
727. 

*«*  Stover  V.  Hough,  47  Neb.  789,  66  N.  W.  825;  Provost  v.  Provost,  64  Hun. 
:634,  18  N.  T.  Supp.  806;  Bansman  v.  Tilley,  46  Minn.  66.  48  X.  W.  439, 

4«s  Smith  T.  Miller  (Tenn.  Ch.)  42  S.  W.  182;  National  Mut  Bldg.  Ass'n  t. 
Kondrak«  9  Kulp  (Fa.)  14. 

(546) 


Ch.    14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS..  •  §   351 

dence  presented  by  the  applicant  is  not  contradicted,  it  will  justify 
the  court  in  vacating  the  judgment,  provided  it  is  plain,  positive,  and 
specific.*'*  But  if  his  allegations  are  traversed  by  affidavits  or  tes- 
timony presented  on  behalf  of  the  adverse  party,  then  the  applicant 
must  establish  his  contention  by  a  fair  preponderance  of  evidence.*'^ 
So,  where  the  ground  offered  for  the  vacation  of  the  judgment  is  the 
disability  of  the  defendant  (as,  that  he  was  insane  when  the  action 
was  commenced),  he  must  assume  the  burden  of  proving  the  fact, 
by  superior  weight  of  testimony.*** 

Where  a  party  moves  for  the  vacation  of  a  judgment  taken  against 
him  by  reason  of  "unavoidable  casualty  or  misfortune,"  or  through 
his  "mistake,  surprise,  or  excusable  neglect,"  as  provided  by  the  stat- 
utes, he  must  furnish  clear  and  satisfactory  proof  of  the  facts  consti- 
tuting the  cause  which  prevented  him  from  defending,  or  excusing 
his  default ;  ***  affidavits  may  be  filed  contradicting  the  matters  which 
he  alleges  :  *^*  and  the  motion  will  not  be  granted,  where  the  evidence 
is  conflicting,  unless  the  applicant  makes  out  his  case  by  a  fair  pre- 
ponderance of  the  testimony.*^* 

An  application  for  the  vacation  of  a  judgment,  as  has  been  already 
stated,  must  be  accompanied  by  a  showing  that  the  defendant  has  a 
good  defense  on  the  merits.  But  while  the  court  may  inquire 
whether  the  proposed  defense  is  meritorious,  and  whether  it  would 
be  sufficient,  if  established,  to  defeat  the  plaintiff's  claims,*^^  the  in- 

4««  Yost  v.  Mensch.  141  Pa.  73.  21  Atl.  507,  27  Wkly.  Notes  Cas.  562. 

*«T  Tidioute  &  Tiona  Oil  Co.  v.  Shear,  161  Pa.  508.  29  Atl.  107;  Lomlson  v. 
Faust.  145  Pa.  8.  23  Ati.  377;  Oberly  v.  Oberly.  190  Pa.  341,  42  Atl.  1105; 
Layton  v.  Prewitt  (Ky.)  25  S.  W.  882;  Brown  v.  Stegemann  (Iowa)  81  N.  W. 
450.  But  in  Pennsylvania,  it  is  said  that  the  rule  that,  the  presumption  being 
in  favor  of  the  validity  of  a  Judgment,  the  burden  is  on  the  defendant  to 
establish  invalidity  by  a  preponderance  of  evidence,  and  when  the  proof  Is  in 
equipoise  the  Judgment  will  not  be  opened,  does  not  apply  where  it  was  ob-  *■ 

taineil  by  defendant's  attorney  or  agent  through  fraud  and  abuse  of  trust  re-  " 

lations.     Gillespie  v.  Weiss,  22  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  177.  , 

48  8  Smith  V.  McClure.  146  Ind.  123,  44  N.  E.  1001. 

*«•  Spalding  v.  Crawford.  3  App.  D.  C.  361.  i 

470  Butte  Butchering  Oo.  v.  Clarke.  19  Mont.  306,  48  Pac.  303. 

471  Quick  v.  Lawrence  Nat  Bank.  10  Ind.  App.  523,  38  N.  B.  73;  Mogol- 
berg  V.  Clevinger,  93  Iowa,  736.  61  N.  W.  1092;  Poirier  v.  Gravel.  88  Cal.  70, 
25  Pac.  902. 

47  2  Gibbons  v.  Campbell,  06  Hun,  631,  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  283;  Randall  v.  Unit- 

(547 


•  ■ 


.  .♦ 


§  351  ^  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   14 

quiry  does  not  include  the  truth  of  the  defense.  If  the  proposed  plea 
or  answer  is  investigated  at  all,  on  the  motion  to  v;-cate  or  open  the 
judgment,  it  is  only  to  the  extent  of  ascertaining  whether  the  facts 
set  up,  assuming  their  truth,  constitute  a  good  and  meritorious  de- 
fense. Those  facts  must  of  course  be  proved  on  the  subsequent  trial, 
but  they  are  not  in  issue  on  the  motion  to  open  or  set  aside  the  judg- 
ment. Hence,  generally  speaking,  counter  affidavits  cannot  be  filed, 
nor  counter  evidence  heard  in  any  form  as  to  the  matters  alleged  as 
constituting  a  defense  to  th,e  original  action.*^*  But  in  Pennsyl- 
vania, on  a  rule  to  open  a  judgment,  evidence  may  be  heard  both  for 
and  against  the  proposed  defense ;  and  the  judgment  will  not  be  dis- 
turbed if  the  defendant's  assertion  of  the  facts  on  which  he  relics  is 
not  corroborated  and  is  traversed  by  an  equally  positive  and  com- 
prehensive denial  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff.  If  further  testimony 
is  introduced,  the  court  will  decide  the  motion  according  to  the  pre- 
ponderance of  evidence,  or  it  may,  in  the  exercise  of  a  sound  discre- 
tion, open  the  judgment  and  let  the  issue  be  decided  by  the  verdict 
of  a  jury.*^*    And  a  similar  practice  is  observed  in  Illinois.*^* 

ed  Life  &  Accident  Ins.  Ass'n,  59  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  587,  14  N.  T.  Supp.  631: 
ritzele  v.  Lutkinu,  85  III.  App.  002. 

*78  Benedict  v.  Amoux,  85  Hun,  283,  32  X.  Y.  Supp.  905;  Buck  v.  Havens. 
40  Ind.  221;  Hill  v.  Crnmp,  24  Ind.  291;  Pratt  v.  Kells,  28  Ala.  390;  Hasten 
V.  Indiana  C3ar  &  Foundry  Co.,  25  Ind.  App.  175,  57  N.  E.  148;  Worth  v.  Wet- 
more,  87  Iowa,  62,  54  N.  W.  56;  Francis  v.  Cox,  33  Oal.  323;  Onicier  v.  Weir, 
45  Cal.  53;  Douglass  t.  Todd,  96  Cal.  655,  31  Pac.  623,  31  Am.  St  Bep.  247; 
G.  S.  Congdon  Hardware  Co.  v.  Consolidated  Apex  Min.  Co.,  11  S.  D.  376.  77 
N.  W.  1022;  Grlswold  Linseed  Oil  Co.  v.  Lee,  1  S.  D.  531.  47  N.  W^.  955,  36 
Am.  St.  Rep.  761. 

*74  Woods  V.  Irwin,  141  Pa.  278,  21  Atl.  603.  23  Am.  St  Rep.  282.  28  Wkly. 
Notes  Oas.  185;  City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Weaver,  155  Pa.  74.  25  AU.  876: 
StockweU  V.  Webster,  160  Pa.  473,  28  Atl,  837;  Steiner  v.  Scholl,  163  Pa.  4«r>. 
30  Atl.  159;  Gillespie  v.  Webster,  180  Pa.  405.  36  Atl.  928;  Barley  v.  FIlby, 
103  Pa.  374.  44  Ati.  453;  Krebs  v.  Clark,  9  Pa.  Co.  Ct  R.  420;  McXeal  v. 
Banks,  6  Kulp,  371;   Hildreth  v.  Davis,  Id.  336;   Fishblate  v.  McCuUough,  7 

4T6  Helling  V.  Van  Zandt,  162  111.  162,  44  N.  E.  424;  Matzenbangh  r.  Doyle. 
156  111.  331,  40  N.  K.  035;  Sundberg  v.  Temple,  33  111.  App.  033;  Anderson  v. 
Studebaker,  37  III.  App.  532;  Triiby  v.  Case.  41  111.  App.  153.  Compare  Dlonoe 
V.  Matzenbaugh,  49  III.  App.  527.  In  Brown  v.  Huber,  79  111.  App.  109.  It  is 
said  that,  where  the  evidence  on  a  motion  to  vacate  a  Judgment  by  confes- 
sion is  conflicting,  and  the  contested  matter  in  doubt,  the  motion  should  be 
allowed. 

(548) 


Ch.   14)  VACATING  AND  OPBNINQ  JUDQMBNT&L  §  352 


%  352.    Impositlom  of  Terms. 

Since  the  opening  or  vacating  of  a  judgment,  in  any  case  where  an 
imputation  of  laches  or  inattention  rests  upon  the  party  applying,  is 
an  act  of  grace  and  favor  and  is  discretionary  with  the  trial  court,  it 
has  power  to  impose  such  terms  as  may  be  juSt  and  reasonable,  as  a 
condition  to  the  granting  of  such  relief,  and  its  action  in  this  respect 
will  not  be  interfered  with,  unless  for  a  gross  and  manifest  abuse  of 
discretion.*^*  But  the  converse  of  this  rule  is  equally  true.  The  im- 
position of  terms  is  by  no  means  a  necessary  condition  to  the  opening 
of  a  judgment  (unless  made  so  by  statute),  and  the  judgment-creditor 
cannot  complain  that  terms  were  not  imposed,  unless  he  can  also 
show  that  the  action  of  the  court  was  arbitrary  and  unjust,*^ ^  more 
especially  where  a  judgment  by  default  is  opened  at  the  same  term 
at  which  it  was  entered.*'*  The  most  usual  application  of  this  power 
of  imposing  terms  is  the  requirement  that  the  party  pay  all  previous 
costs  in  the  action  as  a  condition  precedent  to  the  opening  of  the 
judgment.  It  is  clearly  within  the  power  of  the  court  to  make  the 
payment  of  costs  a  condition  to  granting  the  relief  asked,*'*  includ- 

Pa.  DIst.  R.  364;  Lee  v.  Sallada.  7  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  98;  Heilner  v.  Falls  Coal 
Co.,  9  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  78.  The  rule  as  stated  In  Klopfer  v.  Bkls,  155  Pa.  41, 
25  Atl.  785,  Is  that  a  x>etition  to  open  a  Judgment  should  not  be  granted  un- 
less there  is  more  than  oath  against  oath;  but  when  there  is  more  than  this, 
and  it  comes  to  the  question  of  weight  of  the  evidence,  it  is  for  the  court  be- 
low, in  the  exercise  of  a  sound  discretion,  to  decide  to  which  side  the  scales 
incline,  and  if  It  is  in  doubt  on  this  question,  or  as  to  the  credibility  of  the 
witnesses,  a  prudent  course  would  be  to  open  the  Judgment,  and  thus  obtain 
the  aid  of  a  Jury  at  the  trial. 

<7«  Ensly  V.  Wright,  3  Pa.  501;  McMurray's  Heirs  v.  City  of  Erie,  59  Pa. 
223;  Huston  Township  Co-op.  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Beale,  110  Pa.  321,  1 
Atl.  926;  Hornthal  v.  Finelite,  9  Misc.  Rep.  724,  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  686;  Fowble 
V.  Walker,  4  Ohio,  64;  Hovey  v.  Middleton,  56  111.  468;  Mason  v.  McNamara, 
57  ni.  274;  Burhans  v.  ViUage  of  Norwood  Park.  138  111.  147.  27  N.  E.  1088; 
Young  V.  BIrcher,  31  Mo.  136,  77  Am.  Dec.  638;  Magoon  v.  Callahan,  39  Wis. 
141;  Howe  v.  Coldren,  4  Nev.  171. 

*77  Kelber  v.  Pittsburg  Xat  Plow  Co.,  146  Pa.  485,  23  Atl.  335;  Warder  v. 
Patterson,  6  Dak.  83,  50  N.  W.  484;  Johnson  v.  McCurry,  102  Ga.  471,  31  S.  E. 
88. 

4T8  Boutin  V.  Catlin,  101  WMs.  545,  77  X.  W.  910. 

*T»  Goodness  v.  Metropolitan  St.  Ry.  Co.,  49  App.  Div.  76,  63  N.  T,  Supp. 
476;    Szerlip  v.  Baler,  22  Misc.  Rep.  351,  49  N.  Y.  Supp.  300;    Schwartz  v. 

(549) 


§362  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  14 

ing,  in  a  proper  case  and  where  justice  appears  to  require  it,  the  dis- 
bursements of  the  opposite  party,**®  a  proper  fee  to  his  attorneys,*** 
and  his  reasonable  personal  expenses  incurred  in  connection  with  the 
suit,***^  and  also  the  costs  of  the  motion  itself.*'*  But  the  imposi- 
tion of  costs  is  not  a  legal  necessity.  It  is  equally  in  the  discretion 
of  the  court,  if  it  considers  such  action  just  and  proper  in  the  partic- 
ular case,  to  omit  this  requirement.  Thus,  an  order  vacating  a  judg- 
ment on  account  of  surprise  or  excusable  neglect,  need  not  require 
the  payment  of  all  costs  as  a  condition  precedent.*"*  And  indeed, 
where  the  ground  of  the  application  is  a  want  of  jurisdiction  in  the 
court,  no  process  having  been  served  on  the  defendant,  it  would  not 
be  at  all  proper  to  require  him  to  pay  the  costs,  since,  in  that  case,  he 
is  not  chargeable  with  any  kind  or  degree  of  fault  or  carelessness.**' 
Another  very  common  requirement,  on  the  opening  of  a  judgment,  is 

Schendel,  24  Misc.  Rep.  701,  63  N.  Y,  Supp.  773;  Cooper  v.  Borough  of  King- 
ston. 6  Kulp  (Pa.)  344;  Stewart  v.  Scully,  46  Kan.  491,  28  Pac.  957;  Yost  v. 
Minneapolis  Harvester  Works,  41  111.  App.  556;  Ueland  y.  Lyncb,  77  Minn. 
543,  80  N.  W.  700.  77  Am.  St.  Rep.  698;  Leake  v.  Gallogly,  34  Neb.  857,  52  N. 
W.  824;  Howe  t.  Independence  Consol.  Gold  &  Silver  Mln.  Co.,  29  CaL  72; 
Leet  T.  Grants,  36  Cal.  288;  Bailey  v.  Taaffe,  29  CaL  422;  People  t.  0*Con- 
nell.  23  Cal.  281;  Roland  v.  Kreyenhagen,  18  Oal.  455. 

480  MuUer  v.  Post,  58  Hun.  604,  11  N.  Y.  Supp.  615;  Traltteur  v.  Lering- 
ston,  59  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  140,  13  N.  Y.  Supp.  603;  Ketcham  v.  EUiott,  66  Hun, 
627,  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  745;  Meiners  t.  Frederick  Miller  Brewing  Co.,  78  Wis. 
364,  47  N.  W.  430,  10  L.  R.  A.  586. 

481  McCarty  v.  Altonwood  Stock  Farm,  68  Hun,  551,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  1091: 
Ormsby  v.  Conrad,  4  S.  D.  509,  57  N.  W.  778;  Freiberg  v.  Le  Clair,  78  Wis. 
164,  47  N.  W.  178. 

482  Behl  V.  Schuette,  95  Wis.  441,  70  N.  W.  559;  McCarty  v.  Altonwood 
Stock  Farm,  68  Hun,  551,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  1091. 

48S  Richardson  v.  Sun  Printing  &  Publishing  Ass*n,  20  App.  Dlv.  329.  46  N. 
Y.  Supp.  814. 

484  Ryan  y.  Mooney,  49  Cal.  33;  Robinson  v.  Merrill.  80  Oai.  415,  22  Pac. 
200;  Boutin  v.  Catlin,  101  Wis.  545,  77  X.  W.  910.  In  Georgia,  it  is  said  that, 
whUe.  under  the  rule  of  court,  a  Judgment  by  default  should  never  be  opened 
without  the  payment  of  costs,  yet  where  these  terms  are  not  insisted  upon  by 
opposite  counsel,  the  court  may.  in  its  discretion  and  in  conformity  to  local 
practice,  for  special  reasons,  allow  pleas  to  be  filed  without  the  payment  of 
costs,  though  such  practice  is  unsound.  Butler  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  88 
Ga.  594,  15  S.  E.  668. 

485  Waller  v.  Weston,  125  Cal.  201,  57  Pac.  892;  Stanton-Thompson  Co.  ▼. 
Crane.  24  Xev.  171,  51  Pac.  116. 

(550) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  352 

that  the  party  shall  plead  to  the  merits,  or  shall  forbear  to  set  up 
some  particular  defense  which  is  considered  unconscionable  or  purely 
technical.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  this  rests  in  the  discretion  of 
the  court/®*  But  it  seems  that  the  order  requiring  defendant  to  "an- 
swer" should  not  be  so  framed  as  to  exclude  his  right  to  demur.**^ 
And  requiring  him  to  consent  that  the  verdict  on  the  trial  shall  be 
final  and  that  no  appeal  shall  be  taken  for  any  reason,  is  in  excess  of 
the  court's  authority.***  Other  conditions  may  be  imposed  where  it 
is  necessary  to  save  to  the  judgment-creditor  the  fruits  of  the  judg- 
ment he  has  already  recovered.  Thus,  it  is  not  an  abuse  of  discre- 
tion, where  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  case  warrant  it,  to  re- 
quire the  defendant  to  consent  to  the  appointment  of  a  receiver  of 
the  property  in  question.*®*  So  also,  the  court  may  order  that  the 
judgment  shall  stand  as  security  for  the  amount  ultimately  recovered 
by  the  plaintiff,  or  may  require  the  defendant  to  give  a  bond  with 
sureties  conditioned  for  the  payment  of  any  judgment  the  plaintiff 
may  recover,*'®  or  order  him  to  give  an  undertaking  not  to  sell  or 
incumber  any  of  his  property  to  hinder  the  plaintiff  in  the  collection 
of  his  claim.*'^  It  has  even  been  held  to  be  a  fair  exercise  of  the 
court's  discretion,  as  a  condition  on  opening  a  judgment  by  default, 
to  require  the  defendant  to  deposit  with  the  clerk  of  the  court  a  sum 
of  money  sufficient  to  secure  the  plaintiff's  claim,  together  with  the 
costs  and  disbursements.***     But  in  regard  to  all  such  conditions  as 

486  Bailey  v.  Clayton,  20  Pa.  295;  Thompson  v.  Dickinson,  150  Mass.  210, 
34  N.  £.  262;  Dennison  T.  Chapman,  102  Oal.  618,  36  Pac.  943;  Ridley  t.  Man- 
hattan By.  Co.,  72  Hun,  164,  25  N.  Y.  Supp.  380.  See  Anaconda  Mln.  Co.  v. 
SaUe,  16  Mont.  8,  39  Pac.  009. 

4«T  Berg  V.  Pohl,  24  Misc.  Rep.  740,  53  N.  T.  Supp.  700. 

488  Puchs  &  Lang  Manufg  Co.  v.  Springer  &  Welty  Co.,  15  Misc.  Rep.  443, 
37  N.  Y.  Supp.  24. 

*«•  Exley  V.  Berryhill,  36  Minn.  117,  30  N.  W.  436. 

*»o  Dudley  v.  Brlnclc,  8  Misc.  Rep.  76,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  527;  Hart  v.  Wash- 
bum,  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  85,  62  Hun,  623;  Halter  v.  Spokane  Soap-Works  Co.,  12 
Wash.  662,  42  Pac.  126.  Cofupare  Glickman  v.  Loew,  20  App.  Div.  470,  51  N. 
Y.  Supp.  1078;  Brown  v.  Brown,  37  Minn.  128,  33  N.  W.  546;  Union  Nat.  Bank 
V.  Benjamin,  61  Wis.  512,  21  N.  W.  523. 

4»i  Schwartz  v.  Schendel.  24  Misc.  Rep.  701,  53  N.  Y.  Supp.  773. 

4»2  Fuchs  &  Lang  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Springer  &  Welty  Co.,  15  Misc.  Rep.  443, 
37  N.  Y.  Supp.  24.  Compare  Stivers  v.  Ritt,  29  Misc.  Rep.  341,  60  N.  Y.  Supp. 
507. 

(551) 


§   353  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.    l4 

these,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  question  is  not  one  of  the 
court's  power  in  the  matter,  but  of  the  exercise  of  a  sound  judicial 
discretion ;  and  therefore  the  conditions  to  be  imposed  in  each  indi- 
vidual case  must  rest  upon  the  distinctive  facts  of  that  case.  Oner- 
ous terms  should  not  be  imposed  upon  a  defendant  who  is  not  greatly 
in  fault.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  judgment  is  now  good  and  col- 
lectible, it  should  not  be  set  aside  without  adequate  security  fur- 
nished, where  there  is  a  prospect  that  a  subsequent  recovery  on  the 
same  claim  could  not  be  enforced.  Justice  to  both  parties  should 
guide  the  court,  and  all  the  pertinent  facts  of  the  particular  case 
should  be  considered. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  a  judgment  ordered  to  be  set  aside  **on  pay- 
ment of  all  costs"  remains  in  full  force  imtil  such  payment  is  made.**' 
And  so,  if  an  order  is  made  setting  aside  a  judgment  on  condition 
that  the  moving  party  pay  to  the  other  a  sum  of  money  and  file  an 
answer  within  a  certain  time,  the  conditions  must  be  complied  with 
within  the  time  fixed,  or  the  judgment  will  remain  in  force  as  if  the 
order  had  never  been  made.*** 

S  353.    PartlAl  VaoAtion  of  Jvdcmeat. 

Where  a  judgment  is  rendered  on  a  petition  which  contains  two 
distinct  causes  of  action,  though  not  separately  stated  and  numbered, 
but  united  in  a  single  count,  and  a  motion  is  made  to  vacate  and  set 
aside  the  judgment  and  grant  a  new  trial  for  defects  apparent  in  the 
retord,  and  the  record  discloses  that  judgment  was  properly  entered 
on  one  cause  of  action  and  improperly  entered  on  the  other,  the 
court  may  sustain  the  motion  in  part  and  vacate  the  judgment  as  to 
the  one  cause  of  action,  while  at  the  same  time  it  overrules  the  mo- 
tion in  part  and  refuses  to  disturb  the  judgment  in  respect  to  the 
other  cause  of  action.*®*  But  it  is  thought  that  a  defendant  cannot 
take  advantage  of  so  much  of  a  decree  as  is  favorable  to  him,  and 

*»3  Gregory  v.  Haynes,  21  Cal.  443;    Furman  T.  Furman,  153  N.  Y.  309,  47 
N.  E.  577,  60  Am.  St.  Rep.  029. 
4»4  Hartman  v.  Olvera,  49  Cal.  101. 

*»»  Weaver  v.  Leach,  26  Kan.  179.    See  Wise  v.  Schloesser,  111  Iowa,  16,  82 
S,  W.  439. 

(552) 


Ch.   14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  854 

have  it  set  aside  as  to  the  residpe;**®  A  judgment  may  also  be 
opened  as  to  some  of  the  defendants,  and  not  as  to  the  others,  where 
their  interests  are  severable  and  the  judgment  is  not  an  entirety.*'^ 
But  in  Texas,  under  a  statute  providing  that  only  one  final  judgment 
shall  be  entered  in  any  cause,  a  judgment  in  a  suit  by  a  seller  to  re- 
cover goods  procured  from  him  through  fraud,  entered  against  the 
vendee,  his  trustee  in  insolvency,  a  receiver  of  his  property,  and  his 
sureties,  is  an  entirety,  and  cannot  be  set  aside  as  to  a  part  of  the 
judgment-debtors.**®  So  an  order  setting  aside,  a  judgment  enfor- 
cing a  lien  for  street  improvements  against  the  lots  of  various  owners 
goes  to  the  entire  judgment,  and  not  merely  to  the  judgment  as 
against  the  persons  who  moved  to  set  it  aside.*** 

§  354.    Allowanoe  of  ApplicAtioii  disoretionAry. 

A  motion  to  vacate  or  set  aside  a  judgment  is  addressed  to  the 
sound  legal  discretion  of  the  trial  court  on  the  particular  facts  of  the 
case,  and  its  action  in  the  matter,  whether  of  allowance  or  refusal, 
will  not  generally  be  disturbed  by  the  appellate  court,  unless  there 
has  been  a  manifest  abuse  of  such  discretion.'®®  The  nature  of  this 
discretion  has  been  described,  in  a  well-considered  opinion  of  the 

*•«  Ross  V.  Ross,  21  Or.  9.  26  Pac.  1007. 

4»7  Wright  V.  Churchman,  135  Ind.  683,  35  N.  E.  835. 

*•«  Levy  V.  Gill  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  46  S.  W.  84. 

499  Bitzer  V.  O'Bryan  (Ky.)  54  S.  W.  951. 

BOO  Eldred  v.  Hazlett's  Adin'r.  38  Pa.  16;  Gllliland  v.  Bredin,  63  Pa.  39S; 
Iamb's  Appeal,  89  Pa.  407;  Sweesey  v.  Kitchen,  80  Pa.  160;  McClelland  v. 
Pomeroy,  75  Pa.  410;  Earley's  Appeal,  90  Pa.  322;  Wemet's  Appeal,  91  Pa. 
319;  Leader  v.  Dunlap,  6  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  243;  O'Brien  v.  Sylvester,  12  Pa. 
Snper.  Ct  408;  City  of  New  York  v.  Smith,  138  N.  Y.  676,  34  N.  E.  400;  Cun- 
ningham V.  Hatch,  18  N.  Y.  Supp.  458;  Seiffert  v.  Caverley,  19  N.  Y.  Supp. 
r»20;  St.  Clair  v.  Oonlon,  12  App.  D.  C.  161;  Hudglns  v.  White,  65  N.  C.  393; 
Herren  v.  Harralson,  97  Ga.  374,  24  S.  E.  457;  Bridges  v.  Blakeman,  108  Ga. 
801,  34  S.  E.  122;  Elliston  v.  Bank  of  Commonwealth,  3  Dana  (Ky.)  99;  Hop- 
kins v.  Hopkins,  47  Kan.  103,  27  Pac.  822;  Cavanaugh  v.  Toledo,  W.  &  W.  R. 
Co.,  49  Ind.  149;  Hoag  v.  Old  People's  Mut.  Beu.  Soc,  1  Ind.  App.  28,  27  N. 
E.  438;  Burke  v.  Ward,  50  111.  App.  283;  Carr  v.  School  District  of  Belton,  42 
Mo.  App.  154;  Hunt  v.  Jenney,  2  Mo.  App.  Rep'r,  1249;  Merritt  v.  Putnam,  7 
Minn.  493  (Gil.  399);  Granse  v.  Frings.  46  Minn.  352,  49  N.  W.  60;  Pine  Moun- 
tain Iron  &  Coal  Co.  v.  Tabour.  55  Minn.  287,  56  X.  W.  895;  St.  Mary's  Hos- 
pital T.  National  Ben.  Co.,  60  Minn.  61,  61  N.  W.  824;  Seymour  v.  Board  of 

(553; 


§   354  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  14 

supreme  court  of  California,  in  terms  which  would  probably  be  ac- 
cepted as  accurate  and  reasonable  in  all  jurisdictions.  "The  dis- 
cretion intended,"  says  the  court,  "is  not  a  capricious  or  arbitrary 
discretion,  but  an  impartial  discretion,  guided  and  controlled  in  its 
exercise  by  fixed  legal  principles.  It  is  not  a  mental  discretion^  to 
be  exercised  ex  gratia,  but  a  legal  discretion,  to  be  exercised  in  con- 
formity with  the  spirit  of  the  law  and  in  a  manner  to  subserve  and 
not  to  impede  or  defeat  the  ends  of  substantial  justice.  In  a  plain 
case  this  discretion  has  no  office  to  perform,  and  its  exercise  is  lim- 
ited to  doubtful  cases,  where  an  impartial  mind  hesitates.  If  it  be 
doubted  whether  the  excuse  offered  is  sufficient  or  not,  or  whether 
the  defense  set  up  is  with  or  without  merits  in  foro  legis,  when  exam- 
ined under  those  rules  of  law  by  which  judges  are  guided  to  a  con- 
clusion, the  judgment  of  the  court  below  will  not  be  disturbed.  If, 
on  the  contrary,  we  are  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the 
court  below  has  come  to  an  erroneous  conclusion,  the  party  com- 
plaining of  the  error  is  as  much  entitled  to  a  reversal  in  a  case  like 
the  present  as  in  any  other."  *®^  It  is  also  said,  however,  that  as  a 
general  rule,  in  a  doubtful  case,  the  court  should  incline  to  relieve. 
The  exercise  of  the  court's  discretion  ought  to  tend  in  a  reasonable 
degree  to  bring  about  a  judgment  on  the  merits  of  the  case,  and 
when  the  circumstances  are  such  as  to  lead  the  court  to  hesitate 
upon  the  motion  to  open  the  default,  it  is  better,  as  a  rule,  that  the 
doubt  should  be  resolved  in  favor  of  the  application,  proper  terms 
and  conditions  being  imposed.***  A  doubt  as  to  the  propriety  of 
allowing  the  motion  may  arise  from  the  nature  of  the  evidence  or  the 

Supers  of  Obippewa  County,  40  Wis.  62;  Wheeler  &  WUson  Mannrg  Co.  v. 
Monahan,  63  Wis.  194,  23  N.  W.  109;  Evans  v.  Fall  River  County.  4  S.  D.  119, 
55  N.  W.  862;  Dougherty  v.  Nevada  Bank,  68  Cal.  275,  9  Pac.  112;  Gamer  t. 
Erlanger,  86  Cal.  60,  24  Pac.  805;  Williamson  v.  Cummings  Rock  DriU  Co..  95 
Cal.  652,  30  Pac.  762;  Clarke  v.  AVitram.  99  Cal.  50,  33  Pac.  798;  Robert  E. 
Lee  Silver  Mln.  Go.  v.  Englebach,  18  Colo.  106,  31  Pac.  771;  White  v.  North- 
west Stage  Co.,  5  Or.  99;  Askren  v.  Squhre,  29  Or.  228.  45  Pac.  779;  Lovejo^ 
V.  Willamette  Transp.  &  Locks  Co.,  24  Or.  569,  34  Pac.  600;  City  of  Spokane 
Falls  V.  Curry,  2  Wash.  St  541,  27  Pac.  477;  Llresley  v.  O'Brien.  6  Was'j.  553* 
34  Pac.  134;   Ilagar  v.  WlkofT,  2  Okl.  580,  39  Pac.  281. 

•01  Bailey  v.  Taaffe,  29  Cal.  422. 

602  Watson  v.  San  Francisco  &  H.  B.  R.  Co.,  41  Gal.  17;  Vermont  Marble 
Co.  V.  Black  (Cal.)  38  Pac  612. 

(554) 


Ch.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  354 

fact  of  its  being  evenly  balanced.  Thus,  where  the  oath  of  the  peti- 
tioner is  opposed  by  the  oath  of  the  plaintiff  in  the  judgment,  it  is 
no  abuse  of  discretion  to  refuse  to  open  the  judgment.*®'  But  if  the 
relief  is  accorded,  it  will  be  presumed,  in  the  court  above,  that  there 
was  sufficient  evidence  to  justify  th^  order. '^^^  Where  the  situation 
of  the  judgment-creditor  has  undergone  a  material  change,  as  by  the 
incurring  of  expense  in  issuing  and  levying  execution,  and  by  the 
fact  that  a  material  witness  has,  by  the  death  of  the  judgment-debtor, 
become  disqualified,  there  is  no  abuse  of  discretion  in  refusing  to 
open  the  judgment.*®* 

But  it  is  only  in  cases  of  doubt  as  to  the  facts  of  the  case,  or  as  to 
the  propriety  of  allowing  the  motion,  that  the  discretion  of  the  court 
comes  into  play.  Where  the  case  is  plain  and  free  from  all  uncer- 
tainty, it  is  not  a  question  of  discretion  but  of  legal  right.  For  in- 
stance, if  absolutely  no  excuse  is  offered  for  the  default  of  the  mov- 
ing party,  an  order  vacating  the  judgment  is  not  within  the  discre- 
tion of  the  court.*®*  On  the  other  hand,  if  adequate  cause  for  set- 
ting asi.de  the  judgment  is  shown  by  the  uncontradicted  evidence  or 
affidavits  of  the  petitioner,  the  court  must  grant  relief;  it  has  no 
discretion  to  refuse ;  *®^  and  the  petitioner  may  even  have  man- 
damus to  compel  the  court  to  act,  if  the  judgment  or  decree  cannot 
be  taken  up  on  appeal.*®*  In  Missouri  it  is  said  that  "while  this 
court  will  not  interfere  with  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court  in  re- 
fusing to  vacate  and  set  aside  a  judgment  where  there  is  a  conflict 
of  evidence,  it  will  do  so  when  the  evidence  is  all  on  one  side  and  it 
is  clear  that  the  discretion  has  been  abused."  *®®  In  Wisconsin,  the 
area  of  the  court's  discretion  appears  to  be  more  contracted.  It 
is  said  that  "unless  the  default  of  the  party  is  excused  and  a  verified 
answer  tendered  showing  a  defense  on  the  merits,"  the  appellate 

»«•  Barton's  Appeal  (Pa.)  7  Atl.  168;  Rleker  v.  Doerr,  16  Lane.  Law  Rev.  59. 

504  WlUett  v.  MUlman,  61  Iowa,  123,  15  N.  W.  866. 

•05  Jeflferson  Co.  Bank  v.  Bobbins,  67  Wis.  68,  29  N.  W.  893. 

Bo«  Milwankee  Mut.  Loan  &  Bldg.  Soc.  y.  Jagodzinski,  84  Wis.  35,  54  N.  W. 
102. 

•07  Hull  v.  Vlning,  17  Wash.  352,  49  Pac.  637. 

i08  CampbeU  v.  Donovan,  111  Mich.  247,  69  N.  W.  514;  Bridgeport  Electric 
&  Ice  Co.  V.  Bridgeport  Land  &  Imp.  Co.,  104  Ala.  276,  16  South.  93. 

•09  Craig  v.  Smith,  65  Mo.  536. 

(555) 


§  354s  LAW  or  JrmsMExn,  CCh.  14 

court  will  not  interfere  with  a  refusal  to  open  the  judgment.'^*  A 
court  having  jurisdiction  to  set  aside  a  judgment  has  the  right  to 
give  any  less  relief  by  which  justice  may  be  obtained  and  by  which 
the  rights  of  a  party  in  excusable  detank  ma^-  be  protected,  and  the 
mode  of  effecting  this  object  is  under  the  control  and  subject  to  the 
discretion  of  the  c6urt.'^^  In  California  the  trial  court  has  no  power 
to  review  its  own  order  setting  aside  a  judgment  for  want  of  service 
of  summons,  where  the  order  was  regularly  made  after  hearing  and 
consideration.*^'  According  to  the  practice  in  some  of  the  states, 
the  refusal  of  the  court  below  to  open  a  judgment  is  ground  for  an 
appeal,  but  cannot  be  brought  up  on  wmt  of  error/^* 


f  354*.    PnMtiee  am  Oveaias  Defttslt. 


Where  the  relief  sought  by  a  judgment-debtor  is  not  that  the  judg- 
ment should  be  stricken  off  or  absolutely  set  aside  as  being  void, 
but  that  a  default  should  be  opened,  so  that  he  may  contest  the  case 
on  the  merits,  and  the  application  is  granted,  the  proper  practice  is 
for  the  court  to  include  in  its  order  a  direction  that  the  party  have 
leave  to  plead,  or  that  a  new  trial  be  granted,  or  that  the  case  be 
set  down  for  trial  or  hearing,  according  to  the  situation  of  the  par- 
ticular case.'^^  It  is  not  proper  to  enjoin  the  enforcement  of  the 
judgment."'  But  where  matters  arise,  in  an  application  to  vacate  a 
confessed  judgment,  which  are  proper  to  be  submitted  to  a  jury, 

>!•  rnkn  Lambering  Oo.  v.  Board  of  Sup'rs  of  Chippewa  Co^  47  Wla.  2^ 
2  X.  W.  281. 

•11  McCan  v.  MeCall,  54  N.  Y.  541. 

»i2  Hanson  v.  Hanson  (CaL)  20  Pac.  736. 

»i3  GiUcspie  T.  Campbell  (Pa.)  1  AtL  665. 

*i*  Beck  V.  Jnckett  111  Iowa,  339,  82  N.  W.  762;  Belknap  v.  Groover  (Tex. 
CiT.  Apiui  56  8.  W.  249;  Gormully  &  Jeffery  ^lanoTg  Co.  r.  Catharine,  Z> 
Misc.  Rep.  338,  55  N.  T.  Sopp.  475.  In  Pennsylrania,  where  a  jndgment  is 
set  aside  sitter  the  term  at  which  it  was  rendered,  it  is  better  that  the 
formal  eatry  should  be,  "Judgment  vacated,  Terdict  set  aside,  and  new  triil 
jmnted,"  instead  of  merely  "ftnle  abftolute  for  new  trial,'*  which  does  not  at 
once  show  aU  tliat  has  been  done.  Fisher  t.  HestonTille,  K.  &  F.  Fusl  By. 
Co.,  185  Pa,  602,  40  AtL  97. 

si»  Hnnton  t.  Euper,  63  Ark.  323,  38  S.  W.  517. 

(55G) 


Ch.    14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMBNTS.  §  355 

further  proceedings  under  the  judgment  may  be  stayed,  and  the  mat- 
ters accordingly  submitted.'^^'  Where,  after  a  judgment  by  default, 
leave  is  granted  to  the  defendant  to  plead,  **the  judgment  to  stand," 
and,  on  trial  of  the  general  issue  filed  accordingly,  plaintiff  has  a  ver- 
dict for  less  than  the  amount  of  the  original  judgment,  it  is  proper  to 
let  the  judgment  stand  as  of  its  original  date  for  such  reduced 
amount,  rather  than  to  enter  it  as  of  the  date  of  the  verdict/*' 

S  355.    Elfeot  of  VacatiiiK  Judsment. 

If  a  judgment  is  absolutely  void  and  a  mere  nullity,  of  course  it  is 
no  protection  or  justification  to  any  person,  and  it  is  immaterial 
whether  it  be  set  aside  or  not.  But  if  it  is  voidable  only,  and  not 
void,  it  seems  clear,  as  a  matter  of  legal  reason,  that  acts  done  un- 
der it  by  the  plaintiff  or  others  ought  not  to  be  invalidated  by  its 
subsequent  vacation,  provided  that  the  reason  for  setting  it  aside  be 
not  attributable  to  the  plaintiff,  but  the  relief  be  granted  as  a  matter 
of  grace  and  favor  to  the  defendant  and  on  account  of  his  mistake 
or  excusable  neglect.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  judgment  is  to  be 
vacated  by  reason  of  the  fraud  or  misconduct  of  the  plaintiff,  or  for 
any  irregularity  for  which  he  is  actually  or  constructively  to  blame, 
h  isi  equally  clear  that  he  should  not  be  permitted  to  justify  under  it. 
And  herein  there  is  an  important  difference  between  the  setting  aside 
of  an  irregular  judgment  and  the  reversal  of  an  erroneous  judgment. 
"Although  a  void  judgment,  or  one  that  is  voidable  for  irregularity, 
will  not,  after  being  set  aside,  justify  the  acts  of  the  party  done  un- 
der it  before  it  was  set  aside,  this  principle  has  never  been  applied 
to  a  judgment  merely  erroneous  and  reversed  for  error  by  a  court 
of  review.  An  irregular  judgment  is  called  voidable,  and  when  set 
aside  is  treated  as  though  void  from  the  beginning;  for  the  party 
himself  is  held  chargeable  with  the  irregularity;  while  a  judgment 
pronounced  by  the  court,  although  upon  an  erroneous  view  of  the 
law,  and  subject  therefore  to  be  reversed  by  an  appellate  tribunal, 
is  never  treated  as  void,  but  valid  for  all  purposes  of  protection  to 

91 «  Rasmussen  v.  Smith,  82  111.  App.  334. 
•17  Dulle  T.  Lally.  167  III.  485,  47  N.  £.  753. 

(557) 


5  365  LAW  OP  JUDOMENT&  (Ch.  14 

the  party  acting  under  it  before  reversal.  The  fact  that  in  the  one 
case  the  party  is  responsible  for  the  irregularity,  and  in  the  other 
whatever  of  error  there  is  in  the  judgment  is  the  error  of  the  court, 
seems  to  be  the  ground  of  distinction  between  the  two,  and  it  is 
manifestly  a  just  and  proper  distinction.  While  it  may  well  be  held 
that  a  party  is  not  justified  by  a  judgment  which  is  subsequently  set 
aside  for  an  irregularity  in  entering  it  up,  it  would  seem  unjust  to 
hold  that  a  judgment  duly  rendered  by  the  court  shall  fail  to  pro- 
tect a  party  acting  under  it  before  reversal,  because  reversed  for 
error  committed  by  the  court."  '^^  Under  the  Pennsylvania  prac- 
tice,  as  already  explained,***  an  order  opening  a  judgment  and  let- 
ting the  defendant  in  to  a  defense,  does  not  destroy  the  lien  from 
the  date  of  its  original  entry.**"  But  in  some  other  jurisdictions,  the 
vacation  of  a  judgment,  especially  at  the  same  term  at  which  it  was 
rendered,  leaves  the  case  as  if  there  had  been  no  entry  of  judg- 
ment.*** A  more  difRcult  question  concerns  the  intervening  rights 
of  third  persons.  Some  of  the  cases  hold  that  a  judgment  by  de- 
fault may  be  opened  on  showing  of  an  adequate  cause,  where  the 
case  has  not  been  enrolled,  though  third  parties  have  purchased  in 
reliance  on  the  judgment.***  But  the  prevailing  opinion  appears 
to  be  that  the  setting  aside  of  a  judgment  will  not  affect  the  title  to 
property  which  was  the  subject  of  the  judgment,  or  is  affected  by  it, 

»!•  Simpson  v.  Hombeck,  3  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  53. 

810  Supra.  §  350. 

620  Steinbridge's  Appeal,  1  Pen.  &  W.  (Pa.)  481.  A  Jadfirment  Ifl  a  jwSg- 
ment  to  aU  intents  and  purposes,  and  with  all  its  incidents  and  attributes,  after 
the  allowance  of  a  rule  to  open  it  the  same  as  before;  and  hence,  when  it  is 
closed  again,  after  a  trial  on  the  merits  by  a  verdict  for  a  sum  due,  an  exei*n- 
tion  Issues  upon  it  for  the  amount^o  found  as  if  it  had  not  been  disturbed. 
McAnulty  v.  National  Life  Ass*n,  6  Lack.  Leg.  N.  128. 

B21  jKtna  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  HamUton  County,  25  C.  C.  A. 
9i,  79  Fed.  575;  Olson  v.  Nunually,  47  ICan.  391,  28  Pac.  149.  27  Am.  St.  Ro^ 
296.  In  Nebraska,  a  court  has  no  power,  on  setting  aside  a  mere  vaonvj 
judgment,  to  continue  in  existence  the  statutory  Judgment  lien  so  that  it  nuj 
attach  to  such  judgment  as  may  be  subsequently  rendered  in  the  same  ctiu**. 
Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Kllllnger.  46  Neb.  677,  05  N.  W.  790,  41  U  R,  A 
222. 

522  Benedict  v.  Auditor  General,  104  Mich.  2Cl>,  02  N.  W.  304. 
(558) 


i 


Ql.  14)  VACATING  AND  OPENING  JUDGMENTS.  §  855 

if  it  has  passed  to  a  purchaser  in  good  faith^  relying  on  the  judg- 
ment.**' 

»«•  Security  Abstract  of  Title  Co.  v.  Longacre,  56  Neb.  460,  76  N.  W.  1073. 
In  Minnesota,  the  matter  Is  regulated  by  a  statute  which  provides  that  the 
setting  aside  of  a  Judgment  shall  not  prevail  against  a  bona  flde  purchaser, 
whose  titie  was  based  thereon,  where  the  Judgment  had  been  of  record  in  the 
proper  county  for  a  period  of  not  less  than  three  years  before  the  application 
to  set  aside  the  Judgment  was  made.  Gen.  Laws  Minn.  1887,  c.  61;  Drew 
V.  01  ty  of  St  Paul,  44  Minn.  501,  47  N.  W.  158;  Gowen  T.  Conlow,  51  Minn. 
213.  63  N.  W.  866. 

(569) 


§   356  LAW  OF  JUDQMBNT&  {fjtL,   15 


CHAPTER  XV. 

BELIJBJF  IN   EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW. 

Pabt  L    Jurisdiction  ov  E<^niTT  to  Bkjoin  the  Ekfokcbmext  or 

S  356.  Origin  of  the  Power. 

357.  Nature  of  Belief  granted. 

358.  What  Adjudications  subject  to  the  Power. 

359.  What  Parties  may  Apply. 

360.  What  Courts  exercise  the  Power. 

361.  Concurrent  Remedies. 

362.  Same;   Relief  on  Motion. 

363.  Same;   Appeal,  Error,  or  OertlorarL 
3iM.  Same;    Cross-Actions  and  Actions  oyer. 

Part  II.    Grounds  for  Enjoining  JuDGMKHli^ 

365.  General  Grounds  for  Equitable  Relief. 

366.  General  Rule  Stated. 

367.  Errors  and  Irregularities. 

368.  Fraud. 

369.  Fraud  in  Preventing  Defense. 

370.  Fraud  in  Procuring  the  Judgment. 

371.  Deceit  and  Concealment 

372.  Perjury. 

373.  Taking  Judgment  contrary  to  Agreement 

374.  Unauthorized  Appearance  of  Attorney.' 

375.  Negligence  or  Mistake  of  Counsel. 

376.  Want   of  Jurisdiction. 

377.  Judgment  founded  on  False  Return  of  Servicei 

378.  Legal  Defense  not  Interposed 

379.  Illegality  of  Consideration. 

380.  Excuses  for  not  defending  at  Law. 

381.  Same;  Mistake. 

382.  Same;    Surprise. 

383.  Same;   Accident  or  Misfortune. 

384.  Ignorance  of  Legal  Defense. 

385.  Discovery  must  have  been  sought 

386.  Newly-discovered   Evidence. 

387.  Negligence  of  Party  precludes  Relief. 

388.  Defense  not  available  at  Law. 

389.  Defense  available  either  at  Law  or  Equity. 

390.  Satisfaction   or   Release  of   Judgment 

391.  Injunction  as  a  Means  of  securing  Set-Off. 

392.  Personal  Disability  of  Pardes. 

(560) 


Ch.   15)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW,  §  356 


Part  III.    Practicb  on  Application  to  Enjoin  Judokbnt. 

3d3.    Nature  and  Requisites  of  BUI. 

393a.  Evidence. 

393b.  Joinder  of  Parties. 

394.  Conditions  on   Granting   Relief. 

395.  Effect  of  Enjoining  Judgment 

396.  Dissolution  of  Injunction. 


Part  L     Jurisdiction  op  Equity  to  Enjoin  the  Enforcement  of 

Judgments. 

§  356.    Origin  of  the  Power. 

The  power  and  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of  equity  to  enjoin  a 
party  from  enforcing  a  judgment  which  he  has  obtained,  when  it 
would  be  against  conscience  to  permit  him  to  do  so,  is  at  the  present 
day  so  firmly  established,  so  salutary  in  its  operation,  and  so  thor- 
oughly in  accord  with  the  promptings  of  justice,  that  it  is  difficult  to 
realize  the  stubbornness  and  bitter  jealousy  with  which  the  begin- 
nings of  its  exercise  were  resisted.  That  such  was  the  fact,  how- 
ever, is  fully  certified  by  the  historians.  This  species  of  jurisdiction 
"was  one  of  the  first  subjects  that  engaged  the  attention  of  the 
English  chancellors,  and  though  violently  resisted  by  common-law 
lawyers  and  judges,  the  power  was  largely  exercised  by  Cardinal 
Wolsey  in  the  reign  of  Henry  VIII,  and,  according  to  Mr.  Reeves, 
with  great  ability  and  justice.  It  is  related  of  Sir  Thomas  More, 
who  succeeded  Cardinal  Wolsey,  that  having  invited  the  judges  to 
dine  with  him,  he  showed  them  the  number  and  nature  of  the  causes 
in  which  he  had  granted  injunctions  to  judgments  of  the  courts  of 
common  law,  and  the  judges,  upon  full  debate  of  the  matter,  confessed 
that  they  could  have  done  no  otherwise  themselves.  Still,  how- 
ever, clamors  against  the  equity  jurisdiction  continued  until  they 
culminated  in  the  famous  controversy  in  the  reign  of  James  I,  which 
was  conducted  principally  by  Lord  Coke  against,  and  by  Lord  Elles- 
mere  in  favor  of,  the  chancery  jurisdiction.  The  Very  point  of  this 
controversy,  according  to  Judge  Story  (i  Story's  Eq.  §  51),  was 
whether  a  court  of  equity  could  give  relief  from  or  against  a  judg- 
ment at  common  law,  and  it  was  finally  decided  in  favor  of  the  equity 
1 JLAW  JUDG.~36  (561) 


§  366  LAW  bV  JUDOMfiNTS.  (Oh,  16 

jurisdiction.*  From  that  time  down  to  this  day  the  jurisdiction  has 
been  exercised  in  England,  and  decrees  of  ecclesiastical  courts  have 
often  been  relieved  against  on  the  ground  of  fraud ;  *  and  so  in 
like  manner  have  awards,*  and  verdicts,*  and  judgments  at  law.' 
And  even  decrees  in  chancery  may  be  avoided  for  the  same  cause."  • 
Nor  have  the  improvements  of  the  law  or  the  changes  in  judicial 
organization  superseded  this  power  of  equity  or  obviated  the  neces- 
sity of  its  occasional  exercise.'  A  recent  decision  of  the  supreme 
court  of  the  United  States  declares  that  the  appropriate  remedy  to 
set  aside  or  enjoin  the  execution  of  judgments  at  law  wrongfully 
obtained  is  by  bill  in  equity.'  But  this  jurisdiction,  though  unques- 
tioned, is  one  which,  from  the  pressure  of  hardship,  always  an  element 
in  these  cases,  is  liable  to  abuse ;  and  the  abuse  of  it,  say  the  courts, 
is  extremely  mischievous,  tending  as  it  does  to  conflict  between  juris- 
dictions and  to  the  promotion  of  needless  litigation.'  Hence  "bills 
seeking  relief  from  final  judgments,  solemnly  rendered  in  the  due  and 
ordinary  course  of  administration  of  justice  by  courts  of  competent 
jurisdiction,  are  always  watched  by  courts  of  equity  with  extreme 
jealousy,  and  the  grounds  upon  which  interference  will  be  allowed 
are,  confessedly,  narrow  and  restricted."  ^* 

1  Spence,  Chanc.  Jur.  p.  674. 

2  Van  Brough  v.  Cock,  1  Ch.  Cas.  201;    Bissel  v.  Axtell,  2  Vera.  47. 
«  LoDsdale  v.  Littledale,  2  Ves.  Jr.  451. 

«  Williams  v.  Lee,  3  Atk.  223;  Bateman  y.  WiUoe,  1  Sehoales  &  L.  201. 

BBamsley  y.  Powell,  1  Ves.  Sr.  119;  Galnsborougli  y.  Gifford,  2  P.  Wmfl. 
424;    Humphreys  v.  Humphreys,  3  P.  Wms.  394. 

•  Cochran  v.  Eldridge,  49  Pa.  365,  368.  citing  Uoyd  y.  Mansell,  2  P.  Wms. 
73;   Galley  v.  Baker,  Cas.  t.  Talbot,  201;   Bradlsh  v.  Gee,  Amb.  229. 

t  The  statutes  limiting  the  time  within  which  Judgments  may  be  set  aside 
on  motion  or  pctitiou.  for  mistake,  surprise,  excusable  neglect,  etc.,  have 
no  application  to  a  suit  in  equity  to  enjoin  or  annul  a  judgment  on  the  ground 
of  fraud.  McXeil  v.  McNeil  (C.  C.)  78  Fed.  834;  Ex-Mission  Land  &  Water 
Co.  V.  Flash,  97  Cal.  610,  32  Pac.  600;  Irvine  v.  Leyh,  102  Mo.  200,  16  S, 
W.  10. 

8  Phillips  V.  Negley,  117  U.  S.  665,  6  Sup.  Ct  901,  29  L.  Ed-  1013. 

0  Kersey  v.  Rash,  3  Del.  Ch.  321. 

10  Johnson  v.  Templeton,  GO  Tex.  238. 

(562) 


Ch,   1  6)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  367 


I  357.    Natnre   of  Relief  Kxantecl. 

The  action  of  a  court  of  equity  in  giving  relief  against  a  judgment 
at  law  is  almost  always  indirect  Courts  of  chancery,  it  must  be 
remembered,  do  not  claim  to  exercise  any  supervisory  power  over 
the  courts  of  law,  or  their  proceedings.  Judgments  are  not  reversed 
or  vacated  in  equity.  Adjudications  at  law  are  not  overhauled  or 
re-examined.  It  is  to  the  party  himself  that  the  energies  of  the  court 
of  equity  are  directed,  and  its  remedial  power  is  exercised  by  putting 
restraint  upon  his  usual  liberty  of  following  up  his  judgment  by  the 
appropriate  process  for  its  collection.  Equity  therefore  acts  on  the 
person,  not  the  proceeding;  and  while  it  will  enjoin  the  enforcement 
of  a  judgment,  in  proper  cases,  it  will  not  interfere  with  the  judg- 
ment itself.*^  Some  of  the  cases  hold  that  a  court  of  equity  cannot 
set  aside  the  judgment  of  a  law  court  and  award  a  new  trial.  And 
indeed  this  is  rarely  done,  if  ever,  in  express  terms;  but  the  same 
end  is  effected  by  decreeing  that  unless  the  party  consents  to  have 
the  judgment  set  aside  and  a  new  trial  had,  he  shall  be  perpetually 
enjoined  from  collecting  his  judgment.*'  But  cases  sometimes 
arise  where  the  right  to  move  for  a  new  trial  at  law  was  lost,  or  an 
application  was  refused,  in  consequence  of  some  of  the  circumstan- 
ces which  equity  always  regards  as  sufficient  warrant  for  its  inter- 
ference. In  such  instances,  the  complainant  being  in  no  fault,  it  is 
generally  considered  to  be  within  the  power  of  equity  to  grant  a 
new  trial.**    Thus  relief  of  this  character  may  be  granted  where  tht 

11  Yancey  v.  Downer,  5  Litt.  (Ky.)  8,  15  Am.  Dec.  35;  Richardson  v.  City 
of  Baltimore,  8  Gill  (Md.)  433;  Contee  v.  Cooke,  2  Har.  &  J.  (Aid.)  179; 
Blighrs  Heirs  v.  Tobin,  7  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  612,  18  Am.  Dec.  219;  Farmers* 
Bank  y.  Collins.  13  Bush  (Ky.)  138;  Harding  v.  Fiske,  25  Abb.  N.  C.  348, 
12  N.  Y.  Supp.  139;  Justice  v.  Scott,  39  N.  C.  108.  But  equity  may  reform 
a  Judgment  at  law,  by  the  addition  of  something  omitted  through  mistake, 
when  due  cause  therefor  is  shown.  Hamburg-Bremen  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Polzer 
Mauuf'g  Co.,  22  C.  C.  A.  283,  7G  Fed.  479.  It  is  no  objection  to  the  main- 
tenance of  an  action  to  enjoin  the  enforcement  of  a  Judgment  that  it  is  a 
collateral  attack  on  the  judgment.    Ross  v.  Banta,  140  Ind.  120,  34  N.  E.  805. 

laPelham  v.  Moreland,  11  Ark.  443;  Lawless  v.  Reese,  3  Bibb  (Ky.)  48G; 
Gainty  t.  Russell,  40  Conn.  4r)0;  Yancey  v.  Downer,  5  Utt.  (Ky.)  8,  15  Am. 
Doc.  35. 

"Knifong  V.  Hendricks,  2  Grat.  (Va.)  212,  44  Am.  Dec.  385;    Carter  v. 

(5C3) 


I 


§  358  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   15 

judgment  is  against  conscience,  and  the  applicant  had  no  opportunity 
to  make  defense,  or  was  prevented  from  defending  by  accident,  or 
the  fraud  or  improper  management  of  the  adverse  party,  and  with- 
out fault  on  his  own  part.^*  There  is  much  learning  in  the  books 
on  this  point,  but  it  is  merely  collateral  to  our  present  subject  and 
belongs  more  properly  to  a  treatise  on  equity.  A  few  words  must 
be  added  as  to  the  measure  of  the  relief  granted.  It  should  always 
be  adjusted  to  the  exigencies  of  the  particular  case.  If  it  is  claimed 
that  the  judgment  at  law  is  excessive,— either  because  of  the  fraud 
or  unfair  dealing  of  the  other  party,  or  in  consequence  of  a  mistake 
or  miscalculation, — ^that  is  no  ground  for  enjoining  the  whole  judg- 
ment. The  creditor  should  merely  be  prohibited  from  proceeding  to 
collect  the  excess.**  So  where  the  execution  of  a  judgment  has  been 
enjoined,  and  the  defendant,  upon  being  interrogated,  admits  a  par- 
rial  payment  of  such  judgment,  the  injunction  should  be  perpetuated 
for  the  amount  admitted  to  have  been  paid,  and  dissolved  as  to 
the  remainder  still  due.** 

§  368.    Wluit  Adjndieations  subject  to  tke  Power. 


Generally  speaking,  all  judgments  rendered  or  purporting  to  be 
rendered  by  courts  of  law  are  subject  to  the  equitable  power  here 
considered.  As  to  the  particular  case  of  a  judgment  that  is  abso- 
lutely void,  however,  the  authorities  do  not  agree.  Some  of  the  deci- 
sions hold  that  the  defendant  in  a  judgment  cannot  have  equitable 
relief  against  it  because  it  is  either  erroneous  or  void,  since,  if  void. 
it  may  be  disregarded  or  may  be  set  aside  on  motion,  and  if  erro- 

Bennett  6  Fla.  214;  Iloskins  v.  Hattenback.  14  Iowa.  314;  Land  t.  EUfot 
1  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  608;  How  v.  MorteU.  28  111.  478;  Deputy  v.  TobiaK, 
1  Blackf.  (Ind.)  311,  12  Am.  Dec.  243.  But  equity  will  not  set  aside  a  jndg> 
ment  at  law  on  grounds  which  were  presented  to  the  trial  conrt  in  a  mo- 
tion for  a  new  trial,  and  held  insutficient.  Telford  y.  BrinkerhofT.  163  IlL  439, 
45  X.  E.  156;   Hendrickson  v.  Bradley,  29  C.  C.  A.  303,  85  Fed.  50a 

1*  Carrington  v.  Ilolabird,  17  Conn.  530. 

IB  Hale  V.  Bozeman,  60  Miss.  965;  Booth  v.  Kesler,  6  Grat  (Va.)  350: 
Barrow  v.  Kobichaux,  14  I-.a.  Ann.  207;  Thompson  v.  Laughlin,  91  CaL  313, 
27  Pac.  752.  Or  the  court  may  order  satisfaction  of  the  Judgment  on  pay- 
ment of  the  amount  actually  due.    LJndley  v.  Roes,  137  Pa.  629,  20  Atl.  W4, 

16  Perry  v.  Kearney,  14  La.  Ann.  400.    And  see  Kamm  v.  Stark,  I  Sawy. 
547,   Fed.  Cas.  No.  7,604. 
(564) 


Ch.    lo)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §   358 

neous  It  may  be  revised  on  appeal.*^  There  is  much  to  be  said  in 
favor  of  this  view,  especially  in  contemplation  of  the  known  re- 
luctance of  equity  to  interfere  if  any  adequate  remedy  offers  itself 
at  law.  If  the  judgment  is  merely  void,  a  sale  under  it  would  be  a 
nullity.  The  purchaser  would  take  no  title,  and  the  officer  would  be 
liable  as  a  trespasser.  Still,  in  some  of  the  states,  a  bill  for  an  in- 
junction is  considered  the  appropriate  method  for  obtaining  relief 
even  against  a  void  judgment,  and  this  practice  has  become  fully 
established  by  the  rulings  of  the  courts.*®  An  injunction  will  lie  to 
prevent  the  collection  of  a  judgment  which  has  been  vacated  or  set 
aside  by  the  court  which  rendered  it.**  And  an  execution  issued  on 
a  judgment  the  record  of  which  has  been  destroyed,  there  being  no 
renewal  by  substitution,  will  be  enjoined.*®  But  in  the  case  of  a 
judgment  on  a  promissory  note  which  was  given  solely  for  the  pur- 
pose of  testing,  by  a  collusive  action,  whether  the  maker  had  any 
title  in  property  held  in  trust  for  his  wife,  the  chancery  court  refused 
to  interfere,  because  the  whole  proceeding  was  "an  abuse  of  legal 
process  and  a  fraud  on  the  law."  **  A  judgment  by  scire  facias  is 
of  the  same  force  as  any  other,  and  while  it  may  be  enjoined  in  a 
proper  case,  the  defendant  is  not  entitled  to  any  greater  indulgence, 
ill  respect  to  his  own  neglect  or  omission,  than  in  any  other  case.** 
It  is  also  held  that  a  court  has  power  to  enjoin  the  collection  of  a 
judgment  which  it  had  power  to  render,  although,  by  reason  of  the 
accrued  interest  and  costs,  the  amount  exceeds  the  limit  of  original 
jurisdiction.*'     As  a  general  rule,  equity  will  not  re-examine  and  re- 

17  Murpbree  v.  Bishop,  79  Ala.  404;  Lockridge  v.  Lyon,  68  Ga.  137;  Sanchez 
T.  Carriaga,  31  Cal.  170;  St.  Louis.  X.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Reynolds,  89  Mo. 
140,  1  8.  W.  208.  See  Fuller  v.  Townsley-Myrlck  Dry-Goods  Co.,  58  Ark. 
314,  24  8.  W.  635. 

18  Glass  V.  Smith,  66  Tex.  548,  2  S.  W.  195;  Smith  v.  Deweese,  41  Tex. 
595;  Cooke  v.  Burnham,  32  Tex.  129;  Chambers  v.  Hodges,  23  Tex.  110; 
Hernandez  v.  James,  23  La.  Ann.  483;  Tomllnson  v.  Litze,  82  Iowa,  32,  47 
N.  W.  1015,  31  Am.  St.  Rep.  458;  Heath  v.  HalfhiU,  106  Iowa,  131,  76  N. 
W.  522;    Smith  v.  Morrill,  12  Colo.   App.  233,  55  Pac.  824. 

i»  Rickets  v.  Kitchens,  34  Ind.  348. 
«o  Cyrus  v.  Hicks,  20  Tex.  483. 

21  Wells  V.  Smith,  13  Gray  (Mass.)  207,  74  Am.  Dec.  631. 

22  Thomp.son  v.  Hammond.  1  Edw.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  497. 
28  Davis  V.  Davis,  10  Bush  (Ky.)  274. 

(565) 


§    359  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  15 

adjust  settlements  which  have  been  made  by  compromise  judgments 
in  courts  of  law  having  jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter.  Yet  a 
compromise  judgment,  if  obtained  by  fraud,  accident,  or  mistake,  may 
be  relieved  against  by  injunction.**  There  is  also  undoubted  juris- 
diction in  equity  to  set  aside  an  award,  if  good  and  equitable  reasons 
are  presented  for  such  action.**  But  a  bill  will  not  lie  to  vacate  an 
award  on  the  ground  of  mistake  on  the  part  of  the  arbitrators  or 
failure  to  determine  all  the  matters  submitted;  for  these  matters 
may  be  pleaded  in  defense  to  an  action  at  law  on  the  award.** 
Where,  under  a  code  practice,  decrees  are  to  be  enforced  by  execu- 
tion in  the  same  manner  as  judgments  at  law,  an  injunction  may  be 
granted,  if  otherwise  proper,  to  restrain  the  execution  of  a  decree.*' 
The  fact  that  a  judgment  has  been  affirmed  on  appeal  does  not  ex- 
empt it  from  liability  to  attack  by  an  original  bill  in  equity  for  fraud, 
perjury,  or  mistake.**  But  equity  will  not  interfere  to  set  aside  an 
interlocutory  decree  in  a  cause  then  pending  in  another  court.** 

S  359.    Wliat  Parties  mmj  Apply. 

As  a  rule,  relief  in  equity  against  a  judgment  at  law  is  given  only 
to  the  parties  to  the  action,**  or  their  privies,**  or  those  whose  rights 
are  directly  affected  by  the  judgment.  Thus,  one  who  has  pur- 
chased land  subject  to  the  lien  of  a  judgment  cannot  go  into  equity 
to  enjoin  the  judgment,  his  grantor  making  no  objection  to  it,  unless 
he  can  show  that  it  was  founded  in  fraud  and  expressly  designed 
to  injure  him  in  his  rights  as  a  purchaser.**     So  an  execution  in 

a«Hahn  v.  Hart,  12  B.  Mod.  (Ky.)  420;  United  States  Electric  UisbtiDg 
Co.  V.  Leiter.  19  D.  C.  575;  Steiner  v.  Lenz,  110  Iowa,  49,  81  X.  W.  190; 
Swanson  v.  Jordan  (Tenn.  Ch.)  52  S.  W.  1102;  City  of  Goliad  v.  Welalger, 
4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  653,  23  S.  W.  694. 

2  5  Milnor  v.  Georgia  R.  &  Banking  Co.,  4  Ga.  385. 

2c  Mickles  v.  Thayer,  14  AHen  (Mass.)  114. 

aT  Oro  Fino  &  Morning  Star  Mln.  Co.  v.  Cullen,  1  Idaho,  126. 

as  Nelson  t.  First  Nat.  Bank  (C.  C.)  70  Fed.  526. 

20  Furnald  v.  Glenn,  12  C.  C.  A.  27,  64  Fed.  49. 

»o  Mayes  v.  Woodall,  35  Tex.  687;   Marriner  v.  Smith,  27  Cal.  649. 

«i  Bullock  V.  Winter,  10  Ga.  214. 

82  Man-lner  v.  Smith,  27  Cal.  649;  Shufelt  v.  Shufelt,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.)  137, 
37  Am.  Dec.  381;  French  v.  Shotwell,  6  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  235. 

(56C) 


Oh,  16)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §   359 

ejectment  will  not  be  restrained  at  the  instance  of  a  stranger  holding 
a  paramount  title,  for  if  his  title  is  good  the  judgment  does  not  affect 
him.'*  Nor  will  an  injunction  be  granted  to  restrain  execution- 
creditors  from  proceeding  to  sell  the  property  of  their  debtor,  on  the 
ground  that  certain  claims  to  the  property  have  been  interposed,  cast- 
ing a  cloud  upon  the  title,  and  rendering  it  probable  that  the  prop- 
erty will  bring  less  than  its  value,  to  the  injury  of  other  creditors  of 
the  same  debtor,  the  debtor  being  insolvent.'*  A  stranger  to  an 
execution^  whose  goods  have  been  levied  on  under  it,  cannot  have 
an  injunction  on  the  ground  that  the  judgment  was  erroneous;  for 
he  has  a  good  remedy  at  law."  But  on  the  other  hand,  it  has  been 
held  that  where  a  judgment-creditor  may  collect  from  property  that 
his  debtor  has  not  conveyed,  but  refuses  or  fails  to  do  so,  he  may  be 
enjoined  from  proceeding  against  the  debtor's  grantee.'*  It  is  cer- 
tainly clear  that  a  third  person  may  maintain  an  action  to  enjoin  per- 
petually the  enforcement  of  a  judgment  which  was  procured  through 
fraud  and  for  the  purpose  of  defrauding  him.'^  And  in  some  states 
it  has  been  held  that  where  a  judgment  is  entered  by  confession  with- 
out action,  unless  the  statute  authorizing  such  entry  has  been  sub- 
stantially complied  with,  the  enforcement  of  the  judgment  may  be 
enjoined,  upon  principles  of  equity,  at  the  suit  of  a  third  party  preju- 
diced thereby."  If  the  applicant  is  in  privity  of  interest  or  estate 
with  the  defendant,  he  is  of  course  not  regarded  as  a  stranger  to  the 
action,  and  his  right  to  interfere  is  more  easily  established.  Thus, 
where  a  suit  was  brought  in  Massachusetts  against  a  corporation  on 
a  judgment  rendered  in  New  York,  and  no  defense  had  been  made  by 
the  company  in  the  latter  state,  a  temporary  injunction  was  granted 
restraining  the  suit  on  a  bill  filed  by  an  individual  stockholder.'" 
So  the  receiver  of  a  national  bank,  though  not  a  party  to  a  suit 

•«  Harper  v.  Hill,  35  Miss.  63.  And  see  Whitman  v.  Willis,  51  Tex.  429. 
Compare  Alexander  v.  Mortgage  Co.  of  Scotland  (C.  C.)  47  Fed.  131. 

3  4  Robinson  v.  Thompson,  30  Ga.  933.  See  Mentzer  y.  Ellison,  7  Colo. 
App.  315,  43  Pac.  4(M. 

sft  Markley  v.  Rand,  12  Cal.  275. 

seHurd  y.  Eaton,  28  lU.  122. 

•7  Busenbark  v.  Busenbark,  33  Kan.  572,  7  Pac.  245. 

»•  Schuster  v.  Rader,  13  Colo.  329,  22  Pac.  505. 

<•  Sumner  v.  Marcy,  3  Woodb.  &  M.  105,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  13,609. 

(567) 


§   360  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   15 

against  the  bank  in  a  state  court,  may  appear  in  that  court  and  contest 
the  vaHdity  of  the  judgment.**®  The  same  rule  applies  to  a  holder  of 
bonds  of  a  corporation,  the  value  of  which  is  impaired  by  a  collusive 
decree,  to  which  he  was  not  a  party,  establishing  other  claims  against 
the  corporation  as  liens  upon  its  property  superior  to  the  lien  of  its 
bonds.*^  So  also,  the  beneficiaries  of  a  trust  estate  may  maintain  a 
bill  to  enjoin  a  fraudulent  judgment  against  their  trustee,  to  which 
they  were  not  parties.**  And  the  same  principle  applies  as  between 
a  principal  and  guarantor,  or  principal  and  surety.*'  A  judgment  at 
law  against  two  defendants  may  be  annulled  by  a  decree  of  a  court 
of  chancery  as  to  one  and  remain  binding  as  to  the  other.**  But  if 
the  bill  is  filed  by  one  defendant  alone,  the  other  should  be  made  a 
party  to  the  action,  unless  sufficient  reasons  for  the  omission  be 
stated.*'  And  where  a  separate  judgment  is  rendered  against  each 
of  two  joint  wrong-doers,  neither  judgment  can  be  perpetually  en- 
joined while  both  remain  in  force  and  unsatisfied,  although  one  of 
such  judgments  has  been  assigned  by  the  holder  to  a  third  person.** 
Since  the  sovereign  is  beyond  the  reach  of  any  prohibitory  process, 
it  follows  that  an  injunction  cannot  be  issued  to  restrain  the  United 
States  from  collecting  a  judgment  in  its  favor.*^ 

I  360.    Wliat  Courts  Exercise  the  Power. 

The  enjoining  of  a  judgment  at  law  is  a  purely  equitable  remedy. 
But  it  is  not  necessary  for  its  exercise  that  the  tribunal  should  be 
distinctively  and  individually  organized  as  a  chancery  court.  This 
power  is  habitually  brought  into  play  in  those  states  where,  for  want 
of  separate  equity  courts,  the  law  courts  apply  equitable  remedies. 

*o  Denton  v.  Baker,  35  C.  C.  A.  187,  03  Fed.  4G. 

*i  Kuhardson  v.  Loree,  36  C.  C.  A.  301,  94  Fed.  375. 

*»  Suelllng  V.  American  Freehold  Land  Mortg.  Co.,  107  Ga.  852.  31  L. 
R.  A.  59,  33  S.  E.  634,  73  Am.  St.  Rep.  160. 

*3  Bradshaw  v.  Miners'  Bank,  26  C.  C.  A.  673,  81  Fed.  902;  MIchener  t. 
Springlield  Engine  &  Thrasher  Co.,  142  Ind.  130.  40  N.  E.  679. 

**  Kennedy  v.  Evans,  31  lU.  258;  Bamett  v.  Lynch,  1  Marv.  (Del.)  114,  40 
Atl.  666.     See  Fulliam  v.  Drake,  105  Iowa,  615,  75  N.  W.  470. 

* 5  Gates  V.  Lane,  44  Cal.  392. 

*o  Meixell  v.  Kirkpatrick,  25  Kan.  19. 

*7  Hill  V.  United  States,  9  How.  386,  13  L.  Ed.  183. 
(568) 


Ch.   15)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AOAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  360 

And  even  under  the  codes,  where  law  and  equity  are  fused,  equitable 
jurisdiction,  equitable  proceedings,  and  equitable  remedies  are  not 
abolished,  although  metamorphosed  as  to  their  external  appearance. 
Questions  as  to  the  power  to  enjoin  judgments  most  commonly  arise 
between  co-ordinate  courts.  In  several  of  the  states  it  is  held  that 
one  court  has  no  jurisdiction  of  an  action  to  enjoin  or  annul  the 
judgment  of  another  court  of  concurrent  jurisdiction,  or  of  a  court  of 
co-ordinate  rank  in  another  district  or  division  of  the  same  state.** 
And  in  some,  this  rule  is  established  by  statute.*"  But  in  others,  it 
is  thought  that  any  court  having  jurisdiction  of  the  parties  and  the 
subject-matter  may  issue  its  injunction  to  restrain  the  enforcement  of 
a  judgment,  in  a  proper  case,  as*  where  the  judgment  has  been  paid 
or  satisfied,  or  was  procured  by  fraud  and  conspiracy,  though  it  was 
rendered  by  a  court  of  concurrent  or  equal  jurisdiction.*®  Thus,  in 
Tennessee,  it  is  held  that  one  chancery  court  may  enjoin  the  execu- 
tion of  a  judgment  wrongfully  taken  in  another  chancery  court.'*^ 
In  the  exercise  of  its  jurisdiction  over  the  parties,  a  court  may  enjoin 
the  enforcement  of  a  judgment  rendered  in  another  state,***  and  an 
execution  issued  upon  a  judgment  of  the  supreme  court  of  a  state 
may  be  enjoined  by  the  district  court  of  the  county  in  which  it  is 
sought  to  be  enforced.***     Also,  chancery  has  jurisdiction  to  cancel, 

4  3  Plunkett  V.  Black,  117  Ind.  14,  19  N.  E.  537;  Beck  r.  Fransham,  21 
Mont.  117,  53  Pac.  90;  Reynolds  v.  Dunlap,  M  Ga.  727,  19  S.  E.  906;  Ellis 
V.  Harrison,  24  Tex.  Civ.  App.  13,  57  S.  W.,  984;  Corbln  v.  Gaslna  Land  Ck)., 
26  App.  Div.  408,  49  N.  Y.  Supp.  929;  Mo'sby  v.  Glsborn,  17  Utah,  257,  54 
rac.    121. 

4»  Civ.  Code  Prac.  Ky.  §  285,  provides  that  "an  Injunction  to  stay  pro- 
ceedings on  a  Judgment  shall  not  be  granted  In  an  action  brought  by  the 
party  seeking  the  Injunction  In  any  other  court  than  that  in  which  the 
Judgment  was  rendered."    A  similar  rule  Is  enacted  in  Iowa  (Miller's  Code,  i 

9  3396),  and  in  Connecticut  (Gen.  St.  §  775).     See  Jacobson  v.  Wernert    (Ky.)  i 

41  S.  W.281;   Oberholtzer  v.  Hazen  (Iowa)  70  N.  W.  207;    Smith  v.  Hall,  71  j 

Conn.  427,  42  Atl.  86.  ,  j 

60  Say  era  v.  Bmkhardt,  29  C.  C.  A.  137,  85  Fed.  246;  Ashcraft  v.  Knoblock, 
146  Ind.  169,  45  N.  E.  (K);  Holderraan  v.  Tedford,  7  Kan.  App.  657,  53  Pac. 
887;  Sheriff  v.  Judge  of  Twenty-First  Judicial  District  Court,  46  La.  Ann. 
29,   14  South.  427. 

»i  Douglass  V.  Joyner.  (M)  Tenn.  32. 

»2  Davis  V.  Cornue,  151  X.  Y.  172,  45  N.  E.  449. 

»3  Massle  v.  Mann,  17  Iowa,  131;   Brown  v.  Walker  (C.  C.)  84  Fed.  532. 

(569) 


§    361  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.    15 

and  enjoin  the  enforcement  of,  a  void  judgment  rendered  by  a  justice 
of  the  peace.** 

The  federal  courts  are  prohibited  by  statute  from  granting  writs 
of  injunction  to  stay  proceedings  in  any  of  the  state  courts,  and  this 
prevents  them  from  enjoining  the  enforcement  of  a  judgment  recov- 
ered in  a  state  court.'*  But  a  federal  circuit  court,  where  the  requi- 
site diversity  of  citizenship  exists,  and  the  amount  in  controversy  is 
sufficient,  has  jurisdiction  to  entertain  a  suit  and  enter  a  decree 
which,  as  between  the  parties,  shall  set  aside,  annul,  and  vacate  a 
judgment  of  a  state  court,  and  the  proceedings  taken  and  rights 
acquired  thereunder,  on  the  ground  that  such  judgment  was  pro- 
cured by  fraud  or  was  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction.**  A  state  court 
has  no  power  or  jurisdiction  to  restrain  an  action  in  any  of  the  fed- 
eral courts,  nor  to  enjoin  the  enforcement  of  a  judgment  rendered  by 
a  court  of  the  United  States,  though  its  injunction  may  be  directed  in 
personam  against  the  parties  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the  decree  or 
judgment.*^ 

I  361.    Concurrent  Bemediofl. 

Embarrassing  questions  sometimes  arise  as  to  the  right  and  power 
of  equity  to  interfere  by  injunction  against  a  judgment  while  the 
party  has  a  concurrent  and  equally  efficacious  remedy  by  application 
to  the  court  which  rendered  the  judgment,  or  by  appeal  to  a  higher 
court.  The  general  rule,  however,  as  established  by  the  best  author- 
ities, is  that  the  party  seekisg  relief  must  have  exhausted  all  his 
resources  at  law,  for  equity  will  not  grant  an  injunction  where  there 

r    »4  Leonard  v.  Capital  Ins.  Co.,  101  Iowa,  482,  70  N.  W.  629. 

BO  Rev.  St.  U.  S.  §  720;  LoulsviUe  Trust  Co.  v.  aty  of  Cincinnati  (C.  C.) 
73  Fed.  716;  Foote  v.  Glenn  (C.  C.)  52  Fed.  529.  See  Terre  Haute  &  I.  K- 
Co.  V.  Peoria  &  P.  U.  R.  Co.  (C.  C.)  82  Fed.  943. 

»«  Howard  v.  De  Cordova,  177  U.  S.  609.  20  Sup.  a.  817.  44  L.*  Ed.  90B; 
Davenport  v.  Moore  (C.  C.j  74  Fed.  945;  McNeil  v.  McNeil  (C.  C.)  78  Fad. 
834;  Young  v.  Sigler  (C.  C.)  48  Fed.  182;  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  r.  Kortznuui 
(a   C.)   82   Fed.   241. 

B7  Riggs  V.  Johnson  Co.,  6  Wall.  166,  18  L.  Ed.  768;  United  States  r. 
Keokuk,  6  Wall.  514,  18  L.  Ed.  933;  Central  Nat  Bank  v.  Stevens.  16S>  U. 
S.  432,  18  Sup.  Ct  403,  42  L.  Ed.  807;  Prugh  v.  Portsmouth  Sav.  Bank.  4S 
Neb.  414,  67  N.  W.  309;  Strozier  v.  Howes,  30  Ga.  578;  EngUsh  v.  MiU«*r, 
2  Rich.  Eq.  (S.  C.)  320;    Coster  v.  Griswold,  4  Bdw.  Ch.  364. 

(570)* 


Cb.    15)  REUEP  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §   362 

is  an  adequate  remedy  at  law.'*  Nor  will  the  court  grant  an  injunc-: 
tion  to  stay  proceedings  in  another  court  having  the  same  power  to 
grant  relief.*®  But  the  remedy  at  law,  though  adequate  to  the  case, 
may  have  been  lost  through  circumstances  not  attributable  to  the 
neglect  or  fault  of  the  party  seeking  relief.  In  such  instances,  all 
question  as  to  the  right  of  equity  to  lend  its  aid  is  at  once  removed. 
Thus,  where  there  are  statutes  authorizing  the  law  courts  to  grant 
relief  from  their  judgments  in  certain  cases,  this  will  not  preclude  a 
party,  in  a  proper  case,  from  obtaining  relief  in  equity  after  the  time 
limited  for  applying  for  relief  under  those  statutes  has  elapsed,  pro- 
vided sufficient  reasons  are  shown  for  not  having  made  such  appli- 
cation in  time.^**  If,  for  example,  the  judgment  was  fraudulently  and 
secretly  entered  up,  and  the  defendant  had  no  notice  or  knowledge 
of  its  existence  until  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  within  which  he 
might  have  moved  the  law  court  to  vacate  it,  it  is  a  case  for  equitable 
interference,  merits  being  shown.*^ 

§  362.    Same;  Belief  on  Motion. 

The  liberal  practice  of  the  courts  in  granting  new  trials  and  enter- 
taining motions  to  vacate  or  open  their  own  judgments,  and  the 
enactment  of  statutes  in  many  of  the  states  authorizing  the  setting 
aside  of  judgments  taken  against  a  defendant  "through  his  mistake, 
inadvertence,  surprise,  or  excusable  neglect,"  have  considerably 
abridged  the  province  of  equity  in  giving  relief  by  injunction.  And 
the  rule  is  generally  adhered  to,  as  the  more  safe  and  conservative 
principle,  that  equity  will  not  grant  relief  against  an  execution  if  the 
party  can  equally  well  be  relieved,  on  motion    to  open,  vacate,  or 

»«  Wilkinson  v.  Rewey,  59  Wis.  554,  18  N.  W.  513;  Crandall  v.  Bacon, 
20  Wis.  639,  91  Am.  Dec.  451;  Blbend  v.  Kreutz,  20  Cal.  109;  Hart  v.  Lazaron, 
46  Ga.  396;  Johnson  v.  Driver,  108  Ga.  595,  34  S.  E.  158;  Burch  v.  West, 
134  111.  258,  25  N.  E.  658;  Missouri,  K.  &  E.  Ry.  Oo.  v.  Hoereth,  144  Mo.  136, 
45  S.  W.  1085;  Bankers'  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bobbins,  53  Neb.  44.  73  N.  W.  269; 
Cadwallader  v.  McClay,  37  Neb.  359,  55  N.  W.  1054,  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  496. 

5»  Grant  v.  Quick,  5  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  612;    Dufossat  v.  Berens,  18  La.  Ann. 

339. 

•0  DIstrlr-t  Twp.  of  Newton  v.  White,  42  Iowa,  008;   Baker  v.  O'Riordan,  Go 

Cal.  3rKS,  4  I»ac.  232. 

•  1  Spooner  v.  Leland,  5  R.  I.  348. 

(571) 


§    362  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (.Cll.  15 

modify  the  judgment,  or  to  stay  or  quash  the  execution,  in  the  court 
which  issued  the  execution  or  has  control  of  it.**  It  is  true  that  some 
cases  maintain  a  different  view,  holding  that  although  the  judgment 
might  be  vacated  or  set  aside  on  motion,  and  although  the  time  for 
so  moving  has  not  yet  expired,  still  equity  may  enjoin  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  judgment.**  But  in  so  holding  they  depart  from  the 
fundamental  principles  of  equity  and  are  not  to  be  commended.  If 
the  time  limited  by  law  for  seeking  relief  in  the  law  court  has  already 
expired,  without  the  neglect  or  fault  of  the  party,  that,  as  stated  in 
the  preceding  section,  is  a  different  matter,  and  the  right  of  equity  to 
interfere  is  unquestioned.**  It  has  been  held  that  the  summary  re- 
fusal of  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  or  for  the  vacation  of  the  judgment 
will  not  prevent  the  party  from  coming  into  equity  with  a  bill  for  an 
injunction,  based  on  the  same  grounds.**     But  the  weight  of  author- 

• 
««  Cowley  V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  (C.  C.)  46  Fed.  325;    Puraald  v.  Glenn 

(C.  C.)  56  Fed.  372;    Reed  v.  Prescott,  70  X.  H.  88.  46  Ati.  457;    Smith  v. 

Kanamerer,  152  Pa.  98.  25  Atl.  165;    Brown  v.  Chapman,  90  Va.  174,  17  S.  E. 

855;    Morrison  v.  Speer,   10  (Jrat.   (Va.)   228;    Howell  v.  Thomason,  34  W. 

Va.  794,  12  S.  E.  1088;    Henderson  v.  Moore,  125  N.  C.  383.  34  S.  E.  44«: 

Crocker  v.  Allen,  34  S.  C.  452,  13  S.  E.  650,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  831;    Hart  v. 

Lazaron,  46  Ga.  39<>;    J.  A.   Roebling  Sons  Co.  v.   Stevens   Electric  Co.,  W 

Ala.  39,  9  South.  369;    Hlntrager  v.  Sumbargo.  54  Iowa.   604,   7  N.  W.  Hi* 

(compare  Connell  v.   Stelson,  33  Iowa,   147);    Hulett  v.   Hamilton,  60  Minu. 

21,  61  N.  W.  672;    Hockaday  v.  Jones,  8  Okl.  156,  56  Pac.   1054;    Imlay  x. 

Carpentier,  14  Cal.  173;    Bibend  v.  Kreutz,  20  Cal.  109;    Logan  t.  Hllle|as5. 

16  Cai.  201. 

•8  Meyers  v.  Smith,  59  Neb.  30,  80  N.  W.  273;  Norwich  Union  Fire  Ids. 
Soc.  V.  Stang,  18  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  R.  464;  Landnim  v.  Farmer,  7  Bush  iKji 
46;  Hernandez  v.  James,  23  La.  Ann.  484;  Caruthers  v.  Hartsfleld,  3  Yerip. 
(Tenn.)  366,  24  Am.  Dec.  580. 

e*  Thompson  v.  Laughlin,  91  Cal.  313,  27  Pac.  752:  Larson  v.  Williams. 
100  Iowa,  110,  63  N.  W.  464.  62  Am.  St.  Rep.  544;  Radzuweit  v.  WatkiD< 
53  Neb.  412,  73  N.  W.  679;  Spooner  v.  Leland,  5  R.  I.  348.  But  if  the  party 
knew  of  the  judgment  against  him  in  time  to  have  moved  for  its  vacatl**. 
that  remedy  being  available,  he  cannot  have  relief  in  equity  without  sbowmz 
some  sufficient  reason  why  he  did  not  proceed  at  law.    Woodward  v,  Pik**. 

43  Neb.  777,  62  N.  W.  230;    Rowlett  v.   Williamson.    18  Tex.   Ov.   App.  >. 

44  S.  W.  624;    Long  v.  Elsenbels.  18  Wash.  423,  51  Pac.   1061. 

«5  Simpson  v.  Hart,  14  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  (>3;    Sherer  v.  Akers.  74  Ma  .\if- 
217.    Where  a  justice  of  the  peace  refuses  to  vacate  a  judgment  obtain**' 
in  his  court  through  fraud,  and  no  appeal  lies,  the  judgment  del)tor  In  entitl<<^ 
to  relief  In  equity.     Merriman  v.  Walton,  105  CaL  403,  38  Pac  1108*  3U  L 
R.  A.  786,  45  Am.  St  Rep.  50. 

(572) 


Ch.    15)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AQAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §   363 

ity  is  against  this  proposition.  The  best  cases  hold  that  equity  will 
refuse  to  act  by  injunction  when  the  grounds  alleged  have  already 
been  considered  and  held  insufficient  on  a  motion  at  law ;  in  such  case 
the  whole  matter  is  res  judicata  and  equity  will  not  re-open  it.**  To 
show  the  disposition  of  the  chancery  courts  in  this  regard,  we  cite 
the  case  of  Dalhoff  v.  Keenan,*^  where  it  appeared  that  the  party 
had  filed  his  petition  for  a  new  trial  in  the  law  court  within  the  time 
prescribed  by  the  code,  alleging  that  the  judgment  was  fraudulent, 
but  this  petition  was  dismissed  because  a  necessary  witness  was 
absent  and  because  the  other  party  promised  that  he  would  make  "a 
fair  offer  of  compromise,"  and  afterwards  the  complainant  brought  an 
action  in  equity  to  set  aside  the  judgment  and  for  a  new  trial  of  the 
issues.  But  it  was  held  that  the  action  in  equity  was  properly  dis- 
missed, because  the  coipplainant  had  an  adequate  and  speedy  remedy 
at  law,  which  he  had  begun  to  pursue  but  had  improvidently  aban- 
doned. 

§  363.    Same;    Appeal,  Error,  or  Certiorari. 

In 'pursuance  of  the  same  general  principle,  the  party  must  have 
exhausted  his  possible  remedies  by  appeal,  writ  of  error,  or  certiorari, 
before  equity  will  hear  him.  If,  by  failing  to  appeal,  or  by  prose- 
cuting an  appeal  in  a  defective  or  insufficient  mode,  he  loses  his 
remedy  at  law,  he  cannot  proceed  in  equity  by  injunction,  unless  new 
and  sufficient  equities  be  alleged.**     Nor  will  a  judgment  be  enjoined 

«•  Wnson  V.  Buchanan,  170  Pa.  14,  82  Atl.  620;  Matson  v.  Field,  10  Mo. 
100;  Davis  v.  Bass,  4  Ind.  313;  Collins  v.  Butler,  14  Cal.  223;  Critchneld 
V.  Porter,  3  Ohio,  518;   Gray  v.  Barton,  62  Mich.  186,  28  N.  W.  813. 

«7  66  Iowa,  679,  24  X.  W.  273. 

es  Leet  v.  I^eet,  12  App.  Div.  11,  42  N.  Y.  Supp.  174;  Ludwig  v.  Lazarus, 
10  App.  Div.  62,  41  N.  Y.  Supp.  773;  Rafferty  v.  Potter,  21  R.  I.  517,  45 
Atl.  152;  Brumbaugh  v.  Schnebly,  2  Md.  320;  Flanneken  v.  Wright,  64  Miss. 
217,  1  South.  157;  Long  v.  Smith,  30  Tex.  160;  Texas-Mexican  R.  Co.  v. 
Wright  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  29  S.  W.  1134;  McIIugh  v.  Sparks,  15  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  57,  38  S.  W.  537;  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  (Jlass  (Tex.  Civ. 
.\pp.)  40  S.  W.  330;  James'  Adm'r  v.  Neal's  Adm'r,  3  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  369; 
Todd  V.  Jackson,  22  Ky.  Law  Rep.  1(597,  61  S.  W.  1;  Evans  v.  International 
Trust  Co.  (Tenn.  Ch.)  59  S.  W.  373;  Palmer  v.  Malone,  1  Helsk.  (Tenn.)  549; 
Ward  V.  Derrick,  57  Ark.  500,  22  S.  W.  03;  Parsons  v.  Pierson,  128  Ind. 
479.  28  N.  E.  97;  Ross  v.  Banta,  140  Ind.  120,  34  N.  E.  865;  Wyman  v. 
Ilardwick,  52  Mo.  App.  621;    Renfroe  T.  Renfroe,  54  Mo.  App.  429;    Brown 

(573) 


§   868  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  lo 

when  the  complainant  has  neglected  to  except  to  it  as  he  might  havi 
done.**  So  a  judgment  which  is  not  appealed  from,  and  which  di- 
rects a  forced  sale  of  articles  for  its  satisfaction  which  are  by  law 
exempt  from  forced  sale,  is  not  a  nullity,  however  erroneous;  and 
when  no  means  have  been  used  to  correct  the  error  by  appeal,  the 
conclusive  force  of  the  judgment  cannot  be  evaded  by  a  resort  to 
injunction.^*  Nor  is  the  death  of  a  party  before  judgment  sufficient 
ground  for  an  injunction;  the  proper  remedy  is  by  error  coram 
nobis.^*  If  the  right  of  appeal  has  been  lost  by  lapse  of  time,  the 
party  seeking  the  aid  of  equity  must  be  able  to  show  that  such  loss 
was  not  the  result  of  his  own  negligence,  default,  or  indifference." 
If  he  has  been  deprived  of  his  opportunity  to  appeal  by  the  fraud  or 
deceit  of  the  adverse  party,  or  by  a  trick  played  upon  him,  this  will 
furnish  a  stronger  ground  for  equity  to  interfere,  but  it  must  also 
appear  that  the  complainant  has  no  adequate  remedy  at  law.^' 
Where  the  right  of  appeal  has  been  cut  off  by  the  death  or  resigna- 
tion of  the  trial  judge  before  signing  the  bill  of  exceptions,  equity 

V.  Campbell,  110  Gal.  644,  43  Pac.  12;  Daty  v.  Pennle,  86  Cal.  552,  25  Pac 
67,  21  Am.  St.  Rep.  61;  Mayer  v.  Nelson,  54  Neb.  434,  74  N.  W.  »41.  See. 
per  contra,  Baldwin  v.  Davidson,  139  Mo.  118,  40  S.  W.  765,  61  Am.  St.  Repi 
460;   Williams  v.  Pile.  104  Tenn.  273,  56  S.  W.  833. 

•9  DibWe  V.  Tmluck,  12  Fla.  185. 

TO  Rountree  v.  Walker,  46  Tex.  200. 

71  Williamson's  Adm'r  v.  Appleberry,  1  Hen.  &  M.  (Va.)  206.  And  see 
Holman  v.  G.  A.  Stowers  Furniture  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  30  S.  W.  1120. 

"Waldo  V.  Thweatt,  64  Ark.  126,  40  S.  W.  782;  HoUenbeak  v.  McCoy, 
127  Cal.  21,  59  Pac.  201.  The  fact  that  petitioner  relied  on  a  promise  of  th^ 
trial  Judge  to  Inform  him  of  his  decision  in  time  to  enable  petitioner  to  file 
a  bill  of  exceptions  for  the  purpose  of  appeal,  and  that  the  Judge  forgot  to  do 
so,  is  not  sufficient  ground  for  equity  to  set  aside  the  Judgment,  for  it  shows 
that  the  petitioner  was  not  free  from  default  and  neglect.  Donaldson  v. 
Roberts,  109  Ga.  832,  35  S.  E.  277. 

73  In  case  of  a  default  Judgment,  the  mere  fact  that  plaintiff  did  not  notify 
defendant  of  the  entry  of  judgment,  and  did  not  sue  out  execution  until 
after  the  lapse  of  a  year,  in  order  that  defendant  might  not  petition  for  a 
writ  of  review,  is  not  such  fraud  as  will  entitle  defendant  to  restrain  the 
enforcement  of  the  Judgment.  Trustees  of  Amherst  College  v.  AUon.  1»V> 
Mass.  178,  42  N.  E.  570.  So,  where  the  successful  party  wrongfully  obtalnt-d 
possession  of  a  case  made  for  appeal  by  the  defeated  party,  and  withheld  It 
until  the  time  for  appeal  had  passed,  It  was  held  to  be  no  ground  to  enjoin 
the  judgment.  For  the  remedy  was  by  petition  in  error  in  the  a|)pcUate 
court.     Muse  v.  Wafer,  29  Kan.  279. 

(574) 


Ch.   15)  RELIEF*  IN  EQUITT  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  363 

may  enjoin  the  enforcement  of  the  judgment,  if  it  is  shown  to  be 
unjust  and  oppressive,  and  if  the  applicant  for  relief  has  not  been 
guilty  of  any  want  of  due  diligence.^*  And  if  a  meritorious  bill  of 
exceptions  is  dismissed  because  of  a  mistake  made  by  the  certifying 
judge,  without  the  fault  of  counsel,  an  injunction  may  be  granted 
against  the  judgment  until  the  matters  set  up  in  the  dismissed  bill 
of  exceptions  can  be  heard.*"*  But  it  is  held  that  enforcement  of  a 
judgment  should  not  be  enjoined  merely  because  the  trial  judge 
wrongfully  refused  to  allow  an  appeal,  or  to  sign  the  bill  of  excep- 
tions, or  to  approve  the  bond  offered  for  appeal;  for  in  such  cases 
there  is  an  adequate  remedy  by  mandamus.''*  On  the  other  hand, 
equity  may  relieve  against  a  judgment  from  which  no  appeal  could 
be  taken  because  the  amount  in  controversy  was  too  small,  and  will 
do  so  where  a  meritorious  case  for  its  interference  is  made  out.^^ 
And  so  where  the  attempt  to  appeal  was  frustrated  by  the  destruction 
of  the  records  by  fire,  provided  the  complainant  has  been  in  no 
fault.^" 

In  Illinois,  it  was  at  one  time  held  that  relief  might  be  obtained 
against  a  judgment  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  though  the  party  might 
have  a  remedy  at  law;  and  that,  even  if  he  had  notice  of  the  judg- 
ment in  time  to  appeal,  and  made  an  abortive  attempt  to  do  so,  this 
would  not  prevent  him  from  appl)dng  to  equity  for  an  injunction.''® 
But  later  decisions  hold  that,  if  a  judgment  is  not  the  result  of  the 
negligence  of  the  person  against  whom  it  is  rendered,  it  is  unjust; 
and  if  he  cannot  appeal  from  it,  he  may  sue  out  a  writ  of  certiorari, 

T4  Kansas  &  A.  V.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Fitzhugh,  61  Ark.  341,  33  S.  W.  960,  54  Am. 
St.  Kep.  211;  Little  Rock  &  F.  S.  Ry.  C5o.  v.  Wells,  61  Ark.  354,  33  S.  W. 
208,  30  L.  R.  A.  560,  54  Am.  St.  Rep.  216;  Grafton  &  G.  R.  Ck).  v.  Davisson, 
45  W.  Va.  12,  29  S.  E.  1028,  72  Am.  St.  Rep.  799;  Galbraith  v.  Barnard. 
21  Or.  67.  26  Pac.   1110. 

T5Kohn  V.  Lovett,  43  Ga.  179. 

7  6  Houston,  E.  &  W.  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Elllsor,  14  Tex.  Civ.  App.  706,  37  S.  W. 
972;  Boyd  v.  Weaver,  134  Ind.  266,  33  N.  E.  1027.  Compare  Picket  v.  Mor- 
ris, 2  Wash.  (Va.)  255. 

77  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  King,  80  Tex.  681,  16  S.  W.  641;  Gulf,  C. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Henderson,  83  Tox.  70,  18  S.  W.  432. 

7  8  Bailey  v.  Stevens,  11  Utah.  175,  39  Pac  828. 

TO  Xelson  y.  Rockwell,  14  HI.  375. 

(575) 


§  364  LAW  OP  JUD0UENT8.  {Ch,   15 

and  have  a  new  trial ;  and  therefore  he  cannot  sue  to  enjoin  its  col- 
lection.** 

§  364.    Same;    CroM- Actions  and  Aetions   orer. 

In  a  number  of  instances  courts  of  equity  have  refused  to  enjoin 
the  collection  of  a  judgment  (unjust  and  inequitable  though  it  might 
be),  where  the  party  had  an  adequate  and  available  remedy  at  law  by 
a  cross-action,  as  for  breach  of  warranty  of  the  property  for  the 
price  of  which  the  suit  was  brought.*^  So  where  the  defendant  was 
prevented  by  unavoidable  accident  from  setting  up  offsets  to  the 
plaintiff's  demand,  which  were  not  connected  with  the  claim  sued 
on  and  may  be  enforced  at  law,  he  is  not  entitled  to  enjoin  the  judg- 
ment and  interpose  his  counterclaims  against  it,  but  must  pursue 
his  remedy  at  law.**  The  availability  of  the  legal  remedy  being  the 
test,  it  would  seem  that  the  existence  of  a  counterclaim,  capable  of 
being  used  as  an  independent  cause  of  action,  should  be  no  bar  to 
equitable  relief,  if  it  could  not  be  enforced  against  the  plaintiff  in 
consequence  of  his  being  a  non-resident  and  keeping  beyond  the 
jurisdiction.  But  the  courts  hold  otherwise.  On  this  state  of  facts 
an  injunction  has  been  refused.*'  On  the  same  principle,  equity  will 
not  interfere  to  give  relief  where  the  judgment  debtor  is  in  such  a 
position  that  he  may  make  himself  whole,  immediately  upon  paying 
the  judgment,  by  a  suit  at  law  against  a  person  who  is  responsible 
over  to  him  for  the  loss  or  damage  he  may  suffer.**  Thus,  injunction 
will  not  issue  to  restrain  the  execution  of  a  void  judgment,  when  re- 
plevin against  the  officer  would  furnish  a  full  and  adequate  rem- 
edy.** But  in  some  states  it  is  held  that  a  cause  of  action  by  a  judg- 
ment defendant  against  the  officer  who  falsely  returned  a  service  on 
defendant  is  not  an  adequate  remedy  at  law,  such  as  to  prevent  equity 

80  Booth  V.  Koehler,  51  111.  App.  370;  Reid  t.  Stock  Yards  L.  Coal  &  F. 
Co.,  88  111.  App.  32. 

81  Ponder  v.  Cox,  26  Ga.  485;  Henry  v.  EUlott  59  N.  C.  175;  Gorman 
V.  Young  (Ky.)  18  S.  \V.  369.  See  Murphy  v.  Cuddlby,  111  Iowa,  615,  82  X. 
W.  999. 

8  2  Hudson  V.  Kline,  9  Grat.  (Va.)  379. 

88  Beall  V.  Brown,  7  Md.  393. 

84  Drake  v.  Lyons,  9  Grat.  (Va.)  64. 

t^B  Straub  T.  Simpson,  74  Mo.  App.  230, 

(576) 


Ch.   15)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDOMBNTS  AT  LAW.  §  865 

from  enjoining  the  enforcement  of  the  judgment  as  obtained  by  the 
fraud  of  the  officer.** 


Part  II.     Grodnds  for  Enjoining  Judgments. 

§  366.    Oeaeral    Orovnda    for  Equitable  Belief. 

There  are  two  reasons  why  equity  is  slow  to  interfere  with  the 
operation  of  judgments  recovered  in  a  court  of  law.  In  the  first 
place,  it  is  sensitive  to  the  imputation  of  seeking  to  usurp  a  species 
of  appellate  jurisdiction  and  so  to  extend  its  power  over  all  other 
courts.  And  secondly,  a  judgment  on  the  merits  ought  to  be  forever 
conclusive  between  the  parties,  no  re-examination  should  be  allowed, 
and  it  is  neither  the  function  nor  the  ambition  of  equity  to  overhaul 
judgments  at  law.  Hence,  in  applying  to  equity  for  relief,  it  is  nec- 
essary that  something  more  than  a  merely  erroneous  or  irregular 
judgment  should  be  shown.®^  Some  of  the  elements  which  univer- 
sally afford  an  attaching-point  for  the  equitable  jurisdiction  must  be 
present,  making  it  tmconscientious  for  the  successful  party  to  en- 
force his  judgment  as  it  stands.  Thus,  if  the  defense  was  one  which 
could  not  be  interposed  at  law,  equity  will  relieve,  because  the  party 
has  not  had  a  fair  trial.  So  if  he  was  ignorant  of  his  defense,  and 
guilty  of  no  laches  in  failing  to  discover  it;  or  was  prevented  from 
setting  it  up  by  fraud  or  accident,  or  the  act  of  his  adversary,  without 
any  negligence  or  fault  on  his  own  part.  The  object  of  an  injunc- 
tion to  stay  proceedings  at  law  is  to  prevent  the  party  against  whom  it 
issues  from  availing  himself  of  an  unfair  advantage,  resulting  from 
fraud,  accident,  mistake,  or  otherwise,  and  which  would  therefore  be 
against  conscience.®®     Hence  equity  cannot  relieve  against  the  oper- 

••  Dowejl  V.  Goodwin,  22  R.  I.  287,  47  Atl.  693,  51  Ia  R.  A.  873,  84  Am. 
St.  Rep.  842. 

«T  Questions  which  have  been  adjadicated  In  a  court  of  law  having  juris- 
diction of  the  parties  and  the  subject-matter  cannot  be  reviewed  by  the 
defeated  party  In  a  suit  in  equity,  since  equity  has  no  power  to  review  or 
correct  errors  In  a  proceeding  at  law.  Fulliam  v.  Draliie,  105  Iowa,  61o, 
75  X.  W.  479. 

«•  Little  V.  Price,  1  Md.  Ch.  182;  Bachelder  v.  Bean,  76  Me.  370;  Mason 
V.  House,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  500,  49  S.  W.  911;  Handley  v.  Jackson,  31  Or. 
552,  50  Pac.  915,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  839;  Crocker  v.  Allen,  34  S.  C.  452,  13 
8.  £.  650,  27  Am.  St  Rep.  831;  Perry  v.  Johnston  (C.  C.)  95  Fed.  322. 

1  LAW  JUDG.-37  (577) 


§   366  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  15 

ation  of  a  judgment  at  law  simply  on  account  of  its  hardship.**  It 
must  first  of  all  appear  that  it  would  be  unjust  and  against  conscience 
to  enforce  the  judgment.*®  Then  it  must  be  shown  that  if  a  new 
and  fair  examination  of  the  merits  be  had,  the  result  will  be  other 
than  that  already  reached.**  There  must  be  a  meritorious  defense. 
No  matter  what  circumstances  of  fraud  or  irregularity  may  have 
attended  the  entry  of  the  judgment,  if  it  appears  that  no  defense  was 
made  because  no  valid  defense  existed,  and  that  the  instrument  in 
suit  was  given  for  a  valid  and  valuable  consideration,  an  injunction 
will  be  refused.**  Nor  will  equity  interfere  unless  it  shall  also  be 
shown  that  the  party  has  used  due  diligence  and  exhausted  every 
means  of  defending  the  case  or  obtaining  redress  at  law.**  But  on 
the  other  hand,  where  a  proper  case  for  relief  by  injunction  is  made 
out,  the  fact  that  the  judgment-creditor  is  of  undoubted  solvency 
and  able  to  refund  the  money  which  may  be  collected  on  the  execu- 
tion, will  not  prevent  such  equitable  intervention.** 

I  366.    General  Bvle  stated. 

The  leading  case  in  America  upon  the  subject  of  equitable  reKcf 
against  judgments  at  law,  is  that  of  Marine  Insurance  Co.  v.  Hodg- 
son.**  In  that  case  Chief  Justice  Marshall  specified  the  grounds  for 
the  interference  of  equity  in  the  following  terms :  "Without  attempt- 
ing to  draw  any  precise  line  to  which  courts  of  equity  will  advance, 
and  which  they  cannot  pass,  in  restraining  parties  from  availing 
themselves  of  judgments  obtained  at  law,  it  may  safely  be  said  that 
any  fact  which  clearly  proves  it  to  be  against  conscience  to  execute 
a  judgment,  and  of  which  the  injured  party  could  not  have  availed 
himself  in  a  court  of  law,  or  of  which  he  might  have  availed  himself 
at  law,  but  was  prevented  by  fraud  or  accident  unmixed  with  any 

8B  HiJrs  Ex'x  y.  Rogers,  Rice,  Bq.  7;  Hamilton  t.  Adams.  13  Ala.  586, 
50  Am.  Dec.  150. 

»o  Fowler  v.  Lee,  10  GUI  &  J.  (Md.)  358,  32  Am.  Dec.  172. 

•1  Taggart  v.  Wood,  20  Iowa,  236;  Sauer  v.  City  of  Kansas,  G9  Mo.  46^ 

»2  Sohler  v.  Merril,  3  Woodb.  &  M.  179,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  13,158. 

»«  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.  v.  Wall,  1  Or.  295;  Nevins  v.  McKee,  61  Tex.  412. 

•4  CaningtoD  v.  Ilolabird,  19  Conn.  84.  See  Shipman  t.  Fletcher*s  Adm'r, 
i95  Va.  585,  29  S.  E.  325. 

•B  7  Cranch,  332,  8  L.  Ed.  362. 

(578) 


Gh.  15)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  866 

fault  or  negligence  in  himself  or  his  agents,  will  justify  an  application 
to  a  court  of  chancery."  And  the  principles  here  set  forth,  though 
perhaps  somewhat  extended  by  more  recent  decisions,  have  been 
adopted  without  question,  as  a  general  statement  of  the  rule,  in  all 
our  courts.**  "When  a  party  goes  into  chancery  after  a  trial  at 
law/'  says  a  learned  judge  in  New  York,  "he  must  be  able  to  impeach 
the  justice  and  equity  of  the  verdict,  and  it  must  be  upon  grounds 
which  either  could  not  be  made  available  to  him  at  law,  or  which  he 
was  prevented  from  setting  up  by  fraud,  accident,  or  the  wrongful 
act  of  the  other  party,  without  any  negligence  or  other  fault  on  his 
part.'*  •^  "A  court  of  equity  does  not  interfere  with  judgments  at 
law  unless  the  complainant  has  an  equitable  defense,  of  which  he 
could  not  avail  himself  at  law  because  it  did  not  amount  to  a  legal 
defense,  or  had  a  good  defense  at  law,  which  he  was  prevented  from 
availing  himself  of  by  fraud  or  accident,  unmixed  with  negligence  of 
himself  or  his  agents."  •*     So  speak  all  the  authorities. 

••  RaUroad  Co.  v.  Neal,  1  Woods,  363,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  11,534;  Emerson  v. 
Udall,  13  Vt  477,  37  Am.  Dec.  004;  Pettes  v.  Whitehall  Bank.  17  Vt.  435; 
Wingate  v.  Haywood,  40  N.  H.  437;  Hibbard  v.  Eastman,  47  N.  H.  507, 
93  Am.  Dec.  467;  Vilas  v.  Jones,  1  N,  Y.  274;  Briesch  v.  McCauley.  7  Gill 
(MdL)  189;  Uttle  v.  Price,  1  Md.  Ch.  182;  Kent  v.  Ricards,  3  Md.  Ch.  392; 
Wlndwart  v.  Allen,  13  Md.  196;  Alford  v.  Moore's  Adm'r,  15  W.  Va.  597; 
Braden  y.  Reitzenberger,  18  W.  Va.  286;  Ponder  y.  Cox,  26  Ga.  485;  Watts 
V.  Gayle,  20  Ala.  817;  Lafon's  Ex'rs  v.  Desessart,  1  Mart.  N.  S.  (La.)  71; 
Nerlns  v.  McKee,  61  Tex.  412;  Lester  v.  Hosklns,  26  Ark.  63;  Miller  v. 
Morse,  23  Mich.  365;  Kelleher  v.  Boden.  55  Mich.  295,  21  N.  W.  346;  Proctor 
V.  Pettitt,  25  Neb.  96,  41  N.  W.  131;  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.  v.  Wall,  1  Or.  295; 
Mastick  v.  Thorp,  29  Cal.  444;  Boston  v.  Haynes,  33  Cal.  31,;  Taggart  v. 
Wood,  20  Iowa,  2.S6;  Graham  v.  Citizens'  Nat.  Bank,  45  W.  Va.  701,  32  S. 
E.  245;  West  v.  Magness  (Tenn.  Ch.)  46  S.  W.  469;  Foshee  v.  McCreary, 
123  Ala,  493,  26  Soutii.  309;  Wilson  S.  M.  Go.  v.  Curry,  126  Ind.  161,  25  N. 
Ew  896;  Kaufman  v.  Schneider,  35  111.  App.  256;  Losey  v.  Neldig,  52  Neb. 
167,  71  N.  W.  1067;  Kaufroann  v.  Drexel,  56  Neb.  229,  76  N.  W.  559;  City 
of  Broken  Bow  v.  Broken  Bow  Waterworks  Co.,  57  Neb.  548,  77  N.  W. 
1078;  McBrlde  v.  Wakefield,  58  Neb.  442,  78  N.  W.  713.  Equity  will  not 
enjoin  the  collection  of  a  Judgment  against  a  municipal  corporation,  regularly 
ohtainod  and  supported  by  a  moral  obligation  to  pay,  even  though  there  may 
be  a  goml  technical  defense.  Skirving  v.  National  Life  Ins.  Co.,  8  C.  C. 
A.  241,  ri9  Fed.  742. 

97  Vilas  V.  Jones,  1  N.  Y.  274. 

ta  Ueudrickson  y.  Hinckley,  17  How.  443,  15  L.  Ed.  123. 

(579) 


§   367  LAW  OF  JTJDOMENTd.  (Ch.  15 


I  367.    Error*  and  Itrrei^ularities. 

The  doctrine  is  fully  established  that  a  court  of  equity  will  not,  on 
the  application  of  the  defendant  in  a  judgment  at  law,  who  has  had 
a  fair  opportunity  to  be  heard  upon  a  defense  over  which  the  court 
pronouncing  the  judgment  had  full  jurisdiction,  set  aside  the  judg- 
ment or  enjoin  its  enforcement  simply  on  the  ground  that  it  was 
unjust,  irregular,  or  erroneous,  or  because  the  equity  court  would, 
in  deciding  the  same  case,  have  come  to  a  different  conclusion.**    A 

••  2  Story's  Bq.  Jur.  f  1572;    Baker  V.  Morgan,  2  Dow,  526;    Tarrer  t. 
Ta^^'e^,  9  Pet.  174,  9  L.  Ed.  91;   Ludlow  v.  Ramsey,  11  WaU.  581,  20  I*  Ed. 
216;    Pettes  v.  Whitehall  Bank,  17  Vt.  435;   Fletcher  v.  Warren,  18  Vt  4o: 
Paddock  v.  Palmer,  19  Vt.  581;   StUwell  v.  Carpenter,  59  N.  Y.  414;   Sbotten- 
klrk  v.  Wheeler,  3  Johns.  Gh.  279;   De  Relmer  ▼.  Cantlllon,  4  Johns.  Gb.  85: 
H<^mes  V.  Rems'en,  7  Johns.  Ch.  286;  Donovan  v.  Finn,  1  Hopk.  Ch.  59;  Bosh 
V.  O'Brien.  47  ApQ,  DIv.  581,  62  N.  Y.  Supp.  685;   Vanarsdelen  v.  Whitaker, 
10  Phila.  153;    Holmes  v.  Steele,  28  N.  J.  fiq.  173;   Phillips  v.  Pollen,  45  N. 
J.  Eq.  5,  16  Ati.  9;    Stout  v.  Slocum,  52  N.  J.  Eq.  88,  28  AtL  7;   Methodist 
Protestant  Church  v.  Mayor  of  City  of  Baltimore,  6  Gill  (Md.)  391.  48  Am. 
Dec.  540;  Boyd  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  Canal  Co.,  17  Md,  195,  79  Am.  Dec  WC: 
Slack  V.  Wood,  9  Grat.  (Va.)  40;   McDowaU  v.  McDowall,  BaUey,  Eq.  (S.  O 
324;    Stockton  v.  Briggs,  58  N.  C.  309;   Grantham  v.  Kennedy,  M.  X.  C.  148: 
Cohen  V.  Dubose,  1  Harp.  Bq.  (S.  O.)  102,  14  Am.  Dec,  709;   Hunt  t.  Coach- 
man, 6  Rich.  Eq.  (S.  C.)  286;    Turpin  v.  Thomas*  Representatives,  2  Hen. 
&  M.  (Va.)  139,  8  Am.  Dec.  615;    Robuck  v.  Harkins,  38  Ga.  174;   Jones  r. 
Watkins,  1   Stew.   (Ala.)   81;    Coffin  v.   McCuUough's  Adm'r,   30   Ala.   1<>T: 
Saunders   v.  Albritton,   37  Ala.   716;    Ammons   v.  Whitehead,   31  Miss.  IK*: 
Walker  v.  Villa vaso,  26  La.  Ann.  42;    FItzhugh  v.  Orton,  12  Tex.  4;    Prror 
V.  Emerson,  22  Tex.  162;    RoUer  v.  Wooldridge,  46  Tex.  485;    Rejmolds  v. 
ilorine,  13  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  234;   Burke  v.  Wheat,  22  Kan.  722;    Missouri  Pao. 
R.  Co.  v.  Reid,  34  Kan.  410,  8  Pac.  846;    Publishing  House  of  Evangelicil 
Ass'n  V.  Heyl,  61  Kan.  634,  60  Pac.  317;    Ex  parte  Christian,  23  Ark.  611: 
Clopton  V.  Carloss,  42  Ark.  560;    Dunn  v.  Fish,  8  Bhickf.  (Ind.)  407:    Macr 
V.  Lloyd,  23  Ind.  60;    De  Haven  y.  Covalt,  83  Ind.  344;    Davis  t.  Clements. 
148  Ind.  606,  47  N.  E.  1056,  62  Am.  St.  Rep.  539;    Fitch  v.  Byall,  149  Ind 
554,  49  N.  E.  455;    Hart  v.  O'Rourke.  151  Ind.  205,  51  N.  E.  330;    Chicao* 
Waifs  Mission  &  Training  School  v.  Excelsior  Electric  Co..  44  IlL  App.  42:.: 
Hendron  v.  Kinner,  110  Iowa,  544,  81  N.  W.  783;    Drake  v.  Han&haw,  47 
Iowa,  201;   Hazeltlne  v.  Reusch,  51  Mo.  50;   Corley  v.  McKeag.  57  Mo.  App, 
415;    Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Warden,  73  Mo.  App.  117;    F<»d  t.  HHl 
92  Wis.  188,  66  N.  W.  115,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  902;    Merritt  v.  Baldwin.  6  Wi^ 
439;    Jilsun  v.  Stebbins,  41  Wis.  235;    Ableman  v.  Roth,   12  Wis.  81;    P:— 
V.  Sunol,  6  Cal.  294;  Logan  v.  Hillegass,  16  Cal.  200;  Fox  t.  McCUy,  iS  Nti^ 
820,  67  N.  W.  888. 

(580) 


Cb.  16)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  367 

good  illustration  of  this  rule  is  furnished  by  the  decision  in  a  case 
where  the  defendant  at  law,  after  losing  his  case  by  reason  of  a  sug- 
gestion of  the  court  that  his  remedy  was  in  chancery  and  not  at  law, 
applied  for  relief  in  equity.  It  was  said :  "If  the  party  chose  to  be- 
lieve in  the  opinion  of  the  court,  it  must  be  at  his  own  hazard,  and 
it  now  seems  to  me  to  be  no  good  ground  for  reHef  in  equity  that  the 
court  or  his  counsel  gave  him  bad  advice ;  he  should  have  excepted 
to  the  opinion  of  the  court  in  refusing  to  continue,  and  if  on  examina- 
tion this  should  be  found  to  be  error,  then  he  would  have  had  relief; 
but  having  failed  to  do  so  furnishes  no  more  ground  for  relief  than 
he  would  have  been  entitled  to  if  the  court  had  committed  any  other 
error,  and  he  had  submitted  to  it  till  it  was  too  late  to  redress  it."  ^®° 
To  take  another  illustration, — where  a  judgment  was  rendered  ac- 
cording to  a  particular  construction  of  a  statute,  and,  after  a  writ  of 
error  thereon  was  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations,  the  supreme 
court  gave  a  different  construction  to  the  statute  in  another  case,  it 
was  held  that  equity  would  not  interfere  to  open  the  judgment.^®* 
Again,  that  a  debt  was  divided  and  suits  brought  on  each  portion  in 
a  justice's  court  which  would  have  no  jurisdiction  over  one  suit  for 
the  whole  amount,  is  no  reason  for  enjoining  the  judgment  in  one 
suit,  unless  it  also  appears  that  by  means  of  the  division  the  defend- 
ant was  deprived  of  some  right  or  remedy,  and  that  he  had  not  con- 
sented to  the  division.^®*  It  is  well  settled  that  no  injunction  can  be 
had  against  a  judgment  merely  on  account  of  a  defect  or  insufficiency 
of  the  evidence,  or  because  the  rules  of  evidence  were  violated  on  the 
trial.**'  Nor  can  a  court  of  equity  set  aside  a  judgment,  rendered 
by  a  court  which  had  jurisdiction,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  not  war- 
ranted by  the  pleadings,^®*  nor  because  there  was  no  finding  of  fact 

looRisher  v.  Roush,  2  Mo.  95,  22  Am.  Dec.  442. 

101  Jones  V.  Watkins,  1  Stew.  (Ala.)  81.  And  see  Oassel  v.  Scott,  17  Ind, 
514. 

102  Pryor  v.  Emerson.  22  Tex.  1G2. 

103  Pico  V.  Sunol,  6  Cal.  294;  Hunt  v.  Coachman,  6  Rich.  E>i.  (S.  C.)  286; 
Merritt  v.  Baldwin,  6  Wis.  439;  Vaughn  v.  Johnson,  9  N.  J.  Eiq.  173;  Brigot's 
Heirs  v.  Brigot,  49  La.  Ann.  1428,  22  South.  641;  Geyer  v.  Douglass,  85  Iowa, 
V»,  52  X.  W.  Ill;  Nashville,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mattingly,  101  Ky.  219, 
40    S.   W.   673. 

104  Alien  V.  Allen,  38  C.  C.  A.  336,  97  Fed.  525;  Hunter  v.  Kansas  City 
Safe-Deposit  &  Savings  Bank,  158  Mo.  262,  58  S.  W.  1053;    Moore  v.  Brit- 

,     (581) 


S    368  LAW  OP  JUDOMBNT8.  (Ch.   15 

to  support  the  judgment/®'  nor  for  any  irregularities  as  to  the  senr- 
ice  of  the  summons,  the  judgment  not  being  shown  to  be  unjust.*** 
So,  an  illegal  allowance  in  a  judgment,  or  an  error  in  the  calculation 
of  interest,  is  no  ground  for  an  injunction.^®^  But  where,  through 
fraud,  accident,  or  mistake,  a  judgment  has  been  entered  for  an 
amount,  or  in  terms,  not  as  intended,  equity  will  give  relief,  on  clear 
and  satisfying  proof.^®*  Or,  as  differently  stated,  equity  will  relieve 
in  cases  of  mistakes  in  judgments,  decrees,  or  other  matters  of  rec- 
ord, when  the  mistake  is  not  judicial  and  there  are  no  other  means 
of  obtaining  redress.*®*  Thus,  where  the  defendant  agreed  that 
the  justice  before  whom  the  case  was  pending  should  enter  a  condi- 
tional judgment  against  him,  and  the  justice  entered  an  absolute 
judgment  by  confession,  it  was  considered  that  equity  might  re- 
lieve.**® So  where  a  judgment  was  entered  against  a  sheriff,  under 
a  mistake  of  the  clerk  in  supposing  a  bail-piece  to  be  insufficient, 
when  the  counsel  had  agreed  that  it  might  be  filed,  relief  was  granted 
against  the  judgment.*** 

8  368.    FravdL 

Fraud  has  always  been  reckoned  among  the  special  abhorrences 
of  equity,  and  fraud  is  one  of  the  grounds  upon  which  application  is 
most  frequently  made  to  equity  for  relief  or  redress.  It  is  well  set- 
tled that  equity  will  enjoin  a  party  from  enforcing  a  judgment  which 
he  has  obtained  by  means  of  fraud.***    "Fraud  will  vitiate  a  judg- 

ton,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  237.  38  S.  W.  528;  Preston  v.  Kindrick.  94  Va.  760. 
27  S.  E.  588,  64  Am.  St  Rep.  777;  Reast  v.  Hughes  (Tex.  Civ.  App.i  33  S. 
W.  1003. 

105  Petaika  v.  Fltle,  33  Neb.  756,  51  N.  W.  131. 

io«  Garden  City  Wire  &  Spring  Co.  v.  Kause.  67  111.  App.  108. 

lOT  Davis  V.  Wade,  58  Mo.  App.  641;  Walker  v.  VlUavaso.  26  La.  Ann. 
42;  Raggett  v.  Watson,  70  Miss.  64,  11  South.  679.  See  Oohen  v.  Dubone, 
1   Harp.   Ch.   102. 

108  Katz  V.  Moore,  13  Md.  566. 

100  Smith  V.  Rutler,   11    Or.  46,   4  Pac.   517. 

110  Gwinn  v.  Newton,  8  Humph.   (Tenn.)   710. 

111  Smith  V.  W'allace,  1  Wash.  (Va.)  254. 

1"  White  V.  Crow,  110  U.  S.  183,  4  Sup.  Ct.  71,  28  L.  Ed.  113;  Wlngate 
V.  Haywood,  40  N.  H.  437;  Pearce  v.  Olney,  20  Conn.  544:  Carrington  v. 
Holablrd,  17  Conn.  530;  Greene  v.  Haskell,  5  R.  I.  447;  Munn  v.  W"orrall, 
16  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  221;  Corwlthe  V.  Grilling,  21  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  9;   Whittlesey  t. 

(582) 


Ch«  15)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  368 

ment,  and  a  court  of  equity  may  declare  it  a  nullity.  Equity  has  so 
great  an  abhorrence  of  fraud  that  it  will  set  aside  its  own  decrees  if 
founded  thereupon."  **•  The  rule  is  concisely  stated  by  the  chan- 
cery court  in  New  Jersey  in  the  following  language :  "The  court  will 
grant  relief  against  a  judgment  which  is  against  conscience,  which 
was  obtained  by  fraud  or  in  any  other  way  by  which  injustice  has  been 
done,  and  where  the  injured  party  has  had  no  opportunity  for  de- 
fense, or  could  not  make  it  through  any  defect  of  the  law,  and  where 
adequate  relief  cannot  be  afforded  by  the  court  where  such  judgment 
is  obtained,  and  timely  application  for  relief  is  made  to  this  court."  *** 
A  bill  will  lie  to  vacate  a  judgment  for  fraud,  even  although  it  has 
already  been  made  the  foundation  in  another  state  of  a  suit  in  which 
the  defendant's  property  in  that  state  has  been  attached.*^'  So, 
the  fact  that  one  is  solvent  is  no  ground  for  refusing  to  enjoin  pro- 
ceedings on  a  judgment  which  he  has  obtained  by  fraud.^^*^  On 
the  other  hand,  a  judgment  cannot  be  impeached  in  equity  on  the 
ground  of  fraud  practised  by  the  successful  party,  where  it  appears 
that  the  fraud,  if  attempted,  was  unsuccessful.*^^  And  equity  will 
not  interfere  on  the  ground  of  fraud  unless  the  fraud  is  clearly  stated 
and  proved.***  And  allegations  that  the  judgment  was  obtained 
"through  fraud  and  other  ill  practices"  are  too  vague  and  general.*** 

Delaney,  73  N.  Y.  571;  Binsse  v.  Barker,  13  N.  J.  Law,  ?63,  23  Am.  Dec. 
720;  Burch  T.  Scott,  1  Bland  (Md.)  112;  Kent  v.  Rlcards,  3  Md.  Ch.  392; 
PolDdexter  v.  Waddy.  6  Munf.  418,  8  Am.  Dec.  749;  Smith  v.  Hays,  64  K. 
C.  321;  Brown  v.  Thornton,  47  Ga.  474;  Dugan  v.  McGann,  GO  Ga.  353; 
Hair  V.  Lowe,  19  Ala.  224;  Hahn  v.  Hart,  12  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  426;  Crank 
Y.  Flowers,  4  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  629;  Ogden  y.  Larrabee,  57  111.  389;  Cowin 
V.  Toole,  31  Iowa,  513;  Bresnahan  v.  Price,  57  Mo.  422;  Payne  v.  CShea,  84 
Mo.  129;  Burpee  v.  Smith,  Walk.  Oh.  (Mich.)  327;  Hayden  v.  Hayden,  46 
Cal.  332;  Smith  v.  Quarles  (Tenn.  Ch.)  46  S.  W.  1035;  Oliver  v.  Riley,  92 
Iowa,  23,  60  N.  W.  180;  Larson  v.  Williams,  100  Iowa,  110,  69  N.  W.  441, 
02  Am.  St.  Rep.  544;  Smith  v.  Taylor,  78  Mo.  App.  630;  Benson  r.  An- 
derson, 10  Utah,  135,  37  Pac.  256. 

ii«  Whigate  v.  Haywood,  40  N.  H.  437. 

114  Moore  v.  Gamble,  9  N.  J.  £q.  246. 

iisEdson  V.  Cumlngs,  52  Mich.  52,  17  N.  W.  693. 

!!•  Sanderson  v.  Voelcker,  51  Mo.  App.  328. 

iiTAUen  y.  Allen,  38  C.  C.  A.  336,  97  Fed.  525. 

118  Jones  y.  Sonth's  Adm'rs,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  352. 

110  Rooks  y.  WllUams,  13  La.  Ann.  374. 

(583) 


§   368  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNTS.  (Ch*  15 

And  further,  in  order  to  obtain  equitable  relief  ag^nst  a  judgment  on 
the  ground  of  fraud,  it  is  necessary  to  be  alleged  and  shown  that 
there  is  a  good  defense  on  the  merits.*"  Or,  as  otherwise  stated,  it 
must  be  made  clearly  to  appear  that  the  judgment  has  no  other  foun- 
dation than  the  fraud  charged,  and  that  if  there  had  been  no  fraud 
there  would  have  been  no  judgment.**^  Thus  equity  will  not  relieve 
against  a  judgment  alleged  to  have  been  obtained  by  fraud,  where 
the  relief  asked  for  is  merely  a  reduction  of  the  damages.***  It  has 
been  adjudged  a  good  ground  for  the  intervention  of  equity  that 
the  judgment,  fairly  and  regularly  rendered,  has  afterwards  been 
fraudulently  altered  so  as  to  increase  the  amount  for  which  it 
stands,***  or  so  as  to  include  a  person  not  originally  named  in  it  nor 
made  a  party  to  the  action.***  Aside  from  the  cases  just  instanced, 
it  is  evident  that  the  fraud  on  which  the  application  to  equity  is  based 
may  be  of  three  different  characters,  or  arise  in  three  several  ways. 
First,  there  may  have  been  fraud  in  the  instrument  or  transaction  on 
which  the  judgment  at  law  is  founded.  This,  since  it  constitutes  a 
good  defense  to  the  suit  at  law,  must  be  set  up  then  and  there.  If 
the  defendant  was  ignorant  of  it,  or  had  no  opportunity  to  plead  it, 
or  was  prevented  from  setting  it  up  by  the  artifice  or  fraud  of  his 

m 

adversary,  it  may  be  available  on  a  subsequent  application  to  chan- 
cery. But  otherwise  it  furnishes  no  ground  for  equitable  interfer- 
ence.***    Secondly,  whatever  was  the  character  of  the  defense,  sup- 

lao  White  V.  Crow,  110  U.  S.  183,  4  Sup.  Ct.  71,  28  L.  Ed.  113;  Hair  t. 
Lowe,  19  Ala.  224;  Peaice  y.  Olney,  20  Conn.  544;  Ableman  ▼.  Roth.  12  Wis. 
81;  Way  y.  Lamb,  15  Iowa,  79;  At  water  v.  American  Exch.  Nat.  Bank« 
40  111.  App.  501;    Henkleman  y.  Peterson,  Id.  540. 

121  Drlnger  y.  Receiver  of  Erie  Ry.  Co..  42  N.  J.  Bq.  573,  8  Atl.  811, 

i>2  Inhabitants  of  Essex  County  y.  Berry,  2  Yt  161;  Murdock  v.  De  Vries^ 
37  Cal.  527. 

12  8  Babcock  y.  McCamant,  53  111.  214. 

124  Chester  v.  Miller,  13  Cal.  558. 

126  Muscatine  v.  Mississippi  &  M.  R.  Co.,  1  Dill.  536,  Fed,  Gas.  No.  9.971; 
Gardiner  v.  Van  Alstyne,  163  N.  Y.  573,  57  N.  E.  1110;  Taylor  v.  Manory. 
70  Md.  1,  23  Atl.  10U8;  Adler  y.  Van  Kirk  Land  &  Const  Co.,  U4  Ala.  551, 
21  South.  490,  02  Am.  St.  Rep.  133;  Covington  y.  Chamblin,  156  Mo.  574, 
57  S.  W.  728;  Hamilton  y.  McLean,  139  Mo.  678,  41  S,  W.  224;  Link  ▼. 
Link,  48  Mo.  App.  345;  Shufeldt  y.  Gandy,  34  Neb.  32,  51  N.  W.  302;  Nor- 
wegian Plow  Co.  V.  Bellman,  47  Neb.  186,  66  N.  W.  292,  31  L.  R.  A.  747. 
A  bill  to  set  aside  a  judgment  for  fraud  must  aver  that  the  complainant  had 

(584) 


Ch,   15)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  369 

posing  it  to  b«  good  and  meritorious,  the  successful  party  may  have 
practised  fraud  or  trickery  in  such  wise  as  to  prevent  the  other  from 
bringing  it  before  the  court.  Here  equity  will  relieve,  if  the  appli- 
cant himself  was  guilty  of  no  negligence  or  fault.  And  thirdly,  the 
fraud  charged  may  have  been  practised  in  the  act  of  procuring  the 
judgment  to  be  entered,  or  in  taking  judgment  in  violation  of  an 
agreement  to  fhe  contrary.  This  also  is  sufficient  ground  for  the 
interference  of  equity.  These  propositions  will  be  elaborated  in  the 
next  succeeding  sections. 

§  309.    Fraud  1a  PreTentlAK  Defense. 

Where  a  party,  having  a  good  defense  to  an  action  commenced 
against  him  at  law,  is  prevented,  by  the  fraud  or  fraudulent  repre- 
sentations of  the  plaintiff  or  his  attorney,  from  setting  up  that  de- 
fense, and  a  judgment  is  obtained  against  him,  without  any  negli- 
gence or  fault  on  his  part,  it  is  a  proper  case  in  equity  for  relief 
against  the  judgment.^**  As  remarked  by  a  learned  judge,  "a  decree 
or  judgment  receives  its  forCe  from  the  fact  that  it  is  the  decision  of 
a  competent  tribunal,  before  which  both  the  parties  have  had  an 
opportunity  of  appearing  and  prosecuting  their  claims  and  having 
them  fairly  adjudicated.  When  this  is  prevented  by  the  fraud  or 
circumvention  of  one  of  the  parties,  without  the  fault  or  negligence  of 
the  other,  the  decree  or  judgment  of  the  court  ceases  to  have  its 
binding  effect,  and  it  is  competent  for  the  party  injured  to  resort  to  a 
court  of  chancery  to  obtain  relief."  **^  Thus,  in  one  case,  a  per- 
petual injunction  was  granted,  in  order  to  stay  proceedings  on  a 
judgment  at  law  outained  in  a  suit  instituted  in  the  name  of  a  person 

no  knowledge  of  the  fraud  before  final  Judgment  was  rendered.  Noll  v. 
Chattanooga  Go.  (Tenn.  Ch.)  38  S.  W.  287.    And  see  infra,  §  378. 

126  Hugging  V.  King,  3  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  616;  Spencer  v.  Vigneaux,  20  Cal. 
442;  Cummins  v.  White,  4  Blackf.  (Ind.)  356;  Mack  v.  Doty,  Harr.  (Mich.) 
366;  I'oindexter  v.  Waddy,  6  Munf.  (Va.)  418,  8  Am.  Dec.  749;  De  Louis 
y.  Meek,  2  G.  Greene  (Iowa)  55,  50  Am.  Dec.  491;  Lazarus  V.  McGuirk, 
42  La.  Ann.  194,  8  South.  253;  Dodge  v.  Williams,  107  Ga.  410,  33  S.  E.  4GS; 
MltcbeU  V.  Kirby  (Ky.)  38  S.  W.  507. 

i«T  Lockwood  V.  Mitchell,  19  Ohio,  448,  53  Am.  Dec.  438.  This  was  also 
the  ground  of  the  decision  in  the  remarkable  litigation  reported  as  "The 
Wagner  Cases,"  59  Md.  313. 

(585) 


§    370  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  {fihm   15 

not  interested,  whose  name  was  used  only  for  the  purpose  of  prevent- 
ing a  defense  which  the  defendant  had  against  the  real  plaintiff  in 
interest.^'*  So,  equity  will  relieve  where,  in  ex  parte  proceedings 
in  foreign  attachment,  advantage,  after  being  waited  for,  has  been 
deliberately  taken  of  a  complainant's  absence  to  obtain,  without  his 
knowledge,  a  judgment  upon  a  claim  to  which  he  has  a  sufficient  de- 
fense either  at  law  or  in  equity,  and  to  sell  his  land  for  an  inadequate 
price  to  the  plaintiff  in  the  attachment  suit.^*'  It  is  to  be  observed 
that  the  rule  that  a  judgment  silences  all  defenses  which  might  have 
been  urged  against  its  rendition  cannot  be  invoked  in  an  action  to 
enjoin  its  execution  for  fraud,  when  the  fraud  alleged  consists  in  acts 
of  the  party  which  prevented  his  adversary  from  setting  up  his  de- 
fenses.^'® At  the  same  time,  a  party  to  an  action  at  law  must  not  be 
too  credulous,  nor  rely  too  easily  upon  mere  suggestions  or  repre- 
sentations made  to  him  by  his  adversary.  Though  the  conduct  of  his 
opponent  may  have  been  tricky  or  evasive,  it  is  his  own  duty  to  be 
careful  and  ^agilant,  and  he  cannot  obtain  relief  in  equity,  on  this 
ground,  unless  he  shows  that  he  is  free  from  the  charge  of  negligence 
or  lack  of  due  attention  to  his  case.*** 

§  370.    Fraud  In  Proenrijis  thm  Ji&d8;BteAt« 

While  it  is  true  that  equity  will  not  generally  listen  to  an  impeach- 
ment of  a  judgment  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  when  the  fraud  alleged 
was  antecedent  to  the  judgment  and  was  or  might  have  been  litigated 
in  the  action  at  law,  yet  fraud  practised  in  the  very  matter  of  obtain- 
ing the  judgment  is  regarded  as  perpetrated  upon  the  court  as  well 
as  upon  the  injured  party,  and  a  judgment  so  procured  may  be  en- 
joined."*   The  rule  has  been  thus  stated:    "The  question  of  fraud 

128  Greenlcaf  v.  Maher,  2  Wash.  C.   C.  ot>3,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  5,780. 
i»»  Herbert  v.  Herbert,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  11,  20  Atl.  290. 

180  Lazarus  v.  McGuirk,  42  La.  Ann.  194,  8  South.  253. 

181  See  Hoey  v.  Jackson,  31  Fla.  541,  13  South.  459;  Collins  t.  Scott  100 
Cal.  446,  34  Pac.  1085;  German  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Perry,  45  111.  App.  197. 

182  Muscatine  v.  Mississippi  &  M.^R.  Co.,  1  Dill.  586,  Fed.  Cas.  Xo.  9,971: 
California  Beet  Sugar  Co.  v.  Porter,'68  Cal.  369,  9  Pac.  313;  Lee  t.  Harmoa 
84  Mo.  App.  157;  Watts  v.  Fnizer,  80  Ala.  186;  Hogg  v.  Link,  90  Ind.  346: 
Pearce  v.  Olney,  20  Conn.  544;   Asbury  ▼.  Fri8z»  148  Ind.  513,  47  N.  E.  32S: 

(580) 


Ch.   15)  RBMEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  370 

which  is  open  to  examination  in  such  case  is  as  to  something  which 
intervened  in  the  proceedings  by  which  the  judgment  was  obtained, 
and  it  must  have  occurred  in  the  very  concoction  or  procuring  of 
the  judgment,  and  not  have  been  known  to  the  opposite  party  at  the 
time,  and  for  not  knowing  which  he  is  not  chargeable  with  neglect 
or  inattention.  The  fraud  must  consist  in  something  of  which  the 
complaining  party  could  not  have  availed  himself  in  the  court  giving 
the  judgment,  or  of  which  he  was  prevented  from  availing  himself 
there  by  fraud."  ^"'  Or,  as  otherwise  stated,  the  fraud  alleged  must 
be  extrinsic  or  collateral  to  the  matters  involved  in  the  issues  or  the 
trial  at  law.^'*  Where,  as  in  some  of  the  states,  the  statutes  author- 
ize the  courts  to  vacate  their  own  judgments  for  "fraud"  practised  by 
the  successful  party  in  obtaining  them,  it  is  held  that  the  word 
"fraud"  is  used  in  its  common  and  direct  sense;  it  means  fraud  in 
fact,  not  fraud  in  law,  and  embraces  only  intentional  wrong.^**  The 
fraud  which  will  justify  a  court  of  equity  in  thus  interfering  may  as- 
sume various  shapes.  It  may  consist  in  deceit  and  imposition  prac- 
tised upon  the  court,  as  a  means  of  obtaining  a  judgment  which 

Turner  v.  Colson  (Ky.)  55  S.  W.  551;  Schroer  v.  Pettibone,  16S  111.  42,  45  N. 
E.  207. 

i««  StllweU  V.  Carpenter,  2  Abb.  N.  C.  (N.  Y.)  238;  Seals  v.  Weldon,  121 
Ala.  319»  25  South.  1021. 

"*  Irvine  v.  Leyh,  124  Mo.  361,  27  S.  W.  512;  United  States  v.  Throck- 
morton, 98  U.  S.  61,  25  L.  Ed.  93.  A  default  judgment  recovered  by  means 
of  false  statements  In  respect  to  a  fact  essential  to  the  right  of  recovery, 
which  deceived  both  the  defendant  and  the  court,  cannot  be  set  aside  by  a  suit 
in  equity,  as  this  is  not  a  collateral  or  extrinsic  fraud.  Ritchie  v.  McMullen, 
25  C.  O.  A.  50,  79  Fed.  522.  Equity  cannot  set  aside  an  adjudication  at  law 
determining  and  locating  the  quantity  of  lands  required  for  a  public  use  merely 
because  the  parties  who  brought  about  the  adjudication  had  a  fraudulent  or 
iUegal  intent;  but  it  must  appear  that  the  court  itself  proceeded  fraudulently, 
or  in  excess  of  its  powers,  or  that  it  committed  a  gross  mistake,  or  was  im- 
posed upon  by  fraudulent  methods.  Coe  v.  Aiken  (C.  0.)  61  Fed.  24.  But 
it  has  been  said  that  the  rule  that  fraud  for  which  equity  will  vacate  a  judg- 
ment must  be  fraud  in  procuring  the  judgment,  is  not  to  be  applied  in  all  its 
strictness  to  a  judgment  based  on  service  by  publication  against  one  who 
bad  no  actual  notice;  but  relief  will  be  given  in  such  case  on  proof  that 
the  judgment  was  entered  on  a  cause  of  action  known  to  be  without  founda- 
tion.   Irvine  v.  Leyh,  102  Mo.  200,  14  S.  W.  715,  16  S.  W.  10. 

nsOhio  &  W.  Mortgage  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Carter,  9  Kan.  App.  621,  58  Pac. 
1040.    And  see  Williams  v.  Lumpkin,  86  Tex.  041,  26  S.  W.  493. 

(587) 


§   370  LAW  OF  JUDQMENTS.  (Ch.   15 

never  ought  to  have  been  rendered/**  or  in  the  act  of  the  successful 
party  in  illegally  tampering  with  the  jury,**^  or  in  his  wrongful  con- 
duct in  obtaining  a  judgment  and  a  sale  of  defendant's  property  by 
a  surreptitious  use  of  legal  process  and  proceedings/**  or  in  collu- 
sion. Thus,  collusion  between  the  plaintiff  and  the  judge  or  ijustice 
who  rendered  the  judgment  will  be  ground  for  enjoining  its  execu- 
tion.^** So  a  judgment  against  an  estate  may  be  enjoined  when  it  is 
shown  to  have  been  obtained  by  means  of  collusion  between  the  ex- 
ecutor or  administrator  and  the  alleged  creditor  or  claimant.***  And 
the  same  is  true  of  a  judgment  against  a  corporation  recovered  by 
collusion  between  its  president  and  the  plaintiff.***  Again,  one  not 
a  party  to  an  account,  who  causes  an  action  to  be  begun  thereon  for 
his  own  benefit,  but  ostensibly  for  the  plaintiff,  by  whom  all  interest 
in  the  action  and  in  the  judgment  is  disclaimed,  should  be  enjoined 
from  enforcing  the  judgment.***  Where  a  claim  on  which  an  action 
had  been  brought  was  settled  before  the  term  of  the  court  began,  and 
the  plaintiff  wrongfully  entered  the  action  and  took  judgment,  the 

136  Benson  y.  Anderson,  10  Utah,  135,  37  Pac.  256;  Larson  t.  WUliams,  100 
Iowa,  110,  69  N.  W.  441,  62  Am.  St.  Rep.  544;  Wickersbam  y.  Gomerford,  96 
Cal.  433*  31  Pac.  358.  But  a  court  of  equity  wlU  not  set  aside  a  Judgment 
rendered  by  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction,  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  be- 
cause of  false  statements  made  by  the  defendants  to  the  court  as  to  their 
financial  condition,  by  which  the  court  was  induced  to  render,  and  the  plain- 
tiff to  accept,  a  Judgment  for  less  than  the  amount  actually  due.  United 
States  y.  Beebe,  34  G.  G.  A.  321,  92  Fed.  244.  So,  aH  independent  suit  can- 
not he  maintained  In  equity  to  set  aside  a  decree  aUottlng  a  homestead  to 
the  widow  of  a  decedent,  on  the  ground  that,  in  procuring  such  decree,  she 
misrepresented  to  the  court  the  facts  as  to  the  property.  Hanley  y.  Hanley, 
114  Cal.  690,  46  Pac.  736.  Again,  proof  that  eyidence  which  would  go  to 
preyent  the  recoyery  of  a  Judgment  was  eoUusiyely  withheld  from  the  court 
is  not  alone  sufficient  to  establish  fraud  or  imposition;  it  must  also  appear 
that  the  Judgment  was  in  fact  unjust  First  Baptist  Ghurch  t.  Syma,  51 
N.  J.  Eq.  363,  28  Atl.  461. 

i»7  Piatt  y.  ThreadglU  (C.  C.)  80  Fed.  192. 

188  Herbert  y.  Herbert.  49  N.  J.  Eq.  565,  25  Atl.  366. 

189  Kimble  y.  Short,  2  Kan.  App.  130,  43  Pac  317;  Hason  ▼.  Qulnii,  9 
Lrz,  Leg.  Reg.  (Pa.)  543. 

i40Elting  y.  Fhrst  Nat.  Bank,  173  HI.  368,  50  X.  E.  1095;  First  Baptist 
Church  y.  Syms  (N.  J.)  31  AU.  717;   Ramsey  y.  Hicks,  53  Mo.  App.  190. 

141  Babcock  Hardware  Go.  y.  Farmers'  &  Drovers*  Bank,  54  Kan.  273,  35 
Pac.  256. 

142  Marchman  y.  Sewell,  93  Ga.  653,  21  S.  £.  172. 

(588) 


Ch.   15)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  871 

court  in  equity  granted  an  injunction  against  the  execution.^**  So 
where  a  written  agreement  was  made,  on  the  understanding  that  pay- 
ment might  be  made  in  money,  or  in  property  at  a  valuation  by  two 
honest  men,  and  that  this  understanding  should  be  indorsed  upon  the 
agreement,  which  the  party  afterwards  refused  to  do,  but  took  judg- 
ment on  the  contract,  it  was  held  that  chancery  would  consider  the 
indorsement  as  made  and  would  enjoin  the  judgment.***  But  in 
order  to  obtain  this  relief  it  is  essential  that  the  complainant  himself 
should  be  entirely  free  from  any  fraud  or  improper  conduct.  Thus 
a  party  against  whom  a  judgment  has  been  entered  on  a  bond  cannot 
obtain  relief  in  equity,  against  such  judgment,  on  the  ground  that  he 
was  acting  as  the  agent  of  the  judgment  plaintiff  in  the  sale  of  terri- 
tory in  which  to  sell  a  patented  article,  and  that  such  bond  was  only 
a  sham,  by  which  to  induce  others  to  purchase  patent  rights,  and  was 
never  to  be  enforced  against  him.***^ 

S  371.    Deeeit  and  CoAoealm^nt. 

Where  a  judgment  at  law  has  been  procured  by  artifice  or  con- 
cealment on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  and  the  court  where  the  fratid 
has  been  perpetrated  is  not  able  to  afford  adequate  relief,  a  court  of 
equity  will  take  hold  of  the  party  who  has  committed  the  fraud  and 
will  prevent  his  using  the  judgment  to  the  injury  of  his  adversary.*** 

i*»DevoU  V.  Scales,  49  Me.  320;  Gates  v.  Steele,  58  Conn.  316,  20  Ati. 
474,  18  Am.  St.  Rep.  268. 

144  Dandrldge  v.  Harris,  1  Wash.  (Va.)  326,  1  Am.  Dec.  465. 

w5  Bamett  v.  Barnett,  83  Va.  504,  2  S.  E.  733. 

i4«  Tomklns  v.  Tomklns,  11  N.  J.  Eq.  512;  Griffith  v.  Reynolds,  4  Grat. 
(Va.)  46;  Pratt  v.  Northam,  5  Mason,  05,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  11,376;  Fish  v. 
Lane,  3  N.  C.  342;  Spencer  v.  Vlgneaux,  20  Cal.  442;  Mosby  v.  Glsborn,  17 
Utah,  257,  54  Pac.  121.  But  a  defendant  cannot  claim  fraud  In  the  rendering 
of  a  judgment  against  him  merely  because  the  plaintiff  therein  did  not  volun- 
teer information  immaterial  to  the  Issues,  and  which  could  have  been  used 
only  to  affect  the  credibility  of  witnesses.  Long  v.  Gilbert  (Tenn.)  59  S. 
W.  414.  A  compromise  judgment  will  not  be  set  aside  on  the  ground  of  fraud, 
because  of  representations  by  the  defendants  that  they  were  without  prop- 
erty, and  that  nothing  could  be  realized  by  execution  against  them,  when 
no  representations  are  made  with  respect  to  the  merits  of  the  cause  of  ac- 
tion, and  especially  where  the  complaint  itself  is  based  upon  the  fact  of  their 
insolvency.  United  States  v.  Beebe,  180  U.  S.  343,  21  Sup.  Ct.  371,  45  L. 
Ed.  563. 

(589) 


§  372  I.AW  OF  JUDQMENIS.  (Cb.   15 

Thus  a  vendee  of  land  may  come  into  equity  to  enjoin  a  judgment  at 
law  on  the  notes  given  for  purchase-money,  upon  alleging  the  ven- 
dor's fraudulent  representations  of  title  in  himself,  a  breach  of  his 
warranty  of  title,  and  the  insolvency  of  his  estate.**^  So  on  ac- 
count of  a  deficiency^  in  the  quantity  of  the  land  sold,  which  would 
entitle  the  vendee  to  a  diminution  of  the  price. ^*'  So  on  account  of 
a  representation  that  the  property  was  free  from  charges,  when  in 
fact  it  was  incumbered  bv  liens  for  more  than  its  value.***  In  a  case 
where  the  sureties  on  a  replevin-bond  alleged  that  they  had  been  in- 
duced, while  in  a  state  of  intoxication,  to  sign  a  blank  paper,  upon 
which  the  bond  was  afterwards  written  in,  it  was  held  that  equity 
would  not  relieve  them  unless  it  were  shown  that  an  unfair  advantage 
had  been  taken  of  their  condition  to  their  detriment.*'*  But  equity 
will  relieve  against  a  judgment  entered  on  an  agreement  to  which  one 
defendant's  name  was  forged,  although, the  co-defendant  who  forged 
it  was  the  only  culpable  party,  the  judgment  being  entered  under  a 
mistake  of  fact.*** 

§  372.    Perjvrj. 

Whether  relief  will  be  granted  in  equity  on  the  ground  that  the 
judgment  was  procured  by  the  perjury  of  the  plaintiff  or  a  witness,  is 
disputed.    There  are  some  English  and  American  cases  holding  that 

« 

such  action  is  proper,  where  adequate  redress  cannot  be  had  at  law, 
and  where  the  proof  to  convict  the  perjured  witness  could  not  be 
obtained  in  time  to  be  used  on  the  trial.*'*    And  in  at  least  one  state 

i*T  Walton  V.  Bonham,  24  Ala.  513;  Wray's  Adm*rs  v.  Fumlss,  27  Ala. 
471;  Cox  V.  Jerman,  41  N.  C.  526;  Graham  v.  Tankersley,  15  Ala.  634;  Jaynes 
V.  Brock,  10  Grat.  (Va.)  211;  Gray  v.  Ward  (Tenn.)  52  S.  W.  1028. 

i4«  Davis  V.  Millaudon,  14  La.  Ann.  868. 

i*»  Poe  V.  Decker,  5  Ind.  150.    Compare  Amfck  v.  Bowyer,  3  W.  Va.  7. 

150  Campbell  v.  Ketcham,  1  Bibb  (Ky.)  406. 

151  Lindsley  v.  Sparks,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  56,  48  S.  W.  204. 

162  Coddrington  v.  Webb,  2  Vern.  240;  Tovey  v.  Young,  Finch,  Prec.  Ch. 
103;  Peagram  v.  King,  9  N.  C.  605;  Burgess  v.  Lovengood,  55  N.  C.  457. 
The  United  States  supreme  court  has  held  that  a  court  of  equity  may  enter- 
tain a  suit  to  enjoin  the  enforcement  of  a  judgment  at  law  when  the  bill 
alleges  that  the  judgment  was  obtained  by  the  use  of  a  forged  letter  as 
evidence,  the  complainant  being  ignorant  of  the  existence  of  such  evhl-nce 
before  the  trial,  and  not  discovering  its  falsity  until  too  late  to  move  for  a 
new  trial,  and  not  being  guilty  of  any  laches  in  the  matter.    Man^ball    t. 

(590) 


Ch.   15)  RBLIBP  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  378 

(Minnesota)  the  statutes  authorize  a  suit  to  be  brought  to*  set  aside 
a  judgment  obtained  by  the  fraud  or  perjury  of  the  prevailing 
party.* °'  In  some  other  jurisdictions,  it  is  thought  that  if  a  party  to 
a  suit  intentionally  procures  and  produces  false  testimony,  suborning 
his  witnesses  to  perjury  and  conspiring  with  them  to  secure  a  judg- 
ment, this  amounts  to  such  fraud  as  will  enable  the  adverse  party,  if 
defeated  in  the  suit,  to  secure  an  injunction  against  the  judgment**^* 
But  this  doctrine  is  denied  in  other  states,*'^*  and  indeed  the  general 
current  of  authority  is  now  in  favor  of  the  rule  that  perjury  commit- 
ted by  the  successful  party  or  his  witnesses  at  the  trial  is  no  sufficient 
ground  for  vacating  the  judgment  or  enjoining  its  enforcement.*** 

§  373.    TakiAK  Jndsntent  eontrary  to  Asreement. 

If  the  plaintiff  or  his  attorney  makes  promises  or  representations 
to  the  defendant,  to  the  effect  that  the  suit  will  not  be  pressed,  or 
brought  to  trial,  or  will  be  dismissed,  or  that  credits  will  be  allowed, 
or  that  no  recovery  will  be  sought  against  him,  or  any  other  similar 
matter,  to  induce  him  to  refrain  from  defending  the  case,  and  if  the 
latter,  honestly  relying  upon  the  understanding  thus  established, 
omits  to  present  his  defense,  notwithstanding  which  the  plaintiff 
fraudulently  and  in  violation  of  the  agreement  proceeds  to  take  a 

Holmes,  141  U.  S.  589,  12  Sup.  Ct  62,  35  L.  Ed.  870.  A  final  decree  which 
plaintiff  permits  to  go  against  him  because  of  false  answers  under  oath  by 
defendants,  plaintiff  being  unable  to  present  evidence  to  overcome  the  same, 
is  vitiated  by  fraud  and  may  be  annulled.  Graver  v.  Faurot,  22  G.  G.  A. 
156»  76  Fed.  257. 

IBS  Gen.  St.  Minn.  1894,  §  5434.  See  Watkins  v.  Landon,  67  Minn.  186, 
69  N.  W.   711. 

15*  Barr  v.  Post,  59  Neb.  361,  80  N.  W.  1041,  80  Am.  St.  Rep.  680;  Meyers 
V.  Smith,  59  Neb.  30,  80  N.  W.  273;  Camp  v.  Ward,  69  Vt.  286,  37  Atl.  747, 
60  Am.  St.  Rep.  929. 

i*»  Maryland  Steel  Co.  v.  Marney,  91  Md.  360,  46  Atl.  1077;  Noll  v.  Chat- 
tanooga Co.  (Tenn.)  38  S.  W.  287;   Ross  v.  Wood,  70  N.  Y.  8. 

156  Demerit  v.  Lyford,  27  N.  H.  541;  Gott  v.  Carr,  6  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  309; 
Smith  V.  Lowry,  1  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  320;  Woodruff  v.  Johnston,  61  N.  Y. 
Super.  Ct  348,  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  861;  Ootzhausen  v.  Kerting  (C.  C.)  29  Fed. 
821;  Latimer  v.  Dean,  31  Plttsb.  Leg.  J.  (N.  S.)  192;  Smedes  v.  Ilsley,  68 
Miss.  590,  10  South.  75;  Guthrie  v.  Doud,  33  111.  App.  68;  Barr  v.  Post,  59 
Xeb.  361.  80  N.  W.  1041,  80  Am.  St.  Rep.  680;  Friese  v.  Hummel,  26  Or. 
145,  37  Pac.  458,  46  Am.  St  Rep.  610. 

(591) 


§   373  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  ifi^'   1^ 

judgment,  equity  will  grant  relief  by  injunction.*'^  So  where  a  judg- 
ment is  fraudulently  taken  by  default  in  violation  of  an  agreement 
for  a  compromise,  the  interposition  of  a  defense  being  thus  prevent- 
ed, its  enforcement  will  be  restrained,  and  titles  acquired  under  it 
(with  notice)  will  be  voidable  in  equity."*  So  equity  will  relieve 
against  a  judgment  obtained  by  inducing  the  defendant  to  withdraw 
an  equitable  plea  filed  in  the  case,  by  a  promise  of  the  plaintiff  that 
if  such  plea  were  withdrawn  he  would  do  the.  equity  set  up  in  the 
plea,  which  he  failed  to  do.^**  In  another  case,  where  the  maker  of 
a  promissory  note  held  a  receipt,  acknowledging  payment  thereof, 
from  the  indorsee,  who  sued  upon  the  note,  representing  to  the 
maker  that  he  did  not  intend  to  enforce  its  collection  against  him, 
but  against  the  payee,  and  judgment  was  accordingly  rendered  by 
default,  it  was  held  that  an  injunction  should  be  granted  perpetually 
restraining  the  collection  of  the  judgment  from  the  maker.*** 
Where  a  defendant  suffers  judgment  to  be  taken  against  him  in  con- 

157  Pearce  v.  Olney,  20  Conn.  544;  Chambers  v.  Bobbins,  28  Conn.  552; 
Delaney  v.  Brown,  72  Vt.  844,  47  Atl.  1067;  Hinckley  v.  MUes.  15  Hun  (X. 
Y.)  170;  Dobson  v.  Pearce,  12  N.  Y.  156,  62  Am.  Dec.  152;  Moore  ▼.  Gamble, 
9  N.  J.  Eq.  246;  MUler  v.  Harrison,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  76;  Chase  y.  Manhardt  1 
Bland  (Md.)  333;  Kent  v.  Bicards,  3  Md.  Ch.  392;  Holland  t.  Trotter,  22 
Grat.  (Va.)  136;  Jarman  ▼.  Saunders,  64  N.  C.  367;  Markham  ▼.  Angler. 
57  Ga.  43;  Purviance  v.  Edwards,  17  Fla.  140;  Brooks  y.  Whit8<Mi,  7  Smedes 
&  M.  (Miss.)  513;  Newman  y.  Meek,  Smedes  &  M.  Gh.  (Miss.)  331;  Buniler 
y.  Rice,  21  Tex.  171;  Williams  y.  Fowler,  2  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  405;  Broaddns 
y.  Broaddus,  3  Dana  (Ky.)  536;  Edmondson  y.  Moseby's  Heirs,  4  J.  J.  Mar>i.. 
(Ky.)  497;  Xewnan  v.  Stuart,  5  Hayw.  (Tenn.)  78;  Brandon  v.  Green,  7 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  130;  Stone  y.  Lewman,  28  Ind.  97;  Johnson's  Adm'ra  t. 
Unyersaw,  30  Ind.  435;  Wlerich  y.  De  Zoya,  2  GHman  (IlL)  385;  Beams 
y.  Denham,  2  Scam.  (111.)  58;  How  y.  Mortell,  28  111.  479;  Bogers  v.  Qwlnn. 
21  Iowa,  58;  De  Louis  y.  Meek,  2  G.  Greene  (Iowa)  55,  50  Am.  Dec.  491; 
Baker  v.  Redd,  44  Iowa,  179;  Perry  y.  Slter,  37  Mo.  273;  Boberts  ▼.  Miles, 
12  Mich.  297;  Scrlven  y.  Hursh,  39  Mich.  98;  Keeler  y.  Elston,  22  Xeb.  310. 
34  X.  W.  891;  Sanderson  y.  Voelcker,  51  Mo.  App.  328;  HamUton  y.  WoodL 
55  Minn.  482,  57  N.  W.  208;  Helm  y.  Butin  (Cal.)  40  Pac.  39;  McLeran  t. 
McXamara,  55  Cal.  508. 

158  Murphy  y.  Smith.  86  Mo.  333;  Nealls  y.  Dicks,  72  Ind.  874;  Bridge- 
port Say.  Bank  y.  Eldredge,  28  Conn.  556,  73  Am.  Dec.  688;  Bogers  y.  Gwfain, 
21  Iowa,  58;  Hlbbard  y.  Eastman,  47  N.  H.  507.  93  Am.  Dec  467;  Kent  T. 
Rlcards.  3  Md.  Ch.  392;    Brake  y.  Payne,  137  Ind;  479,  37  K  £.  140. 

looMnrkham  y.  Angier,  57  Ga.  43. 
i«o  Baker  y.  Redd.  44  Iowa,  179. 
(592) 


Ch.   15)  RBLIBP  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  374 

sideration  of  an  agreement  on  the  plaintiff's  part  that  no  money  need 
be  paid  on  it  except  upon  the  happening  of  a  certain  event,  the  plain- 
tiff will  not  be  permitted  to  exact  payment  in  violation  of  the  agree- 
ment.**^ So  where  the  liability  of  the  principal  had  been  fixed  and 
discharged,  and  the  surety  had  been  lulled  into  security  by  the  delu- 
sive promises  of  his  creditor  and  had  been  the  victim  of  artifice  and 
circumvention,  and  the  judgment  against  him  was  obtained  in  con- 
tempt of  an  injunction,  and  the  assertion  of  any  right  under  it 
would  be  fraudulent,  it  was  considered  a  proper  case  for  the  inter- 
vention of  equity.**^  In  order  to  induce  a  court  of  equity  to  declare 
a  judgment  confessed  for  a  certain  amount  to  be  merely  collateral 
security  for  rwhatever  sum  might  be  found  due  from  defendant  to 
plaintiff,  the  court  must  be  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that 
such  was  the  agreement  of  the  parties,  but  upon  being  so  satisfied 
it  will  enjoin  the  enforcement  of  the  judgment,  on  the  ground  that  to 
enforce  it  would  be  a  fraud  on  the  defendant.**'  A  judgment  recov- 
ered before  a  justice  for  an  unjust  amount,  after  an  executed  agree- 
ment of  settlement,  relied  on  by  the  defendant,  but  invalid  because 
made  on  Sunday,  will  be  enjoined  in  equity.*** 

§  374*    Unantliorised  Appearance  of  Attorney. 

It  was  the  rule  of  the  early  English  law  that  where  a  regular  attor- 
ney of  the  court  appeared  and  answered  for  the  defendant  in  a  suit 
at  law,  a  judgment  recovered  by  the  plaintiff  would  not  be  vacated, 
nor  execution  enjoined  by  a  court  of  equity,  though  the  attorney 
appeared  without  authority  from  the  defendant,  unless  it  were  shown 
that  the  attorney  was  not  of  sufficient  ability  to  answer  for  the  dam- 
ages caused  by  his  unauthorized  act,  or  there  had  been  collusion  be- 
tween him  and  the  plaintiff.  And  this  view  was  at  one  time  gen- 
erally favored  by  the  American  courts,  and  even  now  it  still  retains 
its  force  in  some  few  jurisdictions.***     But  in  the  progressive  de- 

i«i  Moore  v.  Barclay,  16  Ala.  158. 

f  2  Cage  V.  Cassidy,  S»  How.  109,  16  h.  Ed.  430.  And  see  Cassldy  v. 
Antomatic  Time  Stamp  Co.,  185  lU.  431,  56  N.  E.  1116. 

i«»Keighler  v.  Savage  Manufg  Co.,  12  Md.  383,  71  Am'.  Dec.  600.  See 
Gooper  v.  l>ler,  46  ill.  462,  95  Am.  Dec.  442. 

i««  Blakealey  v.  Johnson,  13  Wis.  530. 

i«»  Bunton  v.  Lyford,  37  N.  H.  512,  75  Am.  Dec.  144;  Smyth  v.  Bnlch,  40 
1  LAW  JUDG.-38  (593^ 


§   374  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  IS 

velopment  of  the  law,  this  harsh  and  inequitable  rule  has  fallen  into 
desuetude.  It  has  been  abandoned  by  the  English  courts. '••  And 
in  this  country,  almost  universally,  it  is  now  held  that  equity  may  en- 
join the  collection  of  a  judgment,  unjust  in  itself,  which  was  procured 
upon  the  appearance  of  an  attorney  without  authority,  without  any 
regard  to  the  question  of  the  latter's  solvency  and  ability  to  respond 
in  damages.^®^  But  the  complainant  must  make  it  appear  that  the 
judgment  is  inequitable  in  itself,  by  reason  of  some  fraud  or  trick  or 
collusion,  or  that  the  result  would  or  'might  have  been  different  if 
there  had  been  a  full  and  fair  trial  upon  the  merits.***  If  an  attor- 
ney, assuming  without  authority  to  act  for  a  plaintiff,  brings  a  suit 
and  loses  it,  the  defendant  recovering  a  judgment  for,  costs,  equity 
will  restrain  the  enforcement  of  such  judgment  in  the  same  circum- 
stances which  would  induce  it  to  relieve  the  defendant  in  the  converse 
case.*** 

X.  H.  363;  HoflFmire  t.  HoflFmlre,  3  Edw.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  174;  Americui  Ins. 
Go.  y.  Oakley,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.)  496.  38  Am.  Dec.  561.    See  1  Salk.  86. 

!•«  Bayley  y.  Buekland,  L.  R.  1  Exeh.  1;  Robson  y.  Eaton,  1  Term  R.  G2: 
Hubbart  v.  Phillips,  13  Mees.  &  W.  702. 

i«7  United  States  y.  Throckmorton,  98  U.  S.  61,  25  L.  Ed.  93;  Harshey  t. 
Blackmarr,  20  Iowa,  161,  89  Am.  Dec.  520;  De  Louis  y.  Meek,  2  G.  Greeue 
(Iowa)  no,  50  Am.  Dec.  491;  Critchfleld  y.  Porter,  3  Ohio,  518;  Allen  y.  Stone. 
10  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  547;  Jones  y.  WiUJamson,  5  Cold.  (Tenn.)  371;  Karrel  y. 
Manouyrler,  14  La.  Ann.  3,  74  Am.  Dec.  424;  Glfford  y.  Thorn,  9  N.  J.  Eq. 
702;  Cassidy  y.  Automatic  Time  Stamp  Co.,  185  lU.  431,  56  N.  E.  1116;  Hand- 
ley  y.  Jackson,  31  Or.  552,  50  Fac.  915,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  839;  Kanfmann  t. 
Drexel,  56  Neb.  229,  76  N.  W.  559;  HoUinger  y.  Reeme,  138  Ind.  363,  315 
N.  E.  1114,  24  L.  R.  A.  46,  46  Am.  St  Rep.  402;  Smith  y.  Johnson,  44  W. 
Va.  278,  29  S.  K.  509.  In  United  States  y.  Throckmorton,  supra.  Mr.  Justice 
Miller  said:  "Where  the  unsuccessful  party  has  been  preyented  from  ex- 
hibiting fully  his  case,  by  fraud  or  deception  practiced  on  him  by  his  op- 
ponent, as  by  keeping  him  away  from  court,  [or  by]  a  false  promise  of  s 
compromise;  or  where  the  defendant  neyer  had  knowledge  of  the  suit  beSn^ 
kept  in  ignorance  by  the  acts  of  the  plaintiff;  or  where  an  attorney  fraudu- 
lently or  without  authority  assumes  to  represent  a  party  and  conniyes  at  hU 
defeat;  or  where  the  attorney  regularly  employed  corruptly  sells  out  his* 
•client's  Interest  to  the  other  side, — ^these,  and  similar  cases  which  show  that 
there  has  neyer  been  a  real  contest  In  the  trial  or  hearing  of  the  case,  are 
i-easons  for  which  a  new  suit  may  be  sustained  to  set  aside  and  annul  the 
former  judgment  or  decree,  and  open  the  case  for  a  new  and  a  fair  bearin^c.** 

io8Budd  V.  Gamble.  13  Fla.  265;  Harris  y.  6 win,  18  Miss.  563.  Com- 
pare Mills  y.  Scott  (C.  C.)  43  Fed.  452. 

i«»  Smyth  T.  Balch,  40  N.  H.  363;   Robson  y.  Eaton,  1  T^m  R.  62. 

(594) 


Ot  15)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  375 


I  375.    Neslisenee  or  Mistake  of  Comisel. 

It  is  well  settled  that  equity  will  not  relieve  against  a  judgment  at 
law  on  account  of  any  ignorance,  unskilfuUness,  or  mistake  of  the 
party's  attorney  (unless  caused  by  the  opposite  party),  nor  for  coun- 
sel's negligence  or  inattention.^^^  The  fault  is  in  such  cases  attrib- 
uted to  the  party  himself.  Thus  the  neglect  of  an  attorney  to  plead 
a  valid  and  proper  defense,  or  to  attend  the  trial,  either  intentiopally 
or  through  forgetfulness,  and  his  failure  for  like  reasons  to  notify  his 
client  of  the  time  of  trial,  whereby  a  judgment  is  wrongfully  obtained 
against  the  client,  furnishes  no  ground  for  relief  against  the  judg- 
ment.*^' So  a  party  cannot  obtain  a  new  trial  in  equity,  on  the 
ground  that  his  counsel  mistook  the  facts  of  his  defense,  if  he  was 
present  at  the  trial.*''*  Nor  is  it  an  adequate  ground  for  relief  that 
the  counsel  neglected  to  assign  errors  on  an  appeal  in  the  case.*^" 
In  a  case  in  California  it  appeared  that  the  defendant's  attorney  on 
the  trial  objected  to  the  introduction  of  certain  testimony,  and  the 

iTocrim  T.  Handley,  94  U.  S.  652,  24  L.  Ed,  216;  Village  of  CeUna  v. 
Eastpcrt  Sav.  Bank,  15  O.  O.  A.  495,  68  Fed.  401;  Trustees  of  Amherst 
CoUege  V.  Allen,  165  Mass.  178,  42  N.  E.  570;  Scroggln  v.  Hammett  Grocer 
Co.,  66  Ark.  183,  49  S.  W.  820;  Funk  v.  Kansas  Manufg  Co.,  53  Neb.  450,  73 
N.  W.  931;  Sasser  v.  OUlff,  91  Ga.  84,  16  S.  E.  312;  Wynn  v.  Wilson.  1 
Hemp.  698,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  18,116;  Rogers  y.  Parker,  1  Hughes,  148,  Fed. 
Cas.  No.  12,018;  Warner  v.  Conant,  24  Vt.  351,  58  Am.  Dec.  178;  Bm'ton 
V.  Wiley,  26  Vt.  430;  McBroom  v.  Sommervllle,  2  Stew.  (Ala.)  515;  Watts 
T.  Gayle,  20  Ala.  817;  Broda  v.  Greenwald,  66  Ala.  538;  Dibble  v.  Truluck, 
12  Fla.  185;  Barrow  v.  Jones,  1  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  470;  Morton's  Ex*rs  v. 
NonneUy,  3  Hayw.  (Tenn.)  210;  Chester  v.  Apperson,  4  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  639; 
Graham  v.  Roberts,  1  Head.  (Tenn.)  56;  Burton  v.  Hynson,  14  Ark.  32; 
White  V.  Bank  of  United  States,  6  Ohio,  529;  Winchester  v.  Grosvenor,  48 
IlL  517;  Dlnet  v.  Elgenmann,  96  111.  39;  Kern  v.  Strausberger,  71  lU.  413; 
FuUer  v.  Little,  69  lU.  229;  Shricker  v.  Field,  9  Iowa,  366;  Jones  v.  Leech, 
46  Iowa,  186;  Miller  v.  Bernecker,  46  Mo.  194;  Bowman  v.  Field,  9  Mo.  App. 
576;  Huobschman  v.  Baker,  7  Wis.  542;  Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.'  v.  Wal- 
worth County  Bank,  23  Wis.  249;  Boston  v.  Ha>iies,  83  Cal.  31;  Quinn  v. 
Wetherbee,  41  Cal.  217. 

iTi  Sharp  y.  MotUtt,  94  Ind.  240;  Bardonski  v.  Bnrdonski,  144  III.  284.  33 
N.  E.  39;  Payton  v.  McQuown,  97  Ky.  757,  31  S.  W.  874,  31  L.  R.  A.  33,  53  Am. 
St.  Rep.  437;  Fears  v.  Riley,  148  Mo.  49,  49  S.  W.  836. 

172  .Tamison  v.  May,  13  Ark.  600. 

ITS  Miller  y.  Bernecker,  46  Mo.  194;  Dinet  y.  Eigemnann,  96  111.  39. 

(595) 


i   <i76  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  15 

court  erroneously  overruled  the  objection.  An  exception  was  taken 
to  the  ruling,  and  by  reason  of  such  erroneous  ruling  the  plaintiff  re- 
covered judgment.  The  testimony  was  taken  down  by  the  official  re- 
porter, who  failed  to  note  the  objection  and  exception.  The  defend- 
ant moved  for  a  new  trial,  and  adopted  as  his  statement  the  report 
of  the  oiTicial  reporter,  without  observing  the  error  in  the  report,  and 
for  that  reason  failed  to  obtain  a  new  trial.  It  was  held  that  the  mis- 
take had  been  accompanied  by  such  negligence  on  the  part  of  the 
attorney  that  a  court  of  equity  would  not  relieve  against  the  judg- 
ment.*^* A  few  exceptions  to  this  rule  are  to  be  discovered  in  the 
books.  Thus,  in  an  early  case  in  Tennessee,  where  a  defendant  at 
law  had  instructed  his  counsel  in  his  defense,  but  the  plea  was  so 
framed  that  the  evidence  did  not  support  it  and  the  defense  therefore 
failed,  it  was  considered  that  equity  would  be  justified  in  giving  re- 
lief.*^* In  New  York — where,  to  be  sure,  the  practice  is  excessively 
liberal  in  this  respect — ^the  courts  will  entertain  a  motion  for  the 
vacation  of  a  judgment  on  the  ground  of  the  neglect  or  mistake  of 
counsel.  With  a  fine  spirit  of  humanity,  but  with  little  regard  for 
the  settled  principles  of  law,  they  declare  that  they  will  not  suffer  a 
client  to  be  ruined  because  he  has  employed  an  incompetent  or  un- 
worthy attorney.*^* 

§  376.    TXTaat  of  JvrUdiotioB. 


It  is  generally  held  that  where  a  judgment  at  law  is  void  for  wan: 
of  jurisdiction,  no  summons  or  notice  having  been  served  on  the  de- 
fendant, nor  opportunity  given  him  for  defense,  nor  any  appearance 
entered  by  or  for  him,  equity  will  relieve  against  the  judgment,  if  it 
be  shown  that  there  is  a  meritorious  defense  to  the  action.*''    And 

1T4  Qulnn  V.  Wetherbee,-41  Oal.  247. 

1T6  Click  V.  Gillespie,  4  Hayw.  CTenn.)  4. 

iT«  Sharp  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  City  of  New  York,  31  Barb.  578. 

1T7  Myers  v.  Daniels,  59  X.  C.  1;  Morgan  r.  Scott,  Minor  (Ala.)  81.  1- 
Am.  Dec.  35;  Brooks  v.  Harrison,  2  Ala.  209;  Secor  v.  Woodward,  8  Ala.  ri<»i: 
Crafts  V.  Dexter,  8  Ala.  767,  42  Am.  Dec.  666;  Stubbs  v.  Leavitt,  30  Alt.  Z:<1: 
Robinson  t.  Reid's  Ex*r,  50  Ala.  69;  Dunklin  v.  Wilson,  64  Ala.  162;  Southern 
Ex.  Co.  V.  Craft,  43  Miss.  568;  McFaddin  v.  Spejicer,  18  Tex.  440;  Wofford  t. 
Booker,  10  Tex,  Civ.  A  pp.  171,  30  S.  W.  67;  Jenninirs  v.  Shiner  (Tex.  CIt. 
App.)  43  S.  W.  276;  Tucker  y.  Wllliamg  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  56  S.  W.  585;  Walktr 

(590) 


Ch.   15)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  376 

the  fact  that  the  law-court,  in  rendering  judgment,  passed  on  the 
sufficiency  of  an  alleged  service  of  the  notice  is  not  a  bar  to  a  read- 
judication  of  the  question  in  an  action  to  restrain  execution  of  the 
judg^ent.^^*  It  is  also  held  that  where  a  judgment  passes  against 
a  party  before  actual  notice  to  him,  although  a  copy  of  the  writ  was 
left  at  his  residence,  he  being  then  absent  from  the  state,  equity  will 
relieve  if  there  is  a  substantial  defense.*^*  But  it  is  no  ground  for 
relief  that  the  defendant  forgot  that  the  writ  was  served  upon  him, 
whereby  he  was  prevented  from  appearing  and  defending,^*®  or  that 
he  erroneously  supposed  the  suit  was  intended  to  be  against  another 
person.^  *^  Nor  will  equity  relieve  on  account  of  the  want  of  notice, 
where  it  appears  that  the  rendition  of  the  judgment  was  suspended, 
by  consent,  until  the  opinion  of  the  supreme  court  in  another  case 
between  the  same  parties  could  be  had,  and  that  the  judgment  was 
not  given  until  after  such  opinion  had  been  obtained.***  Chancery 
has  also  refused  to  interfere  in  a  case  where  the  defendant,  not  deny- 
ing that  he  had  been  duly  served,  alleged  that  he  was  not  a  citizen  or 
resident  of  the  state  and  had  been  fraudulently  decoyed  within  the 
jurisdiction  in  order  to  procure  service  on  him ;  for,  said  the  court, 
the  objection  should  have  been  taken  by  appearing  in  the  original  suit 
and  moving  to  set  aside  the  service.***  Applications  of  this  char- 
acter are  most  commonly  made  in  cases  where,  out  of  several  defend- 

v.  Wynne,  3  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  62;  Ingle  v.  McOurry,  1  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  26;  Ridgeway 
V.  Bank  of  Tenn.,  11  Humph.  523;  Ryan  v.  Boyd,  33  Ark.  778;  Montague  v. 
Mitchell,  28  111.  481;  Weaver  v.  Poyer,  79  111.  417;  Wilday  v.  MeConnel,  63  111. 
278:  Coon  v.  Jones,  10  Iowa,  131;  Glvens  v,  Campbell,  20  Iowa,  79;  Jamison  v. 
Weaver,  84  Iowa,  611,  51  N.  W.  65;  Iowa  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Boylan,  86  Iowa, 
90,  52  N.  W.  1122;  United  States  Mut.  Ace.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Relslnger,  43  Mo.  App. 
571;  Cobbey  v.  Wright,  34  Keb.  771,  52  N.  W.  713;  White  v.  Espey,  21  Or. 
328,  28  Pac.  71;  Roberson  v.  Crow  (Ind.  T.)  53  S.  W.  534;  Campbell  v.  Ed- 
wards, 1  Mo.  324;  San  Juan  &  St.  Ii.  Mining  &  Smelting  Co.  y.  Finch,  6  Oolo. 
214;  Martin  v.  Parsons,  49  Cal.  94;  Jeffery  v.  Fitch,  46  Conn.  601.  Per  contra, 
Armsworthy  v.  Cheshire,  17  N.  C.  234,  34  Am.  Dec.  273. 

178  state  Ins.  Co.  v.  Waterhouse  aowa),  43  N.  W.  611. 

IT©  Jones  v.  Commercial  Bank,  5  How.  (Miss.)  43,  35  Am.  Dec.  419. 

180  Cullum  V.  Casey,  1  Ala.  351;  Dewees  v.  Richardson,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.) 
312. 

181  Hlggins  V.  Bullock,  73  111.  205. 
i8«  Stein  V.  Burden,  30  Ala.  270. 

3  88  Yastine  v.  Bast,  41  Mo.  493.    Compare  Grass  v.  Hess,  37  Ind.  193. 

(597) 


§  376  LAW  OP  JUDOMBNT8.  (Ch*  16 

ants,  only  a  part  have  been  notified  of  the  suit.  Thus  a  judgment 
rendered  against  a  joint  maker  of  a  note,  without  service  upon  him 
of  any  summons  or  process,  is  void,  and  where  it  appears  that  the 
right  of  action  on  the  note  has  expired,  so  that  there  exists  a  good 
defense,  a  perpetual  injunction  will  be  granted,  restraining  the  exe- 
cution of  such  judgment.^**  So  a  judgment  confessed  by  one  part- 
ner against  the  firm,  without  the  consent  of  the  others,  will  be  en- 
joined.^®* But  on  the  other  hand,  where  a  judgment  has  been  ob- 
tained against  a  principal  and  surety,  it  is  no  ground  for  an  injunction 
in  favor  of  the  surety  that  the  principal  was  not  served  with  process 
and  had  no  opportunity  to  defend.***  Equity  also  has  jurisdiction  to 
vacate  a  judgment  which  has  been  fraudulently  altered  so  as  to  in- 
clude a  defendant  who  was  not  served  and  not  originally  included  in 
the  judgment.**^  So,  where  a  suit  between  citizens  of  the  same  state 
has  been  brought  in  a  federal  court,  by  collusion  or  otherwise,  on  the 
ground  of  defendant's  alienage,  and  a  default  decree  entered,  such 
proceedings  are  wholly  without  jurisdiction  and  void,  and  the  exe- 
cution of  the  decree  may  be  enjoined.***  The  same  remedy  may  also 
be  sought  where  the  failure  of  jurisdiction  was  in  respect  to  the  sub- 
ject-matter of  the  controversy  or  the  amount  involved.***  But  in 
any  case  the  complainant  has  the  burden  of  proving  affirmatively  the 
facts  constituting  want  of  jurisdiction.***  And  he  must  show  that  he 
has  not  been  negligent  in  failing  to  avail  himself  of  such  remedies  as 
the  law  would  afford  him.***  Although  the  general  consensus  of 
judicial  opinion  is  as  stated  in  the  beginning  of  this  section,  the  de- 
cisions in  some  of  the  states  hold  that  equity  ought  not  to  restrain 
a  judgment  on  the  mere  ground  that  it  was  void  for  want  of  jurisdic- 
tion, since  the  complainant  has  an  adequate  remedy  at  law,  by  motion 

i«*  Gerrlsh  v.  Seaton,  73  Iowa.  15.  34  N.  W.  485, 
186  Christy  v.  Sherman,  10  Iowa,  535. 

186  Mason  v.  Miles,  63  N.  C.  564. 

187  Chester  v.  MUler.  13  Cal.  558. 

188  Broadis  v.  Broadls  (C.  C.)  86  Fed.  051. 

189  See  Hill  v.  Gordon  (C.  C.)  45  Fed.  276:  Donbam  ▼.  Springfield  Hard- 
ware Co.,  10  a  C.  A.  294,  62  Fed.  110. 

100  Eichoff  V.  Elchoff,  107  Cal.  42,  40  Pac.  24.  48  Am.  St.  Rep.  110:  West- 
brook  V.  ITiompson,  104  Tenn.  363,  58  S.  W.  223. 

i»i  Hamblin  v.  Knight,  81  Tex.  351,  16  S.  W.  1082,  26  Am.  St  Kep.  »15L 
(598) 


Ch.  16}  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  377 

or  Otherwise,  in  the  original  cause.***  Probably  the  true  note  of  dis- 
tinction is  struck  in  the  cases  which  rule  that  equity  will  not  enjoin 
the  judgment  unless  it  is  shown  to  be  inequitable  and. unjust;  if  the 
party  merely  relies  upon  a  defect  of  jurisdiction,  without  attempting 
to  show  that  the  merits  are  with  him  also,  he  must  seek  his  remedy 
at  law."» 

§  37^*    Jndgnktikt  founded  on  Falsa  Return  of  Serrlea* 

Equity  may  vacate  or  enjoin  the  judgment  of  a  court  of  law,  when 
it  is  shown  to  be  unjust  and  that  the  court  rendering  it  never  had 
jurisdiction  of  the  person  of  the  defendant,  although  assuming  it,  in 
consequence  of  a  false  return  of  service  by  the  sheriff  or  other 
officer.***  In  a  case  in  California,  where  the  action  was  to  enforce  a 
tax-lien  on  land,  and  there  was  no  service  of  summons  and  no  ap- 
pearance by  the  defendants,  and  the  court  commissioner  drafted  the 
decree,  and  either  fraudulently  or  by  neglect  inserted  a  clause  in  the 
decree  that  the  summons  had  been  served  and  the  judge,  deceived  by 
the  false  recitals  in  the  decree,  signed  it  and  ordered  it  to  be  entered 
as  the  judgment  of  the  court,  and  at  the  sheriff's  sale  under  the  de- 

!•>  Fnllan  v.  Hooper,  66  How.  Prac.  75;  Morris  t.  Morris,  76  Ga.  733;  Partin 
T.  Luterloh,  59  N.  C.  341. 

i»3  Stokes  v.  Knarr,  11  Wis.  389;  Gerrish  v.  Hunt,  66  Iowa,  682,  24  N.  W. 
274;  Off  v.  Title  G.,  A.  &  T.  Co.,  87  111.  App.  472;  Newman  v.  Taylor,  69  Miss. 
670, 13  South.  831;  Flckes  v.  Vlck,  50  Neb.  401,  60  N.  W.  951;  Combs  v.  Hamlin 
Wizard  Oil  Co.,  58  Ul.  App.  123. 

!•*  Miller  v.  Gorman,  38  Pa.  309;  Brooks  v.  Harrison,  2  Ala.  209;  Crafts  v. 
Derter,  8  Ala.  767,  42  Am.  Dec.  666;  Walker  v.  Gilbert,  Freem.  Ch.  (Miss.)  85; 
Jones  v.  Commercial  Bank,  5  How.  (Miss.)  43,  35  Am.  Dec.  419;  Ridgeway  v. 
Bank  of  Tenn.,  11  Humph.  (Tenn.)  522;  Ingle  v.  McOurry,  1  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  26; 
Bell  V.  Williams,  1  Head  (Tenn.)  229;  Estis  v.  Fatten,  3  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  382; 
Ryan  v.  Boyd,  33  Ark.  778;  Owens  v.  Ranstead,  22  lU.  161;  Harshey  v.  Black- 
ma  rr,  20  Iowa,  161,  89  Am.  Dec.  520;  Newcomb  v.  Dewey,  27  Iowa,  381;  Stone 
V.  Skerry,  31  Iowa,  582;  Johnson  v.  Coleman,  23  Wis.  452,  99  Am.  Dec.  193; 
DoweU  V.  Goodwin,  22  R.  I.  287,  47  Atl.  693,  51  L.  R.  A.  873,  84  Am.  St. 
Rep.  842;  Bramlett  v.  McVey,  91  Ky.  151,  15  S.  W.  49;  Huntington  v.  Crouter. 
33  Or.  408.  54  Pac.  208,  72  Am.  St  Rep.  726;  DuBols  v.  Clark,  12  Colo.  App. 
220,  55  Pac.  750.  But  equity  will  not  enjoin  the  enforcement  of  a  Judg- 
ment merely  because  the  return  on  the  summons  Is  defectlye,  if  it  appears 
that  the  summons  was  properly  served,  and  defendant  had  ample  oppor- 
tunity to  defend.  Peoria.  D.  &  E.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Duggan,  32  III.  App.  STA;  Mc- 
Faddin  T.  Garrett,  49  La.  Ann.  1319.  22  South.  358. 

(599) 


i  877  LAW  OP  JUDQMBNTa.  (Ch.  15 

cree  the  commissioner  became  the  purchaser  and  obtained  a  sheriff's 
deed,  it  was  held  that  a  court  of  equity  would  grant  relief  to  the 
owner,  by  restraining  the  purchaser  from  setting  up  the  judgment  as 
an  estoppel  or  from  using  it  to  perpetuate  the  advantage  he  had 
gained.^***  It  should  be  remarked  that  there  is  a  line  of  decisions 
wherein  the  application  of  the  rule  above  stated  is  materially  re- 
stricted. These  cases  hold  that  equity  should  not  grant  relief  unless 
the  false  return  of  service  was  procured  or  induced  by  the  plaintiff,  or 
unless  the  latter  can  be  in  some  way  connected  with  the  deception, 
thus  linking  the  case  supposed  with  the  category  of  those  wherein 
the  defendant  was  prevented  from  setting  up  his  defense  by  the  trick- 
ery or  fraud  of  his  adversary.^®*  The  analogy  here  presented  is 
plausible,  but  deceptive.  For  in  case  the  plaintiff  is  in  no  fault,  and 
the  officer  is  alone  to  blame  for  the  false  return,  these  decisions  can 
suggest  no  remedy  except  that  the  defendant  should  pay  the  judg- 
ment and  then  bring  his  action  against  the  officer.^*'^  Practically, 
however,  this  remedy  must  often  be  illusory.  And  at  its  best,  it  in- 
volves a  circuity  and  remoteness  of  obtaining  redress  which  is  foreign 
to  the  spirit  of  equity.  But  although  the  main  rule  for  cases  of  this 
sort  may  be  regarded  as  generally  well  settled,  there  is  a  material  dif- 
ference of  opinion  as  to  whether  the  relief  will  be  granted  when  there 
still  exists  a  complete  and  adequate  remedy  in  the  original  suit. 
Numerous  respectable  authorities  hold  that  it  should  be  granted ;  *** 
others  that  it  should  be  refused.^*®     But  at  all  events,  before  equity 

!•«»  Martin  v.  Parsons,  49  Cal.  95. 

106  Walker  v.  Robbins,  14  How.  584,  14  L.  Ed.  552;  Johnson  ▼.  Jonefi,  2 
Neb.  126;  Taylor  v.  Lewis,  2  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  400,  19  Am.  Dec.  135;  Gregorj 
v.  Ford,  14  Cal.  138,  73  Am.  Dec.  639;  Gardner  v.  Jenkins,  14  Md,  68;  Preston 
v.  Klndrick,  94  Va.  760,  27  S.  E.  588,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  777. 

i»T  In  Walker  v.  Robbins,  14  How.  584,  14  L.  Ed.  552,  It  was  said:  'In 
cases  of  false  returns  affecting  a  defendant,  where  the  plaintiff  at  law  is  not 
in  fault,  redress  can  only  be  had  in  the  court  of  law  where  the  record 
was  made,  and  if  relief  cannot  be  had  there,  the  party  injured  must  seek  hii 
remedy  against  the  marshal.*' 

108  Landrum  v.  Farmer,  7  Bush  (Ky.)  46;  Caruthers  v.  Hartsfleld,  3  Tcii^ 
(Tenn.)  366,  24  Am.  Dec.  580;  McNairy  v.  Eastland,  10  Yerg,  (Tenn.)  309;  Coo- 
nell  V.  Stelsou,  33  Iowa,  147;  Hernandez  v.  James,  23  La.  Ann.  4S3;  Johnson 
y.  Coleman,  23  Wis.  452,  99  Am.  Dec.  193. 

i»»  BIbend  v.  Kreutz,  20  Cal.  109;  Sanchez  v.  Carrlaga.  31  Cal.  170;   Comst^& 

(600) 


Ch.   15)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  378 

will  interpose  by  injunction  in  a  case  of  this  description,  it  must  be 
averred  and  proved  that  the  defendant  has  a  meritorious  defense,  or 
at  least  something  more  than  the  mere  barren  right  of  being  per- 
mitted to  defend.=*»^ 

§  378.    Legal  Defense  not  Interposed. 

The  rule  is  well  settled  and  perfectly  inflexible,  that  if  the  defendant 
in  an  action  at  law  had  a  good  defense,  purely  legal  in  its  nature,  of 
the  existence  of  which  he  was  aware,  and  which  he  had  an  oppor- 
tunity to  set  up,  but  neglected  to  defend  himself,  he  cannot  come  into 
equity  seeking  relief  against  the  judgment  in  that  action,  on  the  same 
grounds  which  constituted  that  defense,  unless  his  failure  to  make 
the  defense  was  due  to  circumstances  of  fraud,  accident,  or  surprise, 
entirely  unmixed  with  negligence  or  fault  on  his  own  part.^®*     In 

V.  ClemeDs*  19  Cal.  77;  Chambers  v.  King  Wrought  Iron  Bridge  Manufactory, 
16  Kan.  270;  CrandaU  v.  Bacon,  20  Wis.  639,  91  Am.  Dec.  451. 

200  Gregory  v.  Ford,  14  Cal.  138,  73  Am.  Dec.  639;  Coon  v.  Jones,  10  Iowa, 
131;  Secor  v.  Woodward,  8  Ala.  500;  Gardner  v.  Jenkins,  14  Md.  58;  Harris  v. 
Gwln,  10  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  563;  Fowler  v.  Lee,  10  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  358,  32 
Am.  Dec.  172. 

201  Hungerford  v.  Sigerson,  20  How.  156;  Wynn  v.  Wilson,  1  Hempst.  698, 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  18,116;  New  Orleans  v.  Morris,  3  Woods,  103,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
10,182;  Emerson  v.  Udall,  13  Vt.  477,  37  Am.  Dec.  604;  Tyler  v.  Hamersley,  44 
Conn.  419,  26  Am.  Rep.  479;  Le  Guen  v.  (Jouvemeur,  1  Johns.  Cas.  (N.  Y.) 
436,  1  Am.  Dec.  121;  Foster  v.  Wood,  6  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  86;  Mills  v.  Van 
Voorhis,  10  Abb.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  152;  Ingalls  v.  Merchants'  Nat.  Banit,  51  App. 
Div.  305,  64  N.  Y.  Supp.  911;  Katz  v.  Moore,  13  Md.  566;  Ewing  v.  Nlckle,  45 
Md.  413;  Lryday  t.  Douple,  17  Md.  188;  Huston  v.  Ditto,  20  Md.  305;  Harns- 
barger's  Adm»r  v.  Kinney,  13  Grat.  (Va.)  511;  Smith  v.  McLain,  11  W.  Va.  654; 
Jackson  v.  Patrick,  10  S.  C.  207;  Bobbins  v.  Mount,  3  Ga.  74;  Pollock  v.  Gil- 
bert, 16  Ga.  398;  Vaughn  v.  Fuller,  23  Ga.  366;  Neal  v.  Henderson,  72  Ga. 
209;  Bailey  v.  State  Sav.  Bank,  97  Ga.  398,  24  S.  E.  40;  Stames  v.  Mutual  Loan 
&  Banking  Co.,  97  Ga.  400,  24  S.  E.  138;  Griffin  v.  Smyly,  105  Ga.  475,  30 
S.  E.  416;  Foster  v.  State  Bank,  17  Ala.  672;  Thomas  v.  Phillips,  4  Smedes 
&  M.  (Miss.)  358;  Williams  v.  Jones,  10  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  lOS;  Sempie 
V.  McGatagan,  10  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  96;  Scroggins  v.  Howorth,  23  Miss. 
514;  Shipp  V.  Wheeless,  33  Miss.  646;  Jordan  v.  Thomas,  34  Miss.  72,  69  Am. 
Dec.  387;  Gaines  v.  Kennedy,  53  Miss.  103;  Minor  v.  Stone,  1  La.  Ann.  283; 
Todd  V.  Fisk,  14  La.  Ann.  13;  McRae  v.  Purvis,  12  La.  Ann.  85;  Gibson  v. 
Moore,  22  Tex.  611;  Jordan  v.  Corley,  42  Tex.  284;  Prewitt  v.  Perry,  6  Tex. 
260;  Coffee  v.  Ball,  49  Tex.  16;  Smith  v.  Durrett,  Sneed  (Ky.)  236;  Cowan 
V.  Price.  1  Bibb  (Ky.)  173;  Paynter  v.  Evans,  7  B.  Men.  (Ky.)  420;  Galbraith 
V.  Martin,  5  Humph.  (Tenn.)  50;  Brandon  v.  Green,  7  Humph.   (Tenn.)  130; 

(601) 


§    378  LAW  OP  JUDQMBNTS.  C^h.   15 

Other  words,  "a  court  of  chancery  will  not  entertain  a  party  seeking 
relief  against  a  judgment  at  law  in  consequence  of  his  default  upon 
grounds  which  might  have  been  successfully  taken  in  the  said  [law] 
court,  unless  some  reason  founded  in  fraud,  accident,  surprise,  or 
some  adventitious  circumstances  beyond  the  control  of  the  party  be 
shown  why  the  defense  at  law  was  not  made."  ^®*  Thus  relief  in 
equity  was  refused  in  a  case  where  the  defendant  had  a  good  defense 
of  a  discharge  under  the  bankrupt  act,  but  neglected  to  answer  or 
plead  it  because  the  plaintiff  had  commenced  the  suit  before  his  dis- 
charge in  bankruptcy,  and  continued  it,  unknown  to  him,  from  term 
to  term,  until  after  his  discharge,  before  taking  judgment;  for  he 
knew  of  the  institution  of  the  suit  and  was  bound  to  notice  every- 
thing else  that  was  done.***'  Nor  will  equity  relieve  because  the 
party  did  not  prove  on  the  trial  payments  which  he  alleges  he  had 
made,  unless  he  shows  some  fraud  or  circumvention  practised  to  pre- 
vent his  making  the  proof.*^*  Nor  because  the  promissory  note 
upon  which  judgment  was  rendered  was  without  consideration.*** 
That  the  legal  defense  was  not  presented  or  considered  through  the 
oversight  of  counsel  or  the  error  of  the  judge,  or  the  failure  on  the 
part  of  the  defendant  to  collect  the  evidence  in  due  season  and  present 
it  in  a  way  to  be  available,  is  no  sufficient  excuse.*®*  And  if  the  de- 
Ohio  &  W.  Mortg.  &r  Trust  Oo.  v.  Carter,  9  Kan.  App.  621,  58  Pac.  1040;  Kim- 
ball V.  Hutchison,  61  Kan.  191,  59  Pac.  275;  Andrews  v.  Fenter,  1  Ark.  186; 
Lester  t.  Hoskins,  26  Ark.  63;  Bently  y.  Dillard,  6  Ark.  79;  Heaipetead 
y.  Watklns,  6  Ark.  317,  42  Am.  Dec.  696;  Menifee's  Adm*r  y.  Ball,  7  Ark. 
520:  Rabum  y.  Shortrid^e.  2  Blackf.  (Ind.)  480;  Skinner  y.  Demin^,  2  Ind. 
558.  54  Am.  Dec.  463;  Smith  v.  PoweU,  50  111.  21;  Hlgglns  y.  Bullock,  73  IB. 
205;  Carney  y.  ViUage  of  Marseilles,  136  lU.  401,  26  N.  E.  491,  29  Am.  St. 
Rep.  328;  Newman  y.  Schueck,  58  111.  App.  328;  Lewis  y.  Firemen's  Ins.  Co.. 
67  111.  App.  195:  Spraker  y.  Bartlett,  73  111.  App.  522;  Johnson  y.  I^on.  14 
Iowa,  431:  Faulkner  y.  Campbell,  Morris  (Iowa)  148;  Collier  y.  Baston,  2  Mo. 
146;  Kelly  y.  Hurt,  74  Mo.  561;  Kelleher  y.  Boden,  55  Mich.  295,  21  X.  W. 
346;  Sargeant  v.  Bigclow,  24  Minn.  370;  Clark  y.  Lee,  58  Minn.  410.  59  N- 
W.  970;  Snyder  v,  Vanuoy,  1  Or.  344;  Marsh  y.  Edgerton,  1  Chanil.  fWis-V 
198,  2  Pin.  230;  Phelps  y.  Peabody,  7  Cal.  50;  Agard  v.  Valencia,  39  CaL  292. 

202  Braden  y.  Reitzenberger,  18  W.  Va.  286;  Nevins  y.  McKee,  61  Tex.  412. 

208  Bellamy  v.  Woodson,  4  Ga.  175,  48  Am.  Dec.  221. 

204  Deaver  v.  Erwin,  42  N.  O.  250;  Harnsbarger*8  Adm'r  y.  Kinney.  13  GraL 
(Va.)  511;  Sullivan  v.  Shell,  36  S.  C.  578,  15  S.  E.  722,  31  Am.  St  Rep.  894. 

206  Garrison  v.  Cobb,  106  Ind.  245,  6  N.  E.  332. 

20 e  i^bauon  Mut.  Ins.  Co.'s  Appeal  (Pa.)  1  AtL  559. 

(602) 


Ch.  15)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  379 

fendant  is  precluded  from  setting  up  in  equity  defenses  which  he 
might  have  made  available  at  law,  much  less  can  he  urge,  as  a  ground 
for  relief  in  equity,  any  defenses  which  actually  were  tried  and  deter- 
mined at  law.  Equity  will  invariably  decline  to  re-examine  a  ques- 
tion which  was  fully  and  fairly  examined  at  law.  The  decision,  how- 
ever inequitable  it  may  appear,  is  final,  and  the  matter  is  res  judi- 
cata.*®^ Hence  a  judgment  obtained  without  fraud  or  mistake,  upon 
issue  joined  and  after  litigation,  will  be  interfered  with  by  a  court  of 
equity  only  when  it  appears,  first,  that  to  allow  its  execution  would 
be  against  equity  and  good  conscience,  and  second,  that  the  facts 
rendering  it  thus  inequitable  were  not  available  as  a  defense  in  the 
action  in  which  the  judgment  was  recovered.^*** 

f  379.    Illegality  of  Consideratioiu 

In  regard  to  judgments  rendered  upon  a  contract  which  was  inher- 
ently illegal  or  immoral,  there  has  been  some  difference  of  opinion 
as  to  whether  equity  ought  not  to  relax  the  strictness  of  the  rule 
stated  above,  and  enjoin  such  judgments,  irrespective  of  the  fact  that 
such  illegality  of  the  consideration  might  and  should  have  been  set 
up  as  a  defense  at  law.  Some  cases  are  to  be  found  in  which  relief 
has  been  thus  granted  where  the  judgment  was  founded  upon 
usury.^®*  But  the  more  favored  opinion  is  that  where  the  defense  of 
usury  was  open  to  the  defendant  at  law  and  he  had  an  opportunity  to 
set  it  up,  but  neglected  to  do  so,  equity  will  not  relieve.*^®  There 
are  also  precedents  for  the  intervention  of  equity  to  annul  gaming 

>07  Bateman  v.  WlUoe,  1  Schoales  &  L.  204;  Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hodgson,  7 
Crancli,  332.  3  t..  Ed.  3fJ2;  Truly  v.  Wanzer,  5  How.  141,  12  L.  Ed.  88;  Hen- 
drickson  v.  Hinckley,  17  How.  443.  15  L.  Ed.  123;  Foray  the  v.  McCreight,  10 
Kich.  Eq.  (S.  C.)  308;  More  v.  Bagley,  Breese,  94,  12  Am.  Dec.  144;  Yongue  v. 
Billups,  23  Miss.  407;  Brlescb  v.  McCaiiley,  7  Gill  (Md.)  180;  Brown  v.  Wilson, 
56  Ga.  534;  White  v.  Cahal's  Adm'r,  2  Swan  (Tenn.)  .ISO;  Simpson  y.  Hart,  1 
Johns.  Ch.  97;  Etnerson  v.  Udall,  13  Vt.  477,  37  Am.  Dec.  604;  Agard  v. 
Valencia,  39  Cal.  292;  Foster  v.  State  Bank,  17  Ala.  672;  Snyder  v.  Vannoy,  1 
Or.  344;  Sumner  v.  Whitley,  1  Mo.  708;  Matson  v.  Field,  10  Mo.  100. 

208  Clute  V.  Potter,  37  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  199. 

2o»Frlprson  v.  Moody,  3  Humph.  (Tenn.)  561;  Greer  v.  Hale,  95  Va.  533, 
28  S.  E.  873,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  814. 

210  Lucas  V.  Spencer,  27  111.  15;  Chinn  v.  :Mit(lioll,  2  Mete.  (Ky.)  92;  Brown 
V.  ToeU'B  Adm'r,  5  Rand.  (Va.)  543,  16  Am.  Dec.  759. 

(G03) 


^379  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.    15 

contracts,  though  the  defense  could  have  been  interposed  at  law.*" 
In  Illinois,  a  statute  provides  that  all  judgments,  mortgages,  bonds, 
notes,  etc.,  given  or  executed  for  any  money  won  by  gaming,  may  be 
set  aside  by  any  court  of  equity  upon  bill  filed  for  that  purpose  by  the 
person  giving,  entering  into,  or  executing  the  same,  or  by  any  other 
person  interested  therein.  This,  it  is  held,  applies  as  well  to  judg- 
ments rendered  in  contested  actions  as  to  judgments  on  confession. 
And,  such  a  suit  being  authorized  by  statute,  the  fact  that  the  ille- 
gality of  the  contract  sued  on  would  have  constituted  a  good  defense 
to  the  action  in  which  the  judgment  was  recovered,  does  not  oust  the 
court  of  chancery  of  jurisdiction.*^*  In  a  recent  case  it  was  held  that 
a  bill  would  lie  to  enjoin  the  plaintiff  from  collecting  a  judgment  con- 
fessed five  years  previously,  under  a  warrant  of  attorney  in  a  bond, 
the  defendant  having  had  no  day  in  court,  upon  the  ground  that  the 
consideration  of  the  bond  was  an  agreement  to  suppress  a  prosecu- 
tion for  a  felony.*^'  But  the  supreme  federal  court  holds,  and  with 
undoubted  justice,  that  equity  should  not  relieve  against  a  judgment 
at  law  on  the  ground  that  it  was  founded  on  a  consideration  illegal 
and  expressly  forbidden  by  the  laws  of  the  state,  when  the  party  ap- 
plying for  relief  was  in  pari  delicto  with  the  other ;  "a  position,"  says 
the  court,  "which,  however  it  might  shield  him  against  attempts  from 
associates  in  wrong,  so  far  as  these  should  be  iu"ged  through  the  in- 
strumentality of  courts  of  justice,  can  invest  him  with  no  rights, 
either  at  law  or  in  equity,  as  against  advantages  acquired  by  his  con- 
federates." "* 

211  Woodson  v.  Barrett,  2  Hen.  &  M.  (Va.)  86,  3  Am.  Dec.  612;  Skipwith  v. 
Strother,  3  Rand.  (Va.)  214;  OLaj  v.  Fry,  3  Bibb.  (Ky.)  248,  6  Am.  Dec.  6W. 
Compare  Owens  v.  Van  Winkle  Gin  &  Machinery  Oa„  96  Ga.  408,  23  S.  EL 
416,  31  L.  R.  A.  767. 

212  Rev.  St.  111.  c.  38,  §  135;  West  v.  Carter,  129  111.  249,  21  N.  E.  782; 
Mallett  V.  Butcher,  41  111.  382;  Lucas  v.  Nichols,  66  111.  41;  Harris  v.  M<y 
Donald,  79  111.  App.  638.     See  also  Lucas  v.  Waul,  12  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  157. 

218  Glven's  Appeal,  121  Pa.  260.  15  Atl.  468,  6  Am.  St.  Rep.  T95.  And 
see  Heath  v.  (3obb,  17  N.  C.  187. 

214  Sample  v.  Barnes,  14  How.  70,  14  L.  Ed.  330;  Creath  y.  Sims,  5  How. 
192,  12  L.  Ed.  110. 

(G04) 


Ch.  15)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  380 


§  380.    Eaccvses  for  Dot  defendliiK  at  La^r. 

Among  the  excuses  for  not  making  one's  defense  at  law  which  are 
generally  considered  as  sufficient  to  justify  the  interference  of  equity 
are  the  following : — fraud,  circumvention,  or  any  other  improper  act 
of  the  other  party  whereby  a  defense  was  prevented;  mistake,  sur- 
prise, or  accident ;  and  justifiable  ignorance  of  the  facts  constituting 
a  defense.^*"  Some  of  these  have  already  been  considered,  and  the 
others  will  be  considered  in  their  order.  But  first  it  is  necessary  to 
advert  to  certain  kinds  of  excuses  which  have  been  adjudged  inade- 
quate, and  to  the  manner  of  satisfying  the  court  of  the  existence  of 
a  valid  excuse.  That  the  debtor  had  a  valid  defense,  but  was  ad- 
vised by  his  counsel  that  it  was  not  necessary  to  bring  it  forward  be- 
fore the  court,  is  unanimously  condemned  as  insufficient  to  warrant 
the  intervention  of  a  court  of  chancery.*^*  Nor  can  equity  enjoin 
a  judgment  where  the  only  reason  alleged  for  the  failure  of  the  de- 
fendant to  avail  himself  of  a  legal  defense  is  an  erroneous  ruling  of 
the  law  court  excluding  such  defense.^^''  So  when  the  grounds  re- 
lied on  in  equity  are  equally  available  at  law,  it  is  no  ground  for  relief 
that  parties,  who  were  not  at  the  time  of  the  trial  examinable  as  wit- 
nesses, have  since  been  made  so  by  statute.*^*  If  a  party,  having  a 
good  defense  at  law,  by  his  own  voluntary  act  deprives  himself  of  the 
means  of  making  it,  a  court  of  equity  will  not  interpose  in  his  behalf ; 
as  where  a  party,  having  a  good  defense  to  a  note,  voluntarily  exe- 

219  A  good  statement  of  tbe  rule  is  that,  to  entitle  a  party  to  relief  in 
equity  against  a  Judgment  on  account  of  the  loss  of  his  defense,  it  must  be 
shown  that  it  was  occasioned  by  the  fraud  or  fault  of  the  adverse  party,  or 
by  his  own  mistake,  unmixed  with  any  negligence  or  fault  of  himself,  his 
counsel,  or  agents.    Telford  v.  Brinkerhoff,  163  111.  439,  45  N.  E.  156. 

21 «  Duckworth  v.  Duckworth's  Adm*r,  35  Ala.  70;  Brown  v.  Wilson,  56  Ga. 
5^1;  Shricker  v.  Field,  9  Iowa,  367. 

"TGriswold  V.  Hazard,  141  U.  S.  260,  Jl  Sup.  Ct.  972,  35  L.  Ed.  678; 
Edmanson  v.  Best,  6  C.  C.  A.  471,  57  Fed.  531;  Ingwersen  v.  Buchholz,  88  111. 
App.  73. 

«i»  Kendall  v.  Wlnsor,  6  R.  I.  453.  A  Judgment  in  a  suit  by  an  administrator 
cannot  be  enjoined  merely  because,  under  the  statute,  the  defendants  wore 
not  competent  to  testify  In  the  suit  In  which  the  Judgment  was  entered,  and 
there  was  no  other  evidence  to  sustain  their  defense.  Williams  v.  Carr,  4 
Colo.  App.  368,  36  Pac.  646. 

(G05) 


§   381  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  15 

cutes  a  deed  of  trust  to  secure  its  payment,  equity  will  not  enjoin  the 
execution  of  the  trust  on  account  of  such  defense  to  the  original 
note.^^**  In  regard  to  the  evidence  to  prove  the  state  of  facts  al- 
leged as  an  excuse  for  the  party's  failure  to  make  his  defense  at  law, 
it  is  said  that  "the  same  certainty  of  proof  is  not  required  to  establish 
an  excuse  for  not  making  the  defense  at  law  that  would  be  de- 
manded to  establish  the  existence  of  that  defense."  **•  Yet  as  it  is 
the  excuse,  and  not  the  defense,  which  must  be  established  at  this 
stage  of  the  proceedings,  it  is  of  no  avail  to  prove  the  defense  if  the 
excuse  remains  without  evidence  to  support  it.     For  example,  where 

A.  pays  a  debt  for  which  he  and  B.  are  liable,  and  afterwards  recovers 
a  judgment  at  law  against  B.  for  half  the  amount,  and  on  a  bill  by 

B.  for  relief  against  the  judgment,  on  the  ground  that  he  was  surety 
for  A.  in  the  debt,  he  fails  to  prove  his  alleged  reason  for  not  making: 
the  defense  at  law,  but  proves  that  he  was  surety  for  A.,  there  can  be 
no  relief  afforded  to  him  in  equity.^^* 

§  381.    Same;    MUtak*. 

A  mistake  of  fact,  provided  it  be  honest  and  genuine,  and  such  as 
a  man  might  reasonably  make,  will  be  a  sufficient  excuse  for  not  de- 
fending an  action  at  law,  and  will  warrant  a  court  of  equity,  if  the 
judgment  be  against  conscience,  in  interposing  by  injunction  to  re- 
strain its  enforcement.^^*  For  instance,  where  A.,  a  creditor  of  B., 
called  upon  the  latter  to  execute  a  bond  with  surety  for  the  debt,  and 
supposing  liimself  authorized  by  the  conversation,  applied  to  C.  to 
execute  the  bond  as  surety,  who  did  so  accordingly,  and  A-  subse- 
quently recovered  judgment  on  the  bond,  it  was  held;  upon  a  bill  by 

C.  showing  that  A.'s  representation  of  his  authority  from  B.  was 
made  under  a  mistake,  that  the  judgment  should  be  enjoined  as 

210  Fanning:  v.  Farmers'  &  Merchants'  Bank,  8  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  13a 

220  Rice  v.  R.  R.  Bank.  7  Humph.  (Tenn.)  39. 

221  Turner  v.  Davis,  7  Leigh  (Va.)  227.  30  Am.  Dec.  502. 

222  Bibend  v.  Krexitz,  20  Cal.  109;  Chase  v.  Manhardt,  1  Bland  Ofd.)  350; 
Ford  V.  Ford,  Walk.  (Miss.)  505,  12  Am.  Dec.  587;  Drew  v.  Clarke;  Cooke 
(Tenn.)  374,  5  Am.  Dec.  098;  Partridge  v.  Harrow,  27  Iowa,  96,  99  Am.  Deo. 
043;  Wilson  v.  Bouphton,  50  Mo.  17;  Kohn  v.  Lovett.  43  Ga.  180;  Lumpkin 
V.  Williams,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  214,  21  S.  W.  967;  Clark  v.  Sayers.  48  W.  Va. 
33,  35  S.  E.  882. 

(G06) 


Ch.  15)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  882 

against  C.^**  But  it  is  no  ground  for  relief  in  equity  that  the  party 
was  prevented  from  making  his  defense  at  law  by  a  mistake  of  law, 
although  it  was  a  mutual  mistake  of  both  parties  to  the  suit.***  Nor 
that  the  defendant  mistook  his  rights  and  so  failed  to  make  a  defense 
which  it  was  competent  for  him  to  present  at  law.***  Nor  will  equity 
interfere  because  of  his  ignorance  of  the  nature  of  the  proceeding 
against  him  and  a  misapprehension  of  what  was  necessary  to  charge 
him.***  Nor  because  he  misunderstood  the  nature  of  the  action  and 
because  those  interested  in  the  matter  were  out  of  the  county.**^ 
Nor  will  relief  be  granted  where  the  defendant,  misnamed  ia  the  pro- 
cess, was  in  court  when  the  judgment  was  rendered  against  him  by 
default,  and  failed  to  defend  by  adA4ce  of  his  counsel.***  Where  an 
application  for  relief  is  made  upon  this  ground,  due  diligence  must  be 
shown  and  the  facts  set  forth  showing  how  the  omission  occurred.*** 

§  382.    Same;    Surprise* 

In  the  cases  where  surprise  has  been  accepted  as  a  sufficient  excuse 
for  not  defending  at  law,  it  has  generally  transpired  that  the  surprise 
was  one  intentionally  prepared  by  the  plaintiff  and  sprung  upon  the 
defendant  at  the  trial,  whereby  the  case  is  assimilated  to  that  of  a 
fraud  or  trick  on  the  former's  part.  Thus,  in  an  early  case,  the  payee 
of  an  usurious  note  pretended  to  have  sold  and  transferred  the  same 
to  a  third  person,  in  whose  name  a  suit  at  law  was  brought  upon  the 
note,  whereby  the  makers  of  the  note  were  induced  to  suppose  that 
the  payee  of  the  note  could  be  examined  by  them  as  a  witness  in  that 
suit  to  prove  the  usury,  but  such  payee,  when  called  as  a  witness  at 
the  trial,  testified  that  he  was  one  of  the  real  plaintiffs  in  interest  in 

«»»  Bird  V.  Chaffln,  21  N.  C.  55. 

««4  Richmond  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Shippen,  2  Pat.  &  H.  (Va.)  327;  Meem  v.  Ruck- 
er.  10  Grat.  (Va.)  506;  Hubbard  v.  Martin,  8  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  498;  City  of  Broken 
Bow  V.  Broken  Bow  Waterworks  Co.,  57  Xeb.  548,  77  N.  W.  1078. 

225  Dickerson  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Plpley  Co.,  6  Ind.  128,  G3  Am.  Dec.  373; 
Snider  v.  Rinehart,  20  Colo.  448,  39  Pac.  408. 

226  Meem  v.  Rucker,  10  Grat  50C;  English  y.  Aldrich,  132  Ind.  500,  31  N. 
B.  456,  32  Am.  St.  Rep.  270. 

227  state  Bank  v.  Stanton,  2  Gilman  (111.)  352. 

228  Graham  v.  Roberts,  1  Head  (Tenn.)  50. 

228  Simmons  v.  Martin,  53  Ga.  620;  Slappey  v.  Hodge,  90  Ala.  300,  13  South. 
256. 

(607) 


§   383  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch^  15 

the  suit,  and  declined  to  testify  as  to  the  alleged  usury,  and  from  the 
state  of  the  pleadings  he  could  not  be  examined  as  a  plaintiff  under 
the  statute  for  the  prevention  of  usury.  It  was  held  that  the  defend- 
ants in  that  suit  could  maintain  a  bill  in  chancery  against  the  real 
plaintiffs  in  the  suit  at  law  for  discovery  and  relief,  upon  the  ground 
that  they  had  been  deceived  and  defrauded  out  of  their  defense  at 
law.*'^  But  an  injunction  will  not  be  allowed  on  the  ground  of  sur- 
prise, where  there  was  no  surprise  but  such  as  the  party  might  have 
reasonably  anticipated.***  And  a  party  seeking  relief  in  equity  on 
this  ground  must  show  that  the  surprise  was  not  in  consequence  of 
his  own  negligence.***  Thus  it  is  no  excuse  that  the  witness  on 
whom  the  defendant  relied,  but  whom  he  had  never  questioned,  failed 
to  prove  the  defense  set  up.**'  So  the  fact  that  the  party's  counsel 
was  surprised  by  the  production  of  a  certain  piece  of  evidence  is  no 
ground  for  relief  in  equity,  if  he  was  previously  cognizant  of  the  evi- 
dence.*** On  the  sariie  principle,  surprise  of  a  party  or  his  counsel, 
at  the  fact  that  the  supreme  court  refused  to  review  the  judgment  of 
the  circuit  judge,  under  a  stipulation  of  the  parties  which  had,  in 
effect,  made  the  decision  of  such  judge  final,  is  no  ground  for  equi- 
table interference  with  the  judgment.*** 

§  383.    Same;    Aoeident  or  msfortaae* 

Unavoidable  accident  or  misfortune,  preventing  the  party  from 
making  his  defense  at  law,  is  a  sufficient  ground  for  the  interference 
of  equity  in  an  otherwise  meritorious  case.***  This,  it  will  be  re- 
membered, is  one  of  the  grounds  specified  in  the  statutes  of  some  of 
the  states  as  authorizing  the  vacation  of  a  judgment  on  motion  in  the 
court  where  rendered.**'     It  may  be  stated  that  equity  is  guided  by 

«8o  Post  V.  Boardman,  10  Paige,  580. 

231  Fowler  v.  Roe,  11  N.  J.  Eq.  367;  Shannon  v.  Reese,  38  Ala.  586. 
«««  Lawson  v.  Bettison,  12  Ark.  401. 
288  Winiams  V.  Loekwood,  1  Clarke.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  172. 

284  Gibson  V.  Watts,  1  McCord,  Kq.  (S.  0.)  490;  Hall  v.  Griffin,  110  Ala.  214, 
24  South.  27. 

288  Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Walworth  Co.  Bank,  23  Wis.  249. 

286  Kersey  v.  Rash,  3  Del.  Ch.  321;  Radzuwelt  v.  Watkina,  53  Neb.  412,  73 
N.  W.  679;  Herbert  v.  Herbert,  49  N.  J.  Eq.  70,  22  AtL  789. 

287  Supra,  §§  337-340. 

(60S) 


Ch.    15)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  383 

practically  the  same  rules  which  have  been  applied  by  the  courts  of 
law  in  construing  these  statutes,  excef.!:,  perhaps,  that  the  lines  are 
rather  more  closely  drawn  in  equity,  and  less  indulgence  is  shown  in 
respect  to  the  kinds  of  accident  which  are  accepted  as  sufficient  ex- 
cuses, and  in  respect  to  the  possibility  of  the  party's  surmounting  the 
obstacle  and  making  his  defense.  A  few  illustrative  cases  may  follow 
here.  It  has  been  broadly  held  that  the  sickness  of  a  party,  or  of  his 
near  relative,  or  the  pendency  of  another  suit  against  him  requiring 
his  attendance,  will  not  authorize  the  interference  of  equity.^'*  And 
this  is  undoubtedly  true,  if  it  would  have  been  possible  for  him  to  be 
represented  by  counsel.  Floods,  which  prevented  him  from  reaching 
the  place  of  trial,  will  furnish  a  sufficient  excuse,  but  only  in  case  the 
bill  is  very  explicit  as  to  the  time  of  the  prevalence  of  high  water  and 
of  the  meeting  and  adjournment  of  court,  and  as  to  the  efforts  that 
were  made  to  reach  it,  and  as  to  the  impossibility  of  a  successful  de- 
fense in  the  absence  of  the  defendant.^*®  In  another  case,  equity  re- 
fused to  enjoin  a  judgment  on  the  ground  that  the  defendant  was  pre- 
cluded by  intense  excitement  prevailing  in  the  country  from  attend- 
ing court,  that  it  was  dangerous  to  travel  from  home,  that  it  was 
generally  understood  there  would  be  no  court,  and  that  the  judge  of 
the  court  said  that  he  should  hold  no  session  for  the  trial  of  cases. **° 
It  should  be  remarked,  in  this  connection,  that  a  good  excuse  for  not 
being  present  at  the  term  at  which  judgment  was  rendered,  is  not 
sufficient  where  no  counsel  was  employed,  nor  witnesses  summoned, 
nor  any  other  steps  taken  to  defend  the  action.'*^  The  inability  of 
the  party's  attorney  to  attend  the  court,  or  his  sickness,  may,  under 
some  circumstances,  entitle  the  party  to  reHef  in  equity ;  **^  but  it  is 
no  ground  for  an  injunction  that  defendant's  counsel  was  absent, 

238Pharr  v.  Reynolds,  3  Ala.  521.  See  Hord  v.  Dlshman.  5  Call  (Va.)  279; 
Wood  V.  Lenox.  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  318,  23  S.  W.  812,  Roller  v.  Ried  (Tex.)  24 
S.  W.  655;  Hopper  v  Da  vies,  70  111.  App.  682;  Owen  v.  Gersou,  119  Ala.  217, 
24  South.  413. 

««»  English  V.  Savage.  14  Ala.  342;   Brooks  y.  Whitson,  15  Miss.  513. 

240  George  v.  Tutt.  36  Mo.  141.  See  Kye  v.  Sochor,  92  Wis.  40,  65  N.  W. 
854,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  896. 

«*i  McCoUum  V.  Prewitt,  Ala.  Sel.  Cas.  498;  Oole  v.  Hundley,  16  Miss.  473. 

«*«  McBroom  v.  Sommeryille,  2  Stew.  (Ala.)  515.  See  Sasser  v.  Olllff,  91 
Ga.  84, 16  S.  E.  312. 

1  LAW  JUDG.-^  (000) 


§   384  LAW  OF  JUDGBiENTS.  (Ch.   15 

when  it  appears  that  the  defendant,  if  present  at  the  trial,  might  have 
emplo>ed  other  counsel  equally  competent.^*'  So  the  death  of  de- 
fendant's original  counsel,  and  want  of  familiarity,  on  the  part  of  the 
counsel  who  succeeds  him,  with  the  grounds  of  the  defense,  do  not 
furnish  a  suflScient  reason  for  equity  to  enjoin  the  enforcement  of  the 
judgment.***  On  the  other  hand,  equity  has  thought  it  proper  to 
give  relief  on  account  of  the  loss  of  a  written  contract  without  which 
the  defense  at  law  could  not  be  made;***  but  has  refused  its  aid 
where  it  was  not  satisfied  that  the  loss  of  the  particular  document 
Ayould  endanger  the  complainant's  defense  in  the  court  of  law.'**  In 
a  case  where  parties  were  prevented  from  making  their  defense  at 
law  by  the  acts  of  the  plaintiff,  until  the  only  witness  by  whom  the 
defense  could  be  proved  was  dead,  and  a  resort  to  a  court  of  chan- 
cery in  consequence  thereof  became  indispensable,  it  was  held  that 
they  were  entitled  to  relief  in  that  court.**^  But  the  fact  that  a  wit- 
ness omitted,  in  giving  his  testimony,  to  state  a  material  fact,  and  that 
the  complainant,  by  reason  of  his  deafness,  did  not  know  of  such 
omission  until  after  the  trial,  is  no  ground  for  relief.*** 

§  384.    IcBoranoe  of  Lesal  Dafenae. 

It  may  be  regarded  as  well  settled,  upon  the  authorities,  that  equity 
will  grant  relief  against  a  judgment  at  law  where  it  is  shown  that 
there  is  a  good  and  valid  defense  to  the  action  on  the  merits,  of 
which  the  defendant  was  ignorant  at  the  time  of  the  trial,  and  which 
he  could  not  have  discovered,  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  and 
proper  diligence,  in  time  to  set  it  up  at  law.***    For  example,  where 

248  Crim  T.  Handley.  94  U.  S.  652,  24  L.  Ed.  216;  Mock  v.  Oondlff.  6  Port. 
(Ala.)  24. 

244  PoweU  V.  Stewart,  17  Ala.  719. 

245  Vathir  v.  Zane,  6  Gi-at.  (Va.)  246, 
2  46  Rogers  v.  Cross,  3  Chaud.  34. 

247  Mack  V.  Doty,  Har.  (Mich.)  3G6. 

248  Stone  V.  Moody,  6  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  31. 

249  Davis  V.  TUeston,  6  IIow.  114,  12  L.  Ed.  366;  Garrett  t.  I^yncb,  45  AUl 
'211;  Wales  v.  Bank  of  Michigan,  Har.  (Mich.)  308;  Hubbard  y.  Hobson, 
Brcese  (111.)  190;  Jones  v.  EJlgore,  2  Rich.  Eq.  (S.  C.)  63;  Pearce  y.  Gbastain, 
;3  Ga.  226,  46  Am.  Dec.  423;  Iglehart  y.  Lee.  4  Md.  Ch.  314;  Baltzell  y.  Kan- 
.dolph,  9  Fla.  366;  Meek  v.  Howard,  10  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  502;  Brown  y. 
Xiuehrs,  79  IlL  575;   Wells,  Fargo  &  Oo.  y.  Wall,  1  Or.  295;    Ludington  y. 

(610) 


Ch.    15)  RBLIEF  IN  BQmTT  AGAINST  JUDOMBNTS  AT  LAW.  |  884 

an  administrator  has  recovered  judgment  for  the  purchase  money  of 
property  of  his  intestate  sold  by  him,  it  is  a  sufficient  excuse  to  the 
vendee  for  not  defending  at  law,  that  he  did  not  know  until  after  the 
judgment  was  rendered  that  the  administrator  had  no  authority  to 
sell.^**  So  where  the  creditor  obtains  a  judgment  at  law  against  the 
sureties  before  they  have  notice  of  an  agreement  to  forbear  suit, 
equity  will  enjoin  its  collection.*'**  But  it  is  an  important  corollary 
to  the  above  rule — or,  indeed,  an  integral  part  of  the  rule — ^that  mere 
Ignorance  of  his  defense  is  not  sufficient ;  it  must  be  shown  that  the 
party  is  guilty  of  no  negligence,  and  that  he  could  not  possibly  have 
ascertained  it  by  the  exercise  of  careful  and  reasonable  diligence.*^* 
It  must  appear  that  the  defendant's  ignorance  was  not  due  to  any 
lack  of  diligence  on  his  part,  or  that  it  was  caused  by  the  act  of  the 
opposite  party.*'*  "A  party  who  seeks  the  aid  of  a  court  of  chan- 
cery, after  a  judgment  at  law  against  him,  on  the  ground  that  he 
was  Ignorant  of  the  defense,  must  show  the  exercise  of  ordinary  dili- 
gence to  discover  it ;  or  that  he  was  prevented  from  employing  such 
diligence  by  fraud,  accident,  or  the  act  of  the  opposite  party,  unmixed 
with  fault  or  negligence  on  his  part."  ***  Thus  an  alteration  in  an 
instrument  sued  on  at  law  may  be  taken  advantage  of  there,  and  tho 
failure  of  the  defendant  to  discover  the  alteration  until  after  judg- 
ment is  no  ground  for  relief  in  equity.*"^'  So  the  allegation  that 
there  was  a  mistake  in  an  account,  upon  which  a  judgment  at  law  was 
recovered,  which  was  not  discovered  until  after  the  trial  and  verdict, 

HaDdley,  7  W.  Va.  209;  Taylor  v.  Sutton.  15  Ga.  103.  60  Am.  Dec.  682;  Rust 
V.  Ware,  6  Grat.  (Va.)  50,  52  Am.  Dec.  100. 

«8o  Crisman  v.  Beasley,  1  Smedes  &  M.  Ch.  (Miss.)  561. 

251  Armlstead  v.  Ward,  2  Pat.  &  H.  (Va.)  5(H. 

«»2  Brown  v.  Swann,  10  Tet.  497,  9  L.  Ed.  508;  Avery  v.  U.  S..  12  WaU.  304, 
20  L.  Ed.  405;  Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hodgson,  7  Cranch,  333,  3  L.  Ed.  362: 
Metropolitan  El.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Johnston,  158  N.  Y.  739,  53  N.  E.  1128;  Devlin  v. 
Boyd,  61  Hun,  625,  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  37;  McCollum  v.  Prewitt,  37  Ala.  573; 
Taylor  v.  Sutton,  15  Ga.  103,  60  Am.  Dec.  G82;  Leggett  v.  Morris.  6  Smedes  & 
M.  (Miss.)  723;  Slack  v.  Wood,  9  Grat.  (Va.)  40;  Taliaferro's  Adm'r  v.  Branch 
Bank,  23  Ala.  755:  Skinner  v.  Deming,  2  Ind.  558,  54  Am.  Dec.  463;  McCown 
V.  Macklin*s  Ex'r,  7  Bush  (Ky.)  308;  Thompson  v.  Berry,  3  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 
395;  Tutt  V.  Ferguson,  13  Kan.  45;  Garrett  v.  Lynch,  45  Ala.  204. 

2  5»  Carolus  v.  Koch,  72  Mo.  645. 

2  54  Stinnett  v.  Branch  Bank,  9  Ala.  120. 

tsB  Shelmlre  v.  Thompson,  2  Blackf.  (Ind.)  270. 

(611) 


i   385  LAW  OF  JUDGMBNT8L  (Ch.   15 

is  not  sufficient  to  authorize  an  injunction  against  the  judgment.*** 
Nor  is  it  any  ground  for  rehef  in  equity  that  defendant  did  not  know, 
at  the  time  of  the  trial  at  law,  what  the  legal  criterion  of  damages 
was.*** 

S  385.    DisooTery  must  luiTe  lieen  fouclftt. 

It  is  no  excuse  for  failure  to  set  up  a  legal  defense  in  the  action  at 
law  that  the  defendant  could  not  make  it  available  without  invoking^ 
the  aid  of  chancery  to  get  a  'discovery ;  he  should  have  obtained  such 
discovery  oeforc  going  to  trial  at  law.**'  This  principle  was  once 
stctted  by  Chancellor  Walworth  in  the  following  terms :  "As  a  gen- 
eral rule,  if  a  party  against  whom  an  action  is  brought  has  a  legal 
defense,  he  must  avail  himself  of  it  in  the  suit  at  law.  It  will  be 
too  late,  after  he  has  suffered  a  judgment  to  be  recovered  against 
him  there,  to  apply  to  this  court  for  relief.  And  even  where  the 
facts  constituting  the  legal  defense  can  only  be  established  by  a  dis- 
covery from  the  plaintiff,  if  they  are  fully  known  to  the  defendant, 
and  he  can  avail  himself  of  them  upon  the  trial  by  the  aid  of  a  bill 
of  discovery,  he  should  resort  to  that  mode  of  defense  when  the  ne- 
cessity of  it  is  apparent,  or  he  may  be  precluded  by  the  judgment  in 
that  suit.  In  cases  of  this  kind,  however,  this  court  will  accept  of 
a  satisfactory  excuse  for  not  resorting  to  a  bill  in  the  first  instance, 
and  may  grant  relief  after  judgment  has  been  obtained  in  the  suit  at 
law."  "» 

2»e  Falls  v.  Robinson,  5  Md.  3&5. 

a»7  McKean  v.  Read,  6  Litt.  Sel.  Cas.  (Ky.)  395,  12  Am.  Dec.  318. 

258  Norton  v.  VS^oods,  5  Paige  (N.  Y.)  249;  Bartholomew  v.  Yaw,  9  Paige 
(N.  Y.)  1G5;  Pollock  v.  Gilbert,  16  Ga.  :m8,  60  Am.  Dec.  732;  Albritton  v. 
Bird,  R.  M.  Charlt  (Ga.)  93;  Barker  v.  Elkins,  1  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  465.  8ee 
also  Norrls  y.  Hume,  2  Leigh  (Va.)  334,  21  Am.  Dec.  631;  Brown  T.  Swann,  10 
Pet  497,  9  fj.  Ed.  508;  Green  v.  Massle.  21  Grat.  (Va.)  axS. 

2B9  Norton  V.  Woods,  5  Paige  (N.  Y.)  249.  An  exactly  opposite  view  was 
taken  in  Deputy  v.  Tobias,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.)  311,  12  Am.  Dec.  243,  where  IIoI- 
man,  J.,  said:  '*But  a  bill  of  discovery  is  the  dernier  resort  In  obtaining  tes* 
timony,  inasmuch  as  when  it  is  resorted  to,  it  shuts  the  door  against  every 
other  method.  Therefore  It  is  purely  discretionary  with  every  suitor  whether 
he  will  file  such  a  bill  or  not,  and  he  can  never  be  considered  In  laches  for  not 
seeking  a  discovery  from  the  opposite  party." 

(612) 


Ch.   15)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDQMBNT8  AT  LAW.  §  ciiSU 

§  386.    Newly-discoTered    XSridenee. 

On  principles  analogous  to  those  just  considered,  it  is  held  that 
where  the  defendant  knew  of  his  defense  at  the  time  of  the  trial  at 
law,  but  had  no  evidence  to  support  it,  was  ignorant  that  any  such 
evidence  existed,  and  could  not  have  discovered  it  by  the  exercise  of 
due  diligence,  equity  will  grant  him  relief  upon  the  ascertainment  and 
production  of  such  evidence.^**  But  here,  it  is  obvious,  any  court 
would  be  slow  to  pardon  any  negligence  or  sloth  on  the  part  of  the 
defendant  in  seeking  for  the  evidence  which  he  needs.  Being  aware 
that  he  has  a  good  legal  defense,  it  is  his  duty,  as  well  as  his  interest, 
to  make  the  most  careful  and  exhaustive  efforts  to  arm  hUnself  with 
the  testimony  which  will  support  it.  If  he  has  not  done  this, — if  he 
has  been  negligent  in  the  search  for  evidence, — equity  will  not  relieve 
him.**^  And  the  substance  of  the  newly-discovered  evidence  must 
be  set  forth  in  the  bill,  in  order  that  the  chancery  court  may  judge 
whether  it  is  of  the  requisite  character  and  weight.^**  In  regard  to 
the  last  point,  the  circumstances  under  which  equity  will  grant  a  new 
trial  because  of  newly-discovered  evidence  have  been  summed  up  as 
follows :  (i)  The  evidence  must  have  been  discovered  since  the  trial. 
(2)  It  must  be  evidence  that  could  not  have  been  discovered  before 
the  trial  by  the  plaintiff  or  defendant,  as  the  case  may  be,  by  the  ex- 
ercise of  reasonable  diligence.  (3)  It  must  be  material  in  its  object, 
and  such  as  ought,  on  another  trial,  to  prbduce  an  opposite  result  on 
the  merits.  (4)  It  must  not  be  merely  cumulative,  corroborative,  or 
collateral.^*'     It  remains  to  be  stated  that  the  statutory  provisions, 

2«o  Alley  V.  Ledbetter.  16  N.  C.  449;  Levan  v.  Patton,  2  Helsk.  (Tenn.)  108; 
<'ox  r.  Mobile  &  G.  R.  Co.,  44  Ala.  611;  McGehee  v.  Gold,  68  111.  215;  Rust  v. 
Ware,  6  Grat.  (Va.)  50,  52  Am.  Dec.  100;  Iglebart  v.  Lee,  4  Md.  Oh.  514; 
Foote  V.  Sllsby,  1  Blatchf.  545,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  4,918;  Taylor  v.  Sutton,  15  Ga. 
l(i:t,  CO  Am.  Dec.  682;  Fcarce  v.  Ghastain,  3  Ga.  226,  46  Am.  Dec.  423;  Mills 
V.  Van  Voorhis,  10  Abb.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  152;  Melick  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  52  Iowa, 
t>4.  2  N.  W.  1021;  Wilson  v.  Wilson.  113  Ala.  670,  21  South.  67.  Per  contra, 
( I  usman  t.  De  Poret,  33  La,  Ann.  333. 

2«i  Taylor  v.  Bradshaw,  6  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  145,  17  Am.  Dec.  132;  Glover 
V.  Hedges,  1  N.  J.  Eq.  113;  McCaulis  v.  Duval,  69  Ga.  744. 

2«2  Miller  v.  McGuire,  1  Morris  (Iowa)  150. 

2C3  Wynne  v.  Newman's  Adm'r,  75  Va.  816;  Willems  v.  WlUems,  72  111. 
App.  200;  Meyers  v.  Smith,  59  Neb.  30,  80  N.  W.  273.    The  evidence  must  be 

(613) 


§   387  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  15 

in  many  of  the  states,  authorizing  the  law  courts  to  grant  new  trials 
on  the  ground  of  newly-discovered  evidence,  do  not  divest  the  courts 
of  equity  of  the  power  to  grant  a  new  trial  in  cases  where  the  facts 
will  justify  it»«* 


§  387.    KeglisMMe  of  Partj  pr^olndea  BeU«f. 

A  litigant  is  required  to  exercise  the  greatest  degree  of  watchful- 
ness over  the  progress  of  his  case  in  court ;  and  if  he  fails  to  attend 
the  trial  and  assert  his  rights,  merely  in  consequence  of  his  own 
opinion  of  the  state  of  the  docket,  or  through  forgetfulness,  or  negli- 
gence of  #ny  other  kind,  he  will  have  no  standing  in  equity  after  a 
judgment.^**  That  he  omitted  to  defend  the  suit  in  consequence  of 
being  misled  by  the  clerk  of  the  court  as  to  its  character,  is  con- 
sidered as  inexcusable  negligence.'**  So,  where  a  garnishment  suit 
is  pending,  but  is  not  prosecuted  to  judgment  for  two  terms  after  that 
to  which  it  was  made  returnable,  the  garnishee  has  no  ri^^ht  to  think 
that  the  suit  is  abandoned  as  to  him  and  settle  his  debt,  and  if  he 
does  so,  equity  will  not  grant  him  relief  from  a  judgment  subse- 
quently obtained  against  him  in  the  garnishment  suit.**^  So  where 
a  defendant  at  law,  having  a  good  legal  defense,  merely  writes  to 
counsel  to  defend  him,  without  instructing  him  in  his  defense,  he  is 
guilty  of  such  neglect  as  to  preclude  relief  in  equity  against  a  judg- 

of  such  a  conclusive  character  that  if  it  bad  been  offered  It  would  hare  pro- 
duced a  different  result.    Bloss  v.  Hull,  27  W.  Va.  503. 

.  2  64  Horn  y.  Queen,  4  Neb.  108;  Colyer  v.  Langford*8  Adm'rs,  1  A.  K.  Marsh. 
(Ky.)  287;  Duncan  v.  Lyon»  3  Johns.  Ch.  350,  8  Am.  Dec.  513;  Baltxell  v. 
Randolph,  9  Fla.  366.    See  Snider  v.  I^inehart,  20  Colo.  448.  39  Pac.  408. 

16  6  "Warner  v.  Conant,  24  Vt  351,  58  Am.  Dec.  178;  Yancey  v.  Downer.  5 
Utt.  (Ky.)  8,  15  Am.  Dec.  35;  Stroup  v.  Sullivan.  2  Ga.  275.  46  Am.  Dec.  3S8; 
Briggs  V.  Smith,  5  R.  I.  213;  Mc Vicar  v.  Filer,  31  Mich.  304;  Gardiner  t.  Van 
Alstyne,  22  App.  Div.  579,  48  N.  Y.  Supp.  114;  Berry  v.  Bnrghard,  111  Ga. 
117.  36  S.  E.  459;  Barr  v.  Post.  59  Neb.  301,  80  X.  W.  1041.  80  Am.  St.  Rep. 
680;  Ohio  &  W.  Mortgage  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Garter,  9  Kan,  App.  621.  58  Pac. 
1040;  Mason  v.  Jones.  7  D.  C.  247;  Ivey  v.  McConnell  (Tex.  Civ.  .App.)  21  S. 
W.  40;^;  Roots  y.  Cohen  (Miss.)  12  South.  5$)3:  HoHinger  v.  Reeme,  138  Ind. 
363,  36  N.  E.  1114,  24  L.  R.  A.  40,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  402. 

see  Hanna  v.  Morrow,  43  Aric.  107. 

207  Stroup  y.  Sulllyan,  2  Ga.  275,  46  Am.  Dec.  389. 

(6U) 


Ch.  15)  RBLIBP  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  388 

ment.**'  But  a  distinction  must  be  taken  between  such  neglect  as 
is  attributable  solely  to  the  party  himself  and  such  as  is  brought 
^bout  by  the  improper  or  deceitful  conduct  of  the  other  side.  The 
former  is  not  excusable,  the  latter  sometimes  is.^** 

It  is  not  only  in  making  his  defense  at  law  that  a  party  is  re- 
quired to  exercise  diligence.  Though  he  may  have  a  good  excuse 
for  failing  to  set  up  such  defense  at  the  proper  time,  still  equity  will 
refuse  to  give  him  an  injunction  against  the  judgment  if  he  negligent- 
ly omitted,  having  full  knowledge  of  the  facts,  to  apply  in  due  season 
for  such  remedies  as  were  open  to  him  by  appeal,  motion  for  a  new 
trial,  or  motion  to  vacate  the  judgment.*^®  And  aside  from  this, 
chancery  will  be  slow  to  extend  assistance  to  one  who  has  been  so 
dilatory  or  slothful  in  seeking  its  aid  as  to  be  chargeable  with 
laches.*^* 

§  388.    Defense  not  available  at  Iiat^. 

Thus  far  we  have  been  speaking  only  of  defenses  purely  legal  in 
their  character  and  which  could  have  been  interposed  in  the  action 
at  law.  But  where  the  case  varies  from  this  type,  entirely  different 
rules  apply.  If  the  matter  relied  on  by  the  complainant  could  not 
have  been  received  as  a  defense  in  the  trial  at  law,  because  it  fell 
within  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  chancery,  or  by  reason  of  the 
forms  of  legal  procedure,  equity  will  relieve  notwithstanding  there 
may  have  been  an  ineffectual  attempt  to  defend  at  law.^^^     And 

«•«  Stanard  v.  Rogers.  4  Hen.  &  M.  (Va.)  438;  Hill  v.  Bowyer,  18  Grat  (Va.) 
^iM;  Sanders  y.  Fisher.  11  Ala.  812. 

s««  Rowland  y.  Jones.  2  Helsk.  (Tenn.)  821. 

*T0  Heller  v.  Dyervllle  Manuf  g  Co.,  116  Cal.  127,  47  Pac.  1016;  Perkins  v. 
St  Louis.  K.  0.  &  0.  R.  Co.,  143  Mo.  513,  45  S.  W.  2B0;  Graham  v.  Citizens' 
Nat.  Bank,  45  W.  Va.  701,  32  S.  E.  245. 

2T1  Rio  Grande  Irrigation  &  Colonization  Co.  v.  Gildersleeve,  174  U.  S.  603, 
19  Sup.  Ct  761,  43  L.  Ed.  1103;  Furnald  v.  Glenn.  12  C.  C.  A.  27,  64  Fed.  49; 
Cheney  v.  Hovey.  56  Kan.  637.  44  Pac.  605.  See  Raisin  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Kenna,  114  Ala.  274,*  21  South.  816. 

872  Crim  V.  Handley,  94  U.  S.  652,  24  L.  Ed.  216;  Hendrickson  v.  Hinckley, 
17  How.  443.  15  L.  Ed.  123;  Ferriday  v.  Selcer.  Freem.  Ch.  (Miss.)  258;  CaHo- 
way  V.  McElroy,  3  Ala.  406;  Clifton  v.  Livor,  24  Ga.  91;  King  v.  Baldwin,  17 
Johns.  384.  8  Am.  Dec.  415;  Vennum  v.  Davis,  35  111.  5G8;  Dunham  v.  Downer. 
31  Vt.  249;  Kersey  v.  Rash,  3  Del.  Ch.  321;  Newton  r.  Field.  16  Ark.  216; 
Stevens  v.  Hertzler,  114  Ala.  563,  22  South.  121;   Yanscoy  v.  Stinchcomb,  29 

(615) 


§  389  tAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  15 

where  the  defendant  has  both  a  legal  defense  and  an  equitable  de- 
fense, the  latter  not  cognizable  at  law,  a  failure  to  use  diligence  in 
making  his  legal  defense  will  not,  it  seems,  prevent  a  court  of  equit>^ 
from  granting  an  injunction  upon  proof  of  the  equitable  defense,  in 
case  a  judgment  is  rendered  against  him.'"  The  most  difficult  ques- 
tion under  this  head  arises  in  connection  with  the  codes  of  practice, 
enacted  in  several  of  the  states,  which  confer  large  equitable  powers 
upon  the  courts  of  law.  One  decision  holds  that  such  a  statute  mere- 
ly permits,  but  does  not  require,  an  equitable  defense  to  be  made  to 
an  action  on  a  legal  demand;  and  therefore,  if  the  defendant  fails 
to  avail  himself  of  this  privilege,  and  permits  a  judgment  to  go  against 
him,  he  may  still  bring  an  equitable  action  to  obtain  relief  against 
the  judgment.^'*  Notwithstanding  the  plausibility  of  this  reasoning, 
it  is  opposed  by  the  weight  of  the  authorities,  which  rule  that  the 
fact  that  a  defense  is  equitable  is  no  excuse  for  not  setting  it  up  at 
law,  if  available  under  the  code.*^* 

§  389.    Defense  aTailable  either  at  Iaw  or  Eqvltr* 

There  is  a  third  possibility  in  regard  to  the  character  of  the  defense 
to  the  action;  it  may  be  one  that  is  equally  available  either  at  law 
or  in  equity.  In  this  event,  where  the  defense  is  a  matter  of  which 
courts  of  law  and  equity  have  concurrent  jurisdiction,  it  is  generally 
held  that  the  party  may  choose  the  forunj  in  which  to  make  his  de- 
fense, and  if  he  omits  to  do  so  at  law,  he  may  then  have  recourse  to 
equity  for  relief  against  the  judgment. '^'  Thus,  in  some  of  the 
states,  equity  will  relieve  against  a  judgment  at  law,  by  default,  for 

W.  Va.  263,  11  S.  E.  927;  Gillett  v.  SuUlvan,  127  Ind.  327.  28  X.  E.  827; 
Hawkins  v.  HardiDg,  37  111.  App.  564.  Compare  Gentle  ▼.  Atlas  Savings  & 
Loan  Ass'n,  105  Ga.  406,  31  S.  £.  544. 

«T3  Cornelius  v.  Thomas,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  283;  Winchester  ▼.  Gleares,  3  Hajw. 
(Tenn.)  213. 

«74  Dorsey  v.  Reese,  14  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  157. 

27  6  Kelly  V.  Hurt,  74  Mo.  561;  Winfleld  v.  Bacon,  24  Barb.  (N.  T.)  154; 
Savage  v.  Allen,  54  N.  Y.  458. 

27 6  Harlan  v.  Wingate's  Adm'r,  2  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  138;  Dwsey  t.  Rec«e. 
14  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  157;  Morrison's  Ex'r  v.  Hart,  2  Bibb  (Ky.)  4,  4  Am.  Dec. 
663;  Hempstead  y.  Watklns,  6  Ark.  317,  42  Am.  Dec.  696;  Bently  r.  DlUard, 
6  Ark.  79;  Rathbone  v.  Warren,  10  Johns.  587.  But  compare  Vaugtm  t*  John- 
son, 9  N.  J.  Eq.  173;  Galbraith  y.  Martin,  5  Humph.  (Tenn.)  50. 

(616) 


Ch.  15)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JtTDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  390 

money  won  at  gaming,  because  here  the  jurisdiction  of  law  and 
equity  is  concurrent,  and  the  party  may  have  his  election  where  he 
will  set  up  his  defense ;  and  if  he  so  chooses  he  may  let  judgment  go 
by  default  at  law,  and  then  resort  to  equity;  although  it  would  of 
course  be  otherwise  if  he  had  presented  his  defense  at  law  and  fail- 
ed.''^ For  if,  in  any  case  where  the  jurisdiction  of  law  and  equity 
is  concurrent,  the  party  makes  his  defense  in  the  trial  at  law,  he  will 
be  regarded  as  having  made  his  election ;  and  if  he  fails  he  will  have 
no  ground  for  a  bill  in  equity  for  relief  against  the  judgment,  unless 
his  defeat  occurred  through  fraud  or  accident.*'*  And  this  election 
is  manifested,  it  is  said,  "by  offering  any  defense  whatever,  it  matters 
not  whether  by  demurrer  to  the  declaration,  or  by  plea  in  abatement 
or  in  bar."  ^'^  But  it  is  also  held  that  if  there  is  a  doubt  whether  a 
defense  is  available  at  law,  and  there  is  an  undoubted  jurisdiction  in 
equity,  and  at  law  the  defendant  omits  to  make  his  defense,  or  if  he 
makes  it  and  it  is  overruled  on  the  ground  that  it  cannot  be  consid- 
ered at  law,  a  court  of  equity  may  afford  relief,  notwithstanding  a 
trial  at  law.*" 

§  390.    SatUfaotion  or  Release  of  Jndgmeiit. 

Payment,  release,  or  discharge  of  the  claim  on  which  a  suit  is 
founded  must  generally  be  set  up  as  a  defense  before  judgment.  It 
forms  no  exception  to  the  rule  that  matters  cannot  be  heard  on  a  bill 
in  equity  which  might  have  been  pleaded  in  the  action  at  law,  un- 
less the  party  was  prevented  from  bringing  them  before  the  court 
by  fraud  or  accident,  without  his  own  fault  or  negligence.*®^  But 
payment  made  after  the  institution  of  suit,  where  it  cannot  be  brought 

277  Clay  V.  Fry,  3  Bibb  (Ky.)  248,  6  Am.  Dec.  654;  Lucas  v.  Nichols,  66  111. 
41;  Gough  V.  Pratt,  9  Md.  526;  Collins  v.  Lee,  2  Mo.  16.     See  supra,  §  379. 

27  8  Haughey  v.  Strang,  2  Port.  (Ala.)  177,  27  Am.  Dec.  648;  DutU  v.  Pacheco, 
21  Cal.  438,  82  Am.  Dec.  749;  Burton  v.  Hynson,  14  Ark.  32;  Dickson  v.  Rich- 
ardson, 16  Ark.  114;  Morrison's  Ex'r  v.  Hart,  2  Bibb  (Ky.)  4,  4  Am.  Dec.  663; 
Dunham  v.  Downer,  31  Vt  249;  Farmers'  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Johnston,  113  Mich. 
426,  71  N.  W.  1074. 

27»  Le  Guen  v.  Gouvemeur,  1  Johns.  Cas.  505, 1  Am.  Dec.  12L 

280  King  V.  Baldwin,  17  Johns.  884,  8  Am.  Dec.  415. 

281  Foster  v.  Wood,  6  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  90;  Duncan  v.  Lyon,  3  Johns.  Oh. 
<X.  Y.)  356,  8  Am.  Dec.  513. 

(617) 


§    891  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   15 

to  the  notice  of  the  court  before  judgment,  under  the  local  practice^ 
is  good  ground  for  enjoining  the  judgment.***  Whether  a  bill  in 
equity  for  an  injunction  is  the  proper  remedy  to  prevent  a  judgment* 
plaintiff  from  proceeding  to  collect  anew  a  judgment  which  has  been 
in  fact  satisfied,  has  been  disputed.  Some  of  the  cases  hold  that  such 
an  application  is  meritorious  and  should  be  allowed.***  But  others^ 
and  we  think  with  better  reason,  consider  that  equity  ought  not  to 
interfere  in  such  a  case,  inasmuch  as  the  party  has  a  prompt  and 
adequate  remedy  at  law.***  But  it  is  held  that  a  court  of  equity  will 
relieve  against  the  suing  out  or  levy  of  any  process  of  execution  upon 
a  judgment  enjoined  which  has  been  discharged  by  proceedings  in 
bankruptcy.*** 

§  391.    lajunetion  as  a  Kmuis  of  MovrUiK  8et-<W. 

As  equity  may  order  one  judgment  to  be  set  off  against  another, 
so  also  it  has  power  to  restrain  the  execution  of  a  judgment  when  it 
is  made  to  appear  that  the  judgment-defendant  has  a  debt  against  the 
plaintiff  exceeding  the  judgment  in  amount  and  that  the  latter  is 
insolvent.***  But  a  bill  for  this  purpose  cannot  be  sustained  on  the 
iliere  ground  that  the  defendant  has  claims  against  the  plaintiff  which 
might  be  the  subject  of  set-off,  if  there  is  no  averment  to  show  that 
the  former  for  any  reason  could  not  have  availed  himself  of  his  right 
of  set-off  in  the  action  in  which  the  judgment  against  him  was  recov- 

282  Humphreys  v.  Leggett,  9  How.  297,  13  L.  Ed.  145;  Florat  v.  Handj,  35 
La.  Ann.  816. 

2S8  Bo  wen  v.  Clark,  46  Ind.  405;  Shaw  ▼.  Dwight,  16  Barb.  536;  MaUorj  t. 
Norton,  21  Barb.  424;  Texas  Land  &  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Worsham,  5  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  245,  23  S.  W,  938;  Smith  v.  Taylor,  78  Mo.  App.  630;  Kallander  v.  Neid- 
hold,  98  Mich.  517,  57  N.  W.  571;  Johnson  v.  Huber,  106  Wis.  282,  82  X.  W. 
137;  Phillips  v.  Kuhn,  35  Neb.  187.  52  N.  W.  881;  Marks  v.  WUlls,  36  Or. 
1,  58  Pac.  526,  78  Am.  St.  Rep.  752;  Thompson  v.  LanghUn,  91  Cal.  313,  27 
Pac.  752. 

284  McRae  v.  Davis,  58  N.  C.  140;  Perrine  v.  Carlisle,  19  Ala.  686;  Lansing 
V.  Eddy,  1  Johns.  Ch.  (X.  Y.)  49;  Robinson  v.  McDowell,  125  N.  C.  337,  34 
S.  E.  550;  Rollins  v.  Xational  Casket  Cto.,  40  W.  Va.  590,  21  S.  E.  722. 

286  Peatross  v.  McLaughlin,  6  Grat.  (Va.)  64. 

286  McCleUan  v.  Klnnaird,  6  Grat.  (Va.)  352.  And  see  also  Hinrichsen  v. 
Reinback,  27  111.  295;  Sunmer  v.  Whitley,  1  Mo.  708;  Capehart  v.  Etheridge, 
63  X.  C.  353;  Jarrett  v  Goodnow,  39  W.  Va.  602,  20  S.  E.  575,  32  L.  R.  A. 
321;  Dunham  Lumber  Co.  v.  Holt,  124  Ala.  181,  27  South.  65a 

(618) 


Ch.   IS)  REUEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  392 

ered.**^  Nor  will  proceedings  on  a  judgment  at  law  be  enjoined  in 
equity  in  order  to  give  the  defendant  an  opportunity  to  set  off  or 
recoup  a  counterclaim,  where  such  claim  is  unliquidated  and  arose 
out  of  an  entirely  distinct  transaction.^*'  An  injunction  granted  to 
restrain  the  collection  of  a  judgment  on  the  ground  that  the  debtor 
therein  is  entitled  to  a  credit  for  a  sum  less  than  the  whole  amount 
of  the  judgment,  should  provide  that  the  judgment-creditor  may  pro- 
ceed by  execution  to  collect  the  undisputed  balance  of  the  judg- 
ment,*** 

S  392.    Personal  DliabiUty  of  Partiei. 

Courts  of  equity  are  sometimes  called  upon  to  restrain  the  enforce- 
ment of  a  judgment  on  the  ground  that  it  was  taken  against  a  person 
who,  at  the  time,  was  incapacitated  for  legal  action  by  some  personal 
disability,  such  as  infancy,  coverture,  or  lunacy.  The  degree  of  val- 
idity to  be  attributed  to  such  judgments  is  chiefly  disputed,  as  we 
have  already  seen,  in  cases  where  a  judgment  by  default  has  been 
rendered  upon  a  cause  of  action  to  which  the  infancy  or  coverture, 
if  pleaded,  would  have  been  a  complete  defense.^*"  If,  on  the  one 
hand,  such  disability  of  the  defendant  is  not  regarded  as  a  jurisdic- 
tional defect,  a  judgment  of  this  character  will  at  most  be  voidable 
and  not  void.  This  is  the  position  taken  by  many  of  the  courts,  as 
will  appear  from  the  sections  just  cited.  But  in  such  case,  the  rem- 
edy is  obviously  by  motion  or  other  appropriate  proceeding  in  the 
court  rendering  the  judgment.  And  any  application  to  equity  for 
relief  would  be  met  by  the  familiar  rule  that  an  injunction  cannot  be 
granted  on  account  of  matters  which  might  and  should  have  been 
pleaded  in  defense  to  the  action  at  law.**^  But  if,  on  the  other  hand^ 
as  many  decisions  hold,  such  a  status  as  coverture  amounts  to  a  ne- 

28 T  Wolcott  V.  Jones,  4  Allen  (Mass.)  367;  Garvin  v.  Squires,  9  Ark.  533^ 
50  Am.  Dec.  224;  Twigg  v.  Hopkins,  85  Md.  301,  37  Ati.  24;  Zinn  v.  Dawson, 
47  W.  Va.  45,  34  S.  E.  784.  81  Am.  St.  Rep.  772. 

288  Jackson  v.  Bell,  31  N.  J.  Eq.  554. 

289  Levy  v.  Stelnbach,  43  Md.  212. 

2»o  See,  as  to  married  women,  §§  188-101;  as  to  Infants,  §§  193-197;  and 
as  to  lunatics,  §  205. 

2»i  See  Wyman  v.  Hardwlck,  52  Mo.  App.  621;  Evans  v.  Caiman,  92  Mich. 
427,  52  N.  W.  787,  31  Am.  St.  Rep.  606;  Levysteln  v.  O'Brien,  106  Ala.  352, 
17  South.  550,  30  L.  R.  A.  707,  54  Am.  St.  Rep.  50. 

(619) 


§   393  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   15 

gation  of  that  juristic  personality  which  is  essential  to  the  formation 
of  any  and  all  legal  relations,  then  it  is  equally  evident  that  the  courts 
of  law  can  acquire  no  jurisdiction  over  a  defendant  so  circumstanced, 
and  that  a  judgment  such  as  that  supposed  would  be  simply  null. 
That  equity  would  have  power  to  restrain  its  collection  seems  clear 
beyond  doubt.  And  it  will  become  still  more  clear  if  we  reflect  that, 
since,  on  the  premises,  the  defendant  would  have  no  power  to  em- 
ploy an  attorney  or  interpose  a  defense,  the  case  is  brought  well 
within  the  confines  of  the  rule  which  has  formed  the  connecting 
thread  of  this  whole  chapter,  viz. :  that  chancery  will  relieve  against 
an  inequitable  judgment  on  grounds  which  could  not  have  been 
pleaded  at  law.^®^  The  reader  will  be  further  advised  of  the  doc- 
trines on  this  topic  by  referring  to  the  discussion  of  the  general  sub- 
ject in  a  previous  chapter.  It  is  held  that  service  of  process  on  a 
privileged  person  (as  a  member  of  the  legislative  body)  is  not  void, 
and  his  remedy  is  by  motion  or  plea,  and  not  by  injunction  to  re- 
strain an  execution  on  a  judgment  by  default  against  him  on  such 
service.^"* 

• 

Part  III.     Practice  on  ApM.tcation  to  Enjoin  Judgment. 

S  393.    Nature  and  Beqvisites  of  BilL 

A  bill  in  equity  for  the  vacation  of  a  judgment,  or  to  enjoin  its 
enforcement,  should  always  show  that  the  merits  of  the  controversy 
are  with  the  complainant.  If  it  fails  to  allege  a  good  and  meritori- 
ous defense  to  the  claim  on  which  the  judgment  was  rendered,  so 
that  it  would  be  inequitable  and  unjust  to  allow  the  enforcement  of 
the  judgment  as  it  stands,  the  bill  states  no  cause  of  action  and  must 
be  dismissed.^**     Nor  is  it  enough  to  aver  that  complainant  has  stat- 

2»2  Griffith  V.  Clarke.  18  Md.  457;  Medart  v.    Fasnatch.  15  La.  Ann.  021 

«»8  Peters  v.  League,  13  Md.  58,  71  Am.  Dec.  622. 

2»*  White  V.  Crow,  110  U.  S.  183,  4  Sup.  Ct.  71,  28  L.  Ed.  113;  Massachu- 
setts Benefit  Life  Ass'n  v.  Lohmlller,  20  C.  C.  A.  274,  74  Fed.  23:  Home  IJfe 
Ins.  Co.  V.  Caulk,  86  Md.  385,  38  Atl.  901;  Anderson  v.  Oldham,  82  Tex.  228. 
18  S.  W.  557;  Rotan's  Heirs  v.  Springer,  52  Ark.  80,  12  S.  W.  156:  Bontain 
V.  Blackburn,  27  111.  406;  Combs  v.  Hamlin  Wizard  Oil  Co.,  58  111.  App.  123; 
Tompkins  v.  I^ang,  74  111.  App.  500;  Ableman  v.  Roth,  12  Wis.  81;  Petalka 
T.  Fitle,  33  Neb.  756,  51  N.  W.  131;  Janes  v.  Howell,  87  Neb.  320,  55  N.  W. 

(620) 


Ch.  15)  RBLIBP  IN  EQUITY  AGAJNST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §  393 

ed  the  facts  to  his  attorney  and  is  advised  by  him  that  he  has  a  good 
defense;  he  must  allege  explicitly  that  he  has  .such  a  defense,  and 
set  out  the  facts  constituting  it.^®**  Even  a  void  judgment  will  not 
be  set  aside  in  equity  where  no  meritorious  defense  to  the  action  is 
shown,  if  the  invalidity  is  not  apparent  on  its  face.'^®*  So,  on  a  bill 
in  equity  to  vacate  a  judgment  and  obtain  a  new  trial,  the  relief  will 
be  denied  where  it  appears  that  the  evidence  on  a  new  trial  would  be 

4 

in  direct  conflict,  and  might  properly  result  in  a  second  judgment 
identical  with  the  first.^*^^ 

Again,  the  bill  must  show,  by  sufficient  averments,  that  there  is 
some  adequate  ground  for  equity  to  interfere  with  the  judgment  at 
law,  such  as  fraud,  accident,  or  mistake,  want  of  jurisdiction,  excus- 
able failure  of  the  complainant  to  present  his  defense  at  law,  or  the 
like,  and  it  must  set  forth  the  facts  constituting  the  fraud  or  other 
ground  on  which  he  means  to  rely.**®  Thus,  where  it  is  alleged 
that  the  adverse  party  practised  fraud  in  obtaining  the  judgment,  the 
facts  showing  such  fraud  must  be  stated  in  a  plain  and  concise  man- 
ner, as  in  other  cases,  mere  knowledge  of  certain  facts  not  being 
sufficient;  the  fraudulent  acts  and  proceedings  of  such  party,  de- 
signed and  practised  for  the  purpose  of  securing  an  unfair  and  un- 
just judgment,  must  be  clearly  shown.***     But  a  petition  to  set  aside 

965,  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  4»4;  Eldred  v.  White.  102  Cal.  600,  36  Pac.  »44.  A  Joint 
complaint  to  review  a  Judgment  for  newly-discovered  matter  must  state  a 
cause  of  action  as  to  all  the  complainants.  Wame  v.  Irwin,  153  Ind.  20,  53 
N.  E.  926.  The  rule  above  stated  does  not  apply  where  the  plaintiff  himself  is 
seeking  affirmatively  to  enforce  the  Judgment.  Campbell  Trinting  Press  & 
Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Marder,  Luse  &  Co.,  50  Neb.  283,  69  N.  W.  774,  61  Am.  St. 
Rep.  573. 

206  Eldred  v.  White,  102  Cal.  600,  36  Pac.  944. 

2»e  Pilger  v.  Torrence,  42  Neb.  903,  61  N.  W.  99. 

28  7  Roots  V.  Cohen  (Miss.)  12  South.  593. 

2»8Wlllems  V.  Willems,  72  111.  App.  200;  Young  v.  Sigler  (C.  C.)  48  Fed. 
182;  Handley  v.  Jackson,  31  Or.  552,  50  Pac.  915,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  839;  Camp 
V.  Ward,  69  Vt.  286,  37  Atl.  747,  60  Am.  St.  Rep.  929;  McDonald  v.  Pearson, 
114  Ala.  630,  21  South.  534.  A  bill  to  enjoin  the  enforcement  of  a  Judg- 
ment rendered  by  a  court  of  competent  Jurisdiction  must  state  facts  sufficient 
to  overcome  the  presumption  that  the  Judgment  is  valid.  Davis  v.  Clements, 
148  Ind.  605,  47  N.  E.  1056,  62  Am.  St.  Rep.  539. 

«•»  Ohio  &c  W.  Mortgage  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Carter,  9  Kan.  App.  621,  68  Pac. 
1040.  A  bfil  attacking  a  Judgment  as  fraudulent  by  reason  of  the  Judge's 
having  been  counsel  before  the  trial  should  state  on  whose  behalf  he  so  acted. 

(621) 


§   393  LAW  OF  JUpOMENTS.  (S^^-   1^ 

a  judgment  obtained  by  fraud,  which  sets  out  the  facts  showing  the 
fraud,  is  sufficient  though  it  lacks  a  specific  allegation  of  fraud,'** 
Where  the  ground  of  attack  on  the  judgment  is  want  of  jurisdiction, 
a  petition  alleging  that  there  was  no  service  of  process  on  the  judg- 
ment-defendant, that  he  did  not  employ  counsel  or  authorize  any  one 
to  retain  counsel  to  represent  him  in  the  suit,  and  that  he  knew 
nothing  about  the  suit  or  the  judgment  rendered  therein,  is  g^ood  on 
demurrer.'®^ 

In  the  next  place,  the  complainant  in  such  a  suit  must  exonerate 
himself;  that  is,  he  must  introduce  proper  averments  to  show  that 
the  judgment  against  him  was  not  attributable  to  his  own  negli- 
gence or  lack  of  attention  to  the  progress  of  the  case,  and  that  he 
has  been  diligent  in  seeking  to  make  his  defense,  and  he  must  set 
forth  the  facts  which  he  relies  on  as  showing  such  diligence.***  For 
instance,  a  statenrent  that  complainant  used  all  the  diligence  in  his 
power  to  procure  the  evidence  necessary  to  defeat  the  suit  at  law  is 
not  sufficient;  the  facts  in  regard  to  the  diligence  used  must  be  set 
out,  so  that  the  court  can  determine  whether  proper  diligence  has 
been  exercised. •®* 

Further,  the  complainant  must  allege  that  he  has  no  adequate  rem- 
edy at  law  against  the  judgment,  or  (if  the  case  be  so)  that  he  has 
unavailingly  exhausted  his  legal  remedies;  or,  if  he  failed  to  seek 
redress  at  law,  he  must  show  the  reason  for  such  failure  and  clear 
himself  of  the  charge  of  negligence  or  carelessness.*** 

Finally,  a  bill  seeking  to  enjoin  the  collection  of  a  judgment  and 

and  that  the  complainant  objected  to  hlB  sitting,  or  failed  to  object  by  reason 
of  ignorance  of  tbe  Judge's  disqualification.  Griffith  v.  Griffith  (Teiu.)  46  S. 
W.  340. 

BOO  Oliver  v.  Riley,  92  Iowa.  23,  60  N.  W.  180. 

801  Graham  v.  East  Texas  Land  &  Imp.  Co.  (Tex.)  50  S.  W.  579. 

802  Ratliff  V.  Stretch,  130  Ind.  282.  30  X.  K.  30;  Combs  v.  Hamlin  Wizard 
Oil  Co.,  58  111.  App.  123;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Henderson.  33  Tex. 
70,  18  S.  W.  432;  Griffith  v.  Griffith  (Tenn.)  46  S.  W.  340;  East  Texas  I^nd 
&  Improvement  Co.  v.  Graham,  24  Tex.  Civ.  App.  521,  GO  S.  \V.  472;  Warne 
V.  Irwin,  153  Ind.  20.  53  N.  K  926. 

808  Brady  v.  Horvath.  79  III.  App.  17. 

804  Eldred  v.  White,  102  Cal.  600,  36  Pac.  944;  Lininger  v.  Glenn,  33  Neb. 
187.  4t>  X.  W.  1128;  Xational  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Hinson,  103  Ala.  532,  15  South. 
844;  IIo<  kaday  v.  Jones,  8  Old.  156,  56  Pac.  1054. 

(622) 


Ch,  15)  RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.  §    393b 

execution,  which  does  not  so  identify  them  as  to  make  it  appear 
what  judgment  and  execution  are  meant,  and  which  does  not  limit 
the  prayer  to  any  particular  judgment  and  execution,  is  demurra- 
ble.'*** A  bill  to  vacate  a  decree  for  fraud  may  be  filed  without  leave 
of  court  first  obtained,  unless  that  is  made  necessary  by  local  statute 
or  rule  of  court.*** 

§  393a.    Bridence. 

In  a  proceeding  in  equity  to  enjoin  the  enforcement  of  a  judgment 
at  law,  the  presumption  is  in  favor  of  the  regularity  and  the  just- 
ness of  the  judgment  attacked,  and  the  burden  is  upon  the  complain- 
ant to  show  that  he  is  equitably  entitled  to  be  relieved  from  the  ob- 
ligation of  the  judgment.**^  While  there  is  no  rule  as  to  the  pre- 
cise measure  of  proof  which  will  justify  a  court  of  equity  in  opening 
or  enjoining  a  judgment,  it  is  stated  that  the  weight  of  the  evidence 
should  be  clearly  with  the  party  seeking  relief  against  the  judg- 
ment.***  Or,  as  stated  with  reference  to  a  judgment  alleged  to  have 
been  procured  through  fraud,  the  evidence  of  the  fraud  must  be  clear 
and  convincing.***  Where  the  answer  is  a  general  denial,  evidence 
of  matters  occurring  after  the  rendition  of  the  judgment  is  not  ad- 
missible.*** 

§  393b.    Joinder  of  Parties. 

In  a  bill  in  equity  to  enjoin  or  set  aside  a  judgment  or  decree,  it  is 
generally  necessary  to  join  as  parties  defendant  all  persons  whose 
rights  would  or  might  be  aflfected  by  the  grant  of  the  relief  asked.*^^ 
But  where  one  of  several  joint  judgment-debtors  sues  to  restrain 
the  enforcement  of  the  judgment  as  against  himself  alone,  he  need 
not  join  the  others  as  parties  plaintiff.***      Where   the  action   is 

805  Adams  v.  White,  23  Fla.  352,  2  South.  774. 

»oe  McDonald  v.  Pearson,  114  Ala.  630,  21  South.  534. 

»oT  Tompkins  v.  Lang,  74  III.  App.  50<);  Mutual  Xat.  Bank  v.  Moore.  104 
La.  150,  29  South.  103;  Adams  School  Tp.  v.  Irwin,  150  Ind.  12,  49  N.  E.  806. 

808  Fisher  v.  Holbrook,  7  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  647. 

»o»  Mulcahey  v.  Dow,  131  Cal.  73,  63  Pac.  158;  Evans  v.  International  Trust 
Co.  (Tenn.)  59  S.  W.  373. 

810  Burnett  v.  Milnes,  148  Ind.  230,  46  N.  E.  464. 

ail  Harrison  v.  Wallton's  Ex'r,  95  Va.  721,  30  S.  E.  372,  41  L.  R.  A.  703, 
64  Am.  St.  Rep.  830. 

3u  Meniman  v.  Walton,  105  Oal.  408,  38  Pac  1108,  30  L.  R.  A.  786,  45 
Am.  St  Rep;  50. 

(623) 


{ 


§394  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   !> 

brought  against  the  sheriff  or  other  officer  holding  process  under 
the  judgment,  to  restrain  him  from  proceeding  for  its  collection,  it 
is  said  that  the  person  in  whose  favor  the  judgment  was  rendered 
should  be  made  a  defendant." *•  But  on  the  other  hand,  in  Texas,  if 
the  suit  is  against  the  judgment-creditor,  neither  the  justice  of  the 
peace  who  rendered  the  judgment,  nor  the  officer  who  is  about  to 
levy  execution  under  it,  is  a  proper  party,  notice  to  them  of  the  in- 
junction being  sufficient.'** 

§  394.    CondlttoBS  on  Grunting  Relief. 

In  accordance  with  the  general  rule  and  policy  of  equity,  it  is  held 
that  he  who  seeks  relief  against  a  judgment  must  do  equity;  that  is, 
he  must  restore  any  advantage  he  may  have  gained,  and  he  must 
submit  to  all  orders  of  the  court  necessary  to  adjust  the  rights  of  the 
litigants  in  entire  accordance  with  equity.'*'  Thus,  if  the  whole 
amount  involved  is  not  disputed,  the  complainant  must  pay  or  offer 
to  pay  what  he  admits  to  be  due,  or  show  some  sufficient  excuse  for 
his  failure;  otherwise  his  case  cannot  be  sustained.'*'    An  order  for 

813  East  Riverside  Irr.  District  v.  Holcomb,  126  Gal.  315,  68  Pac.  817.  Co- 
known  heirs  of  a  former  grantee,  made  parties  in  proceedings  leading  to  a 
decree  afTecting  tlje  title  to  real  estate,  are  proper,  but  not  necessary,  parties 
defendant  in  a  later  action  to  set  aside  such  decree  on  the  ground  of  fraad. 
where  such  unknown  heirs  are  not  parties  to  the  firaud  attacked.  Kannallr 
V.  Renner,  84  111.  App.  51. 

'i«  Gulf,  G.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Go.  y.  Blankenbecklor,  13  Tex.  Giy.  App.  248,  35 
S.  W.  331. 

315  Creed  v.  Scruggs,  1  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  590;  Reeves  v.  Cooper,  12  X.  J.  Eq. 
223;  Baragree  v.  Cronkhite,  33  Ind.  192;  Yonge  y.  Shepperd,  44  Ala.  315;  Oyer- 
ton  y.  Stevens,  8  Mo.  622;  Flickinger  y.  HnU,  5  GiU  (Md.)  60;  Shelton  y.  GUU 
11  Ohio,  417;  Hill  y.  Harris,  42  Ga.  412. 

816  Yonge  y.  Shepperd,  44  Ala.  315;  Jordan  y.  Ghester  (Tex.)  43  S.  W. 
901;  Keifer  v.  Summers,  137  Ind.  106.  35  N.  E.  1103;  Tompkins  y.  Lang,  74 
111.  App.  500;  Herwick  y.  Koken  Barber  Supply  Oo.,  61  Mo.  App.  454;  Brewer 
y.  Mock,  14  Colo.  App.  454,  60  Pac.  578.  Code  N.  Y.  §  613,  proyides  that  an 
order  staying  proceedings  on  a  money  judgment  shall  not  be  granted  unless 
the  full  amount  of  the  judgment  is  paid  into  court,  or  an  undertaking  giyen 
in  lieu  thereof,  as  well  as  an  undertaking  to  secure  payment  of  damages;  and 
this  applies  to  a  motion  for  an  injunction  restraining  the  sheriff  from  paying 
over  the  proceeds  of  a  sale  under  a  judgment.  Ingalls  y.  Merchants'  Nat. 
Bnnk,  51  App.  Div.  305,  &4  N.  Y.  Supp.  911.  In  Alabama,  where  a  bin  to 
restrain  the  enforcement  of  a  Judgment  admits  that  a  certain  amount  of 
(02-1) 


Ch.  15)      RBLIEP  IN  EQUITY  AGAINST  JUDGMENTS  AT  LAW.        §  395 

an  injunction  to  a  sale  under  execution  does  not  become  effectual 
until  any  conditions  required  by  the  order  (such  as  the  execution  of 
a  bond)  have  been  complied  with.*^^  Equity  will  of  course  be  guid- 
ed, in  the  matter  of  imposing  conditions,  by  the  peculiar  circumstan- 
ces of  the  individual  case. 

S  395.    Effect  of  EnJoiainK  Judsment. 

An  injunction  to  prevent  a  judgment-plaintiff  from  proceeding  fur-. ' 
ther  with  his  execution  does  not  generally  operate  as  a  release  of 
errors.'**  And  so  the  injunction,  if  not  perpetual,  does  not  destroy 
the  Hen  of  the  judgment,  but  merely  suspends  it  until  the  dissolution 
of  the  injunction.'*®  Hence,  "when  the  operative  energy  of  an  exe- 
cution has  been  suspended  by  an  injunction,  a  sale  under  a  junior 
execution  does  not  affect  the  lien  acquired  by  such  elder  execution, 
but  the  property  in  the  hands  of  any  person  remains  liable  to  a  levy 
when  the  injunction  is  removed."  •^'^  But  where  the  collection  of 
an  execution  is  enjoined,  and  the  officer  has  other  junior  executions 
in  his  hands,  and  proceeds  to  sell  the  property  levied  upon,  he  can- 
not apply  the  proceeds  to  the  execution  enjoined,  although  before 
the  return  of  the  process  the  injunction,  by  consent,  is  dissolved  by 
order  of  court. '^*  A  judgment  suspended  by  injunction  may  be  re- 
vived on  the  death  of  either  party,  and  the  injunction  operates  on  the 
judgment  on  scire  facias,  prohibiting  execution  thereon."*  Where 
the  execution  of  a  judgment  is  restrained  by  injunction  until  the 
lien  is  lost  by  limitation,  the  party  proceeding  by  injunction,  upon 
its  dissolution,  cannot  take  advantage  of  such  loss  of  the  lien.'^' 
Where  a  judgment  upon  a  bill  of  exchange  against  an  acceptor  was 

it  is  due,  such  amount  should  be  paid  into  court.  A  simple  offer  to  pay 
is  Insufflciei^t.  J.  A.  Roebllng  Sons  Go.  v.  Stevens  Electric  Light  Ck).,  93  Ala. 
3^,  9  South.  369. 

817  Pell  V.  Lander,  8  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  554. 

318  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  Oo.  v.  Todd,  40  111.  89. 

•!•  Smith  v.  Bverly,  4  How.  (Miss.)  178. 

•  20  Lynn  y.  Gridley,  Walk.  (Miss.)  548,  12  Am.  Dec.  591. 

»2i  Newlhi  V.  Murray,  63  X.  C.  566. 

»«a  Richardson's  Adm'r  v.  Prince  George  Justices,  11  Grat.  (Va.)  190. 

•as  Work  y.  Harper,  31  Miss.  107,  66  Am.  Dec  549. 

1  LAW  JUDG.-^  '  (625) 


§  396  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  C^"'   ^^ 

enjoined,  it  was  held  not  to  enjoin  suits  against  the  other  parties  to 
the  bill."* 

§  306.    BUsolvtion  of  InJunotioB. 

Where  the  injunction  of  an  entire  judgment  at  law  has  in  the 
first  instance  been  properly  granted,  and  the  answer  shows  that  the 
complainant  is  entitled  to  some  relief,  though  not  to  the  extent  claim- 
ed in  the  bill,  the  injunction  may  be  dissolved  in  part,  or  continued 
on  such  terms  as  will  insure  ultimate  justice  between  the  parties; 
but  to  authorize  such  dissolution,  or  a  requirement  that  the  com- 
plainant pay  a  portion  of  the  judgment  into  court,  as  a  condition  to 
the  continuance,  the  answer  should  show  expUcitly  the  amount  which 
the  plaintiff  at  law  is  in  equity  entitled  to  receive.  If  this  be  not  done, 
and  there  is  no  danger  of  the  debt  being  lost  by  continuing  the  in- 
junction, it  should  be  retained  until  the  final  hearing.'"  On  dis- 
solving an  injunction  shown  to  be  groundless,  damages  may  be 
given  against  the  complainant  according  to  the  amount  of  the  judg- 
ment enjoined.*** 

824  Bohannon  v.  Combs,  12  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  563. 

826  Maulden  v.  Armistead,  18  Ala.  500. 

»J»«  Stewart  v.  Robinson,  24  La.  Ann.  182.    See  Off  ▼.  Titie  G.,  A.  &  T.  Co., 

87  111.  App,  472. 

(626) 


Ch.  16)  THB  LIEN  OV  JUDQMENTS.  §  397 


THE  LIEN  OF  JUDQMENTS. 

Part  I.    Ouioin  and  Nature  of  Judohekt-Libnb. 

S  397.  Early  History  of  Judgment-Liens. 

398.  Judgment-Lien  is  Statutory. 

399.  Legislative  Control  of  Judgment-Liens. 

400.  Lien  gives  no  Property  In  Debtor's  Land. 

401.  Lien  is  General. 

402.  Courts  cannot  control  the  Lien. 

403.  Parties  cannot  change  Nature  of  Lien. 

404.  Docketing  the  Judgment. 

405.  Indexing  the  Judgment 

406.  Certainty  required  in  Docket  and  Index  as  to  Names  of  Parties. 
406a.  Same;  As  to  Amount. 

Part  IL    What  Judgments  create  Liens. 

407.  What  is  Necessary  to  Judgment-Liens. 

408.  Interlocutory  Judgments. 

409.  Judgments  against  Personal  Representatives. 

410.  Nunc  Pro  Tunc  Judgments. 

411.  Decrees  in  Chancery. 

412.  Judgments  of  Inferior  Courts. 

413.  Judgments  of  Federal  Courts. 

414.  Statutory  Basis  of  such  Liens. 

415.  Territorial  Extent  of  such  Liens. 

416.  Decrees  in  Admiralty. 

Part  HI.    To  "what  Propektt  the  Lten  attaches. 

417.  Territorial  Restriction  of  Lien. 

418.  Transfer  of  Judgment  to  Another  County. 

419.  Lien  binds  Real  Estate. 

420.  Actual  Interest  of  Debtor  bound. 

421.  Title  held  in  Trust. 

422.  Inchoate  Title. 

423.  Land  Fraudulently  Conveyed. 

424.  Exempt  Property. 

425.  Homestead  Property. 

426.  Life-Estates.    ' 

427.  Estates  by  Curlesy. 

428.  Reversions  and  Remainders. 

429.  Leasehold  Interests. 

(627) 


§   897  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNT&  {fih.  16 

Pabt  IIL    To  what  Propertt  ths  Lisk  attaches— Coniinaed* 

430.  Land  held  by  Joint  Owners. 

431.  Partnership  Property. 

432.  After-Acquired  Property. 

433.  Equitable  Estates  and  Interests. 

434.  Equity  of  Redemption. 

435.  Judgment  against  Trustee. 

436.  Land  held  under  a  Pow^er. 

437.  Judgment  against  Cestui  Que  Trust. 

438.  Interest  of  Vendor  under  Executory  Ck)n tract. 

439.  Interest  of  Vendee  under  Executory  Contract 
439a.  Sale  of  Land  After  Entry  of  Judgment 

440.  Estates  successively  conveyed. 

Part  IV.    Date  of  the  Lien. 

441.  Common  Law  Rule. 

442.  Exceptions  to  the  Rules. 

443.  Present  Statutory  Rules. 

444.  Cases  in  which  Lien  relates  back. 


Part  V.    PRionrrr  akd  Precedence  of  JuDOMENT-LiKHiL 

445.  Lien  is  subject  to  Prior  Rights  and  Equities. 

446.  As  against  Prior  Unrecorded  Conveyance. 

447.  Precedence  of  Purchase-Money  Mortgage. 

448.  Priority  of  Government  Claims. 

449.  Priority  by  Date  of  Entry. 

450.  Two  Judgments  entered  the  Same  Day. 

451.  Judgment  and  Conveyance  entered  the  Same  Day. 

452.  Judgment  given  to  secure  Future  Advances. 

453.  Prior  Undocketed  Judgment 

454.  As  against  Subsequent  Dower  Right 

455.  Priority  by  Superior  Diligence. 

456.  Priority  by  Prior  Levy. 

457.  Postponement  by  Stay  of  Execution. 

458.  Postponement  by  Failure  to  Revive, 

459.  Sale  under  Junior  Judgment. 

460.  Order  of  Priority  on  After- Acquired  I^nds. 

Part  VI.    Duration  of  the  Lien* 

461.  General  Rules. 

462.  Dormant  Judgment  Acts. 

463.  Legislative  Abridgment  of  the  Time. 

464.  Lien  of  Transf  v  rred  Judgment 

465.  Extension  of  Lien  by  Agreement  of  Partlea. 

((528) 


Ch,  16)  THB  LIBN  OF  JUDQMBNTS.  §  3U7 

Part  VI.    Duration  op  the  Lien— Continued. 

466.  Survival  against  Judgment-Debtor. 

467.  Death  of  Judgment-Debtor. 

468.  Remedies  of  Creditor  after  Expiration  of  Lien. 


Part  VII.    Suspension  and  Dibcharqb  of  Judgmekt-Liens. 

469.  General  Principles. 

470.  Suspension  of  Lien  by  Injunction. 

471.  Stay  of  Procaedlngs. 

472.  Opening  or  Vacating  Judgment. 

473.  Appeal  or  Error. 

474.  Bankruptcy. 

475.  Appointment  of  Receiver. 

476.  Taking  Defendant  on  Capias. 

477.  Payment. 

478.  Cancellation  or  Entry  of  Satisfaction. 

479.  Sale  of  the  Land. 

480.  Acquisition  of  Title  by  Judgment-Creditor. 

481.  Release  of  Lien. 


Part  I.     Origin  and  Nature  of  Judgment-Liens, 

§  397.    Early  Hiitory  of  JudKinent-Iiieiii. 

At  common  law,  except  for  debts  due  the  king,  the  lands  of  a 
debtor  were  not  liable  to  the  satisfaction  of  a  judgment  against  him, 
and  consequently  no  lien  thereon  was  acquired  by  a  judgment.  "This 
was  in  accordance  with  the  policy  of  the  feudal  law,  introduced  into 
England  after  the  Conquest,  which  did  not  permit  the  feudatory  to 
charge,  or  to  be  deprived  of,  his  lands  for  his  debts,  lest  thereby  he 
should  be  disabled  from  performing  his  stipulated  military  service, 
and  which,  moreover,  forbid  the  alienation  of  a  feud  without  the 
lord's  consent.  The  goods  and  chattels  of  the  debtor,  therefore, 
and  the  annual  profits  of  his  lands,  as  they  arose,  were  the  only 
funds  allotted  for  the  payment  of  his  debts.  This  continued  to  be 
the  law  until  the  passage  of  the  statute  of  Westminster  2d,  13  Ed- 
ward I,  c.  18,  by  which,  in  the  interest  of  trade  and  commerce,  the 
writ  of  elegit  was  for  the  first  time  provided  for.  By  that  statute 
the  judgment-creditor  was  given  his  election  to  sue  out  a  writ  of  fieri 
facias  against  the  goods  and  chattels  of  the  defendant,  or  else  a  writ 

(G29) 


§   398  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNT8.  (Ch.   M 

commanding  the  sheriflf  to  deliver  to  him  all  the  chattels  of  the  de- 
fendant (except  oxen  and  beasts  of  the  plough)  and  a  moiety  of  his 
lands  until  the  debt  should  be  levied  by  a  reasonable  price  or  extent. 
When  the  creditor  chose  the  latter  alternative,  his  election  was  en- 
tered on  the  roll,  and  hence  the  writ  was  denominated  an  elegit,  and 
the  interest  which  the  creditor  acquired  in  the  lands  by  virtue  of  the 
judgment  and  writ  was  known  as  an  estate  by  elegit."  *  It  will  be 
at  once  apparent  that  the  right  thus  conferred  upon  the  creditor  gave 
rise  to  a  true  judgment  lien,  although  it  diflfered  materially,  both  in 
its  extent  and  the  manner  of  its  enforcement,  from  the  type  with 
which  we  are  now  familiar. 

I  398.    Jndcment-Ideii  Is  Stmtvtory. 

If  we  inquire,  therefore,  in  any  case,  for  the  ultimate  basis  of  the 
lien  of  a  judgment  on  land,  it  must  be  supported  by  statutory  author- 
ity. In  most,  if  not  all,  of  the  American  states,  the  legislatures  have 
enacted  in  express  and  positive  terms  that  judgments  shall  be  liens 
on  land  for  a  prescribed  number  of  years.  But  in  some,  this  direct 
creation  of  a  most  eflfective  remedy  did  not  come  until  comparatively 
late  in  their  history.  In  the  interval,  it  is  true,  real  estate  was  con- 
sidered bound  by  a  judgment  against  its  owner,  but  that  was  only  in 
virtue  of  the  early  English  statute  above  referred  to,  which  had  been 
adopted  by  the  state  or  not  repudiated.  Thus  the  statute  of  West- 
minster 2d  "was  substantially  adopted  in  Virginia  at  an  early  day, 
and  in  consequence  of  this  right  to  subject  a  moiety  of  the  defend- 
ant's lands,  the  courts  held  that  a  lien  was  acquired  by  the  judgment, 
which  extended  to  all  the  defendant's  lands  within  the  state,  and 
which  was  superior  to  the  claims  of  subsequent  purchasers,  though 
for  valuable  consideration  and  without  notice.  The  lien  thus  ac- 
quired was  a  legal  lien,  and  remained  so  long  as  the  capacity  to  sue 
out  an  elegit  continued,  whether  the  writ  was  sued  out  or  not."  * 

1  Hutcheson  v.  Grubbs,  SO  Va.  2.54;  Jones  y.  Jones,  1  Bland  <Md.)  443.  18 
Am.  Dec.  327;  2  Co.  Inst.  394;  3  Bl.  Comm.  418;  Bac.  Abr.  •♦Execution,"  D. 

2  Hutcheson  v.  Grubbs,  80  Va.  254;  Borst  v.  NaUe,  28  Grat  (Va.)  423;  Price 
V.  Thrash.  30  Grat.  (Va.)  515;  Leake  v.  Ferguson,  2  Grat.  (Va.)  420;  Taylor's 
Adm*r  v.  Spindle,  Id.  44.  See,  also,  Coombs  ▼.  Jordan,  3  Bland  (Md.)  284.  22 
Am.  Dec.  236. 

((>30) 


Ch.   16)  THB  LIEN  09*  JUDOMBNTS.  §  399 

But,  compared  with  the  species  of  judgment  Hen  now  commonly 
known,  it  could  only  be  regarded  as  a  qualified  or  restricted  lien. 
For,  from  the  nature  of  the  writ  which  occasioned  it  and  by  which  it 
was  to  be  enforced,  it  could  not  be  foreclosed  by  a  sale  of  the  realty, 
but  only  by  taking  it  into  possession  and  receiving  the  rents  and 
profits.  In  the  absence,  then,  of  express  legislative  enactment,  judg- 
ments do  not  attach  as  liens  to  real  estate  in  the  modern  sense  of  the 
term.*  "Unless  there  is  a  statute  in  the  particular  state  expressly 
making  a  judgment  a  Ken  on  real  estate,  no  such  property  will  at- 
tach to  it ;  and  the  only  kind  of  lien  belonging  to  it  will  be  that  aris- 
ing in  consequence  of  the  right  to  take  out  an  elegit."  *  An  illus- 
tration of  this  may  be  found  in  a  decision  of  the  supreme  court  of 
Pennsylvania  that,  in  divorce  proceedings,  an  order  for  the  payment 
of  the  wife's  expenses  and  support  pendente  lite  is  not  a  judgment 
such  as  to  create  a  lien  on  the  husband's  lands ;  the  ruling  being  based 
on  the  ground  that  there  is  no  statutory  authority  for  so  regarding 
it» 

I  399.    Iiesiilatlve  Gontrol  of  JudKinent-Ideiii. 

Since  liens  arising  from  judgments  are  exclusively  the  creatures 
of  statute,  we  should  naturally  expect  to  find  them  largely  under  the 
control  of  the  legislature,  except  in  so  far  as  the  necessity  of  pre- 
serving vested  rights  and  contractual  obligations  should  forbid  such 
interference.  And  so  the  decisions  have  always  held.  Thus  a  law 
requiring  a  judgment  to  be  docketed  in  each  county  where  it  is  sought 
to  bind  real  estate  of  the  defendant,  although  previously  it  was  a 
lien  throughout  the  state  without  this,  is  constitutional  and  valid.* 
So  a  statute  changing  the  mode  of  acquiring  a  lien  under  an  existing 
judgment  upon  the  property  of  the  debtor  (for  example,  by  substitut- 
ing the  lien  of  a  docketed  judgment  for  that  formerly  created  by  a 

•  Walker  v.  Elledge,  65  Ala.  51;  Carlisle  v.  Godwin,  68  Ala.  137;  Mitchell 
V.  Wood.  47  Miss.  231;  Converse  v.  Michigan  Dairy  Co.  (C.  C.)  45  Fed.  18; 
Thompson  v.  Avery,  11  Utah,  214,  30  Pac.  829.  , 

/  United  States  v.  Morrison,  4  Pet.  124,  7  L.  Ed.  804. 
»  Groves'  Appeal,  68  Pa.  143. 

•  Tarpley  v.  Hamer,  9  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  310;  Spencer  v.  Rippe,  7  Okl. 
G08,  56  Pac.  1070.    Compare  Rock  Island  Nat.  Bank  v.  Thompson,  74  111.  App. 

(631) 


§   399  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  16 

fieri  facias)  is  not  objectionable  on  constitutional  grounds.^  So 
again,  it  has  been  held  that  a  statute  which  provides  that  "no  judg- 
ment heretofore  rendered  or  which  may  hereafter  be  rendered,  on 
which  execution  shall  not  have  been  taken  out  and  levied  before  the 
expiration  of  one  year  next  after  the  rendition  of  such  judgment, 
shall  operate  as  a  lien  upon  the  estate  of  any  judgment-debtor  to  the 
prejudice  of  any  bona  fide  judgment-creditor,"  affects  the  remedy 
merely,  and,  in  its  operation  upon  judgments  rendered  before  its 
passage,  it  is  not  to  be  considered  ex  post  facto,  nor  does  it  impair 
the  obligation  of  contracts.®  But  the  latest  decisions  regard  the 
statute  giving  the  right  to  a  judgment  lien  as  a  part  of  the  contract 
on  which  the  judgment  is  based;  and  hence  it  is  now  held  that  a 
law  which  absolutely  destroys  the  lien  of  a  judgment,  or  provides 
that  it  shall  cease  and  determine  at  the  end  of  a  limited  period  after 
the  date  of  the  judgment,  is  unconstitutional  and  void,  so  far  as  it 
relates  to  judgments  rendered  prior  to  its  passage,  as  impairing  the 
obligation  of  contracts  and  invading  vested  rights.*  But  however 
it  may  be  in  regard  to  judgments  entered  before  the  passage  of  the 
act,  it  is  certain  that  a  statute  denying  to  final  judgments  thereafter 
rendered  the  incident  of  a  lien  on  real  property  does  not  impair  the 
obligation  of  contracts  made  before  its  enactment.**  And  converse- 
ly, it  is  entirely  competent  for  the  legislature  to  invest  existing  judg- 
ments, as  well  as  future  judgments,  with  the  incidents  of  a  lien,  by 
retrospective  laws.** 

T  Whitehead  v.  Latham,  83  N.  C.  232. 

8  McCormlck  v.  Alexander,  2  Ohio,  65;  Bank  of  Fnlted  States  ▼.  liongworth, 
1  McLean,  35,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  923;  Bay  v.  Thompson,  43  Ala.  434,  94  Am.  Dec. 
696. 

9  Merchants*  Bank  of  Danville  v.  Ballon,  98  Va.  112.  32  S.  E.  481,  44  L.  R. 
A.  306,  81  Am.  St.  R^p.  715;  Palmer  v.  Laberee,  23  Wash.  400,  63  Pac.  216: 
Raught  V.  Lewis,  24  Wash.  47,  63  Pac.  1104. 

10  Moore  v.  Holland,  16  S.  C.  15.  A  statute  is  valid  which  provides  that  a 
judgment  recovered  for  money  won  by  defendant  from  another  at  gaming 
shall  be  a  lien  on  the  property  where  the  gambling  took  place,  provided  it 
was  with  the  knowledge^of  the  owner;  for  the  reason  of  the  statute  has  refers 
ence  to  the  discouragement  of  gambling,  rather  than  to  the  natural  justice  of 
the  case  as  between  parties.    Trout  v.  Marvin,  62  Ohio  St  132,  56  N.  E.  es^ 

11  Moore  v.  Letehford,  30  Tex.  185,  14  Am.  Hep.  3C3. 

(632) 


Cb.   16)  THB  LIEN  OF  JUDOMBNTS.  §  400 


I  400.    Lien  gives  no  Property  in  Debtor's  Land. 

"If  anything  is  settled  by  reason  and  authority,  it  is  that  a  judg- 
ment-creditor is  not  entitled  to  the  protection  of  a  purchaser  of  the 
legal  title  against  an  equitable  owner  or  his  creditors,  or  to  any 
advantage  which  his  debtor  had  not."  **  A  judgment-lien,  binding 
the  present  and  future  real  property  of  the  debtor,  is  a  creation  of 
statute  laws  and  has  no  other  existence ;  a  general  lien  by  judgment 
does  not  constitute  per  se  a  property  in  the  land  itself,  but  only  gives 
a  right  to  levy  on  the  same  to  the  exclusion  of  adverse  interests  sub- 
sequent to  the  judgment.*'  Hence  a  judgment  creditor  has  neither 
jus  jn  re  nor  jus  ad  rem  in  the  debtor's  land,  but  only  the  right  to 
make  his  lien  effectual  by  a  sale  under  execution.**  So  if  A.  makes 
a  verbal  contract  with  B.  to  sell  him  a  tract  of  land  and  puts  him  in 
possession,  judgment-creditors  of  B.  do  not  thereby,  by  virtue  of  the 
lien  of  their  judgments  or  the  levy  of  execution,  acquire  such  an 
interest  in  the  land  as  to  entitle  them  to  be  subrogated  to  the  rights 
of  B.,  and  to  compel  A.  to  make  a  conveyance  to  them  upon  paying 
him  the  purchase-price  which  B.  was  to  pay.**  But  on  the  other 
hand,  a  judgment-creditor  has  the  right  to  proceed  by  ancillary  pro- 
ceedings, in  any  other  court  of  concurrent  jurisdiction  with  the  court 
rendering  the  judgment,  to  remove  clouds  from  titles  to  any  prop- 
erty which  he  deems  to  be  subject  to  the  lien  of  his  judgment.**  A 
judgment  for  a  sum  of  money,  which  may  be  satisfied  by  a  sale  of 
real  estate  if  not  otherwise  satisfied,  is  not  lis  pendens  in  regard  to 
the  title  to  the  real  estate  of  the  defendant  in  the  judgment ;   either 

i«  Reed's  Appeal.  13  Pa.  47fi. 

13  Finch  V.  Wlnchelsea.  1  P.  Wms.  277;  Brace  v.  Duchess  of  Marlborough, 
2  P.  Wms.  491;  Conard  v.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.,  1  Pet.  443,  7  L.  Ed.  189;  Pierce 
V.  Brown,  7  Wall.  205,  19  L.  Ed.  134;  Cover  v.  Black,  1  Pa.  493;  Reed's  Ap- 
peal, 13  Pa.  476;  Sill  v.  Swackhammer,  103  Pa.  7;  Kollock  y.  Jackson,  5  Ga. 
153;  Foute  y.  Fairman,  48  Miss.  536;  Young  v.  Templeton,  4  La.  Ann.  254, 
50  Am.  Dec.  563;  Swarts  v.  Stees.  2  Kan.  236,  85  Am.  Dec.  588;  Ashton  v. 
Slater,  19  Minn.  347  (Gil.  300.) 

14  Dall  V.  Freeman.  92  N.  C.  351;  Bruce  v.  Sugg,  109  N.  0.  202,  13  S.  B.  790, 
26  Am.  St.  Rep.  562. 

*»*  Logan  v.  Hale,  42  Cal.  615. 

i«  Scottish-American  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Follansbee  (C.  C.)  14  Fed.  125. 

(G33) 


§  402  LAW  OF  JUDQMBNT8.  (Ch.   16 

it  is  a  Hen  or  the  real  estate  is  not  affected  by  it.*^  Since  a  judg- 
ment-lien constitutes  no  property  in  the  land  itself,  the  judgment- 
debtor  has  a  right,  previous,  to  levy,  to  cut  timber  and  firewood, 
which,  if  not  removed,  are  his  personal  property  and  do  not  pass  by 
execution-sale.**  An  assignee  in  bankruptcy  takes  the  property  sub- 
ject to  all  existing  liens,  and  cannot  avail  himself  of  a  claim  that  an 
executibn  was  dormant  at  the  time  of  the  assignment,  if  the  bankrupt 
could  not.** 

I  401.    Lien  is  General. 

"A  judgment  is  not  a  specific  lien  upon  any  specific  real  estate  of 
the  judgment  debtor,  but  a  general  lien  upon  all  his  real  estate,  sub- 
ject to  all  prior  liens,  either  legal  or  equitable,  irrespective  of  any 
knowledge  of  the  judgment-creditor  as  to  the  existence  of  such 
liens."  *®  In  the  case,  however,  where  mortgaged  premises  have  been 
sold  at  a  sheriff's  sale  under  a  judgment  junior  to  the  mortgage,  and 
where  the  time  for  redemption  has  not  expired,  the  general  lien  of 
the  judgment  is  turned  into  a  specific  lien  upon  the  premises,  to  the 
extent  of  the  amount  of  the  bid  at  the  sheriff's  sale  and  of  the  inter- 
est thereon.**  It  should  also  be  noted,  that  the  lien  being  but  an 
incident  of  the  judgment,  its  loss  does  not  necessarily  impair  the 
validity  of  the  judgment  as  a  personal  security.  Thus  a  judgment 
obtained  against  a  decedent  in  his  lifetime,  the  lien  of  which  has 
expired  by  failure  to  revive,  is  sufficient  evidence  of  a  claim  in  the 
distribution  of  a  fund  which  belongs  to  his  estate.** 

S  402.    Gourti  cannot  control  the  Iden* 

As  a  general  rule,  and  except  in  special  and  peculiar  cases,  it  does 
not  belong  to  the  courts  of  law  to  prescribe  the  kind  or  extent  of  the 
lien  which  shall  result  from  the  judgments  they  pronounce,  or  to  con- 

17  St.  Joseph  Maiiufg  Co.  v.  Daggett,  84  111.  556. 

18  Independent  School  Dist.  v.  Werner,  43  Iowa,  643. 
i»  Crane  v.  Penny  (D.  C.)  2  Fed.  187. 

2oRodgers  v.  Bonner,  45  X.  Y.  379;*  Lanning  v.  Oarpenter.  48  X.  Y.  408; 
Dozier  v.  Lewis,  27  Miss.  G79;  Mansfield  v.  Gregory,  11  Neb.  297,  9  N.  W.  87. 

21  Snyder  v.  Stafford,  11  Paige  (N.  Y.)  71. 

22  Esterlj^'s  Appeal,  109  Pa.  222. 

(034) 


Ch.  16)  THE  LIEN*  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §  404 

trol  It  in  any  way,  as  by  restricting  it  to  certain  described  property.** 
The  court  has  usually  nothing  to  do  with  the  manner  in  which  its 
judgment  shall  be  enforced  or  the  fund  from  which  it  shall  be  satis- 
fied; it  merely  pronounces  the  sentence  of  the  law  upon  the  facts 
before  it,  to  which,  thereupon,  the  incident  of  a  lien  attaches  by  virtue 
solely  of  positive  law.  It  is  of  course  to  be  understood  that  reference 
is  here  made  to  judgments  at  law,  as  distinguished  from  decrees  in 
chancery.  The  powers  of  equity  in  this  respect  are  sufficiently  fa- 
miliar. 

I  403.    Partlei  oannot  ohaase  Nature  of  Iileii* 

"The  lien  of  a  judgment  upon  the  lands  of  the  judgment-debtor  is 
entirely  the  creature  of  the  statute,  and  is  not  dependent  in  any 
manner  upon  the  contract  of  the  parties.  It  begins,  continues,  and 
terminates  at  the  will  of  the  legislature."  **  Hence  parties  cannot 
by  agreement  convert*  a  judgment  into  a  chattel  mortgage  or  a  bill 
of  sale,  or  give  to  it  any  greater  effect  than  the  law  gives  it ;  and  a 
parol  agreement  that  a  judgment  shall  be  a  lien  upon  all  the  debtor's 
personal  property  will  not  be  enforced  in  equity,  even  as  against 
subsequent  assignees  who  assent  to  the  arrangement."* 

i  404.    DooketinK  the  JudKineiit. 

It  is  a  general  statutory  requisite  that  judgments  shall  be  duly 
entered  upon  the  docket  before  they  can  become  liens  upon  the 
debtor's  realty,  at  least  as  against  subsequent  purchasers  in  good 
faith.**  Unless  this  requirement  is  complied  with,  the  judgment 
will  not  attach  as  a  lien  upon  the  debtor's  property.*^     And  it  is  the 

»»  Castro  V.  lilies,  13  Tex.  229;  Had  win  v.  Fisk,  1  La.  Ann.  43.  Where  a 
judgment  Is  a  legal  lien  upon  real  estate,  such  lien  is  enforceable  by  sale  of 
the  property,  and  does  not  require  tlie  aid  of  a  court  of  equity  to  enforce  It. 
Davis  V.  Harper,  14  App.  D.  C.  463. 

24  Houston  V.  Houston,  67  Ind.  276. 

25  running  v.  Carpenter,  48  N.  Y.  408. 

26  But  it  is  held  that  a  judgment,  tnough  undoeketed,  is  good  against  subse- 
quent creditors  with  or  without  notice.  Gordon  v.  Rlxey,  76  Va.  61>4.  Under 
the  Texas  statute  which  requires  judgments  to  be  recorded  in  order  to  create 
liens,  an  unrecorded  writ  of  error  bond,  given  upon  an  unrecorded  judgment, 
creates  no  lien.    Hart  v.  Russell,  32  Tex.  31. 

2T  Callanan  ▼.  Votruba.  lOA  Iowa,  672,  74  N.  W.  13,  40  L.  R.  A.  375,  65  Am. 

(G35) 


§  405  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   16 

duty  of  the  judgment  creditor  to  see  to  it  that  his  judgment  is  rightly 
and  properly  entered;  for  if  a  mistake  is  made,  it  may  prevent  the 
judgment  from  binding  the  land  in  the  hands  of  a  subsequent  pur- 
chaser, though  it  would  remain  binding  as  between  the  original  par- 
ties.** The  statutory  provisions  in  the  diflferent  states,  as  to  the 
time  and  manner  of  entering  judgments  upon  the  docket,  and  as  to 
the  nature  and  contents  of  the  docket  entries,  differ  so  widely  that 
it  would  not  be  profitable  to  discuss  them  in  this  place;  but  the 
reader  is  referred  to  certain  illustrative  cases  cited  in. the  margin.** 

I   105.    IndezinK  the  Judgment* 

In  many  of  the  states  there  is  a  further  statutory  requirement, 
designed  for  convenience  and  expedition  in  making  searches,  that 
the  judgment  be  duly  indexed.  This  is  usually  done  in  a  separate 
book  or  series  of  books  kept  for  that  purpose,  and  under  the  judg- 
ment-debtor's surname  in  its  alphabetical  order.  The  statute  may 
be  so  framed  as  to  make  the  index  an  essential  part  of  the  record ; 
and  when  this  is  the  case,,  a  judgment  is  no  lien  upon  the  debtor's 
property,  until  correctly  indexed,  as  against  a  purchaser  who  has 
searched  the  index  with  due  care.'®  And  the  judgment,  though  duly 
filed  and  recorded,  creates  no  lien  if  it  is  not  indexed.'*     Where  the 

St  Rep.  538;  Sklower  v.  Abbott  19  Mont  228,  47  Pac.  001;  Act  Ga.  Dec.  20, 
1800  (St  1890,  No.  72,  p.  17).  Ck)mpare  Johnson  v.  Schlosser,  146  IncL  509,  45 
N.  E.  702,  36  L.  R.  A.  59,  58  Am.  St.  Rep.  367. 

28  Wood  y.  Reynolds,  7  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  406.  See  Hesse  v.  Mann,  40  Wis. 
500. 

2»  Spence  v.  Brown,  86  Tex.  430,  25  S.  W.  413;  GuUett  Gin  Co.  v,  Olirer, 
78  Tex.  182,  14  S.  W.  451;  Gnnter  v.  Buckler  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  32  a  W.  229; 
Reynolds  y.  Collier,  103  Ala.  245,  15  Sontb.  608;  Lamey  y.  Coffman,  11  Wash. 
301,  39  Pac.  682. 

soMetz  y.  State  Bank,  7  Neb.  165;  Sterling  Manufg  Co.  t.  Early.  e» 
Iowa,  94,  28  N.  W.  458.  But  where  a  subsequent  mortgagee  of  land  belonging 
to  a  judgment  debtor  has  actual  notice  that  a  judgment  against  the  latter 
is  defectively  indexed,  the  mortgage  is  subject  to  such  Judgment  Butts  t. 
Cruttenden,  14  Pa.  Super.  Ct  449.  A  judgment  rendered  and  entered  against 
two  dofeudants  jointly,  but  indexed  as  to  only  one  of  them,  creates  a  lien  on 
such  defendant's  property.  Blum  v.  Keyser,  8  Tex.  Civ.  App.  675,  28  S.  W. 
561;  Whitacre  v.  Martin,  51  Minn.  421,  53  N.  W.  806. 

31  Nye  V.  Moody,  70  Tex.  434,  8  S.  W.  606;  Oppenheimer  v,  RobinscHi  (Ter. 
Civ.  App.)  26  S.  W.  320. 

(636) 


Ch     16)  THE  LIEN  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  40(> 

original  index  of  a  judgment  is  not  sufficient  to  create  a  lien,  a  new  ' 
index,  made  on  the  transfer  of  the  record  of  judgments  to  a  new 
book,  will  not,  as  an  original  index,  render  the  judgment  a  lien  as  of 
the  date  of  the  transfer.**  And  when  two  indices  of  abstracts  of 
judgments  are  kept  by  the  clerk  of  the  court,  it  is  necessary  that 
each  abstract  should  be  entered  in  each  index.**  But  when  the  index 
entry  is  properly  made,  the  lien  is  not  affected  by  the  failure  of  the 
clerk  to  note  on  the  face  of  the  record  that  he  has  indexed  it.** 
And  in  Virginia,  it  has  been  decided  that  indexing  the  judgment  is 
no  part  of  the  record;  and  a  judgment  creditor  who  procures  his 
judgment  to  be  properly  docketed  secures  a  valid  lien,  even  though 
it  is  not  properly  indexed,  as  against  a  purchaser  who  has  been  led 
to  buy  by  the  omission  in  the  index.*" 

i  406.    Certainty  required  in  Dooket  and  Index  ai  to  Names  of  Partiei» 


The  common  occurrence  of  mistakes  in  the  docketing  and  in- 
dexing of  judgments,  such  as  mis-spelling  of  names  and  other  ir- 
regularities, has  frequently  led  the  courts  to  pass  upon  the  degree 
of  certainty  required  in  these  entries.  The  purport  of  the  decisions 
appears  to  be  that  the  sufficient  degree  of  accuracy  is  attained  if  an 
intending  purchaser  (for  example),  exercising  a  reasonable  degree 
of  care  and  a  reasonable  amount  of  intelligence  in  making  a  search, 
could  not  fail  to  be  apprised  of  the  existence  and  character  of  the 
judgment.  At  the  same  time,  "a  subsequent  purchaser  is  affected 
with  such  notice  as  the  index  entries  afford;  and  if  they  are  of  such 
a  character  as  would  induce  a  cautious  and  prudent  man  to  make  an 
examination,  he  must  make  such  investigation.,  or  the  failure  to  do 
so  will  be  at  his  peril."  *• 

•»  GlaBscock  V.  Stringer  (Tex.  Civ.  App )  32  S.  W.  920. 

»«  Central  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Southeia  Nat.  Bank,  12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  334, 
34  S.  W.  383. 

»♦  GuUett  Gin  Co.  v.  Oliver,  78  Tex.  182,  14  S.  W.  451. 

«»  Old  Dominion  Granite  Co.  v.  Clarke,  28  Grat.  617. 

80  Metz  v.  State  Bank,  7  Xeb.  165.  A  record  of  a  Judgment  against  one 
whose  Christian  name  is  indicated  only  by  initial  letters  is  elTectual  to  put  upon 
inquiry  a  subsequent  purchaser  of  lands,  the  title  to  which  appears  of  record 
in  a  person  of  the  same  surname  as  such  Judgment  debtor,  and  whose  Chris- 

(637) 


§   406  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   16 

Since  the  principal  object  of  such  an  index  is  to  afford  information 
concerning  judgment  debtors  and  the  liens  on  their  property,  it  is 
generally  held  that  subsequent  purchasers  and  incumbrancers  will  be 
charged  with  notice  of  a  judgment  which  is  correctly  indexed  under 
the  name  of  the  defendant,  although  the  plaintiff's  name  may  be  pla- 
ced under  a  wrong  letter,  or  not  indexed  at  all.*'  But  the  entry  of 
the  judgment  must  be  placed  under  the  letter  which  begins  the  de- 
fendant's surname,  not  under  the  initial  of  his  first  name."  It  is 
not,  however,  necessary  to  specify  the  character  in  which  the  parties 
sued  or  defended ;  and  the  law  is  sufficiently  complied  with  by  placing 
the  defendant's  name  in  its  proper  alphabetical  position,  followed 
by  the  plaintiff's  name,  though  neither  party  is  designated  as  defend- 
ant or  plaintiff,  and  though  neither  the  word  "versus"  or  "against," 
nor  any  abbreviation  thereof,  is  placed  after  either  name.'* 

A  description  of  a  person  by  the  name  by  which  he  is  commonly 
known  is  sufficient  for  the  purposes  of  a  docket  entry,*®  That  the 
name  is  mis-spelled  is  not  always  a  fatal  error.  If  it  is  spelled  pho- 
netically,— ^that  is,  if  the  name  as  written  on  the  index  would  be  pro- 
nounced in  the  same  manner  as  the  person's  true  name  is  commonly 
and  habitually  pronounced, — it  is  sufficient  to  give  notice,  provided 
that  the  variation  in  spelling  is  not  so  radical  that  no  one  would  be 
likely  to  think  of  the  names  as  identical.*^  But  there  must  be  such 
a  degree  of  approximation  as  to  be  readily  understood.  For  in- 
stance, a  judgment  rendered  against  "Bankhead,"  and  recorded  and 

tian  name  has  the  same  initial.  Pinney  v.  Russell  &  Co.,  52  Minn.  443,  54 
N.  W.  484. 

»7  Franke  v.  Lone  Star  Brewing  Co.,  17  Tex.  Civ.  App.  9,  42  S.  W.  861; 
Central  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Southern  Xat.  Bank,  12  Tex.  Ov.  App.  334,  34 
S.  W.  383.  But  in  Alabama,  under  the  statute,  the  record  of  a  judgment 
creates  no  lien  on  the  defendant's  property  unless  the  name  of  the  plaintiff  or 
the  owner  of  the  judgment  is  shown  therein.  Duncan  v.  Ashcraft.  121  Ala. 
552,  25  South.  735;  Appling  v.  StOTall,  123  Ala.  398.  26  South.  212;  Ivy  Coal 
&  Coke  Co.  V.  Alabama  Nat.  Bank.  123  Ala.  477.  26  South.  213, 

8  8  Willis  V.  Downes  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  46  S.  \V.  920. 

3»  WilUs  V.  Smith,  66  Tex.  31,  17  S.  W.  247;  Von  Stein  v.  Trexler,  5  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  299,  23  S.  W.  1047. 

*o  In  re  Jones'  Estate,  27  Pa.  336. 

41  Myer  v.  Fegaly,  39  Pa.  429,  80  Am.  Dec.  534. 

(038) 


C3l.   16)  THB  LIEN  OF  JUDQMBNT&  §  406 

indexed  as  against  "Burkhead,"  confers  no  lien.**  So  it  has  been 
held  that  "Helen"  and  "Ellen"  cannot  be  regarded  as  the  same  name ; 
and  a  judgment  entered  and  indexed  against  "Ellen  Desney"  is  not 
constructive  notice  that  it  is  a  lien  upon  lands  of  "Helen  Desney."  *• 
Again,  the  statute  requiring  record  notice  of  judgment-liens  intends 
that  the  docket  shall  exhibit  the  names  spelled  in  English.  It  is  to 
furnish  a  guide  to  the  eye,  not  the  ear.  Hence  "Joest"  will  not  serve 
for  "Yoest."  **  Although  it  is  true,  as  a  general  rule,  that  the  law 
recognizes  but  one  Christian  name,  and  there  are  decisions  to  the 
effect  that  the  omission  of  the  initial  letter  of  the  defendant's  middle 
name  will  not  render  the  entry  invalid  or  prevent  the  judgment  from 
becoming  a  lien  as  against  subsequent  purchasers,**  yet  most  of 
the  authorities  hold  that  the  entry  cannot  be  considered  complete 
or  sufficient  unless  it  designates,  at  least  by  an  initial,  each  of  the 
names  of  the  defendant  preceding  his  surname,  especially  where  the 
statute  requires  his  name  to  be  set  out  "at  length."  *• 

The  term  "Junior"  is  a  convenient  means  of  distinguishing  be- 
tween father  and  son  who  bear  the  same  name,  but,  on  common 
law  principles,  it  is  no  part  of  the  younger  man's  name,  and  hence  is 
not  required  to  be  included  in  the  docket-entry  of  a  judgment  against 
him,  although  the  "Senior"  of  the  same  name  resides  in  the  same 
county.*^  A  judgment  against  a  firm,  docketed  without  setting  out 
the  Christian  names  of  the  individual  partners,  is  held  in  Pennsylvania 
and  Texas  to  be  of  no  effect  as  a  lien,  so  far  as  regards  subsequent 
purchasers  and  incumbrancers  in  good  faith.**     But  an  opposite  view 

4»  Anthony  v.  I'aylor,  68  Tex.  403,  4  S.  W.  531. 

*3  Thomas  v.  Desney,  57  Iowa,  58,  10  N.  W.  315.  So,  a  judgment  docketed 
and  indexed  a8  against  *'May  Alley"  is  not  notice  to  a  purcliaser  from  "Mary 
A.  AUely."     Phillips  v.  McKalg,  36  Neb.  853,  55  N.  W.  25S). 

*♦  Heirs  Appeal,  40  Pa.  453,  80  Am.  Dec.  590. 

*5  Clnte  V.  p:mmerich,  26  Hun,  10. 

*•  Crouse  v.  Murphy,  140  Pa.  335,  21  Atl.  358,  12  L.  R.  A.  58,  23  Am.  St. 
Rep.  232;  Johnson  v.  Hess,  126  Ind.  298,  25  N.  E.  445,  9  L.  R.  A.  471;  Davis 
v.  Steeps,  87  Wis.  472,  58  N.  W.  769,  23  L.  R.  A.  818,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  51.  See 
Butts  V.  Cruttenden,  14  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  449. 

*T  BidweU  v.  Coleman,  11  Minn.  78  (Gil.  45). 

*«  York  Bank's  Appeal,  36  Pa.  458;  Ridgway's  Appeal,  15  Pa.  177,  53  Am. 
Dec.  586;  Smith's  Appeal,  47  Pa.  128;  Hamilton's  Appeal,  103  Pa.  368;  GuUett 
Gin  Co.  ▼.  OUver.  78  Tex.  182,  14  S.  W.  451;  Pierce  v.  Wimberly,  78  Tex. 

(639) 


§  40(3a  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   16 

obtains  in  California.^*  And  it  appears  to  be  immaterial  that  a  mis- 
take was  made  in  setting  out  the  firm  name  of  the  defendants,  if 
their  individual  names  are  correctly  given  in  the  docket  and  index.** 
If  there  are  several  defendants  (not  partners),  but  some  of  them  are 
merely  formal  or  nominal  parties,  it  is  sufficient  if  the  index  contains 
the  names  of  those  only  against  whom  a  personal  judgment,  or  judg- 
ment for  money,  is  rendered.**  But  if  all  the  defendants  are  equally 
affected  by  the  judgment,  as  real  and  substantial  parties,  no  lien  will 
be  created  upon  the  lands  of  any  one  of  them  whose  name  is  omitted 
from  the  docket  and  index,  as  against  subsequent  purchasers  or  in- 
cumbrancers, or  as  against  creditors  whose  subsequent  judgments 
are  duly  entered  and  indexed.**  It  must  finally  be  observed  that  a 
judgment  duly  rendered  against  one  whose  name  is  mis-spelled  or 
otherwise  incorrectly  given  in  the  proceedings,  will  be  a  lien  on  his 
real  estate,  when  docketed,  against  all  but  those  who  can  claim  that, 
by  reason  of  the  error,  the  docket  was  no  notice  to  them.  A  fraudu- 
lent grantee  cannot  object  to  it.'* 

I  406m.    8aa&e;   As  to  Amovnt. 

The  record  of  a  money  judgment  should  always  show  the  amount 
for  which  it  was  rendered,  and  the  rate  of  interest  which  it  bears, 
so  as  to  convey  definite  and  precise  information  to  subsequent  lien- 
ors or  purchasers.  In  some  states,  this  is  explicitly  required  by 
statute;  and  a  failure  to  comply  with  the  law  in  this  respect  will 
deprive  the  judgment  of  its  character  as  a  hen.  Thus,  if  the  amount 
for  which  the  judgment  was  rendered  is  incorrectly  stated,  or  if  it 

187,  14  S.  W.  454;  Steffens'v.  Cameron  (Tex.)  19  S.  W.  1068;  Glasscock  t. 
Price  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  45  S.  W.  415.  But  It  seems  that  If  the  oame  of  the 
defendant  Is  correctly  given,  It  is  not  a  material  mistake  that  the  names  of 
the  plaintiffs  (a  firm)  are  set  forth  only  in  the  style  of  the  partnership.  Cooke 
V.  Avery,  147  U.  S.  375,  13  Sup.  Ct.  340,  37  L.  Ed.  209;  Openheimer  ▼.  Robin- 
son,  87  Tex.  174,  27  S.  W.  95. 

4»  Hibberd  v.  Smith,  50  Cal.  611. 

50  Willis  V.  Downes  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  46  S.  W.  920;  Semple  ▼.  Enbanks,  13 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  418,  35  S.  W.  509. 

61  W.  P.  Fuller  &  Co.  v.  HuU,  19  Wash.  400,  53  Pac.  666. 

B3  Dewey  v.  Sugg,  109  N.  C.  328,  13  S.  £.  923,  14  L.  R.  A.  398;  Noble  t. 
Barner,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  357,  55  S.  W.  382. 

•8  Fuller  V.  Nelson,  35  Minn.  213,  28  N.  W.  511. 

(640) 


Ch.   16)  THE  LIEN  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §   407 

is  not  expressed  in  dollars  and  cents  (either  by  words  or  by  the 
appropriate  marks  or  abbreviations),  it  will  not  create  any  lien  on 
the  property  of  the  judgment  debtor.**  As  to  interest  on  the  judg- 
ment, it  is  enough  if  the  rate  of  interest  which  the  judgment  bears 
is  correctly  specified,  so  that  the  amount  of  interest  due  at  any  given 
time  can  be  ascertained  by  mere  calculation.*^*  But  an  abstract  which 
fails  to  show  credit  for  an  amount  recovered  on  an  execution  sale 
does  not  create  a  lien.** 

Part  II.     What  Judgments  create  Liens. 

§  407.    What  is  neoeiiary  to  JudKment-Ideiis. 

In  order  that  a  judgment  should  create  a  lien  upon  the  real  prop- 
erty of  the  debtor,  it  is  first  of  all  necessary  that  it  should  be  capable 
of  collection  by  execution  against  such  property.*^  A  judgment  which 
by  its  terms  cannot  be  enforced  against  the  property  of  a  party  can- 
not become  a  lien  thereon.**  So  a  judgment  against  a  municipal 
corporation  is  not  a  lien  on  its  real  estate,  because  no  execution  can 
issue  against  the  land.**  Next,  it  is  essential  that  the  judgment 
should  have  been  rendered  by  a  lawful  and  validly  constituted  court. 
Upon  this  point  questions  have  seldom  arisen,  except  in  connection 
with  the  acts  of  courts  created  by  the  insurrectionary  authorities  in 
the  southern  states  during  the  late  civil  war.    Thus  it  was  held  in 

B*  Bush  r.  Farrls,  18  C.  C.  A.  315,  71  Fed.  770;  In  re  Boyd,  4  Sawy.  262, 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  1,746;  Glasscock  v.  Stringer  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  32  S.  W.  920. 
Failure  of  the  record  of  the  judgment  to  Include  the  amount  of  the  costs  will 
defeat  the  lien  only  to  the  extent  of  the  costs.  Lamey  y.  Coffman,  11  Wash. 
301,  39  Pac.  682. 

»»  P.  J.  Willlfl  &  Bro.  V.  Sommerville,  3  Tex.  Civ.  App.  509,  22  S.  W.  781; 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Cloud,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App.  627,  21  S.  W.  770.  But  where  the 
abstract  of  a  judgment  erroneously  states  the  date  of  a  credit  thereon,  so  that 
a  proper  calculation  of  the  interest  due  on  the  judgment  as  recorded  would 
not  show  the  amount  actually  due,  it  is  defective  and  creates  no  lien.  Noble 
r.  Bamer,  "22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  357,  55  S.  W.  382. 

5«  Willis  V.  Sanger,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  655,  40  S.  W.  229. 

57  Hagan  v.  Chapman,  1  Pennewill  (Del.)  445,  41  Atl.  974;  Heff  v.  Cox,  5 
Ohio  N.  P.  413. 

»« In  re  Boyd,  4  Sawy.  262,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  1,746. 

B»  Schaffer  v.  Cadwallader,  36  Pa.  126;  People  v.  Superior  Court  of  Cook 
County,  55  111.  App.  376. 

1  LAW  JUDG.-41  (641) 


§   407  LAW  OP  JUDOHBNT&  (Ch.  Ill 

Alabama  that  judgments  rendered  by  the  courts  of  that  state,  during 
the  period  referred  to,  did  not  create  such  a  lien  upon  the  property 
of  the  judgment  debtor  as,  in  the  absence  of  legislation,  could  be 
recognized  and  enforced  by  the  courts  of  the  now  existing  state  gov- 
ernment.'® Later  decisions,  it  is  true,  have  recognized  a  higher  de- 
gree of  validity  in  such  judgments ;  •*  but  it  is  only  by  acknowledg- 
ing the  rightful  existence  of  those  courts,  so  that  the  change  of  opin- 
ion does  not  militate  against  the  rule  here  contended  for. 

In  the  next  place,  in  order  that  there  should  be  a  lien,  it  is  neces- 
sary that  there  be  a  valid  and  subsisting  judgment.  If  the  alleged 
judgment  is  absolutely  void  and  a  mere  nullity,  it  can  of  course 
create  no  lien.  Or,  to  speak  more  exactly,  it  creates  that  which 
may  bear  the  semblance  and  color  of  a  lien,  but  which  is  incapable 
of  originating  or  transferring  rights,  since  the  judgment  itself,  to 
which  the  lien  is  only  an  incident,  will  not  bear  the  test  of  judicial 
scrutiny.  Similarly,  where  a  verdict  and  judgment  are  set  aside  and 
a  new  trial  granted,  such  judgment  does  not  operate  as  a  lien  upon 
the  defendant's  property.**  And  so  a  judgment  which  has  been  re- 
versed upon  appeal,  is  not  a  lien,  pending  its  further  appeal,  upon 
the  defendant's  estate,  and  it  will  not  be  allowed  to  prejudice  the 
title  of  a  bona  fide  purchaser  for  value.*'  It  was  even  held,  in  an 
early  Massachusetts  case,  that  a  deed  of  land  was  a  good  and  lawful 
conveyance,  although  an  execution  had  been  levied  upon  the  land, 
when  the  judgment  under  which  the  execution  issued,  though  not 

eo  Martin  v.  Hewitt,  44  Ala.  418;  Noble  y.  Cullom,  44  Ala.  554;  Barclay  v. 
Plant,  50  Ala.  509.  The  incident  of  lien  was  accorded  to  such  Judgments  bj 
Rev.  Code  Ala.  §  2877  (Act  Feb.  19,  1867). 

61  Parks  V.  Coffey,  52  Ala.  42;  Hill  v.  Huckabee,  52  Ala.  155;  HIU  t.  Anni- 
stead,  56  Ala.  118.    See  supra,  f  173. 

•»  Paxton  V.  Boyce,  1  Tex.  317. 

88  Foot  V.  Dillaye,  65  Barb.  521;  Meyer  v.  CampbeU.  12  Mo.  603;  Oliver  t. 
Lansing,  57  Neb.  352,  77  N.  W.  802.  The  subsequent  rendition  of  another 
Judgment  in  the  same  cause  will  not  revive  the  lien  of  a  Judgment  reversed 
on  appeal,  so  as  to  make  it  effective  from  the  date  of  the  original  judgment. 
Id.  But  where  an  Injunction  against  a  Judgment  Is  perpetuated  only  as  to 
a  part  of  it,  or  a  reversal  is  only  as  to  part  of  a  Judgment,  the  lleo  of  the 
part  not  affected  continues  from  the  date  of  the  Judgment  Grafton  &  G.  R. 
dDo.  V.  Davisson,  45  W.  Va.  12,  29  S.  B.  1028,  72  Am.  St  Bep.  799. 

(042) 


Ctk.  16)  THE  LIEN  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §  407 

yet  reversed,  was  so  erroneous  that  it  was  "legally  certain"  that  it 
would  be  reversed.** 

In  the  next  place,  it  is  requisite  that  the  judgment  should  be  for 
a  definite  and  certain  sum  of  money.**  A  judgment  which  specifies 
no  sum  recovered,  but  refers  to  the  pleadings  to  show  what  is  ad- 
judged, cannot  create  a  lien  on  lands  of  the  defendant  as  against  a 
party  lending  on  the  property  without  other  notice  than  that  afforded 
by  the  registry  of  the  judgment.**  But  a  judgment  in  an  action  for 
an  accounting  between  partners,  requiring  the  payment  of  a  specified 
sum  of  money  by  one  of  the  parties  to  a  receiver,  may  be  docketed 
in  favor  of  the  receiver  and  be  enforced  by  execution,*'  And  a 
final  judgment  of  a  court  of  record  is  a  lien,  although  for  costs  only.** 

In  the  next  place,  it  is  important  to  pay  some  attention  to  the 
kind  or  character  of  the  judgment,  with  reference  to  its  capacity  for 
creating  a  lien.  A  judgment  by  confession  carries  with  it  a  lien  on 
lands,**  and  so  of  course  does  a  judgment  by  default,  if  it  is  final  atnd 
definite.  In  Pennsylvania,  under  the  statutes  on  the  subject,  an 
award  has  no  greater  effect  than  the  verdict  of  a  jury  until  approved 
by  the  court  and  judgment  entered  on  it,  and  consequently,  until  that 
is  done,  it  does  not  constitute  a  lien  on  realty.'®  A  decree  for  alimony 
has  only  the  lien  of  an  ordinary  judgment  for  money,  as  to  any  prop- 
erty of  the  defendant  not  specifically  dealt  with  in  the  decree.'*  In 
some  states,  a  forfeited  forthcoming  bond  has  the  force  of  a  judg- 

•4  Borden  v.  Borden,  5  Mass.  67,  4  Am.  Dec.  32. 

•8  Hamberger  v.  Easter,  57  Ga.  71;  Lirette  v.  Carrane,  27  La.  Ann.  298; 
Eames  v.  Germania  Turn  Vereln,  74  111.  54;  Roane  v.  Hamilton,  101  Iowa,  250, 
70  N.  W.  181. 

««  Lirette  v.  Carrane,  27  La.  Ann.  298. 

•7  Geery  v.  Geery.  6.3  N.  Y.  252. 

•8  Bobb  V.  Graham,  15  Mo.  App.  289. 

«»  Gilman  v.  Hovey,  26  ^lo.  280. 

70  Stephen's  Ex'rs*  Appeal,  '^  Pa.  9.  An  award  of  arbitrators  In  favor  of 
a  plaintiff,  from  which  he  appeals,  is  not  a  lien  upon  the  defendant's  real 

estate  so  long  as  the  appeal  stands.    Eaton's  Appeal,  83  Pa.  152.    Under  a 

statute  in  Pennsylvania,  directing  the  amount  of  a  verdict  to  be  entered  in  the 

judgment  docket,  the  lien  of  a  verdict  partakes  of  the  nature  of  a  judgment 

Men.    Fuellhart  v.  Blood,  21  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  601. 

71  Coulter  V.  Lumpkin,  94  Ga.  225,  21  S.  E.  461;  Conrad  v.  Everich,  50  Ohio 
St.  476,  35  N.  E.  58,  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  679;  Phllbrick  v.  Andrews,  8  Wash.  7, 
35  Pac.  858. 

(643) 


§  408  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNTS.  (Ch.  16 

ment,  so  as  to  create  a  lien  upon  the  lands  of  the  obligors,  but  only 
from  the  time  the  bond  was  returned  to  the  clerk's  office.^*  A  re- 
cognizance to  the  commonwealth,  or  a  judgment  thereon  in  favor 
of  the  commonwealth,  creates  no  lien  upon  the  estate  of  the  party, 
unless  by  express  statute.^*  So  a  rule  absolute  against  a  sheriflF 
requiring  him  to  pay  over  money  is  not  such  a  judgment  as  binds 
his  property  in  the  same  way  in  which  judgments  on  verdicts  bind 
it.^*  The  mere  loaning  of  money  to  a  judgment  debtor,  to  be  ap- 
plied by  him  in  part  satisfaction  of  a  judgment  which  is  a  lien  upon 
the  debtor's  land,  does  not  operate  to  transfer  such  lien,  in  whole  or 
in  part,  to  the  lender,  even  though  it  was  understood  between  the 
parties  to  the  transaction  that  it  should  have  that  effect.^* 

§  408.    Interloeiitory  Judgments. 

It  IS  generally  held  that  an  interlocutory  judgment  by  default, 
which  lacks  finality  until  the  amount  of  the  recovery  is  ascertained, 
cannot  be  considered  as  creating  a  lien.  The  incident  of  lien  does 
not  attach  until  the  sum  to  be  recovered  is  made  definite  and  finally 
entered  up,  and  then  it  does  not  relate  back  to  the  entry  of  the  in- 
terlocutory judgment.''*  But  the  supreme  court  of  Pennsylvania 
has  ruled  that  a  judgment  entered  by  default  for  want  of  a  plea  is 
not  interlocutory  but  final,  and  constitutes  a  lien  upon  the  defend- 
ant's real  estate  from  the  date  of  entry,  although  the  damages  may 
not  have  been  assessed,  if  the  claim  is  for  a  sum  certain  or  is  ascer- 
tainable by  calculation/^  But  a  judgment  by  confession  for  a  sum 
to  be  ascertained  by  the  prothonotary  binds  the  real  estate  of  the 

7«  Cabell  v.  Given,  90  W.  Va.  760,  5  S.  E.  442. 

78  Commonwealth  v.  Adkins,  8  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  380.    See  Thompson  v.  Ayery, 
11  Utah,  214,  39  Pac.  829. 
74  Speer  v.  McPherson,  24  Ga.  146. 

76  Unger  v.  Leiter,  32  Ohio  St.  210. 

7<  De  Saussure  v.  Zelgler,  6  Rich.  (S.  C.)  12;  Davidson  ▼.  Myers,  24  Md. 
538;  Citizens'  Loan  Ass*n  v.  Martin,  1  Marv.  (Del.)  213,  40  AtL  1108.  Bat  a 
Judgment  for  money  in  an  action  on  a  note  and  to  foreclose  the  mortgage 
securing  it  is  final,  so  as  to  be  a  lien  on  other  property  of  the  defendant,  though 
the  Judgment  of  foreclosure  is  not  final.  McCaskill  v.  Graham,  121  N.  C.  190^ 
28  S.  E.  264. 

77  Sellers  v.  Burk,  47  Pa.  344;  Hays  y.  Tryon,  2  Miles,  208;  Bryan  t.  Eaton, 
4  Wkly.  Notes  Cas.  493. 

(644) 


Ch.  16)  THE  L.IBN  OP  JVDOMBNT8.  §  410 

defendant  only  from  the  time  of  the  liquidation  of  the  sum  by  the 
prothonotaryj* 

I  409.    Judgmenta  as^^st  Peraonal  RepreaentatiTea. 

Inasmuch  as  executors  and  administrators  are  not'  invested  with 
the  title  to  the  lands  of  the  decedent,  it  follows  that  judgments  ren- 
dered against  them  in  their  representative  character  have  no  opera- 
tion as  liens  upon  realty  belonging  to  the  estate.^*  And  in  Con- 
necticut, under  a  statute  which  provides  that  if  the  owner  of  an 
unsatisfied  judgment  shall  file  a  certificate  in  the  town  clerk's  office, 
it  shall  constitute  a  lien  upon  land  belonging  to  the  debtor,  which 
may  be  foreclosed  or  redeemed  in  the  same  manner  as  a  mortgage, 
if  an  execution  could  have  been  levied  thereon,  it  is  held  that  a  judg- 
ment creditor  who  has  obtained  a  judgment  against  the  adminis- 
trator of  his  debtor's  estate  cannot  thus  obtain  a  lien  against  the 
land  of  the  estate.*® 

§  410.    Nuno  Pro  Tvno  JiidKm«nta* 

A  purchaser  of  real  estate  takes  it  charged  with  the  lien  of  only 
such  judgments  as  are  actually  existing  at  the  time  of  the  purchase, 
and  it  is  not  competent  for  a  court  to  bind  by  a  lien  the  land  of  a 
third  person  by  the  rendition  of  a  nunc  pro  tunc  judgment  against 
his  grantor/^  In  a  case  in  Indiana,  two  judgments  having  been  ren- 
dered by  a  justice  of  the  peace,  the  plaintiff  took  transcripts  and  filed 
them  in  the  clerk's  office  of  the  proper  county;  afterwards  the 
judgment  debtor  sold  a  tract  of  land  situated  in  that  county  and 
received  the  purchase-money  in  full ;  a  few  days  later  the  transcripts, 

78  Philadelphia  Bank  v.  Craft,  16  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  347. 

TB  Laidley  v.  Kline,  8  W.  Va.  218;  Woodyard  v.  Polsley,  14  W.  Va.  211; 
Di  Lorenzo  v.  Dragone,  25  Misc.  Rep.  26,  54  N.  Y.  Supp.  420;  Wright  v.  Frank- 
lin Bank,  59  Ohio  St.  80,  51  N.  E.  876;  Applegate  v.  Applegate,  107  Iowa, 
312,  78  N.  W.  34;  Mott  v.  Newark  German  Hospital,  55  N.  J.  Eq.  722,  37 
Atl.  757. 

80  Flynn  v.  Morgan,  55  Conn.  130,  10  Atl.  466. 

81  Miller  V.  Wolf,  63  Iowa,  233,  18  N.  W^  889;  McXamara  v.  New  York,  L. 
E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  56  N.  J.  Law,  56,  28  Ati.  313;  FerreU  y.  Hales,  119  N.  C. 
199,  25  S.  E.  S21. 

(645) 


§411  lAW  OF  JUDaMSNT&  (Ch.  16 

together  with  the  order-book  in  which  they  were  recorded,  were 
destroyed  by  fire;  afterwards  the  justice  made  out  new  transcripts, 
and  these  were  duly  filed.  It  was  held  that  the  judgments,  as  evi- 
denced by  the  second  transcripts,  were  not  liens  on  the  land.**     An 

» 

amendment  of  a  judgment  which  was  originally  incomplete  cannot 
relate  back  so  as  to  impair  the  title  of  one  who  purchased  the  judg- 
ment-debtor's land,  prior  to  the  order  of  amendment,  in  good  faith 
and  for  a  valuable  consideration.** 

I  411.    Deoreea  la  diaceeiy. 

It  is  generally  held,  under  statutes  assimilating  judgments  and 
decrees  in  respect  to  their  effects  and  means  of  enforcement,  that  a 
decree  in  chancery,  if  for  a  liquidated  sum  of  money,  creates  a  lien 
upon  the  debtor's  land.®*  The  proviso  here  inserted  obviously  re- 
stricts the  class  of  decrees  attended  with  this  incident  within  nar- 
row limits.  Thus  it  is  said :  "A  decree  of  foreclosure  is  not  such  a 
decree  as  will  confer  a  general  lien  as  a  judgment  at  law.  True,  the 
statute  provides  that  decrees  of  courts  of  chancery  'shall,  from  the 
time  of  their  being  pronounced,  have  the  force  and  effect  of  a  judg- 
ment at  law.'  A  judgment  at  law  gives  a  general  lien,  but  it  is  not 
every  decree  in  chancery  that  can  give  a  lien  similar  to  a  judgment. 
There  are  a  great  variety  of  decrees  in  chancery  which  give  no  lien, 
such  as  decrees  or  injunctions  to  stay  waste,  to  surrender  and  can- 
cel securities,  to  set  aside  fraudulent  conveyances, 'and  various  oth- 
ers; yet  the  language  of  the  statute  covers  all  decrees.  Hence  the 
language  of  the  statute  must  be  limited,  and  as  a  lien  is  only  a  secu- 
rity for  a  money  demand,  no  decree  in  chancery  can  confer  a  lien 
under  the  statute  except  a  decree  expressly  for  the  payment  of  money. 
At  law  it  is  only  a  judgment  against  a  debtor  or  a  judgment  for  the 
payment  of  money  that  gives  a  lien ;  a  judgment  in  ejectment  gives 
no  lien.  Hence  the  decrees  in  chancery  that  confer  liens  similar  to 
judgments  are  decrees  for  the  payment  of  money.     A  decree  of  forc- 

82  Sheldon  v.  Arnold,  17  Ind.  165. 

83  Lea  y.  Yates,  40  Ga.  56. 

84  Soriba  v.  Deane,  1  Brock.  166,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  12..%59;  Ebmes  v.  Germania 
Turn  Verein,  74  III.  54;  Blake  v.  Hey  ward,  1  Bailey,  Eq.  (S.  C.)  208;  Close  t. 
Close,  28  X.  J.  Eq.  472. 

(046) 


Ch.   16)  THE  LIEN  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §   411 

closure  is  not  a  decree  for  the  payment  of  money."  ®"  A  decree  pro- 
viding that  if  thie  defendant  does  not,  in  a  given  time,  pay  the  plain- 
tiff a  certain  sum,  certain  property  of  the  defendant,  real  and  per- 
sonal, on  which  the  plaintiff  has  a  specific  lien,  shall  be  sold,  is  not 
a  decree  which  creates  a  lien  on  other  real  estate  of  the  defendant.®* 
In  an  action  to  enforce  a  mortgage,  if  a  judgment  is  entered  direct- 
ing a  sale  of  the  mortgaged  property  and  an  application  of  the  pro- 
ceeds on  the  amo,unt  due,  and  further  declaring  that,  in  case  of  a 
deficiency,  the  plaintiff  have  execution  for  the  balance,  the  lien  of  the 
judgment  does  not  attach  to  real  estate  of  the  defendant  other  than 
that  mortgaged,  until  after  a  sale  has  been  made  and  a  deficiency 
reported,  even  if  the  judgment  is  docketed  when  first  rendered.®^  "A 
mere  contingent  provision,  referring  to  no  particular  amount,  and  in 
abe3raiice  until  the  contingency  is  determined,  is  not  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  statute.  It  may  become  a  valid  and  perfect  judgment,  but 
until  the  amount  to  be  recovered  is  ascertained  and  fixed,  no  effect 
can  be  given  to  it  as  a  lien."  **  It  is  also  held  that  a  judgment  re- 
covered for  a  debt  secured  by  a  mortgage  on  lands  cannot  become  a 
lien  on  such  lands ;  and  a  sale  of  the  equity  of  redemption  under  an 
execution  on  such  judgment  will  not  confer  any  title  upon  the  pur- 
chaser ;  and  it  makes  no  difference  that  the  judgment  was  not  recov- 
ered upon  the*bond  accompanying  the  mortgage,  so  long  as  it  was 
obtained  for  the  same  indebtedness.**  It  should  be  added  that 
chancery  may  create  a  lien  directly  by  decree  for  that  purpose.*® 

•B  Myers  ▼.  Hewitt,  16  Ohio,  449,  454,  per  Read,  J.  And  see  Hamberger  v. 
Easter,  57  Ga.  71;  Karnes  v.  Harper,  48  111.  527;  Kirby  v.  Runals,  140  111. 
289,  29  N.  B.  697;  Huntington  v.  Meyer,  92  Wis*  557,  66  N.  W.  500;  Kraner  v. 
Chambers,  92  Iowa,  681,  61  N.  W.  373. 

«•  Linn  V.  Patton,  10  W.  Va.  187. 

8T  Hlbberd  v.  Smith,  50  Cal.  511;  Culver  v.  Rogers,  28  Oal.  520;  Chapln  v. 
Brodep,  16  Cal.  403;  Winston  v.  Browning,  61  Ala.  80;  Hershey  v.  Dennis,  53 
Cal.  77;  Bell  v.  GUmore,  25  N.  J.  Eq.  104.  See  Roll  v.  Rea,  57  N.  J.  Law,  647, 
32  Atl.  214.  Per  contra,  Fletcher  v.  Holmes,  25  Ind.  458;  Blum  v.  Keyser,  8 
Tex.  av.  App.  675,  28  S.  W.  561;  W.  P.  Fuller  &  Co.  v.  Hull,  19  Wash.  400, 
53  Pac.  666. 

88  Chapln  V.  Broder,  16  Cal.  403. 

99  Greenwich  Bank  v.  Loomis,  2  Sandf.  Ch.  70. 

•0  Carmlchael  v.  Abrahams,  1  Desaus.  (S.  C.)  114.  See  Branley  v.  Dambly, 
69  Minn.  282,  71  N.  W.  1026. 

(647) 


§412  ULW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  16 


i  412.    Judgmentm  of  Inferior  Conrte. 

■ 

Judgments  rendered  by  justices  of  the  peace  and  other  inferior 
courts  are  not  generally  recognized  by  the  statutes  as  creating  a  lien 
upon  the  debtor's  realty.  But  it  is  commonly  provided  that  such 
judgments  may  be  transferred,  by  transcript,  to  one  of  the  superior 
courts,  and  that,  the  transcripts  being  duly  filed  and  entered,  the 
judgments  shall  have  the  same  effect,  as  liens,  as  if  originally  ren- 
dered by  the  court  to  which  they  are  so  transferred.  The  lien  at- 
taches from  the  time  of  filing  the  transcript  with  the  clerk  of  the 
superior  court,  and  binds  the  same  property  which  would  have  been 
affected  by  a  judgment  of  the  latter  court.**  And  this  is  so,  al- 
though the  clerk  may  neglect  to  enter  such  judgment  in  the  docket 
of  the  court.  •*  The  transcript,  to  become  a  lien  on  real  estate,  must 
be  filed  in  the  proper  court  of  the  county  where  the  judgment  was 
recovered,  and  cannot  in  the  first  instance  be  filed  in  the  court  of 
another  county.**    The  statutes  generally  limit  the  time  within  which 

»i  Hawkins  v.  Wills,  4  U.  S.  App.  274,  1  C.  C.  A.  339.  49  Fed.  506;  Brown 
V.  Hyman,  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  436;  Dysart  v.  Branderth,  118  N.  C.  968,  23  S.  E. 
966;  Bunding  v.  Miller,  10  Mo.  445;  Tracy  v.  Whltsett,  51  Mo.  App.  149;  Work 
y.  Brown,  38  Neb.  498,  56  N.  W.  1082.  The  Pennsylvania  Act  ol  June  24, 
1885,  which  gives  to  Judgments  of  justices  of  the  peace,  aMennoi,  etc^  the 
same  force  as  if  originally  obtained  in  the  court  of  common  pleas,  where 
a  transcript  thereof  has  been  filed  in  the  office  of  the  prothonotary,  was  in- 
tended to  give  the  Judgment  creditor  the  right  to  levy  execution  on  the 
personal  estate  as  well  as  the  real  estate  of  the  debtor,  which  right  had  been 
doubtful  under  the  prior  statutes,  and  was  not  intended  to  repeal  Act  May 
5,  1854,  which  provides  that  "no  execution  shall  be  issued  on  a  Judgment  ren- 
dered before  a  Justice  of  the  peace  or  alderman,  after  five  years  from  the  rendi- 
tion of  such  Judgment,  unless  the  same  shall  have  been  revived  by  scire 
facias  or  amicable  confession."  Smith  v.  Wehrly,  157  Pa.  407,  27  AtL  700: 
Inquirer  Printing  &  Publishing  Co.  v.  Same,  157  Pa.  415,  27  Atl.  703.  In 
Nebraska,  under  Code  Glv.  Proc.  §  561,  the  docketing  in  the  district  court 
of  a  Judgment  rendered  by  a  county  court  or  a  Justice  of  the  peace,  does  not 
make  such  Judgment  one  of  the  district  court,  so  as  to  entitle  the  Judg- 
ment creditor  to  a  pro  rata  distribution  of  funds  with  a  creditor  under  a 
contemporaneous  district  court  Judgment  Moores  v.  Peycke,  44  Neb.  405, 
62  N.  W.  1072. 

»2  Petray  v.  Howell,  20  Ark.  615. 

»»  Pemberton  v.  Pollard,  18  Neb.  435,  25  N.  W.  582;  Bowman  t.  Sllvua,  6 
Kulp  (Pa.)  496. 

(G48) 


Ch.  16)  THB  LIEN  OF  JUDQMBNTB.  f  414 

such  a  transcript  of  a  justice's  judgment  may  be  filed,  but  unless  there 
is  an  explicit  restriction  of  the  time,  it  may  be  done  at  any  time  dur- 
ing the  life  of  the  judgment.®*  The  transcript  may  be  filed  before 
the  time  to  appeal  from  the  judgment  has  expired.**^  But  in  order 
to  obtain  the  advantage  of  a  lien  by  this  method  of  proceeding,  it 
is  necessary  to  comply  fully  with  the  requirements  of  the  statute. 
If  the  law  contemplates  the  filing  of  a  complete  transcript  of  the  jus- 
tice's record,  it  is  not  satisfied  by  a  mere  abstract  of  the  judgment.*® 
While  the  allowance  of  a  claim  against  the  estate  of  a  decedent, 
by  a  probate  court,  has  all  the  force  and  effect  of  a  judgment,  it  is 
not  generally  regarded  as  creating  a  lien  on  the  estate.*^ 

I  413*    JvdKmenta  of  Foderal  Ooorta. 

In  states  where  the  judgments  of  state  courts  of  record  create  a 
lien  upon  the  lands  of  the  judgment-debtor,  the  judgment  of  a  United 
States  circuit  or  district  court,  sitting  within  the  state,  has  the  same 
operation,  as  a  lien,  in  the  county  where  rendered,  and,  under  cer- 
tain restrictions  to  be  hereafter  noticed,  throughout  the  territory  of 
the  state.** 

I  414.    Statutory  Baala  of  luoli  Idena. 

If,  as  we  have  already  seen,  judgment-liens  are  essentially  the 
creatures  of  statute  law,  it  is  pertinent  to  inquire  how  the  judgments 
of  the  federal  courts  came  to  be  invested  with  this  operation.     Until 

•4  Rhoad  V.  Patrick,  37  S.  C.  517,  16  S.  E.  536. 

»8  Dawson  v.  Cunning.  50  HI.  App.  286. 

•«  White  V.  Espey,  21  Or.  328,  28  Pac.  71. 

•TKennerly  v.  Sliepley,  15  Mo.  648,  57  Am.  Dec.  219;  Stone  v.  Wood,  16 
in.  177. 

•8  Massingill  v.  Downs,  7  How.  760,  12  L.  Ed.  903;  WilUams  v.  Benedict,  8 
How.  107,  12  L.  Ed.  1007;  Pierce  v.  Brown,  7  Wall.  205,  19  L.  Ed.  134;  Crop- 
sey  V.  Grandall,  2  Blatchf.  341,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  3,418;  Lombard  v.  :payard,  1 
WaU.  Jr.  196,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  8,469;  CarroU  v.  Watklns,  1  Abb.  U.  S.  474,  Fed. 
Cas.  No.  2,457;  Barth  v.  Makcerer,  4  Blss.  20G,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  1,069;  Shrew  v. 
Jones,  2  McLean,  78,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  12,818;  Sellers'  Lessee  v.  Corwln,  5  Ohio, 
398,  24  Am.  Dec.  301;  Lawrence  v.  pelger,  31  Ohio  St.  175;  Byers  v.  Fowler, 
12  Ark.  218,  44  Am.  Dec.  271;  Trapnall  v.  Richardson,  13  Ark.  543,  58  Am. 
Dec.  338;  Manhattan  Co.  v.  Evertson,  6  Paige  (N.  Y.)  457;  Andrews  v.  Wilkes, 
O  How.  (Miss.)  554,  38  Am.  Dec.  450;  Simpson  v.  Niles,  Smith  (Ind.)  104;  Pol- 
lard  T.  Cocke,  19  Ala.  188. 

(649) 


§  414  ULW  OF  JUDOIOBNTS.  (Cb.  1ft 

a  recent  date  there  was  no  legislation  of  congress  specifically  declar- 
ing that  such  judgments  should  have  the  incident  of  a  lien  upon  land. 
Xor  could  it  be  within  the  province  of  a  state  legislature  to  enact 
that  they  should  have  that  effect.  The  answer  to  the  question  is 
given  in  the  following  language :  "J^dS^^ii^s  were  not  liens  at  com- 
mon law,  but  congress,  in  adopting  the  modes  of  process  prevailing 
in  the  states  at  the  time  the  judicial  system  of  the  United  States  was 
organized,  made  judgments  recovered  in  the  federal  courts  liens  in  aU 
cases  where  they  were  so  by  the  laws  of  the  states,  and  a  later  act  of 
congress  has  provided  that  judgments  shall  cease  to  have  that  opera- 
tion in  the  same  manner  and  at  the  same  periods  in  the  respective 
federal  districts  as  like  processes  do  when  issued  from  the  state 
courts/'  ••  It  must  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  this  indirect 
method  of  vesting  such  judgments  with  the  quality  of  lien  was  in 
any  sense  a  recognition  of  a  right  in  the  states  to  regulate  the  opera- 
tion of  federal  judgments.  Judgment-liens  in  the  federal  courts  owe 
their  existence  solely  to  the  authority  of  the  national  government. 
As  remarked  by  the  supreme  court  of  Ohio :  "That  judgment-liens 
are  the  creations  of  positive  law,  without  which  they  cannot  exists 
and  that  they  cannot  survive  the  law  which  g^ves  them  being,  are  prin- 
ciples too  well  settled  to  be  drawn  in  question.  I  suppose  it  equally 
clear  that  they  must  be  created  by  the  government  under  whose  au- 
thority the  judgment  is  rendered.  The  state  may  determine  the  ef- 
fect of  its  own  judgments,  but  cannot  aflfect  those  rendered  by  the 
courts  of  the  United  States;  while  the  same  limitation  is  equally 
true  of  the  legislation  of  the  general  government.  Each  has  an  equal 
right  to  provide  for  the  security  and  satisfaction  of  judgments  ren- 
dered in  its  courts,  but  neither  has  any  power  whatever  to  limit 

•B  Baker  v.  Morton,  12  Wall.  130.  20  L.  Ed.  262,  Clifford,  J.  See,  also. 
KoDlng  V.  Bayard,  2  Paine,  251,  Fed.  Oas.  Xo,  7,924.  The  act  of  congress 
above  referred  to  is  as  follows:  "Judgments  or  decrees,  rendered  In  a  circuit 
or  district  court,  within  any  state,  shall  cease  to  be  liens  on  real  estate  or 
chattels  real,  in  the  same  manner  and  at  like  periods  as  judgments  and  de- 
crees of  the  courts  of  such  state  cease,  by  law,  to  be  liens  thereon.**  Her. 
St.  U.  S.  §  OCT.  This  was  substantially  a  re-enactment  of  the  act  of  Jnly  4. 
1840  (5  Stat.  aaS)  c.  43,  §  4.  In  a  territory,  the  Judgments  of  the  federal 
courts  are  liens  on  the  debtor's  land  only  when  Judgments  are  liens  by  the 
laws  of  the  territory.    Thompson  v.  Avery,  11  Utah«  214,  39  Pac  82a 

(650) 


Ch.  16)  THS  LIEN  OF  JUDOMBNT8.  §  415 

« 

this  sovereign  right  in  the  other."  ^•^  But  since  congress  originally 
adopted  fte  slat^  htws  on  the  Mifejcct,  the  mtes  for  <ie!ln  mining  the 
nature  and  character  of  the  judgments  that  would  g^ve  a  Hen,  for 
ascertaining  what  species  of  estates  were  bound  thereby,  and  similar 
matters,  had  to  be  sought  in  the  laws  and  decisions  of  the  particular 
state.**^  Thus  it  is  ruled  that  a  verdict  alone,  without  the  entry  of 
a  judgment,  in  a  federal  court,  gives  no  lien  upon  land  in  Pennsyl- 
vania.*®* So  if,  under  the  state  law,  the  lien  of  a  judgment  rendered 
by  a  court  of  the  state  attaches  from  the  day  of  the  final  adjournment 
of  the  term,  the  same  rule  applies  to  federal  judgments  in  that 
state.****  So  judgment-liens  of  the  federal  courts  are  subject  to  the 
state  statute  of  limitations  like  the  liens  of  domestic  judgments.*®* 
And  the  lien  of  such  a  judgment  may  be  modified  or  suspended,  dur- 
ing the  pendency  of  an  appeal  or  writ  of  error,  in  accordance  with 
the  state  practice,  in  the  discretion  of  the  federal  court.*** 

§  415.    Territorial  Extent  of  vneli  I«iens« 

In  the  absence  of  restrictive  legislation  by  congress,  the  lien  of  a 
federal  judgfment  was  always  held  to  be  co-extensive  with  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court  which  rendered  it.  That  is  to  say,  if  the  judg- 
ment was  entered  by  a  federal  district  court,  its  lien  extended  to  all 
chargeable  property  of  the  debtor  throughout  the  district,  and  was 
not  restricted  to  the  particular  county  in  which  the  court  was  sitting, 
although,  by  the  state  law,  the  lien  of  a  judgment  rendered  by  a  state 
court  in  that  county  would  not  extend  into  another  county ;  and  simi- 
larly, if  the  judgment  were  rendered  by  a  United  States  circuit  court, 
its  lien  would  cover  all  property  of  the  debtor  within  the  confines 
of  the  circuit.*®*     To  this  effect  was  a  decision  of  the  chief  federal 

100  Corwin'g  Lessee  t.  Benbain,  2  Ohio  St.  SB. 

101  Perkins  v.  Brierfleld  Iron  &  Coal  Ck).,  77  Ala.  403. 

102  Estate  of  Morris,  6  Phila.  134. 

103  Jones  V.  Guthrie,  23  III.  421. 

104  Abbey  v.  Ck)mmerclal  Bank,  34  Miss.  571,  69  Am.  Dec.  401. 

105  United  States  v.  Sturgls  (D.  C.)  14  Fed.  810. 

io«  Conard  v.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.,  1  Pet.  453,  7  L.  Ed.  180;  Shrew  v.  Jones,  2 
McLean,  78.  Fed.  Cas.  No.  12,818;  Cropsey  v.  Crandall.  2  Blatehf.  341,  Fed. 
Cas.  No.  3.418;  Carroll  v.  Watkins,  1  Abb.  U.  S.  474,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  2,457; 
Lombard  v.  Bayard,  1  Wall.  Jr.  196,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  8,469;  Barth  v.  Makeever, 

(651) 


§   415  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.    16 

court,  where  it  was  said :  "In  those  states  where  the  judgment  or  the 
execution  of  the  state  court  creates  a  lien  only  within  the  county  in 
which  the  judgment  is  entered,  it  has  not  been  doubted  that  a  simi- 
lar proceeding  in  the  circuit  court  of  the  United  States  would  create 
a  lien  to  the  extent  of  its  jurisdiction.  This  has  been  the  practical 
construction  of  the  power  of  the  courts  of  the  United  States,  whether 
the  lien  was  held  to  be  created  by  the  issuing  of  process  or  by  express 
statute.  Any  other  construction  would  materially  affect,  and  in 
some  degree  subvert,  the  judicial  power  of  the  Union.  It  would 
place  suitors  in  the  state  courts  in  a  much  better  condition  than  in 
the  federal  courts."  *®'  As  a  necessary  consequence  of  this  doctrine 
it  was  held  that  state  statutes  requiring  judgments  to  be  recorded  in 
the  county  in  which  the  land  lies  could  have  no  eflect  upon  the  I'en 
of  the  judgment  of  a  federal  court.*®*  But  congress  has  recently 
passed  an  act  which  materially  changes  the  law  in  this  respect,  and 
in  effect  puts  the  judgments  of  the  federal  courts  upon  the  same  foot- 
ing with  those  of  the  state  courts,  in  respect  to  the  territorial  extent 
of  their  lien.  The  wording  of  the  act  is  given  in  a  note.**^*  *  The  pur- 
port of  this  statute  appears  to  be  as  follows:     i..  The  judgment  of  a 

4  Biss.  206*  Fed.  Oas.  No.  1,069;  Byers  v.  Fowler.  12  Ark,  218.  44  Am.  Dec. 
271;  Trapnall  v.  Richardson,  13  Ark.  543,  58  Am.  Dec.  338;  Doyle  v.  Wade. 
23  Fla.  90,  1  South.  516,  11  Am.  St  Hep.  334;  Hall  t.  Green,  60  Misa.  47; 
BraDch  v.  Lowery,  31  Tex.  96;  United  States  v.  Duncan,  12  111.  523,  Fed.  Cas. 
No.  15,003;  Sellers'  Lessee  t.  Corwln,  5  Ohio,  398,  24  Am.  Dec.  301;  Rock 
Island  Nat.  Bank  t.  Thompson,  173  111.  593,  50  N.  E.  1089,  61  Am.  St  Rep.  137. 

107  Masshiglll  V.  DowDS,  7  How.  760,  12  L.  Ed.  903. 

108  Doyle  v.  Wade,  23  Fla.  90,  1  South.  516,  11  Am.  St  Rep.  334;  Carroll  t. 
Watkins,  1  Abb.  U.  S.  474,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  2,457.  Compare  HaU  t.  Green,  00 
Miss.  47. 

109  Act  Cong.  August  1,  1888  (25  Stat  357),  provides  as  foUowa:  •That 
Judgments  or  decrees  rendered  in  a  circuit  or  district  court  of  the  United 
States  within  any  state  shall  be  liens  on  property  throughout  such  state  In  the 
same  manner  and  to  the  same  extent  and  under  the  same  conditions  only  as 
if  such  judgments  and  decrees  had  been  rendered  by  a  court  of  general  ju- 
risdiction of  such  state:  Provided,  that  whenever  the  laws  of  any  state  re- 
quire a  judgment  or  decree  of  a  state  court  to  be  registered,  recorded,  docket- 
ed, indexed,  or  any  other  thing  to  be  done,  in  a  particular  manner,  or  in  a 
certain  office  or  county,  or  parish  in  the  state  of  Louisiana,  before  a  lien  shall 
attach,  this  act  shall  be  applicable  therein  whenever  and  only  whenever  the 
laws  of  such  state  shall  authorize  the  judgments  and  decrees  of  the  United 
States  courts  to  be  registered,  recorded,  docketed,  indexed,  or  otherwise  con- 

(652) 


Cb.  16)  THE  LIEN  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §   415 

federal  court  will  become  a  lien  upon  real  property  situated  in  the 
county  where  the  court  was  sitting  at  the  time  of  its  rendition,  at  all 
events  and  without  any  reference  to  docketing,  etc.,  under  state 
laws.  2.  If  the  laws  of  the  state  restrict  the  liens  of  judgments  ren- 
dered by  its  own  courts,  in  the  first  instance,  to  property  within  the 
county  where  the  court  has  jurisdiction,  but  provide  that  a  judgment 
lien  may  attach  to  property  situate  in  another  county  in  the  same 
state,  when  the  judgment  is  docketed,  or  a  transcript  of  it  filed,  in 
the  proper  office  in  such  other  county,  and  if  the  statute  authorizing 
such  transfers  of  judgments,  for  purposes  of  lien,  from  one  county 
to  another,  expressly  includes  judgments  of  the  federal  courts  in  the 
description  of  judgments  which  may  be  so  transferred,  or  if  there  is 
a  separate  statute  assimilating  judgments  of  the  federal  courts,  in 
this  respect,  to  the  judgments  of  the  courts  of  the  state,  then  the  lien 
of  a  judgment  rendered  by  a  United  States  court  in  such  state  will  be 
primarily  restricted  to  property  within  the  county  where  the  court 
was  sitting  at  the  time  the  judgment  was  rendered,  but  may  be  ex- 
formed  to  the  rules  and  requirements  relating  to  the  judgments  and  decrees 
of  the  courts  of  the  state. 

"See.  2.  That  the  clerks  of  the  several  courts  of  the  United  States  shall  pre- 
pare and  keep  in  their  respective  offices  complete  and  convenient  indices  and 
cross-indices  of  the  judgment  records  of  said  courts,  and  such  Indices  and  rec- 
ords shall  at  all  times  be  open  to  the  inspection  and  examination  of  the  public. 

"Sec.  3.  Nothing  herein  shall  be  construed  to  require  the  docketing  of  a 
judgment  or  decree  of  a  United  States  court,  or  the  filing  of  a  transcript  there- 
of, In  any  state  office  within  the  same  county  or  parish  in  the  state  of  Louisi- 
ana in  which  the  judgment  or  decree  is  rendered,  in  order  that  such  judgment 
or  decree  may  be  a  lien  on  any  property  within  such  county." 

In  several  of  the  states,  since  188S,  statutes  have  been  enacted  to  meet  and 
carry  into  effect  the  provisions  of  the  above  act  of  congress.  They  authorize 
judgments  and  decrees  of  the  federal  courts  to  be  docketed  (or  transcripts  to 
be  filed)  in  the  clerks'  offices  in  the  different  counties  of  the  state,  in  the  same 
manner  as  judgments  of  the  domestic  courts,  so  as  to  attach  as  liens  upon 
realty  in  the  several  counties  where  they  are  so  recorded.  See  Alsop  v.  Mose- 
ley,  104  N.  C.  60,  10  S.  E.  124,  construing  an  act  of  North  Carolina  of  1880; 
Rock  Island  Nat.  Bank  v.  Thompson,  173  111.  503,  50  N.  E.  1089,  64  Am.  St. 
Rep.  137,  construing  Laws  111.  1881),  p.  197.  See,  also,  Laws  Or.  1891,  p.  41. 
In  Kansas,  the  existing  statute  (Gen.  St.  1868,  c.  SO,  §  419)  is  held  to  satisfy 
the  requirements  of  the  act  of  congress.  Dartmouth  Sav.  Bank  v.  Bates  (O. 
G.)  44  Fed.  546.  On  the  other  hand,  the  statute  of  Ohio  (Rev.  St.  §  5056)  does 
not  apply  to  judgments  rendered  in  the  United  States  courts.  Stewart  v. 
Wheeling  &  L.  E.  Ry.  Co.,  53  Ohio  St.  151,  41  N.  E.  247,  29  L.  R.  A.  438. 

(653) 


§415  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.    16 

tended  to  other  counties  of  the  state  upon  compliance  with  the  re- 
quirements of  the  state  statute  in  regard  to  docketing  or  filing  judg- 
ments in  other  counties.  3.  If  the  laws  of  the  state  limit  the  lien 
of  its  own  judgments  to  the  county  where  rendered,  and  authorize 
the  transfer  of  such  judgments  to  other  counties  for  purposes  of  lien. 
but  make  no  provision  for  the  transfer  of  judgments  of  the  United 
States  courts,  then  the  act  of  congress  of  1888  does  not  apply  at  all, 
and  the  extent  of  the  lien  of  judgments  of  the  federal  courts  in  such 
state  will  remain  precisely  as  before  the  passage  of  that  act;  that 
is  to  say,  the  Hen  of  a  judgment  rendered  by  a  federal  court  within 
such  state  will  be  co-extensive  with  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the 
court  rendering  it.*** 

In  Kansas,  where  the  statute  in  force  before  1888,  providing  for 
the  transfer  of  judgments  from  one  county  to  another,  for  purposes 
of  lien,  was  already  applicable  to  judgments  of  the  federal  courts,  it 
was  held  that  a  creditor  who  had  obtained  a  judgment  in  a  federal 
court  in  that  state  before  the  passage  of  the  act  of  congress  of  1888, 
would  be  obliged,  if  he  wished  to  bind  realty  in  other  counties,  to  file 
transcripts  of  his  judgment  therein  within  a  reasonable  time  after  the 
enactment  of  the  act  of  congress ;  and  that  if  he  neglected  for  more 
than  four  months  after  the  passage  of  the  law  to  take  such  action,  he 
would  lose  his  lien.'**  But  elsewhere  it  has  been  held  that  the  act  of 
congress  does  not  affect  the  lien  of  a  judgment  which  had  attached 
prior  to  the  passage  of  the  act.*** 

It  has  also  been  held  that  a  judgment  in  favor  of  the  United  States, 
recovered  in  one  of  the  federal  courts  outside  of  a  given  state,  is  not 
a  lien  upon  lands  within  that  state  from  the  docketing  of  the  judg- 
ment, although,  by  the  law  of  the  United  States,  an  execution  on  such 
judgment  may  be  issued  against  the  defendant's  property  in  any  state 
of  the  Uiiion.*** 

110  Dartmouth  Sav.  Bank  v.  Bates  (C.  0.)  44  Fed.  546. 

111  First  Nat  Bauk  v.  Clark,  55  Kan.  219.  40  Pac,  270. 

112  Commercial  Bank  v.  Eastern  Bauliing  Co.,  51  Neb.  766,  71  N.  W.  1024. 
ii»  Manhattan  Co.  v.  Evertson,  6  Paige  (N.  Y.)  457, 

(654) 


Oh.  16)  THB  LIKN  OF  JUDGMBNTS.  |  417 

I  410.    Deoreea   In    Admiralty* 

A  final  decree  in  admiralty  in  the  United  States  district  court  in  a 
suit  in  personam,  for  the  payment  of  money,  is  a  lien  on  the  lands  of 
the  defendant  in  the  district  "Exclusive  original  jurisdiction  in 
admiralty  and  maritime  cases  is  conferred  upon  the  district  courts  of 
the  United  States,  but  the  circuit  courts  hear  such  cases  on  appeal, 
and,  as  a  matter  of  daily  practice,  render  decrees  therein  for  the^  pay- 
ment of  money ;  and  it  is  not  to  be  doubted,  we  think,  that  such  de- 
crees are  as  much  within  the  provisions  under  consideration  as  de- 
crees in  equity;  and  if  so,  no  reason  is  perceived  why  the  same 
rule  should  not  be  applied  to  decrees  of  a  like  character  rendered  in 
the  district  courts."  *^* 

Part  III.     To  what  Property  the  Lien  attaches. 

§  417.    Territorial  Reatriotton  of  Iden. 

Although  a  judgment  in  personam  has  the  effect  of  establishing  a 
claim  against  the  defendant  which  follows  his  person  and  may  be 
enforced  against  him,  by  some  appropriate  proceeding,  wherever  he 
may  be  found,  yet  it  can  be  collected  by  the  direct  process  of  execu- 
tion only  within  the  territory  over  which  the  court  rendering  the 
judgment  has  jurisdiction  and  within  which  its  process  may  run. 
Hence,  as  a  general  rule,  the  judgment  constitutes  a  lien  only  upon 
the  real  estate  of  the  debtor  lying  within  such  territorial  limits.  A 
judgment  rendered  in  one  state  or  country  is  not  a  lien  upon  land  in 
another  state  or  country. ^^'^  In  order  to  have  that  effect,  it  must  be 
made  the  basis  of  a  suit  and  judgment  in  the  second  state  or  country, 
and  then  the  lien  will  attach  as  an  incident  of  the  second  judgment, 
not  the  first.    And  even  within  the  limits  of  the  same  state,  unless 

114  Ward  v.  Chamberlain,  2  Black,  430,  17  L.  Ed.  319. 

iiBBiUan  v.  Heroklebrath,  23  Ind.  71;  Reynolds  v.  Stockton,  140  U.  S. 
254,  11  Sup.  Ot.  773,  35  L.  Ed.  464;  Smith  v.  Eyre,  149  Pa.  272,  24  AU.  288. 
But  where  a  Judgment  was  recovered  in  M.  county,  Virginia,  and  became  a 
lien  on  lands  in  B.  county,  its  lien  was  neither  lost  nor  impaired  by  reason 
of  the  division  of  the  state  of  Virginia  into  two  states  and  the  falling  of  M. 
county  into  the  state  of  West  Virginia.  Gatewood's  Adm'r  v.  Goode,  23  Grat. 
<Va.)  880. 

(G55) 


§  418  UIW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  C^b.   16 

it  is  otherwise  provided  by  the  statutes,  the  lien  of  a  judgment 
attaches  only  to  the  real  estate  of  the  debtor  which  lies  within  the 
particular  county  where  the  judgment  was  rendered  and  docketed."* 
But  where  a  judgment-lien  attaches  upon  lands  in  a  certain  county, 
and  afterwards  a  new  county  is  set  off,  within  which  these  lands  (or 
part  of  them)  fall,  the  lien  does  not  cease  to  exist  by  reason  of  such 
new  organization,  but  holds  during  the  full  period  allowed  by  stat- 
ute without  any  further  record.^^^  "It  is  supposed  that  when  a  new 
county  is  organized,  with  no  saving  clause  in  the  act,  and  land  sub- 
ject to  a  judgment-lien  in  the  old  county  falls  within  the  new  organiza* 
tion,  the  lien  ceases  to  exist.  We  do  not  think  so.  The  lien  being 
given  by  express  provision,  althougfli  it  is  admitted,  as  a  part  of  the 
remedy,  to  be  within  the  control  of  the  legislature,  must,  nevertheless, 
remain  until  lost  by  the  act  of  the  judgment-creditor,  or  taken  away 
by  subsequent  legislation."  *^* 

§  418.    Timmsfer  of  Jiids»ent  to  AaotKer  Covmtyw 

In  many  of  the  states  there  are  statutes  authorizing  a  transcript 
of  a  judgment  recovered  in  one  county  to  be  docketed  in  another, 
for  the  purpose  of  binding  lands  of  the  judgment-debtor  situated  in 
the  latter  county.* ^*    Such  a  transfer,  however,  does  not  destroy  the 

lie  King  T.  Portia,  77  N.  G.  25;  Baker  v.  Chandler,  51  Ind.  85;  SUte  Bank 
Y.  Carson,  4  Neb.  498;  GoodeU  v.  Blnmer,  41  WIb.  436;  Farmers'  Bank  t. 
Heisrhe,  3  Md.  357,  See  Harnett  v.  East  Tennessee,  V.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  (Tenn.) 
48  S.  W.  817.  In  Alabama  it  was  held,  in  1843,  that  the  lien  of  a  Judgment 
in  any  court  of  reeord  of  the  state  extended  to  aU  the  lands  of  the  judgment 
debtor  within  the  state.  Campbell  y.  Spence,  4  Ala.  543,  39  Am.  Dec.  301. 
And  In  Pennsylvania,  in  1792,  a  similar  ruling  was  made  in  regard  to  the 
effect  of  a  Judgment  in  the  supreme  court  Ralston  y.  Bell,  2  Dall.  158.  1  L. 
Ed.  330. 

"T  Davidson  v.  Root,  11  Ohio,  98,  37  Am.  Dec.  411;  People  v.  Hovious,  17 
Cal.  471;  Hays*  Appeal,  8  Pa.  182;  West's  Appeal,  5  Watts  (Pa.)  87;  Garvin 
v.  Garvin.  34  S.  C.  388,  13  S.  E.  C25;  Dermott  v.  Carter,  109  Mo.  21,  18  a 
W.  1121. 

118  Davidson  v.  Root,  11  Ohio.  98,  37  Am.  Dec.  411. 

11  •  Farmers-  Bank  v.  Heighe,  3  Md.  357;  Goodell  v.  Blumer,  41  Wia  436; 
Perry  v.  Morris,  65  X.  O.  221;  Neil  v.  ColweU,  66  Pa.  216;  Code  Clr.  Proo. 
Cal.  §  674;  Acts  Ark.  ISDl,  No.  56,  p.  92,  §  1;  Comp.  Laws  S.  D.  §  5101; 
Bostwick  v.  Benedict.  4  S,  D.  414.  57  N.  W.  78;  Code  Civ.  Proe.  Mont  S  1200; 
A.  M.  Holter  Hardware  Co.  v.  Ontario  Mln.  Co.,  24  Mont.  184,  61  Pac.  3.. 
(656) 


Ch.  16)  THE  LIEN  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §   4J8 

lien  of  the  judgment  on  the  debtor's  property  in  the  county  where  it 
was  originally  docketed. ^■''®  But  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  statute 
enacts  that  its  lien  shall  continue  in  the  second  county  for  a  pre- 
scribed term  after  the  filing  of  the  transcript  there^  it  is  held  that 
the  lien  will  bind  the  land  in  the  second  county  during  the  whole  of 
such  term,  although,  in  the  interval,  it  may  have  expired  by  limita- 
tion in  the  first  county.^^*  It  is  to  be  noted  that  a  transcript  thus 
entered  in  another  county  is  not  a  judgment  of  the  court  to  which 
transferred,  but  a  quasi  judgment  for  certain  limited  purposes,  such 
as  lien,  execution,  and  revival.  Hence  if  the  original  judgment  is  set 
aside  for  irregularity,  the  judgment  on  the  transcript  will  fall  with 
it.'*'  Another  consequence  of  this  principle  is  that  no  authority 
can  be  derived  from  the  statute  for  a  transfer  of  the  same  judgment 
from  the  second  county  to  a  third, — that  would  be  merely  an  exem- 
plification of  an  exemplification.  If  it  is  desired  to  bind  lands  in  a 
third  county,  a  transcript  must  be  taken  directly  from  the  first.^** 
And  when  a  judgment  is  so  transferred,  its  merits  cannot  be  inquired 
into  at  all  by  the  court  to  which  it  is  taken ;  it  is  there  only  for  pur- 
poses of  enforcement  and  satisfaction.***  In  regard  to  the  requisites 
of  the  transcript,  it  is  necessary  that  it  should  be  sufficient  to  give 
reasonably  certain  and  definite  information  to  subsequent  purchasers 
or  lienors.  It  is  held  to  answer  this  requirement  if  it  sets  out  the  date 
of  the  rendition  of  the  judgment,  the  names  of  the  parties  to  the  suit, 
the  amount  of  the  debt,  and  the  costs  of  the  action.**'  If  the  statute 
provides  that  "judgments  at  law"  may  be  thus  transferred  from  one 
county  to  another,  this  term  will  not  be  given  an  extensive  signifi- 
cation, but  will  be  taken  in  its  strict  meaning.  Thus,  a  verdict,  with- 
out the  rendition  of  judgment  upon  it,  is  not  capable  of  being  taken 
to  another  county  for  purposes  of  lien.**'  And  under  a  statute 
worded  as  above,  a  decree  of  a  court  of  equity  cannot  be  thus  trans- 

120  Perry  v.  Morris.  65  N.  C.  221. 

121  Donner  y.  Palmerp  23  Gal.  40.    Ck)mpare  Bradfield  y.  Newby,  130  Ind 
69.  28  N.  E.  619. 

122  Brandt's  Appeal,  16  Pa.  343. 
!«•  Mellon  y.  Guthrie.  51  Pa.  116. 
124  King  v.  Nlmick,  34  Pa.  207. 
126  Wilson  y.  Patton,  87  X.  C.  31& 
120  Bailey  v.  Eder,  90  Pa.  446, 

1  LAW  JUDG.-42  (657) 


§419  liAW  <»"  JUI>aMBNT8.  (Ch.  16 

ferred  to  another  county,  although  it  be  for  the  payment  of  a  definite 
sum  of  money.^'^  But  a  valid  and  subsisting  judgment  may  be 
transferred  after  the  death  of  the  plaintiff,  and  the  suggestion  of  death 
and  substitution  of  the  administrator  may  be  made  either  before  or 
after  the  transfer.*** 

§  419.    Idea  binds  Real  Estate. 

The  language  usually  employed  in  statutes  on  this  subject  is  to 
the  effect  that  judgments  shall  be  a  lien  on  the  "reaLestate"  or  "real 
property"  of  the  defendant."*  These  terms  serve  well  enough  to  ex- 
empt chattels  from  this  operation  of  a  judgment,  but  leave  room  for 
a  certain  ambiguity  as  to  the  various  species  of  estates  and  interests 
in  land  which  may  possibly  come  under  the  designation  of  realty. 
These  questions  will  be  examined  in  succeeding  sections.  It  has  been 
held  that  judgments  against  a  turnpike  company  are  not  liens  upon 
the  turnpike  road.***  And  under  the  laws  of  Texas  regulating  rail- 
ways, a  railroad  is  not  considered  real  estate  within  the  meaning  of 
a  statute  which  makes  the  judgment  of  a  court  of  record  a  lien  on  the 
"real  estate"  of  the  debtor.***    But  if  the  laws  of  the  particular  state 

127  Brooke  v.  Phillips,  83  Pa.  183. 

128  Walt's  Adm'rs  v.  Swlneliart,  8  Pa.  97. 

is«  A  Judgment  does  not  create  a  lien  upon  personal  property  belonging  to 
the  debtor.  McXamara  y.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Go.,  56  N.  J.  Law,  56, 
28  Atl.  313;  Stahlman  v.  Watson  (Tenn.)  39  S.  W.  1055.  The  lien  does  not 
bind  choses  in  action.  Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.  t.  Exchange  Bank,  100  Qa. 
619,  28  S.  E.  393;  Stahlman  v.  Watson,  supra.  Nor  the  right  ef  a  licensee 
under  an  oil  lease.  Meridian  Nat.  Bank  v.  McConica,  8  Ohio  Cir.  Ct  R.  442. 
Nor  the  interest  of  one  holding  a  parol  license  to  mine,  at  least  while  the 
license  remains  revocable.  Blindert  v.  Kreiser,  81  Wis.  174,  51  N.  W.  324. 
On  the  other  hand,  max:hinery  permanently  attached  to  realty  may  become 
subject  to  the  lien  of  a  Judgment  against  the  owner  of  the  land,  although 
sold  under  an  agreement  that  title  should  remain  in  the  seller  until  fuU  pay- 
ment Raymond  y.  Schoonover,  181  Pa.  352,  37  Atl.  524.  See  also,  as  to 
permanent  improvements  on  the  land  partaking  of  the  character  of  realty, 
Lessert  v.  Sleberling.  59  Neb.  309,  80  N.  W.  900.  A  Judgment  lien  existing 
at  the  time  an  executor  sells  real  estate  is  transferred  from  the  land  to  the 
fund  arising  from  such  sale.  Barkman  v.  Hain,  5  Ohio  N.  P.  508.  The  lien 
of  a  judgment  against  a  corporation  whose  assets  consist  partly  in  real  estate 
is  an  incumbrance  on  such  real  estate.  WiUsIe  T.  Rapid  Valley  Horse-Ranch 
.Co..  7  S.  D.  114,  63  N.  W.  546, 

ISO  Beam's  Appeal,  19  Pa.  453. 

a»i  Scogin  v.  Perry,  32  Tex.  21. 

(G58) 


Ch.  16)  TUB  LIEN  OF  JUDGMBNTS.  {  420 

are  so  framed  as  to  give  the  character  of  fixtures  to  the  rolling  stock 
of  a  railroad,  then  such  stock  will  be  subject  to  the  lien  ol  a  judg- 
ment.^** 

I  420.    Aetual  Interest  <if  DeMor  bevad. 

The  lien  of  a  judgment  attaches  to  the  precise  interest  or  estate 
which  the  judgment-debtor  has,  actually  and  effectively,  in  the  land. 
By  this  is  meant  that,  as  the  recovery  of  a  judgment  against  him  can- 
not of  itself  operate  to  change  the  quantity  of  his  interest  in  the 
property,  so  its  lien  cannot  be  made  effectual  to  bind  or  convey  any 
greater  or  other  estate  than  the  debtor  himself,  in  the  exercise  of  his 
rights,  could  voluntarily  have  transferred  or  alienated.  Hence  it  is 
of  no  consequence  that  he  may  have  an  apparent  or  colorable  inter- 
est greater  than  would  pass  by  his  conveyance  of  the  title ;  the  lien 
has  no  effect  except  upon  his  actual  estate,  legal  or  equitable,  accord- 
ing as  the  law  varies  in  the  different  jurisdictions.*'*  "The  general 
lien  of  a  judgment-creditor  upon  the  lands  of  his  debtor  is  subject  to 
all  equities  which  existed  against  such  lands  in  favor  of  third  persons 
at  the  time  of  the  recovery  of  the  judgment.  And  the  court  of  chan- 
cery will  so  control  the  legal  lien  of  the  judgment-creditor  as  to  re- 
strict it  to  the  actual  interest  of  the  judgment-debtor  in  the  property, 
so  as  fully  to  protect  the  rights  of  those  who  have  a  prior  equitable 
interest  in  such  property  or  in  the  proceeds  thereof."  *•*  "The 
moment  a  judgment  is  docketed  it  becomes  in  law  a  general  lien  on 
all  the  real  estate  of  the  debtor,  not  only  as  against  himself,  but  also 

112  Milwaukee  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Jnmes,  6  Wall.  750,  18  L.  Ed.  854. 

i»8  Baker  v.  Morton,  12  Wall.  150,  20  L.  Ed.  2G2;  In  re  Estes  (D.  C.)  6  Sawy. 
459,  3  Fed.  134;  Sandfoid  v.  McLean,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.)  117.  23  Am.  Dec.  778; 
Coombs  V.  Jordan.  3  Bland  (Md.)  284,  22  Am.  Dec.  230;  Ex  parte  Trenholm,  19 
S.  C.  126;  Blankonship  v.  Douglas,  26  Tex.  225,  82  Am.  Dec.  608;  Holden  v. 
Garrett,  23  Kan.  08;  Doswell  v.  Adlcr,  28  Ark.  82;  Unknown  Heirs  of  Whit- 
ney V.  Kimball,  4  Ind.  54(i,  58  Am.  Dec.  638;  Shan)e  v.  Davis.  76  Ind.  17; 
Heherd  v.  Wines,  105  Ind.  237.  4  N.  E.  457;  Churchill  v.  Morse,  23  Iowa, 
229,  02  Am.  Dec.  422;  I'nion  Bank  v.  Manard,  51  Mo.  548;  Uhl  v.  May,  5  Neb. 
157;  Gal  way  v.  Malchow,  7  Neb.  285;  Colt  v.  Du  Bols,  7  Neb.  391;  Berkley 
r.  Lamb,  8  Neb.  302.  1  N.  W.  320;  Nessler  v.  Neher,  18  Neb.  049,  26  N.  W. 
471;  Id.,  23  N.  W.  345.  And  see  Robisson  v.  Miller,  158  Pa.  177,  27  Atl.  887; 
<'leavenger  t.  Felton,  46  W.  Va.  249,  33  S.  E.  117;  Hawley  v.  Smeiding,  3 
Kan.  App.  159,  42  Pac.  841. 

13*  Buchan  v.  Sumner,  2  Barb.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  207,  47  Am.  Dec.  305. 

(059) 


S 


f  421  JJLW  OF  JUDQMBNTS.  (Ch.   IG 

as  against  all  other  persons  deriving  title  through  or  under  him  sub- 
sequent to  such  judgment.  It  affects  the  legal  estate,  and  the  lien  of 
the  judgment  cannot  at  law  be  detached  or  defeated  by  any  species  of 
alienation  whatsoever."  *••  A  judgment  is  not  a  lien  on  land  unless 
there  is  a  legal  or  equitable  seisin  of  the  judgment-debtor ;  but  where 
he  is  the  actual  possessor,  that  is  sufficient,  for  actual  possession  is 
prima  facie  e\'idence  of  title.*'*  On  the  other  hand,  although  tne 
legal  title  to  land  is  in  one,  yet  if  another  has  actual  possession,  a 
judgment  against  the  former  is  a  lien  only  upon  his  interest,  whatever 
that  may  be,  for  the  possession  of  the  other  is  notice  to  all  the  world 
of  his  claims.*'^  In  Illinois  it  is  held  that  a  judgment  lien  attaches  to 
whatever  interest  in  real  estate  the  records  disclose  in  the  judgment 
debtor,  in  the  absence  of  notice  from  other  sources.*** 

S  421.    Title  held  in  Tniet. 

The  lien  of  a  judgment  does  not  in  equity  attach  upon  the  mere 
legal  title  to  land  existing  in  the  defendant,  when  the  equitable  title 
is  in  a  third  person.* *•  And  transitory  seisin  of  lands  by  the  judg- 
ment-debtor, in  trust  for  another,  will  not  subject  the  lands  to  the 
judgment-lien.**®  To  illustrate,  in  a  recent  case  it  appeared  that 
A.  agreed  to  purchase  three  lots  from  B.  as  agent  for  C,  and  the 
deed  was  made  out  to  A.,  but  he  declined  to  receive  it  on  the  ground 

136  Morris  v.  Mowatt,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.)  586,  22  Am.  Dec.  661. 

^»«  Jackson  v.  Town,  4  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  599,  15  Am.  Dec.  40o. 

i»»  Uhl  V.  Bd[ay,  5  Neb.  157;  Lumbard  v.  Abbej,  73  111.  177;  Thomas  v.  Ken- 
nedy, 24  Iowa,  397,  95  Am.  Dec.  740. 

!■«  Massey  v.  Westcott,  40  HI.  160. 

"»  Ells  V.  Tousley,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.)  280;  Lounsbury  v.  Pupdy,  11  Barb.  (X.  Y.) 
490;  WithneU  v.  Com^land  Wagon  Co.  (C.  C.)  25  Fed.  372;  Hays  v.  R^er.  102 
Ind.  524,  1  N.  E.  386.  See,  also,  Fulton's  Estate,  51  Pa.  204;  Moore  T.  Iliomas. 
137  Ind.  218,  36  N.  E.  712;  Dodd  v.  Bond,  88  Ga.  355.  14  S.  E.  581.  In  Iowa, 
the  doctrine  is  that  a  Judgment  is  not  a  lien  upon  land  to  which  the  Jotl?- 
ment  debtor  holds  only  the  naked  legal  title,  when  the  fact  that  a  third  person 
owns  the  equitable  title  is  either  disclosed  by  the  record  or  is  known  to  the 
Judgment  creditor  (Brebner  v.  Johnson,  84  Iowa,  23.  50  N.  W.  35);  and  that 
as  an  express  trust  cannot  be  established  by  parol  evidence,  such  evidence  is 
not  admissible  to  show  that  the  title  of  real  estate  in  the  name  of  a  Judgment 
defendant  is  held  in  trust  for  another,  and  that  therefore  the  property  is  not 
subject  to  the  lien  of  the  Judgment  Brown  v.  Barngrover,  82  Iowa,  204,  -17 
N.  W.  1082. 

1*0  Aicardi  v.  Craig,  42  Ala.  311. 

(600) 


Ch.    16}  THB  LIEN  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §   421 

that  he  could  not  pay  for  the  lots  and  had  agreed  to  let  D.  have 
them  at  the  stipulated  price.  The  agent  refused  to  alter  the  deed, 
and  D.  paid  the  money  to  him,  and  A.  conveyed  the  property  to  D. 
It  was  held  that  under  these  circumstances  a  judgment  against  A. 
was  not  a  lien  on  the  lands  conveyed  to  D.  The  court  observed 
that  A.  "was  vested  with  the  naked  legal  title.  The  conveyance  was 
made  to  him  as  a  matter  of  convenience.  He  was  a  mere  conduit, 
and  held  the  legal  title  in  trust  for  D.  Under  such  circumstances 
A.  had  no  interest  on  which  the  judgment  became  a  lien.  His  cred- 
itors can  only  get  what  he  had,  and  what  he  had  was  of  no  pecuniary 
value."  ^**  So  where  a  grantee  is  named  in  a  conveyance  and  desig- 
nated as  "trustee/'  this  is  sufficient  to  allow  him  to  hold  the  title 
for  the  unnamed  beneficiary,  if  one  actually  exists,  and  a  judgment 
and  levy  of  execution  against  the  trustee  individually  are  a  lien  only 
on  his  personal  interest,  if  any,  in  the  property.^**  So  in  an  action 
against  a  partner,  who  held  the  legal  title  to  a  mine  in  trust  for  the 
benefit  of  the  firm,  to  enforce  a  lien  for  labor  performed  thereon, 
where  judgment  is  rendered  against  him,  only  his  interest  in  the 
mine  can  be  sold  to  satisfy  such  lien.^**  Another  important  appli- 
cation of  this  principle  is  in  the  case  where  one  sells  and  conveys 
real  estate  to  which  he  has  no  title,  or  an  imperfect  title,  at  the  time 
of  the  sale,  and  subsequently  acquires  a  perfect  title,  the  same  then 
enuring  to  the  benefit  of  the  grantee.  If,  between  the  date  of  the 
conveyance  and  the  acquisition  of  the  perfect  title,  a  judgment  is  ren- 
dered against  the  grantor,  the  title  of  the  grantee  is  prior  to  the  lien 
of  the  judgment.*** 

The  same  rule  also  applies  in  the  case  where  the  judgment  debtor, 
though  having  the  legal  title  to  lands,  holds  it  subject  to  a  resulting 
trust  in  favor  of  another.     Thus,  where  one  person  pays  the  purchase 

1*1  Atkinson  v.  Hancock,  67  Iowa,  452,  25  N.  W.  701;  Dlmmlck  v.  Rosenfeld, 
34  Or.  101,  55  Pac.  100. 

1*2  Boardman  v.  WiUard,  73  Iowa,  20,  34  N.  W.  487.  But  property  con- 
veyed to  an  Insolvent  purchaser  as  trustee  for  his  wife,  the  consideration 
being  paid  by  the  husband,  becomes  subject  to  the  lien  of  a  Judgment  against 
him,  which  is  not  divested  by  a  return  and  cancellation  of  the  deed,  the  same 
not  having  been  recorded.     Kline  v.  Trlplett  (Va.)  25  S.  E,  886. 

1*3  Rosina  v.  Trowbridge,  20  Nev.  105,  17  Pac.  751. 

i*«  Watklns  v.  Wassell,  15  Ark.  73. 

(661) 


§  422  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  16 

money  for  a  parcel  of  realty,  and  procures  the  title  to  be  placed  in 

the  name  of  another,  if  the  latter  has  no  substantial  interest  in  the 

property,  a  judgment  against  him  will  not  be  a  lien  on  the  land.*** 

So  where  one  conveys  land  to  another  by  a  deed  absolute  in  form, 

but  intended  as  security  for  the  payment  of  money,  or  subject  to  a 

parol  agreement  to  reconvey,  the  grantee  has  no  such  interest  in  the 

property  as  will  be  bound  by  the  lien  of  a  judgment  recovered  against 

him."* 

I  422.    laolioate  Title. 

On  the  general  principle  that  a  judgment-lien  attaches  to  the 
precise  interest  which  the  debtor  has  in  the  land,  whatever  that  in- 
terest may  be,  the  authorities  hold  that  the  lien  may  be  considered 
as  binding  several  species  of  inchoate  or  inceptive  titles.  Thus  a 
purchaser  at  a  sale  under  order  of  the  probate  court  acquires  an  in- 
ceptive title  or  interest  in  the  property  so  purchased  at  the  time  it  is 
struck  down  to  him,  and  judgments  entered  against  him  subsequent 
to  the  sale,  but  prior  to  its  confirmation  by  the  court,  are  a  lien  upon 
such  interest  subject  to  the  future  confirmation  of  the  sale.**^  So 
a  purchaser  at  sheriff's  sale,  before  his  deed  has  been  acknowledged, 
has  an  inceptive  interest  in  the  land  by  the  contract,  which  may  be 
bound  by  the  lien  of  a  judgment.**®  And  numerous  cases  have 
decided  that  a  judgment-Hen  will  attach  to  land  which  has  been  pur- 
chased from  the  government,  in  advance  of  the  issuance  of  a  patent 
to  the  buyer.***  But  it  is  also  held,  and  with  much  show  of  reason, 
that  a  judgment  is  not  a  lien  upon  a  mere  right  of  pre-emption. *•• 

1*5  Wade  V.  Sewell  (€.  C.)  56  Fed.  129;  Carter  v.  Chanen,  83  Ala.  IST.. 
3  South.  313;  Bucknell  v.  Deering,  99  Iowa,  548,  68  X.  W.  825;  Coldiron  v.  Ashe- 
vlUe  Shoe  Co.,  93  Va.  364,  25  S.  E.  238;  Baird  v.  Williams,  4  Okl.  173,  44  Pir, 
217.    See  Blackburn  v.  Lake  Shore  Traffic  Co..  90  Wis.  362,  63  X.  W.  289. 

i*«  Main  v.  Bosworth,  77  Wis.  660,  46  X.  W.  1043;  Michael  v.  Knapp,  4  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  464,  23  S.  W.  280. 

147  Holmes*  Appeal,  108  Pa.  23.  But  a  purchaser  who  has  utterly  faOetl 
to  comply  with  the  terms  of  sale,  has  no  estate  in  the  premises,  legal  or 
equitable,  to  be  bound  by  a  judgment-lien.    Jacobs*  Appeal,  23  Pa.  477. 

1*8  Morrison  v.  Wurtz,  7  Watts  (Pa.)  437;  Slater's  Appeal,  28  Pa.  169. 

1*9  Levi  V.  Thompson,  4  How.  17,  11  L.  Ed.  856;  Landes  v.  Brant  10  How. 
348,  13  L.  Ed.  449;  Huntingdon  t.  Grantland,  33  Miss.  453;  Jackson's  Lessee 
V.  Williams,  10  Ohio,  69;  Rogers  v.  Brent,  5  Gllman  (111.)  573,  50  Am.  Dec. 
422;  Ca vender  v.  Smith's  Heirs,  5  Iowa,  157. 

150  Harrington  v.  Sharp,  1  G.  Greene  (Iowa)  131,  48  Am.  Dec.  363.    In  this 

(662) 


Ch.  16)  THE  LIEN  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §   428 


I  423.    LaMd  Fnmdwleatly  CoKwmjedm 


Where  a  person  has  aliened  his  land  by  a  conveyance  which  is  in 
fraud  of  his  creditors,  and  afterwards  a  judgment  is  recovered  against 
him,  many  of  the  authorities  hold  that  such  judgment  does  not  attach 
as  a  lien  upon  the  land,  at  least  until  the  commencement  of  an  action 
by  the  judgment-creditor  to  set  aside  the  conveyance;  on  the  ground 
that  the  fraudulent  conveyance  is  not  void,  but  voidable,  and  that 
it  is  valid  as  between  the  parties,  and  as  to  the  plaintiff,  until  at- 
tacked.^'* In  one  of  the  cases  cited  in  the  margin.  Judge  Deady, 
after  an  extensive  review  of  the  authorities,  expressed  himself  as  fol- 
lows :  "In  my  own  opinion  the  lien  of  a  judgment  which  is  limited 
by  law  to  the  property  of  or  belonging  to  the  judgment-debtor  at  the 
time  of  the  docketing,  does  not  nor  cannot,  without  doing  violence 
to  this  language,  be  held  to  extend  to  property  previously  conveyed 
by  the  debtor  to  another,  by  deed  valid  and  binding  between  the  par- 
ties.    A  conveyance  in  fraud  of  creditors,  although  declared  by  the 

case  the  court  said:  "Under  our  statute  a  Judgment  is  a  lien  only  on  the 
'real  estate  of  the  person*  against  whom  it  was  rendered.  By  the  language 
*real  estate  of  the  person,'  we  understand  that  the  fee-simple,  or  estate  of 
inheritance,  must  be  in  the  person,  in  order  to  have  the  Judgment  against  him 
operate  as  a  lien  upon  the  land.  A  mere  pre-emption  right  confers  no  such 
fee  or  estate  upon  a  person.  It  is  but  a  temporary  and  conditional  interest, 
unknown  to  the  common  law.  It  only  imparts  to  the  pre-emptioner  a  right 
over  others  to  purchase  the  land  within  a  limited  period,  at  a  stipulated  price, 
and  if  he  fails  to  pay  the  price  within  the  time  required,  the  right  ceases. 
It  is  of  a  nature  no  greater  than  an  estate  for  years— a  mere  equitable  and 
contingent  interest;  and  hence  we  are  firmly  of  opinion  that  a  Judgment 
cannot  operate  as  a  Uen  upon  a  pre-emption  right  to  lands."  So  also,  a  gen- 
eral Judgment  is  not  a  lien  on  a  locator's  interest  in  a  mining  claim  on  pub- 
lic lands  for  which  no  patent  has  been  issued.  Phoenix  Min.  &  Mill.  Co.  t. 
Scott,  20  Wash.  48.  54  Pac.  777. 

181  Miller  v.  Sherry,  2  Wall.  249,  17  L.  Ed.  827;  Brooks  v.  Wilson,  53  Hun. 
173,  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  116;  Manhattan  Co.  v.  Evertson,  6  Paige  (N.  Y.)  465;  Mc- 
Kee  r.  Gilchrist,  3  Watts  (Pa.)  230;  Mulford  v.  Peterson,  35  N.  J.  Law,  127; 
Neal  V.  Foster  (C.  C.)  36  Fed.  29;  Rappleye  v.  International  Bank,  93  111.  396; 
In  re  Estes  (D.  C.)  3  Fed.  134;  United  States  v.  Elsonbcis  (D.  C.)  88  Fed.  4; 
Sawtelle  v.  Weymouth,  14  Wash.  21,  43  Pac.  1101;  Doster  v.  Manistee  Nat. 
Bank,  67  Ark.  325,  55  S.  W.  137;  Joyce  v.  Perry,  111  Iowa,  567,  82  N.  W. 
941;  French  Lumbering  Co.  v.  Theriault,  107  Wis.  627,  83  N.  W.  927,  51 
L.  K.  A.  910,  81  Am.  St.  Rep.  856. 

(663) 


§  423  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNTS.  (Gh.  16 

statute  to  be  void  as  to  them,  is  nevertheless  valid  as  between  the 
parties  and  their  representatives,  and  passes  all  the  estate  of  the  gran- 
tor to  the  grantee;  and  a  bona  fide  purchaser  from  such  grantee 
takes  such  estate,  even  against  the  creditors  of  the  fraudulent  grantor, 
purged  of  the  anterior  fraud  that  affected  the  title.  Such  a  convey- 
ance is  not,  as  has  been  sometimes  supposed,  'utterly  void,'  but  it  is 
only  so  in  a  qualified  sense.  Practically  it  is  only  voidable,  and  that 
at  the  instance  of  creditors  proceeding  in  the  mode  prescribed  by 
law,  and  even  then  not  as  against  a  bona  fide  purchaser.  The  opera- 
tion of  the  lien  of  a  judgment,  being  limited  by  statute  to  the  prop- 
erty then  belonging  to  the  judgment-debtor,  is  not  a  mode  prescribed 
by  which  a  creditor  may  attack  a  conveyance  fraudulent  as  to  himself, 
or  assert  any  right  as  such  against  the  grantor  therein.  This  lien  is 
constructive  in  its  character,  and  is  not  the  result  of  a  levy  or  any 
other  act  directed  against  this  specific  property.  It  is  the  creature 
of  the  statute,  and  cannot  have  effect  beyond  it."  *•* 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  many  well  considered  cases  hold  that  a 
subsequent  judgment  is  a  lien  on  land  previously  conveyed  in  fraud 
of  creditors,  and  that  the  judgment-creditor  may  treat  the  convey- 
ance as  simply  void,  and  may  rest  exclusively  upon  his  legal  reme- 
dies, without  invoking  the  aid  of  a  court  of  equity;  that  is,  he  may 
proceed  to  sell  the  land  upon  execution,  leaving  it  to  the  sheriff's 
vendee  to  impeach  the  fraudulent  conveyance.*'*    According  to  an- 

i»a  In  re  Estes  (D.  C.)  3  Fed.  134,  141. 

133  Jackson  y.  Holbrook,  36  Minn.  494,  32  X.  W.  852.  1  Am.  St  Rep.  f%3: 
Chautauqua  Oo.  Bank  v.  Risley,  19  X.  Y.  369,  75  Am.  Dec.  347;  Danbam 
V.  Cox,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  437.  64  Am.  Dec.  460;  Eastman  v.  Schettler,  13  Wis.  324; 
Smith  T.  Morse,  2  Cal.  524;  First  Nat  Bank  v.  Maxwell,  123  Cat  360,  55  Pac 
960.  69  Am.  St.  Rep.  64.  In  re  Lowe  (D.  C.)  19  Fed.  5S9;  Slattery  v.  Jones, 
96  Mo.  216,  8  S.  W.  551,  9  Am.  St.  Rep.  344.  In  Jackson  v.  Holbrook,  supn, 
the  choice  of  remedies  open  to  the  Judgment-creditor  is  indicated  as  follows: 
"A  Judgment-creditor  seeking  relief  against  prior  fraudulent  conveyances  of 
land  has  the  choice  of  three  remedies.  He  may  sell  the  debtor's  land  apoo 
execution  issued  on  his  Judgment,  and  leave  the  purchaser  to  contest  the 
validity  of  the  defendant's  title  in  an  action  of  ejectment;  or,  secondly,  be 
may  bring  an  action  in  equity  to  remove  the  fraudulent  obstruction  to  the 
enforcement  of  his  lien  by  execution,  and  await  the  result  of  the  action  be- 
fore selling  the  property;  or,  thirdly,  he  may,  on  the  return  of  an  execntloD 
unsatisfied,  bring  an  action  in  the  nature  of  a  cre<i:tors*  bill,  to  have  the  con- 
veyance adjudged  fraudulent  and  void  as  to  his  Judgment,  and  the  lands 
(664) 


Ch.  16)  THB  LIEN  OF  JUDGMENTS.  f  423 

Other  view,  if  the  debtor  has  fraudulently  conveyed  away  or  incum- 
bered his  real  estate,  so  as  to  interpose  an  obstacle  which  embar- 
rasses the  creditor  in  appropriating  it  by  legal  process  in  satisfaction 
of  his  debt,  then  the  latter  may  file  his  bill  to  remove  out  of  the  way 
such  fraudulent  conveyance  or  incumbrance,  and  it  is  not  necessary 
for  him  to  first  take  out  execution  on  his  judgment,  for  the  judgment 
is  a  lien  on  the  land.^'*  But  of  course  these  rules  only  apply  in 
cases  where  the  conveyance  was  made  with  intent  to  hinder  and 
defraud  creditors.  Thus  a  judgment  is  not  a  lien  on  land  which  the 
debtor  has  previously  conveyed  in  good  faith  to  his  son,  in  trust 
for  his  wife,  to  pay  a  debt  really  due  her.*'*  And  in  any  other  case 
where  the  fraudulent  purpose  was  clearly  wanting,  the  judgment 
would  be  no  lien. 

fold  by  a  recelyer  or  other  officer  of  the  court,  and  the  proceeds  applied  to 
the  satisfaction  of  the  judgment,  as  in  the  case  of  equitable  interests  the 
debtor's  assets  are  reached  and  applied.  Erickson  t.  Quinn,  15  Abb.  Prac. 
N.  S.  (N.  Y.)  168.  In  the  first  two  classes,  the  creditor  enforces  his  Judgment 
at  law,  and  the  sale  upon  execution  must  necessarily  be  subject  to  prior  stat- 
utory Uens.  The  purchaser  in  such  cases  succeeds  to  such  title  only  as  the 
debtor  had,  treating  the  debtor's  fraudulent  transfer  as  void.  Freem.  Ex'ns« 
§  447.  As  to  cases  falling  within  the  second  class,  the  object  of  the  equi- 
table suit  is  to  make  the  legal  remedy  more  effective.  In  such  case,  no  trust 
is  created  in  respect  to  the  property,  but  the  creditor  falls  back  upon  his  legal 
remedy,  and,  instead  of  bringing  his  equitable  suit  before  the  sale,  he  may, 
if  necessary,  maintain  it  after  sale  in  the  form  of  an  action  to  remove  a  cloud 
from  his  title.  Erickson  v.  Quinn,  supra.  And  where  assets  are  applied  by 
the  court  in  creditors'  suits,  as  respects  real  estate,  the  rule  is,  as  in  other 
cases,  to  prefer  prior  liens,  in  the  distribution.  'Where  the  law  gives  prior- 
ity, equity  will  not  destroy  it;  and  especially  where  legal  assets  are  created 
by  statute  as  Judgment-liens,  they  remain  so,  though  the  creditors  be  obliged 
to  go  into  equity  for  assistance.  The  legal  priority  will  be  protected  and 
preserved  in  chancery.'  Kent,  C.  J.,  Codwise  v.  Gelston,  10  Johns.  522;  Scou- 
ton  V.  Bender,  3  How.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  185;  Wiswall  v.  Sampson,  14  How.  67, 
14  L.  Ed.  322."  In  Pennsylvania,  it  is  said  that  a  Judgment  creditor,  who 
advises  the  debtor  to  make  a  fraudulent  conveyance  in  order  to  cheat  another 
creditor,  does  not  thereby  lose  the  lien  of  his  Judgment  Fidler  v.  John,  178 
Pa.  112,  35  Atl.  976. 

1S4  Dunham  v.  Cox,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  437,  64  Am.  Dec.  460. 

165  Benson  v.  Maxwell  (Pa.)  14  Atl.  161. 

(666) 


§  425  LAW  OF  JITDGMBNT&  (Cb.  16 

I  424.    Ezeaipt  Property. 

In  the  nature  of  things,  a  judgment  cannot  operate  as  a  lien  upon 
any  property  which  is  by  law  exempt  from  seizure  and  sale  on  exe- 
cution. Under  a  statute  providing  that  judgments  shall  be  liens  on 
real  estate  subject  to  execution,  where  the  entire  property  of  a  resi- 
dent householder  at  the  time  of  the  rendition  of  a  judgment  is  less  in 
value  than  the  amount  allowed  by  law  as  exempt  from  execution,  and 
so  continues,  the  judgment  does  not  become  a  lien  on  his  real  estate, 
and  his  grantee- takes  it  free  from  any  lien  of  the  judgment  or  execu- 
tion issued  upon  it.*** 

425.    Homeitead   Property. 

Since  land  held  as  a  homestead  is  not  liable  to  levy  and  sale  on 
execution,  it  is  not  bound  by  the  lien  of  a  judgment  against  the 
owner,  except  as  to  the  surplus  value  of  the  property,  if  any,  over 
the  amount  Umited  as  a  homestead  exemption.  Hence,  while  the 
land  retains  this  character,  the  owner  will  not  be  deterred  from  pla- 
cing incumbrances  upon  it,  or  even  alienating  it,  by  the  fact  that 
there  are  judgments  outstanding  against  him.*"'  But  a  judgment- 
lien  against  property  acquired  before  the  filing  of  a  declaration  of 
homestead  by  the  debtor  and  his  wife,  or  before  the  debtor's  mar- 
riage, or  otherwise  before  the  land  acquires  the  character  of  a  home- 
stead, subjects  such  property  to  sale  under  execution;  such  lien 
cannot  be  divested  by  any  subsequent  act  of  the  owners.***     And  if 

ise  Dumbould  y.  Rowley,  113  Ind.  353,  15  N.  E.  463;  King  y.  Easton,  135 
Ind.  a53,  35  N.  E.  181. 

157  Ackley  y.  Chamberlain,  16  Cal.  181,  76  Am.  Dec.  516;  McDonald  y. 
Badger,  23  Cal.  400,  83  Am.  Dec.  123;  SulUyan  y.  Hendrickson,  64  CbL  258; 
MoDroe  v.  May,  9  Kan.  466;  Gapen  y.  Stephenson,  17  Kan.  613;  Lorimer  t. 
Marshall.  44  111.  App.  645;  Farmers*  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  y.  Schwenk,  64  Neb, 
C37,  74  N.  W.  1063;  Traders'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Schorr,  20  Wash.  1,  64  Pac.  543, 
72  Am.  St.  Rep.  17;  Lamb  y.  Shays,  14  Iowa,  567;  Wiggins  y.  Chance,  54 
111.  175;  Black  v.  Epperson,  40  Tex.  162;  Briggs  y.  Briggs,  45  Iowa,  318; 
Grimes  v.  Portman,  99  Mo.  229,  12  S.  W.  792. 

i38Kennerley  v.  Swartz,  83  Va.  704.  3  S.  E.  348;    Smith  v.  Richards,  2 

Idaho,  4G4,  21  Pac.  419,  citing  Freem.  Bx'ns,  SS  249,  249d.  249e;    Thouip. 

Homest.  &  Exemp.  §  317;    Smyth,  Homest.  §  35;    Piatt,  Mar.    Uom.   ^    ... 

Kelly  V.  Dill,  23  Mlun.  435;   Bullene  y.  Hiatt,  12  Kan.  98;   Robinson  v.  Wil- 

(GG6) 


Ch.  16)  THB  LIBN  OF  JUDOMBNTS.  §  425 

the  property  loses  its  character  as  a  homestead,  it  then  becomes  sub- 
ject to  existing  and  future  judgments.  Thus,  under  a  law  which 
enacts  that  the  homestead  exemption  shall  exist  "so  long  as  the  same 
shall  be  owned  and  occupied  by  the  debtor  as  such  homestead/'  a 
judgment  against  the  owner  of  land  is  a  lien  which  remains  dormant 
while  the  land  is  so  occupied,  but  it  becomes  living  and  operative  as 
soon  as  the  homestead  occupation  is  abandoned.**^*  In  that  event,  all 
existing  judgments  will  attach  together  as  of  the  date  of  the  aban- 
donment, but  without  regard  to  their  seniority,  and  priority  will  be- 
long to  the  creditor  who  first  manifests  his  diligence  by  levying  on 
the  property.**®  It  is  evident  that  if  an  abandonment  of  the  home- 
stead character  of  the  land  precedes  the  debtor's  alienation  of  it  by 
such  an  interval  of  time  that  the  two  acts  cannot  be  considered  as 
parts  of  the  same  transaction,  the  liens  of  existing  judgments  will 
attach,  and  the  property  will  go  to  the  purchaser  burdened  with  such 
liens.**^  But  a  more  difficult  question  arises  in  case  the  relinquish- 
ment of  the  homestead  consists  in  the  very  act  of  selling  it.  Accord- 
ing to  the  decisions  in  some  of  the  states,  if  the  owner  of  a  home- 
stead attempts  to  alienate  the  land  ipso  facto  he  abandons  its  charac- 
ter as  a  homestead,  and  at  the  same  instant  the  liens  of  existing 
judgments  against  him  attach  to  the  property,  and  the  purchaser  must 
therefore  take  it  charged  with  such  liens.**'    This  view  is  based 

son,  15  Kan.  595,  22  Am.  Rep.  272:  Bartholomew  y.  Hook,  23  Gal.  278;  Riz 
V.  McHenry,  7  Cal.  89;   Elston  v.  Robinson,  21  Iowa,  532. 

1B9  Kellennan  v.  Aultman  (C.  C)  30  Fed.  888.  Compare  Horbach  y.  Smiley, 
54  Neb.  217,  74  N.  W.  6*23. 

ISO  Bliss  y.  Clark,  39  HI.  596,  89  Am.  Dec.  330;  McDonald  v.  Crandall.  43 
111.  231.  92  Am.  Dec.  112.  But  in  Virginia,  It  is  said  that  the  lien  of  a  Judg- 
ment which  attached  before  the  homestead  was  claimed  will  have  priority, 
after  the  abandonment  of  the  homestead,  over  a  deed  of  trust  or  mortgage 
executed  during  the  occupancy  of  the  land  as  a  homestead.  Blose  v.  Bear, 
87  Va.  177,  12  S.  E.  294,  11  L.  R.  A.  705. 

i«i  Ackley  v.  Chaml>erlain,  16  Cal.  181,  76  Am.  Dec.  516;  Marriner  y.  Smith, 
27  Cal.  649;  Green  v.  Marks,  25  111.  222. 

i«2  Kellerman  v.  Aultman  (C.  C.)  30  Fed.  888;  Eaton  y.  Ryan,  5  Neb.  47; 
State  Bank  y.  Carson,  4  Neb.  498;  Moore  y.  Granger,  30  Ark.  574;  Jackson 
v.  Allen,  30  Ark.  110;  Folsom  y.  Carli,  5  Minn.  335  (Gil.  264),  80  Am.  Dec. 
429;  Tillolson  y.  Millard,  7  Minn.  513  (Gil.  419),  82  Am.  Dec.  112;  Hoyt  v. 
Howe,  3  Wis.  752,  62  Am.  Dec.  705;  Whitworth  v.  Lyons,  39  Miss.  467.  Com- 
pare Roberts  y.  Robinson,  49  Neb.  717,  68  N.  W.  1035,  59  Am.  St.  Rep.  567. 

(667) 


§425  LAW  OF  JIJDGMBNT&  (Cb.  16 


I  424.    Exempt  Property. 

In  the  natare  of  things,  a  judgment  cannot  operate  as  a  lien  upon 
any  property  which  is  by  law  exempt  from  seizure  and  sale  on  exe- 
cution. Under  a  statute  providing  that  judgments  shall  be  liens  on 
real  estate  subject  to  execution,  where  the  entire  property  of  a  resi- 
dent householder  at  the  time  of  the  rendition  of  a  judgment  is  less  in 
value  than  the  amount  allowed  by  law  as  exempt  from  execution,  and 
so  continues,  the  judgment  does  not  become  a  lien  on  his  real  estate, 
and  his  grantee,  takes  it  free  from  any  lien  of  the  judgment  or  execu- 
tion issued  upon  it.^** 

425.    Homeitead   Property. 

Since  land  held  as  a  homestead  is  not  liable  to  levy  and  sale  on 
execution,  it  is  not  bound  by  the  lien  of  a  judgment  against  the 
owner,  except  as  to  the  surplus  value  of  the  property,  if  any,  over 
the  amount  hmited  as  a  homestead  exemption.  Hence,  while  the 
land  retains  this  character,  the  owner  will  not  be  deterred  from  pla- 
cing incumbrances  upon  it,  or  even  alienating  it,  by  the  fact  that 
there  are  judgments  outstanding  against  him.^*^  But  a  judgment- 
lien  against  property  acquired  before  the  filing  of  a  declaration  of 
homestead  by  the  debtor  and  his  wife,  or  before  the  debtor's  mar- 
riage, or  otherwise  before  the  land  acquires  the  character  of  a  home- 
stead, subjects  such  property  to  sale  under  execution;  such  lien 
cannot  be  divested  by  any  subsequent  act  of  the  owners.*  ••     And  if 

iBo  Dumbould  y.  Rowley,  113  Ind.  353,  15  N.  E.  463;  King  y.  Easton,  135 
Ind.  a53,  35  N.  E.  181. 

loTAckley  v.  Chamberlain,  16  Cal.  181.  76  Am.  Dec.  516;  McI>onald  t. 
Badger,  23  Gal.  400,  83  Am.  Dec.  123;  Sullivan  v.  Hendrickson,  64  ObL  258; 
Monroe  v.  May,  9  Kan.  466;  Gapen  v.  Stephenson,  17  Kan.  613;  Lorimer  t. 
Marshall,  44  111.  App.  645;  Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Schwenk.  54  Neb. 
r>57,  74  N.  W.  1063;  Traders*  Nat.  Bank  v.  Schorr.  20  Wash.  1,  54  Pac.  513. 
72  Am.  St.  Rep.  17;  Lamb  v.  Shays,  14  Iowa,  567;  Wiggins  t.  Chance,  54 
111.  175;  Black  v.  Epperson,  40  Tex.  162;  Briggs  v.  Briggs,  45  Iowa,  318; 
Grimes  v.  Portman,  99  Mo.  229,  12  S.  W.  792. 

i58KennerIey  v.  Swartz.  83  Va.  704.  3  S.  E.  348;    Smith  v.  Richardff.  2 

Idaho,  4G4,  21  Pac.  419,  citing  Freem.  Ex'ns.  $$  249.  249d,  249e;    Thoiup. 

Homest.  &  Exemp.  §  317;    Smyth.  Homest.  §  'So;    Piatt.  Mar.    Woin,   »    . .: 

Kelly  V.  Dill,  23  Minn.  435;   Bullene  v.  Hiatt,  12  Kan.  98;   Robinson  v.  Wll- 

(G66) 


Ch.   16)  THB  LIBN  OF  JXJDOMBNTS.  §  425 

the  property  loses  its  character  as  a  homestead,  it  then  becomes  sub- 
ject to  existing  and  future  judgments.  Thus,  under  a  law  which 
enacts  that  the  homestead  exemption  shall  exist  ''so  long  as  the  same 
shall  be  owned  and  occupied  by  the  debtor  as  such  homestead/'  a 
judgment  against  the  owner  of  land  is  a  lien  which  remains  dormant 
while  the  land  is  so  occupied,  but  it  becomes  living  and  operative  as 
soon  as  the  homestead  occupation  is  abandoned.**^®  In  that  event,  all 
existing  judgments  will  attach  together  as  of  the  date  of  the  aban- 
donment, but  without  regard  to  their  seniority,  and  priority  will  be- 
long to  the  creditor  who  first  manifests  his  diligence  by  levying  on 
the  property.***^  It  is  evident  that  if  an  abandonment  of  the  home- 
stead character  of  the  land  precedes  the  debtor's  alienation  of  it  by 
such  an  interval  of  time  that  the  two  acts  cannot  be  considered  as 
parts  of  the  same  transaction,  the  liens  of  existing  judgments  will 
attach,  and  the  property  will  go  to  the  purchaser  burdened  with  such 
liens.**^  But  a  more  difficult  question  arises  in  case  the  relinquish- 
ment of  the  homestead  consists  in  the  very  act  of  selling  it.  Accord- 
ing to  the  decisions  in  some  of  the  states,  if  the  owner  of  a  home- 
stead attempts  to  alienate  the  land  ipso  facto  he  abandons  its  charac- 
ter as  a  homestead,  and  at  the  same  instant  the  liens  of  existing 
judgments  against  him  attach  to  the  property,  and  the  purchaser  must 
therefore  take  it  charged  with  such  liens.**'    This  view  is  based 

son,  15  Kan.  505.  22  Am.  Rep.  272;  Bartholomew  y.  Hook,  23  Gal.  278;  Rix 
V.  McHenry,  7  Cal.  89;   Elston  v.  Robinson,  21  Iowa,  532. 

iB»  Kellennan  v.  Aultman  (C.  C)  30  Fed.  888.  Compare  Horbach  v.  Smiley,. 
54  Neb.  217,  74  N.  W.  623. 

i«o  Bliss  V.  Clark,  39  HI.  596,  89  Am.  Dec.  330;  McDonald  v.  Orandall.  43 
lU.  231,  92  Am.  Dec.  112.  But  in  Virginia,  It  is  said  that  the  lien  of  a  Judg- 
ment which  attached  before  the  homestead  was  claimed  will  have  priority, 
after  the  abandonment  of  the  homestead,  over  a  deed  of  trust  or  mortgage 
executed  during  the  occupancy  of  the  land  as  a  homestead.  Blose  v.  Bear, 
87  Va.  177,  12  S.  E.  294,  11  L.  R.  A.  705. 

lei  Ackley  v.  Chamberlain,  16  Cal.  181,  76  Am.  Dec.  516;  Marriner  v.  Smith, 
27  Cal.  649;  Green  v.  Marks,  25  111.  222. 

i«2  KeUerman  v.  Aultman  (C.  C.)  30  Fed.  888;  Eaton  v.  Ryan,  5  Neb.  47; 
State  Bank  v.  Carson,  4  Neb.  498;  Moore  v.  Granger,  30  Ark.  574;  Jackson 
▼.  Allen,  30  Ark.  110;  Folsom  v.  Carli,  5  Minn.  3S5  (Gil.  264),  80  Am.  Dec. 
420;  Tillotson  v.  Millard.  7  Minn.  513  (GH.  419),  82  Am.  Dec.  112;  Hoyt  v. 
Howe.  3  Wis.  752.  62  Am.  Dec.  705;  Whitworth  v.  Lyons,  39  Miss.  467.  Com- 
pare Roberts  v.  Robinson,  49  Neb.  717,  68  N.  W.  1035,  59  Am.  St.  Rep.  567. 

(G67) 


§  425  LAW  OF  JUD6M8NT&  (Cb.  16 

S  424.    Ezeatpt  Property. 

In  the  nature  of  things,  a  judgment  cannot  operate  as  a  lien  upon 
any  property  which  is  by  law  exempt  from  seizure  and  sale  on  exe- 
cution. Under  a  statute  providing  that  judgments  shall  be  liens  on 
real  estate  subject  to  execution,  where  the  entire  property  of  a  resi- 
dent householder  at  the  time  of  the  rendition  of  a  judgment  is  less  in 
value  than  the  amount  allowed  by  law  as  exempt  from  execution,  and 
so  continues,  the  judgment  does  not  become  a  lien  on  his  real  estate, 
and  his  grantee. takes  it  free  from  any  lien  of  the  judgment  or  execu* 
tion  issued  upon  it.*** 

425.    Homestead   Property* 

Since  land  held  as  a  homestead  is  not  liable  to  levy  and  sale  on 
execution,  it  is  not  bound  by  the  lien  of  a  judgment  against  the 
owner,  except  as  to  the  surplus  value  of  the  property,  if  any,  over 
the  amount  limited  as  a  homestead  exemption.  Hence,  while  the 
land  retains  this  character,  the  owner  will  not  be  deterred  from  pla- 
cing incumbrances  upon  it,  or  even  alienating  it,  by  the  fact  that 
there  are  judgments  outstanding  against  him.**^  But  a  judgment- 
lien  against  property  acquired  before  the  filing  of  a  declaration  of 
homestead  by  the  debtor  and  his  wife,  or  before  the  debtor's  mar- 
riage, or  otherwise  before  the  land  acquires  the  character  of  a  home- 
stead, subjects  such  property  to  sale  under  execution;  such  lien 
(pannot  be  divested  by  any  subsequent  act  of  the  owners.*  ••     And  if 

160  Dumbould  y.  Rowley,  113  Ind.  353,  15  N.  E.  463;  King  y.  Eaaton.  X3& 
Ind.  353.  35  N.  B.  181. 

loTAckley  v.  Chamberlain,  16  Cal.  181,  76  Am.  Dec.  616;  McDonald  t. 
Badger,  23  Cal.  400,  83  Am.  Dec.  123;  SulUvan  y.  Hendrlckson,  54  Oal.  258: 
Monroe  y.  May,  9  Kan.  466;  Gapen  y.  Stephenson,  17  Kan.  613;  Lorimer  t. 
Marshall,  44  111.  App.  645;  Farmers*  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  y.  Schwenk,  54  Neb. 
057,  74  N.  W.  1063;  Traders'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Schorr,  20  Wash.  1,  54  Pac.  513, 
72  Am.  St.  Rep.  17;  Lamb  y.  Shays,  14  Iowa,  567;  Wiggins  y.  Chance,  54 
111.  175;  Black  y.  Epperson,  40  Tex.  162;  Briggs  y.  Briggs,  45  Iowa,  318; 
Grimes  v.  Portman,  99  Mo.  229,  12  S.  W.  792. 

issKennerley  y.  Swartz,  83  Va.  704,  3  S.  E.  348;  Smith  y.  Richards,  2 
Idaho,  404,  21  Pac.  419,  citing  Freem.  Ex'ns,  {{  219,  249d,  240e;  Tbomp. 
Homest.  &  Exemp.  §  317;  Smyth,  Homest.  $  35;  Piatt,  Mar.  uoni.  >  ... 
Kelly  v.  Dill,  23  Minn.  435;   Bullene  y.  Hlatt,  12  Kan.  08;   Robinson  v.  \VU- 

(6G6) 


Ch.  16)  THB  LIBN  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  425 

the  property  loses  its  character  as  a  homestead,  it  then  becomes  sub- 
ject to  existing  and  future  judgments.  Thus,  under  a  law  which 
enacts  that  the  homestead  exemption  shall  exist  ''so  long  as  the  same 
shall  be  owned  and  occupied  by  the  debtor  as  such  homestead,"  a 
judgment  against  the  owner  of  land  is  a  lien  which  remains  dormant 
while  the  land  is  so  occupied,  but  it  becomes  living  and  operative  as 
soon  as  the  homestead  occupation  is  abandoned.*  °*  In  that  event,  all 
existing  judgments  will  attach  together  as  of  the  date  of  the  aban- 
donment, but  without  regard  to  their  seniority,  and  priority  will  be- 
long to  the  creditor  who  first  manifests  his  diligence  by  levying  on 
the  property.*®®  It  is  evident  that  if  an  abandonment  of  the  home- 
stead character  of  the  land  precedes  the  debtor's  alienation  of  it  by 
such  an  interval  of  time  that  the  two  acts  cannot  be  considered  as 
parts  of  the  same  transaction,  the  liens  of  existing  judgments  will 
attach,  and  the  property  will  go  to  the  purchaser  burdened  with  such 
liens.*®*  But  a  more  difficult  question  arises  in  case  the  relinquish- 
ment of  the  homestead  consists  in  the  very  act  of  selling  it.  Accord- 
ing to  the  decisions  in  some  of  the  states,  if  the  owner  of  a  home- 
stead attempts  to  alienate  the  land  ipso  facto  he  abandons  its  charac- 
ter as  a  homestead,  and  at  the  same  instant  the  liens  of  existing 
judgments  against  him  attach  to  the  property,  and  the  purchaser  must 
therefore  take  it  charged  with  such  liens.***    This  view  is  based 

son,  15  Kan.  505,  22  Am.  Rep.  272;  Bartholomew  v.  Hook,  23  Gal.  278;  Rix 
V.  McHenry,  7  Cal.  89;   Elstoii  v.  Robinson,  21  Iowa.  532. 

i5»  Kellerman  v.  Aultman  (C.  C)  30  ¥e±  888.  Compare  Horbach  v.  Smiley, 
54  Neb.  217,  74  N.  W.  623. 

leo  Bliss  V.  Clark,  39  111.  596,  89  Am.  Dec.  330;  McDonald  v.  CrandaH.  43 
111.  231,  92  Am.  Dec.  112.  But  In  Virginia.  It  is  said  that  the  lien  of  a  judg- 
ment which  attached  before  the  homestead  was  claimed  will  have  priority, 
after  the  abandonment  of  the  homestead,  over  a  deed  of  trust  or  mortgage 
executed  during  the  occupancy  of  the  land  as  a  homestead.  Blose  v.  Bear, 
87  Va.  177,  12  S.  E.  294,  11  L.  R.  A.  705. 

181  Ackley  v.  Chamberlain,  16  Cal.  181,  76  Am.  Dec.  516;  Marrlner  v.  Smith, 
27  Cal.  649;  Green  v.  Marks,  25  111.  222. 

162  Kellerman  v.  Aultman  (C.  O.)  30  Fed.  888;  Eaton  v.  Ryan,  5  Neb.  47; 
State  Bank  v.  Carson,  4  Neb.  498;  Moore  v.  Granger,  30  Ark.  574;  Jackson 
v.  Allen,  30  Ark.  110;  Folsom  v.  Carli,  5  Minn.  335  (Gil.  2W),  80  Am.  Dec. 
429;  Tlllolson  v.  Millard.  7  Minn.  513  (Gil.  419),  82  Am.  Dec.  112;  Hoyt  v. 
Howe,  3  Wis.  752,  62  Am.  Dec.  705;  Whitworth  v.  Lyons,  39  Miss.  467.  Com- 
pare Roberts  v.  Robinson,  49  Neb.  717,  68  N.  W.  1035,  59  Am.  St.  Rep.  567. 

(667) 


§  431  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.    16 

from  G.  and  the  original  grantor.  Upon  this  state  of  facts  it  was 
held  that  judgments  rendered  against  G.  prior  in  date  to  such  con- 
veyance were  liens  on  his  interest  in  the  land,  but  as  to  those  ren- 
dered subsequent  to  that  period,  H.  was  entitled  to  relief  by  perpet- 
ual injunction  against  them.*** 

S  431.    Partaersldp   Prope?|]r. 

A  judgment  against  a  partnership  for  a  firm  debt,  entered  by  con- 
fession of  all  the  partners,  is  a  lien  upon  the  partnership  real  es- 
tate.**^ And  so  also  a  judgment  of  a  separate  creditor  against  one 
of  the  partners  will  be  a  lien  on  the  firm  property,  although  subordi- 
nated to  all  claims  against  the  partnership  as  such.  Where  realty 
is  purchased  with  partnership  funds  and  held  and  used  for  partnership 
purposes,  though  the  legal  title  is  in  the  name  of  individual  partners, 
the  statutory  lien  of  a  judgment  of  a  separate  creditor,  on  such  land, 
must  be  postponed  to  the  equity  of  a  firm  creditor  whose  claim  ac- 
crued during  the  continuance  of  the  partnership,  although  subsequent 
to  the  time  that  such  statutory  lien  attached.  Such  lien  is  good  only 
to  the  extent  of  the  residuary  interest  of  the  partners  in  the  land, 
after  the  satisfaction  of  all  claims  against  the  partnership.* ••  Con- 
versely, a  judgment  against  the  firm  is  a  lien  on  the  separate  real 
estate  of  the  individual  partners.***  But  where,  upon  a  hearing  be- 
fore an  auditor  appointed  to  determine  the  validity  of  certain  claims 
against  an  estate,  a  judgment  obtained  against  the  firm  of  which 
the  decedent  was  a  member  was  filed,  it  was  held  that  as  the  record 
did  not  show  the  names  of  the  individual  partners,  the  judgment 
could  not  be  charged  upon  the  individual  property  of  the  decedent.*** 

186  Hollida  V.  Shoop,  4  Md.  465,  59  Am.  Dec.  88. 

18T  In  re  Codding  (D.  C.)  9  Fed.  849. 

188  Page  y.  Thomas,  43  Ohio  St.  38,  1  N.  E.  79,  54  Am.  Rep.  788.  And  see, 
also,  Melly  v.  Wood,  71  Pa.  488,  10  Am.  Rep.  719;  Hoskfns  v.  Johnson.  24 
Ga.  G25. 

i80Cummings'  Appeal,  25  Pa.  268,  64  Am.  Dec.  695;  Pitts  y.  Spotts,  86 
Va.  71,  9  S.  E.  501.  A  contrary  view  is  maintained  in  Stadler  t.  Allen,  44 
Iowa,  198.  And  see  Baldridge  t.  Eason.  99  Ala.  516,  13  South.  74.  IndlTld- 
ual  creditors  of  a  partner  are  not  entitled  to  priority  of  payment  out  of  pro- 
ceeds of  his  indiyidual  real  estate,  as  against  a  Judgment  creditor  of  the 
firm,  who,  by  docketing  his  Judgment,  has  acquired  a  prior  lien  on  such  real 
estate.    MacDonald  y.  MacDonald,  62  Hun,  621,  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  280l 

100  Fox's  Appeal  (Pa.)  11  AtL  228. 

(G72) 


Ch.   16)  THE  LIEN  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  432 


i  432.    After-Aaquirod  Property. 

In  most  of  the  states  it  is  held  that  the  lien  of  a  judgment  attaches 
to  and  binds  land  acquired  by  the  debtor  after  the  rendition  and  dock- 
eting of  the  judgment ;  it  being  either  so  provided  by  statute,  or  by 
following  the  doctrines  of  the  English  common  law.***.  But  in  two 
states — Pennsylvania  and  Ohio — it  has  been  firmly  settled  from  a 
very  early  day  that  the  lien  will  not  attach  to  after-acquired  lands 
unless  they  are  levied  on,  and  consequently  the  debtor  can  make 
clear  title  to  such  lands  in  the  interval,  and  execution  cannot  be  levied 
on  lands  which  the  defendant  got  by  purchase  after  the  judgment,  if 
he  aliened  them  in  good  faith  before  levy.*®*  And  this  doctrine  has 
also  been  accepted  in  a  few  other  states.**'  By  the  English  common 
law  the  lien  attached  to  subsequently  acquired  realty  without  a 
levy.***  In  Illinois,  the  rule  is  that  where  an  execution  is  issued  upon 
a  judgment  within  one  year  from  its  rendition,  the  judgment  will  be- 
come a  lien  upon  any  real  estate  the  judgment-defendant  may  acquire 
subsequent  to  its  rendition  and  within  seven  years,  but  if  no  execution 

i»i  Ridgely  v.  Gartrell»  3  H.  &  McH.  (Md.)  449;  McClung  v.  Beirne,  10 
Leigh  (Va.)  3at,  34  Am.  Dec.  739;  Handly  v.  Sydenstrlcker,  4  W.  Va.  605; 
Ralston  v.  Field,  32  Ga.  453;  Harrison  v.  Roberts,  6  Fla.  711;  Moody  v.  Har- 
per, 25  Miss.  484;  Jenlsins  v.  Gowen,  37  Miss.  444;  Cayce  v.  Stovall,  50  Miss. 
396;  Thulemeyer  v.  Jones,  37  Tex.  500;  Barron  v.  Tiiompson,  54  Tex.  235; 
Franke  v.  Lone  Star  Brewing  Cto.,  17  Tex.  Civ.  App.  9.  42  S.  W.  801;  Green- 
way  V.  Cannon,  3  Humph.  (Tenn.)  177,  39  Am.  Dec.  161;  Chapron  v.  Cassa- 
day.  3  Humph.  (Tenn.)  661;  Davis  v.  Benton,  2  Sneed  (Tenn.)  665;  Babcock 
V.  Jones.  15  Kan.  296;  Bank  v.  Watson,  13  Ark.  74;  Ridge  v.  Prathef,  1 
Blackf.  (Ind.)  401;  Curtis  v.  Root,  28  lU.  367;  Wales  v.  Bogue.  31  111.  464; 
Steele  v.  Taylor,  1  Minn.  274  (Gil.  210);  CJolt  v.  Du  Bois,  7  Neb.  391;  Duell 
T.  Potter.  51  Neb.  241,  70  N.  W.  932;  Lessert  v.  Sieberling,  59  Neb.  309,  80 
N.  W.  900;    Leonard  v.  White  Cloud  Ferry  Co.,  11  Neb.  340,  7  N.  W.  538. 

!•«  Colhoun  V.  Snider,  6  Bin.  (Pa.)  135;  Bundle  v.  Ettwein,  2  Yeates  (Pa.) 
23;  Packer's  Appeal,  6  Pa.  277;  Lea  v.  Hopkins,  7  Pa.  402;  Moorehead  v.  Mc- 
Klnney,  9  Pa.  265;  Waters'  Appeal,  35  Pa.  523,  78  Am,  Dec.  354;  Ross*  Ap- 
peal, 100  Pa.  82:  Torrence  v.  Torrence,  24  Pa.  Oo.  Ct.  R.  408;  Roads  v. 
Symmes,  1  Ohio,  281,  13  Am.  Dec.  621;  McCormick  v.  Alexander,  2  Ohio,  65; 
Stiles  V.  Murphy,  4  Ohio,  92. 

i»3  Han'lngton  v.  Sharp,  1  G.  Greene  (Iowa)  131,  48  Am.  Dec.  3(J5.  See 
H.  Herman  SawmiU  Co.  v.  Martin,  22  Ky.  Law  Sep.  651,  68  S.  W.  524. 

184  4  Kent,  Comm.  ♦435-6. 

1  LAW  JUDG.-43  (673) 


§   433  XiAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  16 

is  issued  thereon  within  a  year,  no  lien  will  exist.**'  The  lien  of  a 
judgment  attaches  to  after-acquired  property  from  the  time  the  title 
vests  in  the  debtor,  but  does  not  relate  back  to  the  date  of  the  judg- 
ment. Hence  the  liens  of  all  judgments  in  existence  when  the  debtor 
acquires  the  property  attach  simultaneously  and  equally.*** 

§  433.    Eqnitable  Estates  and  Interests. 

At  common  law,  and  generally  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  expressly 
giving  to  it  that  effect,  the  lien  of  a  judgment  does  not  extend  to  an 
equitable  interest  held  by  the  judgment-debtor  in  the  land.**^  For 
instance,  a  judgment  is  not  a  lien  upon  a  possible  equitable  interest 
of  the  debtor  in  a  tract  of  land,  which  interest  arises  out  of  a  mistake 
made  by  the  sheriff,  in  selling  the  land  on  execution,  as  to  the  quan- 
tity contained  in  the  tract.***  In  many  of  the  states,  statutes  have 
been  enacted  changing  the  common  law  rule  and  assimilating  legal 
and  equitable  estates  for  purposes  of  lien  and  execution.  But  in 
cases  of  ambiguity  in  such  acts,  or  lack  of  specific  reference  to  equi- 
table interests,  considerable  doubt  has  been  expressed  as  to  the  pro- 
priety of  departing  from  the  ancient  rule.  Thus  in  Oregon,  although 
the  statute  enacts  that  a  judgment  shall  be  "b,  lien  on  all  real  prop- 
erty of  the  judgment-debtor  not  exempt  from  execution,  owned  by 
him  in  the  county  at  the  time  of  docketing,"  yet  it  is  held  that  a 
judgment  at  law  is  not  a  lien  upon  an  equitable  title  in  land.***  On 
the  other  hand,  in  Maryland,  it  is  considered  that  a  judgment  is  a 

195  Breed  v.  Gorham,  108  lU.  81. 

196  Cayce  y.  StovaU,  50  Miss.  396.    See  infra,  §  460. 

i*T  Morsell  v.  First  Nat  Bank,  91  U.  S.  357,  23  L.  Ed.  436;  Brandies  r. 
Coclirane,  112  U.  S.  344,  5  Sup.  Gt  194,  28  L.  Ed.  760;  WithneU  y.  Conrtl&nd 
Wagon  Co.,  25  Fed.  372;  Jackson  y.  Chapin,  5  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  485;  Bogart  v. 
Perry,  1  Johns.  Ch.  52;  TruesdeU  y.  Lehman,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  218,  20  Atl.  391; 
Slpley  y.  Wass,  49  N.  J.  Eq.  463,  24  Ati.  233;  Dixon  v.  Dixon.  81  N.  C.  323; 
Powell  y.  Knox,  16  Ala.  364;  Klrkwood  y.  Koester,  11  Kan.  471;  Baird  T. 
Kirtland,  8  Ohio,  21;  Russell  y.  Houston,  5  Ind.  180;  Jetfriefl  y.  Sherbam.  21 
Ind.  112;  Harrington  y.  Sharp,  1  G.  Greene  (Iowa)  131,  48  Aul  Dec.  365: 
Trask  y.  Green.  9  Mich.  3r)S;  Nessler  y.  Neher,  18  Neb.  649,  26  N.  W.  471: 
AVoolworth  V.  Parker,  57  Neb.  417.  77  N.  W.  1000;  Smith  v.  Ingles,  2  Or.  43; 
Bloomfleld  v.  Humason,  11  Or.  229,  4  Pac.  332. 

i9»  Russell  y.  Houston,  5  Ind.  180.  See,  a  similar  case,  Terrell  t.  Prestell, 
\j8  Ind.  86. 

100  Smith  y.  Ingles,  2  Or.  43. 

(674) 


Ch.   16)  THE  LIEN  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  438 

legal  lien  upon  an  equitable  estate  in  lands,  and  binds  them  from  its 
date,  on  the  ground  that  the  statute  makes  no  distinction  between 
the  two  species  of  interests,*^®  Under  the  statutes  of  Iowa,  judg- 
ments of  superior  courts  are  liens  upon  all  interests  of  the  judg- 
ment-debtor in  r^al  estate,  whether  legal  or  equitable,  ^nd  it  is  im- 
material, as  between  the  parties,  whether  such  interest  appears  of 
record  or  not.*^*  In  Pennsylvania  the  same  result  is  reached,  but 
without  the  aid  of  a  statute.  The  reason  is  thus  stated  by  the  court : 
"At  common  law  an  equitable  estate  is  not  bound  by  a  judgment  or 
subject  to  an  execution,  but  the  creditor  may  have  relief  in  chan- 
cery. We  have  no  court  of  chancery,  and  have  therefore,  from  ne- 
cessity, established  it  as  a  principle  that  both  judgments  and  execu- 
tions have  an  immediate  operation  on  equitable  estates."  *^* 

Although  at  common  law,  and  so  far  as  regards  the  competence  of 
the  law  courts,  without  the  aid  of  a  statute,  there  is  no  method  of 
making  a  judgment-lien  effectual  upon  a  purely  equitable  estate  in 
the  land  held  by  the  debtor,  yet  it  has  always  been  held  by  the  courts 
of  chancery  that,  for  their  purposes,  such  interests  were  just  as  much 
bound  by  the  judgment  as  any  legal  estate,  and  could  be  subjected  to 
its  satisfaction  through  the  processes  of  equity.*®'  "Courts  of  chan- 
cery, in  adjusting'  the  conflicting  rights  of  creditors,  following  by 
analogy  the  principles  of  the  common  law,  will,  as  far  as  equity  and 
good  conscience  permit,  regard  a  judgment  as  a  lien  upon  the  equi- 
table real  estate  of  the  debtor."  *®*  In  Tennessee  a  judgment  cre- 
ates a  lien  upon  equitable  estates  in  land,  to  be  asserted  in  a  court  of 
chancery,  co-extensive  with  the  lien  which  at  law  exists  upon  legal 
estates,  and  which  will  in  like  manner  attach  to  after-acquired  equita- 
ble realty."* 

200  McMechen  v.  Marman,  8  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  57. 

201  Lathrop  v.  Brown,  23  Iowa,  40;   Blain  v.  Stewart,  2  Iowa,  378. 
202Auwerter  v.  Mathlot,  9  Serg.  &  B.  402;    Carkhuff  v.  Anderson,  3  Bin. 

4;  Semple  v.  Mown,  4  Phlla.  85. 

203  Unknown  Heirs  v.  Kimball,  4  Ind.  546,  58  Am.  Dec.  638;  Lee  v.  Stone, 
5  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  1,  23  Am.  Dec.  589;  Haleys  v.  Williams,  1  Leigh  (Va.)  140, 
19  Am.  Dec.  743;  Mlchaux's  Adm'r  v.  Brown,  10  Grat.  (Va.)  612;  Roach  v. 
Bennett,  24  Miss.  98. 

204  Lee  V.  Stone,  5  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  1,  23  Am.  Dec.  589. 

205  Chapron  v.  Cassaday,  3  Ilumph.  661.  See  Weaver  v.  Smith,  102  Tenn. 
47,  50  S.  W.  771. 

(675) 


§  434  l4AW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.    16 


I  434.    Equity  of   Bedenptton. 

It  is  generally  held  that  a  judgment  creates  a  lien  upon  an  equity 
of  redemption  of  real  estate  from  the  time  it  is  recorded.**^  And  a 
judgment-debtor  cannot,  by  conveying  his  equity  of  redemption  to  a 
prior  mortgagee,  cut  off  the  lien  of  a  judgment.*^'  So  a  judgment 
obtained  against  the  owner  of  an  equity  of  redemption  in  mortgaged 
premises,  after  a  decree  of  foreclosure  but  before  a  sale  of  the  prem- 
ises by  the  master,  has  an  equitable  lien  upon  the  surplus  moneys  pro- 
duced by  the  sale  under  the  decree ;  but  it  is  otherwise  if  the  judg- 
ment was  docketed  subsequent  to  the  sale.*®*  Where,  after  making 
a  contract  for  the  sale  of  land,  the  vendor  assigns  his  claim  for  the 
purchase-money  and  conveys  the  legal  title  to  another  as  collateral 
security  for  a  debt,  such  conveyance  is  in  legal  effect  a  mortgage, 
and  the  vendor  has  a  right  of  redemption,  or  a  resulting  trust,  which 
is  bound  by  the  lien  of  a  judgment  subsequently  rendered  against 
him.*®*  But  in  a  case  where  a  court  of  chancery,  upon  a  creditor's 
bill,  had  ordered  the  debtor  to  convey  his  realty  to  a  receiver  ap- 
pointed by  the  court,  it  was  held  that  a  judgment  recovered  against 
the  debtor  after  his  conveyance  to  the  receiver  did  not  create  a  lien 
upon  the  lands. *^®  And  in  general,  where  a  debtor  has  conveyed  an 
estate  to  trustees  upon  an  active  trust,  so  that  there  remains  in  him 
nothing  more  than  a  reversionary  equitable  interest,  and  afterwards 
a  judgment  is  recovered  against  him,  its  lien  will  not,  at  common 
law,  attach  to  such  remaining  interest  of  the  debtor.  But  in  equity 
the  judgment-creditor  is  not  without  remedy.  For,  by  filing  a  bill 
for  that  purpose,  he  may  secure  a  quasi  lien,  which  will  give  him  an 
interest  in  any  surplus  which  may  remain  from  the  estate  after  dis- 
cos Bank  y.  Morsell,  1  McArthur,  155;  Julian  y.  Beal,  26  Ind.  220,  89  Am. 
Dec.  460;  Taylor  v.  ComeUus,  60  Pa.  187;  Macauley  v.  Smith,  132  N.  Y.  524. 
30  N.  R  097.    Compare  Blair  v.  diamblin,  39  lU.  526,  80  Am.  Dec.  322. 

207  Walters  v.  Defeubaugh,  90  IlL  241. 

208  Sweet  ▼.  Jacocks,  6  Paige,  355,  31  Am.  Dec.  252.    See  SulliTan  t.  Leckie, 
60  Iowa,  326,  14  N.  W.  355. 

209  Klnports  v.  Boynton,  120  Pa.  306,  14  Atl.  135.  6  Am.  St.  Rep.  706. 

210  Chautauqua  Co.  Bank  v.  White,  6  N.  Y.  230,  57  Am.  Dec.  442. 

(676) 


Ch.    16)  THE  LIEN  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  434 

charging  the  trusts  and  which  would  result  to  the  grantor's  benefit, 
paramount  to  that  of  the  latter.^^^  Thus,  at  common  law,  a  judg- 
ment is  not  a  lien  upon  real  estate  which,  before  the  judgment  was 
rendered,  had  been  conveyed  to  trustees  with  a  power  of  sale  to  se- 
cure the  payment  of  debts  of  the  grantor  described  in  the  deed  of 
trust.^^*  But  in  many  of  the  states,  under  the  statutes  or  settled 
precedents  of  the  courts,  before  adverted  to,  which  have  changed  the 
ancient  rule  in  regard  to  legal  liens  upon  equitable  estates,  it  is  now 
held  that  the  resulting  trust  in  favor  of  the  grantor  in  such  a  trust 
deed  is  property  which  will  be  bound  by  the  lien  of  a  subsequent 
judgment,  and  that  such  lien  may  be  enforced  by  levy  and  sale  of  the 
land  subject  to  the  incumbrance  of  the  trust  deed.'^"  After  a  sale, 
however,  under  the  deed  of  trust,  the  debtor's  right  to  redeem  is 
removed  from  the  land  and  is  represented  by  the  surplus  in  the 
hands  of  the  trustee,  against  which  such  judgment-lien  is  continued 
and  may  be  enforced  in  equity."^*  But  if  the  judgment-creditor  suf- 
fers a  sale  to  be  made  under  the  deed  of  trust,  without  getting  out 
execution  on  his  judgment  or  otherwise  giving  the  trustee  actual 
notice  of  his  claim,  and  the  latter  pays  over  the  surplus  in  his  hands, 
after  satisfying  the  objects  of  the  trust,  to  the  grantor,  the  judgment- 
creditor  cannot  recover  in  an  action  against  the  trustee,  for  the 
latter  is  not  bound  to  search  the 'records  for  possible  liens  upon  the 
fund."» 

Where  the  statutes  authorize  the  sale  of  land  for  delinquent  taxes, 
but  provide  that  the  owner  shall  have  a  limited  period  within  which 
to  redeem  from  such  sale,  his  interest  in  the  property,  during  the 

811  Freedman's  Savings  Co.  v.  Earle,  110  U.  S.  710,  4  Sup.  Ct.  226,  28  L. 
Ed.  301;  Brandies  v.  Cochrane,  112  U.  S.  344,  5  Sup.  Ct.  194,  28  L.  Ed.  760; 
McFerran  v.  Davis,  70  Ga.  661;  Schroeder  v.  Gurney,  10  Hun,  413;  Chau- 
tauqua Co.  Bank  v.  White,  6  N.  T.  236,  57  Am.  Dec.  442. 

212  Moreell  V.  Bank.  91  U.  S.  357,  23  L.  Ed.  436;  Marlow  v.  Johnson,  31 
Miss.  128.     See  Johnston  v.  Lemmonds,  109  N.  C.  643,  14  S.  E.  86. 

213  Trimble  v.  Hunter,  104  N.  C.  120,  10  S.  E.  291;  Hale  v.  Home,  21  Grat. 
(Va.)  112;  Pahlman  v.  Shumway,  24  III.  127;  Cook  v.  Dillon,  9  Iowa,  407, 
74  Am.  Dec.  354. 

21*  Cook  V.  Dillon,  9  Iowa,  407,  74  Am.  Dec.  354. 

216  Warner  v.  Veltch,  2  Mo.  App.  459;  Cook  v.  Dillon,  9  Iowa,  407,  74  Am. 
Dec.  354. 

(677) 


§   486  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  16 

running  of  such  period,  is  subject  to  the  lien  of  judgments  rendered 
against  him.*^* 

I  435.    Judgment  against  Tmstee. 

A  trustee  cannot  bind  land  held  under  the  trust  by  a  confession  of 
judgment.  Tlie  lien  resulting  from  such  judgment  will  attach  to 
nothing  but  the  personU  interest,  if  any,  which  the  trustee  may 
have  in  the  estate.^^^  But  a  trustee  '^wte^  without  the  knowledge  of 
his  cestui  que  trust,  purchases  real  estate,  takes  the  tMe  m  M^  ^wn 
name,  and  pays  part  of  the  consideration  with  trust  funds  in  his 
hands  and  gives  his  own  note  and  mortgage  for  the  remainder,  has 
an  interest  in  the  land  upon  which  a  judgment  against  him  will  attach 
as  a  lien.*^* 

I  436*    Iiand  l&eld  imdar  m  Powev*    > 

If  land  is  held  by  one  under  a  power  of  appointment  which  he 
might  exercise  for  his  own  benefit,  it  is  generally  held  that  he  has 
such  an  interest  in  the  estate  as  will  be  bound  by  the  lien  of  a  judg- 
ment against  him.*^*    In  a  case  in  New  York,  it  appeared  that  cer- 

21  •  McNeill  V.  Garter,  57  Ark.  579,  22  8.  W.  M;  Appeal  of  Singer  (Pa.)  7 
Ati.  800;  HiU  ▼.  Gordon,  45  Fed.  276^  It  is  otherwise  where  land  is  abso- 
lutely forfeited  to  the  state  for  nonpayment  of  taxes.  Wiant  ▼.  Hays,  38 
W.  Va.  681,  18  S.  E.  807,  23  L.  R.  A.  82. 

217  Huntt  V.  Townshend,  31  Md.  336,  100  Am.  Dec.  63. 

218  Martin  v.  Baldwin,  30  Minn.  537,  16  N.  W.  449. 

210  Brandies  v.  Cochrane,  112  U.  S.  344,  5  Sup.  Ct.  194,  28  L.  Ed.  760.  Id 
this  case  Matthews,  J.,  said:  "Prior  to  the  enactment  of  1  &  2  Vic.  c.  110. 
it  was  settled  in  England  that -at  law  a  Judgment  against  the  party  baring 
a  power  of  appointment,  with  the  estate  vested  in  him  until  and  In  default 
of  appointment,  was  defeated  by  the  subsequent  execution  of  the  power  in 
favor  of  a  mortgagee.  Doe  v.  Jones,  10  Barn.  &  O.  459;  Tunstall  v.  Trappes, 
3  Sim.  286,  300.  And  it  was  held  to  be  immaterial  that  the  purchaser  had 
notice  of  the  Judgment;  Eaton  v.  Sanxter,  6  Sim.  517;  or  that  a  portion  of 
the  purchase-money  was  set  aside  as  an  indemnity  against  it.  Skeeles  v. 
Shearly,  8  Sim.  153,  s.  c.  on  appeal,  3  Mylne  &  C.  112.  In  that  case.  Sir 
John  Leach,  the  vice-chancellor,  decided  that  the  effect  of  the  transmlstfion 
of  the  estate  by  appointment  was,  .that  the  appointee  takes  it  In  the  same 
manner  as  if  it  had  been  limited  to  him  by  the  deed  under  which  the  appoint- 
or takes  in  default  of  appointment,  and,  consequently,  free  and  disconnected 
from  any  interest  which  the  appointor  had  in  the  tenements  in  default  of  ap* 
pointment;  that,  as  the  appointee  is  in  no  sense  the  assignee  of  the  appointor, 

(678) 


Ch.  16)  THB  UBN  OF  JXJDOMBNT8.  §  ^^7 

tain  lands  were  devised  to  trustees  upon  certain  conditions,  and  with 
a  further  provision  by  which  the  cestui  que  trust,  S.,  was  empowered 
and  authorized  to  convey  and  dispose,  by  his  last  will  and  testament, 
of  all  the  said  land,  or  any  part  thereof,  and  to  limit  and  appoint 
the  uses  thereof  in  such  manner  as  he  might  deem  proper.  In  case 
S.  should  die  without  having  made  such  will  and  appointment,  then 
remainder  in  fee  to  his  surviving  issue.  S.  during  his  life  conveyed 
several  portions  of  the  land  to  different  grantees,  and  died  without 
surviving  issue.  It  was  held  that  the  power  originally  given  to  S. 
was  a  general  power,  of  which  he  might  have  the  exclusive  benefit, 
and  that,  having  exercised  it,  his  interest  in  the  property  was  to  be 
deemed  assets,  upon  which  judgments  recovered  against  him  were 
equitable  liens.**^ 

§  437.    J'ndgmant  asain*t  Cestui  Qna  Tnut. 

The  equitable  estate  or  interest  of  a  cestui  que  trust  in  a  dry  or 
passive  trust  merely,  is  liable  to  execution  and  sale  on  a  judgment 
recovered  against  him.**^  But  in  this  country  generally,  in  the 
absence  of  a  statute  changing  tjje  rule  of  the  common  law,  a  judg- 
ment is  not  a  lien  on  the  interest  or  estate  of  the  beneficiary  in  an 
active  trust,  nor  is  there  any  remedy  at  law  to  enforce  the  payment 
of  a  judgment  out  of  such  interest  or  estate.***  The  creditor  may 
indeed  obtain  relief  upon  a  bill  in  equity,  but  the  ground  of  the  juris- 
diction is  not  that  of  a  lien  or  charge  arising  by  virtue  of  the  judg- 
ment itself,  but  of  an  equity  to  enforce  satisfaction  of  the  judgment 

he  cannot  be  affected  by  JudgmeYits  which  affect  only  the  estate  and  inter- 
est of  the  appointor,  and,  that  being  so,  the  circumstance  of  his  having  notice 
of  such  Judgments  is  immaterial.  The  statute  of  1  &  2  Vic.  a  110,  altered 
the  law  in  this  respect,  by  making  Judgments  an  actual  charge  on  the  debt- 
or's property,  where  he  has,  at  the  time  the  Judgment  is  entered  up,  or  at 
any  time  afterward,  any  disposing  power  over  it,  which  he  might,  without 
the  assent  of  any  other  person,  exercise  for  his  own  benefit;  so  that  it  would 
continue  to  bind  the  property,  notwithstanding  any  appointment  2  Sugd. 
Powers  (7tb  Load.  Ed.)  33;  Burt  Real  Prop.  (8th  Lond.  Ed.)  283;  Hotham 
T.  Somerville,  9  Beav.  63." 
S20  Tallmadge  v.  Sill,  21  Barb;  34. 

221  Doe  dem.  McMullen  v.  Lank,  4  Houst.  pel.)  648. 

222  Flanagin  y.  Daws,  2  Houst  (Del)  476;  Beckett  v.  Dean,  57  Miss.  232. 

(679) 


§  437  LAW  OF  JUD6MSNT3.  (Ch.  16 

by  means  of  an  equitable  execution.**'  In  an  early  Virginia  case,  it 
appeared  that  a  deed  of  marriage  settlement  vested  certain  real  estate 
in  a  trustee,  in  trust  to  pay  the  wife  an  annuity  out  of  the  profits, 

228  Freedman's  Sayings  &  Trust  Co.  y.  Earle,  110  U.  S.  710,  4  Snp.  Ct.  226. 
28  L.  Ed.  301.  In  dellyerlng  the  opinion  of  the  court  in  this  case,  ^latthews, 
J.,  obseryed:  "At  common  law  executions  upon  judgments  could  not  be  lev- 
ied upon  estates  merely  equitable,  because  courts  of  law  did  not  recognise 
any  such  titles  and  could  not  deal  with  them.  They  could  not  be  levied  upon 
the  estate  of  the  trustee  when  the  Judgment  was  against  the  cestui  que  trust 
for  tlie  same  reason;  and  when  the  Judgment  was  against  the  trustee,  if  his 
le^al  estate  should  be  levied  on,  the  execution-creditor  could  acquire  no  ben* 
eflcial  interest,  and  if  the  leyy  tended  injuriously  to  affect  the  interest  of  the 
cestui  que  trust,  the  latter  would  be  entitled  to  relief,  by  injunction  or  other- 
wise, in  equity.  Lewin,  Trusts,  181,  186;  2  Spence,  £q.  Jur.  39.  But  as 
courts  of  equity  regarded  the  cestui  que  trust  as  the  true  and  benefldal 
owner  of  the  estate,  to  whose  uses,  according  to  the  terms  pf  the  trust,  the 
legal  title  was  made  subservient,  so  in  its  eyes  the  estate  of  the  cestui  que 
trust  came  to  be  invested  with  the  same  incidents  and  quaUties  which  in  a 
court  of  law  belonged  to  a  legal  estate,  so  far  as  consistent  with  the  preser- 
vation and  administration  of  the  trust  This  was  by  virtue  of  a  principle  of 
analogy,  adopted  because  courts  of  equity  were  unwilling  to  interfere  with 
the  strict  course  of  the  law,  except  so  far  as  was  necessary  to  execute  the 
Just  intentions  of  parties,  and  to  prevent  the  forms  of  law  from  being  made 
the  means  and  instruments  of  w^rong,  injustice,  and  oppression.  Thus  equi- 
table estates  were  held  to  be  assignable  and  could  be  conveyed  or  devlAed, 
were  subject  to  the  rules  of  descent  applicable  to  legal  estates,  to  the  ten- 
ancy by  the  curtesy,  though  not  to  dower,  by  an  anomalous  exception  after- 
wards corrected  by  statute  3  &  4  Will.  4,  c.  1(^;  and  were  ordinarily  gov- 
erned by  the  rules  of  law  which  measure  the  duration  of  the  enjoyment  or 
regulate  the  devolution  or  transmission  of  estates;  so  that,  in  general,  wliat- 
ever  would  be  the  rule  of  law,  if  it  were  a  legal  estate,  was  appUed  by  the 
court  of  chancery  by  analogy  to  a  trust  estate.  1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  o02. 
When  the  object  of  the  bill  is  to  obtain  satisfaction  of  the  Judgment  by  a 
sale  of  the  equitable  estate,  it  must  be  alleg'ed  that  execution  has  been  issued. 
This  is  not  supposed  to  be  necessary  wholly  on  the  ground  of  showing  that 
the  judgment-creditor  has  exhausted  his  remedy  at  law;  for,  if  so,  it  would 
be  necessary  to  show  a  return  of  the  execution  unsatisfied,  which,  however, 
is  not  essential.  Lewin,  Trusts,  513.  But  the  execution  must  be  sued  out; 
for  if  the  estate  sought  to  be  subjected  is  a  legal  estate,  and  subject  to  be 
taken  In  execution,  the  ground  of  the  Jurisdiction  in  equity  is  merely  to  aid 
the  le;ral  right  by  removing  obstacles  in  the  way  of  its  enforcement  at  law 
(Joiies  y.  Green,  1  Wall.  330,  17  L..  Ed.  553);  and  if  the  estate  is  equitable 
merely,  and  therefore  not  subject  to  be  levied  on  by  an  execution  at  law.  the 
Judgment-creditor  is  bound,  nevertheless,  to  put  himself  in  the  same  postti<ui 
as  if  the  estate  were  legal,  because  the  action  of  tlie  court  converts  the  estate. 
so  as  to  make  it  subject  to  uu  execution,  as  if  it  were  legal.    The  ground  of 

(680) 


Oh.   16)  THB  LIBN  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  438 

and,  subject  to  the  annuity,  in  trust  for  the  grantor's  son.  The 
annuitant  being  yet  alive,  a  creditor  of  the  son  recovered  judgment 
against  him  and  brought  a  bill  in  equity  to  subject  the  son's  equi- 
table interest  in  the  estate  to  the  debt.  It  was  held  that  such  equi- 
table interest  could  not  be  taken  in  execution  at  law,  but  that  it  was 
bound  by  the  judgment  in  equity,  and  would  be  applied  to  the  satis- 
faction of  the  debt;  but  as  the  annuitant  was  yet  living  and  could 
not  be  compelled  to  take  a  g^oss  sum  in. satisfaction  of  the  annuity, 
and  as  the  trustee  was  to  hold  the  subject  and  pay  the  annuity  out 
of  the  profits,  equity  ought  not  to  direct  an  out  and  out  sale  of  the 
debtor's  interest  subject  to  the  annuity,  but  ought  only  to  direct  the 
application  of  the  surplus  of  profits  as  they  accrue,  after  paying  the 
annuity,  to  the  debt.^**  In  Indiana,  judgments  are  by  statute  liens 
on  lands  held  in  trust  for  the  judgment  debtor  in  their  chronological 
order,  and  a  junior  judgment  obtains  no  priority  by  a  decree  in 
equity  subjecting  the  lands  to  execution  to  satisfy  it,  where  the  plain- 
tiff in  the  senior  iudgment  is  not  a  party.* ^* 

§  438.    Interest  of  Vendor  nnder  Ezeentory  Contract. 

Where  the  owner  of  land  executes  an  agreement  for  the  sale  and 
conveyance  of  the  same,  he  continues  to  be  the  legal  owner  so  long 
as  any  part  of  the  purchase-money  conditioned  in  the  contract  re- 
mains unpaid,  and  his  interest  in  the  estate  (which  is  the  fee,  subject 
to  the  equitable  right  of  the  vendee)  is  bound  by  the  lien  of  a  judg- 

the  Jurlsdletloii,  therefore,  is  not  that  of  a  Hen  or  charge  arising  by  virtue 
of  the  Judgment  itself,  but  of  an  equity  to  enforce  satisfaction  of  the  Judg- 
ment by  means  of  an  equitable  execution.  And  this  it  effects  by  a  sale  of 
the  debtor's  interest  subject  to  prior  incumbrances,  or  according  to  circum- 
stances, of  the  whole  estate,  for  distribution  of  the  proceeds  of  sale  among 
all  the  incumbrancers  according  to  the  order  in  which  they  may  be  entitled 
to  participate.  Sharpe  v.  Earl  of  Scarborough,  4  Yes.  538.  It  is  to  be  noted, 
therefore,  that  the  proceeding  is  one  instituted  by  the  Judgment-creditor  for 
his  own  interest  alone,  unless  he  elects  to  file  the  bill  also  for  others  in  a 
like  situation,  with  whom  he  chooses  to  make  common  cause;  and  as  no 
specific  lien  arises  by  virtue  of  the  Judgment  and  execution  alone,  the  right 
to  obtain  satisfaction  out  of  the  specific  property  sought  to  be  subjected  to 
sale  for  that  purpose  dates  from  the  filing  of  the  bill." 

22*  Coutts  v.  Walker,  2  Leigh  (A'a.)  268. 

22 B  Maxwell  v.  Vaught,  06  Ind.  136. 

(081) 


§   438  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   16 

ment  duly  docketed  against  him  after  the  execution  of  the  agreement, 
but  before  the  execution^  a  deed ;  and  on  a  sale  under  such  judg- 
ment, the  MkctOFs  vendee  succeeds  to  the  precise  situation  of  the 
original  vendor,  and  becomes  entitled  to  require  and  receive  payment 
of  the  balance  of  the  purchase-money.***  Since,  however,  the  lien 
of  a  judgment  attaches  only  to  the  real  and  effective  interest  of  the 
debtor,  and  is  subject  to  all  prior  rights  and  equities,  it  can  never 
operate  to  pass  any  greater  or  more  extensive  estate  than  the  debtor 
himself  could  have  transferred  by  his  voluntary  alienation.  Hence, 
in  the  case  supposed,  the  equitable  right  of  the  vendee  to  require  a 
conveyance  upon  fulfilling  his  part  of  the  contract  is  not  cut  out  or 
set  aside  by  the  attaching  of  the  judgment-lien.  No  matter  into 
whose  hands  the  legal  title  may  pass  by  sale  under  execution,  the 
vendee's  claim  remains  the  same.  And  the  execution  purchaser's 
interest  is  limited  to  the  amount  of  purchase-money  remaining  due, 
after  payment  of  which  he  must  convey  the  legal  title.**'  In  this 
divided  condition  of  the  title,  judgments  against  vendor  and  vendee 

2s«  Minneapolis  &  St.  Lonls  R.  Go.  v.  Wilson,  25  Minn.  382;  Young  v.  Dev- 
rles,  31  Grat  (Ya.)  304;  Stewart  v.  Coder,  11  Pa.  90;  Ware  v.  Jackson,  10 
Ga.  452;  Gear  v.  Lockridge,  9  Ind.  92;  McMullen  v.  Wenner,  16  Serg.  &  R. 
(Pa.)  18,  16  Am.  Dec.  543;  Fasholt  v.  Reed,  16  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  266;  Lefferson 
V.  DaUas,  20  Ohio  St.  68;  Fllley  v.  Duncan,  1  Neb.  134,  93  Am.  Dec.  337; 
Uhl  V.  May,  5  Neb.  157;  Courtnay  v.  Parker,  16  Neb.  311,  20  N.  W.  120  (8. 
c.  21  Neb.  582.  33  N.  W.  262);  Olander  v.  Tighe,  43  Neb.  344.  61  N.  W.  633; 
Wehn  v.  FaU,  55  Neb.  547,  76  N.  W.  13,  70  Am.  St.  Rep.  397;  Goolbangh  v. 
Roemer,  30  Minn.  424,  15  N.  W.  869;  WeUs  v.  Baldwin,  28  Minn.  406,  10  N. 
W.  427.  Per  contra,  Woodward  v.  Dean,  46  Iowa,  499;  Hampson  v.  Edelen. 
2  Har.  &  J.  (Md.)  64,  3  Am.  Dec.  530;  Georgetown  v.  Smith,  4  Cranch.  C.  C. 
93,  Fed.  Gas.  No.  5,347;  Moore  t.  Byers,  65  N.  0.  240;  Money  ▼.  Dorsey,  7 
Smedes  &  M.  15. 

3  27  Filley  y.  Duncan,  1  Neb.  134.  93  Am.  Dec.  337;  Moyer  y.  Hlnman,  17 
Barb.  137.  "The  equitable  title  of  the  vendee  in  a  contract  for  the  purchase 
of  land,  made  In  good  faith  and  for  a  full  and  adequate  consideration,  ia  su- 
perior to  the  lien  of  a  Judgment-creditor  whose  Judgment  is  recovered  with 
notice,  actual  or  constructive,  of  such  contract.  The  Judgment  Is  a  technical 
lien  upon  the  land,  subject  to  the  contract,  because  the  legal  title  rests  in  the 
vendor,  but  to  be  enforced  only  against  the  Interest  of  the  latter  to  the  extent 
of  the  unpaid  purchase-money.  Upon  the  fulfillment  of  the  contract  by  the 
parties  thereto  such  lien  ceases,  and  is  as  effectually  cut  out  as  If  the  deed 
had  been  executed  at  the  date  of  the  contract.  The  judgment-debt^xr,  hav- 
ing no  lien,  cannot  afterwards  apply  to  a  court  of  equity  to  redeem  from  a 
prior  mortgage."    BerryhlU  y.  Potter,  42  Minn.  279,  44  N.  W.  251. 

(682) 


Ch.   16)  THB  LIEN  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  438 

respectively,  by  their  different  creditors,  bind  the  right  of  each  in  the 
land,  whether  legal  or  equitable.**®  Now  it  is  evident  that  three 
cases  may  arise,  according  to  the  situation  of  the  parties  in  reference 
to  the  payment  of  purchase-money  at  the  date  of  the  docketing  of  the 
judgment.  For  either  the  whole  of  the  price  may  have  been  paid  at 
that  time,  or  none  of  it,  or  a  part  only.  And  these  three  cases,  though 
presenting  somewhat  different  features,  are  all  govfxaed  by  tlie  same 
general  principle.  In  the  first  place,  if  the  whole  of  the  purchase- 
money  has  been  paid  by  the  vendee  at  the  time  judgment  is  entered 
Bgamst  the  vendor,  the  lien  will  indeed  attach  upon  the  title  still 
remaining  in  the  latter  (until  the  execution  of  the  deed),  but  it  could 
pass  no  real  or  beneficial  interest  in  the  land.  The  purchaser  at 
sheriff's  sale  under  the  judgment  would  acquire  nothing  but  the 
naked  legal  title,  which  he  would  hold  in  trust  for  the  vendee,  and 
which  he  must  convey  upon  demand  or  at  the  time  stipulated  in  the 
agreement.**"  Similarly,  if,  by  the  agreement,  the  whole  purchase- 
money  is  to  be  applied  to  the  discharge  of  judgments  prior  to  the 
agreement,  and  is  so  applied,  a  judgment  subsequent  to  the  agree- 
ment is  not  binding  on  the  land.**®  In  the  next  place,  although  none 
of  the  purchase-money  has  been  paid,  yet  the  contract  of  sale  will 
give  the  vendee  an  equitable  interest  in  the  estate  which  is  not  to  be 
displaced  by  a  subsequent  judgment-lien  against  the  vendor.***  The 
purchaser  at  an  execution  sale  under  the  judgment  would  take  the 
legal  title,  but  he  would  take  it  charged  with  the  contract  of  sale, 
and  could  demand  from  the  vendee  no  more  than  the  stipulated 
price.  In  the  third  place,  if  a  part  of  the  purchase-money  has  been 
paid  and  the  purchaser's  note  given  for  the  balance,  the  Hen  of  a 
judgment  will  still  attach  to  the  vendor's  interest.***  Yet  if  the  note 
given  for  such  balance  of  price  is  passed  away,  before  maturity,  to  a 
bona  fide  holder  for  value  without  notice,  and  is  duly  paid  in  his 

228  Chahoon  ▼.  HoUenback,  16  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  425,  16  Am.  Dec.  587. 

22»Manley  v.  Hunt,  1  Ohio,  257;  Lounsbury  v.  Pnrdy,  11  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
400;  Thomas  v.  Kennedy,  24  Iowa,  397,  95  Am.  Dec.  740.  See  Brown  ▼.  Bnt- 
ler,  87  Va.  621,  13  S.  E.  71. 

2«o  Foster  v.  Foust  2  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  11. 

231  Hampson  v.  Edelen,  2  Har.  &  J.  (Md.)  64,  3  Am.  Dec.  530;  Lane  v. 
Ludlow,  2  Paine,  591,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  8,052. 

28S  Bell  V.  McDuffie,  71  0&.  264. 

(083) 


§   439  LAW  OF  JUD0MBNT8.  (ptk.  16 

hands  (no  injunction  preventing  either  of  these  acts  being  done),  then 
the  vendor  has  no  longer  any  interest  in  the  property,  and  the  lien  is 
gone.^**  An  exception  to  the  rule  is  sometimes  based  upon  the  fact 
of  possession  in  the  vendee.  Thus  it  has  been  held  that  land  in  the 
possession  of  a  vendee  under  a  valid  contract  to  purchase  cannot  be 
sold  as  the  property  of  the  vendor  under  judgments  which  did  not 
obtain  liens  until  after  the  contract  was  made.***  At  any  rate,  it  ap- 
pears to  be  well  settled  that  the  docketing  of  the  judgment  is  not 
notice  of  the  lien  to  the  purchaser  in  possession,  since,  after  he  has 
taken  his  contract  for  the  purchase,  he  is  not  bound  to  keep  the  run 
of  the  dockets;  and  payments  subsequently  made  by  him  to  the 
judgment-debtor,  pursuant  to  the  contract,  without  actual  notice  of 
the  judgment,  are  valid  as  against  its  lien  upon  the  land.*'*  If  the 
premises  are  sold  at  sheriff's  sale,  on  a  judgment  against  the  vendor 
entered  before  the  date  of  the  contract  for  a  sum  exceeding  the 
amount  the  vendee  was  to  pay,  the  latter  is  entitled  to  the  surplus,  in 
preference  to  a  creditor  of  the  vendor  whose  judgment  was  obtained 
after  the  date  of  the  articles.*** 

§  439.    Interest   of   Vendee   nnder  Ezeentivry  ContvAet. 

In  regard  to  the  interest  of  the  vendee  in  an  executory  contract 
for  the  sale  of  lands,  it  must  be  remembered  that  his  estate  is  equi- 
table merely,  the  legal  title  remaining  in  the  vendor,  and  conse- 
quently, at  common  law,  it  would  not  be  subject  to  levy  and  sale  on 
execution.    But,  as  we  have  already  seen,**^  the  common  law  rule 

28S  Riddle's  Appeal  (Pa.)  7  Atl.  232;  Logan's  Adm'r  v,  PanniU,  90  Va.  11, 
17  S.  E.  744.  In  Moore  v.  Byers,  65  N.  C.  240,  It  was  beld  that  where  a  ven- 
dor of  land  receives  part  of  the  purchase-money  and  takes  notes  for  the  res- 
idue thereof,  retaining  the  title  until  such  notes  shall  be  paid,  and  after- 
ward a  Judgment  is  obtained  against  him,  and  he  then  dies,  such  judgment 
will  not  be  a  lien  upon  the  land  or  the  notes  in  the  hands  of  his  executors, 
but  the  notes,  when  collected,  will  be  assets  for  the  payment  of  debts. 

234  Adickes  v.  Lowry,  15  S.  C.  128;  Blwell  v.  Hitchcock,  41  Kan.  130.  21 
Pac.  109.  And  see  Snyder  v.  Botkin,  37  W.  Va.  355,  16  S.  B.  591;  Hecker 
V.  Mourer,  8  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  43. 

23  5  Moyer  v.  Hinman,  13  N.  Y.  180;  Parks  v.  Jackson,  11  Wend.  (N.  T.) 
442,  25  Am.  Dec.  650. 

236  Siter's  Appeal,  26  Pa.  178;   Grouse's  Appeal,  28  Pa.  139. 

S37  Supra,  S  433. 

684) 


Ch.   16)  THE  LIEN  OF  JVDOMBNT8.'  §  439 

as  to  judgment-liens  on  equitable  interests  has  been  modified  in  many 
of  the  states  by  statutes.  Hence  it  is  held,  in  several  jurisdic- 
tions, that  where  a  vendee  of  land  has  paid  part  of  the  purchase- 
money  and  holds  a  bond  for  title,  but  has  not  yet  received  a  convey- 
ance, he  has  acquired  such  an  interest  in  the  land  as  will  be  bound  by 
the  lien  of  a  judgment  against  him.*'*  Of  course  an  execution- 
purchaser  of  such  interest  would  succeed  to  the  precise  situation  of 
the  judgment-debtor,  and  would  be  entitled  to  demand  a  deed  from 
the  original  vendor  upon  complying  with  the  terms  of  the  original 
contract,  but  would  take  no  higher  or  greater  interest.  On  the  other 
hand,  in  some  few  of  the  states,  either  in  pursuance  of  the  common 
law  doctrine  or  by  express  provision  of  the  statutes,  it  is  held  that 
the  interest  of  a  debtor  in  a  contract  for  the  purchase  of  lands  can- 
not be  sold  on  an  execution  against  him,  but  the  remedy  of  the  judg- 
ment-creditor is  by  a  suit  in  equity,  after  his  execution  at  law  has 
been  returned  unsatisfied.^'®  It  is  also  held  that  a  conveyance  with 
covenant  of  title  made  by  a  grantor  who  has  a  bond  tor  a  deed,  and 
before  he  obtains  the  legal  title,  vests  the  legal  title  in  the  grantee 
eo  instante  when  the  grantor  obtains  it,  and  there  is  no  space  of  time 
in  which  the  Hen  of  a  judgment  obtained  against  such  grantor,  after 
the  conveyance  was  made,  can  attach  against  the  land.**® 

SB 8  Adams  v.  Harris,  47  Miss.  144;  Foster's  Appeal,  3  Pa.  79;  Auwerter 
v.  Mathlot,  9  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  402;  Oatlin  v.  Robinson,  2  Watts  (Pa.)  373; 
Ralston  v.  Field,  32  Ga.  453;  Harp  v.  Patapsco  Guano  CJo.,  99  Ga.  752,  27 
S.  E.  181;  McFarland  t.  Fish,  34  W.  Ya.  54S,  12  S.  E.  548;  Damron  y.  Smith, 
37  W.  Va.  580,  16  S.  E.  807;  Davis  v.  Vass,  47  W.  Va.  811,  35  S.  E.  826; 
Coombs  T.  Jordan,  3  Bland  Old.)  284,  22  Am.  Dec.  236;  Jackson  y.  Parker,  9 
Cow.  (N.  Y.)  73;  Russell's  Appeal,  15  Pa.  319;  Pugh  v.  Good,  3  Watts  &  S. 
(Pa.)  56,  37  Am.  Dec.  534;  Waters'  Appeal,  35  Pa.  523,  78  Am.  Dec.  354;  Rand 
v.  Garner,  75  Iowa,  311,  39  N.  W.  515. 

23»  Ellsworth  V.  Cuyler,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.)  418;  Boughton  v.  Bank  of  Orleans, 
2  Barb.  Ch.  (X.  Y.)  458;  Cooper  v.  Cutshall,  Smith  (Ind.)  128;  Gentry  v.  Alli- 
son, 20  Ind.  481;  Roddy  v.  Elam,  12  Rich.  Eq.  (S.  C.)  343.  And  see  Sweeney 
V.  Pratt,  70  Oonn.  274.  38  Atl.  182,  66  Am.  St.  Rep.  101;  Rosenberger  v.  Jones, 
118  Mo.  559,  24  S.  W.  203;  Nelson  v.  Turner,  97  Va.  54,  33  S.  E.  390;  Mer- 
chants' Nat.  Bank  v.  Eustls.  8  Tejc.  Civ.  App.  350,  28  S.  W.  227. 

240  Lamprey  v.  Pike  (C.  C.)  28  Fed.  30.  Compare  Van  Camp  v.  Peeren- 
boom,  14  Wis.  65. 

(685) 


§  439a  LAW  OF  JUDOMENTB.  (Gh.  16 


I  439a.    Sale  of  Irfuid  After  Entry  of  ^ndsmoat. 

When  the  lien  of  a  judgment  has  once  attached  to  land,  it  cannot 
be  divested  by  any  voluntary  alienation  of  the  property  by  the  owner 
thereof;  that  is  to  say,  any  purchaser  from  the  judgment  debtor, 
who  has  actual  or  constructive  notice  of  the  lien  of  the  judgment  on 
the  property,  will  take  the  estate  charged  with  the  lien.**^  And  if 
a  purchaser  has  knowledge  that  a  judgment  debtor  is  the  real  owner 
of  the  land,  he  will  take  it  subject  to  the  lien  of  the  judgment,  al- 
though the  record  title  was  in  a  trustee  when  the  judgment  was 
rendered,  and  the  sale  was  not  fraudulent  as  to  creditors.***  But  he 
will  take  the  property  subject  only  to  the  amount  called  for  by  the 
judgment  as  recorded,  and  not  subject  to  an  usurious  increase  under 
a  subsequent  agreement  between  the  creditor  and  the  judgment 
debtor.***  Of  course  the  land  is  charged  only  with  the  liens  of  such 
judgments  as  existed  at  the  time  of  the  purchase.  A  bona  fide  sale 
of  real  property  for  a  fair  price,  with  no  fraudulent  intent,  leaves  no 
rights  in  the  vendor  subject  to  the  lien  of  a  judgment  subsequently 
recovered.***  But  where  the  lien  of  an  existing  judgment  is  specif- 
ically excepted  from  the  covenants  of  warranty  in  the  deed,  the  pur- 
chaser cannot  insist  that  his  grantor's  chattels  shall  be  exhausted 
before  the  land  is  sold  on  execution  under  the  judgment.*** 

Where  the  statutes  provide  that  the  lien  of  a  judgment  shall  endure 
only  for  a  limited  period,  or  shall  expire,  or  cease  to  be  effective, 
after  the  lapse  of  a  certain  number  of  years,  this  limitation  will  enure 
to  the  benefit  of  a  purchaser  from  the  judgment  debtor,  so  that,  at 
the  end  of  the  statutory  time,  such  purchaser's  title  will  be  freed 
from  the  lien  of  the  judgment.**'     Where  a  sale  of  a  judgment  debt- 

241  Lessert  v.  Sleberling.  59  Neb.  309.  80  N.  W.  900;  First  Nat  Bank  v. 
Hays  (Idaho)  61  Tac.  287;  Miimich  v.  Shaffer,  135  Ind.  034,  34  N.  £1  967; 
Stewart  v.  Perkins,  110  Mo.  600.  19  S.  W.  989. 

2*2  Armstrong  v.  Elliott,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  41.  48  S.  W.  605. 

2"  Bensimer  v.  Fell,  35  W.  Va.  15, 12  S.  E.  1078,  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  774. 

244  Appeal  of  State  Line  &  S.  R.  Co.,  171  Pa.  12.  32  Atl.  1126. 

24  6  Wollam  V.  Brandt,  56  Neb.  527,  76  N.  W.  1081. 

246  McCaskill  v.  Graham,  121  N.  0.  190,  28  S.  E.  264.  In  Georgia,  a  statute 
provides  that,  when  any  person  has  purchased  real  property,  in  good  faitb 
and  for  a  valuable  consideration,  and  has  been  in  possession  of  the  same 

(GSG) 


Ch.   16)  THE  LIEN  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §  440 

or's  property  is  effected  by  order  of  court,  it  is  competent  for  the 
court  (as  to  all  parties  within  its  jurisdiction  and  whose  claims  are 

■ 

before  it)  to  direct  that  the  sale  shall  be  made  free  from  all  incum- 
brances, and  that  the  existing  liens  shall  be  transferred  to  the  fund 
arising  from  the  sale.^*^ 

What  has  been  said  of  voluntary  conveyances  in  fee  by  a  judgment 
debtor  applies  equally  to  conveyances  by  way  of  mortgage.  When 
a  judgment  for  money  has  attached  as  a  lien  upon  real  estate,  a  mort- 
gage thereafter  executed  will  not  invest  the  mortgagee  with  a  lien 
superior  to  that  of  the  judgment.**' 

§  440.    Eitates  sneoasiiTaly  CoiiTayad. 

A  judgment-creditor  cannot  enforce  his  lien  against  the  land  of  a 
subsequent  purchaser  so  long  as  there  are  other  lands  of  the  debtor 
sufficient  to  satisfy  the  judgment.**"  And  where  lands  subject  to  the 
lien  of  a- judgment  have  been  sold  or  incumbered  by  the  owner  at 
different  times  to  different  purchasers,  there  is  no  contribution  among 
the  successive  purchasers,  but  the  various  tracts  are  liable  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  judgment  in  the  inverse  order  of  their  alienation 
or  incumbrance,  the  land  last  sold  being  first  chargeable.  In  such 
case,  the  equities  between  the  several  purchasers  are  equal,  yet 
the  first  purchaser,  having  the  prior  equity,  is  preferred.**®    A  judg- 

for  four  years,  it  shall  be  discharged  from  the  lien  of  any  judgment  against 
his  grantor.  Civ.  Code  Ga.  §  5355.  See  this  statute  construed  in  Hale  v. 
Robertson,  100  Qa.  168,  27  S.  £.  937;  Blalock  v.  Denham,  85  6a.  646,  11  S. 
B.  1038. 

247  Nelson  y.  Jenks,  51  Minn.  108,  52  N.  W.  1081.  Judgments  rendered  be- 
fore a  void  assignment  for  the  benefit  of  creditors  and  the  appointment  of  a 
receiver  become  liens  on  the  lands  of  the  assignor.  Younger  y.  Massey,  41 
S.  a  50,  19  S.  E.  125. 

248  Beach  v.  Reed,  55  Neb.  605,  76  N.  W.  22.  As  to  Judgment  liens  in  the 
case  of  a  deed  absolute  in  form  but  intended  as  a  security,  see  Olnaha  Goal, 
Coke  &  Ldme  Co.  v.  Suess,  54  Neb.  379,  74  N.  W.  620;  Main  v.  Bos  worth,  77 
Wis.  660,  40  N.  W.  1043;  Michael  v.  Knapp,  4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  464,  23  S.  W. 
280. 

24»  James  v.  Hubbard.  1  Paige  (N.  Y.)  228. 

280  National  Sav.  Bank  v.  Ores  well,  100  U.  S.  630,  25  L.  Ed.  713;  Relfe  v. 
Bibb,  43  Ala.  519;  McClung  v.  Beirne,  10  Leigh  (Va.)  394,  34  Am.  Dec.  739 
<oyeiTuling  Beverley  v.  Brooke,  2  Leigh  [Va.]  425);  Nailer  v.  Stanley,  10 
Serg.  &  B.  (Pa.)  450,  13  Am.  Dec  691;  Clowes  y.  Dickenson,  5  Johns.  Ch.  (N. 

(087) 


$441  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNTS.  (Cfa.  16 

ment-creditor,  having  by  his  conduct  waived  or  lost  his  right  to  sub- 
ject the  land  first  liable  to  satisfy  his  judgment,  is  not  entitled  to 
subject  the  lands  next  liable  for  the  whole  amount  of  his  judgment, 
but  only  for  the  balance  after  crediting  thereon  the  value  of  the  land 
first  liable."^ 

Part  IV.     Date  of  the  Lien. 

§  441.    Coataion  Iaw  Role. 

It  was  the  rule  of  the  common  law  (and  this  rule  still  obtahis  in 
some  of  the  states)  that  the  judgments  of  a  court  of  record  all  relate 
back  to  the  first  day  of  tlie  term  and  are  considered  as  rendered  on 
that  day ;  and  therefore  their  lien  will  attach  to  the  debtor's  realty 
from  the  beginning  of  the  term,  and  will  override  a  conveyance  or 
mortgage  made  on  the  second  'or  any  succeeding  day,  although 
actually  prior  to  the  rendition  of  the  judgment.*'^'  *'This  general 
principle  of  the  common  law,  like  many  others,  is  of  such  remote 
antiquity,  and  so  long  recognized  without  dispute,  that  the  reasons 
and  policy  on  which  it  was  founded  are,  in  a  great  degree,  left  to 
conjecture.  One  reason  is  assigned  arguendo  in  the  case  of  Wynne 
V.  Wynne  [i  Wils.  39]  cited  at  the  bar:  that  all  the  suitors  whose 
cases  are  in  such  a  situation  as  to  entitle  them  to  a  judgment  on  the 
first  day  of  the  court  ought  to  be  in  the  same  situation,  and  none  to 
have  any  advantage  over  another,  and  as  it  is  impossible  for  the 

y.)  235;  Uodgers  v.  McCluer's  Adm'rs,  4  Grat  (Va.)  81.  47  Am.  Dec.  715; 
KeUy  y.  Hamblen,  98  Va.  383,  36  S.  E.  491;  Meek  y.  Thompson,  99  Tenn. 
732,  42  S.  W.  685;  Bank  of  Hambnrg  v.  Howard,  1  Strob.  Eq.  (8.  O.)  173; 
James  v.  Hubbard,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.)  228;  Merrttt  v.  Ricliey,  97  IndL  236;  Day 
y.  Patterson,  18  Ind.  114;  Sidener  y.  White,  46  Ind.  588;  Houston  y.  Houston, 
67  Ind.  276;  Jones  v.  Myrlck's  Ex'rs,  8  Grat  (Va.)  179. 

2  51  Jones  V.  Myrick's  Ex'rs,  8  Grat.  (Va.)  179. 

s 02  Johnson  y.  Smith,  2  Burrows^  967;  Bragner  y.  Langmead,  7  Term  B. 
20;  Waghorne  y.  Langmead,  1  Bos.  &  P.  571;  Fann  y.  Atkinson,  Will.  427: 
Odes  y.  Woodward,  2  Ld.  Raym.  766;  Robinson  v.  Tonge,  3  P.  Wms.  397; 
Farley  v.  Lea.  20  N.  C.  307,  32  Am.  Dec.  680;  Foust  v.  Trice,  53  X.  C.  494; 
Harding  y.  Spivey,  30  N.  C.  63;  Skipwith's  Ex'r  y.  CJunningham,  8  Leigh  (Va.) 
271,  31  Am.  Dec.  642;  Colt  y.  Du  Bols,  7  Neb.  391;  Mutual  Assurance  Soc. 
y.  Stanard,  4  Munf.  (Va.)  539;  Brockenbrough*8  Ex*x  y.  Brockenbrousb*s 
Adm'r,  31  Grat.  (Va.)  580;  Hooton  v.  Will,  1  Dall.  450,  1  L.  Ed.  218;  Otxa* 
goss>  V.  Bank  of  Cleveland,  3  McLean,  140,  Fed.  Gas.  No.  13,571. 

(iSSS) 


/ 


Ch.  16)  THE  LIEN  QF  JUDGMENTS.  §  441 

court  to  give  judgment  in  all  such  cases  in  one  day,  the  only  means 
of  putting  them  upon  a  footing  of  equality  is  to  refer  all  given  in 
the  same  term  to  the  first  day,  and  give  them  the  same  effect  as  if 
they  were  really  so.  Another  reason  may  have  been  to  prevent 
debtors  from  withdrawing  their  property  from  the  effect  of  judg- 
ments against  them  by  alienations  made  after  it  was  known  that  in 
the  course  of  the  term  a  judgment  would  pass.  Whatever  was  the 
foundation  of  the  rule,  it  operated  uniformly  as  between  different 
creditors,  and  the  creditors  of  and  purchasers  from  the  debtor,  with- 
out any  exception,  so  far  as  I  have  been  able  to  discover,  until  the 
case  of  purchasers  was  provided  for  by  the  statute  29  Car.  2,  c.  3,  §  14, 
which  required  that  the  true  date  of  all  judgments  should  be  noted  on 
the  margin  of  the  roll,  and  provided  that  they  should  bind,  as  to  pur- 
chasers, only  from  such  date.  Before  that  statute,  judgments  con- 
fessed in  vacation,  under  powers  of  attorney  previously  given  for  that 
purpose,  related  to  the  first  day  of  the  preceding  term  and  over- 
reached intermediate  alienations.  To  remedy  this  mischief — of  al- 
lowing judgments  confessed  under  powers  of  attorney,  when  no  pre- 
vious suit  was  depending,  to  overreach  intermediate  alienations — 
was  the  chief  object  of  the  provision  of  the  statute  on  that  subject, 
as  appears  by  its  preamble.  .  .  .  But  cases  might  occur  in  which 
judgments  might  be  rendered  during  a  term  which  could  not  by 
possibility  relate  to  the  first  day ;  as  where  it  appears  that  the  plain- 
tiff's case  was  not  in  a  condition  for  a  judgment  on  the  first  day,  if 
the  court  had  been  prepared  to  hear  it,  and  some  further  proceed- 
ing was  indispensably  necessary  to  mature  his  case  for  judgment. 
Wynne  v.  Wynne,  i  Wils.  42;  Swann  v.  Broome,  3  Burrows,  1596. 
.  .  .  These  are  the  only  adjudged  cases  I  have  met  with  in  which 
exceptions  have  been  allowed  to  the  general  rule,  and  they  are 
founded  upon  obviously  good  reasons,  that  'might  very  well  apply 
to  all  cases  in  which  it  appeared  that  the  plaintiff's  case  could  not  be 
matured  for  judgment  on  the  first  day  of  the  term."  **• 

28»  CouttB  V.  Walker,  2  Leigh  (Va.)  268. 

1  LAW  JUDG.-44  (689) 


I  442  UiW  09  JUPOMSNTg.  (Ch.  16 


S  442.    Bxoeptiiuis  to  the  Bvle. 

The  principal  exceptions  to  this  rule  of  the  common  law  have 
been  already  mentioned,  in  the  decision  quoted  in  the  preceding  sec- 
tion, and  the  authorities  are  generally  in  harmony  with  the  conclu- 
sions there  reached.  Thus  it  is  agreed  that  the  rule  docs  not 
apply  to  a  judgment  rendered  during  the  term  in  a  case  which  was 
in  such  a  condition  that  the  judgment  could  not  have  been  given  on 
the  first  day  of  the  term.*'*  And  at  a  very  early  day,  it  was  held 
that,  as  between  creditors,  judgments  by  confession  do  not  relate  to 
the  preceding  term,  but  take  priority  according  to  the  times  of  their 
entry.'**  In  North  Carolina  it  has  been  adjudged  that  a  rule  of 
court,  that  all  judgments  docketed  during  the  term  "shall  be  deemed 
to  be  docketed  on  the  first  day  of  the  term,"  makes  them  relate  to 
the  first  day  even  when  the  judge  fails  to  open  court  on  that  day.*** 
But  on  the  other  hand,  in  Virginia,  it  is  considered  that  the  lien  dates 
only  from  the  first  day  on  which  the  court  is  actually  in  session.*** 
So,  in  Ohio,  a  mortgage  handed  in  for  record  on  the  first  day  of  the 
term  of  court,  but  before  the  court  actually  convened,  was  held  to 
prevail  against  the  lien  of  a  judgment  recovered  at  the  same  term. 
The  court  said:  "At  •what  time,  then,  does  a  term  of  court  begin? 
It  cannot  be  said  that  a  term  of  court  commences  before  the  judges 
authorized  to  hold  court  have  convened.  There  can  be  no  term  of 
court  unless  there  is  a  court.  If  judgments  attach  only  as  liens  from 
the  beginning  of  the  term  of  court,  they  attach  from  the  time  on  the 
first  day  of  the  term  at  which  the  court  was  duly  organized  and 
opened."  **•    As  against  intervening  purchasers,  it  may  be  regarded 

264  Swann  v.  Broome,  3  Buitows,  1596;  Yates  v.  Robertson,  80  Va.  475: 
Withers  v.  Carter,  4  Grat*  (Va.)  407,  50  Am.  Dec.  78. 

266  Welsh  V.  Murray,  4  DaU.  320,  1  L.  Ed.  850.  And  see  Hockman  v.  Hock- 
man,  93  Va.  455,  25  S.  E.  534,  57  Am.  St.  Rep.  816. 

268  Norwood  V.  Thorp,  64  N.  C.  682. 

257  Skipwith's  Ex'r  v.  Cunningham,  8  Leigh,  271,  31  Am.  Dec.  642. 

SB8  Follett  V.  HaU,  16  Ohio,  111,  47  Am.  Dec.  365;  HolUday  y.  Franklin 
Bank,  16  Ohio,  533.  The  Hen  of  a  judgment  creditor,  under  a  Judgment  ren- 
dered after  the  service  of  summons  In  a  foreclosure  suit  against  the  debtor. 
instituted  at  the  same  term  of  court.  Is  subject  to  the  decree  of  foreclosure, 
though  the  judgment^  by  force  of  the  statute,  haa  a  retroactlYe  effect  fiom 

(690) 


Ch.  16)  THE  LIBN  OF  JUDOMVNTS.  I  443 

as  settled  that  the  lien  of  a  subsequent  judgment  will  not  attach,  jtxs^ 
tice  forbidding  that  in  such  a  case  it  should  relate  back  to  a  time  ante- 
rior to  the  conveyance.***  And  in  at  least  one  state  the  common  law 
rule  has  never  been  accepted  at  all.  "The  uniform,  uninterrupted 
practice  in  Pennsylvania  for  more  than  a  century  [that  is,  a  century 
prior  to  1805]  has  been  to  consider  the  binding  eflfect  of  judgments 
upon  lands  to  take  place  only  from  the  actual  entry  of  the  judgments. 
Judgments  thus  entered  have  never  been  supposed  liable  to  be 
affected  bv  fictions  or  relations.  This  custom  has  been  used  and 
approved  since  the  first  settlement  of  the  province  and  conduces  to 
safety  and  security.  As  between  conflicting  judgment-creditors,  the 
well  known  rule  applied  to  the  truth  of  the  fact  as  to  the  entry  of  the 
judgments,  'qui  prior  est  tempore  potior  est  jure,'  must  govern."  ••* 

S  443.    Present    Statutory   Rules. 

That  the  rule  of  the  common  law,  fixing  the  date  of  the  lien  of  a 
judgment  by  relation  to  the  first  day  of  the  term,  has  been  abolished 
in  a  great  majority  of  the  states,  and  has  been  much  modified  in 
others,  will  appear  from  the  following  synopsis  of  the  present  statutes 
on  the  subject: 

In  Kansas,*"  Nebraska,*®*  Ohio,*®*  and  Wyoming,***  the  lien  at- 

the  first  day  of  the  term.  Appleby  v.  Mullaney,  7  Ohio  N.  P.  120.  Where  a 
lery  on  land  Is  made  after  the  judgment  Is  revived,  the  Hen  dates  from  the 
seizure  on  execution,  and  not  from  the  time  of  the  revivor.  Smith  v.  Hogg, 
52  Ohio  St  527,  40  N.  E.  406. 

»69  Morgan  v.  Sims,  26  Ga.  283;  Pope  v.  Brandon,  2  Stew.  (Ala.)  401,  20 
Am.  Dec.  49.  And  see  Emporia  Mut  Loan  &  Sav.  Ass'n  v.  Watson,  45  Kan. 
132,  25  Pac.  686. 

260  Welch  V.  Murray,  4  Yeates,  197. 

««i  avil  Code  Kan.  §  419;  Bowling  v.  Garrett,  .49  Kan.  504,  31  Pac.  135, 
33  Am.  St.  Rep.  377. 

2«2  Code  Civ.  Proc.  Neb.  §  477;  Ocobock  v.  Baker,  52  Neb.  447,  72  N.  W. 
582,  G6  Am.  St.  Rep.  519;  Ilayden  v.  Huff.  60  Neb.  625,  83  N.  W.  920.  A 
judgment,  not  confessed,  rendered  at  a  term  subsequent  to  that  In  which  the 
action  was  commenced,  is  superior  to  a  mortgage  or  conveyance  of  the  debt- 

2«8  Rev.  St.  Ohio,  §  5375;  Jeffrey  v.  Moran,  101  U.  S.  285,  25  L.  Ed.  785; 
Urbana  Bank  v.  Baldwin,.  3  Ohio,  65;  National  Bank  of  Columbus  v.  Ten- 
nessee Coal,  Iron  &  R.  Co.,  62  Ohio  St.  564,  57  N.  E.  450. 

20*  Rev.  St  Wyo.  S  3829;   Coad  v.  Cowhick,  9  Wyo.  316,  63  Pac.  584. 

(691) 


§443  LAW  OF  JUDOMENTS.  (Ch.  16 

taches  "from  the  first  day  of  the  term  at  which  the  judgment  is  ren- 
dered; but  judgments  by  confession  and  judgments  rendered  at  the 
same  term  during  which  the  action  was  commenced,  shall  bind  such 
lands  only  from  the  day  on  which  such  judgment  was  rendered." 

In  Virginia  and  West  Virginia,  the  lien  attaches  "at  or  after  the 
date  of  such  judgment,  or,  if  it  was  rendered  in  court,  at  or  after  the 
commencement  of  the  term  at  which  it  was  so  rendered."  *•• 

In  seven  states  and  territories  (Arkansas,  Indiana,  Iowa,  Missouri, 
New  Mexico,  North  Carolina,  and  Wisconsin),  the  lien  commences 
on  the  day  of  the  "rendition"  of  the  judgment.*** 

In  nine  states  (Colorado,  Dakota,  California,  Idaho,  Montana, 
Minnesota,  New  York,  Oregon,  and  Utah),  the  lien  of  a  judgment 
commences  from  the  date  on  which  it  is  "docketed."  **^ 

In  Alabama  and  Texas,  it  begins  from  the  date  on  which  the  judg- 
ment is  "registered."  **• 

or'8  land,  executed  after  the  commencement  of  the  term  at  which  the  Judg- 
ment Is  rendered,  though  before  the  actual  rendition  of  the  Judgment  Hoag- 
land  V.  Green,  54  Neb.  164,  74  N.  W.  424;  Norfolk  State  Bank  y.  Murphy,  40 
Neb.  735,  58  N.  W.  706,  38  L.  R.  A.  243.  A  Judgment  revived  is  a  Uen  from 
the  date  of  the  order  of  revivor.  Horbach  v.  Smiley,  54  Neb.  217,  74  N.  W. 
623. 

20  6  Code  Va.  9  3567;  New  South  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Reed,  06  Va. 
345,  81  S.  E.  514,  70  Am.  St.  Rep.  858;  Yates  v.  Robertson,  80  Va.  475;  Oode 
W.  Va.  p.  863,  9  5;  Smith  v.  Parkersburg  Co-Operative  Ass'n.  48  W.  Va.  232* 
37  S.  E.  645. 

200  Dig.  St  Ark.  1884,  p.  801,  9  3818;  Code  CivU  Proc.  Ind.  9  608;  2  Mc- 
clain's Code  Iowa  1888,  p.  1177,  9  4080;  Rev.  St.  Mo.  1880,  9  6012  (this  stat- 
ute provides  that  Judgments  shall  be  a  lien  on  lands  after  their  rendition,  but 
if  two  or  more  Judgments  are  rendered  at  the  same  term  against  the  same 
person,  their  lien  shall  commence  on  the  last  day  of  the  term.  See  Bradley 
v.  Ueffeman,  156  Mo.  653,  57  S.  W.  763;  Pullis  v.  Pullis  Bros.  Iron  Co.,  157 
Mo.  565,  57  S.  W.  1006);  Code  Civil  Proc.  N.  M.  9  2133;  Code  N.  C.  9  435; 
Rev.  St.  Wis.  1878,  9  2002.    See  Friar  v.  Ray,  5  Mo.  511. 

20T  civU  Code  Colo.  9  211;'  Code  CivU  Proc.  Dak.  9  300;  Code  CIvH  Proc. 
Cal.  9  671;  Rev.  St  Idaho  1887,  9  4457;  Comp.  St  Mont  1887,  p.  138,  9  907: 
Gen.  St  Minn.  1878,  c.  66,  9  277;  Code  Civil  Proc.  N.  Y.  9  1250;  HlM's  Ann- 
Laws  Or.  p.  342;  2  Comp.  Laws  Utah  1888,  p.  300,  9  ^14.  See  Stannis  v. 
Nicholson,  2  Or.  332. 

«08  Act  Ala.  Feb.  28»  1887,  9  1;  Rev.  St  Tex.  art  3150;  WiUia  v.  Smith, 
66  Tex.  31,  17  S.  W.  247.  See  Quinn  v.  Wiswall,.  7  Ala.  615;  AU.  C.  &  N. 
Co.  V.  State,  54  Ala.  36;  Ex  parte  Dillard.  68  Ala.  684;  Powe  v.  McLeod.  76 
Ala.  418. 

(692) 


Ch.   16)  THE  LIEN  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §  444 

In  Arizona,  from  the  day  when  the  judgment  is  "recorded  and 
indexed."  "• 

In  New  Jersey,  from  the  date  of  its  "actual  entry."  *^* 

In  Florida,  the  lien  commences  when  the  judgment  is  "entered  and 
pronounced  in  any  court."  ^^^ 

In  Pennsylvania,  the  lien  attaches  from  the  date  of  entry  or  revival 
of  the  judgment.*^* 

In  Georgia  and  Illinois,  judgments  rendered  at  the  same  term  are 
all  of  equal  date.*^* 

In  Maine,  New  Hampshire,  and  Vermont  a  judgment  is  regarded 
as  having  been  rendered  on  the  last  day  of  the  term  unless  it  appears 
by  the  record  to  have  been  rendered  on  a  different  day.*^* 

In  Maryland,  according  to  the  decisions,  "a  judgment  has  relation 
to  the  time  when  it  is  entered  up.  It  will  not  affect  any  bona  fide 
conveyance  made  for  value  before  that  time,  for  it  only  attaches  upon 
that  which  is  then  or  afterwards  becomes  the  property  of  the 
debtor."*^'  And  in  Tennessee,  also,  the  lien  commences  from  the 
actual  date  of  the  judgment  and  has  no  relation  back  to  the  beginning 
of  the  term.*^* 

§  444.    Cases  in  irhloli  Lien  relates  back* 

• 

There  are  certain  cases  in  which,  by  an  exception  to  the  now  com- 
monly accepted  rule,  the  lien  may  relate  back  to  a  time  anterior  to 
the  actual  date  of  the  judgment.  Thus,  in  a  proceeding  in  rem  by 
attachment  on  land,  the  lien  of  the  judgment  of  condemnation  is  a 
specific  lien  on  the  property  condemned,  which  relates  back  to  the 
time  when  the  attachment  was  laid,  and  ripens  into  a  perfect  legal 

2«»  Rev.  St.  Ariz.  §  2252. 

2T0  Revision  N.  J.  p.  520,  S  2.  See  Hunt  v.  Swayze,  55  N.  J.  Law,  33  25 
Ati.  850. 

2T1  McClel.  Dig.  Laws  Fla.  p.  618,  fi  1. 

2T2  1  Brightley,  Purd.  Dig.  Pa.  p.  946,  fi  5. 

2T8  Code  Ga.  1882,  §  3578;  Rev.  St.  111.  1889,  p.  840,  §  1.  See  Morgan  v. 
Sims,  26  Ga.  283;  Ryhlner  v.  Frank,  106  111.  326. 

274  Chase  v.  Gllman,  15  Me.  64;  Goodall  v;  Harris,  20  N.  H.  363;  New 
Hampshire  Strafford  Bank  v.  Cornell,  2  N.  H.  324;  Bradish  v.  State,  35  Vt 
452;  Town  of  Huntington  v.  Town  of  Charlotte,  15  Vt  46. 

27  6  Dyson  v.  Simmons,  48  Md.  207,  215;  Anderson  v.  Tuck,  38  Md.  225. 

276  Murfree*s  Heirs  y.  Oarmack,  4  Yerg.  270,  26  Am.  Dec.  232. 

(693) 


§445  LAW  OP  JUDGMBNT8.  (Ch.  16 

title  in  the  purchaser  under  the  execution.*^'  So,  upon  the  declara- 
tion of  the  forfeiture  of  a  writ  of  error  bond,  by  a  judgment  affirming 
the  judgment  below,  the  lien  which  springs  out  of  it  relates  back  to 
the  time  of  its  execution  and  binds  the  land  of  the  surety  in  the 
county  where  the  original  judgment  was  rendered  from  that  time.*** 
Again,  "a  judgment  entered  on  the  day  on  which  the  defendant's 
land  is  sold  by  the  sheriff  on  ^n  execution,  is  a  lien  on  his  land  at 
the  time  of  the  sale,  although  entered  at  a  later  hour  of  the  day  than 
the  sale,  and  is  entitled  to  share  in  the  proceeds."  '^^  But  on  the 
other  hand,  a  judgment  for  damages  for  detention  of  dower  takes 
date,  as  a  Ken,  from  the  time  of  its  entry,  and  not  from  the  time  when 
the  right  to  dower  accrued. '••  So  the  lien  of  a  judgment  on  which 
execution  is  stayed  dates  not  from  the  rendition  of  the  judgment,  but 
from  the  time  when  execution  may  be  sued  out.***  And  in  gen- 
eral, except  under  the  most  exceptional  circumstances,  the  lien  can- 
not be  considered  as  relating  back  to  the  time  of  the  accrual  of  the 
cause  of  action.*'* 

Part  V.     Priority  and  Precrdrnce  of  Jddoment-Lirxs. 

I  445.    Xden  is  Svbjeot.to  Prior  Bichta  and  EqvitftM. 

The  attaching  of  a  judgment-lien  upon  land  does  not  disturb  the 
condition  of  the  title  with  respect  to  existing  equities,  interests,  or 
other  liens.  The  new  Uen  must  simply  take  its  place  in  the  ranks. 
It  is  subordinate  and  inferior  to  conveyances,  mortgages,  or  other 
judgment  liens,  previously  made  or  procured  without  fraud,***  but 

277  Ck)ckey  y.  Milne's  Lessee,  16  Md.  200.  In  West  Virginia,  on  the  rendition 
of  a  judj^ment  on  an  attachment,  the  lien  of  t^e  attachment  is  merged  in  the 
judgment,  and  the  priority  of  the  lien  is  referred  back  to  the  first  daj  of  the 
term.    Smith  v.  Parkersburg  Co-Operative  Ass'n.  48  W.  Va.  232,  37  S.  E.  W5. 

278  Berry  y.  Shuler,  25  Tex.  Supp.  140;  Shane  y.  Francis,  30  Ind.  92. 

279  Smairs  Appeal,  24  Pa.  398. 

280  Evans  y.  Evans,  1  Phila.  113. 

281  United  States  Bank  v.  Winston's  Ex'r.  2  Brock.  252,  Fed.  Cas.  Xa  944. 

282  White  y.  K.  &  D.  M.  R.  Co.,  52  Iowa.  97,  2  N.  W.  1016;  l«ntz  y.  Lam- 
plugh,  12  Pa.  344. 

288  Home  y.  Seisel,  92  Oa.  683,  19  S.  E.  709;   Martinez  y.  Lhidsey.  91  Ala. 
334,  8  South.  787;   Kennard  y.  Mabry,  78  Tex.  151,  14  &  W.  272;   Wynne  v. 
State  Nat.  Bank,  82  Tex.  378,  17  S.  W.  918;  Willis  y.  Heath  (Tex.)  IS  &  W. 
(694) 


Ch.  16)  THE  LIfiN  OF  JUDGMENTS.  {  445 

superior  to  a  conveyance  or  incumbrance  of  real  property  of  the 
debtor,  to  which  the  judgment  lien  had  already  attached  before  such 
conveyance  or  incumbrance  was  made,***  the  last  proposition  being 
subject  to  the  proviso  that  the  judgment  will  not  prevail  against  a 
subsequent  sale  or  lien  on  the  property  unless  it  has  been  docketed, 
filed,  registered,  or  otherwise  made  a  matter  of  public  record,  as  the 
local  statute  may  provide.^®" 

The  lien  of  a  judgment -is  also  subject  to  all  the  equities  which 
were  held  against  the  land  in  the  hands  of  the  judgment-debtor  at 
the  time  the  judgment  was  rendered.  And  if  called  upon  in  a  proper 
case,  the  courts  of  chancery  are  always  ready  to  protect  the  rights 
of  those  who  hold  such  equities,  as  against  the  legal  lien  of  the  judg- 
ment, and  to  confine  the  efficacy  of  the  latter  to  the  actual  interest,  or 
residuary  estate  (so  to  speak)  of  the  debtor,  after  due  recognition  is 
given  to  the  outstanding  equities  in  their  proper  order.***    Thus  a 

801;  Anglo-American  Land,  Mortgage  &  Agency  Go.  v.  Bush,  84  Iowa,  272,  50 
N.  W.  1063.  As  to  prior  fraudulent  or  invalid  conveyances  or  mortgages,  see 
MiUer  V.  Cox,  88  W.  Va.  747,  18  S.  E.  960.  A.  chattel  mortgage  filed  before  a 
judgment  in  a  justice's  court  will  prevail  over  an  execution  issued  on  such 
judgment.  Woolner  v.  Levy.  48  Mo.  App.  469.  A  deed  made  by  an  Insane 
person  not  under  guardianship  is  voidable  only;  it  passes  title  so  that  a  judg- 
ment thereafter  rendered  will  not  be  a  specific  lien  on  the  property  conveyed 
until  the  conveyance  is  actually  avoided.  French  Lumbering  Co.  v.  Theriault, 
107  Wis.  627,  83  N.  W.  927,  51  L.  R.  A.  910,  81  Am.  St.  Rep.  856. 

i84  Weil  V.  Casey,  125  N.  O.  356.  34  S.  B.  506,  74  Am.  St  Rep.  644;  Gulley  v. 
Thurston,  112  N.  C.  192,  17  S.  E.  13.  Where  land  is  omitted  from  a  mortgage 
by  mistake,  the  lien  of  a  judgment  subsequently  filed  against  the  mortgagor 
is  subject  to  the  equity  of  the  mortgagee.  Chadron  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n 
V.  Hamilton,  45  Neb.  869,  63  N.  W.  808.  That  one  buys  land  for  a  full  price, 
in  good  faith,  and  without  notice,  is  of  no  avail  against  the  Hen  of  a  prior 
judgment.    Gates  v.  Munday,  127  N.  C.  439,  37  S.  E.  457. 

««»  See  Sweetland  v.  Buell,  164  N.  Y.  541,  58  N.  B.  663,  79  Am.  St.  Rep.  676; 
McKenna  v.  Van  Blarcom,  109  Wis.  271,  85  N.  W.  322,  83  Am.  St.  Rep.  893. 

2««  Finch  V.  Earl  of  Wlnchelsea.  1  P.  Wms.  277;  Pierce  v.  Brown,  7  Wall. 
205,  19  L.  Ed.  134;  Sweet  v.  Jacocks,  6  Paige  (N.  Y.)  355,  31  Am.  Dec.  252; 
Buchan  v.  Sumner,  2  Barb.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  165,  47  Am.  Dec.  305;  BUs  v.  Tousley. 
1  Paige  (N.  Y.)  280;  Coombs  v.  Jordan,  3  Bland  (Md.)  284,  22  Am.  Dec.  236; 
Floyd  V.  Harding,  28  Grat  fV'a.)  401;  Walke  v.  Moody,  65  N.  C.  599;  Coster's 
Ex'rs  V.  Bank  of  Georgia,  24  Ala.  37,  64;  Larthet  v.  Hogan,  1  La.  Ann.  330; 
Blankenship  v.  Douglas,  26  Tex.  225.  82  Am.  Dec.  608;  Frazer  v.  Thatcher,  49 
Tex.  26;  Wharton  v.  Wilson,  60  Ind.  591;  Foltz  v.  Wert,  103  Ind.  401,  2  N.  E. 
950;  Wells  v.  Benton,  108  Ind.  585,  8  N.  E.  4M;  Goodell  v.  Blumer,  41  Wis. 
436. 

(695) 


S"  446  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  16 

lien  by  contract  upon  real  property,  prior  in  time  to  the  judgment,  is 
paramount  to  the  judgment-lien,  though  the  judgment-creditor  has 
no  notice  or  knowledge  of  such  prior  lien  by  contract,  and  a  purchaser 
at  execution-sale  under  the  judgment,  with  notice,  actual  or  construc- 
tive, acquires  no  greater  interest  than  the  judgment-debtor  had.**^ 
In  a  case  where  a  person  who  had  contracted  for  the  purchase  of  land 
obtained  a  deed  for  the  same  from  the  vendor  under  an  agreement 
that  it  should  not  be  used  until  the  balance  of  the  purchase-money 
then  due  was  paid,  it  was  held  that  this  was  a  valid  delivery  of  the 
deed  to  pass  the  legal  title  to  the  land  to  the  vendee  subject  to  the 
vendor's  equitable  Hen  for  the  unpaid  purchase-money,  and  that 
such  balance  of  price  must  be  paid  in  preference  to  a  judgment  against 
the  vendee  which  was  a  lien  upon  his  estate  in  the  land.*'*  A  spe- 
cific equitable  lien  upon  land  is  entitled  to  a  preference  over  a  sub- 
sequent legal  lien  by  judgment.  But  an  equitable  lien  created  to 
secure  an  antecedent  indebtedness  (for  example,  an  agreement  by  a 
debtor  to  execute  a  mortgage  to  his  creditor)  is  not  entitled  to  a  pref- 
erence over  a  lien  by  judgment  where  both  attach  upon  the  land  at 
the  same  time.***    Nor  are  judgment-creditors  protected  against 

287  Dos  well  V.  Adler,  2S  Ark.  83. 

288  Arnold  v.  Patrick,  6  Paige  (N.  Y.)  310.  In  a  later  case  In  the  same  atate 
It  was  said:  'The  question  as  to  the  extent  to  which  a  secret  equitable,  add 
unrecorded  lien  of  a  vendor,  for  unpaid  purchase-money  of  lands  sold  and 
conveyed  by  him,  exists  as  against  a  judgment-creditor  after  the  lien  is  re- 
corded, or  other  parties  tlian  the  vendee,  must  depend  upon  the  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances of  the  particular  case.  Such  lien  cannot  exist  generally  against 
purchasers  in  good  faith,  under  a  conveyance  of  the  legal  estate,  without  no- 
tice, when  the  purchase-money  has  been  paid.  The  general  rule  stated  ap- 
plies more  particularly  to  cases  where  it  is  sought  to  enforce  an  equitable  Uen 
for  the  purchase-money,  which  has  never  been  put  on  record  as  against  sab- 
sequent  mortgagees  or  purchasers  in  good  faith  and  for  a  valuable  conaldera- 
tion.  In  such  a  case  it  Is  too  clear  to  admit  of  any  question  that  the  rights  of 
the  person  claiming  such  equitable  lien  should  yield,  by  reason  of  his  neglect, 
to  the  claims  of  subsequent  incumbrancers  or  purchasers,  and  it  may  well  be 
asserted  that  a  prior  claimant  for  the  purchase-money,  under  such  circum- 
stances, has,  by  his  silence  and  neglect,  yielded  his  right"  Spring  v.  Short 
90  N.  Y.  538.  See  Tallman  v.  Farley,  1  Barb.  280.  In  Valentine  v.  Seles,  79 
Md.  187,  28  Atl.  892,  it  is  held  that  an  unrecorded  contract  for  the  sale  of 
land,  made  in  good  faith  for  a  valuable  consideration,  takes  precedence  of 
the  general  lien  of  a  subsequent  Judgment 

i89  Dwight  V.  Newell,  3  N.  Y.  185. 

(696) 


Cb.   16)  THE  LIEN  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  446 

trusts  of  which  they  have  no  notice,  or  allowed  in  equity  to  hold 
against  the  cestui  que  trust.^*®  An  opinion  counter  to  the  general 
rule  has  sometimes  been  expressed  in  Pennsylvania.  In  a  case  in 
that  state  it  appeared  that  A.  advanced  money  to  B.  and  took  his 
judgment  therefor,  on  the  faith  of  an  entry  of  satisfaction  of  a  prior 
judgment ;  but  upon  the  application  of  the  equitable  assignee  of  the 
prior  judgment,  the  court  struck  off  the  entry  of  satisfaction.  In 
the  distribution  of  the  proceeds  of  a  sheriff's  sale  of  B.'s  real  estate, 
it  was  held  that  A.  was  entitled  to  be  paid  in  full,  before  the  prior 
judgment  could  participate  in  the  distribution;  for  A.  was  not  re- 
quired to  look  into  equities  to  which  he  was  not  a  party  and  of  which 
he  had  no  knowledge.^®* 

S  446.    Am  uf^adnrnt  Prior  Unreoorded  ConTeyanoe. 

In  many  of  the  states  there  are  statutes  which  make  a  deed  or 
mortgage  invalid,  as  against  subsequent  bona  fide  purchasers  and 
creditors,  unless  it  is  duly  recorded.  And  where  the  law  stands  thus, 
it  is  generally  held  that  the  lien  of  a  judgment  is  to  be  preferred  to  a 
conveyance  executed  before  the  rendition  of  the  judgment  but  not 
recorded  until  afterwards,  provided  that  the  judgment-creditor  has  no 
actual  notice  of  the  existence  of  such  prior  conveyance.***     "As  a 

2»o  Shryock  v.  Waggoner,  28  Pa.  430. 

2»i  Hamer's  Appeal,  94  Pa.  489. 

2»2  United  States  v.  Devereux,  32  a  0.  A.  564,  90  Fed.  182;  Lash  v.  Har- 
dick,  5  Dill.  505,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  8,097;  Hunt  v.  Swayze,  55  N.  J.  Law,  33,  25 
AtL  850;  McClure  v.  Thistle's  Ex'rs,  2  Grat  (Va.)  182;  Young  v.  Devries,  31 
Grat.  (Va.)  304;  Robinson  v.  Commercial  &  Farmers*  Bank  (Va.)  17  S.  E.  730; 
Blakemore  v.  Wise,  95  Va.  269,  28  S.  E.  332,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  781;  Price  v. 
Wall's  Ex'r.  97  Va.  334^  33  S.  K  509,  75  Am.  St  Rep.  788;  Anderson  v.  Nagle, 

12  W.  Va.  98;  Andrews  v.  Mathews,  59  Ga.  466;  Motley  v.  Jones>  98  Ala.  443« 

13  South.  782;  Mississippi  Valley  Oo.  y.  Chicago,  St  L.  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.,  58  Miss. 
^6;  Cavanaugh  v.  Peterson,  47  Tex.  198;  Firebaugh  v.  Ward,  51  Tex.  400; 
Russell  Y.  Nan,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App.  60,  23  S.  W.  901;  Hawkins  v.  Files,  51  Ark. 
417,  11  S.  W.  681;  Cleveland  v.  Shannon  (Ark.)  12  S.  W.  497;  May  ham  v. 
Coombs,  14  Ohio,  428;  Guiteau  v.  Wisely,  47  111.  433;  Smith  v.  Willard,  174 
111.  638.  51  N.  B.  835,  66  Am.  St  Rep.  313;  Vause  v.  Templeton,  87  lU.  App. 
455;  Reed  v.  Austin's  Heirs,  9  Mo.  722,  45  Am.  Dec.  336;  Frothingham  v. 
Stacker,  11  Mo.  77;  Belcher  v.  Curtis,  119  Mich.  1,  77  N.  W.  310,  75  Am.  St 
Rep.  376;  Dutton  v.  McReynolds,  31  Minn.  66,  16  N.  W.  468;  Hall  v.  Sauntry, 
72  Minn.  420,  75  N.  W.  720,  71  Am.  St  Rep.  497;   Lewis  v.  Atherton.  5  Okl. 

(697) 


§   446  L4W  OF  JtTDOMBNTS.  (Ch.  16 

general  proposition,"  says  the  court  in  Texas,  "a  judgment  lien  only 
attaches  to  the  actual  interest  of  the  debtor  in  the  land ;  but  on  ac- 
count of  our  registration  laws,  ordinarily,  if  the  judgment-lien  at- 
taches before  the  creditor  has  notice  of  the  existence  of  the  unre- 
corded deed,  then  such  deed  is  subordinated  to  the  lien,  and  subse- 
quent notice  of  the  existence  of  the  deed  would  work  no  change  in 
the  rights  of  the  parties."  *••  But  this  applies  only  to  a  creditor 
who  is  not  informed  as  to  the  prior  deed  or  mortgage.  If,  at  the  time 
of  docketing  the  judgment,  he  has  notice  of  the  unrecorded  convey- 
ance, the  judgment  lien  will  take  second  place.***  And  this  notice 
may  very  well  be  constructive,  or  inferred  from  circumstances. 
Whatever  is  sufficient  to  charge  a  purchaser  with  notice  is  sufficient 
to  charge  a  judgment  creditor.***  Thus,  an  unrecorded  deed  will 
take  precedence  over  a  subsequent  judgment  against  the  grantor, 
where  the  grantee  was  in  actual,  open,  and  notorious  possession  un- 
der the  deed,  and  especially  where  he  has  given  a  purchase-money 
mortgage  for  part  of  the  price,  and  the  same  is  duly  recorded,*** 
But  the  mere  fact  that  the  land,  being  unimproved,  is  inclosed,  and 
is  advertised  as  being  for  sale,  by  signs  posted  on  the  property,  is  not 
sufficient  to  put  the  judgment  creditor  on  inquiry.**^  If  the  latter 
had  no  notice  of  the  unrecorded  deed  at  the  time  the  judgment  was 
rendered  or  placed  on  the  docket,  his  rights  are  not  affected  by  the 
fact  that  he  acquires  knowledge  of  such  deed  at  the  time  he  sells  the 

90,  47  Pac.  1070.  This  rule  does  not  apply  (in  lUinols)  to  bolden  of  Judg- 
ments on  claims  allowed  against  the  estate  of  a  decedent,  such  jndinnenta  not 
being  liens  on  lands  left  by  the  latter.  Noe  v.  Montray,  170  111.  168,  48  N.  E. 
71)0.  And  a  statute  placing  judgment  creditors  on  the  same  footing  with  bona 
dde  purchasers,  as  against  unrecorded  conveyances,  does  not  give  them  pri- 
ority over  a  resulting  trust  which  cannot  be  made  a  matter  of  record.  School 
District  No.  10  v.  Peterson,  74  Minn.  122,  76  N.  W.  1126,  73  Am.  St  Rep.  337. 

298  Calvert  v.  Roche,  59  Tex.  463. 

a»4  Lamberton  v.  Merchants*  Nat.  Bank,  24  Minn.  281;  StovaU  ▼.  Odell,  10 
Tex.  av.  App.  169,  30  S.  W.  60;  Bamett  v.  Squyres  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  52  a  W. 
612.     Compare  Winston  v.  Hodges,  102  Ala.  304,  15  South.  528. 

a»B  H.  C.  Tack  Co.  v.  Ayers,  56  N.  J.  Eq.  56,  38  Atl.  194. 

S90  Adam  v.  Tolman,  180  111.  61,  54  N.  E.  174.  And  see  PoweU  v.  Allred,  11 
Ala.  318;  Northwestern  Land  Co.  v.  Dewey,  58  Minn.  359.  59  N.  W.  1086: 
Gardom  v.  Chester,  60  N.  J.  Eq.  238,  46  Atl.  602.  Compare  Hill  v.  Gordon  (C. 
a)  45  Fed.  276. 

2»7  Clark  V.  Butts,  73  Minn.  467,  76  N.  W.  263. 

(698) 


CRl.  16)  THE  LIBN  OF  JUDOMBNT8.  §  446 

land  under  an  execution  on  his  judgment.**'  And  although,  as 
stated,  an  unrecorded  deed  will  take  precedence  as  against  a  judg- 
ment creditor,  if,  before  the  recovery  of  his  judgment,  he  has  actual 
notice  of  the  conveyance  by  the  debtor,  yet  the  assignee  of  such  judg- 
ment, who  buys  without  notice  that  his  assignor  had  notice  before 
the  rendition  of  the  judgment  of  the  unrecorded  conveyance,  is  not 
affected  by  the  notice  to  his  assignor.**'  And  so,  while  a  mortgage 
imperfectly  recorded  is  ineffectual  as  a  lien  against  subsequent  judg- 
ment-creditors, yet  if  there  be  a  second  mortgage,  between  the  first 
and  the  judgments  in  point  of  time,  to  which  the  proceeds  of  the 
mortgaged  premises  when  sold  would  be  paid,  and  this  mortgagee 
had  actual  notice  of  the  first  mortgage  when  he  took  his  own,  the 
first  mortgage  is  good  as  to  him,  and  therefore  is  entitled  to  have  the 
money  appropriated  to  it.*®* 

But  in  a  number  of  states  the  statutes  are  such  that  a  deed  or  mort- 
gage is  valid  without  being  recorded.  And  in  these  jurisdictions  the 
courts  adhere  to  the  rule  that  a  judgment  is  a  lien  only  upon  the 
actual  interest  of  the  debtor,  and  consequently  that  the  judgment  ac- 
quires no  lien  at  all  if  the  land  has  been  previously  conveyed  away, 
although  the  deed  is  not  recorded,  or  that  its  lien  is  subordinated  to 
that  of  a  prior  unrecorded  mortgage.**^  But  if  there  be  a  sale  made 
under  such  subsequent  judgment  to  a  third  person,  for  value  paid  and 
without  notice,  the  rights  of  such  purchaser  will  take  priority  over 
those  of  the  grantee  in  an  unrecorded  deed  or  mortgage.*** 

8»8  Smith  v.  WlUard,  174  111.  538,  51  N.  B.  835,  66  Am.  St  Rep.  313;  Rus- 
sell V.  NaU,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App.  60,  23  S.  W.  901. 

a»»  Dnke  v.  Clark,  58  Miss.  465. 

soo  Manufacturers*  &  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Bank  of  Pennsylvania,  7  Watts 
&  S.  (Pa.)  335,  42  Am.  Dec.  240. 

801  Sparks  v.  State  Bank,  7  Blackf.  (Ind.)  469;  Schroeder  v.  Gumey,  73  N. 
•Y.  430;  Mellon's  Appeal,  32  Pa.  121;  Larimer's  Appeal,  22  Pa.  41;  Norton  v. 
Williams,  9  Iowa,  528;  Bell  v.  Evans,  10  Iowa,  353;  Wllcoxson  v.  Miller,  49 
Cal.  193;  Hampton  v.  Levy,  1  McCord  Eq.  (S.  0.)  107;  Farley  v.  McAlister,  39 
Tex.  602;  Smith  v.  Savage,  3  Kan.  App.  556,  43  Pac.  847;  StanhUber  v.  Graves, 
97  Wis.  515,  73  N.  W.  48;  Dawson  v.  McCarty,  21  Wash.  314.  57  Pac.  816,  75 
Am.  St.  Kep.  841.  For  the  rule  in  Georgia,  see  BaUey  v.  Bailey,  93  Ga.  768, 
21  S.  Bl  77;  Donovan  v.  Simmons,  96  Ga.  340,  22  S.  E.  966;  Lytic  v.  Black, 
107  Ga.  386,  33  S.  E.  414. 

808  Evans  v.  McGlasson,  18  Iowa,  150;  Paine's  Lessee  y.  Mooreland,  15 
Ohio,  435,  45  Am.  Dec.  585. 

(G99) 


I   447  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  16 


I  447.    Preoedenoe  of  PnroluMo-lKoney  VortcAS^* 

A  mortgage  or  trust-deed  given  to  secure  the  balance  of  purchase- 
money  on  a  tract  of  land,  executed  simultaneously  with  the  convey- 
ance of  the  legal  title  and  duly  recorded,  has  priority  of  lien  over 
judgments  obtained  against  the  purchaser  anterior  to  the  convey- 
ance.'***  In  such  case,  the  purchaser  acquires  only  a  temporary  sei- 
sin, and  not  such  an  interest  in  the  land  as  becomes  subject  to  the 
Uen  of  a  judgment  against  him  in  preference  to  the  mortgage,  as 
the  deed  and  the  mortgage  are  but  parts  of  the  same  transaction.*** 
And  where  the  purchaser,  at  the  same  time  he  receives  the  convey- 
ance, executes  a  mortgage  to  a  third  person,  who  advances  the  pur- 
chase-money for  him,  such  mortgage  is  entitled  to  the  same  prefer- 
ence over  a  prior  judgment  as  it  would  have  had  if  it  had  been  exe- 
cuted to  the  vendor  himself.*®*  Thus  if  A.  executes  a  deed  of  land 
to  B.,  and  B.  mortgages  it  to  C,  and  also  conveys  it  back  to  A.,  the 
two  deeds  and  mortgage  being  executed  as  parts  of  one  transaction 
solely  to  enable  B.  to  procure  a  loan  from  C,  no  lien  of  a  judgment 
held  by  D.  against  B.  at  the  time  thereof  can  attach  to  B.'s  interest, 
and  no  execution  afterward  issued  can  be  levied  thereon.****  But 
where  a  judgment  debtor  acquires  title  to  land  after  the  judgment 
has  been  obtained,  and  immediately  executes  a  mortgage  thereof  to  a 
third  person  to  secure  him  against  some  distinct  debt  or  liability,  and 
not  to  secure  the  purchase-money  of  the  land,  the  judgment  will  be 
the  elder  lien.**^ 

308  Oake*B  Appeal,  23  Pa.  186,  62  Am.  Dec.  328;  Parsons  v.  Hoyt  24  Iowa, 
154;  Scott  v.  Warren,  21  Ga.  408;  Straus  v.  Bodeker's  Bx'x,  86  Va.  543.  10 
S.  E.  570;  Gowardln  v.  Anderson,  78  Va.  88;  Summers  v.  Dame,  31  Grat 
(Va.)  791;  Clark  v.  Munroe,  14  Mass.  351;  Clark  y.  Butler,  32  N.  J.  Bq.  C64; 
Curtis  y.  Root,  20  111.  53;  Courson  y.  Walker,  &4  Ga.  175,  21  S.  K  287.  Com- 
pare Roane  y.  Baker  (111.)  2  N.  E.  501. 

804  Gowardln  y.  Anderson,  78  Va.  88. 

806  Haywood  y.  Nooney.  3  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  643;  Ctowardin  t.  Anderson,  78  Va- 
8S;  Clark  y.  Munroe,  14  Mass.  351;  Kaiser  y.  Lembeck,  55  Iowa,  244,  7  N.  W. 
519. 

806  Ransom  y.  Sargent,  22  Kan.  516. 

807  Root  V.  Curtis,  38  lU.  192;  Weil  y.  Casey,  125  N.  C.  356,  34  S.  E.  506,  74 
Am.  St.  Rep.  044. 

(700) 


Ch.   16)  THB  LIBN  OF  JUDGMBNTS.  {448 


I  448.    Priority  of  OorommeBt  Olaims. 

It  is  provided,  by  section  346  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United 
States,  that  "whenever  any  person  indebted  to  the  United  States  is 
insolvent  .  .  .  the  debts  due  the  United  States  shall  be  first 
satisfied,"  and  this  priority  is  declared  to  extend  to  cases  in  which 
an  act  of  bankruptcy  is  committed.  Section  5101  provides  that  in 
the  order  for  a  dividend  in  a  bankruptcy  proceeding,  after  paying  cer- 
tain costs  and  expenses,  "debts  due  the  United  States  shall  have  prior- 
ity." ••*  It  may  now  be  regarded  as  settled  that  the  priority  of  the 
United  States,  given  by  these  statutes,  "does  not  overrule  any  liens 
upon  the  debtor's  property  which  existed  before  the  event  occurred 
which  gives  the  statutory  priority ;  that  is,  before  the  insolvency."  ••• 

It  is  competent  for  the  legislature  of  a  state  to  enact  that  taxes 
assessed  against  real  property  shall  constitute  a  paramount  lien  or 
claim  upon  the  same,  and  shall  take  precedence  of  all  other  liens, 
however  created,  whether  by  mortgage,  judgment,  or  otherwise. 
When  such  a  law  is  in  force  (as  is  the  case  in  several  of  the  states), 
the  lien  of  a  judgment  against  the  owner  will  be  subordinated  and 
postponed  to  the  statutory  lien  of  taxes  on  the  property,  even  though 
the  judgment  was  recovered  before  the  levy  or  assessment  of  the 
taxes;  and  a  valid  and  completed  sale  for  the  taxes  will  divest  the 
lien  of  the  judgment,  leaving  to  the  creditor  only  the  right  to  come 
upon  the  surplus,  if  any,  or  to  redeem  from  the  tax  sale.'^* 

In  some  states,  it  is  held  that  a  judgment  obtained  against  one  in 
his  lifetime  has  the  preference  over  a  debt  or  specialty  passed  to  the 

»08  And  see  Bankr.  Act  1898,  §  64.  par.  "b,"  cl.  5. 

909  United  States  v.  Lewis,  13  N.  B.  R.  38,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  15,595;  Cottrell  T. 
Plerson  (C.  0.)  12  Fed.  805;  Hoppock  v.  Shober,  69  N.  0.  153;  Conard  v.  At- 
lantic Ins.  Co..  1  Pet.  438,  7  L.  Ed.  189;  Brent  v.  Bank  of  Washington,  10 
Pet.  59C,  9  L.  Ed.  547.  In  so.  far  as  the  early  case  of  Thelusson  v.  Smith,  2 
Wheat.  396,  4  L.  Ed.  271,  may  have  asserted  a  different  doctrine,  It  must  be 
regarded  as  overruled  by  the  later  decisions  above  cited. 

810  See  Black.  Tax  Titles,  §§  laj,  18(J,  426;  First  Nat  Bank  v.  Hendricks, 
134  Ind.  361,  33  N.  E.  110;  Eaton's  Appeal,  83  Pa.  152;  Jenkins  v.  Newman, 
122  Ind.  99.  23  N.  E.  683;  Dunlap  v.  Gallatin  Co.,  15  111.  7;  Keating  v.  Craig, 
73  Mo.  507;  Hardenbergh  v.  Converse,  31  N.  J.  Eq.  500;  Staunton  v.  Harris, 
9  HeUk.  (Tenn.)  579. 

(701) 


§  449  LAW  OP  JUPaMBHTs.  (Ch.  16 

state  after  such  judgment,  in  the  settlement  of  the  estate  of  the 
decedent.'^* 

I  449.    PHority  hj  I>«t«  ef  Batry. 

By  reference  to  a  preceding  section  it  will  be  seen  that  in  at  least 
seventeen  states  and  territories,  by  the  statutes,  the  lien  of  a  judg- 
ment commences  from  the  day  when  it  is  docketed  or  registered  or 
the  date  of  its  actual  entry.  And  it  is  a  general  rule  that,  as  between 
all  judgment  liens  entered  at  different  times,  that  which  was  first 
docketed  has  the  preference.***  And  on  similar  principles,  where 
several  judgment  creditors  resort  to  equity  to  subject  an  equitable  in- 
terest of  their  debtor  in  land  to  the  satisfaction  of  their  judgments, 
they  will  be  entitled  to  satisfaction  according  to  the  priority  of  their 
judgments  in  point  of  time.***  As  between  a  judgment  at  law  and  a 
decree  in  equity,  where  the  law  requires  both  to  be  enrolled;  the 
same  rule  obtains ;  and  where  a  decree  is  obtained  prior  to  a  judg- 
ment against  the  same  defendant,  but  the  judgment  is  enrolled  before 
the  decree,  the  judgment  takes  the  precedence.***  As  between  a 
judgment  in  another  county  and  a  mortgage,  priority  of  lien  is  deter- 

•11  HoUlngsworth  v.  Patten's  Adm'x,  3  Har.  &  McH.  (Md.)  125. 

SIS  Johnson  v.  Mitchell,  17  Ga.  593;  Pliryear  t.  Taylor,  12  Qrat  (Ya.)  401; 
Stewart  v.  Wheeling  &  L.  E.  Ry.  Co.,  53  Ohio  St  151.  41  N.  £.  247,  29  L.  R.  A. 
438;  Hagadorn  v.  Hart,  62  Uun,  ^,  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  625;  Max  Meadows  Land 
&  Imp.  Cto.  V.  McGavock,  98  Va.  411,  36  S.  B.  490;  Osborne  v.  Hill,  91  Ga.  137, 
16  S.  E.  965.  Under  a  statute  providing  tliat  entries  on  the  Judgment  docket 
"shaU  be  so  made  that  one  shall  follow  the  other  in  the  order  of  time  in  which 
the  said  judgments  shall  have  been  rendered,"  priority  of  position  on  the  page 
of  the  docket  prima  facie  implies  priority  of  date.  In  re  Kann's  Elstate,  171 
Pa.  262,  32  Atl.  1095.  But  a  judgment  which,  on  Its  face.  Is  prior  in  date  to 
another  judgment,  anterior  in  position  on  the  Judgment  docket,  will  have  pri> 
ority  over  such  Judgment  In  distribution.  Buhl  v.  Wagner,  22  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R. 
608;  In  re  Kann*s  Estate,  supra.  Where  two  Judgments  are  erroneously  dock- 
eted and  indexed,  the  one  first  Altered  has  priority.  In  re  Shaver,  18  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  R.  202. 

In  Illinois,  where  the  statute  provides  that  '^there  shall  be  no  priority  of  the 
lien  of  one  Judgment  over  that  of  another  rendered  at  the  same  term  of  court 
or  on  the  same  day  in  vacation,'*  it  is  held  that  executions  on  Judgments  con- 
fessed on  different  days  in  vacation  are  entitled  to  priorities.  Coe  ▼.  Hallam, 
173  111.  401,  50  N.  E.  1072. 

818  Haleys  v.  Williams,  1  I^gh  (Va.)  140,  19  Am.  Dec  743. 

81*  ISIcKee  V.  Gaylc,  40  Miss.  676. 

(702) 


Cb.  16}  THB  UBN  OP  JT70GMBNTS.  |  449 

mined  by  priority  of  registration  in  the  county  where  the  land  is  sit- 
uated.**"  A  judgment  for  a  firm  debt  has  no  priority  over  a  judg- 
ment previously  obtained  against  the  several  members  of  the  firm 
on  their  individual  liabilities^  and  the  purchaser  at  a  sale  under  execu- 
tion to  enforce  the  latter  judgment  takes  a  good  title  as  against  the 
purchaser  at  a  sale  under  the  former.'^*  So  the  lien  of  a  judgment 
rendered  pending  a  petition  for  divorce,  and  before  the  rendition  of  a 
decree  for  alimony,  is  superior  to  that  of  the  decree,  where  the  peti- 
tion does  not  allege  a  claim  to  any  specific  tract  of  land,  or  pray  for 
alimony  by  way  of  annuity  upon  the  husband's  real  estate  gener- 
ally.'^' It  should  also  be  remarked  that  the  lien  of  a  judgment  de- 
pends upon  the  condition  of  the  record  at  the  time  of  its  entry,  and 
cannot  be  affected  by  a  subsequent  revival  of  an  earlier  judgment 
giving  such  senior  judgment  creditor  rights  which  did  not  exist  at 
the  time  of  the  entry  of  the  junior  judgment.*  *• 

The  same  rule  which  applies  as  between  two  judgments  also  gov- 
erns the  case  of  a  conflict  between  a  judgment  and  a  conveyance, 
where  the  laws  require  the  latter  to  be  registered.*^'  Thus,  accord- 
ing to  a  late  case,  under  a  statute  providing  that  judgments  shall  be 
entered  by  the  clerk  on  the  judgment  docket  of  the  court,  and,  if 
docketed  within  ten  days  from  the  end  of  the  term,  shall  be  a  lien  on 
the  debtor's  real  estate  from  the  beginning  of  the  term,  a  deed  exe- 

»i»  Firebaugh  v.  Ward,  51  Tex.  409. 

sit  Davis  V.  Delaware  &  H.  Oanal  Co.,  109  N.  Y.  47,  15  N.  B.  873,  4  Am.  St 
Rep.  418.  The  law  is  the  same  also  in  the  converse  case;  subsequent  Judg- 
ments against  the  Individual  members  of  the  firm  are  postponed  to  a  prior 
judgment  against  the  firm.  Stevens  v.  Bank  of  Central  New  York,  31  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  290. 

817  Hamlin's  Lessee  v.  Bevans,  7  Ohio,  161,  pt  1,  28  Am.  Dec.  625. 

»i8  Young  v.  Young,  20  Pa.  CJo.  Ct.  R.  45.  But  the  equitable  right  of  a 
judgment  creditor,  whose  judgment  is  recovered  after  an  entry  of  satisfaction 
entitling  him  to  priority  over  a  senior  judgment  creditor,  which  satisfaction 
is  set  aside,  can  be  enforced  only  where  the  property  of  the  debtor  is  more 
than  sufficient  to  pay  intermediate  judgments  between  his  and  that  of  the 
senior  judgment  creditor.    McGune  v.  McCune,  164  Pa.  611,  30  Atl.  577. 

818  Under  Code  N.  C.  I  435,  which  makes  a  docketed  judgment  a  lien  on 
"all  the  land"  of  the  debtor  in  the  county  where  It  is  docketed,  from  the  date 
of  the  docketing,  the  lien  of  a  judgment  has  priority  over  the  Hens  of  mort- 
gages on  the  homestead  executed  subsequently  to  the  docketing  of  such  judg- 
ment   Vanstory  y.  Thornton,  112  N.  C.  106,  17  S.  B.  566,  34  Am.  St.  Rep.  483. 

(703) 


§450  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  16 

cuted  in  November  is  superior  to  a  judgment  rendered  in  the  pre- 
ceding August  and  docketed  in  the  following  July.**®  And  where  a 
judgment  is  a  prior  lien  to  a  mortgage,  a  purchaser  under  the  judg- 
ment will  stand  in  the  place  of  the  judgment-creditor  and  take  preced- 
ence of  the  mortgage,  although  his  title  under  the  sheriff's  sale  be 
defective.***  It  remains  to  notice  certain  exceptional  cases  wherein 
a  departure  from  the  foregoing  rule  has  been  sanctioned.  These  are 
mostly  governed  by  considerations  of  justice  and  equity.  Thus, 
where  monev  is  made  under  several  executions  issued  on  different 
judgments,  that  issuing  upon  the  elder  judgment  is  not  entitled  to 
priority  of  satisfaction  if  it  has  been  delayed  or  suspended  in  fraud  of 
the  rights  of  other  creditors.***  So  where,  upon  promissory  notes 
given  for  the  purchase-money  of  land  and  secured  by  an  express  lien 
or  equitable  mortgage  in  the  deed  of  conveyance,  several  judgments 
are  rendered,  in  favor  of  two  different  holders  of  such  notes,  against 
the  maker,  each  of  the  judgments  is  entitled  to  share  in  the  proceeds 
of  the  land,  even  though  one  may  have  been  recovered  and  enrolled 
before  the  other.***  In  a  case  in  West  Virginia,  where  two  judg- 
ments had  been  recovered,  one  in  1868  and  the  other  in  1869,  and  the 
one  last  recovered  was  docketed  in  1870,  while  the  one  first  obtained 
was  docketed  in  1871,  but  both  were  docketed  before  a  Contract  in 
writing  01  deed  to  a  purchaser  for  valuable  consideration  without  no- 
tice was  recorded,  it  was  held  that  the  judgment  first  recovered, 
though  last  docketed,  had  priority.*** 

%  450.    Two  Jndsments  entered  the  BAine  Day* 

The  rule  obtaining  in  a  majority  of  the  states  is  that,  as  between 
judgments  entered  of  record  on  the  same  day,  there  is  no  priority, 
for  the  law  cannot  in  this  case  regard  fractional  parts  of  a  day;  hence 
all  such  judgments  create  equal  liens,  and  the  issuing  of  an  execution 
on  any  one  of  them  does  not  affect  the  others,  but,  the  land  of  the 
defendant  being  sold,  a  pro  rata  distribution  of  the  proceeds  must 

820  Holman  v.  MUler,  103  N.  a  118,  9  S.  E.  429. 

»»i  Wait's  ExY  v.  Savage  (N.  J.)  15  Atl.  225. 

SS2  Grand  Gulf  Bank  v.  Henderson,  5  How.  (MiB8.)  292L 

828  Aaron  v.  Warner,  62  Miss.  370. 

824  Anderson  v.  Nagle,  12  W.  Va.  98. 

(704) 


Ch.  16)  THE  LIEN  OF  JUDOMBNTa  §  450 

be  made  in  satisfaction  of  the  judgments.*'*  In  North  Carolina, 
however  (and  in  a  few  sporadic  cases  elsewhere),  it  is  held  that  where 
several  judgments  are  docketed  on  the  same  day,  the  court  will  in- 
quire into  the  fractional  part  of  a  day,  in  order  to  ascertain  which 
was  the  first  entered  and  give  it  the  preference.'*'  In  New  York, 
the  statute  requires  the  clerk  of  the  court  to  docket  a  judgment  by 
entering  upon  the  docket  book  certain  particulars,  including  "the 
day,  hour,  and  minute  when  the  judgment  roll  was  filed,  and  the 
day,  hour,  and  minute  when  the  judgment  was  docketed  in  his 
office."  **^  And  judgments  entered  the  same  day  will  take  rank  ac- 
cording to  the  exact  time  when  they  were  placed  upon  the  docket. 
In  some  other  states,  the  doctrine  is  that  where  two  judgments  in 
favor  of  different  plaintiflfs  against  the  same  defendant  are  filed  and 
docketed  on  the  same  day,  neither  has  the  preference  as  a  lien ;  but 
if  one  of  the  creditors  first  takes  out  an  execution  and  delivers  it  to 
the  sheriff  before  the  other  creditor  takes  out  his  execution,  and  the 
lands  of  the  debtor  are  taken  and  sold,  a  priority  will  be  gained  by 
the  vigilant  creditor,  and  his  execution  must  be  first  satisfied.'***  In 
Mississippi,  the  question  of  the  priority  of  the  rendition  of  two  judg- 
ments in  the  same  court  is  to  be  determined  by  the  minutes  of  the 
court,  and  it  is  not  admissible  to  show  by  evidence  aliunde  that  the 
one  last  entered  was  in  fact  first  rendered.*** 


825  Claason's  Appeal,  22  Pa.  S59;  Metzler  v.  Kilgore,  3  Pen.  &  W.  (Pa.)  245, 
23  Am.  Dec.  76;  Ladley  v.  Crelghton,  70  Pa.  400;  Mechanics*  Bank  v.  Gor- 
man, 8  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  304;  Clawson  v.  Elchbaum,  2  Grant,  Gas.  (Pa.)  130; 
Emerlek  v.  Garwood,  1  Browne  (Pa.)  20;  RockhlU  v.  Hanna,  4  McLean,  554, 
Fed.  Gas.  No.  11,060;  McLean  v.  Rockey,  3  McLean,  235,  Fed.  Gas.  No.  8,801; 
Bruce  v.  Vogel,  38  Mo.  100;  Janney's  Bx'r  v.  Stephen's  Adm*r,  2  Pat.  &  H.  11; 
Burney  v.  Boyett,  1  How.  (Miss.)  30. 

32«  Bates  V.  Hinsdale,  65  N.  G.  423;  Lemon  v.  Staats*  Heirs,  1  Gow.  (N.  Y.) 
502;  Blggam  v.  Merrltt,  Walk.  (Miss.)  430,  12  Am.  Dec.  576. 

*27  Oode  Giv.  Proc.  §  1246.  A  similar  rule  prevails  In  Alabama.  See  Ger- 
man Security  Bank  v.  Gampbell,  90  Ala.  249,  12  South.  436,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  55. 

»2»  Lippencott  v.  Wilson,  40  Iowa,  425;  Tilford  v.  Burnham,  7  Dana,  109; 
Gay  y.  Rainey,  80  HI.  221,  31  Am.  Rep.  76;  Kesterson  v.  Tate,  04  Iowa,  665, 
63  N.  W.  850,  58  Am.  St.  Rep.  410. 

«a»  Johnson  v.  Edde,  58  Miss.  664;  Herron  v.  Walker,  60  Miss.  707,  12  South. 
259. 

1  LAW  JUDQ.-45  (705) 


§  451  I«4W  OF  JUDQllBNTa.  (Ch.  16 

S  451.    Jndemeiit  mad  ConTeyanee  entered  ilie  Baine  Day* 

The  doctrine  has  sometimes  been  expressed  that  a  judgment  en- 
tered on  a  given  day,  no  matter  at  what  hour,  is  a  lien  during  the 
whole  of  that  day,  and  therefore  has  preference  over  a  mortgage  or 
other  conveyance  recorded  at  any  hour  of  the  same  day.*'*  But  this 
view  is  generally  rejected,  as  too  refined  and  artificial,  although,  in 
some  states,  a  distinction  is  still  made  between  a  deed  and  a  mort- 
gage, as  to  their  respective  rank  as  against  a  judgment  docketed  on 
the  same  day.  It  may  now  be  regarded  as  well  settled  that,  in  a  con- 
test between  a  vendee  of  the  land  and  a  judgment-creditor  whose 
judgment  was  docketed  on  the  same  day  with  the  conveyance,  the 
fractions  of  the  day  must  be  taken  into  consideration,  the  precise 
time  of  each  ascertained,  and  the  rule  applied  "first  in  order  first  in 
right."  '"^  In  the  language  of  Chief  Justice  Gibson  of  Pennsylvania, 
"the  argument  that  a  judgment,  whose  date  in  contemplation  of  law 
covers  the  whole  day,  is  necessarily  anterior  to  a  conveyance  at  an 
intermediate  point  of  the  same  day,  is  too  subtle  to  be  solid.  The 
conclusion  attempted  would  not  be  borne  out  by  the  most  fanciful 
eflfect  of  the  legal  fiction ;  for  it  might  be  possible  to  deliver  a  con- 
veyance so  exactly  at  the  stroke  of  twelve  as  to  leave  no  room  for  an 
intervening  lapse  of  ahy  appreciable  portion  of  time.  But  justice  is 
not  to  be  dispensed  on  principles  so  artificial  where  it  can  be  avoided. 
When  judgments  bear  the  same  date,  they  must  necessarily  come  in 
together ;  but  between  a  judgment  and  a  conveyance,  actual  priority 
must  be  shown  like  any  other  fact."  ••*  The  last  statement  in  the 
foregoing  quotation, — that  the  precise  time  of  entry  of  the  judgment 
may  be  shown  by  less  than  record  proof, — though  reasonable  and 
well  calculated  to  promote  justice,  is  not  everywhere  accepted.  In 
at  least  one  state,  the  courts  refuse  to  hear  evidence  outside  the  rcc- 

880  HolUngs worth  v.  Thompson,  5  Har.  (Del.)  432.  See  Beyer's  festate.  51 
Pa.  432,  91  Am.  Dec.  129. 

881  Clawson  v.  Elchbaum,  2  Grant,  Cas.  (Pa.)  130;  Mechanics*  Bank  ▼.  Gor- 
man. 8  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  301;  Small's  Appeal,  24  Pa.  398;  Ladley  v.  Crelghton. 

•70  Pa.  490;  Murfree's  Heirs  v.  Carmack.  4  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  270,  26  Am.  Dec.  232. 
832  Mechanics'  Bank  y.  Gorman,  8  Watts  &  S.  304;  Hoppock*8  Ex*n  v.  Bam- 
fley,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  413. 

(706) 


1 


Ch.  16)  THB  USN  OF  JUDOMSNTS.  |  452 

i 

ord,  on  the  question  of  the  actual  priority  of  the  judgment  and  the 
deed,  and  award  the  precedence  to  the  lien  of  the  former  unless  it 
actually  appears  of  record  to  have  been  subsequent  to  the  convey- 
ance.'** In  a  contest  of  this  sort,  it  is  held,  the  lien  of  the  judgment 
takes  efTect  from  its  rendition  by  the  judge,  and  not  from  the  time  of 
signing  the  minutes  of  the  court."* 

In  a  contest  for  priority  between  a  mortgagee  of  the  land  and  a 
judgment-creditor  whose  judgment  was  docketed  on  the  same  day 
with  the  mortgage,  it  seems  reasonable  to  accord  to  the  former  the 
same  rights  and  privileges  that  are  granted  to  a  purchaser.  And  in 
Tennessee  this  is  the  accepted  doctrine.  The  hour  of  entry  may  be 
inquired  into,  and  actual  priority  will  give  legal  precedence.***  But 
in  Pennsylvania  the  rule  is  otherwise.  Evidence  is  not  admissible 
of  the  hour  at  which  the  judgment  was  rendered;  if  the  judgment- 
lien  and  the  mortgage-lien  are  created  on  the  same  day,  they  are 
entitled  to  equality  of  distribution.***  "The  fractional  division  of  a 
day  cannot  be  noticed  in  determining  the  time  when  the  lien  of  a 
judgment  attached.  If  it  could  be,  there  is  nothing  on  the  record  of 
this  judgment  to  show  whether  it  was  entered  at  an  earlier  or  a  later  v 
moment  than  the  mortgage.  The  rule  in  such  cases  is  to  treat  the 
two  liens  as  commencing  simultaneously,  and  if  the  land  of  the 
debtor  is  not  sufficient  to  pay  both,  the  loss  must  be  divided  in  equal 
proportions."  **^ 

S  452.    Judsmeiit  BiTen   to  aeevre  Future   AdTaneea. 

Though  a  judgment  confessed  to  secure  future  advances  to  be 
made  to  the  borrower  himself  will,  in  equity,  be  postponed  to  a  sub- 
sequent bona  fide  judgment  for  a  subsisting  debt,  except  for  such 
advances  as  had  been  made  before  the  second  judgment  was  obtain- 

388  Murfree  v.  Garmack,  4  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  270,  26  Am.  Dec.  232;  Berry  v. 
Clements^  9  Humph.  (Tenn.)  312. 

834  Clark  T.  Duke.  59  Miss.  575. 

885  Murfree  v.  Oaruiack,  4  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  270,  28  Am.  Dec.  232;  Berry  v. 
Clements*  9  Humph.  (Tenn.)  312. 

88«  Clawson  v.  Elchbaum,  2  Grant,  Cas.  (Pa.)  130;  Claason's  Appeal,  22  Pa. 
359;  Hendrick8on*s  Appeal,  2i  Pa.  363.  And  see  Goetzinger  y.  Rosenfeld,  16 
Wash.  392,  47  Pac.  882,  38  L.  R.  A.  257. 

887  Hendrickson's  Appeal,  24  Pa.  363. 

(707) 


§  463  LAW  OF  JUDQMENT&  (Ch.   16 

ed,  yet  a  jtidgnient  confessed  to  secure  existing  debts  which  the 
plaintiff  agrees  to  pay  or  assume,  to  the  amount  of  the  judgment, 
does  not  come  within  that  category,  and  is  vaUd  from  the  date, 
against  subsequent  liens,  although  at  the  date  of  the  confession  no 
debt  is  specified  except  one  due  to  the  plaintiff  himself.***  A  judg- 
ment entered  on  a  bond  conditioned  that  the  obligor  will  pay  to  the 
obligee  the  sum  of  all  notes,  checks,  drafts,  and  obligations  which 
B.  has  incurred  or  may  hereafter  incur  to  a  certain  bank,  is  a  lien 
for  future  advances  as  against  intervening  incumbrances  only  from 
the  date  of  such  future  advances.*** 

S  453.    Prior  Undooketed  Jndsment* 

As  we  have  already  shown,  a  judgment  does  not  attach  as  a  lien 
upon  real  estate  until  it  is  duly  entered  of  record.  Hence  a  prior 
undocketed  judgment  will  be  postponed  to  a  subsequent  conveyance 
or  incumbrance  effected  in  good  faith  and  put  on  record.***  And 
if,  before  the  purchase  of  real  estate,  the  purchaser,  having  received 
information  that  a  transcript  of  a  judgment  against  the  owner  has 
been  filed,  goes  to  the  proper  officers,  and  in  good  faith  causes  an 
examination  of  the  records  to  be  made,  and  they  disclose  the  fact 
that  there  is  no  judgment-lien,  he  is  justified  in  acting  upon  the 
belief  that  there  is  none.**^  But  if  a  judgment  is  actually  recorded, 
the  fact  that  a  party  is  ignorant  of  it  is  due  to  his  own  negligence, 
against  the  consequences  of  which  a  court  of  equity  cannot  reHeve 
him  by  interfering  with  the  rights  of  others  who  are  without  fault,*** 

»»«  Walker  v.  Arthur,  9  Rich.  Eq.  (S.  C.)  397. 

»«»  Kerr's  Appeal,  92  Pa.  236. 

8*0  Corley  v.  Renz  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  24  S.  W.  935;  Dotterer  v.  Harden,  8S 
Ga.  145.  13  S.  E.  971. 

s«i  Bell  y.  Davis,  75  Ind.  314.  It  has  even  been  held  that  actual  notice  by 
a  purchaser  of  land  of  ain  undocketed  judgment  does  not  render  the  judgment 
a  lien  on  the  land,  as  against  him.  Glasscock  v.  Stringer  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  32 
S.  W.  920;  Sklower  v.  Abbott,  19  Mont.  228.  47  Pac.  901. 

•*2  Bunn  y.  Lindsay,  95  Mo.  250,  7  S.  W.  473,  6  Am.  St  Rep.  48. 

(708 


Cb.  16)  THE  LIEN  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §   455 


S  454.    As  aKainst  Snbseqnent  Dower  RlcHt* 

Where  the  lien  of  a  judgment  has  attached  to  land,  and  the  owner 
afterward  marries,  the  lien  is  not  thereby  divested  or  postponed  to 
the  wife's  inchoate  right  of  dower  created  by  the  marriage.**'  But  if 
the  lien  attaches  subsequent  to  the  marriage,  it  will  be  subordinate 
to  the  wife's  right  of  dower.*** 

9  465.    Priority  by  Superior  DiUsoAoe* 

In  cases  where  several  judgments  have  an  exact  equality  of  lien,  it 
will  sometimes  happen  that  one  of  the  creditors,  by  his  superior 
activity  and  diligence^  will  put  himself  in  a  position  to  claim  a  pref- 
erence over  the  other,  and  such  claim  is  always  recognized  and 
enforced.  This  is  the  case,  in  some  states,  where  two  judgments  are 
entered  on  the  same  day,  but  one  creditor  sues  out  execution  while 
the  other  remains  inactive.**"^  And  this  claim,  founded  on  superior 
vigilance,  will  sometimes  even  result  in  elevating  a  junior  judgment 
above  the  rights  of  the  elder  lien.  Thus,  where  plaintiff  and  defend- 
ant were  judgment-creditors  of  the  same  party,  and  sought  to  enforce 
their  judgments  against  a  piece  of  land  which  had  been  fraudulently 
conveyed  away  by  the  judgment-debtor,  it  was  held  that,  the  plain- 
tiff having  taken  the  first  steps  to  uncover  the  property  fraudulently 
conveyed,  his  rights  were  superior  to  those  of  the  defendant,  although 
the  latter  held  the  senior  judgment.***     On  similar  principles,  an 

»«»  Brown  v.  Williams.  3;  Me.  403;  Sandford  v.  McLean.  8  Paige  (N.  Y.)  117, 
23  Am.  Dec.  773;  Lane  y.  Gover,  3  Har.  &  McH.  (Md.)  394;  Queen  Anne's  Oo. 
V.  Pratt,  10  Md.  5;  Davidson  v.  Frew,  14  N.  C.  3,  22  Am.  Dec.  708;  Hodges  v. 
MeCabe,  10  N.  C.  78;  Blsland  v.  Hewett,  11  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  104;  Bobbins 
T.  Bobbins,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  174;   Elceman  v.  Finch,  79  Ind.  511. 

3**  Gould  V.  Luckett,  47  Miss.  96,  116. 

«*8  Supra,  §  450. 

«*«  Boyle  V.  Maroney,  73  Iowa,  70.  35  N.  W.  145,  5  Am.  St  Bep.  657;  Brldg- 
man  v.  MeKIssick,  15  Iowa,  260;  Howland  r.  Knox,  59  Iowa,  46,  12  N.  W. 
777;  Lyon  v.  Bobbins,  46  111.  276;  Armlngton  v.  Bau,  100  Pa.  165;  Haak's 
Appeal,  100  Pa.  59.  But  a  very  vigorous  dissent  from  this  opnion  has  been 
expressed  in  a  recent  case  in  Minnesota.  Jackson  y.  Holbrook,  36  Minn.  494, 
32  N.  W.  852,  1  Am." St.  Rep.  683.  And  see  Wilkinson  v.  Paddock,  125  N.  Y. 
748,  27  N.  E.  407;  Ma  tula  v.  Lane,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  391,  55  S.  W.  504. 

(709) 


§   456  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   16 

attachment  is  a  valid  charge  upon  land  from  the  moment  it  is  levied, 
so  that  a  sale  on  execution  relates  back  to  that  event  for  the  purpose 
of  defeating  all  intervening  incumbrances,  as  a  judgment  recovered 
between  the  levy  of  the  attachment  and  the  judgment  in  the  attach- 
ment suit.**^  So  again,  if  a  judgment-creditor  delivers  his  execution 
to  the  sheriff  merely  for  the  purpose  of  protection  against  other  cred- 
itors and  with  no  bona  fide  intention  of  making  the  money,  and  directs 
the  sheriff  not  to  levy,  or  not  to  sell,  until  he  receives  further  orders, 
such  acts  will  postpone  the  lien  of  his  judgment  to  that  of  junior 
creditors  who  proceed  in  good  faith  to  a  levy  and  sale.*** 

%  456.    Priority  by  Prior  Ifory. 

There  are  some  cases  in  which  a  junior  judgment  may  acquire  the 
precedence  by  virtue  of  superior  diligence  in  making  a  levy.  Thus, 
under  the  laws  of  some  of  the  states,  where  a  judgment-creditor 
allows  more  than  one  year  to  elapse  after  his  judgment  has  become 
a  lien  on  real  estate,  before  he  takes  out  and  levies  an  execution, 
his  lien  becomes  subsequent  and  inferior  to  the  liens  of  other  judg- 
ment-creditors.*** In  this  connection  we  must  call  attention  to  an 
extremely  interesting  and  peculiar  question — called  the  "triangular 
question" — which  arises  where  there  is  a  judgment  not  levied  within 
a  year,  a  junior  judgment  levied  within  the  year,  and  thus  acquiring 
a  preference  as  against  the  senior  judgment,  and  an  intervening 
mortgage  executed  and  recorded  prior  to  the  rendition  of  the  second 
judgment.  Under  these  circumstances  it  is  held  that  the  senior 
judgment  must  be  first  paid,  and  then  the  mortgage,  and  the  junior 

347  Lackey  v.  Selbert,  23  Mo.  85;  Langdon  v.  Raiford,  20  Ala.  532.  Com- 
pare Llchton  V.  McDougald,  5  Ga.  176. 

»*8  Field  V.  Llverman,  17  Mo.  218;  Patton  v.  Hayter.  15  Ala.  18;  Andrus  t. 
Burke  (N.  J.  Ch.)  48  Atl.  228. 

34  9  Lamme  v.  Schilling,  25  Knn.  92.  And  see  Excelsior  Manurg  Co.  v. 
Boyle.  46  Kan.  202,  26  Pac.  408;  Klsterson  v.  Tate,  94  Iowa.  665.  63  N.  W, 
350,  58  Am.  St.  Rep.  419.  Under  the  laws  of  Ohio  regulating  the  lien  of  Judg- 
ments, a  Judgment  levied  within  a  year  from  its  rendition,  opon  a  part  of  the 
lands  of  the  Judgment  debtor,  Is  not  a  lien  upon  the  lands  not  levied  upon,  as 
against  a  subsequent  Judgment  rendered  more  than  a  year  after  the  first  and 
levied  upon  such  lands  within  a  year  from  its  rendition.  Pence  y.  Oochran 
(D.  C.)  6  Fed.  269;  Bish  v.  Bums,  7  Ohio  Cir.  Ct  R-  285. 

(710) 


Ch.  16)  THS  LIBN  OF  JT7DOMBNTS.  §456 

judgment  must  be  postponed  to  both.  The  difficulties  of  the  ques- 
tion, and  its  solution,  are  thus  presented  by  the  supreme  court  of 
Ohio :  "If  it  be  attempted  to  settle  the  question  on  the  principle  of 
superiority^  it  runs  in  a  circle  and  produces  no  result.  If  the  junior 
judgment  takes  it  from  the  senior  judgment,  then  the  mortgage 
would  take  it  from  the  junior  judgment,  and  the  senior  judgment 
from  the  mortgage,  and  thus  perpetually  without  a  conclusion.  If 
it  be  attempted  to  reason  it  out  by  interposing  intervening  liens,  it 
results  in  a  triangle  of  equal  equities,  without  any  circumstance  to 
determine  in  favor  of  either.  If  it  be  said  that  the  intervening  mort- 
gage should  protect  the  senior  judgment,  because  it  was  superior 
to  the  junior  judgment  and  inferior  to  the  senior,  so  it  might,  with 
equ^l  reason,  be  said  that  the  senior  judgment  should  check  the 
mortgage  in  favor  of  the  junior  judgment,  or  that  the  junior  judg- 
ment should  protect  the  mortgage  from  the  senior  judgment.  The 
court  therefore  felt  the  necessity  of  establishing  a  rule,  and  that 
which  was  considered  least  objectionable  was  adopted,  to  wit,  that 
each  should  have  precedence  according  to  age.  This,  too,  has  some 
show  of  reason  in  the  fact  that  the  lien  of  the  senior  judgment  ex- 
tended to  the  whole  estate  mortgaged,  and  the  mortgagee  took  sub- 
ject to  such  lien,  and  would  hold  only  as  to  the  balance  of  the  estate 
after  satisfying  the  senior  judgment,  and  the  lien  of  the  junior  judg- 
ment attached  only  to  the  balance  left,  if  any,  after  satisfying  the  mort- 
gage out  of  the  balance  left  by  the  senior  judgment.  Or,  in  other 
words,  the  junior  judgment  attached  only  to  the  equity  of  redemption 
in  that  portion  of  the  interest  covered  by  the  mortgage,  after  satis- 
fying the  lien  of  the  senior  judgment."  •**  Where  there  are  two  ex- 
ecutions against  the  same  defendant,  the  lien  of  the  executions,  as  be- 
tween the  execution-creditors,  attaches  from  the  levy,  and  not  from 
the  time  at  which  they  went  into  the  hands  of  the  officer.* '^^ 

8B0  Holliday  y.  Franklin  Bank,  16  Ohio,  535;  Brazee  v.  Lancaster  Bank,  14 
Ohio,  318;  Fitch  v.  Mendenhall,  17  Ohio,  578. 
sfti  Field  y.  Milbum,  0  Mo.  492. 

(711) 


§  459  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Gh.   16 


S  467.    Poatpaiiemeiit  by  Stay  of  EzeevtUiflu 

It  IS  held  that  an  extension  of  time  for  payment  or  stay  of  execution 
on  real  estate  to  a  time  short  of  the  statutory  period  of  limitation 
of  a  judgment-lien  may  be  made  without  prejudice  to  the  creditor, 
and  does  not  postpone  the  judgment  to  other  and  junior  judg- 
ments."^* But  on  the  other  hand,  a  mortgage  for  a  valuable  con- 
sideration made  pending  a  stay  of  execution  by  order  of  the  plaintiff, 
will  take  precedence  of  the  judgment.'"* 

S  468.    Poatponemeiit  by  Failure  to  B«tIt6. 

In  those  jurisdictions  where  a  judgment,  in  order  that  its  lien  may 
continue,  must  be  periodically  revived,  the  lien  of  a  judgment  not 
revived  within  the  statutory  time  will  be  superseded  by  the  lien 
of  younger  judgments  in  full  original  life  or  which  have  been  duly 
revived.*"*  And  the  same  consequence  will  result  although  the  rec- 
ord shows  that  the  elder  judgment  was  for  purchase-money.*" 

%  469.    Bale  under  Junior  Jndsment* 

It  is  the  settled  rule  in  at  least  two  states,  that  the  lien  of  the 
senior  judgment  is  divested  by  a  sale  under  the  junior  judgment 
and  execution,  and  the  remedy  of  the  senior  creditor  is  to  claim 
enough  of  the  fund  to  satisfy  his  judgment.***  And  so,  under  a 
statute  which  provides  that  judgments  shall  take  precedence  in  the 
order  in  which  executions  shall  be  taken  out  and  levied,  in  a  case 

SB2  Marshall  v.  Moore,  36  HI.  321. 

8B8  Sanford  v.  Ogden,  34  Ala.  118. 

8B4  Pennsylvania  Agricultural  &  Manurg  Bank  v.  Crevor,  2  Rawie  (Pa.)  224; 
MiUer  T.  Miller,  147  Pa.  545,  548,  23  AU.  841;  Kamlnsky  v.  Trantham,  45  & 
C.  393,  23  S.  E.  132;  Colson  v.  Kennedy,  88  Ga.  174.  14  S.  E.  119;  Brady  v. 
Creditors,  43  La.  Ann.  165,  9  South.  59;  Davlsson  v.  Mackay,  22  Or.  1&47.  29 
Pac.  791;  Smith  v.  Schwartz,  21  Utah,  126.  60  Pac.  305. 

8  55  Ruth's  Appeal,  54  Pa.  173. 

856  Harrison  v.  McHenry,  9  Ga.  164,  52  Am.  Dec.  435;  Dowdell  v.  Neal.  10 
Ga.  14S;  Sanders  v.  McAfee,  42  Ga.  255;  Tarver  v.  Ellison.  57  Ga.  54;  Jones 
v.  Wright,  60  Ga.  364;  Blohme  v.  Lynch,  26  S.  C.  300,  2  S.  B.  136;  Matthews 
v.  Nance,  49  S.  0.  389,  27  S.  E.  408. 

(712) 


Ch.   16)  THB  LIEN  OF  JUDGMENTS  §  460 

where  the  first  lien  was  a  judgment  on  which  no  levy  had  been  made, 
and  the  second  lien  was  a  mortgage,  and  the  third  a  judgment  under 
which  a  levy  and  sale  took  place,  it  was  held  that  the  lien  of  the  elder 
judgment  was  destroyed,  and  in  an  action  to  foreclose  the  mortgage, 
it  was  considered  to  be  free  from  the  lien  of  the  first  judgment, 
and,  being  prior  to  the  second  judgment,  it  was  free  from  that  lien 
also.*'^  But  the  general  rule  undoubtedly  is,  that  a  sale  under  the 
junior  judgment  docs  not  divest  the  lien  of  the  elder  judgment ;  the 
property  passes  subject  to  such  elder  lien;  the  junior  creditor  is 
entitled  to  all  the  money  made  at  his  sale,  but  afterwards,  at  any 
time  within  the  statutory  period,  the  senior  creditor  may  take  the 
appropriate  steps  to  enforce  his  lien."*  And  it  is  even  held  that 
where  both  judgments,  the  elder  and  the  junior,  are  the  property  of 
the  same  person,  he  may  proceed  to  levy  and  sell  under  the  younger 
lien  without  any  prejudice  to  his  right  afterwards  to  enforce  the 
other,  or  without  disturbing  or  destroying  its  lien,  provided  his  con- 
duct is  free  from,  any  imputation  of  deceit  or  unfairness  towards  the 
purchaser.  ••• 

S  460.    Order  of  Priority  on  Aftor-Aequired  Iiaiidfl, 

If  several  judgments  are  rendered  and  entered  against  the  same 
defendant  at  different  times,  and  he  afterwards  acquires  the  legal 
title  to  real  estate,  the  liens  of  the  several  judgments  attach  together 
upon  the  property  at  the  same  instant ;  all  stand  upon  the  same  foot- 
ing, and  the  oldest  judgment  has  no  priority.**®    This  general  rule 

SB7  Lambertville  Nat  Bank  v.  Boss  (N.  J.)  13  Atl.  18.  Compare  HoUiday  v. 
Franklin  Bank,  16  Ohio,  535;  supra,  §  456. 

858  Commercial  Bank  v.  Yazoo  Co.,  6  How.  (Miss.)  530,  38  Am.  Dec.  447; 
Rankin  v.  Scott.  12  Wheat.  177,  6  L.  Ed.  592;  Llttiefleld  v.  Nichols,  42  Cal. 
372;  Shotwell  v.  Murray,  1  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  512;  Bruce  v.  Vogel,  38  Mo. 
100;  Lathrop  v.  Brown,  23  Iowa,  40;  Hiestand  v.  Williamson,  128  Pa.  122, 
18  Atl.  427;  Paddack  v.  Staley,  18  Colo.  App.  363,  58  Pac.  363. 

85»  Shotwell  V.  Murray,  1  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  512. 

800  In  re  Hazard's  Estate,  141  N.  Y.  586.  36  N.  E.  739;  Moore  r.  Jordan.  117 
N.  0.  86,  23  S.  E.  259,  42  L.  B.  A.  209,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  576;  Belknap  v.  Greene. 
56  S.  C.  119.  34  S.  E.  26;  Moody  v.  Harper,  25  Miss.  484;  Cayce  v.  Stovall,  50 
Miss.  396;  Willis  v.  Downes  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  46  S.  W.  920;  Matula  v.  Lane,  22 
Tex.  ClY.  App.  391.  55  S.  W.  504;  Relfe  v.  McComb,  2  Head  (Tenn.)  558,  75 
Am.  Dec.  748;  Davis  v.  Benton,  2  Sneed  (Tenn.)  665;  Michaels  v.  Boyd,  Smith 

(713) 


§   461  LAW  OF  JUDOM1BNT8.  (Ch.   IS 

is  accepted  in  all  the  states,  so  far  as  we  have  been  able  to  discorver» 
except  Oregon.  In  that  state,  judgment-liens  attach  to  after-ac- 
quired property  in  the  order  of  the  dates  of  the  docketinf^  of  the 
judgments.*'*  In  another  state,  where  personal  property  of  the 
defendant  in  execution  is  brought  into  the  county  after  executions 
of  different  judgment-creditors  have  come  to  the  sheriff's  hands 
against  such  defendant,  the  eldest  judgment  creditor  who  has  pre- 
served his  lien  will  have  the  prior  right.***  It  has  also  been  thought 
that,  where  a  statute  requires  an  executor  to  pay  judgments  docketed 
against  the  deceased,  according  to  their  priority,  a  creditor  whose 
judgment  was  first  docketed  will  be  entitled  to  priority  of  payment, 
though  the  property  sought  to  be  applied  was  acquired  by  the  judg- 
ment debtor  after  all  the  judgments  had  been  docketed.*  ••  Again, 
where  a  debtor  has  made  a  fraudulent  and  simulated  sale  of  prop- 
erty, and  afterwards  several  judgments  are  recovered  against  him, 
and  the  property  is  then  returned  to  him,  the  liens  of  the  judgments 
will  rank  according  to  their  several  dates  of  recordation.***  So  also, 
where  land  has  been  appropriated  for  a  right  of  way,  a  prior  judg- 
ment creditor  of  the  owner  of  the  land  has  a  lien  on  the  money 
awarded  superior  to  that  of  an  assignee  of  the  judgment  of  award.*** 

•Part  VI.     Duration  of  the  Lteh, 

§  461.    GeB«VAl  B«Im« 

In  the  statutes  of  every  state  there  is  fixed  a  limitation  of  the 
period  during  which  a  judgment  shall  continue  to  be  a  lien  upon  real 
estate.     Sometimes  this  period  is  set  absolutely  at  ten  years ;  **• 

(Ind.)  100;  Ware  v.  Purdy  (Iowa)  60  N.  W.  520;  KIsteraon  v.  Tate.  M  Iowa, 
665,  63  N.  W.  350.  68  Am.  St.  Rep.  419;  Ware  v.  Delahaye,  05  Iowa,  667,  64 
N.  W.  640. 

»«i  Creighton  v.  Leeds,  9  Or.  215. 

862  Wood  V.  Gary,  5  Ala.  43. 

808  In  re  Foster's  Estate,  8  Misc.  Rep.  344,  29  N.  T.  Supp.  316. 

86*  Schwabacher  v.  Lelbrook,  48  La.  Ann.  821,  19  South.  758. 

806  Yakima  Water,  Light  &  Power  Co.  v.  Hathaway.  18  Wash.  377.  61  Pac. 
471. 

800  A  sale  may  be  made  under  the  Judgment  on  the  tenth  anniversary  of 
the  day  on  which  it  was  rendered,  or,  if  the  ten  years  expire  on  a  Sunday* 
(7U) 


Ch.  16)  THB  LIBN  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  461 

sometimes  the  Hen  runs  for  five  years,  with  the  privilege  of  renewal 
for  an  equal  period,  and  successive  revivals  after  that;'*^  and  in 
some  jurisdictions  the  statutory  time  may  vary  from  the  types  here 
cited.  Occasionally  we  meet  with  a  statute  which  makes  the  life 
of  the  lien  depend  upon  the  issuing  of  execution,  or  which  makes  a 
distinction,  as  to  its  continuance,  founded  on  the  character  of  the 
person  against  whom  it  is  set  up,  whether  he  be  the  debtor,  a  pur- 
chaser, or  a  subsequent  incumbrancer.  Thus,  in  Nebraska,  the  lien 
of  a  judgment  continues  for  five  years  after  the  rendition  of  the 
judgment,  and  as  against  all  persons  except  bona  fide  judgment- 
creditors,  for  five  years  after  the  issuance  of  execution.***    A  judg- 

then  on  the  following  day.  Spencer  v.  Hang,  45  Minn.  231,  47  N.  W.  7W. 
Bnt  the  issuance  of  an  execution  and  the  making  of  a  levy  within  the  10 
years  wiU  not  be  effectual  to  continue  the  Hen  of  the  Judgment  to  the  time 
of  sale,  where  the  sale  does  not  take  place  until  after  the  expiration  of  the 
10  years;  and  the  purchaser  at  such  sale  will  take  subject  to  liens  placed 
on  the  land  since  the  rendition  of  the  Judgment.  Wells  v.  Bower,  126  Ind. 
115.  25  N.  E.  603,  22  Am.  St.  Rep.  570;  Albee  V.  Curtis.  77  Iowa,  644,  42 
N.  W.  508;  Lakin  v.  C.  H.  McCormick  &  Bro.,  81  Iowa,  545,  46  N.  W.  1061. 
So  In  South  Dakota,  where  the  statute  makes  a  Judgment  Hen  continue  for 
ten  years  from  the  time  of  its  docketing,  and  provides  for  an  action  to 
enforce  the  lien  on  real  estate,  if  such  an  action  is  commenced  and  brought 
to  issue  within  the  ten  years,  but  not  reached  for  trial  until  after  the  expira- 
tion thereof,  the  lien  is  lost.    Ruth  v.  Wells.  13  S.  D.  482.  83  N.  W.  568. 

««7  See  Wetmore  v.  Wetmore,  155  Pa.  507,  26  Atl.  694.  The  statute  in 
South  Carolina  provides  that  a  Judgment  shall  be  a  lien  on  real  estate  for 
10  years  from  the  date  of  Its  entry,  but  the  plaintiff  may,  within  three  years 
**after  its  active  energy  has  expired,  revive  the  Judgment,  with  like  liens 
as  in  the  original  for  a  like  period."  It  is  held  that  a  Judgment  revived 
within  the  three  years  has  a  continuous  lien  from  the  date  of  Its  entry,  and 
Its  priority  is  preserved  as  against  all  liens  which  existed  against  the  Judg- 
ment debtor  during  the  period  of  its  original  active  energy.  Vemer  v. 
Bookman,  53  S.  C.  308,  31  S.  E.  283,  69  Am.  St.  Rep.  870;  Woodward  v. 
Woodward,  39  S.  C.  259,  17  S.  E.  638,  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  716.  Under  the  present 
statute  in  Arkansas,  Judgment  liens  continue  in  force  only  for  three  years 
unless  renewed.    Acts  Ark.  1891,  No.  50,  $  2,  p.  92. 

3«8  Reynolds  v.  Cobb,  15  Neb.  378,  19  N.  W.  502;  Flagg  v.  Flagg,  39  Neb. 
229,  58  N.  W.  109;  Cotton  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  51  Neb.  751,  71  N.  W.  711; 
Dillon  V.  Chicago,  K.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  58  Neb.  472,  78  N.  W.  927.  See  Pasour 
V.  Rhyne,  82  N.  O.  149;  Pipkin  v.  Adams,  114  N.  C.  201,  19  S.  E.  105; 
McCarty  v.  Ball,  82  Va.  872,  1  S.  E.  189;  Benbow  v.  Boyer,  89  Iowa,  494, 
56  N.  W.  544.  The  statute  in  New  York,  which  provides  that  execution 
may  be  had  upon  real  estate  after  the  10  years  by  filing  a  notice,  subscribed 

(715) 


§   462  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  16 

ment,  however,  does  not  lose  its  lien  upon  real  estate  by  the  suffering 
of  an  execution,  issued  thereon,  to  lie  dormant  in  the  sheriff's  hands. 
The  doctrine  on  the  subject  of  dormant  executions  does  not  apply 
to  real  estate,  the  lien  upon  which  depends  upon  the  docketing  of  the 
judgment,  and  not  upon  the  execution  or  levy.  And  such  lien  does 
not  become  dormant  until  the  expiration  of  the  full  statutory  limita- 
tion.**®  In  cases  where  the  judgment  must  be  periodically  revived, 
it  is  held  that  the  question,  whether  the  lien  has  been  kept  alive  and 
remains  in  force,  must  be  determined  by  an  inspection  of  the  record ; 
if  the  record  does  not  show  its  existence,  the  lien  is  lost.*^*  The  lien 
of  a  judgment  in  favor  of  the  state  is  never  lost  by  lapse  of  time.*^* 

\  462.    Dormant  Jndsment  Aeta* 


In  several  of  the  states  there  are  statutes  which  prescribe  that,  after 
the  lapse  of  a  certain  time,  the  lien  of  a  judgment  shall  be  lost,  unless, 
within  that  time,  steps  have  been  taken  to  enforce  it,  such  as  the  levy 
of  an  execution  on  property  of  the  defendant.*'*    These  statutes  are 

by  the  sheriff,  describing  the  Judgment,  the  execution,  and  the  property 
levied  upon,  does  not  extend  the  original  lien  of  the  judgment  Floyd  v. 
Clark,  16  Daly,  528,  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  848.  But  a  judgment  for  foreclosure 
and  sale  of  mortgaged  premises  may  be  enforced  even  after  20  years  or 
more  from  Its  entry.    Wing  v.  De  La  Rlonda,  125  N.  Y.  678,  25  N.  B.  1061. 

s«»  Mulr  V.  Leltch,  7  Barb.  341.  The  statute  of  Ihnltatlons  begins  to  mn 
on  a  judgment  by  default  from  the  entry  of  the  judgment,  and  not  from  the 
entry  of  the  default    Edwards  v.  Hellings,  103  Cal.  204,  37  Pac.  218. 

•70  Duffey  V.  Houtz,  106  Pa.  96. 

»7i  Comm.  V.  Baldwin,  1  Watts  (Pa.)  54,  26  Am.  Dec.  83. 

ST 2  In  Georgia,  the  Oode,  \  2914,  provides  that  no  domestic  Judgment  shall 
be  enforced  after  the  expiration  of  seven  years  from  the  time  of  Its  ren<ll- 
tion,  where  no  execution  has  been  issued  on  it  or  where  execution  has 
been  issued  and  seven  years  have  expired  from  the  time  of  the  last  entry 
on  the  execution  made  by  an  officer  authorized  to  execute  and  return  the 
same.  See  Smith  v.  Williams,  89  Ga.  9.  15  S.  E.  130,  32  Am.  St  Rep.  6i: 
Formby  v.  Shackleford,  94  Ga.  670,  21  S.  £.  711.  An  entry  on  an  execution 
signed  by  a  person  as  "Former  Sheriff"  does  not  satisfy  the  statute,  as  an 
ex-sheriff  is  not  authorized  to  execute  and  return  executions.  Orr  t.  Mor- 
row, 91  Ga.  148,  17  S.  E.  287.  Nor  wiU  the  judgment  be  saved  by  an  entry 
on  the  execution  docket,  made  by  the  clerk  without  being  thereto  requested 
by  the  judgment  creditor,  that  on  a  certain  day  the  execution  was  handed 
by  him  to  the  sheriff.  Daniel  v.  Hayncs,  91  Ga.  123,  16  S.  R  649.  In  Texas, 
the  law  provides  that  a  judgment  whereon  execution  has  not  issued  within 
(716) 


Ch.   16)  THE  LIEN  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §   462 

called  "dormant  judgment  acts,"  and  unless  their  terms  are  com- 
plied with,  the  lien  of  a  judgment  will  expire  and  give  place  to  junior 
liens.*^*  They  are  not  merely  statutes  of  limitations,  and  a  judgment 
will  not  be  saved  from  dormancy  by  the  mere  fact  that  partial  pay- 
ments are  made  and  receipted  for  within  the  limited  time,***  nor  by 
the  payment  of  the  costs  of  the  action  to  the  clerk  and  his  entry  of 
ihe  fact  upon  the  execution.*"  An  officer's  indorsement  on  the  writ 
that  he  had  received  directions  from  the  plaintiff's  attorney  to  collect 
it  is  not  sufficient  to  keep  the  judgment  alive,'**  nor  can  that  object 
be  accompHshed  by  making  upon  the  execution  a  nunc  pro  tunc 
entry  of  a  levy  alleged  to  have  been  made  before  the  judgment  be- 
came dormant.***  In  Tennessee,  where  the  statute  requires  an  ex- 
ecution to  be  taken  out  and  the  land  sold  within  twelve  months,  the 
lien  is  not  saved  by  the  levy  of  an  execution  and  the  filing  of  a  cred- 
itor's bill,  nor  by  a  stipulation  contained  in  the  judgment  that  ex- 
ecution shall  not  issue  for  a  certain  time  after  its  rendition.***  On 
the  other  hand,  an  execution  regularly  issued  within  the  limited  time 
will  stop  the  running  of  the  statute  against  the  judgment,  though 
it  was  issued  for  that  sole  purpose  and  without  any  expectation  of 
collecting  the  money,***  as,  where  the  execution  is  levied  on  defend- 
ant's  homestead,  and  a  claim  of  exemption  is  successfully  inter- 

12  months  after  its  rendition  may  be  revived  within  10  years  after  its  date, 
and  not  thereafter.  It  is  not  necessary  that  an  execution  should  issue  every 
12  months,  in  order  to  keep  alive  a  Judgment  on  which  an  execution  had 
been  taken  out  within  the  first  year  after  its  rendition.  Oentral  Ck)al  Oo. 
V.  Southern  Nat  Bank,  12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  334,  34  S.  W.  383;  Davis  v.  Beall, 
21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  183,  50  S.  W.  1086.  See  Mundine  v.  Brown  (Tex.  Civ.  App.) 
23  S.  W.  90;  Adams  v.  Crosby,  84  Tex.  80,  19  S.  W.  355. 

»78  Thomas  v.  Van  Meter,  164  111.  304,  45  N.  E.  405;  Horbach  v.  Smiley. 
54  Neb.  217,  74  N.  W.  623;  Smith  v.  Hogg,  52  Ohio  St.  527,  40  N.  B.  406; 
Thompson  v.  Hubbard,  3  Kan.  App.  714,  44  Pac.  1095. 

»74  Stanley  v.  McWhorter,  78  Ga.  37,  1  S.  E.  J260;  Lewis  v.  Smith,  99  Ga. 
603,  27  S.  E.  162;  Blue  v.  Collins,  109  Ga.  341,  34  S.  E.  598;  Nelson  Y.  GiU, 
66  Ga.  536. 

876  Lewis  V.  Smith,  99  Ga.  603,  27  S.  E.  162. 

«7«  Hanks  v.  Pearce,  96  Ga.  159,  22  S.  E.  676. 

«T7  Lewis  V.  Smith,  99  Ga.  603,  27  S.  E.  162. 

«78  Gardenhire  v.  King.  97  Tenn.  585,  37  S.  W.  54a 

S7»  Murphy  y.  Klein,  71  Miss.  908, 15  South.  658. 

(717) 


§  468  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  C^^h.   16 

posed.**®  A  decree  in  equity  which  merely  prescribes  tha  perfonn- 
arice  of  a  duty  is  not  within  either  the  letter  or  the  spirit  of  these 
acts,**^  but  the  filing  of  an  equitable  petition,  for  the  purpose  of  en- 
forcing the  collection  of  a  judgment,  is  sufficient  to  prevent  the  run- 
ning of  the  dormancy  statute,  as  against  such  judgment,  so  long  as 
the  equitable  action  is  pending.***  An  order  by  a  justice  of  the  peace 
for  the  sale  of  property  attached  in  a  suit  before  him  is  an  "execu- 
tion," within  the  meaning  of  these  statutes.***  And  since  the  usual 
method  of  enforcing  the  payment  of  a  judgment  against  a  municipal 
corporation  is  by  the  writ  of  mandamus,  issued  to  enforce  the  levy 
and  collection  of  taxes  for  that  purpose,  this  writ  is  to  be  considered 
the  equivalent  of  a  writ  of  execution,  within  the  meaning  and  pur- 
pose of  the  statutes  relating  to  the  dormancy  of  judgments,  when 
the  question  concerns  a  judgment  against  a  municipality .***  When  a 
judgment  has  become  dormant  by  the  laws  of  the  state  where  it  was 
rendered,  and  has  not  been  revived  or  renewed,  it  cannot  be  fastened 
as  a  lien  upon  lands  of  the  judgment  debtor  in  another  state.*** 

S  463.    IiesifllatlT^  Abridsateiit  of  ike  Tlai#, 

It  is  a  familiar  principle  of  constitutional  law  that  a  statute,  retro- 
active in  its  operation,  which  merely  changes  the  remedy  provided 
for  the  enforcement  of  an  existing  right,  cannot  be  said  to  impair  the 
obligation  of  contracts,  if  a  substantive  and  eflfective  remedy  is  still 
left  to  the  creditor.  And  it  is  an  equally  well  known  rule  that  a  stat- 
ute of  limitations,  applying  retroactively  to  existing  rights  or  rem- 
edies and  abridging  the  period  of  time  allowed  for  their  enforcement, 
is  not  invalid  in  such  application,  if  a  reasonable  length  of  time  is 
left  for  the  assertion  of  such  rights,  or  the  prosecution  of  such  rem- 
edies, before  the  bar  of  the  statute  cuts  them  off.  Now,  using  these 
two  admitted  rules  as  premises,  it  is  easy  to  deduce  the  conclusion 

• 

880  McClarln  v.  Anderson.  104  Ala.  201.  16  South.  639.  Comimre  Wuest 
V.  James.  51  Ohio  St.  230,  36  N.  E.  832. 

881  Butler  V.  James,  33  Ga.  148. 

882  Conley  v.  Buck,  100  Ga.  187,  28  S.  E.  97. 

888  Webber  v.  Harshbarger,  5  Kan.  App.  185.  47  Pac.  166. 

884  Deiiipsey  v.  Township  of  Oswego.  2  C.  O.  A.  110.  51  Fed.  97. 

886  Clznpman  v.  Chapman,  48  Kan.  G3l>,  29  Tac.  1071. 

(718) 


Ch..l6)  THB  LIEN  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  464 

that  a  statute  shortening  the  time  during  which,  by  earlier  laws,  the 
lien  of  a  judgment  was  to  continue,  is  not  open  to  any  constitutional 
objection,  in  its  application  to  judgments  whose  lien  had  attached 
before  the  act  was  passed,  if  a  reasonable  time  (though  less  than  the 
original  period)  is  still  allowed  to  the  judgment-creditor  in  which  to 
enforce  his  Ken.  And  so  the  authorities  hold.^*'  But  the  case  is 
diflferent  if  the  statute  is  made  to  apply  to  a  case  in  which  the  whole 
of  the  new  period  of  limitation  had  run  before  the  passage  of  the  act, 
so  that  the  lien  would  be  instantly  cut  off.  Thus,  where  a  statute 
had  provided  that  a  final  judgment  should  be  a  lien  for  ten  years,  and 
that  the  creditor  might  have  an  additional  three  years  within  which 
to  revive  it,  and  a  later  act  repealed  the  proviso  allowing  the  addi- 

• 

tional  three  years,  it  was  held  that  the  latter  act  was  unconstitutional, 
as  interfering  with  vested  rights,  when  applied  to  a  judgment  the  lien 
of  which  had  expired  before  its  passage,  but  the  additional  three 
years  for  reviving  which  had  not  then  expired.*'^ 

f  464.    Idea  of  Transferred  Judcment. 

The  length  of  time  during  which  the  lien  of  a  judgment  transferred 
from  one  county  to  another  shall  continue  depends  entirely  upon  the 
construction  of  the  local  statute.  In  Pennsylvania  such  lien  contin- 
ues for  five  years  from  the  entry  of  the  judgment  in  the  county  to 
which  it  is  transferred.'**  But  on  the  other  hand,  in  Indiana,  under 
a  statute  declaring  that  the  lien  of  a  judgment  shall  continue  for  ten 
years  after  the  rendition  thereof,  and  another  statute,  providing  that 
when  a  transcript  of  a  judgment  from  another  county  is  filed,  the 
judgment  set  forth  in  the  transcript  shall  be  a  lien  on  property  within 
the  county  to  the  same  extent  as  judgments  of  the  local  court,  from 
the  time  of  filing  the  transcript,  it  is  held  that  the  lien  of  a  judgment, 
a  transcript  of  which  is  filed  in  another  county,  is  in  force  for  ten 

886  Henry  v.  Henry,  31  S.  0.  1,  0  S.  E.  726;  McOormlck  v.  Alexander,  2 
Ohio,  65;   supra,  §  399. 

«87  King  V.  Belcher,  30  S.  C.  381,  9  S.  E.  359;  Merchants'  Bank  of  Danville 
V.  Ballon,  98  Va.  112,  32  S.  E.  481,  44  L.  R.  A.  806,  81  Am.  SL  Rep.  715; 
Palmer  v.  Laberee,  23  Wash.  409,  63  Pac.  216. 

S88  KnausB*  Appeal*  49  Pa.  419. 

(719) 


§   466  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch,  16 

years  after  its  rendition,  and  not  ten  years  from  the  time  of  filing  the 
transcript.*** 

*  §  465.    Ezteaiion  of  Idea  by  Asreement  of  Pftitlet. 

It  has  been  held  that  where  a  judgment  is  rendered  in  pursuance 
of  a  written  agreement  of  the  parties,  entered  of  record,  that  the  judg- 
ment shall  be  rendered  collectible  and  payable  nine  years  from  its 
date,  the  ten  years  during  which  such  judgment  will  remain  a  lien  on 
the  real  estate  of  the  defendant  will  not  commence  to  run  until  the 
expiration  of  the  nine  years.***  In  the  case  cited  the  law  of  Indiana 
is  thus  stated :  The  lien  of  judgments  upon  real  estate  is  regulated 
by  statute,  and  the  general  rule  is  that  the  lien  continues  for  ten  years 
from  the  rendition  of  the  judgment  and  no  longer ;  but  there  are  four 
exceptions,  the  statute  excluding  from  the  computation  of  time  (i) 
the  time  during  which  the  party  is  restrained  by  an  appeal  from  pro- 
ceeding, (2)  the  time  during  which  the  plaintiff  is  restrained  by  an 
injunction,  (3)  the  time  the  plaintiff  may  be  prevented  from  proceed- 
ing by  the  death  of  the  defendant,  and  (4)  the  time  the  plaintiff  may 
be  prevented  from  enforcing  the  judgment  by  an  agreement  of  the 
parties  entered  of  record.  But  it  must  be  considered  very  doubtful 
whether  any  such  exception  as  that  last  mentioned  would  be  admit- 
ted in  other  states,  unless  specifically  provided  for  by  the  statute.*** 
As  between  the  parties  a  judgment  may  be  kept  alive,  although  once 
paid,  for  the  purpose  of  securing  another  loan ;  but  as  against  sub- 
sequent lien-creditors,  a  mortgage  or  judgment  once  paid  cannot  be 
kept  alive.*** 

§  466.    SurrlTal  agalnot  Jiidsnomt-]>obtor. 

The  lien  of  a  judgment  expires,  at  the  end  of  the  statutory  period, 
only  as  against  subsequent  purchasers  or  incumbrancers,  but  it  still 
continues,  the  judgment  being  unsatisfied,  against  the  judgmcnt- 

880  Brown  y.  WuskofT,  118  Ind.  569,  19  N.  E.  463.  See  a  later  deciakm  In 
the  same  case  In  21  N.  E.  243. 

890  Applegate  v.  Edwards,  45  Ind.  329.  And  see  Patterson  ▼.  BazltJ*  33  & 
C.  354,  11  S.  E.  1065. 

801  Savings  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Bear  VaUey  Irr.  Co.,  89  Fed.  82. 

302  Peirce  v.  Black,  105  Pa,  342. 

(720) 


Ch.    16)  THB  LIEN  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  466 

debtor  himself.*'*  Hence  if  one  suffers  his  property  to  be  sold  on 
execution  issued  on  a  judgment  after  its  lien  has  expired  by  limita- 
tion, he  cannot  afterwards,  in  a  collateral  proceeding,  call  in  ques- 
tion the  validity  of  the  sale.'**  .  So  in  a  case  where  the  real  estate  of 
a  debtor  was  sold  by  the  sheriff,  and  the  proceeds  applied  to  the  pay- 
ment of  all  judgments  which  had  been  either  entered  or  revived 
within  five  years,  and  they  were  all  thereby  discharged,  and  there  was 
a  surplus,  and  there  were  two  judgments  the  liens  of  which  had  ex- 
pired, in  consequence  of  their  not  being  revived,  it  was  held  that  the 
surplus  belonged  to  the  holders  of  those  two  judgments.  For  al- 
though, as  to  creditors  whose  judgment-liens  were  in  force,  these 
unrevived  judgments  had  undoubtedly  ceased  to  be  liens,  yet,  as  be- 
tween them  and  the  judgment-debtor,  the  liens  continued  notwith- 
standing their  non-revival  within  the  statutory  time.***  Inasmuch 
as  the  statutes  ordinarily  provide  that  the  lien  shall  expire,  after  a 
certain  time,  as  against  "bona  fide  purchasers  and  subsequent  incum- 
brancers," some  attention  to  these  terms  becomes  necessary.  As  to 
the  former,  it  is  held  that  if  a  purchaser  collusively  contrives  with  the 
judgment-debtor  to  deprive  the  creditor  of  Ijis  lien  upon  the  lands 
purchased,  knowing  that  the  judgment  is  unpaid,  or  if  he  purchases 
under  circumstances  indicating  an  intention  to  deprive  the  creditor 
of  the  means  of  collecting  his  judgment,  such  purchaser  will  not  be 
protected  as  a  bona  fide  purchaser  of  the  land,  discharged  of  the  lien 
of  such  judgment,  although  he  pays  the  full  value  of  the  estate.*** 
As  to  the  term  "subsequent  incumbrancers"  in  these  statutes,  it  is 
held  to  apply  to  creditors  of  a  grantee  of  the  judgment-debtor,  where 
the  conveyance  was  made  within  the  statutory  period,  and  the  debts 
were  contracted  after  the  grantee's  investiture  with  the  legal  title.**^ 

»•»  McCahan  v.  Elliott,  103  Pa.  034;  Fetterman  v.  Murphy,  4  Watts  (Pa.) 
424,  28  Am.  Dec.  729;  Aurand's  Appeal,  34  Pa.  151;  Bank  of  North  America 
T.  Fitzslmons,  3  Bin.  (Pa.)  342;  Benslmer  v.  Fell,  35  W.  Va.  15,  12  S.  E. 
1078,  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  774. 

»»*  Hhids  V.  Scott,  11  Pa.  19,  51  Am.  Dec.  50C;  Tufts  v.  Tufts,  18  Wend. 
(X.  Y.)  621;  Yeager  v.  Davis,  112  Ind.  230,  13  N.  E.  707. 

»•»  Brown's  Appeal,  91  Pa.  485.  Compare  Nutt  v.  Cuming,  22  App.  Dlv.  92, 
47  N.  Y.  Supp.  800;  Floyd  v.  Clark,  16  Daly,  528.  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  848. 

890  Pettlt  V.  Shepherd,  5  Paige  (N.  Y.)  493,  28  Am.  Dec.  437. 

»0T  Grldley  v.  Watson,  53  lU.  186. 

1  LAW  JUDG.-46  (721) 


S  468  LAW  OP  JUDOMBNT8.  (Ch.  16 


f  467.    Beath  of  Judcmemt-Bebtor. 

In  most  of  the  states,  the  lien  of  a  judgment  on  real  estate  is 
not  destroyed  by  the  death  of  the  judgment  debtor,  but  continues  in 
force  for  the  same  length  of  time  as  if  he  had  remained  in  life.*** 
But  in  Pennsylvania,  a  statute  provides  that  a  judgment  against  a 
decedent  at  the  time  of  his  death  "shall  not  continue  a  lien  on  the 
real  estate  of  such  decedent  as  against  a  bona  fide  purchaser,  mort- 
gagee, or  other  judgment  creditor  of  such  decedent,  or  of  his  heirs 
or  devisees."  This,  however,  does  not  limit  the  lien  as  against  the 
heirs  and  devisees  of  the  judgment  debtor;  as  to  such  persons,  the 
land  will  continue  to  be  bound  by  the  lien  of  the  judgment  for  five 
years  after  the  death  of  the  decedent.**'  In  New  York,  the  statutes 
give  to  docketed  judgments  a  lien  on  land  for  ten  years,  and  provide 
that  a  judgment  lien,  if  existing  at  the  death  of  the  judgment  debtor, 
shall  "continue  for  three  years  and  six  months  thereafter,  notwith- 
standing the  previous  expiration  of  ten  years  from  the  filing  of  the 
judgment  roll."  This  is  not  an  abridgment  of  the  life  of  the  lien, 
and  it  will  not  be  limited  to  three  years  and  a  half  from  the  debtor's 
death,  if  the  original  ten  years  would  not  expire  within  that  time.*** 

§  468.    Remedies  of  Creditor  after  Ezpiration  of  Idea* 

It  is  well  settled  that  the  lien  of  a  judgment  cannot  be  enforced 
in  equity  after  the  right  to  enforce  the  judgment  at  law  has  ceased 
to  exist.***  But  if  the  judgment  creditor,  during  the  life  of  the  judg- 
ment, files  his  bill  in  equity  against  the  judgment  debtor  and  an- 

3»8  Morton  y.  Adams,  124  Gal.  229,  56  Pac.  1038,  71  Am.  St.  Rep.  53:  Barrett 
V.  Furnish,  21  Or.  17,  26  Pae.  861;  Ensleu  v.  Wheeler,  1)8  Ala.  200.  13  South. 
473;  Lewis  v.  Smith,  90  6a.  603,  27  S.  E.  162;  Rltchey  v.  Burlcke*8  Adm*re. 
21  Ky.  Law  Rep.  1120.  54  S.  W.  173;  McAfee  v.  Reynolds  and.)  28  N.  K  423. 
18  L.  R.  A.  211.  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  194. 

«»»  See  Puellhart  v.  Blood,  7  Pa.  Dlst.  R.  575;  Bleseeker  ▼.  Cobb,  13  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  56;  Konigmaker  v.  Bro^vn,  14  Pa.  269;  Nicholas  v.  Phelps,  15  Pa. 
.36;  Shearer  v.  Brhiley,  76  Pa.  300;  Baxter  T.  Allen,  77  Pa.  468;  Stevenson  ▼. 
Black  (Pa.)  1  Atl.  312. 

400  In  re  Holmes.  59  Hun,  369.  13  X.  Y.  Supp.  100,  affirmed  131  N.  Y.  80,  29 
K.  E.  1003. 

«oi  Smith  y.  Meredith,  30  Md.  429;  Hutcheson  ▼•  Grubbs,  80  Ya.  251. 
(722) 


Cb.  16)  THB  LIBN  OF  JUDOMBNTS.  §  46fi 

Other,  to  subject  property  to  the  payment  of  his  judgment,  he  does 
not  lose  his  lien  on  such  property  if  he  allows  his  judgment  to  become 
darmant  (or  if  the  general  lien  of  the  judgment  expires  by  statutory 
Emitaricm)  bcioire  the  entry  of  a  final  decree  in  the  equity  suit.*®* 
But  if  the  creditor  has  lost  his  lien  by  his  failure  to  take  the  proper 
steps  to  enforce  it  in  due  season,  he  cannot  change  the  result  by 
the  mere  act  of  issuing  an  execution.*®*  But  it  is  not  necessary  that 
a  judgment  should  be  revived  in  order  to  maintain  its  li^n  on  money 
in  the  sheriff's  hands.*®* 


Part  VII.     Suspension  and  Dischargb  of  Judgment  Liens. 

§  469.    General  PHneiples. 

Inasmuch  as  the  lien  of  a  judgment  does  not  merely  bind  the 
debtor's  estate  by  his  own  consent  or  sufferance,  but  attaches  by  force 
of  law  in  consequence  of  the  rendition  of  the  judgment  against  him, 
it  follows  that  he  cannot  relieve  his  land  from  its  burden  by  any  act 
short  of  satisfying  the  judgment,  nor  can  he,  without  a  release  from 
the  judgment-creditor,  change,  limit,  or  impair  the  lien  or  prejudice 
the  rights  of  its  holder.  The  act  of  the  debtor,  therefore,  in  selling, 
.  conveying,  mortgaging,  or  leasing  the  land,  or  his  abandonment  or 
repudiation  of  the  title,  or  attornm'ent  to  a  third  person  (if  he  really 
had  an  interest  subject  to  the  judgment),  cannot  affect  or  destroy  the 
lien  of  the  judgment  when  once  it  has  attached.*®'  Thus  a  voluntary 
assignment  for  the  benefit  of  creditors  does  not  affect  liens  on  the 
land  assigned  created  by  existing  judgments  against  the  assignor.*®® 
Nor,  after  such  an  assignment,  does  the  failure  of  a  creditor  to  sue 

402  City  of  ancinnati  v.  Hafer,  49  Ohio  St  60,  30  N.  B.  197;  Davidson  v. 
Burke,  143  111.  139,  32  N.  B.  514,  38  Am.  St.  Rep.  367. 

4o»  Roe  V.  Swart  5  Oow.  (N.  Y.)  294. 

*04  Commonwealth  v.  Gleim,  3  Pen.  &  W.  (Pa.)  417. 

*05  MoiTls  V.  Mo  watt.  2  Paige  (N.  Y.)  586,  22  Am.  Dec.  661;  Decker  v.  Gil- 
bert SO  Ind.  107;  Brooker  v.  Sprague,  99  Ind.  169;  Rodgers  v.  McCluer,  4 
Grat.  (Va.)  81,  47  Am.  Dec.  715;  Agricultural  Bank  y.  Pallen,  8  Smedes  &  M. 
(Miss.)  357,  47  Am.  Dec.  92;  Tinney  v.  Wolston,  41  IlL  215;  Bdmunds  v. 
Smith.  52  N.  J.  Eq.  212,  27  Atl.  827. 

406  Shaeffer*8  Appeal,  101  Pa.  45. 

(723) 


I  170  LAW  or  JUDOMBNTS.  (C9l.  16 

out  and  levy  execution*  impair  the  lien  of  his  judgment.**^  But  in 
one  state  it  has  been  held  that  although  a  judgment  is  by  law  a  lien 
upon  the  land  of  tThe  defendant,  yet  he  may  after  the  judgment  con- 
vey good  title,  if  he  has  at  all  times  afterwards  a  sufficient  amount 
of  property,  subject  to  and  within  reach  of  an  execution,  to  satisfy 
the  judgment.*^* 

§  470.    Svspeasioa  of  Idea  by  InJiuietioB* 

An  injunction  against  the  enforcement  of  a  judgment  at  law,  if 
not  perpetual,  does  not  destroy  the  lien  of  the  judgment,  but  merely 
suspends  it  until  the  dissolution  of  the  injunction,  after  which  the 
lien  will  revive  and  continue  for  the  full  statutory  period.***  Whether 
this  statutory  period  is  to  be  computed  exclusive  of  the  time  during 
which  the  lien  was  so  suspended,  is  not  clear  upon  the  authorities, 
and  must  be  determined  by  the  language  of  -the  local  statute.  In 
one  state  the  law  expressly  excepts  from  the  computation  of  the 
period  for  which  the  lien  continues  in  life  "the  time  during  which 
the  plaintiff  is  restrained  by  an  injunction."  ***  But  in  another 
state,  for  want  of  a  similar  saving  clause  in  the  statute,  the  courts 
have  been  forced  to  conclude  that  if  the  lien  ran  out  during  the 
pendency  of  such  an  injunction,  it  was  finally  lost,  and  could  not  be 
revived,  upon  the  dissolution  of  the  injunction,  at  least  as  against  a 
bona  fide  purchaser  from  the  judgment-debtor.***  But  here  con- 
siderations of  equity  must  intervene,  and  it  becomes  important  to 
inquire  at  whose  instance  the  injunction  was  issued.  For  instance,  in 
a  case  where  the  creditor  was  prevented  from  enforcing  his  execu- 
tion until  after  the  time  prescribed  by  the  statute,  in  consequence  of 
an  injunction  granted  on  the  application  of  a  mortgagee  of  the  proi>- 
erty,  the  lien  of  whose  mortgage  was,  at  the  issuance  of  the  injunc- 
\ion,  secondary  to  that  of  the  judgment,  and  the  injunction  i^^as  sub- 
sequently dissolved,  upon  the  failure  of  the  mortgagee  to  establish 

*0T  Scott  V.  Dunn,  26  Ohio  St.  63. 
«08  Howse  T.  Judson,  1  Fla.  133. 

409  Smith  y.  Everly,  4  How.  {Miss.)  178;   L^nn  ▼.  Gridley,  Walk.  (Mls8^ 
548, 12  Am.  Dec.  591;  supra,  §  395. 

410  Applcgate  v.  Edwards,  45  Ind.  329. 

411  Tucker  ▼.  Shade,  25  Ohio  St  856b 

(724) 


Ch,  16)  THB  LIEN  OF  JUDOMBin?8.  §  472 

his  claim  to  protection,  it  was  held  that  he  could  not  take  advantage 
of  the  fact  that .  the  lien  of  the  judgment  was  lo>st,  and  that  be  was 
not  entitled  to  hold  the  property  discharged  of  the  lieii  of  the  judg- 
ment.*^* In  Alabama  a  judgment-lien  is  discharged  by  an  injunc- 
tion  issued  upon  the  execution  of  a  bond  with  sureties  by  the  judg- 
ment-debtor, if  the  bond  provides  the  plaintiff  with  another  security 
for  the  payment  of  his  judgment.*^* 

§  471.    Stay  of  Pvooeedlnsi, 

In  general,  the  lien  of  a  judgment  is  not  destroyed  by  an  agree- 
ment of  the  parties  to  stay  execution  for  a  specilfied  period.*^*  And 
a  stay  of  proceedings  by  order  of  court,  pending  a  motion  for  a  new 
trial,  or  by  appeal  with  stay-bond,  merely  suspends  the  running  of 
the  statutory  time  during  which  a  judgment  is  a  lien  on  real  estate, 
but  it  does  not  postpone  its  beginning  until  after  the  stay  has 
ceased.*^' 

§  472.    Openins  or  Vaoatlng  Judgment* 

Opening  a  default  judgment  merely  to  let  the  defendant  in  to  a 
defense  does  hot  destroy  its  lien ;  the  lien  continues  for  the  statutory 
period.* ^'  But  vacating  a  judgment  effectually  obliterates  it  for  all 
purposes;  and  of  course  the  lien  is  thereby  cancelled,  leaving  the 
judgment-debtor  free  to  sell  or  incumber  the  property  anew.  But 
judgments  which  have  been  vacated  are  sometimes  restored,  and 
thereby  the  lien  of  the  judgment  re-attaches.  A  party  whose  judg- 
ment has  been  illegally  vacated  will  not  be  deprived  of  his  lien  if  he 
ultimately  procures  the  reversal  of  the  order  which  set  it  aside,  unless 
the  equities  of  bona  fide  purchasers  or  incumbrancers  have  intervened. 
And  further,  the  lien  is  restored  to  the  exact  position  it  occupied  at 

412  Work  V.  Harper,  31  Miss.  107,  66  Am.  Dec.  549. 
418  Bartlett  v.  Gayle,  6  Ala.  305,  41  Am.  Dec.  52. 

414  Brewster  v.  Clamfit,  33  Ark.  72;  Love  v.  Harper,  4  Hnmph.  (Tenn.)  113; 
Ayers  v.  Waul,  44  Tex.  549. 

415  Barroilhet  v.  Hathaway,  31  Cal.  395.  89  Am.  Dec.  193;  Isler  v.  Brown, 
66  X.  C.  556;  Mercantile  Trust  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  69  Fed.  193; 
Hobbs  T.  Simmonds,  61  Conn.  235,  23  Atl.  962. 

416  Cope's  Appeal,  96  Pa.  294.  See  Smith  v.  De  Lanty,  11  Wash.  386,  39 
Pac.  638.    Compare  Crane  v.  Richardson,  73  Miss.  254,  18  South.  542. 

(725) 


§  474  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   16 

the  time  the  judgment  was  vacated.  That  is,  it  continues  to  take 
precedence  of  any  liens  which  were  junior  to  it  at  that  date,  unless 
the  holders  of  such  junior  liens  have  acquired  new  rights,  by  proceed- 
ings under  their  several  judgments,  of  which  they  cannot  justly  be 
deprived.*  ^^ 

f  473.    Appeal  or  Brror, 

It  is  generally  held  that  the  lien  of  a  judgment  is  not  discharged 
by  an  appeal  being  taken,  but  merely  suspended;  nor  is  the  judg- 
ment on  appeal  a  discharge  of  the  lien  of  the  judgment  below.*** 
"Even  if  there  be  a  new  judgment  [e.  g.,  of  affirmance  on  appeal] » 
this  does  not  necessarily  destroy  the  lien  which  the  law  has  given, 
for  it  is  competent  for  the  law  to  keep  the  lien  in  existence,  although 
a  new  judgment  be  predicated  on  the  first."  *^*  And  where  a  decree  is 
reversed  in  part  and  affirmed  as  to  the  residue,  the  reversal  in  part 
does  not  destroy  the  lien  of  so  much  of  the  decree  as  is  unreversed.*** 

I  474.    Banknaptey. 

The  lien  of  a  judgment-creditor  who  fails  to  prove  his  debt  is  not 
displaced  by  the  subsequent  bankruptcy  of  the  debtor.  And  where 
a  judgment-debtor  is  declared  a  bankrupt,  has  his  homestead  set 
apart,  procures  his  discharge,  and  afterwards  disposes  of  the  prop- 
erty set  apart  as  a  homestead,  it  at  once  becomes  subject  to  execu- 
tion under  the  prior  judgment.  "Liens  are  not  destroyed  but  pre- 
served by  the  bankrupt  act."  *** 

41T  King  y.  Harris,  34  N.  Y.  330;  Id.,  30  Barb.  471;  Smith  v.  De  Lanty,  11 
Wash.  386,  39  Pae.  638. 

^is  Hardee  v.  Stovall,  1  Oa.  02;  Montgomery  v.  McGlmpsey,  7  Smedes  &  M. 
(Miss.)  557;  Ourtis  v.  Root,  28  III.  367;  Moore  v.  Rittenhouse,  15  Ohio  St.  310; 
Dewey  y.  Latson,  6  Cal.  130;  Leonard's  Appeal,  94  Pa.  180;  Gottlieb  y.  Thatch- 
er, 151  U.  S.  271,  14  Sup.  Ct  319,  38  Ii.  Ed.  157;  Rock  Island  Nat  Bank  y. 
Thompson,  173  111.  593,  50  N.  E.  1089,  64  Am.  St  Rep.  137;  Schafer  y.  Bnck,  76 
111.  App.  464.  Compare  Campbell  y.  Spence,  4  Ala.  543,  39  Am.  Dec.  301: 
Wronkow  y.  Oakley,  133  N.  Y  505,  31  N.  E.  521,  16  L.  R  A.  209,  28  Am.  St 
Rep.  661;  Gmner  v.  Westln,  66  Tex.  209,  18  S.  W.  512;  Rubinsky  y.  Patrick, 
2  Pa.  Dist.  R.  695. 

«i»  Planters'  Bank  y.  Calyit  3  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  143,  41  Am.  Dec.  616. 

<*o  Thomson's  Adm'r  y.  Chapman's  Adm'r,  83  Va.  215,  2  S.  E.  273. 

*2i  Jackson  v.  Allen,  30  Ark.  110;  McCance  v.  Taylor,  10  Grat  (Va.)  58a 
But  see  Bankr.  Act  1898,  {  67. 

(726) 


Ch.   16)  THE  LIEN  OF  JUDGMBNT&  {476 


i  475«    Appofntmemt  of  BeoolT«iw 

It  is  held  that  the  lien  of  a  judgment  on  the  real  estate  of  a  cor- 
poration is  not  lost  or  aflfected  by  the  subsequent  appointment  of  a 
receiver  to  settle  the  business  of  such  corporation ;  nor  is  the  judg- 
ment-plaintiff thereby  prevented  from  proceeding  by  execution,  levy, 
and  sale  of  such  property  to  make  his  debt;  *^*  though  of  course  he 
must  apply  to  the  court  appointing  the  receiver  for  leave  to  levy  on 
the  property  in  the  latter's  hands.  And  the  lien  of  a  judgment  will 
not  be  continued  beyond  the  statutory  period  by  the  mere  fact  that, 
during  such  period,  all  the  judgment  debtor's  property  is  in  the  hands 
of  a  receiver,  under  the  control  of  a  court  having  jurisdiction ;  and 
if,  during  this  period,  the  judgment  creditor  does  not  ask  permission 
of  the  court  appointing  the  receiver  to  levy  his  execution,  he  loses 
his  lien  by  his  own  neglect.*** 

f  476.    Taking  Befendamt  on  Caplai. 

At  common  law,  "the  writ  of  capias  ad  satisfaciendum  is  an  execu- 
tion of  the  highest  nature,  inasmuch  as  it  deprives  a  man  of  his  lib- 
erty till  he  makes  the  satisfaction  awarded;  and  therefore,  when  a 
man  is  once  taken  in  execution  upon  this  writ,  no  other  process  can 
be  sued  out  against  his  lands  or  goods."  ***  Hence  the  lien  of  the 
judgment  is  destroyed  by  an  execution  against  the  debtor's  person. 
It  may,  however,  revive,  in  the  few  cases  in  which  the  creditor,  fail- 
ing to  obtain  satisfaction  by  this  means,  is  permitted  to  resort  to 
other  remedies ;  but  not  as  against  intervening  rights.  "If  the  plain- 
tiff be  remitted  to  other  remedies  by  a  discharge  of  his  debtor  by  act 
of  law,  or  by  an  escape,  it  will  not  operate  to  restore  his  lien  on  the 
debtor's  property,  which  he  has  elected  to  waive  or  abandon,  as 
against  creditors  who  have  obtained  a  precedence  during  such  sus- 
pension." **•    Where  a  judgment  is  recovered  against  several,  and  a 

«S3  Southern  Bank  v.  Ohio  Ins.  Co.,  22  Ind.  181;  Central  Coal  &  Coke  Cto.  y. 
Southern  Nat.  Bank,  12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  334,  34  S.  W.  383. 

*2»  Savings  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Bear  Valley  Irr.  Co.  (C.  0.)  89  Fed.  32.    Compare 
Semple  v.  Eubanks,  13  Tex.  Civ.  App.  418,  35  S.  W.  500. 

434  3  Bl.  Comm.  414. 

4S0  BockhiU  v.  Hanna,  15  How.  180, 14  L.  Ed.  656. 

(727) 


§  478  LAW  OF  JUDOMENTa.  (Cb.  16 

capias  served  on  one  of  them,  who  executes  a  forthcoming  bond, 
which  is  forfeited,  this  does  not  extinguish  the  lien  of  the  judgment 
upon  the  land  of  the  others.*** 

§  477.    Payment. 

• 

The  Hen  of  a  judgment  is  discharged  by  payment  of  the  judg- 
ment.**^ But  a  tender  of  the  amount  of  the  judgment,  if  not  ac- 
cepted, does  not  extinguish  its  lien.***  An  attorney's  lien  upon  a 
judgment  affects  only  his  client's  interests,  and  not  the  right  of  the 
opposite  party  to  discharge  the  judgment  with  depreciated  funds.*** 
But  although  a  judgment  lien  or  obligation  may  be  exting^uished  at 
law  by  the  payment  of  the  debt,  yet,  for  the  benefit  of  a  surety  who 
has  paid  it,  the  lien  in  equity  continues  in  full  force.***  But  after  it 
is  thus  discharged,  it  is  said  that  the  lien  cannot  be  restored  by  any 
subsequent  agreement  between  the  parties ;  ***  although,  in  some 
jurisdictions,  it  appears  that  it  may  be  kept  alive  for  the  purpose  of 
securing  further  advances.**' 

S  478.    CaaoellAtioa  or  Entry  of  8ntlBfaoti«»a* 

A  judgment  creditor  who  enters  satisfaction  of  his  judgment,  or 
causes  an  execution  to  be  returned  satisfied,  authorizes  others  to 
treat  the  property  of  the  debtor  as  released  from  the  lien  incident  to 
the  judgment.***     And  so  a  judgment,  when  cancelled  by  order  of 

*2«  Leake  v.  Ferguson,  2  Grat  (Va.)  419. 

«27  Banks  v.  Evans,  10  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)  35,  48  Am.  Dec.  734.  But  where 
a  judgment  is  given  to  secure  the  payment  of  an  accommodation  note,  the 
renewal  of  the  note  at  maturity  does  not  constitute  payment,  so  as  to  dis- 
charge the  lien  of  the  judgment  Laucks  v.  Michael,  154  Pa.  355,  26  Atl.  314. 
A  Judgment  plaintiff  in  lawful  possession  of  lands  on  which  his  judgment  is 
a  lien  has  not  the  right  to  apply  the  rents  and  profits  therefrom  to  the  satis- 
faction of  his  judgment  as  against  the  owner,  who  is  not  a  judgment  de- 
fendant   Boggs  y.  Douglass,  105  Iowa,  344,  75  N.  W.  185. 

*28  People  V.  Beebe,  1  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  379;  Law  v.  Jackson,  9  Cow.  (N.  T.)  Wl. 

*a»  NeU  V.  Staten,  7  Helsk.  (Tenn.)  290. 

«3o  German- American  Sav.  Bank  y.  Fritz,  68  Wis.  390,  32  N.  W.  123. 

*ai  De  La  Vergne  v.  Evertson,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.)  181,  19  Am.  Dec.  411. 

*82  Peirce  v.  Black,  105  Pa.  342. 

«38  Page  y.  Benson,  22  111.  484;   Branch  Bank  v.  Ford,  13  Ala.  431.     Bat  a 
senior  Judgment  creditor,  who  erroneously  enters  satisfaction  of  his  Judg- 


CSh.  16)  THK  LIEN  OF  JUDOMBNT8.  §  481 

the  court,  ceases  to  be  a  lien  on  real  estate  owned  by  the  debtor  dtir- 
ing  the  life  of  the  judgment.***  On  the  same  principle,  where  the 
defendant  executed  his  notes  for  the  amount  of  the  judgment  ren- 
dered against  him,  which  was  subsequently  cancelled,  it  was  held  that 
the  judgment  ceased  to  exist,  and  there  was  no  longer  a  lien  upon 
the  defendant's  real  estate,  when  no  fraud  was  imputable  in  obtain- 
ing the  cancellation.*** 

§  479.    Salo  of  the  IiuicL 

A  sale  of  land  under  an  execution  extinguishes  the  lien  of  the  judg- 
ment on  the  land  sold.*'* 

§  480.    Acquisition  of  Title  by  Judcneat-Creditor. 

Since  a  judgment  is  a  general  lien  upon  all  the  debtor's  real  estate, 
it  does  not  merge  when  the  judgment-creditor  acquires  title  to  a  par- 
ticular portion  of  such  lands,  but  may,  in  ordinary  cases,  be  enforced 
against  the  remaining  lands.*' ^  In  case  the  creditor  should  become 
the  owner  of  the  only  piece  of  land  belonging  to  the  debtor,  there 
would  probably  be  a  merger  of  the  lien,  but  no  loss  of  the  right  to 
satisfy  the  judgment  by  levy  upon  personalty.  But  the  precise  ques- 
tion does  not  appear  to  have  come  before  the  courts. 

§  481.    Releaie  of  Lien* 

A  release  by  a  judgment  creditor,  at  the  instance  of  the  debtor,  of 
one  of  several  tracts  of  land  bound  by  a  judgment,  will  not  operate 
as  a  release  of  the  others.***  It  is  said  that  a  release  of  a  judgment- 
lien  may  be  by  parol,  but  the  proof  thereof  must  be  clear,  satisfactory, 

ment.  Is  stiU  entitled  to  priority,  on  such  satisfaction  being  set  aside,  as 
against  subsequent  Judgment  creditors,  whose  Judgments  were  recovered  pri- 
or to  the  entry  of  satisfaction,  and  who  have  in  no  way  been  misled  by  such 
entry.    McCune  v.  McOune,  164  Pa.  611,  30  Atl.  577. 

4«4  Worthington  v.  Nelson,  75  Iowa,  648,  36  N.  \V.  911. 

*«»  Polk  Co.  V.  Nelson  (Iowa)  43  N.  W.  80. 

48«  People  V.  Easton,  2  Wend.  297. 

*8T  Caley  v.  Morgan,  114  Ind.  350,  16  N.  B.  790.  And  see  Sellers  t.  Floyd, 
24  Colo.  484,  52  Pac.  674;  In  re  Voorhles,  46  S.  O.  114.  24  S.  E.  170. 

*38  Wolfe  V.  Gardner,  4  Har.  (Del.)  338. 

(729) 


§   481  LA.W  OF  JUDOMBNTS.  (Cb.   16 

and  conclusive.^**  There  may  also  be  a  species  of  rdease  in  equity 
or  by  estoppel.  Thus,  where  lands  subject  to  the  incumbrance  of  a 
judgment  are  conveyed  with  covenants  of  warranty  to  a  purchaser 
for  full  value,  the  grantee  and  his  successors  in  interest  occupy  a 
position  similar  to  that  of  sureties  for  the  judgment-debtor  and  are 
entitled  to  the  same  equities ;  and  a  release  by  the  judgment-creditor, 
without  their  consent  and  with  knowledge  of  their  rights,  of  any  se- 
curity to  which,  in  equit)%  they  would  be  entitled  on  payment  of  the 
judgment,  discharges  the  lien  of  the  judgment.****  In  a  case  in  New 
York,  it  appeared  that  the  agent  of  the  judgment-creditor  was  pres- 
ent at  a  sale,  by  the  debtor  to  a  third  person,  of  certain  lands  on 
which  the  judgment  was  a  lien,  drew  the  conveyance,  and  was  in- 
formed of  the  sale,  and  the  debtor  soon  afterward  delivered  to  such 
agent,  as  security  for  the  judgment-debt,  the  notes  given  in  payment 
for  the  land  conveyed.  It  was  held  that  the  receipt  of  these  notes  by 
the  agent  of  the  creditor,  with  knowledge  of  their  consideration,  al- 
though it  did  not  affect  the  creditor's  lien  upon  the  lot  as  security  for 
the  judgment  in  case  it  should  not  be  otherwise  satisfied,  imposed  on 
him,  in  equity,  a  duty  to  apply  the  proceeds  of  the  notes  in  reduction 
of  the  judgment.**^ 

*»•  Dalby  v.  Cronkhite,  22  Iowa,  222. 

**o  Barnes  v.  Mott.  64  N.  Y.  397.  21  Am.  Rep.  625. 

4«i  Ingalls  V.  Morgan,  10  N.  Y.  178.  So,  where  the  owner  of  a  judgment 
which  was  a  lien  on  personal  property,  and  on  real  property  subject  to  an 
attachment,  sold  the  personal  property,  but  made  no  attempt  to  enforce  his 
claim  against  the  realty,  and  two  years  thereafter  the  debtor  conveyed  it  to 
the  attaching  creditor  in  payment  of  his  daim,  which  was  more  than  the 
value  of  the  land;  and  the  grantee  thereafter,  with  the  judgment  creditor's 
knowledge,  paid  the  taxes  thereon,  claiming  to  own  it,  for  a  period  of  eight 
years,  it  was  held  that  the  judgment  creditor  had  abandoned  his  lien.  CaU 
V.  Oozart  (Tenn.)  48  S.  W.  312.  But  judgment  creditors,  by  bringing  suits  in 
equity  to  have  fraudulent  transfers  of  land  set  aside,  and  by  having  receivers 
appointed  therein,  not  of  the  real  estate  of  the  judgment  debtors,  but  of  the 
pei-sonal  property  and  the  rents  and  profits  of  the  real  estate  only,  do  not 
thereby  waive  their  legal  liens  on  the  lands,  or  on  the  surplus  fund  arisins 
from  the  sale  of  the  land  under  a  mortgage  thereon.  Wilkinson  v.  Paddock, 
126  N.  Y.  748,  27  N.  B.  407. 

(730) 


Ch.  17)  BSYIVAL  OF  JUDQMBNTi.  i  482 


REVIVAL  OF  JUDGMBNTS. 

§  482.  BevlTal  by  Motion  or  Suit 
482a.  Revival  by  Scire  Facias. 

4«3.  Venue  of  the  Action. 

484.  Right  to  sue  out  Scire  Facias 

485.  Time  of  Issuing  the  Writ 

486.  Pleadings. 

487.  Service  of  Writ 

488.  Parties  Plaintiff. 

489.  Parties  Defendant. 

490.  Same;  Judgment  against  Decedent 

491.  Same;  Joint  Defendants. 

492.  Terre-Tenants. 
498.  Defenses. 

494.  Same;   Payment  Release,  Set-Off, 

495.  Same;  Discharge  in  Banlcruptcy. 

496.  Same;  Invalidity  of  Original  Judgment 

497.  Same;   CcUateral  Agreements. 

498.  Judgment  on  Scire  Facias. 

499.  Practice  In  Pennsylvania. 


§  482.    ReTiTal  by  Motion  or  Suit. 

In  several  of  the  states,  when  a  judgment  has  become  dormant, 
or  has  lost  its  lien  by  the  expiration  of  the  statutory  period  of  lim- 
itation, it  may  be  revived,  for  purposes  of  lien  and  execution,  by  a 
formal  suit  or  action  brought  for  that  purpose,  having  all  the  char- 
acteristics of  a  plenary  proceeding.^  In  South  Carolina,  the  proper 
proceeding  to  revive  a  judgment  is  to  issue  a  summons  to  renew  ex- 
ecution, although  an  order  giving  permission  to  issue  execution  on 
a  judgment  will  revive  it.*  In  California,  the  statute  provides  that 
"in  all  cases  other  than  for  the  recovery  of  money,  the  judgment 
may  be  enforced  or  carried  into  execution  after  the  lapse  of  five 
years  from  the  date  of  its  entry,  by  leave  of  the  court,  upon  motion 

1  Ingraham  v.  Champion,  84  Wis.  235,  54  N.  W.  398;  Haupt  v.  Burton,  21 
Mont  572,  55  Pac.  110,  69  Am.  St.  Rep.  698. 

aLawton  v.  Perry,  40  S.  C.  255,  18  S.  E.  861;  Ex  parte  Graham,  54  S.  C. 
163,  j^  S.  K  67. 

(731) 


§  .482a  .LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  17 

or  by  judgment  for  that  purpose."  •  But  a  judgment  which  has  be- 
come barred  by  statute  cannot  be  revived  by  a  parol  promise  to  pay 
it.*  Nor  will  supplementary  proceedings  on  a  judgment  be  effectual 
to  keep  it  alive  or  take  the  place  of  an  action  to  revive  it."  In  some 
jurisdictions,  it  is  necessary  for  the  personal  representatives  of  a 
deceased  judgment  creditor  to  revive  it,  in  order  to  be  able  to  enforce 
it  as  against  the  judgment  debtor ;  and  whether  this  should  be  done 
by  a  formal  action,  or  may  be  eflfected  merely  on  motion,  will  depend 
upon  the  local  statute.* 

f  482a.    ReTlval  by  Soire  Faoiai. 

The  statutes  of  several  of  the  states  provide  that  a  judgment  shall 
cease  to  be  a  lien  on  real  estate  at  the  expiration  of  a  certain  period 
of  time  (usually  five  or  ten  years),  but  also  provide  that,  within  that 
period,  the  judgment  may  be  revived  by  a  proceeding  by  scire  facias, 
with  the  effect  of  continuing  its  lien  for  another  like  period.  When 
used  for  this  purpose,  the  writ  requires  the  defendant  to  show  cause 
why  the  judgment  should  not  be  revived  and  its  lien  continued.* 
The  purpose  of  a  proceeding  by  scire  facias  to  revive  a  personal 
judgment  is  not  to  raise  the  issue  of  the  validity  of  the  original  judg- 
ment, but  to  give  the  debtor  an  opportunity  to  show,  if  he  can,  that 
it  has  been  paid,  satisfied,  or  released,  and,  if  he  cannot,  to  avoid  the 
statute  of  limitations  against  it,  and  to  give  the  creditor  a  new  right 
of  enforcement  from  the  date  of  the  judgment  of  revival.  Such  a 
proceeding  is  not  a  substitute  for  an  action  of  debt  on  the  judgment, 
but  one  which  may  be  maintained  concurrently  with  such  action,  and 
without  regard  to  its  pendency.* 

»  Code  OIv.  Proc.  Cal.  §  685.  See  Cortez  v.  Superior  Court,  86  OaL  274,  24 
Pac.  1011.  21  Am.  St  Rep.  37. 

*  Ludwlg  V.  Huck,  45  lU.  App.  651. 

5  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Bralthwaite.  7  N.  D.  358.  75  N.  W.  244,  66  Am. 
St.  Rep.  653. 

•  See  Daisy  Roller  MUls  v.  Ward.  6  N.  D.  317.  70  N.  W.  271;  Reynolds  v. 
Crook.  95  Ala.  570,  11  South.  412;  Alford  v.  Hoag.  8  Kan.  App.  141.  54  Pac 
1105;  Selders  v.  Boyle,  5  Kan.  App.  451,  49  Pac.  320. 

7  Wonderly  v.  •Lafayette  County  (C.  Q)  74  Fed.  702;  City  Building  &  Loan 
Ass'n  V.  Xickey,  21  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  226. 

8  Lafayette  County  v.  Wonderly,  34  a  C.  A.  360,  92  Fed.  31X    An  acUon 

(732) 


Ch.   17)  REVIVAL  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §  482a 

In  this  sense,  the  proceeding  by  scire  facias,  while  it  partakes  in 
some  measure  of  the  characteristics  of  an  independent  action  at  law 
(as,  in  requiring  service  of  a  writ  and  a  plea  by  the  defendant),  yet 
is  not  regarded  as  a  new  suit.  In  contemplation  of  law  it  is  merely 
a  continuation  of  the  action  which  resulted  in  the  judgment  now 
sought  to  be  revived,  and  as  dependent  upon  the  liability  already 
created  by  that  judgment.®  Each  successive  writ  of  scire  facias  to 
revive  a  judgment,  or  to  recover  damages  for  the  breach  of  the  con- 
dition of  a  bond  on  which  the  judgment  has  been  rendered,  must  be 
founded  upon  the  judgment  which  immediately  preceded  it;  for  a 
recovery  upon  a  writ  of  scire  facias  is  a  bar  to  any  subsequent  recov- 
ery upon  the  original  judgment.***  It  must  be  observed  that  this 
writ,  as  a  remedy  for  the  revival  or  enforcement  of  a  judgment,  is 
not  universally  applicable  in  the  United  States.  In  some  jurisdictions, 
where  the  only  form  of  action  authorized  by  law  is  the  "civil  action," 
the  writ  of  scire  facias  is  unknown  in  practice.** 

brought  on  a  Judgment  by  regular  summons  and  complaint,  wherein  a  money 
Judgment  alone  is  prayed  for,  is  not  In  the  nature  of  a  scire  facias.  Lawton 
v.  Perry,  40  S.  C.  255,  18  S.  E.  861. 

•  Hatch  V.  Eustls,  1  Gall.  100,  Fed.  Oas.  No.  6,207;  Fitzhugh  v.  Blake,  2 
Cranch,  C.  C.  37,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  4,»i0;  Adams  v.  Rowe,  11  Me.  89,  25  Am. 
Dec.  266;  State  Treasurer  v.  Foster,  7  Vt.  52;  Ctomstock  v.  Holbrook,  16 
Gray  (Mass.)  Ill;  Gray  v.  Thrasher,  104  Mass.  373;  Eldred  v.  Hazlett*s 
Adm'r,  38  Pa.  16;  Irwin  v.  Nixon's  Heirs,  11  Pa.  419,  51  Am.  Dec.  559; 
Kirkland  v.  Krebs,  34  Md.  93;  Ingram  v.  Belk,  2  Strob.  (S.  C.)  207.  47  Am. 
Dec.  591;  Funderburk  y.  Smith,  74  Ga.  515;  Brown  y.  Harley,  2  Fla.  159; 
Perkins  y.  Hume,  10  Tex.  50;  Masterson  y.  C?undlff,  58  Tex.  472;  Carter  v. 
Carriger*s  Adm'rs,  3  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  411,  24  Am.  Dec.  585;  Blackwell  y.  State, 
3  Ark.  320;  Wolf  y.  Pounsford,  4  Ohio,  397;  Challenor  v.  Nlles,  78  111.  78; 
Denegre  v.  Haun,  13  Iowa,  240;  Eaton  y.  Hasty,  6  Neb.  419,  29  Am.  Rep. 
365;  Bankers'  Life  Ins.  Co.  y.  Bobbins,  59  Neb.  170,  80  N.  W.  484;  Long  y. 
Thormond,  83  Mo.  App.  227.  But  a  scire  facias  to  reyive  a  Judgment  on 
which  no  execution  issued  in  a  year  and  a  day  may  be  regarded  as  a  suit 
on  the  Judgment,  so  far  as  concerns  the  plaintiffs  right  to  discontinue  as  to 
parties  not  served.    Hanson  v.  Jacks,  22  Ala.  549. 

10  CoUingwood  y.  Carson,  2  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  220;  Custer  v.  Detterer,  8 
WaUs  &  S.  (Pa.)  28. 

11  Humiston  y.  Smith,  21  Oal.  129. 

(733) 


§  4&&  KAir  Om  IVDQMMHTSL.  C^«  17 


I  483.    Venue    of  the    Aetioa. 

It  is  a  settled  rule  that  a  scire  facias  to  revive  a  judgment  can 
issue  only  from  the  court  in  which  the  record  remains  of  the  judg- 
ment to  be  revived.^*  Thus,  proceedings  to  revive  a  judgment 
against  the  heirs  of  the  defendant,  so  as  to  have  execution  against 
lands  inherited  by  them,  must  be^  brought  in  the  court  where  the 
judgment  was  rendered,  and  an  independent  suit  therefor  in  another 
county,  where  a  transcript  had  been  filed  to  obtain  a  lien,  cannot  be 
maintained  where  the  lands  have  been  sold  without  fraud.**  Where 
the  defendant  resides  out  of  the  county,  service  must  be  perfected 
by  sending  out  process  to  the  county  where  he  is  to  be  found,  di- 
rected to  the  sheriff  of  that  county,  whose  duty  it  then  becomes  to 
serve  and  return  the  process.**  Where  a  judgment  has  been  ob- 
tained before  a  justice  of  the  peace,  and  a  transcript  taken  and  filed 
in  the  court  of  common  pleas,  a  scire  facias  to  revive  the  judgment 
must  be  issued  by  the  common  pleas  and  not  by  the  justice.**  This 
writ  cannot  be  brought  in  a  court  of  chancery  to  enforce  or  revive  a 

12  Vallance  v.  Sawyer.  4  Me.  62;  State  v.  Brown,  41  Me.  535;  State  v. 
Kinne,  39  N.  H.  129;  Carlton  v.  Young,  1  Aikens  (Vt.)  332;  Gibflon  T.  Davis, 
22  Vt.  374;  Osgood  v.  Thurston,  23  Pick.  (Mass.)  110;  In  re  Dougherty's  Es- 
tate, 9  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  189.  42  Am.  Dee.  326;  Boylan  v.  Anderson,  3  N.  J. 
Law,  529;  Tindall  v.  Carson,  16  N.  J.  Law,  94;  Conner  v.  Nelf,  2  Ind.  App. 
364,  27  N.  R  645;  City  Nat.  Bank  v.  Swink  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  49  S.  W.  130; 
Grimke's  Ex'rs  v.  Mayrant,  2  Breyard  (S.  C.)  202;  Dickinson  v.  Alllaon,  10 
Ga.  557;  Funderburk  v.  Smith,  74  Ga.  515;  Chapman  y.  Nelson,  31  La.  Ann. 
341;  Masterson  v.  Cundlflf,  58  Tex.  472;  Schmidtke  v.  Miller,  71  Tex.  103,  8 
S.  W.  638;  C^allenor  v.  Niles,  78  111.  78;  CSarnes  v.  Crandall,  4,  Iowa.  151; 
Wilson  v.  Tlernan,  3  Mo.  577. 

i«  Thompson  v.  Parker,  83  Ind.  96.  Compare  Kendig  v.  North,  7  Drf.  Ca 
R.  (Pa.)  574. 

1*  Dickinson  v.  Allison,  10  Ga.  557. 

IB  Brannan  v.  Kelley,  8  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  479;  Smith  v.  Wehrly,  157  Pa.  407. 
27  Atl.  700.  An  action  to  revive  a  judgment  may  be  brought  in  the  trial 
court  on  a  judgment  of  the  supreme  court  rendered  in  favor  of  plaintiff  on 
reversal  of  a  judgment  in  favor  of  del^endant  in  an  action  on  a  money  de- 
mand, though  the  judgment  of  the  supreme  court  was  never  certified  to  the 
trial  court,  nor  entered  in  its  minutes,  as,  in  such  case,  the  judgment  of  the 
supreme  court  wiil  be  considered  as  the  judgment  of  the  trial  court  Carotb- 
ers  v.  Lange  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  55  S.  W.  580. 

(734) 


Ch.  17)  REVIVAL  OF  JUDOMBNTS.  §   484 

decree,  unless  there  be  a  statute  authorizing  executions  to  issue  upoa 
decrees  in  equity.** 


I  484.    Bislit  to  Mmm  mt  WtAm  FaDlars. 

At  common  law,  a  party  was  not  entitled  to  maintain  a  scire  facias 
to  have  execution  of  a  judgment  where  there  was  no  change  of 
parties,  and  the  writ  was  available  only  in  cases  where  the  time  for 
issuing  execution  was  past.*^  But  according  to  the  modern  deci- 
sions, an  action  of  debt,  or  a  scire  facias,  may  be  brought  on  a  judg- 
ment after  an  execution  has  issued,  and  it  is  not  a  valid  objection  to 
such  a  proceeding  that,  at  the  time  of  its  commencement,  the  plain- 
tiff could  have  proceeded  by  execution.**  And  where  a  party  unnec- 
essarily sues  out  a  scire  facias,  when  he  might  have  an  immediate 
execution,  the  writ  should  not  be  quashed  for  that  reason,  but  ex- 
ecution should  not  issue  until  he  obtains  judgment  under  the  writ.** 
Complete  satisfaction  of  the  judgment  will  alone  suffice  to  prevent 
its  revival  in  this  manner.**  Thus  a  subsisting  levy  on  land  is  no 
bar  to  a  scire  facias  on  the  judgment  to  continue  its  lien  or  to  sub- 
stitute a  representative  of  either  party.**  So  a  conditional  appropria- 
tion by  an  auditor  to  a  judgment-creditor  in  the  distribution  of  pro- 
ceeds of  the  debtor's  real  estate,  will  not  prevent  the  reviving  of  the 
judgment  for  the  whole  amount,  where  no  money  has  been  actually 
received  upon  it,  and  the  conditions  attached  to  the  appropriation  have 

!•  Jeffreys  y.  Yarborough,  16  N.  O.  510;  Cartis  v.  Hawn,  14  Ohio,  185;  Lo- 
gan V.  Cloyd,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  201. 

IT  Harmon  v.  Dedrlck,  3  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  192. 

!•  Stewart  v.  Peterson's  Ex'rs,  63  Pa.  230;  Stille  v.  Wood,  1  N.  J.  Law,  118; 
Rogers  v.  Hollings worth,  95  Tenn.  357,  32  S.  W.  197.  The  right  to  a  manda- 
mus for  the  enforcement  of  a'  judgment  is  equivalent  to  the  right  to  issue  an 
execution  thereon  for  the  pnrposes  of  an  application  to  revive  the  Judgment 
on  scire  facias.    Wonderly  v.  Lafayette  Oounty  (C.  C.)  74  Fed.  702. 

i»  I^mbeon  v.  Moffett,  61  Md.  426. 

30  A  Judgment  which  has  been  paid  and  extinguished  by  the  owner  of  land 
on  which  it  was  a  lien  cannot  be  afterwards  revived  to  cut  out  other  liens. 
Henry  &  Ooatsworth  Co.  v.  Halter,  58  Neb.  685,  79  N.  W.  616.  A  judgment 
which  has  become  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations  cannot  be  revived  by 
scire  facias.    Browne  &  Manzanares  Co.  v.  Chavez,  9  N.  M.  316,  54  Pac.  234. 

SI  Trapnall  v.  Richardson,  13  Ark.  543,  58  Am.  Dec.  338. 

(735) 


§485  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Cb.  17 

not  been  fulfilled.**  So  a  scire  facias  may  be  issued  to  revive  a 
judgment  which  has  been  removed  by  a  writ  of  error  sued  out  with- 
out bail  and  still  pending;  for  a  writ  of  error  without  bail  is  not  a 
supersedeas.*'  .  But  the  writ  cannot  be  used  to  revive  a  judgment  on 
which  no  execution  could  ever  have  issued.** 


I  486.    Time  of  Iwrains  tbe  Writ. 

Where  the  statute  provides  that  no  judgment  shall  continue  a  lien 
on  realty  for  a  longer  period  than  five  years  (or  ten  years)  from  the 
day  of  entry  or  revivor,  unless  a  writ  of  scire  facias  to  revive  it  be 
sued  out  within  that  period,  the  limitation  of  the  time  of  bringing 
the  writ  begins  to  run  from  the  rendition  of  the  judgment.*'  But 
in  such  case  the  day  of  entry  of  the  judgment  is  to  be  excluded  in  the 
computation  of  the  period  within  which  it  must  be  revived.**  And 
where  the  last  day  of  the  pferiod  thus  computed  falls  on  Sunday,  a 
writ  of  scire  facias  issued  on  the  Monday  following  is  in  time  to  pre- 
serve the  lien.*^    And  if  the  process  of  scire  facias  to  revive  issues  a 

S3  Masser  v.  Dewart,  46  Pa.  534. 

*3  Boyer  v.  Rees,  4  Watts  (Pa.)  201. 

24  Turner  y.  Dupree*8  Adm'r,  19  Ala.  198;  Horton  v.  aark,  40  Ga.  412. 
But  In  Missouri,  the  statutes  having  provided  for  the  reyival  of  Judgments  by 
scire  facias,  without  making  any  exceptions,  the  courts  cannot  except  a  Judg- 
ment from  their  operation  on  the  ground  that  It  is  not  a  lien  on  property,  or 
because  no  execution  could  issue  thereon.  Lafayette  County  v.  Wonderly,  34 
C.  0.  A.  360,  92  B"ed.  313. 

SB  Scott  V.  Seelye,  39  La«  Ann.  749,  2  South.  809;  Ayre  v.  Burke,  82  Va. 
338,  4  S.  E.  618;  Browne  &  Manzanares  Co.  v.  Chavez,  9  N.  M.  316,  54  Pac. 
234.  The  general  law  as  to  the  limitation  of  actions  does  not  apply  to  the 
proceeding  to  revive  dormant  Judgments.  Bankers'  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bobbins, 
59  Neb.  170,  80  N.  W.  484.  As  to  retrospective  operation  of  statutes  limiting 
the  time  within  which  scire  facias  may  be  brought  to  revive  Judgments,  see 
Wrightman  v.  Boone  County,  31  C.  C.  A.  570,  88  Fed.  435.  As  to  the  effect 
of  nonresldence  or  personal  disabilities  of  the  parties  in  susp^idlng  the  run- 
ning of  the  statute  of  limitations,  see  Bartol  v.  Eckert,  50  Ohio  St  31,  83  K. 
E.  291.  Where  a  judgment  has  been  already  revived  on  scire  facias,  the  peri- 
od of  limitation  begins  to  run  from  the  date  of  the  revival  instead  of  the  date 
of  the  original  Judgment.    Kratz  v.  Preston,  52  Mo.  App.  251. 

2e  Green's  Appeal,  6  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  327;  Lutz's  Appeal,  124  Pa.  273»  16 
Atl.  858. 

ST  Lutz's  Appeal,  124  Pa.  273, 16  AU.  85a 
(73G) 


€h.   17)  RBVIVAL  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §  4S6 

single  day  within  the  time,  it  saves  the  bar ;  •*  and  the  terre-tenant 
may  be  connected  with  this  process,  though  not  named  in  it,  by  an 
alias,  which  latter  may  issue  any  time  within  five  years.**  In  some 
states,  the  life  of  a  judgment-lien  is  continued  for  a  certain  period 
after  the  death  of  the  debtor,  without  reference  to  the  time  that  may 
have  elapsed  since  its  entry  or  last  revival,  provided  it  had  not  then 
become  dormant.  But  elsewhere  it  is  held  that  if  more  than  five 
years  of  the  whole  period  (ten  years)  have  elapsed  during  the  life  of 
the  debtor,  then  the  creditor  has  only  the  remainder  of  the  ten  years 
in  which  to  revive  the  judgment  against  the  personal  represent- 
atives.^*  In  Pennsylvania  a  judgement  may  be  revived  against  terre- 
tenants  at  any  time  within  the  period  of  five  years,  notwithstanding 
there  may  have  been  an  intermediate  revival  by  scire  facias  without 
notice  to  them."^  But  an  alias  scire  facias,  issued  after  five  terms 
ffom  the  former,  is  not  sufficient  to  preserve  the  lien  of  a  judgment 
which  had  expired  in  the  interval.'*  In  the  same  state  is  was  for- 
merly held  that  where  there  was  a  stay  of  execution,  the  five  years 
within  which  the  judgment  must  be  revived,  did  not  begin  to  run 
until  the  expiration  of  the  stay.**  But  this  was  afterwards  changed 
by  a  statute.** 

S  486.    Pleadiass. 

The  writ  of  scire  facias  to  revive  a  judgment  is  not  merely  a  form 
of  summons  or  citation  to  the  defendant ;  it  also  serves  the  purpose 
of  a  declaration,  to  which  the  defendant  may  plead  or  demur,  as  to 
any  other  declaration.    And  as  the  proceeding  is  not  original,  but  a 

K  The  Issuance  of  a  writ  of  scire  facias  to  revive  a  Judgment  suspends  the 
running  of  the  statute  of  limitations  against  it  for  the  purposes  of  the  pro- 
ceeding, and  the  fact  that  the  Judgment  would  have  become  ineffective  for 
any  purpose,  by  limitation,  before  the  hearing,  had  the  proceeding  not  been 
commenced,  Is  no  defense  to  a  revival.  Lafayette  Oounty  v.  Wonderly,  34  C. 
C.  A.  360,  92  Fed.  313;  Fitzpa trick  v.  Leake,  47  La.  Ann.  1648,  18  South.  649. 

28  Llchty  V.  Hochstetler,  91  Pa.  444;  Porter  v.  Hitchcock,  98  Pa.  625;  Sll- 
verthom  v.  TovT-nsend,  37  Pa.  263. 

80  Handy  v.  Smith's  Adm'r,  30  W.  Va.  105,  8  S.  E.  604. 

81  Fursht  V.  Overdeer,  3  Watts  &  S.  470. 

fi«  Allen  V.  Liggett,  81  Pa.  486.  See  Stewart  v.  Justices  of  St.  Clair  County 
Court  (C.  C.)  47  Fed.  482. 

»s  Pennock  v.  Hart,  8  Serg.  &  R.  369. 
»4  Act  Pa.  March  26,  1827. 

1  LAW  JUDG.-47  (737) 


S  486  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  17 

continuation  of  the  former  action,  the  plaintiff  is  not  required  to  file 
a  new  declaration  or  rule  the  defendant  to  plead.*  •  Where  a  legal 
title  to  have  execution  of  the  original  judgment  is  not  set  out  in  the 
writ,  judgment  may  be  arrested  as  for  want  of  a  cause  of  action.** 
A  scire  facias  to  revive  a  judgment  must  therefore  follow  the  original 
judgment  in  amount,  date,  and  parties;  otherwise  it  is  defective  un- 
der a  plea  of  nul  tiel  record.*'^  But  it  is  sufficient  if  the  writ  con- 
tains such  recitals  as  will  point  to  the  judgment  intended  to  be  re- 
vived with  such  certainty  that  the  defendant  must  know  what  judg- 
ment is  meant.**  It  is  not  nec.essary  to  aver  that  execution  was  not 
issued  within  a  year  and  a  day;  that  the  judgment  remains  unpaid 
and  unsatisfied  is  a  sufficient  allegation.**  So  a  writ  of  scire  facias, 
in  reciting  a  judgment  on  a  prior  scire  facias,  need  not  redtc  the 
amount  for  which  such  judgment  was  obtained;  such  a  recital  is  in 
no  respect  uncertain,  informal,  or  insufficient,  when  the  writ  recites 
the  judgment  on  the  prior  scire  facias  as  it  would  be  set  out  in  the 
full  and  formal  record  of  that  judgment.^^  So  a  scire  facias  against 
the  heir,  on  a  judgment  recovered  against  the  ancestor,  need  not 
aver  ineffectual  proceedings  against  the  personal  representatives; 

ss  Blake  v.  Dodemead,  2  Strange,  775;  Governor  and  Company  of  Bank  of 
Scotland  v.  Fenwick,  1  Ezch.  792;  Nunn  v.  Glazton,  3  Exch.  T12;  Nesbit  v. 
Manro,  11  GUI  &  J.  (Md.)  261;  Bowie  v.  Neale,  41  Md.  124;  Blah  v.  WUliar,  50 
Md.  382;  McVeigh  v.  Bank  of  Old  Dominion,  76  Ya.  267;  Brown  ▼.  Harley,  2 
Fla.  159;  Hopkins  v.  Howard,  12  Tex.  7;  State  v.  Robinson,  8  Yerg.  (Tenn.) 
370;  Oalhouu  v.  Adams,  43  Ark.  238;  Farris  v.  People,  58  111.  26;  Mercbants* 
Mnt  Ins.  Co.  t.  Hill,  17  Mo.  App.  590. 

«•  McKinney  y.  Mehaffey,  7  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  276. 

87  Richter  v.  Cumroings,  60  Pa.  441;  Wolf  v.  Pounsford,  4  Ohio,  397;  War- 
field  Y.  Brewer,  4  Gill  (Md.)  265. 

s  8  Ward  v.  Prather*8  Adm'r,  1  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  4;  Davidson  r.  Hunter. 
22  Utah,  117,  61  Pac.  55C.  Though  the  scire  facias  must  correctly  recite  the 
original  judgment,  irregularities  not  misleading  will  not  avoid  it;  and  where 
defendant  has  suffered  a  default  thereon,  and  execution  has  issued,  no  mere 
Junior  creditor  can  object.    Landon  v.  Brown,  160  Pa.  538,  28  Atl.  921. 

89  Albin  V.  People,  46  m.  372.  But  if  the  statement  accompanying  the  scire 
facias  shows  on  its  face  that  the  Judgment  is  more  than  20  years  old.  and 
avers  merely  that  no  part  of  the  debt  has  been  paid,  It  does  not  rebut  the 
presumption  of  payment  of  the  Judgment  Hummel  v.  Lilly,  188  Pa.  463,  41 
Atl.  613,  68  Am.  St  Rep.  879.  Compare  National  Sav.  Bank  t.  Welcker.  21 
X>.  C.  324. 

40  Brown  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  Canal  Co.  (C.  (X)  4  Fed*  770. 

(738) 


Ch.  17)  REVIVAL  OP  JUDGMENTS,  §  487 

but  if  no  such  proceedings  have  been  had,  such  defense  must  be  set 
up  by  plea.*^  But  on  the  other  hand,  a  writ  of  scire  facias  to 
enforce  a  judgment  rendered  against  a  trustee  is  insufficient  if  it  be 
only  alleged  therein  that  the  plaintiff  recovered  a  judgment  against 
the  defendant  as  trustee.  It  should  appear  for  what  the  trustee  was 
made  chargeable.**  A  substantial  variance  between  the  recitals  in 
the  writ  of  scire  facias  and  the  judgment  to  be  revived  would  break 
the  continuity  of  the  lien;  but  if  the  objection  be  formal  and  tech- 
nical only,  it  will  not  affect  the  lien  of  the  original.** 

S  487.    Serrlee  of  Writ. 

At  common  law,  the  rule  is  that  two  returns  of  nihil  to  a  writ  of 
scire  facias  are  equivalent  to  a  return  of  scire  feci ;  that  is,  the  court 
thereupon  acquires  jurisdiction  of  the  defendant  and  may  proceed 
to  award  execution  on  the  original  judgment.**  But  here  an  im- 
portant distinction  is  recognized,  viz.,  that  if  execution  is  awarded 
upon  a  return  of  scire  feci,  the  defendant  is  concluded  by  the  judg- 
ment ;  but  when  it  is  awarded  upon  two  returns  of  nihil,  the  defend- 
ant may  afterwards  present  his  defense  by  audita  querela,  or  upon 
motion  to  the  court,  and  may  have  the  full  benefit  thereof.**'  And 
the  revival  of  a  judgment  by  scire  facias  for  purposes  of  execution, 
on  two  returns  of  nihil,  operates  merely  to  keep  in  force  the  local 
lien,  and  does  not  stop  the  running  of  the  statute  of  limitation  in 
another  state,  where  the  defendant  resides,  nor  support  a  new  action 
against  the  defendant  in  another  state.**    The  common-law  rule  is 

*i  Bogers  y.  Denham's  Heirs.  2  Grat.  (Va.)  200. 

42  Gibson  v.  Davis.  22  Vt.  374. 

*8  In  re  Dougherty's  Estate,  9  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  180,  42  Am.  Dec.  326. 

**  Randal  v.  Wale,  Cro.  Jac.  59;  Barret  v.  Cleydon,  2  Dyer,  168;  Bromley 
V.  Littleton,  Yel.  112;  Andrews  v.  Harper,  8  Mod.  227;  Warder  v.  Tainter, 
4  Watts  (Pa.)  270;  Chambers  v.  Carson,  2  Whart  (Pa.)  9;  Oumming  v.  Eden's 
Devisees  &  Terre-Tenants,  1  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  70;  Woodforlt  v.  Bromfield,  5  N. 
C.  187;  Ingram  v.  Belk,  2  Strob.  (S.  C.)  207,  47  Am.  Dec.  591;  Barrow  v. 
BaJley,  5  Fla.  9;  Dunlevy  v.  Ross,  Wright  (Ohio)  287;  Sans  v.  People,  3  Gil- 
man  aw.)  327;  Choate  v.  People,  19  111.  63;  Brown  v.  Wygant,  163  U.  S.  618, 
16  Sup.  Ct  1150,  41  L.  Ed.  284;  Kratz  v.  Preston,  52  Mo.  App.  251. 

4  5  Barrow  v.  Bailey,  5  Fla.  9;  Kratz  v.  Preston,  52  Mo.  App.  251;  Jones 
V.  George,  80  Md.  294,  30  Atl.  635. 

40  Owens  v.  McCloskey,  161  U.  S.  642,  16  Sup.  Ct.  693,  40  L.  Ed.  837;   Betts 

(739) 


§  488  ULW  OF  JUDOMBNTS.  (Cb.  17 

still  adhered  to  in  some  of  the  states.  Thus,  in  Massachusetts,  if 
the  law  prescribes  no  particular  form  of  notice  to  be  given  to  a 
defendant  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  it  is  for  the  court  to 
cause  such  notice  to  be  given  to  him  as  shall  be  reasonable  and 
enable  him  to  appear  and  defend  his  rights.*^  But  in  some  other 
states  it  is  held  that  the  writ  of  scire  facias  must  be  served  personally.** 
And  where  there  is  a  terre-tenant  of  the  land,  he  must  also  be  served 
with  process;  although,  if  he  appears  and  confesses  judgment  on 
the  scire  facias,  he  thereby  waives  the  objection  that  he  was  not 
served.**  In  Pennsylvania,  it  is  held  that  service  is  good  when  made 
on,  the  defendant,  who  remains  in  the  possession  of  his  real  estate^ 
although  he  has  made  an  assignment  for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors.^^ 
But  where  the  judgment  to  be  revived  is  against  two  defendants 
jointly,  the  scire  facias  must  be  served  on  both;  if  served  on  only 
one  of  the  joint  debtors,  it  cannot  afterwards  be  amended  so  as  to 
include  both,  so  as  to  save  the  bar  of  the  statute.'^ 

I  48&    Parties   Plaintiff. 

The  plaintiff  in  a  scire  facias  will  ordinarily  be  the  same  person 
who  was  i^aintifT  in  the  original  judgment,  and  in  such  case  his 
capacity  to  sue  out  the  writ  will  be  governed  by  the  same  rules  which 
determine  the  capacity  of  persons  to  maintain  other  species  of  ac- 
tions.   Thus,  a  married  woman  may  bring  a  scire  facias  to  continue 

y.  Johnson,  68  Vt  549,  85  Atl.  489;  Robb  v.  Anderson,  43  Dl.  App.  575:  Rice 
y.  Moore,  48  Kan.  590,  30  Pac.  10,  16  L.  R.  A.  198,  30  Am.  St  Rep.  318;  Hep- 
ler  y.  Davis,  32  Neb.  556,  49  N.  W.  458,  13  L.  R.  A.  565,  29  Am.  St  Rep.  457. 
But  in  Louisiana,  when  the  defendant  resides  in  another  state,  the  court  may 
appoint  a  curator  ad  hoc,  upon  whom  service  can  be  made,  and  thereupon 
a  Jud^nnent  may  be  rendered  binding  on  the  defendant;  a  suit  to  revive  a 
judgment  being  considered  one  quasi  in  rem.  Bertron  t.  Stewart,  43  La. 
Ann.  1171,  10  South.  295. 

47  Comstoclc  V.  Holbrook,  16  Gray,  111. 

*8  Feeter  v.  McCombs,  1  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  19;  Rice  v.  Talmadge,  20  Vt  378; 
Betts  V.  Johnson,  68  Vt  549,  35  Atl.  489;  Mendenhall  v.  Robinson,  56  Kan. 
633,  44  Pac.  610.    See  PhiUips  v.  Wait  106  Ga.  580,  32  S.  E.  842. 

*9  Dickerson's  Appeal,  7  Pa.  255;  White  v.  Harden,  154  Pa.  387,  26  AtL 
312. 

CO  In  re  Dohner's  Assignees,  1  Pa.  lOL 

61  Lyon  V.  Ford,  20  D.  C.  530. 

(740) 


Ch.    17)  REVIVAL  O^  JUDGMENTS.  §  489 

the  lien  of  a  judgment  against  her  husband,  the  judgment  having 
been  entered  in  her  favor  before  they  were  married.'*  When  the 
writ  is  used  to  revive  a  judgment  in  favor  of  an  intestate,  it  should  be 
issued  in  the  name  of  his  administrator;*  but  if  issued  in  the  name 
of  the  intestate,  it  may  be  amended  by  substituting  that  of  the  admin- 
istrator.*'" Where  the  judgment  creditor  has  become  a  bankrupt, 
the  right  to  procure  a  revival  of  the  judgment  devolves  upon  his 
trustee  in  bankruptcy.**  Where  the  judgment  has  passed  by  as- 
signment to  a  third  person,  the  determination  of  the  proper  plain- 
tiff in  an  action  to  revive  it  will  depend  upon  the  statutory  rules  in 
the  particular  jurisdiction.  If  the  law  requires  all  suits  to  be  brought 
in  the  name  of  "the  real  party  in  interest,"  the  scire  facias  should 
be  sued  out  in  the  name  of  the  assignee.  If,  however,  such  a  provi- 
sion does  not  exist,  a  suit  to  revive  a  judgment  is  properly  brought 
in  the  name  of  the  original  plaintiff,  even  though  the  judgment  may 
have  become  the  property  of  a  third  person.'* 

S  489.    Partiea  Defemdamt* 

The  general  rule  is  that  "all  the  parties  to  the  original  judgment 
must  be  parties  to  the  proceedings  to  renew  or  revive  that  judg- 
ment." *•    It  is  also  a  rule  that  all  persons  must  be  joined  who  have 

B2  Kinkade  v.  Cunningham,  118  Pa.  501,  12  Atl.  410. 

ft  3  Challenor  v.  Niles.  78  111.  78. 

»*  See  Brown  v.  Wygant,  163  U.  S.  618,  16  Sup.  Ct  1159,  41  L.  Ed.  284. 

»»  See  Marbury  v.  Pace,  30  La.  Ann.  1330;  McRoberts  v.  Lyon,  79  Mich. 
25,  44  N.  W.  160;  Wells  v.  Graham,  39  W.  Va.  605,  20  S.  E.  576;  Haupt  v. 
Burton.  21  Mont  572,  65  Pac.  110.  69  Am.  St  Rep.  698;  Bludworth  v.  Poole, 
21  Tex.  Oiv.  App.  551,  53  S.  W.  717.  Where  schre  facias  Is  brought  upon  a 
Judgment  which  has  been  assigned  to  third  persons  in  unequal  portions,  sep- 
arate judgments  of  revival  may  be  entered  thereon  In  favor  of  the  several 
assignees  for  the  amounts  respectively  due  to  them.  In  re  Ernst's  Estate, 
164  Pa.  87,  30  Atl.  371.  But  one  who  obtains  a  Judgment  against  a  garnishee, 
based  on  the  latter*s  indebtedness  to  the  principal  debtor  on  another  Judg- 
ment, cannot  of  his  own  volition,  and  without  attempting  to  levy  execution  on 
the  Judgment  recovered  in  the  garnishment  proceedings,  substitute  himself 
as  use  plaintiff  in  the  Judgment  which  his  debtor  holds  against  the  garnishee, 
and  issue  process  for  its  revival  and  collection.  Wherry  v.  Wherry,  179  Pa. 
84,  36  Atl.  165. 

B6  Funderburk  v.  Smith,  74  Ga.  515.  See  Messmore  v.  Williamson,  189  Pa. 
78,  41  AtL  1110. 

(741) 


§  490  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.   17 

a  substantial  interest  in  the  land  to  be  bound  by  the  lien.  But  the 
failure  to  make  a  naked  trustee,  who  has  no  beneficial  interest  in 
the  land,  a  party  to  a  writ* issued  for  the  revival  of  the  judgment,  wii 
not  destroy  the  hold  of  the  judgment  on  a  cestui  que  trust  who  is 
duly  joined.'^  In  a  recent  case  in  the  United  States  circuit  court 
for  the  western  district  of  Tennessee,  the  question  was  on  a  scire 
facias  to  revive  a  judgment  against  the  old  corporation  of  the  city  of 
Memphis.  It  appeared  that  the  legislature  had  abolished  the  char- 
ter of  that  city  and  organized  the  same  inhabitants  and  territory  into 
a  municipal  corporation  by  another  name,  and  the  supreme  court 
of  the  state  had  construed  the  legislation  as  creating  a  successor 
to  the  old  corporation  liable  for  its  debts.  It  was  therefore  adjudged 
that  scire  facias  was  the  proper  remedy  to  revive  a  judgment  ex- 
isting against  the  old  corporation  at  the  time  of  the  repeal  of  the 
charter,  against  the  new  corporation ;  and  the  fact  that  the  assets  of 
the  extinct  municipality  were  undergoing  administration  in  a  court 
of  equity  under  regulations  prescribed  by  the  legislature  did  not  de- 
feat the  plaintiff's  right  to  a  revivor,  nor  the  fact  that  there  was  no 
property  liable  to  execution  in  the  hands  of  the  new  corporation.'* 
A  number  of  judgments  against  the  same  person  may  be  consol- 
idated and  revived  in  one  amicable  action  of  scire  facias,  although 
one  of  them  is  also  against  another  defendant,  and,  when  so  revived, 
the  continuity  of  the  liens  is  preserved.'* 

S  490.    Same;    Judgment  Acalnst  Deeedemt. 


Scire  facias  is  the  proper  remedy  to  revive  a  judgment  against  an 
ancestor  so  as  to  compel  the  heirs  at  law  to  satisfy  it  out  of  lands 
inherited  by  them.**  But  as  to  the  proper  persons  to  be  made  de- 
fendants to  a  revival  of  this  sort,  there  is  the  greatest  diversity  of 
practice  in  the  different  states.     In  some  jurisdictions  the  rule  obtains 

eT  Bowers  v.  Harner,  3  Phila.  (Pa.)  146.  A  Judgment  against  a  former 
husband  cannot  be  revived,  after  his  death,  against  his  wife  and  her  second 
husband,  over  the  latter's  objection,  merely  because  he  is  the  husband  of 
decedent's  wife.    WesseU  v.  Gross  (Tenn.  Ch.  App.)  57  S.  W.  372, 

68  Grahtland  v.  City  of  Memphis,  12  Fed.  287. 

e»  Yeager's  Appeal,  129  Pa.  268,  18  Atl.  137. 

•0  Commercial  Bank  v.  Kendall,  21  Miss.  278. 
(742) 


Ch.  17)  RBVJVAL  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §  490 

that  it  is  not  necessary  to  make  the  executors  or  administrators  of 
a  deceased  defendant  parties  to  the  writ,  the  subject-matter  in  dis- 
pute being  beyond  their  province,  but  that  the  heirs  and  terre-ten- 
ants must  be  joined.**  In  Pennsylvania,  and  some  other  states,  on 
the  other  hand,  it  i^  established  law  that  where  a  judgment  has  been 
obtained  against  a  man  in  his  lifetime,  it  may  be  revived  after  his 
death,  for  the  purpose  of  lien  and  execution,  by  a  scire  facias  issued 
against  his  personal  representatives  alone,  and  in  such  case  it  is 
unnecessary  to  bring  in  the  widow  and  heirs  by  a  writ  against  them.'* 
And  conversely  it  is  held,  in  the  same  state,  that  under  these  cir- 
cumstances, if  the  writ  be  sued  only  against  the  heirs  in  possession 
of  the  inheritance,  it  is  erroneous;    the  executor  or  administrator 

must  be  made  a  party  to  it.''*     In  Indiana,  it  is  said  that  the  adminis- 

• 

trator  and  heirs  of  a  decedent  are  properly  joined  as  defendants 
in  a  proceeding  to  revive  a  judgment  against  him.'*  In  Maryland, 
where  the  original  defendant  in  a  judgment  is  dead,  and  scire  facias 
is  issued  to  revive  the  judgment  as  against  his  land,  it  must  be  is- 
sued against  the  terre-tenant  and  also  the  personal  representatives." 
It  is  to  be  remarked  that  a  scire  facias  against  the  heirs  and  terre- 
tenants  of  the  judgment  debtor  will  not  reach  property  never  owned 
by  such  debtor,  but  inherited  by  his  children  after  his  death  from  a 
third  person.** 

•1  Tessler  v.  Wyse,  3  Bland  (Md.)  40;  Walden  v.  Craig,  14  Pet  147,  10  L. 
Bd.  393;  Stewart  v.  Gibson,  71  Mo.  App.  232.  A  Judgmwit  of  revivor  of  a 
Judgment  against  an  intestate  imposes  no  personal  liability  on  the  heirs, 
though  they  are  necessary  parties  defendant  to  the  action.  Stewart  v. 
Glhson,  supra. 

«i  Middleton's  Ex'rs  v.  Middleton,  106  Pa.  252;  Grover  y.  Boon,  124  Pa. 
399,  16  Aa.  885;  McMiUan  v.  Red,  4  Watts  &  S.  237;  United  States  v. 
Houston  (D.  0.)  48  Fed.  207;  Hauck  v.  Gundaker,  21  Pa.  Oo.  Ot  R.  12; 
Cheraw  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Marshall,  40  S.  C.  59,  18  S.  E.  247.  See  Colenburg 
V.  Venter,  173  Pa.  113,  33  Atl.  1046;  CaUahan  v.  Fahey,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct  B.  488; 
In  re  Davey's  Estate,  9  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  125. 

•»  Brown  v.  Webb,  1  Watts,  411. 

•*  Graves  y.  Skeels,  6  Ind.  107. 

«»  Tiers  v.  Codd,  87  Md.  447,  39  Atl.  1044. 

••  Adams  y.  Stake,  67  Md.  447»  10  AtL  444. 

(743) 


§  492  ULW  OF  JUDOMBNTS.  (Ch.  17 


I  491.    Same;   Joint  Defeadaate. 

In  case  the  judgment  sought  to  be  revived  was  rendered  against 
two  or  more  joint  defendants,  it  is  a  practically  universal  rule  that 
the  scire  facias  must  follow  the  judgment,  and  all  the  original  de- 
fendants must  be  made  defendants  to  the  writ,  if  living;  if  one  has 
died,  the  writ  must  be  against  the  survivors  jointly  with  the  heirs 
and  terre-tenants  of  the  decedent  (or  his  personal  representative  in 
proper  cases) ;  and  it  is  irregular  to  take  proceedings  against  the  sur- 
viving defendants  alone,  or  against  the  representatives  of  the  dece- 
dent without  joining  the  survivors.*^  Hence,  where  a  plaintiff  for 
any  sufficient  cause  desires  to  revive  a  judgment  against  one  or  more 
q{  several  defendants  without  joining  all,  his  remedy  is  by  an  action 
of  debt  on  the  judgment;  it  cannot  be  done  by  scire  facias.**  So 
where  a  writ  to  revive  a  judgment  against  several  is  not  served  on 
one  of  them,  the  plaintiff  cannot  discontinue  the  proceeding  as  to 
him  and  revive  the  judgment  against  the  others.** 

S  492.    Terre-Teiiaiits. 

A  terre-tenant,  in  the  sense  in  which  the  term  is  used  in  connection 
with  the  subject-matter  now  under  consideration,  is  one  who  has 
an  estate  in  the  land,  coupled  with  the  actual  possession,  which  he 
derived  mediately  or  immediately  from  the  judgment-debtor  while 
the  land  was  bound  by  the  lien.    And  the  rule  is,  that  on  a  scire  facias 

•7  Sainsbnry  v.  Pringle,  10  Bam.  &  C.  751;  Fowler  v.  Rickerby,  9  Dowl. 
682;  Panton  v.  Hall,  2  Salk.  598;  Rex  v.  Chapman,  3  Anst  811;  Grenell  v. 
Sharp,  4  Whart.  (Pa.)  344;  Commonwealth  v.  Mateer,  16  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  416; 
Dowling  y.  McGregor,  91  Pa.  410;  McAfee  v.  Patterson.  2  Smedes  &  M.  (Min.) 
593;  Henderson  v.  Vanhook,  24  Tex.  358;  Bolinger  v.  Fowler,  14  Ark.  27; 
Calloway's  Heirs  y.  Eubank,  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  280:  Qray*s  Adm'r  y.  Mc- 
DoweU,  5  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  501;  Murray's  Adm'r  v.  Baker,  5  B.  Men.  (Ky..» 
172;  Huey's  Adm'r  y.  Redden's  Hehrs,  3  Dana  (Ky.)  488;  Mitchell's  Heirs  y. 
Smith's  Heirs,  1  Utt.  (Ky.)  243;Hallowell  y.  Brown,  8  Houst  (Del)  500,  32 
Atl.  392;  Rowland  y.  Harris  (Tex.  Ciy.  App.)  34  S.  W.  295. 

«8  Carson  y.  Moore,  23  Tex.  450.  But  compare  Patterson  t.  Walton.  119 
N.  C.  500,  26  S.  E.  43;  National  Exchange  Bank  y.  Preston,  97  Va.  222,  33 
S.  E.  546. 

09  Greer  v.  State  Bank,  10  Ark.  455;  Coleman  y.  Ed%rards,  2  Bibb  (Ky.>  505. 
Compare  Hanson  y.  Jacks,  22  Ala.  549. 

(744) 


Gh.   17)  REVIVAL  OF  JUDQMBNTS.  §  492 

to  revive  the  Ben  of  a  judgment  on  land  which  is  in  the  possession 
of  a  terre-tenant,  it  is  essential  that  the  terre-tenant  be  made  a  party 
to  the  proceeding. ■'^  In  Pennsylvania,  however,  under  the  wording 
of  the  statute,  it  has  been  decided  that  the  issuing  of  a  scire  facias 
within  five  years  after  the  judgment  was  rendered  continues  the  lien 
on  lands  that  had  been  conveyed  by  the  defendant,  although  tip 

m 

service  of  the  writ  is  actually  made  on  the  terre-tenant."'^  In  the 
same  state  the  statutes  provide  two  modes  of  reviving  a  judgment, 
(i)  by  agreement  between  the  parties  and  terre-tenants,  (2)  by  a 
writ  of  scire  facias.  And  it  is  held  that  a  revival  by  agreement  with 
the  judgment-debtor  alone  does  not  continue  the  lien,  as  against  the 
terre-tenants,  after  the  expiration  of  the  statutory  period.^*  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  an  amicable  revival  of  the  judgment  by  the  terre- 
tenant,  by  an  agreement  to  which  the  defendant  is  not  a  party,  will 
continue  the  lien  of  the  judgment  on  the  land.^*  And  if  the  writ  is 
served  upon  the  terre-tenant,  it  matters  not  that  judgment  is  not 
formally  entered  against  him  on  the  scire  facias.''* 

As  to  who  are  to  be  considered  terre-tenants,  the  authorities  are 
in  the  main  harmonious,  the'  definition  g^ven  at  the  beginning  of  this 
section  exhibiting  the  substantial  result  of  the  various  rulings.  And 
first,  the  party  must  have  a  substantial  interest  or  estate  in  the  land. 
Thus,  a  mere  occupant,  holding  in  the  character  of  a  yearly  lessee  of 

TO  Lusk  V.  Davidson,  Z  Pen.  &  W.  (Pa.)  229;  McOray  ▼.  Clark,  82  Pa.  457; 
Ix>ng  V.  MiUer,  158  Pa.  573,  28  Atl.  233;  Suter  v.  Findley,  5  Fa.  Super.  Gt. 
103;  Morton's  Ex'rs  v.  Croghan's  Terre^enants,  20  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  106;  Von 
Pnhl  V.  Rucker,  6  Iowa,  187.  In  Pennsylvania,  under  the  act  of  April  16, 
1840,  the  terre-tenant  is  not  entitted  to  notice  of  the  revival  of  a  Judgment 
as  between  the  original  parties,  unless  he  has,  at  the  time  of  such  revival, 
recorded  his  deed  or  taken  such  possession  of  the  land  as  amounts  to  con- 
structive notice  to  the  judgment  creditor.    Buck's  Appeal,  100  Pa.  109. 

Ti  Mcinweiser  v.  Hains,  110  Pa.  468,  2  Atl.  431. 

Ti  Baum  V.  Custer  (Pa.)  13  Atl.  771;  Armstrong's  Appeal,  5  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.) 
■352.  But  the  lien  of  a  judgment  on  a  farm  which  defendant  owned  and  lived 
on  when  judgment  was-  entered  is  continued  by  a  revival  of  the  judgment 
by  an  amicable  scire  facias,  signed  by  defendant  alone,  the  record  title  and 
the  possession  remaining  the  same,  notwithstanding  a  secret  conveyance  by 
defendant  to  his  wife.  Lyon  v.  Cleveland,  170  Pa.  611,  33  Atl.  143,  30  L. 
R.  A.  400,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  782. 

78  Sames's  Appeal,  26  Pa.  184;   Landon  v.  Brown,  IGO  Pa.  538,  28  Atl.  921. 

T4  Day  v.  Willy,  3  Brewst.  43;   Duncan  v.  Flynn,  9  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  321. 

(745) 


§   492  LAW  OF-  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  17 

the  defendant,  need  not  be  made  a  party  to  the  writ.*'  So  an  as- 
signee for  the  benefit  of  creditors  is  not  a  purchaser;  he  is  a  mere 
volunteer  standing  in  the  place  of  the  assignor,  and,  as  a  general 
rule,  has  no  rights  against  the  lien-creditors  of  the  assignor  which 
the  latter  did  not  himself  have.^*  Secondly,  the  person  to  be  bound  as 
terre-tenant  must  derive  his  title  from  the  judgment  debtor.  "Where 
a  party  is  in  possession  holding  title  adverse  to  that  of  the  defend- 
ant, or  paramount  to  his,  such  party  is  not  a  terre-tenant  within  the 
meaning  of  the  law,  because  his  rights  are  in  no  manner  affected  by 
the  judgment.  If  he  has  a  good  title,  the  judgment  does  not  bind 
his  land,  nor  can  a  sale  under  the  execution  affect  his  interest.  One 
who  purchased  the  lands  at  a  tax  sale,  and  went  into  possession,  is 
not  a  terre-tenant.  If  the  sale  was  valid,  the  purchaser  held  a  title 
paramount  to  the  judgment,  and  not  to  be  affected  by  the  proceed- 
ing^ under  the  execution.  If  the  sale  was  invalid,  then-  the  pur- 
chaser was  in  possession  without  title  under  the  judgment-debtor^ 
and  not  as  his  terre-tenant."  ^^  In  the  third  place,  the  person  des- 
ignated as  terre-tenant  must  have  obtained  his  title  from  the  judg- 
ment-debtor during  the  time  when  the  land  was  bound  by  the  lien  of 
the  judgment.  A  purchaser  after  the  lien  has  expired  is  not  a  terre- 
tenant  and  is  not  bound  by  the  judgment  on  the  scire  facias.'^    The 

T5  CUppInger  v.  Milier,  1  Pen.  &  W.  64. 

70  Kepler  v.  Erie  Dime  Savings  &  Loan  Co.,  101  Pa.  002.  Similarly,  as- 
signees in  banlcruptcy  are  not  terre-tenants  who  must  have  notice  of  the 
revival  of  a  judgment.    In  re  Huddell  (a  C.)  47  Fed.  207. 

T7  Polli  V.  Pendleton.  31  Md.  118. 

70  Dengler  r,  Kiehner,  13  Pa.  38,  53  Am.  Dec.  441.  In  this  case  Gihson* 
G.  J.,  said:  "A  Judgment-creditor  has  a  rTght  to  call  on  a  terre-tenant  of 
land,  purchased  by  him  from  the  debtor  while  it  was  bound  by  the  Judgment, 
to  show  why  the  debt  ought  not  to  be  levied  on  it;  and  the  terre-tenant 
having  slept  his  time,  being  warned,  is  concluded  as  to  everything  he  might 
have  made  matter  of  defense  to  the  scire  facias.  But  the  creditor  must  at 
least  have  laid  a  prima  facie  case;  he  must  show  that  he  whom  he  calls  a 
terre-tenant  actually  stood  in  the  relation  of  one,  else  there  will  not  have  been 
such  privity  between  them  as  would  estop  the  lattei^by  the  Judgment.  But 
who  is  a  terre-tenant?  Not  every  one  who  happens  to  be  in  possession  of  the 
land.  There  can  be  no  terre-tenant  who  is  not  a  purchaser 'of  the  estate, 
mediately  or  immediately,  from  the  debtor,  whUe  it  was  bound  by  the  Judg> 
meut;  and  when  he  has  taken  a  title  thus  bound,  he  must  show  how  the  lien 
of  it  has  been  discharged,  whether  by  payment,  release,  or  efQux  of  time. 
These  are  matters  of  defense  which  may  be  precluded.    True,  we  have  a 

(746) 


Ch.  17)  REVIVAL  OP  JUDGMENTS.  §  493 

failure  of  a  judgment-creditor  to  preserve  his  lien,  by  neglecting  to 
give  the  terre-tenant  notice  of  a  scire  facias  to  revive,  will  not  dis- 
charge the  liability  of  a  surety  on  the  bond  upon  which  the  judg- 
ment was  entered  J* 


On  the  general  principle  of  res  judicata  (which  applies  equally  to 
proceedings  by  scire  facias  as  to  any  other  action  or  suit),  and  on  the 
further  ground  that  this  method  of  reviving  a  judgment  is  merely  a 
supplementary  step  in  the  original  action,  the  defendant  is  absolutely 
precluded  from  going  behind  the  judgment  and  offering  in  defense  to 
the  scire  facias  any  matter  which  existed  before  the  rendition  of  the 
•original  judgment  and  might  have  been  presented  in  the  former  pro- 
ceeding.*®   In  no  case  and  under  no  circumstances  can  the  merits  of 

statute  which  directs  notice  to  be  given  to  occupants,  but  only  to  let  the 
lessee  of  a  terre-tenant  in  to  a  defense,  which  his  landlord  may  have  neg- 
lected to  make,  for  bis  protection.  The  facts  of  this  case  are,  that  the  estate 
had  been  bound  by  the  Judgment,  but  that  the  lien  of  it  had  expired  when  the 
ancestor  of  the  plaintiffs  purchased  It  It  had  ceased  to  be  a  judgment  of 
greater  effect  against  the  land  than  it  was  against  the  debtor's  chattels,  and 
the  purchaser's  title  was  paramount  to  it.  He  was  not  a  terrertenant  or  the 
lessee  of  a  terre-tenant,  and  as  he  had  not  a  day  in  court,  the  judgment, 
being  inter  alios,  was  not  an  estoppel.  The  case  is  clearly  within  the  prin- 
ciple of  Mitchell  V.  Hamilton  [8  Pa.  496],  and  is  ruled  by  It." 

TO  Kindt's  Appeal,  102  Pa.  441. 

«o  Aliens  v.  Andrews,  Cro.  Ellz.  283;  Cook  v.  Jones,  Cowp.  727;  Thomas  v. 
Williams,  3  Dowl.  P.  C.  655;  Baylis  y.  Hay  ward,  4  Adol.  &  E.  256;  Dickson  v. 
Wilkinson,  3  How.  57,  11  L.  Ed.  491;  United  States  v.  Thompson,  Gilp.  614, 
Fed.  Gas.  No.  16,487;  Smith  v.  Eaton,  36  Me.  298,  58  Am.  Dec.  746;  Spring- 
field Card  Manuf  g  Co.  v.  West,  1  Cush.  (Mass.)  388;  Thayer  v.  Tyler,  10  Gray 
(Mass.)  164-;  Sigourney  v,  Stockwell,  4  Mete.  (Mass.)  518;  Stephens  v.  Howe, 
127  Mass.  164;  Bobbins  v.  Bacon,  1  Root  (Oonn.)  548;  Bradford  v.  Bradford, 
5  Conn.  127;  McFarland  v.  Itwin,  8  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  77;  Cardesa  v.  Humes,  5 
Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  65;  Davidson  v.  Thornton,  7  Pa.  128;  Carr  v.  Townsend's 
Bx'rs,  63  Pa.  202;  Weaver  v.  Wible,  72  Pa.  409;  Pittsburgh,  C.  &  St  L. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Marshall,  85  Pa.  187;  Wurzberger  v.  Carroll,  8  Kulp  (Pa.)  266; 
Mulligan  y.  Devlin,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  465;  Loeber  v.  Moore,  20  D.  0.  1;  Wil- 
lett  V.  Otterback,  Id.  324;  Kemp  v.  Cook,  6  Md.  305;  May  v.  State  Bank,  2 
Rob.  (Va.)  56,  40  Am.  Dec.  726;  Ferebee  v.  Doxey,  28  N.  C.  448;  Koon  v. 
Ivey,  8  Rich.  37;  Camp  v.  Baker,  40  Ga.  148;  Miller  v.  Shackelford,  16  Ala. 
95;  Betancourt  v.  Eberlin,  71  Ala.  461;  Mathews  v.  Mosby,  13  Smedes  &  M. 
(Miss.)  422;  Anderson  v.  Williams,  2  Cushm.  (Miss.)  684;  Pollard  v.  Eckford, 

(747) 


§   493  LAW  OP  JUDGMENTS.  (Ch.  17 

the  original  judgment  be  inquired  into  by  the  defendant  on  a  writ  to 
revive  it.  As  a  rule,  therefore,  the  only  allowable  pleas  to  a  scire 
facias  upon  a  judgment  are  (i)  nul  tiel  record  (under  which  the 
defendant  may  deny  the  existence  of  the  original  judgment  or  allege 
that  it  is  entirely  void),  and  (2)  payment,  including  release,  satisfac- 
tion,  or  discharge  of  the  original  judgment.*^  Thus  the  objection 
that  a  bond  and  warrant  were  usurious  cannot  be  taken  to  a  scire 
facias  on  the  judgment  confessed  on  the  warrant.®*  Nor  can  the 
invalidity  of  the  consideration  for  the  contract  on  which  the  judg- 
ment was  rendered  be  shown  in  defense,*'  nor  the  coverture  or  other 
disability  of  one  of  the  parties,®*  nor  is  it  permissible  to  set  up  in 
defense  that  the  judgment  sought  to  be  revived  was  obtained  by 
fraud,**  or  that  there  was  fraud  in  the  negotiation  of  the  note  on 
which  the  judgment  was  given,  before  suit  was  begun  on  it.**  Again, 
the  pendency  of  an -action  of  debt  on  a  judgment  concurrently  with 
a  proceeding  by  scire  facias  for  its  revival  is  not  a  defense  to  the  lat- 
ter proceeding,  nor  is  a  judgment  for  the  plaintiff  in  the  former 
action  before  the  hearing  on  the  writ.*^  A  general  denial  of  each 
and  every  allegation  of  the  writ  not  admitted  in  the  answer  is  not  a 
form  of  defense  permitted  in  scire  facias  to  revive  a  judgment.** 
But  of  course  the  statute  of  limitations  is  a  good  defense  to  the  scire 
facias,  though  it  must  be  specially  pleaded,**  and  also  the  defend- 
ant may  show  that  his  position  with  reference  to  the  judgment  is  that 

50  Miss.  C31;  Baxter  r.  Dear,  24  Tex.  17,  76  Am.  Dec  89;  City  Nat  Bank 
V.  Swink  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  49  S.  W.  130;  Nestlerode  v.  Foster,  8  Ohio  ar. 
Ot.  R.  70;  Bell  v.  Williams,  4  Sneed  (Tenn.)  196;  Love  t.  Allison,  2  Tenn.  Ch. 
Ill;  Vredenburgh  v.  Snyder,  6  Iowa,  39;  Watkins  T.  State,  7  Mo.  334;  BUej's 
Adm*r  v.  McCord's  Adm'r,  24  Mo.  265. 

81  Blackburn  v.  Beall,  21  Md.  208;  Dowling  ▼.  McGregor,  91  Pa.  410;  Me- 
Cracken  v.  Swartz,  5  Or.  62. 

8«  Lysle  V.  Williams,  15  Serg.  &  R.  135;  Blckel  ▼.  Cleaver,  13  Pa.  Co.  Ct  B. 
314. 

83  Mulligan  v.  Devlin,  2  Pa.  Dist  B.  685. 

84  Lauer  v.  Ketner,  162  Pa.  265.  29  AU.  908»  42  Am.  St.  Bep.  838. 
sBBnmo  v.  Oviatt,  48  La.  Ann.  471,  19  Soutli.  464. 

86  Siipplee  V.  Halfmann.  161  Pa.  33,  28  Atl.  941. 

87  Lafayette  County  v.  Wonderly.  34  C.  C.  A.  360.  92  Fed.  313. 

88  Wonderly  v.  Lafayette  County  (C.  C.)  77  Fed.  605. 
«»  Jones  V.  George,  80  Md.  294,  30  Atl.  635. 

(748) 


Ch.   17)  REVIVAL  OF  JUDOMBNTS.  §  494 

of  a  surety  only.*®  Where  the  charter  of  a  corporation  makes  the 
stockholders  personally  liable  for  all  debts  except  loans,  and  a 
judgment  is  obtained  against  the  corporation  and  a  scire  facias  sued 
out  against  the  stockholders  to  charge  them  personally,  there  are 
no  defenses  open  to  them  except,  first,  that  they  are  not  stockholders, 
or,  second,  that  the  debt  on  which  the  judgment  was  founded  was 
for  a  loan.*^ 

But  there  may  be  exceptional  cases  in  which  the  general  rule 
would  not  be  strictly  enforced.  Thus,  if  the  defendant  dies  after 
verdict  and  before  judgment,  and  his  administrator  becomes  a  party 
to  the  suit  and  judgment  passes  against  him,  and  execution  is  issued 
and  returned  unsatisfied,  then,  on  scire  facias  against  the  adminis- 
trator, he  may  well  plead  no  assets  oi^  insolvency,  for  he  had  no  time 
to  make  such  plea  in  the  original  suit.*'  And  indeed,  in  one  state, 
it  is  held  that  a  defendant  may  set  up  any  grounds  he  has  in  opposi- 
tion to  a  motion  to  revive  a  judgment  and  to  have  execution.*' 

§  404.    Same;   Payment,  Release,  Set-Off* 

As  we  have  already  stated,  payment,  satisfaction,  or  release  of  the 
original  judgment  is  one  of  the  defenses  available  in  an  action  by  scire 
facias  to  revive  it.**  It  is  also  permissible  for  the  defendant  to  avail 
himself,  in  such  a  proceeding,  by  proper  allegations,  of  the  presump- 
tion of  payment  which  arises  from  the  lapse  of  a  great  period  of  time 
since  the  rendition  of  the  judgment  without  payments  on  it  or  steps 
taken  to  enforce  it.**    And  it  is  said  that  he  may  plead  both  payment 

•0  Neetlerode  v.  Foster.  8  Ohio  Clr.  Ct.  R.  70. 

•1  Wilson  V.  Stockholders  of  Pittsburgh  &  Youghiogheny  Goal  Oo.,  43  Pa.  424. 

•a  Hatch  v.  Eustis,  1  Gall.  160,  Fed.  Gas.  No.  6,207.  And  see  Oolwell  v. 
Rockwell,  100  Pa.  133. 

»»  McLeod  V.  Williams,  122  N.  G.  451,  30  S.  E.  129. 

»4Hayden  v.  Slaughter,  43  La.  Ann.  385,  8  South.  919;  Smith  y.  Goray,  196 
Pa.  602,  46  Atl.  855.  If  the  defendant  fails  to  appear  and  set  up  a  defense 
of  part  payment,  the  question  of  payment  is  res  Judicata.  Babb  v.  Sullivan, 
43  S.  G.  436,  21  S.  E.  277.  The  plea  (or  affidavit  of  defense)  must  allege 
payment  of  the  Judgment  sought  to  be  revived;  if  It  alleges  payment  of  the 
original  debt,  it  is  not  sufficient.    Nealon  v.  Mc>!eal,  3  Lack.  Jur.  (Pa.)  117. 

95Steltzer  v.  Steltzer,  10  Pa.  Super.  Gt.  310;  Wlttstruck  v.  Temple,  58 
Neb.  16,  78  N.  W.  456.  Where  the  Judgment  is  more  than  20  years  old,  it 
will  not  be  revived,  the  presumption  being  that  it  has  been  paid.    Green  y. 

(749) 


§  495  LAW  OF  JUDOMBNTS.  (Ch.   17 

and  presumption  of  payment.**  Accord  and  satisfaction  is  also  a 
proper  plea  to  a  scire  facias  to  revive  a  judg^ent.*^  But  evidence 
is  not  admissible  of  payment  anterior  to  the  rendition  of  the  original 
judgment. •■  And  so,  where  a  separate  judgment  has  been  rendered 
against  one  obligor  on  a  joint  and  several  obligation,  and  scire  facias 
is  issued  to  revive  the  judgment,  the  defendant  cannot  avail  himself 
of  a  release  given  to  his  co-obligor  subsequent  to  the  original  judg- 
ment.**  Set-off  or  counterclaim  is  in  no  case  available  as  a  de- 
fense.^®*  A  terre-tenant,  but  no  one  else,  may  |:Jead  that  the  land  is 
discharged  from  the  lien  of  the  original  judgment.**^ 

§  495.    Saaiei   DisoharKo  ia  Bankniptoy. 


A  discharge  in  bankruptcy  is  also  a  good  defense  to  a  scire  facias 
to  revive  a  judgment,  provided  the  defendant  was  so  discharged  after 
the  rendition  of  the  original  judgment ;  if  before,  he  ought  to  have 
pleaded  it  in  the  principal  suit.*®*  But  where  a  judgment  entered 
before  the  institution  of  bankruptcy  proceedings  is  revived  by  scire 
facias,  after  the  discharge  of  the  bankrupt,  upon  the  land  subject  to 
its  lien  when  entered,  and  so  restricted  that  it  can  only  be  enforced 
on  such  real  estate  (and  against  the  proceeds  thereof  in  the  hands  of 
a  trustee  for  sale),  the  defendant  is  fully  protected,  and  any  execu- 
tion issued  on  the  judgment  would  be  restrained  accordingly.**'  In 
the  case  of  a  scire  facias  to  revive  a  judgment  of  revival,  a  plea  that 

Plattsburg,  13  Pa.  Co.  Gt.  R.  335.  In  Nebraska,  the  lapse  of  14  yeiirs  after 
the  entry  of  a  judgment  and  before  a  proceeding  to  revive  is  instituted,  with- 
out the  issuance  of  an  execution,  raises  the  presumption  of  payment,  whlcli, 
however,  is  not  conclusive.    WittstruOlc  v.  Temple,  supra. 

00  De  Ford  v.  Green,  1  Marv.  (Del.)  316,  40  Atl.  1120. 

97  McCullough  V.  Franklin  Goal  Co.,  21  Md.  256. 

»8  McVcagh  V.  Little,  7  Pa.  279;  Trader  v.  Lawrence,  182  Pa.  233,  37  AtL 
812. 

09  United  States  v.  Thompson,  Gilp.  614.  Fed.  Cas.  No.  16.487. 

100  Jenkins  v.  Anderson  (Pa.)  11  Atl.  558;  Anderson  v.  Gage,  Dud.  (S.  C) 
319. 

101  Sllverthom  v.  Townsend,  37  Pa.  263. 

102  Spring  Run  Coal  Co.  v.  Tosier,  102  Pa.  342;  Stewart  v.  Colwell,  24  Pa. 
67;  Duncan  v.  Hargrove,  22  Ala.  150;  In  re  Wesson  (D.  C.)  4  Hughes,  ri9o 
S8  Fed.  855. 

loa  Walters  v.  Oyster  iPa.)  1  Atl.  430. 

(750) 


1.   17)  RBVIVAL  OF  JUDGMENTS.  §  496 

e  defendant  was  discharged  as  a  bankrupt  at  a  time  which  was 
ter  the  original  judgment  but  before  the  judgment  of  revival,  comes 
o  late  and  is  inadmissible.^®* 


I  496.    Same;    InTalldity  of  Orlsliud  Jndsment* 

Under  a  plea  of  nul  tiel  record  to  a  scire  facias  to  revive  a  judg- 
ent,  the  defendant  may  take  advantage  of  any  facts  (as  total  want 
jurisdiction)  which  make  the  original  judgment  absolutely  void; 
It  if  the  judgment  be  not  absolutely  void,  the  defendant  cannot, 
ider  this  plea,  object  to  mere  errors  or  irregularities.^®"  Thus,  th« 
ilure  to  file  a  complaint  in  a  suit  commenced  by  attachment,  al- 
ough  an  irregularity  for  which,  on  appeal,  a  judgment  by  default 
Duld  be  reversed,  is  no  defense  to  a  scire  facias  to  revive  the  judg- 
ent  recovered  in  that  suit.^®'  So  the  defendant  is  estopped  to  make 
e  defense  that  the  judgment  was  rendered  against  him  by  default 
I  insufHcient  service,  where  he  has  pleaded  the  same  judgment  in 
ir,  on  a  plea  of  former  recovery,  in  a  subsequent  action  on  the  same 
;mand.^®^  The  defendant  can  indeed  move  to  set  aside  the  original 
dgment  because  surreptitiously  obtained,  or  the  judgment  will  be 
)ened  if  given  on  default  in  ignorance  of  the  party's  rights,  or  upon 
e  showing  of  a  defense  which  arose  afterwards ;  but  otherwise  he 
n  only  object  by  showing  that  the  judgment  has  been  paid  or  never 
:isted.^®"  But  judgments  which  are  absolute  nullities  cannot  be 
vived.  They  cannot  be  continued  in  existence  when  they  never  had 
ly  life."* 

104  Stewart  v.  Colwell,  24  Pa.  67. 

105  Campbeirs  Appeal,  118  Pa.  128,  12  Atl.  299;  Haner's  Appeal.  6  Watts  &  j 
(Pa.)  473;  Davidson  v.  Thornton,  7  Pa.  128;  Tripp  v.  Potter,  33  N.  C.  121;  ' 
L'Fadden  v.  Lockhart,  7  Tex.  573;  Anthony  v.  Humphries,  9  Ark.  176;   Bell 
Williams,  4  Sneed  (Tenn.)  196;   Haynes  v.  Aultman,  Miller  &  Co.,  36  Neb.  ! 
7,  54  N.  W.  511;   Loeber  v.  Moore,  20  D.  C.  1;   Harper  v.  Cunningham,  8 

)p.  D.  0.  430;  Ulmer  v.  Frankland  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  766.  ; 

106  Betancourt  v.  Eberlin,  71  Ala.  461.  j 

107  Kennedy  v.  Bambrick,  20  Mo.  App.  630. 

108  Weber  v.  Detwiller  (Pa.)  8  Atl.  910. 

109  In  re  Board  of  Administrators,  37  La,  Ann.  916;  Enewold  v.  Olsen,  39 
?b.  59.  57  N.  W.  765,  22  L.  R.  A.  573,  42  Am.  St  Rep.  557;  Wittstruck  v. 
imple,  58  Neb.  16,  78  N.  W.  456. 

(751) 


f    498  LAW  OF  JUDGMENTS.  (CSl.  17 


S  497.   Sune;.  €)oll»te««l 

It  IS  no  defense  to  the  revival  of  a  judgment  that  the  plaintiff  had 
agreed  not  to  issue  execution.*^'*  And  so  a  verbal  assurance  by  a 
grantor  that  a  clause  in  the  deed,  reserving  the  lien  of  a  judgment 
owned  by  him,  should  never  be  enforced,  in  whole  or  in  part,  against 
the  grantee,  one  of  the  heirs  of  the  defendant  in  the  judgment,  on 
the  ground  of  which  the  deed  was  accepted,  is  a  purely  voluntary 
contract,  and  void  in  a  scire  facias  for  revival  against  the  grantee  as 
an  heir.^^^  But  on  the  other  hand,  under  the  plea  of  payment,  the 
defendant  may  give  in  evidence  that  when  he  executed  the  bond  and 
warrant  upon  which  the  judgment  was  confessed,  the  plaintiff  prom- 
ised to  cancel  it  upon  an  event  which  has  occurred  since  the  judg- 
ment.*** So  an  agreement  entered  into  prior  to  the  date  of  a  judg- 
ment, as  to  the  mode  of  its  discharge,  but  which  was  not  to  be  exe- 
cuted until  afterwards,  and  all  payments  made  in  pursuance  of  such 
agreement,  are  admissible  in  evidence  in  support  of  the  plea  of  pay- 
ment  and  satisfaction.**'  Also,  the  terre-tenant  may  offer  evidence 
of  a  coUatersrf  agreement  between  the  original  parties,  the  effect  of 
which  is  not  to  impair  the  judgment  but  to  restrict  its  lien."* 

§  498.    J«48»eat  on  Solve  Faotas. 

According  to  the  practice  obtaining  in  a  majority  of  the  states, 
and  founded  on  the  view  that  this  species  of  proceeding  is  not  a  new 
suit  but  a  continuation  of  the  original  action,  it  is  error  for  the  court 
to  proceed  to  render  a  new  judgment,  on  a  scire  facias  to  revive; 
the  proper  entry  is  that  the  plaintiff  have  execution  of  the  judg- 
ment mentioned  in  the  writ  and  his  costs.***    It  is,  however,  held 

"0  Ladd  V.  The  Church.  6  Phila.  (Pa.)  591. 

111  Codding  v.  Wood,  112  Pa.  371,  3  Atl.  455. 

112  Hartzell  v.  Reiss,  1  Bin.  (Pa.)  288.  See  Smith  y.  Smith,  135  Pa.  48.  21 
Atl.  168. 

118  Downey  v.  Forrester,  35  Md.  117. 

11*  Sankey  v.  Reed,  12  Pa.  95. 

116  Denegre  v.  Haun,  33  Iowa,  240;  Hamphreya  v.  Lnndj,  87  Mo.  S20; 
Ilanly  y.  Adams,  15  Ark.  232;  Chimp  y.  Gainer,  8  Tex.  372;  Mnrmj'B  Adm*r 
y.  Baker,  5  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  172;  Sogers  y.  HoUlngsworth,  96  Tenn.  967,  82 
(752) 


.   17)  REVIVAL  OP  JUDOMBNTS.  §   498 

some  jurisdictions  that  the  judgment  on  scire  facias  must  recite 
I  original  judgment  with  such  particularity  as  to  identify  it,  and 
it  any  substantial  variance  will  break  the'  continuity  of  the  lien.^^* 
id  in  some  states,  the  judgment  on  this  writ  should  declare  the 
ount  presently  due,  by  liquidating  the  amount  of  principal  and 
rrued  interest  on  the  original  judgment,  and,  if  the  new  judgment 

0  bear  interest,  it  should  specify  the  date  from  which  such  interest 
:o  begin.**^ 

[n  Vermont,  the  law  requires  that  the  court  shall  give  judgment 
the  plaintiff  for  the  amount  of  the  original  judgment  with  in- 
est,  and  costs  on  the  scire  facias ;  and  this  requires  a  new  judg- 
nt  which  merges  the  original  judgment,  and  is  the  judgment  to 
described  in  the  execution.^*®  But  in  those  states  where  the  en- 
on  a  scir£  facias  is  but  a  reiteration  of  the  former  judgment,  and 
:  an  independent  sentence,  it  follows  that  if  the  original  judgment 
reversed,  a  judgment  on  a  scire  facias  to  revive  it  will  likewise 

119 

■ 

\n  order  that  a  judgment  be  revived,  made  in  a  proceeding  there- 
,  in  which  all  proper  parties  are  before  the  court,  is  conclusive 
the  question  of  the  right  to  revive,  as  against  any  objection  based 

X,  197.    See  Marx  v.  Sanders.  08  Ala.  500,  11  South.  764.    A  judgment  for 

possession  of  land  may  be  revived  the  same  as  a  Judgment  in  a  personal 

ion,  and  the  judgment  as  revived  should  be  that  plaintiff  have  execution, 

1  be  given  the  possession  as  against  defendants  and  their  successors, 
apt  V.  Burton,  21  Mont.  572,  55  Pac.  110,  69  Am.  St.  Rep.  G98.  Ajudg- 
Lit  purporting  to  revive  the  execution  issued  on  a  judgment  sought  to  be 
ived  is  amendable  so  as  to  make  it  recite  that  the  judgment  itself  is  re- 
ed.    Phillips  V.  Wait.  106  Ga,  848.  32  S.  E.  647. 

i«  See  Worman*8  Appeal,  110  Pa.  25,  20  Atl.  415;  Zeiders*  Appeal.  137  Pa. 
.  20  Atl.  805.  In  a  proceeding  to  revive  a  judgment  by  scire  facias,  a 
*?ment  awarding  an  execution  in  favor  of  different  parties,  for  a  different 
J  than  that  recited  in  the  writ,  will  be  set  aside.  Zumbro  v.  Stump.  38 
Va.  325,  18  S.  E.  443. 

17  Kistler  V.  Mosser,  140  Pa.  367,  21  Atl.  357.  See  Bludworth  v.  Poole. 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  551,  63  S.  W.  717.  In  Missouri,  the  judgment  in  proceed- 
s  by  scire  facias  to  revive  should  simply  declare  that  the  judgment  re- 
ed is  still  in  force  for  the  amount  remaining  unpaid  thereon;   and  a  find- 

of  the  aggregate  amount  of  principal  and  interest  due  at  the  date  of 
Ivor  will  be  treated  as  surplusage.    Sappington  v.  Lenz,  53  Mo.  App.  44. 

18  Slayton  v.  Smille.  66  Vt.  197.  28  Atl.  871. 

10  Mills  V.  Conner,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.)  7;  Eldred  v.  Hazlett.  38  Pa.  16. 
1  LAW  JUDG.— 48  (753) 


§  49f9  LAW  OF  judombntbl  (Ch-  17 

on  a  condition  of  facts  existing  prior  to  that  time  which  could  then 
have  been  made;  and  such  matters  are  res  judicata  on  application 
for  a  subsequent  revival.  ^*^ 

8  499.    Praotioe  Im  PenasylTUilm. 

In  the  state  of  Pennsylvania  the  practice  is  different  from  that 
described  in  the  preceding  section:  "A  judgment  regularly  revived 
by  scire  facias,"  says  the  supreme  court  of  that  state,  "is  not  void 
even  if  the  original  judgment  was  void.  A  scire  facias  here  is  a 
substitute  for  an  action  of  debt  elsewhere;  the  judgment  on  it  is 
quod  recuperet,  instead  of  a  bare  award  of  execution;  it  therefore 
warrants  the  awarding  of  the  execution.  The  last  judgment  cannot 
be  considered  invalid,  although  it  was  entered  on  a  scire  facias  issued 
on  a  previous  judgment  that  was  void.  The  new  judgment,  being 
regular  on  its  face  and  voidable  only,  has  a  sufficient  vitality  to  sup- 
port the  sale."  **^  A  revival  of  judgment  by  amicable  scire  facias,  to 
be  valid,  and  to  be  notice  to  subsequent  purchasers  or  subsequent 
judgment-creditors,  must  be  docketed ;  it  is  not  sufficient  that  it  be 
filed  among  the  papers  of  the  original  judgment  and  noted  upon  the 
docket  entry  of  such  judgment.^** 

120  Witherspoon  v.  T witty,  43  S.  0.  348,  21  a  B.  256. 

121  Duff  V.  Wyncoop.  74  Pa.  300;  Buehler*8  Heirs  v.  Bnfflngton.  43  Pa.  278; 
CustQr  V.  Detterer,  3  Watts  &  S.  28.  But  a  judgment  so  rerlved  in  Pennsyl- 
vania, without  service  or  appearance,  has  no  binding  force  as  against  a  de- 
fendant who  resides  in  another  state.  Owens  t.  McCloskey,  161  U.  S.  642, 
16  Sup.  Ct  693,  40  L.  Ed.  837. 

122  McCleary's  Appeal.  1  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  299. 

(754) 


[End  of  Yolumb  L] 


«Mi 


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3  bios  ObS  l^H  102 


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