CLASSIFICATION CHANGED FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO UNCLASSIFIED
WHERE APPEARING
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S&4
THE BATTLE
FOR
LEYTE GULF
OCTOBER 1944
STRATEGICAL
AND
TACTICAL ANALYSIS
VOL Y
BATTLE
OF
SURI6A0 STRAIT
October 24th.-25th.
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
1958
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Na ral War Col eg©
NAVPERS 92628 <*
7" UNCLASSIFIED
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CONFIDENTIAL
ii
A^rfi'
ft«ji tivti'ti «t
«
THE BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF
OCTOBER 1944
STRATEGICAL
AND
TACTICAL ANALYSIS
VOLUME V
BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT
FROM 1042 OCTOBER 23RD
UNTIL 0733 OCTOBER 25TH
Classification cftangfctf i*
Oil I ^$^rtyJz*<l*rs^*'
Naval *& College
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Qtf
1 4 A359
By
Commodore Richard W. Bates, USN (Ret)
Head, World War II Battle Evaluation Group
Naval War College
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
In preparing this volume, Commodore Richard W. Bates, USN (Ret), had
as his principal assistants:
Captain Charles A. Marinke, USN, who collected the original
basic data, prepared certain of the original plates and diagrams,
and provided an initial draft of the early phases of the battle
proper.
Captain Jack C. Titus, USN, who prepared most of the present
plates and diagrams, corrected the basic drafts, provided initial
drafts of the late phases of the battle proper, and who, upon the
retirement of Commodore Bates, completed the volume.
Commander Roy S. Belcher, Jr., USN, who compiled background
information on Japanese air and surface operations.
Commander Howard Cole, USN, who compiled background information
of Allied air and surface force operations.
Mr. Clark H. Kawakami and Mrs. Lily Y. Tanaka who translated
Japanese documents and who served as advisors in matters of
ambiguous translations.
Mr. Philip R. Gaudet and Mr. Joseph Domingoes who drafted all
diagrams and plates in smooth form for publication.
Chief Quartermaster Samuel T. Trembath, USN, and Chief Signalman
Francis J. Henderson, USN, who succeeded one another in the
Battle Evaluation Group in the order listed, compiled information
for plates and diagrams and assisted in plotting the movements
of certain of the forces.
Chief Yeoman Maurice W. Burton, USN; Chief Yeoman Henry W.
Sutphin, USN; Chief Yeoman Donald Pefferkorn, USN; Yeoman Second
Class James A. Hine, USN; Yeoman Second Class Ben H. Weithers,
USN; and Mrs. Betty R. Harvey, who provided the secretarial work.
Considerable valuable information concerning Japanese naval and
air operations was received from the Army Historical Division and
its Military History Section in the Far Eastern Command, and from
Captain Toshikazu Ohmae, ex-IJN, attached to that section.
Commodore Bates, for his part, checked and evaluated the above data,
personally collected all data other than the above, consulted ranking
American officers who participated in the battle or in its planning, wrote
the manuscript, and prepared all analyses and comments, resulting therefrom,
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
FOREWORD
This analysis of the Battle of Surigao Strait, Battle for Leyte Gulf,
in which the Japanese THIRD Section was largely destroyed, and the Japanese
SECOND Striking Force was forced to retire, was prepared by the Naval War
College. It is based on information from both Allied and Japanese sources
which is wider in scope and more complete than that available to writers
on this subject up to this time. It endeavors to maintain at all times
the viewpoint of the commanders of the units on both sides.
It follows directly the preceding series of volumes which include (a)
preliminary phases of the Battle for Leyte Gulf including the Battle off
Formosa, and the Japanese reactions thereto, which were analyzed in Volume
I, (b) the next phase which embraced the operations of the SEVENTH Fleet
Advance Forces in Leyte Gulf prior to D-day and the Japanese reactions
thereto, which were analyzed in Volume II and (c) the third phase which
embraced in general the Allied landing operations in the Leyte Gulf area
of the Philippines and the Japanese reactions thereto, which were analyzed
in Volume III.
It should have been preceded by Volume IV which was to have been a
continuity volume and was to have covered the general operations of the
Allied and Japanese forces from the end of Volume III until the completion
of the Battle for Leyte Gulf. However, for reasons beyond the control of
the Naval War College, the Chief of Naval Operations decided to conclude
the battle analyses with the Battle of Surigao Strait and to discontinue
all other planned volumes, i.e., Volume IV, Volume VI, Battle off Samar
wherein the Japanese FIRST Striking Force (battleships) was turned back by
the Allied Escort Carriers of the SEVENTH Fleet, and Volume VII, Battle
off Cape Engano wherein the Japanese Main Force (carriers) was generally
destroyed by units of the THIRD Fleet (Fast Carrier Force).
Complete information from all sources- was not available to this
analysis. This is especially true of the Japanese SECOND Striking Force,
the data for which is surprisingly meager. It is also true concerning the
thought processes which motivated the principal Japanese senior commanders.
All known sources for obtaining information in the United States and in
Japan have been examined and re-examined with only limited success on the
Japanese side, but with somewhat more success on the Allied side since,
during the past several years, some new material, largely in the form of
dispatches, has been located. Notwithstanding, new facts and circumstances
may come to light from time to time which may change some of the analysis
produced herein.
In view of the critical nature of this analysis an effort has been made
in certain important situations to place the critic in the position of the
commander in order to obtain the latter' s point of view. In employing this
system it is realized that although the critic can often succeed in placing
himself sufficiently near the position of the commander for any practical
purposes, in many instances he may not succeed in doing so.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Because of the nature of this battle, because of certain controversies
which have arisen concerning it — largely relating to the Japanese side—
because of the fact that the Allied operations during the early phases
consisted of numerous destroyer attacks some of which were not particularly
effective, and finally because of the "crossing of the Tee", as complete
a study as possible of this battle has been provided.
The Battle of Surigao Strait was a real test of existing Allied and
Japanese night tactical concepts as well of the combat ability in night
action of the various commanders on both sides. The pages of history have
invariably revealed defects in command in similar situations and it would
have been surprising had such defects not appeared in this action.
This battle reaffirmed the lesson so often forgotten — that the test of
battle is the only test which proves the combat ability of commanders*
The ability or lack of ability of the various commanders in the art of war
became apparent. Valor alone was shown to be insufficient, for valor is
not an attribute of only one race, but is an attribute and a heritage of
many races. The indispensable qualification for command, the art of war,
was shown to be the ability in combat to apply the science of war to active
military situations.
The present senior officers of the Navy are well aware of the reasons
for changes in established doctrines and in the developments of new ones.
But this cannot necessarily be said of the commanders of the future, who
very probably will be inexperienced in command in war.
Finally, all comments and criticisms, the more important of which are
emphasized herein by the employment of capital letters, are designed to
be constructive. By indicating what appear to be sound and unsound
decisions, and the apparent reasons for arriving at them, it is hoped to
provoke earnest thought among prospective commanders and thus to improve
professional judgement in command.
ii CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword ... 1.^pir;i
Table of Contents ni-ixxyu.
Zone Time and Discussion of Dispatch Times lxxviii
Principal Commanders lxxix-lxxxiv
Introduction lxxxv-lxxxvii
Brief Narrative of the 1042 October 23rd to 0733 October 25th Phase of
The Battle for Leyte Gulf lxxxvii~cviii
Strategic Area cix-cxii
(a) General Discussion cix-cx
(b) The Surigao Strait Area ex
(c) Weather cxL-cxii
CHAPTER I - JAPANESE OPERATIONS, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd 1-17
(A) Operations of CinC Combined Fleet 1-16
Watches with great interest movement of forces 1
Receives two RDF fixes on "unknown forces" 1
Learns that Commander FIRST Striking Force hoisted flag in YAMATO 1
Transmits his situation estimate to his commanders 1
Dispatch containing the estimate quoted 1-2
(1) Operations of Commander FIRST Striking Force 2-4
Mission and deployment of FIRST Striking Force explained 2
Awaits an opportunity to transfer to YAMATO 3
Unable to transfer until 1623 because of a series of submarine
contacts. At 1630 notifies interested commands that his flag
has been hoisted in YAMATO 3
Knows that Commander SW Area Force had made arrangements for
additional antisubmarine protection. 3
Receives CinC Combined Fleet's estimate of situation 3
Likely receives several contacts 3-4
(a) Operations of Commander Main Body 4-5
Discussion of events previous to this period 4
Force maneuvers almost constantly 5
Modifies the movement plan 5
(b) Operations of Commander THIRD Section 5-11
Discussion of his objectives 5-6
Likely learns of enemy submarine action 6
Believes his presence known to the enemy 6
Receives Commander SW Area Force's dispatch which directs
penetration by SECOND Striking Force 7
Directs BATDIV WO as to gunnery policy 7
Likely learns that Commander FIRST Striking Force was
aboard YAMATO and operations were being continued as
planned 7
Instructs his forces as to allocation of targets and
firing ranges 7-8
Discussion thereon 9
Directs measures to be taken for night antiaircraft and
antisubmarine dispositions 9
Issues instructions for use of reconnaissance seaplanes 9
iii CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Notes that "Main Strength" of 955th Air Group had been
assigned to screen the THIRD Section 10
Receives CinC Combined Fleet's estimate of situation 10
Discussion thereon 10-11
Extremely anxious that reconnaissance seaplane should be
successful 11
Makes a major deviation from planned course 11
(2) Operations of Commander Main Force 11-13
Discussion of events previous to this period 11-12
Makes a number of submarine contacts during the day 12
Estimates situation and makes decisions 12-13
(3) Operations of Commander Advanced Expeditionary Force 13
RO-109 got underway as ordered 13
(4) Operations of Conmander 3W Area Force 13-16
Learns of torpedo attacks against Main Body 13
Receives request for immediate screening and towing services
for TAKAO 13-U.
COMCRUDIY SIXTEEN becomes Commander Guard Force under ris
direct command 1U
Notifies "All Commanders Seaplane Bases" of TAKACfs damage and
directs them to escort and carry out neutralization attacks lh
Orders HIYODORI and MITSU MARU to assistance of TAKAO 14
(a) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force 14-16
Discussion of movements and instructions prior to this
period 14-15
Sights a B-24 type aircraft 15
Receives instructions from Commander SW Area Force which
restated his mission 15
Enters Culion anchorage and conmences fueling his destroyers
from his cruisers 15
COMCRUDIV SIXTEEN becomes Commander Guard Force 16
Damaged AOBA arrives Manila Bay safely 16
COMCRUDIV SIXTEEN shifts flag to KINU and with URANAMI
proceeds to Manila Harbor to refuel 16
COMDESDIV TWENTY-ONE with DESDIV TWENTY-ONE arrives Manila,
discharges SIXTH Base Air Force personnel, refuels and
departs to rejoin SECOND Striking Force 16
(b) Operations of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force 16
Continues efforts to organize his units and to prepare for
all out effort 16
(c) Operations of Commander FIFTH Base Air Force 16
Deploys two Kamikaze Units to Mindanao 16
(B) Operations of Commanding General FOURTH Air Army 17
Moves his headquarters to Bacolod, Negros 17
Discussion of low percentage of planes 17
CHAPTER II - ALLIED OPERATIONS, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd 18-59
(A) Operations of COMSOWESPAC 18
Making preparations for installation of Philippine Commonwealth
Government 18
Replies to COMTHIRDFLT's dispatch as to earliest estimate safe
strike South China Sea 18
Departs NASHVILLE for Tacloban at 1119 18
iv CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Likely learns C.G. TWENTY-FOURTH Corps assumed command ashore 18
Returns aboard the NASHVILLE 18
Underway in NASHVILLE for night retirement 18
Maintains close scrutiny of developing situation 18
(1) Operations of Commander SEVENTH Fleet 19
Continues operational control of SOWESPAC naval forces from
WASATCH 19
Familiar with developing situation but takes no direct action 19
(a) Operations of CTF 77 19-22
His estimate of the situation quoted 19-20
Discussion thereon 20
Learns that COMTHIRDFLT changed plans for TG 38.2 20
Views above information with satisfaction 20
Departs WASATCH for installation of Philippine Commonwealth
Government at Tacloban 20
Knew that commencing about noon TCAP over Leyte had been
reduced to twelve VF permitting heavier strikes against
northern Mindanao and western Visayan airfields and
shipping 20
Likely learns C.G. TWENTY-FOURTH Corps had assumed command
ashore at 1200 20
His staff receives CTF 79 's situation report 21
Returned aboard WASATCH some time after 1400. 21
Learns ten PBY's of VPB's THIRTY- THREE and THIRTY-FOUR
had arrived 21
Learns of enemy force in Latitude 13°-00'N, Longitude
118°-40'E 21
Learns of sightings in Makassar Strait 21
Approves CTG 77.4' s proposal to send two CVE's to Morotai
to pick up replacement aircraft 21
Learns that Leyte Gulf, with the exception of a small
unexplored area, was now considered safe from moored
mines 21-22
Knows that TG 78.7 would arrive about dawn 22
Receives authority to retain CRUDIV FOUR 22
Intercepts DACE and DARTER reports 22
These reports do not appear to have affected his
"Magnified Tokyo Express" concept 22
(1) Operations of CTF 78 and CTG 78.1 23-24
Watches the unloading with interest 23
Probably attends ceremony for installation of Philippine
Government 23
Informs CTG 77.4 that COMDESRON TWENTY-ONE would arrive and
report to CTG 77.4 23
Requests information on LST's on beaches 23
Directs COMLSTGRP TWENTY-THREE to form TG 78.11 23
Observes the departure of TG 78.11 at 1700 23
Issues instructions to CTG 78.7 24
(a) Operations of CTG 78.2 24
Observes unloading of his units 24
Learns that two of his gunboats had successfully
reconnoitered San Juanico Strait 24
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(b) Operations of CTU 77.2.1 and CTG 77.3 25
(1) Operations of CT'J 77.2.1 25
Awaits FS missions - destroyers refuel 25
Gets underway for night screening station 25
Arrives on station in Area DRUM 25
(2) Operations of CTG 77.3 25
Awaits call fire assignments 25
Destroyers refuel 25
SHROPSHIRE and BOISE carry out FS missions 25
Commences patrolling area 25
(c) Operations of CTG 78.7 25-26
Enters Leyte Gulf and heads for northern transport area 26
(d) Operations of CTG 78.8 26
Proceeds toward Leyte Gulf from Humboldt Bay 26
(2) Operations of CTF 79 26-28
Queries CTG 79.2 as to what time his ships would sail 26
Learns that all BLT's had been landed 26
Designates units which would compose TU 79. 14 o 5 26
Learns that two LST's remain to be unloaded 26
Learns that TRANSDIV TEN had commenced general unloading and
that unloading progress on BLUE and ORANGE Beaches is not
proceeding as rapidly as desired 26
Receives CTG 79.1's dispatch on transfer of command 27
Learns that unloading of MERCURY would delay sailing 27
CTG 79.2 informs him that only WILLIAM P. BIDJLE would sail 27
Originates dispatch living composition and departure time of
TU 79. 14. U 27
Informs his command that command of forces ashore had passed
to C.G. TWENTY- FOURTH Corps 27
Receives CTG 79.1's sortie plan 27
Learned that CTF 78 to assign COMDESRON TWENTY-ONE to CTG 77.4 27
Learns from CTG 79.2 that ships are low on fuel 27
Returns aboard the MOUNT OLYMPUS 27
Learns that CTG 77.2 intended to suspend replenishment
operations at 1700 until 0700 27
Receives word of night screening destroyers 28
Receives CTG 79.1's visual dispatch executing sortie plan and
also modifying it 28
Orders CTG's 79.1 and 79.2 to direct all LST's seaward of the
MOUNT OLYMPUS to close in 28
Issues night operating instructions to CTG 79.2 23
Probably intercepts CTF 77' s dispatch stating that he considered
the approach of enemy combatant ships and oilers toward Coron
Bay as the first phase of a buildup of a magnified Tokyo
Express operation 28
Learns that TG 79.2 was low on smoke 28
(a) Operations of CTG 79.1 28-30
Observes the unloading progress of his ships 23
Issues his sortie plan 29
Informs his command that upon his departure command would
pass to CTF 79 29
Receives CTF 79's dispatch forming TU 79.14.5 and giving
sailing time 29
*o
vi CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Recommends that MERCURY be sailed not later than 1800
regardless of amount of cargo remaining aboard 29
Receives CTF 79fs dispatch giving composition and sailing
time of TU 79.14.4 29
Issues visual dispatch executing sortie plan and also
modifying it 29
Takes command of TU 79.14.4 and departs 29-30
(b) Operations of CTG 79.2 30-31
Evidences considerable concern with delay in unloading 30
No doubt receives CTF 79' s dispatch forming TU 79.14.5 30
Notifies CTF 79 and CTG 79.1 that only WILLIAM P. BIDDLE
would be ready to sail that evening 30
Notifies CTF 79 that ships were low on fuel 30
Receives CTF 79fs dispatch giving composition and sailing
time of TU 79.14.4 31
Receives CTF 79 's night operating instructions 31
Informs CTF 79 that his smoke supply was low 31
(c) Operations of CTU 77.2.2 31-32
Awaiting FS and call fire missions 31
Ships refuel and replenish ammunition 31
Confers with CTF 77 aboard WASATCH 31
All servicing activities halted 32
Proceeds to his night covering station 32
(3) Operations of CTG 77.2 32-33
Making preparations to replenish fuel and ammunition and also
to furnish FS 32
Operates largely as CTU 77.2.2 during period 1042 - 1700 32
Heads for his night screening station 32
Likely intercepts CTF 77' s magnified Tokyo Express dispatch 32
Arrives on station off Taytay Point about 1851 32-33
(4) Operations of CTG 77.4 33-34
Launches third and fourth strikes 33
Launches fifth direct support mission 33
Transfers planes from CHENANGO and SAGINAW BAY to other
carriers 33
Receives CTF 77 fs estimate 34
Likely does not view situation with alarm 34
Recovers last flight of day 34
(5) Operations of CTG 70.1 34-35
WACHAPREAGUE group arrives Liloan Bay 34
Discussion of PT operations 34-35
(b) Operations of CTF 71 35-38
Watching developing situation with interest 35
Receives CTF 77' s magnified Tokyo Express dispatch 35
Directs BATFISH to cover approaches between Negros and Mindanao
and GURNARD to cover southwest approaches to Brunei Bay 35
Directs PADDLE to patrol as previously ordered 35
Re-estimates the situation 35
Informs interested commands of location of submarines 35
Discussion thereon 35-36
DACE reports making four hits in battleship and also gives
composition, course and speed of Japanese force 36
DARTER confirms DACE's report but is more explicit 36
vii CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Receives BREAM and ANGLER contact reports 36
Advises interested commands of ANGLER'S contact 36
(1) BREAM and GUITARnO 37
BREAM reports her successful attack to CTF 71 37
GUTTARRO contacts enemy force estimated to consist of
fifteen to twenty ships including three BB 37
(2) ANGLER 37
Makes contact on Main Body, FIRST Striking Force 37
(3) DACE and DARTER 33
V/olfpack commander notifies CTF 71 of composition of
Japanese force 3?
Directs DACE to take attack position 33
DACE sights damaged cruiser TAKAO 38
DACE heads for attack position 38
(2) Operations of CAAF SOWESPAC 39
Attends installation ceremonies at Tacloban 39
Objects to both C.G. SIXTH Army and C0MS0W2SPAC to offloading
supplies on Tacloban airstrip 39
(a) Operations of C.G. FIFTH Air Force 39-40
Awaiting amplification of his Morotai-based PB4Y's 39
Learns that scheduled strikes against shipping were made 39
Shipping sweep against Zamboanga diverted 39
Issues orders for rescue services 39
Learns that a PB4Y had observed shipping in Puerto
Princesa harbor 40
Learns that PB4Y sighted SECOND Striking Force 40
Receives CTF 77' s dispatch requesting him continue
thorough reconnaissance Coron Bay 40
Advises his command that he estimates no change in enemy
air strength 40
(b) Operations of CTF 73 41
CTG 73.4 continues to execute Search Plan FOX 41
Morotai-based PB4Y's fail to locate either THIRD Section
or Main Body, FIRST Striking Force 41
(1) Operations of CTG 73.7 41
Supervising preparations to tend seaplanes 41
Ten PBY's arrive 41
Advises CTF 77 that seaplane searches would commence 41
(B) Operations of CINCPAC-CINCPOA 42-59
COMTHIRDFLT and COMSEVENTHFLT have no common superior 42
Discussion thereon 42
Advises subordinates of second contact by Japanese plane on
surface units 42
(1) Operations of Western Pacific Task Forces 43-51
(a) Operations of COMTHIRDFLT 43-51
Brief summary of COMTH IRDFLT « s situation 43
Changes his logistics orders 43
Orders (a) CTG 38.1 to strike YaD and (b) CTG 30.9 at
Ulithi to expedite replenishment of TG 38.1 43
Receives information that Japanese plane had contacted
surface force 43
Receives contact report on enemy submarine 44
Issues dispatches concerning next major operation 44
viii CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Advises CINCPAC that information on enemy movements west
of Luzon was sketchy and suggests submarine
reconnaissance 44
Receives CTF 77* s estimate of situation which reauested
certain searches by THIRD Fleet 44
Receives contact report on SECOND Striking Force 44
Learns of DACE's attack 44
Orders INDEPENDENCE to launch search at 2400 45
Decides to reconnoiter coast of Palawan 45
Receives DARTER' s report 45
(1) Operations of CTF 38 45-46
Estimates the situation 45-46
Orders CTG 38.3 to launch two strikes at dawn October
24th 46
Informs COMTHIRDFLT that afternoon searches negative 46
Receives CTF 77 's estimate of the situation 46
Receives reports of enemy forces 46
(a) Operations of CTG 38.1 46-47
Learns that CTG 38.4's orders changed 46
Calls COMTHIRDFLT' s attention to effectiveness
and availability of night fighters 47
(b) Operations of CTG 38.2 47-48
Awaits detailed instructions 47
Completes refueling 47
Receives amplifying orders 47-48
Prepares search to north 48
COMTHIRDFLT requests sweep of northwest coast of
Palawan 48
(c) Operations of CTG 38.3 48-49
Launches afternoon search 48
Searches negative for enemy warships 48
Alert to developing situation 49
Issues search instructions to TG 38.3 49
(d) Operations of CTG 38.4 49-50
Receives dispatch changing orders 49
Tells CTG 38.3 direct HELM rejoin 49
Completes fueling 50
Informs CTF 77 of availability of aircraft 50
HELM rejoins 50
(2) Operations of CTG 30.5 50-51
Continues his air searches 50
Tinian search fails to detect Main Force 50
Discussion thereon 50-51
Learns sector searches were negative 51
Receives all important contacts 51
(2) Operations of CTF 17 52-59
Informs those interested of submarine locations 52
Discussion thereon 52
Receives CTF 77 's estimate of the situation 52
Advises his command of events 53
Grants ICEFISH extension of patrol 53
Directs ESCOLAR to guard frequency for information 53
Advises submarines of good hunting between blind bombing area
and submarine patrol zone 53
IX
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDE TIAL
Seems more concerned with sinking of enemy shipping than
obtaining information on movements of enemy forces 53
Probably learns of DRUM'S contact on enemy convoy 53
Receives DARTER'S dispatch reporting sinking heavy cruiser
and damaging another 53
(a) CONVOY COLLEGE 54.56
(1) SAWFISH, ICEFISH, DRUM 54-55
SAWFISH sights convoy 54
SAWFISH makes second attack, succeeds in sinking the
KIMIKAWA MARU 54
ICEFISH receives extension of patrol 55
(2) SNOOK 55
Attempts to close SAWFISH'S convoy 55
(3) SHARK, BLACKFISH, SEADRAGON 55
Patrolling along northeast corner of Area 55
Makes no effort to close SAWFISH'S contact 55
Proceeds to Datrol northern edge of area 55
(4) HADDOCK, HALIBUT, TUNA 56
Proceed uneventfully to Datrol stations 56
(5) PINTADO, JALLAO, ATULE 56
Proceed uneventfully to patrol stations 56
(6) BONEFISH 56
Eastbound via Saipan 56
Sights large unidentified aircraft 56
(b) Northwest Coast of Formosa 56
TANG patrols uneventfully 56
(c) Northeast Coast of Formosa 56-57
SILVERSIOES, TRIGGER, SALMON patrol uneventfully 56
SALMON moves to north 57
(d) MARU MORGUE 57
FIRST Supply Group passes undetected 57
(e) Nagasaki - Sasebo 57-
PERCH proceeds to lifeguard station 53
PERCH receives instructions on lifeguard duties 53
CROAKER receives instructions on lifeguard duties 58
(f) HIT PARADE (Approaches to Bungo Suido) 58
RONQUIL and BSSUGO patrol uneventfully 53
RONQUIL informs BESUGO she is moving into area 53
GABILAN patrols uneventfully 58
(g) The Approaches to Tokyo Bay 59
TAM30R and GREENLING patrol uneventfully 59
(C) China-3urma-India Theater 59
(1) Operations of C.G. FOURTEENTH Air Force 59
Search over South China Sea flown, no contacts of importance 59
CHAPTER III - JAPANESE OPERATIONS, 0000 - 1330, October 24th : .- ? ?
(A) Operations of CinC Combined Fleet ~ -f:
Learns of a large enemy force bearing 090°(T) distant 250 miles
from Manila rT
Receives numerous reports from various commanders 60-61
Becomes concerned about attacks on Main Body 61
:
CONFIDENTIAL
(1) Operations of Commander FIRST Striking Force
Wears severalMhatsM
Learns THIRD Section under air attack
Learns Commander Main Force intends attack enemy task force
Receives same contact reports as Commander Main Body-
Receives Commander THIRD Section's 1400 position report
(a) Operations of Commander Main Body
Learns enemy task force contacted 250 miles east of Manila
Force assumes antiaircraft disposition
Ships launch search aircraft
First air attack begins
MY0K0 and MUSASHI torpedoed
COMCRUDIV FIVE transfers to HAGURO
Orders MY0K0 proceed to Brunei Bay
Second air attack begins
MUSASHI receives three additional torpedo hits
Receives contacts on TG 38.2 and TG 38.3
Receives contacts on enemy forces
Requests he be advised of contacts and attacks
Third air attack begins
MUSASHI again torpedoed, YAHAGI suffers near misses
Receives another contact from Leyte Gulf
YAMATO bombed during fourth air attack
NAGATO bombed during fifth air attack
Orders MUSASHI to retire, KIYOSHLMO to escort
Reverses course while re-estimating situation
Informs superiors of estimate and actions
Discussion of this dispatch
Knows strength of opposing forces
Learns Advance Guard detached
Learns SIXTH Base Air Force to attack carrier force
Ordered to resume advance
(b) Operations of Commander THIRD Section
MOGAMI launches reconnaissance seaplane
FUSO hit during air attack
Receives report on enemy forces
Reports results of action to superiors
Designates reassembly, refueling and supply points
MOGAMI seaplane reports results of reconnaissance
Orders aircraft to attack enemy light craft
Reports his position
Learns of areas designated as bombardment targets
Orders FIRST Division to move out in front of SECOND
Division
Prescribes target priority for aircraft unit
Discussion thereon
Knows Main Body attacked
Likely receives same contact reports as Commander FIRST
Striking Force
(2) Operations of Commander Main Force
Launches morning search
Launches attack group
Recovers morning search
FIRST* Attack Unit fails to find enemy force
61-62
61
62
62
62
62
63-68
63
63
63
63
63
63
63-64
64
64
64
65
65
65
65
66
66
66
66
67
67
67
67
68
68
68
69-72
69
69
69
69
69-70
70
70
70
71
71
71
72
72
72
72-74
72
72
72
72
XL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND Attack Units attack TG 38.3 73
Orders Advance Guard detached to proceed southward 73
Enemy carrier plane sights force 73
Recovering last of CAP 74
(3) Operations of Commander Expeditionary Force 74
Some submarines arrive on station 74
Re-disposes his submarines 74
(4) Operations of Commander SW Area Force 75-36
Warns of likelihood of air attack 75
Learns (a) AOBA towed into Manila Bay, (b) DESDIV TWENTY-ONE
attacked by aircraft and WAKABA sunk, (c) THIRD Section
repulsed air attack, (d) Main Body attacked by aircraft and
(e) MYOKO damaged and ordered to Brunei Bay 75
Sends no escorts to MYOKO 75
Knows of various contacts and results of friendly air attacks 75
Learns Main Body under repeated air attacks 76
Replies that SIXTH Base Air Force scheduled to attack 76
Learns NAGANAMI had discovered the DARTER 76
Learns that second phase air attack made hit on carrier 76
(a) Operations of Commander Guard Force 76—77
Issues orders for first operation 76
Description of orders 76-77
KINU and URANAMI sortie from Manila 77
URANAMI damaged during air attack 77
URANAMI lies to repairing damage 77
(b) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force 78-32
Departs Culion Anchorage 78
Learns of air attack on DESDIV TWENTY-ONE 78
Notifies his force of bombardment areas 78
Force ahead of planned schedule 78
Warns force of possible air attack 79
Issues Signal Order No. 145 79
Unaware he has been sighted 79
Learns DESDIV TWENTY-ONE again attacked by air 79
Likely receives several reports 80
COMDESDIV TWENTY-ONE heads for Manila 80
Probably receives position report THIRD Section 30
Learns of attacks on KINU and URANAMI 81
Receives more reports of Main Body 81
Issues Signal Order No. 147 31
Description of order 31
Discussion of influences affecting plan 82
(c) Operations of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force 32-35
Upon receipt of contact on TG 38.3, orders general
offensive 82
FIRST Attack Group proceeds to target 33
Learns location of two enemy carrier groups 33
Learns Commander Main Force plans attack against enemy
task force 83
SECOND Attack Group takes off but fails to make contact 84
Receives contact report on TG 38.2 34
Received several battle reports from Commander Main Body ?-
Discussion of shortage of aircraft 34
xU
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Dusk attack group attacks enemy-
Knows that attacks had been ineffective
Lists results of attack
(d) Operations of Commander FIFTH Base Air Force
Achieves no successes during the day
(B) Operations of C.G. FOURTH Air Army
First attack group takes off for Leyte Gulf
Group sinks two and damages three ships
Second attack group unsuccessful
Records of third attack unknown
Japanese claims and aircraft losses
85
35
85
86
86
87-88
87
87
87
87
88
CHAPTER IV - ALLIED OPERATIONS, 0000 - 1830, October 24th 89-207
(A) Operations of COMSCv/ESPAC 89-159
Receives intelligence summaries from SEVENTH Fleet and his own
headquarters 89
Probably receives submarine reports 89
Requested to move from NASHVILLE but does not 89
Follows operations of CTF 77 and COMTHIRDFLT 89
Disregards his headquarters' recommendation on reply to
COMTHIRDFLT' s 210645 90
(1) Operations of Commander SEVENTH Fleet 90
Takes no unusual action during day 90
(a) Operations of CTF 77 90-107
Receives his headquarter ' s intelligence summary 90-91
Receives Headquarters COKSOWESPAC intelligence summary 91
Likely receives BREAM' s report 91
This report adds to his estimate of enemy forces 91
Learns of ANGLER'S contact 91
Weighs possible courses of action on air defense 91-92
Informs CTG 77*4 enemy air attack may be brewing, cancels
western Visayas strike 92
Discussion thereon 92
Intercepts GUITARRO's report 92
Learns CTG 38,4 launching search 92
Receives report of several sightings 93
Intercepts GUITARRO's second report 93
Realizes report modifies previous estimate of situation 93
Draws various commanders attention to implications of
change in tactical situation 93
Air attack develops 93-94
Discussion thereon 94
Learns CTG's 38.3 and 38.4 to concentrate at best speed
on CTG 38.2 94
Possibly receives aircraft contact report on THIRD Section 94
Report appears to influence estimate 94
Report inaccurate 94
Learns of TG 38.4 attack on enemy destroyers 95
Reinstitutes fighter sweeps of Visayan airfields 95
Informs interested commanders of enemy air attacks 95
Learns of major force south of Mindoro 95
Discussion thereon 95
496799 O - 59 - 2
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COMTHIRDFLT requests information on searches from Leyte 95
Receives CTF 79* s daily operational summary 96
Learns carrier aircraft to strike enemy force 96
Discussion thereon 96
Informs COMTHIRDFLT of air attack 96
Learns CTF 38 ordered to keep area to north under
observation 96
Receives report of enemy southeast of Mount Dumali 97
C.G. SIXTH Army assumes command of forces ashore 97
This action completes amphibious assault phase of
operation 97
Re-estimates the situation 97-93
Orders under which his forces were operating discussed 98-99
Issues battle plan 99
Discussion of battle plan and orders 99-100
Increases estimate of enemy battleships 100
Does not know if THIRD Section is being tracked by planes 101
Warns CTG 77.2 of impending night engagement 101
Advises COMTHIRDFLT on enemy force 101
Discussion thereon 101
Concept of fleet action still remote 102
Intercepts TANGIER'S dispatch of enemy force 102
Learns of another enemy force 102
Advises interested commanders of strategic plan 102
Receives garbled contact report 103
Directs CTG 70.1 to prevent undetected passage between
Dinagat Island and Mindanao 103
Advises COMTHIRDFLT on purpose of enemy air attack 103
Estimate of intentions discussed 10/*
Informs his forces of friendly MT3»s 10/*
Advises COMTHIRDFLT of aircraft searches 104
Problem of aircraft availability discussed 104
Receives report of attack on E Section 105
Receives another report on THIRD Section 105
Reports fail to alter estimate of enemy force 105
Receives partly garbled report on Main Body 105
Intercepts COMTHIRDFLT' s Battle Plan 105
Discussion thereon 106
Receives CTG 70.1 fs battle plan 106
Learns that CTG 70.1 ordered patrols 106
Notes TG 77.2 heading southward 106
Two events would jeopardize his security 107
Discussion of CTF 77' s concept of operations 107
(1) Operations of CTF 78 and CTG 78.1 108-114
Receives reports of enemy forces 108
Undergoes several aircraft attacks 108
COKDESRON TWENTY-ONE reports for duty 108
Requests CTG 77.2 to assume A/S patrol 108
Directs COMDESRON TWENTY-ONE report to CTG 77.4 103
Learns night surface attack imminent 108
Receives CTF 77 's dispatch ordering preparation for
night engagement 109
Receives COMSEVENTKFLT's supplement to Harbor
Defense Plan 109
XLV
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CONFIDENTIAL
Learns CTG 70.1 intends to patrol across lower
Leyte Gulf 109
(a) Operations of CTG 78.2 109-110
Receives reports of enemy forces approaching 109
COMMINDIV THIRTY-FOUR reports for duty 109
Observes arrival of TG 78.7 109
First Japanese air attack in force 110
Continues to unload LST's 110
Learns night surface attack imminent 110
Receives CTF 77' s dispatch ordering preparation
for night engagement 110
Receives COMSEVENTHFLT « s supplement to Harbor
Defense Plan 110
(b) Operations of CTU 77.2.1 111-112
Receives reports of approaching enemy forces 111
Proceeds to logistics area 111
Confers with CTG 77.2 aboard LOUISVILLE 111
Learns night surface attack imminent 111
WEST VIRGINIA and MARYLAND refuel 111
Learns enemy force in eastern Sulu Sea 111
Receives COMSEVENTHFLT ■ s supplement to Harbor
Defense Plan 112
Prepares to depart logistics area 112
(c) Operations of CTG 77.3 112-113
Receives reports of approaching enemy forces 112
Returns to San Pedro Bay 112
Detaches BEALE, DALY and SHROPSHIRE for shore
bombardment 112
PHOENIX, BOISE and SHROPSHIRE refuel 112
Learns enemy force might arrive that night and
assignment to CTG 77.2 112
Terminates his FS mission 112
Reports to CTG 77.2 for duty 113
Again confers with CTG 77.2 113
Discussion thereon 113
Learns of COMSEVENTHFLT ' s supplement to Harbor
Defense Plan 113
Proceeds toward battle station 113
Joins TG 77.2 as Commander Right Flank Force 113
(d) Operations of CTG 78.7 113-114
Proceeding to northern transport area 113
Detaches ten LST's to YELLOW Beach TWO 114
Detaches remaining units 114
TG 78.7 dissolved, COMDESRON TWENTY-ONE reports
to CTF 78 114
(e) Operations of CTG 78.8 114
Proceeding to Leyte Gulf 114
(2) Operations of CTF 79 114-120
Several air raid alerts 114
Receives reports of Japanese forces approaching 114
Learns large air attack brewing 115
COMLSTGROUP FORTY reports for duty 115
Requests CTU 77.7.1 arrange to fuel destroyers 115
xv CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Receives word that LSUTZE was bombed and strafed
Directs CTU 79.11.1 to commence sortie
Queries CTG 79.2 as to time of AURIGA unloading
Again orders CTU 79.11.1 to sortie
Learns major enemy force sighted
Forwards summary report to CTF 77
Observes departure of TU 79.14.5
Learns AURIGA'S estimated time of unloading
Learns night surface attack inminent
Learns MTB's to patrol lower Surigao Strait
Observes departure of TU 79.14.8
Receives CTF 77' s dispatch directing prepare for
night engagement
Originates dispatch forming TU 79.14.9
Directs CTU 79.11.3 to fuel
Receives COMSEVSNTHFLT • s supplement to Harbor
Defense Plan
Learns CTG 70.1 intends to patrol lower Leyte Gulf
Units of force listed
(a) Operations of CTG 79.2
Jaoanese aircraft begin air raid
Confers with CTF 79 aboard MOUNT OLYMPUS
Witnesses departure of TU 79.14.5
Receives sailing orders from CTF 79
Orders his units to get underway on signal
Returns to ROCKY MOUNT and issues sortie plan
As CTU 79.14.8 departs for Hollandia
(b) Operations of CTU 77.2.2
Acts largely as CTG 77.2 during night
Directs units to FS stations
Learns LSUTZE bombed and strafed
CALIFORNIA refuels wnile LOUISVILLE, HSYWOOD L.
EDWARDS, 3LAXT0N and PORTLAND replenish
ammunition
Discussion thereon
ALBERT W. GRANT, LEUTZE, ROBINSON, COLUMBIA and
DENVER furnish FS
Orders units to form and heads for night battle
station
(3) Operations of CTG 77.2
Receives ANGLER'S and GUITARRO's reports
Orders units to fueling and FS areas
Learns CTF 77 believes night surface attack inminent
Learns of THIRD Section in Sulu Sea
Confers with CTU 77.2. aboard LOUISVILLE
Receives request to assume A/S patrol around TF 78
Receives orders from CTF 77 to prepare for night
battle
Completes battle plan
Requests Commander Battle Line and Connander Right
Flank Force to report on board to discuss plan
Comnander Battle Line reports aboard
Commander Right Flank Force reports aboard
Discussion of conference
115
115
115
115
116
116
116
116
116
116
117
117
117
117
117
117
117-118
118
118
113
118
113
118
118
118
119-120
119
119
119
119
119-120
120
120
120-126
120
121
121
121
121
121
121
122
122
122
122
122
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CONFIDENTIAL
Both commanders enthusiastic about plan 122
Prepares to issue plan, receives several dispatches
relating thereto 123
Dispatches do not clash with plan 123
Decides to send all ships' planes which could not be
stowed in hangers ashore, 123
Directs Left Flank Force to form and proceeds toward
battle area 123
Issues battle plan 124
Plan stated 124-125
Comment thereon 125
Confusion exists as to number of battleships
approaching 125
Learns torpedo boat operating areas 125
Transmits battle plan visually 125
Discussion thereon 125-126
(4) Operations of CTG 77.4 126-130
Receives CTF 77' s dispatch instructions 126
Likely learns of ANGLER and GUTTARRO contacts 126
Advises CTF 73 that two carriers would arrive Morotai 126
TCAP patrols without encountering enemy opposition 127
Large enemy air strike develops 127
Air battle joined 127
Allied damage stated 127
Discussion of air attack 128
CHENANGO and SAGINAW BAY complete preparations for
departure 128
Second major air attack against Leyte Gulf 128
Discussion thereon 128
Learns of attacks on Main Body and THLRD Section 128
Evidently ordered by CTF 77 to reinstitute sweeps
against western Visayan airfields 128-129
Evaluates pilot's claims concerning attack on Bacolod 129
Advises CTF 77 of departure of carriers 129
Several enemy planes shot down 129
Type of aircraft missions discussed 129
Assessment of claims discussed 129-130
(5) Operations of CTG 70.1 130-136
Part of basic instructions to MTB's quoted 130
Observes air attack had developed in force 130
Confers with CTF 77's Operations Officer 130
Discussion of conference 131
Studies situation with staff 131
Receives order directing him to station MTB's 131
Completes plan 132
Issues plan 132
Plan quoted 132
Discussion thereon 132-133
Commanding Officer WACHAPREAGUE receives plan and
informs responsible MrB officers 133
Notes that MTE's start south 134
Receives two dispatches assigning areas and tasks 134
WACHAPREAGUE MTB's get underway 134
XVll
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Motor torpedo boats assigned stations 135
Receives CTF 77' s dispatch directing him to prevent
enemy forces passing undetected through strait
between Dinagat and Mindanao 136
(6) Operations of CTG 78.3 and CTU 78.3.5 136
Deploys units to patrol mouth of Sogod Bay 136
(b) Operations of CTF 71 137-149
Receives BEriGALL's request for patrol extension 137
Studies running estimate 137
Sends summary dispatch to submarines 138
Receives GUITARRO's contact report 138
Directs BLACKFIN to cover western approaches Balabac Strait 138
Discussion thereon 138
Advises of contacts reported by GUITARRO and BREAM 138
Receives ANGLER'S amplifying report 138
Learns DARTER aground and DACE proceeding to assist 138
Receives GUITARRO's contact on same force as ANGLER 139
Learns DACE had rescued DARTER' s p2rsonnel and boat
demolished 139
Learns efforts to demolish DARTER were unsuccessful 139
Learns COMTHIRDFLT requested assistance from TF 71 139
Directs PADDLE return to Fremantle 139
May have learned of enemy force south of Mindoro 139
Estimates situation on DACE's request for assistance 139
Orders ROCK proceed assist DACE 139-140
Discussion thereon 140
Likely learns of enemy force in Sulu Sea 140
Studies deployment of submarines 140
Cancels BLACKFIN 's orders and directs patrol north of
Palawan 140
Decision correct 141
Informs CTF 77 of DARTER' s grounding 141
Directs BSRGALL cover western aopro?.ches Balabac Strait 141
Sends summary submarine activities to COMTHIRDFLT 141
Discussion thereon 141
Assigns COBIA lifeguard duties 141
Concerns himself with providing intelligence of enemy
activities along west coast of Luzon 142
Directs- COD continue patrol area A-2 142
(1) BREAM and GUITARRO 142-143
BREAM recovers six Japanese soldiers 142
Receives orders patrol area A-3 142
GUITARRO reports force consisting of fifteen to twenty
ships including three probable battle shiDs 142
Later advises that force consisting three battleships
and two possible carriers headed south 142
Report incorrect and had adverse effect planning 142
GUITARRO reports one light and one heavy cruiser 143
(2) ROCK and BERGALL 143
ROCK patrolling eastern half line between Cape Varella
and North Danger Shoal 143
BERGALL returning to station after sweep south of
Saigon 143
BERGALL requests five days extension patrol 143
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CONFIDENTIAL
BERGALL receives orders patrol western approaches
Balabac Strait 143
ROCK receives orders proceed Bombay Shoal to attempt
destruction of DARTER 143
(3) ANGLER 144
ANGLER after amplifying report on Main Body decides
to patrol entrance West Apo Passage 1 Vi
Discussion thereon 144
CTF 71 directs him patrol south Lubang Island to
cover southwest approaches Verde Island Passage 144
(4) DACE and DARTER 144-147
Resume* of action prior to this time 144
DARTER and DACE close TAKAO 144-145
DARTER grounds on Bombay Shoal 145
Discussion thereon 145
DARTER'S crew transfer to DACE and unsuccessful
attempts made demolish DARTER 145
DACE closes DARTER rather than destroying TAKAO 145
Discussion thereon 146
DACE reports DARTER aground 146
DACE attempts torpedo DARTER 146
Sends erroneous dispatch that DARTER crew rescued
and submarine destroyed 146
DACE attempts demolish DARTER using gunfire 146
Sends corrected report, requests assistance 147
DACE clears area 147
Japanese destroyer NAGANAMI unsuccessfully attempts
demolish DARTER 147
(5) GURNARD 147-148
En route new station makes contact and investigates 147
Discussion thereon 147
Determines contact to be battleship 148
Reports (a) contact, (b) torpedoes remaining and (c)
special mission not accomplished 148
Discussion thereon 148
Contact small target, GURNARD head for Brunei 148
(6) COBIA 148
Passing through Sulu Sea 148
Receives orders for lifeguard duty 148
(7) BLACKFIN 148
Northeast of Dangerous Ground proceeding area D-6 148
Receives orders patrol area A-5 north of Palawan
Passage 148
(8) PADDLE 149
Patrolling Cape Mangkalihat to North Watcher Island 149
Receives orders return to Fremantle 149
(2) Operations of CAAF SOWESPAC 150-159
Inspects Tacloban airstrip 150
(a) Operations of C.G. FIFTH Air Force 150-151
Gives additional search instructions to CTF 73 150
Aware of principal contact reports 150-151
Informed that extended searches would require more aircraft 151
Recommends Search Plan FOX be modified 151
xLx
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CONFIDENTIAL
Plans to strike enemy force in Sulu Sea
(b) Operations of CTF 73
CURRITUCK en route Mios Woendi
Receives instructions concerning searches
Recommends modifications
(1) Operations of CTG 73.4
Receives inaccurate report on enemy force under attack
Discussion thereon
Another plane sights THIRD Section
Plane makes report
Receives contact report on Main Body
Receives contact report on SECOND Striking Force
Another plane reports THIRD Section
(2) Operations of CTG 73.7
Continues to supervise operations
HALF MOON preparing planes for flight
Discussion thereon
SAN CARLOS gets underway
Issues orders for afternoon searches
Sends instructions to HALF MOON for night search
Two enemy bombers attack HALF MOON
Fueling PBY's stops and gasoline lines flooded with
salt water to minimize fire hazard
Planes of VPB 34 were refueled with salt water
Discussion thereon
Receives orders regarding searches
Transmits implementing order
SAN CARLOS anchors San Pedro Bay
Concerned with location of HALF MOON
Issues orders HALF MOON get underway
Discussion thereon
CTF 77 advises VF would cover take-off PBY's
HALF MOON informs CTG 73.7 that three planes would
be ready
Discussion thereon
CTG 73.7 directs HALF MOON remain with planes and
cancels morning search
Two planes search Surigao Strait, the Mindanao and
Sulu Seas
Discussion thereon
"TARE" mission apparently modified
Discussion thereon
(B) Operations of CINCPAC-CINCPOA
Sends his intelligence summary
Receives numerous contact reports
(l) Operations of Western Pacific Task Forces
(a) Operations of COMTHIRDFLT
Makes many decisions
Steaming toward San Bernardino Strait
Receives CTG 38.2' s plan for day's operations
Receives intelligence summary
Receives CTG 38.4' s plan for 0600 search
Intercepts BREAM' s report on CRUDIV SIXTEEN
151
151-152
151
151
152
152-154
152
152-153
153
153
153
153-154
154
154-159
154
154
154-155
155
155
155
155
155
155
155
156
156
156
156
156
156
157
157
157
157
157-158
158
158
158-159
160-207
160
160
160-192
160-192
160
160
160
160
161
161
CONFIDENriAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Receives CTF 71' s relay of ANGLER' s report 161
Receives GUITARRO»s first report 161
Learns CTG 77.4 ordered take defensive measures 161
Receives GUITARRO's second report 161
Carrier groups in launching positions 162
Groups launch reinforced searches 162
Receives CINCPOA's intelligence summary 162
Intercepts CABOT 's plane report of major force 162
Intercepts INTREPID message clarifying sightings 162
Discussion of evaluation 162-163
Advises CTG's 38.3 and 38.4 of sighting 163
Discussion of situation not developing along predicted
lines 163
Events of which not yet aware 164
Issues orders TG's 38.3 and 38.4 concentrate toward
TG 38.2 at best speed 164
Directs CTF 38 and CTG 38.3 to attack 164
TG 38.2 advises forty-five plane strike ready 164
Points out CTF 77 seaplane coverage sea area to north-
eastward vital 164
Orders CTG 38.2 strike enemy I64
Decision recall TG 38.1 considered sound 165
Orders CTF 38 keep area to north under observation 165
Notes CTG 38.2 launching air strike 165
Alerts COMBATDIV SEVEN possibility of surface action 165
Learns of enemy force of twenty-five ships and that TG
38.3 launching attack 165
Learns of contact on THIRD Section 165
Does nothing about this dispatch 165
Receives report TG 38.4 attacked three destroyers 166
Notes CTG 38.2 launching second air attack 166
Learns that PRINCETON hit by bomb 166
CTF 38 informs him of position and intentions 166
Learns that enemy planes attacked shipping in Leyte Gulf 167
Learns of enemy convoy southeast Mount Dumali 167
Informs theater commanders of operations 167
Learns CTG 38.1, with BOSTON, would arrive Point MICK 0700 168
Receives summary report from CTG 38.2 168
Learns CTG 38.4' s intentions 168
Queries CTG's 38.3 and 38.4 whether attacking enemy and
requesting results 168
Receives CTF 38 's summary 168
Receives results of strike on Main Body 168
Receives report of THIRD Section 168
Intercepts contact on THIRD Section 169
Directs CTG 38.2 arrange night search plane shadow enemy 169
Receives CTF 77 's directive prepare for night battle 169
Receives report from CTG 38.2 on results of second strike 169
Learns CTF 77 surmised probable enemy landing force in
convoy
Formulates surface action plan 169-170
Discussion thereon 170
Learns three groups enemy planes approaching Leyte 170
xxL CONFIDENTIAL
169
CONFIDENTIAL
Issues new orders to CTG 38.4 170
Receives CTF 38 fs strike report, also summary operations
of TG 38.3 170
Receives report on THIRD Section 170-171
Receives summary from CTF 38 171
Learns search plane contact on SECOND Striking Force 171
Intercepts reports on Main Force 171
Reports of vital significance 171
Issues orders to CTG 38.4 171-172
Learns ENTERPRISE plane contacted Main Force at 1715 172
Receives summary report from CTF 38 172
Learns results of TG 38.4 's strikes 172
Receives report from CTG 38.2 of third strike 172
Directs CTG 33.4 to proceed westward 172
Receives CTG 38.4' s report of strike against Main Body 173
Re-estimates situation 173
Unknown to him Main Body changes course eastward 173
Remains off San Bernardino Strait 173
(1) Operations of CTF 38 174-178
Receives much the same reports as COMTHIRDFLT and
CTF 77 174
Invites CTG 38. V s attention to GUITARRO's report 174
Concerned over air attacks in strength 174
First major air attack detected 174
Learns plane sighted Main Body 174
Observes PRINCETON burst into flames 174
Advises COMTHIRDFLT of PRINCETON'S situation 175
Notes PRINCETON rocked by explosions 175
Decides CTG 38.3 remain in general vicinity 175
Informs interested commanders of actions 175
Receives orders keep area to north under observation 175
Receives orders strike force south Mindoro 175
Sends summary to COMTHIRDFLT 175
Enemy raids fail to hit ships 176
Intercepts CTF 77' s order prepare for night battle 176
Sends latest situation summary 176
Learns large explosion aboard PRINCETON had blown her
stern off causing many casualties in BIRMINGHAM 176
Begins receiving messages from northern search planes
on Main Force 176
Recommends PRINCETON be sunk 176
Orders CTG 38.3 be prepared for surface action 177
Receives COMTHIRDFLT « s battle plan 177
Prepares to launch strike against enemy force 177
Orders CTG 38.3 join COMTHIRDFLT 177
Receives COMTHIRDFLT' s dispatch to use discretion
regarding PRINCETON 177
Aware of situation 177
Feels situation had changed significantly and advises
COMTHIRDFLT 178
(a) Operations of CTG 38.1 173-179
Likely receives same information as COMTHIRDFLT 178
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Detaches FARENHOLT, GRAYSON, MC CALLA and
WOODWORTH to CTG 30.3 178
BOSTON, BURNS, CHARRETTE, COWELL, BELL and BOYD
join 178
Receives orders from COMTHIRDFLT 178
Learns of discovery of Main Body, THIRD Section
also COMTHIRDFLT 's request for seaplane coverage 179
Understands developing situation 179
(b) Operations of CTG 38.2 179-183
Learns of GUITARRO and ANGLER contacts 179
Launches westward search from INTREPID 179
INTREPID search planes sight and report Main Body 180
Receives COMTHIRDFLT ' s orders to relay contact to
CTF 38 180
Launches first strike against Main Body 180
Reports strike results to COMTHIRDFLT 180
Japanese records list limited damage 180
Three VT shot down 180
Advises COMTHIRDFLT that he was launching second
strike 181
Results of strike 181
Learns of various events 181
Reports search coast of Palawan negative 181
Results of third strike 181
Reports results of second strike 182
Receives COMTHIRDFLT' s orders to CTG 38.4 182
Advises COMTHIRDFLT of contact on Main Force 182
Reports results of last strike 182
Operating off San Bernardino Strait 183
(c) Operations of CTG 38.3 183-188
Makes contact on enemy plane 183
Makes contact on second plane 183
Both planes shot down by VF(N) 183
CTF 38 informs him "much enemy activity suggests
heavy air attack" 183
Launches initial air operations 183
Notes about to be attacked by two large groups 183-184
Events occur in relatively rapid succession 184
Learns ESSEX VF had requested help 184
PRINCETON hit by bomb 184
Orders two cruisers and four destroyers standby
PRINCETON 184
CTF 38 directs remain in the vicinity 184
Launches strike against force in Siguyan Sea 185
CTF 38 directs him to search each sector between
350o(T) and 040o(T) 185
Directs that search to the north and second strike
against force in Sibuyan Sea be launched at 1305 185
Cancels search, launches CAP and Strike Group TWO 185
Description and results of Strike Group ONE 185
CAP vectored out to intercept 186
Requests permission, which was approved, to launch
search originally scheduled but without fighter
escort 186
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CAP successful in breaking up both enemy attacks 186
Strike Group TWO attacks Main Body 186
Explosion aboard PRINCETON causes many topside
casualties aboard BIRMINGHAM 186
RENO reports situation to CTG 38.3 186
Begins receiving messages from search planes which
sighted Main Force 187
Directs RENO to sink PRINCETON 187
Considerable confusion exists as to what enemy
forces had been sighted 187
Receives word to detail his battleship, cruisers
and a squadron of destroyers to attack and sink
enemy 187
RENO torpedoes and sinks PRINCETON 187
Lands his last strike and learns that contacts to
north were greater than reported 187
Records 167 enemy aircraft destroyed during day
with ten Allied losses 188
(d) Operations of CTG 38,4 138-191
Receives much same information as other commanders
during morning 188
Emphasis placed on description and results of
attacks made by aircraft of Japanese surface
forces 188
Launches reinforced search to cover sector between
230° (T) and 270° (T) 133
FRANKLIN aircraft attack three enemy destroyers 188
ENTERPRISE planes locate and attack THIRD Section 188-139
Japanese comments on battle damage 139
Launches second strike against enemy destroyers 189
Receives COMTHIRDFLT's orders to concentrate 139-190
Informs COMTHIRDFLT of position and operations 190
Advises COMTHIRDFLT that attacked THIRD Section
and was now closing 190
Launches strike and results thereof 190
Battle damage not listed 190
Receives instructions during afternoon 191
Enemy air activity over force very light 191
(2) Operations of CTG 30.5 191-192
Continues air searches 191
Likely receives the various contact reports 191
Probably hears report of large merchant ship and three
destroyers 191
Likely learns of actions decided upon 192
Subordinate commanders had not reported day1 s searches 192
(2) Operations of CTF 17 192-207
Learns of ANGLER and GUITARRO contacts 192
Learns of BREAM contact 192
His evaluation of above contacts not known 192
Receives GUITARRO1 s second report on Main Body 193
Issues two submarine position reports 193
Receives COMTHIRDFLT's dispatch reporting large enemy force
south of Mindoro 193
XXLV
CONFIDENTIAL
ONFIDENTIAL
Learns COMTHIRDFLT had not located enemy carriers 193
Unknown whether or not considered disposing two wolf packs
along Latitude 20°-00'N as scouting line 193
Discussion of concept of situation 194
Awaits additional news of movements of enemy forces and
Allied reaction 194
Likely learns of enemy force in Sulu Sea and that CTF 77 was
preparing for night action 194
Not included as action addressee on COMTHIRDFLT 's battle plan
dispatch 194
Extends ICEFISH «s patrol and orders her to join PINTADO wolf
pack 194
Is aware that friendly forces were being disposed to counter
enemy movements 194
Studies his running estimate 194
Informs CONVOY COLLEGE submarines of situation 195
Not informed of air strikes against Main Body or THIRD Section 195
(a) CONVOY COLLEGE 195-202
(1) SAWFISH, ICEFISH, DRUM 195-197
Patrolling area DELETE 195
(a) SAWFISH trailing convoy and coaching other
submarines into contact 195
SAWFISH clears area 195
Wolf pack commander requests submarines to inform
him of results 195
ICEFISH and DRUM inform wolf pack commander of
attacks 196
SAWFISH informs CTF 17 of results of attacks 196
Directs CONVOY COLLEGE submarines to be alert for
northbound cripples 196
Wolf pack dissolved, ICEFISH and DRUM operate
independently 196
Discussion thereon 196
(b) ICEFISH attacks 196-197
Credited with sinking TENSHIN MARU 197
Receives orders from wolf pack commander to patrol
at discretion in vicinity Cape Bojeador 197
(c) DRUM attacks unsuccessfully but later scores hit
in second convoy 197
Receives orders to patrol at discretion 197
(2) SHARK, BLACKFISH, SEADRAGON 198-200
Wolf pack not on station 198
Wolf pack commander shows lack of interest in SAWFISH'S
contact 198
SHARK sinks during day 198
(a) Wolf pack commander changes mind and orders pack
to patrol along Latitude 20°-30»N 198
SNOOK advises him that convoy now consists of three
ships 198
Directs his units to attack 198
Where and how SHARK sinks is not known 198
(b) BLACKFISH receives orders from SHARK to proceed
south and patrol along Latitude 20°-30fN to cover
northbound convoy 198
XXV
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Overhears many conversations on wolf pack
frequency from another wolf pack 199
Proceeds eastward to new patrol station 199
Assumes command of reduced wolf pack 199
(c) SEADRAGON follows activity in vicinity 199
Attacks convoy of three freighters 199
Sinks freighter 199
Credited with sinking DAITEN MARU, KOKURYU MARU
and EIKO MARU - 200
(3) SNOOK 200
Contacts and attacks convoy 200
Makes second attack on convoy 200
Gives position of convoy and reports three ships
remaining 200
Makes third attack on convoy 200
Sinks SHINSEI MARU, KIKUSUI MARU and ARISAN MARU 200
Unable contact wolf pack commander but reports to
CTF 17 200
Convoy attacked was HARUKAZE convoy of twelve ships 201
SHARK may have sunk one ship of convoy 201
(4) HADDOCK, HALIBUT, TUNA 201
Coordinated attack group en route patrol station 201
(5) PINTADO, ATULE, JALLAO 201-202
Wolf pack en route patrol station 201
ATULE and JALLAO both report submarine contacts 202
(6) BONEFISH 202
En route Saipan 202
No longer participating in KING II operations 202
(b) Northwest Coast of Formosa 202-203
TANG contacts convoy 202
TANG sunk by own tomedo 202
TANG credited with sinking KOGEN MARU and MATSUMOTO MARU 203
Some of TANG's crew survive 203
(c) Northeast Coast of Formosa 203
SILVERSIDES, TRIGGER and SALMON patrolling area 203
(d) MARU MORGUE 204
Submarines SEA DOG, BILLFISH, SAURY, BURRFISH and STERLET
patrolling Nansei Shoto 204
BURRFISH sights convoy and tracks 204
(e) Nagasaki - Sasebo 204-205
CROAKER and PERCH operate independently 204
(1) CROAKER makes radar contact 204
CROAKER attacks sinking MIKAGS MARU 204
Proceeds toward lifeguard station 204
Discussion of wolf pack operating in unusually loose
fashion 204-205
(2) PERCH makes contact on a convey of six ships 205
Convoy escapes 205
Discussion of range of communication equipment 205
(f) HIT PARADE 205-207
(1) Approaches to Bungo Suido 205-206
BESUGO attacks convoy and sinks CD 132 205-206
RONQUIL makes contact on convoy 206
RONQUIL makes unsuccessful attack 206
XXVI
CONFIDE ;::ai
CONFIDENTIAL
Wolf pack commander directs RONQUIL and BESUGO to
shift patrol areas
(2) Approaches to Kii Suido
GABILAN patrols uneventfully
(3) Approaches to Tokyo
GREENLING and TAMBQR patrol uneventfully
(C) China-Burma- India Theater
(1) Operations of C.G. FOURTEENTH Air Force
Search of South China Sea negative
Night searches not flown
CHAPTER V - MEANS AVAILABLE AND OPPOSED, OCTOBER 24th - 25th
(A) Forces engaged
(1) Allied Forces
(a) Battle Line
(b) Left Flank Force
(c) Right Flank Force
(d) DSSRON FIFTY-FOUR
(e) Motor Torpedo Boats
(f) Total
(2) Japanese Forces
(a) THIRD Section, FIRST Striking Force
(b) SECOND Striking Force
(c) Total
(B) Armament
(1) Allied Forces
(a) TG 77.2
(b) TG 77.3
(c) DESRON FIFTY-FOUR
(d) Grand Total
(2) Japanese Forces
(a) THIRD Section
(b) SECOND Striking Force
(c) Grand Total
(C) Ammunition and Torpedoes on board 0000, October 25th
(1) Allied
(a) Battleships (16-inch)
(b) Battleships (14-inch)
(c) Average projectiles per gun (Battleships)
(d) Cruisers Heavy (6-inch)
(e) Cruisers Light (6-inch)
(f) Average projectiles per gun (Cruisers)
(2) Japanese allowance of Ammunition and Torpedoes
(a) THIRD Section
(1) Battleships
(2) Heavy Cruiser
(3) Destroyers
(b) SECOND Striking Force
(1) Heavy Cruisers
(2) Light Cruisers
(3) Destroyers
206
206
206
207
207
207
207
207
207
208-217
208-209
208
208
208
208
208
208
208
208-209
208
208
209
209-211
209
209
209-210
210
210
210-211
210
211
211
211-215
211-213
211
212
212
212-213
213
213
2L4-215
214
2L4
214
214
215
215
215
215
XXVll
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(D) Strength and Weakness Factors
Allied Force
Strength Factors
Weakness Factors
Japanese Forces
Strength Factors
Weakness Factors
CHAPTER VI - JAPANESE OPERATIONS. 1830 - 2400. October py.t.h
(A) Operations of Commander THIHD Section
Directs Commander FIRST Division to move out in front of SECOND
Division
Decision to separate his forces discussed
Learns Commander Kain Body retired temporarily
His decision to continue on considered correct
Receives CinC Combined Fleet's dispatch directing "All forces to
the attack, trusting in divine aid"
Analyzes his situation
Realizes best chance for success to adhere original schedule
Modifies basic orders
Likely considers possibility of night action
His decision to change objective area correct
Informs superiors
Knows CinC Combined Fleet was alert to situation
Receives coordinating instructions
These orders changed original plan
Realizes modification of designated reassembly ooint would likely
be necessary
Realizes that THIRD Section was required as replacements
Views new instructions with concern
New orders approved decision to continue as scheduled
Learns SECOND Striking Force would be two hours behind
After encountering enemy torpedo boats queries Commander FIRST
Division as to enemy and receives reply no enemy shiDs sighted
Discussion of importance of this dispatch
Discussion of expectations of Allied forces
Receives two dispatches reporting contacts and attacks on Allied
carrier groups
(1) Operations of Commander FIRST Division
Proceeds ahead of SECOND Division
Assigns stations to his ships
Reaches assigned station and slows to fleet speed
Passes undetected by Allied motor torpedo boats
Aware that SECOND Division had encountered and fired on enemy
torpedo boats
In answer to query from Commander THIRD Section he replies
"No enemy ships sighted"
Unknown to him, ships were detected by radar
Again reports enemy not sighted
(2) Operations of Commander SECOND Division
Directs SECOND Division change course which increases distance
between FIRST and SECOND Divisions
No unusual occurrance for some hours
216-217
216
216
216
217
217
217
213-235
213-230
218
213-219
219
219
219
219-220
220
220
221
221
222
222
222
223
223
223
223
223
224
224
224
224-225
225
226-227
226
226
226
226
227
227
227
227
223-230
228
228
XXVXll
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
SHIGURE reports sighting three MTB's
SHIGURE opens fire forcing MTB's to turn away
SHIGURE hits PT 152
Breaks off engagement and returns to base course
Believes that MTB's were maintaining contact
(B) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force
Retains force in alert cruising disposition and continues
zigzagging
Learned previously of composition of enemy forces
Transmits information to SECOND Striking Force
Fails to include all intelligence
Learns operations to continue and awaits action by Commanders
FIRST Striking Force and THIRD Section
Enters Mindanao Sea
Notes that DESDIV TWENTY-ONE had not rendezvoused
Learns that Japanese planes had damaged carrier
Learns Commander THIRD Section expected to penetrate off Dulag at
0400 October 25th and re-estimates situation
Receives Commander FIRST Striking Force's dispatch on plans for
the operation
Plans appear to have surprised him
Re-estimates situation but makes no change in plans
Discussion on fuel consumption rates
Advises Commander THIRD Section and DESDIV TWENTY-ONE of plans
Unaware COMDESDIV TWENTY-ONE returning Manila
Sights starshells fired by SECOND Division
Orders No. 4 Approach Formation
Directs his command be ready to make twenty-eight knots immediately
and maximum battle speed on fifteen minutes notice
Continues on without incident
228
229
229
229
230
230-235
230
230
231
231
231
231
231
231-232
232
232
232-233
233
233
234
234
234
234
235
235
CHAPTER VII - ALLIED OPERATIONS, 1830 - 2400, October 24th
236-257
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2 (OTC) 236-245
His units proceed to battle disposition stations 236
Desires form battle disposition before complete darkness as units
had not operated together before 236
Two air alerts occur 236
Wonders why the five destroyers of TG 79.11 were not assigned to
him for duty 236
Receives request from CTG 79.11 to make torpedo attack 236
Queries CTG 79.11 whether screen is same as on previous night 237
Faces problem of what do with TG 79.11 237
Battle line reaches its initial point and turns east 237
Approves CTG 79.11' s request 237
Discussion thereon 237-238
Informed by CTG 79.11 of his battle plan 238
Approves plan but issues additional instructions 238
Discussion thereon 238-239
Receives CTG 79.11* s attack plan 239
Battle disposition now formed 239
Informs CTG 79.11 no units of TG 77.2, except perhaps some MTB's,
would operate south of patrol line 239
496799 0-59
XXLX
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Discussion thereon 239
Directs left flank force form Battle Disposition A-l while ri?ht
flank cruisers in line of bearing 239-240
Reasons for not employing antisubmarine screens 240
Studies situation constantly 240
Directs CTG 79.11 and COKDZSRON FIFTY-SIX establish post-attack
rendezvous 240
Receives above information 240
Approves rendezvous points 240
Sets condition ONE EASY for all ships 241
Unaware MT3's had made contact with Japanese surface forces 241
(1) Operations of Commander Battle Line 241-242
Proceeds to initial station 241
Directs DE3DIV XRAY screen van and rear of battle line 241
Changes course to 090°(T) speed five knots 242
Discussion concerning positioning antisubmarine screen ?7t?
Reverses course to west P;t?
Notes currents and speed affect station keeping ?A?
Reverses course to east 242
(2) Operations of Commander Left Flank Force 242-244
Proceeds toward initial station 242
Changes course to 090°(T) reduces speed to five knots 243
Issues station instructions for Left Flank Force 243
Cruisers and destroyers take assigned stations 243
Composition of attack sections 243
Discussion deployment 243-244
Changes course to 000°(T) 244
Receives surface contact report from COLUMBIA evaluated as
land 244
Changes course to 270° (T) 244
In approximate station on MISSISSIPPI 244
(3) Operations of Commander Right Flank Force 244-245
Proceeds to assigned station 244
Arrives on station, changes course to 090°(T), reduces speed
to five knots 244
Right Flank destroyers endeavor follow movements of OTC 244
In general follows movements of battle line 244-245
Orders destroyers maneuver as necessary, avoid shore 245
Changes course to 290°(T) 245
Intercepts CTG 77.2' s message to COKDESRON FIFTY-SIX and CTG
79.11 directing them establish post-attack rendezvous 245
Changes course to 090° (T) in order maintain station 245
(B) Operations of CTG 79.11 246-250
Continues patrolling Antisubmarine Stations ONE to SEVEN 246
Determines request authority make torpedo attack 246
Plans employing five destroyers in two-group attack 246
Feels justified request permission make an attack 247
Discussion thereon 247
Chooses new task meet demands of new situation 247
Decides not communicate with immediate superior in view of
communication delay 247
Decides request approval planned attack from immediate superior
in area 247
XXX
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CONFIDENTIAL
Advises CTG 77.2 of his intentions 247
Receives query from CTG 77.2 whether screen is same as on previous
night, answers affirmatively 248
Receives authorization to attack 248
Advises CTG 77.2 plans attack with two groups 248
Receives approval from CTG 77.2 248
Estimates enemy intentions 248
Issues attack plan 248
Discussion thereon 249
Receives CTG 77.2 's battle plan 249
Realizes interference likely with destroyers in Station SEVEN 249
Queries CTG 77.2 whether part of TG 77.2 to operate south of
patrol line 249
Receives negative reply with exceptions 249
Radar tracks unidentified planes during evening 250
Receives directive establish post-attack rendezvous points 250
Designates post-attack rendezvous points 250
Directs contact reports by made by TBS voice radio 250
(C) Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats 250-257
(1) Bohol and Camiguin PT's 250-254
En route stations 250
Discussion intership communications (PT common) 251
(a) Bohol PT's 251-253
Makes radar contact on unidentified plane 251
Discussion of patrol plan 251
Contact Japanese force but unable to report 251-252
Taken under fire, PT's 130, 152 hit 252
Retire. PT's 130, 131 head for Camiguin PT's to relay
contact report 252
Discussion thereon 252
Sights Camiguin PT's 253
(b) Camiguin PT's 253-254
Discussion patrol inadequacy 253
Fails to contact FIRST Division 253
Discussion thereon 253-254
Sights starshells and gunf lashes to northeast 254
(2) Limasawa PT's 254-256
Maintairs station until visibility becomes poor 254
Sights searchlight, flares, hears gunfire to southwest 255
Endeavors unsuccessfully communicate with base 255
Makes radar contact on FIRST Division (PT 151) 255
Proceeds toward target, makes visual contact at two miles 255
Efforts report above contact unsuccessful 255
Approaches to deliver torpedo attack 256
(3) SW Panaon PT's 256
Fails detect Japanese FIRST Division 256
(4) SE Panaon PT's 256-257
Contacts unidentified aircraft 256
Fails transmit contact report 257
(5) Other PT's 257
Uneventful 257
xxxi
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CHAPTER VIII - JAPANESE OPERATIONS, 0000 - 0100, October 25th 258-269
(A) Operations of Commander THIRD Section 253-268
Situation appears developing satisfactorily 258
Realizes FIRST Division behind schedule 258
Furnishes information facilitate rejoining of FIRST Division 258
Begins receiving contact reports 259
FIRST and SECOND Divisions mistake each other for enemy 259
Reduced visibility reduces station keeping distance 259
FIRST Division rejoins 260
(1) Operations of Commander FIRST Division 260-266
Changes time of rendezvous with SECOND Division 260
Advises Commander THIRD Section "penetrating from now1' 260
Fails detect MTB's 260
Learns Commander THIRD Section's intentions 26l
YAMAGUMO sights three enemy MTB's 261
MOGAMI employs searchlight unsuccessfully 261
Discussion Japanese and American illumination doctrine 261-262
Employment searchlights considered correct 262
Forms column astern MOGAMI 262
Discussion thereon 263
Destroyers open fire on MTB's 263
Advises Commander THIRD Section ship silhouette, apparently
enemy, sighted 263
Takes evasive action 264
SHIGURE sights enemy destroyer 26/*
Realizes command in unfavorable position 264
Recognizes ship as friendly 264-265
Makes preparations rejoin Commander THIRD Section 265
FIRST Division rejoins 266
(2) Operations of Commander SECOND Division 266-268
Estimates FIRST Division forty-five minutes behind schedule 266
Commander FIRST Division reports enemy contacts as SHIGURE
reports contacting enemy destroyer 266
YAMAGUMO and SHIGURE endeavor ascertain character their
targets 267
Knows Commander FIRST Division breaking off penetration and
rejoining SECOND Division 267
Learns contacts other than MTB's friendly 267
Changes course facilitate rejoining of FIRST Division 267
Knows enemy torpedo boats are ahead Main Body 267
Japanese radar very poor 268
FIRST Division rejoins, forming THIRD Section 268
(B) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force 269
Proceeds in No. 4 Approach Formation 269
Makes preparations for sudden gun and torpedo action 269
Passes Allied motor torpedo boat patrol line undetected 269
Learns Commander THIRD Section advancing as scheduled 269
Re-estimates situation 269
xxxii
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CHAPTER IX - ALLIED OPERATIONS, OOOQ - 0100, October 25th 270-280
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2 (OTC) 270-273
Weather conditions in Surigao Strait 270
Receives first contact report 270
Receives MC GOWAN's contact report 271
Receives another contact report 271
Discussion as to origin this latter report 271
Estimates probability more enemy forces present than those detected 271
Learns MC GOWAN's contact believed to be friendly 272
(1) Operations of Commander Battle Line 272
Steaming east at five knots 272
Familiar with developing situation 272
(2) Operations of Commander Left Flank Force 272
Units experience difficulty maintaining formation 272
All ships being kept informed of enemy situation 272
(3) Operations of Commander Right Flank Force (CTG 77.3) 273
Employs medium frequency voice net 273
(B) Operations of CTG 79.11 273-275
Learns eastward movement of enemy forces 274
Learns of PT contact at 2310 274
Repeats contact report to CTG 77.2 and own command 274
Receives two contact reports from MC GOWAN 274
Directs COMDESDIV 108 form western attack group 274
Receives contact report on two targets bearing 310° (T) distant ten
miles from Camiguin Island 274
Directs COMDESDIV 108 return destroyers to patrol stations 274
Learns MONSSEN speed restricted 274
(C) Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats 275-278
(1) Bohol and Camiguin PT's 275
PT 130 successfully transmits 2310 contact report to base 275
Discussion thereon 275
Discussion PT 152' s attempt close enemy 275
(2) Limasawa PT's 276-277
Closes enemy to launch torpedoes 276
Attack unsuccessful, driven off 276
Discussion thereon 276
MTB's unable complete successfully a contact report 277
(3) SW Panaon PT's 277
Fail sight Japanese ships nearby 277
(4) Other Motor Torpedo Boats 278
PT 134 sights flares or starshells 278
CHAPTER X - JAPANESE OPERATIONS, 0100 - 0245, October 25th
281-292
(A) Operations of Commander THIRD Section 281-288
Decides radio silence no longer necessary 281-
Advises Commanders FIRST and SECOND Striking Forces plan pass
southern entrance Surigao Strait at 0130 281
Discussion thereon 281-282
Expedites forming No. TWO Approach Disposition 282
Advises his ships of planned 0129 position 282
Visibility poor, alerts destroyers be prepared for torpedo action
on short notice 282
XXXlll
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(B)
Requests COMDESDIV FOUR report position 283
Changes course, discussion thereon 233
Learns NACHI had entered radio telephone net 233
Loams YAMAGUMO had sighted a MTB 283
Takes no action 283
Orders approach formation formed 284
Receives Commander SECOND Striking Force's schedule of penetration
and plan of attack 234
Concludes he is to enter Leyte Gulf alone 284
Advises his units by dispatch SECOND Striking Force will Denetrate
at 0300 284
Discussion lack of employment voice radio 28$
Increases speed to maintain new schedule 235
MICHISHIO reports sighting ship silhouette 235
Takes no action but awaits amplification 235
Contacts two groups of MTB's 285
Takes evasive action 286
Evades torpedoes within his formation 286
Takes evasive action avoid torpedoes fired by third group 236
Discussion thereon 236
Discussion ability detect MTB's 287
Discussion concerning opposition to be encountered 237
Advises Commander SECOND Striking Force he had passed undamaged
lower entrance Surigao Strait although attacked by Allied MTB's 283
Discussion of high cooperation indicated by above 238
Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force 239-290
Gives penetration plan by dispatch 289
Discussion thereon 239
Passes Allied MTB patrol line 290
Evaluates ABUKUMA's contact report as false 290
Receives Commander THIRD Section's report of situation 290
Informs that commander his flagship entering R/T net 290
Issues orders prepare for action 290
Learns of attack on THIRD Section by MTB's 290
Ceases zigzagging and increases speed 290
CHAPTER XI - ALLIED OPERATIONS, 0100 - 0245, October 25th 293-320
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2 293-301
Weather remains relatively clear but dark 293
Variable southerly currents make station keeping difficult 293
Receives contact reports from MTB 293
Discussion extensive evaluation required make intelligent estimate
of enemy 293
Receives erroneous contact report 293
Discussion thereon 293-294
Observes CTG 79.11,s attack preparations 294
Receives contact reports from PT 134 294
Situation begins develop rapidly 294
Receives report two large ships coming up strait 294
Requests CTG 79.11 query MTB's concerning other targets 294
Discussion of failure of MTB's and communication system keep OTC
informed 294-295
XXXLV
:;:,fi:znt:ai
CONFIDENTIAL
Receives report PT 134 has 3truck a neavy object 295
Decides put no torpedo firing limitations on destroyers 295
Knows ships of battle line having difficulty keeping station 295
Knows TG 79.11 has commenced attack 295
Orders all ships set condition ONE 295
Reasons therefor 295-296
Receives contact report from MC GOWAN 296
Intercepts Commander Battle Line's order increasing speed battle
line to ten knots 296
Receives LOUISVILLE'S contact report 296
(1) Operations of Commander Battle Line 297
Orders ships to General Quarters 297
Changes course to 270° (T) 297
Receives MC GOWAN' s contact report 297
Increases speed to ten knots 297
(2) Operations of Commander Left Flank Force 297-299
Destroyers having difficulty maintaining formation 297
Discussion reasons left flank cruisers not in correct position 297-298
Learns COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX forms three attack sections into
single column 298
Changes course avoid Hibuson Island and regain correct station
on battle line 298
Changes course to west 299
Sets Condition ONE 299
Receives MC GOWAN' s contact report 299
Makes no effort regain correct station 299
LOUISVILLE makes radar contact on one or more large ships 299
(3) Operations of Commander Right Flank Force 300-301
Cruisers and destroyers continue operate independently of each
other 300
Receives various contact reports 300
Is surprised hear CTG 79.11 about to attack 300
Discussion thereon 300
Receives MC GOWAN 's contact report 301
Changes course and stops in order adjust position 301
COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR changes course and speed in order avoid
interfering with TG 79.11' s attack 301
(B) Operations of CTG 79.11 302-307
Hears MTB contact reports 302
Relays MTB contact report to CTG 77.2 302
Relays second contact report on THIRD Section to CTG 77.2 302
Re- estimates situation 302
Decides enemy plans attack transports 303
Directs MELVIN form astern MC GOWAN 303
Receives two contact reports from PT 134 303
Decides form both attack groups 303
Likely condemns incompleteness of information 303-304
Directs radar contact be reported immediately by TBS voice radio 304
Receives Commander Western Attack Group's torpedo attack plan 304
Discussion thereon 304
Notifies CTG 77.2 "going to start down in a few minutes" 304
Learns two ships coming up strait 305
Forms Eastern Attack Group 305
xxxv CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Learns Commander Western Attack Group "starting down" 305
Plans employ follow-t he-leader tactics 305
Directs ships employ IFF 305
Broadcasts message to MTB's determine whether other targets coming
up channel outside two reported 306
Receives MC GOWAN's contact report 306
Directs Commander Western Attack Group take charge of own group 306
Discussion thereon 306
Commences operation with Western Attack Group behind its proper
station for coordinated attacks 306
Reasons not known 307
Commander Western Attack Group fails maintain continuous contact
on Eastern Attack Group 307
Reason not understandable 307
Resulting situation makes possibility of coordinated attack
unlikely 307
All destroyers of Eastern Attack Group in radar contact with enemy 307
Torpedo attacks both groups well underway 307
(C) Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats 303-320
(1) SW Panaon PT's 308
Fails to make contact when THIRD Section passes nearby 308
Visibility poor and electronic equipment either inoperative or
poorly handled 308
(2) Madilao Point PT's 303
Fail to receive contact reports after 0025 308
Fail to contact THIRD Section 308
Weather conditions poor 303
(3) SE Panaon PT's 309-312
Not surprised when PT 134 makes radar contact on group of
targets 309
Directs PT 134 report this contact 309
Boats become separated owing weather conditions 309
(a) PT 134 309-311
Closes to within two miles of enemy 309
Fails forward all information 310
Information forwarded lost in relay 310
Attacks unsuccessfully firing three torpedoes 310
Estimates other MTB's attacking 310
Retires and reports results 310
Reports having struck heavy underwater object believed to
be submarine 311
(b) PT 137 311
Sights two destroyers (ASAGUMO, YAMAGUMO) 311
Fires one torpedo which missed, retires 311
(c) PT 132 311-312
Detects radar target (YAMAGUMO) and fires four torpedoes,
all miss 311-312
Retires to original station 312
(4) Bilaa Point PT's 312-313
Detects several radar targets but decides not to attack 312
Discussion thereon 312
Sights gunfire "up in Surigao Strait" 313
xxxvi CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
by other MTB's
two CA's, two DD's
(5) Sumilon PT's
Drifting with current
Makes first contact but fails report it
Changes course to intercept
Discussion thereon
Observes enemy being attacked
Observes enemy composition as
Fails make contact report
Discussion concerning primary objective these 14TB 's
Attacks unsuccessfully firing six torpedoes
Reasons for failure close target to favorable firing range
not known
Retires under fire
(6) Lower Surigao PT's
Drifting southward with current
Makes unsuccessful attack firing four torpedoes
PT's 490 and 493 damaged by enemy fire while retiring
(7) Other Motor Torpedo Boats
(a) Discussion confined to MTB's with eventful patrols
(1) Upper Surigao PT's
Reports enemy coming through straits
Makes contact on enemy force
Reports this contact, is directed withdraw
Retires without attacking
Discussion thereon
(2) Kanihaan PT's
Receives contact reports
Sights gun flashes and searchlight glare (THIRD Section
and Lower Surigao PT's)
(3) South Amagusan Point PT's
Drifts south with current
Sights gunfire between THIRD Section and Lower Surigao
PT's
Knows radar equipment two MTB's not functioning
satisfactorily
Obtains radar contact on three targets (THIRD Section)
Makes preparations attack
Clears area so destroyers can attack
(4) East Amagusan Point PT's
PT 323 reports sighting gunfire south in Surigao Strait
(b) Operations of MTB's Mindanao Sea uneventful
313-316
313
313
313
313-314
314
314-315
315
315
316
316
316
316-317
316
316-317
317
317-320
317
317-318
317
318
318
318
318
319
319
319
319-320
319
319
319
319
320
320
320
320
320
CHAPTER XII - JAPANESE OPERATIONS, 0245 - 0320, October 25th 321-329
(A) Operations of Commander THIRD Section 321-329
SHIGURE reports sighting three ship silhouettes apparently enemy
(Eastern Attack Group) 321
Makes several searchlight sweeps 321
Illumination generally ineffectual 321
Discussion Japanese searchlight illumination doctrine 322
Opens fire 322
Still in No. TWO Approach Formation 322
Line of sight obscured by destroyer smoke 323
XXXVLl
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
MOGAMI opens fire 323
Radar ineffective 323
Employs starshells 323
Gunfire ineffective 324
Fails to take evasive action against torpedoes 324
Discussion thereon 3?y,
YAMAGUMO evades torpedo 324
Does not reply to query from Commander SECOND Striking Force 324
FUSO struck by torpedo 325
Discussion concerning failure to report damage 325
Does not know of damage to FUSO 325
Similar occurrence during battle of Jutland 325
Forming battle formation 326
THIRD Section continues to fire as range increases 326
SHIGURE reports sighting two dark objects (MC DERKUT and KONSSEN) 326
THIRD Section checks fire 326
Opens fire on Western Attack Group 326
YAMAGUMO reports torpedo track while almost simultaneously green
tinted parachute flare observed 326-327
Source of flare unknown 327
Takes evasive action avoid possible enemy torpedoes 327
Radical maneuver causes ships to check fire 327
Makes contact report to Commander FLRST Striking Force 327
Returns to base course 327-323
Discussion thereon 323
YAMAGUMO sunk, MICHISHIO, ASAGUMO and YAMASHIRO damaged by enemy
torpedoes 328
Explosion of YAMAGUMO sighted by Allied battle line 328
Only three ships remain to continue battle 329
(B) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force 329
Requests Commander THIRD Section "Notify situation" 329
Changes course too soon 329
USHIO forced to change course to avoid grounding 329
Sights Mt. Nelangcapan (Panaon Island) 329
CHAPTER XIII - ALLIED OPERATIONS, 0245 - 0320, October 25th
330-383
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2
Decides enemy continuing up strait, receives no contact reports
from own units
Discussion thereon
Requests CTG 79.11 report enemy composition
Receives reply enemy consists of two large, three small
Reply confirms 2310 MTB report
Knows Allied torpedo attacks in progress
Observes flares and gunfire to the south
Endeavors estimate enemy's plan
Estimate correct in general concept, incorrect in fact
Changes course to the east
Receives amplifying report from CTG 79.11
Estimates enemy composition as two large ships, three small
Action Report makes no comment concerning movements of TG 79.11
Receives CTG 79.11' s report as two large, one small
330-351
330
330
331
331
331
331
331
331
331-332
332
332
332
332
332
xxxvaii
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Observes searchlights 332
Learns torpedo firing had been completed by TG 79.11 and DESDIV
103 333
Learns CTG 79.11 has observed five targets 333
LOUISVILLE observes one or more Japanese ships slowing down 333
Learns COMDESDIV 108 scored a hit 333
Queries CTG 79.11 as to types of enemy ships 333
Fails note Commander Battle Line still steaming at ten knots 333
(1) Operations of Commander Battle Line 334-336
No radar contacts yet established 334
Watches developing situation 334
MARYLAND contacts a surface target, fails to report 334
Observes gunfire and illumination to the south 334
TENNESSEE and WEST VIRGINIA contact enemy, fail to report 334
Learns Commander Eastern Attack Group has attacked and is
retiring 334
Reverses course 334
Receives contact report - MISSISSIPPI'S on two large ships,
one small 334
Report incorrect as enemy was three large, four small 335
Learns Commander Western Attack Group has fired torpedoes 335
Contacts on enemy by battle line 335
Discussion thereon 335
Receives only MISSISSIPPI and -WEST VIRGINIA reports 335-336
Discussion concerning WEST VIRGINIA'S evaluation 336
Discussion on battleship failure report contacts 336
Observes gunfire, searchlights and starshells to south 336
(2) Operations of Commander Left Flank Force 337-338
LOUISVILLE tracking target 337
Receives MC GOWAN's amplifying report 337
DENVER makes radar contact but fails report it 337
Range closing 337
Not receiving information from his ships 337
Learns CTG 79.11 had five targets 337
Observes gunfire and illumination to south 337
Learns COMDSSRON TWENTY-FOUR ordered attack 337
Learns CTG 79.11 has attacked and is now retiring 337
Reverses course 338
Receives additional information about enemy 338
Learns Western Attack Group retiring 338
Learns from CTG 79.11 enemy contacts of five targets - two hit
and dropping back 338
Notes large explosion in enemy force 338
(3) Operations of Commander Right Flank Force 339-351
Intercepts amplifying report from CTG 79.11 339
Receives contact reports from own ships but fails forward to
OTC 339
Discussion thereon 339-340
Picture on scope confused 340
Re-estimates situation 340
Discussion thereon 340-341
Orders destroyers attack in two groups 340
Receives DALY's amplifying report 341
XXXLX
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Receives CTG 79.11' s target designation 341
Queries C014DESR0N TWENTY-FOUR if he has TG 79.11 on his radar
scopes 341
Orders COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR to attack 341
Discussion thereon 341
Watches progress of attacks on radar scope 341
Gives freedom of action to his squadron commander 342
Intercepts CTG 79.11' s report on progress of action 342
Learns Commander Western Attack Group now retiring 342
Queries COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR whether he has targets on his
scope 342
Knows his destroyers attacking 342
Notes explosion and large flash from enemy area 343
(a) Operations of Commander Right Flank Cruisers 343
Has fair idea of enemy movement 343
Learns of PHOENIX contact on one large, two smaller 343
Changes course conform movements battle line 343
Intercepts CTG 77.2's message requesting CTG 79.11 furnish
information concerning enemy ship types 343
May have received SHROPSHIRE'S initial contact 343
Sights large explosion in direction of enemy 343
Learns from radar scope three large ships, one small still
closing 343
(b) Operations of COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR 344-351
Awaits orders attack 344
Controls operations from CIC 344
Discussion thereon 344
Receives contact reports and observes enemy on radar scope 344
Knows Western Attack Group has turned eastward to avoid
his ships 344
Receives order directing him not to advance 344
Changes course to north in order identify his group to
Right Flank Force 345
Receives order "When released attack in two groups, etc." 345
Order not unexpected 345
Unable discern enemy composition from his radar scope 345
On request advises Commander Right Flank Force he has TG
79.11 on his screen 345
Receives orders to attack 346
Commences attack 346
ARUNTA increases speed to twenty-five knots 346
DALY and BACHE fall well behind HUTCHINS 346
Watches Western Attack Group approach 346
Directs Commander Attack Group 2.2 follow Eastern Attack
Group down 346
This contrary instructions 346
Discussion thereon 34o-347
Twice directs Commander Attack Group 2.2 attack 348
(1) Operations of Commander Attack Group 1.2 (COMDESRON
TWENTY-FOUR) 343-349
Sees Western Attack Group not yet cleared 348
Deduces Commander Attack Group 2.2 not planning cross
strait 343
xl CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Accepts new situation 348
Advises Commander Right Flank Force of enemy's course,
speed, range, bearing 348
Directs Commander Attack Group 2.2 attack 3^9
Observes explosion on YAMAGUMO 349
Course to enemy now clear 349
(2) Operations of Commander Attack Group 2.2 349-351
Receives orders attack 349
Plan in disagreement with that of COMDESRON TWENTY- FOUR 350
His decision attack from west considered sound 350
Decision in accordance with U.S. Naval practice 350
Does not issue firing plan to his ships 350
Learns COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR, in effect, has approved
his decision 351
Receives orders boil up and make smoke 351
Observes radar picture continues to improve 351
Observes five targets with one large, probably
battleship 351
Breaks through smoke screen and observes explosion 351
BEALE asks how many torpedoes to fire 351
(B) Operations of CTG 79.11 352-377
(1) Commander Eastern Attack Group (CTG 79.11) 352-367
Heads for torpedo launching point 352
Radar picture continues to improve 352
Receives composition, range, bearing of enemy from MC GOWAN 352
Approaches from northerly rather than easterly direction thus
making himself better target 352
Discussion thereon relative coordination 352-353
Directs command form echelon 353
Discussion thereon 353
Learns Commander Western Attack Group maneuvering avoid right
flank destroyers 353
Could see Western Attack Group well behind expected position 354
Coordinated attack now impossible 354
Changes course further to east 354
Discussion thereon 354
Receives request from CTG 77.2 furnish information concerning
enemy 354
Replies "Targets are five, etc." 354
Radar picture not as reported above 355
MC GOWAN and MELVIN give estimates 355
Receives two contact reports from Western Attack Group 355
Decides on enemy composition and formation 356
Decides to (a) retain depth setting and (b) change firing plan 356
Discussion thereon 356
Issues attack instructions 356
Not aware COMDESDIV 108 so far behind as to preclude coordinated
attack 357
Discussion concerning clearness, brevity, positiveness 357
Is illuminated by searchlight 357
Unaware he had already been sighted visually 357
Course change advantageous as regards target angle but
disadvantageous as regards closing the range 357
Discussion thereon 357
xli CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Changes course and speed to close enemy
MELVIN and MC GOWAN chanre course
Decision to change course considered sound but insufficient
Discussion thereon
Directs group to fire when ready
Discussion thereon
REMEY fires eight using range to YAMASHIRO, bearing of
YAMAGUMO
Torpedo spread insufficient
Commences retiring under fire
Failure to open fire illogical
MC GOWAN fires ten torpedoes
All torpedoes miss
Discussion thereon
MELVIN fires nine torpedoes making one hit in FUSO
Discussion thereon
Japanese continue searchlight illumination and gunfire
MC GOWAN and MELVIN make radical turn and parallel roughly
course of REMEY
Realizes difficulties could occur between units of Western
Attack Group and DE3R0N TWENTY-FOUR
Observes Japanese shifted from searchlight to starshell
illumination
Reports being straddled while retiring to CTG 77.2
Message incorrect since Western Attack Group had not fired
Destroyers make smoke and maneuver to evade enemy salvos
Intercepts message from Commander Western Attack Group
directing that command standby torpedoes
Receives message directing Western Attack Grouc standby to
fire
Reports estimate of situation to CTG 77.2
Report incorrect
Discussion thereon
Considers some of his torpedoes scored
Hits r.ot actually observed
Japanese continue fire at eastern group
Learns Western Attack Group attacking
Knows TG 79.11 has completed firing
Receives impression firing has been effective
Notes enemy has ceased firing on eastern group
Reports estimate of attack results to CTG 77.2
Grants MELVIN permission terminate smoke
Reduces group speed to eighteen knots
Observes large explosion in target area
Receives request from CTG 77.2 as to types of enemy ships
Summary of torpedo attack by Eastern Attack Group
Heads for his post-attack rendezvous
(2) Commander Western Attack Group
Heads toward torpedo launching point
Intercepts MC GOWAN' s contact report
Increases speed to twenty- five knots
Likely learns Eastern Attack Group to fire torpedoes only
Encounters DESRON TWENTY-FOUR and changes course
357-358
353
353
359
359
359-360
360
360
361
361
361
361-362
362
362
362
362
363
363
363
363
363-36/.
364
364
364
364
364-365
365
365
365
365
365
365
366
366
366
366
366
366
367
367
367-377
367
367
367
367
367
xlii
: :.-::r:::;i
CONFIDENTIAL
MC DERMUT reports radar contact on enemy 368
Heads for enemy 368
MONSSEN makes radar contact but fails report it 368
Learns enemy consists of two large and three small targets 368
Makes no effort locate himself with relation Eastern Attack
Group 369
Failure to do so unsound 369
Receives CTG 79.11' s message designating targets 369
Directs MC DERMUT take third target and MONSSEN take one to
north 369
Decides attack southern group of targets 369-370
Decision correct 370
Conforms to doctrine in rejecting concept of coordinated attack 370
Observes enemy searchlight and starshells 370
Realizes his retiring destroyers may encounter attacking
destroyers of COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR 371
Changes course, speed prevent enemy obtaining a good firing
solution 371
Discussion thereon 371
Western Attack Group taken under fire 371-372
Orders group standby torpedoes 372
Units fail exchange target information 372
MONSSEN changes course to close range and avoid being fouled
by MC DERMUT 372
Fired at by enemy 373
Discussion failure to return fire 373
Directs MC DERMUT fire torpedoes 373
MC DERMUT fires full salvo successfully 373
Directs MONSSEN fire torpedoes and inform him of same 373
Observes his command illuminated by searchlight, followed by
gunfire 373
MONSSEN fires full salvo successfully 373
Discussion concerning graphic analysis of MONSSEN' s ranges,
bearings 374
Discussion concerning graphic solution of torpedo firing
problem 374
Orders speed increased and retirement made to westward 374-375
MC DERMUT take evasive action clear MTB's 375
COMDESDIV 108 informs MTB's identity of destroyers 375
Discussion on necessity prepare communications 375
Observes green flare ideally placed to illuminate his command
to enemy 376
Not all Japanese commanders realize flare friendly 376
Enemy still employing searchlights and starshells 376
Fails observe enemy course change 376
Clears area changes course to north 376
Commander THIRD Section returns to northerly course while still
within maximum torpedo range 376
Observes three explosions in target area 376-377
Summary of torpedo attack 377
Discussion concerning thoroughness of preparations prior to and
during attack 377
xliii CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(C) Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats 373-333
(1) Upper Surigao PT's 373
Sights THIRD Section but does not make contact report 378
Commences drifting with current 373
(2) Kanihaan PT's 373-379
Makes radar contact and maneuvers to close target 378
Sights FUSO but retires without attacking 373-379
His decision retire unsound 379
Likely placed too liberal interpretation on his orders 379
(3) South Amagusan PT's 379-330
Has enemy and friendly forces on radar scope 379
Maintains unusually good summary plot 330
Observes searchlight and gunfire 380
Is informed friendly destroyers in area 380
(4) East Amagusan PT's 380-382
Makes no radar contacts during this period 330
Sights searchlights and starshells to southeastward 380
Informs section two destroyers sighted are friendly 330
(a) PT 328 381
Proceeds to clear destroyer attack area 381
Is illuminated by enemy searchlight, is not fired on 331
(b) Fr 323 331
Proceeds to clear destroyer attack area 381
Sights blue (green) flare 331
(c) PT 329 331-332
Requests permission fire on destroyer then realizes it is
friendly « 381
Commences to drift with current 382
(5) SE Panaon PT's 332
Operate independently without making contacts 382
(6) Sumilon PT's 382
Patrol uneventfully 382
(7) Bilaa Point PT's 382
Makes radar contact 332
(8) Madilao Point PT's 383
Makes radar contact on two targets southwest of Binit Point 333
Does not make contact report 383
(9) Lower Surigao Pr's 383
Fails sight or be sighted by PT 493 which was aground 383
CHAPTER XIV - JAPANESE OPERATIONS, 0320 - 0348, October 25th
(A) Operations of Commander THIRD Section
Unaware of magnitude of disaster to force
Learns YAMASHIRO torpedoed
Sends "Urgent Battle Report No. 2"
Discussion thereon
Observes Attack Group 2.2, takes evasive action and opens fire
Continues to fire during enemy retirement
YAMASHIRO receives second torpedo hit
Discussion concerning "halfway measures"
Heads for Dulag anchorage
Discussion relating to defense of disabled ships
334-399
384-399
334
384
384
384
335
385
335
335-336
336
336-337
xliv
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CONFIDENTIAL
(B)
Discussion concerning probable estimate of situation
Probably notes gunfire from Right Flank Destroyers and FUSO's
explos ion
Learns SECOND Striking Force penetrating strait
YAMASHIRO changes course, action considered sound
YAMASHIRO opens fire
Each ship operating independently
(1) Operations of Operational Ships of THIRD Section
(a) MOGAMI
Not on station
Does not turn with YAMASHIRO
Passes SHIGURE
Knows more of situation than Commander THIRD Section
Parallels course of YAMASHIRO
Observes torpedo hit in YAMASHIRO
Fails to change course on order
Difficult to distinguish friend from foe
Remains unharmed by torpedoes or gunfire
(b) SHIGURE
Passes unhit through torpedo spreads
Notices damage to formation
Reverses course, heads south
Unable to communicate with YAMASHIRO
Discussion thereon
Discussion concerning change of course
Passes YAMASHIRO
Passes FUSO, makes no attempt to pick up survivors
Action considered correct
Ignores Commander THIRD Section's turn signals
Learns SECOND Striking Force entering strait
Experiences difficulty in communication
(2) Operations of Damaged Ships of THIRD Section
(a) ASAGUMO
Proceeds northward slowly with severed bow
Decides to retire
Taken under fire
Fails to return fire
(b) MICHISHIO
Drifting without power after being torpedoed
Taken under fire
Fails to return fire
Still under fire while burning
(c) FUSO
No direct information available
Description of damage sustained
Blows up and breaks in two sections
Discussion thereon
Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force
Realizes navigation in error, orders course change
ABUKUMA torpedoed
Sights and fires on MTB
Proceeds ahead with remaining ships
Action considered correct
387
387
388
388
388
388
389-392
389-390
389
389
389
389
389
389
389-390
390
390
390-392
390
390
390-391
391
391
391
392
392
392
392
392
392
393-396
393
393
393
393
393
394
394
394
394
394
394-396
394
395
395
395-396
397-399
397
397
397
398
398
496799 O - 59 - 4
xlv
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Enters strait and forms planned battle formation
Destroyer command shifts* to COMDESDIV EIGHTEEN
Heads up strait
ABUKUMA lays to for emergency repairs
Observes action of THIRD Section
Informs Commander THIRD Section that he was penetrating strait
CHAPTER XV - ALLIED OPERATIONS. 0320 - 0343, October 25th
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2
Awaits reports from right flank destroyers
Receives CTG 79.11' s dispatcn giving enemy composition
This report not entirely correct
Learns Right Flank Destroyers conducting attack
Discussion concerning battle line situation
Advises CTF 77 of enemy composition
Wonders at lack of battle damage to destroyers
Learns Commander Battle Line intends to open fire prematurely
Discussion thereon
Learns enemy retiring
Realizes immediate action necessary
" Orders COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX to attack with torpedoes
Decision considered correct
Learns COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX attack plan
Informs COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX of enemy course and speed
Informs units that COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX is attacking
Informs Commander Battle Line enemy retiring and to close battle
line
Discussion thereon
Observes large explosion to south
Receives report of force coming up strait
Learns gunfire from destroyers hitting enemy
Learns Attack Section TOO ordered to fire half salvos
Situation summary
(1) Operations of Commander Battle Line
Receives TG 79.11' s reports of enemy composition
Discussion of unauthorized increase in speed
Obtains enemy composition from radar scope
SIGOURNEY obtains radar range on FUSO
Directs his command to open fire at 26,000 yards
Discussions of reasons prompting this order
Learns enemy appears to be retiring
Learns DESRON FIFTY-SIX launching torpedo attack
Orders COMDESDIV XRAY to concentrate his screens
Directed by OfC to close battle line
Understands it to mean close the range; order cancelled before
compliance
MISSISSIPPI informs him second enemy group approaching
Battle Line fails to open fire
Discussion thereon
Receives report of another enemy force
Observes explosion in target area
Learns destroyers hitting enemy
398
39*
393
398
399
399
400-457
400-445
400
400
400
400
400-401
401
401
401
402
402
402
402
402
402
402-403
403
403
403
403
403
403
404
404
404-408
404
404-405
405
405
405
405-406
406
406
406
406
407
407
407
407
408
408
408
xlvi
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(2) Operations of Commander Left Flank Force 408-418
Discussion concerns only left flank cruisers 408
Intercepts report of enemy composition 408
Report, although incorrect, coincided with radar scope 408
Learns Commander Battle Line increasing speed 409
Learns right flank destroyers attacking 409
Learns battle line to open fire at 26,000 yards 409
Learns enemy retiring 409
Orders COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX launch torpedo attack 409
Tracks second enemy group 409
LOUISVILLE tracking two groups 409
Observes large explosion to south 410
Learns another enemy force coming up strait 410
Learns right flank destroyers hitting enemy 410
(a) Operations of COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX 410-413
Not equipped with a separate maneuvering voice circuit 410
Flagship makes first radar contact 410
Learns right flank destroyers attacking 411
Likely learns battle line to open fire at 26,000 yards 411
Learns enemy retiring and receives orders to attack 411
Issues orders to attack sections 411
Discussion of attack plan 411-412
Learns from CTG 77.2 enemy course and speed 412
Attack sections discussed separately 413
(1) Commander Attack Secton ONE 413-414
Maneuvering for position 413
Discussion of approach 413
Closely follows movements of attack sections 414
Learns another enemy force entering strait 414
Learns right flank destroyers shelling enemy 414
Probably reassured by success of destroyers 414
(2) Commander Attack Section TWO 414-417
Failure to turn and increase speed unknown 414
Discussion of attack plan 415
Maintains radar contact on enemy 415
Delays increasing speed 415
Orders section to standby to make smoke 416
Learns more enemy ships entering strait 416
Learns right flank destroyers shelling enemy 416
Directs his commanding officers "This has to be quick.
Standby your fish" 416
Discussion thereon 416
Evaluates radar picture 417
(3) Commander Attack Section THREE 417-418
Maneuvers for firing position 417
Tracking enemy on radar 417
Discussion on intership communications 417
Discussion of approach 1+18
Learns another enemy force entering strait 418
Learns right flank destroyers shelling enemy 418
Commences his approach 418
(3) Operations of Commander Right Flank Force 419-445
Follows torpedo attack action by radar and radio 419
Requests situation from COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR 419
xlvii
CONFIDENTIAL
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Is concerned over his destroyers at'ack 419
Learns enemy composition and DESRON TWENTY-FOUR attacking 419
Learns Attack Group 2.2 completed attack 419
Difficulties experienced in intership communication 41?
Learns Attack Group 1.2 about to attack 420
Informs CTG 77.2 of destroyer actions 420
Realizes destroyers should clear area 420
Advises CTG 77.2 that squadron completed attack and enemy was
retiring 420
Directs COKDESRON TWENTY-FOUR to track enemy and report course
and speed 420
Order considered sound 420
Directs C0MDE3R0N TWENTY-FOUR to get over to west 421
Order considered sound 421
Learns COKDESRON FIFTY-SIX ordered to attack 421
Concludes COKDESRON TWENTY-FOUR still attacking 421
Notes Japanese still continuing northward 421-422
Directs COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR to keep clear as COKDESRON
FIFTY-SIX was attacking 422
Decides to correct position 422
Learns another enemy force penetratin? strait 422
Learns COKDESRON TWENTY-FOUR attacking with gunfire 422
Orders that commander to stay clear 422
Changes course to be on base course when battle line opens fire 422
Radar scope shows three enemy groups 423
Discussion on Japanese disposition 423
Receives situation reports and relays information 423
Erroneously thinks DESRON FIFTY-SIX attacking 423
(a) Operations of Commander Right Flank Cruisers 4 24-42 5
Changes course to close enemy 424
Situation evaluated 424
Observes YAKASHIRO fire on destroyers 424.
Three cruisers tracking leading ship 425
(b) Operations of Commander Attack Group 1.2 425-437
Continues approach 425
Had not issued torpedo firing plan 425
Discussion thereon 425
BEALE reauests number of torpedoes to fire 425-426
Directs destroyers to fire half salvos 426
Discussion thereon 426
Receives request to report types of enemy shios 426
Directs Commander Attack Group 2.2 to report when torpedoes
had been fired 426
Does not observe enemy gunfire 426
Commences attack 427
Learns Attack Group 2.2 had fired torpedoes 427
Realizes chance for coordinated attacks lost 427
Order to fire torpedoes not understood 427
Discussion thereon 427
HUTCHINS fires torpedoes 427
Discussion of need for target designation 428
Both forces experience difficulty concerning actions of
opposing forces 428
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CONFIDENTIAL
Learns two torpedoes crossed ahead of DALY 429
Erroneously advises Commander Right Flank Force he had
fired torpedoes 429
DALY and BACHE had not yet fired 429
Erroneously reports enemy retiring 429
Receives orders to track and report enemy course and speed 429
Advises Commander Right Flank Force that he was going to
chase enemy 429-430
Receives orders to get over to west 430
Realizes BACHE had not yet fired torpedoes 430
Authorizes BACHE and DALY to fire prior retiring 430
DALY fires torpedoes 431
BACHE fires torpedoes 431
Informs Commander Right Flank Force enemy headed north . 431
HUTCHINS sights explosions 432
Decides to close enemy for gunfire attack 432
Receives directions to stay clear 432
Opens fire on enemy 433
Erroneous impressions created during attack 434
Discussion thereon 434
Advises Commander Right Flank Force that enemy headed north 435
Authorizes HUTCHINS to close enemy 435
Discussion on roles of gun and torpedo 435-436
Units continue to shell enemy 436
Informs Commander Right Flank Force hitting regularly with
five inch 436
Learns Attack Group 2.2 coming down 436
Continues to close enemy 437
(2) Operations of Commander Attack Group 2.2 437-445
Proceeds to torpedo launching point 437
Directs BEALE to fire half salvo 437
Discussion thereon 438
Launches torpedoes 438
Comparison of American and British torpedo doctrine 439
ARUNTA completes firing and retires 440
KILLEN prepares to fire 440
Decides to attack large ship 440
Discussion thereon 441
KILLEN attacks 441
BEALE attacks 441
Discussion thereon 441-442
Reports his group had fired 442
KILLEN fires second salvo 442-443
Discussion thereon 443
Observes command discovered by enemy 443
Units fail to return enemy fire 443-444
KILLEN credited with hit 444
Summary of torpedo attacks 444
BEALE straddled 445
Changes course to return to scene of action 445
(B) Operations of CTG 79.11 446-448
Retires to post-attack rendezvous 446
OTC requests types of ships encountered 446
xlix
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(b)
(c)
(2)
Evaluation of enemy by commanding officers
Reports evaluation tc OTC
Sends amplifying; report to OTC
Eastern Attack Group at rendezvous
Queries command as to torpedoes remaining
(C) Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats
(1) 3S Panaon PT's
Operating independently
(a) PT 134
Sights four destroyers
Receives contact report from ?T 132
Fires torpedo
Decides to modify message
PT 137
Sights enemy destroyer but fails to report
Fires torpedo and taken under fire
Discussion thereon
PT 132
Sights five ships
Sights ABUKUMA
Bilaa PT's
Sight three or four ships
Do not atoack
Decision considered correct
Make radar contact on ABUKUMA
Sumilon PT's
Contact five more targets
Report contacts to CTG 79.11
Sight two burning ships to north
Madilao Point PT's
Maintain radar contact on NACKI and ASHIGARA
Observe starshells off Binit Point
Kanihaan PT" s
Sight FUSO again
Discussion on not attacking
South Amagusan PT's
Continue patrol
(7) East Amagusan PT's
(a) PT 328
Sights unidentified ship
Fails to sight BACHE and DALY
(b) PT 323
Shells hit nearby
PT 329
Drifts vdth current
(8) Upper Surigao PT's
Drifts with current
(9) Lower Surigao PT's
(a) PT 490
Drifts with current
(b) PT 491
Nothing of importance
(c) PT 493
Destroys classified equipment
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(c)
446-447
447
447
448
448
449-457
449-452
449
449-450
449
449
449
450
450-451
450
450
450-451
451-452
451
452
452-453
452
452
453
453
453-454
453
453-454
454
454
454
454
454-455
454
455
455
455
455-4 56
455-456
455
456
456
456
456
456
456-457
456
457
457
457
457
457
457
457
CONFIDENTIAL
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\
CHAPTER XVI - JAPANESE OPERATIONS, 0348 - 0420, October 25th
(A) Operations of Commander THIRD Section
Flagship damaged but continues on
Learns FUSO still afloat and underway
Receives Allied gunfire
Principal staff members wounded or killed
Turns to westward
Discussion thereon
Continues to fight back
Receives third torpedo hit
YAMASHIRO receives fourth torpedo hit
THIRD Section destroyed as fighting unit
Next senior officer fails to assume command
(1) Operations of Operational Ships, THIRD Section
(a) MOGAMI
Fails to detect Commander THIRD Section's change of course
Decides to fire torpedoes
Mistakes enemy ships for friendly destroyers
Realizes trap but fails to report
Launches torpedoes during retirement
Operating on one engine
(b) SHIGURE
Sights torpedo tracks
Situation confused
Evades shellfire
Confronted with making vital decision
Discussion thereon
Does not fire torpedoes
Seeks information concerning situation
Receives direct hit
Passes MOGAMI offering no assistance
Exchanges visual calls with NACHI
(2) Operations of Damaged Ships, THIRD Section
(a) ASAGUMO
Continues southward
Fails to observe torpedoes
Observes MOGAMI afire
(b) MICHISHIO
Sinks at 0358
(c) FUSO
Continues to burn while drifting south
(B) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force
Proceeds in battle formation
Sights two ships afire
Estimates the situation
Discussion regarding attack plan
Sights MOGAMI afire
Exchanges calls with SHIGURE
Discussion of failure to obtain intelligence from SHIGURE
Makes radar contact
Directs units prepare for torpedo attack
ABUKUMA continues to make repairs
458-468
458-466
458
458
458
458
459
459
459
459
459-460
460
460
460-465
46O-462
46O
460
461
461
461
461-462
462-465
462
462
462
463
463-464
464
464
464
464
465
465-466
465
465
465
465
466
466
466
466
466-468
466
466
467
467
467
468
468
468
468
468
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CHAPTER XVII - ALLIED OPERATIONS. 0348 - 0420, October 25th 469-539
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2 469-535
Range to enemy continues to close 469
Learns Comaander Battle Line to open fire when range 26,000 yar 469
Alerts cruisers he is about to open fire 469
Delays firing to benefit attacking destroyers 469
Orders his cruisers to open fire 469
Temporarily blinded by gunfire 470
Learns small "enemy" group coming up may be friendly 470
Learns left flank destroyers launching torpedoes 470
Directs Commander Right Flank Force comr.ence firing 470
Is informed that Right Flank Force had opened fire 470
Observes more battleshios open fire 470
Observes enemy ships retiring 471
Suggests battle line change course 471
Knows battle line had executed course change 471
Learns progress DESRON FIFTY-SIX attack 471
CALIFORNIA misses turn signal 471
Battle line checks fire 472
Learns firing on DESRON FIFTY-SIX 472
Orders all ships cease firing 472
Discussion thereon 472
Orders C0XDE3RCN FIFTY-SIX to clear channel 472
Discussion of fire distribution 472-473
Explains reasons for not ordering fire distribution 473
Considerations influencing his judgement 473-474
Decision later meets with approval of superiors 474-475
Discussion thereon 475
Confirms enemy retiring 475
Notes battleships unload hot guns 475
Changes course 475-476
Weighs decision to close enemy 476
Decides to use DESDIV XRAY _76
Has reason to believe ALBERT W. GRANT damaged k%
Orders Commander Right Flank Force to resume fire 476
(1) Operations of Comnander Battle Line -"7-436
Issues no instructions on fire distribution 4'
Discussion thereon 477
Informs CTG 77.2 of intentions 477
Has erroneous evaluation of enemy disposition 4'
Discussion of evaluation of radar contacts 477-478
Discussion of not opening fire 4"
Learns CTG 77.2 about to open fire 473
Witnesses cruisers of both flanks open fire 473
WEST VIRGINIA opens fire 479
Changes course so all guns bear -^9
Flagship CIC experiences difficulty tracking enemy and
designating target 479
CALIFORNIA opens fire 480
TENNESSEE opens fire 430
MARYLAND opens fire 480
Notes leading target changed course and speed 480
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CONFIDENTIAL
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Orders course change 481
Discussion thereon 481
CALIFORNIA and WEST VIRGINIA cease firing 431
CALIFORNIA misinterprets turn signal 481
TENNESSEE acts to avoid collision 481
Warns ships to watch out for CALIFORNIA 482
TENNESSEE fires last salvo 482
Learns friendly ships firing on DESRON FIFTY-SIX 482
Orders battle line to cease firing 482
Orders ships with hot loaded guns to fire at enemy 482
Recapitulation of firing 483
Discussion of fire ranges and bearings 483-484
Learns RICHARD P. LEARY passing through torpedo waters 484
Learns COMBATDIV TWO reassigning stations 484
Directs COMDESDIV XRAY report to CTG 77.2 484
Changes course away from enemy 484
Discussion thereon 485-486
Ammunition table 486
(2) Operations of Commander Left Flank Force 487-516
Awaits opportunity to open fire 437
Orders TG 77.2 cruisers to open fire 487
Opening fire ranges and bearings 487
Discussion of COLUMBIA and MINNEAPOLIS firing 488
Does not issue fire distribution orders 488
Target continues to close 488
COLUMBIA probably fires at "phantom" 489
Observes MOGAMI retiring 489
PORTLAND shifts target 489
Discussion thereon 489
Observes leading target turning westward 489
DENVER picks up two pips on radar 489-490
DENVER fires at unidentified target 490
DENVER fires on ALBERT W. GRANT 490
©UISVILLE notes pip approaching 490
LOUISVILLE fires on ALBERT W. GRANT 491
LOUISVILLE reports hits 491
DENVER reports having been straddled 491
Learns firing on DESRON FIFTY-SIX 491
Orders all ships to cease firing 491
Ammunition table 492
Reverses course to port 492
Discussion thereof 492
Orders CTG 77.3 to resume firing 492
(a) Operations of COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX 493-516
(1) Operations of Commander Attack Section ONE 493-504
Continues to approach enemy 493
Notes cruisers open fire 493
Decision to continue attack plan correct 493
Learns WEST VIRGINIA about to open fire 493
Decides to commence approach 493
ALBERT W. GRANT off course 493
Learns Attack Section TWO to launch torpedoes 494
liii CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(2)
Knows nothing of Attack Section THREE
Does nothing to coordinate operations
Realizes prompt action necessary for multiple attack
Radar shows indications target friendly
Learns Section TWO retiring
Learns Section THREE firing torpedoes
Identity of target not yet settled
Decides to continue closing
Decides target is enemy
Discussion of delay in firing
Decides to turn westward
Decision considered correct
Observes enemy on westerly course
Orders ships to fire when ready
Decision to fire appears sound
GRANT and LEARY increase speed
NEWCOMB launches torpedoes
LEARY fires torpedoes
Two torpedoes misfire
ALBERT '.v. GRANT observes large explosion
ALBERT W. GRANT fires torpedoes
ALBERT W. GRANT straddled by gunfire
Observes torpedo wake
Observes second large explosion
Learns ALBERT W. GRANT had fired
Enemy shellfire straddles his command
Retires to north in column
Discussion thereon
ALBERT W. GRANT receives first hit
Realizes course change to north unwise
Under fire by friendly ships
Informs CTG 77.2 of friendly fire
Hears cease firing order
Is ordered out of channel
ALBERT W. GRANT fires second half salvo
GRANT'S first half salvo misses IA1 RO
LEARY observes torpedo wakes
Observes GRANT hit and slowing
Learns LEARY passing through torpedo water
Results of torpedo attack
Summary of torpedo attack
ALBERT W. GRANT dead in water and in danger of sinking
Operations of Commander Attack Section TWO
Continues approach
Changes course to head for firing point
Notes left flank cruisers open fire
Radar detects weak pip
Under fire by enemy guns
Does not return fire
Explanation not adequate
Orders section to standby to fire
494
494
494-495
495
495
495
496
496
496
496
496
497
497
497
497
497
49fl
498
498
498
499
499
499
499
500
500
500
500-501
501
502
502
502
502
502
502
5Q3
503
503
503
503
504
504
505-511
505
505
505
505
506
506
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CONFIDENTIAL
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Misunderstanding; BRYANT fires 506
Discussion of torpedo firing data 506
Discussion of misunderstanding 507
Orders section to fire 503
HALFORD fires 508
Discussion of torpedo firing data 508
Orders section to make smoke 509
ROBINSON fires 509
Discussion of torpedo firing data 509
Discussion of attack 510
Alters retirement plan 510
Fails to fire at SHIG-URE 510
Learns HALFORD fired 510
HALFORD and ROBINSON claim hits 511
Summary of torpedo attack 511
Learns DSSRON FIFTY-SIX under friendly fire 511
Heads for post-attack rendezvous 511
(3) Operations of Commander Attack Section THREE 512-516
Commences approach; observes firing 512
Units differ in tracking data 512
LEUTZE diverges from course 512
Notes shells nearby 512
Changes course 513
Discussion thereon 513
Orders torpedoes fired 513
Discussion thereon 513
LEUTZE fires torpedoes 513
Discussion thereon 513
BENNION nearly torpedoed by LEUTZE 513
BENNION fires torpedoes 514
Discussion thereon 514
Continues to better firing position 514
Decision considered doubtful 514
Discussion thereon 514
HEYWOOD L.EDWARDS fires torpedoes 514
Discussion of target angle 515
BENNION fires second half salvo 515
Turns to retire; orders make smoke 515
Observes some near splashes 515
BENNION' s torpedoes hit YAMASHIRO 516
Learns DESRON FIFTY-SIX under friendly fire 516
Learns all ships ordered to cease firing 516
Continues on course and speed 516
Re-forms column and heads north 516
Summary of torpedo attacks 516
Number of torpedoes remaining 516
(3) Operations of Commander Right Flank Force 517-535
Awaits order to commence firing 517
Fears Attack Group 2.2 would cross strait 517
Directs attack group commanders retire to shore 517
!▼ CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(1)
Receives orders for cruisers to open fire
Opening fire bearings and ranges
SHROPSHIRE'S fire control limitations
Commander thoroughly familiar with situation
Alerts force to friendly contacts
Orders cruisers to fire slowly
PHOENIX fires high capacity shells for spotting
Action considered sound
Learns Attack Group 1.2 heading toward cruisers
Queries Commander Attack Group 2.2 if under fire
receives negative reply
Receives order from CTG 77.2 to open fire; replies
previously opened fire
SHROPSHIRE opens fire
Commences course change to west
PHOENIX and BOISE check fire
Decision appears sound
SHROPSHIRE'S decision to continue firing also sound
Does not issue fire instructions
Discussion thereon
Steadies temporarily on course 250° (T)
SHROPSHIRE under fire
BOISE and PHOENIX resume fire
Notes enemy turning away
Intercepts C0MDESR0N FIFTY-SIX' s report of attack
Completes original turn
Receives report from C0MDESR0N TWENTY-FOUR and directs
him to close beach
PHOENIX fires secondary battery
Learns left flank destroyers being fired on
Receives orders to cease firing
Recapitulation of firing
Ammunition Table
Sights two enemy ships burning fiercely
Learns left flank cruisers changing course west
Re-estimates the situation
Actions at this time correct
Learns BATDIV FOUR changing course to north
Receives orders to resume fire
Ships do not fire; no targets within range
(a) Operations of C0KDESR0N TWENTY-FOUR
Commander Attack Group 1.2 and C0KDSSRON TWENTY-FOUR
HUTCHINS prepares fire second half salvo
Directs HUTCHINS fire torpedoes
DALY's torpedoes miss
BACHE's torpedoes miss
HUTCHINS fires torpedoes
Action considered sound
Likely learns cruisers about to open fire
Receives orders to head shoreward
517
518
518
518
518
519
519
519
519
519
519
519-520
520
520
520
520-521
521
521
521
521
521
521
522
522
522
522
522
522
523
523
523
523
523
523
52/,
524
524
524-536
524-531
524
524
524-525
525
525
525
526
526
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CONFIDENTIAL
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HUT CHINS opens fire
Does not comply with spirit of orders
Discussion thereon
HUTCHINS ceases fire
DALY decides to shift targets
BACHE decides to shift targets
Informs CTG 77«3 that he is closing
HUTCHINS fires on MOGAMI which returns fire
Torpedoes hit MICHISHIO sinking her
Summary of torpedo firings
BACHE opens fire on MOGAMI
HUTCHINS changes course toward enemy
BACHE also changes course
DALY opens fire and changes course
MOGAMI catches fire
Range continues to decrease
Target endeavors to identify herself
Directs HUTCHINS to clear area
HUTCHINS complies
Reauests CTG 77.3 watch for him
HUTCHINS ceaees fire
Queries DALY and BACHE as to torpedoes fired and was
informed "five each"
DALY shifts targets
BACHE ceases fire
DALY under fire
Receives orders to get to beach
DALY ceases fire
Receives order to cease firing
DALY and BACHE closing HUTCHINS
Receives orders to lie along shore and standby for another
run
(2) Commander Attack Group 2.2
Heads toward YAMASHIRO for attack
KILLEN fires torpedoes
Action difficult to understand
Receives orders to stay to east, turns west
Decision confirmed
Likely learns cruisers to open fire
Turns south for gunfire attack
ARUNTA opens fire
Ships employing follow-the-leader tactics
KILLEN opens fire
ARUNTA checks fire and shifts targets
KILLEN ceases fire, notes torpedoes would miss
ARUNTA ceases firing
ARUNTA commences retiring
Receives orders to cease firing
Receives query as to torpedoes and makes incomplete reply
Receives order to lie along shore and await another run
526
526
526
527
527
527
527
527
527-528
528
528
529
529
529
529
529
529
530
530
530
530
530
530
530
531
531
531
531
531
531
532-535
532
532
532
532-533
532-533
533
533
533
533
533-534
534
534
534
534
534
535
535
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CONFIDENTIAL
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(B) Operations of CTG 79.11 535-536
(1) Conoander Eastern Attack Group 535-536
Patrolling post-attack rendezvous area 535
Advises CTG 77.2 MC DSRMUT and MONSSEN still retiring 535
MC GOWAN reports large explosion 535
Learns Western Attack Group at post-attack rendezvous 535
Learns DESRON FIFTY-SIX under fire by friendly shops 536
Learns DESRON FIFTY-SIX ordered to clear channel 536
Informs Commander Attack Section TWO and CTG 77.2 of location 536
(2) Commander Western Attack Group 536
Continues his retirement 536
Remains in vicinity of rendezvous 536
Makes radar contact on HALF MOON 536
Informs CTG 79.11 that MC DERMUT and MONSSEN arrived at
rendezvous 536
(C) Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats 537-539
(1) Upper Surigao PT's 537
Sights four burning ships 537
(2) Lower Surigao PT's 537-533
(a) PT 490 537
Makes radar contact SECOND Striking Force 537
Reports contact to CTG 77.2 537
(b) PT 491 537-538
Makes no contacts 538
(c) PT 493 538
Beached Maoyo Point 533
(3) East Amagusan PT's 533-539
(a) PT 328
Patrolling close to Leyte shore 538
(b) PT 323 538
Clears destroyer attack area 533
(c) PT 329 533-539
Sights three fires 533-539
(4) Other PT's 539
Operations uneventful 539
CHAPTER XVIII - JAPANESE OPERATIONS, 0420 - 0520, October 25th
140-552
(A) Operations of Commander THIRD Section
Likely lost when YAMASHLRO sunk
No effort made to discern who was senior
Commander SECOND Striking Force follow behind NACHI
Units discussed separately
(1) MOGAMI
Heads southeasterly, out of control
Appears dead in water
Chief quartermaster endeavors to avoid collision
NACHI and MOGAMI collide
Gunnery officer, now CO., takes over navigation
Receives order follow behind NACHI
Tries to jettison remaining torpedoes
540-545
540
540
540
540
540-543
540
540- 541
541
541
541
541
541
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Sole remaining engine room untenable
Attempts to follow NACHI
Exchanges calls with ASAGUMO
Neither offers help to the other
Increases speed
Bridge steering restored
Steadies on course 192° (T) at fifteen knots
(2) SHIGURE
Changes course to pass Binit Light close aboard
Suffers steering engine casualty
Encounters difficulty in shifting steering
Informs Commander SECOND Striking Force steering engines
out of order
Opens fire on PT's
Appears to have had more steering difficulties
Commander SECOND Striking Force again sights her
Settles on course
(3) ASAGUMO
Continues south while damaged
Likely order to follow behind NACHI
Attempts to follow MOGAMI
Opens fire on PT
(4) FUSO
In two sections, drifts south with current
(B) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force
Prepares to fire torpedoes
Likely notes SHIGURE continues to retire
DESDIV EIGHTEEN discussed separately
Changes course and directs destroyers to attack
Discussion of concept of torpedo attacks
NACHI and ASHIGARA fire torpedoes
Collides with MOGAMI with resulting serious damage
ASHIGARA continues on course
Decides to head south to survey situation
Re-estimates situation and decides to retire
Discussion thereon
Certain officers disagree with decision to retire
Japanese geographical terms loose
Control Station Officer's disagreement not considered correct
ASHIGARA maneuvers to fall in astern
Orders THIRD Section to follow NACHI
Learns SHIGURE' s steering engines out of order
Sends dispatch that BATDIV TWO destroyed and MOGAMI severely
damaged and afire
Reverses course avoiding SHIGURE' s line of fire
Orders change of course to 180° (T)
Sights SHIGURE
(1) Operations of COMDESDIV EIGHTEEN
Proceeds to clear cruisers
Heads toward enemy's probable location
Changes course find cruiser targets
Contacts nothing but Hibuson Island
542
542
542
542
542
542
543
543-544
543
543
543
543
543-544
544
544
544
544-545
544
544
545
545
545
545
546-552
546
546
546
546
546-547
547
547
547
547
548
548
548
548
548-549
549
549
549
549
549
549
550
550-551
550
550
550
550
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Commences retiring in accordance with orders
Parallels cruiser track
Observes USHIO heading toward southern entrance
Slows
(2) Operations of ABUKUMA
Completes first emergency repairs and follows SECOND Striking
Force
Decision considered correct
Sights escorting destroyers
Time of sighting believed in error
CHAPTER XIX - ALLIED OPERATIONS, 0420 - 0520. October 25th
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2
Completes turn to course 270° (T)
Decides not to pursue enemy
Learns NE//C0MB and RICHARD P. LEARY at rendezvous
Directs Left Flank Force to resume fire
Learns cf four additional targets
Learns MTR's had sighted some ships headed south
Learns GRANT hit and lying dead in water
COMDESDIV XRAY reports for duty
Wonders at delay in COMDESDIV XRAY's reporting
Learns NEWCOMB would assist ALBERT .;. GRANT
Learns of PHOENIX1 s contact
Receives contact report from COMCRUDIV T'.v'ELVE
Directs ships not to hit ALBERT W. GRANT
Directs COMDESDIV XRAY to attack
Radar indicates enemy dead in water or retiring
Re-estimates the situation
Changes course to proceed south
Discussion thereon
Receives ARUNTA's contact report
Orders left flank cruisers form column
Informs MTB*s friendly cruisers and destroyers heading south
Informs CTF 77 that enemy retiring
Discussion thereon
Asks COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX if all ships accounted for
Orders left flank cruisers change course toward enemy
Queries COMDESDIV XRAY as to speed
Contacts enemy ships on radar
Knows existing situation
Notes enemy course change
Learns DESRON FIFTY-FOUR to remain at post-attack rendezvous
until after daylight
Directs COMDESDIV 112 to retain destroyers in former stations
until daylight then regain regular screen
Likely learns of northward movement of targets
Learns DESDIV 112 coming down at thirty knots
Likely intercepts PT 494 's contact report
Discussion thereon
Orders increase speed to twenty knots
550
551
551
551
551-552
551
551
551
551-552
553-591
553-586
553
553
553
553
554
554
554
554
554
555
555
555
555
555
555
555
556
556
556
556
556
556
557
557
557
557
558
558
558
558
558
558-559
559
559
559
560
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(1) Operations of COMDESDIV XRAY
Receives orders to proceed south and attack
Sections commence reforming
Decision to re-form not considered sound
Discussion thereon
Learns battleships about to turn
Changes course to proceed around battleships
AULICK proceeds to north around battle line
Decision discussed
THORN misses turn
Fails to reply query on course and speed
Discussion thereon >
(a) Western Destroyers
CONY and CLAXTON make contact on ASHIGARA
THORN fails to change course
(b) Eastern Destroyers
Closing CLAXTON to reform division
WELLES increases speed to close AULICK
AULICK proceeds to close CLAXTON
SIGOURNEY closes BACHE And DALY
Experience difficulties due to division makeup
Discussion thereon
(2) Operations of Commander Battle ^ine
Completes turn to north
Directs BATDIV TWO rejoin battle line and BATDIV FOUR
and MISSISSIPPI change course and speed
Observes tactical situation
COMBATDIV TWO reports course, speed and order of ships
Alert to probability of Japanese air attacks
DE3R0N TWENTY-FOUR not available
Learns DESRON FIFTY-SIX ordered screen left flank
Realizes must defend with battleships alone
Reverses course to east
Order of ships in column given
Receives contact report from WEST VIRGINIA
(3) Operations of Comirander Left Flank Force
Completes turn and slows to ten knots
Orders left flank cruisers resume fire
LOUISVILLE makes contact on additional target
Receives several messages on tactical situation
Warns units not to hit ALBERT W. GRANT
Changes course to 190° (T)
Orders cruisers to form column
Discussion thereon
Informs MTB's friendly cruisers and destroyers
heading south
Changes course to south
Learns TG 77.3 together on west side
Queries COMDESDIV XRAY as to speed
Contacts enemy group on radar
Learns DESRON FIFTY-SIX accounted for
Notes enemy cruisers had changed course to west
Notes enemy cruisers retiring
Receives messages on tactical situation
560-566
560
560
560-561
561
561
562
562
56?
563
563
563
564
564
564
564-565
564-565
565
565
565
565-566
566
566-568
566
566
566
567
567
567
567
567
567
567
568
563-572
568
568
568
569
569
569
570
570
570
570
570
570
570
571
571
571
572
496799 0-59-5
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Unaware DESDIV 112 would be later than expected
Orders cruisers to increase speed
(U) Operations of COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX (Comnander Attack
Section ONE)
Arrives at post-attacK rendezvous
Makes incorrect report to CTG 77 »2
ALBERT W. GRANT notifies COLUMBIA she needs assistance
Receives orders to assist GRANT
Discussion thereon
LEARY fails to conform to movements
Receives second message from COLUMBIA
Receives ALBERT W. GRANT'S message requesting medical aid
LEARY arrives at post-attack rendezvous
Heads for GRANT
Informs CTG 77.2 ships at rendezvous except NEWCOMB
Dispatches medical aid to ALBERT './. GRANT
Receives orders to screen left flank cruisers
Directs LEARY provide anti-aircraft defense
(a) Operations of Commander Attack Section TWO
Changes course to north
Changes course to west
Replies to CTG 77.2 that he would screen
Directs Attack Section THR2E form column
Receives instructions on destroyer disposition
Receives query whether at thirty knots
(b) Operations of Commander Attack Section THREE
Proceeds toward post-attack rendezvous
Forms column astern of Attack Section TWO
(5) Operations of Commander Right Flank Force
Continues to track enemy
Receives armament report from COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR
Informs CTG 77.2 l-UB's sighted ships headed south
Reports PHOENIX 's contact to CTG 77.2
Learns of COMCRUDIV TWELVE'S contact
Orders cruisers to change course
Receives KILLEN's contact report
Cnanges course to west
Directs ARUNTA to stay near land
Informs his cruisers of situation
Decides to support left flank force
Discussion thereon
Directs casualty reports be reported oer TBS
Informs CTG 77.2 his ships were together on his side of
channel
Orders destroyers to screen to south
Commences to form anti-aircraft disposition
PHOENIX contacts enemy target
572
572
573-577
573
573
573
573
574
574
574
574
575
575
575
575
575
5^5
576-577
576
576
576
576
577
577
577
577
578-580
578
578
578
573
579
579
579
579-530
580
580
580
530
581
581
581
531
581
lxii
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(a) Operations of COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR 582-586
(1) Operations of Commander Attack Group 1.2 and COMDESRON
TWENTY-FOUR 582-583
Heads for Cabugan Grande Island 582
Slows to fifteen knots 582
Reports his armament situation to CTG 77»3 582
Receives queries on contacts 582
Learns MTBfs reported enemy headed south 582
Receives request for report on destroyers 583
Receives orders take station south of cruisers 583
Directs destroyers form screen 583
Queries CTG 77.3 as to base course 583
(2) Commander Attack Group 2.2 584^-586
Waits for something to turn up 584
KILLEN tracks enemy ship 584
KILT, EN contacts four ships by radar 584
ARUNTA contacts four destroyers 585
ARUNTA reports having five enemy ships to south 585
Informs CTG 77.2 that three ships contacted were his
group 585
Receives orders to get out of channel 585
Informs CTG 77.3 of position 585
Changes course to east 586
Heads for station in screen 586
Receives KILLEN1 s contact report 586
Units taking station 586
(B) Operations of CTG 79.11 587
Operates north and west of Cabugan Grande Island 587
Eastern Attack Group at post-attack rendezvous 587
Units dropped from discussion 587
(C) Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats 587-591
(1) Upper Surigao PT«s 587-588
Contacts two enemy ships 587
Decides to attack enemy destroyer 587
Makes unsuccessful torpedo attack 588
Taken under fire 588
(2) Kanihaan PT«s 588-589
Sights MOGAMI 588
Sights two burning portions of FUSO 588
Proceeds to regain station 588
Drifts with current 589
(3) South Amagusan PT»s 589
Drifts with current 589
Fails to pick up SHIGURE 589
(4) East Amagusan PT»s 589-590
(a) PT 328 589
Drifts with current 589-590
(b) PT 323 589-590
Proceeds south at four knots 589
Reports sighting destroyer by large burning ship 590
(c) PT 329 590
Drifting with current 590
Sights PC 1130 590
Decides to return to base 590
lxiii
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(5) Lower Surigao PT»s
(a) PT 490
Sends confusing message
Discussion thereon
(b) PT 491
Drifts with current
(c) PT 493
Beached on Maoyo Point
(6) Other PT's
Patrol uneventful
CHAPTER XX - JAPANESE OPERATIONS. 0520 - OoOO, October 25th
(A) Commander SECOND Striking Force
Units widely separated but takes no action
Discussion thereon
Realizes retiring units being taken under fire
Re— estimates situation; changes course to avoid gunfire
Discussion thereon
Recalls destroyers
(1) Operations of COMDESDIV EIGHTEEN
Proceeding toward southern entrance
Sights MTB»s
Notices ABUKUMA under escort; reduces speed
Receives order directing destroyers re join cruisers
(a) USHIO
Proceeding to escort ABUKUMA
Sights PT»s 194 and 150
Opens fire; MTB's retire under smoke
MTB fires torpedo; misses
Commences escorting ABUKUMA
Directed to rejoin cruisers
(2) ABUKUMA
In entrance rapidly closing USHIO
Reverses course
Sights PT's 194 and 150; opens fire
MTB attacks repulsed
Joined by USHIO
Fires starshells toward Sonok Point
(3) M0GAMI
Following NACHI but losing distance
Taken under fire and straddled
Takes evasive and preventive action
Endeavors to ascertain situation
Discussion thereon
Shelling ceases after ten direct hits
Sights PT»s 490 and 491
Heads for southern entrance
590-591
590-591
590
591
591
591
591
591
591
591
592-600
592-600
592
592
593
593
593
593
594-595
594
594
594
594
594-595
594
595
595
595
595
595
595-596
595
595
595
595
596
596
596-597
596
596
596
596
596-597
597
597
597
lxLv
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(4) ASAGUMO
Attempting to follow MOGAMI
Notes gunfire and changes course to avoid
Enemy fire ceases after one hit started fire
Decides to abandon ship
(5) SHIGURE
Employing manual steering
Shifts to auxiliary power steering
Fails to fall in astern of NACHI
Discussion thereon
Heads for passage between Binit Point and Bilaa Point
(6) FUSO
Two burning sections of FUSO continue to drift south
Bow section receives direct hit and sinks
598
598
598
598
598
598-599
599
599
599
599
599
600
600
600
CHAPTER XXI - ALLIED OPERATION, 0520 - 0600, October 25th
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2
Operates largely as Commander Left Flank Force
Familiar with developing situation
Notes Right Flank Force following Left Flank Force
Notes Commander Battle Line remaining in position
Receives PT 490 's contact report
Knows Commander Left Flank Force opened fire
Receives message that PT 194 sinking
Hears COMDESDIV XRAY»s report on pass astern
Knows Commander Left Flank Force ceases fire
Concerned about whole command
(1) Operations of C0MDESR0N FIFTY-SIX
(a) Operations of Commander Attack Section ONE
Lying close alongside damaged ALBERT W. GRANT
Hears Commander Left Flank Force order open fire
Directs RICHARD P. LEARY to screen
Goes alongside ALBERT W. GRANT to receive wounded, furnish
power and aid
(b) Operations of COMDESDIV 112
Acting as C0MDESR0N FIFTY-SIX
Queries CTG 77»2 as to his position
Reverses course to rejoin cruisers
(2) Operations of COMDESDIV XRAY
Proceeding south to make torpedo attack
Repairs to WELLES^ fuel pump completed
Learns CLAXT0N, tracking MOGAMI, has additional contacts
CONY makes radar contact
Reports pass astern of cruisers
Receives order to join cruisers as screen
SIGOURNEY makes radar contact
Receives orders form circular screen
SIGOURNEY passes through heavy oil slick; makes no report
Receives CTG 77.2's order to form circular disposition
Sights survivors in water
AULICK and THORN sight Japanese survivors
Destroyers maneuvering to form screen
601-625
601-616
601
601
601
601
601
601
601
602
602
602
602-604
602-603
602
602
603
603
603-604
603
603
604
60V606
604
605
605
605
605
605
605
605
606
606
606
606
606
Lxv
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(3) Operations of Commander Left Flank Force 6O6-6U
Proceeds south with cruisers astern 6O6
Queried by COMDESDIV 112 as to his position 606
Changes course to open fire 607
Orders cruisers to open fire 607
Firing table 607
Discussion thereon 606
Receives word COMDESDIV XRAY would pass astern 608
Directs COMDESDIV XRAY to join as screen 608
Changes course away from enemy 609
Discussion thereon 609
Table, ammunition expended and remaining 610
Directs COMDESDIV XRAY form circular screen 610
Directs CTG 77.3 to change course 611
Receives report of survivors in water 611
(4) Operations of Commander Battle Line 611
Continues to steam east 611
Follows action by intercepted messages 611
(5) Operations of CTG 77.3 612-614
Standing by to support CTG 77.2 and forming antiaircraft
disposition 612
Watches Commander Left Flank Force's movements 612
Intercepts message that PT 194 is sinking 612
Intercepts order to open fire 612
Changes course to give Left Flank Force more sea room 612
Observes left flank cruisers open fire 612
Hears Commander Left Flank Force order change course and
reverses course 613
Receives word that MTB needs help 613
Designates SHROPSHIRE guide 613
Increases speed 613
Executes "Turn 350"; BOISE guide 613
Antiaircraft disposition complete 614
Designated DALY, BACHE, BEALE as SDecial torpedo attack group,
"DALY's Boys" 614
(a) Operations of COMDESRON TWENTY- POUR 6LW>16
(1) Operations of Commander Attack Group 1.2 and COMDESRON
TWENTY-FOUR 6LW>16
Proceeding to screening stations 614
Discussion of failure to change speed and communicate 614-615
DALY reports friendly MTB*s 615
DALY investigates MTB's 615
(2) Operations of Commander Attack Group 2.2 616
Proceeding to screening stations 616
(B) Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats 617-625
(1) Upper Surigao PT's 617
Proceeding toward Dinagat shore 617
Stop and drift 617
(2) Kanihaan PT»s 617
Nothing of importance occurring 617
lxvi
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(3) South Amagusan PT«s
Drifting south; operations uneventful
(4) East Amagusan PTfs
(a) PT 328
Alone and drifting with current
(b) PT 323
Proceeding south
Changes course likely to investigate burning FUSO
(c) PT 329
Proceeding to base
Challenged by DALY
(5) Lower Surigao PT's
(a) PT 490
Drifting south
Sights MOGAMI
No torpedoes, no attack
(b) PT 491
Drifting with current
Sights MOGAMI; attempts to report contact
Commences approach
(c) PT 493
Damaged and abandoned; beached on Maoyo Point
(6) SW Panaon PT's
Sights large fire up strait
Contacts USHIO and ABUKUMA
(a) PT 194
Sights USHIO visually; continues on
Opens fire on ABUKUMA
40MM gun rendered useless by enemy fire
Turns away
Receives second hit
Request help
Heads for shoreline of Panaon Island
Sights PT 196 searching for her
(b) PT 150
Sights USHIO and ABUKUMA
Fires torpedo at USHIO which missed
Under gunfire and returns gunfire
Searches for PT 194
(c) PT 196
Fails to observe other PT's turn toward enemy
Observes gunfire from USHIO and ABUKUMA
Retires under smoke
Searching for PT 194
Sights PT 194
(7) SE Panaon PT«s
Units operating separately
(a) PT 137
Drifting with current
Proceeds to assistance of PT 194
Sights two destroyers
Sights starshells; is illuminated
Discussion thereon
Retires to south
617
617
617
617
617
617-618
617
617
618
618
618
618-619
618
618
618
618
618-619
618
619
619
619
619
619-622
619
619
620
620
620
620
620
620
620
620
620
621
621
621
621
621
621-622
621
621
621
622
622
622-623
622
622
622
622
622
622
622
623
Ixvii
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(8) Sumilon PT«s 623
Lying to 623
Sights four fires to north 623
As COMMTBRON THIRTY-SIX directs Commander Bilaa Point PT»s to
join 623
(9) Bilaa Point PT's 623
Returning to Bilaa Point 623
Loses contact with ABUKUMA 623
Receives instructions to join COMMTBRON THIRTY-SIX 623
(10) Mailao PT«s 624
Patrolling toward south 624
Decides to return to base 624
(11) Limasawa PT»s 624
Continues unsuccessful search for PT 190 624
Receives PT 194* s message requesting help; proceeds toward
Sonok Point to assist 624
(a) PT 190 624
Operating alone 624
Receives PT 194fs request for help; does not respond until
later 624
(12) Camiguin PT«s 625
Lying to to detect enemy movements 625
Rejoins PT's 130 and 131 and departs for base 625
CHAPTER XXII - JAPANESE OPERATIONS. 0600 - 0700. October 25th 626-632
(A) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force 626-632
Proceeding south 626
Changes course to pass into Mindanao Sea 626
Notes destroyer take station 626
Exchanges class with M0GAMI 626
Notes KASUMI leave disposition 626
Sights false periscope and opens fire 626
Notes ASHIGARA open fire on MTB 626
Notes USHI0 and AKEB0N0 open fire on MTB 626-627
Changes course to clear ABUKUMA 627
Informs command that COMDESRON ONE will transfer to KASUKI; U3HI0
escort ABUKUMA 627
Designates AKEB0N0 to escort MOGAMI 627
KASUMI preparing to go alongside ABUKUMA 627
(1) USHI0 627-629
Escorting ABUKUMA 627
Completes circle and rejoins NACHI 627
Observes NACHI open fire 628
Observes ASHIGARA open fire on MTB 628
Turns left to cross NACHI 's track 628
Sights PT 150; opens fire 628
Flashes recognition; opens fire on PT 190 628
Changes course to resume station 628
Takes station 628
Leaves disposition to escort ABUKUMA 628
lxviii
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(2) ABUKUMA 629
Under escort 629
Receives dispatch directing KASUMI to come alongside 629
(3) MOGAMI 629-631
Sights PT 491 and opens fire 629
Avoids MTB torpedoes 630
Sights SECOND Striking Force; identifies herself 630
Proceeds to southern exit 630
Repulses two MTB's 630
Sights PT 137; opens fire with main battery 630
Opens fire on PT 150 631
Progressing in control of fires; morale rises 631
(4) SHIGURE 631
Operating to remain clear of SECOND Striking Force 631
Sighted by PT 137 631
Sights six MTB's and opens fire 631
(5) ASAGUMO 632
Badly damaged and afire, prepares to abandon ship 632
Opens fire at MTB with one gun 632
(6) FUSO 632
Burning stern continues to drift 632
Stern sinks about 0640 632
lxix CONFIDENTIAL
confidential
CHAPTER XXIII - ALLIED OPERATIONS, 06CO - 0700, October 25th 633-652
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2, 0600 - 0700, October 25th 633-642
Operates largely as Commander Left Flank Force 633
Receives message DESRON FIFTY-FOUR at rendezvous 633
Directs COMDESRON FIFTY- FOUR resume normal screening 633
Receives warning of enemy aircraft 633
Directs COMBATLINE dispose battle line between Taytay Point
and Hibuson Island 633
Knows his cruisers are pursuing Japanese cripples 633
(l) Operations of Commander Left Flank Force 633-637
Forming circular cruising disposition 633
Intercepts message directing DESDIV XRAY expedite forming screen 634
Reduces speed to facilitate forming 634
Receives message asking course and speed 634
Receives COMDESDIV 112 's message about survivors; directs rescue 634
Notes disposition formed 634
Discussion of reasons for northerly course 634
Heads soutla maintaining circular disposition 634
Receives message requesting tug for ALBERT W. GRANT 634
Receives aircraft warning releasing antiaircraft batteries 635
Receives message stating survivors are Japanese 635
Notes HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS take CLAXTON's station 635
Obsei-ves sunrise 635
Hears survivors accept lines 635
Hears several hundred survivors, most would not accept lines 635
Receives report enemy retiring 635
Directs COMCRUDIV TWELVE destroy cripples 636
BENNION reports men in water 636
Directs BENNION rescue survivors, beware of torpedoes 636
Discussion thereon 636
Notes COMCRUDIV TWELVE leaving disposition 636
Forms column 636
Directs COMDESDIV 112 not to waste time on rescue 636
(2) Operations of COMCRUDIV TWELVE 637
Directed proceed and destroy cripples 637
Dep arts disposition 637
Queried by COMDESDIV 112 as to additional destroyers;
reply ambiguous 637
Informs COMDESDIV 112 of position 633
(3) Operations of COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX 638-641
(a) Operations of Commander Attack Section ONE 638-639
Alongside ALBERT W. GRANT to assist; RICHARD P. LEARY
screening 638
NEWCOMB moors to ALBERT W. GRANT 638
Sends request for medical assistance 638
Reports condition of ALBERT W. GRANT and requests tug 639
NEWCOMB commences doubling lines to tow 639
RICHARD P. LEARY sends medical assistance 639
Notes NEWCOMB commence towing 639
lxx CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(b) Operations of COMDESDIV 112
Acting as COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX
Asks CTG 77.2 for his course and speed
Directs his two sections proceed independently
Reports passing survivors
Directs destroyers pick up survivors
Intercepts message that survivors are Japanese
Assumes command of rescue operation
Sends message asking COMCRUDIV TWELVE if he needs
additional destroyers
Informs CTG 77.2 that CLAXTON has three survivors
Directs HALFORD and BRYANT to follow and rejoin cruisers
(4) Operations of COMDESDIV XRAY
CLAXTON prepares to rescue survivors; other units taking
stations in screen
Directs division to expedite forming
Heads back to survivor area
Relieved as OTC by COMDESDIV 112
(5) Operations of CTG 77.3
In circular cruising disposition
Follows movements of CTG 77.2
(a) DALY
Investigating friendly MTB's
Discussion of DALY's failure to rejoin CTG 77.3
(B) Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats
(1) Upper Surigao PT's
Nothing of importance occuring
(2) Kanihaan PT's
Hear PT 491 call for help
Pass burning oil slick
Pass within two miles of ASAGUMO
(3) South Amagusan PT's
Commence return to base
Sighted by PT 328
(4) East Amagusan PT's
MTB's separated
(a) PT 328
Sights South Amagusan PT's
(b) PT 323
Sights ASAGUMO dead in water
Prepares to attack
Challenged by friendly TBF's
Fired on by ASAGUMO
Asks if target enemy
Ready to fire torpedoes
(c) PT 329
Seeks shelter close inshore
(5) Lower Surigao PT's
(a) PT 490
Commences return to base
(b) PT 491
Proceeds to firing position
Fired on by MOGAMI
Fires two torpedoes
Retires under fire from MOGAMI
Sights PT 493, calls for help
639^-641
639
639
639
640
640
640
640
641
641
641
641-642
641
642
642
642
642-643
642
642
643
643
643
644-652
644
644
644
644
644
644
644-645
644
644
645-646
645
645
645
645-646
645
645
645
645
646
646
646
646
646-647
646
646
646-647
646
646
646
646
647
lxxi
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Closes PT 493
Picks up survivors
(c) PT 493
Damaged and abandoned
PT 491 rescues crew
(6) SW Panaon PT's
(a) PT's 194 and 196
PT 196 transfers hospital corpsrr.en to PT 194
PT's 151 and 146 join
Proceed to Liloan
(b) PT 150
Continues unsucessful search for PT 194
Sights four destroyers to the south
Sighted by destroyers and fired on
Reports contact to base
Heads up Sogod Bay toward Ilijan Point
Changes course for San Richardo Point
Sights damaged cruiser; reports contact
Is fired on by MOGAMI
(7) SE Panaon PT's
Discussion of op erations of PT 137 only
(a) PT 137
Radio transmitter not functioning
Sights enemy destroyer
Continues search for PT 194
Sights SECOND Striking Force
Sights damaged MOGAMI
Proceeds to intercept
MOGAMI opens fire
(8) Sumilon PT's
Lying to waiting for Bilaa Point PT's to join
Joined by Bilaa Point PT's
Return to base
(9) Bilaa Point PT's
Join Sumilon PT's
(lO)Madilao PT's
Returning to base
Sight two columns of black smoke
Sight four or five destroyers
Head for Madilao Point
Pass Madilao Point and head for Bilaa Point
(ll)Limasawa PT's
PT's 151 and 146 continue to the assistance of PT 194
Join PT's 194 and 196 and return to base
(a) PT 190
Proceeds to aid PT 194
Sights six large ships and closes to identify them
Notes two destroyers open fire
Retires under smoke
Makes contact report and heads for Liloan Bay
(12)Camiguin PT's
Enroute Liloan Bay
Observes shell splashes fired by imaginary submarine
Searches for imaginary submarine
Resumes course for Liloan Bay
647
647
64^
647
647
647-649
647-64?
647
648
648
648-649
648
648
648
648
648
648
648
643
649
649
649
649
649
649
649
649
649
649
650
650
650
650
650
650
650-6;:
650
650
650
650
651
651-652
651
651
651-652
651
651
652
652
652
652
652
652
652
652
lxxii
: FIDQJTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CHAPTER XXIV - JAPANESE OPERATIONS. 0700 - 0733, October 25th
(A) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force
Sights carrier type aircraft
Air attacks continue
(1) ABUKUMA and USHIO
USHIO proceeding escort ABUKUMA
KASUMI alongside ABUKUMA
Sights carrier- type aircraft; notes KASUMI open fire
Completes transfer COMDESRON ONE to KASUMI
USHIO opens fire on aircraft
(2) MOGAMI and AKEBONO
AKEBONO reverses course to escort MOGAMI
AKEBONO notes MTB«s and opens fire
MOGAMI bombed and strafed by enemy aircraft
(3) SHIGURE
Escapes attack by enemy aircraft
(4) ASAGUMO
Dead in water, fires at enemy MTB
Prepares to abandon ship
Receives torpedo hit
Completes abandoning ship
Taken under fire and sinks
CHAPTER XXV - ALLIED OPERATIONS. 0700 - 0733. October 25th
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2
Operates largely as Commander Left Flank Force
Receives congratulations from.CTF 77
Receives report CVE's under attack off Samar
Discussion thereon
Issues no instructions
Discussion thereon
(l) Operations of Commander Left Flank Force
CRUDIV TWELVE sent ahead; other units forming
Receives request from CONY to open fire on ASAGUMO
Grants permission
Discussion thereon
AULICK and SIGOURNEY open fire on ASAGUMO
Discussion thereon
Directs battle Line form between Hibuson and Cabugan Grande
Observes HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS and THORN commence firing
Observes DENVER and COLUMBIA open fire
Receives CTF 77' s warning of approaching enemy aircraft
Observes LEUTZE open fire
Receives report from MINNEAPOLIS on destroyer near beach
Directs LOUISVILLE launch plane to search
Observes CLAXTON open fire
Changes course; all units cease fire
Observes ASAGUMO sink
Receives report of survivors
653-655
653-655
653
653
653-654
653
653
653
653
654
654
654
654
654
655
655
655
655
655
655
655
655
656-673
656-669
656
656
656
656-657
658
658
659-664
659
659
659
659
660
660
660
660
660
660
660
660-661
661
661
661
661
662
lxxiii
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Directs AULICK and SIGOURNEY to sink cripples and rejoin
Receives message reporting CVE's under attack
Re-estimates situation
Decides to return Leyte Gulf and reform command
Discussion thereon
Directs destroyers form antisubmarine screen
Changes course to north
(2) Operations of COMCRUDIV TWELVE
Observes BENNION open fire
Changes course to unmask guns, slows and orders ships open fire
Issues no firing instructions
Discussion thereon
Notes ASAGUMO roll over; ships cease fire
Firing table
Observes ASAGUMO sink
COLUMBIA intercepts message reporting TU 77.4.3 under attack;
fails to inform COMCRUDIV TWELVE
HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS directed to investigate survivors
Changes course to rejoin _^ ..
(3) Operations of COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX and Commander Attack Section
ONE
Flagship towing ALBERT W. GRANT
Receives warning of imminent air attack
(4) Operations of COMDESDIV 112
Still in survivor area
BRYANT abandons rescue; heads for cruisers
HALFORD sinks small boat and heads for cruisers
COMDESDIV 112 recovers one survivor and heads south
Sights FT 323
Notes prematurely division joined CTG 77.2
(5) Operations of CTG 77.3
Follows Left Flank Force down strait
Observes Left Flank Force open fire
Intercepts message reporting CVE's under attack; does not relay
message to CTG 77.2
Discussion thereon
Notes sinking of ASAGUMO
Returns to north
(B) Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats
(1) PT's 137 and 150
Continue toward MOGAMI
Taken under fire
Retire to north after receiving permission to return
(2) East Amagusan PT's
(a) PT's 329 and 328
Returning to base
(b) PT 323
Fires three torpedoes; third hit
Under ASAGUMO* s gunfire
Commences return to base
Challenged by destroyer
662
662-663
663
663
663-664
664
664
664-667
665
665
665
665
666
666
666
667
667
667
667
667
667
668-669
668
668
668
668
668
669
669-670
669
669
669
669
670
670
670-673
670
670
670
670
671
671
671
671
671
671
671
671
Lodv
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(3) Kanihaan PT's
Proceeding toward Maoyo Point
Sight MOGAMI class cruiser on fire
Discussion thereon
Go alongside PT 491 at Maoyo Point
Feel underwater explosion
(4) Lower Surigao PT»s
(a) PT 490
Returning to base
(b) PT 491
Alongside PT 493 assisting survivors
Notes Kanihaan PT«s arrive
Observes PT 493 sink at 0745
(c) PT 493
Beached on Maoyo Point
Sinks
CHAPTER XXVI - EPILOGUE
672-673
672
672
672
672
673
673
673
673
673
673
673
673
673
673
673
67V-676
APPENDIX I
APPENDIX II
MAIN BATTERY AMMUNITION (ARMOR PIERCING AND TORPEDOES)
REMAINING IN TG«s 77.2 AND 77.3 AS OF 0733 OCTOBER
25th 677-679
TIDAL CURRENTS IN SURIGAO STRAIT
680-684
APPENDIX III
APPENDIX IV
APPENDIX V
APPENDIX VI
APPENDIX VII
APPENDIX VIII
ORGANIZATION OF COMBINED FLEET, 1042 OCTOBER 23rd -
1830 OCTOBER 24th, BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF 685-689
ORGANIZATION OF ALLIED FORCES AT 1042 OCTOBER 23rd -
1830 OCTOBER 24th, BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF 690-718
ORGANIZATION OF ALLIED FORCES, 1830 OCTOBER 24th,
1944, BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT 719-721
ORGANIZATION OF JAPANESE FORCES, 1830 OCTOBER 24th,
1944, BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT ' 722
JAPANESE AIRCRAFT 723
CERTAIN ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS WORK 724-725
lxxv
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PLATES AND DIAGRAMS
PLATE TITLE FACES PAGE
I Allied Command Relations cxii
II Japanese Command Relations cxii
III Contacts Received by Principal Japanese Commanders, October
23rd, 1944 2
IV Allied Search Plan FOX, SOWESPAC 22
V Contacts Received by Principal Allied Commanders, October 23rd,
1944 24
VI Allied Motor Torpedo Boat Operating Areas 34
VII Allied Submarine Operating Area Classifications, SOWESPAC 36
VIII Allied Submarine Operating Areas, SOWESPAC 36
IX Allied Search Plan FOX (Modified), SOWESPAC 42
X Allied Search Plan, Central Pacific 50
XI Allied Submarine Operating Area Classifications, Western Pacific 52
XII Allied Submarine Operating Areas, Western Pacific 52
XIII Contacts Received by Principal Japanese Commanders, October 24th,
1944 60
XIV Japanese Submarine Dispositions Ordered October 24th, 1944 74
XV Contacts Received by Principal Allied Commanders, October 24th,
1944 90
XVI Japanese Formations, SECOND Striking Force 230
XVII Battle Disposition Allied Forces, Surigao Strait 240
XVIII Allied Screening Plan, Battle for Leyte Gulf 246
XIX Disposition of Allied Motor Torpedo Boats, Battle of Surigao
Strait 250
XX Japanese Formations, THIRD Section 260
XXI Radar Scope Sketches, TG 79«H 356
XXII Range Diagram for Multi-speed Torpedoes 360
XXIII Torpedo Analysis, MONSSEN 374
XXIV Allied Fire Distribution Showing Concentration on YAMASHIRO 472
lxxvi CONFIDENTIAL
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DIAGRAM TITLE FACES PAGE
Weather Legend 726
"A" Strategic Area Chart 728
"B" Events Depicted; Air Searches and Movements of Forces from
1042 to 2400 October 23rd, 1944 730
"C" Events Depicted; Air Searches and Movements of Forces from
0000 to 2400 October 24th, 1944 736
"D" Events Depicted; Japanese Approach Past PT Boats, 1830 to
2400 October 24th, 1944 738
"E" Events Depicted; FIRST Division Sweep of Water West of Panaon
Island, 0000 to 0100 October 25th, 1944 740
Him
HTM
II Til
II Pit
Events Depicted; THIRD Section Enters the Strait and PT
Boats Attack, 0100 to 0245 October 25th, 1944 742
"G" Events Depicted; First Destroyer Torpedo Attack, DESRON
54, 0245 to 0320 October 25th, 1944 746
HH" Events Depicted; Second Destroyer Torpedo Attack, DESRON
24, 0320 to 0348 October 25th, 1944 750
Events Depicted; SECOND Striking Force Enters the Strait,
0245 to 0348 October 25th, 1944 752
Events Depicted; Third Destroyer Torpedo Attack, DESRON
56 and Major Gun Action, 0348 to 0420 October 25th, 1944 756
"K" Events Depicted; Cruisers Start the Pursuit, 0420 to 0520,
October 25th, 1944 760
"L" Events Depicted; Second Cruiser Gun Action, T.G. 77.2,
0457 to 0600 October 25th, 1944 762
MM" Events Depicted; Retiring SECOND Striking Force Drives off
PT Boats, 0515 to 0700 October 25th, 1944 766
"N" Events Depicted; Second Cruiser Movement South, 0600 to
0700 October 25th, 1944 768
"0" Events Depicted; Concluding Gun Action and Cruiser Retire-
ment North, 0700 to 0845 October 25th, 1944 770
Events Depicted; SECOND Striking Force in the Mindanao Sea,
0700 to 0840 October 25th, 1944 772
496799 o - 59 - 6 Ixxvii CONFIDENTIAL
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ALL TIMES IN THIS ANALYSIS, EXCEPT ALLIED DISPATCH
TIKES ARE ZONE TIME (-9)
ALLIED DISPATCH TIMES ARE GREENWICH CIVIL TIME*
The time of receipt of many dispatches, both Allied and Japanese, has
been generally unavailable to this analysis. In order to compensate for
this, it has been assumed from an average time of receipt of a number of
important dispatches that, unless otherwise stated, important dispatches
concerning operations were received by action addressees in one-half hour
when handled via direct circuits. Such assumed times of receipt are
indicated by the phrase Mat about", while actual times of receipt are
indicated by the phrase "at (time inserted)". While this assumption may
seem somewhat generous, a study of this analysis will show that where
such assumptions are made the result of later receipt (such as one hour
or more) would have caused little or no change in the basic study.
Often the time of receipt is known for one command but is not known
for other commands. "When this much information is available an analysis
of the commander under discussion is made to determine whether or not it
was likely he received the dispatch on the same transmission as the
commander with the known time of receipt. Such items as location, command
organization, importance of command and importance of the dispatch are
considered. When appropriate it is therefore assumed that several
commanders received a particular dispatch at the same time, in which case
the assumption is so indicated in the text.
In order to summarize contact information each contact plate lists in
tabular form time of contact, location and the time of receipt by the
principal commanders. The abbreviation "Rec'd" in the time box indicates
the report was probably received; exact time unknown. The time box left
blank indicates either lack of information as to receipt or the contact
was considered of lesser concern to the commander. Where applicable the
one-half hour transmission time assumption explained above, has been
applied to contact reports and those receipt times recorded.
It will be noted that some Allied Air Force dispatches employ local
zone time, in which cases the zone designating letter (I) is suffixed
to the date-time-group.
lxxviii CONFIDENTIAL
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PRINCIPAL COMMANDERS
JAPANESE
Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet
Chief of Staff
Commander Mobile Force
Chief of Staff
Commander Main Force
Chief of Staff
Commander FIRST Striking Force
Chief of Staff
Commander SECOND Striking Force
Chief of Staff
Commander Advance Expeditionary Force
Chief of Staff
Commander Southwest Area Force
Chief of Staff
Commander THIRD Southern Expeditionary Force
(Philippine Force)
Chief of Staff
Admiral Toyoda, Soemu, UN
Vice Admiral Kusaka,
Ryunosuke , I JN
Vice Admiral Ozawa,
Jisaburo, IJN
Rear Admiral Obayashi,
Sueo, IJN
Vice Admiral Ozawa,
Jisaburo, IJN
Rear Admiral Obayashi,
Sueo, IJN
Vice Admiral Kurita,
Takeo, IJN
Rear Admiral Koyanagi,
Tomiji, IJN
Vice Admiral Shima,
Kiyohide, IJN
Rear Admiral Matsumoto,
Takeshi, IJN
Vice Admiral Miwa,
Shigeyoshi, IJN
Rear Admiral Nishina,
Kozo, IJN
Vice Admiral Mikawa,
Gunichi, IJN
Vice Admiral Nishio,
Hidehiko, IJN
Vice Admiral Mikawa,
Gunichi, IJN
Rear Admiral Shimamoto,
Kyugoro, IJN
lxxix
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Commander FIFTH Base Air Force
Chief of Staff
Commander SIXTH Base Air Force
Chief of Staff
CinC Southern Army
Chief of Staff
CG FOURTEENTH Area Army
CG FOURTH Air Army
Chief of Staff
Southern Army
(a) FOURTH Air Army
(1) SECOND Air Division
(2) FOURTH Air Division
Vice Admiral Teraoka,
Kimpei, IJN
Captain Odahara,
Toshihiko, IJN
Vice Admiral Fukudome,
Shigeru, IJN
Rear Admiral Sugimoto,
Ushie, IJN
Field Karshal Terauchi,
Hisaichi, IJA
Lt. General Iimura,
Jo, IJA
General Yamashita,
Tomoyuki , IJA
Lt. General Tominaga,
Kyoji, IJA
Lt. General Terada,
Seiichi, IJA
Field Marshal Terauchi,
Hisaichi, IJA
Lt. General Tominaga,
Kyoji, IJA
Lt. General Kinoshita,
Isamu, IJA
Lt. General Kinoshita,
Isamu, IJA*
(3) SEVENTH Air Division
* Philippine Air Operation, Phase II, Page 40. It is believed Lt. General
Kinoshita commanded both divisions after assuming command of the 2ND Air
Division when its original commander was wounded on October 19th, 1944.
lxxx
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ALLIED
(a) Southwest Pacific Area
Commander Southwest Pacific Area
(COMSOWESPAC)
General MacArthur,
Douglas A., USA
Chief of Staff
Lt. General Sutherland,
Richard K., USA
Commander Allied Air Force SOWESPAC
(COMAIRSOWESPAC)
Lt. General Kenney,
George C.,(AC), USA
Chief of Staff
Commander Allied Naval Forces SOWESPAC
Chief of Staff
Commander SEVENTH Fleet (COMSEVENTHFLT)
Chief of Staff
Commanding General SIXTH Army-
Chief of Staff
Commander Central Philippines Attack Force
(CTF 77)
Chief of Staff
Commander Bombardment and Fire Support
Group (CTG 77.2)
Brigadier General Beebe,
Royden E.,(AC), USA
Vice Admiral Kinkaid,
Thomas C, USN
Commodore Schaeffer,
Valentine H., USN
Vice Admiral Kinkaid,
Thomas C, USN
Commodore Schaeffer,
Valentine H., USN
Lt. General Krueger,
Walter, USA
Brigadier General Decker,
George H., USA
Vice Admiral Kinkaid,
Thomas C, USN
Commodore Schaeffer,
Valentine H., USN
Rear Admiral Oldendorf,
Jesse B., USN
Chief of Staff
Commander Escort Carrier Group (CTG 77.4)
Chief of Staff
Captain Bates, Richard
W., USN
Rear Admiral Sprague,
Thomas L., USN
Captain Carson, Joseph
M., USN
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Commander Dinagat Attack Group (CTG 78.4)
Chief of Staff
Rear Admiral St ruble,
Arthur D., U3N
Captain Abdill, Everett
W., USN
Commander Minesweeping and Hydrographic
Group* (CTG 77.5)
Commander Northern Attack Force (DTF 78)
Chief of Staff
Commander Palo Attack Group (CTG 78.1)
Chief of Staff
Commander San Ricardo Attack Group
(CTG 78.2)
Chief of Staff
Commander Southern Attack Force (CTF 79)
Chief of Staff
Commander Attack Group ABLE (CTG 79.1)
Commander Loud, Wayne
R., USN
Rear Admiral Barbey,
Daniel E., USN
Commodore Noble, Albert
G., USN
Rear Admiral Barbey,
Daniel E., USN
Commodore Noble, Albert
G., USN
Rear Admiral Fechteler,
William M., USN
Caotain Sprague, Albert
T.~, Jr., USN
Vice Admiral Wilkinson,
Theodore S., USN
Commodore Powell,
Paulus P., USN
Rear Admiral Conolly,
Richard L., USN
Chief of Staff
Commander Attack Group BAKER (CTG 79.2)
Chief of Staff
Commander Submarines SEVENTH Fleet
Chief of Staff
Captain Moore,
Waiter E., USN
Rear Admiral Royal,
Forrest B., USN
Captain Dugan, Paul
F., USN
Rear Admiral Christie,
Ralph W., USN
Captain Nichols, Philip
G., USN
* Since no Chief Staff Officer was assigned CTG 77.5 this function was
performed as additional duty by Lieutenant Roy E. Daly, USNR.
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Commander Submarines West Australia
(CTF 71)
Chief of Staff
(b) Pacific Ocean Areas
CinC Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA)
Chief of Staff
Commander Western Pacific Task Forces
Chief of Staff
Commander THIRD Fleet (COMTHIRDFLT)
Chief of Staff
Commander FIRST Carrier Task Force
(CTF 38)
Chief of Staff
Commander Forward Area Central Pacific
Task Force (CTF 57)
Chief of Staff
Commander Shore-Based Air Force
Forward Area (CTF 59)
Chief of Staff
Commander Submarines Pacific Fleet
(COMSUBPAC) (CTF 17)
Chief of Staff
Rear Admiral Christie,
Ralph W., USN
Captain Nichols, Philip
G., USN
Admiral Nimitz, Chester
W., USN
Vice Admiral McMorris,
Charles H., USN
Admiral Halsey, William
F., Jr., USN
Rear Admiral Carney,
Robert B., USN
Admiral Halsey, William
F., Jr., USN
Rear Admiral Carney,
Robert B., USN
Vice Admiral Mitscher,
Marc A., USN
Commodore Burke, Arleigh
A., USN
Vice Admiral Hoover,
John H., USN
Captain Scull, Herbert
M., USN
Major General Hale, Willis
H., (AC), USA
Colonel Carr, Lawrence
J., (AC), USA
Vice Admiral Lockwood,
Charles A., USN
Commodore Comstock,
Merrill, USN
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(c) China-Burma-India Theater
CG Army Forces CBI
Chief of Staff
CG GOURTEENTH Air Force
Chief of Staff
CG TWENTIETH Bomber Command
Chief of Staff
General Stilwell, Joseph
W., USA
Brigadier General Cannon,
Robert K., USA
Major General Chennault,
Claire L., (AC), USA
Brigadier General Glenn,
Edgar E., USA
Major General LeMay,
Curtis E., (AC), USA
Brigadier General Upston,
John S., USA
lxxxiv
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INTRODUCTION
Volume I of the study of the Battle for Leyte Gulf covers the
preliminary operations of this battle on both the Allied and Japanese
sides until 0719 October 17th, 1944. This was the moment when the
Japanese lookouts on Suluan Island at the entrance to Leyte Gulf, made a
contact report on Allied surface forces entering Leyte Gulf. These
Allied surface forces were the advance forces of the SEVENTHFLT which
had been ordered, commencing D-3* day (October 17th) to prepare the way
for the seizure by the SIXTH Army of certain areas on Leyte Island
preparatory to seizing the Philippines. (A thorough brief of Volume I is
contained in the Introduction to Volume I — a limited brief in Volume II*)
Volume II of this study covers the three-day period of operations from
D-3 through D-l day (2400 October 19th). During this time the:
(a) Allied forces seized Suluan Island, positions on Southern Homonhon
and Northern Dinagat Islands, cleared most of the objective area of mines,
prepared by gunfire and aircraft bombing the enemy areas in the vicinity
of the selected landing beaches, reconnoitered with UDT's the approaches
to the above landing areas, hit Formosa (B-29fs), Luzon and the Visayas
by air strikes and reconnoitered with air and submarines certain crucial
areas;
(b) Japanese forces, having estimated that all of the above presaged
Allied landings in the Central and Southern Philippines, activated SHO
ONE and commenced concentrating force movements to the Philippine area as
follows: (1) the FIRST Striking Force at Brunei Bay, (2) the SECOND
Striking Force at Mako, both commanders to arrive on October 20th, (3)
the Main Force was to depart the Inland Sea on this same day (October
20th) and head toward Leyte, (4) the SIXTH Base Air Force in Formosa
(about 395 operational planes), and (5) the submarines in the waters east
of Leyte. At this time the FIFTH Base Air Force consisted of about forty
operational planes out of about sixty-seven available; the FOURTH Air
Army of about fifty- five out of ninety- two available.
Meanwhile the Army and Navy were in strong disagreement. The
Navy had informed the Army that they were planning to have the Combined
Fleet penetrate into Leyte Gulf and the Army had opposed this, desiring
the Navy to conserve fleet strength; and,
(c) A thorough brief of Volume II is contained in the Introduction to
Volume II; a limited brief in Volume III,
Volume III of this study covers the three and one-half day period of
operations from 0000, D-day (October 20th) through 1042, D/3 day (October
23rd). During this time the:
Although COMSOWESPAC employed the term A-day rather than D-day, the
latter is employed throughout this analysis to follow the more familiar
military usage.
Ixxxv CONFIDENTIAL
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(a) Allied forces landed with limited or no opposition (1) on Leyte
.Island (a) the TENTH Corps (consisting of the TWENTY-FOURTH Division and
FIRST Cavalry Division) in the vicinity of Tacloban, (b) TWENTY-FOURTH
Corps (consisting of the SEVENTH Infantry Division and NINETY-SIXTH
Infantry Division) in the vicinity of Dulag and (2) on Panaon Island, the
TWENTY-FIRST Infantry Regiment . Progress ashore and the unloading of
supplies was so successful that Army commanders assumed command ashore as
follows: (a) on the 20th (l) at 1100 the Regimental Commander TWENTY-
FIRST Infantry Regiment, (2) at 1430 the C.G. TWENTY-FOURTH Infantry
Division and C.G. FIRST Cavalry Division and (3) at 1730 the C.G. NINETY-
SIXTH Infantry Division, (b) on the 21st (1) at 1300 the C.G. SEVENTH
Infantry Division and (2) at 1600 the C.G. TENTH Corps. (This left the
C.G. TWENTY-FOURTH Corps and the C.G. SIXTH Army who had not as yet
assumed command ashore.) Meanwhile the THIRD and SEVENTH Fleet carriers
conducted air strikes against Luzon and the Visayas and in support of the
ground operation, while the submarines continued their attack and
reconnaissance operations. The submarines made three important contacts,
one on the SECOND Striking Force, one on the Main Body, FIRST Striking
Force and one on CRUDIV SIXTEEN, and succeeded in torpedoing the ATAGO,
MAYA and TAKAO of the Main Body, FIRST Striking Force and the AOBA of
CRUDIV SIXTEEN, with results mentioned under (b) following,
(b) Japanese forces, being in limited strength, permitted the Allied
ground troops to land with only limited or no opposition. Thereafter,
owing to the power of the Allied offensive by ground, air and sea forces,
the Japanese ground troops on Leyte were generally ineffective. Meanwhile,
on October 20th the Chief of the Army General Staff decided to defend
Leyte employing the maximum ground forces wr.ich could be brought into the
area in a manner similar to that which had been originally planned for
Luzon. This was a marked change from the basic SHO ONE plan which called
for the defense of Leyte by the ground troops locally available.
Meanwhile, also on the 20th, the FIRST Striking Force ana .IV
SIXTEEN arrived at Brunei Bay, the SECOND Striking Force arrived at Mako,
the Main Force sortied Bungo Suido. Then, on the 21st, the SECOND
Striking Force and CRUDIV SIXTEEN got underway for Manila and on the 22nd
the Main Body, FIRST Striking Force and the THIRD Section, FIRST Striking
Force got underway for Leyte. On this day the SIXTH Base Air Force
commenced moving to Luzon and the FOURTH Air Army received sixty-one
reinforcement planes. On the 23rd (a) the Main Body was intercepted by
the DACE and DARTER in Palawan Passage, and the ATAGO and MAYA were sunk,
the TAKAO heavily damaged and (b) CRUDIV SIXTEEN was intercepted by the
BREAM and the AOBA was torpedoed, (c) the SIXTH Base Air Force launched
its general offensive (150 planes) but was turned back and (d) the FOURTH
Air Army received sixty additional reinforcement aircraft. A thorough
brief of Volume III is contained in the Introduction to Volume LEI.
lxxxvi CONFIDENTIAL
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Volume IV, which as point out in the FOREWORD, was to have been a
continuity volume, was discontinued long before its completion. However
since a portion of this Volume, i.e., the period from 1042 October 23rd
to 1830 October 24th had been under analysis for sometime, it was avail-
able in lesser detail than that which characterized the earlier volumes.
Therefore, since an understanding of the events which occurred during the
period is essential to a proper understanding of the Battle of Surigao
Strait, a limited discussion of these events is provided in Chapters I
through IVo
In these limited discussions an effort has been made:
(a) on the Japanese side to discuss rather fully the operations of
(1) Commander THIRD Section who fought the Battle of Surigao Strait and
(2) Commander SECOND Striking Force who followed the THIRD Section into
Surigao Strait and (3) much less fully the operations of all other
Japanese commanders, and
(b) on the Allied side to discuss rather fully the operations of (1)
CTF 77 who was the strategic commander in Leyte Gulf at the time of the
Battle of Surigao Strait, (2) CTG 77.2 who was the tactical commander in
the above battle, (3) CTG 70.1 who commanded the Motor Torpedo Boats in
Leyte Gulf directly under Commander SEVENTH Fleet (CTF 77) and (4) much
less fully the operations of all other Allied commanders.
Command relations are discussed in Volume I* (Allied in Chapter II
and Japanese in Chapter III). This discussion will not be repeated
herein although diagrams of the command relations existing at the time
of the Battle of Surigao Strait are included as Plates I and II,
A Brief Narrative of the 1042 October 23rd - 0733 October 25th
Phase of the Battle for Leyte Gulf
(1) Operations 1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
(a) Japanese.
During this day CinC Combined Fleet watched with great interest
the movement of his forces toward the battle areas. He also followed
closely the contact reports on enemy forces although these were sparse
due to bad weather east of the Philippines. At 1710 he issued his
Estimate of the Situation which gave (a) a clear and fully correct
explanation of Allied plans and (b) an explanation of own plans.
The Main Body, FIRST Striking Force, which temporarily was under
the tactical command of Commander Battleship Division ONE continued
northward in Palawan Passage. At 1623 Commander FIRST Striking Force,
who since the sinking of the ATAGO had been in the KISHINAMI, transferred
to the YAMATO and at 1630 resumed tactical command of the Main Body.
* Volume I, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92194), Naval War College,
1953.
lxxxvii CONFIDENTIAL
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Commander THIRD Section, who had passed through Balabac Strait at
1025, continued uneventfully across the Sulu Sea. He spent the day in
planning and issuing instructions to his ships concerning the coming
action in the Battle of Surigao Strait.
Commander Main Force, as yet undetected by the enemy, continued
on toward the southwest in accordance with his mission to divert Allied
task forces from the area east of the Philippines to the north. During
the afternoon he continued planning for the following day, when he was to
initiate air action at 0600.
Commander SECOND Striking Force (less CRUDIV SIXPEEN and DESDIV
TWENTY-ONE) continued on toward Coron Bay arriving at 1800. During the
evening he fueled his destroyers from the cruisers.
CRUDIV SIXTEEN, in the damaged AOBA, was being towed into Manila
Bay. At noon he became Commander Guard Force. After the AOBA had
anchored safely inside Manila Bay he, at 204.5, transferred his flag to
the KINU and with the URANAMI, proceeded to Manila Harbor to fuel.
COMDESDIV TWENTY-ONE arrived Manila at 1500, discharged SIXTH
Base Air Force personnel and refueled. At 2125 he departed to rejoin
Commander SECOND Striking Force off Negros Island.
Commander Advanced Expeditionary Force had eleven submarines
en route to assigned stations east of the Philippines.
During the afternoon two contacts were made by radio direction
finders on unknown forces east of Luzon. These contacts did not
indicate any unusual activity.
Commander FIFTH Base Air Force, who had about twenty-four opera-
tional aircraft, deployed two Kamikaze Units to Mindanao airfields during
the day.
Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, who had about 223 aircraft at the
end of the day, continued his efforts to organize his units in the Clark
Complex and to prepare for an all out effort the next day.
C.G. FOURTH Air Army, who moved his headquarters to Bacolod,
Negros, during the day, continued to prepare for his all out attack the
next day and accommodated the considerable number of newly arriving
aircraft in the middle Visayan airfield complex. At the end of the day,
although he had about 232 aircraft, only 128 were to be operational for
the attack the next morning.
(b) Allied.
During this day COMSOWESPAC conducted the installation ceremonies
for the Philippine Commonwealth Government at Tacloban, also C.G. TWENTY-
FOURTH Corps assumed command ashore as of 1200.
lxxxviii CONFIDENTIAL
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CTF 77, during the afternoon, received a contact report on the
SECOND Striking Force and also one on a possible battleship, a light
cruiser, a destroyer and several Sugar Charlies in Macassar Strait as
well as the DACE and DARTER reports of their attacks on three battleships,
three other heavy ships and four ATAGO's (FIRST Section of the FIRST
Striking Force) in Palawan Passage. There is nothing to indicate that
these reports caused him to revise his opinion that the Japanese intended
to conduct magnified Tokyo Express operations against Leyte.
CTF 78, and CTF 79 as well, (a) followed unloading operations
closely, as a result of which they were able to unload a large number of
ships and to sail them before dark and (b) planned the unloading of the
ships that were to arrive in the transport areas the next day.
After 1042 (a) the escort carriers provided about eighty ground
support missions, about forty target CAP and twelve target ASP missions
and forty-three airfield and shipping strike missions, with losses of one
VF and two VT. Thus there remained at the end of the day 310 VF and 138
VT; (b) Allied submarines carried out their usual operations with (1)
TF 17 submarines attacking a convoy and (2) TF 71 submarines (ANGLER and
GUITARRO) contacting the Main Body, which was continuing northward despite
the loss of the ATAGO and MAYA and the torpedoing of the TAKAO by the
DACE and DARTER; (c) the PB4Y flying in Sector 312°(T) - 321o(T) from
Morotai contacted the SECOND Striking Force shortly before 1220; (d) ten
PBY's arrived in Leyte Gulf to search to the northward the next day; (e)
no mines were swept by the minesweepers of TG 77. 5 •
COMTHIRDFLT continued his planning for the following day's
operations which were to commence with a search to the westward covering
southern Luzon and the Visayas. Although he gave his principal attention
to his supporting capabilities he was also preparing his command for
operation HOTFOOT— air strikes against the Japanese mainland. During the
evening he ordered a search to the northward to cover sector 320° (T) to
OlOo (T) to a distance of 350 miles to be launched at midnight and also
ordered that the bays along the northwest coast of Palawan be searched
the following morning.
TF 38, during the remainder of the day, operated as follows:
(a) TB 38,1 continued on toward Ulithi.
(b) TG 38.2 finished fueling from TG 30.9 at 1057 and proceeded
toward the next day' s launching position astride the eastern exit to San
Bernardino Strait*
(c) TG 38.3 continued toward the next day's launching position
about ninety miles eastward of Polillo Island. Its afternoon searches,
which included the Sibuyan Sea, were negative except for certain shipping
in Manila Harbor,
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(d) TG 33. 4, in company with TG 38.1 en route to Ulithi, was
fueling destroyers from the heavier ships. At 1118 in accordance with
orders received from COMTHIRDFLT, it headed for the next day's launching
position bearing 050° (T), distant fifty miles from the southeast tip of
Samar.
The aircraft of TG 30.5 carried out the Central Pacific Search
Plan and failed to contact the Japanese Main Force although that force
was well within the limit of their search from Tinian. The FOURTEENTH
Air Force's searches from China made no significant contacts this day.
(2) Operations 0000 - 1830, October 24th.
(a) Japanese.
During this day the various units of the Combined Fleet moved
toward decisive battle areas and CinC Combined Fleet followed with intense
interest the contacts and events reported by those units. The continuing
contact reports showed large enemy carrier forces east of the Philippines
and strong forces, including battleships and transports, in Leyte Gulf.
In addition, the reports from his commanders indicated that (a) Conmander
Main Force planned to launch an attack against the enemy force east of
Manila and the Main Force Advance Guard had been ordered to proceed south
to destroy remaining enemy elements, (b) the THIRD Section had been
lightly damaged in an attack by carrier aircraft, (c) the Main Body of the
FIRST Striking Force had been heavily damaged in continuing; air attacks
with the MUSASHI and MYOKO out of action and (d) the SIXTH Base Air Force
had made one hit on a carrier and one cruiser had been moderately damaged
and set afire. He was concerned about the attacks on the Main Body, FIRST
Striking Force, and, at 1813, sent a dispatch to all of his forces: "All
forces to the attack trusting in divine aid."
Commander FIRST Striking Force, as he passed to the south of
Mindoro Island about 0734 and headed for the Sibuyan Sea, made preparations
to meet the expected air attack from the enemy task force east of Manila
which began at 1026 and continued during the afternoon. By 1530, when the
fifth Allied Air Attack was in progress, the MYOKO and MUSASHI had been so
badly damaged that he had (a) ordered them to their bases and (b)
temporarily reversed course while he re-estimated the situation. During
the day he received numerous contact reports on enemy carrier forces east
of the Philippines and knew that these enemy forces were grouped as
follows: (1) Northeast of Polillo Island, (2) east of Cataduanes Island
and (3) off Samar. In addition, he also received contact reports on the
enemy forces in Leyte Gulf. He had not received reports of the results
of friendly attacks on the enemy forces east of the Philippines although
he knew that such attacks were to be conducted.
At 1714, after (a) receiving dispatches stating that the Main Force
Advance Guard was being sent south to destroy remaining elements and that
the SIXTH Base Air Force was to make a dusk attack against the enemy
carrier forces, and (b) noting that there had been no additional air
attacks since the fifth air attack, he reversed course and headed for San
Bernardino Strait. During the day the Main Body, FIRST Striking Force,
had been reduced by one battleship, one cruiser and two destroyers.
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Commander THIRD Section continued across the Sulu Sea. At 0905
he was attacked by carrier aircraft and the FUSO was hit by one bomb.
His force escaped without serious damage. During the day he received
reports on the enemy strength in Leyte Gulf, made plans and issued
instructions to his ships for crossing the Mindanao Sea, and for the
action to be fought in Surigao Strait.
Commander Main Force, still undetected by the enemy, continued on
in a southwesterly direction toward an area to the northeast of Polillo
Island. At 0600 he launched search planes and at 1114 ordered a full
strength air attack against TG 38.3 which was some 150 to 160 miles away.
The attack group, consisting of fifty-seven planes, proceeded to the
target area in two units. The first unit encountered enemy fighters and
after the ensuing fight failed to locate the enemy ships. The second
unit found a hole in the clouds and conducted an attack, reported as
successful, but failed to obtain any hits. A few of the surviving planes
returned to the carriers but the majority of them proceeded to airfields
on Luzon. At 1439, having no information of the results of the air
attack and feeling that his force was still undetected by the enemy, he
ordered the Advance Guard (ISE, HYUGA and four destroyers) to proceed
southward to attack and destroy enemy remnants. This was in accordance
with his mission to lure the enemy to the northward so that it could not
interfere with the operations of the FIRST Striking Force. At 1635 an
enemy carrier plane was sighted about the force and its radio report was
intercepted by him. He now knew that the enemy knew of his presence and
so advised all friendly forces.
Commander SECOND Striking Force was in Coron Bay refueling his
destroyers from the cruisers. At 0200, having completed fueling, he
departed for Surigao Strait. During the day he received numerous reports
and planned his operations in Surigao Strait. He knew that the WAKABA of
DESDIV TWENTY-ONE had been sunk as a result of air attack but he did not
know that the other two ships of that DESDIV had returned to Manila.
Although he was sighted by an Allied search plane he was unaware of the
presence of this plane and believed that he was undetected. As a result
of the temporary retirement of the Main Body, FIRST Striking Force, in the
Sibuyan Sea due to air attack, he increased speed in order to effect close
liaison with the THIRD Section.
Commander Guard Force, who was also COMCRUDIV SIXTEEN, departed
Manila at 0630 after issuing his orders for the troop transport operation.
At 0700, just after clearing the harbor entrance, he was attacked by
aircraft. This attack continued until 1000. The URANAMI suffered machine
gun and rocket hits which penetrated her fuel tanks and the resulting loss
of oil reduced her cruising radius by one-half. After the attack he
proceeded to the south on his troop carrying mission.
Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was to make a maximum effort this
day against the enemy. One of his planes made contact with a large enemy
force east of Manila at 0050 and he immediately ordered a general
offensive. The attack, consisting of about 158 planes, reported obtaining
a hit in a carrier and one cruiser set afire. The carrier hit was on the
PRINCETON, one of the units of TG 38.3. Although he received many contact
xci CONFIDENTIAL
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reports during the day and made other attacks, these attacks were largely-
ineffective. In spite of a pointed query from Commander Main Body, FIRST
Striking Force, as to what attacks had been made against the enemy he
appears to have only sent two fighters to provide CAP for the Main Body.
Commander FIFrH Base Air Force's four Kamikaze Units were
scattered at airfields in Luzon, Cebu and Mindanao. Nothing significant
was accomplished during the day.
C.G. FOURTH Air Army made an all out attack against enemy shipping
in and around Leyte Gulf. It appears that he had 128 planes which were
operational. The first wave of about eighty planes, of which about twenty
were shot down, succeeded in sinking a tug (ATA SONOMA) and an LCI (1065)
and damaging a destroyer (LEUTZE) and one liberty ship (THOMAS). Other
attacks were unsuccessful.
(b) Allied.
During the day COMSOWESPAC followed with interest the intelligence
reports and contact reports made by the various units in the area.
CTF 77, during the early morning hours, received .-. B and
GUITARRO contact reports on the Main Body, FIRST Striking Force, and also
intelligence reports on the reinforcement of the Jaoanese air forces. He
therefore directed CTG 77.4 to cancel strikes planned against the Visayan
airfields and to augment the target CAP over Leyte Gulf. This arrange-
ment proved effective for the enemy air attacks during the day were
largely ineffective. He therefore reinstituted the fighter sweeps of the
Visayan airfields. Having received contact reports on the THIRD Section
and on the SECOND Striking Force he (a) arranged to transfer conmand of
the forces ashore to C.G. SIXTH Army and (b) at 1215 and at 1219 issued
his instructions for night engagement. He stationed the (a) heavier
ships at the upper end of Surigao Strait in order to destroy those forces
and (b) MTB's in the eastern Mindanao Sea and lower Surigao Strait to
report and attack the approaching Japanese forces. During the afternoon
he ordered three ?BY searches to the north and two through the Mindanao
Sea. At 1700 he intercepted COMTHIRDFLT ' s Battle Plan which indicated
that TF 34 "will be formed" to engage the enemy (Main 3ody, FIRST Striking
Force).
During the early morning hours TG 77.2 and TG 77.3 were in
southern Leyte Gulf covering the transports and other noncombatant ships
against night attack. With the advent of daylight the ships then returned
to the fire support and logistics areas. By midafternoon, having received
CTF 77 's orders to prepare for night battle which orders assigned TG 77.3
to CTG 77.2, he prepared his battle plan, continued refueling and
replenishing ammunition. The essential provisions of his battle plan were:
(a) CTG 77.2 was OTC and would also command the Left Flank Force composed
of five cruisers and nine destroyers, (b) CTG 77.3 would conmand the
Right Flank Force composed of three cruisers and six destroyers, (c) CTU
77.2.1 (Commander Battle Line) would command the Center Force composed of
six battleships and six destroyers, (d) these forces would steam slowly
xcii CONFIDENTIAL
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back and forth at the northern end of Surigao Strait, and (e) destroyers
would attack from the flanks using torpedoes and the heavy ships— owing
to their limited AP— -would hold their fire until the enemy had approached
to between 17,000 yards and 20,000 yards from the battleships* Beginning
at 1721 his units started south for the battle area and at 1725 he issued
his battle plan.
CTF 78 and CTF 79 followed unloading operations closely. During
the morning Reinforcement Group TWO arrived and unloading was commenced.
During the day CTF 79 sailed two groups of unloaded ships from the area.
At 1650 both commanders received CTF 77 's supplement to his Harbor Defense
Plan Noo ONE which directed that all noncombatant ships be anchored in
their respective areas with a close inner screen and that there would be
no departure from or entry into Leyte Gulf during darkness.
During the morning CTG 77»4 maintained a strong TCAP over Leyte
Gulf which proved effective in driving off strong enemy air attacks. He
also maintained a CAP over his own CVE's and provided ground support.
Shortly after noon he launched an air strike against the western Visayas.
At 1643 he sailed two CVE's for Morotai to pick up replacement aircraft.
At the beginning of the day CTG 70.1 had two tenders and the
majority of his MTB's in San Pedro Say and one tender and eleven MTB's in
Liloan Bay. Some of the MTBrs were on patrol or special missions. After
a morning conference with CTF 77 he, about noon, received that commander's
order to station the maximum number of MTB's in lower Surigao Strait that
night in order to detect and report enemy forces approaching. During the
afternoon he prepared his battle plan, instructed and prepared the MTB's
for the coming action and sent them to their selected stations.
During the morning CTF 71 received reports from his submarines.
The ANGLER and GUITARRO made contact reports on the Main Body, FIRST
Striking Force, while the DACE reported the grounding of the DARTER on
Bombay Shoal, the rescue of her personnel and the subsequent attempts to
destroy the DARTER. During the day he probably received most of the
contact reports made by the various commands and rearranged his submarines
in order to cover the various passages which the enemy might use in
retiring as well as to provide for the destruction of the DARTER.
During the day CTG 73*4, who was under the operational control of
C. G. FIFTH Air Force and who was operating his seach souadrons from
Morotai, made contact on the THIRD Section and the Main Body, FIRST
Striking Force, as well as the SECOND Striking Force.
CTG 73 • 1, who had two seaplane tenders and ten seaplanes in Leyte
Gulf, spent the day in preparing his aircraft for night searches in the
Mindanao Sea and to the north.
At 0600 COMTHIRDFLT launched air searches from his three carrier
groups (CTG's 38.2, 38.3 and 38.4) to cover the western Philippines from
Mini la south to the entrance to the Mindanao Sea.
496799 0-59-7 xciii CONFIDENTIAL
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Commencing at 0820 when he received a contact report from his
search planes reporting the Main Body, FIRST Striking Force, as rounding
the southern tip of Mindoro, he advised CTG's 38.3 and 33.4 and directed
(a) them to concentrate toward him, (b) both CTG 38.2 and CTG 33.3 to
attack, (c) CTG 38.1, who had been proceeding to UTithi, to reverse
course and launch a search to the northward and northwestward the next
morning, and (d) COMBATDIV SEVEN to be prepared to assume the duties of
Commander Battle Line.
During the remainder of the day he (a) received contact reports
on the various enemy forces both from his own aircraft and from the
search planes of CTG 73.4, including a late afternoon report that the
Japanese Main Body, heavily damaged, was retiring to the westward, and a
contact report on an enemy force to the north composed of carriers and
battleships (Japanese Main Force), (b) received some information on the
attacks made by his aircraft, (c) learned of the damage by enemy air
attack on the PRINCETON, as a result of which she was to be sunk, (d)
learned of the enemy air attack on friendly forces in Leyte Gulf, and
(e) had formulated a battle plan for surface action in anticipation of a
possible sortie by the Main Body, FIRST Striking Force, through San
Bernardino Strait.
TF 38, during the day, operated as follows:
(a) CTG 38.1 continued on toward Ulithi until 1043 when he
reversed course in accordance with COMTHIRDFLT ' s orders and headed for a
fueling rendezvous to the northwest.
(b) CTG 38.2, with COMTHIRDFLT in one of his ships, continued
toward his launching point off San Bernardino Strait and at 0600 launched
a westward search. At 0746 one of his search planes had sighted the Main
Body, FIRST Striking Force, and at 0853 he launched his first attack
against this force. During the day he continued to attack the enemy to
the westward.
(c) CTG 38.3, with CTF 38 in one of his ships, continued toward
his launching point about ninety miles east of Polillo Island. During
the early morning hours he had contact on four enemy aircraft. At 0606
he launched his initial air strike.
His command was attacked first by a large group of enemy planes
which was driven off by the CAP, the second enemy strike did not close and
the third strike, although attacked by the CAP, heavily hit the PRINCETON.
As a result of this hit he ordered the BIRMINGHAM, RENO and three
destroyers to standby her.
During the day he launched two strikes against the Main Body,
FIRST Striking Force, and repelled two more enemy air attacks without
additional damage. At 1409 he launched a search to the northward con-
sisting of five VB without fighter escort. At 1523 the major portion of
the PRINCETON'S stern and after flight deck were blown off by a large
explosion, killing and injuring many personnel on the BIRMINGHAM which
was alongside.
xciv CONFIDENTIAL
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At 1635 his search planes began reporting the Japanese Main Force
to the north. Shortly thereafter he received a suggestion from CTF 38
that, in view of the contact to the north, the PRINCETON be sunk.
At 1746 the RENO fired two torpedoes into the PRINCETON which
exploded and sank.
(d) CTG 38.4 continued toward his launching point off southern
Samar. At about 0600 he launched a reinforced search toward the southwest
and west. He attacked (a) at 0815 the three destroyers of DESDIV TWENTY-
ONE (SECOND Striking Force) off the western coast of northern Panay Island
sinking the WAKA3A, (b) at 0905 the THIRD Section (FIRST Striking Force)
obtaining one hit on the FUSO, (c) about 1230 the remaining two destroyers
of DESDIV TWENTY-ONE with but minor success and (d) at 1330 the Main Body
(FIRST Striking Force) while en route north to concentrate with COM-
THIRDFLT.
Late in the afternoon he could see rG 38.2 hull down and COM-
THIRDFLT directed him to take tactical command of both groups and to keep
them concentrated in the general vicinity.
CTG 30,5' s aircraft carried out the Central Pacific Search Plan
but made no significant contacts on this day. The FOURTEENTH Air Force
aircraft flew the day search missions from China but no sightings were
made.
During the day CTF 17 followed the developing situation closely
by means of contact reports and other dispatches from the commanders in
the active area. He was not informed of the results of the air attacks
against the Japanese forces until 1938 and did not issue any instructions
to his submarines concerning the likely retirement of Japanese forces to
the northward, other than to warn them at 1830 to be alert for movement
of additional enemy ships passing through Luzon Straits and toward the
south and for cripples moving north. During the early morning his sub-
marines stationed to the west of Luzon Straits were attacking the Harukaze
convoy and sank several ships. During this action the SHARK was lost.
Also during the early morning the CROAKER sank a cargo ship off
Cheju Do and the BESUGO sank the destroyer escort CD 132 off Bungo Suido.
(3) Operations from 1830 to 2400, October 24th.
(a) Japanese.
At 1830, October 24th, Commander THIRD Section was rounding
Siquijor Island at the entrance to the Mindanao Sea. Despite the fact that
the Main Body, FIRST Striking Force had resumed course to the westward he
decided to continue on and therefore directed his FIRST Division, composed
of the MOGAMI and DESDIV FOUR, to proceed ahead and conduct a sweep of the
waters west of Panaon Island. This sweep, as of 2400, was uneventful.
Shortly afterward he (a) learned that the Main Body would penetrate
into Leyte Gulf about 1100 the next day and (b) was directed to penetrate
into Leyte Gulf as scheduled and to rendezvous with the Main Body off
Suluan Island at 0900.
xcv CONFIDENTIAL
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Meanwhile, with the SECOND Division (YAMASHIRO, FUSO and SHIGURE),
he continued across the Mindanao Sea at eighteen knots until 2252 when he
was attacked by MTB's which he drove off without damage to his ships.
Commander SECOND Striking Force continued on toward the Mindanao
Sea at twenty- two knots. Although DESDIV TWENTY-ONE did not rendezvous
he continued on and at 2110 passed to the south of Siquijor Island. Other
than sighting starshells fired by the THIRD Section during their encounter
with MTB's the period was uneventful and at 2400 he was some thirty-eight
miles astern of the THIRD Section.
(b) Allied.
At 1830 CTG 77.2, who was OTC of the Allied forces involved in the
Battle of Surigao Strait and also Commander Left Flank Force, and Commander
Battle Line and Conmander Right Flank Force, with their respective forces,
were standing toward the battle disposition area east of Hingatungan Point.
He now received word from CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON FIFTY-FOUR) that in
case of surface contact to the south, he (CTG 79.11) planned to make
immediate attack with torpedoes, then to retire to clear TG 77.2 and
requested approval. Since this attack would provide helpful and early
information of the enemy and might also damage some of the enemy ships he
(CTG 77.2) approved it.
By about 2021 the battle disposition was to all intents and
purposes formed although the destroyers were not in their final positions.
During the remainder of this period the major Allied forces
steamed back and forth across the northern end of Surigao Strait at five
knots, awaiting reports of the enemy, but although contact had been made
no reports were received. This was unfortunate because the (a) Bohol
PT's had contacted (at 2236) the SHIGURE, YAMASHIRO and FUSO but could
not get their contact report off to anyone because of communication
difficulties. These Bohol PT's were forced by enemy gunfire to retire
whereupon the OTC sent two of his MTB's to report the contact through the
Camiguin PT's, and (b) Limasawa PT's had contacted (at 2330) the MOGAMI,
MICHISHIO, ASAGUMO and YAMAGUMO, but for similar reasons, like the Bohol
PT's, had been unable to make a contact report.
(4) Operations from 0000 to 0100, October 25th.
(a) Japanese.
At 0000 both the FIRST and SECOND Divisions of the THIRD Section
were proceeding toward Surigao Strait. Commander THLoD Section learned
shortly after midnight that the FIRST Division (a) would be delayed some
forty-five minutes in reaching the rendezvous point, (b) was in the waters
west of Limasawa Island, and (c) had made contact with enemy MTB's. The
FIrST and SECOND Divisions now sighted each other and, at the same time,
fired starshells in order to identify their sightings. Having identified
themselves, Commander FIRST Division then maneuvered to rejoin without
penetrating the waters west of Panaon Island (Sogod Bay),
xcvi CONFIDENTIAL
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Commander SECOND Striking Force continued on toward the entrance
to Surigao Strait. Although he sighted the starshells fired by the THIRD
Section, he did not sight, nor was he sighted by, any enemy forces.
(b) Allied.
The Allied battle forces continued to steam east and west at low
speed across the northern end of Surigao Strait. At 0026 CTG 77.2
received PT 127' s 2310 contact report on an enemy force ten miles south-
east of Bohol Island and at 0038 he received a contact report on two
targets ten miles northwest of Camiguin Island.
Meanwhile, as the Limasawa PT's approached the Japanese FIRST
Division of the THIRD Section to fire torpedoes, the MOGAMI turned on a
searchlight. Only two of the three MTB's succeeded in firing before they
were driven off by gunfire. None of the torpedoes hit and none of the
KTB's had been able to deliver a contact report.
(5) Operations from 0100 to 0245, October 25th.
(a) Japanese.
Commander THIRD Section continued on toward the entrance to
Surigao Strait. At 0125 he changed course to 040° (T) and headed into
Surigao Strait. At 0126 he learned that the NACHI, which was the flag-
ship of Commander SECOND Striking Force, had entered the radio telephone
net although that commander did not take command. At 0202 he changed
course to 000°(T) and headed up the strait at twenty knots. He was now
attacked in succession by PT 134, the Lower Surigao PT's and by the
Sumilon PTfs. He avoided the torpedoes and drove off the MTB' s by gunfire.
After this series of encounters he informed Commander SECOND Striking Force
that he had passed the lower entrance without damage although he had been
attacked by MTB's.
Commander SECOND Striking Force continued on toward the southern
entrance to Surigao Strait at twenty-two knots. At 0235, while in a
severe rain squall, he stopped zigzagging and increased speed to twenty-six
knots.
(b) Allied.
CTG 77.2, with his battle disposition, continued to patrol across
the northern end of Surigao Strait at five knots. Although he received
fragmentary reports on the THIRD Section it was not until 0204 that he
began to receive relayed contact reports from PT 134 which placed the
enemy force off the southern tip of Panaon Island. At 0231 he knew that
CTG 79.11 had started down the strait to make a torpedo attack. At 0244
he knew that Commander Battle Line had increased speed to ten knots but
he, as OTC, took no action, neither increasing speed nor directing
Commander Battle Line to remain at five knots.
xcvii CONFIDENTIAL
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Having received several contact reports from PT 127, CTG 79.11
started down the strait to meet the enemy without issuing any specific
instructions about coordinating the attacks of his two groups.
Meanwhile the MTB's, operating independently by groups or units,
fired (a) one torpedo at the YAMAGUMO, (b) four torpedoes most likely
at the YAMAGUMO, (c) three torpedoes probably at the FUSO, six torpedoes
at the MOGAMI, (d) four torpedoes at the MICHISHIO and (e) two torpedoes
at the ASAGUMO. All of the above twenty torpedoes missed. PT 493 was
heavily hit by enemy gunfire with the result that she was beached and
abandoned at Maoyo Point.
(6) Operations from 0245 to 0320, October 25th.
(a) Japanese.
Commander THIRD Section continued up the strait at twenty knots.
He soon received reports of targets to starboard which he took under fire.
He took no evasive action with the result that the FUSO was torpedoed and
dropped out of formation.
Soon after this he received reports of enemy ships on the port
bow and his ships shifted fire to these targets. He now maneuvered to
avoid torpedoes by a turn to starboard. In returning to the base course
of 000°(T) he entered the torpedo water of the MC DSRMUT and MONSSSN with
the result that the YAMAGUMO sank, the MICHISHIO lost power and stopped,
the ASAGUMO lost her bow and most of her speed, while the YAMASHIRO was
forced to slow to ten knots for several minutes. Only the SHIGURE and
MOGAMI escaped damage.
Commander SECOND Striking Force, who was in a heavy rain sauall,
continued on toward the southern entrance to Surigao Strait at twenty-six
knots until 0311 when he slowed to twenty-two knots. A few minutes later
he sighted the mountains of Panaon Island about seven kilometers on his
port bow and noted that the USHIO was already turning away from the beach.
(b) Allied.
CTG 77.2 learned at 0256 from CTG 79.11 that the enemy consisted
of two large ships and three small ones. At 0303 he changed course to
090°(T) and remained at five knots although the battle line continued to
make ten knots. His radar now showed two large targets and three small
ones.
CTG 77.3 (Commander Right Flank Force) at 0302 ordered his destroyers
to commence their attack following CTG 79.11' s attack. The destroyer
commander, COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR, who was proceeding at fifteen knots now,
at 0317, directed Commander Attack Group 2.2 to attack using high speed and
smoke. That commander immediately increased speed to twenty-five knots.
At 0248 Commander Eastern Attack Group (CTG 79.11) increased speed
to twenty- five knots. He now reported to CTG 77.2 that the enemy consisted
of two large ships and three small ones. At 0258 he changed course to
090°(T) but discovering that this was a poor course he promptly changed
xcviii CONFIDENTIAL
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course back to 120°(T) and at the same time increased speed to thirty
knots. Between 0300:45 and 0301:42 his three ships fired a total of
twenty-seven torpedoes, all of which missed except for one hit by the
MELVIN in the FUSO. Immediately after firing each ship turned away,
retired under the gunfire of the enemy and headed for their post-attack
rendezvous.
At this same time Commander Western Attack Group was proceeding to
his torpedo launching point at twenty knots. He soon increased speed to
twenty-five knots and between 0307 and 0308 was illuminated and taken under
fire but no damage resulted. Between 0310:15 and 0311:30 his two destroyers
fired a total of twenty torpedoes and obtained hits in the MICHISHI0,
ASAGUM0, YAMAGUM0 and YAMASHIR0. They then turned away to the west and
later to the north.
Many MTB's in Surigao Strait had radar contact on the THIRD Section
but made no effort to attack, probably because of the warning of friendly
destroyer attacks and instructions to keep clear.
Between 0311 and 0312 the Madilao PT's and the Bilaa Point PT's
made radar contact on two ships of the SECOND Striking Force. Their
reports did not reach the responsible commanders further to the north.
(7) Operations from 0320 to 0348, October 25th.
(a) Japanese.
Commander THIRD Section continued on to the north, although at a
lower speed, but his ships were no longer conforming to his movements
except in a most general way. The MOGAMI had changed course to 345° (T) and
had slowed to ten knots while the SHIGURE had reversed course. At 0330 he
sent a dispatch to Commanders FIRST and SECOND Striking Forces reporting
(a) enemy motor torpedo boats and destroyers in the northern entrance to
Surigao Strait, (b) two of his destroyers torpedoed and drifting and (c)
the YAMASHIRO torpedoed but without impediment to her battle cruising. As
he moved up the strait he maneuvered to avoid torpedoes from Attack Group
2.2 while the YAMASHIRO opened fire on that group. At 0331:18 the
YAMASHIRO received her second torpedo hit which had been fired by the
KILLEN. Meanwhile the SHIGURE, still at twenty-six knots, had reversed
course to north. The YAMASHIRO, followed by the MOGAMI and SHIGURE in a
general way, now steadied on course 340° (T) to head for Dulag Anchorage
and, after completing the necessary damage control measures about 0336,
made good a speed of eighteen knots. At about 0345 she opened fire against
the units of Attack Group 1.2 and probably also against any other targets
that she could see.
ASAGUMO, having lost her bow, proceeded north at very low speed
and then to the west, taking such damage control measures as she could.
She was now fired on by the HUTCHINS and changed course to the south. She
was not hit.
The MICHISHIO drifted to the south where she was taken under fire
by the DALY and the BACHE. She was hit and fires were started but she did
not return the fire.
xcix CONFIDENTIAL
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The FUSO, badly damaged and afire, was proceeding at very low
speed attempting to put out the fires which were causing explosions. She
first turned slowly to the south and then at 0345, as a result of a
violent explosion, she blew apart into two sections.
Commander SECOND Striking Force, who had almost run aground on
Panaon Island, changed course to 065°(T) and increased speed to twenty-four
knots. The ABUKUMA now received a torpedo hit from PT 137. She fell out
of formation to the south and gradually lost speed while Commander SECOND
Striking Force increased speed to twenty-eight knots and, after changing
course, headed up the strait.
(b) Allied.
CTG 77»2, with the Left Flank Force, was making five knots on
course 090°(T) although the battle line was still making ten knots. He
now intercepted a message from Commander Battle Line increasing speed to
fifteen knots and ordering the battle line to open fire when the range
was 26,000 yards. Learning that the right flank destroyers had comDleted
firing he ordered C0MDESR0N FIFTY-SIX (left flank destroyers) to attack.
At 0345 he received a delayed report from PT 523 that five destroyers and
one large ship were passing in a northerly direction through the southern
entrance to Surigao Strait (SECOND Striking Force).
COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX promptly launched his attack emoloying three
attack sections to make a multiple attack, attacking from the port bow,
from ahead and from the starboard bow on the enemy force.
Commander Right Flank Force, with the right flank cruisers,
continued to maintain station on the battle line during which tir.e he
seems to have been concerned with the safety of his destroyers for on
three separate occasions he either directed C0XDS3R0N TWENTY-FOUR to get
over to the west or to keep clear.
Commander Attack Group 1.2 continued his aoproach down the western
side of the strait. At 0329, while at twenty- five knots and making smoke,
he changed course to the north and ordered his ships to fire their torpedoes.
His destroyers fired as follows: (a) HUTCHINS fired five intermediate
speed torpedoes at the SHIGURE which missed because the target reversed
course, (b) DALY fired five low speed torpedoes at the "OGAXI which missed
due to the target1 s changes of course and speed during the long torpedo run
and (c) BACHE fired five low speed torpedoes at the SHIGURE which missed
because she thought the target was making seventeen knots when it was
actually making twenty-six knots.
After firing the DALY and BACHE reversed course to the south in
order to follow the HUTCHINS. At 0339 the HUTCHINS changed course to
148°(T) and increased speed to thirty knots. She now opened fire on the
ASAGUMO and shortly afterward changed course to the north. Then the DALY,
followed by the BACHE, opened fire on the KTCKISHIO and obtained some hits
and started fires. At 0345 they were forced to check fire when the HITCHINS
crossed their line of fire, and Attack Group 1.2 was taken under fire.
The enemy fire was ineffective. At 0346:30 the HUTCHINS changed course to
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040°(T) and continued at thirty knots. The DALY and BACHE, which had just
changed course to 050°(T), now resumed fire on the MICHISHIO. At 0347:30
the HUTCHINS ceased fire in order to conserve ammunition.
Attack Group 2.2 attacked as follows: (a) at 0323 the ARUNTA
fired four forty-knot torpedoes at the YAMASHIRO. The target speed used
was twenty-five knots, which had been obtained by tracking the SHIGURE,
while the YAMASHIRO1 s actual speed was ten knots. As a result the
torpedoes passed ahead, (b) At 0324 the KILLEN fired five intermediate
speed torpedoes at the YAMASHIRO and obtained one hit, and (c) at 0325:15
the BEALE fired five intermediate speed torpedoes at the SHIGURE which
was reversing course at the time of firing and all torpedoes missed.
The KILLEN now fired a second salvo of intermediate speed torpedoes
at the YAMASHIRO but after firing two torpedoes observed that the target
was turning away and ceased firing. Both torpedoes missed. At 0331
Attack Group 2.2 was illuminated and taken under fire but incurred no
damage. At 0344:30 Commander Attack Group 2.2 changed course to 160°(T)
and headed for the scene of action.
The MTB's operated as follows: (a) PT 137 (SE Panaon PT's) off
Binit Village fired one torpedo at the NACHI which missed astern but hit
the ABUKUMA, (b) PT 134 sighted the USHIO and fired her one remaining
torpedo which missed, and (c) the Sumilon PT's made radar contact on five
ships of the SECOND Striking Force and reported it,
(8) Operations from 0348 to 0420, October 25th.
(a) Japanese.
At 0352, just as the first salvos from the Allied ships to the
north had commenced landing on the YAMASHIRO, Commander THIRD Section
asked the FUSO for her maximum speed but did not get a reply. This was
his last radio transmission. The YAMASHIRO, however, continued to close
the enemy firing as she advanced. Shortly after being taken under fire
she started to burn. At 0356 she turned to the west and at 0405 she was
hit by a torpedo fired by the BENNION. She now turned to the south.
Between 0411 and 0412 she received a fourth torpedo hit which had been
fired by the NEWCOMB. At 0419 she suddenly sank.
At 0351 the MOGAMI observed the Allied ships open fire and increased
speed to twenty- five knots. At 0401:30 she launched four torpedoes on
northerly courses in the general direction of the enemy gun flashes.
Although no hits were obtained the torpedoes passed close aboard the
RICHARD P. LEARY. At 0402 she was hit on the bridge, killing all of the
bridge officers, including the Commanding Officer. The ship, burning,
damaged and out of control, gradually slowed down.
The SHIGURE continued closing the YAMASHIRO, which she noted was
under heavy fire, at twenty-six knots. She turned away and increased
speed to retire without firing either torpedoes or guns. After completing
the turn to the south she received her first hit which did not affect her
speed or navigability. At 0415 she exchanged calls with the NACHI and
shortly afterward increased speed to thirty knots in order to pass ahead
of the SHIRANUHI.
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The ASAGUMO, on course 180°(T) at seven to nine knots, turned to
the east to move away from the approaching DALY and BACHE. This caused
the HUTCHINS torpedoes to miss.
The MICHISHIO which, under the gunfire of the DALY and BACHE was
afire, continued to drift to the south with the current. At 0357:48 she
was hit by a torpedo fired by the HUTCHINS at the ASAGUMO, and sank almost
immediately.
Commander SECOND Striking Force at 0410 passed the two burning
sections of the FUSO and concluded that they were the FUSO and the
YAMASHIRO. About 0415 he sighted the MOGAMI afire and dead in the water.
At this same time he exchanged calls with the SHIGURE but made no effort
to obtain information of the enemy from her. About 0418 he obtained a
radar contact on the enemy (likely Hibuson Island) and directed his
destroyers, led by the SHIRANUHI, to proceed ahead and make a torpedo
attack,
(b) Allied.
At 0351 CTG 77.2 opened fire with the left flank cruisers. The
right flank cruisers, except for the SHROPSHIRE, then opened fire as well.
At 0353 he observed that the WEST VIRGINIA had opened fire and shortly
afterward he observed other battleships firing. At 0400, knowing that the
battle line was making fifteen knots and was almost north of Hibuson Island,
he suggested to Commander Battle Line that he reverse course to west,
which that commander did shortly afterward.
The DENVER now commenced firing her secondary battery and then her
main battery at the ALBERT W. GRANT making numerous hits. The LOUISVILLE
likewise commenced firing her secondary battery at the ALBERT W. GRANT but
seems to have obtained no hits. At 0406 CTG 77.2 received a voice radio
message that the DENVER had been straddled. He immediately increased speed
to fifteen knots. At 0408, having received a startling message that he
was firing on COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX in the middle of the channel, he
immediately ceased firing and directed COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX to get out of
the channel as soon as possible. Neither he nor COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX knew
that the ALBERT W. GRANT was so badly damaged as to be unable to get out
of the channel.
At 0419 he ordered Commander Right Flank Force to resume fire but
none of the ships did so for the YAMASHIRO sank at this time and there were
no other enemy ships within effective gun range.
At 0353 the WEST VIRGINIA, at the direction of COMBATDIV FOUR,
opened fire on the YAMASHIRO at a range of 22,800 yards. About this tirr.e,
because the MISSISSIPPI'S forward turrets did not bear, Commander Battle
Line changed course by individual ship turns to 120°(T). His battleships
commenced firing as follows: CALIFORNIA at 0355, TENNESSEE at 0356 and
MARYLAND at 0359. MISSISSIPPI and PENNSYLVANIA had not opened fire because
of difficulties in obtaining a solution to the fire control problem with
obsolete equipment.
cii CONFIDENTIAL
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He now turned to course 270°(T) by simultaneous ship turns but the
CALIFORNIA interpreted the turn signal as a turn to 13 5° (T) rather than to
270°(T). By clever ship handling the TENNESSEE was able to avoid collision
with the CALIFORNIA and also able to go ahead soon enough to avoid
embarrassing the MISSISSIPPI . During this turn the battleships ceased
firing. At 0413 he intercepted a message from the RICHARD P. LEARY
reporting that she was proceeding through torpedo water as a result of
which he directed COMBATDIV TWO to maneuver his division separately and to
bring it into the battle line without delay and then, at 0418, changed
course of the battle line, less BATDIV WO, to 000°(T). At 0416 he directed
COMDESDIV XRAY to comply with CTG 77.2 *s order to report for duty,
DESRON FIFTY-SIX attacked as follows: (a) at 0351 Commander Attack
Section ONE increased speed to twenty five knots and at 0353 changed course
to 210°(T). Observing that the target was turning to the west he also
turned to the west and fired intermediate speed torpedoes at the YAMASHIRO
as follows: NEWCOMB five and obtained one hit, RICHARD P. LEARY three
which missed, and ALBERT W. GRANT five which also missed. Immediately
after firing the ALBERT W. GRANT was straddled and hit by gunfire from
both sides. Commander Attack Section ONE, observing that his command was
being straddled, turned to the north and notified CTG 77.2 that TG 77.2
was firing on him in the middle of the channel. The ALBERT W. GRANT now
fired her remaining five intermediate speed torpedoes at the YAMASHIRO but
made no hits. She had been heavily hit, was not able to follow in column
and was slowing rapidly on course 000°(T). Meanwhile, the RICHARD P.
LEARY sighted two torpedo tracks on each side which had been fired by the
MOGAMI. She was unable to report the torpedo tracks until 0413. About
this time she increased speed to her maximum but was unable to close the
NEWCOMB. At 0420 the ALBERT W. GRANT was dead in the water in the center
of the channel and was in danger of sinking. The other two ships were
practically clear of the line of fire#
(b) Commander Attack Section TWO continued toward his torpedo
launching point. (1) At 0355:15 the BRYANT, mistaking a preparatory signal
for a firing order, fired five intermediate speed torpedoes at what appears
to have been splashes, all missed. (2) At 0356:30 the HALFORD fired five
intermediate speed torpedoes at the YAMASHIRO all of which missed because
she had been tracking the target at zero speed, and (3) at 0358 the
ROBINSON fired five intermediate speed torpedoes at the YAMASHIRO all of
which missed because the YAMASHIRO turned away. Commander Attack Section
TWO now turned away and proceeded north along the west side of Hibuson
Island.
(c) Commander Attack Section THREE passed astern of the cruiser
column and increased speed to thirty knots. At 0357 the LSUTZE fired five
intermediate speed torpedoes at the YAMASHIRO. At 0358 the BENNION, which
had narrowly missed being torpedoed by the LEUTZE's torpedoes, fired five
intermediate speed torpedoes at the YAMASHIRO. At 0359:15 the HEYWOOD L.
EDWARDS fired four intermediate speed torpedoes at the YAMASHIRO. All of
the above fourteen torpedoes missed due to the change of course of the
YAMASHIRO to the west. At 0359:15 the BENNION fired a second salvo of
five intermediate speed torpedoes at what she thought was a second battle-
ship, and made one lucky hit on the YAMASHIRO. Commander Attack Section
THREE now retired under smoke.
ciii CONFIDENTIAL
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Commander Right Flank Force (CTG 77.3), with his cruisers in line
of bearing, was on course 090°(T) at fifteen knots. He was concerned over
the safety of his destroyers and therefore ordered his destroyers out of
the channel. In the meantime the PHOENIX and the BOISE had opened fire
with the Left Flank Cruisers. The SHROPSHIRE had not opened fire because
her fire control radar was limited to about 15,500 yards in range. When
the range reached 15,800 yards the SHROPSHIRE opened fire on the YAMASHIRO.
At this time a few splashes were noted around the PHOENIX. Commander
Right Flank Force now commenced turning to the west in order to cover the
western portion of the strait. At 0409 he received CTG 77.2 's order to
cease firing and immediately ordered his ships to cease fire.
Commander Attack Group 1.2, in the HUTCHINS, was on course 040°(T)
speed thirty knots, while the DALY and BACHE, some 5,000 yards to the
south, were making twenty-five knots in the same general direction. At
0349:30 the HUTCHINS fired her remaining five intermediate speed torpedoes
at the ASAGUMO. The ASAGUMO turned away and the torpedoes passed harmlessly
to the south but hit the MICHISHIO at the end of their run. The three
ships proceeded on northerly courses with the DALY and BACHE together but
following the HUTCHINS in only the most general way. The destroyers now
opened fire on the YAMASHIRO, MOGAMI and>iICHISHIO and, with perhaDs some
assistance from the PORTLAND, set the MOGAMI on fire. At 0405 Commander
Attack Group 1.2, having been directed by CTG 77.3 to get in to the beach,
proceeded to do so.
At 0349 the KILLEN fired her three remaining torpedoes at the
YAMASHIRO using low speed due to the great distance that the torpedoes
had to run. These torpedoes missed but appear to have come close to the
ALBERT W. GRANT. Commander Attack Group 2.2 turned to the west to clear
the channel. The ARUNTA and KILLEN now fired for a time at the YAMASHIRO
and later the ARUNTA fired on the MOGAMI after which the Attack Group
retired toward Pandan Point,
(9) Operations from 0420 to 0520, October 25th.
(a) Japanese.
At 0430 the NACHI collided with the MOGAMI without serious
additional damage to the MOGAMI. The MOGAMI, now still burning, followed
as closely as she could with her maximum speed of fourteen knots, which
she obtained with one untended engine.
At 0424 as the SHIGURE retired she suffered a steering casualty
and, because of difficulty in shifting to hand steering, stopped. After
receiving Commander SECOND Striking Force's order to follow behind the
NACHI, she replied at 0445 that her steering engines were out of order.
Passing ahead of the NACHI on westerly courses she turned to the south
and experienced more steering trouble necessitating slowing to fifteen
knots to assist in steering the ship.
The ASAGUMO, which had lost her bow, continued on course 090°(T)
at six knots which she later changed to 238°(T) at nine and one-half
knots, and followed in a general way the movements of the other ships,
civ CONFIDENTIAL
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The two burning sections of the FUSO continued to drift to the
south.
Commander SECOND Striking Force was Droceeding on course north at
twenty-eight knots toward a radar target to the north. At 0424 he changed
course to 090°(T) and directed his destroyers to attack. At 0427 the
NACHI and ASHIGARA each fired eight high speed torpedoes on base torpedo
course 025°(T) at the radar target which was probably Hibuson Island.
After firing the NACHI collided with the MOGAMI and was so heavily damaged
that she could only make eighteen knots after the collision. Commander
SECOND Striking Force now decided to retire from the battle area and
ordered (l) his destroyers to join and (2) the THIRD Section to follow
behind the NACHI. At 0449 he sent a dispatch informing the battle report
addressees that BATDIV WO had been destroyed and that the MOGAMI had
been severly damaged and set afire.
COMDESDIV EIGHTEEN proceeded to attack at twenty-four knots but
sighted nothing other than Hibuson Island through breaks in the smoke.
At 0435, in accordance with orders from Commander SECOND Striking Force,
he discontinued his attack. The USHIO increased speed and departed toward
the south to escort the damaged ABUKUMA. Shortly after the other
destroyer proceeded to escort the ABUKUMA.
(b) Allied.
CTG 77 r 2 now learned that the NEwCOMB and RICHARD P. LEARY were at
the post-attack rendezvous point while the ALBERT W. GRANT was still
proceeding north at about ten knots. At 0424 he directed his cruisers to
resume fire when a solution was obtained, although at this time there
were no targets within effective gun range. At 0428 he learned that the
ALBERT W. GRANT had been hit and was lying dead in the water. At 0429
COMDESDIV XRAY reported to him for duty. ~At 0431 he learned that (a)
PHOENIX had radar contact on five small targets on a northerly course
bearing 160°(T), distant 20,000 yards (DESDIV EIGHTEEN of SECOND Striking
Force), and (b) DENVER had radar contact on three enemy shiDS on bearing
190° (T), distant fourteen miles (NACHI, ASHIGARA and MOGAMI). At 0432 he
directed COMDESDIV XRAY to attack the enemy and then clear the channel
and retire to the northward hugging the coast.
At 0433 he headed south at fifteen knots and formed a cruiser
column. At 0440 he advised CTF 77 that the enemy appeared to be retiring
to the south and strongly recommended that an air attack be made in the
early morning on any that might escape. At 0458 he directed COMDESRON
FIFTY-SIX to screen the Left Flank Cruisers from ahead. At 0501 he noted
that the enemy cruisers, which he had contacted a few minutes earlier,
had changed course to the west.
Due to communication difficulties it was not until 0432 that
COMDESDIV XRAY received orders from CTG 77.2 to proceed south and make a
torpedo attack. He thereupon directed his section at the western end to
clear the battle line and form column on the CLAXTON and directed the
eastern destroyers to clear the battle line to the north. The ships
complied moving to the north and west to proceed around the western end
of the battle line.
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The eastern destroyers, without waiting for the western destroyers,
now commenced moving south. They moved loosely so that all of his ships,
excepting the CONY, were a considerable distance astern of the CLAXTON.
Commander Battle Line, in the MISSISSIPPI, and BATDIV FOUR was
completing a turn to the north to avoid torpedoes while BATDIV TWO
continued to the west. The two groups rejoined on westerly courses and
at 0458 reversed course to the east by simultaneous ship turns.
COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX in the NEWCOMB arrived at the post-attack
rendezvous point and slowed to fifteen knots. He thought that the ALBERT
W. GRANT was proceeding north at about ten knots although that ship was
actually dead in the water. When he learned the facts he proceeded to the
ALBERT W. GRANT to assist her and at 0457:30 dispatched greatly needed
medical assistance to that ship. At 0511 he directed the RICHARD P. LEARY
to proceed to the vicinity of the ALBERT W. GRANT to assist in the anti-
aircraft defense of that ship.
Commander Attack Section TWO was north of Hibuson Island re-forming
his section in the general area of the post-attack rendezvous. At 0458
he advised CTG 77.2~t hat he was now in charge of DESRON FIFrY-SIX and
would screen ahead of the Left Flank Cruisers. However, owing to a
confusing signal, he delayed joining up.
During this period Commander Attack Section THREE proceeded to the
north of the battle line in order to return to the post-attack rendezvous
north of Hibuson Island.
At 0422 Commander Right Flank Force slowed to ten knots and at the
same time made radar contact on the NACHI and ASHIGARA on northerly courses.
At 0430 his flagship, the PHOENIX, made radar contact on DE3DIV £EN
also on northerly courses. Noting that his contacts had turned sharply to
the eastward as if to fire torpedoes he turned to course 300°(f) to avoid
them. At 0448 he commenced following the Left Flank Cruisers down the
strait in order to be in a supporting position. At 0508 he commenced
forming antiaircraft disposition. At 0510 he contacted the ASAGUKO by
radar and at 0512 he increased speed to twenty knots.
Commander Upper Surigao PT's was taken under fire by the SHIGURE
and at 0456 he headed toward her and fired three torpedoes which missed
because the SHIGURE had turned away. A hot run torpedo on FT 321' s deck
attracted the attention of the A3AGUM0 and caused her to open fire also.
Having suffered damage to this MTB he therefore turned away to the south.
(10) Operations from 0520 to 0600, October 25th.
(a) Japanese.
Commander SECOND Striking Force was retiring from the scene of
action at eighteen knots, which was the best speed that his flagship, the
NACHI, could make after her collision with the MOGAMI. His destroyers
were well ahead and proceeding to escort the A3UKUMA. Although he had
ordered the remaining ships of the THIRD Section to follow the NACHI they
had not done so. The SHIGURE was well ahead of him, the KOGAKI and ASAGUMO
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were dropping behind due to lack of speed. At 0531, after seeing the
Allied cruisers open fire on the MOGAMI and ASAGUMO, he changed course to
160°(T) apparently to throw off the enemy gunfire. At 0551, being
approximately astern of his destroyers, he changed course to 180°(T) and
at 0555 recalled his destroyers.
The ABUKUMA, having completed repairs, was now proceeding toward
the USHIO at twenty knots. At 0532 she sighted PT's 150 and 1% and drove
them off by gunfire.
At 0529 the MOGAMI was taken under fire by the cruisers of TG
77.2 from the north. She received ten direct hits which appear to have
caused little additional damage for her speed was not reduced. 'When the
firing ceased at 0540 she changed course to follow the NACHI.
At 0531 the ASAGUMO, on course 238°(T), observed that the Allied
cruisers to the north had opened fire. She therefore turned to course
140°(T). Despite the turn she was taken under fire at 0533 by the
MINNEAPOLIS, was hit on the stern and set afire, which fire gradually
gained the upper hand. At 0600 she stopped.
The SHIGURE, which was using manual steering, at 0535 shifted to
auxiliary power steering.
The two sections of the FUSO continued to burn and drift toward
the south. The LOUISVILLE opened fire on what seems to have been the bow
section at 0531 and at 0540 this section sank.
(b) Allied.
CTG 77.2 was proceeding south at twenty knots in order to destroy
enemy cripples. At 0529, while on course 2500(T), the LOUISVILLE opened
fire on the bow of the FUSO, the MINNEAPOLIS on the ASAGUMO, and the other
ships on the MOGAMI. At 0533 and 0535 respectively the LOUISVILLE and the
MINNEAPOLIS shifted fire to the MOGAMI. Hits were obtained in the MOGAMI
and ASAGUMO, and probably in the FUSO bow which sank at 0540. At 0536 he
directed COMDESDIV XRAY to join him and screen the cruisers. At 0537 he
changed course by simultaneous ship turns to 010°(T), at 0539 ordered
cease firing and at 0549 formed circular cruising disposition.
Commander Right Flank Force followed the Left Flank Force down the
strait to help if need be. At 0538 he reversed course to keep clear of
CTG 77.2 and formed an antiaircraft disposition,
PT's 150 and 194 contacted the USHIO and ABUKUMA and, before being
driven off by gunfire, PT 150 fired one torpedo at the USHIO which missed.
PT 194 was hit below the waterline and retired along the western shore of
Panaon Island.
cvii CONFIDENTIAL
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(11) Operations from 0600 to 0733, October 25th.
In view of the fact that the Japanese operations consisted largely of
retirement and the Allied operations consisted largely of movements in
Surigao Strait the detail employed in discussing previous operations is
omitted here.
(a) Japanese.
Commander SECOND Striking Force, with the SECOND Striking Force,
continued to retire down Surigao Strait and into the Mindanao Sea. The
MOGAMI and SHIGURE also continued to retire in a similar manner although
the SHIGURE remained well clear of the SECOND Striking Force.
(b) Allied.
CTG 77.2 continued to the north until he had formed his Left
Flank Force into an antiaircraft disposition when, at 0618, he turned
once more to the south and destroyed the ASAGUKO. After receiving
information that the escort carriers, TG 77.4, were under attack by a
strong enemy force he reversed course at 0733 to the northward in order
to rejoin his battleships and re-form his forces and to be available for
action as required.
During this time CTG 77.3 with the Right Flank Force followed
the movements of CTG 77.2 and was prepared to support that coimander if
necessary.
cviii CONFIDENTIAL
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THE STRATEGIC AREA
Although the general strategic area involved in the Leyte operation
is discussed rather fully in Volume I it seems well at this point to
emphasize certain factors mentioned therein. This seems so for while
Volume V (the present volume) is designed to cover largely the Battle
of Surigao Strait, it also covers in a limited way Allied and Japanese
operations (land, sea and air) from 1042 October 23rd to 1830 October
24th through the entire area. This, as pointed out earlier, is because
Volume IV has not as yet been written.
(a) GENERAL DISCUSSION
The strategic area involved in the combat and support operations
of the three naval battles, Surigao, Samar and Cape Engano, which
occurred during the Battle for Leyte Gulf, extended from the Japanese
home islands on the north to the Malay Barrier on the south and from the
Marianas on the east to the China Coast and Malay Peninsula on the west.
The strategic area principally involved during the Battle of Surigao
Strait was the Philippines Area.
The former strategic area was of vital importance to the Japanese
in that once the South China Sea came under search and attack by land-
based aircraft from the Philippine Islands the lifeline from the vast
natural resources of Southeast Asia (Southern Resources Area) to the
Japanese homeland, already damaged by Allied submarine attack, would be
severed. This would deny vital oil and food to Japan and isolate her
forces in the Netherlands East Indies and other parts of Southwest Asia.
This danger was clearly recognized by the Japanese Navy from the beginning
but not by the Japanese Army until the last minute and perhaps not fully
recognized even then.
In addition, this area was the logical focus of the two Allied
lines of attack, i.e. the attack (a) across the Central Pacific under
Commander Pacific Ocean Areas (Admiral Chester W. Nimitz) and (b) through
New Guinea under Commander Southwest Pacific Area (General Douglas
Mac Arthur) •
Psychological stakes were high since the capture of the Philippine
Islands would result in the liberation of a large conquered population
from Japanese domination and would thereby notify the many millions of
Southeast Asia that they would also soon be liberated from Japanese
domination.
The relative strengths of the two sides were such that a Japanese
naval victory would not necessarily force the Allies to give up their
former gains but would merely force a delay in the Allied plans. On the
other hand, an Allied naval victory would result not only in the
destruction of a large portion of the Japanese Navy but also in the loss
of the Philippine Islands. This would sever the Japanese lifeline to
Southeast Asia and might well immobilize most of the Japanese naval units
remaining.
496799 o - 59 - 8 cix CONFIDENTIAL
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It should be clear then that the holding of the Philippines was of
the utmost importance to the Japanese,
(b) THE SURIGAO STRAIT AREA
The Battle of Surigao Strait was fought in the strait of that name,
which is the strait connecting the Pacific Ocean and the .-dnaanao Sea,
This strait is one of the two straits which permit passage from the Pacific
Ocean to the west through the central islands of the Philippines; the otner
is, of course, San riernardino Strait, It was traversed Dy ^iagellan in 1521
when he discovered the Philippine Islands,
Leyte Gulf, where the principal Allied amphibious forces were operat-
ing and which is adjacent on the north, lies between the islands of Samar,
Leyte and Homonhon, Its southern boundary is generally considered as a line
between Homonhon and Leyte Islands,
The eastern entrance to Surigao Strait which is fourteen miles wide
lies between Desolation Point, Dinagat Island and Homonhon Island and faces
on the Pacific Ocean, The strait turns around Hiouson Island and extends
some thirty miles to the south between Dinagat Island on the east and Leyte
and Panaon Islands on the west. The strait then turns to the soutnwest
around Bclobolo Point and Binit Point, The southern entrance to the strait
lies between Binit Point, Panaon Island and Bilaa Point, Hinaanao Island,
and faces on the Mindanao Sea. Throughout its length tne strait is deep and
clear and the shores of the islands which border it are steep-to. The strait
has a minimum width of nine miles near its southern end between Boloooio
Point and Sumilon Island.
With the exception of a few shcals having depths of fourteen to
twenty fathoms the strait slopes from around thirty fathoms in the northern
entrance to over 400 fathoms in the southern entrance. It shculd oe noted,
however, that starting about two miles north of Desolation Point depths of
more than fifty fathoms can be carried through the strait. Currents are
strong, reaching six knots or more at times, although dangerous tide rips
and whirlpools are absent in the main channel due to the evenness of the
bottom and the regularity of the channel. The tidal currents during the tine
of the battle are contained in Appendix II,
Hinatuan Passage, which runs from the southern entrance of Surigao
Strait to the Pacific Ocean between Dinagat and Mindanao Islands, is narrow
and tortuous particularly near the western end. It has tidal currents ol
seven or more knots and there are dangerous tidal rips and whirlpools.
Although it is sometimes used by steamers trading in the vicinity, it is
much more difficult to transit than Surigao Strait »
. *»
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CONFIDENTIAL
(c) WEATHER*
The weather in the Philippine Islands is controlled by three air
masses. The Northeast Monsoon which begins in November and lasts until
March brings greatly modified polar continental air which has its origin
on the Asian continent. The Southwest Monsoon which lasts from July to
October brings equatorial air. During the transition periods between
these two seasons, the Northeast Trades bring maritime tropical air from
the tropical regions of the North Pacific Ocean.
These changes in the air masses result from: (1) the seasonal
migration of the Intertropical Convergence Zone (variously known as the
•equatorial front', the 'intertropical front', or the 'doldrums') wh^ich
tends to follow the thermal equator, but which lags about two months
behind it on the average. However, the lag between the two may vary from
one to three months. (2) The seasonal variation in the strengths and
locations of the Asiatic High and the North Pacific High,
The mean position of the Intertropical Convergence Zone in this
area in February is about 05°-00'S Latitude, and in August it is about
15°-00'N Latitude.
The areas to the south of the Intertropical Convergence Zone are
dominated by the Southwest Monsoon, and as the Zone moves to the north
the Philippines come under the influence of equatorial air. This is the
rainy season for the west coasts. If the southwest winds blow uninter-
ruptedly for several days, overcast skies with low ceilings and poor
visibilities result from the influx of humid equatorial air. When the
winds are light to gentle southwesterly, or variable, the clouds are of
the cumulus or cumulonimbus type and the rain is in the form of showers
or occasional squalls. Most of these showers and squalls cover a small
area and are of relatively short duration. Showers over the open water
are most frequent in the late night and early morning hours and least
frequent in the afternoon. Showers over the islands are more frequent
than over the sea and occur most often from midafternoon to early evening.
This season is also marked by maximum typhoon activity. Normally two to
four typhoons influence the weather in the Philippines during each of
these months (July to October), although few actually cross the islands.
Since the Southwest Monsoon ends in the Philippines in October the
area north of the Intertropical Convergence Zone comes under the influence
of the Northeast Trades until the Northeast Monsoon commences in November.
Data from United States Coast Pilot, Philippine Islands, Part I, Third
Edition, 1939, pages 30-34; NIS 105, Part X, Southwestern Sector of
the North Pacific, Marine Climate and Oceanography, June 1954, pages
2-1 to 2-31; Aerological Aspects of Night Photography, The Philippine
Islands, NAVAER-IT-6, February 1944; Climate and Weather of the North
and Central Philippine Islands, NAVAER 50-IT-21, June 1944. A some-
what shorter discussion of the weather embracing the Philippines is in
Volume I, Battle for Leyte Gulf, NavPers 91973.
cxL CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
The Intertropical Convergence Zone is wider and its daily position
is more variable in the Philippine area than it is farther east. In
October its mean position lies between the northern end of Leyte Island
and about 05°-00'N Latitude (a short distance south of the southern coast
of Mindanao). In the region of the Northeast Trades (north and east of
Samar) the weather, except for tropical cyclones, is conducive to naval
operations during October and is characterized by fairly steady northeast
winds, broken cloudiness, visibility at flying altitudes of five miles or
less due to high level haze, temperatures of about 82 F., and high
humidity.
Tropical cyclones, particularly those which develop into typhoons,
bring dense cloudiness, violent precipitation and destructive winds and
seas. During October in the Leyte-Samar area one typhoon occurs every
one to two years, although in the area about 150 miles to the northeast
of Samar the frequency increases greatly so that there is normally one or
two during the month.
Within the Intertropical Convergence Zone the weather is usually
characterized by high humidity, light and variable winds, low barometric
pressure, considerable low cloudiness, poor visibility, and freauent
intense showers and thunder showers. This type of weather, while not
optimum for some kinds of naval operations, does not prohibit them.
(1) Weather in Surigao Strait
The weather in the Intertropical Convergence Zone or
Equatorial Front — as it has been employed in previous volumes — has been
stressed somewhat heavily here for this weather existed in the southern
end of Surigao Strait during the night of October 24th - 25th. Repeated
references — both Japanese and Allied — have been made in this volume •
relative to the poor visibility encountered there. Among other examples
this caused (a) the Japanese SECOND Striking Force very nearly to run
aground on Panaon Island — emergency turns to the right prevented a
serious grounding there — and (b) Allied MTB's to (1) fail to observe
illumination and gunfire (Madilao PT's about 0200 October 25th) and (2)
become widely separated (SE Panaon PT's at 0124 October 25th. )
cxii CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
ALLIED COMMAND RELATIONS
BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF
OCTOBER 1944
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
US ARMY
AIR FORCES
, OMMANOING GEN,
'Gen. H.H.Arnold
1 AC] USA
US ARMY / US NAVY
C of STAFF / COMINCH
■ en.G. C.Marshall / Adm. E.J. King
USA / USN
20th. AIR FORCE
Gen. H.H.Arnold
(AC) USA
C-B-l
Supreme Allied Commander
CHINA THEATER
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek
Chief of Staff
Gen. J.w. stilwell
Dual
Copoatr
Com Gen. US Army Forces
CHINA, BURMA, INDIA
THEATER (CBI)
Gen.J.W.Stilwell.USA
14th. AIR FORCE
Moj.Gen.C.L.Chennault
~\
20th. BOMBER COMMAND
Maj.Gen. C. Le May
POA
Commander in Chief
PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS I
Adm.C.W Nimilz.USN
Deputy Commander
20th. BOMBER FORCE
Commander in Chief
US PACIFIC FLEET
Commander
WEST. PAC. TASK FORCES
Adm.W.F.Halsey.USN
TF 17
SUBMARINES
V.Adm. C.ALockwood
Commander
THIRD FLEET
TF 57
FORWARD AREA
CENTRAL PACIFIC
V.Adm. J.H.Hoover
I
TF 59
SHORE BASED
AIRCRAFT
Maj.Gen.W.H.Hale.USA
TF 38
FAST CARRIER
FORCE
VAdm.M.A.Mitscfier
TF 34
HEAVY SURFACE
STRIKING FORCE
V.Adm. W.A.Lee
TG 38.3
R.Adm.FC.Shermon
TG 30.5
SEARCH.RECONNAISSANCE
AND PHOTOGRAPHIC COMMAND
Como. D. Ketcham
TG 34.5
SPECIAL GROUP
R Adm 0 C. Badger
~L
TG 30.8
FLEET OILER GROUP
Copt. J. T. Acuff
TG 38.4
R.Adm.R. E.Davison
LEGEND
CHAIN OF COMMAND
COOPERATION AND COORDINATION
I MOVEMENTS OF FORCES
Notes >
* Largely departed, some units remaining.
** Lt. General W. Krueger.USA, took command of
ARMY units ashore at 241400 Item.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
JAPANESE COMMAND RELATIONS
23-25 OCTOBER 1944
BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF
OCTOBER 1944
BOARD OF
FIELD MARSHALS
and
FLEET ADMIRALS
Consultation
EMPEROR
Consultation
SUPREME
WAR
COUNCIL
IMPERIAL GHO
NAVY SECTION
'(NAVAL GENERAL STAFF)/
Adm K. Oikawa
ARMY SECTION
"(ARMY GENERAL STAFF)/
Gen.Y. Umezu
SURFACE ESCORT
CINC
f Adm. N. Nomura
COMBINED FLEET
CINC
Adm. S. Toyoda
CHINA AREA FLEET
CINC
Adm. N. Kondo
*
7===//
/
NAVAL DISTRICTS
and
GUARD DISTRICTS
COMDTS
A
( \
V—
OTHER
ARMIES
/
SOUTHERN
ARMY
Fid. Marshal H.Terauchi
SEVENTH BASE
AIR FORCE
W-
V.Adm. S. Kira
THIRD
AIR FLEET
ADVANCE FORCE
(EXPEDITIONARY)
V. Adm. S. Miwa
/ SIXTH FLEET
(SUBMARINES) .
FIRST
SUBMARINE
FORCE
V.Adm. S.Miwo
NORTHEAST
AREA FORCE
V. Adm. E. Goto
/ OTHER
ARMIES
i£ZZZZ7
NORTHEAST
AREA FLEET
SEVENTH
SUBMARINE
FORCE
R. Adm. N.Owada
ELEVENTH
SUBMARINE
FORCE
R.Adm. N. Ishizakl
SECOND BASE
AIR FORCE
V Adm E.Golo
FIRST STRIKING
FORCE
V. Adm. T. Kurita
SECOND FLEET
MAIN
FORCE
V.Adm. j.Ozawo
THIRD FLEET
MAIN BODY
(FIRST B SECOND
SECTIONS
V. Adm. T. Kurita
^TWELFTH AIR FLEE
THIRD
SECTION
V.Adm. S. Nishimura
SOUTHWEST
AREA FORCE
V.Adm. G. Mikawa
A
1
SOUTHWEST
AREA FLEET
XXX
MAIN UNIT
V.Adm. J. Ozawa
XXX
ADVANCE GUARD'
R.Adm. C. Matsuda
SECOND STRIKING
FORCE
V.Adm. K. Shimq
FIFTH FLEET .
SIXTH BASE
AIR FORCE
V.Adm.S.Fukudome
2nd. AIR FLEET
/
OTHER UNITS "~|
\ I COMBINED FLEET I
IINOT PARTICIPATING!
/"IN BATTLE FOR /
\Z_ LEYTE GULF) /
THIRD
AIR ARMY
(W. OF BORNEO)
EIGHTEENTH
ARMY
(E NEW GUINEA)
FIFTH BASE
AIR FORCE
V. Adm. T. 0 nishi
1st. AIR FLEET
THIRD BASE
AIR FORCE
V.Adm. G. Mikawq
13th. AIR FLEET /
CRUDIV2I
DESRON ONE
V. Adm.K. Shimo
DESDIV. 21
Cdr. N. Ishii
A EAST INDIES
FORCE
V. Adm. S. Kowose
2nd. SO. EX. FLEET/
NORTH OF
AUSTRALIA FORCE
V.Adm. S.Yamagoto
/4th. SO.EX. FLEET
WESTERN
FORCE
V. Adm. M.Tayui
/I si. SO. EX. FLEET,,
PHILIPPINE
FORCE
V. Adm. G. Mikawq
/3rd. SO.EX FLEET/
FOURTH
AIR ARMY
(PHIL.)
Lt. Gen. K.Tominoga
SEVENTH
AREA ARMY
( NEI- MALAYA)
BURMA
AREA ARMY
(BURMA)
SECOND
AREA ARMY
(W. NEW GUINEA)
FOURTEENTH
AREA ARMY
(PHIL.)
Gen.T. Yamashito
I
THIRTY FIFTH
ARMY
Lt. Gen- S. Suzuki
LEGEND
CHAIN OF COMMAND
COORDINATION
MOVEMENT OF FORCES
;==== OPERATIONAL CONTROL
Note:
* COMCRUDIV 16 assumed duties as Commander Guord Force
at 231200.
XX Sometimes called "Mobile Force Main Body" The term "Main
Force" is here employed to avoid confusion with "Main
Body, FIRST Striking Force."
XXX After 1439 October 24 th, 1944.
CONFIDENTIAL
CINC COMBINED FLEET
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
CHAPTER I - JAPANESE OPERATIONS, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd
(A) Operations of CinC Combined Fleet, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd,
During the day CinC Combined Fleet who was in his Hiyoshi Headquarters,
watched with great interest the movement of his forces*
As the penetration operation moved toward its climax he was particularly
interested in enemy contacts in order to determine as soon as possible,
enemy reaction to the discovery of his forces. The Naval General Staff
recorded on this day however, that weather conditions east of the
Philippines were bad and that the enemy situation could not be determined.*
It seems probahle however that he did receive several RDF fixes and that
after 1042 he received (a) one on an "unknown force" at 1325, bearing
086°(T), distant 285 miles from Catanduanes Island** (Contact "C",
Plate III) and (b) at 1550 an unknown force bearing 052° (T), distant
eighty- five miles from Catanduanes Island** (Contact "D")«
At about 1700 he learned that Commander FIRST Striking Force had
hoisted his flag in the YAMATO.***
During the afternoon he had worked on an estimate of the situation to
be transmitted to his commanders and at 1710 his chief of staff released
the dispatch. This dispatch is interesting, not only because it was
received by all his commanders and likely influenced their thinking, but
also because it seems appropriate that at this time he should (a) give his
commanders his estimate, presumably based on the best intelligence
information available and (b) restate the plan so there would be no doubt
that the operation was to be continued. Because of its importance this
dispatch is quoted:
"1, Estimate of enemy plans.
Since it is very probable that the enemy is generally aware of the
concentration of our forces, he will probably act as fo^Jlows:
"(1) Concentrate submarines in great strength in the San Bernardino
and Surigao Straits area,
"(2) Plan attacks on our surface forces, using large type planes
and task forces, after tomorrow morning.
* Material for Situation Estimates, 1ST Section, Naval General Staff,
October 1944, WDC Document 216714 (Microfilm),
** Appended Chart IV, Enemy Fleet Dispositions, October 23rd, 1944,
Detailed Action Report Main Force, SHO No, 1 Operation, October 20th -
29th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744 •
*** Commander 1ST Striking Force Dispatch 231630 October 1944 (addressees
unknown but presumed to be all interested commanders), Detailed Action
Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation, October 18th - 28th, 1944,
WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
CONFIDENTIAL
CINC COMBINED FLEET and
COM FIRST STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
"(3) Plan decisive action by concentrating his surface strength in
the area east of San Bernardino Strait, and Tacloban where he
has his transport group. He should be able to dispose himself
in this manner by afternoon of 24th 0
"2. Our plans.
"(l) Carry through our original plans.
"(2) In affecting the operations the following points are specially
emphasized:
H(a) Make up for our inferior surface strength by making every
effort to direct the enemy to the north towards the Main
Body of the Mobile Force.
"(b) Maintain an even stricter alert against submarines and
aircraft. Utilize every possible trick to keep enemy
submarines under control, particularly while breaking
through the narrow straits.
"(c) Destroy enemy task force carriers with our shore based
planes, while his carrier-based planes are engaging our
surface forces."*
(1) Operations of Commander FIRST Striking Force, 1042 - 2400,
October 23rd.
Commander FIRST Striking Force had been ordered in Combined Fleet
DesOpOrd 363 to penetrate to the Tacloban area at dawn on X-day (October
25th) • His force would first attack and destroy enemy surface forces in
the area and then annihilate the enemy landing forces. This endeavor was
to be undertaken with the cooperation of the land-based air forces.**
It was for the accomplishment of this mission that he had divided
the FIRST Striking Force into two forces, i.e., (a) the Main Body consisting
of the FIRST and SECOND Sections to proceed through the Sibuyan Sea and
San Bernardino Strait and to approach Leyte Gulf from the north and (b)
the THIRD Section to proceed through Mindanao Sea and Surigao Strait and
to approach Leyte Gulf from the south. The tasks assigned each of these
groups are given under (a) "Operations of Commander Main Body, 1042 - 2400,
October 23rd" and (b) "Commander THIRD Section, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd" #
* CofS Combined Fleet Dispatch 231710 October 1944 (addressees unknown),
Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October
16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
** Commander 1ST Striking Force Operation Order No. 4, October 1944,
Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October
16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document I6I64I, NA 11839.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM FIRST STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
It will be recalled that at 1042 he was in the destroyer KISHINAMI
awaiting an opportunity to transfer his flag to the YAMATO. This was
because the Allied submarines DACE and DARTER had, earlier in the morning,
(a) sunk his flagship the ATAGO and also the MAYA and (b) damaged the
TAKAO to the extent that she was unnavigable. COMBATDIV ONE had then
assumed tactical command of the Main Bodyc
Because of a series of submarine contacts he was unable to transfer
to the YAMATO until 1623. He then at 1630 advised all interested commands
by dispatch that his flag had been hoisted in the YAMATO.*
By 1940 (when it was received by COMDESRON ONE) he knew that
Commander SW Area Force had ordered the 954th and 955th Air Groups to
provide additional antisubmarine patrol protection to his forces as well
as to the SECOND Striking Force and CRUDIV SIXTEEN.
At 2034 he received CinC Combined Fleet's 1200 estimate of the
situation which has been quoted in full under "Operations of CinC Combined
Fleet, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd". It seems likely that he was in general
agreement with this estimate and plan although that portion which estimated
that the enemy would "Plan decisive action by concentrating his surface
strength in the area east of San Bernardino Strait and Tacloban where he
had his transport group",** may have caused him concern. This matter has
been discussed under the "Operations of Commander THIRD Section, 1042 -
2400, October 23rd" and as his reaction was likely the same as that
commander, it will not be discussed at this point.
Although COMBATDIV ONE recorded the comment that "today, the weather
was bad in the Manila area and practically no searches were carried out",
it seems likely however that Commander FIRST Striking Force did have the
following contacts:
(a) At 0633 two carrier planes sighted by the submarine 1-41 in
Latitude 15°-35'N, Longitude 130°-12'E, 500 miles east of
Lamon Bay*»< Contact "A", Plate III)*
(b) At 0915 an RDF fix in Latitude 14°-02'N, Longitude 127°-32»E,
bearing 083°(T), distant 200 miles from Catanduanes Island***
(Contact "B").
* Commander 1ST Striking Force Dispatch 231630 October 1944 (addressees
unknown but presumed to be all interested commanders), Detailed Action
Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation, October 13th - 28th, 1944
WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
** CofS Combined Fleet Dispatch 231710 October 1944 (addressees unknown),
Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October
16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
*** Appended Chart IV, Enemy Fleet Dispositions on October 23rd, 1944,
Detailed Action Report Main Force, SHO No. 1 Operation, October 20th -
29th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
CONFIDENTIAL
COM FIRST STRIKING FORCE
and COM MAIN BODY
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
(c) That at 1200 one plane had returned from searching a bearing
095°(T) from Manila to a distance of 300 miles with negative
results.*
(d) At 1325 an RDF fix on an unknown force in Latitude 14°-03»N,
Longitude 129°-05'E, bearing 086° (T), distant 235 miles from
Catanduanes Island** (Contact "C").
(e) At 1550 an RDF fix on an unknown force in Latitude 14°-34«N,
Longitude 125°-08»E, bearing 052° (T), distant eighty-five
miles from Catanduanes Island** (Contact "D"),
(a) Operations of Commander Main Body, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
Commander Main Body (who was also Commander FIRST Striking
Force), with the Main Body, had been proceeding uneventfully northward
through Palawan Passage during the night of October 22nd - 23rd. He was
en route Leyte Gulf via San Bernardino Strait where his objective was the
penetration of Leyte Gulf and, in coordination with Commander THIRD
Section, the (a) destruction of enemy surface forces and (b) the
destruction of the enemy transports, ground and landing forces,***
However between 0633 and O656 on the morning of October 23rd
he had been caught by surprise by two Allied submarines, the DARTER and
DACE as a result of which the AT AGO and MAYA had been torpedoed and sunk.
The TAKAO had been so heavily damaged at the same time that he had found
it necessary to retire her to Brunei Bay with the NAGANAMI and ASASHIMO
as escorts.
His command now consisted of the battleships YAMATO (FFF),
MUSASHI, NAGATO, KONGO (FF^ HARUNA; the heavy cruisers CHOKAI, MYOKO,
HAGURO, KUMANO (F), SUZUYA, TONE, CHIKUMA; the light cruisers NOSHIRO (F),
YAHAGI; and the destroyers SHIMAKAZE, HAYASHIMO, AKI3HIM0, KISHINAMI,
OKINAMI, HAMANAMI, FUJINAMI, NOWAKI, KIYOSHIMO, URAKAZE (F), HAMAKAZE,
YUKIKAZE, ISOKAZE.
By 1042, when Volume III ended, he was reorganizing the Main
Body which was still in confusion as a result of this surprise attack and
was rapidly departing the vicinity of the torpedoing by steering a northerly
course. Meanwhile because of the sinking of the ATAGO he had transferred
his flag temporarily to the KISHINAMI, and was now expecting to transfer
it (at about 1300) to the YAMATO, presently the flagship of COMBATDIV ONE.
* Detailed Action Report No. 2, 5TH Attack Unit (752ND Air Group),
October 22nd - 29th, 1944, WDC Document 161004, NA 12605,
** Appended Chart IV, Enemy Fleet Dispositions on October 23rd, 1944,
Detailed Action Report Main Force, SHO No. 1 Operation, October 20th -
29th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
*** Commander 1ST Striking Force Operation Order No. 4, October 1944,
Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October
16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839 •
4 CONFIDENTIAL
COM MAIN BODY and
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
As this time approached, however, since several submarine
contacts had been reported (actually all false) it became necessary to
maneuver the force almost constantly until after 1409 when the last of
this series of submarine contacts was made.*
Finally, at 1623, he succeeded in transferring to the YAMATO**
and at 1630 announced by radio that he had "assumed command of the
fleet".***
He now modified the movement plan to approach the Mindoro coast
from a point fifty-five miles west of Talabasi Point, heading 090° (T)
until close to the coast, thence southeastward along the coast on a course
of 115° (T) to round the southern tip of Mindoro at dawn on October
24th.**** He also ordered radar silence during the night***** and
continued on generally at eighteen knots.****** Little did he realize
that at this time he was being trailed by the ANGLER which at 2130 had
reported him as being on course 050°(T), speed eighteen knots ********
At 2319 he changed course to 090° (T ).******
(b) Operations of Commander THIRD Section, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd«
Commander THIRD Section, with the THIRD Section, composed of the
battleships FUSO and YAMASHIRO (FF), the heavy cruiser MOGAMI and the four
destroyers MICHISHIO (F), ASAGUMO, YAMAGUMO and SHIGURE, had commenced
passing through Balabac Strait during the early morning of this day and
by 1042 was well into the Sulu Sea. He was en route Leyte Gulf via
Surigao Strait and was to (a) arrive off Binit Point at 0100 October 25th
(X-day) and (b) penetrate Tacloban Anchorage at dawn (0427) the same
day.******** His objectives were (a) the destruction of the enemy
* Detailed Action Report No. 3, YAMATO, SHO No. 1, Antiair and
Surface Actions, October 17th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161639.
** Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations,
October 16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839 •
*** Commander 1ST Striking Force Visual Dispatch 231630 October 1944
(addressees unknown but presumed to be all interested commanders),
Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation, October
18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
**** Ibid., COMBATDIV 1 (Commander Main Body) Visual Dispatch 231827
October 1944 to Main Body.
-a**-** Commander 1ST Striking Force (Commander Main Body) Visual Dispatch
231900 October 1944 to Main Body, Detailed Action Report SUZUYA,
SHO No. 1 Operation, October 18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document
161747.
****** Detailed Action Report No. 3, YAMATO, SHO No. 1, Antiair and
Surface Actions, October 17th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161639.
******* War Patrol Report ANGLER, Report of 5TH War Patrol, Serial 0(10),
November 9th, 1944.
******** Commander 1ST Striking Force Dispatch 212053, October 1944 to
CinC Combined Fleet, Commander Main Force, Conmander 2ND
Striking Force, War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document
161638, NA 11739.
5 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
October 23rd
transport group and landing forces and (b) a diversionary attack on
enemy surface forces (a protection objective).* These objectives are
more fully discussed in Volume III under "Operations of Commander FIRST
Striking Force, October 21st" .**
At about 1056 he likely intercepted COMBATDIV ONE's dispatch
reporting (a) the torpedo attacks against the Main Body, FIRST Striking
Force, (b) the sinking of the ATAGO and MAYA and (c) the damaging of the
TAKAO by submarine action.*** From this he could see that the Chief of
Staff Combined Fleet's estimate concerning Allied submarines in narrow
waters**** was remarkably accurate in this regard and likely caused him
to examine his own antisubmarine dispositions.
At 1300 he had reason to believe that his presence was known
to the enemy for at that time he received a message from the MOGAMI
reporting that a group of four aircraft suspected of being enemy had
been sighted at 1030 at a great distance.*****
At approximately 1355, he changed course to 050°(T)****** and
proceeded generally in accordance with his previously announced movement
plan. *******
**
www
-R-fi-K-
##*-*
Coramander 1ST Striking Force Operation Order No. 4, October 1944,
Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operation, October
16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92510), Naval War
College, 1957, Chapter IV, (A)(1).
COMBATDIV 1 Dispatch 231026 October 1944 to CinC Combined Fleet,
Commanders Main Force, SW Area Force, Chief of Naval General
Staff, Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operation,
October 16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
CofS Combined Fleet Dispatch 221651 October 1944 to Connander SW
Area Force, info Commanders 1ST and 2ND Striking Forces,
COMCRUDIV 16, COMBATDIV 2 (3RD Section), War Diary DESRON 10,
October 1944, WDC Document 161638, NA 11744.
MOGAMI Visual Dispatch 231300 October 1944 to 3RD Section,
Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines,
October 18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
Appended Chart 1, SHO No. 1 Operation, Movements of 3RD Section,
1ST Striking Force from 1500 October 22nd - 1700 October 27th,
Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October
23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 221155 October 1944 to CinC
Combined Fleet, COMCRUDIV 16, Commanders 1ST and 2ND Striking
Forces, etc., Detailed Action Report No. 13, DESRON 10, SHO
Operations, October 17th - 31st, 1944, WDC Document 161005,
NA 11744.
-K-5HHBfr
-*##***
***-»-**#
CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
At 1645 (when it was received by COMDESRON ONE) he received a
dispatch from Commander SW Area Force which (a) set forth the organization
of the SECOND Striking Force and (b) directed the penetration of the
SECOND Striking Force as follows:
"The SECOND Striking Force, Main Body, operating as ordered by
the force commander, will penetrate through Surigao Strait into Leyte
Gulf at dawn on X-day0 It will destroy the enemy invasion forces present
in support of the operations of the FIRST Striking Force and at the same
time will provide indirect cover for the movements of the Guard Force."*
Although the wording of this dispatch was of interest to him
he had known for some time that the SECOND Striking Force was assigned to
the operation and, as discussed in Volume III** under "Operations of
Commander THIRD Section, 0000 - 1042, October 23rd", he had already
advised his command of the SECOND Striking Force schedule.
About this time he directed BATDIV TWO to (a) use main battery
to repel air attack if necessary and (b) in case of an encounter with
enemy surface ships (especially battleships) prior to penetration into
the anchorage, fire would be opened with 0 type (HE) shells until the
change over to armor-piercing could be effected.***
At about 1700 he likely learned that Commander FIRST Striking
Force was aboard the YAMATO and that operations were being continued as
planned.****
At 1730 he instructed his forces by visual dispatch as follows:
"Except as stipulated below gunfire against enemy transports
at the time of penetration into the anchorage will be as ordered by ship
commanders.
* Commander SW Area Force Dispatch 231000 October 1944 to Commander
2ND Striking Force, COMCRUDIV 16, CinC Combined Fleet, Commander
3RD Section (SW Area Force DesOpOrd No. 689), War Diary DESRON 1,
October 1944, WDC Document 161638, NA 11739*
** Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92510), Naval War College,
1957, Chapter VIII, (A)(1)(b).
*** Commander 3RD Section Visual Dispatch (date-time-group unknown)
October 23rd, 1944 to 3RD Section (3RD Section SigOrd No. 6),
Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
**** Commander 1ST Striking Force Dispatch 231630 October 1944
(addressees unknown but presumed to be all interested commanders),
Detailed Action Report Main Force, SHO No. 1 Operation, October
20th - 29th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
Ml. Allocation of targets:
BATDIV TWO from the south of the anchorage, the destroyer
force from the north, and MOGAMI in the center.
"2. Order of ship targets:
Ships in process of unloading or loading, craft on the
lee of large transports, craft on the inner side in case
of a concentration anchored in depth.
"3. Standard firing ranges:
BATDIV TWO, 20-10 kms; MOGAMI, 15-13 kms; destroyers
7-4 kms.
In case of overlapping in lines of fire, units (ships)
will keep a distance of 3-5 kms apart from each other.
"4. Firing outline:
"a. In the absence of special orders, BATDIV TWO will
employ directed fire against enemy warships as
required by the situation. (Main batteries alternating
fire.)
"b. Main batteries will use 0-type HE shells and
illumination shells as required. BATDIV TWO will
issue special orders.
"c. In order to avoid over-concentration of fire, BATDIV
TwO will follow the rule of every gun against a
target indicated by the fire director.
"d. Aiming point will be the intersection of the waterline
and bridge line.
M5. Targets will be shifted in the following cases:
"a. When the target has been heavily set afire.
Mb. When a number of effective hits has been confirmed and
it appears probable that the target ship will be
abandoned.
"c. In cases other than a. and b., the standard gunnery
doctrine will be followed. "*
* Commander 3RD Section Visual Dispatch 231730 October 1944 to 3RD
Section, (3RD Section SigOrd No. 7), Detailed Action Report SHIGURI,
Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717
(Part 4), NA 11801.
8 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
THESE INSTRUCTIONS, WHILE SOMEWHAT LONG, ARE INTRODUCED HERE
AS THEY INDICATE CLEARLY, AMON} OTHER ITEMS, THE MANNER IN WHICH COMMANDER
THIRD SECTION PLANNED TO APPROACH THE TARGET ANCHORAGE IN THREE GROUPS BY
TYPES, WITH THE DESTROYERS IN ONE GROUP FROM THE NORTH, THE BATTLESHIPS
IN ANOTHER FROM THE SOUTH AND THE MOGAMI IN ANOTHER FROM THE EAST, THE
TARGET PRIORITIES, AND THE FIRE DISTRIBUTION. SINCE (a) AT THE TIME OF
OPENING FIRE IT WOULD STILL BE NIGHT AND THEREFORE QUITE DARK, AND (b)
THE TACLOBAN ANCHORAGE, IN VIEW OF ITS LOCATION AND DANGERS TO NAVIGATION,
SHOULD BE DIFFICULT TO APPROACH FROM THE NORTH AS WELL AS FROM THE EAST,
IT WOULD APPEAR THAT COMMANDER THIRD SECTION HAD ESTIMATED THAT THE
NORTHERN TRANSPORTS WOULD BE FARTHER SOUTH THAN THEY ACTUALLY WERE AND
THAT THE SEA AREA NORTH OF THE TRANSPORTS WOULD BE DEEP ENOUGH, AND WIDE
ENOUGH TO PERMIT HIS DESTROYERS TO OPERATE FREELY. ACTUALLY THE NORTHERN
TRANSPORTS WERE IN SAN PEDRO BAY WHERE DESTROYER OPERATIONS WOULD BE
DIFFICULT.
At about 1824 he may have received a report of a submarine in
position Latitude 08°-34.5,N> Longitude 120°-21.5fEo Although there is
no record in documents available that such a report was received by him,
the submarine COBIA which was transiting the Sulu Sea in a southerly
direction returning to Fremantle, reported that at 1754 she sighted a
reconnaissance seaplane and submerged.* From whence came this plane is
not known but it seems likely that it was a FIRST Striking Force aircraft.
At 1903 he directed "Anti-aircraft and Anti-submarine Alert
will be especially tightened tonight" and "No. 2 Alert for radar search
dispositions".**
At 1905 he issued his instructions for the use of his eight
reconnaissance seaplanes (a) a single plane search of Leyte Gulf and
vicinity to be launched at 0200 October 24th, (b) a single plane search
of Mindanao Sea and Leyte Gulf to be launched at 1600 October 24th,
(c) the FIRST Contact Unit to be launched at 2230 October 24th to make
contact and guide the force, (d) an attack unit to be launched at 1600
October 24th to proceed to Cebu in order to carry out a strike in Leyte
Gulf at dawn, October 25th and (e) in case of air attack all planes
proceed to Cebu and carry out their assigned missions.***
* War Patrol Report COBIA, Report of 2ND War Patrol, Serial 035,
November 5th, 1944*
** Commander 3RD Section Visual Dispatch 231903 October 19A4 to 3RD
Section (3RD Section SigOrd No. 9), Detailed Action Report SHIGURE,
Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document
161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
*** Commander 3RD Section Visual Dispatch 231905 October 1944 to 3RD
Section (3RD Section SigOrd No. 10), Detailed Action Report SHIGURE,
Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document
161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
At 1950 (when it was received by COMDESRON ONE) he probably
received a dispatch* from Commander SW Area Force assigning the 954th
and the 955th Air Groups to antisubmarine patrols on October 24th. He
noted that the "Main Strength" of the 955th Air Group had been assigned
to screen the THIRD Section, while elements of the same force would
screen the SECOND Striking Force.
At 2034 (at which time it was received by Commander FIRST
Striking Force) he received the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet estimate
of the situation.** As he studied this dispatch he noted that it
contained no new ideas in the execution of the plan but emphasized the
importance of (a) the diversionary effect of the Main Force, (b) strict
antiair and antisubmarine alerts and (c) the destruction of enemy task
force carriers by shore-based aircraft. He was particularly interested
however in the estimate of enemy intentions as they affected his part of
the operations. These estimates stated that the enemy would:
a. "Concentrate submarines in great strength in the San
Bernardino and Surigao Straits area.
b. "Plan attacks on our surface forces using large type planes
and task forces after tomorrow morning,
c. "Plan decisive action by concentrating his surface strength
in the area east of San Bernardino Strait and Tacloban
where he has his transport group. He should be able to
dispose himself in this manner by afternoon of 24th".
ALTHOUGH INFORMATION AS TO WHAT ENEMY CONTACTS COMMANDER THIRD
SECTION HAD RECEIVED DURING THE DAY IS MEAGER, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT HE
HAD ESSENTIALLY THE SAME LIMITED INFORMATION AS DID COMMANDER FIRST
STRIKING FORCE. IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT HE NOW CONSIDERED THE ESTIMATE OF
ENEMY INTENTIONS IN LIGHT OF THIS INTELLIGENCE.
IN REGARD TO ITEM (a), IN VIEW OF THE UNHAPPY EVENTS OF THE DAY
WHEREIN CERTAIN JAPANESE HEAVY CRUISERS HAD BEEN TORPEDOED BY ALLIED
SUBMARINES IN PALAWAN PASSAGE AND APPROACHING MANILA BAY, HE HAD EVERY
REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THIS ESTIMATE OF ENEMY INTENTIONS WAS ACCURATE AND
MUST NOT BE OVERLOOKED.
AS REGARDS ITEM (b), AIR ATTACKS WERE TO BE EXPECTED. SINCE HE
HAD ALREADY ISSUED AN ORDER FOR ANTIAIRCRAFT AND ANTISUBMARINE ALERTS TO
BE TIGHTENED TONIGHT HE UNDOUBTEDLY FELT THAT HE HAD TAKEN NECESSARY
PRECAUTIONS.
* Commander SW Area Force Dispatch 231254 October 1944 to Commanders
954TH and 955TH Air Groups, 2ND Striking Force info Commander 1ST
Striking Force (SW Area Force DesOpOrd No. 688), War Diary DESRON 1,
October 1944, WDC Document 161638, NA 11739.
** CofS Combined Fleet Dispatch 231710 October 1944 (addressees unknown
but presumably to all interested commanders), Detailed Action Report
1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October 16th - 28th, 1944, WDC
Document 161641, NA 1183 9 •
10 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
AS REGARDS ITEM (c) i.e., THE ENEMY WOULD, "PLAN DECISIVE ACTION
BY CONCENTRATING HIS SURFACE STRENGTH IN THE AREA EAST OF SAN BERNARDINO
STRAIT AND TACLOBAN WHERE HE HAS HIS TRANSPORT GROUP", HE WAS EXTREMELY
INTERESTED AND SOMEWHAT DISTURBED. AS DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH IN VOLUME
III UNDER "OPERATIONS OF COMMANDER FIRST STRIKING FORCE, OCTOBER 21ST",*
THE JAPANESE THOUGHT THAT (a) "KNOWLEDGE OF THE LARGER BODY (MAIN BODY,
FIRST STRIKING FORCE) COMING FROM THE NORTH MIGHT DRAW AMERICAN SHIPS FROM
THE GULF AND THUS LEAVE NISHIMURA FREE TO ENTER",** AND (b) THE ALLIED
BATTLESHIPS SO DRAWN OUT OF THE GULF, AND PROCEEDING ALONG THE COAST OF
SAMAR IN ORDER TO CLOSE THE MAIN BODY, WOULD BE DESTROYED IN NIGHT BATTLE.*
THIS NEW ESTIMATE, ALTHOUGH NOT EXPLICIT, SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT CINC
COMBINED FLEET WAS NOW OF THE OPINION THAT THE ENEMY WOULD COUNTER THE
TWO PRONGS OF THE PENETRATION IN TWO SEPARATE SURFACE ENGAGEMENTS, i.e.,
OFF SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT AND IN LEYTE GULF.
As he had received but two situation reports from Leyte Gulf
in the past two days (one at 0907 October 22nd - eighty transports, and
the other at 0930 October 23rd - four BB or CA/CL, thirteen large
transports and four small transports) he was extremely anxious that the
reconnaissance seaplane scheduled for launching at 0200 should make a
successful reconnaissance.
He now proceeded uneventfully through the Sulu Sea until
approximately 2328 when he changed course to 100°(T).*** Since this
course change marked the beginning of a major deviation from his planned
route it would be interesting to learn his reasons for it. However,
there is no recorded reason nor is there any record that he reported
the change.
At midnight the THIRD Section was in position Latitude
09°-ll«N, Longitude 120°-04»E, on course 100° (T).
(2) Operations of Commander Main Force, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
Commander Main Force, with the Main Force, composed of the
ZUDCAKU (FF), ZUIHO, CHITOSE, CHIYODA, the hermaphrodite carriers ISE,
HYUGA, the light cruisers OYODO (FF), TAMA (F), ISUZU and the destroyers
AKITSUKI, HATSUZUKI, WAKATSUKI, SHIMOTSUKI, KUWA, MAKI, KIRI and SUGI,
had departed Bungo Suido on the evening of October 20th and had been
moving in a generally southwesterly direction in order to reach a station
off Luzon Strait. His objective was deception by which he hoped to
*~" Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92510), Naval War College,
1957, Chapter IV, (A)(1).
** USSBS Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Nav No. 9, Interrogation
of Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita, ex-UN, Volume I, Page 36.
*** Appended Chart I, SHO No. 1 Operation, Movements of 3RD Section, 1ST
Striking Force from 1500 October 22nd - 1700 October 27th, 1944,
Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
496799 o - 59 - 9 U CONFIDENTIAL
COM MAIN FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
divert Allied task forces from the area east of the Philippines to the
north thereby contributing to the success of the penetration attack of
the FIRST Striking Force.*
The degree of success he obtained in accomplishing the above
objective was of great importance to both Commander Main Body, FIRST
Striking Force, who would be penetrating San Bernardino Strait, on the
evening of October 24th, and to Commander THIRD Section, who would be
penetrating Surigao Strait during early morning of October 25th.
Despite the fact he had been at sea for three days he had not as
yet been contacted by the Allies despite the further fact that he had
sent out a long dispatch on the afternoon of October 22nd.
At 1042 October 23rd, when this volume commences, he had succeeded
in reaching the vicinity of Latitude 22°-30«N, Longitude 131°-00«E
(about 550 miles east of Formosa).
During the day he continued in a southwesterly direction toward
Latitude 19°-00»N, Longitude 126°-40»E from whence he expected to
initiate air action at about 0600, October 24th.** He did not launch an
afternoon search, but did maintain an ASP about the force. Although he
made a number of submarine contacts during the day, they apparently were
all false for the only Allied submarine in the area, the BONEFISH, as it
headed eastward returning to Pearl Harbor, *** had crossed his track some
hours earlier. Neither the BONEFISH nor the Main Force was aware of the
presence of the other0
During this afternoon he estimated the developing situation and
arrived at certain decisions concerning the operations of the following
day (October 24th) as follows:
(1) To launch search planes at 0545 October 24th. If the
enemy is spotted, to launch the initial air attack,
otherwise, to launch another search at 1300 and an air
attack.
To steer course 220° (T) and to operate to divert the
enemy to the north.
* Mobile Force Dispatch 200021 October 1944 to Mobile Force (Mobile
Force DesOpOrd No. 62), Detailed Action Report Main Force, SHO No. 1
Operation, October 20th - 29th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
** Detailed Action Report Main Force, SHO No. 1 Operation, October 20th
29th, 1944, WDC Document 16 1005, NA 11744 o
*** War Patrol Report BONEFISH, Report of 6TH War Patrol, No Serial,
November 8th, 1944.
12 CONFIDENTIAL
COM MAIN FORCE and
COM ADV EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
(2) In case the air attack fails to have a diversionary effect,
to send out the Advance Guard* to conduct diversionary
operations o
(3) In case the above is unsuccessful and the enemy task force
moves southward at time of penetration to attack the enemy
task force off Samar.**
(3) Operations of Commander Advanced Expeditionary Force, 1042 - 2400,
October 23rd.
Commander Advanced Expeditionary Force had on this day eleven
submarines en route to assigned stations east of the Philippines*
The placement of these submarines has been discussed in Volume
HI*** under the "Operations of Commander Advanced Expeditionary Force,
October 20th" and shown on Plate XXVI of that volume. In brief, they were
in a rectangular area approximately 200 by 400 miles to the eastward of
the islands of Mindanao, Samar and southern Luzon. It was planned that
all submarines would reach their stations by October 24th or 25th.****
During the day an additional submarine, the RO-109, completed
preparations and got underway as ordered on October 20th. This submarine
apparently reached its assigned station about October 27th.****
There appears to have been no contacts made by these submarines
on Allied surface forces during the day.
(4) Operations of Commander SW Area Force, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
Commander SW Area Force, with headquarters in Manila, in addition
to other units, commanded the Naval Air Forces concentrated in the
Philippines as well as the SECOND Striking Force.
During the morning, probably about 1056, he learned of the
torpedo attacks against the Main Body, the sinking of the ATAGO and MAYA
and the damage to the TAKAO.***** He also received a request from the
* Advance Guard consisted of ISS, HYUGA, HATSUZUKI, AKITSUKI,
WAKATSUKI, SHIMOTSUKI.
** Detailed Action Report Main Force, SHO No. 1 Operation, October
20th - 29th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
*** Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92510), Naval War
College, 1957, Chapter II (A)(2).
**** Submarine Operations in the THIRD Phase Operations, Part IV,
September 1944, February 1945, Japanese Monograph No. 184,
Compiled by the SECOND Historical Records Section of the
Repatriation Relief Bureau of the Welfare Ministry, June 1944*
***** COMBATDIV 1 Dispatch 231026 October 1944 to CinC Combined Fleet,
Commander Main Force, SW Area Force, etc., Detailed Action Report
1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October 16th - 28th, 1944,
WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
13 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SW AREA FORCE and
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
Chief of Staff, FIRST Striking Force for immediate screening and towing
services for the TAKAO.*
At 1200 in accordance with his DesOpOrd No. 637, COMCRUDIV SIXTEEN
became Commander Guard Force and from this time forward operated under
his direct command.
At 1254, realizing that some coordination of his antisubmarine
patrol support was necessary, he issued a directive ordering the 954th
and 955th Air Groups to screen the Main Body, the THIRD Section, the
SECOND Striking Force and CRUDIV SIXTEEN and specified the division of
effort.**
At 1323 he notified "All Commanders Seaplane Bases" of the plight
of the TAKAO and directed them to assign aircraft to escort her and
carry out neutralization attacks.***
By 1402 he had decided which surface units to send to the
assistance of the TAKAO. He therefore ordered the torpedo boat HIYODORI
and the MITSU MARU**** (probably an oiler) to the scene and directed
that the MITSU MARU be prepared to take the TAKAO in tow.*****
During the remainder of the day he received reports from the
various units within his area. His information of enemy contacts seems
to have been generally the same as other commanders in the area and are
listed under the "Operations of Commander THIRD Section, 1042 - 2400,
October 23rd."
(a) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force, 1042 - 2400,
October 23rd.
(1) During the early morning Commander SECOND Striking Force,
with the SECOND Striking Force, temporarily composed of the heavy cruisers
NACHI (FF) and ASHIGARA, the light cruiser ABUKUMA and the destroyers
AKEBONO (F), USHIO, KASUMI and SHIRANUHI, had been proceeding on a
* CofS 1ST Striking Force Dispatch 230330 October 1944 to CofS SW Area
Force, Detailed Action Report TAKAO, Antisubmarine Action, October
23rd - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160141, NA 11839.
** Commander SW Area Force Dispatch 231254 October 1944 to Commanders
954TH and 955TH Air Groups, 2ND Striking Force, info Coamander 1ST
Striking Force (SW Area Force DesOpOrd No. 688), War Diary DESRON 1,
October 1944, WDC Document 161638, NA 11739.
*** Commander 3RD Expeditionary Fleet Dispatch 231323 October 1944 to
All Commanders Seaplane Bases, info Commander 1ST Striking Force,
Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October
16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
**** Two MITSU MARU's are listed, one an oiler of 5,682 tons, the other
a cargo vessel of 404 tons; The Imperial Japanese Navy in World War
II, prepared by Military History Section Special Staff GHQ, Far
East Command, February 1952, Page 268.
***** Commander Philippine Force Dispatch 231402 October 1944 to MITSU
MARU, HIYODORI, Commander 1ST Striking Force, Detailed Action Report
TAKAO, Antisubmarine Action, October 23rd - 25th, 1944, WDC Document
160141, NA 11839. CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
generally southerly course toward Coron Bay and except for the information
concerning the torpedoing of the AOBA had had an uneventful passage.
CRUDIV SIXTEEN and DESDIV TWENTY-ONE which were on independent assignments
were not with him.
His instructions were to penetrate into Leyte Gulf and to
cooperate with Commander FIRST Striking Force. He had therefore
determined (a) his objective to be an exploitation one wherein he was "to
expand the battle results during the melee caused by the FIRST Striking
Force's penetration attack11* and (b) to pass through the sputhern
entrance to Surigao Strait at 0600* or five hours after the THIRD Section.
At 1042 he was bearing 312°(T), distant 110 miles from
Coron Bay, where he planned to refuel before proceeding toward Surigao
Strait and Leyte Gulf. At 1212 he sighted a B-24 type aircraft.** This
was a search plane from Morotai which reported the force quite
accurately.*** At 1645 he received instructions from Commander SW Area
Force which (a) outlined for clarification the organization of the
SECOND Striking Force, (b) established a Guard Force commanded by
COMCRUDIV SIXTEEN, and (c) restated the mission of the SECOND Striking
Force penetration as follows:
"The SECOND Striking Force, Main Body, operating as
ordered by the force commander will penetrate through
Surigao Strait into Leyte Gulf at dawn on X-day. It
will destroy the enemy invasion forces present in
support of the operations of the FIRST Striking Force
and at the same time will provide indirect cover for
the movements of the Guard Force. "****
At 1800 he entered Culion Anchorage near Coron Bay where
he hoped an oiler might be present but to his disappointment none was
there* so he commenced fueling his smaller shiDS from his heavy cruisers
thus reducing, to a degree, the cruising radius of the cruisers.
* Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation, SW Area Opera-
tion, Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-UN, 2ND Striking Force Staff
Torpedo Officer, GHQ FEC Special Historical Collection, Supporting
Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthurfs Historical
Report on Allied Operations in the SW Pacific Area (Item 22,
Footlocker 5 of 10, SWPA Series, Volume II).
** War Diary ABUKUMA, October 1944, WDC Document 161636, NA 11973.
*** 5TH Bomber Command Dispatch 230320 October 1944 to all concerned
current operations SWPA.
**** Commander SW Area Force Dispatch 231000 October 1944 to Commander
2ND Striking Force, COMCRUDIV 16, CinC Combined Fleet, etc., (SW
Area Force DesOpOrd No. 687), War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944,
WDC Document 161638, NA 11739.
15 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE,
COM SIXTH BASE AIR PORCE and
COM FIFTH BASE AIR FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
(2) At noon COMCRUDIV SIXTEEN in the damaged AOBA, which was
being towed by the KINU and screened by the URANAMI, became Commander
Guard Force. From this time onward he operated under the direct command
of Commander SW Area Force «,*
Despite the fact that the AOBA was being towed through
waters where Allied submarines were operating, she arrived safely in
Manila 3ay where at 2045 she anchored inside the entrance. At this time
COMCRUDIV SIXTEEN transferred his flag to the KINU and then with the
KINU and URANAMI proceeded to Manila Harbor to refuel.* (The KINU may,
in addition, have loaded some troops and supplies.)
(3) During the day COMDESDIV TWENTY-ONE with DESDIV TWENTY-ONE
arrived Manila about 1500, where he (a) discharged the SIXTH Base Air
Force personnel he had been ordered to transfer from Takao and (b)
refueled and departed about 2125. Although he had been ordered to rejoin
Commander SECOND Striking Force during the morning of October 24th, but
because of delays encountered in Manila Bay, he decided to rejoin that
commander at 1800, October 24th, in the vicinity of the southern tip of
Negros Island.**
(b) Operations of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, 1042 - 2400,
October 23rd.
Commander SIXTH Base Air Force continued his efforts to
organize his units in the Clark Complex and to prepare for an all out
effort October 24th. His aircraft numbered approximately 223 planes at
the end of this day.
(c) Operations of Commander FIFTH Base Air Force, 1042 - 2400,
October 23rd.
Commander FIFTH Base Air Force, who had about twenty-four
operational aircraft, deployed two Kamikaze Units to Mindanao, one to
Davao No. 1 and the other to Cagayan.***
* Detailed Action Report KINU, SHO No. 1 Operation, October 13th -
26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
** Detailed Action Report DESDIV 21, SHO No. 1 Operation, Antiair
Action South of Mindoro, October 24th, 1944, WDC Document 161717,
NA 11301.
*** War Diary 61ST Air Flotilla, October 1944, WDC Document 161643,
NA 12260.
16 CONFIDENTIAL
C.G. FOURTflAIR ARMY
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
(B) Operations of Commanding General FOURTH Air Army, 1042 - 2400,
October 23rd,
C.G. FOURTH Air Army (1) moved his headquarters to Bacolod, Negros
during the day, (2) prepared for his all out attack effort the following
day and (3) accomodated, in the middle Visayan airfield complex, the
considerable number of newly arriving aircraft. THERE IS A REPORT THAT
HE HAD 232 AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT IN THE PHILIPPINES,* WITH ONLY ABOUT 128
OPERATIONAL FOR THE ATTACK THE NEXT MORNING, ** AND IT IS BELIEVED THAT
BOTH OF THESE FIGURES HAVE VALIDITY. THE LOW PERCENTAGE OF PLANES
OPERATING IS DUE TO (a) THE LACK OF ADEQUATE REPAIR AND SERVICE
FACILITIES, (b) THE POOR QUALITY OF JAPANESE MAINTENANCE, WORKMANSHIP
AND THE HAPHAZARD DISPERSAL OF VITAL PARTS AND ACCESSORIES, (c) THE
FACT THAT THE TAXI STRIPS WERE USUALLY VERY ROUGH OR, WHERE THERE HAD
BEEN HEAVY RAINS, SOFT AND MUDDY*** AND (d) POSSIBLY THE EFFECT OF
ALLIED FIGHTER SWEEPS.
* Daily Record of the War Situation, 4TH Air Army, GHQ FEC Special
Historical Collection Supporting Documents to General of the Army
Douglas Mac Arthur's Historical Report on Allied Operations in the
SW Pacific Area (Item 4, Footlocker 7 of 10, SWPA Series, Volume II),
** Documents from the file of Lieutenant Katsuo Sato, ex-IJA, Staff
Officer, 4TH Air Army, Department of the Army Historical Division
Microfilm HS-7.
*** CINCPAC-CINCPOA Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, Volume No, 33, February
26th, 1945, Page 36; also George C. Kenney, "General Kenney Reports",
(New York, 1949), Page 513; also General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur»s Historical Report on Allied Operations in the SW Pacific
Area, Volume II, "Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area,
December 8th, 1944 to September 22nd, 1945" Chapter VII through XIV,
Page 357.
17 CONFIDENTIAL
COMSOWESPAC
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
CHAPTER II - ALLIED OPERATIONS, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd
(A) Operations of COMSOWESPAC, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
At the beginning of this period, COMSOWESPAC was primarily engaged
in making final preparations for the installation ceremonies of the
Philippine Conmonwealth Government which were to occur about noon in
the Philippine Commonwealth Building at Tacloban.*
It appears also that he had or was preparing a reply to COMTHIRDFLT's
request for an estimate of the earliest date after which it would be
safe to move into the South China Sea via Surigao and Mindoro Straits
with well-escorted fleet oilers and major combatant ships, with the
view that the China Sea might suddenly become a critical area.**
His reply addressed to CTF 77 and released at 1411 while he was off
the NASHVILLE (he had departed the NASHVILLE at 1119) (a) revealed that
he anticipated an operation against Mindoro between December 1st and
5th with land-based pursuit (aircraft) installed five days later and
(b) requested that CTF 77 advise all addressees the estimated date
Surigao Strait and other passages w ould be cleared for traffic.***
He departed the NASHVILLE for Tacloban at 1119.
After the installation ceremonies, he seems to have spent some time
in Tacloban choosing his temporary headquarters. He then proceeded to
the airfield and, after observing the unloading operations, returned to
the NASHVILLE, arriving on board at 1426.****
While ashore he very likely learned that the C.G. TWENTY-FOURTH
Corps had assumed command ashore as of 1200.*****
At 1620 he got underway in the NASHVILLE, with the flagship group,
for his usual night retirement in the eastern portion of Leyte Gulf.
He spent the remainder of the day maintaining close scrutiny of the
developing situation.
* CTF 77 Dispatch 220814 October 1944 to CTF 79; also George C.
Kenney, "General Kenney Reports", (New York, 1949), Page 453.
** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 210454 October 1944 to COMSOWESPAC, info CINCPAC,
COMINCH, CTF 77, CTF 38, CTG 38.1.
*** COMSOWESPAC Dispatch 230511 October 1944 to CTF 77, info C0M3RDFLT,
CINCPAC, C0M7THFLT.
**** George C. Kenney, "General Kenney Reports", (New York, 1949), Page
453; also War Diary NASHVILLE, October 23rd, 1944.
***** C.G. 24TH Corps Dispatch 230330 October 1944 to CTF 77.
18 CONFIDENTIAL
COMSEVENTHFLT and CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
(1) Operations of Commander SEVENTH Fleet, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
COMSEVENTHFLT took no unusual action this day as COMSEVENTHFLT
nor in his capacity as CANF SOWESPAC insofar as the Leyte operation was
concerned. His deputy commander continued administrative control from
his headquarters at Hollandia while he himself, as COMSEVENTHFLT and
CTF 77, continued operational control of SOWESPAC naval forces associated
with the Leyte operation from the WASATCH.
His headquarters at Hollandia (a) at 1209 issued the intelligence
summary for the day (all of the important items in this summary have been
or will be covered elsewhere), (b) received most, if not all, of the
dispatches relating to the operation and acted as necessary on those items
which fell to that headquarters and (c) at 2113, transmitted a compilation
of ship sightings for this day which have been individually referred to
elsewhere.* For some reason the most important contact of the afternoon,
that on the Japanese SECOND Striking Force, was conspicuous by its absence.
It should be understood that since COMSEVENTHFLT was also CTF 77
he received all of the dispatches which he received as CTF 77; and
therefore was familiar with the developing situation and of the actions
being taken by all commands. He appears to have taken no direct action
thereon but, instead, to have employed them in his running estimate.
(a) Operations of CTF 77 (Central Philippines Attack Force),
1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
At 1042 CTF 77 was embarked in the WASATCH, which was anchored
in the Northern Transport Area.
He had just released his latest estimate of the situation
which included a request for assistance from COMTHIRDFLT and C.G. FIFTH
and THIRTEENTH Air Forces. Because of its importance, as it reveals the
thinking of CTF 77 and its possible impact on the thought processes of
other principal commanders, it is quoted herewith:
HI regard the approach of enemy combatant ships and tankers
toward Coron Bay as the first phase of the build up of magnified Tokyo
Express runs against Leyte. Believe highly probable that a tanker group
arrived Coron Bay area between 0200/1 23 and 0300/1 23 for purpose of
refueling major task force of enemy fleet which has been assembling for
several days in southern Formosa. Submarine reports indicate three
probable battleships approaching from the southern position to arrive
Coron Bay tonight Monday. Another group of 11 enemy ships with many
radars could arrive about the same time. There are indications of a
concentration of large number of enemy aircraft in the Luzon area. It
is also very important that early preparations for enemy operations be
disrupted. Commander FIFTH Air Force and THIRTEENTH Air Force requested
continue thorough reconnaissance Coron Bay and approaching routes and to
strike as practicable day and night. COMTHIRDFLT requested strike Coron
Bay earliest practicable and extend search as far as practicable to
westward and northwestward. Primary objective enemy combat ships and
* C0M7THFLT Dispatch 231213 October 1944 to All Concerned Current
Operations SOWESPAC, C0M3RDFLT, CTF 38, CTG's 38.2 and 38.3.
19 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
aircraft. It is possible that enemy carriers will support surface forces
and strike from west of Palawan. TG 77.4 is striking in western Visayas
twice daily,"*
A comprehensive discussion of events leading up to the
release of this dispatch and an analysis of the dispatch itself is
contained in Volume III under "Operations of CTF 77, 0000 - 1042, October
23rd" .**
The basic conclusions derived as a result of this analysis
are repeated herewith:
"IT SEEMS CORRECT TO SAY THAT CTF 77 WAS CLEARLY DISREGARDING
THE POSSIBILITY OF (A) MAJOR FLEET ACTION AND (B) RAIDS BY SURFACE FORCES
REFERRED TO BY COMSOWESPAC IN HIS 212240 AND BY HIMSELF AS COMSEVENTHFLT
IN HIS 210526 MENTIONED LATER IN THIS DISCUSSION, BUT WAS INSTEAD,
OPERATING ON THE CONCEPT THAT THE JAPANESE NOW CONTEMPLATED THE MOVEMENT
OF GROUND TROOPS TO LEYTE BY TOKYO EXPRESS OPERATIONS THROUGH THE VTSAYAS
EMPLOYING MAJOR FORCES AND POSSIBLY SUPPORTED BY CARRIERS OPERATING
SOLELY FROM THE SOUTH CHINA SEA."
At about 1106 (when it was received by CTF 79) he learned that
COMTHIRDFLT had changed his plans as regards TG 38.2. CTG 33.2 instead
of proceeding with CTG 38.3 to a position off Polillo Island, was to (a)
proceed to the vicinity of Latitude 13°-00«N, Longitude 125°-00«E (the
eastern entrance to San Bernardino Strait), (b) arrive there by 0600,
October 24th and (c) launch a reinforced search to the westward, to
include Coron Bay, striking targets of opportunity.***
He likely viewed this dispatch with satisfaction as it showed
that the commander of the covering force (COMTHIRDFLT) was fully alert
to the responsibilities of a covering force and had acted independently
and prior to receipt of his (CTF 77* s) dispatch 230142.
At about t his time, with CTF 79, he departed the WASATCH for
Tacloban and the ceremonies relative to the installation of the
Philippine Commonwealth Government.
He knew that commencing about noon, as a result of prior
arrangements, the Target CAP over Leyte had been reduced to twelve VF
which permitted heavier strikes to be conducted against northern Mindanao
and western Visayan airfields and shipping.
At 1307, while ashore at Tacloban, he likely learned that
C.G. TWENTY-FOURTH Corps had assumed command ashore at 1200. He was
pleased to hear this for now both corps commanders had assumed command
ashore and this cleared the way for C.G. SIXTH Army to assume command.
* CTF 77 Dispatch 230142 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, C.G.'s 5TH and 13TH
Air Forces info all TFC's and TGC's 3RD and 7THFLT's, CINCPAC, COMINCH,
COMSOWESPAC, CAAF SOWESPAC.
** Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92510), Naval War College,
1957, Chapter VII (A)(1)(a).
*** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 230003 October 1944 to CTG 38.2.
20 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
This would transfer the responsibility for the ground offensive from
himself to that commander.
At 1321 his staff received CTF 79' s daily situation report
the tenor of which indicated unloading operations were proceeding
satisfactorily and that operations ashore were continuing well, with
swampy terrain impeding the advance more than was enemy resistance.*
Some time after 1400 he returned on board the WASATCH.
At about 1530 he learned the first ten PBY's of VPB's
THIRTY-THREE and THIRTY-FOUR had arrived in Leyte Gulf.** Five sectors
between 341° (T) and 041° (T) (Plate IX) were to be flown upon establishment
of the two squadrons with their aircraft in the gulf. But, until such
time as this occurred, reduced coverage of the sectors would have to be
accepted.
At 1644 (when it was received by CTF 79), he received an
aircraft contact report on four MUTSUKI class destroyers, two NACHI class
heavy cruisers and one NATORI class light cruiser in Latitude 13°-00fN,
Longitude ILS^O'E on course 200°(T), speed twenty knots (Contact M5W,
Plate V).***
At approximately 1730 he learned that several important
sightings had occurred in the vicinity of Makassar Strait: (a) a possible
battleship on course 315°(T), speed thirty knots (the actual reported
position was on North Watcher Island), (b) one light cruiser and one
destroyer in southwest Makassar Strait on course 045°(T) and (c) seven
Sugar Charlies (cargo vessel, 500-1,000 C.T.) northwest of Makassar
Strait (Contact "3").****
It appears that the contact estimated to be a possible
battleship was quite in error since Japanese records fail to show the
presence of a battleship in this area at this time. Such a report could,
however, have hindered efforts to determine with accuracy the number of
battleships threatening the Allies in Leyte Gulf during the next two days.
At 1841 he approved CTG 77.4' s proposal to send two carriers
to Morotai to pick up replacement aircraft.*****
At 2000 he learned from CTG 77.5 that (a) for the first day
since the commencement of mine-sweeping operations no mines had been
swept and (b) Leyte Gulf was now considered safe from moored mines in all
areas defined by the appropriate section of CANF SOWESPAC Plan 13-44
* CTF 79 Dispatch 230216 October 1944 to CTF 77.
** CTG 73.7 Dispatch 230720 October 1944 to CFAW 17 (ADMIN), info
CTF 77, C.G. 308TH BOMWING, CTF 73.
*** C.G. 5TH Bomber Command Dispatch 230320 October 1944 to All
Concerned Current SOWESPAC Operations.
**** Troop Port Commander (probably C.G. 5TH Air Force) Dispatch
231410/1 October 1944 to All Interested in Current Operations*
***** CTF 77 Dispatch 230941 October 1944 to CTG 77.4, info CTF 73, etc.
21 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
except for an unexplored danger area existing between Latitude Uo-00*N
and Latitude lO^+l'N and between Longitude 126°-00'E and a line drawn
from the west tangent of Homonhon Island to the west tangent of Manicani
Island (Plate IV, Volume III).*
He likely knew that CTG 78.7, with TG 78.7 consisting of,
among other units, twenty Liberty ships (XAK), thirty-three LST's and
some important units of the Service Force was proceeding toward the
northern transport area where it would arrive about dawn. It is of
considerable interest that in permitting these vessels to enter Leyte
Gulf at this time, he evinced no undue concern as regards a possible
early enemy attempt to penetrate Leyte Gulf.
At 2133 (when it was received by CTF 79) he received authority
from CINCPOA to retain CRUDIV FOUR less INDIANAPOLIS plus MINNEAPOLIS.**
This was important for with the situation still fluid, it was desirable
to retain not only the three cruisers but also COMCRUDIV FOUR who was,
as CTG 77.2, the commander of his major combatant surface forces.
During the evening he intercepted at (a) 2031 (when it was
received by CTF 79) the DACE's report of her attack on the Main Body,
FIRST Striking Force*** (Contact "2") and (b) 2153 (when it was received
by CTF 79) the DARTER'S report**** (Contact "1"). The gist of these two
reports was that (a) it was the Japanese first team, (b) there were at
least three battleships, three other heavy ships and four ATAGO's, (c) one
KONGO class battleship was believed to have been sunk (actually it was
the CA MAYA), (d) one ATAGO class heavy cruiser had been sunk and another
heavily damaged all in Palawan Passage and (e) one probable carrier
together with cruisers and destroyers.
Although it seems doubtful that he even suspected it, these
submarine reports were only on the First Section Main Body, FIRST
Striking Force. The Second Section, which was but a few miles astern,
had not as yet been discovered by the DACE and DARTER.
It is not believed that these reports affected CTF 77fs
"Magnified Tokyo Express" concept in any way. This seems so for it was
because (a) of the original reports by the DARTER that he had formulated
this concept and (b) these later reports showed the enemy force to
(1) have been of about the earlier reported strength but (2) owing to
damage, be weaker. Certainly he had expected carriers, for had he not,
in his dispatch 230142, referred to the possibility that "enemy carriers
will support surface forces and strike from west of Palawan"?
CTG 77.5 Dispatch 230839 October 1944 to CTF 77.
CINCPOA Dispatch 231000 October 1944 to CTF 77, info COMSOWESPAC,
C0M3RDFLT, C0M7THFLT, CTF's 78 and 79.
*** DACE Dispatch 231115 October 1944 to CTF 71.
DARTER Dispatch 231240 October 1944 to CTF 71.
22 CONFIDENTIAL
U w w w
* M H H
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 78 and CTG 78.1
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
(1) Operations of CTF 78 (Northern Attack Force) and CTG 78.1
(Palo Attack Group), 1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
CTF 78, who was also CTG 78.1, in the BLUE RIDGE at anchor
off RED Beach had been unloading his shipping. Since he had received
certain contact reports which gave cause for concern he had been watching
the unloading of his twenty LST*s (fourteen with CTG 78.1 and six with
CTG 78.2) and the JUPITER with considerable interest. However, since it
was now clear that, except for LST 741 (which was aground), all would be
unloaded and would depart the area that evening, he likely felt somewhat
relieved.
It seems probable that as CTF 78 he attended the ceremony
for the installation of the Philippine Government, which occurred at
Tacloban at noon.
Shortly after noon he informed CTG 77.4 that COMDESRON
TWENTY-ONE, with NICHOLAS, O'BANNON, TAYLOR and HOPEWELL, would arrive
the next day and upon completion of fueling would report to CTG 77.4 on
covering station.* These destroyers with a DESDIV from CTF 79 were to
relieve DESRON FIFTY-SEVEN presently screening that task group, which
was to then report to COMTHIRDFLT for duty.
At 1335 by TBS voice radio he requested CTF 79 to advise
him when LST»s 24, 471, 472(F) and 606, which had arrived at ORANGE and
BLUE Beaches on October 22nd, had completed unloading, as he planned to
sail them with the next returning echelon.**
Mindful of the importance of sending unloaded shipping
out of the area, he at 1527 directed COMLSTGRP TWENTY-THREE in LST 1018
to form TG 78.11 consisting of the JUPITER, sixteen additional LST's and
three escorts and at 1700 to depart Leyte Gulf for Kossol Roads and
Hollandia . ***
At 1700 he observed the departure of CTG 78.11 in LST 1018
with the JUPITER and twenty-two additional LST«s (24, 170, 397, 465, 471,
472, 549, 606, 613, 623, 666, 667, 668, 695, 697, 740, 744, 751, 912, 986,
993 and 1017), and three escorts, CARSON CITY (FF), PC's 598 and 1129.****
* CTF 78 Dispatch 230317 October 1944 to CTG 77.4, info CTF 77, CTF
38, C0M3RDFLT.
** CTF 78 TBS Voice Radio Dispatch 230455 October 1944 to CTF 79.
*** CTF 78 Dispatch 230627 October 1944 to COMLSTGRP 23, info CTF 79, etc,
**** Action Report CTG 78.11 (COMLSTGRP 23), Operations While En Route
from Leyte Island, Philippines, to Hollandia, New Guinea, October
23rd - 26th, 1944, Serial 001, November 2nd, 1944; also Action
Report LST 24, Operations in the Invasion of Leyte Island,
Philippines, October 23rd - 26th, Serial CG-63, November 3rd, 1944.
23 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 78, CTG 78.1
and CTG 78.2
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
Prior to 2036 he had been estimating the situation to
determine what instructions he should give to CTG 78.7 who, with
Reinforcement Group TWO, would arrive in the Northern transport area on
the following morning, for at that time he issued certain instructions
thereon,* The prospective arrival of this group must have been of
considerable concern to him for, among other units, it was composed of
twenty Liberty ships, thirty-three LST's and some important units of the
Service Force, TU 77.7.2.
Thus, at the end of the day, CTG 78.1 had remaining solely
the BLUE RIDGE (FFF), LST 741 (which was aground), RUSSELL, JOHN RODGERS,
LANG and a number of landing and patrol craft.
(a) Operations of CTG 78.2 (San Ricardo Attack Group),
1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
CTG 78.2 in the FREMONT (FFF), at anchor off WHITE
Beach, was observing the unloading of his units. He had the JUPITER, six
LST's (170, 397, 549, 613, 912 and 993) and six XAK's to unload. However,
since the latter were not expected to depart the area before D plus 9,
(actually none appear to have departed before D plus 10 Day), he likely
was not too concerned about them.
During the forenoon he received information that two
of his gunboats, LCI(G)'s 64 and 69, with representatives of the FIRST
Cavalry Division had successfully reconnoitered San Juanico Strait,
passing through the entire strait with no signs of enemy action.**
At 1700 he observed CTG 78.11 with TG 78.11
consisting of the JUPITER, one frigate (CARSON CITY) and the six LST's
mentioned above from his own command as well as seventeen LST's and two
escorts from CTG 78.1 depart the area.***
Thus, with the departure of this convoy, he had
remaining the FREMONT (FFF), one ARL (ACHILLES), six XAK's (THOMAS,
FIELDS, SHORT, GIANELLA, KINNEY, JUDSON), and the ANDERSON and JENKINS.
In addition he still had a number of landing and patrol craft.
* CTF 78 Dispatch 231136 October 1944 to CTG 78.7, info CTF 19T
** Action Report CTG 78.2, Leyte Operation, Serial 0085, November
29th, 1944.
*** Action Report CTG 78.11, Operations En Route Leyte Island to
Hollandia, New Guinea, Serial 0001, November 2nd, 1944.
24 CONFIDENTIAL
-I — I — I I ' I
i — I — I — I 1 — I — I — I — r— i — i — I — i — I — I — I — I 1 — i — I — i 1 >• I — i — I — i — I ' — I — I- 1 — ' — I — ' — I — i — I r-
CONTACTS RECEIVED
BY
PRINCIPAL ALLIED COMMANDERS
1042-2400 OCTOBER 23rd 1944
BOTTLE FOB LEYTE GOLF
OCTOBER 1944
ALL TIMES ITEM
EAST CHINA
SEA
^MIYAKO SHIMA
.ISHIGAKI
CONFIDENTIAL
r— T — ■ — | 1 1 — r
13
V
rAMAMI 0 SHIMA
TIME
OF
CONTACT
LOCATION
TIMES OF RECEIPT
CTF 77 C 3rd FLT
0630-23ro
S PALAWAN PASS
2153 1 2350
2
0700-23fd
S. PALAWAN PASS
203
2032
H
09IO-23rd
MAKASSAR STRAIT
1730
1729
4
t220-23rd
EAST OF LUZON
1310
i
!220-23rd
NW OF PALAWAN 1.
1644
1744
Position of battleship cited os being 00°-43'N, I20'-I3'E
in C0M7thFLT 231213
1220
ISS (SURFACED) (4)
'C200°(T)
S I2K
o
..'•y
0700-3BB.2CA,
• ■■• (PROBABLE) I CV + CRUISERS
, ■»<,, intr <Ka,t and DESTROYERS TO
- ^"^^"IT COMPLETE II SHIPS ON
«*»-.:. RADAR
;«AN6MBAS
■' IS.
if
«%
TALAUD
IS.
/
•
V
■i
0
A°
kHOROTAI
AHhALMAHERA
• I """1
'8A~
V
'^
is*.
•
y>
CERA M
SEA
<&?
30«-
20*-
I0»-
•CD;"-- -:
JAVA
6fe
MO LU K K A
B A N 0 A SEA
PLATE Si
'tf
496799 O-59-10
CONFIDENTIAL
CTU 77.2.1, CTG 77.3
and CTG 78.7
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
(b) Operations of CTU 77.2.1 (Fire Support Unit NORTH)
and CTG 77.3 (Close Covering Group), 1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
(1) Operations of CTU 77.2.1 (Fire Support Unit NORTH).
At 1042 CTU 77.2.1, with TU 77.2.1, was at anchor
in San Pedro Bay awaiting FS missions. During the day his three destroyers
(AULICK, CONY, SIGOURNEY) refueled, returning to their anchorage by 1430.*
At 1700 he got underway for his assigned night
screening station north of Tay Tay Point, in southern Leyte Gulf.**
At 1938 he arrived on station in Area DRUM*** where
he was joined by COMBATDIV TWO with BATDIV TWO (TENNESSEE, CALIFORNIA,
PENNSYLVANIA) .**
As of 2400 this patrol had been uneventful.
(2) Operations of CTG 77.3 (Close Covering Group).
At 1042 CTG 77.3, in the PHOENIX, with the
SHROPSHIRE, BEALE, HUTCHINS, DALY and KILLEN, was at anchor in San Pedro
Bay awaiting call fire assignments, while the BOISE, BACHE and ARUNTA were
underway and available for FS as requested.
During the afternoon the destroyers refueled,****
while the SHROPSHIRE and later the BOISE, carried out FS missions.*****
By 1847, with TG 77.3, less BACHE which remained
off RED BEACH, available for FS missions, he had commenced patrolling the
area southeast of the transport area in accordance with CTF 77* s Harbor
Defense Plan ONE.******
As of 2400 this patrol had been uneventful.
(c) Operations of CTG 78.7 (Reinforcement Group TWO),
1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
At 1042 CTG 78.7******* who was also COMDESRON TWENTY-
ONE in the NICHOLAS, was bearing 108°(T), distant about 120 miles from
Leyte Gulf .********
* Deck Logs AULICK, CONY, SIGOURNEY, October 23rd, 1944.
** War Diary COMBATDIV 3, October 23rd, 1944.
*** War Diary COMBATDIV 4, October 23rd, 1944.
**** Deck Logs BACHE, DALY, KILLEN, HUTCHINS, October 23rd, 1944; also
War Diary BEALE, October 23rd, 1944; also Action Report HMAS
ARUNTA, Operations in the Invasion of Leyte Island, October 20th -
29th, 1944, No Serial, Undated.
***** Deck Log BOISE, October 23rd, 1944.
****** Deck Logs BOISE, DALY, October 23rd, 1944; also War Diary PHOENIX,
October 23rd, 1944; also Action Report HMAS ARUNTA, Operations in
the Invasion of Leyte Island, October 20th - 29th, 1944, No
Serial, Undated.
******* Captain John K.B. GINDER, USN.
******** War Diary NICHOLAS, October 23rd, 1944.
25 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 78.7, CTG 78.3
and CTF 79
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
At 1930, with TG 78.7, he entered Leyte Gulf and
headed for the northern transport area.* Some time after 2036 he received
a dispatch from CTF 78 assigning eleven LST's to proceed YELLOW Beach.**
(d) Operations of CTG 78.3 (Reinforcement Group THREE),
1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
At 1042 CTG 78.3 in the frigate EUGENE (FFF) and with
TG 78.3 which was composed largely of seventeen Liberty ships and six
LST's, was proceeding towards Leyte Gulf having departed Humboldt Bay at
0700 this day.***
(2) Operations of CTF 79 (Southern Attack Force), 1042 - 2400,
October 23rd.
As this period began CTF 79 was aboard the WASATCH
preparatory to attending the ceremony for the installation of the
Philippine Commonwealth Government which was to take place at noon at
Tacloban.****
At 1135 he queried CTG 79.2 as to what ships would be
ready to sail this day.***** At this time he also learned that personnel
of the 381st RCT had been landed at 0927, and now all BLT's had been
la nd e d • ******
About noon he issued a dispatch designating the units
which would compose TU 79. 14. 5, this dispatch also gave the departure
time #*-JBBBB5-*
At 1303 he received word that of all the WHITS Beach LST's
only two remained to be unloaded, and that these two LST's were scheduled
to retract at 3^00. ********
At 1305 he was informed that TRANSDIV TEN had commenced
general unloading. ********* At the same time he became aware that
unloading progress on BLUE and ORANGE Beaches was not proceeding as
rapidly as de si red. **********
* Action Report CTG 78.7, Serial 0176, November 10th, 1944.
** CTF 78 Dispatch 231136 October 1944 to CTG 78.7, info CTF 79.
*** Action Report CTG 78.3, Serial 071, November 16th, 1944.
**** Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92510), Naval War
College, 1957, Chapter VTI (A)(2).
***** CTF 79 Visual Dispatch 230235 October 1944 to CTG 79.2.
****** CTG 79.2 Visual Dispatch 230146 October 1944 to CTF 79.
******* CTF 79 Dispatch 230258 October 1944 to CTG's 79.1, 79.2, CTU
79.11.1, info All TFC's and TGC's 7THFLT, CNB Hollandia.
******** CTU 79.11.2 Voice Radio Message 230403 October 1944 to CTF 79.
********* CTG 79.2 Visual Dispatch 230354 October 1944 to CTF 79.
********** CTG 79.2 Voice Radio Message 230320 October 1944 to C.G. 96TH
DIV., info CTF 79.
26 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 79
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
At 1312 he received CTG 79.1' s dispatch in which that
commander informed his units that those remaining in the area after his
departure, at 1700 this day, would come directly under the command of
CTF 79.*
Ten minutes later he received another dispatch from that
commander informing him that the unloading of the MERCURY would delay
her sailing and recommending that she be sailed at 1800 in order to
overtake him regardless whether or not she had completed unloading.**
At 1346 he was informed by CTG 79.2 that only the WILLIAM
P. BIDDLE would be able to sail this day.***
At 1356 he originated a dispatch giving the composition
and departure time of TU 79.14.4.****
At 1418 he informed his command that command of all
landing forces in his area had passed ashore at 1200 to C.G. TWENTY-
FOURTH Corps.*****
At 1419 he received CTG 79.1fs sortie plan.****** At this
time he also learned that CTF 78 intended to assign COMDESRON TWENTY-ONE
to duty with CTG 77.4 upon his arrival in the gulf the following day.*******
At 1441 he received word from CTG 79.2 that four
battleships and two destroyers were low on fuel.********
At 1450 he returned aboard the MOUNT OLYMPUS.*********
At 1515 he learned that CTG 77.2 intended to suspend
replenishment operations at 1700 until 0700 the following morning.**********
* CTG 79.1 Visual Dispatch 230252 October 1944 to TG 79.7, 79.5,
TU 79.7.1, CTU 79.7.5, 79.3.6, info CTG 79.3, CTF 79.
** CTG 79.1 TBS Voice Radio Message 230422 October 1944 to CTF 79.
*** CTG 79.2 TBS Voice Radio Message 230410 October 1944 to CTF 79,
CTG 79.1, info CTU 79.4.1.
**** CTF 79 Dispatch 230456 October 1944 to CTG's 79.1, 79.2, etc.,
info CNBfs Hollandia and Manus.
***** CTF 79 Dispatch 230518 October 1944 to CTF 77, info CTG«s
79.1 and 79.2.
****** CTG 79.1 Visual Dispatch 230242 October 1944 to BIDDLE, CLAY,
etc., info CTF 79, CTG«s 79.2, 79.3, etc.
******* CTF 78 Dispatch 230317 October 1944 to CTG 77.4, info CTF's
38, 77, C0M3RDFLT.
******** CTG 79.2 Visual Dispatch 230430 October 1944 to CTF 79.
********* Action Report SPROSTON, Capture and Occupation of Leyte Island,
Philippine Islands, October 14th - 26th, 1944, Serial 060,
October 30th, 1944.
*«*******-* CTG 77.2 TBS Voice Radio Message 230615 October 1944 to CTU
79.6.1, TU 72.2.2, info CTF 79, CTF 77.
27 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 79 and CTG 79.1
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
At 1540 he received word of the destroyer's night
screening composition,*
At about 1610 he received CTG 79.1fs visual dispatch
executing his sortie plan at 1700 and also modifying it. Among other
things he learned that the CHARA might not be unloaded in time to depart
for this dispatch directed her to join, if unloaded in time to get
underway by 1800, otherwise she was to notify the appropriate commanders
and remain in Leyte Gulf until ordered to depart by CTF 79.**
At 1638 he ordered CTG's 79.1 and 79.2 to direct all
LST's seaward of the MOUNT OLYMPUS to close in toward the transport
area.***
At 1719 he issued the night operating instruction to CTG
79.2 quoted in full under "Operations of CTG 79.2, 1042 - 2400, October
23rd".
At 1733 (when it was received by COMTHIRDFLT) he probably
intercepted CTF 77 's dispatch wherein that commander stated that he
regarded the approach of enemy combatant ships and tankers toward Coron
Bay as the first phase of a build up of what he considered to be
magnified Tokyo Express runs against Leyte.****
At 1746 he was informed by CTG 79.2 by TBS voice radio
that his group was low on smoke.***** This may have caused him some
alarm as heretofore the smoke screens had been an effective defense
against Japanese aircraft.
(a) Operations of CTG 79.1 (Attack Group ABLE), 1042 -
2400, October 23rd.
At the beginning of this period CTG 79.1, in his
flagship APPALACHIAN, continued to remain at anchor off YELLOW and VIOLET
Beaches. With three of his large ships unloaded (CAVALIER, MONITOR,
PRESIDENT HAYES) and three (CHARA, THUBAN, ALSHAIN) of the remaining four
almost unloaded he was preparing his departure plan .******
* CTU 79.11.2 Visual Dispatch 230615 October 1944 to CTF 79.
** CTG 79.1 Visual Dispatch 230642 October 1944 to CTF 79, CTG 79.2,
CTG 79.3, etc.
*** CTF 79 TBS Voice Radio Message 230738 October 1944 to CTG's 79.1
and 79.2.
**** CTF 77 Dispatch 230L42 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, C.G.'s 5TH and
13TH Air Forces, info all TFC»s and TGC»s 3RD and TTHFLT's,
CINCPAC, CINCSWPA, COMINCH, COMFEAF.
***** CTG 79.2 TBS Voice Radio Message 230821 October 1944 to CTF 79.
****** Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92510), Naval War
College, 1957, Chapter VTI (A)(2)(a).
28 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79.1
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
At 1142 he issued his sortie plan stating that (a)
it was his intention to form the transports in three columns at close
intervals of 700 yards, (b) stating the ships in each column and naming
a TRANSDIV commander in command of each, and (c) he intended to get
underway at 1700.*
At 1152 he sent a dispatch to his units stating that
upon his departure about 1700 this day command of the remaining units
would pass to CTF 79.**
About noon or shortly thereafter he no doubt received
CTF 79' s dispatch forming TU 79.14.5 and giving the sailing time of that
unite*** This was of special interest to him as the composition of this
unit consisted of most of his remaining landing craft.
Since (a) his unloading was proceeding generally
according to his present plans it was clear that if he could expedite the
unloading of the MERCURY he would be able to sail all of his heavy ships,
and (b) he was to command the departing convoy, he would be leaving few
problems for CTF 79.
At 1322 he sent a dispatch to CTF 79 recommending
that the MERCURY, whose sailing time would be delayed due to the progress
being made in unloading, be sailed not later than 1800 regardless of the
amount of cargo remaining on board in order to overtake him.****
At 1520 he received CTF 79 fs dispatch which gave the
composition and sailing time of TU 79.14.4.*****
At 1542 he issued a visual dispatch which directed
(a) the execution of his sortie plan at 1700, (b) omission of the
TRANSDIV in the right hand column and rearranging the other two TRANSDIV s
and (c) the CHARA to join if unloaded in time to get underway by 1800,
otherwise she was to notify the appropriate commanders and remain in Leyte
Gulf until ordered to depart by CTF 79 .******
At 1643, in the APPALACHIAN, he took command of TU
79.14.4 and departed Leyte for Hollandia.******* In addition to his
flagship he had with him the following ships: PRESIDENT HAYES,
* CTG 79.1 Visual Dispatch 230242 October 1944 to Ships Concerned,
info CTF 79, CTG 79.2, CTG 79.3, etc.
** CTG 79.1 Visual Dispatch 230252 October 1944 to TG's 79.5, 79.7,
CTU's 79.3.6, 79.7.5, TU 79.7.1, info CTF 79 and CTG 79.3.
*** CTF 79 Dispatch 230258 October 1944 to CTG's 79.1, 79.2, CTU
79.11.1, info All TFC's and TGC's 7THFLT, CNB Hollandia.
**** CTG 79.1 TBS Voice Radio Message 230422 October 1944 to CTF 79.
***** CTF 79 Dispatch 230456 October 1944 to CTG's 79.1, 79.2, 79.5,
etc., info all interested current operations, etc.
****** CTG 79.1 Visual Dispatch 230642 October 1944 to CTF 79, CTG 79.2,
CTG 79.3, etc.
******* Action Report CTG 79.1, Participation in Amphibious Operations
for the Capture of Leyte, Philippine Islands, Serial 00454,
October 26th, 1944.
29 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79.1 and CTG 79.2
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
CAVALIER (FF), THUBAN, ALSHAIN, WILLIAM P. BIDDLE, MONITOR, LUCE,
STEMBEL, PREBLE, LONG, PALMER, ISHERWOOD and CHARLES J. BADGER.
However, he did not have the CHARA which had been delayed in unloading
and did not complete unloading until the following morning.
Thus, at the end of the day, there remained of the
assault shipping in the area the MERCURY and CHARA, thirty-one LST's
(34, 123, 125, 126, 169, 205, 207, 213, 219, 223, 242, 451, 461, 478,
482, 488, 565, 605, 608, 609, 611, 612, 617, 670, 686, 693, 733, 738,
739, 909, 1006), plus a number of landing and patrol craft. Command of
these ships with the departure of the APPALACHIAN passed to CTF 79«*
(b) Operations of CTG 79.2 (Attack Group BAKER), 1042 -
2400, October 23rd.
At the beginning of this period CTG 79.2, in the
ROCKY MOUNT, was anchored in the LST area off ORANGE Beach.
He was largely concerned with unloading his ships and
with the departure of the unloaded ones. Because of this he evidenced
considerable concern with the delay in the unloading operation on the
beach where difficulties were so great as to require (a) sending ashore
beach parties to assist in the unloading of the ship's boats** and (b)
requesting C.G. NINETY-SIXTH Division "to improve paucity of active labor
and vehicular equipment on BLUE and ORANGE Beach."***
About noon or shortly thereafter he no doubt
received CTF 79 's dispatch forming TU 79.14.5, and giving the sailing
time of that unit.****- This was of special interest to him as the
composition of this unit consisted of most of his remaining landing craft.
At 1310 in response to a query thereon, he notified
both CTF 79 and CTG 79.1 that only the WILLIAM P. BIDDLE would be ready
to sail (that evening).*****
At 1330 he notified CTF 79 that four of the battle-
ships and two of the destroyers were low on fuel as of 0800.******
Action Report CTG 79.1, Participation in Amphibious Operations for
the Capture of Leyte, Philippine Islands, Serial 00454, October
26th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 79.2, Leyte Operation, Serial 0032, November
4th, 1944.
*** CTG 79.2 TBS Voice Radio Dispatch 230320 October 1944 to C.G.
96TH Division, info CTF 79.
**** CTF 79 Dispatch 230258 October 1944 to CTG»s 79.1, 79.2, CTU
79.11.1, info all TFC's and TGC's 7THFLT, CNB Hollandia.
***** CTG 79.2 TBS Voice Radio Dispatch 230410 October 1944 to CTF 79,
CTG 79.1, info CTU 79.4.1.
****** CTG 79.2 Visual Dispatch 230430 October 1944 to CTF 79.
30 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79.2 and CTU 77.2.2
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
Somewhere between 1520 and 1545 he received CTF 79 !s
dispatch giving the composition and sailing time of TU 79.14.4.* His
interest in this was not great for only the WILLIAM P. BIDDLE and the
LUCE were included therein.
At 1719 he received CTF 79 fs instructions to (a) not
retire tonight, (b) station smoke boats by 1800 and (c) station LC^s to
windward of transport area.** In reply to this dispatch he immediately
informed CTF 79 that his smoke supply was low.***
At 1750 he informed CTF 79 of the progress made in
unloading .****
Thus, at the end of the day, CTG 79.2 had remaining
the ROCKY MOUNT, CLAY, ARTHUR MIDDLETON, BAXTER, GEORGE F. ELLIOTT,
AURIGA, CAPRICORNUS, RUSHMORE and twenty- four LST's (20, 117, 118, 269,
270, 277, 483, 486, 564, 567, 568, 615, 669, 671, 672, 698, 704, 745,
916,917, 918, 999, 1013 and 1024), plus a number of landing and patrol
craft.
(c) Operations of CTU 77.2.2 (Fire Support Unit SOUTH),
1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
At 1042 CTU 77.2.2, with TU 77.2.2, was awaiting FS
and call fire missions. In addition, he was making preparations to
replenish fuel and ammunition as scheduled.
Commencing at (a) 1119 the LEUTZE closely followed
by the RICHARD P. LEARY and NEWCOMB commenced refueling from the
ASHTABULA which refueling was completed at L421,***** (b) 1310 the
BENNION closely followed by the LOUISVILLE, MINNEAPOLIS and CLAXTON
commenced replenishing ammunition from the MAZAMA and DURHAM
VICTORY,****** and (c) 1323 the PENNSYLVANIA closely followed by the
CALIFORNIA and TENNESSEE also commenced refueling from the oilers
CHEPACHET, S ARAN AC and SALAMONIE. *******
During the afternoon, at about 1515, as CTG 77.2,
he conferred with CTF 77 in the WASATCH.******** The matters discussed
are not known.
* CTF 79 Dispatch 230456 October 1944 to CTG»s 79.1, 79.2, 79.5,
info all interested in current operations.
** CTF 79 Visual Dispatch 230819 October 1944 to CTG 79.2.
*** CTG 79.2 TBS Voice Radio Dispatch 230821 October 1944 to CTF 79.
**** CTG 79.2 Visual Dispatch 230850 October 1944 to CTF 79.
***** Deck Logs LEUTZE, NEWCOMB, RICHARD P. LEARY, October 23rd, 1944.
****** Deck Logs LOUISVILLE, BENNION, MINNEAPOLIS, CLAXTON, October
23rd, 1944.
******* Deck Logs PENNSYLVANIA, CALIFORNIA, TENNESSEE, October 23rd, 1944.
******** CTG 77.2 Visual Dispatch 230630 October 1944 to CTF 79.
31 CONFIDENTIAL
CTU 77.2.2 and CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
At 1700 all servicing activities were halted. At
this time the servicing activities were not completed for (a) the
CALIFORNIA and TENNESSEE had not as yet completed refueling, (b) the
LOUISVILLE and CLAXTON had not completed replenishing amnunition and
(c) the PORTLAND, seven remaining destroyers of DESRON FIFTY-SIX and
three destroyers of DESDIV X-RAY had not as yet commenced replenishing
ammunition*
Also at 1700 with TU 77.2.2, less the LEUTZE,
ROBINSON and ALBERT W. GRANT, which were to be available for FS missions,
he proceeded to his night covering station in accordance with CTF 77' s
Harbor Defense Plan ONE.*
This completes his operations for the period 1042 -
1700. After this time and until 2400, since he operated as CTG 77.2,
his operations during this time are discussed under "Operations of CTG
77.2, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd".
(3) Operations of CTG 77.2 (Combardment and Fire Support
Group), 1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
At 1042 CTG 77.2, in the LOUISVILLE, was making
preparations to replenish fuel and ammunition and also to furnish FS and
call fire support.
Since during the period 1042 - 1700 he operated largely
as CTU 77.2.2 his operations during this time are discussed under
"Operations of CTU 77.2.2, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd".
At 1700 having largely completed the day's operations as
CTU 77.2.2, he, in the LOUISVILLE, with the PORTLAND, MINNEAPOLIS, DENVER,
COLUMBIA, NEWCOMB, HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, RICHARD F. LEARY, HALFORD, BRYANT,
CLAXTON, THORN and WELLES departed the FS area and headed for his night
covering station as prescribed in CTF 77!s Harbor Defense Plan ONE.*
While en route, and likely at 1733, (when it was received
by COMTHIRDFLT) he intercepted CTF 77' s dispatch wherein that commander
stated that he regarded the approach of enemy combatant ships and tankers
toward Coron Bay as the first phase of a build up of what he considered
to be magnified Tokyo Express runs against Leyte.**
He arrived on station at about 1851 at which time he
commenced operating on an east-west line at various speeds*** off Tay Tay
Point, while BATDIV's TWO, THREE and FOUR escorted by the AULICK, CONY
* Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Bombardment and Capture of Leyte
Island, Philippine Islands, October 16th - 24th, 1944, Serial OOL47,
November 5th, 1944 •
** CTF 77 Dispatch 230142 October 1944 to COM3RDFLT, C.G.'s 5TH and 13TH
Air Forces, info all TFC's and TGC»s 3RD and 7THFLTS, CINCSWPA,
CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMFEAF.
*** War Diary COMDESRON 56, October 23rd, 1944; Action Report LOUISVILLE,
Seizure and Occupation of Leyte Area, October 17th - 24th, 1944,
Serial 0044, November 1st, 1944.
32 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2 and CTG 77.4
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
and SIGOURNEY lay to, north of Taytay Point in Area DRUM.* His
remaining destroyers (LEUTZE, ROBINSON, ALBERT W. GRANT) remained behind
in their FS area available for FS and call fire support missions.**
At 2400 his command was approximately in the above area.
Up to this hour the patrol had been uneventful.
(4) Operations of CTG 77.4 (Escort Carrier Group), 1042 -
2400, October 23rd.***
CTG 77.4, in the SANGAMON with a total of 311 VF and 190
VT, continued to provide (a) air cover and support over the objective
area, and (b) air protection for his own units, in accordance with his
basic air plan,**** as modified by CTF 77 's 220603 (quoted in full in
Volume III under "Operations of CTF 77, October 22nd").
It will be recalled that during the forenoon he had
launched his first and second direct support missions. Shortly after
1100 he commenced his third and at 1215 the fourth launch, which included
both a direct support mission as well as strikes against the airfields on
Negros Island and shipping in Bacolod Harbor. He claimed having damaged
or destroyed twenty- five aircraft. While Japanese reports thereon are
meager it is known that, although Commander FOURTH Air Army had planned
to have 172 aircraft for strikes against the Allies on the following day,
only 128 operational aircraft could be assembled. This may have been
partly due to the Allied fighter strikes. The TCAP was now reduced to
six VF and six VT.
He now launched his fifth direct support mission.
At 1631 having received authority to send the CHENANGO
and SAGINAW BAY to Morotai to obtain aircraft replacements, a requirement
for which no provisions had been made in the basic operation plans, he
directed these two escort carriers to (a) transfer a total of eighteen
VF and twenty VT to the other escort carriers of TG 77.4 and (b) receive
four flyable duds. He also announced that he planned to detach the
above two carriers at 1700 the following day.*****
* Deck Log SIGOURNEY, October 23rd, 1944; also Action Report
CALIFORNIA, Participation in Operations off Island of Leyte,
October 19th - 24th, 1944, Serial 0025, November 8th, 1944.
** War Diaries LEUTZE, ROBINSON, ALBERT W. GRANT, October 23rd, 1944*
*** All information here, except as otherwise indicated, obtained from
Action Report CTG 77.4, Leyte Operations, October 12th - 29th, 1944,
Serial 00120, November 15th, 1944.
**** CTG 77 .4 Operation Plan No. 2-44, Serial 00075, October 5th, 1944,
Annex "D".
**#** CTG 77.4 Dispatch 230731 October 1944 to CTU's 77.4.2, 77.4.3,
77.4.12 and TU's 70.9.11 and 70.9.12.
33 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77./* and CTG 70.1
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
At about 1732 (when it was received by CTU 77. 4. 2) he
received CTF 77 's dispatch 230142 which was discussed fully in Volume III
under "Operations of CTF 77, 0000 - 1042, October 23rd". What his
reaction was to this dispatch is not known. However, since he had most
of the information which had enabled CTF 77 to arrive at his estimate, it
is quite probable that he agreed with the estimate. This seems so for
despite the fact that his earlier intelligence estimate (a) discounted
the likelihood of a major fleet reaction to the Leyte invasion and (b)
suggested the possibility of a fast enemy task force launched from Okinawa
as an advance force against Allied supply lines and supported by land-
based air attacks,* the more recent enemy sightings indicated that the
most likely direction from which the enemy might attempt penetrating
raids would be from westward.
In reviewing the tasks currently assigned to his forces,
he could see that if the situation so required he could significantly
increase his local and target CAP effort. Therefore he quite likely did
not view the present situation with alarm.
At 1925 he recovered his last flight of the day.
Commencing with the third launch of the day, he had flown about eighty
ground support missions, about forty target CAP and twelve target ASP
missions and about forty-three airfield and shipping strike missions —
totalling approximately 170 missions over the objective and western
Visayas areas. Having lost one VF in combat and two VT operationally,
he now had remaining 310 VF and 188 VT.
(5) Operations of CTG 70.1 (Motor Torpedo Boats), 1042 -
2400, October 23rd (Plate VI).
It will be recalled that at 0744 the WACHAPRSAGUE with
PT's 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 146, 150, 151, 152, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195
and 196 had departed San Pedro Bay and headed for Liloan Bay, Panaon
Island. This left thirty MTB's and the WILLOUGHBY with CTG 70.1 in the
OYSTER BAY in San Pedro Bay.
The WACHAPRSAGUE group arrived in Liloan Bay during the
early afternoon where the WACHAPRSAGUE anchored at 1414.
Later (a) PT's 128 and 130 patrolled the Ormoc 3ay area
(Area 109) where they contacted at 2300 eight enemy small craft which
they attacked immediately and succeeded in sinking a number of enemy
barges,** (b) PT's 127 and 196 on a mission for the guerrilla forces
shelled Japanese headquarters at Maasin** (Areas 101 and 102) Southern
end of Leyte Island, (c) PT's 150 and 191 patrolled between Leyte Island
and the Canotes Islands (Areas 109 and 114) and sank several enemy small
craft,*** (d) PT's 491 and 495 departed San Pedro Bay for Homonhon Island
* CTG 77»4 Operation Plan No. 2-44, Serial 00075, October 5th, 1944,
Annex "E".
** 'War Diary KTBRON 7, October 23rd, 1944.
*** War Diary KTBRON 12, October 23rd, 1944.
34 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 71
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
on a mission to guerrillas* and (e) PT's 192 and 195 landed Alamo
Scouts** at Madilao Point, Mindanao Island,*** (These scouts appear to
have been part of the "Nellist Mission" commanded by Lieutenant William
E. Nellist.)**
All other MTB's appear to have continued preparations for
immediate service.
(b) Operations of CTF 71, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
Since (a) during the early morning as discussed under
"Operations of CTF 71, 0000 - 1042, October 23rd" his submarines had
contacted strong Japanese forces moving northward through Palawan Passage
and (b) he had received contact reports by CTF 71 submarines on Japanese
forces moving in a southerly direction and (c) the above Japanese forces
seemed headed toward Coron Bay or Manila, it seems clear that CTF 71
watched the developing situation with considerable interest.
It seems likely that shortly after noon he received CTF 77' s
230142 quoted in full under "Operations of CTF 77, 1042 - 2400, October
23rd" wherein that commander stated that he regarded the approach of the
enemy combatant ships and tankers toward Coron Bay as the first phase of
the build up of magnified Tokyo Express runs against Leyte.
He studied the situation and wisely decided that there should
be a submarine (a) in the western approaches to the Mindanao Sea to
provide early warning of enemy operations to Leyte. In accordance with
this decision he at 1356 directed the BATFISH to cover these approaches
between Negros Island and Mindanao Island with instructions "report
movement enemy heavy forces eastward very important",**** and (b) guarding
the southwest approaches to Brunei Bay for at 1401 he directed the GURNARD
to cover the southwest approaches to Brunei Bay with instructions
concerning reporting enemy movements the same as the BATFISH.*****
He also at 1744 directed the PADDLE in Makassar Strait to
patrol as previously ordered — that the air strike on Balikpapan was
cancelled.******
He now commenced re-estimating the situation. First he
determined the location of his own submarines as of 0900 and having done
so he at 1952 informed all interested commands by dispatch.******* His
* War Diary MTBRON 33, October 23rd, 1944.
** Alamo Scouts were reconnaissance units from the 6TH Army which were
designed to obtain essential information of hostile territory and
dispositions, 6TH U.S. Army, Report of the Leyte Operation, October
17th - December 25th, 1944, Page 159.
*** War Diary MTBRON 12, October 23rd, 1944.
**** CTF 71 Dispatch 230456 October 1944 to TO 71.1 (BATFISH).
***** CTF 71 Dispatch 230501 October 1944 to TG 71.1 (GURNARD).
****** CTF 71 Dispatch 230844 October 1944 to TG 71.1 (PADDLE).
******* CTF 71 Dispatch 231052 October 1944 to all interested commands.
35 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 71
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
determination was generally fairly correct, although there were certain
glaring errors (Diagram "B"). These were the (a) DACE reported as being
west of Balabac Strait when she was in fact in about the center of
Palawan Passage, (b) GUITARRO reported as being northwest of Manila when
she was in fact west of Mindoro Strait, (c) BATFISH reported as being in
western approaches to the Mindanao Sea when she was in fact in southern
Makassar Strait and (d) GURNARD off Brunei Bay when in fact she was off
Point Datoe. It should be clear that these submarines were far removed
from their assigned stations. In some cases, such as the BATFISH, this
error amounted to as much as 700 miles.
As the day passed he awaited further reports from his
submarines but especially from the DACE and DARTER. At about 202*5 he
received a report from the DACE to the effect that (a) she had made four
hits in a KONGO class battleship believed sunk and (b) task force on
course 040°(T), speed fifteen knots, composition doubtful but for sure
three battleships (one ISE, one KONGO (sunk), third unknown); two ATAGO
or NACHI heavy cruisers plus following probables; one carrier, plus
cruisers and destroyers to complete eleven ships shown on radar.*
A short time later (at 2153) he received a report from
the DARTER which largely confirmed the DACE report but was more explicit
in that here the Commanding Officer DARTER stated that (a) he believed
force was Jap first team, (b) dimly seen at dawn, (c) at least three
battleships, (d) three other heavy ships, (e) four ATAGO' s, (f) at 0530
he sank one ATAGO class heavy cruiser and made four hits in another,
which was stopped in Latitude 09°-24'N, Longitude 117°-11'E.**
It seems likely that prior to midnight he received (a) a
contact report from the BREAM to the effect that at 0430 in Latitude
14°-05'N, Longitude 119°-40'E, she had contacted two AOBA class cruisers,
one large destroyer on course 070°(T), speed nineteen knots, and had
made two hits in one cruiser,*** and (b) the ANGLER'S first report on
having contacted at 2130 in Latitude 12°-40'N, Longitude 115°- 53' E a
task force consisting of four large ships and escorts on course 050° (T),
speed eighteen knots.****
As pointed out under ANGLER, this force was the Main Body,
FIRST Striking Force.
CTF 71 at 2354 advised all interested commands of the ANGLER'S
contact.*****
At the end of the day CTF 71 could feel that his submarines
had been very effective in not only destroying some of the Japanese naval
forces but also in trailing them.
* DACE Dispatch 231115 October 1944 to CTF 71.
** DARTER Dispatch 231240 October 1944 to CTF 71.
*** BREAM Dispatch 231231 October 1944 to CTF 71.
**** Action Report CTF 71, Summary of Operations of TF 71 Submarines in
Support of King II (Leyte) Operations, October 9th - 27th, 1944
Serial 00328, November 17th, 1944.
***** CTF 71 Dispatch 232354 October 1944 to all interested comnands.
36 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBMARINE OPERATING AREA CLASSIFICATIONS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 8 ADJACENT CENTRAL PACIFIC
All areas submarine patrol zones unless otherwise indicated;
Dotted areas indicate air surface zone [ ^'W/-\
Hatched areas indicate joint zone [ j
Mottled areas indicate blind bombing zone [£cgfV<j
OCTO B E R 8 th. - 31 st. inc. 1944
(APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX V TO CANF, SWPA OP-PLAN 13-44)
COMSOWESPAC ZONE NOTICES 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,11
BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF
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PLATE3ZE
496799 O - 59 - 11
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
I? I [1 I in | ill I i | I I in [! r
CONFIDENTIAL
BREAM, GUITARRO
and ANGLER
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
Since the operations of the submarines here were in general
uneventful, comment will be confined solely to those submarines which
contacted enemy units,
(1) BREAM and GUITARRO.
The BREAM, which had torpedoed the AOBA of CRUDIV
SIXTEEN and had promptly submerged, at 1952 surfaced and reported her
success to CTF 71.* Since the attack had been made on the southern edge
of her assigned area (A-3 - A-7, Plate VIII) she continued her patrol in
that area.
The GUITARRO which was endeavoring to close the force
which the DARTER had contacted, finally made contact herself on what she
thought were merchant ships. While trailing these ships she, at 2315,
contacted another force which by midnight she had sighted and estimated
consisted of fifteen to twenty ships including three battleships.**
(2) ANGLER.
The ANGLER which was patrolling across the northern
entrance to Palawan Passage to intercept the DARTER1 s contact finally at
(a) 1950 made radar contact on an enemy force which she commenced trailing
in a northeasterly direction, (b) 2015, estimated composition as possible
four large ships with six escorts*** and (c) at 2215 sent a contact
report to CTF 71 reporting four large ships plus escorts at 2130 in
Latitude 12°-40'N, Longitude 118°-56'E.**** Although ANGLER, while
tracking this force also contacted a convoy, she decided to remain with
her first contact which was headed for Calavite Passage. This was a wise
decision for this was the Main Body, FIRST Striking Force which, despite
the loss of three cruisers (ATAGO and MAYA (sunk), TAKAO, (damaged)) and
two destroyers (NAGANAMI, ASASHIMO) as escorts, was continuing the
penetration operation.
* BREAM Dispatch 231231 October 1944 to CTF 71.
** War Patrol Report GUITARRO, Report of 3RD War Patrol, Serial 044,
November 16th, 1944«
*** War Patrol Report ANGLER, Report of 5TH War Patrol, Serial 0(10),
November 9th, 1944.
**** Action Report CTF 71, Summary of Operations of TF 71 Submarines in
Support of KING II (Leyte) Operations, October 9th - 27th, 1944,
Serial 00328, November 17th, 1944»
37 CONFIDENTIAL
DACE and DARTER
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
(3) DACE and DARTER.
The DARTER, while submerged, commenced closing the
damaged cruiser but owing to the presence of the destroyers, decided to
wait until darkness,* Because of the chain of events she had failed
to obtain a navigational fix with the result that her dead reckoning
position was about twenty- four hours old.** At 2015 the wolf pack
commander in the DARTER learned that the DACE had contacted the cruiser.*
At 2140 he reported by dispatch to CTF 71 concurring the composition of
the Japanese force, quoted in full earlier under "Operations of CTF 71,
1042 - 2400, October 23rd".***
At 2200 he received word from the Commanding Officer DACE
to the effect that at 2153 the damaged cruiser (TAKAO) was moving in a
southwesterly direction at a speed of four to six knots and that he was
trailing,**** He therefore decided to attack and directed the DACE to
take attack position bearing 150°(T), distant ten miles from the cruiser
while the DARTER took station bearing 050° (T), distant ten miles from
the cruiser,***** Now feeling that the cruiser was definitely moving
slowly, albeit erratically, down Palawan Passage he endeavored to close
in order to make an attack.
The DACE remained submerged during the day. At 1355 she
made a sonar contact and closed. At 1630 she sighted a damaged ATAGO
class cruiser (TAKAO), escorted by two destroyers (NAGANAMI and ASASHTMO) .****
At 1945 she surfaced and sent a contact report to CTF 71 relative to her
morning attack .****** At 2015 she notified the wolf pack conraander in the
DARTER by voice radio of the presence of the damaged cruiser and was
directed to rendezvous with DARTER.**** At 2200 she notified the wolf
pack commander by voice radio that at 2153 the damaged cruiser was moving
southwest at four to six knots,**** at which time she was directed by the
wolf pack commander to assume an attack position bearing 150° (T), distant
ten miles from the cruiser,***** She promptly headed for this position
and, while en route, was advised at 2345 by voice radio by the wolf pack
commander that the DARTER in about ninety minutes would make a surface
attack from the starboard quarter and if the DARTER was forced down or
chased off she (DACE) was to attack from the port bow.*******
* War Patrol Report DARTER, Report of 4TH War Patrol, Serial 020,
November 5th, 1944.
** Personal Interview Commanding Officer DARTER (Commander D.H.
MC CLINTOCK, USN), Naval Records and Library, CNO, March 9th,
1945, Microfilm No. 139963.
*** DARTER Dispatch 231240 October 1944 to CTF 71.
**** War Patrol Report DACE, Report of 5TH War Patrol, Serial 09,
November 6th, 1944.
***** War Patrol Report DARTER, Report of 4TH War Patrol, Serial 020,
November 5th, 1944.
****** DACE Dispatch 231115 October 1944 to CTF 71.
**-***** war Patrol Report DACE, Report of 5TH War Patrol, Serial 09,
November 6th, 1944; also War Patrol Report DARTER, Report of 4TH
War Patrol, Serial 020, November 5th, 1944.
38 CONFIDENTIAL
CAAF SOWESPAC and
C.G. FIFTH AIR FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
(2) Operations of CAAF SOWESPAC, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
CAAF SOWESPAC was at this time embarked in the NASHVILLE while the
operation of his aircraft in support of KING II continued to be controlled
from Hollandia.
At 1119 he left the NASHVILLE with COMSOWESPAC to attend the
installation of the Philippine Commonwealth Government at Tacloban, the
capitol of Leyte. The party returned on board at 1426,*
Having viewed with concern the manner in which troop supplies were
continuing to pile up on the Tacloban airstrip and impeding its
construction, he made personal representation to both C.G. SIXTH Army and
COMSOWESPAC to prevent additional offloading of supplies there .**
This matter is discussed in considerable detail in Volume III
under "Operations of CTF 77, October 22nd" .***
(a) Operations of C.G. FIFTH Air Force, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
During the forenoon C.G. FIFTH Air Force who was at Biak (Owi)
and who had assigned certain tasks to his subordinate commanders had been
receiving reports of the results. This is discussed somewhat fully in
Volume III under "Operations of C.G. FIFTH Air Force, 0000 - 1042,
October 23rd".****
Having received the DARTER'S contact reports on the Japanese
force in Palawan Passage he was likely awaiting amplification of the
contact reports by his Morotai-based PB4Y's.
It seems probable that he learned in the early afternoon that
his scheduled (a) strike against shipping in Tawi Tawi and (b) sweep
against shipping in Cagayan, Karimai and Dijogo had been accomplished,*****
The shipping sweep against Zamboanga seems to have been
diverted and resulted in a fighter bomber sweep against the Halmaheras.
At 1506 he issued orders for the provision of rescue services
for bombing missions to be flown the following day. In addition he
ordered a courier plane to be flown to Leyte Gulf .******
* George C. Kenney, "General Kenney Reports", (New York, 1949), Page
454; also War Diary NASHVILLE, October 23rd, 1944.
** Ibid., Page 454.
*** Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92510), Naval War
College, 1957, Chapter V (A)(1) (a)(1).
**** Ibid., Chapter VII (A)(2)(a).
***** C.G. 5TH Air Force Dispatch 240058/1 October 1944 to all concerned
current SOWESPAC operations.
****** C.G. 5TH Air Force for 276th Rescue Group Dispatch 231506/1 to
310TH BOMWING, 2ND Emergency Rescue Squadron, CTU 73.2.1, CTG 79.1,
info TANGIER, Fighter Command.
39 CONFIDENTIAL
C.G. FIFTH AIR FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
(This was to transmit intelligence via courier planes from
their headquarters in Hollandia that was not otherwise available except
in dispatch form).
At about 162$ (when it was received by COMTHIRDFLT), he
learned that the PB4Y in Sector 303°(T) - 312°(T) in Dassing Puerto
Princesa at 1440 had observed some shipping in the harbor and fighters
taking off which had not attacked.*
At about 1628 (when it was received by CTG 38.1) he learned
that one of the Morotai-based PB4Y's flying in Sector 312°(T) - 321°(T)
had sighted shortly before 1220, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser
and four destroyers in Latitude 13°-00'N, Longitude 118°-40'E, on course
200°(T), speed twenty knots.** This was the Japanese SECOND Striking
Force which reported having sighted a B-24 type aircraft at 1212.***
At about 1733 (when it was received by COMTHIRDFLT) he
received CTF 77 's dispatch 230142, which among other things, requested
that the C.G.'s FIFTH and THIRTEENTH Air Forces continue thorough
reconnaissance of Coron Bay and approaching routes, and strike as possible
day and night. He began to ponder what action to take in order to best
fulfill this request.
At 2121 he reported to COMSOWESPAC that the planes flying the
two sectors out of Owi between 314° (T) and 330° (T) had completed their
search with an average coverage of ninety-five per cent and negative
results.****
At 2331 he advised his command that for October 24th he
estimated no change in the enemy air strength from that for October 23rd.
Exactly what this meant is not clear for he had issued an identical
estimate on October 22nd for October 23rd. That it was incorrect is
apparent since on the previous day about 258 planes had been flown into
Luzon as reinforcements for the SIXTH Base Air Force and FOURTH Air
Army.***** Evidently this fact was not available but might have been
anticipated.
* Aircraft in Sector II Dispatch 230700 October 1944 to C.G. 5TH Air
Force.
** C.G. 5TH Bomber Command Dispatch 230320 October 1944 to all
concerned current SOWESPAC operations.
*** War Diary ABUKUMA, October 1944, WDC Document I6I636, NA 11973.
**** C.G. 5TH Air Force Dispatch 232121 I October 1944 to COMSOWESPAC,
info C0M7THFLT, C.G.'s 5TH and 13TH Air Forces.
***** Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92510), Naval War
College, 1957, Chapter VI (A)(4).
40 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 73 and CTG 73.7
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
(b) Operations of CTF 73 (Naval Air Force), 1042 - 2400,
October 23rd.
CTF 73 in the CURRITUCK was at this time moored alongside the
TANGIER in Morotai Harbor.*
Meanwhile CTG 73.4 (Search and Support Group), under the
operational control of C.G. FIFTH Air Force, continued to execute his
part of Search Plan FOX with his Morotai-based squadrons, VPB's 101, 115
and 146. His immediate operational senior was the Commanding Officer
310th Bombardment Wing, who in turn was responsible to Commanding General
FIFTH Air Force.
The contacts made by his planes are discussed under
"Operations of C.G. FIFTH Air Force, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd" and are
not repeated here0
It should be emphasized that during this day the Morotai-
based PB4Y«s failed to locate either the THIRD Section or the Main Body,
FIRST Striking Force although the enemy units were well within the search
sectors flown. A discussion of the failure of these planes to locate
either of these forces will not be undertaken herein but the most likely
explanation based on all evidence available is that these searches were
probably improperly flown.
(1) Operations of CTG 73.7 (Advanced Group), 1042 - 2400,
October 23rd.
During this day the SAN CARLOS, which was the flagship of
CTG 73.7, remained anchored in Hinunangan Bay.** Since the first elements
of VPB's THIRTY-THREE and THIRTY-FOUR were to arrive this day he was quite
likely closely supervising the preparations to tend them. The HALF MOON,
also in TG 73.7, was apparently assigned this latter task.***
At 1530 ten PBY's arrived and at 1620 he reported their
arrival to COMFAIRWING SEVENTEEN (Administration) and to CTF 77.****
At 2127 having, in all probability, (a) determined the
expected availability of the seaplanes, and (b) discussed the matter over
the TBS voice radio circuit with CTF 77, although there is no real
evidence of this, he advised CTF 77 by dispatch that, among other things,
his night seaplane searches would commence the following evening using
three seaplanes to search three sectors between 341° (T) and 017 (T) and
his day seaplane searches would commence the following morning using two
seaplanes to search two sectors between 017°(T) and 041°(T) (Plate IX) .*****
_ war Diary CURRITUCK, October 23rd, 1944. ~
** War Diary SAN CARLOS, October 23rd, 1944.
*** War Diary HALF MOON, October 23rd, 1944.
**** CTG 73.7 Dispatch 230720 October 1944 to COMFAW 17 (ADMIN), info
CTF 77, CG. 308TH BOMWING, CTF 73.
***** CTG 73.7 Dispatch 231227 October 1944 to CTF 77, info C0M7THFLT,
CTF 73, all interested in Catalina Operations, C.G. 5TH Air Force,
C.G. 308TH BOMWING.
41 CONFIDENTIAL
CINCPAC - CINCPOA
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
(B) Operations of CINCPAC-CINCPOA, 1042 - 22+00, October 23rd.
A comprehensive discussion of Allied arrangements is contained in
Volume I, Chapter II, and will not be repeated herein. However one
arrangement is of sufficient importance to justify repetition. This is
the fact that COMTHIRDFLT and COMSEVENTHFLT (or COMSOWESPAC) were
designated coordinate commanders while having no common superior in the
next echelon.
This placed CINCPOA, who was on the same command level as COMSOWESPAC,
in the position of having to act as arbiter in those decisions of
CQMTHIRDFLT which had an impact on the strategic direction of the Leyte
operation and which, by implication, might be at variance with the views
of either COMSOWESPAC or COMSEVENTHFLT. CINCPOA had determined to act
in this capacity on the previous day, when COMTHIRDFLT had reauested
COMSOWESPAC for information as to when he (COMTHIRDFLT) (a) might be able
to pass through Surigao Strait and into the South China Sea* and (b)
could expect to be relieved of his covering responsibilities.** These
matters have been discussed in full in Volume III under "Operations of
CINCPAC-CINCPOA, October 22nd". It will be recalled that CINCPOA at this
time advised COMTHIRDFLT, among other things, that the restrictions
imposed by the necessity for covering COMSOWESPAC ' s forces were accepted.***
At 1206 he advised certain of his subordinates that a Japanese plane
for the second straight day had contacted a surface unit or units,
possibly Japanese, most likely in Latitude 23°-20'N, Longitude 131°-38»E.
He assigned low weight to this intelligence on the basis of the
unlikelihood of such an occurrence on two consecutive days. A discussion
of this is contained under "Operations of COMTHIRDFLT, 102+2 - 22+00,
October 23rd» and also in Volume III under "Operations of CINCPAC-CINCPOA,
0000 - 102+2, October 23rd".
* C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 2102+54 October 192+2+ to CCMSOWESPAC, info CINCPAC,
COMINCH, CTF's 38, 77, etc.
** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 210645 October 1944 to COMSOWESPAC, info CINCPAC,
COMINCH, CTF's 38, 77, etc.
*** CINCPAC Dispatch 211852 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info COMINC
COMSOWESPAC.
42 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COMTHIRDFLT
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
(1) Operations of Western Pacific Task Forces, 1042 - 2400, October
23rd.
(a) Operations of COMTHIRDFLT, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd,
In order to better understand the operations of COMTHIRDFLT at
this time it seems wise to inject here a brief summary of the situation.
It will be recalled that earlier COMTHIRDFLT had received information from
Allied submarines which reported (a) enemy forces including at least one
carrier moving south toward Manila or Coron Bay (the SECOND Striking Force)
and (b) enemy forces including battleships moving northeast through
Palawan Passage. Because of these contacts and because, as pointed out
under "Operations of CINCPAC-CINCPOA, 0000 - 1042, October 23rd», he had
been advised by CINCPOA that the restrictions imposed by the necessity
to cover COMSOWESPAC forces were accepted, he had reassigned his three
carrier task groups (TG's 33.2, 38.3, 38.4) so that at 0600 on the
following morning they would be positioned as follows: (a) TG 38.3 about
ninety miles eastward of Polillo Island, (b) TG 38.2 astride the eastern
exit from San Bernardino Strait and (c) TG 38.4 bearing 050°(T) distant
fifty miles from the southeast tip of Samar.
He did this to cover the principal enemy capabilities of
(a) attempting to reinforce the ground troops at Leyte by Tokyo Exoress
runs, (b) making strong air and surface raids against the Leyte forces or
(c) making a strong attack on the Leyte forces employing major forces.
Having issued these instructions and mindful of his logistics
he called CTG 30.8 on board the NEW JERSEY. At 1110 he cancelled his
previous orders to that commander and directed him, in part, (a) to
maintain nine oilers and the CVE SARGENT BAY in Area ALCOHOL until
further orders and (b) the remainder of THIRDFLT oilers with standard
loads at Ulithi. These orders were a major departure from the October 22nd
order which related largely to readying his forces for Operation HOTFOOT,
they show clearly that COMTHIRDFLT was giving his principal attention to
his covering responsibilities.
However, from the orders he issued at about this same time
(a) to CTG 38.1 to launch a deck load strike against YAP en route Ulithi
and (b) to CTG 30.9 at Ulithi to employ every means at his disposal to
rearm, reprovision and refuel TG33J.on a twenty- four hour working basis
it seems clear that, at this time, he saw no reason for diverting CTG 38.1
from Ulithi and was clearly continuing to prepare his command for HOTFOOT.*
At 1310 he received information from CINCPOA (a) suggesting
that a Japanese plane had sighted earlier a surface force in Latitude
23°-20,N, Longitude 131°-38'E and (b) stating that since (l) a similar
sighting had been made on the previous day and (2) the Japanese would not
make this mistake on two successive days, it was doubtful if this was
enemy. Actually, it was the Japanese Main Force which, in part because of
this, was not detected by Allied planes until the following afternoon.
* C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 230204 October 1944 to CTG 38.1, All TFC's 7THFLT,
All TGC's 3RDFLT, info CINCPAC, COMINCH; also C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 230238
October 1944 to CTG 30.9, info CTG 38.1, ATCOM Ulithi.
43 CONFIDENTIAL
COMTHIRDFLT
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
AI30 at 1310 he received an aircraft sighting report on one
enemy submarine in Latitude 17°-20'N, Longitude 130^-40' E, on course
200° (T), speed twelve knots* (Contact "4", Plate V).
Between this time and 1733 he issued several dispatches
concerning the Dreparations of his command for the next scheduled major
operation (Operation HOTFOOT). One of these, issued at 1325, related
to the logistic requirements for increasing the fighter complement in
his carriers;** another, among other things, related to transferring from
TG 30.3 to TG 38.1 the BOSTON, CHARRETTE, BELL, BURNS, BOYD and C0W2LL
and transferring in return from TG 38.1 to TG 30.3 the FARENHOLT,
W00D.V0RTH, MC CALLA, GRAYSON. ***
At 1648 realizing that his information concerning enemy
operations to the westward of Luzon was very sketchy indeed, he advised
CINCPAC to this effect and suggested that submarine observation of that
area would be helpful during the current epidemic of Japanese movements.****
At 1733 he received CTF77's dispatch 230142 quoted in full
under "Operations of CTF 77, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd" which gave that
commander's estimate of the situation and requested certain searches be
made by the THIRD Fleet.***** While his reactions to this dispatch are
not known it seems likely that he was pleased in that his planned
searches for the following day covered exactly those areas requested by
CTF 77.
At 1744 he received a Morotai-based aircraft contact report
on two NACHI class heavy cruisers, one NATORI class light cruiser and
four MUTSUKI class destroyers in Latitude 13°-00'N, Longitude 118°-40'S,
on course 200°(T), speed twenty knots ****** (Contact "5", Plate V).
This contact was on the Japanese SECOND Striking Force and on
evaluating it, he very likely estimated it to be the same force contacted
by the ICEFISH northwest of Luzon on the previous day.*******
At 2032 he learned of the DACE's attack******** (Contact "2").
* Plane No. 52 of Flight No. 223 Dispatch 230320 October 1944 to
Any or All U.S. Ships.
** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 230425 October 1944 to COKAIRPAC, info CINCPAC,
CTF 38, CTG 38.1, C0MAIR7THFLT Logistics.
*** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 230546 October 1944 to CTG's 30.3, 38.1, 30.9,
CANBERRA, info COMINCH, CINCPAC, All TFC's and TGC's 3RDFLT, etc.
**** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 230748 October 1944 to CINCPAC, COKSUBPAC,
CTF 77.
***** CTF 77 Dispatch 230142 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, C.G.'s 5TH and
13TH Air Forces, info All TFC's and TGC's 3RD and 7THFLT's,
CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, CAAF SOWESPAC.
****** C.G. 5TH Bomber Command Dispatch 230320 October 1944 to all
concerned SOWESPAC Operations.
******* ICEFISH Dispatch 221301 October 1944 to COMSUBPAC, info C0M7THFLT
(Readdressed by COM7THFLT to CTF's 38, 57, 71, 72, C0M3RDFLT,
All TGC's TF 38.
******** DACE Dispatch 231115 October 1944 to CTF 71.
44 CONFIDENTIAL
COMTHIRDFLT and CTF 38
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
During the early evening he undoubtedly continued to study the
developing situation with keen interest and weigh his planned action in
the light of new intelligence. It appears he decided that, despite the
fact submarines to the north and air searches out of Tinian had revealed
no significant enemy movements, the security of his northern flank was in
doubt and that he must therefore be ready to institute northward searches.
Accordingly at 2210, he ordered the INDEPENDENCE, among other things, to
be Drepared to launch at 2400 or as soon thereafter as possible a search
to the northward to cover sector 320°(T) to 010°(T) to a distance of 350
miles.*
It also apoears that during the late evening he continued to
ponder the implications of the DACE's attack report. Anxious to leave as
little as possible to chance — in particular to eliminate the bays along
the northwest coast of Palawan as possible rendezvous or refueling
points — he decided to launch a search the following morning to reconnoiter
that section of the Palawan Coast. In addition, he seems to have been
dissatisfied with the paucity of details in CTG 38.2' s plan for the next
day for at 2317 he sent a TBS voice radio message to CTG 38.2 which
(a) mildly admonished him for the lack of details contained in his
(CTG 38.2) earlier search instructions to TG 38.2, (b) based on a report
just received (most likely the DACE's attack report) advised CTG 38.2 of
the need for the bays along the northwest coast of Palawan from Imuruan
Bay to Bacuit to be investigated and (c) stated his desire that despite
the long distance involved, a sweep of that general area be launched as
early as practicable.**
At 2350 he received the DARTER'S report*** (Contact "1").
At the end of the day COMTHIRDFLT, in TG 38.2, was on course
249°(T), speed fifteen knots, zigzagging, about 110 miles east northeast
from the eastern entrance to San Bernardino Strait.****
(1) Operations of CTF 38, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
At 1042 CTF 38, in the LEXINGTON, with TG 38.3 continued
on toward TG 38.3 's assigned position about ninety miles east of Polillo
Island.
As the day passed he made an estimate of the situation.
While his thought processes are not known, it seems clear from the order
he issued later that he was concerned about the 0600 position of TG 38.3
and felt that in addition to making its scheduled searches to the westward
as directed by COMTHIRDFLT, TG 38.3 might well take what might be termed
unusual security measures. This was so, for Luzon would be but ninety
miles away and the aircraft from Luzon fields could be troublesome.
Therefore he felt that action should be taken to prevent not only this
but to prevent any unlocated attack from the north which area was not
* C0M3RDFLT TBS Voice Radio Message 231310 October 1944 to INDEPENDENCE,
info CTF 38, CTG's 38.2 and 38.4.
** C0M3RDFLT TBS Voice Radio Message 231400 October 1944 to CTG 38.2.
*** DARTER Dispatch 231240 October 1944 to CTF 71.
**** Deck Log NEW JERSEY, October 23rd, 1944.
45 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 33 and CTG 33.1
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
being covered by COMTHIRDFLT 's orders. Finally he felt that since
TG 38.3 was to be within air attack range of Manila, action should be
taken against the shipping there.
Having completed this estimate he at 1547 issued
instructions to CTG 38.3 to that effect.*
At 1646 he reported by TBS voice radio to COMTHIRDFLT who,
with TG 38.2 had closed to TBS voice radio range, that his (TG 38.3' s)
afternoon searches (Diagram "B") had Droved negative. It will be recalled
that these searches had been ordered by COMTHIRDFLT at 0252 and were
designed to cover as much of the Sibuyan Sea as practicable.**
At about 1733 he received CTF 77 's alerting dispatch
which has been discussed in detail heretofore. In carefully studying it
he likely noted, among other things, that the combined searches of the
three TF 38 groups would, except for the sea area west of Palawan, cover
the areas considered important by CTF 77.
During the evening he received three reports of enenqr
combatant forces. One at 1744 from C.G. FIFTH Bomber Command reported
two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and four destroyers about 120 miles
west of Mindoro*** (Contact "5", Plate V), a second at 2031 from the DACE
reported her successes against the Main Body, FIRST Striking Force****
(Contact "2"), and the third at 2153 from the DARTER reported her
successes against the same force***** (Contact "l"),
(a) Operations of CTG 38.1, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
At 1042 CTG 38.1, in the WASP, with TG's 33.1 and
38.4 in company, was en route Ulithi which was about 530 miles away.
TG 38.1 consisted of the WASP (FFF), HORNET, HANCOCK,
MONTEREY, C0WP3NS, PSNSACOLA, SALT LAKE CITY, CHESTER (FF), SAN DIEGO,
OAKLAND, DUNLAP, FANNING, CASE, CUMMINGS, CASSIN, DOWNSS, MC CALLA,
W00DW0RTH, FARENHOLT, IZARD (FF), CONNER, BROWN and GRAYSON with a total
of 187 VF, 67 VB and 72 VT.
At 1047 he received a dispatch from COMTHIRDFLT to
CTG 38.4 cancelling the movement for that task group to Ulithi and
directing that commander to (a) proceed to a position about fifty miles
off the southeast tip of Samar and (b) launch westward searches the
following dawn. Since he probably received this important dispatch
* CTF 38 Visual Dispatch 230647 October 1944 to CTG 33.3, info
C0M3RDFLT, CTG 38.2.
** CTF 38 TBS Voice Radio Message 230746 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
*** C.G. 5TH Bomber Command Dispatch 230320 October 1944 to all
concerned current SOWESPAC Operations.
**** DACE Dispatch 231115 October 1944 to CTF 71.
***** DARTER Dispatch 231240 October 1944 to CTF 71.
46 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 38.1 and CTG 38.2
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
earlier, i.e., at 1000, this fact is discussed in Volume III under
"Operations of CTG 38.1 and CTG 38.4, 0000 - 1042, October 23rd".*
However, the fact that he, with TG 38.1, was not
recalled as was CTG 38.4 must have indicated to him that COMTHIRDFLT did
not consider the situation in the Coron Bay area to be so serious as to
override the requirement to make adequate preparations for Operation
HOTFOOT. Therefore having been informed by the HANCOCK that the radar
equipped night fighters were highly effective he at 1228, among other
things, invited COMTHIRDFLT ' s attention to this fact, pointed out that a
number of these planes were at Pearl Harbor and recommended that they take
part in the operation. **
During the remainder of the day nothing of particular
importance occurred with relation to CTG 38.1 so he continued on toward
Ulithi. No planes nor pilots were lost during the day.
At 2400 CTG 38.1 was bearing 299°(T), distant 370
miles from Ulithi and on course 125°(T), speed fifteen knots.
(b) Operations of CTG 38.2, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
At 1042 CTG 38.2, in the INTREPID, with TG 38.2,
which was fueling from the oilers of TG 30. 9*** (TOMAHAWK, KENNEBAGO,
MARIAS, PECOS, CACHE and SAUGATUCK) was on course 270° (T), speed ten knots
and zigzagging. He was heading for his 0600 October 24th position
(Latitude 13°-00»N, Longitude 125°-00'E). He had received orders to
proceed to the latter position by visual dispatch an hour and one-half
earlier and was awaiting detailed instructions in connection therewith.**-**
At 1057 his ships had completed fueling.
His command consisted, at this time, of the
INDEPENDENCE (FFF), INTREPID, CABOT, IOWA (FF), NEW JERSEY (FFFFF),
VINCENNES (F), MIAMI, BILOXI, MILLER, THE SULLIVANS, TINGEY (FF), OWEN,
HICKOX (F), HUNT, LEWIS HANCOCK, MARSHALL, HALSEY POWELL (F), CUSHING,
COLAHAN, UHLMANN, YARNALL (F), TWINING, STOCKHAM,WEDDERBURN with a total
of eighty- five VF, twenty- four VB***** and thirty-five VT.
At about 1106, he received the amplifying orders from
COMTHIRDFLT he had been anticipating.****-** He noted that in addition to
proceeding to the previously ordered position off San Bernardino Strait,
* Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92510), Naval War
College, 1957, Chapter VII (B)(1) (a)(1) (a).
** CTG 38.1 Dispatch 230358 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info CINCPAC,
CTF 38.
*** Deck Log INTREPID, October 23rd, 1944.
**** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 230017 October 1944 to CTG 38.2.
-k-sbh** This is one VB more than was reported in Volume III.
****** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 230003 October 1944 to CTG 38.2, info COMINCH,
CINCPAC, All TFC's and TGC's 3RDFLT, All concerned SOWESPAC
Operations.
496799 O - 59 - 12
47 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 38.2 and CTG 38.3
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
he was to (a) launch a reinforced search to westward at dawn the next
day to include Coron Bay and (b) to strike targets of opportunity.
At 1146 he changed course to 240°(T), speed sixteen
knot s .*
At 2210 he received COMTHIRDFLT « s orders** to prepare
to launch a search to the north as discussed earlier under "Operations of
COMTHIRDFLT, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd".
At 2300 he received a TBS voice radio message from
COMTHIRDFLT, discussed in full under "Operations of COMTHIRDFLT, 1042 -
2400, October 23rd", which (a) seemed to mildly reprove him for the paucity
of details in his earlier search advisory (CTG 38.2 dispatch 230747) and
(b) on the basis of recent intelligence requested that he sweep the
northwest coast of Palawan from Imuruan Bay to Bacuit.***
At 2400 CTG 38.2 was about eighty miles from his
assigned 0600 October 24th position, on course 249° (T), speed fifteen
knots.* He had lost no aircraft nor pilots during this period.
(c) Operations of CTG 38.3, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
At 1042 CTG 38.3, in the ESSEX, with TG 38.3 on
course 275°(T), speed twenty-three knots was heading for his assigned
position about ninety miles east of Polillo Island.
His command consisted of the ESSEX (FFF),
LEXINGTON (FFFF), PRINCETON, LANGLEY, MASSACHUSETTS, SOUTH DAKOTA,
SANTA FE, BIRMINGHAM, MOBILE, RENO, CLARENCE K. BRONSON (FF), COTTEN,
DORTCH, GATLING, HEALY, PORTERFIELD (FF), CALLAGHAN, CASSIN YOUNG, IRWIN,
PRESTON, LAWS, LONGSHAW and MORRISON, with a total of 136 VF, fifty-five
VB and fifty- four VT.
The afternoon search which was launched at 1212 was
composed of eleven VF and seven VB.
Two sectors were flown (a) one from 280° (T) to 350°
(T) with each ten degree sector being covered by one VF and one VB to a
distance of 350 miles and (b) one from 250°(T) to 265°(T) through the
Sibuyan Sea to a distance of 400 miles being flown by two pairs of VF.--***
At 1738 when the afternoon search planes returned he
learned that there had been no contacts on enemy warships although one
VF had reconnoitered Manila Harbor and reported the presence of eleven
to twenty medium AK's but could not determine whether any warships were
present.****
* Deck Log INTREPID, October 23rd, 1944.
** C0M3RDFLT TBS Voice Radio Message 231310 October 1944 to
INDEPENDENCE, info CTF 33, CTG's 33.2, 33.4.
*** C0M3RDFLT TBS Voice Radio Message 231400 October 1944 to CTG 38.2.
**** War Diary CTG 38.3, October 23rd, 1944; also Deck Log LEXINGTON,
October 23rd, 1944.
48 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 33.3 and CTG 38.4
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
Since during the day he received most of the contacts
received by COMTHIRDFLT and CTF 38 he was alert to the developing
situation and likely made certain that the searches on the morrow would
be effectively accomplished.
At 1908 he directed TG 38.3, among other things, to
(a) at 0610 search to 300 miles between 225°(T) and 295°(T) with four VF
and four VB in each ten degree sector, (b) employ (l) eight VF as radio
relay planes and (2) twenty VF for a sweep of the Manila area,*
Owing to a collision in mid-air the PRINCETON had
lost two VF. As a consequence there were 134 VF, fifty- five VB and
fifty-four VT remaining in his carriers.
At 2400 CTG 33.3 was about 190 miles east of Polillo
Island on course 280° (T), speed twenty- four knots.**
(d) Operations of CTG 38.4, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd.
At 1042 CTG 38.4, in the FRANKLIN, with TG 38.4 and
in company with CTG 38.1 continued to (a) head for Ulithi and (b) top
off his destroyers from his heavy ships.
TG 38.4 now consisted of the FRANKLIN (FFF), SAN
JACINTO, ENTERPRISE (F), BELLEAU WOOD, WASHINGTON, ALABAMA, WICHITA (F),
NEW ORLEANS, MAURY (FF), GRIDLEY, HELM, MC CALL, MUGFORD (F), RALPH
TALBOT, PATTERSON, BAGLEY, WILKES, NICHOLSON, SWANSON (F), COGSWELL (F),
CAPERTON, INGERSOLL, KNAPP, with a total of 109 VF, forty-four VB and
fifty-four VT.
At 1047 he received a dispatch from COMTHIRDFLT
directing him to (a) proceed to a position about fifty miles, bearing
050° (T) from the southeast tip of Samar and (b) launch westward searches
the following day. Since, as pointed out under "Operations of CTG 38.1,
1042 - 2400, October 23rd", this dispatch had probably been received at
1000 (when COMCRUDIV SIX reported receiving it), it will not be discussed
here.
In accordance with these orders he at 1118 directed
the formation to change course to 250° (T), speed eighteen knots.*** He
continued flying routine CAP and antisubmarine patrols.
At 1248 he sent a dispatch to CTG 38.3 to direct the
HELM, which had delivered mail to the LEXINGTON, to rejoin TG 33.4 in
Latitude 11°-30»N, Longitude 126°-30»E, at 0600 October 24th.****
However, the HELM was already returning to TG 38,4.
* CTG 38.3 TBS Voice Radio Message 231008 October 1944 to TG 38.3
carriers.
** Deck Log LEXINGTON, October 23rd, 1944.
*** Deck Log ENTERPRISE, October 23rd, 1944.
**** CTG 38.4 Dispatch 230348 October 1944 to CTG 38.3, info HELM.
49 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 33.4 and CTG 30.5
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
Having completed his fueling at 1452 he now increased
speed which varied throughout the remainder of the day from twenty to
twenty-six knots.
During the day he, of course, received much the same
information regarding enemy contacts as did COMTHIRDFLT and CTF 38. He
therefore realizing (a) the possible seriousness of the developing
situation and the importance of the following day's searches and possible
strikes, likely made certain that these searches and strikes would be
effectively accomplished and (b) that his scheduled searches would fly
over the western Visayas, at 1909 informed CTF 77 that at 0600 (the
following morning) he was sending four search and attack teams, each team
composed of eight VF and six VB to search sectors between 230° (T) and
270° (T) from Latitude 11°-30»N, Longitude 126°-30'E to a distance of
325 miles. »
At 1950 he observed the HELM rejoin.
At 2400 TG 38.4 was on course 245°(T), sDeed twenty
knots** and heading for the above position which was but ninety-seven
miles away. No planes nor pilots were lost during the day.
(2) Operations of CTG 30.5 (Air Search, Reconnaissance and
Photographic Group), 1042 - 2400, October 23rd
CTG 30.5, in the HAMLIN (AV 15) at Ulithi, on this day
continued his air searches from Kossol Passage (TU 30.5.1), Saipan
(TU 30.5.2) and Tinian (TU 30.5.3) in accordance with Commander Forward
Area Central Pacific (CTF 57) Operation Plan No. 6-44 as indicated in
Plate X, and in Diagram "B".
Shortly after 1100, the plane flying out of Tinian in
Sector 290°(T) - 299°(T) should have closed to within visual or radar
detection distance of the Japanese Main Force heading in a southwesterly
direction. (The latter, at this time, was about seventy miles inside the
1,000 mile limit of the search and would remain inside the search arc
until approximately 1700.***)
This plane failed to gain contact. Why, is not known
since (a) the weather was reasonably good at this time — ISUZU in her War
Diary reports cloudy weather during the day, visibility about twenty-
seven miles at 0600, five point four miles at 1200 and twenty-seven miles
at 1800,**** (b) the Main Force was well within the limit of the search
sector and (c) the Japanese Main Force did not contact any Allied PB4Y
planes on this day.
* CTG 38.4 Dispatch 231009 October 1944 to CTF 77.
** Deck Log FRANKLIN, October 23rd, 1944.
*** Appended Track Chart for Mobile Force Main Force, October 20th - 29th,
1944, Detailed Action Report Main Force, SHO No. 1 Operation, October
20th - 29th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
**** War Diary ISUZU, October 1944, WDC Document 161636, NA 11973.
50 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 30.5
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
However this failure to detect the Main Force, when
within the search arc, was not a new phenomenon. Instead, exactly the
same failure had occurred on the previous day. This failure is
discussed under "Operations of CTG 30.5, October 22nd" and is important
because it seems to show that the Allied searches in the critical
sectors on this day, as on the preceding day, were either (a) improperly
flown or (b) flown insufficiently far to gain contact.
Before the end of the day he learned that his searches
had been completed as follows:
(a) CTU 30.5.1 (sector searches to northwest of Kossol
Passage) negative with full distance and coverage,* and
(b) CTU 30.5.2 (sector searches to the northwest of
Saipan) negative with ninety- five per cent coverage in some sectors.**
He did not receive a report on this day from his unit
commander at Tinian (CTU 30.5.3) because that report was delayed in
transmission. However, since he was on the AOIC (Aircraft Operational
Intelligence Circuit) he not only knew that the search was being
conducted but had in addition received all important contacts. Among
these were (a) at 1200 a very large Japanese submarine on course 180°(T),
speed twelve knots, in Latitude 17°-10'N, Longitude 130°-40'E (Contact
"4", Plate V) and (b) at 1300 a SUKI class destroyer with three small
destroyers and two SC's on course 150°(T), speed fifteen knots, in
Latitude 26°-50«N, Longitude 141°-30'E.***
* CTU 30.5.1 Dispatch 230835 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info All TFC's
3RDFLT, CTF's 57, 59, CTG 30.5.
** CTU 30.5.2 Dispatch 230725 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info All TFC's
3RDFLT, CTF's 57, 59, CTG 30.5.
*** CTU 30.5.3 Dispatch 231040 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info All TFC's
3RDFLT, CTF 57, CTG 30.5.
51 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
(2) Operations of CTF 17 (Submarine Force Pacific), 1042 - 2400,
October 23rd.
CTF 17 during this period operated as heretofore. His submarines
as shown on Diagram "Bn were either on station, returning from station or
heading toward their new stations. However, it is clear that he was not
fully informed as to their actual locations for at 1152 he issued a
dispatch advising those interested of the location of his submarines.
That portion of this dispatch which applied to the submarines in the
Western Pacific is quoted in full as follows: "TF 17 Subs 23rd. POMFRET,
PINTADO, JALLAO, ATULE, BARBEL at Saipan. Eastbound. WHALE, SEAHORSE
22 North 156 East. BONEFISH 20 North 133 East. Westbound HADDOCK,
HALIBUT, TUNA 20 North 133 East, Patrolling vicinity Luzon Strait are ten
subs . "*
This dispatch is of considerable importance for it was auite in
error as these examples will portray: (a) the PINTADO, JALLAO, ATULE,
which were proceeding to their patrol stations, were not at Saipan but
instead were about 300 miles to the northwest, (b) the BARBEL which was
returning to Saipan was about 270 miles from there, (c) the WHALE and
SEAHORSE which were approximately correct in Latitude were about 400 miles
to the westward of their reported positions, (d) the BONEFISH was about
360 miles to the westward of the reported position, (e) the HADDOCK,
HALIBUT and TUNA were about 250 miles to the eastward of the reported
position and (f ) instead of ten TF 17 submarines in the vicinity of Luzon
Strait there were but seven (SHARK, BLACKFISH, SEADRAGON, SNOOK, SAWFISH,
ICEFISH, DRUM) most of which were over 100 miles to the westward of the
strait proper.
Since he had received contact reports from CTF 71 reporting
Japanese forces moving up through Palawan Passage toward Coron 3ay or
Manila and since he had reports from his own submarines about enemy forces
moving south off the west coast of Luzon also heading in the direction of
Coron Bay or Manila it is clear that he awaited amplification of these
sightings. During the afternoon he received no further contact reports.
However he received something perhaps more important. This was CTF 77 fs
estimate of the enemy plans based on the above contacts wherein CTF 77
stated, among other items, that the approach of enemy combatant ships and
tankers toward Coron Bay was, in his opinion, the first phase of the buildup
of magnified Tokyo Express runs against Leyte.** He noted that, although
submarine contact reports were responsible for CTF 77 's estimate, there
were no additional instructions to the submarines the submarines were
omitted. Instead CTF 77 had called upon those commanders charged with
covering the Leyte forces to provide that coverage by recormoitering Coron
Bay and approaching routes by air and by making air strikes against forces
discovered.
* CTF 17 Dispatch 230252 October 1944 to All Stations Interested in
Friendly Subs,
** CTF 77 Dispatch 230142 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, C.G.'s 5TK and 13TH
Air Forces, info all TFC's and TGC's 3RD and 7THFLTS, CIXCSWPA,
CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMFEAF.
52 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
All areas submarine patrol zones unless otherwise indicated
Dotted areas indicate air surface zone, f h: ";:;3
Hatched areas indicate joint zone. j%^gj
SUBMARINE OPERATING AREA CLASSIFICATIONS
WESTERN PACIFIC
OCTOBER 8 th — 31 st. inc. 1944
CINCPOA ZONE NOTICES 35,38,40,42,44,45,47
BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF
OCTOBER 1944
OCTOBER
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
At 1809 he was likely surprised to learn that COMTHIRDFLT had
noted the same omission for that commander at that time advised CINCPAC
that since information concerning Japanese movements off Lingayan was
sketchy, submarine observations would be helpful,*
Commencing at (a) 1857 he advised his command of events of interest
and in particular he (1) referred to the SEA DOG's report of two hits in a
freighter in a large southbound convoy and (2) informed the ICEFISH that
her extension of patrol would be granted** and (b) 1914 directed ESCOLAR
wolf pack to guard a China frequency for information on lifeguard
assignment s .***
At 1922 he advised the submarines in CONVOY COLLEGE (five water
areas embracing Luzon Strait and extending westward to Hainan Island —
Plate XII) that (a) China-based planes reported shipping along the
boundary between the Blind Bombing area and the submarine patrol zone and
(b) submarines in Areas DESTROY and DETECT should find good hunting near
that line.**** The information in this dispatch appears to have been
meant for (1) the HADDOCK, HALIBUT and TUNA which were en route to Area
DESTROY and scheduled to arrive at sunset October 24th and (2) the SHARK,
BLACKFISH and SEADRAGON which were now supposed to be patrolling Area
DETECT but which had drifted into Area DESTROY. Otherwise Area DESTROY
was unoccupied except for the SNOOK which was under orders to join the
SHARK wolf pack after sunset October 24th and which was working her way
toward Area DETECT.***** ACTUALLY THEN, THE ONLY SUBMARINES IMMEDIATELY
CONCERNED WERE THE SHARK, BLACKFISH, SEADRAGON AND SNOOK. IF THESE
SUBMARINES ACTED ON THIS INFORMATION IT WOULD FURTHER WEAKEN THE ALREADY
WEAK ALLIED SUBMARINE PATROL IN LUZON STRAIT BY MOVING THE NORTHERN GROUP
OF SUBMARINES EVEN FURTHER TO THE NORTHWEST.
Why CTF 17 seemed more concerned at this time with the sinking of
merchant shipping than with the obtaining of information regarding the
movements of enemy combatant forces is not explained. Perhaps having
received CTF 77' s 230142, commented onsbove, and having concurred in the
views therein expressed, he considered that this was largely a SOWESPAC
responsibility.
Finally, at approximately (a) 2030 he probably received a contact
report from the DRUM reporting a convoy of four ships and at least three
escorts in Latitude 19°-08«N, Longitude 118°-31'E on course 350°(T), speed
seven knots,****** and (b) 2320 he received a dispatch from the DARTER
reporting having sunk one ATAGO class heavy cruiser and damaged a
secondo*******
* C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 230748 October 1944 to CINCPAC, info CTF 77,
CTF 17.
** CTF 17 Dispatch 230957 October 1944 to All Submarines.
*** CTF 17 Dispatch 231014 October 1944 to All Submarines.
**** CTF 17 Dispatch 231022 October 1944 to CONVOY COLLEGE.
***** CTF 17 Dispatch 201952 October 1944 to All Submarines, info CINCPAC.
****** War Patrol Report DRUM, Report of 11TH War Patrol, Serial 056
undated.
******* DARTER Dispatch 231240 October 1944 to CTF 71, CTF 17, info CINCPAC.
53 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
(a) CONVOY COLLEGE
The submarines SAWFISH, ICEFISH, DRUM, SHARK, BLACKFISH,
SEADRAGON and SNOOK patrolled CONVOY COLLEGE as on the previous day.
The weather in this area had not improved from the previous day with a
rough sea still running from 060°(T).*
(1) SAWFISH, ICEFISH, DRUM
This coordinated attack group (wolf pack), with the
exception of the ICEFISH, patrolled Area DELETE submerged during
daylight and on the surface during darkness.** The ICEFISH had strayed
into the eastern end of Area DESTROY and had spent most of the day in
that area but by evening she had returned to Area DELETE.
The patrol of this group was uneventful until 1533 when
the SAWFISH, in Latitude 18°-57'N, Longitude lia0-23'E, sighted tops and
smoke of a convoy which she estimated consisted of one very large AP, in
the van, with eight or nine other ships escorted by two destroyers.
This was a fairly accurate estimate for the convoy appears to have been
the KARUKAZE convoy consisting of twelve ships.*** This convoy, after
dispersal had been ordered for Manila shipping, had departed that harbor
for Takao on October 21st and reported having been under repeated
submarine attacks commencing at 1730 this day.***
At 1724 the SAWFISH attacked the convoy, firing five
torpedoes, and claimed sinking one cargo ship. At 1925 she cleared the
area to the southward to send a contact report to the other submarines in
the area, and by 2000 had returned to regain contact on the convoy.****
During the next few hours the remainder of the wolf pack
plus the SNOOK had made contact on the convoy and all closed to attack.
However, only the SAWFISH succeeded in getting in another attack before
midnight and this time, at 2321, she fired her remaining torpedoes and
recorded one hit.**** Actually in these two attacks (1724 ^£2321 J she
sunk one ship—the converted seaplane tender KIMIKAWA MARU.*****
Although they had not succeeded in getting into attack
position by midnight both the DRUM and ICEFISH had made contact by that
time and the DRUM had made four reports, none of which are available to
this analysis. She likely reported four ships and at least three escorts
since that is recorded in her War Patrol Report. On the other hand the
ICEFISH did not make a contact report but records in her War Patrol Report
* Deck Log SAWFISH, October 23rd, 1944.
** Deck Logs SAWFISH, ICEFISH, DRUM, October 23rd, 1944.
*** War Diary 1ST Escort Force, October 1944, WDC Document 161719,
NA 11609. „ , e . , aa,,
**** War Patrol Report SAWFISH, Report of 8TH War Patrol, Serial 83-44,
November 8th, 1944. . _ b-,.*.—.
***** The Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II, prepared by Military
History Section, Special Staff, GHQ FEC, February 1952.
54 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
that she had made radar contact on several large ships and several
escorts. She also received a dispatch from CTF 17 granting her request
for extension of patrol and stating that detailed instructions would be
given the following night.-*
(2) SNOOK
The SNOOK, in Area DESTROY, was proceeding submerged on a
northeasterly heading in order to join the SHARK'S wolf pack in Area
DETECT. The day passed uneventfully and at 1914 she surfaced. At 2030
she intercepted the SAWFISH'S contact on the northbound convoy seventy- five
miles to the southeast of her and commenced closing the convoy. She
notified the SAWFISH of her actions but by midnight she had not made
contact.**
(3) SHARK, BLACKFISH, SEADRAGON
This wolf pack, which was supposed to be patrolling Area
DETECT, was actually patrolling along the northeast corner of Area
DESTROY. The reason for this is not readily available. It patrolled
submerged during daylight and on the surface during darkness.*** The day
passed uneventfully. Upon surfacing at dark ninety per cent of the crew
of the BLACKFISH again experienced illness with several serious cases.-****
As pointed out in Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf, this was likely due
to the leaking of carbon tetrachloride from cans with loose lids.*****
At 2030 the BLACKFISH (a) intercepted the SAWFISH contact
on a convoy to the southward and (b) received the same information from
the wolf pack commander in the SHARK.
No effort was made to close this contact for also at this
same time the wolf pack commander directed his wolf pack to patrol the
northern edge of the patrol area as reports received from China-based
patrol planes indicated good hunting,**** As a consequence the submarines
of the wolf pack proceeded to take up stations as ordered. No contacts
of importance were made during the day0
* CTF 17 Dispatch 230957 October 1944 to All Subs, info CINCPAC.
** War Patrol Report SNOOK, Report of 7TH War Patrol, Serial 053,
November 18th, 1944.
*** Deck Logs BLACKFISH, SEADRAGON, October 23rd, 1944.
**** War Patrol Report BLACKFISH, Report of 9TH War Patrol, Serial 001,
November 1944.
***** Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92510), Naval War
College, 1957, Chapter III (B)(2) (a) (2).
55 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
(4) HADDOCK, HALIBUT, TUNA
This wolf pack was in Area PARLOR proceeding westward to
its patrol station in CONVOY COLLEGE. The units remained on the surface
during daylight as well as darkness,* except for trim and training dives.
They made no contacts of importance, and at midnight were about to pass
into the eastern edge of Area VESTIBULE.
(5) PINTADO, JALLAO, ATULE
This wolf pack continued westward en route to its patrol
station in CONVOY COLLEGE, The units proceeded on the surface during
daylight as well as darkness except for trim and training dives.** They
made some contacts on friendly aircraft, but made no contacts of importance.
By midnight they had entered Area PARLOR.
(6) BONEFISH
The BONEFISH was eastbound in the CONVOY COLLEGE Safety
Lane returning to Pearl Harbor via Saipan. She remained on the surface
during daylight as well as darkness. Except for sighting, at 1218, a
large unidentified aircraft on a westerly course, the day passed
uneventfully.***
(b) Northwest Coast of Formosa.
The TANG patrolled, in northern Formosa Strait, submerged
during daylight and on the surface during darkness.**** No contacts of
importance were made this day.
(c) Northeast Coast of Formosa.
This area once again was patrolled by the three submarines,
SILVERSIDES, TRIGGER and SALMON. The SALMON having departed on October 19th
to see medical aid had returned to this area to take up her regular patrol
station. These submarines patrolled submerged during daylight and on the
surface during darkness.***** None of them made any contacts of importance,
although they all sighted enemy aircraft. During the evening the
SILVERSIDES made an unsuccessful sweep to the eastward in an attempt to
pick up a convoy,****** previously contacted by the SEA DOG,******* while
* Deck Logs HADDOCK, HALIBUT, TUNA, October 23rd, 1944.
** Deck Logs PINTADO, JALLAO, ATULE, October 23rd, 1944.
*** War Patrol Report BONEFISH, Report of 6TH War Patrol, No Serial,
November 8th, 1944.
**** War Patrol Report TANG, Report of $TH War Patrol, No Serial,
September 10th, 1945.
***** Deck Logs SILVERSIDES, TRIGGER, SALMON, October 23rd, 1944.
****** War Patrol Report SILVERSIDES, Report of 11TH War Patrol, Serial
045, November 23rd, 1944.
******* SEA DOG Dispatch 220L49 October 1944 to CTF 17, info MARU MORGUE.
56 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
the SALMON commenced moving to the north of the northwest tip of
Ishigaki Shima for the next day's patrol.*
(d) MARU MORGUE
The submarines SEA DOG in Area ABANDON, SAURY in Area
ABOLISH, BURRFISH in Area ABRIDGE, STERLET in Area ABUSE and BILLFISH in
Area ABDUCT, continued to patrol MARU MORGUE as before. The weather was
clear with good visibility and the submarines patrolled submerged during
daylight and on the surface during darkness.** One area, Area ABLAZE,
located eastward of Amami 0 Shima, remained unpatrolled due to the
departure of the BARBEL and SKATE with only one relief (BILLFISH) provided.
This was an unfortunate situation for unknown to the MARU
MORGUE submarines the Japanese FIRST Supply Group, which had departed
BUNGO SUIDO at 0500 on the previous day had passed undetected through
Area ABLAZE and entered Satsukawa Bay in southern Amami 0 Shima.
The SEA DOG sighted numerous planes during the day*** and the
BILLFISH sighted several small trawlers and small patrol craft in the
early evening.**** With these exceptions, none of the submarines of this
area made any contacts of importance.
The BURRFISH at 2300 set course to close the convoy reported
and attacked by the SEA DOG on October 22nd.*****
(e) Nagasaki - Sasebo
The two submarines patrolling Areas NINE (CROAKER) and TWELVE
(PERCH) were some 230 miles apart.
The PERCH was in southern Tsushima Strait where she was
patrolling on the surface across the Nagasaki - Shanghai convoy route in
a position to intercept a carrier force reported in Formosa Strait on a
northeasterly course at 1530 October 21st and which she hoped to intercept
on this day.****** While what this force actually was is not known, it
seems possible that it was a convoy of merchant ships escorted by the
SHINYO (CVE) en route Hainan Island to Mutsure (an island in the western
approaches to Shimonoseki Suido) where it arrived at 0600 the following
morning. The question of this convoy is discussed in Volume III .*******
* War Patrol Report SALMON, Report of 11TH War Patrol, Serial 0-16,
November 10th, 1944.
** Deck Logs SEA DOG, BILLFISH, SAURY, BURRFISH, STERLET, October
23rd, 1944.
*** War Patrol Report SEA DOG, Report of 1ST War Patrol, No Serial,
undated.
**** War Patrol Report BILLFISH, Report of 6TH War Patrol, Serial 038,
November 27th, 1944.
***** War Patrol Report BURRFISH, Report of 4TH War Patrol, Serial 024,
December 2nd, 1944.
****** War Patrol Report PERCH, Report of 3RD War Patrol, No Serial,
November 8th, 1944.
******* Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92510), Naval War
College, 1957, Chapter III (C).
496799 O - 59 - 13
57 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
At 2100, having failed to intercept this force, she proceeded
towards her October 25th lifeguard station bearing 284° (T), distant 124
miles from Danjo Gunto.* About this time she received CTF 17' s dispatch
containing supplementary instructions pertaining to her lifeguard duties.**
She made no contacts of importance,*
The CROAKER submerged was proceeding in a southerly direction
toward her lifeguard station and planned to pass to the westward of
Cheju Do (Quelpart Island). At 1848 she surfaced and remained on the
surface during the remainder of the day.*** During the evening she also
received supplementary instructions pertaining to her lifeguard duties
from CTF 17.** She made no contacts of importance.****
(f) HIT PARADE (Approaches to Bungo Suido).
The submarines BSSUGO and RONQUIL continued to guard the
approaches to Bungo Suido with the former in the eastern approaches and
the latter in the western approaches.***** (Diagram "B"). They patrolled
submerged during daylight and on the surface during darkness. ******
Although they sighted several aircraft and sampans during the day they
made no contacts of real importance.******* At 2355 the RONQUIL received
a dispatch from CTF 17, not available to this study, and immediately
informed the BESUGO that she was entering her area.********
The GABILAN was guarding the approaches to Kii Suido although
she was too far to the eastward of the Strait leaving the western
approaches open to transit. THERE SEEMS TO BE CONSIDERABLE DOUBT AS TO
THE CORRECTNESS OF THIS STATION SINCE A POSITION ON THE 100 FATHOM CURVE
EQUIDISTANT BETWEEN KAMATA SAKI (SOMETIMES CALLED GAMOTA ZAKI) AND HINO
MISAKA, AS DISCUSSED IN VOLUME II, WOULD BE BETTER SUITED TO GUARD KII
SUIDO.********* The above submarine patrolled on the surface during
darkness and submerged during daylight and made no contacts of
import anc e • **********
* War Patrol Report PERCH, Report of 3RD War Patrol, No Serial,
November 8th, 1944.
** CTF 17 Dispatch 231014 October 1944 to SSCOLAR, PERCH, CROAKER,
info CINCPAC.
*** Deck Log CROAKER, October 23rd, 1944.
**** War Patrol Report CROAKER, Report of 2ND War Patrol, Serial 027,
November 10th, 1944.
***** BESUGO Dispatch 221544 October 1944 to CTF 17.
****** Deck Logs BESUGO, RONQUIL, October 23rd, 1944.
******* War Patrol Report RONQUIL, Report of 2ND War Patrol, Serial 038,
November 28th, 1944; also War Patrol Report BESUGO, Report of
1ST War Patrol, Serial 027, November 4th, 1944.
******** War Patrol Report RONQUIL, Report of 2ND War Patrol, Serial 038,
November 28th, 1944.
********* Volume II, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92914), Naval War
College, 1955, Chapter V (B)(2)(f).
********** War Patrol Report GABILAN, Report of 3RD War Patrol, Serial 031,
November 13th, 1944.
58 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17 and
C.G. FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 23rd
(g) The Approaches to Tokyo Bay,
The TAMBOR continued to operate in the eastern approaches to
Tokyo Bay to the southeast of O'Shima,* while the GREENLING continued to
patrol in Enshu Nada about sixty miles distant from the westward
approaches to Tokyo, These submarines which patrolled submerged during
daylight and on the surface during darkness made no contacts of
importance,** The weather conditions in Enshu Nada were generally poor
with fog*** while visibility in the vicinity of the TAMBOR was low.**
(C) China - Burma - India Theater, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd,
(1) Operations of C.G. FOURTEENTH Air Force, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd,
On this day the two-place search over the South China Sea was
flown, as scheduled, by B-24 aircraft of the FOURTEENTH Air Force
(Diagram"BB)#
At 1545 the west course plane sighted a single ship about 100
miles east of Hainan.****
At about 1800 the night searches took off. Between 2200 and 2230
the east course aircraft sighted three widely separated single ships from
300 to 330 miles northwest of Manila.****
The foregoing contacts were not significant.
* War Patrol Report TAMBOR, Report of 12TH War Patrol, Serial 08019,
November 30th, 1944.
** Deck Logs GREENLING, TAMBOR, October 23rd, 1944.
*** War Patrol Report GREENLING, Report of 11TH War Patrol, No Serial,
November 23rd, 1944.
**** HQ Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama, AAF Operations
from China Bases in Support of Leyte Campaign, Letter, No Serial,
November 8th, 1944 to President, Naval War College.
59 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CINC COMBINED FLEET
October 24th
CHAPTER III - JAPANESE OPERATIONS, 0000 - 1830, October 24th
(A) Operations of CinC Combined Fleet, 0000 - 1330, October 24th.
This was a day of crucial movements and actions by units of the
Combined Fleet engaged in the SHO Operation which was now approaching the
climactic decisive stage. Early in the day, at about 0242, CinC Combined
Fleet learned that a "large enemy force" had been discovered at 0050,
bearing 090°(T), distant 250 miles from Manila* (Contact "A", Plate XIII).
This was the first of a series of contacts on enemy forces east of the
Philippines which, as later developed, consisted of three groups with an
aggregate of about eleven carriers.**
During the day CinC Combined Fleet received numerous reports from his
various commanders, the most important of which were: (a) from Connander
Main Force reporting (1) that at 1145, the Main Force planned to launch a
seventy-six plane attack against the enemy force east of Manila,***
(2) that at 1439 the Main Force Advance Guard had been ordered detached
to proceed south to "take advantage of any favorable opportunity to
attack and destroy remaining enemy elements"**55* and (3) he may have
learned that at 1645 the Main Force had finally been detected by enemy
carrier aircraft,***** (b) the THIRD Section, at 0945, had been attacked
and lightly damaged by carrier aircraft,*2**** (c) the Main Body of the
FIRST Striking Force had been subjected to five air attacks totalling
about 250 carrier planes******* and had suffered considerable damage
**
***
****
CofS SW Area Force Dispatch 240212 October 1944 to SW Area
Situation Report Addressees, Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1,
SHO No. 1 Operation, October 18th - 23th, 1944, WDC Document
161005, NA 11744.
Material for Situation Estimates, 1ST Section, Naval General
Staff, October 1944, WDC Document 216764.
Commander Main Force Dispatch 241133 October 1944 to all Fleet
and Squadron Commanders, CinC Combined Fleet, Commander 5TH Base
Air Force, Imperial GHQ (Navy Section), Detailed Action Report
1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October 16th - 28th, 1944,
WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
Commander Main Force Dispatch 241439 October 1944 to CinC Combined
Fleet, all Fleet and Squadron Commanders, Main Force, info to
Imperial GHQ (Navy Section), etc., (Main Force SigDesOpOrd No. 2),
Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation, October
18th - 23th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
Commander Main Force Dispatch 241650 October 1944 to all interested
Commanders, Detailed Action Report Main Force, SHO No. 1 Operation,
October 20th - 29th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 241105 October 1944 to 1ST Striking
Force Battle Report Addressees, Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1,
SHO No. 1 Operation, October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document
161005, NA 11744.
Commander 1ST Striking Force (Commander Main Body) Dispatch 241600
October 1944 to CinC Combined Fleet, info Commanders Main Force,
5TH and 6TH Base Air Force, SW Area Force, Detailed Action Report
1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October 16th - 28th, 1944,
WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
*****
******
*******
60
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
23'
124-
126-
COMMANDER MAIN FORCE {
TIME
OF
CONTACT
LOCATION
NE OF CATANDuANES
THIRD
SECTION
SECOND
STRIKING
FORCE
TIMES OF RECEIPT
; 4th
MAIN 6th 5th AIR
IYB FORCE BAF BAF ARMT
A
00S0-24lh
08IS
0815
0252
ORlG REC'O
B
0600-24tr>
NW OF CATANOUANES
0900
ORtG
REC'O
C
0600-24th
E OF POULLO IS
0900
ORIG
REC'D
D
0600-24th
LEYTE 6ULF
1033
1033
1033
REC'O
REC'O
E
0650-24lh
LEYTE GULF
1200
1400
1400
'
OBOO-24lh
E OF POULLO IS
0820
ORIG
REC'O
G
0853-2 4 th
E OF POLILLO IS.
RtTC'D
REC'O
0902
0910
0902 RECO I
H
0900-2 4 th
NE OF POLILLO IS.
HEC'D
REC'D
1030
1030 : RECO
■
0940-24th
NE OF SAN BERNARDINO
REC'D
REC'O
1015
J 0945-241h
NE OF SAN BERNARDINO
*EC D
RECTJ
1535
RECD
RECD
n
l030-24th
NE OF POLILLO IS
1046
ORIS
RECO
L
IIOO-24th
NE OF SAN BERNARDINO
REC'D
REC'D
1102
w
H00-24th
NE OF SULUAN IS
REC'D
REC'O
1104
N
Il05-24th
NE OF POLILLO IS
IMS
0
H50-24th
LEVTE GULF
REC'O
REC'D
1204
P
l535-24th
E OF POLILLO IS-
ORIG
REC'D
-
!725-24th
E OF POLILLO IS.
ORIG
REC'D
R
1607-24-h
NE OF POLILLO IS
ORIG REC'D
S jl8l5-241h
NE OF POLILLO IS
REC'O" indicates probable receipt Exact time unknown Omissions mdicotes lack of information a
considered of lesser concern to commander
ORIG indicates command in *hich contact probably originated
I807-2CV 5CA/CL 1000
^COURSE SOUTHEAST
I030-2CV 10 PLUS OTHER SHIPS
COURSE NORTH
I05-38B, 10 PLUS OTHERS
UlBI5-4CV 2CVE
„0853-4CV 10 OTHER SHIPS
®TVact AMPLIFIED TO INCLUOE
L tAbl 4CV 2CVE
* C NORTHEAST 20 KTS.
©1725-2 CVL (DAMAGED) 2BB 5 OTHERS
.C EAST 22 KTS
535-lCV I CVL 2 CVE IBB 2CA
0050-LARGE ENEMY FORCE,.
0600 -IBB
0945
LARGE ENEMY FORCE
INCLUDING 3CV 3BB(^,CEAST 24 KTS
*<D MOO -ENEMY FORCE
^ 3BB REST UNKNOWN C SE
II05-I0-PLUS SHIPS
C NORTH
0940 10-PLUS SHIPS
COMMANDER FIRST STRIKING FORCE
AND COMMANDER MAIN BODY
LARGE ENEMY FORCE±
C NORTH 30 KTS
0600
4B8 4 CA/CL
80 TRANSPORTS
5-8 BB 10 CA/CL
CONFIDENTIAL
CINC COMBINED FLEET
n^TmrKT-PTAT C0M FIRST STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
((1) the battleship MUSASHI heavily damaged and out of action, (2) the
heavy cruiser MYOKO damaged and out of action, (3) the battleship NAGATO
lightly damaged with speed reduced to twenty-one knots and (4) the
battleship YAMATO lightly damaged) and (d) the SIXTH Base Air Force in
its attack had scored one 500 pound bomb hit on a carrier and one cruiser
had been moderately damaged and set afire.*
During the evening CinC Combined Fleet became concerned about the
attacks on the Main Body. He later stated that, "If it became too
unbearable Admiral Kurita might turn back, but even if he were to turn
back, it would be difficult for surface ships to elude the pursuit of
aircraft. Whether the force advanced or retired, there would be very
little difference in the resulting damage. In addition, once we withdrew,
it would be difficult to revive the operation, and the entire operation
would have to be scrapped. This was how I reasoned, and finally, after
much painful consideration I made up my mind and dispatched. ..",** "All
forces to the attack trusting in divine aid."***
(1) Operations of Commander FIRST Striking Force, 0000 - 1830,
October 24th.
As pointed out in preceding volumes, Commander FIRST Striking
Force "wore several hats". In addition to commanding the FIRST Striking
Force he also commanded the Main Body; the FIRST Section of the Main
Body; and, after hoisting his flag in the YAMATO, BATDIV ONE.
It is evident in the analysis of this commander that although he
used the FIRST Striking Force title, by far the greater portion of his
actions were those which concerned only the Main Body and actually were
performed in his capacity as Commander Main Body. In this analysis under
the heading, "Operations of Commander FIRST Striking Force" only those
actions which are considered to be the function of the higher command
level are discussed.
Commander FIRST Striking Force in his dual capacity was of course
well aware of the operations of the Main Body.
* Clark Air Base Dispatch 241145 October 1944 to 6TH Base Air Force
Battle Report Addressees (6TH Base Air Force Battle Report No. 1),
Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October
16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
** Admiral Soemu Toyoda, ex-UN, "The End of the Imperial Navy" (Tokyo,
April 1950), Pages 157-163.
*** CinC Combined Fleet Dispatch 241813 October 1944 to SHO Forces,
(Combined Fleet DesOpOrd No. 372), Detailed Action Report No. 15
MYOKO, Battle off the Philippines (Antiair Action in Mindoro Sea),
October 24th, 1944, WDC Document 161647.
61 CONFIDENTIAL
COM FIRST STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1151 he learned that the THIRD Section had been subjected to
air attack but that "combat effectiveness was unimpaired". *
At 1241 he received Commander Main Force dispatch 241138 which
stated that commander's intentions to launch a full strength attack
(sixty-seven planes) against the enemy task force in position Latitude
15°-35fN, Longitude 124°-15fE.**
During the day Commander FIRST Striking Force received the same
contact reports as did Commander Main Body. These contacts are noted and
discussed under "Operations of Commander Main Body, 0000 - 1830, October
24th ».
By 1447 he had received Commander THIRD Section's 1400 position
report*** which indicated that the THIRD Section was pretty well on
schedule and could easily conduct the penetration as planned.
At 1530 he was aware that the Main Body had reversed course and
at 1541 he ordered the NICHIEI MARU (oiler) and CD #32 (Coastal Defense
Ship - Escort) to depart immediately upon completion of preparations for
Coron Bay and upon arrival stand-by.****
At 1715 he knew that the Main Body had again resumed the advance
and he began to consider the effect the delay of the Main Body would have
on the overall Leyte penetration operation.
* Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 241105 October 1944 to 1ST Striking
Force Battle Report Addressees, Detailed Action Report 1ST
Striking Force, SHO Operations, October 16th - 28th, 1944, WDC
Document 161641, NA 11839.
** Ibid., Commander Main Force Dispatch 241138 October 1944 to All
Fleet and Squadron Commanders, CinC Combined Fleet, Commander 5TH
Base Air Force, etc,
*** Ibid., Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 241410 October 1944 to
Commanders 1ST and 2ND Striking Forces.
**** Commander 1ST Striking Force Dispatch 241541 October 1944 to
NICHIEI MARU, CD #32, Commander Combined Escort Force, SW Area Force,
CinC Combined Fleet, War Diary NICHIEI MARU, October 1944, *DC
Document 160148, NA 11838.
62 CONFIDENTIAL
COM MAIN BODY
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
(a) Operations of Commander Main Body, 0000 - 1830, October 24th.
The Main Body commenced this day, a day of crucial operations
for this force, some fifty miles west of Mindoro on course 090°(T).
Shortly after midnight several of the ships of the force reported sighting
submarines and evasive maneuvering was conducted,* No attacks on the
force were made however.
Probably at 0255 Commander Main Body received information that
the "enemy task force" had been contacted 250 miles east of Manila**
(Contact "A", Plate XIII). As he plotted this contact he could see that
as the Main Body rounded the southern tip of Mindoro at sunrise it would
be about 280 miles from the contact and therefore within range of the
enemy carrier planes. As a result preparations were commenced for the
expected attack.
Shortly after clearing the narrow passage between Libagao
Island and Masin Island south of Mindoro, about 0734, the force assumed
antiaircraft disposition with each section in circular formation.***
Between 0700 and 0800 various ships of the force launched
search aircraft in accordance with FIRST Striking Force SigOrd No. 193.****
These planes (seven) were ordered to search ten degree sectors to a
distance of 300 miles with Banton Island as the point of origin and the
"base line" 075°. It is known that at least six of these planes conducted
searches and some gave Commander FIRST Striking Force considerable
information.
At 1026 the air attacks began. The first attack which was
reported to consist of about thirty planes but which actually numbered
forty-five from TG 38.2, made coordinated bombing, torpedo and strafing
attacks and succeeded in hitting the MYOKO and the MUSASHI with one
torpedo each. The MYOKO was damaged so badly that COMCRUDIV FIVE
transferred his flag to the HAGURO and the Commander Main Body ordered her
proceed to Brunei Bay, if necessary putting in at Coron Bay for emergency
* Detailed Action Report No. 3, YAMATO, SHO No. 1 Antiair and Surface
Actions, October 17th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161639.
** CofS SW Area Force Dispatch 240212 October 1944 to SW Area Force
Situation Report Addressees, Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO
No. 1 Operation, October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 16100 5,
NA 11744.
*** The Main Body disposition was Y-20, the 1ST Section in Y-25 and the
2ND Section in B-3. These dispositions were to be discussed and
diagrammed in Volume IV, Battle for Leyte Gulf.
**** Commander Main Body Visual Dispatch 232350 October 1944 to Ships
Carrying Aircraft (1ST Striking Force SigOrd No. 193), Detailed
Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation, October 18th - 28th,
1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
63 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
repairs* without escort,
affect her operations.
COM MAIN BODY
October 24th
The hit on the MUSASHI did not materially
At approximately 1207 the second air attack began. This
attack which was also launched by TG 38.2, was reported by Commander Main
Body as consisting of thirty** aircraft which was correct.*** During this
attack the MUSASHI received three additional torpedo hits (total four) and
her speed was reduced to twenty-two knots. **** In addition she received
two bomb hits.*****
By 1315 Commander Main Body had contact reports indicating
that he was opposed by the following forces:
(a) Two groups of ten ships eacn off the entrance to San
Bernardino Strait, the composition of one group was unknown,****** while
the other was reported to include three battleships and one small
carrier,******* (Contacts "I" and WLM). These contacts were both on
TG 38.2.
(b) Two groups some thirty miles apart, one group with four
carriers and ten other ships******** about 100 miles east of Polillo Island
(Contact "G"), the other with two carriers and ten other stops*********
about 100 miles northeast of Polillo Island (Contact "H"), These contacts
were both on TG 38.3.
**
-»-*-«-
#*-**
-a-**-**
-5HHHHH5-
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-JHBHBBSBJ-
-JHHHHMHBHi-
Commander 1ST Striking Force (Commander Main Body) Visual
Dispatch 24112$ October 1944 to MYOKO, Detailed Action Report
No. 15, MYOKO, Battle off the Philippines (Antiair Action in
Mindoro Sea), October 24th, 1944, WDC Document 161647.
Commander 1ST Striking Force (Commander Main Body) Dispatch
241225 October 1944 to 1ST Striking Force Battle Report
Addressees, Detailed Action Report No. 3, NOSHIRO, Antiair and
Surface Actions, October 23rd - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
War Diary INTREPID, October 1944, Serial 0195, November 9th,
1944.
Commander 1ST Striking Force (Commander Main Body) Dispatch
241250 October 1944 to 1ST Striking Force Battle Report
Addressees, Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation,
October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 16 1005, NA 11744.
Detailed Action Report MUSASHI, Battle Off the Philippines,
October 24th, 1944, WDC Document 161639.
Number 1 Plane, 3RD Recco Unit Dispatch (date-time-group and
addressees unknown), October 24th, 1944, Detailed Action Report
1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October 16th - 28th, 1944,
WDC Document 161641, NA 11339.
Plane No. 3, 1ST Search Unit Dispatch 241100 October 1944
(addressees unknown), Detailed Action Report KONGO, SHO
Operation, October 22nd - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161637.
62ND Air Flotilla Aircraft Dispatch 240853 October 1944 to
unknown addressees, Detailed Action Report 3ATDIV 1, SHO No. 1
Operation, October 18th - 23th, 1944, WDC Document 161005,
NA 11744.
Ibid., 62ND Air Flotilla Aircraft Dispatch 240900 (presumed)
October 1944 to unknown addressees.
64
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM MAIN BODY
October 24th
(c) About ninety miles north of Catanduanes Island at 1105
a "Task Force" reported by Commander Main Force,* (Contact "N"). This
contact was also on TG 38.3 being about eight miles northwest of the
actual position,
(d) A "large force", composition unknown off the coast of
Samar** (Contact "M"). This contact was about fifteen miles northeast of
TG 77.4.3 and about fifteen miles southeast of TG 38.4. Which of the
forces the pilot actually saw is not known.
(e) In Leyte Gulf at 0600, nine to twelve battleships,
fourteen cruisers, eighty transports plus destroyers and ten torpedo
boats in the Mindanao Sea to the south**-* (Contact "D").
As he now had ample evidence of enemy forces east of the
Philippines and as he had no word of friendly air attacks, he sent a
dispatch to the air unit commanders stating that his force was under
repeated attacks and requested to be advised immediately of "contacts and
attacks" made on the enemy.-****
At 1324 the third air attack commenced. This attack, which
he reported consisted of eighty aircraft***** appears to have been the
strike group from TG 38.3 recorded as fifty-eight aircraft.****** During
this attack the MUSASHI received her fifth torpedo hit and reported that
her maximum speed was estimated at twenty knots and the YAHAGI suffered
near misses which reduced her speed to twenty-two knots.
■**
■*■*#
Commander Main Force Dispatch 241138 October 1944 to All Fleet and
Squadron Commanders, CinC Combined Fleet, Commander 5TH Base Air
Force, etc., Detailed Action Report ZUIHO, SHO No. 1 Operation,
October 20th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161008.
Plane No. 7, 3RD Recco Unit (CRUDIV 7 Aircraft) Dispatch 241100
October 1944 (addressees unknown but probably 1ST Striking Force),
Detailed Action Report KONGO, SHO Operation, October 22nd - 28th,
1944, WDC Document 161637; also Detailed Action Report 1ST
Striking Force, SHO Operation, October 16th - 28th, 1944, WDC
Document 161641, NA 11839.
1ST Striking Force Search Plane Report (date- time-group unknown),
October 24th, 1944 to CinC Combined Fleet, Commander SW Area Force,
Commander 1ST Striking Force, etc., Detailed Action Report BATDIV
1, SHO No. 1 Operation, October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document
161005, NA 11744.
Commander 1ST Striking Force (Commander Main Body) Dispatch 241315
October 1944 to Commanders Main Force, SW Area Force, info CinC
Combined Fleet, Commanders 5TH and 6TH Base Air Forces, Detailed
Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October 16th -
28th, 1944, WDC Document I6I64I, NA 11839.
Ibid., Commander 1ST Striking Force (Commander Main Body), Dispatch
241342 October 1944 to 1ST Striking Force Battle Report
Addressees.
Deck Logs LEXINGTON and ESSEX, October 24th, 1944.
*■***
■JHBSHfr
-5HHHHBJ-
65
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM MAIN BODY
October 24th
At 1400 he received another contact from Leyte Gulf. This was
the report made by the MOGAMI search plane and which had been relayed by
the Bulan Air Base,* This report which reported forces in the gulf as of
0650 was about the same as the previous report on Leyte Gulf except that
the "five to eight battleships and ten cruisers" mentioned in the earlier
report were not included in this one, (Contact "E").
During the fourth air attack which commenced about 1426 and
which was conducted by a group of about twenty planes likely from
TG 38.3,** the YAMATO received a bomb hit on the bow but her combat
effectiveness was unimpaired.
Closely following this attack, at approximately 1500, the fifth
air attack commenced. This was the largest attack of the day reported by
Commander Main Body as "over 100 planes". These aircraft were from
TG 38.4 which had launched its first strike of sixty-five aircraft at
I313*** and TG 38.2 which had launched its third strike of thirty-one
aircraft at 1350.**** During this attack (a) the NAGATO received two
bomb hits and several near misses which reduced her maximum speed
temporarily to twenty-one knots,***** and (b) the MUSASHI which was now
some distance from the Main Body and "putting up a desperate fight",
started emitting black smoke and listing to port. She was apprently
unnavigable .**#***
At 1510 he ordered the MUSASHI to retire to Mako via Coron Bay
if necessary and the KIYOSHIMO to escort.*******
Bulan Seaplane Base Dispatch 241227 October 1944 to 1ST Striking
Force Battle Report Addressees, Detailed Action Report 1ST
Striking Force, SHO Operations, October l6.th - 28th, 1944, WDC
Document 161641, NA 11839.
Deck Log ESSEX, October 24th, 1944.
Action Report CTG 38.4, Operations in Support of the Occupation
of Leyte and Against the Japanese Fleet, October 22nd - 31st,
1944, Serial 00267, November 18th, 1944.
Action Report CTG 38.2, October 6th - November 3rd, 1944,
Serial 0040, November 8th, 1944.
Detailed Action Report No. 2, NAGATO, Antiair and Surface Actions,
October 24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161639.
Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation, October
18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744; also Vice
Admiral Matome Ugaki, ex-IJN (COMBATDIV 1) Personal Diary
SENSOROKU, Nippon Shuppon Kyodo Kabushiki Kaisha (Tokyo March
15th, 1953), Volume II.
Commander 1ST Striking Force (Commander Main Body) Dispatch
241510 to MUSASHI, KIYOSHIMO, etc., Detailed Action Report
BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation, October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC
Document 161005, NA 11744.
-a*
*-**-»-
-*#-*-«-*
#****#
•JBHKBBJ-*
66
CONFIDENTIAL
COM MAIN BODY
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
By 1530, while the attack was still in progress, Commander
Main Body, had become considerably alarmed over the situation and had
apparently tentatively decided to temporarily reverse course while he
re-estimated the situation for at this time he ordered the force to
change course to 290°(T)o*
At 1600, having apparently confirmed this decision to retire,
he informed his superiors of his action and his estimate of the situation.
Because of the importance of this dispatch it is quoted in full:
wIn coordination with the attack operations of the air forces,
the main strength (Main Body) of the FIRST Striking Force advanced so as
to break through San Bernardino Strait one hour after sunset. However,
from 0830 to 1530, the force underwent repeated attacks by waves of enemy
carrier planes totalling about 250. These attacks were increasing both
in frequency and intensity and it appeared improbable that search attack
operations by our own air forces would be effective. If the force
continued its advance in spite of these circumstances, it would become an
easy prey and sustain mounting losses, which would jeopardize the
accomplishment of its mission. It is therefore considered advisable to
retire temporarily from the zone of air attacks and to resume the advance
when the battle results of friendly units permit. 1600 position Sibuyan
Sea, 13°-00'N, 122°-40'E, course 290°, speed eighteen knots."**
This action of Commander Main Body was of great interest to
all the other commanders in the SHO Operation because of the close
coordination required of the participating forces. This decision is
therefore an important one to this operation and it was to have been
discussed at considerable length in Volume IV, Battle for Leyte Gulf.
By this time (1600) Commander Main Body knew that he was
opposed by enemy carrier forces grouped roughly, (1) some 90 - 100 miles
northeast of Polillo Island and (2) approximately sixty miles east of
Catanduanes Island. The northern force had been reported to be in two
groups totalling six large carriers and two escort carriers (Contacts "G"
and "H") while the southern group had been reported and amplified to
include three large carriers (Contacts "L" and "J"). In addition, the
"large enemy force" which he had received at 1104 (Contact "M") off Samar
in which the presence of carriers was undetermined had been reported
moving northward and might well be within carrier plane range (Plate XIII),
* Detailed Action Report No. 3, YAMAT0, SHO No. 1 Operation, Antiair
and Surface Actions, October 17th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161639.
** Commander 1ST Striking Force (Commander Main Body) Dispatch 241600
October 1944 to CinC Combined Fleet, info Commander Main Force, 5TH
and 6TH Base Air Forces, SW Area Force, Detailed Action Report 1ST
Striking Force, SHO Operations, October 16th - 28th, 1944, WDC
Document 161641, NA 11839.
67 CONFIDENTIAL
COM MAIN BODY
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1603 Commander Main Body received Commander Main Force's
order detaching the Advance Guard to proceed south to attack and destroy
remaining enemy elements.*
At 1640 a dispatch was received from Commander SW Area Force
in which that commander (a) expressed the belief that enemy aircraft
attacking the FIRST Striking Force were from the carrier group in position
Latitude 13°-45'N, Longitude 125°-25*E, and (b) that the SIXTH Base Air
Force was scheduled to make a dusk attack against this force.** This
force was the southern group (Contact "J") which had been reported to
include three CV's and three BB's.
At 1714, with the above information at hand and noting that
there had been no additional attacks since the fifth attack, Commander
FIRST Striking Force ordered the Main Body to resume the advance.***
At 1830 the Main Body was in the vicinity of Latitude 13°-04'N,
Longitude 122°-42'E on base course 120°(T) heading for Masbate Pass.
Just before sunset the force passed not far from the MUSASHI, which was,
at this time badly damaged, and in danger of sinking, with two destroyers,
the KIYOSHIMO and the HAMAKAZE, standing by.
Thus, during the day, the striking power of the Main Body had
been reduced by four ships; one battleship, one heavy cruiser and two
destroyers.
* Commander Main Force Dispatch 241439 October 1944 to CinC Combined
Fleet, All Fleet and Squadron Commanders, etc., (Main Force SigDesOpCrd
No. 2), Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation, October
18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
** Commander SW Area Force Dispatch 241610 October 1944 to Commander
1ST Striking Force, Detailed Action Report No. 3, YAMATO, SHO No. 1
Antiair and Surface Actions, October 17th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document
161639.
*** Detailed Action Report No. 3, YAMATO, SHO No. 1 Antiair and Surface
Actions, October 17th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161639.
68 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
(b) Operations of Commander THIRD Section, 0000 - 1830,
October 24th.
The THIRD Section, at the beginning of this day, was in
position Latitude 09°-ll«N, Longitude 120°-04'E.
At 0200 the MOGAMI launched her Number ONE reconnaissance
seaplane for dawn reconnaissance of Leyte Gulf in accordance with
Commander THIRD Section's SigOrd No. 10* of the night before.
At 0855 enemy aircraft were sighted** and at approximately
0905 an attack commenced. The attack group consisted of twelve SB2Cfs
and sixteen F6F's, which had been launched from the ENTERPRISE (TG 38.4)
at 0602 . By 0940 the attack was completed. There had been one direct hit
on the after deck of the FUSO which set her reconnaissance seaplanes afire
and made a hole in the stern. There were some casualties from rockets
and strafing but no other serious damage.-*** The position of the attack
was in the vicinity of Latitude 09°-02«N, Longitude 121°-35'E.
During the morning (likely at 1033 when it was received by
COMBATDIV ONE) Commander THIRD Section may have received a reconnaissance
report from a FIRST Striking Force search plane which reported that there
was in Leyte Gulf at 0600: "four battleships and four cruisers five miles
east of Dulag; eighty transports ten miles east of Dulag; five to eight
battleships and ten cruisers in the vicinity (of the transports);
destroyers cruising around inside the gulf, and ten motor torpedo boats
in the Mindanao Sea sixty miles south of Tacloban."****
After receiving battle reports from his various ships,
Commander THIRD Section, at 1105, reported the action to his superiors and
other interested commanders.***** It is of interest that his position was
not included. It will be recalled that just before midnight October 23rd
he had commenced a major deviation from his planned route and at the time
of the attack was some eighty miles south of the planned position of the
same time.
At 1120 he designated (a) as reassembly point "Camiguin Island
(Mindanao Sea) on bearing 030° from light, distance thirty-five miles"
* Commander 3RD Section Visual Dispatch 231905 October 1944 to 3RD
Section (3RD Section SigOrd No. 10), Detailed Action Report SHIGURE,
Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document
161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Commander 3RD Section Visual Dispatch 240855 October 1944 to 3RD
Section, Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines,
October 18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document I60463, NA 12653.
*** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document I6O463, NA 12653.
**** 1ST Striking Force Search Plane Report {date-time-group unknown but
TOR 241033), October 1944 to CinC Combined Fleet, Commander SW Area
Force, Commander 1ST Striking Force, etc., Detailed Action Report
BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation, October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC
Document 161005, NA 11744.
***** ibid., Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 241105 October 1944 to 1ST
Striking Force Battle Report Addressees.
69 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
and (b) as refueling and supply point, "Puerto Princesa (tentatively)".*
This dispatch indicated that at this time it was the intention of
Commander THIRD Section to retire after battle southward through Surigao
Strait,
At noon the MOGAMI reconnaissance seaplane which had been
launched at 0200 returned overhead and reported the reconnaissance
results by message drop to MOGAMI and YAMASHIRO.** The information
reported as of 0650 was:
"1. About eighty transports on bearing 100° from Dulag, distance
seven miles. Disposed in several short columns of offset sections.
"2, Four battleships, two cruisers and two destroyers on bearing
157° from Dulag, distance eight miles,
"3« Two destroyers nearing Dulag landing point.
"4. Two destroyers and twelve seaplanes on bearing 241° from
Suluan Island, distance forty-seven miles.
"5. Four destroyers and ten plus small craft in Panaon Strait.
"6. No aircraft carriers observed inside Gulf but four planes
seen providing direct cover."***
After receipt of this information Commander THIRD Section
ordered his Number ONE Attack Unit, which had proceeded to Cebu, to "attack
the enemy light craft along the northwest coast of Panaon Island at dusk
October 24th".****
By 1313 the THIRD Section was approaching Negros Island to the
west of Casilan Point and at this time course was changed to 140° (T) to
parallel the coast. Commander THIRD Section was now back on his original
track and very nearly on schedule and it is of interest that shortly
thereafter, at 14 10, he reported his position.*****
* Commander 3RD Section Visual Dispatch 231120 October 1944 (3RD
Section SigOrd No. 11) to 3RD Section, Detailed Action Report
SHIGURE, Battle for Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC
Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document I6O463, NA 12653.
*** MOGAMI Visual Dispatch 241225 October 1944 to 3RD Section, Detailed
Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th,
1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
**** Commander 3RD' Section Dispatch 241225 October 1944 to Cebu Air Base,
San Jose Air Base; info Commander 1ST Striking Force, Detailed
Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October 16th -
28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
***** Ibid., Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 241410 October 1944 to
Commanders 1ST and 2ND Striking Forces.
70 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
In the meantime, at 1400, Commander THIRD Section received a
dispatch from Commander SW Area Force stating that the areas designated
by the Army as shore targets for naval bombardment were as follows:
"1. The area between Dulag and a point 3.3 kms. to the south,
and extending 2 kms. inland©
n2. Enemy beachhead area east of a line running from the coast
6.5 kms. south of Tacloban to a point 1 km. west of Tacloban. The Army
will endeavor to bomb the principal targets within the above area so that
the smoke will facilitate target identification."*
Also, at 1410, Commander THIRD Section directed "At about
sunset upon order, the FIRST Division (MOGAMI, MICHISHIO, ASAGUMO,
YAMAGUMO) will break formation and move out about twenty kilometers in
front of the SECOND Division ( YAMASHIRO, FUSO, SHIGURE), sweeping the
route of advance and clearing the waters on the west side of Panaon Island
of enemy craft,** He also directed that the FIRST Division was not to
penetrate deeply into Sogod Bay, was to rejoin about 0030 on a bearing of
250°(T), distance seventeen miles, from Binit Point and that after the
FIRST Section had rejoined he intended to assume No. TWO search formation,**
(Plate XIX). This action clearly indicates Commander THIRD Section's
concern for the enemy small craft which might attempt to ambush him during
the approach.
Almost immediately, at 1412, he released a dispatch to his
aircraft contact unit now at Cebu (previously sent by visual to his
ships***), prescribing the target priority as follows:
"1. Battleship group closest us
"20 If no battleships in Gulf, cruiser group
"3. Destroyer groups (surprise attack craft) capable of
attacking us
"4. Notify position of transports."****
* Commander SW Area Force Dispatch (date-time-group unknown but TOR
241400) October 1944 to 1ST Striking Force, Detailed Action Report
MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October 18th - 25th, 1944, WDC
Document I6O463, NA 12653.
** Commander 3RD Section Visual Dispatch 241410 October 1944 to 3RD
Section (3RD Section SigOrd No. 13), Detailed Action Report SHIGURE,
Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717
(Part 4), NA 11801.
*** Commander 3RD Section Visual Dispatch 241400 October 1944 to 3RD
Section, Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines,
October 18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document I6O463, NA 12653.
**** Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 241412 October 1944 to Cebu Air Base,
Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October
16th - 23th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
496799 o - 59 - 14 71 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
and COM MAIN FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
This dispatch is quoted because it offers the interesting thought that
Commander THIRD Section felt there was a possibility that there would be
no battleships in the Gulf when he arrived. This fact was to have been
discussed at length in Volume IV, Battle for Leyte Gulf, and is also
discussed under "Operations of Commander THIRD Section, 1830 - 2400,
October 24th" in this volume.
Although there is no record of receipt it seems likely that
Commander THIRD Section had received at least most of the battle reports
Commander FIRST Striking Force had sent out during the day and he
therefore knew that the Main Body had been heavily attacked and that the
MYOKO and the MUSASHI were out of action.
It also seems likely that Commander THIRD Section received
generally the same contact reports as did Commander FIRST Striking Force.
At 1830 the THIRD Section was in position Latitude 08°- $6' N,
Longitude 123°-37!E, and was ready to execute the order which directed
splitting the force into two sections.
(2) Operations of Commander Main Force, 0000 - 1830, October 24th.
The Main Force, continuing according to plan, proceeded in a
southwesterly direction during the early morning hours and at 0600 in
position Latitude 19°-10,N, Longitude 125°-40'E the morning search was
launched. At 1114 Commander Main Force ordered a full strength air
attack on an enemy force which had been reported in position Latitude
15°-20«N, Longitude 123°-40«E at 0853* (Contact »G", Plate XIII). By
1155, in accordance with this order, the attack group, consisting of
fifty-seven aircraft (thirty fighters, twenty fighter-bombers, five
attack and two reconnaissance) was airborne and forming up preparatory to
departure for the enemy which was "bearing 210°(T), distant 150-160
miles" (last reported at 1105 in position Latitude 15°-35fN, Longitude
124°-15'E (Contact "N")).**
Shortly after launching the attack group, the morning search was
recovered and the force operated generally to the westward awaiting return
of the attack group*
The Attack Group proceeded to the target area in two units. In
the vicinity of Latitude 15°-10'N, Longitude 123°-50«E, the FIRST Attack
Unit encountered enemy fighters. After the ensuing fight this unit,
apparently somewhat disorganised, searched for the enemy force but could
not find it due to low clouds and rain. Four of the thirty- two planes
in this unit returned to their carriers and the remainder proceeded to
bases in the northern Philippines.**
* 62ND Air Flotilla Aircraft Dispatch 240853 October 1944 to unknown
addressees, Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation,
October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
** Detailed Action Report Main Force, SHO No. 1 Operation, October
20th - 29th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
72 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM MAIN FORCE
October 24th
The SECOND Attack Unit of twenty-two planes (which had also been
engaged by enemy fighters*) found a hole in the clouds at 1350 and
sighted an enemy force consisting of two fleet carriers, two converted
carriers and several other units. A "successful surprise attack" was
made and the attack unit proceeded to bases in the Philippines.** This
attack was on TG 38.3 which reported that the LEXINGTON, LANGLEY and
ESSEX all experienced near misses but no hits. Two planes were shot down
over the force.*
Although four planes returned to their carriers they had little
to report for the ISE states in her report that the results of the attack
were unknown until October 29th,*** and Commander Main Force, in his
dispatch action report at the end of the day, reported the results of the
attack unknown.**** However, in his summary of losses (written later) he
states that a total of about fourteen planes from the Attack Units were
lost although exact figures were not available.**
At 1439, having no information as to the results of the air
attack and as his force was still apparently undiscovered, Commander Main
Force ordered the Advance Guard (BB/XCV's HYUGA and ISE, DD»s HATSUZUKI,
AKITSUKI, WAKATSUKI and SHIMOTSUKI) detached to proceed southward to
"grasp a favorable opportunity to attack and destroy enemy reninants" .*****
At 1635 an enemy carrier plane was sighted about the force and
the planes radioed contact report was intercepted as was the acknowledge-
ment.** As a result Commander Main Force knew that at last his carriers
had been discovered and at 1650 so advised his superiors and other
interested commanders.******
•JBttJ-**
■SHHBHHt-
War Diary CTG 38.3, October 24th, 1944.
Detailed Action Report Main Force, SHO No. 1 Operation, October
20th - 29th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
Detailed Action Report ISE, SHO No. 1 Operation, October 25th,
1944, WDC Document 161006, NA 12604.
Commander Main Force Dispatch 250014 October 1944 to Main Force
Action Report Addressees (General Action Report No. l), Detailed
Action Report Main Force, SHO No. 1 Operation, October 20th - 29th,
1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
Ibid., Commander Main Force Dispatch 241439 October 1944 (Main
Force SigDesOpOrd No. 2) to CinC Combined Fleet, All Fleet and
Squadron Commanders Main Force, info Imperial GHQ (Navy Section)etc.
Ibid., Commander Main Force Dispatch 241650 October 1944 to other
interested commanders.
73
CONFIDENTIAL
COM MAIN FORCE and
COM EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1830 the Main Force carriers were recovering the last of the
CAP aircraft in the vicinity of Latitude 18°-50«N, Longitude 125°-25«E.*
The Advance Guard at this time was some ninsty-five miles to the southeast
in the vicinity of Latitude 17°-15'N, Longitude 126°-00 » E, «* operating
with the intention of attacking the enemy at moonset (2400).***
(3) Operations of Commander Expeditionary Force, 0000 - 1330,
October 24th.
During this day some of the twelve submarines ordered to stations
east of the Philippines arrived on station while the remainder, with the
exception of the RO-109, were expected to arrive October 25th.
Commander Expeditionary Force received during the day, the major
contacts which were received by the other commanders. Apparently because
these contacts indicated the enemy was operating closer to the coast than
had been anticipated, he ordered his submarines redisposed to positions
in the seas "extending from the east coast of Samar to the area east of
the Surigao Strait and approximately sixty nautical miles off the coast"
(Plate0XIV). This redisposition was expected to be compiled by noon,
October 25th.****
During the day there were apparently no contacts made by his
submarines nor were they contacted by the Allies.
* Appended Track Chart, Detailed Action Report ZUIKAKU, SHO No. 1
Operation, October 20th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161008.
** Appended Track Chart, Detailed Action Report ISE, SHO No. 1 Operation,
October 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161006, NA 12604.
*** Detailed Action Report COMCARDIV 4 (Commander Advance Guard), SHO
No. 1 Operation, October 24th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161006,
NA 12604.
**** Submarine Operations in the THIRD Phase Operation, Part IV, September
1944 - February 1945, Japanese Monograph No. 184, compiled by the 2ND
Historical Records Section of the Repatriation Relief Bureau of the
Welfare Ministry, June 1954»
74 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
125"
DISPOSITION OF JAPANESE FIRST SUBMARINE
GROUP
AS ORDERED BY COMMANDER EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,
OCTOBER 24th, 1944
DISPOSITION EFFECTIVE 1200, OCTOBER 25th, 1944
JAPANESE SUBMARINE OPERATIONS, PART IV, JAPANESE MONOGRAPH 184 ~
I5<
IP? /
N°
ST**
JT
RO-
46
RO-
43
1-53
CONFIDENTIAL
COM SW AREA FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
(4) Operations of Commander SW Area Force, OOOO - 1330, October 24th.
Commander SW Area Force, as senior air commander in the
Philippines, watched with interest the unfolding situation. As he was in
Manila, as were Commanders FIFTH and SIXTH Base Air Forces, it seems
probable that he received generally the same reports as did these
commanders.
At 0212 he passed on to interested commanders the 0050 contact on
the enemy "task force" and warned of the likelihood of an air attack on
Luzon and the waters west of Luzon * (Contact "A", Plate XIII).
During the morning he received reports that (a) the AOBA, which
had been torpedoed the day before and had been towed into Manila Bay by
the KINU, was leaking badly and that boats with pumps were required,**
(b) DESDIV TWENTY-ONE had been attacked by aircraft off the west coast of
Panay and the destroyer WAKABA had been sunk,*** (c) the THIRD Section
had repulsed an air attack, suffering only minor damage to the FUSO,****
(d) the Main Body had been attacked by carrier aircraft and (e) in the
above attack the MYOKO had been damaged and ordered to proceed to
Brunei Bay.*****
In this latter report Commander SW Area Force was requested to
arrange an escort for the MYOKO but at 1410 (when it was received by
COMDESRON TEN) he received a dispatch from Commander Main Body which
ordered the NAGANAMI to leave the TAKAO and proceed to the assistance of
the MYOKO,****** so he apparently sent no additional escorts.
During the day, being in close contact with his two base air
force commanders, he knew of the various contacts made as well as the
results of friendly air attacks.
* CofS SW Area Force Dispatch 240212 to SW Area Force Situation Report
Addressees, Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation,
October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
** AOBA Dispatch 240850 October 1944 to CofS SW Area Force, Detailed
Action Report No. 6 AOBA, Antisubmarine Action West of Philippines,
October 23rd, 1944, WDC Document 161747.
*** HATSUHARU Dispatch 240900 October 1944 to Commanders DESRON 1, 2ND
Striking Force, SW Area Force, Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO
No. 1 Operation, October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005,
NA 11744.
**** Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 241105 October 1944, addressees
unknown, Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations,
October 16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
***** Commander 1ST Striking Force (Commander Main Body) Dispatch 241135
October 1944 to 1ST Striking Force Battle Report Addressees,
Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation, October
13th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
«-**#*-* Commander 1ST Striking Force (Commander Main Body) Dispatch 241316
October 1944 (1ST Striking Force DesOpOrd No. 58) to NAGANAMI, info
MYOKO, TAKAO, etc., Detailed Action Report No. 13, DESRON 10, SHO
Operation, October 17th - 31st, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
75 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SW AREA FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
Sometime during the afternoon he received a dispatch from
Commander Main Body which stated that the Main Body was being subjected
to repeated enemy carrier-based attacks and pointedly asked what "contacts
and attacks" had been made on the enemy.* At 1610 Commander SW Area Force
released a dispatch in reply which stated, "the enemy aircraft attacking
the FIRST Striking Force (Main Body) are believed to be from a carrier
group at Latitude 13°-45'N, Longitude 125°-25,E (Contact "J", Plate XIII ).
The SIXTH Base Air Force is scheduled to make a dusk attack against this
enemy".** This carrier group was TG 33.2 which had not yet been attacked
and was in fact the source of the majority of the attacks on the Main Body.
At about 1626 he received a message from the destroyer NAGANAMI.
She had discovered the DARTER which had run aground the night of October
23rd - 24th. The NAGANAMI reported shelling the DARTER for three minutes
and even attempting to pull it off the shoal but it was too high aground.
She stated that she left the DARTER afire and would report later concerning
documents and other items recovered.*** It is interesting to recall that
the crew of the DARTER and the DACE had also done their best to sink the
DARTER.
By 1830 Commander SW Area Force had received word that the second
phase of the air attack which took off at 1400 had scored one hit on a
WASP class carrier.**** He knew that dusk attacks were scheduled and he
awaited the results of this attack with interest.
(a) Operations of Commander Guard Force, 0000 - 1830, October 24th.
During the day Commander Guard Force (COMCRUDIV SIXTEEN), who
was now operating directly under the command of Commander SW Area Force,
continued his troop transport operation.
At 0556 he released his orders for the first operation. In
accordance with SW Area Force DesOpOrd No. 684 he provided for:
(1) the organization (Unit designation — ships — commander)
(a) Main Body—KINU, URANAMI— direct command (of COMCRUDIV
SIXTEEN)
* Commander 1ST Striking Force (Commander Main 3ody) Dispatch 241315
October 1944 to Commanders Main Force, SW Area Force, etc., Detailed
Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation, October 18th - 28th,
1944, WDC" Document 161005, NA 11744.
** Commander SW Area Force Dispatch 241610 October 1944 to Commander
1ST Striking Force, Detailed Action Report No. 3, YAMATO, SHO No. 1
Antiair and Surface Actions, October 17th - 28th, 1944, '.'.DC
Document 161639.
*** NAGANAMI Dispatch 241556 October 1944 to TAKAO, Commander SW Area
Force, Detailed Action Report TAKAO, October 23rd - 25th, 1944,
WDC Document 160141, NA 11839.
**** Commander 6TH Base Air Force Dispatch 241804 October 1944 to
Commanders SW Area Force, 5TH and 6TH Base Air Force Battle Report
Addressees, 6TH Base Air Force Battle Report No. 3, Detailed Action
Report No. 13, DESRON 10, SHO Operations, October 17th - 31st, 1944,
WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
76 CONFIDENTIAL
COM GUARD FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
(b) FIRST Transport Unit — Transports 6, 9, 10— Senior
Ship Captain
(c) SECOND Transport Unit—Transports 101, 102— Senior
Ship Captain
(2) Troop Loading Allocation— KINU 500, URANAMI 150,
Transport Unit 400 per ship
(3) Landing point — Ormoc, Leyte
(4) Route— Via Bohol Strait and north side of Camotes Island
to Ormoc
(5) Schedule — Ships to reach Ormoc at 0400 October 26th after
departing Cagayan on October 25th: The Main Body at 1500 (two hours
after arrival), FIRST Transport Unit at 0630, SECOND Transport Unit at
0530
(6) Anchorage assignments at Ormoc
(7) The use of all ships boats for the rapid disembarkation
of troops upon anchoring.*
At 0630 Commander Guard Force, with the KINU and URANAMI,
sortied from Manila Bay** en route to Cagayan.
At 0700, just after clearing the harbor entrance he was
attacked by aircraft in three waves continuing until 1000.** During this
attack which was conducted by search and fighter sweep aircraft from TG
38.3, the URANAMI received many strafing and rocket hits which punctured
her fuel oil tanks reducing the cruising range by one half.***
By 1700 he had decided to allow the URANAMI to lay to in order
to repair the holed tanks and at 1800 off the west coast of Semirara
Island (southern tip of Mindoro) the operation commenced. The KINU
screened while the URANAMI lay dead in the water.***
* Commander Guard Force Dispatch 240556 October 1944 (Guard Force
DesOpOrd No. 13) to Commander 2ND Striking Force, KINU, URANAMI,
Transports 6, 9, 10, 101, 102, etc., Detailed Action Report CRUDIV
16, SHO Operation, October 17th - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161005,
NA 11744.
** Detailed Action Report CRUDIV 16, SHO Operation, October 17th - 27th,
1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
*** Detailed Action Report URANAMI, SHO No. 1 Operation, October
18th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161717, NA 11801.
77 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
(b) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force, OOOO - 1830,
October 24th.
At approximately 0200 Commander SECOND Striking Force, having
completed the refueling in Culion Anchorage, departed the anchorage* on a
course of approximately 193°(T) and when well clear of the area he
increased speed to twenty knots, assumed No. One Alert Cruising Disposition
and commenced zigzagging. At 0409 he changed course to approximately
167° (T) and continued toward Point "A", his planned noon position.
At about 0830 Commander SECOND Striking Force learned that the
three destroyers of DESDIV TWENTY-ONE, en route south from Manila to rejoin
him during the day had been attacked by carrier aircraft east of Maniguin
Island Light (off northwest coast of Panay) and that the WAKABA had
sustained one direct hit and was unnavigable.** Shortly thereafter further
information was received that (a) at 0900 the WAKABA had sunk, (b) the
division commander and the Commanding Officer WAKABA were safe and (c) the
HATSUHARU was acting as flagship.*** This attack was conducted by eight
VF and six VB which had been launched as a search- strike group at 0602
from the FRANKLIN of TG 38.4.****
At 0935 he notified his force of the areas designated by the
Army for ship bombardment as follows:
"1. Area centering on Dulag and extending 3.3 kms to the south.
"2. Enemy positions east of a line running from the coast 6.5
kms south of Tacloban to the coast 1 km west of Tacloban. As far as
possible the Army will endeavor to indicate the more important targets
within the areas defined above by air bombing •"*****
This dispatch is the same as one received by Commander THIRD
Section at 1400 on this day from Commander SW Area Force. The difference
in time indicates that Commander SECOND Striking Force might have received
this information directly from the Army on Leyte.
By 1013 the force had progressed ahead of the planned schedule
and was in the vicinity of Point "A". At this time the course was changed
to approximately 108° (T), and the force proceeded toward Point "B", a
point at the entrance of the Mindanao Sea, which was to be passed at 2000.
* War Diary DESDIV 7 (USHIO), October 1944, WDC Document 161717,
NA 11801; also War Diary ABUKUMA, October 1944, WDC Document 161636,
NA 11973.
** HATSUHARU Dispatch 240800 October 1944 to Commander 2ND Striking
Force, etc., Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation,
October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
*** Ibid., HATSUHARU Dispatch 240900 October 1944 to Commander 2ND
Striking Force, SW Area Force, DESRON 1.
**** Action Report CTG 38.4, Operations in Support of the Occupation of
Leyte and Against the Japanese Fleet, October 22nd - 31st, 1944,
Serial 00267, November 18th, 1944.
***** Commander 2ND Striking Force Visual Dispatch 240935 October 1944 to
2ND Striking Force, Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off the
Philippines, October 24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
78 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1110 he informed his force that five B-24's had been
sighted over Davao at 0952 heading northwest and that there was a strong
possibility of air attack about 1200, He directed the force to enforce
No. TWO Antiaircraft Alert from 1130 and be ready for 26 knots immediately.*
At 1140 he issued his Signal Order No. 145 to his force as
follows:
"1. It is highly probable that enemy submarines are lying in
wait at the western entrance of the Mindanao Sea (Area No. 1) and at the
entrance of Surigao Strait (Area No. 2),
M2. In Area No. 1, the Fleet will cruise in No. 1 Alert
Formation, and in Area No. 2 it will assume No, 3 Approach Formation.
During the penetration (into the strait) two destroyers will fire depth
charges.**
"3. COMDESRON 1 will designate the destroyers to drop depth
charges and will decide their disposition. He will report his decisions
to this command."***
At 1155 a Morotai search plane sighted the force and reported
it quite accurately.**** The plane, however, was not detected by the force
and Commander SECOND Striking Force continued his advance thinking his
force was still undiscovered.*****
At about 1241 he learned that (a) the two remaining destroyers
of DESDIV TWENTY-ONE were again under attack by enemy carrier planes,
(b) one enemy plane had been shot down and (c) the 1211 position was
Latitude 19°-30»N, Longitude 121°-20'E. ****** It was obvious that the
latitude was in error and was likely 11°-30,N. If such were the case it
would be logical as it was twenty-eight miles to the southwest of the
* Commander 2ND Striking Force Visual Dispatch 24H10 October 1944 to
2ND Striking Force, War Diary ABUKUMA, October 1944, WDC Document
161636, NA 11973.
** Plate XX.
*** Commander 2ND Striking Force Visual Dispatch 241110 October 1944
(2ND Striking Force SigOrd No. 145) to 2ND Striking Force, Detailed
Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off the Philippines, October 24th -
26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
**** 5TH Bomber Command Dispatch 240100 (sic) October 1944 to All Commands
this Circuit.
***** Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation, SW Area
Operations, Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-IJN, 2ND Striking Force Staff
Torpedo Officer, GHQ FEC Special Historical Collection, Supporting
Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Historical
Report on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (item 22,
Footlocker 5 of 10, SWA Series, Volume II) •
****** HATSUHARU Dispatch 241211 to Commanders 6TH Base Air Force, 2ND
Striking Force, Main Force, etc., Detailed Action Report DESDIV 21,
SHO No. 1 Operation, Antiair Action South of Mindoro, October 24th,
1944, WDC Document 161717, NA 11801.
79 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRI- TORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
last reported position. The planes conducting the attack were the planes
of the FRANKLIN'S strike Able which were launched at 0948 to follow up
the attack of the search-strike group. The claim of one plane shot down
is correct as one SB2C failed to return and was reported to have crashed
near the target.*
By 1400 Commander SECOND Striking Force had likely received,
among other reports, (a) the 0600 reconnaissance report of Leyte Gulf
(Contact "D", plate XIII), (b) the 0650 Leyte Gulf report of the MOGAMI
search plane (Contact "E")(both of these reports have been quoted in full
earlier in this narrative under the "Operations of Commander THIRD Section,
0000 - 1830, October 24th") and (c) that the Main Body had been heavily
attacked by carrier planes during the day and that (1) the MYOKO had been
damaged and retired (2) the MUSASHI had been damaged.
At 1445 COMDSSDIV TWENTY-ONE, with the HATSUHARU and the
HATSUSHLMO, changed course to 000°(T) and headed for Manila.** He failed,
however, to inform Commander SECOND Striking Force (or anyone else) with
the result that as late as 0101 the next morning Commander SECOND Striking
Force was expecting him to rejoin. This expectation is shown by the
commander's making him an action addressee in his dispatch giving his
planned schedule of sweeping Leyte Gulf and departing through the southern
entrance to Surigao Strait at 0900.***
Probably at 1447 (when received by Commander FIRST Striking
Force) Commander SECOND Striking Force received the 1400 position report
of the THIRD Section.**** This was of interest to him as it was his
responsibility to coordinate his movements with the THIRD Section. As he
knew that the Main Body had been delayed by the air attacks and as the
THIRD Section had not been ordered to slow down he decided that in order
to "effect close liaison with the THIRD Section" to "move up the time of
passage through the Surigao Strait" to 0500.***** He therefore, at about
1452, increased speed to twenty knots.
* Action Report FRANKLIN, Operation against the Enemy in the
Philippine Islands and in the Philippine Sea, October 22nd - 31st,
1944, Serial 0041, November 4th, 1944.
** Detailed Action Report DESDIV 21, SHO No. 1 Operation, Antiair
Action South of Mindoro, October 24th, 1944, WDC Document 161717,
NA 11301.
*** Ibid., Commander 2ND Striking Force Dispatch 250101 October 1944 to
Commander SW Area Force, COKDESDIV 21, 2ND Striking Force, info all
SHC Force Commanders.
**** Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 241410 October 1944 to Commanders 1ST
and 2ND Striking Force, Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force,
SHO Operations, October 16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641,
NA 11839.
***** Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation, SW Area
Operations, Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-IJN, 2ND Striking Force Staff
Torpedo Officer, GHQ FSC Special Historical Collection, Supporting
Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Historical
Report on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (Item 22,
Footlocker 5 of 10, SWPA Series, Volume II).
80 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At about 1726 he received a message stating that the KINU
and URANAMI had repulsed three air attacks between 0730 and 1000 near
the entrance to Manila Bay, claiming five aircraft shot down, with 72
killed and wounded in the two ships. While KINU had no significant
damage the URANAMI had her fuel tanks holed by machine gun bullets and
had lost about 200 tons of fuel,* This report of five aircraft shot down
is in error for CTG 38.3 reports only one plane failed to return from the
morning fighter sweep »**
By 1745 Commander SECOND Striking Force had received more
reports on the actions of the Main Body and knew that (a) the MUSASHI had
been hit by five torpedoes and had been ordered to return to Coron Bay,
and (b) at 1600 Commander FIRST Striking Force had reported that because
of the air attacks, he was temporarily retiring. As no orders had been
issued delaying the THIRD Section, Commander SECOND Striking Force again
decided that it was necessary to further close the distance between the
two forces and therefore increased speed to twenty-two knots and issued
his Signal Order No. 147 (which were actually night intentions) as follows:
"Unless special orders are issued today or tomorrow, the Fleet
will, without orders, operate as outlined below and will penetrate
Surigao Strait at 0300 tomorrow.
"1. Course at X-hour will be 80°, at Y-hour 60°. At 0230 speed
will be increased to 26 knots and at Z-hour to 28 knots.
"2. Estimated X, Y and Z-hours are 1925, 2205 and 0245
respectively.
"3. At 0200 the Fleet will stop zigzagging and will assume No.
4 approach formation.
"4. At X-hour and 5 minutes after changing course at X-hour
(sic) the Fleet will resume zigzagging.
"5. After 0230 the Fleet will be ready to make 28 knots
immediately and maximum battle speed on 15 minutes notice. After 0400 the
Fleet will be ready to make maximum battle speed immediately."***
No. FOUR Approach Formation is shown in Plate XX.
* Commander Guard Force Dispatch 241656 October 1944 (Guard Force
General Battle Report No. 1) to Commander SW Area Force, info CinC
Combined Fleet, Commander 2ND Striking Force, AOBA.
** War Diary CTG 38.3, October 1944.
*** Commander 2ND Striking Force Visual Dispatch 241745 October 1944
(2ND Striking Force SigOrd No. 147) to 2ND Striking Force, Detailed
Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off the Philippines, October 24th -
26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
81 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
and COM SIXTH BASE AIR FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
In his postwar statement the staff torpedo officer stated
that, "though it was our desire to shorten even more the time difference,
it was impossible from the standpoint of fuel".*
Fuel was undoubtedly a major concern of Commander SECOND
Striking Force in formulating this plan but it seems likely there were
other factors which influenced his decision to an even greater extent.
These appear to have been: (a) It seems logical that Commander THIRD
Section would be ordered to delay his penetration in which case he could
be closed at will and (b) the command organization which ordered him to
operate "in support of" the FIRST Striking Force but did not place him
under the command of Commander FIRST Striking Force seems to have been an
ever present consideration which influenced him to keep such a distance
that the SECOND Striking Force would be independent.
At approximately 1819 the force changed course to 090° (T)
and continued into the Mindanao Sea at twenty-two knots.
At 1830 the SECOND Striking Force was in position Latitude
08°-55'N, Longitude 122°-54'E.
(c) Operations of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force, 0000 - 1830,
October 24th.
October 24th was a day of utmost importance to the Japanese
air forces for this was the day of maximum effort during which it was
hoped to destroy the Allied task force carriers** and to annihilate
enemy shipping in and around Leyte Gulf.***
The air activities of this day commenced at 0050 when a 901st
Air Group patrol plane of the SIXTH Base Air Force made radar contact and
reported "a large enemy force" in position Latitude 14°-35'N, Longitude
125°-15»E**** (Contact "A", Plate XIII). This contact was on TG 38.3 and
the position some ten miles to the south. Commander SIXTH Base Air Force
almost immediately ordered the opening of the general offensive.
* Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation, Southwest Area
Operations, Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-IJN, 2ND Striking Force Staff
Torpedo Officer, GHQ FEC Special Historical Collection Supporting
Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur1 s Historical
Report on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (Item 22,
Footlocker 5 of 10, SWPA Series, Volume II).
** CofS Combined Fleet Dispatch 231710 October 1944 (addressees unknown),
Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October
16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839,
*** 4TH Air Army Operations Order A- $18, 1000 October 21st, 1944,
Documents from file of Lieutenant Colonel Katsuo Sato, I J A, Staff
Officer, 4TH Air Army, Department of Army Historical Division,
Microfilm HS-7.
**** Plane L-18 Dispatch 240050 October 1944 to Canacao Air 3ase, Detailed
Action Report 901ST Air Group, Night Searches, October 10th - 23th,
1944, WDC Document 160551, NA 12402.
82 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM SIXTH BASE AIR FORCE
October 24th
The FIRST Attack Group, which numbered about 158 planes*,
began taking off about 0700, formed up in three waves and proceeded to the
target area. At 0845 some of the force was intercepted by the Allied CAP
and the attack group was considerably scattered, some of the aircraft did
get through however. The THIRD Attack Unit, consisting of eleven attack
planes and eighteen fighters, encountered bad weather and did not make
contact with the enemy.** The results of this attack were reported as one
carrier hit by a 500 pound bomb and a cruiser moderately damaged and set
afire .***
By 11 A 5 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had information that
there were two carrier groups, (a) at 0853, Latitude 15°-20'N, Longitude
123°-40»E, four carriers and ten other ships**** (Contact "G") which an
0940 sighting amplified to four cariers and two special carriers in
Latitude 15°-15'N, Longitude 123°-25fE***, and (b) at 0900 in Latitude
15°-55'N, Longitude 123°-25'E, two carriers and ten cruisers*** (Contact
"H"). Actually all these contacts were on TG 38.3*
Shortly after noon Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received the
information from Commander Main Force that at 1145 he planned to launch a
full scale attack against the enemy task force. ***** Whether or not
Commander SIXTH Base Air Force received another dispatch which followed
shortly is not known. This second dispatch was sent to inform Commanders
FIFTH and SIXTH Base Air Forces that the Main Force Attack Group would
arrive at Nichols Field about 1600.******
•*#
■a-x-*
#*-»-«-
S-x-*tt*
iHBBHBJ-
The total of 158 aircraft (93 fighters and 65 attack) is derived
from a count of aircraft in the sources available to this analysis.
This figure is somewhat lower than a Japanese postwar monograph
which claimed 189 aircraft took part.
Detailed Action Report No. 2, 263RD Attack Unit (653 RD Air Group),
SHO Operation, October 22nd - November 25th, 1944, WDC Document
161004, NA 12605.
Commander Clark Air Base Dispatch 24H45 October 1944 to 5TH Base
Air Force Battle Report Addressees, Commander 6TH Base Air Force,
etc., Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations,
October 16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
62ND (sic) Air Flotilla Aircraft Dispatch 240853 October 1944 to
unknown addressees, Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1
Operation, October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005,
NA 11744.
Commander, Main Force Dispatch 24H38 October 1944 to All Fleet and
Squadron Commanders, CinC Combined Fleet, etc., Detailed Action
Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October 16th - 28th,
1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
Commander Main Force Dispatch 241151 to Commanders 5TH and 6TH
Base Air Forces, SW Area Force, Nichols Air Base, Detailed Action
Report Main Force, SHO No. 1 Operation, October 20th - 29th, 1944,
WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
83
CONFIDENTIAL
COM SIXTH BASE AIR FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
The SECOND Attack Group, consisting of twenty-five carrier
type bombers and eighteen carrier fighters, took off about 14.00 to
attack the carriers "east of Lamon Bay". This attack group encountered
bad weather and by 1530 had returned to base.*
Sometime just prior to 1521 he received a contact report on a
"large enemy force" including three carriers and three battleships sighted
at 0945 in position Latitude 13°-45'N, Longitude 125°-25'E, course 090°(T),
speed twenty-four knots** (Contact "J"). This was a contact on TG 38.2
although some thirty miles bearing 300 (T) from the actual position.
By 1530 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force had received several
of the battle reports from Commander Main Body as well as Commander Main
Body's 241315 in which he emphasized the urgency of his situation and
pointedly asked what attacks and contacts had been made by the air
units.*** In this connection it is interesting to note that in postwar
interrogation Commander SIXTH Base Air Force was asked about the air
protection for the FIRST Striking force, to which he replied, "-—although
there were repeated requests for such support (presumably CAP) from KURITA,
I turned a deaf ear to those requests and decided the best protection I
could give to KURITA1 s force would be to concentrate my entire air force
in attacking your task force which was waiting outside beyond the channel.
I did send a few fighters to protect the surface units and to scout for
submarines— ",**** The "few fighters" appear to have been two in
number, one of which was damaged during the afternoon while landing at
Batangas .*****
THIS ACUTE SHORTAGE OF AIRCRAFT WAS NOT DUE TO ANT FAULT OF
THE LOCAL COMMANDERS. DURING AND SINCE THE MARIANAS CAMPAIGN JAPANESE
LOSSES OF AIRCRAFT AND TRAINED PILOTS HAD BEEN GREATER THAN HER ABILITY
TO REPLACE THEM. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS AND THE
TRAINING OF MEN TO USE THEM MUST KEEP PACE WITH THE NEED FOR THOSE
WEAPONS AND MEN.
* Detailed Action Report 2ND Fighter Striking Unit, 304TH Fighter
Unit (203RD Air Group), Battle off the Philippines, October 21st -
29th, 1944, WDC Document 160517, NA 12309.
** Dispatch 241207 October 1944 (originator unknown) to Commander 6TH
Base Air Force, Detailed Action Report No. 3, YAMATO, SHO No. 1,
Antiair and Surface Actions, October 17th - 23th, 1944, WDC
Document 161639.
*** Commander 1ST Striking Force (Conniander Main Body) Dispatch 241315
October 1944 to Commanders Main Force and SW Area Force, info CinC
Combined Fleet, Commanders 5TH and 6TH Base Air Forces, Detailed
Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October 16th -
28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
**** USSBS Interrogations Nav No. 115, Interrogation of Japanese
Officials, Interrogation of Vice Admiral Shigeru FUKUDOME, ex-IJN,
Volume II, Page 504.
***** Detailed Action Report No. 2, 164TH and 165TH Fighter Units (653RD
Air Group), SHO Operation, October 23rd - November 15th, 1944,
WDC Document 161004, NA 12605.
84 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SIXTH BASE AIR FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
In reply to the request for information from Commander FIRST
Striking Force, Commander SW Area Force at 1610 dispatched the information
that it was his belief that the attacks on the FIRST Striking Force were
from the carrier group in position Latitude 13°-45fN, Longitude 125°-25'E
(Contact "J") and that the SIXTH Base Air Force was scheduled to make a
dusk attack against that force,*
This dusk attack group, which consisted of three carrier type
attack aircraft employed as a search unit and six carrier type attack
aircraft with eighteen fighters as escort, commenced taking off about
1621, The search unit took off separately and proceeded independently to
contact the enemy. Plane number TWO of this unit sighted TG 38.3 about
1720 but because of radio failure did not report until his return. This
plane was present at 1750 when the PRINCETON sank and included the sinking
of a carrier in his report.** The main strength of the attack group,
however, failed to find the enemy and returned. ***
By 1830 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force knew that his attacks
of the day had been largely ineffective. In summary reports issued later
he listed the results as follows:
(a) Two large carriers damaged****
(b) One battleship and one cruiser moderately damaged and set
afire****
(c) Sixty-seven Japanese aircraft failed to return.*****
Actually the light carrier PRINCETON was sunk. The
light cruiser BIRMINGHAM and three destroyers were damaged in attempting
to assist the PRINCETON .******
* Commander SW Area Force Dispatch 241610 October 1944 to Commander
1ST Striking Force, Detailed Action Report No. 3, YAMATO, SHO
No. 1 Operation, Antiair and Surface Action, October 17th - 28th,
1944, WDC Document 161639.
** Detailed Action Report No. 2, 263 RD Attack Unit (653RD Air Group)
SHO Operation, October 22nd - November 25th, 1944, WDC Document
161004, NA 12605.
*** War Diary 653RD Air Group, October 1944, WDC Document 160295,
NA 12535.
**** Commander 6TH Base Air Force Dispatch 242244 October 1944 to
Commanders 2ND Striking Force, 3RD Section, 6TH Base Air Force
Battle Report Addressees, Detailed Action Report No. 3, YAMATO,
SHO No. 1 Operation, Antiair and Surface Actions, October 17th -
28th, 1944, WDC Document 161639.
***** Commander 6TH Base Air Force Dispatch 250851 October 1944 to 6TH
Base Air Force Battle Report Addressees, Detailed Action Report
No. 13, DESRON 10, SHO Operations, October 17th - 31st, 1944,
WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
****** Action Report TG 38.3, Battle of the Philippines, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0090, December 2nd, 1944.
4,6799 o - 59 - 15 85 CONFIDENTIAL
COM FIFTH BASE AIR FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
(d) Operations of Commander FIFTH Base Air Force, 0000 - 1830,
October 24th.
Commander FIFTH Base Air Force who was in his Manila
headquarters had essentially the same information as Commander SIXTH Base
Air Force. He was primarily interested in the operations of his Special
Attack (Kamikaze) Units as much depended upon their success. As will be
recalled his units had been dispersed and he now had them placed as
follows:
(a) The SHIKISHIMA Unit at Clark (Mabalacat)
(b) The YAMATO Unit at Cebu
(c) The ASAHI and YAMAZAKURA Units at Davao No. 1
(d) The KIKUSUI Unit at Cagayan
These units, perhaps because of a lack of enemy information,
were strangely inactive during the day. The KIKUSUI Unit moved up to
Davao No. 1 and two single search-attack planes were launched by the
units at that field — one failed to return,* A postwar account states
that both the Mabalacat Unit and the Cebu Unit sortied during the day
but failed to locate the enemy and returned.** Although official records
available are silent on this matter, it seems likely that the account is
accurate.
There were no successes during the day however and Commander
FIFTH Base Air Force, though likely disappointed, poised his units for
full operations and better results on the following day.
Information as to his receipts and losses of aircraft on
this day are missing but it is likely that he continued to operate
approximately twenty- four aircraft.
* War Diary 61ST Air Flotilla, October 1944, WDC Document 161643,
NA 12260.
** Roger Pineau, "Kamikaze", based on the Japanese book KAMAKAZS
TOKUBETSU KOGSKITAI by Captain Nakajima and Commander Inoguchi.
66 CONFIDENTIAL
C.G. FOURTH AIR ARMY
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
(B) Operations of C.G. FOURTH Air Amy, OOOO - 1830, October 24th.
For the FOURTH Air Army this was the day of the all-out offensive
against the enemy shipping in and around Leyte Gulf.
Shortly after sunrise the first attack group commenced taking off and
when formed up proceeded to Leyte Gulf. The Japanese records concerning
the FOURTH Air Army activities on this day are sketchy and there is some
disagreement as to the actual number of planes involved. As noted
previously under "Operations of C.G. FOURTH Air Army, 1042 - 2400, October
23rdM, a staff officer reported after the war that 128 planes were
operational for the attacks on this morning.* As the initial attack was
scheduled to be composed of all operational aircraft it would seem that
the first attack consisted of that number. In a recently discovered
dispatch however the SECOND Air Division reported the "first wave"
consisted of eighty planes.** This group was intercepted between 0750
and 0825 by the Target CAP of TG 77.4. Allied sources reported the attack
to number forty-eight planes of which fifteen to twenty were shot down.***
The Japanese accounts do not record the results of this attack but the
Allies reported that the LEUTZE (DD) was strafed and damaged,**** the
THOMAS (liberty ship) was damaged,***** the SONOMA (ATA) was bombed and
sunk ,-jhbhhb!- the LCI 65 severely damaged after shooting down a plane which
crashed on her f ant ail, ****** and the LCI 1065 was struck by a plane which
employed Kamikaze tactics and sunk.*******
The second attack was scheduled to take off at 1100 - 1120 and
according to the above mentioned SECOND Air Division dispatch was composed
of thirty-eight planes. This corresponds closely to the Allied report
that the second attack commenced at 1120 and was composed of about forty
planes.*** This attack was unsuccessful.
The third attack is recorded as consisting of twenty-nine aircraft,**
but the time of take-off is unknown. Allied sources record only the two
major attacks of the day and it is probable that these planes attacked
in small groups.
* Documents from the file of Lieutenant Colonel Katsuo Sato, ex-IJA
Staff Officer, 4TH Air Army, Department of the Army Historical
Division Microfilm HS-7.
** 2ND Air Division Dispatch dated October 25th, 1944, ADVATIS
Bulletin No. 170.
*** CTF 77 Dispatch 241057 October 1944 to CINCSWPA, info COMINCH,
CINCPAC, etc.
**** LEUTZE TBS Voice Radio Message 232331 October 1944 to CTF 79.
***** CTF 78 Dispatch 240016 October 1944 to CTF 77; also Action Report
BEALE, Assault and Bombardment of Leyte Island, Philippines,
Serial 0236, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
****** Action Report CTG 78.2, Leyte Operation, Serial 0085, November
29th, 1944.
******* CTF 78 Dispatch 232400 October 1944 to CTF 77.
87 CONFIDENTIAL
C.G. FOURTH AIR ARMY
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
The Japanese Army records indicate 147 sorties were flown on this
day and as a result of the attacks claim (a) one cruiser and one landing
craft sunk, (b) five transports set afire, (c) two cruisers damaged.
FOURTH Air Army plane losses were recorded as forty-seven,*
At the close of his operations for this day he had, including
replacements, 137 operational aircraft.*
Daily Record of the War Situation, 4TH Air Army, GHQ FSC Special
Historical Collection, Supporting Documents to General of the Army
Douglas MacArthur's Historical Report on Allied Operations in the
Southwest Pacific Area (item 4, Footlocker 10 of 10, SWPA Serias,
Volume II).
88 CONFIDENTIAL
COMSOWESPAC
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
CHAPTER IV - ALLIED OPERATIONS, OOOO - 1830, October 24th
(A) Operations of COMSOWESPAC, COCO - 1830, October 24th.
COMSOWESPAC in the NASHVILLE, with the flagship group, continued on
his night retirement in the eastern portion of Leyte Gulf.*
At 0018 and 0019 respectively he received intelligence summaries from
SEVENTH Fleet and his own headquarters.** In studying these summaries he
likely became aware that the Japanese reaction to the Allied landings was
building into something greater than originally anticipated.
It seems likely that during the next few hours he received the BREAMS
report about torpedoing a cruiser*** (AOBA of CRUDIV SIXTEEN) (Contact "1",
Plate XV), the ANGLER'S report of four large plus escorts off Mindoro
Island**** (Contact "2") and the GUITARRO's report on the Main Body giving
its main composition of three battleships and two probable carriers*****
(Contact "4").
He returned to San Pedro Bay and anchored at 0806 in the vicinity of
RED Beach.*
He and CAAF SOWESPAC apparently became quite engrossed in the air
battle in progress. It seems that three Japanese aircraft dove toward
the NASHVILLE but were all destroyed, one by the TCAP, another by ship's
antiaircraft fire and a third by crashing into the water near the
NASHVILLE.****** This account by CAAF SOWESPAC is not related in the
NASHVILLE'S War Diary.*
During the afternoon he was requested by CTF 77 to move his headquarters
from the NASHVILLE in order to release the NASHVILLE for impending night
action. However, he did not desire to do so, but preferred to remain on
board regardless of the ship's employment.* As it developed the NASHVILLE
was not assigned to CTG 77 »2 in the Battle of Surigao Strait which occurred
early the following morning.
During the day whenever enemy air attacks were expected the NASHVILLE
got underway to avoid and then reanchored.*
Also during the day, realizing the developing situation in the area of
Palawan Strait and Coron Bay he followed the operations of CTF 77 and
COMTHIRDFLT with interest. He therefore was fully familiar with several
* War Diary NASHVILLE, October 24th, 1944.
** C0M7THFLT Dispatch 230309 October 1944 to All Interested in
C0M7THFLT Intelligence Summary; also GHQ SWPA Dispatch 231256
October 1944 to COMSOWESPAC, C.G. 6TH Army.
*** BREAM Dispatch 231231 October 1944 to CTF 71.
**** CTF 71 Dispatch 231451 October 1944 to CINCPAC, COMSUBPAC,
C0M3RDFLT.
***** GUITARRO Dispatch 231900 October 1944 to CTF 71.
****** George C. Kenney, "General Kenney Reports", (New York, 1949),
Pages 453 and 454*
89 CONFIDENTIAL
COMSOWESPAC and
COMSEVENTHFLT
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
contacts made by the search aircraft and with CTF 77' s instructions
regarding prospective night battle and that commander's estimates of
enemy surface strength, Hewas also generally familiar with the operations
of TF 38 carriers and the battle with the Main Body in the Sibuyan Sea.
Since these matters are discussed more fully under "Operations of CTF 77,
0000 - 1830, October 24th", they will not be further discussed here.
At 2120 he received his headquarter' s recommendation as regards the
kind of reply that should be made to COMTHIRDFLT «s 210645 which has been
covered elsewhere, wherein he was asked when the situation in Leyte would
permit release of COMTHIRDFLT from his covering role. His headquarters
suggested that, in view of the danger of possible enemy attack from the
northeast, COMTHIRDFLT forces should remain in the area until medium
bombers could be installed on Leyte which was estimated to be D plus 15
day.* However, since he had already replied to COMTHIRDFLT and had stated
his position quite strongly to the effect that he considered COMTHIRDFLT 's
mission to cover the operation to be essential and paramount,** he did
nothing further at this time. This matter is discussed in Volume III
under "Operations of .COMSOWESPAC, October 21st".***
(1) Operations of Commander SEVENTH Fleet, 0000 - 1830, October 24th.
COMSEVENTHFLT took no unusual action this day as COMSEVENTHFLT
nor in his capacity as CANF SOWESPAC insofar as the Leyte operation was
concerned. His deputy commander continued administrative control from
his headquarters at Hollandia while he himself, as COMSEVENTHFLT and
CTF 77, continued operational control of SOWESPAC naval forces associated
with the Leyte operation from the WASATCH.
(a) Operations of CTF 77 (Central Philippines Attack Force),
0000 - 1830, October 24th.
At the beginning of the day CTF 77, embarked in the WASATCH,
continued his usual night retirement in the eastern portion of Leyte Gulf
generally north of the swept channel with his flagship group (TG 77.1)
consisting of the WASATCH, NASHVILLE (COMSOWESPAC embarked), AMMEN,
MULLANY, BUSH and ABNER READ.****
At 0018 he received his headquarters' intelligence summary.*****
In noting that this sunmary had been prepared prior to noon on the previous
day, and comparing it with other intelligence he had received during the
last twenty- four hours, he could see that it added little to what
information he had by other means. He also noted, however, that it went
* GHQ Hollandia Dispatch 230250 October 1944 to COMSOWESPAC and
NASHVILLE.
** COMSOWESPAC Dispatch 212240 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
*** Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92510), Naval War
College, 1957, Chapter III (A).
**** War Diary NASHVILLE, October 23rd, 1944o
***** C0M7THFLT Dispatch 230309 October 1944 to All Interested in
C0M7THFLT Intelligence Summary.
90 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
a step further than he had in sending out his dispatch 230142,* by
identifying the second Japanese surface force assumed to be in Palawan
Passage as a convoy. Although CTF 77 had also estimated two Japanese
surface forces to be in Palawan Passage, he had not specifically
designated them as being a convoy and its covering force. His
headquarters' estimate may have had the effect of somewhat complicating
his "Magnified Tokyo Express" concept by thus introducing a convoy.
At 0019, he received Headquarters, COMSOWESPAC Intelligence
Summary, which, among other things, estimated that the Japanese proposed
to stage two hundred aircraft to Luzon indicating a quickening air
offensive.**
It is likely (since COMTHIRDFLT received it at that time) that
at 0026 he intercepted a report from the BREAM to the effect that she had
(a) contacted two AOBA class cruisers (CAfs) and a large destroyer at 0430
October 23rd in Latitude 14°-05'N, Longitude 119°-40»E on course 070°(T),
speed nineteen knots (Contact "1", Plate XV), and (b) scored two hits in
one of the cruisers with two torpedoes,***
By comparing this contact with other more recent ones, he
could see that it was distinct from them. This added further support to
his estimate that a large number of enemy combatant ships were perhaps
forming in the Manila-Coron Bay area. The force attacked was CRUDIV
SIXTEEN, composed of three ships, AOBA (CA), KINU (CL), and URANAMI (DD).
As has been discussed in Volume III under "Operations of COMCRUDIV
SIXTEEN, 0000 - 1042, October 23rd", the AOBA was hit by one rather than
by two torpedoes. Shortly thereafter COMCRUDIV SIXTEEN proceeded toward
Manila with the KINU towing the AOBA at seven point five knots while the
URANAMI provided antisubmarine protection.
At 0032, he learned from CTF 71 that the ANGLER had, at 2130,
contacted an enemy task force of four large ships plus escorts in
Latitude 12°-40'N, Longitude 11S°-56'E on base course 050°(T), speed
eighteen knots**** (Contact "2").
Reviewing his preparations to insure the security of his
force he weighed possible courses of action to improve his local defenses
against enemy air attack. He had in mind the danger of possible carrier
strikes from west of Palawan, these to be augmented perhaps by land-based
air strikes. He had referred to both of these strikes in his 230142*****
* CTF 77 Dispatch 230142 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, C.G.'s 5TH and
13TH Air forces, infor All TFC's and TGC's 3RD and 7THFLT«s, CINCPAC,
COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, CAAF SOWESPAC.
** GHQ SWPA Dispatch 231256 October 1944 to COMSOWESPAC, C.G. 6TH Army,
WASATCH.
*** BREAM Dispatch 231231 October 1944 to CTF 71.
**** CTF 71 Dispatch 231451 October 1944 to CINCPAC, COMSUBPAC,
C0M3RDFLT, C0M7THFLT, All TFC's 3RD and 7THFLTS, C.G.'s 5TH and
13TH Air Forces, info COMINCH.
***** Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92510), Naval War
College, 1957, Chapter I (A)(1)(a).
91 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
wherein he had stated, among other things, (a) it is possible that enemy
carriers will support surface forces and strike from west of Palawan and
(b) there are indications of a concentration of a large number of enemy
aircraft in the Luzon area. At this time he may have considered asking
COMTHIRDFLT for assistance in connection with reinforcing the TCAP over
Leyte Gulf — CTG 38.4 was sufficiently close to accomplish this (Diagram
"C") — but probably for various reasons among which may have been (a) his
failure to obtain post D-day fighter sweeps from COMTHIRDFLT and (b) the
thought that TG 38.4, which was the nearest carrier group, might require
these fighters for its own defense, he did not do so.
At this point he seems to have arrived at the opinion that
air strikes emanating from carriers — the positions of which were unknown —
and from air fields — the precise ones to be used being also unknown —
required that he concentrate his limited fighter strength over Leyte Gulf
and his own carriers. This thought is supported by the fact that at 0122
he sent the following dispatch to CTG 77.4: "Possibility large enemy air
attack may be brewing. Until otherwise directed cancel western Visayas
strike. Increase target CAP to thirty-six fighters with additional
sixteen fighters in Condition ELEVEN (fighters capable of being launched
on ten minutes notice )"»*
THIS DECISION WAS SOUND FOR ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NO AIRCRAFT
CARRIERS OPERATING IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA WHICH WERE TO STRIKE ALLIED
FORCES AT LEYTE AS FORECAST BY CTF 77, THERE 'WERE IN FACT INCREASING
NUMBERS OF LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT BEING FLOWN INTO THE PHILIPPINES. THESE
REINFORCEMENTS WHICH FOR THE BASE AIR FORCES HAD ARRIVED LARGELY ON THE
22ND AND FOR THE FOURTH AIR ARMY LARGELY ON THE 22ND AND 23RD, WERE
SHCEDULED TO BE EMPLOYED THIS VERY DAY IN A MAXIMUM EFFORT AGAINST ALLIED
FORCES BOTH IN THE LEYTE AREA AND AT SEA EAST OF THE PHILIPPINES.
At 0220, he intercepted the GUITARRO's contact made at 0030
on the Main Body, FIRST Striking Force** (Contact "3"). The report showed
the force's composition to be probably three battleships, between fifteen
and twenty ships total in Latitude 13°-00'N, Longitude 119°-30,E on course
080° (T), speed eighteen knots. This report revealed a larger concentration
of ships than had heretofore been reported.
At 0240 he received a dispatch from CTG 38.4 that the latter
was launching four search and attack teams composed of eight fighters and
six dive bombers each, from Latitude 11°-30,N, Longitude 126°-30'E in
sectors between 230°(T) and 270° (T) to a distance of 325 miles.*** He
could see that this search would pass over the principal airfields in the
western Visayas.
* CTF 77 Dispatch 231532 October 1944 to CTG 77.4, info TG 77.4, TF 77,
CTG 77.13, TF 79, C0M3RDFLT.
** GUITARRO Dispatch 231610 October 1944 to Radio PERTH, info CINCPAC,
CTF 77, etc.
*** CTG 38.4 Dispatch 231009 October 1944 to CTF 77.
92 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 0425, he received his headquarters' report of several ship
sightings made on the 23rd, none of which were of a serious threatening
nature,* He had received this information earlier through other sources*
At 0443, he intercepted the GUITARRO1 s second report on the
Main Body, FIRST Striking Force** (Contact "4"). This report was very
illuminating for it stated that at 0330 (three hours after her first
contact) the Main Body consisted of three definite battleships and two
probable carriers heading south through Mindoro Strait. Why the Commanding
Officer GUITARRO estimated that there were two probable carriers in the
force is not known but it seems likely that is was the result of (a) CTF
77's dispatch 230142 mentioned previously and (b) the DACE's attack
report,*** both of which contained references to a carrier or carriers.
Whether or not CTF 77 thought that these were the only carriers
in the operation is not clear but it seems unlikely for the fighter
director destroyer BENNION in her war diary stated in part "Advance
intelligence reported a large attack (carrier-based) was forming up to the
northwest" .****
As he studied the GUITARRO' s contact, he realized if this were
so it modified his previous estimate of the situation,***** in that
aircraft carriers rather than operating from west of Palawan appeared to
be moving into the Sulu Sea from whence they could directly support
"Magnified Tokyo Express Runs".
It is likely that, in order to draw attention to this contact
and to the implications of the change in the tactical situation if in fact
enemy carriers along with the battleships were proceeding into the Sulu
Sea area, he advised COMTHIRDFLT and all TFC's and TGC's of the THIRD and
SEVENTH Fleets that the submarine GUITARRO had reported three battleships
and two possible carriers in Mindoro Strait at 0330 on the 24th«******
Commencing at about 0831 the anticipated air attack
developed.******* Reportedly eighty planes from the FOURTH Air Army
participated,******** and were heavily repulsed by the CAP and the guns
of the ships. However, the Allies did not escape entirely for (a) the
LEUTZE was strafed and damaged,******* (b) one XAK (THOMAS) was
* C0M7THFLT Dispatch 221213 October 1944 to All Interested Current
Operations SOWESPAC, C0M3RDFLT, CTF 38, CTG's 38.2 and 38.3«
** GUITARRO Dispatch 231900 October 1944 to CTF 71.
*** DACE Dispatch 231115 October 1944 to CTF 71.
**** War Diary BENNION, October 24th, 1944.
***** CTF 77 Dispatch 230142 October 1944 to COM3 RDFLT, etc.
****** CTF 77 Dispatch 232117 October 19A4 to C0M3RDFLT, All TFC's and
TGC's 3RD and 7THFLTS's.
******* LEUTZE TBS Voice Radio Message 232331 October 1944 to CTF 79.
******** 2ND Air Division Dispatch, October 25th, 1944, ADVATIS Bulletin
No. 170,
93 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
damaged,* (c) the ATA SONOMA was bombed and sunk,** (d) the LCI 6$ was
severely damaged after shooting down a plane which crashed on her fantail*
and (e) the LCI 1065 was struck and sunk by a plane which employed
Kamikaze tactics.*** The action continued with varying intensity until
about 0945.****
DESPITE THIS DAMAGE IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT CTF 77 WAS PLEASED
WITH THE RESULTS AS THEY INDICATED HIS ABILITY TO DEFEND HIS FORCES
AGAINST AIR ATTACK EVEN UNDER THE DIFFICULT CONDITIONS OF RADAR DETECTION
EXISTING IN THE WESTERN AREA OF THE GULF. THIS LATTER MATTER IS
DISCUSSED AT LENGTH IN VOLUME III UNDER "OPERATIONS OF CTF 77, OCTOBER
20TH" .*****
At 0920 he intercepted COMTHIRDFLT's dispatch directing CTG's
38.3 and 38.4 to concentrate at best speed on CTG 38.2 (which was off
San Bernardino Strait).******
Possibly at 0943 (when it was received by COMTHIRDFLT) he
received a contact report relayed at 0910 by the PB4Y in Sector TWO of
Search Plan FOX (Contact "10"). The pilot stated that he had intercepted
a VHF transmission. He reported (a) two enemy battleships, two cruisers
and four destroyers in Latitude 08°-50'N, Longitude 122°-05'E on course
030°(T), speed twenty knots, and (b) six miles south of the first force
two battleships, two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers and six destroyers
under attack by a carrier group.*******
As will be shown later, this report seems to have heavily
influenced both CTF 77!s and CTG 77.2* s estimate of enemy forces
approaching Leyte from the southwest.
It was, however, quite inaccurate in that there were in fact
but two battleships, one heavy cruiser and four destroyers in the Japanese
THIRD Section.
Why two groups rather than one were reported cannot be fully
explained. One reasonable explanation is given under "Operations of CTF 73
(Naval Air Force) and CTG 73.4 (Search and Support Group), 0000 - 1830,
October 24th".
*~~ CTF 78 Dispatch 240016 October 1944 to CTF 77; also Action Report
BEALE, Assault and Bombardment of Leyte Island, Philippines,
Serial 0236, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
** Action Report CTG 78.2, Leyte Operation, Serial 0085, November
29th, 1944.
*** CTF 78 Dispatch 232400 October 1944 to CTF 77.
**** CTF 77 Dispatch 240054 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info CINCPAC,
COMSOWESPAC, etc.; also Aircraft Action Reports No. 60-44, VC-60;
No. 22-44, VC-26; No. 20-44, 21-44, VC-27; No. 110-44, VC-3;
No. 53-44, VC-5.
***** Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92510), Naval War
College, 1957, Chapter I (A)(1)(a).
****** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232327 October 1944 to CTG's 38.3 and 38.4.
»«««««* Aircraft in Sector TWO Dispatch 240010 October 1944 to All
Stations this Circuit.
94 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 0950 he probably learned that (a) a TG 38,4 search group
had attacked three destroyers in Latitude 11°-40'N, Longitude 121°-50»E
at 0815 (Contact "7"), (b) one of the destroyers was dead in the water
smoking heavily, (c) the remaining two were standing by and (d) the
original course had been 130°(T), speed fifteen knots.*
About this time, as shown in the following dispatch, he
appears to have reinstituted fighter sweeps of the Visayan airfields
probably because he had observed that the aircraft which had recently
attacked his command were largely land-based planes and he desired to
disrupt further attacks at their source.
Having done this and realizing that other commands would be
interested in the nature and effectiveness of the enemy air attacks which
he had warned them against that very morning he, at 0954, advised them
that (a) at 0750 he had been attacked by a large number of planes including
land-based fighters, two-engine land-based bombers, carrier-type fighters
and carrier-type single-engine bombers, (b) damage had been minor, (c)
interception employing a double fighter CAP had been effective and (d)
sixteen fighters were now en route to sweep the western Visayan airfields.**
At 1004, he learned from COMTHIRDFLT that a TG 38,2 aircraft
had sighted a major enemy force including battleships at 0810 just south
of Mindoro on course 050°(T), speed ten to twelve knots*** (Contact "6").
He was interested to learn what the composition of this force was relative
to carriers and battleships. INFORMATION REGARDING THE CARRIERS WAS
IMPORTANT AS IT COULD MEAN ADDITIONAL AIR ATTACKS ON THE LEYTE AREA;
INFORMATION REGARDING BOTH TYPES OF SHIPS WAS IMPORTANT BECAUSE BY THE
PROCESS OF ELIMINATION HE COULD DETERMINE THE PROBABLE DISTRIBUTION OF
ENEMY CARRIERS AND BATTLESHIPS IN THE PHILIPPINES AREA. HE CLEARLY
EXPECTED COMTHIRDFLT TO LAUNCH MASSIVE AIR STRIKES AGAINST THIS FORCE.
At about 1028 he received a dispatch from COMTHIRDFLT which
(a) advised him of the vital necessity for early coverage of the sea area
northeastward of Leyte by seaplanes to protectthis flank, and (b) requested
information as regards the establishment of this search.****
Although CTG 73.7 had advised "All Interested in Catalina
Operations" on the previous day that such searches would begin the evening
of the twenty-fourth,***** COMTHIRDFLT had apparently not received this
message, for it cannot be located in his dispatch files.
* CTG 38.4 Dispatch 232355 October 1944 to CTF 38, C0M3RDFLT, info
CTG 38.2.
** CTF 77 Dispatch 240054 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info All TFC»s 3RD
and 7THFLT«s, CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, All CTG's 3RDFLT, C.G.
5TH Air Force, etc.
*** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232322 October 1944 to CTG»s 38.3 and 38.4, info
COMINCH, CINCPAC, All TFC's 3RD and 7THFLT«s.
**** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232335 October 1944 to CTF 77, info C0M7THFLT,
COMSOWESPAC, CTF 38.
***** CTG 73.7 Dispatch 231227 October 1944 to CTF 77, info All Interested
Catalina Operations, C0M7THFLT, CTF 73, etc.
95 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
As will be shown later, it appears this request caused him to
re-examine CTG 73 .7' s night PBY search planned for three aircraft.
At 1110 he received CTF 79' s daily operational summary.*
Noting with satisfaction the emphasis CTF 79 appeared to be placing on
unloading and sailing his transports from Leyte Gulf, he turned to observe
the progress of his defense against a new air attack developing. This
second major enemy air attack of the day proved to be fairly large,
approximating, according to CTF 77, forty attacking aircraft,** but was
neither as large nor of such intensity as the morning attack. Japanese
reports thereon are meager. The attack was unsuccessful.
At 1124 he intercepted COMTHIRDFLT «s orders to CTF 38 and
CTG 38.3 to strike the enemy force south of Mindoro composed of four
battleships, eight heavy cruisers and thirteen destroyers.***
This dispatch interested him greatly for it showed (a) that
(1) all of the vessels in the force were combatant types, (2) there were
no carriers and (c) there were four battleships, (b) there was a total of
eight battleships in the Sulu Sea and off Mindoro and (c) COMTHIRDFLT was
already taking air action against the enemy force off Mindoro.
Item (b), if correct, was quite illuminating for it showed
that the ISE and HYUGA were likely in the area— ISE had already been
reported there by the GUITARRO — and therefore all eight remaining Japanese
battleships had been contacted. It will be recalled that there had been
nine battleships originally and since the DACE had reported sinking one
KONGO class battleship there remained but eight. This would indicate that
the 0910 contact report of four battleships in the Sulu Sea was likely
correct.
Now at 1139, in conformance with his policy begun earlier, he sent
COMTHIRDFLT a dispatch informing him of the most recent air attack as
follows: N0ne large group of enemy planes, one medium sized group of
enemy planes, one undetermined sized group approaching Leyte at 1130/1.
Fighters intercepting."****
At 1200 he learned that COMTHIRDFLT had advised CTF 38 to keep
the area to the north under observation since the enemy carrier strength
was not yet located. *****
* CTF 79 Dispatch 240110 October 1944 to CTF 77.
** CTF 77 Dispatch 241057 October 1944 to CCMSOWESPAC, info COMINCH,
CINCPAC, C0M3RDFLT, C0M7THFLT, All TFC's and TGCfs 3RD and 7THFLT«s.
*** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232331 October 1944 to CTF 38 and CTG 38.3.
**** CTF 77 Dispatch 240239 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
***** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232355 October 1944 to CTF 38, info CTG 38.2.
96 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
This may have caused him to wonder how this order was related
to COMTHIRDFLT's request to him earlier regarding the establishment of PBY
searches to the north. He may have felt that based on CINCPOA's estimate
of the location of the Main Force, COMTHIRDFLT had decided to institute
northward searches as soon as possible feeling he could not wait upon the
results of the night PBY searches.
At approximately 1207 he received a rebroadcast contact report
on a twenty-six ship convoy of Japanese origin, comprising no carriers,
observed twenty-six miles southeast of Mount Dumali (NE tip of Mindoro),
on course 090°(T)* (Contact "12"). The time of contact was not included
in the report, although it is known that the Main Body, FIRST Striking
Force, off Mindoro, changed course to 090°(T) at about 1026. He appears
to have identified this contact with the one received at 1124,
During the morning, although paying close attention to the
developing enemy situation, he had been completing arrangements with the
C.G. SIXTH Army for the latter to assume command of all forces ashore on
Leyte. Having finally agreed on the time, he, at 1211, with the C.G.
SIXTH Army issued the following: "The Commanding General SIXTH Army assumes
command of all forces ashore in the Leyte area twenty-four October 1400
ITEM. Kinkaid and Kreuger."**
This was a most satisfying development for it signified the
completion of the amphibious assault phase of the operation insofar as he
was concerned, and meant that the situation ashore was now deemed secure
enough for the array commander to relieve him of the responsibility for
the ground offensive. This was particularly important at this time for
the Japanese were stepping up their naval operations and he desired more
freedom of action as regards the purely naval factors.
As he estimated the situation it is not unlikely that he
learned, through the procedure of monitoring appropriate VHF circuits,
that TG 38.4 planes had broken off their attack against the Japanese THIRD
Section with indecisive results some time before, in order to return to
their parent carriers. He realized that this was necessary if CTG 38,4
was to comply as soon as possible with COMTHIRDFLT's orders to concentrate
toward TG 38.2 off San Bernardino Strait,*** Therefore, he likely reasoned
that the enemy force in the Sulu Sea, though it had been under attack still
retained the several dangerous capabilities of (a) penetrating into Leyte
Gulf via Surigao Strait, destroying shipping therein and landing troops
and (b) landing reinforcements somewhere on the southern or west coasts of
Leyte without penetrating Surigao Strait,
* Radio Hollandia Dispatch 241115/1 October 1944 to CTG's 38.1, 38.2,
38.3, 38.4, info C0M3RDFLT, All TFC's 3RDFLT.
** CTF 77 Dispatch 240311 October 1944 to C0MS0WESPAC, info C0M7THFLT,
All TFC's and TGC's 7THFLT, etc.
*** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232327 October 1944 to CTG 38.3 and CTG 38.4.
97 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
Now, weighing his own and the enemy's strength and weakness
factors, based largely on the somewhat inaccurate report referred to
previously,* he probably over-estimated the strength of the enemy in the
Sulu Sea. Even So, he likely realized that his own forces were
considerably stronger.
He now continued estimating the situation in order to prepare
a general plan for the defense of Leyte Gulf based on the assumption that
the enemy would attempt to force Surigao Strait sometime after 1900.
This statement is based on the fact that from the enemy's last known
position, at a speed of advance of twenty knots, which was the reported
speed, the enemy could not pass Binit Point before 1900.
In preparing this plan he conferred with CTG 70.1 concerning
the capabilities and numbers of the motor torpedo boats which would be
available and discussed their stationing along the southern shores of
Surigao Strait.**
At this point in order better to understand (a) the orders
under which his forces were operating in connection with the defense of
Leyte Gulf and (b) the type of enemy action anticipated by him and his
plans to defend against them, several pertinent citations are quoted in
the following:
"In the event of threatened attack, it is the present
intention of Commander Central Philippines Attack Force (CTF 77):
"(a) If an enemy naval force containing heavy units threatens
our operations, to order Commander Bombardment and Fire Support Group
(CTG 77.2) to concentrate, interpose between enemy force and Attack Forces
and destroy the enemy force. Close Covering Group (CTG 77.3) may be
ordered to reinforce Bombardment and Fire Support Group."***
On October 21st he had further clarified his plan for the
defense of Leyte Gulf in his dispatch 210641 which is quoted in part:
"Harbor Defense Plan 1. CTG 77.2, Withdraw from transport and fire
support area and take position southern area Leyte Gulf. During darkness
be underway and defend gulf against entry of hostile surface forces from
either eastern or southern entrance of Surigao Strait. 3e prepared to
sortie from gulf and attack enemy hostile force if enemy force definitely
located..."****
* Aircraft in Sector TWO Dispatch 240010 to All Stations this Circuit,
** Letter from Vice Admiral (then Captain) R. H. Cruzen, USN (Ret),
Operations Officer to CTF 77, to Commodore R. W. Bates, USN (Ret),
Head World War II Battle Evaluation Group, Naval War College, dated
May 27th, 1957.
*** CTF 77 Operation Plan CANF SOWSSPAC No. 13-44, Serial 00022A,
September 26th, 1944, Appendix 2, Annex "E".
**** CTF 77 Dispatch 210641 October 1944 to CTF's 78, 79, CTG's 77.2,
77.3, info All TFC's and TGC«s 7THFLT.
93 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
As regards the motor torpedo boats, he apparently did not
originally envision their employment as an integrated component of the
major surface forces (TG's 77.2 and 77»3) charged with the defense of
Leyte Gulf against enemy surface attack. His operation plan supports
this view in stating: "The Commander Philippines Attack Force will
control the operations of the Motor Torpedo Boats in the objective area*"*
At 1215, having completed his estimate of the situation, he
issued his general battle plan as follows: "Prepare for night engagement.
Enemy force estimated two BB, four CA, four CL, ten DD reported under
attack by our carrier planes in eastern Sulu Sea at 0910 ITEM October 24*
Enemy may arrive Leyte Gulf tonight. Make all preparations for night
engagement. TG 77.3 assigned to CTG 77.2 as reinforcement. CTG 70.1
station maximum number PT's lower Surigao Strait to remain south of
Latitude 10°-10«N during darkness. "**
This plan is particularly interesting in that CTF 77 had now
reduced by two battleships the strength of the enemy forces (THIRD Section)
as originally contacted in t he Sulu Sea at 0910, and had decided that the
cruisers of the first group were heavy cruisers. It is not clear why he
made the decision to drop two battleships, but it seems likely that
because of VHF or medium frequency interceptions not available to this
analysis, he had gained new information concerning this section.
This decision was correct for there were but two battleships
(YAMASHIRO, FUSO) in the THIRD Section.
Then four minutes later, at 1219, he directed CTG 70.1 as
follows: "Station maximum number PT's lower Surigao Strait tonight. To
remain south of 100-10* North during darkness. Assigned task to report
and attack enemy surface forces entering Leyte Gulf."***
These two dispatches indicate plainly that CTF 77 intended to
retain direct control over the motor torpedo boats even under the situation
of possible battle and did not intend to assign this responsibility to
CTG 77.2. They also indicate plainly by "omission" that he either (a)
overlooked the fact that DESRON FIFTY-FOUR was screening the northern end
of Surigao Strait or (b) desired this DESRON to remain under the comnand
of CTF 79.
THE QUESTION NOW ARISES AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THIS WAS WISE.
AS REGARDS THE DESTROYERS IT WAS CLEARLY UNWISE FOR THEY WERE OPERATING IN
THE AREA WHERE CTG 77.2 WOULD MOST LIKELY OPERATE AND THEREFORE MIGHT WELL
CREATE CONFUSION. THAT THIS CONFUSION DID NOT OCCUR WAS DUE LARGELY TO THE
UNDERSTANDING OF COMDESRON FIFTY-FOUR WHO TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, AS
WILL BE SHOWN LATER, PLACED HIMSELF UNDER CTG 77.2 'S DIRECT COMMAND.
* CTF 77 Operations Plan CANF SOWESPAC No. 13-44, Serial 00022A,
September 26th, 1944, Appendix 5, Annex "E".
** CTF 77 Dispatch 240315 October 1944 to CTG 77.3, CTF 79, CTF 78, CTG
77.2, CTG 70.1, All TFC's 3RDFLT, COMFEAF, info C0M3RDFLT, CINCPAC,
COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, All TGC's 3RD and 7THFLT«s.
*** CTF 77 Dispatch 240319 October 1944 to CTG 70.1.
496799 O - 59 - 16
99 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
AS REGARDS THE MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS, WHILE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN
PREFERABLE TO HAVE HAD THEM OPERATE DIRECTLY UNDER CTG 77.2 THIS WAS NOT
VITAL AS THEY WERE TO BE STATIONED IN LOWER SURIGAO STRAIT CLEAR OF THE
AREA WHERE CTG 77.2 WOULD MOST LIKELY OPERATE.
It will be recalled that on the preceding day, CTF 77 had
requested CTG 73.7 to come aboard the WASATCH about 0900, October 24th
to discuss the operations of the PBY's.* Doubtlessly this meeting was
somewhat delayed by the enemy air attacks and the various problems
arising out of the contacts reported.
Also, as was cited earlier, he had received a request from
COMTHIRDFLT at 1028 for information regarding the establishment of PBY
searches out of Leyte Gulf, emphasizing the vital necessity for early
coverage of the sea area northeastward of Leyte to cover his northern
flank.**
Therefore, concurrent with his planning for the defense of
Leyte Gulf by his local surface forces, he had been considering
COMTHIRDFLT's requirement and accordingly decided to augment the planned
night searches which were scheduled to commence this evening in accordance
with earlier orders issued by CTG 73.7.*** Conscious of the presence of
the Japanese THIRD Section located earlier in the Sulu Sea (so far as can
be determined CTF 77 had not yet learned of the SECOND Striking Force's
presence which at noon was about eighty miles west of the THIRD Section),
at 1225 he sent the following dispatch: "Issue orders for planes take off
earliest practicable. Search three west sectors of Plan FOX (Modified)****
from Leyte to return after sunrise. Three of our fast carrier groups will
be in area. Two additional planes take off at sunset to search Surigao
Straits, Mindanao Sea and Sulu Sea to locate Japanese Fleet, reported in
08°-50'N, 122°-05!E at 240010Z. Force reported consists of four BB, eight
cruisers and ten DDs in two groups. Insure contact reports are transmitted
by AOIC circuit Manus FOX and Honolulu FOX."*****
It will be noted that CTF 77 had now increased the number of
battleships to four. This is interesting for in sending out his or~er to
prepare for night engagement, cited earlier, he had estimated the presence
of two battleships in the enemy disposition.****** What caused him to
return to four battleships as contained in the original contact report
(0910)******* is not explained but it could have been a realization that
his only complete contact report was the 0910 report on two groups of ships,
* CTF 77 Dispatch 231235 October 1944 to CTG 73.7.
** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232335 October 1944 to CTF 77, info C0M7THFLT,
COMSOWESPAC, CTF 38.
*** CTG 73.7 Dispatch 231227 October 1944 to CTG 77, info All Interested
Catalina Operations, etc.
**** Sectors "S", "Ttt and »U», Plate LX«
***** CTF 77 Dispatch 240325 October 1944 to CTG 73.7, info CCM3RDFLT,
CTF 38, etc.
****** CTF 77 Dispatch 240315 October 1944 to CTF's 78 and 79, CTG's 77.2,
77.3, 70.1, etc., info C0M3RDFLT, CTF 38, etc.
******* Aircraft in Sector TWO Dispatch 240010 October 1944 to All Stations
this Circuit.
100 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At this time, the question likely arose in his mind as to
whether or not the THIRD Section in the Sulu Sea was presently being
tracked by either carrier or land-based aircraft. He knew, of course,
that CTG 38,4 (whose planes had discovered and attacked this force) had
been ordered to concentrate toward TG 38,2 off San Bernardino Strait at
best speed. This would take TG 38,4 out of range of the THIRD Section.
So far as the PB4Y's out of Morotai were concerned, he must have realized
that because of their early take-off time (about 0530) it was quite
doubtful that they would be able to track the force much after 1600 and
still have sufficient fuel reserve to return to Morotai, Also, owing to
the time factor, a request to C.G. FIFTH Air Force to order out additional
planes to shadow the THIRD Section would probably be received too late
for execution.
In view of the above it would be interesting to discover why
he did not order CTG 73.7 to send out a PBY as soon as practicable to
shadow the THIRD Section. This answer is not known. However, it would
seem to have been largely due to low aircraft availability for, although
ten PBY's were flown in, but three took off on this day in compliance
with CTF 77 's order 240325, previously quoted, which called for five planes.
Having carefully followed the developing situation, and having
possibly re-estimated the earliest time by which the enemy could penetrate
to lower Surigao Strait, he now decided that an attempt by the Japanese
THIRD Section to penetrate Leyte Gulf was not only probable but was
imminent. Therefore, despite the fact that but one hour earlier he had
directed CTG 77.2 to prepare for night engagement, he (a) became concerned
lest delays in transmission prevent adequate and timely preparations and
(b) decided to warm CTG 77.2 by TBS voice radio. At 1312 he sent the
following message: "Consider enemy night surface attack on Leyte Gulf
via Surigao Strait is imminent. Make all preparations. My dispatch orders
are now being sent out0n*
At 1343, apparently anxious to apprise COMTHIRDFLT of his
reaction to the contact he had received at 1207, he advised that commander
by dispatch, in part, as follows: "Probable enemy landing force in convoy
of twenty-five ships including battleships and cruisers last reported at
1115 twenty-six miles southeast of Mount Dumali on course 090° (T)."**
THIS DISPATCH, WHILE NOT MENTIONING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS
WAS A TOKYO EXPRESS OPERATION, NEVERTHELESS BY ITS INSERTION OF THE PHRASE
"PROBABLE LANDING FORCE" WHICH WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE BASIC DISPATCH
INDICATES THAT CTF 77 WAS STILL OF THE OPINION THAT THESE JAPANESE NAVAL
OPERATIONS WERE PRIMARILY TO AUGMENT THE GROUND FORCES ON LEYTE.***
* CTF 77 TBS Voice Radio Message 240412 October 1944 to CTG 77,2, info
CTF 78, CTF 79 •
** CTF 77 Dispatch 240443 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
*** Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92510), Naval War College,
1957, Chapter VII (A)(1)(a).
101 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
In this connection attention is invited to the discussion on
Tokyo Express operations under "Operations of CTG 70.1 (Motor Torpedo
Boats), 0000 - 1830, October 24th" wherein it was pointed out that since
CTG 70,1 had (a) commenced this battle plan with the phrase "expect Tokyo
Express tonight" and (b) been in conference with CTF 77' s Chief of Staff
that morning, it was assumed that he had obtained this concept from the
Chief of Staff.
DO NOT BOTH OF THESE DISPATCHES INDICATE CLEARLY THAT AT CTF
77 'S HEADQUARTERS THE CONCEPT PERSISTED (DISCUSSED FULLY IN VOLUME III)*
THAT THE JAPANESE OPERATIONS PRESENTLY UNDERWAY WERE FOR THE PURPOSE OF
REINFORCING THE LEYTE GARRISON AND THAT THE IDEA OF MAJOR FLEET ACTION
WAS STILL REMOTE?
At 1357 he intercepted a TANGIER dispatch (the TANGIER was at
Morotai) reporting a new sighting (Contact "16") of three battleships, one
heavy cruiser and four destroyers in Latitude 09°-25'N, Longitude 122°-
23 fE.** Although the time of sighting is not given it is clear that it
was shortly before 1240.
At 1435 he learned that the Morotai-based PB4Y flying in
Sector 312°-321°(T) had sighted at 1155, one ATAGO class CA, two~NAT0RI
class CL, four DD and one float type enemy fighter in Latitude 09°-30'N,
Longitude 120°-30»E on course 105° (T), speed ten knots*** (Contact "15").
This contact, which was on the Japanese SECOND Striking Force,
was distinct from the VHF intercept relayed by the patrol plane earlier
in the morning. CTF 77 fs interpretation of this contact is nowhere
recorded. It can be assumed that in plotting the contact and estimating
a speed of advance of twenty knots, he predicted this force could not
arrive at the southern entrance to Leyte Gulf much before 0600 the
following morning. This contact, though made almost three hours after the
one upon which he had based his battle plan, was about 100 miles west
northwest of the latter. If he accepted the positions of the two forces
as having been reported with reasonable accuracy, he must have realized
that the forces were separate and distinct.
Having completed his plans for the defense of Leyte Gulf he
now, at 1443, advised interested commanders of his general strategic
plan as follows: "Following supplements harbor defense plan contained my
210641. Able. RADM Oldendorf**** reinforced by TC 77.3. Take night
position lower Leyte Gulf. Destroy enemy forces encountered. Baker. CTF
78 and 79 anchor all non-combatant ships in respective transport areas.
Form close inner screen with escorts present. Other forces present seek
refuge San Pedro Bay anchoring prior dark. No departures or entry Leyte
Gulf during darkness."*****
*~ Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92510), Naval War College,
1957, Chapter VII (A)(1)(a).
** TANGIER Dispatch 240340 October 1944 (addressees unknown).
*** C.G. 5TH Bomber Command Dispatch 240100 October 1944 to All Commands
this Circuit.
**** Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, USN.
***** C0M7THFLT (likely CTF 77) Dispatch 240543 October 1944 to All TFC's
and TGC's 7THFLT, info COMSOWESPAC, C0M3RDFLT.
102 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1447 he probably received (although CTF 79 did not) a 1000
contact report on two FUSO class battleships, one unidentified CA and
four unidentified destroyers in Latitude 121°-25' (sic), on course
060° (T), speed fifteen knots.*
Although the position herein given was garbled he likely
recognized it as on one of the two enemy groups reported earlier in the
vicinity of Latitude 08°-50«N, Longitude 122°-05«E. This seems so since
the composition of the latest contact was identical with one of the
groups in the two reported.**
It seems he again examined his plan to defend Leyte Gulf and
decided that there was one possible eventuality for which he had not
specifically provided, namely, that of the enemy slipping undetected
between Dinagat Island and Mindanao and then penetrating to the gulf via
Surigao Strait East (the eastern entrance to Leyte Gulf), Realizing the
implications of this maneuver if successfully executed he sent the
following message to CTG 70.1 at 1509: "Insure enemy forces do not,
repeat, do not pass undetected through strait between Dinagat Island and
Mindanao .»***
It will be recalled that, in addition to his 230142 wherein
he had estimated the Japanese intentions and had then requested Commanders
of the FIFTH and THIRTEENTH Air Forces and COMTHIRDFLT to disrupt the
enemy operations,**** he had informed COMTHIRDFLT of the enemy air attacks
against Leyte Gulf as follows: (a) at 0954 of the early morning attack
and its results***** and (b) at 1139 of the three groups of enemy planes
approaching Leyte.******
Now, at 1549, having had an opportunity to analyze the first
enemy air attack of the day, he advised COMTHIRDFLT, among other things,
that (a) the morning air attack consisted of approximately forty aircraft
which were apparently all shore-based, (b) the TCAP had destroyed fifteen
to twenty- five of these, while ships' gunfire had destroyed several more,
(c) damage to his ships had been one Liberty ship damaged, one LCI
burning and sinking, and one destroyer strafed with minor damage and (d)
HE BELIEVED THAT THE SHORE-BASED ATTACK WAS FOR THE PURPOSE OF COVERING
THE ENTRY OF SHIPS INTO MINDORO STRAIT AND CORON BAY.*******
* C.G. 5TH Bomber Command Dispatch 240215 October 1944 to All
Interested Current Operations. / /
** Aircraft in Sector TWO Dispatch 240010 October 1944 to All
Stations on this Circuit.
*** CTF 77 Dispatch 240609 October 1944 to CTG 70.1, info CTG 77.2.
**** CTF 77 Dispatch 230142 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT; also CTF 77
Dispatch 240443 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
***** CTF 77 Dispatch 240054 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info All TFC's
and TGC's 3RD and 7THFLT»s, CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, etc.
****** CTF 77 Dispatch 240239 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
******* CTF 77 Dispatch 240649 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info COMINCH,
CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC, etc.
103 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
The body of the message, exclusive of his estimate of enemy
intentions, was largely correct, although the attack appears to have been
actually larger than estimated by CTF 77. This matter is discussed under
"Operations of C.G. FOURTH Air Army, 0000 - 1830, October 24th". CTF 77 's
ESTIMATE OF ENEMY INTENTIONS IS SIGNIFICANT IN THAT IT INDICATES THAT HE
CONTINUED TO ASSIGN, EVEN AT THIS LATE HOUR, LITTLE WEIGHT TO THE
POSSIBILITY OF (a) MAJOR FLEET ACTION CALCULATED TO DISRUPT THE ALLIED
STRATEGY OR (b) RAIDS BY SURFACE FORCES, BUT WAS INSTEAD CONTINUING TO
OPERATE ON THE CONCEPT THAT THE JAPANESE CONTEMPLATED THE MOVEMENT OF
GROUND TROOPS THROUGH THE VISAYAS TO LEYTE BY TOKYO EXPRESS OR SIMILAR
OPERATIONS EMPLOYING MAJOR FORCES.
At some time prior to 1611 he received a message from CTG 70.1
advising him that certain motor torpedo boats had departed for Surigao
Strait prior to the receipt of his instructions to remain south of
Latitude 10°-10'N and that as a result some of them might be encountered
as far north as Latitude 10°-17'N.* Therefore, at 1611, he advised his
forces as follows: "Some motor torpedo boats proceeded to station prior
to receipt of instructions to remain south of Latitude 10°-10'N and you
may expect motor torpedo boats to be operating as far north as Latitude
10°-17'N.N In addition he added this information: "There will be thirty
PT's on station"**
It is possible that, at this time, in looking over his
incoming dispatches for the day, he noted that COMTHIRDFLT's request for
information regarding PBY searches to cover the latter' s northern flank
had not been answered. At 1616, therefore, he advised that commander that
(a) the three western sectors of Search Plan FOX (Modified) would begin
tonight as shown in his dispatch 240325, (b) the two eastern sectors would
begin as soon as practicable and (c) the searches to the west sector would
begin employing all planes available.***
From this dispatch it appears that, in CTF 77 !s conversation
with CTG 73.7 earlier in the day, the problem of aircraft availability
must have arisen and although ten PBY's had been flown in from Morotai,
the availability was such that CTG 73.7 would be hard pressed to carry
out his commander's orders. This statement is borne out in a dispatch
sent later by the Commanding Officer of the HALF MOON to CTG 73.7 in which
he said, "appears now that only three planes will take off tonight, the
two specials and TARE."**** (The TARE mission likely referred to Sector
TARE (353-C05°(T)) of Search Plan FOX (Modified) (Plate IX).)
* Action Report CTG 70.1, Surigao Straits, Night of October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 1-0330, December 1st, 1944.
** CTF 77 Dispatch 240711 October 1944 to CTG 77.2, info CTG's 77.3 and
70.1.
*** CTF 77 Dispatch 240716 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info CTF's 38, 57,
COMSOWESPAC.
**** CTG 73.7 Dispatch 241003 October 1944 to HALF MOON with appended
reference thereto. (Recorded as HALF MOON Dispatch 241925 (sic)
October 1944 to CTG 73.7.)
104 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1631 he received CTG 33.4* s report of the morning air
attack against the THIRD Section, FIRST Striking Force. This dispatch
revealed that (a) at 0905 two BB, one CA and four DD were attacked in
Latitude 08°-55'N, Longitude 121°-50»E, on course 035°(T), speed fifteen
knots, (b) each attacking flight group made two bomb hits on each BB,
causing a good fire on one, (c) rocket hits made on the CA and two DD's,
(d) the DD's were heavily strafed and (e) CTG 38,4 was now closing on
TG 38,2 which would take him out of range of the contact.*
If he had had any doubts before as to whether aircraft
attacks on this force by TF 38 planes had been broken off, they were
now dispelled*
There is no indication that this report caused him to change
his mind regarding the composition of the THIRD Section, He may have
compared this dispatch with the PB4Y's erroneous report on the same
force and estimated that this was simply the one surface group referred
to by the PB4Y as being under attack.
At 1632 (when it was received by COMTHIRDFLT), he very likely
received another report on the THIRD Section, this one made by the
aircraft flying the Sector 302°-321°(T) out of Morotai, which was to the
effect that at 0950 the aircraft had sighted two BB, one CA and four DD
in Latitude 08°-55,N, Longitude 121°-32'E, on course 040°(T), speed
fifteen knots** (Contact "11"),
Again there is no indication that this information caused him
to alter his estimate of the composition of the enemy force approaching
Leyte Gulf from the southwest, or to analyze the threat as fcaing in the
form of two well separated formations, although he may well have.
At 1643 he received a partly garbled report on the Main Body,
FIRST Striking Force as follows: "Last position of convoy 120 degrees
west (sic) Banton Island consists of three battleships type unknown,"***
At 1700 he intercepted COMTHIRDFLT «s Battle Plan (quoted and
discussed in full under "Operations of COMTHIRDFLT, 0000 - 1830, October
24th"), The plan, among other things, indicated that (a) certain heavy
ships and destroyers from TG»s 38.2 and 38,4 "will be formed as TF 34",
and (b) "TF 34 engage decisively at long range",**** It also discussed
certain air operations but did not explain them.
* CTG 38.4 Dispatch 240424 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info CTF's 38,
77, COMSOWESPAC, etc,
** 5TH Bomber Command Dispatch 240330 October 1944 to All Concerned
Current Operations,
*** Radio Hollandia Dispatch 240300 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, C0M7THFLT,
CTG's 38.1, 38.2, 38.3, All TFC's SOWESPAC, etc.
**** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 240612 October 1944 to All TFC's 3RDFLT, All
TGC's of TF 38, info COMINCH, CINCPAC.
105 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
SINCE THIS DISPATCH LATER BECAME A CENTER OF CONTROVERSY, IT
SEEMS WELL AT THIS POINT TO DIGRESS SLIGHTLY IN ORDER TO COMMENT UPON THE
INTERPRETATION WHICH WAS APPARENTLY GIVEN IT AT THIS TIME BY CTF 77. IT
MUST BE UNDERSTOOD THAT, ALTHOUGH THE MAIN BODY HAD REVERSED COURSE TO
THE WESTWARD AT 1530, THIS FACT WAS NOT KNOWN TO HIM. THEREFORE, HE
LIKELY WAS STILL OF THE BELIEF THAT THE MAIN BODY WAS EN ROUTE EASTWARD.
WHETHER HE THOUGHT THAT THE MAIN BODY WOULD OR WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO
PENETRATE SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT IS NOT IMPORTANT— WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS
THAT FROM THIS DISPATCH HE KNEW THAT COMTHLRDFLT WAS READY AND HAD NOW
MADE PREPARATIONS FOR NIGHT SURFACE ACTION WITH HIS HEAVY SHIPS SHOULD THE
ENEMY DEBOUCH INTO THE PACIFIC OCEAN.
THIS THIRDFLT BATTLE PLAN QUITE LIKELY HELPED TO JUSTIFY IN
HIS MIND HIS OWN BATTLE PLAN WHICH WAS DESIGNED TO DEFEND AGAINST AN
ENEMY SURFACE ATTACK PRINCIPALLY FROM THE SOUTH— A PLAN CLEARLY BASED ON
THE ASSUMPTION THAT AN ENEMY APPROACH FROM THE NORTH OR FROM THE DIRECTION
OF SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT WOULD BE INTERCEPTED BY THE COVERING FORCE
(THIRDFLT).
At 1703 he received CTG 70.1' s battle plan which, in
anticipation of a night "Tokyo Express" operation, (a) assigned the motor
torpedo boats to stations generally along the shores of Surigao Strait
and the eastern Mindanao Sea (Plate XIX shows their approximate
disposition prior to the Battle of Surigao Strait), (b) strongly
emphasized their reconnaissance and reporting mission and (c) ordered
them to attack after making their contact reports.*
Since he had discussed motor torpedo boat operations with CTG
70.1 prior to the issuance of this order it seems likely that he approved
of it in principle.
At 1734 he learned that CTG 73.7 had directed the Commanding
Officer HALF MOON, among other things, to send out the three routine
patrols (three western sectors of Search Plan FOX (Modified)) as soon as
practicable and the remaining two (to search the Surigao Strait, Mindanao
Sea and Sulu Sea) at 1630.** This dispatch seems to have been garbled
for since the basic dispatch called for the latter planes to take off at
sunset*** this time of 1630 is more likely 1830.
He was well aware that preparations were proceeding rapidly
within CTG 77.2' s command for the forthcoming battle for earlier he had
observed certain TG 77.2 ships loading ammunition and now he noted them
departing southward to take night battle stations.****
* CTG 70.1 Dispatch 240504 October 1944 to All TFC»s and TGC's 7THFLT,
WACHAPREAGUE.
** SAN CARLOS Dispatch 240759 October 1944 to HALF MOON.
*** CTF 77 Dispatch 240325 October 1944 to CTG 73.7, info C0M3RDFLT,
CTF 38, etc.
**** Deck Log LOUISVILLE, October 24th, 1944.
106 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 77
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
What he did not know was that two events, now in the making,
would in effect jeopardize the security of his forces: (a) The failure
of the PBY searches (which had been reduced below the number ordered) to
locate and shadow either (1) the THIRD Section or SECOND Striking Force
penetrating Surigao Strait or (2) the Main Body now en route San
Bernardino Strait and (b) COMTHIRDFLT 's movement to the north to strike
the Main Force thus leaving San Bernardino Strait unguarded except for
a single PBY search which, as stated above, would fail to gain contact.
WHAT WAS CTF 77' S CONCEPT OF THE IMPENDING OPERATIONS AT
THIS TIME? IT APPEARS FAIRLY WELL ESTABLISHED THAT (a) HE WAS WELL
AWARE OF, AND WELL PREPARED FOR, THE JAPANESE SURFACE FORCES PENETRATING
FROM THE SOUTHWEST, ALTHOUGH HIS ESTIMATE OF THEIR COMPOSITION AND HOW
THEY MIGHT BE DIVIDED OR DISPOSED WAS ILL-DEFINED, (b) HE EXPECTED
COMTHIRDFLT TO PREVENT THE MAIN BODY, FIRST STRIKING FORCE FROM
INTERFERING WITH HIS OPERATIONS AND (c) HE WAS NOT YET AWARE THAT THE
MOBILE FORCE HAD BEEN SIGHTED OFF CAPE ENGANO OR THAT COMTHIRDFLT WAS
NOW ON THE VERGE OF MAKING A CRITICAL DECISION AS TO WHAT THE CORRECT
COURSE OF ACTION SHOULD BE IN VIEW OF THIS NEW AND PARTLY UNANTICIPATED
THREAT,
107 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 78 and CTG 78.1
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
(1) Operations of CTF 78 (Northern Attack Force) and CTG 78.1
(Palo Attack Group), 0000 - 1830, October 24th.
At 0000 CTF 78, who was also CTG 78.1, remained at anchor
off RED Beach in his flagship the BLUE RIDGE.
Commencing shortly after midnight and continuing throughout
the day he received numerous reports of Japanese surface forces approaching
Leyte Gulf and, therefore, was familiar with the developing situation.
He had at this time the BLUE RIDGE (FFF), LST 741 (which
was aground), RUSSELL, JOHN RODGERS, LANG and a number of landing and
patrol craft. In addition he was expecting the arrival later in the
morning of Reinforcement Group TWO which, among other units, was composed
of twenty Liberty ships (XAK), thirty-three LST's and some important units
of Service Force TU 77.7.2.
During the day there were several attacks by Japanese
aircraft. At 0900 he notified CTF 77 of the loss of the LCI 1065.*
Shortly thereafter he also notified that Commander of an XAK having been
damaged in the same air attack.**
At 0937 COMDESRON TWENTY-ONE, who was also CTG 78.7
(Reinforcement Group TWO), reported to him for duty.***
At 1001 he (a) requested CTG 77.2 to assume A '5 patrol
around TF 78 commencing at dawn the following day, (this request was in
accordance with CTF 77' s OpPlan 13-44) and (b) informed CTG 77.2 that the
JOHN RODGERS and ANDERSON, on patrol in the vicinity of Suluan Island,
were being withdrawn for fuel and then would report to CTG 78.2.****
At 1156 he directed COMDESRON TWENTY-ONE with the
NICHOLAS (F), O'BANNON, TAYLOR and HOPEWELL to report to CTG 77.4 on the
following day.*****
At 1312 (when it was received by CTF 79) he received
CTF 77* s dispatch 240412 wherein that commander (a) stated that an enemy
night surface attack on Leyte Gulf via Surigao Strait was imminent and
(b) directed CTG 77.2 to make all preparations.******
* CTF 78 Dispatch 232400 October 1944 to CTF 77.
** CTF 78 Dispatch 240016 October 1944 to CTF 77.
*** Action Report NICHOLAS, Report of Philippine Island Occupation,
Serial 063, November 3rd, 1944.
**** CTF 78 Dispatch 240101 October 1944 to CTG 77.2, info CTF 77,
CTG 78.2.
***** CTF 78 Dispatch 240256 October 1944 to COMDESDIV 21, info CTF 77,
CTG 77.4.
****** CTF 77 TBS Voice Radio Message 240412 October 1944 to CTG 77.2,
info CTF 78, CTF 79.
108 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 78, CTG 78.1
and CTG 78.2
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1501 (when it was received by CTF 79) he again
received a dispatch from CTF 77 which stated, in part, that an enemy-
force was under attack in the eastern Sulu Sea and might arrive Leyte
Gulf that night. All units were directed to prepare for a night
engagement 0*
At 1650 he received COMSEVENTHFLT • s supplement to the
Harbor Defense Plan No. ONE wherein CTF 77, among other things, directed
both CTF 78 and 79 to anchor all noncombatant ships in their respective
areas with escorts forming a close inner screen, and that there would be
no departures or entry Leyte Gulf during darkness.**
At 1830 he learned that CTG 70.1 intended to patrol
across the lower part of Leyte Gulf to provide early warning of the
arrival of enemy units in that area.***
At this time as CTF 78 he had remaining all of the
shipping which (a) had arrived with CTG 78.7 with the exception of the
eleven LST«s diverted to YELLOW Beach TWO, (b) remained under the
command of himself as CTG 78.1, i.e., LST 741 (grounded), RUSSELL, JOHN
RODGERS, LANG, NICHOLAS, O'BANNON, TAYLOR, HOPEWELL, SAN PEDRO, MUSKOGEE
and (c) remained under CTG 78.2 and listed under that commander.
(a) Operations of CTG 78.2 (San Ricardo Attack Group),
0000 - 1830, October 24th.
At 0000 CTG 78.2, in the FREMONT, remained at anchor
off WHITE Beach. Commencing shortly after midnight and continuing
throughout the day he received numerous dispatches of Japanese surface
forces approaching Leyte Gulf and therefore was familiar with the
developing situation.
At 0347 COMMINDIV THIRTY-FOUR reported to him for
duty.****
At 0700 he observed the arrival of TG 78.7
(Reinforcement Group TWO)***8* and noted that most of the units had
anchored in the northern transport area. Shortly thereafter seventeen
LSTfs from this group reported in his area.****** It seems probable that
* CTF 77 Dispatch 240315 October 1944 to CTG's 70.1, 77.2, 77,3,
CTF's 78, 79, All TFC's 3RDFLT, COMFEAF, info C0M3RDFLT, CINCPAC,
COMINCH, CINCSWPA, All TGC's 3RD and 7THFLT's.
** C0M7THFLT Dispatch 240543 October 1944 to All TFC's and TGC's
7THFLT, info CINCSWPA, C0M3RDFLT.
*** CTG 70.1 Dispatch 240504 October 1944 to All TFC's and TGC's
7THFLT, WACHAPREAGUE.
**** COMMINDIV 34 Dispatch 231611 October 1944 to CTG 78.2, info CTG 77.5.
***** Action Report CTG 78.2, Leyte Operation, Serial 0085, November 29th,
1944.
****** Action Report CTG 78.7 (Reinforcement Group TWO), Central
Philippines Operation, Serial 0176, November 10th, 1944.
109 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 78.2
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
these LST's reported to him for duty but there is no evidence to this
effect.
Shortly thereafter the Japanese conducted their first
air attack in force. This attack lasted until 0900. As a result CTG 78.2
reported that the attacks against his units had caused the Japanese to
lose five planes; however they succeeded in damaging the XAK THOMAS and
the LCI 65 and sinking the LCI 1065 and the ATA SONOMA.*
During the day he continued to unload his LST's.*
At 1312 (when it was received by CTF 79) he received
as an information addressee CTF 77' s dispatch to CTG 77.2 wherein CTF 77
stated, in part, that he considered that an enemy night surface attack
on Leyte Gulf via Surigao Strait was imminent and directed CTG 77.2 to
make all preparations.**
At 1501 (when it was received by CTF 79) he received
another dispatch from CTF 77, quoted in full under "Operations of CTF 77,
0000 - 1830, October 24th", wherein that commander (a) stated, in part,
that an enemy force estimated to consist of two BB, four CA, four CL and
ten DD was under attack in the eastern Sulu Sea by Allied carriers and
might arrive Leyte Gulf that night and (b) directed all units to prepare
for a night engagement.***
At 1650 he received COMSEVENTHFLT ' s supplement to
Harbor Defense Plan No. ONE wherein CTF 77, among other things, directed
(a) both CTF's 78 and 79 to anchor all noncombatant ships in their
respective areas with escorts forming a close inner screen and (b) that
there would be no departures or entry Leyte Gulf during darkness.****
At 1830 he learned that CTG 70.1 intended to patrol
across the lower part of Leyte Gulf to provide early warning of the arrival
of any enemy units in that area.***** At this time he had remaining the
FREMONT, ARL ACHILLES, JENKINS, ANDERSON and six XAK's (THOMAS, FIELDS,
SHORT, GIANELLA, KINNEY, JUDSON). He may have had, in addition, the
seventeen LST's previously referred to as having been sent to WHITE Beach.
* Action Report CTG 78.2, Leyte Operation, Serial 0085, November 29th,
1944.
** CTF 77 TBS Voice Radio Message 240412 October 1944 to CTG 77.2,
info CTF 78, CTF 79.
*** CTF 77 Dispatch 240315 October 1944 to CTG's 70.1, 77.2, 77.3, CTF's
78, 79, All TFC's 3RDFLT, COMFEAF, info C0M3RDFLT, CINCPAC, COMINCH,
CINCSWPA, All TGC's 3RD and 7THFLT»s.
**** C0M7THFLT Dispatch 240543 October 1944 to All TFC's and TGC's
7THFLT, info CINCSWPA, C0M3RDFLT.
***** CTG 70.1 Dispatch 240504 October 1944 to All TFC's and TGC's 7THFLT,
WACHAPREAGUE.
110 CONFIDENTIAL
CTU 77.2.1
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
(b) Operations of CTU 77.2.1 (Fire Support Unit NORTH),
0000 - 1830, October 24th.
At 0000 CTU 77.2.1, with TU 77.2.1 plus BATDIV TWO, was
lying to in Area DRUM north of Tay Tay Point. Commencing shortly after
midnight and continuing throughout the day he received numerous reports
of Japanese surface forces approaching Leyte Gulf and, therefore, was
familiar with the developing situation.
At 0647, in accordance with orders from CTG 77.2,* he,
with his unit less the WEST VIRGINIA and CONY which were proceeding
independently, proceeded to the logistics area where he arrived at 0951.**
He immediately departed for a conference with CTG 77.2
aboard the LOUISVILLE, returning to the MISSISSIPPI at 1120. ** The
subject of this conference is not available to this analysis.
At 1312 he intercepted CTF 77 fs message, quoted in full
under "Operations of CTF 77, 0000 - 1830, October 24th", wherein that
commander stated, in part, that he considered a night surface attack on
Leyte Gulf tonight via Surigao Strait was imminent and to make all
preparations .***
At 1452 the WEST VIRGINIA, closely followed by the
MARYLAND, refueled from the CHEPACHET and SALAMONIE. This operation was
completed by 1646.****
At 1501 (when it was received by CTF 79) he received CTF
77* s dispatch which stated, in part, that an enemy surface force estimated
to consist of two BB, four CA, four CL and ten DD was under attack in the
eastern Sulu Sea and might arrive Leyte Gulf that night .*****
At 1535 he departed for the LOUISVILLE to confer with CTG
77.2 on CTG 77.2' s battle plan wherein he was to be Commander Battle
Line. ****** The matters discussed in the conference are presented in
"Operations of CTG 77.2, 0000 - 1330, October 24th". He returned to the
MISSISSIPPI at 1645.
* Action Report CALIFORNIA, Participation in Operations off Island
of Leyte, P. I., October 19th - 24th, 1944, Serial 0025, November
8th, 1944.
** War Diary COMBATDIV 3, October 24th, 1944.
*** CTF 77 TBS Voice Radio Message 240412 October 1944 to CTG 77.2,
info CTF 78, CTF 79.
**** Deck Logs WEST VIRGINIA, MARYLAND, October 24th, 1944.
***** CTF 77 Dispatch 240315 October 1944 to CTG's 70.1, 77.2, 77.3,
CTF«s 78, 79, All TFC's 3RDFLT, CAAF SOWESPAC, info C0M3RDFLT, All
TGC's 3RD and 7THFLT»s, COMINCH, CINCSWPA.
****** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of
Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd,
1944.
Ill CONFIDENTIAL
CTU 77.2.1
and CTG 77.3
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1650 (when it was received by CTF 79) he received
COMSEVENTHFLT's dispatch 240543 quoted in full under "Operations of CTF
77, 0000 - 1830, October 24thn, in which that commander supplemented
Harbor Defense Plan No. ONE. This dispatch stated, in part, that TG 77,2,
reinforced by TG 77.3, was to take station in lower Leyte Gulf and
destroy enemy forces encountered.*
Meanwhile, he prepared to depart the logistics area
for his night battle station but it was not until 1848 that he was able
to do so.
(c) Operations of CTG 77.3 (Close Covering Group),
0000 - 1830, October 24th.
At 0000 CTG 77.3 with TG 77.3, less BACHE which lay at
anchor off RED Beach available for FS missions, was patrolling the area
southeast of the transport areas in accordance with Harbor Defense Plan
ONE.
Commencing shortly after midnight and continuing
throughout the day he received numerous reports of Japanese surface forces
approaching Leyte Gulf.
At 0458 he commenced returning to San Pedro Bay.**
About 0655 he detached the BEALE, DALY and SHROPSHIRE
to carry out scheduled shore bombardment missions, while his remaining
units stood by awaiting orders to fuel.***
At 1040 the PHOENIX, closely followed by the BOISE,
commenced refueling from the SUAMICO. The fueling was broken off at 1113
due to an air raid which lasted until about 1339, but was recommenced at
1451 when the PHOENIX, BOISE and SHROPSHIRE refueled from the SALAM0NI2,
SUAMICO and ASHTABULA, respectively.
At 1501, when it was received by CTF 79, he received
CTF 77 fs dispatch to the effect that (a) an enemy force was under air
attack in the eastern Sulu Sea and might arrive Leyte Gulf that night,
(b) all units were to prepare for night engagement and (c) his command
was assigned to the control of CTG 77.2 as reinforcement.****
Upon receipt of this dispatch he terminated his FS
missions without a formal release by CTF 78.*****
* C0M7THFLT Dispatch 240543 October 1944 to All TFC's and TGC's
7THFLT, info CLNCSWPA, C0M3RDFLT.
** War Diary PHOENIX, October 24th, 1944.
*** War Diary BOISE, October 24th, 1944.
**** CTF 77 Dispatch 240315 October 1944 to CTG's 70.1, 77.2, 77.3,
CTF's 78, 79, All TFC's 3RDFLT, COMFEAF, info C0M3RDFLT, All TGC's
3RD and 7THFLT's, COMINCH, CINCSWPA.
***** Action Report CTG 77.3, Leyte Occupation, Serial 0359, November
3rd, 1944.
112 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.3 and CTG 78.7
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1620 he reported to CTG 77.2 for duty.
At 1642 having closed the LOUISVILLE, he departed for
that ship by ship's boat to confer with CTG 77.2. The subject under
discussion was CTG 77 .2' s Battle Plan wherein CTG 77.3 was to be commander
of the Right Flank Force.
AT THIS CONFERENCE HE DECLINED CTG 77.2 'S OFFER TO
INCREASE THE RIGHT FLANK FORCE DESTROYERS IN THAT HE FELT, BECAUSE OF THE
RESTRICTED AREA, CONSIDERABLE UNITY OF DIRECTION WAS INDICATED. FOR THIS
PURPOSE HE EMPLOYED A TASK GROUP COMMON VOICE RADIO CIRCUIT WHICH ALL OF
HIS SHIPS WERE EQUIPPED TO USE. HE STATES IN HIS ACTION REPORT THAT HE
GAINED THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT "DEVELOPMENTS BEING PROPITIOUS IT WAS
THE DESIRE OF THE OTC THAT GUNFIRE OF THE BATTLE LINE AND FLANK FORCE
CRUISERS WAS TO BE HELD UNTIL IT COULD BE OVERWHELMINGLY DEVASTATING AND
DEADLY. AMMUNITION AVAILABLE DID NOT PERMIT A DRAWN OUT ACTION AT LONG
RANGES".*
At 1650 (when it was received by CTF 79) he likely
learned, while on board the LOUISVILLE, of COMSEVENTHFLT's Supplement to
Harbor Defense Plan No. ONE which, in part, ordered CTG 77 • 2 reinforced
by CTG 77.3, to (a) take a night station in lower Leyte Gulf and (b)
destroy enemy forces encountered.** At 1710 he returned to the PHOENIX.*
By 1742, when all of his units had rendezvoused, he
proceeded in a southerly direction toward his battle station.
At 1757 he joined TG 77.2 and took station as
Commander Right Flank Force.***
From this time onward he operated largely as Commander
Right Flank Force and will be so referred to in later chapters.
(d) Operations of CTG 78.7 (Reinforcement Group TWO),
0000 - 1830, October 24th.
At 0000 CTG 78.7, who was also COMDESRON TWENTY-ONE,
in the NICHOLAS, with TG 78.7, was in Leyte Gulf proceeding to the northern
transport area.
His task group at this time consisted of four DD*s
(NICHOLAS (F), O'BANNON, TAYLOR, HOPEWELL), two PF«s (SAN PEDRO, MUSKOGEE)
and one PG (TULSA) as escorts for one AO (SUAMICO), three IX(A0)«s (CARIBOU,
MINK, PANDA), two AN* s (TEAK, SILVERBELL), one AKN (INDUS (F)), one ARS
(CABLE), one A0(W) (SEVERN (YOG 15 in tow)), thirty-three LST«s (464, 552,
553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 569, 573, 610, 619, 658, 663, 673, 687,
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944.
** C0M7THFLT Dispatch 240543 October 1944 to All TFC's and TGC's 7THFLT,
info CBJCSWPA, CQM3RDFLT.
*** Deck Log PHOENIX, October 24th, 1944.
113 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 78.7 and CTF 73.8
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
688, 694, 703, 734, 736, 737, 746, 749, 750, 908, 919, 990, 991, 1015,
1025, 1026) and twenty liberty ships (XAK) (GENERAL FLEISCHER, CAPE
ROMANO, CAPE CONSTANCE, JOHN PAGE, SABIK, JANSSENS, LEO MERRITT, DAVID
GAILLARD, FRANK CUHEL, MARCUS DALY, BENJAMIN WATERHOUSE, JOHN FOSTER,
VITUS BERING, SAMUEL BARLOW, BENJAMIN WHEELER, LOUIS WUELE, CHARLOTTE
CUSHMAN, CASSIOPIA, CLARENCE DARROW, ESCALANTE).*
At 0332 he detached ten LST's (553, 558, 658, 687,
688, 734, 736, 737, 908, 991) to proceed to YELLOW Beach TWO in accordance
with previous instructions.**
At about 0500 the remaining units were detached and
proceeded to their various stations, as follows: Nine LST's to beach and
eight to anchor off WHITE Beach, five LST«s to RED Beach, one liberty
ship and one LST to YELLOW Beach. Those not otherwise assigned proceeded
to the Northern Transport Area to await further instructions.* Meanwhile,
the MUSKOGEE and SAN PEDRO reported to CTF 78 for duty.
At 0937 TG 78.7 was dissolved and COMDESRON TWENTY-ONE
also reported to CTF 78 for duty.***
(e) Operations of CTG 78.8 (Reinforcement Group THREE),
0000 - 1830, October 24th.
At 0000 CTG 78.8, in the frigate EUGENE, with TG 78.8
which was composed largely of seventeen liberty ships (XAK) and six LST's,
was proceeding towards Leyte Gulf having departed Humboldt Bay the
previous day.**** During the period until 1830 little of importance
occurred and at 1830 the task group was bearing 12 5° (T), distant 820 miles
from Leyte Gulf.
(2) Operations of CTF 79 (Southern Attack Force), COCO - 1830,
October 24th.
At 0000 CTF 79, in the MOUNT OLYMPUS, was anchored in the
vicinity of the Southern Transport Area, observing the unloading of his
units. During ,this period there were several air raid alerts. At this
time he had with him only CTG 79.2, as CTG 79.1 had departed on the
previous day.
Commencing shortly after midnight and continuing throughout
the day he received numerous reports of Japanese surface forces approaching
Leyte Gulf. These reports were of some concern to him as he still had the
* Action Report CTG 78.7 (COMDESRON 21), Central Philippines Operation,
Serial 0176, November 10th, 1944.
** CTF 78 Dispatch 231136 October 1944 to CTG 78.7, info CTF 79.
*** Action Report NICHOLAS, Report of Philippine Island Occupation,
Serial 063, November 3rd, 1944o
**** Action Report CTG 78.8 (COMCORTDIV 29), Report of Reinforcement
Group THREE, Central Philippine Operation, Serial 071, November 16th,
1944.
114 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 79
October 24th
APA's CLAY, ARTHUR MIDDLETON, BAXTER; AP GEORGE F. ELLIOTT; AKA«s
CAPRICORNUS, CHARA, AURIGA; AK MERCURY; LSD RUSHMORE, fifty-five LST's
and numerous landing and patrol craft remaining in the area.
At 0122 he received CTF 77* s dispatch to the effect that
a large enemy air attack might be brewing,*
At 0715 COMLSTGROUP FORTY with ten LST's (553, 558, 658,
687, 688, 734, 736, 737, 908 and 991) reported to him for duty from
TG 78. 8.**
At 0726 he requested CTU 77.7.1, by TBS Voice Radio, to
designate one or more oilers to fuel eleven destroyers on the morning
of the 25th. ***
At 0831 he received word from the LEUTZE that she had
been bombed and strafed by two Japanese planes, suffering minor damage.****
At 0933, by TBS voice radio, he directed CTU 79.11.1,
who was also CTU 79.14.5, to commence his sortie.***** Shortly thereafter
he queried (a) at 0945, CTG 79.2 as to what time the AURIGA would be
unloaded,****** and (b) CTG 79.5 as to why he was not sailing his unloaded
LST's, and ordered him to do so,******* Six minutes later he received a
reply to the effect that all LST's, with the exception of LST 461 which
was stuck on the beach, had been ordered to report to CTU 79. 5 .2. ********
At 0959 he again ordered CTU 79.11.1 to commence his
sortie, and told CTU 79.U.2 to disregard his 240033 .********* Why he
did this is not clear, as CTU 79.11.2 was not an addressee on this
dispatch, and furthermore was not scheduled to depart until 1400.
*
CTF 77 Dispatch 231532 October 1944 to CTG 77.4, info TG 77.4,
TF 77, CTG 77.13, C0M3RDFLT.
Action Report COMLSTGROUP 40, Leyte Island, Serial 040,
November 3rd, 1944.
CTF 79 TBS Voice Radio Message 232226 October 1944 to CTU
77.7.1, info CTF 77.
**** LEUTZE TBS Voice Radio Message 232331 October 1944 to CTF 79.
***** CTF 79 TBS Voice Radio Message 240033 October 1944 to CTU
79.11.1.
****** CTG 79 TBS Voice Radio Message 240045 October 1944 to CTG
79.2.
******* CTF 79 TBS Voice Radio Message 240049 October 1944 to CTG
79*5, info CTU 79.5.2.
******** CTG 79.5 TBS Voice Radio Message 240055 October 1944 to
CTF 79 o
********* CTF 79 TBS Voice Radio Message 240059 October 1944 to CTU
79.11.1, info CTU 79.11.2.
496799 O - 59 - 17
115
CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 79
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1004 he learned that a major enemy force including a
battleship had been sighted just south of Mindoro on course 050° (T),
speed ten to twelve knots,* (Contact "511, Plate XV). A short time later
the force was reported to consist of four BB, eight CA and thirteen DD**
(Contact "6").
At 1010 he forwarded a summary report to CTF 77 which
stated, in part, that he (a) anticipated sailing all transports, less
the AURIGA, that afternoon and (b) with the exception of those units
scheduled to remain in the area, would sail all unloaded landing and
patrol craft that day and the following day.***
At 1015 he observed CTU 79.14.5 (CTU 79.11.1), with TU
79.14.5 depart. This unit consisted of DD ERBEN (F), ATF's POTAWATOMI and
,:-.::;EE, ARS PRESERVER, thirty-eight LST's (20, 34, 117, 118, 123, 125,
207, 213, 219, 242, 269, 270, 277, 451, 461, 478, 432, 483, 486, 488, 564,
567, 568, 615, 617, 669, 671, 672, 698, 704, 745, 916, 917, 918, 999, 1006,
1013, 1024), thirty-three LCT's, five LSM's and sixteen Datrol craft.****
Immediately thereafter, at 1017, by voice radio, he reauested CTG 77.5 to
direct the BREESE, HAMILTON and HOWARD to report to CTU 79.11.2 in the
PICKING who was scheduled to depart at 1400.***** He then designated the
units that were to compose TU 79.14.3 and scheduled that unit to depart
at 1400 .******
At 1032 he learned that the AURIGA'S estimated time of
completion of unloading was 2400. *******
At 1312 he received CTF 77' s TBS voice radio message
wherein that commander (a) stated that he considered an enemy night
surface attack on Leyte Gulf that night via Surigao Strait was imminent
and (b) directed CTG 77.2 to make all preparations. ********
At 1358 he learned that CTF 77 had ordered MTB»s to patrol
lower Surigao Strait in anticipation of the approach of the enemy. *********
**
C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232322 October 1944 to CTG's 38.3, 38.4,
info COMTUCH, CINCPAC, All TFC's 3RD and 7THFLT's.
C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232331 October 1944 to CTF 38, CTG 33.3.
*** CTF 79 Dispatch 240110 October 1944 to CTF 77.
**** Action Report COMDESRON 48 (CTU 79.14.5) (CTU 79.11.1), Leyte
Island, Philippine Islands, Octooer 20th - 24th, 1944, Serial
080, October 30th, 1944.
***** CTF 79 TBS Voice Radio Message 240117 October 1944 to CTG 77.5.
****** CTF 79 Dispatch 240124 October 1944 to CTG's 79.2, 79.4, CTU
79.11.2, CHARA, MERCURY, BREESE, HAMILTON, info CNB Hollandia,
CNB Manus, All Interested Current Operations.
******* CTG 79.2 Visual Dispatch 240132 October 1944 to CTF 79.
******** CTF 77 TBS Voice Radio Message 240412 October 1944 to CTG 77.2,
info CTF 78, CTF 79.
********* CTF 77 Dispatch 240319 October 1944 to CTG 70.1.
116 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 79
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1400 he observed the departure of CTU 79.14.3 (CTG 79.2)
with TU 79.14.3.* The composition of this unit is given under "Operations
of CTG 79.2, 0000 - 1830, October 24th".
At 1501 he again received a dispatch from CTF 77 which
(a) stated, in part, that an enemy force was under attack in the eastern
Sulu Sea and might arrive Leyte Gulf that night and (b) directed all
units to prepare for a night engagement.**
At 1624 he originated a dispatch forming TU 79.14.9
consisting of thirteen LST's, six patrol craft and the WICKES, to depart
at 0800 the following morning.***
At 1628 he directed CTU 79.11.3 to fuel his DESRON to
seventy per cent the following morning when the CHEPACHET returned to the
fueling area.**** About this time he informed CTG 77.2 that on the
return of the fueling group the next day he intended to withdraw the
antisubmarine and radar picket patrols and depart the area.*****
At 1650 he received COMSEVENTHFLT » s supplement to Harbor
Defense Plan No. ONE wherein, among other things, he was directed to
anchor all noncombatant ships in their respective areas with escorts
forming a close inner screen, and that there would be no departures or
entry Leyte Gulf during darkness. ******
At 1830 he learned that CTG 70.1 intended to patrol across
the lower part of Leyte Gulf to provide early warning of the arrival of
enemy units in that area.*******
At this time he had remaining in the area, the MOUNT
OLYMPUS, AK AURIGA and seventeen LST«s******** (126, 169, 205, 223, 565,
605, 608, 609, 611, 612, 670, 686, 693, 733, 738, 739 and 909). Although
he apparently overlooks them in his action report, he also had an
additional eleven (sic) LST's********* and an unknown liberty ship
received from CTG 78.7.
* CTU 79.14.8 Visual Dispatch 240500 October 1944 to CTF 79.
** CTF 77 Dispatch 240315 October 1944 to CTG's 70.1, 77.2, 77.3,
CTF's 78, 79, All TFC's 3RDFLT, CAAF SOWESPAC, info C0M3RDFLT,
CINCPAC, COMINCH, CINCSWPA, All TGC's 3RD and 7THFLT's.
*** CTF 79 Dispatch 240724 October 1944 to PC's 462, 464, etc., info
CNB Hollandia, All Current Ops. SWPA.
**** CTF 79 Dispatch 240728 October 1944 to CTU 79.11.3, info
CHEPACHET, CTG 77.2, CTG 77.7, TU 79.11.3.
***** CTF 79 Dispatch 240734 October 1944 to CTG 77.2, info CTF 77,
CTU 79.11.3 •
****** C0M7THFLT Dispatch 240543 October 1944 to All TFC's and TGC's
7THFLT, info CINCSWPA, C0M3RDFLT.
******* CTG 70.1 Dispatch 240504 October 1944 to All TFC's and TGC's
7THFLT, WACHAPREAGUE.
******** Action Report CTF 79, Seizure of Leyte, Report of Participation
of Task Force 79, Serial 00323, November 13th, 1944.
********* Action Report CTG 78.7 (COMDESRON 21), Report of Central
Philippines Operation, Serial 0176, November 10th, 1944.
117 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 79 and CTG 79.2
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
The best evidence is that there were but ten LST's (553,
558, 658, 687, 688, 734, 736, 737, 908 and 991). If there was in fact
an additional LST its bow number is not available to this analysis.
This gave him a total of either twenty-seven or twenty-eight LST's,
(a) Operations of CTG 79.2 (Attack Group BAKER), 0000 -
1830, October 24th.
At 0000 CTG 79.2, in the ROCKY MOUNT, remained at
anchor off ORANGE Beach.
The morning passed uneventfully until 0755 when
Japanese aircraft began a concerted prolonged air raid lasting until
1310.*
At 1018 he departed for a conference with CTF 79
aboard the MOUNT OLYMPUS.* While the subject matter of this conference
is not known it likely was concerned with the formation of a convoy of
which he was to be the commander.
At 1110 he witnessed the departure of TU 79.14.5.*
He was interested in this convoy as all twenty- four of his LST's were
departing with that unit and he would shortly be departing himself.
At 1125 he received a dispatch from CTF 79, quoted
more fully under "Operations of CTF 79, 0000 - 1830, October 24th" which
(a) formed TU 79.14.8, (b) designated him as commander, (c) set 1400 as
the departure time, and (d) prescribed the routing.**
At 1146 he ordered some of the units which were to
compose the task unit to be prepared to get underway on signal at 1400.***
At 1206 he returned to the ROCKY MOUNT and at 1212
issued his sortie plan.****
At 1410 as CTU 79.14.8, in the ROCKY MOUNT, accompanied
by TU 79.14.8, consisting of APA's CLAY, ARTHUR MIDDLETON, BAXTER; AP
GEORGE F. ELLIOTT; AKA's CAPRICORNUS, CHARA; LSD RUSHMORE; AKA MERCURY,
escorted by the PICKING (CTU 79.11.2), SPROSTON, HALS, BREESE, HAMILTON
and HOWARD, he departed the area for Hollandia.*
* Action Report CTG 79.2, Report of Leyte Operation, Serial 0032,
November 4th, 1944.
** CTF 79 Dispatch 240124 October 1944 to CTG's 79.2, 79.4, CTU 79.11.2,
BREESE, HAMILTON, CHARA, MERCURY, info CNB Hollandia, CNB Manus, All
Interested in Current Operations.
*** CTG 79.2 Visual Dispatch 240246 October 1944 to MERCURY, CHARA,
COMDESRON 49, ROCKY MOUNT, TRANSDIV 10, RUSHMORE, AURIGA, info
CTF 79 •
**** CTG 79.2 Visual Dispatch 240312 October 1944 to MERCURY, CHARA,
AURIGA, RUSHMORE, ROCKY MOUNT, COMDESRON 49, TRANSDIV 10, info
CTF 79, SPROSTON, HALE, HOWARD, HAMILTON, BREESE, PICKING.
118 CONFIDENTIAL
CTU 77.2.2
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
(b) Operations of CTU 77.2.2 (Fire Support Unit SOUTH),
OOOO - 1830, October 24th.
During the period 0000 - 0755 CTU 77.2.2 acted
largely as CTG 77.2; therefore, his operations are discussed more fully
under "Operations of CTG 77.2, 0000 - 1830, October 24th".
At 0755 he directed the units of TU 77.2.2 to proceed
to their various FS stations as previously directed which was done.*
At 0928 he was informed by the LEUTZE, by TBS voice
radio, that she had been bombed and strafed by two Japanese planes and
had suffered minor damage and a few casualties.**
At 1425 he learned that (a) the CALIFORNIA had
commenced refueling from the SARANAC and (b) the LOUISVILLE closely
followed by the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, CLAXTON and PORTLAND had commenced
replenishing ammunition from the MAZAMA and DURHAM VICTORY.***
These operations which were completed by 1715*** were
not satisfactory in the following particulars: (a) there was insufficient
ammunition in the ammunition ships for the combatant ships to load to
capacity with armor piercing ammunition, i.e., there were but forty-eight
rounds of sixteen-inch ammunition available, (b) the MAZAMA, which was a
navy ship (and which was well handled), did not carry any sixteen-inch
ammunition whatsoever, while the DURHAM VICTORY, which was a commercial
ship, carried nearly all of the heavy ammunition, i.e., six-inch and
above,**** and (c) the DURHAM VICTORY rate of unloading was "slow,
difficult and unsatisfactory" .***** This was because (1) the DURHAM
VICTORY had "a very small civilian crew, no winchmen and no previous
experience with ammunition handling"***** and (2) of the indifference and
lack of cooperation of the DURHAM VICTORY'S officers and crew.*****
As regards the latter comment DESRON FIFTY-SIX stated,
"with a serious enemy threat developing, with all ships greatly depleted,
and with time a very potent factor, the commanding officer of this ship
put every obstacle he could possibly think of in the way of replenishment
operations. He was the most disagreeable, uncooperative individual it
has ever been my misfortune to run up against. He refused to work through
the noon hour. Ships would arrive alongside on schedule and his hatches
* Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Bombardment and Capture of
Leyte Island, Philippine Islands, October 16th - 24th, 1944,
Serial 00147, November 5th, 1944.
** LEUTZE TBS Voice Radio Message 240928/1 October 1944 to COMDESRON
56, CTG 77.2, CTF 79.
*** Deck Logs CALIFORNIA, LOUISVILLE, HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, CLAXTON,
PORTLAND, October 24th, 1944.
**** COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2) Preliminary Action Report for the Battle
of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November
2nd, 1944.
***** Action Report COMDESRON 56, Operations during seizure of Leyte
Island, Philippines, Serial 0014, January 7th, 1945.
119 CONFIDENTIAL
CTU 77.2.2 and CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
would still be battened down. He refused to handle lines. This would
add from one to two hours to each day's operations. His dis re spec table
(sic) crew would sit around and pass disparaging remarks to the already
overworked and tired enlisted men. He himself sat up on his bridge in
his undershirt and cursed and yelled at our officers and men. Our
replenishment program progressed in spite of him — not because of him.
It cannot be too strongly recommended that regular navy ammunition ships
be utilized in combat areas".*
WHILE THE ABOVE RECOMMENDATION AS TO THE EMPLOYMENT
OF ONLY REGULAR NAVY AMMUNITION SHIPS IS SOUND IT MUST BE POINTED OUT
THAT CIRCUMSTANCES MAY ARISE IN ANOTHER WAR WHEREIN THE EMERGENCY
EMPLOYMENT OF MERCHANT MANNED AMMUNITION SHIPS MAY BE NECESSARY. IN SUCH
CASE CONSIDERABLE CARE SHOULD BE EXERCISED TO INSURE THAT THE CHARACTER
OF THE SHIP AND CREW APPROXIMATE AS NEARLY AS POSSIBLE THE REQUIREMENTS
OF A NAVY AMMUNITION SHIP. THIS LESSON IS OF COURSE EQUALLY APPLICABLE
TO MERCHANT SHIPS EMPLOYED IN OTHER LOGISTICS FUNCTIONS SUCH AS OIL
TANKERS, ETC.
During the day the following ships of his unit
furnished FS: ALBERT W. GRANT, LEUTZE, ROBINSON, COLUMBIA and DENVER.**
At 1721, as CTG 77.2, he ordered his units to form
up*** and by 1735 he was heading for his night battle station.****
Since after this time he operated as CTG 77.2 his
operations are discussed under "Operations of CTG 77.2, OOOO - 1830,
October 24th" 0
(3) Operations of CTG 77.2 (Bombardment and Fire Support
Group), 0000 - 1830, October 24th.*****
At 0000 CTG 77.2, in accordance with CTF 77' s Harbor
Defense Plan No. ONE, was operating with TG 77.2 in the southern portion
of Leyte Gulf.
During the early morning hours, he received reports by
the ANGLER and GUITARRO which had contacted the Main Body, FIRST Striking
Force in the vicinity of Mindoro, discussed under "Operations of CTF 77,
*~ Action Report COMDESRON 56, Operations during seizure of Leyte
Island, Philippines, Serial 0014, January 7th, 1945.
** Deck Logs ALBERT W. GRANT, LEUTZE, ROBINSON, COLUMBIA, DENVER,
October 24th, 1944.
*** Action Report MINNEAPOLIS, Participation in Bombardment of Leyte
Island, P.I., October 18th - 24th, 1944, Serial 0212, November 1st,
1944.
**** Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Bombardment and Capture of
Leyte Island, Philippine Islands, October 16 th - 24th, 1944, Serial
00147, November 5th, 1944.
***** All information here except as otherwise indicated obtained from
Action Report CTG 77.2 (COMCRUDIV 4), Bombardment and Capture of
Leyte Island, Philippine Islands, October 16th - 24th, 1944, Serial
00147, November 5th, 1944.
120 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
0000 - 1830, October 24th" and therefore was familiar with the reported
strength of the Japanese forces in that area at this time.
At 0634 he ordered CTU 77.2.1 to proceed to the fueling
area at 0645 and to remain there until the battleships had completed
fueling.* At 0755 he released his remaining ships and ordered them to
proceed to their FS areas as previously directed. After this time and
until 1721 he operated largely as CTU 77.2.2«
Probably around 0943 he learned of the presence of an
additional Japanese surface force in the Sulu Sea. This was the THIRD
Section off Negros Island (Contact "10", Plate XV). Although its reported
composition was about twice that of its actual composition (the Japanese
SECOND Striking Force at this time being still unlocated) CTG 77.2 by late
morning had formed a not unreasonable estimate of the forces moving
generally toward Leyte.
About 1000 he conferred with CTU 77.2.1 aboard the
LOUISVILLE but what the subject was is not available to this analysis.
At 1312 (when it was received by CTF 79) he received CTF
77' s TBS voice radio message to the effect that he considered an enemy
night surface attack on Leyte Gulf tonight via Surigao Strait was imminent
and to make all preparations.**
At 1505 (when it was received by CTF 79) he received a
dispatch from CTF 78 (a) requesting him to assume antisubmarine patrol
around TF 78 commencing at daylight the following day and (b) stating that
the JOHN RODGERS and ANDERSON which were stationed on patrol in the
vicinity of Suluan Island were being withdrawn for fuel and then would
report to CTG 78.2.***
At 1513 he received orders from CTF 77 to prepare for
night battle.**** These orders stated (a) that an enemy force estimated
to consist of two BB, four CA, four CL and ten DD had been attacked in the
eastern Sulu Sea by carrier planes and might arrive Leyte Gulf that night,
(b) directed him to make all preparations for a night engagement and (c)
advised him that (1) TG 77*3 had been assigned to him for reinforcement
and (2) CTG 70.1 had been ordered to station a maximum number of MTB's in
lower Surigao Strait to remain south of Latitude 10°-10'N during
darkness .*****
*" Action Report CALIFORNIA, Participation in Operations off Island of
Leyte, P.I., October 19th - 24th, 1944, Serial 0025, November 8th,
1944.
** CTF 77 TBS Voice Radio Message 240412 October 1944 to CTG 77.2,
info CTF 78 and CTF 79.
*** CTF 78 Dispatch 240101 October 1944 to CTG 77.2, info CTF 77, CTG
78.2.
**** Preliminary Action Report CTG 77.2, Battle of Surigao Strait,
October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
***** CTF 77 Dispatch 240315 October 1944 to CTG's 70.1, 77.2, 77.3, CTF's
78, 79, All TFC's 3RDFLT, COMFEAF, info C0M3RDFLT, All TGC's 3RD
and 7THFLT«s, COMINCH, CINCSWPA.
121 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
He nowcompleted his battle plan. As this plan had
already been formulated and as he had been keeping a thorough running
estimate he was enabled to complete the plan rather speedily. He
realized that time was passing and that some time would pass before the
plan could be received and studied by his command. He, therefore,
decided to call a conference of his Commander Battle Line and his
Commander Right Flank Force to (a) acquaint them with the plan, (b)
ascertain their views thereon and (c) make any changes deemed necessary
prior to issue.
At about 1525 in accordance with this decision he
requested the above two commanders to report on board to discuss the
battle plan*
The first commander to report on board was CTU 77.2.1
(Commander Battle Line) who reported on board at approximately 1540.
Without waiting for CTG 77.3 to arrive CTG 77.2 now
discussed the plan with his Commander Battle Line. The discussion
lasted for some time and therefore it was not until about 1645 that
Commander Battle Line returned to the MISSISSIPPI.*
A few minutes after this— at about 1647 — CTG 77.3 who
was to be Commander Right Flank Force reported on board for conference.
CTG 77.2 immediately outlined the battle disposition and general plan of
action for the night as he had done with CTU 77.2.1. Realizing the
importance of the right flank, as this was the shortest route to the
transport areas, he offered to augment the six destroyers of TG 77.3 but
CTG 77.3 declined the offer for reasons discussed under "Operations of
CTG 77.3, 0000 - 1830, October 24thM. This discussion lasted only twenty
minutes for at 1710 CTG 77.3 returned to the PHOENIX.**
At each of the two conferences CTG 77.2 pointed out that
(a) (1) the amount of AP ammunition in all battleships was low and that
there was likewise a shortage of ammunition of all types throughout the
force, (2) it was, therefore, essential that the battleships fire at
ranges where their percentage of hits and their fire effect would both be
high, (3) this was settled as between 17,000 and 20,000 yards, (b) (1) it
appeared as if a wonderful opportunity for using the torpedoes in the
offensive role for which they had been designed would be presented and it
was emphasized that each such opportunity would be immediately acted upon,
(2) it was necessary for the destroyers to keep to the sides of the Strait
in attacking and in retiring because it was thought that the enemy radar
would probably be ineffective against the land, and because it was feared
that any of our destroyer units retiring toward our battle line might be
fired on by own forces.
Both Commander Battle Line and Commander Right Flank Force
were very enthusiastic about the battle plan.
* Deck Log MISSISSIPPI, October 24th, 1944.
** Deck Log PHOENIX, October 24th, 1944.
122 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
He now prepared to issue the plan but before he could do
so he received several dispatches relating thereto. These were (a) at
1650 (when it was received by CTF 79) COMSEVENTHFLT's Supplement to
Harbor Defense Plan No. ONE, quoted in full under "Operations of CTF 77,
0000 - 1830, October 24th", which, among other things, ordered him to
take night station in lower Leyte Gulf and to destroy enemy forces
encountered,* and (b) at 1716, CTF 77' s instructions to CTG 70.1 to
insure that enemy forces did not pass undetected through the Strait
between Dinagat Island and Mindanao Island.**
He studied these dispatches with relation to his Battle
Plan and noted that there was no clash*
During the late afternoon he decided to send all of the
ship's planes which could not be stowed in the ships' hangars ashore
for the night. After a series of voice messages, arrangements were made
for the LST's at the southern beaches to tend these planes.*** As a
result the battleships and the Right Flank Cruisers sent all of their
planes, but the Left Flank Cruisers sent only those planes which could
not be placed in the hangars, the exact number being unknown. This
reduced the fire hazard during battle and prevented the planes from being
damaged by the concussion of gunfire.
At 1721 he directed the units which were to comprise his
Left Flank Force to form a circular disposition and proceed toward his
night battle station.**** The various units concerned then headed for
their stations in this circular disposition which was not completely
formed until 1835*
* C0M7THFLT (likely CTF 77) Dispatch 240543 October 1944 to All TF
and TG Commanders 7THFLT, info COMSOWESPAC, C0M3RDFLT.
** CTF 77 Dispatch 240609 October 1944 to CTG 70.1, info CTG 77.2.
*** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosures (B) and
(D).
**** Action Report MINNEAPOLIS, Participation in Bombardment of Leyte
Island, Philippine Islands, October 18th - 24th, 1944, Serial 0212,
November 1st, 1944.
123 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
October 24th
Now realizing that it was vital to issue the plan
immediately he, at 1725, issued it as follows:
"General Situation: Enemy aircraft and naval forces
seem to be assembling westward in the Visayas for an offensive strike
against Leyte area. All today air attacks have been made against our
naval forces in the Leyte Gulf. Attack tonight by enemy striking group
of at least two BBs, four CA, four CL, ten DDs may occur after 1900.
"General Plan: This force will destroy by gunfire at
moderate ranges and by torpedo attack enemy surface forces attempting
to enter Leyte Gulf through either Surigao Strait east or Surigao
Strait south.
"Tasks: Battleline Rear Admiral Weyler, BATDIV THREE
less NEW MEXICO, IDAHO, FOUR less COLORADO, TWO plus destroyers as
designated. Destroy or repel enemy battleline by gunfire closing rapidly
to moderate range of from seventeen to twenty thousand yards. Left Flank
Forces CRUDIVS FOUR less INDIANAPOLIS plus MINNEAPOLIS, TWELVE less
MONTPELIER and CLEVELAND plus destroyers as designated. Defend Left
Flank own battleline. Attack enemy battleline. Right Flank Force Rear
Admiral Berkey CRUDIV FIFTEEN less NASHVILLE, RAN cruiser SHROPSHIRE,
DESDIV FORTY SEVEN. Defend Right Flank own battleline. Attack enemy
battleline. XRAY Battle disposition assumed will be similar to A-2 in
USF 10(A) with battleships in initial station Latitude 10°-35' (east of
Huntungan /HLngatungan/ Point), Longitude 125°- 16' E and steaming in an
easterly direction at five knots. Upon arriving at Longitude 12$o-27'E,
battleships should reverse course and operate back and forth within these
limits of Longitude unless directed otherwise using destroyers as screen
as desired.
124
CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
"Flank Forces maintain stations on battleline. Destroyer
attacks may be launched prior to engagement of battleline. All ships
keep alert for enemy torpedoes and bear in mind possibility of passing
through enemy torpedo water prior to attack.
"Use 3845 kilocycles as primary voice circuit designated
channel ABLE. Use 3980 kilocycles as secondary voice designated channel
BAKER. Use 575 kilocycles for CW communications. Use zone minus 9 time.
Commander Task Group 77.2 in CA 28 with Left Flank Force."* (Plate XVII).
THIS PLAN AS REGARDS FORMAT ERRED IN NOT DESIGNATING A
TIME AT WHICH THE PLAN WAS TO BE EFFECTIVE. HOWEVER, THIS WAS NOT A
VITAL WEAKNESS FOR, IN VIEW OF THE SITUATION, IT WAS CLEAR TO ALL THAT
IT WAS EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT.
It will be noted that the confusion existing in the minds
of some of the commanders in the Leyte Gulf area as to the number of
battleships in the Japanese force approaching in the Sulu Sea which is
indicated in the disparity between (a) the 0910 contact report from a
search plane in Sector TWO which stated that there were four battleships,**
(b) CTF 77*3 battle order issued at 1215 which stated that there were two
battleships,*** and (c) CTF 77's order to CTG 73.7 issued at 1225 which
ordered a search of the Mindanao and Sulu Seas and stated that there were
four battleships,**** also existed in the mind of CTG 77.2. This is
indicated by his use of the phrase, "at least two BB's", rather than two
BB's in his battle plan to his forces.
At 1752 (when it was received by CTF 79) he received a
dispatch from CTF 77 quoted in full under "Operations of CTF 77, 0000 -
1830, October 24th" advising him that motor torpedo boats could be
expected to be operating as far north as Latitude 10o-17fN and that
there would be thirty motor torpedo boats on station.*****
MEANWHILE HE BECAME AWARE OF THE FACT THAT IT WAS HIGHLY
LIKELY THAT HIS DISPATCH BATTLE PLAN WOULD NOT BE DELIVERED TO THE FLAG
AND COMMANDING OFFICERS OF HIS SHIPS FOR WHAT MIGHT WELL BE A LONG TIME
SINCE, ONCE HAVING BEEN RECEIVED, IT HAD TO BE DECODED AS WELL. HE
DECIDED TO TRANSMIT THE DISPATCH BY TWELVE INCH SEARCHLIGHT TO CERTAIN
OF HIS SHIPS FOR RELAY TO THE RESPONSIBLE COMMANDERS. THEREFORE,
COMMENCING AT 1800, HE BEGAN TRANSMITTING IT TO THE COLUMBIA IN PLAIN
LANGUAGE.****** HE REALIZED THAT IN SO DOING HE WAS PERHAPS ENDANGERING
* CTG 77.2 Dispatch 240825 October 1944 to TG 77.2, TG 77.3.
** Aircraft in Sector 2 Dispatch 240010 October 1944 to All Stations
on this Circuit.
*** CTF 77 Dispatch 240315 October 1944 to CTG 77.2, CTG 77.3, CTG
70.1, etc.
**** CTF 77 Dispatch 240325 October 1944 to CTG 73.7, info COM3 RDFLT, etc.
***** CTF 77 Dispatch 240711 October 1944 to CTG 77.2, info CTG 77.3
and CTG 70.1.
****** Action Report COLUMBIA, Bombardment of Leyte Island, Philippine
Islands, October 17th - 24th, 1944, Serial 0012, November 1st, 1944.
125 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2 and CTG 77.4
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
SECURITY, BUT HE FELT THAT HE HAD TO CHOOSE BETWEEN TWO EVILS AND DECIDED
THAT (a) IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT FOR HIS COMMANDERS TO HAVE THE PLAN THAN
TO DENY IT TO THE ENEMY AND (b) THE CHANCE OF THE ENEMY PROFITING BY THE
RECEIPT OF THIS DISPATCH WAS REMOTE FOR NUMEROUS REASONS, AMONG WHICH
WERE (1) IT WAS NOT LIKELY THAT JAPANESE SOLDIERS WERE WAITING TO CATCH
JUST SUCH A DISPATCH, (2) IF CAUGHT IT HAD TO BE TRANSLATED INTO JAPANESE,
(3) IT HAD THEN TO BE COMMUNICATED TO THE JAPANESE NAVAL COMMANDERS
CONCERNED VIA THE ARMY CHAIN OF COMMAND, WHICH IN VIEW OF THE SITUATION
ASHORE IN LEYTE, WAS LIKELY TO BE A MOST LENGTHY UNDERTAKING, CERTAINLY
MORE THAN A MATTER OF HOURS. HIS DECISION, THEREFORE, SEEMS TO HAVE BErU
CORRECT AND LOGICAL AND WAS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF A "COMMAND DECISION".
ACTUALLY (a) THE COLUMBIA DID NOT RECEIVE THE DISPATCH TRANSMITTED BY
RADIO UNTIL 0145 THE FOLLOWING MORNING AND (b) JAPANESE SOURCES OF
INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THIS ANALYSIS DO NOT MENTION HAVING INTERCEPTED
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE SEARCHLIGHT TRANSMITTED DISPATCH.
(4) Operations of CTG 77.4 (Escort Carrier Group), 0000 - 1330,
October 24th.
CTG 77.4, with a total of 310 VF and 188 VT, continued to
(a) provide (1) air cover and support over the objective area and (2) air
protection for his own units, and (b) operate off southern Samar with
TU's 77.4.1, 77.4.2 and 77.4.3 (Diagram "C").
It must have been before 0212 that he received CTF 77' s
dispatch instructions (which had been prompted by the possibility of a
large enemy attack brewing) to (a) unless otherwise directed, cancel the
western Visayas strike and (b) increase the TCAP to thirty-six VF with
an additional sixteen VF in Condition ELEVEN* (fighters capable of being
launched on ten minutes notice), for at that time he directed CTU's
77.4.2 and 77.4.3 to (a) cancel all special strikes, (b) increase the
TCAP for each unit to twelve VF each and (c) keep six VF in Condition
ELEVEN.** Since he himself was CTU 77.4.1 he had already taken this
action for his own command.
During the early morning hours he likely learned of the
ANGLER and GUITARRO contacts on the Main Body (Contacts "2", "3" and "4",
Plate XV).
Shortly after 0500 he launched his TCAP so that it was on
station over Leyte Gulf at about 0600, and at 0530 he launched his local
patrols.***
At 0603 he advised CTF 73 that he expected to have two
carriers (CHENANGO and SAGINAW BAY) at Morotai to pick up planes on
October 26th,****
* CTF 77 Dispatch 231532 October 1944 to CTG 77.4, info TG 77.4, TF 77,
CTG 77.13, TF 79, C0M3RDFLT.
** CTG 77.4 Dispatch 231712 October 1944 to CTU's 77.4.2, 77.4.3.
*** War Diary CTG 77.4, October 24th, 1944.
**** CTG 77.4 Dispatch 232103 October 1944 to CTF 73, info CTG 73.4,
CTF 77.
126 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.4
October 24th
For about two hours the TCAP patrolled over Leyte Gulf
without encountering enemy opposition although, during this time, a
carrier-type bomber made a poor but unopposed (by the TCAP) attack
against Leyte Gulf shipping, and a MOGAMI-based float plane made a
thorough reconnaissance of Leyte Gulf without interference,*
Shortly before 0745 a large enemy air strike developed.
At least thirteen additional fighters were launched from the CVE's to
augment the TCAP.**
At this time the TCAP was being controlled by the CSACP
(Commander Support Aircraft Central Philippines) in the WASATCH with the
MC GOWAN (FD ship for southern area of Leyte Gulf)*** and BRYANT also
controlling,**** Eighteen to twenty enemy aircraft were intercepted at
15,000 feet as they started down over San Juanico Strait,**** Other
attack groups, some penetrating from north central Leyte, were also
intercepted. The air battle was joined, TG 77,4 planes were successful
in blunting the attack and destroying a large number of enemy aircraft.
Upwards of forty enemy planes were claimed shot down by the TCAP, which
claims were later revised downward by CTG 77.4.***** Japanese records
available to this analysis do not disclose their losses for this specific
attack although they do estimate that their first attack, and by far
their largest of the day, was composed of eighty planes,******
The Allies did not entirely escape damage as (a) four
ships were hit (discussed more fully under "Operations of CTF 77, 0000 -
1830, October 24th") and (b) three VF were shot down,*******
**■
War Diaries PHOENIX, NSWCOMB, October 24th, 1944; also Detailed
Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October 18th -
25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
Aircraft Action Report Nos, 110-44, VC-3 and 53-44, VC-4; also
Action Report PETROV BAY, Direct Air Support for the Landings at
Leyte Island, Central Philippines, October 20th - 30th, 1944,
Serial 052, November 2nd, 1944.
War Diary BENNION, October 24th, 1944.
Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for the Capture, Occupation and
Defense of Leyte, P.I,, including the Battle of Surigao Strait,
Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944.
Aircraft Action Report Nos. 60-44, VC-60; 22-44, VC-26; 20-44,
21-44, VC-27; 110-44, VC-3; 53-44, VC-5; also CTG 77.4 Dispatch
240803 October 1944 to CTF 77, info CTF's 78, 79, All TGC«s
TF 77.
2ND Air Division Dispatch dated October 25th, 1944, ADVATIS
Bulletin No. 170.
Action Report SAVO ISLAND, Operations against Philippine Islands,
October 13th - November 3rd, 1944, Serial 074, November 3rd,
1944; also Aircraft Action Report 110-44, VC-3 (KALINAN BAY) and
Deck Log WHITE PLAINS, October 24th, 1944.
***■
■B-3HH?-
■a*-**-*-
•JBHHf-H-M-
•*#-****-*■
127
CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.4
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
ALTHOUGH THE JAPANESE HAVE GIVEN NO REASONS FOR THIS
FAILURE OF THE AIR ATTACK TO (a) ACHIEVE SUCCESSFUL PENETRATION OR (b)
DESTROY OR DAMAGE SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF SHIPS IN LEYTE GULF THE FAILURE
WAS LIKELY DUE TO THE FOLLOWING: (a) ADEQUATE AND TIMELY PREPARATION OF
DEFENSES BY STATIONING THE TCAP OVER THE ENEMY OBJECTIVE (LEYTE GULF)
WELL BEFORE THE ATTACK DEVELOPED AND IN SUFFICIENT STRENGTH TO REPEL THE
ATTACK, (b) USE OF CONVENTIONAL TACTICS BY THE ENEMY IN APPROACHING AT
MEDIUM TO HIGH ALTITUDE (TEN TO TWENTY THOUSAND FEET) IN WAVES THEREBY
SIMPLIFYING THE CONTROLLING SHIPS' PROBLEM OF INTERCEPTION RATHER THAN
ATTACKING FROM MANY DIRECTIONS IN SMALL, WELL DISPERSED ELEMENTS AT
GREATLY VARYING ALTITUDES TO CAUSE SATURATION OF THE RADAR WARNING AND
FIGHTER DIRECTION NETS, (c) THE LOW QUALITY OF THE JAPANESE PILOTS AS
EVIDENCED BY THEIR WEAK DEFENSIVE FLYING AND (d) THE COPIOUS USE OF
SMOKE BY LEYTE GULF SHIPS WHICH SERVED TO SERIOUSLY COMPLICATE THE
PROBLEM OF TARGET SELECTION DURING THE ENEMY'S FINAL ATTACK RUN.
During the latter part of the morning, the CHENANGO and
SAGINAW BAY completed transferring planes and recovering flyable duds
from the other CVE's of the group, preparatory to their departure for
Morotaio* The CHENANGO transferred seven VF and eight VT which left
eleven VF on board while the SAGINAW BAY transferred all of her aircraft
(fifteen VF and twelve VT) and received four flyable VT duds in return.
At about 1130 the second major attack against Leyte Gulf
consisting of several groups of enemy planes commenced. CTF 77 reported
them as being one large, one medium and one undetermined sized group.**
In the ensuing air battle the TCAP was augmented by
fighters diverted from their ground support missions by the fighter
director,*** The attack was not successful for it not only failed to
damage any Allied shipping but, based on Allied records, TG 77,4 pilots
claimed having destroyed at least sixteen enemy planes in air combat,***
Japanese records available to this analysis do not record their losses
during this specific attack. The Allies lost two VF, one of which was
lost in a mid-air collision with a Japanese carrier-type fighter.****
During the forenoon CTG 77,4 learned of Allied air attacks
on the Japanese Main Body off Mindoro and on the THIRD Section in the
Sibuyan Sea0
Because of the fact that at 1220 he launched a strike
composed of thirty-two VF and twelve VT***** against the western Visayas
and in particular against Bacolod Airfield and Bacolod Harbor in
* Deck Log CHENANGO, October 24th, 1944; also Action Report SAGINAW
BAY, Leyte Operation, October Uth - 29th, 1944, Serial 0127,
November 4th, 1944,
** CTF 77 Dispatch 240239 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
*** Aircraft Action Report Nos. 61-44, VF-60; 112-44, VC-3; 5-44, VC-61;
63-44, VC-21; 21-44, VC-27; 14-44, VC-70.
**** Action Report MANILA BAY, Operations in Support of Occupation of
Leyte, P.I., October 12th - 30th, 1944, Serial 0103, November 2nd,
1944.
***** Aircraft Action Report No. 19-44, VF-26.
128 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.4
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
northwestern Negros Island, it is quite clear that sometime during the
middle of the morning he had been ordered by CTF 77 to reinstitute sweeps
against western Visayan airfields .*
This attack against Bacolod airfield and harbor struck at
1500. After evaluating his pilot's claims he reported to CTF 77 that his
pilots destroyed on the airfield two enemy land- reconnaissance fighters,
two carrier- type attack planes, two two-engine land-attack bombers and
damaged one single-engine plane.** As before, Japanese records available
to this analysis do not record their losses during this specific attack.
At 1324 he advised CTF 77 in part that CTU 77.4.14 in the
SAGINAW BAY, in company with the CHENANGO, EDMONDS and OBERRENDER would
(a) depart the area off Leyte Gulf at 1700 for Morotai to pick up
replacement aircraft and (b) arrive off east coast Morotai at 0500
October 26th.***
During the afternoon numerous small groups appear to have
attempted to penetrate Leyte Gulf with several of the enemy planes being
shot down.****
As was discussed under "Operations of C.G. FOURTH Air
Army, 0000 - 1830, October 24thM, twenty-nine Japanese aircraft
participated in an afternoon raid, but no mass attack of such size was
recorded by the Allies.
At 1643 TU 77.4.14 composed of the SAGINAW BAY, CHENANGO,
EDMONDS and OBERRENDER took departure for Morotai .*****
During the day, in addition to the TCAP, TASP missions and
the special strike against Bacolod Airfield, TG 77.4 aircraft few reduced
ground support missions****** and routine local patrols.
In assessing all claims for the day CTG 77.4 estimated
that his planes had destroyed (a) seven two-engine bombers, one carrier-
type reconnaissance plane, twenty two-engine light bombers, eighteen
single-engine fighters, three two-engine fighters, (b) probably shot down
eighteen two-engine bombers, (c) destroyed on the ground, one two-engine
land-attack bomber, two land reconnaissance planes, one carrier-type bomber
and one single-engine fighter and (d) possibly destroyed on the ground one
* CTF 77 Dispatch 240054 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info All TGC's
3RD and 7THFLT's, CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, All TFC's 3RDFLT,
C.G. 5TH Air Force, etc.
** CTG 77.4 Dispatch 242322 October 1944 to CTF's 77, 79, info CTF 78,
All TGC»s TF 77.
*** CTG 77.4 Dispatch 240424 October 1944 to CTF 77.
**** Aircraft Action Report Nos. 22-44, VC-26 and 23-44, VC-27.
***** Deck Log SAGINAW BAY, October 24th, 1944; also War Diary COMCARDIV
22, October 24th, 1944.
****** Aircraft Action Report Nos. 14-44, VC-81; 67-44, VC-20; 43-44,
VC-75; 44-44, VC-25; 111-44, VC-3 and 54-44, VC-5.
129 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77*4 and CTG 70.1
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
land-reconnaissance plane and one army-type fighter, for a total of fifty-
four planes destroyed and twenty probably destroyed. The Japanese
reported that forty-seven planes failed to return out of approximately
147 missions flown.*
During the day TG 77.4 had lost five VF in combat and four
VF and one VT operationally. Also, with TU 77.4.14 there were eleven VF
and four VT. Therefore, he had left in his sixteen carriers remaining in
the vicinity of Leyte Gulf approximately 290 VF and 183 VT.
(5) Operations of CTG 70.1, 0000 - 1830, October 24th.
At the beginning of the day CTG 70.1, in the OYSTER BAY
with the WILLOUGHBY and twenty-eight MTB's, was at anchor in San Pedro Bay.
At this same time (a) the WACHAPREAGUE with eleven MTB's was at anchor at
Liloan Bay, (b) PT's 127, 128, 130 and 196 (from MTB RON SEVEN) and PT's
150, 191, 192 and 195 (from MTB RON TWELVE) were on patrol or sDecial
missions and (c) PT's 491 and 495 (from MTB RON THIRTY-THREE) were on a
mission to guerrillas. All of these assignments and what they accomplished
are discussed under "Operations of CTG 70.1, 1042 - 2400, October 23rd".
These MTB's, with the exception of these in item (c), appear to have
returned to the tenders shortly after daylight, in accordance with their
basic instructions which were, in part: (1) to move to and from their
patrol areas during daylight, (2) to be inside their patrol waters by
thirty minutes after sunset, (3) not to leave their patrol waters until
thirty minutes before sunrise, and (4) ordinarily to clear their patrol
areas shortly after daylight.** The item (c) MTB's returned at 1320.***
Commencing at about 0831 he observed that an air attack
had developed in force, as discussed under "Operations of CTF 77, 0000 -
1830, October 24th", and he learned shortly that his MTB's and their
tenders had escaped damage.
Lmmediately after breakfast he, with CTU 70.1.3,**** in
accordance with orders from CTF 77' s Operations Officer, reported on board
the WASATCH for a conference with that officer. This conference was held
because he had arranged with CTF 77 that "in view of the necessity for
briefing boat officers early in the day to allow time for boats to arrive
on patrol stations", "CTG 70.1 would be notified as early as possible (by
CTF 77) voice radio when enemy movement toward Surieao Strait was
anticipated" .*****
* Daily Record of the War Situation, 4TH Air Army, GHQ FEC Special
Historical Collection Supporting Documents to General of the Army
Douglas MacArthur's Historical Report on Allied Operations in the
Southwest Pacific Area (Item 4, Footlocker 10 of 10, SWPA Series,
Volume II).
** CTG 70.1 Operation Plan No. 2-44, No Serial, October 5th, 1944,
Annex F, Paragraph 1-4.
*** War Diary MTB RON 33, October 23rd and 24th, 1944.
**** Lieutenant Commander Robert G. Leeson, USNR, who was the Senior MTB
RON Commander in the area.
***** Action Report CTG 70.1, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, Night
of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 1-0330, December 1st, 1944.
130 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 70.1
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
Matters discussed were largely (a) the readiness of the
MTB»s, (b) the number which could be made available and (c) their
proposed deployment, as CTF 77 desired them to be so disposed as "to
obtain the earliest possible information of the approach of any enemy
forces attempting to pass through Surigao Strait that night with the
intent of a hit and run raid on the transports in the Leyte Gulf area.
The incidental purpose was to inflict early damage by PT torpedoes",*
(Note: This statement as to CTF 77' s desires does not
appear correct since CTF 77' s dispatches discussed later refer to "lower
Surigao Strait" and "to report and attack" rather than "to obtain earliest
possible information of the approach of any enemy forces attempting to
pass through Surigao Strait that night". It is believed that these
errors are attributed to the passage of time and the consequent lapses
in memory,)
During this conference he advised the Operations Officer
that , owing to the long trip from Mios Woendi under their own power,
several of the boats were in bad shape but that he would get a great
majority in the lower part of the Strait that night.*
It also seems likely that he discussed with CTF 77' s
Operations Officer the various contacts received during the night and,
therefore, was able to make a reasonably good estimate of the capabilities
of the enemy surface forces.
Upon his return from the WASATCH he, with his staff and
CTU 70,1,3, immediately commenced studying the situation to determine
where best to station his MTB«s should CTF 77 so direct,**
This was not too difficult to determine for, as pointed
out above, he had discussed the prospective deployment with CTF 77 's
Operations Officer and therefore was cognizant with CTF 77 's broad ideas
on the employment of MTB's,
Nothing unusual appears to have arisen during the
remainder of the forenoon.
About noon he received the expected order by TBS voice
radio which directed him to station the maximum number of MTB's in lower
Surigao Strait during the night. Fortunately this message was received
(a) prior to briefing the MTB»s for routine patrols and (b) in time to get
all of the MTB's which were in operating condition ready and briefed for
the special situation,***
* Letter from Vice Admiral (then Captain) R. H. Cruzen, USN (Ret).
Operations Officer to CTF 77, to Commodore R. W. Bates, USN (Ret),
Head World War II Battle Evaluation Group, Naval War College, May 27th,
1957.
** Statement of Commander (then Lieutenant Commander) Robert G. Leeson,
USNR, CTU 70.1.3 at the time of the Battle of Surigao Strait, to
Commodore R. W. Bates, USN (Ret), Head World War II Battle Evaluation
Group, Naval War College, July 14th, 1958,
*** Action Report CTG 70.1, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, Night of
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 1-0330, December 1st, 1944.
496799 o - s, - is 131 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 70.1
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
He now completed his plan. He realized that it was
particularly important that the Commanding Officer WACHAPREAGUE receive
this plan as soon as possible for neither that officer nor the MTB|s with
the WACHAPREAGUE had any information concerning the planned disposition
of the WACHAPREAGUE MTB's for this evening. He, therefore, in his plan,
not only gave instructions to the Commanding Officer WACHAPREAGUE as to
the manner in which he wished the WACHAPREAGUE MTB's to be dedoyed but
also as a matter of information gave the deployment of the OYSTER BAY
MTB's.
At 1404 he issued this plan, as follows:
"Expect Tokyo Express tonight. Before darkness station
boats in sections of two or three each at following positions: Southwest
tip of Panaon Island, south of Madilao Point, south of Limasawa Island,
two sections Datrol between Agio Point Bohol past Camiguin Island to
Sepaca Point Ydndanao. Vital repeat vital each section leader report
contacts and that other section leaders and WACHAPREAGUE relay these
reports to CTF 77. Twenty-one boats from OYSTER BAY stationed by sections
as follows: southeast Panaon Island, Bilaa Point Mindanao; in Surigao
Strait five sections: one off Sumilon Island, one midchannel off
Kanhatid Point Dinagat Island, two off Kanihaan Island, one southeast
Amagusan Point. WACHAPREAGUE inform LCI's last station. Sections attack
independently after making contact report."* (Plate XIX).
THE FIRST LINE OF THE BATTLE PLAN— i.e., EXPECT TOKYO
EXPRESS TONIGHT— IS OF GREAT INTEREST TO THIS ANALYSIS IN THAT IT SHOWS
THAT AS LATE AS 1404 ON THIS DAY THE CONCEPT OF A TOKYO EXPRESS OPERATION
WAS IN THE MIND OF CTG 70.1. SINCE, AS MENTIONED EARLIER, CTG 70.1 HAD
BEEN IN CONFERENCE THAT FORENOON WITH CTF 77 'S CHIEF OF ST.AFF IT SEEMS
LOGICAL TO SAY THAT THIS MATTER HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN THAT CONFERENCE AND
THAT THE CHIEF OF STAFF HAD ONCE AGAIN EMPHASIZED THE EXPECTED NATURE OF
THE ENEMY'S OPERATION IN THIS FASHION, AS DISCUSSED IN VOLUME III UNDER
"OPERATIONS OF CTF 77 (CENTRAL PHILIPPINES ATTACK FORCE), 0000 - 1042,
OCTOBER 23 RD".
CTG 70.1 stated in his action report that the "PT's were
stationed to give complete coverage of the approaches to Surigao Straits,
to insure detection of the enemy by whatever route he approached, and to
inform our heavier forces, with the sections inside Surigao Straits as
striking groups, stationed to insure almost continuous contact by at least
one group. Each section was instructed to report any enemy sighted, then
attack, independently".**
WHAT HE MEANT BY THIS PARAGRAPH IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR FOR
THE WORDING AFTER "TO INFORM OUR HEAVIER FORCES" SEEMS THOROUGHLY CONFUSED,
WHEfHER THIS WAS A CLERICAL ERROR OR AN ERROR OF SUBSTANCE IS NOT KNOWN.
HOWEVER, THE GENERAL CONCEPT WAS THAT THE MTB'S WERE SO STATIONED BOTH IN
* CTG 70.1 (OYSTER BAY) Dispatch 240504 October 1944 to WACHAPREAGur,,
info All TFC's 7THFLT and All TGC's 7THFLT.
** Action Report CTG 70.1, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, Nieht of
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 1-0330, December 1st, 1944.
132 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 70.1
CONFIDENTIAL
THE APPROACHES TO SURIGAO STRAIT (SOUTH) AND IN THE STRAIT ITSELF AS TO
INSURE DETECTION AND ALMOST CONTINUOUS CONTACT BY AT LEAST ONE SECTION.
THERE SEEMS TO BE CONSIDERABLE DOUBT AS TO THE WISENESS
OF THIS PLAN FOR THE MTB'S WERE WIDELY DISPERSED, AND THEIR RADARS WERE
NOT PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE, THEREFORE IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR ENEMY FORCES
TO PASS WITHOUT DETECTION. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS WAS THE FAILURE OF THE
CAMIGUIN PT'S TO DETECT THE THIRD SECTION AND THE SECOND STRIKING FORCE.
WOULD IT NOT HAVE BEEN WISER HAD MORE MTB«S BEEN CONCENTRATED IN THE
VICINITY OF LOWER SURIGAO STRAIT WITH A SCREEN ACROSS THE STRAIT TO DENY
UNDETECTED PASSAGE? WOULD NOT THIS HAVE GIVEN AMPLE WARNING TIME TO CTG
77*2 (ABOUT TWO HOURS) AND WOULD IT HAVE NOT PERMITTED A MULTIPLE ATTACK
BY NUMEROUS MTB'S? IN MAKING THIS COMMENT IT IS OF COURSE RECOGNIZED
THAT THE CURRENTS WERE STRONG AND WOULD MAKE STATION KEEPING DIFFICULT.
He also stated in his action report that in order "to
avoid any possibility of PT's attacking own forces, the sections stationed
nearest own forces in the upper end of the Straits were positively
instructed to get clear and stay clear if there were any indications of
own forces moving into their areas. No ships moving down the Straits
during or after the battle were to be attacked by any boats unless
positively identified as enemy".* This was sound procedure,
IT IS OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST THAT, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT IN THIS PLAN THE NECESSITY FOR REPORTING THE CONTACTS PRIOR TO
ATTACKING WAS GIVEN STRONG EMPHASIS, CTU 70.1.3 (COM MTB RON SEVEN) WHO
WAS THE SENIOR MTB OFFICER IN THE SURIGAO STRAIT AREA STATED LATER IN HIS
ACTION REPORT THAT HIS MISSION WAS "TO REPORT AND ATTACK ANY ENEMY CRAFT
ENCOUNTERED". HE APPEARS TO HAVE OBTAINED THIS FROM CTF 77 'S DISPATCH
240319 MENTIONED LATER WHEREIN THE ASSIGNED TASK WAS "TO REPORT AND ATTACK
ENEMY SURFACE FORCES ENTERING LEYTE GULF". WHY HE ACCEPTED THIS TASK
RATHER THAN THAT ASSIGNED BY HIS OWN TASK GROUP COMMANDER, I.E., "VITAL
REPEAT VITAL EACH SECTION LEADER REPORT CONTACTS" AND "SECTIONS ATTACK
INDEPENDENTLY AFTER MAKING CONTACT REPORT", IS NOT KNOWN. AS WILL BE
SHOWN LATER IN THE DISCUSSIONS RELATIVE TO THE MTB'S, DURING THE BATTLE OF
SURIGAO STRAIT SOME OF THE MTB'S WERE CLEARLY MOTIVATED BY THE "REPORT AND
ATTACK" DOCTRINE HEREIN MENTIONED. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT IN THE BRIEFINGS
GIVEN THE MTB COMMANDING OFFICERS PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE FOR THEIR
STATIONS, THE NECESSITY FOR INSURING THAT THE CONTACT REPORTS WERE MADE
BEFORE ATTACKING WAS NOT GIVEN THE PROPER EMPHASIS.
At 1501 the battle plan was received by the Commanding
Officer WACHAPREAGUE, in Liloan Bay, who immediately informed the
responsible MTB officers of the fifteen MTB's which he was tending. ** He
likely pointed out that all of them were to be stationed to the westward
of a line joining Binit and Bilaa Points. Meanwhile COM MTB RON TWELVE had
informed the commander of the LCI group in Liloan Bay of the (1) MTB's to
be stationed off Amagusan Point and (2) the necessity for establishing a
patrol off the entrance to Sogod Bay, since all MTB's would be on assigned
patrol stations .***
* Action Report CTG 70.1, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, Night of
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 1-0330, December 1st, 1944.
** War Diary WACHAPREAGUE, October 24th, 1944.
*** Action Report CTU 78.3.5, Central Philippines, Panaon Attack Group,
No Serial, November 30th, 1944.
133 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 70.1
October 24th
At 1520 CTG 70.1 noted that the MTB«s based on the OYSTER
BAY in Leyte Gulf had started south for their stations and at 1535 he
noted that all leaving had departed. He was particularly pleased because
he had succeeded in dispatching twenty-four MTB's,* which was not only
more than he had promised CTF 77 's Operations Officer but, as shown by his
battle order, was three more than he had planned on using at the time of
preparing the order. These extra MTB's allowed him to have three in each
section and an extra section which he stationed off Amagusan Point. (Of
the two sections off that point he stationed one east of the point and one
south of the point.**)
Sometime before 1611 he received two important dispatches
from CTF 77, quoted in full under "Operations of CTF 77, 0000 - 1830,
October 24th", (a) the first received was 240319 which not only directed
him to station his MTB's in lower Surigao Strait but also directed that
the (1) MTB's were to remain south of Latitude 10°-10'N during darkness
and (2) assigned task was to report and attack enemy surface forces
entering Leyte Gulf,*** and (b) directed his command to (1) prepare for
night engagement and (2) the MTB's to remain south of Latitude 10°-10'N
during darkness.**** These dispatches were of considerable concern to him
for his MTB's had already departed for their assigned stations which meant
that six of his MTB's in Surigao Strait (South Amagusan Point and East
Amagusan Point) would be north of Latitude 10°-10'N. He, therefore,
notified CTF 77 to this effect.*****
Meanwhile, down at Liloan Bay the Commanding Officer
WACHAPREAGUE had been busily engaged in assisting the fifteen MTB's there
to prepare for action. At 1730 the first MTB's got underway and by 1830
all had departed0* This was a source of satisfaction for now there would
be three MTB's in each section on each of his assigned stations. ******
The motor torpedo boats from the OYSTER BAY and the
WACHAPREAGUE were assigned to stations as shown in the following table*******
and were en route at this time.
*
**
***
****
*****
******
*******
Various PT Action Reports, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944.
Action Report PT 328, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No
Serial, October 30th, 1944; also Action Report PT 320, Night
of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial, October 30th, 1944.
CTF 77 Dispatch 240319 October 1944 to CTG 70.1.
CTF 77 Dispatch 240315 October 1944 to CTG 77.3, CTF 73, CTF 79,
CTG's 77.2, 70.1 and all TFC's 3RDFLT.
Action Report CTG 70.1, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands,
Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 1-0330, December 1st,
1944.
War Diary WACHAPREAGUE, October 1944, Serial 073, October 31st,
1944.
Data in this table is from CTU 70.1.3 Report of PT Action,
Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial, November 10th, 1944,
to CTG 70.1.
134
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
SECTION
Bohol PT's
Camiguin PT's
Limasawa PTfs
Southwest Panaon PT!s
Madilao Point PT's
Southeast Panaon PT's
Bilaa Point PT's
Sumilon PT's
Lower Surigao PT's
Upper Surigao PT's
Kanihaan PT's
PT'S ASSIGNED*
152, 130, 131
127, 128, 129
151, 146, 190
196, 150, 194
192, 191, 195
134, 132, 137
494, 497, 324
523, 524, 526
490, 491, 493
327, 321, 326
495, 489, 492
South Amagusan Point PT's 320, 330, 331
East Amagusan Point PT's 328, 323, 329
CTG 70.1
October 24th
LOCATION
North half of a line from Agio
Point, Bohol Island, to Sipaca
Point, Mindanao Island,
Midpoint: 9°-33'N, 124°-38«E
South half of a line from Agio
Point, Bohol Island, to Sipaca
Point, Mindanao Island,
Midpoint: 9°-12'N, 124°-49'E
South of Limasawa Island.
9°-52'N, 125°-04'E
Southwest tip of Panaon Island.
9°-54'N, 125°-15'E
Madilao Point, Mindanao Island.
9°-45'N, 125°-23'E
Southeast tip of Panaon Island.
9°-55'N, 125°-15'E
Bilaa Point, Mindanao Island,
9°-49«N, 125°-25'E
South of Sumilon Island.
9°-54'N, 125°-26'E
Midway between Kanhatid Point,
Dinagat Island and Panaon
Island.
10°-05'N, 125°-22'E
4 miles west of Kanihaan
Island.
10°-10«N, 125°-24'E
South of Kanihaan Island.
100-10'N, 125°-28'E
South of Amagusan Point, Leyte.
10°-14'N, 125°-15'E
2 miles east of Amagusan Point,
Levte.
10&-15'N, 125°-17'E
* OTC in first listed PT.
135
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 78.3 and CTU 78.3.5
October 24th
At some time prior to 1833 he received a dispatch from
CTF 77 directing him to insure that enemy forces do not pass undetected
through the strait between Dinagat Island and Mindanao Island (Hinatuan
Passage)* for at that time he sent the following dispatch to the
WACHAPREAGUE for relay to Commander Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 36 (OTC
of the Sumilon PT's) and to PT 494 (OTC of the Bilaa Point PT's on board):
"Deliver following message to Comron 36 and to PeeTee 494. Plain
Language. Keep watch on passage to east of you in addition to one to
west."**
(6) Operations of CTG 78.3 (Panaon Attack Group) and CTU
78.3.5 (Control and Support Craft), 0000 - 1830, October 24th.***
At 0000 CTU 78.3.5 with TU 78.3.5 composed of PC's 1122,
1133, LCl(G)'s 68, 70 (F), LCl(R)'s 31 (F), 342, LCI(D) 29 remained in
the Sogod Bay - Cabalian Bay area. Little of importance occurred until
1300. At that time he was notified by Commanding Officer WACHAPREAGUE
that an attack by Japanese surface forces was expected that night. Later
he was informed that he would be required to patrol over the mouth of
Sogod Bay. He therefore deployed his units as follows: (a) LCl(G)'s 68
and 70 patrolled a line across the mouth of Sogod Bay from Santa Cruz to
Ilijan Point, (b) PC's 1133 and 1122 patrolled on a line north and south
from Calipian Point in Cabalian Bay and (c) LCl(R)'s 342 and 31 anchored
in Cabalian Bay near Molopolo. In addition the LCI'G)'s were employed
throughout the night relaying voice communications from the WACHAPRSAGUE
to PT boats and between PT boats. However all attempts to communicate
with CTF 78, with one relay exception, were unsuccessful.
He feared that his patrolling units might be attacked by
PT's which had been stationed in Surigao Strait. During the remainder
of this period little of importance occurred.
CTF 77 Dispatch 240609 October 1944 to CTG 70.1, info CTG 77.2.
CTG 70.1 Dispatch 240933 October 1944 to WACHAPREAGUE, info CTF 77.
Action Report CTU 78.3.5, Central Philippine - Panaon Attack Group,
No Serial, November 30th, 1944.
136
CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 71
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
(b) Operations of CTF 71, OOOO - 1330, October 24th •
Shortly after the beginning of this day CTF 71 received a
dispatch from the BERGALL reporting her position in the South China Sea
and requesting and extension of patrol.* He no doubt welcomed this
request as the number of submarines on patrol was diminishing while the
activities of enemy combatant ships was increasing. In this connection
it will be recalled that he had committed himself on October 10th to
provide for the period October 15th - 25th (a) fifteen U.S. submarines
for patrol and (b) four additional submarines for lifeguard duty.**
(The Allied submarines south of the equator are not included in this
discussion.) (Volume III, Plate X.)
He now studied his running estimate to see what could be
done about the situation. He could see that on this day only thirteen
(BREAM, GUITARRO, ROCK, BERGALL, ANGLER, DACE, DARTER, GURNARD, COBIA,
BATFISH, COD, BLACKFIN, PADDLE) out of the thirty-five submarines in
his command could be depended upon to maintain patrol including one
submarine (PADDLE) assigned to part time lifeguard duty. It will be
noted that this number includes (a) the ROCK and BERGALL whose patrol
had expired but which, due to a relatively uneventful patrol, were being
retained in their designated areas for a few more days,*** and (b) (1)
the DACE which had been authorized to remain on station until dark on
this day,**** and (2) the DARTER which on the 21st had been ordered to
remain on patrol a few more days.*** It also includes the COBIA which,
although departing the area, still had considerable fuel on board and
all twenty-four torpedoes.*
He realized that some of these submarines would have to be
replaced where possible and that he would be forced to rely on the
submarines on patrol for these replacements.
* War Diary CTF 71, October 23rd, 1944.
** CTF 71 Letter, Serial 00323, November 17th, 1944, to CTF 77.
*** CTF 71 Dispatch 210536 October 1944 to CTG 71.1 (ROCK, BERGALL,
DARTER) .
**** CTF 71 Dispatch 221043 October 1944 to CTG 71.1 (DACE).
137 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 71
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 0041 he sent a summary dispatch to his submarines informing
them of the DACE and DARTER attack and the contact report of the ANGLER,
both events of the previous day.*
At about 0140 he received a contact report from the GUITARRO
reporting an enemy task force at 0030 in Latitude 13°-00'N, Longitude
119°-30,E, consisting of three probable battleships in a group of from
fifteen to twenty ships on course 080°(T), speed eighteen knots.**
Knowing that the DACE and DARTER were occupied in Palawan
Passage with little patrol time remaining, at least for the DACE, and that
Balabac Strait was now uncovered, he (a) at 0154 directed the BLACKFIN,
upon arriving in her area D-6, to cover the western approaches to Balabac
Strait, with early report of enemy heavy units important, (b) cautioned
her not to enter any of the channels of this strait due to the possibility
of enemy mines, and (c) advised her that the DACE would depart at sunset
this day, but that the DARTER would be patrolling southern Palawan Passage
for a few more days.***
IT IS NOT CLEAR WHERE HE ACHIEVED THIS CONCEPT OF "A FEW MORE
DAYS", FOR AS INDICATED ABOVE, IT WAS ON OCTOBER 21ST THAT HE HAD ADVISED
THE DARTER THAT HE PLANNED TO RETAIN HER ON PATROL FOR A FEW MORE DAYS,
AND NOW NOT ONLY HAD SEVERAL MORE DAYS ELAPSED, BUT THE DARTER HAD BEEN IN
ACTION AGAINST THE JAPANESE MAIN BODY AND HAD REPORTED BUT SIX TORPEDOES
REMAINING AT 2140 THE PREVIOUS EVENING. WHILE ITEM (c) OF THIS DISPATCH
SEEMS UNREALISTIC IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT IT WAS SO WORDED TO ADVISE THE
BLACKFIN THAT SHE MIGHT ENCOUNTER THESE SUBMARINES IN MOVING TO STATION OR
WHILE ON STATION.
At 0324 he advised interested commands of the contacts reported
by the GUITARRO**** and BREAM***** on the previous day.
At about 0410 he received an amplifying report from the ANGLER
reporting that at 0330 the force was heading south through Mindoro Strait,
speed twenty knots. ******
At 0457 (when it was received by CTF 79) he likely learned
from the DACE that the (a) DARTER was aground on Bombay Shoal, (b) DACE
had discontinued her attack on the damaged cruiser in order to assist the
DARTER and (c) estimated position of the damaged cruiser and two destroyers
was Latitude 09°-18«N, Longitude 117°-02«E, course 210°(T), speed six
knots ,*******
*" CTF 71 Dispatch 231541 October 1944 to All Submarines,
** GUITARRO Dispatch 231610 October 1944 to CTF 71; also War Diary
CTF 71, October 1944.
*** CTF 71 Dispatch 231654 October 1944 to BLACKFIN, TG 71.1, info
DARTER and DACE.
**** CTF 71 Dispatch 231824 October 1944 to C.G. 5TH Air Force, C.G. 13TH
Air Force, info CINCPAC, COMSUBPAC, All CTG's 3RD and 7THFLT's.
***** CTF 71 Dispatch 241838 October 1944 to All Commanders, All TFC's
3RD and 7THFLT»s, C.G. 5TH and 13TH Air Forces.
****** ANGLER Dispatch 231840 October 1944 to CTF 71.
******* DACE Dispatch 231850 October 1944 to CTF 71.
138 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 71
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At about this time he received a surprising dispatch. This
was from the GUITARRO reporting three definite battleships and two possible
carriers headed south through Mindoro Strait at 0330,* Now, if not before,
he knew that it was highly probable that the ANGLER and GUITARRO were in
contact with the same force which now included carriers,
A short time later, about 0700, he received with satisfaction
a DACE dispatch reporting that all DARTER personnel had been rescued and
the boat demolished,** However, he likely became very concerned when, at
0915, he received another dispatch from the same submarine to the effect
that (a) efforts to demolish the DARTER failed, (b) all torpedoes had been
expended and she was now employing her deck gun, (c) she was standing by
to make another demolition attempt that night and (d) she requested planes
or another submarine to complete the job.***
He, no doubt, received a COMTHIRDFLT message, passed to him by
CINCPAC, concerning activities along the west coast of Luzon north of
Lingayan, recommending assistance from TF 71 submarines.**** Submarine
observations in that area would be helpful during current epidemic of
Japanese movements. There was only one submarine (COD) in this locality
on patrol, although the CERO of TF 72 was transiting the area northbound.
Shortly after noon (at 1217) he directed the PADDLE, by
dispatch, to return to Fremantle .***** In so doing he knew, from previous
communications with her, that the COBIA would not be able to remain in
this area for air strikes on the 26th, although not as yet ordered.
About this time he may have learned that a search plane had
sighted a major enemy force at 0810 just south of Mindoro on course 050°
(T). ****** New, if not before, he could estimate that this was probably
the same force sighted by his submarines and that they were not headed for
Coron Bay, but instead appeared to be headed toward the eastern Philippines.
Meanwhile, he had been estimating the situation to determine
what he should do relative to the DACE's request for "another submarine to
complete the job". Should he (a) divert a submarine from another patrol
station and continue the destruction efforts, or (b) direct that the (1)
more highly classified equipment such as the Torpedo Data Computer be
destroyed and then (2) submarine concerned continue his patrols or retire
from the area.
He decided on the former and, at 1242, (a) directed (1) the
ROCK, which was about fifty miles to northwestward of North Danger Shoal,
to proceed at best speed to Bombay Shoal to destroy the DARTER, (2) upon
* GUITARRO Dispatch 231900 October 1944 to CTF 71.
** DACE Dispatch 232130 October 1944 to CTF 71.
*** DACE Dispatch 232345 October 1944 to CTF 71.
**** CINCPAC Dispatch 232352 October 1944 to C0M7THFLT, info CINCSWPA,
CTF 71, CTF 77, C0M3RDFLT.
***** CTF 71 Dispatch 240317 October 1944 to PADDLE, TG 71. 1.
****** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232322 October 1944 to CTG's 38.3 and 38.4, info
COMINCH, All TFC's 3RD and 7THFLT«s,
139 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 71
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
destruction of the DARTER the DACE and ROCK to rendezvous and then take
half of the rescued crew each and return to Fremantle via Karimata
Strait, Java Sea and Lombok, and (3) the ROCK to acknowledge this
dispatch and give her estimated time of arrival at Bombay Shoal,* and
(b) advised that the DACE was standing by.
THE QUESTION NOW ARISES AS TO THE WISENESS OF THIS DECISION.
CERTAINLY THERE IS CONSIDERABLE DOUBT ABOUT IT FOR CTF 71 HAD KNOWLEDGE
OF STRONG JAPANESE FORCES IN THE AREA AND IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT
INFORMATION BE CONTINUOUSLY OBTAINED REGARDING THE MOVEMENT OF THESE AND
OF OTHER FORCES NOT AS YET LOCATED. THIS REQUIRED, INSOFAR AS THE TF 71
SUBMARINES WERE CONCERNED, THAT EACH SUBMARINE AVAILABLE BE PROPERLY
EMPLOYED.
THEREFORE, DOES IT NOT APPEAR THAT A WISER DECISION WOULD
HAVE -BEEN TO HAVE: (a) DESTROYED THE HIGHLY CLASSIFIED EQUIPMENT
EMPLOYING THE DACE AND ROCK OR BOTH, (b) DIVIDED THE CREW OF THE DARTER
BETWEEN THE DACE AND ROCK IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THE COMBAT EFFICIENCY
OF THE ROCK WOULD NOT BE IMPAIRED? THIS WOULD LIKELY HAVE MEANT THAT
ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE DARTER'S CREW WOULD BE IN THE ROCK. BY
DOING THIS IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO RETAIN THE ROCK IN THE AREA
FOR SEVERAL MORE DAYS WHILE THE DACE RETURNED TO FREMANTLE. WHY THIS
WAS NOT DONE IS NOT KNOWN BUT IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT CTF 71 FELT THAT
THE HABITABILITY FACTORS WERE GOVERNING.
About this time he likely learned of an enemy force estimated
to (a) consist of two battleships, two to four heavy cruisers, four light
cruisers and ten destroyers reported under air attack in the eastern Sulu
Sea at 0910 and (b) be able to arrive Leyte Gulf tonight.**
With one enemy force in the Sulu Sea and the other heading
east, south of Mindoro, he now attempted to close the channels leading
to these areas to intercept the return of these forces.
He studied the deployment of his submarines and quickly
realized that it was highly important to cover the northern approaches
to Palawan Passage. But, what submarines did he have available for this
purpose? Not the ANGLER or GUITARRO, for they were already in good
intercepting positions. Not the BREAM, for she was in position to obtain
information concerning the movement of Japanese forces along the west
coast of Luzon. This left the BLACKFIN which was en route to station off
Balabac Strait. But if he changed the BLACKFIN 's assignment how could
he cover the western approaches to Balabac Strait?
He decided that this could be done only by shifting the
BERGALL from the western China Sea to the Strait. Having made this
decision he, at 1323, cancelled the BLACKFIN1 s latest orders and directed
her to patrol north of Palawan Passage to cover routes from southward to
Mindoro and Linapacan Straits. In the same dispatch he advised her the
ANGLER was in A-4, the BREAK and GUITARRO in A-3 and the BERGALL west of
Balabac Strait.***
* CTF 71 Dispatch 240342 October 19V* to ROCK.
** CTF 77 Dispatch 240315 October 1944 to CTG 77.3, CTF 79, CTF 73, etc.,
info C0M3RDFLT, COMINCH, CINCPAC, etc.
*** CTF 71 Dispatch 240423 October 1944 to BLACKFIN.
L40 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 71
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
His decisions in the matter seem correct, for certainly the
major portion of the Japanese fleet was clearly in the Coron Bay -
Mindoro Island area.
Shortly thereafter he informed CTF 77 of the DARTER'S
predicament and the action being taken,* He then, at 1334, directed the
BERGALL to (a) cover the western approaches to Balabac Strait with early
report of enemy heavy units important, (b) refrain from entering the
Strait due to the probability of enemy mines and (c) at dark on October
28th return to Fremantle via Karimata Strait, Java Sea and Lombok Strait,**
At 1531 he sent a summary of submarine activities to
C0M3RDFLT, including the GUITARRO' s report of ships heading south
through Mindoro Strait,*** This dispatch was somewhat in error in that,
among other items, it stated that "GUITARRO and ANGLER reported three
definite battleships and two possible carriers headed south through
Mindoro Strait at 0330 24th speed twenty",**** Actually it was the
GUITARRO which made this report — the ANGLER merely reported that the force
previously reported by her was heading south through Mindoro Strait at
0330 speed twenty.*****
This error, while it had no effect on the operations because
it was not received by other commands until late the following day,
nevertheless emphasizes the necessity for great care in analyzing contacts
and in providing accurate information. Since CTF 77 had estimated on the
previous day that it was "possible that enemy carriers will support surface
forces and strike from west of Palawan" this error by CTF 71, had it been
received earlier, might have adversely affected both CTF 77 and the Allied
commanders' estimates.
IN THIS CONNECTION U.S. NAVAL DOCTRINE PROVIDES "WHEN THE
PRESENCE AND EXACT LOCATION OF THE ENEMY ARE KNOWN THE COMPOSITION AND
ACTION OF THE FORCE ARE OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE" .******
Later during the evening (at 1716) he assigned the COBIA to
lifeguard duty for the strike on Tarakan (NE Borneo) at 1100, October 26th,
and in the same dispatch provided her with the necessary information so
that she might accomplish her mission effectively,*******
* CTF 71 Dispatch 240432 October 19V* to CTF 77.
** CTF 71 Dispatch 240434 October 1944 to BERGALL.
*** CTF 71 Dispatch 240651 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
**** GUITARRO Dispatch 231900 October 1944 to CTF 71.
***** war Diary CTF 71, October 24th, 1944; also War Patrol Report
ANGLER, Report of FIFTH War Patrol, Serial 09(10), November 9th,
1944.
****** Basic Fleet Operational Communication Doctrine (NWP 16), Chapter
V, Operational Instructions, Paragraph 504(a).
******* CTF 71 Dispatch 240816 October 1944 to COBIA,
141 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 71
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
Meanwhile, he concerned himself with endeavoring to provide
some intelligence concerning enemy activities along the west coast of
Luzon as requested by COMTHIRDFLT . He knew that the COD was in that
area and likely the CERO as well but since the CERO was on a soecial
mission from CTF 72 (Submarines East Australia) he clearly (as
COMSUBSOWESPAC) was reluctant to divert her. He therefore, at 1736,
directed the COD, among other things, to continue to patrol area A-2
until further orders and to let him know if she was forced to depart.*
(1) BREAM and GUITARRO
It will be recalled that the BREAM had arrived in her
assigned patrol area in Area A-3 which was to the westward of Subic Bay
on the previous evening. She now patrolled on the surface during
darkness and submerged during daylight.*-* During the forenoon she
recovered six Japanese soldiers from life rafts which she thought were
from the convoy which the BLUEGILL had attacked on October 18th.***
She appears to have obtained little pertinent information from these
prisoners. However, her picking them up was in accordance with CTG 71.1fs
Operation Plan which stated in part, nas a great deal of information is
frequently obtainable from enemy prisoners of war, submarines are
encouraged to bring back an occasional prisoner".****
At 2200, when it was received by the GUITARRO, she
received CTF 71 's dispatch stating that friendly planes had sighted a
large Japanese task force proceeding to the Sibuyan Sea via Mindoro Strait
and directing the BREAM to patrol Area A-3.***** Since she was already
in that area this dispatch required no movement.
It will also be recalled that at midnight the GUITARRO
was in contact with an enemy task force estimated to consist of fifteen
to twenty ships including probably three battleships. At 0110 she
reported this to CTF 71 giving course as 030°(T), speed 18 knots.******
She endeavored to attack but was forced away by enemy ships operating
on what the GUITARRO thought were radar bearings.
Finally, at 0400 she advised CTF 71 that the Japanese
force, consisting of three definite battleships and two possible carriers,
was headed south through Mindoro Strait at 0330.******* This was the
Main Body, FIRST Striking Force composed of twenty-seven ships including
five battleships. There were no carriers. Whence came the idea that
there were likely carriers is not known but this incorrect report had an
adverse effect on Allied planning.
* CTF 71 Dispatch 240836 October 1944 to COD.
** Deck Log BREAM, October 24th, 1944.
*** War Patrol Report BREAM, Report of 3RD War Patrol, Serial 021,
November 22nd, 1944.
**** CTG 71.1 Operation Plan 1-44, September 1st, 1944, Annex B, Page 9.
***** CTF 71 Dispatch 241214 October 1944 to GUITARRO, ANGLER and BilEAM.
****** GUITARRO Dispatch 231610 October 1944 to Radio Perth, info
CINCPAC, C0M3RDFLT.
******* GUITARRO Dispatch 231900 October 1944 to CTF 71.
142 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 71
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 0600 she closed Cape Calavite to about two miles and
at 1125, while submerged, she sighted one light and one heavy cruiser
unescorted which headed down Mindoro Strait,* These cruisers were not
identified correctly for the larger ship was the light cruiser KINU and
the smaller ship was the destroyer URANAMI comprising the remnants of
CRUDIV SIXTEEN and were en route to Cagayan, Mindanao.** She did not
report this until 2024 when, having surfaced at 1949, she reported it to
CTF 71.***
Since the operations of many of the submarines were in
general uneventful comment hereafter will be confined solely to those
submarines which contacted enemy units,
(2) ROCK and BERGALL
These two submarines were in the South China Sea assigned
to patrol along a line between Cape Varella and North Danger Shoal.
The ROCK patrolled her station on the eastern half of
the patrol line. She patrolled on the surface during darkness and
submerged during daylight.****
The BERGALL, on the other hand, was not on station but
was instead returning to the patrol line after a sweep of the area south
of Saigon. She generally remained on the surface during daylight as well
as during darkness. Shortly after midnight she requested a five days'
extension of patrol as she had 40,000 gallons of fuel and seventeen
torpedoes .*****
These submarines are mentioned here because, although both
of them as of 1830 had had uneventful patrols, they later received orders
from CTF 71 to move elsewhere thus eliminating the patrol on the Cape
Varella - North Danger Shoal Line.
The BERGALL at 2200 received orders to patrol the western
approaches to Balabac Strait (thus replacing the DARTER) and to depart
the area for Fremantle on the 28th,****** and sometime prior to 2301 the
ROCK received order to proceed to Bombay Shoal to attempt destruction of
the DARTER******* which was aground, for at that time she acknowledged
these orders to do so.
* War Patrol Report GUITARRO, Report of 3RD War Patrol, Serial 044,
November 16th, 1944o
** Detailed Action Report URANAMI, SHO No. 1 Operation, October
18th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161717, NA 11801.
*** GUITARRO Dispatch 241124 October 1944 to Radio Perth.
**** Deck Log ROCK, October 24th, 1944.
***** War Diary CTF 71, October 23rd, 1944.
****** CTF 71 Dispatch 240434 October 1944 to BERGALL.
******* CTF 71 Dispatch 240342 October 1944 to ROCK.
143 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 71
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
(3) ANGLER
At midnight the ANGLER, on the surface, was tracking the
Main Body, FIRST Striking Force. She was well astern and was endeavoring
to close. She correctly determined that the enemy force (a) at 0200 was
on course 090o(T) and (b) at 0300 had entered Mindoro Strait, speed
nineteen - twenty knots.* At 0330 she endeavored to make an amplifying
report but owing to Japanese jamming and other interference she did not
know whether or not she had succeeded. However, her attempt was
successful as CTF 71 received the report about 0410.** She now, at 0340,
decided to patrol the north entrance to West Apo Passage in case the
force doubled back and later, at 0550, submerged to patrol northwestern
Mindoro Strait «
THE COMMANDING OFFICER STATED THAT HE MADE THIS DECISION
BECAUSE HE FELT BY DOING SO HE WOULD BE IN GOOD POSITION TO INTERCEPT
SHOULD THE ENEMY DOUBLE BACK THROUGH THAT STRAIT. While this might well
have proved to be correct it is of interest that later at 2130 he received
a dispatch from CTF 71 addressed to the GUITARRO, ANGLER and BREAM wherein
(a) they were advised that a large Japanese task force was proceeding to
the Sibuyan Sea via south of Mindoro Island, (b) he was directed to Datrol
south of Lubang Island and to cover the southwest approaches to Verde
Island Passage and (c) it was suggested that Admiral Halsey might send
them back that way,,*** It is also of interest that this was one of the
two stations originally assigned the BLUEGILL and ANGLER on October 14th
and from which the Commanding Officer ANGLER, after the BLUEGILL had left
the area, had departed on October 21st on his own initiative to patrol
off the northern end of Palawan Passage,
His patrol as of 1830 except for the above was uneventful.
(4) DACE and DARTER
It will be recalled that (a) these two submarines were
approaching to attack the damaged TAKAO which was being escorted by the
destroyers NAGAN AMI and ASASHIMO, and (b) the DARTER was to attack first
from the starboard quarter in about ninety minutes while the DACE was to
attack from the port bow if the DARTER was forced down or chased off •
As the DARTER closed on the surface she detected two
enemy radars sweeping and decided against a surface attack.**** This was
correct for the ASASHIMO reported at this time that she had sighted by
radar a suspicious object bearing 080°(T) which was probably a bearing on
the DACE.***** The wolf pack commander (in the DARTER) now (a) directed
* War Patrol Report ANGLER, Report of 5TH War Patrol, Serial 09(10),
November 9th, 1944.
** CTF 71 War Diary, October 24th, 1944, Serial 00341.
*** CTF 71 Dispatch 241214 October 1944 to GUITARRO, ANGLER and BREAM.
**** War Patrol Report DARTER, Report of 4TH War Patrol, Serial 020,
November 5th, 1944.
***** Detailed Action Report TAKAO, Antisubmarine Action, October 23 rd -
25th, 1944, WDC Document 160141, NA 11839.
144 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 71
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
the DACE to attack and (b) advised that the DARTER was commencing an end
run around to starboard in order to attack from ahead at radar depth.
(On this end run the Commanding Officer DARTER planned to close no
nearer to the TAKAO than 15,000 yards.)
By 0100 the DARTER, making seventeen knots, had opened
to about 18,000 yards. At 0105 she grounded on Bombay Shoal with such
force that all subsequent attempts failed to get her off. The Commanding
Officer (who was also the wolf pack commander) attributed this grounding
to the lack of navigational sights for about thirty hours.*
WHILE THIS FACT MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE GROUNDING
THE MOST LIKELY REASON APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A MISTAKEN BELIEF THAT THE
TAKAO WAS STEAMING MORE OR LESS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE CHANNEL AND WAS,
THEREFORE, APPROACHABLE IN SAFE WATER AT A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE FROM
EITHER SIDE.
The Commanding Officer DARTER now informed the DACE that
the DARTER was aground. Soon after this he detected by radar a Japanese
destroyer closing and therefore, at 0115, commenced burning Secret and
Confidential matter and destroying Confidential gear. He endeavored to
lighten ship and with the arrival of the DACE endeavored to get off the
shoal. Having failed he, at 0404, commenced transferring his crew to the
DACE by rubber boats i^hich was not completed until 053 5** after which
time he attempted to destroy the DARTER employing demolition equipment
which proved to be ineffective as regards the hull. Finally the torpedoes
and gunfire of the DACE were utilized in an attempt to destroy the DARTER
but with little effect.
Nothing now occurred until evening excepting that about
1136 a Japanese destroyer approached the DARTER.
The Commanding Officer DACE appears to have been taking
his designated station bearing 150°(T), distant ten miles from the TAKAO.
At 0030 he was directed by the wolf pack commander to attack when ready.
As he continued closing his station he, at 0107, learned that the DARTER
was aground. He therefore decided to delay his attack until he had more
information but then, without waiting, he decided to close the DARTER
and at 0240 contacted her aground on Bombay Shoal.** Why he chose to
close the DARTER rather than to attempt to destroy the TAKAO is not
explained. It would appear, however, that he felt that (a) since the
cruiser was clearly heavily damaged and was screened by destroyers his
chance of success there was not great unless the operation was conducted
employing wolf pack tactics which, with the grounding of the DARTER, was
no longer possible and (b) he had every hope of rescuing the crew of the
DARTER and of assisting in her destruction.
* War Patrol Report DARTER, Report of 4TH War Patrol, Serial 020,
November 5th, 1944 •
** War Patrol Report DACE, Report of 5TH War Patrol, Serial 09, November
6th, 1944.
145 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 71
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
IF THESE WERE HIS REASONS THEY SEEM OF DOUBTFUL CORRECTNESS
FOR THE CRUISER APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN WIDE OPEN TO ATTACK FROM AHEAD SINCE
THE DESTROYERS, INSTEAD OF SCREENING ON THE BOWS, WERE, IN THE OPINION OF
THE COMMANDING OFFICER DARTER, SCREENING ON EACH BEAM AT A DISTANCE OF
PERHAPS 4,000 YARDS.* (ACTUALLY THIS WAS LNCORRECT FOR THE TAKAO, IN HER
ACTION REPORT, STATES THAT THE NAGANAMI WAS SEVENTY DEGREES ON HER PORT
BOW, THE ASASHIMO SEVENTY DEGREES ON HER STARBOARD BOW, BOTH DISTANT 2,000
YARDS FROM THE TAKAO.)** THIS WAS A DISPOSITION SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH
HAD PERMITTED THE DACE AND DARTER TO ATTACK THE MAIN BODY SUCCESSFULLY
ON THE PREVIOUS MORNING, AND WOULD MOST LIKELY HAVE PERMITTED A SUCCESSFUL
ATTACK HERE, AND THEN A LATER RESCUE OF THE DARTER'S CREW AND THE
DESTRUCTION OF THE DARTER.
HOWEVER, THERE MAY HAVE BEEN ANOTHER AND MORE PRESSING
REASON. THE COMMANDING OFFICER DACE MAY HAVE FELT THAT IT WAS MORE
IMPORTANT AT THIS TIME TO RESCUE IMMEDIATELY THE CREW OF THE DARTER AND
THEN TO DESTROY HER, LEST THERE FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS (a) HER CLASSIFIED
EQUIPMENT AND INFORMATION AND (b) HER OFFICERS, WHO 'WERE LIKELY WELL
INFORMED ON THE DISPOSITION OF TF 71 SUBMARINES AND OF ALLIED PLANS IN
GENERAL.
By 0350 the Corcmanding Officer DACE reported to CTF 71
by dispatch that (a) the DARTER was aground on Bombay Shoal, (b) he had
discontinued his attack to assist, (c) the damaged ATAGO (type) heavy
cruiser plus two destroyers was, at 0200, in Latitude 09°-18'N, Longitude
117°-02«E on course 210° (T), speed six knots.***
At 0539 he cast off from the DARTER with the latter' s
crew aboard and waited the effect of the demolition charges which they had
set. At 0600, the demolition charges having failed to destroy the ship,
he attempted to destroy her by firing his last four torpedoes, two at
0610 and two at 0630.
Also, at 0630, he sent another dispatch to CTF 71
reporting the DARTER personnel as rescued and the submarine destroyed.****
This latter statement was, of course, erroneous.
At 0645, having no more torpedoes, he decided to employ
four-inch shells and commenced firing but, after firing thirty rounds
and making twenty-one hits, he was, at 0650, forced to submerge by a
Japanese plane which then apparently bombed the DARTER.
* War Patrol Report DARTER, Report of 4TH War Patrol, Serial 020,
November 5th, 1944 •
** Detailed Action Report TAKAO, Antisubmarine Action, October 23rd -
25th, 1944, WDC Document 160141, NA 11839.
*** DACE Dispatch 231850 October 1944 to CTF 71.
**** DACE Dispatch 232130 October 1944 to CTF 71.
L46 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 71
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 0905 realizing that he had made an erroneous report to
CTF 71 he surfaced and sent another report to that commander wherein he
stated, in part, that (1) his efforts to demolish the DARTER had failed,
(2) his torpedoes were expended, (3) he had hit with four-inch shells,
(4) he was standing by, (5) would attempt to board that night and (6)
requested planes and submarines.*
At 1050 he made radar contact upon a plane which was
closing and submerged. At 1118 he heard echo ranging and at 1136, upon
sighting a Japanese destroyer approaching the DARTER, he decided to clear
the area. At 1830 he surfaced and commenced a slow approach on the DARTER.
(Note: The destroyer (NAGANAMI) above referred to
appears to have shelled the DARTER for about three minutes; to have
attempted to destroy her presumably by firing torpedoes, and by
endeavoring to pull her off the reef, but to no avail. The NAGANAMI,
which had the HIY0D0RI with her, now collected material from the submarine
which she sent directly to SECOND Fleet (FIRST Striking Force)
Headquarters .**
(5) GURNARD
This submarine which, at 1401 on the previous day, had
been directed to cover the southwest approaches to Brunei Bay with
instructions as follows, "Reporting movement of enemy heavy forces very
important",*** was en route to this new station as shown in Diagram "C".
At 1141, while submerged, she made a contact by sight on
top masts and smoke, distant about fifteen miles. The Commanding Officer
GURNARD estimated the situation and decided that he should investigate
the contact which was on a southwesterly course.****
WHILE THIS DECISION SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN INCORRECT IN THAT
BY TRACKING THIS CONTACT HIS ARRIVAL OFF- BRUNEI BAY MIGHT BE DELAYED
0VERL0NG THERE WAS ALWAYS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CONTACT MIGHT PROVE TO
BE IMPORTANT. IN THIS CONNECTION THE COMMANDING OFFICER GURNARD STATED
THAT HIS REASONS FOR TRACKING THE TARGET WERE THAT HE HAD HEARD OF THE
ATTACKS BY THE DACE AND DARTER ON THE JAPANESE FORCE IN PALAWAN PASSAGE
AND FELT THAT, ALTHOUGH IT WAS TOO EARLY TO EXPECT ONE OF THE SHIPS FROM
THAT FORCE TO BE AT THIS POINT, THE PRESENCE OF ANOTHER BATTLESHIP WAS
NOT REMOTE. SOUND MILITARY DECISION STATES THAT IN SUCH CASE THE
COMMANDER, "TAKES ACTION ACCORDING TO THE DICTATES OF HIS OWN JUDGEMENT,
GUIDED BY THE KNOWN VIEWS OF HIS SUPERIOR" .*****
* DACE Dispatch 232345 October 1944 to CTF 71.
** Detailed Action Report TAKAO, Antisubmarine Action, October 23rd
25th, 1944, WDC Document 160141, NA 11839.
*** CTF 71 Dispatch 230501 October 1944 to TG 71.1 (GURNARD).
**** War Patrol Report GURNARD, Report of 7TH War Patrol, Serial 030,
November 17th, 1944.
***** Sound Military Decision, U.S. Naval War College, 1942, Page 16.
496799 0-59-19
147 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 71
October 24th
He therefore headed in that direction and at 1250
determined the contact to be a battleship.
At 0330 he reported to CTF 71 that he had (a) sighted the
tops of a probable battleship on base course 255°(T), approximate speed
sixteen knots, in Latitude 03°-10«N, Longitude 109°- 17* E, (b) six
torpedoes forward and five aft and (c) his special mission had not yet
been accomplished.
IN SENDING THIS DISPATCH THE COMMANDING OFFICER GURNARD
WAS COMPLYING WITH DOCTRINE WHICH PROVIDES THAT WHEN A COMMANDER MODIFIES
THE ORDERS GIVEN TO HIM BY HIS SUPERIOR HE SHOULD INFORM THAT SUPERIOR OF
THIS FACT AT THE FIRST AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY.*
He now continued on the surface to track the target and
by 1830 had not closed sufficiently to identify it.
Actually this was not a battleship but was, instead, a
small target which fooled the Commanding Officer, GURNARD, to the extent
that, at 2024, he stated, MWe knew we had been taken in."** The small
ship opened fire, the GURNARD retired and, at 2134, once more headed for
Brunei Bay having lost about ten hours,
(6) COBIA
The COBIA was en route to Fremantle and at this time was
passing through the Sulu Sea. As of 1830 the day had passed uneventfully.
However, sometime before the end of the day she received
orders from CTF 71 to perform lifeguard duty for an air strike by the
THIRTEENTH Air Force against Tarakan on October 26th,*** which modified
her orders temporarily.
(7) BLACKFIN
This submarine, which at midnight was northeast of
Dangerous Ground, was proceeding toward her patrol area D-6 where she
was to guard the western approaches to Balabac Strait. She proceeded
on the surf act during darkness and submerged during daylight.
As of 1830 her movement had been uneventful.****
However, at 2129, she received by dispatch from CTF 71 a
change in her orders. In this dispatch, quoted in full under "Operations
of CTF 71, 0000 - 1830, October 24th", she was directed to patrol Area A-5
north of Palawan Passage to cover the routes from southward to Mindoro
and Linapacan Straits. *****
Sound Military Decision, U.S. Naval War College, 1942, Page 16.
*
War Patrol Report GURNARD, Report of 7TH War Patrol, Serial 030,
November 17th, 1944.
CTF 71 Dispatch 240816 October 1944 to TG 71.1 (COBIA).
War Patrol Report BLACKFIN, Report of 1ST War Patrol, Serial 021,
December 4th, 1944©
CTF 71 Dispatch 240423 October 1944 to TG 71.1 (BLACKFIN).
148
CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 71
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
(8) PADDLE
This submarine was in Makassar Strait where she was
patrolling between Cape Mangkalihat and North Watcher Island, Excepting
for exchanging calls with a U.S. submarine, presumably the BATFISH, her
patrol as of 1830 was uneventful.*
However, at 2111, she received orders from CTF 71 to
return to Fremantle** and immediately commenced complying by heading
down Makassar Strait.*
* War Patrol Report PADDLE, Report of 6TH War Patrol, Serial 018,
November 1st, 1944.
** CTF 71 Dispatch 240317 October 1944 to TG 71.1 (PADDLE).
149 CONFIDENTIAL
CAAF SOWESPAC and
C.G. FIFTH AIR FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
(2) Operations of CAAF SOWESPAC, 0000 - 1830, October 24th.
CAAF SOWESPAC was at this time embarked in the NASHVILLE while the
operation of his aircraft in support of the KING II Operation continued
to be controlled from Hollandia.
He was concerned with the problem of supplies being off loaded
next to the Tacloban airstrip. He had initiated action on the preceding
day to rectify this situation. Again on this day he went ashore about
1000 to inspect the airstrip and upon arrival found off loaded supplies
still impeding construction. He remained on the scene to expedite
removal cf these supplies and by nightfall he could see that enough had
been moved to permit construction to proceed. About this time he returned
to the NASHVILLE.* Since he was embarked in the NASHVILLE, as was
COMSOWESPAC, he very likely received much the same information as did the
latter and therefore was well aware of the developing situation,
(a) Operations of C.G. FIFTH Air Force, 0000 - 1830, October 24th.
C.G. FIFTH Air Force continued in overall control of his
operations from his headquarters at Biako
At 0207, in response to the request made in CTF 77' s dispatch
230142 for thorough reconnaissance of Coron Bay and approaching routes
and for strikes to be made as practicable both day and night, he directed
CTF 73 to (a) extend Search Sectors WO, THREE and XRAY (Plate IV) to
1100 miles, (b) to conduct a double search in Sector THREE concentrating
on the Coron Bay area and (c) stated that the primary objective was enemy
combatant ships.**
During the morning he undoubtedly learned of the contact on
the Japanese Main Body off Mindoro. Also during the day, since his
headquarters were at Biak with those of the C.G. FIFTH Bomber Conmand
who received and retransmitted most of the contact reports made by the
Morotai-based PB4Y's, he undoubtedly was aware of the following principle
contact reports on enemy forces in the Sulu Sea: (a) the 0910 VHF
intercept transmitted by the PB4Y reporting the THIRD Section and an
erroneous second force nearby,*** (Contact "10", Plate XV) (b) two
additional reports of sighting the THIRD Section, one at 0950**** (Contact
"11") and one at 1000***** which should have clarified the composition
of this force but which apparently did not for in his summary of sightings
* George C. Kenney, "General Kenney Reports", (New York, 1949),
Page 455.
** C.G. 5TH Air Force Dispatch 240207/1 October 1944 to CTF 73, info
310TH BOMWING, C.G. 13TH Air Force, VPB 10.
*** Aircraft in Sector 2 Dispatch 240010 October 1944 to All Stations
this Circuit.
**** C.G. 5TH BOMCOM Dispatch 240330 October 1944 to All Concerned with
Operations.
***** C.G. 5TH BOMCOM Dispatch 240215 October 1944 to All Interested in
Operations.
150 CONFIDENTIAL
C.G. FIFTH AIR FORCE and CTF 73
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
at 1230 he gives the 0910 report and not the other two*and (c) the 1115
sighting of the SECOND Striking Force** (Contact "12"). (These contacts
are discussed under "Operations of CTG 73.4, 0000 - 1830, October 24th").
At 1305 he received a reply from CTF 73 to his (C.G. FIFTH
Air Force's) 240207/lTEM which is quoted in full under "Operations of
CTF 73, 0000 - 1830, October 24th", and which, among other things,
included the opinion that the extended searches were already too thinly
covered and would require the assignment of more aircraft to make them
effective.
At 1609 he incorporated these recommendations by CTF 73 in a
dispatch to CAAF SOWESPAC and further recommended that a new sector be
established from Palau covering the area adjacent to the Morotai-based
Sector No. FIVE which extended to the east of Leyte.*** Although the
dispatch actually modifying Search Plan FOX is not available to this
analysis the War Diary of VPB 115 indicates that Search Plan FOX was
modified and Sectors SIX and SEVEN out of Owi were discontinued on October
25th, 1944**** (Plate IV).
During the afternoon, based upon the sighting reports he
received, he made plans to stage a bombing mission through Morotai to
strike the enemy surface force in the Sulu Sea the following day .**■***
(b) Operations of CTF 73 (Naval Air Forces), 0000 - 1830,
October 24th.
CTF 73 (also COMAIRSEVENTHFLT), in the CURRITUCK, was en route
Mios Woendi having left Morotai the previous evening.******
At 0850 (when it was received by COMCARDIV TWENTY-FOUR) he
received a dispatch, quoted in full under "Operations of C.G. FIFTH Air
Force, 0000 - 1830, October 24th", concerning the manner in which certain
of his searches were to be conducted and gave as the primary objective
enemy combatant ships.*******
* C.G. 5TH BOMCOM Dispatch 241230 October 1944 to All Interested
in Current Operations, SWPA, AOIC, CAAF, C0M7THFLT.
** C.G. 5TH BOMCOM Dispatch 240100/1 (sic) October 1944 to All
Commands this Circuit.
*** C.G. 5TH Air Force Dispatch 241609/1 to CAAF SOWESPAC, info C.G,
13TH Air Force, CINCSWPA, C0M7THFLT, CTG 73.4, 5TH Air Force
Weekly Intelligence Review No. 48, October 22nd - 28th, 1944.
**** War Diary VPB 115, October 24th, 1944.
***** 5TH Air Force Fragmentary Field Order No. 229, October 25th,
1944; also CAAF SOWESPAC Operation Order No. 24-44.
****** War Diary C0MAIR7THFLT, October 1944, no serial, undated.
******* C.G. 5TH Air Force 240207/1 October 1944 to CTF 73, info 310TH
BOMWING, C.G. 13TH Air Force, VPB 10.
151 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 73 and CTG 73.4
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At noon, after having studied C.G. FIFTH Air Force's
dispatch 240207/lTEM, he replied to it, in part, as follows: "To make
searches effective must assign more planes to the area. Extended
searches already too thinly covered. Recommend immediate cancellation
Sectors 6 and 7 and reduction of Sector 5 to 500 miles. If foregoing is
approved can assign total 6 planes to cover Sectors 1, 2, 3, X and Y
which should give more effective coverage.11* (Plate IV).
During the afternoon nothing of sufficient importance to
record in his war diary occurred*
(1) Operations of CTG 73.4 (Search and SupDort Group),
0000 - 1330, October 24th.**
Meanwhile CTG 73.4, under the operation control of C.G.
FIFTH Air Force, continued to execute his cart of the Search Plan FOX
with his Morotai-based squadrons, VPB's 101, 11$ and 146. His immediate
operational commander was C.G. FIFTH Bomber Command.
Shortly before 0910 one of his planes in Sector TWO of
Search Plan FOX (Plate IV) relayed a VHF intercept which was probably
additionally relayed by C.G. FIFTH Bomber Command on the AOIC circuit.
This message stated that (a) there were two enemy battleships, two
cruisers and four destroyers in Latitude 08°-50,N, Longitude 122°- 50* E,
on course 030°(T), speed twenty knots, (b) six miles south of the first
force there were two battleships, two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers
and six destroyers, and (c) they were under attack by a carrier group***
(Contact "10", Plate XV).
ALTHOUGH THIS DISPATCH WAS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE
COMMANDERS CONCERNED IN THAT IT INDICATED THAT THE JAPANESE MIGHT
PENETRATE SURIGAO STRAIT THAT NIGHT, IT WAS, HOWEVER, QUITE INACCURATE
IN THAT THERE WERE ACTUALLY ONLY TWO BATTLESHIPS, ONE HEAVY CRUISER AND
FOUR DESTROYERS IN THE THIRD SECTION WHICH WAS THE ONLY FORCE IN THIS
LOCATION. WHY TWO GROUPS RATHER THAN ONE WERE REPORTED CANNOT BE FULLY
EXPLAINED. ONE POSSIBLE EXPLANATION IS AS FOLLOWS:
The ENTERPRISE (TG 38.4) planes which had sighted the
THIRD Section at 0905, and later reported the composition correctly as
two battleships, one heavy cruiser and four destroyers,**** were likely
experiencing difficulty in relaying their contact report. The pilot of
* CTF 73 Dispatch 240300 October 1944 to C.G. 5TH Air Force, info C.G.
13TH Air Force, CAAF, CINCSWPA, C0M7TKFLT, CTG 73.4, 5TH Air Force
Weekly Intelligence Review, October 22nd - 28th, 1944.
** The operations of CTG 73.4 are discussed separately on this day
because of the importance of the contacts made on the Japanese
forces.
*** Aircraft in Sector TWO Dispatch 240010 October 1944 to All Stations
this Circuit.
**** CTG 38.4 Dispatch 240424 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info CTF 38,
CTF 77, CINCSWPA, COMADVON 5, COMADVON 13.
152 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 73.4
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
the PB4Y plane flying Sector TWO (303°-312°(T) from Morotai), monitoring
this VHF circuit, recognizing their difficulty decided to assist by
relaying the reports to his own base. At this same time he was likely
also monitoring the VHF circuit used by the TG 38,3 planes which were
tracking the Japanese Main Body off Mindoro. In listening to the two
sets of transmissions he somehow became confused and decided that the two
separate contacts, i.e., the THIRD Section and the Main Body (which was
in two groups of ships at this time) were two series of reports on the
enemy forces in the Sulu Sea and therefore transmitted the composition as
two groups of ships. (Actually there were three groups of ships, one
group being the THIRD Section in the Sulu Sea which was on course 025° (T),
speed fifteen - sixteen knots; the other two being the FIRST and SECOND
Sections of the Main Body off Mindoro, which were on course 035°(T),
speed eighteen knots.
At 0950 another of his planes also sighted the THIRD
Section and reported two battleships, one heavy cruiser and four destroyers
in Latitude 08°-55fN, Longitude 121°-32«E, on course 040°(T), speed
fifteen knots and that he was proceeding on mission assigned* (Contact
"11").
At 1000 this plane made a second report on the THIRD
Section. It now reported that the two battleships were of the FUSO class,
which was of course correct, the heavy cruiser and destroyers were
unidentified. The position was garbled but he reported the course and
speed as 060° (T) and fifteen knots. He also stated that he was returning
to base.**
At 1115 one of his planes, probably the one flying Sector
YOKE of Search Plan FOX (Plate IV), reported observing a twenty-six ship
convoy of Japanese origin twenty- six miles southeast of Mount Dumali
(northeast coast of Mindoro Island in Latitude 13°-06»N) on course 090°(T)
and added that there were no carriers,*** (Contact "12") , This contact
was on the Main Body, FIRST Striking Force,
At 1155 one of his planes (whether the same plane which
reported the THIRD Section about 0910 or another is unknown) sighted one
ATAGO class heavy cruiser, two NATORI class light cruisers and four
destroyers, with one float plane escort in Latitude 09o-30fN, Longitude
120°-30«E, on course 105°(T), speed ten knots and added that he was
continuing his patrol**** (Contact "15") • The contact report was
reasonably accurate since this was the Japanese SECOND Striking Force
consisting of two heavy cruisers, NACHI class (NACHI, ASHIGARA), one light
C.G. 5TH BOMCOM Dispatch 240330 October 1944 to All Concerned with
Operations,
** C.G. 5TH BOMCOM Dispatch 240215 October 1944 to All Interested in
Operations.
*** Unknown Aircraft (probably Aircraft in Sector YOKE) Dispatch
241H5/I October 1944 to Radio Hollandia, info CINCSWPA.
**** C.G. 5TH BOMCOM Dispatch 240100/1 (sic) October 1944 to All
Interested Commands AOIC Circuit,
153 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 73.4 and CTG 73.7
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
cruiser, NATORI class (ABUKUMA) and four destroyers. It was about
twenty-four miles east of the reported position. It is worthy of note
that the pilot of this plane succeeded in making this contact without
being detected.*
At about 1240 another of his planes, having contacted the
THIRD Section, reported three battleships, one heavy cruiser and four
destroyers in Latitude 09°-25'N, Longitude 122°-23IE** (Contact "16").
Although this was quite accurate as to location it was in error by one
battleship.
During the remainder of the afternoon nothing of
sufficient importance occurred to be noted in his war diary or in the
war diaries of the searching patrol plane squadrons.
(2) Operations of CTG 73.7 (Advanced Group), 0000 - 1830,
October 24th.
On this day CTG 73.7, in the SAN CARLOS anchored in
Hinunangan Bay, continued to supervise operations within his group. The
HALF MOON, which appears to have been tending the advance elements of
both VPB 33 and VPB 34,*** was also anchored there. It is not clear
whether or not at this time the SAN CARLOS was also tending planes for
there is no mention of it in her war diary.
The Commanding Officer HALF MOON was, at this time,
preparing certain planes for flight, for CTG 73.7 had directed him
beginning (a) this evening, to fly the three west sectors (341°(T) -
017°(T)) of Search Plan FOX (Modified) (that portion of Search Plan FOX
operating from Leyte Gulf (Plate IX)) and (b) the following morning the
two east sectors (017°(T) - 041°(T)) of the same Search Plan FOX
(Modified )«**** This would require three planes for the night searches
and two for the day.
SINCE TEN PBY«S HAD BEEN FLOWN INTO LEYTE GULF THE
PRECEDING AFTERNOON, IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN REASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT AT
LEAST HALF OF THEM WOULD BE READY IN ALL RESPECTS TO FLY A NIGHT MISSION.
THE FACTS ARE, HOWEVER, THAT BUT THREE PLANES COULD BE MADE OPERATIONAL.
* Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operations, Southwest Area
Operation, Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-IJN, 2ND Striking Force Staff
Torpedo Officer, GHQ FEC, Special Historical Collection Supporting
Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur1 s Report on
Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (Item 22, Footlocker
5 of 10, SWPA Series, Volume II).
** TANGIER Dispatch 241240/1 October 1944, Addressees Unknown, but
presumably to All Interested Commands.
*** War Diaries SAN CARLOS, HALF MOON, October 24th, 1944.
**** CTG 73.7 Dispatch 231227 October 1944 to CTF 77, info C0M7THFLT, CTF
73, CG. 5TH Air Force, All Interested in Catalina Operations.
154 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 73.7
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
It has been difficult to determine with absolute
assurance what caused this. Certainly the ten planes flown in from
Morotai should have been in good material condition. What, then, caused
the material failure of all but three planes? As is developed in the
following, it is believed that this failure eventuated from a series of
unfortunate events culminating in the HALF MOON's pumping salt water
into the planes of VPB 34.
At 0821 the SAN CARLOS got underway to shift anchorage
to San Pedro Bay** It seems likely that CTG 73.7 was not on board but
was instead en route in some fast craft to meet CTF 77 in the WASATCH at
0900 in accordance with instructions of the preceding day.**
It seems likely also that after this conference, he
returned to the SAN CARLOS while that ship was en route to San Pedro Bay.
This seems so for he began issuing orders relating to the afternoon
searches soon after the probable time of his return.
At 1334 he apparently sent instructions to the Commanding
Officer HALF MOON regarding the routine three-plane night search to be
established this evening. (This order has not been located but CTG 73.7
refers to his own dispatch 240434 in a later message.)
Meanwhile, at Hinunangan Bay two enemy two-engine bombers
made a surprise attack against the HALF MOON at approximately 1448 and
were driven off by antiaircraft fire, but not before they had scored a
near miss.***
Apparently, at this time, the PBY»s of VPB 34 were being
fueled. The fueling operations were immediately stopped and the gasoline
lines of the ship were flooded with salt water to minimize the fire
hazard.
After the raid fueling was resumed. However, for reasons
unknown, but likely because of the disruptive effect of the air raid,
ADEQUATE PRECAUTIONS WERE NOT TAKEN WITH THE RESULT THAT THE PLANES OF
VPB 34 (SOME OR ALL) WERE FUELED WITH SALT WATER INSTEAD OF GASOLINE.
This incident is referred to in retrospect by the Executive Officer of
VPB 34 (at the time of the Leyte Campaign) in an interview held on
October 10th, 1945.**** The account seems credible because (a) the pilot
seems to have had no unusual motive for presenting this information and
(b) the event sequence he establishes fits in well with the facts
relating to this day.
* War Diary SAN CARLOS, October 24th, 1944.
** CTF 77 Dispatch 231225 October 1944 to CTG 73.7.
*** War Diary HALF MOON, October 24th, 1944.
**** Personal Interview of Captain (then Lieutenant Commander) Vadym V.
Utgoff, USN, Executive Officer VPB 34, Pacific Area Black Cats and
Sea Rescues, recorded by Naval Records and Library, CNO, October
10th, 1945 o
155 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 73.7
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
But, to return to CTG 73.7 who had now returned to the
SAN CARLOS en route San Pedro Bay I Sometime before 1550 (at which time
he sent implementing orders to the Commanding Officer HALF MOON) he
received orders from CTF 77, as quoted in full under "Operations of CTF
77, 0000 - 1830, October 24th», directing him to search (a) the three
west sectors of Search Plan FOX (Modified) and (b) with two planes, the
Surigao Strait, Mindanao Sea and Sulu Sea areas,* This would require
five planes for the night searches.
At 1550 he transmitted his implementing order to the
Commanding Officer HALF MOON which, among other things, ordered (a) two
special night "thorough" radar searches of the Mindanao and Sulu Sea and
included the routes to be followed, (b) the planes to track the enemy
force if located and (c) the searches to return after sunrise,** This
order increased the maintenance problems of the Commanding Officer HALF
MOON, for the planned searches now required seven planes — five for the
night searches and two for the day.
At 1631, in his flagship (SAN CARLOS), he anchored in
San Pedro Bay,***
It appears that after transmitting the above order he
became quite concerned with the potentially dangerous location of the
HALF MOON in Hinunangan Bay. Aware of CTF 77 's preparations to defend
Leyte Gulf against possible penetration by the enemy surface force in the
Sulu Sea, he probably realized that (a) if the HALF MOON were to remain
in her present anchorage she would be but several miles to the westward
of the probable line of fire between opposing battle lines should a
surface engagement eventuate and (b) if an enemy ship did penetrate into
Leyte Gulf the HALF MOON would be quite vulnerable to attack.
Therefore, at 1659, he ordered the HALF MOON to "Send
out three routine patrols as soon practicable. Remaining two at 1630
ITEM. Get underway immediately with crash boat proceed position bearing
053 degrees 21 miles Point Molly,**** Send remaining planes same
position as soon as ready. All Planes call Halifax (CSA) when airborne.
Check IFF. Leave all buoys moored,"***** It is noted that the time of
take off for the remaining two planes is given as 1630, (This could have
been a technical error for this search was to take off at sunset which
was at 1830,) (It is not known when the Commanding Officer HALF MOON
received this dispatch but in the press of subsequent events, the HALF
MOON was unable to get underway until 2206 at which time anchorage was
shifted to the western side of Cabugan Grande Island, a few miles to the
northwestward, )******
* CTF 77 Dispatch 240325 October 1944 to CTG 73.7.
** CTG 73.7 Dispatch 240650 October 1944 to HALF MOON.
*** War Diary SAN CARLOS, October 24th, 1944.
**** Point Molly was Mt. Majuyag (Latitude 11°-01*N, Longitude
124°-48'-40'E).
***** SAN CARLOS Dispatch 240759 October 1944 to HALF MOON.
****** War Diary HALF MOON, October 24th, 1944.
156 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 73.7
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1715 he was advised by TBS voice radio from CTF 77,
among other things, that if practicable four VF would cover the take
off's of the PBY's and escort them to the coast but that fighter cover
was doubtful.*
What now occurred at Hinunangan Bay? Well, during the
next few hours it would seem that strenuous efforts were made to make
available the five planes required for the night searches but without
success .** The dispatch files are not complete in this regard but it is
clear that at 1925 CTG 73.7 received a TBS voice radio message from the
Commanding Officer HALF MOON to the effect that but three planes would be
ready for the night searches— the two specials (Sulu Sea searches) and a
"TARE" mission (undoubtedly Sector 353°(T) to 005° (T).)***
IF THE "SEA WATER IN FUEL TANKS" EXPLANATION FOR CTG
73.7*3 BEING UNABLE TO READY MORE THAN THREE PLANES ON THIS EVENING IS
ACCEPTED, AND THERE IS LITTLE JUSTIFICATION FOR NOT ACCEPTING IT, THEN
AN ISSUE WHICH HAS LONG BEEN A SOURCE OF CONTROVERSY HAS BEEN PARTIALLY
CLARIFIED, ADDITIONAL MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS SUCH AS RADAR, STRUCTURAL,
ENGINE OR OTHER GENERAL MATERIAL FAILURES MAY HAVE AGGRAVATED THE
AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY SITUATION, BUT THE MATTER OF PUMPING SALT WATER
INTO THE PLANES OF VPB 34 SUPPLIES THE MAJOR FACTOR PREVENTING THE
SEARCHES FROM BEING FLOWN AS ORDERED BY CTF 77.
The explanation of why but three of VPB 33* s planes were
ready is more difficult to determine. It seems likely that, since this
squadron was apparently scheduled to fly the three-plane search originally
ordered, its planes were fueled earlier than those of VPB 34 and,
therefore, were properly fueled. Yet, if all of VPB 34' s planes were out
of commission because of the salt water in the fuel tanks, it seems
likely that VPB 33 would then have been ordered to increase its efforts
to fly all five missions assigned. It is conceivable that in view of
(a) the confusion precipitated (l) by air attacks, (2) the fueling
episode, and (b) additional maintenance difficulties, only three planes
could be readied in time to make the search.
In response to this CTG 73.7, at 2003, among other
things, (a) directed the HALF MOON to remain with the planes until all
were in flyable condition and (b) authorized cancellation of the morning
search.***
Rather than to drop the matter of the night searches at
this point it seems appropriate to take judicial notice of what actually
transpired. The two planes (the specials referred to above) went out
* CTF 77 TBS Voice Radio Message 240315 October 1944 to CTG 73.7.
** Events occurring subsequent to 1830 are included here for the
purpose of completing the account of the maintenance problems of
TG 73.7 and of stating the patrols flown,
*** CTG 73.7 TBS Voice Radio Message 241003 (sic) October 1944 to HALF
MOON with referenced dispatch HALF MOON 241925 partially quoted.
It seems probable that the time 241003 was garbled and was most
likely 242003. This would follow the time sequence.
157 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 73.7
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
after sunset and searched Surigao Strait, the Mindanao Sea and the Sulu
Sea but did not locate either of the two divisions of the Japanese THIRD
Section or the SECOND Striking Force. This is so even though the pilot
of one plane (about 2130) sighted the MOGAMI which, as discussed under
"Operations of Commander FIRST Division, 1830 - 2400, October 24th", had
at 1330, with DESDIV FOUR, separated from Commander THIRD Section and
headed for Panaon Island. IN HIS POSTWAR STATEMENT THE PILOT STATED
(a) HE DID NOT REPORT THE CRUISER CONTACT BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN BRIEFED TO
MAKE NO REPORTS UNLESS THE JAPANESE FLEET WAS SIGHTED AND (b) HIS RADAR
WAS INOPERATIVE AT THE TIME.* THIS IS QUITE DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND OR
TO RATIONALIZE SINCE, HAVING SIGHTED WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN ENEMY CRUISER,
IT WOULD SEEM THE PILOT, KNOWING HIS RADAR WAS INOPERATIVE, WOULD HAVE
MADE A THOROUGH VISUAL SEARCH OF THE IMMEDIATE AREA, RATHER THAN TO
PROCEED ON HIS ASSIGNED MISSION.
The other pilot, assigned to search the southern Sulu Sea,
was also unsuccessful in gaining contact on either of the two forces,
although he too must have passed over or very close to them in his flight
through the Mindanao Sea.**
THE SEARCH REFERRED TO AS THE "TARE" MISSION WAS
APPARENTLY MODIFIED IN FAVOR OF SCOUTING THE COAST OF SAMAR.
While there are no orders available to this analysis
directing this modification, in a letter written by the pilot of this
flight it is shown that it must have been so for, apparently on orders,
he (a) flew initially along the east coast of Samar, thence along the
north coast and down the west coast to Maqueda Bay followed by a retracing
of this same track back to Leyte Gulf and (b) hugged the cost of Samar
flying about 500 yards off shore at an altitude of 800 feet, so that he
could identify shipping visually.
It appears that he had difficulty in departing Leyte Gulf
owing to Allied antiaircraft gunfire and in order to prevent being fired
upon by friendly forces after his take off, he climbed, flying back and
forth in the vicinity of his seaplane tender, to 10,000 feet before
departing for Homonhon Island after which he let down to make the search.***
(This statement is, in part, supported by the destroyer MC GOWAN's account
of a plane, reportedly friendly but with the wrong IFF showing, which
cruised back and forth over southeastern Leyte in the vicinity of Cabugan
Grande Island from about 2010 until about 2115 at which time the Diane
disappeared from the radar scope.)****
* Letter written by Commander James F. Merritt, Jr., USN, to Commodore
R. W. Bates, USN (Ret), Head, World War II Battle Evaluation Group,
Naval War College, dated October 17th, 1956.
** Ibid., Letter written by Lieutenant Maurice Moskaluk, USNR, to
Commodore R. W. Bates, USN (Ret), dated January 3rd, 1953.
*** Ibid., Letter written by Commander C. B. Sillers, USN, to Commodore
R. W. Bates, USN (Ret), dated April 13th, 1957.
**** Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and
Defense of Leyte, Philippine Islands, including the Battle of
Surigao Strait, Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944.
158 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 73.7
CONFIDENTIAL -October 24th
WHY THIS PLANE FAILED TO CONTACT THE MAIN BODY, FIRST
STRIKING FORCE IS NOT EXPLAINED, BUT IT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE
FACE THAT HAVING DEPARTED LEYTE GULF ABOUT 2115, THE PLANE PASSED
THROUGH SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT SHORTLY BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF THE MAIN
BODY, FIRST STRIKING FORCE AND LATER, RETRACING ITS TRACK, FLEW BY THE
FORCE— THOUGH APPARENTLY NOT SUFFICIENTLY CLOSE FOR DETECTION— WHICH
WAS CRUISING WITHIN TWENTY MILES OF THE COAST OF SAMAR UNTIL SUNRISE
THE MORNING OF THE 25TH.
159 CONFIDENTIAL
CINCPAC - CINCPOA
COKTHIRDFLT
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
(B) Operations of CINCPAC - CINCPOA, OOOO - 1830, October 24th.
During this day CINCPOA continued to study closely the developing
situation. At 0517 he sent his daily intelligence summary for October
23rd which, as will be discussed in greater detail under "Operations of
COMTHIRDFLT, 0000 - 1830, October 24th", appears to have had a profound
effect upon the decisions of the latter commander on this day.
During the day he received those contact reports (Plate XV) which
have been hitherto discussed but did not act thereon, apparently feeling
that COMTHIRDFLT and CTF 77 who were on the scene were quite capable of
deciding upon the correct courses of action vis-a-vis known enemy surface
movements.
(1) Operations of Western Pacific Task Forces, 0000 - 1830,
October 24th.
(a) Operations of COMTHIRDFLT, 0000 - 1830, October 24th.
On this day the tempo of transpiring events increased
considerably with the result that COMTHIRDFLT made many decisions of
major consequence. Yet no searching analysis of these decisions can be
made for to do so would involve a thorough study of the factors leading
to and deriving from these decisions. From this would evolve an analysis
quite voluminous and not altogether pertinent to the study of the Battle
of Surigao Strait. These matters were to have been fully discussed in
Volume IV which, as pointed out in the Introduction, was discontinued.
At midnight COMTHIRDFLT in his flagship, NEW JERSEY, in
company with TG 38.2, was operating off southern Luzon* steaming toward
the entrance to San Bernardino Strait in preparation for the forthcoming
days operations.** Although he had directed the INDEPENDENCE to have a
night search ready for launching at midnight,*** for reasons not
available to this analysis, the search was not launched.
At 0017 he received CTG 38.2* s plan for the day's operations****
which was sent in response to his earlier query.*****
At 0019 he received an intelligence summary from GHQ SOWESPAC
Area, principally reporting ground force intelligence. The air portion
however was significant for it stated that the Japanese proposed to stage
200 aircraft to Luzon which suggested an intensification of the air
offensive in the Leyte area.******
* War Diary INDEPENDENCE, October 24th, 1944.
** War Diary C0M3RDFLT, October 24th, 1944.
*** C0M3RDFLT TBS Voice Radio Message 231310 October 1944 to
INDEPENDENCE, info CTF 38 and CTG's 38.2 and 38.4.
**** CTG 3B.2 TBS Voice Radio Message 231517 October 1944 to
C0M3RDFLT.
***** C0M3RDFLT TBS Voice Radio Message 231400 October 1944 to CTG
38.2.
****** GHQ SOWESPAC Dispatch 231256 October 1944 to CINC SWPA, C.G.
6TH Army.
160 CONFIDENTIAL
COMTHIRDFLT
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 0020* he received CTG 38.4' s plan for the search to be
launched at 0600** in accordance with the instructions he had issued
about 0900 the previous morning.***
At 0026 he intercepted BREAM1 s report of a Japanese force
consisting of two AOBA class cruisers and a large destroyer in Latitude
14°-05!N, Longitude 119°-40fE at 0430 the previous morning**** and
claiming two hits in a cruiser (Contact "1", Plate XV). The force was
CRUDIV SIXTEEN, the cruiser the AOBA, which had received one hit.*****
At 0042 he received CTF 71' s message relaying a contact
report by the ANGLER on a task force of four large ships plus escorts at
2130 in Latitude 12°-40'N, Longitude 1180-58»E on base course 050°(T) at
eighteen knots****** (Contact "2").
At 0215 he received the GUITARRO's first report of an enemy
task force at 0030 consisting of between fifteen and twenty ships,
including probably three battleships, in Latitude 13°-00,N, Longitude
119°-30»E, at eighteen knots on course 080° (T )******* (Contact "3").
The implications of the report have been discussed under CTF 77 for this
day*
At 0223* he received CTF 77 's message to CTG 77.4 citing the
possibility of a large enemy air attack developing and directing
appropriate defensive measures; viz., cancellation of the Western Visayas
strike and an increase of the TCAP to thirty-six fighters with sixteen
additional fighters in condition ELEVEN. ********
At 0443* he received GUITARROfs second report as it was being
rebroadcast by Radio Honolulu, (Contact "4"). This reported three
definite battleships and two possible carriers headed south through
Mindoro Strait at 0330.*********
* War Diary C0M3RDFLT, October 24th, 1944.
** CTG 38.4 Dispatch 231009 October 1944 to CTF 77.
*** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 222359 October 1944 to CTG 38.4, info All
Concerned SWPA Operations, All TFC's and TGC's 3RDFLT, CINCPAC,
COMINCH.
**** BREAM Dispatch 231231 October 1944 to CTF 71.
***** COMCRUDIV 16 Dispatch 230445 October 1944 to CINC Combined
Fleet, Commander SW Area Force, Commander 2ND Striking Force,
Detailed Action Report COMCRUDIV 16, SHO Operation, October
17th - 27th, 1944 WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
****** CTF 71 Dispatch 231454 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, C0M7THFLT,
All TFC»s 3RD and 7THFLT«s, C0MAF»s 5 and 13, COMSUBPAC,
CINCPAC.
******* CTU 71.1.25 Dispatch 231610 October 1944 to CTF 71.
******** CTF 77 Dispatch 231532 October 1944 to CTG 77.4, info TG 77.4,
TF 77, TF 79, C0M3RDFLT and one unknown addressee.
********* GUITARRO Dispatch 231900 October 1944 to CTF 71.
161 CONFIDENTIAL
COMTHIRDFLT
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At dawn the three operating carrier groups were in their
launching positions (Diagram ■C"), as follows: (a) TG 38.3 about ninety
miles due east of the northern tip of the Polillo Islands, (b) TG 38,2
about sixty miles northeast of San Bernardino Strait and (c) TG 38.4
bearing 050o(T) distant fifty miles from the southeast tip of Samar
Island (Sungi Point).
At about 0600 these carrier groups launched reinforced
searches from each of the three grouDS to a distance of 300 miles or more,
completely covering the western approaches to the Philippines, with a
total coverage from orth to south of about 1,000 miles. Relay planes
were stationed from 100 to 200 miles from the task groups for prompt
relay of contact reports.* The wether was favorable for search and
strike operations,**
At 0750 he received CINCPOA's intelligence summary for
October 23rd which, added to other information he had received, appears
to have caused him to initiate a very important sequence of orders. Among
other things this dispatch revealed that (a) CinC Combined Fleet appeared
to be in Japan, (b) Commander Main Force was unlocated but was estimated,
on the basis of several factors, to be in the Formosa-Philiopine Sea area,
(c) Commander FIRST Striking Force was probably in the Philippines on the
23rd and was evaluated as the combatant force sighted by the DACE and
DARTER in Palawan Passage, (d) a force of which the SECOND Striking Force
was a part, probably arrived in Coron Bay on the 23rd, (e) the FIRST and
SECOND Striking Forces would likely be in Coron-Paluan Bay (Mindoro Island)
area on the morning of the 24th and (f) there were indications of an
advance of air reinforcements from Formosa to the Philippines although
the movement did not appear to be on a large scale as yet.
At 0820 he intercepted a somewhat garbled VHF message from a
CABOT plane reporting a major force, including three B3 and many other
units*** (Contact "5").
Almost simultaneously (at 0822) he intercepted a VHF message
from an INTREPID aircraft which clarified the previous sightings by
reporting the force as consisting of four BB, eight CA, thirteen DD,
located south of the southern tip of Mindoro on course 050°(T), speed ten
to twelve knots; included was the additional information that no
transports were in the group and that there was a total of twenty-five
warships**** (Contact "6").
How he evaluated this contact report is nowhere stated but it
seems likely that he evaluated it as the same force which had been attacked
by the DACE and DARTER on the preceding day in Palawan Passage and sighted
by the GUITARRO at 0030 that morning. It was a most important contact for
it showed that a powerful Japanese surface force of battleships, cruisers
and destroyers, but without carriers, was already moving into the northern
* War Diary C0M3RDFLT, October 24th, 1944.
** Action Report C0M3RDFLT, October 23rd - 26th, 1944, Serial 0083,
November 13th, 1944.
*** CABOT 3V11 VHF Message 232320 October 1944.
**** INTREPID 5F VHF Message 232322 October 1944.
162 CONFIDENTIAL
COMTHIRDFLT
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
Sulu Sea. What the absence of carriers meant to him is not known.
Perhaps he recalled CTF 77 's dispatch (230142) of the preceding forenoon
wherein that commander had estimated that "it is possible that carriers
will support surface forces and strike from west of Palawan";* perhaps
he was inclined to give more credence to CINCPOA's estimate of the Main
Force being to the north of him.
He now advised CTG's 38.3 and 38.4 of this sighting and in
addition he (a) indicated the time of the CABOT aircraft sighting as 0810,
(b) directed them to establish a radio watch on 2642 kilocycles, (c) break
radio silence to report any information and (d) to expedite report of
morning searches.**
AT THIS POINT HE APPEARS TO HAVE REALIZED THAT THE SITUATION
WAS NOT DEVELOPING ALONG PREDICTED LINES. FOR HERE WAS A THREAT OF MUCH
MORE SERIOUS NATURE THAN THE MAGNIFIED TOKYO EXPRESS CONCEPT WHICH CTF 77
HAD PROMULGATED ON THE PREVIOUS DAY. HE COULD SEE OF COURSE THAT (a) THIS
MAGNIFIED TOKYO EXPRESS CAPABILITY WAS STILL OF HIGH PRIORITY AND WAS
LIKELY OF THE HIGHEST PRIORITY*** AND THAT (b) ITS IMPORTANCE WAS
INTENSIFIED BY THE POSSIBILITY OF ENEMY CARRIERS OPERATING IN SUPPORT FROM
THE NORTH. IT IS QUITE APPARENT FROM THE ORDERS HE ISSUED LATER, THAT HIS
IMMEDIATE CONCERN WAS WITH THE ENEMY FORCE TO THE SOUTH OF MINDORO FOR,
UNLESS THEIR MOVEMENT WAS DISRUPTED, THIS FORCE HAD THE CAPABILITY OF '
ENGAGING HIS FORCES IN NIGHT BATTLE IN THE VICINITY OF SAN BERNARDINO
STRAIT, POSSIBLY WITH THE ENEMY CARRIERS (ESTIMATED TO BE TO THE NORTH)
OPERATING IN SUPPORT. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT WHILE HE CONCENTRATED ON THE
MAIN BODY AS BEING THE MOST SERIOUS THREAT, THE POSSIBILITY OF CARRIERS TO
THE NORTH ASSUMED IN HIS MIND AN IMPORTANCE BEYOND ANYTHING THUS FAR
ANTICIPATED. HE COULD VISUALIZE THESE CARRIERS LAUNCHING AIR ATTACKS
AGAINST HIS FORCE DIRECTLY OR BY EMPLOYING PHILIPPINE AIRFIELDS AS
REARMING POINTS EMPLOYING THE TECHNIQUE OF SHUTTLE-BOMBING. HE CONCLUDED
THAT IMMEDIATE ACTION WAS NECESSARY TO COUNTER THIS THREAT ALSO AND
DECIDED THEN TO (a) CONCENTRATE HIS THREE FAST CARRIER GROUPS OFF SAN
BERNARDINO STRAIT, (b) STRIKE THE ENEMY FORCE SOUTH OF MINDORO WITH HIS
THREE AVAILABLE CARRIER GROUPS, (c) REQUEST SEAPLANE COVERAGE OF HIS
NORTHERN FLANK AND (d) RECALL CTG 38.1 WITH TG 38.1 FOR THE PURPOSE OF
SEARCHING FOR THE CARRIERS. IN RECALLING CTG 38.1 HE REALIZED THAT THIS
WOULD LIKELY INTERFERE WITH HIS PREPARATIONS FOR OPERATION HOTFOOT BUT THE
CHARACTER OF THE PRESENT THREAT GAVE HIM NO ALTERNATIVE.
* CTF 77 Dispatch 230142 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, C.G.'s 5TH and 13TH
Air Forces, info All TFC's and TGC's 3RD and 7THFLT's, COMINCH,
CINCPAC.
** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232322 October 1944 to CTG* s 38.3 and 38.4, info
All TFC's 3RD and 7THFLT's, COMINCH, CINCPAC.
*** This thought is supported in part by an excerpt from the daily news
broadcasts on the SAN DIEGO for October 24th which stated in part,
"Admiral Halsey believes that these ships — combatant, amphibious and
in the train — will be used to conduct a glorified 'Tokyo Express* to
reinforce the beseiged Japanese troops garrisoning Leyte."
496799 O - 59 - 20
163 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COMTHIRDFLT
October 24th
At this point it seems wise to emphasize here the fact that
at the time several events were occurring of which he was not yet aware.
These were (a) powerful air attacks emanating from Luzon were beginning
against TG 38.3 off Polillo Island, (b) the Japanese THIRD Section in the
Sulu Sea was so far undetected but would within an hour be under attack
by aircraft from TG 38.4, and (c) the SECOND Striking Force in the Sulu
Sea was so far unlocated, having departed Coron Bay early this morning
(0200).*
Commencing at 0827 he began implementing this decision for at
this time he issued orders to TG's 38.3 and 38.4 to concentrate toward
TG 38.2 at best speed.**
At 0831 he directed CTF 38 and CTG 38.3 by dispatch to attack
the enemy force south of Mindoro and gave the location, composition and
course and speed of that force.*** Although his war diary states that he
directed CTG 38.3 and CTG 38.4 to attack the enemy,**** which indicates
that it was his intention to attack with all three task groups, actually
the message was not addressed to CTG 38.4 and hence that commander was not
directed to attack. It appears that CTG 38.4 could not have mounted an
attack immediately because he was still carrying out his reinforced
searches to the westward including attacks on DESDIV TWENTY-ONE and the
THIRD Section. In fact he did not launch his attack against the Main Body,
FIRST Striking Force until 1313 .*****
In less than a quarter of an hour after the INTREPID plane's
report he received a TBS voice radio message from TG 38,2 advising that a
forty-five plane strike consisting of twelve VB, thirteen VT and twenty
VF, ****** was ready for immediate launching.
At 0835 he sent an urgent dispatch to CTF 77 pointing out that
early coverage of the sea area to northeastward of Leyte was vital to the
protection of the flank of THIRD Fleet and requesting information concerning
the establishment of planned seaplane searches. *******
At 0837 he ordered CTG 38.2 to strike the enemy force south of
Mindoro . ********
Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off the Philippines,
October 24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232327 October 1944 to CTG 38.3 and CTG 38.4.
C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232331 October 1944 to CTF 38 and CTG 38.3.
War Diary C0M3RDFLT, October 1944.
Action Report CTG 38,4 (COMCARDIV 2), Operations in support of
the occupation of Leyte and against the Japanese Fleet, Octoher
22nd - 31st, 1944, Serial 00267, November 18th, 1944.
CTG 38.2 TBS Voice Radio Message 232335 October 1944 to
C0M3RDFLT.
C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232335 October 1944 to CTF 77, info CTF 33,
COMSOWESPAC, C0M7THFLT.
C0M3RDFLT TBS Voice Radio Message 232337 October 1944 to CTG 38.2.
*>BHHHe
#-**-**&*
■JHHBBHHHt-
164
CONFIDENTIAL
COMTHIRDFLT
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
Continuing the actions derived from his morning estimate, at
O846 he directed CTG 38.1 to (a) reverse course and proceed to Point MICK
at best speed and (b) launch a search to northwestward and northward at
dawn on the following morning.* THE DECISION TO RECALL THIS TASK GROUP
THEN EN ROUTE ULITHI FOR REPLENISHMENT WAS SOUND SINCE IT SUPPORTS THE
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN COMTHIRDFLT' S ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY »S REACTION TO
THE LEYTE LANDINGS.
At 0855, feeling he could not wait for the results of the PBY
searches out of Leyte Gulf, he ordered CTF 38 to keep the area to the
north under observation as the enemy carrier strength was still not
located.**
Also at 0855 he noted that CTG 38.2 was launching an air
strike.
At 0903 he alerted COMBATDIV SEVEN**-* to the possibilities of
forthcoming surface action by advising him that TG's 38.3 and 38.4 were
concentrating on TG 38.2 and directing him to prepare to assume the duties
of Commander Battle Line.**** In a very short time the latter replied
"ready and willing" ******
At O925 he received a dispatch from CTF 38 relaying the report
from an unidentified plane of the enemy force of twenty-five ships (four
BB's, eight CA's and thirteen DD's) in Latitude 12°-15'N, Longitude
1210-32' E on course 015°(T), at fifteen knots and advising that TG 38.3
was launching its attack while many enemy planes were around the group
(Contact "git).******
At 0943 he intercepted an enemy contact report being
retransmitted on the AOIC by FIFTH Bomber Command at Biak from the search
plane in Sector 303°(T) - 312°(T) of the Morotai Search (Contact "10").
The report was to the effect that (a) one force in Latitude 08°-50fN,
Longitude 122°-05«E, consisting of two BB's, two CA's and four DD's on
course 030°(T), speed twenty knots indicating this was a VHF intercept,
(b) a second force six miles south of the first consisting of six DD's,
two BB's, four CL's and two CA's (Contact "10") adding they were under
attack by a carrier group. *******
His reaction to this dispatch is not known. However it is
known that he did nothing about it but instead decided to continue his
concentration on TG 38.2 and to leave the problem of countering this new
threat to CTF 77.
* C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232346 October 1944- to CTG 38.1, info All
TGC's of TF 38.
** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232355 October 1944 to CTF 38, info CTG 38.2.
*** Rear Admiral Oscar C. BADGER, USN.
**** C0M3RDFLT Visual Message 240003 October 1944 to COMBATDIV 7.
***** COMBATDIV 7 Visual Message 240025 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
****** CTF 38 Dispatch 232353 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
******* Aircraft in Sector 2 Dispatch 240010 October 1944 to All Stations
on this Circuit.
165 CONFIDENTIAL
COMTHIRDFLT
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 0945 (when it was received by CTF 79) he likely received the
message from CINCPAC passing on to COMSEVENTHFLT* his own (COMTHIRDFLT »s)
earlier request for submarine reconnaissance along the northwest coast of
Luzon.**
At 0946 he received the report of an attack by TG 38.4 search
group on three destroyers (DESDIV TWENTY-ONE en route to rejoin Commander
SECOND Striking Force) at 0815 in Latitude 11°-40'N, Longitude 121°-51'E
which were originally on course 130°(T), speed fifteen knots (Contact "7n)»
One destroyer (which later sank) was reported as smoking heavily and dead
in the water with the other two standing by.*** The attack had been made
by planes from the FRANKLIN.****
At 1018 he noted that CTG 38.2 was launching a second air
strike against the large enemy force near Mindoro.
At 1031 he learned from CTF 38 that at about 1000 the PRINCETON
in TG 38.3 had been hit by a bomb amidships on the port side causing a
number of serious explosions and a severe fire which was not yet under
control.***** (As a matter of interest TG 33.3 had been subjected to
intense air attack in force (over 150 planes) both from Luzon to the west
and from 030°(T), the latter apparently being from carriers, and had
claimed shooting down over 100 of them. These planes were from the SIXTH
Base Air Force which had launched 158 planes that morning to attack TG
38.3 • This is discussed more fully under "Operations of Commander, SIXTH
Base Air Force, 0000 - 1830, October 24thM.)
At 1133 he received a dispatch from CTF 38 which, referring to
COMTHIRDFLT' s earlier order for the groups to concentrate toward TG 38.2,
advised him that (a) CTF 38, in company with TG 38.3, at 1100 was in
Latitude 15°-32'N, Longitude 123°-45'E, (b) CTG 38.3 had been instructed
to remain in company with the PRINCETON which still had severe uncontrolled
fires, (c) TG 38.3 was still continuing to attack the enemy and finally,
(d) CTF 38 would attempt to close COMTHIRDFLT if possible and report
conditions later. ******
* CINCPAC Dispatch 232352 October 1944 to C0M7THFLT, info CINCSWPA,
CTF's 71, 77 and COM 3RDFLT.
** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 230748 October 1944 to CINCPAC, info COMSUBPAC,
CTF 77.
*** CTG 38.4 Dispatch 232355 October 1944 to CTF 38, C0M3RDFLT, info
CTG 38.2.
**** Action Report CTG 38.4 (COMCARDIV 2), Operations in Support of the
Occupation of Leyte and against the Japanese Fleet, October 22nd -
31st, 1944, Serial 00267, November 18th, 1944.
***** CTF 38 Dispatch 240103 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
****** CTF 38 Dispatch 240201 October 1944 to CTG's 38.4, 38.2, info
C0M3RDFLT.
166 CONFIDENTIAL
COMTHIRDFLT
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1145 he learned, among other things, that a large number
of Japanese planes had attacked shipping in Leyte Gulf during the period
from 0750 to 0945 inflicting only minor damage,* These planes were from
the FOURTH Air Army.
At 1207 he (a) was advised by TBS voice radio that the
searches along the west coast of Palawan as far south as Imuruan Bay (on
northwest side of Palawan, about fifty miles from the north end) and of
Coron Bay (in the Calamian Group) were negative,** and (b) intercepted
over the AOIC, a report being relayed by Radio Hollandia from the FIFTH
Bomber Command, of a sight contact on a twenty-six ship Japanese convoy
with no carriers present, twenty-six miles southeast of Mount Dumali
(northeast Mindoro) on course 090°(T)*** (Contact "12"). What he thought
this convoy consisted of is not known.
Shortly after noon having decided that it would be wise to
inform the two theater commanders of his present operations, including
contacts made, strikes launched and results claimed, he sent them a
dispatch thereon as follows:
(a) On the basis of sightings of enemy forces he had moved
three task groups on a broad front toward the Philippine coast to launch
reinforced searches at dawn on the 24th and gave the assigned locations of
the three groups as 38.3 east of Luzon, 38,2 off San Bernardino Strait and
38.4 off Surigao Strait.
(b) These searches had sighted a Japanese force of four BB's,
eight CA's and thirteen DD's (and two CL's unconfirmed) south of Mindoro
on a northeasterly course as a result of which the two northern groups
had immediately launched strikes on this enemy force.
(c) He had then directed the flank groups (38.3 and 38.4) to
concentrate toward the central group (38.2) and had recalled TG 38,1
(then en route to Ulithi),
(d) He had also directed CTG 38.3 to conduct searches in order
to keep the area to the north under observation. Several enemy planes
were reported over the northern groups.
(e) Meanwhile, a reinforced search from TG 38.4 had attacked
three destroyers west of Panay, seriously damaging and stopping one. The
other two destroyers stood by the cripple.****
* CTF 77 Dispatch 240054 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info All TFC's
3RD and 7THFLT's, All TGC's 3RDFLT, CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC,
C.G. 5TH Air Force, etc.
** CTG 38.2 TBS Voice Radio Message 240307 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
*** Radio Hollandia Dispatch 241115/1 October 1944 to CTG's 38.1; 38.2,
38.3, 38.4, info C0M3RDFLT, All TFC's 3RDFLT.
**** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 240314 October 1944 to CINCPAC, CINCSWPA, info
COMINCH, CTF 77, C0M7THFLT, All TGC's 3RDFLT.
167 CONFIDENTIAL
COMTHIRDFLT
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1223 he learned from CTG 38.1 that, with the BOSTON, the
latter would arrive at Point MICK the following morning at 0700.*
At 1245 he received, by TBS voice radio from CTG 38.2, a
summary report which included, among other things, that (a) an INTREPID
plane had attacked one CL and one DD standing out between Corregidor and
Bataan; and had possibly hit the CL. (This was the Guard Force of the
SECOND Striking Force en route Cagayan (Mindanao). The cruiser (KINU) was
not hit but the destroyer (URANAMI) was hit by rockets and machine gun
fire),** and (b) FRANKLIN planes had attacked three DD's initially
fourteen miles north of Maniguin Island off the northwest tip of Panay and
had likely sunk one.*** (This was DESDIV TWENTY-ONE.)
At 1300 he received CTG 38.4' s dispatch (quoted in full under
"Operations of CTG 38.4, 0000 - 1830, October 24th") informing him in part
that (a) he was proceeding to close TG 38.2 at twenty-six knots and (b)
would launch a strike against the Japanese force in the vicinity of Tablas
Island.****
Now, having heard nothing from CTG's 38.3 and 38.4 about air
strikes against the Main Body, he (a) at 1300 queried CTG 38.3, "assume
CTG 38.3 is striking large enemy force near Mindoro", and requested that
he be advised of the results of the strikes as soon as possible***** and
(b) at 1303 he similarly queried CTG 38. 4. ******
At 1331 he received from CTF 38 a summary of forenoon events.
This dispatch is quoted in full under "Operations of CTF 38, 0000 - 1330,
October 24th" .*******
At 1345 he received a flash report from CTG 38.2 of the results
of the strike by that group on the Japanese Main Body quoted in part under
"Operations of CTG 38.2, 0000 - 1830, October 24th" .********
At 1353 he received another report from CTG 38.4 (quoted in
full under "Operations of CTG 38.4, 0000 - 1830, October 24th") reporting,
among other things, having contacted at 0905 in Latitude 08°-55'N,
Longitude 121°-50'E another Japanese force (THIRD Section) consisting of
two BB's, one CA and four DD's on course 035°(T), speed fifteen knots
(Contact "9"), and having attacked same. *********
* CTG 38.1 Dispatch 240155 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, CTF 38.
** Detailed Action Report CRUDIV 16, SHO Operation, October 17th -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
*** CTG 38.2 TBS Voice Radio Message 240345 October 1944 to CQM3RDFLT.
**** CTG 33.4 Dispatch 240324 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info CTF 33,
CTG 38.2.
***** C0M3RDFLT DisDatch 240400 October 1944 to CTF 33.
****** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 240403 October 1944 to CTG 38.4, info CTF 38.
******* CTF 38 Dispatch 240307 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, CTG's 38.2
and 38.4.
******** CTG 38.2 TBS Voice Radio Message 240445 October 19/*4 to C0M3RDFLT.
CTG 38.4 Dispatch 240424 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info CTF 33,
CTF 77, COXSCWESPAC, COM ADBOMCOM's 5 and 13.
168 CONFIDENTIAL
COMTHIRDFLT
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1356 he intercepted an enemy contact report being
retransmitted by the TANGIER at Morotai from the PB4Y search plane in
Sector XRAY. This message stated that there were three battleships, one
heavy cruiser and four destroyers in Latitude 09°-25'N, Longitude 122°-
23' E.* (Contact "16" •) Although he stated in his action report that this
message was received at 1240 it seems more likely that it was actually
received at this time when CTG 38.1 reported receiving it. He probably
recognized this contact as being the same force (THIRD Section) that
CTG 38.4 had just reported attacking.
At I4I5 he directed CTG 38.2 to make arrangements for search
planes from the INDEPENDENCE to be in the vicinity of the enemy force at
evening dusk in order to shadow that force and to keep him informed of its
movements.** In so doing, he revealed his preoccupation and concentration
on disrupting the advance of the Main Body, FIRST Striking Force.
At 1430 he received CTF 77 fs directive to prepare for a night
engagement wherein CTF 77 after giving the composition of the Japanese
force (two BB's, four CA's, four CL*s and ten DD's) in the eastern Sulu
Sea, estimated that it might arrive Leyte Gulf that night,*** (night of
October 24th/25th).
At 1445 he received a flash report from CTG 38.2 (a) giving
the results of the second strike and claiming three bomb and three torpedo
hits on a KONGO class BB of the leading group and (b) reporting that the
rest of the Japanese units which were in Latitude 13°-05'N, Longitude
122°-01'E on course 090°(T) (Contact "17") were undamaged.****
At 1458 he received CTF 77 's urgent relay of a contact report
wherein CTF 77 surmised that there was a probable enemy landing force in
the convoy of twenty- five ships, including battleships and cruisers,
reported at 1115 to be twenty-six miles southeast of Mount Dumali (in the
northeast part of Mindoro) on course east.***** (Contact "12".)
By midafternoon (1512), having carried forward his running
estimate of the situation, he formulated a surface action plan in
anticipation of a possible sortie by the Japanese Main Body through San
Bernardino Strait. His battle plan stated that (a) BATDIV SEVEN (IOWA and
NEW JERSEY) VINCENNES, MIAMI and BILQXI and DESRON FIFTY-TWO (less STEPHEN
POTTER) from TG 38.2 and WASHINGTON, ALABAMA, WICHITA, NEW ORLEANS, DESDIV
100 plus PATTERSON and BAGLEY from TG 38.4, would be formed as TF 34 under
Vice Admiral LEE as Commander Battle Line, (b) TF 34 would engage
decisively at long range, (c) CTG 38.4 would conduct the carriers of
* TANGIER Dispatch 241240/1 October 1944 to Unknown Addressees
(probably All Stations this Circuit).
** C0M3RDFLT TBS Voice Radio Message 240515 October 1944 to CTG 38.2.
*** CTF 77 Dispatch 240315 October 1944 to CTF's 78, 79, CTG's 70.1,
77.2, 77.3, COMFEAF, All TFC's 3RDFLT, info C0M3RDFLT, All TGC's
3RD and 7THFLT»s, CINCPAC, CINCSWPA, COMINCH.
**** CTG 38.2 TBS Voice Radio Message 240545 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
***** CTF 77 Dispatch 240443 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
169 CONFIDENTIAL
COMTHIRDFLT
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
TG's 38.2 and 38.4 clear of the surface fighting, (d) instructions for
TG's 38.1 and 38.3 would be issued later and finally (e) HALSEY was OTC
in NEW JERSEY.* This message, which was not transmitted by COMTHIRDFLT
until 1640, was received by CTF 79 at 1700, by CTG 38.1 at 1712 and by
COMINCH at 1709.
THIS BATTLE PLAN IS IMPORTANT TO THIS ANALYSIS AS MUCH FOR ITS
OMISSIONS AS FOR ITS CONTENTS. AMONG ITS OMISSIONS ARE THE FAILURE TO
(a) INCLUDE CTF 77 AND COMSOWESPAC AS INFORMATION ADDRESSEES, (b) GIVE
THE TIME AND/OR MANNER OF PLACING THE PLAN IN EFFECT WITH THE NATURAL
RESULT THAT THE PHRASE "WILL BE FORMED AS TF 34" COULD BE INTERPRETED AS
(1) A STATEMENT OF SIMPLE FUTURITY INDICATING THAT THE PRESENT INTENTIONS
OF THE ISSUING COMMANDER WERE TO MAKE THE PLAN EFFECTIVE AT A LATER TIME
OR (2) AN IMMEDIATE DIRECTIVE EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT, AND (c) PROVIDE
INFORMATION ABOUT THE ENEMY AND THE FAILURE TO SPECIFY AN OBJECTIVE.
HOWEVER, IN THIS LATTER CASE, SINCE THE COMMANDERS CONCERNED IN TF 38
WERE THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH THE SITUATION AND WERE FULLY (a) COGNIZANT
OF THE ENEMY FORCE SOUTH OF MINDORO AND (b) AWARE THAT THE DESTRUCTION OF
THIS FORCE SHOULD IT SORTIE WOULD BE THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF TF 34,
THESE LATTER TWO OMISSIONS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED SERIOUS.
At 1540 he learned that at about four hours earlier three
groups of enemy planes were approaching Leyte and were being intercepted
by Allied fighters.**
At 1544 he issued new orders to CTG 38.4 to close TG 38.2.
He (a) gave (l) the prospective 1700 position of TG 38.2 as Latitude
13°-15fN, Longitude 126°-05'E and (2) the point option course and speed
as 165°(T), eighteen knots and (b) directed CTG 38.4 to set his course to
intercept as early as practicable. ***
At 1608 he received CTF 38 's strike report and summary of the
day's operation of TG 38.3. Since this summary is quoted in full under
"Operations of CTF 38, 0000 - 1830, October 24th", it will not be quoted
here except to state that this report gave the (a) composition of the
enemy force as six to eight battleships, fourteen heavy cruisers and eight
to nine destroyers and (b) results as two heavy cruisers or light cruisers
and one battleship badly damaged.****
At 1632 he received an enemy contact report from the search
plane in Sector THREE of the Morotai-based search, being relayed on the
AOIC from the FIFTH Bomber Command of a force consisting of two battleships,
one heavy cruiser and four destroyers in Latitude 08°-55'N, Longitude
121°-32'E at 0950 on course 040°(T), speed fifteen knots.***** (Contact
"11"). This contact report may have (a) been linked with that received
* C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 240612 October 1944 to All TFC's 3RDFLT, All
TGC's of TF 38, info COMINCH, CINCPAC.
** CTF 77 Dispatch 240239 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
*** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 240644 October 1944 to CTG 38.4, info All TGC's
of TF 38, CTF 34.
**** CTF 38 Dispatch 240612 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info CTG's 33.2,
38.4.
***** C.G. 5TH BOMCOM Dispatch 240330 October 1944 to All Concerned our
Operations.
170 CONFIDENTIAL
COMTHIRDFLT
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
earlier in the forenoon* in spite of the delay of nearly seven hours and,
if so, (b) served to eliminate any confusion possibly engendered by the
error in the numbers of ships in the earlier one*
Although CTF 38 and CTG 38.3 (who were in company but were a
considerable distance from Commander THIRD Fleet) commenced receiving
contact reports from the search planes to the northeast at 1635, Commander
THIRD Fleet did not receive these reports. About an hour later he
received a dispatch summary from CTF 38 which included this information in
an evaluated form.** For this reason the first contacts made by the
search planes from TG 38.3 have not been shown in Plate XV.
At 1636 he received an aircraft contact report from the plane
in Sector THREE (312°-321°) of the Morotai-based search being relayed by
FIFTH Bomber Command on the AOIC which was the first report of a force
consisting of one ATAGO class heavy cruiser, two NATORI class light
cruisers and four destroyers with one float plane at 1155 ITEM in Latitude
09°-30«N, Longitude 120°-30'E on course 105° (T), speed ten knots (Contact
"15"). The originating plane stated that she was continuing on patrol.***
At 1648 COMTHIRDFLT intercepted a carrier aircraft contact
report (partially garbled) on an enemy force sighted at 1640 including
three BB's and one DD at Longitude 125° but Latitude unheard in which the
pilot stated that he saw twenty-eight ships.**** Two minutes later he
intercepted another contact report from the same plane on an enemy task
force consisting of three CV, two CL, three DD in Latitude 18°-00«N,
Longitude 125°-00'E on course 270°(T), speed fifteen knots at I64O.*****
(Contact "20"). THESE REPORTS WERE OF VITAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR THEY
POSITIVELY DISCLOSED THE POSITION OF THE JAPANESE MAIN FORCE, COMPRISING
THE CARRIERS, THE WHEREABOUTS OF WHICH HE HAD BEEN ANXIOUSLY CONCERNED WITH
DURING MUCH OF THAT DAY. THIS FORCE HAD STEAMED FOR DAYS THROUGH WATERS
UNDER SURVEILLANCE BY ALLIED SUBMARINES AND SHORE-BASED SEARCH PLANES AND
HAD LAUNCHED AN AIR STRIKE AGAINST THE THIRD FLEET (TG 38.3) CARRIER FORCE
BEFORE FINALLY BEING DETECTED BY A SEARCH PLANE FROM ONE OF HIS CARRIERS.
At 1710 he (a) directed CTG 38.4 to (1) assume tactical
command of TG*s 38.2 and 38.4, (2) keep the groups in company and (3)
operate in the present general vicinity until otherwise instructed and
(b) informed the commanders concerned that if the enemy sortied TF 34
would be formed when he directed.****** This order must have been written
* Aircraft in Sector THREE Dispatch 240010 (240910/1) October 1944
to All Stations this Circuit.
** CTF 38 Dispatch 240817 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info CTG 38.2
and CTG 38.4.
*** C.G. 5TH BOMCOM Dispatch 240100 (sic) October 1944 to All Commands
this Circuit.
**** Plane 04V14 Contact Report TOR 240748 to MOHAWK (believed to be
ENTERPRISE) .
***** Plane 04V14 Contact Report TOR 240750 to MOHAWK (believed to be
ENTERPRISE) .
****** C0M3RDFLT TBS Voice Radio Message 240810 October 1944 to CTG 38.4,
info CTG 38.2, CTF 34, COMBATDIV 7.
171 CONFIDENTIAL
COMTHIRDFLT
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
up prior to his realization that the Main Force had been contacted. It
is interesting in that it reveals his continued concentration on the
Main Body, FIRST Striking Force.
At 1730* he received a TBS voice radio message from CTG 38.2
stating that the ENTERPRISE reported that one of her planes had made
contact at 1715 on a Japanese force of three CV, two CL and three DD in
Latitude 18°-32«N, Longitude 125°-28'E on course 270°(T), speed fifteen
knots.**
Also at 1730 he received a summary report from CTF 38 which is
quoted in full under that comnander (a) giving the results of the strikes
against the Japanese Main Body, (b) stating that the new contact in the
north was three CV (one of which was an ISE class BB/XCV), four to six
heavy cruisers and six destroyers in Latitude l^-lO'N, Longitude 125°-30'E
on course 210°(T), speed fifteen knots (Contact "21") and (c) giving the
condition of the PRINCETON and stating that in view of the new contact to
the north she would be sunk.*** He now, at 1738, advised CTF 38 to use
his discretion regarding the PRINCETON.****
At 1735 he was informed of the results of TG 38.4fs strikes
in which two destroyers were attacked at 1153 in Latitude H°-38'N,
Longitude 121°-23 •£.*****
At 1755 he received a flash report from CTG 38.2 by TBS voice
radio of the third strike on the Main Body delivered at 1530 and quoted
in full under "Operations of CTG 38.2, 0000 - 1830, October 24th" "wherein
that commander reported in part (a) having damaged two battleships of
KONGO class, (b) that enemy had changed course to westward during attack
but that he could not determine whether this was a real retirement or for
protection of cripples and (c) one heavy cruiser and two destroyers listed
in the morning report were missing****** (Contact "19" )•
At 1819 he directed CTG 38.4 (who had previously been
designated OTC of TG's 38.2 and 38.4)******* to proceed westward at
twenty knots,********
* War Diary C0M3RDFLT October 1944.
** CTG 38.2 TBS Voice Radio Message 240830 October 1944 to
C0M3RDFLT.
*** CTF 38 Dispatch 240817 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info CTG's
38.2 and 38.4.
**** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 240838 October 1944 to CTG 38, info CTG
38.3.
***** CTG 38.4 Dispatch 240646 October 1944 to CTF 38, info C0M3RDFLT,
CTF 77, CINCSWPA, COMADVON 5 and 13.
****** CTG 38.2 TBS Voice Radio Message 240855 October 1944 to
C0M3RDFLT.
mohbmh C0M3RDFLT TBS Voice Radio Message 240810 October 1944 to CTG
38.4, info CTG 38.2, CTF 34, COMBATDIV 7.
******** C0M3RDFLT TBS Voice Radio Message 240919 October 1944 to CTG
38.4.
172 CONFIDENTIAL
COMTHIRDFLT
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1830 he received CTG 38.4' s report of the strike against
the enemy force in Latitude 12°-50»N, Longitude 122°-30»E, which force
when first sighted, was on an easterly course but was last seen on a
westerly course (Contact n18")»
This report, which is quoted in full under "Operations of
CTG 38.4, 0000 - 1830, October 24th», reported having inflicted at 1415
(likely in error, probably 1515) heavy damage on one YAMATO class
battleship and on one KONGO class battleship and reported having damaged
another battleship and having torpedoed and sunk one light cruiser.*
Since this report, and the report received previously from
CTG 38.2, reported the enemy as now on a westerly course and heavily
damaged, it seems clear that he now commenced re-estimating the situation
to determine what, if any, course of action he should follow with
relation to (a) this Main Body and (b) the enemy carriers contacted
to the north of him at 1640.
Actually, although he did not know it, the Japanese Main Body
had changed course to the westward at 1500 to reduce the damage from
air attack, had reversed course to the eastward at 1510, had reversed
course again to the westward at 1530, which reversal was maintained in a
generally northwesterly direction until about 1715 when course was
reversed once again to the eastward and this direction was maintained
(Diagram "C").
BASED ON HIS LATER ACTIONS IT SEEMS CORRECT TO SAY THAT FOR
THE PRESENT HE HAD DECIDED TO REMAIN OFF SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT FOR HE
REMAINED IN THIS AREA FOR THE NEXT TWO HOURS.
* CTG 38.4 TBS Voice Radio Message 240930 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
173 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 38
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
(1) Operations of CTF 38, OOOO - 1830, October 24th.
At the beginning of this day CTF 38, in the LEXINGTON,
with TG 38,3, was about 190 miles east of Polillo Island on course 280°(T),
speed twenty-four knots.*
The LEXINGTON'S TBS and VHF voice logs for this period are
available to this study thereby providing an unusual insight into the
actions of CTF 38 on this day. Since, however, the introductory chapters
of the Battle of Surigao Strait deal principally with those factors
influencing the preparations for an execution of that battle, only a
general analysis of his actions on this day will be made.
During the early morning hours CTF 38 received much the
same sighting reports as did COMTHIRDFLT and CTF 77 and was well aware of
the developing situation (Plate XV).
Receipt of a retransmittal of the GUITARRO's sighting of
the Main Body, FIRST Striking Force, estimated to comprise fifteen to
twenty ships including three battleships in Latitude 13°-00*N, Longitude
119°-30«E, on course 080°(T),** prompted him to (a) invite CTG 38.3 's
attention to the dispatch and (b) order CTG 38.3 to instruct the search
planes if sighting this group to report inmediately, to delay their attack
and track the force.***
As dawn approached he appeared quite concerned over the
probability of enemy air attacks in strength. Snoopers had been shadowing
his group— one had been shot down at 0229, another at 0340 — and he realized
that the enemy would have little difficulty in locating his task group
preparatory to making early morning attacks. Therefore at 0530 he advised
CTG 38.3 as follows: "Much enemy activity suggests heavy air attack this
morning."****
The first major enemy air attack was detected coming in
at about 0759.***** The CAP was effective in destroying the bulk of the
attacking aircraft.
Shortly before 0847 he learned that an unknown plane had
sighted four battleships, eight cruisers and thirteen destroyers in
Latitude 120-25'N, Longitude 121o-32«E and so advised CTG 33.3 and
COMTHIRDFLT****** (Contact "8", Plate XV).
At 0939 he observed the PRINCETON bursting into flames
having been hit by a bomb from a single plane that had dived down through
a low cloud cover .*****
* Deck Log LEXINGTON, October 24th, 1944.
** CTF 71 Dispatch 231824 October 1944 to C.G.'s 5TH and 13TH Air.
Forces, info CINCPAC, COMSUBPAC, All TFC's and TGC's 3RD and 7THFLT.
*** CTF 38 TBS Voice Radio Message 231945 October 1944 to CTG 38.3.
**** CTF 38 TBS Voice Radio Message 232030 October 1944 to CTG 38.3.
***** War Diary CTG 38.3, October 24th, 1944.
****** CTF 38 TBS Voice Radio Message 232347 October 1944 to CTG 38.3;
also CTF 38 Dispatch 232353 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
174 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 38
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1003 he advised COMTHIRDFLT that (a) the PRINCETON had
been hit by a bomb, (b) the fire was not under control, (c) there had
been several serious explosions and (d) he would report more to him
later.*
Beginning about this time he noted that the PRINCETON was
rocked by a series of large explosions causing her to lose all way,**
At 1029 (as recorded in his action report) having learned
that COMTHIRDFLT had ordered CTG's 33.3 and 38.4 to concentrate toward TG
38.2 off San Bernardino Strait,*** he decided to have CTG 33.3 remain in
the general vicinity of the PRINCETON.
At 1101 he sent a message to CTG's 38.2, 38.4 and
COMTHIRDFLT which, in part, stated: "My position at 1100 ITEM, Latitude
15°-32«N, Longitude 123°-45fE. Have instructed CTG 38.3 to remain in the
vicinity of PRINCETON who still has bad uncontrolled fire aboard. CTG
38.3 is continuing to strike. Will close you if possible and report
conditions later."****
About 1125 (when it was received by CTG 38.3) he received
COMTHIRDFLT ' s dispatch advising him that the enemy carrier strength had
not yet been located and ordering him to keep the area to the north under
observation .*****
At 1140 (when it was received by CTG 38.1) he received
orders from COMTHIRDFLT to strike the enemy force south of Mindoro.******
Since he had already advised COMTHIRDFLT that CTG 38.3 was
continuing to strike he did not specifically reply to this order.
At 1207 he sent COMTHIRDFLT the following dispatch:
"Morning search reports 2 Natori class cruisers. 1 dead in water just off
shore northwest tip Mindoro. The other under attack off west shore Lubang
Island. 1 damaged Nachi cruiser in Manila Bay. Enemy has been flying
several large groups twin engine planes from Formosa to Luzon. About 100
enemy planes shot down. Now striking enemy fleet east Mindoro no reports
yet of results. We have another large bogie heading ours from northeast.
Launching search 350 to 040 at 1305. PRINCETON still afloat."*******
* CTF 38 Dispatch 240103 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
** Action Report PRINCETON, Battle of the Philippines and Loss of
USS PRINCETON, October 24th, 1944, Serial 020, November 24th,
1944.
*** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232327 October 1944 to CTG's 38 3 and 38.4.
**** CTF 38 Dispatch 240201 October 1944 to CTG's 38.4 and 38.2, info
C0M3RDFLT.
***** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232355 October 1944 to CTF 38, info CTG 38.2.
****** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232331 October 1944 to CTF 38, CTG 38.3.
******* CTF 38 Dispatch 240307 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, CTG's 38.2 and
38.4.
175 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 38
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
During the early afternoon he noted that strong enemy
raids had attempted to penetrate the fighter defenses but although some
were successful in breaching the TCAP, they failed to hit the ships of
the task group.*
At 1405 having shortly before given permission to CTG
38,3 to launch the northern search without fighter escort, he observed
the five VB take off.**
Earlier during the day he had learned of the enemy surface
force in the Sulu Sea, and now at 1430 (when it was received by COMTHIRDFLT)
he intercepted CTF 77fs order "To prepare for night engagement".
At 1512 having (a) determined the results of the afternoon
strike against the Main Body and (b) confirmed that the PRINCETON was
without steering control and power, he sent his latest situation summary
to COMTHIRDFLT which is quoted as follows: "Task Group 38.3 strike
reports enemy main fleet at lat 12-50 long 122-30. Enemy fleet milling
around aimlessly in several groups. Pilots report by radio 6 to 8
battleships 14 CA and 8 to 9 DD. Incomplete results 38.3 strike 2 CA or
CL and 1 BB badly hit. Estimate of damage from air poor due to clouds at
6000 feet. PRINCETON dead in water with no power and no steering at 1345.
Total Jap planes shot down by TG 38.3 about 150 up to 1500/1. No bogies
now for first time today. 2nd strike on enemy fleet delayed due to
attack. We are getting very short of fighters with loss of PRINCETON
force and combat casualties. Correct my 240307. At 0720 1 NATORI CL dead
in water off Termate Manila Harbor. At 0800 1 damaged NACHI CA southeast
Corregidor. At 0945 1 NATORI CL and 1 DD between Fortune Island and Luzon,
course 180, speed 20."***
At 1532 he learned that a large explosion aboard the
PRINCETON had blown her stern off causing many topside casualties aboard
the BIRMINGHAM.****
At 1635 he began receiving a series of messages from the
northern search planes which had sighted the Main Force***** (Contact "17").
At 1645 realizing the seriousness of this sighting, he
recommended to CTG 38.3 that in view of the contact to the north, the
PRINCETON be sunk. ******
* War Diary CTG 38.3, October 24th, 1944.
** CTG 38.3 TBS Voice Radio Message 240442 October 1944 to CTF 38;
also War Diary CTG 38.3, October 24th, 1944.
*** CTF 38 Dispatch 240612 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info CTG 38.4,
CTG 38.2.
***» CTU 38.4.3 TBS Voice Radio Message 240642 October 1944 to CTG
38.3.
***** IB BRONCHO (ESSEX) TBS Voice Radio Message 241635/1 October 1944
to MOHAWK (LEXINGTON).
****** CTF 38 TBS Voice Radio Message 241645/1 October 1944 to CTG
38.3.
176 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 38
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1707 he advised CTG 38.3 by TBS voice radio as follows;
"If composition of enemy fleet is confirmed, three carriers, one ISE
class, two light cruisers and three destroyers, be prepared to detail
your battleships, CRUDIV THIRTEEN less BIRMINGHAM and RENO and one
squadron of destroyers to attack and sink enemy."* From this message it
is clear that he (a) was preparing for unilateral action against the Main
Force should he be ordered and (b) did not at the moment have a clear
picture of the composition of enemy forces to the north. However, a few
minutes later (at 1712) he advised CTG 38,3 that although he had received
reports of two groups to the north, one at Longitude 123°-30'E consisting
of three battleships; and one at Longitude 125°-00'E consisting of three
carriers, he believed both groups to be one group in the latter position.**
Also at 1712 (when it was received by CTG 38.1) he
received COMTHIRDFLT's battle plan.*** This plan has been discussed
fully under "Operations of COMTHIRDFLT, 0000 - 1830, October 24th".
He continued with CTG 38.3 and CTU 38.3.2 (Commander
Heavy Support Unit) over the TBS voice radio, to prepare a plan in which
CTG 38.3 would proceed northward intact, launching a strike at dawn
against the enemy force and pending the results of that strike detach
after dark the battleships and cruisers to follow up the strike.****
In pondering the effect such a course of action would have
on his commander's plans, he apparently decided against it for at 1851 he
ordered CTG 38.3 to proceed to join COMTHIRDFLT and to consolidate TG 38.3
on the way.*****
At 1815 he received a dispatch from COMTHIRDFLT advising
him to use his discretion regarding the PRINCETON. ******
From an examination of related aircraft transmissions, it
is apparent that by this time he (a) was aware of the presence of at least
one ISE (hermaphrodite) class battleship to the north in addition to the
other carriers and (b) had received CTG 38. 3' s latest estimate of the
group's attacks on the Main Body, FIRST Striking Force off Mindoro. *******
* CTF 38 TBS Voice Radio Message 240807 October 1944 to CTG 38.3.
** CTF 38 TBS Voice Radio Message 240812 October 1944 to CTG 38.3.
*** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 240612 October 1944 to All TFC's 3RDFLT, All
TGC's TF 38, info COMINCH, CINCPAC.
**** CTF 38 TBS Voice Radio Messages 240812 and 240824 October 1944
to CTG 38.3; also CTG 38.3 TBS Voice Radio Message 240823 October
1944 to CTF 38; also CTU 38.3.2 TBS Voice Radio Message 240833
October 1944 to CTF 38.
***** CTF 38 TBS Voice Radio Message 240951 October 1944 to CTG 38.3.
****** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 240838 October 1944 to CTF 38, info CTG
38.3.
******* CTG 38.3 TBS Voice Radio Message 240903 October 1944 to CTF 38.
177 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 38 and CTG 38.1
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At this time feeling the situation had again significantly
changed, he decided to so advise COMTHIRDFLT and at 1830 transmitted the
following dispatch: "Results of strike on Jap fleet consisting of 4
battleships 3 heavy cruisers 4 light cruisers 12 destroyers east of
Mindoro. 2 heavy cruisers and 1 battleship damaged. New contact afternoon
search reports 3 CV's 4 to 6 heavy cruisers and 6 destroyers at Latitude
18-10 Longitude 125-30 east which is 180 miles east of Aparri. 1 of CV's
was ISE class. On course 210 speed 15 knots. No major air attack on us
since 1430 item. PRINCETON had heavy explosion about 1515 causing many
casualties on BIRMINGHAM alongside. In view of our new Jap contact to
north, CTG 38.3 is having PRINCETON sunk. No serious damage to other ships,
Enemy planes showing intermittent IFF. My position at 1630 Item Latitude
15-32 North Longitude 124-23 East. Will close you after PRINCETON is
sunko "*
(a) Operations of CTG 38.1, 0000 - 1830, October 24th.
At the beginning of the day CTG 38.1 in the WASP was
bearing 299°(T), distant 370 miles from Ulithi and on course L25°(T),
speed fifteen knots.
During the early morning hours he very likely
received much the same information as was received by COMTHIRDFLT and
which has largely been discussed elsewhere.
At 0637 he detached the FARENHOLT, GRAYSON, MC CALLA
and W00DW0RTH to CTG 30.3 in accordance with COMTHIRDFLT 's dispatch 230121.
At 0850 he was joined by the cruiser BOSTON and the
destroyers BURNS, CHARRETTE, COwELL, BELL and BOYD. His task group
consisted of the WASP (FFF), HANCOCK, HORNET, COWPENS, MONTEREY, BOSTON
(FF), CHESTER (FF), SALT LAKE CITY, PENSACOLA, OAKLAND, SAN DIEGO, DUNLAP,
FANNING, BROWN, CUMMINGS, CONNER, DOWNES, IZARD (FF), CASE, BURNS, CASSIN,
CHARRETTE, COWELL, BELL and BOYD.**
He now received orders from COMTHIRDFLT as follows:
(a) at 0948 to reverse course, proceed toward Point MICK at best speed and
launch a search to the north and northwest at dawn October 25th*** as a
result of which he at (1) 1030 cancelled the Yap Island strike** and
(2) 1043 changed course to 300° (T), speed twenty knots and (b) at 1041 to
fuel from the fueling group commencing daylight October 25th and to report
completion by urgent dispatch.****
**
CTF 38 Dispatch 240930 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, CTF 77, RENO,
info CTG's 38.2, 33.4.
War Diary CTG 38.1, October 24th, 1944.
*** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232346 October 1944 to CTG 33.1, info All
TGC's of TF 38.
**** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 240143 October 1944 to CTG 38.1, CTU's 33.3.4,
30.8.8, 30.8.11, info All TFC's and TGC«s 3RDFLT.
178 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 38.1
CTG 38.2
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
During the morning he learned of (a) the discovery of
the Main Body off Mindoro, (b) the sighting of the THIRD Section in the
Sulu Sea and (c) COMTHIRDFLT « s request to CTF 77 for seaplane coverage of
his (COMTHIRDFLT's) northern flank. Therefore, he was fully apprised of
COMTHIRDFLT's reasons for recalling his command and his concern with
covering the sea area to the north.
At 1055 he advised COMTHIRDFLT he was arriving Point
MICK in accordance with the latter' s orders and that the BOSTON was with
him.*
A review of his dispatch file for this day reveals
that he was well aware of all of the important events that transpired
during the day and therefore that his understanding of the developing
situation was quite clear.
At 1830 he was probably not aware of the contact on
the enemy carriers to the north. At this time TG 38.1 was on course
295°(T), speed twenty-three knots, en route Point MICK about ninety-eight
miles bearing 139° (T) from it.
Having incurred no aircraft losses during the day he
had on board his carriers as of 1830 a total of 187 VF, 67 VB and 72 VT.
(b) Operations of CTG 38 .2, 0000 - 1830, October 24th.
At the beginning of the day CTG 38.2, in the INTREPID,
with TG 38.2, was about eighty miles northeast of his assigned 0600
October 24th position off San Bernardino Strait, on course 249°(T),
speed fifteen knots.**
During the early morning hours he (a) knew that the
two VF(N) of the INDEPENDENCE had shot down two enemy snoopers, one at
0229 and one at 0340. In each instance the enemy snooper was a long range
four-engine seaplane*** from the SIXTH Base Air Force operating from
Manila,**** and (b) learned of the ANGLER'S and GUITARRO's contacts in the
vicinity of Mindoro and was therefore alerted to the probable area in
which enemy surface forces should be located.
At 0600 he launched a westward search from the
INTREPID composed of twelve VF, six VB, four special reconnaissance VF and
two communication relay planes. The four special VF covered the west
coast of northern Palawan from Imuruan to Bacuit Bays.*****
* CTG 38.1 Dispatch 240155 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info CTF 38.
** Deck Log INTREPID, October 24th, 1944.
*** War Diaries CTG 38.2, INDEPENDENCE, October 24th, 1944.
**** Detailed Action Report 901ST Air Group, Night Searches, October
10th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 160551, NA 12402.
***** War Diaries CTG 38.2, CABOT, October 24th, 1944.
496799 O - 59 - 21 179 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 38.2
October 24th
As has been discussed earlier, INTREPID search planes
sighted (a) the Main Body at 0746 and reported it shortly thereafter,*
(b) a light cruiser and destroyer standing out between Corregidor and
Bataan and (c) a bomb hit on the light cruiser.**
At 0829 he received COMTHIRDFLT's orders to relay the
above contact via TBS voice radio to CTF 38.***
By 0853 he had launched his first strike against the
Main Body consisting of twenty-one VF, twelve VB and thirteen VT from the
INTREPID and CABOT.****
As a result of this strike he reported to COMTHIRDFLT
as having damaged the enemy as follows: (a) three torpedo hits on two
battleships of the leading force, (b) two bomb hits on a KONGO class
battleship, (c) one possible torpedo hit on a NACHI class cruiser, (d) one
probable bomb hit on KONGO class battleship and (e) one possible bomb hit
on fantail of a YAMATO class battleship.*****
According to Japanese records the Main Body received
limited damage at this time as follows: (a) the heavy cruiser MYOKO, one
torpedo hit in the starboard after engine room which forced her at 1125
to be retired to Brunei Bay and (b) the battleship MUSASHI, one torpedo
hit on the starboard side aft but her combat effectiveness was unimpaired.
No other major combat damage was reported by Commander Main Body.******
Two INTREPID VT and one CABOT VT were shot down by
enemy antiaircraft fire. *******
At about 1003 he probably overheard COMTHIRDFLT's
order to COMBATDIV SEVEN to prepare to assume the duties of Commander
Battle Line. ********
INTREPID Dispatch 232322 October 1944 to CTG 38. 2; also CAG
18 Aircraft Action Report No. 54-44*
CTG 38.2 TBS Voice Radio Message 240345 October 1944 to
COMTHIRDFLT.
COMTHIRDFLT TBS Voice Radio Message 232329 October 1944 to
CTG 38.2.
War Diaries INTREPID, CABOT, October 24th, 1944,
CTG 38.2 TBS Voice Radio Message 240445 October 1944 to
C0M3RDFLT.
COMCRUDIV 5 TBS Voice Radio Message 241045 October 1944 to
Commander 1ST Striking Force; also Commander Main Body Dispatch
241220 October 1944 to 1ST Striking Force Battle Report
Addressees, Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1
Operation, October 18th - 23th, 1944, WDC Document 161005,
NA 11744.
CAG 18 Aircraft Action Report No. 55-44; also War Diary CABOT,
October 24th, 1944.
C0M3RDFLT TBS Voice Radio Message 240103 October 1944 to
COMBATDIV 7.
**
***
****
*****
******
*******
********
180
CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 38.2
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1018 he advised COMTHIRDFLT that he was launching
a second strike against the enemy consisting of eight VF, twelve VB and
eight VT.*
At 1030 he launched his second strike consisting of
nine VF, twelve VB and nine VT,** all from the INTREPID. The attack,
executed just after 1200, was a coordinated one which concentrated
principally on a battleship of the YAMATO class (actually the MUSASHI).
Eight VB covered by fighters dove on the MUSASHI claiming three confirmed
1000-pound bomb hits and three possibles. Nine VT followed the bombers,
claiming at least two torpedo hits in the port side of the ship and one
possible hit on the starboard side. Photographs clearly confirm the two
port side hits. Three VB and one VT were shot down by antiaircraft fire****
Japanese records indicate that, in this attack, the MUSASHI received three
more torpedo hits on the port side for a total of four, and two bomb hits.
Her speed was reduced to twenty-four knots.****
During the morning CTG 38.2 learned, among other
things, of (a) COMTHIRDFLT ' s orders to (l) CTF 38 and CTG 38.4 to
concentrate on TG 38.2 and (2) CTG 38.1 to reverse course and proceed to
Point MICK, (b) the enemy bombing of the PRINCETON and (c) the contact
and attack by TG 38.4 aircraft on the enemy force in the Sulu Sea.
At 1207 he reported to COMTHIRDFLT that the special
four plane fighter search had covered the western coast of northern
Palawan and Coron Bay with negative results.*****
At 1345 he launched his third and last strike of the
day against the Main Body.****** (This strike was part of the attack
listed as the fifth air attack by the Japanese.) This strike composed of
twenty-four VF, twelve VB and eight VT from the CABOT and INTREPID was
executed commencing at 1530. Again coordinated attacks were made. After
completion of the bomber runs the fighters strafed preparatory to torpedo
attacks by the VT. The VB pilots claimed three 1000-pound bomb hits on a
KONGO or YAMATO class battleship, while the VT pilots claimed one torpedo
hit in a YAMATO and one in a MOGAMI class cruiser.****** Since the Main
Body came under its heaviest attack commencing at about 1500, which
attack included planes from TG 38.4, Japanese records are not conclusive
as regards TG 38.2' s claims. The Main Body sustained damage as follows:
(a) NAGATO, two bomb hits and several near misses — speed reduced to twenty-
one knots, (b) MUSASHI, ten bomb hits and eleven torpedo hits and (c) one
destroyer KIYOSHIMO, received one bomb hit reducing her speed to twenty-one
toots.******* Aircraft combat losses were one VB and one VT.
* CTG 38.2 TBS Voice Radio Message 240118 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
** War Diary INTREPID, October 24th, 1944.
*** Ibid.; also CAG 18 Aircraft Action Report No. 56-44.
**** Commander 1ST Striking Force Dispatch 241250 October 1944 to Battle
Report Addressees, Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1
Operation, October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA
11744; also Detailed Action Report MUSASHI, Battle off the
Philippines, October 24th, 1944, WDC Document 161639.
***** CTG 38.2 TBS Voice Radio Message 240307 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
****** CAG 18 Aircraft" Action Report No. 57-44.
******* Detailed Action Report No. 2, KIYOSHIMO, Antiair Action in Sibuyan
Sea, October 24th, 1944, WDC Document 161717, NA 11801.
181 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 38.2
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1445 he reported to COMTHIRDFLT, via TBS voice
radio, the results of the second strike, claiming three torpedo hits and
three bomb hits on a KONGO class battleship of the leading force.
Included was the statement that the rest of the force was probably
undamaged.* Why he stated a KONGO class battleship when the aircraft
action report indicated that the torpedo attacks were against a YAMATO
class battleship and did in fact result in hits against the MUSASHI, is
not known.
At 1710 he received COMTHIRDFLT' s orders to CTG 33.4,
who was hull down on the horizon bearing 150° (T), to (a) assume tactical
command of TG's 38.2 and 38.4, (b) operate in the general vicinity until
further orders and (c) keep the groups concentrated. Included was the
information that "if the enemy sorties (through San Bernardino Strait) TF 34
will be formed when directed by me."**
Since he was steaming in company with COMTHIRDFLT, he
was very likely already aware of COMTHIRDFLT* s plans to employ TF 34 in
combat against the Main Body in the event it sortied from San Bernardino
Strait although CTG 38.1 records 1701 as the time of receipt of
COMTHIRDFLT «s 240612 (Battle Plan).
At 1730 CTG 38.2 having intercepted a contact report
from an ENTERPRISE plane off Cape Engano advised COMTHIRDFLT over the TBS
voice radio that the contact was on three CV, two CL and three DD in
Latitude 18°-32'N, Longitude 125°-28'E on course 270°(T), speed fifteen
knots ,***
At 1755 he reported the results of the third and last
strike by his planes together with a situation report of the Main Body.
This report is quoted in full as follows: "Flash report 3rd strike enemy
force reported at 1600 at 12-42 N 122-39 E. Course 270 speed 17. This
force has been 14 miles to the east of this position but reversed course
during the time attack was over target. 2 BB reported to be of KONGO
class were damaged and circling. Apparently not controlled at 12-39 N
122-48 E. This first was listing and afire. The second less damaged.
Course to west may be retiring or may be protection for cripples. In
addition to 2 damaged second force lacks 1 CA it had this morning. First
force lacks 2 DD. Composition of forces 1st force 2 BB, 4 CA, 1 CL, 5 DD.
Second force 2 BB damaged, 3 CA, 1 CL, 6 DD. 3 bomb hits and 1 torpedo
hit by third strike on worst damaged BB."****
At about this time the badly damaged MUSASHI, the
cruiser TONE and two accompanying destroyers having earlier dropped out of
formation were possibly about ten miles east southeast of the force and
were likely the ships referred to in the report as being, "2 BB... damaged
and circling 0"
* CTG 38.2 TBS Voice Radio Message 240545 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
** C0M3RDFLT TBS Voice Radio Message 240810 October 1944 to CTG 33.4,
info CTG 33.2, CTF 34 and COMBATDIV 7.
*** CTG 38.2 TBS Voice Radio Message 240830 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
**** CTG 38.2 TBS Voice Radio Message 240855 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
182 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 38.2
CTG 38.3
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1830 he was still operating generally off San
Bernardino Strait. His aircraft losses for the day were five VT and four
VB from antiaircraft fire and one VB from operational causes. He now had
remaining in his carriers approximately eighty-five VF, nineteen VB and
thirty VT.
(c) Operations of CTG 38.3, 0000 - 183Q, October 24th.
At the beginning of this day CTG 38.3, in the ESSEX
with TG 38.3, was heading for his assigned position about ninety miles
east of Polillo Island.
At 0005 he made contact on an enemy plane bearing
270° (T) distant fifty-seven miles which by 0020 had closed to twenty-
seven miles at which time it turned away.* This aircraft was a SIXTH Base
Air Force patrol seaplane from Manila which reported a large enemy force
in Latitude 14°-35'N, Longitude 1250-15*E at 0050.**
At 0100 he made radar contact on another plane bearing
230°(T) distant seventy-five miles on an easterly course.*
TG 38.2.***
Both of these planes were shot down by the VF(N) of
By 0530 he had made two additional contacts as a
result of which he received a TBS message from CTF 38 in the LEXINGTON to
the effect that "much enemy activity suggests heavy air attack this
morning" ,****
At 0610 he launched his initial air operations.*****
These consisted of twenty-seven VF and twenty-six VB for search, eight VF
for radio relay and eighteen VF for the fighter sweep.****** In addition
twelve VF were launched for CAP and four VF and four VT for SNASP .*******
During the next several hours he noted that his CAP
had shot down four enemy planes and that he was about to be attacked by
two large groups of planes, one distant forty-nine miles consisting of
about forty planes.******** His CAP intercepted the first group and drove
* Deck Log ESSEX, October 24th, 1944.
** Detailed Action Report 901ST Air Group, Night Searches, October
10th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 160551, NA 12402.
*** War Diary CTG 38.2, October 24th, 1944.
**** CTF 38 TBS Voice Radio Message 242030 October 1944 to CTG 38.3.
***** Action Report PRINCETON, Battle of the Philippines and Loss of
USS PRINCETON, October 24th, 1944, Serial 020, November 24th, 1944.
****** Deck Logs LEXINGTON and ESSEX, October 24th, 1944.
******* Deck Log LANGLEY, October 24th, 1944; also Action Report
PRINCETON, Battle off the Philippines and the Loss of USS
PRINCETON, October 24th, 1944, Serial 020, November 24th, 1944.
******** Action Report ESSEX, Battle of the Philippines, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0195, November 21st, 1944.
183 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 38.3
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
them away. The second group which had been contacted at fifty-five miles
did not close. He now at 0800 ordered all available VF scrambled as a
result of which forty-two additional VF were launched from all four
carriers (ESSEX seven, LEXINGTON eleven, LANGLEY twelve, PRINCETON
twelve ) .*
During the next few minutes a number of events occurred
in relatively rapid succession:
sixty miles.
(a) At 0805 he detected a third large raid, distant
(b) At 0820 he received a contact report originated by
a search plane from the INTREPID reporting sighting "four BB, eight CA,
thirteen DD, location south of southern tip of Mindoro, course 050°(T),
speed ten-twelve knots. No transports in the group and in all a total of
twenty-five warships** (Contact "6", Plate XV).
(c) At 0824 when it was received by CTG 38.1, he
received a dispatch from COMTHIRDFLT directing him to concentrate toward
TG 38.2 at best speed.
(d) At 0833 he learned that his seven ESSEX VF had
sighted a large group of fifty to sixty planes and had requested help.
He therefore directed the twelve PRINCETON VF to assist but these VF
failed to make interception.***
Meanwhile the seven ESSEX VF attacked the fifty- sixty
enemy planes and claimed shooting down twenty-five planes with four
probables and three damaged with only minor damage to themselves. However,
despite this success, at 0938 the PRINCETON was hit by a bomb just forward
of the after elevator and near the flight deck centerline.**** This
started a fire on the hangar deck which made the hangar untenable.
CTG 38.3 then, at 0951, ordered the RENO and three
destroyers (CASSIN YOUNG, GATLING and IRWIN) to standby the stricken ship
but at 1002 he noted that an extensive series of explosions was occurring
as a result of which he, at 1004, ordered the BIRMINGHAM and, at 1033,
the MORRISON to standby also. Meanwhile the ship had been largely
abandoned leaving on board a salvage party of about 240 officers and men.****
At 1046 he was directed by CTF 38 to remain in the
vicinity of the PRINCETON.
* Deck Logs ESSEX, LEXINGTON, LANGLEY, October 24th, 1944; also Action
Report PRINCETON, The Battle of the Philippines and Loss of USS
PRINCETON, October 24th, 1944, Serial 020, November 24th, 1944.
** INTREPID Aircraft Voice Message 232320 October 1944.
*** Action Report ESSEX, Battle of the Philippines, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 0195, November 21st, 1944.
**** Action Report PRINCETON, The Battle of the Philippines and Loss of
USS PRINCETON, October 24th, 1944, Serial 020, November 24th, 1944.
184 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 38.3
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
By 1054 he had recovered and serviced enough VF to
permit launching a strike (Strike Group ONE) against the enemy force in
the Sibuyan Sea. By 1108 he had launched for this purpose sixteen VF,
twenty VB and thirty-two VT.* Directly after this he recovered the
fighter sweep launched at 0606 ♦ From these pilots he learned that a
NATORI class CL (evidently the KINU) had been damaged just outside of
Manila Bay,
At 1155 he was directed by CTF 38 to launch a search
consisting of two VF and one VB in each sector between 350°(T) and 040°(T).**
At 1228 he directed that the search be launched about
1305 and further directed that a second strike (Strike Group TWO) be
launched against the enemy force in the Sibuyan Sea at the same time.
However, before he had completed preparations a large
group of enemy aircraft was detected at 1245 bearing (radar) 035°(T),
distant 105 miles closing. He therefore cancelled the search and at 1305
launched twenty-three (LEXINGTON fourteen, LANGLEY nine) additional
fighters as CAP. He also launched his Strike Group WO which consisted of
eight VF and twelve VB from the ESSEX.***
AT ABOUT 1315 STRIKE GROUP ONE ARRIVED OVER THE
JAPANESE MAIN BODY AND AT 1324**** STARTED THEIR ATTACK BY AIR GROUPS. THE
JAPANESE SHIPS IMMEDIATELY COMMENCED MANEUVERING BY SIMULTANEOUS MOVEMENT
ALTHOUGH FROM TIME TO TIME SHIPS HERE AND THERE MANEUVERED ON THEIR OWN.****
BY THIS MEANS, AS WELL AS BY THE EMPLOYMENT OF HEAVY ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE,
THEY ENDEAVORED TO DEFEAT THE ALLIED AIR ATTACK. NO AIR COVER WAS OBSERVED
BY THE ATTACKING PILOTS. THIS METHOD OF DEFENSE WAS FAIRLY EFFECTIVE FOR,
ALTHOUGH THE STRIKE GROUP REPORTED TORPEDO HITS ON TWO BATTLESHIPS AND TWO
HEAVY CRUISERS OF THE LEADING (EASTERN) GROUP, AND BOMB HITS ON ONE
BATTLESHIP OF THE WESTERN GROUP,***** THEY ACTUALLY MADE (a) ONE TORPEDO
HIT IN THE MUSASHI AND TWO NEAR MISSES,****** (b) ONE BOMB HIT (FORWARD)
IN THE YAMATO WHICH DID NOT AFFECT HER COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS,******* AND
(c) A NEAR MISS ON THE YAHAGI WHICH REDUCED HER MAXIMUM SPEED TO TWENTY-
TWO KNOTS.********
* Deck Logs LEXINGTON and ESSEX, October 24th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 38.3, Battle of the Philippines, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0090, December 2nd, 1944.
*** Deck Log ESSEX, October 24th, 1944.
**** Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operations, October
18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11973.
***** CTG 38.3 TBS Voice Radio Message 240903 October 1944 to CTF 38.
****** Detailed Action Report MUSASHI, Battle off the Philippines,
October 24th, 1944, WDC Document 161639.
******* Detailed Action Report No. 3, YAMATO, SHO No. 1 Antiair and
Surface Actions, October 17th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161639.
******** Detailed Action Report No. 3, YAHAGI, SHO No. 1 Operation,
October 22nd - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
185 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 38.3
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1327 another large incoming group of enemy planes
was detected by radar bearing 040°(T), distant ninety miles and the CAP
was vectored out to intercept.*
The appearance of these planes likely reminded him
of CINCPOA's intelligence summary for October 23rd which indicated that
the Japanese Main Force was likely in the Formosa - Philippine Sea area.
If he was so reminded he likely felt that thi3 contact tended to support
this summary and that enemy carriers were in fact to the north and
northeast of him. Mindful of the fact that no searches had been flown in
that area during the day he now, by TBS voice radio, requested CTF 38 f 3
permission to launch the search originally scheduled, but without fighter
escort.** This was immediately approved*** and therefore at 1409 the
LEXINGTON launched the search now consisting of but five VB.
Although the CAP was successful in breaking up both
enemy attacks some singles and small groups did attack the task group
with bombs and torpedoes but all were ineffective.****
At about 1426 Strike Group TWO attacked the Main Body.
The Japanese ships maneuvered and employed heavy antiaircraft fire. In
this case they were more effective than before for, although the Allies
claimed having made two or three direct hits on one battleship and one
hit on one light cruiser,***** they actually made but one bomb hit, and
this was on the forecastle of the YAMATO which did not affect her combat
effectiveness 0 ******
During all of this time efforts were being made to
save the PRINCETON and the escorts, at various times, came alongside to
put out the fires. At 1515 the BIRMINGHAM came alongside on such a mission.
However, at 1523, a tremendous explosion occurred which (a) blew off the
major part of the PRINCETON'S stern and the after section of the flight
deck and (b) took a heavy toll (241 dead or missing, 416 wounded)*******
of BIRMINGHAM topside persomel******** and wounded her captain******* who
at 1530 directed the Commanding Officer RENO to assume the duties of OTC
of the BIRMINGHAM group.*******
CTG 38.3 who had been deeply concerned over the
PRINCETON'S condition now at 1532 received a TBS voice radio message from
the Commanding Officer RENO********* reporting the situation as expressed
in the preceding paragraph.
* Deck Log LEXINGTON, October 24th, 1944.
** CTG 38.3 TBS Voice Radio Message 240442 October 1944 to CTF 38.
*** CTF 38 TBS Voice Radio Message 240442 October 1944 to CTG 38.3.
**** War Diary CTG 38.3, October 1944.
***** CTG 38.3 TBS Voice Radio Message 240903 October 1944 to CTF 38.
****** Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation, October
18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
******* Action Report BIRMINGHAM, Fleet Operations, October 24th - 27th,
1944, Serial 0053, October 31st, 1944.
******** Action Report PRINCETON, Battle of the Philippines and Loss of
USS PRINCETON, October 24th, 1944, Serial 020, November 24th, 1944.
********* CTU 38.3.4 TBS Voice Radio Message 240632 October 1944 to CT
38.3.
186 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 38.3
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
He now at 1635 began receiving a series of messages
from the northern search planes which had sighted the Main Force*. Since
these messages were also received by CTF 38 he was not surprised when at
1645 he received from that commander a suggestion that in view of the
contact to the north, the PRINCETON be sunk.** Concurring in this
suggestion he at 1658 directed the RENO, via relay, to take action.***
The contacts on enemy forces to the north were reported
by the search planes through relay aircraft and considerable confusion
existed as to what had been sighted. The first contact, which as
mentioned above was received at 1635, reported the enemy as three BB,
four - six CA and six DD at Latitude 18°-10'N, Longitude 123°-30'E,
course 210° (T), speed fifteen knots, time 1540,*
There were apparently, however, other reports which
were at variance with this one, for at 1707 he received word from CTF 38
that if the enemy composition of three carriers, one of ISE class, two
CL's and three DDfs, was confirmed he was to detail his battleships,
CRUDIV THIRTEEN, less BIRMINGHAM and RENO, and one squadron of destroyers
to attack and sink the enemy.**** Realizing that if this order were
executed the surface group might be formed before the air battle had been
settled, he, at 1723, recommended to CTF 38 that (a) single plane dawn
searches be made, (b) the strike groups be held on deck until contact was
made and (c) TG 38.3 be kept intact until the air battle had been
settled.***** He was gratified to receive a reply, in part, to the effect
that CTF 38 did not propose to divide TG 38.3 until well after dark.
At 1746 the RENO fired two torpedoes into the
PRINCETON which struck at 1749 causing a tremendous explosion after which
the PRINCETON sank in forty-five seconds. ******
By 1809 he had landed his last strike and search
plane.******* Interrogation of the search pilots soon revealed that
contacts to the north were considerably greater than those previously
reported and included (a) at 1640 in Latitude 18°-10!N, Longitude
125°-28»E two SHOKAKU CV's, one CVL, three CL's and three DD's on course
270°(T), speed fifteen knots, (Contact "20"), (b) at 1540 in Latitude
18°-10»N, Longitude 125°-30'E, four BB's or CA's, five cruisers and six
DD's on course 210°(T), speed fifteen knots, one of the BB's had flight
deck aft and (c) at 1600 in Latitude 19°-40»N, Longitude 123°-00'E, two
destroyers on course 240°(T), speed twelve knots.
* ESSEX TBS Voice Radio Message 240735 October 1944 to LEXINGTON.
** CTF 38 TBS Voice Radio Message 240745 October 1944 to CTG 38.3.
*** CTG 38.3 TBS Voice Radio Message 240758 October 1944 to CTU
38.3.3.
**** CTF 38 TBS Voice Radio Message 240807 October 1944 to CTG 38.3.
***** CTG 38.3 TBS Voice Radio Message 240823 October 1944 to CTF 38.
****** Action Report PRINCETON, Battle of the Philippines and Loss of
USS PRINCETON, October 24th, 1944, Serial 020, November 24th, 1944.
******* Deck Log LEXINGTON, October 24th, 1944.
187 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 38.3
CTG 33.4
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
CTG 38.3 records enemy aircraft destroyed during the
day as 162 planes shot down by aircraft and five by ships' gunfire or a
total of 167. Losses were three VF, two VB and three VT in combat, two VB
operationally, eleven VF and nine VT in the sinking of the PRINCETON and
three VF jetisoned.
As a result, at the end of the day, CTG 38.3 had
approximately 117 VF, fifty-one VB and forty- two VT.
(d) Operations of CTG 38.4, 0000 - 1830, October 24th.
At the beginning of the day CTG 38.4, in the FRANKLIN,
with TG 33.4, was heading for his dawn launching position off southern
Samar. During the early morning hours he received much the same
information received by other TF 38 commanders.
Since most of the dispatches received or sent by him
have been discussed previously under other THIRDFLT commands, the greater
part of them will be omitted from this discussion and instead emphasis
will be placed on the description and results of attacks made on the
Japanese surface forces by TG 38.4 aircraft.
At about 0600 he launched a reinforced search
consisting of thirty- two VF and twenty- four VB from the FRANKLIN and the
ENTERPRISE to cover the sector between 230° (T) and 270°(T). ENTERPRISE
planes covered the two southern 10° sub-sectors while the FRANKLIN planes
covered the two northern 10° sub—sectors.* Each sub-sector was flown by
eight VF and six VB.
At 0815 three enemy destroyers (DESDIV TWENTY-ONE) off
northern Panay Island were sighted by FRANKLIN aircraft. The VF attacked
each destroyer claiming four rocket hits on one destroyer, two hits on
another and estimating the third was heavily damaged. The VB planes which
had not attacked at this time but had continued on to discover other enemy
forces now returned and attacked, claiming several hits and near misses.
No enemy air opposition was encountered over the target.**
At 0905 the THIRD Section, which was reported
correctly as two BB, one CA and four DD, was located by ENTERPRISE planes
in the Sulu Sea,*** The two ENTERPRISE search groups made a coordinated
attack and claimed a minimum of three bomb hits on one battleship, four
on the other and rocket hits on the cruiser and destroyers.**** CTG 38.4
later modified these claims to two bomb hits (500 pound) on each
battleship, along with rocket hits on the heavy cruiser and two destroyers.*9*
* War Diary ENTERPRISE, October 24th, 1944; also CVAG 13 Aircraft
Action Report No. 89-44.
** CVAG 13 Aircraft Action Report No. 89-44.
*** CTG 38.4 TBS Voice Radio Message 240424 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT,
**** War Diary ENTERPRISE, October 24th, 1944.
138 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 38.4
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
One VF (ENTERPRISE) was shot down by antiaircraft fire. No enemy air
opposition was encountered over the target.*
Japanese records indicate that these claims were
excessive for while the FUSO received one bomb hit on the stern which
destroyed her two scouting planes; the YAMASHIRO escaped damage. No
damage of consequence was sustained by any of the ships as a result of
strafing or rocket attacks.**
At 0951 a second strike was launched by the FRANKLIN
against the three destroyers west of northern Panay. On arrival about
1230 the strike, consisting of twelve VF and eleven VB, found only two
destroyers.*** This was because the heavily damaged WAKABA had finally
sunk.**** The destroyers immediately started circling to the left in
tight individual turns.*** CTG 38.4 in reporting the FRANKLIN claims to
COMTHIRDFLT reported rocket and strafing damage to one destroyer and minor
damage to the other.***** No enemy air opposition was encountered over
the target.*** In view of the strength of the Allied attack and its
limited success it would appear that the attacking aircraft failed to
properly coordinate and press home their attacks. Japanese records indicate
that although hits were scored, only one gun on one destroyer was put out
of action and both destroyers were able to maintain full power.****** One
FRANKLIN VB was shot down by antiaircraft fire. •*
At 1024 (when it was received by CTG 38.1) he received
COMTHIRDFLT' s orders to concentrate at best speed toward TG 38.2 (off San
Bernardino Strait).******* Having learned earlier of the presence of the
Main Body in the vicinity of Mindoro, ******** he realized that COMTHIRDFLT
had decided to regroup his three carrier groups in the vicinity of San
Bernardino Strait and concentrate against this enemy force. He also
realized that COMTHIRDFLT had made this decision before learning of the
presence of the enemy surface force (THIRD Section) in the Sulu Sea. *********
* Action Report ENTERPRISE, Report of Operations in the Philippines
Area, including Attacks on the Japanese Fleet and AA Action,
October 22nd - 31st, 1944, Serial OO56, November 3rd, 1944.
** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines,
October 18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
*** CVG 13 Aircraft Action Report No. 90-44.
**** HATSUHARU Dispatch 240900 October 1944 to Commanders 2ND Striking
Force, SW Area Force, DESRON 1, Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1,
SHO No. 1 Operation, October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document
161005, NA 11744.
***** CTG 38.4 Dispatch 240546 October 1944 to CTF 38, info C0M3RDFLT,
CTF 77, etc.; also CVAG 13 Aircraft Action Report No. 89-44.
****** Detailed Action Report DESDIV 21, SHO No. 1 Operation, Antiair
Action south of Mindoro, October 24th, 1944, WDC Document
161717, NA 11801.
******* C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232327 October 1944 to CTG's 38.3 and 38.4.
******** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232322 October 1944 to CTG's 38.3, 38.4,
info COMINCH, CINCPAC, All TFC's 3RD and 7THFLT»s.
Aircraft in Sector 3 Dispatch 240010 October 1944 to All
Stations on this circuit.
189 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 33.4
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
Whether he relayed any specific information to COMTHLRDFLT via aircraft
VHF as regards the strike against this force is not kr.own. He did not at
this time recall the strike against the destroyers (DESDIV TWENTY-ONE)
but neither did he launch a follow-up strike against the THIRD Section.
Finally, at 1224 he sent a message to COMTHIRDFLT
(a) reporting his 1200 position as Latitude 11°-37'N, Longitude 1260-43«E,
(b) explaining that he was delayed by recovery of the search and attack
groups and (c) advising that he was proceeding to close TG 38.2 at twenty-
six knots and would launch a deck- load strike against the "Jap fleet
vicinity Tablas Island."*
At 1324 he advised COKTHIRDFLT by dispatch that, among
other things, he had (a) contacted at 0905 in Latitude 08°-55!N, Longitude
121°-50'E another Japanese force (THIRD Section) consisting of two
battleships, one heavy cruiser and four destroyers on course 035°(T),
speed fifteen knots, (b) scored two bomb hits on each battleship and
rocket hits on the heavy cruiser and two destroyers and (c) w=s now
closing TG 33.2 which action was removing him from effective attack range
on the above force,**
At 1330 he launched the strike. It consisted of
sixteen VF, nine VB, eight VT from the ENTERPRISE*** and twelve VF, twelve
VB and ten VT from the FRANKLIN**** for a total of twenty-eight VF, twenty-
one VB and eighteen VT. At about 1500 the attack commenced. This strike
was part of the attack listed as the fifth air attack by the Japanese.
T^e Japanese ships endeavored to repel the attack by individual maneuver
and by intense, but not particularly accurate, antiaircraft fire.****
Later, in reporting this attack he claimed, among other things, that in
the attack made at 1415 (it actually conmenced at about 1500) (a) a TAMATO
class battleship was bombed, torpedoed and left afire down at the bow,
(b) two bomb hits were scored on a KONGO class battleship, (c) another
battleship was bombed but not seriously damaged, (d) one light cruiser was
torpedoed and seen to roll over, (e) probably two or three torpedo hits
were scored on one of the battleships thai, received the bomb hit and (f)
the enemy was on an easterly course when first sighted and on a westerly
course when last seen.***** In this strike the FRANKLIN lost two VT froa
antiaircraft fire. No enemy aircraft were encountered over the target.
In making the above attack the planes of this carrier
group struck just before the planes from TG 33.2. Since the battle damage
actually received by the Japanese ships is recorded under "Operations of
CTG 33.2, 0000 - 1830, October 24th"," it will not be listed here excepting
to say that no light cruiser was sunk or damaged.
*~~ CTG 33.4 Discatch 240324 October 1944 to 00M3RDFLT, info CTF 38,
CTG 33.2.
** CTG 33.4 Dispatch 240424 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info CTF 38.
*** Action Report ENTERPRISE, Report of Operations in the Philippines
Area, including Attacks on the Japanese Fleet and AA Action,
October 22nd - 31st, 1944, Serial 0056, November 3rd, 1944.
**** CVAG 13 Aircraft Action Report No. 91-44., CoBnander Carrier Air
Group 13, Aircraft Action Reports October 24th - 28th, 1944,
Serial 0^8, November 6th, 1944.
***** CTG 38.4 T3S Voice Radio Message 240930 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
190 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 38.4 and CTG 30.5
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
During the afternoon he received the following
instructions from COMTHIRDFLT: (1) at 1355 (when it was received by
CTG 38.1) to advise COMTHIRDFLT of the earliest time he could join '
TG 38.2— Point OPTION 090° (T) speed fifteen knots,* (2) at 1710 to assume
tactical command of TG's 38.2 and 38.4 and to operate in the general
vicinity, keeping the groups concentrated until further orders,** (3) at
1714 (when it was received by CTG 38.1) to rendezvous with CTG 38.2 based
on COMTHIRDFLT' s new Point OPTION of 165°(T) speed eighteen knots to be
effective at 1700,*** (4) at 1712 (when it was received by CTG 38.1)
outlining COMTHIRDFLT 's battle plan**** and (5) at 1819 to proceed westward
at twenty knots.*****
During the day (a) enemy air activity over the force
had been very light. Local patrols had been flown by the SAN JACINTO
and BELLEAU WOOD and (b) TG 38.4, exclusive of these local patrols, had
flown a total of seventy-two VF, fifty-six VB, eighteen VT and had lost
one VF, one VB and two VT in combat with no operational losses. As a
result at the end of the day CTG 38.4 had approximately eight VF, forty-
three VB and fifty-three VT.
At 1830 CTG 38.4 was on course 285°(T), speed twenty-
five knots.******
(2) Operations of CTG 30.5 (Air Search Reconnaissance and
Photographic Group), 0000 - 1830, October 24th.
CTG 30.5, as on previous days, continued his air searches
from Kossol Passage, Saipan and Tinian as shown on Plate X and Diagram "C".
During the morning while embarked in the HAMLIN (AV 15)
in Ulithi he most likely received the various contact reports on the
Japanese surface forces in the waters around the Philippines as well as
COMTHIRDFLT' s orders in connection therewith to his group commanders
within TF 38.
Shortly before noon, he probably heard over the AOIC the
second report of one of his planes flying in sector 335° (T) - 344° (T) out
of Tinian on a large merchant ship and three destroyers in Latitude
28°-45'N, Longitude 141°-15fE, on course 300°(T) speed eighteen knots.*******
* C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 240413 October 1944 to CTG 38.4, info All
TFC's and TGC's 3RDFLT.
** C0M3RDFLT TBS Voice Radio Message 240810 October 1944 to CTG
38.4, info CTG 38.2, CTF 34, COMBATDIV 7.
*** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 240644 October 1944 to CTG 38.4, info All
TFC's of TF 38, CTF 34.
**** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 240612 October 1944 to All TFC's, TGC's of
TF 38, info COMINCH, CINCPAC.
***** C0M3RDFLT TBS Voice Radio Message 240919 October 1944 to CTG 38.4.
****** Deck Log FRANKLIN, October 24th, 1944.
******* Plane 14 of Flight 223 Dispatch 240224 October 1944 to Any and
all ships.
191 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 30.5
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
During the afternoon he very likely learned of the actions
decided upon by both COMTHIRDFLT and CTF 77 to disrupt the movement of
enemy forces, but since the actions appeared to be developing beyond his
area of responsibility, he appears to have made no unusual plans or
preparations to assist.
By 1830 neither of his subordinate commanders searching
(1) northwest out of Kossol Passage nor (2) west and northwest from Tinian
had reported the results of the day's searches, although nothing of major
significance had been sighted by either search exclusive of the contact
described above,*
(2) Operations of CTF 17 (Submarine Force Pacific), 0000 - 1830,
October 24th.
At the beginning of the day CTF 17 was still engrossed with the
developing situation for he had been receiving reports from his own
submarines and from CTF 71 's submarines as well. He was, therefore,
awaiting reports as to further contacts on enemy forces. He did not have
long to wait for shortly after midnight, at 0032, he received a disDatch
from CTF 71 which informed him that the ANGLER had reported a task force
of four large ships plus escorts in Latitude 12°-40'N, Longitude 118°-58IE
(about eighty miles northwest of Coron Island), on course 050°(T) speed
eighteen knots, at 2130 on the 23rd,** and later, at 0220 (when it was
received by CTF 79) he intercepted a dispatch from the GUITARRO to CTF 71
reporting an enemy task force, at 0030, consisting of fifteen to twenty
ships including three probable battleships in Latitude 13°-00'N, Longitude
119°-30'E (about thirty-five miles 055°(T) from the ANGLER point of contact
or about seventy-eight miles northwest of Coron Island), on course 030°(T),
speed eighteen knots.***
At 0430 he received a second dispatch from CTF 71 which informed
him that the BREAM had reported two AOBA class cruisers and a large
destroyer in Latitude 14°-05!N, Longitude 119°-40'E (southwest of Manila),
on course 070°(T), speed nineteen knots and claiming two hits in one of
the cruisers at 0430 on the 23rd.****
Just how he evaluated the above submarine contacts is not known,
but it seems likely that even though the reported compositions were somewhat
different he considered that they were all the same force. If this was his
evaluation he would have been correct for this was the Main Body, FIRST
Striking Force,
* CTU 30.5.1 DisDatch 241216 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info All TFC's
3RDFLT, CTF's 57, 59, CTG 30.5; also CTU 30.5.3 Dispatch 240945
October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info All TFC's 3RDFLT, CTF's 57, 59,
CTG 30.5.
** CTF 71 Dispatch 231454 October 1944 to CINCPAC, COMSUBPAC, C0M3RDFLT,
C0M7THFLT, All TFC's 3RD and 7THFLT's, C.G.'s 5TH and 13TH Air
Forces, info COMINCH.
*** GUITARRO DisDatch 231610 October 1944 to CTF 71.
**** CTF 71 Dispatch 231838 October 1944 to CINCPAC, COMSUBPAC, All TFG's
3RD and 7rHFLT's, C.G.'s 5TH and 13TH Air Forces.
192 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
Sometime after this, and most likely at 0443, he received the
GUITARRO's second report on the Main Body, FIRST Striking Force, wherein
the GUITARRO reported, "three definite battleships and two possible
carriers headed south through Mindoro Strait at 0330. M
During the forenoon he issued two separate submarine position
reports. The first, at 0059, stated that six submarines in two wolf packs
(HADDOCK, HALIBUT, TUNA and PINTADO, ATULE, JALLAO) were proceeding
westward at best speed to patrol Area DEPART and should arrive on station
within twelve hours. Seven submarines (SAWFISH, ICEFISK, DRUM, SHARK,
BLACKFISH, SSADRAGON, SNOOK), one (SAWFISH) out of torpedoes, patrolling
Luzon Strait, three submarines (SILVERSIDES, TRIGGER, SALMON) off the
northeastern tip of Formosa, and one (TANG) off the northwestern tip of
Formosa,* The second dispatch, issued at 1137, stated that the POMFRET,
SAILFISH, PARCHE, BARBEL, PINTADO, JALLAO and ATULE were at Saipan; the
WHALE and SEAHORSE were north of Latitude 22O-00'N; the HADDOCK, TUNA and
HALIBUT westbound were at Latitude 20°-45'N, Longitude 128°-00«E, while
the BONEFISH eastbound was in Latitude 19°-00«N, Longitude 138°-00'E.**
The information contained in this latter dispatch was incorrect. The
PINTADO, JALLAO and ATULE had departed Saipan two days earlier (October
22nd) and, at this time, were transiting Area PARLOR en route their patrol
station.
Also during the forenoon, but more likely around noon, he received
COMTHIRDFLT's dispatch reporting that a major enemy force including
battleships had been sighted at 0810 just south of Mindoro on an easterly
course.***
At 1335 he received a dispatch from COMTHIRDFLT to CTF 38 and CTG
38.3 to the effect that he had not as yet located the enemy carrier
strength and directing them to keep the area to the north under
observation.**** He likely observed that this dispatch was not addressed
to either CINCPAC or himself and therefore no particular action in this
matter by his submarines was either expected or desired.
Whether or not he gave consideration at this time to disposing
temporarily the two wolf packs en route to CONVOY COLLEGE along Latitude
20°-00»N as a scouting line and directing them to be particularly alert for
the Japanese carrier force which was estimated to be in the Formosa -
Philippine Sea Area is not known. While this is hindsight such a
disposition although sound would have likely missed the carrier force as it
would have passed by before the disposition could have been completed.
* CTF 17 Dispatch 240059 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info COMSOWESPAC
C0MINCH,3RDFLT, CINCPAC, CTF 77, All TFC's 3RDFLT.
** CTF 17 Dispatch 240237 October 1944 to All Stations Interested in
Friendly Subs.
*** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232322 October 1944 to CTG's 38.3 and 38.4, info
COMINCH, CINCPAC, All TFC's 3RD and 7THFLT's.
**** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 232355 October 1944 to CTF 38, CTG 38.3, passed
by Radio Honolulu 240405 October 1944 to COMSUBPAC.
193 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
IT IS LIKELY THAT HE FELT THAT (a) A DEPLOYMENT OF HIS SUBMARINES
TO THE WESTWARD OF LUZON STRAIT WOULD BE MORE PRODUCTIVE OF CONTACTS ON THE
ENEMY, FOR ALL RECENT CONTACTS ON COMBATANT FORCES HAD BEEN TO THE SOUTH
AND WEST OF LUZON, (IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT THE MAIN FORCE HAD NOT YET
BEEN CONTACTED.) AND (b) SHOULD THE JAPANESE BE FORCED TO RETIRE THEY
WOULD DO SO TO THE WESTWARD OF LUZON AND, IF HEADED FOR THE EMPIRE, WOULD
LIKELY PASS TO THE WESTWARD OF LUZON STRAIT WHERE HE HAD A MAJOR
CONCENTRATION OF SUBMARINES. THIS CONCEPT IS SUPPORTED BY THE FACT THAT
AT THIS TIME HE MADE NO CHANGES IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS EITHER TO CONVOY
COLLEGE SUBMARINES OR TO THE TWO WOLF PACKS REFERRED TO ABOVE EN ROUTE TO
THAT AREA.
During the afternoon he awaited additional news of the movements
of enemy forces and of Allied reaction against them for it was of course
clear to him that the Japanese forces off Mindoro were within range of
Allied aircraft and therefore some kind of air action could be expected.
Later in the afternoon he likely learned from CINCPAC of a
dispatch from CTF 77 (a) reporting that an enemy force estimated to
consist of two BB, four CA, four CL and ten DD had been discovered and was
under attack in the eastern Sulu Sea and which might arrive Leyte Gulf
this night and (b) directing the addressees to make preparations for a
night engagement.*
At about 1700 (when it was received by CTF 79) he received a
battle plan issued by COMTHIRDFLT to the THIRD Fleet to the effect that
(a) certain units of his command "will be formed as TF 34" and (b) it
was to "engage decisively at long range" and (c) carriers of TG 38.3 and
38.4 were to be conducted clear of surface fighting.** HE LIKELY WAS
QUITE SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT HE WAS NOT INCLUDED AS AN ACTION ADDRESSEE
FOR IT WAS CLEAR THAT SHOULD AN ENGAGEMENT OCCUR WHEREIN THE JAPANESE
WERE DEFEATED, ALLIED SUBMARINES MIGHT WELL BE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE
DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY.
At 1816 he sent a dispatch to the ICEFISH that her patrol time had
been extended until November 5th and directing her upon the arrival of the
PINTADO wolf pack on October 27th or 28th to join that pack.***
At this time from the information he had gained from dispatches
addressed to him or intercepted by him and from what he had learned at
CINCPAC headquarters (his headquarters were also at Pearl Harbor) it was
clear that although enemy forces had been contacted on easterly courses
through the Philippines friendly surface units were being disposed to
counter these movements.
He likely studied his running estimate of the situation to see what
courses of action he might take to support these Allied movements should
he be required to do so.
* CTF 77 Dispatch 240315 October 1944 to CTF's 78, 79, CTG»s 77.2, 77.3,
70.1, All TFC's 3RDFLT, CAAF SOWESPAC, info C0M3RDFLT, All TGC's 3RD
and 7THFLT«s, CINCSWPA.
** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 240612 October 1944 to All TFC's 3RDFLT, All
TGC's TF 38, info CINCPAC, COMINCH.
*** CTF 17 Dispatch 240912 October 1944 to ICEFISH, info CINCPAC.
194 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
However, although he did not redeploy his CONVOY COLLEGE
submarines he nevertheless decided that it would be wise to inform them
of the situation and, therefore, at 1830 he sent them the following
dispatch:
"It appears that enemy is assembling most of their available
strength in vicinity of Coron Bay (located in group of islands to
northward of Palawan), Subs in CONVOY COLLEGE should be particularly
alert for additional units passing through Luzon Straits and for cripples
heading north. Subs in Area DELETE pay particular attention to vicinity
Cape Bojeador. Information concerning any southbound enemy units is
particularly desired."*
It seems clear that as of this time he had not been informed of
the results of the air strikes against the Main Body, FIRST Striking Force
nor the air strikes against the THIRD Section. Actually the first summary
of results was forwarded by CTF 38 to COMTHIRDFLT at 1830 and was received
by CTF 17 at about 1938.
(a) CONVOY COLLEGE
The submarines SAWFISH, ICEFISH, DRUM, SHARK, BLACKFISH,
SEADRAGON and SNOOK continued to patrol CONVOY COLLEGE as before. The
weather in the area was moderate with wind and sea from the northeast.
(1) SAWFISH, ICEFISH, DRUM
This coordinated attack group (wolf pack) patrolled Area
DELETE on the surface during darkness, except when attacking, and
submerged during daylight. At the beginning of this day it conducted
several attacks on an enemy convoy which had been originally contacted on
the previous evening by the SAWFISH.
(a) The SAWFISH, which had expended the last of her
torpedoes in an attack on the previous night, was now trailing the convoy
and coaching the other submarines in the area into contact, namely
ICEFISH, DRUM and SNOOK .**
The SAWFISH, learning that the SNOOK had completed an
attack, commenced leaving the area so that other submarines would have a
clear field to attack.**
At 0429 the wolf pack commander requested his
submarines to inform him of the result of their attacks. The DRUM replied
that she was being chased by four escorts but the ICEFISH did not reply.
At 0605 the SAWFISH submerged to patrol the western edge of Area DELETE.**
* CTF 17 Dispatch 240923 October 1944 to CONVOY COLLEGE, info COMINCH.
** War Patrol Report SAWFISH, Report of 8TH War Patrol, Serial 88-44,
November 8th, 1944.
496799 0-59-22
195 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
After an uneventful day, at 1925, she surfaced and
some time afterward the wolf pack commander communicated with the ICEFISH
and DRUM once again requesting information as to (a) their attacks and
(b) whether they both still desired an extension of oatrol. Each
submarine replied in the affirmative stating that she had sunk one ship
of the convoy.*
At about this time the SAWFISH set course for
Balintang Channel and shortly thereafter (2200) the wolf pack commander
sent a dispatch to CTF 17 (a) reporting the results of the wolf pack
attacks on the convoy claiming three ships sunk and four additional ships
damaged and (b) requesting (1) routing for the SAWFISH and (2) extension
of patrol for the ICEFISH and DRUM.**
Sometime prior to 2300 he received a dispatch from CTF
17 quoted in full under "Operations of CTF 17, 0000 - 1830, October 24th"
directing the CONVOY COLLEGE submarines to be alert for (1) enemy units
passing through Luzon Straits, (2) northbound cripples, and (3) southbound
units in vicinity of Cape Bojeador,*** for at 2300, while departing the
area, he directed (a) the ICEFISH and DRUM to patrol at discretion and
(b) their attention to the above dispatch. He was not concerned about the
Cape Bojeador area for if the original patrol schedule for this wolf pack
was followed they would be in that area the next day.*
As a result of this dispatch the wolf pack was
dissolved and the ICEFISH and DRUM commenced operating independently.
THE ACTION OF THE WOLF PACK COMMANDER SEEMS QUESTION-
ABLE FOR HIS WOLF PACK HAD BEEN ASSIGNED IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES IN
THE CAPE BOJEADOR AREA AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH
THESE FUNCTIONS AS COORDINATED PATROL GROUP (WOLF PACK) THAN OPERATING
INDEPENDENTLY. IN THIS CONNECTION, PRESENT DAY (1958) DOCTRINE POINTS
OUT THAT IN GROUP PATROLLING THE PRIMARY ADVANTAGE IS THAT THE LIKELIHOOD
OF CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY IS INCREASED.****
(b) The ICEFISH, with contact on the convoy, was preparing
to attack from the port bow when she received a message from the DRUM
indicating that the DRUM was attacking also from port. She commenced
closing for the attack, detected aircraft and sent a message to the
SAWFISH and DRUM that she was diving to attack from the port flank. At
0052 she fired four torpedoes at a large unidentified ship but all missed.
One minute later she fired a second salvo of two torpedoes at an escort
which also missed, but she believed that one of these had unexpectedly
hit the ship fired at originally. At 0352 she surfaced with radar contact
to the north and commenced closing while tracking. At 0413 she sent a
* War Patrol Report SAWFISH, Report of 8TH War Patrol, Serial 88-44,
November 8th, 1944.
** SAWFISH Dispatch 241338 October 1944 to CTF 17.
*** CTF 17 Dispatch 240923 October 1944 to CONVOY COLLEGE, info GOKLNCK.
**** NWP 23 Submarine Operations, Department of the Navy, Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, February 1953, Chapter 6, Paragraph 621.
196 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
contact report to the DRUM and SAWFISH adding that her attack was
completed. At 0420, aircraft having been detected, she submerged. She
surfaced again at 0519 but, with the coming daylight and aircraft closing,
she submerged for the day at 0555.*
In these attacks she is credited with sinking the
cargo ship T3NSHIN MARU (4236 tons).**
A patrol vessel was sighted at 1255 but otherwise the
day's patrol was uneventful and she surfaced at 1955.* It appears that
she had set course for northwestern Luzon (Diagram "C").
At 2300 she received orders from the wolf pack
commander directing (a) the DRUM and ICEFISH to patrol at discretion and
(b) attention to CTF 17' s dispatch which, among other items, ordered this
group to patrol in the vicinity of Cape Bojeador.***
(c) The Drum continued to gain attack position on the
enemy convoy and at 0004 learned from the ICEFISH that there were enemy
aircraft in the vicinity. She sent a message to the wolf pack that she
had altered plans and at 0130, while observing the SNOOK attacking from
the starboard flank,**** she commenced attacking from the port flank. At
0203 she fired a salvo of four torpedoes from her stern tubes with no
recorded target designation and all torpedoes missed. She continued
trailing from the port flank while the SNOOK again attacked from the
starboard flank at which time she started in for a second attack but was
detected by the escorts and at 0400 was driven away. At 0510 she advised
the wolf pack of this development with the hope that another submarine
might attack during the absence of her escorts. At 0619 she submerged for
the day. At 0700 she commenced an approach on a convoy of four cargo ships
and one destroyer on course 050°(T). At 0757 she fired four bow tubes at
a cargo ship and recorded three hits while diving deep to evade.***** She
is credited with sinking the passenger cargo ship SHIKISAN MARU (4725
tons) in Latitude 20°-27fN, Longitude 118°-31fE.**
At 1853 she surfaced and set course for her assigned
area (presumably the area off Cape Bojeador) and at 2300 received orders
from the retiring wolf pack commander in the SAWFISH to patrol at
discretion.
*~" War Patrol Report ICEFISH, Report of 1ST War Patrol, Serial Oil,
November 13th, 1944.
** Japanese Naval and Merchant Losses during World War II by U. S.
Submarines, prepared by the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee,
February 1947.
*** War Patrol Report SAWFISH, Report of 8TH War Patrol, Serial 88-44,
November 8th, 1944.
**** War Patrol Report SNOOK, Report of 7TH War Patrol, Serial 053,
November 18th, 1944.
***** War Patrol Report DRUM, Report of 11TH War Patrol, Serial 056,
undated.
197 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 2Z*th
(2) SHARK, BLACKFISH, SEADRAGON
This wolf pack which was supposed to be patrolling along
the northern edge of Area DETECT was actually disposed as follows: (a)
the SHARK in the northeastern corner of Area DESTROY, (b) the SEADRAGON
in the northwestern corner of Area DETECT and (c) the BLACKFISH in the
Blind Bombing Zone just north of Area DETECT. These submarines patrolled
submerged during daylight and on the surface during darkness.*
The wolf pack commander in the SHARK was aware of the
SAWFISH'S contact to the south but did not seem interested at this time,
preferring the northern part of his area where good hunting was reported
by China-based planes.**
Sometime during the day the SHARK was sunk, which reduced
the wolf pack to two submarines.
(a) The wolf pack commander, proceeding northeastward,
was apparently monitoring the action of the SAWFISH'S wolf pack to the
southward, but since his own wolf pack was largely in the northern part
of Area DETECT he probably believed he could be of little assistance.
However, at 0352, as the convoy continued northward, he apparently changed
his mind, for at this time he ordered his pack to patrol along Latitude
20°-30'N,*** which was along the northern border of Area DELETE in which
area the SAWFISH wolf pack was attacking the convoy.
At 0^.18, upon request, he was advised by the SNOOK
that the convoy, now consisting of but three shiDS, was in Latitude
19°-54'N, Longitude 118°-H!E.***
Between 0500 and 0610 he made several contact reports
on the convoy and at 0610 he reported his position as Latitude 20°-25'N,
Longitude 118°-21'E, course 215° (T) reporting aircraft and directed his
units to close the convoy submerging along the course line to conduct an
attack.***
Since the 0610 report from the SHARK is her last
recorded transmission it is assumed that she conducted an attack on the
convoy. Some time during the day she was sunk, but where and how is not
known, for no Japanese records available to this analysis made any claims,
possibly due to the fact that they failed to realize their success.
(b) The BLACKFISH, northernmost submarine of this wolf
pack, at 0300 was patrolling aLong the 100 fathom curve south of Formosa
Bank. At about 0352 she received orders from the SHARK to proceed south
and patrol along Latitude 20o-30'N,*** to cover the northbound convoy.
* Deck Logs BLACKFISH, SEADRAGON, October 24th, 19 U*.
** War Patrol Report BLACKFISH, Report of 9'TK War Patrol, Serial 001,
November, 1944o
*** War Patrol Report CTG 17.11, Report of Coordinated Patrol of TG
17.11 composed of SHARK, BLACKFISH and SEADRAGON, Serial 0002,
undated.
198 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
SHE CHANGED COURSE AND WHILE PROCEEDING SOUTH OVERHEARD MANY CONVERSATIONS
ON THE WOLF PACK FREQUENCY FROM UNITS OF THE (a) ESCOLAR GROUP IN TSUSHIMA
STRAIT, SOME 800 MILES TO THE NORTHEASTWARD WHICH, STRANGELY ENOUGH, WERE
ALSO CONDUCTING AN ATTACK AT THIS TIME, (b) SAWFISH WOLF PACK AND (c) HER
OWN (SHARK) PACK.*
At 0500 she received the first of several reports from
the wolf pack commander in the SHARK concerning the convoy.** In accordance
with orders she submerged at 0615.* Nothing of interest occurred until
1700o At this time the Commanding Officer, feeling that he should have
contacted the convoy by this time, unless it had been completely destroyed,
altered course to the north to shorten the run to overtake the convoy if it
had passed undetected.* At 1917 he surfaced and proceeded eastward to his
new patrol station within Area DETECT. The crew had improved in health
with only a few sick upon surfacing.*
Commencing with sunset he endeavored at intervals to
communicate with the SHARK but to no avail.** As a result of this he
assumed command of the reduced wolf pack (BLACKFISH, SEADRAGON) as acting
wolf pack commander,** presumably until such time as the SNOOK reported,
as the Commanding Officer SNOOK was senior to him. THIS RAPID ASSUMPTION
OF COMMAND WAS IN GREAT CONTRAST TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER CROAKER* S
FAILURE TO ASSUME TEMPORARY COMMAND OF THE WOLF PACK EVEN AFTER HE HAD
FAILED, OVER A PERIOD OF SIX DAYS, TO CONTACT THE ESCOLAR.
(c) Meanwhile the SEADRAGON was also following the activity
in the vicinity on the wolf pack radio frequency and should have received
the same information as the BLACKFISH. At 0352, although not mentioned in
her war patrol report she should have received the order from the SHARK to
proceed south and patrol Latitude 20o-30*N. At 0437 because of enemy
aircraft she was forced to submerge but surfaced again at 0545 •***
At 0615 she learned that the SHARK had radar contact
on a single freighter and therefore increased speed to gain contact. At
0730 she sighted a ship through her periscope at a range of twelve miles
but the target worked around to the south and she was unable to close.
She submerged at 0850, and at 0920 sighted three freighters with a CHIDORI
escort making seven knots. She immediately commenced her approach.*** At
1055 she fired four torpedoes at the leading ship and hearing two
explosions dove deep to avoid the escort. At 1214 having previously
returned to periscope depth she fired four torpedoes at another freighter
which sank almost immediately. She again dove deep to avoid the escort.***
At 1404 after returning to periscope depth she fired
four torpedoes at the freighter which sank almost immediately. She again
underwent a depth charge attack by the escort but, having received a total
of some forty-eight depth charges during these attacks, believed that the
escort was getting low.*** .
* War Patrol Report BLACKFISH, Report of 9TH War Patrol, Serial 001,
November 19/+4»
** War Patrol Report CTG 17.11, Report of Coordinated War Patrol TG 17.11
composed of SHARK, BLACKFISH and SEADRAGON, Serial 002, undated.
*** War Patrol Report SEADRAGON, Report of 11TH War Patrol, Serial 194,
November 8th, 1944.
199 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1447 she again returned to periscope depth but the
only ship visible was the CHIDORI on the horizon.* In these attacks the
SEADRAGON is credited with sinking two passenger-cargo ships (DAITEN KARU
(4642 tons) and KOKURYU MARU (7369 tons)) and a third cargo ship (EIKO
MARU (1343 tons)).**
(3) SNOOK
This submarine acting independently was attempting to
contact the convoy reported by the SAWFISH on the previous night. At 0022
she contacted the convoy by radar and estimated it to consist of from
seven to ten ships with at least three escorts, zigzagging on base course
345°(T), speed seven knots. At OO56 she fired (a) four torpedoes at a
large merchant ship which she noted settling and (b) one torpedo by mistake.
At 0219 she notified the wolf pack by voice radio as to
her own and the convoy's positions. At 0310 with the DRUM nearby she
fired six additional torpedoes, three at a large cargo ship and three more
at a following ship and observed one hit in each. She was trailed by the
escorts and at 0318 fired four torpedoes from her stern tubes "down the
throat" at the nearest escort, as a result of which the escort abandoned
the chase.
At O4I5 upon request she gave the position of the convoy
and reported three ships remaining.
At 0519 having learned that the SHARK had dived for a dawn
attack she fired five torpedoes at another large ship and claimed two hits.***
In these three attacks she sank three ships, viz. the
passenger-cargo ship SHINSEI MARU (5863 tons), the oiler KIKUSUI MARU
(3887 tons) and the cargo ship ARISAN MARU (6886 tons).**
At 0623 she submerged and at 0740 heard torpedo hits and
depth charges which she thought were the result of the SHARK attacking.
She now retraced the convoys route to look for cripples or survivors.***
At 1923 she surfaced and attempted to communicate with the
wolf pack commander in the SHARK but was unable to make contact.*** About
this time she sent a report to CTF 17 reporting the sinking of three
freighters and the probable sinking of a fourth.**** The remainder of the
day she continued to hear depth charges but patrolled uneventfully
* War Patrol Report SEADRAGON, Report of 11TH War Patrol, Serial 194,
November 8th, 1944.
** Japanese Naval and Merchant Losses during World War II by U.S.
Submarines, prepared by the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee,
February 1947.
*** War Patrol Report SNOOK, Report of 7TH War Patrol, Serial 053,
November 18th, 1944.
**** War Diary CTF 17 (Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet), October,
1944.
200 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
The convoy attacked by the submarines of CONVOY COLLEGE
was the HARUKAZE convoy "of twelve ships which had speedily been organized
when dispersal was ordered for Manila shipping" and departed that port on
October 21st. The Japanese report thereon states that "between 1730
October 23rd and the evening of the 24th the convoy underwent repeated
submarine attacks in the vicinity of Latitude 20°-00'N, Longitude
118°-00fE" and was broken up and destroyed with ten ships being sunk by
torpedoes.* The escorts apparently escaped undamaged. Flying boats were
dispatched to the area on the night of October 23rd and the destroyer UME
was dispatched from Takao on the 24th to escort the remainder of the
convoy and to neutralize the one or more enemy submarines.*
Post war records show that only nine ships were sunk by
the surviving submarines, including one by the SAWFISH on the previous
night.** It may be, then, that the SHARK heretofore not credited, may
have sunk at least one ship of the convoy. At any rate the Japanese credit
this group with an additional ship.*
(4) HADDOCK, HALIBUT, TUNA
As the day began this coordinated attack group (wolf pack)
was about to enter the eastern edge of Area VESTIBULE en route from Saipan
to its patrol station in CONVOY COLLEGE. It proceeded on the surface
during daylight as well as darkness except for short dives, evidently for
trim and training purposes .*** It entered CONVOY COLLEGE safety lane at
about 1700,**** and headed for Area DESTROY where it was to patrol until
the end of the month.***** During the day one friendly and several
unidentified aircraft were sighted.******
(5) PINTADO, ATULE, JALLAO
This wolf pack was proceeding westerly through Area PARLOR
en route from Saipan to its patrol station in CONVOY COLLEGE. The units
proceeded on the surface during daylight as well as darkness except for
training dives or when necessary to avoid detection by aircraft.*******
* War Diary 1ST Escort Force, October 1944, WDC Document 161719,
NA 11609.
** Japanese Naval and Merchant Losses During World War II by U.S.
Submarines, prepared by the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee,
February 1947.
*** Deck Logs HADDOCK, HALIBUT, TUNA, October 24th, 1944.
**** War Patrol Report TUNA, Report of 12TH War Patrol, Serial 014,
December 2nd, 1944.
***** COMSUBPAC Submarine Operational History World War II, Volume 1,
Page 74.
****** War Patrol Reports HADDOCK, Report of 10TH War Patrol, No Serial,
December 10th, 1944; HALIBUT, Report of 10TH War Patrol, Serial
024, December 1st, 1944; TUNA, Report of 12TH War Patrol, Serial
014, December 2nd, 1944.
******* Deck Logs, PINTADO, ATULE, JALLAO, October 24th, 1944.
201 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
At 1047 the ATULE reported contact on an enemy submarine and at 1105 the
JALLAO reported sighting a periscope,* However, unknown to them, both
contacts seem to have been false as there appear to have been no enemy
submarines in the area. During the day there were several aircraft
contacts.** The wolf pack continued toward its patrol area and by
midnight had entered Area VESTIBULE.
(6) BONEFISH
At midnight the BONEFISH, en route from patrol to Saipan
proceeding on easterly courses, was about to depart the CONVOY COLLEGE
safety lane. She proceeded on the surface during daylight as well as
darkness. She made two contacts on unidentified flying boats and was
forced to submerge for a short time to avoid detection by one of them.***
Since she is no longer participating in KING II operations
she will be dropped from further discussion but will be carried on the
diagrams for reference.
(b) Northwest Coast of Formosa,
The TANG patrolled on the surface in the northern part of
Formosa Strait. Upon reaching deeper water she submerged at 0600 for the
day' s patrol. The day passed uneventfully and upon surfacing at dark,
about 1900, she set course for Turnabout Island off the China Coast, When
within about eighteen miles of the island, she made radar contact on a
convoy of at least fourteen ships escorted by one fleet type destroyer and
twelve destroyer escorts. She commenced closing for attack.****
She selected three targets and fired six torpedoes, two at each
target, from an average range of about 1,000 yards. She recorded six hits.
She then selected two more targets and fired three more torpedoes at them,
one at a large modern tanker and two at a transport. One of the torpedoes
directed at the transport appeared to have been intercepted by a
destroyer .****
About an hour later after reloading the last two torpedoes
forward and re-estimating the situation she started in to sink the
already damaged ships. She selected a damaged transport as her target and
fired her remaining two torpedoes at this target. The last torpedo fired
was observed to broach and curve sharply to the left in a tight turn
striking the TANG in her after torpedo room with the result that she
immediately sank stern first in thirty fathoms of water,****
* War Patrol Report PINTADO, Report of 3RD War Patrol, Serial 01,
January 1st, 1945.
** War Patrol Reports ATULE, Report of 1ST War Patrol, Serial 013,
December 11th, 1944; JALLAO, Report of 1ST War Patrol, Serial 015,
December 10th, 1944,
*** War Patrol Report BONEFISH, Report of 6TH War Patrol, No Serial,
November 8th, 1944.
**** War Patrol Report TANG, Report of 5TH War Patrol, No Serial,
September 10th, 1945.
202 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
October 24th
This engagement is believed to have lasted until about 0200
October 25th, which is the approximate time of the TANG's sinking.*
As a result of these attacks she is credited with sinking the
cargo ships KOGEN MARU (6600 tons) and MATSUMOTO MARU (7024 tons) in
Latitude 25°-06'N, Longitude 119°-3VE*** (Also, the Japanese report
gives these sinkings in Latitude 28°-07fN, Longitude 1190-45*E. This is
clearly in error as this places the sinking on the Chinese mainland.)***
A small number of the crew, including the commanding officer,
survived and were taken prisoners by the Japanese. The commanding officer,
with the stories of the eight other survivors, prepared his report from
memory about one year later upon release from a Japanese prisoner of war
camp.****
Due to the nature of this report only general times and lists
of events, subject to the fallacies of memory, are available. The attempt
to reconstruct the movements of this submarine with conflicting information
is difficult.
(c) Northeast Coast of Formosa.
This area, northeastward of Formosa, was being patrolled by the
SILVERSIDES, TRIGGER and SALMON, which patrolled on the surface during
darkness and submerged during daylight,***** The day *as uneventful until
1500 when the TRIGGER sighted and photographed a hospital ship identified
as the BUENOS AIRES MARU . Near the end of the day the SILVERSIDES
and TRIGGER rendezvoused to exchange information.****** Although enemy
aircraft were sighted this group made no contacts of importance. *******
Statement of Commander Lawrence Savadkin, USN, January 10th,
1957, which statement is supported by other references both
Allied and Japanese.
Japanese Naval and Merchant Losses during World War II by U.S.
Submarines, prepared by the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee,
February 1947.
The Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II, prepared by Military
History Section, Special Staff, GHQ FEC, February 1952.
War Patrol Report TANG, Report of 5TH War Patrol, No Serial,
September 10th, 1945.
Deck Logs SILVERSIDES, TRIGGER, SALMON, October 24th, 1944.
War Patrol Report TRIGGER, Report of 10TH War Patrol, Serial
November 3rd, 1944.
War Patrol Reports SILVERSIDES, Report of 11TH War Patrol,
Serial 045, November 23rd, 1944; TRIGGER, Report of 10TH War
Patrol, Serial 033, November 3rd, 1944; SALMON, Report of 11TH
War Patrol, Serial 0-16, November 10th, 1944.
*-3HHHfr
■JBHttHHJ-
033,
203
CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
(d) MARU MORGUE
The submarines SEA DOG, BILLFISH, SAURY, BURRFISK and STERLET
continued patrolling in the Nansei Shoto area as on the previous day.
Area ABLAZE was still unpatrolled. They patrolled on the surface during
darkness and submerged during daylight.* Except for the BURRFISH their
patrols were uneventful.
It will be recalled that the BURRFISH had been heading to close
the convoy attacked by the SEA DOG on October 22nd. At 1407 she sighted
smoke and changed course to intercept. At 1945 she sighted a convoy which
she later evaluated as consisting of three medium ships with five or more
escorts. At midnight the BURRFISH was still tracking the convoy.**
(e) Nagasaki - Sasebo
The CROAKER and PERCH, although members of a wolf pack,
continued to operate independently and at the beginning of this day were
some 120 miles apart. The CROAKER was some forty miles northwest of
Cheju Do while the PERCH was some 100 miles south of that island.
(1) The CROAKER, on the surface, was proceeding southward to
the vicinity of the lifeguard station assigned her for the following day.
At 0315 she made radar contact on a convoy of at least eight merchant
ships and five escorts. She sent a contact report to the ESCOLAR (which
she did not know had been sunk on the 17th) and to the PERCH.***
At 0424 she fired five torpedoes (bow tubes), three at a
large freighter and two at a second freighter which was lagging behind.
At 0509 she fired her remaining four torpedoes (stern tubes) at two
freighters. With all torpedoes expended she commenced clearing the area.
At 0554 she submerged for the day. She is credited with sinking the cargo
ship MIKAGE MARU (2741 tons).****
At 1834 she surfaced and proceeded towards her lifeguard
station for the following day in Latitude 32°-00«N, Longitude 129°-00'E,
about thirty-five miles due east of Danjo Gunto.
IT IS NOT CLEAR WHY, SINCE HE HAD HEARD NOTHING FROM THE
ESCOLAR SINCE 2300, OCTOBER 17TH, THE COMMANDING OFFICER CROAKER PERSISTED
IN SENDING HIS CONTACT REPORTS TO THAT SHIP RATHER THAN TO HAVE ASSUMED
COMMAND OF THE REDUCED WOLF PACK AND TO HAVE ADVISED CTF 17 TO THIS EFFECT.
* Deck Logs SEA DOG, BILLFISH, SAURY, BURRFISH, STERLET, October 24th,
1944.
** War Patrol Report BURRFISH, Report of 4TH War Patrol, Serial 027,
December 2nd, 1944.
*** War Patrol Report CROAKER, Report of 2ND War Patrol, Serial 027,
November 10th, 1944o
**** Japanese Naval and Merchant Losses during World War II by U.S.
Submarines, prepared by the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee,
February 1947.
204 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
THIS MATTER IS DISCUSSED MORE FULLY IN VOLUME III UNDER "OPERATIONS OF
CTF 17 (SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC), OCTOBER 20TH" AS THIS SITUATION HAD
OCCURRED EARLIER.* IT SEEMS HIGHLY PROBABLE THAT THE FACT THAT HE HAD
SENT A CONTACT REPORT TO BOTH THE ESCOLAR AND TO CTF 17 CREATED THE
IMPRESSION AT CTF 17 !S HEADQUARTERS, AS WELL AS AMONG THE SUBMARINES IN
THE EMPIRE AREA, THAT THE ESCOLAR WAS STILL AFLOAT WITH THE WOLF PACK
COMMANDER IN FULL COMAND, WHEN IN FACT SHE HAD LONG BEEN SUNK. CLEARLY
THIS WOLF PACK WAS OPERATED IN AN UNUSUALLY LOOSE FASHION!
(2) PERCH**
The PERCH was patrolling as on the previous day across the
Nagasaki - Shanghai shipping lane where she was hoping to intercept a
convoy moving up from Formosa Strait. At 0415, while on the surface,
having received the CROAKER1 s contact report she headed toward the reported
position and at 0453 made radar contact on a convoy of six ships (three
large and three escorts). At 0505 she sent a contact report thereon to
both the CROAKER and ESCOLAR. The inclusion of the ESCOLAR as an addressee
indicates that the Commanding Officer PERCH either thought that the ESCOLAR
was still operating or, having noted that the CROAKER had included the
ESCOLAR in her contact report, felt that he should do likewise •
By 0619 she had closed the target to four miles but owing
to the light conditions submerged to complete the attack as a result of
which, coupled with an enemy change of course, she was unable to attack
and the convoy escaped. The rest of the day was uneventful excepting that
she was spotted by a patrol craft but succeeded in avoiding it.
At 1820 she surfaced. Her patrol was otherwise uneventful.
IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT DURING THESE ATTACKS ON
SEPARATE CONVOYS COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THESE TWO SUBMARINES WAS REPORTEDLY
INTERCEPTED BY THE BLACKFISH SOME 800 MILES TO THE SOUTHWESTWARD.*** THIS
INCIDENT TENDS TO ILLUSTRATE THE FACT THAT THE RANGE OF COMMUNICATION
EQUIPMENT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO CONTROL.
(f ) HIT PARADE
(1) The approaches to Bungo Suido.
The BESUGO and RONQUIL as a reduced wolf pack continued to
guard the approaches to Bungo Suido. At 0310 the BESUGO contacted by radar
what she estimated to be a large ship with an escort on southwesterly
courses at about twelve knots and advised the RONQUIL. The RONQUIL replied
that she would be ready to attack at 0400. As a result of this dispatch
* Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf (Nav Pers 92510), Naval War College,
1957, Chapter I (B) (2) (e), Nagasaki - Sasebo,
** War Patrol Report PERCH, Report of 3RD War Patrol, No Serial,
November 8th, 1944.
*** War Patrol Report BLACKFISH, Report of 9TH War Patrol, Serial 001,
November 1944»
205 CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
CONFIDENTIAL October 24th
the wolf pack commander assigned the BESUGO to the port flank and the
RONQUIL to the starboard flank. At 0345 she contacted the target visually
and discovered it to consist of one large ship and one slightly smaller
with three or four escorts. She endeavored to get into a favorable firing
position but was unable to do so. Therefore, at 0413 she fired three
torpedoes at a destroyer escort which blew up.* This ship appears to have
been CD 132#** The BESUGO then submerged.***
At 0637 she returned to periscope depth and sighting
nothing began clearing the area. She patrolled submerged during the
remaining daylight hours. She sighted several aircraft.
At 1831 she surfaced and encountered radar equipped
aircraft.
At the beginning of this day RONQUIL notified BESUGO that
she was entering the BESUGO1 s area and promptly received orders to attack
the BESUGO1 s contact from the starboard flank. She made radar contact at
0405 and at 0407 sighted a flash on the contact bearing followed by flames
which she estimated was a result of the BESUGO1 s attack. At 0415 she
received an alert signal from the BESUGO which meant that the submarine
was being forced to submerge.
The RONQUIL now commenced her approach. At 0529 she fired
six torpedoes at a large tanker but all missed. Shortly thereafter, at
0533, she fired four additional torpedoes down the throat at a destroyer
but again all torpedoes missed.**** She surfaced several times during the
morning to gain attack position on the convoy but enemy aircraft forced her
to submerge. She remained submerged for the rest of the day until 2040
when she surfaced in poor visibility.
At about 2000 the wolf pack commander directed the RONQUIL
to shift her patrol area to the southern half of Area SEVEN and the BESUGO
to the northern part of Area EIGHT in order to cover the approaches to
Van Dieman Strait (at the southern end of Kyushu) and the east coast of
Kyushu,
(2) Approaches to Kii Suido.
The GABILAN patrolled uneventfully off Kii Suido on the
surface during darkness and submerged during daylight. She made no contacts
of importance.*****
*~~ War Patrol Report BESUGO, Report of 1ST War Patrol, Serial 027,
November 4th, 1944,
** The Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II, prepared by Military
History Section, Special Staff, GHQ FEC, February 1952,
*** Deck Log BESUGO, October 24th, 1944.
**** War Patrol Report RONQUIL, Report of 2ND War Patrol, Serial 038,
November 28th, 1944.
***** War Patrol Report GABILAN, Report of 3RD War Patrol, Serial 031,
November 13th, 1944.
206 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CTF 17
C.G. FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE
October 24th
(3) Approaches to Tokyo.
The GREENLING and TAMBOR continued to patrol this area.
The TAMBOR remained in the eastern approaches to Tokyo Bay while the
GREENLING was further westward and appears to have been attempting to cover
the approaches to the bays of southern Honshu, Both submarines patrolled
on the surface during darkness and submerged during daylight. Neither
submarine made any contacts of importance during this period. The
visibility in the vicinity of the TAMBOR continued to be low.
(C) China - Burma - India Theater, 0000 - 1830, October 24th.
(1) Operations of C.G. FOURTEENTH Air Force, 0000 - 1830, October 24th.
On this day the two- plane search over the South China Sea was flown
as scheduled by B-24 aircraft of the FOURTEENTH Air Force (Diagram "C")
and was negative — no sightings were made.
The night searches were not flown presumably due to weather.*
AAF Operations from China Bases in Support of the Leyte Campaign,
letter from Historical Division, Air University Library, USAF Air
University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, to President, Naval War College,
November 8th, 1950,
207
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CHAPTER V - MEANS AVAILABLE AND OPPOSED, OCTOBER 24TH - 25TH
(A) FORCES ENGAGED
(1) ALLIED FORCES
(a) BATTLE LINE
WEST VIRGINIA, MARYLAND, MISSISSIPPI,
TENNESSEE, CALIFORNIA, PENNSYLVANIA ' 6 OBB
CONY, AULICK, CLAXTON, SIGOURNEY, WELLES,
THORN 6 DD
(b) LEFT FLANK FORCE
LOUISVILLE, PORTLAND, MINNEAPOLIS 3 CA
DENVER, COLUMBIA 2 CL
NEWCOMB, RICHARD P. LEAHY, ALBERT W. GRANT,
HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, BENNION, LEUTZE, ROBINSON,
BRYANT, HALFORD 9 DD
(c) RIGHT FLANK FORCE
PHOENIX, BOISE 2 CL
SHROPSHIRE (RAN) 1 CA
HUTCHINS, BACHE, DALY, BEALE, KILLEN,
ARUNTA (RAN) 6 DD
(d) DESRON FIFTY-FOUR
REMEY, MC GOWAN, MELVIN, MC DERMUT, MONSSEN 5 DD
(e) MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS 39 MTB
(f ) TOTAL; 6 OBB, 4 CA, 4 CL, 26 DD, 39 MTB
(2) JAPANESE FORCES
(a) THIRD SECTION, FIRST STRIKING FORCE
YAMASHIRO, FUSO 2 OBB
MOGAMI 1 CA
MICHISHIO, ASAGUMO, YAMAGUMO, SHIGURE 4 DD
(b) SECOND STRIKING FORCE
NACHI, ASHIGARA
ABUKUMA
SHIRANUHI, KASUMI, AKEBONO, USHIO
208
2 CA
1 CL
4 DD
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(c) TOTAL: 2 OBB, 3 CA, 1 CL, 8 DD
(B) ARMAMENT
(1) ALLIED FORCES
(a) TG 77.2
1. WEST VIRGINIA
(eight l6»/45, sixteen 5738 DP)
MARYLAND
(eight l6'»/45, eight 5751, eight 5725 DP)
TENNESSEE, CALIFORNIA
(twelve 14750, sixteen 5738 DP)
MISSISSIPPI
(twelve 14750, six 5751, eight 5725 DP)
PENNSYLVANIA
(twelve L4745, sixteen 5738 DP)
LOUISVILLE, PORTLAND, MINNEAPOLIS
(nine 8755, eight 5725 DP)
DENVER, COLUMBIA
(twelve 6747, twelve 5738 DP)
CONY, AULICK, CLAXTON, SIGOURNEY, NEWCOMB,
RICHARD P. LEARY, ALBERT W. GRANT, HSYWOOD L. EDWARDS,
BENNION, LEUTZE, ROBINSON, BRYANT, HALFORD
(five 5738 DP, ten 21" torpedo tubes)
WELLES, THORN
(four 5738 DP, five 21" torpedo tubes)
2. TOTAL: Sixteen 16745, thirty-six 14750,
twelve W/45, twenty-seven 8755,
twenty-four 6"/47, fourteen 5751,
161 5738, forty 5725 and 140
21" torpedo tubes
(b) TG 77.3
1. PHOENIX, BOISE
(fifteen 6"/47, eight 5725 DP)
SHROPSHIRE
(eight 8"/ 50, eight 4", eight 21" torpedo tubes)
209 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
HUTCHINS, BACHE, DALY, BEALE, KILLEN
(five 5"/38 DP, ten 21" torpedo tubes)
ARUNTA
(six 4.7", two 4", four 21" torpedo tubes)
2. TOTAL: Eight 8"/50, thirty 6"/47, twenty-five
5"/38 DP, sixteen 5M/25 DP, six 4*7",
ten 4" and sixty-two 21" torpedo tubes
(c) DESRON FIFTY-FOUR
1. REMEY, MC GOWAN, MELVTN, MC DERMUT, MONSSEN
(five 5"/38 DP, ten 21" torpedo tubes)
2. TOTAL: Twenty-five 5"/38 DP, fifty 21" torpedo tubes
(d) GRAND TOTAL: Sixteen 16 "/45, thirty-six 14"/ 50, twelve
14"/45, twenty-seven 8"/55, eight 8"/50,
fifty-four 6"/47, fourteen 5751, 211 5"/38,
fif by-six 5"/25, six 4o7", ten 4", 252 21"
torpedo tubes
(2) JAPANESE FORCES*
(a) THIRD SECTION
1. YAMASHIRO, FUSO
(twelve 14.2"/45, fourteen 5.91750, sixteen 5740)
MOGAMI
(six 8"/50, eight 5740, twelve 24" torpedo tubes)
MICHISHIO, ASAGUMO, YAMAGUMO
( four 5750,** eight 24" torpedo tubes)
SHIGURE
(four 5750,** six 24" torpedo tubes)
2o TOTAL: Twenty-four 14o2"/45, six 8"/50, twenty-eight
5.91"/50, sixteen 5"/50, forty 5"/40, forty-two
24" torpedo tubes
* Information on Japanese armament contained in U. S. Army JAPAN, Office
of the Military History Officer letter USARJ MH 314.7 of December 30th,
1957 to President, Naval War College c
** Not anti-aircraft weapons but capable of 75 degree elevation*
210 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(b) SECOND STRIKING FORCE
1. NACHI, ASHIGARA
(ten 7.87750, eight 5"/40, sixteen 24" torpedo tubes)
ABUKUMA
(five 5.5750, two 5740, eight 24" torpedo tubes)
SHIRANUHI, KASUMI
(four 5750,* eight 24" torpedo tubes)
AKEBONO, USHIO
(four 5"/50,* nine 24" torpedo tubes)
2. TOTAL: Twenty 7o87"/50, five 5.5"/50, sixteen 5"/50,
eighteen 5"/40, seventy-four 24" torpedo tubes
(c) GRAND TOTAL; Twenty-four 14.2"/45, six 8"/50, twenty
7.87750, twenty-eight 5.91"/50, five
5.5750, thirty-two 5"/50, fifty-eight
5"/40, 116 24" torpedo tubes
(C) AMMUNITION AND TORPEDOES ON BOARD AT 0000 , OCTOBER 25TH
(1) ALLIED
(a) BATTLESHIPS (16-inch)
1. WEST VIRGINIA AP 200**- HC 176***
Torpedoes None
2. MARYLAND**** AP 240 HC 445
Torpedoes None
3. Average Projectiles
Per Gun (16-inch) AP 27. 5 HC 38.8
* Not anti-aircraft weapons but capable of 75 degree elevation.
**■ This information i s found in a Headquarters 14TH Naval District letter
of December 13th, 1945 signed by Rear Admiral (then Captain) John B.
Heffernan, USN (Ret) to Commanding Officers of the Battleships at
Leyte. It seems probable that the Commanding Officer WEST VIRGINIA
had the information requested written in in pencil on the letter and
returned directly to the sender.
***• Ibid. ; also Action Report WEST VIRGINIA, Fire Support Leyte Island
Operation, October 18th - 24th, 1944, Serial 0666, November 1st, 1944.
**** Action Report MARYLAND, Bombardment of Leyte Island, Serial 0208,
October 31st, 1944; also Letter from Rear Admiral (then Captain) John
B. Heffernan, USN (Ret) to Rear Admiral (then Captain) Samuel E.
Morison, USNR (Ret) of January 23rd, 1946.
496799 O - 59 - 23
211 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(b) BATTLESHIPS ( 14-inch)
1. MISSISSIPPI*
20 TENNESSEE**
3. CALIFORNIA
4. PENNSYLVANIA*****
5« Average Projectiles
Per Gun (14-inch)
(c) Average Projectiles Per
Gun (Battleships)
AP 201 HC 543
Torpedoes None
AP 396 HC 262
Torpedoes None
AP 276*** HC 78****
Torpedoes None
AP 360 HC 93
Torpedoes None
AP 25.7 HC 20.3
AP 26al HC 26.5
(d) CRUISERS, HEAVY (8-inch )*»***»
1. LOUISVILLE AP 649
HC 564
Torpedoes None
**
Action Report MISSISSIPPI, Battle of Surigao Strait, Philippine
Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0141, November 21st, 1944;
Action Report MISSISSIPPI, Bombardment of Leyte, Philippine
Islands, October 19th - 20th, 1944, including collateral supporting
actions during period October 21st - 24th, 1944, Serial 0139,
November 23rd, 1944; also Letter from Rear Admiral (then Captain)
John B. Heffernan, USN (Ret) to Rear Admiral (then Captain) Samuel
E0 Morison, U3NR (Ret) of January 23rd, 1946.
Action Report TENNESSEE, Fire Support Delivered during Leyte Opera-
tion, Serial 0U0, October 31st, 1944; also Letter from Rear Admiral
(then Captain) John B. Heffernan, USN (Ret) to Rear Admiral (then
Captain) Samuel E. Morison, USNR (Ret) of January 23rd, 1946.
Action Report CALIFORNIA, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 0024, November 3rd, 1944.
Action Report CALIFORNIA, Operations off Island of Leyxe, P. I.,
October 19th - 24th, 1944, Serial 0025, November 8th, 1944.
Action Report PENNSYLVANIA, Surigao Strait, Serial 0020, November
18th, 1944.
Data from Action Reports, War Diaries and Deck Logs of Ships
Concerned.
«*-«•
ft-R-K-ft
■JBHHS-ft
-K-JBHi-ft*
212
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2C PORTLAND AP 327
HC 95
3» MINNEAPOLIS
4. SHROPSHIRE
5» Average Projectiles
Per Gun (8-inch)
(e) CRUISERS, LIGHT (6-inch )**
1. DENVER
2. COLUMBIA
3. PHOENIX
4. BOISE
Torpedoes None
AP 315 HC 165
Torpedoes None
AP 1134 HC 101
Torpedoes*
AP 69o3
AP 1200
HC 26.7
HC 1120
Torpedoes None
AP 1200 HC 120
Torpedoes None
AP 975 HC 757
Torpedoes None
AP 975 HC 546
Torpedoes None
5. Average Projectiles
Per Gun (6-inch) AP 80.5
(f) Average Projectiles Per
Gun (Cruisers) AP 76.1
HC 47.1
HC 39.1
* No Data.
** Data from Action Reports, War Diaries and Deck Logs of Ships Concerned.
213
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(2) JAPANESE ALLOWANCE OP AMMUNITION AND TORPEDOES*
(a) THIRD SECTION
1. BATTLESHIPS
FUSO, YAMASHIRO (per ship)
14-inch - 1200**
6-inch - 1680
5-inch - 1600
Torpedoes - None
2. HEAVY CRUISER
MOGAMI
8-inch - 720**
5-inch - 1600
Torpedoes - 18
3o DESTROYERS
MICHISHIO, ASAGUMO, YAMAGUMO (per ship)
5-inch - 600
Torpedoes - 16
SHIGURE
5-inch - 600
Torpedoes - 9
* Since no information concerning actual amount of ammunition on board is
available it has been necessary to employ normal ammunition allowances.
This information was provided in HQ USAFFE Military History Section
letter MH 314.8 of July 30th, 1954 to President, Naval War College0
** Approximately 75$ of 14-inch and 8-inch shells were armor piercing.
214 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(b) SECOND STRIKING FORCE
1, HEAVY CRUISERS
NACHI, ASHIGARA (per ship)
8-inch - 1200*
5-inch - 1600
Torpedoes — 24
20 LIGHT CRUISER
ABUKUMA
5o 5-inch - 600
5-inch - 400
Torpedoes — 12
3« DESTROYERS
SHIRANUHI, KASUMI (per ship)
5-inch - 600
Torpedoes - 16
AKEBONO, USHIO (per ship)
5-inch - 600
Torpedoes - 15
* Approximately 75% of 14-inch and 8-inch shells were armor piercing,,
215 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(D) STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS FACTORS
The following survey of pertinent strength and weakness factors of each
force has been made to summarize the material for testing the feasibility
and acceptability of possible courses of action,
ALLIED FORCE
STRENGTH FACTORS
Overwhelming numerical superiority
(a) More battleships (6 to 2).
(b) More cruisers (8 to 4).
(c) More destroyers (26 to 8).
(d) More torpedo boats (39 to 0).
More 16" guns (l6 to 0)o
More 14" guns (48 to 24).
More 8" guns (35 to 26).
More 4", 4.7", 5" and 6" guns than
enemy's 5", 5.5" and 6" (351 to 123).
More destroyer torpedo tubes (244 to
64).
Freedom of action.
Ideal geographical location for
defense.
Single command of principal forces*
Superior radar permitting operation
in zero visibility,,
Forces concentrated.
Employment of MTB's as advance
scouting and harassing units.
Rapid communications possible due to
short distances between forces.
Excellent information concerning strength
and movements of Japanese forces.
WEAKNESS FACTORS
Lack of proper ammunition loading
for surface battle (ships were
loaded for shore fire support).
General shortage of ammunition in
all ships but especially of armor
piercing in the cruisers and
battleships.
No torpedo reloads in any torpedo
carrying ships.
Paucity of communications circuits
which tended to overload existing
circuits.
Ships of battle line had no experi-
ence operating together as a battle
line.
Allied forces had never operated
together as a battle disposition.
Strong southerly currents would make
station keeping difficult.
216
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
JAPANESE FORCES
STRENGTH FACTORS
WEAKNESS FACTORS
Superior torpedo which had long range
(44,000 yards at 36 knots) and high
speed (22,000 yards at 49 knots ).
Torpedoes were carried by all ships
except the two battleships e
All ships carrying torpedoes carried
overloads of 50$ to 100/S.
Better trained in night operations .
Better night vision.
Initiative o
No battle plan.
Japanese forces composed of two
separate and entirely uncoordinated
unitSo
Forces separated so could be destroyed
piecemeal*,
No unity of commando
Ordered to make attack on strongly
defended position.
Restricted courses of action and
limited freedom of movement.
Communications inadequate.
Lack of correct intelligence con-
cerning:
(a) Allied strength in Leyte Gulf,
(b) Allied probable courses
of action.
Radar generally ineffective.
This analysis indicates that insofar as guns and torpedo tubes, freedom
of action, position, command, radar, communications, intelligence and
concentration of forces were concerned the advantage lay with the Allies;
that insofar as the quality of torpedoes, night vision and initiative were
concerned the advantage lay with the Japanese. Thus the Allies had over-
whelming superiority in practically all factors.
217
CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
CHAPTER VI- JAPANESE OPERATIONS. 1830 - 2400, October 24th
(A) Operations of Commander THIRD Section, 1830 - 2400, October 24th.
As the THIRD Section rounded Siquijor Island in the Mindanao Sea at
1830, Commander THIRD Section in the YAMASHIRO directed Commander FIRST
Division (MOGAMI and DESDIV FOUR) to execute his 24L410 of that date.*
Commander FIRST Division, with the FIRST Division, immediately departed
the formation and headed toward the west coast of Panaon Island. Upon
the departure of the FIRST Division, Commander THIRD Section, who was
also Commander SECOND Division, with the remaining three ships of the
THIRD Section (YAMASHIRO, FUSO and SHIGURE) which he had designated as
the SECOND Division, changed course to 050°(T) to pass close to Bohol
Island and commenced his movement along the northern edge of the Mindanao
Sea as laid down in his 221155.** While his reasons for his course are
not explained it seems evident that they embraced one or more of the
following: (a) he desired to avoid operating battleships in the middle
waters of the Mindanao Sea in order to avoid possible Allied submarine
attacks (it will be remembered that CinC Combined Fleet's estimate of
the previous day had forecast strong concentrations of enemy submarines
in the Surigao Straits area and had directed that all commanders were to
utilize every trick to keep enemy submarines under control, particularly
while breaking through the narrow straits),*** (b) he may have desired
to avoid following in the track of the FIRST Division since, should he
follow that track and the Allied scouting units contact the FIRST
Division, contact on the SECOND Division would likely follow. (By
following a circuitous route he might succeed in misleading these Allied
scouting units by drawing them into a search astern of the FIRST Division
and hence away from his own track), (c) he desired to check his course
and speed at intervals by fixes on the land. (Strong westerly currents
predominated in the Mindanao Sea at this time of the year and it may have
appeared wise to Commander SECOND Division to maintain an accurate
navigational plot by land fixes.)
In making the decision to separate his forces, Commander THIRD
Section undoubtedly took into consideration the danger of mistaking
friend for enemy in rejoining his forces during limited visibility in
the presence of known enemy units. He probably reasoned that the weather
in the Panaon area which had been good during the forenoon**** would
remain so and, therefore, the danger of mistaking a friend for an enemy
would be so lessened as to deny it priority over the other considerations
above mentioned. Actually, as will be shown later, the weather commenced
worsening about 2000.****
* Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 241410 October 1944 to 3RD Section,
Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161638, NA 11739.
*** CofS Combined Fleet Dispatch 231710 October 1944 to all SHO Forces,
Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operations, October 18th
28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
**** Action Report PT 194, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0397, October 29th, 1944.
218 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
A study of Diagram MDW will show that by taking the circuitous route
referred to previously Commander SECOND Division automatically caused the
distance between the FIRST and SECOND Divisions to increase beyond the
twenty kilometers originally specified. This maneuver, while otherwise
supportable, seems unwise because the two divisions became so separated
as to be unable to provide mutual support. It seems probable that
Commander FIRST Division was not entirely familiar with the movements of
Commander SECOND Division during the passage through the Mindanao Sea,
although he could hear his voice signals.*
Sometime in the late afternoon and possibly about this time (1830)
Commander THIRD Section received Commander Main Body's dispatch 241600
to the Combined Fleet wherein that commander stated, in essence, that
(a) he had originally planned to force his way through San Bernardino
Straits about one hour after sunset but between 0830 and 1530 he had been
heavily hit by waves of Allied carrier-based planes totalling about 250,
which attacks were increasing in frequency and intensity, (b) Japanese
air power had been highly ineffective, (c) he thought it best to retire
temporarily lest he sustain additional losses which would jeopardize the
accomplishment of his objective and (d) he was now in the Sibuyan Sea in
Latitude 13°-00«N, Longitude 122°-40'E, on course 290°(T), speed eighteen
knots.**
THIS MESSAGE, WHILE PROBABLY NOT UNEXPECTED IN VIEW OF HIS OWN
EXPERIENCES, MUST HAVE BEEN HIGHLY DISCONCERTING TO COMMANDER THIRD
SECTION SINCE IT INDICATED THAT THE COORDINATED EFFORT BETWEEN HIS FORCE
AND THE MAIN BODY FOR DAWN ON THE FOLLOWING MORNING WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE
OF ATTAINMENT. WHAT SHOULD HE DO? SHOULD HE CONTINUE ON, OR SHOULD HE
RETIRE TEMPORARILY AND AWAIT FURTHER ORDERS? HE OBVIOUSLY DECIDED TO
CONTINUE ON, FOR HIS TRACK SHOWS NO CHANGS. THIS WAS THE CORRECT
DECISION AT THIS TIME, SINCE MANY HOURS WOULD PASS BEFORE HE WOULD BE
COMMITTED FINALLY TO THE PENETRATION OPERATION AND IN THAT TIME HE
SHOULD RECEIVE ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS.
If he had any misgivings regarding the correctness of this decision
they were soon dispelled. For, probably prior to 1900 (the time recorded
by SHIGURE),* he received from CinC Combined Fleet a dispatch, and
addressed to all forces engaged in the SHO Operation, directing: "All
forces to the attack, trusting in divine aid.w***
He immediately analyzed his situation with relation to the Main Body
whose 1600 position was known. This position, providing the shortest
route was taken, was about 370 miles from the Tacloban Anchorage. He
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944 WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Commander Main Body Dispatch 241600 October 1944 to CinC Combined
Fleet, Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations,
October 16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
*** CinC Combined Fleet Dispatch 241813 October 1944 to all SHO Forces
(Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 372), Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle
of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th, 194A, WDC Document 161717
(Part 4), NA 11801.
219 CONFIDENTIAL
CQM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
could plainly see that if Commander FIRST Striking Force had reversed
course at 1813, which was impossible since that was the time group of
CinC Combined Fleet's dispatch, he would require a speed in excess of
thirty-six knots (413 miles/11.3 hours) to arrive off Tacloban at dawn
(0427). This speed was in excess of that available within his command
since the full speed of the NAGATO, for example, was but twenty-five
knots, (24»98).* From this he could readily estimate that the Main Body
would necessarily be many hours late in arriving at Leyte Gulf, since
its cruising speed would be much below this, and would therefore be
unable to arrive off Suluan Island at 0400 as scheduled. This supported
his previous estimate.
It is likely that he expected to receive 3ome coordinating orders
from Commander FIRST Striking Force, who was nis immediate superior in
command, but failing in that he nevertheless felt that he was to continue
on.
While there is no information available anywhere as to what went
through Commander THIRD Section's mind at this time, since he and his
entire staff were lost in the night action which followed, it seems
reasonable to say that he now knew that if he continued on as scheduled
and arrived off Tacloban Anchorage at dawn (which the Japanese considered
to be two hours (0427) before sunrise (0627) for this operation)** he
still had the best chance for success in that it would be dark when he
arrived at the transport area. He realized, of course, tnat he would be
without the support of the Main Body but he also realized that the
alternative of facing the superior Allied forces both surface and air
during daylight would be suicidal.
WHAT THEN SHOULD HE DO? FROM HIS ACTIONS AT THIS TIME AND FROM THE
DISPATCH WHICH HE SENT LATER, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT HE DECIDED THAT,
UNLESS HE RECEIVED ORDERS TO THE CONTRARY, HIS BEST CHANCE FOR SUCCESS
WOULD BE TO ADHERE TO HIS ORIGINAL SCHEDULE AND THIS HE PLANNED TO DO.
However, he decided to modify the basic orders in one regard. He
changed the objective area from Tacloban to Dulag and therefore changed
his time of arrival from 0427 off Tacloban to 0400 off Dulag.*** It
seems likely that he made this change because he knew that Allied
shipping in strength (eighty transports, four battleships, two cruisers
and four destroyers)**** had been observed off Dulag that day, and that
since Dulag Anchorage was about ten miles south of Tacloban Anchorage he
would naturally encounter the Dulag forces prior to his arrival off
Tacloban.
* Japanese Naval Vessels at the End of War, April 25th, 1947,
Administrative Division, Second Demobilization Bureau (Compiled by
Shizuo Fukui, Constructor Lieutenant Commander, ex-IJN), Page 1.
** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11301.
*** Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 242013 October 1944 to CinC Combined
Fleet, Commanders 1ST Striking Force, SW Area Force, Detailed Action
Report KONGO, SHO Operation, October 22nd - 28th, 1944, WDC Document
161637.
**** MOGAMI Dispatch 2/+1225 October 1944 to 3RD Section (No. 1 Search Plane
Report of 0650), Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf,
October 23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11301.
220 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
In view of the postwar comments by the Commanding Officer SHIGURE to
the contrary* it should be pointed out here that this change did not
constitute an advance in the time of arrival off Tacloban. Instead, it
maintained the original schedule as closely as possible. The confusion
may have arisen because the Commanding Officer SHIGURE did not
differentiate between Dulag Anchorage and Tacloban Anchorage. It should
be clear from a glance at the chart that at eighteen knots the THIRD
Section would necessarily arrive in Dulag Anchorage one-half hour earlier
than in the Tacloban Anchorage.
It is likely that in his estimate Commander THIRD Section gave
consideration to the possibility of night action should he continue on as
scheduled since he was much the weaker force. This was of serious
concern but it is likely that he hoped to accomplish some of his
objectives without complete destruction because, despite considerable
evidence to the contrary — notably the defeats of the Solomon Island
campaign — he felt with the Japanese High Command that the Japanese were
superior to the Allies in night surface actions. This concept is
obtained not only from the interrogations of the Chief of Staff, FIRST
Striking Force, wherein it was shown that the FIRST Striking Force
trained largely, if not entirely, for night battle,** but it is emphasized
by the Fire Control Officer of the MOGAMI who stated as a principle reason
for the Japanese failure at this battle that, "Also responsible was the
virtually blind reliance placed upon the night fighting ability of the
Japanese fleet".***
In addition, he realized that because night actions at close quarters
often become melees and give numerically weaker forces advantages far in
excess of those which would obtain during daylight, his command would
likely gain an advantage through such night action.
HIS DECISION TO CONTINUE ON AND TO CHANGE HIS OBJECTIVE AREA FROM
TACLOBAN ANCHORAGE AT 0427 TO DULAG ANCHORAGE AT 0400 WAS CORRECT FOR IN
SO DOING HE WAS LOYAL TO THE INTENTIONS OF HIS SUPERIORS AS EXPRESSED IN
THE GENERAL PLAN. HE HAD FOUND HIMSELF FACED WITH AN UNEXPECTED
SITUATION WHICH HAD NOT BEEN FORESEEN OR COVERED IN HIS ORDERS, AND HE
HAD TAKEN ACTION ACCORDINGLY TO INFORM HIS SUPERIORS OF HIS PLANS
RESULTING THEREFROM. SHOULD HIS SUPERIORS DISAGREE WITH THESE PLANS
THERE STILL REMAINED SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THE ATTITUDE OF THESE SUPERIORS
TO BE MADE KNOWN TO HIM.
* USSBS Interrogations of Japanese Officials, NAV No. 79, Interrogation
of Commander Shigeru Nishino, UN, Volume II, Page 346.
** USSBS Interrogation of Japanese Officials, NAV No. 35, Interrogation
of Rear Admiral Tomiji Koyanagi, ex-IJN, CofS, 1ST Striking Force,
Volume I, Page 147.
*** Report on SHO Operation by Lieutenant Fukushi, ex-IJN, Control
Station Officer and Fire Data Computer Officer, MOGAMI, December
1945, Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-39A.
221 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
Having received no further orders from his superiors he radioed at
2013 that "The THIRD Section expects to penetrate to a point off Dulag
at 0400 October 25th",*
At 2045 he received a dispatch from CinC Combined Fleet which,
referring to Commander Main Body's dispatch 241600 about retiring
temporarily,** directed that commander as well as himself to attack in
accordance with Combined Fleet DesOpOrd No. 372,*** which it will be
recalled ordered "All forces to the attack, trusting in divine aid".****
He could see from this dispatch that CinC Combined Fleet had issued the
above OpOrd 372 prior to receiving Commander Main Body's 241600 and that
this new attack directive had been issued to avoid confusion. He now
knew that CinC Combined Fleet was fully alert to the situation and
desired the attack order to stand.
At approximately 2155, or in about ten minutes after it had been
transmitted (based on the fact that Commander Main Body received the
above 2013 dispatch at 2020)***** Commander THIRD Section received the
coordinating instructions from Commander FIRST Striking Force which he
had expected. In these instructions he was advised in part that (a)
Commander Main Body with four battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light
cruisers and eleven destroyers, would pass through San Bernardino Strait
at 0100 October 25th, arriving in Latitude 11°-36«N, Longitude 125°-46«E,
at 0600 and would penetrate into Leyte Gulf at about 1100 the same day;
(b) the THIRD Section would penetrate into Leyte Anchorage as scheduled
and would then rendezvous with the Main Body at 0900 October 25th about
ten miles northeast of Suluan Island.****** This would result in the
re-formation of the FIRST Striking Force.
* Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 242013 October 1944 to Commander
1ST Striking Force and CinC Combined Fleet, info Commander 2!.'D
Striking Force and Commander SW Area Force, Detailed Action Report
1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October 16th - 28th, 194- ,
WDC Document 161641, NA 11339.
** Ibid., Commander Main Body Dispatch 241600 October 1944 to CinC
Combined Fleet.
*** CinC Combined Fleet Dispatch 241959 October 1944 to 1ST Striking
Force, Mobile Force, SW Area Force, 5TH and 6TH Base Air Forces,
3RD Section, CRUDIV 16, Detailed Action Report No. 3, IAHAT0,
SHO No. 1, Anti-air and Surface Actions, October 17th - 23th,
1944, WDC Document 16163 9 •
**** CinC Combined Fleet Dispatch 241813 October 1944 to All Forces
Engaged in the SHO Operation (Combined Fleet DesOpOrd 372),
Detailed Action Report SKEGUHE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October
23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11301.
***** Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October
16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11339.
****** Commander 1ST Striking Force Dispatch 242145 October 1944 to 1ST
Striking Force, CinC Combined Fleet, Commanders Main Force,
Area Force, 6TH Base Air Force, 2ND Striking Force, etc., Detailed
Action Reoort MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October 13th -
24th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
222 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
Whether or not he had expected orders in this form is not known.
However, it seems likely that he was somewhat surprised as this order
changed the original plan as regards the THIRD Section in two particulars.
It ordered the THIRD Section, after it had penetrated Leyte Gulf as
scheduled, to (a) retire to the eastward in order to rendezvous with
the Main Body and (b) to make a second penetration into Leyte Gulf in
company with said Main Body.
As regards item (a) it will be recalled that earlier this day, at
1120,* he had designated as reassembly point "after completion of combat",
a point in the Mindanao Sea bearing 242° (T), distant eighteen miles from
Binit Point. Since this order now directed him to withdraw from Leyte
Gulf to the eastward following his first penetration and then to
rendezvous with the Main Body, it seems clear that he realized that some
modification of his designated reassembly point would most likely be
necessary.
As regards item (b) it seems likely that he realized that since the
Main Body had lost so many ships either by sinking (one battleship -
MUSASHI; two heavy cruisers - ATAGO, MAYA), heavy damage (TAKAO, MYOKO),
or assignment as escorts (NAGANAMI, ASA3HIM0, KIYOSHIMO, HAMAKAZE), the
THIRD Section was required as replacements.
What he thought of these new instructions is not known. However, since
(a) he would now be required to remain largely unsupported in Leyte Gulf
from the time of his original penetration (the new order reaffirmed this
part of the original plan) until he rejoined Commander Main Body at
0900 — a period of five hours,** and (b) the effectiveness of Allied air
attacks and the ineffectiveness of friendly air forces to prevent such
Allied attacks had been clearly demonstrated during the day, it seems
likely that he viewed them with considerable concern.
THESE NEW ORDERS APPROVED WITHOUT QUALIFICATION THE DECISION OF
COMMANDER THIRD SECTION TO CONTINUE AS SCHEDULED, REGARDLESS OF THE
ABSENCE OF THE MAIN BODY.
If, as the result of these orders, Commander THIRD Section formulated
any new plans for the penetration of Surigao Strait this fact is not
available. His original plan called for passing the southern entrance of
Surigao Strait at 0100 and taking course 350°(T) directly to the Tacloban
Anchor age. *** If he did have a new plan, he did not indicate it to his
ships, and therefore, it is concluded that he planned to adhere to the
basic plan*
* Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 241120 October 1944 to 3RD Section,
Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717, (Part 4), NA 11801.
** USSBS Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Nav No. 35, Interrogation
of Rear Admiral Koyanagi,Tomiji, ex-UN, Volume I, Page 152.
*** Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 221155 October 1944 to CinC Combined
Fleet, Commanders Main Force, 6TH Base Air Force, etc., Detailed
Action Report No. 13, DESRON 10, SHO Operation, October 17th - 31st,
1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
223 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 1330 - 2400, October 24th
At 2255 when it was received by the KONGO, or perhaps later, he
received a dispatch from Commander SECOND Striking Force which changed
that commander's time of passing Binit Point from 0600 to 0300 the next
morning and which gave the SECOND Striking Force's penetration speed
through Surigao Strait as twenty-six knots.* FROM THIS HE COULD SEE THAT
THE SECOND STRIKING FORCE INSTEAD OF BEING FIVE HOURS BEHIND HIM WOULD
NOW BE BUT TOO HOURS, AND THEREFORE WOULD BE CLOSING RAPIDLY AT THE TIME
THE THIRD SECTION ARRIVED IN THE DULAG AREA.
He continued uneventfully toward the southern entrance to Surigao
Strait until he encountered enemy torpedo boats between 2252 and 2310, as
discussed under Commander SECOND Division. Having received no damage in
this encounter, and having inflicted some damage on the enemy torpedo
boats, he, at 2320, queried Commander FIRST Division by voice radio as to
the enemy situation in the vicinity of the FIRST Division.** At 2324 he
received a reply that no enemy ships had been sighted.** He then advised
Commander FIRST Striking Force at 2330 that he was "Advancing as scheduled
while destroying enemy torpedo boats."***
THIS WAS A VERY IMPORTANT DISPATCH AND INDICATED THAT COMMANDER THIRD
SECTION WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTACTS ON HIS
COMMAND BY THE MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS. FOR COMMANDER FIRST STRIKING FORCE
WOULD NOW KNOW THAT THE EASTWARD MOVEMENT DURING THE NIGHT OF HIS THIRD
SECTION TOWARD SURIGAO STRAIT WAS KNOWN TO THE ENEMY, AND THEREFORE THE
CONCEPT THAT THE THIRD SECTION MIGHT BE FREE TO ENTER THE GULF BECAUSE
"THE ALLIED FORCES THERE WOULD BE DRAW OUT OF THE GULF BY THE APPROACH
OF THE FIRST STRIKING FORCE (MAIN BODY) FROM THE NORTH", AS HAS BEEN
STATED BY COMMANDER FIRST STRIKING FORCE,**** WAS NOT NECESSARILY CORRECT.
What defensive disposition Commander THIRD Section expected to
encounter in Leyte Gulf is anybody's guess. Forces much stronger than
his own had been reported there. He knew that these forces could be
expected to be fully informed concerning the strength of the Main Body
in the Sibuyan Sea but he could not know whether or not they were also
informed of the fact that the Main Body, which had commenced retiring at
1600, had reversed course and was once again heading eastward.
MOST OF THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE SEEMS TO POINT OUT THERE WAS EVERY
REASON TO BELIEVE THAT HE EXPECTED ALLIED SURFACE FORCES TO BE IN THE
DULAG AREA AS FORECAST ON THE PREVIOUS DAY BY CHIEF OF STAFF COMBINED
FLEET IN HIS 231200 ESTIMATE FOR, AS POINTED OUT EARLIER, THE MOGAMI
SEARCH PLANE WHICH HAD MADE THE DAWN SEARCH OF THE LEYTE AREA HAD SO
REPORTED. HOWEVER THERE IS ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT HE
MAY HAVE THOUGHT THAT THE ALLIED HEAVY SHIPS HAD DEPARTED THE GULF. THIS
IDEA IS PROVIDED BY COMBATDIV ONE'S PERSONAL DIARY WHERE ON (A) 0CT03ER
24TH HE WROTE "THE ENEMY FLEET IN LEYTE GULF HAD MOVED OUT AMD THZPI -.IRZ
* Commander 2ND Striking Force Dispatch 242245 October 1944 to CC:-SA?~I7
2 (3RD Section), COMDESDIV 21, Detailed Action Report KONGO, SHO
Operation, October 22nd - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161637.
** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
*** Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 242330 October 1944 to Commander 1ST
Striking Force and Commander 2ND Striking Force, Detailed Action
Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation, October 18th - 28th, 1944,
WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
**** USSBS Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Nav No. 9, Interrogation
of Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita, ex-IJN, Volume I, Page 36.
224 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
NO LARGE SHIPS IN THE GULF",* AND (B) OCTOBER 25TH HE WROTE "ON THE BASIS
OF THE SITUATION REPORTS OF THE PREVIOUS DAY, (OCTOBER 24TH), THAT THE
ENEMY BATTLESHIP FORCE HAD SORTIED EASTWARD AND THAT NO POWERFUL FORCE
REMAINED IN LEYTE GULF, THE THIRD SECTION CARRIED OUT ITS PENETRATION IN
A HEADLONG RUSH."*
Where COMBATDIV ONE obtained this intelligence is not known as it has
not been located in any other source. The interesting thing about it
however is that it might well have been true. This is so for the Japanese
on this day made dusk searches and dusk attacks on the invasion forces off
Dulag and Tacloban** at which hour the battleships, cruisers and
destroyers of TG 77.2 and the cruisers and destroyers of TC- 77.3 were
forming battle disposition to the eastward of Hingatungan Point, having
left the invasion areas after completing fueling and ammunition
replenishment operations in the late afternoon. Since the Hingatungan
Point area is about twenty-five miles to the southeastward of Dulag it
is quite possible that, owing to the decreasing visibility, these ships
would not be sighted unless the planes haopened to operate in that area.
It seems likely that, prior to midnight, he received Commander SIXTH
Base Air Force's (a) dispatch 242046*** reporting contacts off Luzon on
three Allied carrier task groups consisting of a total of nine large
carriers and two small carriers with the usual surface ship support, and
stating that these carriers were under night air attack, and (b) dispatch
242244**** reporting the results of these attacks and claiming having
damaged two large carriers, one battleship and one cruiser and having shot
down thirty-nine Allied planes. This latter dispatch also reported that
afternoon air attacks had damaged two carriers and two other ships.
The dispatches were of considerable importance to him because they
showed that the air forces were in heavy and successful combat with the
Allied carrier forces with the likely result that the penetration
operation might be facilitated.
* Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki, IJN, (COMBATDIV 1), Personal Diary,
SENSOROKU, Nippon ShupDan Kyodo Kabushiki Kaisha (Tokyo, March 15th,
1953), Volume II.
** Detailed Action Report No. 3, 253RD Attack Unit (331ST Air Group),
Search Attack Operations against Enemy Task Force and Attacks on
Enemy Shipping in Leyte Gulf, October 20th - November 13th, 1944,
WDC Document 160354, NA 12373.
*** Commander 6TH Base Air Force Dispatch 242046 October 1944 to all
SHO Forces, Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation,
October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
**** Commander 6TH Base Air Force Dispatch 242244 October 1944 to all
SHO Forces, Detailed Action Report No. 3, YAMATO, SHO No. 1,
Anti-air and Surface Action, October 17th - 28th, 1944, WDC
Document 161639.
225 CONFIDENTIAL
COM FIRST DIVISION
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
(1) Operations of Commander FIRST Division, 1830 - 2400, October 24th,
As pointed out previously, Commander FIRST Division was directed
at 1830 to proceed independently to a position twenty kilometers ahead
of the SECOND Division. He immediately assumed the course and speed
necessary to accomplish this.* According to the Commanding Officer SHIGURE,
who was not in the FIRST Division but who appears to have had some
information thereon because of the frequent tactical use of voice radio
by the Japanese, the FIRST Division went ahead at twenty-three to
twenty-six knots.*-"- Since there is no information other than the SHIGURE
information available it is assumed that the FIRST Division increased
speed to twenty-six knots in order to gain station expeditiously and
appears to have headed directly for Binit Point (Panaon Island) on
course 062g°(T)o This assumption is supported by motor torpedo boat
contacts to be discussed later.
Immediately after departing the SECOND Division, Commander FIRST
Division directed the MICHISHIO and YAMAGUMO to take stations 30° relative
on the starboard bow of the KOGAMI at a distance of 1500 meters and
the ASAGUMO to take a similar station on the port bow as previously
directed. The YAMAGUMO appears to have been in column some 700 meters
astern of the MICHISHIO. It will be recalled that Commander FIRST
Division had, at 1700, instructed his command as follows: "Upon
reaching a point west of Limasawa, MOGAMI will take lead in a single
line formation and the formation will pass through the strait north of
the island. After passing through the strait the force will make a
sweep southward in accordance with the outline for night maneuvers."***
This outline of night maneuvers referred to is not available to this
analysis.
At about 1918 Commander FIRST Division, having obtained his
assigned station in advance of the SECOND Division, slowed to the fleet
speed which was eighteen knots. Since he could hear most of the voice
radio communications within the* SECOND Division it seems likely that he
knew that his position was no longer ahead of the SECOND Division, but
was instead well to the eastward.
At about 2227 when north of Camiguin Island the FIHST Division
passed through the line of Allied motor torpedo boats, (Diagram "D")#
In so doing it was not detected by the Allied motor torpedo boats nor
were these detected by the FIRST Division. This was because the distances
were excessive for reliable radar detection which at this time was, under
good conditions, about four miles for a Japanese shipborne radar against
a PT boat,**** and about ten miles for an Allied PT boat radar against a
cruisero*****
*~ " Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1%4, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** US3BS Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Nav No. 79, Interrogation
of Commander Shigeru Nishino, UN, Volume II, Page 347.
*** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
**** COM-ONI Technical Intelligence Bulletin 2, issued 5/45, Japanese
Radar Equipment, Page 15.
***** RAD THREE, Radar Operators Manual, COMINCH Serial 01090, April 13th,
1945 (Reissue of earlier publication).
226 CONFIDENTIAL
COM FIRST DIVISION
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 22.00, October 24th
Commencing at about 2252 Commander FIRST Division was aware that
the SECOND Division had encountered enemy torpedo boats and had fired on
them, because the two divisions were within voice radio of one another,
and because messages in regard to such firing were being broadcast by
units of the SECOND Division between 2252 and 2310.*
At 2320 Commander FIRST Division changed course to 03 5° (T), to
head for Limasawa Island which he planned to pass to west and north.**
At this moment he was interrogated over voice radio by Commander THIRD
Section as to the enemy situation,* He promptly replied at 2324 "No
enemy ships sighted",***
He continued on course 03 5° (T), speed eighteen knots. At 2334,
entirely unknown to him, his ships were detected by radar by PT 151
which with PT's 146 and 190 had originally been stationed about two miles
south of Limasawa Island. At this time the boats having drifted with
the current were about nine miles bearing 236°(T) from the southern tip
of Limasawa Island. This contact placed the motor torpedo boats some
nine miles to the northward of the FIRST Division,**** Although the
motor torpedo boats commenced closing the FIRST Division, the FIRST
Division did not discover them for about one-half hour. This was because,
as has been pointed out previously, Japanese radar was inefficient against
motor torpedo boats and because weather conditions had commenced to
deteriorate with visibility about two miles.****
At 2400 he again reported to Commander THIRD Section "Enemy not
yet sighted".*
At this time the FIRST Division was bearing 212° (T), distant
eight and seven-tenths miles from the southern tip of Limasawa Island.
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October
23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** MOGAMI (Commander 1ST Division) Visual Dispatch 241700 to 1ST
Division, info Flag YAMASHIRO (Commander 3RD Section), Detailed
Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October 18th -
25th, 1944, WDC Document I6O463, NA 12653.
*** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document I6O463, NA 12653.
**** Action Report PT 151, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0389, October 29th, 1944.
4967,9 o - 59 - Z4 227 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND DIVISION
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
(2) Operations of Commander SECOND Division, 1830 - 2400, October 24th.
It will be recalled that at 183A when the FIRST Division departed
the disposition to take station twenty kilometers ahead of the SECOND
Division, Commander SECOND Division had directed the SECOND Division
(YAMASKIRO, FUSO and SHIGURE) to change course to 050°(T).* The effect
of this maneuver was to increase considerably the distance between the
FIRST and SECOND Divisions. At about 1845 the SHIGURE took station 2000
meters ahead of the YAMASHIRO, changing the formation to a single column
about 3000 meters long.**
Nothing unusual occurred for seme hours and the division therefore
continued on course 050°(T) at eighteen knots. At 2200, when about five
and one-half miles south of Nauco Point, Bohol Island, Conrr.ander SECOND
Division changed course to 065°(T) in order to Das3 close to Quinali
Point, presumably for a navigational check, before heading for a Dosition
bearing 250°(T), distant seventeen miles from Binit Point (Panaon Island).
This latter position was the 0030 rendezvous which had been designated
by Commander THIRD Section at 1410.***
Commander SECOND Division's Deaceful cruising suddenly came to
an end when at 2252 he received a voice radio message from the SHIGUR
reporting "three enemy motor torpedo boats sighted bearing 30011.****'
These were PT's 130, 131 and 152 which had been stationed on a line
between Bohol Island and Camiguin Island. Actually, from reconstruction
of the plot using both the Japanese reports and the motor torpedo boat
reports, this bearing of 30° must have been recorded in error since the
actual bearing was more probably 130°(T). The motor torpedo boats were
only about two or three miles from the shins at the time of contact.
Commander SECOND Division immediately ordered the SECOND Division to make
an emergency turn to course 110°(T) toward them. This was in accordance
with Allied doctrine*-**-** and aopears to have been Jaoanese doctrine as
well.*****-*
* Appended Chart No. 1, Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of
Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717
(Part 4), NA 11801.
** USSBS Interrogations of Japanese Officials, Nav No. 79,
Interrogation of Commander Shigeru Nishino, ex-IJN, Volume II,
Page 347.
*** 3RD Section Signal Order No. 13, Detailed Action Report SHIGURE,
Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document
161717 (Part 4), NA 11301.
**** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October
23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11301.
*•**-*-* Suggested .Anti-Motor Torpedo 3oat Tactics for Surface Ships,
COMSOPAC Serial 00579, March 24th, 1943.
*»**«* cinC Combined Fleet Standing Order 31 (1943), Combined Fleet
Doctrine, 1943, Book I, Combat, Section H, Action Against Motor
Torpedo Boat, ATIS Document 39, Part VTI, June 3rd, 1945 (NACrl
Document).
228 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND DIVISION
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
This quick turn, and the fact that the destroyer SHIGURE commenced
firing within two minutes after the sighting, caught the motor torpedo
boats unprepared to fire torpedoes, as they were beyond effective torpedo
range,* which forced them to turn away. The Commanding Officer SHIGURE
at 2254 by voice radio reported opening fire0** Whether or not he
employed illumination at this time is not recorded but it is believed
that he fired without any illumination. Furthermore, it is believed that
the battleships had not as yet sighted the motor torpedo boats for, at
2256, the Commanding Officer SHIGURE reported one torpedo boat off the
bow,** which indicates that he may have been trying to locate them to the
battleships.
At 23OO Commander SECOND Division ordered the Commanding Officer
SHIGURE to illuminate the torpedo boats,** which he did using searchlight.
His beam caught PT 152. The battleships then began illumination fire
(starshells) to locate the other targets and also commenced firing their
secondary batteries shortly thereafter.* The searchlight and starshells
were observed by the Limasawa motor torpedo boats, and the starshells by
the shiDs of the SECOND Striking Force, which were about forty miles
astern.*** It seems probable that Commander SECOND Division disapproved
of the searchlights for at 2304 he ordered the SHIGURE to begin
illumination fire.** One minute later, at 2305, he received word from the
Commanding Officer SHIGURE that he had sunk one PT with a direct hit**
(this was partially correct — the SHIGURE had succeeded, in fact, in
making a direct hit on PT 152, but did not sink it).*
The Commanding Officer SHIGURE stated later that (a) he thought
that the motor torpedo boats had fired torpedoes before retiring (this
was not so, as no torpedoes had been fired) and (b) he had not seen any
tracks.****
At 2307 Commander SECOND Division received a reauest from the
Commanding Officer SHIGURE that the order to fire starshells be cancelled
because (a) the range was excessive, possibly because smoke laid by PT 131
blanked off the boats, and (b) the SHIGURE was unable to fire illumination
shells and continue gunfire at the same time.**
Commander SECOND Division did not reply to the above request but
accomplished the equivalent when at 2310 he broke off the engagement and
returned to the base course (065°(T)).**
* Action Report PT 152, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0399, October 29th, 1944.
** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October
23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11301.
*** War Diary DESDIV 7 (USHIO) October 1944, WDC Document 161717,
NA 11801.
**** USSBS Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Nav No. 79,
Interrogation of Commander Shigeru Nishino, ex- UN, Volume II,
Page 341.
229 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND DIVISION
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 2/tth
He now continued on toward the 0030 rendezvous. During this time
voice radio transmission from Allied motor torpedo boats were heard but
their location and number could not be determined. However, he believed
that the boats were maintaining continuous contact.* Actually, this was
not so as the Bohol motor torpedo boats had dispersed, even though PT 152
had unsuccessfully attempted for an hour to overtake the S.3C0ND Division.**
At 2400 the SECOND Division was bearing 237i°(T), distant about
sixteen miles from the southern tip of Limasawa Island.
(B) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force, 1330 - 2400, October
24th.
As Commander SECOND Striking Force, on course 0?0°(T), and making
taenty-two knots, approached the western entrance to the Mindanao Sea at
1830, he expected to encounter Allied submarines. He therefore retained
his force in a daylight alert cruising disposition (Plate XVI) and
continued zigzagging,*** (apparently employing the "X" method). Actually,
thera were no submarines in the Mindanao Sea, either Allied or Japanese.
Sometime before this, likely at 1227 when it was received by COMBATDIV
ONE, he had received a dispatch from the Commanding Officer, Bulan Air
Base (Luzon) informing him of the results of the morning search made by a
plane from the MOGAMI which had landed at that base. The dispatch stated
that there were (a) four battleships, two cruisers, two destroyers bearing
180°(T), distant fifteen miles from Dulag, (b) eighty transports bearing
090° (T), distant seven miles from Dulag, (c) four destroyers northeast of
Panaon Island, (d) ten plus small craft (message drop showed these to be
motor torpedo boats) and (e) twelve destroyers and twelve seaplanes off
shore southeast of Dulag*****
* USSBS Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Nav No. 79,
Interrogation of Commander Shigeru Nishino, ex-IJN, Volume II,
Page 341.
** Action Report PT 152, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0399, October 29th, 1944.
*«* Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off the Philippines, October
24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007; also Action Summary 2ND
Striking Force in SHO Operation, Southwest Area Operation, Commander
Kokichi Mori, ex-IJN, Former 5TH Fleet Staff Torpedo Officer, GHQ
FEC, Special Historical Collection Supporting Documents to C-eneral
of the Army Douglas Mac Arthur's Historical Report on Allied
Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (Item 22, Footlocker 5 of
10, SWPA Series, Volume II).
**** Bulan Air Base Dispatch 241227 October 1944 to 1ST Striking Force
Battle Report Addressees, Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No.
1 Operation, October 13th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005,
NA 11744.
230 CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
As a result of this dispatch he decided that it would be wise to give
his individual ships the latest information of the composition and
location of enemy forces which they might encounter during their
penetration into Leyte Gulf. He therefore transmitted the substance of
this message visually at 1850 to the SECOND Striking Force.*
That this message did not include all of the intelligence within the
command seems clear, for at the same time that Commander SECOND Striking
Force was transmitting the above message, COMDESRON ONE in the ABUKUMA
was also transmitting to DESRON ONE a message which listed the above
information plus additional information to the effect that there were
five to eight battleships and ten cruisers in the Gulf near Dulag, and
ten transports near Panaon Island.**
It seems probable that about this time or earlier he received a
dispatch from CinC Combined Fleet directing "All forces to the attack,
trusting in divine aid."**-* If, in view of Commander FIRST Striking
Force's 241600,**** he now had any concern as to whether the penetration
operations was to be delayed appreciably, or cancelled, this dispatch
should have cleared it up — operations were to continue. It now became
important to know what action would be taken by Commander FIRST Striking
Force and by Commander THIRD Section because any change in plan by these
commanders might adversely affect his own movement plan. He awaited
action by these commanders.
At 1925 he changed course to 080° (T ),*-**** and entered the Mindanao
Sea in accordance with his SigOrd No. 147. ******
At 2000 he noted that DESDIV TWENTY-ONE had not rendezvoused as
scheduled.
At 2047 (when it was received by Commander FIRST Striking Force) he
likely learned that Japanese planes operating out of the Philippines had
made one direct hit on a carrier in Latitude 15°-30'N, Longitude 123°-40,E
*~ Commander 2ND Striking Force Visual Dispatch 241850 October 1944
to 2ND Striking Force, Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off
the Philippines, October 24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
** Ibid., COMDESRON 1 Visual Dispatch 241850 October 1944 to DESRON
1, info 2ND Striking Force.
*** CinC Combined Fleet Dispatch 241813 October 1944 to all SHO
Forces, Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf,
October 23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
**** Commander 1ST Striking Force Dispatch 241600 October 1944 to
CinC Combined Fleet, Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force,
SHO Operations, October 16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641,
NA 11839.
***** Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle Off the Philippines,
October 24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
****** Ibid., Commander 2ND Striking Force Visual Dispatch 241745
October 1944 to 2ND Striking Force (2ND Striking Force SigOrd
No. 147).
231 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 1330 - 2400, October 24th
and that one cruiser had been moderately damaged and set afire.* This
carrier apoears to have been the PRINCETON which, at 0938, had been
bombed successfully by a lone Japanese plane.**
It seems clear that by 2200 (since it was received by MOGAMI at that
time) Commander SECOND Striking Force had received Commander THIRD
Section's dispatch 242013, referred to by the torpedo officer as "a
tragic dispatch",*** wherein that commander advised his immediate
superiors that the THIRD Section expected to penetrate to a point off
Dulag at 0400 October 25th.**** Commander SECOND Striking Force now
re-estimated the situation. It w^s probably obvious to him, from this
dispatch, that Commander THIRD Section was proceeding as scheduled and
that the 0400 arrival off Dulag provided no change in the movement pattern.
At 2220 he changed course to 060° (T ).***** This change of course was
also in accordance with SigOpOrd No. 147, although the change was delayed
fifteen minutes.
It seems likely that about this time he received the long awaited
dispatch from Commander FIRST Striking Force giving that comrander's plans
for the ensuing operation.*** This dispatch basically stated that (a) tl
Main Body, FIRST Striking Force "will" pass through San Bernardino Strait
at 0100 October 25th, "will" head south arriving in Latitude 11°-36,N,
Longitude 125°-46«E, at 0600 and "will" penetrate into Leyte Gulf at 1100,
and (b) the THIRD Section "will" penetrate into Leyte Gulf Anchorage as
scheduled and will then rendezvous with the Main Body, FIRST Striking
Force at 0900 about ten miles northeast of Suluan Island. ******
It seems to have come as a surprise to him for his torpedo officer
states that "Since, judging from the position of the Main Body, FIRST
Striking Force at this time, the Leyte operation would be considerably
* Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SKO Operations, October
16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
** Action Report PRINCETON, The Battle of the Philippines and Loss
of USS PRINCETON 24 October 1944, Serial 020, November 24th, 1944,
Page 1.
*** Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation, Southwest
Area Operation, Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-IJN, 2ND Striking
Force Staff Torpedo Officer, GHQ FEC Special Historical Collection
Supporting Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's
Historical Report on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific
Area (Item 22, Footlocker 5 of 10, SWPA Series, Volume II),
**** Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 242013 October 1944 to Commander
1ST Striking Force and CinC Combined Fleet, info Commander 2ND
Striking Force and Commander SW Area Force, Detailed Action
Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October 16th - 28th,
1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
***** Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off the Philippines,
October 24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
****-** Commander 1ST Striking Force Dispatch 242L45 October 1944 to All
SHO Forces, Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO
Operations, October 16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641,
NA 11839.
232 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
delayed, it was expect 3d that the THIRD Section, which was to coordinate
its actions with those of the Main Body, would be issued an order to
change its schedule but no such order was given."*
He now had the desired information concerning the THIRD Section's
operation which was to the effect that Commander THIRD Section would
proceed as scheduled and would penetrate independently into Leyte Gulf on
the following morning arriving in the Dulag area at 0400.
He forthwith continued his estimate of the situation to determine
whether, because of the demands of the situation, he would be required to
make any changes in his 0300 planned time of passage through the southern
entrance to Surigao Strait. (It will be recalled that at 1745 he had
advanced the time of passage from 0600 to 0300 and had so informed his
commando )** He appears to have realized that, without the presence of
the Main Body, the THIRD Section might require assistance and therefore
"even closer liaison"* was desirable. Despite this fact he decided that
he would make no change. Whether he did this because (a) of a possible
shortage of fuel — his torpedo officer stated later that "though it was
our desire to shorten even more the time difference it was impossible
from the standpoint of fuel"*-- or (b) his desire to avoid closing the
THIRD Section any more than the thirty-five miles which would separate
them at 0400 if both commands continued as planned, is not known.
However, based on the assumption that the THIRD Section was proceeding
up the strait at twenty knots (the distance from Binit Point to the Dulag
Anchorage area — sixty miles divided by three hours) it seems clear that
had he increased speed from twenty-two to twenty-six knots at 2300 he
would have closed the THIRD Section at the rate of about six knots and
have reduced the distance between the two at 0400 by thirty miles, thus
placing them at that time about twelve miles apart.
While no specific information concerning the fuel consumption rates
of the Japanese ships is available to this study, the increase in the
fuel consumption for the five hours, based on similar American cruisers
and destroyers, would have meant an increase of but between two and three
per cent of the maximum capacity.*** This tends to support the view that
Commander SECOND Striking Force did not desire further to close the THIRD
Section.
* Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation, Southwest Area
Operation, Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-IJN, 2ND Striking Force Staff
Torpedo Officer, GHQ FEC Special Historical Collection Supporting
Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur' s Historical
Report on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific 4rea (item 22,
Footlocker 5 of 10, SWPA Series, Volume II).
** Commander 2ND Striking Force Visual (Blinker) Dispatch 241745
October 1944 to 2ND Striking Force (2ND Striking Force SigOrd No.
147), Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off the Philippines,
October 24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
*** War Service Fuel Consumption of U.S. Naval Surface Vessels, FTP
218, United States Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander in Chief,
1945.
233 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
Commander SECOND Striking Force decided at this point to inform
Commander THIRD Section and COMDESDIV TWENTY-ONE of his present plans and
therefore at 2245 he advised these commanders as follows: "The SECOND
Striking Force is scheduled to pass through the southern entrance of
Surigao Strait at 0300 and penetrate at speed of twenty-six knots."*
The reason for including COMDESDIV TWENTY-ONE in this dispatch was
that that commander, with the HATSUHARU and HATSUSHIMO was supposedly en
route to join the SECOND Striking Force and should have rendezvoused at
2000. He had failed to do so and Commander SECOND Striking Force did not
know why, although he did know that DESDIV TWENTY-ONE had been attacked
that morning by Allied carrier planes with the resultant sinking of the
WAKABA. Actually, COMDESDIV TWENTY-ONE was returning to Manila** and had
failed to inform Commander SECOND Striking Force,
At 2300*** Commander SECOND Striking Force observed what appeared to
be illumination flares ahead on the horizon on bearing 050°(T).**** This
was the encounter of the SECOND Division of the THIRD Section with the
motor torpedo boats south of Bohol Island, the flares being the starshells
fired by the SECOND Division.
At 2315 he decided that it would be unwise to remain in his present
cruising formation until 0200 as planned in SigOrd No. 147 and should
instead assume an approach formation immediately. He therefore ordered
No. 4 Approach Formation*** (Plate XVI). HIS ACTION IN SO DOING WAS SOUND
BECAUSE AN APPROACH FORMATION IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF PLACING THE FORCE EI
THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS POSITION FOR DEPLOYMENT FOR BATTLE, AND HE COULD NOT
BE SURE WHEN HE MIGHT ENCOUNTER THE ENEMY FORCE. THE JAPANESE COMBINED
FLEET INSTRUCTIONS FOR NIGHT ACTION IN NARROW WATERS STATiD THAT "BECAUSE
THE CHANCES OF A SUDDEN ENCOUNTER WITH THE ENEMY ARE GREAT IN NARROW
WATERS, ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT, THE FORCES MUST BE CONSTANTLY PREPARED FOR
IMMEDIATE ACTION AND MOVE UNDER THE STRICTEST ALERT."*****
At 2330 the approach formation was formed.******
*" Commander 2ND Striking Force Dispatch 242245 October 1944 to
Commander 3RD Section, etc., Detailed Action Report CARDIV 4, SHO
No. 1 Operation, October 24th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161006,
NA 12604.
** Detailed Action Report DESDIV 21, SHO No. 1 Operation, (AA Action
South of Mindoro), October 24th, 1944, WDC Document 161717,
NA 11801.
*** War Diary DESDIV 7 (USHIO), October 1944, WDC Document 161717,
NA 11801.
**** Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Bsttle off the Philippines,
October 24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
***** CinC Combined Fleet Standing Order 81 (1943), Combined Fleet
Doctrine 1943, Book I, Combat, Section E, Surface Action, Sub
Head VIII, Engagements in Narrow Waters, Paragraph 34, ATIS
Document No. 39, Part VII, June 3rd, 1945 (NACHI Document).
****** Detailed Action Report DESDIV 18 (KASUMI), Battle off the
Philippines, October 24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161717,
(Part 4), NA 11801.
234 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
At 2355 he directed his command to be ready to make twenty-eight
knots immediately and maximum battle speed on fifteen minutes notice.*
The SECOND Striking Force continued on without incident. At 2400
it was bearing 289°(T), distant fifteen miles from the tip of Camiguin
Island, and about thirty-eight miles astern of the SECOND Division,
Detailed Action Report DESDIV IS (KASUMI), Battle off the Philippines,
October 24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
235 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
CHAPTER VII - ALLIED OPERATIONS, 1830 - 2400, October 24th
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2 (OTC), 1830 - 2400, October 24th.
Having completed the preliminary administrative measures for defense
of Surigao Strait, the units of TG 77.2 were proceeding directly to their
stations in the battle disposition in separate units. The battle Line
was proceeding to an initial station directly east of Hingatungan Point
(Leyte) at the western end of its patrol which would permit rapid
evolution of the flank forces on the battle line as it passed through the
point on course 090°(T)#* It was scheduled to patrol Latitude 10°-35«N
between Longitude 125°-l6«E and 125°-27fE.
The sun had set at about 1820. Therefore, the battle formation was
being taken in evening twilight which lasted about one hour. Since only
dim moonlight would temper the darkness at this time, CTG 77.2 was
anxious to get his forces in position before complete darkness had set
in. This was important because his forces had never operated together
before. He felt that if he could form his battle disposition while some
daylight still remained it would not be too difficult to maintain the
disposition but if he had to form it after darkness had fallen it would
probably be a long time before it was finally forme d.
Enemy planes were in the area and an air alert was in effect, lasting
until 1848. However, the alert was again sounded at 1858 as more enemy
planes were reported. There was a mixture of friendly and enemy planes
in and around Leyte Gulf and identification was questionable. The enemy
planes near Surigao Strait did not attack TG 77.2 although some shios
fired on the planes. It seems probable that the Japanese planes were
search planes from the THIRD Section operating from bases at Cebu and
Panay to carry out the dusk reconnaissance ordered by their commander.**
As he apDroached his patrol area, he noted that the five destroyers of
CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON FIFTY-FOUR) were still deployed in an antisubmarine
screen across the strait between Cabugan Grande and Dinagat Island in the
same patrol stations they had occupied on previous nights since D-day.
He once again wondered why it was that neither CTF 77 nor CTF 79 had
ordered them to report to him for duty. However, since they had not been
so ordered he had been unable to include them in his battle plan.
As he came within TBS voice radio range at 1950 he was aueri3d by C
79.11, quoted in full under "Operations of CTG 79.11, 1330 - 2400, October
24th" to the effect that in case of surface contact to the south, C
79.11 planned to make immediate attack with torpedoes, then to retire to
clear TG 77.2 and requested approval,,***
* All information here, unless otherwise indicated, obtained from
Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
Commander 3RD Section Visual Dispatch 231905 October 1944 to 3RD
Section (3RD Section SierOrd No. 10), Detailed Action Report SHIGURE,
Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717
(Part 4), NA 11801.
Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944; also Action Report CTG 79.11
(COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055, November 12th, 1944.
236 CONFIDENTIAL
-X-K-
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
He then at 1951 inquired of CTG 79.11 as to whether or not the screen
was composed of the same ships as the previous night. To this he
received an affirmative reply .-*
He was now faced with the problem of what to do with this force of
destroyers. It was clear that if they remained in their present stations
they might interfere with the attack of his own forces; on the other hand
it was also clear that (a) if they launched an attack at first contact
(which should be about 40,000 yards) they would contribute much to the
success of the battle if they succeeded only in reporting the composition
and disposition of the enemy, and (b) in addition to obtaining the above
information, they should have a very disruptive effect on the Japanese
disposition by sinking or damaging, or both, one or more Japanese shios.
He understood that Japanese radar was relatively primitive and therefore
destroyers attacking from the shores of the strait should be able to get
within torpedo range of the enemy before being discovered. However, he
felt that should Japanese radar and tracking devices prove more effective
than had been anticipated, the factor of consequences as to cost, while
possibly high as regards TG 79.11, would be low as regards TG 77.2. In
other words the gain to CTG 77.2 in information concerning the
characteristics of the Japanese force would more than compensate for the
loss or disabling of one or more destroyers of TG 79.11©
During the above time, the battle disposition was gradually forming.
The various units had been continually harassed by the presence of
unidentified aircraft which had delayed the completion of the disposition.
At about 2000 the battle line reached its initial point and turned east
at five knots.
He now decided to permit the planned attack of CTG 79.11 and at 2010
informed that commander by TBS voice radio as follows: "Your 1950 Item
approved. Retire to cover of Dinagat and pass between Hibuson and
Dinagat. Show IFF. Inform me if enemy is in more than one group and
composition if possible."**
This dispatch shows clearly that he (a) because he realized that it
was possible that some enemy forces might slip by the motor torpedo boats
without detection, was concerned about the Japanese attacking forces.
He had received information from CTF 77 that the strength of the attacking
force would probably consist of two battleships, four heavy cruisers, four
light cruisers and ten destroyers, and it was vital that he learn at the
earliest practicable time the disposition and composition of the forces
actually located. He was particularly interested in the composition of
* Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944; also Action Report CTG 79.11
(COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055, November 12th, 1944»
** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
237 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
this force as his service ammunition was limited, (b) knowing that
destroyer attack doctrine recommended that torpedo attacks of five or
less destroyers be made from one sector,* expected CTG 79.11 to form a
single attack group which would attack and then retire alon? the eastern
shore of the Strait, and (c) mindful of the adverse effect nearby land
had on radars wished to take advantage of the land effects which he
expected Hibuson and Dinagat Islands would have on the Japanese radars.
This idea of the single attack group had not been contemplated by
CTG 79.11, who expected instead to attack from both sides of the Strait
rather than from one side. CTG 79.11 therefore, at 2012, advised CTG
77.2 to this effect by TBS voice radio as follows: "Ky plan would be to
attack from two sides with two groups, one of three and one of two ships.
I will give details later. That would require retirement with one group
well to the west. I will take the other proup well to the east. V/ould
that be s atis factory? "**
At 2016 CTG 77.2 approved the plan but, in so doing, directed CTG
79.11 also by TBS voice radio to (a) keep close to the shore, (b) show
IFF and (c) inform Commander Right Flank Force of the attack plan.**
Although he realized that CTG 79.11' s plan was based on the
expectation that the enemy would choose to operate in mid-channel, (i.e.,
on enemy intentions rather than on enemy capabilities) and had the
weakness that if the enemy did not do so but instead chose to operate
near the shore, the attacking destroyers would then be so divided that
concentration might be difficult, he nevertheless approved the deviation
from doctrine because (a) he felt that (1) the Japanese likely knew that
they had to run the gantlet of motor torpedo boats and destroyers, (2)
they would therefore require room for maneuver, (3) they probably had
radar difficulties similar to these experienced by the Allies when in the
presence of land masses and (4) the chance of their maintaining a mid-
channel position therefore warranted this capability being given a high
priority, (b) the strait, in view of its narrowness, lent itself to
attacks by very small divided forces operating from both shores which,
without too much interference from each other, could readily fade into the
protection of the neighboring shores, (c) the enemy, by quick deployment
along projected Allied torpedo tracks fired by a single strong attack
group operating from one shore only, could avoid receiving torpedo hits
and might, at the same time, succeed in trapping the firing destroyers
against the shore since their retirement was limited by that shore line.
Therefore, an "anvil" attack was more desirable than a simple attack from
one bow and (d) since this plan had been conceived by CTG 79.11 it was
likely in consonance with the destroyer attack training in DESRON FIFTY-
FOUR. In this connection, it seems wise at this point to recall that the
above DESRON consisted of two destroyer divisions and that in Surigao Strait
* Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-43, Destroyer Torpedo Attack Instructions
issued by Commander Destroyers, Pacific Fleet, Serial 01264, October
24th, 1943.
** Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
238 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
at this time there were present two ships of DSSDIV 108 (MC DERMUT,
MONSSEN) commanded by COKDSSDIV 108 and three ships of DESDIV 107
(REMEY, MC GOWAN, MEL7IN) commanded by COMDESDIV 107 (who was also
CTG 79.11).
At 2020 he received a TBS voice radio message from CTG 79.11 to TG
79.11 wherein that commander issued his attack plan* (quoted in full
under "Operations of CTG 79.11"). Since this attack plan conformed
completely to the agreed attack plan, he was satisfied with it, although
he was concerned with the fact that CTG 79.11 had failed to include therein
any instructions regarding reporting composition of enemy or whether it
was in more than one group. However, feeling confident that CTG 79.11
would make a contact report because it was doctrine to do so, he decided
to issue no further instructions at this time.
At 2021 Commander Battle Line reported on station.** At this time,
although his destroyers on both flanks were still out of position, the
disposition was to all intents and purposes formed. At this time the
destroyers on the left flank were in a special circular antiaircraft
cruising disposition with the cruisers left flank, and those on the right
flank were having difficulties with TG 79.11, and with navigation as their
stations were close to the shore.
At 2113 he received a TBS voice radio message from CTG 79.11
inquiring as to whether any of the units of TG 77.2 were to operate south
of his patrol line.** To this at 2121 he replied in the negative but, in
doing so, he explained that it was possible that (a) four motor torpedo
boats might operate near Latitude 10°-17'N and (b) certain units of TG
77.3 (Right Flank Force) might be close to patrol station seven.**
This statement was not entirely correct. It will be observed (Plate
XVII) that the right flank cruisers in their western-most patrol
intersected station seven and that the right flank destroyers operated
south of a part of CTG 79.11' s patrol line initially, and south of the
entire line subsequently. Why, in view of the above situation, (a)
neither he nor CTG 77.3 requested CTG 79.11 to move his patrol line
farther south since its location in Latitude was not important or (b) CTG
79.11 did not move his destroyers farther south automatically in order
not to interfere with the battle disposition, is not explained.
At 2150, by TBS voice radio, he directed the left flank forces to form
Battle Disposition A-l*** with the cruisers in column natural order** and
at 2155 advised that natural order was LOUISVILLE, PORTLAND, MINNEAPOLIS,
DENVER, COLUMBIA.** At this time the right flank cruisers, PHOENIX, BOISE
*~ CTG 79.11 TBS Voice Radio Message 242020 October 1944 to TG 79.11.
** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B) .
*** The designation of Battle Disposition A-l here was to indicate that
all of the units addressed were to be in the left flank as shown in
Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine (USF 10A) United States Fleet,
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1944, Figure 7, Page 4-H»
It was not designated to change in any way the basic Battle
Disposition A-2, Figure 8, Page 4-12.
239 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
and SHROPSHIRE, were in a line of bearing 050° (T) from the PHOENIX which
was the guide. Both flank forces maintained station on the disposition
guide, MISSISSIPPI, while during the counter-marches the battle line
guided on the van battleships,* which, on easterly courses, was the WEST
VIRGINIA and on westerly courses was the PENNSYLVANIA.
IT WILL BE OBSERVED THAT CTG 77.2 DID NOT DIRECT THE EMPLOYMENT OF
ANTISUBMARINE SCREENS. WHILE HIS REASONS FOR THIS ARE NOWHERE STATED IT
SEEMS LIKELY THAT HE FELT THAT THE ANTISUBMARINE PROBLEM WAS OF LITTLE
CONCERN SINCE (A) THERE HAD BEEN NO ENEMY SUBMARINE ATTACKS ON ANY
ALLIED UNITS IN LEYTE GULF AT ANY TIME, (B) ANTISUBMARINE SCREENS HAD
BEEN GUARDING ALL ENTRANCES TO LEYTE GULF SINCE D-DAY, (C) ANTISUBMARINE
DEFENSE AT FIVE KNOTS FOR THE COMPONENTS OF THE BATTLE DISPOSITION WAS
SCARCELY PRACTICABLE AND (D) THE LACK OF TRAINING OF THE ABOVE COMPONENTS
IN MAINTAINING STATION IN A BATTLE DISPOSITION MADE SUCH STATION KEEPLNG
DIFFICULT AND FURTHER COMPLICATIONS, WORSE THAN THE THREAT OF SUBMARINE
ATTACK, MIGHT HAVE ENSUED HAD THE DESTROYERS BEEN ASSIGNED ANTISUBMARINE
STATIONS.
CTG 77.2 was constantly studying the situation as his battle
disposition moved back and forth at five knots along Latitude 10°-35'N,
between Longitudes 125°-l6'E and 125°-27'E.
Realizing the confusion that can occur in a night battle, and desiring
to insure that (a) his own destroyers on their retirement from their
attacks were not mistaken for enemy and (b) their rendezvous points were
correctly chosen so as (1) to facilitate the concentration of the attack
units and (2) to prevent their interference with the ships of the battle
disposition, he at 2232 directed CTG 79.11 and COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX to
establish their post-attack rendezvous points and to advise him of their
location.** Why he omitted COMDESRON WENTY-FOUR is not known. Perhap3
he felt that this was more a province of CTG 77.3 who, at the time, was
experiencing considerable difficulty in establishing a suitable patrol
station for his destroyers.
As consequence of this message he received two messages, one at 2256
from CTG 79.11 to TG 79.11 advising that the post-attack rendezvous points
were (l) Western Group at west end of screening station seven and (2)
Eastern Group at west end of screening station three;*** and the other
at 2256 from COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX to DESRON FIFTY-SIX advising that the
post-attack rendezvous point was three miles north of Hibuson Island.***
The rendezvous points above designated were satisfactory to CTG 77.2
with the possible exception of "West end of screening station seven".
However, feeling that CTG 77.3 would correct any interference with his
forces he took no further action in the matter,,
* Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B) .
** Action Report McDSRMUT, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 06l, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
240 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
25*- 1
-i 1 1 ' r-
15'
l25»-30'
35'
U
BATTLE DISPOSITION ALLIED FORCES
( INCLUDING TG 79.11 PATROL STATIONS )
BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT
BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF
OCTOBER 1944
BAT TLE LINE
AND
DESDIV X-RAY
Xhingatungan
INITIAL PATROL LINE
DESTROYERS RIGHT FLANK
ADJUSTED PATROL LINE
RIGHT FLANK
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0^A=^Vt CRUISERS
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NORTHERN patrol limit ALLIED pt boats
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CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
COM BATTLE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
At 2326 he set condition ONE EASY for all ships. This condition was
"All hands at battle stations with key stations alert, and remaining
personnel at ease or sleeping on station, and ships in their maximum
condition of watertight integrity with the exception that essential
ventilation and certain access fittings were open but tended."* He did
this in order to relieve the fatigue and tension of the personnel at the
guns as well as at other stations.
Up to midnight he had received no true contact reports of the enemy
and had no knowledge of the present positions of the Japanese surface
forces which had been contacted that day. (The only contacts he had
received had proved to be either friendly or land.) However, he felt
confident that if the Japanese attempted a penetration that night via
Surigao Strait he would learn about it promptly because he understood
that thirty-nine motor torpedo boats had been disposed across the southern
entrance to the strait for that purpose. He did not know that such
contacts had already been made and that, as early as 2236, certain of the
Japanese forces had been contacted by radar by PT 131 in the eastern
Mindanao Sea heading toward Surigao Strait.** This was, of course,
because of the inability of the motor torpedo boats, which had made the
contact, to get their reports through to the WACHAPREAGUE.**
(1) Operations of Commander Battle Line, 1830 - 2400, October 24th0
At 1830 Commander Battle Line had just completed forming his
battleships in column — distance 1000 yards — as follows: WEST VIRGINIA
(guide), MARYLAND, MISSISSIPPI, TENNESSEE, CALIFORNIA and PENNSYLVANIA.
He was on course 170°(T), speed twelve knots and was proceeding to his
initial station in Latitude 10°-35'N, Longitude 125°-l6'E, at which
point the battle line would become the base unit of Battle Disposition
A-2*** with the MISSISSIPPI in the center of the column as the disposition
guide. He was accompanied by six destroyers of DSSDIV XRAY — CLAXTON,
CONY, THORN, AULICK, SIGOURNEY, WELLES.
At 1947 he directed DESDIV XRAY to form two screens on the battle
line, one at the van and one at the rear.**** COMDESDIV XRAY then
directed the AULICK, SIGOURNEY and WELLES to form screen No. 53***** to
the east of the leading battleship, and the CLAXTON, CONY and THORN to
form an identical screen to the west of the trailing battleship.****
*~ Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Fleet (USF 10A),
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1944, Paragraph 2130.
** Action Report PT 131, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 0931, October 29th, 1944.
*** Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Fleet (USFIOA),
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1944, Figure 8, Page 4-12.
**** Action Report CLAXTON, Report of Action Oetober 24th - 25th, 1944,
The Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, Serial 007,
November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (C) .
***** Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Fleet (USF 10A),
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1944, Table No. 1, Page
3-4 (Change No. 3).
241 CONFIDENTIAL
COM BATTLE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
Thus there would be three destroyers in the van of the battle line on
either the east or west course.
At 1950, when the WEST VIRGINIA reached the initial point of
the patrol line, he changed the course of the battle line to 090° (T)
and reduced speed to five knots.*
IT SEEMS HIGHLY PROBABLE THAT COMMANDER BATTLE LINE REALIZED
THAT THESE DESTROYERS COULD GIVE LITTLE ANTISUBMARINE PROTECTION BECAUSE
THE DISPOSITION SPEED WAS BUT FIVE KNOTS AND THE LENGTH OF THE BATTLE
LINE WAS SOME 5000 YARDS. WHY THEN DID HE PLACE THEM AT THE VAN AND
STERN OF HIS BATTLE LINE? WHILE HE GIVES NO REASONS THEREFORE, IT SEEMS
LIKELY THAT HE DID SO TO MAKE THEM READILY AVAILABLE FOR ANY URGENCY
WHICH MIGHT ARISE SUCH AS INVESTIGATING A CONTACT, REPELLING ENEMY
DESTROYERS WHICH MIGHT GET BY THE FLANK FORCES OR MAKING A TORPEDO
ATTACK FROM BOTH BLANKS SHOULD DESDIV XRAY BE REQUIRED FOR THIS PURPOSE.**
At 2200, when the battle line had reached the eastern limit of
its patrol line, Commander Battle Line changed course to 000° (T) by
simultaneous ship turns, and then at 2217 changed course to 280° (T) by
the same method.*** DESDIV XRAY conformed to the battle line signals.
The effect of the southerly current was now being felt, and the battle
line was forced to steer slightly northward (280°(T)) to compensate for it.
The currents and slow speed made station keeping for the
battleships quite difficult. This was particularly so because the guide
of the battle line shifted to the van at each reversal of course. The
turns at five knots were especially slow and cumbersome.
At 2340 Commander Battle Line reversed course through north
to 090° (T).***
At 2400 the battle line guide was bearing 090° (T) distant
17,000 yards from Hingatungan Point.
(2) Operations of Commander Left Flank Force, 1830 - 2400, October 24th,
At 1830 Commander Left Flank Force (CTG 77.2) in the LOUISVILLE,
who was also OTC of the Left Flank Force, was proceeding with the left
flank cruisers and destroyers toward his initial station on course 160°(T)
at fifteen knots being at this time about fourteen miles from station.****
The left flank cruisers (CRUDIV FOUR and CRUDIV TWELVE) and the left flank
destroyers (DESRON FIFTY-SIX) were in a special circular disposition with
the cruisers equally spaced on circle four. This was due to the presence
of enemy aircraft.****
* Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
** War Instructions, United States Navy, (FTP 143), Navy Department,
Office of Naval Operations, 1934, Chapter X, Section V, Paragraph
1053.
*** Deck Log CALIFORNIA, October 24th, 1944.
**** Deck Log LOUISVILLE, October 24th, 1944.
242 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
At 1942, as the LOUISVILLE reached her approximate initial point,
CTG 77.2 changed the course of the left flank force to 090° (T) and
reduced their speed to five knots .*
At 2142 he ordered (a) left flank cruisers to form column
formation natural order on the LOUISVILLE at 2150,** This meant that the
LOUISVILLE was to become the guide of the left flank force and that the
cruisers were to form astern of her, from east to west as follows:
PORTLAND, MINNEAPOLIS, DENVER (COMCRUDIV TWELVE) and COLUMBIA, distance
700 yards .** Meanwhile the LOUISVILLE maneuvered to take station bearing
120° (T), distance 14,000 yards from the disposition guide (MISSISSIPPI)
which was almost on station and (b) COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX to take station
in Formation A-2 which was between the cruisers and the battle line.
At 2150 the cruisers formed in column astern of the LOUISVILLE,
and COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX in the NEWCOMB then formed his destroyers in
three sections of three destroyers each, which he termed Attack Sections
ONE, TWO and THREE and aligned them on a line of bearing of section
guides 000°-180°(T)*** interval between sections 2000 yards.****
Attack Section ONE consisted of NEWCOMB (FF), RICHARD P. LEARY
and ALBERT W. GRANT; Attack Section TWO of ROBINSON (F), HALFORD and
BRYANT; Attack Section THREE of HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS (F), LEUTZE and
BENNION .*****
COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX divided his squadron into three sections
because if ordered to attack he planned to employ them in a coordinated
torpedo attack in accordance with standard doctrine ,******
IT IS NOT KNOWN EXACTLY WHY HE CHOSE THIS FORMATION BECAUSE IT IS
PREFERABLE TO HAVE THE DESTROYER ATTACK SECTIONS ON A LINE OF BEARING
NORMAL TO THE EXPECTED ATTACK DIRECTION. SINCE THE ATTACK DIRECTION WAS
EXPECTED TO BE ALMOST DUE SOUTH THIS MEANT THAT THE DESTROYERS SHOULD
HAVE BEEN IN COLUMN. IT SEEMS LIKELY HOWEVER THAT COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX
REALIZING THAT IF ALL DESTROYERS WERE IN CORRECT POSITION IN COLUMN THE
* Deck Log LOUISVILLE, October 24th, 1944.
** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B); also
Action Report MINNEAPOLIS, Participation in Battle of South Surigao
Strait, P.I., Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0215,
November 2nd, 1944.
*** Action Report COMDESRON 56, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0013, October 29th, 1944; also Deck Logs BRYANT,
LEUTZE, RICHARD P. LEARY, HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, October 24th, 1944.
**** -phis interval (distance between division guides) of 2000 yards was
correct for destroyers at this time. However it was full interval
rather than natural interval. Full interval was standard distance
(500 yards) multiplied by the number of destroyers in each section
plus 500 yards; natural interval was standard distance multiplied
by the number of ships,
*^*** Action Report ROBINSON, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 076,
November 3rd, 1944.
****** Action Report COMDESRON 56, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0013, October 29th, 1944.
243 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
COLUMN WOULD BE 5000 YARDS LONG, DECIDED, AT LEAST WHILE AWAITING
INFORMATION OF THE ENEMY WHICH HAD NOT BEEN HEA?J) FROM SINCE THE FORENOON,
TO KEEP HIS DESTROYERS IN THE 000o-180°(T) LINE OF BEARING IN ORDER TO
FACILITATE MANEUVERING AND COMMUNICATIONS.
At 2231 Commander Left Flank Force changed the course of the left
flank forces to 000°(T).*
At 2243 he received a surface contact report from the COLUMBIA
which was evaluated as land.**
At 2245 he changed the course of the left flank forces to 270°(T).*
At 2400 the left flank force was in approximate station on the
MISSISSIPPI as provided in Battle Disposition A-2.
(3) Operations of Commander Right Flank Force (CTG 77.3), 1330 - 2400,
October 24th.
The right flank force under command of Commander Right Flank
Force (COMCRUDIV FIFTEEN in the PHOENIX) was proceeding at 1830 to its
assigned station in Battle Disposition A-2 as ordered by CTG 77.2. At
this time it was about four miles northeast of Tay Tay Point (Leyte)
(Plate XVIII). At 1843 Commander Right Flank Force formed the BOISE and
SHROPSHIRE in that order on a line of bearing 050°(T) from the PHOENIX,***
distant 700 yards, so that the cruisers would be in formation to turn
eastward to their patrol line when they arrived at their initial station.
At about 1952, the cruisers having arrived on station, he reduced
speed to five knots and at 1956 changed course to 090° (T) to await the
arrival of the battle line.***
At this time the right flank destroyers, commanded by COMDESRON
TWENTY-FOUR in HUTCHINS, were in column in the following order: HUTCHINS,
DALY, BACHE, ARUNTA, KILLSN and BEALE, and were endeavoring to maintain
station bearing 230° (T), distant 4000 yards from PHOENIX.**** COMDESRON
TWENTY-FOUR followed the movements of the OTC in the PHOENIX.
When, at about 2000, the battle line arrived in approximate
station Commander Right Flank Force maneuvered the right flank force to
take proper station on the disposition guide MISSISSIPPI. In general,
after taking station, he with his cruisers followed the movements of the
battle line. His right flank destroyers, however, were not always able
to maintain station on the PHOENIX because (a) of shoal water and (b) the
patrol line intersected with the patrol station of the MONSSEN of DESRON
FIFTY-FOUR in Station SIX. Therefore, mindful of these difficulties at
2128 by voice radio he assigned COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR a new station,
* Deck Log LOUISVILLE, October 24th, 1944.
** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
*** Deck Log PHOENIX, October 24th, 1944.
**** Deck Log HUTCHINS, October 24th, 1944.
244 CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 1330 - 2400, October 24th
bearing 230°(T), 8000 yards from the PHOENIX. This new station cleared
the MONSSEN but it introduced new difficulties to COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR
in that his ships were forced to maneuver in even more restricted waters.
The tactical situation of the right flank destroyers now became
quite unacceptable and therefore Commander Right Flank Force, at 2258
by TBS voice radio, ordered COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR to maneuver as necessary
to keep clear of the shore.* COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR then formed his
destroyers in a column from south to north and took a final position
about two miles east of the Cabugan Islands. He patrolled a north-south
line from Bugho Point (Leyte) to the latitude of the northern tip of
Cabugan Grande Island, and operated in this fashion until ordered to
attack.** He made no attempt to follow the movements of the PHOENIX
thereafter •
At 2220 Commander Right Flank Force changed course to 290°(T).***
At 2232 he intercepted CTG 77.2' s TBS voice radio message to
COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX and CTG 79.11, directing them to establish their
post-attack rendezvous points and to advise him of their location.****
He must have noted that COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR had been omitted. Since he
expected his destroyers to attack does it not seem surprising that he did
not order them to designate likewise their rendezvous points?
At 2340 he changed course to 090° (T)*** in order to maintain
station on the MISSISSIPPI.
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15) Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report COMDESRON 24, Night Surface Engagement Surigao Strait,
Leyte, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0129,
October 30th, 1944; also Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4,
(CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00141, November 2nd, 1944.
*** Deck Log PHOENIX, October 24th, 1944.
**** Action Report MC DERMUT, Battle of Surigao Strait. October 25th,
1944, Serial 061, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (c).
245 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79.11
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
(B) Operations of CTG 79.11, 1830 - 2400, October 24th.
CTG 79.11 continued patrolling Antisubmarine Stations ONE to SEVEN
(Plate XVIII). He had been on this duty since sunrise D-day.
He was familiar with the situation expected to develop in lower
Surigao Strait that night for at 1640 (when it was received by COMDESDIV
108)* he had received CTF 77' s dispatch reporting that an enemy attack
force of two battleships, four heavy cruisers, four light cruisers and
ten destroyers could arrive in Leyte Gulf that night** and at 1757 (also
when it was received by COMDESDIV 108)* CTF 77 fs dispatch wherein CTG ^7.2
was directed to defend lower Leyte Gulf and destroy enemy forces
encountered.*** He was concerned because he had received no instructions
relative to the employment of his command in the impending battle and
therefore estimated that he was expected to continue to maintain the
antisubmarine screen. He could see that his command, if it continued in
its present station, would interfere with the battle operations of CTG 77.2
should the Japanese move up through Surigao Strait. He therefore decided
that, unless he received other instructions, it would be necessary for
his conmand to clear the area temporarily about the time of contact
between TG 77.2 and the enemy. He also decided that it would be unwise
to depart the area without making an effort to contribute to the night
battle and determined to request authority to make a torpedo attack.
Because "the location of friendly PT boats made it highly desirable
to launch the torpedo attack north of Latitude lOO-LZ'N" he prepared a
plan of attack which would permit him to attack and retire without
interfering with subsequent attacks by COMDESRON FIFTY-SEC.**** In this
attack he planned to employ only the five destroyers stationed in Surigao
Strait and to leave on station the other two destroyers (MC NAIR and
MERTZ) which were patrolling between Homonhon Island and Dinagat Island.
He considered the latter patrol an essential antisubmarine patrol.****
Having decided to employ only the five destroyers, he planned to
employ these in a two-group attack with one group of two destroyers
attacking from the west and one group of three destroyers attacking from
the east. While he realized that such a two- group attack was not in
accordance with standard destroyer doctrine in that that doctrine
recommended a single attack of five ships from one bow he was determined
to employ the two-group attack if he could gain the approval of CTG 77.2.
He stated later in his action report that he made this decision because he
believed that the advantages of striking the enemy from opposite bows are
so great that the use of two attacking groups as employed by his command
was more than justified.****
* Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
** CTF 77 Dispatch 240315 October 1944 to TF 77.
*** CTF 77 Dispatch 240543 October 1944 to all TFC's 7THFLT.
**** Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Surface Action in
Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 055, November 12th, 1944.
246 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79.11
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
He felt that he was justified in requesting permission to make an
attack because his basic orders directed him to defend the transports
from any type of enemy attack.*
WHY HE FELT THAT HE REQUIRED JUSTIFICATION FOR REQUESTING THAT HE BE
PERMITTED TO MAKE A TORPEDO ATTACK (IN ADVANCE OF THE ATTACKS WHICH WOULD
BE MADE BY CTG 77.2 »S DESTROYERS) IS NOT UNDERSTOOD, FOR HERE HE HAD AN
INCENTIVE TO ACTION ORIGINATING FROM THE DEMANDS OF THE SITUATION.
HE WAS, OF COURSE, FAMILIAR WITH THE FACT THAT WHEN A SUBORDINATE
COMMANDER FINDS HIMSELF CONFRONTED WITH A SITUATION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN
COVERED IN HIS ORDERS FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY AND WHICH NECESSITATES ACTION
ON HIS PART BEFORE HE CAN COMMUNICATE WITH HIS SUPERIOR AND RECEIVE
INSTRUCTIONS, HE SHOULD ANALYZE THE SITUATION TO SEE WHETHER HIS ASSIGNED
TASK WILL PROPERLY MEET THE NEW SITUATION AND THEREBY FURTHER THE GENERAL
PLAN OF HIS SUPERIOR. IF IT WILL NOT MilET THE NEW SITUATION HE SHOULD
SELECT A NEW TASK WHICH WILL DO SO.**
In this case then he could see that his assigned task of patrolling
Surigao Strait would not meet the demands of the new situation. It was
therefore incumbent on him to choose a new task. This he did.
He also knew that timepermitting, he should communicate with his
superior and request instructions.** However, he decided not to communicate
with his immediate superior (CTF 79) because he appears to have felt that
(a) such communication would necessitate the employment of radio with the
ensuing delay incident to coding and transmission and (b) he could expect
a long delay in such communications because his receipt of CTF 77* s
dispatches relating to the prospective battle had been delayed an average
of some three and three-quarter hours*
INSTEAD, HE DECIDED TO REQUEST APPROVAL OF HIS PLANNED ATTACK FROM HIS
IMMEDIATE SUPERIOR IN THE AREA (CTG 77 .2) WITH WHOM HE COULD COMMUNICATE
BY TBS VOICE RADIO. HIS ACTION IN SO DOING WAS OF COURSE CORRECT.
With this in mind he contacted CTG 77.2 as soon as he came within
voice radio range, which was at 1950, and advised him that "in case of
surface contact to the southward I plan to make an immediate attack with
fish, then retire to clear you. If you approve this I will submit my
plan shortly."***
* Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055,
November 15th, 1944.
** War Instructions, United States Navy (FTP 143A), United States
Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Navy Department 1944,
Chapter 2, Section III, Paragraph 214»
*** Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
247 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79.11
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
One minute later he received a query from CTG 77.2 as to whether his
screen was the same as on the previous night. To this he replied in the
affirmative.*
At 2010 he received a message from CTG 77.2 authorizing him to make
the attack. He was directed in the same message to (a) retire to the
cover of Dinagat Island, (b) pass between Hibuson and Dinagat, (c) show
IFF and (d) inform CTG 77.2 if the enemy was in more than one group and
its composition if possible.**
He could see from this dispatch that CTG 77.2 expected him to make an
attack with a single attack group. Since this was not in accordance with
his plans he, at 2012, advised CTG 77.2 that he (a) planned to attack from
both sides with two groups, one of three destroyers and one of two, (b)
planned to retire one group to the west, the other, which he would command,
to the east and (c) would give the details later. He further asked
CTG 77 o2 whether this plan would be satisfactory.**
At 2016 he received a TBS voice radio message from CTG 77.2 wherein
that commander approved the attack plan and directed that he (a) keep
close to the shore, (b) employ IFF and (c) inform CTG 77.3, who commanded
the right flank forces, of the above plan.**
He now estimated that if the enemy approached from the south he would
come directly up the strait as far north as Kanihaan Island (Latitude
10°-10»N) and then change course to 340°(T) to head directly for the
transport area. He further estimated, since his attack would be above
Latitude 10°-12'N, that the enemy would be on that course when he launched
his torpedoes.* Actually this estimate was quite accurate for Conmander
THIRD Section had planned to pass the southern entrance of Surigao Strait
and take course 350°(T) directly to the transport area.***
At 2020 he transmitted by voice radio the following plan to his
ships, CTG 77.2, CTG 77.3 and COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX: "If surface contact
is made to southward, COMDESRON FIFTY-FOUR will form two attack groups.
Western Group COMDESDIV 108 in McDERMUT with MONSSEN, Eastern Group
COMDESRON FIFTY-FOUR in REMEY with McGOWAN and MELVTN in that order.
Attack speed thirty knots. McNAIR and MERTZ will remain in vicinity
stations One and Two. Will use individual target plan, intermediate speed
setting. After delivery of fish retire normal to the axis to clear area
for CTG 77.2 and CTG 77.3, and then north near coast line. Time 20201."*
«*
Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055,
November 15th, 1944.
Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
*** C0M3RD Section Dispatch 221155, October 1944 to all SHO Forces,
Detailed Action Report DESRON 10, SHO Operations, October 17th - 31st,
1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
248 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79.11
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
The above plan indicated (a) a high speed (thirty knots) attack on
both bows of the enemy, using intermediate speed (thirty-three and one-
half knots) torpedoes which had a designed torpedo range of about 9200
yards, (b) an individual target plan wherein each destroyer, unless
otherwise directed, was to select as her target her opposite number in the
enemy formation and was to track this target and compute and use her own
firing data. This firing plan could be modified as necessary when the
number of the enemy targets became known.
SINCE THE ATTACK PLAN WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH DESTROYER DOCTRINE,*
EXCEPT AS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED, AND INTERMEDIATE SPEED SETTING WAS THE
NORMAL SPEED SETTING FOR NIGHT ATTACKS, THE ABOVE PLAN IS CONSIDERED SOUND
AS A PRELIMINARY PLAN. HOWEVER IT IS NOT CLEAR, AS POINTED OUT UNDER
CTG 77.2, THAT IF THE ENEMY MOVEMENT PROVED TO BE DIFFERENT FROM THE
ESTIMATE— THAT IS, FOR EXAMPLE, IF HE MOVED NORTH ALONG THE SHCRE LINE
RATHER THAN IN MID-STRAIT—IT MIGHT BE INFEASIBLE TO MAKE AN ADEQUATE
TWO-PRONG ATTACK WITH THE RESULT THAT A RADICAL CHANGE IN THE ABOVE PLAN
WOULD BE REQUIRED.
Prior to 2102 (when it was received by COMDESDIV 108), and likely
about 2030 when the MONSSEN received it, CTG 79.11 received CTG 77.2* s
battle plan which had been issued by dispatch at about 1730 that
afternoon,,**
Since this plan clearly showed the location of the principal forces of
the battle disposition, notably the battle line and the right and left
flank forces, CTG 79.11 could plainly see that there would be some
interference with his destroyers in Station SEVEN. In fact it is likely
that he had heard of the difficulties there because of the comments over
the TBS voice radio.
He, therefore, at 2118 queried CTG 77.2 by TBS voice radio in this
regard and asked whether part of TG 77.2 was to operate south of this
patrol line.***
At 2120 he received a reply from CTG 77.2 to the effect that his units
would not operate south of the patrol line except (a) four motor torpedo
boats which might operate in Latitude 100-17^ and (b) certain units of
TG 77.3 which might be close to Station SEVEN.***
* Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-43, Destroyer Torpedo Attack Instructions,
issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific Fleet, Serial 01264, October
24th, 1943; also Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-44, Destroyer Torpedo
Doctrine and Manual of Torpedo Control, issued by Commander Destroyers
Pacific Fleet, Serial 01630, July 8th, 1944.
** CTG 77.2 Dispatch 240830 October 1944 to TG's 77.2 and 77.3, info
CTF 77.
*** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
249 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79.11
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
During the evening a number of unidentified planes were being tracked
by radar, notably by the MC GOWAN,* but by other ships as well. Although
it was dim moonlight none of the planes were sighted. They seemed to be
patrolling in the vicinity of Cabugan Grande Island. The MC GOWAN
reported that one of these planes showed surface ship rather than aircraft
identification code. They may have been, in part, Japanese planes of the
THIRD Section operating from bases at Cebu** and, in part, Allied PBY's***
operating from the SAN CARLOS anchored in Hinunangan Bay,
At 2232 CTG 79.11 received a TBS voice radio message from CTG 77.2
directing him to establish his post-attack rendezvous points and to advise
as to their locations*****
Therefore, at 2256, he designated the post-attack rendezvous points
as follows: For western group at the west end of screening Station SEVEN,
and for eastern group at the west end of Station THREE.*****
At 2332, in reply to a query from COMDESDIV 108, he directed that
all contact reports were to be made by TBS voice radio.*****
At 2400 the units of TG 79.11 were in their patrol stations and
patrolling not only against enemy submarines as heretofore but also
against the approach of enemy surface forces from the south.
(C) Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats, 1830 - 2400, October 24th.
(1) Bohol and Camiguin PT's.
It will be recalled that the westernmost Allied motor torpedo
boats were to be stationed along a line between Agio Point, Bohol and
Sipaca Point, Mindanao (Plate XIX), and that the (a) northern half of
this line was to be patrolled by the Bohol PT's and (b) southern half by
the Camiguin PT's.
At 1830 the motor torpedo boats were en route as follows: The
Bohol PT's to initial station off Agio Point and the Camiguin PT's to
initial station one and one-half miles north of Camiguin Island.
* Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and
Defense of Leyte, Philippine Islands, Including the Battle of
Surigao Strait, Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944.
** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11301; also Commander
3RD Section Dispatch 241225 October 1944 to Cebu and San Jose Air
Bases, Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations,
October 16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11339.
*** War Diary Fleet Air Wing 10, October 24th, 1944.
**** Action Report MC DERMUT, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 061, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
***** Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
250 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
It seems well to point out here that all motor torpedo boats
employed a medium frequency voice net (3120 kcs) for inter ship
communication. This circuit was called the PT common and since it was but
five kilocycles off the LAW/ ASP (local air warning/antisubmarine patrol)
net, it provided a valuable source of information for the larger ships,*
(a) Bohol PT«s.
En route to patrol station, the Bohol PT's at 1925 contacted,
by radar, one unidentified plane in Latitude 09o-48fN, Longitude
125°-00,E,** but did not sight the plane nor were the motor torpedo boats
sighted by the plane. It is believed that the plane was from the No. One
Attack Unit, dispatched by Commander THIRD Section from Cebu to attack
the motor torpedo boats on the west coast of Panaon at dusk.***
The Bohol PT«s arrived at a position bearing 050°(T), distant
three miles from Agio Point at 2135 and immediately commenced patrolling
on course 169°(T), speed twelve knots employing radar (Diagram "D").
Commander Bohol PT's likely chose this course in order to (a) close the
patrol line from Agio Point to Sipaca Point and (b) obtain a radar check
of his course and speed using Camiguin Island, The motor torpedo boats
were in left echelon and were therefore on a line of bearing on the port
quarter of the guide (PT 152), distance between adjacent boats seventy-
five yards.**** IT IS DOUBTFUL IF THIS WAS THE CORRECT FORMATION FOR
PATROL BECAUSE RADARS WERE NOT RELIABLE ENOUGH TO COVER THE ENTIRE PATROL.
LINE, AND IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE ENEMY BE DISCOVERED AS HE CROSSED THE
PATROL LINE. WOULD IT NOT HAVE BEEN MORE CORRECT HAD THE COMMANDER OF
THE BOHOL PT'S PLACED HIS BOATS IN A LINEAR PATROL WITH EACH BOAT COVERING
ABOUT FIVE MILES OF THE PATROL LINE? IN SUCH CASE THE CHANCE OF THE
ENEMY CROSSING THE PATROL LINE UNDETECTED WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATLY REDUCED
OVER THE FORMATION ADOPTED, AND THE MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS WOULD STILL HAVE
REMAINED WITHIN RELIABLE VOICE RADIO RANGE OF ONE ANOTHER, WITHIN RADAR
RANGE OF ONE ANOTHER, AND WITHIN EASY CONCENTRATION RANGE.
The patrol was uneventful until 2236 when PT 131 reported two
radar targets on her starboard quarter, distance ten miles.***** These
were the YAMASHIRO and FUSO, of the Japanese SECOND Division. The motor
torpedo boats immediately changed course to 345°(T) to close the target,
increased speed to twenty-four knots and endeavored repeatedly to make a
* Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
** Action Report PT 152, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0399, October 29th, 1944.
*** Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 241225 October 1944 to Commanders
Cebu and San Jose Air Bases, info Commander 1ST Striking Force,
Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October
16th - 23th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
**** Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine Motor Torpedo Boats, U.S.
Fleet, (USF 41), U.S. Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander in
Chief, 1945, Part II, Paragraph 2620, Page 2-13.
***** Action Report PT 131, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0391, October 29th, 1944.
496799 0-59 -26 *- 251 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
contact report to friendly forces but especially to their base
(WACHAPREAGUE at Liloan Bay just north of Panaon Island) but were unable
to do so. At this time the two radar targets bore 292° (T). The motor
torpedo boats were now about eleven miles south of Agio Point. As they
closed the targets they tracked them and determined their course as 080° (T)
(actually, it was 065°(T)), and their speed as twenty-five knots (actually,
it was eighteen knots). At about 2252, having almost reached their attack
position, they slowed to ten knots, took the collision course of 047° (T)
and at 2254 sighted the enemy formation at a distance of from two to three
miles. The recognition was poor however for the motor torpedo boats
believed that they had sighted two enemy battleships, two - three cruisers
and one destroyer,* This, of course, was incorrect because the SECOND
Division consisted of but two battleships and one destroyer.
The motor torpedo boats now found themselves under fire by the
Japanese ships which had turned toward them. They immediately deployed
in order to close and fire torpedoes. However the enemy fire was accurate
with the result that (a) PT 130 was hit by a dud five-inch shell and (b)
PT 152 was hit in the starboard bow which knocked out both radios although
this was not known for several hours,* (This latter hit probably was
scored by the SHIGURE which claimed having made a direct hit.) About this
time PT 152 observed two more "pips" on her radar screen in the same
direction as the original target group,* Since the Japanese force, as
pointed out earlier, consisted of but three units these were likely
phantoms •
The Commander Bohol PT's, in PT 152, now realizing that he
could not get into an attack position at 2255 changed course to 150°(T)
and then retired. Although he increased speed to twenty-four knots he,
at the same time, U3ed a radical zigzag to avoid enemy gunfire with the
result that he made good about nineteen knots. Since he could not contact
any friendly forces by radio he directed PT's 130 and 131 to report enemy's
position by radio.* As a result, about 2313, PT's 130 and 131 headed for
the Camiguin PT' s which they felt might be able to deliver the contact
report.** This caused a separation between the above PT's and PT 152
which was attempting to close the enemy (Diagram "D"),***
WHILE THE ACTION OF THE COMMANDER BOHOL PT'S IN SO DISPATCHING
PT'S 130 AND 131 WAS SOUND IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE CORRECT HAD HE
DISPATCHED THESE TWO MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS AT THE MOMENT WHEN, HAVING
ESTABLISHED THE CHARACTER OF THE ENEMY FORCE, HE DISCOVERED THAT HE WAS
UNABLE TO OBTAIN A RECEIPT FOR HIS CONTACT REPORT. SUCH ACTION WAS CALLED
FOR BY HIS ORDERS WHICH DIRECTED HIM nT0 REPORT ANY ENEMY SIGHTED, THEN
ATTACK, INDEPENDENTLY". HAD HIS BOATS BEEN SERIOUSLY DISABLED WHILE
ATTACKING, THE POSSIBILITY OF NO INFORMATION THEREON REACHING CTG 70.1
WAS VERY GREAT.
* Action Report PT 152, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0399, October 29th, 1944; also Action Report PT 130, Night of October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 5, October 29th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 130, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 5,
October 29th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 152, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0399, October 29th, 1944.
252 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
At approximately 2350 PT's 130 and 131 sighted the Caraiguin
PT's* in position three miles north of Camiguin Island*
At 2400 they were about three miles north of Camiguin Island
and PT 152 was bearing 221°(T), distant eighteen miles from the southern
tip of Limasawa Island.
(b) Camiguin PT's.
The Camiguin PT's arrived on station one and one-half miles
north of Camiguin Island at 2145, lay to and carried out radar watch in
rotation. PT 128 had the watch between 2200 and 2400.*
AS WAS THE CASE WITH THE BOHOL PT'S, THE ABOVE METHOD OF
PATROLLING, WHILE DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE BOHOL PT'S, WAS ALSO OF
DOUBTFUL CORRECTNESS BECAUSE THIS PATROL DID NOT ADEQUATELY COVER THE
SOUTHERN HALF OF THE ASSIGNED PATROL LINE BETWEEN AGIO POINT AND SIPACA
POINT. WHILE IT WAS EFFECTIVE FOR THE AREA NORTH OF CAMIGUIN ISLAND, IT
LEFT THE FOUR MILE DEEP WATER PASSAGE SOUTH OF CAMIGUIN ISLAND ENTIRELY
OPEN. WOULD IT NOT HAVE BEEN PREFERABLE TO HAVE PLACED ONE BOAT IN THE
LATTER AREA AND TO HAVE DIRECTED THE REMAINING TWO BOATS TO MOVE CLOSER TO
THE MID-POINT OF THE AGIO POINT - SIPACA POINT PATROL LINE? THIS WOULD
HAVE GIVEN A FULL COVERAGE OF THE DANGER AREA TO THE SOUTH BETWEEN THE
"LIE TO" POSITION AND CAMIGUIN ISLAND AND WOULD HAVE COVERED ABOUT TEN
MILES TO THE NORTH OF THE "LIE TO" POSITION WHICH WOULD HAVE GIVEN RADAR
COVERAGE SOME MILES TO THE NORTH OF THE MID-POINT. WHILE THIS COVERAGE TO
THE NORTH WOULD HAVE OVERLAPPED INTO THE AREA OF THE BOHOL PT'S, IT WOULD
HAVE INCREASED THE PROBABILITY OF DETECTION OF ENEMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE
WATERS OF THE MINDANAO SEA, WHICH WATERS MIGHT WELL BE TRAVERSED BY
APPROACHING ENEMY HEAVY FORCES.
The above comment is supported by the fact that the FIRST
Division passed at 2227 about seven and one-half miles to the north of the
mid-point of the patrol line (Diagram "D") without being detected.
It is of interest that the FIRST Division failed likewise to
contact the Camiguin PT's but this was likely due to (a) the range, which
at closest approach (2206), was about twelve miles and (b) the land effect
of Camiguin Island.
The failure of the Camiguin PT's to locate the FIRST Division
was not due to incorrect deployment in the patrol area alone. There were
other contributary causes. Among these were (a) the failure of the motor
torpedo boats to be on station sufficiently in advance of the expected
earliest time of the arrival of this division based on the contact made in
the Sulu Sea at 0905** (this would have called for the Bohol and Camiguin
PT's to be on station as early at 1700 if the enemy speed were estimated
as twenty-two knots and as early as 1900 if the enemy speed were estimated
* Action Report PT 127, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 4,
October 29th, 1944.
** Commander 5TH BOMCOM Dispatch 240215 October 1944 to all interested
in current operations.
253 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
as eighteen knots), (b) the fact that the motor torpedo boats arrived on
station, but shortly before the time that the Japanese FIRST Division was
passing Camiguin Island with the possible resulting confusion in
establishing their navigational position and in establishing their radar
watch, and (c) the fact that the above mentioned FIRST Division passed
twelve miles to the north of the "lie to" position which distance seems
to have been about the limiting range of the motor torpedo boat radars on
cruiser type targets as reported in RAD Three,*
As will be shown later, the limiting ranges given in RAD Three
were about two miles greater than those actually obtained by the motor
torpedo boats.
At 2300 the Camiguin PT's sighted numerous starshells and
gunf lashes over the horizon to the northeast. This was the action
between the Bohol PT's and the SECOND Division.
At about 2350 the Camiguin PT's sighted PT's 130 and 131 of
the Bohol PT's which were closing in order to transmit a contact report.**
It seems likely that these two motor torpedo boats had been discovered
earlier since CTG 77.2 reported having received at 0038 a relayed contact
report from PT 127 reporting two contacts bearing 310°(T), ten miles from
Camiguin Island, closing.***
At 2400 the Camiguin PT's were about three miles north of
Camiguin Island,
(2) Limasawa PT's.
The only other motor torpedo boats to observe anything unusual
were PT's 151 (OTC), 146 and 190 which had taken station two miles south
of Limasawa Island at 1830 and will hereinafter be called the Limasawa
PT's. They appear to have maintained station until 1958 when visibility
became poor. By 2300 they had drifted with the current about seven
miles**** as shown in Diagram "D".
* Radar Bulletin No. 3 (RAD 3), Radar Operators Manual, United States
Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, August 5th, 1944
(Reprint March 1945), Part 4, Page 4-S0-7.
** Action Report PT 127, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 4,
October 29th, 1944.
*** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
**** While the PT boats concerned did not report this drift the Commander
Limasawa PT's (then Lieutenant (jg) Dwight Owen, USNR) stated on
October 31st, 1957 to Commodore R. W. Bates, USN (Ret), Head, World
War II Battle Evaluation Group, Naval War College that this drift
could well have occurred as the PT's were lying to and concentrating
on radar search to the SW rather than on accurate maintenance of
position; also Action Reports PT's 151, 146 and 190, Night of October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serials 0389, October 28th; 0388, October 28th;
0398, October 30th, 1944, respectively.
254 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
At this time they sighted searchlight and flares and heard heavy
gunfire to the south southwest at an estimated distance of fifteen miles 0
This estimated distance was incorrect since the action took place about
twenty-three miles away* The fact that gunfire was heard indicates unusual
atmospheric conditions*
Commander Limasawa PT's now endeavored to communicate with his base
(WACHAPREAGUE) but, like the Bohol and Camiguin PT's was unsuccessful* He
considered this failure to have been due to excessive radio interference
due, in part, to the fact that the enemy was jamming the circuit**
The remainder of the patrol was uneventful until 2330 when PT 151
made radar contact on an enemy force nine miles to the south* This contact
was on the Japanese FIRST Division which at the time was on course 035°(T),
speed eighteen knots* The division, after about ten minutes of tracking,
was found to be on course 060°(T), speed fifteen knots***
Commander Limasawa PT's now proceeded toward the target at a speed
of seventeen knots muffled and at 2354 made visual contact at an estimated
range of two miles* The visual sighting disclosed to PT's 151 and 190, one
battleship, a probable light cruiser and three destroyers, and to PT 146,
one large and three smaller ships* PT 146 was correct (M0GAMI and three
destroyers). The fact that PT's 151 and 190 sighted units not present as
well as reported incorrect times and positions is due to the fact that their
reports were reconstructed collectively later from memory with the resulting
errors.***
The motor torpedo boats tried to report the above contacts to their
base as well as to other motor torpedo boats but without avail*****
* Action Report PT's 146 and 190, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 0388, October 28th, 1944 and Serial 0398, October 30th, 1944,
respectively*
** Action Report PT 151, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0389,
October 28th, 1944*
*** Statement by Commander Robert Leeson, USNR, Commander TU 70*1*3 at
Battle of Surigao Strait to Commodore Richard W* Bates, USN (Ret),
Head, World War II Battle Evaluation Group, Naval War College, April
17th, 1954.
**** Action Reports PT's 151, 146 and 190, Night of October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serials 0389, October 28th ; 0388 October 28th; 0398, October
30th, 1944, respectively*
255 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 1830 - 2400, October 24th
Commander Limasawa PT's now slowed his section to nine knots and
approached the large ship on her port quarter for the purpose of
delivering a torpedo attack. This type of approach was permissible for
motor torpedo boats against a medium speed target which was well screened.*
At 2400 the Limasawa PT's were bearing 220o(T), distant nine and
six-tenths miles from the southern tip of Limasawa Island,
(3) SW Panaon PT's.
This section of motor torpedo boats (PT's 196 (OTC), 150, 194),
hereinafter called SW Panaon PT's, reported on station at 1900 at which
time they were between Sonok Point and Balongbalong and about 6000 yards
from the latter.** They continued on course 177°(T) but slowed to five
knots and at 2000 when 6000 yards bearing 221°(T) from Balongbalong stopped.
Commencing about this time the visibility became very bad with rain and
clouds, which poor visibility obtained throughout the night.*** After
stopping they drifted to the westward with the current and by midnight had
drifted about five and one-half miles from the 2000 position. The radar
and radio of PT 196 were functioning badly.**** It is most likely that
none of the group of MTB's realized that they had drifted so far to the
west.
Just before midnight the Japanese FIRST Division moved into normal
range for motor torpedo boat radars against a heavy cruiser — ten to twelve
miles — but none of the SW Panaon PT's detected the Japanese force (Diagram
"D") or were even aware of its presence.
At 2400 the SW Panaon PT's were bearing 129°(T), distant four
miles from the southern tip of Limasawa Island.
(4) SE Panaon PT's.
This section of motor torpedo boats (PT's 134 (OTC), 132, 137),
hereinafter called SE Panaon PT's, was on station off Binit Village at the
southeast tip of Panaon Island where it had arrived at 1910. At 2145 it
contacted by radar an unidentified plane and at 2235 made a similar
contact on two unidentified planes.*****
* Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, Motor Torpedo Boats, U.S.
Fleet (USF 41), United States Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander
in Chief, 1945, Part III, Paragraph 3333.
** Action Report PT 150, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0396, October 29th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 194, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0397, October 29th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 196, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0400, October 31st, 1944.
***** Action Report PT 134, Night Action of October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial H-33, October 27th, 1944.
256 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
1830 - 2400, October 24th
There is no information available as to what these planes were.
They may have been Japanese planes of the THIRD Section operating from
bases at Cebu* or Allied PBY's.**
The Commanding Officer PT 134 reports in his action reports that
the above contacts were transmitted directly to the base (WACHAPREAGUE)
or to the base through PT 523**** Neither the WACHAPREAGUE nor PT 523
make any mention of having received the above reports.****
(5) Other PT's.
The operations of the motor torpedo boats other than the Bohol,
Camiguin, Limasawa, SW Panaon and SE Panaon PT's were uneventful,
excepting that at 2050 the Bilaa Point PT's (494 (OTC), 497, 324), in
accordance with orders from CTF 77, changed their stations from one and
one-half miles west of Bilaa Point (Mindanao) to a position one mile
north of Bilaa Point,***** This was for the purpose of insuring that
enemy forces did not pass undetected through Hinatuan Passage between
Dinagat Island and Mindanao Island.******
Commander 3RD Section Visual Dispatch 231905 October 1944 to 3RD
Section (3RD Section SigOrd No. 10), Detailed Action Report
SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC
Document 161641 (Part 4), NA 11801; also Commander 3RD Section
Dispatch 241225 October 1944 to Cebu and San Jose Air Bases,
Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations, October
16th - 23th, 1944, WDC Document I6I64I, NA 11839.
Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and
Defense of Leyte, Philippines, including the Battle of Surigao
Strait, Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (G).
Action Report PT 134, Night Action of October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial H-33, October 27th, 1944.
Action Report WACHAPREAGUE for Period October 23rd - 26th, 1944,
Serial 072, October 31st, 1944; also Action Report PT 523, Night
of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial, October 26th, 1944.
Action Report PT 494, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No
Serial, October 26th, 1944.
Action Report CTG 70.1, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, Night
of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 1-0330, December 1st, 1944.
**
##*
-a-a-a-K-
**•**-*
•JHHHHHt-
257
CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIBD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 0000 - 0100, October 25th
CHAPTER VIII - JAPANESE OPERATIONS. 0000 - 0100. October 25th
(A) Operations of Commander THIRD Section, 0000 - 0100, October 25th.
Commander THIRD Section, who was also Commander SECOND Division,
continued on toward Surigao Strait as planned. The situation appeared to
be developing satisfactorily but he wondered what had happened to the
Allied destroyers and motor torpedo boats which he had expected to encounter
west of Panaon Island, He had just heard from Conmander FIRST Division
(at midnight) that the enemy had not been sighted* and yet he felt that if
his estimates were correct that commander should now be in the area where
enemy opposition of that nature was expected. He knew, of course that the
FIRST Division was somewhat delayed because Commander FIRST Division had
reported at 0004 that he expected to rendezvous at 0115, a delay of forty-
five minutes.* He appears to have considered this message to be incomplete
for, at 0008, he oueried that commander as to the course of that division.*
This seems to have been a subtle method of discovering the general location
of the FIRST Division for, if the reply indicated a northerly course, he
could estimate from Commander FIRST Division's sweep plans** that the FIRST
Division was in the waters west of Limasawa Island.
At 0012 he received a reply to the effect that (a) the course of the
FIRST Division was 010° (T), and (b) it was "penetrating from now".* From
these two messages he could estimate that the FIRST Division (a) was
approximately forty-five minutes behind schedule, and (b) had not yet passed
between Limasawa Island and Taancan Point (Leyte) (for had it done so the
course wouHhave been about 090°(T))o What he thought of the "penetrating
from now" portion of the message is not known but it is doubtful if he
realized that the MOGAMI was about nine miles from the above passage. This
seems so for a few minutes later considerable confusion arose in identifi-
cation.
At 0015 he informed Commander FIRST Division that (a) he would pass the
rendezvous point at 0035, (b) at 0043 his course would be 090° (T) and (c)
his speed was eighteen knots.* (It will be recalled that the rendezvous
point was seventeen miles, bearing 250° (T) from Binit Point). This
information was furnished in order to facilitate the rejoining of the FIRST
Division and to help in identifying the SECOND Division. It is of interest
that at 0015 SHIGURE was six miles from the newly designated point and that at
the speed being made (eighteen knots) she would pass the rendezvous point
at 0035 if the current were disregarded (Diagram "E").
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Commander 1ST Division Dispatch 241700 October 1944 to 1ST Division, info
Commander yA Section, Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the
Philippines, October 18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 126 53.
258 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL OOOO - 0100, October 25th
Commencing at 0018 he began to receive from Commander FIRST Division
contact reports on enemy units.* He naturally was highly interested in the
number of such units encountered. Since he had received intelligence
information of destroyers in that area as well as motor torpedo boats, he
was anxious to discover whether any of these had been located, and what the
nature of their operations was, i.e., did their primary objective appear to
be one of intelligence, or did they have an attack objective? These were
essential elements of information for if the enemy was not attacking it was
possible that he would encounter heavy action in the gulf, but if the enemy
was attacking it was possible that he would encounter strong forces immedi-
ately, although from information received heretofore such action was
improbable.
Between this time and 0023 he likely, despite the weather, (a) saw one
or more searchlights on his port bow because, at that time, the YAMAGUMO,
which was about seven miles to the northeast, was firing at certain of the
motor torpedo boats, and (b) saw gun tracers.
At 0023, he received a message from Commander FIRST Division reporting a
ship silhouette, apparently enemy.*
At 0025 he received a contact report from Commander FIRST Division sent
to all ships of the THIRD Section that a ship had been sighted on bearing
200° (T)0* He likely estimated that this contact was on one of his SECOND
Division ships because, from the searchlight and tracer bearings, he had
formed an approximate idea of the location of his FIRST Division.
This contact report was auickly followed by a contact report from a
SECOND Division ship (SHIGURE), also sent to all ships of the THIRD Section,
that an enemy destroyer had been sighted bearing 040 (T).*
Although he was certain of his identification of the FIRST Division, he
saw that the SHIGURE report raised the possibility that, perhaps, the FIRST
Division had mistaken his force for enemy. This possibility was confirmed
by the appearance of starshells bursting to the south of him on bearing
200° (T) which had obviously been fired from the direction of the FIRST
Division. He immediately directed that Commander FIRST Division be queried
as to whether or not he had mistaken BATDIV TWO for enemy** But, before his
message could be transmitted he received word at 0028 from Commander FIRST
Division that he was breaking off penetration and rejoining* thus showing .
that that commander had recognized the SECOND Division as friendly©
He now observed that the weather, which had heretofore been improving,
was closing down with reduced visibility.* He, therefore, at 0039> in
anticipation of the reforming of the THIRD Section, advised the THIRD Section
that distance A in No. TWO Approach Formation (Plate XX) would be reduced
to two kilometers* (it was normally four kilometers).
Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th,
1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
259 CONFIDENTIAL
COM FIRST DIVISION
CONFIDENTIAL OOOO - 0100, October 25th
At 0057 he (a) advised his command that he planned at 0129 to change
course to 040°(T) and at 0150 to 000°(T) and (b) intercepted a message from
the MICHISHIO that she was making twenty knots.*
At 0100 the FIRST Division was close enough to the SECOND Division to
consider her as having rejoined.
(1) Operations of Commander FIRST Division, 0000 - 0100, October 25th,
By 0000, the weather encountered by the FIRST Division was quite
squally and visibility was intermittently reduced.**
At 0003 Commander FIRST Division learned that the SECOND Division
was on course 065° (T)0*
Meanwhile Commander FIRST Division appears to have been studying the
situation and to have arrived at the conclusion that he could not possibly
make the search to Sogod Bay and arrive at the rendezvous at 0030 as ordered.
He estimated instead that the would reauire as much as forty-five additional
minutes to make the search and on that basis he thought it wise to so advise
Commander THIRD Section. Therefore, at 0004, he advised that commander that
he expected to rejoin at 0115* rather than at 0030 which had been originally
designated. It seems probable that he expected Commander THIRD Section to
issue a new rendezvous to conform with the 0115 time. Why he did not speed
up earlier to insure his arrival at the 0030 rendezvous on schedule cannot
be determined, but it appears likely that the restriction to remain about
twenty kilometers ahead of the SECOND Division prevented him from moving
ahead faster so that he might make the search into the waters west of Panaon
Island sufficiently early to insure returning to the rendezvous point on
time.
At 0003 he was queried by Commander THIRD Section as to his course.*
Realizing by this query that Commander THIRD Section was interested in
learning whether or not he was in the waters west of Panaon Island, he did
not immediately answer but changed course at 0012 to 010° (T) and then
answered the question, further stating that he was "penetrating from now"
(sic)»* In view of his intention to pass to the west and north of Limasawa
Island, this statement was not particularly accurate for he was more than
nine miles from the passage between Limasawa Island and Taancan Point on
Leyte from whence he could penetrate Sogod Bay»
He had not as yet detected the motor torpedo boats approaching on
his port Quarter which had sighted the force visually at 2354 and were getting
into torpedo attack firing position*** (The range of a motor torpedo boat
torpedo Mark 13 was 5,500 yards at thirty-two knots).****
*~ Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Detailed Action Report MOGAML, Battle off the Philippines, October 18th-
25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
*** Action Reports PT's 151, 146 and 190, Night of October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serials 0389, October 29th, 0388, October 28th, 0398, October 30th,
1944, respectively.
**** Bulletin of Ordnance Information 4-44, BUORD, December 31st, 1944,
Paragraph 129, Page 66.
260 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
COM FIRST DIVISION
CONFIDENTIAL OOOO - 0100, October 25th
At 0015 he received a voice radio message from Commander THIRD
Section that (a) he would pass the rendezvous point at 0035> (b) he would
change course to 090° (T) at 0043 and (c) his speed was eighteen knots**
While he likely found this information advantageous, for it gave him a
position and an intended movement line, known today (1958) in the U. S.
Navy as PIM,** and unless he heard otherwise, he could rejoin along that
line, he also likely regretted that Commander THIRD Section had not seen fit
to change the rendezvous to conform to the new time of rejoining. Instead
it was clear that Commander THIRD Section desired that he rejoin as soon as
practicable*
At about this same time the YAMAGUMO reported sighting three torpedo
boats bearing 030°(T), distant about ten kilometers.*** These were PT«s
150. 194 and 196 which whilel,lying to" had drifted to the westward (Diagram
"E" )»**** However, the bearing, in view of the MOGAMI bearing later, seems
to have been in error and was more likely 080° (T). It is of interest that
the above motor torpedo boats failed to detect the FIRST Division.
At about 0018 Commander FIRST Division advised the THIRD Section by
voice radio that four enemy torpedo boats (actually there were three) had
been sighted on bearing 100° (T).* Meanwhile his flagship (MOGAMI) employing
a searchlight, commenced searching to the eastward from her starboard beam
to her quarter. She sighted nothing because weather conditions to the
eastward were not good and the visibility had for the moment decreased.***
In connection with the employment of searchlights by the MOGAMI
against motor torpedo boats it seems wise at this point to digress from the
narrative to discuss Japanese and American concepts thereon*
JAPANESE DOCTRINE WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT, ONCE MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
HAD BEEN SIGHTED, (A) SPEED SOULD BE BETWEEN TWENTY AND TWENTY-EIGHT KNOTS
AND (B) GUNFIRE SHOULD BE EMPLOYED WITHOUT SEARCHLIGHT OR STARSHELL
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** "PIM" consists of the reference position of the OTC at a given time and
a forecast of the course and speed expected to be made good over the
ground.
*** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October 18th-
25th, 1944, WDC Document I6O463, NA 12653.
**** While the PT boats concerned did not report this drift both the
Commander Limasawa PT's (then Lieutenant (jg) Dwight Owen, USNR) on
October 31st, 1957, and the Commander of the 39 PT's engaged in the
Surigao Strait - Mindanao Sea Area (then Lieutenant Commander Robert
Leeson, USNR) on October 29th, 1957, stated to Commodore Richard W.
Bates, USN (Ret), Head, World War II Battle Evaluation Group, Naval War
College, that this drift could well have occurred as the PT*s were lying
to and concentrating on radar search to the SW rather than on accurate
maintenance of position.
261 CONFIDENTIAL
COM FIRST DIVISION
CONFIDENTIAL OOOO - 0100, October 25th
ILLUMINATION.* THIS DOCTRINE, BY INFERENCE, WAS SIMILAR TO THE U. S. NAVAL
DOCTRINE WHICH WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE EMPLOYMENT OF SEARCHLIGHT OR
STARSHELLS IN NIGHT ACTION SHOULD BE AVOIDED WHEN POWERFUL ENEMY FORCES
(RELATIVE TO OWN FORCES), WHICH IT WAS HOPED TO AVOID, WERE KNOWN OR SUSPECTED
TO BE IN THE AREA, SINCE SUCH ILLUMINATION WOULD DISCLOSE THE PRESENCE OF
ONE«S OWN FORCE.** Why then did he employ searchlights? While he has given
no explanation it seems clear that he based the employment on the following
analysis :
He had been directed, among other items, to sweep the route of
advance in order to protect the approaching SECOND Division.*** He was,
therefore, not endeavoring to avoid the enemy motor torpedo boats but rather
to seek them out and destroy them. If, in so doing, he found the Japanese
radar to be ineffective, (and it appears to have been ineffective because
the contacts were made visually rather than by radar), it was his responsi-
bility to employ any means— within limitations imposed by the OTC— to locate
attacking enemy forces. HE HAD RECEIVED REPORTS THAT ENEMY TORPEDO BOATS
HAD BEEN REPORTED TO THE EASTWARD TWICE WITHIN THREE MINUTES, BUT APPARENTLY
WITH INSUFFICIENT ACCURACY TO PERMIT OPENING FIRE WITHOUT ILLUMINATION. THE
TORPEDO BOATS, THEREFORE, BECAME A SERIOUS MENACE TO HIS FORCE AND IT WAS
ESSENTIAL THAT HE LOCATE THEM AT ONCE, OR FAILING THAT, TO TURN AWAY
IMMEDIATELY. IF THIS WAS HIS ANALYSIS, AND IT SE£MS CORRECT TO SAY THAT IT
WAS, HIS ACTION IN EMPLOYING SEARCHLIGHTS SEEMS CORRECT.
While the MOGAMI was making the above searchlight sweep Commander
FIRST Division decided to form column and therefore directed the destroyers
to form column astern of the MOGAMI.**** It is assumed that the destroyers
formed in natural order: MICHTSHIO (F), ASAGUMO, YAMAGUMO. While his
reasons for so forming are not stated it seems clear that this column form-
ation was standard within the Japanese Navy at this time for the maneuvers
of fast ships such as cruisers and destroyers operating together. This
view is supported by the statement of an officer on the staff of Commander
SECOND Striking Force, who in discussing a similar formation for that force,
stated: "It is the tradition of the Japanese Navy that the commander should
be in the leading position"©*****
* CinC Combined Fleet Standing Order No. 81 (1943), Combined Fleet
Doctrine 1943, Book One, Combat, Section H, Action Against Torpedo
Boats. ATIS Document No. 39, Part VII, June 3rd, 1945 (NACHI Document),
** War Instructions U. S. Navy, 1944 (FTP 143(A)), Chapter 8, Section
III, Use of Starshells and Searchlights, Page 37.
*** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
**** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
***** USSBS Interrogations of Japanese Officials, Nav. No. 58, Interrogation
of Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-IJN, Volume I, Page 244«
262 CONFIDENTIAL
COM FIRST DIVISION
CONFIDENTIAL OOCO - 0100, October 25th
THIS FORMATION HAS ONE MARKED ADVANTAGE. IN NIGHT ACTION ESPECIALLY,
FOLLOW-THE-LEADER TACTICS ARE ALWAYS A MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCE, AND MAY BE
THE ONLY RESOURCE OF THE COMMANDER OF A DETACHMENT TO IMPOSE HIS LEADERSHIP
ON HIS GROUP.* IN THIS CASE, WHERE HIGH SPEED FOLLOW-THE-LEADER TACTICS
WERE IN ORDER AGAINST THE TORPEDO BOATS, IS IT NOT APPARENT THAT THE COLUMN
FORMATION, WITH THE COMMANDER IN THE VAN, WOULD FACILITATE THE MANEUVERS
AND WOULD PRESENT ON INITIAL CONTACT MUCH GREATER FIRE POWER AGAINST THE
ENEMY THAN WOULD A FORMATION WITH THE DESTROYERS IN A SCREEN, OR EVEN WITH
THE DESTROYERS IN COLUMN AHEAD OF THE MOGAMI? IS THIS NOT PARTICULARLY SO
SINCE THE CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS WERE CAPABLE OF APPROXIMATELY THE SAME
HIGH SPEEDS?
As the destroyers took station astern of the MOGAMI, the last
destroyer in the column, YAMAGUMO, sighted and illuminated the motor torpedo
boats attacking on the port quarter of the MOGAMI. She opened fire on the
boats which were about 300 to 600 yards on her port beam. Although the
Commanding Officer PT 151 states in his action report that he had been
illuminated and fired on by the battleship** (MOGAMI), this appears to have
been in error, for the Commanding Officer MOGAMI, also in his action report,
states that, "she sought to fire on the enemy craft without searchlight
illumination but visibility was too poor for sighting and she was unable to
fire".*** He also reported in the same action report having seen several
torpedo wakes which he had successfully evaded. Actually but two torpedoes
had been fired by the motor torpedo boats of which one was known to have
been an erratic run.**** THE FIRST DIVISION FAILED TO MAKE ANY GUNFIRE HITS
ON THE MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS, SHOWING THE DIFFICULTY OF HITTING A FAST MOVING
AND HIGHLY MANEUVERABLE TARGET SUCH AS A MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT DURING DARKNESS.
It will be observed from the plot (Diagram nEM) that the FIRST
Division was to the southwest of Limasawa Island. This fact was confirmed
by the Commanding Officer of the ASAGUMO who stated that at the time they
were to the westward of Limasawa Island.*****
At 0023 Commander FIRST Division advised Commander THIRD Section that
a ship silhouette, apparently enemy, had been sighted.******
* Report of Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn, USN (Ret) to CBfCPAC, May 13th,
1943, on Informal Investigation into the Circumstances Attending the
Loss of the VINCENNES, etc., August 9th, 1944, Paragraph 142, Page 53.
** Action Report PT 151, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0389, October 29th, 1944.
*** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
13th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
**** Action Reports PT's 151, 146 and 190, Night of October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serials 0389, October 29th; 0388, October 28th, 0398, October
30th, 1944, respectively.
***** Composite Report on Surigao Strait Action by Commanding Officers
ASAGUMO (Commander Kazuo Shibayama, ex- UN) and MICHISHIO (Commander
Kazuo Tanaka, ex- UN), March 15th, 1946, Army Historical Division
Microfilm HS-39A.
****** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
263 CONFIDENTIAL
COM FIRST DIVISION
CONFIDENTIAL 0000 - 0100, October 25th
FROM HIS ACTION REPORT IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT COMMANDER FIRST DIVISION,
NOTING THAT NO BEARING HAD BEEN GIVEN BUT PRESUMING THAT THE SHIP SILHOUETTED
WAS IN THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF THE PREVIOUS REPORT (100°(T)), AND, HAVING
FAILED TO SIGHT ANYTHING IN THAT AREA WITH HIS SEARCHLIGHTS, AT THIS POINT
DECIDED THAT A TURN AWAY WAS URGENT SINCE ENEMY TORPEDOES MIGHT WELL BE
HEADING TOWARD HIM* HE, THEREFORE, ORDERED AN EMERGENCY TURN TO PORT OF
EIGHTY DEGREES BY SIMULTANEOUS SHIP TURNS.* THIS WOULD PLACE HIS SHIPS ON
COURSE 290° (T) WHICH WAS WITHIN TEN DEGREES OF THE REVERSE BEARING OF THE
PT BOAT CONTACT. WHILE THE JAPANESE DOCTRINE IN SUCH A SITUATION IS NOT
AVAILABLE TO THIS STUDY IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THIS DOCTRINE WAS SIMILAR TO
U. S. NAVAL DOCTRINE WHICH PROVIDED IN SUCH SITUATIONS, "THAT EFFECTIVE
MANEUVERS SHOULD BE TAKEN FOR THE PURPOSE OF BRINGING THE MOTOR TORPEDO
BOATS ASTERN OF THE DISPOSITION."**
Shortly after completing the turn away, Commander FIRST Division at
0025 (a) sighted a ship silhouette, apparently enemy, on bearing 200° (T)
and promptly reported this contact by voice radio to the THIRD Section* and
(b) received a voice radio message from the SHIGURE (with the SECOND
Division) that she had sighted an enemy destroyer on bearing 040° (T).*
He now could see that, by his turn away, he had placed his command
in an unsatisfactory position relative to the last reported enemy. This
was so, not only as regards any torpedoes which may have been fired since
the turn to the left placed him in the enemy's torpedo water, but also
because his destroyers were now on a Line of bearing 190° (T) from the MOGAMI
which (a) would soon blank the gunfire by any of his ships excepting the
YAMAGUMO and (b) would permit the enemy to cross the "Tee" through enfilade
fire.
At this point the YAMAGUMO opened fire with starshells, presumably
to illuminate the silhouetted 3hip in order to ascertain its character and
to, at the same time, search the surrounding area for other enemy forces.
At this moment the Commanding Officers of the YAMAGUMO and the MOGAMI,
recognizing that the ship silhouetted had Japanese characteristics, temporar-
ily withheld fire.*** Also at this moment starshells were observed oursting
to the eastward (PT 151 reported that four starshells had burst between the
FIRST Division and herself.)**** These were starshells fired by the SECOND
Division, presumably by the SHIGURE. From the fact that Commander FIRST
Division now queried Commander SECOND Division as to his speed,* it seems
clear that he had recognized the SHIGURE as friendly and desired the speed
information so that he could facilitate rejoining. Without waiting for a
*♦
Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine U. S. Fleet (USF 10B), 1945,
Paragraph 4463 •
*** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October 18th.
25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653; also Action Report PT 146,
Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0388, October 28th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 151, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0389,
October 29th, 1944o
264 CONFIDENTIAL
COM FIRST DIVISION
CONFIDENTIAL 0000 - 0100, October 25th
reply and perhaps (a) feeling that his position was precarious if he were
fired upon and (b) wishing to have his command in column to facilitate this
rejoining, he decided to return to base course 010°(T). At 0028 he changed
course eighty degrees to starboard by simultaneous ship turns* — which placed
his ships in column on northerly course— and at the same time told Commander
THIRD Section that he was (a) breaking off penetration (into the waters west
of Panaon) and (b) rejoining the Main Body.*
Also about this same time he received a voice radio message from
Commander SECOND Division (a) stating that illumination fire (starshells)
had been observed on bearing 200°(T) from his flagship (YAMASHIRO) and (b)
inquiring: "Are you mistaking BATDIV TWO (SECOND Division) for enemy?"*
He did not reply to this dispatch but instead made preparations to
rejoin. Meanwhile, at 0030, he heard the SHIGURE report to Commander SECOND
Division that the destroyer previously reported as enemy was friendly.*
He now changed course to port and headed on course of about 180° (T)
to bring him in astern of the SECOND Division (the normal station of the
MOGAMI was astern of BATDIV TWO). While on the southerly course he advised
Commander THIRD Section at 0037 that there were three motor torpedo boats
ahead,* Whether by this he meant the three motor torpedo boats which he had
just engaged or whether he referred to motor torpedo boats which had been
sighted between 0015 and 0018 off the southern tip of Limasawa Island is
not known.
At 0037 he increased speed to twenty knots,* and then at 0039 he
released his destroyers to form No. TWO Approach Formation,*
At this ^time he received a voice radio message from Commander THIRD
Section changing the distance "A" in No. TWO Approach Formation (Plate XX)
to 2,000 meters,* This was due to the weather which began to thicken,
reducing the visibility in general to an estimated 3,000 meters and during
squalls to "extremely poor".*
At 0045 he intercepted a voice radio message from Commander SECOND
Division to the MOGAMI asking, "What is your course?"* to which query the
MOGAMI, at 0048, replied, "We are following astern of BATDIV TWO".*
Then at 0049 he received a message from Commander SECOND Division
stating, "Our course 090°(T)".*
At 0057 he received a voice radio message, sent by Commander THIRD
Section, that the course at 0129 would be 040° (T) and at 0150 would be due
north.*
Meanwhile, in the MOGAMI, he continued to close at twenty knots in
order to reach his station (1,000 meters astern of the FUSO),
Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th,
1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
496799 O - 59 -27
265 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND DIVISION
CONFIDENTIAL OOOO - 0100, October 25th
The numerous messages which passed between the commanders of the
FIRST and SECOND Divisions at this time relating to course and speed,
indicate that (a) the Japanese radar may have been ineffective for surface
ship tracking, or (b) Japanese radar plotting was not comparable to the
Allied CIC (Combat Information Center) plotting.
Since the FIRST Division was now sufficiently close to the SECOND
Division to consider her for tactical purposes as having rejoined — at 0100
the MOGAMI was about 3,300 yards astern of the FUSO— the FIRST Division is
herewith dissolved and the activities of its former units will be discussed
under Commander THIRD Section.
(2) Operations of Commander SECOND Division, 0000 - 0100, October 25th.
Commander SECOND Division continued on course 065°(T) at eighteen
knots, still enjoying clear weather. Since the FIRST Division was not in
sight and its position not well determined, he, at 0003, notified Conmander
FIRST Division that his course was 065°(T).* Since he was also Conmander
THIRD Section he knew that (a) the FIRST Division expected to rejoin at
0115,* (b) Commander THIRD Section had queried Commander FIRST Division as
to the course of that division and (c) the latter commander had replied to
the effect that (1) the course of the FIRST Division was 010°(T) and (2) it
was "penetrating from now".* From these messages, as pointed out ui*der
"Operations of Conmander THIRD Section, 0000 - 0100, October ^5th", he could
estimate that the FIRST Division (a) was approximately forty- five minutes
behind schedule and (b) had not yet passed between Limasawa Island and
Taancan Point (Leyte) (for had it done so the course would have been about
090°(T)). What he thought of the "penetrating from now" portion of the
message is not known but it is doubtful if he realized that the MOGAMI was
about nine miles from the above passage. This seems so for a few minutes
later considerable confusion arose in identification.
At 0015 he knew that Commander THIRD Section had informed Conmander
FIRST Division that (a) he would pass the rendezvous point at 0035, (b) at
0043 his course would be 090°(T) and (c) his speed was eighteen knots.*
(It will be recalled that the rendezvous point was seventeen miles, bearing
250° (T) from Binit Point.)
This exchange of information was interrupted at 0018 when he
commenced receiving a number of contact reports from Conmander FIRST Division,
the first of which reports was on four enemy torpedo boats bearing 100° (T).*
The second, at 0023, was on a ship silhouette, apparently enemy.* This
latter report was amplified two minutes later to include the bearing
200°(T).* Almost simultaneously he received a contact report from the
SHIGURE of his own formation reporting an enemy destroyer on bearing
040°(T).» It will be recalled that the SHIGURE was about 2,000 meters ahead
of the flagship (YAMASHLRO). While the destroyer reported by the SHIGURE
may have been the YAMAGUMO (the southernmost destroyer of the FIRST Division)
the bearing and the fact that the MOGAMI which was much larger was but one
mile to the north, leads to the conclusion that the contact was likely on
the MOGAMI.
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801,
266 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND DIVISION
CONFIDENTIAL OOOO - 0100, October 25th
At this time the SHIGURE fired four starshells beyond the YAMAGUMO.*
The YAMAGUMO in turn fired starshells beyond the SHIGURE.** Both destroyers
were endeavoring to ascertain the character of their targets and to, at the
same time, search the surrounding area for other enemy forces.
Commander SECOND Division now, at 0027, received a query from
Commander FIRST Division as to his speed.**
Before he could answer he heard Commander FIRST Division, at 0028,
order a simultaneous ship turn to starboard of 080° (T),** and immediately
thereafter he knew that commander was breaking off his penetration (into
the waters west of Panaon) and rejoining the SECOND Division to reform the
THIRD Section.**
Promptly following receipt of the above information Commander SECOND
Division, after advising Commander FIRST Division that he had observed star-
shells on bearing 200°(T) from his flagship (YAMASHIRO) inquired: "Are you
mistaking BATDIV TWO FOR enemy?"**
Because of the starshell illumination it seems correct to say that
Commander SECOND Division must (a) have observed the illuminated units turn
to starboard in execution of the above eighty degree turn, (b) have recognized
them as units of the FIRST Division and (c) have realized from the messages
sent by Commander FIRST Division that that command had also recognized the
SECOND Division as friendly. Why then the query? The answer seems to have
been that immediately after having been illuminated by starshells and having
recognized the FIRST Division as friendly, Commander SECOND Division had
become concerned lest one or more units of the FIRST Division mistake the
SECOND Division for enemy and had thereupon directed that the foregoing query
be made.
However, before the ouery could be transmitted Commander FIRST
Division began transmitting the above messages. This forced the query to
follow rather than precede the FIRST Division messages.
At 0030 he was belatedly advised by the SHIGURE that the enemy
destroyer previously reported was friendly.**
At 0033, in order to facilitate the rejoining of the FIRST Division
by settling on the base course as early as possible, he changed the course
of the SECOND Division to 090 (T).**
At 0037, since he was also Commander THIRD Section, he knew that
Commander FIRST Division had reported "three enemy torpedo boats ahead of
Main Body" (SECOND Division).** Immediately thereafter he intercepted a
message from Commander FIRST Division to DESDIV FOUR that he was making
twenty knots.**
* Action Report PT 151, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0339,
October 28th, 1944.
** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th,
1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
267 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND DIVISION
CONFIDENTIAL OOOO - 0100, October 25th
At 0039 he intercepted Commander FIRST Division's instructions to
DESDIV FOUR releasing the destroyers to proceed to their positions in No,
TWO Approach Formation,* and finally also at 0039 he knew that Commander
THIRD Section had changed the distance in the No. TWO Approach Formation
to two kilometers,*
He now was probably pleased that he had settled on his course of
090° (T) earlier than planned because the sooner the THIRD Section was reformed
the more prepared he would be to encounter enemy motor torpedo boats*
At 0045 he queried the MOGAMI as to her course,* and three minutes
later received a reply to the effect that she was following behind RATDIV
TWO,* It will be noted that she did not indicate her location except in a
most general way.
He now, at 0049, advised Commander FIRST Division that the course of
the SECOND Division was 090° (T).*
At 0057, since he was also Commander THIRD Section, he knew that that
commander had advised the command that he planned to change course at 0129
to 040°(T) and at 0150 to 000°(T)o*
IT SEEMS WORTHY OF MENTION THAT, AT LEAST IN THESE LAND ENCLOSED
WATERS, JAPANESE RADAR WAS EVIDENTLY VERY POOR INDEED FOR NONE OF THE COM-
MANDERS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE THE LOCATIONS, COURSES OR
SPEEDS OF THE VARIOUS UNITS ENCOUNTERED, EXCEPTING BY VISUAL SIGHTINGS, WITH
OR WITHOUT ILLUMINATION, SUPPORTED ON OCCASIONS AS ABOVE, BY DIRECT QUERIES
OVER THE VOICE CIRCUIT. JAPANESE RADAR ALSO APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN INEFFICIENT
FOR NAVIGATION PURPOSES SINCE IT SEEMS HIGHLY PROBABLE THAT IT WAS NOT
EMPLOYED FOR THAT PURPOSE BY THE UNITS OF THE THIRD SECTION. THE COMMANDING
OFFICER SHTGURE STATED THAT HE DID NOT NAVIGATE BY RADAR BUT DEPENDED ON
VISUAL SIGHTINGS OF PROMINENT LAND MARKS SUCH AS MOUNTAINS AND THAT, WITH
THE VISIBILITY VARYING FROM ABOUT TWO AND ONE-HALF MILES TO FIVE MILES, HE
WAS OFTEN UNABLE TO SEE THE MOUNTAINS.** ALL OF THIS AUGURED ILL FOR
JAPANESE SUCCESS AGAINST ALLIED FORCES WHICH WERE EQUIPPED WITH EXCELLENT
RADARS AND WERE PROFICIENT IN ITS USE.
At 0100 the SECOND Division (YAMASHTRO) was bearing 149°(T), distant
approximately five miles from the southern tip of Limasawa Island.
At this point, since the FIRST Division was close enough to consider
her for tactical purposes as having rejoined the THIRD Section, the
SECOND Division is herewith dissolved and the activities of its former units
will be discussed under Commander THIRD Section.
* Detailed Action Report SHTGURE, Battle for Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** USSBS Interrogations of Japanese Officials, Nav, No. 79, Interrogation
of Commander Shigeru Noshino, ex-IJN, Vol. II, Page 347.
268 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL OOOO - 0100, October 25th
(B) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force, 0000 - 0100, October 25th.
At 0000 Commander SECOND Striking Force was about thirty-eight miles
astern of the SECOND Division on course 060°(T) at twenty-two knots and
zigzagging* He was proceeding in accordance with his SigOrd No, 147 with
the main exceptions that (a) he was in No, FOUR Approach Formation (Plate
XVI) and (b) his command was ready for twenty-eight knots immediately and
for maximum battle speed on fifteen minutes notice* Although his cruising
speed of twenty-two knots exceeded that of the THIRD Section^ eighteen knots,
he continued to zigzag employing the "X" method (actual speed 19»58 knots)
and, consequently, was not closing the THIRD Section materially.
At 0005 he made preparations for sudden gun and torpedo action.*
At 0025 he observed flares ahead,* These were starshells fired by the
FIRST and SECOND Divisions against each other in the waters south of Limasawa
Island*
At 0045 he passed the assigned patrol line of the Allied motor torpedo
boats between Agio Point, Bohol and Sipaca Point, Mindanao©
Although at 0047 he passed within eleven miles of the Camiguin PT station,
which was about one and one-half miles north of that island, he did not know
that there were motor torpedo boats on patrol in this area because he did
not make any radar or visual sightings at this time on any Allied ships.
His presence was likewise undetected by the five motor torpedo boats (PT,s
127, 128, 129, 130 and 131) then operating in the vicinity of this station©**
It seems likely that during this hour he received the dispatch from
Commander THIRD Section advising that he "was advancing as scheduled while
destroying enemy motor torpedo boats M0***
As a result of this dispatch and of Commander FIRST Striking Force's
dispatch 242145, he re-estimated the situation. He realized that he had not
made known his complete plans to any of those fleet commanders who were
vitally interested in the penetration into Leyte Gulf. He, therefore, pre-
pared a dispatch for release giving his planned operations from 0300 until
0900 the following morning.
At 0100 the SECOND Striking Force was about thirteen miles north of
Camiguin Island and still about thirty-four miles astern of the THIRD Section.
* Detailed Action Report DESDIV 18 (KASUMI), October 24th - 25th, 1944,
WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Action Report PT 127, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 4,
October 29th, 1944.
*** Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 242330 October 1944 to Commanders 1ST
and 2ND Striking Forces, Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No, 1
Operation, October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744©
269 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0000 - 0100, October 25th
CHAPTER IX - ALLIED OPERATIONS , 0000 - 0100, October 25th.
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2, (OTC), 0000 - 0100, October 25th.*
At midnight the weather in the northern part of Surigao Strait was
clear. The moon, which was in its first quarter, was setting (it set at
0007). Since the sky was partially obscured by clouds and no stars were
visible, the night was quite dark. Visibility without night glasses ranged
from two to three miles over the open water to almost zero against the
land. All ships were employing their radars to scan the strait in order
to detect any enemy forces which might have slipped through the motor
torpedo boat patrol areas farther to the south.
CTG 77.2 (who was also Commander Left Flank Force) in his flagship,
LOUISVILLE, anxiously awaited the first contact report on those enemy
forces which had been contacted and attacked by Allied aircraft that
morning in the Sulu Sea. He was somewhat concerned because (a) he had
received no information on them whatsoever and (b) he had originally
estimated that they could arrive at the southern entrance to Surigao Strait
at 1900 and now five hours had elapsed without any reports. Where were
they? Had they decided not to give battle and retired?
At 0026 his anxiety was relieved to the extent that he received his
first contact report. This report by PT 127, and which had been forwarded
by CTG 79.11, was to the effect that a contact had been made at 2310 ten
miles southeast of Bohol Island on three enemy destroyers and two large
unidentified ships, heading north***
From the plot of this contact he could see that the enemy at the time
of contact was roughly ninety miles away. He had difficulty interpreting
the course "north" because there was nothing to be gained by such a course
unless (a) the motor torpedo boats had made an incorrect course estimate,
which was quite possible, (b) the enemy employing Tokyo Express tactics
(CTF 77 in his action report referred to "Probably troop carrying ships"
in the THIRD Section)*** was moving troops into Leyte via the Camotes Sea,
or (c) he was delaying his movement to the eastward in order to synchronize
it with the movements of the force known to be in the Sibuyan Sea. He was
not too concerned as it was clear that, should the enemy be heading for
Surigao Strait, there was ample time to make any necessary changes in plans,
* All information here, except as otherwise indicated, obtained from
Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
** PT 127 TBS Voice Radio Message (date time group unknown) to
WACHAPREAGUE. (Relayed by WACHAPREAGUE to CTG 79.11 and by that
commander to CTG 77.2 and TG 79.11.)
*** CTF 77, Report of Operations for the Capture of Leyte Island
including Action Report of Engagements in Surigao Strait and off
Samar Island on October 25th, 1944, Serial 00302-C, January 31st,
1944; also CTF 77 Dispatch 230142 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT.
270 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL OOOO - 0100, October 25th
Therefore, he was not alarmed when the MC GOWAN at 0030 reported
several unidentified contacts bearing 175°(T), distant eight miles.
(Actually the bearing as sent was 193°(T).) Since the range of first
contact was but eight miles, CTG 77.2 realized that either the contacts
were false or were on something very small, probably on motor torpedo boats,
since these craft were operating as far north as Latitude 10°-17'N. He
awaited further evaluations.
At 0034 he intercepted a message from CTG 79.11 to COMDESDIV 108
directing that commander to form his group in the vicinity of Station SIX.
At 0038 he received another contact report, which he understood had
been relayed from PT 127, to the effect that contact had been made on two
targets bearing 310°(T), distant ten miles from Camiguin Island closing.*
The origin of the contact report cannot be fully determined. None of
the motor torpedo boats in the vicinity of Camiguin Island reported having
made it and nons of them have recorded it in their action reports.
Therefore, whether or not the report itself was actually made is not known.
However, it seems correct to say that it was made but, rather than being
an after midnight contact on enemy forces for relay to all comands, it was
instead a prior to midnight report on PT's 130 and 131 which it will be
recalled were closing the Camiguin PT's at that time in order to relay
through them the original 2310 contact. Surprisingly enough, at the time
(0038) CTG 77.2 received this report the SECOND Striking Force, consisting
of two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and four destroyers, was passing
about nine - ten miles to the north of Camiguin Island on course 065°(T),
Diagram"Dn. Thus, through what seems to have been a fortunate coincidence,
CTG 77-2 now had information of the presence of two enemy forces in their
correct locations for the times given (2310 and prior to 0038), although
he had actually contacted only one of them.
While the total composition of the above two forces was only four large
targets and three destroyers whereas he had expected two battleships, four
heavy cruisers, four light cruisers and ten destroyers he was able to
estimate that there was a probability that more enemy forces were present
in these two groups because the contact ranges were sufficiently great to
prevent detection of smaller targets such as destroyers, and possibly even
of light cruisers by motor torpedo boat radars.**
At 0040 he likely intercepted a message from CTG 79.11 to COMDESDIV 108
wherein CTG 79.11 (a) directed that commander to belay the order to form
his group in the vicinity of Station SIX and (b) advised that the enemy
was ninety miles away,***
*"~ PT 127 TBS Voice Radio Message (date time group unknown) to
WACHAPREAGUE. (Relayed by WACHAPREAGUE to CTG 79.11 and by that
commander to TG 79.11, CTG 77.2 and CTG 77.3.)
** Radar Bulletin No. 3 (RAD 3), Radar Operators Manual, United States
Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, August 5th, 1944
(Reprint March 1945), Part 4, Page 4-SG-12.
*** Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
271 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG- 77.2, COM BATTLE LINE and
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0000 - 0100, October 25th
At about 0045 he learned that the contact made earlier by the MC GOWAN
was believed to be friendly because the contact answered promptly. (He
therefore estimated that the contact was on an Allied motor torpedo boat
which was correct.)
From this time until 0100 all was quiet. He was now alerted to the
presence of the enemy in the Mindanao Sea; his command was also alerted;
he awaited further reports.
(1) Operations of Commander Battle Line, 0000 - 0100, October 25th.
At 0000 the battle line was steaming on course 0Q0°(T) at five
knots.* The ships of the battle line were primarily concerned with station
keeping during this time.
At 0029 the battle line turned to course 080° (T)* to compensate for
the southerly current.
During this hour Commander Battle Line received all of the relayed
contact reports made by the motor torpedo boats and therefore was familiar
with the developing situation. He took no special action.**
(2) Operations of Commander Left Flank Force, 0000 - 0100, October 25th,
At 0010 Commander Left Flank Force (CTG 77.2, who was also OTC of
the left flank forces) executed a turn of 180° to course 090° (T) to maintain
station on the MISSISSIPPI.*** The speed remained at five knots. The left
flank destroyers in turning followed the motions of the cruisers. However,
COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX was having difficulty in maintaining his formation due
to the cramping action of the left flank cruisers and the battle line.
Frequent adjustment of intervals between the three sections was necessary
to keep from embarrassing the larger ships.****
Commander Left Flank Force at this time gave no new instructions
to COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX concerning his station other than those contained
in his battle plan. Why this was so is not clear but it seems likely that
he realized that the fault lay within the flagship and would be corrected
when battle was imminent.
All contact reports were being repeated over the TBS voice radio
circuit to keep all ships informed of the enemy situation.
* Deck Log MISSISSIPPI, October 25th, 1944.
** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944.
*** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
**** Action Report COMDESRON 56, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0013, October 29th, 1944.
272 CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
and CTG 79.11
CONFIDENTIAL OOOO - 0100, October 25th
(3) Operations of Commander Right Flank Force (CTG 77.3), 0000 - 0100,
October 25th.
At 0000 the right flank cruisers were stopped and lying to on
course 090° (T) in order to adjust position on the battle line.* The right
flank destroyers were also lying to in their patrol station. At this time
the right flank forces found themselves out of position to the south.
Commander Right Flank Force now at 0014 commenced maneuvering on
northerly courses and at speeds varying from five knots to zero* in order
to regain station on the MISSISSIPPI.
He received all of the relayed contact reports made by the motor
torpedo boats and was therefore familiar with the developing situation.
He took no special action during this time.
IT SEEMS WELL TO POINT OUT THAT, IN ADDITION TO THE PRIMARY VOICE
CIRCUIT TBS, COMMANDER RIGHT FLANK FORCE HAD A MEDIUM FREQUENCY VOICE NET
(2748 kcs) TO COMMUNICATE WITH ALL HIS SHIPS. THIS CIRCUIT, CALLED TASK
GROUP COMMON, WAS EMPLOYED BY HIS CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS FOR ALL TACTICAL
INFORMATION. WHILE THIS INCREASED THE NUMBER OF CIRCUITS TO BE GUARDED
SINCE ALL SHIPS OF THE RIGHT FLANK STILL GUARDED TBS VOICE RADIO, IT (A)
ALLOWED ALL SHIPS OF THE RIGHT FLANK TO HEAR THE ORDERS AND MANEUVERS OF
THE RIGHT FLANK DESTROYERS WHEN LAUNCHING THEIR TORPEDO ATTACKS AND (B)
REDUCED THE NECESSITY OF EMPLOYING THE ALREADY OVERCROWDED TBS VOICE RADIO
EXCEPT ON THE HIGHER COMMAND LEVELS.**
At 0054 the right flank cruisers came right to course 075°(T).
At 0100 the right flank cruisers were in approximate position on
the MISSISSIPPI as provided in Battle Disposition A-2. The destroyers were
operating on a north and south line about two miles east of the Cabugan
Islands •
(B) Operations of CTG 79.11, 0000 - 0100, October 25th.
At 0010 CTG 79.11 intercepted a dispatch from the WACHAPREAGUE to PT 127
asking (a) the time of contact and (b) as to whether it consisted of two
destroyers and a number of unidentified ships.*** This was the first
information that CTG 79.11 had received concerning the eastward movement
of enemy forces. He was now anxious to hear the reply of PT 127.
* Deck Log PHOENIX, October 24th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
273 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79.11
CONFIDENTIAL 0000 - 0100, October 25th
At 0015 he intercepted the reply which was to the effect that a contact
had been made at 2310 about ten miles southeast of Bohol Island on three
enemy destroyers and two large unidentified ships headed north.*
At 0021 he repeated the contact report to CTG 77.2 and to his own
command.**
At 0030 he received a contact report from the MC GOWAN in Station FOUR,
reporting several unidentified radar contacts bearing 193° (T), distant
eight miles.*** At 0033 he received a second report from the MC GOWAN to
the effect that the radar contacts, which had been tracked on course 310°(T),
speed ten knots, had faded on bearing 188°(T), distant seven miles.***
He now grew concerned lest the enemy be nearer than he had estimated.
Therefore, feeling that his two attack groups should be formed immediately,
he, at 0034, directed COMDESDIV 108 to form his western attack group in the
vicinity of Station SIX and await instructions.** He does not appear to
have commenced forming his eastern attack group at this time presumably
because the eastern destroyers were not being interferred with by friendly
units and therefore concentration could be readily effected.
It seems likely that at about 0038 (when CTG 77.2 received it),**** he
received a report of a contact on two targets bearing 310° (T), distant ten
miles from Camiguin Island, closing in.***
At 0040, having re-estimated the situation and having decided that the
enemy was ninety miles away, he informed COMDESDIV 108 of this opinion and
directed him to return his destroyers to their assigned patrol stations**
(SIX and SEVEN).
At 0043 he advised his command of the Camiguin Island contact, referring
to it as the second contact report.**
At about 0045 he received word from the MONSSEN that, owing to an
engineering casualty, (a) her maximum speed was restricted to twenty-seven
knots until repairs could be effected and (b) she would require forty- five
minutes to effect repairs.**
At about 0053 he received another contact report from the MC GOWAN
reporting an unidentified radar contact on bearing 188°(T), distant eight
miles.***
* Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Surface Action in
Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 055, November i2th, 1944.
** Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
*** Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and
Defense of Leyte, P. I., including the Battle of Surigao Strait,
Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (J).
**** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
21U CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79.11
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL OOOO - 0100, October 25th
He immediately directed her to challenge the contact and to amplify
the report as soon as possible,*
The MC GOWAN challenged by voice radio procedure and was promptly
answered but was unable to identify the call. By about 0045 the commanding
officer had apparently decided that the contact was friendly. **
At 0100 the various units of TG 79.11 were in their patrol stations
ONE to SEVEN inclusive.
(C) Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats, 0000 - 0100, October 25th.
(1) Bohol and Camiguin PT's.
Prior to midnight PT's 130 and 131 had closed the Camiguin PT's
about three miles north of Camiguin Island. The Commanding Officer PT 130
went aboard PT 127 and at 0015 succeeded in having his contact report
transmitted to the base (tfACHAPHEAGUE).*** This report was to the effect
that three enemy destroyers and two large unidentified ships had been
contacted at 2310 ten miles off the southeast tip of Bohol Island, heading
north.**
It should be pointed out here that this contact report, which was
the first report received by CTG 77.2 on Japanese forces moving eastward
in the Mindanao Sea, was received by that commander at 0026.** Had PT's
130 and 131 not given this contact report to PT 127 it is likely that the
report might never have been received by the combatant forces.
After making this report the two Bohol PT's remained with the
Camiguin PT's and patrolled the area being patrolled by those motor
torpedo boats.
During this hour PT 152 of the Bohol PT's, which had separated
from PT's 130 and 131, continued at twenty- four knots to close the
Japanese SECOND Division but, for some unknown reason, was unable to get
nearer than five miles. Why this was so remains unclear for PT 152 did
not report any loss of speed and the SECOND Division was making good less
than eighteen knots. Could it have been (a) that PT 152 had contacted by
radar the SW Panaon PT's which, because of drift, seem to have been
returning to their station off Balongbalong or (b) a phantom? As PT 152
endeavored to close the enemy the commanding Officer at the same time
endeavored unsuccessfully to transmit his contact report. Because of this
and the need for medical aid for one of his men who had been seriously
wounded, he headed for the base at Liloan Bay,****
* Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and
Defense of Leyte, P.I., including the Battle of Surigao Strait,
Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (J).
** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 130, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 5,
October 29th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 152, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0399,
October 29th, 1944.
275 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(2) Limasawa PT's.
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
0000 - 0100, October 25th
At 0000 the Limasawa PT's were approaching the Japanese FIRST
Division to launch a torpedo attack on the port quarter of the large ship
(believed to be a battleship, but actually the MOGAMI), Diagram "E".
At 0015, when they had closed the range to 1800 yards, they
prepared to fire torpedoes. At this moment they observed that the MOGAMI
had turned on a searchlight and had commenced searching the sea to the
eastward of the boats but had failed to illuminate them.*
Possibly as a consequence of this activity by the MOGAMI, the
attack by the Limasawa PT's was poorly delivered. PPs 146 and 151 which
fired at about 0018, launched but one torpedo each. PT 146 's torpedo ran
erratically; PT 151' s made a normal run but missed, and PT 191 failed to
fire at alio*
The motor torpedo boats now maneuvered to fire again but were
driven off by a destroyer (YAMAGUMO) which was taking station in the rear
of the Japanese column. They were illuminated by the YAMAGUMO' s lights
and reported later that they had been fired upon by both the YAMAGUMO and
the MOGAMI* but this was incorrect— only the YAMAGUMO had fired.**
When the motor torpedo boats were illuminated by the YAMAGUMO they
turned to the right to a southeasterly course and increased speed in order
to evade her fire.
At about 0022, or approximately two minutes after steadying on the
new course, they changed course to the left.
During this time they continued to be under fire from the YAMAGUMO
which fire they returned.* Meanwhile (a) PT's 146 and 151 retired on
easterly courses*** while (b) PT 190, in an endeavor to fire an overtaking
shot with her torpedoes steadied on a northwesterly course. Although the
commanding officer in his action report states that "an overtaking shot
was not feasible due to the speed of the destroyers", this seems incorrect
as the Japanese FIRST Division was making but eighteen knots. (The real
reason was more likely the 0028 FIRST Division change of course to the
north). PT 190 now continued on her northwesterly course until she had
reached a position about four miles west of Limasawa Island.**** It
appears that, as the motor torpedo boats retired, they observed both the
starshell spreads fired by the Japanese FIRST and SECOND Divisions. PT 151
reported that the SHIGURE's spread was 400 yards astern of her. PT 146
thought that he had been fired on but this does not appear to have been
the case.***
*~ Action Reports PT's 151, 146 and 190, Night of October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serials 0389, October 28th; 0388, October 28th; 0398, October
30th, 1944, respectively.
Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
Action Reports PT's 146 and 151, Night of October 24th - 25th, 194!+,
Serials 0388, October 28th and 0389, October 28th, 1944, respectively.
Action Report PT 190, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0393, October 30th, 1944.
-K-H-
■JBHt-
#-*-#*
276
CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL OOOO - 0100, October 25th
IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT NEITHER OF THE THREE MOTOR TORPEDO
BOATS ENGAGED IN THIS ACTION WERE ABLE TO COMPLETE SUCCESSFULLY A CONTACT
REPORT EITHER (A) DIRECTLY TO A CONTROL SHIP OR (B) THROUGH A RELAY. PT 190
lost contact with the other two motor torpedo boats shortly after the action
commenced and, moving to the westward of Liraasawa Island, operated
independently the remainder of the night. PT 146 did not have radio
contact with his OTC (PT 151) during the action but was able to establish
visual contact later with PT 151 and they patrolled together to the
eastward of Limasawa Island. At this time Commander Limasawa PT's did not
know the whereabouts of PT 190 nor did PT 190 know the whereabouts of PT's
146 and 151.
At 0100 the Limasawa PT's were widely dispersed as shown on
Diagram "E"e
(3) SW Panaon PT's.
This section of motor torpedo boats continued drifting to the
westward in an area of occasional rain squalls during which time the
visibility remained low.*
However, this visibility was not always low for, at 0015, the
YAMAGUMO sighted the SW Panaon PT's and reported three of them on bearing
030° (T) at a range of five miles. As pointed out under "Operations of
Commander FIRST Division, 0000 - 0100, October 25th", this bearing was
more likely 080° (T). The SW Panaon PT's failed not only to sight the much
larger Japanese ships at this time (MOGAMI and three destroyers) but failed
also to make any radar contact on them whatsoever. It seems probable that
this was due to too much reliance on radars with a corresponding decrease
in visual alertness. At this point, from what occurred later, it seems
correct to say that the Commander SW Panaon PT's realizing that he had
drifted well to the westward — he may have got a radar range and bearing on
Limasawa Island — started back for his station off SW Panaon Island.
The visibility in the vicinity of the SW Panaon PT's now obviously
decreased again because (a) the Japanese were unable to sight them at this
time even with searchlights and (b) the SW Panaon PT's failed to sight
either the searchlights or the starshells which the FIRST and SECOND
Divisions fired at one another between 0023 and 0028. This may have been
due in part to the fact that the enemy was astern where the motor torpedo
boat lookout coverage perhaps was not so thorough as ahead.
At 0100 the SW Panaon PT's were bearing 235°(T), distant three
miles from Balongbalong, Panaon Island (Diagram "E").
Action Report PT 194, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0397,
October 29th, 1944; also Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the
Philippines, October 18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
277 CONFIDENTIAL
CON FI DENTIAL
(4) Other Motor Torpedo Boats.
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
0000 - 0100, October 25th
The operation of the motor torpedo boats other than the foregoing
were uneventful except for the following:
At 0027 PT 134 sighted what she thought were either flares dropoed
by a plane or starshells bearing 230° (T), distant ten miles from the
southern tip of Panaon and reported this sighting through PT 523.*
Actually, these were starshells which had been fired at each other by the
FIRST and SECOND Divisions. In some manner, the report was so delayed
that it was not received by CTG 79.11 until just prior to 0110#**
* Action Report PT 134, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial H-33,
October 27th, 1944.
W Action Report COMDSSDIV 103, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
278
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
THIS PAGE IS BLANK
279 CONFIDENTIAL
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CHAPTER X - JAPANESE OPERATIONS, 0100 - 0245, OCTOBER 25TH
(A) Operations of Commander THIRD Section, 0100 - 0245, October 25th,
Commander THIRD Section continued on course 090° (T) at eighteen knots
while the units which had comprised the FIRST Division were endeavoring to
obtain the approximate stations they would occupy in No. TWO Approach
Formation (Plate XX), scheduled to be formed presently.
Since he could plainly see that (a) the FIRST Division would soon
rejoin the SECOND Division thus reforming the THIRD Section and (b) there
was no necessity for radio silence because he had long since been
discovered by Allied motor torpedo boats which he could expect had
reported his location, course and speed, he decided that it would be wise
at this time to inform Commander FIRST Striking Force and Commander
SECOND Striking Force of his plans and problems. He did this because he
had learned through navigational plots that he was already about one-half
hour behind his original schedule and because he thought that the above
commanders should know, in addition, that (a) he had encountered very weak
enemy opposition— cotor torpedo boats only — which indicated that the enemy
was seeking information of his force rather than serious attacks at this
time, (b) the weather had been poor but was now improving which gave
promise of clearer weather in Surigao Strait and therefore he should not
be delayed by navigational difficulties, and (c) he had received no late
information concerning Allied forces in Leyte Gulf which implied a need
for information thereon, if it was available, and also indicated that his
own search planes had been unproductive.
At 0100 he advised both commanders of his plans as follows:
"Will pass through southern entrance of Surigao Straits at 0130 and
penetrate into Leyte Gulf. Several torpedo boats sighted but enemy
situation otherwise unknown. Weather: Some squalls but visibility
gradually improving,"*
THIS WAS A VERY IMPORTANT DISPATCH IN THAT IT ADVISED THE COMMANDERS
OF THE SITUATION IN THE WATERS OF THE EASTERN MINDANAO SEA AND GAVE THEM
AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE ANY CHANGES IN THEIR OWN PLANS THEY CONSIDERED
NECESSARY IN LIGHT OF THE RELATIVELY UNOPPOSED, ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT DELAYED,
PROGRESS OF THE THIRD SECTION,
It was an excellent example of mutual understanding. Commander THIRD
Section, although he had a fairly definite concept of the planned
movements of (a) the FIRST Striking Force, in that Commander FIRST
Striking Force expected to be off Suluan Island at 0900 that day** and
* Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 250100 October 1944 to Commanders 1ST
and 2ND Striking Forces, Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1
Operation, October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
** Commander 1ST Striking Force Dispatch 242145 October 1944 to 1ST
Striking Force, CinC Combined Fleet, etc., Detailed Action Report
MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October 18th - 25th, 1944, WDC
Document 160463, NA 12653.
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(b) the SECOND Striking Force, in that Commander SECOND Striking Force
expected to pass through the southern entrance to Surigao Strait at 0300
that day,* realized that he was not familiar with what additional
information these commanders had nor what changes in their plans they
might be contemplating 0
HE THEREFORE THOUGHT IT WISE TO KEEP THEM ADVISED OF HIS PROGRESS.
PERHAPS, HAD HE NOT ENCOUNTERED ENEMY MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS, HE MIGHT HAVE
DECIDED THAT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN RADIO SILENCE THAN TO
PROVIDE THE ABOVE INFORMATION. BUT SINCE HE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT
HIS PRESENCE, COURSE AND SPEED WERE KNOWN TO THE ENEMY, HE WISELY
CONCLUDED THAT RADIO SILENCE WAS UNNECESSARY.
Now, realizing that (a) he was approaching the southern entrance to
Surigao and (b) his command was too loosely deployed to form it into No.
WO Approach Formation immediately, he endeavored to expedite the movements
of his ships into their approximate positions in the above formation. He
felt it unwise to enter the narrow waters of the southern entrance to
Surigao Strait with his units out of position.
At this time the MOGAMI and DESDIV FOUR were rejoining separately.
From the reconstructed plot (Diagram "F") the former was about 3,200 yards
astern of the FUSO and the latter about 3,700 yards on the port quarter
of the YAMASHIRO. He therefore at 0100, also in order to assist his
ships in forming the new disposition, informed them by voice radio that
his position at 0129 would be seven point seven miles bearing 161°(T) from
Mt. Nelangcapan.** This position is roughly south of Binit Point. Since
his original schedule called for the THIRD Section to reach a point south
of Binit Point at 0100*** he was now approximately half an hour behind
schedule due to the adverse effect of the westerly currents encountered in
the Mindanao Sea. At 0103 he received word from C0MD3SDIV FOUR that DESDIV
FOUR was obliquely behind BATDIV TWO.** At 0112 he received word from the
MOGAMI that she was following astern of the FUSO** and was, by inference,
in position. Actually the MOGAMI seems to have been somewhat behind
station0
The visibility at this time, although improving, was still low,
particularly in the rain squalls. COMDESDIV FOUR therefore, at 0114,
alerted all destroyers to be prepared for torpedo action on short notice**
(in case of surprise attack).
* Commander 2ND Striking Force Dispatch 242245 October 1945 to Flag
DSSRON 2, etc., Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation,
October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, //DC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
*** Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 221155 October 1944 to CinC Combined
Fleet, COMCRUDIV 16, Commanders 1ST and 2ND Striking Forces, 5TH
Base Air Force, Main Force, SW Area Force, info Sandaken Air Base,
33RD Guard Unit, Detailed Action Report No. 13, DESRON 10, SHO
Operation, October 17th - 31st, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
282 CONFIDENTIAL
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Because of this low visibility Commander THIRD Section was unable to
sight the destroyers. Therefore, at 0115, he requested C0MD33DIV FOUR to
report his position in relation to the formation,* At 0118 he received a
reply from that commander that his flagship was bearing 350°(T) from the
YAMASHIRO, distant three kilometers, which implied that the battleships
were visible to the destroyers.*
At this same time (0118) COMDESDIV FOUR, who was steaming at twenty
knots, appears to have decided to close the battleships so that he could
keep them in sight in the event the visibility worsened. He therefore
headed toward the 0129 estimated position of Commander THIRD Section on
course about 104°(T), (Diagram "F").
At 0125, when the formation was about four miles west of the previously
announced 0129 estimated position, Commander THIRD Section changed the
formation course to 040°(T).* The new course would take the formation
into Surigao Strait, passing Panaon Island about one and three-quarter
miles abeam to port.
WHY HE DID THIS AT THIS TIME IS NOWHERE EXPLAINED BUT IT SEEMS HIGHLY
PROBABLE THAT HE HAD OBTAINED A RADAR RANGE AND BEARING ON MT. NELANGCAPAN
AND HAD DISCOVERED THAT HIS NAVIGATION WAS IN ERROR. He then had to
decide whether to continue on to his 0129 estimated position before he
turned northward toward the strait or to turn toward the strait now. He
clearly decided on the latter course of action, probably because the
weather conditions being low he wished to be in position to obtain a
navigational fix by bearings on Panaon Island.
At 0126 he intercepted a message from COMDESDIV FOUR to DESDIV FOUR
reducing speed to eighteen knots.*
Also at 0126 he received word that the NACHI, which was the flagship
of the SECOND Striking Force, had entered the radio telephone net.* He
now knew that he could communicate directly by voice radio with Commander
SECOND Striking Force. This was valuable information because Commander
SECOND Striking Force, who was his senior, was now in position to assume
overall command.
At approximately 0133 (the 3HIGURE action report gives the time as
0130 but the plot, based on all factors, indicates that 0133 is more
likely correct) he received a report from the YAMAGUMO which, with the
MICHISHIO and ASAGUMO, was maneuvering to take station in No. TWO Approach
Formation, that she had sighted a motor torpedo boat on bearing 010°(T).*
This was PT 137 which had lost contact with her section, had strayed into
the channel and was soon to encounter the YAMAGUMO.
Commander THIRD Section took no action in response to the above contact
report. This seems to have been because he realized that (1) he was being
tracked by the motor torpedo boats and (2) he could not afford to delay
his advance by operations against enemy motor torpedo boats, unless their
threat became serious.
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
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Also at 0133, since in the SHIGURE action report this item followed
the one above, he heard COMDESDIV FOUR by voice radio inform the SHIGURE,
which it will be remembered was leading the formation, that he was ready
to assume position in the aporoach formation.* This meant, of course,
that the SHIGURE was to vacate her station as it was to be occupied by the
MICHISHIO. Commander THIRD Section then, at 0135, directed that the
approach formation be formed.*
At 0137 he heard COMDESDIV FOUR increase speed of DESDIV FOUR to
twenty-one knots presumably to gain distance ahead of the YAMASHIRO before
taking station in the approach formation.*
While the above was progressing, PT 137 fired, at 0142, one torpedo
at the YAMAGUMO, which torpedo missed.** That this attack was not
observed seems clear for the YAMAGUMO does not appear to have made any
report thereon.
Some few minutes before 0148, Commander THIRD Section received
Co.Tjnander SECOND Striking Force's dispatch 250101 which was addressed to
all forces and gave in detail (a) the latter1 s schedule of penetration of
Surigao Strait and plan of attack in Leyte Gulf and (b) the number of days
he could steam at eighteen knots.*** He could see that tvds dispatch,
which is quoted in full under "Operations of Co-^r.ander SECOND Striking
Force, 0100 - 0245, October 25th", did not change Commander SECOND
Striking Force's time of arrival at the southern entrance to Surigao Strait
which, in his 242245 dispatch, had been given as 0300, but merely amplified
that dispatch to include his subsequent actions,****
From this dispatch he could conclude that (a) he was to enter Leyte
Gulf alone and (b) the Commander SECOND Striking Force, who was his senior,
did not intend to assume command or to move his force into a gun
supporting position with the THIRD Section, at least while penetrating
into Leyte Gulf,
He now at 0148 sent a radio dispatch to the units of the THIRD Section
advising them that the SECOND Striking Force would penetrate at 0300
following the THIRD Section.*****
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Action Report PT 137, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 11,
November 4th, 1944.
*** Commander 2ND Striking Force Dispatch 250101 to 2ND Striking Force,
Commander SW Area Force, etc., Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO
No. 1 Operation, October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005,
NA 11744.
**** Ibid., Coirmander 2ND Striking Force Dispatch 242245 October 1944 to
3RD Section.
***** Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 250148 October 1944 to 3RD Section,
Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation, October 13th -
28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
284 CONFIDENTIAL
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IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR WHY HE DID NOT EMPLOY VOICE RADIO SINCE ALL
OF HIS SHIPS WERE WELL WITHIN VOICE RADIO RANGE, AND SINCE, BY SO DOING,
HE COULD HAVE RECEIVED ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FROM EACH OF THEM LONG BEFORE ANY
OF THEM COULD HAVE RECEIVED AND DECODED THE RADIO DISPATCH. PERHAPS,
KNOWING THAT A RADIO DISPATCH WOULD BE INTERCEPTED BY THE PRINCIPAL
COMMANDERS, HE WISHED THEM TO KNOW THAT HE WAS PENETRATING ALONE.
Also at 0148 he increased speed to twenty knots in order to endeavor
to maintain his new schedule against the strong currents which, in view of
the adverse currents which he had found in the Mindanao Sea, could be
expected in Surigao Strait,* It was insufficient to recover the half hour
he had lost but it was the best he could do under the speed limitations.
From this time on it is assumed that the formation was formed, although
actually it was sometime before all ships were on station. This was, of
course, due to the low visibility which made it necessary for all ships
to proceed with caution.
At 0200 he (a) ordered a change of course to port to course 000°(T) to
be executed at 0202* and (b) received a contact report from the MICHISHIO
that a ship silhouette, apparently enemy, had been sighted bearing 320°(T),
distant eight kilometers.* Since the Japanese in this operation referred
to silhouettes as ships larger than motor torpedo boats, and since there
were no Allied ships other than the motor torpedo boats in the general
direction of the bearing, this must have been a false contact.
He took no action on this contact report but awaited amplification.
Meanwhile, it seems clear that he executed the course signal because the
motor torpedo boats in contact, reported him as being on a generally
northerly course after 0200.**
During the execution of this change of course he received at 0205 a
contact report from the ASAGUMO, second destroyer in column, that she had
sighted an enemy torpedo boat on bearing 300°(T),* However, before he
could take any action on this contact he observed that the SHIGURE, or one
of the two larger ships astern of the YAMASHIRO, had illuminated a motor
torpedo boat to the southwest and had opened fire. This was PT 134 which
was attacking singly and had closed to about 2,500 yards,***
During this latter action Commander THIRD Section noted that the
ASAGUMO, in illuminating her reported contact, had illuminated two
additional motor torpedo boats attacking from the same sector. The three
boats thus illuminated were PT's 490, 491 and 493 which were attacking in
line of bearing, distant 200 yards between boats. He also observed that
these boats were about 1,000 yards from the van destroyer, MICHISHIO,
which had promptly opened fire,****
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801,
** Action Report PT 493, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944,
*** Action Report PT 134, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
H-33, October 27th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 490, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
285 CONFIDENTIAL
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After sighting these boats he changed course by two emergency ship
turns to starboard of forty-five degrees; first, at 0207, to new course
045° (T), and second, at 0208, to new course 090° (T).* THIS ACTION WAS
CORRECT BECAUSE, WITH ATTACKS BEING MADE ON HIS PORT BOW AND QUARTER, A
TURN TOWARD THE ENEMY ON HIS PORT BOW WOULD TURN HIS FORCE INTO THE TORPEDO
WATER OF ANY TORPEDOES WHICH HAD BEEN FIRED FROM HIS PORT QUARTER WHILE A
TURN AWAY WOULD NOT ONLY INCREASE THE RANGE OF THE TORPEDO RUN AND THEREBY
AID HIS SHIPS IN OUTRUNNING THE TORPEDOES BUT WOULD ALSO GAIN MORE TIME TO
DRIVE OFF THE MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS BY GUNFIRE,
During these emergency turns Commander THIRD Section observed several
torpedoes within the formation, all of which were evaded successfully.
He also observed that under the gunfire of his ships all the torpedo boats
were retiring at high speed, and that one of them had been damaged. **
This was PT 493 which had received a direct hit.*** PT 490 had also been
hit, but only superficially, by near misses and shell fragments.****
As the motor torpedo boats retired beyond visibility, Commander THIRD
Section at 0211 changed course back to his base course of 00O°(T) by
simultaneous ship turns.* While his ships were still in the turn, they
detected a third group of motor torpedo boats to the southeast which they
promptly illuminated and took under fire. These were PT!s 523, 524 and
526 which, at this time, were about 2,000 yards away.***2* Commander
THIRD Section then, at 0212, ordered an emergency turn of forty-five
degrees to port in order to avoid any torpedoes.* This action was correct
for the motor torpedo boats, just prior to being illuminated, had fired a
total of six torpedoes at the MOGAMI, then in a change of course to
000° (T). It should be apparent that by this additional change of course
of forty-five degrees to 315°(T) Conmander THIRD Section would thereby
comb the torpedo tracks of these torpedoes fired directly at him. Although
it appears from Diagram "F" that the motor torpedo boats had anticipated
a change of course by the MOGAMI to about 045° (T) rather than to 315°(T)
and therefore the torpedoes would have missed anyway, there was no way
for Commander THIRD Section to know this. At this time Commander THIRD
Section observed that these motor torpedo boats, in a manner similar to
those previously sighted, had commenced retiring at high speed as soon as
they were illuminated and fired upon. He therefore, at 0213:30, returned
the command to base course 000°(T).* No further attacks developed.
The Japanese did not claim having inflicted any damage against this
group of motor torpedo boats. In this they were correct.
Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
Action Report PT 493, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No
October 26th, 1944.
Action Report PT 490, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No
October 26th, 1944.
Action Report PT 523, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
■fr*
**#
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**»-«*
Serial,
Serial,
286
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ALTHOUGH THE JAPANESE REPORTS DO NOT INDICATE THE METHOD OF DETECTION
OF THE MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS BUT IMPLY THAT THEY HAD BEEN SIGHTED VISUALLY,
THE MOGAMI REPORTED THAT, BY USING THE TYPE-93 HYDROPHONE, THE PROPELLER
NOISE OF ENEMY TORPEDO BOATS, TRAVELLING AT HIGH SPEED (TWENTY-SIX KNOTS)
COULD BE DETECTED WITH CERTAINTY AT A DISTANCE OF THREE TO FOUR KILOMETERS,
AND COULD BE HEARD MORE CLEARLY THAN THE JAPANESE TYPE-93 TORPEDOES.* HOW
MUCH THE RANGE OF DETECTION BY HYDROPHONE WAS DECREASED (A) WHEN THE MOTOR
TORPEDO BOATS REDUCED SPEED OR (B) WHEN THE LISTENING SHIP INCREASED SPEED
IS NOT GIVEN BUT IT HAS BEEN OBSERVED THAT AT A LOW SPEED OF APPROACH THE
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS WERE NOT DETECTED EVEN WHEN THEY HAD APPROACHED AS
NEAR AS 2,000 YARDS, AND IN SOME CASES AS NEAR AS 1,000 YARDS. IT IS
KNOWN THAT, WHEN STEAMING AT OVER FIFTEEN KNOTS, THE JAPANESE ECHO RANGING
APPARATUS COULD NO LONGER BE EMPLOYED AND RELIANCE WAS THEN PLACED ON THE
HYDROPHONES WHICH WERE EFFECTIVE UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS UP TO TWENTY-ONE
KNOTS.**
The THIRD Section was now well into Surigao Strait, steaming on course
000°(T), at twenty knots, and was almost in the center of the channel.
The ships were undoubtedly searching the darkness for further attacks.
During and after these encounters with the motor torpedo boats
Commander THIRD Section not only maintained No. YtiO Approach Formation but
through silence, gave tacit approval to an order given by COMDESDIV FOUR
to the YAMAGUMO that she remain in that formation.***
This opinion is based on the fact that at 0227 the Commanding Officer
YAMAGUMO asked COMDESDIV FOUR whether or not he desired the YAMAGUMO to
rejoin as she was in No. TWO Approach Formation.*** It is presumed by
this that the Commanding Officer YAMAGUMO meant "should he form column
astern of the ASAGUMO as called for in the projected battle formation, or
remain where he was?" To this query COMDESDIV FOUR replied in the
negative using the words "Hold present position."***
This fact, and the fact that he had issued no recent instructions
concerning the expectancy of battle in Surigao Strait, shows clearly that
he was not expecting to encounter opposition by major Allied naval forces
at this stage of the penetration.
It will be recalled, however, that on October 23rd he had instructed
his command that in case of encounter with enemy surface ships (especially
battleships) prior to penetration into the anchorage they were to open
fire with the present loading (high explosive shells).**** This implies
that he realized that, at sometime before reaching Tacloban Anchorage, he
might be intercepted by Allied heavy ships. Obviously that time had not
yet arrived.
*~ Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
** Commander 1ST Striking Force Standing Order 21 (December 18th, 1943)
Destroyer Doctrine and Procedure Part III, Torpedoes and Mines,
Subparagraph D, Regulations for Underwater Ranging, ATIS Document
39, Part IX, August 11th, 1945 (NACHI Document).
*** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
**** Ibid., Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 231730 October 1944 to 3RD
Section (3RD Section SigOrd No. 7).
287 CONFIDENTIAL
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At 0235, mindful of the fact that Commander SECOND Striking Force was
following some thirty miles astern of him and, if on schedule, would enter
the southern entrance to Surigao Strait at about 0300, and also mindful of
the fact that that commander probably had intercepted some, if not all, of
the voice radio messages and was therefore wondering what effect the Allied
attacks had had on the THIRD Section, he advised that commander by voice
radio that he had passed the lower entrance without damage although he had
been attacked by Allied motor torpedo boats.*
IN SO DOING COMMANDER THIRD SECTION INDICATED A HIGHLY COOPERATIVE
ATTITUDE AND A COMPLETE RECOGNITION OF THE FACT THAT IN NAVAL OPERATIONS
COORDINATE COMMANDERS SHOULD, IN SO FAR AS PRACTICABLE, (A) KEEP ONE
ANOTHER INFORMED OF THEIR POSITIONS, MOVEMENTS, INTENTIONS AND OF CONTACTS
WITH THE ENEMY AND (B) REPORT NErt INFORMATION OF THE ENEMY AND ANY DELAYS
OR MODIFICATIONS IN THE EXECUTION OF THE DIRECTIVE.
At 0245 the THIRD Section was five and one-half miles bearing 270°(T)
from Kotkot Island (off Dinagat Island) on course north at twenty knots
and was proceeding along the north and south axis of the channel.
Commander 3RD Section Voice Radio Message 250235 October 1944 to
Commander 2ND Striking Force, Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle
of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4),
NA 11801.
288 CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL 0100 - 0245, October 25th
(B) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force, 0100 - 0245, October
25th.
Commander SECOND Striking Force continued on course 060°(T), speed
twenty- two knots and zigzagging, toward the southern entrance to Surigao
Strait. His command was in No. FOUR Approach Formation,-* (Plate XVI).
At 0101 he transmitted by dispatch the plan which he had been working
on before midnight. This was to the effect that with the SECOND Striking
Force consisting of two large cruisers, one light cruiser and four
destroyers, he expected (a) to penetrate through the southern entrance to
Surigao Strait at 0300, (b) after passing the Dulag Area to operate
generally in a clockwise manner within Leyte Gulf, (c) to annihilate the
enemy during this sweep and (d) to retire arriving off the southern
entrance of Surigao Strait at 0900, at which time he expected to have
fuel remaining for forty-eight hours at eighteen knots.**
THIS DISPATCH IS OF INTENSE INTEREST IN THAT IT MAKES NO MENTION
WHATSOEVER OF ANY INTENTION ON THE PART OF COMMANDER SECOND STRIKING FORCE
(A) TO JOIN COMMANDER THIRD SECTION OR TO EVEN COOPERATE WITH THAT
COMMANDER EXCEPTING PERHAPS TO LEND SOME SUPPORT SHOULD THAT COMMANDER'S
OPERATIONS IN THE GULF BE DELAYED AND (B) TO JOIN OR COOPERATE WITH
COMMANDER FIRST STRIKING FORCE EVEN THOUGH HE KNEW THAT COMMANDER'S
COMTEMPLATED 0900 POSITION OFF SULUAN ISLAND.*** THIS LATTER THOUGHT IS
CONVEYED BY HIS CONTEMPLATED RETIREMENT THROUGH SURIGAO STRAIT PRIOR TO
THE ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST STRIKING FORCE OFF SULUAN ISLAND. COULD IT HAVE
BEEN THAT HE FEARED TO DO THIS LEST HE BE INCORPORATED IN THAT COMMAND BY
COMMANDER FIRST STRIKING FORCE?
IN EXTENUATION OF HIS ACTIONS IT CAN BE SAID THAT (A) HE HAD RECEIVED
NO ORDERS AT THIS TIME FROM CINC COMBINED FLEET DETACHING HIM TO THE FIRST
STRIKING FORCE AND THEREFORE HE MAY HAVE FELT THAT CINC COMBINED FLEET
INTENDED THAT HE CONTINUE TO OPERATE SEPARATELY AND (B) HE KNEW OF THE
PLANS FOR MOVING TROOPS FROM MINDANAO TO THE WESTERN COAST OF LEYTE TO
ARRIVE AT ORMOC AT 0400 ON THE FOLLOWING DAY (OCTOBER 26TH)**** AND ALTHOUGH
HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS TO GIVE DIRECT SUPPORT HE DID KNOW THAT IN HIS
MOVEMENT INTO LEYTE GULF HE WOULD PROVIDE INDIRECT COVER FOR THE MOVEMENTS
OF THE GUARD FORCE***** AND LIKELY FELT THAT HE SHOULD BE AVAILABLE
SHOULD HE BE NEEDED FOR DIRECT SUPPORT.
* Detailed Action Report DESDIV 18 (KASUMI), Battle off the Philippines,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Commander 2ND Striking Force Dispatch 250101 October 1944 to all SHO
Forces, Detailed Action ReDort BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation,
October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
*** Commander 1ST Striking Force Dispatch 242145 October 1944 to all SHO
Forces, Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations,
October 16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161641, NA 11839.
**** Commander Guard Force (COMCRUDIV 16) Dispatch 240556 October 1944 to
Commander 2ND Striking Force, CRUDIV 16, KINU, URANAMI, etc., (Guard
Force DesOpOrd No. 13), Detailed Action Report CRUDIV 16, SHO
Operation, October 17th - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
***** Commander SW Area Force Dispatch 231000 October 1944, War Diary
DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161638, NA 11739.
289 CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL OlOO - 0245, October 25th
At 0107 he passed the assigned patrol line of the Allied motor torpedo
boats between Agio Point, Bohol, and Sipaca Point, Mindanao,
He continued on without incident until 0117 at which time the light
cruiser ABUKUMA, third ship in column, reported a "probable enemy warship".*
THIS WAS A POOR CONTACT REPORT SINCE IT DID NOT GIVE THE BEARING, RANGE,
METHOD OF DETECTION, OR EVALUATION. WHILE COMMANDER SECOND STRIKING
FORCE'S REACTION TO THIS CONTACT IS UNKNOWN, THE FACT THAT HE CONTINUED
ONWARD WITHOUT DEVIATION INDICATES THAT HE HAD QUICKLY EVALUATED IT AS
FALSE. HE LIKELY REALIZED THAT HIS LOOKOUTS WERE NERVOUS AND WOULD MAKE
AND REPORT IMAGINARY SIGHTINGS.
It seems probable that prior to 0126 he had received Commander THIRD
Section's dispatch advising that (a) that section would pass the southern
entrance to Surigao Strait at 0130, (b) other than sighting torpedo boats
the enemy situation was unknown and (c) the weather was somewhat squally
but the visibility was gradually improving. SINCE IT TOOK HIM ALMOST
ONE-HALF HOUR TO RECEIVE THIS DISPATCH HE APPEARS TO HAVE FELT THAT IT
WOULD BE WISE TO ADVISE COMMANDER THIRD SECTION THAT HE COULD HEAR HIM ON
THE RADIO TELEPHONE NET, 'WHICH BY INFERENCE, MEANT THAT ANY DISPATCHES OF
IMPORTANCE COULD NOW BE MADE OVER THIS MUCH FASTER SYSTEM, FOR, AT 0126,
HE NOTIFIED THAT COMMANDER THAT HIS FLAGSHIP (NACHI) WAS ENTERING THE
RADIO TELEPHONE NET.**
From time to time as the ships of the SECOND Striking Force continued
on they observed flares ahead in the vicinity of the THIRD Section,* and
realized that that section was probably under attack.
At 0219 he issued orders to prepare for action.*
At 0235 he received a message from Commander THIRD Section by voice
radio to the effect that the THIRD Section had been attacked by rotor torpedo
boats during the passage into Suripao Strait but had received no damage.***
From this he could estimate that on his approach to Surigao Strait he
would likely meet no opposition other than motor torpedo boats.
At this same time he entered a severe rain squall in which the
visibility was extremely limited. He now, in accordance with his previous
plans, ceased zigzagging and increased speed to twenty-six knots.**** He
also issued orders to prepare for action and to be ready for maximum speed
at a moments notice.*
At 0245 the SECOND Striking Force was about thirteen miles southwest
of the southern tip of Panaon Island,
5 Detailed Action Report DESDIV 18 (KASUMI), Battle off the Philippines,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Commander 2ND Striking Force Voice Radio Message 250126 October 1944
to Commander 3RD Section, Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of
Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4),
NA 11801.
*** Commander 3RD Section Voice Radio Message 250235 October 1944 to
Commander 2ND Striking Force, Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle
of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717
(Part 4), NA 11801.
*#** Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off the Philippines, October
24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
290 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
THIS PAGE IS BLANK
291 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
THIS PAGE IS BLANK
292 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77*2
CONFIDENTIAL OlOO - 0245, October 25th
CHAPTER XI - ALLIED OPERATIONS, 0100 - 0245 . October 25th
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2, 0100 - 0245, October 25th.*
The wait for more information concerning the enemy1 s progress continued
as the units, in a modified condition of readiness, patrolled lazily in their
stations. The weather remained unchanged in this part of the strait, being
relatively clear, but dark.
The currents in the strait were variable in strength at different
locations but the southward direction was prevalent everywhere. These
currents affected station keeping in the battle line which was endeavoring
to maintain station along Latitude 10°-35'N.
At 0107 (actually it was 0110 ) CTG 77.2 received a report to the effect
that PT 533 (actually it was PT 523) had reported sighting three starshells
or flares bearing 230°(T), distant ten miles from the south tip of Panaon
Island and believed they had been dropped by a plane. He then plotted this
position and found that it was some forty-five miles nearer him than the
2310 reported position. From this he could infer that if the enemy surface
forces were in the vicinity of the starshells or flares they likewise were
some forty-five miles nearer him. Since it was an enemy capability to be in
that area at this time, he was necessarily forced to consider this capability.
This report by PT 523 was actually the relay of a sighting made by PT
134 at 0027.** However, since no time was given in the report, CTG 77.2 had
no way of knowing the time of contact. The location was auite accurate and
was, in fact, the encounter of the Japanese FIRST and SECOND Divisions,
which, as has been pointed out earlier, had fired starshells at one another
at this time.
THE ABOVE REPORT IS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE FRAGMENTARY INFORMATION WHICH
CTG 77.2 WAS RECEIVING AND INDICATES THE EXTENSIVE EVALUATION REQUIRED TO
MAKE AN INTELLIGENT ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY.
At 0149 (actually it was at 0147) he received another contact report from
a motor torpedo boat which reported the enemy at 0123 as bearing 140° (T),
distant two miles from Taancan Point, Leyte.* This report was in error in
that the contact had been made by LCI 70 rather than by a motor torpedo boat
and the distance should have been eighteen miles instead of two.*** THIS
WAS MOST UNFORTUNATE FOR THE CORRECT REPORT GAVE AN ACCURATE LOCATION OF THE
JAPANESE, WHEREAS THE ERRONEOUS REPORT MEANT NOTHING TO CTG 77.2, EXCEPTING
THAT IT INDICATED THAT PERHAPS SOME OF THE ENEMY UNITS WERE IN SOGOD BAY AT
THIS TIME. WHETHER OR NOT HE CONNECTED THESE UNITS WITH THE STARSHELLS AND
* All information here, except as otherwise indicated, obtained from
Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
** Action Report PT 134, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial H-33,
October 27th, 1944.
*** Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944*
293 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0100 - 0245, October 25th
FLARES REPORTED AT 0101 IS NOT KNOWN, BUT IT SEEMS UNLIKELY. THE ABOVE
ERROR WAS MADE ON THE LOUISVILLE FOR THE REPORT HAD BEEN TRANSMITTED
CORRECTLY BY CTG 79 .11* WHO WAS RELAYING IT FROM THE WACHAPREAGUE.
CTG 77*2 now observed that CTG 79.11 had commenced forming his two attack
units preparatory to launching his torpedo attack in accordance with his
previously announced plan. Although the reported enemy was apparently still
far away CTG 77.2 had no objection to this because it removed this command
from the middle waters of Surigao Strait through which the enemy was likely
to approach.
At 0204 he received from CTG 77.3 an important contact report from the
Commanding Officer PT 134 to the effect that one unidentified ship was
proceeding up the strait abeam of the southern tip of Panaon, which placed
it, therefore, less than forty miles away. This was evidently the van unit
or units of the Japanese forces. At 0208 he received an amplifying report
from the Commanding Officer, PT 134 who reported attacking a very large ship
with undetermined results. By plotting the 2310 contact and the above 0204
contact he could see that they were fifty- five miles apart, which distance
could be traversed at slightly less than twenty knots*
At 0210 he received a message from PT 134 wherein she reported that the
enemy had driven her off by gunfire. The situation now began to develop
rapidly. Just prior to 0225 he received a report (probably from a motor
torpedo boat) that two large ships were coming up the strait and had passed
the initial line of motor torpedo boats, for at that time, he notified
Commander Battle Line of that fact.* The initial line of motor torpedo boats
evidently referred to the first group at the southern entrance tc Surigao
Strait. The fact that two ships were present may have convinced him that the
force now in Surigao Strait was the original contact. He was puzzled to note
that the Japanese had their two larger ships in the van without a screen of
lighter ships.
At about 0226 he received word from CTG 79.11 tnat TG 79.11 was going
down (the strait) in a few minutes.
Upon hearing this he felt that it was very important to know as early as
possible whether or not there were more enemy ships coming up the strait
than the two reported. He, therefore, at 0229, reouested CTG 79.11 to ask
the motor torpedo boats "if any other targets are following the two ships up
the strait".
THIS QUERY ILLUSTRATES THE IMPORTANCE TO THE OTC OF ADEQUATE RECONNAIS-
SANCE AND ADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS NEITHER OF WHICH UP TO THIS POINT HAD BEEN
PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE. This is shown by the fact that as early as 0026 he
had received a report of two large ships and three destroyers off Bohol
Island at 2310 and, now, over two hours later, only the two large ships had
been reported. What had happened to the three destroyers? He appears, from
his query to have been of the opinion that the destroyers, and possibly other
ships were somehow astern of the large ships and had not been
* Action Report (DMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
294 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0100 - 0245, October 25th
located as yet. Actually this concept was incorrect for the four destroyers
with the THIRD Section were in the van* It was unfortunate that the motor
torpedo boats, which had tracked the THIRD Section between 0205 and 0212, had
not made more accurate contact reports for their information, even though
still incomplete, would have given CTG 77.2 and CTG 79*11 a much clearer
impression of the approaching enemy.
Also, at 0229, he received a report from the Commanding Officer PT 134,
relayed by CTG 77.3, which stated that the boat had struck a heavy object
in deep water, possibly an anemy submarine coming up the channel. This
report, although somewhat surprising, was clearly recognized as an enemy
capability© Its chief importance was that it alerted all commanders to the
possibility of enemy submarines,
AT THIS POINT CTG 77.2, WHO, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT TORPEDO REPLACE-
MENTS WERE NOT AVAILABLE AND IN FURTHER VIEW OF THE DEVELOPING SITUATION
ELSEWHERE IN THE VISAYAS AREA, HAD BEEN CONSIDERING WHETHER TO DIRECT HALF
SALVOS IN TORPEDO FIRE, DECIDED AGAINST IT ON THE SOUND GROUND THAT THE
DESTROYER COMMANDERS THEMSELVES WOULD BE BETTER ABLE TO MAKE THIS DECISION
IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO FIRING.
During this time he observed, from the voice radio, that the ships of
the battle line were having difficulty in maintaining station. This was
due, in general (a) to the slow speed and southerly current accentuated by
the darkness, and (b) to a lack of training, since the Marshall Islands
campaign, in station keeping in column or in lines of bearing within thirty
degrees of column.* He was seriously concerned about this but realized that
he could do nothing about it.
At 0231 he knew because of speed changes reported over the voice radio
circuit that TG 79.11 had commenced its attack.
At 0236 he ordered all ships to set condition ONE.** This condition,
known as General Quarters was assumed when action was imminent. All battle
stations were manned and alert, ammunition was ready for instant loading, and
the watertight integrity of the ship was as secure as possible.***
While this order may seem to have been issued prematurely since the ships
were already in a modified condition of Readiness ONE (ONE EASY) this is not
believed to have been the case. It must be remembered that (a) there were
still some unlocated enemy ships which had been unreported since 2310 and (b)
the command had been alerted some minutes earlier to the enemy capability
of submarine action. While CTG 77.2 stated later that he deemed it improbable
* Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle line), Battle of Surigao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November 24th,
1944.
** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B),
*** Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U. S. Fleet (USF 10A), United
States Fleet, Headouarters of the Commander in Chief, 1944, Part II,
Paragraph 2120.
295 CONFIDENTIAL
CTC 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL . 0100 - 0245, October 25th
that such a fragile craft as a motor torpedo boat could strike as solid an
object as a submarine without serious damage, it seems clear that he was
unable to discount this capability.
Meanwhile he awaited reports from both CTG 79.11 and COMDESDIV 108
concerning the situation in the lower strait. At 0241 he received his first
contact report from these commands. This was from the MC GOWAN which reported
one unidentified target bearing 184 (T), distant eighteen miles.* This
contact showed this ship to be about twenty-seven miles from the LOUISVILLE.
At 0244 he intercepted Commander Battle Line's order changing speed of the
battle line to ten knots.** He probably puzzled over this, but since he knew,
through interceptions of numerous battle line communications concerning
station keeping, that Commander Battle Line was having great difficulty in
maintaining his ships in correct formation, he decided to take no action at
this time. He likely felt that Commander Battle Line had found it necessary
to increase speed temporarily and would reduce speed once the situation had
clarified,,
Before this contact could be evaluated he received a report at 0245 from
the LOUISVILLE that she had made radar contact on an enemy force bearing
183°(T), distant 53,600 yards. From this great range he could evaluate the
contact as consisting of at least one large ship, probably a battleship.
This confirmed the motor torpedo boat reports of from one to two large ships.
It will be noted from Plate XVII that the Left Flank Force was out of
position in Disposition A-2 at this time. This matter will be discussed more
fully under "Operations of Commander Left Flank Force".
* Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and Defense of
Leyte, P. I,, including the Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 00103,
November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (J).
** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait. October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
296 CONFIDENTIAL
COM BATTLE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL OlOO - 0245, October 25th
(1) Operations of Commander Battle Line, 0100 - 0245, October 25th.
AS STATED BEFORE, THE BATTLE LINE WAS EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTY IN
KEEPING STATION AT FIVE KNOTS. CONSIDERABLE TIME WAS BEING USED ON THE TBS
VOICE RADIO TO TRANSMIT ROUTINE TACTICAL INFORMATION, BUT THE DANGER OF
COLLISION WAS EVER PRESENT AND THE VOICE COMMUNICATIONS WERE NECESSARY.
At 0151 Commander Battle Line reversed course by turn movement to
new course, 280° (T)0*
The various reports of contact were received by Commander Battle
Line© After the report that several large ships were passing through the
strait had been received, he ordered his ships to General Quarters at 0233***
At 0240 he changed course to 270° (T). The effect of the current
seemed to be lessening as the battle line approached the western end of its
patrol line.
At 0241 he received the first report of radar contact© This was made
by the MC GOWAN by voice radio and placed the enemy about thirty-one miles
to the south. Commander Battle Line then, at 0244, increased speed to ten
knots presumably to assist his ships to gain their correct positions in the
battle line.
At 0245 the guide of the battle line was bearing 090 (T), distant
14,000 yards from Hingatungan Point.
(2) Operations of Commander Left Flank Force, 0100 - 0245, October 25th.
At 0101 Commander Left Flank Force executed turn to course 070° (T)
in order to maintain station on the battle line.
At this time he observed that his left flank destroyers (DESRON
FIFTY-SIX), due to being squeezed between the left flank cruisers and the
battle line, were having difficulty in maintaining their formation (line of
bearing 000°-180°(T) of attack section guides with interval of 2,000 yards )»
THIS WAS BECAUSE THE LEFT FLANK FORCES WERE NOT IN THEIR CORRECT
POSITION FOR BATTLE DISPOSITION A-2. IT WILL BE SHOWN LATER THAT THE LEFT
FLANK CRUISERS WERE NEARLY ALWAYS OUT OF POSITION THROUGHOUT THIS ENGAGEMENT
DUE, IN PART, TO THE FACT THAT THE TWO SEARCH RADARS ON THE LOUISVILLE (ONE
OF WHICH WAS BEING EMPLOYED BY CTG 77.2, THE OTHER BY THE LOUISVILLE) WERE
BEING CONCENTRATED DOWN THE STRAIT, AND STATION KEEPING, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY,
HAD BEEN FORCED INTO A SECONDARY ROLE;*** IN PART, AS WILL BE SHOWN LATER,
* Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of Surigao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November 24th,
1944.
** Action Report COMBATDIV 4, Battle of Surigao Strait, Night of October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0235, November 8th, 1944.
*** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
496799 o- s, -29 297 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL OlOO - 0245, October 25th
TO THE FACT THAT THE SPEED OF THE BATTLE LINE WAS NOT MAINTAINED AT FIVE
KNOTS AS ORDERED; IN PART, TO THE SOUTHERLY CURRENTS WHICH TENDED TO SET
THE CRUISERS TOWARD HIBUSON ISLAND, AND, IN PART, TO THE DESIRE OF COMMANDER
LEFT FLANK FORCE TO REMAIN WEST OF HIBUSON ISLAND. WHILE THE REASONS FOR
REMAINING TO THE WESTWARD OF HIBUSON ISLAND ARE NOWHERE EXPLAINED, IT SEEMS
LIKELY THAT WHEN THE DISPOSITION WAS IN THE EASTERN LIMIT OF ITS PATROL,
COMMANDER LEFT FLANK FORCE WAS BOTHERED BY HIBUSON ISLAND AND DECIDED TO
REMAIN TO THE WESTWARD IN ORDER TO FACILITATE HIS FUNCTIONS AS OFFICER IN
TACTICAL COMMAND. THIS WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL TACTICAL
INSTRUCTIONS WHICH PRESCRIBED THAT AT NIGHT AND DURING PERIODS OF LOW
VISIBILITY STATION UNIT GUIDES SHOULD MAINTAIN STATION AS ACCURATELY AS
POSSIBLE.* WHILE THE REASONS FOR IT ARE UNDERSTANDABLE, THEY ARE NOT
NECESSARILY CORRECT FOR CTG 77.2 «S BATTLE PLAN WAS DESIGNED, IN PART, (A)
TO GIVE FREEDOM OF ACTION TO THE LEFT FLANK FORCES FOR RAPID MOVEMENT TO THE
EASTWARD IN THE EVENT THE ENEMY ATTEMPTED TO ENTER LEYTE GULF FROM THE EAST
AND (B) TO EXPEDITE INTERCEPTION SHOULD ENEMY FAST UNITS MOVE UP THE EASTERN
SHORE OF THE STRAIT TO THE EASTWARD OF HIBUSON ISLAND. THE TENDENCY TO
REMAIN TO THE WESTWARD OF HIBUSON ISLAND MIGHT DELAY SUCH INTERCEPTIONS AS
MUCH AS TWENTY MINUTES. ALL OF THIS WAS WELL KNOWN TO CTG 77,2, WHO DECIDED
THAT THEY WERE OF LITTLE CONSEQUENCE WHEN COMPARED WITH HIS RESPONSIBILITIES
AS OTC.
As a result of this squeezing effect, COMDSSRON FIFTY-SIX at 0105
formed the three attack sections into a single column, with Attack Section
TWO (COMDESDIV 112) in the van, Attack Section ONE (COMDSSRON FIFTY-SIX)
in the center and Attack Section THREE (Commanding Officer HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS)
in the rear,,** He took station initially about 1,000 yards due north of the
LOUISVILLE but, as is shown in Plate XVII, this relative position did not
long obtain owing to the fact that the left flank cruisers did not maintain
their correct station on the battle line, whereas COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX
endeavored to do so. ACTUALLY THIS WAS AN ANOMALOUS SITUATION FOR THEORETI-
CALLY HE SHOULD HAVE MAINTAINED STATION ON THE LEFT FLANK CRUISERS SINCE THE
BATTLE DISPOSITION WAS DESIGNED TO MAKE THE MOST EFFECTIVE USE OF THE FLANK
FORCES AND, IF THE RELATIVE POSITIONS AS PROVIDED IN DISPOSITION A-2 WERE
NOT MAINTAINED, THE EFFICACY OF THE DISPOSITION MIGHT BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED.
At 0144 Commander Left Flank Force, because he was being set down
on Hibuson Island, changed course to 050°(T)*** to avoid the island and to
regain correct station on the battle line. This change of course tended to
crowd the battle line even more and shows the ill effects that currents in
narrow waters can have on station keeping.
* General Tactical Instructions, United States Navy (FTP 188), Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, Division of Fleet Training, 1940, Chapter
VII, Section 42, Paragraph 711.
** Action Report COMDESRON 56, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0013, October 29th, 1944.
*** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
298 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL OlOO - 0245, October 25th
Commencing at 0149 Commander Left Flank Force began receiving contact
reports on the enemy as recorded under "Operations of CTG 77<>2, 0100 - 0245,
October 25th".
At 0216 he changed course to port to new course 280°(T), presumably
choosing the latter course because the battle line was also on that course.
Unfortunately the left flank forces were still out of position with relation
to the battle line.
At 0234, realizing this, he changed course to 270° (T) to increase
gradually the distance between his cruisers and the battle line. However,
the maneuver was ineffective because, shortly thereafter, the battle line
also changed course to 270° (T).
At 0236 his left flank forces set Condition ONE in accordance with
orders from CTG 77.2.
At 0241 he received a TBS voice radio contact report from the MC GOWAN
reporting one unidentified surface contact on bearing 184°(T), distant
eighteen miles. This place the enemy about twenty-seven miles from the
LOUISVILLE.
At 0244 he intercepted an order from Commander Battle Line to the
battle line increasing speed to ten knots.
At this point he should have endeavored to regain the correct station
on the MISSISSIPPI but, except for minor adjustments, he seems to have pre-
ferred to remain in his present position.
At 0245 the LOUISVILLE made the first radar contact in the left flank
forces on bearing 183° (T), distant 53,600 yards0* The long range of initial
detection indicated that this contact was one or more large ships, probably
of the battleship type.
At this time the LOUISVILLE was bearing 109° (T), distant about eleven
miles from Hingatungan Point and bearing 073 (T), distant eight and three-
quarters miles from Cabugan Grande Island.
Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao Strait,
Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0045, November
7th, 1944.
299 CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FUNK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL OlOO - 0245, October 25th
(3) Operations of Commander Right Flank Force (CTG 77.3), 0100 - 0245,
October 25th.
The right flank cruisers and right flank destroyers continued to
operate independently of each other; the former maintained station on the
battle line and the patter patrolled a north-south line east of the Cabugan
Islands*
The various contact reports received and recorded under CTG 77.2 were
being received by the right flank forces*
At 0226 Commander Right Flank Force was surprised hear over TBS voice
radio that CTG 79*11 was about to attack* In his action report* he made the
following statement: "This was the first intimation I had that additional
destroyers were present* From calls used they appeared to be Commander
Destroyer Souadron FIFTY-FOUR in REMEY, MONSSEN, MC GOWAN and MC DERMUT with
Commander Destroyer Division 108* I did not know where or in what disposition
they were."* THIS WAS A REMARKABLE STATEMENT AND IMPLIES THAT CONSIDERABLE
CONFUSION WAS PRESENT IN HIS FLAGSHIP AT THIS TIME.
Why this was so is nowhere explained, but the fact that it was so
with relation to TG 79.11 seems astonishing. CTG 77.3 (as COMCRUDIV FIFTEEN)
was (a) on the distribution list for CTF 79* s Operation Plan which provided
for destroyer screens in this area,** (b) his cruisers had passed on several
occasions through Patrol Stations SIX and SEVEN forcing the MC DERMUT, which
was not in his command, to maneuver to clear the cruiser formation,*** (c)
he should have received CTG 79.11's battle plan by voice radio froa CTG 79.11
as he was an information addressee,**** (d) he had heard CTG 79.11 discussing
his plans and issuing orders via the voice radio during the period preceding
the attack, and finally (e) HIS FUG PLOT LIKELY MAINTAINED A CURRENT SUMMARY
PLOT OF ALL FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE VICINITY SINCE THIS WAS NOT ONLY COMMON
SENSE BUT ALSO DOCTRINE FOR COMBAT INFORMATION CENTERS. INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDED
THAT THESE CENTERS "WERE CHARGED WITH THE FUNCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY OF
KEEPING THE COMMANDING OFFICER AND HIGHER COMMANDS EMBARKED INFORMED OF THE
LOCATION, IDENTITY, AND MOVEMENT OF FRIENDLY AND/OR ENEMY AIRCRAFT AND SURFACE
SHIPS WITHIN THE AREA."*****
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944.
** C0M3RDPHIBF0R Attack Plan No. A304-44, No Serial, October 2nd, 1944,
Annex I*
*** Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
**** Action Report CTG 79»11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao Strait,
Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055, November
12th, 1944.
***** Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U. S. Fleet (USF 10A), United
States Fleet, Headauarters of the Commander in Chief, 1944, Part VI,
Paragraph 6142*
300 CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0100 - 0245, October 25th
Once CTG 77.3 had learned that CTG 79.11 was attacking he evidently-
spotted by radar the attacking destroyers of the Western Attack Group moving
south and thereafter plotted easily the progress of their attack for he made
the paradoxical statement in his action report, "It was easy to follow
movements of own and enemy forces and to maintain a comprehensive understand-
ing of the developing situation. •**
At 0240 he received a contact report from the MC GOWAN that she had
contacted one unidentified surface ship bearing 184 (T), distant eighteen
miles.**
At this same time, because the right flank cruisers were at the
westernmost point of the patrol and were, therefore, just north of Cabugan
Grande Island, he changed course to 075° (T) and then stopped in order to
adjust position in relation to the disposition guide**
At this time also the right flank destroyers under COMDESRON TWENTY-
FOUR in the HUTCHINS were approaching the southern end of their patrol*
COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR, noting by radar and by TBS voice radio that
the western attacking unit of TG 79.11 was heading southward to attack and
was at 0242 but 8,200 yards to the north (from MC DERMUT to BEALE), decided
that his sauadron might interfere with this attack and, therefore, hoping
to avoid this, changed course to the westward to 290°(T) and increased speed
to ten knots***
At 0245 the PHOENIX was bearing 035° (T), distant about four miles
from the northeastern tip of Cabugan Grande Island and the HUTCHINS was two
miles east of Bugho Point (Leyte).
* Action Report CTG 77*3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Force, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944.
** Ibid., Enclosure (C).
301 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79.11
CONFIDENTIAL 0100 - 0245, October 25th
(B) Operations of CTG 79.11, 0100 - 0245, October 25th.
Probably due to his position farther south than most of the Allied
forces, CTG 79.11 could now clearly hear the motor torpedo boat contact
reports. HE DID NOT GUARD THE PT BOAT COMMON (3120 kcs), BUT LIKE ALL
SURFACE UNITS, GUARDED THE LOCAL AIR WARNING NET (3115 kcs), AND IT WAS
ON THIS CIRCUIT THAT HE HEARD THE REPORTS. IN SOME CASES, HE WAS ABLE TO
COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH THE MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS WITH THIS FREQUENCY
ARRANGEMENT.*
At 0110 he relayed to CTG 77.2 a report, just received from PT 533
(actually it was PT 523 which was relaying a contact report made by PT 134),
to the effect that she had sighted three starshells or flares, distant ten
miles, bearing 230°(T) from the southern tip of Panaon Island, and that she
believed the flares to have been dropped by a plane.* It is assumed that
he, realizing that communication delays incident to voice radio relays were
being encountered, estimated that this contact had been made some time
earlier. Actually, it had been made at 0027, and was fairly accurate.
At 0147 CTG 79.11 forwarded to CTG 77.2 a contact report which he had
received at 0130 from the WACHAPREAGUE to the effect that LCI 70 had reported
having contacted at 0123 a surface unit bearing 140<>(T), distant eighteen
miles from Taancan Point, Leyte.** This contact which was on the THIRD
Section was quite accurate.
As a result of these two contacts CTG 79.11 re-estimated the situation.
While he does not explain his thought processes, it seems clear from his
later actions that at this time he decided that the enemy, which was now
some forty miles away, was en route to Surigao Strait, and shortly would
pass the southern entrance. However, he did not know of the eastward move-
ment of the FIRST Striking Force toward San Bernardino Strait.* He estimated
that the enemy planned to annihilate the anchored transports and probably
to bombard Allied shore installations and, in order to accomplish this
effectively, would move up the strait to Kanihaan Island; would then change
course to 340° (T) and would head directly for the transport area on this new
course. He further estimated that the enemy would be on this course during
his torpedo attacks.*
This was a surprisingly good estimate since Commander THIRD Section's
original plan called for passing through the southern entrance to Surigao
Strait and then, when he could head for Tacloban Anchorage directly, to
change course to 350°(T).***
* Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao Strait,
Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055, November
12th, 1944.
** Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
*** Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 221155 October 1944 to All SHO Forces,
War Diary DESRON 10, October 1944, WDC Document 161638, NA 11739.
302 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79.11
CONFIDENTIAL OlOO - 0245, October 25th
Whether or not CTG 79.11 considered the possibility that these ships
might be attempting a "Tokyo Express" run is not known, but it seems
probable that he gave this concept consideration for the MC GOWM stated
that this was a "Tokyo Express" run,* and CTF 77 later expressed the same
idea,**
As a result of this estimate CTG 79.11 decided that he should prepare
his command for this enemy attack and, therefore, at 0155, commenced
forming his Eastern Attack Group by directing the MELVTN, in Station THREE,
to form astern of the MC GOWAN in Station FOUR. This was an important
decision because the MELVIN, if on station, could not at any time be nearer
to the MC GOWAN than six miles and might even be as far away as twelve
mileso Thus, she would reouire from about fifteen to thirty minutes to
join the MC GOWAN.
Just after this, at 0157, CTG 79*11 received a contact report from PT
134; this one to the effect that an unidentified ship was proceeding up the
strait and was abeam of the southern tip of Panaon Island.*** Although he
did not know it, this contact had originally been made at 0116, but included
information which was much more recent. The portion concerning passing
abeam of the southern tip of Panaon Island must have been obtained between
0148 and 0154 because these times are those at which the MICHISHIO and the
MOGAMI, respectively, passed abeam of the southern tip (Diagram "F").
At 0203 he received a second contact report from PT 134 to the effect
that she had sighted a large ship and had attacked with undetermined results.
At 0206 he set Condition ONE and prepared to make maximum speed. He
now decided to form both attack groups and, at 0209, issued preparatory
instructions to the MC GOWAN and MELVTN to close the REMEY, which had
commenced moving to a position about one mile south of Station FOUR,***
(Plate XVIII ). Meanwhile, the MONSSEN took station astern of the MC DERMUT
in Station SEVEN to form the Western Attack Group under command of COMDESDIV
10£ in MC DERMUT.
CTG 79.11 NOW LIKELY CONDEMNED THE INCOMPLETENESS OF HIS INFORMATION
CONCERNING THE ENEMY BECAUSE IT MADE HIS ATTACK PROBLEM MORE DIFFICULT THAN
SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE CASE. WHILE THE DATA RECEIVED FROM THE MOTOR TORPEDO
BOATS AND LCI 70 WAS OF VALUE IN THAT IT LOCATED A PORTION OF THE ENEMY,
IT WAS OF LITTLE ATTACK VALUE, IN THAT IT OMITTED, IN GENERAL, THE COMPOSI-
TION, COURSE, SPEED AND FORMATION OF THE ENEMY, EARLY RECEIPT OF WHICH
* Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and Defense
of Leyte, Philippine Islands, including the Battle of Surigao Strait,
Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944.
** Action Report CTF 77, Report of Operation for the Capture of Leyte
Island, including Action Report of Engagements in Surigao Strait and
off Samar Island on October 25th, 1944, Serial 00302-C, January 31st,
1945.
*** Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao Strait,
Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055, November
12th, 1944.
303 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79,11
CONFIDENTIAL 0100 - 0245, OctoDer 25th
WOULD HAVE FACILITATED THE PRELIMINARY SOLUTION OF HIS ATTACK PROBLEM. HE
WOULD NOW HAVE TO OBTAIN THIS ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ORIGINALLY FROM HIS OWN
RADARS DURING THE LIMITED TIKE OF HIS HIGH SPEED APPROACH.
At 0217 he directed his ships to report immediately by TBS voice radio
any radar contact on the enemy.
At 0220 he received Commander Western Attack Group's torpedo attack plan
which prescribed (a) broadside fire to port, (b) individual target plan and
(c) column counter march retirement. Since the above torpedo firing plan
was in accordance with his instructions, issued some six hours earlier (at
2018), and since he made no comment thereon to COMDESDIV 108, it is assumed
that this plan was satisfactory.
In connection with this plan, Commander Western Attack Group stated
later* that his basic attack plan, which he had made known to his flag
captain as early as 2130, was as follows: (a) in order to gain protection
against radar detection, to go down the strait remaining within 1500 - 2000
yards of the shore line, (b) in order to reach a firing point fifty degrees
on the enemy's port bow, distant 7500 yards, to turn sharply toward the
enemy at the time reouired by his own plot and fire from this point and (c)
to retire to the west and north. He further stated that under no circum-
stances, other than the imminent danger of destruction, would he fire
torpedoes until within intermediate range; however, he did not plan to
approach any closer than this range.
THE ABOVE ATTACK PLAN SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SOUND AND IN ACCORDANCE NOT ONLY
WITH THE ACCEPTED DOCTRINE FOR NIGHT TORPEDO ATTACK, BUT ALSO WITH CTG 77.2«s
INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAIN CLOSE TO THE SHORE IN ATTACKING AND ON RETIRING. THE
FIRING POINT OF FIFTY DEGREES WAS WITHIN THE AREA (50° to 80°) WHEREIN THE
PROBABILITY OF HITS WAS GREATEST AND 7500 YARDS WAS WITHIN THE EFFECTIVE
FIRING RANGE FOR A TARGET OPERATING AT SPEEDS UP TO TWENTY KNOTS. HOWEVER,
THE RESERVATION, THAT COMMANDER WESTERN ATTACK GROUP DID NOT CONTEMPLATE
CLOSING THE ENEMY CLOSER THAN 7500 YARDS, WAS NOT SOUND BECAUSE IT DID NOT
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE FACT THAT (A) HIS COMMAND MIGHT NOT dE DETECTED BY
THE JAPANESE AND (B) MIGHT FIND JAPANESE GUNFIRE INEFFECTUAL IN WHICH CASE
THE ATTACK GROUP COULD CLOSE TO A HIGH SPEED TORPEDO (FORTY-FOUR AND ONE-
HALF KNOTS) FIRING POINT (BELOW 6000 YARDS) 'WHICH WOULD HEAVILY INCREASE
HIS PROBABILITY OF HITS.**
At 0225 CTG 79oll advised CTG 77.2 that he was "going to start down in a
few minutes".***
* Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
** Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-43, Destroyer Torpedo Attack Instructions,
issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific Fleet, Serial 01264, October
24th, 1943.
*** Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao Strait,
Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055, November
12th, 1944.
304 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79»11
CONFIDENTIAL OlOO - 0245, October 25th
At 0226 he intercepted a report from CTG 77»2 to Commander Battle line
to the effect that two ships were coming up the strait and had passed the
initial line of motor torpedo boats.
At 0228 the MC GOWAN and MELVIN, having closed the REMEY, he directed
them to form column on the REMEY in that order, distance 500 yards, speed
fifteen knots,* thus forming the Eastern Group0
At 0229 he was advised by Commander Western Attack Group, which was on
course 170° (T), speed fifteen knots, that he was "starting down",** At the
same time he received a directive from CTG 77.2 to inouire of the motor
torpedo boats if any other targets were following the two ships up the
strait.
At about this time it seems probable that both Commander Western Attack
Group and Commander Eastern Attack Group received a report from the Command-
ing Officer PT 134 that he had hit a heavy metallic object with his screws
which he thought was a submarine. Since there is no record of this message
in either commanders log it seems correct to say that neither commander
gave it serious consideration. This was the correct action for the possible
presence of submarines in Surigao Strait had long been considered by the
units of TF 79 and it was for that reason that CTG 79«H had been given a
screening assignment in that strait. However, despite this, he had been
authorized to attack by CTG 77»2 and it was now the responsibility of that
commander to change his orders©
AT 0230 HE DIRECTED THE MC GOWAN AND MELVIN TO MAKE TWENTY KNOTS AND TO
FOLLOW HIM. THUS HE INDICATED THAT HE PLANNED TO EMPLOY FOLLOW-THE- LEADER
TACTICS WHICH WAS STANDARD DESTROYER PRACTICE.*** THESE TACTICS, AS POINTED
OUT UNDER " OPERATIONS OF COMMANDER THIRD SECTION, 0000 - 0100, OCTOBER
25TH", ARE ALWAYS A MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCE AND MAY BE THE ONLY RESOURCE OF
THE COMMANDER OF A DETACHMENT TO IMPOSE HIS LEADERSHIP ON THE GROUP. HIS
EMPLOYMENT OF SUCH TACTICS IN THE PRESENT CASE WAS PARTICULARLY APPLICABLE
IN THAT ENEMY INFORMATION WAS LIMITED, THE APPROACH TIME WOULD BE SHORT,
AND, THEREFORE, TIME WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR SIGNALLING MANEUVERS.
At this time neither Attack Group Commander had as yet contacted the
enemy0
At 0231 CTG 79oll changed standard speed to twenty knots (it had been
fifteen) and directed all ships to show IFF (electronic identification friend
or foe). All ships commenced making twenty knots.
* Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao Strait,
Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055, November
12th, 1944.
** Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
*** Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-43, Destroyer Torpedo Attack Instructions,
issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific Fleet, Serial 01264, October
24th, 1943.
305 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79.11
CONFIDENTIAL 0100 - 0245, October 25th
At 0233, in compliance with the instructions received at 0229, he broad-
cast a message over the local air warning net to all motor torpedo boats to
determine other targets coming up the channel outside of the two reported,*
Unfortunately, none of the above boats appear to have received this message;
at least there were no replies.*
At 0238 TG 79oll made its first contact on the enemy. This was an
intermittent radar contact by the MC GOWAN on bearing 184°(T), range 39,700
yards.** Since only a single pip in the middle of the strait showed on the
radar scope the Commanding Officer MC GOWAN delayed reporting the contact
until it had become more clearly defined.
At 0240 CTG 79oll received a contact report from the Commanding Officer
MC GOWAN reporting one unidentified surface contact bearing 184°(T), range
eighteen miles.***
Immediately after this he directed Commander Western Attack Group to
take charge of his own group and advised that commander that he would keep
him informed of his own course and firing,
THIS WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH DESTROYER ATTACK DOCTRINE WHICH PROVIDED
THAT EACH DIVISION COMMANDER SHOULD ATTACK INDEPENDENTLY BUT THAT THE TWO
ATTACKS SHOULD BE COORDINATED FOR MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS. IT SHOULD BE
CLEAR THAT (a) INDEPENDENT TORPEDO ATTACKS NOT PROPERLY COORDINATED, EVEN
THROUGH FROM DIFFERENT SECTORS, MAY BE HIGHLY INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE THEY K^.Y
MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE ENEMY TO TAKE SUCCESSFUL EVASIVE ACTION AND (b)
ATTACKS FROM MORE THAN ONE FIRING POINT, IN DIFFERENT SECTORS AND PROPERLY
COORDINATED, SHOULD BE HIGHLY EFFECTIVE BECAUSE THEY MAKE THE PROBLEM OF
EVASION MUCH MORE DIFFICULT DUE TO CROSS FIRE. IN SUCH CASE WHAT MAY BE
CORRECT ACTION AGAINST TORPEDOES FIRED FROM ONE FIRING POSITION KAY BE
INCORRECT ACTION FOR TORPEDOES FIRED FROM ANOTHER.****
Whether or not CTG 79.11 planned to coordinate the attacks of the
Eastern and Western Attack Groups is not clear for, as will be shown later,
although he continued to give Commander Western Attack Group instructions
concerning his own courses and speeds, target designations, and preparations
for torpedo firing, he commenced the operation with the Western Attack Group
some five miles behind its proper station for effective coordinated attack.
* Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944.
** Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and Defense
of Leyte, Philippine Islands, including the Battle of Surigao Strait,
Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944.
*** Action Report CTG 79.11 (C0MDE3R0N 54), Night Action in Surigao Strait,
Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055, Novemoer
12th, 1944.
**** Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4^-43, Destroyer Torpedo Attack Instructions,
issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific Fleet, Serial 01264, October
24th, 1943.
306 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79.11
CONFIDENTIAL 0100 - 0245, October 25th
Why he commenced his approach with his attack group so far out of
position is not known, but it seems highly probable, since he makes no
mention of the location of the Western Attack Group in his action report,
and makes no mention of its position on his radar scope that he did not
realize that it was five miles behind him. Instead it seems probable that
he thought that it was more nearly 5,000 yards (the difference in latitude
between Stations FOUR and SEVEN) behind him and expected Commander Western
Attack Group to adjust station accordingly.
Commander Western Attack Group similarly failed, at this time, to main-
tain continuous contact on the Eastern Attack Group and likewise did not
realize that he was five miles behind. He later stated that he had thought
that he was about 5,000 yards behind.
While the failure of Commander Eastern Attack Group to maintain contact
on the Western Attack Group is understandable since the latter group was,
until 0259, intermingled near the western shore with the Right Flank
Destroyers, the failure of Commander Western Attack Group to maintain contact
on the Eastern Attack Group, which was in open water, distant about eight
and one-half miles and well within radar range, is not understandable.
Perhaps he concentrated on the enemy to the exclusion of the Eastern Attack
Group; perhaps he expected to receive coordinating instruction from CTG
79.11; perhaps he gave no thought whatsoever to coordination.
WHATEVER THE REASONS, THE RESULTING SITUATION MADE THE POSSIBILITY OF A
COORDINATED ATTACK UNLIKELY. IF CTG 79.11 HAD REALLY PLANNED TO MAKE A
COORDINATED ATTACK SHOULD HE NOT HAVE INSURED THAT THE WESTERN ATTACK GROUP
WAS APPROXIMATELY ON A 090° - 270° (T) LINE OF BEARING WITH THE EASTERN ATTACK
GROUP PRIOR TO COMMENCING THE APPROACH?
At 0242 both the REMEY and MELVIN made radar contacts on the approaching
unknown force and the REMEY, the flagship, tracked the force on course 007°
(T), speed eighteen knots.* This was an excellent track at such a long range.
The enemy was actually on course 000°(T), speed twenty knots, but it seems
likely, owing to the southerly set of the current, that he was making good
only about eighteen knots. Thus, at this time, all three destroyers of the
Eastern Attack Group were in radar contact with the enemy. None of the
destroyers of the We stern Attack Group had, as yet, made contact due to the
fact that they still were beyond radar range.
By 0245 the torpedo attacks of the two Attack Groups of CTG 79.11 were
well underway. The REMEY, leading the Eastern Attack Group, on course
180°(T), speed twenty knots, was about fifteen miles north of the YAMASHIRO;
the MC DERMUT leading the Western Attack Group, on course 170°(T), speed
twenty knots, was about twenty-one miles northwest of the YAMASHIRO which,
by plot (Diagrams "F" and "G"), was bearing 259°(T), distant six and one-
quarter miles from Tungo Point.
Action Report REMEY, Assault on Leyte Island and the Battle of Surigao
Strait, Serial 008, November 5th, 1944.
307 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL OlOO - 0245, October 25th
From this point on, since the torpedo attacks of TG 79*11 were conducted
independently by the two attack groups, the attack as conducted by each
group will be discussed separately,
(C) Operations of Motor Torpedo boats, 0100 - 024$, Octooer 25th.
(1) SW Panaon PT«s.
During this period this section failed to make any contacts, either
visual or radar,* despite the fact that at 0118, the entire THIRD Section
passed close by, at a distance of from two to four miles (Diagram "F")«
In addition to this apparent radar failure tnis section also experi-
enced voice radio difficulties. The action reports of the three boats give
no indication that they were aware of the actions between the Bohol PT's and
the SECOND Division at about 2256, and between the Limasawa PT's and the
FIRST Division at about 0025. THIS MEANS THAT NOT ONLY WAS THE VISIBILITY
POOR IN THEIR AREAS BUT ALSO THAT THE ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT OF THE ENTIRE
SECTION WAS EITHER INOPERATIVE OR IMPROPERLY HANDLED. IF IT WAS INOPERATIVE
THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN KNOWN EARLIER AND THE BOATS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENT
ON RECONNAISSANCE, EXCEPTING IN COMPANY WITH BOATS HAVING FULLY OPERATIVE
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT. IF IT HAD BEEN OPERATIVE UP TO THIS TIME, IT SEEMS
CORRECT TO SAY THAT IT WAS BEING IMPROPERLY HANDLED.
(2) Madilao Point PT«s.
PT«s 192 (OTC), 191 and 195, hereinafter called Madilao Point PT«s,
were on station one mile south of Madilao Point conducting radar search.**
Although they had observed earlier (about 0025), gunfire, starshells
and searchlights at a great distance in the vicinity of Limasawa Island,
they appear to have received none of the contact reports which followed nor
any additional contact reports or voice radio interceptions during the period
under discussion (0100 - 0245 )• This failure they attributed to radio
interference.
At about 0130 the THIRD Section passed about eight - nine miles to
the northwest of their stations, but none of the Madilao Point PT's made any
radar contacts on them whatsoever. Whether this was due to poor radar
performance or to the fact that the motor torpedo boats were south of their
stations at this time is not known* Weather conditions must have Deen poor
for none of these boats saw the illumination or gunfire which occurred just
after 0200 and which was only about twelve miles to the north*
* Action Report PT 194, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0397,
October 29th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 192, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0395,
October 29th, 1944.
308 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0100 - 0245, October 25th
(3) SE Panaon PT's.
Commander SE Panaon PT's, with PT«s 134, 132 and 137, was lying
to off Binit Point awaiting the arrival of the five large ships which had
been reported by PT 127 as south of Bohol Island at 2310* (actually, PT 127
had reported two large ships and three destroyers). He had reason to expect
them, as, but thirty-five minutes earlier (0025), he had sighted starshells
which he had estimated to be ten miles southwest of his position*
He was not surprised, therefore, when, at 0116, PT 134 contacted by
radar a group of targets bearing about 225° (T), distant eight to ten miles.
He observed from his maneuvering board plot that the targets appeared to be
zigzagging violently. Actually this was not the case. It merely happened
that at this time the various units of the former FIRST Division were
rejoining which naturally gave a confused picture on the relative plot.
He promptly directed the Commanding Officer PT 134 to report this
contact which was done at 0116. For reasons unknown this report which,
instead of reporting a group of targets, reported only a single unidentified
ship opposite the southern tip of Panaon Island, appears to have been delayed
in transit to CTC 77.2 until about 0200.**
Unknown to Commander SE Panaon PT's, at some time after 0124, when
PT 134 started ahead, his boats became separated from each other. This was
due to the fact that (a) because of low visibility, PT 137, which was without
radio and radar, had been stationed between PTfs 134 and 132 in order to
facilitate both station keeping and follow- the— leader tactics and (b) PT 137
had then lost visual contact with both PT«s 134 and 132, which caused PT 132
to lose contact as well. This resulted in independent action against the
oncoming THIRD Section by each motor torpedo boat of this section.
(a) PT 134.
The Commanding Officer PT 134, through plotting, had determined
that the enemy was on a northeasterly course. He, therefore, under verbal
orders of Commander SE Panaon PT's, who it will be recalled was in PT 134,
immediately proceeded toward the enemy on course 055°(T) at ten knots. At
this time he discovered that PT's 132 and 137, which he had expected would
follow him, had not done so, and he was, therefore, operating alone. He was
then directed by Commander SE Panaon PT's to proceed independently.
By 0150 he had succeded in closing to within two miles of the
enemy. His radar screen now showed the target to consist of five "pips"
which indicated three ships (the leading one was the MICHISHIO) in a screen
ahead of two larger ships. Unfortunately, he was unable to determine the
types. Deciding that his previous estimate of heavy ships astern was correct
and that they were probably battleships or cruisers, he prepared to change
course toward them.*
* Action Report PT 134, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial H-33,
October 27th, 1944.
** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao Strait,
October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
309 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0100 - 0245, October 25th
Why he did not fully report the information he had collected
at this time and prior to his attack, is not known. He knew that there
were at least three small and two larger ships in the formation, he knew
the nature of the formation, its course, speed and approximate location.
All of this information was essential to the proper conduct of the pros-
pective action by CTG 77«>2. U. S. Naval Instructions at this time prescribed
that, when action is probable, "detailed accurate information of the enemy
becomes increasingly important, such as information of the enemy's bearing,
disposition or formation number and distribution of the enemy's units, course
and speed".*
While it seems clear that he did forward some information, notably
the enemy's speed, this information appears to have been lost between PT 134
and PT 523** for there is no record that it ever reached CTG 77.2 or CTG
79.11.
At 0200 he changed course to 105 (T) and headed for the center of
the formation. At 0200:30 he found that he was slightly ahead of the desired
bearing and changed course to 125° (T).
At 0205, when the range had decreased to 3000 yards, PT 134 was
illuminated by a searchlight and taken under fire but, despite this, the
commanding officer continued to close. Meanwhile, he returned the enemy's
fire with his 37, 20 and 40 millimeter guns. When he had closed to 2500
yards he fired three torpedoes and immediately commenced retiring. While
this range was excessive because motor torpedo boat doctrine recommended that
the boats should close to ranges of 1000 yards or less in order to insure
hitting,*** the fact that he was alone and, therefore, the target of all gun-
fire may have necessitated his firing from a greater range.
He likely had fired at the FU30 but since the Japanese did not
report a hit, it is probable that the torpedoes passed astern.
At about 0208 he observed that the enemy appeared to be under
fire from a northerly sector since the enemy searchlights were trained in
that direction. He estimated that other motor torpedo boats were attacking.
In this he was correct for the Lower Surigao PT's were attacking at this time.
During his retirement toward Binit Point he reported by voice
radio that he had attacked a very large ship with undetermined results. This
message was ouickly revived in good time by CTG 77»2.****
* War Instructions, United States Navy (FTP 143), Navy Department, Office
of Naval Operations, 1934, Chapter VIII, Section V, Paragraph 821.
** Action Report PT 523, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944-
*** Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, Motor Torpedo Boats, U. S. Fleet
(USF 41), United States Fleet, Headauarters of the Commander in Chief,
1945, Part III, Paragraph 3335.
**** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77*2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944*
310 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL OlOO - 0245, October 25th
He claims that he also reported attacking five large ships east
of Panaon on course north. This report was not recorded by anyone.
At 0229 he reported having struck, with his propellers, a heavy
underwater object which he believed to be a submarine* approaching with the
Japanese force. Postwar information discloses that this was not a submarine
and to this day its nature remains undetermined. It seems likely that the
Commanding Officer PT 134 soon evaluated this contact as other than a
submarine and likely as driftwood or something similar for he completely
omitted this incident in his action report.
At 0245 PT 134 was bearing 106° (T), distant 400 yards from Binit
Point.
(b) PT 137.
It will be recalled that PT 137 did not have an operating radio
or radar and that between 0100 and 0130 she had become separated from her
section. She seems to have proceeded to the southwest after this (perhaps
in an effort to follow PT 134, which had headed south for an interception),
for at 0135, the commanding officer sighted visually two destroyers heading
north, distant 1250 yards. These destroyers appear to have been the two
trailing destroyers of DESDIV FOUR (ASAGUMO and YAMAGUMO) which it will be
recalled were endeavoring, with the MICHISHIO, to reach their stations in
the van of the formation. It is of note that the YAMAGUMO, the trailing
destroyer, reported at 0130 that she had sighted a motor torpedo boat on
bearing 010°(T).** (Actually from the plot (Diagram "F") this bearing was
more likely 030° (T), the time 0133.)
PT 137 then, at approximately 0142, fired one torpedo at the
YAMAGUMO at a range of 1000 yards but the torpedo was observed to miss astern.
Having lost visual contact shortly thereafter the commanding officer retired
toward Binit Village. He made no further contacts during this period.***
(c) PT 132.
As stated previously, the Commanding Officer PT 132 had somehow
become separated from the other two boats of his section at about 0124 and
had strayed southward into the channel. While the exact movements of PT 132
are unknown and the track shown in Diagram "F" is only an estimate, it seems
probable that it was at about 0142, rather than at 0200 as given in the action
report, that the commanding officer detected a radar target at a range of two
miles and on a bearing of 180° (T)**** rather than the 270° (T) given in the
* Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle for Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
*** Action Report PT 137, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 11,
November 4th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 132, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial H-34,
October 26th, 1944.
311 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0100 - 0245, October 25th
action reporto (This seems so for Dlotting factors from other sources tend
to validate the tracks of the major forces). He then (a) closed the target
to an estimated 1200 yards, (b) discovered by sight that it was an enemy
destroyer which appeared to be lying to and (c) fired four torpedoes in
single shots. He observed that all toroedoes had missed and that the
destroyer which had failed to sight either PT 132 or the torpedoes had got
underway on a southerly course. He now lost contact.
Although not mentioned in the Japanese action reports, it is Delieved
that this was the YAMAGUMO, which was maneuvering to assume her station in
No. TWO Approach Formation0
The Commanding Officer PT 132 now retired to his original station off
Binit Point. He made no further contacts during this period©*
(4) Bilaa Point PT's.
PT's 494, 497 and 324, hereinafter called Bilaa Point PT's, were
on station one and one-half miles northeast of Bilaa Point, Mindanao conduct-
ing radar search. The primary mission assigned this section was to insure
that enemy forces did not pass undetected through Hinatuan Passage.
At about 0202 Commander Bilaa Point PT's detected several radar
targets south of Binit Point at a range of eight - nine miles.** He tracked
them by radar* The plot shows that they had oeen picked up at the closest
point of approach after heading around the southern tip of Panaon Island into
Surigao Strait. He decided not to attack as they were (a) heading up the
strait and (b) away from the motor torpedo boats and he did not want to leave
his station,
THIS DECISION WAS, OF COURSE, CORRECT. HE HAD BEEN GIVEN A PREVENTION
OBJECTIVE IN THAT HE WAS TO INSURE THAT NO ENEMY FORCES PASSED UNDETECTED
THROUGH HINATUAN PASSAGE. HE KNEW THAT SOME OF THE ENEMY FORCES ROUNDING
PANAON ISLAND AND HEADING INTO THE STRAIT HAD BEEN LOCATED BY THE SW AND SE
PANAON PT'S FOR HE HAD HEARD THEIR REPORTS ON THE VOICE RADIO. HOWEVER, HE
ALSO KNEW THAT THESE REPORTS WERE NOT THE SAKE AND INDICATED THAT ALL OF THE
JAPANESE SHIPS HAD PERHAPS NOT BEEN LOCATED. HE REALIZED THAT THERE STILL
WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT ONE OR MORE ENEMY SHIPS MIGHT ATTEMPT TO MCVE UP THE
EAST COAST OF DINAGAT ISLAND VIA HINATUAN PASSAGE. THEREFORE, HE DECIDED
THAT HE MUST REMAIN ON STATION. THE FACT THAT THERE WERE NO ENEMY PLANS TO
MOVE THROUGH HINATUAN PASSAGE IN NO WAY INVALIDATES THIS DECISION.
He likely maintained radar contact on the THIRD Section as it moved
northward through Surigao Strait©
* Action Report PT 132, Night of October 24th - 25th, 19<+4, Serial H-34,
October 26th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 494, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
312 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL OlOO - 0245, October 25th
After 0205 he sighted gunfire "up in Surigao Strait" to the north.
This was the action between the SE Panaon, Lower Surigao and Sumilon PT's
with the THIRD Section.*
At about 0211 he made his final radar contact on it bearing 340° (T),
distant eight miles, and proceeding in northerly direction.
No further contacts were made during this period,,
During the latter portion of this period he appears to have drifted
in a southwesterly direction.
(5) Sumilon PT's.
PT's 523, 524 and 526, hereinafter called Sumilon PT«s were
stationed one mile south of Sumilon Island conducting radar search.** Since
0100 they had been drifting with the current as shown in Diagram "F".
Since Commander Sumilon PTfs had, at 0025, commenced intercepting
voice radio messages from Commander SE Panaon PT's concerning the northward
movement of enemy forces, and knew, therefore, their approximate course and
speed, and since he had relayed some information*** to CTG 77«2, notably
that PT 134 had reported that there were unidentified ships proceeding up
the strait opposite the southern tip of Panaon Island, he was alert to
detect the enemy on his radar.
At 0143 he made his first contact at a distance of eight to nine
miles.** He did not make a contact report, presumably because he felt that
CTG 77© 2 was fully familiar with the situation. However, if this were his
reason it was seriously in error for neither CTG 77.2 nor CTG 79.11 knew the
course and speed of the enemy. This was because they were beyond the voice
radio range of PT 134 and the only information they had received was that
which had been relayed by the Sumilon PT's.
In view of his advance information of the approximate movements of
the enemy, Commander Sumilon PT's, without waiting to track the target,
immediately deployed his section on a line of bearing and changed course to
intercept it0**
THUS, COMMANDER SUMILON PT'S, ACTING ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE AND BASING
HIS ACTION ON HIS ESTIMATE OF ENEMY INTENTIONS RATHER THAN OF CAPABILITIES
AND FURTHER FORGETTING THAT HE WAS A SMALL, BUT NEVERTHELESS VITAL, COMPONENT
OF THE RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS OF HIS COMMANDER'S PLAN, HAD DECIDED TO CANCEL
THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE ASSIGNED HIM, "THE PREVENTION OF THE UNDETECTED SORTIE
OF ENEMY TASK FORCES THROUGH HINATUAN PASSAGE", AND TO REPLACE IT WITH A
DESTRUCTION OBJECTIVE*
* Action Report PT 494, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 523, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 134, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial H-33,
October 27th, 1944.
4,6799 0-59-30 313 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL OlOO - 0245, October 25th
THIS DECISION WAS OF DOUBTFUL CORRECTNESS. LIKE COMMANDER BILAA PT'S,
HE HAD BEEN GIVEN A PREVENTION OBJECTIVE, AND, IN COOPERATION WITH THAT
COMMANDER, WAS TO INSURE THAT ENEMY FORCES DID NOT PASS THROUGH HINATUAN
PASSAGE UNDETECTED. SINCE HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER OR NOT THE BILAA PT'S WERE
STILL ON STATION OFF BILAA POINT, FOR THAT COMMANDER HAD GIVEN NO INDICATION
OF ACTION, IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLEAR TO HIM THEN THAT WHILE HE WAS ATTACKING
THE ENEMY HINATUAN PASSAGE MIGHT WELL BE UNGUARDED. THEREFORE, IN VIEW OF
THIS SITUATION, IT SEEMS CORRECT TO SAY THAT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT FOR HIM TO
REMAIN ON STATION THAN TO DEPART STATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF ATTACKING THE
ENEMY.
WHILE IT IS THE DUTY OF A COMMANDER, IN THE ABSENCE OF A SUPERIOR
AND IN THE FACE OF A CHANGING SITUATION, TO TAKE ANY ACTION HE DEEMS NECESSARY
TO SUPPORT HIS COMMANDERS PLANS, EVEN TO THE EXTENT OF DEPARTING FROM HIS
INSTRUCTIONS, THERE IS SERIOUS DOUBT THAT SUCH A SITUATION OBTAINED AT THIS
TIME. THE ENEMY, AS HE MOVED NORTHWARD, WAS BEING DETECTED AND ATTACKED BY
THE MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS ON THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE STRAIT AND NO HELP WAS RE-
QUIRED THERE; BUT WHAT ABOUT THE EASTERN SHORE? PERHAPS, IN THE EXTENUATION
OF HIS ACTION, IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT HE THOUGHT THAT, SINCE THE BILAA PT'S
HAD REPORTED NOTHING NEARER THAN SIGHT MILES, THERE WAS NOTHING ON THAT SIDE
OF THE CHANNEL. BUT, WAS THIS A CORRECT ESTIMATE? COULD NOT ONE OR MORE OF
THE JAPANESE SHIPS HAVE BROKEN OFF WHILE UNDER ATTACK BY THE SUKILON PT'S
AND HAVE PASSED THROUGH THE PASSAGE WITHOUT DETECTION BY HUGGING THE NORTHERN
SHORE? THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY TRUE HAD THE SUMILON PT'S BEEN
DAMAGED IN THE ATTACK.
AS HE APPROACHED HE OBSERVED THAT THE ENEMY WAS BEING ATTACKED BY
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS FROM THE NORTHWEST AND FROM THE SOUTHWEST AND, IN RETURN,
WAS ILLUMINATING THE MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS WITH SEARCHLIGHTS, AND HAD OPENED
FIRE.*
The attacks from the northwest were being made by the Lower Surigao
PT's and the attack from the southwest by PT 134.
As a result of this searchlight illumination to the westward he observ-
ed that (a) the enemy ships were being silhouetted to his position,*-* and (b)
there were two cruisers and two destroyers*** on a zigzag course at a speed of
* Action Report CTG 70.1, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, Night of
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 1-0330, December 1st, 1944.
** Commander Sumilon PT's stated later that, in his well-considered opinion,
the force "consisted of two battleships and three small vessels of the
size of destroyers or larger." (Commander Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron
36 's 1st endorsement, November 24th, 1944 to Action Report PT 523, No
Serial, October 26th, 1944.) This opinion is given no weight in this
analysis because it appears to have been hindsight and because the section
commander's opinion is very likely the opinion of the boat captain as well
since both the section commander and boat captain in a motor torpedo boat
are necessarily on the same tiny bridge. Therefore, the report of the
boat captain has been accepted as the opinion of the section conciander at
the time of the action.
*** Action Report PT 523, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
314 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL OlOO - 0245, October 25th
twenty-five knots. Actually, the THIRD Section was maneuvering at this time
at twenty knots to avoid the attacks from the SE Panaon and Lower Surigao
PT*s. It is of singular interest at this time to record that in their action
reports the Commanding Officer PT 524* reported that he had sighted one
battleship, one cruiser and one destroyer, and the Commanding Officer PT 526**
that he had sighted one battleship, two heavy cruisers and two destroyers*
Of course, none of these sightings were correct for there were tn battleships,
one heavy cruiser and four destroyers. The reasons for such inacc ^racies are
not known© It seems unlikely that it was due to the weather for, according
to the SHIGURE, the visibility had improved and was now seven kilometo-s.
Had this not been the case, it is doubtful if the Sumilon PT's would have been
able to observe, so clearly, the action to the westward of the enemy formation.
IT IS NOT KNOWN WHY NEITHER COMMANDER SUMILON PT'S NOR HIS COMMANDING
OFFICERS REPORTED THE RESULT OF THEIR VISUAL CONTACTS TO CTG 77.2. THEY KNEW,
FROM THEIR INTERCEPTS AND RELAYS, THAT THERE WAS DOUBT AS TO THE COMPOSITION
OF THE ENEMY FORCE, SINCE ALL REPORTS WHICH THEY HAD INTERCEPTED GAVE IT A
DIFFERENT COMPOSITION, AND THEY ALSO KNEW THAT IT WAS VITALLY IMPORTANT TO
KEEP THE PRINCIPAL COMMANDERS INFORMED OF CHANGES IN THE COURSE, SPEED,
COMPOSITION AND FORMATION OF THE ENEMY.
IT MIGHT BE WELL AT THIS POINT TO HAZARD A GUESS AS TO WHAT MOTIVATED
COMMANDER SUMILON PT'S, AS WELL AS THE SECTION COMMANDERS OF MOST OF THE MOTOR
TORPEDO BOAT SECTIONS ENGAGED IN THIS BATTLE, TO GIVE PRIORITY TO THE
DESTRUCTION OBJECTIVE, THIS GUESS IS THAT EACH OF THESE SECTION COMMANDERS
HAD SOMEHOW FORMED AN OPINION THAT THEY WERE EXPECTED TO ATTACK AND DESTROY
THE ENEMY AND THAT DESTUCTION WAS THEIR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE DESPITE THEIR ORDERS
WHICH DIRECTED THEM TO THE CONTRARY. SINCE THE DESTRUCTION OBJECTIVE HAD THIS
PRIORITY, IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE MATTER OF DESTRUCTION HAD BEEN STRONGLY
STRESSED AT THE BRIEFING CONFERENCES, WHICH WERE HELD PRIOR TO THE DEPARTURE
OF THE MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS FOR THEIR BATTLE STATIONS. CTG 70.1 DISCREDITS
THIS THOUGHT IN HIS ACTION REPORT FOR HERE HE STATES, IN PART, THAT THE MOTOR
TORPEDO BOATS WERE POSITIONED "TO INSURE DETECTION OF THE ENEMY BY WHATEVER
ROUTE HE APPROACHED, AND TO INFORM OUR HEAVIER FORCES, WITH THE SECTIONS
INSIDE SURIGAO STRAITS AS STRIKING GROUPS STATIONED TO INSURE ALMOST CON-
TINUOUS CONTACT BY AT LEAST ONE GROUP. EACH SECTION WAS INSTRUCTED TO REPORT
ANY ENEMY SIGHTED, THEN TO ATTACK INDEPENDENTLY."*** PERHAPS, THE EMPLOYMENT
OF THE TERM "STRIKING GROUPS" WAS RESPONSIBLE, FOR IS IT NOT A RARE OCCURRENCE
FOR A STRIKING GROUP TO BE GIVEN A PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF RECONNAISSANCE? IS
NOT THE VERY TERM SYMBOLIC OF ATTACK? PERHAPS, THE EMPHASIS WAS NOT SO MUCH
ON REPORTING THE ENEMY AS TO ATTACK HIM.
* Action Report PT 524, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 526, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
*** Action Report CTG 70.1, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, Night of
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 1-0330, December 1st, 1944.
315 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL OlOO - 0245, October 25th
Commander Sumilon PT's closed the target to a range of 2000 yards and
ordered his section to fire torpedoes. At 0212 each motor torpedo ooat then
fired one torpedo at one of the cruisers, reportedly of the MOGhKI class, and
at 0213 each boat fired a second torpedo at the same cruiser** All torpedoes
missed* This was probably due to the fact that the torpedoes were fired from
2000 yards on the starboard quarter of the cruiser which was then in a turn
away making a hit most unlikely (Diagram "F").
IT IS NOT CLEAR WHY COMMANDER SUMILON PT'S FAILED TO CLOSE THE TARGET
TO A FAVORABLE FIRING RANGE, I.E., 1000 YARDS OR LESS. HE HAD NOT BEEN
DI5.0VERED, THE ENEMY WERE ENGAGED TO THE WESTWARD, THE SITUATION WAS VERY
./ORABLE, INDEED.
Having completed his attack Commander Sumilon FI^s commenced his
retirement. At this time he was fired on by the enemy who likely observed
the "rooster tail" (spray of water off the stern) which is shown by motor
torpedo boats when travelling at high speed. By the employment of smoke he
succeeded in escaping undamaged*
At 0245 he was "lying to" east of Sumilon Island and drifting in a
southerly direction*
(6) Lower Surigao PTfs*
PT»s 49O(0TC),491 and 493, hereinafter called Lower Surigao PT*s were
approximately on station in mid-channel in Latitude 10°-04,N, Longitude 125°-
19:30* E, conducting radar search, and were gradually drifting southward with
the current*
At 0147, Commander Lower Surigao PT's received a report from PT 490
that she had made radar contact at eight miles on four targets coming around
the southern tip of Panaon Island, heading north**** He did not report this
contact, presumably because he knew that these units had already been reported
by PT 134* He tracked the targets for several minutes and then deployed his
section in a line of bearing, distance 200 yards, and proceeded on various
courses at nine knots, making good a track to close them approximately as
shown in Diagram "F"0 He closed to about 1000 yards, but due to a rain souall
could not sight the Japanese ships although he could see their wakes* At 0205
he observed a searchlight to the south but was not illuminated by it. He
continued closing and then, when the rain souall had passed, he sighted a
Japanese formation consisting of three destroyers and one cruiser at a range
of 650 - 700 yards which formation was heavily engaged in action against
American torpedo boats attacking from the southwest* At 0207 he fired two
torpedoes at the leading destroyer (MICHISHIO). At the same time PT 491
* Action Reports PT«s 523, 524, 526, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944,
No Serials, October 26th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 523, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944*
*** Action Report PT 490, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial
October 26th, 1944*
316 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL OlOO - 0245, October 25th
fired two torpedoes at the second destroyer (ASAGUMO)* and PT 493 endeavored
to fire one starboard torpedo, target not given, but the torpedo failed to
launch.** All torpedoes missed.
Almost immediately after this, the boats were illuminated by search-
lights from one of the two leading ships and were fired upon.*** They
returned the enemy fire with all available guns and PT 490 fired her remain-
ing two torpedoes at a range of about 500 yards at the MICHTSHIO. At this
time all three motor torpedo boats were under heavy enemy fire and, therefore,
commenced retiring at high speed, making smoke. Despite this, PT 493 was
heavily hit by three 4.7 shells, PT 490 was lightly hit, and PT 491 was
undamaged. The Commanding Officer PT 493 found it necessary, at 0235, because
she was leaking badly, to beach off Maoyo Point.**
As the boats retired toward the east coast of Panaon Island, they lost
contact with each other.
(7) Other Motor Torpedo Boats.
(a) The operations of the motor torpedo boats in Surigao Strait, other
than those hereafter discussed, were uneventful.
(1) Upper Surigao PT»s.
PT's 327, 321 and 326, hereinafter called Upper Surigao
PT's were stationed four miles west of Kanihaan Island, where they had arrived
about 1830, conducting radar search.****
At 0205 the Commanding Officer PT 327 heard PT 493 report a
contact (unidentified ships) and sighted gunfire to the south. He reported
to CTG 79«11 at this time that the enemy was coming through the straits and
that gunfire was observed. It is not known whether or not CTG 77.2 recieved
this report, for it is not recorded in his action report, but he probably did
for it is recorded in CTG 77.3' s action report.*****
* Action Report PT 491, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 493, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 490, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 326, Night of Octooer 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
***** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
317 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL OlOO - 0245, October 25th
About 0225* one of the Upper Surigao PT»s, probably PT 326,
made contact on an enemy force ten miles to the south and about 0230
reported it to the OTC in PT 327.** At this time the motor torpedo boats
had completed moving to the north against the current and now were drifting
to the south with the current toward Kanihaan Island, being about one mile
north of the southern tip of that islando
About 0235 Commander Upper Surigao PT's reported this con-
tact to CTG 79.11 who directed that the motor torpedo boats withdraw from
the area as he was making an attack.***
Commander Upper Surigao PTfs then, about 0238, withdrew on
course 090° (T) at seven knots.** He made no preparation for attack, although
by the time that the enemy force was passing abeam (0255) he had ouite
accurately tracked them on course 000"(T) at twenty knots.***
While his reasons for not doing so are not known it seems
likely that he realized that, since CTG 79.11 was about to make an attack,
and had directed him to clear the area, it would be unwise to make a motor
torpedo boat attack as this might confuse the destroyer plot by (a) includ-
ing friendly forces or (b) cause the enemy to make radical course changes.
At 0245 he was bearing 277° (T), distant 6,400 yards from the
southern tip of Kanihaan Island.
* The PTls list this time as 0300, the time of reporting the contact to
the OTC as 0305 and the time of reporting to CTG 79.11 as 0310e Tnese
times are obviously in error as the YAMASHIRO passed Kanihaan Island
at O255o This error likely occurred because it was the practice of the
motor torpedo boats to collectively reconstruct the events and write
their reports from memory rather than to make notes of the events as
they happened (statement by Commander Robert Leeson, USNR, CTU 70.1.3
at the Battle of Surigao Strait, to Commodore Richard W. Bates, USN
(Ret), Head World War II Battle Evaluation Group, Naval War College,
April 17th, 1954)» In this analysis it has been assumed that the range
was correctly remembered as ten miles but that the time was not. It
has also been assumed that the times were correctly listed aDout five
minutes apart.
** Action Report PT 326, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 327, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
318 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
0100 - 0245, October 25th
(2) Kanihaan PT's.
PT's 495, 439 and 492, hereinafter called Kanihaan PT's
were, after 1815, on station one-half mile south of Kanihaan Island
conducting radar search.*
During the period up to 0100, nothing was sighted and no
radar contacts were made. It seems clear, however, that they were receiving
the voice radio contact reports made by other PT boats as they report hearing
PT 127 making a report at 0010o*
Shortly after 0205 Commander Kanihaan PT's sighted the gun
flashes and the glare of searchlights as the THIRD Section engaged PT 134
and the Lower Surigao PTrs0 Although he reported the bearing correctly as
215° (T), which was the bearing of Bolobolo Point from his station at Kanihaan
Island, he estimated that the action was behind the southern tip of Panaon
Island when in fact it was really much closer.*
He sighted nothing else during this period.
(3) South Amagusan Point PT'S.
PT's 320, 330 and 331, hereinafter called South
Amagusan Point PT's, were stationed about one mile south of Amagusan Point,
Leyte, where they had arrived about 2000.** By 0100 they had drifted south
with the current and were about four and one-ouarter miles, bearing 134° (T)
from Amagusan Point. It is not known whether or not they were receiving
the voice radio contact reports made by the other PT's because their action
reports are silent in this matter.
Commander South Amagusan PT's continued to drift to the
southward with the current. About 0205, or shortly thereafter, he saw the
exchange of fire between the Japanese THIRD Section and the Lower Surigao
PT's.** He may also have seen the action between the THIRD Section and the
Sumilon PT's although the action reports do not mention it, probably because
it was considered to be a continuation of the previous action*
The action reports state that the radar equipment of PT's
320 and 330 were not functioning satisfactorily and that they depended on
PT 331 for radar information*
About 0230 (when about seven miles bearing 153° (T) from
Amagusan Point) PT 331 obtained radar contact on three targets bearing 150°
(T), distant eight miles. These targets were moving liorth at twenty knots.**
* Action Report PT 495, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 320, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944*
319
CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL OlOO - 0245, October 25th
This was the Japanese THIRD Section and the solution of the enemy course
and speed was accurate. Commander South Amagusan PT1 s immediately went
ahead at twenty knots and changed course to 020°(T) in order to close the
target track. He also began preparations for a torpedo attack.
About 0235 he heard CTG 79.11 direct Commander Upper Surigao
PT!s to clear the area so that his destroyers could make their attack.*
He promptly complied changing course to 317° (T), to head for the shelter of
Amagusan Point, and slowing to ten knots. In view of CTG 70.1,s orders
which provided, in part, that "the sections stationed nearest own forces in
the upper end of the straits were positively to get clear and stay clear if
there were any indications of own forces moving into their areas" and also
that "no ship moving down the straits during or after the battle was to be
attacked by any boats unless positively identified as enemy",** this decision
is considered sound.
At 0245 the South Amagusan PTrs were bearing 148°(T), distant
four point eight miles from Amagusan Point.
(4) East Amagusan Point PT's.
PT«s 328, 323 and 329, hereinafter called the East
Amagusan PT's, were stationed about two miles east of Amagusan Point, where
they had arrived about 1930.***
During the period of this report these motor torpedo Doats
made no radar contacts. PT 328 reported that she had sighted at 0230 gun-
fire south in Surigao Strait, This was the action between 0205 and 0212 when
the THIRD Section was under attack by motor torpedo boats.
(b) The operations of the motor torpedo boats which remained in the
Mindanao Sea were also uneventful. The Camiguin PT»s, reinforced by PT's
130 and 131 of the Bohol PT*s, continued to patrol north of Camiguin Island;
PT 152 continued toward Liloan Bay to obtain medical aid for a wounded njan;
and the Limasawa PT*s continued to patrol with PT 190 to the westward of Lima-
sawa Island and PT 151 and 146 to the eastward of the same island. At this
time, the location of PT 190 was still unknown to Comnander Limasawa PI^s.
* Action Report PT 320, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944; also Action Report PT 327, Night of October 24th
25th, 1944, No Serial, October 30th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 70*1, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, Night of
October 24th - 25th, 19U, Serial 1-0330, December 1st, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 323, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
320 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
CHAPTER XII - JAPANESE OPERATIONS, 0245 - 0320, October 25th.
(A) Operations of Commander THIRD Section, 0245 - 0320, October 25th.
Commander THIRD Section, with that section, in No. TWO Approach
Formation, continued on course 000°(T) at twenty knots up the axis of the
strait. The visibility was now between seven and eight kilometers.*
At 0256 he received from the SHIGURE a report by voice radio "three
ship silhouettes apparently enemy, sighted, bearing 10°(T) distance, eight
kilometers".* These were the three ships of the Eastern Attack Group
(REKEY, MC GOWAN and MELVIN) which were approaching down the middle of the
strai#t. The bearing as reported was off about ten degrees, the composition
exact, the range about half the actual range, which was about 15,000 yards.
Considering the dark night and clouded conditions, this sighting indicates
clearly the ability of the Japanese night lookouts, aided by the excellence
of their wide aperture (twelve centimeter) binoculars, to discern targets
with open water behind them at long ranges in darkness. The fact that
they had been sighted at this time was not known by the Eastern Attack
Group.
Commander THIRD Section was obviously prepared for such a contact for,
within two minutes (0253), a searchlight sweep of the bearing was made by
a high searchlight, presumably from the battleship YAMASHIRO, which swept
for about thirty seconds.** The distance was too great for searchlight
illumination and consequently, although the beam crossed the bearing of
the Allied destroyers, it did not reveal them. Perhaps the Japanese were
unsure of this sighting and had decided to await developments for they
took no further action.
Two minutes later, at 0300, although it is not recorded in the reports
available to this analysis, the Japanese again sighted something on the
starboard bow in the direction of these silhouettes, for they quickly
trained a searchlight in that direction. Since at this time the REMEY had
been firing torpedoes and since some of the flash eliminators in certain
torpedo tubes had failed,*** this "something" appears to have been a
sighting of the flashes caused by these failures.
From Japanese records it appears that this searchlight illumination
was generally ineffectual, probably due to the extreme range, but it was
clear enough for the Japanese to open fire0
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and Defense
of Leyte, Philippine Islands, including the Battle of Surigao Strait,
Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944.
*** Action Report REMEY, Assault on Leyte Island and the Battle of
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 008, November
5th, 1944.
321 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
THIS FREQUENT EMPLOYMENT OF SEARCHLIGHT ILLUMINATION WAS STANDARD
DOCTRINE FOR JAPANESE NIGHT OPERATIONS IN NARROW WATERS WHICH PRESCRIBED
THAT STARSHELLS AND OTHER ILLUMINATION (SEARCHLIGHT) WERE TO BE EMPLOYED
TO FACILITATE FIRING BY THE HEAVY SHIPS.* THIS WAS AT COMPLETE VARIANCE
WITH ALLIED DOCTRINE WHICH DIRECTED THAT, SINCE NIGHT CONTACT WOULD
NORMALLY BE BY RADAR, WHICH WOULD LIKELY OBVIATE THE NEED FOR ILLUMINATION,
NO ILLUMINATION (STARSHELLS OR SEARCHLIGHTS) WAS TO BE EMPLOYED UNLESS
ORDERED BY THE OTC.**
THIS VARIANCE POINTS TO THE SUPERIORITY OF ALLIED RADAR FOR, THE
ALLIES, HAVING CONFIDENCE IN THEIR RADAR (BOTH SEARCH AND FIRE CONTROL),
WERE WILLING TO PLACE PRIMARY DEPENDENCE ON IT WHEREAS THE JAPANESE,
HAVING LIULE CONFIDENCE IN IT, WERE UNWILLING TO RELY ON IT.
One or more of the s hips of the THIRD Section now commenced firing
almost immediately, but due to incorrect range estimates, the first salvo
was about 2,000 yards short of the REMEY. This was about thirty seconds
after the searchlight was turned on.*** The salvo was reported as a
beautiful pattern of about five splashes, estimated to be 4.7 inch
caliber,*** Actually the salvo was of 5-inch caliber, since there were
no 4.7 inch guns in the THIRD Section. It appears to have been fired by
the SHIGURE which carried five 5-inch guns, and which later reported that
she had opened fire at the moment of the searchlight illumination,****
Other ships had opened fire also. However, the firing was mainly done by
the YAMASHIRO and the wing destroyers.*****
It will be recalled that the THIRD Section at this time was still in
No. TWO Approach Formation, (Plate XX). This placed the two wing
destroyers, SHIGURE and YAMAGUMO, in awkward positions during this attack
since the destroyer on the engaged side (YAMAGUMO) on certain bearings
fouled the line of fire of the large ships, and the large ships in turn on
certain bearings fouled the line of fire of the destroyer (SHIGURE) on the
disengaged side, (Diagram "G"). From his actions it seems probable that
the Commanding Officer SHIGURE, even though he was able to open fire,
disliked the difficulties incident to his position and, apparently on his
own initiative, decided at this time (also 0300) to enter the column head
of the YAMASHIRO, for he so informed Commander THIRD Section and COMDESDIV
FOUR by voice radio.**** His action appears to have met with the approval
of the above commanders for they took no contrary action, possibly because
they expected him to return to his correct station once the enemy had been
driven off.
* Combined Fleet Doctrine, 1943, Night Operation Force Doctrine, Part
IV, Night Operations in Narrow Waters, ATIS Document No. 39, Part II,
June 3rd, 1945 (NACHI Document).
** War Instructions, United States Navy, (FTP 143A), United States
Fleet, Headquarters of Commander in Chief, Navy Department, 1944,
Chapter 8, Section III,
*** Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and Defense
of Leyte, PhiliDpine Islands, including the Battle of Surigao Strait,
Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944,
**** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801,
***** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
322 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
At the time the distance "A" (Plate XX) between the leading destroyer
(MICHISHIO) and the leading battleship (YAMASHIRO) which had been
increasing since rounding Binit Point was now about 3,000 meters in order
to permit the wing destroyers to form column, although the YAMAGUMO did
not attempt to enter the column at this time. This seems so for the
Allied radar scopes (Plate XXI) showed such spacing and the Commanding
Officer ASAGUMO, who was second ship in column, also reported that this
distance was now 3,000 meters.*
Between 0300 and 0302 the Japanese observed their line of sight
obscured to a degree by black smoke which the Allied destroyers had
commenced making at this time.**
At 0302, likely because of this smoke effect, they decided that their
searchlight illumination was unsatisfactory and therefore secured the
searchlight. At this moment the MOGAMI opened fire. Since she reports
that she fired without searchlight illumination,*** she must have fired
(a) from radar data, (b) from a computation being automatically generated
by her fire control system based on estimates made during the searchlight
illumination, or (c) by night observations, although this was unlikely
because all three Allied destroyers were making heavy black smoke from
their smokestacks.
The Japanese now shifted their source of illumination to starshells
which were fired by one of the battleships. However, these shells were
placed initially too far to the right and were too short to be effective.
Although the Japanese were employing their search radars continuously to
endeavor to track the Allied destroyers the fact that the gunfire ranges
and starshell ranges were initially so short shows that this effort had
been ineffectual. The view is supported by the Plotting Room Officer of
the MOGAMI who stated that "WE USED OUR NO. 22 RADARS INTENSIVELY BUT DUE
TO THE NARROW WATERS IT WAS DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH SHIPS AND LAND
FEATURES ON THE RADAR SCREENS".**** This statement supports that of the
Commanding Officer SHIGURE, who, as has been pointed out under "Operations
of Commander SECOND Division, 0000 - 0100, October 25th", stated that he
did not employ his radar for navigation.*****
* Composite Report on Surigao Strait Action by Commanding Officers
ASAGUMO (Commander Kasuo Shibayama, ex-IJN) and MICHISHIO (Commander
Kazuo Tanaka, ex-IJN), March 15th, 1946, Army Historical Division
Microfilm HS-39A.
** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
*** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Batble off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document I6O463, NA 12653.
**** Report on SHO Operation by Lieutenant Fukushi, ex-IJN, Control
Station Officer and Fire Data Computer Officer, MOGAMI, December
1945, Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-39A.
***** USSBS Interrogations of Japanese Officials, Nav. No. 79,
Interrogation of Commander Shigeru Noshino, ex-IJN, Volume II,
Page 347.
323 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
The Japanese gunfire began improving as the spotters found the range
and at 0303 the REMEY was straddled but suffered no hits. This was
fortunate for the Japanese fall-of-shot patterns were very small. However,
as the minutes passed, the effectiveness of the Japanese gunfire decreased
due (a) to the smoke effect and (b) the rapid increase in ran^e as the
Allied destroyers retired. By 0308 the range had increased to almost
13,000 yards.
WHY AT THIS TIME COMMANDER THIRD SECTION FAILED TO TAKE ANY EVASIVE
ACTION WHATSOEVER AGAINST TORPEDOES IS NOT KNOWN NOR UNDERSTOOD. HE HAD
RECEIVED REPORTS OF A MAXIMUM OF THREE DESTROYERS WITHIN EFFECTIVE
TORPEDO FIRING RANGE;* HE THEREFORE KNEW THAT IT WAS VERY PROBABLE THAT
THESE DESTROYERS HAD FIRED TORPEDOES FOR THE PATTERN OF THEIR ATTACK HAD
BEEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH WELL ESTABLISHED TORPEDO ATTACK DOCTRINES WHICH
COULD BE EXPECTED TO BE SIMILAR FOR BOTH NAVIES, AND HE WAS A RECOGNIZED
EXPERT IN DESTROYER TACTICS AND IN NIGHT OPERATIONS. THE ONLY LOGICAL
EXPLANATION SEEMS TO BE THAT, REALIZING THAT (A) THE ALLIED DESTROYER
ATTACK HAD BEEN DELIVERED FROM A POINT SHARP ON THE STARBOARD BOW (WITH
A TARGET ANGLE LESS THAN THIRTY DEGREES), (B) THE RANGE HAD OBVIOUSLY
BEEN HIGH FOR AMERICAN TORPEDOES FOR THE ALLIED DESTROYERS COMMENCED
RETIRING AT RANGES OVER 10,000 YARDS AND (C) EVEN THOUGH HE CONTINUED ON
HIS BASE COURSE THESE TWO ITEMS GAVE A LOW PROBABILITY OF TORPEDO HITS,
HE HAD DECIDED THAT HE COULD AFFORD TO TAKE A CALCULATED RISK AND CONTINUE
ON HIS BASE COURSE WITHOUT MANEUVERING. THIS DECISION WAS PROBABLY
AFFECTED, IN PART, BY HIS DESIRE TO MAINTAIN HIS ANNOUNCED TIME OF ARRIVAL
OFF DULAG (0400).
IF THE ABOVE CONJECTURES WERE THE BASIS OF HIS REASONING THEY WERE NOT
SOUND FOR (A) THE SMALL CHANGE OF COURSE NECESSARY TO COMB THE TORPEDO
TRACKS AND THE LIMITED TIME REQUIRED TO DO THIS, BECAUSE THE ALLIED
DESTROYERS WERE ALREADY RETIRING, WOULD NOT HAVE CAUSED MUCH DELAY AND
(B) HIS FORCE WAS SO WEAK THAT HE COULD ILL AFFORD TO HAVE ANY UNITS PUT
OUT OF ACTION BEFORE THEY HAD HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR
MISSION IN LEYTE GULF.
Graphic analysis (Diagram'^") shows that at this time the YAMAGUMO had
already sighted at least one of the approaching torpedoes and had turned
to comb the tracks. In this she was successful. After making sure that
his own ship was safely handled the Commanding Officer then, at about 0307,
reported by voice radio the sighting of a torpedo track from bearing
040°(T).** This torpedo track was made by one of the torpedoes fired by
the MELVTN. EVEN THIS REPORT DREW NO REACTION FROM COMMANDER THIRD
SECTION, AS NO TACTICAL SIGNALS WERE MADE BY HIM.
Very shortly after the torpedo sighting, Commander THIRD Section
likely received a message from Commander SECOND Striking Force requesting
information of the enemy.** Since he did not reply to this request it
seems probable that he either was not receiving all the messages recorded
by the SHIGURE or, for reasons of his own, did not choose to answer this
query.
* USSBS Interrogations of Japanese Officials, Nav. No. 79,
Interrogation of Commander Shigeru Noshino, ex-IJN, Volume II,
Page 347.
** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
324 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
Meanwhile, about 0308:30, a disaster had hit the command. Unknown to
him the battleship FUSO, only 1,000 meters astern, had received at least
one torpedo hit in her starboard side which had caused her (a) to list to
starboard and to lose speed* and (b) since there is no record thereafter
of any communication,** to lose her ability to communicate by radio with
the other ships of her unit. She turned slowly right out of column and
fell back on the MOGAMI which ship, having sighted the torpedo hit in the
FUSO, had taken individual evasive action to the westward.* In so moving
off the course line MOGAMI avoided the torpedoes fired by the MC GOWAN and
by the best of luck was in the gap caused by the failure to fire of the
MELVIN's No. 6 torpedo. At 0310 she changed back to the base course of
000° (T) and at 0311 increased speed in order to move ahead of the FUSO.
It is interesting to note that neither the FUSO nor the MOGAMI reported
the FUSO torpedo hit to Commander THIRD Section.**
While the reason for the failure of the FUSO to report damage appears
to have been due, in part, to the loss of power as pointed out above and
may have been due also to the fact that she may not have been able to
communicate even by blinker with Commander THIRD Section, the failure of
the Commanding Officer MOGAMI to report the damage to the FUSO is less
clear. Perhaps he felt that (a) since he had observed the torpedo hit it
was likely that the YAMASHIRO had also observed it and (b) since the FUSO
was gradually falling astern Commander THIRD Section was aware of it.
BECAUSE OF RADIO DISPATCHES SENT TO COMMANDER FIRST STRIKING FORCE AND
VOICE RADIO MESSAGES SENT LATER TO THE FUSO BY THE YAMASHIRO,** IT SEEMS
PROBABLE THAT COMMANDER THIRD SECTION DID NOT KNOW THAT THE FUSO HAD
FALLEN OUT OF FORMATION. WHILE THIS MAY SEEM SURPRISING IT WAS NOT
NECESSARILY SO FOR IT WAS NIGHT AND THE FLASHES FROM THE GUNS, TOGETHER
WITH THE INTENTNESS OF ALL HANDS TOWARD THE REPULSE OF THE TORPEDO ATTACK
TO STARBOARD, LIKELY HAD TEMPORARILY PUT ASIDE THOUGHTS OF THE FORMATION.
WHILE THIS SHOULD NOT APPLY TO WELL TRAINED LOOKOUTS IT OBVIOUSLY DID
APPLY IN THIS CASE.
HOWEVER, IN APPRAISING THIS FAILURE OF COMMANDER THIRD SECTION TO KNOW
THAT THE FUSO HAD BEEN TORPEDOED AND HAD FALLEN OUT OF FORMATION, IT
SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT A SIMILAR LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OCCURRED DURING THE
BATTLE-CRUISER PHASE OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND WHERE THE INDEFATIGABLE, THE
LAST SHIP IN COLUMN OF THE SIX BRITISH BAfTLE-CRUISERS, EXPLODED AND SANK
IN BROAD DAYLIGHT WITHOUT THE BATTLE-CRUISER COMMANDER IN THE LION, WHICH
LED THE FORMATION, BEING AWARE OF IT FOR SOME MINUTES.***
* Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
*** Commander Holloway Halstead Frost, USN, The Battle of Jutland,
Annapolis, 1936, Page 205; also Rear Admiral W. S. Chalmers, Royal
Navy, Life and Letters of David Earl Beatty, London, 1951, Page 233.
325 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
At 0309, when the SHIGURE was just about to join the column of
destroyers ahead of the YAMASHIRO, COMDESDIV FOUR decided that it would be
well to form battle formation and therefore at this time, and seemingly on
his own initiative, directed the YAMAGUMO to form column.* It is assumed
that the YAMAGUMO, which had slowly been regaining station, immediately
increased speed to about twenty-four knots and changed course to about
350°(T) to take station as the third destroyer in column and therefore
between the ASAGUMO and the SHIGURE. Once she had taken her station the
battle formation would be finally formed with ships in column as follows:
MICHISHIO, ASAGUMO, YAMAGUMO, SHIGURE, YAMASHIRO and MOGAMI.* The FUSO
was swinging out of column as shown on Diagram "Gn.
This appears to have been a deviation from Japanese doctrine which
provided that the OTC would initiate changes in formation.
By 0311 the range to the attacking destroyers (MELVIN) had opened to
about 13,600 yards but, despite this, and despite the smoke interference,
the ships of the THIRD Section continued to fire. This gunfire, owing to
the inadequacy of the radar and illumination, was highly ineffective,
making no hits whatsoever.**
At this time Commander THIRD Section received a voice radio contact
report from the SHIGURE that she had sighted two dark objects bearing
300° (T).* These were the MC DERMUT and MONSSEN of the Western Attack Group
which, at the moment of sighting, were 9,000 yards away and were making
their torpedo attack,*** The SHIGURE appeared to have had unusually
capable lookouts, even by Japanese standards, for her sightings of both the
Eastern and Western Attack Groups were at ranges greater than those to the
leading destroyers, although less than those to the heavy ships.
The ships of the THIRD Section, hearing this contact report and
realizing that the Allied destroyers which were retiring to starboard were,
under the existing situation, beyond effective range, now decided that the
new targets were more fruitful and dangerous than were the old targets and
therefore checked fire preparatory to opening fire to port.
One of the ships of the THIRD Section now illuminated the two dark
objects which were apparently illuminated sufficiently thereby to warrant
opening fire against them. These were the two destroyers MC DERMUT and
MONSSEN which comprised the Western Attack Group and which had already
(0310:15 - 0311:30) fired their torpedoes and were now retiring while
making heavy smoke.*** Certain of the Japanese ships promptly commenced
firing.
At 0313 the YAMAGUMO reported a torpedo track bearing 350°(T).* This
was likely a false sighting since no Allied torpedoes were in this area at
this time. Almost simultaneously with the receipt of this report,
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao Strait,
Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 19A4, Serial 055, November
12th, 1944.
*** Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
326 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
Commander THIRD Section observed a green tinted parachute flare on the
bearing of, but beyond, the Allied destroyers, which flare illuminated
some motor torpedo boats as well as the destroyers.*
These were PT's 323, 328 and 329 which were patrolling off Amaguson
Point,**
The source of the flare is not known. Despite the fact that the
Commanding Officer SHIGURE thought that it was Allied and was being
employed for artillery spotting,*** it appears to have been one of the
Japanese planes which had been ordered by Commander THIRD Section to make
contact on the enemy and then guide the THIRD Section into Leyte Gulf.
The pilot of this plane operating in complete darkness accomplished his
task of contacting the enemy very efficiently, but not effectively, because
the Allied destroyers had fired and had commenced their retirement prior
to this illumination.
Although Commander THIRD Section at 0314 directed COMDESDIV FOUR to
"carry out observation for torpedo action" he did not react otherwise to
the sighting of the above ships or to the torpedo wakes. However, between
these reports and 0316, he decided that it was possible that the enemy
destroyers had fired torpedoes and that he should take immediate and
drastic evasive action for at that time he ordered emergency simultaneous
ship turns of ninety degrees*** to starboard to course 090° (T) which was
executed promptly by all ships still in formation, including the YAMAGUMO,
which had just entered column (Diagram "G").
It is believed that this radical maneuver caused the ships to check
fire, as no firing was reported at this time by the Allied ships which
were retiring behind smoke screens.
At this time he made his first report of ship sightings on other than
motor torpedo boats to Commander FIRST Striking Force as follows: "Sighted
what appear to be three ship silhouettes, apparently enemy",**** Why he
did not report the five destroyers which he had already sighted is not
explained but it seems likely that this dispatch had been prepared
immediately after he had sighted the Eastern Attack Group, and before he
had sighted the Western Attack Group, and had been delayed in transmission.
At 0317:30 he decided to return to base course (000°(T)) and changed
course to the left to that course by emergency simultaneous ship turns
of ninety degrees*** which ironically enough placed his ships in the path
of the twenty torpedoes fired about eight minutes before by the MC DERMUT
* Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
** Action Report PT 323, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
*** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
**** Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 250316 October 1944 to Commander 1ST
Striking Force, Detailed Action Report No. 13, DESRON 10, SHO
Operations, October 17th - 31st, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
327 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
and MONSSEN. What prompted him to return to base course is not known,
but a turn back before sighting the enemy torpedoes or before allowing a
reasonable tirie for their passage is considered unwise, and is often a
costly procedure. In this case, as will be shown later, it proved to be
very costly indeed.
Graphic analysis of the tracks of the torpedoes fired and the tracks
of the ships of the THIRD Section (see Diagram "G") show that, had
Commander THIRD Section continued on his eastern course until after 0320,
his ships would have undoubtedly outrun the torpedoes in the vicinity of
the YAMASHIRO (which had been fired at extreme range for intermediate
speed setting), and combed the tracks of the remainder.
During the time the THIRD Section was returning to her base course,
the YAMAGUMO inquired, at 0318:30, as to the speed of COKDESDIV FOUR,*
apparently to adjust station in the column or to insure that she had not
missed a speed signal. Whether or not she heard the reply (our speed
twenty knots)* is not known, but it is not believed that she did for at
0318 and 0319 the two torpedo spreads of the Western Attack Group struck
the THIRD Section with stunning suddenness. The YAMAGUMO (observed by
both the SHIGURE* and MOGAMI**) was hit by two or more torpedoes
simultaneously which caused her to explode and sink almost instantly. The
MICHISHIO received a hit in the port engine room,*** the A3AGUM0 a hit
below No. One gun, severing the bow,*** and the battleship YAMASHIRO one
torpedo which apparently did not cause much damage,**** but slowed her down
to ten knots for the next eight minutes as shown by Allied radar ranges.
Only the SHIGURE and MOGAMI escaped unharmed. This was because (a) the
SHIGURS was in the gap between the torpedo spreads of the MC DERMUT and
MONSSEN and (b) the MOGAMI was south of the torpedo spreads, not having
closed the gap left by the FUSO, which was now drifting slowly southward
about two miles south of the YAMASHIRO. The FUSO, because of this, escaped
further damage at this time.
The explosion of the YAMAGUMO was sighted as far as the battle line,
twenty miles to the north,***** was seen by most of the Allied ships, and
was certainly seen by Commander THIRD Section. The MICHISHIO and ASAGUMC
slowed down almost immediately. The SHIGURS turned out to port slightly to
avoid the sinking YAMAGUMO.
*~~ Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944," WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
*** Composite Report on Surigao Strait Action by Commanding Officers
ASAGUMO (Commander Kazuo Shibayama, ex-IJN) and MICHISHIO (Conmander
Kazuo Tanaka, ex-IJN), March 15th, 1946, Army Historical Division
Microfilm HS-39A.
**** Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 250330 October 1944 to Commanders
1ST and 2ND Striking Forces, Detailed Action Report BATDI? 1, SHO
No. 1 Operation, October 18th - 23th, 1944, WDC Document 161005,
NA 11744.
***** Action Report CTG 77.2 (COMCRUDIV 4), Battle of Surigao Strait,
Philipoine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd,
1944.
328 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
Thus, at 0320, only three ships remained of the THIRD Section to
continue to fight. That the formation was now completely disrupted seems
clear for the remaining ships, with the single exception of the MOGAMI,
no longer followed the tactical signals issued by Commander THIRD Section.
(B) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force, 0245 - 0320, October 25th,
Commander SECOND Striking Force, still in the heavy squall, continued
on at twenty-six knots toward the strait without incident.
During this period he was monitoring the radio telephone net and likely
heard reports of the various sightings of enemy silhouettes and torpedo
tracks by ships of the THIRD Section. He was quite concerned about these
sightings for, at O3O8, he called Commander THIRD Section and requested
that he "Notify situation'1.* No answer is recorded in the SHIGURE voice
log or elsewhere; however, the voice log indicates that the inquiry was
not pressed further.
At 0311 he changed course to 020°(T) as his dead reckoning navigation
indicated he was at the entrance to Surigao Strait,** Actually, his force
had been set to the west by the flood current flowing from the strait into
the Mindanao Sea and, probably unknown to him, was still about five miles
from the line joining Binit Point (Panaon) and Bilaa Point (Mindanao).
The set caused him to make the turn too early (Diagram "I"). Whether or
not he realized that he was near to land is not known but, since he now
slowed to twenty-two knots,** the indications are that he was somewhat
doubtful of his dead reckoning navigation, and was unable to rely on his
radar.
About 0318 the USHIO, which at this time had regained her proper
position on the port bow of the NACHI, sighted land close ahead and on the
starboard bow. She immediately put her rudder full left and started to
swing to the left to avoid grounding. It is of interest that her radio
telephone was inoperable and she could not warn the other ships by this
means .***
About 0319 his force emerged from the squall and he could see the
mountains of Panaon Island (Mt. Nelangcapan) on his port bow seven
kilometers away,** (Diagram "I").
At 0320, the flagship of Commander SECOND Striking Force was bearing
163° (T), distant approximately two miles from Binit Point.
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off the Philippines, October
24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007,
*** Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation, Southwest Area
Operation, Commander Kokichi Mori, ex- UN, 2ND Striking Force Staff
Torpedo Officer, GHQ, FEC Special Historical Collection Supporting
Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Historical
Report on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (item 22,
Foot locker 5 of 10, SWPA Series, Volume II).
496799 O - 59 -31
329 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
CHAPTER XIII - ALLIED OPERATIONS, 0245 - 0320, OCTOBER 25TH.
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2, 0245 - 0320, October 25th.*
Having established radar contact aboard his flagship, CTG 77.2 was now
in a position to observe the progress of the enemy up the strait, although
he was unable to evaluate the contact because, due to the long range, the
picture was still quite indistinct. The enemy information had been
fragmentary since 0026 and even now, with the enemy within radar range,
he still did not know the composition of the force. The MC GOWAN now, at
0246, sent an amplifying report which increased the contact to three ships
in column on course north.** This was one ship more than had been last
reported by the motor torpedo boats at 0225.
At 0254 he received a report from his flagship that the target was
bearing 181° (T), range 50,000 yards.*** From" this he deduced that the
enemy was continuing up the strait.
IT MIGHT BE WELL AT THIS POINT TO DIGRESS FROM THE ACTION TO POINT OUT
THAT UP TO THIS TIME HE HAD RECEIVED NO CONTACT REPORTS FROM THE SHIPS OF
TG'S 77.2 AND 77.3, AND BUT TWO FROM TG 79.11, AND THIS DESPITE THE FACT
THAT MANY OF THE ABOVE SHIPS HAD ALREADY ESTABLISHED RADAR CONTACT AND HAD
COMMENCED TRACKING. WHY WAS THIS SO? THE ANSWER IS NOT CLEAR CUT, BUT IT
SEEMS THAT, IN GENERAL, THIS INFORMATION WAS HELD WITHIN EACH SHIP AND WAS
EMPLOYED FOR THE SOLUTION OF THAT SHIP'S TRACKING PROBLEMS, WITHOUT ANY
REFERENCE TO THE DISPOSITION OTC. PERHAPS, SINCE ALL MAJOR SHIPS WERE
EQUIPPED WITH RADAR, IT WAS BELIEVED UNNECESSARY TO RELAY INFORMATION TO
THEM WHICH SHOULD BE AVAILABLE ON THEIR RADAR SCOPES;**** PERHAPS IT WAS
FELT THAT THIS INFORMATION WOULD BE REPORTED MORE FULLY BY THE ATTACKING
DESTROYERS; PERHAPS, ALTHOUGH A PRIMARY VOICE CHANNEL IN ADDITION TO THE
TBS VOICE RADIO HAD BEEN MADE AVAILABLE, A LACK OF PREVIOUS TRAINING IN
THE OPERATIONS OF THE SYSTEM WAS RESPONSIBLE.
WHATEVER MAY HAVE BEEN THE REASON, THE FAILURE OF HIS MAJOR SHIPS TO
TRANSMIT CONTACT REPORTS WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT DOCTRINE*****
WHICH REQUIRED THAT A THOROUGHLY COMPETENT CIC BE ESTABLISHED IN THE
FLAGSHIP (OR OTHER DESIGNATED UNIT) TOGETHER WITH A RELIABLE PROCEDURE FOR
THE REPORTING OF CONTACTS AND THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN SHIPS.
THIS WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE DECISIONS HAD TO BE MADS BY THE DISPOSITION
OTC AND THESE DECISIONS COULD BE SOUND ONLY IF BASED ON COMPLETE INFORMATION.
* All information here, unless otherwise indicated, obtained from
Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
** Action Report COMDESDIV 103, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
*** Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao Strait,
Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0045,
November 7th, 1944.
**** Action Report HMAS ARUNTA, Night Action, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial l/41, October 29th, 1944.
***** Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Fleet (U3F 10A), United
States Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1944, Part
VI, Paragraph 6100.
330 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
At 0255, realizing that TG 79.11 should presently be in position to
obtain a much clearer definition of the enemy than was being received by
the ships of his own command, he requested CTG 79.11 to report to him when
he had the enemy on his radar scope and the number of ships.*
Immediately thereafter at 0256 he received CTG 79.H!s reply to his
query as to the number of ships in the enemy formation. This reply was to
the effect the enemy was five and one-half miles west of Tungo Point and
consisted of five ships of which two were large and three small.**
This was of interest in that it confirmed the 2310 motor torpedo boat
report. He now had reason to believe that this was the total composition
of this force. If this was so, his problem would be simple for he vastly
outnumbered the enemy in both ships and gun power even though the two
large enemy ships might be battleships.
At 0253 he likely intercepted CTG 79.11' s message designating torpedo
targets to his ships and indicating that at least three targets were
present.*** At 0259 he intercepted CTG 77. V s order to his right flank
destroyers to attack with torpedoes, following the attacks of TG 79.11*
He now knew that torpedo attacks were in progress simultaneously although
the first was well advanced. This was, of course, highly gratifying in
that it indicated that all operations were proceeding smoothly and in
accordance with plan.
At 0300 he observed flares and gunfire to the south. This was the
commencement of the action between the Japanese THIRD Section and the
Eastern Attack Group.
He now endeavored to estimate the enemy's plan. It seemed incredible
to him that the enemy would proceed up Surigao Strait with such limited
forces and in the face of strong opposition. He decided that (a) the enemy
must have incorrect information as to the strength and location of the
Allied defending forces in Leyte Gulf and (b) this was likely due to the
fact that on previous nights he had left his battleships with the
transports in the transport areas and had patrolled the northern entrance
of Surigao Strait with the cruisers and some of the destroyers of TG 77.2.
This estimate was correct in its general concept but it was incorrect
in fact. The Japanese concept, as discussed under "Operations of Commander
THIRD Section, 1830 - 2400, October 24th", was that the movement of their
FIRST Striking Force through the Sibuyan Sea would attract the Allied
'■ Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
* Action Report REKEY, Assault on Leyte Island and the Battle of
Surigao Strait, Serial 008, November 5th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 79.11 (COKDSSRON 54), Night Action in Surigao Strait,
Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055, November
12th, 1944.
331 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
major strength from Leyte Gulf to the waters east of Samar and would
thereby make it possible for the THIRD Section to penetrate into Leyte
with relative ease.*
At 0303, as Commander Left Flank Force, he (a) changed course to
090° (T) and (b) may have received word from CTG 79.11 that he was being
straddled, had fired his torpedoes and was retiring northward.** Whether
or not he knew at this time that this firing referred only to the Eastern
Attack Group is not known.
At 0306 he intercepted a message from Commander Battle Line to the
battle line ordering a similar change of course to the east.***
At 0308 he received a second dispatch from CTG 79.11 that "there was
just one group; two large and one small. We are being straddled now. All
headed north in one column11.****
Also at 0308 he noted that the enemy had now closed sufficiently to
make radar definition possible. At this time the enemy was bearing 176° (T),
range 38,400 yards, and was estimated from his radar scope to consist of
two large and three small ships on course 015° (T), speed twenty knots.
This estimate, based as it was on a long range picture, was fairly correct.
The enemy actually consisted of seven ships, viz., two battleships, one
heavy cruiser and four destroyers.
Since he makes no comment in his action report concerning the movements
of the destroyers of TG 79.11, it seems likely that he either did not have
them on his radar scope or did not follow their attack.
At 0311 he received a TBS voice radio message from CTG 79.11 reporting
two large targets and one small target, all heading north in column. What
he thought of this report is nowhere stated but since it was in obvious
disagreement with his own radar scopes it is probable that it had no
effect on him except to confuse him.
At 0312 he observed a searchlight bearing 180o(T). This was a portion
of the illumination being employed by the Japanese to drive off the
attacking destroyers of TG 79.11.
* USSBS Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Nav. No. 47, Interrogation
of Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita, CinC 2ND Fleet, Volume I, Page 32; also
Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki, IJN (CCMBATDIV 1), Personal Diary,
SENSOROKU, Nippon Shuppan Kyodo Kabushiki Kaisha (Tokyo, March 15th,
1953) Volume II.
** Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055,
November 12th, 1944.
*** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
**** Ibid.; also Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
332 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
At 0317 he believed that the enemy appeared to be maneuvering because
his CIC had reported that the target was now on course 030°(T), speed
eighteen knots. He was correct in this belief for the enemy in order to
avoid the attack of the Western Attack Group had commenced evasive
maneuvers. By this time, he had received reports from CTG 79.11 and
COMDESDIV 108 that torpedo firing had been completed by these two attack
groups.
He also received a report from CTG 79.11 to the effect that five
targets were observed of which two seemed to be slowing down. This report
again raised the total of enemy ships to five, but now two of them may
have been hit and damaged, since they appeared to be slowing down.
Actually, the FUSO had been hit with one or more torpedoes and had slowed
down, falling back on the MOGAMI. This movement had created an illusion
that both ships had slowed down.
This slowing down of one or more Japanese ships was observed in the
LOUISVILLE, for the LOUISVILLE track chart shows that, at 0319, at least
one large "pip" was some 6,000 yards south of the leading heavy ship.*
The LOUISVILLE also showed four small ships in the vicinity of the damaged
large ship* but, since no Japanese ships other than the FUSO had fallen
back, this latter evaluation was erroneous.
At 0319 he intercepted a message from COMDESDIV 108 to CTG 79.11 that
he had scored "a hit and a big flare on one ship".** This explosion,
which had been observed from the flagship also, was the explosion of the
destroyer YAMAGUMO. At this time the leading large enemy ship was bearing
190° (T), distant 22,000 yards from the LOUISVILLE* and tracked on course
030° (T) at fourteen knots.
Also at 0319, not being satisfied with the information he had received
at 0317 from CTG 79.11 in that this information did not include the types
of ships, he queried that commander as to the types.**
The battle line was now on course 090°(T) at ten knots, while' the left
flank forces remained at five knots. Why CTG 77.2 did not direct Commander
Battle Line to slow to five knots is not known, but it is likely that he
was too concerned with the approach of the enemy, which now was within gun
range of his cruisers, to note that Commander Battle Line was not maintaining
the fleet speed of five knots.
At 0320 the disposition guide (MISSISSIPPI) was bearing 304°(T), distant
twelve and one-quarter miles from Kanhandon Point Light, Hibuson Island.
At this same time his flagship, the LOUISVILLE, was bearing 133° (T),
distant 9,700 yards from the MISSISSIPPI and 297° (T), distant seven point
six miles from Kanhandon Point Light (Diagram "H")#
* Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao Strait,
Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0045,
November 7th, 1944.
** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
333 CONFIDENTIAL
COM 3ATTLE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
(1) Operations of Commander Battle Line, 0245 - 0320, October 25th.
At 0245 the battle line, in condition of Readiness ONE, was still
on course 270°(T) at ten knots.
Since the battle line was the unit most distant from the enemy, no
radar contacts had as yet been established by any of the ships. The
MC GO.VAN's contact at 0241 (bearing 184°(T), distant 36,000 yards)* had,
however, been received and plotted and showed the enemy to be about thirty-
one miles to the south.
At this stage, Corjnander Battle Line could only watch the
developing situation as reported by the units of TG 79.11, which had
already commenced their approach.
At 0243 the MARYLAND contacted a surface target on bearing 191°(T),
range 55,000 yards.* This contact, which was not reported to Commander
Battle Line, was quite accurate in range, but was somewhat inaccurate in
bearing in that it placed the enemy nearly ten miles to the west of its
actual track.
At about 0300 he observed gunfire and illumination to the south.*
This was the commencement of the battle between the Japanese THIRD
Section and the Eastern Attack Group. As has been shown previously, the
Japanese initially employed searchlights to illuminate the attacking
destroyers.
At 0302 the TENNESSEE made contact on the enemy on bearing 170°(T),
range 43,700 yards,** and at 0304 the WEST VIRGINIA did the same on
bearing 164°(T), range 44,000 yards.*** These contacts were not reported
to Commander Battle Line nor to the ships of the battle line.
About this time Commander Battle Line likely intercepted a report
from Commander Eastern Attack Group that he had fired his torpedoes and
was retiring northward.
At 0305, having reached the western limit of his patrol, he
commenced reversing course 180° to the right to course 090° (T ).****
At 0306 he received his first contact report from the ships of the
battle line. This report was from his flagship, MISSISSIPPI, on bearing
167°(T), range 43,000 yards.**--* From this contact he could estimate that
the enemy was about twenty-two miles to the south which was reasonably
correct. He did not report this contact either to his command or to CTG 77.2.
*~ Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of Surigao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November
24th, 1944; also Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944.
** Action Report TENNESSEE, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 0108, October 31st, 1944.
*** Action Report WEST VIRGINIA, Battle of Surigao Straits, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0533, November 1st, 1944.
**** Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of Surigao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November
24th, 1944.
334 CONFIDENTIAL
COM BATTLE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
The MISSISSIPPI now reported that the target appeared to be two or
three large ships on various northerly courses at seventeen knots.* It is
of interest that this evaluation, although confirmed by CTG 79.11 at 0309,
who reported that he was being straddled by a group of two large ships
and one small ship heading north, was incorrect in that the enemy force
consisted of three large and four small ships. However, this was not
known to Commander Battle Line, who, since this information was very
similar to that recently given by the motor torpedo boats, likely was
forced to the conclusion that the enemy force was small indeed.
At 0312 he heard a TBS voice radio report from Commander Western
Attack Group that he had fired his torpedoes.**
At about this same time contacts were made on the enemy by the
ships of the battle line as follows: (a) at 0310 by the TENNESSEE on
bearing 165°(T), range 39,000 yards,*** (b) at 0312 by the CALIFORNIA on
three ships in column on bearing 162°(T), range 1*2,000 yards,**** (c) at
0313 by the MISSISSIPPI on two large and three small targets which seemed
to be forming a larger target from the northwestward on bearing 175°(T),
range 36,500 yards,* (d) at 0314 by the MARYLAND at 43,000 yards***** and
(e) at 0315 by the WEST VIRGINIA on two (large) targets at 42,000 yards.**
The variations in range as reported by the different ships were due,
in part, to ranging on different targets in the same formation, in part, to
ranging on different formations and, in part, (as discussed under "Operations
of Commander THIRD Section, 0245 - 0320, October 25th") to the fact that
the THIRD Section at this time was shifting from a search formation to a
single column battle formation and the destroyers in the van were forming
column on the battleships which were already in column. The battle
formation being formed was to consist of four destroyers in column in the
van, distance 700 meters, followed by the two battleships and the heavy
cruisers, also in column, distance 1,000 meters. The leading battleship
was to be about 2,000 meters astern of the last destroyer when the formation
was complete (Plate "XX").
Commander Battle Line received only two of the above contacts,
namely that by the MISSISSIPPI and that by the WEST VIRGINIA.****** Since
these contacts differed by as much as 5,500 yards, he probably wondered
* Action Report MISSISSIPPI, Battle of Surigao Strait, Philippine
Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0141, November 21st, 1944.
** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
*** Action Report TENNESSEE, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 0108, October 31st, 1944.
**** Action Report CALIFORNIA, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 0024, November 3rd, 1944.
***** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944.
****** Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of
Surigao Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201,
November 24th, 1944.
335 CONFIDENTIAL
COM BATTLE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
why the ranges were so divergent and why he had heard nothing from his
other ships. In reality these two contact reports were on entirely
different forces; one friendly, one enemy. The MISSISSIPPI'S contact
appears to have been on the Western Attack Group whereas that of the WEST
VIRGINIA, while on the enemy, did not indicate on what part of the enemy.
In this connection it should be pointed out that at the very time
(0315) the WEST VIRGINIA was reporting "two targets at 42,000 yards", her
Combat Information Center was reporting the composition as three small,
one medium and one large pip at a range, presumably on the large ship, of
39,000 yards.* At 0315, from plotting, the leading battleship, YAMASHIRO,
was bearing 168°(T), distant 38,100 yards from the WEST VIRGINIA.
It is not known here, any more than it was known in the case of
CTG 77.2, why the ships of the battle line, with the single exception of
the WEST VIRGINIA, failed to report their early contacts either to
Commander Battle Line or to one another. It was important information,
particularly to the battle line OTC who was responsible for making the
tactical decisions.
IT WILL BE OBSERVED THAT COMMANDER BATTLE LINE REMAINED AT TEN
KNOTS DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD HEREIN DISCUSSED. THIS WAS NOT SOUND
PROCEDURE. THE FLEET SPEED PROVIDED IN CTG 77.2'S (THE OFFICER IN
TACTICAL COMMAND) BATTLE PLAN WAS FIVE KNOTS WHICH SPEED SHOULD HAVE BEEN
MAINTAINED UNLESS THE OFFICER IN TACTICAL COMMAND GAVE ORDERS TO THE
CONTRARY.** THIS HE HAD NOT DONE. IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT IF THE GUIDE
DOES NOT MAINTAIN A STEADY COURSE OR A UNIFORM SPEED OTHER SHIPS WILL
ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES IN ATTEMPTING TO MAINTAIN ACCURATE POSITION*** AND,
AS HAS BEEN POINTED OUT ELSEWHERE, THIS HAD ALREADY OCCURRED.
During the foregoing, at 0312, Commander Battle Line observed
gunfire, searchlights and starshells to the south, and heard over the TBS
voice radio that the We stern Attack Group had fired all torpedoes. At
0314 he intercepted an intelligence estimate from CTG 79.11 to CTG 77.2
to the effect that the enemy force consisted of a total of five ships,
two of which were slowing down.****
At 0320 the WEST VIRGINIA was bearing 306° (T), distant eleven
point four miles from Kanhandon Point Light and the closest enemy
battleship, the YAMASHIRO, which was in the van of the heavy units, was
approximately 37,000 yards from the WEST VIRGINIA (Diagram "H").
* Action Report WEST VIRGINIA, Battle of Surigao Straits, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0538, November 1st, 1944.
** General Tactical Instructions, United States Navy (FTP 183),
United States Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1942,
Chapter I, Section 9, Paragraph 1110.
*** Ibid., Chapter II, Section 13, Paragraph 222.
**** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
336 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
(2) Operations of Commander Left Flank Force, 0245 - 0320, October 25th.
At 0245 the Left Flank Forces were on course 270° (T) at five knots.
The LOUISVILLE, which had made the first radar contact at 0245 on bearing
183°(T), range 53,600 yards, was tracking the target.
At 0246 Commander Left Flank Force received an amplifying report
from the MC GOWAN which reported that the earlier contact which she had
reported had now become three or more ships in column on course 000°(T).*
The LOUISVILLE, as yet, had not been able to make any target evaluation.
At 0247 the DENVER made radar contact on what appeared to be three
ships on approximate bearing 180°(T), estimated range 55,000 yards,** but
did not report it. Likewise the PORTLAND made radar contact at 0251 on
bearing 175i°(T), range 54,000 yards, but also failed to report it.***
At 0254 Commander Left Flank Force received a report from the
flagship that the enemy was now on bearing 181°(T), distant 50,000
yards.**** The long range evidently made such a poor track that it was
not possible to make any target evaluation other than that the range
was closing.
IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT, OTHER THAN FROM HIS FLAGSHIP,
COMMANDER LEFT FLANK FORCE, LIKE COMMANDER BATTLE LINE, WAS NOT RECEIVING
TARGET INFORMATION FROM THE SHIPS OF HIS FORCE. HERE TOO, THE COMMANDER
AND THE SHIPS HAD FAILED TO UTILIZE A COMBAT INFORMATION NET TO EXCHANGE
TARGET INFORMATION.
At 0255 he knew, because he was also CTG 77.2, that CTG 79.11 had
been requested to report when he had the enemy on his screen and the
number of his ships.* At 0300 he received a reply to the effect that
there were five targets, two large and three small, about five and one-half
miles west of Tungo Point.* The reported location verified the position
of the enemy being tracked by the LOUISVILLE.****
At this same time, he observed gunfire and illumination to the
south. This was the commencement of the battle between the Japanese THIRD
Section and the Eastern Attack Group.
At 0302 he intercepted an order from CTG 77.3 to COMDESRON TWENTY-
FOUR to commence his torpedo attack.
At 0303 he received a report from CTG 79. U that TG 79.11 was being
straddled, had fired torpedoes and was retiring to the northward.
* Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
** Action Report DENVER, Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 0031, November 4th, 1944.
*** Action Report PORTLAND, Surface Engagement in Leyte Gulf, October
19th - 24th, 1944, Serial O64, October 25th, 1944.
**** Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao
Strait, Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
0045, November 7th, 1944.
337 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
At this time, he increased speed to ten knots and, at 0304.,
executed a reversal of course to the left to 090°(T). The speed increase
was temporary to facilitate the course reversal; the turn to the left
(battle line reversed by turn to the right about two minutes later) was
made, presumably, to open distance on the battle line.
At 0304, he observed that COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX (Commander Left
Flank Destroyers) had executed a course reversal, following the orders of
Commander Left Flank Force.
At 0308 he was informed that the enemy, bearing was 176°(T), range
38,400 yards and consisting of five ships, at least two of which were large,
had been tracked on course 015° (T), speed twenty knots.* Actually, the
THIRD Section was on course 000° (T) and making good about eighteen knots.
At 0311 he reduced speed to five knots. About this time he
received a message from CTG 79.11 reporting that the enemy now consisted
of but three ships, two large and one small, in column on a northerly
course,*
Also about this time he intercepted a message from Western Attack
Group to the effect that he had fired his torpedoes and was retiring to
the north.*
At 0312 he observed searchlights bearing 180°(T).*
At 0317 he received another message from CTG 79.11 to the effect
that there were now five targets of which two may have been hit and were
dropping back,* and word from the LOUISVILLE that the target appeared to
be making good a course of 010° (T) with speed varying between fourteen and
eighteen knots and that it appeared to be zigzagging.** The plot of
Commander Left Flank Force indicated that the enemy w^s on course 030°(T)
at a speed of eighteen knots.*
At 0319 he noted a large explosion in the enemy force bearing
190°(T), distant 22,000 yards,** at which time Commander Western Attack
Group was heard to report that he had scored a hit on one of the ships.*
At 0320 the LOUISVILLE was bearing 297°(T), distant seven point
six miles from Kanhandon Point Light, Hibuson Island (Diagram "H").
* Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
** Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao Strait,
Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0045,
November 7th, 1944.
338 CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
(3) Operations of Commander Right Flank Force (CTG 77.3), 0245 - 0320,
October 25th „*
Commander Right Flank Force, in his flagship, was now awaiting
amplification of the MC GOWAN's 0240 contact report. It will be recalled
that, except for motor torpedo boat reports previously received, he had
received no other contact reports. Owing to the range, his own command
had not as yet been able to make radar contact. At 024-6 he intercepted
the amplifying report expected which was to the effect that the 0240
contact had become three ships in column on course 0O0°(T).
At this time he was on station in the flag plot where he had the
information and communication facilities at hand to give him a comprehensive
picture of the developing situation. Through use of the Dead Reckoning
Tracer (DRT) plot, the Summary Plot, and a remote radar scope, he easily
followed the movements of own and enemy forces.
At 0247 he received his first report from his own command. This
report, received via the Task Group Common, was from the Commanding
Officer KILLEN, who stated that he had made radar contact on two or
three targets bearing 170°(T), range seventeen miles.** He then received,
likewise over the Task Group Common, an additional report at 0250 from
the DALY reporting a radar contact bearing 162°(T), range 30,500 yards.**
He may also have received at 0252 a report from the BOISE reporting a
radar contact bearing 164° (T), range 47,900 yards. *** HE DID NOT FORWARD
THESE REPORTS TO THE OTC, WHOM HE LIKELY KNEW WAS NOT GUARDING THE TG 77.3
TASK GROUP COMMON. THIS RESULTED IN THE DISPOSITION OTC'S NONRECEIPT OF
THIS IMPORTANT INFORMATION.
THE PERFORMANCE, AT THIS POINT, OF THE UNITS OF THE RIGHT FLANK
FORCE AS REGARDS THE REPORTING OF INITIAL CONTACTS, AND THE EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION BETWEEN THEMSELVES, WAS CONSIDERABLY SUPERIOR TO THAT OF THE
UNITS OF TG 77.2. BUT THE PERFORMANCE OF THE UNITS OF THE RIGHT FLANK
FORCE WITH RELATION TO THE DISPOSITION OTC WAS INFERIOR TO THAT OF THE
UNITS OF TG 77.2, BECAUSE, IN TG 77.2, SOME REPORTS HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY
THE DISPOSITION OTC FROM THE UNITS OF THAT TASK GROUP, WHEREAS NONE HAD
BEEN RECEIVED FROM COMMANDER RIGHT FLANK FORCE. THIS WAS PROBABLY DUE TO
THE FACT THAT THE UNITS OF THE RIGHT FLANK FORCE HAD BEEN OPERATING
TOGETHER FOR SOMETIME PRIOR TO THE LEYTE OPERATION AS UNITS OF THE COVERING
FORCE, AS WELL AS BOMBARDMENT UNITS, OF THE SEVENTH FLEET, AND HAD BEEN
OPERATING IN GENERAL UNDER THE DIRECT COMMAND OF COMCRUDIV FIFTEEN (CTG
77.3), WHO WAS USUALLY AN INDEPENDENT COMMANDER.**** THEY HAD, THEREFORE,
* All information here, unless otherwise indicated, obtained from
Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944.
** Ibid., Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report BOISE, Surigao Strait, morning of October 25th, 1944,
Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
*«hf COMCRUDIV 15, Report of the Bombardment of and Occupation of Momote
Airdrome for Negros Island, Serial 0017, March 11th, 1944; also
COMCRUDIV 15 Report of Covering Operations during landings in the
Cape Sansapor Area, New Guinea, July 28th - 31st, 1944, Serial 0200,
August 6th, 1944.
339 CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
BUILT UP A GOOD INTERNAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM WHICH FUNCTIONED EXCELLENTLY
WITHIN THE TASK GROUP BUT DID NOT FUNCTION ADEQUATELY WITH RELATION TO
THE DISPOSITION OTC.
At 0252, feeling that DESRON TWENTY-FOUR was gradually easing to
southward preparatory to attacking, he directed COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR not
to advance* until he had been given orders to do so. Since DESRON TWENTY-
FOUR was at this time on course 290°(T), this message indicates that the
picture on Commander Right Flank Force's scope at this time was confused
in that he was unable to distinguish his own destroyers from those of the
Western Attack Group.
In compliance with this order COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR, at 0254,
changed course to 000° (T).*
Commander Right Flank Force now reestimated the situation. He
knew, as a result of his pre-battle conference with CTG 77.2, that it was
that commander's plan to initiate destroyer attacks prior to engaging the
battle line, and that these attacks were to be unsupported by the gunfire
of the cruisers or the battleships. Instead, they were to be made from
positions close to shore where they would enjoy the protection afforded
by the effect of land masses on radar. He knew also that developments
being propitious, he was to launch the attacks of the right flank
destroyers since CTG 77.2 had delegated to him that task. He had felt
that this type of attack was somewhat dangerous in that the destroyers
might run into a "blasting defense", and he had planned holding them back
until they were within supporting gun range of his cruisers. However, he
had noted that TG 79.11, in advancing to the attack, had, up to this
moment, met no opposition whatsoever, and he realized that, even if his
destroyers did encounter serious opposition, DESRON FIFTY-SIX and DESDIV
XRAY, were available as reserves.
HE THEREFORE DECIDED THAT, ALTHOUGH HE PREFERRED TO LAUNCH HIS
DESTROYERS AT A TIME WHEN HE COULD SUPPORT THEM WITH HIS CRUISER GUNFIRE,
HE WOULD DISREGARD THAT PREFERENCE AND LAUNCH THE UNSUPPORTED ATTACK.
HE NOW AT 0255 ISSUED PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS TO COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR
AS FOLLOWS: "WHEN RELEASED ATTACK IN TWO GROUPS AND BE PREPARED TO MAKE
SMOKE. UNTIL THEN STAY CLOSE TO LAND."*
HIS CONCEPTS ABOVE, AS RELATED TO THE DESIRES OF CTG 77.2, WERE
CORRECT. CTG 77.2 FELT THAT, OWING TO THE LIMITED ARMOR PIERCING
AMMUNITION AVAILABLE, IT WAS NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH AS MUCH DAMAGE TO THE
ENEMY AS POSSIBLE WITH THE TORPEDOES PRIOR TO THE GUN ENGAGEMENT, SO THAT,
WHEN THE ENEMY HAD CLOSED TO THE PREDETERMINED GUN RANGE, THE GUNFIRE ON
THE REMAINING OR DAMAGED ENEMY SHIPS WOULD BE OVERWHELMINGLY DEVASTATING. **
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
340 CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
COMMANDER RIGHT FLANK FORCE'S INSTRUCTIONS TO ATTACK IN TOO GROUPS
WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH DESTROYER ATTACK DOCTRINE WHICH RECOMMENDED THAT
TORPEDO ATTACKS BY SIX DESTROYERS BE MADE FROM TWO ATTACK SECTORS IN
ORDER TO GAIN THE ADVANTAGE OF CROSSFIRE.*
At 0257 he received an amplifying report from the DALY that the
target was on course 005° (T), speed eighteen knots.
At 0258 he received CTG 79.11' s target designation for the
destroyers of his attack group.
Also at 0253, as a precaution prior to launching his destroyer
attack, he queried COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR as to whether he had the ships
of TG 79.11 on his radar scopes. To this he received an affirmative
reply.**
Having now verified in his own mind that the destroyers of DESRON
TWENTY-FOUR had both the enemy ships and the ships of TG 79.11 on their
radar scopes, he, at 0302, ordered COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR by TBS voice
radio to "Proceed to attack, follow down west shore line. Follow other
groups in, retire to northward. Make smoke."**
It seems likely, from this order, that Commander Right Flank Force
was still holding to his concept that it was possible that destroyers
making unsupported attacks against the THIRD Section might be blasted by
heavy gunfire. Therefore, knowing that his units were near the Western
Attack Group, he desired to insure that they "followed" rather than
"preceded" that group, in which case, the enemy gunfire, because of the
previous destroyer attacks, might be less destructive. He seems to have
felt that his destroyer commander was in a highly offensive state of mind
and might choose to be in the van of the destroyer attacks.
At 0303 he knew that the PHOENIX had made radar contact of one
large pip and two small pips, bearing l6l°(T), range 42,800 yards.***
This was extremely gratifying to him because he could now watch the
progress of the attacks, could keep a close check on the identity and
movements of all forces, and could support his destroyers if they met
ships of opposition. At this same time, after noting gunfire and
starshells to the south, he remarked in his action report that it was
comforting to him to observe the absence of reports of damage to the units
of TG 79.11. This clearly meant to him that (a) the Japanese gunfire was
inefficient, based on American standards, or (b) the destroyer attacks,
shielded as they were supposed to be by the land mass, had achieved a
measure of surprise.
* Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-43, Destroyer Torpedo Attack
Instructions issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific Fleet, Serial
01264, October 24th, 1943.
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944.
341 CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
At 0307 he intercepted COMDESRON TWENTY- FOUR'S instructions
directing the ARUNTA, with her three destroyers (ARUNTA (F), KILLEN and
BEALE), to follow the east group (Eastern Attack Group) down the strait,
while C0MDE5R0N TWENTY-FOUR, in the HUrCHINS with the* DALY and 3ACHE,
followed the west group (Western Attack Group) down the strait.* SINCE
HE TOOK NO EXCEPTION TO THIS MESSAGE IT SE5MS LIKELY THAT HE HAD
DETERMINED TO GIVE FREEDOM OF ACTION TO HIS SQUADRON COMMANDER, EVEN
THOUGH BY SO DOING, HE PERMITTED ATTACK GROUP 2.2 (ARUNTA) TO CROSS THE
STRAIT IN OPEN WATER, AND THEREFORE MADS LIKELY HER EARLY DETECTION BY
JAPANESE RADAR, WITH THE ENSUING POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED DAMAGE. WHY HE
DID THIS IS NOT EXPLAINED BUT IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT THE RELATIVELY
UNOPPOSED ATTACK BY CTG 79.11 HAD LESSENED HIS APPREHENSIONS CONSIDERABLY.
At 0308 he intercepted CTG 79.11' s report that (a) the enemy
consisted of but one group of ships, two large and one small, (b) they had
straddled him, and (c) his ships were firing torpedoes.* At this time,
the BOISE had a contact report on two groups, one of which was 2,000 yards
astern of the other;** however, she did not report this fact to CTG 77.3*
At 0312 he again heard CTG 79.11 report that there were five
enemy ships, with two battleships present and that two of the ships
appeared to be slowing down as a result of his attack.* At this time the
radar picture of the PHOENIX had not improved materially and still showed
the original contact of one large and two small pips.***
At this time also, he intercepted the report of Commander Western
Attack Group that all torpedoes were away and that he was coming back*
(retiring northward).
At 03 14 he heard COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR caution Commander Attack
Group 2.2 "there's another group of destroyers ahead of us to fire yet.
We must stay behind them".* This cautioning may have confused him
somewhat, because both units of TG 79.11 had completed firing and had so
reported by TBS voice radio at 0312. Suspecting that perhaps COMDESRON
TWENTY-FOUR had another enemy group on his scope, he, at 0315, queried
that commander as to whether he had the targets on his scope, and, if so,
the range and bearing from him. He received a reply about one minute
later to the effect that the target on course 003°(T), speed nineteen
knots, was bearing 146°(T), range 13,000 yards.* Since this clearly was
the same enemy force that had just been attacked, he realized that it was
highly probable that COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR had failed to receive Commander
Western Attack Group's 0312 report of all torpedoes away. If this was his
belief, it was correct.
At 0317 he heard COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR order Commander Attack Group
2.2 to "boil up, make smoke. Let me know when you have fired. Retire to
northward."* From this, he knew that the destroyers of the right flank
were attacking.
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report BOISE, Surigao Strait, morning of October 25th, 1944,
Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
*** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944.
342 CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK CRUISERS
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
At 0319 he noted an explosion and large flash in the enemy area
and, at the same time, (a) intercepted Commander Western Attack Group's
report by TBS voice radio of having observed hits from his torpedoes,*
and (b) noted on his radar scope that some enemy ships seemed to be
falling behind. The range to the nearest target (MICHISHIO) was about
32,000 yards.
At this time he intercepted a message from CTG 77.2 to CTG 79.11
requesting information as to the types of ships in the enemy formation.*
At 0320 the flagship was bearing 014° (T), distant two point seven
miles from the northeastern tip of Cabugan Grande Island (Diagram "H").
(a) Operations of Commander Right Flank Cruisers, 0245 - 0320,
October 25th,
At 0245 the Right Flank Cruisers were stopped on course 075°(T)
to adjust position on the battle line which was still on a westerly course.
No radar contacts had been made in the Right Flank Force;
however, Commander Right Flank Cruisers had a fair idea of the movement
of the enemy since he had plotted the earlier contacts received over the
TBS voice radio. At 0247 he received from the KILLEN a radar contact
bearing 170°(T), range 34,000 yards and at 0252 he may have received a
contact report from the BOISE of a radar contact, bearing 164°(T), range
47,900 yards. At 0254 the BOISE noted that there appeared to be a second
group of targets about 2,000 - 4,000 yards astern of the first group but
she did not report it.
At 0303 he learned that the PHOENIX (flagship) had made an
initial radar contact bearing l6l°(T), range 42,800 yards on what appeared
to be one large pip and two smaller pips.**
At 0303 he increased speed to ten knots and changed course to
270°(T) to conform to the movements of the battle line.*
At 0313 he may have received the SHROPSHIRE'S initial radar
contact bearing l6l°(T), range 34,300 yards,*--*
At 0319 all three cruisers of the Right Flank sighted a large
explosion in the direction of the enemy. Actually, this was the explosion
of the YAMAGUMO,
At 0320, he could see from his radar scope that (a) some enemy
ships appeared to be drooping behind and (b) three large ships and one
small ship were still closing, the range to the nearest being about 32,000
yards. At this time the PHOENIX was bearing 014°(T), distant two point
seven miles from the northeastern tip of Cabugan Grande Island.
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (C0KCRUD1V 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C),
** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944.
*** Battle Report HMAS SHROPSHIRE, Night Action October 25th, 1944,
Serial SC1123/194, November 4th, 1944,
343 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
(b) Operations of COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR, 0245 - 0320, October 25th.*
At 0245 COMDESRON TWSNTY-FOUR, awaiting orders to attack, was
turning to course 290°(T), speed ten knots, in order to avoid the Western
Attack Group which was still a few miles to the north of his command and
heading directly toward him (Diagram "G"). As yet no radar contacts had
been made by any of his ships, nor had he made any interceptions of such
contact reports from any of the units of the battle disposition.
IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT HERE THAT COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR,
INSTEAD OF BEING ON THE BRIDGE AS WERE THE COMMANDERS OF THE EASTERN AND
WESTERN ATTACK GROUPS, WAS IN THE HUTCHINS « CIC WHERE HE HAD EXCLUSIVE
USE OF ONE REMOrE RADAR SCOPE. BY BEING IN THE CIC HE WAS ENA3LED NOT
ONLY TO OBSERVE HIS OWN SCOPE BUT TO CHECK HIS DATA WITH THAT OF THE
HUTCHINS. WHILE THERE V/AS NO DEFINITE DOCTRINE AT THIS TIME AS TO THE
CORRECT LOCATION OF THE DESTROYER ATTACK COMMANDER, IT SE^-IS CLEAR THAT
CERTAIN ADVANTAGES WERE INHERENT IN THE CIC LOCATION, NOTABLE, (A) HE WAS
IN AN ADMIRABLE POSITION TO GST FIRST HAND, WITHOUT TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION,
ALL OF THE INFORMATION HE REQUIRED TO CONDUCT SUCCESSFULLY, AN APPROACH
TO THE FIRING POSITION AND THEN TO CARRY OUT THE ATTACK ITSELF AND (B) HE
WAS NOT DISCONCERTED OR BLINDED OR HIS MIND DIVERTED FROM THE TASK AT HAND
BECAUSE OF THE NOISE AND FLASH OF OWN AND ENEMY GUNFIRE.
At 0247 he received, over the Task Group Common, a contact
report from the KILLEN, reporting two or three enemy ships, bearing
170°(T), range seventeen miles.** A minute later at 0243, he observed
the enemy on his radar scope, bearing 159°(T), range 30,000 yards.***
At this same time he received, also over the Task Group Common, a contact
report from the DALY reporting two or more targets, bearing 162°(T), range
30,500 yards.** He noted that, although the above ranges were consistent,
there was some disparity in the bearings but it is doubtful if he was
concerned about this at this long range. It was not important now to
have more accurate bearings but would be vital later.
At 0251 he knew, from TBS voice radio intercepts and from his
radar scope, that the ships of the Western Attack Group had turned
eastward to avoid his ships.
At 0252 he received an order from Commander Right Flank Force
directing him not to advance.
* All information here, unless otherwise indicated, obtained from Action
Report COMDESRON 24, Night Surface Engagement Surigao Strait, Leyte,
Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0129, October
30th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
344 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
This probably astonished him because he was on a westerly-
course, 290°(T), and was endeavoring to clear the approach water for the
Western Attack Group. It indicated to him that Commander Right Flank
Force's radar scope picture was somewhat confused. He therefore, at 0253,
changed course to 000° (T) in order to identify his group to the Right
Flank Force.*
At 0255 he received instructions from Commander Right Flank
Force over the Task Group Common (2748 kcs) as follows: "When released,
attack in two groups, and be prepared to make smoke; until then stay close
to land."
This order was not unexpected because doctrine recommended
that torpedo attacks by six destroyers should be made from two attack
sectors.** Anticipating this, he had already advised his command that
should there be a torpedo attack they would attack in two groups, one
consisting of the ARUNTA, KILLEN and BEALE and to be led by the Commanding
Officer ARUNTA; the other of the HUTCHINS (F), DALY and BACHE to be led
by himself. The assignment of the Commanding Officer ARUNTA, who was an
Australian, as the leader of the ARUNTA group, which consisted of one
Australian and two American destroyers, was in accordance with the
agreement made with the Australian government in 1942 which provided that
when the naval forces of the two powers were operating together and no
carrier operations were involved the senior officer of either power would
be in command.***
Meanwhile, the HUTCHINS had tracked the enemy on course north
at seventeen knots. While this was quite accurate as to the movement of
the enemy, COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR still was unable to discern the
composition of the enemy on his radar scope. Fortunately, at this time,
0256, he intercepted CTG 79.11' s reply to a query from CTG 77.2 which
reply gave the enemy composition as five targets, two large and three
small, four miles west of Kanihaan Island. Targets are all in column. ****
At 0258 he intercepted CTG 79.11' s target designation.
Immediately after this he received a message from Commander Right Flank
Force inquiring as to whether he had the ships of TG 79.11 on his screen.
He replied in the affirmative.**** At this time the Eastern Group was
only 20,000 yards away. By this reply he meant that he had both groups
of TG 79.11 on his radar scope.
* Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
** Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-43, Destroyer Torpedo Attack
Instructions issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific Fleet, Serial
01264, October 24th, 1943.
*** War Diary CINCPAC, April 16th, 1942.
**** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
496799 o - 59 - 32 345 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESRON TWENTY- FOUR
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
At 0302 he received orders from Commander Right Flank Force to
"Froceed to attack. Follow down west shore line. After attack retire to
north. Make smoke going down."*
He now commenced his attack and at 0303:30, with the enemy-
bearing about 151°(T), he commenced changing course to 130°(T). At this
time he received another message from Commander Right Flank Force directing
him again to make smoke.
At 0305 he increased speed to fifteen knots.** At this til
the ARUNTA, through mistake, increased speed to twenty- five knots. This
caused her to (a) move 1,500 yards ahead of the KILL?:, which had only
increased speed to fifteen knots and (b) endanger thereby the BACHL.
However, no damage ensued and she quickly slowed to the correct speed of
fifteen knots,* while the KILLEN endeavored to close her.***
At approximately 0307:30 he completed his turn and settled on
course 180°(T). Somehow, during the above turn, the DALY and BACHE fell
behind the HUTCHINS to a distance which gradually increased to about 1,000
yards. For reasons unexplained, they made no effort to close this distance
at this time, although it was doctrine that they keep correct station on
the leader.
As he moved to the south he watched, on the radar scope, the
two ships of the Western Attack Group make their aoproach. He estimated
from their actions thai- they would pass inshore of him on their retirement.
Therefore, in order not to lose time, for he had some distance to travel
to reach his torpedo attack point, he decided to start his approach with
both attack groups.
At 0307 he directed Commander Attack Group 2.2 (ARUNTA (F),
KILLEN, BEALE) to follow the Eastern Attack Group down, and stated that
he would follow the Western Attack Group down with Attack Group 1.2
(HUTCHINS (F), DALY, BACHE).**
THIS APPEARS TO HAVE BEE?; A MISUNDERSTANDING OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS
RECEIVED ONLY A FEW MINUTES BEFORE WHICH GAVE THREE BASIC ATTACK
RESTRICTIONS ON HIS ATTACKS. THESE WERE (A) TO ATTACK FROM THE WESTERN
SHORE LINE, (B) NOT TO ATTACK UNTIL THE PRECEDING DESTROYERS HAD COMPLETED
THEIR ATTACKS AND (C) TO RETIRE TO THE NORTHWARD MAKING SMOKE. DOES IT NOT
SEEM CLEAR THAr, BY ORDERING HIS COMMANDER ATTACK GROUP 2.2 TO FOLLOW THE
EASTERN ATTACK GROUP DOWN, HE THEREBY WAS ORDERING THAT GROUP TO CROSS
THE STRAIT TOWARD THE EASTERN SHORE AND PRESUMABLY AHEAD OF THE ENEMY?
THIS WOULD NOT ONLY PREVENT IT FROM ATTACKING FROM THE WESTERN SHORE AS
ORDERED, BUT WOULD ALSO, AS HAS BEEN POINTED OUT UNDER "OPERATIONS OF
COMMANDER RIGHT FLANK FORCE", MAKE LIKELY ITS EARLY DETECTION BY JAPANESE
RADAR o
*~~ Action Report HMAS ARUNTA, Night Action, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 1/41, October 29th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report KILLEN, Surface Engagement, Surigao Straits, October
24tn - 25th, 1944, Serial 0075, October 28th, 1944.
346 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
WHILE THERE WAS SUFFICIENT TIME FOR COMMANDER ATTACK GROUP 2.2
TO HAVE CROSSED THE STRAIT AHEAD OF THE ENEMY, AND TO HAVE THEN FOLLOWED
THE APPROXIMATE TRACK OF THE EASTERN ATTACK GROUP, THIS WOULD HAVE
REQUIRED CONSIDERABLY MORE TIME THAN WAS REQUIRED BY COMMANDER ATTACK
GROUP 1.2 TO REACH A SUITABLE TORPEDO FIRING POSITION ON THE BOW AND WOULD
FORCE THE LATTER COMMANDER (A) TO DELAY HIS ATTACK IN ORDER TO INSURE A
COORDINATED ATTACK OR (B) TO ABANDON ENTIRELY THE CONCEPT OF A COORDINATED
ATTACK ON BOTH BOWS.
WHAT HE HOPED TO ACCOMPLISH BY THIS ORDER IS NOWHERE FULLY
EXPLAINED BUT HE STATED LATER THAT HIS PLAN OF ATTACK FOR ATTACK GROUP 1.2
WAS NOT TO ATTACK ON THE BOW BUT INSTEAD TO TRY TO PROCEED SOUTHWARD
BELOW THE APPROACHING ENEMY FORCE SO THAT HE WOULD BE BETWEEN THE ENEMY
AND HIS AVENUE OF ESCAPE, SHOULD THE JAPANESE DECIDE TO RETIRE FROM THE
SCENE OF ACTION.
IF THIS WAS HIS PLAN IT WAS QUITE COURAGEOUS. HOWEVER, IT
APPEARS UNSOUND BECAUSE THE JAPANESE, IF THEY DECIDED (A) TO RETIRE,
WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ISOLATE HIM FROM THE ALLIED FORCES TO THE NORTH
AND DESTROY HIM SEPARATELY AND (B) TO CONTINUE ON, WOULD NOT BE IN SERIOUS
DANGER BECAUSE TORPEDO ATTACKS, FIRED FROM THE QUARTER, EVEN WHEN FIRED IN
COORDINATION WITH AN ATTACK ON THE BOW, OFFER A LOW PROBABILITY OF HITS
AND DEMAND A VERY SHORT EFFECTIVE RANGE. THIS MEANS THAT HIS DESTROYERS,
IF THEY HAD ATTACKED FROM THE QUARTER AND HAD EMPLOYED INTERMEDIATE SPEED
TORPEDOES, WOULD HAVE HAD TO CLOSE THE ENEMY TO AS NEAR AS 4,500 YARDS
TO BE WITHIN EFFECTIVE RANGE OF A TARGET MAKING EIGHTEEN KNOTS, WITH THE
RESULTANT INCREASED DANGER OF HEAVY DAMAGE FROM ENEMY GUNS.
WOULD IT NOT HAVE BEEN MORE CORRECT HAD HE ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS
FOR A COORDINATED ATTACK BY BOTH OF HIS ATTACK GROUPS ON THE ENEMY'S
PORT BOW SINCE BOTH ATTACK GROUPS WERE IN EXCELLENT POSITION TO REACH,
AT ABOUT 0320, THEIR CORRECT DOCTRINAL LAUNCHING POSITIONS FOR
INTERMEDIATE SPEED TORPEDO FIRING? WOULD NOT THIS ACTION, WHICH WAS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH DESTROYER DOCTRINE, HAVE CONTRIBUTED MORE COMPLETELY TO
THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF HIS SUPERIOR'S PLAN?
IN THIS ORDER COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR OMITTED ANY PROVISION
FOR A COORDINATED ATTACK AND MADE NO DESIGNATION OF ATTACK SECTORS.
HE PARTIALLY EXPLAINED THIS BY SAYING THAT HE HAD OMITTED THE
ABOVE INFORMATION BECAUSE HIS CAPTAINS HAD BEEN EXERCISED, DRILLED AND
FOUGHT AS A TEAM FOR EIGHTEEN MONTHS, KNEW HIS TACTICS AND APPROACH
PROCEDURES, AND, THEREFORE, IT WAS UNNECESSARY FOR HIM TO PROVIDE THEM
WITH ANY PARTICULAR INSTRUCTIONS OTHER THAN IMMEDIATE TACTICAL SIGNALS.
THIS VIEW WAS NOT THE VIEW OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER ARUNTA
WHO STATED THAT THE DESTROYERS ARUNTA, KILLEN AND BEALE HAD NEVER WORKED
TOGETHER AS A UNIT.*
Action Report RMAS ARUNTA, Night Action October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 1/41, October 29th, 1944.
347 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL O310 - 0320, October 25th
Between 03 10 and 0312 he twice directed Commander Attack Group
2.2 to commence his attack and in the second transmission cautioned him
to keep clear of returning destroyers.* Since this was an independent
attack, the operations of that group will be discussed separately,
following the discussion of the "Operations of Commander Attack Group 1.2."
(1) Operations of Commander Attack Group 1.2 (COMDESRON TWENTY-
FOUR), 0310 - 0320, October 25th.
Commander Attack Group 1.2, with Attack Group 1.2, continued
on course 180° (T) at fifteen knots. At this time the DALY and BACHE were
about 1,000 yards astern of the HUTCHINS.
At 0313, as COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR, he received a message
from Commander Attack Group 2.2 that that group was on course 140° (T),
speed twenty-five knots.** (Actually, ARUNTA's track chart shows course
145°(T).) He could see on his radar scope that Commander Western Attack
Group had not as yet cleared. He, therefore, at 0314, informed Commander
Attack Group 2.2 that there was "another group ahead of us to fire yet.
We must stay behind them".* This of course was in error since the Western
Attack Group had reported firing torpedoes at 0312.
It must have been clear to him from his radar scope and
from the fact that Attack Group 2.2 was reportedly on course 140°('T),
that Commander Attack Group 2.2 was not planning to cross the strait.
Inasmuch as he (a) made no effort to correct this action and (b) directed
Commander Attack Group 2.2 to remain behind the group ahead of them which
had not as yet fired, it can be inferred that he realized that his original
order to his destroyer squadron to attack from both the east and west had
not been in accordance with Commander Right Flank Force's directive, and
since the actions of Commander Attack Group 2.2 were in accordance with
that directive, he had decided to accept the new situation. COMDESRON 24
stated in a postwar statement that the above inference was correct.***
At this point, 0315, he received an inquiry from Commander
Right Flank Force who desired to know whether he had the enemy on his
scope and, if so, what was the range and bearing of the enemy formation.
He promptly replied that the enemy, on course 003°(T), speed nineteen
knots, was bearing 146°(T), range 13,000 yards.* (Actually, as of this
time, this report was in error, since from the HUTCHIN's track chart, the
above data was approximately correct for about 0312 rather than 0315.)
This seemed to satisfy Commander Right Flank Force for he received no
further queries from him.
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Statement of COMDESRON 24 (Rear Admiral K. M. McManus, USN, then
Captain) to Commodore R. W. Bates, USN (Ret), Head, World War II
Battle Evaluation Group, Naval War College, June 7th, 1954.
348 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0310 - 0320, October 25th
At 0317 when the Western Attack Force was crossing
inshore of his track, as COMDSSRON TWENTY-FOUR, he ordered Commander
Attack Group 2.2 to attack at high speed making smoke, to inform him upon
completion of firing, and to retire to northward.* He himself did not
increase the speed of Attack Group 1.2 nor make smoke at this time but
continued south at fifteen knots.**
It was interesting to note that up to 0318, which was
after the torpedo attacks had been completed by the two attack groups of
CTG 79.11, no reports of any sightings, such as gunfire, searchlights or
starshells were made by the ships of DESRON TWENTY-FOUR. It will be
recalled in this connection that during the period since 0300 the Japanese
had been firing starshells and projectiles with tracers, and employing
searchlight illumination to counter the attacks of TG 79.11 from either
side of the strait. This failure to report anything was likely due to
the heavy smoke screen laid down by the Western Attack Group during its
attack and retirement which lay between Attack Group 1.2 and the enemy.
However, this was changed at 0319 when the YAMAGUMO blew up and sank,
because the resulting explosion was sighted and reported by all three
ships of Attack Group 1.2. This was due to the fact that low hanging
smoke was not dense enough to screen the brilliance of such an explosion.
At 0320, to his great relief he observed the retiring
Western Attack Group would pass to the westward on opposite course. His
approach course to the enemy was now clear of friendly units.***
At this time the closest enemy ship (ASAGUMO) bore 109° (T),
range 13,000 yards from the HUTCHINS, which, in a very loose column
with the DALY and BACHE about 1,000 yards astern, was about 2,000 yards
off the east coast of Leyte in Latitude 10°-20'N. The ARUNTA, leading
Attack Group 2.2, was bearing 074°(T), distant 4,000 yards from the
HUTCHINS.
(2) Operations of Commander Attack Group 2.2, 0310 - 0320,
October 25th.
At 0311 Commander Attack Group 2.2 received orders from
Commander Attack Group 1.2 to commence his attack. Therefore, he increased
speed to twenty-five knots and changed course to 145° (T) to head for his
torpedo firing point. From graphic analysis it can be shown that this
course and speed would, if the enemy remained on Dresent course and speed,
bring him to a selected firing point on the port bow of the enemy.
Commander Attack Group 2.2 stated later that since the attack was not to
be supported by gunfire, it was his intention to reach a position 6,000 -
7,000 yards on the enemy's port bow to fire torpedoes ,**** This was
obviously the selected firing point.
* Action Report COMDESRON 24, Night Surface Engagement Surigao Strait,
Leyte, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0129,
October 30th, 1944.
** Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
*** Statement of COMDESRON 24 (Rear Admiral K.M. McManus, USN, then
Captain) to Commodore R.W. Bates, USN (Ret), Head, World War II
Battle Evaluation Group, Naval War College, June 7th, 1954.
-**** Action Report HMAS ARUNTA, Night Action October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 1/41, October 29th, 1944.
349 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 2.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0310 - 0320, October 25th
SINCE HIS PLAN WAS NOW CLEARLY IN DISAGREEMENT WITH THAT
OF COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR, WHO IT WILL BE RECALLED HAD ORDERED AN ATTACK
FROM THE EASTERN SIDE OF THE STRAIT (ON THE ENEMY'S STARBOARD BOW), IT
SEEMS WISE AT THIS TIME TO SPECULATE ON WHAT IT WAS THAT HAD CAUSED THIS
CONFUSION. IT IS KNOWN, OF COURSE, THAT HE HAD RECEIVED COMMANDER RIGHT
FLANK FORCE'S ORDER DIRECTING THAT THE TORPEDO ATTACK WAS TO BE MADE BY
BOTH GROUPS OPERATING FROM THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE STRAIT AKD HAD MADE
PREPARATIONS TO THAT END. IT IS ALSO KNOWN THAT, HAVING COMPLETED THESE
PREPARATIONS, WHICH MUST HAVE BEEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DOCTRINES
DEVELOPED WITHIN DESRON TWENTY-FOUR FOR COMDESRON TWENTY- FOUR STATED THAT
IT WAS UNNECESSARY TO ISSUE ORDERS SINCE HIS SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS KNEW
HIS POLICIES AND DOCTRINES, HE HAD RECEIVED COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR'S
INSTRUCTIONS TO ATTACK FROM THE EASTERN SIDE OF TRE STRAIT. SINCE THIS
(A) DID NOT CONFORM TO COMMANDER RIGHT FLANK FORCE'S 3ASIC ORDER, (B)
DID NOT CONFORM TO SQUADRON DOCTRINES AND (C) WAS VERY DIFFICULT OF
ACCOMPLISHMENT AND LIKELY WOULD PREVENT A COORDINATED ATTACK, HE DECIDED
THAT HIS COMMANDER HAD MISUNDERSTOOD COMMANDER RIGHT FLANK FORCE'S
INSTRUCTIONS AND THAT IN LOYALTY TO THE PLAN HE SHOULD CONTINUE HIS
ATTACK FROM THE WESTERN SHORE AND ON THE PORT BOW OF THE ENEMY. BY DOING
THIS, HE HOPED THAT HIS ATTACK WOULD BE IN COORDINATION WITH THAT OF
COMMANDER ATTACK GROUP 1.2. IT SEEKS CLEAR THAT HE WAS IN COMPLETE
IGNORANCE OF THE LATTER COMMANDER'S PLAN TO MOVE WELL SOUTH AND, THEREFORE,
TO ATTACK ON THE ENEMY'S BEAM OR QUARTER.
THE DECISION OF COMMANDER ATTACK GROUP 2.2 TO CONTINUE HIS
ATTACK AS PLANNED ON THE PORT BOW RATHER THAN TO CROSS THE STRAIT SEEMS
SOUND BECAUSE, APPARENTLY UNKNOWN TO COMMANDER ATTACK GROUP 1.2, HE WAS
ONLY MINUTES AWAY FROM HIS CHOSEN FIRING POSITION AND WAS ATTACKED AS
PLANNED WITHOUT ANY ENEMY INTERFERENCE WHATSOEVER. IF HE SHOULD PERMIT
HIMSELF TO BE DIVERTED FROM THIS HE MIGHT NEVER AGAIN HAVE SUCH A
WONDERFUL OPPORTUNITY.
IT IS OF INTEREST THAT THE DECISION OF COMMANDER ATTACK
GROUP 2.2, WHO IT WILL BE REMEMBERED WAS AN OFFICER OF THE ROYAL
AUSTRALIAN NAVY, WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. NAVAL PRACTICE WHICH STATED:
"IF A SUBORDINATE COMMANDER RECEIVED AN ORDER EVIDENTLY GIVEN WITHOUT
KNOWLEDGE OF THE SITUATION CONFRONTING HIM, AND WHICH, IF RIGIDLY OBEYED,
WOULD NOT FURTHER THE PLAN OF HIS SUPERIOR, HE USES DISCRETION IN OBEYING
THIS ORDER. IF TIME PERMITS, HE ACQUAINTS HIS SUPERIOR WITH THE
SITUATION AND OBTAINS NEW ORDERS. IF TIME DOES NOT PERMIT, HE SELECTS A
TASK 'WHICH HE BELIEVES THE SENIOR WOULD ASSIGN 'WERE HE COGNIZANT OF ALL
THE FACTS. THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR GOOD COMMON SENSE. "*
ALTHOUGH HE WAS CLOSING HIS FIRING POINT HE DID NOT ISSUE
A FIRING PLAN TO THE SHIPS OF HIS GROUP. THIS WAS BECAUSE HE WAS HAVING
DIFFICULTY IN COMMUNICATING WITH THE KILLEN AND BEALE OVER THE TASK GROUP
COMMON. HE HAD ATTEMPTED TO TRANSMIT TACTICAL SIGNALS BY BLINKER TUBE,
BUT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. THEREFORE, HIS SHIPS, FROM NECESSITY, WERE FORCED
TO ATTACK IN FOLLOW-THE-LEADER FASHION WITHOUT SIGNALS.**
* War Instructions, United States Navy (FTP 143A), United States Fleet,
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1944, Chapter 2, Section III,
Paragraph 215.
** Action Report ARUNTA, Night Action, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
1/41, October 29th, 1944.
350 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 2.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0310 - 0320, October 25th
At 0314 he received a message from COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR
to the effect that (a) there was another group of destroyers ahead of them
to fire and (b) the units of DESRON TWENTY-FOUR were to stay behind the
firing group 0 If he had had any concern over the correctness of his
decision to continue his attack on the port bow this concern must now have
been dispelled for this message clearly showed that, since the unit which
had not fired (Western Attack Group) was on the western side of the
strait, COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR was expecting Attack Group 2.2 to be on
that side also, and had in effect approved his decision.
At 0317 he received orders from COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR to
"boil up and make smoke. Let me know when you have fired. Retire to
northward." At this time the enemy (YAMASHIRO) was bearing about 138°(T),
range 13,600 yards from him. The KIT, TEN and BSALE had been roughly
following the motions of the ARUNTA although the latter two ships were on
course 150° (T) in order to close slowly the ARUNTA1 s track. All three
ships continued on toward the planned torpedo launching point on the port
bow of the enemy (Diagram "G"). The KILLEN and BEALE commenced making
smoke* but the ARUNTA did not do so at this time.
He observed that the radar picture continued to improve
as the range closed. He noted that the original two targets had now
become five with one large ship believed to be a battle ship.-"-* The
battleship was obviously the YAMASHIRO since the FUSO had been torpedoed
and had fallen well behind.
During the approach his ships tracked the enemy on a
northerly course at speeds of twenty-five (ARUNTA), eighteen (KILLEN) and
seventeen (BEALE). These variations were likely due to the fact that the
ARUNTA tracked the leading ship, which was a destroyer (MICHISHIO), and
the KILLEN and BEALE tracked the largest ship which they correctly believed
to be a battleship (YAMASHIRO).
At 0319 Commander Attack Group 2.2 broke through the
smoke screen laid down by the Western Attack Group. He observed the
large explosion in the direction of the enemy and noted that they were
firing starshells in his general direction. The explosion was the
YAMAGUMO.
Also at this time the BEALE asked COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR
how many torpedoes to fire,***
At 0320 the ARUNTA was about 5,800 yards east of the Leyte
shore in Latitude 10°-20.5'N.
* Action Report KILLEN, Surigao Straits Surface Engagement, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0075, October 28th, 1944.
** Action Report HMAS ARUNTA, Night Action October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial l/41, October 29th, 1944.
*** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 073, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
351 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79.11
COM EASTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
(E) Operations of CTG 79.11, 0245 - C320, October 25th.
(1) Commander Eastern Attack Group (CTG 79.11).
Commander Eastern Attack Group (CTG 79.11) was on the bridge of
the REMEY, leading the Eastern Attack Group to its torpedo launching
point and was, at 0245, on course 180° (T) at twenty knots,* in mid-strait
about two miles north of Esconchada Point, Dinagat Island.
He noted, as the range closed, that the radar picture continued
to improve. The original contact was a single pip, but the pip had now
enlarged as the distance decreased, which indicated that it would soon
separate into two or more pips.** All of these destroyers were displaying
electronic IFF continuously to aid the discrimination of friend or foe as
the two forces closed. *
At 0246 he received a TBS voice radio report from the Comrr-anding
Officer MC GOWAN that his radar scope now showed that the enemy consisted
of thrse or more targets in column, bearing 134°(T), range fifteen miles.
He knew, from his own plot, that the enemy speed continued to aDproximate
eighteen knots.*
AT 0248 HE COMMENCED BUILDING UP TO THE ATTACK SPEED (THIRTY
KNOTS) BY INCREASING SPEED TO TWENTY-FIVE KNOTS.* HE HAD NOW COMMITTED
HIMSELF TO AN APPROACH FROM A NORTHERLY RATHER THAN FROM AN EASTERLY
POSITION, AND HAD ACCEPTED THEREBY TWO SERIOUS DISADVANTAGES INHERENT IN
AN ATTACK FROM AHEAD: (A) HE WOULD DENY HIMSELF THE PROTECTION AFFORDED
BY THE LAND EFFECT ON THE JAPANESE RADARS AND (B) HE WOULD BE APPROACHING
FROM A DIRECTION WHERE JAPANESE RADARS, AS WELL AS VISUAL SIGHTINGS,
COULD BE EXPECTED TO BE MOST EFFECTIVE. WHY, THEN, DID HE APPROACH FROM
THIS POSITION?
HE GIVES THE ANSWER IN HIS ACTION REPORT.* THERE HE STATED THAT
HE HAD EXPECTED THAT THE ENEMY, UPON REACHING THE LATITUDE OF KANIHAAN
ISLAND, WOULD CHANGE COURSE TO THE WESTWARD TO 340° (T) AND HEAD DIRECTLY
FOR THE TRANSPORTS. ALTHOUGH HE DOES NOT EXPAND ON THIS, IT SEEMS CLEAR
THAT HE EXPECTED THAT IF THE ENEMY DID THIS, THE EASTERN ATTACK GROUP
WOULD AUTOMATICALLY FIND ITSELF IN A FAVORABLE ATTACK POSITION FROM THE
EASTWARD, AND THE WESTERN ATTACK GROUP WOULD CONTINUE TO BE IN A
FAVORABLE ATTACK POSITION FROM THE WESTWARD.
* Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055,
November 12th, 1944.
** Action Report REMEY, Assault on Leyte Island and the Battle of
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 008, November
5th, 1944.
352 CONFIDENTIAL
COM EASTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
THIS DECISION WAS SOUND IF THE ATTACK FROM THE NORTH WAS TO BE
COORDINATED WITH THE ATTACK FROM THE NORTHWEST, BECAUSE THE TORPEDOES
FIRED FROM THE AHEAD POSITION MIGHT BECOME HIGHLY EFFECTIVE SHOULD THE
TARGET MANEUVER TO AVOID THE TORPEDOES FIRED FROM THE NORTHWEST. HOWEVER,
IF THE ATTACK WAS NOT TO BE SO COORDINATED, THE ATTACK FROM THE NORTH
WAS UNSOUND NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE EASE WITH WHICH THE TARGET COULD
AVOID SUCH AN ATTACK, BUT ALSO BECAUSE THE TARGET MIGHT THEN TURN ON THE
GROUP ATTACKING FROM THE NORTHWEST AND DESTROY IT AGAINST THE SHORE.
At 0250:30 he directed the REMEY to change course to the left to
150° (T), informed the MC GOWAN and MELVIN that he had done so, advised
them that he planned to fire torpedoes only, and at the same time directed
them to form echelon so that they would be clear for firing torpedoes.*
From this it is clear that Commander Eastern Attack Group hoped to attack
and to retire undetected. The echelon referred to was a line of bearing
of about fifteen degrees on the starboard quarter of the guide, and was
often employed in destroyer attacks .** For some unexplained reasons the
MC GOWAN and MELVIN formed echelon on the port quarter.
He has given no reasons for changing course to 150° (T) at this
time. However, assuming that he still expected the enemy to change course
at Kanihaan Island, there are two possible reasons which present
themselves; one, that he realized that he was approaching in column and
could be readily enfiladed should the enemy change course as expected to
340°(T); the other, that he did not approve of the target angle which at
this time was less than twenty degrees and realized that (a) if he
continued on course 180° (T) this target angle would not improve greatly,
and (b) by changing course to the eastward he could improve it, although
this would result in a longer and less effective torpedo firing range.
Whether or not up to this time he had given any consideration to
the enemy capability of continuing on a northerly course after passing
Kanihaan Island is not known but the evidence is to the contrary.-*** If
he had given consideration to this capability, does it not seem likely
that he might have commenced his approach from a position more to the
eastward so that the disadvantages inherent in an approach from ahead
would be lessened or completely erased?
At 0252 he intercepted a message from Commander Western Attack
Group to the MONSSEN to the effect that he was "coming left" and then
"coming right" to avoid the right flank destroyers. ***
Action Report REMEY, Assault on Leyte Island and the Battle of
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 008, November
5th, 1944.
Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-43, Destroyer Torpedo Attack
Instructions issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific Fleet, Serial
01264, October 24th, 1943.
Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055,
November 12th, 1944.
353 CONFIDENTIAL
COM EASTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
At 0253 he intercepted a report that the MC DERMUT had made radar
contact on the enemy bearing 158°(T), range 33,000 yards.* From the
above two interceptions he could have readily seen from his plot, even if
he could not locate it by radar, that the V/e stern Attack Group was well
behind its expected position.
If he had any thought of coordinated attack it was at this point
that he should have learned that if the MC DERMUT 's range was correct
(actually the range was not correct for this time (0253); instead it was
a range which had clearly been taken about four and one-half minutes
earlier) such coordinated attack was now impossible unless he (Commander
Eastern Attack Group) maneuvered radically to obtain the correct relation
between the two attack groups for, at this time from his own plot, the
enemy was but 19,000 yards away. Had the two attack groups retained the
same expected relative position in latitude (5,000 yards) the above range,
instead of being 33,000 yards, should have been more nearly 26,000 yards.
This meant that the Western Attack Group was about 12,000 yards behind
the expected position in range at this time. From his later actions it
seems clear that he either did not plot the MC DERMUT 's range or having
plotted it decided to await confirmation.
At 0254 he changed course farther to the east to 135°(T).* Since,
if the enemy should change course to 340°(T), this new course would place
his group beyond the effective torpedo range of intermediate speed
torpedoes, IT SEEMS LOGICAL TO CONCLUDE THAT AT THIS POINT HE HAD
DECIDED THAT THE ENEMY, INSTEAD OF CHANGING TO THE WEST CF NORTH, AT
LEAST FOR THE IMMEDIATE PRESENT, WAS GOING TO CONTINUE COURSE AND SPEED.
THEREFORE A CHANGE OF COURSE TO THE EASTWARD WAS ESSENTIAL IF A MORE
FAVORABLE TARGET ANGLE WAS TO BE OBTAINED WITHOUT UNDUE RUSH. BASED ON
THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS THE DECISION TO CHANGE COURSE MORE THE I
EASTWARD SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN CORRECT.
While the REMEY changed course promptly at 0254 the MC I and
MELVIN delayed for several minutes in order to form a rough column.
Also at 0255 he was requested by CTG 77.2, by T3S voice radio, to
advise when he had the enemy on his radar scope and the number of ships.
At 0256 he replied "Targets are five, two large ones and three
small ones, five and one-half miles west of Tungo Point. ■*«
It appears from an examination of the voice logs of the heavy
ships that this report did not get through to CTG 77.2. However, at the
same time or shortly after, he also broadcast this message on the PT
common with one important change. In the rebroadcast he stated that the
* Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao
Strait, PhiliDoine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055,
November 12 th, 1944.
** Action Report REMEY, Assault on Leyte Island and the Battle of
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 003, November
5th, 1944.
354 CONFIDENTIAL
COM EASTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
Japanese force was four miles west of Kanihaan Island.* This was probably
a correction to the original message for at 0256 the YAMAGUMO was four
point four miles west of Kanihaan Island (she had been five and one-fourth
miles west of Tungo Point at 0249 and YAMASHIRO had been six miles west
of Tungo Point at this time) (Diagram "G").
The above 0256 message was CTG 79.11' s first report, although the
REMEY (his flagship) had been tracking the enemy for some time and, as
early as 0250, had had a relatively clear radar picture of the enemy
formation. This picture was not the picture reported above. The REMEY
believed that the enemy consisted of "two very large ships in column,
two large 'pips' on the bows of the leading very large 'pips', and three
smaller 'pips' arranged ahead in screen formation... there was a possible
'pip' astern of last heavy ship"** (Plate XXI). The REMEY' s estimate of
the enemy composition was almost exactly correct except that (a) there
were seven ships, (b) the "possible 'pip' astern" was the MOGAMI, and
(c) there were only four "pips" ahead of the heavy ships. Why Commander
Eastern Attack Group did not have this information or, if he did, why he
evaluated it as but five ships is not known unless he had been influenced
by PT 127 's 2310 report, received at 0015, that there were two large
unidentified ships and three destroyers in the enemy group.
At this time (a) the MC GOWAN estimated the enemy to consist of
"a column of three to five ships with two or three ships screening ahead
in a narrow wedge shape or short T-barw,*** and (b) the MELVTN, to consist
of three small pips ahead of two large nips followed by one small pip,
and a possible fourth pip ahead and to the left of the formation.****
Thus the MC GOWAN estimated a maximum of eight ships and a minimum of five;
the MELVIN a total of seven.
Also at this same time he received two contact reports from the
Western Attack Group, cne from the MC DERMUT reporting the enemy bearing
160° (T), range 29,700 yards, the other from the MONSSEN reporting the
enemy bearing 160°(T), range 32,000 yards."***** These ranges were a
considerable decrease from his previous 0253 range of 38,000 yards but
they were still excessive based on the expected position of the Western
Attack Group and should have indicated again that the Western Attack
Group continued to be well behind position.
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report REMEY, Assault on Leyte Island and the Battle of
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 008, November
5th, 1944.
*** Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and
Defense of Leyte, Philippine Islands, including the Battle of
Surigao Strait, Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944.
**** Action Report MELVIN, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 079, November 5th, 1944.
***** Action Report CTG 79 oil (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055,
November 12th, 1944.
355 CONFIDENTIAL
COM EASTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
Commander Eastern Attack Group now observed that the ranpe between
his command and the enemy continued to drop rapidly and, at about 0256,
had decreased to below 15,000 yards. This was helpful from the SG radar
viewpoint because at 15,000 yards it was possible to shift from the "long
scale" to the "short scale" which gave a better target definition and a
larger and clearer picture.* From this time onward it is considered that
all ships of the eastern group were operating on the "short scale" and
that the enemy composition should have been clearly defined.
At 0257 he decided that the enemy's main body consisted of two
very large ships, possibly battleships, led by a cruiser. Ke also
decided that these three ships were screened ahead by four small ships and
astern by one small ship.** Since this was not the correct formation at
this time in that the THIRD Section was still in its approach formation,
it is difficult to understand the imoressions gained by Commander Eastern
Attack Group. Perhaps the impressions reported in the action report were
prepared after the battle and the time sequence, with respect to the
relative locations of the Japanese shiDs was lost; perhaps the Japanese
destroyers failed to maintain accurate stations.
At this time Commander Eastern Attack Group, as CTG 79.11, decided
that, since he had not as yet definitely identified battleships, he would
(a) retain his depth setting of six feet and (b) as a conseauence, change
his firing plan.**
THE DECISION TO RETAIN THE DEPTH SETTING AT SIX FEET WAS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH BASIC TORPEDO DOCTRINE WHICH PROVIDED THAT UNLESS
BATTLESHIPS WEitE DEFINITELY IDENTIFIED THE TORPEDO DEPTH SETTING WOULD BE
SIX FEET;*** THE DECISION TO CHANGE THE FIRING PLAN, WHILE NOT SPECIFICALLY
OUTLINED IN BASIC TORPEDO DOCTRINE, WAS, NEVERTHELESS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THAT DOCTRINE WHICH PROVIDED THAT THE TARGETS OF A TORPEDO ATTACK 'WERE
NORMALLY THE MOST IMPORTANT SHIPS OF THE ENEMY FORCE.*** SINCE THE MOST
IMPORTANT SHIPS WERE OBVIOUSLY THE TWO VERY LARGE SHIPS AND THE CRUISER,
AND SINCE, IF THE VERY LARGE SHIPS WERE BATTLESHIPS AND THE SIX FOOT
SETTING WAS RETAINED, THEY WOULD "REQUIRE SEVERAL GOOD TORPEDO HITS TO
STOP"** IT WAS CLEARLY NECESSARY TO CONCENTRATE ADDITIONAL. TORPEDOES ON
THE TWO VERY LARGE SHIPS WHILE RETAINING THE NORMAL CONCENTRATION ON THE
CRUISER,
He, therefore, decided to modify his torpedo firing plan to
accomplish this and, at 0258, issued his instructions as follows: "Am
coming to 090° to fire torpedoes. Will take third target, you both (MSLVIN
and MC GOWAN) take second. COMDESDIV 108 the small one and number
three",** By doing this he planned to concentrate two destroyers on each
of the very large ships, and one destroyer on the cruiser,
*~ Radar Bulletin No. 3 (RAD 3), Radar Operators Manual, United States
Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1944, Part 4, Page
4-SG-7.
** Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055,
November 12th, 1944.
*** Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-44, Destroyer Torpedo Doctrine and
Manual of Torpedo Control, issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific
Fleet, Serial 01630, July 8th, 1944'.
356 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
THE RADAR SCOPE SKETCHES
SEEN BY THE SHIPS OF TG 79.11
AT TIME OF FIRING TORPEDOES
BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT
BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF
OCTOBER 1944
REMEY (F)
EASTERN ATTACK GROUP-TIME 0301
RANGE ABOUT- 11,000 YDS
MCGOWAN
MELVIN
CTG 79.11
Note- These pictures ore not reproductions of
actual radar scopes, but ore instead rough
•ketches by the commanders concerned of
their impressions of the enemy dispositions
as they appeared on their radar scopes at the
reported times.
COMMANDER
W. A. 6.
WESTERN ATTACK GROUP-TIME 0311
RANGE ABOUT- 9,000 YDS
MCDERMUT (F)
MONSSEN
PLATE 331
CONFIDENTIAL
COM EASTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
Tnis indicates that he was not aware of the fact that COMDESDIV
108 was so far behind as to preclude a coordinated attack.
IN ISSUING THESE INSTRUCTIONS HE FAILED TO DESIGNATE THE TARGET
AS THE THREE LARGER SHIPS, INFERRING THEREBY THAT THIS FACT WOULD BE CLEAR
TO HIS DESTROYER COMMAND. ACTUALLY, AS WILL BE SHOWN LATER, IT WAS NOT
CLEAR 'WITH THE RESULT THAT THE DESIRED TARGET DESIGNATIONS WERE NOT
EFFECTED. THIS FAILURE BRINGS FORTH THE FACT THAT A DIRECTIVE WILL BE
MOST EASILY UNDERSTOOD IF IT IS CLEAR, BRIEF AND POSITIVE. CLARITY
DEMANDS THE EMPLOYMENT OF PRECISE EXPRESSIONS SUSCEPTIBLE OF ONLY THE
DESIRED INTERPRETATION; BREVITY CALLS FOR THE OMISSION OF SUPERFLUOUS
WORDS AND OF UNNECESSARY DETAILS BUT SHOULD NEVER BE SOUGHT AT THE
EXPENSE OF CLARITY; P0SITIVENE3S OF EXPRESSION SUGGESTS THE SUPERIOR'S
FIXITY OF PURPOSE WITH CONSEQUENT INSPIRATION TO SUBORDINATES TO PROSECUTE
THEIR TASK WITH DETERMINATION.*
At this same time he observed that his Eastern Group, when he was
about 12,500 yards from the enemy (YAMASHIRO), had been illuminated by a
high searchlight for about fifteen seconds,** He did not know that he
had already been sighted visually at 0256 by the SHIGURE*** and that this
searchlight was most likely designed to be confirmatory of the visual
sighting. The Japanese do not report having sighted the destroyers by
searchlight. Why he thought that he had been illuminated is not understood
for the effective range of a searchlight beam varies between 4,000 - 10,000
yards depending on the types and sizes of searchlights, and he was well
beyond the effective range.****
As the Eastern Attack Group turned to course 090°(T), its
commander soon noted that this course was opening the range and, while it
was advantageous in that it tended to increase the target angle, it was
disadvantageous in that, if it were maintained, it would prevent his
closing to the range of his intermediate speed torpedoes.
While it is not clear what was in the REMEY Combat Information
Center Evaluator's mind when he recommended a change of course to 090°(T),
it is possible that he desired to improve the target angle after which
he would recommend a change of course to close the enemy.
However, whatever his reasons, he failed to inform the bridge
thereon and, consequently, Commander Eastern Attack Group, who now realized
that he was on a course at almost right angles to the enemy's course and
was opening the range, decided that the change of course to 090° (T) was
Sound Military Decision, Naval War College, 1942, Pages 186-187.
** Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055,
November 12th, 1944.
*** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
**** Gunnery Instructions, United States Navy (FTP 134), Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, November 23rd, 1933,
Chapter 11, Paragraph 1102.
357 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM EASTERN ATTACK GROUP
0245 - 0320, October 25th
"obviously wrong".* He, therefore, at 0259:30 directed the REMEY to
change course to 120°(T) and to increase speed to thirty knots, which
was done.**
At this same time the Commanding Officer MC GOWAN, who had already
changed course to 090°(T), changed course to 125°(T). He stated later
that his reason for so doing was to obtain sufficient sea room when the
REMEY turned away after firing.*** Meanwhile the Commanding Officer
MELVIN, who was just about to change course to 090°(T), heard COMDESRON
FIFTY-FOUR inform the MC GOWAN of the change of course to 120© (T ).****
He therefore steadied on that course. These actions by the two commanding
officers placed their ships correctly in echelon on the starboard luarter
of the REMEY and also enabled them to close the distance between ships.
While Commander Eastern Attack Group's decision to change course
to 120° (T) was sound, the change was not sufficient in that it did not
materially improve his situation and was probably the result of an
estimate employing the method of "seaman's eye". A return to course
135°(T), or greater, would have improved the target angle gradually and
closed the range more rapidly.
It is clear from graphic analysis that course 120° (T) would not
take the Eastern Attack Group within effective range (eighty percent of
designed torpedo range) of the intermediate speed torpedoes.***** However,
the majority of the ships of the Eastern Attack Group were tracking the
target on courses greater than 000° (T) —REMEY 007°(T),** MC GOWAN
010°(T)*** and MELVIN 000° (T )******— which automatically decreased the
target angle and indicated to the ships that the effective range was
greater than it actually was. In reality, since the target was on course
000° (T) the ships were well beyond the effective range, but remained
within the maximum range (one hundred percent of the designed torpedo
range) for intermediate speed torpedoes.***** Either Commander Eastern
Attack Group did not realize this or did not consider it necessary to
close any nearer.
Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055,
November 12th, 1944.
Action Report REMEY, Assault on Leyte Island and the Battle of
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 008, November
5th, 1944.
Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and
Defense of Leyte, Philippine Islands, including the Battle of
Surigao Strait, Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944.
Ibid., Enclosure (J).
Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-44, Destroyer Torpedo Doctrine and
Manual of Torpedo Control, issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific
Fleet, Serial' 01630, July 8th, 1944.
Action Report KELVIN, Surigao Strait, Philipoine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 079, November 5th, 1944.
**
**■*
■5KHC-K
###**#
358
CONFIDENTIAL
COM EASTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
Although the Japanese appeared to be taking no offensive action
against his command, his destroyer commanders grew concerned lest they
be fired on by the Japanese ships and, therefore also at 0300, the
Commanding Officer MC GOWAN, who from his action report had probably
been tracking the YAMAGUMO, but who about this time had probably shifted
to the leading heavy ship (YAMASHIRO), requested permission to fire
torpedoes,* Since this request was obviously in accordance with his own
views he immediately directed his Eastern Attack Group to "Fire when
ready".** At this time the target angle was about thirty degrees and the
target range from the flagship REMEY to the third large ship (believed to
be a battleship) was about 12,000 yards. This firing range, while within
the maximum range of intermediate speed torpedo, was beyond the effective
range, which, in this case, was about 10,500 yards.*** (Plate XXII).
BY AUTHORIZING HIS COMMAND TO FIRS AT THIS TIME COMMANDER EASTERN
ATTACK GROUP THEREBY ACCEPTED THE LOW PROBABILITY OF HITS INCIDENT TO A
SHARP TARGET ANGLE AND AN EXTREME FIRING RANGE.*** WHY HE RELEASED HIS
DESTROYERS AT THIS TIME IS NOT UNDERSTOOD FOR HIS COMMAND WAS NOT BEING
ILLUMINATED BY THE JAPANESE, NOR WAS IT UNDER FIRE. THEREFORE, WAS IT
NOT INCUMBENT UPON HIM TO PRESS THE ATTACK HOME TO THE CLOSEST FIRING
POINT WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE ATTACK TO BE DELIVERED SUCCESSFULLY WITHOUT
UNACCEPTABLE LOSSES? THIS WAS CLEARLY EXPRESSED IN POSTWAR DESTROYER
INSTRUCTIONS WHICH STATED THAT AN ATTACK SHOULD BE PUSHED HOME UNLESS THE
SHIP IS RECEIVING DAMAGE TO SUCH A DEGREE THAT THE DESTROYER CANNOT
REACH THE OPTIMUM FIRING POSITION WHILE STILL CAPABLE OF FIRING TORPEDOES.****
In addition to the above does it not seem surprising that he made
no effort at this time to insure that the Western Attack Group was also
in position to fire its torpedoes in coordination in order to gain the
advantages of cross fire?
Immediately after the receipt of the order to fire torpedoes the
REMEY, at 0300:45, commenced firing torpedoes at her designated target
which she reported was bearing 211° (T), range 11,600 yards, target angle
twenty-four degrees and tracked on course 007° (T), speed eighteen knots.
While the Commanding Officer REMEY thought that he was firing at the "rear
very large pip", believed to be a battleship,***** an analysis of his
torpedo data indicates that he fired using the range of the YAMASHIRO and
* Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055,
November 12th, 1944.
*** Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-43, Destroyer Torpedo Attack
Instructions issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific Fleet, Serial
01264, October 24th, 1943.
#*&& Tactical and Operational Instructions Destroyers and Destroyer
Escorts, United States Fleet (USF 68), Navy Department, Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, 1948, Chapter 5, Paragraph 571.
***** Action Report REMEY, Assault on Leyte Island and the Battle of
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 003, November
5th, 1944.
496799 0-59 -33 359 CONFIDENTIAL
COM EASTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
the bearing of the YAMAGUMO. Although unexplained or even hinted at in
his action report, this was Drobably due to the difficulty in petting
the SG radar (normally used by the CIC) and the Mark 4 radar (used by
both gunnery and torpedo control) on the same target. Thus, although
the Commanding Officer REMEY planned to fire at the FUSO since that was
the second very large ship, he actually fired at the YAMAGUMO, which, at
the tine, was slightly forward of the beam of the YAKASHIRO and some 1,500
yards closer to the firing group. The Commanding Officer MC GOWAN, who
encountered similar difficulties in his own firing, commented thereon in
his action report as follows: "it is believad that the main battery
director mipht very well have been on the next vessel astern of the one
the SG was tracking."*
Why the above occurred is not known, but it Drobably resulted
from the lack of clarity in Commander eastern Attack Group's target
designation message referred to earlier and to the fact that the
interpretation of the pictures on the radar scopes varied between the
bridge and the CIC.
The RiSMEY fired on base torpedo course 224°(T) using broadside
fire to starboard, three second intervals, one decree torpedo spread, six
foot depth setting and intermediate speed. She attempted to fire a full
salvo of ten torpedoes but, because the sixth and ninth torpedoes misfired,
succeeded in launching only eight. Except for this, all torpedoes
appeared to run hot, straight and normal.**
In firing on such a sharp track anrle the spread was insufficient
to compensate for the errors in determining the enemy course and speed.
Tne result of this was that none of the REMEY1 s torpedoes, all of which
passed astern of the YAMAGUMO, reached the track of the heavy ships.
She also had the misfortune, during the above firing, to have
several torpedo tube flash eliminators fail with the resultant bright red
flashes incident thereto. These flashes were observed by the
and, although not mentioned in Japanese reports, were probably likewise
observed by the THIRD Section for, immediately thereafter, Commander
Eastern Attack Group noted that the enemy had illuminated :iim and had
opened fire with the first salvo about 2,000 yards short.*** As a
consequence, he increased the speed of the Eastern Group to thirty knots,
ordered the ships to make smoke, and after the REMEY had completed firin
changed course ninety degrees to port to course 030°(T) and commenced
retiring, making all possible speed,***
* Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and
Defense of Leyte, Philippine Islands, including the Battle of
Surigao Strait, Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944.
** Action Report REMEY, Assault on Leyte Island and the Battle of
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 003, November
5th, 1944.
*** Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055,
November 12th, 1944.
360 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
EFFECTIVE RANGE DIAGRAM FOR
MULTI -SPEED TORPEDOES (USN)
BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT
BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF
OCTOBER 1944
FOR TARGET SPEED OF 18 KTS
EXAMPLES To find effective range for a target angle of 50° (or 310* ),
draw a line from the zero point to the 50° mark, as shown •, the point
of intersection of this line with each boundary of firing positions
is the effective range for that speed torpedo. The effective range
Is read in yards by swinging an arc to the left to the direct reading
scale.
SOURCE; Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-43, Destroyer Torpedo Attack Instructions
issued by Commander Destroyers, Pacific Fleet, Serial 01264,
October 24th, 1943, Diagram 301.
PLATE -tttt
CONFIDENTIAL
COM EASTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
Why, having been discovered, he did not direct his ships to open
fire is not explained, but his action in not doing so seems illogical.
The enemy was within easy range, the gun directors were on the target
and in radar control with the guns trained out, the firing would not have
interfered with the torpedo attack which was already underway, considerable
damage might have been inflicted on the Japanese ships, and the morale
effect on his own command would have been electrical.
Following the REMEY's firing, the MC GOWAN, at 0301, commenced
firing a full salvo of ten torpedoes on base torpedo course 222°(T) at a
target which she reported was bearing 212° (T), range 10,950 yards,* on
course 010° (T), speed eighteen knots** (indicated target angle of twenty-
two degrees). Although the commanding officer thought that the CIC and
the main battery director were on the leading heavy ship, the YAMASHIRO,
his later analysis led him to believe that the director was on the second
heavy ship or the FUSO. Graphic analysis shows, however, that the bearing
was on the FUSO and the range, presumably from CIC, was on the YAMASHIRO.
This occurred for the same reasons that the REMEY's range and bearing
were on different ships. Thus he actually fired at the FUSO, which was
the second heavy ship and fortunately enough was the target which had
been designated. Since the commanding officer had intended to fire at the
first heavy ship or, as he phrased it, "the leading ship of the main
column" he could not have understood the message from Commander Eastern
Attack Group designating the targets. This misunderstanding of the target
designation was a natural consequence of Commander Eastern Attack Group's
basic order which, as pointed out earlier, was ambiguous.
Although all ten of the MC GOWAN1 s torpedoes appeared to run hot,
straight and normal they actually all missed astern of the FUSO for the
same reasons that the REMEY's torpedoes missed the YAMAGUMO. These
reasons were (a) the sharp track angle, (b) a ten degree error in the
track angle and the target course (used 010°(T), actual 000°(T)), (c) a
two knot error in target speed (used eighteen, actual twenty) and (c) the
extreme range at the time of firing (10,950 yards). Although the first
two torpedoes reached the track of the heavy ships the remainder, barring
overrun of the designed range of 9,200 yards, did not. The MOGAMI, 2,500
yards astern of the FUSO, was too far astern to be endangered by the two
torpedoes which crossed her track (Diagram "G").
In spite of the Commanding Officer's claim that his torpedo
officer had seen torpedo explosions at 0309, the time that the torpedoes
should have crossed the track, he could not have been too strong in his
belief because of the following two factors: (a) his statement that the
main battery director could have very well been on the next vessel astern
of the one that the SG was tracking*** and (b) the torpedo run shown on
* Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and
Defense of Leyte, Philippine Islands, including the Battle of Surigao
Strait, Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944, Track Chart.
** Ibid., Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and
Defense of Leyte, Philippine Islands, including the Battle of Surigao
Strait, Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944.
361 CONFIDENTIAL
COM EASTERN ATTACK CROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
his torpedo firing chart which was 9,300 yards* whereas tne designed range
of the torpedoes at medium speed was 9,200 yards. In regard to item (b)
above, it is of interest that (l) 9,300 yards is the only distance shown on
the torpedo firing chart and (2) nowhere else is the firing range or the
torpedo run mentioned.
The MELVTN, at 0301:20, commenced firing a full salvo of ten torpedoes
on base torpedo course 227°(T) at her designated target, bearing 212°(T),
range 11,480 yards, target angle thirty-two degrees and tracked on course
000 (T), speed seventeen knots,** It is of interest that tne MELVIN was on
her correct target, the second of the three larger ships, and was the only
one of the above three destroyers which correctly interpreted the target
designation order and fired at the correct target. Owing to a misfire,
only nine of the ten torpedoes launched, and tnese nine appeared to run hot,
straight and normal,** making one hit in the FUSO.
Of interest is the fact that her only error was in determining the
target speed. She used a target speed of seventeen knots when in fact the
target, the FUSO, was making twenty knots. Because she was exactly on the
target in both range and bearing and used the exact course the torpedo
spread was suf fi cient to compensate for this error in speed. Actually all
but the last two of her torpedoes appear to have crossed the track of the
IaKASHIRO and FUSO. While the effect of the failure of one torpedo to be
fired is not known with certainty, it seems probable from Diagram "0" that
the MOGAMI may have escaped being hit because of this failure.
During the above torpedo firing, the Japanese continued their search-
light illumination and gunfire, which continued to be short, but grew closer
with successive salvos,***
Immediately upon completion of torpedo firing at 0301:37, the
MC GOWAN and MELVIN, at 0302, each changed course radically to pert and
paralleled roughly the course of the REMEY, It will oe noted (Diagram ■G*)
that these destroyers did net follow the REMEY in column but turned
independently. This was the correct method of accomplishing tnis phase of
the retirement because, had the destroyers followed in column, they would
have tended to form a "knuckle", in which case the enemy gunfire might have
been highly effective through enfilade. During this turn away both the
MC GOWAN and MELVIN increased speed to thirty knots and shortly afterward
increased speed to all possible.
* Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and Defense
of Leyte, Philippine Islands, including the Battle of Surigao Strait,
Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (E),
** Action Report MELVIN, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 079, November 5th, 1944.
*** Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action In Surigao Strait,
Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055, November
12th, 1944.
362 CONFIDENTIAL
COM EASTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
About this time, Commander Eastern Attack Group probably
intercepted a dispatch (it was recorded in MC DERMUT's voice log) from
Commander Right Flank Force directing COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR to "Proceed
to attack. Follow down the west shoreline. Follow other groups in and
then retire to northward. Make smoke."* This message was of little
concern to him, as Commander Eastern Attack Group, because the attack was
being delivered from the western shoreline, but it was of concern to him
as CTG 79.11 because he realized that difficulties could occur between the
units of his Western Attack Group and the units of DESRON TWENTY- FOUR.
However, since there was nothing that he could do about this he left it
to the competence of Commander Western Attack Group,
A few seconds at 0302, he observed that the Japanese had shifted
their means of illumination from searchlight to starshells, maintaining
three stars in the air continuously.** These starshells were generally to
the east of the destroyers showing***that they had been placed to
illuminate the destroyers on their firing course 120°(T), in which case
it seems correct to say that the Japanese determination of the destroyer's
firing course and speed had been accurate.
As the seconds passed the Japanese firing improved and finally,
at 0303, the REMEY was straddled. Commander Eastern Attack Group then
reported to CTG 77©2 "We are being straddled now. We have fired our fish
and are retiring northward."**
While this was an important message, and one which should have
been reported at this time because it advised CTG 77.2 that the CTG 79.11' s
destroyer attack had been completed and that the area would soon be clear
of friendly ships, it was incorrect and could have had serious consequences,
This was so because only the Eastern Attack Group had fired and the
Western Attack Group was still closing the enemy, (it appears from CTG
77.2' s action report and from the voice logs of CTG 77.3 and the MARYLAND
that his message did not get through for there is no mention of it. It
does appear in the MC GOWAN and MELVIN voice logs however.)
At 0305 the MC GOWAN changed course to 018°(T)****in order to
close the track of the REMEY which was still on course 030°(T). By 0306
the Japanese salvos appear to have come closer to the REMEY for commencing
at that time, as shown on the track chart, she alternated between courses
of 010° (T) and 030°(T). At 0309 she steadied on course 025°(T), and then
headed for the rendezvous point in Station THREE.*****
* " Action Report MC DERMUT, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 061, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055,
November 12th, 1944.
*** Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and
Defense of Leyte, Philippine Islands, including the Battle of
Surigao Strait, Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944.
**** Ibid., Enclosure (E).
***** Action Report REMEY, Assault on Leyte Island and the Battle of
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 008, November
5th, 1944.
363 CONFIDENTIAL
COM EASTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
In the meantime the MELVHI, which had commenced making smoke with
turn away at 0302, steadied on course 013°(T) at 0304. At this time
she was about 1,000 yards on the port quarter of the REMSY. (The HC GOWAN
at the same time was about 300 yards on the starboard quarter of the
REKSY.) The Commanding Officer MELVTN decided to remain on the port
quarter to avoid enfilade fire and to help screen the : with smoke.
At 0308 he swung sharply to port and about half a minute later came back
to course 045° (T) in order to place the smoke between himself and the
enemy. At 0313 he changed course to 025° (T) and followed astern of the
other two ships.*
At 0307 CTG 79.11 intercepted a message from his Commander Western
Attack Group directing that command to standby torpedoes.**
If he did not know by this time that his western group had not
fired in coordination with the eastern group this message should have
alerted him, as well as CTG's 77.2 and 77.3 to that unhappy fact.
Meanwhile at 0308, mindful of the fact that some hours earlier he
had been requested by CT3 77.2 to "report if enemy is in more than one
group and composition if possible", CTG 79.11 reported his estimate of
the situation as follows: "There was just one group, two large and one
small. We are being straddled now. All headed north in one column."
This transmission, however, did not set through to CTG 77.2 and, after
asking at 0309 if CTG 77.2 had received his last transmission without
getting a reply, CTG 79.11 asked CONDSSRGN FIFTY-SIX to relay the message
to CTG 77.2. COMCRUDIV FIFTEEN (CTG 77.3) intercepted the message and,
realizing its importance, retransmitted it to CTG 77.2 at 0310.***
This was a surprising report since it was incorrect. As Commander
Eastern Attack Group, he had already reported five enemy ships and, since
the RSMEY had observed, at the time of firing torpedoes that there were
about eight pips on her radar scope, it is not clear what motivated him
to make this report. As has been shown under "Operations of CTG 77.2,
0245 - 0320, October 25th", at 0311, this message served only to confuse
CTG 77.2, who wondered what had become of the other Japanese ships.
In view of the fact that the original seven ships were still in
the Japanese formation, does it not seem clear that CTG 79.11 not only
failed to comply adequately with CTG 77.2 's request for information of
the composition of the Japanese force, but, in addition, provided that
commander with information which was definitely misleading? This was due,
in a large part, to the fact that CTG 79.11, as Commander Eastern Attack
* Action Report MELVTN, Surigao Straits, Philiopine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 079, November 5th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 79.11 (CCMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao
Strait, Philiopine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055,
November 12th, 1944.
*** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 19^4, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
364 CONFIDENTIAL
COM EASTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
Group, did not close the enemy sufficiently to insure better target
definition, since the importance of correct information was vital. Would
he not have been in accordance with the best destroyer traditions had he,
at the very least, fired starshells to endeavor to silhouette the Japanese
ships, especially so, once he had been discovered?
Commander Eastern Attack Group reported in his action report that
at 0309 his ships observed three to five explosions, not gunfire, in the
enemy formation.* He considered, of course, that these explosions
resulted from his own torpedoes because this was the calculated time when
these torpedoes should have crossed the enemy track, and because he knew
that the torpedoes of his ivestern group, even if fired, could not have
reached the target at this time.
It is of interest that all three destroyers— REMEY, MC GOWAN and
MELVIN — also reported in their action reports having observed certain of
these explosions whereas the two destroyers of the Western Attack Group
(MC DERMUT and MONSSEN) did not report any explosions at this time nor
any underwater detonations. This is surprising since the destroyers of
the eastern group, which were shielded by heavy smoke with limited
visibility, were some 14,000 yards away and opening, whereas the
destroyers of the western group, in clear visibility, were about 12,500
yards away and closing. It will be shown later that these hits were not
actually observed and were not officially reported as having been observed.
Instead, the report came from the radar scopes and gave only conjecture.
The Japanese continued to fire at the eastern group. By about
0310 Commander Eastern Attack Group noted that their salvos were falling
shorter and shorter and that the starshell illumination had deteriorated. **
At 0311, he intercepted a message from Commander Western Attack
Group to the MONSSEN to the effect that the MC DERMUT had fired her
torpedoes and that she (MONSSEN) was to fire when ready. **
At 0312 he intercepted a message from the MONSSEN that she had
fired. He now knew that TG 79.11 had completed firing. *
By 0313 he observed, from his radar scope, that the two rear enemy
ships appeared to fall behind the leaders, with one large ship sheering
to the right and slowing. This was gratifying because it showed that his
firing had been effective.* Actually, in this firing only the FUSO had
been hit. The appearance that the two ships were dropping behind resulted
from the fact that as the FUSO slowed and sheered to the right, out of
column, she naturally closed the MOGAMI which was attempting to close the
YAMASHIRO.***
* Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055,
November 12th, 1944 •
** Action Report REMEY, Assault on Leyte Island and the Battle of
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 008, November
5th, 1944.
*-"-* Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
365 CONFIDENTIAL
COM EASTERN ATTACK GROUP
COM WESTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
TO SUMMARIZE THE ABOVE TORPEDO ATrACK BY THE EASTERN ATTACK GROUP,
A TOTAL OF TWENTY-SEVEN TORPEDOES HAD BEEN FIRED; REMEY (EIGHT), MC GOWAN
(TEN) AND MELVIN (NINE). COMMANDER EASTERN ATTACK GROUP REPORTED AT THE
TIME THAT HE MAY HAVE MADE HITS ON TviO SHIPS BUT HE LATER CHANGED THIS IN
HIS ACTION REPORT TO A CLAIM OF THREE TO FIVE HITS ON THE TWO LARGEST
SHIPS. EXCEPT FOR THE FUSO, WHICH THE MOGAMI* REPORTED AS HAVING BEEN
TORPEDOED ONCE ON HER STARBOARD SIDE AND WHICH THIS ANALYSIS ALSO
INDICATES RECEIVED AT LEAST ONE HIT, NO HITS WERE MADE ON ANY OF THE OTHER
SIX SHIPS. THIS WAS A HIT PERCENTAGE OF ABOUT THREE AND SEVEN-TENTHS PER
CENT.
As a result of these firings these destroyers had torpedoes
remaining as follows: REMEY (two), MC GOWAN (zero) and MELVIN (one).
At 0320 the Eastern Attack Group was about three miles south of
Hibuson Island on course 025°(T), speed twenty knots and heading for its
post-attack rendezvous.
(2) Commander Western Attack Group.
At 0245 Commander Western Attack Group, in the MC DERMUT with the
MONSSEN in column about 600 yards astern, was leading the Western Attack
Group on course 170° (T), speed twenty knots, to its torpedo launching
point. He had not as yet made radar contact with the enemy.**
At this time his group was about six miles farther north than the
Eastern Attack Group and was bearing about 312°(T), distant eight and six-
tenths miles from that group.
Also, at 0246, he intercepted a contact report from the MC GOWAN
to Commander Eastern Attack Group reporting three or more unidentified
ships on course 000°(T) in column, bearing 184°(T), range fifteen miles.**
At 0249, having received orders from CTG 79.11 at 0248 to do so,
he increased speed to twenty- five knots.**
At 0250 he likely intercepted Commander Eastern Attack Group's
instructions to the Eastern Attack Group to fire torpedoes only.
As he headed south he encountered DESRON TWENTY-FOUR (the six
right flank destroyers) which was moving to the westward to close the
shoreline and, by so doing, to avoid interference with the Western Attack
Group. At this time DESRON TWENTY-FOUR was on course 290° (T) and on a
line of bearing 000°-180°(T).***
* Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document I6O463, NA 12653.
** Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
*** Action Report COMDESRON 24, Night Surface Engagement Surigao Strait,
Leyte, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0129,
October 30th, 1944.
366 CONFIDENTIAL
COM EASTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
Also at 0313 he (a) noted that the enemy had ceased firing at the
eastern group,* Whether or not he noted that the enemy had shifted fire
and illumination to his western group is not known but it seems improbable
because none of his ships reported these facts. At this time the REMEY
ceased making smoke but apparently he did not direct the other two ships
to cease making smoke for there is no entry in the voice logs of such an
order; and (b) he reduced speed of the eastern group to twenty-five knots
and then queried the Commanding Officer MC GOWAN by TBS voice radio as to
whether he saw any indications of a hit, to which the Commanding Officer
MC GOWAN at 0317 replied that he thought that he had observed one hit, and
possibly one more, but was not sure.**
At 0316 he reported the results of his firing to CTG 77.2 as follows:
"Total of five (targets). Two may have been hit. They are slowing down
and dropping back,"*** This message, which was not finally received by
CTG 77.2 until 0317, was not complete in that it failed to give any informa-
tion other than numbers. It did not give the composition, the types, the
formation or the course and speed. While he may have felt that CTG 77.2 was
able to track the enemy and thereby obtain his course and speed, he must
have well known that he could not obtain from that source the composition
and actual formation or the types.
The above two messages are in contrast to the statement previously
reported that three explosions had been sighted.
At 0317 the MELVTN asked permission to terminate smoke which was
granted.****
At 0318 Commander Eastern Attack Group reduced the speed of the
group to eighteen knots.
At 0319 he observed one large explosion in the target area* and
received a message from Commander Western Attack Group claiming that he
had just scored a bit hit on the enemy. This was believed to have been
the "blowing up" of a Japanese destroyer by the torpedoes of the Western
Attack Group,***** It was correct in that the YAMAGUMO exploded and sank
almost instantly at this time. ******
At this time he received a TBS voice radio message from CTG 77.2
requesting information as to the types of enemy ships reported at 0317,
* Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055,
November 12th, 1944.
** Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and
Defense of Leyte, Philippine Islands, including the Battle of
Surigao Strait, Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (J),
*** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
**** Action Report MELVIN, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 079, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
***** Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and
Defense of Leyte, Philippine Islands, including the Battle of
Surigao Strait, Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944.
****** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
367 CONFIDENTIAL
COM WESTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
Commander Western Attack Group could see, not only on his radar
scope but also by visual sighting, that this westward movement would
invite collision unless he took immediate action. Therefore at 0252 he
changed course to 090° (T) to clear the northernmost ship of DSSRON TWENTY-
FOUR (BEALE), which at this time was about 1,000 yards to the south
(Diagram "G"). Since "follow-t he- leader" tactics were in effect the
MONSSEN followed in column.*
At 0253 his flagship (MC DERMUT) reported** the first radar
contact on the enemy made by the Western Attack Group. This report was
to the effect that the enemy was bearing 158° (T), range 33,000 yards.
Since this range was, at this time, some 6,000 yards too great it was
probably made earlier (i.e., 0248) but not reported. While this had no
adverse effect in this case it points out clearly the necessity for
exactness in contact reports as to "time".
At 0254, having cleared DSSRON TWENTY-FOUR, he came right to
course 190°(T) to head for the enemy, while working slightly westward
toward the shoreline. He was, at this time, over 6,000 yards from the
shoreline and felt that this was too great a distance to receive any
protection from the land mass against radar detection.***
Also, at 0254, he may have intercepted a message from CTG 77.2
requesting CTG 79.11 to report to him when he had the enemy on his radar
scope and the number of ships, but this is doubtful because (a) CTG 79. U
did not receive the message on TBS voice radio but did receive it on the
PT Voice Common**** and (b) COMDESDIV 108 does not mention it in his
action report.
At 0255 the MONSSEN made radar contact on a single pip bearing
160° (T), range 30,000 yards, but did not report it.*
At 0256 he intercepted Commander Eastern Attack Group's report to
CTG 77.2 that there were two large targets and three smaller ones five and
one-half miles west of Tungo Point,
Also at 0256 he received a second range from his flagship locating
the enemy on bearing 160°(T), range 29,700 yards.***
* Action Report MONSSEN, Participation in the Operation for the
Initial Attack and Occupation of Leyte Island, Philippine Islands,
and in the Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 060, November 5th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055,
November 12th, 1944.
*** Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
**** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
368 CONFIDENTIAL
COM WESTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
Surprising as it may seem, he made no effort at this time to
locate himself with relation to the Eastern Attack Group because, as he
stated later, he "believed that DESDIV 108 (Western Attack Group) was not
more than 5,000 yards to the north of DESDIV 107 (Eastern Attack Group)".*
Although he infers that the Eastern Attack Group was not on his radar
scope at this time it is probable that it was there for it was observed
later, when a need for it arose, at almost exactly the same range.
This failure of Commander Western Attack Group to maintain contact
on the Eastern Attack Group and to make every effort to insure that his
attack was coordinated with that of the Eastern Attack Group was unsound
in that it violated the very principle of multiple attacks, i.e., that the
separate salvos of torpedoes arrive nearly simultaneously at the target.**
In making this comment it is, of course, realized that the blame for this
failure was not the responsibility of Commander Western Attack Group alone
but was largely the responsibility of CTG 79.11, as has been pointed out
under "Operations of Commander Eastern Attack Group, 0245 - 0320, October
25th».
At 0258 he received CTG 79.11' s message designating targets and
assigning the first and third targets to the western group. He was not
confused by this target designation because it coincided exactly with the
picture he had on his radar scope "of three large pips in column heading
north with the leading pip smaller than the other two".* Since, just
three minutes before, the MC DERMUT radar scope had shown but one small
pip*** and two minutes before the MONSSEN* s scope also had shown but one
small pip,**** it is not clear how the picture of the three large pips in
column could have developed so rapidly.
At 0259 he directed the MC DERMUT to take the third target and
the MONSSEN to take the one to the north, and asked the MONSSEN whether
she had the targets on her radar scope.*
At 0300 (a) having received an affirmative reply from the MONSSEN*
and (b) since the CIC was busy tracking the enemy, he decided not to close
the shoreline any farther and therefore changed course to 180°(T).
At this same time he heard the Commanding Officer MC GOWAN request
permission to fire torpedoes, and Commander Eastern Attack Group's reply
to "Fire torpedoes when ready." He was mystified by these messages for he
believed the eastern group to be only about 5,000 yards to the south.
* Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
** Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-43, Destroyer Torpedo Attack
Instructions issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific Fleet, Serial
01264, October 24th, 1943.
*** Action Report MC DERMUT, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 061, November 5th, 1944.
**** Action Report MONSSEN, Participation in the Operation of the
Initial Attack and Occupation of Leyte Island, Philippine Islands,
and in the Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 060, November 5th, 1944.
369 CONFIDENTIAL
COM WESTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
Since his range to the target at this time was over 21,000 yards, and
since he knew that the maximum firing range for intermediate torpedoes
should be about 11,600 yards, he decided that the Eastern Attack Group
must be firing at targets other than those he was tracking. On checking
his radar scope on the bridge for other targets, he noted a small group
of two or three ships to the southeast which he had not seen before.
(These ships were also sighted visually by the Gunnery Officer MONSSEN*
from his battle station, presumably through his optics.) He requested
CIC to give him a range and bearing on this target which at 0301:30 was
given as ll6o(T), 19,700 yards .** He concluded from this that these
targets were the ones the Eastern Attack Group was attacking. However,
since he had already decided to attack the southern group of targets he
continued his attack because the southern targets were large and
definitely enemy. Actually, the small group of targets which were to the
northeast of his present targets comprised the Eastern Attack Group but
he did not know this until much later.**
THIS DECISION TO ATTACK THE SOUTHERN TARGETS WAS OF COURSE
CORRECT. WHILE IT CLEARLY AND IRREVOCABLY REJECTED THE CONCEPT OF A
COORDINATSD ATTACK THIS HAD NOW BECOME UNAVOIDABLE ANYWAY SINCE THE
EASTERN ATTACK GROUP WAS IN FIRING POSITION WHILE HIS OWN GROUP WOULD
NOT BE IN FIRING POSITION (FIFTY DEGREES ON THE ENEMY'S PORT BOW, RANGE
7,500 YARDS)** FOR ABOUT TEN MINUTES.
In rejecting the concept of a coordinated attack Commander
Western Attack Group was conforming to doctrine which stated: "IN A
DELIBERATE ATTACK, COORDINATION IN TIME OF TORPEDO CROSSINGS IS HIGHLY
DESIRABLE, SO THAT THE ENEMY CANNOT EVADE EACH SPREAD IN SUCCESSION.
HOWEVER, WHEN ORDERED TO ATTACK, DESTROYERS SHOULD ATTACK WITHOUT DELAY
WITH HIGHEST SPEED SETTING POSSIBLE. PERFECT COORDINATION IS NEARLY
IMPOSSIBLE AND IF DESTROYERS DELAY, ENEMY HAS MORE TIME TO AVOID THREAT
AND INFLICT DAMAGE ON ATTACKING UNITS."***
In the meantime, he observed far away on his port bow an enemy
searchlight which swept around for a short time and then was extinguished.
He also observed gunfire off the port bow and a little later observed
starshells which he thought were bursting between his group and the
enemy,** as a result of which he stated "this gave one a wonderful
feeling of relief and security at being thus protected from their
sight".** Actually, this was not so and shows the difficulty often
experienced in estimating, from a distance, the position of starshells.
These starshells were being fired by the THIRD Section against the
Eastern Attack Group.
* Action Report MONSSEN, Participation in the Operation for the Initial
Attack and Occupation of Leyte Island, Philippine Islands, and in the
Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 060,
November 5th, 1944.
** Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
19^-4, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
*** Der "oyer Tactical Bulletin 4-43, Destroyer Torpedo Attack
Inst Tactions, issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific Fleet, Serial
01264, October 24th, 1943.
370 CONFIDENTIAL
COM WESTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
At 0302 he likely intercepted a message from Commander Right
Flank Force to COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR which, in part, directed that
commander to attack and to follow down the west shoreline.* This
information was of considerable importance because his retiring destroyers
would likely encounter these attacking destroyers and it was imperative
that they not interfere with the attack.
At 0304 he received, from his CIC, a new course of 150°(T) which
would take him directly to his firing point.* He accepted this solution
of his attack problem and at 0305 changed course thirty degrees to port
to the new course.
However, after one minute, he decided that it would be unwise to
continue on this course too long lest the enemy be tracking him and
obtain a good firing solution. He, therefore, at 0306, when the range
to the YAMASHIRO was 13,500 yards (and the target angle from Diagram "G"
was 321° or thirty-nine degrees on the enemy's port bow) changed course
thirty degrees to the right and returned to his previous course of 180°(T)
and increased speed to thirty knots.** He stated that he did this to
"break the mean range line and offer some protection if the Japanese had
fired torpedoes".**
This decision does not appear to have been sound, because even if
the enemy had fired torpedoes, the short time which had elapsed during
the above changes of course would have been insufficient to have removed
his two ships from enemy torpedo water. In fact, would not the course of
150°(T) have made the likelihood of torpedo hits less in that this course
more nearly paralleled possible enemy torpedo tracks? Does it not,
therefore, seem correct to say that his proper course should have been to
continue on course 150°(T) and head for his chosen firing point?
Commander Western Attack Group stated that at 0307 starshells
burst between his destroyers and the enemy. He also stated that the
enemy was making periodic searchlight sweeps in his direction** but
apparently the illumination was not effective. The Commanding Officer
M0NSSEN stated that the M0NSSEN had been taken under fire at 0308 before
being effectively illuminated*** and the Commanding Officer KC DERMUT
stated that, although illumination was poor, enemy shells could be heard
whistling overhead as if the enemy knew that "we were out here somewhere"
and that illumination did not become effective until just after firing.*
Although the SHIGURE recorded that fire was opened on the Western Attack
Group at 0311**** it is considered that this time was in error as was her
* Action Report MC DERMUT, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 061, November 5th, 1944.
** Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
*** Statement of Gunnery Officer MONSSEN, Action Report MONSSEN,
Participation in the Operation for the Initial Attack and Occupation
of Leyte Island, Philippine Islands, and in the Battle of Surigao
Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 060, November 5th, 19A4.
**** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
371 CONFIDENTIAL
COM WESTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
recorded time of opening fire on the Eastern Attack Group. It appears
that at least one of the Japanese ships opened fire on the Western Attack
Group between 0307 and 0308 but that this firing did not become general
until 0311 when illumination became effective.
At 0307:30 Commander Western Attack Group ordered "Standby your
torpedoes". At this time the range to the target was about 12,000 yards,
the target angle about 312°.*
At 0308 he intercepted a report from CTG 79.11 to CTG 77.2 to the
effect that (a) there was just one group of enemy ships, consisting of
two large and one small, heading north in one column and (b) he was being
straddled. This picture of enemy ships coincided exactly with his own
picture;** however, it did not coincide with the pictures in the CIC's of
the MC DERMUT*** and MONSSEN.**** The MC DERMUT saw four small pips in
addition to the three large ones, which information apparently did not
reach the bridge, and the MONSSEN saw five targets (three small pips and
two large ones) in column. From the voice logs of the above ships it
seems clear that none of this target information was exchanged between
the ships of this attack group. This can probably be attributed to (a)
failure to appreciate the need of this interchange, (b) inexperience in
making torpedo attacks, and (c) lack of training.
Also, at 0308, he changed course once again toward the enemy, this
time through fifty degrees to course 130° (T) to close the range while
maintaining a good target angle, which target angle he believed to be
310°.** From Diagram "G" it was more nearly 313°«>
At 0309:30, in order to fire torpedoes, and on recommendation of
his CIC, he returned to course 180°(T), which placed him about 9,700 yards
from the YAMASHIRO, and 9,200 yards from the SHIGURE which was now the
third ship in column.
At this same time the MONSSEN changed course to 160°(T) in order
to be on the port quarter of the MC DERMUT when firing torpedoes and
thus avoid any possibility of being blanked off or delayed at the firing
point through a casualty to the MC DERMUT and also to close the range
somewhat which was desirable at the time.****
* Statement of Gunnery Officer MONSSEN, Action Report MONSSEN,
Participation in the Operation for the Initial Attack and Occupation
of Leyte Island, Philippine Islands, and in the 3attle of Surigao
Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 060, November 5th, 1944.
** Action Report COMDESDIV 103, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
*** Action Report MC DERMUT, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 2$th,
1944, Serial 061, November 5th, 1944.
**** Action Report MONSSEN, Participation in the Operation for the
Initial Attack and Occupation of Leyte Island, Philippine Islands,
and in the Battle of Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 060, November 5th, 1944.
372 CONFIDENTIAL
COM WESTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
Since the commanders reported as follows: (a) COMDESDIV 108 that
starshells were fired in his direction at 0307,* (b) the Commanding
Officer MONSSEN that he was under fire at 0308** and (c) the Commanding
Officer MC DERMUT that shells were whistling overhead for some time
before firing,*** it is most probable that throughout the laters periods
of the approach to the torpedo firing station, the destroyers were fired
at by the enemy but without adequate illumination or control.
In view of this it is not understood why Commander Western Attack
Group did not open fire with guns. Perhaps he felt that Japanese radar
capabilities were very poor and therefore their knowledge of his position
was also poor; perhaps since (a) they did not train their searchlights or
starshells on him continuously and (b) they ceased their illumination
after a short period of time, he felt that they did not see him; and by
opening fire with guns would give the enemy a better point of aim.
About this time Commander Western Attack Group directed the
MC DERMUT to fire torpedoes.
The MC DERMUT than, at 0310:15, commenced firing a full salvo of
ten torpedoes on base torpedo course 082° (T) at her designated target
bearing 118°(T), range 9,170 yards, target angle 298°, and tracked on
course 000°(T), speed twenty-two knots.*** The target fired at appears
to have been the destroyer SHIGURE which, because the YAMAGUMO had not as
yet entered the column, was the third ship in column.**** All torpedoes
were launched successfully, using broadside fire to port, three second
intervals, one degree spread, six foot depth setting and intermediate
speed, and all appeared to run hot, straight and normal.***
Shortly after the MC DERMUT had commenced firing torpedoes
Commander Western Attack Group, at about 0310:30, ordered the MONSSEN
to "fire torpedoes and let me know when they are out".*
At 0311 Commander Western Attack Group observed that his command
was being illuminated by an enemy searchlight, followed by gunfire.*
Also at this time the MONSSEN commenced firing a full salvo of ten
torpedoes on base torpedo course 0942°(T) at her designated target, bearing
110°(T), range 8,750 yards, target angle 290 degrees and tracked on course
000°(T) at twenty-three knots.** The target fired at was the second
destroyer, the ASAGUMO. All torpedoes were launched successfully using
the same firing plan as the MC DERMUT.
* Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
** Action Report MONSSEN, Participation in the Operation of the Initial
Attack and Occupation of Leyte Island, Philippine Islands and in the
Battle of Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 060,
November 5th, 1944 •
*** Action Report MC DERMUT, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 061, November 5th, 1944.
**** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
4967,9 0-59-34 373 CONFIDENTIAL
COM WESTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
The Commanding Officer MONSSEN, in the torpedo section of his
action report, states that the torpedoes were launched on a base torpedo
course slightly aft of the intended aiming point due to the failure to
get the last bearing on the torpedo director. This was explained as
follows: Failure of the lighting on the torpedo director target bearing
indicator from the gun director made it impossible for the gun director
to generate target bearing for the torpedo director and hence it was
necessary to apply target bearing to the torpedo director by telephoning
the radar bearings from CIC to the torpedo control party.* This procedure
resulted in an undetermined dead time which, at the high bearing rates
caused by the relative speed of fifty knots, produced a considerable error
in the bearing on which the torpedo tubes were laid. This lighting
failure was aggravated at the crucial moment by CIC use of the telephone
to inquire if the torpedoes had been fired.*
In addition to the above, Diagram "G" indicates that the target
bearing at the time of firing was actually 107°(T) compared to the radar
bearing at the time of firing of 110°(T).* This radar error of three
degrees was of course not included in the errors discussed above for the
last bearing did not get on the torpedo director. Graphic analysis of the
ranges and bearings recorded by the MONSSEN* gives the impression that
(a) from 0256 to 0305 she was tracking the YAMA3HIR0, (b) from 0305 to
0308 she was tracking the ASAGUM0, (c) from 0308 to 0311 she was ranging
on the SHIGURE and taking bearings on the ASAGUMO and (d) the range taken
at 0311:30 as the last torpedo was being fired was on the YAMASHIR0
(8,750 yards) while the bearing was taken on the SHIGURE (106°(T)). The
ranges taken on the SHIGURE produced the speed of twenty-three knots for
she, it will be remembered, was moving up to take station astern of the
ASAGUMO. Aside from the speed error introduced, any bearing error in
the last radar bearing applied would, of course, be applied.
Graphic solution of the torpedo firing problem (Plate XXIII) shows
that with a target speed of twenty-three knots, no current and a base
torpedo course of 094i°(T) the firing bearing should have been 129°(T) or
that using the firing bearing of 110° (T) the base torpedo course should
have been 069^° (T). In a similar solution using the actual Japanese
speed of twenty knots the base torpedo course should have been 07/4-5° (T).
From the above it can be seen that it was particularly fortunate for the
MONSSEN that (a) the YAMASHIRO was about 2,500 yards astern of the ASAGUMO,
(b) she was making three knots lower speed than the tracking party had
determined and (c) she turned away and then came back to the base course
of 000°(T) during the torpedo run. In fact the distance astern of the
ASAGUMO, the lower speed and the distance lost during the turn away,
roughly compensated for the error in tube laying.
At 0312 Commander Western Attack Group, learning that MONSSEN had
launched all torpedoes and observing that she was now being straddled
(actually she was not being straddled but shells were landing near the bow),
Action Report MONSSEN, Participation in the Operation for the Initial
Attack and Occupation of Leyte Island, Philippine Islands, and the
Battle of Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 060, "
November 5th, 1944.
374 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Note: Current not considered.
0311. o<^
0311.25
031 I .50
000c
0318.55 at 23 Knots
0318.55 at 20 Knots
0318.55 at 8.6 Knots
N Torpedo run = 7.3 min.
Cross track at 0318.55
\„ Where target should have been ,o
Yat 0311 to hit on BTC - 094>
with 23 Knots target speed. z
TORPEDO ANALYSIS-MONSSEN
BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF
OCTOBER 25th. 1944
PLATE TnTTTT
CONFIDENTIAL
COM WESTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
directed that speed be increased to maximum and that retirement be made
to the westward,* As a result of this order (a) the MC DERMUT increased
speed to thirty-three knots and changed course to 290° (T)** while (b)
MONSSEN changed course also to 290°(T), but not in column.***
Immediately after completing the turn, the Commanding Officer
MC DERMUT sighted two (actually there were three) motor torpedo boats
dead ahead. He put his rudder hard right and steadied on course 350°(T).
After clearing the motor torpedo boats he, at 0314:30, changed course to
325°(T) in order to clear the firing area.** (These motor torpedo boats
were the friendly PT's 328 (F), 329 and 323.)
While avoiding these boats COMDESDIV 108 at 0312:30 called them
on the PT Common Voice Circuit telling them who the destroyers were and
warning them to leave the destroyers alone. At this time he was startled
to hear one of the motor torpedo boats request permission from the senior
boat to fire torpedoes, obviously having mistaken the destroyers for
enemy. As this transmission was on a separate circuit, CIC replied
informing the boats that the two destroyers were friendly.*
It was to avoid just this situation that CTF 77 had directed CTG
70.1 to station motor torpedo boats south of Latitude 10°-10'N during
darkness but, unfortunately, the motor torpedo boats had already been
stationed as far north as Latitude 10°-17'N. CTG 70.1 had been unable to
reassign these boats because of his inability to communicate with them.
THIS INCIDENT, WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN SERIOUS, PLAINLY INDICATES THE
INADVISABILITY OF OPERATING MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT TYPES WITH LIMITED
COMMUNICATION FACILITIES IN WATERS WHERE OWN HEAVIER SURFACE FORCES AS
WELL AS ENEMY FORCES ARE TO BE EXPECTED.
IT ALSO EMPHASIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF INSURING THAT ALL UNITS
REQUIRED FOR AN OPERATION AND WHICH ARE TO OPERATE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO
ONE ANOTHER, ARE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION,
RECOGNITION, AND IDENTIFICATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT SHOULD BE
STRESSED THAT IN OPERATING MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS OR OTHER SIMILAR CRAFT
IN AREAS ADJACENT TO IARG2 FRIENDLY VESSELS, POSITIVE AND TIMELY MEASURES
MUST BE TAKEN TO AVOID MUTUAL INTERFERENCE. WHERE ACTUAL COORDINATION
OR COOPERATION OF SUCH DIVERSE TYPES IS REQUIRED, THERE CAN BE NO
SUBSTITUTE FOR DIRECT ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE PRINCIPAL COMMANDERS
CONCERNED PRIOR TO THE OPERATION.
* Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
** Action Report MC DERMUT, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 061, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
*** Track Chart, Action Report MONSSEN, Participation in the Operation
for the Initial Attack and Occupation of Leyte Island, Philippine
Islands, and in the Battle of Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 060, November 5th, 1944.
375 CONFIDENTIAL
COM WESTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
As he headed northwestward he suddenly observed at 0313:30 a
bright green flare between his destroyers and the shoreline which was
ideally placed to silhouette his command to the Japanese. The MONSSEN,
which had been illuminated by enemy searchlight during her turn, and was
farther to the south, immediately made smoke which obscured her from the
enemy,* and changed course to 325°(T).#* This flare appears to have
been dropped by planes from the THIRD Section which had been ordered
launched some hours earlier, at 2230, with instructions to search Leyte
Gulf, contact and guide the Japanese forces.*
Not all of the Japanese commanders realized that this flare was
friendly for the SKIGURE thought it was some sort of new Allied flare
for artillery (gunnery) spotting.*
As the destroyers retired they observed that, as late as 0314,
the enemy was still employing searchlights and starshells.**
At 0316, as discussed under "Operations of Commander THIRD
Section, 0245 - 0320, October 25th", Commander THIRD Section, having
sighted the destroyers of the western group, commenced changing course
by emergency ship's turn to starboard to course 090°(T) in order to
avoid the torpedoes which he realized might well have been fired since
one possible wake had already been reported. This large change of course
by ship's turn was not observed by Commander Western Attack Group but
the fact that the enemy track showed a tendency to the eastward was
observed.
At 0316:30 Commander Western Attack Group, having moved as far
westward as he considered necessary to gain any advantage which might
accrue from the effect of shore masses on the enemy's radar and also to
clear D3SR0N TWENTY-FOUR which was now attacking, changed course to
north .***■
Fortunately for the Allies, Commander THIRD Section, at 0317:30,
returned to his base course of 000° (T)* before he had succeeded in
removing his command beyond the maximum torpedo range.
At 0319 Commander Western Attack Group, as well as the MC DERMUT***
and the MONSSEN,** observed three explosions, one of which was quite
large, and not associated with gunfire, in the direction of the targets.
He immediately informed CTG 79.11 that a big "flare" had been scored in
the target area. Since (a) the time of these explosions coincided with
the calculated time of arrival of the torpedoes at the target, and (b) the
Japanese reported that at this time the YAMASHIRO and three destroyers
*~ Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Action Report MONSSEN, Participation in the Operation for the Initial
Attack and Occupation of Leyte Island, Philippine Islands, and in the
Battle of Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 060,
November 5th, 1944.
*** Action Report MC DERMUT, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 06l, November 5th, 1944.
376 CONFIDENTIAL
COM WESTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
(MICHISHIO, ASAGUMO and YAMAGUMO) had been torpedoed almost simultaneously,*
it is concluded that these torpedoes had been fired by the MC DERMUT and
MONSSEN. The Japanese reported later that (a) the YAMAGUMO had been hit
by at least three torpedoes, and had sunk almost immediately,* (b) the
YAMASHIRO had been hit by one torpedo but her combat efficiency had not
been impaired,** (c) the MICHISHIO had received one hit which caused her
to fall out of column, ***and (d) the ASAGUMO had received one hit which
had severed her bow and which caused her to fall out of column also.***
TO SUMMARIZE, THE DESTROYERS OF THE WESTERN ATTACK GROUP FIRED A
TOTAL OF TWENTY TORPEDOES, MC DERMUT (TEN), MONSSEN (TEN), AND MADE A
MINIMUM OF SIX HITS FOR A HIT PERCENTAGE OF THIRTY PERCENT.
THE VAST SUPERIORITY OF HITS MADE BY THIS TORPEDO ATTACK OVER
THAT OF THE EASTERN ATTACK GROUP CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO SEVERAL FACTORS OF
WHICH THE FOLLOWING ARE CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT: SHORTER FIRING RANGES
(9,000 YARDS VERSUS 11,000 YARDS AND OVER); GREATER AND, THEREFORE, MORE
EFFECTIVE TARGET ANGLE (TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY DEGREES VERSUS THIRTY
DEGREES); WIDER SPREAD PLACEMENT AT THE TARGET WHICH RESULTED FROM BETTER
FIRE DISTRIBUTION (ALL BUT ONE SHIP (MOGAMI) WAS WITHIN THE SPREAD OF
THE WESTERN ATTACK GROUP'S TORPEDOES, WHEREAS ONLY THREE SHIPS (YAMAGUMO,
FUSO, MOGAMI) CAN BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN WITHIN THE SPREAD OF THE
EASTERN ATTACK GROUP'S TORPEDOES).
In addition to the above tactical factors it appears that (a)
COMDESDIV 108 and his ships had been more thorough in preparing for the
action which is evidenced by the following: (1) No misfires; (2) MC DERMUT
had checked torpedo gyro alignment before the action;**** (3) MC DERMUT had
charged torpedo air flasks to 3,000 pounds per square inch pressure to get
extra range**** (about 800 yards-*****as shown on Diagram UG"), and (b) this
thoroughness carried over to the records in that they submitted very
complete and accurate action reports and track charts.
At 0320 Commander Western Attack Group (MC DERMUT) was in
Latitude 10°-19'N and about 1,800 yards off the shore of Leyte Island.
The MONSSEN was about 1,200 yards astern, and on the port quarter.
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 250330 October 1944 to Commanders 1ST
and 2ND Striking Forces, Detailed Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1
Operation, October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
*** Composite Report on Surigao Strait Action by Commanding Officers
ASAGUMO (Commander Kazuo Shibayama, ex-IJN) and MICHISHIO (Commander
Kazuo Tanaka, ex-IJN), March 15th, 1946, Army Historical Division
Microfilm HS-39A.
**** Action Report MC DERMUT, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 061, November 5th, 1944.
***** Manual of Destroyer Torpedo Control, Destroyer Tactical Bulletin
No. 4-45, issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific, August 22nd,
1945, Section 2.3, Page 14.
377 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
(C) Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats, 0245 - 0320, October 25th.
(1) Upper Surigao PT's.
At 0245 Commander Upper Surigao PT's, in FT 327, with PT's 321 and
326 in company, was proceeding toward the shelter of Kanihaan Island at
seven knots. He had radar contact on the Japanese THIRD Section, which
was approaching him from the south.
At 0255, at a distance of about 6,500 yards,* he sighted the
contact visually as it passed six miles due west of the southern tip of
Kanihaan Island. He evaluated it as one battleship, three destroyers and
one other large ship but did not make a contact report** perhaps because
he had reported its presence to CTG 79.11 at 0235. Actually there were
two battleships, one cruiser on course 000° (T), speed twenty knots,
which was quite accurate.
At 0310 he stopped and commenced drifting with the southerly
current.
At 0320 the Upper Surigao PT's were bearing about 193°(T), distant
2,000 yards from the southern tip of Kanihaan Island (Diagram "G").
(2) Kanihaan PT's.
Commander Kanihaan PT's, with PT's 495, 439 and 492, was on
station one- half mile south of Kanihaan Island conducting radar search.
At approximately 0250 he made radar contact on a large ship
bearing about 260°(T), range six miles.*** He seems to have gone ahead
at this point at about twenty knots and to have changed course to about
3l6°(T). By 0255 he had cleared Kanihaan Island and settled on
approximate course 341° (T) in order to close his target without losing
too much bearing.
Although their action reports do not mention it, the motor
torpedo boats must have seen the Japanese searchlight illumination and
firing at the Eastern Attack Group after 0300. At this time they were
within four and one-half miles of the Japanese formation. That their
action reports do not mention the torpedo hit in the FUSO is not
surprising for the commander of the Japanese force did not know it either.
At approximately 0311:30, at a range of three miles he sighted the
target visually and identified his target as a battleship which he realized
had slowed and which he stated was still proceeding in a northerly
direction.*** This was the battleship FUSO, which had been torpedoed at
* Action Report PT 326, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 327, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 495, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
378 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
0308:30 and was at this time making about twelve knots, on course 030°(T),
He continued on, but before he could make an attack, he received a
warning from Commander Western Attack Group at 0313* to all motor torpedo
boats to the effect that friendly destroyers were approaching down the
strait which were not to be attacked.** He, therefore, retired toward
Kanihaan Island to his patrol station without any further action.
Since he (a) had recognized this ship as a battleship, which was
alone, (b) had undoubtedly recognized it as enemy because the FUSO and
YAMASHIRO had enormous pagoda-like foremast structures which bore no
resemblance to Allied battleships or cruisers, (c) knew that only Allied
destroyers were attacking down the strait at this time, (d) knew that the
action was proceeding northward and away from his present position, (e)
was in an excellent approach position for a torpedo attack against a
slow target and (f) had apparently not been discovered since no enemy
action had been taken against him, his decision to retire his motor
torpedo boats without making a contact report or an attack on the enemy
battleship was unsound.
In all fairness, however, it seems likely that Commander Kanihaan
PT's had interpreted too literally his orders which, according to CTG 70.1,
were, in part, "the sections stationed nearest own forces in the upper end
of the straits were positively instructed to get clear and stay clear if
there were any indications of own forces moving into their areas."***
Also that "no ship moving down the straits during or after the battle
was to be attacked by any boat unless positively identified as enemy."***
At 0320 the Kanihaan PT's were about three and one- half miles,
bearing 332° (T) from Kanihaan Island •
(3) South Amagusan PT's,
At 0245 Commander South Amagusan PT's, with his motor torpedo
boats, was proceeding toward the shelter of Amagusan Point at ten knots.
PT 331, which had the only radar functioning satisfactorily in the group,
was conducting radar search and tracking the enemy.
At approximately 0306:30 the Japanese THIRD Section heading north
and the Allied Western Attack Group heading south were on the radar screen
and approaching each other. The Western Attack Group was about six miles
away, while the THIRD Section was about seven miles away.**** PT 331
stated that the friendly ships were four miles east of Amagusan Point while
the enemy ships were four miles west of Kanihaan Island.*****
* Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 495, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No
Serial, October 26th, 1944.
*** Action Report CTG 70.1, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, Night
of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0330, December 1st, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 320, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No
Serial, October 30th, 1944.
***** Action Report PT 331, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No
Serial, October 30th, 1944.
379 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
Although the enemy was passing about five miles west of Kanihaan
Island and the Western Attack Group was somewhat north of Amagusan Point
(Diagram "G"), this picture otherwise was fairly accurate and indicated
that Commander South Amagusan PT's maintained an unusually good summary
plot despite the inadequate facilities of a motor torpedo boat.
At this same time, being well clear of the coming action, he
stopped and started to drift with the current.
At 0311 he observed the searchlight and gunfire directed at the
Western Attack Group* which he, and his command thought were directed at
themselves.**
According to PT 329 of the East Amagusan PT's, PT 320 at this
time, informed the motor torpedo boats, that friendly destroyers were in
the area. Whether PT 320 obtained this information from COMDESDIV 108 or
determined it himself is not known.
At 0320 he was bearing about 182° (T), distant about two point six
miles from Amagusan Point.
(4) East Amagusan PT's.
Commander East Amagusan PT's, with PT's 328 (OTC), 323 and 329,
was patrolling his station about two miles east of Amagusan Point. At
0245 he had completed a move to the north against the current and was now
drifting south from a position about two miles north of Amagusan Point.
The radar in his flagship, PT 328, was inoperative. It appears that the
radars in the other two motor torpedo boats were operating satisfactorily
although there is no mention of radar contacts during this period.
Around 0300 he sighted searchlights and starshells to the
southeastward.*** This was the action of the THIRD Section and the
Eastern Attack Group. Between 0310 and 0311 he sighted the searchlights,
starshells and firing of the THIRD Section at the MC DERMUT and the
MONSSEN**** and at the same time sighted these two FLETCHER class
destroyers passing fairly close aboard on southerly courses. Shortly
afterward he saw them turn and pass close aboard on a northerly course.***
At 0312:30 he either heard COMDESDIV 108, in MC DERMLFT, warning
the motor torpedo boats on voice radio that he was friendly and not to
attack or as stated under South Amagusan PT's, may have received the warning
from PT 320. He immediately warned his section that the destroyers were
friendly.**** At this same time the units of his section became
separated.*****
* Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
** Action Reports PT's 330 and 331, Night of October 24th - 25th,
1944, No Serials, October 30th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 328, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No
Serial, October 30th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 329, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No
Serial, October 30th, 1944.
***** Action Report PT 323, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No
Serial, October 30th, 1944.
380 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
(a) PT 328.
As a result of the warning of friendly destroyers received
from COMDESDIV 108 at 0312:30 and the close passage of the MC DERMUT and
MONSSEN about the same time, PT 328 then, at 0313, closed Amagusan Point
in order to get out of the destroyer attack area.
At 0313:30 the Commanding Officer (a) likely saw the bright
green flare reported by most ships although he does not mention it in his
action report and (b) observed that he had been picked up by an enemy
searchlight but had not been fired on,*
At 0320 PT 328 was bearing 073°(T), distant 2,900 yards from
Amagusan Point (Diagram "G").
(b) PT 323.
After (1) sighting the MC DERMUT and MONSSEN passing close
aboard on a northerly course and (2) receiving the OTC's warning that the
destroyers were friendly, the Commanding Officer PT 323, went ahead on a
southerly course in order to clear the destroyer attack area.
At 0313:30 he sighted the blue (green ) flare which was
sighted by both friend and foe alike .**
Since there is no mention of the blowing up of the YAMAGUMO
at 0319, it seems likely that this was due to the fact that the THIRD
Section was obscured by the smoke laid by the MC DERMUT and MONSSEN.
At 0320 PT 323 was bearing 100°(T), distant 3,700 yards from
Amagusan Point.
(c) PT 329.
Sometime around 0312 the Commanding Officer PT 329 sighted a
destroyer coming toward him which he clearly mistook as an enemy ship for
he requested permission from the Commanding Officer PT 328 (OTC) to fire
torpedoes. Meanwhile he maneuvered to obtain a favorable firing position.
At 0312:30 he either (a) heard COMDESDIV 108 advising the motor torpedo
boats of the presence of the MC DERMUT and MONSSEN and warning them not to
fire or (b) received this message from PT 320. He did not open fire
because he recognized the destroyer as friendly since (a) it came from the
northeast and (b) he had received word from PT 320 that friendly destroyers
were in the target area.*** This statement seems to have been a post-
battle rationalization for otherwise no request to fire would have been
made.
* Action Report PT 328, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944 •
** Action Report PT 323, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 329, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 19/»4.
381 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
He did not report this contact because he could not get through
to anyone on either the VHF or the TCS radio circuits.*
At 0313:30 he probably sighted the bright green flare reported
by the other ships in the vicinity but he did not mention this matter in
his action report.
About 0316, judging that he was close enough to the Leyte shore,
he stopped and commenced drifting with the current.
At 0320 PT 329 was bearing 050° (T), distant 3,000 yards from
Amagusan Point.
(5) SE Panaon PT's.
At 0245 these PT's were off the southeast coast of Panaon Island
between Binit Point and Bolobolo Point. It will be recalled that they had
become separated prior to the transit of the THIRD Section due to radio
and radar failure in PT 137. At this time they had not yet regrouped and
were operating independently.
They continued to operate about as shown on Diagram "I" making no
contact either on the enemy or each other.
(6) Sumilon PT's.
At 0245 Commander Sumilon PT's was drifting with the current south
of Sumilon Island as shown on Diagram "I". About 0318 he commenced
returning to his station off Sumilon Island.
At 0320 he was bearing 175°(T), distant 4,000 yards from the
southern tip of Sumilon Island.
(7) Bilaa Point PT's.
At 0245 Commander Bilaa Point PT's, with his PT's separated about
1,500 yards, was drifting with the current about one mile northwest of
Bilaa Point (Diagram "I"). At this time he had stopped.
At approximately 0312 PT 497, in position about two and six-tenths
miles southwest of Bilaa Point,** made radar contact on targets bearing
300°(T), distant five to seven miles. These targets were actually the
AKEBONO bearing 290°(T), distant five miles and the NACHI bearing 2S8°(T),
distant seven miles. They had just completed a turn to 020°(T) and were
heading for Binit Point.
* Action Report PT 329, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 497, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
382 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0245 - 0320, October 25th
Although he stated that he reported this contact as three large
targets (which was correct) through PT 523,* there is no indication that
the report reached the responsible commanders further up the strait.
At 0320 he was 6,000 yards bearing 240° (T) from Bilaa Point,
(8) Madilao Point PT's.
At 0245 Commander Madilao Point PT's, with his PT's, was about one
mile south of Madilao Point on course about 180°(T), at slow speed (probably
about seven and one-half knots), patrolling to a point five miles south of
Madilao Point.** PT 195 was using her radar on the five mile scale for
navigational purposes.***
At 0311 Commander Madilao Point PT's made radar contact on two
targets to the southwest of Binit Point at a distance of about ten miles.
He experienced difficulty in recognizing them as enemy for some time due
to their being "such a short distance from Binit Point".****
These two targets were probably the NACHI and the ASHIGARA. Since
the NACHI was nearly five miles from Binit Point at this time it is not
clear how the land interferred with the detection or the identification
of the targets (Diagram "I").
Commander Madilao Point PT's did not report this contact presumably
due to radio interference.****
At 0320 he appears to have been about four point seventy-five miles
bearing 191° (T) from Madilao Point.
(9) Lower Surigao PT's.
At about 0245 the Lower Surigao PT's were operating separately
about as shown in Diagram "I". Commander Lower Surigao PT's, in PT 490,
was proceeding north along the eastern coast of Panaon Island toward
Caligangan Point (Panaon Island). En route he passed PT 493 which was
aground on Maoyo Point without sighting or being sighted by that boat;
PT 491 was well off shore and returning to patrol station off Kanhatid
Point (Dinagat Island); and PT 493 had been beached on Maoyo Point.
* Action Report PT 494, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 191, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0394, October 29th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 195, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0393, October 29th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 192, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0395, October 29th, 1944.
383 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
CHAPTER XIV - JAPANESE OPERATIONS, 0320 - 0348, October 25th.
(A) Operations of Commander THIRD Section, 0320 - 0348, October 25th.
It seems clear that at this time Commander THIRD Section, in the
YAMA3HIR0 on course 000° (T), signalled speed twenty knots, (although the
master plot (Diagram "H"), which is based on Allied radar ranges, shows
that she had slowed to ten knots and did not regain eighteen knots until
0328), did not realize the magnitude of the disaster which had struck his
force for, at 0320, he ordered a turn to port of forty-five degrees (to
course 315°(T))* in order to avoid Allied torpedoes. It is possible that
he did not know that the YAKASHIRO had just been hit by a torpedo, for she
was continuing on without much difficulty. However, he soon learned of the
torpedoing and, realizing that the Allied torpedoes had passed and that
his present course provided maximum gunfire against the retiring destroyers,
decided to continue on that course without turning to the new course.
Owing to the possible confusion on his bridge due to the torpedo attack,
he failed to advise his command of this decision. This failure had no
adverse effect on his ships since they were following his movements only
in a general way.
He passed the disabled MICHISHIO and ASAGUMO to starboard several
minutes later and noting their condition sent, at 0330, a dispatch to
Commanders FIRST and SECOND Striking Forces as follows:**
"Urgent Battle Report No. 2: Enemy destroyers and torpedo boats present
on both sides of the northern entrance to Surigao Strait. Two of our
destroyers torpedoed and drifting. YAKASHIRO sustained one torpedo hit but
no impediment to battle cruising."
THIS REMARKABLE DISPATCH, WHICH WAS THE LAST DISPATCH TRANSMITTED BY
HIM, MUST HAVE 3EEN HURRIEDLY COMPOSED IN THE CONFUSION WHICH NATURALLY
ENSUES WHEN A SHIP IS HIT FOR, ACTUALLY, THE THIRD SECTION WAS STILL SOME
TEN MILES SOUTH OF THE LINE CONNECTING THE NORTHERN TIPS OF CABUGAN GRANDE
AND HIBUSON ISLAND, (DIAGRAM "H") WHICH AREA, IT IS PRESUMED, COMMANDER
THIRD SECTION HAD REFERENCE TO IN HIS DISPATCH. ALSO, JUDGING FROM THIS
DISPATCH, IT CAN BE CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION IN THE
FLAGSHIP ABOUT THE FUSO AND YAMAGUMO FOR AS LATE AS 0330, COMMANDER THIRD
SECTION DID NOT KNOW THAT (A) THE FUSO HAD BEEN FATALLY DAMAGED AND HAD
FALLEN OUT OF FORMATION AND (B) THE YAMAGUMO HAD SUNK.
THIS LACK OF INFORMATION IS APPARENTLY NOT UNUSUAL IN NIGHT ACTION FOR
IN AN ALMOST IDENTICAL SITUATION DURING THE NIGHT BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL,
NOVEMBER 14TH-15TH, 1942, THE AMERICAN BATTLESHIPS WASHINGTON AND SOUTH
DAKOTA HAD BECOME LOST TO EACH OTHER, SO THAT FOR SOMETIME THE TASK GROUP
COMMANDER HAD 10 DKNLEDGi Z? TBE W-ZF^kS-ZZ^S Z?. UUHUlTlUi 0? IBB 50DIB
DAKOTA.***
*~ Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** COMBATDIV 2 Dispatch 250330 October 1944 to Commanders 1ST and 2ND
Striking Forces, Detailed Action Reoort 3ATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation,
October 18th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
*** Act -on Report WASHINGTON, Night of November 14th - 15th, 1942, Serial
0155, November 27th, 1942.
384 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0343, October 25th
In the meantime, having observed Attack Group 2.2 (consisting of
ARUNTA (F), KILLEN, BEALE) almost on his port beam and realizing that this
group had probably fired torpedoes, he, at 0327:30,* ordered a forty-five
degree change of course by simultaneous ship turns to starboard to 045°(T)**
to avoid these latter torpedoes. At the same time his flagship, the
YAMASHIRO, illuminated the KILLEN and BEALE by searchlight and opened fire***
with her five-inch and six-inch batteries. A short time later she commenced
firing starshells**** at which time she secured the searchlight.
Although he must have realized that this firing was not too effective
because the enemy destroyers which were retiring were protected by smoke
screens, and because his own radar was ineffective, he nevertheless
continued firing (a) at the last destroyer in column (BEALE) which soon
disappeared into the smoke and (b) after this for some minutes in the
general direction of the BEALE1 s retirement,****
At 0330, based on Allied radar plots about one and one-half minutes
after he had settled on his new course, he changed course back to north by
simultaneous ship turns to port,** Why he did this is not understood for,
if his earlier change of course to the right to 045° (T) had been based on
the possible danger from Allied torpedoes— and he had reason to fear Allied
torpedoes since he had already received one torpedo hit on his port side
and had seen the YAMAGUMO destroyed, and the MICHISHIO and ASAGUMO damaged
as well — his proper change of course would have also been to starboard. It
should be clear from Diagram "H" that an additional change of course of
forty-five degrees to starboard would have more nearly paralleled the Allied
torpedo wakes. Whether or not he made an error in his order by calling
the wrong color (the Japanese maneuvered over their voice circuit by
employing names of colors, i.e., "green green" meant 45° turn to starboard,
and "red red" meant 45° turn to port)**will never be known. However, even
had he called the correct color it seems probable that the turn would not
have been in time for at 0331:18 the YAMASHIRO received a second torpedo
hit on her port side***** which, from graphic analysis of Allied radar
plots, slowed her temporarily to about five knots. This torpedo had been
fired by the KILLEN at about 0324.
His action in turning away and then returning to the base course shortly
afterward is remarkably similar to his action at 0316 when he turned away
from the attack of the Western Attack Group and then turned back into the
torpedo water of this group in returning to the base course. In this second
attack however, his initial turn of forty-five degrees was only half as
great as that at 0316 and was not sufficient to protect his command by
* Time based on Allied radar ranges and bearings.
** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd •
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
*** Action Report HMAS ARUNTA, Night Action, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 1/41, October 29th, 1944.
**** Action Report BEALE, Night Torpedo Attack on Japanese Naval Forces
at Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0230, October 29th,
1944.
***** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
385 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
paralleling the torpedo tracks. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT (A) HALFWAY MEASURES
SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AND (B) WHEN MEASURES ARE TAKEN, SUFFICIENT TIME MUST
BE ALLOWED FOR THEM TO BE EFFECTIVE.
Shortly after receiving this second torpedo hit, he ordered, at about
0333, another 45° emergency ship's turn to port.* However, it seems clear
from Allied plots that the YAMASHIRO (a) finally steadied on course 340°(T)
instead of 315°(T), which had been ordered and (b) having completed the
necessary damage control measures, increased speed to eighteen knots.
While the reasons for settling on this course are nowhere given it
seems clear that he felt that the most recent Allied torpedo attack — that
by Attack Group 2.2 — was now over and that he should therefore head for
Dulag Anchorage. It will be observed that the new course of 340°(T), from
his 0336 position, would have placed him in a location very similar to
that which he would have been in had he turned to his planned course of
350°(T) upon entering the strait .**
At about 0336, he was pleased to note that the YAMASHIRO was making
good about eighteen knots. At this time he was probably steering 345°(T)
to offset the effect of the current.
Whether or not at this time he knew the various locations of his ships
or could see any of them is not known. As a matter of interest, since the
MCGAMI was only about 3,300 yards astern and the SHIGURE about 6,200 yards
astern, it seems correct to say that he not only knew their locations but,
in view of the excellence of Japanese night glasses, could seem them as
well. It seems probable, therefore, that about this time he realized that
the FUSO was not in sight and was likely damaged or had suffered some
engineering casualty.
Why he took no action to determine the status of his ships, and
especially that of the FUSO which was half of his major strength, is not
known.
WHILE THE JAPANESE DOCTRINE, IN CASES SIMILAR TO THE ABOVE, ARE NOT
AVAILABLE TO THIS STUDY THEY WERE PRESUMABLY SIMILAR TO AMERICAN DOCTRINE***
WHICH PROVIDED THAT (A) UNLESS THE OTC DETERMINED OTHERWISE, WHEN A FLEET
(AND PRESUMABLY FORCE OR GROUP) WAS PROCEEDING INTO BATTLE AND A BATTLESHIP
WAS DISABLED, A SHIP FROM THE BATTLE LINE SCREEN GROUP ASTERN WAS TO PROCEED
AT ONCE, WITHOUT WAITING FOR ORDERS, TO DEFEND THE DISABLED BATTLESHIP
AGAINST SUBMARINE AND AIR ATTACK, (B) NO AID WAS TO BE PROVIDED AUTOMATICALLY
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 221155 October 1944 to CinC Combined
Fleet, Commanders 1ST Striking Force, SW Area Force, 2ND Air Fleet
(6TH Base Air Force), CRUDIV 16, etc., Detailed Action Report No. 13
DESRON 10, SHO Operation, October 17th - 31st, 1944, WDC Document
161005, NA 11744.
*** War Instructions, United States Navy, (FTP 143A), United States Fleet,
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Navy Department, 1944, Chapter
12, Section XVIII, Paragraphs 12201 and 12202.
386 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
FOR CRUISERS, BUT INSTEAD SUCH AID WAS TO BE PROVIDED BY THE COMMANDER OF
THE GROUP TO WHICH THE DISABLED SHIP BELONGED OR BY THE COMMANDER OF THE
DESTROYERS ATTACHED TO THE SAME GROUP ONLY IF THE STATE OF THE ACTION
PERMITTED AND IF SHIPS WERE AVAILABLE AND (C) NO AID WAS TO BE PROVIDED
SMALLER SHIPS SUCH AS DESTROYERS UNLESS SO ORDERED BY THE OTC.
TODAY, 1958 DOCTRINE STATES, »IF A SHIP IS DISABLED DURING AN ENGAGEMENT
AND IS UNABLE TO KEEP STATION, THE OTC SHALL BE NOTIFIED AND THE SHIP
ASTERN SHALL BE WARNED. IF POSSIBLE, THE DISABLED SHIP SHALL HAUL OUT ON
THE DISENGAGED SIDE AND CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE ENEMY TO THE BEST OF HER
ABILITY. IF THE FLAGSHIP IS DISABLED, THE TWO CLOSEST DESTROYERS SHALL
CLOSE HER AND BE PREPARED TO EMBARK THE OTC AND HIS STAFF. HELICOPTERS MAY
BE USED FOR THIS PURPOSE IF CONDITIONS PERMIT. AFTER THE ENGAGEMENT THE
NEAREST SCREENING DESTROYER OR OTHER DESIGNATED SHIP SHALL CLOSE THE
DISABLED SHIP TO GIVE PROTECTION AGAINST AIR AND SUBMARINE ATTACK. SURVIVORS
SHOULD NOT NORMALLY BE RESCUED UNTIL AFTER THE ENGAGEMENT. LIFE RAFTS AND
LIFE PRESERVERS, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE DROPPED BY PASSING SHIPS."*
However, since (a) there was no destroyer screen astern and (b) two of
the three Japanese destroyers had now been disabled it was not possible to
provide a protective destroyer except possibly one of those which had been
disabled and was astern with the FUSO. Anyway, it seems clear that
Commander THIRD Section took no action for the voice log is silent in this
matter,**
WHAT HIS ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION WAS AT THIS TIME IS NOT KNOWN.
HE HAD AT FIRST ENCOUNTERED ONLY MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS, AND MORE RECENTLY
DESTROYERS AS WELL, AND HAD RECEIVED NO INFORMATION OF OTHER ENEMY FORCES
FROM ANY SOURCE. HE HAD OBSERVED ABOUT THREE DESTROYER ATTACK SECTIONS,
CONSISTING OF BUT TWO TO THREE DESTROYERS EACH, AND HAD NOTED THAT THESE
DESTROYERS HAD APPROACHED FROM THE SHORES OF THE STRAIT, HAD FIRED TORPEDOES
UNSUPPORTED BY ANY GUNFIRE WHATSOEVER, AND HAD RETIRED BEHIND SMOKE. HE
REALIZED, OF COURSE, THAT THESE WERE ATTRITION TACTICS AND, THEREFORE,
PROBABLY WONDERED WHETHER, AFTER ALL, THE JAPANESE ESTIMATES HAD BEEN
CORRECT AND THAT THE ALLIED OPPOSITION, WHICH HE HAD EXPECTED TO ENCOUNTER,
HAD BEEN LARGELY DRAWN OUT OF THE STRAIT BY THE OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST
STRIKING FORCE IN THE SIBUYAN SEA. HE CERTAINLY HOPED SO. IT IS POSSIBLE
THAT THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE ABOVE SUSTAINED HIM IN HIS DECISION TO CONTINUE
ON WITHOUT DELAY AND TO HEAD DIRECTLY FOR DULAG ANCHORAGE.
Between 0340 and 0345 he probably noted the gunfire engagement between
the Right Flank Destroyers and the ASAGUMO and MICHISHIO, and also knew of
the large explosion to the south (FUSO) at the latter time. (This explosion
was sighted as far north as the battle line.)*** However, what action he
took in this matter is not recorded.
* Striking Force Operations, (NWP 20), Department of the Navy, Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, May 1953, Chapter 7, Paragraph 732.
** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
*** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
496799 O - 59 - 35 387 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
Also at 0344 he was informed by Commander SECOND Striking Force by voice
radio that the latter was penetrating through the strait,* From this he
could see that Commander SECOND Striking Force was about forty-five minutes
behind schedule and therefore was about thirty miles behind his force.
(Actually he was about twenty-two miles behind.) If he had hoped for any
support or cooperation within the immediate future from the SECOND Striking
Force he could now see that this was highly improbable.
At 0345 the YAMASHIRO turned, without signal, to course 020<>(T),
presumably to parallel the probable torpedo tracks from the Allied
destroyers on her port quarter who were engaging the damaged ASAGUMO and
MICHISHIO and, in doing so hoped to comb the wakes of any torpedoes which
these destroyers may have fired. If this was the reason for this change
of course it was sound because the new course was almost exactly the
correct torpedo course. Allied radar ranges and bearings show that after
this turn the YAMASHIRO reduced speed to about fifteen knots.
At this same time the YAMASHIRO opened fire perhaps (a) against both
Attack Groups 1.2 and 2.2 or (b) as the DALY, after reporting three round
balls of dull orange flame in succession on bearing 045°(T), stated,
"..♦immediately opened fire with major and minor caliber guns, frantically
throwing steel through 360°, and initiating general gun action between both
forces."** The MOGAMI stated that the YAMASHIRO was firing intermittently
without searchlight illumination but that the targets and results were not
clear.***
At 0348, despite her two torpedo hits, the YAMASHIRO continued on
course 020° (T) at fifteen knots. At this time she, when about 17,000 yards
south of the LOUISVILLE, was bearing 227° (T), distant 15,100 yards from
Kanhandon Point Light, Hibuson Island.
Although Commander THIRD Section continued to issue orders to his
command, it should be clear that his formation had been, for all intents
and purposes, abandoned and that each commanding officer was operating
independently. Therefore, the operations of the commanding officers of
each of the ships of the THIRD Section will be discussed separately.
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944.
*** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
388 CONFIDENTIAL
MOGAMI
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
(1) Operations of Operational Ships of THIRD Section, 0320 - 0348,
October 25th.
(a) MOGAMI.
By 0320 the Commanding Officer MOGAMI had made up the distance
lost during the evasive maneuvering between 0207 and 0213 (Diagram "F")
but he had not yet made up the distance lost in turning out to pass the
FUSO at 0309 (Diagram "G") nor had he moved up to the position formerly
occupied by the FUSO. At this time Allied radar plots indicated that he
was about 2,500 yards astern of the YAMASHIRO (Diagram MHn) and had commenced
a turn to port in compliance with Commander THIRD Section's 0320 emergency
forty- five degree turn to port.* His track shows that he steadied on
course 345° (T) and slowed to ten knots. This was probably for the purpose
of letting the situation ahead of him clarify before steaming into the area
where the ships ahead had been torpedoed.
From the Allied radar data it is clear that he did not turn to
course 045°(T) when the YAMASHIRO turned at 0327:30 but continued on course
345°(T). Whether this was because (a) Commander THIRD Section did not send
his order to turn until 0330 (as indicated by the SHIGURE Action Report) or
(b) he did not received the order or (c) he had decided to wait until he
had sufficient room to clear the MICHISHIO cannot be determined, but it was
probably the latter.
At 0329 he increased speed to twenty knots, and at 0329:30 he
passed the SHIGURE which was on opposite course about 1,100 yards to the
westward (Diagram nH")»
At 0330 he seemed to have a better knowledge of events than did
Commander THIRD Section. He knew that (a) the FUSO had been disabled and
had dropped out of formation,**(b) the ASAGUMO and MICHISHIO had been
damaged and the former was out of action, **(c) the YAMAGUMO had been sunk**
and that (d) only three ships, namely the YAMASHIRO, his own ship the
MOGAMI, and one destroyer, which he thought was the MICHISHIO but actually
was the SHIGURE, were operational.**
At 0330:30 he changed course to 045° (T) and paralleled the
course of the YAMASHIRO. Since the YAMASHIRO was at this time turning to
port to course 000°(T) it appears that he decided to follow roughly the
track of the YAMASHIRO and at the same time move away from the two attack
groups to the west.
About 0332 he observed a direct torpedo hit being made on the
YAMASHIRO, apparently near the bow.**
He did not turn at 0333 when Commander THIRD Section ordered an
emergency turn of 45° to port* but continued on, probably wishing to follow
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
389 CONFIDENTIAL
MOGAMI and SHIGURE
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
approximately in the wake of the YAMASHIRO and move further away from the
two Allied destroyer groups in the west. He continued on course 045° (T)
until 0337 when he changed course to 000°(T) which paralleled the earlier
track of the YAMASHIRO.
He likely noticed (a-) that at approximately 0340 he had closed
the YAMASHIRO somewhat, for at this time he slowed to eighteen knots, (b)
between 0340 and 0345 the gunfire attack of the Allied destroyers (DESRON
TWENTY-FOUR) against the damaged ASAGUMO and MICHISHIO, and (c) at 0345 the
YAMASHIRO open fire, for about twenty-five seconds later he changed course
to 320°(T) in order to close the YAMASHIRO track and to unmask his port
battery. He implied that he was not firing at this time because it was
difficult to distinguish friend from foe, although he did state that the
YAMASHIRO was firing intermittently without searchlight illumination but
that the targets and results were not clear.*
At this same time he likely noted the explosion in the FUSO
about eight miles south.
At 0348, still unharmed by torpedoes or gunfire, the MOGAMI,
continuing on course 320°(T) at about eighteen knots, was about 3,700 yards
astern of the YAMASHIRO and about 20,700 yards from the LOUISVILLE.
(b) SHIGURE.
By 0320 the SHIGURE had succeeded in passing through the
torpedo spreads of the Western Attack Group without a single torpedo hit —
in fact, she was the only ship within the spreads so fortunate — actually
she was between the torpedo spreads fired by the MC DERMUT and MONSSEN as
shown in Diagram nGM. Her commanding officer attributed his escape to the
fact that he was adjusting his course and speed to take his proper station
in the battle formation.** He, of course, being only about 700 meters
astern of the YAMAGUMO, observed the explosion in that ship and likewise
observed the torpedoing of the MICHISHIO, ASAGUMO and YAMASHIRO.
He noted that (a) all four ships had been hit almost
simultaneously,** (b) the YAMAGUMO had blown up and had sunk and (c) the
MICHISHIO, ASAGUMO and YAMASHIRO had fallen out of formation.*** In this
he was in error for it was the FUSO which, having been torpedoed at about
0308-0309, had fallen out of formation some minutes earlier; the YAMASHIRO
had continued on. He also noted that the YAMASHIRO had a list to port**
which was likely correct since she had received a torpedo hit on that side.
In his postwar interview he stated that having witnessed these
unfortunate events he increased speed to twenty-six knots and proceeded
northward*** to clear the damaged destroyers. Meanwhile he had endeavored
* Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
*** USSBS Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Nav No. 79, Interrogation
of Commander Shigeru Nishino, ex-IJN, Volume II, Page 346.
390 CONFIDENTIAL
SHIGURE
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
to communicate with the damaged YAMASHIRO, but receiving no reply he had
reversed course, so that he was heading on a southerly course while the
FUSO and MOGAMI continued onward on a northerly course. From the plot it
appears that he settled on course 186°(T) at 0325:30 (Diagram "H").
At about this same time he intercepted a message from the
Commanding Officer ASAGUMO to COMDESDIV FOUR in the MICHISHIO reporting that
the ASAGUMO had received a torpedo hit in her bow,*
Why he was unable to communicate with the YAMASHIRO is not known
for this ship, although somewhat damaged by a torpedo hit, was still heading
north. Perhaps she was too busy to answer, perhaps his memory is at fault
and he actually never queried either her or Commander THIRD Section at all.
Had he queried the latter he would certainly have received a reply for at
0320 Commander THIRD Section had issued orders via voice radio to the THIRD
Section, which orders are recorded in the SHIGURE voice log.
The Commanding Officer SHIGURE further stated that since he was
unable to establish communications with the YAMASHIRO he had reversed
course (a) to learn, if possible, what had happened to her, (b) to receive
instructions from Commander THIRD Section and (c) if necessary, to transfer
Commander THIRD Section to the SHIGURE.**
HIS ACTION IS NOT CONSIDERED SOUND. SINCE THE SHIGURE WAS THE
ONLY DESTROYER WHICH HAD SURVIVED THE TORPEDO ATTACKS DOES IT NOT SEEM
CORRECT TO SAY THAT SHE SHOULD PROPERLY HAVE REMAINED WITH THE ONLY BATTLE-
SHIP WHICH HAD SURVIVED THE TORPEDO ATTACKS SO THAT THE BATTLESHIP MIGHT BE
PROVIDED WITH A SCREEN, ALBEIT A VERY LIMITED ONE? WHAT JAPANESE DOCTRINE
WAS IN THIS MATTER IS NOT KNOWN BUT, SINCE THE JAPANESE WERE OFFENSIVE
MINDED, IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT THE DOCTRINE PROVIDED FOR THE SHIGURE
REMAINING ON STATION AHEAD OF THE YAMASHIRO. SHE COULD ACCOMPLISH NOTHING
OFFENSIVE IN A TURN TO THE SOUTH.
DOES IT NOT SEEM MORE LIKELY, THEREFORE, THAT HIS REAL REASON
FOR TURNING TO THE SOUTH WAS THE FACTOR OF "PRUDENCE"? HAVING OBSERVED
WHAT HAD OCCURRED TO THE OTHER THREE DESTROYERS AND TO THE YAMASHIRO, HE
THOUGHT IT PRUDENT TO RETIRE TEMPORARILY FROM THE VAN POSITION. THE FACT
THAT, IN TURNING AWAY, HE HAD RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS FROM COMMANDER THIRD
SECTION TO REMAIN ON STATION IS NOT CONSIDERED OF IMPORTANCE FOR THE
COMMANDER AT THE MOMENT, IN VIEW OF WHAT HAD OCCURRED, WAS SO OCCUPIED WITH
HIS OWN IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS THAT HE HAD LITTLE TIME TO BE CONCERNED WITH THE
SHIGURE.
It seems clear, at this point, that the Commanding Officer
SHIGURE thought that it was the YAMASHIRO which had been seriously
torpedoed and had fallen out of formation and that the FUSO, believed
undamaged, was continuing onward to the north. He also thought that the
Commanding Officer FUSO had assumed command of the formation because he
was next senior in command.
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** USSBS Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Nav No. 79, Interrogation
of Commander Shigeru Nishino, ex-IJN, Volume II, Page 346.
391 CONFIDENTIAL
SHIGURE
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0343, October 25th
At about 0327 he passed the ship which he considered to be the
FUSO but which actually was the YAMASHIRO, still on a northerly course. At
this same time he intercepted a message from the Commanding Officer ASAGUMO
(to CGMDESDIV FOUR in the MICHISHIO) reporting that the ASAGUMO had
received a torpedo hit in her bow,*
Shortly after this, still moving south at about 0329, he passed
the MOGAMI continuing north. At 0330, not having located the YAMASHIRO, he
commenced a second reversal of course to the northeast. As he reversed
course one of his lookouts reported that he had sighted what he believed to
be the YAMASHIRO sinking** (actually it was the FUSO, which did not sink
until much later). At this time the damaged FUSO, which was still to the
south of him was but 5,200 yards away. He continued north and did not
attempt to close her to pick up survivors.**
HIS ACTION IN SO DOING WAS CORRECT, FOR HE WAS GOING INTO BATTLE
AND COULD NOT AFFORD TO PICK UP SURVIVORS SINCE THIS WOULD NOT ONLY CAUSE
UNACCEPTABLE DELAY, BUT WOULD ALSO SO LOAD HIS DECKS AS TO EFFECT SERIOUSLY,
IF NOT FATALLY, THE BATTLE EFFICIENCY OF HIS SHIP.
During the next few minutes, at 0330, 0332 and 0333, he
received emergency 45° turn signals from Commander THIRD Section* but he
ignored all of them as he was still in his turn to course 000° (T). At 0336
he changed course to 030°(T) to pass between the damaged MICHISHIO and
ASAGUMO and to rejoin the FUSO and MOGAMI and to reassume his station in
the van.** He did not realize that these turn signals were from COMBATDIV
TWO in the YAMASHIRO and not from the Commanding Officer FUSO.
About 0343:30 he changed course to 340°(T) in order to close
the MOGAMI track. At this time the MOGAMI was about 1,700 yards to the
northwest and was on course 000° (T), speed eighteen knots. He probably
could not see the YAMASHIRO at this time because she was on very nearly the
same bearing as the MOGAMI and was about 5,300 yards away (Diagram "H").
He continued on at twenty-six knots in order to reach the van. About 0344
he noted that the enemy gunfire (presumably from DESRON TWENTY-FOUR) had
gradually grown more intense and that one ship, which had been stopped by
a torpedo hit (MICHISHIO), was receiving concentrated gunfire.* He probably
saw the explosion aboard the FUSO at this time.
At 0344 he intercepted a message from Consnander SECOND Striking
Force to Commander THIRD Section that the former was entering Surigao
Strait.*
At 0348 the SHIGURE, still closing, was now only about (a) 4,000
yards on the starboard quarter of the YAMASHIRO which was on course 020°(T)
and (b) 700 yards on the starboard quarter of the MOGAMI, which was on
course 320° (T).
Being under the impression that this battleship was the FUSO,
he informed her by voice radio that he was following behind her. Naturally,
he received no acknowledgement* for the FUSO had long since lost all
communications. _____^__
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** USSBS Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Nav No. 79, Interrogation of
Commander Shigeru Nishino, ex-IJN, Volume II, Page 346.
392 CONFIDENTIAL
ASAGUMO
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0343, October 25th
(2) Operations of the Damaged Ships of THIRD Section, 0320 - 0348,
October 25th,
(a) ASAGUMO,
At 0320, having lost her bow* forward of the No. One gun mount,
the ASAGUMO** continued to proceed northward at very slow speed, attempting
to control her damage. At this time the commanding officer sighted the
damaged MICHISHIO on the starboard bow. At 0325 he notified COMDESDIV
FOUR, who was in the MICHISHIO, that he had received a torpedo hit forward.**
At 0334, finding that he could increase speed and realizing
that he could accomplish nothing further, he decided to retire and
therefore began a slow turn to the left. He settled on course 285° (T) at
nine knots, (Diagram "H").
At 0341 the HUTCHINS opened fire in his direction, and a little
less than a minute later he commenced changing course to 178°(T). He
undoubtedly noted the DALY open fire at 0342 and the BACHE at 0344.
Fortunately for him the latter two destroyers were firing at and hitting
the more distant MICHISHIO which was 3,000 yards to the southeastward.
The HUTCHINS did not obtain hits** most probably because of the long turn
his ship was making. The gunnery section of the HUTCHINS action report
describes hits and fires, and states that the target was dead in the water
after the tenth salvo. It is concluded from this that the spotter was
observing the fall of shot from the DALY and BACHE. From the HUTCHINS
track chart it is evident that the ASAGUMO was tracked in CIC although
imperfectly. Whether or not the HUTCHINS gunnery radar was tracking the
ASAGUMO cannot be established but it probably was not.
At 0347 he steadied on course 178° (T) at eight knots and at
0348 the HUTCHINS ceased fire.
During his turn and afterward, the Commanding Officer ASAGUMO
did not open fire with either guns or torpedoes and, in addition to
observing the gunfire on the MICHISHIO, undoubtedly saw the gunfire of the
YAMASHIRO to the north.
At 0348 the ASAGUMO, in the middle of the channel, was bearing
323°(T), distant 19,200 yards from the northern tip of Kanihaan Island,
* Action Report DENVER, Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 0031, November 4th, 1944; also Detailed Action Report MOGAMI,
Battle off the Philippines, October 18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document
160463, NA 12653.
** Composite Report on Surigao Strait Action by Commanding Officers
ASAGUMO (Commander Kazuo Shibayama, ex-IJN) and MICHISHIO (Commander
Kazuo Tanaka, ex-IJN), March 15th, 1946, Army Historical Division
Microfilm HS-39A.
393 CONFIDENTIAL
MICHISHIO and FUSO
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
(b) MICHISHIO.
The MICHISHIO, which had sustained a torpedo hit in her port
engine room at 03 18: 18* and had imnediately sheared out of column to
starboard, had by 0320 lost her power and was drifting with the current
on course 180° (T) at a speed of about two point twenty-three knots
(Diagram "H").
At 0342 she was taken under fire by the DALY, and at 0344 by
the BACHE. Both ships obtained hits which could be seen and caused one
or more fires,** This is confirmed by the SHIGURE which stated that
"farther astern another ship was stopoed and receiving concentrated enemy
shellfire,"*** which ship appears to have been the MICHISHIO.
Since she apparently did not return this fire, it seems clear
that she was in very serious condition indeed for Allied experience
heretofore had indicated that Japanese ships in action could be expected
to fight to the end.****
At 0348 while (a) still under fire by the ships of Attack
Group 1.2, (b) afire and (c) in a sinking condition, she was bearing
324°(T), distant 15,500 yards from the northern tip of Kanihaan Island
and, was about 3,600 yards to the southeast of the ASAGUMO.
(c) FUSO.
No direct information of any consequence is available concerning
the FUSO. Therefore, it has become necessary to reconstruct her track and
narrative through the employment of (a) Allied radar tracks, (b) the voice
log and action report of the SHIGURE, (c) the interrogation of the
Commanding Officer SHIGURE by the Strategic Bombing Survey, (d) the report
of Lieutenant Fukushi***** and (e) the sightings reported by (1) the
MOGAMI, (2) the Allied destroyers and (3) the Allied motor torpedo boats.
It will be recalled that, between 0308 and 0309, the FUSO had
sustained at least one torpedo hit on her starboard side****** which had
* Composite Report on Surigao Strait Action by Commanding Officers
ASAGUMO (Commander Kazuo Shibayama, ex- UN) and MICHISHIO
(Commander Kazuo Tanaka, ex-IJN), March 15th, 1946, Army Historical
Division Microfilm HS-39A.
** Action Report BACHE, Engagement of Enemy Surface Forces, Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0106,
October 25th, 1944.
*** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
**** Action Report MINNEAPOLIS, Report of Participation in Truk Air and
Surface Action, February 16th - 17th, 1944, Serial 024, February
24th, 1944, Part V(2), Japanese Military Character.
***** Report on SHO Operation by Lieutenant Fukushi, ex-IJN, Control
Station Officer and Fire Data Computer Officer, MOGAMI, December,
1945, Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-39A.
****** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
394 CONFIDENTIAL
FUSO
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
disabled her sufficiently to cause her to fall out of column and to retire
to the southward. Since no further radio transmissions were received*
from her after that time it seems clear that all communication equipment
had been disabled also*
At 0323 she commenced a turn to the southward at very slow
speed (Diagram MH"). During this time she was evidently fighting internal
fires and employing every damage control measure possible. However, she
was clearly unsuccessful for, commencing at 0338 she suffered internal
explosions,** and at 0345 she blew up and commenced burning heavily***
with a large flare seen as far away as the battle line.**** As a result
of these incidents she apparently lost power and drifted slowly with the
current. She was now entirely enveloped in flames from her waterline to
her masthead.***** Whether it was at this time, as a result of the large
explosion at 0345, that she broke into two sections, or whether it was
later, cannot be determined but it likely occurred about this time, and
certainly before 0400.
In this connection the torpedo officer stated later that as
the SECOND Striking Force approached closely a large fire he could see
that it was the YAMASHIRO and FUSO which were completely afire and burning
furiously with their hulls silhouetted****** and the Commanding Officer
SHIGURE stated later on interrogation that during his retirement he saw
two burning hulks but that he was not sure whether they were the two
halves of the FUSO or the destroyers MICHISHIO and AS AGUMO. ******* Since
the YAMASHIRO had already sunk far to the north, the MICHISHIO had sunk
prior to the SHIGURE' s retirement and the ASAGUMO was not burning at the
time of the SHIGURE1 s retirement, the two burning hulks must necessarily
have been the two sections of the FUSO.
* Voice Log, Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf,
October 23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 069, October 29th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 495, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No
Serial, October 26th, 1944; also Action Report PT 524, Night of
October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial, October 26th, 1944*
**** Action Report MISSISSIPPI, Battle of Surigao Strait, Philippine
Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0141, November 21st, 1944.
***** Report on SHO Operation by Lieutenant Fukushi, ex-IJN, Control
Station Officer and Fire Data Computer Officer, MOGAMI, December,
1945, Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-39A.
****** Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation, Southwest
Area Operations, Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-IJN, Former 2ND
Striking Force Staff Torpedo Officer, GHQ FEC Special Historical
Collection Supporting Documents to General of the Army Douglas
Mac Arthur^ Historical Report on Allied Operations in the South-
west Pacific Area (Item 22, Footlocker 5 of 10, SWPA Series,
Volume II).
******* USSBS Interrogation of Japanese Officials, NAV No. 79,
Interrogation of Commander Shigeru Nishino, ex-IJN, Volume II,
Page 351.
395 CONFIDENTIAL
FUSO
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
Diagram "H" is plotted on the assumption that she broke into
two sections at 0345, with the stern* swinging slowly to the left until
0400, since this fits later radar data.
At 0348 the FUSO stern was bearing 293° (T), distant 7,700
yards, while the bow was bearing 291° (T), distant 8,000 yards from the
northern tip of Kanihaan Island.
NOTE:
The question as to the possibility of a battleship exploding
into two sections as above stated was referred to the Chief of the Bureau
of Ships, who replied, in part, as follows:
"It is our conclusion that it is well nigh impossiDle for the
FUSO to have broken into nearly eoual parts because of her very rugged
and damage resistant structure. The USS ARIZONA did not show any evidence
of hull failure in the area enclosed by the armor belt, even though a
massive magazine explosion occurred.
"It is however considered possible that the FUSO may have lost
her bow as a result of torpedo damage. Although our war experience does
not include this type of failure in battleships, several cases exist where
cruisers suffered this type of damage. In the case of the USS HELENA
(CL 50) the bow section remained afloat for more than twelve hours.
"It is probable therefore that if other evidence indicates the
presence of two floating bodies this can best oe explained by the separation
of the bow from the main hull of the battleship."**
* Based on the concept that the explosion alone was not sufficient to cause
the separation of about 2,000 yards, which the radar data indicates, and
that, therefore, the stern must have continued under power for an
appreciable time after the explosion.
** Letter from Rear Admiral Albert G. Mumma, USN, Chief of the Bureau of
ShiDs to Rear Admiral Richard W. Bates, USN (Ret), December 2nd, 1958.
396 CONFIDEKTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
(B) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force, 0320 - 0348, October 25th.
It will be recalled from "Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force,
0245 - 0320, October 25thM, that Commander SECOND Striking Force, on course
020° (T), speed twenty-two knots, had just emerged from the very low
visibility of a severe rain squall and had sighted Mt. Nelangcapan on the
port bow seven kilometers away. About this time he could also make out the
coast line* (about two miles away) and likely observed the USKIO swinging
to port. Realizing that his navigation was seriously in error and that
some of his units might run aground, he immediately ordered a simultaneous
ship turn of forty- five degrees to starboard* to a new course of 065° (T)
and changed speed to twenty-four knots.** This was an excellent change of
course for, if continued, it would place him squarely in the strait (Diagram
"I").
Meanwhile (a) at 0318 the USHIO, upon sighting the beach ahead and on
the starboard bow, had started to swing to the left in order to clear the
beach. At approximately 0321 she steadied on course 110° (T) and, about
one minute later, at 0322 she changed course to 050° (T) and increased
speed to twenty-eight knots in order to regain her proper position in the
formation and (b) at 0324:30 the Commanding Officer ABUKUMA sighted a
torpedo wake on his port hand about 500 meters away. He immediately
endeavored to turn away to starboard but before the turn could be effected
he received a torpedo hit under the bridge on the port side which slowed
the ABUKUMA to ten knots. He continued turning south, and when he had
swung about twenty-eight degrees to a heading of 093° (T) he sighted the MTB
bearing 150° relative to port (303°(T)), distant three kilometers. He then
opened fire with his machine guns*** as did the SHIRANUHI (the next ship)
which also employed machine guns*** He steadied on a course of about
150° (T)**** at which time the SHIRANUHI and KASUMI maneuvered to avoid him
(Diagram "I")0
It is probable that at least one of the ships of the SECOND Striking
Force opened fire with starshells as well, for this is reported by PT 137#*****
* Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation Southwest Area
Operation, Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-IJN, 2ND Striking Force Staff
Torpedo Officer, GHQ, FEC Special Historical Collection Supporting
Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Historical
Report on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (Item 22,
Footlocker 5 of 10, SWPA Series, Volume II),
** Detailed Action Report DESDIV 18 (KASUMI), Battle off the Philippines,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
*** Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off the Philippines, October
24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
**** Action Chart (0230-0830, October 25th), Detailed Action Report
ABUKUMA, Battle off the Philippines, October 24th - 26th, 1944,
WDC Document 161007.
***** Action Report PT 137, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
11, November 4th, 1944.
397 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
At this point Commander SECOND Striking Force, who had noted the ABUKUMA
fall out of formation, increased speed to twenty-eight knots,* Shortly
thereafter he received word that (a) the ABUKUMA had been torpedoed in the
port side, abeam of the forward radio room, (b) was down by the bow and (c)
had been slowed to about ten knots.**
HE NOW DECIDED THAT HIS LIMITED NUMBER OF SHIPS AND THE STATE OF THE
ACTION— HE COULD HEAR THE SOUND OF GUNFIRE AND COULD SEE OCCASIONAL
FLARES— REQUIRED HIM TO PROCEED AHEAD WITH HIS REMAINING SHIPS. HE,
THEREFORE, APPARENTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH DOCTRINE, DECIDED THAT THE ABUKUMA
WOULD HAVE TO DEFEND HERSELF AGAINST ADDITIONAL MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT ATTACKS
AS BEST SHE COULD WHILE HE PROCEEDED NORTH TO BATTLE.** BASED ON THE
CONCEPT THAT A SHIP SO DISABLED THAT SHE IS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN THE REQUIRED
BATTLE SPEED MAY INTERFERE GREATLY WITH THE COMMANDER1 S FREEDOM OF ACTION,
HIS ACTION IN LEAVING THE ABUKUMA BEHIND WITHOUT ANY ESCORT AND IN
PROCEEDING ONWARD AT TWENTY- EIGHT KNOTS IS CONSIDERED CORRECT.
About 0330, by which time had cleared Panaon Island, he returned to his
former course of 020° (T) and entered the strait. At this same time he
directed the screening destroyers (USHIO and AKEBONO) to form column astern
of the SHIRANUHI and KASUMI*** thus forming his planned battle formation
(Plate XVI).
Immediately after this the ABUKUMA commenced swinging to the westward
and after steading momentarily on that course changed course to the north,
which with current then running, resulted in the movement as shown on
Diagram MIn.
Command of the destroyers, which had been in the ABUKUMA, now shifted
to COMDESDIV EIGHTEEN in the SHIRANUHI.****
At 0338, while still at twenty-eight knots, he changed course to north
and headed up the strait.
At approximately 0340 the ABUKUMA stopped and lay to for emergency
repairs.*****
* Detailed Action Report USHIO, Antiair and Surface Action in the
Mindanao and Sulu Seas, October 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717,
NA 11301.
** Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation, SW Area Operation,
Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-IJN,2ND Striking Force Staff Torpedo Officer,
GHQ, FEC Special Historical Collection Supporting Documents to
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Historical Report on Allied
Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (item 22, Footlocker 5 of
10, SWPA Series, Volume II).
*** Detailed Action Report DESDIV 18 (KASUMI), Battle off the Philippines,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
**** War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161638, NA 11739.
***** Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off the Philippines, October
24th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
398 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
At 0343 he sighted, also up the strait, in the direction of the THIRD
Section a number of ships on fire, heard gunfire, and observed gun
flashes.* At the same time, although not so stated, it seems clear that
he had been receiving the voice radio transmissions of the units of the
THIRD Section and, therefore, knew that (a) he was observing some of the
action which had been reported over the voice radio and (b) Commander
THIRD Section was continuing the penetration.
Whether or not he had received by this time Commander THIRD Section's
dispatch which reported that (a) two destroyers had been disabled and (b)
the YAMASHIRO had been torpedoed but was continuing on,** is not definitely
known but it seems unlikely. Although the Commanding Officer ABUKUMA
implies in hi3 action report*** that this information was available in the
ABUKUMA, he does not indicate when it was received.
At 0344 he informed Commander THIRD Section by voice radio that he was
penetrating through the strait.**** Since the SECOND Striking Force had
entered the strait at 0330 this report was about fourteen minutes late.
It, therefore, incorrectly indicated to Commander THIRD Section that the
SECOND Striking Force was about seven miles farther astern than, in fact,
it was*
At 0348 the SECOND Striking Force was bearing 038°(T), distant eight
and three-tenths miles from Binit Point.
Meanwhile, at 0345 the ABUKUMA went ahead at seven knots and commenced
swinging to the right to a course of about 125° (T) .***** At 0348 she was
still swinging to the right and was bearing 154^°(T), distant three and
three-quarter miles from Binit Point (Diagram "I")*
* Detailed Action Report DESDIV 18 (KASUMI), Battle off the Philippines,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Commander 3RD Section Dispatch 250330 October 1944 to Commanders
1ST and 2ND Striking Forces (Urgent Battle Report No. 2), Detailed
Action Report BATDIV 1, SHO No. 1 Operation, October 18th - 28th,
1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
*** Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off the Philippines, October
24th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
**** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
***** Appended Charts, Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off the
Philippines, October 24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
399 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0343, October 25th
CHAPTER XV - ALLIED OPERATIONS. 0320 - 0348, October 25th.
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2, 0320 - 0348, October 25th.*
The sighting of the large explosion in the enemy area at 0319, followed
by the receipt of Commander Western Attack Group's TBS voice radio report
to the effect that he had at that moment scored a (torpedo) hit, was
gratifying to CTG 77.2 for he knew from this that CTG 79.11' s destroyers
had achieved considerable success without receiving any damage. He now
awaited with less concern than heretofore the reports which he expected to
receive presently from the destroyers of the Right Flank Force, which were
about to attack.
At 0320 he received CTG 79.11' s reply to his message, transmitted but
one minute earlier, requesting information as to enemy types. This reply
was to the effect that there were possibly two battleships present but
that he would check further.
He now awaited the results of CTG 79.11* s investigation and at 0324
was advised by that commander that it was the general opinion of his
commanding officers that (a) the enemy force consisted of two battleships,
one or two cruisers and one destroyer, (b) some of the enemy ships had been
definitely hit, and (c) the enemy had fired several torpedoes at his group.**
Although he did not know it, this report was not entirely correct. It
was correct in that at the time of TG 79.11' s attack there were two battle-
ships (YAMASHIRO and FUSO) and one cruiser (MOGAKI) in the Japanese formation
but it was incorrect in that instead of one destroyer there were four
destroyers (MICHISHIO, ASAGUMO, YAMAGUMO and SHIGURE) present.***
At 0325 he noted from plots in his flagship that the enemy was maneuvering
but maintaining speed. The range from the LOUISVILLE to the leading Japanese
ship was 26,900 yards.****
At about this time he intercepted a report from the KILT .EN that she had
fired torpedoes. From this he correctly assumed that the Right Flank
Destroyers were now conducting their attack.
At 0329 he intercepted Commander Battle Line's order changing the speed
of the battle line to fifteen knots. ALTHOUGH HE REALIZED THAT, SINCE (A)
THE ENEMY WOULD SOON BE NEAR ENOUGH TO OPEN FIRE WITH THE GUNS, (B) COKBATLDfE
All information here, except otherwise indicated, obtained from
Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055,
November 12th, 1944.
*** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
**** Track Chart, Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off
Surigao Strait, Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 0045, November 7th, 1944.
*»
400 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
WAS OPERATING (l) AS THOUGH HE DID NOT KNOW THAT HE WAS DISPOSITION GUIDE
AND (2) AS AN INDEPENDENT COMMANDER, (C) THE BATTLE LINE WAS NOW NEARLY
DUE NORTH OF THE LEFT FLANK CRUISERS, AND, THEREFORE, WAS NEAR THE EASTWARD
END OF ITS RUN WHICH MIGHT FORCE IT, AND, HENCE, THE ENTIRE DISPOSITION
WHICH WAS SUPPOSEDLY GUIDING ON IT, TO REVERSE COURSE TO THE WESTWARD AT A
MOST CRUCIAL TIME, AND (D) THIS WOULD FORCE THE GUN ACTION TO BE FOUGHT ON
WESTERLY COURSES RATHER THAN ON EASTERLY COURSES WHICH, BECAUSE OF THE
NEARNESS OF THE WESTERN SHORE, WOULD BE HIGHLY UNSATISFACTORY, HE DECIDED,
FOR REASONS OF HIS OWN, TO TAKE NO ACTION, WOULD IT NOT HAVE BEEN BETTER
HAD HE TEMPORARILY DESIGNATED THE LOUISVILLE AS DISPOSITION GUIDE AND THEN
DIRECTED COMBATLINE (A) TO TAKE IMMEDIATELY CORRECT STATION ON THE
LOUISVILLE AND (B) UPON ARRIVING ON STATION TO (l) RESUME FLEET SPEED OF
FIVE KNOTS AND (2) ASSUME DISPOSITION GUIDE, INFORMING HIM AND ALL UNITS OF
THE BATTLE DISPOSITION THAT HE HAD DONE SO, SO THAT THE GUIDE MIGHT BE
RETURNED TO THE BATTLE LINE?
He, himself, because (a) of his difficulties with Hibuson Island and
(b) his desire to be in a suitable position to cross the enemy's "Tee", at
least with the left flank cruisers, decided to remain at five knots (Diagram
"H"),
At 0330 he advised CTF 77 that the enemy consisted of two battleships,
one or two cruisers and one destroyer and that he believed that several hits
had been scored,*
At 0331, not having heard any more reports of the torpedo attacks by the
right flank destroyers, he inquired of Commander Right Flank Force if he had
any news of his destroyers,** He received a reply promptly to the effect
that the group that went down the right side had fired and that the other
group was going to fire presently,**
SINCE NONE OF THESE REPORTS MADE ANY REFERENCE TO BATTLE DAMAGE AND SINCE
HE HAD HEARD NOTHING OVER THE VOICE CIRCUITS WHICH INDICATED THAT HIS
DESTROYERS WERE SUFFERING ANY DAMAGE, HE WONDERED WHY THIS WAS SO. HE KNEW
THAT THE JAPANESE BELIEVED THEMSELVES TO BE MASTERS OF NIGHT ACTION AND YET
HERE THEY SEEMED TO BE COMPLETELY IMPOTENT. ALTHOUGH HIS ACTION REPORT MAKES
NO MENTION OF THIS PROBLEM, IT SEEMS HIGHLY PROBABLE THAT HE REALIZED IT WAS
DUE TO THE FACT THAT HIS DESTROYERS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS PLAN, WERE
ATTACKING FROM THE PROXIMITY OF THE SHORE AND THAT, THEREFORE, THE JAPANESE
RADAR, AS HAD BEEN HOPED, HAD BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE LAND MASS. IF
THIS WAS SO, AND HE HAD EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE IT TO BE SO, IT AUGURED WELL
FOR THE SUCCESS FOR HIS SUBSEQUENT ATTACKS.
At 0332 he intercepted a message from COMBATLINE ordering the battle
line to commence firing when the range to the enemy had reached 26,000 yards.
* Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
401 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
THIS SURPRISED HIM BECAUSE IT WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BASIC PLAN
WHICH CLEARLY SPECIFIED THAT THE BATTLELINE WOULD OPEN FIRE WHEN THE RANGE
HAD DECREASED TO THE RANGE BAND 17,000 - 20,000 YARDS. HE WAS QUITE
CONCERNED OVER THIS BECAUSE HE COULD SEE THAT COMBATLINE, BY HIS INCREASE
OF SPEED TO TEN AND THEN TO FIFTEEN KNOTS, AND NOW BY HIS ORDER TO OPEN
FIRE AT 26,000 YARDS, CLEARLY INTENDED TO OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY. HOWEVER,
BEFORE HE WAS ABLE TO REACT EITHER TO MODIFY OR CANCEL THE ORDER OF COMBATLINE,
HE RECEIVED, AT 0334, FROM COMMANDER RIGHT FLANK FORCE, THE INFORMATION
THAT THE LATTER1 S WESTERN GROUP OF DESTROYERS HAD FIRED TORPEDOES AND HAD
REPORTED THAT THE ENEMY WAS NOW RETIRING. THIS FACT, OF COURSE, CHANGED THE
SITUATION ENTIRELY AS REGARDS THE COMMENCE FIRE RANGE, FOR, IF THE RETIRE-
MENT WAS GENERAL, THE ENEMY NOT ONLY WOULD NOT "CLOSE" TO THE DESIGNATED
RANGE BAND BUT WOULD NOT CLOSE EVEN TO THE 26,000 YARDS.
He realised that it was necessary to take immediate action. He studied
his flagship radar plot and discovered that, although some of the Japanese
ships were maneuvering radically and some had slowed, the principal units
were still standing north •
He concluded that, despite this, the chances were that the destroyers on
the scene were better able to judge the movement of the Japanese units than
was radar, which necessarily required some minutes to detect a change of
course. He decided that since (a) it was essential to prevent any of the
enemy ships from escaping and (b) it was likely that he would not be able to
accomplish this by the gunfire of his larger ships, he would be forced to
employ his destroyers again. He therefore, at 0335, ordered COMDESRON
FIFTY-SIX to attack with torpedoes and to "get the big boys" indicating that
the large ships were the primary targets.
In doing this he realized that some of these destroyer's would, because
of the widening of the strait, at its northern end, be forced to attack in
relatively open water with but limited land mass protection against enemy
radar.
IN VIEW OF THE NECESSITY FOR ANNIHILATING THE ENEMY THE DECISION OF CTG
77.2 IN ORDERING THIS DESTROYER ATTACK IS CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN CORRECT.
Immediately after issuing this order he intercepted COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX' s
instructions to his destroyers (a) to turn south and work up to speed in
making attack, (b) that Attack Section THREE was to attack in sector 230°-
315°(T) and Attack Section TWO in sector 090°-045°(T) and (c) to employ
individual target plan, with intermediate speed torpedoes,* He noted that
Attack Section ONE was missing from this order but assumed that from doctrine
this was sector 315°-045°(T), He was satisfied with these instructions since
they clearly indicated a coordinated multiple attack by three sections.
Meanwhile, he continued his plotting and, from this, felt that, at least
for the present, some units were still heading in a northerly direction for,
at 0337, he advised COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX that the enemy was on course 010° (T),
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
402 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 034S, October 25th
speed twelve knots .* Actually, the enemy was on course 34-5° (T), having
changed course from 340° (T) at 0336, speed eighteen knots*
He now, in order to insure that his ships did not fire into DESRON FIFTY-
SIX, informed the units of TG 77.2 and Commander Right Flank Force that
DESRON FIFTY-SIX was launching a torpedo attack. His reason for notifying
Commander Right Flank Force, instead of the units of the right flank force,
appears to have been his failure to have the task group call.
At 0339, becoming convinced that the enemy was retiring, he informed
COMBATLINE to this effect and ordered him to "close the battle line."**
It is not clear what he meant by this order for "to close the battle
line" meant absolutely nothing, especially when addressed to COMBATLINE.
It is believed that what he meant to order COMBATLINE to do was "to close
the range" but whether the mistake was made by himself or by his internal
organization is not known. However, he promptly discovered his error and
at 0341 cancelled the order and added for clarification "do not close battle
line".**
At 0345 he observed a large explosion far to the south of the flagship.***
This explosion is believed to have been in the battleship FUSO which at this
time was burning furiously and exploding.****
At 0345 he received a relayed report from PT 523 to the effect that five
destroyers and one large ship (SECOND Striking Force) were passing in
northerly direction through the southern entrance to Surigao Strait.* His
reaction to this message is nowhere recorded but since (a) the enemy force
was only a relatively light force and was twenty miles away and (b) his
plot showed that the leading enemy group was still standing northward at
twelve to sixteen knots and would soon be within the medium range band he
did not think much about it for the present. At this time the range to the
leading enemy ship from his flagship was about 18,900 yards and from the
battle line about 25,000 yards.
Shortly thereafter he received a message from Commander Right Flank Force
that his right flank destroyers reported (a) hitting the enemy steadily with
5-inch shells and (b) one of the enemy ships was dead in the water.* This
was the MICHISHIO which at this time was very badly damaged.
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (CQMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of Surigao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November
24th, 1944.
*** Preliminary Action Report CTG 77.2, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 495, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
496799 o -59 -36 403 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
COM BATTLE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
At 0347 he intercepted an order from Commander Attack Section TWO to his
section to fire half salvos followed by a statement that he was making
thirty knots.* This order, which might have been confusing, was not so
because the location of Attack Section TWO (Diagram "H") was such that it
clearly indicated that this was a preparatory signal.
At 0348 the situation was as follows: TG 77.2 was nearly due north of
the leading enemy ship. The disposition guide in the battle line, since
the battle line was making fifteen knots and the left flank cruisers but
five knots, had overtaken the left flank cruisers and was at this moment
slightly farther east than the LOUISVILLE and was about 24,000 yards north
of the leading enemy ship. The disposition guide was bearing 328° (T),
distant 16,000 yards from Kanhandon Point Light, Hibuson Island.
(1) Operations of Commander Battle Line, 0320 - 0348, October 25th.
At 0320 the battle line was on course 090° (T), speed ten knots. **
Commander Battle Line was closely following the operations down the
strait. He had received and was still receiving TG 79.11' s reports regarding
their torpedo attacks, and of the enemy composition. At 0324 he received a
TBS voice radio message from CTG 79.11 (quoted in full under "Operations of
CTG 79 oil, 0320 - 0348, October 25th") which stated in part that at least
two enemy battleships were present in the enemy formation.***
AT 0329, FOR SOME UNKNOWN AND UNRECORDED REASON, BUT PROBABLY
BECAUSE OF HIS FEAR OF ENEMY TORPEDOES, HE INCREASED THE SPEED OF THE BATTLE
LINE TO FIFTEEN KNOTS.** IN DOING THIS HE WELL KNEW (A) FROM THE INFORMATION
AVAILABLE IN HIS FLAG PLOT, THAT THE OTC, IN THE LEFT FLANK CRUISERS, WAS
STILL AT FIVE KNOTS AND THAT THE BATTLE LINE WAS OVERTAKING THE CRUISERS,
(B) THAT AT THIS SPEED HE WOULD ARRIVE AT THE EASTERLY END OF HIS RUN
(LONGITUDE 1250-27«E) MUCH SOONER THAN HE WOULD AT FIVE KNOTS AND THEREFORE
MIGHT FIND IT NECESSARY (l) TO REVERSE COURSE AT A MOST CRUCIAL TIME, (2)
IF HE DID NOT REVERSE COURSE WOULD LIKELY FIND IT NECESSARY TO MOVE BEYOND
THE EASTWARD END OF HIS RUN WHICH MIGHT PREVENT CROSSING OF THE "TEE" BY
THE BATTLE LINE, (3) MIGHT FIND IT NECESSARY TO CHANGE COURSE TO THE SOUTH-
EAST SO THAT HIS GUNS MIGHT BEAR, AND (C) THAT HIS INCREASE OF SPEED WAS
CONTRARY TO THE GENERAL TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS WHICH DIRECTED THAT THE FLEET
SPEED (THE SPEED OF THE DISPOSITION GUIDE) WAS TO BE CONTROLLED BY THE OTC
AND THAT THE FLEET GUIDE WAS TO MAINTAIN A UNIFORM SPEED.**** DOES IT NOT
*"" Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of Surigao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November
24th, 1944.
*** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
**** General Tactical Instructions, United States Navy (FTP 183), United
States Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1942, Sections
9 and 13,
404 CONFIDENTIAL
COM BATTLE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
SEEM CORRECT TO SAY THEN THAT HIS ACTION WAS UNSOUND BECAUSE BY HIS ACTION
HE (A) SERIOUSLY DIMINISHED THE ADVANTAGES INHERENT IN THE BATTLE DISPOSITION,
(B) ASSUMED AUTHORITY WHICH PROPERLY BELONGED TO* THE OFFICER IN TACTICAL
COMMAND, AND (C) THEREBY UNNECESSARILY ENDANGERED THE SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION
OF CTG 77.2 «s BATTLE PLAN?
At 0330 he noted in his radar scope that the enemy consisted of two or
three cruisers or destroyers in the van, followed by two battleships in
column which were on course north at sixteen knots,* This was the correct
number of ships but only one battleship (YAMASHIRO) and one cruiser (MOGAMI)
remained in any formation at all. Of the remaining three destroyers, two
(MICHISHIO and ASAGUMO) were disabled, and moving at slow speed, and one,
the SHIGURE, was circling and at this time was on a southerly course.
At 0332 the SIGOURNEY obtained a radar range of 42,600 yards on a target
bearing 174°(T).** This was the damaged FUSO, which at this time was moving
slowly south and is shown on Diagram "H" as bearing 1754°(T), range 42,500
yards from the SIGOURNEY.
COMBATLINE NOW OBSERVED THAT THE ENEMY RANGE WAS CLOSING RAPIDLY. HE
THEREFORE, BY TBS VOICE RADIO, AT 0332, DIRECTED THE BATTLE LINE TO OPEN
FIRE WHEN THE RANGE HAD CLOSED TO 26,000 YARDS.* SINCE (A) THIS RANGE WAS
CONTRARY TO CTG 77. 2' S BATTLE PLAN WHICH SPECIFIED OPENING FIRE RANGES FOR
THE BATTLE LINE AS 17,000 TO 20,000 YARDS,*** (B) THESE OPENING FIRE RANGES
HAD BEEN CHOSEN BECAUSE CTG 77.2 FELT THAT DUE TO THE SHORTAGE OF AMMUNITION
OF ALL TYPES BUT ESPECIALLY TO THE SHORTAGE OF ARMOR PIERCING PROJECTILES,
IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE BATTLE LINE GET A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF ARMOR PIERCING
HITS AT RANGES WHERE THEIR EFFECT WOULD BE HIGH,*** AND (C) COMBATLINE
SHOULD HAVE BEEN FULLY COGNIZANT OF THIS FACT BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN BRIEFED
BY CTG 77.2 AT THE LATTER »S CONFERENCE ON THE BATTLE PLAN HELD ON THE
PREVIOUS AFTERNOON ON BOARD THE LOUISVILLE,*** IT SEEMS PERTINENT TO DISCUSS
THE REASONS WHICH PROMPTED HIM TO MAKE THIS SUDDEN CHANGE IN FIRING PLAN.
COMBATLINE STATED LATER THAT HIS REASONS WERE (A) HE FELT THAT IF HE
WAITED UNTIL THE RANGE HAD DECREASED TO 20,000 YARDS HE WOULD LOSE SOME OF
THE RANGE ADVANTAGE HE POSSESSED IN FIRING AT A LONGER RANGE USING ARMOR
PIERCING PROJECTILES— HIS FIRST FIVE SALVOS WERE TO EMPLOY THESE
PROJECTILES—AND DELIBERATE FIRE, AND (B) THAT CTG 77.2 HAD CHOSEN THE RANGE
BAND (17,000 - 20,000 YARDS) BECAUSE OF THE PREDOMINANT BOMBARDMENT LOADING
OF THE BATTLE LINE WHICH LIMITED ITS EFFECTIVE FIRE TO THAT RANGE IN A
PROLONGED ENGAGEMENT.*
* Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of Surigao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November
24th, 1944.
** Action Report SIGOURNEY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 055, October 30th, 1944.
*** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4(CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
405 CONFIDENTIAL
COM BATTLE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
IT IS NOT KNOWN WHENCE CAME THE LATTER IDEA FOR, AS POINTED OUT
EARLIER, THE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IN CTG 77.2' S MIND WAS TO MAKE ARMOR
PIERCING HITS AT THE EARLIEST TIME WHEN, BASED ON ALL FACTORS, THE PERCENTAGE
OF HITS AND THEIR EFFECT WOULD BE HIGH, AND THE POSSIBLE EFFECT OF ENEMY
SHELLS ON OWN UNITS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. THIS WHOLE MATTER HAD BEEN ANALYZED
DURING THE PLANNING PHASE AT HOLLANDIA AND IT HAD BEEN DETERMINED THERE AND
SO STATED IN THE NIGHT BATTLE PLAN ISSUED BY CTG 77.2 THAT "LONG RANGES ARE
GENERALLY UNFAVORABLE TO OWN BATTLE LINE OWING TO THE RELATIVELY POOR
PATTERNS AND LOW AMMUNITION ALLOWANCE OF ARMOR PIERCING PROJECTILES (WITHIN
THE COMMAND)".* BECAUSE (A) THE THIRD FLEET WAS EXPECTED TO INTERCEPT ANY
THREATENING ENEMY SURFACE FORCE AND (B) ALL PREPARATORY FIRE HAD TO BE
PROVIDED BY TG 77.2 AND TG 77.3, THE AMMUNITION ALLOWANCE OF ARMOR PIERCING
PROJECTILES HAD BEEN SET AT BUT TWENTY PER CENT OF THE POSSIBLE LOADING.
HIGH CAPACITY PROJECTILES FOR BOMBARDMENT COMPRISED THE REMAINDER.*
BASED ON THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT COMBATLINE 'S
DECISION TO OPEN FIRE AT 26,000 YARDS RATHER THAN AT 20,000 OR LESS WAS
UNSOUND.
COMBATLINE now intercepted two messages, one at 0334 from Commander
Right Flank Force to the effect that the enemy appeared to be retiring, the
other at 0335, from the OTC launching the torpedo attack of DESRON FIFTY-SH.**
At 0338 he noted that the range to the enemy was closing steadily.**
Since he planned to open fire in a few minutes he decided that, in order to
avoid any possible interference which might arise, it would be wise to
station his van and rear destroyer screens (DESDIV XRAY) in a column ahead
and astern of the battleships.** He therefore immediately ordered COMDESDIV
XRAY, in the CLAXTON, to concentrate his screens, van and rear, 4,000 yards
from the nearest battleship.***
At 0339 COMBATLINE was advised by the OTC that the enemy seemed to
be retiring and was directed to close the battle line.**
Although this order, as worded, meant precisely nothing, COMBATLINE
understood it to mean to close the range of the enemy**which was correct.
However, before he could execute it, it was cancelled by CTG 77.2,
COMDESDIV XRAY now, at 0342, directed the CONY and the THORN to take
station 500 yards astern of the CLAXTON in that order.**** At this same time
the AULICK and the WELLES headed for the head of the battle line where they
formed column on the AULICK***** 4,000 yards ahead of the WEST VIRGINIA.
* CTG 77.2 Operation Plan 2-44, Serial 0008, October 5th, 1944, Annex ~
"H".
** Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of Surieao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November
24th, 1944.
*** Action Report COMBATDIV 4, Battle of Surigao Strait, Night of October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0235, November 8th, 1944.
**** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
***** Action Report WELLES, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 016-44,
October 30th, 1944.
406 CONFIDENTIAL
COM BATTLE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
The time now drew near when COMBATLINE would reach his designated
open fire range of 26,000 yards, and he was making preparations to do so.
His target at this time, although he did not know it, was the YAMASHIRO.
However, at 0340, the commanding officer of his flagship, MISSISSIPPI,
notified him that since (a) there was an enemy group consisting of two or
three large ships (MOGAMI, SHIGURE and perhaps one of the damaged destroyers,
although the latter were not really in this group) bearing 175° (T), range
31,500 yards, which was approaching the leading enemy ship now at a range of
28,000 yards, and (b) this new group seemed more important than the group
which the flagship was presently tracking, he, the commanding officer,
had decided to withhold fire until he was better informed on the enemy
composition and formation,* Meanwhile, the four battleships (WEST VIRGINIA,
MARYLAND, CALIFORNIA and TENNESSEE) which were also tracking the YAMASHIRO— .
the PENNSYLVANIA appears to have been confused— passed the open fire range
of 26,000 yards at about 0344. NONE OF THEM OPENED FIRE AT THIS TIME,
POSSIBLY BECAUSE EACH COMMANDING OFFICER, REALIZING THAT COMBATLINE 'S
OPENING FIRE RANGE WAS IN EXCESS OF THAT ORDERED BY CTG 77 o 2,** (A) HAD
DECIDED TO AWAIT A DIRECT ORDER FROM COMBATLINE SINCE COMBATLINE MIGHT WANT
TO DELAY OPENING FIRE, (B) PREFERRED TO FOLLOW THE MOTIONS OF THE SENIOR
OFFICER IN OPENING FIRE, AND (C) THOUGHT IT UNWISE TO OPEN FIRE AT END OF
EASTERLY RUN AND THUS REVEAL PRESENCE OF ALLIED FORCE AT MOMENT WHEN
NECESSARY TO REVERSE COURSE. THEIR ACTIONS IN SO DOING, WHILE UNDERSTANDABLE,
DO NOT APPEAR CORRECT FOR THEY (A) HAD ORDERS TO OPEN FIRE, (B) DID NOT KNOW
THE REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF THE FLAGSHIP TO DO SO, AND (C) HAD, EXCEPT
AS COMMENTED ON BELOW, RECEIVED NO INFORMATION EITHER BY VOICE RADIO OR
RADAR WHICH INDICATED ANY CHANGE IN OWN OR ENEMY SITUATION WHICH MIGHT CAUSE
THEM TO WITHHOLD FIRE.
IN FAIRNESS TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER MISSISSIPPI FOR HIS FAILURE
TO OPEN FIRE, IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT HERE THAT IN ADDITION TO HIS
DIFFICULTY IN IDENTIFYING HIS TARGET AND OBTAINING AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION,
HE STATED LATER THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE, SOURCE UNKNOWN, TO THE EFFECT
THAT "WATCH OUT FOR SHIPS ASTERN; THEY MAY BE THE REAL TARGET", *** AND
COMBATDIV FOUR, IN THE WEST VIRGINIA, ALSO STATED LATER THAT HE HAD RECEIVED
A MESSAGE, SOURCE UNKNOWN, "DO NOT FIRE"**** OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT. SINCE
THESE MESSAGES WERE NOT RECEIVED ELSEWHERE IT SEEMS CORRECT TO SAY THAT
THEY WERE LIKELY COMMENTS FROM WITHIN THE SHIP CONCERNED, WHICH, ON TRANS-
MISSION TO THE BRIDGE, RECEIVED THE CHARACTER OF AN ORDER.
WHATEVER MAY HAVE BEEN THE ACTUAL REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF THE
BATTLE LINE TO OPEN FIRE IT WAS TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE ALLIED COMMAND THAT
IT DID NOT DO SO FOR, AS HAS BEEN POINTED OUT PREVIOUSLY, THE CORRECT FIRING
RANGE WAS IN THE RANGE BAND 20,000 - 17,000 YARDS.
*"" Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of Surigao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November
24th, 1944.
** Action Report WEST VIRGINIA, Battle of Surigao Straits, October 25th,
1944, Serial 0538, November 1st, 1944.
*** Action Report MISSISSIPPI, Battle of Surigao Strait, Philippine
Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0141, November 21st, 1944.
**** Action Report COMBATDIV 4, Battle of Surigao Strait, Night of October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0235, November 8th, 1944.
407 CONFIDENTIAL
COM BATTLE LINE
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
At 0345 he intercepted the relayed report from a motor torpedo boat
which stated that another force of five destroyers and one large ship was
proceeding up the strait.*
At this time he observed an explosion in the target area.** This
was the damaged battleship FUSO.
At 0346 Commander Battle Line intercepted a report from Commander
Right Flank Force to CTG 77.2 that the right flank destroyers were hitting
the enemy regularly with 5-inch gunfire and that one ship was dead in the
water,*
At 0348 the guide of the battleline (WEST VIRGINIA) was bearing
334°(T), distant 15,000 yards from Kanhandon Point Light, Hibuson Island.
The AULICK, the leading destroyer of the eastern, or van, destroyers, was
4,000 yards ahead of the WEST VIRGINIA and the THORN, the last destroyer of
the western, or trailing, destroyers, was 4,000 yards astern of the
PENNSYLVANIA (Diagram "H").
(2) Operations of Commander Left Flank Force, 0320 - 0348, October 25th.
At 0320 the Left Flank Force was on course 090°(T), speed five knots.
Although the left flank destroyers (DESRON FIFTY-SIX) were still operating
as a unit of the left flank force, they commenced their torpedo attack
during the time covered by this section and therefore, their operations will
hereinafter be discussed separately. As a consequence, under the title
"Commander Left Flank Force", the operations of the left flank cruisers only
will be discussed.
Commander Left Flank Force was quite anxious to receive a late report
of the enemy composition, for his unit was the closest major unit to the
enemy, and this information was therefore of the utmost importance. If the
enemy continued on its most recently reported course and speed, he would be
squarely in its path. However, he did not have long to wait for, at 0324,
he intercepted CTG 79.11,s report that the enemy force consisted of two
battleships, one or two cruisers and one destroyer, but that some of the
enemy ships had been definitely hit.
This report, although incorrect at the time that CTG 79.11 made his
torpedo attack, now corresponded with the present number of ships (five)
shown in the LOUISVILLE radar scope. The LOUISVILLE noted that these ships
were maneuvering and that the leading ship (YAMASHIRO) was bearing 174° (T),
at a range of 26,900 yards. She tracked it at a speed of fifteen knots.***
*~~ Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of Surigao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November
24th, 1944.
** Action Report MISSISSIPPI, Battle of Surigao Strait, Philippine
Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0141, November 21st, 1944.
*** Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao Strait,
Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0045,
November 7th, 1944.
408 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
At 0329 Commander Left Flank Force intercepted Commander Battle
Line's order changing speed to fifteen knots. His reactions to this have
been discussed previously under "Operations of CTG 77.2, 0320 - 0348".
At 0331 he intercepted a report from Commander Right Flank Force to
the effect that some of the right flank destroyers were firing torpedoes.
At this time the leading enemy ship (YAMASHIRO) was bearing 175°(T), range
25,100 yards.
At 0332 he intercepted the order of Commander Battle Line directing
them to open fire at 26,000 yards. He could see from his plot that the
range was nearing that now. At 0334, as CTG 77.2, he received the information
from Commander Right Flank Force that one of his destroyer groups had fired
torpedoes and that the enemy was retiring.* His reactions to this situation
are also discussed under "Operations of CTG 77.2, 0320 - 0348".
At 0335, as CTG 77.2, because he felt that his destroyers were
better able to judge an immediate enemy change of course than was the radar,
he decided that perhaps all of the enemy were retiring and, therefore,
ordered COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX to launch his torpedo attack, and "get the
big boys".
At this same time he observed from his radar tracking that the
leading enemy group (YAMASHIRO) had changed course to 340° (T) and was at
speed sixteen knots. This was a fairly correct estimate.
Meanwhile, he had tracked a second enemy group which, at 0338, was
bearing 178°(T), range 28,000 yards. He determined that this group was on
course 345°(T), speed fifteen knots, and that it consisted of four ships;
one medium, the others small. This estimate was fairly correct as regards
composition for in this area at this time were the MOGAMI, SHIGURE,
MICHISHIO and ASAGUMO. The course and speed were in error. None of these
four ships were on the above course and speed but were instead on different
courses and speeds as shown on Diagram "H", although at this time, with
exception of the MOGAMI, they were almost in a north and south line. It
seems probable that the ship being tracked was the SHIGURE which was settling
on course 030° (T) at a speed of about twenty-six knots and which, at this
time, was bearing 179° (T), range 27,700 yards from the LOUISVILLE. Actually
the mean range of these four ships was about 26,600 yards.
At about 0340, if the LOUISVILLE, as seems likely, made the
information available to him, he knew that the LOUISVILLE tracking had
revealed (a) three ships (two large and one small) bearing 178°(T), range
20,700 yards, on course 000°(T), at speed thirteen knots, and (b) three
large pips bearing 183°(T), range 40,000 yards which appeared to be
retiring.
* Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
409 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
At 0345 he observed a large explosion far to the south (FUSO). At
this same time he received a report relayed by COMCRUDIV TWELVE from PT 523,
that a large ship and five destroyers were proceeding in a northerly
direction through the southern entrance to Surigao Strait,*
The above report was followed by a message from Commander Right
Flank Force to the effect that the right flank destroyers were hitting the
enemy steadily with 5-inch shells and that one of the enemy ships was dead
in the water.
At 0348 the three enemy ships continued north. The leading ship
was bearing 186°(T), range 17,500 yards from the LOUISVILLE, which, at this
time, was bearing 307°(T), distant 11,700 yards from Kanhandon Point Light,
Hibuson Island.
(a) Operations of COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX, 0320 - 0348, October 25th.
At 0320 COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX in the NEWCOMB, with DESRON FIFTY-
SIX, was in position about 4,200 yards north of the LOUISVILLE and was about
4,200 yards southwest of the WEST VIRGINIA. His destroyers were in a single
column from east to west — Attack Section WO, Attack Section ONE, Attack
Section THREE — on course 090°(T), speed five knots. (It seems clear — from
the plots of the movements of units — that Attack Section ONE at this time
had closed somewhat on Attack Section TWO.)
Owing to the fact that the destroyers were not equipped with a
separate maneuvering voice circuit COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX was forced to employ
TBS voice radio for transmission of all information.** He stated later
that he considered this an acute handicap because he felt that the TBS
voice radio was already overloaded and he was reluctant to use it as often
as he desired.**
At this time his flagship made its first radar contact. This
contact consisted of but one small pip bearing 185°(T), range 33,000 yards.
He commenced tracking this pip and in a few minutes evaluated its course as
000° (T), its speed as twelve knots, and, based on the various contact
reports and amplifying reports he had received over ^he TBS voice radio,
estimated it to consist of three ships.***
At 0324 he likely intercepted a message from CTG 79.11 reporting
(a) the enemy as composed of two battleships, two cruisers and one destroyer
and (b) that some of the above ships had been damaged.****
*~ Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report COMDESRON 56, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0013, October 29th, 1944.
*** Action Report NEWCOMB, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 0044, October 31st, 1944.
**** Action Report ROBINSON, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 076, November 3rd, 1944, Enclosure (B).
410 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0343, October 25th
Except for reports that the right flank destroyers were firing
their torpedoes and were receiving no damage in return and that the battle
line, at 0329, had increased speed to fifteen knots,* nothing of direct
bearing on these operations occurred until 0332. Meanwhile, he observed
that Commander Left Flank Force had not increased speed but was continuing
at five knots. He, therefore, also remained at five knots.
At 0332 he likely intercepted a message from Commander Battle
Line to the battle line directing the battle line to open fire at 26,000
yards.* This likely concerned him somewhat for he could readily see that
if he continued on at five knots and the battle line continued on at fifteen
knots the battleline would be about 2,500 yards to the north of him at about
the time the range from the battleline to the nearest enemy ship had
decreased to 26,000 yards, in which case he would be in the line of fire.
However, he did not have long to worry for, at 0334, he (a)
likely intercepted a message from Commander Right Flank Force to CTG 77.2
reporting that the western group of destroyers had completed firing and
that the enemy appeared to be retiring* and (b) at 0335, received orders
from CTG 77.2 to launch his attack and "get the big boys".**
Since he had been expecting this order for some time, he had
divided his squadron into attack sections for this very purpose and had
prepared his attack orders for a coordinated attack, he was able to issue
the order immediately. This order, which he issued also at 0335,* directed
his attack sections to (a) execute a section column movement to 180°(T)
and work up to attack speed, (b) attack from sectors as follows: Section
TWO, sector 045° to 090°(T); Section THREE, sector 270° to 315°(T), (c)
employ individual target plan and (d) fire intermediate speed torpedoes.**
He did not give the attack sector for his own section (Section ONE) because,
since it was squadron doctrine, it was clear to his attack groups that he
would attack in the sector 315° to 045°(T).
In compliance with this order the leading ships of the three
attack sections turned about as follows: (a) NEWCOMB at 0335, turned to
course 160° (T) but only increased speed to ten knots in order to allow the
other two sections to move ahead, (b) HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, at 0336, turned
to course 180° (T) and increased speed to fifteen knots, and (c) ROBINSON,
at 0339, turned to course 180°(T) and increased speed to fifteen knots
(Diagram "H").
THE ABOVE ATTACK PLAN IS CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN SOUND BECAUSE
IT CONFORMED, IN GENERAL, TO DESTROYER DOCTRINE AND TO CTG 77.2 «S DESIRE TO
ATTACK FROM THE PROTECTION OF THE LAND MASSES. HOWEVER, THIS LATTER FACTOR
WAS NOT SO IMPORTANT AT THIS TIME BECAUSE (A) OF THE DAMAGE WHICH REPORTS
INDICATED HAD BEEN DEALT TO SOME OF THE JAPANESE SHIPS AND (B) THE STRAIT,
AT ITS NORTHERN END, WIDENED APPRECIABLY MAKING IT DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN MUCH
LAND MASS PROTECTION AGAINST ENEMY RADAR ESPECIALLY IN THE NORTHERN AND
WESTERN SECTORS.
* Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
** Action Report COMDESRON 56, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0013, October 29th, 1944.
411 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 034a, October 25th
THE FACT THAT HIS PLAN HAD BEEN PREPARED FOR SOME TIME AND HAD,
THEREFORE, BEEN ISSUED IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIVING THE ORDER TO ATTACK SHOWS
THAT, IN HIS OPINION, HE CONSIDERED THE PLAN STILL TO BE SOUND EVEN THOUGH
HIS ATTACK WOULD PROBABLY BE SUPPORTED BY THE GUNS OF THE BATTLE DISPOSITION,
RATHER THAN UNSUPPORTED, AS HAD BEEN THE CASE IN THE ATTACKS MADE EARLIER
BY OTHER UNITS.
IF THIS WAS HIS OPINION IT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN CORRECT FOR MOST
OF THE DESTROYERS WOULD BE ATTACKING THROUGH RELATIVELY OPEN WATER AND WOULD,
THEREFORE, LIKELY BE DETECTED BY ENEMY RADAR WITH THE ENSUING PROBABILITY
OF HEAVY GUN OPPOSITION, WHICH OPPOSITION WOULD BE GREATLY LESSENED BY THE
EFFECT OF MAJOR ALLIED GUNFIRE. WHILE IT IS REALIZED THAT THE FIRE OF THE
BATTLE DISPOSITION ON THE JAPANESE SHIPS MIGHT HAVE CAUSED THEM TO TURN
AWAY AND THEREBY LESSEN THE PROBABILITY OF TORPEDO HITS, THIS IS NOT
CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT A CHANGE IN THE ATTACK PLAN.
A MULTIPLE SECTOR ATTACK FROM THREE SECTORS IS DESIGNED TO COVER JUST SUCH
A SITUATION.
ALTHOUGH HE HAD ISSUED NO ORDERS TO HIS ATTACK SECTION COMMANDERS
ON THE METHOD TO BE EMPLOYED IN CROSSING THE LINE OF ADVANCE OF THE LEFT
FLANK CRUISERS, THESE COMMANDERS, THROUGH EXPERIENCE, DOCTRINE, AND GOOD
COMMON SENSE, KNEW EXACTLY WHAT THEY WISHED TO DO, AND DID IT WITHOUT
HESITATION. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE COMMANDERS OF ATTACK SECTIONS ONE* AND
TWO** BEGAN MANEUVERING AT THIS TIME TO CROSS TO THE EASTWARD OF THE LEFT
FLANK CRUISERS AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE WHILE COMMANDER ATTACK SECTION THREE***
BEGAN MANEUVERING IN SIMILAR MANNER TO CROSS TO THE WESTWARD.
THE DECISION OF THE VARIOUS ATTACK SECTION COMMANDERS TO OPERATE
IN THIS MANNER WAS SOUND FOR TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE SINCE, (A) IF THE ENEMY
WERE RETIRING IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO PREVENT HIM FROM ESCAPING, (B) THE BATTLE
LINE WAS ABOUT TO OPEN FIRE, AND (C) IF ATTACK SECTION THREE HAD ROUNDED TO
THE EASTWARD OF THE CRUISERS INSTEAD OF TO THE WESTWARD IT WOULD HAVE BEEN
FORCED TO CROSS THE STRAIT FROM EAST TO WEST IN ORDER TO REACH ITS APPROACH
POSITION, AND WOULD, BECAUSE OF THE ADDITIONAL TIME REQUIRED TO REACH ITS
TORPEDO FIRING POSITION, HAVE EITHER DELAYED THE COORDINATED ATTACK BY ALL
THREE SECTIONS OR FORCED THE THIRD SECTION TO ATTACK INDEPENDENTLY.
OTHER THAN THE ABOVE HE DID NOT GIVE ANY INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS
ATTACK GROUP COMMANDERS BUT RELIED ON THEM TO APPROACH THEIR CORRECT FIRING
POINTS FROM THE LEAST VULNERABLE POSITIONS CONSISTENT WITH THE RESTRICTIONS
OF A COORDINATED ATTACK.
At 0337 he received a TBS voice radio message from CTG 77.2
informing him that the enemy's course was 010°(T), the enemy's speed twelve
knots.****
*~ Action Report NEWCOMB, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 0044, October 31st, 1944.
** Action Report ROBINSON, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 076, November 3rd, 1944.
*** Action Report H. L. EDWARDS, Surface Action, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 0102, November 2nd, 1944.
**** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
412 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION ONE
CONFIDENTIAL 0337 - 0343, October 25th
Since each of the attack sections was to attack in separate
sectors the operations of each attack section commander will be discussed
separately.
(1) Commander Attack Section ONE, 0337 - 0348, October 25th.
At 0337 Commander Attack Section ONE (who was also COMDESRON
FIFTY-SIX), with Attack Section ONE in column, NEWCOMB (FF), RICHARD P.
LEARY and ALBERT W. GRANT, was on course 160°(T), at speed ten knots. In
order to get his three sections into position for a coordinated attack he,
as COMDESRON FIFTY-SEC, ordered Attack Section ONE to remain at ten knots
until Attack Sections TWO and THREE had cleared the left flank cruisers.*
This was necessary because, if he was to make a coordinated attack, it was
vital for all three sections to arrive at their firing points at such time
as would permit their torpedoes to arrive at the target together.
In view of this, at 0339, he notified DESRON FIFTY-SIX that
Attack Section ONE would remain at ten knots until the other attack sections
had cleared.**
It will be recalled that at 0320 he had made radar contact
on a "pip" which he had estimated consisted of three ships. He had
continued tracking this pip on northerly courses at a speed of about twelve
knots* and had received a confirmation of his estimate at 0337 when CTG
77.2 informed him that the enemy's course was 010°(T), speed twelve knots.
From this data, from his knowledge of the probable movements of his other
two sections, and from the location of his planned firing point, which is
nowhere listed on the information available to this study but which should
have been within the range of his intermediate speed torpedoes, he could
plan his approach in order to (a) comply with the basic instructions and
(b) assist in making the coordinated attack effective.
Although he has left little information as to how he planned
to approach his firing point it seems clear, from this little information
and his later track, that he planned, (a) to make an almost direct approach
from the northeast part of his sector, obtaining, if possible, the land
mass effect of Hibuson Island — it will be observed that he was in his own
sector at this time, albeit beyond torpedo range — (b) to turn left and fire
torpedoes to starboard and then (c) to retire to the eastward towards his
post-attack rendezvous.*** While he realized that this was somewhat
dangerous in that he would be approaching the enemy through open water, he
appears to have felt that the enemy was somewhat confused and damaged***
owing to the previous torpedo and gun attacks and that, therefore, his
attack plan for his section was sound. His views in this matter seem
correct.
* Action Report NEWCOMB, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 0044, October 31st, 1944.
** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, ^944, Enclosure (D).
*** Action Report COMDESRON 56, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0013, October 29th, 1944.
413 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION ONE
CONFIDENTIAL 0337 - 0348, October 25th
At 0339 he found it advisable to maneuver his section
farther to the eastward in order not to interfere with the leading cruiser
LOUISVILLE.* During his approach he, as COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX, closely
followed the movements of his attack groups. He knew that Commander Attack
Section TWO, at 0344, had ordered speed increased to twenty-five knots and,
at 0346, had directed his command as follows: "This has to be quick.
Standby your torpedoes."** What he thought of this latter message is
nowhere stated but it is clear that he took no action.
He heard nothing from Commander Attack Section THREE,
presumably because that commander operated his section by MN voice radio
which was not installed in the ships of the other sections.
At about 0345 he received a report (a) from PT 523 (relayed
by COMCRUDIV TWELVE) that five destroyers and one large ship were passing
in a northerly direction through the southern entrance to Surigao Strait**
and (b) from Commander Right Flank Force that his destroyers were hitting
the enemy steadily with 5-inch shells and that one of the enemy ships was
dead in the water.**
It is not believed that he was concerned about the enemy at
the southern entrance to the strait since (a) they were relatively far away
and (b) his present objective was the destruction of the enemy forces in
the northern end of the strait. On the other hand, it seems probable that
he was reassured by the success of the destroyers now in the strait for
their reports indicated that they were suffering no damage whatsoever.
At 0347 he returned to course 170°(T) and increased speed
to fifteen knots.***
At 0348 the NEWCOMB was bearing 335°(T), distant four point
sixty- five miles from Kanhandon Point Light, Hibuson Island.
(2) Commander Attack Section TWO, 0337 - 0348, October 25th.
At 0337 Commander Attack Section TWO, in ROBINSON, with
HALFORD and BRYANT in column astern, was still on course 090°(T) at a speed
of five knots.**** Why he did not turn and increase speed when the other
two sections did is nowhere explained, although radar ranges and the plotting
of the courses and speeds in Diagrams "H" and "J" verify the track chart
submitted by the ROBINSON.
* Action Report ALBERT W. GRANT, Operations Against Central Philippines,
Leyte Area, and Night Surface Action of October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Against Japanese Task Force in Surigao Strait, Serial 0106, November
11th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
*** Action Report NEWCOMB, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 0044, October 31st, 1944.
**** Action Report ROBINSON, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 076, November 3rd, 1944, Enclosure (C).
414 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION TWO
CONFIDENTIAL 0337 - 0348, October 25th
He noted that (a) the night visibility with binoculars
appeared to be about 7,000 yards (the enemy had previously discovered Allied
destroyers attacking from the eastern shore at a range as great as 14,000
yards or twice the Allied expected range of visual visibility), (b) he could
operate within several hundred yards of Hibuson Island and (c) presumably
based upon enemy course of 010°(T) and speed of twelve knots, the southern
tip of that island would be within his attack sector and within effective
firing range of his intermediate speed torpedoes.*
He, therefore, decided that, in view of this, he would (a)
approach along the western shore of Hibuson Island, hoping to gain thereby
any advantage the adverse effect of its land mass on enemy radars and visual
detection might give, (b) fire at a range of about 8,000 yards, and (c)
retire to the east of Hibuson Island where he would be protected against
enemy gunfire.*
THIS PLAN APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SOUND AND IN ACCORDANCE NOT
ONLY WITH THE ACCEPTED DOCTRINE FOR NIGHT TORPEDO ATTACK BUT ALSO WITH CTG
77.2'S INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAIN CLOSE TO THE SHORE IN ATTACKING AND RETIRING.
HOWEVER, HIS PLAN TO FIRE AT A PREDETERMINED RANGE OF ABOUT 8,000 YARDS,
WHICH RANGE WAS NEAR THE OUTER LIMIT OF THE EFFECTIVE RANGE OF INTERMEDIATE
SPEED TORPEDOES, INDICATED THAT HE CONSIDERED THE POSSIBLE LAND MASS
PROTECTION OF HIBUSON ISLAND TO BE MORE IMPORTANT IN THE EXECUTION OF HIS
ATTACK THAN OTHER FACTORS, SUCH AS CLOSING THE ENEMY TO A FIRING RANGE
WHICH WOULD OFFER A GREATER PROBABILITY OF HITS.
At this time (0337) Commander Attack Section TWO was
necessarily highly interested in his radar picture of the approaching enemy.
He had made his initial contact at 0255 on a single enemy pip, bearing
180°(T), range 48,800 yards, which he had continued to track.** By 0326
he had observed that (a) this "pip" had resolved into three Mpips", bearing
184°(T), range 31,400 yards, and tracked on course 345°(T), speed twelve
knots** and (b) this did not agree with CTG 79.11' s report at 0324 that
there were five targets. He likely attributed this difference to the long
range. At 0337, the enemy was bearing 186o(T), range 27,400 yards and was
on course 330° (T), speed fifteen knots.**
At 0339 he changed course to 180°(T) and increased speed to
fifteen knots.*** This turn was completed at 0341 at which time the
ROBINSON reported three enemy ships bearing 189°(T), range 24,600 yards, on
course 340° (T) at a speed of fourteen knots.**
Although COMDESRON FIFTY-SEC had directed him to increase
speed to twenty knots at 0339, the ROBINSON track chart and radar ranges
show that he did not do so until about 0345 • This delay was probably due to
the short distance that he had to run to reach his chosen firing position in
the radar shadow of Hibuson Island and the necessity, if he was to use the
island as his background, of allowing sufficient time for the enemy to
approach the firing point.
* Action Report COMDESDIV 112, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 040,
October 31st, 1944.
** Action Report ROBINSON, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 076, November 3rd, 1944.
*** Ibid., Enclosure (c).
415 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION TWO
CONFIDENTIAL 0337 - 0348, October 25th
At 0345 he changed course to 170° (T), increased speed to
twenty knots and ordered his section to standby to make smoke.*
Meanwhile, he had received several messages; one was a
report relayed from PT 523 that five destroyers and one large ship were
passing in a northerly direction through the southern entrance to Surigao
Strait; another was from Commander Right Flank Force to the effect that his
destroyers were hitting the enemy steadily with 5-inch shells and that one
of the enemy ships was dead in the water.**
The fact that the Allied destroyers were being so successful
in damaging the enemy by both guns and torpedoes without damage to themselves
probably did not pass unnoticed by Commander Attack Section TWO.
About this time he observed a dull glow on the horizon.* It
seems probable that his attention was directed to this glow because of the
explosion and fire on the FUSO which occurred at this time. He attributed
this glow to the numerous gun flashes from the enemy ships which were
evidently firing at a very rapid rate at the Allied destroyers in the area.*
He appears to have decided that he would soon be under gunfire also and
would be forced to fire his torpedoes possibly long before arriving at his
planned firing position for, at 0346, he directed his commanding officers
as follows: "This has to be quick. Standby your fish (torpedoes)."*
WHAT HE MEANT BY THIS ORD^R IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR FOR, AT
THIS TIME, THE RANGE WAS OVER 20,000 YARDS. DOES NOT THIS ORDER GIVE THE
IMPRESSION THAT (A) HE HAD DECIDED THAT ONCE HE CAME UNDER ENEMY FIRE, HE
WOULD FIRE HIS TORPEDOES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE EVEN AT MAXIMUM RANGE FOR LOW
SPEED TORPEDOES AND WOULD IMMEDIATELY RETIRE AND (B) HE WOULD DO THIS EVEN
TO THE DETRIMENT OF A COORDINATED ATTACK SINCE HE WAS CLOSER TO THE ENEMY
THAN THE OTHER TWO ATTACK SECTIONS? IF THIS WAS HIS PLAN IT SEEMS UNSOUND
FOR ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF HIS DESTROYERS WAS AS
TORPEDO CARRIERS. THEY HAD BEEN LAUNCHED TO THE ATTACK AND THEIR ATTACK
MUST NOW BE PRESSED HOME TO INSURE ITS SUCCESS. WHILE IT 15 RECOGNIZED THAT
SHOULD THE ENEMY FIRE BE SO INTENSE AS TO PREVENT AN EFFECTIVE ATTACK BEING
DELIVERED AT THE OPTIMUM FIRING POINT, THE ATTACK MUST THEN BE DELIVERED
AT THE CLOSEST FIRING POINT WHICH WILL PERMIT AN EFFECTIVE ATTACK TO BE
DELIVERED WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE LOSSES, SUCH DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE BEEN HIS
PLAN, AT LEAST AT THIS TIME.
Meanwhile, he closely observed the radar scope and, at 0346,
noted that the three enemy ships were much more clearly defined than hereto-
fore and had resolved into one very large target bearing 194°(T), range
20,100 yards, followed by two large targets.***
* Action Report COMDESDIV 112, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 040,
October 31st, 1944.
** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
*** Action Report ROBINSON, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 076, November 3rd, 1944.
416 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION THREE
CONFIDENTIAL 0337 - 0348, October 25th
At 0347 he increased speed to twenty- five knots.
At 0348 he evaluated the radar picture of one very large
and two large ships to be one battleship bearing 196°(T), range 17,800
yards and tracked on course 325°(T), speed eighteen knots, followed by two
cruisers.* This was fairly accurate as regards composition and speed since
the battleship was the YAMASHIRO and the two cruisers were the MOGAMI and
the destroyer SHIGURE. It was somewhat inaccurate as regards course since
the YAMASHIRO had changed course to 015° (T) at 0345.
At this same time he directed his destroyers to fire half
salvos and to increase speed to thirty knots.*
At 0348 the ROBINSON was bearing 322° (T), distant 8,200
yards from Kanhandon Point Light, Hibuson Island, (Diagram "H").
(3) Commander Attack Section THREE, 0337 - 0348, October 25th.
At 0337 Commander Attack Section THREE, with Attack Section
THREE in column in order HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS (F), LEUTZE and BENNION, was
changing course to 180°(T) and increasing speed to fifteen knots preparatory
to heading for his firing position in attack sector 270°-315°(T).
At this time he was necessarily highly interested in his
radar picture of the approaching enemy. He had made his initial contact at
0314 on a single enemy pip bearing 181° (T), range 34,000 yards, which he
had tracked on northerly courses at twenty knots.** Now the enemy speed
was reported by his flagship as fifteen knots.*** There is no information
as to what radar definition he had of the target at this time but from the
reports of his other two ships it seems probable that the single pip of
0314 had by now (0337) resolved into one large and two medium size ships.**
Naturally, all three ships of the attack section were tracking the leading
large ship which was bearing about 181°(T), range 26,700 yards.**
ALTHOUGH THE MANEUVERING VOICE LOGS OF THE THREE SHIPS OF
THIS SECTION ARE NOT AVAILABLE BECAUSE THEY WERE OPERATING BY MN VOICE
RADIO,** WHICH HAD OUTLETS ON THE BRIDGE ONLY AND COULD NOT BE RECORDED
DURING DARKEN SHIP CONDITIONS, THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN A CONTINUOUS FLOW
OF INFORMATION BETWEEN THEM. THIS WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT DOCTRINE****
WHICH REQUIRED A RELIABLE PROCEDURE FOR THE REPEATING OF CONTACTS AND THE
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN SHIPS SO THAT THE ATTACK SECTION COMMANDER
MIGHT HAVE ALL OF THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE. NONE OF THIS INFORMATION WAS
MADE AVAILABLE TO THE DISPOSITION OTC.
* Action Report ROBINSON, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 076, November 3rd, 1944.
** Action Report H. L. EDWARDS, Battle of Surigao Straits, October 25th,
1944, Serial 0102, November 2nd, 1944.
*** Ibid., Enclosure (A) to Part II.
**** Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine (USF 10A), United States Fleet,
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1944, Part VI, Paragraph
6120.
417 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION THREE
CONFIDENTIAL 0337 - 0348, October 25th
As he turned he had to decide quickly whether he should
follow Attack Sections ONE and TWO to the eastward and then, having cleared
the LOUISVILLE, depart for his firing point, or whether he should change
course to the westward and pass astern of the COLUMBIA, which was the last
ship of the left flank cruisers. He decided on the latter course of action.*
His decision was, of course, correct for time was essential since the
leading enemy units were continuing to close the battle line which would
soon open fire . If he had decided on the former course of action he would
not only have lost time, because of the longer distances involved, but
would have placed himself directly in the line of fire of the left flank
cruisers which might — and did — open fire before the battle line.
He therefore, at 0341, increased speed to twenty knots and
turned westward to 250°(T) to facilitate the maneuver.*
Whether or not, as he commenced his approach, he had a
definite predetermined firing position in mind is unknown. He stated later
that his plan was to attack on the port bow of the enemy, within effective
range of intermediate speed torpedoes and in coordination with the other
two attack sections.*
At 0345 he likely intercepted a report relayed from PT 523
that five destroyers and one large ship were passing in a northerly direction
through the southern entrance to Surigao Strait; and another was from
Commander Right Flank Force to the effect that his destroyers were hitting
the enemy steadily with 5-inch shells and that one of the enemy ships was
dead in the water.**
Also at 0345, because he seemed to be about to foul the
cruisers, he changed course to 290°(T) and then one minute later, at 0346,
having cleared the cruisers, he came left to 230° (T) and increased speed
to twenty- five knots to commence his approach.*
At 0348 the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS was bearing 299°(T), distant
15,100 yards from Kanhandon Point, Hibuson Island, and was also bearing
279° (T), distant 1,000 yards from the COLUMBIA which was the last ship in
column of the left flank cruisers.
* Action Report H. L. EDWARDS, Battle of Surigao Straits, October 25th,
1944, Serial 0102, November 2nd, 1944.
** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
418 CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
(3) Operations of Commander Right Flank Force (CTG 77.3), 0320 - 0348,
October 25th,
At 0320 Commander Right Flank Force intercepted a voice radio
message from COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR directing Attack Groups 1.2 and 2.2 to
stand by to fire a half salvo to starboard.*
Since these attack groups were heading in a southerly direction with
the enemy on the port bow, with the direction of firing torpedoes clearly
to port, he was likely confused somewhat by this order. However, he wisely
took no action perhaps feeling that the matter would be straightened out by
later events.
He now observed on his radar scope the two right flank destroyer
attack groups conducting their approach about eleven miles to the south.
He knew that the two attack groups of CTG 79.11 had completed their torpedo
attacks and were returning.* However, in view of the fact that the enemy
situation still remained somewhat unclear and since CTG 77.2 had requested
information from CTG 79.11 as to enemy types, he requested COMDESRON TWENTY-
FOUR, at 0321, to get as accurate a picture as possible, especially as to
types of ships.*
Since, as has been pointed out previously, he was concerned over the
attacks now underway by his right flank destroyers, although not so concerned
as he had been before CTG 79.11 had attacked successfully and without injury,
he watched the movements of his destroyers on his radar scope, listened to
their reports as they advanced, and watched closely for enemy reaction.
At 0323 he intercepted a TBS voice radio message from Commander
Attack Group 2.2 directing the BSALE to standby to fire a half salvo to
port.*
At 0324 he recorded in his action report that (a) COMDESRON FIFTY-
FOUR reported that there were two battleships, one or two heavy cruisers
and one destroyer in the enemy group and (b) DESRON TWENTY-FOUR was then
firing torpedoes in its first attack.**
At 0328 he intercepted a TBS voice radio message from Commander
Attack Group 2.2 to COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR reporting that his group had
completed firing torpedoes and was retiring to the north.* Upon hearing
this report, he asked COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR for an estimate of enemy speed,
to which the Commanding Officer ARUNTA replied, "Speed twenty knots."*
It appears however, that Commander Right Flank Force did not hear
this reply for about a minute later he asked ARUNTA for an estimate of the
enemy speed to which the Commanding Officer ARUNTA first replied, "Wait" and
then, at 0330 replied, "My speed is twenty- five knots."* This illustrates
the communication difficulties experienced by ARUNTA.
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944.
496799 o -59 -37 419 CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHr FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
Meanwhile, at 0329 he intercepted a voice radio order from Commander
Attack Group 1.2 to Attack Group 1.2 that he was coming left to north to
fire torpedoes and for the group to fire when ready.* He could expect from
this that these destroyers would commence firing torpedoes in a few minutes.
At this same time he intercepted Commander Battle Line's order to the battle
line to increase speed to fifteen knots.
At 0331 he received a message by TBS voice radio from CTG 77.2
requesting information concerning the operations of the right flank
destroyers to which query he replied that the group that went down the right
side had fired and were retiring (to their post battle rendezvous) and that
the other group would report presently when they had fired.* At this same
time he increased speed to fifteen knots to maintain station on the battle
line wnich he knew had increased speed about two minutes earlier.
At 0332 he intercepted a TBS voice radio message from COMBATLINE to
the battle line directing them to open fire at 26,000 yards.* This
concerned him considerably for, at this moment, his radar ranges indicated
that the leading enemy ship (YAMASHIRO) was about 31,000 yards from the
battle line which meant that the battle line was likely to open fire in a
few minutes. This was an unsatisfactory situation because one group of his
destroyers had yet to complete its attack and, therefore, might accidently
become a target. Since the opening range, prescribed in CTG 77.2' s battle
plan,** was to be between 17,000 and 20,000 yards, he likely expected CTG
77.2 to direct Commander Battle Line to cancel this order and to conform to
the battle plan, but he could not be sure. Therefore, he realized that it
would be wise to have his destroyers clear the area once they had completed
firing.
At 0333 he was relieved to receive a report from COKDESRON TWENTY-
FOUR that Attack Group 1.2 had fired and that the enemy appeared to be
retiring.* He knew from this, and from the earlier report of Conmander
Attack Group 2.2, that (a) the squadron had now completed firing and (b) the
enemy appeared to be retiring. Therefore, he so advised CTG 77.2.*
SINCE, FROM THE RADAR PLOT THE ENEMY APPEARED TO CONTINUE TO CLOSE,
HE LIKELY MAINTAINED A CLOSE WATCH IN ORDER TO DISCERN THE REPORTED RETIRE-
MENT, AND DIRECTED COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR TO KEEP TRACK OF THE ENEMY AND TO
REPORT ENEMY COURSE AND SPEED.*
THIS WAS A SOUND ORDER FOR IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DESrROY THE JAPANESE
SHIPS AND, SHOULD THEY BE RETIRING IN FACT, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE
IMMEDIATE COUNTER- ACT I ON IN ORDER TO INSURE THAT NONE ESCAPED. THIS WAS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH DOCTRINE WHICH DIRECTED THE EXPLOITATION OF IMMEDIATELY
FAVORABLE SITUATIONS TO THE COMPLETE ANNIHILATION OF THE ENEMY.***
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
*** War Instructions, United States Navy (FTP 143A), United States Fleet,
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1944, Chapter 2, Section VTI,
Paragraphs 233 and 234.
420 CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0343, October 25th
At this moment he received a TBS voice radio message from COMDESRON
TWENTY-FOUR stating that he was going to "chase" the enemy.* Since the
term "chase" has the naval connotation of "pursuing a disorganized enemy-
force that has withdrawn from action",** he realized that by this message
COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR was reaffirming his statement that the enemy was
retiring. In such case his destroyers would be in the attack waters of
DESRON FIFTY-SIX. On the other hand, he realized that, should the enemy
not be retiring, his destroyers would be in the target area and subject to
attack by Allied gunfire from the battle disposition. In either case, he
felt it wise to remove his destroyers from the target area and, therefore,
immediately directed COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR to "get over to the west".***
THIS ORDER BY COMMANDER RIGHT FLANK FORCE WAS SOUND FOR THE
DESTROYERS RIGHT FLANK HAD NOW PROBABLY FIRED MOST, IF NOT ALL, OF THEIR
TORPEDOES AND HAD ONLY THEIR GUNS LEFT. IT WAS, OF COURSE, CLEAR THAT
DESTROYER GUNFIRE COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO BE PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE AGAINST
ENEMY HEAVY SHIPS WHEREAS THE TORPEDOES OF DESRON FIFTY-SIX COULD BE HIGHLY
EFFECTIVE AND, THEREFORE, IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THEIR DELIVERY AGAINST THE
ENEMY NOT BE INTERFERED WITH IN ANY WAY.
At 0335 he intercepted a TBS voice radio message from CTG 77.2 to
COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX, directing that commander to launch his attack and "get
the big boys".**** This probably confused him because of Commander Battle
Line's order to commence firing at 26,000 yards. He could see that, unless
this order were cancelled or modified, DESRON FIFTY-SIX might be in jeopardy.
He realized, however, that CTG 77.2 was fully cognizant of the situation
and that his fears were probably groundless. Perhaps he felt that the
reported retirement of the enemy had caused CTG 77.2, who would naturally
be fearful lest any of the enemy get away, to launch this attack since the
enemy might never be within the planned open fire gun range of the battle
line.
Between 0334 and 0338 he intercepted several TBS voice radio trans-
missions between COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR and the DALY and BACHE concerning
the firing of torpedoes* and he could conclude from these transmissions that
that commander, despite his earlier report that his squadron had fired
torpedoes, was still engaged in making a torpedo attack.
Despite the report of COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR that the enemy ships
were retiring, Commander Right Flank Force noted, at 0338, that the leading
Japanese ship was continuing northward with little decrease in speed,***
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** War Instructions, United States Navy (FTP 143A), United States Fleet,
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1944, Chapter 13, Section II,
Paragraph 1304.
*** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944.
**** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
421 CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
and that the other Japanese ships had either slowed down or had been damaged.
The leading ship was the battleship YAMASHIRO which had sustained one
torpedo hit at 0319 and another at 0331 which had left her fighting ability
generally unimpaired. At this same time COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR reported that
the enemy (meaning the SHIGURE) had reversed course and was heading northward.*
Also at 0339 Commander Right Flank Force advised COMDESRON TWENTY-
FOUR that COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX was launching his torpedo attack and again
directed him to stay clear of the targets.**
At 0340 he noted that (a) the range from the PHOENIX to the nearest
enemy ship was about 26,000 yards and (b) the distance to the MISSISSIPPI
from the PHOENIX was about 13,000 yards. From this he could estimate that
the distance of the enemy from the MISSISSIPPI was about 28,000 yards. This
range indicated that the battle line was, therefore, about to open fire.
Since the right flank cruisers were somewhat out of position with relation
to the MISSISSIPPI, he decided to correct his position and turned to course
120°(T) for this purpose.***
At the same time he received a report from PT $23, over the Local
Air Warning Circuit, reporting five destroyers and one large ship on a
northerly course passing the southern entrance to Surigao Strait.*** This
caused him considerable concern because it indicated that another enemy
attempt to penetrate the strait was underway.*** His concern was probably
due to the shortage of torpedoes in his destroyers which he could estimate
had been largely expended.
About 0342 he received a voice radio report from COMDESRON TWENTY-
FOUR that the enemy (SHIGURE) was then on course 020° (T), speed twenty-three
knots.** At this time the SHIGURE was actually on course 030° (T), speed
twenty-six knots (Diagram nHM).
At 0343 he received a report from COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR that he was
attacking the enemy with (5-inch) gunfire.**** This was probably a great
surprise for he had ordered COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR to retire to the western
shore.** He immediately directed that commander to stay clear.***
At 0344, having arrived in his approximately correct position, and
desiring to be on the base course when the battle line opened fire because
his after turrets were near the limit of their forward train, he changed
back to the base course 090° (T).***
*~ Action Report COMDESRON 24, Night Surface Engagement Surigao Strait,
Leyte, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0129,
October 30th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944.
**** Ibid., Enclosure (C); also Action Report COMDESRON 24, Night Surface
Engagement Surigao Strait, Leyte, Philippine Islands, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0129, October 30th, 1944.
422 CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0343, October 25th
At this time he observed that (a) the range to the leading Japanese
ship had decreased to about 22,000 yards and (b) this ship was persistently
moving northward despite the torpedo and gunfire attacks of the Allied
destroyers. In addition, his radar scope showed that there were three
enemy groups; the first group looked like the one heavy ship above leading
two large ships (cruisers) in column, with the other two groups of small
ships (destroyers) astern.* It is of interest that the BOISE also showed
(a) two heavy ships, at least one of which was believed to be a battleship
in a rough column heading northward, accompanied by what was believed to be
a destroyer possibly waiting for an opportunity to launch a torpedo attack,
and (b) a group of small ships milling around to the southward.** The
SHROPSHIRE* s radar scope showed two groups each of two large ships about
5,000 yards apart heading northward, but the destroyer accompanying the
leading two large ships was not discovered until a few minutes later.***
Actually, at this time the YAMASHIRO was leading the Japanese group,
with the MOGAMI following about 4,000 yards astern; the SHIGURE, about 1,800
yards astern and to the eastward of the MOGAMI, was approaching at high speed
and was about to pass the MOGAMI en route to the YAMASHIRO, the three ships
being very nearly in line of bearing of 140° (T) from the YAMASHIRO which
was bearing about 150° (T) from the PHOENIX giving the indication of the
three ships in a rough column; about 6,000 yards astern of the YAMASHIRO
was the ASAGUMO and about 3,000 yards further away was the MICHISHIO, both
under attack by the destroyers of the right flank; five miles farther to
the south was the disabled FUSO**** (Diagram »H").
Commencing at 0345 he began receiving in succession a number of
reports***** from COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR to the effect that (a) the enemy
was still headed north, (b) one of the enemy ships was dead in the water and
(c) DESRON TWENTY-FOUR ships were (l) hitting the enemy regularly with their
5-inch guns and (2) going to attack the enemy with torpedoes.
Realizing that this was very important information since it showed
that the enemy was completely demoralized he, at 0347, relayed the informa-
tion to the OTC (CTG 77.2).*****
At 0347 he heard one of the attack section commanders of DESRON
FIFTY-SEC direct his section to fire half salvos of torpedoes and thought
from this that DESRON FIFTY-SIX was firing torpedoes.***** Actually, this
was merely a preparatory order from Commander Attack Section TWO. No
torpedoes had as yet been fired.
*~ Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944.
** Action Report BOISE, Surigao Strait, October 25th, 19Z+4, Serial 069,
October 30th, 1944.
*** Action Report HMAS SHROPSHIRE, Night Action, October 25th, 1944,
Serial SC 1123/194, November 4th, 1944.
**** The. track charts of the LOUISVILLE, HUTCHBIS, DALY and MC GOWAN
showed this target which was either too distant for the other ships
to record or their CIC's were not concerned about it.
***** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
423 CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK CRUISERS
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
At 0348 the PHOENIX, which was 18,800 yards northwest of the leading
enemy ship (YAMASHIRO), was bearing 062° (T), distant 9,800 yards from the
northeastern tip of Cabugan Grande Island,
(a) Operations of Commander Right Flank Cruisers, 0320 - 0348,
October 25th.
The right flank cruisers were now north of the Cabugan Islands.
At 0324 CTG 77.3, on course 270°(T), speed ten knots, executed a reversal of
course to the right by turn movement to 090°(T).*
At 0331 the cruisers had just completed their turn. Commander
Right Flank Cruisers ordered speed increased to fifteen knots.
At 0340 the range to the nearest enemy ship was aDDroximately
26,000 yards from the PHOENIX. At this time CTG 77.3 changed course to '
120° (T) in order to close the enemy, and to correct nis position with relation
to the disposition guide.
At 0342 the Commanding Officer BOISE noted that CQMDESRON
TWENTY-FOUR had opened fire with his 5-inch guns.** Although he does not
indicate whether this was a visual sighting or the result of a radio message,
it appears to have been the latter because at this time COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR
reported to CTG 77.3 that he had opened with gunfire.***
At 0344, having closed the enemy sufficiently, he changed course
of the cruisers back to 090°(T). The range to the leading Japanese ship had
now decreased to about 22,000 yards. This was so despite the torpedo and
gunfire attacks of the Allied destroyers and must have been an impressive
demonstration to Commander Right Flank Cruisers (CTG 77.3) of either (a) the
lack of hits being made by the Allied destroyers or (b) the toughness of the
Japanese ships. At this time, as pointed out under "Operations of Commander
Right Flank Force (CTG 77.3)", (a) the PHOENIX had three groups of ships on
her radar screen; the first group looked like one heavy ship leading and two
large ships (cruisers) in column, and two small groups of small ships
(destroyers) astern,* (b) BOISE radar screen showed two heavy ships in a
rough column headed northward, accompanied by what was believed to be a
destroyer waiting for an opportunity to launch a torpedo attack** and (c)
SHROPSHIRE had two groups each of two large ships 5,000 yards apart heading
northward.****
Also at 0344 he, as well as many of his units, observed the
terrific gunfire of the YAMASHIRO when she commenced return fire on the
destroyers, which gunfire appeared to many observers as explosions.
* Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944.
** Action Report BOISE, Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 069,
October 30th, 1944.
*** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
**** Action Report HMAS SHROPSHIRE, Night Action, October 25th, 1944,
Serial SC 1123/194, November 4th, 1944.
424 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0343, October 25th
The three cruisers of the right flank, however, were preoccupied
with the tracking of the leading Japanese ship, the YAMASHIRO. As the range
decreased below 20,000 yards, the gunners of the PHOENIX and BOISE awaited
the order to commence fire; the radar and fire control equipment of the
SHROPSHIRE was not effective beyond 15,500 yards,*
(b) Operations of Commander Right Flank Destroyers (COMDESRON TWENTY-
FOUR), 0320 - 0348, October 25th.
Since Commander Right Flank Destroyers operated throughout this
period almost entirely as Commander Attack Group 1.2 and only rarely as
Commander Right Flank Destroyers, all matters connected with Commander Right
Flank Destroyers are discussed under the operations of Commander Attack
Group 1.2.
(1) Operations of Commander Attack Group 1.2, 0320 - 0348,
October 25th.
Commander Attack Group 1.2, with Attack Group 1.2, on course
180°(T) at speed fifteen knots, continued his approach. He was still in a
loose column formation with the DALY and BACHE about 1,000 yards astern of
the HUTCHINS. At this time he was forward of the beam of the enemy,
continuing south to get behind him, and had noted four ships in column
advancing to the north.** Actually, there were five ships in rough column,
MICHISHIO, ASAGUMO, SHIGURE, YAMASHIRO and MOGAMI, in that order.
As yet he had not signalled any torpedo firing plan to
either attack group.**
WHILE THIS WAS DUE TO THE FACT THAT HE CONSIDERED THAT HIS
DESTROYER COMMANDING OFFICERS WERE SUFFICIENTLY INDOCTRINATED TO KNOW WHAT
TO DO IN A SITUATION OF THIS NATURE,** IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT IT WAS UNWISE
NOT TO HAVE DONE SO BECAUSE (A) THERE WAS AMPLE TIME AVAILABLE, (B)
EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS IN ACTION ARE ENHANCED IF
THE DESTROYERS ATTACK ACCORDING TO A PREARRANGED PLAN, AND (C) THE RAPIDITY
AND ACCURACY OF UNIT TORPEDO FIRE WILL BE INCREASED IF THE COMMANDING
OFFICERS ARE INFORMED OF THE NATURE OF THE ANTICIPATED METHODS OF FIRE, AND
MANEUVERS FOR FIRING.***
None of his ships except the BEALE in Attack Group 2.2
seemed concerned at the non-receipt of a firing plan, which shows that the
squadron was familiar with the squadron commander's doctrines. The BEALE,
on the other hand, wished information as to the number of torpedoes to be
* Action Report HMAS SHROPSHIRE, Night Action, October 25th, 1944, Serial
SC 1123/194, November 4th, 1944, CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15) 1ST Endorsement,
Serial 0403, November 15th, 1944.
** Action Report COMDESRON 24, Night Surface Engagement Surigao Strait,
Leyte, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0129,
October 30th, 1944.
*** Current Tactical Orders Destroyers (USF 32) Rev., United States Fleet,
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1940, Chapter 10.
425 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
fired, and therefore, at 0319, had requested instructions* thereon. THIS
WAS AN IMPORTANT ITEM TO HAVE SETTLED IMMEDIATELY FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF
TORPEDOES WAS NEXT TO IMPOSSIBLE, AND THE DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO FIRE
ALL TORPEDOES, EXCEPT IN AN EMERGENCY, WAS THEREFORE ONE OF CONSIDERABLE
IMPORTANCE.
Commander Attack Group 1.2, as COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR, at
0320, in replying to the BEALE, directed his destroyers to "standby to fire
half salvos to starboard. BEALE acknowledge."** This message was not
received clearly by the BEALE who asked the ARUNTA to repeat it** which was
promptly done.*
Why COMDESRON TWENTY- FOUR directed Attack Group 2.2 to
standby to fire torpedoes to starboard when they properly should have been
fired to port is nowhere explained. Perhaps he had hopes that it might be
possible to make a coordinated attack. However, he must have seen on his
radar scope that to accomplish this he would have to turn his own group
radically toward the enemy. Since he did not do this but continued on, it
seems probable that he had not as yet decided on his course of action.
At 0321 he received a message from Commander Right Flank
Force directing him to report as accurately as possible as to types of
enemy ships encountered.**
At 0323, as Commander Attack Group 1.2, he increased speed
to twenty- five knots, and ordered all ships to make heavy smoke.** As
COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR he, at 0324, directed Commander Attack Group 2.2 to
report when torpedoes had been fired.
At this time the DALY* and BACHE,*** but apparently not the
HUTCHINS,**** observed starshells burst well ahead of them to starboard.
This starshell firing was probably a continuation of the Japanese firing
against the Western Attack Group but its effects were dissipated by the heavy
smoke. Three minutes later a flare, obviously dropped by a plane, illuminated
the area in the vicinity of the DALY.* No enemy gunfire was observed at
this time*
By 0327 he had noted on his radar scoDe that the enemy ships
were abeam of the HUTCHINS.*****
* Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report BACHE, Engagement of Enemy Surface Forces, Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0106, October 25th, 1944.
**** Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
***** Ibid., Enclosure (A).
426 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
It now likely appeared to him that at least one of the enemy-
ships had commenced retiring. Since he believed that he was in an excellent
position to fire torpedoes,* he decided to commence his attack. Therefore,
at 0327:36, he changed course to 090° (T) and at 0329 to 000° (T).**
Just before this, at 0328, he received a report that Attack
Group 2.2, which was about 7,000 yards to the northeast, had completed
firing torpedoes. ***
From this report he could see that any chance for
coordinated attacks had now been lost and that his own attack would
necessarily be conducted independently. Perhaps this did not surprise him
because, as was pointed out earlier, it seems probable that he had not
contemplated any specific coordination. This thought is inferred from his
view, expressed later,* that, in order to prevent the Japanese from retiring,
it was more important for him to work to the southward of the enemy than to
attempt to execute a coordinated attack. He then, at 0329, advised his
group over the Task Group Common that he was "Coming left to north, fire
your fish when you wish."***
Why he directed his destroyers at this time to fire their
torpedoes is not understood for his command was not being illuminated by
the Japanese nor was it under gunfire. In fact, he stated later that the
enemy appeared to be unaware of his presence,*
Since the enemy, with the exception of the SHIGURE, had
continued on northerly courses Commander Attack Group 1.2' s belief that he
was in a good firing position, would have been correct had he continued on
course 090° (T) or slightly to the north of this course, for by so doing, he
would have closed the enemy to a point where he could have employed inter-
mediate speed torpedoes and thereby increased markedly his probability of
hits. However, his change of course to north placed him in a position
where it was necessary to employ low speed torpedoes**** with the consequent
decreased probability of hits owing to the fact that (1) the enemy would
have more time for maneuvering and (2) the density of the torpedoes in the
target area would be low.
At this time, 0329, the range to the nearest enemy ship
(SHIGURE) was 9,100 yards, and the range to the leading enemy ship
(YAMASHIRO) was 12,000 yards.
* Action Report COMDESRON 24, Night Surface Engagement Surigao Strait,
Leyte, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0129,
October 30th, 1944.
** Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
*** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, PhilipDine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
**** Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-44, Destroyer Torpedo Doctrine and
Manual of Torpedo Control, issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific
Fleet, Serial 01630, July 8th, 1944, Paragraph 3-46, Page 27.
427 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
Somehow, at this time, the Commanding Officer HUTCHINS, who
had been tracking the fourth pip from the north,* which analysis reveals
was likely the MOGAMI, suddenly shifted to the SHIGURE, which he had
observed to be retiring, and at 0329:30, using broadside fire to starboard,
fired a half salvo of five intermediate speed torpedoes on base torpedo
course 120°(T) at this target bearing 093°(T), range 8,200 yards (her track
chart indicates a range of 8,750 yards and a bearing of 096°(T) which
appears to have been correct) and tracked on course 200°(T), speed fifteen
knots.* Depth setting was six feet, firing interval three seconds, and
torpedo spread one degree. All torpedoes appeared to run hot, straight and
normal. By firing at the SHIGURE, which he had not planned to fire at
since she was a detached ship but which he considered a large "pip", he was
enabled to employ intermediate speed torpedoes because the target angle of
seventy-three degrees on her present course and her range of 8,200 yards
was 525 yards beyond the effective range of the torpedoes but well within
the maximum range,**
The DALY and BACHE, following roughly in the wake of the
HUTCHINS on course north, both turned late and as a result, lost some
distance. At this time (a) the DALY was tracking a pip,*** which later
proved to be the MOGAMI and (b) the BACHE was tracking the circling
destroyer SHIGURE.****
THE FACT THAT BOTH THE HUTCHINS AND THE BACHE WERE TRACKING
THE SAME PIP (SHIGURE) INDICATES THE NEED FOR A DEFINITE TARGET DESIGNATION
PRIOR TO FIRING TORPEDOES. IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT HAD ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CLOSED THE ENEMY RELATIVE SIZE OF THE TARGETS WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE CLEARLY
DEFINED ALLOWING A MORE CAREFUL SELECTION OF TARGETS.
It was quite difficult at this time for Commander Attack
Group 1.2 to understand thoroughly what was transpiring in the Japanese
formation for all the Japanese ships were on different courses and speeds.
It was also difficult for the Japanese to discern what was happening, and
whence came the attacks, for they had apparently failed to detect Attack
Group 1.2 on their radars or, because of smoke, to sight it.
At 0331 he may have intercepted (a) a TBS voice radio message
from CTG 77.2 to Commander Right Flank Force requesting information
concerning the operations of the right flank destroyers***** and (b)
Commander Right Flank Force's reply that the group which had gone down the
right side had fired and were retiring and that the other group would report
when they had fired.*****
*~ Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
** Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-44, Destroyer Torpedo Doctrine and
Manual of Torpedo Control, issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific
Fleet, Serial 01630, July 8th, 1944, Paragraph 3-46, Page 27 •
*** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944.
**** Action Report BACHE, Engagement of Enemy Surface Forces, Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0106, October
25th, 1944.
***** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
428 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0343, October 25th
At 0332 he received a report from the Commanding Officer DALY
that two torpedoes had crossed from starboard to port* about fifty yards
ahead of him. Although no Japanese records available to this study
substantiate this sighting, does it not seem surprising that the wakes were
not observed by the BACHE which was following about 500 yards astern of the
DALY? If they were, in fact, Japanese torpedoes, they were likely fired
either accidentally or intentionally, as a jettison measure by either of
the damaged destroyers MICHISHIO or ASAGUMO and were probably fired into
the smoke in the general direction of the retiring Western Attack Group
rather than at Attack Group 1.2, the presence of which appears to have been
unknown to the Japanese.
It is not known whether or not he intercepted Commander
Battle Line's TBS voice radio order issued at this time directing the battle
line to open fire at 26,000 yards.** If he did, it probably emphasized in
his mind the necessity for remaining sufficiently clear of the Japanese
formation to insure that the units of the battle disposition might not
confuse his units with those of the enemy.
At 0332:42 HUTCHINS, at the direction of Commander Attack
Group 1.2, started a wide turn to port and continued around to course
180° (T).***
At 0333 Commander Attack Group 1.2 advised Commander Right
Flank Force that he had fired his torpedoes,** This report, which was in
error, must have surprised the commanding officers of the DALY and BACHE for
they had not as yet fired.**** He followed this message with another to the
effect that the enemy was retiring.** Why he sent this latter message is
not explained for, from his radar scope, he should have been able to see
that the major portion of the enemy ships were still on a northerly heading.
Unfortunately the HUTCHINS track chart***** which presumably he consulted
for he was in the HUTCHINS CIC, shows that at this time she was plotting
only the track of the circling SHIGURE and had not yet detected that ship's
reversal of course to north which had started at 0331:30.
He now, as COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR, received a message from
Commander Right Flank Force to keep track of the enemy and to report enemy
course and speed.** He decided that the best way of accomplishing this task
was to trail the enemy and, therefore, he advised Commander Right Flank
* Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
**** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944; also Action Report BACHE, Engagement
of Enemy Surface Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0106, October 25th, 1944.
***** Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 069, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
429 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 032*8, October 25th
Force that he was going to "chase" the enemy.* This was an unhappy choice
of words for, instead of chasing them, which, as has been pointed out under
"Operations of Commander Right Flank Force (CTG 77.3), 0320 - 0348", has
the connotation of a retirement by the enemy, he would have to trail rather
than chase, for at this very time the enemy was moving north again. However,
the HUTCHINS track chart shows that the SHIGURE turn to the north was not
detected at this time.**
However, this plan did not meet with the approval of
Commander Right Flank Force, who directed him to "get over to the west".***
Since he was already turning to the left and would end the turn about 2,000
yards offshore and on course 180° (T), he likely felt that he was complying
with the order from his commander. He continued his turn to the south.****
While his reason for heading south rather than north is not known it seems
probable it was based on his desire to remain in such a position that,
should the enemy retire, he would be better able to intercept them. If
this was his reason it seems logical in view of his orders.
Meanwhile, the DALY and BACHE, which had lost some distance
in turns, were now about 1,200 and 2,500 yards, respectively, astern of the
HUTCHINS (Diagram "H").
At 0335 the BACHE changed course to 3450(t)***** and headed
for the point at which the HUTCHINS had started her turn.
At 0335 Commander Attack Group 1.2 knew that the BACHE had
not as yet fired for, at this time, she requested permission to fire a half
salvo of torpedoes before retiring.*
This message appears to have alerted him to the fact that
neither the DALY nor the BACHE had fired and he, therefore, authorized
both of them to fire before retiring and directed them to inform him upon
completion of firing.* The DALY immediately replied in the negative* in
order that the commander would know that she had not as yet fired her
torpedoes.
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 069, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
*** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philiooine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944.
**** Action Report COMDESRON 24, Night Surface Engagement Surigao Strait,
Leyte, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0129, October
30th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
***** Action Report BACHE, Engagement of Enemy Surface Forces, Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0106,
October 25th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
430 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
The DALY, now at 0335:30,* changed course to 350°(T) and,
using broadside fire to starboard, fired a half salvo of five low speed
torpedoes on base torpedo course 055°(T)** at the largest "pip" which she
believed to be a battleship and which was bearing 093° (T), range 10,700
yards and tracked on course 010° (T), speed sixteen knots. Depth setting
was six feet, firing interval three seconds, torpedo spread one degree.
All torpedoes appeared to run hot, straight and normal.*** Actually, from
the analysis, she fired at the MOGAMI which at this time was on course
045° (T) at twenty knots. She reported having fired to COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR
at approximately 0337.**** From her track chart** she apparently started
tracking the crippled ASAGUMO, which was at the same range and only three
degrees away in bearing, shortly after firing.
At 0336 the BACHE, using broadside fire to starboard, fired
a half salvo of five low speed torpedoes on base torpedo course 068° (T) at
a target \^hich he did not identify but which, from analysis, was the SHIGURE,
bearing 109°(T), range 10,200 yards and tracked on course 018°(T) at
seventeen knots.***** Depth setting was six feet, firing interval three
seconds, torpedo spread one degree. All torpedoes appeared to run hot,
straight and normal.
At 0336:30 the DALY commenced a turn to 200© (T)** and at
0337:30 the BACHE commenced a turn to 130°(T).*****
Commander Attack Group 1.2 now observed that the radar
scope showed three targets continuing north with three small ones lagging
behind and possibly retiring.****** He concluded from this that the
undamaged Japanese units were continuing their attack and therefore reported
to Commander Right Flank Force that the enemy had reversed course and was
headed north.**** At the same time he queried the DALY as to whether she
had fired her torpedoes.****
* Although the DALY stated in her action report that she fired
torpedoes at 0332 a study of the voice radio logs of CTG 77.3,
PHOENIX and DALY reveals that she reported to COMDESRON 24 at 0336
that she had not yet fired and about a minute later reported that
she had fired torpedoes. The DALY's track chart shows a similar
confusion as to times, having an error of about three minutes
(negative) until 0336 and then gradually decreasing to an error of
about one minute at the time of opening gunfire at 0342.
** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
*** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944.
**** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
***** Action Report BACHE, Engagement of Enemy Surface Forces, Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0106,
October 25th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
****** Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 069, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
431 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0343, October 25th
Also at 0338, at the approximate end of the HUTCHINS
torpedo running time, the commanding officer and other observers on the
bridge visually sighted one to three explosions slightly on the port bow.
The sound operators heard two faint and one loud snap in the sonar
equipment.*
From this it is assumed that he thought that it was likely
that he had made a hit. However, he did not make a hit, because the SHIG-URE
had reversed course long before the torpedoes could have reached her** and
no other Japanese ships were within the torpedo spread. Since the Japanese
did not report any torpedo hits at this time it seems probable that these
explosions were those occurring in the damaged FUSO as a result of the
original torpedo attack by DESRON FIFTY-FOUR. The FUSO was approximately
14,000 yards away and on a bearing sufficiently close to permit this error.
Commander Attack Group 1.2, observing that he had fired his
torpedoes without having been fired on or even illuminated, decided to
increase speed and to close the enemy somewhat, presumably to clear the
smoke and to bring the enemy more on his beam so that he might fire his guns.
At 0339 the HUTCHINS increased speed to thirty knots and
changed course to 148°(T);**» the DALY changed course to 175°(T)**** and
the BACHE, just completing her turn, steadied on course 180°(T) .*****
Commander Attack Group 1.2 endeavored to notify the DALY and BACHE of the
change of speed to thirty knots****** but they failed to receive the message
and remained at twenty- five knots.
At this time, owing largely to the firing maneuvers of the
three ships of this section, the HUTCHINS was some 4,400 yards ahead of
the DALY.
Also at 0339 he (a) was advised by Commander Right Flank
Force that COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX was launching his torpedo attack and was
directed to stay clear (of the target area), (b) received a report from the
*~" Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
** Action Report BACHE, Engagement of Enemy Surface Foraes, Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0106, October
25th, 1944, Enclosure (A); also Appended Chart 2 (Chart of Night
Battle, 3RD Section, 1ST Striking Force, 0030 - 0530, October
25th, 1944), Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte
Gulf, October 23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4),
NA 11801.
*** Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 069, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
**** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
***** Action Report BACHE, Engagement of Enemy Surface Forces, Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0106, October
25th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
****** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 25th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
432 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
BACHE that she had completed firing and (c) advised Commander Right Flank
Force that the enemy base course was 020°(T), the enemy speed twenty-three
knots.* Actually, the track of the YAMASHIRO was 345°(T), speed eighteen
knots; the track of the MOGAMI 000°(T), speed twelve knots; the track of
the SHIGURE 030°(T), speed twenty-six knots. From this it seems correct
to say that he had tracked the SHIGURE rather than the YAMASHIRO or MOGAMI.
At 0341, realizing that the enemy was still continuing
north, albeit in a very loose column,** and that his present course of
148° (T), if maintained, would remove him completely from action, he decided
to change course to north. He therefore directed the Commanding Officer
HUTCHINS to change course to north and to open fire at the nearest enemy
ship.***
The HUTCHINS immediately opened fire by full radar control
on a target which she believed to be a destroyer*** bearing 060°(T),**
range 12,000 yards*** and at 0341:30 changed course to 008°(T).** This
target was the damaged ASAGUMO which was changing course to port in order
to retire from the strait.
At 0342 the DALY, following the lead of the HUTCHINS, also
opened fire employing full radar control. The DALY fired on a destroyer
target bearing 085°(T), range 11,000 yards which appeared to have reversed
course.**** This was the MICHISHIO which was proceeding southward at slow
speed.
At 0343 Commander Attack Group 1.2, observing that two of
his ships had opened fire with their guns, advised Commander Right Flank
Force to this effect.* At this same time DALY***** and BACHE****** both
changed course to 150°(T) in order to parallel the track of the HUTCHINS
and make up some of the lost distance (Diagram nHw).
At 0344 (a) the BACHE, employing full radar control, opened
fire on the MICHISHIO bearing 086° (T), range 11,800 yards,****** (b)
Commander Attack Group 1.2 observed that (1) the enemy had responded
vigorously to the above firing employing starshells which were initially
short, (2) enemy salvos of 5-inch, 6- inch and 8-inch shells were landing in
the vicinity of the HUTCHINS and (3) no hits were being made on the ships
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 069, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
*** Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
**** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944.
***** Ibid., Enclosure (A).
****** Action Report BACHE, Engagement of Enemy Surface Forces, Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0106,
October 25th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
433 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
of his group,* (this was his indication that the enemy knew of the presence
of his attack group), and (c) the DALY, observing that the HUTCHINS had
changed course back to the north and would soon cross her bow, changed
course to 135°(T),** presumably in order to continue firing as long as
possible.
At 0345 so much was happening around the destroyers of
Attack Group 1.2 that some erroneous impressions were created, leading to
false reports and overoptimistic claims. The HUTCHINS reported early hits
on the ASAGUMO and fires started.*** The DALY and BACHE were forced to
check fire at 0345 as the HUTCHINS crossed their line of fire,**** but the
DALY reported "three large explosions unmistakably torpedo hits"**** and
again that "each explosion was a round ball of dull orange flame"**** on
bearing 045° (T),**** and claimed them as three torpedo hits from the five
low speed torpedoes she fired at 0333.**** She further stated "the ship,
which was hit by three torpedoes, immediately opened fire with major and
minor caliber guns".**** The BACHE reported that (a) she had made gunfire
hits on her target after three salvos and (b) eye witnesses had stated
definitely that fires had been started as the target became dead in the
water.*****
GRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF THE JAPANESE AND ALLIED ACTION REPORTS
INDICATES THAT AT 0345 THE FOLLOWING OCCURRED; (A) THE HUTCHINS TARGET
(ASAGUMO) WAS NOT HIT NOR SET AFIRE BY GUNFIRE AT THIS TIKE,****** (B) THE
MICHISHIO WAS DEAD IN THE WATER AND BEING HEAVILY HIT BY THE DESTROYERS
GUNFIRE,******* AND (C) THE THREE BALLS OF FLAMS REPORTED BY THE DALY AS
TORPEDO HITS WERE LIKELY THE YAMASHIRO'S GUNFIRE RESPONSE TO THE DESTROYERS
GUNFIRE, SINCE SHE WAS THE ONLY TARGET IN THE VICINITY INDICATED BY THE DALY
TRACK CHART.** ACTUALLY, THE DALY TORPEDOES (27 KNOTS) COULD NOT HAVE
ARRIVED IN THE TARGET AREA UNTIL FOUR MINUTES LATER, AT 0349, AT WHICH TIMS
THE TORPEDO RUN WAS ABOUT 11,500 YARDS.
* Action Report COMDESRON 24, Night Surface Engagement Surigao Strait,
Leyte, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0129,
October 30th/ 1944.
** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
*** Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
**** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944.
***** Action Report BACHE, Engagement of Enemy Surface Forces, Surisiao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0106,
October 25th, 1944.
-jhhbhh*- Composite Report on Surigao Strait Action by Commanding Officers
ASAGUMO (Commander Kazuo Shibayama, ex-IJN) and MICHISHIO (Commander
Kazuo Tanaka, ex-IJN), March 15th, 1946, Army Historical Division
Microfilm HS-39A.
******* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October
23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
434 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
Also at 0345 Commander Attack Group 1.2 advised Commander
Right Flank Force that the enemy was headed north toward the battle
disposition.*
The BACHE, at 0345:48, changed course to 050<>(T)** and at
0346 the DALY also changed course to 050°(T).*** It appears that the two
commanding officers arrived at a decision to change course independently
for there is no record of any communication in the various voice logs. It
is likely that both decided to turn at this time because their fire had
been blanked by the HUTCHINS and they desired to follow her in a general
way, and too, at the same time, to close the enemy.****
At 0346, observing that the enemy gunfire, although on
occasions rather close, was ineffective, Commander Attack Group 1.2
authorized the Commanding Officer HUTCHINS to close the enemy more
radically.***** He did this despite the fact that he had been directed by
Commander Right Flank Force to remain clear of the area because of the
torpedo attacks by DESRON FIFTY-SIX then underway.****** His decision was
clearly correct for (a) the units he was presently attacking, i.e., ASAGUMO
and MICHISHIO, which were slowly retiring, were well behind the larger
enemy units which were still advancing and which were being attacked by
DESRON FIFTY-SIX and (b) he would, therefore, be well clear of the torpedo
water of the attacking DESRON which, it is assumed, he could clearly track
on his radar scope.
IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW WHAT HE THOUGHT OF HIS
PRESENT SITUATION FOR THE ROLE OF THE GUN AND TORPEDO HAD BEEN REVERSED.
HE KNEW THAT THE PRINCIPAL FUNCTION OF HIS DESTROYERS WAS TO DELIVER THEIR
TORPEDOES AGAINST THE ENEMY. HE ALSO KNEW THAT TO ACCOMPLISH THIS
SUCCESSFULLY HE SHOULD LAUNCH THEM FROM THE MOST EFFECTIVE FIRING POINT
EMPLOYING THE GUNS, AS NECESSARY, TO ASSIST HIM IN ARRIVING AT THIS FIRING
POINT, WHICH MEANT THAT HE SHOULD CLOSE THE ENEMY SUFFICIENTLY TO INSURE THE
MOST EFFECTIVE DELIVERY OF HIS ATTACK EVEN THOUGH, IN SO DOING, HE WOULD
TAKE HEAVY DAMAGE. THIS HE HAD NOT DONE. INSTEAD HE HAD FIRED HIS TORPEDOES
AT A LONG RANGE, WITH A RELATIVELY POOR TARGET ANGLE AND AT A TIME WHEN HE
HAD EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT HE HAD APPROACHED UNDETECTED. NOW THAT HE
*"~~ Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944.
** Action Report BACHE, Engagement of Enemy Surface Forces, Surigao
Strait, Philippine Island, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0106, October
25th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
*** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
**** Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
***** Ibid.; also Action Report COMDESRON 24, Night Surface Engagement,
Surigao Strait, Leyte, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 0129, October 30th, 1944.
****** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
496799 O -59 -38
435 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
WAS CLOSING THE ENEMY HE HAD DISCOVERED THAT THE ENEMY GUNFIRE WAS
INEFFECTIVE AND THAT HE COULD AND PROPERLY SHOULD HAVE CLOSED THE ENEMY TO
A MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE RANGE AND TARGET ANGLE. IT MUST HAVE BEEN CLEAR TO
HIM THEN THAT HE HAD UNNECESSARILY ACCEPTED A LOW TORPEDO HIT FACTOR.
The Commanding Officer HUTCHINS, having decided that a
course of 040°(T) would be correct, at 0346:30 changed course to 040°(T)*
and continued thirty knots. While it is not known why he chose this course
it seems probable that it was a collision course with the northern Japanese
ships provided by his CIC. About this time the Commanding Officer HUTCHINS
noted that the DALY and BACHE were not in sight.*
At 0347 the DALY, having steadied on course 050°(T), resumed
gunfire on the MICHISHIO. It is assumed that the BACHE resumed fire as well.
At approximately 0347:30 the Commanding Officer HUTCHINS
observed that the ship which he believed to have been his target appeared
to burn brightly with an occasional explosion on board.* He therefore, not
desiring to expend all of his ammunition on this ship— he had fired 130
rounds of 5-inch AA common — ceased firing at this target. At this time the
gun range was 7,300 yards.*
Commander Attack Group 1.2, who was still in the HUTCHINS
CIC, reported to Commander Right Flank Force as follows: (a) at 0347 that
he was "hitting again regularly with our five inch";** and (b) at 0348 "we
got one dead in the water. Going to present him with five fish".**
The ship dead in the water was the MICHISHIO. However, the
above message was in error for the Commanding Officer HUTCHINS was planning
to fire five torpedoes at the ASAGUMO which was steaming southward at seven
to nine knots*** rather than at the MICHISHIO.
About this time he received from Commander Attack Group 2.2,
who was about ten miles to the northward, a message to the effect that
Attack Group 2.2 was coming down (the strait) again.** As COMDESRON TWENTY-
FOUR, he ordered Commander Attack Group 2.2 to come down between the shore
and his ships.** While he gave no reasons for this restriction it seems
probable that it was done to insure that Attack Group 2.2 which was well to
the north (a) did not interfere with the attack of COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX and
(b) did not interfere with the firing of his own group.
* Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Composite Report on Surigao Strait Action by Commanding Officers
ASAGUMO (Commander Kazuo Shibayama, ex-IJN) and MICHISHIO (Commander
Kazuo Tanaka, ex-IJN), March 15th, 1946, Army Historical Division
Microfilm HS-39A; also Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
436 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 2.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, Octoher 25th
During this period each of the destroyers of Attack Group
1.2 had fired five torpedoes and each of them had five torpedoes left.
Since the torpedoes fired by the DALY and the BACHE did not cross the
YAMASHIRO track until about 0349 the results of the torpedo attacks will be
discussed under "Operations of Commander Attack Group 1.2, 0348 - 0420",
At 0348 Attack Group 1.2, with the HUTCHINS on course
040° (T) at thirty knots and the DALY and BACHE on course 050° (T) at twenty-
five knots, continued to close the enemy. At this time the HUTCHINS was
bearing 050°(T), distant four point six miles from Amagusan Point (Leyte)
and the DALY and BACHE were about 5,300 yards to the south (Diagram "H").
(2) Operations of Commander Attack Group 2.2, 0320 - 0348,
October 25th.
At 0320 Commander Attack Group 2.2, who was also the
Commanding Officer ARUNTA, on course 145°(T) at twenty-five knots, was
proceeding to his torpedo launching point in a very loose formation with
the KILLEN and BEALE still about 1,500 yards behind. Unknown to him, the
Commanding Officer BEALE had, at 0319, requested COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR to
inform him as to the number of torpedoes to be fired. However, the latter
did not answer the BEALE directly but instead addressed Attack Groups 1.2
and 2.2 to "Standby to fire half salvo to starboard, BEALE acknowledge".*
The Commanding Officer BEALE did not receive the message clearly and there-
fore at 0322 asked Commander Attack Group 2.2 to repeat the message.*
Meanwhile, at approximately 0322, Attack Group 2.2 commenced
making stack smoke.**
It is not known whether or not Commander Attack Group 2.2
received the above message from COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR because he had been
having difficulty in communicating which had forced him to employ follow-
the-leader tactics entirely.*** However, it appears likely that he did
receive it and was concerned lest the BEALE make preparations to fire to
starboard when, in his opinion, she should fire to port following the
actions of the flagship. It was for this reason that, at 0323, he directed
the BEALE to standby to fire a half salvo to port.****
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Deck Log KILLEN, October 25th, 1944; also Action Report HMAS ARUNTA,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial l/41, October 29th, 1944; also
Action Report BEALE, Night Torpedo Attack on Japanese Naval Forces
at Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0230, October 29th,
1944, Enclosure (A).
*** Action Report HMAS ARUNTA, Night Action, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial l/41, October 29th, 1944*
**** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
437 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 2.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
SINCE THIS ORDER TO THE BEALE WAS IN OPPOSITION TO THAT
ISSUED BY HIS IMMEDIATE SUPERIOR IT SEEMS WISE AT THIS TIME TO SPECULATE
AGAIN AS TO WHAT IT WAS THAT CAUSED HIM, FOR THE SECOND TIME, IN A MATTER
OF MINUTES, TO ACT IN THIS FASHION. THE ANSWER SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN THAT HE
HAD EITHER (A) COMMITTED HIS COMMAND TO AN ATTACK ON THE ENEMY'S PORT BOW
WITH THE PORT TORPEDO BATTERY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SQUADRON DOCTRINE AND,
BEING NOW AT HIS CHOSEN FIRING POINT (6,000 - 7,000 YARDS) ON THE ENEMY'S
PORT BOW,* THOUGHT IT WISE TO CONDUCT HIS ATTACK AS PLANNED AWAITING AN
ORDER WHICH, IF DELAYED, MIGHT CAUSE HIM TO PASS HIS CHOSEN FIRING POSITION,
OR (B) FELT THAT HIS IMMEDIATE SUPERIOR, NOT KNOWING HIS FIRING PLAN, HAD
ERRED IN INCLUDING HIS ATTACK GROUP AND THAT, OUT OF LOYALTY TO HIS COMMANDER,
HE SHOULD FIRE TO PORT WHICH SHOULD GIVE HIM THE MOST EFFECTIVE ATTACK.
WHILE HIS DECISION TO FIRE TO PORT AT THIS TIME WOULD
LIKELY RESULT IN A VERY SATISFACTORY ATTACK FOR A SINGLE GROUP, IT MUST BE
REMEMBERED THAT (A) HIS GROUP WAS BUT ONE OF TWO GROUPS, THE ATTACKS OF
WHICH SHOULD PROPERLY HAVE BEEN COORDINATED FOR THE BEST RESULTS, (B) BY
FIRING AT THIS TIME WITHOUT COORDINATING HIS ATTACK WITH THE OTHER GROUP HE
MIGHT BE ENDANGERING THE SUCCESS OF HIS COMMANDER'S PLAN AND (C) HE WAS THE
SUBORDINATE, NOT THE COORDINATING COMMANDER. SINCE A SINGLE ATTACK HAS MUCH
LESS CHANCE OF SUCCESS THAN A MULTIPLE ATTACK FROM DIFFERENT SECTORS WHEREIN
THE ATTACK UNITS ARE PROPERLY COORDINATED** AND SINCE THE COORDINATING
COMMANDER, BY HIS ORDER TO THE BEALE "TO STANDBY TO FIRE STARBOARD TORPEDOES'',
HAD GIVEN INDICATIONS THAT HE MIGHT BE PLANNING A COORDINATED ATTACK, DOES
IT NOT SEEM CORRECT TO SAY THAT COMMANDER ATTACK GROUP 2.2 SHOULD HAVE
QUERIED THE COORDINATING COMMANDER PRIOR TO FIRING? TIME WAS STILL
AVAILABLE.
It will be observed that he did not issue orders to the
Commanding Officer KILLEN, who was with the BEALE. This was because he
appears to have felt that there was no misunderstanding on that officer's
part and that the KILLEN would launch her port torpedoes in accordance with
squadron doctrine.
During the above period the ARUNTA had, for some time, been
tracking the leading ship of the Japanese formation.* Now, at 0323,
Commander Attack Group 2.2, in his capacity as Commanding Officer ARUNTA,
having arrived at his previously chosen firing point, launched a full salvo
of four torpedoes at what he reported as the "only large ship sighted in
the enemy formation."*
Graphic analysis shows that his fire control party had
likely been tracking the SHIGURE, which was the leading Japanese ship, but
that, when at the moment of firing, the YAMASHIRO was sighted to the
southeast, the latter was actually used as the target.
* Action Report HMAS ARUNTA, Night Action, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 1/41, October 29th, 1944.
** Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-44, Destroyer Torpedo Doctrine and Manual
of Torpedo Control, issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific Fleet,
Serial 01630, July 8th, 1944.
438 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 2.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
The torpedoes fired were British and were set to run 11,000
yards at forty knots.* They were fired when the target was bearing 120°(T),
target angle 305°, course 355°(T). Although the tracking showed the range
to the target to be 6,900 yards, the course 350°(T) and the speed twenty-
five knots,* these latter items clearly pertained to the SHIGURE for the
actual values for the YAMASHIRO were range 8,300 yards, course 000°(T),
speed ten knots (increased to eighteen knots at 0327, before the arrival of
the torpedoes). Depth setting was six to eight feet, alternated between
torpedoes.* This differed from the American naval practice wherein all
torpedoes were fired at the same depth.** The torpedo spread was three and
one-half degrees between torpedoes, or a total of fourteen degrees,* whereas
American naval practice was a spread of one degree between torpedoes or a
total of four degrees between five torpedoes.**
Graphic solution of the torpedo firing problem using a
torpedo speed of forty knots, a target speed of seventeen knots,*** an
inclination**** of 125° left (target angle 305°) and a target bearing of
120°(T) gives a base torpedo course of 099°(T) which was in fact the base
torpedo course employed.
IT IS OF INTEREST AT THIS POINT TO DIGRESS A MOMENT TO
COMPARE THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN DOCTRINES FOR TORPEDO FIRING UNDER
CONDITIONS SIMILAR TO THE ABOVE.
THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE, WITH ITS GREATER DENSITY OF TORPEDOES,
PRODUCED A GREATER PROBABILITY OF HITS BUT REQUIRED A MUCH MORE ACCURATE
SOLUTION OF THE TORPEDO PROBLEM. THE BRITISH DOCTRINE, WITH ITS WIDER
TORPEDO SPREAD, DID NOT REQUIRE AS ACCURATE A SOLUTION OF THE TORPEDO PROBLEM
BUT REQUIRED FIRING FROM A MUCH SHORTER RANGE IN ORDER TO EXPECT HITS, EVEN
WITH A CORRECT SOLUTION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE AMERICAN TORPEDOES, BEING
BOTH SLOWER AND MORE CONCENTRATED, WERE EASIER TO AVOID BY MANEUVER AND,
THEREFORE, REQUIRED, IF DETECTED, A FIRING POINT POSSIBLY AS NEAR TO THE
ENEMY AS THE BRITISH REQUIREMENT.
* Action Report HMAS ARUNTA, Night Action, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 1/41, October 29th, 1944.
** Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-43, Destroyer Torpedo Attack
Instructions, issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific Fleet, Serial
01264, October, 1943.
*** Based on the deflection used of 14 knots left. Deflection is the
component of target speed across the line of sight expressed in knots
and designated right or left in accordance with the target motion
across the line of sight. Oral statement by Commander L.R.P. Lawford,
RN, DSC, (then Commanding Officer HMS VERYAN BAY) to Captain J.C.
Titus, USN, Naval War College, June 16th, 1955 o
**** Ibid., Inclination is defined as the angle between the line of sight
and the course of the target measured on the far side of the target
toward the bow and designated as right or left depending on whether
the bow of the target is to the right or left of the line of sight.
439 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 2.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0343, October 25th
Immediately after the ARUNTA had completed firing, Commander
Attack Group 2.2 turned right to course 338°(T) to retire, and commenced
making smoke,*
At 0324 he was directed by COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR to report
when his attack group had completed firing torpedoes.**
During the above operations of the ARUNTA, the Commanding
Officer KILLEN prepared to fire torpedoes.
While it is probable that he knew that he was to fire to
port since the enemy was on the port hand and the group commander had given
no indication of any intention to turn around, it is also probable that
COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR' s message to standby to fire to starboard had confused
him. Therefore, his interception of his commander's instructions to the
Commanding Officer BEALE to standby to fire to port*** must have been
received with satisfaction.
He had observed that the enemy formation had now separated
into two groups of four ships each. In the leading group, which he had
been tracking — he had discontinued tracking the rear group— was one very
large ship which he estimated to be a battleship, two either cruisers or
large destroyers and one destroyer.*** This picture of the leading group
was reasonably accurate. There were, at this time (a) in the leading group,
one battleship (YAMASHIRO) and three destroyers (MICHISHIO, ASAGUMO,
SHIGURE) and (b) in the rear group, one battleship (FUSO) and one cruiser
(MOGAMI).
He decided to attack the very large ship and set his torpedo
depth at twenty- two feet.*** This was the correct setting provided he was
definitely sure that it was a battleship.**** The fact that he employed
twenty-two feet shows that he was convinced that it was a battleship despite
the fact that he employed the word "estimated".
As he prepared to fire — he evidently wished to fire inter-
mediate speed torpedoes since this was basic doctrine for firing torpedoes
at night— he noted that the range to the battleship was greater than that
required for such speed. From his track chart*** at this time (0323) the
range to the YAMASHIRO was 9,800 yards with a target angle of 308°.
* Action Report HMAS ARUNTA, Night Action, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial l/41, October 29th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report KILLEN, Surface Engagement Surigao Straits, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0075, October 28th, 1944.
#*** Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-43, Destroyer Torpedo Attack
Instructions, issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific Fleet, Serial
01264, October 24th, 1943.
440 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 2.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
WHILE WHAT PASSED THROUGH HIS MIND AT THIS TIME IS NOT
KNOWN, SINCE HIS ACTION REPORT IS SILENT ON THIS MATTER, IT SEEMS LOGICAL
TO SAY THAT SINCE HE WAS NOT BEING FIRED ON HE DECIDED TO CLOSE THE RANGE
UNTIL HE WAS WITHIN THE RANGE OF HIS INTERMEDIATE SPEED TORPEDOES HOPING
THEREBY TO IMPROVE THE TARGET ANGLE SOMEWHAT. THIS WAS THE CORRECT
DECISION FOR IT IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY THE PROBABILITY OF HITS.
At 0324 he arrived within the desired effective range and,
using broadside fire to port, fired a half salvo of five intermediate speed
torpedoes on base torpedo course 101°(T) at the battleship, bearing 125° (T),
target angle 305°, range 8,700 yards and tracked on course 000° (T), speed
eighteen knots.* Depth setting was twenty- two feet, firing interval three
seconds, torpedo spread one degree. All torpedoes appeared to run hot,
straight and normal.** From Diagram "H" this target was clearly the
YAMASHIRO.
Upon completion of the above firing the KILLEN followed in
the wake of the ARUNTA as well as she could, and commenced retiring.**
Meanwhile, the BSALE, which destroyer was about 1,200 yards
astern of the KILLEN, had been making preparations to fire to port in
accordance with instructions received at 0323 from Commander Attack Group
2.2.*** ,
At 0325:15 she fired a half salvo of five torpedoes at the
leading enemy ship, which she reported was a battleship, bearing 115°(T)
(actual bearing was 104°(T)), range 6,800 yards, torpedo track angle 270°(T)
and tracked on course 347°(T) (giving a base torpedo course of 077°(T)) and
at a speed of seventeen knots.**** All torpedoes were launched successfully
using broadside fire to port, three second intervals, one degree spread, six
foot depth setting and intermediate speed, and all appeared to run hot,
straight and normal.****
Actually the BEALE fired at the SHIGURE. That this is
correct is shown by the following analysis, (Diagram "H"):
(a) The SHIGURE was in fact the leading Japanese ship at the
time and was about 2,000 yards in a northwesterly direction from the second
Japanese ship, the ASAGUMO.
(b) Just seventy-five seconds before the BEALE commenced
firing torpedoes or at 0324, the SHIGURE, which had been on course 347°(T),
* Action Report KILLEN, Surface Engagement Surigao Straits, October 25th,
1944, Serial 0075, October 28th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
** Action Report KILLEN, Surface Engagement Surigao Straits, October 25th,
1944, Serial 0075, October 28th, 1944.
*** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
**** Action Report BEALE, Night Torpedo Attack on Japanese Naval Forces at
Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0230, October 29th, 1944.
441 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 2.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
had commenced changing course to port. Since the BEALE makes no mention of
this, it seems clear that she still considered the SHIGURE to be on course
347°(T). Also, at 0324 the range from the BEALE to the SHIGURE was 7,300
yards, the bearing 112°(T). (Twenty-five seconds before firing (or at
0324:50) the range had decreased to 6,800 yards, the bearing to 112°(T)
while at the time of firing the range had decreased to 6,000 yards, the
bearing to 110° (T).)
(c) At this same time (0324) the YAMASHIRO was bearing
125°(T), range 9,700 yards and was about 3,000 yards from the SHIGURE in a
southerly direction.
(d) It is important to note that had the SHIGURE continued
on course 347° (T) and had she been making seventeen knots as tracked (she
was actually making twenty-six knots) she would have been embraced by the
BEALE1 s torpedo spread.
(e) Since the BEALE stated that this same target was clearly
seen in the optical range finder at a minimum range of 5,470 yards* and
since the minimum range from the BEALE to the SHIGURE (at about 0325:50)
was 5,500 yards this appears to be a further confirmation of the belief
that the target at which the BEALE fired was the SHIGURE.
Although Commander Attack Group 2.2 did not receive the
reports that the KILLEN and BEALE had completed firing since neither ship
made any reports thereon he, nevertheless, at 0328, reported to COMDESRON
TWaMTY-FOUR that his group had fired torpedoes** adding that the enemy was
on course 000°(T). It is likely that he had noticed that the two ships
astern of him had changed course to follow him and had correctly concluded
that they had fired. Immediately after making this report, he received a
query from Commander Right Flank Force concerning enemy speed and, after
communication difficulties, finally succeeded at 0329 in informing that
commander that the enemy speed was twenty- five knots.** This was correct
for the SHIGURE but it was in error for the other Japanese ships since they
were all making eighteen knots or less.
At about this time the ARUNTA torpedoes likely crossed the
target track passing well ahead of the leading ship YAMASHIRO.
The Commanding Officer KILLEN was now fully convinced that
his target was a battleship.*** He therefore decided to fire another half
salvo to starboard. To accomplish this, he changed course at 0327 to 000°(T),
and at 0328:30, using broadside fire to starboard, commenced firing another-
* Action Report BEALE, Night Torpedo Attack on Japanese Naval Forces at
Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0230, October 29th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report KILLEN, Surface Engagement Surigao Straits, October 25th,
1944, Serial 0075, October 28th, 1944.
442 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 2.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
half salvo of five intermediate speed torpedoes on base torpedo course
086° (T) at the same battleship, bearing 112°(T),» target angle 282 degrees,
torpedo track angle 266 degrees, range 8,100 yards and tracked on course
000° (T), speed eighteen knots.---* Firing interval was three seconds and
torpedo spread one degree. Since he had detected-— whether by radar or by
sight is not stated— another target almost on the same bearing — probably
the ASAGUMO — he wisely decided to employ a six foot depth setting so that
he might obtain hits on one or both of these targets.** Just as he was
firing his first torpedo of this spread he received word from his CIC that
the target had begun a change of course. He immediately ordered his torpedo
battery to check fire, as a result of which only the first two torpedoes
were fired which appeared to run hot, straight and normal.**
WHILE THE DECISION OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER KILLEN TO CHECK
TORPEDO FIRE UNDER THE ABOVE CONDITIONS IS CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN SOUND
SINCE THE KILLEN WAS NOT UNDER FIRE AND SINCE, ONCE THE NATURE OF THE CHANGE
OF COURSE HAD BEEN DETERMINED, AN OPPORTUNITY WOULD LIKELY BE OFFERED TO
RESUME FIRE, IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT A TORPEDO SPREAD WILL COMPENSATE
FOR SOME EVASIVE MANEUVERS. BECAUSE OF THIS, IT IS NOT GENERALLY WISE TO
CEASE FIRING BEFORE ALL TORPEDOES WHICH WERE TO BE FIRED HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED.
IN THIS CONNECTION, IT IS GENERALLY CORRECT TO COMPLETE FIRING IF THE TRACK
ANGLE IS IN THE VICINITY OF 80° TO 100° AND IF THE SOLUTION IS CONSIDERED
ACCURATE. THIS IS SO BECAUSE THE ENEMY MANEUVERS TO EVADE SUCH A SPREAD
WOULD HAVE TO BE QUITE RADICAL.***
Although Commander Attack Group 2.2 stated in his action
report that at 0330 he had slowed to twenty knots and ceased making smoke,****
graphic analysis (Diagram "H") shows that he did not slow to twenty knots
until 0336. This is supported by his voice radio report to CTG 77.3 at 0330
that his speed was twenty-five knots.*****
At 0331 Commander Attack Group 2.2 observed that his command
had been discovered by the enemy for his ships were being illuminated with
star shells and searchlights and were being fired on accurately in range.****
No units of his attack group returned the enemy fire.
ARUNTA continued on course 338°(T) at twenty-five knots, KILLEN at 0331
changed course to 300°(T)* in order to move away from the enemy and close
the ARUNTA1 s track, and the BEALE, although she reported being straddled at
* Action Report KILLEN, Surface Engagement Surigao Straits, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0075, October 28th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
** Action Report KILLEN, Surface Engagement Surigao Straits, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0075, October 28th, 1944.
*** Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-43, Destroyer Torpedo Attack
Instructions, issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific Fleet, Serial
01264, October 24th, 1943.
**** Action Report HMAS ARUNTA, Night Action, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial l/41, October 29th, 1944.
***** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
443 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 2.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0343, October 25th
this time,* appears not to have changed course but to have followed the
KILLEN on course 000°(T).** Why the commanding officer did not turn away,
as did the KILLEN, is nowhere explained, but it seems clear that he would
have reduced the enemy's ability to hit by making the enemy fire control
problem more difficult.
At about 0331 the KILLEN and the BSALE torpedoes crossed
the enemy's target track and one torpedo hit the YAMASHIRO, which was now
the leading ship, on the port side.*** This hit has been credited to the
KILLEN as the BEALE' s torpedoes crossed about 3,400 yards ahead.
At 0334 the KILLEN changed course to 338° (T)**** in order
to follow the ARUNTA, and at approximately 0335 the BEALE changed course to
the left to possibly 300°(T) to follow the KILLEN. At approximately 0335:40
the KILLEN1 s second salvo of two torpedoes crossed the YAMASHIRO' s track
some 500 yards ahead. Hits could not have been expected under the conditions
prevailing because the target, as pointed out under "Operations of Commander
THIRD Section, 0320 - 0348", had not only changed course but had also slowed
to about five knots after being hit at 0331:18.
TO SUMMARIZE THE TORPEDO ATTACKS DURING THIS PERIOD (0320 -
0348) THE DESTROYERS OF ATTACK GROUP 2.2 FIRED A TOTAL OF SIXTEEN
TORPEDOES— ARUNTA (FOUR), KILLEN (SEVEN) AND BEALE (FIVE)— AND MADE ONE HIT
FOR A PERCENTAGE OF ABOUT 6.25 PER CENT. THIS WAS BY THE KILLEN AT ABOUT
0332 AGAINST THE YAMASHIRO. THE REASONS FOR THIS LOW PERCENTAGE OF HITS
WERE:
(A) THE ARUNTA FIRED AT THE LEADING TARGET WHICH SHE TRACKED
ON COURSE 350°(T), SPEED TWENTY- FIVE KNOTS. THIS WAS THE SHIGURE WHICH, AT
THE TIME OF FIRING, HAD COMMENCED A RADICAL TURN SOUTHWARD. THIS CAUSED THE
TORPEDOES TO MISS THIS TARGET. THE NEXT SHIP IN FORMATION, THE YAMASHIRO,
WHICH HAD NOW BECOME THE LEADING SHIP, WAS MAKING ONLY EIGHTEEN KNOTS WHICH
WAS TOO SLOW TO CAUSE HER TO BE WITHIN THE ARUNTA SPREAD EVEN THOUGH IT WAS
FOURTEEN DEGREES WIDE.
(B) THE BEALE ALSO FIRED AT THE LEADING TARGET (SHIGURE)
WHICH SHE TRACKED ON COURSE 347° (T), SPEED SEVENTEEN KNOTS. SINCE THE BEALE
FIRED TWO MINUTES AFTER THE ARUNTA, THE SHIGURE HAD TWO ADDITIONAL MINUTES
IN WHICH TO REVERSE COURSE. THIS CAUSED THE BEALE TORPEDOES TO MISS THIS
TARGET. HER TORPEDOES PASSED WELL AHEAD OF THE YAMASHIRO WHICH AT THIS TIME
WAS IN THE TORPEDO SPREAD OF THE KILLEN.
AS A RESULT OF THESE FIRINGS THESE DESTROYERS HAD TORPEDOES
REMAINING AS FOLLOWS: ARUNTA (ZERO), KILLEN (THREE), BEALE (FIVE).
* Action Report BEALE, Night Torpedo Attack on Japanese Naval Forces at
Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0230, October 29th, 1944.
** Ibid., Enclosure (A).
*** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
**** Action Report KILLEN, Surface Engagement Surigao Straits, October 25th,
1944, Serial 0075, October 23th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
444 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 2.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0343, October 25th
At 0336 the leading Japanese ship (YAMASHIRO) was bearing
117°(T), range 12,400 yards from the ARUNTA which now slowed to twenty
knots. About forty seconds later the KILLEN also slowed to twenty knots
in order to remain about 500 yards astern of the ARUNTA. At this time the
BEALE had completed her turn and was about 3,300 yards on the KILLEN* s
starboard quarter (Diagram "H").
At approximately 0336 the Commanding Officer BEALE noted
that the starshell illumination was now short; however, the ship was again
straddled at 0338* shortly after changing course to follow the ARUNTA and
KILLEN. After this time no further enemy gunfire was reported by the BEALE
or other ships of Attack Group 2.2
Regarding the above firing, Commander Attack Group 2.2
reported having observed one or two salvos land near the ARUNTA and one
salvo land between the KILLEN and the BEALE.** These observations were
confirmed by the Commanding Officer KILT .EN, who reported having sighted
three salvos land near the BEALE,*** and by the Commanding Officer BEALE
sho reported that he had been straddled twice by 5-inch or 6-inch salvos.*
Despite the fact that the Japanese salvos were small in pattern, no hits
were made although some shells passed over the BEALE.
At 0338 Commander Attack Group 2.2 noted that the leading
pip (battleship) was on course 335°(T) at about seventeen knots.**** This
should have been discouraging to him for it indicated that his torpedo
attacks, insofar as the large pip was concerned, had been ineffective.
At 0343 the BEALE slowed to twenty knots in order to remain
about 500 yards behind the KILLEN.
At 0344:30 Commander Attack Group 2.2 changed course to
160°(T)** in order to return to the scene of action and to assist Attack
Group 1.2 and at 0346, while still in the turn, he slowed to fifteen
knots.***** At 0348 he advised COMDESRON TVv'ENTY-FOUR that he was coming
down that way again and received an immediate reply directing him to come
down between the shore and the ships of Attack Group 1.2.*****
At 0348 the ARUNTA was bearing 136°(T), distant four point
eight miles from the northeastern tip of Cabugan Grande Island, the HUTCHINS
was bearing 166°(T), range 13,600 yards and the YAMASHIRO was bearing 114°(T)
range 12,100 yards from the ARUNTA (Diagram "H").
* Action Report BEALE, Night Torpedo Attack on Japanese Naval Forces at
Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0230, October 29th, 1944.
** Action Report HMAS ARUNTA, Night Action, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial l/41, October 29th, 1944.
*** Action Report KILLEN, Surface Engagement Surigao Straits, October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0075, October 28th, 1944.
*-*** Track Chart, Action Report HMAS ARUNTA, Night Action, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial l/41, October 29th, 1944.
***** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
445 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79.11
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
(B) Operations of CTG 79.11, 0320 - 0348, October 25th.
The Eastern and Western Attack Groups were retiring toward their
respective post-attack rendezvous. Since these two attack groups were no
longer engaged in independent attacks, their operations will be discussed
together under "Operations of CTG 79.11."
At 0320 the Eastern Attack Group (REMEY, MC GOWAN, MELVTN) was
proceeding toward the channel east of Hibuson Island on course 025°(T) at
twenty knots.
The Western Attack Group (MC DERMUT, MONSSEN) was also retiring but was
on the western side of Surigao Strait near the Leyte shore and was on course
000°(T), at thirty knots (Diagram "H"). At 0320:30 the (a) MC DSRMUT
changed course to 330°(T)* in order to avoid the destroyers of Attack Group
1.2 which were slightly on her starboard bow and on a southerly course and
(b) MONSSEN steadied on course 345° (T)** in order to close the MC DERMUT
track.
A few minutes before this (0319) CTG 79.11, in the REMEY, had received
a TBS voice radio request from CTG 77.2 to report, if possible, the types
of enemy ships encountered during his torpedo attack (at 0301),*** He
seemed unable to give CTG 77.2 this information immediately because he
wanted to check with his commanding officers, adding that he believed two
battleships were present.***- However, he apoears to have consulted with
the commanding officers of the Eastern Attack Group only.***
He received replies from his commanding officers as follows: (a)
immediately from the Commanding Officer REMEY who gave his estimate as
eight ships,**** (b) at 0321 from the Commanding Officer MC GOWAN, who
stated that he had not had a good look, and gave his radar estimate as six
targets***** of which three or possibly four were small ships****** and
(c) at 0322 from the Commanding Officer KELVIN, who gave his estimate as
two battleships******* and later at 0324, included one light cruiser which
* Action Report MC DERMUT, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 061, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
** Action Report MONSSEN, Participation in the Operation for the Initial
Attack and Occupation of Leyte Island, Philippine Islands, and in
the Battle of Surigao Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 060, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
*** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
***# Action Report REKEY, Assault on Leyte Island and the Battle of
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 003, November
5th, 1944.
***** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
****** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
******* Action Report KELVIN, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 079, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (E).
446 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79.11
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
he had seen explode.* (This MELVIN estimate differs considerably from her
action report estimate as of 0301. In the action report and as shown in
Plate XXI, the MELVIN reported sighting seven ships. Perhaps, in making
this estimate, the Commanding Officer MELVIN, despite the instructions of
CTG 79.11, reported only the larger ships.)
CTG 79.11 now, also at 0324, replied by TBS voice radio to CTG 77.2' s
request as follows: "General opinion seems to be two battleships, one or
two cruisers and one destroyer; some targets definitely hit. We saw large
burst of fire. Couldn't tell what type of ship."**
How he arrived at this conclusion is unknown, for the data provided gave
an indication of three or four small ships rather than one destroyer. Had
he included these small ships in his estimate he would have been entirely
correct for the THIRD Section at this time was in full strength which
included two battleships, one heavy cruiser and four destroyers, a total of
seven.
Meanwhile, as Commander Eastern Attack Group in the REMEY, he had at
0322 changed course to 030° (T) and at 0326 being clear of the enemy and of
the area likely to be used for subsequent attacks, had slowed to fifteen
knots.***
Similarly, Commander Western Attack Group having cleared Attack Group
1.2, had at 0323 changed course to 030°(T) not only to get further offshore,
but also to confuse the enemy fire control for at this same time he recorded
that at 0321 a starshell had burst close on his starboard quarter.**** At
0327, being far enough offshore, he changed course to 350°(T).****
At this time CTG 79.11 amplified his report to CTG 77.2 with the TBS
voice radio message that several torpedoes had been fired at his group.*****
The basis of this report is unknown as (a) neither he nor any of his ships
mention any enemy torpedoes in either their action reports or show it on
track charts nor (b) do the Japanese mention firing torpedoes (perhaps the
Japanese destroyers had fired their torpedoes rather than be sunk with them).
The MC GOWAN, however, recorded the message as: "Several hits were seen by
our group."****** This may have been the correct version although this is
doubtful since of the several voice logs which record the message, only the
MC GOWAN has this version.
* Action Report MELVIN, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 079, November 5th. 1944, Enclosure (E).
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15) ? Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report MELVIN, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 079, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
**** Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
***** Action Report REMEY, Assault on Leyte Island and Battle of Surigao
Strait, Serial 008, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (E); also Action
Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
****** Action Report MC GOWAN, Operation for Capture, Occupation and
Defense of Leyte, Philippine Islands, including the Battle of
Surigao Strait, Serial 00103, November 5th, 1944.
447 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79.11
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
At 0328 he should have received a TBS voice radio message from Commander
Western Attack Group to the effect that that group had fired at a group
astern consisting of three ships, "one small and two large"* and that, at
the time the torpedoes should have hit, they saw a large burst of fire but
were unable to distinguish what it was.** CTG 79.11 does not seem to have
received this message for it does not appear in the voice log of his group
of destroyers.
At 0330 as Commander Eastern Attack Group he informed his command that
upon arrival in the vicinity of Station THREE, the group would cruise back
and forth in column formation with REMEY guide, and no signals over the
present circuit.***
At 0332 Commander Western Attack Group, since the MONSSEN had fallen in
astern and since he was now well clear of the scene of action, slowed to
fifteen knots and changed course to 338° (T),** to head for the rendezvous
area north of Cabugan Grande Island.
At 0334 Commander Eastern Attack Group arrived in the vicinity of his
post-attack rendezvous which was the west end of Station THREE, northeast
of Hibuson Island.**** During the remainder of this period, with the
Eastern Attack Group, he remained in the vicinity slowly working up the
channel on easterly and westerly courses.
At 0342 he queried his command by TBS voice radio as to the number of
torpedoes remaining and learned that the MELVIN had one and the MC GOWAN
had none.***- Since he was in the REMEY he knew that that destroyer had
two. Therefore, he now knew that he had but three torpedoes within the
Eastern Attack Group.
At 0348 he was bearing 06l°(T), distant two point two miles from the
southeastern tip of Hibuson Island. At this same time Commander Western
Attack Group, who was still proceeding toward his post-attack rendezvous
at the western end of Station SEVEN, which was about three and one-half
miles away, was bearing 085°(T), distant one point six miles from the
northeastern tip of Cabugan Grande Island.
* There is some question as to the accuracy of this message in that
some ships received it as "two small and one large" . However, since
COMDESDIV 108 was the originator it is assumed that his version is
correct, "one small and two large".
** Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 038, November 5th, 1944.
*** Action Report REMEY, Assault on Leyte Island and the Battle of
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 008, November 5th,
1944, Enclosure (E).
**** Action Report REMEY, Assault on Leyte Island and the Battle of
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 008, November 5th,
1944.
UhB CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0343, October 25th
(C) Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats, 0320 - 0348, October 25th.
(1) SE Panaon PT's.
At 0320 these MTB's were off the southeastern coast of Panaon Island
and, with the exception of PT 134 (OTC) which was slightly to the north,
were between Binit Point and Bolobolo Point. It will be recalled that they
had become separated prior to the transit of the THIRD Section due to radio
and radar failure in PT 137. At this time since they had not yet regrouped
and were operating independently and since each one encountered the enemy
they will be discussed separately.
Their actions cannot be completely reconstructed due to the (a)
incomplete action reports submitted and (b) lack of Japanese data concerning
them. It appears that only one of them (PT 137) was sighted by the Japanese
and that, only momentarily, after her torpedo had struck the ABUKUMA.
(a) PT 134.
At 0320 the Commanding Officer PT 134 was proceeding as shown
on Diagram "I" and was slightly north of Bolobolo Point. At about 0323,
judging that he had gone far enough, he commenced drifting with the current
which in this locality was setting to the south.
He states in his action report that shortly thereafter "a column
of four destroyers passed 1,000 yards outboard."* Since (a) the evidence
from Japanese sources is that the major portion of the SECOND Striking Force
(which was the only force passing Binit Point at this time) was not nearer
to that point than 5,000 yards, and (b) the USHIO did pass about that close
to the Point, it seems probable that the Commanding Officer PT 134 at this
time only sighted the USHIO.
Why then did he state that he had sighted four destroyers? The
answer seems to be that just after this he likely saw three (NACHI,
ASHIGARA, SHIRANUHI) of the five ships remaining in the SECOND Striking
Force formation, and, when writing his report later, included the USHIO with
these three.
At approximately 0326 he received a contact report from the
Commanding Officer PT 132, quoted in full under "Operations of Commanding
Officer PT 132" to the effect that "three enemy destroyers and two
unidentified vessels" were standing up the strait.
At approximately 0328 he fired .his one remaining torpedo at the
USHIO but missed astern.* (There is no indication that USHIO sighted
either PT 134 or the torpedo.)
After firing he changed course and continued on toward Binit
Village. At 0338, being about 200 yards from the shoreline, he stopped and
commenced to drift with the current.
* Action Report PT 134, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial H-34,
October 27th, 1944.
449 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
He now decided to modify the message he had received from PT
132 for at 0339 he sent a message for relay to the Commanding Officer PT
523 as follows: "See if you can get the word passed up the line five
destroyers and possibly other larger craft have come up."*
Whence came the idea of the larger craft is not known since
none of the SE Panaon PT's make any mention of larger ships at this time
but do mention "other large ships were sighted towards the middle of the
strait during the next hour, etc."**
At 0343 he appears to have returned to his basic station near
Binit Village.
(b) PT 137.
At 0320 the Commanding Officer PT 137, whom it will be recalled
was moving slowly into the strait because he had sighted gunfire to the
north of Panaon Island at 0305, believed that he was off Binit Village.***
About this time, while so operating, he sighted what appeared
to be an enemy destroyer moving down the strait. This is believed to have
been the cruiser NACHI, which had turned to course 065° (T) to avoid Panaon
Island. He did not report this contact because, as has been pointed out
before, neither his radar equipment nor his radio communications were
operative.
Why he sighted only one ship of a formation of five ships is not
known. However, it seems probable that this was due to the fact that the
SECOND Striking Force was in a line of bearing 020° - 200° (T) and all ships
in column, except the NACHI, were obscured to PT 137 which was approximately
on the line of bearing and to the northward. The other two destroyers
(AKEBONO and USHIO) were not in sight due to their positions.
He commenced closing the enemy and at 0323, having apparently
closed undetected since the enemy did not open fire on him, he fired one
torpedo at the NACHI at an estimated range of 700 - 900 yards. Shortly
thereafter, he heard an explosion, was immediately taken under fire by (a)
the machine guns of the ABUKUMA and SHIRANUHI which had not sighted her
until that moment and (b) starshells from at least one of the Japanese
ships.*---* The Commanding Officer PT 137 immediately retired, approximately
as shown on Diagram "I", and succeeded in avoiding any damage whatsoever.
Like the Commanding Officer DARTER who, as pointed out in Volume
III, **** ("Operations of CTF 71 (Submarines West Australia), 0000 - 1042,
* Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report PT 134, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial H-34,
October 27th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 137, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 11,
November 4th, 1944; also Action Report PT 497, Night of October 24th -
25th, 1944, No Serial, October 30th, 1944.
**** Volume III, Battle for Leyte Gulf (NavPers 92510), Naval War College,
1957, Chapter VII (A) (b)(5).
450 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0343, October 25th
October 23rd, (5) DACE and DARTER") had made a most fortunate contact on
the Main Body, FIRST Striking Force at 0116, October 23rd, this experience
of the Commanding Officer PT 137 can also be classified as a remarkable
example of the fortunes of war. The latter commander had (a) no radar,
(b) lost his section, (c) moved into the strait without fore-knowledge of
the enemy's presence in that area of the strait, (d) immediately encountered
the nearest ship of a Japanese formation, which formation was formed on a
line of bearing 020° - 200°(T) this being the approximate bearing of the
force from him, (e) due to conditions of visibility, sighted only this ship
of a formation of five, (f) fired one torpedo at this ship at a range of
700 - 900 yards, which torpedo passed astern of both his own target (NACHI)
and the next ship in the line of bearing (ASHIGARA) and (g) finally struck
the third ship in line of bearing (ABUKUMA) about 3,000 yards away. (This
fortuitous torpedo hit was the first made by a motor torpedo boat in this
engagement and was one of two credited to the motor torpedo boats during
this action.)
Therefore, since based on Napoleon's concept that certain
generals are lucky (Augereau) and certain unlucky (Sauret) it was stated
in Volume III that the Commanding Officer DARTER would likely have been
characterized by Napoleon as being one of the lucky ones, can it not also
be stated that the Commanding Officer PT 137 would likely have been included
as one of that happy band?
At 0348, although his exact position is not known, it seems
likely that he was bearing 108°(T), distant 700 yards from Binit Point
(Diagram "I").
(c) PT 132.
At 0320 PT 132 was drifting with the current in a southwesterly
direction off Binit Point (Diagram "I").
About 0323 the commanding officer sighted three enemy destroyers
and two smaller unidentified vessels, range 1,700 yards, course northeast,
speed twenty to twenty-five knots. He relayed this information to PT 134«*
The ships he sighted were the NACHI, ASHIGARA, ABUKUMA,
SHIRANUHI and KASUMI of the SECOND Striking Force. He likely did not sight
the (a) USHIO, which passed him on the reverse bearing about 0325, probably
because his attention was taken by the five ships to the south nor (b)
AKEBONO, which was further to the east, for he does not mention these ships
in his action report** Likewise he does not mention the torpedoing of the
ABUKUMA and probably missed it because of the absence of a flash as reported
by PT 137.**
* Action Report PT 132, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial H-34,
October 26th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 137, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 11,
November 4th, 1944.
496799 0-59-39
451 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
0320 - 0348, October 25th
About 0330 he sighted the ABUKUMA and reported it as one
destroyer on course 195°(T), range 2,000 yards.* The ABUKUMA at this time
was turning to the west making the estimate of her course difficult. The
range was considerably in error thus accounting for his error in calling
her a destroyer and undoubtedly his radar had failed, although he does not
mention it in his action report, for the range at this time was more likely
8,000 yards (Diagram "I"). Although he records in his action report that
he reported this destroyer to CTF 77* it must have failed to get through
during this busy time, since there is no mention of it in the various voice
logs or action reports.
Having expended all of his torpedoes prior to this time (he had
expended them at about 0142 ) he took no action but instead at approximately
0330 headed for Bolobolo Point. At 0348 he was lying to between Binit
Point and Bolobolo Point.
(2) Bilaa PT's.
It will be recalled that at 0312 Commander Bilaa PT's, in PT 494,
who with his section, was drifting slowly in a southwesterly direction from
Bilaa Point, had made radar contact on the SECOND Striking Force which
contact he continued to hold.
At approximately 0327 the units of his section sighted what (a) he
thought were three large ships,** (b) the Commanding Officer PT 497 thought
were two cruisers and two destroyers*** and (c) the Commanding Officer PT
324 thought were one cruiser and three destroyers.**** He promptly reported
this contact to PT 523** of the Sumilon PT's, which were farther up the
strait, but the message apparently failed to get through since it is not
reported anywhere.
These ships had been silhouetted by the starshells fired by one or
more units of the SECOND Striking Force against the SE Panaon PT's which
had attacked them from the west. The sightings were quite accurate with
that of the Commanding Officer PT 497 being the more accurate, for these
units were clearly the NACHI, ASHIGARA, SKIRANUHI and KASUMI.
He did not attack because "all targets were at least seven miles
away to the northwest and an attack would have left the strait east of
Bilaa Point unguarded, particularly against ships escaping throueh that
strait from Surigao Strait."**
* Action Report PT 132, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
H-34, October 26th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 494, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 497, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 324, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
452
CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
As discussed previously under "Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats,
0100 - 0245, October 25th, Sumilon PT's", his decision in this matter was
correct for the reason therein given, i.e., he was to guard Hinatuan Passage
and should he attack the enemy that passage might be left unguarded since
he did not know what the Sumilon PT's were doing. Actually the strait was
unguarded at this time, for the best evidence is that both the Sumilon PT's
and the Bilaa PT's were tracking the enemy in the center of the strait with
little, if any, attention being paid to the passage itself and the Bilaa
PT's had drifted well to the southwest as shown on Diagram "I".
Sometime after this he seems to have made radar contact on the
damaged ABUKUMA, which contact he held throughout the remainder of this
period.
At 0348 he appears to have been off Madilao Point (Diagram "I").
(3) Sumilon PT's.
At 0320 Commander Sumilon PT's, with his section (PT's 523 (OTC),
524, 526), was returning toward Sumilon Island from the south (Diagram "I").
At approximately 0332 all motor torpedo boats of this section
contacted five more targets reportedly following three miles astern of the
targets (THIRD Section) they had fired on at 0212.
Since the (a) Sumilon PT's were near Sumilon Island it can be stated
with complete accuracy that this contact was on the SECOND Striking Force,
which at this time had just passed through the southern entrance to Surigao
Strait, and (b) the THIRD Section and the SECOND Striking Force were roughly
thirty miles apart at this time. It is of interest to speculate as to
whence came the distance of three miles referred to above? The answer seems
to be that all three commanding officers made the same error in their action
reports— they wrote three for thirty miles. The reason for this is not
known. However, it seems likely that it was due to the fact that either
(a) all three reports were drawn up at the same time, perhaps in conference
as they are very similar, and this mistake was made at that time, or (b)
since all three reports were typed by the same yeoman in the same office, as
shown by their identification symbols, the same error was made in all three.
It is likely that the contact was first made on the AKEBONO, which
was about 5,600 yards away rather than on the NACHI, which was about 8,900
yards away.
About 0339 he received a message from Commander SE Panaon PT's
asking him to relay PT 132 's contact on five destroyers and possibly other
larger craft moving up the strait.* However, in view of his own contacts
he seems to have decided that this contact report could be improved on by
firming the number of larger ships to "one". (Why he did this is not
* Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
453 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
explained for certainly the NACHI and ASHIGARA should have appeared larger
on the radar scope.) Therefore at 0340, he reported to CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON
FIFTY-FOUR) that there were five destroyers and one larger ship passing up
the strait in a northerly direction.*
About 0345, being slightly north of Sumilon Island, he stopped and
commenced drifting with the current. At this same time he sighted two
burning ships to the north,** apparently the two halves of the FUSO.
At 0343 he was bearing 230° (T), distant 1,700 yards from the center
of Sumilon Island.
(4) Madilao Point PT's.
At 0320 Commander Madilao Point PT's, with PT's 192 (OTC), 191 and
195, was near the southern end of his patrol. He decided to reverse course
and therefore, at about 0321, he changed course to 000° (T) and continued to
patrol at slow speed (Diagram "I"). At this time he maintained his radar
contact on the NACHI and the ASHIGARA.***
At 0326 he observed gunfire and starshells in the vicinity of Binit
Point.*** (This ammunition was being fired by units of the SECOND Striking
Force at PT 137 which had just torpedoed the ABUKUMA.)****
At 0348 he was bearing approximately 223°(T), distant one point
five miles from Madilao Point.
(5) Kanihaan PT's.
At 0320 Commander Kanihaan PT's, with PT's 495 (OTC), 489 and 492,
was proceeding toward Kanihaan Island (Diagram "H").
While his exact movements are not known it seems likely that at
about 0325 he judged that he was clear of any likely action and therefore
changed course to north. At the same time he reduced speed so as to move
slowly north toward the scene of the coming action.
At approximately 0345 he sighted the battleship (FUSO) again.
Apparently the battleship exploded at this time for the MTB's reported that
she "caught fire at 0345 and burned until morning . "*****
*~~ Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report PT 524, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 192, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0395, October 29th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 137, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 11,
November 4th, 1944; also Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off
the Philippines, October 24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
***** Action Report PT 495, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
454 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
Why he did not attack her at this time is not clear. Perhaps she
was burning so fiercely that he thought it a waste of torpedoes as she
would likely destroy herself. However, since War Instructions at the time
stated "VICTORY IS NOT COMPLETE UNLESS THE ENEMY FORCE IS ANNIHILATED.
EVERY ENEMY UNIT, IF POSSIBLE, IS DESTROYED"* it was clearly incumbent on
him to insure that, if possible, the battleship was sunk.
This was particularly important at this time for war experience
had shown that, in many cases, ships which appeared to have been damaged
beyond saving were often saved because the personnel had been well trained
and put forth the same determined efforts toward saving her that they
exercised in fighting her.
Whether or not he operated with this destructive objective in view
is not clear from the action reports.
At 0348 he was bearing 338°(T), distant two and one-half miles from
the northern tip of Kanihaan Island (Diagram "H").
(6) South Amagusan PT's.
At 0320 Commander South Amagusan PT's, with PT!s 320 (OTC), 330 and
331, was drifting with the current in a southerly direction while he
continued his patrol (Diagram "H").
Since the radar equipment in PT's 320 and 330 continued to operate
in an unsatisfactory manner reliance necessarily continued to be placed on
that of PT 331.
The MTB's report nothing of importance during this period of the
patrol. This was a correct report for no Japanese forces were within radar
range. The nearest enemy ship (FUSO) was about 17,500 yards due east.
At 0348 he was bearing 179i°(T), distant three point five miles
from Amagusan Point.
(7) East Amagusan PT's.
Since the East Amagusan PT's had become separated just before 0320
they will be discussed separately.
(a) PT 328.
At 0320 the Commanding Officer PT 328 was slowly closing
Amagusan Point in order to get out of the destroyer attack area.
At 0340 he sighted an unidentified ship proceeding south. He
prepared to fire torpedoes, but since there were friendly ships in the area
he decided not to attack. This was a wise decision for the unidentified
ship was the HUTCHINS, which at the time was about 5,000 yards to the
northeastward .
* War Instructions, United States Navy (FTP 143(A)), United States Fleet,
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1944, Chapter 13, Section II,
Paragraph 1305.
455 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
His failure to sight the BACHE and DALY at this time was due to
the fact that these destroyers were about 4, 500 yards to the north of the
HUTCHINS and therefore about 9,000 yards away and obscured somewhat by smoke,
At 0342 he appears to have changed course to approximately
315°(T) in order to retire around Amagusan Point.
At 0348 PT 328 was bearing 200°(T), distant about 2,400 yards
from Amagusan Point.
(b) PT 323.
At 0320 the Commanding Officer PT 323 was heading on a southerly
course in order to clear the destroyer attack area.
At approximately 0326, being well south of Amagusan Point, he
changed course to about 325° (T) to head for Amagusan Point.
He apparently did not sight the HUTCHINS for there is no mention
of it in his action report. It seems likely that at approximately 0340:30
he changed course to 030° (T) in order to head up against the current and to
move off shore.
At 0345, when about one mile northeast of Amagusan Point, he
noted that a shell had passed overhead and had struck a hill off his port
quarter, which hill was about three-quarters of a mile away. About five
seconds later he noted that a second shell had landed about fifty or sixty
yards also off his port quarter which lifted his stern out of the water.*
While he does not say so it seems clear that he thought that
these shells, which were most likely from the YAKASHIRO, were being fired
at him. Actually this was not the case. Instead they were intended for
the destroyers of Attack Group 1,2 which were attacking with gunfire and
which were in the vicinity of PT 323, although somewhat to the eastward.
At 0348 PT 323 was bearing 063° (T), distant 2,800 yards from
Amagusan Point (Diagram "H").
(c) PT 329.
At 0320 Pf 329, which was drifting with the current, was in the
vicinity of Amagusan Point.
At 0348 she was likely bearing about 080°(T), distant 1,800
yards from that point.
(8) Upper Surigao PT's.
At 0320 Commander Upper Surigao PT's, with PT's 327 (OTC), 321 and
326, was about a mile south of Kanihaan Island drifting south with the
current. He drifted south without incident during this period.
* Action Reoort PT 323, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 36th, 1944.
456 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0320 - 0348, October 25th
At 0348 he was about two point one miles south of Kanihaan Island.
(9) Lower Surigao PT's.
(a) PT 490.
At 0320 PT 490 was bearing 094°(T), distant two point nine miles
from Caligangan Point and was proceeding on course 000°(T) at ten knots.
At 0323 she stopped and commenced drifting with the current.*
At 0348 she was bearing 092° (T), distant three point four miles
from Caligangan Point
(b) PT 491.
At 0320 PT 491 was bearing about 123°(T), distant seven miles
from Caligangan Point and was proceeding on course 330° (T) at five knots.
At 0348 she was bearing 114° (T), distant five point four miles
from Caligangan Point.
(c) PT 493.
PT 493, damaged and abandoned by her crew, was beached on Maoyo
Point. Sometime around 0345 one officer and one man returned on board and
destroyed the classified equipment.**
* Action Report PT 490, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 493, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
457 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
CHAPTER XVI - JAPANESE OPERATIONS, 0348 - 0420, OCTOBER 25th.
(A) Operations of Commander THIRD Section, 0348 - 0420, October 25th.
At 0348 Commander THIRD Section, on course 020°(T) at speed of about
fifteen knots, continued toward the awaiting Allied battle disposition. Up
to this time his flagship had suffered two torpedo hits but no gunfire
damage. Other than the destroyer and torpedo boat attacks, he had not
encountered any Allied opposition and was now nearing the northern t»art of
the strait from which he planned to penetrate to a point off Dulag to
accomplish his assigned mission. Whether or not he felt optimistic about
his ability to do so is, of course, not known but he would, in a few minutes,
know that he had walked into a trap and that his section was likely doomed
to destruction.
At this same time he undoubtedly intercepted the message from the
SHIGURE to the FUSO informing the latter that the SHIGURE was following
behind him.*
This was probably very reassuring to him because he had not heard from
the FUSO since she had fallen out of formation. He now knew that she was
still afloat and clearly underway. Perhaps his losses were not so bad as
he had feared.
At about 0352, just as the first salvos of the battle disposition had
commenced landing on the YAMASHIRO, he called the FUSO and requested that
she notify him of her maximum speed.* The FUSO did not reply.* At this
time the Commanding Officer SHIGURE called Commander THIRD Section requesting
that he be notified of the situation, but he likewise received no reply.*
This appears to have been due to the Allied gunfire which apparently had
knocked out the YAMASHIRO' s voice communication system. No further
transmissions from Commander THIRD Section are recorded either by voice or
by CW radio.
Whether or not this was because all radio communications had been put
out of action at this time or whether it was due to the disorganization of
the staff caused by the death or wounding of the principal members thereof,
including Commander THIRD Section, is not known but it is known that
Commander THIRD Section failed to inform Commander SECOND Striking Force,
as well as his ships presently out of formation, of the nature of the
Allied trap and gave no instructions thereafter to any of his units
whatsoever.
At 0352 the YAMASHIRO began to slow to about twelve knots but continued
on course 020°(T). Whether or not the SHIGURE, which had overtaken the
YAMASHIRO and was about 1,000 yards abeam momentarily at 0355, was sighted
is not known. The Commanding Officer SHIGURE stated that he had observed
the YAMASHIRO receiving fierce concentrated gunfire from enemy battleships
and cruisers which set her afire.*
Detailed Action Reoort SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
458 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
The YAMASHIRO continued on course 020°(T) at twelve knots until 0356,
at which time she commenced a turn to the westward. During this time she
fired on any targets which were visible to her gunners.-- The large radius
of the turn and the time taken to make it give indications that she may-
have been on hand steering at this time.
WHILE THE COMMANDING OFFICER'S REASONS FOR TURNING TO THE WESTWARD ARE
NOT EXPLAINED IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT HE REALIZED THAT HE HAD RUN INTO A TRAP,
THAT HIS CHANCE OF SURVIVAL WAS SMALL INDEED AND THAT HIS ONLY HOPE OF
ESCAPING WOULD BE TO CHANGE COURSE TO THE WESTWARD (OR TO THE EASTWARD)
AND THENCE TO THE SOUTH WHERE HE MIGHT RECEIVE SOME PROTECTION FROM THE
SECOND STRIKING FORCE. IT IS PRESUMED THAT HE CHOSE TO SWING TO THE
WESTWARD RATHER THAN TO THE EASTWARD BECAUSE THE YAMASHIRO HAD ALREADY
SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE UNDERWATER DAMAGE ON HER PORT SIDE FROM TWO TORPEDO
HITS AND HE DID NOT CHOOSE TO EXPOSE THIS DAMAGED SIDE TO FURTHER DAMAGE.
HIS ACTION IN SO DOING APPEARS CORRECT AND LOGICAL.
At 0401, having settled on course 260°(T), and now accelerating to
twelve knots, the YAMASHIRO continued valiantly to fight back, despite the
tremendous concentration of gunfire which she was receiving. Explosions
and fires racked her from stem to stern but as late as 0407 she was still
able to direct accurate fire at the left flank cruisers*-* and at the
ALBERT W. GRANT. ***
Between 0405 and 0408 she slowed temporarily for a few minutes, likely
due to a torpedo hit (her third) which she received at this time. (This
torpedo had been fired by the BENNION about 0359:15 (Diagram "J").)
However, just prior to 0408 she commenced increasing speed and by about
0409 was once again making about twelve knots.
At 0409 the Commanding Officer YAMASHIRO observed that propitiously the
Allied gunfire had now suddenly ceased and likely wondered to what
occurrence he owed this surprising event. He, of course, did not know that
the cease firing had been ordered by the Allied OTC because Allied ships
were firing on the ALBERT W. GRANT. What a relief this cease fire must
have been to him and to his crewl They had been able to see only destruction
before them; now perhaps they might succeed in extricating themselves and
their ship.
The Commanding Officer YAMASHIRO decided to retire to the southward
immediately and at 0409 commenced a turn in that direction. It seems likely
that between 0411 and 0412, as the YAMASHIRO steadied on this southerly
course, she received a fourth torpedo hit from the torpedo spread fired by
* Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
** Action Report DENVER, Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 003 1, November 4th, 1944.
*** Action Report ALBERT W. GRANT, Operations Against Central Philippines,
Leyte Area, and Night Surface Action Against Japanese Task Force in
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0106, November 11th,
1944.
459 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION and MOGAMI
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
the NEWCOMB at 0404. (A warrant officer survivor from the YAMASHIRO reported
that she had received four torpedo hits.)* Surprising enough, despite this
possible additional hit, she succeeded (from Allied tracking) in increasing
speed to about sixteen knots. However, this burst of speed was short lived
for at 0419 she abruptly disappeared from the Allied radar scopes, indicating
that she had sunk rapidly, probably by capsizing first,** in Latitude 10°-
22.2«N, Longitude 125°-21.3fE.
THIS SINKING MARKS THE END OF THE OPERATION FOR THE THIRD SECTION WHICH
HAD BEEN COMPLETELY DESTROYED AS A FIGHTING UNIT WITH BUT POUR SHIPS, FUSO,
MOGAMI, SHIGURE AND ASAGUMO, REMAINING AFLOAT. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE
COMMANDING OFFICER FUSO, BECAUSE OF THE EXPLOSION WHICH HAD CAUSED HER TO
BREAK INTO TWO SECTIONS AND THE HEAVY FIRES WHICH NCW COMPLETELY ENGULFED
HER, WAS MOST LIKELY DEAD, OR IN THE WATER, IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THE
SENIOR SURVIVING OFFICER WAS EITHER THE GUNNERY OFFICER OF THE MOGAMI, WHO
WAS NOW COMMANDING OFFICER, OR THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF EITHER THE SHIGURE
OR ASAGUMO. HOWEVER, ALL THREE OF THESE COMMANDING OFFICERS WERE CONCENTRAT-
ING ON INDIVIDUAL SURVIVAL OR RETIREMENT, AND NOT ONE OF THEM ASSUMED CL
OF THE RETIRING UNITS OR EVEN ATTEMPTED TO DO SO.
(1) Operations of Operational Ships of the THIRD Section, 0343 - 0420,
October 25th.
(a) MOGAMI.
The Commanding Officer MOGAMI had probably not detected the
change of course of Commander THIRD Section to 020°(T) at 0344, for at 0343
he was still on course 320° (T), speed about eighteen knots,*** Both the
YAMASHIRO and SHIGURE were visible, and the SHIGURE was observed to move up
as flank guard for the YAMASHIRO.****
At about 0351, observing that the "enemy eroup lying in wait to
the north in enveloping formation (ran^e 15 - 20 kilometers)", was directing
a fierce concentrated (radar-directed) shellfire at the THIRD Section****
he increased speed to twenty- five knots. He noted that this gunfire was
effective for the YAMASHIRO, which was firing intermittently without search-
light illumination, had been set on fire.**** Since his own radar was
ineffective and since he did not see the enemy by direct observation he
decided to fire torpedoes at the gunf lashes and, at 0353, he turned westward
to fire broadside fire to starboard. As he did he was taken under fire and
his ship began receiving hits astern and, at 0356, was set afire.*****
*~~ Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Suri^ao Strait, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944.
** Report on SHO Operation by Lieutenant Fukushi, ex-IJN, Control
Station Officer and Fire Data Computor Officer, MOGAMI, December 1945,
Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-39A.
*** Courses and speeds of MOGAMI have been determined by Allied radar
ranges and bearings for the period 0343 - 0420.
**** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, ivDC Document I6O463, NA 12653.
***** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
460 CONFIDENTIAL
MOGAMI
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
This gunfire, which was from Attack Group 1.2 (HUTCHINS, DALY,
BACHE), apparently interfered with the torpedo launching for the torpedoes
do not appear to have been fired at this time. The gunfire was probably
noted as coming from the southwest instead of from the north and, since the
destroyer situation had been confusing and the radar inoperative, the
Commanding Officer MOGAMI appears to have decided that the firing ships
were friendly destroyers and therefore turned toward them, making visual
identification signals with flashing lights and red flares.* However, he
soon realized his error for the shellfire intensified. He now decided to
retire and at 0357 steadied on a southerly course, increased speed, and
began to make smoke. However, this smoke was not particularly effective
for he continued to receive repeated shell hits which resulted in heavy
fires. Some of these hits probably came from the PORTLAND which, at 0357,
had opened fire on the second target (MOGAMI) bearing 194°(T), range 19,300
yards and on course 180°(T), speed twenty- five knots.**
Does it not seem surprising that the Commanding Officer MOGAMI,
observing the YAMASHIRO under heavy fire from the north and realizing that
she had run into a trap from which she was not likely to escape, and further
realizing that Commander THIRD Section had failed to report this unhappy
situation to anyone, did not immediately advise the commanders of both the
FIRST and SECOND Striking Forces of the above developments?
At this time (0400) he was queried by the Commanding Officer
SHIGURE by voice radio as to the situation*** but does not appear to have
received this message.
During this retirement, at about 0401:30, he fired four
torpedoes from his port torpedo tubes to the northward.**** No torpedo
firing data is available. However, from the fact that the RICHARD P. LEARY
passed through torpedo waters at about 04II***** it can be surmised that
these torpedoes were set at high speed (forty-nine knots) with a designed
torpedo run of 22,000 yards. ******
At 0402 at least two shells hit the bridge killing all officers
in that area (including the commanding officer, the executive officer and
the navigator), leaving only a chief petty officer to keep the ship on a
southeasterly course until the senior officer (the gunnery officer who was
* Action Report BACHE, Engagement of Enemy Surface Forces, Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0106, October
25th, 1944.
-** Action Report PORTLAND, Surface Engagement in Leyte Gulf, October
25th, 1944, Serial 065, October 28th, 1944.
*** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle for Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
**** Report on SHO Operation by Lieutenant Fukushi, ex-IJN, Control
Station Officer and Fire Data Computer Officer, MOGAMI, December
1945, Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-39A.
***** Action Report RICHARD P. LEARY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 103, November 7th, 1944.
****** Summary Report, U.S. Naval Technical Mission, November 1st, 1946,
Page 118.
461 CONFIDENTIAL
SHIGURE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
busy fighting the ship) could take command. The steering mechanism also had
been knocked out requiring the ship to be steered by hand steering. Hits
were scored in the engine rooms which, due to smoke and heat, necessitated
stopping both starboard engines and the port after engine. The MOGAKI now
operated on but one engine — the port forward engine.*
The ship, burning, damaged, and out of control, now gradually
slowed down.
Meanwhile at 0404 (when the BACHE ceased firing) and probably to
the great surprise of the Commanding Officer MOGAKI (who was the Gunnery-
Officer) all gunfire against him ceased.
At 0420 the MOGAMI, still without a commanding officer on the
bridge, was bearing 199°(T), distant ten point one miles from Kanhandon
Point Light, Hibuson Island.
(b) SHIGURE.
The Commanding Officer SHIGURE, on course 340°(r), speed twenty-
six knots, continued closing the YAMASHIRO which he thought was the FUSO.
At 0350, or shortly afterward, he sighted the tracks of three
torpedoes which he stated passed under the ship.** From Diagram "J" the
torpedoes passed ahead although the bubble tracks may well have been rising
as he turned to parallel the track of the YAMASHIRO. These torpedoes had
been fired by the DALY at 0335:30 (Diagram "H").
At 0351 he was undoubtedly surprised and puzzled to hear
Commander THIRD Section call the FUSO by voice radio inquiring as to her
maximum speed.** Evidently this message did not change his opinion that
the ship ahead was the FUSO. He probably thought that Commander THIRD
Section was still afloat, though well astern, and was inquiring as to the
FUSO's maximum speed, perhaps with the idea of determining future action.
However, since he had been concerned about Commander THIRD Section earlier
and had believed the YAMASHIRO sunk, he immediately called Commander THIRD
Section requesting that he be informed of the situation.** He received no
reply for at this time the shells of the Allied battle disposition had
begun landing on and around the YAMASHIRO and apparently had disabled her
voice radio communication system.
He now observed that the YAMASHIRO was being heavily hit and had
begun to burn.** He continued to close on a course nearly parallel to her
course. He was soon caught in the shellfire directed at her. He stated
later that, because of these shells, he had been unable to retire. However,
he had been able to take evasive action by maneuvering his ship with the
happy result that he did not receive any direct hits but did receive some
damage from near misses.** He passed within one thousand yards of the
YAMASHIRO at 0355 and continued northward. At 0356 he observed the MOGAMI,
to the south, receive a direct hit which set her afire.**
* Detailed Action Report MOGAMI. Battle off the Philippines, October ISth -
25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle for Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
462 CONFIDENTIAL
SHIGURE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
He was now confronted with the necessity of making a vital
decision. He knew that there were at least four enemy battleships present
in the Allied battle disposition.* He had received this information from
the MOGAMI. The MOGAMI had obtained it from her search plane which had
reported to both the MOGAMI and YAMASHIRO by message drop at 1200 the previous
day that there were, among other units, four battleships inside Leyte Gulf.**
From his later actions it appears that he considered but three courses of
action. These were (a) to remain with the battleship, (b) to close the enemy
in order to make his torpedo firing as effective as possible, (c) to retire
completely from the strait.
While the mental process he went through at this time to
determine which course he should select is nowhere explained, it seems
likely that he reasoned as follows:
(a) The first course of action was suitable, feasible and
acceptable since he belonged with that ship. However, he rejected this
course of action presumably because he believed the battleship to be
unnavigable .*
(b) While the second course of action was suitable because, if
it were successful, it would contribute somewhat to the objective of the
penetration operation by damaging or even sinking one or more Allied capital
ships, and while such an attack was in accordance with the Japanese concepts
of the "banzai" attack,*-** it was not feasible because Allied gunfire was
very effective and the chance of his being heavily hit before he could
reach an effective firing position was very great indeed.
(c) The third course of action was suitable, feasible and
acceptable, in that his destroyer, if it escaped, would be available for
later operations. He probably realized that in so doing he was accepting a
code of honor far removed from the Japanese "Bushido" concepts of the honor
of a warrior but he clearly was not of this heroic mold.
He therefore accepted the latter course of action as the selected
course and at 0356, when the intensity of the Allied gunfire appeared to
lessen, he began a turn to starboard and therefore away from the area of
Allied shells.
Why he apparently gave no consideration to a fourth course of
action, i.e., to attempt to join Commander SECOND Striking Force, who he
knew had been heading up the strait since 0344, is not understood. Would
he not thereby have contributed much more effectively to the success of the
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle for Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
*** Information compiled by Captain Toshikazu Ohmae, ex-IJN, Japanese
Research Division, Military History Section, GHQ, FEC, relating to
Penetration Operations of 1ST Striking Force, Battle for Leyte Gulf,
contained in GHQ, FEC, Military History Section letter to President,
Naval War College, March 30th, 1954.
463 CONFIDENTIAL
SHIGURE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
Japanese operations in the strait, and therefore to the accomplishment of
the Japanese objectives, than he would have contributed by following any
of the other courses of action?
This seems so for it must be remembered that the fact that the
THIRD Section had been caught in a trap by the Allies and had been penerally
destroyed, was not known to Commander SECOND Striking Force. Therefore, it
was imperative that that Commander be informed of this disaster and of the
Allied dispositions so that he might take intelligent action.
It will be noted that at the time of his turn away the Commanding
Officer SHIGURE did not fire his torpedoes at the Allied left flank cruisers
which were distant about 12,100 yards at closest approach. He stated that he
did not do so because he had been unable to locate any enemy ships. Why
this was so is not entirely clear for the YAKASHIRO, although suffering
heavily from Allied gunfire was still able to locate the Allied left flank
cruisers and to straddle the DENVER, COLUMBIA and MINNEAPOLIS.* While it
is probably true that the YAMASHIRO had better radar and optical equipment
it must be remembered, on the other hand, that at this time the SHIGURE
had not as yet been hit although heavily straddled.
During the turn away he increased speed to full battle speed**
(he made about thirty- two knots) and about 0358 he steadied on course
i85°(r).
He now, at 0400, queried the Commanding Officer MOGAMI by voice
radio for information concerning the situation. However, he thought that,
because his voice radio had been knocked out temporarily by a near miss, he
had failed to receive the MOGAMI 's reply. Actually no reply had been made.
Shortly after this, he received a direct hit, believed to have
been an 8-inch projectile,** in the after part of the ship but the hit did
not affect speed or navigability.
At 0408 he passed about 1,800 yards to the eastward of the
MOGAMI, which was observed to be burning and apparently heavily damaged.**
He continued on course and speed.
Why he did not remain with the MOGAMI to assist her to retire is
not known but it seems likely that he had no intention of doing so on his
own initiative. Perhaps he felt that if the Commanding Officer MOGAMI
wished him to remain he would advise him by visual signal.
At 0409, being clear of the enemy gunfire, he changed course to
210° (T) and slowed to twenty- four knots.
* Action Report DENVER, Operations Against the Enemy, October 17th - 24th,
1944, Serial 0032, November 10th, 1944; also Action Report COLUMBIA,
Bombardment Report, Leyte Island, Philippine Islands, October 17th -
24th, 1944, Serial 0012, November 1st, 1944; also Action Report
MINNEAPOLIS, Battle of Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0215, November 2nd, 1944.
** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle for Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
464 CONFIDENTIAL
ASAGUMO
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
At about 0415 he exchanged calls with the NACHI. He stated
later, on interrogation, that he employed blinker "because the telephone
was broken."-"- It is of interest that there is no mention of this exchange
of calls in his action report which, by the way, lists all messages as
being by telephone (voice radio),**
Shortly after 0418 he commenced increasing speed to thirty knots
in order to pass ahead of the SHIRANUHI, which had just turned to a north-
westerly course (Diagram "J")„
At 0420 the SHIGURE was bearing 303°(T), distant 15,000 yards
from the northwestern tip of Kanihaan Island.
(2) Operations of Damaged Ships of the THIRD Section, 0348-0420,
October 25th.
(a) ASAGUMO.
The ASAGUMO, having suffered a severed bow, continued southward
at seven to nine knots, likely hoping to retire from the battle area. The
sound of gunfire of the YAMASHIRO was heard from the north,*** although
this was probably the sound of Allied as well as Japanese gunfire.
At 0349 the Commanding Officer ASAGUMO decided to turn away,
probably because he could see that the DALY and the BACHE were rapidly
approaching and that his ship would soon become a more inviting gun target
than the hapless MICHISHIO. As luck would have it he started his turn at
the same time that the HUTCHINS— unbeknown to him — fired her torpedoes at
him.
At 0353 he steadied on course 090°(T), speed about six knots.
The result of this change of course was that at about 0354:30 the HUTCHINS
torpedoes passed harmlessly to the south. Since he makes no mention of
these torpedoes or their wakes, it is assumed that he did not observe them.
Although it is not mentioned in his account of the action he
undoubtedly witnessed at 0358 the torpedoing of the MICHISHIO, which was
about 3,000 yards on his starboard bow. After this he continued to the
eastward at about six knots making good a course of 108° (T) in the southerly
current •
About 0400 he sighted the MOGAMI astern, proceeding on a
southerly course and observed that she was on fire,***
At 0420 the ASAGUMO was bearing 334°(T), distant 14,300 yards
from the northwestern tip of Kanihaan Island.
* USSBS Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Nav No. 79, Interrogation
of Commander Shigeru Nishino, ex-IJN, Volume II, Page 350.
** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801,
*** Composite Report on Surigao Strait Action by Commanding Officers
ASAGUMO (Commander Kazuo Shibayama, ex-IJN) and MICHISHIO (Commander
Kazuo Tanaka, ex-IJN), March 15th, 1946, Army Historical Division
Microfilm HS-39A.
465 CONFIDENTIAL
MICHISHIO and FUSO
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
(b) MICHISHIO.
At 0348 the MICHISHIO was under fire by both the DALY and the
BACHE. She was dead in the water and was most likely in a sinking condition.
Suddenly, at about 0353, she noted that the gunfire against her had lessened
(the DALY had shifted fire to the MOGAMI) and at 0356 had ceased altogether,
(the BACHE had also shifted fire to the MOGAMI). Once the firing had^
ceased the MICHISHIO appears to have been able to extinguish fires resulting
from this gunfire since the HUTCHINS torpedo control party apparently did
not know of her presence in this area.
At 0357:48, by a lucky combination of circumstances, she was
hit by the HUTCHINS' torpedoes which had been fired at the ASAGUMO. She
sank almost immediately in Latitude 10°-l6.4,N, Longitude 125°-23.1fE.
(c) FUSO.
The two sections of the FUSO which were about 2,000 yards apart
continued to burn furiously and appeared to be white hot. They continued
to drift to the south with the current (Diagram "J").
(B) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force, 0348 - 0420, October 25th.
Commander SECOND Striking Force, with the SECOND Striking Force less the
ABUKUMA, on course 000o(f) at speed twenty-eight knots, in battle formation
with the cruisers in the van and the destroyers trailing, was proceeding
toward the battle area.
As he passed up the strait he observed two fires which appeared to be
two large ships afire.*
At 0405 as he approached the two burning ships, he concluded that he had
entered the battle area — actually, he was still south of Kanihaan Island and
therefore about 35,000 yards from the YAMASHIRO — and radioed a message to
all forces engaged in the SHO Operation that the SECOND Striking Force had
reached the battle area.**
At 0410, as he passed about one and one-half miles west of the two large
fires, he decided that these two large ships were the two battleships of
the THIRD Section, FUSO and YAMASHIRO,* which had been destroyed by the
Allied forces. (Actually, this was only the FUSO which by this time, as
mentioned earlier, had broken into two sections.) Since he did not observe
the MOGAMI anywhere, and could see firing to the north he believed that the
MOGAMI and the destroyers were attacking. About this time he noted that all
firing had ceased. He probably wondered what success the MOGAMI attack had
achieved. ^
* Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation, Southwest Area
Operation, Corrmander Kokichi Mori, ex-IJN, 2ND Striking Force Staff
Torpedo Officer, GHQ, FEC, Special Historical Collection, Supporting
Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Historical Report
on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (Item 22, Footlocker
5 of 10, SWPA Series, Volume II).
** Commander 2ND Striking Force Dispatch 250405 October 1944 to SHO
Operation Forces, Detailed Action Report No. 13, DSSRON 10, SHO
Operations, October 17th - 31st, 1944, WDC Document 161005, NA 11744.
466 CONFIDENTIAL
COM S3C0ND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
The situation was not clear as the smoke prevented any enemy sighting.*
Commander SECOND Striking Force now estimated the situation as follows:
(a) the enemy is concentrated in strength to the north, (b) he is laying
smoke to conceal the movements of his forces, (c) he will employ radar
directed fire at the approaching Japanese units, and (d) he will launch
simultaneous gun and torpedo attacks as soon as the SECOND Striking Force
had penetrated o*
This estimate was almost exactly correct. The Allied strength (a) was
concentrated as indicated, (b) it was prepared to employ, as it had already
employed against the THIRD Section, radar directed gunfire against the
SECOND Striking Force, and (c) it was prepared to launch, as it had already
launched against the THIRD Section, simultaneous gun and torpedo attacks
against the SECOND Striking Force once that force had come within gun range.
It was slightly incorrect in that, while it is true that the Allied
destroyers in attacking and retiring were employing smoke screens to
conceal their movements, such screens had not as yet been employed by the
battleships and cruisers.
In order to counter this situation, Commander SECOND Striking Force
planned, upon sighting or detecting the enemy by radar, (a) to execute a
torpedo attack by his cruisers, (b) send the destroyers ahead for a torpedo
attack on the enemy, supported by the gunfire of the cruisers and (c) re-form
his battle formation with the destroyers in the van and launch his assault.
This plan was surprisingly similar to Allied doctrine for night attack
at this time although Allied doctrine provided that the minimum force
which could be expected to enjoy any chance of success was two cruisers and
one squadron (nine) destroyers.**
While it is clear, therefore, that Commander SECOND Striking Force's
plan had little chance of success it cannot be seriously criticized because
the Japanese forces were recognizedly inadequate and no other course of
action, other than retirement, was available to Commander SECOND Striking
Force. Whether or not he had any hope for the success of the above plan is
not stated, but this seems doubtful because the heavy damage to the battle-
ships of the THIRD Section, which he had already observed, indicated that
the powerful forces lying in wait at the northern entrance to Surigao Strait
consisted in part of battleships.
About 041$, or slightly before, he sighted, on the starboard hand, a
ship which was completely afire and which appeared dead in the water.
Friendly or enemy character was unknown.* This was the MOGAMI, which was
damaged and slowing down, but was not yet completely stopped. She was
about 10,000 yards away at this time (Diagram "J").
* Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation, Southwest Area
Operation, Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-IJN, 2ND Striking Force Staff
Torpedo Officer, GHQ, FEC, Special Historical Collection, Supporting
Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Historical Report
on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (Item 22, Footlocker
5 of 10, SWPA Series, Volume II).
** Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Fleet (USF 10A), United States
Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1944, Appendix Three.
496799 O - 59 -40
467 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
Although not mentioned in this fashion in any of the reports — all of
which are most indefinite — it seems probable that it was also at about
0415 when Commander SECOND Striking Force first sighted the SHIGURE heading
south and exchanged calls with her,* This matter is discussed under
"SHIGURE, 0348 - 0420, October 25th".
Why he did not question the Commanding Officer SHIGURE at this time as
to (a) the nature of the operations to the north, i.e., what forces opposed
him; what had happened to the THIRD Section, etc., and (b) why the SHIGURE
was heading south and out of action, is not explained.
HIS FAILURE TO DO SO IS NOT UNDERSTOOD FOR HE HIMSELF WAS HEADING NORTH
AND INTO BATTLE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO OBTAIN ANY
INTELLIGENCE WHICH WOULD ASSIST HIM IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF HIS OBJECTIVE.
WHAT BETTER SOURCE WAS AVAILABLE THAN THE COMMANDING OFFICER SHIGURE?
According to his torpedo officer he now (at about 0420) made radar
contact on an enemy group of ships bearing 02 5° (T), range eleven kilometers,
and thereupon directed the cruisers and destroyers to prepare for torpedo
attack.** Actually this radar contact must have been made shortly before
0418 because, at this time, the SHIRANUHI,*** the leading destroyer,
commenced increasing speed to thirty-four knots and started to move out of
column on course 330° (T).
What this contact was on is not known for there were no forces, either
friendly or enemy in this location. Hibuson Island was on this bearing,
distant about twelve miles (at 0418) and there is a possibility that this
island was mistaken for an enemy force. However, for this to be so the
range would have had to be eleven to twelve miles rather than eleven thousand
meters. Perhaps the record in this connection is in error and the range was
in fact eleven miles. Commander SECOND Striking Force decided to carry out
his attack plan.
During this time the ABUKUMA continued making repairs — she was shoring
up her watertight bulkheads— while she slowly steamed in a generally south-
easterly direction presumably to clear the motor torpedo boats. At intervals
she would stop her engines and lay to. At 0415 she got underway again at
ten knots and headed on course 200°(T).
At 0420 (a) the NACHI was bearing 088°(T), distant seven point three
miles from Amagusan Point, (b) the SHIRANUHI, leading the destroyers, was
bearing 095° (T), distant six point seven miles from Amagusan Point and (c)
the ABUKUMA was bearing 304° (T), distant four point two miles from Madilao
Point*
* USSBS Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Nav No. 79, Interrogation of
Commander Shigeru Nishino, ex-IJN, Volume II, Page 350.
** Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation, Southwest Area
Operation, Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-IJN, 2ND Striking Force Staff
Torpedo Officer, GHQ, FEC, Special Historical Collection, Supporting
Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Historical Report
on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (Item 22, Footlocker
5 of 10, SWPA Series, Volume II).
*** Detailed Action Report DESDIV 18 (KASUMI), Battle off the Philippines,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
468 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0343 - 0420, October 25th
CHAPTER XVII - ALLIED OPERATIONS. 0343 - 0420, October 25th.
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2, 0348 - 0420, October 25th.
CTG 77.2 (OTC) carefully watched the approach of the enemy. The enemy
situation had not changed materially in the last few minutes, as their
leading units, although maneuvering, continued to close. He noted at 0348
that the range was about 16,600 yards (actually, from the corrected plot it
was about 17,200 yards) to the nearest enemy ship,* which he had tracked on
course 015° (T), speed sixteen knots.**
At this time he intercepted a TBS voice radio message from Commander
Battle Line that he had a "group of small ones, followed by heavy group.
When large group reaches 26,000 yards I will open fire."*** By observation
on the radar scope, he likely noted that the battle line was but 6,500 yards
to the north of him and, since his range to the leading group was but 16,000
yards, he may have been puzzled as to which target Commander Battle Line
had reference. However, he took no action on this message.
At 0350 he decided to open fire with his cruisers, and, therefore, sent
a TBS voice radio message to warn them that he was about to open fire.***
He would have liked to delay opening fire until the time that the DESRON
FIFTY-SIX torpedoes were about to reach the target in order to obtain a
concentration of shells and torpedoes on the target— but this could not be
done because of the rapidly decreasing range. Instead, he decided to delay
until the destroyers were approaching their firing positions at which time
he would open fire in order to divert the enemy from the attacking
destroyers.** He realized, of course, that this had an inherent weakness
in that the enemy could be expected to maneuver to throw off the Allied gunfire
which maneuvering might affect adversely the Allied torpedo fire. However,
he hoped that any errors thus introduced by this maneuvering would be
compensated for by the torpedo spreads of the three attacking sections of
DESRON FIFTY-SIX.
A minute later, at 0351 when the range was 15,600 yards, by TBS voice
radio he ordered all cruisers of TG 77.2 to "open fire".**** His flagship
opened fire immediately followed a little later by the MINNEAPOLIS, DENVER
and COLUMBIA. The PORTLAND was delayed and did not open fire until a minute
or so later. The BOISE, of the right flank cruisers, also opened up,
followed a little later by the PHOENIX.
* Track Chart, Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off
Surigao Strait, Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 0045, November 7th, 1944.
** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
*** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
**** Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao Strait,
Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0045,
November 7th, 1944.
469 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
0348 - 0420, October 25th
As a result of the firing by the LOUISVILLE, CTG 77.2, who was on the
starboard wing of the bridge, was temporarily blinded. Fortunately, this
had no adverse effects.*
At 0353, as the left flank cruisers continued firing — he did not as yet
know that the right flank cruisers had commenced firing — he heard the
Commanding Officer WEST VIRGINIA inform Commander Battle Line that the WEST
VIRGINIA was about to open fire,-** and shortly afterward he observed her
open fire.*** The LOUISVILLE, at this time, was fairly close to the line
of fire between the CALIFORNIA and the enemy.
At this time the LOUISVILLE detected another small enemy group "coming
up fast bearing 190°(T), possibly friendly".**** This estimate of bearing
and identification was correct for it was Attack Group 1.2 (HUTCHINS, DALY
and BACHE), Fortunately, this group was not taken under fire.
At this time also, CTG 77.2 intercepted a TBS voice radio broadcast
from Commander Right Flank Force to the effect that "these three little
ones in front are friendly trying to get into shoreline".**
At 0355 he intercepted an order to fire torpedoes from Commander Attack
Section TWO of DESRON FIFTY-SIX. From this he knew that the left flank
destroyers had commenced launching torpedoes.
Also at 0355, feeling that the right flank force had not opened fire,
he directed, by TBS voice radio, Commander Right Flank Force to commence
firing.**
He did this because, although the BOISE and the PHOENIX were firing — the
BOISE employing rapid fire — he could not see them; his line of sight to the
right flank force was obscured by the gunfire of the ships of the left flank
force. Therefore, since his order had been to the cruisers of TG 77.2, and
not to the cruisers of TG 77.2 and TG 77.3, he thought it well to make sure
that this order which was intended, per se to include the cruisers of TG
77.3, was so understood by CTG 77.3. This order was promptly answered by
Commander Right Flank Force, who replied by TBS voice radio, "we opened fire
with you".** This reply was apparently delayed in its delivery to CTG 77.2
for at 0356 that commander repeated his order.** Since no further messages
thereon are recorded it seems correct to say that CTG 77.2, by this time,
either had received the reply or knew from other sources that the right
flank cruisers were firing.
He now observed that more battleships of the battle line had opened fire,
for the CALIFORNIA and TENNESSEE commenced firing at 0355.
* Hawthorne Daniel "As Seen From the Bridge", Blue Book Magazine, March
1949.
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao Strait,
Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0045,
November 7th, 1944.
470 CONFIDENTIAL
-5H5-K-
#**-*
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
At 0356 he observed from his radar scope that the group of enemy ships
(actually, this group consisted solely of the MOGAMI), astern of the
leading ship (YAMASHIRO), had turned westward and at 0358 had started
retiring at high speed* — twenty five knots „ At this latter time, he also
observed that the leading enemy ship had likewise commenced a turn to the
westward.
At 0400, knowing that the battle line, which at this time was north of
Hibuson Island, was still making fifteen knots and was still heading on
course 090°(T),* and feeling that it was already too far to the east he
suggested to Commander Battle Line by TBS voice radio that he reverse course
to 270°(T).** He did not know that the battle line, in a line of bearing
090° - 270°(T), was now on course 120°(T). If he had known this, does it
not seem likely that, instead of suggesting, he would have ordered Commander
Battle Line to change course, for the battle line would now pass well ahead
of the left flank cruisers which were also on course 090°(T) but still at
five knots?
Also at 0400 he observed from his radar scope and radar tracking that
the leading enemy ship had changed course to the westward and seemed to be
retiring,*
At 0402 he knew that Commander Battle Line had executed a change of
course to 270° (T) by simultaneous individual ship turns,**
At 0403 he intercepted a TBS voice radio message from COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX
directing Attack Section ONE to fire torpedoes when ready and to retire with
smoke,*** This was pleasant news for it indicated not only that DESRON
FIFTY-SIX should soon be retiring from the battle area, but that Attack
Section ONE, which was in the center of the strait, would soon be clear.
At 0406 he began receiving TBS voice radio reports from COMCRUDIV TWELVE
in the DENVER that the enemy was firing at the left flank cruisers and that
the DENVER had been straddled,* He immediately changed speed to fifteen
knots,****
At this same time, he intercepted a TBS voice radio message from
Commander Battle Line that the CALIFORNIA had missed the last turn signal
and for other ships to watch out for her,**
* Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B),
*** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
**** Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao Strait,
Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0045,
November 7th, 1944.
471 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
This message was of considerable concern to him but was not entirely
unexpected for, as pointed out previously in this analysis, he knew that
his battleships had had little opportunity to practice station keeping in
column or in line of bearing. He could only hope that this error of the
CALIFORNIA was not so serious as to endanger the operations of the battle
line, but this hope did not long survive for he now noted that the fire of
the battle line had ceased. The WEST VIRGINIA, MARYLAND, CALIFORNIA and
TENNESSEE had checked fire, and the PENNSYLVANIA and the MISSISSIPPI had
not as yet opened fire.
At 0408 he received a startling message from COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX that
"fou are firing on COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX. We are in the middle of the
channel."* Then, before he could take action, he received a second message
as follows: "You are firing at us."* Without delaying, he, at 0409,
ordered "All ships cease firing."* This order was quickly complied with
and the entire battle disposition ceased firing.
THIS ACTION BY CTG 77.2 WOULD HAVE 3EEN SOUND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT A
FEW JAPANESE SHELLS HAD STRADDLED THE DENVER AND MINNEAPOLIS ABOUT TWO
MINUTES EARLIER, HAD HE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED THIS ORDER BY A SECOND MESS A
DIRECTING THAT FIRE BE RESUMED PROMPTLY BY EACH SHIP ONCE THE LOCATIONS OF
COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX AND THE ENEMY HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED.
This is so for, while it was desirable to lift fire from COMDEoRON
FIFTY-SIX, it was essential to expedite the resuming of fire on the three
Japanese ships (YAMASHIRO, MOGAMI, SHIGURE) in order to destroy them. As
pointed out earlier under "Kanihaan PT's, 0320 - 0348", War Instructions
were emphatic on this point.
Unfortunately, he did not issue instructions to resume fire but instead
directed COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX to get his ships out of channel as soon as
possible.* He did this, of course, to insure that no friendly ships were in
the area between the battle disposition and the Japanese ships so that he
could safely resume fire. However, he did not know that the ALBERT W. GRANT
was so heavily disabled that she would not leave the area for some time. On
the contrary, he had reason to believe that all ships were not only able to
clear the area but were doing so, for, also at 0409, he received a TBS voice
radio message from COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX to the effect that DESRON FIFTY-SIX
was getting out at full speed.* Clearly, COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX was as
uninformed of the plight of the ALBERT W. GRANT as was CTG 77.2.
IT WILL BE NOTED THAT THROUGHOUT THIS PHASE OF THE OPERATIONS, CTG 77.2,
AS OTC, DID NOT ISSUE ANY INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING FIRE DISTRIBUTION. IT
THEREFORE SEEKS V/ISE, AT THIS POINT, TO DIGRESS A MOMENT FROM THE DISCUSSION
OF THE BATTLE TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF FIRE DISTRIBUTION (SEE PLATE XXIV).
SINCE (A) TACTICAL DOCTRINE, WITH WHICH HE WAS FULLY FAMILIAR, ASSIGNED HIM
THIS RESPONSIBILITY IN THE FOLLOWING WORDS: "FIRE DISTRIBUTION NORMALLY IS
ORDERED BY THE TASK GROUP COMMANDER. ..",** (B) HE WAS (1) LONG EXPERIENCED
* Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
** War Instructions, United States Navy (FTP 143A), United States Fleet,
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1944, Chapter 12, Section XI,
Paragraph 12163.
472 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
"V>JVEST VIRGINIA
,0359
MARYLAND
OPENING FIRE DISTRIBUTION
SHOWING CONCENTRATION
ON YAMASHIRO
BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT
BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF
OCTOBER 1944
10 12 3 4 9
THOUSANDS OF YARDS
PLATE XgTV
CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
IN FLEET MANEUVERS, (2) A GRADUATE OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE WHERE FIRE
DISTRIBUTION WAS THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED AND EXPLAINED IN MANEUVER BOARD
PROBLEMS, (3) THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR, THEREFORE, WITH THE ILL EFFECTS OF OVER
CONCENTRATION AND (C) HE HAD PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED WITH COMMANDER CRUISERS
PACIFIC FLEET THE QUESTION OF FIRE DISTRIBUTION EMPLOYING RADAR (NO DEFINITE
CONCLUSIONS HAD BEEN ARRIVED AT),* IT IS LOGICAL TO BELIEVE THAT THERE MUST
HAVE BEEN AN INTELLIGENT EXPLANATION FOR HIS ACTION.
HE GIVES THIS EXPLANATION IN HIS ACTION REPORT AS FOLLOWS: "FIRE
DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS ACTION WAS DIFFICULT BECAUSE, WHILE THE SHIPS ON THE
LEFT FLANK WERE CROSSING THE "T" AND, THEREFORE, WERE FIRING AT A MORE OR
LESS COMMON TARGET, THOSE ON THE RIGHT FLANK COULD CLEARLY DESIGNATE THEIR
TARGETS. FIRE DISTRIBUTION WAS, THEREFORE, LEFT TO THE INDIVIDUAL COMMANDERS
AND SHIPS, AND, AS A WHOLE, FUNCTIONED REASONABLY WELL."*
IN AMPLIFICATION OF THE ABOVE EXPLANATION, THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS,
ALTHOUGH NOT MENTIONED IN HIS ACTION REPORT, CLEARLY INFLUENCED HIS
JUDGEMENT:
(A) (1) THE FINAL COMPOSITION OF THE ENEMY AT THE TIME OF OPENING FIRE
WAS NOT KNOWN. THIS WAS SO FOR MOST OF THE ALLIED TARGETS WERE RADAR "PIPS"
RATHER THAN "VISUAL" TARGETS, AND, THEREFORE, THE ALLIED COMMANDERS WERE NOT
ALWAYS SURE WHETHER THEIR RADAR "PIPS" REPRESENTED ONE ENEMY SHIP OR MORE
THAN ONE. HE THOUGHT AT THIS TIME THAT THE LEADING GROUP CONSISTED OF TWO
BATTLESHIPS IN COLUMN FOLLOWED PERHAPS BY ONE OR MORE SMALLER UNITS.
ACTUALLY, AT 0351, (TIME OF OPENING FIRE) THERE WAS BUT ONE BATTLESHIP IN
THE VAN FOLLOWED AT A DISTANCE OF ABOUT 2,400 YARDS BY THE SHIGURE AND AT
3,400 YARDS BY THE MOGAMI.
(2) DOCTRINE STATED THAT "THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEEING THAT THEIR
VESSELS ARE FIRING AT THE CORRECT TARGETS RESTS WITH THE DIVISION COMMANDERS
AND THE COMMANDING OFFICERS. SUCH OFFICERS, HAVING REGARD FOR PRESCRIBED
DOCTRINE OR INSTRUCTIONS, SHOULD USE INITIATIVE IN SELECTING TARGETS:
"(A) IN THE ABSENCE OF FIRE DISTRIBUTION ORDERS FROM A SENIOR
AT THE TIME ACTION IS JOINED.
"(B) WHEN, DUE TO LOW VISIBILITY, CONFUSION OF BATTLE OR OTHER
CONDITIONS, THE CONTROL OF FIRE DISTRIBUTION BY THE SENIOR IS IMPRACTICABLE."**
(3) THEREFORE, HE FELT THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH DOCTRINE, EACH
DIVISION COMMANDER AND COMMANDING OFFICER WOULD FIRE AT THE TARGET OR TARGETS
WHICH FULFILLED THE REQUIREMENTS OF DOCTRINE MOST EFFECTIVELY.
(B) ALL OF HIS SHIPS, EXCEPT THE SHROPSHIRE, WERE EQUIPPED WITH LONG
RANGE FIRE CONTROL RADAR AND HE HOPED THAT RADAR SPOTTING WOULD PROVE
EFFECTIVE EVEN IN THE FACE OF A SITUATION WHICH, BEFORE* RADAR, WAS CONSIDERED
"OVER CONCENTRATION". DOCTRINE IN THIS MATTER PROVIDED AS FOLLOWS:
* Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
** War Instructions, United States Navy (FTP 143A), United States Fleet,
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1944, Chapter 12, Section XI,
Paragraph 12163.
473 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
"IN CONCENTRATION FIRE, THE COMBINED FIRE POWER OF THE CONCENTRATING
SHIPS IS USUALLY LESS THAN THE SUM OF THEIR FIRE POWERS WHEN FIRING SINGLY.
THE LOSS OF FIRE POWER THROUGH CONCENTRATION INCREASES RAPIDLY WITH THE
NUMBER CONCENTRATING ON ONE TARGET. WITH TWO SHIPS CONCENTRATING ON ONE
THE LOSS MAY BE SLIGHT; WITH THREE THE LOSS MAY BE GREATER BUT STILL
PERMISSIBLE UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. THE CONCENTRATION OF MORE THAN
THREE SHIPS ON ONE USUALLY INVOLVES SO GREAT A REDUCTION OF FIRE POWER AS
TO RENDER ITS USE PROHIBITIVE."*
(C) HIS COMMANDERS WERE EXPERIENCED AND IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS
HE EXPECTED THEM TO ISSUE ANY FIRE DISTRIBUTION ORDERS NECESSARY. THE
WEAKNESS OF THIS ITEM IS THAT, AS WILL BE SHOWN LATER, HE DID NOT ISSUE ANY
FIRE DISTRIBUTION ORDERS TO HIS OWN IMMEDIATE COMMAND— THE LEFT FLANK
CRUISERS.
THIS DECISION LATER MET WITH THE APPROVAL OF HIS SUPERIORS IN THE CHAIN
OF COMMAND AS FOLLOWS:
(A) CTF 79.
"THIS WAS THE LARGEST ACTION WHICH HAS OCCURRED IN THE WAR TO DATE
IN WHICH RADAR FIRE CONTROL WAS USED EXCLUSIVELY. UNDER THE CONDITIONS
WHICH EXISTED IT WAS CLEARLY IMPRACTICABLE TO ASSIGN TARGETS. THE "T" BEING
CROSSED, FULL ADVANTAGE OF ENFILADE FIRE WAS INDICATED AND WAS TAKEN AS
PROVED BY THE RESULTS. CERTAINTY OF HITTING COULD ONLY BE ASSURED BY
OCCASIONALLY LIFTING THE RANGE AND IT APPEARS THAT, WITH THE IDEA OF CON-
SERVING AMMUNITION SUPPLY CERTAIN SHIPS, WHEN IN DOUBT AS TO THE EFFICACY OP
THEIR FIRE, WISELY CEASED FIRE ALTOGETHER,"** AND
(B) COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET INCORPORATED IN THE SEVENTH FLEET PRELIMINARY
ACTION REPORT, CTG 77.2 'S REASONS FOR LEAVING FIRE CONTROL DISTRIBUTION TO
HIS INDIVIDUAL COMMANDERS AND SHIPS,*** AND STATED LATER THAT THE
"INCORPORATION OF MANY OF THE COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THEREIN CONTAINED
CONSTITUTE APPROVAL OF BASIC REPORT."****
IT ALSO MET WITH THE APPROVAL OF CINCPAC-CINCPOA IN THE FOLLOWING WORDS:
* War Instructions, United States Navy (FTP 143 A), United States Fleet,
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1944, Chapter 12, Section XI,
Paragraph 12165(e).
** CTF 79 First Endorsement February 10th, 1945, to CCMCRUDIV 4 (CTG
77.2) Preliminary Action Report for Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
*** Commander Central Philippines Attack Force (CTF 77 and C0M7THFLT)
Report of Operation for the Capture of Leyte Island including Action
Report of Engagements in Surigao Straits and off Samar Island on
October 25th, 1944, Serial 00302-C, January 31st, 1945, Part V,
Conclusions, Comments and Recommendations, Naval Gunfire, Item B,
Fire Distribution.
**** C0M7THFLT Second Endorsement March 5th, 1945, to COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG
77.2) Preliminary Action Report for Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
474 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0343 - 0420, October 25th
"THAT THE MOGAMI AND A DESTROYER SURVIVED WHEN TWO BATTLESHIPS WERE
SUNK IS NOT ILLOGICAL. EVERYBODY IN OUR FORCES FROM THE OBB«S DOWN TO PT«S
FIRED AT THE BIG ONES NOT SO MUCH BECAUSE OF THEIR IMPORTANCE (SINCE
INDIVIDUAL RECOGNITION WAS GENERALLY LACKING) BUT BECAUSE THEY GAVE THE
BEST "PIPS" OR VISUAL POINTS OF AIM AT WHICH GUN OR TORPEDO FIRE COULD BE
DIRECTED. A FIRE DISTRIBUTION PLAN TO COVER ALL OF THE ENEMY'S VESSELS WAS
IMPOSSIBLE UNDER THE EXISTING SITUATION."*
DESPITE THE ABOVE OPINIONS, DOES IT NOT SEEM PRIMARILY FROM HINDSIGHT,
BUT ALSO FROM THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THIS ANALYSIS, AND FROM THE FACT
THAT CTG 77*2 AS OTC BELIEVED THAT THE NEAREST GROUP CONSISTED OF TWO
BATTLESHIPS IN COLUMN FOLLOWED BY SOME SMALLER UNITS, THAT IT WOULD HAVE
BEEN BETTER HAD HE ISSUED SOME GENERAL FIRE DISTRIBUTION INSTRUCTIONS TO THE
EFFECT THAT (A) THE TWO BATTLESHIPS IN THE VAN WERE ASSIGNED TO COMMANDER
BATTLE LINE AND (B) THE SMALLER UNITS WERE ASSIGNED TO THE COMMANDERS OF THE
RIGHT AND LEFT FLANK FORCES AS TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY? THIS WOULD HAVE
TENDED (A) TO REDUCE "OVER CONCENTRATION" AGAINST THE ENEMY BATTLESHIPS, (B)
TO SAVE AMMUNITION WHICH WAS IN SHORT SUPPLY IN THE AREA, (C) TO ALERT
COMMANDER BATTLE LINE AND THE COMMANDERS OF THE RIGHT AND LEFT FLANK FORCES
TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS MATTER, AND (D) TO KEEP ALL TARGETS WITHIN
GUN RANGE UNDER FIRE.
Now to return to the battle I
Commencing at about 0409, and confirmed at about 0412, CTG 77.2fs plots
gave indications that the enemy was retiring, for one ship had steadied on
course 180° (T) (YAMASHIRO), some ships were apparently dead in the water and
one ship (SHIGURE), at least, was retiring at twenty- four knots.**
At 0411 he intercepted a TBS voice radio request from the CALIFORNIA
and one from the MARYLAND to Commander Battle Line for authority to unload
hot guns at the enemy. At 0412 he intercepted the latter1 s reply directing
all battleships with loaded hot guns to unload at the enemy,*** He noted
that this authority was followed by the unloading salvos.
Whether or not he, at 0413, intercepted the TBS voice radio report from
the RICHARD P. LEARY that she was passing through torpedo waters is unknown
but it seems unlikely for he took no action. Instead, at about this very
time (0414) he, as Commander Left Flank Force Cruisers, executed a
simultaneous individual ship turn of 180° to new course 270°(T). He states
in his war diary that he made this reversal of course "to avoid enemy
torpedoes as the enemy was turning so that torpedoes might be fired."****
This statement seems to have been in error for he knew at this time that the
Japanese ships, at which he had been firing, were retiring. Does it not
* CINCPAC-CINCPOA Operations in the Pacific Ocean Area, October 1944,
forwarded to CINCUS by serial 002393, May 31st, 1945.
** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
*** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
**** War Diary COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), October 25th, 1944.
475 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
0348 - 0420, October 25th
seem fair to say then that, had he been aware of torpedoes he would have
ordered an •immediate battle disposition change of course by ship turns to
parallel the likely general direction of the enemy torpedoes rather than
have ordered a change of course for the left flank cruisers only?
As a matter of interest, at this very time the question arose as to the
advisibility of changing course to the south in order to close the enemy but,
because of his respect for Japanese torpedoes, he decided against it.*
Instead, realizing that (a) some of the enemy ships were likely to escape,
(b) an enemy force consisting of five destroyers and one larger ship had been
reported by PT 523 at 0342 as entering Surigao Strait on a northerly course
at that time, and (c) except for the battle line destroyers (DESDIV XRAY)
there were no other destroyers available which had not as yet been launched
to the attack, he decided that it would be wise to detach DESDIV XRAY from
the battle line and make it available to himself as OTC for immediate
employment should he desire to use it. He therefore, at 0415, directed
Commander Battle Line to direct C0KDESDIV XRAY to report to CTG 77.2 for duty.
Whether or not he heard Commander Battle Line direct C0MBATDIV TWO to
maneuver his division separately and order the remaining battleships to turn
away to the north at 0418 is unknown.
Between 0418 and 0419 he received two TBS voice radio messages from
C0MDESR0N FIFTY-SIX to the effect that the NEWC0KB, followed by the RICHARD
P. LEARY, was out of the channel but that the ALBERT W. GRANT was due west
of Hibuson Island and was slowly proceeding north.**
From this he had reason to believe that the ALBERT W. GRANT had been
damaged for he had ordered DESR0N FIFTY-SIX to clear the channel as soon as
possible, which all units, except the ALBERT W. GRANT, had succeeded in
doing. As yet he did not know that the ALBERT W. GRANT had been riddled by
friendly and enemy shells and was in danger of sinking.
He now felt that it was safe for the right flank force to resume fire
and therefore, at 0419, he issued the order for Commander Right Flank Force
to resume fire.** (He could not order the left flank force to open fire
because Attack Section ONE was still in the line of fire.) However, at this
moment, the one target within range (YAKASHIRO) disappeared from the radar
screen and was presumed sunk.*** None of the ships of the battle disposition,
therefore, opened fire.
At 0420 the LOUISVILLE was bearing 339° (T), distant 8,300 yards from
Kanhandon Point Light, Hibuson Island.
-**
**-*
Statement on February 24th, 1955 by Commodore R. W. Bates, USN (Ret),
Head World War II Battle Evaluation Group, Naval War College, who was
Chief of Staff to CTG 77.2 at the Battle of Surigao Strait.
Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
Preliminary Action Report COKCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
476
CONFIDENTIAL
COM BATTLE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
(1) Operations of Commander Battle Line, 0343 - 0420, October 25th.
At 0348 Commander Battle Line continued on course 090° (T) at speed
fifteen knots.
It will be noted that he issued no instructions concerning fire
distribution. He, of course, realized that, failing to receive any orders
in this matter from the OTC, it became his responsibility to determine whether
or not he should issue orders thereon to the battle line or allow the
division commanders and commanding officers, who had the ultimate responsi-
bility, to handle this as they thought best. He decided on the latter plan
saying later that "With an undetermined enemy battleline array, advance
fire distribution signals were considered unwise. For normal action fire
distribution is adequately covered in current battleship doctrine which
gives necessary instructions for division commanders and commanding officers
when OTC or COMBATLINE do not designate otherwise."*
HIS ACTION IN SO DOING APPEARS UNWISE UNLESS HE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE
THAT HIS BATTLESHIPS COULD SPOT GUNFIRE WITH RADAR DESPITE THE NUMBER OF
SHIPS FIRING. SINCE THIS WAS A VERY DEBATABLE QUESTION DOES IT NOT SEEM
CORRECT TO SAY THAT HE SHOULD HAVE GIVEN FIRE DISTRIBUTION INSTRUCTIONS TO
HIS DIVISION COMMANDERS OF SUCH NATURE AS TO PREVENT "OVER CONCENTRATION",
PERHAPS TO ALLOW NO MORE THAN THREE BATTLESHIPS TO FIRE AT THE SAME TARGET
AT THE SAME TIME? IN SUCH CASE ALL OF HIS BATTLESHIPS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY
HAVE FIRED AT THE SAME TIME, WITH THE RESULTANT SAVING OF AMMUNITION.
At 0349, observing that none of his ships had opened fire and
realizing that (a) they were probably waiting for him to open fire and (b)
CTG 77.2 was likely wondering why he had not opened fire, he decided to
clarify the matter for all and therefore advised CTG 77.2 by TBS voice
radio of his intentions as follows: "I have a group of small ones followed
by a group of large ones. When large ones reach 26,000 yards I will open
fire."*
This dispatch shows that he had an erroneous evaluation of the
enemy disposition. Whether this evaluation had been formed by himself or by
his flagship is unknown but it appears that the flagship CIC was not confused
as they produced one of the better battleship track charts of the action*
In commenting on the enemy disposition a short time before this he stated:
"The picture which was forming now required much interpretation. Basically,
Commander Battle Line had a PPI track from the SG radar which was
interpreted for size and formation of units involved by consideration of
previous and current reports of units in contact."* Perhaps this method
of evaluation was still being used.
About 0340 the radar had picked up a new contact at a range of
31,500 yards which was evaluated as two or three large ships.** This new
contact was the MOGAMI (Diagram "H"). Why the two contacts were now
* Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of Surigao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November 24th,
1944.
** Action Report MISSISSIPPI, Battle of Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands,
October 25th, 1944, Serial 0141, November 21st, 1944.
477 CONFIDENTIAL
COM BATTLE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
evaluated as a group of small ones followed by a group of large ones is
nowhere explained. The radar pip of the nearest ship, YAMASHIRO, should
have been much larger than that of the more distant MOGAMI, not only because
the YAMASHIRO was larger than the MOGAMI but also because the YAMASHIRO was
nearer than the MOGAMI. In addition the track chart of his flagship shows
that she made initial contact on the YAMASHIRO at a range more than 12,000
yards greater than the range at which she had picked up the MOGAMI.* At
this time, however, the SHIGURE was only about 800 yards on the MOGAMI 's
beam so that this pip may have appeared larger than it actually was.
In the meantime the range had been closing and at 0349 was 23,600
yards to the YAMASHIRO and 26,600 yards to the MOGAMI (Diagram "J").
Although he does not state why he had not opened fire when the range to the
YAMASHIRO was 26,000 yards (as he had intended to do) the Commanding Officer
of his flagship stated that a warning had been received to "Watch out for
ships astern, they may be the real target."** Curiously enough, COMBATDIV
FOUR reported that at some time prior to the range closing to 26,000 yards
the battle line commander reportedly ordered "Do not fire", or words to that
effect but that the WEST VIRGINIA did not receive this order.*** Since none
of the other ships report this and there is nothing of this nature in any
of the voice radio logs it appears that in both cases it was generated
internally and reported over the telephone system. It seems likely, however,
that his reason for not opening fire when the range to the YAMASHIRO was
26,000 yards was that he was not sure which of the two leading targets was
the more important. The other two battleship division commanders and their
ships were waiting for the flagship to open fire.****
At 0350 he intercepted a TBS voice radio message from CTG 77.2
informing the cruisers of TG 77.2 that he was about to open fire.*****
At 0351 he intercepted a TBS voice radio message from CTG 77.2 to
the cruisers to commence firing.****** Shortly after this order, he
witnessed the left flank cruisers open fire, followed by the right flank
cruisers. *****
* Action Report MISSISSIPPI, Battle of Surigao Strait, Philippine
Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0141, November 21st, 1944, Track
Chart.
** Action Report MISSISSIPPI, Battle of Surigao Strait, Philippine
Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0141, November 21st, 1944.
*** Action Report COMBATDIV 4, Battle of Surigao Strait, Night of October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0235, November 8th, 1944.
**** Action Report COMBATDIV 2, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00149, November 7th, 1944.
***** Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of Surigao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November
24th, 1944.
****** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
478 CONFIDENTIAL
COM BATTLE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
At 0353 he received a message from Commander Right Flank Force that
the three little ones out in front were friendly, trying to get into shore,*
What consideration he gave to this message is not recorded.
Meanwhile, COMBATDIV FOUR, in the WEST VIRGINIA (F), observing that
the range to the enemy leading ship had closed to 24,000 yards, ordered the
Commanding Officer WEST VIRGINIA to inform Commander Battle Line that he
was about to open fire, and then to commence firing.** The Commanding
Officer WEST VIRGINIA therefore reported at 0353 over TBS voice radio that
he was ready to open fire and very shortly thereafter he commenced firing
with an opening range of 22,800 yards, using salvo fire, at the leading
enemy large ship.***
About this time Commander Battle Line was notified by his flagship
that her forward turrets were trained too far aft.**** He must now have
realized the unhappy situation which was developing because, instead of
remaining at five knots as ordered, he had persisted in operating at fifteen
knots. He could plainly see that his guns would soon no longer bear and it
would be necessary to change course toward the enemy to improve the bearing
and, at the same time, to reduce the range. He, therefore, at 0354, changed
course by simultaneous ship turns thirty degrees to starboard to course
120° (T ).*****
At this time his flagship CIC was still having difficulty tracking
the enemy and designating a target. Although the leading target (YAMASHIRO)
was now at a range of but 21,800 yards, the MISSISSIPPI did not commence
firing for, apparently because of the second group, this target had not been
designated to the main battery. The second group (MOGAMI) now seemed to
have commenced reversing course, having reached a minimum range of 25,000
yards, A new target, a single unidentified ship, was picked up, bearing
197° (T), range 31,000 yards and tracked on course 307°(T), speed twenty-
eight knots.****** This was the HUTCHINS which had just turned to course
310°(T).
* Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
** Action Report COMBATDIV 4, Battle of Surigao Strait, Night of October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0235, November 8th, 1944.
*** Action Report WEST VIRGINIA, Battle of Surigao Straits, October 25th,
1944, Serial 0538, November 1st, 1944.
**** Commander Battle Line's 1ST Endorsement Serial 0199, November 23rd,
1944, to Action Report MISSISSIPPI, Battle of Surigao Strait,
Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0141, November 21st,
1944..
***** Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of Surigao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November
24th, 1944.
******Action Report MISSISSIPPI, Battle of Surigao Strait, Philippine
Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0141, November 21st, 1944.
479 CONFIDENTIAL
COM BATTLE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
At 0355 Commander Battle Line observed the CALIFORNIA commence
firing on the leading large ship (YAMASHIRO) which she had tracked on
course 342°(T) at fifteen knots. Her opening range was 20,400 yards,
bearing 188° (T).* From Diagram "J" the range at this time was 20,900 yards
and the bearing 189°(T). This error in range either represents an error in
time of approximately forty-five seconds or it is an advance range (the
range at which the target would be when the projectiles landed). Since
other times in the action report are generally correct it is believed to be
more likely that she recorded the advance range. In this respect it is of
interest that the range of 20,400 yards corresponds very closely to the
distance from the ship's 0355 position to the target 0356 position, that the
bearing between the two positions is 188^° (T) and that the time of flight
is approximately thirty-one seconds.
At 0356 the TENNESSEE opened fire on the same large ship (YAMASHIRO)
which she had tracked on course 000°(T), speed sixteen knots. The opening
range was 20,500 yards, the bearing was not stated.** Although the
TENNESSEE'S action report states that fire was opened at 0355 the actual
time of opening fire is considered to have been 0356 for the following
reasons: (a) her track chart shows that after completing the turn to
120°(T) at 0355 she proceeded along the new course for about 700 yards
before opening fire which distance would take about one minute, (b) this
time error agrees with the time errors established for other events recorded
in this action report and (c) her deck log gives 0356 as the time of
opening fire,***
At 0356 the range from Diagram "J" was 20,500 yards and the bearing
was 192°(T).
At 0359 he observed the MARYLAND commence firing. The MARYLAND
had opened fire on the leading large ship (YAMASHIRO), which at this time
was also under fire by the right and left flank cruisers.**** His opening
range was 20,800 yards, bearing 210°(T).
It seems clear that the range and bearing given by the MARYLAND was
either incorrectly reported in the action report or was incorrectly obtained
within that ship for a check of Diagram "J" shows that the YAMASHIRO at this
time was bearing 202°(T) rather than 210°(T) and the range was 19,800 yards
rather than 20,800 yards. In fact, there were no enemy forces whatsoever
in the area indicated by the 210° (T) bearing.
Between 0400 and 0401 he noted that the leading target had changed
course to the westward and had reduced speed to ten knots. At this time the
target bore 201°(T), range 18,800 yards. He now received a message from
CTG 77.2 suggesting that he reverse course to 270° (T ) .*****
*~ Action Report CALIFORNIA, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 0024, November 3rd, 1944.
** Action Report TENNESSEE, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 0108, October
31st, 1944.
*** Deck Log TENNESSEE, October 25th, 1944.
**** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944.
***** Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of Surigao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November 24th,
!944o 480 CONFIDENTIAL
COM BATTLE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
In compliance with this suggestion, at 0401, by TBS voice radio, he
ordered and, at 0402, executed simultaneous individual ship turns of 150°
to starboard to course 270°(T).* He requested and received an acknowledge-
ment from COMBATDIV FOUR only.
SINCE THE CORRECT EXECUTION OF THIS MESSAGE WAS OF EXTREME IMPORTANCE,
DOES IT NOT SEEM SURPRISING THAT COMMANDER BATTLE LINE FAILED TO INSURE ITS
CORRECT RECEPTION BY THE UNITS OF HIS COMMAND BY PARALLELING THE TBS VOICE
RADIO MESSAGE WITH A CW RADIO DISPATCH?
At about this time the CALIFORNIA checked fire having fired forty-
three 14-inch shells and the WEST VIRGINIA, owing to a desire to retain some
of her AP ammunition, ceased firing having fired ninety-one 16-inch shells.
The CALIFORNIA had fired a total of six salvos, none of which were full gun
(twelve gun) salvos. The WEST VIRGINIA had fired a total of fourteen salvos
of which five were full (eight gun) salvos.
During the execution of the above turn, it became apparent to
COMBATDIV TWO in the TENNESSEE, and to the latter' s commanding officer,
that the CALIFORNIA, which was the next ship ahead of the TENNESSEE, was not
turning to the new course.-** This was, in fact, the case for the Commanding
Officer CALIFORNIA had (a) received the signal as a fifteen degree turn to
course 135°(T) instead of a 150° turn to course 270°(T), (b) already
steadied on that course and (c) at 0403, resumed fire.*** COMBATDIV TWO,
therefore, at 0404, queried the latter over TBS voice radio "Did you receive
turn signal?" He received a prompt affirmative**** reply, for the Commanding
Officer CALIFORNIA naturally believed that he was referring to the fifteen
degree turn which he had just executed.
Meanwhile, the Commanding Officer TENNESSEE, who had checked fire
during the turn, having fired sixty-three 14-inch shells, noted that he was
unable to resume fire because the CALIFORNIA was fouling the range.
Realizing that the danger of collision was imminent, for he was closing the
CALIFORNIA rapidly, he, at 0404, quickly backed his engines and by some
clever ship handling succeeded in avoiding the collision.***** As the
CALIFORNIA passed across his bow, he resumed speed in order not to embarrass
the ship astern of him.
The prompt and correct manner in which he acted to avoid this
collision indicates that he was fully alert to the developing situation.
* Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of Surigao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November
24th, 1944.
** Action Report COMBATDIV 2, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00149, November 7th, 1944.
*** Action Report CALIFORNIA, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 0024, November 3rd, 1944.
**** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
***** Action Report TENNESSEE, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 0103, October 31st, 1944.
496799 O -59 - 41
481 CONFIDENTIAL
COM BATTLE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
At 0405 the CALIFORNIA checked fire again after having fired two
additional 14-inch salvos (her seventh of nine guns and her eighth of eight
guns).
The error of the CALIFORNIA had also become evident to Commander
Battle Line, for that commander at 0406 warned his ships over TBS voice
radio to watch out for the CALIFORNIA which apparently had not received the
turn signal,* It was not until the receipt of this signal that the error
was detected by the Commanding Officer CALIFORNIA, who immediately commenced
his turn to starboard to course 270°(T).** However, he was now out of
position south of the battle line and in the line of fire. Fortunately, no
battleships were firing at this time for, at some point during the turn,
the MARYLAND also had checked fire after firing forty 14-inch projectiles
in five full gun (eight gun) salvos.
Just prior to 0408, observing that the line of sight was clear, the
Commanding Officer TENNESSEE resumed fire and fired his thirteenth 14-inch
salvo. This was a salvo of six guns and was his last salvo. He had fired
a total of sixty-nine 14- inch shells in thirteen salvos as follows: Nine
six gun, one five gun, one four gun, and two three gun salvos.
At 0408 Commander Battle Line intercepted a message from COMDESRON
FIFTY-SIX to CTG 77.2 that friendly units were firing on DESRON FIFTY-SIX
in the middle of the channel. Since no battleships were firing, he knew
that this message did not involve his ships. He also intercepted the message
from COMBATDIV TWO ordering the CALIFORNIA, which had just resumed fire and
had fired one salvo (her ninth) of two 14-inch guns, to fall in astern of
the TENNESSEE.* He was interested in this signal because it was in effect
an exchange of station by two ships of the battle line.
At 0409 he received the order from CTG 77.2 to all ships to cease
firing, and he promptly repeated this order to the battle line. All ships
immediately ceased firing. At this time the YAMASHIRO was bearing 210°(T),
range 19,000 yards from the MISSISSIPPI.***
Between 0410 and 0411 the WEST VIRGINIA fired two one gun salvos
(her fifteenth and sixteenth), and then ceased firing having fired a total
of ninety-three 16-inch shells. These had been fired in sixteen 16- inch
salvos as follows: Five full (eight gun) salvos, five seven gun salvos,
one six gun, one five gun, one three gun, one two gun and two one gun salvos.
At 0411 the CALIFORNIA and MARYLAND reported that they had loaded
hot guns and requested authority to unload them in the direction of the
enemy. At 0412 Commander Battle Line ordered all ships with loaded hot guns
to fire them at the enemy. The CALIFORNIA then fired one one gun salvo
(her tenth) and the MARYLAND fired one eight gun salvo (her sixth).
*~~ Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
** Action Report CALIFORNIA, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 0024, November 3rd, 1944.
*** Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of Surigao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November
24th, 1944.
482 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM BATTLE LINE
0348 - 0420, October 25th
At this time, 0412,* his flagship, the MISSISSIPPI, which at long
last had finally obtained a solution to the fire control problem fired a
single twelve gun salvo on the large leading target (YAMASHIRO), range
19,790 yards, bearing 205°(T),** course 155°(T).*** Target speed at this
time was not stated although the track chart indicates an increase in speed
over the ten knots recorded at 0400, Diagram "J" shows that the range was
19,800 yards, bearing 205i°(T), target speed fourteen knots, on course
165°(T).
The CALIFORNIA had fired a total of sixty-three 14-inch shells in
ten salvos as follows: three nine gun, two eight gun, two six gun, one five
gun, one two gun and one one gun salvo.
The MARYLAND had fired a total of forty-eight 16-inch shells in
six full (eight gun) salvos*
A recapitulation of the above firing follows:
Time
Order in Opening
Formation Fire Range
Opening Fire
Range****
Diagram MJW
Opening
Fire
Bearing
Opening Fire
Bearing
Diagram "J"
0353
WEST VIRGINIA 22,800
22,700
197
196
0359
MARYLAND 20,800
19,800
210
202
0412
MISSISSIPPI 18,700
19,800
205
205i
0356
TENNESSEE 20, 500
20,500
193
192
0355
CALIFORNIA 20,400
20,900
188
188i
,1 1, ,m
PENNSYLVANIA did not fire
The opening fire ranges and bearings of the WEST VIRGINIA, TENNESSEE
and CALIFORNIA advance range with their Mark VIII fire control radars were
approximately correct; those of the MARYLAND were incorrect, possibly due to
the fact that (a) she may have opened fire on a phantom and (b) she was
having difficulty with her Mark III fire control radar and, since she finally
Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of Surigao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November
24th, 1944; also Action Report MISSISSIPPI, Battle of Surigao Strait,
Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0141, November 21st,
1944.
Action Report MISSISSIPPI, Battle of Surigao Strait, Philippine
Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0141, November 21st, 1944.
Ibid., Enclosure (A),
The difference in range between the opening fire ranges and the
Diagram "J" ranges can be attributed generally to the fact that the
battleships are plotted as in column whereas it is likely that they
often were not in true column.
483
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM BATTLE LINE
0348 - 0420, October 25th
picked up her target from the WEST VIRGINIA'S fall of shot,* she may have
ranged on a WEST VIRGINIA splash; the bearing of the MISSISSIPPI'S target
was correct but her time of opening fire was long delayed because she had
difficulty in identifying her target and obtaining an acceptable solution;
and finally the PENNSYLVANIA'S failure to open fire at all was likewise due
to her failure to identify her target or to obtain an acceptable solution.
The MISSISSIPPI and PENNSYLVANIA difficulties were attributed by Commander
Battle Line to material (Mark III fire control radar) and to personnel.*
At 0413 he intercepted a message from the RICHARD P. LEARY that she
was passing through torpedo waters.* He, of course, knew that the RICHARD
P. LEARY was in DESRON FIFTY-SIX but, considering the confusion which
existed in his flagship CIC relative to the targets, it seems doubtful, if
he knew her present location at this time.
At 0415 he intercepted a second order from COMBATDIV TWO directing
the TENNESSEE to move ahead and take station on the PENNSYLVANIA and once
again directing the CALIFORNIA to take station astern of the TENNESSEE. **
At this time (a) the TENNESSEE, which had increased speed to seventeen knots
at 0408*** in order to regain distance lost during her maneuvering to avoid
collision, was about 1,600 yards astern and slightly on the starboard
quarter of the PENNSYLVANIA while (b) the CALIFORNIA, which had lost
distance by failing to turn to the west, was about 3,700 yards astern of the
PENNSYLVANIA and 1,200 yards south of the battleship track**** (Diagram "J").
At 0416 he received an order from CTG 77.2 to detach COMDESDIV
XRAY and have that commander report to him. He directed COMDESDIV XRAY to
comply.*****
Commander Battle Line was concerned about the RICHARD P. LEARY
report for the Japanese were well known to have long range and highly
effective torpedoes. He felt, from the RICHARD P. LEARY transmission, that
the Japanese had fired their torpedoes to the northward and that it was
necessary to take immediate action to safeguard the battle line. However,
this he was unable to do because the CALIFORNIA, which was trying to move
back into column between the TENNESSEE and the MISSISSIPPI, was interfering
with his action. He, therefore, ordered COMBATDIV TWO to maneuver his
division separately and to bring it into the battle line without delay.*
Then, at 0418, by simultaneous individual ship turns to the right of ninety
degrees, he changed the course of the battle line, less BATDIV TWO, to 000°(T),
which change of course was followed by DSSDIV XRAY.
*~" Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of Surigao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November 24th,
1944.
Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
Track Chart, Action Report TENNESSEE, Battle of Surigao Strait,
October 25th, 1944, Serial 0108, October 31st, 1944.
Track Chart, Action Report CALIFORNIA, Battle of Surigao Strait,
October 25th, 1944, Serial 0024, November 3rd, 1944.
***** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
484 CONFIDENTIAL
#-»■
■**#
*-»-**
COM BATTLE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
His action in so doing was in accordance with the doctrine at the
time which provided in part:*
"However, when our battle line is threatened with dangerous salvos
of approaching torpedoes or with heavy air attack, the commander of the
battle line, unless specifically directed by the officer in tactical command,
decides whether to accept the menace of the torpedoes or air attack in
order to keep the enemy battle line under gunfire or to initiate evasive
maneuvers by the battle line as a whole. The situation existing at the time
governs his decision ."
He stated later that he turned away rather than toward the enemy
because he knew that (a) the stronger enemy force in the Sibuyan Sea had
not been completely eliminated from the picture and (b) the OTC in the
LOUISVILLE did not want to bring the battle line into the close waters in
which the OTC was going to pursue the enemy remnants.**
BUT WAS HIS DECISION CORRECT? IT WOULD APPEAR NOT, FOR EVEN HAD HE
RECEIVED ALL DISPATCH INFORMATION ON THE MAIN BODY, FIRST STRIKING FORCE HE
WOULD NOT, AT THIS TIME, HAVE KNOWN MORE THAN THAT AT 2030 A PART OF THE
ABOVE MAIN BODY HAD BEEN SIGHTED BETWEEN BURIAS AND MASBATE, COURSE NOT
REPORTED.*** FROM THIS HE COULD ESTIMATE THAT SHOULD THE MAIN BODY PENETRATE
SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT AND HEAD FOR LEYTE GULF AT TWENTY-FIVE KNOTS (MAXIMUM
SPEED OF THE NAGATO) (THE SPEED ACTUALLY EMPLOYED WAS TWENTY KNOTS)**** THE
MAIN BODY COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO ARRIVE OFF SULUAN ISLAND BEFORE 0730,
AND PROBABLY MUCH LATER, AND THEREFORE A MOVEMENT TOWARD THE ENEMY, WHICH
WAS NOW RETIRING, COULD HAVE BEEN MADE WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING THE STRATEGICAL
SITUATION. HOWEVER, IT MUST BE STRESSED HERE THAT SINCE COMMANDER BATTLE
LINE WAS A TACTICAL COMMANDER HIS DECISIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE ON THE
BASIS OF TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. IN THIS INSTANCE HIS COMMENT CONCERNING
THE ENEMY FORCE IN THE SIBUYAN SEA RELATED TO A BROADER OBJECTIVE THAN THAT
PRESENTLY ASSIGNED— THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY FORCE IN SURIGAO STRAIT—
AND THEREFORE SUCH A DECISION WAS PROPERLY A FUNCTION OF THE OTC.
IN ADDITION (A) THE WATERS WELL SOUTH OF HIM, EXCEPT FOR THE DISABLED
ALBERT W. GRANT, WERE CLEAR OF FRIENDLY FORCES, (B) BECAUSE OF BETTER SHIP
CONTROL IT WAS EASIER TO AVOID ENEMY TORPEDOES BY HEADING TOWARD THEM THAN
AWAY FROM THEM, AND (C) IT WAS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN SUITABLE GUN RANGE
SHOULD THE OTC REOPEN GUNFIRE WHICH WAS LIKELY. THEREFORE, DOES IT NOT SEEM
* War Instructions, United States Navy (FTP 143A), United States Fleet,
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1944, Chapter 12, Section X,
Paragraph 12100.
** Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of Surigao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November
24th, 1944.
*** C0M3RDFLT Dispatch 241215 October 1944 to CTF 77, info COMINCH,
CINCPAC, All TFC's and TGC«s 3RD Fleet.
**** Average speed from YAMATO track chart for period 250037 (time of
passage of San Bernardino Island) October 1944 to 250644 (time of
contact on TU 77.4»3).
485 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM BATTLE LINE
0348 - 0420, October 25th
CORRECT TO SAY THAT HE SHOULD HAVE TURNED TOWARD THE ENEMY, SINCE BY
TURNING AWAY AT THIS CRITICAL TIME HE MIGHT HAVE PLACED AN UNNECESSARY
LIMITATION ON HIS COMMANDERS* FREEDOM OF ACTION.
In making this analysis it is realized that by heading south some
confusion might have resulted because of (1) the movement to the westward
of the Left Flank Force, (2) the position of the CALIFORNIA and (3) the
position of the DENVER (Diagram "J"). However, it was incumbent on these
units to remain clear.
During the above firing period the battleships fired main battery
anniunition, and had ammunition remaining as follows:
Remaining
AP HC
Total Salvos
Fired
WEST VIRGINIA
Fired*
AP
89
HC
16"
16
4
16"
MARYLAND
6
48
0
14"
MISSISSIPPI
1
12
0
14"
TENNESSEE
13
69
0
14"
CALIFORNIA
10
63
0
14"
PENNSYLVANIA
_0
0
0
TOTAL
45
231
4
111 172
192 445
189 543
327 262
213 78
^60 _£
1392 1593
Average rounds per gun remaining:
(a) AP ■ 1392 divided by 64 ■ 21.75
(b) HC = 1593 divided by 64 ■ 24.89
At 0420 the MISSISSIPPI was bearing 323° (T), distant 14,100 yards
from Kanhandon Point Light, Hibuson Island.
* These salvos varied from one gun to full salvos which were twelve guns
with the 14-inch ships and eight guns with the 16- inch ships.
486
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
0348 - 0420, October 25th
(2) Operations of Commander Left Flank Force, 0348 - 0420, October 25th.
At 0348 Commander Left Flank Force, on course 090o(T), speed five
knots, was awaiting the opportunity to open fire with his cruisers. The
range to the nearest enemy ship was now 17,200 yards and closing. His
cruisers were in an ideal position to cross the WT" of the leading Japanese
group which he believed consisted of two battleships followed perhaps by
one or more smaller units and which was almost due south of his flagship at
this time. In addition to this group, he observed that there were other
groups of enemy ships present to the south (MOGAMI and damaged ships).* A
new group of fast moving ships had been detected to the west of the Japanese
and were reported as possibly friendly.** This was Attack Group 1.2, led
by the HUTCHINS.
At 0350 he (as CTG 77.2) decided to open fire and sent a warning
over TBS voice radio to all TG 77.2 cruisers and destroyers that he was
about to open fire.*** A minute later he ordered all TG 77.2 cruisers to
open fire.***
The LOUISVILLE immediately opened fire on the leading Japanese ship
(YAMASHIRO). She was followed by the other four cruisers of the left flank
force, which also fired on the YAMASHIRO, about as follows:
0352
Order in
Formation
LOUISVILLE**
PORTLAND****
Opening Opening Fire Opening Opening Fire
Fire
Range
Range
Diagram "Jn
Fire
Bearing
Bearing
Diagram "J"
15,500
15,800
187°(T)
(track chart)
186°(T)
15,500
15,500
186°(T)
184°(T)
15,800
15,600
192°(T)
(track chart)
181°(T)
15,500
15,600
182° (T)
179° (T)
15,450
15,600
189°(T)
176o(T)
0351:30 MINNEAPOLIS***** 15,800
0351:30 DENVER******
0351:30 COLUMBIA*******
* Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao
Strait, Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
0045, November 7th, 1944.
Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
Action Report PORTLAND, Surface Engagement in Leyte Gulf, October
25th, 1944, Serial 065, October 28th, 1944.
Action Report MINNEAPOLIS, Battle of South Surigao Strait, Philippine
Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0215, November 2nd, 1944.
Action Report DENVER, Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 0031, November 4th, 1944.
******* Action Report COLUMBIA, Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 0010, November 1st, 1944.
**
www
****
w w w w w
*****
******
487
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
0348 - 0420, October 25th
The opening fire ranges of all ships and the opening fire bearings
of the LOUISVILLE, PORTLAND and DENVER were approximately correct. The
reported open fire bearing of the COLUMBIA, and the open fire bearing of
the MINNEAPOLIS, were clearly incorrect.
What happened in these latter two cases was as follows:
(a) Although the COLUMBIA reported the open fire bearing to have
been 189°(T), her track chart shows it to have been 179°(T). Since, based
on Diagram MJ", the bearing was more likely about 176° (T) and, since there
were no enemy units on the bearing 189°(T), it seems probable that the
track chart bearing (179°(T)) was the actual open fire bearing employed.
This track chart bearing is therefore accepted as the actual firing bearing
rather than the 189°(T), and on this basis it can be said that the COLUMBIA
was firing at the YAMASHIRO rather than at a phantom.
(b) The MINNEAPOLIS did not report her opening bearing but, from
her most incomplete and very smoothed out track chart, her opening fire
bearing was about 192°(T). Since, as in the case of the COLUMBIA, there
were no enemy units on this bearing it seems likely that the MINNEAPOLIS
either fired on a "phantom" or submitted an incorrect track chart.
All left flank cruisers were now firing salvo fire and all were
firing at the leading Japanese large ship (YAMASHIRO). Explosions and fires
were noted by the MINNEAPOLIS, DENVER and COLUMBIA, indicating that hits
were being scored immediately,
IT WILL BE OBSERVED THAT COMMANDER LEFT FLANK FORCE, AS THE OTC OF
THE LEFT FLANK CRUISERS, DID NOT ISSUE ANY FIRE DISTRIBUTION ORDERS. WHY
THIS WAS SO IS NOT EXPLAINED ALTHOUGH IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE SAME FACTORS
WHICH MOTIVATED HIM AS OTC OF THE BATTLE DISPOSITION MOTIVATED HIM Hi THIS
SITUATION AS WELL. BUT WERE THESE FACTORS EQUALLY APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE?
IT WOULD APPEAR NOT FOR, SINCE HE BELIEVED THAT THE ENEMY FORCE CONSISTED
OF TWO BATTLESHIPS FOLLOWED BY SOME SMALLER UNITS, HE MIGHT WELL HAVE
DESIGNATED HIS CRUISERS TO FIRE AT THE SMALLER UNITS AND HAVE LEFT THE
LEADING LARGE SHIPS (BATTLESHIPS) TO THE BATTLE LINE.
He noted that the gunnery target (YAMASHIRO) continued to close
despite the hits that were being made on her. At 0353 he observed the
battle line commence firing,* Actually, this was not entirely so for only
the WEST VIRGINIA had opened fire at this time.
Whether or not the left flank cruisers had a good picture of the
locations of the three attack sections of DESRON FIFTY-SIX is unknown, for
no destroyer tracks appear, except sporadically, on the cruisers' track
charts. The absence thereof does not mean that the locations were not
charted on the Summary Plots in their CIC's but it is possible that the
cruisers, in concentrating on the enemy ship that was under fire and watching
for other targets nearby, did not concern themselves too much about friendly
forces.
Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
488
CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
At 0353 the DENVER, which appears to have had trouble maintaining
station in column at five knots, changed course to 070°(T).*
At 0355, the COLUMBIA opened fire with her secondary (5- inch)
battery on a target which she had tracked for some time bearing 190° (T),
range 14,000 yards.** This target cannot be identified for, as plotted,
it was about 3,000 yards to the westward of the YAMASHIRO and in an area
where there were no targets, either friendly or enemy, (Although she
called this target "B" it is clearly not the "B" on her track chart. The
latter appears instead to have been the SHIGURE and is shown to the eastward
of the YAMASHIRO track.) Since, when she ceased firing about nine minutes
later, her cease firing range and bearing were essentially the same as her
opening fire range and bearing, it seems clear that the targets' course and
speed were the same as the COLUMBIA'S. Therefore, the target was most
likely a "phantom".
Also at 0355 Commander Left Flank Force, from the gun flashes and
the tracers, observed that more battleships had commenced firing and, at
0356, that the second large target (MOGAMI) had commenced retirement.***
At this latter time the Commanding Officer PORTLAND, having observed
that the present target was under fire from many ships and burning brightly,
checked fire to seek another target. At 0358, having noted a target farther
south and retiring at high speed, he commenced firing on bearing 194° (T),
range 19,300 yards.**** This was the MOGAMI, which was retiring and under
fire by the destroyers of Attack Group 1.2. From the data submitted by
other ships, it appears that this range was obtained one minute earlier, or
at 0357 (about the time that the MOGAMI completed her turn to the south),
at which time Diagram "J" shows a range of 19,300 yards and a bearing of
197°(T).
THIS ACTION BY THE PORTLAND WAS CORRECT, AND WAS DISTINCTLY UNUSUAL
DURING THIS BATTLE IN THAT THE PORTLAND AND THE DENVER WERE THE ONLY SHIPS
WHICH SHIFTED MAIN BATTERY FIRE FROM THE YAMASHIRO TO ANOTHER TARGET. WHY
THE OTHER SHIPS FAILED TO DO SO REMAINS A MYSTERY AS SPOTTING FOR MANY OF
THE SHIPS WHICH WERE FIRING AT THE YAMASHIRO, WAS VERY DIFFICULT.
At 0400 the leading heavy target was observed to be turning westward.
Some firing had been noted on it.
The DENVER in her action report states that just before this — at
0358 — she picked up a "pip" which appeared to come from astern of the main
battery target (YAMASHIRO) and to head directly for the DENVER at twenty
* Track Chart, Action Report DENVER, Surigao Straits, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0031, November 4th, 1944.
** Action Report COLUMBIA, Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 0010, November 1st, 1944.
*** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
**** Action Report PORTLAND, Surface Engagement in Leyte Gulf, October
25th, 1944, Serial O65, October 28th, 1944.
489 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 034S - 0420, October 25th
knots,* However, it appears from her track chart that she had (a) picked
it up about three minutes earlier, at about 0355,** and (b) probably
tracked it for not more than two or three minutes. This pip was very
likely the SHIGURE, which (Diagram "J") was in the above position. However,
the SHIGURE had already commenced swinging to starboard and by this time
(0353) was on a southerly course. It seems highly probable, therefore,
that the DENVER lost the SHIGURE as the latter ship turned to starboard.
At 0402 the DENVER picked up another "pip", this one bearing 163°(T), range
9,300 yards and, for some unexplained reason, appears to have assumed that
the 035S "pip" and the 0402 "pip" were one and the same "pip". However, if
the plotter had divided the distances between these two plots by four
minutes, he would have discovered that they could not be the same because
the speed, instead of being twenty knots, was more likely about fifty knots
(6,600 yards divided by four minutes). He might then have given more
thought to the possibility that this new (0402) "pip" might be friendly
because he well knew that DESRON FIFTY-SIX was attacking in that very area.
The DENVER now commenced firing her secondary battery at the 0402
target. It is not clear at what she was firing unless it was the destroyer
ALBERT W. GRANT, of Attack Section ONE of DESRON FIFTY-SIX, which was fast
approaching her torpedo firing point. However, since at this time the
ALBERT W. GRANT was bearing 149°(T), range 6,000 yards and since the DENVER
soon (0403) lost this target, it seems likely that she was either firing at
with an incorrect solution or was firing at a "phantom". At this time her
track chart shows that she changed course to 080°(T).**
At 0404:30 the DENVER shifted her main (6-inch) battery from the
YAMASHIRO to the secondary battery target now bearing 165°(T), range 8,000
yards, which bearing she appears to have obtained from the secondary
battery director. However, within thirty seconds she corrected the bearing
to 172°(T) and at 0406 commenced firing. Although she did not report her
0406 opening fire range or bearing, from Diagram "Jn the bearing was about
177°(T), the range 7,700 yards. That her target was the unfortunate ALBERT
W. GRANT seems clear for that ship later reported having been hit by 6-inch
projectiles commencing at 0407. No other 6-inch cruisers were firing at
the ALBERT W. GRANT.
Meanwhile, the LOUISVILLE noted that a "pip" which she stated she
had first tracked at 0354 on course 330°(T), range 14,000 yards, was now
much nearer and was approaching the formation at high speed. Actually,
from the LOUISVILLE track chart, she did not track this target. She merely
appears to have (a) plotted something at 0354 and something else again at
about 0404, (b) concluded that both plots were on the same target, and (c)
then drawn a line between these two plots and have called that an indication
of the enemy course and speed. What the first target was is not known.
Perhaps it was a phantom; perhaps it was one of the low flying Japanese
planes in the vicinity which had given, at times, weak target indications to
certain units. For example, Attack Section TWO had noticed this at 0351.
The second target, as will be discussed presently, was an Allied destroyer.
* Action Report DENVER, Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0031, November 4th, 1944.
** Ibid., Enclosure (B).
490 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
The LOUISVILLE now trained her secondary (5-inch) battery on her
new target and, at 0404:30, commenced firing on bearing 183°(T), range
7,000 yards. This was the bearing and range of the destroyer ALBERT W.
GRANT which, at this very moment, was launching her first salvo of torpedoes
at the YAMASHIRO.
Thus, commencing at 0404, two Allied cruisers were firing at the
ALBERT W. GRANT.
Although the LOUISVILLE reported hits on this target (ALBERT W.
GRANT), it is very doubtful that she made any, for (a) she had tracked the
target on course 250° (T), speed twenty-two and one-half knots* (the target
was actually on course 270°(T), speed twenty-five knots),** (b) the ALBERT
W, GRANT reported that, except for the 6-inch hits which had entered her
starboard side, all other hits had entered "her port side,** (c) any hits
made by the LOUISVILLE would necessarily have entered from the starboard
side and (d) the LOUISVILLE was firing 5-inch projectiles.
The foregoing was unknown to Commander Left Flank Force, who, as
has been mentioned previously, had made no target designation.
At 0406 Commander Left Flank Force began to receive reports from
the Commanding Officer DENVER, first, to the effect that enemy shell
splashes were landing nearby, and secondly, at 0407, that the DENVER had
been straddled.*** In order to throw off the enemy fire he immediately
increased speed to fifteen knots.****
At 0408 he received two urgent messages in succession from COMDESRON
FIFTY-SIX to the effect that friendly units were firing on DESRON FIFTY-SIX
in the middle of the channel.*****
Whether or not he had located DESRON FIFTY-SIX in the middle of the
channel — the LOUISVILLE track chart shows a brief plot of the NEWCOMB
commencing at 0407* — is not known, but as CTG 77.2, at 0409, he ordered all
ships to cease firing.****** He then ordered COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX to get
his ships out of the channel.***** He received the reply that DESRON FIFTY-
SIX was clearing the channel at full speed.***** It is clear from this that
neither COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX nor Commander Left Flank Force were aware that
the ALBERT W. GRANT had been heavily hit.
*~ Track Chart, Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off
Surigao Strait, Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 0045, November 7th, 1944.
** Action Report ALBERT W. GRANT, Operations against Central Philippines,
Leyte Area, and Night Surface Action against Japanese Task Force in
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0106, November 11th,
1944.
*** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
**** Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao Strait,
Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0045,
November 7th, 1944.
***** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
****** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
491 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
0348 - 0U20, October 25th
During the above period the cruisers fired main battery ammunition
and had ammunition remaining as follows:
FIRED
AP
HC
LOUISVILLE
243
0
PORTLAND
162
0
MINNEAPOLIS
237
0
DENVER
931*
37
COLUMBIA
844
_0
TOTAL
2417
37
REMAINING
AP HC
406
564
165
95
78
165
269*
1083
-256
120
1274
2027
At 0412 it became apparent to him that the leading enemy ship was
retiring, which meant that all enemy ships were now retiring. He was
anxious to resume fire to prevent the escape of these ships. However, he
believed that the left flank cruisers were too far to the east and he
decided to reverse course to be in a better position to take the enemy
under fire. He, therefore, at 0414, commenced a turn by simultaneous
individual ship turns to port to 270° (T).**
While his reasons for changing course to the westward are clear in
that he was already far to the east and wished to regain station on the
battle line which had been on a westerly course for some twelve minutes,
his reasons for changing course to port rather than to starboard are not
clear. There were no apparent reasons for changing course to port; there
were several for changing course to starboard. Among these latter were (a)
the enemy was retiring and it was necessary to keep them within gun range
and (b) the left flank force, which properly belonged 14,000 yards, bearing
120° (T) from the guide of the battle line (MISSISSIPPI), was now only 5,000
yards from that guide.
At 0419, as he (CTG 77.2) issued the order to CTG 77.3 to resume
firing, the leading enemy ship suddenly disappeared from the radar screens
and was assumed sunk,*** There were now no enemy targets within gun range.
* Estimated. The DENVER reported having on hand after Battle of Surigao
Strait 113 rounds of 6-inch AP. However, as will be shown later, the
ammunition expended by the DENVER embraced the 6-inch AP fired during
the period (a) 0351:30 - 0404 and 0406 - 0409 and (b) fired during the
period 0531 - 0538. The amount of ammunition fired during the latter
period is not known but since the COLUMBIA at this time fired 200 rounds
in nine minutes, it is assumed that the DENVER, which fired for seven
minutes, fired at the same rate and therefore fired seven-ninths of 200
rounds or 156 rounds. This added to the 113 rounds which the DENVER had
remaining at the end of the battle would give 269 rounds remaining at
0409.
Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao Strait,
Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0045,
November 7th, 1944.
Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
492 CONFIDENTIAL
*-*
*-##
COM ATTACK SECTION ONE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
At 0420 the LOUISVILLE was bearing 339°(T), distant 8,300 yards
from Kanhandon Point Light, Hibuson Island,
(a) Operations of COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX, 0348 - 0420, October 25th.
(1) Operations of Commander Attack Section ONE, 0348 - 0420,
October 25th.
Commander Attack Section ONE, with Attack Section ONE,
continued to approach the enemy on course 170°(T), speed fifteen knots. At
0348 he observed that the leading Japanese ship was about 20,000 yards from
the NEWCOMB.
At 0350 he intercepted a message from CTG 77.2 advising the
cruisers of TG 77.2 that he was about to open fire.* At this moment his
attack section was about to cross the line of advance of the left flank
cruisers about 5,000 yards eastward of the LOUISVILLE* A minute later, at
0351, he intercepted CTG 77.2' s order for the cruisers to open fire.** He
then noted that these cruisers had opened fire shortly thereafter.***
At the moment of opening fire it is highly probable that
he checked the locations of his other two attack units. If he did so he
noted that Attack Section TWO was about 3,000 yards directly ahead of the
NEWCOMB and Attack Section THREE had crossed astern of the COLUMBIA. It
was important to know the above locations and to follow the movements of
the attack groups thereafter in order that proper coordination might be
maintained between all three sections.
THE SITUATION WAS DEVELOPING AS ANTICIPATED. HIS DESTROYERS
WOULD NOW LAUNCH THEIR TORPEDOES AT A TARGET WHICH WAS UNDER HEAVY GUNFIRE.
HE COULD SEE THAT HIS ATTACK SECTION TWO WOULD BE CLEAR OF THIS GUNFIRE BUT
THAT ATTACK SECTIONS ONE AND THREE WOULD ULTIMATELY BE IN THE LINE OF FIRE.
HOWEVER, HE SAW NO REASON FOR CHANGING HIS PLAN, EVEN THOUGH THE GUNFIRE
CAUSED THE ENEMY TARGETS TO MANEUVER, FOR HIS MULTIPLE SECTOR ATTACK WAS
DESIGNED TO COVER ANY ENEMY MANEUVERS RESULTING FROM THE GUNFIRE OF THE
BATTLE DISPOSITION. THIS DECISION TO CONTINUE HIS ATTACK PLAN IS CONSIDERED
CORRECT.
At this same time (0351) he increased speed to twenty-five
knots.****
* Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
*** Action Report COMDESRON 56, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0013, October 29th, 1944.
**** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
493 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION ONE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
At 0353 he intercepted a message from Commanding Officer
WEST VIRGINIA to Commander Battle Line that the WEST VIRGINIA was about
to open fire. At this time he noted from a position considerably removed
from the line of fire that Allied cruiser shells were already hitting the
enemy with devastating accuracy and that their "arched line of tracers in
the darkness looked like a continual stream of lighted railroad cars
going over a hill",*
Also at 0353, since (a) he had tracked the enemy on course
000° (T) at a speed of twelve knots and (b) both of his other attack sections
appeared to be well on their way, he decided that it was now necessary to
commence his approach and, therefore, changed course without signal to
210°(T).* At this time the leading enemy ship was bearing 205°(T), range
15,500 yards.
The Commanding Officer of the ALBERT W. GRANT, which was
the trailing destroyer of the section, now, for unexplained reasons,
decided to steer course 200°(T)*» instead of the 210°(T) being steered by
the other two ships of the section. Perhaps this was because the RICHARD
P. LEARY had not increased speed to twenty-five knots at 0351 but instead,
for unexplained reasons, had remained at fifteen knots.
At 0354, over the TBS voice radio, he heard Commander
Attack Section TWO order his section to standby to fire torpedoes. This
likely alerted him to the fact that that section was about to fire torpedoes
for, from the radar scope, he could see that it was rapidly approaching a
suitable firing position and might fire some minutes before Section ONE.
Why he, as COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX, did not slow down Section TWO somewhat is
not known.
Except for the picture on the radar scope, he knew nothing
at this time of the actions of his Commander Attack Section THREE because,
as has been mentioned earlier, that commander was controlling his section
by the use of MN voice radio. However, since that commander appeared to be
in good position for a coordinated attack, he was probably not concerned
over their relative positions.
HE DID NOTHING TO COORDINATE THE OPERATIONS OF HIS ATTACK
SECTIONS WITH THOSE OF HIS OWN SECTION, AND APPARENTLY EITHER (A) LEFT IT
TO THE DISCRETION OF THEIR COMMANDERS TO EFFECT COORDINATION, (B) CONSIDERED
THAT, IN VIEW OF THEIR PRESENT RELATIVE POSITIONS, A COORDINATED ATTACK
WOULD BE MADE, OR (C) IGNORED THE MATTER ENTIRELY.
At 0356, when he heard Commander Attack Section TWO order
his section to fire torpedoes,* he knew that unless (a) he fired as soon as
he came within the effective range of his intermediate speed torpedoes,
* Action Report COMDESRON 56, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0013, October 29th, 1944.
** Action Report ALBERT W. GRANT, Operations against Central Philippines,
Leyte Area, and Night Surface Action, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
against Japanese Task Force in Surigao Strait, Serial 0106, November
11th, 1944.
494 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION ONE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
which should be in a matter of several minutes since the range to the target
was now about 13,700 yards,* and (b) Commander Attack Section THREE did
likewise, the chance of a three section multiple attack would quickly pass.
However, before he could take any action in this matter, he
was faced with a problem even more serious that that of coordination. His
radar now began showing indications that the target might be friendly.**
This caused considerable confusion and required immediate checking because
he feared that his target instead of being Japanese might well be one or
more ships of DESRON FIFTY-FOUR (he likely meant DESRON TWENTY-FOUR), the
position of which was unknown to him. This checking took a few minutes and
may account for the fact that he did not increase the speed of his own
section to endeavor to reduce the time which would elapse between the torpedo
firing by Attack Section TWO and that of his own section, as well as of
Attack Section THREE.
Actually, COMDESRON FIFTY-FOUR* s two attack groups were no
longer in the combat area of Surigao Strait having already arrived in the
vicinity of their post-attack rendezvous,*** and COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR' a
two attack groups were attacking by gunfire from a position about 10,000
yards to the westward of the enemy, and were not in a position to interfere
with DESRON FIFTY-SIX (Diagram "J").
As he approached his target he observed that the shells
fired by the battleships and cruisers of the battle line were passing
overhead and were heavily hitting the enemy.**
He now, at 0357, intercepted Commander Attack Section TWO's
orders to make smoke and, at 0358, to (a) change course by emergency turn
to 000° (T) and (b) watch out for the beach.**** From these orders and from
his radar scope, he could see that Commander Attack Section TWO was
apparently turning to retire up the west side of Hibuson Island.
At this time he knew that the ships of Attack Section THREE
had commenced firing torpedoes, for the LEUTZE had reported, at 0358, over
TBS voice radio, that her torpedoes were away.***** This fact assured him
that at least the two flank sections had delivered a coordinated attack.
At this time he changed course to 200° (T), presumably preparatory to firing
starboard torpedoes .******
* Track Chart, Action Report NEWCOMB, Battle of Surigao Strait,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0044, October 31st, 1944.
** Action Report COMDESRON 56, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th
25th, 1944, Serial 0013, October 29th, 1944.
*** Action Report CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54), Night Action in Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 055,
November 12th, 1944.
**** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
***** Deck Log NEWCOMB, October 25th, 1944.
****** Action Report RICHARD P. LEARY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 103, November 7th, 1944.
495 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION ONE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
Although the range had now fallen to about 9,200 yards* the
question as to the friendly or enemy character of the target being tracked
by him had not as yet been finally settled. Conditions were reassuring,
however, since (a) he had tracked this target for a long time and had
definitely recognized it as a large ship,** (b) he stated later that at this
time he could see "the devastating accuracy of the cruiser fire",** and
certainly could see that his target was the target being fired upon and was
therefore enemy, and (c) he knew that if, somehow, an Allied destroyer had
come into his line of fire it was a simple matter to set his torpedoes at
twenty- two feet which would pass under such a destroyer without danger.
Meanwhile, he wisely decided to continue on his present
course and speed to close the enemy until such time as he had cleared up
the above confusion relating to the friendly or enemy character of the
target. He was not too concerned about this since the delay would improve
the range and possibly track angle.
At 0359, when he had finally decided that the target was
enemy, he noted that the enemy was firing guns and that the leading enemy
ship was slowing down and turning to the westward,** The range was closing
rapidly, and by 0400, as the target continued to turn, the range had
decreased to about 7,000 yards.***
While it would have been possible, shortly after this time,
to have fired his intermediate speed torpedoes to starboard as originally
planned, since Attack Section ONE would have arrived within the effective
range of such intermediate speed torpedoes (roughly 6,000 yards), it would
have been unwise to have done so because such an attack was likely to be
highly ineffective. The reasons are (a) the target was turning radically
and its new course could not be estimated with any degree of certainty,
(b) the range to the target at this time, while within the effective range
of the intermediate speed torpedoes, was the maximum permissible by doctrine,
and (c) even if the target should steady on a westerly course, which would
be a change of course of about ninety degrees, the probability of hits
would be low since long range overtaking torpedoes have the lowest hit
factor of any target angle,****
Up to this time, it had been his intention to (a) turn to
the eastward and to fire torpedoes to starboard***** and (b) retire toward
his post-attack rendezvous north of Hibuson Island. However, he now decided
to turn to the westward and, therefore, at 0400, by TBS voice radio ordered
(a) a 90° course change to right and (b) "get ready to fire".*****
*~ Track Chart, Action Report NEWCOMB, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0044, October 31st, 1944.
** Action Report COMDESRON 56, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0013, October 29th, 1944.
*** Action Report NEWCOMB, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 0044, October 31st, 1944.
**** Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-43, Destroyer Torpedo Attack
Instructions, issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific Fleet, Serial
01264, October 24th, 1943.
***** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D),
496 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION ONE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
HIS DECISION WAS OF COURSE CORRECT FOR HE WAS THERE TO
DELIVER AN EFFECTIVE TORPEDO ATTACK WHICH COULD ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY
OBTAINING A SUITABLE FIRING POSITION WHERE THE TARGET ANGLE AND THE RANGE
WOULD BE FAVORABLE. THIS CLEARLY REQUIRED A CHANGE OF COURSE TO THE WEST.
IN MAKING THIS DECISION HE UNDOUBTEDLY REALIZED THAT HE WOULD BE IN THE
CENTER OF THE STRAIT FOR A MUCH LONGER PERIOD THAN HE HAD ANTICIPATED AND
WOULD, THEREFORE, BE MORE EXPOSED THAN EVER TO POSSIBLE ENEMY GUNFIRE.
By this time the Commanding Officer of the SHIGURE, who at
0356 had commenced reversing course to starboard, had completed his turn.
It is not clear whether or not Commander Attack Section ONE had observed
the movements of this destroyer on his radar scope for he makes no mention
of her in his action report. However, since he refers to the enemy column
it seems likely that he was aware of her presence but had decided that his
correct physical objective was the large ship since he had been ordered to
"get the big boys"»
At 0401 he observed that the enemy was steadying on a
westerly course and, therefore, he steadied the NEWCOMB on course 270°(T).*
At this time he planned, upon completion of firing, to cross to the western
shore and to retire up the western shoreline where he would be joined by
Commander Attack Section THREE.
By about 0402 having determined that (a) the present course
of the enemy ship was about 290°(T), speed nine knots,* (b) the range to the
target was well within the effective range of his intermediate speed
torpedoes, and (c) he had succeeded in reaching a good firing position
although not the optimum — he issued a preparatory signal to standby torpedoes
and at 0403 ordered "fire when ready, and retire with smoke"***
HIS DECISION TO FIRE BEFORE REACHING THE OPTIMUM FIRING
POSITION, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN FORWARD OF THE BEAM OF THE ENEMY SHIP,
APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SOUND DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE WAS NOT UNDER FIRE AND
MIGHT HAVE DELAYED FIRING UNTIL AN EVEN BETTER FIRING POSITION HAD BEEN
OBTAINED. THIS SEEMS SO BECAUSE THE MOVEMENTS OF THE TARGET, ALTHOUGH
UNCERTAIN, SEEMED TO BE REASONABLY FIRM, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT, AND
THEREFORE, IT WAS BETTER TO FIRE WITH A GOOD SOLUTION THAN TO DELAY FOR A
BETTER SOLUTION AND PERHAPS LOSE THE PRESENT GOOD FIRING OPPORTUNITY.
In the meantime, the Commanding Officer (a) RICHARD P. LEARY
realizing that he was now about 2,500 yards astern of the NEWCOMB and
continuing to fall farther behind had at 0358 increased speed to twenty-
five knots and (b) ALBERT W. GRANT likewise had increased speed to twenty-
five knots. Now at 0403 the Commanding Officer RICHARD P. LEARY followed
very shortly by the Commanding Officer ALBERT W. GRANT commenced changing
course to starboard to course 270° (T) to follow in the track of the section
leader (NEWCOMB).
* Action Report NEWCOMB, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 0044, October 31st, 1944.
** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
496799 0-59 -42 497 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION ONE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
At this time the ALBERT W. GRANT was about 400 yards on
the port quarter of the RICHARD P. LEARY and therefore about 300 yards
south of the NEWCOMB1 s track.
At 0404 the NEWCOMB, using broadside fire to port commenced
firing a half salvo of five intermediate speed torpedoes on base torpedo
course 213° (T) at the battleship (which she had recognized as a FUSO class
battleship)* bearing 200°(T), target angle 90°, range 6,200 yards and
tracked on course 290°(T), speed nine knots. Depth setting was six feet,
firing interval three seconds, torpedo spread one degree, and in addition,
because the base torpedo course was beyond the limit of torpedo tube train,
about 40° right gyro angle was set on the torpedoes.** All torpedoes
appeared to run hot, straight and normal. The NEWCOMB now continued on
course 270°(T) at speed twenty- five knots.
As previously discussed, the Commanding Officer RICHARD P.
LEARY had lost distance on the NEWCOMB. Noticing this, he had increased
speed to twenty-seven knots during the turn to 270°(T).*** After completing
the turn he, at 0404:01, using broadside fire to port, commenced firing a
half salvo of five intermediate speed torpedoes on base torpedo course
223°(T) at the large target (which he believed to be a FUSO class battleship
but which was probably the splashes from the shorts of the Allied heavy
ships) bearing 223°(T), target angle 101°, range 7,200 yards and tracked
on course 302°(T) at speed zero.**** Depth setting was six feet, firing
interval three seconds and torpedo spread one degree. A gyro angle of
33° right was set on the torpedoes. (See summary of Torpedo Attacks of
Attack Section ONE at 0420.)
He quickly learned that (a) only three torpedoes had left
the ship, as two of the five had misfired electrically and could not be
immediately fired by percussion because the man assigned to "ride the
breech" had fallen to the deck, (b) when ready to fire by percussion a
short time later, fire had been withheld "because the ALBERT W. GRANT
following was by this time in line of fire",**** and (c) the three torpedoes
fired were observed to run hot, straight and normal.**** He now forgot to
advise his section commander that he had completed firing.
At 0404 the Commanding Officer ALBERT W. GRANT observed that
a large explosion had occurred in the Japanese Main Body***** (this explosion
was in the YAMASHIRO). Since no torpedoes were crossing the YAMASHIRO track
at that time, the explosion must have been caused by shellfire.
*~ Action Report COMDESRON 56, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0013, October 29th, 1944.
** Action Report NEWCOMB, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 0044, October 31st, 1944.
*** Torpedo Track Chart, Action Report RICHARD P. LEARY, Battle of
Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 103, November 7th, 1944.
**** Action Report RICHARD P. LEARY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 103, November 7th, 1944.
***** Action Report ALBERT W. GRANT, Operations against Central Philippines,
Leyte Area, and Night Surface Action against Japanese Task Force in
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0106, November
Uth, 1944.
498 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION ONE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
At 0404:18, just as he was completing his turn to 270°(T),
using broadside fire to port, he commenced firing a half salvo of five
intermediate speed torpedoes on base torpedo course 209° (T) at the large
target bearing 209°(T), target angle 129°, range 6,900 yards and tracked
on course 260°(T) at speed zero.* Depth setting was six feet, firing
interval three seconds and torpedo spread one degree. A gyro angle of 24°
right was set on the torpedoes. All torpedoes appeared to run hot, straight
and normal.**
At 0404:30 the Commanding Officer ALBERT W. GRANT observed
that he was being fired on by friendly ships in the Allied battle disposition
as well as by the enemy and that he was being straddled by both. He
expressed this in his action report as follows: "0404:30 Ship began to be
straddled by gunfire", "from both sides."** He promptly increased speed.
This firing from the Allied side was by the LOUISVILLE which at this very
time had opened fire with her 5-inch battery.***
At this time a torpedo wake was observed about twenty feet
astern of the ALBERT W. GRANT which led the commanding officer to believe
that the torpedo had probably passed under his ship. What ship fired this
torpedo remains unknown since there is no data which shows the direction
from whence it came. It could have been a lone torpedo fired earlier by
one of the damaged Japanese destroyers; it could also have been one of the
KILLE^s torpedoes which had been fired at 0350 employing low speed and a
twenty- two foot depth setting. Diagram "J" shows this possibility clearly
although this torpedo would necessarily have had to run beyond its designed
range (14*000 yards) and possibly beyond its designed speed.
At about 0405:30, when the torpedoes of the BENNION which
were headed for another target should have crossed the track of the enemy
battleship, a second large explosion followed by flames on the battleship
were observed by the Commanding Officer ALBERT W. GRANT who noted at the
same time that this same battleship was being heavily hit by Allied shells.**
What caused the above explosion then cannot be completely evaluated for a
BENNION torpedo may have hit the battleship, or the gunfire may have caused
the explosion.
* Since (a) the ALBERT W. GRANT track chart shows that from 0356 to 0404
the YAMASHIRO had run 700 yards on a course of about 260° (T) and (b)
it takes about three minutes to establish speed zero, it was assumed
in the above plotting that she fired at the YAMASHIRO in its 0400
position rather than its actual 0404 position. This is verified by the
0404:30 ranges and bearings from the DENVER and the LOUISVILLE which
accurately locate the ALBERT W. GRANT.
** Action Report ALBERT W. GRANT, Operations against Central Philippines,
Leyte Area, and Night Surface Action against Japanese Task Force in
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0106, November 11th,
1944.
*** Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao Strait,
Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0045,
November 7th, 1944.
499 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION ONE
0348 - 0420, October 25th
At 0406 (a) Commander Attack Section ONE received a message
from the Commanding Officer ALBERT W. GRANT reporting that she had fired
torpedoes,* and (b) the DENVER commenced firing with her main battery on
the ALBERT W. GRANT.**
About this time Commander Attack Section ONE observed that
the enemy had now located him for enemy shells began straddling his command.
This concerned him for he could expect that one or more of his ships would
likely be hit presently.
HE WAS NOW CONFRONTED WITH A DIFFICULT SITUATION. HE HAD
FIRED HIS TORPEDOES AND IT WAS VITAL THAT HE RETIRE IN SUCH MANNER AS TO
RECEIVE THE LEAST DAMAGE FROM ENEMY GUNFIRE. HE DECIDED THAT HIS BEST
COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO CHANGE COURSE TO THE NORTH BECAUSE HE WISHED "TO
PRESENT THE SMALLEST TARGET ANGLE AND PRODUCE THE GREATEST OPENING RANGE
RATE",*** AND SO ADVISED THE COMMANDING OFFICER NEWCOMB, WHO IMMEDIATELY
COMPLIED BY CHANGING COURSE TO THE NORTH AND AT THE SAME TIME, INCREASING
SPEED TO THIRTY- TWO KNOTS.****
THIS DECISION TO RETIRE TO THE NORTH BY COLUMN MOVEMENT IS
CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN OF DOUBTFUL CORRECTNESS FOR IT (A) WOULD PERMIT THE
ENEMY TO CROSS THE "T" OF HIS SECTION, AND (B) MIGHT CAUSE FRIENDLY UNITS
TO MAKE THE LOGICAL ERROR OF MISTAKING THE SECTION FOR AN ENEMY TORPEDO
ATTACK ON THE BATTLE DISPOSITION. HE STATED LATER THAT IN MAKING THIS
DECISION HE HAD REJECTED THE WESTERLY COURSE ON THE GROUND THAT HIS SHIPS
WOULD PROBABLY RECEIVE VERY HEAVY AND UNACCEPTABLE GUNFIRE DAMAGE*** AND,
THEREFORE, A RADICAL CHANGE OF COURSE AND SPEED WAS NECESSARY IF THE ENEMY
GUNFIRE WAS TO BE REDUCED IN EFFECTIVENESS.
WHILE IT IS ACCEPTED THAT SUCH A RADICAL CHANGE OF COURSE
WAS PROBABLY URGENT AT THIS TIME, IT IS NOT ACCEPTED THAT THE CHANGE OF
COURSE TO THE NORTH BY COLUMN MOVEMENT WAS CORRECT. WOULD IT NOT HAVE BEEN
WISER HAD HE ORDERED A CHANGE OF COURSE MORE TO THE NORTHEASTWARD BY
EMERGENCY SHIP TURNS SINCE THIS WOULD HAVE PREVENTED FORMING A "KNUCKLE" OF
MORE THAN ONE SHIP AT THE POINT OF TURNING? IN THIS CONNECTION IT SEEMS
WISE AT THIS TIME TO POINT OUT THAT IT IS A RECOGNIZED TACTICAL ERROR TO
CHANGE COURSE BY COLUMN MOVEMENT IN SUCH MANNER AS TO FORM A "KNUCKLE"
WITHIN EASY GUN RANGE OF A POWERFUL ENEMY. SUCH A "KNUCKLE" HAS OCCURRED
IN NUMEROUS NAVAL BATTLES, AND NOTABLY AT THE BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA IN 1904
WHERE THE JAPANESE BATTLE LINE REVERSED COURSE BY COLUMN MOVEMENT WITHIN
EFFECTIVE GUN RANGE (UNDER 10,000 YARDS) OF THE RUSSIAN BATTLE LINE AND
ESCAPED HEAVY DAMAGE, AND POSSIBLY THE LOSS OF THE BATTLE, BECAUSE THE
RUSSIANS, WHO HAD IMMEDIATELY ENDEAVORED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS ERROR BY
OPENING FIRE, (THE RANGE WAS 8,000 YARDS OR LESS) HAD SUFFERED THE TWIN
MISFORTUNES OF POOR AMMUNITION AND EQUALLY POOR GUNNERY.
*~~ Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
Action Report DENVER, Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 0031, November 4th, 1944.
Action Report COMDESRON 56, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0013, October 29th, 1944.
Action Report NEWCOMB, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 0044, October 31st, 1944.
#*
www
■jrJrir
-JB*-*
500
CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION ONE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
A CHANGE OF COURSE BY SHIP TURNS WOULD ALSO (A) HAVE
INTERFERED GREATLY WITH THE ENEMY GUNFIRE, (B) HAVE PREVENTED ENFILADE ON
RETIREMENT, (C) LIKELY HAVE IDENTIFIED THE UNIT MORE CLEARLY TO OWN FORCES,
(D) HAVE HEADED THE SECTION TOWARD ITS DESIGNATED POST-ATTACK RENDEZVOUS
(THREE MILES NORTH OF HIBUSON ISLAND) AND (E) REDUCED THE TIME INVOLVED IN
CLEARING THE AREA.
In connection with item (E), the Commanding Officer ALBERT
W. GRANT commented as follows: wIn addition, it is an opinion held by
this command that after launching torpedoes the 'turn away' from the enemy
battle line should be by simultaneous ship movements instead of by column
movement in order to further reduce the time involved in clearing the
enemy. "*
About 0406:30 the Commanding Officer ALBERT W. GRANT swung
his ship to the right and back to the left,** probably for the purpose of
interfering with the enemy's solution of the gunfire problem. During these
maneuvers he commenced laying "funnel smoke" „* Shortly after falling in
astern of the RICHARD P. LEARY (about 0407:30) he started to swing to the
right to 310°(T).** While he gives no reason for this it seems probable
that he did it to (a) avoid the use of gyro angle and (b) close the distance
to the NEWCOMB by "cutting the corner". As he commenced swinging he
received his first shell hit which landed among the empty powder cases
stacked across the fantail and disabled the after 5-inch gun. Fortunately
it did not affect his speed or steering.
He immediately ordered the remaining five torpedoes which
were in the forward mount fired.* He presumably did this because (a) he
was in a good firing position, (b) enemy gunfire was accurate and he was
planning therefore to clear the area immediately and (c) mindful of doctrine
that "a sinking cruiser or destroyer fires her torpedoes at the best
available enemy target...",*** he desired to insure that his torpedoes were
launched before increased damage made it impossible.
In the meantime, the Commanding Officer RICHARD P. LEARY
did not follow the track of the NEWCOMB but continued on to the west at
twenty-seven knots.**** He did not increase speed to thirty- two knots
because neither the section commander nor the Commanding Officer NEWCOMB
had advised him of this change in speed.
* Action Report ALBERT W. GRANT, Operations against Central Philippines,
Leyte Area, and Night Surface Action against Japanese Task Force in
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0106, November
11th, 1944.
** Ibid., Enclosure (A).
*** War Instructions, United States Navy (FTP 143A), United States Fleet,
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, 1944, Chapter 12, Section
XII, Paragraph 12173 (d),
**** Action Report RICHARD P. LEARY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 103, November 7th, 1944.
501 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION ONE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
In the meantime, Commander Attack Section ONE appears to
have realized that his change of course to the north was unwise in that his
section would now be enfiladed by Japanese gunfire for, at 0407 his flagship
(NEWCOMB) changed course to 030°(T), commenced zigzagging and began making
smoke,*
At about 0408 Commander Attack Section ONE noted that salvos
from the Allied battle disposition were falling in the vicinity of the
NEWCOMB.* He immediately changed course to the right to 060°(T),*
presumably to avoid the gunfire, and informed CTG 77.2 over the TBS voice
radio that TG 77.2 was firing on DESRON FIFTY-SIX in the middle of the
channel.** He quickly repeated the message and was pleased to hear CTG 77.2,
at 0409, order all ships to "cease firing".** He then received an order
from CTG 77.2 to get his ships out of the channel as soon as possible.**
To this he replied that he was getting out of the channel at full speed.**
At this time he did not realize that the ALBERT W. GRANT had been heavily
hit and was not following in column. It seems clear that his failure to
know this was due to the fact that he had not kept his destroyers closed up,
but rather permitted them to straggle badly with the result that the ALBERT
W. GRANT, at 0408 was about 1,700 yards astern of the NEWCOMB instead of
the normal 1,000 yards.
At about this time (0408:12) the Commanding Officer ALBERT
W. GRANT, using broadside fire to port, fired a second half salvo of five
intermediate speed torpedoes, on base torpedo course 203° (T) at the battle-
ship target. No information concerning the bearing, target angle, range or
target course and speed is available. The depth setting was six feet, the
firing interval three seconds, and torpedo spread one degree. All torpedoes
appeared to run hot, straight and normal.***
Upon completion of firing, the Commanding Officer ALBERT W.
GRANT continued turning farther to the right to course 0CO°(T)***in order
to follow the preceding two ships of his section in column.
At 0409 the Commanding Officer NEWCOMB, while making full
speed, changed course to 075°(T)****in order to head for the post-attack
rendezvous, which it will be recalled, was the west end of Screening Station
THREE. At this time the (a) RICHARD P. LEARY was still making twenty-seven
knots on a westerly course and (b) ALBERT W. GRANT, which had been badly
damaged, was swinging slowly to a northerly course and slowing rapidly, due
to loss of power*
* Action Report NEWCOMB, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 0044, October 31st, 1944.
** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
*** Action Report ALBERT W. GRANT, Operations against Central Philippines,
Leyte Area, and Night Surface Action against Japanese Task Force in
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0106, November 11th,
1944.
**** Action Report NEWCOMB, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 0044, October 31st, 1944, Enclosure (A).
502 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION ONE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
At 0410 the RICHARD P. LEARY also changed course to 000°(T).*
About this same time the ALBERT W. GRANT'S first half salvo of five torpedoes
crossed the track of the YAMASHIRO but passed well astern of her and there-
fore missed.
Shortly after this (at 0411) the RICHARD P. LEARY steadied
on course 000°(T). At this moment the commanding officer suddenly observed
four torpedo wakes, two on the starboard side and two on the port side,
which paralleled his course,* These were clearly the MOGAMI torpedoes
which had been fired at about 0401:30,** He endeavored to report these
torpedoes but, owing to the congestion on the TBS voice radio circuit, was
unable to do so until about two minutes later,*** After the torpedoes had
passed he changed course to 075° (T) in order to follow the NEWCOMB.
At 0411 Commander Attack Section ONE observed that the
ALBERT W. GRANT had been hit and was slowing,**** His flagship immediately
commenced tracking the damaged ship while he, with deep concern, awaited
word from her as to the nature of her damage.
At this time, because he had heard fragmentary portions of
her report about torpedo wakes, he was also concerned about the RICHARD P,
LEARY which was 4,400 yards astern. He, therefore, at 0412 queried the
commanding officer of that destroyer as follows: "Are you all right?
Clear the channel as soon as you can."*** At 0413 he received a message
that the RICHARD P. LEARY was passing through torpedo water,*** It seems
likely that at this time the Commanding Officer RICHARD P. LEARY increased
speed to maximum.
Between 0411 and 0412 the NEWCOMB 's torpedoes also crossed
the track of the target. It seems likely from graphic analysis that at
least one torpedo hit was scored on the YAMASHIRO. (A warrant officer
survivor of the YAMASHIRO reported that she had received four torpedo
hits,)***** This analysis confirms the report of the Commanding Officer
RICHARD P. LEARY who reported later having observed two large explosions
in the target at 0411:30,
Between 0412 and 0413 the RICHARD P. LEARY* s torpedoes
crossed well astern of the target and therefore all missed.
Between 0413 and 0415:30 the ALBERT W. GRANT'S second half
salvo of five torpedoes crossed the track of the YAMASHIRO but passed well
astern*
*~ Action Report RICHARD P. LEARY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 103, November 7th, 1944.
** Report on SHO Operation by Lieutenant Fukushi, ex-IJN, Control
Station Officer and Fire Data Computer Officer, MOGAMI, December
1945, Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-39A.
*** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
**** Action Report NEWCOMB, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0044, October 31st, 1944.
***** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944.
503 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION ONE
0348 - 0420, October 25th
Meanwhile, the NEtfCOMB and RICHARD P. LEARY were rapidly
clearing the channel and by 0415 the NEWCOMB was to the northwestward of
Hibuson Island. The NEWCOMB, which had been tracking the ALBERT W. GRANT,
noted her to be making slow speed in the center of the channel.*
TO SUMMARIZE THE TORPEDO ATTACK OF ATTACK SECTION ONE,
DURING THIS PERIOD (0348 - 0420) THE DESTROYERS FIRED A TOTAL OF EIGHTEEN
TORPEDOES— NEWCOMB (FIVE), RICHARD P. LEARY (THREE) AND ALBERT W. GRANT
(TEN)— AND MADE ONE HIT FOR A HIT PERCENTAGE OF FIVE POINT FIVE PER CENT.
THESE DESTROYERS HAD TORPEDOES REMAINING AS FOLLOWS: NEWCOMB (FIVE),
RICHARD P. LEARY (SEVEN), ALBERT W. GRANT (ZERO).
THE RICHARD P. LEARY «S HALF SALVO AND THE ALBERT W. GRANT'S
FIRST HALF SALVO OF TORPEDOES MISSED BECAUSE:
(A) THE RICHARD P. LEARY FIRED AT A PHANTOM TARGET
(BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN FALL OF SHOT). THIS SEEMS SO FOR THE FOLLOWING
REASONS: (l) SHE REPORTED THE TARGET TO BE BEARING 223°(T); (2) THE
NEWCOMB REPORTED THE SAME TARGET TO BE BEARING 200° (T) AND THE ALBERT W.
GRANT 209° (T); THEREFORE, THE CORRECT BEARING FOR THE RICHARD P. LEARY
SHOULD HAVE BEEN BETWEEN 200°(T) AND 209°(T); (3) NO ENEMY SHIPS WERE ON OR
NEAR THE BEARING REPORTED; (4) SHE REPORTED THE TARGET SPEED AS ZERO WHEN,
IN FACT, IT WAS ABOUT TWELVE KNOTS; AND (5) SHE REPORTED THE RANGE AS 7,200
YARDS WHEN, IN FACT, IT WAS ABOUT 6,200 YARDS.
(B) THE ALBERT W. GRANT TRACKED THE TARGET ON COURSE 260° (T)
AT SPEED ZERO WHICH ALSO INDICATED THAT SHE HAD LOST THE TARGET IN THE
EXTENSIVE FALL OF SHOT AROUND THE TARGET AND SINCE HER TORPEDO PROBLEM
SOLUTION WAS OTHERWISE CORRECT, HER TORPEDOES NECESSARILY MISSED ASTERN.
At 0416 Commander Attack Section ONE informed CTG 77.2 over
the TBS voice radio that the ALBERT W. GRANT was due west of Hibuson Island
and was proceeding slowly on course north. At 0418 he received a TBS voice
radio message from CTG 77.2 asking whether he was now clear, or was he
still in the channel. He replied to the effect that the NEWCOMB and
RICHARD P. LEARY were clear of the channel bu that the ALBERT W. GRANT was
proceeding slowly northward (in the channel).**
At 0419 he intercepted CTG 77.2's TBS voice radio message
to Commander Right Flank Force to "Resume Fire".**
At 0420 the ALBERT W. GRANT was dead in the water and in
danger of sinking. She was bearing 287°(T), distant 11,000 yards from
Kanhandon Point Light, Hibuson Island. Tne NEWCOMB, with RICHARD P. LEARY
about 6,000 yards astern, was bearing 004°(T), distant 5,200 yards from
the same point.
* Action Report NEWCOMB, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 0044, October 31st, 1944.
** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
504
CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION TWO
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
(2) Operations of Commander Attack Section TWO, 0348 - 0420,
October 25th.
Commander Attack Section TWO in ROBINSON with HALFORD and
BRYANT continued his approach on course 170°(T) at thirty knots.
At 0349 he ordered the ROBINSON to change course to 158°(T).*
The other ships were following the flagship in follow- the-leader tactics.
This change of course was to head Attack Section TWO toward
the firing point which Commander Attack Section TWO had previously chosen
and which was to be no nearer the enemy than 8,000 yards. The original
course of 170° (T) would have taken the section inside this limiting range.
At this same time he intercepted a TBS voice radio message from Commander
Battle Line that he would open fire at 26,000.*
At 0350 he received a TBS voice radio message from the OTC
that the cruisers were ready to open fire,** At 0351 he received a second
message from the OTC to commence firing** and then noted that the left
flank cruisers had opened fire shortly thereafter. He realized now that
his torpedo attack would be delivered against a target already under fire
from the guns of the battle disposition. This did not concern him
particularly because (a) he was well to the eastward of the line of fire
and (b) DESRON FIFTY-SIX1 s multiple attack would cover any enemy maneuvers
resulting from the cruiser gunfire.
Also at 0351 he detected a weak pip with aircraft
characteristics* bearing 209°(T), range 9,700 yards,*** This is believed
to have been a low flying plane since there were no Japanese targets in
this immediate area. He then broadcast the range and bearing of this
target over the TBS voice radio to his section and cautioned them to watch
it,** HIS ACTION IN BROADCASTING THIS INFORMATION WAS CORRECT, ALTHOUGH
SOMEWHAT UNUSUAL IN THIS BATTLE WHERE THE LARGER PART OF THE INFORMATION
OBTAINED BY INDIVIDUAL SHIPS WAS RETAINED WITHIN THESE SHIPS AND NOT
DISSEMINATED TO THE OTC OR TO THE OTHER UNITS.
During the above, the executive officer of the ROBINSON
observed enemy gunfire being directed at Attack Section TWO.* Splashes
were seen on the starboard bow about 500 yards short, but on in deflection.
Subsequent salvos moved ahead of the ROBINSON. One starshell was also
observed.*** Since the SHIGURE did not fire any guns at this time these
shells were obviously from the 5-inch and 6-inch batteries of the YAMASHIRO,
This gunfire was not observed by the BRYANT but the Commanding Officer
HALFORD observed a few scattered shots off both bows, but nothing in
quantity,****
* Action Report COMDESDIV 112, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 040,
October 31st, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report ROBINSON, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 076, November 3rd, 1944.
**** Action Report HALFORD, Night Action in Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 048, October 26th, 1944.
505 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION WO
0343 - 0420, October 25th
Commander Attack Section TWO, believing that the enemy
fire control solution was poor did not open fire with his guns because he
felt his gun flashes would reveal his actual position.*
It is not believed that this is an adequate explanation,
for it is improbable that the enemy would have been firing had they not
had knowledge of the location of the attack section. Would not a more
adequate explanation have been that the enemy battleship, which was firing
at them, was under heavy fire from the battle disposition and was surrounded
by splashes making spotting difficult indeed? Therefore, the addition of
his 5-inch salvos not only would have contributed little or nothing to the
destruction of the battleship but would have tended to increase the already
complex spotting difficulties of the battle disposition.
At 0352 the ROBINSON reported that the target was bearing
205°(T), range 13,000 yards and tracked on course 025°(T), speed fifteen
knots,**
At 0353 he changed course to 165° (T) probably to move along
his relative movement line to the firing point.
He noted that the range to the target was decreasing
rapidly. Therefore, at 0354, when the range to the enemy battleship had
fallen to about 11,400 yards from the flagship he directed his command by
TBS voice radio as follows: "Steady around.., island, standby to fire when
ready". *** It will be recalled that he had previously, at 0345, directed
his section to standby their torpedoes.
The Commanding Officer BRYANT construed the preparatory
signal just received to be a firing order and ordered his torpedoes fired.
In the meantime he had experienced some difficulty in tracking the target,
stating in his action report that at 0351 he had tracked the target on
course 030°(T), and between 0352 and 0354 on course 058°(T), and that the
target speed had increased to eighteen knots.**** From his track chart it
appears that he was alternately tracking the YAMASHIRO and the SHIGURE.
He now decided that he had the correct target course and speed and therefore,
employing course 058°(T), speed eighteen knots he set up the torpedo problem
on the director. However, at 0355, which was just before firing, he
obtained another range and bearing which showed that the target had not
changed course to the right to 058° (T) but was instead still on course
030°(T). Unfortunately there was insufficient time to get this on the
torpedo director.****
Action Report COMDESDIV 112, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 040,
October 31st, 1944.
Action Report ROBINSON, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 076, November 3rd, 1944.
Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
Action Report BRYANT, Battle of Surigao Straits, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 048, November 1st, 1944.
•«-«■
##*
•JHHB1-
506
CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION TWO
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
He now, at 0355:15, using broadside fire to starboard,
fired a half salvo of intermediate speed torpedoes on base course 212°(T)
on a target tracked on course 058°(T), speed eighteen knots. Depth setting
was six feet, firing interval three seconds, torpedo spread one degree,
and gyro angle 312° • All torpedoes appeared to run hot, straight and
normal.* At 0356:09, when the torpedoes were reported fired to the bridge,
the target was bearing 222° (T), range 8,800 yards. Since the reported
target angle was 342°,* the Commanding Officer BRYANT must have considered
the bearing at the time of firing to have been 220°(T). From Diagram "J"
the bearing of the SHIGURE at 0356:09 was 220° (T) and the range was 8,800
yards.
Although the actual bearing at the time of firing is not
known, the range and bearing after firing are known and check closely with
Diagram "J". From the BRYANT'S track chart, as nearly as it can be scaled,
the range at 0355 was 10,400 yards, the bearing 220°(T). This is clearly
a just before firing range on the SHIGURE, for the YAMASHIRO, at this same
time, was 11,400 yards away. The bearing at 0355 was either poor or was
taken on the YAMASHIRO for from Diagram "J" the bearing of the SHIGURE was
213°(T) and the YAMASHIRO was 217°(T). Since the YAMASHIRO was under heavy
fire from the Allied battleships and cruisers to the north it is likely
that the bearing at 0355, and the firing bearing as well, were taken on
splashes.
The BRYANT in firing her torpedoes on a base torpedo
course of 212°(T) (target course 058°(T)) necessarily missed to the east
of the YAMASHIRO track, and since the SHIGURE reversed course at 0356
missed her as well although the torpedoes reached the water in which she
had turned.
COMMANDER ATTACK SECTION TWO HAD NOT INTENDED TO HAVE THE
BRYANT FIRE AT THIS TIME BUT HAD MERELY ISSUED THE ABOVE PREPARATORY
INSTRUCTIONS TO ADVISE HIS COMMAND THAT HE WOULD ORDER TORPEDOES FIRED
PRESENTLY. WHY THEN DID THE BRYANT MISUNDERSTAND? THE COMMANDING OFFICER
BRYANT HAS OFFERED NO EXPLANATION BUT IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT THE FAULT LAY
LARGELY WITH COMMANDER ATTACK SECTION TWO, WHO IT WILL BE RECALLED HAD
EARLIER, AT 0345, ORDERED HIS SECTION TO STANDBY TO FIRE TORPEDOES AND HAD
EMPHASIZED THE FACT THAT THE FIRING WAS IMMINENT, AND WHO HAD NOW, FOR
REASONS OF HIS OWN, ISSUED A SECOND PREPARATORY WARNING SIGNAL. IT SEEMS
CLEAR THEN THAT THE COMMANDING OFFICER BRYANT UNDER THE STRESS AND TENSION
OF THE SITUATION, THOUGHT THAT THIS SECOND PREPARATORY ORDER WAS THE
ANTICIPATED FIRING ORDER.
THE ABOVE COMMENTS ARE NOT DESIGNED IN ANY WAY TO EXCUSE
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER BRYANT, WHO WAS EXPECTED TO
FOLLOW THE DEVELOPING SITUATION SO CLOSELY THAT HE WOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED
IMMEDIATELY THAT THE FIRING RANGE WAS EXCESSIVE FOR INTERMEDIATE SPEED
TORPEDOES AND THAT THE TARGET ANGLE OFFERED A LOW PROBABILITY OF HITS.
Action Report BRYANT, Battle of Surigao Straits, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 048, November 1st, 1944.
507 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION TWO
0348 - 0420, October 25th
At 0356 Commander Attack Section TWO directed his section
to standby to fire. Shortly thereafter he directed the section to fire
torpedoes,*
In accordance with these orders, at 0356:
using broadside fire to starboard, fired a half salvo of
speed torpedoes on base torpedo course of 224°(T) at her
224° (T), track (target) angle 22°, range 9,000 yards and
025°(T), speed zero. Depth setting was six feet, firing
seconds, torpedo spread one degree and gyro angle 340° „
appeared to run hot, straight and normal.**
30, the HALFORD,
five intermediate
target bearing
tracked on course
interval three
All torpedoes
Although the target angle should have been stated as 19°
for a course of 025°(T) it is considered that the target angle was recorded
in error since (a) if it was actually 22° the course would have been 022°(T)
and (b) on her track chart the course is marked 025°(T) in spite of having
been plotted as 045° (T). It seems clear that the target course used was
025°(T).
The HALFORD fired at the YAMASHIRO which at the time of
firing was bearing 227°(T), range 9,000 yards. This seems so for although
the bearing of the SHIGURE was 225°(T) the range was but 8,200 yards. Also
the SHIGURE was making twenty-six knots which should have been readily
noted by the plotters in the HALFORD' s CIC.
In this firing the basic factors of target angle and range
made the possibility of hits remote for (a) a target angle of 19° lies in
the low probability of hits zone*** and (b) the range of 9,000 yards with
a target speed of zero was at the maximum limit of the designed torpedo
range (9,200 yards),*** and would not permit any error whatsoever.
Actually, the YAMASHIRO was continuing onward on course
020°(T) speed about twelve knots. The error in the base torpedo course
appears to have been due to the estimated "zero" speed which had been
determined incorrectly by the HALFORD. The HALFORD 's CIC had become
temporarily confused by the presence in the radar scopes of the pips of
(a) the SHIGURE and (b) the splashes resulting from large caliber shells
which were falling in the vicinity of the YAMASHIRO. These splashes,
naturally, if tracked, gave "zero" speed.
The flagship track shows that confusion referred to above
was not confined to the HALFORD alone for the flagship also, at 0355, had
tracked the target as stopped. However, by 0356, this error had been
Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
Action Report HALFORD, Night Action in Surigao Strait, October 24th
25th, 1944, Serial 048, October 26th, 1944.
Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-43, Destroyer Torpedo Attack
Instructions, issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific Fleet, Serial
01264, October 1943.
**
■tf-tf-tf-
508
CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION TWO
CONFIDENTIAL 0343 - 0420, October 25th
discovered for at this time the target was tracked on course 322°(T),
speed fifteen knots, and at a range of 9>340 yards,*
At 0356:30 Commander Attack Section TWO ordered his section
to make maximum speed and immediately thereafter the HALFORD reported that
her torpedoes had been fired,** He may not have heard this report because
he does not mention it and it does not occur in the ROBINSON voice radio
log which is otherwise quite complete. At 0357 he ordered his section to
make smoke,**
At 0357 the ROBINSON changed course to 150<>(T)*** and
commenced increasing speed to thirty- five knots,*
At 0358 the ROBINSON, using broadside fire to starboard,
fired a half salvo of five intermediate speed torpedoes on base torpedo
course 250°(T) at the battleship (YAMASHIRO), bearing 222°(T), target
angle 80° (computed), range 8,300 yards and tracked on course 322°(T),
speed fifteen knots. Depth setting was six feet, firing interval three
seconds, torpedo spread one degree. All torpedoes appeared to run hot,
straight and normal,*
It will be noted that the Commanding Officer ROBINSON had
fired his torpedoes (a) beyond their effective range but within their
maximum range and (b) with a depth setting of six feet although he had
definitely decided that his target was a battleship* in which case a deep
setting of twenty-two feet should have been used.
The bearing reported by the ROBINSON is in error for her
track chart shows a bearing of 227°(T) at the time of firing and Diagram
MJM shows that the bearing of the YAMASHIRO was 242°(T) at this time. The
SHIGURE was bearing 229° (T), although the range was 7,300 yards, hence the
bearing of 227° (T) shown on her track chart was probably taken on the
SHIGURE. Graphical analysis of her torpedo firing problem, however, shows
that she used the bearing of 222° (T) as the firing bearing.
The YAMASHIRO, at 0356, commenced swinging slowly to the
left and steadied on course 260°(T) about 0401, While the ROBINSON'S
torpedoes reached the YAMASHIRO track at the end of her turn they arrived
there about four minutes after the YAMASHIRO, and therefore all missed
astern*
Commander Attack Section TWO conducted this torpedo attack
from the bridge,**** He stated later that, since the commanding officer
was stationed in the outer open bridge, he had for his exclusive use a
* Action Report ROBINSON, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 076, November 3rd, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 77*3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Track Chart, Action Report ROBINSON, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 076, November 3rd, 1944.
**** Action Report COMDESDIV 112, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 040,
October 31st, 1944.
509 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION TWO
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
radar scope which was "sufficient to give an adequate picture of the
situation in general and of the relative movements of friendly and enemy
forces" •* From this it is assumed that he knew the relative positions of
Attack Sections ONE and THREE and could see that he was well advanced
toward the enemy in relation to them. He further stated that the
"geographic setuD allowed him to deliver a sneak attack almost undetected
and under such circumstances that this section was relatively safe from
enemy gunfire".* If these facts are correct it would be interesting to
know why he (a) did not make a better attempt at coordinating his attack
with that of the other two attack sections, (b) led his own attack section
to a firing point which was outside of the effective range of intermediate
speed torpedoes and was therefore unacceptable, and (c) did not Dress the
attack to its optimum advantage by closing the range.
It will be recalled that Commander Attack Section WO had
planned to retire by passing south of Hibuson Island and then to the north
along the eastern side.* At 0358 his flagship changed course to 118°(T)**
in order to pass close to the southern side of Hibuson Island. Immediately
after steadying on the new course he incorrectly received information from
his CIC that there was dangerous water ahead* and promptly ordered an
emergency turn to course 000°(T), warning the HALFORD and BRYANT to watch
out for the beach.*** All three ships promptly commenced their turns and,
in so doing, in order to utilize their radars for navigational safety,
discontinued tracking the target.
This was unfortunate because the SHIGURE, which at this
time had changed course to south through east, was at 0400 bearing almost
due west distant 8, 500 yards from the ROBINSON and was a very desirable
target for the gunfire of this section. At this time the SHIGURE was
under fire by one or more ships of the battle disposition but since no
ships admit having fired at her she may have received some of the gunfire
directed at the battleship.
During the turns to the north Commander Attack Section TWO
asked the HALFORD if she had fired her torpedoes and obtained an affirmative
reply.****
All ships completed their turns safely although the
ROBINSON came within 600 yards of Little Hibuson Island despite the use of
the engines to shorten the turn.* However, on completion of the turns, the
units of the section became somewhat separated and for the next few minutes
(Diagram "J") operated independently.
* Action Report COMDESDIV 112, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 040,
October 31st, 1944.
** Track Chart, Action Report ROBINSON, Battle of Surigao Strait,
Serial 076, November 3rd, 1944.
*** Action Report HALFORD, Night Action in Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 048, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
**** Action Report HALFORD, Night Action in Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 048, October 26th, 1944.
510 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION TWO
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
They all assumed northerly courses while still making smoke.
At this time, as they were closing their own forces, Commander Attack
Section TWO directed them to turn on their IFF. Since the wind continued
to be from the northeast this smoke did not interfere with the piloting.
Between 0402 and 0405 the HALFORD observed what she
considered to be six torpedo hits stating that she believed that two of
them were from her own torpedoes.* The ROBINSON also observed two explosions
about the latter time which she also claimed as hits.** This, of course,
was not quite true for the BRYANT and HALFORD torpedoes, while reaching the
water in which the SHIGURE had turned to the south some seven minutes
earlier, did not cross the YAMASHIRO's track and the ROBINSON'S torpedoes,
which started to cross the YAMASHIRO's track about one-half minute later,
were (at 0406) about 1,500 yards astern of that ship and did not run far
enough to overtake her.
The explosions observed likely were occasioned by the
torpedoes of the BENNION.
TO SUMMARIZE THE TORPEDO ATTACKS DURING THIS PERIOD THE
DESTROYERS OF ATTACK SECTION TWO FIRED A TOTAL OF FIFTEEN TORPEDOES AND
MADE NO HITS. THIS WAS LARGELY BECAUSE OF THE YAMASHIRO'S TURN TO 260° (T),
AND BECAUSE OF THE POOR AIMING CAUSED BY THE CONFUSING RADAR PICTURE
OBSERVED FROM THE MANY SPLASHES AND THE DUAL TARGETS.
The destroyers of this section had torpedoes remaining as
follows: ROBINSON (five), BRYANT (five), HALFORD (five).
Commander Attack Section TWO intercepted (a) at 0408
COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX' s report that he was being fired on by friendly units,
(b) at 0409 the OTC's (CTG 77.2) order to all ships to cease firing, (c)
the OTC's order to COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX to get his ships out of the channel***
and (d) COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX' s reply that he was clearing at full speed.
At 0410 Commander Attack Section TWO changed course to 090° (T), reduced
speed to twenty- five knots, and stopped making smoke.**
At 0415 he again reduced speed to fifteen knots and headed
for the post-attack rendezvous two miles north of Hibuson Island.**
At 0420 ROBINSON was bearing 058°(T), distant 6,700 yards
from Kanhandon Point Light, Hibuson Island. The HALFORD and BRYANT were
in the same vicinity (Diagram "J").
* Action Report HALFORD, Night Action in Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 048, October 26th, 1944.
** Action Report COMDESDIV 112, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 040,
October 31st, 1944.
*** Action Report ROBINSON, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 076, November 3rd, 1944, Enclosure (B).
511 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION THREE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
(3) Operations of Commander Attack Section THREE, 0348 - 0420,
October 25th,
At 0348 Commander Attack Section THREE (Commanding Officer
HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS) with LEUTZE and BENNION, on course 230O(T), at twenty
knots, was rounding the COLUMBIA to begin his approach.
At 0350 he intercepted a message from CTG 77,2 advising
the cruisers of TG 77,2 that he was about to open fire. From this message
he now knew that his torpedo attack would be supported by cruiser gunfire.
At 0351, as he received the OTC's order to commence firing, he changed
course to 180° (T) and increased speed to thirty knots. He observed the
right flank cruisers firing over his section and noted that hits on the
target were made almost immediately.
At this time (0351) the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS was tracking the
leading large target, bearing 162°(T), range 15,000 yards, on course 017°(T),
speed thirteen knots.* The LEUTZE was tracking the same target but on
course 035°(T) at speed twenty-five knots,** The BENNION, however, was
tracking as many as four targets, all proceeding northward. She, like the
other two ships of her section, had designated the leading large target,
which she was tracking on course 020°(T) at speed fourteen knots,*** as
her torpedo target.
Judging from the above differences in tracking, and notably
in the case of the LEUTZE, it seems clear that the information being
compiled in each of the three destroyers was not being exchanged with the
other destroyers of the same section. The HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS and the
BENNION tracking results were reasonably accurate for best evaluation
indicates that the battleship was on 020°(T), speed about fifteen knots.
For some reason the Commanding Officer LEUTZE steadied on
course 190°(T) instead of 180°(T), which caused him to diverge westward
from the track of the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS. Whether or not Commander Attack
Section THREE noted that his attack section was not following in column is
not known, but the course (190°(T)) of the LEUTZE, which her track chart
shows she continued to steer, gradually placed her on the starboard quarter
of the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS and opened the distance between the ships,****
(Diagram "J").
At about 0353 Commander Attack Section THREE noted that
some gunfire was being directed in his direction. At least two salvos were
observed near the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS.***** The Commanding Officer LEUTZE
also observed gunfire as well as starshells *******
*~ Track Chart, Action Report HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, Battle of Surigao
Straits, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0102, November 2nd, 1944.
** Action Report LEUTZE, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 00335, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
*** Track Chart, Action Report BENNION, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0418, October 28th, 1944.
**** Track Chart, Action Report LEUTZE, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 00335, November 5th, 1944.
***** Action Report HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, Battle of Surigao Straits, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0102, November 2nd, 1944.
****** Action Report LEUTZE, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 00335, November 5th, 1944.
512 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION THREE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
At 0355 he changed course to 210o(T).
While his reasons for changing course to the westward at
this time are not explained since his present course of 180°(T) would have
closed the enemy more quickly, it shows that he was probably planning to
fire torpedoes almost immediately and desired to unmask his torpedo battery
in order to fire torpedoes without gyro angle.
It seems likely that at this time he intercepted Commander
Attack Section TWO's order to fire torpedoes for, immediately thereafter,
at 0356, he also ordered "Fire torpedoes."* At the time of the issuance of
this order, the range to the target from the flagship was 9,700 yards, which
was beyond the effective range of intermediate speed torpedoes,
WHILE HE HAS GIVEN NO EXPLANATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THIS
FIRING ORDER AT THIS EARLY TIME WITHOUT EVEN A PREPARATORY SIGNAL, IT SEEMS
PROBABLE THAT (A) KNOWING (l) THE VALUE OF A MULTIPLE ATTACK AND (2) THAT
COMMANDER ATTACK SECTION ONE WOULD LIKELY FIRE ALMOST IMMEDIATELY, HE
ENDEAVORED, THEREBY, TO COMPLETE THE MULTIPLE ATTACK BY AUTHORIZING HIS
COMMANDING OFFICERS TO FIRE, RELYING ON THEM TO WITHHOLD FIRE UNTIL WITHIN
THE EFFECTIVE RANGE OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE SPEED TORPEDOES.
The Commanding Officer LEUTZE, having completed his change
of course to 210°(T), now, at 0357, from a position on the starboard quarter
of the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, commenced firing torpedoes.* Using broadside
fire to port, he fired a half salvo of five intermediate speed torpedoes on
base torpedo course 120°(T) at the leading large ship, believed to be a
battleship, bearing 142° (T), range 9,900 yards and tracked on course 020° (T)
at fifteen knots. Depth setting was six feet, firing interval three
seconds, torpedo spread one degree. All torpedoes appeared to run hot,
straight and normal.*
From the above firing data it is clear that the Commanding
Officer LEUTZE fired his intermediate speed torpedoes beyond their effective
range (torpedo run to target track was 8,500 yards while the effective range
of the torpedoes was 7,360 yards) but within their maximum range of 9,200
yards. However, on his present course of 210°(T) and present speed of
twenty- five knots, delay would not have reduced the torpedo run materially
(a delay of thirty seconds would have reduced the torpedo run about fifty
yards and a delay of one minute would have produced the same torpedo run of
8,500 yards). This shows that his change of course from 190°(T) to 210°(T)
just before firing was in error for had he continued on course 190° (T) he
would have achieved a better firing position because of a reduction in range,
The Commanding Officer BENNION, at 0357, having passed
beyond the track of the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, commenced changing course to
210° (T). At this moment, probably unknown to him, he was very nearly
torpedoed by the LEUTZE i Graphic analysis of the freak incident shows that
the LEUTZE1 s torpedoes, which were launched at 0357 nearly 1,000 yards to
the northwest, had passed fully armed (500 yards is the arming distance for
destroyer torpedoes), just astern (only eighteen seconds or 280 yards) of
the BENNION.
* Action Report LEUTZE, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 00335, November 5th, 1944.
4,6799 o - 59 -43 513 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION THREE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
At 0358, having steadied on course 210°(T), the Conmanding
Officer BENNION, having identified the target as a battleship* and using
broadside fire to port, fired a half salvo of five intermediate speed
torpedoes on base torpedo course 131^° (T) at a large ship observed optically
to be a battleship, bearing 146°(T), target angle 315°(T), range 3,800
yards, and tracked on course 011°(T), speed twelve knots. Depth setting
was twenty-two feet,* in accordance with destroyer doctrine,** firing
interval three seconds, torpedo spread one degree and the torpedoes appeared
to run hot, straight and normal.* These torpedoes were fired within their
effective range.
Since the BENNION' s action report gives the firing bearing
as 146° (T) and the track chart gives the firing bearing as 139° (T) the
question arises as to which firing bearing was the one actually employed.
This is easily resolved in favor of 146°(T) for the torpedoes were fired
with a base torpedo course of 13l2°(T) which, a graphical solution of the
firing problem indicates, would be the correct torpedo course for a firing
bearing of 146° (T).
Although Commander Attack Section THREE knew that both the
LEUTZE and BENNION had fired he did not fire at this time, even though he
was within the effective firing range of his intermediate speed torpedoes
and had a good target angle. Instead, he continued on to obtain an even
better firing position.
HIS DECISION TO DELAY HIS FIRING WAS OF DOUBTFUL CORRECTNESS
SINCE IT TENDED TO WEAKEN THE MULTIPLE ATTACK. HIS TORPEDOES WOULD NOW
ARRIVE AT THE TARGET ABOUT WO MINUTES LATER THAN THOSE OF THE LEUTZE AND
BENNION AND ABOUT FOUR MINUTES LATER THAN THOSE OF ATTACK SECTION TWO.
WHILE THESE TIME DIFFERENTIALS MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN
SIGNIFICANT WHERE THE TARGET WAS NOT UNDER FIRE, IN THIS CASE THEY WERE
HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE THE TARGET WAS UNDER VERY HEAVY FIRE AND COULD
BE EXPECTED TO MANEUVER RADICALLY. DOES IT NOT SEEM LOGICAL, THEREFORE,
TO SAY THAT THE NECESSITY FOR HAVING THE TORPEDOES ARRIVE AT THE TARGET
ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY IN ORDER, THROUGH THEIR CROSSFIRE EFFECT, TO PREVENT
THE TARGET BY SUCH MANEUVERS FROM AVOIDING BEING HIT, REQUIRED THAT THE
ENTIRE SECTION FIRE THEIR TORPEDOES TOGETHER, AND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE
AFTER ATTACK SECTION TWO HAD FIRED?
Finally, at 0359, using broadside fire to port, he (HEYWOOD
L. EDWARDS) fired a half salvo of four intermediate speed torpedoes on base
torpedo course 104°(T) at the leading heavy ship, bearing 121°(T), target
angle 281°, range 7,800 yards, and tracked on course 010°(T), speed ten
knots. Depth setting was six feet, firing interval three seconds, torpedo
spread one degree. The four torpedoes launched— one torpedo tube failed to
fire — appeared to run hot, straight and normal.***
*~ Action Report BENNION, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 0418, October 28th, 1944.
** Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-43, Destroyer Torpedo Attack
Instructions, issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific Fleet, Serial
01264, October 1943.
*** Action Report HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, Battle of Surigao Straits, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0102, November 2nd, 1944.
514 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION THREE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
The above target angle shows that by his delay he had
succeeded in improving his target angle from about 300° at 0357 to 291° at
0359. Luckily the change in the target course used, from 017°(T) to
010° (T), made the torpedo run 7,350 yards and hence he fired his torpedoes
within their effective range.
In the meantime, the Commanding Officer BENNION had tracked
a second target to the south of her first and evaluated it as another
battleship. He, therefore, ordered the remaining half salvo of torpedoes
fired at this battleship.* At 0359:15, using broadside fire to port, he
fired a second half salvo of five intermediate speed torpedoes on base
torpedo course 143°(T) at the second battleship bearing 155°(T), target
angle 323°, range 9,800 yards, and tracked on course 012°(T), speed twelve
knots. Depth setting was twenty- two feet, firing interval three seconds,
torpedo spread one degree. All torpedoes appeared to run hot, straight
and normal.*
The identity of the BENNION* s second target is hard to
determine for there appears to have been no ship, either friendly or enemy,
in this position. Careful analysis of the target tracks submitted by the
BENNION indicates that in attempting to track many targets— as many as four
at one time — BENNION *s CIC became somewhat confused and fired at a phantom
target. This confusion may have resulted from (a) making two tracks from
one, (b) joining the plots of two targets into a single track or (c) from
dead reckoning a previously tracked target and firing on the estimated
position. Furthermore, it has been noted that the BENNION* s CIC, in
tracking this target, made only one plot at 0356 and one at 0359 and none
after the latter time. From this information, it has been concluded that
in tracking the MOGAMI, whose track resembles the one in question, the
BENNION *s CIC had, during its concentrated effort in firing the first half
salvo, not detected the reversal of course by that ship at 0356 and had,
at 0359, obtained a range and bearing on short splashes from the PORTLAND* s
gunfire which gave an indication that the target was on a northerly course.
(It will be recalled that the PORTLAND had opened fire on the MOGAMI at
0358.) Of course, this was actually about 180° in error since the MOGAMI
was retiring.
Upon completion of the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS' firing Commander
Attack Section THREE, at 0400, correctly changed course by simultaneous
individual ship turns to 300°(T) to retire, and ordered his ships to make
smoke. At this time he observed two single enemy projectiles land near his
ship,** The Commanding Officer BENNION also noted some near splashes.*
At 0401 Commander Attack Section THREE reported over TBS
voice radio that he had completed firing torpedoes.***
At 0404 he changed course to 340° (T) by simultaneous
individual ship turns.
* Action Report BENNION, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 0418, October 28th, 1944.
** Action Report HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, Battle of Surigao Straits, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0102, November 2nd, 1944.
*** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
515 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION THREE
0348 - 0420, October 25th
By this time Commander Attack Section THREE,* as well as
the Commanding Officers LEUTZE** and BENNION,*** could see from their plots
of the track of the enemy battleship that she had turned to a westerly
course and was continuing in that direction, which naturally indicated that
all of their first salvos of torpedoes would pass well to the north of this
target and therefore miss. However, the Commanding Officer BENNION now
observed that the target had turned toward his second half salvo which had
been fired at the second ship. He, therefore, knowing that his torpedoes
should arrive between 0405 and 0406 in the target area, watched the target
closely. He then, at the correct time, observed explosions in the leading
battleship, which he believed were hits from his torpedoes.
In this he may have been correct for graphic analysis
indicates that the BENNION1 s second half salvo of torpedoes, although
fired at a different target, likely scored a hit at this time on the
YAMASHIRO. This seems so, not only because these explosions were sighted
by others (Attack Section TWO) but because evidence indicates that the
target temporarily slowed further after this time, indicating possible
additional underwater damage. This hit is considered to be one of the
four hits reported by a warrant officer survivor of the YAMASHIRO.****
At 0408 he intercepted a message over TBS voice radio from
an unknown station reporting that "You are firing on DESRON FIFTY-SIX in
the middle of the channel."* This was followed at 0409 by the orders from
the OTC (a) to all ships to cease firing and (b) to COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX to
get his ships out of the channel as quickly as possible. He continued on
course and speed to comply.
At 0414, since he was well clear of the channel, he slowed
speed to twenty-five knots and ordered the LEUTZE and BENNION to form
column on the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS and to cease smoking .*
At 0418 he succeeded in re-forming column and headed on
course 000° (T).**
To summarize the torpedo attacks during this period the
destroyers of Attack Section THREE fired a total of nineteen torpedoes
and made one hit for a hit percentage of five and three-tenths per cent.
The destroyers of this section had torpedoes remaining as
follows: HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS (six), LEUTZE (five), BENNION (zero).
At 0420 the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS was bearing 020° (T), distant
11,300 yards from the northeast tip of Cabugan Grande Island.
* Action Report HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, Battle of Surigao Straits, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0102, November 2nd, 1944.
** Action Report LEUTZE, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 00335, November 5th, 1944.
Action Report BENNION, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 0418, October 28th, 1944.
Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944.
##*
■JHHJ-H-
516
CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
(3) Operations of Commander Right Flank Force, 0348 - 0420, October 25th,
At 0348 Commander Right Flank Force was on course 090°(T), speed
fifteen knots. As he awaited the order to commence firing, he became
concerned, and probably confused, regarding the position of his destroyers
and especially the position of Attack Group 2.2 (ARUNTA, KILLEN, BEALE),
because he had just intercepted a message over the Task Group Common wherein
Commander Attack Group 2.2 had informed Commander Attack Group 1.2 that he
was coming down his way again. The latter replied by directing the former
to come down between the shore and himself.
Since Commander Right Flank Force was clearly under the impression
that Commander Attack Group 2.2 had attacked down the eastern shoreline, he
became alarmed lest Attack Group 2.2, in order to rejoin Attack Group 1.2,
be forced to cross the strait ahead of the enemy. This alarm was greatly
increased when he intercepted at this same time a TBS voice radio message
from Commander Battle Line to the OTC as follows: "Have group of small
ones followed by heavy group; when large group reaches 26,000 yards I will
open fire."*
Since he knew at this time that the Japanese force in the upper
strait now consisted of but three ships (one large well ahead* followed by
two heavy — probably cruisers**) he realized that Commander Battle Line's
evaluation of his radar picture was in error and that the "small ones" in
the van were not only friendly but likely were units of his own Attack
Group 2.2 returning from the eastern shore. He, therefore, immediately
(at 0349) directed Commander Attack Group 2.2 "If you have not reached the
middle of the channel stay to the eastward as fast as you can"* which
message was promptly acknowledged. At this moment he received over the
Task Group Common two messages in rapid succession from Commander Attack
Group 1,2 to the effect that he (a) had a target dead in the water, (b) was
going to fire five torpedoes into it, and (c) there were three ships between
him (Attack Group 1,2) and the right flank cruisers.*
From the above messages, from his radar scope and radar tracks, and
because he thought that (a) DESRON FIFTY-SIX had commenced firing torpedoes
at 0347 and therefore these torpedoes were approaching the Japanese column,
and (b) knew that the battle disposition was about to open fire, he
concluded that his destroyers were more confusing to the general situation
than helpful. Therefore, at 0350 he directed both attack group commanders
(Commander Attack Group 1.2 and 2.2) to retire to shore as soon as
possible.*
As this order went out over the Task Group Common, he received the
order over the TBS voice radio to all TG 77.2 cruisers — which included his
cruisers — that CTG 77.2 was about to open fire, and at 0351 he received the
long awaited order from the OTC "Cruisers, open fire."* He immediately,
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine .Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944.
517 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
0348 - 0^20, October 25th
over his Task Group Common, ordered all right flank cruisers, which
appeared to have been in correct station with relation to one another,
except the BOISE which was about 500 yards north of her proper track, to
open fire.*
At 0351:30 he noted that the BOISE had opened fire followed at 0352
by the PHOENIX.
Both the BOISE and the PHOENIX opened fire at the leading Japanese
ships, with opening fire bearings and ranges as follows: BOISE, 153°(T),
18,100 yards; PHOENIX, 152° (T), 16,600 yards. The opening fire ranges and
bearings of the above two cruisers show that they both opened fire on the
YAMASHIRO.
Unfortunately, the SHROPSHIRE, which was the northernmost right
flank cruiser, and therefore farthest from the enemy, was unable to open
fire due to the limitations of her fire control radar which did not permit
satisfactory radar bearings for accurate gunfire beyond 15,500 yards on
even the largest target.**
COMMANDER RIGHT FLANK FORCE, WHO WAS THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR 'WITH THIS
SITUATION,*** APPEARS TO HAVE DECIDED THAT THE ADVANTAGE OF HAVING HIS
FLAGSHIP IN A LEADING POSITION SO THAT IN CASE OF EMERGENCY HE COULD
OPERATE BY FOLLOW-THE-LEADER TACTICS OUTWEIGHED THE ADVANTAGE OF HAVING THE
SHROPSHIRE NEAREST THE ENEMY WHERE SHE MIGHT OPEN FIRE EARLIER. HIS
DECISION WAS OF COURSE CORRECT BECAUSE OF (1) THE VAST SUPERIORITY IN
ALLIED GUNPOWER OVER THE JAPANESE AND (2) THE FACT THAT IN NIGHT ACTION
FOLLOW-THE-LEADER TACTICS MAY BE THE ONLY MEANS AVAILABLE FOR THE COMMANDER
OF LIGHT FORCES TO GUIDE HIS COMMAND IN WHICH CASE THE COMMANDER SHOULD BE
IN POSITION NEAREST THE ENEMY.
Meanwhile, Commander Right Flank Force, who had been concerned over
the small "pips" in the middle of the channel*** referred to previously by
Commander Battle Line and who had been evaluating the radar picture, had
reached the conclusion "that they were definitely friendly destroyers
retiring from their torpedo attack."*** Anticipating that they might be
mistaken for the enemy he broadcast, also at 0352, "Believe those three
little ones in front are friendly trying to get into shoreline."* It seems
likely that these three pips were one of COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX' s attack
sections which were proceeding to the attack since these sections were much
nearer to the enemy than any other Allied attack units, and were the only
units of three which were in the middle of the channel.
Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
Action Report HMAS SHROPSHIRE, Night Action, October 25th, 1944,
Serial SC 1123/194, November 4th, 1944.
Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944.
**
-fc-S-B-
518
CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0343 - 0420, October 25th
The BOISE fired full gun salvos at the battleship and, seeing that
hits were being scored, went to rapid fire at 0353.* Commander Right
Flank Force, who knew that spotting was next to impossible with this type
of fire and ammunition was low, at this same time, ordered his cruisers to
fire slowly and deliberately.** The BOISE immediately complied.
The PHOENIX, which had commenced firing with half salvos,
alternating between the forward and after gun groups and employing high
capacity shells, observed visually, after firing four salvos, that hits
were being made. She therefore shifted to full fifteen gun salvos, still
using high capacity projectiles. After having fired nine high capacity
salvos, she shifted to armor piercing projectiles.***
ALTHOUGH EARLY EFFECTIVE HITS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE THE OPTIMUM AIM
OF NAVAL GUNFIRE, THE DECISION TO USE HIGH CAPACITY PROJECTILES FOR THE
EARLY SPOTTING ROUNDS, IN ORDER TO CONSERVE ALREADY LOW LEVELS OF ARMOR
PIERCING PROJECTILES, IS CONSIDERED SOUND. HOWEVER, OWING TO THE FACT THAT
THERE WAS A HEAVY OVER CONCENTRATION OF FIRE AT THE YAMASHIRO, IT IS
DOUBTFUL IF THE PHOENIX «S FIRING PLAN WAS REALLY EFFECTIVE.
At 0354 Commander Right Flank Force received a message from
Commander Attack Group 1.2 informing him that Attack Group 1.2 was heading
toward the cruisers and requesting that he watch out for it.**
This message seems to have confirmed in his mind the fact that
Attack Group 2.2 had not reached the western shore of the strait and
therefore, might have been the "group of small ones" which had been reported
earlier (at 0348) by Commander Battle Line. Deeply concerned lest this
group be under fire, since the whole battle disposition had now opened up,
he immediately asked Commander Attack Group 2.2 if he was under fire. He
was relieved to receive a prompt reply to the negative.
At 0355 he received an order from CTG 77.2 to "open fire". He
promptly replied, "We opened fire with you."****
At 0356:25, as the range reached 15,800 yards to the leading enemy
battleship from the SHROPSHIRE, he observed that ship open fire with her
8-inch guns. The SHROPSHIRE employed deliberate full salvo fire and in
every case but one her fall-of-shot was observed and corrected each time
before succeeding salvos were fired.***** As a matter of fact the Commanding
Officer stated in his action report that the 8-inch salvos were followed
out to the target and spotted by radar. How this was accomplished is a
* Action Report BOISE, Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 069,
October 30th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944.
**** Ibid., Enclosure (D).
***** Action Report HMAS SHROPSHIRE, Night Action, October 25th, 1944,
Serial SC 1123/194, November 4th, 1944.
519 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
0348 - 0420, October 25th
mystery due to the numerous splashes around the YAMASHIRO.* However, these
splashes did not seem to bother the SHROPSHIRE spotter, for there is no
mention of any difficulties relating thereto in the action report. At this
time enemy shells were observed falling ahead and astern of the PHOENIX.
Commander Right Flank Force, (a) noting at this time that hi3
cruisers were fast approaching mid-channel and the battle line was
continuing to the eastward and (b) realizing that if he continued on to the
eastward at fifteen knots with the battle line he would soon leave a large
portion of the western part of the strait with only limited destroyer
protection, (Plate XVII) decided to reverse course to cover that area.
Therefore, in accordance with this decision, he at 0358 commenced changing
course to the west by simultaneous ship turns to starboard. At this time
both the PHOENIX and the BOISE checked fire,**while the SHROPSHIRE continued
firing*
WHILE THE REASONS FOR CHECKING FIRE HAVE NOT BEEN GIVEN IT SEEMS
POSSIBLE THAT AT THIS POINT THE COMMANDING OFFICERS PHOENIX AND BOISE
REALIZED THAT SINCE (A) THE ACCURACY OF GUNFIRE GENERALLY DIMINISHED DURING
A LARGE TURN OWING TO THE FACT THAT CERTAIN VARIABLES REQUIRED FOR THE
CORRECT SOLUTION OF THE FIRE CONTROL PROBLEM SUCH AS (1) OWN SHIP SPEED AND
(2) THE RETARDATION IN OWN SHIP SPEED CAUSED BY THE TURN COULD NOT BE
ACCURATELY DETERMINED, AND (B) THE ENEMY WAS UNDER SUCH HEAVY FIRE THAT THE
TEMPORARY LOSS OF FIRE FROM THE RIGHT FLANK CRUISERS DURING THE CHANGE OF
COURSE WOULD NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE BATTLE SITUATION, IT WOULD BE WISE TO
LIFT FIRE TEMPORARILY IN ORDER TO CONSERVE AMMUNITION WHICH MIGHT BE NEEDED
LATER. IN EITHER CASE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT (A) DOCTRINE REQUIRED THAT
ALL SHIPS FIRING MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE FIRE AGAINST THE ENEMY IN ORDER TO
CREATE AND MAINTAIN A FAVORABLE SITUATION, (B) THIS REQUIRED GUNFIRE BE
MAINTAINED EVEN DURING BATTLE MANEUVERS UNLESS TO DO SO MIGHT UNNECESSARILY
ENDANGER OWN SHIPS, AND (C) RIGHT FLANK CRUISERS WERE IN AN ECHELON
FORMATION WHICH THEORETICALLY MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO MANEUVER AND
FIRE WITHOUT INTERFERING WITH ONE ANOTHER, THE DECISION TO CHECK FIRE FOR
THE REASONS ABOVE APPEARS SOUND.
While it seems likely that the same problems in control of fire
during a turn which affected the American cruisers also affected the
SHROPSHIRE, it is assumed that her commanding officer desired to maintain
fire during the turn because he had only fired two salvos at the time the
turn was commenced and therefore felt that the necessity for conserving
ammunition was not at the moment of pressing importance,
THIS DECISION WAS ALSO SOUND SINCE CTG 77.2 HAD STATIONED THE BATTLE
DISPOSITION IN THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE STRAIT IN ORDER TO PREVENT ENEMY
FORCES FROM MOVING TOWARD THE TRANSPORT AREAS OFF DULAG AND TACLOBAN UNDER
Commander L.R.P. Lawford, RN, DSC, Commanding Officer HMS VERYAN BAY,
stated to Captain J.C. Titus, USN, on June 16th, 1956, that radar
equipment of the type installed in the SHROPSHIRE had the capability
of following 8-inch projectiles out to the target.
Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944; also Action Report BOISE, Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
*#
520
CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
THE PROTECTION OF THE WESTERN SHORE. COMMANDER RIGHT FLANK FORCE'S ACTION
SHOWS THE EXCELLENT UNDERSTANDING WHICH, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE CONFERENCE
HELD ON BOARD THE LOUISVILLE THE PRECEDING AFTERNOON, EXISTED BETWEEN
HIMSELF AND CTG 77.2. THIS ACTION WAS, THEREFORE, A FINE EXAMPLE OF THE
FACTOR OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, THE FINAL AIM OF WHICH IS ATTAINED WHEN,
WITHOUT SPECIFIC INSTRUCTION, EACH SUBORDINATE COMMANDER IN THE CHAIN OF
COMMAND ACTS INSTINCTIVELY AS HIS IMMEDIATE SUPERIOR, IF PERMITTED, WOULD
HAVE HIM ACT.
During the turn he observed that the PHOENIX and BOISE had checked
fire, and that the SHROPSHIRE was continuing to fire with her forward
turrets.
PRIOR TO AND DURING THE GUNFIRE OF HIS CRUISERS HE DID NOT ISSUE ANY
INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING FIRE DISTRIBUTION. WHY THIS WAS SO IS NOT UNDERSTOOD
FOR HE KNEW FROM HIS RADAR PLOT THAT THE THREE JAPANESE SHIPS WERE NOT IN A
CLOSE FORMATION BUT WERE INSTEAD IN A VERY LOOSE FORMATION WHERE EACH OF THE
THREE SHIPS WAS ON A DIFFERENT COURSE AND OR SPEED.
THEREFORE, NORMAL FIRE DISTRIBUTION WAS NOT PRACTICABLE AND A
SPECIAL FIRE DISTRIBUTION WAS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO PREVENT OVER CONCENTRATION
AND TO INSURE THAT ALL THREE SHIPS WERE TAKEN UNDER FIRE. THAT COMMANDER
RIGHT FLANK FORCE CONCURS WITH THESE COMMENTS SEEMS CLEAR SINCE HE STATED
LATER THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN BETTER HAD THE PHOENIX AND BOISE, WHICH WERE
EQUIPPED WITH THE MARK VIII FIRE CONTROL RADAR, FIRED AT THE MORE DISTANT
TARGETS AND THEREBY PREVENTED OVER CONCENTRATION ON THE LEADING SHIP.*
Before he could complete his change of course to the west he appears
to have noted in his radar scope that the enemy battleship was turning
gradually to the westward. Not knowing what course the enemy might finally
decide to steer and realizing that at the present moment he was about to
cross the Tee, he decided to settle temporarily on course 250°(T) which
would permit this maneuver and therefore, at 0401, directed his command to
steer this course.**
At this time enemy salvos were falling near the SHROPSHIRE. The
first salvos landed short and then the later salvos all landed over. These
salvos were fired by the forward turrets of the YAMASHIRO.
Also at this time he noted that the BOISE and PHOENIX had resumed
fire. All three of his cruisers were now firing again and all three were
firing at the battleship, which had caught fire and was burning fiercely.
He now identified the battleship as a FUSO or ISE Class.
He noted that the battleship was still being hit and was continuing
her turn to the westward. He also noted that the other two targets were
likewise turning away.
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944.
** Ibid., Enclosure (C).
521 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
0348 - 0420, October 25th
At 0402 he noted that the SHROPSHIRE had commenced firing rapid
salvos despite orders to the contrary. Since he had directed all cruisers
to fire slowly and deliberately, does it not seem surprising that he did
not caution the SHROPSHIRE on this for she continued to fire rapid fire
for some five and one-half minutes. Also at 0402 he intercepted a message
from COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX reporting that that DESRON had completed firing
torpedoes* and therefore would be retiring toward the flank of the battle
disposition.** This was in error since only Attack Section TWO and THREE
had completed firing. Attack Section ONE was preparing to fire.
At 0404 he appears to have decided that the enemy was settling on
a generally westerly course. He therefore completed his original turn to
270°(T).** At this time he received a report from COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR
that (a) he was now due south of the right flank cruisers and (b) the ships
of his attack group had ten torpedoes remaining, distributed as follows:
DALY (five), BACHE (five). From this he could see that the HUTCHINS was
without torpedoes. He then advised COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR that the location
given was approximately correct and directed him once again to close the
beach.
At 0407 he noted that the PHOENIX had commenced firing her 5-inch
battery at the battleship which was still moving westward and still
returning fire. While he does not say so in his report he must have been
impressed with the ability of the Japanese battleship to survive the many
hits which she was undoubtedly sustaining.
At 0408 he intercepted a TBS voice radio report from COMDESRON
FIFTY-SIX that his command was being fired on by units of the battle
disposition. As pointed out earlier he had feared that this might happen
to his own destroyers and had made every effort to prevent it. He had
thus far succeeded. But now the very thing he had feared for his right
flank destroyers had occurred to the left flank destroyers!
Whether or not he had planned to order cease firing within his own
cruisers is not known for, within a minute, he received orders from CTG 77.2
to cease firing. He immediately, over the task group common, directed his
command to cease firing, which order was promptly complied with by all
ships. At this same time he intercepted CTG 77.2' s instructions to
COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX to get his ships out of the channel as soon as possible.
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface ^hgagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944.
** Ibid., Enclosure (C).
522
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
A recapitulation of the above firing follows:
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
0348 - 0420, October 25th
Order in
Formation
PHOENIX
BOISE
SHROPSHIRE
Opening
Fire
Range
16,600
18,100
15,800
Opening
Fire
Range
Diagram
"J"
16,600
17,800
15,600
Opening
Fire
Bearing
152
153
162
Opening
Fire
Bearing
Diagram
"J"
152
153
162
During the above period the right flank cruisers fired ammunition
and had ammunition remaining as follows:
PHOENIX
BOISE
SHROPSHIRE
Fired
AP HC
424 104
Remaining
AP HC
551 653
439
0 536 546
214 0 920 101
1077 104 2007 1300
At 0412 he noted (a) visually that two of the three enemy ships
were burning fiercely (MOGAMI and YAMASHIRO) and (b) by radar scope that
the battleship had now changed course to south and that all three enemy
ships were retiring*
At 0414 he intercepted, over TBS voice radio, Commander Left Flank
Force's order to his cruisers to change course to 270°(T),
He now re-estimated the situation. He clearly (a) perceived that
unless something was done shortly the Japanese ships might escape and (b)
realized that his group might be ordered down the strait in chase. He
therefore changed course at 0416:30 to 090° (t) to close the OTC and turned
on his IFF so that Commander Left Flank Force would realize that the force
closing him was friendly. At the same time he realized that it might be
necessary to make additional destroyer torpedo attacks, and therefore, at
0418 he directed his destroyers to "lie to along the shore and await
another run,"
HIS ACTIONS AT THIS TIME WERE CORRECT. IT WAS ADVISABLE (A) TO
ALERT HIS DESTROYERS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL TORPEDO ATTACKS SO
THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED FOR IMMEDIATE SERVICE, AND (B) TO CLOSE HIS
SUPERIOR SO THAT HE MIGHT BE BETTER PREPARED TO COORDINATE HIS ACTIVITIES
AS DIRECTED BY THAT SUPERIOR.
523
CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
At 0417 he intercepted Commander Battle Line's order to BATDIV FOUR
and the MISSISSIPPI to change course to 000°(T).*
At 0419 he received orders from CTG 77.2 to resume fire and at this
moment noted that the battleship had disappeared from the radar scope.
This was because the YAMASHIRO appears to have sunk at this time.
He repeated this order to his force but none of the ships opened
fire because there were no targets within range at this time.**
At 0420 the PHOENIX was bearing 073°(T), distant 6,000 yards from
the northeastern tip of Cabugan Grande Island.
(a) Operations of COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR, 0348 - 0420, October 25th.
(1) Commander Attack Group 1.2 and COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR.
At 0348 Commander Attack Group 1.2, who was still in the
HUTCHINS CIC, was on course 040°(T) at speed thirty knots. The HUTCHINS
was preparing to fire a second half salvo of five torpedoes*** while the
DALY**** and BACHE,***** which were now about 5,000 yards south of the
HUTCHINS and still making twenty- five knots, were firing at the same
destroyer target (MICHISHIO).
He noted that the HUTCHINS was tracking a target (ASAGUMO)
within intermediate speed torpedo range which was proceeding southward at
seven to nine knots and believed to be a large ship (cruiser***). He
therefore directed the Commanding Officer HUTCHINS to fire torpedoes.
At 0349 the DALY's torpedoes, which had been fired at 0335:30,
likely crossed the YAMASHIRO track. Based on the analysis of the composite
plot (Diagrams "H" and "J") and on Japanese action reports none of the
torpedoes hit but, instead, appear to have passed between the YAMASHIRO,
in the van, and the second ship, the MOGAMI which were about 4,000 yards
apart. This view is supported by the SHIGURE which reported having passed
over three torpedo wakes. The time given by the SHIGURE (0330) was
obviously in error since at this time she was on a southerly course and no
torpedoes could have possibly been in her vicinity unless the spread had
been in general erratic, which was not the case. However, later (after
0344) she had returned to northerly courses which had taken her into the
DALY»s torpedo water. Also, her track as developed from Allied heavy ship's
*~ Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944.
** Ibid., Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
**** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944.
***** Action Report BACHE, Engagement of Enemy Surface Forces, Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0106, October
25th, 1944.
524 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0343 - 0420, October 25th
radar data, shows that she changed course to 010° (T) at 0351 in a position
where the torpedoes had passed about 0350:15. The torpedo wakes should
have been sighted. It is therefore believed that the three torpedo wakes
reported by the SHIGURE were the DALY's and that the time of crossing the
YAMASHIRO track was 0349.
The BACHE torpedoes also likely crossed the YAMASHIRO track at
0349, the MOGAMI track about 0350:30, and the SHIGURE track at 0351. Since
the MOGAMI and the SHIGURE were about 3,000 yards to the north, the
YAMASHIRO was 2, 500 yards beyond the SHIGURE and the ASAGUMO and MICHISHIO
were about 7,000 yards to the south none of the Japanese ships reported
sighting the torpedo wakes or any torpedo hits at this time.
At 0349:30 in compliance with this order and employing broadside
fire to starboard the HUTCHINS fired the remaining five intermediate speed
torpedoes on base torpedo course 12li°(T) at the target bearing 110°(T),
target angle 110°, range 6,200 yards,* and tracked on course 180°(T), speed
eight knots.** Depth setting was six feet, firing interval about eight
seconds and torpedo spread one degree. All torpedoes appeared to run hot,
straight and normal.**
WHILE THE FACT THAT THERE WERE STILL THREE ENEMY SHIPS ATTACKING
TO THE NORTH, AND THE FURTHER FACT THAT FIVE ENEMY DESTROYERS AND ONE
LARGER SHIP HAD BEEN REPORTED PASSING THROUGH THE SOUTHERN ENTRANCE TO
SURIGAO STRAIT, MAY CAUSE STUDENTS OF WARFARE TO CONSIDER THAT COMMANDER
ATTACK GROUP 1.2 'S ACTION IN ORDERING THIS TORPEDO ATTACK WAS UNSOUND, THIS
IDEA IS NOT CONSIDERED VALID FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: (A) COMMANDER
ATTACK GROUP 1.2 HAD BEEN DIRECTED BY HIS SUPERIOR (COMMANDER RIGHT FLANK
FORCE) TO ATTACK THE ENEMY MOVING NORTHWARD IN THE UPPER END OF THE STRAIT,
(THIS WAS A DESTRUCTION OBJECTIVE. HE AND THE DESTROYER ATTACKS WHICH HAD
PRECEDED HIM HAD PARTIALLY ACCOMPLISHED THIS AND HAD DISABLED SOME OF THE
ENEMY. HE HAD NOW BEEN DIRECTED TO CLEAR THE AREA WHICH WAS A SAFETY
OBJECTIVE. THIS MEANT THAT HE COULD NOT APPROACH THE THREE TARGETS TO THE
NORTH SUFFICIENTLY CLOSE TO MAKE AN EFFECTIVE TORPEDO ATTACK ON THOSE
UNITS.), (B) THE PROBLEM OF THE SHIPS ENTERING SURIGAO STRAIT WAS PROPERLY
A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OTC WHO HAD ISSUED NO INSTRUCTIONS THEREON, (C)
DOCTRINE PROVIDED THAT NO DISABLED SHIP SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO ESCAPE UNLESS
THE CONDITIONS AND THE SITUATION AT THE TIME MADE COMPLETE DESTRUCTION
IMPOSSIBLE,*** (D) HE CONSIDERED HIS TARGET TO BE A LARGE SHIP (CRUISER**)
WHICH HE COULD ATTACK WHILE STILL COMPLYING WITH THE SPIRIT OF HIS TWO
OBJECTIVES.
* Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 069, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
** Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
*** War Instructions, United States Navy (FTP 143A), United States Fleet,
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Navy Department, Chapter 12,
Section XVT, Paragraph 12195.
525 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
0348 - 0420, October 25th
At 0350 Commander Attack Group 1.2 likely intercepted over TBS
voice radio CTG 77.2' s message stating that the cruisers were about to
open fire.*
At this same time, he received a message from Commander Right
Flank Force wherein that commander ordered both attack group commanders to
take their groups shoreward as soon as possible, **
At 0351 the Commanding Officer HUTCHINS changed course to
010° (T)*** in order to unmask the gun battery and at the same time opened
fire on the leading ship bearing 041°(T),*** range 10,000 yards,**** which
he correctly judged to be a heavy ship. This target was the YAMASHIRO,
which was under fire not only by the HUTCHINS, but also by the left and
right flank cruisers. Since the commanding officer could see two targets
and since he felt that the range wa3 excessive he asked his CIC if there
was not a nearer target than the one being fired on. His CIC then replied
in the affirmative and designated a new and closer target which was the
MOGAMI.
Commander Attack Group 1,2 now directed the HUTCHINS, at 0352,
to change course to 310°(T)***** in order to close the beach. In so doing
he did not comply with the spirit of CTG 77.3' s orders for to clear the
area as quickly as possible required a change of course to 270° (T)#
WHILE HIS ACTION INDICATED AN OFFENSIVE STATE OF MIND AT THIS
TIME, IT WAS NOT SOUND FOR THE LITTLE EFFECT HE COULD HOPE TO ACHIEVE FROM
HIS GUNFIRE COULD NOT COMPENSATE FOR THE CONFUSION AND EVEN IRRITATION HIS
FAILURE TO MOVE HIS FORCES OUT OF THE COMBAT AREA MIGHT HAVE PROVOKED IN
THE FLAGSHIP. HE DID NOT SEEM TO REALIZE THAT THE ENEMY FORCE WAS BEING
EASILY TRACKED BY THE BATTLE DISPOSITION AND THAT HIS PRESENCE (A) MIGHT
CONFUSE THE RADAR PICTURE AND (B) INSTEAD OF HELPING TO WIN THE BATTLE
EXPEDITIOUSLY, MIGHT TEN) TO AFFECT ITS PROGRESS ADVERSELY. ACTUALLY THIS
HAD, IN FACT, OCCURRED FOR ALREADY THE FLAGSHIP OF THE BATTLE DISPOSITION
AND THE FLAGSHIP OF THE BATTLE LINE HAD COMMENCED TRACKING ATTACK GROUP 1.2
WHICH THEY HAD DESIGNATED AS ENEMY.******
* Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COKCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944.
Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 069, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
Action Report COMDESRON 24, Night Surface Engagement, Surigao Strait,
Leyte, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0129,
October 30th, 1944.
Track Chart, 0305 to 0416, October 25th, 1944, Action Report
LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao Strait, Leyte
Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0045,
November 7th, 1944; also Track Chart, Action Report MISSISSIPPI,
Battle of Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 0141, November 21st, 1944.
***
■**-**
*****
******
526
CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
At 0352:30, about the time of completing the turn to 310°(T),
the Commanding Officer HUTCHINS, ordered cease firing in order to shift
targets. He had expended 100 rounds of 5-inch ammunition at the YAMASHIRO.
This was a wise decision for the new target, the MOGAMI, was only about
6,500 yards away and was not under fire.
At this same time, 0352:30, the Commanding Officer DALY, who
decid i to shift targets, ceased firing at the MICHISHIO* leaving this
target to the BACHE and at 0353 changed course to 000°(T)** in order to
close the range to the enemy ships to the north. He had fired seventy- five
rounds of 5-inch ammunition at the MICHISHIO.
Shortly after this the Commanding Officer BACHE, judging that
his target was sufficiently damaged and having fired seventy-five rounds of
5-inch ammunition, decided to shift targets and ceased firing on the
MICHISHIO. In this he was correct for (a) the MICHISHIO was dead in the
water and not firing her guns and (b) the MOGAMI to the north was a much
greater threat. He now changed course to 000° (T),*** and followed the DALY,
At 0354 Commander Attack Group 1.2 realizing that, since he was
not closing the shore as ordered but instead was closing his own cruisers,
he might be mistaken for enemy, informed Commander Right Flank Force to
this effect and requested that they keep watch for him.****
At 0354 the DALY changed course to 295°(T) in order to unmask
her gun battery and, shortly after completing this turn, changed course to
310o(T).**
At 0354:30 the HUTCHINS opened fire on a target, believed to be
a cruiser, at a range reported to be 6,700 yards***** but which from her
track chart was 6,100 yards.****** This latter range agrees closely with
the range indicated on Diagram "J". This target was the MOGAMI, which
shortly afterward replied to the HUTCHINS gunfire. The HUTCHINS action
report states that the MOGAMI was smoking but not on fire.*****
At about 0355 the Commanding Officer HUTCHINS noted in his
action report that the machine gun crews reported explosions on the star-
board quarter on the approximate bearing of the last torpedo target.*****
This could not have been so for the ASAGUMO, which was the target for
* Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944.
** Ibid., Enclosure (A).
*** Action Report BACHE, Engagement of Enemy Surface Forces, Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0106,
October 25th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
**** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippines, October 25th,
1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
***** Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
****** Ibid., Enclosure (A).
527 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
these torpedoes and which reported no torpedo hits at this time,* had
turned away, very fortuitously, at the moment of firing and was well clear
of the torpedo tracks (Diagram "J"). By rare good luck the torpedo spread,
at 0358, struck the MICHISHIO, which was drifting to the south, almost at
the end of their run. The MICHISHIO then sank.
Since the HUTCHINS stated that the explosions had been observed
at about 0355 and the actual time of hitting based on Diagram "J" was more
likely 0358 the question arises as to why the three minute difference.
The answer seems to be contained in the qualifying word "about". The
observers, who claimed sighting the explosions, were members of the machine
gun crews. These crews were in exposed stations on the top side of the
destroyer where there were no lights. Therefore, it seems probable that
the reported time was more of a guess.
The torpedo firing by the destroyers of Attack Group 1.2 was
now completed.
TO SUMMARIZE THESE FIRINGS THESE DESTROYERS HAD FIRED A TOTAL
OF TWENTY TORPEDOES—HUTCHINS, TEN; DALY, FIVE; BACHE, FIVE, AND HAD MADE
ONE HIT FOR A HIT PERCENTAGE OF FIVE PER CENT.
IN SUMMARY THE FAILURE TO MAKE MORE HITS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN
LARGELY DUE TO THE FOLLOWING: (A) THE HUTCHINS FIRED AT A TARGET (SHIGURE)
WHICH HAD REVERSED COURSE SHORTLY AFTER THE TORPEDOES HAD BEEN FIRED; (B)
THE DALY TORPEDOES WERE FIRED AT LONG RANGE AND LOW SPEED AT THE MOGAMI
WHICH WAS TRACKED ON COURSE 010°(T), SPEED SIXTEEN KNOTS BUT WHICH WAS
ACTUALLY ON COURSE 045° (T) AT A SPEED OF TWENTY KNOTS. DURING THE TIME OF
THE TORPEDO RUN (0335:30 - 0351) THE MOGAMI CHANGED COURSE TO NORTH AT 0337
AND TO 320° (T) AT 0345:30, AND DURING THE TORPEDO RUN SHE SLOWED TO TWELVE
KNOTS AND THEN INCREASED SPEED TO EIGHTEEN KNOTS; AND (C) THE BACHE
TORPEDOES WERE FIRED AT LONG RANGE AT LOW SPEED AT THE SHIGURE WHICH WAS
TRACKED ON COURSE 018°(T), SPEED SEVENTEEN KNOTS, BUT WHICH WAS ACTUALLY,
AT THE TIME OF FIRING, ON COURSE 030° (T), SPEED TWENTY-SIX KNOTS, WHICH
SPEED WAS MAINTAINED ALTHOUGH COURSE WAS CHANGED TO THE WESTWARD TO 340° (T),
A CHANGE OF FIFTY DEGREES (DIAGRAMS "H» AND »J»).
Also at 0355 the Commanding Officer BACHE changed course to
295° (T)** in order to unmask the gun battery and to follow, in a general way,
the movements of the HUTCHINS. At 0356 he opened fire on a target (later
identified as a MOGAMI class cruiser) bearing 020°(T), range 3,200 yards.***
This target was, in fact, the MOGAMI which was starting a turn to the south.
* Composite report on Surigao Strait Action by Commanding Officers
ASAGUKO (Commander Kazuo Shibayama, ex-IJN) and MICHISHIO (Commander
Kazuo Tanaka, ex-IJN), March 15th, 1946, Army Historical Division
Microfilm HS-39A.
** Action Report BACHE, Engagement of Enemy Surface Forces, Surigao Strait,
Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0106, October 25th,
1944, Enclosure (A).
*** Action Report BACHE, Engagement of Enemy Surface Forces, Surigao Strait,
Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0106, October 25th,
1944.
528 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
As the MOGAMI* s salvos commenced coming closer to the HUTCHINS,
it appeared that she might obtain the hitting gun range. The Commanding
Officer HUTCHINS, therefore, changed course twenty degrees toward the enemy
to 330°(T) at 0356.* During this turn he reached a minimum range to the
MOGAMI of 5,400 yards.*
About 0356:15 the BACHE changed course to 315° (T) and shortly
afterward to 342° (T)** in order to more nearly parallel the course of the
MOGAMI and also to follow the general track of the HUTCHINS.
At 0357 the Commanding Officer DALY opened fire on the MOGAMI
bearing 032° (T), range 7,500 yards and reported hits on the first salvo. ***
Immediately after opening fire he changed course to 355°(T)**** in order to
roughly parallel the MOGAMI track and to follow the HUTCHINS in a general
way.
Because of the accurate gunfire of the above three destroyers-
assisted perhaps by the PORTLAND — the MOGAMI caught on fire, which
heartening fact was noted by the destroyers.
Commander Attack Group 1.2 had observed that, as the target
moved southward (making smoke) and as the Allied attack group moved north-
ward, the range continued to decrease as the forces approached their
probable nearest point.
ABOUT THIS TIME THE DESTROYERS OBSERVED THAT THE TARGET WAS
ENDEAVORING TO IDENTIFY HERSELF TO THEM EMPLOYING DIRECTIONAL FLASHING
LIGHTS AND RED FLARES WHICH WERE TWO OF THE METHODS EMPLOYED BY THE JAPANESE
FOR NIGHT IDENTIFICATION.***** THE OTHER METHODS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN THE
EMPLOYMENT OF (A) SLEEVE (WINDSOCK) DISPLAYED GENERALLY ON BOTH YARDARMS
ON EITHER SIDE OF THE BRIDGE, (B) HOISTED COLORED SIGNAL LIGHTS, AND (C)
PYROTECHNICS (SUCH AS STARSHELLS AND FLARES). THIS SURPRISED THE COMMANDING
OFFICER BACHE WHO CHECKED HIS GUNFIRE TEMPORARILY TO VERIFY HIS IDENTIFICA-
TION OF THE TARGET.****** HOWEVER, AS HE CHECKED GUNFIRE, HE NOTED THAT THE
TARGET WAS BURNING SO BRIGHTLY AS TO SILHOUETTE HER PLAINLY AND HE CORRECTLY
IDENTIFIED HER THEN AS A MOGAMI CLASS CRUISER. THE DALY, AT THE SAME TIME,
INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED HER AS A FURUTAKA CLASS CRUISER.***
* Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 069, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
** Action Report BACHE, Engagement of Enemy Surface Forces, Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0106,
October 25th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
*** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944.
**** Ibid., Enclosure (A).
***** Navy Minister Military Serial 1183, January 24th, 1944, War Ti^ne
Regulations for Identification of Friendly Forces, ATIS Document
No. 39, Part X, August 12th, 1945. (NACHI Document).
****** Action Report BACHE, Engagement of Enemy Surface Forces, Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0106,
October 25th, 1944.
496799 0-59-44
529 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
0348 - 0420, October 25th
At about 0358 he noted that Allied cruisers were now firing
at the MOGAMI and that the first salvo had hit.* He therefore, realizing
that he must not be in the area while his own battle disposition was
firing and must now obey his previous orders to clear the area, directed
the Commanding Officer HUTCHINS to clear the area.
At 0359 the Commanding Officer HUTCHINS, in compliance with
these orders, changed course to 350°(T)** in order to pass to the eastward
of Attack Group 2.2 which was heading in a southerly direction.
Commander Attack Group 1.2 now advised Commander Right Flank
Force of his course, and again requested that they keep watch for him.
Through some mistake the course transmitted to Commander Right Flank Force
was given as 300° (T)*** whereas the course actually being steered was,
from the track charts, 350°(T). This latter course has been accepted as
the correct course because a course of 300°(T) would have clearly inter-
fered with the operations of Attack Group 2.2.
At 0359:30 the Commanding Officer HUTCHINS, on instructions
from Commander Attack Group 1.2, who knew that the HUTCHINS ammunition was
low and was interfering with the "spotting" of the Allied cruisers, ceased
firing, having expended 246 rounds at the MOGAMI.** At this point,
because he had been fighting a "reverse" action and had already passed the
nearest point to the MOGAMI, the range had commenced increasing and was
now 8,200 yards.
At 0402 Commander Attack Group 1.2 observed that Attack Group
2.2 was on a southerly course about a mile to the west. At this time he
asked the DALY and BACHE how many torpedoes they had and was promptly
informed "five each".***
At 0403 the Commanding Officer DALY became aware of a target
further north, bearing 043°(T), range 11,000 yards,**** The range was
decreasing while that to the MOGAMI was increasing. He therefore checked
fire on the MOGAMI, having expended eighty-two rounds of 5-inch ammunition
changed course to 330°(T) and, in view of his distance behind the HUTCHINS,
increased speed to thirty knots.**** At 0404 he opened fire on the new
target — a large enemy ship—now bearing 047°(T), range 10,200 yards. This
target was the YAMASHIRO. Also at 0404 the Commanding Officer BACHE ceased
firing on the MOGAMI, having expended 134 rounds of 5-inch ammunition. At
this time the MOGAMI was afire and none of her gun batteries were active.*****
*~ Action Report COMDESRON 24, Night Surface Engagement, Surigao Strait,
Leyte, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0129,
October 30th, 1944.
Action Report HUTCHINS, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 069, October 30th, 1944.
Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944.
Action Report BACHE, Engagement of Enemy Surface Forces, Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0106,
October 25th, 1944.
**
-tf-tf-V-
****
*****
530
CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
Immediately after opening fire on the YAMASHIRO the Commanding
Officer DALY noticed that ship was firing secondary battery gunfire at the
DALY and further noticed that the enemy projectiles were tracer type and
were landing over about 200 to 500 yards,* In order to upset the enemy
spotting he changed course to 305° (T) and at 0405 changed course again to
341°(T).** He was not hit.*
Also at 0405 Commander Attack Group 1.2 over the Task Group
Common informed Commander Right Flank Force that he believed that the right
flank cruisers were due north of him.*** In a matter of seconds he
received Commander Right Flank Force's reply advising him that this was
correct and directing him once again nto get in to the beach".*** He
immediately changed course to 325° (T) and commenced slowing down in order
to allow his other two ships to close the distance to the flagship.****
About 0406 he received an inquiry, also from Commander Right Flank Force,
as to the number of torpedoes left in Attack Group 1.2. He replied that
the BACHE and DALY each had five.***
Also at 0406 the Commanding Officer DALY ceased firing on the
YAMASHIRO, having expended twenty-five rounds of 5-inch ammunition on that
target .*
At 0408:36 the Commanding Officer DALY changed course to
000°(T),** presumably to remain clear of Attack Group 2.2. The BACHE
followed in column,***** and about this time increased speed to thirty
knots.
At 0409 Commander Attack Group 1.2, in the HUTCHINS, received
the order from Commander Right Flank Force to "cease firing." He
immediately directed his destroyers to cease firing.***
At about 0411 the Commanding Officer DALY changed course to
325°(T) and followed the track of the HUTCHINS.** The DALY and BACHE were
now closing the HUTCHINS due to their greater speed.
At 0418 Commander Attack Group 1.2 received a message from
Commander Right Flank Force directing him to lie to along the shore and
standby for another run.*** He therefore continued on his course heading
toward a lie-to point north of Cabugan Grande Island.*
At 0420 he was bearing 050°(T), distant 1,800 yards from the
northeastern tip of Cabugan Grande Island. The DALY and BACHE had now
closed to about 3,500 yards.
*"~ Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944*
** Ibid., Enclosure (A).
*** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
**** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosures (A) and (B).
***** Action Report BACHE, Engagement of Enemy Surface Forces, Surigao
Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0106,
October 25th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
531 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 2.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
(2) Commander Attack Group 2.2, 0348 - 0420, October 25th.
As Commander Attack Group 2.2, in the ARUNTA, on course 157°(T),
speed fifteen knots headed toward the YAMASHIRO to make a gunfire attack,*
the KILLEN and BEALE followed in very loose column. The Commanding Officer
KILLEN at this time was preparing to fire his remaining three torpedoes
at the leading ship (YAMASHIRO) as soon as he was in position to fire.**
At 0349 the Commanding Officer KILLEN, who was now about 1,500
yards astern of the ARUNTA and on course 180°(T), fired his three remaining
torpedoes using broadside fire to port and a low speed setting, on base
torpedo course 072°(T), at the enemy battleship bearing 10o5°(T), target
angle 286^°, range 12,450 yards and tracked on course 000°(T), speed
fifteen knots. Depth setting was twenty-two feet, firing interval three
seconds, torpedo spread one degree. All torpedoes aopeared to run hot,
straight and normal.***
IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHAT THE COMMANDING OFFICER
KILLEN HOPED TO ACCOMPLISH BY THIS PARTIAL SALVO OF THREE TORPEDOES SET AT
LOW SPEED FOR (A) THE PROBABILITY OF HITUNG A SINGLE TARGET WITH THREE
LOW SPEED TORPEDOES AT SUCH A RANGE (12,000 YARDS) WAS LOW, (B) THE LEAD
ANGLE NECESSARY (BASE TORPEDO COURSE 072°(T)) TO FIRE THESE TORPEDOES
MIGHT WELL HAVE ENDANGERED THE DESTROYERS OF DESRON FIFTY-SIX WHICH THE
COMMANDING OFFICER KILLEN KNEW 'WERE ATTACKING AT THIS TIME, AND (C) THE
BATTLE DISPOSITION WAS ABOUT TO OPEN FIRE. THIS WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE THE
TARGET TO MANEUVER LONG BEFORE THE TORPEDOES COULD POSSIBLY ARRIVE AT THE
TARGET WHICH, WITH THE SMALL SPREAD (TWO DEGREES), WOULD LIKELY INSURE
THAT ALL TORPEDOES MISSED.
Also at 0349 Commander Attack Group 2.2 received an order from
Commander Right Flank Force as follows: "If you have not reached middle
of channel stay to eastward as fast as you can."**** Although he
acknowledged the order, he likely did not understand it for, at this time,
he was fairly close to the western shore. However, (a) mindful of the fact
that this was a safety objective and that it was Commander Right Flank
Force's desire to get him close to shore regardless of whether it was the
east or the west shore and (b) believing that a nearby patch of smoke
contained one or more friendly destroyers which he should avoid, he turned
westward to course 270°(T) to get closer to the shore.* The correctness of
his decision was confirmed a minute later, at 0350, when he received
Commander Right Flank Force's order directing Commanders Attack Groups 1.2
and 2.2 to "take your group to shore as soon as possible." His statement
that "it was necessary to make a detour around smoke that apparently
contained one of our own destroyers" shows that his radar picture was
incomplete. Certainly the movements of Attack Group 1,2, since this group
*~~ Action Report HMAS ARUNTA, Night Action ReDort, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 1/41, October 29th, 1944.
** Action Report KILLEN, Surface Engagement Surigao Straits, October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0075, October 28th, 1944.
*** Ibid., Enclosure (A).
**** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October
25thj 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
532 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 2.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
was under the command of DESRON TWENTY-FOUR (his squadron commander),
should have been more closely followed and accurately recorded on the
summary plot. Actually, at this time the HUTCHINS, which it will be
recalled was the flagship of Attack Group 1.2, was about six and one-
quarter miles to the southward and there were no ships, either friendly
or enemy, in the smoke.
Also at 0350 he likely intercepted, over TBS voice radio, CTG
77.2 's message stating that the cruisers were about to open fire.*
At 0352:30, having closed the shore about a mile, Commander
Attack Group 2.2 again turned south to conduct his gunfire attack.** At
this time he observed the battle disposition open fire.
At 0354, with an opening range of 13,300 yards, his flagship
likewise opened fire at a target which was visible to the gun director
operator and appeared to be a destroyer.***
Actually, it was not a destroyer but was instead the battleship
YAMASHIRO. The nearest destroyer, the SHIGURE, was about 1,000 yards
beyond the battleship and on approximately the same line of bearing. The
ARUNTA fired eleven salvos of 4. 7- inch projectiles and attempted to employ
visual spotting. However she soon realized that that visual spotting was
not practical because the target area was obliterated by the splashes from
the battle disposition projectiles.***
In the meantime the KILLEN and BEALE followed the ARUNTA in a
general way, for they were employing follow-the-leader tactics. This was
necessary because, as pointed out earlier, the ARUNTA had encountered
difficulty in communicating with the KILLEN and BEALE over the Task Group
Common Voice Radio Circuit, as well as by blinker tube. Having heard
Commander Right Flank Force's 0349 order and seeing the ARUNTA start to
turn to the west, the Commanding Officer KILLEN, immediately after firing,
also turned to the west and steadied on a course of 265°(T).**** It
appears that the BEALE followed closely.
The smoke which confused the ARUNTA, probably handicapped the
KILLEN likewise, for that destroyer continued on to the west and well past
the turning point that would have put her astern of the ARUNTA.
At 0354 (perhaps she could see the ARUNTA at this time) she
turned toward the south.**** At 0355 she opened fire on the battleship
bearing 092°(T), range 12,500 yards.***** Her track chart shows 14,500
* Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
** Track Chart, Action Report HMAS ARUNTA, Night Action Report, October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial l/41, October 29th, 1944.
*** Action Report HMAS ARUNTA, Night Action Report, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 1/41, October 29th, 1944.
**** Track Chart, Action Report KILLEN, Surface Engagement Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0075, October 28th, 1944.
***** Action Report KILLEN, Surface Engagement Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0075, October 23th, 1944
533 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 2.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
yards,* which agrees closely with Diagram "J". At 0357, as she steadied on
course 090°(T), she turned to starboard and steadied on course 175°(T) in
order to follow the ARUNTA.*
About 0356 the Commanding Officer ARUNTA checked fire on the
YAMASHIRO, having fired eleven six-gun salvos at her. He gave as his
reason for checking fire that "the HUTCHINS passed in the line of fire
laying smoke"** although at this time the HUTCHINS was still about three
miles to the southeast. Although he implies that he promptly shifted fire
to the MOGAMI there must have been a delay of several minutes in order to
(a) satisfy the range and bearing reported and (b) to allow the HUTCHINS
to pass.
The KILLEN found that she was unable to spot by radar because
the splashes from the gunfire of the cruisers and the battle line made her
own splashes unrecognizable. Therefore, at 0359, she ceased firing having
expended fifty-nine rounds of 5-inch ammunition,*** Shortly after this
the commanding officer noted to his disappointment that the battleship had
changed course to the west,* which meant that the three torpedoes fired at
0349 would miss.
At approximately 0400 the HUTCHINS passed the ARUNTA on opposite
course and about a mile to the eastward. About 0402 the ARUNTA resumed
fire on the other large target (MOGAMI) bearing 300° relative, range 11,400
yards.** At 0403 she changed course to 155°(T)**** and changed speed to
twenty- five knots***** in order to keep the range from opening. Shortly
afterward she ceased firing, having expended ninety 4.7-inch projectiles in
fifteen salvos,** probably because of the near approach of the BACHE to the
line of fire although she appears to have been firing over the DALY, which
was about 1,000 yards further away.
At 0405 the ARUNTA changed course to 330°(T)**** and commenced
retiring.
At 0409 Commander Attack Group 2.2, as well as his commanding
officers, received orders from Commander Right Flank Force to cease firing.
At this same time he changed course to 000°(T).****
* Action Report KILLEN, Surface Engagement Surigao Straits, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0075, October 28th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
** Action Report HMAS ARUNTA, Night Action Report, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 1/41, October 29th, 1944.
*** Action Report KILLEN, Surface Engagement Surigao Straits, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0075, October 28th, 1944.
**** Track Chart, Action Report HMAS ARUNTA, Night Action Report, October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 1/41, October 29th, 1944.
***** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
534 CONFIDENTIAL
COM EASTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
At 0412 Commander Attack Group 2.2 received an inquiry from
COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR as to the status of torpedoes on board ships of
Attack Group 2.2. After several minutes he replied that the BEALE had five
torpedoes left and that he could not communicate with the KILLEN.*
At 0413 he slowed to fifteen knots and changed course to 010° (T).**
At 0416 he received an order from Commander Right Flank Force to
lie to along the shore and await another run.* He therefore turned to course
241° (T)** to head for Pandan Point while the KILLEN and BEALE changed course
to 260°(T).***
At 0420 the ARUNTA was bearing 058° (T), distant one point nine
miles from Pandan Point and the KILLEN and BEALE were about 1,300 and 2,100
yards respectively to the northeast (Diagram MJ")0
(B) Operations of CTG 79.11, 0348 - 0420, October 25th.
(1) Commander Eastern Attack Group,
With his group in column formation with REMEY as guide, Commander
Eastern Attack Group was patrolling the post rendezvous area in the vicinity
of Antisubmarine Patrol Station No. THREE. Over the MN voice radio circuit,
which he had directed would not be employed for maneuvering, he was
gathering the battle readiness and attack results of his group. He was
concerned lest his Western Attack Group, which was heading for its post
rendezvous point (Antisubmarine Patrol Station No. SEVEN), be mistaken for
enemy by the Allied battle disposition.
At 0349 he received a report from the MELVIN that she had received
no material or personnel casualties. At 0350 he received a similar report
from the MC GOWAN. At about this same time he noted that the battle
disposition was experiencing difficulties in separating friend from foe
and in selecting targets upon which to open fire. Growing even more
concerned over the safety of his Western Attack Group he advised CTG 77.2
by TBS voice radio that the MC DERMUT and MONSSEN were still retiring.
At 0353 he received a report from the Commanding Officer MC GOWAN to
the effect that he had observed a large explosion in the direction of the
MONSSEN. Since Commander Eastern Attack Group took no action on this message
and did not query the MONSSEN thereon, it seems clear that he realized that
what the MC GOWAN had observed was the opening fire of the right flank
cruisers.
At 0406 he was relieved to receive a TBS voice radio message from
the MC GOWAN relaying a report from the MC DERMUT that the Western Attack
was at the post attack rendezvous and would remain there until further orders.
*~ Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Track Chart, Action Report HMAS ARUNTA, Night Action Report, October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 1/41, October 29th, 1944.
*** Track Chart, Action Report KILLEN, Surface Engagement Surigao Straits,
October 25th, 1944, Serial 0075, October 28th, 1944.
535 CONFIDENTIAL
COM WESTERN ATTACK GROUP
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
At 0409 he overheard COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX report to CTG 77.2 that
DESRON FIFTY-SIX, in the middle of the channel, was being fired upon by
friendly ships. One minute later he intercepted a TBS voice radio message
from CTG 77.2 directing DESRON FIFTY-SIX to clear the channel and
immediately thereafter he heard Commander Attack Section TWO (COMDESDIV 112)
report, also by TBS voice radio, that Attack Section TWO was turning east
at twenty- five knots.*
From his plot he now knew that his Eastern Attack Group might be
endangered by this change of course. He therefore immediately informed
Commander Attack Section TWO by TBS voice radio that a portion of DESRON
FIFTY- FOUR was northeast of Hibuson Island. He further reported by TBS
voice radio to CTG 77.2 that the REMEY, MELVTN and MC GOWAN were northeast
of Hibuson Islando
At 0420 Commander Eastern Attack Group was patrolling in the
vicinity of Antisubmarine Patrol Station No. THREE.
(2) Commander Western Attack Group.
With the MONSSEN following in column astern Commander Western
Attack Group in MC DERMUT continued his retirement.
At 0359 being in the vicinity of his rendezvous, he commenced
steaming along a polygon figure to remain in the vicinity as shown on
Diagram "J".
At 0400, when in position about two and a half miles north of
Cabugan Grande Island, he made radar contact on an unidentified ship
bearing 270°(T), range 4,500 yards. He challenged this contact by TBS
voice radio and quickly learned that this was the HALFMOON (AVP 26) which
was heading north to get out of the battle area.**
At about this same time, being unable to communicate with Commander
Eastern Attack Group, he, at 0405, asked the MC GOWAN in the Eastern Group
to relay to Commander Eastern Attack Group the fact that the MC DERMUT and
MONSSEN had arrived at their rendezvous station where they planned to
remain until further orders.
At 0420 the Western Attack Group was on northwesterly course 315°(T)
in a position bearing 008°(T), distant about seven miles from the north-
eastern tip of Cabugan Grande Island.
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report COMDESDIV 108, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 038, November 5th, 1944. CONFIDENTIAL
536
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
(C) Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats, 0348 - 0420, October 25th.
(1) Upper Surigao PT's,
At 0348 Commander Upper Surigao PT's, with PT's 327, 321 and 326,
was about two point one miles south of Kanihaan Island and was drifting
south with the current.
At approximately 0403 he went ahead at six knots and changed course
to 352°(T) in order to return to the vicinity of Kanihaan Island.
At approximately 0408 he sighted four burning ships which he
recorded as being four to ten miles bearing 200° (T) to 330°(T) from
Kanihaan Island.* One of these ships was the MOGAMI bearing 329°(T),
distant ten miles from Kanihaan Island; one was the ASAGUMO; the remaining
two were the two sections of the FUSO.
At 0420 he was about one point three miles south and slightly west
of Kanihaan Island.
(2) Lower Surigao PT's.
(a) PT 490.
At 0348 PT 490 was bearing 092© (T), distant three point four
miles from Caligangan Point. She was drifting with the current which was
setting 155° (T) at about two point two knots.
At approximately 0400 the commanding officer made radar contact
on four unidentified ships (actually there were six) at a range of about
12,000 yards moving north up the middle of the strait. These units
comprised the SECOND Striking Force.
He promptly reported this contact to CTG 77. 2.** Although
there is no mention of this message in the various voice logs, CTG 77*2 in
his preliminary action report, states that the PT's reported at 0520 that
four large ships were coming up the strait.*** What caused the delay is
not known but it was most likely due to the (a) numerous relays normally
required and (b) fact that heavy ships were in action.
At 0420 PT 490 was bearing 106j0(T), distant four point one
miles from Caligangan Point,
(b) PT 491.
At 0348 PT 491 was bearing 114°(T), distant five point forty-
three miles from Caligangan Point and was proceeding on course 330°(T) at
five knots,
*~ Action Reports PT's 327 and 326, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944,
No Serials, October' 30th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 490, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
*** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
537 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
Although she was passed at approximately 0358 about four point
eight miles to the eastward by the NACHI leading the SECOND Striking Force,
there is no mention of any contact thereon in her action report.*
At 0400 she stopped and commenced drifting with the current.
At 0420 PT 491 was bearing 116° (T), distant five point six miles
from Caligangan Point.
(c) PT 493.
PT 493, damaged and abandoned by her crew, was beached on
Maoyo Point.
(3) East Amagusan PT's.
Since the East Amagusan PT's continued to operate separately they
will be discussed separately.
(a) PT 328.
At 0348 PT 328, with Commander East Amagusan PT's on board, was
proceeding toward the Leyte shore on a northwesterly course at about five
knots.
At approximately 0400, when close to the Leyte shore, he stopped
and commenced drifting slowly eastward with the current.
At 0420 PT 328 was bearing approximately 244°(T), distant 2,000
yards from Amagusan Point.
(b) PT 323.
At 0348 PT 323 was on course 030°(T) at slow speed.
At 0413 she changed course to 180°(T) in order to clear the area
in which friendly destroyers had been making their attacks on the enemy.
At 0420 PT 323 was bearing 071°(T), distant 4,500 yards from
Amagusan Point (Diagram "J").
(c) PT 329.
At 0348 PT 329, off Amagusan Point, was drifting with the current
on a course of about 200°(T).
Around 0410 the commanding officer sighted three fires which
were the two halves of the burning FUSO and the ASAGUMO (Diagram "J").
Although he reported these fires as bearing 150°(T), distant nine miles, the
bearing of the southernmost half was around 115°(T). Since the ASAGUMO was
* Action Report PT 491, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
538 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0348 - 0420, October 25th
a considerable distance to the north at this time and since the Commanding
Officer PT 329 implied that the three fires were close together, the
memory of those on board must have referred to a much later time (about
0534) when the ASAGUMO had moved to the vicinity of the FUSO.
At 0420 PT 329 was bearing 151° (T), distant 2,000 yards from
Amagusan Point.
(4) Other PT's.
The operations of the motor torpedo boats, other than the Upper
Surigao, Lower Surigao and East Amagusan PT's were uneventful.
539 CONFIDENTIAL
COM THIRD SECTION
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
CHAPTER XVIII - JAPANESE OPERATIONS. 0420 - 0520, October 25th
(A) Operations of Commander THIRD Section, 0420 - 0520, October 25th.
Commander THIRD Section and the Commanding Officer YAMASHIRO were likely-
lost when at 0419 the YAMASHIRO sank* This fact was, of course, not known
to the commanding officers of the remaining ships, i.e., FUSO, MQGAMI,
SHIGURE and ASAGUMO, although it might well have been surmised by them
because of the heavy gunfire to the north. However, the SHIGURE, and possibly
the MOGAMI and ASAGUMO, knew that (a) the SHIGURE had not received a reply to
her message at 0352 addressed to Commander THIRD Section and (b) Commander
THIRD Section had not issued any additional instructions to the units under
his command since that time. As regards the FUSO, it seems correct to say
that the Commanding Officers of the MOGAMI, SHIGURE and ASAGUMO knew that a
battleship had fallen out of formation (she had been torpedoed at 0303) and
had not been heard from on the voice circuits since, although the heavy fires
in the area where she most likely was gave strong indications that she was
in serious difficulties.
WHY, IN VTEW OF THESE FACTS, THERE WAS NO EFFORT MADE BY THE COMMANDING
OFFICERS, MOGAMI, SHIGURE AND ASAGUMO TO DISCERN WHO THE SENIOR SURVIVING
COMMANDING OFFICER WAS, IS NOT KNOWN.
However, if they had any concern in this matter it was quickly dispelled
for at 0441 they were directed by Commander SECOND Striking Force to "follow
behind NACHI", who, as pointed out under "Operations of Commander SECOND
Striking Force, 0420 - 0520, October 25th", had commenced retiring at about
0430. Since all of the units of the THIRD Section still afloat in the battle
area, with the exception of the FUSO, were already retiring these instructions
were likely welcome indeed.
Because of the fact that these four units were operating independently
throughout the major portion of this period they are discussed separately.
(1) MOGAMI
At the commencement of this period the MOGAMI, burning, damaged and
out of control, and with a chief quartermaster as the navigator, was heading
in a southeasterly direction at slow speed. She continued to be free of
enemy gunfire.
At about this time, although her action report makes no mention of
it, she was moving so slowly as to appear "dead in the water" to the staff
of Commander SECOND Striking Force in the NACHI.* She also must have appeared
Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation, Southwest Area
Operation, Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-IJN, 2ND Striking Force Staff Torpedo
Officer, GHQ, FEC, Special Historical Collection, Supporting Documents to
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Historical Report on Allied
Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (Item 22, Footlocker 5 of 10,
SWPA Series, Volume II).
540 CONFIDENTIAL
MOGAMI
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
stopped to certain of the Allied ships for those ships, which plotted her
show no change in location* Soon after this she seems to have gathered
headway again for, at about 0425, when she sighted the NACHI on her star-
board bow, she was making about four knots©
Suddenly, at about 01+28, the chief quartermaster noted that the
NACHI was changing course to starboard. Realizing that the danger of
collision was real he endeavored to avoid it« However, owing to her slow
speed and to the manual steering reauired, the MOGAMI was unable to respond
adeauately.
As a result, at 0430, in position bearing 198° (T), distant ten point
seven miles from Hibuson Island light, the ships collided striking in the
bowsj after which they immediately separated. Fortunately the resulting
damage was not heavy, consisting, as regards the MOGAMI, solely of slight
dents on the starboard side and on the side of her forward gun turret.*
She now. partially as a result of this collision, settled on a course
of about 156°(t), speed five point seven knots.**
The Gunnery Officer, who was now the Commanding Officer, realizing
that he had not been under fire for about one-half hour, and further realiz-
ing that only limited responsibility should be placed on the chief ouarter-
master for navigating the ship through the lower strait, proceeded to the
bridge and at 0440 took over the navigation of the ship.*
About one minute later— at 0441 — he received Commander SECOND
Striking Force's order directing the units of the THIRD Section to "follow
behind NACHI".***
Meanwhile the MOGAMI made every effort to jettison her remaining
torpedoes (it will be recalled that she had fired four torpedoes at 0401:30
leaving eight in her torpedo tubes). She had succeeded in jettisoning four
of these eight, when, also at about 0441, a large fire broke out amidships.
This fire exploded the remaining four torpedoes in the tubes as well as
certain antiaircraft and machine gun ammunition in the area of the fire and
of the torpedo explosions.**** This left six torpedoes (reloads) in storage
somewhere in the ship, but likely in the vicinity of the mounts.
* Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
** Action Report DENVER, Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 0031, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
*** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
**** Report on SH0 Operation by Lieutenant Fukushi, ex-IJN, Control Station
and Fire Data Computer Officer, MOGAMI, December 1945, Army Historical
Division Microfilm HS-39A.
541 CONFIDENTIAL
MOGAMI
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
About this time the sole remaining operating engine room, the
forward port engine room, became untenable due to smoke and high temperature.
Because of the heavy smoke pouring through the engine room ventilators from
burning boats and punts on deck, breathing became very difficult, the
visibility became zero, and the temperature reached 140° (F) (60°(C)) in the
control room* All personnel withdrew to No, SIX fireroom leaving the main
engine operating**
The Commanding Officer MOGAMI now, at 0445, attempted to follow the
NaCHI as ordered* This view is supported by the DENVER track chart which
shows that the MOGAMI was bearing 169° (T), range 29,400 yards and that at
this time she changed course to 190° (T).**
At about 0446 she sighted a destroyer on the port bow with her bow
severed**** At 0450, noting that this destroyer had turned toward him, the
commanding officer signalled by blinker light, "This is the MOGAMI. We are
using hand steering", and received a signal back, "This is ASAGUMO"**
WHILE IT MAY SEEM SURPRISING THAT NEITHER THE MOGAMI NOR THE ASAGUMO
ASKED FOR NOR OFFERED ANY HELP THE ONE TO THE OTHER, THEIR ACTION IN THE
MATTER SEEMS CORRECT FOR THEY WERE BOTH DAMAGED AND RETIRING UNDER THEIR OWN
POWER WITH THE MOGAMI NOW INCREASING SPEED TO FOURTEEN KNOTS AND THE ASAGUMO
TO BUT NINE POINT FIVE KNOTS. SINCE THE MOGAMI WAS MUCH MORE VALUABLE TO
THE JAPANESE EFFORT THAN WAS THE ASAGUMO IT BECAME IMPORTANT THAT SHE SURVIVE
IF POSSIBLE AND SINCE THE ENEMY SHIPS COULD BE EXPECTED TO CONDUCT A "CHaSE"
NO DELAY WAS WARRANTED.
Around this time the MOGAMI appears from the Allied radar plots to
have increased speed to about fourteen knots. The MOGAMI track shows sixteen
knots. How, under the emergency conditions reported, she accomplished this
is not explained.
At about 0455, probably because he observed the SRTGURE open fire on
the Upper Surigao PTfs and did not wish to cross the line of fire, the
(^mmanding Officer MOGAMI changed course to 304°(T)** (Diagram "K")*
At 0500 he changed course to 270° (T) to parallel the course of the
NACHI and increased speed to fifteen knots* About 0505 he changed course to
230° (T).**
At approximately 0510 bridge steering was restored by the installa-
tion of emergency wiring.*
* Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October 18th -
25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
** Action Report DENVER, Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0031, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
*** Report on SHO Operation by Lieutenant Fukushi, ex-IJN, Control Station
Officer and Fire Data Computer Officer, MOGAMI, December 1945, Army
Historical Division Microfilm HS-39A.
542 CONFIDENTIAL
SHIGURE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0514 the MOGAMI, still making fifteen knots, steadied on course
192°(T). At 0520 she was bearing (a) 274°(T), distant six point sixty-five
miles from the northern tip of Kanihaan Island and (b) 318°(T), distant
2,700 yards from the NACHI.
(2) SHIGURE
At 0420 the SHIGURE, having cleared the SHIRANUHI, changed course
to about 189°(T) in order to pass Binit Light close aboard (Diagram "K").
She was working up to thirty knots in order to clear the strait as
rapidly as possible. However, just as all seemed well, she suddenly, at
0424> suffered a steering engine casualty as a result of which she commenced
shifting to manual steering.*
Although she does not mention it in her action report, it seems
clear that she encountered difficulties in so shifting for her 0426
position was plotted by the KILLEN as bearing 155°(T), distant 27,700
yards from the KILLEN, her 0438 position was plotted by the PHOENIX as
"dead in the water" in position bearing 159°(T), distant sixteen point
four miles from the PHOENIX and her 0438:30 position by the Upper Surigao
PT's as bearing about 323°(T), distant about 9,200 yards (Diagram "K").
Since it takes about three minutes for CIC to establish a speed zero she
must have actually been dead in the water about 0435. From the Allied
radar data her course from 0426 to 0435 appears to have been 040°(T).
At 0440 she sighted the NACHI, and perhaps also the MOGAMI, on a
southerly course-- some 5,200 yards to the north and east. It is likely that
she was sighted by the NACHI at about the same time for at 0441 Coirmander
SECOND Striking Force ordered the THIRD Section to "follow behind NACHI".
At 0445 she replied that her steering engines were out of order.*
At approximately 0455, while still on a northeasterly heading, she
sighted the Upper Surigao PT's bearing about 120°(T), distant about 5,400
yards. She immediately opened fire at the PT's,** went ahead at twenty-four
knots and changed course to 300° (T).*** (The MTB*s reported that the firing
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Action Report PT 321, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
*** SHIGURE1 s movements until after her change of course at 0522 are based
on (a) Track Chart, Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Straits, Philippine
Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, (b)
Appended Chart 2, Chart of Night Battle, THIRD Section, FIRST Striking
Force, 0030 - 0530, October 25th, 1944, Detailed Action Report SHIGURE,
Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717
(Part 4), NA 11801, and (c) the statement of her Commanding Officer
that he retired at 24 knots contained in USSBS Interrogations of
Japanese Officials, Nav. No. 79, Interrogation of Commander Shigeru
Nishino, ex-IJN, Volume II, Page 350,
543 CONFIDENTIAL
SHIGURE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
was not accurate until after 0459 at which time PT 321 had a hot run on deck
while attempting to fire torpedoes. This hot run was sufficiently Dright to
attract the attention of the ASAGUMO which also opened fire. The gunfire,
probably from the SHIGURE, was accurate enough to seriously wound one map
and to make a shrapnel hole in the radar mast of the PT 321.* This action
is discussed more fully under "Operations of Upper Surigao PT's, 0420 - 0520,
October 25th".
About 0501 he changed course to 240°(T) and at 0509 to 196°(T). At
the latter time she was Dearing 157°(T), range thirteen point eight miles
from the PHOENIX.**
Starting at approximately 0513 she appears to have had more steering
difficulties as both her action chart and the PHOENIX track chart show her
on a sinuous course. Then at approximately 0515 she slowed to fifteen knots
presumably for the purpose of assisting in the steering of the ship.
At about this same time Commander SECOND Striking Force, in NACHI,
once again sighted the SHIGURE on his starboard bow,*** distant 4,400 yards.
Several minutes later (0517) the SHIGURE settled on course 195°(T)
and appears to have corrected the worst of her steering difficulties although
she did not report her steering restored until later.
At 0520 the SHIGURE was proceeding on course 195° (T), speed fifteen
knots, and was bearing 256° (T), distant seven point seven miles from the
southern tip of Kanihaan Island, (Diagram "L")«
(3) ASAGUMO
The damaged ASAGUMO continued on course 090° (T) at a speed of about
six knots. Due to the current, which was setting south, she was making good
a course of about 108° (T),
At 0441 she most likely received Commander SECOND Striking Force's
order to "follow behind NACHI ".****
* Action Report PT 321, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
Octooer 30th, 1944.
** Track Chart, Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944.
*** Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operations, Southwest Area
Operation, Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-UN, 2ND Striking Force Staff
Torpedo Officer, GHQ, FEC Special Historical Collection, Supporting
Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Historical Report
on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (Item 22, Footlocker
5 of 10, SWPA Series, Volume II).
**** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, tiattle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
544 CONFIDENTIAL
ASAGUMO and FUSO
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0447, probably realizing that the MOGAMI was attempting to follow
the NACHI, she changed course to 238 (T) and increased speed to nine point
five knots.* The commanding officer stated later that he had sighted the
MOGAMI afire about 0400 and had attempted to follow her but did not have
enough speed.** At 0450 he exchanged calls with her.***
At about 0459 he sighted PT 321 which had had a hot torpedo run on
deck and promptly opened fire on her <>**** Although the SHIGURE was also
firing at this MTB and was probably the more accurate of the two ships since
she (a) was not as badly damaged as the ASAGUMO, (b) had been firing at the
MTB!s for several minutes and (c) was closer, it is possible that the
ASAGUMO assisted in making the Upper Surigao PT's turn to the south.
At 0518 the ASAGUMO was bearing 174° (T). range 16,100 yards from the
LOUISVILLE***** and at 0520 she was bearing 2946(T), distant four point eight
miles from the northern tip of Kanihaan Island.
(4) FUSO
The two sections of the FUSO, which remained about 2,000 yards apart,
continued to drift to the south with the current. (Diagram "L").
* ASAGUMO track based on Allied radar plots.
** Composite Report on Surigao Strait Action by Commanding Officers
ASAGUMO (Commander Kazuo Shibayama, ex-UN) and MICHISHIO (Commander
Kazuo Tanaka, ex-IJN), March 15th, 1946, Army Historical Division
Microfilm HS-39A.
*** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Dcoument 160463, NA 12653.
**** Action Report PT 321, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
***** Track Chart, Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off
Surigao Strait, Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 0045, November 7th, 1944.
496799 o- 59 -45 545 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
(B) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force, 0420 - 0520, October 25th.
At the commencement of this period Commander SECOND Striking Force, in
his flagship NACHI, followed by the ASHIGARA, was on course 000o(T) at
twenty-eight knots. DESDIV EIGHTEEN (SHIRANUHI, KASUMI, AKEBONO, USHIO)
was moving to the northwest at thirty-four knots on course 330°(T). All
ships were preparing to fire torpedoes* against an enemy group of ships
which had been located by radar*
At this time he likely noted that the SHIGURE, which had just crossed
ahead of the SHIRANUHI, was about 3,100 yards to the southwest (Diagram
MKW) and was continuing to retire.
Since, at this time, DESDIV EIGHTEEN was operating largely on its own,
the operations of this command will be discussed separately.
When Commander SECOND Striking Force had determined that all ships
had completed preparations for firing torpedoes, he (a) at 0424, changed
course to starboard, apparently to about 090°(T), in order to fire torpedoes
to port and (b) at the same time directed the destroyers to attack.** This
was in accordance with his battle plan discussed under "Operations of
Commander SECOND Striking Force, 0348 - 0420, October 25th", wherein upon
contacting the enemy, he planned to launch separate torpedo attacks, first
by his cruisers and then by his destroyers.
WHILE THE CONCEPT OF MAKING TORPEDO ATTACKS AS ABOVE STATED WAS SOUND
THERE IS CONSIDERABLE QUESTION AS TO THE ADVISABILITY OF LAUNCHING (A)
ATTACKS AGAINST A FORCE, THE CHARACTERISTICS AND MOVEMENTS OF WHICH ARE
UNKNOWN AND (B) UNCOORDINATED TORPEDO ATTACKS.
SINCE HIS RADAR HAD NOT PROVEN PARTICULARLY GOOD—IT WILL BE RECALLED
THAT ABOUT ONE HOUR EARLIER HE HAD VERY NEARLY RUN AGROUND ON PANAON
ISLAND— WOULD IT NOT HAVE BEEN A BETTER COURSE OF ACTION HAD HE CHANGED
HIS PLAN AND SENT THE DESTROYERS AHEAD TO INVESTIGATE THE RADAR CONTACT
AND TO ATTACK IF WARRANTED?
THIS SEEMS THE PROPER COURSE FOR HE HAD ALREADY OBSERVED NOT ONLY THAT
HIS COMMAND WAS NOT UNDER FIRE BUT THAT THE GUNFLASHES AHEAD HAD CEASED.
* Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation, Southwest Area
Operation, Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-IJN, 2ND Striking Force Staff
Torpedo Officer, GHQ, FEC, Special Historical Collection, Supporting
Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Historical Report
on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (item 22, Footlocker
5 of 10, SWPA Series, Volume II).
*» Ibid.; also Track Chart, Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface
Engagement off Surigao Strait, Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0045, November 7th, 1944.
546 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
WHILE THE JAPANESE INSTRUCTIONS AT THIS TIME ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO THIS
ANALYSIS, IT IS ASSUMED THAT THEY WERE SIMILAR TO U. S. NAVY INSTRUCTIONS
WHICH STATED THAT "THE NUMBER OF TORPEDOES CARRIED BY ANY SHIP IS LIMITED
AND THE REPLACEMENTS OF EXPENDED TORPEDOES MAY BE DIFFICULT, UNCERTAIN OR
LONG DELAYED. TORPEDOES ARE FIRED ONLY WHEN THERE IS REASONABLE EXPECTATION
OF OBTAINING RESULTS WHICH JUSTIFY THE EXPENDITURE".*
At 0427 both cruisers, using radar contact, fired eight high speed**
(forty-nine knots),*** short range (22,000 yards)*** torpedoes per ship on
base torpedo course 025°(T), with a torpedo spread of one degree.** Since
neither of the cruisers reported to the contrary it is assumed that all
torpedoes ran hot, straight and normal. What they were firing at is not
known for there were no Allied nor Japanese ships in the area referred to.
However, as pointed out under "Operations of Commander SECOND Striking
Force, 034S - 0420, October 25th", it seems likely that the target was
Hibuson Island for the western shoreline of that island was embraced in
each spread (Diagram "K").
At about this time he decided that the ship sighted in the water at
0415 was the MOGAMI. He further decided that he was not clearing her and,
therefore, changed course to the right to about 110°(T). (Actually this
ship which was in fact the MOGAMI and which had been moving so slowly as to
appear stopped was gathering headway.) He now recognized this fact and
realized that there was danger of collision. The Commanding Officer NACHI,
who by now was also fully alert to this, endeavored to avoid collision by
employing full right rudder but he was unsuccessful — the ships collided at
0430 in the bows. The damage to the NACHI was serious; her stem was
heavily damaged, her speed reduced to eighteen knots, her anchor windlass
room was flooded and there appeared to be seepage into the steering room.**
Meanwhile the ASHIGARA continued on course 090°(T) and passed astern
of the MOGAMI.
Commander SECOND Striking Force now decided to head south in order to
survey the situation. Therefore, he settled on course 180°(T) at five
knots.
* War Instructions, United States Navy (FTP 143A), United States Fleet,
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Navy Department, Chapter 12,
Section XII, Paragraph 12169.
** Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation, Southwest Area
Operation, Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-IJN, 2ND Striking Force Staff
Torpedo Officer, GHQ, FEC Special Historical Collection, Supporting
Documents to General of the Army Douglas Mac Arthur's Historical Report
on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (item 22, Foot-
locker 5 of 10, SWPA Series, Volume JI).
*** U. S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan Summary Report, November 1st,
1946.
547 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
He now re-estimated the situation and decided that in view of the NACHI's
reduced speed, the destruction of the greater part of the THIRD Section and
the possibility of coordinating his activities with Commander Main Body it
would be unwise to proceed further up the strait and therefore directed his
destroyers to "Reverse course to the south and rejoin".* He also notified
CinC Combined Fleet and Commander SW Area Force that "This force has
completed its attack and is temporarily retiring from the battle area in
order to plan subsequent action".**
WHILE HIS ACTION IN DECIDING TO RETIRE SEEMS SOUND FOR THE REASONS
STATED, AND FOR THE FURTHER REASON THAT HIS CRUISERS HAD LITTLE CHANCE OF
SUCCESS WHERE THE BATTLESHIPS HAD FAILED, HIS ACTION IN SENDING THIS
DISPATCH WAS NOT SOUND FOR IT STATED THAT HE HAD COMPLETED AN ATTACK, WITH
THE IMPLICATION THAT IT WAS AGAINST A SUITABLE TARGET, WHEN AS A MATTER OF
FACT HE DID NOT KNOW (A) WHAT THE TARGET THAT HE HAD FIRED AT WAS NOR (B)
WHAT FINAL ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN BY THE DESTROYERS. WOULD HE NOT HAVE BEEN
MORE CORRECT HAD HE (A) REPORTED TO CINC COMBINED FLEET THE DISASTER TO THE
THIRD SECTION WHICH HE HAD CLOSELY OBSERVED AND (B) STATED THAT IN CONSEQUENCE
THEREOF HE HAD FIRED HIS TORPEDOES AT AN ENEMY DISCOVERED ONLY BY RADAR AND
HAD THEN RETIRED.
Certain of the Japanese officers disagreed with Commander SECOND Striking
Force's decision to retire without further closing the enemy. One of them,
the Control Station Officer of the MOGAMI, stated later, "Most deplorable
in this connection was the action of the SECOND Striking Force which despite
the fact that it succeeded in penetrating into Leyte Gulf then failed to
carry out a thorough action against the enemy. This is indeed indisputable.
Considerable dissatisfaction on this score was felt among the personnel
both of AKEBONO and of the flagship NACHI".***
This comment by the Control Station Officer is interesting in that it
shows either (a) the looseness of the Japanese concepts as to what
constituted Leyte Gulf or (b) the lack of knowledge among some of the THIRD
Section survivors as to the distance the SECOND Striking Force actually
penetrated into Surigao Strait. Diagram "K" shows that even the destroyers
did not penetrate beyond Esconchada Point (Dinagat Island) and, that at the
time of their greatest penetration, they were no nearer to the nearest
Allied major units (right flank cruisers) than about 20,000 yards.
In view of this the Control Station Officer's disagreement is not con-
sidered correct, for while to have "carried out a thorough action against
the enemy" was suitable in that, if successful, it would have contributed
* Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation, Southwest Area
Operations, Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-LJN, 2ND Striking Force Staff
Torpedo Officer, GHQ, FEC Special Historical Collection, Supporting
Documents to General of the Army Douglas Mac Arthur's Historical Report
on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (item 22, Footlocker
5 of 10, SWPA Series, Volume II).
** Commander 2ND Striking Force Dispatch 250435 October 1944 to CinC
Combined Fleet, Commander SW Area Force, info SHO Operation Forces,
Detailed Action Report CARDIV 4, SHO No. 1 Operation, October 24th -
25th, 1944, WDC Document 161006, NA 12604.
*** Report on SHO Operation by Lieutenant Fukushi, ex-IJN, Control Station
Officer and Fire Data Computer Officer, MOGAMI, December 1945, Army
Historical Division Microfilm HS-39A.
548 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
to the accomplishment of the objective based on the disaster to the THIRD
Section it was clearly infeasible in which case the consequences as to
cost would be unacceptable. Such an attack would necessarily be classed
as a "Banzai" attack but, in this case the possibility of success which
Banzai attacks often had had, was so low as to be negligible.
At 0434 the ASHIGARA, which had slowed to fifteen knots, changed course
to 223°(T) and further decreased speed to ten knots in order to fall in
astern of the NACHI.
At 0440, since the SHIGURE recorded that at this time she had sighted
the SECOND Striking Force on a southerly course,* it seems likely that
Commander SECOND Striking Force had likewise sighted the SHIGURE, for at
0441 he ordered the THIRD Section to "follow behind NACHI".* At 0445 he
received the SHIGURE' s reply that her steering engines were out of order.*
At 0449 he sent a dispatch, presumably to all battle report addressees
to the effect that BATDIV TWO had been destroyed and that the MOGAMI had
been severely damaged and set afire.**
At about 0451, having learned from the NACHI the extent of her damage,
he directed her to increase speed to eighteen knots. At 0455, when the
SHIGURE opened fire on the Upper Surigao PT's, he reversed course to the
north*** in order not to cross the line of fire.
At about 0458, as this turn to the north was completed, he changed
course to 270°(T). At 0500, when he steadied on the new course, the
DENVER track chart shows that the radar bearing was 179°(T), range 25,300
yards. At 0504 he changed course to 230°(T).***
At 0506 he ordered a change of course to 180°(T).*** The MOGAMI,
doing her best to follow NACHI, as ordered at 0441, was about 1,300 yards
on the NACHI* s port quarter and at this same time had just changed course
to 230°(T).**** ASHIGARA, seeing that there was not sufficient room to
safely pass ahead of MOGAMI, continued the turn, steadied on course
150°(T),*** and passed astern of MOGAMI (Diagram "K"). At about 0511
ASHIGARA changed course to 185°(T) and increased speed to twenty knots in
order to fall in astern of NACHI at 0520.
* Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Commander 2ND Striking Force Dispatch 250449, October 1944 to Unknown
Addressees, Detailed Action Report 1ST Striking Force, SHO Operations,
October 16th - 28th, 1944, WDC Document I6I64I, NA 11839.
*** Track Chart, Action Report DENVER, Surigao Straits, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0031, November 4th, 1944.
**** Ibid.; also Track Chart, Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface
Engagement off Surigao Strait, Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0045, November 7th, 1944; also Preliminary Action
Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
549 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE and
COMDESDIV EIGHTEEN
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At about 0515 Commander SECOND Striking Force sighted SHIGURE on the
starboard bow,* She was proceeding on southerly courses toward the southern
entrance to Surigao Strait.
At 0520 Commander SECOND Striking Force, in NACHI with ASHIGARA astern,
was five point fifty-eight miles, bearing 268°(T) from Kanihaan Island.
MOGAMI was on the starboard auarter, distant 3,000 yards, and was closing
the NACHI track on course 155°(T), but was gradually dropping behind,
(1) Operations of COMDESDIV EIGHTEEN, 0420 - 0520, October 25th,
As mentioned under "Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force,
0420 - 0520, October 25thM at 0420 COMDESDIV EIGHTEEN, in SHIRANUHI with
KASUMI, AKEBONO and USHIO in column astern, was proceeding on course 330° (T)
to clear NACHI and ASHIGARA, and was increasing speed to thirty-four knots.
At this time he was about eight miles, bearing 092° (T) from Bobon Village
(Leyte). (Diagram "K").
At 0424:51, being well clear of the cruisers, he changed course to
000°(T), and headed toward the enemy's probable location.
As he moved to the northward he likely knew that the cruisers had
fired their torpedoes, but at what target he did not know, for he seems to
have had nothing on his radar scopes. He realized at this time that since
the cruisers had turned to the eastward some minutes earlier he was, at 0429,
some distance ahead of them in the direction of the enemy. Therefore, it
seems likely that, having nothing on his radar scope, he decided to change
course also to the east to endeavor to contact the targets fired at by the
cruisers, for, at 0429:54, he changed course to 090°(T).*»
As he moved to the eastward he seems to have continued to contact
nothing other than Hibuson Island — about eight miles away— and which he
sighted from time to time through breaks in the smoke screen which persisted
from the actions between THIRD Section and the Allied ships.
At about 0435 or shortly before he was directed by Commander SECOND
Striking Force to, "Reverse course to the south and rejoin". Having sighted
nothing and having nothing on his radar screen he immediately changed course
to 145° (T) and commenced retiring.
* Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation, Southwest Area
Operation, Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-UN, 2ND Striking Force Staff
Torpedo Officer, GHQ, FEC Special Historical Collection Supporting
Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Historical Report
on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (Item 22, Footlocker
5 of 10, SWPA Series, Volume II).
** Track Chart, Action Report CALIFORNIA, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0024, November 3rd, 1944; also Track Chart, Action
Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao Strait, Leyte
Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0045, November 7th,
1944; also Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944.
550 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESDIV EIGHTEEN
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0440:42, observing that both the NACHI and ASHIGARA were on a
course of 180°(T), he changed course to 180°(T) in order to parallel their
track.*
At about this time he observed that the USHIO, under instructions
from Commander SECOND Striking Force, was heading toward the southern
entrance to Surigao Strait in order to escort the ABUKUMA which had been
torpedoed at 0325 that morning** by PT 137.
At 0444 he slowed to twenty knots in order to avoid closing the
cruisers too rapidly. However, it appears that at about 0503 the remaining
three destroyers were directed to proceed down the strait.
At 0520 COMDESDIV EIGHTEEN, still on course 180° (T) at twenty
knots, was bearing 275°(T), distant five point ninety-three miles from
the northern tip of Sibanoc Island. (Diagram "L").
(2) Operations of ABUKUMA, 0420 - 0520, October 25th.
At 0420 the damaged ABUKUMA, which was about four miles northwest
of Madilao Point, had just come to course 200°(T) and increased speed to
ten knots.
At 0445 having completed her first emergency repairs, including
strengthening bulkheads, she reversed course to 020°(T)*** and increased
speed to twenty knots in order to follow the SECOND Striking Force.
THIS ACTION BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER ABUKUMA WAS OF COURSE CORRECT.
SINCE HIS OWN FORCES WERE PROCEEDING UP THE STRAIT AND INTO BATTLE, IT WAS
INCUMBENT UPON HIM TO FOLLOW AND TO ENDEAVOR TO REJOIN, OR TO BE AS NEARLY
IN SUPPORT AS POSSIBLE. WHILE THE JAPANESE INSTRUCTIONS IN SUCH CASE ARE
NOT AVAILABLE TO THIS STUDY, BASED ON THE ACTION OF THE ABUKUMA IT WOULD
APPEAR THAT THEY WERE SIMILAR TO THE U.S. NAVY INSTRUCTIONS AT THE TIME,
WHICH STATED THAT OWN SHIPS DISABLED IN ACTION "SHOULD CONTINUE TO ENGAGE
THE ENEMY AS LONG AS IT IS POSSIBLE TO INFLICT DAMAGE ON THE ENEMY OR TO
DIVERT ENEMY FIRE WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE BE DIRECTED AGAINST MORE EFFECTIVE
UNITS. IF THE DISABLEMENT IS TEMPORARY THE VESSEL SHOULD ENDEAVOR TO
FOLLOW IN THE REAR OF HER FORMATION. IF UNABLE TO REJOIN HER FORMATIONS
SHE SHOULD JOIN A FOLLOWING UNIT OF AN APPROPRIATE TYPE OR TAKE SUCH PART
IN THE ACTION AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT."****
At 0515 she reported sighting CRUDIV TWENTY-ONE and its escorting
destroyers approaching on opposite course.*** Since the USHIO was eleven
point five miles away and the other units were even farther away, and since
*~~ Track Chart, Action Report PORTLAND, Surface Engagement in Leyte Gulf,
October 25th, 1944, Serial 065, October 28th, 1944.
** Detailed Action Report USHIO, Antiair Action in the Mindanao and Sulu
Seas, October 24th - 27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717, NA 11801.
*** Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off the Philippines, October
24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007*
**** War Instructions, United States Navy, 1944 (FTP 143A), Chapter 12,
Section XIV, Paragraph 12188.
55I CONFIDENTIAL
ABUKUMA
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
it was still dark with poor visibility* it seems very doubtful indeed if
she actually sighted any of these units at this time. In view of the
fact that the range was closing rapidly it seems probable that there was
a time of sighting error of at least five minutes.
At 0520 the ABUKUMA was bearing 123°(T), distant three point six
miles from Binit Point 0
* Action Report PT 194, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0397,
October 29th, 1944.
552 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
CHAPTER XIX - ALLIED OPERATIONS. 0420 - 0520, October 25th
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2, 0420 - 0520, October 25th.
At 0420 CTG 77.2 (OTC), having just completed simultaneous 180°
individual ship turns with his left flank cruisers, was on course 270°(T),
speed fifteen knots. His flagship, LOUISVILLE, because of this maneuver,
was the last ship in column.
With the completion of this turn he had to decide what further action
he should take since none of the enemy ships were within gun range and all
others were retiring.
At this point he was aware that certain members of his staff were
recommending that he chase the enemy with his cruisers.* However, he did
not accept this recommendation but instead decided not to pursue the enemy
at this time. How he arrived at this decision is not fully explained, but
there are indications that he was concerned over enemy torpedoes. However,
this concern could not have been too great, for he also decided to continue
the battle disposition on its westerly course rather than to turn it to a
new course parallel to the expected enemy torpedo tracks. It seems more
likely that, knowing that (a) additional enemy forces (one large ship and
five small ones) had been reported at 0342 by PT 523 as passing Surigao
Strait on a northerly course, he was determined to await further reports
thereon before advancing down the strait with his heavy ships and possibly
subjecting them to torpedo attacks by these new units as well as possibly
by other as yet undiscovered units and (b)iat 0415 he had directed COMDES-
DIV XRAY to report to him for duty and had as yet heard nothing from that
commander, he desired to delay his pursuit of the enemy until that
commander had reported. This was important, as he planned to have DESDIV
XRAY precede his heavy forces if and when he decided to pursue the enemy.**
At 0420:30 he received a message from CokjESRON FIFTY-SIX that the
NEWCOMB and the RICHARD P. LEARY were at the toost-attack rendezvous point
(three miles north of Hibuson Island), and that the ALBERT W. GRANT was
still proceeding on a northerly course at about ten knots.*** Unfortunately
the latter information was in error for the ALBERT W. GRANT was at this
time dead in the water, <
At 0423 he slowed to ten knots and at 0424 he directed the Left Flank
Force to resume fire when a solution was obtained.**** Why he issued this
order when no enemy targets were within effective gun range is not known
but it is assumed that he hoped thereby to give his ships freedom of
action to open fire should an enemy target appear.
* Oral Statement of Commodore Richard W. Bates, USN (Ret) (Chief of
Staff to CTG 77.2 at the Battle of Surigao Strait), October 20th, 1957.
** Hawthorne Daniel, "As Seen From the Bridge", Blue Book Magazine,
March, 1949.
*** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
**** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
553 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0426 he received a TBS voice radio message from COMCRUDIV TWELVE to
the effect that there were four additional targets bearing 184°(T), distant
fourteen to seventeen miles,* (Diagram "K"). This contact was on the
SECOND Striking Force which at this time was bearing 183°(T), distant
thirteen point eight miles (to the NACHI). COMCRUDIV TWELVE stated in his
action report that this contact was reported, inferring that someone had
reported it to him, but he does not say who reported it.** Since his
track chart shows no trace of the above contact and since the DENVER and
COLUMBIA do not mention it, it seems clear that it came from the DENVER
CIC, for the DENVER track chart shows the track of this group starting at
0423**** He took no immediate action on this report presumably preferring
to wait for more information on the situation.
At 0427 he received a message from CTG 77.3 to the effect that the
MTB's had sighted some ships heading south.**** This likely was a relay
of PT 132 "s contact report on the ABUKUMA.*****
At 0428 he received a TBS voice radio message from the Commanding
Officer COLUMBIA reporting that the GRANT had been hit and was lying dead
in the water,****** He immediately retransmitted the substance of this
message and included therein a directive to COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX to have a
destroyer stand by0******
At 0429 he received a TBS voice radio message from COMDESDIV XRAY
reporting for duty and stating that three of his destroyers (CLAXTON, CONY,
THORN) were in the van. of the battleships and three (AULICK, SIGOURNEY,
WELLES) were in the rear.*
Since at 0415 he had instructed Commander Battle Line by TBS voice
radio to direct COMDESDIV XRAY to report to him (CTG 77.2) for duty he
likely wondered what had caused the fourteen minute delay. Actually the
delay was largely due to communication difficulties between the commands
concerned for COMDESDIV XRAY had first reported at 0421. This matter is
discussed more fully under "Operations of COMDESDIV XRAY, 0420 - 0520,
October 25th".
Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
Action Report COMCRUDIV 12, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, and Subsequent Operations of CRUDIV 12 in Leyte Gulf, October
25th - 29th, 1944, Serial 0147, November 7th, 1944.
*** Track Chart, Action Report DENVER, Surigao Straits, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0031, November 4th, 1944.
**** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
***** Action Report PT 132, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
H-34, October 26th, 1944.
****** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine
Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944,
Enclosure (C).
*»
554 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0430 he received a TBS voice radio message from COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX
reporting that NEWCOMB was standing toward the ALBERT W. GRANT and would
render all assistance required.*
Just one minute later at 0431 he received a contact report from CTG
77.3 to the effect that the PHOENIX had contacted by radar five fairly
small targets on a northerly course bearing 160°(T), distant 20,000 yards.
He promptly relayed this report to COMDESDIV XRAY.* This contact was on
the four destroyers (DESDIV EIGHTEEN) of the SECOND Striking Force. The
range was correct but the bearing was somewhat incorrect being more nearly
166°(T) (Diagram "K"). Peculiarly enough this contact is not shown on
the track charts submitted by CTG 77.3, the PHOENIX, or by the SHROPSHIRE.
It is shown on the BOISE track chart from 0429 to 0435, and on the KILLEN
track chart from 0429 to 0438.**
Also at 0431 he received a report from COMCRUDIV TWELVE that a group
of three enemy ships was bearing 190° (T), distant fourteen miles.* These
were the NACHI, ASHIGARA and MOGAMI (Diagram "K"). The composition of
this group and the range were correct but the bearing was incorrect being
more nearly 172°(T). (This report was repeated by COMCRUDIV TWELVE at
0434.)*
At 0431:30 he (a) warned his command that the ALBERT W. GRANT was
badly hit, was dead in the water in the channel and (b) directed all
ships to take precautions not to hit her.***
At 0432 he directed COMDESDIV XRAY by TBS voice radio to (a) proceed
south, (b) engage and fire torpedoes at the enemy and (c) then clear the
channel and retire to the northward hugging the coast.****
By this time (0432) his radar screen indicated that all enemy units
were either dead in the water or retiring to the southward.*****
At this point he commenced re-estimating the situation to determine
(a) whether he should now pursue the enemy and (b) if so, with what forces.
He decided that he should proceed south with his left flank cruisers
leaving his battleships and his right flank force to operate independently.
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Track Chart, Action Report BOISE, Surigao Strait, Morning of October
25th, 1944, Serial 069, October 30th, 1944; also Track Chart, Action
Report KILLEN, Surigao Straits Surface Engagement, October 25th,
1944, Serial 0075, October 28th, 1944.
*** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944; also
Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
**** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
***** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
555 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0433 in accordance with his decision he changed course to 190°(T)
by individual ship turns.* Surprising enough he did not issue any
instructions thereon to either Commander Battle Line or Commander Right
Flank Force, excepting to advise the latter that he was heading on course
190° (T).**
WHILE HIS DECISION TO PROCEED SOUTH WITH THE LEFT FLANK CRUISERS WAS
SOUND THERE IS CONSIDERABLE DOUBT AS TO HIS WISDOM IN DEPARTING WITHOUT
GIVING ANY INSTRUCTIONS WHATSOEVER TO THE ABOVE COMMANDERS. THIS IS
PARTICULARLY TRUE WHEN IT IS REMEMBERED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT
THEY HAD BEEN ASSEMBLED IN A BATTLE DISPOSITION AND THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING
NECESSARY IN CASES OF THIS NATURE MIGHT NOT OBTAIN. FORTUNATELY THIS DID
NOT PROVE DISADVANTAGEOUS FOR, AS IS SHOWN LATER, BOTH COMMANDERS OPERATED
EXACTLY AS DESIRED.
At 0433 ?30 he received a TBS voice radio message from the ARUNTA
reporting a contact on five enemy ships five miles to the south** (since
this contact is discussed under "Operations of Commander Attack Group
2.2, 0420 - 0520, October 25thM it will not be discussed here). His
radar scope now showed that the enemy units were circling or maneuvering
radically but by 0437 they were again retiring on southerly courses.***
(This reflects the normal confusion that appears in the plot immediately
following a large change of course and in this case was probably magnified
by the collision of the NACHI and the MOGAMI and by the separate tracks
followed by the ASHIGARA and the USHIO (Diagram "K").)
At this same time (0437) he ordered his left flank cruisers to form
column on the flagship, LOUISVILLE, and increased speed to fifteen knots.**
At 0438 he sent a message via the PT common circuit to COMMTBRCN
THIRTY-SIX and certain other MTB's informing them that friendly cruisers
and destroyers were proceeding south and requesting them to notify all
PT's.**
At 0440 he sent a message to CTF 77 via the local air warning net
reporting that (a) the enemy appeared to be retiring to the south, (b)
they were being strongly pursued by the cruisers and destroyers and (c)
strongly recommending an air attack in the early morning on any that might
escape.****
* Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
**** Ibid.; also Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engage-
ment with Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands,
October 25th, 1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
556 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
SINCE THE CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS WERE MAKING BUT FIFTEEN KNOTS THE
STATEMENT THAT THEY WERE PURSUING STRONGLY SEEMS SOMEWHAT EXAGGERATED.
ON THE OTHER HAND THE REQUEST FOR A MORNING AIR STRIKE ON THE ESCAPING
ENEMY SHIPS WAS A VERY WISE ONE AND SHOWS A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE
COORDINATION NECESSARY COMPLETELY TO DESTROY THE ENEMY.
THIS IS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. AS SOUND
MILITARY DECISION STATES, "TO ESTABLISH AND TO CULTIVATE A STATE OF MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING FROM WHICH WILL FLOW MUTUAL LOYALTY BORN OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE
ARE PRIME OBLIGATIONS OF COMMAND. WITHIN THE LIMITS OF RESPONSIBILITY AND
RESULTANT AUTHORITY, INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE WILL FOLLOW. ON A FOUNDATION
OF INTELLIGENT COOPERATION AND RESOLUTE DETERMINATION, THE ACTS OF THE
LOWEST COMMANDER WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DESIRES OF THE HIGHEST."*
At 0442 he may have intercepted a TBS voice radio message from the
AUUCK to COMBATDIV THREE reporting that he was proceeding around the
battleships on their unengaged side in order to join COMDESDIV XRAY.**
However, the evidence appears to be very much to the contrary for it seems
unlikely that he would later have queried COMDESDIV XRAY as to his speed.
It seems far more likely that at this time he thought that DESDIV XRAY was
already en route south.
At 0442 he received a TBS voice radio message from the COLUMBIA
addressed to him and to COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX stating that she had inter-
cepted a message to the effect that the ALBERT W. GRANT had been hit, had
no power and was taking water .*** He noted that COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX had
acknowledged indicating that he would furnish help, and that about two
minutes later the TENNESSEE had repeated to him the basic message.****
Because of this, at 0447:30 he asked COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX if all of his
ships were present or accounted for.***
At 0450, his cruisers being approximately in formation, he ordered his
left flank cruisers to change course by column movement to 180°(T),***
which headed them directly toward the enemy.
At 0451 he received two TBS voice radio messages (a) one from CTG 77.3
reporting that all of his ships were together and on his (the west) side
of the channel,*** and (b) the other from the WEST VIRGINIA reporting that
a plane had just passed her.**
Meanwhile, since he had not contacted DESDIV XRAY either by sight or by
radar, he became concerned as to its location. He realized that it should
be somewhere in the vicinity but where? Feeling that it was most likely to
the north of him he, at 0453, queried COMDESDIV XRAY also by TBS voice radio
as to what speed was being made and promptly received a reply of twenty
knots.**
* Sound Military Decision, Naval War College, Newport, R. I., 1942,
Chapter I, Page 15.
** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
**** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
557 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0456:30 he contacted by radar a group of enemy ships on a northerly
course bearing 175°(T), distant 25,500 yards. This contact is discussed
fully under "Operations of Commander Left Flank Force, 0420 - 0520,
October 25th".
Since he was also Commander Left Flank Force he knew that (a) at 0457
COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX had reported that all of his destroyers were present or
accounted for, and that all were at the rendezvous except the NEWCOMB
which was assisting the ALBERT W. GRANT,* (b) Commander Left Flank Force
had directed COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX to screen the left flank cruisers from
ahead, stating that he was about five miles to the west of Hibuson Island**
and that his course was 180<>(T),* and (c) at 0459 COMDESDIV 112 had replied
for COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX stating that COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX was in the
NEWCOMB which was screening the ALBERT W. GRANT, and that he (COMDESDIV
112) was in charge and would screen ahead of the cruisers.**
At 0501 he noted that the enemy cruisers had changed course to the
west and that the burning enemy ships were moving to the south.***
At 0508 he was informed by COMDESRON FIFTY-FOUR by TBS voice radio
that his destroyers would remain in the previously designated post- rendezvous
point until after daylight and then resume normal screening stations.***8
Then, at 0509, he noted that the enemy cruisers had changed course to south
southwest and appeared to be retiring. At the latter time he further noted
that the other enemy ships had scattered and "appeared to be operating
independently, and trying to retire to the southward".***
At 0511 he likely intercepted COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX' s order directing
the RICHARD P. LEARY to proceed to the vicinity of the NEWCOMB and ALBERT
W. GRANT to render assistance against air attack.*
At about 0512 he directed COMDESDIV 112 to (a) retain destroyers in
former stations until daylight and then (b) regain regular screen.*****
He apparently made an error in the call for these instructions clearly
pertain to DESRON FIFTY-FOUR. It appears that this latter message confused
COMDESDIV 112 for, at 0515, that commander, in the ROBINSON, changed course
to the west and delayed his arrival in the vicinity of the cruisers.
At 0514 he likely received a message from PT 490, discussed under
"Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats, 0420 - 0520, October 25th, Lower
Surigao PT's, PT 490", which reported certain gunfire in Surigao Strait
Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine
Islands, October 24th-- 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944,
Enclosure (C).
Action Report HALFORD, Night Action in Surigao Strait, October 24th
25th, 1944, Serial 048, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
*** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
**** TBS Voice Log, Action Report MELVIN, Surigao Straits, Philippine
Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 079, November 5th, 1944.
***** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C) .
-»-*
558 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
and the movement northward of three targets.* Since the data contained
therein was quite confusing it seems likely that he gave it relatively
slight attention.
At 0517, sin-e he was Commander Left Flank Force as well, he knew that
that commander had asked COMDESDIV 112 if his division was coming down at
thirty knots and had received an immediate reply of "Affirmative".**
Actually the division was making fifteen knots at the time and did not
increase speed to twenty knots until 0530.***
While he does not explain his reasons for querying COMDESDIV 112 in
such fashion the evidence seems to point to the fact that he did not
realize that his 0512 message had gone to that commander rather than to
COMDESRON FIFTY-FOUR and he was now wondering what was delaying the
arrival of the DESRON FIFTY-SIX destroyers.
At 0518 the LOUISVILLE track chart shows that the MOGAMI was about
18,000 yards away, bearing 193° (T), heading away and that the ASAGUMO was
about 16,100 yards away, bearing 174° (T) on a crossing course. She
appears not to have been tracking the NACHI and ASHIGARA at this time
although they were within radar range.****
Several minutes later at 0519, since the air warning net was of almost
the same frequency as the PT common, he likely intercepted a message from
PT 494 to PT 526 reporting that of the three targets off Panaon Island at
least two had proceeded in a northerly direction and one was south of
Panaon Island.* It seems likely that (a) both the 0514 and 0519 messages
referred to the three cruisers (NACHI, ASHIGARA, ABUKUMA) operating with
Commander SECOND Striking Force and (b) since the ABUKUMA had been torpedoed
and had fallen out of formation much earlier, both of these messages had
clearly been greatly delayed in transmission. Had the time of sighting been
included in those messages the above delays would have been unfortunate,
but not serious, but without the time of sighting they might well have
become both serious and confusing.
IN THIS CONNECTION COMMUNICATION DOCTRINE STATES, IN PART, UNDER THE
HEADING "FAILURE TO OBTAIN OR TO STATE FULLY THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE",
"CONTACT REPORTS MUST INCLUDE WHAT IS SIGHTED, WHERE IT IS SIGHTED, WHAT
DIRECTION AND SPEED IT IS GOING AND WHEN IT IS SIGHTED . "*****
*~ Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
*** Action Report COMDESDIV 112, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 040,
October 31st, 1944.
**** Track Chart, 0412 to 0540, October 25th, 1944, Action Report LOUIS-
VILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao Strait, Leyte Gulf,
Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0045, November 7th,
1944.
****** Basic Fleet Operational Communications Doctrine (NWP 16), Department
of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, September 1953,
Chapter 5, Paragraph 501(b).
559 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESDIV XRAY
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0519 he ordered his left flank cruisers to increase speed to twenty
knots.*
At 0520 CTG 77.2, in LOUISVILLE, was seven point nine miles, bearing
274°(T) from Esconchada Point (Diagram "K").
(1) Operations of COMDESDIV XRAY, 0420 - 0520, October 25th.
At 0421 COMDESDIV XRAY reported to CTG 77.2 (OTC), stating that one
section was east of the battle line (eastern destroyers) and one was west
of the battle line (western destroyers). However, due to conmunication
difficulties it was not until 0432 that he received orders to proceed south
and make a torpedo attack,** At this latter time, since they were con-
forming to the movements of the MISSISSIPPI and BATDIV FOUR as ordered by
Commander Battle Line (Diagram MK"), his destroyers were on course 270°(T),
speed ten knots. Upon receiving CTG 77.2' s order to proceed south he
immediately directed his division to clear the battle line and to form
column natural order on the CLAXTON.*** He stated later that, at the same
time, he had directed the eastern destroyers (SECOND Section) under the
Commanding Officer AULICK, to clear the battle line to the north because
he expected the battle line to turn to the south**** — presumably to close
the enemy.
The individual ships immediately commenced heading on various
courses; the eastern destroyers to the westward and the western destroyers
to the northwest as shown in Diagram "Kn (based on their track charts and
deck logs). In accordance with this plan, and since they were in reverse
order also, the second commanders commenced re-forming their individual
sections. At 0433 the CLAXTON changed course to 325°(T) and increased
speed to twenty knots while the AULICK changed course to 300° (T) and
increased speed to twenty knots.
The question now arises as to whether or not this decision to
re-form north of the battle line was sound. The answer seems clearly in
the negative for: (a) CTG 77.2 had directed the division commander to
attack,***** (b) this meant to attack without delay for the Manual of
Torpedo Control stated, "Once the decision is made to attack, approach
* Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
** Letter of Captain Miles H. Hubbard, USN (COMDESDIV XRAY at the
battle of Surigao Strait) to Commodore Richard W. Bates, USN (Ret),
Head World War II Battle Evaluation Group, Naval War College, March
30th, 1949; also Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface
Engagement with Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands,
October 25th, 1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 15th, 1944.
**** Letter of Captain Miles H. Hubbard, USN (COMDESDIV XRAY at the
battle of Surigao Strait) to Commodore Richard W. Bates, USN (Ret),
Head World War II Battle Evaluation Group, Naval War College, March
30th, 1949.
***** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action, Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
560 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESDIV XRAY
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
should be made to the firing point at the highest possible speed, subject
to considerations of concealment and of maintaining the attack unit
formation,"* (c) attack doctrine recommended that torpedo attacks of six
destroyers be made from two sectors** which meant that the six destroyers
should normally be divided into two attack sections of three destroyers
each, (d) the division was presently divided into two such sections which
were separated by about 13,000 yards and were therefore in excellent attack
position to make a two sector attack on the enemy, (e) as regards the (1)
eastern destroyers, the sea area toward the enemy was clear. This should
have been apparent from the radar screens. At this time (0432) the left
flank cruisers which had been moving in a westerly direction and were now
changing course to 190°(T)*** were well clear while the ALBERT W. GRANT and
the NEWCOMB were also well clear, although the NEWCOMB was headed toward
the ALBERT W. GRANT and might interfere, but not seriously, (2) western
destroyers, the sea area toward the enemy was not clear in that (a) the
battleships PENNSYLVANIA and TENNESSEE which were changing course to the
north to rejoin COMBATDIV THREE in the MISSISSIPPI and (b) the cruisers of
CRUDIV FIFTEEN were almost due south. Therefore, as regards item (a) it
is clear that COMDESDIV XRAY would have found it necessary to clear these
two battleships either by passing to the westward of them or by passing
between them, either of which maneuvers would have been easy to accomplish.
As regards item (b) he would have found no difficulty for the three
cruisers which comprised this division were changing course to the westward.
Whether or not he knew this is not important, the fact would have been
clearly evident on his radar scopes in a matter of minutes.
WHY, THEN, IN VIEW OF ALL OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN FURTHER
VIEW OF THE DOCTRINE IN EFFECT, DID HE DECIDE THAT PRIOR TO ATTACKING IT
WAS FIRST NECESSARY TO RE-FORM HIS DIVISION AND TO ENDEAVOR TO DO SO TO
THE NORTH OF THE BATTLE LINE EVEN THOUGH HE MUST CLEARLY HAVE RECOGNIZED
THAT THIS WOULD ENTAIL A MOST UNACCEPTABLE DELAY AT A CRUCIAL TIME IN THE
BATTLE? THE ANSWER IS NOT READILY APPARENT BUT IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT IT
WAS LARGELY DUE TO (A) HIS OWN INEXPERIENCE (HE WAS BOTH COMMANDING OFFICER
CLAXTON AND ACTING DIVISION COMMANDER), AND (B) THE FACT THAT HIS DIVISION
WAS NOT A COMPLETE TACTICAL UNIT BUT WAS COMPOSED OF UNITS FROM OTHER
DIVISIONS (i.e., CLAXTON, AULICK FROM DESDIV FORTY-FIVE, WELLES FROM DESDIV
THIRTY-EIGHT, THORN FROM DESDIV THIRTY-SEVEN, CONY, SIGOURNEY FROM DESDIV
THIRTY-FOUR) .
IN OTHER WORDS COMDESDIV XRAY AT THIS TIME FELT A LACK OF CONFIDENCE
IN HIS ABILITY TO BRING HIS SHIPS INTO BATTLE UNTIL HE HAD FIRST ASSEMBLED
THEM IN A CLEAR AREA TO THE NORTHWARD AND GIVEN THEM HIS BATTLE ORDERS.
* Manual of Destroyer Torpedo Control, Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-45,
issued by Commander Destroyers, Pacific Fleet, August 22nd, 1945, Part
I (Torpedo Attack Doctrine), Paragraph 1.13, Page 1.
** Destroyer Tactical Bulletin 4-43, Destroyer Torpedo Attack Instructions
issued by Commander Destroyers Pacific Fleet, Serial 01264, October
24th, 1943, Part IV, Paragraph 402D.
*** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
496799 O - 59 - 46
561 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESDIV XRAY
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0434 he was advised by COMBATDIV TWO that the battleships were
to make a left turn and to keep clear,* Since his three destroyers had
just completed a turn to the right (or away from the battleships) this
required no action on his part.
At 043S, being well clear of the battleships, he changsd course to
270°(T)** and at 0439:30 the AULICK also changed course to 270°(T).*** At
this time the AULICK was about 10,000 yards astern of the CLAXTON.
At 0441:24 the CONY increased speed to twenty knots, changed course
to 270° (T) and took her proper position astern of the CLAXTON,**** and at
0442 COMDESDIV XRAY changed course to 220°(T)** to proceed around the
battleships and toward the enemy.
At this same time (0442) the Commanding Officer AULICK informed
Commander Battle Line by TBS voice radio that he was proceeding around the
Battle Line's unengaged side to join COMDESDIV XRAY.***** It is assumed
here that he meant with the SECOND Section.
HIS DECISION AT THIS POINT TO COMMENCE ROUNDING THE WESTERN END OF
THE BATTLE LINE PRIOR TO HIS RE-FORMING HIS DIVISION SEEMS AT VARIANCE
WITH HIS ORIGINAL PLAN TO RE-FORM HIS DIVISION NORTH OF THE BATTLE LINE
PRIOR TO MOVING TO THE ATTACK. THIS SEEMS SO FOR IN THIS CASE, WHEREAS
HIS OWN SECTION (WESTERN DESTROYERS) WAS APPROXIMATELY FORMED, THE EASTERN
DESTROYERS WERE STILL FAR TO THE EASTWARD AND STILL UNFORMED. EVIDENTLY
HE REALIZED THAT MUCH VITAL TIME WAS PASSING AND THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL
THAT HE PROCEED TO THE ATTACK EVEN WITHOUT THE EASTERN DESTROYERS. THIS
WAS A SOUND DECISION AND ONLY REAFFIRMS WHAT HAS BEEN STATED EARLIER, i.e.,
THAT HE SHOULD HAVE PROCEEDED TO THE ATTACK AT 0432 WITH EACH SECTION
PROCEEDING SOUTH SIMULTANEOUSLY. IT SEEMS CORRECT TO SAY THAT HE LIKELY
NOW REALIZED THE ERROR OF HIS ORIGINAL DECISION TO FORM HIS DIVISION
NORTH OF THE BATTLE LINE.
At 0444 the Commander SECOND Section (eastern destroyers) increased
speed to twenty-five knots. ******
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Track Chart, Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Strait,
Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November
5th, 1944.
*** Track Chart, Action Report AULICK, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 147, October 29th, 1944.
**** Track Chart, Action Report CONY, Night Battle, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 039-44, October 29th, 1944.
***** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine
Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944,
Enclosure (C).
****** Action Report SIGOURNEY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 055, October 30th, 1944.
562 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESDIV XRAY
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0445 the Commanding Officer THORN who was making fifteen knots
changed course to 270°(T)* having, for reasons unknown, failed to turn to
the track of the CLAXTON. It appears likely that he missed the turn to
220°(T) (made by the CLAXTON at 0442) for, from his track chart he proceeded
a considerable distance to the westward before turning to the south,*
At 0452 COMDESDIV XRAY changed course to 120<>(T)** At 0453 he
received an inquiry from CTG 77.2 as to his speed to which he promptly
replied that he was making twenty knots,*** and at 0455 he changed standard
speed to twenty knots.*** It appears that this latter message was mis-
interpreted by the AULICK for her deck log states that she slowed to
twenty knots at this time.****
At 0458 he intercepted a message from CTG 77.2 to the CONY wherein
the CONY was requested to give her present course and speed,*** Since the
CONY failed to reply it is assumed that he felt that she had not received
the message. While likely wondering why it was that CTG 77.2 had queried
the CONY rather than himself, or even his flagship (CLAXTON), he realized
that action was necessary and, therefore, at 0502, he changed speed to
twenty- five knots.*** Then, also at 0502, he intercepted a second message
from CTG 77.2 to the CONY requesting DESDIV XRAY's course and speed.***
Although he likely noted that the CONY once again had failed to reply he
also failed to take action himself to answer CTG 77.2's query,
WHY THIS WAS SO IS NOT UNDERSTOOD FOR HE MUST HAVE CLEARLY
RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS INFORMATION TO THE OTC WHO HAD DIRECTED
HIM TO ATTACK, AND WHO HAD NOW QUERIED THE CONY TWICE THEREON. CERTAINLY
THE FACT THAT HE HAD INCREASED SPEED AFTER INTERCEPTING CTG 77.2'S FIRST
TRANSMISSION TO THE CONY GIVES INDICATIONS THAT (AS MENTIONED EARLIER) HE
REALIZED THAT HE HAD DELAYED MOVING TO THE ATTACK FOR A MUCH LONGER PERIOD
THAN SHOULD PROPERLY HAVE OCCURRED AND THEREFORE HAD INCREASED SPEED.
IT IS OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST THAT IN ADDITION TO FAILING TO KEEP
CTG 77*2 INFORMED OF HIS MOVEMENTS HE ALSO FAILED TO KEEP HIS OWN UNITS SO
INFORMED. PERHAPS PART OF THE CONFUSION WITHIN HIS DIVISION CAN BE TRACED
TO THIS FACT FOR, BASED ON THEIR TRACKS, IT SEEMS DOUBTFUL IF THE VARIOUS
UNITS EVEN EMPLOYING RADAR, WERE IN ALL CASES FAMILIAR WITH HIS MOVEMENTS.
Since the eastern destroyers did not succeed in concentrating with
the western destroyers it seems well at this time (0458) to discuss the
operations of each section separately.
* Track Chart, Action Report THORN, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 034, October 30th, 1944.
** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th. 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944.
*** Ibid., Enclosure (C).
**** Deck Log AULICK, October 25th, 1944.
563 CONFIDENTIAL
CQMDESDIV XRAY
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
(a) Western Destroyers.
These consisted of the CLAXTON (F), CONY and THORN. There
were few difficulties with the first two destroyers which continued on a
southeasterly course (120°(T)) at twenty- five knots until 0507 when they
changed course to 160°(T).* At 0513 the CONY made radar contact on the
ASHIGARA, bearing 169°(T), distant 31,700 yards on course 190°(T), speed
thirteen knots** and at 0515 the CLAXTON likewise made radar contact on
the ASHIGARA bearing 179°(T), distant 30,000 yards.* The CONY range and
bearing were almost exactly correct; the CLAXTON range was correct, the
CLAXTON bearing was incorrect; the correct bearing being about 173°(T).
The THORN, as pointed out earlier, did encounter serious
difficulty having, at 0445, while on a course of 270°(T) at fifteen knots,
failed to turn to course 220°(T) and follow the CLAXTON. Since there
were no ships of his section in the area to the westward it is not clear
why the commanding officer continued in that direction for about thirteen
minutes and thereby failed immediately to rejoin his section as he
properly should have done.
He may have mistaken the MC DERMUT and MONSSEN which were
operating near the Leyte shore for the CLAXTON and CONY, but this seems
doubtful for he well knew that the enemy were to the southward and not
to the westward and therefore his basic course should be in a southerly
or southeasterly direction.
At this time (0458) finally realizing this fact, he changed
course first to 180°(T)*** and then at 0505 to 135°(T), increased speed
to twenty-five knots**** and followed in the general direction of the
CLAXTON and CONY.
At 0520 the CLAXTON, with the CONY about 600 yards astern,
was bearing 252°(T), distant seven point thirty- five miles from Kanhandon
Point Light (Hibuson Island) and the THORN (12,000 yards astern of the
CLAXTON) was bearing 284°(T), distant ten point six miles from the same
light.
(b) Eastern Destroyers.
At this time (0458) the eastern destroyers were closing the
CLAXTON to re-form the division. However, they were not in formation but
appeared to be planning to re-form when they had rejoined. At 0500 the
AULICK (based on the track charts of the SIGOURNEY and WELLES) changed
* Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944.
** Action Report CONY, Night Battle Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 039-44, October 29th, 1944.
*** Track Chart, Action Report THORN, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, Serial 034, October 30th, 1944.
**** Action Report THORN, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 034, October 30th, 1944.
564 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESDIV XRAY
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
course to 205°(T). At this point the SIGOURNEY, which was almost in
position, suffered engine trouble, reduced speed to between twenty and
twenty-two knots,* and made a wide turn to the north, as shown on Diagram
"K«»#**
Meanwhile the WELLES, at 0500, increased speed to thirty-two
knots to close the AULICK.***
The AULICK continued on course 205°(T), speed twenty- five
knots until 0508 when, being well clear of the battleships, she changed
course to 120°(T).**** Then, at 0514, she changed course again to 145°(T)
presumably to close the CLAXTON, and at 0518 to 150°(T) and increased
speed to thirty knots.****
The Commanding Officer SIGOURNEY seems to have decided that
his engine casualty would not permit him to join his division for, at 0510,
he changed course to 180°(T).* The vibration of his starboard engine soon
ceased, as a result of which he increased speed finally to thirty-two
knots but continued to head south and made no effort to rejoin. Why is
not apparent for the right flank cruisers were now steaming on southerly
courses and were well clear. What the SIGOURNEY had actually done was to
close the BACHE and DALY.
At 0505 the Commanding Officer WELLES changed course to
250°(T); at 0506 to 230°(T) and finally having suffered an engine casualty
he changed course to 205° (T) which paralleled the AULICK at that time.
At 0511 he changed course to 160°(T); at 0513 to 115°(T) and at 0515 to
13 5° (T ).*****
Thus, at 0520 the AULICK (about 12,000 yards astern of the
CLAXTON) was bearing 282°(T), distant 22,000 yards from Kanhandon Point
Light (Hibuson Island); the WELLES was bearing 288°(T), distant 24,000
yards from the same light and the SIGOURNEY was bearing 025°(T), distant
2,900 yards from Cabugan Grande Island.
A large part of the difficulties experienced by this division
seems to have been due to the fact that this was a division made up, as
pointed out earlier, of destroyers from four different divisions, which
had rarely, if ever, trained together as a unit. Although it had been
formed on August 25th in Tulagi Harbor****** and consisted at that time of
four destroyers (CLAXTON, CONY, SIGOURNEY, AULICK) there had been no
* Action Report SIGOURNEY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 055, October 30th, 1944.
** Ibid., Track Chart.
*** Action Report WELLES, Battle of Surigao Straits, Serial 016-44,
October 30th, 1944.
**** Deck Log AULICK, October 25th, 1944.
***** Deck Log WELLES, October 25th, 1944.
****** War Diary CLAXTON, August 1944.
565 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESDIV XRAY
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
opportunity to train for night battle because the ensuing time had been
spent in escorting the gathering forces through the Solomons to Leyte
Gulf. Later the division was increased to six destroyers, the THORN
joining on September 30th,* and the WELLES on October 12th.**
This provides the battle lesson— first enunciated in the
Naval War College Analysis "Battle of Savo Island" that:
"ALL SHIPS SHOULD BE SO TRAINED AS TO READILY PERMIT THEIR
BEING SHIFTED FROM ONE ORGANIZATION TO ANOTHER WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE LOSS
OF EFFICIENCY. HOWEVER, WHENEVER THE MILITARY SITUATION PERMITS, THE
EXISTING TACTICAL ORGANIZATION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED, AND THE DESIGNATED
TACTICAL COMMANDERS SHOULD BE EMPLOYED IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE CHAIN OF
COMMAND, AS WELL AS TO INSURE THAT WELL INDOCTRINATED TACTICAL GROUPS
ARE AVAILABLE AGAINST THE ENEMY, THIS IS PARTICULARLY APPLICABLE WHEN
NIGHT OPERATIONS ARE ANTICIPATED. "***
(2) Operations of Commander Battle Line, 0420 - 0520, October 25th.
It will be recalled that (a) at 0420 Commander Battle Line, in the
MISSISSIPPI, was northwest of Hibuson Island in which position, with
BATDIV FOUR (MARYLAND, WEST VIRGINIA), he was completing a turn to the
north to avoid enemy torpedoes reported by the RICHARD P. LEARY at 0413.
At 0420:18 he completed the turn and steadied on course 0OO°(T), and (b)
he had allowed BATDIV TWO (PENNSYLVANIA, TENNESSEE, CALIFORNIA) to
continue on westerly courses in order to re-form, during which time that
BATDIV operated more or less independently.
He now directed (a) at 0422, COMBATDIV TWO to rejoin the battle
line when BATDIV TWO had been re-formed**** and (b) at 0424:30, BATDIV
FOUR and MISSISSIPPI to turn to course 270° (T) and to change speed to ten
knots.***** He issued this latter order because he considered that the
torpedoes reported by the RICHARD P. LEARY had now passed even though they
had not been sighted*
Then he observed that at (a) 0435, CTG 77.2 (OTC) with the left
flank force had departed to the southward in pursuit of the enemy,**** and
(b) 0439 COMBATDIV TWO had rejoined the battle line with BATDIV TWO.****
Since he was now no longer in the leading ship he, therefore, at 0440,
designated the PENNSYLVANIA as guide.****** (At this time the MISSISSIPPI
(his flagship) was about 2,300 yards astern of the CALIFORNIA.) (Diagram "K").
* War Diary THORN, September 1944.
** Action Report WELLES, Bombardment and Landing in the Philippine
Islands, Serial 015-44, October 30th, 1944.
*** The Battle of Savo Island, August 9, 1942 (NavPers 91187), Naval
War College, 1950, Page 365, Lesson 25.
**** Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of
Surigao Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201,
November 24th, 1944.
***** Action Report COMBATDIV 4, Battle of Surigao Strait, Night of
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0235, November 8th, 1944.
****** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25tn, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
566 CONFIDENTIAL
COM BATTLE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0442 he received TBS voice radio messages from (a) COMBATDIV
TWO reporting his course as 270°(T), speed ten knots, and giving the
order of ships as PENNSYLVANIA, TENNESSEE, CALIFORNIA,* and (b) the
Commanding Officer AULICK that the AULICK was proceeding around the battle-
ships on their unengaged side to join COMDESDIV XRAY.**
At 0451 he intercepted a TBS voice radio message from the WEST
VIRGINIA to CTG 77.2 reporting that a plane had just passed over her,*
Since none of the battleships reported this plane in their action reports
it would seem likely that it was sighted visually only and therefore came
in at a very low altitude. He was likely alerted by the presence of this
plane to the fact that dawn would arrive at 0519 at which time the
probability of Japanese air attacks on his battle line would increase. He
realized that it would be well to increase his antiaircraft defense by the
addition of destroyers but which ones was the problem.
He likely felt that DESRON TWENTY-FOUR, since it was actually
attached to CTG 77.3, was not available. If this was his conclusion it
was correct for CTG 77.3 at 0455:30 ordered COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR to
screen ahead of the right flank cruisers.**
It also seems likely that he concluded that, since (a) DESRON
TWENTY-FOUR would be with CTG 77.3, (b) DESDIV XRAY was attacking and (c)
DESRON FIFTY-FOUR was likely unavailable as it was attached to CTG 79,
DESRON FIFTY-SIX was all that remained.
Any thought of employing this latter destroyer division was
shattered when at 0458 he intercepted a TBS voice radio dispatch from
CTG 77.2 to COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX directing that commander to screen the
left flank cruisers from ahead,*
With the receipt of this message he could plainly see that he
would be forced to defend himself against air attack with the battleships
alone and, therefore, he now studied the situation to determine the best
formation to assume under these adverse circumstances.
At this point, being sufficiently far to the west, he reversed
course to due east by simultaneous ship turns of 180° to the left,***
At 0507 the turn was completed. The ships were now in column from
the east as follows: WEST VIRGINIA, MARYLAND, MISSISSIPPI, CALIFORNIA,
TENNESSEE, PENNSYLVANIA.
* Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B),
567 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0516 he received a contact report from the WEST VIRGINIA
reporting an unidentified ship bearing 183°(T), distant 42,400 yards fro»
that battleship. Two minutes later at 0513 he received an amplified
report that the ship was now bearing 182°(T), distant 43,500 yards, course
180°(T), speed ten knots.* This contact which was fairly accurate in
range but somewhat off in bearing, was on the heavy cruiser MOGAMI which
actually bore 176°(T), distant 43,980 yards. It seems likely that the
second range given had been obtained at about 0516:30 although the bearing
at this latter time was also about 176° (T).
With the arrival of dawn he seems to have decided that since his
major danger at this point was from enemy aircraft his present formation
of column was satisfactory. This seems so for he maintained this formation
for some time.
At 0520 the MISSISSIPPI was bearing 048°(T), distant 16,000 yards
from the northeastern tip of Cabugan Grande Island.
(3) Operations of Commander Left Flank Force, 0420 - 0520, October 25th,
It will be recalled that at 0420 Commander Left Flank Force had
just completed a simultaneous 180° turn with his cruisers and was on
course 270°(T), speed fifteen knots. Therefore his flagship, the LOUIS-
VILLE, was the last ship in column.
At 0423 he slowed to ten knots.**
At 0424, judging that his Attack Section ONE (NEWCOMB, RICHARD P.
LEARY and ALBERT W. GRANT) was clear of the line of fire, he ordered the
left flank cruisers to resume fire when they had a solution.** At this
time, however, since the MOGAMI, which was the nearest enemy ship, was
some 28,000 yards away and the range was opening slowly, (Diagram nKM),
none of his ships opened fire.
At this same time the LOUISVILLE made radar contact on an
additional enemy target bearing 192° (T), range 28,000 yards.*** This was
the NACHI which at this time was bearing 19lJ°(T), range 28,600 yards
(Diagram wKn). It is not known whether or not this contact was reported
to Commander Left Flank Force but most likely it was not for it does not
appear in his action report nor on his track chart.
He now commenced receiving TBS voice radio messages as follows:
Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
*** Track Chart, 0412 to 0540, October 25th, 1944, Action Report LOUISVILLE,
Night Surface Engagement off Surigao Strait, Leyte Gulf, Philippine
Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0045, November 7th, 1944.
**
568 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
(a) at 0426 he received a report from COMCRUDIV TWELVE that there
were four additional targets bearing 1&4°(T), distant fourteen to seventeen
miles**
(b) at 0427 a report from CTG 77*3 that the FT boats had seen some
ships headed south.**
(c) at 0428 a message from the COLUMBIA stating that the ALBERT W.
GRANT had been hit and was lying dead in the water,***
(d) at 0430 a report from COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX that he (COMDESRON
FIFTY-SEC in the NEWCOMB) was standing toward the ALBERT W. GRANT and
would render the assistance required.*
(e) at 0430 a report from CTG 77-3 that there were five fairly
small targets on a northerly course bearing 160°(T), distant 20,000
yards,* and
(f ) at 0431 a report from COMCRUDIV TWELVE that a group of three
enemy ships was bearing 190°(T), distant fourteen miles.*
Most of the above reports are discussed more fully under
"Operations of CTG 77.2, 0420 - 0520, October 25th".
Meanwhile, since he was also CTG 77.2, he knew that that commander
had decided to send the cruisers of the left flank force down the strait
in pursuit of the enemy and therefore, at about this time, he issued a
preparatory signal to the cruisers to turn to 190°(T). He then, mindful
of the fact that such a course would pass near the ALBERT W. GRANT, in
which case it was possible that one of his ships might mistake her for
enemy, warned the Left Flank Force at 0431:30 to that effect by TBS voice
radio saying that (a) the ALBERT W. GRANT had been heavily hit, (b) was
dead in the water in the channel and (c) directed all ships to take
precautions not "to hit" her.*** In fact, in his action report he employed
the term "to avoid"** rather than "to hit" which seems to indicate that he
was thinking of collision as much as of gunfire.
At 0433 he executed the signal to change course to 190°(T) basing
his decision on the fact that all enemy units were either dead in the water
or retiring.** Why he gave these reasons is not clear for he had previously
received several reports (a) at 0420 and 0431 from COMCRUDIV TWELVE and
(b) at 0430 from CTG 77.3 to the effect that enemy units had been observed
coming up the strait on a northerly course.
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
*** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
569 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
He now watched the situation developing in the lower strait with
considerable care and quickly discovered from his radar scopes that the
enemy units were circling or maneuvering radically and that by 0437 they
were again retiring on southerly courses. He therefore at this time
ordered his left flank cruisers to form column on the LOUISVILLE and
increased speed to fifteen knots.*
EXACTLY WHY HE FORMED COLUMN RATHER THAN TO PROCEED SOUTH ON A
LINE OF BEARING IS NOT EXPLAINED. CERTAINLY THE LINE OF BEARING MADE IT
POSSIBLE TO BRING MORE GUNS, i.e., THE FORWARD TURRETS OF THE FIVE
CRUISERS, AGAINST ANY ENEMY ENCOUNTERED AND MADE IT EASIER TO AVOID
TORPEDOES. ON THE OTHER HAND IT WAS STILL DARK WITH NO MOON AND IT SEEMS
LIKELY THAT HE FELT THAT IN COLUMN HE WOULD HAVE BETTER CONTROL OVER HIS
CRUISERS AND THAT THIS HAD PRIORITY OVER THE ABOVE ADVANTAGES.
As mentioned under "Operations of CTG 77.2, 0420 - 0520, October
25th", he now, as CTG 77.2, (a) in order to safeguard his forces from
friendly attack sent a message at 0438 over the PT common voice circuit
to MTBRON THIRTY-SIX and certain other MTB's that friendly cruisers and
destroyers were proceeding south and to notify all PT's* and (b) at 0440
over the local air warning circuit to CTF 77 that (l) the enemy appeared
to be retiring to the south, (2) they were being strongly pursued by the
cruisers and destroyers and (3) strongly recommending an air attack in
the early morning on any that might escape.**
At about 0449 he should have (a) passed the damaged ALBERT W.
GRANT to starboard about 800 yards and (b) observed by radar the NEWCOMB
on his port quarter rapidly closing the ALBERT W. GRANT. The term
"should have" is used advisedly as none of the various reports available
to this study submitted post battle by any of the cruisers mention the
above •
At this point he seems to have decided that (a) his ships were
perhaps too close to the ALBERT W. GRANT, (b) his present course was
carrying him too far to the westward and away from the retiring Japanese
units which at this time were more nearly to the south of him and (c) he
wanted more maneuvering room, for at 0450 he changed course by column
movement to 180°(T).*
At 0451, since he was also CTG 77.2, he knew that CTG 77.3 had
reported that all TG 77.3 forces were together and on the west side of
the channel.* This was a gratifying report for now all the attacking
destroyers with the exception of DESDIV XRAY and certain units of DESRON
FIFTY-SIX— he had not as yet received a position report from COKDESRON
FIFTY-SIX — were near their designated post-attack rendezvous points and
the cruisers of TG 77.3 were on the west side of the channel. Therefore
it was probable that any forces encountered ahead of the left flank
cruisers were either destroyers from DESDIV XRAY or enemy destroyers with
the latter far the more likely.
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Ibid.; also Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of
Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
570 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
Nevertheless, as Commander Left Flank Force the question as to the
location of DESDIV XRAY was of continuing concern to him. Therefore, at
0453, he queried COMDESDIV XRAY by TBS voice radio as to his speed and
promptly received a reply of "twenty knots'1,* Why he did not also ask for
DESDIV XRAY's present position is not understood for the question as to
whether they were ahead of him was of considerable importance*
However, it seems likely that at this point, because of the "twenty
knots" speed and because he had no radar contacts nearer than 25,500 yards,
he realized that they were most likely behind him.
At 0456:30 he contacted by radar a group of enemy ships on a
northerly course bearing 175°(T), distant 25,500 yards,** He thought
that this was a new group of five or six ships, one medium, the others
small, and refers to it in his action report as the third group.**
Actually it was the NACHI, ASHIGARA and MOGAMI which had reversed course
back to north a short time before. At this time the NACHI bore 172°(T),
distant 24,400 yards from the LOUISVILLE (Diagram "K").
At 0457 he was advised by COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX that all of his
destroyers were present or accounted for and that all were at the
rendezvous except the NEWCOMB which was assisting the ALBERT W. GRANT.*
He now (a) at 0458 having heard nothing from COMDESDIV XRAY other than
the "twenty knots" asked the CONY to give him present course and speed,*
(b) directed COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX to screen the left flank cruisers from
ahead* and (c) gave his own position as about five miles to the west of
Hibuson Island*** and his course as 180°(T).*
At 0459 he received a reply from COMDESDIV 112 to the effect that
COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX was in the NEWCOMB, which was screening the ALBERT W.
GRANT and that he (COMDESDIV 112) was in charge and would screen ahead of
the cruisers,***
At 0501 he noted that the enemy cruisers had changed course to
west,**
At 0502 having received no reply from the CONY he repeated his
0458 query but this time requested COMDESDIV XRAY*s course and speed.*
Why he chose to query the CONY rather than DESDIV XRAY is not
explained nor is it understood for the voice logs show previous communi-
cations with COMDESDIV XRAY and none with the CONY,
At 0509 he noted that the enemy cruisers had changed course to
south-southwest and appeared to be retiring. At the latter time he noted
that other enemy ships had scattered and appeared to be operating
independently and trying to retire to the southward,**
*~ Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
*** Action Report HALFORD, Night Action in Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 048, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
571 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0511 he likely intercepted COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX' s directions to
the Commanding Officer RICHARD P. LEARY to proceed to the vicinity of the
NEWCOMB and the ALBERT W. GRANT to render assistance against air attack.*
He could quickly estimate that this left COMDESDIV 112 in ROBINSON with
five other destroyers to screen his cruisers.
Since he was also CTG 77.2 he likely received (a) at 0514 a
message from PT 490 reporting certain gunfire in Surigao Strait and the
northward movement of three targets** and (b) at 0519 a message from
PT 494 to PT 526 commenting on the three targets off Panaon Island.**
Both of these messages are discussed more fully under "Operations of CTG
77.2, 0420 - 0520, October 25th«.
At 0517 he asked COMDESDIV 112 if his division was coming down at
thirty knots and received an immediate reply of "Affirmative".* Actually
this division was making fifteen knots at the time and did not increase
speed to twenty knots until 0530.*** It seems probable that COMDESDIV 112
did not hear the thirty knot portion of the query because only the first
part of the question appears in the DALY voice log.**** Thus, because of
both the turn to the west and the low speed this group of destroyers was
to be later than he expected them to be.
At 0518 the LOUISVILLE track chart shows that the MOGAMI was about
18,000 yards, bearing 193°(T) and was heading away, and the ASAGUMO was
about 16,100 yards, bearing 174° (T), on a crossing course. She appears
not to have been tracking the NACHI and ASHIGARA at this time although
they were within radar range.*****
At 0519 he ordered his cruisers to increase speed to twenty
knots****** in order to prevent the escape of the enemy cruisers since
the range would increase upon changing to the firing course.
At 0520 Commander Left Flank Force, in LOUISVILLE, was seven point
nine miles, bearing 274°(T) from Esconchada Point (Diagram "K").
* Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944,
Enclosure (C).
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report COMDESDIV 112, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 040,
October 31st, 1944.
**** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
***** Track Chart 0412 - 0540, October 25th, 1944, Action Report
LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao Strait, Leyte
Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0045,
November 7th, 1944.
****** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
572 CONFIDENTIAL
ATTACK SECTION ONE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
(4) Operations of COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX (Commander Attack Section ONE),
0420 - 0520, October 25th.
At 0420 Commander Attack Section ONE (who was also COMDESRON
FIFTY-SIX) who had been proceeding in the NEWCOMB on course 070<>(T),
speed thirty-two knots, having arrived at his post-attack rendezvous
point (three miles north of Hibuson Island) changed course to 000° (T)* and
slowed to fifteen knots.** The RICHARD P. LEARY which was about 6,000
yards astern of him and which had been clearing the area at thirty knots
also slowed to fifteen knots. The ALBERT W. GRANT which was about 11,000
yards astern was now dead in the water and was so heavily damaged as to be
in danger of sinking.***
He clearly did not know this for at 0420:30 he reported to CTG
77.2 that the NEWCOMB and the RICHARD P. LEARY were at the post-attack
rendezvous point and that the ALBERT W. GRANT was still proceeding on a
northerly course at about ten knots.****
At 0425 he changed course and speed to 245°(T),* ten knots,** and
at 0427 he directed the RICHARD P. LEARY to fall in astern of the NEWCOMB
and to conform to her movements.*****
Meanwhile the Commanding Officer ALBERT W. GRANT seeing the
cruisers to the north and having no means of communicating excepting by
blinker gun, since his flagship, owing to the temporary loss of power, had
no other means of communicating, now decided to request help. Therefore,
he endeavored to attract attention by repeating the following message
several times to a friendly cruiser (it was the COLUMBIA): "We are dead
in the water. Tow needed."****** As discussed more fully under "Operations
of CTG 77.2, 0420 - 0520, October 25th" the Commanding Officer COLUMBIA
at 0428 retransmitted the substance of this message to CTG 77.2 and to
COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX.
At 0429 Commander Attack Secton ONE, as COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX,
received a TBS voice radio message from CTG 77.2 giving the above informa-
tion and directing him to provide one destroyer to assist the ALBERT W.
GRANT. He promptly (at 0430) advised CTG 77.2 that the NEWCOMB was
designated******
* Track Chart, Action Report NEWCOMB, Battle of Surigao Strait,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0044, October 31st, 1944.
** Deck Log NEWCOMB, October 25th, 1944.
*** Deck Log ALBERT W. GRANT, October 25th, 1944.
**** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (B).
***** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
****** Action Report ALBERT W. GRANT, Operations against Central
Philippines, Leyte Area, and Night Surface Action against Japanese
Task Force in Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0106, November 11th, 1944.
573 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION ONE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
IT IS NOT CLEAR WHY HE DESIGNATED THE NEWCOMB RATHER THAN THE
RICHARD P. LEARY UNLESS, SINCE HE WAS SOME MINUTES NEARER, HE MAY HAVE
FELT THAT THIS WOULD SAVE TIME IN REMOVING THE DAMAGED DESTROYER FROM
THE CENTER OF THE STRAIT. HIS ACTION IN SO DOING SEEMS QUESTIONABLE FOR
HE WAS THE SQUADRON COMMANDER, THE BATTLE WAS STILL UNDERWAY AND HIS
SQUADRON WAS EVEN NOW CONCENTRATING AT THE RENDEZVOUS POINT NORTH OF
HIBUSON ISLAND. WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT THE SQUADRON HAD COMPLETED ITS
TORPEDO ATTACK IT WAS NEVERTHELESS THE FUNCTION OF THE SQUADRON COMMANDER
TO REASSEMBLE IT AND TO DETERMINE ITS FIGHTING CAPACITY, i.e., ARE ALL
SHIPS READY FOR FURTHER ACTION: HOW MANY TORPEDOES DO THEY HAVE, ETC.,
AND TO ADVISE CTG 77.2 THEREON. CERTAINLY THE SQUADRON, EVEN WITHOUT
TORPEDOES, WAS STILL A FORMIDABLE FIGHTING UNIT AND COULD BE WELL EMPLOYED
IN BOTH ANTISUBMARINE AND ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE OPERATIONS AS WELL AS IN
GUNFIRE AGAINST THE RETIRING ENEMY.
Now, at 0432, in accordance with the above, he stood toward the
ALBERT W. GRANT to aid her. At this time he thought that the RICHARD P.
LEARY was conforming to his movements.* Unfortunately the commanding
officer of the latter destroyer seems to have become confused for although,
at 0433, the RICHARD P. LEARY acknowledged COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX' s
instructions to conform to the movements of the NEWCOMB** she did not do
so. Instead she moved to the eastward presumably heading toward the
HALFORD, which she seems to have mistaken for the NEWCOMB.
Meanwhile, at 0442, he received a second TBS voice radio message
from the COLUMBIA stating that she had intercepted a TBS voice radio
message from COMBATDIV THREE (Commander Battle Line) to the effect that
the ALBERT W. GRANT had been hit, was taking water and had no power.**
At 0447 he (COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX) received a visual message from
the ALBERT W. GRANT requesting medical assistance,*** and at 0447:30 he
received a TBS voice radio message from CTG 77.2 inquiring as to whether
all of his ships were present or accounted for.**
Meanwhile the RICHARD P. LEARY arrived at the post-attack
rendezvous point and, not contacting the NEWCOMB, headed on course 270° (T)
at ten knots. It is not clear what the commanding officer was contemplating
at this time but since he had received instructions to follow the NEWCOMB
it seems likely that he was awaiting further information as to the location
of that ship.
* Action Report COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0013, October 29th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report ALBERT W. GRANT, Operations against Central Philippines,
Leyte Area, and Night Surface Action against Japanese Task Force in
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0106, November
Uth, 1944.
574 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION ONE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0453 COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX in the NEWCOMB, having passed astern
of the COLUMBIA which was heading south and was the last ship in column,
headed directly for the damaged ALBERT W. GRANT. This was fortunate for
the latter ship, at 0455, lost all light and power.*
At 0457 he replied to CTG 77.2' s query of about ten minutes
earlier saying that all of his ships were present and accounted for and
that all of them were at the post-attack rendezvous point except the
NEWCOMB.**
At 0457:30, having closed the ALBERT W. GRANT, he dispatched
medical assistance which was greatly needed since the medical officer
and one of two hospital corpsmen had been killed,*
At 0458 he received a TBS voice radio message from CTG 77.2
directing him to screen the left flank cruisers from ahead and giving his
(a) position as five miles west of Hibuson Island and (b) course as
180o(T).** Before he could reply to this message he was likely relieved
to hear his second in command, COMDESDIV 112, reply to the effect that
COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX was in the NEWCOMB with the ALBERT W. GRANT and that
he (COMDESDIV 112) was in charge of DSSRON FIFTY-SIX and would screen from
ahead as ordered.***
THIS WAS ANOTHER EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING WHEREIN
THE SUBORDINATE ACTED EXACTLY AS HE FELT HIS SUPERIOR DESIRED HIM TO ACT.
At 0505 he likely learned that the ALBERT W. GRANT had lighted
fires under No. FOUR Boiler,*
At 0511, as Commander Attack Section ONE, he directed the RICHARD
P. LEARY to proceed to the vicinity of the ALBERT W. GRANT to assist the
NEWCOMB in antiaircraft defense of that ship.** The Commanding Officer
RICHARD P. LEARY immediately complied.****
At 0520 Commander Attack Section ONE, in the NEWCOMB, was bearing
276° (T), distant five point four miles from Kanhandon Point Light (Hibuson
Island). The ALBERT W. GRANT was close alongside and the RICHARD P. LEARY
was about 7,600 yards to the northeast.
* Action Report ALBERT W. GRANT, Operations against Central Philippines,
Leyte Area and Night Surface Action against Japanese Task Force in
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0106, November 11th,
1944.
** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
*** Action Report HALFORD, Night Action in Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 048, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
**** Deck Log RICHARD P. LEARY, October 25th, 1944.
575 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION TWO
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
(a) Operations of Conmander Attack Section TWO, 0420 - 0520,
October 25th,
At 0420 Commander Attack Section TWO (COKDESDIV 112), in the
ROBINSON, with the HALFORD and BRYANT, was north of Hibuson Island and
was proceeding on easterly courses at fifteen knots.
At 0422 he changed course to 000°(T) by simultaneous ship
turns* and apparently directed his ships to form line of bearing 090°(T)
for at 0430 the BRYANT recorded that the division was formed in line of
bearing of 090° (T) from the ROBINSON.**
At 0437 he slowed to ten knots,***
At 0448 he changed course to 270<>(T), which placed his ships
in column, and directed the ships to report any casualties* in order to
comply with CTG 77.2' s query to COMDESRON FIFTY-SEC at 0447:30 asking if
all of the ships of DESRON FIFTY-SIX were present or accounted for,****
All of the ships reported no casualties,*
At 0453 he changed course, by column movement, to 180°(T).***
At 0458 he intercepted a TBS voice radio message from CTG 77.2
directing COMDESRON FIFTY-SII to screen the left flank cruisers from ahead,
He immediately, and on his own initiative, replied at 0459 to the effect
that (a) COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX was in the NEWCOMB assisting the ALBERT W.
GRANT, (b) COMDESDIV 112 was in charge of DESRON FIFTY-SIX and (c) he
would screen ahead,*****
At 0504 he changed course to 230°(T) and increased speed to
fifteen knots,****** At 0506, knowing that Attack Section THREE was
fast approaching, he directed that section to form column astern, interval
2,000 yards, course 230°(T), speed fifteen knots,* and at 0512 he was
pleased to note that the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, leading Attack Section THREE,
was in proper position astern.
At about 0512 he received a TBS voice radio message from CTG
77.2 directing him to retain the destroyers in their former stations until
daylight and then to regain their regular screening stations ********
*~ Action Report COMDESDIV 112, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 040,
October 31st, 1944.
** Deck Log BRYANT, October 25th, 1944.
*** Action Report ROBINSON, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 076,
November 3rd, 1944.
**** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
***** Action Report HALFORD, Night Action in Surigao Strait, October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 048, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
****** Action Report ROBINSON, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 076,
November 3rd, 1944, Enclosure (B).
******* Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
576 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION TWO and
COM ATTACK SECTION THREE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
Although this message should properly have been addressed to COMDESRON
FIFTY-FOUR, as discussed under "Operations of CTG 77.2, 0420 - 0520,
October 25th", he did not realize this and therefore at 0515 changed
course to 270°(T).*
At 0517 he received a query from CTG 77.2 inquiring as to
whether his destroyers were coining down the strait at thirty knots. He
was likely confused by this query for, but five minutes earlier, he had
been directed to retain the destroyers in their former stations. However,
he now seems to have realized that there was a mistake somewhere and that
despite the previous message he was expected to close the TG 77.2 cruisers.
He therefore immediately replied in the affirmative.** However, since he
was only making fifteen knots at this time and did not increase speed to
thirty knots until about 0530 and since the DALY did not receive the thirty
not portion of this message, it seems highly probable that he likewise did
not receive the thirty knot portion of the query.
At 0520 the ROBINSON was bearing 343° (T), distant three point
eight miles fron Kanhandon Point Light (Hibuson Island).
(b) Operations of Commander Attack Section THREE, 0420 - 0520,
October 25th.
At 0420 Commander Attack Section THREE (Commanding Officer
HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS) with LEUTZE and BENNION astern was on course 000o(T),
speed twenty- five knots, proceeding via north of the battle line toward
the designated post-attack rendezvous point north of Hibuson Island.
At 0430, being well north of the battle line, he changed
course to 090°(T); at 0444 to 110°(T),*** and at 0506 having received an
order from COMDESDIV 112 (Commander Attack Section TWO) to form column
astern, interval 2,000 yards, course 230°(T), speed fifteen knots,* he
immediately changed course to 180°(T) and slowed to fifteen knots.****
At 0511 he changed course to 230°(T) and, at 0512, completed the turn in
his assigned position.
Later operations of the ships of this section are discussed
under the operations of Commander Destroyer Division 112.
* Action Report COMDESDIV 112, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 040,
October 31st, 1944.
** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
*** Action Report BENNION, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 0418, October 28th, 1944.
**** Deck Log LEUTZE, October 25th, 1944.
„67,,o- 5,-47 577 CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
(5) Operations of Commander Right Flank Force, 0420 - 0520, October
25th.
At 0420 Commander Right Flank Force (CTG 77.3), in PHOENIX, was on
course 090°(T), speed fifteen knots. His other two cruisers, BOISE and
SHROPSHIRE, were generally disposed on a line of bearing 045°(T), distance
1,000 yards, although the SHROPSHIRE was somewhat behind in bearing and
beyond in distance. Despite the fact that he had received at 0419 an order
from CTG 77.2 to resume firing and had passed it to his force, none of the
ships had opened fire. This was because the YAMASHIRO had sunk at this
same time and there were no other targets within effective range.
Meanwhile he continued to endeavor to track the enemy and at 0422,
having obtained a track on enemy forces moving on a northerly course at
twenty-three knots, he advised his command of the contact.* This contact
appears to have been on the NACHI and ASHIGARA of the SECOND Striking
Force which at this time were also on a northerly course but at twenty-
eight rather than twenty-three knots.
Also at 0422 he received a report over the task group common from
COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR advising that (a) only three ships (BEALE, BACHE and
DALY) had any torpedoes left, each had five, and (b) the ammunition was
very low.** This report meant, in part, that of his six destroyers only
three had torpedoes, the three others (HUTCHINS, KILLEN, HMAS ARUNTA)
having none. It is of interest that as regards ammunition the HUTCHINS
had but fifty rounds per gun,*
At this same time (0422) he reduced speed to ten knots.***
At 0427 he reported to CTG 77.2 by TBS voice radio that the MTB's
had seen some ships headed south.*** This was probably a report of the
ABUKUMA which had been (a) sighted by PT 132 about 0330 and (b) reported
to CTF 77 about 033 5.****
At 0430, learning that his flagship (PHOENIX) had contacted by
radar five small targets in a group bearing 160° (T), distant 20,000
yards,***** he promptly reported it by TBS voice radio to CTG 77.2.***
Therefore it is discussed more fully under "Operations of CTG 77.2, 0420 -
0520, October 25th".
*~ Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait. October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
*** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
**** Action Report PT 132, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
H-34, October 26th, 1944.
***** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944.
578 CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0431 he intercepted a TBS voice radio contact report from
COMCRUDIV TWELVE to CTG 77.2 (OTC reporting three enemy ships bearing
190°(T), distant fourteen miles,* It seems likely that he became somewhat
concerned because he now had two reports on enemy forces moving up the
strait, one on five small targets and one on three targets. He also seems
to have felt that the enemy ships which had turned sharply to the right
were maneuvering to fire torpedoes and therefore he decided to make a
radical change of course to the westward. This was of course the correct
decision for not only were the enemy ships maneuvering to fire torpedoes
but the NACHIand ASHIGARA had already (at 0427:00 - 0427:21) each fired
eight torpedoes.
Therefore, at this time he executed an order to his cruisers for
simultaneous ship turns to course 300°(T).** As shown by the PHOENIX voice
log, some confusion had arisen over the basic signal but by this time it
had been cleared up so that the turn was executed without difficulty.
At 0432 he received (a) contact report from the KILLEN on four
destroyers bearing 128°(T), distant 11,640 yards** and (b) a request from
the ARUNTA to open fire on these targets.*** Since the KILLEN appears to
have felt that these destroyers were friendly— actually they were DESDIV
EIGHTEEN (SHIRANUHI, KASUMI, AKEBONO, USHIO)— the request of ARUNTA seems
to have been designed to obtain a verification of the enemy character from
Commander Right Flank Force. Due to an exchange of signals regarding "our
position" to quote the KILLEN, CTG 77.3 did not authorize opening fire and
therefore the ARUNTA quite properly did not open fire.*** This matter is
discussed more fully under "Operations of Commander Attack Group 2.2,
0420 - 0520, October 25th".
At 0433 he received a TBS voice radio message from CTG 77.2 stating
"My course 190°(T), acknowledge".* Knowing that the left flank destroyers
had recently completed a destroyer attack and were even now assembling at
their rendezvous point, he could readily interpret from this dispatch that
CTG 77.2 was heading south with the left flank cruisers. Since he had
received no instructions thereon he, at this point, commenced estimating
the situation to determine what action he should take*
At 0434 he changed course by simultaneous ship turns to 270°(T).****
It is not clear why he made this additional change of course unless he
felt that, owing to his large change of course, the danger of enemy
torpedoes, properly fired, was now remote, and he therefore desired to
steer the same course as the fleet guide. It will be recalled that the
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
*** Action Report KILLEN, Surface Engagement Surigao Straits, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0075, October 28th, 1944.
**** Action Report HMAS SHROPSHIRE, Night Action, October 25th, 1944,
Serial SC 1123/194, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure No. 4.
579 CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
fleet guide was steering 270°(T). Actually he would have been wiser to
have remained on course 300°(T) for a little longer since that course,
while not the reverse of the original enemy bearing (160°(T)), was within
forty degrees thereof. In so doing he would have more nearly paralleled
the most likely enemy torpedo tracks.
Also at this time he received a surprising message from the ARUNTA
to the effect that the three ships which had been reported by COMCRUDIV
TWELVE at 0431 were Attack Group 2.2 (ARUNTA, KILLEN, BEALE).* He
immediately acknowledged the message over the task group common and
directed the ARUNTA to "get out of the middle of the channel and stay near
the land",* When he had finished the transmission of this message he
repeated it, adding "stay near land. You'll get sunk".*
At 0437 he increased speed to fifteen knots.*
At 0441, in reply to an 0436 query as to her geographical position,
he received a message from the ARUNTA to the effect that Pandan Point was
bearing 251° (T), distant "035" • Since this latter distance was not under-
stood two repetitions were necessary, and the distance was finally given
as one-half mile from Pandan Point,* (The plot (Diagram "K") shows that
at 0436 the ARUNTA was actually 3,500 yards from Pandan Point.) He
acknowledged the message and added that Attack Group 2.2 should "stay into
land".*
At 0443, (a) desiring to keep his cruisers informed of the
changing situation and (b) realizing that the enemy might change course
back to the north, he informed his cruisers over the task group conmon
that there were some destroyers going down to attack, adding that other-
wise they were to open fire on anyone they were sure was enemy,* This
message pertained to DESDIV XRAY which had been ordered to attack by
CTG 77.2 at 0432.
At 0445 he slowed to ten knots in order not to close too closely
his destroyers which were operating about 6,000 yards to the westward.
At 0443 having decided to parallel the left flank force and
support it as necessary he changed course to 180°(T).**
THIS DECISION TO FOLLOW DOWN THE STRAIT AND TO BE IN A POSITION TO
SUPPORT IF NECESSARY WAS OF COURSE CORRECT. IT IS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF
AN INCENTIVE ORIGINATING FROM THE DEMANDS OF THE SITUATION. IN SUCH CASE
THE COMMANDER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE (A) RECOGNITION OF THE NECESSITY FOR
ACTION AND (B) CORRECT SELECTION OF AN APPROPRIATE OBJECTIVE TO BE EMPLOYED
AS A BASIS FOR HIS OWN ACTION EXACTLY AS IF IT HAD BEEN ASSIGNED BY HIGHER
AUTHORITY.***
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944.
*** Sound Military Decision, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 1942,
Page 50 .
580 CONFIDENTIAL
COM RIGHT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0450, in a series of messages over the task group common, he
asked COMDESDIV TWENTY-FOUR for a quick report as to whether (a) all of
DESRON TWENTY-FOUR'S destroyers were there and (b) if all of them were
operational** This information was of considerable importance since it
appeared that the force might be in action ere long. He promptly received
a reply from COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR over the task group common that all of
his destroyers were present,* He now, at 0453, directed that commander
not to report details of damage on the task group common circuit.* This
was a wise provision for it would prevent serious overloading of the
circuit used to control his right flank force. However, he now, at 0454,
seems to have negated the advantages gained by keeping these reports off
the task group coranon for at this time he directed that reports of
casualties were to be reported over TBS,* the circuit used to control both
the Left Flank Force and the Center Force of battleships. It did have the
advantage, however, of enabling the OTC to hear the reports as they came
in.
At 0451 he reported to CTG 77.2 that all of his ships were
together and on his side of the channel.*
At 0455 he changed course to 160°(T) by simultaneous ship turns,**
in order to parallel the general t rend of the coast and retain sufficient
sea room for maneuver.
At 0455:30, in order to interpose his destroyers between his
cruisers and the enemy, he ordered his destroyers to take station 6,000
yards south of the cruisers.*
At 0459, realizing that dawn would break at 0518, he modified this
order to the extent that the destroyers were directed to form an antiair-
craft screen around the cruisers.*
At 0507, in reply to an inquiry from COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR asking
for his base course, he gave the base course as 160°(T).*
At 0508 he increased speed to fifteen knots,** and commenced
forming antiaircraft disposition VICTOR, axis 180<>(T).*
At 0510 his flagship (PHOENIX) contacted by radar an enemy target
bearing 146°(T), distant 31,400 yards.*** This was the ASAGUMO which was
moving to the southwest at about eight knots. From Diagram MKn the
bearing was more nearly 137^°(T).
At 0512 he ordered the Right Flank Force to increase speed to
twenty knots.**
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944.
*** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944.
581 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
(a) Operations of COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR, 0420 - 0520, October 25th.
(1) Operations of Commander Attack Group 1.2 and COMDESRON
TWENTY-FOUR.
At 0420 Commander Attack Group 1.2, who was COMDESRON
TWENTY-FOUR, in HUTCHINS, had just received instructions to lie to along
the shore for another run and was proceeding on course 330°(T), speed
twenty knots, heading for an open area north of Cabugan Grande Island.
DALY and BACHE, in that order, were following well astern, there being
about 3,300 yards between the HUTCHINS and the DALY (Diagram "K"). The
latter two ships were making twenty- five knots in an effort to close.
At 0420:45, as Commander Attack Group 1.2, he slowed to
fifteen knots,* and about a minute later he asked the DALY and the BACHE
if they had executed the change of speed to fifteen knots, receiving an
affirmative reply from the BACHE.* Actually these two ships were still in
the process of catching up with the flagship and did not slow down until
later.
At 0422, as COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR, he reported to CTG 77.3
that of his DESRON only three ships (BEALE, BACHE, DALY) had any torpedoes
left, each having five, and that the ammunition was very low,** with the
HUTCHINS having about fifty rounds per gun left.***
During the next minute, also as COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR, he
was queried several times by CTG 77.3 as to whether he had contact on any
of the large targets to which he replied in the negative.*
At 0426 he (a) learned from CTG 77.3, over the task group
common, that the MTB's had reported that the enemy ships were heading
south,*** and (b) slowed to thirteen knots and changed course to 350°(T).
At 0428:30, as Commander Attack Group 1.2, he changed
course to 170° (T) by simultaneous ship turns.* This order could not be
carried out as signalled because the DALY was still in her turn to the old
course of 350° (T) and the BACHE had not yet started her turn to that
course. However, both destroyers maneuvered to get into proper station.
At 0435 he undoubtedly heard (a) Commanding Officer ARUNTA
inform CTG 77.3 that his section was the three ships reported by COMCRUDIV
TWELVE at 0431 and (b) CTG 77.3 fs reply directing the ARUNTA to get out of
the middle of the channel and stay near the land lest she be sunk.*
At 0436:30 he changed course to 350°(T) by simultaneous
ship turns.* At this same time the DALY, being in proper position astern
of the BACHE, also changed speed to thirteen knots.
*~ Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
*** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait. October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (Cj.
582 CONFIDENTIAL
*#
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0443 he likely heard CTG 77.3 inform his cruisers that
"there are some destroyers going down to attack. Otherwise open fire on
anyone you are sure is enemy".*
At 0446 he changed speed to ten knots.**
At 0450 he received a request from CTG 77.3 over the task
group common for a quick report on the condition of his destroyers. This
matter is discussed more fully under "Operations of CTG 77.3, 0420 - 0520,
October 25th". After replying that they were all present he proceeded to
obtain the details of any damage from the individual ships.
At 0455:30 he was directed by CTG 77.3 to take station
with his destroyers 6,000 yards south of the cruisers. He then changed
course by simultaneous ship turns to 170°(T).**
At 0500, in accordance with 0459 instructions from CTG
77.3, he directed his destroyers to form an antiaircraft screen around
the cruisers.**
At 0501 he completed his turn to 170°(T). As shown in
Diagram "K", his ships were now in reverse order and, apparently without
signal, commenced maneuvering to reverse the order of ships.
At 0506, as Commander Attack Group 1.2, he queried CTG 77.3
as to the base course and was told that it was 160°(T).**
At 0508 he received CTG 77.3's order to TG 77.3 increasing
speed to fifteen knots and at 0509 to the cruisers to form immediately
an antiaircraft cruising disposition.** From this and the base course
his ships could readily form the antiaircraft screen.
At 0512 he received CTG 77.3's order to increase speed to
twenty knots.***
At 0520, in the HUTCHINS, he was bearing 04S°(T), distant
2,200 yards from the southern tip of Cabugan Grande Island while the DALY
and BACHE, on courses nearly parallel to the HUTCHINS course but at ten
knots, were north of the flagship at distances of 3,000 and 3,700 yards
respectively.
* Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
583 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 2.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
(2) Commander Attack Group 2,2, 0420 - 0520, October 25th.
At 0420 Commander Attack Group 2.2, who was also Commanding
Officer ARUNTA, was on course 241°(T), speed fifteen knots, and in his own
words was waiting for something to turn up. The KILLEN and the BEALE were
not following in column but had steadied on course 260°(T) with the result
that at this time the KILLEN was about 038°(T), distant 1,300 yards on the
ARUNTA' s starboard quarter (Diagram "Kn)»
Also at this time (0420) the KILLEN started tracking an
enemy ship (SHIGURE) and obtained an estimated track of 190°(T), speed
twenty-seven to thirty knots.* This was very nearly correct as plotting
(Diagram nK") shows the SHIGURE on course 189°(T), speed twenty-eight
knots. Whether or not this information reached CTG 77.3 is unknown as it
does not appear in any of the voice logs. As discussed under the operations
of that commander, CTG 77.3 at 0422 advised his command that the enemy was
on a northerly course at twenty-three knots.**
At 0420:30 the ARUNTA, followed at varying times and
distances by the KILLEN and BEALE, commenced maneuvering in order to pass
well clear of Bugho Point.
About 0425 the KILLEN contacted by radar four ships which
she believed to be friendly although they had no IFF showing.* She
reported the contact as bearing 128°(T), distant 11,640 yards. Actually
the report was in error for the bearing and range at this time, from
Diagram "KH, should have been 146° (T), distant 18,800 yards. It was not
until later (0429) that the range on her own track chart had dropped to
approximately those given above as the initial ranges. The accuracy of
Diagram "K^s plot in this case is supported by the action reports of the
LOUISVILLE, BOISE and DENVER.*** As mentioned under "Operations of CTG
77.3, 0420 - 0520, October 25th" these destroyers were DESDIV EIGHTEEN
(SHIRANUHI, KASUMI, AKEBONO, USHIO).
Also at 0431 he likely intercepted a report from CTG 77.3
to CTG 77.2 on five fairly small targets bearing 160°(T), distant 20,000
yards and on a northerly course.****
* Track Chart, Action Report KILLEN, Surface Engagement Surigao Straits,
October 25th, 1944, Serial 0075, October 28th, 1944.
** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Track Chart, Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off
Surigao Strait, Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 0045, November 7th, 1944; also Track Chart, Action Report
BOISE, Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 069, October 30th,
1944; also Track Chart, Action Report DENVER, Surigao Straits,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0031, November 4th, 1944.
**** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
584 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION 2.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0432 Commander Attack Group 2.2 intercepted a report by
the KILLEN to CTG 77.3 on four destroyers bearing 128°(T), distant 11,640
yards.* Evidently this is a repeat of the KILLEN* s 0425 contact but why
she changed the range and bearing is not explained. The ARUNTA soon
contacted these destroyers on her radar scope for her commanding officer
promptly requested permission to open fire.** However, likely to his
surprise, CTG 77.3 did not approve this request immediately.
At 0433:30 the Commanding Officer ARUNTA, as Commander
Attack Group 2.2, reported to CTG 77.2 that he had five enemy ships five
miles to the south of him.* It is not clear to what he referred for the
only ships to the south of him were five friendly MTB's (329, 323, 320,
330, 331, approximately in that order, and from seven to eleven miles away).
Therefore it seems more likely that he was really reporting DESDIV
EIGHTEEN, which was to the southeast, the four units of which at this time
were changing course to the eastward. If this is accepted, the question
then arises, "whence came the fifth ship"? Perhaps he was affected by
CTG 77. 3* s report relative to five small ships mentioned above? Perhaps
he miscounted the three cruisers MOGAMI, NACHI and ASHIGARA? However, in
such case, should there not have been at least six ships?
Meanwhile he had been studying the 0431 contact report
from COMCRUDIV TWELVE to CTG 77.2 and had now arrived at the conclusion
that the three ships contacted were the ships of his own attack group and
at 0434 so informed CTG 77.3 over the task group common. This was an
incorrect conclusion for the three ships were likely NACHI, ASHIGARA and
MOGAMI, although the latter cruiser was on a southerly course.
At 0435 he was directed by CTG 77.3 to get out of the
middle of the channel and to stay near the land or he would be sunk,***
and at 0436 he was requested to give his geographical position.
Meanwhile he changed course to 333°(T)**** presumably in
order to close Attack Group 1.2, which at this time was north of Cabugan
Grande Island.
Having now determined his position as correctly as possible
he advised CTG 77.3 that Pandan Point was bearing 251°(T), distant 035
yards.*** Since, as mentioned under "Operations of CTG 77.3, 0420 - 0520,
October 25th", the range as given was obviously in error, the message was
challenged several times with the result that the range from Pandan Point
was finally given as one-half mile from Pandan Point.*** How this
confusion arose is not clear for at this time he was actually bearing
071°(T), distant 3,500 yards from Pandan Point.
* Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (D).
** Action Report KILLEN, Surface Engagement Surigao Straits, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0075, October 28th, 1944.
*** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
**** Track Chart, Action Report ARUNTA, Night Action Report, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 1/41, October 29th, 1944.
585 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 2.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0443 he (a) executed 3peed fifteen knots* and (b) heard
CTG 77.3 (l) inform his cruisers that there were some destroyers going
down to attack and (2) directing them to open fire on anyone that they
were sure was enemy,**
He now likely intercepted (a) the communications between
CTG 77.3 and COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR relative to the readiness of the
destroyers of that DESRON, discussed more fully under "Operations of CTG
77.3, 0420 - 0520, October 25th«, and (b) at 0455:30 CTG 77.3's instructions
to his destroyers to take station 6,000 yards south of the cruisers.**
At this time he changed course to 090°(T)*** presumably to
clear the waters likely to be used by Attack Group 1.2 in moving south and
to be in position to pass the cruisers on either side depending on develop-
ments. CTG 77.3 had not yet given either the course or the speed of the
cruisers.
While moving toward the east he, at 0459, (a) intercepted
CTG 77.3 's additional instructions to COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR wherein the
above screening orders were modified to form an antiaircraft screen** and
(b) received orders from COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR to form the screen.**
At 0507 he headed on course 160°(T) at twenty-five knots
for his station in the TG 77.3 cruiser antiaircraft screen.***
At this same time he received a contact report from the
KILLEN on four unidentified targets bearing 120°(T), distant 10,600 yards
and a query as to whether he could identify them.** He did not reply but
it seems likely that he realized that this was a phantom for, except for
the PORTLAND and MINNEAPOLIS in the vicinity of the bearing but well beyond
the range, there was nothing there.
At 0509 he intercepted CTG 77.3' s orders to his cruisers
to form antiaircraft disposition VICTOR, axis 180°(T).** At this time
the cruisers were on course 160°(T).
From this time until 0520 the units of Attack Group 2.2
were rapidly taking station in the above disposition.
* Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait. October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Deck Log KILLEN, October 25th, 1944.
586 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 79.11
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
(B) Operations of CTG 79.11, 0420 - 0520, October 25th.
During this period Commander Western Attack Group, with the Western
Attack Group, operated in an area some seven - eight miles north and
slightly to the west of the northern tip of Cabugan Grande Island, This
area was about four miles farther north than the designated post-attack
rendezvous (the western end of Antisubmarine Patrol Station No. SEVEN)
and was chosen in order to avoid the destroyers of CTG's 77.2 and 77.3*
Meanwhile, Commander Eastern Attack Group, with the Eastern Attack
Group, operated in the vicinity of his designated post-attack rendezvous
(the western end of Antisubmarine Patrol Station No. THREE),
Since these two attack groups took no further part in the action and
were, in addition, largely clear of other units they will be dropped from
further discussion.
(C) Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats, 0420 - 0520, October 25th.
(1) Upper Surigao PT's.
At 0420 Commander Upper Surigao PT's, with PT's 327, 321 and
326, was about one point three miles south and slightly west of the center
of Kanihaan Island and was proceeding on course 352°(T) at six knots.
At about 0438 he contacted through PT 321' s radar, since the
radars of both PT 326 and 327 were inoperative, two enemy ships both of
which he believed to be destroyers. One of these ships was burning and
the other appeared to be lying to, covering the burning ship. Although
PT 327 reported that both ships were six miles northwest of Kanihaan
Island* the other two PT's reported them as six miles and four miles
southwest of Kanihaan Island.**
At this time the ASAGUMO was bearing 350°(T), distant five point
seventy- five miles; the MOGAMI was bearing 337°(T), distant six point five
miles; and the SHIGURE was bearing 315°(T), distant four point nine miles
from the northern tip of Kanihaan Island (Diagram "K"). It appears there-
fore that PT 327 had contacted the ASAGUMO and the MOGAMI, while PT's 321
and 326 had contacted the MOGAMI and the SHIGURE.
Commander Upper Surigao PT's now decided that, in accordance with
his orders, he would attack the undamaged destroyer employing all three
MTB's and therefore at approximately 0439 he increased speed to ten knots
and headed toward the target. As he neared the destroyer (SHIGURE) he was
fired upon by her at 0455 when the range was about three miles.***
Fortunately for him the enemy fire was wild.****
* Action Report PT 327, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
** Action Reports PT 321 and PT 326, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944,
No Serials, October 30th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 321, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 326, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
587 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
He now, at 0456, seems to have increased speed to about twenty-
five knots and have changed course to 300° (T) in order to reach his firing
position on the SHIGURE. At about 0458 PT 327 fired two torpedoes, at
least one of which exploded prematurely about ten seconds after firing;*
PT 321 attempted to fire one torpedo but had a hot run on deck;** and PT
326 fired one torpedo,*** No hits were obtained because the SHIGURE was
now proceeding away at high speed.***
Immediately after firing he turned away to the south but, because
of PT 321 's hot run on deck which illuminated that MTB, the SHIGURE' s
gunfire became quite accurate. This illumination also attracted the
attention of the ASAGUMO which promptly opened fire. PT 321 was now
caught in a heavy crossfire and received a shrapnel hole in the radar mast.
Also, one man was severely wounded before the burning torpedo could be
rolled overboard.**
At 0520 he was bearing 207°(T), distant 2,100 yards from the
southern tip of Kanihaan Island. (Diagram "L").
(2) Kanihaan PT's.
At 0420 Commander Kanihaan PT's, with PT's 495, 489 and 492,
was about four miles north of Kanihaan Island and was still proceeding
north at four and one-half knots.
At 0423 he sighted a ship on fire bearing 300°(T), distant four
miles, which he evaluated as a destroyer***** This ship was the MOGAMI
which was stopped and burning heavily.
At 0428 he sighted two destroyers burning on bearing 240° (T),
range four miles,**** These two ships were actually the two halves of the
burning FUSO which, by this time, had separated enough to appear as two
separate ships (Diagram "K").
At this same time (0428) he seems to have changed course to 330°(T)
in order to close the burning MOGAMI**** and notified CTG 79.11 that he
was going out to investigate the burning ship,***** He hadn't gone far
however when, at 0439, he heard CTG 79.11 warn all MTB's that friendly
ships were coming down the strait.**** This was apparently a rebroadcast
of CTG 77.2' 3 0438 warning to that effect.****** After acknowledging the
message he reversed course to what seems to have been about 160° (T) and
increased speed to possibly ten knots in order to regain his station off
Kanihaan Island.****
*~ Action Report PT 327, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 321, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 326, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 495, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
***** Action Report MARYLAND, Night Action Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0210. November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
588 CONFIDENTIAL
JUUUUCX-
AHKMXA
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
At 0458, judging that he was close enough to Kanihaan Island, he
stopped and commenced drifting with the current. At 0520 he was bearing
308° (T), distant 1,300 yards from the northern tip of Kanihaan Island
(Diagram "K").
(3) South Amagusan PT's.
At 0420 Commander South Amagusan PT's, with PT's 320, 330 and 331,
was bearing 179° (T), distant four point fifty- five miles from Amagusan
Point and was drifting in a southerly direction with the current.
Since the radar equipment in PT's 320 and 330 continued to operate
in an unsatisfactory manner, reliance necessarily continued to be placed
on that of PT 331.
During the period nothing was noted in the action reports of the
MTB's.
Why this was so is not entirely clear for, based on RAD THREE,*
the SHIGURE was within the ten - twelve mile range band and therefore
should have been contacted. The answer seems to be, as mentioned under
"Camiguin PT's, 1830 - 2400, October 24thw, that the limiting ranges given
in RAD THREE were about two miles greater than those actually obtained by
the MTB's in this operation,
(4) East Amagusan PT's.
Since the East Amagusan PT's (328, 323, 329) continued to operate
separately they will continue to be discussed separately.
(a) PT 328
At 0420 PT 328, with Commander East Amagusan PT's on board,
was bearing about 244° (T), distant 2,000 yards from Amagusan Point and was
drifting very slowly eastward with the current. His radar continued to be
inoperative. Where he thought his other MTB's were is not known. Certainly
the evidence is that he not only did not know where they were, but seems
to have made no effort to reassemble them despite the inadequacy of his
radar. Perhaps he expected them to rejoin him in the basic station to the
east of Amagusan Point. Whatever his reasons may have been the facts are
that the MTB's did not assemble but operated independently and well
separated,
(b) PT 323
At 0420 PT 323 was bearing 071°(T), distant 4,500 yards from
Amagusan Point and was proceeding south at four knots. Although during
this period she noted no contacts, this seems to have been in error for,
based on Diagram nKw and on her own action report, it seems highly probable
that between 0511 and 0520 she sighted the SHIGURE and MOGAMI, as these
ships were well within range,
* Radar Bulletin No. 3 (RAD 3), Radar Operator's Manual, United States
Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, August 5th, 1944 (Reprint
March 1945), Part 4, Page 4-SO-7.
589 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
It also seems highly probable that it was these two ships
which she reported at 0630 as "a destroyer was sighted standing by a
large ship that was burning furiously eight miles northeast of Caligangan
Point",* Since at 0511 the SHIGURE was bearing 064°(T), distant eight
point one miles from that point and the MOGAMI was nearby it seems clear
that the time of 0630 is in error.
At 0520 she was bearing 156° (T), distant five point four miles
from Amagusan Point.
(c) PT 329
At 0420 PT 329 seems to have been bearing about 151° (T),
distant 2,000 yards from Amagusan Point and was drifting with the current.
At 0430 she sighted a target close inshore and west of
Amagusan Point** which upon closing she learned was PC 1130. This PC was
drifting slowly eastward off the barrio of Sua,*** a small village west
of Amagusan Point (Diagram "K"),
At 0501 she decided to return to base** and promptly increased
speed to about fifteen knots and steered various courses to round Amagusan
Point close inshore.
At 0516 she appears to have settled on course about 354°(T),
At 0520 she seems to have been bearing about 021°(T), distant
three point six miles from Amagusan Point,
(5) Lower Surigao PT's.
(a) PT 490
At 0420 PT 490 was bearing 106£°(T), distant four point one
miles from Caligangan Point. She was drifting with the current which was
setting 155°(T) at about two point twenty-five knots. Her patrol was, in
general, uneventful until 0514. when the comnanding officer, mindful of
the fact that he had seen ships on fire, tracer firing and three ships
moving north advised CTG 77.2 to that effect as follows:
"I am viewing the fire from a point fourteen miles north of
Bobon on the tip of Leyte Island. Light tracer is very clear. The heavy
fire over the horizon is in the middle of the strait. Three large targets
east of southern tip are proceeding north through strait,"****
* Action Report PT 323, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 329, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
*** Action Report PC 1133, Surigao Strait Battle, October 24th - 26th,
1944, Serial 205, Licember 3rd, 1944.
**** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
590 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0420 - 0520, October 25th
It seems highly probable that the Bobon referred to was
actually meant to be Binit Point and was somehow garbled in transmission
or reception, for the only Bobon in the area was to the west of Amagusan
Point and therefore miles out of position. Certainly PT 490 was at no
time during the period of battle north of Bobon— in fact she was generally
about half-way between Bobon and Binit Point,
This message, in addition to being confusing because of the
above, was also confusing for (a) there had been no gunfiring for some
time and therefore the "light tracer" is not identified unless it was
connected with the action between the Upper Surigao PT's and the SHIGURE
and ASAGUMO which occurred at about 0455 and (b) the three ships to which
he refers are not identified unless they were the NACHI, ASHIGARA and
MOGAMI, the first two of which were momentarily, about 0458, on a northerly
course. However it seems far more likely that this was a considerably
delayed report on the SECOND Striking Force which had passed north about
0400 and had been sighted when they were silhouetted against the FUSO
fires, in which case the "light tracer" fires were probably the tracers
from Attack Group 1.2 which had been firing at the MOGAMI and YAMASHIRO
between 0353 and 0406, and the heavy fire was the fire of the heavy ships.
At 0520 she was bearing 090i°(T), distant three point fifty-
five miles from Maoyo Point,
(b) PT 491
At 0420 PT 491 was bearing 116°(T), distant five point six
miles from Caligangan Point and was drifting with the current. At 0520
she was bearing 105^°(T), distant four point eighty-seven miles from Maoyo
Point •
(c) PT 493
PT 493, damaged and abandoned by her crew, was beached on
Maoyo Point.
(6) Other PT's.
The operations of the motor torpedo boats other than the Upper
Surigao, Kanihaan, South Amagusan, East Amagusan and Lower Surigao PT's
were uneventful excepting that at 0519 PT 494 of the Bilaa Point PT's,
over the PT common, advised PT 526 that of the three targets east of
Panaon Island, at least two had proceeded in a northerly direction and one
was south of Panaon Island.* As discussed under "Operations of CTG 77.2,
0420 - 0520, October 25th", it seems likely that this report referred to
the SECOND Striking Force and that the two targets moving in a northerly
direction were the NACHI and ASHIGARA and the target south of Panaon Island
was the ABUKUMA. Since the evidence available to this analysis indicates
that the ABUKUMA had fallen out of formation much earlier it seems likely
that the message was long delayed in transmission. This would not have been
too confusing had the time of sighting been included, but since it was
omitted, the omission likely was serious.
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
591 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
CHAPTER XX - JAPANESE OPERATIONS. 0520 - 0600. October 25th
(A) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force, 0520 - 0600, October 25th.
At 0520 Commander SECOND Striking Force, in his flagship NACHI, followed
in column by the ASHIGARA, on course 180°(T), speed eighteen knots was
bearing 268°(T), distant five point fifty-eight miles from Kanihaan Island.
His four destroyers were well ahead on his port bow, and were moving
down the strait, the SHIRANUHI, KASUMI and AKEBONO at twenty knots; the
USHIO at thirty knots (Diagram "L"), in order to escort the damaged ABUKUMA.
At this point the developing situation was about as follows: Commander
SECOND Striking Force was rapidly retiring from the scene of the battle
and was moving southward, as were all ships of his own direct command, as
stated above, as well as those remaining from the destroyed THIRD Section,
He had assumed command over the latter and had directed them to follow
him in column. This they had not done for one reason or another, i.e.,
(a) the damaged MOGAMI which was 2,600 yards on his starboard quarter and
which was making fifteen knots could not make the fleet speed (eighteen
knots) and was gradually falling astern, (b) the slightly damaged SHIGURE
which was 4,700 yards on his starboard bow was retiring at twenty- four
knots, and (c) the damaged ASAGUMO which was 5,600 yards on his port quarter
at seven point three knots was rapidly falling astern.
Thus, his various units were widely separated, and were becoming more
so giving the appearance of a rout. What was he doing about it? The
answer seems to be "nothing" .
Why, for example, he seems to have taken no action to direct the SHIGURE
to remain with his two heavy cruisers, or at least to escort the MOGAMI,
is nowhere explained nor is it explained why he failed to dispose some of
his units around her so that she might have the maximum chance of escaping.
The fact that he sent his four destroyers to escort the damaged ABUKUMA
rather than the damaged MOGAMI seems to provide a clue; i.e., that he had
determined to insure the safe retirement of the ships of the SECOND Striking
Force and to give little if any protection to the three damaged units of
the THIRD Section above referred to, or even to give them further orders.
WHILE SUCH ACTION MAY HAVE BEEN CORRECT BASED ON JAPANESE DOCTRINE,
WHICH SEEMS EXCEEDINGLY DOUBTFUL, IT CERTAINLY WAS NOT CORRECT BASED ON
ALLIED DOCTRINE FOR ALLIED DOCTRINE STATED "WITHDRAWAL MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH A DEFINITE PLAN IN ORDER THAT IT MAY BE ORDERLY AND NOT A ROUT."*
This then was the disposition of the Japanese forces at this time. All
of this was well known to Commander SECOND Striking Force. But whether or
not that commander knew that the Allied cruisers were moving down the strait
at twenty knots in order to close his units is not known. Although it is
quite possible that he did not know this, it seems quite logical to say
that he should have expected pursuit by fast forces.
* War Instructions, United States Navy, 1944, (FTP 143A), Chapter 12,
Section XXVI, Paragraph 12310.
592 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
Therefore it cannot be said that he was taken by surprise at 0529 when
he saw the flash of Allied guns and realized that the retiring units of
the THIRD Section were being taken under fire.
He now likely re-estimated the situation to determine whether to (a)
turn back and engage the enemy in order to protect the MOGAMI which was on
his starboard quarter bearing 321°(T), distant but 4,000 yards, or (b)
continue his retirement leaving the MOGAMI to escape if possible. He
clearly decided on the latter course of action for, instead of turning
back, he changed course at 0531 to 160° (T) apparently in order to throw
off the enemy gunfire*
HIS DECISION IN SO DOING SEEMS UNSOUND SINCE THE SAFETY OF THE MOGAMI
WAS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE JAPANESE NAVY. THEREFORE IT SEEMS CORRECT
TO SAY THAT HE SHOULD HAVE TURNED BACK TO DEFEND THE MOGAMI, AT LEAST
UNTIL HE HAD OBTAINED AN IDEA OF THE STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY FORCE. SINCE
DAWN HAD COMMENCED BREAKING AT ABOUT 0518 HE WELL KNEW THAT EVEN IF HIS
RADAR WERE NOT FUNCTIONING WELL HE WOULD SHORTLY HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF
LIGHT AND THE ENSUING VISUAL OBSERVATION. AS A RESULT OF THIS VISUAL
OBSERVATION HE MIGHT THEN RE-ESTIMATE THE SITUATION AND THEREUPON TAKE THAT
ACTION WHICH SEEMED WISEST ON THE PREMISES.
At 0551, being approximately astern of his destroyers and well clear
of the Panaon coast, he changed course to 180°(T),* (Diagram "L").
At 0555 he recalled his destroyers** which at this time were in the
Mindanao Sea with the ABUKUMA, (Diagram nM"), and directed them to screen
the NACHI and ASHIGARA. Within a matter of minutes the four destroyers
departed the ABUKUMA and headed in a generally northeasterly direction to
rejoin him.
At 0600 Commander SECOND Striking Force, in NACHI, with ASHIGARA
following astern, was 6,700 yards bearing 312°(T) from the northern tip of
Sumilon Island (Diagram WMH).
* USSBS Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Nav No. 58, Interrogation
of Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-IJN, Volume I, Page 241 (Annex C, Track
of 5TH Fleet - Surigao Strait).
** Detailed Action Report USHIO, Antiair Action in the Mindanao and Sulu
Seas, October 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717, NA 11807.
496799 0-59 -48
593 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESDIV EIGHTEEN and USHIO
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
(1) Operations of Commander Destroyer Division EIGHTEEN, 0520 - 0600,
October 25th.
At 0520 Commander Destroyer Division EIGHTEEN, in SHIRANUHI, with
KASUMI and AKEBONO in column astern, was proceeding toward the southern
exit from Surigao Strait on course 180°(T) at twenty knots. (Since the
USHIO was about 4, 500 yards ahead and was proceeding at thirty knots to
escort the ABUKUMA (Diagram "M") she is discussed separately,)
At 0525 he changed course to 215° (T) and at 0530 he increased
speed to twenty- four knots.*
At 0535:30 despite poor visibility** he sighted two motor torpedo
boats (PT's 150 and 196) bearing 23 5° (T), distant 5,000 meters* (5,468
yards), which were "withdrawing and laying smoke under illumination (star-
shell**) by friendly (ABUKUMA) ships."* Actually these MTB's had been
driven off by gunfire.
At 0544, having noticed that the USHIO had the ABUKUMA under
escort, he slowed to eighteen knots* in order temporarily to remain behind
ABUKUMA.*** At 0548 he slowed to sixteen knots.*
At 0555 he received an order from Commander SECOND Striking Force
directing the destroyers to rejoin.**** Based on the USHIO track chart it
appears that the SHIRANUHI promptly changed course to approximately 059°(T)
and increased speed to approximately twenty-six knots in order to take
position on the port bow of the NACHI, while the AKEBONO changed course to
approximately 03 5° (T) in order to take a similar station on the starboard
bow of the NACHI.***** The KASUMI seems to have followed in column.
At 0600 the SHIRANUHI was bearing 162°(T), distant four miles
from Binit Point while the AKEBONO was 3,000 yards to the north (Diagram
"M").
(a) USHIO
At 0520 the USHIO, which had been on course 180°(T) at thirty
knots, changed course to approximately 213°(T)***** in order to head for
the ABUKUMA (about 15,000 yards away). The latter ship which had sighted
the USHIO about five minutes earlier was on course 020° (T) at twenty
knots.***
* Detailed Action Report DESDIV 18 (KASUMI), Battle off the Philippines,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
** Action Report PT 194, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0397, October 29th, 1944.
*** Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off the Philippines, October
24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
**** Detailed Action Report USHIO, Antiair Action in the Mindanao and
Sulu Seas, October 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717, NA 11807.
***** Ibid., Action Chart, 0540 - 0950, October 25th, 1944.
594 CONFIDENTIAL
USHIO and ABUKUMA
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
At approximately 0532 either the USHIO or the ABUKUMA, or boiih,
sighted PT's 194 and 150 to starboard.*
The ABUKUMA immediately opened fire with star shells. Having
illuminated the MTB^ both ships opened fire,* This caused the MTB*s to
retire under a smoke screen.
Meanwhile, one of the MTB's - PT 150 - had fired one torpedo
at her which missed.**
Whether or not the USHIO sighted this torpedo is not known for
there is no mention of it in her action report. However it must be
emphasized here that this is not necessarily conclusive since the gunfire
is not mentioned either.
At 0540 she passed out of Surigao Strait and at the same time
commenced escorting the ABUKUMA as ordered by Commander SECOND Striking
Force,*** Her movements were as shown in Diagram "M" which is based on
her action chart .****
At 0555 she was directed by Commander SECOND Striking Force
to rejoin,*** However she did not depart from the vicinity of the ABUKUMA
until after making another circle around that ship,****
At 0600 she was bearing 1984°(T), distant six point four miles
from Binit Point,
(2) ABUKUMA
At 0520 the ABUKUMA, which was in the entrance to Surigao Strait
and on course 020°(T), speed twenty knots, was rapidly closing the USHIO
which was proceeding south. She was also firing starshells from time to
time ,*****
At 0525 she reversed course to 200° (T)****** at which time she was
contacted by radar by PT 150.** About 0532 either she or the USHIO, or
both, sighted PT's 150 and 194 to starboard and opened fire,* Although
she repulsed these attacks she did not seem to think that she had made any
hits for she failed to mention the action in her action report, (Actually,
as mentioned under "Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats, 0520 - 0600, October
25th", her gunfire was quite accurate and made several effective hits on
PT 194.)
* Action Report PT 194, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0397, October 29th, 1944*
** Action Report PT 150, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0396, October 29th, 1944.
*** Detailed Action Report USHIO, Antiair Action in the Mindanao and
Sulu Seas, October 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717, NA 11807.
**** Ibid., Action Chart, 0540 - 0950, October 25th, 1944o
***** Action Report PT 137, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
11, November 4th, 1944.
****** Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off the Philippines, October
24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
595 CONFIDENTIAL
ABUKUMA and MOGAMI
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
At 054.0 she was joined by the USHIO which commenced escorting her.*
About 0542 she fired starsheUs toward Sonok Point** in order to see what
might be lurking along the western shore of Panaon Island,
At 0544, based on the USHIO' s action chart, she changed course to
260°(T)*** and slowed to ten knots.* It is likely that some of the
emergency repairs completed earlier carried away about this time for the
USHIO reports that the ABUKUMA 's maximum speed was ten knots.* In fact
the USHIO fs action chart shows that her speed was more nearly seven knots
until after 0600.***
At 0600 the ABUKUMA, escorted by the USHIO, was bearing 193°(T),
distant six point seven miles from Binit Point.
(3) MOGAMI
At 0520 the MOGAMI was proceeding on course 192° (T) at fifteen
knots and was no longer trying to follow the NACHI except in a most
general way. She was gradually losing distance due to the NACHI 's superior
speed (Diagram MLM).
At 0529 the Commanding Officer MOGAMI (who was the Gunnery Officer)
was surprised by being taken under fire by forces to the north in the
strait. He was not sure whether this firing came from enemy or friendly
ships. However, since he had been straddled at a range of 19,500 yards on
the first enemy salvo— which, as a matter of interest, had been fired by
the PORTLAND— it became necessary to take some evasive, and some preventive
action. He therefore immediately took (a) evasive action by making a
sharp turn to starboard and then a more gradual turn back to the south and
(b) preventive action by making the recognition signal.****
Meanwhile he endeavored to ascertain the situation which was
rapidly growing more serious as other ships commenced firing at the MOGAMI
with equally effective results. In this connection the Control Station
Officer stated that they had (a) received about twenty salvos, (b) been
heavily straddled, and (c) received over ten hits from heavy and medium
caliber guns,*****
The making of the recognition signal and the fact that this was
the second time in this action that the MOGAMI had questioned the enemy
* Detailed Action Report USHIO, Antiair ' ction in the Mindanao and
Sulu Seas, October 25th, 1944, WDC Docunent 161717, NA 11807.
** Action Report PT 137, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
11, November 4th, 1944.
*** Action Chart, 0540 - 0950, October 25th, 1944, Detailed Action
Report USHIO, Antiair Action in the Mindanao and Sulu Seas, October
25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717, NA 11807.
**** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
***** Report on SHO Operation, Lieutenant Fukushi, ex-IJN, Control Station
Officer and Fire Data Computer Officer, MOGAMI, December 1945, Army
Historical Division Microfilm HS-39A.
596 CONFIDENTIAL
MOGAMI
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
nature of the gunfire being directed at her— the first time was at 0356
when the MOGAMI was being attacked by the destroyers of Attack Group 1.2
at which time the commanding officer — who was the captain — had decided
that these were friendly destroyers and had turned toward them making
visual identification signals with flashing lights and red flares,
discussed under "Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force (MOGAMI),
0348 - 0420, October 25thM — reminds students of history that at the Battle
of Savo Island the Commanding Officer VINCENNES had behaved similarly.
In this latter case the Commanding Officer VINCENNES, when he had been
illuminated and fired on by the Japanese cruisers (CHOKAI, AOBA, KAKO,
KINUGASA), had at first thought that they were friendly and later, when he
was fired on by the FURUTAKA, he had, after great difficulty, hoisted a
U.S. Ensign at his masthead to indicate his friendly nature.*
THESE TWO EXAMPLES SHOW THE NECESSITY, ESPECIALLY DURING NIGHT
ACTION, FOR (A) THE COMMANDING OFFICERS OF SHIPS TO BE AS FAMILIAR AS
POSSIBLE WITH THE DEVELOPING SITUATION, (B) FOR THEM TO AVOID HAVING
PRECONCEIVED IDEAS AS TO THE CHARACTER OF CONTACTS, (C) FOR THE CIC»S OR
OTHER COMMAND CENTERS TO MAINTAIN AN ACCURATE PLOT OF OWN AND ENEMY
FORCES, AND (D) FOR A RELIABLE PROCEDURE FOR THE REPORTS OF CONTACTS AND
THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN SHIPS.
About 0533 she steadied on a course of about 180° (T) and at 0535
changed course to about 200°(T). 1
By 0540 the shelling had ceased and she then changed course to
150°(T). During this period the ten direct hits which she had received
apparently did little if any additional damage to her main engines, for
she continued to move in a southerly direction at fifteen knots.
Sometime between 0540 and 0543 she was sighted by PT 490 and 491
which were operating independently.** Whether or not she sighted these
two PT's at this same time is not known but it is known that she must
have sighted at least PT 491 prior to 0601 for at that time she opened
fire on that MTB which had changed course to close her.***
About 0558:30, being near the middle of the channel, she changed
course to 180° (T) and headed for the southern exit to Surigao Strait.****
At 0600 the MOGAMI was bearing 271° (T), distant eight point
fifteen miles from the northern tip of Sibanoc Island (Diagram MLM),
* Battle of Savo Island (NavPers 91187), Naval War College, 1950,
Page 234.
** Action Reports PT's 490 and 491, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944,
No Serials, October 26th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 491, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
**** Action Chart, Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the
Philippines, October 18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA
12653.
597 CONFIDENTIAL
ASAGUMO and SHIGURE
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
(4) ASAGUMO
At 0520 the damaged ASAGUMO was proceeding on course 238° (T) at a
speed of about nine point five knots* in an attempt to follow the MOGAMI**
(Diagram nLn).
About 0525 she succeeded in increasing speed to fourteen knots.
At 0531 the Commanding Officer ASAGUMO noted the gunfire on her
starboard quarter and realized that the enemy were in pursuit of the
retiring Japanese forces. Since the tracers passed almost directly over-
head he also realized that this was radar controlled fire** and that the
ASAGUMO was a likely target. Therefore, presumably to throw cff the energy
gunfire, he made a radical change of course to port to 140°(T).***
As he completed the turn, and despite the turn, he was fired on
at 0533 by the approaching enemy with the unfortunate result that he was
hit on the stern which resulted in a fire. The enemy fire was quite
accurate and therefore he was likely astonished when the enemy at 0535
ceased firing at him. This hit was made by the MINNEAPOLIS which had
fired with an open fire bearing of 178°(T), an open fire range of 14,600
yards, and had at 0535 shifted her fire to the MOGAMI.****
As a result of this hit the ASAGUMO slowed down even more and,
from radar tracking, appears to have been reduced to about seven point
three knots.
The fire gradually obtained the upper hand and the Commanding
Officer ASAGUMO decided to abandon ship.** Therefore he changed course
to 180° (T) at 0359 and at 0600 stopped.
At 0600 the ASAGUMO was bearing 235°(T), distant five point two
miles from the northern tip of Kanihaan Island.
(5) SHIGURE
At 0520 SHIGURE was on course 195°(T), speed fifteen knots, and
was bearing 256°(T), distant seven point seven miles from the southern
tip of Kanihaan Island. She was about 5,000 yards on the starboard bow
of the NACHI (Diagram "L").
* The track of the ASAGUMO is based on Allied radar data.
** Composite Report on Surigao Strait Action by Commanding Officers
ASAGUMO (Commander Kazuo Shibayama, ex-IJN) and MICHISHIO (Conmander
Kazuo Tanaka, ex-IJN), March 15th, 1946, Army Historical Division
Microfilm HS-39A.
*** Track Chart LOUISVILLE, 0412 to 0540, October 25th, 1944, Action
Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao Strait, Leyte
Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0045, November
7th, 1944.
**** Action Report MINNEAPOLIS, Battle of South Surigao Strait, Philippine
Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0215, November 2nd, 1944.
598 CONFIDENTIAL
SHIGURE
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
It will be recalled that at this time she was employing manual
steering and had not fallen in astern of the NACHI as ordered by Commander
SECOND Striking Force because of this fact.
At 0521 she increased speed to twenty- four knots and at 0522
changed course to 155° (T)* in order to regain the center of the channel.
At 0532:30, being close enough to the center of the channel, she
changed course to 180° (T).**
At 0535 she shifted to auxiliary power steering*** which was not
entirely satisfactory,**** probably because of damage to the telemeter
lines,***
It is not clear why, having restored his auxiliary steering, the
Commanding Officer SHIGURE did not fall in astern of the NACHI, particularly
so since in such case the SHIGURE would have been the last ship in column
and therefore would have had considerable freedom of action. Failing in
this he might well have notified Commander SECOND Striking Force of the
improvement in his steering system and (a) asked whether or not he was now
to fall in astern of the NACHI or (b) thus given that commander an
opportunity to issue any new instructions,
WHY HE FAILED TO DO SO BUT INSTEAD CONTINUED ON AT TWENTY-FOUR
KNOTS, WHEREAS THE NACHI AND ASHIGARA WERE MAKING BUT EIGHTEEN KNOTS, IS
NOT EXPLAINED. COULD IT HAVE BEEN THAT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT COMMANDER
SECOND STRIKING FORCE BY HIS ORDER TO FALL IN ASTERN OF NACHI HAD ASSUMED
COMMAND OF THE REMNANTS OF THE THIRD SECTION, HE (COMMANDING OFFICER
SHIGURE) CONSIDERED HIMSELF TO BE WHOLLY INDEPENDENT OF THAT COMMANDER
PERHAPS BY VIRTUE OF HIS STEERING DIFFICULTIES, WHATEVER MAY HAVE BEEN
HIS REASONS THEY DO NOT APPEAR SOUND AND INDICATE THAT HE DID NOT HAVE AN
OFFENSIVE NOR A COOPERATIVE STATE OF MIND,
At 0549 she changed course to 185° (T)** and headed for the passage
between Binit Point and Bilaa Point,
At 0600 SHIGURE was bearing 122°(T), distant four point nine miles
from Binit Point (Diagram "MM)«
* Track Chart, Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Straits, Philippine
Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944.
** Appended Chart 2, Chart of Night Battle, 3RD Section, 1ST Striking
Force, 0030 - 0530, October 25th, 1944, Detailed Action Report
SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd - 27th, 1944, WDC
Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11301,
*** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
**** USSBS Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Nav No. 79, Interrogation
of Commander Shigeru Nishino, ex-UN, Volume II, Page 350,
599 CONFIDENTIAL
FUSO
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
(6) FUSO
The two burning portions of the FUSO continued to drift to the
south with the current. The LOUISVILLE opened fire on what seems to
have been the bow section at 0531»* The CONY recorded that she lost
radar contact with what also seems to have been the bow of the FUSO at
a range of 20,000 yards about 0536:30** and the CLAXTON recorded that
she had lost radar contact with this target by 0540.*** It is considered
that this section sank at this latter time in Latitude 10°-09»N,
Longitude 125°-24'E (Diagram MLW).
* Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao Strait,
Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0045,
November 7th, 1944*
** Action Report CONY, Night Battle, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
039-44, October 29th, 1944.
*** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944.
600 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
CHAPTER XXI - ALLIED OPERATIONS, 0520 - 0600, October 25th
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2, 0520 - 0600, October 25th.
During this period CTG 77.2 operated largely as Commander Left Flank
Force and, therefore, most of his operations are discussed under "Operations
of Commander Left Flank Force, 0520 - 0600, October 25th".
It will be recalled that at 0520, in the LOUISVILLE, he was heading
south with the left flank cruisers. Therefore, since he was also Commander
Left Flank Force, he was thoroughly familiar with the situation developing
down the strait as the left flank cruisers headed in that direction.
He noted that (a) Commander Right Flank Force, with the cruisers of
that force, was following the left flank cruisers down the strait to
render assistance if necessary, and was now 11,600 yards on the
LOUISVILLE'S starboard quarter (Diagram "L"), and (b) Commander Battle
Line was remaining in his present position and awaiting developments.
At 0527 he received a TBS voice radio message from the MINNEAPOLIS
asking him if he had PT 490fs report of three large targets, two of
which were headed north, while the third remained in the south.* This
message appears to have been a combination of the information contained
in PT 490 's message to CTG 77.2 at 0514 and PT 494 !s message to PT 526
at 0519 •** A discussion of this stale and confusing information is
contained under "Operations of CTG 77.2, 0420 - 0520, October 25th".
At 0529 he knew that Commander Left Flank Force had ordered his left
flank cruisers to "Open fire when the target bears".***
At 0530 he received a message to the effect that PT 194 had reported
that she was sinking and trying to beach on southern Leyte Island.****
As will be shown later under "Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats, 0520 -
0600, October 25th", this MTB was rapidly sinking but was eventually
saved.*****
* Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944,' Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944; also
Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
**** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
***** Forwarding letter COMMTBRON 12, Action Report PT 194, Night of
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0406, October 29th, 1944.
601 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2 and
COM ATTACK SECTION 1
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
He likely heard (a) at 0532 COMDESRON FIFTY-SEC' s order to the RICHARD
P. LEARY to screen at fifteen knots around the NEWCOMB and the ALBERT W.
GRANT,* and (b) at 0534 the WACHAPREAGUE's message to all PT boats to the
effect that PT 194 had requested that all firing at the south end of Leyte
Island cease as the fire was approaching PT 194c**
At 0536, hearing COMDESDIV XRAY report that he would pass astern of
the cruisers,* he now knew, within reasonable limits, the location of
that division.
At 0537, since he was also Commander Left Flank Force, he knew that
that command had (a) directed his cruisers to change course to 010°(T)
by simultaneous ship turns,*** and (b) just as the turn was being
completed, ordered cease firing,***
He seems to have been concerned about his whole command for at 0549
he directed CTG 77.3 and TG 77.3 to change course to 350°(T),**** likely
to give thereby searoora to TG 77.2, He included in the list of addressees
(probably as information addressees) Commander Battle Line and COMDESDIV
112 (who was acting as COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX in the absence of that commander
with the disabled ALBERT W. GRANT). It would appear therefore that he
desired that all of his commanders know that the Right and Left Flank
Forces were now returning up the strait toward Leyte Gulf,
At 0600 the LOUISVILLE was bearing 077° (T), distant three point nine
miles from Bugho Point, Leyte. The PHOENLX was bearing 319° (T), distant
4,800 yards from the LOUISVILLE (Diagram »L").
(1) Operations of Commander Destroyer Squadron FIFTY-SIX, 0520 - 0600,
October 25th,
(a) Operations of Commander Attack Section ONE, 0520 - 0600,
October 25th.
At 0520 Commander Attack Section ONE (COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX), in
the NEWCOMB, was lying close alongside the damaged ALBERT W. GRANT, and
the RICHARD P. LEARY, about 7,600 yards to the northeast, was closing him
at fifteen knots.
At 0529 he heard Commander Left Flank Force over the TBS voice
radio direct the Left Flank Cruisers to open fire on the enemy remnant s.*****
* Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
** Action Report CTG 77.3, Surface Engagement with Japanese Forces,
Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00117,
November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
**** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
***** Action Report COMDESRON 56, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 0013, October 29th, 1944.
602 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION 1
and COMDESDIV 112
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
At 0532 he directed the RICHARD P. LEARY to screen around the
NEWCOMB and the ALBERT W. GRANT,* which the RICHARD P. LEARY commenced
doing at 0534.**
At 0536 the WEST VIRGINIA informed the RICHARD P. LEARY that
she had sighted an aircraft with lights burning bearing 190° (T), range
nine miles,*** This aircraft was in the vicinity of Attack Section ONE.
At 0540 the RICHARD P. LEARY1 s medical officer reported on
board the NEWCOMB**** after which (0543) the NEWCOMB went alongside the
ALBERT W. GRANT to receive the wounded, and to furnish electric power,
electric submersible pumps and gasoline handy-billies to that destroyer
in order to combat flooding.*****
At 0547 the ALBERT W. GRANT was able to put her No. 4 boiler
on the auxiliary steam line and immediately afterwards began to use her
after pumps to combat flooding.*****
At 0600 Attack Section ONE was about five miles west of
Hibuson Island.
(b) Operations of COMDESDIV 112, 0520 - 0600, October 25th.
At 0520 Commander Destroyer Division 112, in ROBINSON, who
was acting as COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX, with Attack Sections TWO and THREE
astern, was on course 270°(T), speed fifteen knots, and was operating in
the approximate vicinity of the post-attack rendezvous north of Hibuson
Island.
It will be recalled that at 0517 CTG 77.2 had asked him if
his destroyers were coming down the strait at thirty knots to which he
had replied in the affirmative.* He now at 0520 queried CTG 77.2 as to
his position. At 0522 he received a reply to the effect that CTG 77.2
was seven miles southwest of Point HYPO.* (As discussed under "Operations
of Commander Left Flank Force, 0520 - 0600, October 25th", Point HYPO is
considered to be Hibuson Island.)
At 0523 he changed course to 210°(T) and increased speed to
twenty knots.*
* Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
** Deck Log RICHARD P. LEARY, October 25th, 1944.
*** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
**** Deck Log NEWCOMB, October 25th, 1944.
***** Action Report ALBERT W. GRANT, Operations against Central Philippines,
Leyte Area, and Night Surface Action against Japanese Task Force in
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0106, November
11th, 1944.
603 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESDIV 112
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
At 0527 he likely heard the MINNEAPOLIS inquire if CTG 77.2
had received PT 490*3 report on three large targets off Panaon Island,
two of which were heading north and the third remaining in the south.*
At 0535 he changed course to 180°(T).*» The HALFORD recorded
this course as 185° (T)*** but the plot (Diagram "L") shows that the course
was more nearly 183° (T).
At 0540 he increased speed to twenty-five knots.**
At 0546 he likely intercepted Commander Left Flank Force's
TBS voice radio message to COMDESDIV XRAY, and at 0549, a somewhat
similar message to the Left Flank Cruisers, to form circular cruising
disposition on course 010°(T), speed fifteen knots.****
At 0557 he likely intercepted COMDESDIV XRAY«s message
concerning survivors to Commander Left Flank Force.****
At approximately 0559 realizing that (a) the Left Flank
Cruisers were to the north of him and on a northerly course, (b) the
picking up of survivors by DESDIV XRAY might well leave those cruisers
without an adequate screen and (c) there was little reason for him to
proceed to the south by himself, he reversed course to 000°(T)***** and
slowed to twenty knots.****
At 0600 the ROBINSON was bearing 309°(T), distant eight point
three miles from Pelotes Point, Dinagat Island.
(2) Operations of Commander Destroyer Division XRAY, 0520 - 0600,
October 25th.
At 0520 COMDESDIV XRAY, in the CLAXTON, was proceeding on course
160°(T) at twenty- five knots to make a torpedo attack on the retiring
Japanese forces. The CONY was about 600 yards astern of him but the rest
of his division were scattered from 12,000 to 16,000 yards behind the
flagship (Diagram "KM)»
* Action Report HALFORD, Night Action in Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 048, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
** Action Report COMDESDIV 112, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 040,
October 31st, 1944.
*** Deck Log HALFORD, October 25th, 1944.
**** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
***** This change of course is not recorded in the action reports or deck
logs. However, the ROBINSON Deck Log on the page of columnar data
records that at 0600 the ships head was 260°(T) indicating that
course was changed at 0559.
604 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESDIV XRAY
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
It will be recalled that the WELLES had slowed to about twenty
knots at 0506 due to loss of a feed pump. However, the repairs were soon
completed so that at 0523 she increased speed to thirty-one knots* and
followed the AULICK which was now making thirty knots, A few minutes
later (0528) she advised COMDESDIV XRAY that her top speed was thirty- two
point five knots.**
At 0525 COMDESDIV XRAY learned that the CLAXTON, which shortly
after regaining radar contact on the ASHIGARA had commenced tracking the
MOGAMI, had made radar contact on two more targets moving slowly south-
west.*** About 0527 the CONY also made contact on these two additional
targets recording them as one large and one small,**** bearing 165°(T),
distant 22,200 yards, but whether or not this was reported to COMDESDIV
XRAY is not known. Actually this range was on the ASAGUMO, which was
moving toward the southwest at the time while the bearing appears to
either have (a) been recorded in error or (b) taken on the FUSO bow.
This seems so for the FUSO bow was bearing 170© (T) while the ASAGUMO was
bearing 179° (T) (Diagram »L»).
At 0531 the CONY recorded that the larger of these two targets
had disappeared from the radar scope at a range of 20,000 yards.**** It
is considered that this time is in error for (a) the CONY action report
has a variable time error of several minutes, (b) the LOUISVILLE had been
firing at the FUSO (bow) between 0531 and 0533, (c) at 0536:30 the range
from the CONY to the FUSO (bow) was 20,000 yards (Diagram "L"), and (d)
the CLAXTON recorded loss of both contacts at 0540.***
At 0536 COMDESDIV XRAY reported to Commander Left Flank Force
that he was passing astern of the cruisers. At 0537 he received that
commander's order to join the cruisers as their screen.***** He therefore
changed course back to the north and at 0538 notified his division that
the CLAXTON was slowing in order to comply with Commander Left Flank
Force's order.*****
At 0539 the SIGOURNEY made radar contact on a target bearing
158°(T), range fifteen miles.****** This contact was on the FUSO (stern)
which at this time was at that range although the bearing was actually
166o(T).
At 0546 COMDESDIV XRAY received an order from Commander Left Flank
Force to form a circular screen around the cruisers,***** and promptly
changed the CLAXTON »s course to 300°(T ),******* while the other destroyers
of the division maneuvered about as shown on Diagram MLn.
*~ Deck Log WELLES, October 25th, 1944.
** Action Report SIGOURNEY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 055, October 30th, 1944.
*** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944.
**** Action Report CONY, Night Battle, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
039-44, October 29th, 1944.
***** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
****** Deck Log SIGOURNEY, October 25th, 1944.
******* Deck Log CLAXTON, Columnar Sheet, October 25th, 1944.
605 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESDIV XRAY and
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
At 0547 the SIGOURNEY passed through a heavy oil slick.* She did
not report this to anyone.
At 0549 he received Commander Left Flank Force's order to the
cruisers to form circular cruising disposition on course 010°(T), speed
fifteen knots, axis 000°(T) and that the destroyers were to form on Circle
TWO,** He therefore, at 0553, assigned his destroyers as follows: "WELLES
000; THORN 060; CONY 120; CLAXTON 180; SIGOURNEY 240; AULICK 300, ■«**
At 0554 he noticed a strong odor of fuel oil and sighted survivors
in the water,*** At 0557 he reported to Commander Left Flank Force that
there were numerous survivors in the water abeam of the cruisers and asked
if he should pick them up. That commander then inquired as to whether the
survivors were friendly or enemy. To this he replied that he could not
tell, whereupon he was directed to pick up survivors,**
At 0600 the AULICK**** and at 0606 the THORN***** sighted Japanese
survivors in the water. They continued on to reach their assigned stations
in the screen. The THORN also sighted oil and debris,**
At 0600 the CLAXTON was bearing 1000(T), distant five point seven
miles from Bugho Point, Leyte Island. The other destroyers of the division
were maneuvering to form a screen around the cruisers as shown in Diagram
"L",
(3) Operations of Commander Left Flank Force, 0520 - 0600, October 25th.
At 0520 Commander Left Flank Force, in LOUISVILLE, with his cruisers
in column astern at varying distances as shown in Diagram "L", was on
course 180°(T) at twenty knots, (At this time the ASAGUMO, bearing 176°(T),
range 15,000 yards, was on a southwesterly course at nine point five knots,
while the MOGAMI, bearing 191°(T), range 18,500 yards, was on a southerly
course at fifteen knots,)
At 0520 he was queried as to his position by TBS voice radio by
COMDESDIV 112, who, by a communication error, had been delayed in reaching
his assigned screening station. He replied at 0522 that he was seven miles
southwest of Point HYPO.** (This point is not defined in the records
available to this analysis, but since a point seven miles southwest of the
southwestern tip of Little Hibuson Island coincides with the LOUISVILLE
0517 position, it is likely that this was the point intended and that the
CLAXTON recorder did not understand the name and wrote down "H" or HYPO.)
*~~ Action Report SIGOURNEY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 055, October 30th, 1944.
** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
*** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944.
**** Deck Log AULICK, October 25th, 1944.
***** Action Report THORN, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 034, October 30th, 191 U.
606 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
0520 - 0600, October 25th
At 0522 he changed course by column movement to 250°(T)*
preparatory to opening fire on the enemy remnants to the south. At this
time the LOUISVILLE master gyro compass follow-up failed,** which probably
accounts for the confusion as to the time of commencing the turn
(LOUISVILLE action report states that she turned at 0520 and only
COMCRUDIV TWELVE gives the correct time that the individual ships turned).
This casualty made it necessary to set own ship's course into the range-
keepers by hand,**
At 0529 he ordered his cruisers to, "Open fire when the target
bears".*** The PORTLAND opened fire immediately at a smoking target
bearing 185°(T), range 19,500 yards and tracked on southerly courses at
seventeen knots.**** This target was the MOGAMI which reported being
straddled on the first salvo.***** The other ships opened fire on the
FUSO, ASAGUMO and MOGAMI as indicated in the table below:
REPORTED TARGET
DIAGRAM »L"
COURSE SPEED
FIRING
OPENING r .:
OPENING FIRE
(T) (knots)
TIME
SHIP
RANGE
BEARING
TARGET
RANGE
BEARING (Remarks)
0529
PORTLAND
19,500
185
MOGAMI
19,500
185
186® 17
0531
DENVER
20,000
190
MOGAMI
20,100
189i
235® —
(CA or BB)
0531
LOUISVILLE
18,900
160
FUSO (bow) 18,900
158
(very large fire)
0533
COLUMBIA
21,200
191
MOGAMI
21,250
192
218 16
(large burning
ship, believed
to be BB)
0533
MINNEAPOLIS 14,750
178
ASAGUMO
14,700
176
(DD, no bow)
0533® LOUISVILLE
18,900
180
MOGAMI
18,800
179
180 17
(afire, believed
to be original
BB target)
0535
MINNEAPOLIS
22,250
179
MOGAMI
20,000
180
20
(afire and
retiring)
@ From track charts
**
##*■
JULMJC
A A A A
•K-JBHB*
Action Report COMCRUDIV 12, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, and Subsequent Operations in Leyte Gulf, October 25th - 29th,
1944, Serial 0147, November 7th, 1944.
Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao Strait,
Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial 0045,
November 7th, 1944.
Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 19A4, Enclosure
(C).
Action Report PORTLAND, Surface Engagement in Leyte Gulf, October
25th, 1944, Serial O65, October 28th, 1944.
Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
607
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
0520 - 0600, October 25th
In connection with the above it is to be noted that the LOUISVILLE
shifted fire from the FUSO to the MOGAMI at 0533* and the MINNEAPOLIS
shifted fire from the ASAGUMO to the MOGAMI at 0535.**
The ASAGUMO reported that she was hit in the stern and set afire***
which was confirmed by Allied observers.**** The MOGAMI reported receiving
over ten hits.***** The CONY and the CLAXTON which were coming down the
strait reported that a target had disappeared from the radar scope, the
former at about 0536:30****** and the latter at 0540.******* This appears
to have been the bow of the FUSO which as shown above was fired on by the
LOUISVILLE only.
Why the MINNEAPOLIS fired against the MOGAMI with a range of
about 2,250 yards in excess is not explained. It could have been due to
ranging on splashes which were well over, but it more likely was due to
recording the range after she had ceased firing and had turned away. It
is of interest that at about this time (0539:23) the range, from Diagram
WL", was exactly 22,250 yards.
It will be recalled that the LOUISVILLE experienced a failure of
the master gyro compass follow-up which made it necessary to set own ship's
course into the rangekeepers by hand. Judging from the firing bearings
obtained this casualty did not detract from her shooting ability.
At 0536 Commander Left Flank Force received word from COMDESDIV
XRAY that DESDIV XRAY would pass astern of the cruisers, whereupon he, at
0537, directed that commander to join him and screen his cruisers .********
**
***
****
Action Report LOUISVILLE, Night Surface Engagement off Surigao
Strait, Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 0045, November 7th, 1944.
Action Report MINNEAPOLIS, Participation in Battle of South
Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, Night of October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serial 0215, November 2nd, 1944.
Composite Report on Surigao Strait Action by Commanding Officers
ASAGUMO (Commander Kazuo Shibayama, ex-IJN) and MICHISHIO
(Commander Kazuo Tanaka, ex-IJN), March 15th, 1946, Army
Historical Division Microfilm HS-39A.
Action Report COMCRUDIV 12, Battle of Surigao Strait, October
25th, 1944, and Subsequent Operations in Leyte Gulf, October
25th - 29th, 1944, Serial 0147, November 7th, 1944; also Action
Report DENVER, Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 0031, November 4th, 1944.
Report on SHO Operation by Lieutenant Fukushi, ex-IJN, Control
Station Officer and Fire Data Computer Officer MOGAMI, December
1945, Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-39A.
Action Report CONY, Night Battle, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 039-44, October 29th, 1944.
Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine
Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944.
Ibid., Enclosure (C).
*****
******
*******
********
608
CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
Also at 0537 he ordered a change of course to 010°(T) by-
simultaneous ship turns.* Although he gives no reason for this turn away
it was most likely due to the fact that he had noted the MOGAMI1 s change
of course to the westward at 0529 which gave every indication of firing
torpedoes.
It is not clear why he (a) did not turn toward the enemy rather
than away in that (1) the necessary course change would have been much
smaller, (2) it would have been easier to avoid the torpedoes by heading
toward them rather than away and (3) the danger of interference from
TG 77.3 would have been avoided, and (b) did not turn back and continue
the pursuit of the Japanese ships once he had determined that the enemy
torpedoes, if fired, had likely passed. Had he done so it is hardly
likely that the MOGAMI would have escaped*
Although he stated later that he had turned to the north at this
time to look for DESDIV XRAY,** this seems to be incorrect since he had
heard from COMDESDIV XRAY but one minute earlier (at 0536) that DESDIV
XRAY was passing astern of the left flank cruisers and had promptly
replied, "Join me as screen".***
THEREFORE IT SEEMS HIGHLY PROBABLE THAT HIS BASIC REASON FOR
TURNING NORTH WAS HIS BELIEF THAT HE WAS NOW IN ENEMY TORPEDO WATER AND
THAT, SINCE HE HAD ALREADY ALERTED CTF 77 TO THE FACT THAT SOME ENEMY
SHIPS WERE ESCAPING AND HAD STRONGLY RECOMMENDED AN EARLY MORNING AIR
ATTACK ON ANY THAT MIGHT ESCAPE, HE THOUGHT IT WISE NOT TO ENDANGER
UNNECESSARILY HIS SHIPS AT THIS TIME.
At 0539, just as his ships were completing their turns, he
ordered cease fire.* Although both the MOGAMI and the ASAGUMO were in
flames they were not sunk. The Commanding Officer DENVER recognized
this fact and stated that it was probable that the MOGAMI had made good
her escape to the southward.****
* Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
** Personal Interview of Vice Admiral (then Rear Admiral) Jesse B.
Oldendorf, USN, CTG 77.2, recorded by Naval Records and Library, CNO,
February 19th, 1945.
*** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
**** Action Report DENVER, Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 0031, November 4th, 1944.
496799 o- s, -49 609 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
0520 - 0600, October 25th
After cease fire at 0539 his ships had ammunition left as shown
in the table below:
FIRING SHIP
ON
AT
AP
HAND
0529
HC
FIRED
AP HC
TARGET
REMAINING
AT 0539
AP HC
LOUISVILLE
406
564
18
72
90
0
0
0
FUSO
MOGAMI
316
564
PORTLAND
165
95
71
0
MOGAMI
94
95
MINNEAPOLIS
78
165
9
54
63
0
0
0
ASAGUMO
MOGAMI
15
165
DENVER
269* 1083
156*
0
MOGAMI
113
1083
COLUMBIA
356
120
200
0
MOGAMI
156
120
From the above table it can be readily seen that the supply of
armor piercing ammunition ammunition was very low particularly when the
high rate of fire of the ships is considered.
At 0541 the LOUISVILLE changed course to 350°(T)*» in order to
give the PHOENIX more room to complete her turn to the north, and after
a short time changed back to base course of 010°(T).**
Also at 0541 he received a message from CTG 77.3 informing him
that the PHOENIX was going to unload one gun through the muzzle.***
At 0546 he directed COMDESDIV XRAY to form a circular screen
around his cruisers*** and at 0549 he ordered his cruisers and destroyers
to form circular cruising disposition as follows:
"Form cruising disposition on LOUISVILLE in position 1000. Heavy
ships on circle one in order from LOUISVILLE: PORTLAND, COLUMBIA, DENVER,
MINNEAPOLIS. Present course 010°(T), speed 15 knots, axis 000°(T)o
Destroyers form on circle two" c***
* Estimated. The DENVER reported having on hand after the Battle of
Surigao Strait 113 rounds of 6— inch AP. The ammunition expended by
the DENVER embraced the 6-inch AP fired during the periods (a) 0351:30 -
0404 and 0406 - 0409, and (b) fired during the period 0531 - 0538.
The amount of ammunition fired during the above periods is not known,
but since the COLUMBIA, during the latter period, fired 200 rounds in
nine minutes it is assumed that the DENVER, which fired for seven
minutes, fired at the same rate and therefore fired seven-ninths of 200
rounds or 156 rounds. This added to the 113 rounds which the DENVER
had remaining at the end of the battle would give 269 rounds on hand
at 0529.
Deck Log LOUISVILLE, October 25th, 1944.
Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
610 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
and COM BATTLE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
Also at 0549, as CTG 77.2, he directed CTG 77.3 and TG 77.3 to
change course to 350°(T), including Commander Battle Line and COMDESDIV
112 in the call (probably as information addressees).* It appears that
he desired to open the distance between TG 77.2 and TG 77.3 more rapidly
for at this time the distance between the LOUISVILLE and the PHOENIX was
only about 800 yards in spite of CTG 77.3 having increased speed to
twenty-five knots at 0546. It also appears that he changed course to
015° (T) at 0551 for the same reason.**
At 0557 he received a TBS voice radio message from COMDESDIV XRAY
to the effect that there were numerous survivors in the water abeam of
the cruisers and asking if he should pick them up. He then requested
information as to whether the survivors were friendly or enemy. After
receiving a reply that COMDESDIV XRAY could not tell, but that there were
strong oil fumes in the vicinity, he directed that commander to pick up
survivors o***
At 0600 the LOUISVILLE and the PORTLAND were in their assigned
stations in the disposition while the SIGOURNEY was fast approaching hers.
At this time the LOUISVILLE was bearing 077°(T), distant three point nine
miles from Bugho Point, Leyte Island.
(4) Operations of Commander Battle Line, 0520 - 0600, October 25th.
Commander Battle Line, with his battleships but without a screen,
continued to steam east and west along a Line some six miles north of
Hibuson Island. He was able to follow the actions of Commander Left
Flank Force in a general way by intercepting that commander's voice radio
messages and thus knew that Commander Left Flank Force had ceased fire
and turned to the north at 0539.****
Since Commander Battle Line took no part in the remaining
operations of this battle his operations are not discussed further.
* Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Deck Log LOUISVILLE, October 25th, 1944.
*** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine
Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944,
Enclosure (C).
**** Action Report COMBATDIV 3 (Commander Battle Line), Battle of Surigao
Strait, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0201, November
24th, 1944.
611 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.3
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
(5) Operations of CTG 77.3, 0520 - 0600, October 25th.
At 0520 CTG 77.3 was on course 160°(T), speed twenty knots and,
with his three cruisers, was standing by to render assistance as necessary
to CTG 77.2, At this time, in anticipation of dawn, he was forming
Antiaircraft Disposition VICTOR (Diagram "L").
He was watching the movements of Commander Left Flank Force with
care for, since that commander had issued no instructions nor plans, he
would have to be alert not to embarrass him and yet be in a supporting
position,.
At 0522 he intercepted a TBS voice radio message to the left flank
cruisers to change course to 250°(T).* Since he had several targets on
his radar screen he could estimate from this signal that Commander Left
Flank Force would be opening fire shortly.
At 0526 he intercepted a message from PT 194. to the WACHAPREAGUE
saying, "Sinking, send help".**
At 0528 he slowed to ten knots*** in order not to approach the
left flank cruisers too rapidly while they were on their firing course.
At 0529 he (a) intercepted a TBS voice radio message from
Commander Left Flank Force to his cruisers to open fire, (b) changed
course by simultaneous ship turns to 180°(T) in order to give the Left
Flank Force more sea room, and (c) directed his force to submit their
damage and casualty reports to him by visual signal after sunrise. **
He issued this latter order to insure that the voice circuits which were
primarily command circuits and were employed for maneuvering and control
would not be overloaded with extraneous matter at this crucial time.
Also at 0529 he observed the left flank cruisers opening fire.
At 0533 he intercepted a message from the WACHAPREAGUE to all
MTB's to the effect that PT 194 requested that firing at the south end
of Leyte Island cease as fire was approaching her.**
At 0536 he received a message to the effect that PT boats had
reported a ship afire and heading south, bearing 13 5° (T) from Amagusan
Point. He states in his action report that this placed this ship bearing
162<>(T), distant 19,000 yards from the PHOENIX.*** Although this range
is about 1,000 yards beyond the range to the ASAGUMO, the bearing checks,
* Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944.
612 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.3
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
and, since there were no other ships nearby, it seems clear that he had
hurriedly taken a range and bearing on the ASAGUMO. At this time the
ASAGUMO was bearing 131° (T) from Amagusan Point (Diagram "L").
At 0538, after hearing Commander Left Flank Force order a change
of course by simultaneous ship turns to 010° (T), he reversed course, also
by simultaneous ship turns, to 000° (T),* and at 0539 he increased speed
to twenty knots.** While he stated in his action report that his reason
for so doing was to close the battleships*** it seems more likely that
his real reason was to avoid embarrassing CTG 77.2 who was turning toward
him.
At 0540 having heard from the DALY that she could not turn to the
right but would have to turn to the left, he directed her to keep clear
as best she could.****
At 0541 having received word that an MTB was in need of help he
so advised his destroyers, as a result of which the DALY, at 0542,
replied that she had one 1,200 yards on her starboard bow. He then
directed her to investigate.** Which MTB was in need of help is not
clear, but since (a) PT 194 was known to be sinking and (b) the fact
that PT 493 had been beached on Maoyo Point was not known until later,
it can be assumed that it was PT 194*
At 0544 he (a) designated SHROPSHIRE as guide, (b) received a
message from the DALY that she had two friendly MTB's off her starboard
bow which she was investigating, and (c) directed the DALY to inform the
friendly MTB's of the damaged MTB.****
At 0546 he increased speed to twenty-five knots**** in order to
increase the distance between himself and the left flank cruisers. This
was important as the two commands were unusually close, the distance from
the PHOENIX to the LOUISVILLE being about 600 yards at this time.
At 0549, among others, he was directed by CTG 77.2 to execute,
"Turn 350."** However he did not execute this order as he felt he
required more sea room before turning. Finally, when at 0553 this
objective had been accomplished, he changed course by simultaneous ship
turns to 350°(T).***» Also at this time he directed the BOISE to take
guide.****
* Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C); also Action Report
BOISE, Surigao Strait, Morning of October 25th, 1944, Serial 069,
October 30th, 1944.
** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944.
**** Ibid., Enclosure (C).
613 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.3 and
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
At 0555, when the BACHE had finally succeeded in gaining station,*
his Antiaircraft Disposition VICTOR was complete with the exception of
the DALY. Due to the time taken to investigate the MTB's as well as to
her failure to speed up and follow the HUTCHINS closely, the DALY was not
to enter formation until 0759.**
At 0559 he informed his destroyers that, when so directed, DALY,
BEALE and BACHE were to constitute a special torpedo attack group to be
designated as DALYfs boys. DALY promptly replied, "Roger". Each of
these three destroyers had five torpedoes remaining, whereas the other
three destroyers (HUTCHINS, KILLEN, ARUNTA) in TG 77.3 had none.
At 0600 CTG 77.3, in PHOENIX, was bearing 041°(T), distant 7,100
yards from Bugho Point, Leyte Island.
(a) Operations of COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR, 0520 - 0600, October 25th.
(1) Operations of Commander Attack Group 1.2 and COMDESRON
TWENTY-FOUR, 0520 - 0600, October 25th.
At 0520 Commander Attack Group 1.2, who was COMDESRON
TWENTY- FOUR, in HUTCHINS, was on course 150° (T) at twenty-five knots. The
DALY and BACHE, on course 155° (T) at ten knots, were some 3,000 yards to
the north. All were proceeding to their screening stations in Antiair-
craft Disposition VICTOR being formed by CTG 77.3.
At 0520:48 the DALY, noticing that the HUTCHINS was
gaining in bearing and now bore nearly due south, changed course to
178° (T) in order to close the HUTCHINS' track. She held her speed of
ten knots, however. Why she did this is nowhere explained, although from
the record, she knew that the cruisers were now making twenty knots***
and it was obviously impossible to overtake at ten knots. In fact she
did not increase speed to fifteen knots until 0537 when she was some 9,000
yards astern of the HUTCHINS.
Why this condition occurred is not explained. It appears
that the maneuvers to re-form the section in proper order were undertaken
without signal and that since the section had been at ten knots speed
when the maneuver was commenced the DALY and the BACHE had continued at
that speed. Under these conditions it would be logical to expect the
HUTCHINS to increase speed to pass the other two ships and then, when she
was ahead, to resume the original speed or make a speed signal to indicate
a change of speed for the division as a whole. However, there is no
record of any speed signal being made and the HUTCHINS had increased speed
to twenty-five knots in order to reach her screening station with the
right flank cruisers.
* Deck Log BACHE, October 25th, 1944.
** Deck Log DALY, October 25th, 1944.
*** Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
614 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 1.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
DOES IT NOT APPEAR THAT, IN THIS CASE, A SPEED SIGNAL
FROM EITHER COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR OR FROM THE HUTCHINS WOULD HAVE
PREVENTED CONFUSION AND KEPT THE GROUP CONCENTRATED AND BETTER ABLE TO
PERFORM ANY DUTIES WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED?
There were other instances during the battle where the
policy of not communicating appears to have been a handicap. Some of
these were the blanking of the gunfire of the DALY and the BACHE by the
HUTCHINS at 0345 and the increased distance from that time until about
0430 which resulted in the HUTCHINS being isolated (5,300 yards from the
DALY at 0343 and 3,500 yards at 0420) and precluded the obtaining of
mutual support from the DALY and BACHE during the gunnery phase of the
action,
FROM THE ABOVE IT APPEARS THAT DURING AN ENGAGEMENT IT IS
ESSENTIAL TO COMMUNICATE THOSE COURSE AND SPEED CHANGES NECESSARY TO
OBTAIN COORDINATED ACTION AND CLOSE MUTUAL SUPPORT EVEN THOUGH OPERATING
IN GENERALLY FOLLOW-THE-LEADER TACTICS.
The DALY and BACHE followed the HUTCHINS in a general way
as shown on Diagram ML" .
At 0529 COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR received a message from
CTG 77.3 directing that the damage and casualty reports be submitted by
visual signal after sunrise.*
At 0540 (two minutes after TG 77.3 had been ordered to
reverse course to the right) the DALY reported to CTG 77.3 that she
could not turn to the right but would have to turn to the left.**
Presumably this was due to the presence of PT 329 which had just been
picked up on the port bow. CTG 77.3 then replied directing the DALY to
keep clear as best she could.**
At 0541 CTG 77.3 informed his destroyers that one of the
MTB's was in need of help and asked if any of them had an MTB which was
in need of help. The DALY replied at 0542 that she had one that was 1,200
yards off the bow.** This was the PT 329.*** CTG 77.3 then directed the
DALY to investigate.**
At 0544 the DALY reported to CTG 77.3 that she had two
friendly MTB's off her starboard bow and that she was investigating.**
The identity of the second MTB could not be established from the informa-
tion available to this analysis. The movements of the DALY after this
are unknown but presumably she turned to the west to inform the PT 329 of
the damaged PT to the south.
*"" Action Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 078, October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report PT 329, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
615 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK GROUP 2.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
At 0550 the HUTCHINS took her proper station in the
formation* and at 0555 the BACHE, having been saved by CTG 77. V s
reversal of course and increase of speed to twenty-five knots, did
likewise.**
Since all of the destroyers of DESRON TwTENTY-FOUR were now,
with the exception of the DALY, in formation with the cruisers of TG 77.3
the actions of these destroyers and their commander will be discussed
under the operations of CTG 77.3.
(2) Operations of Commander Attack Group 2.2, 0520 - 0600,
October 25th.
At 0520 Commander Attack Group 2.2, who was the Commanding
Officer ARUNTA, was on course 160°(T) at twenty-five knots proceeding
toward his screening station in Antiaircraft Disposition VICTOR being
formed by CTG 77.3. The KILLEN was already in position, but the BEALE,
being 4,500 yards behind the KILLEN, would not be able to take her proper
station for some time, (Diagram "L").
Both the ARUNTA and the BEALE now maneuvered as necessary
to take their proper stations in the above antiaircraft disposition. In
a matter of minutes (at 0522) the ARUNTA was on station but it was not
until 0535 that the BEALE succeeded in arriving there.***
Since all units of Attack Group 2.2 were now in their
proper stations in Antiaircraft Disposition VICTOR with CTG 77.3, their
ensuing actions will be discussed under the operations of the Commander,
* Action Report COMDESRON 24, Night Surface Engagement, Surigao Straits,
Leyte, Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0129,
October 30th, 1944.
** Deck Log BACHE, October 25th, 1944.
*** Deck Log BEALE, October 25th, 1944.
616 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
(B) Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats, 0520 - 0600, October 25th.
(1) Upper Surigao PT's.
At 0520 Commander Upper Surigao PT's, with PT's 327, 321 and 326,
was proceeding toward the Dinagat shore at fifteen knots on course 040° (T)
and was bearing 207° (T), distant 2,100 yards from the southern tip of
Kanihaan Island.
At 0527, judging that he was close enough to the shore of Dinagat
Island, he stopped and commenced drifting with the current. From this
time until 0600 his operations were uneventful.
At 0600 he was bearing 098°(T), distant 1,800 yards from the
southern tip of Kanihaan Island (Diagram "L").
(2) Kanihaan PT's.
At 0520 Commander Kanihaan PT's, with PT's 495, 489 and 492, was
drifting south with the current and was bearing 308°(T), distant 1,300
yards from the northern tip of Kanihaan Island. Nothing of importance
occurred during this period.
At 0600 he was bearing 282°(T), distant 900 yards from the
southern tip of Kanihaan Island (Diagram "L").
(3) South Amagusan PT's.
At 0520 Commander South Amagusan PT's, with PT's 320, 330 and 331,
was bearing 180°(T), distant six point thirty- five miles from Amagusan
Point and was drifting with the current in a southerly direction. Only
PT 331' s radar was operating satisfactorily. During this period his
operations were uneventful. At 0600 he was bearing 180°(T), distant
seven point two miles from Amagusan Point (Diagram "L").
(4) East Amagusan PT's.
(a) PT 328.
At 0520 PT 328, with Commander East Amagusan PT's on board,
was bearing 237°(T), distant 1,500 yards from Amagusan Point. She was
alone and was drifting slowly eastward with the current. At 0600 she was
bearing 226°(T), distant 1,300 yards from Amagusan Point (Diagram "L").
(b) PT 323.
At 0520 PT 323 was bearing 156°(T), distant five point four
miles from Amagusan Point and was proceeding south at approximately four
knots.
Although she does not mention it in her action report it seems
from her subsequent actions that at approximately 0530 she changed to an
easterly course with the intention of investigating the burning FUSO which
she could undoubtedly see.
617 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
At 0600 she was bearing 148°(T), distant seven point eight
miles from Amagusan Point (Diagram "L").
(c) PT 329.
At 0520 PT 329 was bearing 021o(T), distant three point six
miles from Amagusan Point and was proceeding along the Leyte Shore to her
base in San Pedro Bay, at approximately fifteen knots, on a northerly
course (Diagram "L").
At 0534 she seems to have changed course to about 324°(T).
At 0542* off Pandan Point** she was challenged by the DALY,
which had presumably sighted her about 0540. After some delay she pro-
ceeded toward Cabugan Chico Island** on a course of approximately 300°(T).
At 0552 she seems to have changed course to 345°(T) and at
0556 to 020°(T) in order to pass close to the western shore of Cabugan
Chico Island. At 0600 she was bearing 004°(T), distant 1,800 yards from
the western tip of Cabugan Chico Island.
(5) Lower Surigao PT's,
(a) PT 490.
At 0520 PT 490 was bearing 090jo(T), distant three point
fifty- five miles from Maoyo Point. She continued to drift with the
current which was setting 155°(T) at about two knots.
About 0540 she sighted the MOGAMI which was heading south at
low speed and on fire.*** At this time the MOGAMI was bearing 038°(T),
range about 5,400 yards (Diagram "LM). She made no effort to attack the
MOGAMI because she had no torpedoes left on board.***
At 0600 PT 490 was bearing 104i°(T), distant four point
twenty-five miles from Maoyo Point.
(b) PT 491.
At 0520 PT 491 was bearing 105i°(T), distant four point
eighty-seven miles from Maoyo Point and was drifting with the current.
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C); also Action
Report DALY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 073,
October 30th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report PT 329, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 490, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
618 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
About 0543 she sighted the MOGAMI, on fire, proceeding south
at low speed.* At this time the MOGAMI was bearing approximately 012°(T),
range 6,200 yards (Diagram "L"). The commanding officer attempted to
report this contact but could not get his message through to anyone due
to overloading of the voice radio circuit.* He also tracked the MOGAMI
for a time and at 0548, when the range had decreased to about 4, #00 yards,
he seems to have gone ahead at ten knots on course 172° (T) in order to
reach a firing position and then, at 0555, noticing that he was losing
bearing, he seems to have increased speed to about fifteen knots.
At 0600 he was bearing 083°(T), distant two point nine miles
from Caniguin Point.
(c) PT 493.
PT 493, damaged and abandoned by her crew, was beached on
Maoyo Point.
(6) SW Panaon PT»s.
At 0520 Commander SW Panaon PT's, in PT 194, with PT's 150 and
196 in company, was about one mile southeast of Binit Village and was
proceeding in a northeasterly direction at about seven and one-half knots.
But a short time before, because of communication and radar failures in
PT 196, he had transferred from that MTB to PT 194. He had not made
contact with any forces during the night and was probably curious as to
what was taking place in the strait.
At 0525 he sighted a large fire up the strait which was too far
away to estimate the distance. Therefore, in order to make a better
observation, he changed course to about 065°(T), and increased speed to
about ten knots.**
It appears from the plot that at this time the MTB's deployed with
PT 194 in the center and PT's 196 and 150 a short distance t^rthe north
and south respectively (Diagram "M").
At approximately 0528 (a) PT 150 contacted the USHIO and ABUKUMA
by radar and obtained a range to the former of about 6,000 yards. The
commanding officer immediately changed course to about 144°(T) and
increased speed to about thirty knots in order to intercept her,*** and
(b) PT 194 sighted the ABUKUMA visually as that ship was completing her
turn to 200°(T).** The commanding officer then, at about 0528:30, changed
course to 163°(T) and increased speed to twenty-three knots in order to
intercept her. Unfortunately, the OTC in PT 194 failed to inform PT 196
of the two contacts with the result that PT 196 continued on course and
speed. Whether this was through oversight or communication failure is not
indicated in the action reports.
* Action Report PT 491, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 194, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0397,
October 29th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 150, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0396,
October 29th, 1944.
619 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
Since his three motor torpedo boats became separated their
operations will be discussed separately.
(a) PT 194.
Shortly after completing her turn to intercept the ABUKUMA,
the commanding officer sighted the USHIO visually. He made no radar
contact with either target. He continued on to intercept the ABUKUMA.
At 0532 when the range had closed to about 1,200 yards and he had
tentatively identified the two targets as destroyers, he noted that both
the ABUKUMA and the USHIO had opened fire. He immediately changed course
to parallel the ABUKUMA^ track and opened fire with all of his guns.
After getting off one round from the 40MM gun it was damaged and rendered
useless by the accurate enemy fire,* presumably from the ABUKUMA.
He immediately turned away to course 296°(T), increased speed
and commenced making smoke. About this time he noted that his MTB had
been hit below the waterline in the vicinity of the lazarette and had
commenced taking on water.* As a result of this damage he (a) at 0533
sent a message stating that PT 194 was sinking and requesting help,** and
(b) requesting that all firing at the south end of Leyte (Panaon) Island
cease, as it was endangering PT 194. At 0534 the WACHAPREAGUE relayed
this second message to CTG 77.2.**
As PT 194 retired under smoke she was hit at least once more
in the cockpit. This hit (a) exploded the spare 20MM ammunition and (b)
resulted in considerable damage as well as in rendering the OTC unconscious
and in wounding two officers and six enlisted members of the crew.*
About 0537 she started to slow because of the water entering
the hole below the waterline. As she approached the shoreline of Panaon
Island the enemy gunfire ceased. About 0543 she was close inshore near
Balongbalong •
She now seems to have proceeded along the western shore of
Panaon Island at about ten knots, so close inshore that other motor
torpedo boats, which were searching for her to render assistance, did not
sight her when they passed (Diagram "M")»
Shortly before 0600 she sighted PT 196 which had been
searching the shoreline for her in order to render assistance.***
At 0600 she was bearing 124°(T), distant one mile from Sonok
Point. (Diagram "M").
* Action Report PT 194, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0397,
October 29th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
*** Action Report PT 196, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0400,
October 31st, 1944.
620 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
(b) PT 150.
Shortly after completing her turn to 144°(T) to intercept the
USHIO, PT 150 sighted visually both the USHIO and the ABUKUMA. He
estimated that they were both destroyers on course 210°(T) at twenty knots.*
Actually the USHIO appears to have been on course 213°(T) at thirty knots,
and the ABUKUMA on course 200° (T) at twenty knots.
About 0531:30 he turned toward the USHIO, seems to have
steadied on course about 045° (T), and at 0532 with a range of about 1,800
yards, fired one torpedo at the USHIO. At this time he noted that both
the USHIO and the ABUKUMA had opened fire. He continued his turn to
000°(T), increased speed to about thirty-four knots, and opened fire with
twenty and thirty-seven millimeter guns.* His torpedo missed, probably
because of his ten knot error in the enemy's speed and the sharp track
angle (Diagram "M").
He now continued on to the north and at 0535:30 was sighted
by the KASUMI.** Why he did not sight the KASUMI and the two other
destroyers as well is not known.
He now, having lost contact with the other two MTB's in his
section, changed course to about 255°(T) and headed for Balongbalong to
look for PT 194.*
At 0545, being off Balongbalong, he slowed to about nine knots
and commenced a more careful search.* However the search was ineffective,
even though he passed fairly close to her, likely because the latter was
so close inshore as to not to be easily seen from seaward.
At 0600 he was bearing 145°(T), distant about 1,800 yards from
Sonok Point.
(c) PT 196.
At 0529 the Commanding Officer PT 196, having failed to observe
that PT's 194 and 150 had turned to the south to close the enemy, continued
on course 065°(T) at ten knots. At 0532, observing the gunfire from the
USHIO and ABUKUMA, he immediately headed on a southerly course and increased
speed to fifteen knots. However, when several large caliber projectiles
landed nearby, and he had observed that he could not distinguish the targets
through the smoke laid down by the other MTB's, he, at about 0534, changed
course to 300°(T), increased speed to twenty-five knots, commenced laying
smoke and headed for the shore.***
At 0535:30 he was sighted by the KASUMI.** Why he did not
sight the KASUMI and the other two destroyers is not known.
* Action Report PT 150, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0396,
October 29th, 1944.
** Detailed Action Report DESDIV 18 (KASUMI), Battle off the Philippines,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
*** Action Report PT 196, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0400,
October 31st, 1944.
621 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
In the meantime, having heard PT 194 ask for help, he slowed
to about fifteen knots and headed around the southern tip of Panaon
Island looking for that MTB.*
At 0600 he contacted by sight PT 194 and prepared to go
alongside and render assistance. At this time he was bearing 130o(T),
distant one point one miles from Sonok Point (Diagram "M").
(7) SE Panaon PT's.
It will be recalled that the three motor torpedo boats in this
section had been separated since 0124. Since (a) on the one hand (l) PT
134 recorded nothing after sighting four destroyers proceeding south off
Panaon Island at approximately 0430,** and (2) PT 132 recorded nothing
after sighting the ABUKUMA at approximately 0330,*** and (b) on the other
hand (1) PT 137 recorded that she was under starshell illumination from
about 0326 until about 0543, and (2) other events occurring off Binit
Village,**** it is concluded that PT's 134 and 132 were not in the area
between Binit Point and Bolobolo Point. For this reason, and for the
lack of other data, the operations of PT's 134 and 132 are not discussed
and their tracks are not shown on Diagram MMM .
(a) PT 137.
At 0520 PT 137 was drifting with the current between Binit
Village and Binit Point. Her radio transmitter was not functioning.
At 0533 she heard PT 194's message asking for help and pro-
ceeded toward Sonok Point**** at about thirty knots to render assistance.
At 0540 she sighted two destroyers (USHIO, ABOKUMA) on a
southerly course**** (Diagram MM").
At approximately 0543 she sighted starshells ahead which
illuminated her. She stated that these starshells, and also heavy caliber
gunfire, came from a ship or ships in Latitude 10°-05,N, Longitude 125°-
22 'E,**** which is in the center of Surigao Strait. Although this position
is fairly close to the position of the MOGAMI at that time, neither PT's
490 and 491 (which were nearby) recorded any firing at this time nor did
the MOGAMI record firing. In addition it seems most unlikely that such
firing would be done over mountainous Panaon Island which varies from 1600
to 2300 feet in elevation in this vicinity. It seems clear then that this
firing was by either the USHIO or ABUKUMA, and was for the purpose of
illuminating the west side of Panaon Island to see anything that might be
lurking there.
* Action Report PT 196, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0400, October 31st, 1944.
** Action' Report PT 134, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
H-33, October 27th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 132, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
H-34, October 26th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 137, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
11, November 4th, 1944.
622 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
As a result of being illuminated, PT 137 changed course to
150° (T) and retired south and east around Binit Point. Just after
steadying on the new course she sighted PT 150 on a northerly course along
the shore.*
At 0600 she was bearing 256° (T), distant 2,400 yards from
Binit Point.
(8) Sumilon PT's.
At 0520 Commander Sumilon PT's, with PT's 523, 524 and 526, was
lying to about two miles southeast of Sumilon Island.
About 0530 he sighted four fires about twelve miles to the north.**
At 0545, in his capacity as COMMTBRON THIRTY-SIX, he directed
Commander Bilaa Point PT's to join him.***
At 0600 he was bearing 154°(T), distant two miles from the western
tip of Sumilon Island.
(9) Bilaa Point PT's.
At 0520 Commander Bilaa Point PT's, who had been returning to his
station off Bilaa Point, was about one-half mile north of Bilaa Point. He
continued on course 060°(T) at about five knots with PT's 494, 324 and
497 in company.
About 0530 he lost contact with the ABUKUMA,**** which contact he
had maintained continuously since about 0327.
At 0545 he received instructions from Commander Motor Torpedo
Boat Squadron THIRTY-SIX (Commander Sumilon PT's) to join him.*** He
therefore changed course to about 013°(T) and increased speed to about
eight knots in compliance (Diagram "M").
At 0600 he was bearing 159°(T), distant three point six miles from
the western tip of Sumilon Island.
* Action Report PT 137, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 11,
November 4th, 1944 •
** Action Report PT 524, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944; also Action Report PT 526, Night of October 24th
25th, 1944, No Serial, October 26th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 494, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 497, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
623 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0520 - 0600, October 25th
(10) Madilao PT's.
At 0520 Commander Madilao PT's, with PT's 192, 191 and 195, was
about two miles south of Madilao Point and was patrolling toward the south
at five knots.
About 0559 he decided to return to base via Sogod Bay* and changed
course to 315° (T), increasing speed to about twenty-three knots,**
At 0600 he was bearing 192° (T), distant four point seven miles
from Madilao Point (Diagram "M").
(11) Limasawa PT's.
After 0100 Commander Limasawa PT's, with PT's 151 and 146,
continued the unsuccessful search for PT 190 in the vicinity of Limasawa
Island, The operations of PT 190 will be discussed separately.
At 0533 he received PT 194' s message requesting help and headed
toward Sonok Point to render assistance,***
At 0600 he was bearing 249°(T), distant three point one miles from
Sonok Point (Diagram "M").
(a) PT 190.
At 0520 PT 190 was operating alone, well to the west of
Limasawa Island, having become separated from PT's 151 and 146 after the
attack on the M0GAMI and her destroyers about 0019,
At 0533 she received PT 194' s message requesting help but did
not respond to this call for help until later.****
At 0600 she was about seven miles southwest of Limasawa Island.
* Action Report PT 192, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0395, October 29th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 195, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0393, October 29th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 151, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0339, October 28th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 190, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0398, October 30th, 1944.
624 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(12) Camiguin PT's.
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
0520 - 0600, October 25th
Commander Camiguin PT's, with PT's 127, 128 and 129, had left
PT's 130 and 131 to patrol in the vicinity of Camiguin Island and at 0520
was lying to halfway between Camiguin Island and Bohol Island to detect
any enemy movements •* He had observed gun flashes to the northeast from
the battle in Surigao Strait.*
About 0535 he proceeded south toward PT's 130 and 131, which at
this time were about three miles west of Camiguin Island,*
About 0600 he joined PT's 130 and 131, about three miles west
of Camiguin Island and headed for his base at Liloan Bay,*
PT' s 130 and 131 observed nothing of sufficient importance during
this period to record in their action reports.
* Action Report PT 127, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 4,
October 29th, 1944.
496799 O - 59 -50
625
CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
CHAPTER XXII - JAPANESE OPERATIONS. 0600 - 0700, October 25th
(A) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force, 0600 - 0700, October 25th.
At 0600 Commander SECOND Striking Force, in NACHI, followed closely by
the ASHIGARA, was on course 180°(T) at eighteen knots. His four destroyers
which were in the Mindanao Sea escorting the ABUKUMA had just been recalled
to escort the NACHI and ASHIGARA. (Diagram "M").
At 0602 he changed course to 240°(T)* in order to pass south of Binit
Point and enter the Mindanao Sea.
He now noted that (a) at 0607 the AKEBONO had taken station on the
NACHI 's starboard bow,** (b) at 0615 the SHIRANUHI and KASUMI had taken
similar stations on the NACHI 's port bow,*** and (c) the USHIO was rapidly
closing.*
At 0614 he exchanged calls with the MOGAMI.**** The two ships were
about 6,200 yards apart at this time (Diagram "h").
At 0620 he noted that the KASUMI had left the disposition and was
heading at moderate speed (twenty-two knots) toward the ABUKUMA which was
about 16,000 yards ahead (Diagram "M"). This was in compliance with
COMDESRON ONE's order directing her to come alongside the ABUKUMA (flagship)
for the purpose of transferring the squadron flag.*** It is assumed that
he (Commander SECOND Striking Force) had authorized this maneuver.
At 0622 his flagship sighted an object which appeared to be a submarine
periscope and opened fire with machine guns. His units immediately prepared
to make a depth charge attack. However, at 0623, when the apoarent
periscope proved to be a bamboo pole, the attack was stopped.**
Also at 0623, noting that the ASHIGARA had opened fire on a motor
torpedo boat,** he, at about 0624, turned away from this contact (which is
assumed to have been PT 150) to course 231°(T).*****
At 0627 he noted that the USHIO had also opened fire** on an MTB. This,
as pointed out under "Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats (PT 150), 0600 -
0700, October 25th", was PT 150 which had sighted the SECOND Striking Force
* The tracks of the ships in the 2ND Striking Force are based on Action
Chart, 0540 - 0950, October 25th, 1944, Detailed Action Report USHIO,
Antiair Action in the Mindanao and Sulu Seas, October 25th, 1944, WDC
Document 161717, NA 11807.
** Detailed Action Report USHIO, Antiair Action in the Mindanao and Sulu
Seas, October 25th, 1944, VDC Document 161717, NA 11807.
*** Detailed Action Report DESDIV 18 (KASUMI), Battle off the Philippines,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
**** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document I6O463, NA 12653.
***** Action Chart, 0540 - 0950, October 25th, 1944, Detailed Action Report
USHIO, Antiair Action in the Mindanao and Sulu Seas, October 25th,
1944, WDC Document 161717, NA 11807.
626 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
destroyers at 0624 and had turned away. He also noted that the AKEBONO,
and perhaps other ships as well,* had likewise opened fire about this
time.
At 0639 he noted that the USHIO was retiring towards the disposition
in order to take her position in formation, and likely ceased fire shortly
afterwards.**
About 0643 he changed course to 252°(T) in order to clear the ABUKUMA.
At 0700 he informed his command that (a) the KASUMI would go alongside
the ABUKUMA, (b) the squadron flag would be speedily transferred and (c)
the ABUKUMA with the USHIO as escort would then proceed to Cagayan
(Mindanao Island) and effect emergency repairs.*** He noted that, upon
receipt of this dispatch, the USHIO had left the disposition and was
proceeding toward the ABUKUMA.****
At this same time he informed the MOGAMI that he was dispatching an
escort and requested a report of the MOGAMI' s damage.***** Since this
escort was to be the AKEBONO****** it seems clear that this destroyer had
been so ordered at the same time by another dispatch.
At 0700 the NACHI was bearing 231°(T), distant twelve miles from Binit
Point. ABUKUMA, with KASUMI preparing to go alongside, was about 7,000
yards to the southwest.
(1) USHIO.
At 0600 the USHIO, escorting the damaged ABUKUMA, was on course
260°(T) at twelve knots. Her movements were in general as shown in
Diagram "M" which is based on her action chart.**
About 0607 she completed her second circle of the damaged ABUKUMA
and departed to rejoin the NACHI and ASHIGARA.** At this same time she
observed the AKEBONO assume station to the right of the cruisers.****
* Action Report PT 150, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0396, October 29th, 1944.
** Action Chart, 0540 - 0950, October 25th, 1944, Detailed Action
Report USHIO, Antiair Action in the Mindanao and Sulu Seas, October
25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717, NA 11807.
*** Commander 2ND Striking Force Dispatch 250700 October 1944 to 2ND
Striking Force, Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off the
Philippines, October 24th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
**** Detailed Action Report USHIO, Antiair Action in the Mindanao and
Sulu Seas, October 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717, NA 11807.
***** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document I6O463, NA 12653.
****** Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation, Southwest Area
Operation, Commander KokLchi Mori, ex-IJN, 2ND Striking Force Staff
Torpedo Officer, GHQ FEC Special Historical Collection, Supporting
Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Historical
Report on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (item 22,
Footlocker 5 of 10, SWPA Series, Volume II).
627 CONFIDENTIAL
USHIO
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
At 0622 she observed the NACHI open fire with machine guns on an
apparent submarine periscope. She immediately assumed battle stations
and prepared to make a depth charge attack. At 0623, when the periscope
proved to be a bamboo pole, she discontinued her attack preparations.*
Also at 0623 she observed the ASHIGARA open fire on a motor
torpedo boat.*
At 0624, being about 3,000 yards ahead of the NACHI and on the
reverse of the NACHI 's course, she cumed to the left** in order to cross
the NACHI 's track and take position on that ship's starboard bow.
At 0625 she sighted PT 150. Although sne recorded that this
was twenty-five degrees to starboard* her action chart shows that the
contact was to port** and that probably the bearing was obtained later.
She promptly turned toward the contact and steadied on course 230° (!) at
twenty knots. At 0627, just after comDleting the turn, and when the target
was bearing 283° (T), distant 8,000 meters (3,743 yards), she opened fire.
At 0637, when the target bore 326°(r), distant 10,700 meters (11,700 yards),
she ceased firing.** She made no hits*** which was probably due to the
high speed zigzag employed by PT 150.
At this point, she, and most likely the AKSBONO as well, after
flashing the numeral one by blinker as a recognition signal,**** opened
fire at another MT3. This MT3 was PT 190 which had been lying to about
12,000 yards to the west. PT 190 now turned away and retired to the
northwest. (Diagram "M").
At 0639 she changed course to 190° (T)** in order to resume her
position in formation and likely ceased firing shortly afterwards.
Although PT 190 recorded that her gunfire was extremely accurate, bracketing
the MTB with eight or ten salvos, there were no hits, probably because PT
190 zigzagged at high speed and used smoke to cover the retirement.****
At 0650 she changed course to 252° (T)** and took station although
she was about 5,500 yards astern of the AKEBONO (Diagram "K").
At 0700, in obedience to the orders of Commander SECOND Striking
Force to escort the ABUKUMA to Cagayan,***** she left the disposition and
proceeded to the ABUKUMA.*
* Detailed Action Report USHIO, Antiair Action in the Mindanao and
Sulu Seas, October 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717, NA 11307.
** Ibid., Action Chart 0540 - 0950, October 25th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 150, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0396, October 29th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 190, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0398, October 30th, 1944.
***** Commander 2ND Striking Force Dispatch 250700 October 1944 to 2ND
Striking Force, Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off the
Pij-lipoines, October 24th - 26th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
628 CONFIDENTIAL
ABUKUMA and MOGAMI
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
(2) ABUKUMA.
At 0600 the ABUKUKA, under escort of the USHIO, was proceeding on
course 260° (T) at a speed of about seven knots (Diagram MM").
At 0605 she changed course to 249°(T) and changed speed to about
nine knots.*
Although not mentioned in her action report, the commanding officer
undoubtedly knew that the KASUMI had been ordered** to come alongside at
0620 in order to take off COMDESRON ONE.***
At 0700 he received a dispatch from Commander SECOND Striking Force
directing the (a) KASUMI to come alongside ABUKUMA and take off COMDESRON
ONE and his staff and (b) ABUKUMA, with USHIO as escort, to proceed to
Cagayan and effect emergency repairs,****
At this time he noted that the KASUMI was rapidly approaching.
At 0700 the ABUKUMA was bearing 228<>(T), distant fifteen point two
miles from Binit Point. The NACHI was about 7,000 yards to the northeast.
(3) MOGAMI.
At 0600 the MOGAMI was bearing 271°(T), distant eight point fifteen
miles from the northern tip of Sibanoc Island and was on course 180° (T) at
fifteen knots.
Plotting shows (Diagram "M") that at 0600 she slowed to fourteen
knots. This was probably due to some change in the condition of her
machinery since her engines continued to be unt ended.**-***
She undoubtedly had sighted PT 491 sometime before 0600 because
she opened fire at 0601 when the MTB changed course toward her track. ******
It may have been as early as 0$50 for this is the time listed in her action
* Action Chart, 0540 - 0950, October 25th, 1944, Detailed Action
Report USKIO, Antiair Action in the Mindanao and Sulu Seas, October
25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717, NA 11807.
** Action Summary 2ND Striking Force in SHO Operation, SW Area
Operation, Commander Kokichi Mori, ex-IJN, 2ND Striking Force Staff
Torpedo Officer, GHQ FEC Special Historical Collection Supporting
Documents to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Historical
Report on Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (Item 22,
Footlocker 5 of 10, SWPA Series, Volume II).
*** Detailed Action Report DESDIV 18 (KASUMI), Battle off the
Philippines, October 24th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4),
NA 11801.
**** Commander 2ND Striking Force Dispatch 250700 October 1944 to 2ND
Striking Force, Detailed Action Report ABUKUMA, Battle off the
Philippines, October 24th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161007.
-a-a-x** Report on SHO Operation by Lieutenant Fukushi, ex-IJN, Control
Station Officer and Fire Data Computer Officer, MOGAMI, December
1945, Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-39A.
****** Action Report PT 491, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
629 CONFIDENTIAL
MOGAMI
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
report at which she engaged and drove off enemy motor torpedo boats.* The
exact time cannot be determined from the reports available to this analysis.
At 0605:39, immediately after PT 491 had fired two torpedoes, she
changed course toward the MTB** and steadied on course 222° (T). The
torpedoes passed on her port hand about 300 yards away and at 0607 she
changed course to 177°(T) and continued on toward the exit of Surigao
Strait. She was still making fourteen knots.
At 0610 she sighted the SECOND Striking Force to the south.* This
must have been a most welcome sight. At 0614 she identified herself to
the NACHI* using the light source of her infra red signalling device, since
all other signalling equipment had been destroyed. ***
At 0620 she changed course to 180°(T) in order to proceed to the
southern exit from Surigao Strait without approaching too close to Binit
Point, where it was likely that MTB's would be waiting.
At 0625 she was observed by the KASUMI firing toward the land****
— the Leyte shore (Panaon Island).*** In this firing she repulsed two
motor torpedo boats near the exit of Surigao Strait.* This fire likely
was not very effective for none of the motor torpedo boats mention it in
their action reports.
At 0645 she was sighted by PT 137 in Latitude 09°-50'N, Longitude
125°-21'E, making a speed estimated to be between twelve and fourteen
knots, and steering a southerly course. She was smoking badly abaft her
stack.***** About this time she changed course to 240° (T )****** in order
to follow the SECOND Striking Force. Noting that PT 137 had turned toward
her, had increased speed and that the range was closing rapidly, she, just
before 0700, opened fire with her secondary battery. This fire also could
not have been very effective because PT 137 stated that she had been
driven off by a destroyer which had headed toward her and opened fire.*****
This destroyer was likely the AKEBONO and the time after 0700, for about
this time Commander SECOND Striking Force directed the AKEBONO to escort
the MOGAMI.
* Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document I6O463, NA 12653.
** Action Report PT 491, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
*** Report on SHO Operation by Lieutenant Fukushi, ex-IJN, Control
Station Officer and Fire Data Computer Officer, MOGAMI, December
1945, Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-39A.
**** Detailed Action Report DESDIV 18 (KASUMI), Battle off the Philippines,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
***** Action Report PT 137, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 11,
November 4th, 1944.
****** Track Chart, Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the
Philippines, Octooer 18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document I6O463,
NA 12653.
#0 CONFIDENTIAL
MOGAMI and SHIGURE
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
At 0654 she was sighted by PT 150 which noted that she (a) was
severely damaged and smoking heavily from the vicinity of the after stack
and (b) moving southwest at from ten to fifteen knots. She opened fire
at this MTB with her secondary battery commencing about 0700.*
In the meantime with the arrival of full daylight, (a) fire
fighting became more effective than during darkness and therefore some
progress was being made toward control of the fire and (b) the morale of
the crew rose now that the ship was closer to the SECOND Striking Force. **
At 0700 the MOGAMI was bearing 172° (T), distant six point nine
miles from Binit Point.
(4) SHIGURE.
At 0600 the SHIGURE, on course 185°(T) at twenty-four knots, was
bearing 122°('f), distant five miles from Binit Point. As shown in Diagram
"M" this position was nearly in the center of the exit from Surigao Strait.
She appears to have been operating so as to remain clear of the SECOND
Striking Force.
At 0615 she was sighted by PT 137 in Latitude 09°-46'N, Longitude
120°-20'E (four miles west of Madilao Point). PT 137 stated that the
SHIGURE turned toward her and opened fire.*** It apoears that the PT 137
was in error for the SHIGURE did not open fire against PT's until 0648.****
At this time, however, she did change course to 244°(T) to pass between
Camiguin and Bohol Islands.*****
At O648 she sighted six motor torpedo boats on the horizon and
opened fire.**** This contact was on the three Camiguin PT's, with two of
the Bohol PT's which had joined them. It is of interest that Commander
Camiguin PT's thought that this gunfire came from a submarine to. the west
of them, while only one of the MTB's (PT 129) conceded that it might have
been from a retiring destroyer. Actually she was to the eastward of the
MTB's which, at O658, had turned away. The SHIGURE now ceased firing.****
At 0700 the SHIGURE, still on course 244°(T) at twenty-four knots,
was bearing 220°(T), distant twenty-two miles from Binit Point.
* Action Report PT 150, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0396, October 29th, 1944.
** Report on SHO Operation by Lieutenant Fukushi, ex-IJN, Control
Station Officer and Fire Data Computer Officer, MOGAMI, December 1945,
Army Historical Division Microfilm HS-39A.
*** Action Report PT 137, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 11,
November 4th, 1944.
**** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
***** ibid., Track Chart (Appended Chart I).
631 CONFIDENTIAL
ASAGUMO and FUSO
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
(5) ASAGUMO.
At 0600 the ASAGUMO, badly damaged and with fires raging out of
control, had just stopped in order to abandon ship. At this time she was
about five point two miles southwest of Kanihaan Island. It aDoears that
she did not abandon ship immediately, but instead spent considerable time
trying to save the ship after preparations had been made to abandon her.*
At 0630 she was sighted by PT 323 which immediately commenced
making an approach but she did not sight PT 323 until about O646, for at
that time, with a rangs of 3,000 yards, she opened fire — somewhat
inaccurately — with one gun.** She continued to fire throughout the
remainder of this period.***
At O656 she was observed by PT 495, which was passiner about one
and one-quarter miles north of her, to have two small boats alongside,****
which were likely receiving some members of the crew.
At 0700 she was bearing 230o(r), distant five point five miles
from the southern tip of Kanihaan Island. PT 323, which at this time was
ready to fire torpedoes, was about 1,000 yards to the northwest (Diagram
»N»).
(6) FUSO.
The burning stern section of the FUSO continued to drift to the
south. At 0630 PT 323 reported the stern as a large ship burning
furiously.** About 0652 the Kanihaan PT's reported that the fire was
still burning furiously although there was no ship left when they passed
within 700 yards of the fire.*--** From the above it is concluded that
the stern of the FUSO sank about 0640, approximately in Latitude 10<>-03. 7'N,
Longitude 125°-24.6«E (Diagram "N").
It seems clear that some time before the sinking the crew
abandoned ship, for the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS sighted two groups of survivors
totalling from 300 to 400 men floating in the water. Apparently the
survivors off Tungo Point were from the ASAGUMO, while those off Kanihaan
Island were from the FUSO. None of the survivors would accept rescue.*****
This matter is discussed under "Operations of COKCHUDIV TWELVE, 0700 -
0733, October 25th".
* Composite Report on Surigao Strait Action by Commanding Officers
ASAGUMO (Commander Kasuo Shibayama, ex-IJN) and MICHISKIO (Commander
Kazuo Tanaka, ex-IJN), March 15th, 1946, Army Historical Division
Microfilm HS-39A.
** Action Report PT 323, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
*** Action Report COMCRUDIV 12, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944 and of Subseauent Operations of Cruiser Division 12 in Leyte
Gulf, October 25th - 29th, 1944, Serial 0147, November 7th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 495, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
***** Action Report HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, Battle of Surigao Straits, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0102, November 2nd, 1944.
632 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
CHAPTER XXIII - ALLIED OPERATIONS, 0600 - 0700, October 25th
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2, 0600 - 0700, October 25th.
Since during this period, as during the preceding period, CTG 77.2
operated largely as Commander Left Flank Force, most of his operations are
discussed under "Operations of Commander Left Flank Force, 0520 - 0600,
October 25th". However, it seems well to emphasize once again that since
he was both CTG 77.2 and Commander Left Flank Force he likely found it
difficult to separate the two commands in his mind. Therefore, in order
to adequately appreciate his command difficulties, it is wise to read the
operations of Commander Left Flank Force as well. Suffice it to say that
at 0600 he was in the LOUISVILLE heading on course 015°(T) at a speed of
fifteen knots, and was forming an antiaircraft disposition.
At 0607 he received a message from COMDESRON FIFTY-FOUR (CTG 79.11)
stating that three of his destroyers were in Station THREE and the other
two in Station SEVEN, the post-attack rendezvous points, and that he
would leave these stations in a few minutes for his normal screening
stations.*
Although COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX sent a message to unknown addressees at
0612 reporting many casualties in the ALBERT W. GRANT and requesting that
medical officers, hospital corpsmen and medical supplies be sent to the
NEWCOMB,* it appears that CTG 77.2 did not receive this message for he
took no action and did not mention it in his action report.
At 0613 he directed COMDESRON FIFTY-FOUR (CTG 79.11) to close up his
force and resume normal screening.*
At 0620 he received a warning from CTF 77 stating that there were many
enemy aircraft in the area and releasing the antiaircraft batteries.**
At 0625 he directed Commander Battle Line to dispose the battle line
between Taytay Point (Leyte Island) and Hibuson Island.** Taytay Point
lies about nine miles northwest of Hingatungan Point. It will be recalled
that Hingatungan Point was the point he had employed in the original
positioning of the battle line (Plate XVII), and that Taytay Point was the
point from which he had operated on the nights preceding the battle.
From this time until 0700 he was familiar with the fact that his
cruiser force was pursuing the Japanese cripples.
(1) Operations of Commander Left Flank Force, 0600 - 0700, October 25th,
At 0600 Commander Left Flank Force, in the LOUISVILLE, was on
course 015°(T), speed fifteen knots. His cruisers and DESDIV XRAY, less
CLAXTON which was picking up survivors, were forming a circular cruising
disposition as shown in Diagram "N".
* Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
633 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
At 0602 he intercepted a message from COMDESDIV XRAY which directed
the destroyers of that division to expedite forming the screen on Circle
TWO.*
At this same time he slowed to ten knots* presumably to facilitate
the formation of the disposition.
At 0603 he received a message from an unknown commander (probably
COMDESDIV 112) stating that he was trying to join with six destroyers and
asking for his course and speed. At 0606 he replied stating that he was
bearing 260°(T) and was on course 010°(T) (actually 015°(T))at ten knots,*
Although he did not state from what position the bearing was taken it
seems clear that it was from Hibuson Island (Diagram MMn).
At 0609 he received a message from COMDESDIV 112 that he had just
passed a large group of survivors. After (a) inquiring as to their
identity and (b) receiving a reply that they appeared to be Japanese, he
directed that commander to pick them up.*
At 0618 he noted that all of his cruisers were in their proper
stations on Circle ONE, and all of his destroyers of DESDIV XRAY, with
the exception of the CLAXTON, were in position on Circle TWO.
Although he states in his action report that he had temporarily
abandoned the pursuit until dawn** and in his post battle interview in
Washington later, that he had turned north at this time to look for DESDIV
XRAY*** the evidence seems to indicate that while these factors were
important they were not all important, for at 0618 for example it was day-
light with sunrise about to occur (in twelve minutes). Doe3 it not seem
more likely that the dominant factor was antiaircraft defense and, there-
fore, he had decided to wait until his antiaircraft disposition had been
formed at which time he would head south again for the purpose of
destroying enemy cripples and any enemy ships which endeavored to defend
them?
Therefore, also at 0618, he changed course to 190° (T) by
simultaneous ship turns** thus maintaining the VICTOR disposition.
At 0620 he received a message from COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX (a)
reporting (1) that the ALBERT W. GRANT had many casualties, (2) she had no
power and (3) was dead in the water, and (b) requesting the immediate
services of a tug. As CTG 77,2 he readdressed this message to CTF 77
requesting compliance.**
* Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
*** Personal interview of Vice Admiral (then Rear Admiral) Jesse B.
Oldendorf, USN, CTG 77.2, recorded by Naval Records and Library, CNO,
February 19th, 1945.
634 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
Also at 0620 he received a warning from CTF 77 stating that there
were many enemy aircraft in the area and releasing the antiaircraft
batteries.*
At 0621 he received a TBS voice radio message from COMDESDIV XRAY
that all survivors were Japanese and that, so far, they had refused to
take the lines thrown to them.**
At 0625 he noted that the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS had taken the
screening station left vacant by the CLAXTON.*** It is of interest that
the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS recorded in her action report that at this time
there were five columns of smoke visible on the horizon, as well as the
superstructure of an enemy destroyer dead in the water.****
At 0630 he observed sunrise.*
At 0632 he heard from COMDESDIV XRAY that the Japanese survivors
had changed their minds and were now accepting lines from the destroyers.**
At 0633 he increased speed to fifteen knots.*****
At 0635 he heard from COMDESDIV 112, who was clearly now in the
survivor area, that (a) there were several hundred survivors in the area,
(b) four destroyers under COMDESDIV 112 's tactical command were picking
up survivors, (c) the HALFORD was intercepting a boat, and (d) most of
the survivors would not accept lines from the destroyers.**
At 0636 he received a motor torpedo boat report that the enemy
was retiring in Latitude 10°-02'N. ****** This was probably a delayed
receipt of PT 491' s report made just before O6OO.******* (The MOGAMI,
which was the last of the retiring Japanese shios, passed through
Latitude 10°-02'N at 0557 (Diagram »L»).)
At 0638 he increased speed to twenty knots and at 0640 changed
course to 175°(T) .*****
* Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine
Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944,
Enclosure (C).
*** Deck Log HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, October 25th, 1944.
**** Action Report HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, Battle of Surigao Straits,
October 25th, 1944, Serial 0102, November 2nd, 1944.
***** Deck Log LOUISVILLE, October 25th, 1944.
****** Action Report MINNEAPOLIS, Battle of South Surigao Strait,
Philippine Islands, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0215, November 2nd, 1944.
******* Action Report PT 491, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No
Serial, October 26th, 1944.
635 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
At 0644 he directed COMCRUDIV TWELVE in the DENVER to proceed with
the COLUMBIA and three destroyers designated by COMDESDIV 112 to destroy
the cripples, warning the cruiser commander to beware of torpedoes while
he was engaged in this task,* (The action taken by COMCRUDIV TWELVE will
be discussed separately.)
At this same time he heard from the BENNION that she could see
men in the water on her port beam and asked if she should pick them up.
He authorized her to do so, but directed her not to waste time if they
were Japanese, and added a warning to beware of torpedoes.*
As he issued this warning his mind likely reverted to World War I
and that unhappy day in British history (September 2nd, 1914) when the
two British light cruisers HOGUE and CRESSY were torpedoed by the German
submarine U-9 while endeavoring to recover survivors from the British
light cruiser ABOUKIR which had been torpedoed some minutes earlier, also
by the U-9.**
He now noted that COMCRUDIV TWELVE in DENVER with COLUMBIA,
HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS and LEUTZE was (a) at O648 in accordance with his 0644
instructions, moving out of the disposition, and (b) was forming column
on a southerly course.***
Since he had not been attacked by Japanese aircraft he now seems
to have decided that the aircraft menace had largely passed for at 0651
he ordered the PORTLAND and MINNEAPOLIS, in that order, to form column
astern of the LOUISVILLE.****
At this same time he received a report from the BENNION that the
objects she had sighted previously were rubbish.*
He now, at (a) 0652, intercepted a TBS voice radio message from
COMDESDIV 112, informing COMCRUDIV TWELVE that COMDESDIV 112 would proceed
with ROBINSON, HALFORD and BRYANT to join the two cruisers and asking for
their present position* and (b) 0653, received a TBS voice radio message,
also from COMDESDIV 112 that (1) CLAXTON had recovered three survivors,
(2) there were no more takers of the offers of assistance, (3) unless
otherwise directed, COMDESDIV 112 would join the cruisers and (4) would
then direct the CLAXTON to give up rescue as being of no further use.*
He then, at 0654, directed COMDESDIV 112 not to waste any more
time on the rescue of Japanese survivors.*
* Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
** Sir Julian S. Corbett, Naval Operations, (New York, 1920), Volume I,
Page 179.
*** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C); also Deck Log DENVER, October 25th, 1944.
**** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
636 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
and COMCRUDIV TWELVE
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
At 0657 he recorded in his action report that a large enemy
destroyer (ASAGUMO) had opened fire on the DENVER and COLUMBIA and that
the Allied destroyers had returned the fire.* COMCRUDIV TWELVE recorded
that despite the above firing no hits had been sustained by his ships and
no splashes had been observed,** It seems possible that this was because
the ASAGUMO had been firing at PT 323*** rather than at the cruisers. As
will be discussed later, none of the Allied ships opened fire until after
0700.
At 0700 the LOUISVILLE was bearing 094° (T), distant five point
six miles from Amagusan Point, Leyte Island
(2) Operations of COMCRUDIV TWELVE, 0644 - 0700, October 25th.
At 0644 COMCRUDIV TWELVE received a TBS voice radio message from
CTG 77.2 directing him to (a) proceed in the DENVER, with the COLUMBIA
and three destroyers designated by COMDESDIV 112, and destroy Japanese
cripples, and (b) to beware of torpedoes.****
Immediately after this he received a TBS voice radio message from
COMDESDIV 112 designating the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, LEUTZE and BENNION.
At 0648 he changed course to 170<>(T) and with the COLUMBIA,*****
HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS and LEUTZE**** departed the disposition. The BENNION
which had departed but three minutes earlier to investigate survivors was
not available.
At 0651 he was queried by COMDESDIV 112 as to whether he desired
three more destroyers in the screen additional to the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS,
LEUTZE and BENNION. Before he could reply he intercepted a TBS voice
radio message from the BENNION to CTG 77.2 reporting that (a) the objects
previously sighted had turned out to be rubbish**** and (b) she was now
available to screen CRUDIV TWELVE.
At 0652 he replied to COMDESDIV 112 stating: "Negative, we have
only three. M**** Although this reply was ambiguous he was promptly (a)
informed by COMDESDIV 112 that he (COMDESDIV 112) would proceed with the
ROBINSON, BRYANT and HALFORD and (b) queried as to his (COMCRUDIV TWELVE)
present position.****
* Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
** Action Report COMCRUDIV 12, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, and Subsequent Operations of CRUDIV 12 in Leyte Gulf, October
25th - 29th, 1944, Serial 0147, November 7th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 323, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
**** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine
Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944,
Enclosure (C).
***** Deck Log DENVER, October 25th, 1944.
637 CONFIDENTIAL
COMCRUDIV TWELVE
CONFIDENTIAL 0644 - 0700, October 25th
After intercepting (a) a TBS voice radio message from COKDESDIV
112 to CTG 77.2 reporting that (1) CLAXTON had three survivors, (2)
there were no more takers of offers of assistance, (3) unless directed
otherwise COMDESDIV 112 would join the cruisers and would direct the
CLAXTON to give up the rescue attempt as of no further use,* and (b) CTG
77.2's reply not to waste any more time on the Japanese survivors, he
informed COMDESDIV 112 that he was eleven miles southwest of the Island*
(Hibuson Island). Diagram "K" indicates that the DENVER likely passed
through that position at 0649 or some six minutes earlier.
At 0657 he intercepted a TBS voice radio message from COMDESDIV
112 to the BRYANT and HALFORD (a) directing them to follow the ROBINSON
and join COMCRUDIV TWELVE,* and (b) asking the HALFORD if she had
completed the job of chasing small boats. He also intercepted the
HALFORD' s affirmative reply and COMDESDIV s order to her, at 0658, to
sink the boat and depart.*
At 0700 the DENVER was bearing 102°(T), distant five point eight
miles from Amagusan Point. The BENNION, on a southerly course to join,
was about 4,000 yards to the eastward.
(3) Operations of COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX, 0600 - 0700, October 25th.
(a) Operations of Commander Attack Section ONE, 0600 - 0700,
October 25th.
At 0600 Commander Attack Section ONE, in the NEWCOMB, was
close alongside the damaged ALBERT W. GRANT rendering assistance and the
RICHARD P. LEARY was screening the two ships.
At 0610 he observed that the NEWCOMB had moored to the ALBERT
W. GRANT and had continued (a) transferring the wounded, the classified
publications and the electrical coding machines to the NEWCOMB and (b)
furnishing fresh water and all possible assistance.**
At 0612 he sent a TBS voice radio message to unknown
addressees requesting a doctor, hospital corpsmen and medical supplies
for the ALBERT W. GRANT adding that there were many casualties.*
At 0615 he was relieved to learn that the AL3ERT W. GRANT had
commenced generating her own electricity by cutting in her main generator
in the after engineroom.***
* Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
** Deck Log NEWCOMB, October 25th, 1944.
*** Action Report ALBERT W. GRANT, Operations against Central Philippines,
Leyte Area and Night Surface Action against Japanese Task Force in
Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0106, November 11th,
1944.
638 CONFIDENTIAL
COM ATTACK SECTION ONE
and COMDESDIV 112
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
At 0620 he sent a TBS voice radio message to CTG 77.2 (a)
reporting that (1) there were many casualties in the ALBERT W. GRANT, (2)
she had no power (presumably meaning propulsion), (3) was dead in the
water, and (b) requesting immediate services of a tug.*
Also at 0620 he noted that the NEWCOMB had commenced doubling
her lines in preparation for towing the ALBERT W. GRANT.**
At 0628 he noted that the RICHARD P. LEARY had sent her motor
whaleboat with a doctor, two hospital corpsmen and medical supplies to
assist on board the ALBERT W. GRANT.***
At 0633 he was pleased to note that the NEWCOMB had commenced
towing the ALBERT W. GRANT toward the Southern Transport Area in Leyte
Gulf and after turning to her new course (330°(T)) the two destroyers
were making good six point six knots. The RICHARD P. LEARY continued
screening operations,***
At 0700 the three destroyers were still in the same general
area about five miles west of Hibuson Island.
(b) Operations of COMDESDIV 112, 0600 - 0700, October 25th.
At 0600 COMDESDIV 112 who was acting as COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX,
in the ROBINSON, with the destroyers of Attack Sections TWO (ROBINSON,
HALFORD, BRYANT) and THREE (HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, LEUTZE, BENNION) in column,
had just reversed course to the north and had slowed to twenty knots in
order to take station as screen for the Left Flank Cruisers*
At 0603 he asked CTG 77.2 for his course and speed stating
that he was trying to join that commander. At 0606 he received CTG 77.2's
reply to the effect that the LOUISVILLE was bearing 260°(T), course
010O(T), speed ten knots.**** Although CTG 77.2 did not identify the
point from which his bearing was taken it was clearly Hibuson Island.
He immediately directed his two sections to proceed independ-
ently to join the cruisers and changed the course of Attack Section TWO
to 300°(T), speed twenty knots.***** Meanwhile Attack Section THREE
continued on to the north at twenty knots as shown in Diagram MN".
* Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
** Deck Log NEWCOMB, October 25th, 1944.
*** Deck Log RICHARD P. LEARY, October 25th, 1944.
**** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine
Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944,
Enclosure (C).
***** Action Report COMDESDIV 112, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 040,
October 31st, 1944.
639 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESDIV 112
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
At 0609 he reported to CTG 77.2 that he had just passed by a
large group of survivors. The commander immediately inquired if he could
identify the survivors and to which he replied that they appeared to be
Japanese survivors. He was then directed by CTG 77.2 to pick them up.*
Therefore, at 0611, in accordance with these orders he
directed the three destroyers in Attack Section WO to standby to pick up
survivors* and, at 0612, reversed course to return to the survivor area.**
At 0618 he issued directions for picking up survivors as
follows: (a) do not overload, at the most take sixty to seventy- five,
(b) search each man carefully for weapons, (c) kill anyone that shows
violent resistance and (d) be very careful against suicidal damage to
your ships,*
He then, at 0620, directed his ships to proceed independently
to pick up survivors.*
At 0621 he intercepted a message from COMDESDIV XRAY to CTG
77.2 stating that all of the survivors were Japanese and so far they had
refused to take the lines thrown to them. At 0632 he intercepted another
message from COMDESDIV XRAY to CTG 77.2 reporting that the Japanese had
changed their minds and were accepting lines.*
He now assumed command of the rescue operation with the
result that COMDESDIV XRAY in the CLAXTON fell under his tactical command.
At 0632 he noted that with his ships lying to in the vicinity
of several hundred survivors, the Japanese, with few exceptions, refused
all offers of rescue.**
At 0635 he received a message from the HALFORD reporting
that she (a) had sighted a boat containing men who were trying to paddle
toward the beach and (b) would try to intercept it.*
At 0637 he reported by TBS voice radio to CTG 77.2 that (a)
there were several hundred survivors in the area, (b) four destroyers
under his tactical command were picking up survivors, (c) the HALFORD was
intercepting a boat and (d) most of the survivors would not accept lines
from the destroyers.*
By this time the CLAXTON had picked up three Japanese
survivors.***
* Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
** Action Report COMDESDIV 112, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 040,
October 31st, 1944.
*** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944.
640 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESDIV 112
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
At 0644, having intercepted a TBS voice radio message from
CTG 77.2 directing COMCRUDIV TWELVE in the DENVER, to (a) proceed with
the COLUMBIA and three destroyers to designated by COMDESDIV 112, (b)
polish off Japanese cripples and (c) beware of torpedoes,* he designated
the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, LEUTZE and BENNION.
He then, at 0645, repeated the warning to look out for
torpedoes to the destroyers engaged in the rescue operation.**
At 0651 he sent a message to COMCRUDIV TWELVE stating that
since the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, LEUTZE and BENNION were already with that
commander he wondered if three additional destroyers were desired. To
this query COMCRUDIV TWELVE replied, "Negative, we have only three".*
Although this was an ambiguous reply, he promptly replied (at 06 52) that
he would proceed with ROBINSON, HALFORD and BRYANT to join the cruisers,
and requested their position.*
At 0653 he informed CTG 77.2 by TBS voice radio that (a) the
CLAXTON had three survivors, (b) there were no more takers of offers of
assistance and (c) unless otherwise directed, he would join the cruisers
and would direct the CLAXTON to give up rescue attempts as being of no
further use. CTG 77.2 promptly replied that he was not to waste any more
time on rescuing the Japanese.* About this time the CLAXTON left the
survivor area to rejoin the cruisers.***
At 0655 he received a message stating that COMCRUDIV TWELVE
was eleven miles southwest of the island.* Although it did not state the
name of the island it clearly referred to Hibuson Island for the DENVER
had passed through a position eleven miles southwest of Hibuson Island but
six minutes previously (Diagram "N").
He then, at 0657, directed the HALFORD and BRYANT to follow
the ROBINSON in rejoining the cruisers and asked the HALFORD if she had
completed chasing the small boat. The HALFORD immediately replied that
she had and that the survivors had jumped overboard and had refused her
offer of rescue. He then, at 0658, directed the HALFORD to sink the boat
and depart.*
At 0700 the ROBINSON and the BRYANT were still in the survivor
area while the HALFORD was occupied with the small boat above referred to.
(4) Operations of COMDESDIV XRAY, 0600 - 0632, October 25th.
At 0600 COMDESDIV XRAY, who was also Commanding Officer CLAXTON,
was preparing to rescue Japanese survivors. The other five destroyers in
his division were maneuvering to take their assigned positions in the Left
Flank Cruiser screen (Diagram "N").
* Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
** Action Report HALFORD, Night Action in Surigao Strait, October 24th -
25th, 1944, Serial 048, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
*** Deck Log CLAXTON, October 25th, 1944.
496799 O - 59 -51
641 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESDIV XRAY and CTG 77.3
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0632, October 25th
At 0602 he directed his division to expedite forming the screen on
Circle TWO.* Since this was his last order to his division during this
period only the actions of the CLAXTON will be discussed here since the
actions of the other destroyers of the division have already been discussed
under "Operations of Commander Left Flank Force, 0600 - 0700, October 25th",
At about 0603 the CLAXTON reversed course in order to head back
into the survivor area. By about 0615 she had stopped and had commenced
attempting to pick up survivors.
At 0621 COMDESDIV XRAY reported to CTG 77.2 that all of the
survivors were Japanese and, up to that time, had refused lines. At 0632
he reported further to CTG 77.2 that the Japanese survivors had changed
their minds and were accepting lines.*
At this latter time, with the arrival of COMDESDIV 112, in the
ROBINSON, he was relieved by that Commander as OTC in the survivor area.**
His operations from henceforth are discussed under "Operations of
COMDESDIV 112, 0600 - 0632, October 25th" and "Operations of Commander
Left Flank Force, 0600 - 0700, October 25th".
(5) Operations of CTG 77.3, 0600 - 0700, October 25th.
At 0600 CTG 77.3 (Commander Right Flank Force), in the PHOENIX,
with BOISE, SHROPSHIRE and DESRON TWENTY-FOUR, less the DALY, which was
still investigating MTB's near Cabugan Chico Island, was on course 350°(T)
at twenty- five knots. His force was in a circular cruising disposition
with the cruisers on Circle ONE and the destroyers on Circle TWO (Diagram
"N").
Knowing that CTG 77.2 had slowed to ten knots at 0602 he, at 0603,
slowed to fifteen knots*** and at 0605 slowed to ten knots.****
Further knowing that CTG 77.2 had changed course to the south at
0618 and not wishing to get too far away from that commander, whom he was
supporting, he, at 0625, changed course to 175°(T).***** He then (a) at
0628 increased speed to fifteen knots,**** and at 0650 to twenty knots and
(b) at 0655 changed course to 150°(T).****
* Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
** Action Report COMDESDIV 112, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 040,
October 31st, 19Z*4.
*** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
**** Action Report PHOENIX, Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands, October
25th, 1944, Serial 091, October 26th, 1944.
***** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944.
642 CONFIDENTIAL
DALY
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
At 0700 the PHOENIX was bearing 101o(T), distant three point nine
miles from Bugho Point, Leyte Island.
(a) DALY.
It will be recalled that at 0545 the DALY had been directed
by CTG 77.3 to inform the friendly MTB's which she was investigating of
the damaged MTB to the south. There is no indication in either her action
report or deck log of how long this took her, but presumably she remained
in the vicinity of Cabugan Chico Island during this period for she did not
rejoin TG 77.3 until 0759.
It will also be recalled that at 0559 CTG 77.3 had sent a
message to the DALY, BEAL3 and BACHE (the destroyers with torpedoes
remaining after the torpedo action) as follows: "When directed to form,
DALY, BEALE and BACHE will constitute a special attack group to be
designated DALY's boys. Over to DALY," which message was immediately
acknowledged by the DALY.*
IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THIS MESSAGE WAS CLEARLY SENT IN
ORDER TO BE PREPARED FOR EVENTUALITIES, AND IN FURTHER VIEW OF THE FACT
THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO MAKE A SUCCESSFUL TORPEDO ATTACK WHEN THE
PARTICIPATING SHIPS ARE WIDELY SEPARATED, AS IN THIS CASE, IT WOULD BE
INTERESTING TO LEARN WHY THE DALY HAD NOT AS YET REJOINED.
Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with Japanese
Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th, 1944, Serial
00117, November 10th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
643 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
(B) Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats, 0600 - 0700, October 25th.
(1) Upper Surigao PT's.
Nothing of sufficient importance occurred to be noted in the
action reports of these PT's.
(2) Kanihaan PT's.
At 0600 Commander Kanihaan PT's, with PT's 495, 489 and 492, was
drifting south with the current and was bearing 282°(T), distant 900
yards from the southern end of Kanihaan Island.
At approximately 0638 he heard PT 491 call for help over the PT
common voice circuit. He immediately went ahead at moderate speed and
changed course to round the FUSO fire and head for Maoyo Point.*
At 0652 he passed about 700 yards south of the spot where he had
last seen the battleship (FUSO) and now saw nothing but a burning oil
slick.** This indicates that the stern of the FUSO had sunk earlier,
probably about O64O.
At O656 he passed within two miles of the ASAGUMO which at this
time had two small boats alongside.**
At 0700 he was bearing 244°(T), distant six miles from the
southern tip of Kanihaan Island.
(3) South Amagusan PT's.
At 0600 Commander South Amagusan PT's, with PT's 320, 330 and 331,
was bearing 180°(T), distant seven point two miles from Amagusan Point
and was drifting with the current in a southeasterly direction. At this
same time he was bearing 072°(T), distant two point five miles from
Caligangan Point (Diagram "N").
At 0640 he decided to return to base*** and went ahead on
approximate course 003° (T) at about fifteen knots.
At 0654 he was sighted by PT 328**** which immediately stood out
from the Leyte shore west of Amagusan Point to meet him. Since PT 328
was close inshore he probably did not sight her until she was clear of
the shore.
* Action Report PT 489, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 495, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
*** Action Reports PT's 330 and 331, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944,
No Serials, October 30th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 328, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
644 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
At 0700 he was bearing 164°(T), distant three miles from Amagusan
Point and was about 3,000 yards from PT 328.
(4) East Amagusan PT's,
This section of MTB's was widely separated with PT 328 south of
Amagusan Point, PT 323 southeast of the same point but much farther away
and PT 329 about twelve miles to the north, off Cabugan Grande Island,
Therefore, each of the MTB's will be discussed separately,
(a) PT 328.
At 0600 PT 328, with Commander East Amagusan PT's on board,
was bearing 226° (T), distant 1,300 yards from Amagusan Point. She was
operating alone and was drifting slowly eastward with the current.
At 0654 she sighted the South Amagusan PT's (PT's 320, 330,
331) about four miles to the south and headed north. She immediately
changed course to about 145°(T), at about fifteen knots in order to join
them* (Diagram "N").
At 0700 she was bearing 162°(T), distant 3,000 yards from
Amagusan Point and was about the same distance from the South Amagusan
PT's.
(b) PT 323.
At 0600 PT 323 was bearing 148°(T), distant seven point eight
miles from Amagusan Point and was proceeding on an easterly course at
about four knots.
At 0630 the commanding officer sighted a destroyer at a range
of about two and one-half miles, which destroyer was standing by a large
ship which was burning furiously. This destroyer was dead in the water
and was heading about 045° (T).** This was the damaged ASAGUMO which was
preparing to abandon ship. The large ship was the stern of the burning
FUSO. (Although he did not mention it in his action report and probably
did not know it, the FUSO stern sank shortly after this time, the bow
having sunk earlier,***)
He promptly changed course to about 125°(T) and prepared to
attack. As he closed the enemy he was challenged at 0635 by two friendly
TBF's, which left the area upon receipt of the correct reply.**
At 0646, at a range of 3,000 yards, he was fired on with a
single gun by the ASAGUMO. Her gunfire was not particularly accurate,**
* Action Report PT 328, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 323, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 495, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
645 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
However, for reasons unknown, he now wondered whether or not
this destroyer was friendly and therefore queried Commander Left Flank
Force thereon. Upon receiving a reply that she was enemy he announced
that he was closing in for an attack,*
At 0700 he was 1,000 yards from the ASAGUMO and was ready to
fire torpedoes. At this same time he was bearing 235°(T), distant five
point six miles from the southern tip of Kanihaan Island (Diagram "N").
(c) PT 329.
At 0600 PT 329 was about 1,600 yards west of the southern tip
of Cabugan Grande Island and was on course 020° (T) at about fifteen knots.
At 0603, being close to the western shore of Cabugan Grande
Island, the commanding officer seems to have decided to seek shelter from
enemy aircraft by lying to, close inshore.**
At 0700 he was bearing about 205°(T), distant about 1,500
yards from the northeastern. tip of Cabugan Grande Island (Diagram "N").
(5) Lower Surigao PT's.
(a) PT 490.
At approximately 0600 PT 490 commenced her return to San Pedro
Bay making good about twenty point five knots on a direct course. Nothing
else of sufficient importance to record in her action report occurred
during this period.
(b) PT 491.
At 0600 PT 491 was bearing 083°(T), distant two point nine
miles from Caniguin Point and was making about fifteen knots on course
about 172° (T) in order to reach her firing position on the MOGAMI, which
cruiser was about 5,000 yards on his port quarter at this time.
At 0600:30 he changed course to about 13 5° (T) in order to
close the MOGAMI »s track. When, about 0601, the MOGAMI opened fire and
some of her shells landed about twenty- five yards away, he changed speed
to twenty- five knots.***
At 0604:30 he changed course to about 045° (T) and at 0605, at
a range of about 3,000 yards he fired two torpedoes. As he retired under
smoke he received heavy fire from the MOGAMI, which was seen to turn to
starboard allowing the torpedoes to pass harmlessly ahead** (Diagram "M").
* Action Report PT 323, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944; also Action Report MARYLAND, Surigao Strait, October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0210, November 4th, 1944, Enclosure (C).
** Action Report PT 329, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 491, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
646 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
0600 - 0700, October 25th
He now maneuvered about as shown on the above diagram in order
to pass Caniguin Point close aboard.
At approximately 0636 he sighted PT 493 beached on Maoyo Point.
He stated that the camouflage coloring of a dark green vertical stripe and
a light green stripe was so good close inshore that the MTB could only be
sighted from two miles away by the use of binoculars.*
direction.
He decided to close the MTB and therefore headed in that
He was alongside her at O646.*
Shortly after sighting this MTB he called for help. This
radio call was heard by the Kanihaan PT!s** but it appears not to have
been heard by his own OTC in PT 490 for it is not mentioned in his action
report .***
He then picked up the survivors of the PT 493. Since he
remained in this area until about 0800 it seems probable that this task
took considerable time, due to difficulties in (a) locating the party and
(b) moving the five wounded and the two bodies of those killed,
(c) PT 493.
PT 493, damaged and abandoned by her crew, was beached on
Maoyo Point,
At O646 PT 491 came alongside and picked up the survivors
including five wounded and the bodies of two men killed,**** How long
this took is unknown but, as pointed out above under PT 491, it was quite
long.
(6) SW Panaon PT's.
It will be recalled that (a) PT 194 had been hit by gunfire from
the USHIO and ABUKUMA and at 0533 had requested help, (b) PT 196 had
commenced looking for her, and (c) at 0600 had sighted her in the vicinity
of Sonok Point (western Panaon Island). Because of this the operations
of these two MTB's will be discussed together, while PT 150, which
continued to operate independently, will be discussed separately,
(a) PT!s 194 and 196.
At 0601 PT 196 went alongside PT 194 and transferred a hospital
corpsman and two other men in order to help with the casualties and
repairs .*****
* Action Report PT 491, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 495, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 490, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 493, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
***** Action Report PT 196, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0400, October 31st, 1944.
647
CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
At 0610 when the transfer had been completed these two MTE's
were joined by PT's 151 and 146* which had also received the 0533 message
requesting help, above referred to, and had closed Sonok Point to render
assistance to PT 194. The four motor torpedo boats, now under the command
of Commander SW Panaon PT's in PT 194, continued on toward Liloan.**
At 0700 Commander SW Panaon PT's was bearing 318°(T), distant
seven and one-half miles from Sonok Point,
(b) PT 150.
It will be recalled that PT 150 had continued her search for
PT 194 until she was about one mile southeast of Sonok Point. In this
search she had been unsuccessful.
About 0605 she changed course to the south and increased speed
to about fifteen knots in order to continue the search farther off shore.
At 0624 she sighted to the south four destroyers, distant
7,500 yards.*** These were the AKEBONO, USHIO, SHIRANUHI and KASUMI,
(Diagram "M"), which, with the exception of the KASUMI were screening the
NACHI and ASHIGARA. The KASUMI was proceeding to aid the damaged ABUKUMA.
PT 150 must have been sighted about the same time for one or
more of these Japanese ships, probably the AKEBONO and ASHIGARA, opened
fire,**** PT 150 now seems to have changed course to about 305° (T),
increased speed to thirty knots, and reported the contact to her base. At
0627 the USHIO also opened fire, recording the range as 8,000 meters
(8,748 yards) and the bearing as 283° (T).*****
PT 150 changed course to 330° (T) and made good about thirty
knots as she headed up Sogod Bay toward Ilijan Point, Panaon Island. At
0637, when the USHIO ceased firing, PT 150 was bearing 326°(T), range
10,700 meters (11,700 yards),*****
She continued to the north and about 0639 changed course to
130°(T), to head for San Ricardo Point,*** and slowed to twenty- five knots.
At 0654 she sighted a damaged cruiser (MOGAMI) smoking heavily
from the vicinity of the after stack, moving southwest at about ten to
fifteen knots. She changed course to 160°(T), increased speed to thirty
knots and reported the contact to her base.***
About 0700 she was fired on by the MOGAMI .******
*~ Action Report PT 151, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0389, October 28th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 146, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0388, October 28th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 150, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0396, October 29th, 1944.
**** Detailed Action Report USHIO, Antiair Action in the Mindanao and
Sulu Seas, October 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717, NA 11807.
***** Ibid., Action Chart, 0540 - 0950, October 25th, 1944.
-a-***-** Action Report PT 137, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
11, November 4th, 1944.
648 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
At 0700 PT 150 was bearing 190°(T), distant two and one-half
miles from San Ricardo Point and PT 137 was about a mile ahead (Diagram
»M«).
(7) SE Panaon PTfs.
Since (a) there are no entries in the action reports of PT's 134
and 132 for this period and (b) their locations are unknown, their
operations are not discussed,
(a) PT 137.
At 0600 PT 137 was proceeding on an easterly course at about
five knots to round Binit Point in a second search for PT 194 • Her radio
transmitter was not functioning.
About 0615 she sighted an enemy destroyer (SHIGURE) seven
miles southeast of Binit Point* (Diagram "M").
About 0630, having gone beyond Binit Point, she reversed
course in order to continue her search for PT 194 from west of Binit
Point to Sonok Point.
At 0640 she sighted two very large ships and approximately
eight smaller vessels which she recorded as being about fifteen miles
away,* This sighting was made on the SECOND Striking Force and the
SHIGURE— a total of two large and six smaller ships. Although the SHIGURE
was about fifteen miles from PT 137, the rest were much closer with the
ASHIGARA but five miles away (Diagram "M").
At 0645> when about one mile southwest of Binit Point in
Latitude 09°-50'N, Longitude 125°-21fE, she sighted an enemy heavy cruiser
on a southerly course at approximately twelve to fourteen knots. This
cruiser which was smoking badly from abaft the stack, and which she
identified as a TONE class cruiser* was the MOGAMI.
At this time she seems to have changed course to about 180°(T)
and increased speed to about ten knots in order to intercept the MOGAMI,
About 0700, with PT 150 also attempting to intercept the MOGAMI and
closing PT 137 rapidly, the MOGAMI opened fire on the two MTB's with her
secondary battery,*
At 0700 PT 137 was bearing 198°(T), distant three point six
miles from Binit Point. PT 150 was about one mile to the northwest
(Diagram »M").
Action Report PT 137, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 11,
November 4th, 1944.
649 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
(8) Sumilon PT's.
At 0600 Commander Sumilon PT's, with PT's 523, 524 and 526, was
lying to about two miles southeast of Sumilon Island waiting for the
Bilaa Point PT's to join him. Shortly afterwards he sighted these 24TB' s
approaching and went ahead at about five knots on a northeasterly course
to intercept them.
At 0630, having been joined by the Bilaa Point PT's,* he continued
on through the passage east of Satan Rock at fifteen knots and headed
toward his base in San Pedro Bay.
At 0700 he was bearing 004°(T), distant about six miles from the
northern tip of Sumilon Island (Diagram ,,Mn).
Since these MTB's arrived at their San Pedro Bay base after an
uneventful trip, they will be dropped from further discussion.
(9) Bilaa Point PT's.
At 0600 Commander Bilaa Point PT's, with PT's 494, 324 and 497,
was heading toward Sumilon Island to join Commander Sumilon PT's.
Shortly after 0600 he sighted the Sumilon PT's and at 0630 he
joined these MTB's.*
Further operations of Commander Bilaa Point PT's are discussed
under Commander Sumilon PT's.
(10) Madilao PT's.
At 0600 Commander Madilao PT's, with PT's 192, 191 and 195, was
about four and three-quarters miles south of Madilao Point and was
proceeding to base via Sogod Bay on course 315°(T) at twenty-three knots.
At 0610 he sighted two columns of black smoke ahead in the mouth
of Sogod Bay,** These columns of smoke were from the USHIO and the
ABUKUMA (Diagram "M"). At this same time he sighted four or five
destroyers five miles south of Panaon Island.** These were the SHIRANUHI,
KASUML, AKEBONO and SHIGURE. Since (a) the SHIGURE was only about four
miles away and was closing him rapidly and (b) the SHIRANUHI and KASUKI
had just reversed course (to the southwest), he realized that he was
likely to be caught in a trap. He therefore changed course to 060°(T) and
headed for Madilao Point****
* Action Report PT 494, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
** Action Report PT 195, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0393,
October 29th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 192, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0395,
October 29th, 1944.
650 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
0600 - 0700, October 25th
About 0623, after passing Madilao Point, he changed course to
about 030°(T) to head for Bilaa Point and slowed to about five knots in
order to let the situation work itself out. He stated in his action
report that he was advised to remain in the patrol area due to the
presence of enemy forces to the west but he does not state who advised
him to do this.-* Presumably it was Commander Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron
THIRTY-SIX (Commander Sumilon PT's) who, it will be remembered, had
directed Commander Bilaa Point PT's to retire at 0545.
At 0700 he was bearing 224° (T), distant one point four miles from
Bilaa Point.
Since he arrived at Liloan Bay at about 1030* via lower Surigao
Strait and Panaon Strait after passing through heavy rain squalls** and
after an uneventful trip, these MTB's will be dropped from further
discussion.
(11) Limasawa PT's.
At 0600 Commander Limasawa PT's, with PT's 151 and 146, continued
toward Sonok Point at fifteen knots on course 060°(T) to assist the
damaged PT 194.
At 0610 he joined PT's 194 and 196 off Sonok Point*** and all four
MTB's continued on toward their base at Liloan arriving about 0730.****
At 0700 he was bearing 318°(T), distant seven and one-half miles
from Sonok Point.
(a) PT 190.
About 0615 PT 190, which was about seven miles southwest of
Limasawa Island, proceeded to the aid of PT 194 on course 085° (T) at
thirty-three knots .-*****
At O63O she sighted six large ships about twelve miles away
and closed to identify them. At 0634, when she had closed to about eight
miles, she stopped and Identified the ships as one battleship or heavy
cruiser, one heavy cruiser, on fire, and four destroyers.***** This was
the SECOND Striking Force (Diagram "MM). Why one of these cruisers was
reported as burning is not clear, but since the MOGAMI was about seventeen
miles from the MTB it seems doubtful if that ship was sighted sufficiently
well to identify it as a heavy cruiser.
Action Report PT 192, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0395, October 29th, 1944.
Action Report PT 195, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0393, October 29th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 151, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0339, October 28th, 1944.
-**** Action Report PT 146, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0388, October 28th, 1944.
***** Action Report PT 190, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0398, October 30th, 1944.
651
CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0600 - 0700, October 25th
About 0636 she noted that two destroyers (probably the USHIO
and AKSBONO) were headed toward her and that after flashing a recognition
signal consisting of the numeral one by blinker, had opened fire. She
promptly went ahead at maximum speed, turned away and laid smoke. Thus
she avoided being hit although she was straddled eight or ten times. She
zigzagged toward Sogod Bay and by 0705 had succeeded in eluding the
destroyer. She now made a contact report through PT 152 and headed for
Liloan Bay where she arrived about 0745.*
(12) Camiguin PT's.
About 0600 Commander Camiguin PT's, with PT's 127, 128, 129, 130
and 131, the latter two from the Bohol PT's, was three miles west of
Camiguin Island and was en route to Liloan Bay on course 030°(T), speed
about twenty-seven knots.**
At O64S he observed two shell splashes in his vicinity which he
thought were fired from a submarine hull down to the west of his position,
although he stated that the position of the firing ship was Latitude
09°-10«N, Longitude 125°-00«E,** which was to the southeast of his
position. PT 129, however, stated that this firing might have cone from
a destroyer retiring to the southwest at high speed.*** This was the
correct assumption for the firing was done by the SHISURE which had
opened fire at this time on six motor torpedo boats on the horizon.****
About five minutes after the first salvo Commander Camiguin PT's
turned to the west to search for the imaginary submarine,*** and at 0658
the firing stopped.**** The search for the submarine proved fruitless
and at approximately 0715 he resumed course for Liloan Bay, arriving
about 0955.**
Because nothing of importance connected with the Battle of
Surigao Strait occurred thereafter, the Camiguin PT's and PT's 130 and
131 will be dropped from further discussion.
**
Action Report PT 190, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0398, October 30th, 1944.
Action Report PT 127, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 4,
October 29th, 1944.
*** Action Report PT 129, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0390, October 28th, 1944.
**** Detailed Action Report SHIGURE, Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23rd -
27th, 1944, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4), NA 11801.
652 CONFIDENTIAL
COM SECOND STRIKING FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
CHAPTER XXIV - JAPANESE OPERATIONS, 0700 - 0733, October 25th
(A) Operations of Commander SECOND Striking Force, 0700 - 0733, October 25th.
At 0700 Commander SECOND Striking Force, in NACHI, with ASHIGARA and
SHIRANUHI, was proceeding on course 252°(T) at eighteen knots. The USHIO
and AKEBONO had just departed to escort the ABUKUMA and MOGAMI respectively
(Diagram "P").
At 0705 the KASUMI went alongside the ABUKUMA and commenced trans-
ferring COMDESRON ONE and his staff to the KASUMI.* Things proceeded
smoothly until 0715 when carrier-type aircraft were sighted. **
These aircraft were from TU 77.4.1 and consisted of eleven VT armed
with torpedoes escorted by seventeen VF with 500 pound SAP bombs.***
They had been directed to destroy the remnants of the enemy fleet in
Surigao Strait, presumably in accordance with CTG 77.2' s recommendation
thereon to CTF 77 at 0440.
At 0717 the KASUMI opened fire.**** Meanwhile at 0718 COMDESRON ONE
succeeded in completing the transfer***** and at 0719 the KASUMI cleared
the side of the ABUKUMA and proceeded to rejoin the NACHI.*
At 0733 the air attacks were still continuing. At this time the NACHI
was bearing approximately 208°(T), distant twelve point five miles from
the southern tip of Limasawa Island.
(1) ABUKUMA and USHIO.
At 0700 the ABUKUMA, which was on course 249° (T), speed about nine
knots, was some fifteen miles southwest of Binit Point. She was awaiting
the (a) KASUMI which was coming alongside in order to remove COMDESRON ONE
and his staff, and (b) USHIO which had just departed the NACHI and
ASHIGARA in order to escort her.
At 0705 the KASUMI having come alongside, she commenced transfer
operations.* At 0715 she sighted carrier-type aircraft** and noted that
at 0717 the KASUMI had opened fire.****
At 0719, COMDESRON ONE and his staff having transferred to the
KASUMI,***** that ship then cleared and proceeded to rejoin the NACHI.*
* Detailed Action Report DESDIV 18 (KASUMI), Battle off the
Philippines, October 24th - 25th, 1944-, WDC Document 161717 (Part 4),
NA 11801.
** Ibid. j also Detailed Action Report USHIO, Antiair Action in the
Mindanao and Sulu Seas, October 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717,
NA 11807.
*** Action Report COMCARDIV 22 (CTG 77.4), Leyte Operations from
October 12th - 29th, 1944, Serial 00120, November 15th, 1944.
**** Detailed Action Report USHIO, Antiair Action in the Mindanao and
Sulu Seas, October 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717, NA 11807.
***** War Diary DESRON 1, October 1944, WDC Document 161638, NA 11739.
653 CONFIDENTIAL
ABUKUMA and USHIO
MOGAMI and AKEBONO
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
At 0724 she observed the USHIO open fire on aircraft which moved
out of range almost immediately »* These attacking aircraft were from
the CVE's of TG 77.4«*»
At 0733 the ABUKUMA was approximately eleven miles bearing 191°(T)
from the southern tip of Limasawa Island and the USHIO was about two miles
to the southwest of her (Diagram "P").
(2) MOGAMI and AKEBONO.
At 0700 the MOGAMI, which was about seven miles south of Binit
Point, was on course 240° (T) at about fourteen knots. She had just opened
fire on PT's 137 and 150 which were approaching about four miles to the
northwest. At this same time the AKEBONO, which had been directed to
escort her, was reversing course in compliance with these orders.
Shortly thereafter the AKEBONO, noting the MTB's (PT»s 137 and
150), opened fire on them. Although her gunfire was short of her targets
and consequently no damage resulted, the motor torpedo boats were never-
theless driven off by 0715.***
At this time COMDESDIV SEVEN in the AKEBONO sent a visual
dispatch to the MOGAMI inquiring as to the extent of her damage, to which
the MOGAMI replied at 0716 that (a) her maximum speed was twelve knots
and (b) she had 800 tons of fuel which would enable her to continue for
forty hours.****
At 0727 she was bombed and strafed by four enemy aircraft which
carried out a persistent attack but were driven off by gunfire from her
forward turrets, her remaining dual purpose gun and her machine guns.
There were no bomb hits.***** These aircraft were from the CVE's of
TG 77.4.**
At 0733 the MOGAMI was approximately thirteen miles, bearing
211° (T), from Binit Point. The AKEBONO, coming up from astern, was about
two miles to the northeast.
* Detailed Action Report USHIO, Antiair Action in the Mindanao and
Sulu Seas, October 25th, 1944, WDC Document 161717, NA 11307.
** War Diary COMCARDIV 22, October 1944.
*** Action Reports PT's 137 and 150, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serials 11 and 0396, November 4th, 1944, and October 29th, 1944,
respectively.
**** Dispatch Log, Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the
Philippines, October 18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
***** Detailed Action Report MOGAMI, Battle off the Philippines, October
18th - 25th, 1944, WDC Document 160463, NA 12653.
654 CONFIDENTIAL
SHIGURE
0700 - 0733, October 25th and
ASAGUMO
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0722, October 25th
(3) SHIGURE.
At 0700 the SHIGURE was on course 244° (T) at twenty- four knots
and was approximately twenty- two miles southwest of Binit Point «
It appears that she escaped attack by the aircraft of TG 77.4 as
there is no mention of any aircraft during this period.
At 0733 she was approximately twenty-six miles, bearing 211° (T)
from the southern tip of Limasawa Island and about fourteen miles
southwest of the NACHI.
(4) ASAGUMO.
At 0700 the ASAGUMO, badly damaged and afire, was dead in the
water and was firing at PT 323 which was approaching to make a torpedo
attack. At this same time she was preparing to abandon ship and had two
small motor launches alongside for this purpose.
Shortly after 0700 (estimated to be about 0705) the third torpedo
fired by PT 323 hit her in the stern,* the first two having missed.** By
this time the ASAGUMO had abandoned ship since it was apparent that she
was endangered not only by the torpedoes of PT 323 but also by the gunfire
of the Left Flank Force which was rapidly closing her. The two motor
launches headed toward Tungo Point.***
About this same time her fear of the Left Flank Force proved
correct for at 0705 she was fired on, first by a destroyer (CONY) and then
during the next six minutes by eight other destroyers (THORN, WELLES,
AULICK, SIGOURNEY, CLAXTON, HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, BENNION and probably
LEUTZE), as well as by the DENVER and COLUMBIA.
At 0719 she rolled over**** and at 0722 sank***** in Latitude
10°-06.4'N, Longitude 125°-23.4!E (Diagram "0").
* Composite Report on Surigao Strait Action by Commanding Officers
ASAGUMO (Commander Kazuo Shibayama, ex-IJN) and MICHISHIO (Commander
Kazuo Tanaka, ex-IJN), March 15th, 1946, Army Historical Division
Microfilm HS-39A.
** Action Report PT 323, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
*** Action Report HEYtfOOD L. EDWARDS, Battle of Surigao Straits, October
25th, 1944, Serial 0102, November 2nd, 1944*
**** Deck Log COLUMBIA, October 25th, 1944.
***** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
655 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
CHAPTER XXV - ALLIED OPERATIONS. 0700 - 0733. October 25th
(A) Operations of CTG 77.2, 0700 - 0733, October 25th.
CTG 77.2 during this period, as during the two preceding periods,
operated largely as Commander Left Flank Force. Therefore, most of his
operations are discussed under that commander rather than under CTG 77.2.
However, as pointed out in the preceding period, it is likely that, since
he was both CTG 77.2 and Commander Left Flank Force, he found it difficult
to separate both commands in his mind. Therefore, in order to adequately
appreciate his command difficulties, it is wise to read the operations of
Commander Left Flank Force as well as those of CTG 77.2.
At 0727 he received his first word from CTF 77 relative to his victory.
This was a TBS voice radio message which stated, "Congratulations to you
and your noble cohorts. Well done. Kinkaid".
Actually it was not until 0728 that he received any information which
was important to him as CTG 77.2. This was CTF 77' s dispatch reporting
that the escort carriers of TG 77.4 were under attack by enemy surface
units composed of battleships, cruisers and destroyers, twenty-five miles
northeast of Samar Island.*
Although it is believed that this dispatch may have been garbled
either in transmission or in recording it seems more likely that it was
written loosely to give the general idea only, for clearly, since Samar
is a fairly large island, twenty-five miles northeast of it is not
particularly definite. It seems likely that this is a portion of the
plain language dispatch sent by CTF 77 at 0727. The actual wording of
this latter dispatch was, "Enemy force attacked our CVE's composed of
four BB's, eight cruisers and other ships. Request Lee** proceed top
speed cover Leyte. Request immediate air strike by fast carriers."***
Note: To digress for a moment, this was not CTF 77 's first informa-
tion relative to the above attack. The facts are that he had received
information thereon:
(a) Prior to 0707 (or about twenty minutes earlier) for at this time
he had advised COMTHIRDFLT and CTF 34** by dispatch that CTU 77.4.3
(Northern Carrier Group) was under attack by enemy battleships and cruisers,
and gave the enemy position,****
Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee, USN, COMBATPAC, who was to have commanded
TF 34.
*** C0M7THFLT Dispatch 242227 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, All TFC's and
TGC's 7THFLT and 3RDFLT.
**** CTF 77 Dispatch 242207 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT and CTF 34 (TOR
C0M3RDFLT 242322).
**
656 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
(b) At 0715 from CTU 77.4.3. This is based on the fact that the
PHOENIX intercepted such a report to the effect that the carriers were
under attack by Japanese battleships and other vessels.
(c) At 0720 CTG 77.4' s voice radio message stating that TU 77.4.3 was
under attack by an enemy force consisting of battleships and cruisers
bearing 060°(T), distant 100 miles from Point MOLLY.* This message was
received by CTF 79 at 0720 and by the COLUMBIA at 0723.
This later message appears to have caused him to send two dispatches
to COMTHIRDFLT (a) at 0725, an urgent, confidential dispatch stating:
"About 0700 CTU 77.4.3 reported under fire from enemy battleships and
cruisers in Latitude 11-40, Longitude 126-25. Evidently came through San
Bernardino during the night. Request immediate air strike. Also request
support from heavy ships. My OBBs low in ammunition"**, and
(b) at 0727, in order to avoid the loss of time due to coding and
decoding, an urgent plain language dispatch stating:
"Enemy force attacked our CVE's composed of four BBs eight cruisers
and other ships. Request Lee proceed top speed cover Leyte. Request
immediate strike by fast carriers,"***
This was the dispatch referred to earlier as received by CTG 77.2 at
0728*
WHY HE MADE NO EFFORT UNTIL 0727 TO ACQUAINT CTG 77.2 WITH THIS NEW
SITUATION EITHER DIRECTLY OR AS AN INFORMATION ADDRESSEE, AND WHY, WHEN
HE FINALLY DID SO INFORM THAT COMMANDER, HE DID NOT ISSUE HIM ANY
INSTRUCTIONS WHATSOEVER IS NOT EXPLAINED.
Now to return to CTF 77 fs 2522271
As the receipt of this dispatch presented a new and perhaps unexpected
development CTG 77.2 immediately commenced re-estimating the situation.
Since he wore what was termed "two hats", i.e., he was both CTG 77.2 and
Commander Left Flank Force, he was now forced to estimate the situation on
the basis of both commands. His basic decision as Commander Left Flank
Force is discussed under "Operations of Commander Left Flank Force, 0700 -
0733, October 25th". Suffice it to state here that, as the latter commander,
he had decided largely to* discontinue the pursuit of the retiring enemy
forces and to return to ieyte Gulf,
* Point MOLLY was a standard radar reference point for the Leyte area
and was in Latitude 11°-00»N, Longitude 124°-43»E (Diagram "C").
** CTF 77 Dispatch 242225 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT (TOR C0M3RDFLT
250022),
*«-* C0M7THFLT Dispatch 252227 October 1944 to C0M3RDFLT, info All TFC«s
and TGC's 7TH and 3RDFLT«s (TOR C0M3RDFLT 250000).
496799 O - 59 - 52
657 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.2
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
But, what was his estimate as CTG 77.2? Certainly his decision as
stated above as Commander Left Flank Force must have been based in part
on the fact that he was also CTG 77.2 and therefore it was satisfactory
to himself as that commander. Why, then, knowing that the left flank
force was returning to Leyte Gulf did he not issue any instructions
thereon so that his principal subordinate commanders, i.e., Commander
Battle Line and CTG 77.3 (Commander Right Flank Force) would know what he
planned to do?
Strangely enough he issued no instructions whatsoever at this time
but instead seems to have relied on his subordinate commanders to take
any action they considered necessary. Perhaps (a) (1) having directed
Commander Battle Line at 062$ to dispose the battle line between Taytay
Point (Leyte Island) and Kibuson Island and (2) knowing that CTG 77.3 had
followed him down the strait and could be expected to follow him on his
return up the strait, he considered that no further orders from himself
were necessary or (b) he was awaiting orders from CTF 77.
In either case the fact that he did not issue any instructions does
not appear wise. This seems so for other Allied commanders in the area
were most likely wondering what action he was going to take since this
knowledge was important in the formulation of their own decisions. This
applied largely to COMSEVEh'THFLT, CTF 77, and CTG 77.4, but it was also
applicable to COMTHIRDFLT.
The lesson which this emphasizes is commented on under "Operations of
CTG 77.2, 0420 - 0520, October 25th".
At 0732 he knew that the left flank force had changed course to
355°(r) and that CTG 77.3 with the right flank force had also changed
course, the latter to about 020°(T). Since this movement by CTG 77.3 was
exactly what he had expected it can be assumed that he was pleased.
Meanwhile, as he moved northward, he awaited further (a) details on
the battle between the escort carriers and the FIRST Striking Force and
(b) orders from CTF 77.
At 0733 he was bearing 2325°(T), distant eight point seven miles from
the southern tip of Kanihaan Island.
658 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
(1) Operations of Commander Left Flank Force, 0700 - 0733, October
25th.
At 0700 Commander Left Flank Force in the LOUISVILLE was on course
175°(T) at twenty knots. He had divided his force sending COMCRUDIV
twelve, in Denver, with the Columbia, heywood l. edwards, leutze and
BENNION ahead, in order to finish off the crippled ASAGUMO. This group,
which was forming ahead of the LOUISVILLE (the DENVER being about 1,600
yards ahead of the LOUISVILLE), will be discussed separately. The
PORTLAND and MINNEAPOLIS were forming column astern of the LOUISVILLE and
were very nearly in position at this time. There is not sufficient data
to determine the positions of his screening destroyers during the period
0700 - 0733 but it is assumed that they maintained their previous relative
positions.*
About 0702 he noted that the CLAXTON was about 4,000 yards astern
of the LOUISVILLE.**
At this same time he received a message from the CONY reporting
that the ASAGUMO had opened fire.*** This firing seems to have been
directed at PT 323 since both COMCRUDIV TWELVE and the SIGOURNEY recorded
they had observed no splashes and COMCRUDIV TWELVE also recorded that
there were no hits.**** At 0703 he received a request from the CONY to
open fire which he granted at 0704.***
SINCE HE HAD ALREADY ASSIGNED TO COMCRUDIV TWELVE NOT ONLY THE
TASK TO DESTROY THE ASAGUMO, BUT ALSO ADEQUATE FORCES (TWO LIGHT CRUISERS
AND THREE DESTROYERS), IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR WHY HE GRANTED THE CONY
PERMISSION TO OPEN FIRE AT THIS TIME. CERTAINLY, BASED ON A GENERAL
KNOWLEDGE OF GUNFIRE CONCENTRATIONS AND EFFECTIVENESS, HER GUNFIRE WAS NOT
NEEDED, WHEREAS HER AMMUNITION AS A RESERVE, WAS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE.
PERHAPS IT WAS A MATTER OF MORALE, IN THAT THE CONY (A) (A UNIT OF DESDIV
XRAY) HAD NOT FIRED AT ANY TARGET, AND HE THOUGHT IT, THEREFORE, WELL TO
PERMIT HER TO OPEN FIRE OR (B) WAS NOW BEING FIRED UPON, AND SHOULD
PROPERLY BE PERMITTED TO REPLY TO REDUCE THE DANGER TO HERSELF.
About 0704:30 the CONY opened fire on the ASAGUMO. She did not
record the range or bearing,***** and at 0705 the BENNION opened fire at
a range of 12,000 yards, bearing 175°(T) .******
* Diagram "0" shows the positions of these screening destroyers.
Their tracks are not shown.
** Deck Log CLAXTON, October 25th, 1944.
*** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine
Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944,
Enclosure (C).
**** Action Report COMCRUDIV 12, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, and Subsequent Operations of CRUDIV 12 in Leyte Gulf, October
25th - 29th, 1944, Serial 0147, November 7th, 1944.
***** Action Report CONY, Night Battle, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
039-44, October 29th, 1944.
****** Deck Log BENNION, October 25th, 1944.
659 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
Also at 0705 the MINNEAPOLIS sighted three ships, hull down, on
bearing 165°(T).* These three ships were the Sumilon and Bilaa Point PT's
which were about fourteen miles away.
At 0706 (a) the AULICK opened fire on the ASAGUMO at a range of
11,000 yards,** and (b) the SIGOURNEY at a range of about 12,000 yards***
(bearings were not recorded). It is of interest to note, at this point,
that three DESDIV XRAY destroyers, which were screening the left flank
cruisers, had already opened fire whereas none of CRUDIV TWELVE'S group,
which had been directed to destroy the destroyer, had as yet done so.
The fact that he permitted these DESDIV XRAY destroyers to open fire
supports the view above expressed that he felt that the morale requirement
had a priority over the limited ammunition expenditure such firing would
entail.
Also at 0706 he directed Commander Battle Line to form the battle
line between Hibuson Island and Cabugan Grande Island.****
At 0707 he changed course to 210°(T)***** in order to give the
DENVER and COLUMBIA more sea room for firing.****
At 0708 he observed the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS and the THORN commence
firing at the ASAGUMO. The ranges and bearings were not recorded,
although the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS noted that the target's bow was blown off,
and that she was settling in the water. ******
At 0709 he observed the DENVER and COLUMBIA, which had just
steadied on their firing course, open fire.
At 0711 he received CTF 77* s warning of approaching enemy aircraft
which had been addressed to all commands.****
At 0715 he observed the LEUTZE open fire.*******
Also at 0715 he received a TBS voice radio contact report from the
MINNEAPOLIS to the effect that she had sighted on bearing 275° (T) what
appeared to be an enemy destroyer near the beach.******** By 0719 he had
* Action Report MINNEAPOLIS, Battle of South Surigao Strait,
Philippine Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 0215,
November 2nd, 1944.
** Deck Log AULICK, October 25th, 1944.
*** Action Report SIGOURNEY, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, Serial 055, October 30th, 1944.
**** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of
Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd,
1944.
***** Deck Log LOUISVILLE, October 25th, 1944.
****** Deck Logs HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS and THORN, October 25th, 1944.
******* Action Report LEUTZE, Battle of Surigao Straits, Serial 00335,
November 5th, 1944.
******** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine
Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th,
1944, Enclosure (C).
660 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
identified this ship as the friendly PC 1122* although it was most probably
PC 1133 which was close inshore off Sua while PC 1122 was close inshore
off Calapian Point about six miles to the south.**
Meanwhile a discussion had arisen as to whether or not any
Japanese ships other than those which had been reported later, i.e., one
cruiser and four destroyers, had succeeded in retiring safely. He,
therefore, directed the Commanding Officer LOUISVILLE to launch one of his
ship's planes to scout the Surigao Strait, Sogod Bay and Bohol Island
areas •
In accordance with these orders the LOUISVILLE, at 0716, launched
one SOC aircraft with orders to scout the above areas,*
Also at 0716 he intercepted a TBS voice radio message to the
HALFORD from COMDESDIV 112 who was now proceeding south in the ROBINSON to
rejoin the formation (a) inquiring if the MTB near her was friendly or
enemy and (b) her prompt reply that it was friendly,*** This was PT 323
returning to her base.
At 0717 he observed the CLAXTON open fire. She recorded that the
range was 12,000 yards, the bearing 195°(T).**** This bearing was
considerably in error, probably by more than thirty degrees.
At 0719 he ordered all ships to turn left to course 155°(T) .*****
While COMCRUDIV TWELVE'S group executed this turn by simultaneous ship
turns, his own three cruisers executed it as a column movement. At this
time the DENVER****** and COLUMBIA ceased firing and the COLUMBIA recorded
in her action report that the ASAGUMO had rolled over.******* During the
next two minutes the destroyers also ceased fire.
At 0720 he asked COMCRUDIV TWELVE if he could see anything else
worthwhile, and at 0721 that commander replied that he could see a small
destroyer or PC beyond the smoke on bearing 270°(T) .***** This was
probably PC 1122 which had been ordered to hide close inshore off Calapian
Point** (Panaon Island — shown in Diagram "F").
At 0722 he observed the ASAGUMO sink.*
* Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of
Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd,
1944.
** Action Report PC 1133, Surigao Strait Battle, Serial 205,
December 3rd, 1944.
*** Action Report HALFORD, Night Action in Surigao Strait, October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 043, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
**** Deck Log CLAXTON, October 25th, 1944.
***** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine
Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944,
Enclosure (C).
****** Action Report DENVER, Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 0031, November 4th, 1944.
******* Action Report COLUMBIA, Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 0010, November 1st, 1944.
661 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
At 0722 the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS reported to him that there were
numerous survivors in the water and two boats full of survivors on the
port bow,*
At 0723 he changed course to 170°(T)** in order not to follow the
DENVER and COLUMBIA too closely.
At 0727 he directed the AULICK and SIGOURNEY to finish off the
cripples and then to rejoin his force,* While he did not designate any-
specific target the objective was (a) clear to the SIGOURNEY, for the
SIGOURNEY deck log contains the 0730 entry, "proceeding in direction of
large columns of smoke"*** and (b) unclear to the AULICK for the commanding
officer of that destroyer, at 0731, asked for a confirmation of this
order,*
At the same time he received a report from a MTB that an enemy
force consisting of two battleships, two or three cruisers and destroyers
had been sighted fifteen miles south of Panaon Island.**** The THORN
recorded this message as two battleships, two cruisers and four destroyers
south of Bohol Island.***** Although the evidence is inconclusive, it
seems logical to consider that this report was a garble of PT 190' s 0705
contact report on an 0630 sighting of one battleship or heavy cruiser, one
cruiser afire, and four destroyers.******
At 0728 he directed the LOUISVILLE to change course to 155°(T)**
so as to more nearly parallel the track of COMCRUDIV TWELVE in the DENVER.
Up to this time things had been progressing most favorably. Ke
had largely destroyed the Japanese ships which had ventured up the strait,
he had requested that any escaping ships be destroyed by aircraft (which
he presumed was about to occur), he had just sunk the ASAGUMO, he had
launched a plane to locate any retiring enemy units for the purpose of
destroying them by gunfire, and he had not been attacked by Japanese
aircraft, although he knew it was likely that such aircraft at this very
time were attacking allied shipping off the landing beaches.
Suddenly at this point (0728) he received a message from CTF 77
reporting that the Task Force's CVE's were under attack by enemy surface
units composed of battleships, cruisers and destroyers twenty-five miles
northeast of Samar Island.**** This message was CTF 77 's retransmission
of a message from CTU 77.4.3 (a CVE group off Samar Island) stating that
* Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine
Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944,
Enclosure (C).
** Deck Log LOUISVILLE, October 25th, 1944.
*** Deck Log SIGOURNEY, October 25th, 1944.
**** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
***** Action Report THORN, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th, 1944,
Serial 034, October 30th, 1944.
****** Action Report PT 190, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0398, October 30th, 1944.
662 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
he was under attack by a Japanese force. The PHOENIX intercepted an
earlier message at 0715.* The Japanese force was the Main Body, FIRST
Striking Force, which had sortied undetected through San Bernardino
Strait. **
As this presented a new and perhaps unexpected development he
immediately commenced re-estimating the situation. Exactly what his
thought processes were at this point are not explained. However, it is
clear that two principal courses of action presented themselves: (a) to
continue his present operations and endeavor to destroy any additional
stragglers or (b) to return to Leyte Gulf where, as CTG 77.2, he could
re-form his command.
He decided to execute the latter course of action leaving behind
the two destroyers (AULICK and SIGOURNEY) which he had directed to destroy
the cripples.
His decision in this case was of course correct for the following
reasons: (a) His basic instructions from CTF 77 had been promulgated in
Harbor Defense Plan No. ONE issued by CTF 77 at 1541, October 21st,
wherein he had been directed in part, "during darkness be underway and
defend the gulf against the entry of hostile surface forces from either
the eastern or southern entrance to Surigao Strait",*** (b) his basic
instructions for the Battle of Surigao Strait had been promulgated by CTF
77 at 1443, October 24th, wherein he had directed, "to take night position
lower Leyte Gulf. Destroy enemy forces encountered",**** and (c) this had
been largely accomplished, and now, based also on Harbor Defense Plan No.
ONE, he was expected to return to his respective fire support areas during
daylight.
Therefore, he had only to determine which enemy force presented
the greater danger to the Allied forces in Leyte Gulf (a) those enemy
units remaining in lower Surigao Strait and the Mindanao Sea or (b) those
presently engaging TG 77.4. This presented no problem for (1) as
mentioned earlier, he had requested air attacks against the above
remaining enemy units which, failing to destroy them, should force them
to retire even farther to the westward, (2) his presence in the lower
gulf would permit him to interpose should any of those units attempt to
enter the gulf and (3) the danger from the enemy forces off Samar was
clearly greater.
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944.
** The Battle off Samar was to have been written as Volume VT of the
Battle for Leyte Gulf,
*** CTF 77 Dispatch 210641 October 1944 to CTF's 78, 79, CTG's 77.2 and
77.3.
**** C0M7THFLT (likely CTF 77) Dispatch 240543 October 1944 to All TFC's
and TGC's 7THFLT, info COMSOWESPAC, C0M3RDFLT.
663 CONFIDENTIAL
COM LEFT FLANK FORCE
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
HIS DECISION TO RETURN TO LEYTE GULF WAS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF
MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING FOR HERE, IN THE ABSENCE OF HIS SUPERIOR AND FACED
WITH A CHANGING SITUATION, HE HAD INSTINCTIVELY ACTED AS HIS SUPERIORS
WOULD HAVE HIM ACT AS WAS DEMONSTRATED LATER (0754) WHEN AS CTG 77,2 HE
WAS ADVISED BY CTF 77 THAT ALL AVAILABLE DESTROYERS, PLUS NASHVILLE, WERE
BEING SENT TO HIM FOR SORTIE (PRESUMABLY TO DEFEND THE ESCORT CARRIERS
NOW UNDER ATTACK).
At 0730 he directed his destroyers to form an antisubmarine screen
around the cruisers* and at the same time directed the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS
to investigate the survivors** which she had previously reported.
At 0732 he changed course to 355°(T), followed at 0733 by COMCRUDIV
TWELVE, in order to proceed north through Surigao Strait and assist the
friendly CVE's which were under attack off Samar. He reported that at
this time he could see four enemy ships dead in the water and burning
fiercely.* It is more likely that these were merely four columns of smoke,
for the CONY, at this time, recorded that she could see four ships, hull
down, to the south.*** Also, it is likely that he had seen these ships
earlier during his movement down the strait, for at 0730 all of the
Japanese ships to the south, including the MOGAMI, had passed beyond the
limiting bearing on the eastern edge of Panaon Island, and the COLUMBIA
recorded at this time that only one column of smoke remained (FUSO fire)
and that all masts had disappeared.**** The CONY likely saw the MTB»s
engaged in the rescue of the personnel of PT 493 at Maoyo Point, Panaon
Island.
Subsequent operations are contained in the Epilogue. At 0733
Commander Left Flank Force was bearing 232f°(T), distant eight point
seven miles from the southern tip of Kanihaan Island.
(2) Operations of COMCRUDIV TWELVE, 0700 - 0733, October 25th.
At 0700 COMCRUDIV TWELVE, in the DENVER, followed by the COLUMBIA,
and preceded by the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS and LEUTZE in that order, was
proceeding on course 170°(T), speed twenty knoos to sink the ASAGUMO,
which was about 16,500 yards away. At this time he was about 1,600 yards
ahead of the LOUISVILLE. The BENNION, which had been investigating
rubbish, was about 4,000 yards to the east of the DENVER.
* Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
*** Action Report CONY, Night Battle, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
039-44, October 29th, 1944.
**** Action Report COLUMBIA, Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 0010, November 1st, 1944.
664 CONFIDENTIAL
COMCRUDIV TWELVE
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
At 0701 he recorded that the Japanese ship (ASAGUMO) was firing on
the ships assigned to him but that no hits had been sustained and no
splashes were noted.* Actually this firing seems to have been directed
against PT 323, which was making torpedo attacks, rather than against the
ships of CRUDIV TWELVE.
At 0705, immediately after the CONY had opened fire at 0704:30, he
observed the BENNION open fire on bearing 175°(T), range 12,000 yards. **
At 0706 he changed course to 180° (T) by simultaneous ship turns.
(This placed the COLUMBIA 1,000 yards directly astern of the DENVER. )***
At 0708 he changed course to 210°(T) to unmask the cruisers' after
batteries, slowed to fifteen knots*** and ordered his ships to open fire.*
The HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS opened fire immediately,**** the DENVER***** and
COLUMBIA****** at 0709, after completing the turn.
It is of interest that the DENVER employed her secondary battery
(5-inch) while the COLUMBIA employed her main battery of 6- inch guns.
Although the DENVER did not give the range and bearing, the COLUMBIA did,
having recorded an opening fire range of 11,650 yards and a bearing of
166° (T ).****** It is of interest that both her track chart******* and
Diagram "0" show the bearing to have been 156°(T). It therefore seems
likely that the COLUMBIA bearing of 166°(T) was correctly taken but
improperly logged.
The LEUTZE delayed firing until 0715.******** Although she did
not state the range or bearing it appears from Diagram "0" that the
ASAGUMO was bearing 129° (T), distant about 7,800 yards.
It is not clear why COMCRUDIV TWELVE did not issue some sort of
fire distribution instructions, for he had with him two light cruisers and
three destroyers, the latter three most likely as a screen. Certainly the
gunfire from either one of the cruisers, or one or more well directed
torpedoes from one of the destroyers, should have sufficed. At this time,
although the BENNION had expended all of her torpedoes there were six in
the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS and five in the LEUTZE. Perhaps COMCRUDIV TWELVE
realized that although there was some ammunition replacement in the area
in the ammunition ships, there were no torpedo replacements.
* Action Report COMCRUDIV 12, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, and Subsequent Operations of CRUDIV 12 in Leyte Gulf, October
25th - 29th, 1944, Serial 0147, November 7th, 1944.
** Deck Log BENNION, October 25th, 1944.
*** Deck Log COLUMBIA, October 25th, 1944.
**** Deck Log HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, October 25th, 1944.
***** Action Report DENVER, Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 0031, November 4th, 1944.
****** Action Report COLUMBIA, Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 0010, November 1st, 1944.
******* Ibid., Track Chart.
******** Action Report LEUTZE, Battle of Surigao Straits, Serial 00335,
November 5th, 1944.
665 CONFIDENTIAL
COMCRUDIV TWELVE
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
At 0719 he received a TBS voice radio message from Commander Left
Flank Force directing all ships to turn left to course 155°(T).* While
the LOUISVILLE, PORTLAND and MINNEAPOLIS executed this turn as a column
movement, the DENVER, COLUMBIA, and the three destroyers with the DENVER,
executed it by simultaneous ship turns.
At this time he noted that (a) the DENVER** and COLUMBIA had
ceased firing, and (b) the ASAGUMO roll over,*** He also noted that
within the next two minutes all of the destroyers had ceased firing.
During this firing the COLUMBIA expended main battery ammunition
(6-inch) and had main battery ammunition remaining as shown below:
ON HAND REMAINING
AT 0707 FIRED AT 0722
FIRING SHIP AP HC AP HC AP HC
DENVER 113 1083 — — 113 1083
COLUMBIA 156 120 103 — 53 120
Although the DENVER did not fire 6-inch she is listed above in
order better to aopreciate the main battery ammunition situation in this
cruiser division at this time.
At 0720 he was queried by Commander Left Flank Force as to whether
he could see anything else that was worthwhile. At 0721 he replied that
he could see a small destroyer or PC beyond the smoke and off the point,
on bearing 270°(T).* This was probably PC 1122, which had been ordered to
hide close inshore off Caligangan Point.****
At 0722 he observed the ASAGUMO sink at a ranze of four miles.*****
The COLUMBIA recorded at this time that all masts of enemy vessels had
disappeared and that only one column of smoke remained,****** This column
of smoke was presumably from the FUSO fire. At this point the HEYWOOD L.
EDWARDS reported to Commander Left Flank Force that there were (a) numerous
survivors in the water and (b) two boats full of survivors on the port bow,*
At 0724 he (COMCRUDIV TWELVE) changed course to 150° (T) and
increased speed to twenty knots,*** At this time the Commanding Officer
* Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine Islands,
October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944, Enclosure
(C).
** Action Report DENVER, Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 0031, November 4th, 1944.
*** Deck Log COLUMBIA, October 25th, 1944.
**** Action Report PC 1133, Surigao Strait Battle, Serial 205, December
3rd, 1944.
***** Deck Log DENVER, October 25th, 1944.
****** Action Report COLUMBIA, Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 0010, November 1st, 1944.
666 CONFIDENTIAL
COMCRUDIV TWELVE and
COM ATTACK SECTION ONE
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
COLUMBIA intercepted a message from CTU 77.4.3 reporting that she was
under attack by enemy forces,* but he apparently failed to inform
COMCRUDIV TWELVE of this contact report for that commander did not receive
this information until 073S.**
By 0726 all CRUDIV TWELVE ships were in column as shown in Diagram
"0".
At 0730 Commander Left Flank Force directed the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS
to investigate the survivors*** which she immediately did. Upon
approaching she discovered that there were two groups of survivors, one
off Tungo Point and one off Kanihaan Island.**** The first group was
composed of survivors from the ASAGUMO and the second of survivors from
the FUSO. The two boats were motor launches from the ASAGUMO.*****
At 0733 COMCRUDIV TWELVE changed course to 355°(T), following
Commander Left Flank Force and momentarily slowed to fifteen knots******
in order to enter the formation from astern.
At 0733 the DENVER was bearing 230° (T), distant seven point eight
miles from the southern tip of Kanihaan Island. The HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS,
on course 055°(T) at twenty knots, was bearing 224°(T), distant seven
point twenty-five miles from the same point.
(3) Operations of COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX and Commander Attack Section
ONE, 0700 - 0733, October 25th.
At 0700 COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX (Commander Attack Section ONE), in the
NEWCOMB, was still in the general area about five miles west of Hibuson
Island. His flagship was towing the ALBERT W. GRANT alongside, and the
RICHARD P. LEARY was screening. He was making good a course of 330°(T) at
about six point six knots. *******
At 0710 he received a warning of imminent air attack. *******
* Action Report COLUMBIA, Surigao Straits, October 24th - 25th, 1944,
Serial 0010, November 1st, 1944.
** Action Report COMCRUDIV 12, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, and Subsequent Operations of CRUDIV 12 in Leyte Gulf, October
25th - 29th, 1944, Serial 0147, November 7th, 1944.
*** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine
Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944,
Enclosure (C).
**** Action Report HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, Battle of Surigao Straits,
October 25th, 1944, Serial 0102, November 2nd, 1944.
***** Composite Report on Surigao Strait Action by Commanding Officers
ASAGUMO (Commander Kazuo Shibayama, ex-UN) and MICHISHIO
(Commander Kazuo Tanaka, ex-IJN), March 15th, 1946, Army Historical
Division Microfilm HS-39A.
****** Deck Log COLUMBIA, October 25th, 1944.
******* Deck Log NEWCOMB, October 25th, 1944.
667 CONFIDENTIAL
COMDESDIV 112
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
At 0725 he likely learned with satisfaction that the ALBERT W.
GRANT had cut in No. FOUR boiler on the main steam line.* This boiler had
heretofore (since 0547) been cut in on the auxiliary steam line only.
At 0733 the group of three destroyers was about ten miles northwest
of Hibuson Island,
(4) Operations of COMDESDIV 112, 0700 - 0733, October 25th.
At 0700 COMDESDIV 112, in the ROBINSON, with the BRYANT, was still
in the survivor area trying to pick up Japanese survivors. At this time
the BRYANT decided to abandon the attempt to pick up survivors, and headed
instead for the cruisers to the south.**
The HALFORD which was about two miles east of this area was
preparing to sink a small boat which had been attempting to escape. At
0703 she succeeded and at 0705 she also headed south to join the cruisers.***
Apparently COMDESDIV 112 was determined not to depart until he had
recovered at least one Japanese survivor, for he continued in the area
until he had done so. Then, at 0712, he also headed south to join the
cruisers.****
The total number of Japanese survivors picked up to this time was
four, three by the CLAXTON and one by the ROBINSON .*****
About 0715 he sighted a MTB (PT 323) about eight miles to the
south and on a northerly course. Whether he or the HALFORD, which was
considerably closer, challenged PT 323 is not stated but it was probably
the ROBINSON for PT 323 stated that the destroyer apparently could not
see her reply. ******
At 0716 he asked the HALFORD if those were enemy motor torpedo
boats and if she was engaging them to which the HALFORD promptly replied
that they were friendly. At 0717 he asked the HALFORD who had been firing
and received the reply that the MTB's had been firing.******* Although
there is no statement concerning any firing at this time by PT 323 this
MfB might well have been firing at the ASAGUMO or at her two boats.
* Action Report ALBERT W. -GRANT, Operations against the Central
Philippines, Leyte Area, and Night Surface Action against Japanese
Task Force in Surigao Strait, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0106, November lltS, 1944.
** Deck Log BRYANT, October 25th, 1944.
*** Deck Log HALFORD, October 25th, 1944.
**** Deck Log ROBINSON, October 25th, 1944.
***** Action Report COMDESDIV 112, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 040,
October 31st, 1944.
****** Action Report PT 323, Nisht of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No
Serial, October 30th, 1944.
******* Action Report HALFORD, Night Action in Surigao Strait, October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 048, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
668 CONFIDENTIAL
CTG 77.3
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
At 0730, probably because Commander Left Flank Force had ordered
an antisubmarine screen at this time, COMDESDIV 112 noted, a little
prematurely", that his division had joined that commander and had formed
an eleven ship screen.*
At 0733 the ROBINSON was bearing 025° (T), distant 13,800 yards
from the LOUISVILLE.
(5) Operations of CTG 77.3, 0700 - 0733, Octobsr 25th.
At 0700 CTG 77.3 (Commander Right Flank Force), in the PHOENIX,
with BOISE, SHROPSHIRE and DESRON TWENTY-FOUR, less DALY, which was still
investigating MTB's near Cabugan Chico Island, was following Commander
Left Flank Force down the strait at twenty knots on course 150°(T). He
was about seven miles behind the LOUISVILLE and was following the same
general track.**
At 0701 he changed course to 180°(T).***
At 0710 he observed the cruisers and destroyers of the Left Flank
Force opening fire on a target to the south.****
At 0715 his flagship (PHOENIX) intercepted a TBS voice radio
message from CTU 77.4.3 (Northern Carrier Group— a CVE group off Samar) to
CTF 77 reporting that the carriers were under attack by Japanese battleships
and other vessels.**** Apparently he did not relay this message to CTG
77.2 for, based on his action report, that commander did not receive this
information until it was relayed by CTF 77 at 0723.*****
OWING TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS DISPATCH IT IS NOT CLEAR WHY CTG
77.3 DID NOT QUERY CTG 77.2 AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THAT COMMANDER HAD
RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION. CERTAINLY THE INFORMATION WAS OF CONSIDERABLE
IMPORTANCE TO CTG 77.2 FOR IT SHOWED THAT THE JAPANESE FORCE (MAIN BODY
FIRST STRIKING FORCE), WHICH HAD BEEN UNDER HEAVY AIR ATTACK ON THE
PREVIOUS DAY IN THE SIBUYAN SEA, HAD PASSED THROUGH SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT
DURING THE NIGHT AND WAS EVEN NOW MOVING TOWARD LEYTE GULF. IN THIS
CONNECTION IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT FAILURE TO (A) FORWARD VITAL
INFORMATION PROMPTLY EVEN THOUGH IT MAY BE INCOMPLETE AT THE TIME OR (B)
APPEARS INCONSEQUENTIAL, MAY HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT UPON THE OPERATIONS OF
THE COMMANDER FOR WHAT MAY APPEAR UNIMPORTANT TO ONE COMMANDER MAY BE
VITALLY IMPORTANT TO ANOTHER.******
* Action Report COMDESDIV 112, Battle of Surigao Strait, Serial 040,
October 31st, 1944.
** Since (a) CTG 77.3 took no part in the sinking of the ASAGUMO and
(b) his track lies along the track of CTG 77.2, the track of TG 77.3
is not shown on Diagram H0M.
*** Deck Log PHOENIX, October 25th, 1944,
**** Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, PhilipDine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944.
***** Preliminary Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
****** Basic Rapid Communication Plan for the U.S. Fleets (FLTCOM)(USF 70
(B)), Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Division of Naval
Communications, June 1947, Chapter ONE, Section 130, Paragraph 133.
669 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
At 0722 he noted the sinking of the ASAGUMO.*
At 0729 he directed his cruisers to form column. **
At 0732, knowing that CTG 77.2 was turning to the north, he
changed course to 020°(T) and after completing the change of course,
anticipating that there would be orders to proceed to the aid of the CVE's
which were then under attack,* increased speed to twenty five knots at
0736.***
At 0733 he was bearing 276°(T), distant seven point six miles from
the southern tip of Kanihaan Island and was about six miles north of the
LOUISVILLE.
(B) Operations of Motor Torpedo Boats, 0700 - 0733, October 25th.
The operations of the Motor Torpedo Boats which were returning to
their bases are not discussed and, in general, their tracks are not shown
on Diagrams "0" and "P".
(1) PT's 137 and 150.
It will be recalled that at the end of the last Deriod (0600 -
0700) (a) PT 137 (SE Panaon PT's) and PT 150 (SW Panaon PT's) were
simultaneously, but independently, closing the MOGAMI in order to attack
her and (b) these MTB«s had been taken under fire by the MOGAMI. This
fire was not particularly accurate for the two MTB's were not driven off
until the arrival of the AKEBONO which at this time departed from her
screening station with the SECOND Striking Force in order to escort the
MOGAMI.
At approximately 0700, when about 7, 500 yards south of Balong-
balong,**** PT 150 caught up with PT 137 and the two motor torpedo boats
then continued on toward the MOGAMI. They were now taken under fire by
the AKEBONO as well. However, the enemy gunfire was short and no damage
resulted.*** kx
About 0715, after having received permission to return to their
base, PT's 137 and 150 abandoned the attack and retired to the northwest.****
At 0733 they were approximately four and one-half miles, bearing 272°(T),
from Balongbalong (Diagram "P").
**
Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Surface Engagement with
Japanese Forces, Surigao Strait, Philippine Islands, October 25th,
1944, Serial 00117, November 10th, 1944.
Deck Log BOISE, October 25th, 1944.
*** Deck Log PHOENIX, October 25th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 150, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
0396, October 29th, 1944.
***** Action Report PT 137, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial
11, November 4th, 1944.
670 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
(2) East Amagusan PT's.
(a) PT's 328 and 329.
At this time PT's 328 and 329 were en route to their base and
are, therefore, no longer discussed herein nor are their tracks shown on
Diagram "0".
(b) PT 323.
At 0700 PT 323 fired the first of three torpedoes* at the
damaged ASAGUMO which was firing at her without much effect with one gun.**
Observing that this torpedo had missed, the Commanding Officer PT 323
made a second torpedo firing run, and fired a second torpedo which also
missed. He then made a third torpedo firing run, and fired a third
torpedo which hit the ASAGUMO in her after section.***
It seems likely that during this torpedo firing PT 323 had
also fired her guns at the ASAGUMO, for at 0717 COMDESDIV 112 queried the
HALFORD as to what ship had been firing and was informed that the MTB's
had been firing.****
About 0705 she seems to have steadied on course 045°(T) and to
have increased speed to about twenty-five knots in order to clear the area
CTG 77.2 was likely to use when he opened fire against the ASAGUMO
(Diagram "0"). At approximately 0710 she changed course to about 000°(T)
and commenced her return to base.
At 0715 she was challenged by a destroyer steaming south* (as
discussed under "Operations of COMDESDIV 112, 0700 - 0733, October 25th",
this was probably the ROBINSON). Since it appeared that the destroyer
could not see her reply the Commanding Officer PT 323 informed CTG 77.2
to this effect and requested that commander to notify the destroyer that
she was friendly.* (There is no record of these messages in the voice
logs, but there is a record of a message from COMDESDIV 112 to the HALFORD
asking if the PT boats were friendly or enemy, and of the HALFORD* s reply:
"Friendly".*****)
* Action Report PT 323, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 30th, 1944.
** Action Report COMCRUDIV 12, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, and Subsequent Operations of CRUDIV 12 in Leyte Gulf, October
25th - 29th, 1944, Serial 0147, November 7th, 1944.
*** Composite Report on Surigao Strait Action by Commanding Officers
ASAGUMO (Commander Kazuo Shibayama, ex-IJN) and MICHISHIO (Commander
Kazuo Tanaka, ex-IJN), March 15th, 1946, Army Historical Division
Microfilm HS-39A.
**** Action Report HALFORD, Night Action in Surigao Strait, October
24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 048, October 26th, 1944, Enclosure (A).
***** Action Report CLAXTON, Battle of Surigao Straits, Philippine
Islands, October 24th - 25th, 1944, Serial 007, November 5th, 1944,
Enclosure (C).
671
CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
(3) Kanihaan PT's.
At 0700 Commander Kanihaan PT's, with PT»s 495, 489 and 492, was
proceeding toward Maoyo Point on course 2535°(T) at a speed of seventeen
knots and was bearing 244°(T), distant six miles from the southern tip of
Kanihaan Island.
At 0702, when about halfway from Kanihaan Island to Maoyo Point,
he saw, at a range of seven miles, a cruiser of the MOGAMI class on fire
aft. This cruiser was rounding the southern end of Panaon Island on a
southwesterly course at high speed.*
Since at this time the MOGAMI (a) was well to the southwest at a
distance of about nineteen miles, (b) under the visibility conditions
existing and the rules for visibility** could not be seen except under
mirage conditions and (c) was to the westward of the MTB's while the sun
had just risen in the east, it seems correct to say that there was a
mistake in the time of contact as reported by the MTB's. This conclusion
is supported by (a) PT 491 which states that the Kanihaan PT's arrived at
Maoyo Point at 0800*** whereas the Kanihaan PT's say that they arrived
there at 0700,* and (b) that both PT's 137 and 150 reported that at this
time the MOGAMI was smoking badly abaft the stack with no reference to an
observable fire**** whereas earlier (0543) a fire had been noted on her
stern.***
Therefore, it seems likely that Commander Kanihaan PT's in writing
up his report more or less guessed at the times and that the fire he saw
in the stern of the MOGAMI at a range of seven miles had actually been
sighted much earlier.
Except for these matters the remainder of the report was correct
as the ship seen was in fact the MOGAMI which was on a southwesterly
course rounding the southern end of Panaon Island (Diagram "P" shows
MOGAMI track).
At 0728 he slowed to five knots and at 0730 went alongside PT 491.
At this time he noted that PT 493, which had been badly damaged, was
beached on Maoyo Point.*****
At 0733 the Kanihaan PT's were still at Maoyo Point.
* * *
* Action Report PT 495, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
** Bowditch, American Practical Navigator, Revised Edition, 1938, Part
II, Table 8.
*** Action Report PT 491, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
**** Action Reports PT 137 and PT 150, Night of October 24th - 25th,
1944, Serials 11, November 4th, 1944, and 0396, October 29th, 1944,
respectively.
***** This MTB appears to have sunk about 0745 although PT 493 gave the
sinking as 0630 and PT 495 as 0715.
672 CONFIDENTIAL
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
CONFIDENTIAL 0700 - 0733, October 25th
At 0735 he felt an underwater explosion which he believed to be
the ASAGUMO as she had disappeared when he passed her location on his way
back to his base,* This was undoubtedly the explosion reported at 0734
by the DENVER and COLUMBIA to COMCRUDIV TWELVE.**
(4) Lower Surigao PT's.
(a) PT 490.
PT 490 was returning to her base and therefore her operations
are not discussed further.
(b) PT 491.
At 0700 PT 491 was still alongside the damaged PT 493 which
was beached on Maoyo Point and was receiving on board the survivors of
that MTB including the five wounded and the bodies of the two who had been
killed.
At 0730 the Commanding Officer PT 491 noted that the Kanihaan
PT's had arrived and had come alongside but he does not state for what
purpose. Whether it was to transfer some of the survivors to his own
command, to help pull the PT 493 into deep water, or merely to confer is
not stated,*** although the latter reason seems the more likely.
At approximately 0745 he observed the PT 493 slide off the
reef and sink in deep water.*** Whether this was due to natural causes
and her damaged condition or to action by the other MTB's is not stated.
At 0733 PT 491 continued to remain alongside the damaged PT
493 at Maoyo Point.
(c) PT 493.
At 0700 PT 493 was still beached on Maoyo Point with PT 491
alongside. She was continuing to transfer the survivors to PT 491.
By 0730 the Commanding Officer PT 491 observed the arrival of
the Kanihaan PT's on the scene.
Shortly after this at approximately 0745 he observed PT 493
slide off the reef and sink in deep water.****
* Action Report PT 495, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
** Action Report COMCRUDIV 12, Battle of Surigao Strait, October 25th,
1944, and Subsequent Operations of CRUDIV 12 in Leyte Gulf, October
25th - 29th, 1944, Serial 0147, November 7th, 1944.
*** Action Reports PT's 495, 489, 492, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944,
No Serials, October 26th, 1944.
**** Action Report PT 493, Night of October 24th - 25th, 1944, No Serial,
October 26th, 1944.
496799 o - 59 - 53 673 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL EPILOGUE
CHAPTER XXVI - EPILOGUE
(A) Concluding Events,
The concluding events of the Battle of Surigao Strait consisted mainly
(a) of the continued retirement through the Mindanao and Sulu Seas toward
a safer haven to the westward of those units of the SECOND Striking Force
and THIRD Section (cruisers and destroyers) which had escaped destruction
in Surigao Strait and (b) the continued movement northward to lower Leyte
Gulf of those Allied units (cruisers and destroyers) (largely units of
TG's 77.2 and 77.3) now in lower Surigao Strait. These latter units were
to rejoin the battleships off Taytay Point and were then to (a) take up a
position to defend Leyte Gulf against the expected assault of the Main
Body, FIRST Striking Force, which was at this time attacking the CVE's off
Samar Island or (b) proceed to sea to succor the CVE's.
(1) Japanese Operations.
The SECOND Striking Force with the MOGAMI and SHIGURE from the
THIRD Section continued its retirement through the Mindanao Sea, The
attack by Allied aircraft against the relatively undamaged units continued
until about 0905, although it continued longer against the damaged MOGAMI
and ABUKUMA. During the afternoon of October 25th and the morning of
October 26th there were several air attacks but despite this the SECOND
Striking Force, less the ABUKUMA, USHIO, AKEBONO, MOGAMI and SHIGURE,
arrived and refueled at Coron Bay during the afternoon of October 26th,
The operations of the latter three units were as follows:
(a) The ABUKUMA, escorted by the USHIO, continued her retirement
toward Cagayan for repairs. At 0933, she was attacked ineffectively by
Grumman fighters. At 0940, because of information from Commander SW Area
Force to the effect that Cagayan was unsuitable for repairs, she changed
her destination to Dapitan (Mindanao Island) which was about seventy miles
to the westward. After making overnight emergency repairs there she
headed for Coron Bay. During the morning of October 26th she was attacked
by land-based B-24's from the FIFTH Air Force. As a result of the
additional damage sustained, with the ensuing fires and internal
explosions, it became necessary to abandon ship. She 3ank at 1242 in
Latitude 08°-54.4'N, Longitude 1220-47.5'E. Her crew was rescued by the
USHIO which took them to Coron Bay where they arrived 0917, October 27th,
(b) At 0830 the MOGAMI, which had stopped because, owing to the
fire and intense heat, her engines could not be tended, was under air
attack until about 0930. She received hits in her after section and also
additional hits on her bow, which started a big fire forward. Since her
No. ONE magazine could not be flooded due to the pumps being damaged, the
danger of explosion made it necessary to abandon ship. She was then
torpedoed with one torpedo by the AKEBONO and sank at 1307 in Latitude
09°-30«N, Longitude 124°-56'E. Her survivors were carried by the AKEBONO
to Cavite, arriving at 2400, October 26th,
674 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL EPILOGUE
(c) The SHIGURE continued on ahead of the SECOND Striking Force
and at a higher speed (twenty- four knots). She was under attack by
land-based planes on the morning of the 25th and of the 26th. (The
FIFTH Air Force launched fifty-six B-24fs and twenty-eight P-38's for
this attack and three B-24's for the attack on the morning of the 26th.)
She did not enter Coron Bay because she observed the SECOND Striking Force
under air attack to the south and, therefore, headed for Brunei Bay,
Borneo, passing west of Palawan Island, arriving at 1700, October 27th.
(2) Allied Operations.
As CTG 77.2 (Commander Left Flank Force) and CTG 77.3 proceeded
northward to rejoin the battleships, the Allied forces in Leyte Gulf, at
about 0814, came under enemy air attack, likely from planes of the FIFTH
Base Air Force and of the FOURTH Air Army. (On the way CTG 77.2 detached
the CONY and WELLES to remain behind as additional pickets in Surigao
Strait.)
This air attack, which was largely directed against those
amphibious forces remaining off the beaches, and against the battleships
off Taytay Point, was ineffectual, primarily because it was made in
piecemeal fashion and in very limited numbers against effective opposition.
It was followed by similarly ineffectual attacks around 1100 and by others
later in the day.
At 0846 CTF 77 directed CTG 77.2 to proceed with his entire force
to a point about twenty- five miles west of Point FIN. (This newly
assigned point was bearing 072°(T), distant three point five miles from
Kanhandon Point Light, Hibuson Island, and was seven point twenty-five
miles west of Desolation Point, Dinagat Island.)
As CTG 77.2 proceeded towards this station CTF 77 at 0953 further
directed CTG 77.2 to (a) send immediately one division of battleships,
one division of heavy cruisers and about half of his destroyers to the
assistance of TU 77.4.3, and (b) re-form the remainder of his force inside
the Gulf.
Although the majority of his heavy ships were dangerously low on
ammunition to meet a force as strong as the Main Body, FIRST Striking
Force, and the majority of his destroyers were short of torpedoes, CTG
77.2, at 1015, in accordance with these instructions (a) formed a special
force consisting of the three battleships with the most armor-piercing
projectiles (TENNESSEE, CALIFORNIA, PENNSYLVANIA), one heavy cruiser
division embracing all the heavy cruisers under his command including the
SHROPSHIRE from TG 77.3 (LOUISVILLE, PORTLAND, MINNEAPOLIS, SHROPSHIRE)
and twenty destroyers consisting of five units from DESRON FIFTY-SIX
(ROBINSON, BRYANT, LEUTZE, HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, HALFORD) each armed with
five torpedoes; all six units of DESDIV XRAY, of which four (CLAXTON,
AULICK, CONY, SIGOURNEY) were each armed with ten torpedoes and two (THORN,
WELLES) were each armed with five torpedoes; five units from DESRON TWENTY-
ONE (NICHOLAS, 0«BANN0N, TAYLOR, LONG, RUSSELL) each armed with ten
torpedoes; and four units from DESRON FIFTY-ONE (HALLIGAN, HARADEN, TWIGGS,
WICKES), each armed with ten torpedoes to go to the aid of the escort
carriers, and (b) directed the remaining ships to protect Leyte Gulf and
to obtain fuel and ammunition as opportunity permitted.
675 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL EPILOGUE
With this special force, and after a delay ordered by CTF 77,
CTG 77.2, at 1127, departed the Gulf and headed for sea and the CVE's.
However, at 1257, he was recalled by CTF 77 and directed to concentrate
at the entrance to the Gulf. Here he remained during the remainder of
the day while certain of his ships fueled and replenished anmunition.
Meanwhile CTF 77 reinforced TG 77.2 with the NASHVILLE and three
destroyers (ABNEH READ, BUSH, MAC DONOUGH), plus all destroyers present
in TF's 78 and 79.
(B) General Situation, October 25th,
While the southern prong of the Japanese attacking forces (THIRD
Section and SECOND Striking Force), having been defeated in the Battle of
Surigao Strait, were retiring, the central prong of the Japanese attacking
forces (Main Body, FIRST Striking Force) had passed through San Bernardino
Strait without detection. Then, with the break of day, this force had
encountered, to the surprise of both sides, the Allied Escort Carrier
Force (CTG 77.4), which was slow and vulnerable and no real match for the
fast, hard-shooting, heavily-armored Japanese ships.
Meanwhile the northern prong of the Japanese force (Main Force) had
succeeded in drawing to the north the Allied covering force (THIRD Fleet)
so that this force was not available to support directly the escort
carriers.
A strange battle now ensued, largely between aircraft and guns, which
was terminated when Commander Main Body, FIRST Striking Force decided to
recall his units. This eventuated in the retirement of the Main Body
through San Bernardino Strait that night.
LEYTE GULF WAS SAFE FOR THE PRESENT!
676 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
APPENDIX I
MAIN BATTERY AMMUNITION (ARMOR-PIERCING AND TORPEDOES)
REMAINING IN TG«S 77 .2 AND 77 .3 AS OF
SHIP
GUNS
16" WEST VIRGINIA 8
MARYLAND 8
SUB-TOTAL 16
14" TENNESSEE** 12
CALIFORNIA** 12
PENNSYLVANIA** 12
MISSISSIPPI
12
SUB-TOTAL 48
BATTLESHIPS 64
8" LOUISVILLE** 9
PORTLAND** 9
MINNEAPOLIS** 9
SHROPSHIRE** 8
SUB-TOTAL 35
ARMOR-PIERCING PROJECTILES
ON
PERCENT
BOARD
PER GUN
CAPACITY*
CAPACITY*
111
13.9
1000
11.1
192
24.6
1000
19.2
303
18.9
2000
15.15
327
27.2
1200
27.2
213
17.8
1200
17.8
360
30.0
1200
30.0
189
15.7
1500
12.6
1089
22.7
5100
21.4
1392
21.7
7100
19.6
316
35.2
1305
24.2
94
10.5
1125
8.4
15
1.7
1215
1.2
920
115.0
1840
50.0
1345
38.4
5485
24.5
* Capacity as used herein does not indicate the shipfs total capacity
to carry main battery projectiles but is the sum of the AP and HC
projectiles that each ship was directed to have on hand by CTF 77
OpPlan 13-44, Serial 00022A, September 26th, 1944, 1200 ITEM.
** Designated to go to the aid of the escort carriers at 1015 October
25th, 1944.
677
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
SHIP
GUNS
ON
BOARD
PER GUN
CAPACITY*
PERCENT
CAPACITY*
6n DENVER
12
113
9.4
3360
3.4
COLUMBIA
12
53
4.4
3360
1.6
PHOENIX
15
551
36.7
3225
17.1
BOISE
15
536
35.7
3225
16.6
SUB- TOTAL
54
1253
23.2
13170
9.5
CRUISERS
89
TORPi
TUBE
2598
29.2
18655
TORPEDOES
13.9
SHIP AND SQUADRON
DO ON PER
S BOARD TUBE
ALLOWANCE
PERCENT
ALLOWANCE
21" SHROPSHIRE
8
8
1.0
8
100
DESRON FIFTY-FOUR
REKEY
10
2
MC GOWAN
10
0
MELVIN
10
1
MC DERMUT
10
0
MONSSEN
10
0
SUB-TOTAL
50
3
DESRON TWENTY-
•FOUR
HUTCHINS
10
0
DALY
10
5
BACHE
10
5
ETT.T,fH
10
0
BEALE
10
5
ARUNTA
4
0
SUB-TOTAL
54
15
.06
50
.28
54
28
* Capacity as used herein does not indicate the ship's total capacity
to carry main battery projectiles but is the sum of the AP and HC
projectiles that each ship was directed to hare on hand by CTF 77
OpPlan 13-44, Serial 00022A, September 26th, 1944, 1200 ITEM.
678
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
SHIP AND SQUADRON
TORPEDO
TUBES
ON
BOARD
PER PERCENT
TUBE ALLOWANCE ALLOWANCE
DESRON FIFTY-
-SIX
21" NEWCOMB*
10
5
R. P. LEARY*
10
7
H. L. EDWARDS*
10
6
BENNION*
10
0
LEUTZE*
10
5
ROBINSON*
10
5
BRYANT*
10
5
HALFORD*
10
5
SUB-TOTAL
80
38
♦475 80 47.5
DESDIV XRAY
CLAXTON
10
10
CONY
10
10
AULICK
10
10
SIGOURNEY
10
10
THORN
5
5
WELLES
5
5
SUB-TOTAL
50
50
1.0 50 100
GUNS
SUMMARY
ARMOR-PIERCING PROJECTILES
SHIPS
ON
BOARD
PERCENT
PER GUN CAPACITY** CAPACITY**
14
153
3990
26.1 25755 15.5
DRPEDO
rUBES
TORPEDOES
Tl
SHIPS
ON
BOARD
PERCENT
PER TUBE ALLOWANCE ALLOWANCE
26
242
114
.47
242
47
* Designated to go to the aid of the escort carriers at 1015 October
25th, 1944.
** Capacity as used herein does not indicate the ship's total capacity
to carry main battery projectiles but is the sum of the AP and HC
projectiles that each ship was directed to have on hand by CTF 77
OpPlan 13-44, Serial 00022A, September 26th, 1944, 1200 ITEM.
679
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
APPENDIX II
TIDAL CURRENTS IN SURIGAO STRAIT*
The current in Surigao Strait is made up of the tidal component and a
weaker drift to the west and south caused by the westward flowing North
Equatorial Current. In this area, as in San 3ernardino Strait, when the
moon is near its extreme declination, either north or south, the diurnal
inequality in the ebb current is so pronounced that one ebb entirely dis-
appears and instead of two floods and two ebbs there are but one flood
and one ebb in a day. Since the flood is greatly prolonged under these
conditions and since the flood tide rises in the Pacific and enters the
Mindanao Sea through the strait it follows that the current was setting
to the south in most of Surigao Strait, and to the west in the Mindanao
Sea and in the northern entrance to Surigao Strait during the approach to
and during the Battle of Surigao Strait,
Since the conditions producing tidal currents and the maximum
velocities of the currents in San Bernardino Strait and Surigao Strait
are roughly the same it was assumed that the difference in time between
high tide and maximum flood and between low tide and maximum ebb in the
two straits would be about the same. In San Bernardino Strait maximum
flood follows high tide by 1 hour and 36 minutes while maximum ebb
follows low tide by 1 hour and 29 minutes. For ease in calculations
1 hour and 30 minutes has been used for both the flood and ebb tides in
Surigao Strait.
Since the time of duration of the flood and ebb tides, the conditions
producing the tides and the maximum velocities are so similar, it follows
that the envelope of velocities of the tidal currents would be the same
shape in both straits. (See sketch page 70, Current Tables Pacific Coast.)
The effective current capacity of the various portions of the strait,
the Mindanao Sea between Bohol Island and Camiguin Island, and between
Siquijor Island and Mindanao Island was determined principally by the
relative widths of the channels. Using these parameters a table of
currents was calculated.
Current direction was determined by a consideration of the lines of
stream flow. These indicate that between Desolation Point, Dinagat Island
and Homonhon Island the flood current would set to the west, circle around
Hibuson Island and set to the south in Lower Surigao Strait. Similarly
* This appendix is based on data contained in the following: United
States Coast Pilot, Philippine Islands, Part II, 1939, pp. 34 - 36;
Current Tables Pacific Coast, 1944, pp. 70-77; Tide Tables Pacific and
Indian Oceans, 1944, pp. 297 and 299; Cine Pac-CincPOA Bulletin 114-44,
Tables of Tides, Currents and Daylight and Dark for Selected Points,
July 15th, 1944, pp. 7, 8 and 49; letter from ^ydrographer to President,
Naval War College/ Serial 7399, November 25th, 1953; Current Charts,
Northwestern Pacific Ocean, 1944, K.O. Misc. No. 10,058A; U.S.C.&G.S.
Charts 4220 and 4719; H.O. Chart 14424.
680 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
at the southern end of the strait the current turns around Binit Point
and moves toward the channel between Bohol Island and Camiguin Island on
a mean course of 243°(T).
In the various bays, such as Cabalian, Sogod and Butuan Bays, the
current forms a large eddy which moves clockwise in bays to west or
north of the main channels and counterclockwise to east or south of the
main channels.
681 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT TABLE SURIGAO
(All Times
ITEM)
OFF
OFF
ESCONCHADA
HIBUSON-
BOHOL-
OFF
BIN IT
241815 MAXF
KANIHAAN
241705
-LEYTE
BUGHO PT.
241615
10°-30«N
241500
CAMIGUIN
241800
SICUIJOR
Time:
241645
241745
Current :
i ■
3.50
1900
3.3
2.80
2.80
2.45
1.16
1.75
1845
1.65
1.92
1830
1.82
F
2000
24181 5
1945
1930
3.1
2.17
1.55
1.70
2100
1915
2045
2030
2.9
2.05
1.45
1.60
L
2200
2015
241845
2145
2130
2.7
1.90
0.9
1.35
1.48
2300
2115
1945
2245
2230
2.5
1.75
0.83
1.25
1.38
2400
2215
2045
2345
2330
0
2.3
1.60
0.77
1.15
1.27
250100
2315
2145
250045
250030
2.1
1.45
0.70
1.05
1.15
0115 MINF
250005
242345
2330
2200
0100
0045
2.10
1.70
1.70
1.45
0.70
1.C5
1.15
0
0130
0020
2345
2215
0115
0100
2.1
1.7
1.45
0.70
1.05
1.15
0230
0120
250045
2315
0215
0200
2.4
1.9
1.70
0.80
1.20
1.32
0330
0220
0145
250015
0315
0300
D
2.7
2.2
1.90
0.90
1.35
1.48
0400
0250
250230
0200
0045
0345
0330
2.9
2.3
2.3
2.00
1.00
1.45
1.60
0430 MAXF
0320
0300
0230
0115
0415
0400
3.0
2.4
2.4
2.10
1.00
1.50
1.65
0500
0350
0330
0300
0145
0445
0430
2.8
2.2
2.2
1.95
0.90
1.40
1.54
0600
0450
0430
0400
0245
0545
0530
2.1
1.7
1.7
1.50
0.70
1.05
1.15
A32
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
OFF
BINIT
250700
1.4
OFF
KANIHAAN
250550
1.1
ESCONCHADA
-LEYTE
HIBUSON-
BUGHO PT.
250500
1.00
10°-30'N
250345
0.50
BOHOL-
CAMIGUIN
250645
0.70
OFF
SIQUIJOR
Time:
Current :
250530
1.1
250630
0.77
0800
0.7
0650
0.6
0630
0.6
0600
0.50
0445
0.25
0745
0.35
0730
0.48
0900
0.00 S
0750
0.00
0730
0.00
0700
0.00
0545
0.00
0845
0.00
0830
0.00
E
1000
1.30
0850
1.00
0830
1.00
0800
0.90
0645
0.40
0945
0.60
0930
0.66
B
1100
2.00
0950
1.60
0930
1.60
0900
1.40
0745
0.60
1045
1.00
1030
1.10
1200
2.50
1050
2.00
1030
2.00
1000
1.70
0845
0.80
1145
1.30
1130
1.43
B
1300
2.70
1150
2.10
1130
2.10
1100
1.80
0945
0.90
1245
1.40
1230
1.54
1400
2.80 ME
1250
2.20
1230
2.20
1200
1.90
1045
0.90
1345
1.40
1330
1.55
MAXF
- Maximum flood (two for each flood tide)
MINF - Minimum flood
S - Slack water
ME - Maximum ebb
683
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT TABLE SURIGAO
(All Times HBO
SUMMARY
OFF
BINIT
OFF
KANIHAAN
241705
2.80
ESCONCHADA
-LEYTE
HIBUSON-
BUGHO PT.
241615
2.45
10°-30«N
241500
1.16
BOHOL-
241800
1.75
OFF
SKUIJOR
Time: 241815 MAXF
Current: 3.50
241645
2.80
241745
1.92
250115 MINF
2.10
250005
1.70
242345
1.70
242330
1.45
242200
0.70
250100
1.05
250045
1.15
250430 MAXF
3.00
250320
2.40
250300
2.40
250230
2.10
250115
1.00
250415
1.50
250400
1.65
250900 S
0.00
250750
0.00
250730
0.00
2507OO
0.00
250545
0.00
250345
0.00
250830
0.00
251400 ME
2.80
251250
2.20
251230
2.20
251250
1.90
251045
0.90
251345
1.40
251330
1.55
MAXF - Maximum flood (two for each flood tide)
MINF - Minimum flood
- Slack water
ME - Maximum ebb
6S4
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
APPENDIX III
ORGANIZATION OF COMBINED FLEET
1042 October 23rd - 1830 October 24th
BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF
COMMANDER IN CHIEF COMBINED FLEET
(a) Main Force
CARDIV 3
CV ZUIKAKU (FFF)
CVL ZUIHO
CVL CKITOSE
CVL CHIYODA
Air Group 601, elements of
653, elements of
CARDIV 4
BB/XCV HYUGA (F)
BB/XCV ISE
XCV JUNYO**
CVL RYUHO**
Air Group 634***
DESRON 10, elements of
DESDIV 41 less FUYUZUKI
DD SKIMOTSUKI
DESDIV 61 less SUZUTSUKI
Admiral Toyoda, So emu
Vice Admiral Ozawa, Jisaburo
Vice Admiral Ozawa, Jisaburo
Rear Admiral Kaizuka, Takeo*
Captain Sugiura, Kuro
Captain Kishi, Yoshiyuki
Captain Jo, Eiichiro
Rear Admiral Matsuda, Chiaki
Rear Admiral Nomura, Tomekichi*
Rear Admiral Nakase, Noboru*
Captain Shibuya, Harumi
Captain Matsuura, Yoshi
Captain Amano, Shigetaka
Captain Wakita, Kiichiro
DD's HATSUZUKI (F), AKITSUKI, WAKATSUKI
Captain Amano, Shigetaka
CORTRON 31, elements of
CL 0Y0D0 (FF)
CL ISUZU
DESDIV 43, elements of
MAKI, KIRI, KUWA
Rear Admiral Edo, Heitaro
Captain Mudaguchi, Kakuro
Captain Matsuda, Gengo
DESRON 11 Rear Admiral Takama, Tamotsu**-**
CL TAMA (F) Captain Yamamoto, Iwata
DD's SUGI, MOMI,** KAYA,** KASHI,** HINOKI (F)**
931st Air Group, elements of
Supply Force, Main Force**
XAO JINEI MARU
XAO TAKANE MARU
DD AKIKAZE
Escort Vessels 22, 29, 31, 33, 43, 132 .
*
■JHBHt-
Promoted to Rear Admiral October 15th, 1944o
Did not sortie with Main Force. . 0,onTU,
It seems probable that no elements of Air Group 634 were embarked in CaRDIV's
3 or 4 since all of them had been transferred to the 6TH Base Air Force.
Rear Admiral Takama in HINOKI did not sortie.
685
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(b) FIRST Striking Force
FIRST Section
BATDIV 1
BB YAMATO (FFF)*
BB MUSASHI***
BB NAGATO
CRUDIV 5 less MOGAMI
CA MYOKO (F)****
CA HAGURO
CA CHOKAI*****
DESRON 2 less SHIGURE, KIYOSHIMO
CL NOSHIRO (F)
DD SHIMAKAZE
DESDIV 2 less KYOSHIMO
DD's HAYASHIMO, AKISHIMO
DESDIV 31 less NAGANAMI****** and
ASASHIMO******
DD's KISHINAMI, OKINAMI
DESDIV 32
DD's HAMANAMI, FUJINAMI
SECOND Section
BATDIV 3
BB KONGO (FF)
BB HARUNA
CRUDIV 7
CA KUMANO
CA SUZUYA
CA TONE
CA CHIKUMA
(F)
Vice Admiral Kurita, Takeo
Vice Admiral Kurita, Takeo
Vice Admiral Ugaki, Matome
Rear Admiral Xorishita, Kobuer2-*
Rear Admiral Inokuchi, Toshihei**
Rear Admiral Kobe, Yuji**
Vice Admiral Hashimoto, Shintaro
Rear Admiral Ishihara, Itsu**
Captain Sugiura, Kajyu
Captain Tanaka, Jyo
Rear Admiral Hayakawa, Mikio
Captain Kajiwara, Sueyoshi
Captain Shiraishi, Nogoyoshi
Captain Fukuoka, Tokujiro
Captain Oshima, Ichitaro
Vice Admiral Suzuki, Yoshio
Vice Admiral Suzuki, Yoshio
Rear Admiral Shimazaki, Toshio**
Rear Admiral Shigenaga, Kazue**
Vice Admiral Shiraishi, Kazutaka
Captain Hitomi, Soichiro
Captain Teraoka, Masao
Captain Mayuzumi, Haruo
Captain Norimitsu, Saiji
Rear Admiral Kimura, Susumu
Captain Yoshimura, Katake
DESRON 10 less DESDIV s 4, 41, 61,
plus NOWAKI, KIYOSHIMO
CL YAHAGI
DD's NOWAKI, KIYOSHIMO*******
DESDIV 17 Captain Tanii, Tamotsu
DD's URAKAZE (F), HAMAKAZE,******* YUKIKAZE, ISOKAZE
*~
**
***
****
*****
******
*******
Became Force Flagship after sinking of ATAGO.
Promoted to Rear Admiral October 15th, 1944.
Damaged and dropped out 2^1510, October 1944*
Damaged and returned to Brunei 241200, October 1944. Flag transferred
to HAGURO.
Assigned to CRUDIV 5 by 1ST Striking Force Dispatch 230739.
Screen for TAKAO, 1ST Striking Force Dispatch 231035, October 1944.
Escorts for MUSASHI.
686
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD Section Vice Admiral Nishimura, Shoji
BATDIV 2 Vice Admiral Nishimura, Shoji
BB YAMASHIRO (FF) Rear Admiral Shinoda, Katsukiyo*
BB FUSO Rear Admiral Ban, Masami*
CA MOGAMI Captain Toma, Ryo
DESDIV 4 less NOWAKI, plus SHIGURE Captain Takahashi, Kameshiro
DD's MICHISHIO (F), ASAGUMO, YAMAGUMO, SHIGURE
Service Force
FIRST Supply Force
YUHO MRU
HAKKO MARU
ITSUKUSHLMA MARU
MANEI MARU
NIPPO MARU
OMUROSAN MARU
CHIBURI**
YURISHIMA
Escort No. 19
SECOND Supply Force
NICHIEI MARU
RYOEI MARU
KURAHASHI
MIYAKE
MANJU
(c) Advanced Expeditionary Force Vice Admiral Miwa, Shigeyoshi
FIRST Submarine Force Vice Admiral Miwa, Shigeyoshi
A Submarine Division
1-26, 1-45, 1-53, 1-54, 1-56
B Submarine Division
1-38, 1-41, 1-46, RO-41, RO-43, RO-46
C Submarine Division
RO-109, RO-112
XAS TSUKUSHI MARU
(d) Southwest Area Force Vice Admiral Mikawa, Gunichi
(1) SECOND Striking Force Vice Admiral Shima, Kiyohide
CRUDIV 21 Vice Admiral Shima, Kiyohide
CA NACHI (FFF) Captain Kanooka, Empei
CA ASHIGARA Captain Miura, Hayao
* Promoted to Rear Admiral October 15th, 1944*
** Escort for TAKAO, Commander 1ST Striking Force Dispatch 230905, October 1944-
687 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
DESRON 1
CL ABUKUMA (FF)
DESDIV 7
DD's AKEBONO (F), USHIO
DESDIV 18
DD's SHIRANUHI (F), KASUMI
Rear Admiral Kimura, Kasatomi
Captain Hanada, Takuo
Commander Iwarami, Jiichi
Captain Inoue, Yoshio
DESDIV 21 Commander Ishii, Hisashi
DD's WAKABA (F), HATSUSHIMO, HATSUHARU
CRUDIV 16 less KITAGAMI*
CA AOBA**
CL KINU
DD URANAMI
(2) SIXTH Base Air Force
(a) Western Attack Force ZERO
(b) We stern Attack Force ONE
(c) Western Attack Force WO
(d) Western Attack Force THREE
(e) Western Attack Force FOUR
(3) Philippine Force
31st Special Base Force (Manila)
32nd Special Base Force (Davao)
33rd Special Base Force (Cebu)
954th Air Group
955th Air Group
Vice Admiral Sakonju, Naomasa
Captain Yamazumi, Chusaburo
Captain Kawasaki, Harumi
Vice Admiral Fukudome, Shigeru
Vice Admiral Fukudome, Shigeru
Vice Admiral Yamada, Sadayoshi
Rear Admiral Kikuchi, Tomozo
Rear Admiral Joshima, Takatsugu
Major General Yamamoto, Kenji
Vice Admiral Mikawa, Gunichi
Rear Admiral Arima, Kaoru
Rear Admiral Doi, Naoharu
Rear Admiral Harada, Kaku
Commander Nakagome, Yoshimasa
Commander Imagawa, Fukuo
Attached Forces 3rd Southern Expeditionary Fleet
(4) THIRD Base Air Force
23th Air Flotilla
381st Air Group
(5) FIFTH Base Air Force
Vice Admiral Mikawa, Gunichi
Rear Admiral Kogure, Gunji
Captain Nakajima, Daizo
Vice Admiral Onishi, Takijiro
23rd Air Flotilla (North of Australia
Air Base Unit) Rear Admiral Furukawa, Tamotsu
26th Air Flotilla (Philippine Air Base Unit)***
6lst Air Flotilla (West Caroline Air
Base Unit) Vice Admiral Ueno, Keizo
153rd Air Group Captain Takahashi, Nobukichi
201st Air Group Captain Yamamoto, Sakae
76lst Air Group Captain Maeda, Kosei
1021st Air Group Captain Keito, Keiroku
331st Air Group Captain Shimoda, Kisao
* Assigned to counterlanding operations.
** Torpedoed 230425 October 1944 and did not sortie with remaining ships.
*** Commanded temporarily by a Senior Officer after death of Rear Admiral Arima
Masafumi, October 15th.
688
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(e) Antisubmarine Patrol Force
CORTRON 31, elements of
DESDIV 30 less AKIKAZE
UZUKI, YUZUKI
DESDIV 43, elements of
MOMO, TAKE, UME
933rd Air Group
(f) "T" Attack Force
752nd Air Group, elements of
762nd Air Group
801st Air Group, elements of
7th Heavy Bomber Regiment (Army)
98th Heavy Bomber Regiment (Army)
Captain Mita, Kunio
Captain Kuno, Shuzo
496799 O - 59 - 54
689
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
APPENDIX IV
ORGANIZATION OF ALLIED FORCES AT
1042 October 23rd - 1830 October 24th
BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF
ALLIED NAVAL FORCES
(a) TF 77 CENTRAL PHILIPPINES ATTACK FORCE
(1) TG 77.1 Flagship Group*
(a) TU 77.1.1 Fleet Flagship Unit
AGC WASATCH (FFFFF)
DD»s AMUEN, MULLANY
(b) TU 77.1.2 Cruiser Unit
NASHVILLE**
DSSDIV 48 less AMMEN, MULLANY
ABNER READ (F), BUSH
(2) TG 77.2 Bombardment and Fire
Support Group
(a) TU 77.2.1 Fire Support Unit
NORTH***
BATDIV 3 less NEW MEXICO, IDAHO
MISSISSIPPI (FF)
BATDIV 4 less COLORADO
WEST VIRGINIA (F)
MARYLAND
DD«s AUUCK (F), CONY,
SIGOURNEY
(b) TU 77.2.2 Fire SuDport Unit
SOUTH****
BATDIV 2 less NEVADA
TENNESSEE (F)
CALIFORNIA
PENNSYLVANIA
Vice Admiral Kinkaid, Thomas C.
Vice Admiral Kinkaid, Thomas C.
Captain Granum, Alfred M.
Captain Granum, Alfred M.
Captain Granum, Alfred M.
Captain Coney, Charles E.
Captain Coney, Charles E.
Captain McLean, John 3.
Rear Admiral Oldendorf, Jesse B.
Rear Admiral Weyler, George L.
Rear Admiral Weyler, George L.
Captain Redfield, Herman J.
Rear Admiral Ruddock, Theodore 0., Jr,
Captain Wiley, Herbert V.
Captain Ray, Herbert J,
Commander Andrew, John D.
Rear Admiral Oldendorf, Jesse B.
Rear Admiral Chandler, Theodore E.
Captain Heffernan, John B.
Captain Burnett, Henry P.
Captain Martin, Charles F.
War Diary WASATCH, October 23rd, 1944; also War Diary NASHVILLE, October
23rd, 1944.
General Douglas A. Mac Arthur (COMSOWSSPAC) embarked.
Action Report CTU 77.2.1 (COMBATDIV 3), Bombardment of and Fire Support
Mission on Leyte Island, Philippine Islands, Serial 0166, October 20th, 1944.
**** Action Report COMCRUDIV 4 (CTG 77.2), Bombardment and Capture of Leyte
Island, October 16th - 24th, 1944, Serial 00147, November 5th, 1944.
« A M
690
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CRUDIV 4 less INDIANAPOLIS,
plus MINNEAPOLIS
LOUISVILLE (FFF)
PORTLAND
MINNEAPOLIS
CRUDIV 12 less MONTPELIER,
CLEVELAND
DENVER (F)
COLUMBIA
DESRON 56
DESDIV 111
LEUTZE, NEWCOMB (FF), BENNION,
HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, RICHARD P. LSARY
DESDIV 112 less ROSS, plus
HALFORD Captain Conley, Thomas F., Jr.
ROBINSON (F), ALBERT W. GRANT,
BRYANT, HALFORD
Rear Admiral Oldendorf, Jesse B.
Captain Hurt, Samuel H.
Captain Settle, Thomas G. W.
Captain Slocum, Harry B.
Rear Admiral Hayler, Robert W#
Captain Bledsoe, Albert M.
Captain Curts, Maurice E.
Captain Smoot, Roland N.
Captain Smoot, Roland N.
DESDIV XRAY less AULICK, CONY,
SIGOURNEY
CLAXTON (F), THORN, WELLES
(3) TG 77.3 Close Covering Group*
(a) TU 77.3.1 Light Cruiser Group
CRUDIV 15 less NASHVILLE
PHOENIX (FF)
BOISE
DESDIV 47 less BEALE
HUTCHINS (F), BACHE, DALY, KILLEN
Commander Hubbard, Miles H.
Rear Admiral Berkey, Russell S.
Rear Admiral Berkey, Russell S.
Rear Admiral Berkey, Russell S#
Captain Duncan, Jack H,
Captain Roberts, John S.
Captain McManes, Kenmore M.
(b) TU 77.3.2 Heavy Cruiser Group
HMAS SHROPSHIRE
DD's BEALE, HMAS ARUNTA
Captain Nichols, Charles A. G., RN
Captain Nichols, Charles A. G., RN
(4) TG 77.4 Escort Carrier Group Rear Admiral Sprague, Thomas L.
(a) TU 77.4*1 Panaon Carrier Group** Rear Admiral Sprague, Thomas Lo
(1) TU 77.4.11 CARDIV 22
CVE SANGAMON (FFF)
CVEG 37 (19 VF, 9 VT)
CVE SUWANNE
CVEG 60 (22 VF, 9 VT)
Rear Admiral Sprague, Thomas L.
Captain Browder, Maurice E.
Lieutenant Commander Hindman, Stanley
E.
Captain Johnson, William D.
Lieutenant Commander Feilbach,
Harvey 0., USNR
* Action Report CTG 77.3 (COMCRUDIV 15), Leyte Occupation, Serial 0359,
November 3rd, 1944.
** Action Report CTU 77.4.1 (COMCARDIV 22), Leyte Occupation, October 12th
29th, 1944, Serial 00104, November 8th, 1944.
691
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
cve chenango*
cveg 35 (18 vf, 8 vt)
cve san:
cveg 26 (22 vf, 8 vt)
(2) TU 77.4.12 CARDIV 23 less
E«a SARGENT BAY,
RUDYERD BAY
CVE SAGINAW BAY (FF)*
VC 78 (15 VF, 12VT)
CVE PETROF BAY
. 76 (18 VF, 12 VT)
(3) TU 77.4.13 Screen
Captain Van Deurs, George
Lieutenant Cornmander Moore,
Frederick R., Jr.
Captain Blick, Robert I.
Lieutenant Conmander Funk, Harold N.
Rear Admiral Henderson, George R.
tain Sutton, Frank C.
Lieutenant Connander Hyde, John L.,Jr.
Captain Kane, Joseph L.
Cociaander McCauley, James W.
Captain Nunn, Ira H.
DE3DIV 93 less HEERMANN, HOEL Captain Nunn, Ira .
MC CORD (F), TRATHEN, KAZSLWOOD
CORTDIV 63 less SHELTON,
DENNIS Commander Bewick, James V.
EDMONDS,* RICHARD S. BULL, COOLBAUGH,
EVB8SOLE, KlZr.tJO M. ROWSLL, OEBERENDER**
(b) TU 77.4.2 Southern Carrier
Group***
(1) TU 77.4.21 CARDIV 24 less
CVE's ANZIO, CORREGIDOR
CVE NATOMA BAY (FF)
VC 31 (16 VF, 11 VT)
CVE MANILA BAY
VC 30 (17 VF, 9 VT)
(2) TU 77.4.22 CARDIV 27
CVE MARCUS ISLAND (FF)
VC 21 (15 VF, 10 VT)
CVE KADA3KAN 3 AY
VC 20 (15 VF, 12 VT)
CVE SAVO ISLAMI
VC 27 (17 VF, 12 VT)
CVE Zl i ~ A:
VC 75 (17 VF, 11 VT)
Rear Admiral Stump, Felix B.
Rear Admiral Stump, Felix B.
Captain Morehouse, Albert K.
Lieutenant Comnander Barnes, Robert C.
Captain Lee, Fitzhugh
Lieutenant Commander Stufcbs, Harry
K., USNR
Rear Admiral Sample, William D.
Captain Greber, Charles F,
Lieutenant Conmander Murray, Thomas
0., US:
Captain Hunter, Robert N.
Lieutenant Coonander Dale, John R.,
USNR
Captain Skstrom, Clarence E.
Lieutenant Commander Jackson,
Percival W.
Captain Young, Harold L.
Lieutenant Smith, Allen W., Jr., USNR
* Departed October 24th for Morotai, Deck Log SAGIMAH BAY, October 25th, 1944.
** Joined and departed for y.zrozai October 24th.
«w Action Report CTU 77.4.2 (CCKCARDIV 24), Reoccupation of Leyte Island,
October 13th - 29th, 1944, Serial 001L4, November 2nd, 1944.
692
; :::?:: £::::.-l
CONFIDENTIAL
(3) TU 77.4.23 Screen Captain Reynolds, Luther K.
DESDIV 94 less JOHNSTON Captain Reynolds, Luther K.
HAGGARD (F), FRANKS, HAILEY
CORTDIV 69 less STAFFORD,
SAMUEL B. ROBERTS plus
LE RAY WILSON Commander Phifer, Thomas C.
RICHARD W. SUESENS (F),
ABERCROMBIE, LE RAY WILSON,
WALTER C. WANN
(c) TU 77.4.3 Northern Carrier
Group*
(1) TU 77.4.31 CARDIV 25
CVE FANSHAW BAY
VC 68 (15 VF, 10 VT)
CVE ST. LO
VC 65 (17 VF, 9 VT)
CVE WHITE PLAINS
VC 4 (17 VF, 12 VT)
CVE KALINAN BAY
VC 3 (18 VF, 12 VT)
(2) TU 77.4.32 CARDIV 26
CVE's HOGGATT BAY, NEHENTA
BAY
CVE KITKUN BAY
VC 5 (15 VF, 12 VT)
CVE GAMBIER BAY
VC 10 (18 VF, 12 VT)
Rear Admiral Sprague, Clifton A. F.
Rear Admiral Sprague, Clifton A. F.
Captain Johnson, Douglass P.
Lieutenant Commander Rogers,
Richard S0
Captain McKenna, Francis J.
Lieutenant Commander Jones, Ralph M.,
USNR
Captain Sullivan, Dennis J,
Lieutenant Fickenscher, Edward
R., Jr.
Captain Williamson, Thomas B.
Lieutenant Commander Keighley,
William H., USNR
Rear Admiral Ofstie, Ralph A.
Captain Whitney, John P.
Commander Fowler, Richard L.
Captain Vieweg, Walter V. R.
Commander Huxtable, Edward J., Jr.
* Action Report CTU 77.4.3 (COMCARDIV 25), Leyte Operation, October 12th -
27th, 1944, Serial 00110, November 6th, 1944; also CTG 77.4 Operation Plan
2-44.
693
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(3) TU 77.4.33 Screen Commander Thomas, William D.
DESDIV 93 less MC CORD,
TRATHEN, HAZELWOOD
plus JOHNSTON Commander Thomas, William D.
HOEL (F), HEERMANN,
JOHNSTON
DE's RAYMOND, DENNIS (F),
JOHN C. BUTLER, SAMUEL
B. ROBERTS Lieutenant Commander Hansen,
Sigurd, USNR
(5) TG 77.5 Minesweeping and
Hydrographic Group* Commander Loud, Wayne R.
(a) TU 77.5.1 Minesweepers Commander Loud, Wayne R.
(1) Sweep Unit ONE** Commander Loud, Wayne R.
MINDIV 5 Lieutenant Brennan, John E., USNR
DMS's SOUTHARD (F),***
CHANDLER,** HOVEY (FF),**
LONG****
MINDIV 19 (Modified) Lieutenant Commander Clague, John,
USNR
DM's PREBLE,****
BREESE*****
DMS«s HAMILTON (F),*****
HOWARD,**
PALMER***** Lieutenant Olson, Louis C, USNR
* Action Report CTG 77.5 (COMMINRON 1), Minesweeping Operations in Surigao
Straits and Leyte Gulf, Serial 0111, October 29th, 1944.
** Departed October 24th, 1944.
*** Joined TG 77.4 on October 24th, 1944.
**** Departed October 23rd, 1944 with TU 79.14.4.
***** Departed October 24th, 1944 with TU 79.14.3.
694 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(2) Sweep Unit TWO
MINDIV 14
AM's ZEAL (F), VELOCITY,
TUMULT, TOKEN
Lieutenant Commander Woodhouse,
Ernest W., USNR
(3) Sweep Unit THREE
MINDIV 13 plus AM SENTRY
AM's REQUISITE (F),
PURSUIT, REVENGE, SAGE, SENTRY
Lieutenant Commander Pierce,
Herbert R., Jr., USNR
(4) MINDIV 34 less SCUFFLE,
SENTRY
AM's SAUNTER, SALUTE,
SCRIMMAGE, SCOUT
(5) Sweep Unit FOUR
YMS's 1, 81, 140 (F),
311, 319
(6) Sweep Unit FIVE
YMS's 238, 243, 286, 293,
335, 389,* 398 (F)
(7) Sweep Unit SIX
Lieutenant Commander Keefer, James
R., USNR
Lieutenant Staehli, Ralph J., Jr.,
USNR
Lieutenant Latta, William A., USNR
Lieutenant Schminke, Paul, USNR
YMS's 39, 49, 52, 340 (F), 342
(8) Sweep Unit SEVEN Lieutenant Burns, Thomas W., USNR
YMS's 71, 73, 176, 314, 341 (F)
(b) TU 77.5.2 Hydrographic Unit Commander Hunt, Robert B. S., RAN
HMAS GASCOYNE, YMS's 316, 393,
HMAL 1074
(6) TG 77.7 Service Group
Rear Admiral Glover, Robert 0.
(a) TU 77.7.1 Fueling Unit** Captain Beard, Jefferson D,
AO's ASHTABULA (F), SALAMONIE, SUAMICO,***
SARANAC, CHEPACHET, AE MAZAMA, SS DURHAM VICTORY,****
AOG KISHWAUKEE***
CORTDIV 40 less FOREMAN, ENGLAND
plus MANNING, LOVELACES-
BOWERS, WHITEHURST, WILLMARTH,
WITTER, MANNING, LOVELACE
Commander Thorwall, Charles A., USNR
Captain Hylant, Emory P.
(b) TU 77.7.2 Task Unit I^eyte**-***
less ARETHUSA
IX (AO's) CARIBOU, MINK, PANDA; AN's TEAK
SILVERBELL, SATINI^F:*^-**-* AKN INDUS (F),
ARL ACHILLES; ARS CABLE, AO(W) SEVERN, AE MURZBJ******
__— _
**
***
****
*****
Departed October 24th, 1944 with TU 79.14.5.
War Diary CTU 77.7.1, October 1944.
Joined on October 24th (War Diary SARANAC, October 1944).
Employed as ammunition ship.
War Diary INDUS, October 1944 (arrived Leyte with TG 78.7 October 24th).
****** Enroute Leyte with TG 78.8
695
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(b) TF 78 NORTHERN ATTACK FORCE
(1) TG 78.1 Palo Attack Group
(a) TU 78.1.1 Group Flagship*
(Also Flagship Unit)
AGC BLUE RIDGE (FFF)
Rear Admiral Barbey, Daniel E.
Rear Admiral Barbey, Daniel S.
Commander McDowell, Lewis R.
Commander McDowell, Lewis R.
TU 73.1.2 Relief Group Flagship* Lieutenant Connander Wicks, John
DD RUSSELL E., Jr.
(b) TU 78.1.5 LSM Unit**
LSM's 19 (F), 21, 257
Lieutenant McComb, Edward L., USNR
(c) TU 78.1.6 Escort and Fire
Support Unit-**** Captain Crommelin, Henry
DESDIV 49 less STEVENS, MURRAY,
HARRISON, MC KEE Captain Crommelin, Henry
JOHN RODGERS (F)
(d) TU 78.1.7 Control Unit**** Captain Brantly, Neill D.
PC's 598,***** 623 (F), 1129,*****
SC 726
(e) TU 78.1.8 LCI Support Unit****** Lieutenant Sargent, Robert E., Jr.,
LCl(R)'s 71 (F), 72, 73, USNR
74, 331
(f ) TU 78.1.9 Demolition Unit
LCl(D)«s 227, 228
Lieutenant (jg) Sibigtroth, JoseDh
C, USNR
(g) TU 78.1.10 LCI Smoke Unit*-****** Captain McGee, Homer F.
LCI(L)'s 28 (F), 361, 363, 364,
429, 447, 448
(h) TU 78.1.11 Salvage Unit**-***-*** Lieutenant Commander Castle,
AT QUAPAW Northrup H., USNR
(i) TU 78.1.12 Army Headquarters
Unit Lieutenant Gunby, D. Kirk, USNR
PCE(R)'s 848 (F), 849, 850,
SS APACHE, FP 47
Action Report BLUE RIDGE, Leyte Operation, Serial 00530, Novamber 15th,
1944.
War Diary LSM 21, October 1944.
Action Report CTU 78.1.6, Serial 0114, November 5th, 1944.
Action Report CTU 78.1.7, No Serial, November 1st, 1944.
Departed 1700 October 23rd with TG 78.11.
Action Report CTU 78.1.3, Serial 160, November 22nd, 1944.
Action Report CTU 78.1.10, Leyte Operation, Serial 0122, November 20th,
1944.
******** Action Report QUAPAW, Philippine Operation, October 20th - 29th, 1944,
Serial 033, October 20th, 1944.
696 CONFIDENTIAL
**
***
****
*£***
******
*******
CONFIDENTIAL
(j) TU 78.1.13 Beach Parties
Beach Party No. 1
Beach Party No. 4
Lieutenant Zinser, Eugene J., USNR
Lieutenant Walter, Raymond G., USNR
Lieutenant Zinser, Eugene J., USNR
(k) LST Unit (Red Beach)-* Commander Linthicum, Theodoric C.
LST's 623, 666, 667, 668, 695, 697,
740, 741, 744, 751, 986, 1017, 1018 (F)
(2) TG 78.2 San Ricardo Attack Group**
(a) Group Flagship
APA FREMONT (FFF)
Relief Group Flagship
DD ANDERSON
(b) Headquarters Support Aircraft
(c) TU 78.2.5 LSM Unit
LSM's 18 (F), 20, 22, 23, 34,
138, 139, 258, 311
(d) DD JENKINS***
(e) TU 78.2.7 Control Unit
PC's 1134 (F), 1119, 1120,
SC 991
(f) TU 78.2.8 Support Unit
LCl(R)'s 34, 230 (F), 337, 338,
340, 341; LCI(G)'s 64, 69 (F)
(g) TU 78.2.9 Salvage Unit
ATA SONOMA****
(h) TU 78.2.10 Beach Parties*****
Beach Party No. 3
Beach Party No. 8
S-K-JHBt-
Rear Admiral Fechteler, William M.
Captain Conlan, Clarence V.
Lieutenant Commander Benson, Ralph
H., Jr.
Commander Spangler, Earle S., USNR
Commander Weintraub, Daniel J.
Commander Gallery, Philip D.
Lieutenant Commander Holt, William
J., Jr., USNR
Commander Day, Dwight H.
Lieutenant Wurzler, Walter R., USNR
Lieutenant Commander Halloran,
Edward R., USNR
Lieutenant Commander Halloran,
Edward R., USNR
Lieutenant Nordyke, Ted, USNR
(i) WHITE Beach Unit
LST's* 170, 397, 549, 613, 912, 993
AK JUPITER,* ARL ACHILLES******
XAK's THOMAS, GIANELLA, KINNEY, JUDSON FIELDS, SHORT
_. _
Departed 1700 October 23rd with TG 78.11.
Action Report CTG 78.2 (COMPHIBGRU 8), Leyte Operation, Serial 0085,
November 29th, 1944.
Unit of TU 78.2.6 remaining.
Sunk October 24th, 1944.
Action Report CTU 78.2.10, Report of Operations, Force Beachmaster,
October 13th - November 16th inclusive, No Serial, November 20th, 1944.
Unit of TU 77.7.2.
697
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(j) LCI Group 44 (Temporary)
LCI»s 683, 684, 685, 693, 977,
978 (F), 979, 980, 981, 982,
1064, 1065*
(3) TG 78.3 Panaon Attack Group**
(a) TU 78.3.5 Control and Support
Craft***
PC's 1122, 1133
LCI(G)'s 68, 70 (F)
LCl(R)'s 31 (F), 342
LCI(D) 29
(b) TU 78.3.6 Beach Party No. 7
(4) TG 78.5 Harbor Entrance Control
Group****
PF's BISBEE (F), GALLUP
LCI's 343, 344, 430 (F), 432
(5) PF CARSON CITY*****
(6) TG 78.7 Reinforcement Group TWO
Convoy Unit******
Commander Tucker, James F.
Captain Murphey, Charles D.
Lieutenant O'Neill, Thomas F., USNR
Captain Benson, Francis W.
Captain Ginder, John K. B,
(a) Liberty Ships
GENERAL FLEISCHER, CAPE ROMANO, CAPE CONSTANCE,
JOHN PAGE, SABIK, JANSSENS, LEO MERRITT, DAVID
GAILLARD, FRANK CUHEL, MARCUS DALY, BENJAMIN
WATERHOUSE, JOHN FOSTER, VITUS BERING, SAMUEL
BARLOW, BENJAMIN WHEELER, LOUIS WUSLE, CHARLOTTE
CUSHMAN, CASSIOPIA, CLARENCE DARROW, ESCALANTE
(b) Service Force TU 77.7.2 less AE
MURZIM. ******* AN SATTNT.EAF*******
IX (AO) ARETHUSA, ******** ARL
ACHIU.ES********* Captain Hylant, Emory P.
IX(AO)'s CARIBOU, MINK, PANDA
AN's TEAK, SILVERBELL, AKN INDUS (F)
ARS CABLE, AO(W) SEVERN, (YOG- 15 in tow)
*
**
***
****
*****
******
*******
********
*********
Sunk October 24th, 1944.
Units remaining at 1042 October 23rd.
Action Report CTU 78.3.5, Central Philippines-Panaon Attack Group, No
Serial, November 30th, 1944.
Action Report CTG 78.5, Report of Operations of the Harbor Entrance
Control Group, October 18th - 24th, 1944, No Serial, November 22nd, 1944.
Departed 1700 October 23rd with TG 78.11.
Action Report CTG 78.7 (COMDESRON 21), Central Philippines Operation,
Serial 0176, November 10th, 1944.
En route Leyte with TG 78.8.
Broke down October 18th, returned Hollandia.
Arrived Leyte with TG 78.6 October 22nd.
698
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Captain Seay, Erskine A,
(c) LST Unit
LST's 464, 552, 553, 554, 555,
556, 557, 558, 559, 569, 573,
610 (FF), 619, 653, 663, 673,
687, 688, 694, 703, 734, 736,
737, 746, 749, 750, 908, 919,
990, 991, 1015, 1025, 1026
AO SUAMICO, PG TULSA
(d) Screen Captain Ginder, John K. B.
DESDIV 41 less HOWORTH Captain Ginder, John K. B.
NICHOLAS (F), O'BANNON, TAYLOR,
HOPEWELL, PF's SAN PEDRO, MUSKOGEE
(7) TG 78.8 Reinforcement Group THREE
(Convoy Unit)*
(a) Service Ship Unit
AE MURZLM, AK's HYPERION,
ZAURAK (F), APC 17, AN
SATINLEAF
Commander Steinmetz, John L., USCG
Lieutenant Commander Kapuscinski,
John S., USNR
(b) Liberty Ship Unit
FLOYD B. OLSON, THOMAS NELSON, PRINCE
L. CAMPBELL, JOS C. S. BLACKBURN,
AMERIGO VESPUCCI, MATTHEW P. DEADY, VAN
NUTS, CAPE JUDY, CAPE CUMBERLAND, SEAMAN
A. KNAPP, MORRISON R. WAITE, JOHN ALDEN,
ATWATER, A. BAILEY, JOHN BARTRAM, JUAN
CABRILLO, CARL G. BARTH
(c) LST Unit
LST's 22, 206 (F), 220, 454, 618, 922
(d) Screen
CORTDIV 29 less CORPUS CHRISTI,
HUTCHINSON
PF's EUGENE (FFF), EL PASO,
VAN BUREN, ORANGE
(c) TF 79 SOUTHERN ATTACK FORCE**
Force Flagship
AGC MT OLYMPUS (FFFF)
Commander Support Aircraft
Commander Steinmetz, John L., USCG
Vice Admiral Wilkinson, Theodore S.
Captain Shultz, John H.
Captain Taylor, Herbert W., Jr.
* Action Report CTG 78.8, Reinforcement Group 3, Central Philippine Operation,
Serial 071, November 16th, 1944.
** Action Report CTG 79.1 (COMPHIBGRU 3), Leyte Operation, Serial 00454,
October 26th, 1944.
699
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(1) TG 79.1 Attack Group ABLE
Group Flagship
APPALACHIAN (FFF)*
(a) TG 79.3 Transport Group ABLE
(1) TU 79.3.1 TRANSDIV 7
APA CAVALIER (FF),*
AKA THUBAN*
(2) TU 79.3.2 TRANSDIV 30
AKA CHARA**
(3) TU 79.3.3 TRANSDIV 38
AKA ALSHAIN*
(4) TU 79.3.4 TRANSDIV XRAY
APA PRESIDENT HAYES,* AK
MERCURY,*** LSV MONITOR*
Rear Admiral Conolly, Richard L.
Captain Jeffs, Charles R.
Captain Richardson, Clifford G.
Captain Richardson, Clifford G.
Commander Clark, John P., USNR
Captain Krause, Roland S.
Captain Schieke, Herman E.
(5) TU 79.3.6 LCT Unit**** Lieutenant Wassell, Meyer, USNR
LCT's 667, 738, 739, 740, 772,
781, 819, 320, 861, 863, 864, 990
(6) TU 79.11.1 Transport Group
ABLE Screen
DESRON 48
DESDIV 95 less STSMBEL,*
WALKER,***** ABBOTT*****
DD»s ERBEN (F),**** HALE***
Captain Marshall, William J.
Captain Marshall, William J,
(7) BLUE-ORANGE Beach Unit****** Lieutenant Talley, William 0.
LST's 24, 471, 472 (F), 606
(b) Tractor Group ABLE
(1) TG 79.5 1ST Unit
(a) TU 79.5.1
LST's 608, 609, 611,
612 (FF), 693, 738,
739 (F), 909
Captain Webb, Richard C, Jr.
Captain Webb, Richard C, Jr.
Commander Shivley, Joshua C.
(b) TU 79.5.2
LST's 126, 169, 205, 223,
242,**** 565 (F), 605,
670, 686, 733
Commander Parsons, Edwin C, USNR
*
**
***
****
*****
Departed October 23rd with TU 79.14.4.
Departed October 24th, 1944.
Departed October 24th with TU 79.14.8.
Departed October 24th with TU 79.14.5.
Departed October 22nd with TU 79.14.1.
****** Departed 1700 October 23rd with TG 78.11.
700
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(c) TU 79.5.3*
Lieutenant Commander Harlan, James L.
LST's 34, 123, 125, 207,
213, 219, 451 (F), 461,
478, 482, 488, 617, 1006
(2) TG 79.7 Control Unit Commander Busck, Vilhelm K.
DD STEMBEL (F),** PC's 462,
464, 470, 563, PCS«s 1391,*
1418,* 1429,* SC's 631,*
632,* 1004, 6 LCC's
(3) TU 79.7.1 Gunboat Support
Unit
Commander Montgomery, Alan R.
(a) TU 79.7.2 Rocket Unit* Commander Montgomery, Alan R.
LCl(G)«s 365, 366, 407,
422, 439, 440, 442, 475,
558 (F), 559, 560, 561,
565 (FF), 567, 568, 580,
751, 752
(b) TU 79.7.3 Mortar Unit*
LCl(M)'s 1056 (F),
1057, 1058, 1059
LCI(A)«s 975, 1055
(c) TU 79.7.4 Salvage and
Fire Fighting Unit*
LCI(L) 564 (F), 676
(2) TG 79.2 Attack Group BAKER
Group Flagship
AGC ROCKY MOUNT (FFF)***
(a) TG 79.4 Transport Group BAKER
Lieutenant Commander Robison, Carl
F., USNR
(1) TU 79.4.1 TRANSDIV 10
(Temporary)
APA»s CLAY (F),*** ARTHUR
MIDDLETON,*** BAXTER,***
WILLIAM P. BIDDLS,** AP
GEORGE F. ELLIOTT, ***
AKA«s AURIGA,**** CAPRICORNUS,***
LSD RUSHMORE***
Lieutenant Commander Starkus,
Charles J., Ret.
Rear /idmiral Royal, Forrest B.
Captain Patten, Stanley F.
Captain Morrison, George D.
Captain Morrison, George D.
* Departed October 24th with TU 79.14.5.
** Departed October 23rd with TU 79. 14.4.
*** Departed October 24th with TU 79.14.8.
**** Remaining from TU 79.4.2 and TU 79.4.3.
701
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(2) TG 79.11 Commander Screen* Captain Coward, Jesse G.
DESRON 54 Captain Coward, Jesse G.
DESDIV 107 less WADLEIGH,
NORMAN SCOTT Captain Coward, Jesse G.
REMEY (FF), MERTZ, MONSSEN
DESDIV 108 Coramanaer Phillips, Richard H.
MC DERMUT (F), MC GOWAN,
MC NAIR, MELVIN
DESRON 49 Captain McLean, Ephraim R., Jr.
DESDIV 97 less WILLIAM D.
PORTER, YOUNG Captain McLean, Ephraim R., Jr.
PICKING (F),** SPROSTON,**
WICKES
DESDIV 93 less KLMBERLY,
LUCE*** Captain Cooper, William G.
ISHERWOOD (F),*** CHARLES
J. 3ADGER*** '
DESDIV 101 less HALL, PAUL
HAMILTON plus MAC DONOUGH Captain Martin, Hugh J.
HALLIGAN (F), HARADB1,
TWIGGS, MAC DONOUGH
(b) TG 79.6 LST-LCI Transport Group
BAKER Captain Rimer, Theodore W.
(1) TU 79.6.1 LST-LSM Transport
Unit Commander Ageton, Arthur A.
Unit Flagship DD LUCE (FF)*** Commander Owens, Hint on A.
(a) TU 79.6.11 Assault Unit
BLUE**** Lieutenant Commander Reith, George,
LST's 20, 483, 486, USNR
568, 671, 745, 918,
999, 1013, 1024
(b) TU 79.6.12 Assault Unit
ORANGE**** Lieutenant Commander Drexler, Louis
LST's 117, 113, 277, A., Jr.
564, 567, 669, 672,
698, 916, 917 (F)
* Although CTG 79.11 (COMDESRON 54) was nominally in command of the screen
composed of DESRON' s 43, 49 and 54, he, from his station in the outer
screen, was too far away to effectively control the intermediate and inner
screens. CTU 79.11.2 (COMDESRON 49) therefore took control of the inner
and intermediate screens and due to the reaxuirements for gunfire support
from the destroyers forming the two screens combined the two squadrons into
one inner screen on October 20th, 1944. Action Report CTU 79.11.2 (COMDES-
RON 49), Assault on Leyte Island, Philippines, Serial 0121, October 30th,
1944; also Action Report COMDESRON 48 (CTU 79.11.1), Leyte Gulf, Philippine
Islands, October 20th - 24th, 1944, Serial 030, October 30th, 1944.
** Departed October 24th with TU 79.14.3.
*** Departed October 23rd with TU 79.14.4.
**** Departed October 24th with TU 79.14.5.
702 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(c) TU 79.6.13 Reserve Unit
ONE* Lieutenant Barber, Oliver W.
LST's 269, 270 (F), 615,
704, LSM's 134, 135
(d) TU 79.6.14 Reserve Unit
TWO Lieutenant Commander Blanche,
LSM's 24 (F),* 29,* John G., Jr.
136, 233
(e) TU 79.6.15 LCT Unit** Lieutenant Franklin, Gordon P., USNR
LCT's 688, 747, 821, 822,
830, 898, 992, 1016, 1296, 1298
(2) TU 79.6.2 LCI Unit Captain Rimer, Theodore W.
(a) TU 79.6.21 Mortar Unit*** Lieutenant Commander Hannett,
LCl(M)'s 658, 659, George W., USNR
660 (F), 754
LCl(A)«s 775,* 994*
(b) TU 79.6.22 Rocket Gunboat
Unit** Lieutenant Giliberty, Frank R., USNR
LCl(G)'s 366,* 372,*
373,* 439,* 440,* 451,*
461,* 462, 464, 465, 467,
472, 475
(c) TU 79.6.23 LCI Salvage
Unit* Captain Rimer, Theodore W.
LCl(L)'s (S&FF) 738 (F),
598
(3) TU 79.11.3 Landing Craft Screen****
PCE(R)«s 851, 852, 853
(c) TG 79.19 Salvage Group less
GRAPPLE Commander Foss, Henry 0., USNR
ARS PRESERVER,* ARL EGERIA, ATF's
POTAWATOMI,* CHOWANOC,* CHICKASAW,*
MENOMINEE*
* Departed October 24th with TU 79.14.5.
** Action Report CTG 79.2 (COMPHIBGRU 6), Leyte Operation, Serial 0032,
November 4th, 1944.
*** Action Report CTU 70.6.21 (COMLCI(L)GRP 17), Serial 114, November 4th, 1944.
**** Units remaining October 23rd. CTU 79.11.3 (COMDESRON 54) assumed CTG 79.11
October 20th.
703 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COMMANDER ALLIED NAVAL FORCES SQWESPAC
(a) TG 70.1 Motor Torpedo Boats
(1) TU 70.1.3 Leyte Group
(a) MTB RON 7
MTB's 127, 128, 129, 130, 131,
132, 134, 137, 138
(b) MTB RON 12
MTB's 146, 150, 151, 152, 190,
191, 192, 194, 195, 196
(c) MTB RON 21
MTB's 320, 321, 323, 324, 325,
326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331
(d) MTB RON 33
MTB's 488, 489, 490, 491, 492,
493, 494, 495, 496, 497
(e) MTB RON 36
MTB's 522, 523, 524, 525, 526
U.S. Army QS 13, 1 Crash Boat
(2) TU 70.1.6 Advance Tender Unit
AGP's WACHAPREAGUS, WILLOUGHBY,
OYSTER BAY
(b) TF 71 Submarines, West Australia
(1) TG 71.1 U.S. Patrol Group
Vice Admiral Kinkaid, Thomas C.
Commander Bowling, Selman S.
Lieutenant Commander Leeson, Robert,
USNR
Lieutenant Commander Leeson, Robert,
USNR
Lieutenant Pullen, Weston C, Jr.,
USNR
Lieutenant Gleason, Carl T.
Lieutenant Preston, Arthur M., USNR
Lieutenant Commander Tappaan,
Francis D., USNR
Lieutenant Commander Holroyd,
Walter W., USNR
Rear Admiral Christie, Ralph W.
Rear Admiral Christie, Ralph W.
(a) On Patrol
ANGLER, COD, DARTER, BERGALL, DACE,
PADDLE, ROCK, GURNARD, BREAM
(b) En route Patrol
BATFISH, GUITARRO, MUSKALLUNGS,
GROWLER, HAKE, HARDHEAD, GUNNEL,
BLACKFIN
(c) En route Base
RATON, BLUEGILL, HAMMERHEAD, LAPON
COBIA
(2) TG 71.7 British and Netherlands
Patrol Group
(a) On Patrol
TANTIVY, STOIC, SIRDAR, STORM
Rear Admiral Christie, Ralph W.
704
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(b) En route Patrol
TANTALUS
(c) En route Base
SPITEFUL, TELEMACHUS, ZWAARDVISCH
(c) TF 72 Submarines, East Australia
(1) TG 72.1 Special Mission Group
NAUTILUS, NARWHAL, CERO
(d) TF 73 Naval Air Forces
(1) TG 73.1 Flag Group
CURRITUCK (FF), 1 AVR
(2) TG 73 .2 Strike and Rescue Group*
(a) TU 73.2.1 Rescue Unit
ORCA, VPB 11 (8 PBY), 1 AVR
(b) TU 73.2.2 Strike Unit
TANGIER, VPB 29 (8 PBY), 2 AVR's
(3) TG 73.3 Manus Group**
HEDRON 10
Patrol Planes Present Manus
Carrier Replacement Pool
Patrol Plane Replacement Squadrons
(4) TG 73.4 Search and Support Group
Patrol Planes Present Woendi
(a) TU 73.4.1***
HERON, VPB 52 Detachment (4 PBY)
(b) TU 73.4.2****
VPB 146 (15 PV)
(c) TU 73.4.3****
VPB 101 (12 PB4Y)
(d) TU 73.4.4****
(5) TG 73.7 Advanced Group
Captain Haines, John M.
Captain Haines, John M.
Rear Admiral Wagner, Frank D.
Captain Evans, William A.
Captain Oliver, Richard M.
Commander Fleming, Morton K., Jr.
Captain Oliver, Richard M.
Captain Lambrecht, John 0.
Captain Jones, Carroll B.
Lieutenant Norcott, John M., USNR
Lieutenant Commander Robinson, Jesse
P., Jr.
Commander Compton, James R.
Commander Compton, James R.
Commander Renard, Jack
* Based at Morotai.
** 15 VSB (VS 61) employed for offshore patrol not included.
*** Based at Hollandia.
**** Operating from Morotai.
496799 O - 59 - 55
705
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(a) TU 73.7.1
HALF MOON
SAN CARLOS
VPB 33 (15 PBY)*
VPB 34 (12 PBY)*
1 AVR
(b) TU 73.7.2**
VPB 130 (15 PV)
(6) TG 70.2 Antisubmarine Group***
Commander Bandy, Jack I.
Commander Bandy, Jack I.
Lieutenant Commander Mills, DeLong
Lieutenant Commander Anderson,
Fernald P.
Lieutenant Commander Utgoff, Vadym V.
Lieutenant Commander Dodds, Charles
R.
Rear Admiral Wagner, Frank D.
(a) TU 70,2,1 Hunter-Killer Unit Commander Pickering, Samuel M.
SAN PABLO, VP 11 Detachment (4 PBY)
CORTDIV 33 less MACHIAS Commander Ryssy, John W., USCG
ALLENTOWN (F), CHARLOTTESVILLE,
SANDUSKY
ALLIED AIR FORCES SOWESPAC****
(a) Far East Air Forces
(1) FIFTH Air Force (Assault Force)
(a) FIFTH Fighter Command
8th Fighter Group (52 P38)
35th Fighter Group (65 P-47)
49th Fighter Group (69 P-38)
58th Fighter Group (73 P-47)
348th Fighter Group (104 P-47)
475th Fighter Group (68 F-38)
418th Night Fighter Squadron (11
421st Night Fighter Squadron (12
547th Night Fighter Squadron (12
Lieutenant General Kenney, George C,
(AC), USA
Lieutenant General Kenney, George C,
(AC), USA
Lieutenant General Whitehead, Ennis
C, (AC), USA
Brigadier General Wurtsmith, Paul E.,
(AC), USA
P-61)
P-61)
P-61)
*
Commenced movement to Leyte October 23rd.
Operating from Manus.
Operating from Morotai throughout October 1944.
Data regarding the organization, disposition, and strength of Allied Air
Forces, SOWESPAC was obtained from the following sources and estimated as
of October 23rd.
(1) Air Evaluation Board, Leyte Campaign, June 1945.
(2) Allied Air Forces SOWESPAC Operations Report No. 23, October 14th -
25th, 1944.
(3) Letter from Director, Historical Division, USAF Air University
Library to President, Naval War College, February 25th, 1953.
(4) Letter from Research Studies Institute, USAF Air University to
President, Naval War College, November 3rd, 1952.
(5) THIRTEENTH USAAF Letter of Instructions No. 2, October 6th, 1944.
(6) Allied Air Forces, SOWESPAC Operations Instruction No. 71, September
24th, 1944.
(7) War Diary Commander Aircraft Northern Solomons (CTG 70.9), October
17th, 1944.
706
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(b) FIFTH Bomber Command Brigadier General Crabb, Jarred V.,
(AC), USA
3rd, 312th, 417th Light Bomb Groups
(210 A-20)
38th, 345th Medium Bomb Groups
(113 B-25)
22nd, 43rd, 90th, 380th Heavy Bomb Groups
(164 B-24)
(c) FIFTY-FOURTH Troop Carrier Wing Brigadier General Carter, Warren R.,
(AC), USA
317th, 374th, 375th, 433rd Troop
Carrier Groups (271 C-47)
(d) NINETY-FIRST Photographic
Reconnaissance Wing Colonel Sams, William C, (AC), USA
6th Photographic Group (61 F-5, F-7)
71st Reconnaissance Group (16 B-25,
43 P-40, 12 L-5)
(2) THIRTEENTH Air Force (Supporting
Force)
(a) THIRTEENTH Fighter Command
18th, 347th Fighter Groups
(121 P-38)
419th Night Fighter Squadron
(11 P-51)
(b) THIRTEENTH Bomber Command
42nd Medium Bomb Group
(83 B-25)
5th, 307th Heavy Bomb Groups
(78 B-24)
868th Heavy Bomb Squadron
(11 LAB-24)
(c) Troop Carrier Group
403rd Troop Carrier Group
(48 C-47)
(b) TG 70.9 Aircraft Northern Solomons
(1) FIRST Marine Aircraft Wing
(a) Air Group 12
VMF 114, 211, 218, 313
(62 F4U, 19 FG)
VMSB 142, 243 (41 SBD)
(b) Air Group 14
VMF 212, 222, 223 (63 F4U)
VMSB 244 (21 SBD)
VMO 251 (21 F4U)
Major General Streett, St, Clair,
(AC), USA
Brigadier General Barnes, Earle W.,
(AC), USA
Brigadier General Matheny, William
A,, (AC), USA
Colonel Sands, Harry J., Jr., (AC),
USA
Major General Mitchell, Ralph J.,USMC
Major General Mitchell, Ralph J.,USMC
Colonel Willis, William A., USMC
Colonel Hopkins, Zebulon C, USMC
707
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(c) Air Group 24
VMSB 133, 236, 241, 341
(87 SBD)
(d) Air Group 61
VMB 413, 423, 433, 443
(46 PBJ)
(e) Air Group 25
VMR 152, 153 (32 R4D)
Colonel Meyer, Lyle H., USMC
Colonel Smith, Perry K., USMC
Colonel Koonce, Allen C, USMC
(2) 79th RAAF Fighter Squadron (14 Spitfire)
(3) Royal New Zealand Air Units
3rd Squadron, RNZAF (17 PV)
17th, 22nd Squadrons, RNZAF (36 F4U)
(4) 17th Photographic Squadron
(5 F5A, 1 RA-24B)
(5) Attached Naval Squadrons
VPB 148 (9 PV)
VPB 130 (14 PV)
VPB 44 (15 PBY)
VPB 52 (11 PBY)
VS 61 (15 SBD, 1 J2F)
(c) Royal Australian Air Force Command
378 VF, 96 VB(L), 36 VB(M),
12 VB(H), 42 VPB (MS)
Captain Bartman, Walter M., (AC), USA
Lieutenant Commander Jakeman, Lloyd F.
Lieutenant Commander Doads, Charles R.
Lieutenant Commander Bogard, Gerald S.
Lieutenant Commander Isner, Rennis,
Jr., USNR
Lieutenant McGowan, William I.
Air Vice Marshal Bostook, W.D., RAAF
708
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CINCPAC - CINCPOA
(a) Western Pacific Task Forces Admiral Nimitz, Chester W.
(1) THIRD Fleet Admiral Halsey, William F., Jr.
(a) TF 38 Fast Carrier Force Vice Admiral Mitscher, Marc A.
(1) TG 38.1 Vice Admiral McCain, John S.
(a) TU 38.1.1 Carrier Unit
CARDIV 5 less BATAAN plus
HANCOCK, COWPENS Vice Admiral McCain, John S.
WASP (FFF) Captain Weller, Oscar A.
CVG 14 (49 VF, 22 VB,
18 VT) Commander Blitch, John D.
HORNET Captain Doyle, Austin K.
CVG 11 (50 VF, 22 VB,
18 VT) Lieutenant Commander Smith, Lloyd A#
HANCOCK Captain Dickey, Fred C.
CVG 7 (42 VF, 23 VB,
18 VT) Commander Lamade, John D.
MONTEREY Captain Ingersoll, Stuart H.
CVLG 28 (24 VF, 9 VT) Lieutenant Commander Mehle, Roger W.
COWPENS Captain Taylor, Herbert W., Jr.
CVLG 22 (22 VF, 9 VT) Lieutenant Commander Jenkins, Thomas
H., USNR
(b) TU 38.1.2 Support Unit Rear Admiral Smith, Allan E.
CRUDIV 5 Rear Admiral Smith, Allan E.
CHESTER (FF) Captain Hartley, Henry
PENSACOLA Captain Mullinnix, Allen P.
SALT LAKE CITY Captain Busbey, Leroy W., Jr.
CRUDIV 11 less SAN JUAN,
FLINT, RENO, 'TUCSON Captain Mullan, William E. A.
SAN DIEGO (F) Captain Mullan, William E. A.
OAKLAND Captain Reed, Kendall S.
BOSTON* Captain Herrmann, Ernest E.
(c) TU 38.1.3 Screen Unit Captain EsDe, Carl F.
DESDIV 7 plus CASSIN,
DOWNES Captain Smith, Harold P.
DUNLAP (F), FANNING,
CASE, CUMKLNGS, CASSIN, DOWNES
DESDIV 23 less LANSDOWNE,
LARDNER Captain Burford, William P.
MC CALLA (F),** WOODWORTH,
FARENHOLT** '
DESDIV 91 less CHARRETTE,
BELL, BURNS* plus BROWN,
GRAYSON Captain Espe, Carl F,
IZARD (FF), BROWN,
GRAYSON, CONNER
* Joined October 24th.
n.
709 CONFIDENTIAL
** Detached October 24th.
CONFIDENTIAL
(2) TG 33.2 Rear Admiral Bogan, Gerald F.
(a) TU 38.2.1 Carrier Unit Rear Admiral Bogan, Gerald F.
CARDIV 4 less BUNKER HILL Rear Admiral Bogan, Gerald F.
INTREPID (FFF) Captain Bolger, Joseph F.
CVG 13 (48 VF, 23 VB,
19 VT) Commander Coleman, Wilson M.
CABOT Captain Michael, Stanley J.
CVLG 29 (22 VF, 9 VT) Lieutenant Commander Eder, Willard E.
INDEPENDENCE Captain Ewen, Edward C.
CVLGN 41 (15 VF(N),
7 VT(N)) Commander Caldwell, Turner F., Jr.
(b) TU 38.2.2 Support Unit Rear Admiral Badger, Oscar C.
BATDIV 7 Rear Admiral Badger, Oscar C.
IOWA (FF) Captain McCann, Allan R.
NEW JERSEY (FFFFF)* Captain Holden, Carl F.
CRUDIV 14 less VICKSBURG,
HOUSTON plus BILOXI Rear Admiral Whiting, Francis E. K.
VINCENNES (F) Captain Brown, Allen D.
MIAMI Captain Crawford John G.
BILOXI Captain McGurl, Daniel M.
(c) TU 38.2.3 Screen Unit Captain Womble, John P., Jr.
DESRON 52 Captain Womble, John P., Jr.
DESDIV 103 less STEPHEN
POTTER Captain Womble, John P., Jr.
THE SULLIVANS, MILLER,
TINGEY (FF), OWEN
DESDIV 104 Captain Kenny, William T.
HICKOX (F), HUNT, LEWIS,
HANCOCK, MARSHALL
DESRON 53 Captain Jarrett, Harry B.
DESDIV 105 less BENHAM Captain Jarrett, Harry B.
HALSEY POWELL (F),
CUSKING, COLAHAN, UHLMANN
DESDIV 106 Captain Tompkins, Benjamin F.
YARNALL (F), TWINING,
STOCKHAM, WEDDERBURN
(3) TG 38.3 Rear Admiral Sherman, Frederick C.
* Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., (C0M3RDFLT) embarked.
710 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(a) TU 38.3.1 Carrier Unit Rear Admiral Sherman, Frederick C.
CARDIV 1 less ENTERPRISE,
COWPENS plus LEXINGTON,
PRINCETON, LANGLEY Rear Admiral Sherman, Frederick C.
ESSEX (FFF) Captain Weiber, Carlos W.
CVG 15 (54 VF, 25 VB,
18 VT) Commander Mc Campbell, David
LEXINGTON (FFFF)* Captain Litch, Ernest W.
CVG 19 (36 VF, 30 VB,
18 VT) Commander Winters, Theodore H., Jr.
PRINCETON** Captain Buracker, William H.
CVLG 27 (23 VF, 9 VT) Lieutenant Commander Bardshar,
Frederic A.
LANGLEY Captain Wegforth, John F.
CVLG 44 (23 VF, 9 VT) Commander Wordell, Malcolm T.
(b) TU 38.3.2 Heavy Support
Unit Rear Admiral Hanson, Edward W.
BATDIV 8 less INDIANA Rear Admiral Davis, Glenn B.
MASSACHUSETTS (F) Captain Warlick, William W.
BATDIV 9 less ALABAMA Rear Admiral Hanson, Edward W.
SOUTH DAKOTA (FF) Captain Riggs, Ralph S.
(c) TU 38.3.3 Light Support
Unit Rear Admiral DuBose, Laurence T.
CRUDIV 13 less BILOXI Rear Admiral DuBose, Laurence T.
SANTE FE (FF) Captain Wright, Jerauld
BIRMINGHAM Captain Inglis, Thomas B.
MOBILE Captain Miller, Christopher C.
RENO Captain Alexander, Ralph C.
(d) TU 38.3.4 Screen Unit Captain Wilkinson, Edwin R.
DESDIV 99 Captain Wilkinson, Edwin R.
CLARENCE K. BRONSON (FF),
COTTEN, DORTCH, GATLING,
HEALY
DESRON 55 Captain Jarrell, Albert E.
DESDIV 109 Captain Jarrell, Albert E.
PORTERFIELD (FF), CALLAGHAN,
CASSIN YOUNG, IRWIN, PRESTON
DESDIV 110 less
PRITCHETT Commander Edsall, Warren R.
LAWS (F), LONGSHAW,
MORRISON
(4) TG 38.4*** Rear Admiral Davison, Ralph E.
* Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher (CTF 38) embarked.
** Sunk October 24th.
*** Action Report CTU 38.4.2 (COMCRUDIV 6), Operations with TG 38.4 for the
periods October 21st - 31st, 1944, Serial 0065, November 6th, 1944.
711 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(a) TU 38.4.1 Carrier Unit
CARDIV 2 less HANCOCK
FRANKLIN (FFF)
CVG 13 (34 VF, 27
VB, 18 VT)
SAN JACINTO
CVLG 51 (22 VF,
9 VT)
(1) TU 38.4.11
ENTERPRISE (F)
CVG 20 (30 VF,
17 VB, 18 VT)
BELLEAU WOOD
CVLG 21 (23 VF,
9 VT)
(b) TU 38.4.2 Light Support
Unit
CRUDIV 6 less MINNEAPOLIS,
SAN FRANCISCO
WICHITA (F)
NEW ORLEANS
Rear Admiral Davison, Ralph E.
Rear Admiral Davison, Ralph E.
Captain Shoemaker, James M.
Commander Kibbe, Richard L.
Captain Martin, Harold M.
Commander Moore, Charles L., Jr.
Rear Admiral Sallada, Harold B.
Captain Glover, Cato D.
Commander Smith, Daniel F., Jr.
Captain Perry, John
Commander Casey, Vincent F.
Rear Admiral Joy, Charles T.
Rear Admiral Joy, Charles T.
Captain Spencer, Douglas A.
Captain Hurff, Jack E.
Captain Long, Victor D.
Captain Long, Victor D.
Captain Long, Victor D.
Captain Poehlmann, Karl F.
(c) TU 38.4.3 Screen Unit
DESRON 6
DESDIV 11 less CRAVEN
MAURY (FF), GRIDLEY,
HELM, MC CALL
DESDIV 12
MUGFORD (F), RALPH
TALBOT, PATTERSON, BAGLEY
DESDIV 24 less GRAYSON Captain Greenacre, Alvord J.
WILKES, NICHOLSON,
SWANSON (F)
DESDIV 100 Captain Miller, Wallace J.
COGSWELL (F), CAPERTON,
INGERSOLL, KNAPP
(d) TU 38.4.4 Heavy Support
Unit Vice Admiral Lee, Willis A. (COMBATPAC)
BATDIV 6 less NORTH CAROLINA
plus ALABAMA Vice Admiral Lee, Willis A. (COMBATPAC)
WASHINGTON (FFFF) Captain Cooley, Thomas R.
ALABAMA Captain Murphy, Vincent R.
(5) TF 34 Heavy Surface Striking
Force*
Vice Admiral Lee, Willis A., Jr.
Since TF 34 and TG 34.5 were made effective October 25th, the tentative task
organization for these groups as issued by Commander Battleships Pacific Fleet
in COMBATPAC Operation Order No. 13-44, Addendum No. 1, Serial" 00080, October
16th, 1944, is included herewith. The actual organization made effective
October 25th differed somewhat from the above organization.
712
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(a) TG 34.1 Battle Line
Vice Admiral Lee, Willis A., Jr.
(1) TU 34.1.1 Rear Admiral Badger, Oscar C.
BATDIV 7 Rear Admiral Badger, Oscar C.
IOWA (F) Captain McCann, Allan R.
NEW JERSEY (FFFFF)* Captain Holden, Carl F.
(2) TU 34.1.2 Rear Admiral Davis, Glenn B.
BATDIV 8 Rear Admiral Davis, Glenn B.
MASSACHUSETTS (F) Captain Warlick, William W.
WASHINGTON (FFFF)** Captain Cooley, Thomas R.
(3) TU 34.1o3
BATDIV 9
SOUTH DAKOTA (F)
ALABAMA
(b) TG 34.2 Right Flank
(1) TU 34.2.1
Rear Admiral Hanson, Edward W.
Rear Admiral Hanson, Edward W.
Captain Riggs, Ralph S.
Captain Murphy, Vincent R.
Rear Admiral Whiting, Francis E. M,
(2) TU 34.2.2 Rear Admiral Whiting, Francis E. M,
CRUDIV 14 less VICKSBURG,
HOUSTON plus BILOXI Rear Admiral Whiting, Francis E. M.
VINCENNES (FF) Captain Brown, Allen D.
MIAMI Captain Crawford, John G.
BILOXI Captain McGurl, Daniel M.
(3) TU 34.2.3 Captain Wilkinson, Edwin R.
DESDIV 99 Captain Wilkinson, Edwin R.
CLARENCE K. BRONSON (F),
COTTEN, DORTCH, GATLING, HEALY
(4) TU 34.2.4
DESDIV 104 less
MARSHALL
HICKOX (F), HUNT,
LEWIS HANCOCK
(c) TG 34.3 Center
(d) TG 34.4 Left Flank
(1) TU 34.4.1
CRUDIV 5
CHESTER (FF)
PSNSACOLA
SALT LAKE CITY
(2) TU 34.4.2
Captain Kenny, William T.
Captain Kenny, William T.
Rear Admiral Smith, Allan E.
Rear Admiral Smith, Allan E.
Rear Admiral Smith, Allan E.
Captain Hartley, Henry
Captain Mullinix, Allen P.
Captain Busbey, Leroy W., Jr.
* Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., (C0M3RDFLT) embarked.
** Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee (COMBATPAC & CTF 34) embarked.
713
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(3) TU 34.4.3 Captain Espe, Carl F.
DESDIV 91 less CHARRETTE,
BURNS, BELL plus
PRESTON, UHLMANN Captain Espe, Carl F.
IZARD (F), CONNER,
PRESTON, UHLMANN
(e) TG 34.9 Supporting Carrier
Group
(1) TU 34.9,1 Carrier Unit
ONE
1 CVL, PATTERSON,
BAGLEY Commander Shea, William H., Jr.
(2) TU 34.9.2 Carrier Unit
TWO
1 CVL
DESDIV 12 less PATTERSON,
BAGLEY Captain Poehlmann, Karl F.
MUGFORD (F),
RALPH TALBOT
(6) TG 34.5 Special Group* Rear Admiral Badger, Oscar C.
(a) TU 34.1.1 Rear Admiral Badger, Oscar C.
BATDIV 7 Rear Admiral Badger, Oscar C.
IOWA (FF) Captain McCann, Allan R.
NB.V JERSEY (FFFFF)** Captain Holden, Carl F.
(b) TU 34.2o2 Rear Admiral Whiting, Francis E. M.
CRUDIV 14 less VICKSBURG,
HOUSTON plus BILOXI Rear Admiral Whiting, Francis E. K.
VINCENNSS (F) Captain Brown, Allen D.
MIAMI Captain Crawford, John G.
BILOXI Captain McGurl, Daniel M.
(c) TU 34.2.3 Captain Wilkinson, Edwin R.
DESDIV 99 Captain Wilkinson, Edwin R.
CLARENCE K. BRONSON (F),
COTTEN, DORTCH, GATLING, HEALY
(d) TU 34.9.2 Carrier Unit
TWO
1 CVL
DESDIV 12 less PATTERSON,
BAGLEY Captain Poehlmann, Karl F.
MUGFORD (F), RALPH
TALBOT
* Since TF 34 and TG 34.5 were made effective October 25th, the tentative task
organization for these groups as issued by Commander Battleships Pacific Fleet
in COMBATPAC Operation Order No. 13-44, Addendum No. 1, Case 1, Serial 00030,
October 16th, 1944, is included herewith. The actual organization made
effective October 25th differed somewhat from the above organization.
** Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., (C0M3RDFLT) embarked.
714 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(b) TG 30.3
Rear Admiral Wiltse, Lloyd J,
Rear Admiral Wiltse, Lloyd J.
Captain Herrmann, Ernest E.
Captain Behrens, William W.
Captain Early, Alexander R.
DESDIV 92 less BRADFORD, BROWN,
plus BURNS, BELL, CHARRETTE Captain Sweet ser, Willard M.
BOYD (F),* COWELL,* BURNS,*
BELL,* CHARRETTE,* DMS TREVER,
FARENHOLT,*** MC CALLA,***
(1) TU 30.3.1 Towing Unit
BOSTON (FF)*
HOUSTON ( CURRENT- ZUNI
towing)**
CANBERRA (ATR 50-WATCH
HILL towing)**
GRAYSON,*** WOODWORTH***
(2) TG 30.7 Hunter-Killer Group
CVE HOGGATT BAY (FF)
DE's BEBAS (F), SEID,
STEELE, SAMUEL S. HINDS
(c) TG 30.5 Air Search and
Reconnaissance
(1) TU 30.5.1 Seaplane Squadrons
and Tenders Kossol Passage
CHANDELEUR (F), POCOMOKE,
MAKINAC, YAKUT AT
VPB 16 (13 PBM)
VPB 202 (13 PBM)
VPB 216 (14 PBM)
VH1 Detachment (5 PBM)
(2) TU 30.5.2 Seaplane Squadrons
and Tenders, Saipan
KENNETH WHITING (F), COOS
BAY, SHELIKOF
VPB 4 (16 PB2Y)
VPB 18 (12 PBM)
VH1 Detachment (5 PBM)
Captain Saunders, William V.
Captain Saunders, William V.
Commodore Ketcham, Dixwell
Captain Goodney, Willard K.
Lieutenant Commander Scarpino,
William J.
Commander Leeman, Robert W.
Commander Cook, Harry E., Jr.
Commander Lyons, Raymond R.
Lieutenant Commander Curtis,
Frederick L.
Lieutenant Commander Brower, Charles
M., USNR
* Departed October 24th to rejoin TG 38.1.
** COMCRUDIV 10 Report of Salvage of USS CANBERRA and USS HOUSTON, Serial 0032,
November 30th, 1944.
*** Reported October 24th.
715
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(3) TU 30,5.3 Land Plane Search
Group Tinian Commander Rigsbee, Everett 0., Jr.
VPB 102 (15 PB4Y) Lieutenant Commander Pearson,
Gerald R., USNR
VPB 116 (15 PB4Y) Comrander Gumz, Donald G.
VPB 117 (15 PB4Y) Commander Rigsbee, Everett 0., Jr.
VPB 150 (16 PV) Commander Riddell, Robert S.
VPB 151 (15 PV) Commander Masterton, Paul
(4) TU 30.5.4 Seaplane and Tender
Detachment Ulithi Captain McLean, Gordon A.
HAMLIN (F), CASCO, ONSLOW
VPB 17 (13 PBM) Lieutenant Commander Kuehner,
Kenneth A., USNR
(d) TG 30.8 Fleet Oiler and Transport
Carrier Group Captain Acuff, Jasper T.
7 CVE, 6 DD, 15 DE, 24 AO
(2) TF 59 Shore-Based Aircraft, Forward
Area, Central Pacific Major General Kale, Willis H., (AC)
USA
(a) TG 59.1 Marianas Air Defense Brigadier General Cushman, Thomas J.,
Command USMC
(1) Army
318th Fighter Group (82 VF)
Detachment 6th Night Fighter Squadron (6 VF(N))
Detachment 28th Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron (4 F5B)
(2) Marine
VMF 216, 217, 225, 321 (82 VF)
VMF(N) 534 (14 VF(N))
VMTB 131, 242 (40 VTB)
VMO 1, 2, (20 VO)
(b) TG 59.2 Bomber Command Brigadier General Landon, Truman H.,
(AC), USA
Army
30th, 494th Bomber Groups (109 VBH)
(c) TG 59.5 Transport Air Group Colonel McOuade, Thomas J., USMC
Marine
VMR 253 (16 VR)
(d) 'TG 59.6 Garrison Force Western
Carolines Major General Moore, James T., USMC
(1) TU 59.6.2 Air Defense Command
Palaus Colonel Bailey, Caleb T., USMC
716 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(a) Army
Detachment 23th Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron (3 F5B)
(b) Marine
VMF 114, 122 (42 VF)
VMF(N) 541 (13 VF(N))
VMTB 134 (24 VTB)
(b) TF 17 Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet Vice Admiral Lockwood, Charles A.,Jr,
(1) TG 17.1 Empire Patrol Group
(a) On Patrol, Single Submarines
BURRFISH, STERLET, SAURY, SEA DOG,
TAMBOR, GRESNLING, APOGON, SNOOK,
SEA FOX, BILLFISH, SEAL, GABI LAN,
KINGFISH
(b) On Patrol, Coordinated Attack Groups
(1) TG 17.11 Commander Blakely, Edward N.
SHARK (F),* SEADRAGON,
BLACKFISH
(2) TG 17.14 Commander Lee, John E.
CROAKER (F), PERCH
(3) TG 17.15 Commander Banister, Alan B.
SAWFISH (F), ICEFISH, DRUM
(4) TG 17.17 Commander Wogan, Thomas L.
BESUGO (F), RONQUIL
(5) TG 17.19 Commander Coye, John S., Jr.
SILVERSIDES (F), TRIGGER,
SALMON, TANG
(c) En route Patrol
(1) Single Submarines
PILOTFISH, SARGO, POGY, SKIPJACK,
SCAMP
(2) Coordinate Attack Group
(a) TG 17.12 Commander Roach, John P.
HADDOCK (F), HALIBUT, TUNA
(b) TG 17.16 Commander Clarey, Bernard A.
PINTADO (F), ATULS, JALLAO
* Presumed lost October 24th.
717 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(d) En route Base
ASPRO, SNAPPER, TILEFISH,* SEAHORSE,
SEA DEVIL, WHALE, PARCHE, SAILFISH,**
BONEFISH, BARBEL,** SKATE
(2) TG 17.2 Mandate Patrol Group
(a) On Patrol
PERMIT
CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER***
(a) FOURTEENTH Air Force
General Stilwell, Joseph W., USA
Major General Chennault, Claire L.,
(AC), USA
308th Heavy Bomb Group (26 B-24, 20 LAB-24)
341st Medium Bomb Group (23 B-25)
51st Fighter Group (55 P-40, 19 P-51)
23rd Fighter Group (47 P-40, 25 P-51)
(b) TWENTIETH Bomber Command
FIFTY-EIGHTH Bomb Wing****
40th Bomb Group (35 B-29)
444th Bomb Group (35 B-29)
462nd Bomb Group (34 B-29)
468th Bomb Group (36 B-29)
Major General LeMay, Curtis E., (AC),
USA
Colonel Blanchard, William H., (AC),
USA
Colonel Harvey, Alva L., (AC), USA
Colonel Kalberer, Alfred F., (AC), USA
Colonel Faulkner, Ted S., (AC), USA
Ar rived Midway October 24th.
Arrived Saipan October 24th,
Data regarding the organization, disposition and strength of China-based
Allied Air Forces supporting the Leyte campaign was obtained from the
following sources:
(1) Letters from the Director, Library Division, USAF Air University to
President, Naval War College, November 8th 1950 and February 23rd, 1951.
(2) Letter from the Research Studies Institute, USAF Air University to
President, Naval War College, November 3rd, 1952.
(3) TWENTIETH Bomber Command Tactical Missions Reports Nos. 1, 10, 12,
October 14th, 16th, 17th, 1944.
**** Headquarters discontinued October 12th, 1944.
718
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
APPENDIX V
ORGANIZATION OF ALLIED FORCES
1830, October 24th, 1944
BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT
ALLIED FORCES (CTG 77.2)*
(a) BATTLE LINE
(1) BATDIV 2 less NEVADA
TENNESSEE (F)
CALIFORNIA
PENNSYLVANIA
(2) BATDIV 3 less NEW MEXICO, IDAHO
MISSISSIPPI (FF)
(3) BATDIV 4 less COLORADO
WEST VIRGINIA (F)
MARYLAND
(4) DESDIV XRAY
CLAXTON (F)
CONY
THORN
AULICK
SIGOURNEY
WELLES
(b) LEFT FLANK FORCE
(1) CRUDIV 4 less INDIANAPOLIS plus
MINNEAPOLIS
LOUISVILLE (FFF)
PORTLAND
MINNEAPOLIS
Rear Admiral Oldendorf, Jesse B,
Rear Admiral Weyler, George L,
Rear Admiral Chandler, Theodore E.
Captain Hef fernan, John B,
Captain Burnett, Henry B.
Captain Martin, Charles F.
Rear Admiral Weyler, George L,
Captain Redfield, Herman J.
Rear Admiral Ruddock, Theodore D.
Captain Wiley, Herbert V,
Captain Ray, Herbert J.
Commander Hubbard, Miles H.
Commander Hubbard, Miles H.
Commander Moore, Allen W,
Lieutenant Commander Schneider,
Frederick H., Jr.
Commander Andrew, John D.
Lieutenant Commander Hale, Fletcher
Lieutenant Commander Slaughter,
John S.
Rear Admiral Oldendorf, Jesse B,
Rear Admiral Oldendorf, Jesse B,
Captain Hurt, Samuel H»
Captain Settle, Thomas G. W.
Captain Slocum, Harry B.
(2) CRUDIV 12 less MONTPELIER, CLEVELAND Rear Admiral Hayler, Robert W.
DENVER (F) Captain Bledsoe, Albert M.
COLUMBIA Captain Curts, Maurice E.
* Preliminary Action Report CTG 77.2 (COMCRUDIV 4) for Battle of Surigao
Strait, October 25th, 1944, Serial 00141, November 2nd, 1944.
719
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(3) DESRON 56
DESDIV 111
NEWCOMB (F)
LEUTZE
BENNION
HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS
RICHARD P. LEARY
DESDIV 112 less ROSS plus HALFORD
ROBINSON (F)
ALBERT W. GRANT
BRYANT
HALFORD
(c) RIGHT FLANK FORCE (CTG 77.3)
(1) CRUDIV 15 less NASHVILLE plus
HMAS SHROPSHIRE
PHOENIX (FF)
BOISE
HMAS SHROPSHIRE
(2) DESRON 24 less DESDIV 48 plus
HMAS ARUNTA
HUTCHBJS (F)
DALY
BACHE
HMAS ARUNTA
KILLEN
BEALE
(d) SPECIAL ATTACK FORCE ( CTG 79.11)
(1) DESRON 54
DESDIV 107 less WADLEIGH,
NORMAN SCOTT, MERTZ
REMEY (FF)
MONSSSN
DESDIV 108 less MC NAIR
MC DERMUT (F)
MC GOWAN
MELVIN
(e) MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS (CTG 70.1)*
(1) MTB RON 7 less MTB 138
MTB's 127, 128, 129, 130, 131,
132, 134, 137
(2) MTB RON 12
MTB's 146, 150, 151, 152, 190,
191, 192, 194, 195, 196
Captain Smoot, Roland N.
Captain Smoot, Roland N.
Commander Cook, Lawrence B.
Commander Robbins, Berton A., Jr.
Commander Cooper, Joshua W.
Commander Boulware, Joe W,
Commander Habecker, Frederic S.
Captain Conley, Thomas F., Jr.
Commander Grantham, Elonzo B., Jr.
Commander Nisewaner, Terrell A.
Commander High, Paul L.
Commander Hardy, Robert J,
Rear Admiral Berkey, Russell S.
Rear Admiral Berkey, Russell S.
Captain Duncan, Jack H.
Captain Roberts, John S.
Captain Nichols, Charles A.G. , RN
Captain McManes, Kenmore M.
Commander Lanlns, Caleb B.
Commander Visser, Richard G.
Commander Morton, Robert C.
Commander Buchanan, A. 2., RAN
Commander Corey, Howard G.
Comr-iander Coffee, Doyle M.
Captain Coward, Jesse G.
Captain Coward, Jesse G.
Captain Coward, Jesse G.
Commander Fiala, Reid P.
Commander Bergin, Charles K.
Commander Phillips, Richard H.
Commander Jennings, Carter B.
Commander Cox, William R.
Commander Atkins, Barry K.
Commander Bowling, Selman S«
Lieutenant Commander Leeson, Robert,
USNR
Lieutenant Pullen, Weston C, Jr.,
USNR
Action Report CTG 70.1, Report of Action Motor Torpedo Boats, Surigao Strains,
P. I., Night of October 24th - 25th, Serial 1-0330, December 1st, 1944.
720
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(3) MTB RON 21 less MTB 325 Lieutenant Gleason, Carl T.
MTB's 320, 321, 323, 324, 326,
327, 328, 329, 330, 331
(4) MTB RON 33 less MTB 488 Lieutenant Preston, Arthur M., USNR
MTB's 489, 490, 491, 492, 493,
494, 495, 496, 497
(5) MTB RON 36 less MTB's 522, 525 Lieutenant Commander Tappaan,
MTB's 523, 524, 526 Francis D., USNR
721 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
APPENDIX VI
ORGANIZATION OF JAPANESE FORCES
1830, October 24th, 1944
BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT
JAPANESE FORCES*
(a) THIRD Section
(1) BATDIV 2
BB YAMASHIRO (FFFF)
FUSO
(2) CA MOGAMI
(3) DESDIV 4 less NCWAKI plus SHIGURE
DD MICHISHIO (F)
ASAGUMO
YAMAGUMO
SHIGURE
(b) SECOND STRIKING FORCE less CRUDIV 16,
DESDIV 21
(1) CRUDIV 21
CA NACHI (FFF)
ASHIGARA
(2) DESRON 1
CL ABUKUMA (FF)
(3) DESDIV 7
DD AKEBONO (F)
USHIO
(4) DESDIV 18
DD KASUMI (F)
SHIRANUHI
Vice Admiral Nishimura, Shoji
Vice Admiral Nishimura, Shoji
Vice Admiral Nishimura, Shoji
Rear Admiral Shinoda, Katsukiyo
Rear Admiral Ban, Masami
Captain Toma, Ryo
Captain Takahashi, Kameshiro
Commander Tanaka, Tomoo
Commander Shibayama, Kazuo
Commander Ono, Shiro
Commander Nishino, Shigeru
Vice Admiral Shima, Kiyohide
Vice Admiral Shima, Kiyohide
Captain Kanooka, Smpei
Captain Miura, Hayao
Rear Admiral Kimura, Masatomi
Captain Hanada, Takuo
Captain Iwagami, Jiichi
Lieutenant Commander Yoda, Shiro
Commander Araki, Masaomi
Captain Inoue, Yoshio
Commander Yamana, Hiroo
Commander Ara, Teisaburo
Military History Officer, U. S. Army Japan 1st endorsement to President,
Naval War College letter serial 289-58 dated February 11th, 1958, Enclosure
(2).
722
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
THIS PAGE IS BLANK
726 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIEENTIAL
LEGEND
REPORTED SCATTERED SHOWERS AND
VARIABLE CONDITIONS.
LINE OF SQUALLS OR INDIVIDUALLY
REPORTED SQUALLY AND/OR SHOWERY
PRECIPITATION AREAS.
•*•■•■••■■•••••■•■•■
•••••■••■••••■•■•a**
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• ■(*>■•*•••••*■«•■••
FOG, MIST OR HAZE
APPROXIMATE POSITION OF THE INTER
TROPICAL FRONT.
APPROXIMATE CENTER OF TROPICAL STORM
AND DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT.
727 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
THIS PAGE IS BLANK
728 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
TTrrn-pHll|li l>i|ii | i. | "/"I
CONFIDENTIAL
r
CONFIDENTIAL
1.
1
3.
12.
13.
1057
About
1100
1118
4.
1200
5.
1220
6.
About
1300
7.
About
1400
8.
1500
9.
1538
10.
1623
11.
1645
1730
1738
14. 1800
Events Depicted on Diagram "B"
October 23rd, 1944
1042 - 2400
TG 38«2 completed refueling and at 1146 changed course to
240°(T), speed sixteen knots, to head for the dawn launching
position.
Tinian-based search planes failed to contact the Main Force.
CTG 38.4 changed course to 250°(T), speed eighteen knots to
head for the dawn launching position. At 1452 he completed
fueling and increased speed.
COMCRUDIV SIXTEEN became Commander Guard Force. AOBA being
towed by KINU, arrived in Manila Bay at 2045*
A morotai-based PB4Y sighted the SECOND Striking Force
(Contact 5, Plate V.)
Morotai-based PB4Y's failed to sight Main Body, FIRST
Striking Force.
Morotai-based PB4Y's failed to sight THIRD Section.
COMDESDIV TWENTY-ONE arrived Manila, discharged SIXTH Base
Air Force personnel, refueled and departed about 2125.
SAWFISH contacted the HARUKAZE convoy of twelve ships.
SAWFISH made two torpedo attacks and notified the other
submarines of the convoy's position, course and speed.
Commander FIRST Striking Force transfered his flag to the
YAMATO.
Commander SECOKD Striking Force received Commander SW Area
Force's orders which established the Guard Force and restated
the mission of the SECOND Striking Force.
Commander THIRD Section issued gunnery instructions for the
Battle of Surigao Strait.
TG 38. 3' s search of the Sibuyan Sea disclosed no contacts.
One fighter reconnoitered Manila Bay and reported eleven to
twenty freighters.
Commander SECOND Striking Force entered Culion Bay and
commenced refueling his destroyers from the cruisers.
729
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
15.
About
1800
16.
1903
17.
1930
18.
1950
19.
2210
20.
2315
21.
2317
22.
2345
Commander Main Force decided to attack the enemy on the
following day.
Commander THIRD Section issued orders to tighten anti-
aircraft and antisubmarine alerts.
TG 78.7 (Reinforcement Group TWO) entered Leyte Gulf and
headed for Northern Transport Area.
ANGLER contacted Main Body, FIRST Striking Force (Contact
2, Plate XV.)
COMTHIRDFLT ordered the INDEPENDENCE to launch a night
search at 2400 to the northward to cover sector 320°(T)
to 010° (T) to a distance of 350 miles.
GUITARRO contacted Main Body, FIRST Striking Force
(Contact 3, Plate XV.)
COMTHIRDFLT ordered CTG 38.2 to search the bays along the
northwest coast of Palawan from Imuruan Bay to Bacuit.
DARTER and DACE prepared to make another attack on the
TAKAO which was moving toward the southwest at four to
six knots.
1.
1042
2.
1119
3.
1200
4.
1530
5.
1643
6. 1739
Events within Leyte Gulf
(Not Depicted on Diagram "B")
CTF 77 issued an estimate of the situation concerning the
concentration of Japanese forces in the Coron Bay area.
COMSOWESPAC proceeded to Tacloban to conduct the
installation ceremonies of the Philippine Government.
C.G. TWENTY-FOURTH Corps assumed command ashore.
First ten PBY's of TG 73.7 arrived in Leyte Gulf.
CTG 79.1 took command of TU 79.14.4 and departed Leyte
Gulf for Hollandia.
CTG 77.5 reported no mines swept on this day and most of
Leyte Gulf was considered safe from moored mines.
730
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
| ■ I'M rTTTTTnrrTrrT1,l|..| | ^rpTp,!,,!..,..,.
110°
BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF
AIR SEARCHES AND MOVEMENT OF FORCES
1042 TO 2400 23 OCTOBER 1944
Submarines generally remained submerged during
daylight-, The movements depicted on this diagram
therefore, were usua|ly made on the surface ol night.
s„ h u *air.r
CohiiOENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
0050
0052
to
1404
0105
to
0650
0200
0200
0400
7.
0413
8.
0431
9.
0500
10.
About
0600
11.
0600
12.
About
0700
13.
0700
Events Depicted on Diagram "C"
October 24th, 1944
0000 - 1830
A SIXTH Base Air Force patrol plane made contact on TG
38.3. (Contact MA'», Plate XIII).
Convoy College submarines sank nine ships from the
HARUKAZE convoy. During this day the SHARK was lost.
DARTER ran aground on Bombay Shoal. Failing to get off
she transfered her crew to the DACE and attempted to
destroy the ship. The demolition charges failed and the
DACE attempted to destroy her using torpedoes and gunfire.
This attempt failed also. DACE was driven off by a
Japanese plane.
Commander SECOND Striking Force departed Coron Bay for
Surigao Strait.
MOGAMI launched one search plane for a dawn reconnaissance
of Leyte Gulf.
GUITARRO reported to CTF 71 that the Main Body, composed
of three definite battleships and two possible carriers,
was headed south through Mindoro Strait. (Contact "4",
Plate XV).
BESUGO sank a small escort, CD 132,
CROAKER sank MIKAGE MARU.
CTG 77.4 launched TCAP to protect Leyte Gulf against air
attack. The TCAP was able to blunt the enemy air attack
which commenced about 0745.
COMTHIRDFLT « s three carrier groups launched searches to the
westward.
Commander Main Force launched the morning air search.
C.G. FOURTH Air Array launched the first air attack against
enemy shipping in Leyte Gulf. One ATA and one LCI were
sunk and three other ships damaged.
Commander SIXTH Base Air Force launched his first air
attack of the day against TG 38.3. This attack hit the
PRINCETON and set her afire.
731
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
14.
0700
to
0800
15.
0700
to
1000
16.
0754
17.
0810
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
28.
0900
0905
0910
0930
1026
23.
1043
24.
1100
25.
1115
26.
1125
27.
1155
1155
Commander Main Body launched seven search planes to search
in ten degree sectors from Banton Island to a distance of
300 miles with "base line" of 075°(T).
Guard Force (KINU and URANAMI) under attack by planes from
TG 38.3 and suffered minor damage.
TG 38.3 was under intermittent air attack during most of
the day.
INTREPID search plane made contact on Main Body south of
Mindoro and reported four BB, eight CA, thirteen DD, no
transports, total of twenty-five ships. (Contact "6",
Plate XV).
WAKABA sunk as a result of air attack by planes from TG
38.4. COMDESDIV TWENTY-ONE informed Commander SECOND
Striking Force of the attack and the sinking.
THIRD Section attacked by planes from TG 38.4. Minor
damage resulted.
One of CTG 73.4 's search planes relayed a contact report
on two groups of enemy ships totaling four battleships,
four heavy cruisers, four light cruisers and ten
destroyers. (Contact "10", Plate XV).
PRINCETON was hit by a bomb and caught fire.
First air attack made by planes from TG 38.2 against Main
Body, FIRST Striking Force. MYOKO was badly damaged and
ordered to return to Brunei Bay.
CTG 38.1 reversed course to head for Point MICK.
C.G. FOURTH Air Army launched the second air attack
against enemy shipping in Leyte Gulf.
One of CTG 73 .4' s search planes sighted the Main Body and
reported no carriers present. (Contact "12", Plate XV).
GUITARRO sighted KINU and URANAMI headed south toward
Mindoro Strait.
One of CTG 73 .4' s search planes sighted the SECOND Striking
Force. The search plane was not detected by the SECOND
Striking Force. (Contact "15", Plate XV).
Commander Main Force launched the first air attack against
TG 38.3. The first attack unit did not locate the enemy
carriers. The second attack unit located the enemy
carriers and attacked but no damage was done.
732
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
29. 1200 Commander THIRD Section received the report of air
reconnaissance of Leyte Gulf by message drop from the
search plane,
30. 1207 Second air attack made by planes from TG 38.2 against Main
Body, FIRST Striking Force. MUSASHI»s speed reduced to
twenty-two knots.
31. 1211 Second air attack on DESDIV TWENTY-ONE by planes from TG
38.4. No serious damage was incurred.
32. 1220 CTG 77.4 launched an air attack against western Visayas
and, in particular, Bacolod Airfield and Bacolod Harbor.
33. 1224 CTG 38.4 explained to COMTHIRDFLT that he had been delayed
by the recovery of his search and attack groups and advised
that he was proceeding to close TG 38.2 and would launch a
deck-load strike against the enemy force off Tablas Island,
34. 1240 Another of CTG 73.4' s search planes contacted the THIRD
Section. (Contact "16", Plate XV).
35. 1324 Third air attack made by planes of TG 38.3 against the Main
Body. MUSASHI's speed reduced to twenty knots and YAHAGPs
speed reduced to twenty- two knots,
36. I4OO Commander SIXTH Base Air Force launched his second air
attack of the day against TG 38.3. This attack encountered
bad weather and returned to base,
C.G. FOURTH Air Army launched his third air attack against
enemy shipping in Leyte Gulf,
CTG 38,3 launched a search to the north composed of five VB,
Fourth air attack made by planes of TG 38,3 against the
Main Body. No serious damage was incurred,
40. 1445 COMDESDIV TOENTY-ONE reversed course and headed for Manila,
He failed to inform Commander SECOND Striking Force of his
action,
41 • 1452 Commander SECOND Striking Force increased speed to twenty
knots in order to effect closer liason with the THIRD
Section,
42. 1500 Fifth air attack made by planes of TG»s 38.2 and 38,4
against the Main Body. MUSASHI became un-navigable as a
result of this attack,
43. 1523 A tremendous explosion blew off PRINCETON'S stern and
injured a large number of the BIRMINGHAM'S crew, including
her captain. The RENO took charge of the rescue efforts.
733 CONFIDENTIAL
37.
After-
noon
38.
1409
39.
1426
CONFIDENTIAL
44. 1530 Commander Main Body reversed course while he re-estimated
the situation.
45. 1621 Commander SIXTH Base Air Force launched a dusk attack
against TG 38.3. Although one of the search planes
witnessed the sinking of the PRINCETON the attack planes
failed to find the enemy and returned to base.
46. 1635 A search plane from TG 38.3 made contact on the Main Force,
(Contacts "20" and "21", Plate XV).
47. 1650 COMTHIRDFLT received a report of an enemy force to the
north consisting of three CV, two CL and three DD.
(Contact "20", Plate XV).
48. 1714 Commander Main Body, after receiving word that the Advance
Guard, Main Force, was proceeding south to destroy enemy
remnants and that the SIXTH Base Air Force was scheduled
to make a dusk attack against one of the enemy carrier
groups, resumed the advance.
49. 1745 Commander SECOND Striking Force issued his night intentions
and increased speed to twenty-two knots in order to further
close the distance to the THIRD Section,
50. 1749 PRINCETON torpedoed by RENO and sank.
51. 1800 Commander Guard Force stopped while URANAMI repaired
damaged fuel tanks.
52. 1809 CTG 38.3 learned from returning pilots that the enemy force
to the north was composed of two groups, (a) two CV, one
CVL, three CL, three DD, and (b) four BB or CA including
one BB/XCV, five cruisers and six DD.
Events within Leyte Gulf
(Net Depicted on Diagram "C")
1. 0122 CTF 77 decided to concentrate his fighter planes over Leyte
Gulf and to cancel strikes against western Visayas.
2. 0831 First air attack against shipping in Leyte Gulf by planes
of FOURTH Air Army. One ATA and one LCI were sunk and
three other ships damaged.
3« About CTF 77 decided that since (a) he had repulsed the first air
0950 attack of the day and (b) most of the planes were land planes,
he should reinstitute attacks on the Visayan airfields.
734 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
k.
5.
6.
w I
Fore-
noon
1015
1110
1215
1225
9. 1400
10.
1404
11.
1410
12.
1443
13. 1509
14.
1520
to
1535
15.
1540
16.
1647
17.
1700
18.
Late
After-
noon
19.
1725
20.
1730
to
1830
21. 1830
CTG 70.1 conferred with CTF 77 concerning readiness and
proposed deployment of MTB's in case of night action.
CTU 79.14.5 (CTU 79.11.1) departed Leyte Gulf for Hollandia,
The second air attack was made by planes of the FOURTH Air
Army against shipping in Leyte Gulf. This attack was
unsuccessful.
CTF 77 directed his forces to prepare for night battle.
CTF 77 ordered night searches by three PBY's to the north
and two PBY's in the Mindanao Sea.
C.G. SIXTH Army assumed command of all forces ashore in the
Leyte area.
CTG 70.1 issued his battle plan for night action.
CTU 79.14.8 (CTG 79.2) departed Leyte Gulf for Hollandia.
CTF 77 issued supplementary orders to his harbor defense
plan to the forces which would defend Leyte Gulf.
CTF 77 directed CTG 70.1 to insure that enemy forces did
not pass undetected between Dinagat Island and Mindanao
Island.
MTB's departed OYSTER BAY which was anchored in San Pedro
Bay for stations in Surigao Strait.
CTU 77.2.1 (Commander Battle Line) reported on board the
LOUISVILLE for a conference with CTG 77.2.
CTG 77.3 (Commander Left Flank Force) reported on board
the LOUISVILLE for a conference with CTG 77.2.
CTF 77 intercepted COMTHIRDFLT's battle plan which indicated
that TF 34 would be formed of certain heavy ships and
destroyers.
CTG 77.2 directed that all ships' planes which could not be
stowed in hangars be sent ashore for the night.
CTG 77.2 issued his battle plan for the coming night action.
MTB's departed WACHAPREAGUE which was anchored in Liloan Bay
for stations in the Mindanao Sea.
CTG 73.7' s search planes did not start their search as
scheduled although later three PBY's got off, two searching
the Mindanao Sea and one the coast of Samar.
735
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736 CONFIDENTIAL
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|M I L"i"| I"!"!1
"n^TrTr,Trr,T^
CONFIDENTIAL
Events Depicted on Diagram "D"
October 24th, 1944
1330 - 2400
1. 1830 Commander FIRST Division in MOGAMI, with MICHISHIO, ASAGUMO
and YAMAGUMO, moved ahead of the SECOND Division in order
to make a sweep of the waters west of Panaon Island.
2. 1834 Commander SECOND Division changed course to 050° (T) in
order to pass close to Bohol Island.
3. 2135 Bohol PT's 152, 130, 131 had commenced patrol across
Mindanao Sea on course 169° (T) from Agio Point, Bohol
Island, speed twelve knots.
4. 2145 Camiguin PT's 127, 128, 129 arrived on station and commenced
a radar watch with the duty rotated among the boats. PT 128
assumed the radar duty from 2200 to 2400.
5. 2155 Commander THIRD Section received a revision of Commander
FIRST Striking Force's plan which stated that he would pass
through San Bernardino Strait at 0100, penetrate Leyte Gulf
at 1100, October 25th, and directed Commander THIRD Section
to rendezvous with the Main Body ten miles northeast of
Suluan Island at 0900.
6. 2200 Commander SECOND Striking Force received Commander THIRD
Section's dispatch relating his plans of penetration to a
point off Dulag at 0400, October 25th.
7. 2227 FIRST Division of Japanese THIRD Section crossed the patrol
line of Allied PT boats. Neither of the forces were aware
of the other's presence.
8. 2236 PT 131 of the Bohol PT's made radar contact on two targets
at a range of ten miles. The PT's changed course to 345° (T)
and commenced closing at twenty-four knots attempting
unsuccessfully to make a contact report. (This was the
YAMASHIRO and FUSO.)
9. 2245 Commander SECOND Striking Force advised Commander THIRD
Section and COMDESDIV TWENTY-ONE that he planned to pass
through southern entrance of Surigao Strait at 0300 and
penetrate at twenty-six knots,
10. 2252 Commander SECOND Division was informed by the SHIGURE that
she had sighted three enemy torpedo boats, which she later
took under fire.
11. 2252 Commander FIRST Division was aware that Commander SECOND
Division had encountered enemy torpedo boats and had
opened fire on them.
496799 O - 59 - 57
737 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
12. 2254 Bohol PT's after closing their contact to within two miles
sighted two battleships, two cruisers and one destroyer
and deployed for attack. However, before they could launch
torpedoes they were sighted by the Japanese and taken under
fire resulting in damage to PT's 130 and 132. (The
composition was incorrect as the force consisted of only
two battleships and one destroyer.)
13. 2310 Commander SECOND Division broke off action against motor
torpedo boats,
14. 2313 PT's 130 and 131 proceeded to the Camiguin PT's in order
to report the contact on the Japanese SECOND Division.
15. 2315 Commander SECOND Striking Force formed No. FOUR Approach
Formation.
16. 2354 Limasawa PT's made visual contact on the Japanese FIRST
Division.
738 CONFIDENTIAL
i
CONFIDENTIAL
I
J
CONFIDENTIAL
Events Depicted on Diagram "E"
October 25th, 1944
0000 - 0100
1. 0000 Limasawa PT's 151, 146 and 190, having sighted the Japanese
FIRST Division at 2354, continued approach on port quarter
of large ship for torpedo attack,
2. 0012 Commander FIRST Division changed course to 010°(T) and
informed Commander THIRD Section that he was "penetrating
from now."
3. 0015 SW Panaon PT's commenced return to their assigned station
off Balongbalong,
4. 0018 MOGAMI detected motor torpedo boats on bearing 100°(T) and
made a voice radio report. Commander FIRST Division
ordered DD's into column astern as previously planned and
searched area from starboard beam to quarter with search-
light but did not pick up MTB's visually,
5. 0019 MTB's closed to 1800 yards on port quarter of MOGAMI for
torpedo attack. PT's 151 and 146 fired one torpedo each
and attempted to get into position to fire a second
torpedo. PT 190 did not fire. No hits were made.
6. 0020 As DD's were maneuvering to take station in column astern
of MOGAMI, the MTB's were detected, illuminated with
searchlights and taken under fire by YAMAGUMO. The MTB's
turned right and returned the fire. PT's 146 and 151
retired on easterly courses while PT 190, in an endeavor
to fire a torpedo, turned back to the northwest.
7. 0023 Commander FIRST Division sighted a ship silhouette,
apparently enemy, and so advised Commander THIRD Section.
Assuming that this sighting was on the same general bearing
as the MTB sighting on bearing 100° (T) he turned away.
8. 0025 Commander FIRST Division sighted a ship silhouette on
bearing 200°(T) and so reported to Commander THIRD Section,
He now realized that his division was in danger from
enfilade fire,
9. 0025 SHIGURE sighted a destroyer bearing 040° (T) and so reported
to Commander THIRD Section,
10. 0026 Both divisions of the Japanese THIRD Section fired star-
shells to illuminate each other. Visual identification was
later established without damage to either group.
739 CONFIDENTIAL
496799 O - 59 - 58
CONFIDENTIAL
11. 0030 Commander FIRST Division returned to a southerly course,
having decided to break off the sweep of the waters west
of Panaon and rejoin the SECOND Division.
12. 0033 Commander SECOND Division executed course 090°(T).
13. 0039 Commander FIRST Division released his destroyers to form
No. TWO Approach Formation.
l/i.# 0050 PT 1$2 commenced return to base in order to transmit a
contact report and obtain aid for a wounded man.
740 KHEEBHUIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
1. 0100
2. 0118
3. 0124
0125
5. 0142
6. 0143
7. 0147
3. 0148
9. 0148
10. 0200
11. 0202
12. 0202
Events Depicted on Diagram "F"
October 25thT 19LL.
0100 - 0245
Commander FIRST Division with MOGAMI and DESDIV FOUR
continued rejoining Commander THIRD Section to form
Approach Disposition No. TWO. Due to squalls and rain in
this area visibility was reduced to less than 3,000 yards.
SW Panaon PT1 s failed to detect the THIRD Section which
passed at a range of from two to four miles. MICHISHIO,
ASAGUMO and YAMAGUMO likewise failed to detect the MTB's.
Commander SE Panaon PT's in PT 134, having tracked the
Japanese force since 0116, ordered his MTB's to attack.
The MTBfs became separated which resulted in independent
attacks.
Commander THIRD Section changed course of formation to
040° (T) by column movement.
PT 137 (SE Panaon PT's) launched a torpedo at two destroyers
sighted visually at 1,250 yards. The torpedo missed and
shortly thereafter PT 137 lost contact.
Sumilon PT's 523, 524 and 526 made radar contact on Japanese
surface force. Commander Sumilon PT's ordered his MTB's to
attack.
Lower Surigao PT's 490, 491 and 493 made radar contact to
the south at eight miles. Commander Lower Surigao PT's
ordered his MTB's to attack.
DESDIV FOUR destroyers of the FIRST Division rejoined and
formed Approach Disposition No. TWO. Commander THIRD
Section changed speed to twenty knots.
PT 132 (SE Panaon PT's) sighted a single destroyer and
attacked independently by launching four torpedoes,
apparently at the YAMAGUMO. All torpedoes missed.
PT 134 (SE Panaon PT's) evaluated the radar targets as a
main body with a van of destroyers and turned to intercept.
Bilaa Point PT's 494, 497 and 324 made radar contact on
enemy ships but did not attack as they were guarding
Hinatuan Passage to prevent undetected passage by the
Japanese.
Japanese THIRD Section changed formation course to 000°(T)
by column movement.
741
CONFIDENTIAL
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13. 0205
14. 020$
15. 0207
16. 0211
PT 134 (SE Panaon PT's), while attacking, was illuminated
by searchlight and taken under fire as he reached a range
of 3,000 yards. He returned the gunfire, closed to 2,500
yards, launched three torpedoes and then retired. (All
torpedoes missed and PT 134 received no damage.)
ASAGUM0 reported sighting MTB's to the northwest and SHIGURE
illuminated PT 134 and opened fire on her.
Lower Surigao PT's had closed to about 700 yards when they
were illuminated with searchlights while launching torpedoes.
PT 490 launched two more torpedoes while under fire from
Japanese ships. (Japanese ships evaded and all torpedoes
missed. PT 493 was damaged by three 5" shell hits in the
hull.)
Since the MTB's to the northwest had retired Commander THIRD
Section ordered a return to the base course of 000°(T).
During the turn he sighted additional MTB's attacking from
the southeast and ordered a turn away to 315° (T) and opened
fire.
17. 0212
18. 0213:30
19. 0235
20. 0235
While Japanese ships were repelling the Lower Surigao PT's,
the Sumilon PT's 523, 524 and 526 had closed undetected to
less than 2,000 yards and launched torpedoes. The PT's were
later taken under fire but escaped without damage, having
launched a total of six torpedoes. Since the THIRD Section
was turning away at the time of firing all torpedoes missed.
Japanese THIRD Section, having successfully repelled MTB's,
returned to course 000° (T) to continue north into Surigao
Strait.
Commander THIRD Section advises Commander SECOND Striking
Force that he had passed the lower entrance to Surigao
Strait without damage although he had been attacked by
Allied MTB's.
Lower Surigao Strait PT 493, seriously damaged during attack
at 0207 and separated from other boats of the section,
beached off Maoyo Point, Panaon Island.
742
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f
CONFIDENTIAL
Events Depicted on Diagram "G"
October 25th, 1944
0245 - 0320
1. 0245 Eastern Attack Group of COMDESRON FIFTY-FOUR (CTG 79.11) was
proceeding to the torpedo attack point on course 180° (T),
speed twenty knots. All three ships were in radar contact
with the enemy and tracking.
743 CONFIDENTIAL
2. 0245 Western Attack Group of COMDESRON FIFTY-FOUR was proceeding
to the torpedo attack point on course 170°(T), speed twenty
knots. Neither ship had radar contact with the enemy.
3. 0245 The Japanese THIRD Section was in Approach Disposition No.
TWO, steaming on course 000°(T), speed twenty knots and was
continuing the penetration. It was not in contact with
enemy ships.
4. 0245 Upper Surigao PT's (327, 326, 321) made radar contact to the
south. Having heard that COMDESRON FIFTY-FOUR was making an
attack, the PT boats withdrew toward Kanihaan Island.
5. 0245 COMDESRON TWENTY-FOUR, in HUTCHINS, with DESDIV FORTY-SEVEN
and ARUNTA, was maneuvering to the westward to clear DESDIV
108 and was awaiting orders to launch a torpedo attack.
6. 0246 MC GOWAN reported to Commander Eastern Attack Group, three
or more ships, in column, on course 000°(T), speed eighteen
knots, range 31,000 yards, bearing 184°(T).
7. 0255 Upper Surigao PT's (327, 326, 321) sighted Japanese force
visually but did not attack due to the presence of friendly
ships. PT's continued retirement to Kanihaan Island.
8. 0256 SHIGURE sighted three ship silhouettes, bearing 010°(T),
distant eight kilometers and reported the contact to
Commander THIRD Section.
9. 0257 Commander Eastern Attack Group evaluated the enemy force as
a main body of two large ships which were led by one or more
smaller ships. On this basis he ordered torpedo fire
distribution.
10. 0258 YAMASHIRO made a searchlight sweep on her starboard bow.
11. 0300 SHIGURE started to enter column.
12. 0301 Japanese commenced fire with searchlight illumination which
was followed by starshell illumination a short time later.
-
i
'
1
CONFIDENTIAL
13. 0301 During the REMEY torpedo launching, enemy searchlights
again illuminated the group for about a minute. C0MDE3R0N
FIFTY-FOUR ordered "make smoke." REMEY increased speed to
maximum and turned northward to retire,
14. 0302 Having completed torpedo launching, destroyers of Eastern
Attack Group ordered maximum speed and retired northward.
Enemy salvos began falling close to group and enemy star-
shells began bursting near the ships,
15. 0302 Commander Attack Group 1.2, in HUTCHINS, was ordered by
CTG 77.3 to attack. He then ordered his group to attack,
16. 030$ ARUNTA prematurely executed speed twenty- five knots and
nearly overran BACHE who was third ship in column,
17. 0308 Japanese ships continued gunfire aided by starshell
illumination,
18. 0308:30 Japanese battleship FUSO was hit by one or more torpedoes
causing her to slow and turn out of column to the right,
19. 0309 YAMAGUMO was ordered to enter column by COMDESDIV FOUR.
YAMAGUMO speeded up to take station as No. 3 ship in
destroyer van.
20. 0310 MC DERMUT observed enemy salvo close off the starboard bow.
Upon launching torpedoes, MC DERMUT and MONSSEN were
illuminated by searchlight and heard salvos whistling
overhead and observed one salvo in the wake of the MC DERMUT.
21. 0311 Commander Attack Group 2.2 in ARUNTA ordered to attack from
east with KILLEN and BEALE. (Actually attacked from west.)
22. 0311 SHIGURE reported two dark objects bearing 300°(T). The
ships of the THIRD Section now ceased fire on the Eastern
Attack Group and prepared to open fire to port.
23. 0311 East Amagusan PT's (328, 329, 323) sighted two destroyers
heading south. The destroyers later turned northward.
24. 0311:30 Kanihaan PT's (495, 489, 492) closed a large radar target
and sighted a battleship at three miles distance proceeding
slowly north. Complying with the orders of COMDESDIV 108
to remain clear, retired toward patrol station without
attacking.
25. 0312 Japanese force directed gunfire at MC DERMUT and MONSSEN,
using searchlight and starshells for illumination,
26. 0312 MC DERMUT sighted two small craft dead ahead. Craft
identified as friendly FT boats. COMDESDIV 108 communicated
with them and warned them not to attack,
744 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
27. 0316 Commander THIRD Section ordered emergency turn to starboard
to evade torpedoes. His ships checked fire at this time.
28. 0317:30 Commander THIRD Section ordered emergency turn to port to
return to original course of 000°(T).
29. 0319 MICHISHIO was hit by one torpedo causing her to lose speed
and turn out to starboard. ASAGUMO was hit by one torpedo
below No. 1 gun, severing her bow and causing her to lose
speed. YAMAGUMO was hit by two or more torpedoes, blew up
and sank immediately. This explosion was sighted by most
Allied ships, even as far away as the battle line. YAMASHIRO
was hit by one torpedo but battle condition was unimpaired
and ship continued on course and speed.
745 CONFIDENTIAL
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746
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Events Depicted on Diagram nHn
October 25th, 1944
0320 - 0343
1, 0320 Attack Group 1,2 was proceeding to torpedo launching point
on course 180° (T), speed fifteen knots.
2, 0320 Attack Group 2.2 was closing the ARUNTA which was about
1,500 yards ahead. ARUNTA «s course was 145° (T), speed
twenty- five knots,
3, 0320 Eastern Attack Group continued retiring northeastward to
post-attack rendezvous north of Hibuson Island.
4, 0320 Western Attack Group continued retiring northward along
the coast of Leyte Island.
5, 0320 CTG 77.2 in LOUISVILLE as OTC and Commander Left Flank
Force, with Left Flank Cruisers in column, was on course
090°(T), speed five knots. All cruisers were in radar
contact with the enemy,
6, 0320 CTG 77,3 in PHOENIX as Commander Right Flank Force, with
Right Flank Cruisers in line of bearing, was on course
270° (T), speed ten knots. All cruisers were in radar
contact with the enemy,
7, 0320 The formation of the Japanese THIRD Section had been broken
by Allied torpedo hits at 0319, but the YAMASHIRO, MOGAMI
and SHIGURE continued northward in a straggling manner,
8, 0320 The BATTLE LINE was in column on course 090°(T), speed ten
knots and was in radar contact with the enemy formation.
9, 0320 COMDESDIV XRAY in the CLAXTON had three destroyers on the
east and three on the west of the BATTLE LINE assigned
screening duties,
10, 0320 COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX with his squadron in column on course
090°(T), speed five knots, in three groups of three ships
each, was awaiting orders to make a torpedo attack,
11, 0320 FUSO, having earlier suffered a torpedo hit, was proceeding
slowly eastward. No outward appearance of damage was
visible, but she had been seriously damaged internally, A
short time later she turned to the south,
12, 0323 Commander Attack Group 1,2 ordered his group to increase
speed to twenty-five knots and to make smoke,
13, 0323 ARUNTA launched four torpedoes to port at a large leading
target bearing 115°(T), range 6,900 yards. (YAMASHIRO).
All torpedoes missed.
747 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
14. 0324 SHIGURE, having passed two friendly damaged destroyers to
starboard, increased speed and turned to the south.
15. 0324 KILLEN launched five torpedoes to port at a ship identified
as a battleship bearing 125°(T), range 8,700 yards.
(YAMASHIRO). She made one hit.
16. 0325:15 BEALE launched five torpedoes to port at a target bearing
115°(T) (actually 104°(T)), range 6,300 yards. (SHIGURE).
All torpedoes missed.
17. 0327:30 Commander THIRD Section ordered a forty-five degree change
of course to the right to avoid torpedoes fired by Attack
Group 2.2. He ordered a return to the base course of
000° (T) at 0330.
18. 0328:30 KILLEN commenced launching torpedoes to starboard at same
target as at 0324, now bearing 112° (T), range 8,100 yards.
(YAMASHIRO). Target was observed to be maneuvering after
launching second torpedo and fire was checked. All
torpedoes missed.
19. 0329 Commander Battle Line ordered the battle line to increase
speed to fifteen knots.
20. 0329:30 HUTCHINS launched five torpedoes to starboard at an enemy
ship which had just turned south bearing 093°(T), range
8,200 yards. (SHIGURE). This target reversed course and
all torpedoes missed.
21. 0330 MICHISHIO, damaged by a torpedo hit in the port engineroom,
was drifting southward and attempting to control the damage.
22. 0331 Attack Group 2.2 was taken under fire, most likely by the
YAMASHIRO. This fire was ineffective.
23. 0331:18 YAMASHIRO received additional damage from a second torpedo
hit launched by the KILLEN at 0324. She slowed temporarily
but was making eighteen knots at 0336.
24. 0331:30 SHIGURE again reversed course and proceeded to the north at
twenty-six knots.
25. 0335 CTG 77.2 ordered COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX (left flank destroyers)
to launch torpedo attack and to "get the big boys."
COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX ordered section leaders to make
coordinated torpedo attacks from assigned sectors.
26. 0335:30 DALY launched five torpedoes to starboard at the largest
radar target, believed to be a battleship, bearing 093°(T),
range 10,700 yards. (MOGAMI). All torpedoes missed.
748 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
27. 0336 3ACHE launched five torpedoes to starboard at a target
bearing 109°(T), range 10,200 yards. (SHIGURE). All
torpedoes missed,
28. 0338 Explosions occurred in FUSO which were heard by HUTCHINS
on her sound gear,
29. 0340 Commander East Amagusan PT's in PT 328 sighted an
unidentified ship about a mile away heading south making
heavy black smoke. The ship sighted was the HUTCHINS,
followed at 2,800 yards by the DALY and BACHE which were
apparently not sighted,
30. 0342 ASAGUKO, damaged by torpedo hit at 0319, turned southward
at about nine knots after being taken under fire by the
HUTCHINS.
31. 0345 The YAMASHIRO turned to course 020°(T), presumably to avoid
any torpedoes fired by Attack Group 1.2, and reduced speed
to about fifteen knots,
32. 0345 FUSO exploded and broke into two sections. This explosion
was seen as far away as the battle line. She was now
enveloped in flames from her water Line to her masthead.
33. 0348 MICHISHIO, dead in the water after being torpedoed at 0319,
was burning and settling lower in the water. She was now
taken under fire by the DALY and BACHE.
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Events Depicted on Diagram "I"
October 25th, 1944
0245 - 0348
1. 0245 Commander SECOND Striking Force, in a heavy squall,
continued on toward Surigao Strait at twenty-six knots on
course 060° (t).
2, 0311 Commander SECOND Striking Force changed course to 020°(T)
and reduced speed to twenty-two knots, which may have
indicated that he was doubtful of his navigational position,
3« 0320 Commander SECOND Striking Force, emerging from the squall,
sighted the mountains of Panaon Island almost dead ahead
and ordered an emergency turn of 45° to starboard. USHIO
maneuvered independently.
4. 0322 SE Panaon PT 137 sighted what appeared to be a destroyer
(probably the NACHI) and commenced approach for attack.
5. 0323 SE Panaon PT 137 closed the target sighted at 0322 and
while still undetected, fired a single torpedo at an
estimated range of 700 - 800 yards. (Target was actually
the NACHI, but the torpedo hit the ABUKUMA, the third
ship in a line of bearing, whose presence was not known
to the PT.)
6. 0323 SE Panaon PT 132 with no torpedoes remaining, sighted three
destroyers and two smaller ships on northeasterly course at
twenty-five knots, estimated range 1,700 yards.
7. 0325 ABUKUMA sighted a torpedo wake to port and almost
immediately received a torpedo hit in the port side below
the bridge. This torpedo had been launched by PT 137 at
0323. The resulting damage slowed her to ten knots and
forced her to drop out of the formation. ABUKUMA and
SHIRANUHI opened fire on PT 137.
8. 0325 Commander SECOND Striking Force increased speed to twenty-
eight knots.
9. 0327 SE Panaon PT 134, lying to off Binit Village, sighted the
USHIO and, when the target was passing about 1,000 yards
away, fired a single torpedo which missed.
10. 0327 Bilaa Point PT's (494, 497, 324) made radar contact on
three to four targets bearing 300° (T) moving up the strait,
range five to seven miles, and reported the contact to
PT 523.
751 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
11. 0330 Commander SECOND Striking Force, having cleared Panaon
Island, ordered his destroyers to form column on course
020°(T) thus assuming his planned battle formation.
12. 0332 Commander Sumilon PT's in PT 523 made radar contact on one
large ship and five destroyers on a northerly course. He
reported this contact to CTG 79.11 at 0540.
13. 0333 Commander SECOND Striking Force changed course to 000°(T).
14. 0343 Commander SECOND Striking Force sighted ahead a number of
ships afire, heard and observed gunfire.
15. 0344 Commander SECOND Striking Force informed Commander THIRD
Section by voice radio that he was penetrating through the
strait.
16. 0345 Commander Sumilon PT's in PT 523 sighted two burning ships
about twelve miles to the northward. (Probably the two
burning sections of the FUSO.)
752 CONFIDENTIAL
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Events Depicted on Diagram "J"
October 25th, 1944
0348 - 0420
1. 0349 KILLEN launched three torpedoes to port at a battleship
bearing 1065°(T), range 12,450 yards. (YAMASHIRO). All
torpedoes missed,
2. 0349:30 HUTCHINS launched five torpedoes to starboard at a target
bearing 110° (T), range 6,200 yards. (ASAGUMO). The
torpedoes missed ASAGUMO but hit MICHISHIO at the end of
their run.
3. 0349:30 ASAGUMO turned to the eastward to avoid gunfire from
Attack Group 1.2 and the HUTCHINS torpedoes passed
harmlessly to the south of her.
4. 0350:30 SHIGURE sighted torpedo wakes from the torpedoes fired by
the DALY at 0335:30.
5. 0351 CTG 77.2 ordered Left Flank Cruisers to open fire.
6. 0351 CTG 77.3, following CTG 77.2, ordered the Right Flank
Cruisers to open fire.
7» 0351 Commanding Officer MOGAMI observed the enemy group lying
in wait to the north and the concentrated gunfire directed
at the YAMASHIRO. He increased speed to twenty- five knots.
8. 0352 Allied gunfire commenced hitting the YAMASHIRO which
appears to have crippled her communications as well as
inflicting other damage causing her to slow to about
twelve knots. She was also set afire.
9. 0353 DENVER, apparently as a result of station-keeping troubles,
moved out of column.
10. 0353 WEST VIRGINIA, having notified Commander Battle Line she
was ready to open fire, did so shortly thereafter. She was
the first battleship to open fire.
11. 0354 SHIGURE, continuing northward, was being straddled by
gunfire directed at the YAMASHIRO. She avoided direct hits
by a fishtail maneuver, but suffered some damage from near
misses.
12. 0354 MOGAMI, having turned to the westward to launch torpedoes,
commenced receiving gunfire from destroyers of Attack Group
1.2 and by 0356 was afire.
13. 0355:15 BRYANT launched five torpedoes to starboard at a target
bearing 220° (T), range 8,800 yards. (YAMASHIRO). All
torpedoes missed.
753 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
14. 0356 ARUNTA checked fire on YAMASHIRO in order to Ilovr HUTCHINS
to cross the line of fire.
15. 0356 SHIGURE, when the intensity of Allied gunfire diminished,
turned to starboard to retire,
16. 0356:36 HALFORD launched five torpedoes to starboard at a target
bearing 224°(T), range 9,000 yards. (YAMASHIRO). All
torpedoes missed.
17. 0357 MOGAMI, now on a southerly course, was taken under fire by
the PORTLAND.
18. 0357 LEUTZE launched five torpedoes to port at a target believed
to be a battleship bearing 142° (T), range 9,900 yards.
(YAMASHIRO). All torpedoes missed.
19. 0358 Commander Right Flank Cruisers turned to the west.
20. 0358 ROBINSON launched five torpedoes to starboard at a target
believed to be a battleship bearing 222°(T), range 8,300
yards. (YAMASHIRO). All torpedoes missed.
21. 0358 MICHISHIO sank after being hit by a HUTCHINS torpedo which
had been fired at 0349:30.
22. 0358 BENNION launched five torpedoes to port at a large target
observed optically to be a battleship bearing 146°(T),
range 8,800 yards. (YAMASHIRO). All torpedoes missed.
23 • 0358 SHIGURE, on a southerly course, increased speed to thirty-
two knots. A short time later she received a direct hit
by an eight-inch projectile but it did not affect her
navigability.
24. 0359 HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS launched four torpedoes to port at a
target bearing 121° (T), range 7,800 yards. (YAMASHIRO).
All torpedoes missed.
25. 0359:15 BENNION launched five torpedoes to port at a second
battleship bearing 155°(T), range 9,800 yards (target
unidentified). She made one hit in YAMASHIRO.
26. 0400 Commander Attack Section ONE ordered a turn to 270©(T) and
directed his destroyers to get ready to fire.
27. 0400 Commander Attack Section THREE turned away and commenced
his retirement.
28. 0401 YAMASHIRO steadied on course 260°(T) and continued to fight
back by returning gunfire which straddled the Left Flank
Cruisers. Her secondary battery later scored hits on the
ALBERT W. GRANT.
754 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
29. 0401:30 MOGAMI, while retiring, launched four torpedoes to the
northward in the general direction of the enemy. All
torpedoes missed,
30. 0402 MOGAMI received several hits from gunfire from Attack Group
1,2 and the PORTLAND causing extensive damage to main and
steering engines.
31. 0404 CALIFORNIA, having misinterpreted a turn signal at 0402,
nearly collided with TENNESSEE.
32. 0404 NEWC0MB launched five torpedoes to port at a target
believed to be a battleship bearing 200° (T), range 6,200
yards. She made one hit in the YAMASHIRO.
33. 0404:01 RICHARD P. LEARY launched three torpedoes to port at a
target believed to be a battleship bearing 223° (T), range
7,200 yards (probably splashes). All torpedoes missed.
34. 0404:18 ALBERT W. GRANT launched five torpedoes to port at a large
target bearing 209°(T), range 6,900 yards. (YAMASHIRO).
All torpedoes missed.
35. 0405 YAMASHIRO was forced to slow temporarily, likely due to a
third torpedo hit which was launched from the destroyer
BENNION at 0359:15.
36. 0406 DENVER was straddled by YAMASHIRO gunfire. Commander Left
Flank Force increased speed to fifteen knots.
37. 0406 Conmander Attack Section ONE, observing that his command
was being straddled, directed the NEWCOMB to change course
to the north in order to avoid the gunfire.
38. 0406:30 ALBERT W. GRANT swung to the right and back to the left in
order to throw off the gunfire.
39. 0407 ALBERT W. GRANT commenced receiving hits from gunfire which
came from friendly as well as enemy ships.
40. 0403 MOGAKI, as a result of damage from enemy gunfire, was
slowly losing speed.
41. 0408 CTG 77.2 received a startling message from COMDESRON FIFTY-
SIX, "you are firing on COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX, we are in the
middle of the channel."
42. 0408:12 ALBERT W. GRANT launched five torpedoes at the YAMASHIRO,
torpedo course 203°(T). She made no hits.
43. 0409 CTG 77.2 ordered all ships to cease firing and all ships
immediately complied.
755 CONFIDENTIAL
46.
0413
47.
0416
48.
0417
CONFIDENTIAL
44. 0410 Commander SECOND Striking Force decided that the two
burning sections of the FUSO were the remains of the FUSO
and YAMASHIRO.
45 • 0411:30 YAMASHIRO, after swinging to a southerly retirement course,
received a fourth torpedo hit launched from the NEWCOKB at
0404.
RICHARD P. LEARY reported passing through torpedo water.
These torpedoes had been fired by the MOGAMT at 0401:30.
CTG 77.2 ordered Commander Battle Line to direct COMDESDIV
XRAY to report to him for duty.
Commander Right Flank Cruisers changed course to 090°(T)
to close the Left Flank Force in preparation for the chase
down the strait.
Commander Right Flank Force directed his destroyers to lie
along the shore and await orders for another torpedo attack.
The Battle Line, less BATDIV TWO, changed course to the
right to 000°(T).
Commander SECOND Striking Force, in the NACHI, made radar
contact on the enemy, bearing 025°(T), range eleven
kilometers. (More likely eleven miles.)
52. 0419 YAMASHIRO, having received damage from four torpedo hits
and a great number of projectiles from Allied gunfire,
sank in Latitude 10O-22.2«N, Longitude 125°-21~3'E.
53. 0419 CTG 77.2, believing that COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX was clear of
the Line of fire, issued orders to resume fire but no ships
complied because there were no targets within gun range.
54. 0420 ALBERT W. GRANT was dead in the water and in danger of
sinking from damage received by gunfire commencing at 0407.
49.
0418
50.
0418
51.
0418
756 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
f /
CONFIDENTIAL
Events Depicted on Diagram "K"
October 25th, 1944
0420 - 0520
1. 0420 Commander Left Flank Cruisers was on course 270° (T) at
fifteen knots.
2. 0420 Commander Battle Line, in MISSISSIPPI, with MARYLAND and
WEST VIRGINIA, was proceeding north at fifteen knots.
DESDIV XRAY was also proceeding north at fifteen knots,
COMBATDIV TWO, in PENNSYLVANIA, with TENNESSEE and
CALIFORNIA, was proceeding to the west at fifteen knots
re-forming his division*
3. 0420 Commander Right Flank Cruisers was on course 090°(T),
speed fifteen knots. His cruisers were still in a line of
bearing.
4. 0420 Commander Attack Section ONE, in NEWCOMB, with RICHARD P.
LEARY some distance behind, was proceeding toward the
post-attack rendezvous north of Hibuson Island. The
ALBERT W. GRANT was seriously damaged and dead in the
water in the center of the channel,
5. 0420 Commander Attack Section TWO, in ROBINSON, with HALFORD and
BRYANT, was re-forming his section in the vicinity of the
post-attack rendezvous north of Hibuson Island.
6. 0420 Commander Attack Section THREE, in HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, with
LEUTZE and BENNION astern, was proceeding north of the
battle line to return to the post-attack rendezvous north
of Hibuson Island.
7. 0420 Commander SECOND Striking Force, in NACHI, with ASHIGARA
astern, was on course 000°(T), speed twenty-eight knots.
His four destroyers were passing him on his port side. All
ships were making preparations to fire torpedoes,
8. 0420 COMDSSRON TWENTY-FOUR, with Attack Sections 1.2 and 2.2
well separated, was waiting along the western shore for
orders to make another attack if necessary.
9. 0427 NACHI and ASHIGARA launched eight torpedoes each on base
torpedo course 025°(T). These torpedoes appear to have
been fired at Hibuson Island.
10. 0428 NACHI changed course to the right in order to pass ahead of
the MOGAMI which was at this time gathering headway on a
southerly course.
496799 0-59-59
757 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
11. 0430 Although the NACHI used full rudder she was unable to avoid
collision with the MOGAMI. The resulting damage to the
NACHI reduced her speed to eighteen knots. NACHI proceeded
on course 180° (T) at five knots while surveying the damage.
12. 0430 COMDESDIV EIGHTEEN, in SHIRANUHI, changed course to 090°(T)
in an attempt to locate the enemy at which the cruisers had
fired. Only Hibuson Island was sighted.
13 • 0431 Commander Right Flank Cruisers turned to the west in order
to avoid torpedoes from the enemy forces to the south which
had turned sharply to the east as if maneuvering to fire
torpedoes.
14. 0432 CTG 77.2 ordered COMDESDIV XRAY to proceed south and make a
torpedo attack on the enemy.
15. 0432 COMDESRON FIFTY-SIX, in NEWCOMB, proceeded to the assistance
of the damaged ALBERT W. GRANT.
16. 0433 CTG 77.2 turned to the south with his Left Flank Cruisers
to pursue the enemy.
17. 0433 COMDESDIV XRAY directed his division to form to the north
of the battle line.
18. 0435 Commander SECOND Striking Force decided to retire and so
informed the interested commanders.
19. 0435 COMDESDIV EIGHTEEN was directed by Commander SECOND Striking
Force to reverse course to the south and rejoin. He
immediately complied.
20. 0435 SHIGURE was dead in the water having stopped in order to
repair her steering engine.
21. 0437 Commander Left Flank Cruisers formed column.
22. 0438:30 Upper Surigao PT's increased speed to ten knots and conmenced
an approach on the SHIGURE which they had just contacted by
radar.
23. 0439 COMBATDIV TWO rejoined the battle line on a westerly course.
PENNSYLVANIA was designated guide.
24. 0439 Commander Kanihaan PT's (495, 489, 492) who was proceeding
toward the burning MOGAMI, reversed course upon receiving a
warning of friendly ships coming down the strait.
25. 0441 Commander SECOND Striking Force ordered the THIRD Section
to follow behind the NACHI. SHIGURE replied that her
steering engines were out of order.
758 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
26. 0442 COMDESDIV XRAY, in CLAXTON with CONY astern, started to
round the western end of the battle line.
27. 0442 USHIO proceeded ahead at high speed to escort the ABUKUMA.
Shortly afterward, the other three destroyers also
proceeded south for the same purpose.
28. 0445 MOGAMI attempted to follow the NACHI and ASHIGARA.
29. 0447 ASAGUMO changed course to the southwest in an attempt to
follow the MOGAMI.
30. 0448 Commander Right Flank Cruisers changed course to south in
order to support the Left Flank Cruisers.
31. 0451 NACHI increased speed to eighteen knots.
32. 0455 SKIGURE took Upper Surigao PT's (327, 321, 326) under fire;
went ahead and turned away.
33 • 0455 Commander SECOND Striking Force reversed course so as not
to cross the line of fire from the SHIGURE to the Upper
Surigao PT's. Upon completing the turn he changed course
to the west.
34« 0455:30 Commander Right Flank Force ordered his destroyers to take
station 6,000 yards south of the cruisers.
35. 0457:30 NEWCQMB closed the ALBERT W. GRANT and sent medical
assistance.
36. 0458 Upper Surigao PT's launched three torpedoes at SHIGURE.
All missed because the SHIGURE had turned away. PT 321«s
torpedo had a hot run on deck, which attracted the
attention of the ASAGUMO, and the PT's were caught in a
heavy crossfire from SHIGURE and ASAGUMO.
37. 0458 Commander Battle Line reversed course to east.
38. 0459 ASAGUMO, after sighting a fire from a hot torpedo run on
the deck of PT 321, opened fire.
39. 0500 SIGOURNEY had an engine casualty and made a wide detour to
the north and west.
40. 0506 Commander SECOND Striking Force changed course to the south
and continued his retirement.
41. 0507 WELLES had an engine casualty and slowed down.
42. 0508 Commander Right Flank Force commenced forming antiaircraft
disposition VICTOR.
759 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
43. 0511
44. 0512
45. 0512
46. 0513
47. 0514
RICHARD P. LEARY was ordered by Commander Attack Section ONE
to proceed to the ALBERT W. GRANT and provide antiaircraft
defense during the rescue operations.
Attack Section THREE formed column astern of Attack Section
TWO.
COMDESDIV 112, in ROBINSON, received an order from CTG 77.2
to retain the destroyers in their present stations until
daylight and then to regain their regular screening
stations. (This message should have been sent to COMDESRON
FIFTY-FOUR.) As a result COMDESDIV 112 changed course to
the west instead of proceeding south to screen the Left
Flank Cruisers.
SHIGURE continued to have steering difficulties.
MOGAMI changed course to 192°(T) and was gradually left
behind because she could not keep up with the NACHI and
ASHIGARA.
760
confide; :ial
CONFIDENTIAL
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BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT
CRUISERS START THE PURSUIT
0420-0520,25 OCTOBER 1944
BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF
OCTOBER 1944
Notes.
I. Current used SECOND Striking Force 1.3 Knots, set I80*(T)
2 Current used Allied Forces,
(o) Bottle line: 0 5 Knots, set I80°(T)
(b) Lett Flonfc Cruisers
(1)0420-0450 0 55 Knots, set 215D(T)
(2)0450-0520^ 1.5 Knots, set I60"(T)
(c) Right FlonK Cruisers
(1)0420-0450-0 5 knots, set I80°(T)
(2)0450-0520: I 0 Knots, set IGO'(T)
(d) Atlock Group \.Z- 0.3 knots, set I60°{T)
(e)AttocKGroup2 2^ I.OKnols.sel I60°|T)
(f) DESOIV Xroy 0 5 knots, set I80*(T)
(g) Attack Section One- 0.25 to I 0 knots, set 270°(T) lo200°{T)
(h) Attack Section Two: 0.3 Knols, set 270°(T) to 230°(T) "■_
(l)Attock Section Three: 0.3 knots.set (80°(T) to230D(T)__
3. PT trocKs estlmoled.
4. Japanese frocks In red.
5. Weather -scattered showers ond variable
conditions eicept wnere shown otherwise
042!i\SHIRANUHI
0422\SHIRAMJH! (j) 'sini!
SHIRAN
NACHI (27)
^JTT" ■" ~ C^0430
__^ 0434 ASH1GARA
m voeaui
p"0410 ASHIGARA
043830 MOGAMI^ ~~/~- ^
0445 NACH.
■ J"0450 4S4GUM0
05.1 MOGA^i, t /
..<' if® ! ! / if
WZ4 SHISUREr 10515 I / 0 ,
ASHIGARA*' SHIGURE "?
0455 04Z3xan>
Of 38 30 Upptr SuiigeoPTS\
on 'sHieJ/iecc
Jif^-sl
SWCUftE and MOGAM!
' I 05I^NACHI
, 0SIJfsHIGURE 052O*M0GAMI \\
0520^ PT 323
IOV'y Thousonds ol Yords
0520™ASHIGARA ^ebono'
0520*NACHI "'
osogj
>o#FUSO (stern)
SHrRANUHl 20
|05I4 r-ySOIbc-l
os2o|pTS 495,489,492^-7
or
n
0430^pTS 3^7,321,326
^3,° DIAGRAM "K"
CONFIDENTIAL
'
CONFIDENTIAL
1.
5.
0457
2.
0520
3.
0520
4.
0520
0521
6. 0522
7.
0525
8.
0529
9.
0529
10.
0530
11.
0531
12. 0531
Events Depicted on Diagram "L"
October 25th, 1944
0457 - 0600
Commander SECOND Striking Force, with the SECOND Striking
Force and the mobile ships of the THIRD Section, continued
his retirement.
MOGAMI, on course 1920 (T) at fifteen knots, was gradually
falling astern of the NACHI and ASHIGARA.
Commander Left Flank Cruisers was proceeding down the
strait to engage the fleeing enemy.
Commander Right Flank Force (CTG 77.3) was proceeding down
the western shore of Surigao Strait in order to support
the Left Flank Cruisers. His cruisers had nearly formed a
circular disposition and his destroyers were forming a
circular screen.
SHIGURE increased speed to twenty-four knots and, at 0522,
changed course to 155°(T) in order to regain the center of
the channel.
Commander Left Flank Cruisers changed course to 250° (T)
preparatory to opening fire on the damaged enemy ships to
the south.
ASAGUMO, which was attempting to follow the MOGAMI,
succeeded in increasing speed to fourteen knots.
Commander Left Flank Cruisers opened fire on the damaged
enemy ships to the south.
MOGAMI, taken under fire by the Left Flank Cruisers, took
evasive action by making a sharp turn to the right and a
gradual turn back to the south.
PT 323 changed course to the east probably to investigate
the FUSO fire.
Commander SECOND Striking Force, observing that the Allied
cruisers to the north had opened fire on the MOGAMI,
changed course to 160°(T) in order to throw off the enemy
gunfire.
LOUISVILLE opened fire on bow section of FUSO and, although
only eighteen rounds of eight-inch AP were fired, the bow
section sank at 0540.
761
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
13. 0533 Despite having turned away from the enemy gunfire, the
ASAGUKO was taken under fire. She was hit on the stern
and a fire resulted. This gunfire was from the MINNEAPOLIS
which shifted her gunfire to the MOGAMI at 0535.
14. 0535 SHIGURE, now on a southerly course, shifted to auxiliary
power steering,
15» 0537 Commander Left Flank Cruisers turned away to course 010°(T)
to avoid possible torpedoes from the MOGAMI.
16. 0538 COMDESDIV XRAY, in CLAXTON, with CONY astern, slowed and
changed course to the north in order to take station as
screen for the Left Flank Cruisers. His other destroyers
were a considerable distance to the north.
17. 0538 Commander Right Flank Force reversed course to the north.
18. 0540 PT 490 sighted the MOGAMI on southerly courses at low speed
and on fire. She had no torpedoes and so did not attack.
19. 0540 Commander Left Flank Cruisers ordered cease firing.
20. 0540 Allied gunfire had ceased and MOGAMI changed course to
150O(T).
21. 0542 The DALY, which was a considerable distance behind COMDESRON
TWENTY-FOUR in HUTCHINS, turned to the west after challenging!
PT 329 in order to investigate arid deliver a message.
22. 0543 PT 491 sighted the MOGAMI, about 6,000 yards away, on fire
and proceeding south at low speed. He attempted to report
the contact without success and then maneuvered to gain a
favorable firing position.
23. 0546 COMDESDIV XRAY started to form a circular screen around the
Left Flank Cruisers.
24. 0549 Commander Left Flank Force started to form circular cruising
disposition.
25. 0551 Commander SECOND Striking Force, being approximately in the
center of the channel, changed course to 180°(T),
26. 0557 COMDESDIV XRAY sighted numerous survivors in the water and
reported them to CTG 77.2. He was directed to pick them up.
(These survivors were from the YAMASHIRO.)
27. 0558:30 MOGAMI, being near the center of the channel, changed course
to 180° (T) and headed for the southern exit from Surigao
Strait.
762 CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Events Depicted on Diagram "M"
October 25th, 1944
0515 - 0700
1» °515 The ABUKUMA, having completed the first emergency repairs,
was proceeding on course 020°(T) at twenty knots following
the SECOND Striking Force. At this time she recorded
sighting the USHIO standing toward her but this time seems
doubtful,
2. 0515 USHIO, proceeding down the strait to escort the ABUKUMA, was
on course 180° (T) at thirty knots.
3. 0520 USHIO changed course to 213 °(T) and headed toward the
ABUKUMA.
4. 0525 ABUKUMA, having observed USHIO rapidly approaching from the
north, reversed course.
5. 0525 SW Panaon PT's (194, 150, 196), after proceeding past Binit
Point in order to see what was happening in Surigao Strait,
sighted a large fire to the north in Surigao Strait. They
proceeded on course 065°(T) and increased speed to ten
knots.
6. 0528 PT's 150 and 194 contacted the USHIO and ABUKUMA and
proceeded to intercept. PT 196 which had no radar was not
notified of the contacts •
7. 0532 ABUKUMA and USHIO sighted PT's 194 and 150 to starboard and
opened fire. PT 150 fired one torpedo at USHIO, which
missed, and the PT's retired under smoke.
8. 0533 PT 194 was hit by ABUKUMA 's gunfire and retired toward
Balongbalong . She was forced to slow by flooding and
asked for assistance.
9. 0533 PT 137 heard PT 194's request for help and proceeded toward
Sonok Point to look for her.
10. 0535 PT's 150 and 196, operating separately, proceeded toward
San Ricardo Point to look for PT 194 and assist her.
11. 0535:30 KASUMI sighted PT's 150 and 196 withdrawing and laying
smoke under starshell illumination.
12. 0540 PT 137 sighted USHIO and ABUKUMA on a southerly course.
13. 0542 ABUKUMA fired starshells toward Sonok Point in order to
disclose any enemy force lurking there.
763 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
14. 0543 PT 137 sighted starshells ahead and reversed course.
15. 0544 ABUKUMA, being escorted by the USHIO, changed course to
260° (T) and slowed to ten knots or less,
16. 0545 Commander Sumilon PT's directed the Bilaa Point PT's (494,
324, 497) to join him.
17. 0549 SHIGUAE changed course to 185° (T) and continued toward the
Mindanao Sea at twenty- four knots, keeping well clear of
the ABUKUMA and DESDIV EIGHTEEN.
18. 0555 Commander SECOND Striking Force recalled his destroyers and
directed them to screen the NACHI and ASHIGARA.
19. 0559 Commander Madilao PT's (192, 191, 195) decided to return
to his base (Liloan Bay) via Sogod Bay and changed course
to 315°(T) and increased speed to twenty-three knots.
20. 0601 MOGAMI opened fire on PT 491 when the MTB changed course
toward her.
21. 0601 PT 196 went alongside PT 194 and transfered a hospital
corpsman and two other men to help with the casualties and
repairs.
22. 0602 Commander SECOND Striking Force changed course to 240°(T)
in order to pass south of Binit Point and enter the Mindanao
Sea.
23. 0605 ABUKUMA changed course to 249° (T) and changed speed to nine
knots.
24. 0605 PT 491 fired two torpedoes at the MOGAMI at a range of about
3,000 yards. Both torpedoes missed as the MOGAMI turned
toward PT 491.
25. 0605 PT 150, having failed to locate PT 194, reversed course to
the south.
26. 0607 DESDIV EIGHTEEN destroyers commenced taking stations on the
bows of the NACHI and ASHIGARA.
27. 0610 PT's 151 and 146, which had heard PT 194' s reauest for help,
joined PT's 194 and 196 and the four MTB's returned to
their base at Liloan Bay.
28. 0610 Madilao PT's (192, 191, 195) sighted smoke from the USHIO
and ABUKUMA and at the same time sighted four or five
destroyers coming south from Surigao Strait. They changed
course to 060° (T) and headed for Madilao Point.
76/, CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
29. 0615 SHIGURE, being well south of the SECOND Striking Force,
changed course to 244°(T) to pass between Bohol and
Camiguin Islands,
30. 0620 KASUMI departed from her screening station on the bow of
the NACHI in order to take COMDESRON ONE and staff off the
damaged ABUKUMA.
31. 0623 ASHIGARA opened fire on PT 150 and, at 0624, Commander
SECOND Striking Force turned away to course 231° (T).
32. 0625 MOGAMI fired on two motor torpedo boats near Binit Point.
33. 0627 USHIO opened fire on PT 150 which was retiring at high
speed. USHIO ceased fire at 0637.
34. 0630 Sumilon PT's (523, 524, 526) and Bilaa Point PT's (494, 324,
497) joined and commenced their return to base.
35. 0636 PT 491, retiring toward the north, sighted PT 493 aground on
Maoyo Point. She called for help and went to the aid of
PT 493.
36. 0637 USHIO opened fire on PT 190 which retired to the northwest.
37. 0639 USHIO changed course to the south in order to rejoin the
NACHI and ASHIGARA.
38. 0642 Commander SECOND Striking Force changed course to 252°(T) in
order to clear the ABUKUMA.
39. 0645 PT 137 sighted MOGAMI which was smoking badly abaft the
stack. PT 137 changed course to 180°(T) and increased speed
to ten knots in order to intercept.
40. 0645 MOGAMI changed course to 240°(T) and entered the Mindanao
Sea following the SECOND Striking Force.
41. 0650 USHIO turned to the formation base course of 252©(T) and
resumed her position in the disposition.
42. 0654 PT 150 sighted the MOGAMI and headed south to intercept at
high speed.
43. 0658 About this time MOGAMI opened fire on PT's 137 and 150 which
were approaching from the north.
I
765 CONFIDENTIAL
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Events Depicted on Diagram "N"
October 25th, 1944
0600 - 0700
1. 0600 The stern of the FUSO, completely afire, was slowly drifting
to the south.
2. 0600 Commander Left Flank Force was forming circular antiaircraft
disposition on a northerly course at fifteen knots.
3. 0600 CTG 77.3, with all of his ships except the DALY in a
circular disposition, was on a northerly course at twenty-
five knots clearing the Left Flank Force.
4. 0601 ASAGUMO, badly damaged and with fires raging out of control,
was dead in the water. The crew was preparing to abandon
ship, but also spent considerable time trying to save her.
5. 0603 CLAXTON, in accordance with CTG 77.2' s orders, reversed
course to return to the survivor area and pick up survivors.
6. 0604 PT 329 stopped close inshore at Cabugan Grande Island to
seek shelter from enemy aircraft.
7. 0606:30 COMDESDIV 112 directed his two attack sections to proceed
independently to join the cruisers.
8. 0609 COMDESDIV 112 reported passing a large group of survivors
to CTG 77.2.
9. 0610 NEWCOMB moored alongside ALBERT W. GRANT and continued
furnishing all possible assistance, including transfering
the wounded.
10. 0612 COMDESDIV 112, in accordance with orders from CTG 77.2,
reversed course to pick up survivors.
11. 0618 Commander Left Flank Force turned to course 190°(T).
12. 0620 CTG 77.2 received a warning of enemy aircraft from CTF 77.
13. 0625 HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS entered formation taking the position
left vacant by the CLAXTON.
14. 0625 CTG 77 .3 reversed course in order to follow the Left Flank
Force down the strait,
15. 0630 CTG 77.2 observed sunrise.
16. 0630 PT 323, which had been approaching the FUSO, sighted the
ASAGUMO, and commenced an approach on the latter.
767 CONFIDENTIAL
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17. 0633 NEWCOMB commenced towing the ALBERT W. GRANT alongside.
RICHARD P. LEARY, having previously transfered her doctor
and two hospital corpsmen, was screening.
18. 0640 Commander Left Flank Force, having previously increased
speed to twenty knots, changed course to 175°(T).
19. O64O Kanihaan PT's (495, 439, 492), having heard PT 491 call for
help in the rescue of PT 493, headed for Maoyo Point.
20. 0640 Commander South Amagusan PT's decided to return to base and
proceeded on northerly courses at about fifteen knots.
21. 0645 BENNION moved out of formation to investigate objects
appearing to be survivors but which turned out to be
rubbish.
22. 06/:6 ASAGUMO sighted PT 323 approaching and opened fire with one
gun at a range of about 3,000 yards.
23. 0648 COMCRUDIV TWELVE in the DENVER and with the COLUMBIA,
HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, LEUTZE and BENNION, proceeded ahead to
sink the ASAGUMO and started to form column.
24. 0651 Commander Left Flank Force ordered PORTLAND and MINNEAPOLIS
to form column astern of LOUISVILLE.
25. 0652 Kanihaan PTfs, passing about 700 yards away, reported that
there was no ship left but only burning oil on the surface.
It is concluded that the stern of the FUSO sank about 0640.
26. 0653 CLAXTON departed from the survivor area to rejoin the
cruiser screen, having picked ud three Japanese survivors
from the YAMASHIRO.
27. 0654 Ff 328 sighted the South Amagusan PT's and stood out from
the Leyte shore to join them.
28. O656 PT 495, passing about one and one-quarter miles to the
north, observed two small boats alongside ASAGUKO.
29. 0657 Commander Left Flank Force noted that the ASAGUMO was
firing at the Allied forces.
768 CONFIDENTIAL
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Events Depicted on Diagram "0"
October 25th. 1944
0700 - 0845
1. 0700 ASAGUMO, badly damaged and afire, was dead in the water but
was still firing at PT 323.
2. 0700 PT 323 commenced launching torpedoes at the ASAGUMO from
about 1,000 yards away. The first two missed but the third
torpedo hit the ASAGUMO in the stern.
3. 0700 COMCRUDIV TWELVE in the DENVER and with the COLUMBIA,
HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, LEUTZE and BENNION, was moving ahead
and forming column in order to sink the ASAGUMO.
4» 0700 Commander Left Flank Force, having previously directed
PORTLAND and MINNEAPOLIS to form column on the LOUISVILLE,
was following COMCRUDIV TWELVE down the strait. The
destroyers remaining with him maintained approximately the
same positions in formation.
5. 0700 BRYANT abandoned the attempt to pick up survivors and
headed south to join the cruisers.
6. 0702 CLAXTON entered column about 4,000 yards astern of the
LOUISVILLE.
7. 0703 HALFORD, after the survivors had jumped overboard and
refused rescue, sank the small boat and departed to join
the cruisers.
8. 0704:30 CONY, after obtaining permission from CTG 77.2, opened fire
on the ASAGUMO followed by the BENNION at 0705. Shortly
afterward the AULICK, SIGOURNEY, HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS and
THORN also opened fire on the ASAGUMO.
9. 0705 PT 323 departed from the vicinity of the ASAGUMO and
commenced her return to base.
10. 0709 After steadying on the firing course of 210°(T) and slowing
to fifteen knots, the DENVER and COLUMBIA opened fire on
the ASAGUMO. LEUTZE delayed opening fire until 0715 and
CLAXTON until 0717.
11. 0712 ROBINSON departed from the survivor area after rescuing one
survivor.
12. 0719 Commander Left Flank Force ordered all ships to change
course to 155°(T). At this time the DENVER and COLUMBIA
ceased firing and within the next two minutes the destroyers
also ceased firing.
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13. 0719 ASAGUMO rolled over. She sank at 0722.
14. 0728 Kanihaan PT's (495, 489, 492) slowed and prepared to go
alongside PT 491 at Kaoyo Point.
15. 0728 CTG 77.2 received information that the CVE's of TG 77.4 were
under attack off the coast of Saraar by a strong force of
Japanese battleships and cruisers. At 0732 he reversed
course to rejoin the battleships and make preparations to
either defend the eastern entrance to Leyte Gulf or go to
the aid of the CVE's.
16. 0730 Commander Left Flank Force directed the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS
to investigate the survivors and motor launches which she
had reported at 0722.
HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS sank two motor launches and departed to
rejoin the cruisers.
ROBINSON took proper station in the disposition.
Left Flank Force formed circular disposition on a northerly
course.
Antiaircraft disposition formed by the Left Flank Force.
CONY and WELLES ordered to remain behind to guard Surigao
Strait.
HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS took proper station in the disposition.
17.
0748
18.
0758
19.
0800
20.
0820
21.
0824
22.
0838
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Events Depicted on Diagram "P"
October 25th, 1944
0700 - 0840
1. 0700 MOGAMI, following astern of the SECOND Striking Force, was
firing at PT's 137 and 150.
2. 0700 AKEBONO had just reversed course and was proceeding to the
aid of the MOGAMI.
3. 0700 USHIO proceeded to escort the ABUKUMA.
4. 0700 SHIGURE continued her retirement toward the west.
5. 0700 Commander SECOND Striking Force in NACHI with ASHIGARA and
SHIRANUHI continued his retirement toward the west.
6. 0705 KASUMI went alongside the ABUKUMA in order to take off
COMDESRON ONE and staff.
7. 0715 PT's 137 and 150, having received permission to retire,
abandoned the attack on MOGAMI and retired to the northwest.
8. 0715 Allied carrier type aircraft were sighted and at 0717
KASUMI opened fire.
9. 0719 COMDESRON ONE and staff having come aboard, the KASUMI
cleared the ABUKUMA' s side and went ahead to rejoin the
NACHI and ASHIGARA.
10. 0724 USHIO opened fire against enemy aircraft.
11. 0727 MOGAMI was bombed and strafed by enemy aircraft. No
additional damage was done by this attack.
12. 0733 Allied air attacks, particularly against the damaged
ABUKUMA and MOGAMI, continued.
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I25--00
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AKEBONO ^°0720
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0
BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT
SECOND STRIKING FORCE IN
THE MINDANAO SEA
0700-0840, 25 OCTOBER, 1944
BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF
OCTOBER 1944
Notes.
I. Current used NACHI, 0 9 knots, set 245 (T)
2. Current used MOGAMh 1.12 knots, id 242°(T)
3. T rocks of PTS returning to oose nel shown.
Other PT Irocks eslimoled.
4. Jopanese Irooks ore in red, ore parW estimated
ond ore lorgely c-osed on USHIO * Action
Chon 0540-0950, 25 October, 1944.
5. Weolher-sco.lered showers and .e.loblB
conditions except where sho-f otn"*<se.
9«-35—
0733^. -
SHIGURE
Juuliu
Thousands ot Yards
35
I
40
_L_
DIAGRAM "P"
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