Avenarius and the standpoint of pure experience

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AVENARIUS

AND THE STANDPOINT OF

PURE EXPERIENCE

BY

WENDELL T. BUSH, Ph.D.

Lecturer in Philosophy in Columbia University

ARCHIVES OF
PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS

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.1. McKEEN' CATTELL and FBEDERICK .J. K. WOODBHIDOK

No. 2, November, 1905

Columbia University Contributions to Philosophy and Psycholofy, Tol. X., Mo. 4

DLSSKRTATION

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Deg^ree

of Doctor of Philosophy under the Faoalty of Philosophy,

Columbia University

NEW YORK
THE SCIENCE PRESS

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CONTENTS

PAGB

INTRODUCTION 1

APPRECIATIONS OF EXPERIENCE

I. The independent outer world is an object not of reasoned
belief but of spontaneous experience which philosophical
theory has no power to alter. To say, however, that the
independent existence of the outer world is a character-
istic feature of normal human experience is to say noth-
ing whatever about its real metaphysical independence. 5

II. An object of experience need not be of the sort that can

be presented to sense-perception 7

III. Avenarius: his way of describing the experience of know-

ing something. Knowledge is exf>erience with the cog-
nitive character 1)

IV. This definition of knowledge is not self-contradictory,

since it makes no metaphysical assumption to contradict.

It is not a question-begging term ] 4

V. Two meanings of the word experience. The word is used

here to mean direct cognition of fact 15

VI. There is a natural (not necessarily true) view of the world.

This is naive realism 16

VII. Distinction between the Independent and the Transcend-
ent. Independence is a character of objects within the
field of experience. Transcendence means existence
without necessary reference to any field of experience.
The outer world and my fellow men are evidently inde-
pendent, and they are characterized in normal human
experience as transcendent also 22

VIII. Solipsism can not be logically refuted, but this makes no

difference to experience 25

IX. A review of some attempts to show that experience guar-
antees the transcendent object. The attempts fail.
Summary of the discussion thus far 29

iii

»V CONTENTS

THE DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIENCE

I. We can seek to give a psychophysical account of pure
cognitive experience and this will not be a metaphysical
undertaking, for the concepts will not be used with a
metaphysical purpose 34

II. The concept of psychophysical parallelism is employed in
the interest not of ultimate explanation but of descrip-
tion 35

III. The theories of Avenarius are not concftrned with meta-

physical problems w^i,

IV. Science seeks to discover the * How * of experience.

Metaphysics seeks to discover the * Why ' of experience.
The experience which science describes and metaphysics
explains is experience characterized by the natural view
of the world 5f;

THE EXPLANATION OF EXPERIENCE

I. Explanation in metaphysics differs from scientific de-
scription in that the former attaches the predicate of
existence to its concept of reality. The demand for the
existential predicate is an emotional demand 60

II. The new epistemology of science will bring it to pass that
reputable philosophy will not seek reality behind and
different from the world of concrete experience 61

SUGGESTIONS TOWARD A CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE

The concept suggested is that of the historical process
which, starting from animism, has led to the modem
concept of nature elaborated by the special sciences.
The concept is suggested in the interest of history 71

AN EMPIRICAL DEFINITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Consciousness means experience that can belong to only
one observer. Consciousness thus defined ceases to be
a basis for idealism. There remains the natural view
of the world 73

INTRODUCTION

A FEW words in explanation of the following essay may not be
out of place. AVhen I first wrote down the matter of the essay, some
six years ago, I was dissatisfied with the metaphysical alternatives
from which the student of philosophy could select. The study of
the writings of Richard Avenarius heightened my dissatisfaction
with previous metaphysics, and suggested to me a point of view
for a fresh start. It seems to me that discontent with established
and professional metaphysics has become quite general and that
a fresh start is very generally desired. Well, the only sound thing
to start from is actual experience, experience not viewed through
the assumptions and dialect of previous systems, but taken in an
absolutely empirical fashion. We must make the effort to beg as
few questions as possible at the outset. If we are rigorous enough
we shall discover just what questions we have to bosr and why we
beg them.

This return to the empirically given is the standpoint of 'pure
experience.' 'Pure experience' means at present a point of view.
It is premature to speak of a philosophy of 'pure experience'; we
do not yet know what such a philosophy will have to say. But
there can be no question that the point of view is the right one,,
and it takes something of a struggle to win it. And as I came to
the point of view through Avenarius, the essay includes the attempt
to restate, in a relatively independent fashion, what seem to me the
essentials of his doctrine.

There are not, however, as there might seem to be, two lines of
effort neither united nor clearly distinguished. I think I may claim
to express the views, or at least the attitude, of Avenarius all the
time. An account of the philosophy of Avenarius is a difficult
matter, not because the thought is obscure or hard to follow, but
because it is expressed in an elaborate and novel terminology which
can hardly be omitted altogether, but which, if introduced to any
great extent into an exposition, certainly gets between the reader
and the thought.

I have been encouraged in this undertaking by the fact that no
good account of Avenarius exists for English readers. The article
by Carstanjen in Mind^ is altogether too slight. In German,

> October, 1897.
1 1

2 AVENARIUB A\D PURE EXPERIENCE

Wundt's criticism^ is Miarked by a hostile polemical K[)irit that
elfectually interferes with its usefulness. In French, however, the
articles by Delacroix^ are not unsuccessful, but they hardly show
how much can be f^otten out of the works reviewed.

I have spoken of this essay as the effort to reach a point of view,
and such an effort must have reference to present philosophical
tendencies. Every student of metaphysics has pot to take account
of idealism, and take account of it logically. Idealism claims to
rest upon demonstrable facts of experience, and to be a strictly
logical deduction. The really candid critic must inspect experience
as impartially as he can, and see whether the premises of idealism
are really all that they claim to be. That is, the critic must place
himself at the standpoint of pure experience, and putting theories
and definitions out of his head, mu.st get acquainted directly with
those aspects of experience which will later constitute the basis of
a philosophy.

This effort to appreciate experience in an undistorted way, to
take it as it comes, not checking the coming by a.sking metaphysical
questions, but simply trying to see what comes, is what concerns
the first section of the essay. As the duty of squaring myself with
idealism looms in the background, it is the independent outer world
aspect of experience that interests me most. The thesis of my first
section is that naive realism is a perfectly correct description of
experience as such, but that this does not make it a true meta-
physical theory of existence. It may be true and it may not.

As experience we have the world with all its empirical detail.
It interests us and we want to know about it. We can feel two
kinds of curiosity about the world. We can, on the one hand, wish
to become better and better acquainted with its empirical character,
or we can conceive it as a whole and ask what is the cause or ground
or nature of the whole in view of which we shall interpret and
comprehend the parts that come within our ken. The first tyi)e of
interest desires description of experience, the second desires an ex-
planation of experience, and the second and third sections of the
paper are entitled, respectively, ' The Description of Experience ' and
'The Explanation of Experience.'

The complete description of experience is the task of all the
special sciences working together, and recently there has arisen
in scientific circles a point of view which regards the concepts of
science, such concepts as atom, ether, energy, etc., as conceptual
instruments for effecting convenient descriptions or increasing our
fund of empirical data, but it is not regarded as of the smallest

* Philosophische Studien, Bd. 13, Heft 1, 2 and 3.

- Kexme de M^taphysique et de Morale, Vol. V., p. 764, Vol. VI., p. 61.

INTRODUCTION 3

consequence for the purpose in hand, that anything corresponding
to these concepts actually exists. If, however, one asserts that atoms
really exist, or that reality is constituted in one way or another,
then one has passed to the plane of metaphysics. It is clear, then,
that the logical distinction between science and metaphysics appears
in this, that metaphysics, the endeavor to know 'reality,' needs the
predicate of existence, while science does not.

The question arises, why should not he, to whom the concept of
an Absolute seems demanded by the facts of experience, treat this
concept as the physicist treats the concept of the atom? And so
far as I can see there is only an emotional reason why he should
not do so. For the question is not whether there is reality, but
whether in a given concept we have a true account of it.

Now metaphysics is anxious to be 'scientific* in every possible
way, and among students of metaphysics we have those who are
cool-blooded and critical, and those who warm to their tasks
with emotional energy. It should not be in the least surprising
if the former type of philosopher follows the example of science,
and the second type alone continues to cling to the existential predi-
cate. And in view of the great and increasing prestige of science,
metaphysics, in the sense above explained, may become of less and
less consequence in the world of thought. And if this comes to
pass, as there is much reason to expect, we shall have science and
the natural view of the world which we find in pure experience.
This would be a verification of the predictions of Avenarius.

The fourth section, entitled 'Suggestions toward a Concept of
Experience,' proposes a point of view which might be of service to
the student of history, particularly the student of the history of
theories of reality. This follows the theory that Avenarius has
put forward in his essay 'Der Menschliche "NVeltbegriff. ' It is a
concept of a history of 'pure experience,' beginning in an animistic
stage of culture and continuing until the animism which at the
beginning had the character of undoubted fact, has been entirely
eliminated from experience and from theory. The contention of
Avenarius is that when this process of rejecting animism is com-
pleted, the theory of idealism must disappear. This concept is the
concept of a genuine history, in which theories of reality have been
determined by the fund of animism not yet rejected.

Finally, in the fifth and last section, I take up some contem-
porary discussions of pure experience. Professor William James
has recently published his conviction that consciousness as a kind
of stuff or entity does not exist. He believes that in dropping the
idea of such an entity he is getting rid of the last remnant of the
idea of the soul. To one who has in mind the theories of Avenarius,

4 AVENARWH ASD PURE EXPERIENCE

and the concept of a history of pure experience such as that just
explained, this statement from Professor James must seem of great
consequence. What are the results of this for idealism? is the
imperative question. I have done what I can to indicate the results
that seem to me likely to follow, and my position is that the rejec-
tion of consciousness from the position it has hitherto oeoupied
in metaphysics must follow from a candid iiLspeetion of pure ex-
perience, and that this cuts the ground from under the argument
for idealism. I thus exhibit at least the presumption that the
conception of a history of pure ex[)erienee, whieh T take from
Avenarius, is sound.

APPRECIATIONS OF EXPERIENCE

It often happens in philosophical discussion that the idea of an
experience that is valid or logically justifiable leads us to forget
or ignore our actual experience. That a tjTpe of experience should
be apparently illogical and illusory is enough oftentimes to dismiss
it from consideration. In what follows, I wish to speak not of valid
experience as such, but simply of average human experience which
may be naive and illusory but which is not therefore less genuine.

I am not concerned with any metaphysic. I do not purpose to
justify any experience as against any other, but simply to state
some of the commoner characteristics of frankly naive and spon-
taneous experience, and to mention some logical considerations that
seem relevant. And if from time to time the habits of language
may cause it to appear that I am discussing a metaphysical question,
I would beg the reader to recall that my real interest is in char-
acteristics of human experience simply, detached as completely as
may be from any notion of reality.

Each one of us can say, 'Here I am in a world of things, among
my fellows.' AVhether in our philosophical moments we believe in
a world of independent external objects and of different external
selves is another matter. However illusory its appearance, the
outer world does seem to be a world of facts, whose reality is not
dependent upon our cognition. Reflection may show that this ap-
pearance is highly ambiguous, and that such an independent reality
can be neither comprehended nor described,— but the appearance
persists. All sorts of things happen or seem to happen without any
help from humanity,— things which humanity would be only too
glad to help if it could. Independent facts and forces there seem
to be which man can take advantage of to his profit. The farmer
plants his crops and they grow, not without his care, to be sure, but
chiefly by virtue of something which he does not seem to contribute.
There is falling water to turn a mill wheel, metals there are to be
dug from the earth, heavenly bodies to be searched out with the
telescope, germs of disease to be avoided. One who has never heard
of metaphysical realism has nevertheless a completely realistic
attitude.

This is the attitude of the 'plain man.' The philosopher is rather
fond of contrasting himself with the 'plain man,' and since he is
interested in the contrast-effect, he is apt not to observe how much

6

6 AVENARJU8 AND PURE EXPERIENCE

he and the 'plain man' have in common. His ideal of a logical or
valid experience causes him often enough to l>e somewhat indifferent
to important characteristics of actual experience.

Both the philosopher and the 'plain man' are obliged to take
the universe very much in the same way. Whether we are philos-
ophers or not, our adjustment to our world of objects is as though
these were genuinely independent of us. This seems a common-
place that scarcely needs even to be alluded to. Yet I trust I may
be pardoned for dwelling a little longer on the 'plain man.' He
is an instructive individual who seldom comes by his rights in
philosophy.

The 'plain man,' if asked for his opinion on the merits of realism,
would be at least so sure of its case that he would be unable to com-
prehend any other point of view. His would be, indeed, a very
poor metaphysic, and likely enough quite in error, but this humble
realism would express with great energy how the world comes home
to the natural unsophisticated man. "You ask me," we may
imagine him saying, "how I know that the world out there is inde-
pendent of me and of everybody else. I know it by experience.
Don't my crops grow, whether any one thinks about them or not?
Do you suppose I have anything to do with the change of the sea-
sons? I've never seen Spain and South Africa, but I know there
are such places, and it wouldn't make any difference if Spain and
South Africa didn't contain a living soul, and if everybody else,
the Lord Almighty included, should forget there ever had been such
places; Spain and South Africa would stay just where they are.
You needn't try to tell me it's all in my mind's eye." Something
like this the 'plain man' would surely say.

And then we might talk to him of secondary qualities and brain-
states and categories. To all of which he would reply with simple
and eloquent disgust. Most of his reasons might be as poor as they
could be, but the poorness of his reasons would not weaken his
sturdy faith precisely because they have little or nothing to do
with it. He never inferred or demonstrated to himself the existence
of an independent external world. He has always known such a
world because he has always lived in it,— it is the world of his ex-
perience, that is, his experience is characterized in that way.

One of the first and most important steps to take in an epistemo-
logieal discussion of experience is to free one's terms, experience,
knowledge and the like, from metaphysical implications which solve
in advance problems which might be later proposed. This precau-
tion is so important that I will illustrate the neglect of it by a few
sentences from an article by Professor Andrew Seth.^

^Philosophical Review, Vol. I., p. 511, 'The Problem of Epistemology.'

APPRECIATIONS OF EXPERIEyCE 7

Professor Seth has been stating what he regards as the most
important features of the idealistic theory of knowledge, and he
declares that for idealism, the object of knowledge *is nothing be-
yond the cognitive states themselves.' And he continues: "Now
on such a theory it is pretty evident that the distinction of knowing
and being, of subject and object, would never have arisen and
would not have required, therefore, to be explained away. ' '

It seems even more evident, however, that if the distinction of
subject and object were not a primary character of experience, it
could not play the role it does in theories of knowledge. And just
as the subject-object distinction is more original and primitive than
any theory of knowledge, just so the experience of the outer world
is more original and primitive than any metaphysic. And by this
I mean, not that the outer world exists, but that experience has a
certain characteristic feature.

II

These introductory remarks have sought to separate experience
from validity in the ordinary sense. I wish now to consider what
we may fairly mean by saying that a thing or a fact is given in
experience. The 'plain man' says he knows by experience that the
outer world has its own independent existence. I 'know' by ex-
perience all sorts of facts about my fellows, and I know by experi-
ence that I have real fellows. At the same time I admit that a true
metaphysic might, for all I know, show me that quite the opposite
is true. Still, that makes no difference to my experience. We all
know, I presume, by experience what happened to us yesterday.
These various facts and many more, we say, are given in experience.
But they may not be 'presented' in experience. A presented ob-
ject is an object directly and immediately perceived, and of course
must be an object 'given' in experience, but many objects of the
class I call 'given in experience' could not possibly be 'presented.'

Such objects are the thoughts and feelings of my fellow and the
past event. Yet speaking unphilosophically, perhaps, but honestly,
we say that these are facts of our experience given in experience,
known through experience.

I dwell upon the point, obvious though it is, because when we
say a fact is given in experience we are so apt to mean presented
to perception. To bring something to the test of experience is to
produce it for direct inspection. But to define an object of ex-
perience in this way, as an object perceived or at least capable of
being perceived, is to divorce the concept of experience hopelessly
from the life that it is intended to describe. There is no ground
for denying that the pious mystic may know God and the Saints

8 AVENAltWH AND PURE EXPERIENCE

as facts of his experience. And accepting experience in thi» large
empirical way, we in list admit as objects of it, facts which could
not Iw presented, which could not, perhaps, even exist. And be-
cause the point is so fundamental, let me repeat myself.

Every one would say that the presence of his fellows was given
to hijn in experience. We should all instinctively pronounce it
the idlest of philosophical va{j:aries, were I to devote time and para-
graphs to proving that this paper is addressed to a real circle of
readers, and if I wei*e really in any doubt about it I should be de-
clared simply insane.

Yet we do seriously discuss how we come to believe in the pres-
ence of other selves, and how we can rationally justify the belief.
There is something a little futile, perhaps even a little insincere, in
such discussion. We do not 'come to believe' in other selves at all.
It is misleading to inquire into our 'belief in other selves. Other
selves are simply facts,— not reality-facts, perhaps, but experience-
facts. Our belief (if I may still use the word) in other selves is
in no proportion to our success in explaining or rationalizing the
belief. In this elTort we may succeed, or we may fail ; our neighbor
is in either case an equally genuine fact in our experience. Yet
the essential part of this fact, the life of feeling and ideas and will,
all, indeed, that makes him our neighbor, we can not possibly per-
ceive. But the presence of it all about us is so much a fact of
experience that without it any one would probably go mad. What-
ever the psychological process may be by which human experience
becomes social, it has, from the earliest times we can remember, the
social character.

The fellow being is one type of an object of experience that
can not be presented to perception. Another type is the past event.

Suppose I say to some one, 'Did you go to any of the operas last
winter?' And I receive the answer, 'Yes, I did go'; and I reply,
'Are you quite sure? Perhaps you didn't,' I may be answered
as follows: *I distinctly remember going. I remember all about
it, I can tell you just who sang and where my seat was.' The
declaration amounts to saying that it is a fact of present experience
that one did go to the opera some time ago. Surely it is a fact
of present experience to each of us that he has done many particular
things on days that are past. Yet we are not now doing the indi-
vidual things we did yesterday. Facts of experience these past
events are. Presented immediate facts they are not. We have,
to be sure, immediate data about them, but the past event is ob-
viously never presented in experience at all. Mental images, recol-
lections, echoes of its sense, character, may be presented, but these
are not the original event, and there may conceivably have been no
original event.

APPRECIATIONS OF EXPERIEyCE 9

It may seem that we have not come far toward stating what we
may fairly mean by saying that a fact is given in experience. We
have at least made out that the test of perception is not a sufficient
one. Some objects seem to be facts of experience, when the ideas
of them come home to us in a certain way, when they have what
has been called 'reality feeling.' Even an object of sense-percep-
tion needs the tone of reality in order to be quite unambiguous.
One can at least ask the question, 'Is this a real house or the illusion
of a house, which I see?' An hallucination may be all but per-
fect, and differ from a genuinely perceived object only in its tone
of reality. "An hallucination," says Professor James, "is a strictly
sensational form of consciousness, as good and true a sensation
as if there were a real object there."* The poor tinker Sly, in
Taming of the Shrew, who for a jest is made to believe himself a
lord, is the victim of a shifting reality-feeling.

" Am I a lord ? And have I such a lady ?
Or do I dream? Or have I dreamed till now?
I do not sleep: I see, I hear, I speak;
I smell sweet savours, and I feel soft things:
Upon my life I am a lord indeed
And not a tinker, nor Christophero Sly."

To sum up. For a fact to be an object of experience it is not
necessary that it be perceived or be of a sort that could possibly
be perceived. It is not necessary that it exist or be of a sort that
could possibly exist.

Ill

I have suggested 'reality-feeling' as the sort of criterion that
may help us to characterize an object of experience. In spite of all
the uncertainties of experience we say it is the surest basis of
knowledge and the only foundation for theory. A priori knowl-
edge, if there be such, I include within experience. To have an
object of experience is to know that object in some respect. The
object may not exist, but that makes no difference to the experience
that 'knows' it. What I wish now to examine is the relation of
'reality-feeling' to knowledge as a case of experience.

The discussion thus far has been carried on from the point of
view of Avenarius and here I shall attempt some account of the
way in which Avenarius describes the experience of knowing some-
thing. His opinions will illustrate important phases of our prob-
lem, and bring out the empirical detail of the situation with which
we have to deal.

Avenarius gives an elaborate analysis of the feeling-tones which

'William James, 'Principles of Psychology,' II., p. 115.

10 AVENARIU8 AND PURE EXPERIENCE

may give character to ideas,— such feelings as conpruity and in-
congruity, familiarity and strangeness, the various ways in which
an idea may be satisfactory or unsatisfactory. Hig gpeeial purpose
leads him to bring out as clearly as p(jssible the contrast in feeling-
tone between a problem solved and a problem unsolved, between the
sense of having attained insight, and of being still baffled and barred
from insight.

We have been made familiar with groups of terras which are
used to characterize what we call the 'real.'* Professor Royce has
collected such terms into three groups expressive of three attitudes
toward reality. One of these attitudes lays stress on the aspect of
immediacy as characteristic of the real. The real is what we can
get at, and test and get directly acquainted with. Another attitude,
as Professor Royce describes it, emphasizes the character of perma-
nence, of substantial self-sufficiency. The unreal has no 'depth' or
'interior constitution,' 'but the real abides in its own house.' One
may detect here a sense of independent existence as giving char-
acter to the real. I hasten to say that I am alone responsible for
this interpretation. In a sense, however, this aspect of independ-
ence is the aspect of existence par excellence. Finally, a third class
of terms describes the real as what can be depended upon, what will
not leave you in the lurch. We can be sure of the real, but the
unreal is a sham and not to be trusted.

In a similar way Avenarius describes three feeling-tones as
characteristic of what we accept as real and true.' These he calls
the 'existential' character, the 'acquaintance' character and the
'security' character. The references just made to the analysis given
by Professor Royce are a sufficient explanation of these three very
similar aspects which Avenarius has picked out.

Avenarius unites these three characters into what he calls the
'fidential' character. His meaning seems to be that that which is
felt to be real in a persuasive and convincing way is that with
which we feel ourselves most at home. The real is reassuring, we
feel that we understand it as we understand an old friend. It is
not strange and baffling. The unreal is ' unheimlich,' something to
which we can't get adjusted, and which, therefore, does not have
a place in our world of truth,- This 'fidential' character Avenarius
explains by the term 'HeimJiaftigkeit/ and he quaintly says that
every real problem is a kind of Heimweh,— the desire to get back
into the region where we feel at home, by reducing our uncompre-
hended data to terms of known data.

The term ' reality- feeling, ' with which we are so familiar, is a

1 Royce, ' The World and the Individual,' Vol. I., p. 52.
* ' Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung,' Vol. II., p. 32.

APPRECIATIONS OF EXPERIEyCE 11

sufficiently good equivalent for the 'fidential,' and in our discus-
sion may be substituted for it. The important thing to notice,
however, is that when we get these three attitudes, or three feeling-
tones, or better, when we get all the reality-feeling and reality-atti-
tude that Professor Royce and Avenarius both describe, we have
got what we were looking for. At least experience has no other
test by which thought can recognize its goal.

Experience means for Avenarius what I have attempted to mean
by it. The subject of the experience in question merely observes
the situation before him and reports it, but there are no implications
about real objective facts in what he reports, except for him who
reports the facts of experience. The facts reported may be wholly
mythological, but to be objects of experience they must characterize
experience by their apparent reality, and the observer must be
quite unaware of having in any way produced the facts out of
himself or contributed anything to determine their character. He
simply observes and reports.^ This account of an object of experi-
ence we frequently have implied in the insistence of people who
have seen apparitions, that they were not dreaming, that they tell
simply what they saw, that it was as plain as day, etc.

Whether Luther ever hurled his ink-bottle at the devil or not,
or whether *der alt hose Feind' ever became to him a visual object,
Luther's experience may well have been characterized by the reality
of the devil as an actual person. The experience of many thou-
sands of persons is no doubt characterized by the efficiency of holy
relics to cure disease. The friendliness of disembodied souls,
miracles of the saints, the existence of God, can all be objects of
experience. That is, experience is adjusted to the reality of these
things, just as our experience is adjusted to the reality of our fellow
of whom we can get no glimpse whatever. But we sometimes
awaken from the cognitive dream. We do so all the time in trivial
ways, as when one seeks for his purse or his keys, and finds he has
left them at home. But in the case of ideas which play large dra-
matic roles in life the change, when it occurs, is gradual. But the
change can alivatjs occur, and that is the important point.

We are familiar with the distinction of the 'What' and the
'That.' Avenarius distinguishes what we may call the 'What' and
a variable 'That.' There is a certain content, imagined or per-
ceived, and there is my attitude toward it, by which I characterize
it as certainly known, or as believed, or as probable, or as doubted,
or as disbelieved and rejected. Every cognitive experience includes
these two factors. There is a content, and the content is the object
of an attitude. The content, Avenarius designates as elements; the

* ' Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung,' Vol. II., pp. 352 and 356.

12 AVKSAIilUH AS It I'llti: l:M-l.l!l i:SCE

attitude of knowlodj^e, doubt, belief, etc., he calls a character. "If
I observe that I first presumed or jn^essed somethinj^f, then believed
it and finally knew it, I have, in the relation content-character, the
content as constant and the character as variable. If I observe
what different thin<,'s 1 have believed in at different periods of my
life, I have the character as constant and the content as variable."'
Evidently, experience appears in this distinction a« a character, for
in the question, did you experience tJiat, or did you imagine it or
dream it? the idea of experience stands for certainty, sure knowl-
edge of fact.

The shifting value of the reality-feeling is readily illustrated
by Uie religious questionings and doubts of many persons. At the
outset there is frequently no question about God at all ; everything is
sure, and as yet unquestioned. No question has ever occurred,
just as no genuine question has ever occurred about the reality of
my fellow being. It is misleading to say that one believes in this
stage. One simply knows. There is perfect adjustment, perfect
satisfaction ; no problem appears anywhere. There is an experience
of genuine insight. Many persons who go through painful religious
experiences start from a situation like this, others always remain in
it,— others attain to it. It is our attitude toward our intimate
friends,— we know them, we are sure of them, they are the most real
facts in our lives.

But this condition of perfect mental and organic stability does
not always continue. The time comes when one believes in God,—
one no longer claims direct insight and certain knowledge. God
exists, yes,— one is sure of that, and one is sure of God,— but one
doesn't know so many things about God. The 'fidential' is be-
ginning to be attenuated. God becomes more and more an object
of doubt ; if not less knowable, at least less known, and known about,
and therefore not to be depended upon with the same quiet assur-
ance as before. Finally one asks the question does God exist, any-
way? The idea began as the idea of something that was an object
of experience and knowledge, with nothing problematic about it.
Then the reality-feeling began to fade. The idea took on a slightly
problematic tone, it became problematized, and this problematic
quality became more and more 'characteristic. The idea is different
somehow, a little strange. A quality of difference or otherness has
come over it. Finally what was known and experienced as real
turns completely into a problem. And then the problem gradually
ceases to exist. The idea of God is at last understood to be a super-
stition to be explained on historical and anthropological grounds.
The idea has become deproblematized. And yet God was at the

' Avenarius, ' Der Menschliche Weltbegriff,' p. 1.

APPRECIATIOXS OF EXPERlEyCE 13

Start known to exist. At least we have not the slightest ground for
denying that experience was characterized by the existence of God
as an object of will attitudes.

Psychologically this means probably that the physiological sys-
tem comes into the best adjustment to its environment by means
of this idea, or else that the idea expresses such an adjustment.
Avenarius likes to say that the central nervous system attains a
condition of stability, poise, rest, and that a complete cognition
is the expression of such stability. Into his elaborate psycho-
physical account I do not need to go, but it is important to notice
how an idea may express a genuine object of experience and how
experience may become less and less characterized by this object,
until it is no longer an object of experience but has become an ob-
ject of critical reflection; after which it may be comprehended in
one way or another, as fact or as myth.

Political convictions often have a similar history. One knows
at the start that a high tarift', perhaps, is the only salvation of
national industries. There is no question about it,— one can't be
said to believe, for one actually knows all about it. Presently one
thinks one doesn't know quite so much, but one believes the former
doctrine. And afterward one may veer quite to the other side, and
if one is of a dogmatic temperament one may know that various
things are so which one formerly knew were not so. And in each
instance it is a genuine case of knowledge. Formerly, the soul was
an object of experience and knowledge. To-day it has almost ceased
to be a problem. It was once a matter of experience that the earth
went around the sun. No doubt witchcraft was repeatedly a matter
of experience in early New England histoiy. There is really no
limit to the impossible things that may be objects of experience.
They may not continue very long to exhibit this empirical certainty,
but while they pass themselves off as genuine facts, they are facts
of experience, that is, experience has that character. One of the
most helpful bits of terminology that Avenarius has hit upon is
what he calls the problematization of an idea.^ He means that the
idea assumes a problematic character which it may retain or it may
lose by being again understood, in which case, the idea is said to
be ' deproblematized. ' Any idea, any fact you like, may become
problematized or deproblematized.

Let me give one more illustration of the cognitive process, in
the spirit of Avenarius. We are in a street-car, and at the opposite
end of the car is a man whom we recognize as a friend. We are
just about to go to speak to him when we suddenly hesitate. Is
it really our friend Smith? Perhaps it isn't. He looks like Smith

> ' Kr. der R. Erf.,' II., p. 225.

14 AVENARIUS AND PURE EXPERIENCE

though,— but he doesn't look so much like Smith as he juBt now did.
After all, he doesn't look like Smith, it can't be Smith, it isn't Smith ;
—but who is it? Perhaps it's Jones; it looks like Jones; of course
it's Jones.

Now whether the man is Smith or Jones or some one else makes
no difference to the process of arriving at the judgment, 'That is
Jones.' The man was first seen and he had a familiar look about
him,— he was characterized by a quality of sameness, he is the same
man as the one I know as Smith, Then this samenes.s (juality
diminishes,- the man feels to us less and less the same,— he takes
on a problematic character, we are in doubt and we worry over the
problem who it can be. Then we reach a negative certainty,— the
man is certainly not Smith. He has taken on a quality of differ-
ence or otherness. Gradually this negative certainty passes over
into a positive attitude. Another quality of sameness appears. The
man may be Jones. The sameness quality grows stronger until we
are certain he is the same man as Jones. With this certainty the
man has lost the problematic character.

At this point either motor results follow, we rise and speak to
the man Jones, or we turn our thoughts to other things. We do not
worry any longer over the problem of the man's identity. We have
found that out. But who the man really is, is a fact outside the
knowing process and irrelevant to it.

It is this irrelevancy of outer fact that I want to insist upon.
If it makes any difference to the kind of process and experience of
knowledge, then it is not irrelevant, but so long as that experience
which claims to be knowledge is quite the same in its own positive
character, whether it happens to be in error or not, it seems like a
metaphysical distinction and not a merely descriptive one, to call
some apparently cognitive experience genuine knowledge, and re-
fuse this name to other such experience because in the course of
events it has to be recognized as error. I therefore define knowl-
edge, provisionally at least, as experience with the cognitive char-
acter. Other cognitive experience may drive it out, but it does
not cease to be knowledge until that happens.

IV

One is perhaps inclined at this point to protest against a misuse
of words. We do not normally use the word knowledge to mean
merely an experience which has a cognitive feeling. By knowledge
we mean knowledge and not perhaps error that feels like knowledge.
Truth and error, it is held, are two radically different things, and
knowledge means the possession of truth and it can not mean the
possession of error. This is the traditional attitude.

APPRECIATIONS OF EXPERIENCE 15

I admit that the point of view I here defend uses the word
knowledge in a novel way, which may be a little confusing. But
the habit of declaring that knowledge must be knowledge of outer
fact, and then to say that epistemology investigates knowledge, is
to declare an important problem solved by a mere fiat before be-
ginning. Or put differently, there must be a transubjective object
of knowledge, otherwise there would be no knowledge for epistem-
ology to investigate; but we have epistemology, therefore we have
knowledge, therefore we have the transubjective objects of knowl-
edge. Perhaps we have, but it is to beg the most fundamental of
questions to assume the transubjective objects in our definition of
knowledge. We have cases of experience which we say are cases
of knowledge. As types of experience, they must be distinguished
by experience qualities. These experience marks are precisely what
they are, whether there is any knowledge of transubjective things
or not.

I quote a few sentences from Professor Seth for the sake of stating
more clearly what I think epistemology ought not to be. He says :
"Epistemology may be intelligibly described as dealing with the
relation of knowledge to reality."* Again: "This reference of
ideas to a world of reality beyond themselves is what is meant when
knowledge is contrasted with reality." Also: " Now it is the
essential function of epistemology to deal with this very relation,
—to investigate it on the side of its validity, its truth. "-

All this is, I think, what epistemology should not try to be, at
least at the beginning. It all follows, however, from including a
metaphysical validity in the definition of knowledge. It should
not be forgotten that our total data are experience characterized one
way or another, and that when we speak of truth and error as
something secured, we can mean only certain types of experience.
But any piece of experience is properly described by pointing out
its own positive characters, and not by a subsequent estimate of its
value. Actual cases of knowledge are cases of experience char-
acterized as cognitive. And to the experience which said, *I am
knowledge,' subsequent observation can always say, 'You were
error. ' But from the point of view of a strictly empirical account,
the experience now called error was, so long as it retained the
cognitive character, a genuine case of knowing something.

No doubt I seem to have mixed up experience and knowledge in
a confusing way. I began by speaking of objects of experience,

' Philosophical Review, Vol. T., p. 133.
»L. c, p. 136.

16 AVENAlfWfi AND PVHE KXl'tllilESiK

facts ^iven in experience, and then I slipped into a discussion of
knowledge, and it may seem that sometimes I used knowledf?e and
experience as equivalent terms, and ajrain, I spoke of knowUnlge
as a special type of experience, namely cognitive experience.

The criticism would be fair, but it is of service in pointing out
that there are two meanings of the word experience, and llicsc I
must now try to separate.

Most often we mean by experience, something as wide as the
whole of consciousness. There is no defining experience in this
most comprehensive sense. No feeling, however elusive, falls out-
side of experience. Experience means also, however, something
more limited and definite. In this narrower meaning, experience
is the experience of some particular object or fact. We express this
meaning of the term when we say to any one, 'Did you experience
that or did you imagine it or invent it or dream it or postulate it?'
Experience in this sense is the cognition of apparently real fact.
It is in this sense that Avenarius uses the word. lie defines it as
the ' Kenntnissnahme seiender Sachen.'^

A near-sighted person frequently sees some one across the street
whom he thinks must be an acquaintance, but he can not be sure,
owing to his defective eyesight. In this case, and speaking from
the point of view of the narrower definition, the object of his ex-
perience is his own state of uncertainty. He can not say, *I per-
ceive my friend A, over there,' but he can say, 'I perceive great
uncertainty in myself.' The latter judgment is a complete cogni-
tion. His uncertainty is fact of his experience, but his experience
does not present it as fact that the man across the street is really
his friend. It is this cognitive character of experience that we
have in mind when we speak of experience as the basis of science,
when we speak of facts, of experience and objects of experience.
Any discussion of experience as a criterion of certainty must con-
ceive it in the narrower sense, as direct cognition of fact, without,
however, implying that the fact has any metaphysically independ-
ent existence. It may or it may not. In either case we have the
same empirical situation. I shall accordingly use the word experi-
ence to mean experience cognitive, experience having an object.

I trust it will not sound either dogmatic or excessively common-
place if I say at once that the independent outer world is an object
of experience.

VI

It has been already observed how we meet again and again with
the declaration or the insinuation that knowledge of a real tran-
scendent is the only knowledge worth the name, and at the same

> ' Kr. der R. Erf.,' II., p. .3.59.

APPRECIATIONS OF EXPERIENCE 17

time it is admitted that we can not understand how experience can
transcend itself. But experience has got to do so somehow, it is
argued, or else knowledge is impossible.

In all this, a philosophical doctrine is seen to meet resistance
from something that is not logical thought. The problem of the
transcendent object can hardly get a hearing on its own merits. It
is met by thoroughly realistic prejudices, which seem to be planted
deep down in our nature. This attitude of resistance to certain
perfectly logical points of view is something deeper than the senti-
mental antipathies to a criticism of cherished ideas. It expresses
that law of experience which a psychologist is trying to make out
when he seeks to discover why we believe in an out€r world. Cer-
tain it is that there is a law of our experience which makes the outer
world, whatever we may say about it, or whatever logical dilemmas
we may get into on account of it, always an equally real fact as a
constant character of experience.

It would be interesting if cases of experience could be observed
in which the outer world should lose its reality-feeling, in which
the subject would hesitate to say whether the outer world were
really experienced or only fancied and dreamed. If such cases
could be observed, and their phenomena connected with physiolog-
ical disturbances, we might see our way clear to speak with great
confidence of a natural view of the world, determined by organic
conditions and expressing the natural adjustment of the organism
to its conditions of life.

Pathological cases of this type have in fact been observed.^ I
am obliged to quote at second hand.- Dilthey writes as follows:
"There is in dreams a shading of the liveliness of the sense of
reality. This occurs in the experience of every one, and by it
dream-images can come very close to reality. For a long time I
took a memory-image for the image of an actual event, until I was
able to prove that it was the recollection of a dream-image. From
Krishaber we have the following description, given by an educated
patient, of his condition which lasted a considerable time. The
account is from Krishaber 's observations of a certain class of neuro-
pathic conditions of which profound sense-disturbances were espe-
cially characteristic: 'The impression of being in a dream was the
most trying to me of all. A hundred times I touched objects about
me, I spoke out loud in order to bring back the reality of the outer
world and my own identity. But the touching of objects did not
correct my impression.' Another case of this type was observed

* Krishaber, ' De la Nervopathie cerebro-cardiaque.*

* Observations by Krishaber cited by Dilthey in Sitzungsberiehte der K. P.
Akadetnie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin for 1890, Vol. 2, p. 1004.

2

18 AVENARIUS ASD PURE EXI'KRIEyCE

in the case of an officer, who lost at the same time th<» lively wnse
of his own identity and of the reality of the outer world, and had
the feeling of being sunk in a dream." Again, "In all the ca«es
collected by Krishaber, the patient suddenly fell a victim to dizzi-
ness, roaring in the eai*s, and disturbances of sight, hearing and
touch. An especially accurate observer of himself says: 'These dis-
turbances of sight reminded me of how things look when seen
through powerful concave lenses, or when one stands beside a very
hot furnace and looks through the draft, so that the objects beheld
seem to tremble. My own disturbances of sight resemble a combi-
nation of these two.' The disturbances of hearing were even more
pronounced. And every time there proceeds from these altered
conditions, especially from the sense-disturbances, an alteration in
the sense of the reality of the outer world, and a parallel change
in self-consciousness."

The patient first observed was a writer. After violent sense-
disturbances he seemed to be dreaming and no longer the same
person. Both his own identity and the outer world became matters
of uncertainty to him. Another case was that of an English officer.
"It seemed to the patient that something was wrapped about him
and stood as a barrier between him and the outer world, giving him
a feeling of complete isolation. When he spoke, his voice seemed
strange, he did not recognize it or believe it was his own. . . . He
doubted his own existence. He seemed to be not himself, and it
cost him an effort to believe in the identity of his own person. At
times he was not sure of his existence, and at the same time he
lost belief in the reality of the outer world, and was as if sunk deep
in a dream." It seemed to a third patient as though persons
about him were figures in a dream. He thought he was no longer
the same person, and as he walked he w^as unable to feel the floor.

I cite these cases to support the opinion that the experience of
an outer world is rooted in the very organization of our being.
Just what these deep-lying roots are is a special problem for psy-
chology, but the fact that such experience does express some essen-
tial factor in our organization justifies us in speaking of a natural
view of the world as contrasted with the idealistic point of view.
For although we may not be justified in comparing crude organic
attitudes with any reasoned metaphysic, still these natural attitudes
of adjustment give rise to the naive realism of the 'plain man,' and
this it is on which a reflected realism depends.

The proposal of the problem, how we come to know an outer
world, as a problem for empirical psychology, does seem to contain
the implication that such experience expresses the natural adjust-
ment of the physiological subject.

APPRECIATIONS OF EXPERIENCE 19

Helmholtz^ thinks to solve the problem by applying his doctrine
of unconscious inferences, and in this opinion he is followed by
Zeller.^ Dilthey, in the article from which I have quoted, argues
that the subject meets stubborn resisting facts which are thereby
characterized as other than self. The subject gets segmented off,
as it were, from the rest of the world. Cornelius explains the idea
by the 'principle of economy. '^

Of these various efforts, that of Dilthey is decidedly the best,
—but however that may be, all I wish to insist upon here is that
experience is characterized by laws of its own in a profoundly
realistic way, a way which may be of the greatest consequence for
the actual fate of metaphysical theories. By no amount of intel-
lectual discipline can we rid our world in experience of its realistic
character. We may be fully convinced that this character is a
vicious illusion, but the character remains. Dr. Johnson did not
refute Berkeley's metaphysic, but he did testify to the character of
experience which is common to sane humanity. The lecturer who is
going to present to his class a refutation of realism at least takes
naively for granted that his lecture-room is waiting for him in
quite a realistic way. Realism of this unreflective sort describes
our adjustment to our world of experience. It is our natural or-
ganic attitude toward our outer world. And the student of philos-
ophy who has this same natural attitude along with the rest of his
fellows may, indeed, vigorously repudiate any charge of being a
realist in his philosophy, but he and his fellows will have a world
of common objective reference, much of which will have a material
character, and which, emotional values being neglected, seems pretty
much the same for all observers. As a philosopher, he will hardly
be so sure about his doctrine as the unreflective man is about the
world of his experience. But although he may pass through crises
of critical philosophy, he has to reflect about a world that persist-
ently retains its realistic character. It may indeed become more
or less ambiguous in certain respects, it will alter with regard to the
emotional values in it, but these changes do not affect the outer
substantial reality as a characteristic of experience. Such realism
as this can hardly be called a metaphysical realism. It is certainly
quite independent of any metaphysical doctrine. It is an organic
experiential realism that seems a great deal more fundamental than
realism or idealism in critical philosophy.

In presenting this point, the chief diflficulty I have to contend
against is its character of extreme commonplace. The habit, how-

' ' Physiologische Optik,' Leipzig, 1867, p. 447.

' ' Vortrjige iind Abhandlungen,' III., p. 253.

*' Psychologic als Erfahrungswissenschaft,' p. 114.

20 AVENARIU8 AND PURE EXPERlEyCE

ever, of seeking reality in some other world of ideal truth cauaes us
to leap over the delusive and illogical but the very real experience
of actual life. But except, perhaps, for the mystic in his momenta
of rapture, this seeking a beyond does not change the character
of human experience that I have laid stress upon, so that as a
philosopher a man may be anything you like, but as a man, living
the life of a human being, he is bound to be a realist in his spon-
taneous organic attitudes. These, of course, are not philosophy, but
they determine the character of experience, which is the basis of
philosophy.

What I have been trying to bring forward is the fact of what
has been called a natural view of the world, a natural WeltbegrifP
as contrasted with a relatively artificial one resting on a foundation
of dialectical subtlety. The latter we may believe and preach, but
the former we live. The subtle and critical doctrine may be the
true one, hut it makes no difference to experience whether it is true
or not.

I trust this will not appear far-fetched and trivial. To me, it
appears at the other extreme of commonplace. I dwell upon it
so much because of our habits, as students of philosophy, of neglect-
ing experience which seems illusory from our favorite point of view.

There is then a natural view of the world, a natural attitude
toward it, a natural illusion if you like, from which we may po.s8ibly
be delivered by moments of profounder insight. But our experi-
ences of philosophic grace are like many other experiences of grace ;
one comes at pretty regular intervals, perhaps, into the temple, but
one continually relapses into sin. It is just about impossible to
continually recognize in the outer world the garment of divinity.
We have very probably our 'philosophy of clothes,' but it is pretty
certainly a philosophy of Sunday clothes.

This natural view of the world which seems so appropriate to
the organism in a biological way is that natural attitude which
Avenarius has discussed in his essay *Der Menschliche Weltbegriff.'

A few sentences in that book are so striking that I venture to
quote them. He has been speaking of the idealistic movement
which issued in the proposition, "The world is my idea" {Vorstel-
lung) , and he continues : ' ' But even for the most advanced idealist
who seeks to limit his idea of the world to this minimum of content,
there remains always the recollection of 'things' as they used to
be before his conversion to idealism,— as something really existent,
or as he used to call them real, as something immediately sure, as
immediately cognized, and known and knowable,— as parts of his
environment independent of his thought, in contrast with himself
and set over against his thought,

* Avenarius.

APPRECIATIONS OF EXPERIENCE 21

"This recollection is, however, not so void of significance for
the most critical idealist as is the recollection of a nurse's tale or
a belief of childhood; it plays a wholly peculiar role. . . . And
this means that the 'problem'^ which arose when it was 'discovered'
that the perceptions which were caused by the 'things' of the earlier
(realistic) view are indeed nothing but ideas, and that the 'things'
too of the earlier view are only ideas, this means that the 'problem'
which arose by virtue of this discovery has not yet found its final
solution by our becoming accustomed to the judgment, everything
is my idea, is in my consciousness.

"And why not? Because of the despised naive realism which
always lives anew because it is always being experienced (der immer
neu aufleht weil er immer neu erleht wird). And so the ghost of
realism stalks by day in the proud mansion of idealism, and will
not be cast forth."'

Whatever those functions are which cause us to believe so in-
stinctively in the outer world, we must assume they are continuously
active. The pathological cases mentioned above showed that the
sense of reality which attaches to the outer world is a product of
natural human functions, and these, unless disorganized, must cause
our experience to be characterized as experience in a real inde-
pendent world of objective facts.

The above considerations show that at least one view of the
world seems to have a functional value for the organism, while
others are functionally less suitable. If there be one view of the
world which surpasses others in functional value, this means that
the organism through this Welthegriff secures an adjustment to
its environment and a stability within itself. As a fact, some
points of view do seem to have this functional value. We sometimes
hear it said, 'That point of view would turn my world upside down'
or, *I could not get ahead on that supposition.' But whether sug-
gestions like these be worth anything or not, there is evidently a
natural view of the world, the only view the 'plain man' knows, and
which is as deeply rooted in the experience of the critical idealist
as in that of any one else. That view is practical naive realism.
As metaphysic, it is of course of the most uncritical type. But it
can be a stubborn obstacle in the way of idealism, producing a sense
of incongruity, and occasioning that vague discontent with a doc-
trine which is admitted to be perfectly logical. "I believe,"' says
Avenarius, "from personal observations that there is a large class
of men trained in natural science who are at the same time idealists,

* See meaning of ' problem ' in above account of Avenarius, pp. 12 and 13.
« ' Der Menschliche Weltbegriff,' p. 106.
» L. c, p. 108.

22 AVENARKJS AMt I'lJItE KXPEIUKNCE

who would fet'l it a relief to return to their earlier realism, and
would he happy to have it occur if they only knew how to escape
from idealism logically, with a good conscience." But they can
not escape the conclusion that consciousness and its phenomena are
all that is given in experience. "And yet with all these consistent
deductions there is usually not lacking a dualistic discontent.
Something about this view of the world is wrong and were better
got rid of. One can't just say what the disturbing factor is, in
this so strictly logical Weltbcgri/f.*'^

Avenarius has his own explanation, but we need not go so far as
his theory of 'introjection' would take us in order to see that
idealism, whether it be true or not, seeks to have us view the world
in a way that is opposed to our organic constitution, Avenarius
would say that idealism is thus biologically uiitenablt? (' biolofjisck
unhaltbar').

There is then a natural view of that experience which we call the
outer world, just as there is a natural view of that experience which
stands for our fellow being. And it is not strange that natural
views of these things should regard them as being really what they
seem to be, transcendent realistic facts.

The critical philosopher is the man who seeks to emasculate his
natural view of the world. Of course, in so doing, he may be
getting nearer to metaphysical truth. lie will have a greater or
a less success in obeying the commands of reason, but he can
hardly eliminate altogether the influence of his natural organic
attitude. So that the 'critical' doctrine which results will be a com-
promise between nature and reason. I do not say that this is an
interference with the function of critical doctrines ; far from it.

But not every one is a critical philosopher; relatively few do
emasculate their natural view of the world. I venture to say that
even the majority of philosophers have the same quiet assurance
about their outer world, that the plain man has, although they can
state more problems about it. For the greater part of humanity,
the realistic nature of the world is a simple fact of experience, and
for the rest, whatever they may say about it, it is a fact of experi-
ence, too. Those for whom it is not a fact of experience are the
cases referred to above whose reality-functions, if I may call them
so, have become disorganized.

VII

We mean by realism a conception w^hich describes the world as
consisting of mutually independent objects. The 'independent' as
thus used has a metaphysical meaning. But the idea of metaphys-

* • Der Menschliche Weltbegriff,' p. 109.

APPRECIATIO^H OF EXPERIESCE 23

ieal independence has its origin in an aspect of things which is
found in experience, and which is called their independence. There
is certainly an aspect of a large part of the world which, as an
experience-character must be called independence, and in order to
distinguish between this empirical character and the metaphysical
meaning, I shall use the two words 'independent' and 'transcendent.'
The transcendence-character is a metaphysical character, the inde-
pendence-character is a strictly empirical one. We instinctively re-
gard our fellows as transcendent objects. They may be or may not,
but they are certainly independent objects. In speaking of inde-
pendent objects I shall therefore not be speaking metaphysically.
And as for transcendent objects, I shall discuss not them but the
idea of them.

This distinction between the independent and the transcendent
is an important one. It does not, however, occur at all to the 'plain
man,' nor does it occur to the rest of us most of the time. For him
who is unconcerned with philosophical problems, the independent
object is a transcendent object. lie will not doubt that the church,
the city hall and the bank stand up on their foundations without
any assistance from experience, finite or absolute.

I hope this will not seem like attributing reflective metaphysical
opinions to the man who is understood not to reflect at all along
these lines. lie does not, of course, distinguish the independent
and the transcendent and then say they are two aspects of one and
the same object. He has no such ideas at all clearly formulated,
but he has very definite ideas about 'real things' which are not
asking his permission to exist, lie has, perhaps, left a plough up
in the field. He is certain that the plough is just where he left it,
unless some one has taken it away. Doubts about the transcendent
reality of his plough would be quite unintelligible to him. And
since he does not distinguish the independent from the transcendent
character, his plough has both characters undistinguished. To say
that he does indeed accept the independence-character, since he
must, but that he can not be said to believe in the transcendence-
character, is to say that he understands by the independence-char-
acter the limitations we have in mind, when we describe this char-
acter as a 'merely' empirical character. But this is to credit him
w^ith a distinction which not many writers on episteraology have
thought of making.

I think we may be sure of these conclusions because there is so
much of the 'plain man' in each of us. "When we talk philosophy
w^e do indeed steer a very different course, but when we simply
experience the world we are all plain men together. That is, we
are all thrown back on those natural functions which determine
experience for us in these respects.

24 AVENARWa ASU I'UUE KXI'EUIESCE

I regard it then as no betrayal of the 'plain man' to say that for
him the transcendent object is an object of experience. But this
does not mean that there need be anywhere in the universe a meta-
physically transcendent object. For the spontaneous unreflective
consciousness, the independent object has not been denuded of the
transcendence-character. One has become highly sophisticated l>e-
fore one calls n tree or a house a construct of cons<;iou8ness. From
the naive point of view, there is, of course, consciousness, but that
is all in one's head, if one must locate it. That tree, however, is
not consciousness, or a phenomenon of consciousness. It is a tree,
and trees are 'known' to be something quite different from con-
sciousness.

The critical onlooker says, to be sure, that the tree and the
house are independent objects, but that this character is no ground
for describing them as transcendent as well. The critical onlooker
is, however, outside of the situation, and his observations do not,
as such, alter the experience which he criticizes.

The only writer who, to my knowledge, has been clear and
specific as well as just on this point is Uphues.* Uphues does not
distinguish the independence from the transcendence-character in
so many words, but he implies the distinction. Accordingly, in the
quotation from him which I shall give, 'das Transcendente' is to be
understood in the above -undifferentiated sense of independent ob-
ject still unreflectively apperceived as transcendent.

''Die Natur," says Uphues, "ut das Jenseits des Beimisstseins,
der Gegensatz desselben, und in diesem Sinne hezeichnen wir sie als
das Transcendente.'"^ A littk farther on, he continues: "It de-
pends upon the constitution {Einrichtung) of consciousness, that in
sensations, and in ideas and thoughts built up upon them, we do
present to ourselves something wholly different from consciousness.
. . . The direction of consciousness upon the transcendent object
is originally the only one that can be observed. The child makes
no reflections upon consciousness and its processes. The world
perceived by the senses is the only object with which it is at all
concerned. This direction of consciousness upon the transcendent
object is in later years, if not the only one, at least the prevailing
one. Very many remain on the child's level; reflections about the
processes of consciousness play in their lives no role whatever, and
even for the others, such reflections are an achievement laboriously
brought about, interrupting at times the practical business of life
with the outer world. More important it is that when we make
judgments about the transcendent object, we do not proceed in an

* * Psychologie des Erkennens,' Leipzig, 1893.

* Uphues, I. c, p. 66.

APPRECIATIONS OF EXPERIEyCE 26

arbitrary way, but follow the laws which are laid down by our own
nature. ' '^

This direction of consciousness upon the 'transcendent' object
is certainly one of the most fundamental characteristics of human
experience. It is the original distinction between subject and
object which Professor Seth finds so inconsistent with an idealistic
theory of knowledge. Uphues repeatedly observes, however, that
to describe an act of perception as characterized by the presence
of an (apparently) transcendent object is to say nothing whatever
about the transcendent existence of such an object.

This should suffice to make clear in what sense the transcendent
object can be an object of experience. Why it is that the inde-
pendent object should be characterized as transcendent as well is a
phychological question. But the fact that the independent object
is so characterized is the point to observe.

VIII

Of all our independent objects the one that is most stubbornly
and defiantly transcendent is our fellow. It is just the transcend-
ent side of him which seems to give purpose and value to actual
concrete life, and which gives him the peculiar position of fellow.
Whether he is really a transcendent object, I do not inquire, but
human experience has precisely the character which the transcend-
ent reality of fellow beings would confer upon it,— that is, it is
characterized as a social experience. It has a history of develop-
ment by means of social relations, and a particular method of profit-
ing and learning by these relations, which the psychology of imita-
tion has done much to describe. But the describer of this social
experience is in the same position as he who describes the act of
peceiving a house or a tree. In neither case are we logically obliged
to assume the transcendent object otherwise than as a character of
experience, the experience in which the perception takes place.

Assuming the reality of my fellows, they form with myself
something more nearly comparable to a colony of monads than to
anything else, monads which have no windows through which we
can get direct views into one another's habitations, which may,
therefore, conceivably have no inside, but may be like the painted
architecture of the stage.

This is, of course, a solipsistic account of the matter, a solipsistic
description of a social experience. And if any one urge that a
social experience must needs involve at least two currents of per-
sonal experience, I think he has misunderstood. It is the same

' ' Psychologic des Erkennens,' p. 69.

26 AVENARIUS AND I'VHE EXl'EIUESCE

metaphysical petiiio that lurks in the usual definitions of knowledge
and error.

For a solipsistic doctrine is a very different thing from a
solipsistic experience. Suppose a solipsistic account to be true, and
that my stream of consciousness is the only stream of consciousness.
My social experience is quite indifferent to the truth or falsity of
solipsism, just as my experience of the outer world is quite indif-
ferent to the truth or falsity of idealism. The important thing for
experience is how it is characterized, not what exists outside of it.
Our human experience is characterized as life in a real world among
real fellows, but it does not follow from this merely that any tran-
subjective outer world or transcendent fellow beings exLst in a tran-
subjective way. The fact remains that the denial of solipsism (and
we all deny it) defines the fellow being as metaphysically tran-
scendent and this is to put him in the same logical position with
relation to the perceiving subject as the house or the tree. On the
other hand, the experience itself must be described as equally social,
whatever results we come to on matters of theory.

In view of these considerations it is interesting to note how
writers shy away from solipsism. They appear to imagine that a
solipsistic doctrine means an experience in which fellow beings are
represented by thin ghostly shapes, phantoms, which have the char-
acter of phantoms. What I insist upon is that a solipsistic doctrine
implies nothing whatever as to how the experience under discussion
will be characterized. One who was sure of the logical correctness
of the solipsistic argument would discuss his doctrines with others,
submit to social tests and social demands, and this, I maintain,
would not be any repudiation of his solipsism.

The fact simply is that his experience would be characterized by
the natural view of the world, the natural Weltbegriff of Avenarius.
Whatever doctrine the person in question may have, the reality
of fellow beings and the outer world is a fact of his experience.
He adjusts himself to them as thus defined ; that is his natural atti-
tude, it describes his experience, although it may not describe any-
thing else.

A discussion of solipsism is always a thankless task. Both the
writer and the reader know in advance that nothing can be said
in such a discussion that will in any way alter their actual experi-
ence. We all regard it inevitably as a mere vagary of dialectic of
which the absurdity is too manifest to call for careful statement.

Of the 'absurdity' of solipsism I am w^ll aware. I know as well
as any one that a solipsistic doctrine, however faultless its logic,
however unquestionable its data, would make no difference to me
as an interpretation of experience. I am sure that others would

APPRECIATIONS OF EXPERIENCE 27

be equally indifferent. This fact, however, that a solipsistic doctrine
can make no real difference to us points to an aspect of experience
which deserves examination. I feel obliged, therefore, to dwell a
little longer on solipsism, in spite of its uncongenial character.

Since solipsism is so manifestly absurb, its refutation ought to
be easy enough. It might pursue the following method: AVhen
you argue for solipsism observe, pray, the kind of situation you
appeal to. You admit that your experience has the character
of a social experience. But you deny that there is a genuine sys-
tem of experience which proceeds from the interaction of different
selves. You maintain that in your universe there exists only one
self which is yourself. At least you insist that no other can be
observed. Obviously you appeal to an observation which is not
subject to the limitations of your own observation. You place your-
self in thought above the entire fact to be observed, and then you
see all there is and report accordingly. But to establish the correct-
ness of your report another observation will be necessary, and then
this observation must be criticized by a third, and so on. It is the
infinite process with the last judgment not a bit nearer the goal than
the first one. To establish a solipsistic doctrine, you must have an
observation which can overlook the whole situation, and then one
of two things happens. You either get into the infinite regress, or
you admit that the observation you appeal to is really an observa-
tion of the facts, and that if the facts include a system of different
selves, the observation can be a recognition of that fact. But your
observation must not be a kind of experience which we know noth-
ing about. When you appeal to an imagined observation, it must
be the sort of fact that you understand and apply the name to in
your own experience. But such an observation could be no more
authoritative than your own observations every day. Your social
experience is a continuous observation of the very kind you would
appeal to to report the delusiveness of that experience. So that you
either admit the suffieiency of every-day experience as a refutation
of solipsism, or you appeal to an observation which can not observe.

Now we all 'know' that the case against solipsism is a great deal
better than any argument like this makes it appear. One who should
try to argue for a positive solipsism could be answered in the above
way. But solipsism need not be positive, it need not assume any
burden of proof. The defender of solipsism may proceed as follows :
*'You mistake my purpose; I am not trying to prove the truth of
solipsism. I say merely that the situation is ambiguous and capa-
ble of two explanations, and I see nothing but sentiment which
obliges me to reject the solipsistic one. I insist also that in the
reality of our fellow being we have the same problem of a transcend-
ent object that we have in the case of a house or a tree."

28 AVENARWH AND PURE EXI'EIilENCE

Now if you admit difficulties in the way of knowinj? the tran-
scendent as such, those difficulties as difficulties of logic apply to the
fellow being. I admit readily the infinite regress as the result of
an attempt to prove a positive solipsistic doctrine, but the infinite
regress occurs tliere because it must occur with every attempt to
know a transcendent object. The infinite regress simply illustrates
that aspect of the situation which I call attention to. AVhat one
gets in any case of knowledge is experience characterized as cognitive,
and the presumed agreement between such cognitive experience and
its assumed transcendent object can not be got at. We can not go
back of the cognitive experience, although we can go from one
cognitive experience to another. To be sure, I have continually a
cognitive experience of my fellows, but this does not settle the ques-
tion of their transcendent character in any logical way. It does
satisfy me practically,— this whole discussion is academic if you like,
and this sort of practical satisfaction is a decidedly important phase
of experience. But logically we are left with a sort of negative
solipsism on our hands which we can not get rid of. Actually, we
simply toss it away. We can not stand that kind of suggestion. Our
whole being rebels. We simply banish solipsism out of court. But
I submit that this is not a logical nor a philosophical way of escape.

I am not here, however, to argue the claims of one metaphysic
or another. I wish simply to observe, if I can, what motives deter-
mine our philosophical decisions.

Perhaps the most common way of attacking solipsism is to enu-
merate the many dreadful consequences which ought to follow. Such
argument does, perhaps, make him against whom it is directed feel
rather foolish, but it is no better as logic than the argumentum ad
hominem ever is.

It seems as though the eonse-quence of defining the object of
knowledge as a transcendent object whose reality does not depend
on being known brought one into a logical impasse. It is not that
I think I am the only self in the universe, but that I do not see any
way to prove that I am not the only self. Of course I know there are
other selves all about me ; that is the way my experience is character-
ized ; but if I once realize that my experience can not go beyond itself,
and that my fellow is regarded by me as in his very essence a tran-
scendent fact, I then observe that my knowledge of other selves as
transcendent is not a logical knowledge, but rather a biological
attitude.

Meanwhile this discovery makes absolutely no difference to ex-
perience. It continues to be as social as ever. One goes about
one's work and lives out one's life in the world among one's fellows.
One has observed, perhaps, that one can not prove that solipsism is

APPRECIATIONS OF EXPERIENCE 29

logically impossible, but that that does not disturb one. One does
not say that solipsism as a logical possibility is inconsistent in such
and such respects. One says it is absurd and revolting; that is, one
substitutes esthetic categories for logical ones.

I have raised the question about solipsism in order to bring out
the way in which the experience of all of us is superior to logic. We
all draw the line with great emphasis at the fellow being. His
reality must not be brought into question. We can perhaps discuss
it as a problem, but we know that it will not be a real problem. We
know that our experience is characterized in a social way and that
this social character is all-important in our world of values. The
fact that a character of experience is simply a character of experi-
ence and can in no way turn into a transcendent thing is not allowed
to make any difference.

IX

Realists do not take kindly to considerations like the preceding.
Such discussion sounds like argument for subjectivism. The realistic
prejudice already referred to demands the transcendent object.
What I have called the independent object is not enough. A few
attempts to support this demand may be here briefly reviewed.

Volkelt writes as follows: "If pure experience were the only
source of knowledge we should have to give up all claim to objective
knowledge, and content ourselves with mere enumeration and de-
scription of our own processes in consciousness. Every attempt to
formulate knowledge must end in failure. ' ''■

Here we have the initial assumption in the word 'knowledge'
which solves a problem in advance by a mere fiat. If pure experience
be the only source of knowledge, then pure experience is a good enough
basis for all the science we have, for it has no other basis, and we
can continue our scientific undertakings on that one. In the state-
ment quoted, the idea of an experience valid from a certain point
of view seems to get in the way of a frank description of actual ex-
perience as such. It is felt that because a point of view seems so
subjective, therefore the experience described must feel equally sub-
jective. But this is pure assumption.

If, however, knowledge is to be a cognition of the real transcend-
ent, and since knowledge we must have, some way has got to be found
to lead from pure experience over into the transubjective region.
Accordingly, Volkelt continues as follows: "The new principle is to
secure me a knowledge of the transubjective region which is closed
to experience. The certainty of this principle must, however, be
grounded in experience, must find an experience in which subjective

* • Erfahrung und Denken,' p. 133.

30 AVENARIUS AND PURE KIl'ERIESCE

certainty forces me to conclude that in that experience I cognize
something that experience itself can not reach."'

This is a frank statement of the situation. It is an appeal to
pure experience to tell something about facts which it conf(?ssedly
can not touch. Suppose experience does her best to comply; in
that case we have experience characterized in one way or another,
in such a way, in fact, as to satisfy us. As Avenarius would say,
our new experience is 'deproblematized.'

The principle by which Volkelt thinks we gain a knowledge of
transubjective things is the necessity one is under to make a par-
ticular judgment and not any other, if one wishes to tell the truth
about a fact with which one is acquainted. He testifies to a con-
straint, a Zwang, which lies in the very nature of the case, a demand
that the ideas be related so and not otherwise.'

One understands at once what is meant, although such terms as
constraint and demand are a little misleading. When one has the
insight that constitutes perfect knowledge one can, of course, report
it only one way. If it is an insight which one would have been glad
to avoid, there may be some sense of compulsion about it, but unless
the observer has an emotional antipathy to the truth which he per-
ceives, that truth is simply a part of his world of fact, but it can not
be said to assault him with any kind of imperative. There are judg-
ments, however, judgments of insight, which claim to have a perfectly
obvious objective validity. There is a test of such validity, the test
of social agreement. Volkelt tries to explain that it is this social
agreement which he means by the objective validity of judgments.
But so long as the success of a judgment depends upon its reporting
correctly the facts about a transubjective object, social agreement
may be the test of such judgments, but it is not equivalent to their
validity, except in a purely practical way. If we are to accept
social agreement as validity, we must throw overboard the tran-
scendent object. This, however, will be a mere matter of theory ; —
the independent objects of experience will, many of them at least,
continue to be characterized as transcendent.

Volkelt tries to describe a kind of transcendental 'Must.'
Rickert, with a much less realistic attitude, argues for a 'tran-
scendental Ought. ''^ His argument is somewhat as follows : Suppose
I see a tree, and I perceive it to be a green tree. That perception in-
cludes the judgment, the tree is green. It would certainly be false
to say that no judgment occurs until I happen to put it into words.
But having perceived the green tree I am not now at liberty to de-

* ' Erfahrung und Denken,' p. 135.

'L. c, p. 140.

' ' Der Gegenstand der Erkenntniss,' Freiburg i. B., 1892, p. 66.

APPRECIATIONS OF EXPERIEXCE 31

ceive myself about it. The true judgment has a kind of value which
a false judgment would not have. That to which the judgment
corresponds is this ought, which is authoritative for the individual.

It is enough to point out that this felt imperative is in the first
place a character of pure experience, whatever else it may be.

Another subjective principle of a similar sort is Sigwart's 'Prin-
ciple of Agreement.' If any one question the validity of this
principle, Sigwart admits that **We can only fall back upon our
consciousness that the unification of elements which agree (viz., sub-
ject and predicate) is something absolutely self-evident,"^— or in
other words, that it is a fact of pure experience. But, says Sigwart,
there is experience that is obviously subjective and individual, and
experience which has all the character of universal validity. The
latter sort of experience can be tested by certain principles such as
(1) stability in the character of objects,— they are not found with
one character to-day and a different one to-morrow; and (2) social
agreement.^ But the objective validity which depends upon these
tests can get along very well without any transcendent object
whatever.

A very common way of arguing for the realistic metaphysical
existence of the outer world is to call in the concept of causality.
There must be an outer world, it is said, as the cause of our sensa-
tions, which depend upon the stimulation of a sense organ. Sig-
wart's comment upon this argument is the right one. He says:
"No doubt scientific reflection upon our sense-perceptions, which
begins by assuming that they are occasioned by external objects,
finds itself confirmed in this assumption by the fact that it is thus
enabled to explain our sensations. . . . But it is, after all, con-
vincing only after we have tacitly presupposed the existence of
objects, the assumption of which it was intended to explain."^

Objective validity in the realist's sense is, then, Sigwart admits,
not so obvious in any character of experience. "But," he continues,
"it still remains open to us to acknowledge the existence of an ex-
ternal world, which is the same for all, as a postulate of our search
for science and knowledge, which we can not avoid believing,
although we recognize that it is not self-evident."*

I should put it more strongly than this. We can not help having
the outer world as a fact of experience because our experience must
needs be that of a human being. We may say that we doubt or that
we suspend judgment, but we have all the time our natural organic

^ Sigwart, ' Logic,' English translation, Vol. I., p. 296.
*L. c, Vol. I., p. 310.
•L. c, Vol. I., p. 321.
*L. c, Vol. I., p. 322.

82 AVENARIUB AfiD PURE EXPERIENCE

attitudes. Doubt about the outer world may express a theory, a
theory that is true, perhaps, but it does not describe the fundamental
character of experience.

Let me summarize briefly.

There is what we may call a natural view of the world, by which
we express our organic adjustment to it. That view asserts that a
real transcendent outer world and real fellow beings are objects of
experience. It asserts this, not so much in the form of a doctrine
as in the form of a spontaneous attitude. It is not to be assumed,
however, that either realism or idealism is therefore true. This
natural view of the world accepts the world as being really what it
seems to be, so far as it can be observed, and not the illusory appear-
ance of a fundamentally different reality. The work of observing
the world is natural science. This natural view of the world is
shared more or less unreflectively by all normal human beings. On
this point I would not be dogmatic, but I believe the proposition
is substantially correct. Some of us, however, have elaborated a
doctrine which declares that the world as observed and as observable
is appearance and illusion, and that reality is something quite dif-
ferent. This doctrine may be true, hut it makes no difference to
experience whether it is or not. Knowledge is a type of experience;
it is experience with the cognitive character. Error is the relation
in which one cognitive experience stands to a subsequent one which
contradicts it. Any cognitive experience may be contradicted by a
subsequent cognitive experience. There is nothing about experi-
ence which prevents such things as a personal devil or the Real
Presence being objects of Knowledge. There may be insight into
the future without, of course, implying that the future is going to
conform itself to the insight. Always the question has been, How
is experience characterized? and never. Is there a transcendent ob-
ject of knowledge? But it has been pointed out that it makes no
difference to experience whether there is a transcendent object or
not. Experience has independent objects which it characterizes as
transcendent, and it could not possibly have any more. But this
conclusion involves solipsistic possibilities. These too, however, make
no difference to experience, for a solipsistic doctrine is a very dif-
ferent thing from a solipsistic experience. Experience, whether it
be one or many in the world, is such a vital, stubborn thing that it
resists any and all consequences of theory. Where it seems to be
affected, the theory is the product of the experience, not experience
the product of the theory. "We do escape from solipsism in theory,
but we do so by casting it out of court. So that if I have to say why
I am convinced, in theory, of the reality of my fellows, I can only
say it is on the basis of the natural view of the world. But the

APPRECIATIONS OF EXPERIENCE 33

natural view of the world is not logic, so that the philosophy which
we finally construct is a compromise, some logic, some natural
Weltbegriff'. All sorts of mythological objects may be objects of ex-
perience. We know that to different individuals and to com-
munities in different stages of culture, very different objects are
objects of experience. AVe frequently express our estimate of these
by calling the individual insane and the community superstitious.
In doing so, however, we simply set our experience over against the
one which we criticize. Both are equally pure experience, though
one may be a pure experience of mythological objects, and the other
such an experience as we call clarified and scientific. In the growth
from childhood to intellectual maturity we see, in some measure,
the transition from the former to the latter. In the historical
growth of a race from primitive and prehistoric beginnings to a high
degree of civilization of the modern type, we see, on a large scale,
the movement from the one type of rehu Erf alining to the other.
Thus we may describe experience as a form with a variable content,
or as a variable character.

This is to advance somewhat beyond the discussion as above
pursued, but it brings us to the considerations which occupy the
second section of this paper.

NOTE.

The term ' Pure Kxporience ' is intended to translate the German ' reine
Erfahrung,' but the German word * rein ' suggests ' mere,' ' nothing else than '
which the English word ' pure ' less readily connotes. The English term at
once suggests the question, What is an unpure experience? Experience con-
ceived not as pure is conceived not as experience simply, experience as such,
but as interpreted in the light of some metaphysic. Pure experience is experi-
ence taken in an absolutely empirical way, and conceived without metaphysical
presupposition. The previous discussion has attempted to give an example of
taking experience in the sense of * reine Erfahrung,' experience without meta-
physical implications. Transcendent objects may or may not exist. It is a
question not of them, but of experience characterized, in this discussion, as
cognitive. For the most recent and the clearest statement of the ' pure experi-
ence ' position see Professor William James in the Journal of Philosophy, Psy-
chology and Scientific Methods, Vol. I., Nos. 18, 20, 21, and Vol. II., Nos.
2, 7, 11; and Professor Dewey in Vol. II., No. 15, of same journal.

THE DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIENCE

Pure experience means mere experience, experience just as it
comes, consisting of things, thoughts and relations, and these con-
sisting of it. It is not conceived subjectively nor does it presume
any particular metaphysic of an objective reality. It is the simple
presence or absence of whatever is empirically present or not present.
And as we are in this discussion concerned with cognitive experi-
ence, by pure experience we shall mean experience characterized as
the immediate cognition of facts, which facts may be things or
relations, thoughts, feelings, convictions or uncertainty,

Avenarius gives a long list of examples of experience, and
although some account was given above of his way of describing
experience, a few illustrations from his own pages may serve to
introduce a consideration of his general undertaking: "It is an
experience that the sun shone yesterday, that it was obscured
on the day before, that a recent year was perhaps an unusually
rainy one, or perhaps unusually dry. . . . Among people of
primitive culture an individual will declare it his experience that
the moon, in case of an eclipse, is holding her child in her arms,
that one visits distant places in sleep, that a shadowy being
with a character something like a breath (hauchartig) is the
source of feeling and movement in the body; and that a body can
exist with a soul or without it, and that a soul can exist both em-
bodied and disembodied. Stages of culture not so far from our
own have the experience that shrieking drives away the monster
that darkens the sun, and that incantations drive out the evil spirit
which has entered into a body. In our own civilization, the de-
mented patient experiences the command of God to throw himself
out of the window,— he will fly like a bird [if he does so]."^

A list like this could be prolonged indefinitely, but its significance
is apparent from a few examples. Every such case of experience
is a case of insight. The person who has the insight is not aware
that he contributes anything toward the construction of what he
perceives. He is sure that he is not mutilating any facts. He
reports the truth as he perceives it. The command of God, a bit of
geometry, excursions of the soul, facts of chemistry or mechanics
are all facts which are directly observed and reported. From our

^ ' Kr. der R. Erf.,' II., p. 342.

34

THE DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIENCE 35

point of view some reports of experience may be true reports of
fact while others are not, but this is to say that experience is not
necessarily valid experience. And the charge of incorrect observa-
tion must always be a character of another experience.

Now this cognitive experience can be made the object of scientific
study. To say that an explanation of cognitive experience must be
wholly futile because the judgments which state the explanation
will themselves express only other cognitive experience is to mis-
understand the purpose. The real effort in a psychophysical ac-
count of pure experience is not so much to get back of pure experi-
ence, as to get a larger acquaintance with it— to extend cognitive
experience so as to include judgments about cognitive experience
itself. Of course we explain cognitive experience by reducing it
to cognitive experience, but this is our way of getting a fuller and
richer cognitive experience. Whether we employ psychophysical
concepts or mere introspection is a question of method. Because
psychology makes extensive use of psychophysical concepts, and
speaks of an outer world as the source of stimuli, psychology is not
therefore metaphysics. Psychology has its point of view and its
favorite method. Its data are observed data. Its aim is to observe
other data. Any instruments which lead to richer observations are
legitimate, and do not commit the psychologist to a metaphysic
just because the aim is to come around again to another observation,
and not to rest in the concept of an ultimate ground of phenomena
which can not be observed.

II

This, however, is the distinction between description and explana-
tion as ultimate goals. We may say that the aim of science is the
widest possible acquaintance with phenomena, where the word phe-
nomena does not imply the metaphysical distinction of appearance
and reality. ^Methods of observation appropriate to different re-
gions of phenomena, and points of view for the apperception and
orderly synthesis of phenomena, are developed. In the course of
this work of observation and description various points of view are
elaborated which have the function of explaining phenomena rather
than of synthesizing and describing them, although both explanation
and description may be accomplished. A point of view which both
explains and describes is the principle of evolution. A point of
view which as yet can be said only to explain is the reference of
mental states to physical processes in the brain as the ground of
consciousness. This latter point of view it is which has brought
forth the much-discussed concept of psychophysical parallelism. At
the risk of digression, a brief orientation on this concept will clear
the ground for considering the application which Avenarius has
made of it in his 'Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung.'

36 AVENARILH AM) I'UUE EXl'KItlESCB

We know of course that a great deal of consciousness dep<3ndB
upon brain-conditions. If we could make out these brain-condition*
for given mental states, we should, to the extent we had done so,
succeed in explaining the latter. We are able to explain many phe-
nomena of consciousness in a general way. It is an explanation,
though a very incomplete one, to say that a sufficient blow on the
head puts an end to consciousness, to say that the sensations of sight
or hearing or the power of speech can be eliminated by accidents of
a given type to the brain. Well,— explanation is interesting. No
one is obliged to take explanatory points of view if he does not wish
to explain, but if he cares for the explanation of mental states he
must assume that they are explainable. lie must look for causal con-
nections wherever they can be found, and not conclude that on the
whole he will not look for causal connections in precisely tli*' roirion
where, to a certain extent, they leap at the eyes.

Just why certain physical processes should have phenomena of
consciousness as sequences no one pretends to say,— but the same
mystery exists in all caudal relations. If one ask why the stream
of consciousness continues to flow, why it didn't stop a minute ago
instead of keeping on, one can only say it is because the heart con*
tinues to beat, the blood to circulate, and the brain to function. One
can ask, if one has the courage, why the earth doesn't stop in its
orbit, or why the sun doesn't stop shining. The fact simply is that
consciousness keeps on in its dramatic and picturesque career, and
if we wish to explain some details of that career, we look for laws
of regularity between antecedent and consequent, and we assume,
as a point of view that clears the ground and simplifies the problem,
that consciousness is explainable in all respects, so far as the facta
themselves are concerned. And whether one talks of antecedent
and consequent or of parallel states seems hardly to matter at all.

In consciousness, such phenomena as the noon whistle of a neigh-
boring factory, the sound of a man shoveling coal, a bicycle-bell, a
piano across the street, the rattle of a wagon, may follow one after
another. All sorts of sensations are continually starting up in con-
sciousness in the most chaotic fashion. Any causal connection be-
tween them is out of the question. But this means that if sensations
are explainable at all, they are explainable by something that is
conceived as consisting of something else than psychic states. But
if the mental states are conceived as depending upon physical states,
and these latter as causally related, we get the mental states in-
directly into a real series, and get rid of chance.^

This is a point on which psychologists have done a good deal of
hedging, no doubt because psychology is still open to the suspicion

*See Mtinsterberg, 'Aufgaben imd Methoden der Psychologic,' p. 117.

THE DESCIUPTIOS OF EXPERIENCE 37

of entertaining metaphysical motives. AVundt will not admit any
causal connection between the physical and psychical series; each
seems to flow on regardless of the other, but somehow bound to take
notice of the other after the fashion of a preestablished harmony.^
His article, 'Ueber psychische Causalitat,' etc.,* is a polemic against
what he calls the materialistic psychology, in which a causal relation
is assumed between physical states and states of consciousness.

I really see no reason why one should not be frankly and out-
spokenly materialistic in a natural science. It is understood that
the question about ultimate reality is not raised at all, and until
this question is raised there is no metaphysic.

But it certainly comes to the same thing in science to say that a
physical state is the universal antecedent, or the universal con-
comitant, or the cause of a given mental state. When consciousness
is disordered because of an observable accident to the brain, one says
the condition of the brain thus introduced is the cause of the dis-
ordered consciousness. There seems no more purpose in speaking
of it as a merely parallel physical state which is, however, not a
cause of a mental state, than to speak of a stroke of apoplexy and the
bursting of a blood-vessel as parallel physical states, but not to be
taken as causes of changes in consciousness. Epistemology and the
higher criticism of concepts may ask in what sense the word 'cause' is
here used, but if the psychologist can say that without the physical
state, the mental state would not have occurred, he has enough
ground for using the word 'cause' in a frank and practical way.
But in doing so he will be raising no question about reality, he
will simply be assuming that his phenomena are explainable by
causal relations.

Thus the relations which the psychophj'sical point of view as-
sumes are relations for the purpose of explanation, but it is an ex-
planation within the limits of phenomena, and no metaphysical im-
plications are permitted. The explanation is not an ultimate ex-
planation ; the triumph of the point of view would be to be brought
around again into the mental series, to be able to predict the mental
states from the physical ones. That is, the triumph would lie not
in an explanation, but in a description, and this hope, this possibility
it is which makes explanations important parts of scientific under-
takings. The explanation which confessedly is no help to a new
observation may be interesting, but it hardly seems important. And
if it helps to a new observation it fulfills its function, whatever its
concepts may be. There may indeed be a metaphysical concept of
psychophysical parallelism, such a doctrine as that of Spinoza, for

» ' Logik,' Vol. II., 2te. Abtheilung, pp. 255, 257, 259.
* Philosophische Studien, Bd. X., Heft 1.

38 AVENARIU8 AND PURE EXPERIENCE

instance, but when the concept appears in psychology to-day, the
presumption is that it is a point of view for the work in hand.

As an illustration of psychophysical parallelism on a very
elaborate scale and of the distinction between description and ex-
planation, I purpose to go somewhat at length into the principle
work of Richard Avenarius, his 'Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung.' I
am the more disposed to this undertaking since Avenarius has. it
seems to me, been very generally misunderstood, and I think un-
justly.

Ill

I will say at once that the aim of the 'Kritik der Reinen
Erfahrung' is to be a contribution to natural science, and that it is
not a system of metaphysics. The interest that it appeals to is
primarily the interest in psychology; it appeals also to the interest
in sociology and history.

That it should not have been so understood is explicable enough.
The title reminds us of Kant. A 'Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung'
must, one thinks, have a good deal in common with the 'Kritik der
Reinen Vernunft.' Also, the author was a professor of philosophy
at Zurich; his earlier works were a monograph on Spinoza and an
attempt to define philosophy as the effort to conceive the world ac-
cording to a mechanical principle. His later work, 'Der Menschliche
Weltbegriff,' had a good deal to say about idealism, and he himself
was the editor of one of the principal philosophical quarterlies.

In view of these facts, one took up the 'Kritik der Reinen
Erfahrung' expecting to find, if not positive metaphysics, at least
a criticism of metaphysical concepts. If we add to this a disposition
to skip the notes in fine print, we have reasons enough for misunder-
standing the work before us.

A remark which Avenarius makes in a note is a good introduc-
tion to his point of view. "As we have learned," he says, "to think
of the nourishment of organisms, of their recovery from injuries and
sickness, of their adaptations to changes in their environment with-
out the intervention of the soul, so we have now to learn to think
of the so-called purposive changes in the central nervous system
without calling in a soul (Geist) to help explain, a soul whose own
psychic changes would have to be first explained."^

We may like this point of view or we may not; it is, in either
case, an important psychological point of view at the present time.
Psychology seeks to describe those mental activities which are its
subject-matter by formulating laws of their occurrence and in mak-
ing out psychophysical relations wherever they can be found, and

^ ' Kr. der R. Erf.,' I., p. 202.

THE DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIENCE 39

it is felt that it would be to give up the whole task to admit a prin-
ciple of original and arbitrary energy as a faetor in the explanation.
We constantly hear that this is materialism, and for one who does
not distinguish between science and metaphysics it is materialism.
But that distinction should, in the light of present-day discussion,
be fairly obvious,

Avenarius undertakes to write a psychology of the processes of
knowledge. Whether his psychology is a good one is a point for
psychologists to decide. The important thing for us to notice is
that the 'Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung' is psychology.

There is at the outset a certain fund of information to build upon.
Whatever our metaphysic may be, we 'know' in psychology that con-
sciousness depends upon processes in the brain of some sort, that the
nervous system is responsive to stimuli, that the whole body, and the
nervous system as part of it, is constantly engaged in breaking down
tissue, and is in need of appropriate nourishment and of periodical
repose. We know that the organism and its parts are capable of
exhaustion, and, within limits, of recovery from exhaustion. There
is a teleological aspect of the reactions which the organism makes
to a great many stimuli. This aspect it is which has given to the
soul concept such a stubborn foothold in psychology. But though
we are unable to make a psychological use of this concept, we may
not, therefore, overlook the facts which it was intended to explain.
We can observe, too, a certain rhythmical character in life as a whole
and in many particular processes. The alternation of day and night
occasions regular intervals of work and rest, with points of maximal
vigor and fatigue, and transitions back and forth between them.

We are assured also that there is a region which we call the cen-
tral nervous system which receives stimuli and determines reactions.
We know, too, that the physiological system acquires habits and is
capable of acquiring skill. These things depend upon processes of
some sort in an organ, the brain, but upon what processes in partic-
ular we know hardly at all.

Can we conceive an organ of such a type as to account for enough
of such phenomena as to make it a useful concept for psychological
purposes? Avenarius thinks we can, and he proceeds to describe
a central nervous system with such characters as would explain, he
thinks, a great many phenomena in a psychological way.

Avenarius describes a way of apperceiving the central nervous
system. Certain phenomena being given, there is wanted a concept
to make them intelligible. Avenarius is, in so far, in the same
position as the one who elaborates a system of atomic relations to
account for chemical phenomena.

The central nervous system is called by Avenarius the System

40 AVENAIilUS AND I'UIiE KXI'KlilKSCE

C. This do.si*,'nati()n is cliosen for purposes of convfuience, and for
limiting,' the discussion of the system C to those characters which
he wishes to lay stress upon. The system C appears to be really the
brain, but the word brain has many associations and suggestions
which Avenarius wishes to leave out of account.

The system C is conceived as situated in the world amon*; objects,
from which it receives stimuli of various sorts, to many of which
the reaction is a cognition. The undertaking is chiefly a psychology
of cognitive experience, and accordingly non-cognitive reactions are
left out of account. Avenarius states the situation as follows:
"Let any part of our environment be in such a relation to human
individuals that when the former is a.s8umed, the latter state an
experience; 'something is experienced, something is an experience
or is a product of experience, or depends upon experience.' "^

The statements of experience are called J^-values, the stimuli
themselves are called i2- values (Reiz). An J5J- value depends directly
not upon any i2-value, but upon the system C, and any particular
jE'-value is a consequence primarily of the constitution of C at the
time when it gave expression to E.

Changes of some sort certainly take place in the brain. We say
that tissue is broken down and built up. The process of wear and
tear we believe to be due in great part, at least, to physiological
excitations due to the world without. The rebuilding of tissue de-
pends, we are sure, upon the blood-supply to the brain. We are
familiar with feelings of exhaustion and of recovery of vigor, and
we are reasonably sure that these feelings depend on corresponding
conditions of the brain, and that between the condition which accom-
panies a loss of vigor and that which accompanies the feeling of
restored vigor a series of states of the brain intervenes. We know
also tliat there can be too much nourishment of the whole organism
and presumably of the brain and we know that the excess can be
worked off, that is, that a certain destruction of brain tissue brings
back a normal condition of that organ, a point of balance between
nourishment and work which we would preserve if we could. This
ideal point of balance about which we seem continually to oscillate,
Avenarius calls the 'Vitalerkaltiingsmaximum,' or the point of com-
plete vital preservation. When that point is reached, the system
C is in a state of stability. Such a point we do seem to pass and
repass continually.

We may regard this condition of stability within C as the balance
of two factors, one of them all those influences which make for the
exhaustion of C, the other, the influences which make for the restora-
tion and nourishment of C. The former of these, being the sum of
^ ' Kr. der R. Erf.,' I., p. .3.

THE DESCRIPTIOy OF EXPERIENCE 41

the ^-values which play upon C and stimulate it to reactions,
Avenarius calls fiU). The other he calls f{S).

And since the stability of C means that these two opposing
factors are equal to each other and therefore nullify each other,
Avenarius expresses the situation by the equation f{li)= — f{S),
or f{R) 4-/(5') =0, which means that the result of the coopera-
tion of fiR) and f(S) is that the system C does not depart from
stability.

But if, starting with the system C in stability, we vary either
f{R) or f{S), then it will no longer be true that f{R) -f fi^) =0.
To the degree to which one of the factors has been altered, the
system C has departed from a state of stability. There has ensued
a 'Vital Difference' and this vital difference is the dift'erence between
fiR) and f{S). One of the two factors is more effective in its in-
fluence than the other, and the difference between the two opposed
forces is the vital difference. Since one of the factors is regarded
as negative as related to the other, the difference is thus expressed:
fiR) + fiS) > 0. The equation fiR) + /(&') =0 signifies that the
vital difference has a value of zero, while the equation fiR)-{-
fiS) > 0 signifies that the vital difference is greater than zero.

The system C, however, tends always to return to stability, and
the process of return must be a process of annulling the vital
difference. There is thus a transition from stability through a
condition of instability characterized by the existence of a vital
difference back to stability, where the vital difference is reduced to
zero. This series of states from stability to stability, Avenarius
calls a vital series.

The vital series as thus described is a series of changes in the
system C. The reason for assuming such series of changes is that
parallel series of conscious states can be observed. The process of
attention is an example. We start from what we may call a con-
dition of indifference, or rest, or stability, then something awakens
our interest and we begin to attend to some sort of a problem. We
continue in a state of indecision and doubt and perplexity, looking
forward, however, toward the solution which we hope to find. At
last the solution comes, and we are at peace with oui*selves again.

Now if to the changes of consciousness there is a parallel series
of brain-events, they must form a series, and since each term of the
series must be adequate to its effect in consciousness, the physiolog-
ical series may be described with reference to its dependent mental
states, and its terms considered as bearing relations to one another
similar to the relations and proportions in the consciousness series.
This is not so empty or so metaphysical as it may sound. We take
it for granted, in a general way, that of the changes in brain tissue

42 AVEMARIUS AND PURE EXPERIENCE

which produce changes in consciousness, the greater the one e)i;uige
the ^eater the other. And although the one series of chani^es is
quantitative and the other qualitative, we do speak of a more and
less, and carry on a good deal of comparison in the region of
qualities. We have, in any case, a physiological series, and depend-
ent upon this a series of mental states, or rather we have a con-
tinuous nervous process and a continuous stream of conii<;iousne88
depending upon the former, and these continuous processes we can
break up into parallel lengths, called vital series. The physiological
series is called the Independent Vital Series, the series in conscious-
ness is called the Dependent Vital Series.

It is unfortunate that the method of exposition chosen by
Avenarius makes it appear superficially that the dependent vital
series is deduced from the concept of the independent series, to-
gether with the general presuppositions, and that therefore nothing
about the dependent series can be any better established than the
concept of the independent series.

Obviously, however, the dependent series is a movement in con-
sciousness which can be observed, and it is to account for these
series of conscious states, which are data of experience, that the
physiological series is assumed.

In the above case of an attention-process as a dependent vital
series, three stages can be observed: first, the appearance of the
problem, the awakening of interest and the consequent feeling of
restlessness and dissatisfaction if the solution does not immediately
appear. This is the 'Initial' stage; then comes the continued
effort to solve the problem, the 'Medial' stage; and finally the appear-
ance of the solution, characterized by satisfaction, abating anxiety,
the settling down upon an opinion or a cognition. This is the 'Final'
stage. Corresponding Xo these three stages of the dependent series
are three stages of the independent series,— the appearance of the
vital difference and a departure of the system C from stability, the
continuance for a longer or shorter time with an approximately con-
stant vital difference, and then the reduction of the vital difference
to zero, with consequent return to stability.

The system C maintains itself by getting back to stability after
disturbances. This functional activity can be performed in a way
that is better or worse for the life of the system C itself, that is,
we can conceive an ideal system C. Such an organ would, after any
disturbance, return to stability with the shortest interval of a vital
series. This would be accomplished if the system C were trained
to recover stability by means of well-learned and completely habitual
vital series, that is, if the system C by virtue of its liability to habit
has learned to recover stability with maximum facility.

THE DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIENCE 43

Now we are sure that the nervous system is subject to habit, and
that this is one of the factors which is most important in making
life well organized, in simplifying the mental outlook, in making
experience coherent and developing a consistent will. Our point of
view obliges us, therefore, to assume a parallel physiological develop-
ment.

Certain independent (physiological) vital series thus become
habitual, and the functional excellence of the system C is in pro-
portion as the fund of habitual series is adequate to all the reactions
of the system. Such an 'eingeiihte' series Avenarius calls a 'vital
series of the first order.' Other series with a more or less novel
character he calls 'vital series of a higher order.' Evidently the
functional development of the system C lies in the reduction of series
of higher orders to series of the first order. This means the gradual
introduction of order into the behavior of the system C by means
of its own education, if we may so describe it.

By habit we reduce the complex environment to its simplest
terms. We learn to ignore large masses of it, or rather we react
upon various manifolds according to certain constant characters or
values which we find in them. If we translate this into physio-
logical terms, it gives us a sort of physiological selection. The
nervous system has become responsive to certain selected portions
of its environment. That is, the education of the system C has
been controlled by certain ^-values to the exclusion of others. This
concept of physiological habit is of the first importance in the theory
of Avenarius, but it is so important because the fact of habit is of
such great importance in life.

The consequence of habit is that experience becomes less and
less diversified. All sorts of ^-values no longer occur. In its
effects upon experience, growth by habit is a process of exclusion,
which, so far as the character of the sj'stem C is concerned, could
go on indefinitely. It is a process by which the mind comes to give
a final definite character to the manifold presented to it by the world,
—a process by which a maximum experience of the world expresses
itself in a resulting apperception of the world. This final apper-
ception of the world depends upon the possession of a predicate
which is applicable to every fact which experience testifies to as
existent, and this means, in the terminology of Avenarius, that a
final stage of the system C has been found by which any vital dif-
ference may be annulled. By virtue of its capacity for acquiring
habits, the system C has found an answer to the question, 'What is
everything ? '

This idea of a limiting stage of the process of progressive deter-
mination of experience is, of course, only an idea, but it is not.

44 AVENARIU8 AND PURE EXPEFtlENCE

therefore, an insignificant idea. It is the e(>iic<*|)t of the natural
limit of that kind of process which we are perfectly familiar with
as habit.

It is easy to get the impression that every vital series must be
started by an outer 7)J- value. This, however, is not the case. If we
recall the formula for stability, f{K) -\- fiS) =0, we perceive that
a vital series can be initiated by a variation of f{S) as well as of

fiR).

The system C is, after all, the brain,— blood is being constantly
supplied to it and its own complex constitution and energy must
be a continual source of instability.

A judgment is an A^-value. Judgments accordingly follow the
same law of habit that all £J-values follow. There is a progressive
exclusion of possible judgments, a progressive definition of experi-
ence in the narrower sense, an evolution of pure experience by virtue
of the law of habit. It is this evolution of pure experience in
which Avenarius is primarily interested.

One has only to compare different civilizations and stages of
culture to observe that the world may contain for one race and for
one time very different objects of experience from those which it
contains for another race or another time. Our own way of ex-
periencing the world is certainly the outcome of an evolution. The
discussion about possible objects of experience in the first section
of this paper sought to make clear that almost anything can be an
object of experience. We conceive of our experience to-day as being
very much more valid, more adjusted to the facts of nature, more
* scientific ' than the experience of our ancestors a few centuries back.
"We are disposed to think that we have awakened from credulity and
superstition, and that we look out upon the world with a sane and
critical observation. Perhaps we do, but it is interesting to note
that experience has come to be what it is for the man of science
among us as the result of the continual modification of a primitive
and wholly uncritical experience.

About that primitive experience we, of course, know very little,
but there is reason enough to suppose that it had a decidedly 'ani-
mistic' character. In that primitive stage of culture in our own
prehistoric past no doubt many things could be objects of experience
which could not be objects of our experience. There has been a
progressive elimination of certain objects of experience, and a pro-
gressive enrichment of experience by the acquisition of other objects.
When we are in an imaginative mood we sometimes lament that
nature has lost for us the vivifying presence of the gods of the soil,
the groves and the streams. But in a rationalizing mood, we say
that we no longer introject into nature the likeness of ourselves.

THE DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIENCE 45

We hold that our concept of nature is a valid concept, the product
of critical and unbiased observation. Translated into the language
of Avenarius, this means that our iJ-values correspond to our
ii?-values. We say about nature only what she says about herself.
The ^-values which express primitive animistic experience are cer-
tainly decidedly different in some respects from those iJ-values
which express the experience of a Helmholtz or a Huxley. Yet they
are alike in being all J?-values. Whether justly or not, we do speak
of an enlightened scientific experience and contrast it with one
that is relatively superstitious, and the enlightened experience, as
well as the other, has its roots in that primitive experience which we
may suppose to have been absolutely imaginative and credulous.

But few of us are accomplished men of science. Not everj' one
has moved so far from the starting-point. And yet we may say that
there is a large group of minds that take what we may call the
scientific point of view, whose experience does not include mytholog-
ical objects. Other minds, those that make up the great majority in
our own civilization, while not distinguished by very consciously scien-
tific points of view, do yet have an experience, more resembling the
experience of a scientific mind than that of the primitive animistic
mind. Yet there still remain, Avenarius thinks, some traces of the
original fund of animistic objects. The further development of
this idea, the description and criticism of the remnant of animism,
has for Avenarius a special polemical interest, which would lead us
too far aside to follow up. What Avenarius would have us observe
is that the evolution of experience is still in progress, and that what
lies ahead must be a continuation of what lies behind. The progress
thus far has been the development of that concept of nature which
natural science has come to regard as the proper one, and the very
general elimination of animism. The continuance of the same proc-
ess should mean the complete elimination of animism, making the
modern concept of nature wholly consistent and the complete ac-
ceptance of the world so defined as an object of experience.

All this history of experience can be made the matter of a psycho-
logical study which should seek to describe the process from a psycho-
physical point of view. This is what Avenarius has done.

The line of thought by which Avenarius himself approached this
problem helps somewhat to throw light on the definition of the prob-
lem itself as Avenarius understood it. Avenarius has expressed
great indebtedness to ]\Iach,^ and his approval of the latter 's 'Prin-
ciple of Economy.' Mach has stated this principle in the following
terms: "Science itself, therefore, may be regarded as a minimal
problem, consisting of the completest possible presentment of facts

»'Kr. der R. Erf.,' Vol. I., p. xiii; Vol. II., p. 492.

46 AVENARIUB AND I'UJiE EXl'EHIENCE

with the least possible expenditure of thought.*'^ That is, the aim
of science is to give such a conceptual description of experience as
shall be most comprehensive and readily intelligible.

"With this in mind let us make science the object of a psychological
inquiry. It seems evident enough that the mind is an instrument
for accomplishing purposes. It makes a difference to the organism
whether the mind functions well or ill. But in attributing this
teleological value to the mind, we have demanded two things. Not
only must there be an organ to function in a purposive way, but this
functioning must be carried out as well as the given conditions make
possible. Other things being equal, that functional adjustment will
be the best one which is made with the least expenditure of energy.

This may sound like an effort to translate psychology into pseudo
mechanics, but I think there is really no mystery. No one would
deny, I fancy, that, other things being equal, that adjustment of the
organism is the best which is least exhausting to it. Vital energy,
whatever that may be or depend upon (and I do not wish to imply
any unique 'vital force'), is finite in quantity, so that it makes a
great deal of dift'erence whether our energy is wasted or not. But
if we banish the concept of a 'vital force' and mean by force only
what is meant in mechanics, and then undertake to give a psycho-
physical account of the way in which Maeh's 'Principle of Economy'
works, remembering that the idea of mechanical force is due to the
sense of effort and energy in experience, it seems not inappropriate
to find the mechanical equivalent of the principle of economy in the
principle of least resistance. Accordingly, an early essay by Aven-
arius is entitled, 'Philosophy as Conceiving the World according to
the Principle of Least Resistance. '

It may perhaps be said that this is an attempt to describe science
itself as the line of least resistance, whereas science means effort,
the expenditure of force. How much less is the effort involved in
being indifferent to scientific problems ! The man who cares nothing
for science is, other things being equal, more economical, as regards
his energy, than the eager scientist. Science is not, this view would
hold, the line of least resistance, but a line of very great resistance.

This objection is, however, not so well founded as it seems to be
at first glance. We find ourselves with a large program of theo-
retical interests on our hands. These interests are more or less
lively attitudes on our part. We find ourselves responding to what
interests us. We can not put the problems aside and be indifferent
to them ; they haunt us, and demand our attention, I am speaking,
of course, of the men who care for problems, of the men who have

The Science of Mechanics,' translated from 2d ed., Chicago, 1893, p, 490.

THE DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIENCE 47

made science and philosophy and are making it. The need of solv-
ing a problem is a real practical need. How much science should
we at present have if there had not been a large amount of that
human restlessness, which we call interest, on matters of theory.

This scientific uneasiness depends upon a capacity for discover-
ing problems and being worried by them. The presence of some
unexplained, uncomprehended thing is a cause of effort, of striving,
of using up energy. The energy is expended for a purpose, the
solving of the problem ; and of various solutions that may offer them-
selves that one is accepted as the best which calls for the smallest
expenditure of energy. The elegant demonstration is the one which
makes use of few resources. Clearness and transparency of method
and result mean usually that relatively little effort is needed to
understand them.

Let us admit then, for the purpose of this discussion, that the
principle of economy is the guiding principle in science, and that
tlie principle of least resistance is its parallel principle in nerve-
tissue.

Every special science seeks to get what it might call a valid ex-
perience of its objects, and this means that it tries to get the objects
pure and uncontaminated by any personal equation. No doubt the
principle of economy leads, to a certain extent, to a misrepresenta-
tion of objects, but this is the ignoring of what is regarded as
irrelevant from the point of view of the special interests, whereas a
subjective enrichment of the object is the putting into it of what
might make a difference in the description. This much seems clear,
science feels at liberty to ignore as much detail in the objects as it
is not interested in, but it denies the right to add anything.

Now if we admit that the special sciences are seeking to get their
objects pure and if we imagine that there is a special science for
each region of phenomena, and if we call this experience of pure
objects a pure experience, then the special sciences are collectively
aiming at a pure experience of the world.

This was the meaning of pure experience as Avenarius used the
term in his 'Philosophic als Denken der Welt Gemass dem Princip
des Kleinsten Kraftmasscs, ' and it is one of the meanings of the
term in the ' Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung. ' But since such a pure
experience is defined from an epistemological and not from a psycho-
logical point of view, the concept does not appear in the same form
in the later work.

The special sciences are distributed, each to its own field. Within
each field, novel facts are comprehended by reducing them to a group
of known facts, which group undertakes to be as small as possible.
In the same way the effort to understand the world would be the

48 AVENARIUfi AND PUKE KXI'I'JUESCE

effort to reduce to ii sin^^le concept the cliariiclcrs, coiiiiihiii to the
pure experience, which the special sciences are able to securr. This
effort, based upon the special sciences, to describe the common char-
acter of the whole world, is, says Avenarins, philosophy. It is the
effort to answer the question. What is everything? With so much
in mind, we are prepared to understand the following quotation:
**In accordance with the principle of least resistance there is accom-
plished the reference of a sin;;le presentation to a j;eneral concept,
and in so far as this presentation is strange and novel it is made
known by this reference. Accordinpfly, conceptual understanding is
a force-economizing, theoretical apprehension of an object, and the
totality of objects will be most economically conceived, if they can
be apprehended under one general concept. This effort to conceive
the totality of objects with the minimum expenditure of force is
philosophy. The all-comprehending concept must state what is
common to all particular objects. This common aspect mast be
given in pure experience. Individual cases of pure experience are
secured by means of observation in the special sciences, and the
purification of experience, in general, results from the elimination
of what is found to not really belong to the objects of experience."*

It may appear that we are getting a good way from the system
C and its vital series. The digression has its purpose, however, in
that it will help us to understand the way in which Avenarius him-
self viewed his problem, by seeing that problem in its earlier stages.

Let us now connect the essay we have just been considering with
an article by Avenarius entitled 'The Relation of Psychology to
Philosophy.'- In the essay just considered, Avenarius describes
philosophy as a certain kind of human effort, the effort to get a
unified conception of the universe, to ask the question, What is every-
thing? and to tell what it is.

This question, WTiat is the nature of the world ? How is the world
constituted? is the question of philosophy. When this question is
first asked, there is no doubt concerning our power to know how the
world is constituted if we can only find it out. At the same time,
psychology contributes little or nothing in giving shape to philos-
ophy. Psychology hardly exists as an independent field, but forms
a chapter in some sj'stem of metaphysics. The fate of metaphysical
systems, however, contradictions discovered within and without,
made the problem of knowledge more and more prominent, so that
instead of the question. How is the world constituted? we have the
question, How is the w^orld known? W^hen this question is first

^ ' Philosophic als Denken der Welt,' p. 43.

' ' Ueber die Stellung der Psychologic zur Philosophie,' Vierteljahrschrift fur
Wissenschaftliche Philosophie, I., p. 471.

THE DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIENCE 49

critically asked reality is still attributed to objects which lie outside
of experience, but great emphasis is laid upon the subjective factor
in knowledge. It is taken for granted that perception does not
give an object as it really is, that the whole content is not given in
perception, but, on the other hand, it is assumed that the whole con-
tent given in perception does not really belong to the object. Ob-
jective reality is thus, at the same time, more and less than ex-
perience.

The original question, How is the world constituted! demands
now a distinction between what can be taken as valid experience of
objects and experience which misrepresents its objects. By this
emphasis laid upon the problem of knowledge, and the recognition
that the mind is so constituted as perhaps to interfere with its own
cognitive purposes, psychology becomes of decided importance for
philosophy, and it is not long before the world of real objects shrinks
to a region of things in themselves, set over against forms of ex-
perience. It is a matter of recent history how the content of the
world, which seemed to be lost on the objective side, was brought
back from the subjective side, and how from this point of view the
great systems of idealism grew up. But whether deservedly or not,
those systems have fallen into disrepute, one factor in this situation
being the progress of physical science. And to-day if one asks how
we know the world, the scientist will point to his instruments fur
observation and experiment and say, * With these we know the world. '

But knowledge secured by the aid of instruments for exact meas-
urement is not the less subjective. Truer, perhaps, it would have
been to say, 'By the use of these instruments do we conceive the
world. '

The question, How is the world constituted? has become, pro-
visionally at least, the question, How is the world conceived! And
to this question one may now give a somewhat unexpected answer.
The world is conceived by a nervous organism reacting in a certain
way to its environment, and the question, How is the world conceived!
becomes the question. How does this organism behave in conceiving
the world? or, "What kind of a natural process is philosophy!
Philosophy is a certain type of human activity, and if one agrees
that activities of thought depend upon processes in nervous tissue,
one has a ground for asking, as a scientist, what sort of natural
process philosophy is.

Avenarius undertakes to carry out frankly the psychophysical
point of view. He conceives that t\T)es of experience depend upon
typical processes within an organ. The organ he afterwards called
by the name of * System C ' and its processes he sought to describe as
'Vital Series.'

4

50 AVENARIU8 AND PURE EXPERIENCE

This brings us back to the 'Kritik der Reinen EJrfahning,* but it
brings us back prepared to observe the application of the method
of the 'Kritik' to the description of philosophy as a natural process.
If the question, 'How do we conceive the world!' in this new form
can be answered with any measure of success, we may be able to
reach some conclusions about the conditions on which the fate of
systems of philosophy depends, and be able to state what conditions
must be fulfilled by a philosophy which shall endure.

It was remarked above that the appearance of a problem means
a certain restlessness on the part of him who sees the problem. We
ought to distinguish between real problems and pretended prob-
lems. By real problems I mean questions that strike us as really
problematic, questions whose solution one way or another makes
a difference to us, questions which are problems not merely by virtue
of a definition, but by virtue of the kind of interest they arouse.
Besides the genuine problems there are problems which do not show
any really problematic character. The problem about solipsism is
a problem of this sort. A healthy man can not possibly find any
real problem here. We may admit that the reality of other selves is
problematic, but we shall be quite unable to experience the prob-
lematic character which we admit.

Progress in science and philosophy is largely due to a capacity
for discovering real problems. Oriental peoples have this genius
in a far less degree than Europeans. The problems of the Oriental
consciousness are solved. Only the Western con.sciousness is tor-
mented with doubts about reality, duty, the past and the future.
Avenarius loves to dwell on the satisfaction and relief which the
solution of a real problem affords, and on the teasing, restless, un-
satisfied state which accompanies an unsolved real problem.

The distinction between the real problem and the artificial prob-
lem w^ould appear to be a real and important distinction from the
psychological point of view, where the purpose is an accurate descrip-
tion of experience. For this point of view, the so-called artificial
problem is no problem at all. That is, its parallel brain-proce.ss
can not be the one w-hich gives rise to the problematic character.
Accordingly, the word 'problem' will designate, in what remains to
be said about Avenarius, always the real and genuine problem, the
problem with the biological disturbance behind it. Evidently a
philosophy which is to endure, which shall be, as Avenarius puts it,
' hiologisch haltiar/ must be an ^- value or a group of ^-values which
express a permanent stability of the system C. These E'-values hare,
in the process of physiological selection which marks the evolution
of habit, come to prevail over other ^-values. They have come to
prevail because they represent the constant character of nature.

THE DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIEXCE 61

We find an analogue of such a brain-condition in the accom-
plished man of the world.^ He is adjusted to all the situations he
is liable to meet. Nothing surprises him or throws him out of com-
posure. So long as the world remains the sort of place he has found
it to be, he knows how to live in it, and how to adjust himself to its
demands. And this attitude of adjustment is not a theoretical
attitude ; he does not have a theory about the world he knows; he has
the certainty of reiiie Erfahrung. He has 'sized up' the world and
knows what it is, and the world, as he understands it, is the world of
his experience with nothing problematic about it. Such a final and
definite comprehension of the world is, in the above case, evidently
arrived at by a process of growth from something less mature, less
aufgekldrt, and accordingly not well fitted to maintain itself in the
face of a large and varied experience.

We have here an evolution of experience, and at the beginning
we have a certain fund of convictions and experience and 'knowl-
edge,' and at the end we have another fund of experience. Such
a fund of experience Avenarius calls an * Erkenntnissmenge.' Evi-
dently the second Erkenninissmenge is obtained by a gradual modi-
fication of the first. In actual experience, we know well enough how
this happens. The world does not correspond to our expectations
and we have to make our expectations correspond to the world.

But what Avenarius wants is a comprehension of just this process
in psychophysical terms. And the process to be comprehended is
not the history of an individual system C.

Whatever Weltbcgriff' our remote ancestors may have had, it no
doubt expressed their assurance about the world and not their doubts
and problems concerning it. But, as we can observe, doubts and
problems arose; the iP-values of the Welthegriff lost their qualities
of existence, acquaintance and security, and became problematized.
Or as Avenarius puts it, the 'world concept' turned into the 'world
problem.' It was bound to do this, because the world had been
conceived animistically by the imaginative projection into it of char-
acters which it did not possess, while the system C has got to be
formed by the real ij'-values and not by mj-thical ones.

But, as in the case of the man of the world, so here the goal of
the process is the deliverance from illusion, the winning of a clarified
idea of the world which is in accord with the facts.

But, some will exclaim, what kind of a system C will that be
which can have a history like this, beginning in the dim past and
reaching into the future ?

At this point I take leave to recall the social basis of the concept
of validity. Validity as a fact in actual experience, as a character

* I owe this illustration to Professor Royoe.

52 AVENARIV8 AND PURE EXPERIENCE

of actual judgments, depends upon social agreement. If only one,
or only a very few astronomers had been able to Htie spots on the sun,
the judgment 'there are sun-spots' would have had no validity in
science. The crank with his hobby may conceivably be right all the
time, but such validity as his judgments might possess is something
different from the validity which characterizes accepted judgments.

Just as science is not the private possession of any one individual,
so a primitive view of the world is share<l in common. But philo-
sophical views of the world to-day can not be said to be held in
common to any great extent. In so far philosophy is at a dis-
advantage as compared with science, for there is not enough agree-
ment in philosophical judgments to give them the character validity.

We have thus a cooperation of different minds as the basis of
validity. But from a psychophysical point of view this means the
cooperation of different nervous systems, or a social system C. Such
a system C as this can have a history which no individual could have.
Avenarius calls such a system a 'Congregal System,' and represents
it by the symbol 26'.

Now it is easy to ridicule this concept, but it is unquestionably
a perfectly legitimate one. It does describe the situation. The
situation involves the psychophysical aspect of experience, the his-
tory and evolution of experience, and the fact that the education of
an individual depends in the very highest degree upon his relations
with other individuals, and that judgments about objective things
derive their validity from social cooperation in these judgments.

It seems to me rather a proof of the value of the concept of the
individual system C that it can be so readily extended to include all
those individual systems which do determine one another in their
judgments, and thus do really constitute a system.

By virtue of such a system as 2C, the experience of one genera-
tion depends upon the experience of previous ones, and the process
of eliminating the fc'-values which are not determined by ^-values
is made possible. These i^-values which are to be got rid of repre-
sent the remnants of primitive animism, which was, of course, a
falsification of nature by an imaginative introjective process. The
heritage of animism which we have on our hands is, Avenarius
thinks, the soul-concept and its consequences in philosophy.

The soul is conceived to be something within the body,— it is the
basis of a literal distinction between inner and outer. The concept
of the soul is, indeed, not prominent to-day, but the distinction be-
tween inner experience and outer experience, internal sense and
external sense, is common enough. If there had been no soul-con-
cept, the course of philosophy would no doubt have been very dif-
ferent from what it actually has been; it seems very probable that

THE DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIENCE 53

there would have been no Kantian theory of the categories, and that
we should not have seen Schopenhauer announcing as the most ob-
vious of truisms that the world is my representation. By thus
explaining idealism as the final result of the soul-concept which was
itself a bit of introjection left over from the original animistic reine
Erfahrung, Avenarius includes it among the i^-values which will
be eliminated in the course of the history of 2C, if that history is
not interrupted.

As the subjective additions to nature are eliminated from our
view of the world, we approach a purely descriptive concept. We
no longer speak of the world of our experience as the phenomenal
world, while the real world is something else, we know not quite
what. The world we observe is accepted as the real world, precisely
as the plain man accepts it. And if we ask what the whole world
is, our answer to this question will seek to state what the whole
world has in common as the object of our clarified experience which
has at last got the world pure. The judgment about the whole
world will then state merely what can be observed by any one, and
not what is the product of the poetic imagination of a few,— as when
one says, everything is a bit of one absolute experience. The final
Weltbegriff will express a knowledge of genuine i^-values only,
which affect the peripheral nerves. This concept of nature being
the product of maximum experience will not be liable to variation.

I think it is clear enough in a general way what Avenarius is
trying to state, although it is not always clear in detail. We have
a historical process, the evolution of experience. This historical
process has, as its first stage, a view of the world, which if put into
words would tell simply how nature is experienced. This Welthegriff
describes what is I'cine Erfahrung. By constant variation the Welt-
hegriff comes to describe the world as it is not experienced. The
actual experience of the world gives the lie to the 'critical* theory
of it. The process approaches a ^Yelthegriff which describes the
world as it is experienced. The experience which this view of the
world asserts is an £'-value and expresses such a 'final' state of the
system C as can follow upon the presentation of any i?- value.

As to the content of this ^-value Avenarius can say only that it
will be *Vorgefundenes.'^ This may seem a poor outcome, but it
means that the world is whatever it is observed to consist of. Trees
are trees and houses are houses and clouds are clouds. They are
not thoughts of God nor experience of the absolute nor phantasms
of our own. There will be no effort to go behind what experience
offers. Every single fact will be just this that we observe, the
empirical fact before us. This is what Avenarius means by saying

*'Der Menschliche Weltbegriff,' p. 114.

64 AVENARIUB AND PURE EXPERIENCE

that the clarified and pennanent Welthegri/f will declare, 'Every-
thing is this.'* And is not this precisely the philosophy, or, if you
prefer, the lack of it, of the 'plain man'? He it is that does full
justice to the empirical diversity of the world. Science seeks to re-
move diversity by reducing things to common denominators. Meta-
physics has not, since Aristotle at least, shown and disposition to
recognize diversity. Possibly one should make an exception of
Leibniz, but speaking generally, metaphysics has usually sought to
absorb the empirical world with all its diversity and uniqueness into
some form of an existent One, and there is much to suggest that thi«
One is the mystic ONE of Neo-Platonism.

But the 'plain man' never pretends that one thing is like an-
other except for practical purposes. For him the common feature
throughout the world is the fact that everything in it is a 'this.' And
if one must ask the question 'Was ist alles?' one can answer from
the point of view of pure experience only * Alles ist dies. '*

The 'Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung' really undertakes to describe
the form of the evolution which our experience of the world has
undergone and is still undergoing,— a form which might go along
with one content or another. We should keep in mind that Aven-
arius is dealing with fact or with what we accept as equivalent to
fact. We have the kind of experience that is expressed in what,
following Avenarius, I have called 'the natural view of the world.'
We have also the idealistic theory of reality, and this claims to be
a scientific theory, and one which is more scientifically complete
than any other metaphysic. But it describes reality in a way that
obliges the man who does the actual work of making us acquainted
with the world to assume a somewhat apologetic attitude.

We have also the fact that the actual idealism of history is a result
of the fortunes of the idea of the soul and the idea of God, both of
which must be assumed to have had entirely natural origins. This
is, of course, no refutation of idealism, but it strengthens the pre-
sumption that something is wrong somewhere about the premises of
idealism. The difficulty of making out just where the error lies may
well be due to the fact that we are all bred up in the point of view
which leads so logically into idealism. Avenarius saw on all hands
a discontent with idealism, and I 'think it is fairly evident that this
discontent has increased since Avenarius wrote, and is increasing.

> ' Kr. der R. Erf.,' II., p. 376.

^ L. c. Compare Professor Dewey in the Journal of Philosophy. Psychology
and Scientific Methods, Vol. II., No. 15. " Experience is always of thats; and
the most comprehensive and inclusive experience of the universe which the
philosopher himself can obtain is the experience of a characteristic that."

THE DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIENCE OO

The key to the logic of the situation has not yet been found, although
I think the first step toward finding it has been taken.^

'The dualistic discontent,' as Avenarius calls it, expresses a de-
sire to conceive the world in a way corresponding to our natural
experience of it. In view of the continuity of experience, such an
evolution as that described by Avenarius seems, then, extremely
plausible, when once attention is called to it.

We can not cast off all at once habits of mind cultivated by cen-
turies of faith ; they bind us in ways we can not name. But the theo-
logical tradition is giving way, and in proportion as it does, we come
more and more to feel that the truth about the world is to be found in
a complete description of its empirical content. It seems not at all
unlikely that the theological tradition will in time cease to affect
metaphysics, and that in consequence metaphysics will no longer
give the lie to common sense. Of the metaphysics of this third
stage Avenarius says only that it will be 'biologisch haltbar.' He
does not say it will be true.

If we are to understand by metaphysics the speculation which puts
such stress on distinguishing 'appearance' from 'reality,' which de-
fines reality as the source of appearance, a reality to some extent
knowable but mostly unknowable, if metaphysics means this, Aven-
arius does seem to cast it ruthlessly overboard. As the task of
philosophy he predicts that of stating the character common to all
objects of experience. And for one who really occupies the pure
experience position, and is not concerned with polemical attitudes
toward any other, the common character of all objects of experience
must be the most abstract, the most unimportant and the most
uninteresting of predicates. Far more important and interesting
will be what is concrete and actual.

To come back into the terminology of the 'Kritik der Reinen
Erfahrung,' the final view of the world will express a knowledge
of genuine /?-values only such as affect the system C. This concept
of nature being the result of complete determination by habit, will
not be liable to change.

Of course it is not meant that this final Welthegri/f is necessarily
going to be attained, but only that the process is of such a kind as
to have this for its limit. The process may be interrupted by a
catastrophe at any moment.

I beg the reader not to accept this account of the views of Aven-
arius as anything more than a fragmentary one. I have cared very
much more for the general purpose and outcome than for details of
method and the system of terminology that is so characteristic.

* William James in the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientifio
Methods, Vol. I., No. 18, * Does Consciousness Exist.'

66 AVKSAItlLH A.\U I'URE KXl'ERIENCE

IV

In the introduction to the 'Principles of Mechanics,' of Jlerz/
we find the following statement: "In endeavoring thus to draw in-
ferences as to the future from the pant, we always adopt the fol-
lowing process. We form for ourselves images or symbols of ex-
ternal objects, and the form which we give them is such that the
necessary consequents of the images in thought are always the
images of the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured.
. . . The images of which we here speak are our conceptions of
things. With the things themselves they are in conformity in one
important respect, viz., in satisfying the above-mentioned require-
ment. For our purpose it is not necessary that they should be in
conformity with the things in any other respect whatever." The
concepts must be 'permissible,' that is, logically self -consistent; they
must be correct, or not contradicted by experience ; and they must be
appropriate, that is, embody the 'principle of economy.'*

Herz, thus, in agreement with Mach and Carl Pearson, describes
the scientific concept as a construction of the investigator. It is an
instrument with a function, that of leading to new observations and
predicting sequences of phenomena.

This point of view is, however, radically opposed to the older
view which defined its aim as the discovery of the real causes of
observable phenomena. It was taken for granted that the phe-
nomena of nature depended upon movements of matter,— and that
matter in motion was a definite transcendent object of knowledge.
The following from Helmholtz expresses this point of view. "The
theoretical portion of physical science seeks to discover the unknown
causes of events from their observable effects; it seeks to under-
stand them according to the law of causality. We are forced to
this task by the principle that every change in nature must have an
adequate cause. . . . The final goal of the theoretical sciences is
thus to discover the ultimate unchanging causes of changes in
nature. ' '^

Herz himself at one time predicted that the great problem of
physical science would be the nature and the laws of the space-filling
ether. "It seems more and more probable that this question will
take precedence of all others."* 'Herz spoke then wholly com-
mitted to old preconceptions,' says Kleinpeter in the article from
which I take the quotation; and it goes without saying that Herz

* Translation by Jones and Walley, p. 1.

« L. c, p. 2.

» Helmholtz, 'Ueber die Erhaltung der Kraft,' p. 2, Berlin, 1847.

* ' Ueber E. Mach's und H. Herz's Principielle AuflFassung der Physik,' by
Kleinpeter in Archiv fur Phil., II. Abtheilung, Bd. V., Heft. 2, p. 176.

TEE DESCRIP'1J<J.\ ut EXPERIEyCE , 57

had assumed a fundamentally different point of view when he wrote
the 'Mechanics.'

Kirehhoff in the introduction to his 'Vorlesungen iiber Mathe-
matische Physik' gives expression to the new point of view. He
says: "The point of departure which I have chosen is not the ordi-
nary one. It is customary to define mechanics as the science of
forces, and forces as the causes which produce motion or strive to
produce motion, ... In the cause of the precision, which is, in
other respects, characteristic of conclusions in mechanics, it seems
desirable to get rid of ambiguous terms (Dunkelheiten) even if we
are obliged to narrow the task of mechanics. I, therefore, propose,
as this task, the description of the movements which occur in nature,
a description as complete and as simple as possible."^

One of the frankest statements that the scientific concept is a
construction of the mind and not necessarily an image of transub-
jective things, is the prefatory note of Herz to book I. of his 'Me-
chanics.' It is as follows: "The subject-matter of the fii*st book is
completely independent of experience. All the assertions made are
a priori in Kant's sense. They are based upon the laws of the in-
ternal intuition of, and upon the logical forms followed by, the
person who makes the assertion; with his external experience they
have no other connection than these intuitions and forms may
have. "2

The second book contains the application of the system of con-
cepts to the phenomena of experience. The contrast and relation-
ship between volume I. and volume II. of the 'Kritik der Reinen
Erfahrung' are almost identical with that between books I. and II.
of the 'Mechanics' of Herz. Avenarius would not and could not
claim that the concepts and definitions which fill volume I. are en-
tirely a priori constructions. But they are psychological inventions
for the purposes of scientific apperception, inventions, however,
which are adapted to the phenomena. But the lines of procedure
of Herz and Avenarius seem very similar. Herz described scientific
method as the formation and use of images or sjinbols of external
objects such that 'the necessary consequents of the images in thought
are always the images of the necessary consequents in nature of the
things pictured.' Now critics of Avenarius have complained of the
dialectical way in which his 'Kritik' develops; but such a char-
acter is inevitable if there are to be any consequences of the sjimbol
which shall be symbols of facts. Whether Avenarius has met with
any success in this effort, whether his outcome is really a logical
consequence of his symbol, or whether it could have been stated with-

» Vol. I., p. iii.
*P. 45.

58 ^ AVEyARIUS AND PURE EXPlJJaK.WB

out any reference to a system C and its determination by recurrent
vital series, is a decision which lies outside the present undertakinjj.
I am disposed to believe that the results which Avenarius finally
reached were won partly by means of his symbol. When we have
all three groups, the concepts, the phenomena of experience and
the final conclusions and statements, we can, perhaps, say that the
latter group needed only the group of experience-facta to produce it.
But if a group of concepts are of assistance of any sort in n-aching
conclusions, the concepts have served their pui'j)<)Sf, whatever oritics
may think of them.

The efforts of KirchhofT, of Ilerz, and I may say of Avenarius,
show the effort to eliminate explanation from science as an ultimate
goal, and to limit its task to description which shall be as simple
and as complete as possible. But from this point of view it is not
pretended that science is a statement of nature's eternal truths, and,
as Kleinpeter observes, it follows that there is for humanity *no
objective truth enthroned above gods and men, as the ancient Greeks
imagined. '

We admit readily the wisdom of this point of view, and yet some
of us are sure to feel not quite satisfied. Science does well indeed
to get rid of metaphysics, to accept its method as method and not
as revelation. Yet a Veritas there must be, we say, and by what
right does science forbid us to seek it because she seeks something
else?

If we look for the essentially logical distinction between the two
points of view above indicated, between that which seeks a knowl-
edge of ultimate causes, and that which seelcs complete and econom-
ical descriptions, we observe that it is in the existential judgment,
which is present in the older point of view, while absent in the later
one. It is evident, also, that the older point of view, therefore, is a
metaphysical point of view. The great role which materialism
played thirty and forty years ago was an inevitable result of the
great triumphs of physical science, when physicists defined the goal
of their science as metaphysical insight, insight into the eternal laws
of the movements of matter of which all change in the world is the
resulting effect.

It is no doubt more intelligent to recognize science as the effort
to describe experience rather than to try to regard it as explaining
experience in any ultimate sense. Yet many will feel that the older
point of view had a more substantial purpose than the new one.
It at least was seeking the Veritas which must exist. We might not
like materialism, but the science of that faith was a courageous sci-
ence not afraid of the truth wherever it might be found.

THE DESCRIPTION OF EJPERIEXCE 59

He who feels this attitude longs for the existential judgment.
His mood is not satisfied with science as now defined ; description is
not enough, and he demands the explanation of experience. The
experience which is to be explained is the experience with some of
whose aspects we became acquainted in the first section of this paper.
It is experience characterized by the outer world and the fellow
man as transcendent objects,— in a word, by the natural view of the
world.

THE EXPLANATION OF EXPERIENCE

In the work of describing experience, by far the greater part of
the subject-matter belongs to the outer world. The complete pro-
gram of the undertaking to describe all experience would be the
classification of the sciences, which provide the tasks for many minds
working together.

But the fellow man is more than a cooperator in description. He
has the peculiar function of providing the basis for validity. We
are accustomed to say that scientific conclusions must have universal
validity, by which we mean acceptability to all observers who care
to verify the conclusions, or to such a majority of them that the dis-
senters can be ignored.

But in explanations of experience, which are of an ultimate type,
the fellow being appears to occupy a somewhat different position.
In philosophy, the postulate is still made, no doubt, that agreement
between different observers of the given situation is possible, philo-
sophical discussion would have no meaning without it; but prac-
tically such agreement is not expected, certainly not from all ob-
servers of the situation, even though they be all pronounced en-
tirely competent. Yet every philosophy undertakes to be valid, and
expects to secure some measure of validity whether it meet with
approval or not.

Science aims at universally verifiable descriptions of phenomena.
The question whether the description is a valid one is equivalent to
the question whether the description fulfills the scientific purpose,
whether it is universally verifiable. Metaphysics, on the other hand,
asks the question, What is reality? What is the ultimate ground of
phenomena? What is the ultimate cause of experience? The ques-
tion. Does reality consist of matter with a molecular structure? does
not mean, Is the concept of the molecule so useful as to lead to uni-
versally verifiable descriptions of phenomena? The question as to
the molecular constitution of reality is a question which seeks not
acquaintance with phenomena, but a knowledge of something under-
lying phenomena, and expressing itself through phenomena. The
question as to the validity of a metaphysical judgment is a question
whether the judgment fulfills the metaphysical purpose or not, and
this purpose is not universal verifiability, but a true report about
the ultimate ground and cause of experience.

60

THE EXPLA^ATlOy OF EXPERIENCE 61

Of course the actual fate of philosophical systems depends upon
the degree to which they can win the other tj-pe of validity, by com-
mending themselves to students of philosophical problems. Every
philosophy seeks this type of validity and is fortunate to the degree
that it secures it, but the validity it aims at is of another type, al-
though practically this validity may have to submit to the same test
as the other one.

Philosophical explanations are sure to be determined by the
aspect of experience that seems most significant, most interesting.
Those who are chiefly interested in the natural and exact sciences,
and charmed with the conceptual regularity and order which is char-
acteristic of large i-egions in those sciences, have usually defined
reality from the point of view of this prevailing interest. The goal
of natural science as described by Helmholtz is an expression of this
point of view.

But explanation from the side of the interest in natural science
is giving way to description,^ Statements like that of Helmholtz,
quoted above, sound already a little antiquated. Explanations of
experience are, therefore, coming more to be determined by the other
chief factor in the natural view of the world, namely, the fellow
being. Reality must be so understood as to be an adequate ground
for the social aspect of experience. From the side of this interest,
the dramatic aspects of human experience and human history are
cared for. Moral and esthetic experience, the problem of evil, per-
sonality, are important headings. But the explanation which takes
special account of these interests must not do too great violence to
the other feature of the natural Weltbegriff, the outer world. The
significance of my fellow depends largely upon the fact that we are
supposed to have common interests and common objects, and the
sphere for these must be preserved.

II

We can approach the explanation of experience by an indefinite
number of ways. Every metaphysic is an attempt to explain ex-
perience. It seeks not to describe phenomena, but to get behind
phenomena to some ultimate ground, and the experience to be ex-
plained presents as its most characteristic feature the cognition of
apparently transcendent objects. This character, which comes out
most frankly in the naive realism which I have called the natural
view of the world, appears to determine metaphysics more than any
other character of experience. Sir W. Hamilton testifies to this
character in the following vigorous statement. "We are immediately

' See preface to second edition of Carl Pearson's ' Grammar of Science.'

62 AVENARIUS AND PURE EXPERIENCE

conscious in perception of an ego and a non-ego, known together and
known in contrast to each other. This is the fact of the duality of
consciousness. It is clear and manifest. When I concentrate my
attention in the simplest act of perception, I return from my ob-
servation with the most irresistible conviction of two facts, or rather
two branches of the same fact; that I am and that something dif-
ferent from me exists."^ "The ego and non-ego, mind and matter,
are given together." This fact is 'clear and manifest.'

I am not now asking whether there is any truth in these state-
ments. I simply call attention to the fact that when a philosopher
harks back to the plain testimony of consciousness, this is what he
harks back to. I think Hamilton was prevented by a philosophical
theory from going quite far enough. Certainly the ego which
normal consciousness testifies to in 'the simplest act of perception*
is usually just the body, and if one is very much interested in some-
thing objective, the perception of the ego will not form part of
the experience at all.

Mill, although unable to be quite so frank as Hamilton, still
retains the transcendent object as something whose existence is too
evident to be questioned. "I believe that Calcutta exists," he
says, "though I do not perceive it, and that it would still exist if
every percipient inhabitant were suddenly to leave the place or
be struck dead."^ Calcutta would still be real under these circum-
stances, for it would remain 'a permanent possibility of sensation.'
If the inhabitants return or come to life again, they will perceive
Calcutta, and Calcutta was there all the time waiting to be per-
ceived. So Mill reflects.

This 'possibility of sensation' is the classic entrance to the
idealism which claims to explain experience in a really profound
and consistent way. What, it is asked, is an object of experience
while it is mere possibility of sensation? What kind of a positive
fact is Calcutta while it is waiting to be perceived? It appears to
be taken for granted that it is all the time a 'possibility' of experi-
ence, but that if it is really anything at all, it must be something
more. The same sturdy instinctive realism which both Hamilton
and Mill represent, appears in this request for a further account of
the possibility of sensation.

Suppose one were to reply that not even the possibility of sensa-
tion exists in the sense in which Mill spoke of it. One could
answer, experimentally at least, that so long as Calcutta is not per-
ceived or thought about by human minds, Calcutta simply does not
exist. One who made this answer would, no doubt, hasten to add

* * Lectures on Metaphysics,' Boston, 1859, p. 200.

* ' Examination of Hamilton,' p. 246, New York, 1884.

THE EXPLAyATION OF EXPERIEyCE 63

that of course he did not really believe it, that he suggested this
reply in order to observe what the logical results might be. And
as for the few who might make this reply in all sincerity, some of
these would save the transcendent character of Calcutta by declar-
ing it to be an object in an eternal experience, and the others would,
I am sure, feel that something was wrong, and that the transcendent
character should be gotten back somehow. The 'dualistic discon-
tent' makes itself felt when we undertake to define the world as a
series of dissolving views. And yet why not? That is the way
the world flows by before us. One view melts into another with
enough consistency and a good deal of predictability.

But we will none of such sophistry. The changing view is all
characterized as more than view. The realistic bias so character-
istic of our human nature demands permanence and stability.
Moreover, one might feel obliged to be consistent and thorough-
going, and then our fellows would dissolve away together with the
views to which they belong, and against this we set a subborn face.
But the material outer world is probably able to take care of itself
even without the help of the fellow being; our reality- functions
see to it that the world remains, even in idealism, a transcendent
object, so far as any one finite mind is concerned.

The transcendence-character must somehow be preserved, for
it is preserving it to translate it into something p)ermanent in an
experience, which is outside the limits of what I recognize just
now as mine. This motive is contributed by the outer world char-
acter of experience. Another important motive there is in the
fellow being, not so much in the external aspect he presents by ap-
pearing in the outer world, as by his being a fellow. As such,
he is the condition of all our ethical attitudes, and of everything
that gives the deeper value and significance to life. His presence
lays a significant demand upon the outer world. External objects
must be the same objects for him and for me. That is made the
test of their reality as external objects. But most important of all
is it that the fellow being remain a transcendent object. Yet how,
then, can there be one and the same outer world for us both? It
would seem as though his outer world must exist in a different
space from mine and in a different time. In fact, it seems as though
in one universe there were room for only one self. This is really,
it seems to me, the clinching argument for idealism, and it is one
that the critics of that doctrine, and those who prove to us the
actual transcendent existence of the world, hardly notice. These
philosophers take all their illustrations from a one-object-one-subject
relation, whereas the case of realism can not be proved without
making clear the one-object-two-subjects relation.

04 A yh'.\ A HI UN A .\ I) I'UJfl. i:\ I'l^KI I^S Ct'

The idealist is prepared to handle this difficulty, by declaring
that the relation of one object to two subjects is a mythical rela-
tion. Of course there is in one universe room for only one self,
and when your experience and mine and the object are all abs<jrbed
into this absolute experience, we get the one-subject-one-object
relation back again. Do we indeed know of any experience
analogous to the absorption of the experience of me and my fellows
into one, in such a way as to comprehend them both, yet leave to
each its individuality? On a small and trivial scale, we do. If
I seize some object, a book, with both hands, the book which I grasp
with my right hand is the same book as the one I grasp with my
left. There is for the experience of grasping simply the one ex-
perienced object, because the touch-sensations of both hands, and
the visual elements in the total perception are all brought together
in one experience. For the same reason, the space through which
my right hand swings is a part of the same space as that through
which my left hand swings. In cases of alternating personality,
in what intelligible empirical sense is the world of one of these
selves the same world as that of the other selft The illustration
of grasping the book shows that any external object can be kept
one by defining it as the object within one experience. This logical
necessity contradicts, of course, the plain testimony of pure experi-
ence, and as pure experience is the sole ground of good theory, and
as logical contradictions proceed from definitions, one is justified
in suspecting that the idealistic implications are begged somewhere
in a definition. But realism can certainly have no logical standing
until this petitio is pointed out.

But whatever means we resort to to explain experience, we
adopt some concept and attach to it the existential predicate and
seek thus to deproblematize the situation. We are seeking an
experience with the fidential-character, the character of ^Ileim-
haftigkeit,' as Avenarius called it, and, in fact, the presence of ulti-
mate problems is often testified to in language that breathes an
acute tone of ' lleimweh.' The search for truth is indeed the search
for a satisfied will, but the truth which we find may remain the
truth for ten minutes or for a lifetime.

But science, too, seeks to deproblematize a situation by means
of a concept, only science does not attach the existential predicate.
Just in this matter of the existential judgment, metaphysics goes
beyond science. Science does not deny that there is an ultimate
truth, but she does not claim to have found it. She is very likely
to say that it can not be found. Science has a system of concepts
of which the necessary consequences are images of the actual
effects and expressions of the ultimate ground of things. Science

TEE EXPLAXATIOy OF EXPERIENCE 65

says that phenomena are as if reality were thus and so, as if the
world of matter had a molecular structure, as if space were filled with
a vibrating ether, and, with the attention directed upon experience of
another sort, she might say, as if each finite human life were a
moment in an absolute life which comprised all of reality.

If such a concept as the Absolute were a useful concept in getting
a synthetic sense of experience of a certain type, or in helping to
describe it, or in making one a more sensitive and appreciative ob-
server of this experience, then the concept of the Absolute would have
precisely the same validity as the concept of the atom. Both could
dwell side by side in science very well.

Yet anxious ones cry out, "But the Veritas! The reality back of
phenomena ! The something which completes my fragmentary experi-
ence and answers my questions! No mere acquaintance with phe-
nomena, however wide, can be to me a substitute for this deeper
insight."

What, precisely, are the motives because of which we search for
something back of phenomena and demand a deeper insight? But
before taking up this question let us recall what actual truth and
error appear to be, that experience, namely, which is called the pos-
session of truth, and that experience which is called the possession of
erjor.

There is no test of truth other than the removal of the problematic
character from the content about which a true judgment is desired, —
and the possession of truth, as a case of experience, can be in no wise
distinguished from the possession of a deproblematized content.

If this content happen to break out into a problem again, then the
temporary peace and satisfaction of the will must be pronounced an
error. And then another truth may be found, or the same truth may
turn out to be true after all. Is a given conclusion a valid one?
The question is an inquiry whether the conclusion has got rid of the
problem-character and continues deproblematized. 'Yes, the con-
clusion is valid,' means that the conclusion has not yet shown itself
to be unsatisfactory. Or, 'No, that conclusion was an error,' means
that the conclusion in question has lost the character of sameness
which made it appear as a true account of certain facts, the same as
the facts, in some respects, and has taken on a quality of otherness,
so that one now has to observe, 'No, the facts are certainly not like
that, it was an erroneous account of them. ' The possibility of error
thus means the possibility of experience which shall include in it the
contradiction of a previous cognitive experience. To say that error
is or is not possible in any given case is to predict something about
the future.

If one simply observes the situation one is obliged, I think, to

5

66 AVENARIUS AND PURE EJFERIENCE

report it somewhat as I have done. Of course it takes an eflfort to
mean by truth, error, and validity merely these characters of experi-
ence. The primitive realism which is such a sturdy growth within
us causes us to try to mean something very different by truth, error
and validity. But when we get these facts into our experience, what
we have is experience, with the fidential character.

When we read the pages of certain philosophers of the past we
can not doubt that to thera some objects were assured experienced
facts, which to-day have to be proved by elaborate dialectical
methods. Thus Descartes appeals to his idea of God as to the idea
of something that could not possibly be doubted in any moment of
sanity. Spinoza gives the impression even more strongly of being a
man in whose experience God is an established and simply unquestion-
able reality. He could probably no more have doubted the existence
of God than the 'plain man' doubts the existence of the outer world.

It seems hardly possible that the concept of God should appear in
modern philosophical literature with the complete fidential character
which it appears to have had with Descartes and Spinoza. But that
does not mean that we have learned to question the existence of a
ground of things back of phenomena. Philosophy still regards the
visible and tangible world as a secondary quality of endless variety.
We speak of change and the necessity of some ground of change, of
fragmentary experience and the necessity of its completion, of thought
and its 'Other' which exists even now before it is found as deproblem-
atized experience.

As a mere suggestion, a hint, I recall the way in which Avenarius
accounts for Idealism as a prevailing point of view in philosophy.
The suggestion is that the search for an ultimate ground of experi^
ence, especially a spiritual ground with dramatic consequences, is a
stirring of the old animistic habit within us.

But as to the motives which cause metaphysics to pass beyond
science and attach the existential predicate to the useful concept, these
may be many and different. We still hear now and then that the
existence of God is assured in the necessity of a first cause. In rep-
utable philosophical literature we do not now often meet with the
concept of an eificient cause of the world, but the idea of a final cause
lurks in all teleological metaphysics. The historical influence of the
Christian conception of God would provide one motive for still seek-
ing a ground of phenomena.

The intellectual interest in the dialectical problems, the exercise
of thinking and of imagination, which is always attractive, and the
sense of being engaged in very important undertakings, is another
motive or group of motives.

As a statement of a third motive, I will quote a sentence from

THE EXPLANATlOy OF EXPERIENCE 67

Professor Ladd's work.^ "The construction of a tenable and com-
forting philosophy is a work of good-will; it is a beneficent deed, a
gift of blessing to humanity." And the dedication: "To those who
have the faith of reason in its strivings to know the deeper truth of
things. ' '

Now I would not be understood as not sharing in the faith of
reason or in the longing for the existential judgment. But at present
it interests me to stand aside and view the varied spectacle of
philosophical effort. Experience itself in its diversity, the descrip-
tion of experience, and the explanation of experience, help to make up
that spectacle. Even he who enters eagerly into the work of descrip-
tion or explanation can but observe the situation before him and re-
port what he can see. If he does more, he mutilates the facts which
he has undertaken to describe in their integrity. And there is much
to suggest that the philosopher is not the mere spectator nearly so
often as he should be.

It is sometimes said that the function of idealism is to make men
feel at home in the world. Some lines of Professor Seth are such an
apt testimony on this point that I can not resist quoting them:
* * Metaphysically, idealism is opposed most ordinarily to materialism ;
in the widest sense it is the opposite of what may be called the me-
chanical and atheistic view of the universe, whatever special form that
may take. Is self-conscious thought with its ideal ends,— the True,
the Beautiful, the Good,— the self-realizing End that works in changes
and makes it evolution? or are these but the casual outcome of a
mechanical system?— a system in its ultimate essence indifferent to
the results which in its gyrations it has unwittingly created, and will
as unwittingly destroy? Is thought or matter the prius? Is the
ultimate essence and cause of all things only 'dust that rises up and
is lightly laid again,' or is it the Eternal Love of Dante's Vision,—
'the love that moves the sun and the other stars' ? That is the funda-
mental metaphysical antithesis. If we embrace the one alternative,
however we may clothe it in detail, we recognize the universe as our
home, and we may have a religion ; if we embrace the other, then the
spirit of man is indeed homeless in an alien world. ' ' *

We have here, I think, a sufficient explanation of the longing for the
existential judgment. The existential judgment is needed to deprob-
lematize the situation. Of course the emotional need is not always
stated quite so frankly, but it frequently appears in a philosophy as
its efficient cause. The philosophy of Spinoza is as clearly an adjust-
ment to the emotional values of his world as were the deeds of Saint

^ ' A Theory of Reality,' New York, 1899, p. 33.
2 Phil. Review, Vol. I., p. 140.

08 AVEAAlilUii ASD I'LUL LU'LJULSCE

Francis. Even Kant, who nearly always displays the ideal phil-
osophical temper, lets one see that his course is determined by his
valuation of moral character. Fichte is evidently, in all his work,
responding to a moral enthusiasm, defining reality so as to adapt it to
emotional needs.

Not all metaphysicians, however, have been determined in their
philosophy by religious cravings. Many an imagination loves to play
with cosmic themes, and what it produces is a work of art.

Metaphysics is, like all knowledge laboriously attained, the re-
sponse which has been made to demands for cognitive satisfaction.
The demand is, of course, the expression of a temperament and may
show a religious or an esthetic character. It may show, too, what we
are obliged to call the purely intellectual character, where the cogni-
tive satisfaction which is sought is a deli«;lit in knowing, in rt'lating
ideas, in building up an ideal system of thought which charms by its
order and completeness. A superb example of this type is Aristotle.

I ask above for the motives which makes metaphysics iasist upon
the existential judgment, and I have indicated certain emotional
needs which demand this satisfaction. Actually, however, the ex-
istential judgment is so characteristic of metaphysics because until
very recently it was equally characteristic of science, and the motives
which are driving it out of science have not yet made themselves felt
in philosophy. This critical attitude in science has not yet become
very general, but we can not doubt that it will become rapidly author-
itative. A point of view which leaves to science full scope to carry
on its tasks, and defines those tasks in such a way as to eliminate
metaphysics, or at least to reduce the metaphysical presuppositions to
a minimum, is sure to be most welcome. And this point of view,
when it comes to be regarded as the only point of view for science,
when the definition of the goal of science as the knowledge of the
unchanging original causes of phenomena comes to be looked back
upon as something quite antiquated and outgrown, may have impor-
tant consequences for metaphysics.

Metaphysics, as we saw, is the response to interests of rather differ-
ent types. It undertakes to satisfy certain emotional needs of a
religious or semireligious character, and it ministers to the purely
intellectual and esthetic delight in noble ideal constructions. To the
former of these two classes of interest, the existential judgment must
always be indispensable. It is not evident why it should be indis-
pensable to the latter. The latter type of mind is ever admitted to be
the more scientific of the two. And supposing that the concepts of
science, the atom, the molecule, the ether, etc., are recognized and
claimed as nothing but conceptual instruments for extending our ac-
quaintance with nature, and the idea of the atom or of the ether as an

THE EXPLANATIOy OF EXPERIENCE 69

image of 'reality' is remembered as a notion surprisingly naive, is it
not altogether likely that minds of the purely intellectual type, which
devote themselves to problems about an ultimate reality, may feel dis-
posed to regard their concepts as science regards hers?

For the example of science in such ways is authoritative. Meta-
physics has become very eager to be 'scientific,' in all possible ways,
and there is no reason to suppose that the methods of science will be
less alluring than formerly.

Well,— if this happens (and the new epistemology of science
makes it seem not unlikely)— if it comes to pass that the concepts
of God, the Absolute, the Unknowable, the concept of reality itself
as something distinguished from appearance, should be looked upon
as working hypotheses, then a long step would have been taken to-
ward the clarified experience which Avenarius sought to describe as
the limit of the evolution of experience.

But then these concepts must do one of two things. They must
either (1) lead to new observations by proving convenient instru-
ments of description, for a working hypothesis must work, or (2)
they must attempt to describe something which is confessedly re-
moved from all possible observation. In the former case meta-
physics becomes a natural science, in the latter case it is difficult to
see that metaphysics remains anything at all. For that which is re-
moved from all possible observation is no longer accepted without
question as existing, and this concept of reality is itself a working
hypothesis used, it may be said, to make phenomena intelligible, by
which is meant, however, to make them dramatically interesting.

But, it may be said, there will still be those who refuse to sur-
render the existential judgment. They will keep metaphysics true
to its ancient function, the search for reality behind appearance.

No doubt they will, but it is a question of how much honor will
be paid to their literature. Of course speculations as to the future
are generally idle, but we have here certain definite data. We have,
I think, the beginning of a new epistemological situation of a per-
fectly statable kind, and we have a large amount of experience show-
ing the recent growing dependence of philosophy upon the special
sciences. This dependence is growing ever greater. See such defi-
nitions of philosophy as that given by Wundt, in which philosophy
is expected to follow behind the special sciences, collecting, organ-
izing and criticizing their results. And if the existential predicate
as applied to the working concept comes to be regarded by scientists
as an evidence of medieval simplicity, it will be but natural, the
prestige of science being what it is, and growing ever greater, that
this new epistemology should be adopted by the more critical students

70 AVENARIUa AND PURE EXPERIENCE

of philosophy. More and more the search for reality behind appear-
ance would seem like a monkish dream.

This might be a great catastrophe for human knowledge and
experience, but nature permits catastrophes.

And if it should come to pass? Well,— we should then have
science and our natural view of the world.

To put it as briefly as possible, science is interested in ccjntents,
and aims at getting more content. The existential predicate adds
nothing to the definable content, therefore science has no interest in
the existential predicate. By what interest then is the existential
predicate demanded ? Not by an interest in contents that are in any
way statable, therefore by an interest in contents that are unutter-
able. For it can not be denied that the predicate of existence does
enrich the total content, but it does so in unutterable ways. And
the interest in the unutterable is a purely emotional interest.

The relation between science and metaphysics as above described
is strikingly like that situation in the Middle Ages which brought
forth the doctrine of the twofold truth. This doctrine was first
stated in the interest of religion, but its effect was to liberate scientific
speculation, and to protect religion so well that theologj' occupied,
more and more, a position of dignified but somewhat lonesome aloof-
ness. If now we are told that a proposition can be true in science and
false in metaphysics, and vice versa, one really can not be blamed for
detecting in the 'fringe' a feeling of prophecy.

SUGGESTIONS TOWARD A CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE

Are we in a position to bring together any suggestions toward a
concept of experience ? Let us see.

Experience is, for our purpose, cognitive experience of objects, —
experience in the narrower, and more precise sense. And the objects
of experience are characterizations of experience, objects which may
or may not be mythological objects.

The most important character of experience is the real outer world
as a permanent transcendent object, or totality of objects, which con-
tains certain objects of peculiar interest, my fellows, who in turn
experience the same outer realities that I do.

This presence before me and about me of a real outer world and
fellow beings like myself is a character of my experience. It is also
a character of my experience that the experience of my fellows (those
who are sane) has the same character as mine.

The possibility that this natural view of the world should ever
cease to be a character of experience seems too remote to make it
worth entertaining ; the few cases we can observe where this has hap-
pened have been cases in which there was a profound disorganization
of functions.

Other objects of experience are, however, observed to come or to
disappear. But these variable objects appear to depend not merely
upon the individual, but upon the social relations, current beliefs and
attitudes, the ' Erkenntnissmenge* in which the individual grows up.

Experience is, therefore, not an individual fact, but a social fact,
focussed in individuals but forming a system. The limits of this sys-
tem must be arbitrarily defined, but within the system the experience
of the individual is determined as regards a great deal of its cognitive
character by the ' E rkennt tiissmenge' of the whole.

This social system of experience has a history ; the common fund
of objects of experience is known to change. Certain objects or char-
acters are eliminated by other objects or characters which replace
them. Thus the sun as an object of experience which revolved about
the earth has been replaced by the sun as an object of experience
about which the earth revolves in an elliptical orbit. Other objects
or characters are eliminated and not replaced. These are objects of
the animistic type. I know an Egyptian dragoman who was terrified
at hearing a lady under his guidance speak slightingly of the water of
the Nile for drinking purposes. He feared the Nile would hear and

71

72 A^E^AI^u^ a.\i> nin-: i:xi'i:i(ii;.\vt:

take its revenge. The historical current of experience to which we
belong has no doubt included objects like this, but they have disap-
peared from our own system of experience. Mythological objects
have been eliminated to a very great extent, and new objects, or new
characters of objects, are brought into the system and described as
the objects of a scientific knowledge of nature.

All experience shows the psychophysical aspect; therefore ex-
perience as a social system must show the same aspect. It is becoming
more and more plausible that con.sciousness depends upon processes
in brain-tissue, and therefore the system of experience must be
regarded as depending upon an elaborate system of nervous sub-
stance. This physiological system has been represented by the
symbol 5C And if the changes in the ' Erkenntnissmenge' of a
system of experience are the effects of processes in 2C the history
of experience must depend upon a parallel history of 2C.

The psychophysical aspect, however, is an aspect with which
only the psychologist need be especially concerned. But to the extent
that the psychophysical aspect of experience comes under considera-
tion, actual experience must be regarded as depending upon 20 in
its relations with outer stimuli.

The evolution of experience still continues. What lies ahead may
be expected to render the concept of nature more complete and defi-
nite and to further the elimination of mythological objects.

This concept of experience is an instrument for conceptual syn-
thesis. Other concepts are equally possible. The one which I sug-
gest proceeds from the standpoint of the natural view of the world,
and accepts its data from all sources whence information can be
obtained. The concept is suggested in the interest of the study of
history. The author of this concept is Richard Avenarius.

AN EMPIRICAL DEFINITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In beginning this final chapter I can but refer to certain recent
articles which seek to improve our empirical accounts of perception
and knowledge.* My own effort is in the spirit of the writers I refer
to, and especially have I felt encouraged by the articles of Professor
James.

Professor James explains at the outset that he does not deny the
existence of everything we may suitably call consciousness. The
function of knowing is not to be denied, and for this function the
name consciousness can be retained. He does deny the existence of
any 'entity' or 'aboriginal stuff or quality of being contrasted with
that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts
of them are made.'*

Now, it is a merely verbal matter, but for my own present pur-
pose I am going to call this function of knowing simply knowing or
knowledge, and I am going to use the word consciousness to signify
another fact or group of facts equally real. It is for the reader to
decide whether my use is justified.

As creatures of habit we say that there are things and there is
awareness of things, that there are objects and that there is conscious-
ness of objects. Any fact to which I attend becomes straightway an
object, and every object, we say, must have a subject. This subject
can not be my body, for that is another object. The subject must be
something far more subtile, namely, consciousness.

'Must be,' we say, not 'is.' The sincere empiricist may well
be suspicious of *must-bes.' His first business is to see what the
empirical situation contains, not what a definition implies. In
what follows I try to report a strictly empirical content. leaviuLr (nit
all 'must-bes.'

It sounds like an innocent and an intelligible proposition tu say
that I see the chair on the other side of the room. If, however, I
mean that an inspection of the situation as experienced reveals any
detail of the content that can be called 'seeing' as distinct from the
visual chair, and other objects in the shape of sensations of head,

* Professor William James in The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and
Scientific Methods, Vol. I., Nos. 18, 20, 21; Vol. II., No. 2. Professor Frederick
J. E. Woodbridge, in the same journal, Vol. II., No. 5. Ralph Barton Perry, in
The Psychological Review for July, 1904.

* Journal of Phil., Psy. and Sci. Methods, Vol. I., p. 478.

73

74 AVENAKIUB AND PURE EXPERIENCE

throat and body, this commonplace statement is false. The situation
contains not seeing, but visual and other objects, and if I am inter-
ested in the object on the other side of the room in such a way as to
make me oblivious of myself, the situation m just then experi<'nced
by me contains no seer.

It is easy to understand, however, why we say 'I see the chair'
and think we have a feeling of doing stjmething. Owing to acts of
mine, the content is constantly changing, I am continually doing
things in order that particular contents may exist, as when I travel
and take great pains to see all the picture-galleries, or all the Gothic
architecture, that I can. And when I at last have come to something
that I have long and eagerly wished to see, there may be such a lively
pleasure and such a sense of purpose fulfilled that I say to myself,
'Now you are beholding it, now you have really got the experience
you have been longing for.' In these cases an empirical ego is
present, but it is another object in the field of experience.

This sense of personal eflBciency expresses itself in a sentence
having its subject in the first person and a verb in the active voice
and, in the example used, the visual object in the accusative case.
And now applying this manner of words to the simple case of 'seeing*
the chair, we get what seems to me a very bad piece of psychology.
The situation may contain ego elements and non-ego elements, but
these are all objects within the content ; and anything like a sense of
effort or strain which might be called a feeling of the act of percep-
tion is simply another object which would be grouped among the
ego elements. But in most normal cases (introspection is an ab-
normal case) there is simply the presence of the thing 'perceived,'
When I look up, there is the chair and that seems to be the whole
story. The chair is there before me, but I can discover no conscious-
ness of it. The sound of the electric car is out there in the street,
but there is no consciousness of it. There is the odor from a lamp,
but consciousness of the odor does not accompany it.

The field of experience contains objects of endless variety,— trees,
buildings, sensations, pains, pleasures, hopes, fears, mathematical
relations and logical necessities. But in no ease of knowledge does
an empirical inspection discover the object plus consciousness of it.
If we mean, then, by consciousness something observable over and
above the brute fact that the object is there wherever it is, we cer-
tainly mean what no observation can discover.

It may strengthen this conviction to reflect that the idea of con-
sciousness is probably, as Professor James says, 'the faint rumor left
behind by the disappearing soul upon the air of philosophy.' We
speak of states of consciousness ; our psychologizing forefathers spoke

EMPIRICAL DEFINITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 75

of states of the soul and meant the same thing. We instinctively
feel that consciousness is an inner thing rather than an outer one,
and if now the tendencies pointed out by Professor James, and
his own declarations mean that consciousness as a metaphysical con-
cept is on the point of being dropped, and that with it goes the last
bit of animism, does it not seem an unexpected verification of an
important part of the theory of Avenarius? Avenarius calls the
metaphysical idea of consciousness the last stage of animism,^ and
says, *am besten wars man gabe einen so verfanglichen Ausdruck
ganz auf . '* Naturally it is of particular interest to see whether eon-
sequences for idealism are likely to follow the new attitude toward
consciousness.

And first, it does not seem to me that we should regard conscious-
ness as a bad word. We can continue to use it to mean what we have
really always meant by it, namely, what is essentially private to one
observer. That there is a great mass of experience which is essen-
tially private and is thus contrasted with what is public, is the basis
of the familiar distinction between the inner and the outer world.
Private objects are what we may intelligibly call subjective facts.
For an object to be subjective is for it to be private. Now by any
case of consciousness we mean what is equivalent to a mental state,
and 'the fact that our mental states are incapable of observation by
anybody but ourselves seems to be not an accidental, but an essential
character of these mental states."

In adopting this criterion of privacy^ I am glad to find myself in
agreement with Professor Miinsterberg, who writes: "The most gen-
eral condition which characterizes a psychical fact is that it can be
experienced by only one, and that as object it stands to the subject
in the relation of mere capacity to be experienced (Erfahrbarkeit) ;
it is distinguished from physical facts by the circumstance that these
can be experienced by more than one. . . ." *

The privacy character is, I think, not really different from the
one advanced by Dr. Perry in his article 'Conceptions and Miscon-
ceptions of Consciousness.' Dr. Perry describes cognitive experi-
ence precisely as I have done. ' The earlier judgment which is pro-
nounced error by a later one, is thereby viewed as idiosyncrasy or
confusion. Such rejected convictions are 'definitely recognized as
my experience.'* "There is no experience of which one may not

» ' M. WeltbegriflF,' p. 106.

* L. c, p. 132, note G7. Compare ' Kr. der R. Erf.,' I., p. viii and p. 22.
' Royce, ' Outlines of Psychology,' p. 4.

* ' Grundziige der Psychologie,' p. 202.

' Psychological Beview for July, 1904, pp. 285-6-7.

* Dr. Perry's article, p. 284.

76 AVENARIU8 AND PURE EXPERIENCE

come to say 'it is my state or it is your state.' " "The most un-
equivocal instance is the dream. "^

So long as we keep within the limits of the experience of one
mind, this seems to me a very adequate account of the matter, l)ut
the judgments with which scientists as such are concerned are judg-
ments in which they have a common interest, and in which validity
means the support of corroborative agreement. In the case of the
single mind, the earlier judgment loses validity as soon as it loses
verification by subsequent judgments. The individual who can not
obtain the assent of other observers finds his judgment classified as
idiosyncrasy.

It seems to me a very misleading analysis which does not take
into account the necessity of verification by other minds, at least, if
we mean to be empirical, and if we are discussing that type of judg-
ment which is a judgment in science. Now that cognitive experience
which for itself is rational and full of insight, yet which a later
judgment of the same mind, or a judgment of another mind, char-
acterizes as whimsical, is what the criticizing mind can not get hold
of and make its own. It remains the private experience of another,
a mental state, a state of consciousness. The experience that is 'defi-
nitely recognized as my experience' and presents a *for-me relation,*
and is best illustrated by the case of a dream, is so manifestly char-
acterized by its essential privacy and limitation to one observer, that
Dr. Perry's excellent account can lose nothing by accepting privacy
as the characteristic property of consciousness rather than idiosyn-
crasy and error, and idiosyncrasy appears naturally as privacy as
soon as other minds are taken into account. And error, in science,
is the fact of rejection by other observers. What is rejected is the
decision of a cognitive experience, and it is rejected simply because
it is not shared, for if it were shared it would be not rejected, but
affirmed.

In what I said above about the great variety of objects and the
universal absence of any type of object that can be called conscious-
ness of them, I find myself in substantial agreement with Professor
"Woodbridge,^ and I can not see that I really differ from him in pro-
posing to use the word consciousness in a different sense.

Professor Woodbridge expresses greater confidence in saying what
consciousness is not than in saying what it is. It is not ' a kind of
receptacle' into which things can get. It is not, as the idealist be-

' L. c, p. 289.

2 L. c, p. 287.

3 ' The Nature of Consciousnesg.' A paper read before the American Philo-
sophical Association, December 29, 1904, and published in the Journal of Phil.,
Psy. and Sci. Methods, Vol. II., No. 5.

EMPIRICAL DEFINITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS < t

lieves, the stuff and matter of all reality. But we can say that
things exist in consciousness and express an intelligible and consistent
meaning. When things exist in consciousness a new 'type of connec-
tion' is established between them. They are 'connected up in a new
way. ' ^ " The peculiar way in which consciousness connects the ob-
jects in it is thus the way of knowledge actual or possible. "^ " This
peculiar form of connection . . . simply makes them known or know-
able, and known with all their variety of distinctions from a thing
to a thought."' And there is 'apparently abundant right to con-
clude that when consciousness exists, a world hitherto unknown has
become known.'*

Now, I do not see why in the sentences I have quoted, the word
knowledge or knowing or cognition could not be substituted for the
word consciousness, and express even more clearly what is meant.
Of course, in view of the fact that the article expresses a greater con-
fidence in its negations than in its positive aflfimiations, I do not wish
to interpret these with undue assurance, but the meaning, I take it,
is that when consciousness occurs real objects become known, and the
only difference it makes to the objects is that they are related in ways
to which they themselves are indifferent, but which constitute knowl-
edge. These relations are relations of mutual implication.

With all the negations of Professor Woodbridge I entirely agree,
and I can not see that any of these suffer from substituting the word
knowledge for the word consciousness. The question whether con-
sciousness exists is simply the question whether these cognitive rela-
tions exist, and the suggestions of Professor Woodbridge toward a
definition of consciousness really seem to me to have in view a defini-
tion of knowledge.

Professor Woodbridge recognizes as 'an important aspect of con-
sciousness,' the 'isolation' of the 'individual consciousness.'* It
seems to me that he would simplify the statement of his own position
and certainly admit nothing inconsistent with that position by accept-
ing the criterion of privacy and isolation as giving the essential prop-
erty of consciousness.

I shall, accordingly, use the word consciousness to mean experience
that is essentially the private and unsharable experience of one per-
son, and I shall conceive such experience, which for each one of us
is a certain streaming of objects of the private tjT)e. as contrasted
with objects that are public, and directly observable by any one so
far as their own nature is concerned. This is the ordinary antith-
esis of subjective and objective, mind and nature, * Bewusstsein

^Journal of Phil., II., No. 5, p. 125 « *L. c, p. 122. » L. c, p. 122.

*L. c, p. 125. « L. c, p. 121.

78 AVESAUIUH AM) I'UUM EXPERIENCE

and Natursein. ' ' We have the two kinds of objects ; the distinction
is commonplace, but strictly empirical.

Let us now see whether this return to the ungarbled facts of
experience has any consequences for transcendental idealism. My
purpose is precisely that of Dr. Perry in the article I have referred
to, namely, to deal logically with the idealistic theory of an Absolute.
The success of Dr. Perry's criticism depends, it seems to me, on the
obligation which the idealist may be under to accept Dr, Perry's defi-
nition of consciousness. It does not seem to me that the idealist is
obliged to accept this definition, but, as I have above remarked, all
the intentions of this definition seem to me better carried out when
we say that consciousness is private experience, and the idealist cer-
tainly would not deny that he conceives all objects as mental states
and that these are, as such, essentially private and exclusive.

The word consciousness is so wrapped up with idealistic implica-
tions that it seems to me most desirable to get rid of the phrase
'objects exist in consciousness.' Consciousness is subjective, indi-
vidual and private, and if we intend to give an accurate description
of the empirical situation, it is wise to cease using phrases that have
us ensnared before we know it in a metaphysical tradition. To come
back to the chair, the actual test whether my visual object be chair
or hallucination would be to find out whether you too see what I do.
Meaning, then, by consciousness the kind of objects that are private
and exclusive, there is no motive whatever for saying the chair exists
'in consciousness.' It exists in the room, in space, in time (although
here I think we begin to use metaphors), it exists in the system of
relations that constitutes knowledge of it.

From the point of view, then, of an accurate description of the
empirical situation, I have no ground for claiming the chair as my
private object, which it must be if it is a mental state or a ca.se of
consciousness. If the privacy of consciousness nowhere comes into
play that identical chair can be your object and my object, by which
we mean that you, I and the chair are all objects in one situation.

But if the above reasoning is sound, how fares it with the logic of
idealism ?

When the argument for idealism can be stated in so many ways
it may seem futile perhaps to pick out one. The one I give is not
the same as that quoted by Dr. Perry. I give the following argument
because it has always seemed to me the best one, and because it is
usually ignored by critics.

It begins by explaining that specific sense-qualities exist only by

* Munsterberg, ' Grundziige,' p. 204.

EMPIRICAL DEFINITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 79

■"irtue of the functional activity of the perceiving subject, and that
it is impossible to describe or conceive an object in other terms than
those of consciousness, and that consequently to assume the existence
of an object having other attributes is to assume nothing. And to
assume that the object exists as consciousness is to define it as what
is the private experience of one observer. When all experience and
all objects of experience are defined as consciousness, no common
object is possible. It is impossible that a father and a mother could
refer to their child and each refer to the same object. Different
selves are completely sundered existences.

Now this flies in the face of normal experience, but it is perfectly
logical, granting the premises. The argument proceeds: different
selves can not come together in any way or have any common objects.
Two selves, therefore, can not occupy the same universe. And if we
are to claim to live together at all in the same universe, this universe
must be the total consciousness of one self, which integrates and ab-
sorbs all our various individual selves. My world and your world
are the same because we are of it, and it is the consciousness of one
self.

Now, since we do all the time claim to have objects in common,
we appeal continually to a situation which, when examined, shows
that every concrete human life is a fragment of an absolute con-
sciousness.

To think of shattering such a work of art! It is like looting a
temple. And yet, if the chair before me is not of the essentially
private portion of experience, this grand and really spiritual fabric
of the imagination dissolves away like the architecture of dreams.

And then ? Well, there is pure experience and the task of science
is to describe it. What other kind of a world there could be except
a world of pure experience I really can not imagine.

And here I apprehend disgust and disappointment. Is this
idealism ashamed, or agnosticism skulking under a better name, or
realism too timid to speak out? It is hard to answer; the 'radical
empiricist' has learned something from each doctrine. I am not sure
that the demand for existence distinguished from experience is an
intelligible demand. But in saying that, I do not admit any flight
to idealism or to any other of the traditional alternatives in meta-
physics. My conviction, which, of course, I can not prove, is that
metaphysics, in the sense hitherto most customary, has nearly
finished its career. But there remains precisely the same kind of
data, namely, experience characterized in one way or another, and
the only legitimate method of dealing with it, namely, minute in-
spection by all available technique, and accurate description.

0

B Buih, Wendell T, 18r'^6-
5208 Avenarius and the
E9B8 standpoint of pure

experience.

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