SSi WE
011 895 674 6 ^
HOLLINGER
pH8.5
MILL RUN F3-1543
E 415
.9
.584 M8
Copy
2 W
,y 2 H"
THE ATTITUDE OF THADDEUS
STEVENS TOWARD THE
CONDUCT OF THE
CIVIL WAR
By
JAMES ALBERT WOODBURN
REPRINTED FROM THE
gimmatt gi^t^tial §mm
Vol. XII., No. 3 ; ^ APRIL, 1907
t
<i.
[Reprinted from The American Histuricai, Review, Vol. XII., No. 3, April, 1907.]
THE ATTITUDE OF THADDEUS STEVENS TOWARD
THE CONDUCT OF THE CIVIL WAR
From July, 1861, to his death in 1869 Thaddeus Stevens was the
leader of the Republican majority of the House of Representatives.
He was chairman of the Ways and Means Committee of the House
throughout the war, and his attention was therefore largely devoted
to questions of taxation and finance, of revenues and appropriations.
These subjects in time of war offer a large field of study in connec-
tion with Stevens. But the purpose of this paper is not to consider
Stevens's contributions and services on these lines, but rather to
bring into review his career and opinions in relation particularly to
the more distinctly constitutional, political, and party issues which
the war presented.
There are three salient aspects about which the political move-
ments and controversies of the Civil War may best be organized and
studied : first, the relation of the war to slavery ; second, the relation
of the war to the Constitution ; third, the eflfect of the war upon the
political status of the seceded states and their relation to the Federal
Union. These, together with the increased war powers of the
President, present the essential issues and phases of the struggle in
which the student of war politics will be most concerned. I shall
attempt to summarize or bring into brief review Stevens's record
upon these salient features of the war.
Stevens recognized as clearly as any man then in public life the
seriousness of the great conflict in which the country was engaged,
and in the councils of the nation he constantly insisted upon prompt-
ness, energy, and determination of purpose. To him it was perfectly
clear that the slaveholders were trying to destroy the Union to save
slavery; he would, therefore, destroy slavery to save the Union.
The Southern states had violated the Constitution to gain their inde-
pendence ; Stevens would give them none of the benefits of the Con-
stitution in the war that it was found necessary to wage upon them.
These states had of their own free will repudiated the Constitution
and withdrawn from the Union. He would no longer recognize
them as sister states under the aegis of law, but having subdued
them as a belligerent enemy he would hold and govern them as con-
quered provinces. These principles of action he laid down in the
568 /. A. Woodhiirn
beginning, and in the pursuance of them he was clear, consistent,
and undeviating from first to last. Firm of purpose and clear of
vision, he had no manner of doubt as to the course the nation should
pursue in the varying phases of the struggle for the Union. No one
need to have been left in doubt as to his policies and plans, for among
the membership of the national House he stood pre-eminent as a
man with the qualities that a public man most needs in such a time
— dauntless courage, a conscience of his own, opinions of his own,
and a will of his own. He encountered no superior in intellectual
combat, and in the fight he was appointed to endure he well fulfilled
the canons of the strenuous game — he never flinched, he fouled no
man, and he hit the line hard. An unconquerable fighter, he seemed
made for a time of war, a time of storm and stress, and, his enemies
themselves being the judges, he stood foursquare to all the winds
of opposition that came. These characteristics, together with the
times in which he lived and the problems which he faced, make
Stevens one of the most memorable figures in our Congressional
annals. I proceed to notice his war career with reference to the
three aspects of the war to which I have referred — slavery, the Con-
stitution, and the status of the states.
The evidence is conclusive that it was not the original purpose
of the nation in the Civil War to interfere with slavery. If it had
been but a hundred days' war, it would probably have ended with
slavery intact. Hostile intention against slavery was specifically
disclaimed. Air. Lincoln disclaimed it on behalf of the executive,
and the two houses of Congress disclaimed it on behalf of the legis-
lative branch of the government.
At the beginning of the war, two days after the battle of Bui!
Run, Congress passed almost unanimously, in both Houses, the
famous Crittenden resolutions setting forth the objects of the war.
These resolutions recited, in substance, that the war was not prose-
cuted for the purpose of subjugating the Southern states — that is,
of overthrowing their state governments and reducing them to
provinces ; nor for the purpose of interfering with slavery in the
states, but to defend and maintain the Constitution and the laws,
and to preserve the Union with all the equality and rights of the
several states unimpaired. The war should accomplish these ends
and no more. This resolution voiced at the time the public opinion
of the country, and almost the unanimous opinion of the Republican
party. President Lincoln represented this opinion, and in a con-
servative spirit he attempted at first to conduct the war without inter-
fering with slavery, on the assumption that the status of the states
and their relation to the Union had not changed.
Atlilitdc of Stevens toivard Conduct of Civil War 569
But the war made all the difference in the world. The events
of but a few short months of war wrought a decided change in the
purpose and temper of Congress and the country. It was seen that
slavery was a source of strength to the Rebellion. Conservative
Union men were being rapidly and radically convinced that if the
national government did not interfere with slavery, slavery would
seriously interfere with the national government and the success of
its arms. This change in policy and purpose is indicated by the
fact that when the Thirty-seventh Congress came together again in
its regular session in December, 1861, and an attempt was made to
reaffirm the Crittenden resolution which had received such universal
approval but a few months before, it was decisively rejected. It was
rejected by a party vote upon the motion of Stevens, who had thus
considerable satisfaction in seeing that at least his own party had
now come to his position in asserting its freedom from a doctrinaire
impediment to the conduct of the war, and that the nation was now
to feel free to strike at slavery or to do whatever else would seem
best calculated to promote the success of the national cause.
The events of the war had, however, made no change in the pur-
poses and opinions of Stevens. His principles were settled, his
mind was fixed from the beginning. When the Crittenden resolu-
tion had been oft'ercd in July, he objected to it and withheld his vote.
He was one of four in the House who were not ready to subscribe
to its doctrine. He was one of the more pronounced and radical —
may we not say more far-seeing? — antislavery men who believed
that the Rebellion must result in the destruction of slavery. He
would not embarrass the government nor prevent its dealing a blow
in opposition to slavery when occasion should arise. He wanted the
government to have a free hand, an unrestricted liberty, in the con-
duct of the war, and he did not wish Congress to commit itself to a
doctrine from which it would subsequently have to recede. He
believed in the beginning what Lincoln came to believe in the midst
of the war, that, in this national crisis. Congress and the President,
representing the sovereign nation, had the right to take " any step
which might best subdue the enemy." ' He wanted the rulers of
the nation to indulge no scruples nor lay down any generalities that
would interfere with the most vigorous prosecution of the war.
Time clearly vindicated Stevens's leadership in this respect. A
fortnight had not gone by after the passage of the Crittenden resolu-
tion defining the objects of the war and giving an implied promise
that slavery would not be interfered with, before slavery had become
a subject of sore discussion in Congress. It came up in connection
^ Life and Writings of B. R. Curtis, I. 34S.
570 J. A. Woodbiirii
with the first Confiscation Act, August 3, 1861. To this measure
Stevens gave his earnest support. This was the beginning of war
legislation concerning slavery. It aroused opposition, because a sec-
tion of the law required that owners should forfeit the slaves whom
thev allowed to be used in arms against the United States or to labor
*
in forts or intrenchments, or whom they should employ in any naval
or military capacity against the national government.
In the debate on confiscation, August 2, 1861, Stevens voiced
his deep opposition to slavery and his purpose to strike at that insti-
tution whenever occasion offered. He said:' ■ ' ' ^ j
God forbid that I should ever agree that the slaves should be re-
turned to their masters and that you should rivet again the chains
which you have once broken. I do not say that this war is made for
that purpose. Ask those who made the war what its object is. Do not
ask us. I did not like the Crittenden resolution because it looked like
an apology from us in saying what were the objects of the war. Those
who made the war should explain its objects. Our object is to subdue
the rebels.
In this discussion Stevens predicted the arming of the blacks and
said that he was ready to act for it, " horrifying to gentlemen as it
may appear ; that is my doctrine and it will be the doctrine of the
whole people of the North before two years roll round."
After the rejection of the Crittenden resolution in December, 1861,
Stevens wished to bring his party and the administration to higher
and more aggressive ground upon slavery and emancipation. He
would speak out the whole truth whether the nation would hear or
forbear. On December 3, 1861, the first day of the regular session
of the Thirty-seventh Congress, Stevens introduced a joint resolu-
tion, for enactment into law, containing two propositions : the first
was to strike for general emancipation as the best means of crushing
the Rebellion ; the second, to inake full payment for losses to loyal
owners by this policy. His resolution asserted that slavery had
caused the Rebellion and that there could be no peace and Union
while that institution existed ; as slaves are used by the rebels for
supporting the war, and as by the law of nations it is right to liberate
the slaves of an enemy to weaken his power, therefore the President
should be directed to declare free and to direct our generals in com-
mand to order freedom to all slaves who shall leave their masters
or aid in quelling the Rebellion.
His speech of January 22, 1862, on these resolutions shows him
■ In order to avoid excessive lengtli of quotation, I have throughout this
article omitted many sentences from Stevens's speeches without sign of omission
and have even in some cases used abridged phrases, without, I trust, ever mis-
representing in any degree his meaning.
Attitude of Stevens toward Conduct of Civil ]Var 371
to be one of the earliest, boldest, most outspoken, and, I think, most
influential of the antislavery advocates who were seeking to direct
the war to antislaver)' ends. Stevens knew that Congress and his
party were not yet ready to follow in the line of his proposals, and
that the public sentiment of the country did not sustain his radical
policy. But he wished to educate that sentiment and to lead his
party in the direction which he clearly saw would ultimately be
found to be essential. He felt that the national government in the
conduct of the war so far had been weak, timid, vacillating, inef-
fective, without appreciation of the formidable task before it. The
country needed a tonic : the administration needed nerve and a stif-
fened spine. Stevens would infuse more energy into the prosecution
of the war, and not be afraid to employ the means at hand. He did
not think it a time for honeyed words and conciliation. He was not
a representative of peace and good will ; he was a representative for
war ; the business of war was to conquer, and in the war now forced
upon the nation he stood for firm, unyielding, uncompromising force.
It seems reasonable to say that in energizing the war power of the
nation and leading it to lay hold of every possible weapon for over-
coming resistance to the national authority there was in the national
forum no stronger personal force than Thaddeus Stevens. A review
of his speeches will give one a high appreciation of their educational
influence in this direction.
He was bitter and unsparing in his denunciation of the Southern
leaders for their course, and he sought to arouse the resentment and
war spirit of the nation to crush the South. Yet he manifested a
better conception of the Southern spirit and character and of the
consequent nature of the task before the country than that possessed
by his opponents and critics. Dismissing all hope of reunion by
voluntary concession from the South, he wished to have it clearly
recognized, as it should have been, that from the Southern stand-
point the separation was final, and that the Confederate States would
consent to reunion only through the exhaustion of war. Stevens
saw that the task could be accomplished only by the sacrifice of thou-
sands of lives and millions of money. He recognized that the
Southerners were proud, haughty, obstinate, and that their training
had led them to believe that they were born to command. They had
declared that they would suffer their country to become a smoking
ruin before they would submit. Stevens would accept the issue.
He said :
It were better to lay wastt the whole South than to suffer the nation
to be murdered, better to depopulate the country and plant it with a
new race of freemen, than to suffer rebellion to triumph. There should
572 J. A. IVoodbuDi.
be no negotiation, no parley, no truce until every rebel shall have laid
down his arms and submitted to the Government.
He was among the first to see that this would not be done until the
South was wholly exhausted :
Let us not be deceived. Those who talk about peace in sixty days
are shallow statesmen. The war will not end until the Government
shall more fully recognise the magnitude of the crisis; until they have
discovered that this is an internecine war in which one party or the
other nnist be reduced to hopeless feebleness and the power of further
cttort shall be utterly annihilated. It is a sad but true alternative.
The South can never be reduced to that condition so long as the war
is prosecuted on its present principles. The North with all its millions
of people and its countless wealth can never conquer the South until
a new mode of warfare is adopted. So long as these states are left
the means of cultivating their fields through forced labor, you may
expend the blood of thousands and billions of money, year by year,
without being any nearer the end, unless you reach it by your own
submission and th.e ruin of the nation. Slavery gives the South a
great advantage in time of war. They need not and do not withdraw
a single hand from the cultivation of the soil. Every able bodied
white man can be spared for the army. The black man, without lifting
a weapon is the mainstay of the war.'
Stevens would have no regard for the " sympathizer with trea-
son " who would " raise an outcry about a servile insurrection or
prate learnedly about the Constitution." He thought a " rebellion of
slaves fighting for their freedom was not so abhorrent as a rebellion
of freemen fighting to murder the nation."' He wished the Northern
armies to be " possessed and impelled by the inspiration that comes
from the glorious principle of freedom." He thought the North
had not shown " the fiery zeal that impelled the South ; nothing of
that determined and invincible courage that was inspired in the
Revolution by the grand idea of liberty, equality and rights of man."
Our statesmen do not seem to know how to touch the hearts of
freemen and rouse them to battle. No sound of universal liberty has
gone forth from the capital. Our generals have a sword in one hand
and shackles in the other. Let it be known that this government is
fighting to carry out the great principles of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the blooJ of every freeman would boil with enthusiasm
and his nerves be strengthened for a holy warfare. Give him the
sword in one band and the book of freedom in the other, and he will
soon sweep despotism and rebellion from every corner of this continent.
The occasion is forced upon us and the invitation presented to strike
the chains from four millions of human beings and create thein men ;
to extinguish slavery on this whole continent: to wipe out so far as we
are concerned the most hateful and infernal blot that ever disgraced
the escutcheon of man ; to write a page in the history of the world
whose brightness shall eclipse all the records of hemes and sages.'
' Congressional Globe, January 22, 1862.
= Ibid.
Atiitudc of Stevens toioard Conduct of Civil War 573
This was effective oratory, the oratory of conviction and action.
It was spolccn at a time when slavery still seemed rooted and
grounded in the policy of the President and of Congress and in the
public sentiment of the country. Who will say that the voice of
Stevens was not a powerful influence in bringing the country and
its rulers to the higher plane of emancipation, to a readiness to direct
the war for liberty as well as for union?
As the war continued and the administration still seemed con-
servative and reluctant to pursue an antislavery policy, Stevens re-
peatedly expressed his- dissatisfaction. Lincoln's message proposing
compensated emancipation Stevens characterized as " the most
diluted milk and water gruel proposition that was ever given to the
American nation." He urged the passage of the Act (March 13,
1862) forbidding the return of fugitive slaves and he favored every
act looking toward antislavery ends. He said he could not approve
puffing generals who sympathized with slavery at the head of our
armies with orders to pursue and return fugitive slaves, nor did he
like it to have our forces set to guard the property of rebel soldiers.
When asked if he intended his charge against the President and the
Secretary of War or only against the generals in the field, he said
" I intend it shall apply where it belongs."
I am no sycophant, no parasite. What I think I say. These acts
have been perpetrated without rebuke. Let the world determine where
the responsibility rests. I believe the President is as honest a man
as there is in the world; but I believe him to be too easy and amiable,
and to be misled by the malign influence of Kentucky counselors — and
the Border State men.'
He again urged the enlistment of negro troops and advised the
administration not to be afraid of the cry of abolitionism, but to
follow out the policy of military emancipation suggested by General
Hunter's order. He had no hope of success until that policy was
adopted. He viewed the matter not only as a question of emancipa-
tion or abolition, but as the only means of putting down the Rebellion.
For rebuking General Hunter he thought the administration deserved
to be driven out, and he denounced it for refusing the liberation and
employment of the slaves. He would seize all property of disloyal
men as our armies advanced, and he would plant the South with a
military colony if the Southerners would not otherwise submit.
We come now to the attitude of Stevens toward the Constitution ;
the constitutionality of war measures ; and the effect of secession and
war on the status of the seceded states.
The antislavery policy advocated by Stevens and men like him
' Congressional Globe, July 5, 1862.
574 J- ^- ^Voodbiii'u
was one of the apologies for party opposition to the war. The anti-
slavery men were accused of wishing to make the war entirely sub-
servient to abolition, and of being unwilling to see the Union re-
stored with slavery as it was. They would not be quiet but were
obtruding their opinions everywhere, with the result that while in
July, 1861, the nation was united, the Union forces were now divided,
since those who wished to prosecute the war solely for the purpose
of restoring the Union were alienated and estranged.^ A large body
of conservative men in the North, chiefly among those who had
opposed the Republican party and Mr. Lincoln's election, looked
upon the antislavery programme both as a perversion of the Consti-
tution and as an entire departure from the original and legitimate
objects of the war. Under the leadership of adroit and able men.
these conservative Democrats and Constitutional Unionists became a
compact party of opposition whose opinions and purposes may be
summarized as follows :
(i) In the first place they accepted the Crittenden resolution as
their war platform, and they would have it clearly recognized that
the primary and sole object of the war was to save the Union. It
was not to interfere in any way with slavery. Any act or policy
tending to turn the military forces of the government from mere
union-saving to abolitionism, or toward emancipation as a means of
union-saving, was unconstitutional, a perversion of the object of the
war, and it ought to be resisted.
(2) In the second place the war must be so conducted and ended
as to preserve the equality of the states. The Union was based on
this equality and it must be preserved. There must be no conquest
or subjugation or interference with statehood or with the rights of
the states, their governments, or their domestic laws. Whoever
should attempt by Federal authority to destroy any of the states, or
to establish territorial governments within them, was guilty of a high
crime against the Constitution and the Union. The Union as it was
must be restored and maintained under the Constitution as it is ; and
any person proposing peace on any other basis than the integrity of
the states was as guilty a criminal as he who would propose peace
on the basis of a dismembered Union. The Southern states must
not be reduced to provinces or territories, nor the Southern people
regarded as alien enemies ; but the constitutional relation of the
states to the Union was to be recognized as being undisturbed and
the constitutional rights of the Southern people should be fully main-
tained. To prosecute hostilities beyond these limits or in a spirit of
' Diven of New York. Congressional Globe, January 22, 1862.
Attitude of Stevens toward Conduct of Civil JJ^ar 575
conquest would destroy state equality, subvert the Constitution, and
prevent the Union/
(3) In the third place, a corollary to this view, the constitutional
limits set to congressional and executive power must be the same
in war as in peace. Secession, rebellion, and war had made no
change as to the power that Congress could exercise within the
states, be they the states of the Confederacy or the states of the
Union. The President's powers were not increased. Therefore his
executive orders, his proclamations, his military emancipation, his
suspension of Iiabcas corpus, his arbitrary arrests, must all be tested
by the terms and canons of the Constitution as in times of peace.
■' The Union as it was ; the Constitution as it is," was the maxim of
the party.
In the view of these constitutionalists, the Union was to be saved
only by, through, and under the Constitution — nothing more nor less.
They idealized the Constitution. To them the Constitution was
identical with the nation. Without it there could be no Union.
The Constitution gone, the republic is dead. The war was for the
preservation of the Constitution and for that alone ; it was against
the Constitution and because it was binding on all that the South-
erners were rebels. These conservatives denounced the antislavery
advocates as being indifferent as to whether or not their policies
were in harmony with the Constitution, and this fact made the
hated abolitionists — as they called all antislavery men — as guilty
criminals as the secessionists themselves.
In the view of this party almost everything that the President
or Congress proposed or did, for the effective and vigorous prosecu-
tion of the war, was unconstitutional. Confiscation of slave prop-
erty was unconstitutional ; retaining fugitive slaves within our lines
was unconstitutional ; the military emancipation of Fremont and
Hunter was unconstitutional ; the use of slaves as contraband was
unconstitutional ; Lincoln's plan of compensated emancipation was
unconstitutional ; enlistment of negro troops was unconstitutional ;
the Emancipation Proclamation was unconstitutional ; the draft was
unconstitutional ; the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was
unconstitutional ; military arrests were unconstitutional ; suspending
or in any way reinstituting state governments at the South was un-
constitutional ; Lincoln's appointment of military governors and his
beginnings of reconstruction were unconstitutional. No exercise
of power was constitutional except what was unmistakably granted
by a strict construction of the Constitution interpreted as in times
of peace. Instead of the war's having made all the difference in the
'Pendleton's resolutions, Congressional Globe, July 31, 1861.
576 J. A. M'oodburii
world, it had made no difference at all. The Southern states and
the Southern people were to have all the rights, privileges, immuni-
ties, and benefits of the Constitution. They were not bound by its
provisions in the conduct of the war, but their opponents were to be
restrained from every aggressive act of power not within its specific
limits. This was a fearful handicap for the national government.
Such a policy would have led to a passive and harmless war — almost
purely defensive in its operations. Carried to its logical conclusion,
no invasion of the Southern states nor subduing of the Southern
people would have been possible under it, and it is very problematical
whether the Constitution and the Union could have been saved for
the South under its operation.
To this party and its constitutional view Thaddeus Stevens was
diametrically opposed. He was its constant and stout antagonist.
He derided these sticklers for the Constitution and in unsparing
terms he denounced all their works and ways. They and he were
at the antipodes of the political world, and they had but little bowels
of mercy for one another. Stevens wished to establish a legal basis
for the conduct of the war that would give the nation a chance to
fight, and in the first discussion on slavery and the war to which I
have referred (August 2, 1861) he laid down the legal and proper
premises for that fight. He brushed theories aside, looked at the
facts, and saw things as they were, and he sought a basis of action
best calculated to bring the result desired. He took the bold ground
that in the contest for its life the nation was not bound by the limita-
tions of the Constitution. The war had abrogated the Constitution
— not where it was respected and could be enforced by ordinary civil
processes, but with respect to hostile confederated states that had
rejected and repudiated the Constitution, trampled it under foot, and
were resisting its restoration by organized armies. The people of
the Confederate States were public belligerent enemies, and the
nation in its eft'ort to overcome them was bound only by the laws of
war and the law of nations. The Constitution had no right to inter-
vene if it stood in the way of the laws of war in dealing with the
enemy.
Who says the Constitution must come in in bar of our action ? It
is the advocates of rebels, of rebels who have repudiated the Constitu-
tion, who have sought to overthrow it and trample it in the dust. Sir,
these rebels who have disregarded and set at defiance that instrument
are, by every rule of municipal and international law. estopped from
pleafling it against our action. Sir, it is an absurdity. There must
be a party in court to plead it, and that party to be entitled to plead
it in court, must first acknowledge its supremacy, or he has no business
Attitude of Stevens toivard Conduct of Civil War 577
to be in court at all. . . . They can not be permitted to come in here
and tell us that we mustibe loyal to the Constitution/
When he was asked how members of Congress who had taken
an oath to stipport the Constitution could violate it in their action,
whether rebels complain of it or not, he replied that they do not
violate it when "they are operating against men who have no rights
to the benefits of the Constitution. The law of nations was plain
upon this point, the law estabhshed in the days of Cicero, " Inter
arma silent leges." " This is a law that has been in force to the
present time, and any nation that disregards the law is a poor pusil-
lanimous nation which submits its neck to be struck oi? by the
enemy."
Stevens admitted that the Constitution, while it was in force for
the South, did not authorize Congress to interfere with slavery in the
states. While the Constitution and laws were supreme no one
would attempt it. But when the Constitution had been repudiated
and set at defiance by armed rebellion the case was different.
There were not [he said] three thousand abolitionists, properly so
called in the United States. Before this war the parties were bound
together by a compact, by a .reaty, called a Constitution. They ad-
mitted the validity of municipal laws binding on each. This war has
cut asunder all these ligaments, abrogated all these obligations. Since
these States have voluntarily thrown off that protection and placed
themselves under the law of nations, it is not only our right but our
duty to knock off every shackle from every limb.
He who wishes to re-establish the Union as it was cannot escape
the guilt of attempting to enslave his fellow-men. The " Union as it
was and the Constitution as it is ", is an atrocious idea ; it is man-steal-
ing. The Southern States have forfeited all rights under the Consti-
tution which they have renounced. They are forever estopped from
claiming the Constitution as it was. The United States may give them
those rights if it choose, but they cannot claim them. If a disgraceful
peace were made leaving the cause of this rebellion and the cause of
future wars untouched and living, its authors would be the objects of
the deepest execration and of the blackest infamy. . . , All this
clamor against radicals, all this cry of the " Union as it was ", is but
a persistent effort to re-establish slavery and to rivet anew forever the
chains of bondage on the limbs of immortal beings. May the God of
Justice thwart their designs and paralyze their wicked efforts."
Stevens believed that in an emergency in order to " snatch the
nation from the jaws of death " Congress was authorized to de-
clare a dictator. It was a fearful power, and he hoped the necessity
for it would never arise. But the safety of the people is the supreme
'Congressional Globe, August 2, 1861.
'Ibid., January 22. 1864.
578 J- '-I- IJ^ooi/inru
law, and rather than see the nation perish, rather than see it dishon-
ored by compromise, concession, and submission, rather than see the
Union dissevered, he was ready to apply the dictator's power.
It will be seen that Stevens's constitutional position, or extra-
constitutional position, was consistent, straightforward, and out-
spoken. He blinked nothing, but always looked the constitutional
issue squarely in the face. He made no pretenses and would re-
sort to no forced construction to justify a course already prede-
termined. This is seen still more clearly in his attitude toward
the admission of West Virginia.
The Constitution clearly provides that no state shall be divided
except by its own consent. When \'irginia seceded, the people
in the western counties of the state, wishing to remain loyal to
the Union, assumed to form a state government and choose state
officers and a state legislature. They elected Senators and Repre-
sentatives to Congress, who were admitted to their seats. They
claimed to be the people of Virginia, constitutionally competent
to give its consent to the formation of a new state within the bor-
ders of the Old Dominion. This people, having given its consent
to the division of the old state of Virginia, immediately erected
itself into the new state of \\'est Mrginia. Nobody consented
e.xcept those within the limits of the new state. That is, the new
state consented to the division of the old. And when the new state
had been admitted according to prearrangement, Mr. Pierpont, pre-
tending to be the governor of the state that pretended to be Vir-
ginia, was to move over to Alexandria and keep up the pretense
of being the gubernatorial head of Old \'irginia, with an official
body that Sumner afterward called the " common council of Alex-
andria." As Stevens said after the war, " all the archives, prop-
erty, and eftects of the Pierpont Government were taken to Rich-
mond in an ambulance." This was the government recognized
during the war as the legitimate constitutional government of
Mrginia.
There were distinguished members of Congress who sought to
find ground in the Constitution, or in "the fictitious construction
of that instrument, for this process by which Virginia was divided
and ^^'est \^irginia admitted. It was not the way of Thaddeus
Stevens. To Stevens the proceedings, or the arguments based
upon them, were all ridiculous and absurd. He was opposed to
giving seats in the House to members from Virginia after the
secession of that state, for " We know," as he said, " that members
have been elected to this House bv onlv twentv votes and those
Attitude of Stevens tmoarel Conduct of Civil War 579
cast under the guns of a fort. Now, to say that those gentlemen
represent any district is a mere mockery." '
Stevens was willing to accomplish the end in view, the dismem--
bernient of \'irginia and the admission of the new state, the sufficient
ground for the act being that it would w'eaken the enemy and help
the national cause. But he recognized that the legal ground for the
proceeding was, not the Constitution, but the laws of war. " We
may admit West Mrginia," he said, " not by any provisions of the
Constitution but under our absolute power which the laws of war
give us. I shall vote for this bill upon that theory and that alone ;
for I will not stultify myself by supposing that we have any warrant
in the Constitution for this proceeding."
He regarded it as n-.ockery to claim that the legislature of \^ir-
ginia had ever consented to the division of that state. The ma-
jority of the people of Mrginia, organized as a political community,
was the state of Virginia. That state had changed its constitution
and its relation to the federal government from that of one of its
members to that of secession. The act was treason, but so far as
the state corporation was concerned it was a valid act and governed
the state. " A small number of the citizens of Mrginia — the people
in West Virginia — assembled together, disapproved of the acts of'
Mrginia and with the utmost self-complacency called themselves
Virginia. Is it not ridiculous ? "
That seems more straightforward than to stretch the Constitution
by a forced and fictitious construction while claiming to respect its
provisions. To a layman it seems like better law, sounder sense,
and more correct political science, if the United States was to be
regarded as a nation and not a mere congeries of states.
This view of the character of the state and the effect of seces-
sion he maintained consistently on all occasions. He looked upon
the Southern states as public enemies. We were at war with an
acknowledged belligerent, with a foreign nation, and since such a
war had annulled all former compacts existing between them neither
could claim as against the other the aid of the Constitution. Stevens
held that the Southern states, having committed treason, renounced
their allegiance to the Union, discarded its Constitution and laws,
organized a distinct and hostile government, and by force of arms
having risen from the condition of insurgents to the position of an
independent power de facto, and having been acknowdedged as a
belligerent both by foreign nations and by our own government, the
Constitution and laws of the Union were set aside as far as they were
concerned, and that as between the two belligerents they were under
' Congressional Globe, December 2, 1861.
5 So /. .4. J]'oodbui-ii
the laws of war and nations alone. If the rebel states were still in
the Union and under the Constitution, as some contended, he saw
no reason why they should not elect the next President of the United
states. If the rebels declined to vote, then one hundred loyal men
who, as his legal opponents contended, still continued to be " the
state," might meet and choose electors. The few loyal men around
Fortress Monroe or Norfolk, or Alexandria, and a few cleansed
patches in Louisiana, being one thousandth part of the state, might
choose electors for the whole state. It was such reasoning that
seemed like a mockery of constitutional law and political science to
Stevens.
As to the minority who were loyal to the Union within a seceded
state, he would regard them as citizens of that state and subject to its
conditions. They must migrate or bear the burdens and penalties
of their domicile, although in dealing with persons he would dis-
tinguish between the innocent and the guilty. The states were at
war with the nation. The idea that a few loyal citizens are the
state and may override and govern the disloyal millions, he was
unable to comprehend. " If ten men fit to save Sodom can elect a
governor and other state officers against more than a million Sodom-
ites in \'irginia, then the democratic doctrine that the majority shall
rule is discarded and ignored."
The position of Stevens was vigorously assailed by Mr. Francis
P. Blair, of ^Missouri, in a notable speech in the House, February 5,
1864. Blair held that Stevens's policy of confiscation could only be
efifected by the extermination of our whole kindred race in the South.
The world would expect them to shed the last drop of blood rather
than to submit to such spoliation, with no alternative but to die as
paupers. Europe would be justified in intervening to put down such
an mnovation on the code of humanity and to arrest barbarities in
defiance of the law of nations. It was frenzied altruism tending to
promote " amalgamation of repugnant races in the name and by the
charm of equality."
Blair held that the Southern states were indestructible ; that
their status was like that of Missouri, whose state organization had
remained loyal to the Union. All that was needed was to drive out
the rebel power that was holding the state government in duress.
Our army and navy were crushing the life out of the usurpation,
vetoing what Blair called the " assumption of Stevens that the state
governments in the rebel states are as perfect now as before the
rebellion, and being subsisting states, capable of corporate action,
thev have as states changed their allegiance from the United States
to the Confederate States." In this undeniable fact, as Stevens had
Atlilnde of Stevens toiuard Conduct of Civil ]\\
ar
stated it, Blair maintained that the secession doctrine was " abso-
hitely recognized, with more distinctness than Calhoun ventured to
urge it."
Here the majority of disloyalists in a State [said Blair] have the
right admitted to over-ride a minority of loyal men and make them
forswear their allegiance to the Union. No man, North or South, ever
asserted the secession cause so boldly in the forum as the gentleman
from Pennsylvania. He founds the rebel government upon the will
of a majority of the people; proclaims that the minority, though loyal to
the General Government (which has a right to the "allegiance of all)
must abandon the states or subscribe to their authority; insists that the
usurpation has established independent states endowed with all the
mimunities and rights of an independent nation carrying on a legitimate
war. This is the secession, abolition, absolute-conquest doctrine which
the gentleman has broached in defiance of national and State Constitu-
tions, the law of the civilized world and of all humanity.'
On May 2, 1864, during the discussion in the House on the
Wade-Davis plan of reconstruction, Stevens had occasion to refer to
these criticisms. He restated his position that the South was only a
belligerent, with such rights only as the laws of war might accord.
The fact of their being rebels as well as belligerents put them in a
worse predicament and only extended our rights and justified the
sinuinuii} jus of martial law. In urging again a general scheme of
confiscation he said the country should decide whether this was an
unjust war, and whether the enemy was obstinate and ought to bear
the burden of the war.
Stevens pictured in vigorous language the suffering and destruc-
tion of the war, which he denounced as unjust and as deserving of
punishment. " If we are not justified ". he said, " in exacting the
extreir.e demands of war then I can hardly conceive a case where it
would be applicable. To allow them to return with their estates
untouched, on the theory that they have never gone out of the Union,
seems to me rank injustice to loyal men."
Stevens replied with special vigor to Blair, " whose speech ", he
said, " contained the distilled virus of the copperhead." He recog-
nized that selling estates in perpetuity as the result of attainder for
treason was forbidden by the Constitution; conviction for treason
could work no such consequence. What he contended for was the
forfeiture of the property of rebels as enemies. Blair had said that
Stevens had " treated with scorn the idea that States held in duress
by the rebel power have a right to look to our laws and Constitution
for protection." Stevens replied ;
This is a false statement of my position. If the armies of the
Confederate States should overrun a loyal state and hold it in duress,
' Congressional Globe. February 5. 1864.
582 J. A. \\'oodbui-n
that state would have a right to appeal to the Constitution for protec-
tion. But a state which by a free majority of its voters has thrown
off its allegiance to the Constitution and holds itself in duress by its
own armies, is estopped from claiming any protection under the Con-
stitution. To say that such a state is within the pale of the Union
so as to claim protection under its Constitution and laws is but the
raving of a madman.
To escape the consequence of my argument he [Blair] denies that
the Confederate States have been acknowledged as a belligerent or
have established and maintained independent governments dc facto.
Such assurance would deny that there was a sun in the heavens. They
have a Congress in which eleven states are represented ; they have at
least 300,000 soldiers in the field; their pickets are almost within sight
of Washington. They have ships of war on the ocean destroying
himdreds of our ships, and our government and the governments of
Europe acknowledge and treat them as privateers, not as pirates. There
is no reasoning against such impudent denials.
Stevens denied that he was countenancing secession in recog-
nizing the palpable facts of war. The law forbids robbery and
mtirder. but tliese crimes exist dc facto. Does the man who declares
their existence give coimtenance to them ? If the fiction of equity
courts that whatever ought to be shall be considered as existing — if
this is trtie, then the rebel states are in the Union.
If the naked facts, palpable to every eye, attested by many bloody
battle-fields, and recorded by every day's hostile legislation both in
Washington and Richmond are to prevail, then the rebellious states are
no more in the Union in fact, than the loyal states are in the Con-
federate States. Nor should they ever be treated so until they repent
and are rebaptized into the National Union.
Stevens congratulated the country that the House had recently
passed a resolution (1864) recognizing the Confederate States as a
public enemy. That was the doctrine for which he had been con-
tending. The consequences which he had sought to establish would
follow as a corollary. " I have lived ", he said, " to see the triumph
of principles which, although I had full faith in their ultimate suc-
cess, I did not expect to witness. If Providence will spare me a
little longer, until this government shall be so reconstructed that the
foot of a slave can never again tread upon the soil of the Republic,
I shall be content to accept any lot which may await me." '
These extracts will serve to make clear Stevens's attitude toward
the chief issues of the Civil War. Those whom he opposed will
not be easily reconciled to honor his memory. As Sumner said,
■' No one gave to language a sharper bite." His words were words
of sarcasm, satire, denunciation. They aroused resentment and often
left a bitter sting. His antagonists dreaded him, and he has been
^ Consrcssional Globe, vol. 65. pp. 2042-2043, May 2. 1864.
Attitude of Stevens toward Conduct of Civil War 5 S3
spoken of as a man of hate and vindictive vengeance. But there
is testimony to show, from party friend and foe alike, that he was a
man of deep and tender humanitarian feelings. He desired fair
play and a square deal for all mankind. The punitive measures
which he favored did not spring from personal feelings. It was the
cause that he hated or loved. He loved justice; he entertained a
deep hatred of slavery and secession, and he believed that a just
punishment, as well as mercy, should be visited upon those whom he
considered as the guilty authors of his country's woes. In this he
was but human, a natural man begotten of passionate times, and he
probably represented to a large degree the feelings of a majority of
his fellow-countrymen. He deplored the compromising errors of the
fathers, and his great purpose was to write the law of justice and
human equality into the Constitution of his country; and he would
feign no fraternal, sentimental regard for those who, as he thought,
sought to violate, obstruct, or pervert these great principles of gov-
ernment.
James Albert Woodburn.
011 895 674 6
HOLLINGER
pH 8.5
MILL RUN F3-1543
TVNews
OpenLibrary