HIST. REF,
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BATTLES AND
LEADERS OF THE
CIVIL WAR
volOme one
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THE BUGLE CALL.
FROM THE PAINTING BY WILLIAM M. HUNT.
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BATTLES AND
LEADERS OF THE
CIVIL WAR
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BEING FOR THE MOST PART CONTRIBUTIONS
BY UNION AND CONFEDERATE OFFICERS.
BASED UPON "THE CENTURY WAR SERIES."
EDITED BY ROBERT UNDERWOOD JOHNSON
AND CLARENCE CLOUGH BUEL,OF THE EDI-
TORIAL STAFF OF "THE CENTURY MAGAZINE'.'
NEW-YORK
%\)t Century Co.
Lis $77
HIST. REF,
333
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Copyright, 1887,
By The Century Co.
The De Vinne Press.
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CAMP GOSSIP. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
PREFACE
TTTITH the main purpose in its origin of interesting veterans in their own
T ▼ memories and of instructing the generation which has grown up since
the War for the Union, the " Century War Series," through peculiar circum-
stances, has exerted an influence in bringing about a better understanding
between the soldiers who were opposed in that conflict. This influence, of
which substantial evidence has been given, North and South, lends additional
historical interest to the present work. Many commanders and subordinates
have here contributed to the history of the heroic deeds of which they were a
part. General Grant, who, in accord with the well-known purpose of President
Lincoln, began at Appomattox the work of reconciliation, contributed to the
\\ ar Series four papers on his greatest campaigns, and these are here included.
They Were written before his severe illness, and became the foundation of
his " Personal Memoirs." The narrative of his battles, continued under the
tragic circumstances of the last year of his life, retrieved his fortunes and
added a new laurel to his fame. The good temper and the unpartisan char-
acter of his articles, and of the papers by the leading writers on both sides,
arc the most significant signs in these pages. For the most part, each side
has confined controversy to its own ranks, and both have emphasized the
benefit as well as the glory of the issue. Coincident with the progress ol .he
series during the past three years, may be noted a marked increase in the
number of fraternal meetings between Union and Confederate veterans,
enforcing the conviction that the nation is restored in spirit as in fact, and
that each side is contributing its share to the new heritage of manhood and
peace.
On the 17th of July, 1883, Mr. Buel, Assistant-Editor of " The Century"
magazine, proposed in detail a magazine series by prominent generals of
IX
x PREFACE.
both sides. The original suggestion (based upon the success of two articles
from different points of view on the John Brown raid, sn " The Century" fo\
that month) was of eight or ten articles on the decisive battles of the wa
and included in the main the features of the expanded ^pu'es. Mr. R. ^
Gilder, the Editor-in-Chief, at once cordially adopted the suggestion, now
mitting the charge of its execution to Mr. Johnson, the Associate-Editor,
assisted by Mr. Buel ; from the start Mr. Gilder has aided the work by his
counsel, and by the support of his confidence in its success and public use-
fulness— ends which could not have been attained except for the liberal and
continued support of Roswell Smith, Esq., President of The Century Co. The
elaboration of the first plan, the securing of the contributions, and the
shaping and editing of the series were shared by Mr. Johnson and Mr. Buel,
the former devoting the more time to the work during the months of organ-
ization, and the latter having entire charge of the editing for nearly the whole
of the second year. The course of the series in magazine form was from
November, 1884, to November, 1887.
That the plan and the time of the enterprise were alike fortunate, may be
estimated from the unprecedented success of the articles. Within six months
from the appearance of the first battle paper, the circulation of " The Century "
advanced from 127,000 to 225,000 copies, or to a reading audience estimated
at two millions. A part of this gain was the natural growth of the periodical.
The still further increase of the regular monthly issue during the first year
of the serial publication of Messrs. Nicolay and Hay's Life of Lincoln (1886-87)
has proved the permanent character of the interest in important contribu-
tions to the history of the Civil War.
The present work is a natural sequence of the magazine series, and was
provided for before the publication of the first paper. Both the series and this
expansion of it in book form are, in idea as well as in execution, an outgrowth
of the methods and convictions belonging to the editorial habit of " The Cen-
tury" magazine. The chief motive has been strict fairness to the testimony of
both sides, and the chief endeavors have been to prove every important state-
ment by the " Official Records " and other trustworthy documents, and to spare
no pains in the interest of elucidation and accuracy. These ends could not have
been attained without the cordial cooperation as writers, and assistance as
interested actors, of the soldiers of both sides; in these respects the aid
rendered by veterans, from the highest rank to the lowest, has been unstinted,
and would be deserving of particular mention if such were possible within
' f an ordinary preface. Nearly every writer in the work, and
thers whose names do not appear, have been willing sources
or suggestion and information. Special aid has been received from General
James B. Fry, from the late Colonel Robert N. Scott, who was the editorial
head of the " War Records " office, and from his successor, Colonel H. M.
Lazelle ; and thanks are due to General Adam Badeau, George E. Pond,
Colonel John P. Nicholson, Colonel G. C. Kniffin, and to General Marcus
J. Wright, Agent of the War Department for the Collection, of Confederate
Records.
PREFACE. xi
Material for the illustrations, which form a m< t striking and not the least
important feature of the work, has been received from all sides, as will be
noted in the table of contents. Special acknowledgment is due to the Boston
Commandery of the Loyal Legion, to whose complete set of the Gardner and
the Brady photographs, as well as to other material, access has been had
from the beginning of the series. Colonel Arnold A. Band, Secretary of the
Boston Commandery, and General Albert Ordway have rendered valuable
aid in connection with the Brady and the Gardner photographs and in other
ways. The importance of accuracy has been kept constantly in view in
the preparation of the illustrations — a laborious work which has been exe-
cuted under the direction of Alexander W. Drake, Superintendent, and W.
Lewis Fraser, Manager, of the Art Department of The Century Co.
The Editors.
New York, November, 1887.
CONFEDERATE WOODEN CANTEEN, FOUND AT ANTlETAM.
CORRECTIONS IN THE FIRST EDITION.
Page 5. For Admiral Charles A. Davis (so printed in part of the edition), read Admiral Charles H. Davis.
4
Page 6 and page 108. For Charles G. Memminger, read Christopher G. Memminger.
Page 41. "From Moultrie to Sumter," by General Doubleday. Concerning the statement that Major Robert
Anderson, of Kentucky, " was a regular officer and owner of a slave plantation in Georgia,"
Major Anderson's widow writes to the Editors that he never owned a plantation anywhere, and
that he never resided in Georgia. She adds, " He inherited slaves in Kentucky from his father,
Colonel Richard Clough Anderson, and these he liberated immediately on coming into possession of
them, which was a few years after he was graduated at the Military Academy of West Point."
General Doubleday will modify the statement for other editions.
Page 81. For Lieutenant James A. Yates (so printed in part of the edition), read Lieutenant Joseph A. Yates.
Page 236. For Sergeant Thomas Shumate (so printed in part of the edition), read Sergeant Joseph Shumate.
Page 261. " The Confederate Commissariat at Manassas," by Colonel Northrup. Near the middle of the second
column— for "Lieutenant-Colonel Robert B. Lee was added," read "Lieutenant-Colonel Richard B.
Lee was added."
Page 438. In the foot-note: For General George W. Cullom (so printed in part of the edition), read General
George W. Ctillum.
Page 576. "The Campaign of Shiloh," by General G. T. Beauregard. Line 27— for the 13th of February, read the
13th of March.
Page 669. Title to portrait. For Colonel Zebulou B. Vance, read Brigadier-General Robert B. Vance.
xn
CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE.
PAGE
FRONTISPIECE, "THE BUGLE CALL." Prom the lithograph by D. C. Fabronius of the painting
by William M. Hunt VT
PREFACE IX
Illustrations: Camp Gossip, from Gardner photo. ; and Confederate Wooden Canteen (W. Taber).
LIST OF MAPS XXII
LIST OF ARTISTS & XXIII
LIST OF DRAUGHTSMEN xxill
LIST OF ENGRAVERS XXIII
INTRODUCTION.
PRELIMINARY EVENTS. From the Charleston Convention to the first Bull Run
Illustration: The Reveille (W. Taber).
ORGANIZATION OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS
The United States Government : The Buchanan Administration ; The Lincoln Administra-
tion; The United States War Department ; The United States Navy Department.
The Confederate States Government: Provisional Organization; Reorganization: Confed-
erate States War Department : Confederate States Navy Department.
Governors of the States during the War.
SIGNS OF WAR.
WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR GENERAL CHARLES P. STONE. .... 7
Illustrations: Rotunda of the Capitol in 1861, from photo, lent by General M. C. Meigs (E. J. Meeker) —
Map of the United States in 1861, showing Military Posts occupied by United States Troops January l,
1861, ami Approximate Limit of Territory controlled by the United States Forces .Inly, 1861 (Jacob
Wells) — Uniform of the National Rifles; Uniform of the Potomac Light Infantry <H. A. Ogden) —Brevet ,
Lieut. -General Wintield Scott, from Brady photo.— Headquarters of General Scott (TJieo. It. Diiris) —
Washington Arsenal, from Russell photo. (E. J. Meeker)— The Columbian Armory (T. If. Davis) — Joseph
Holt. Secretary of War. from Brady photo. — President Buchanan, from Brady photo.— General Charles
P. Stone, from Brady photo.— President Lincoln, from ambrotype taken May 20, 1860— Vice-Preside) 1 1
Hamlin, from Brady photo. — South or Garden Side of the White House (F. 11. Cocks) — The White House
at Night (Joseph Pennell) — Inauguration of President Lincoln, from plioto. lent by General M. C. Meigs.
WITH SLEMMER IN PENSACOLA HARBOR COLONEL J. H. OILMAN 26
Illustrations : Peusacola Harbor from the Bar (Thco. R. Davis) The Man who refused to haul
down the Union Flag ( William Waud) — Map of Peusacola Bay, redrawn from "Frank Leslie's" (Fred.
E. Sitts) — Confederate, Water-battery, from photo, lent by Loyal) Farragut (W. Taber) — Lieutenant
Adam J. Slemmer, from Brady photo.
RECOLLECTIONS OF THE TWIGGS SURRENDER .MRS. CAROLINE BALDWIN BARROW. 33
Illu stratioxs : A Texau Ranger, from ambrotype i.l. ('. Redwood) — The Alamo, Sail Antonio
(Abram Hosier) — Colonel Daniel H. Vinton, from photo.
^r In onler to save much repetition, particular credit is here given to the Boston Commandery of the Loyal Legion, to ( 'ol-
nel Arnold A. Rand, General Albert Midway. Charles B. Hall, and W. H. Whiton, for the use of photographs and drawings.
War-time photographers whose work is of the greatest historical value, and lias been freely drawn upon in the preparation-
f the illustrations, are M. B. Brady, Alexander Gardner, and Captain A. J. Russell in the North ; and D. H. Anderson of
ichmond, Va.. and George S. < look of Charleston, S. C— the latter since the war having succeeded to the ownership of the
nderson negatives.
xiii
V
\
\
xiv CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE.
FORT SUMTER.
PAGE
FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER GENERAL ABNER DOUBLED AY 40
Illustrations: View of Charleston from Castle Pinckney (T. R. Davis) — Major Robert Anderson,
from Bradj photo. — Major Anderson and his Officers, from Cook photo.— The Sea-battery at Fort Moul-
trie, from photo.— Map of Charleston Harbor (Jacob Wills) — The Hot-shot Furnace, Fort Moultrie, from
photo.— Major Anderson's Men Crossing to Fort Sumter (Theo. R. Davis).
INSIDE SUMTER IN '61 CAPTAIN JAMES CHESTER 50
Illustrations : South-west or Gorge Front of Fort Sumter, from photo, lent by the Washington Light
Infantry, Charleston, S. C. (^Y. Tuber) —The Sally-port of Fort Sumter, from photo.— Ground Plan of
Fort Sumter (F. E. Sitts) — Interior of Fort Sumter after the Surrender, from photo. (W. Tuber) —
Interior of Fort Sumter after the Bombardment, showing the Gate and the Gorge Wall, from photo.—
Interior of Fort Sumter, showing the 10-iuch Colnmbiad bearing on Charleston, from photo, lent by G. L.
G. Cook C W. Tuber) — Eft'eet of the Bombardment on the Barbette Guns, from photo, lent by the Rev. John
Johnson (E. J. Meeker) — The Sumter Garrison Watching the Firing on the "Star of the West" (T. B.
Davis) — Confederate Floating Battery in Action (T. It Davis)— Plan of the Floating Battery, from a
Sketch by Colonel Joseph A. Yates — Sergeant Carmody Firing the Barbette Guns of Sumter (T. li. Davis)
— A Casemate Gun during the Conflagration (T, R. Davis) — Ruins of the Casemates and of the Barbette
Tier of Guns, from photo's.
THE FIRST STEP IN THE WAR GENERAL STEPHEN D. LEE 74
Illustrations : Bursting of the Signal-shell from Fort Johnson over Fort Sumter (T. R. Davis) —
Governor Francis W. Pickens, from photo, lent by Louis Manigault — Confederate Mortar-battery on
Morris Island, from photo.— General G. T. Beauregard, from Anderson-Cook photo.— Secession Hall,
Charleston, from Cook photo. (E. J. Meeker) — Fort Sumter at the close of the Bombardment (T. R. Davis)
— Jefferson Davis, from Brady photo.— View of Cumming's Point (T. R. Davis).
NOTES ON THE SURRENDER OF FORT SUMTER . COLONEL A. R. CHISOLM 82
ORGANIZING FOR THE CONFLICT.
\K .GENERAL JACOB D. COX 84
-Life-mask of Stephen A. Douglas, from photo.—
Port rait ot Steph taken in 1852 — Major-General George B. McClellan,
from photo, by R. W. Addis — ......, m Granger, from Brady photo.— Camp Dennison,
near Cincinnati, based upon photo, r W. Tuber).
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONT- )
GOMERY. By the Editor of the Charleston >../?. BARNWELL RHE/'T 90
" Mercury" in 1SG0-2 )
Illustrations: Montgomery, Alabama, in 1861, showing the Confederate Capitol (T. R. Duvis) —
Alexander H. Stephens, from Brady photo.— William L. Yancey, from Cook photo.— Robert Toombs,
from photo.— Leroy Pope Walker, from Brady photo.— R. Barnwell Rhett, from Cook photo.— Howell
Cobb, from photo, lent by General Marcus J. Wright — Stephen R. Mallory, from daguerreotype —
Judah P. Benjamin, from photo, lent by James Blair — Charles G. Memminger and John H. Reagan,
from steel-engravings, by permission of D. Appletou & Co.
FIRST OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA.
JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN i8bi GENERAL JOHN D. IMBODEN HI
Illustrations : Richmond, Va., in 1861 (Theo. R. Duvis) — Palmetto Regiment parading in Charleston,
S. C, en route for Richmond (Theo. R. Davis) —Map of Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland (Jacob
Wells) —Court-house, Charleston, Va., where John Brown and his Associates were Tried and Sentenced,
from photo, by W. G. Reed (Harry Venn)— Map of Harper's Ferry (<S. H. Brown) — Portrait of John
Brown, from photo, by J. W. Black & Co. (with Autograph) ^""ine-house. Harper's Ferry (Joseph
Pennell) —Portrait of Colonel Robert E. Lee, from photo, ta ■ the War, lent by General G. W.
C. Lee — View of Harper's Ferry looking down the Potomac >to. CTF. Tn her) — Harper's Ferry
from the Maryland wide, from photo, (W. Tuber)— Lieut.-C ,omas J. ("Stonewr ikson,
C. S. A., from phntn i>\- Tanner & Van Ness — General Jai 61, from pen sketcl . Mrs.
Harriet Coxe Ble Voivk) —Colonel Roger Jones, ly photo.
CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE. xv
PAGE
McCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA GENERAL JACOB D. COX 126
Illustrations: An Affair of Outposts (W. Taber) — Majov-( al Lew Wallace, from Brad;,
photo.— Map of Campaigns in West Virginia (Jacob Wells) — Brig.-General T. A. Morris, from Brady
photo.— Plan of Combat at Rich Mountain (J. W ells) — Brig.-Geni ohn Pegram, C. S. A., from
Anderson-Cook photo.— Brig.-Geueral R. S. Garnett, C. S. A., from photo.— Major-General W. S. Rose-
erans, from photo, by Bogardns — Brig.-General H. A. Wise, C. 8. A., froi 1 Brady photo.— Brig.-General
J. B. Floyd, C. S. A., from photo.— Post-hospital and Wagon-shop at Kanawha Falls, from photo, lent
by General J. D. Cox (Harry Fe n n ) —Plan of Gauley Bridge and Vicinity (Jacob Wells) —View ot
Gauley Bridge and New River Cliffs, from photo's lent by General J. D. Cox (Harry Fenn) — Plan of
Affair at Carnifex Ferry (Jacob Wells ) — Floyd's Command Recrossing the < tauley River, and Preparing
to Shell Rosecrans's Camp at Gauley Bridge, from sketches by W. D. Washington owned by J. F.
Gibson ("IF. L. Shepjpard) —View of Rornney, Va. (A. E. Waud).
FIRESIDE AND FIELD OF BATTLE.
GOING TO THE FRONT (Recollections of a Private— 1 ) . WARREN LEE GOSS 1-49
Illustrations: Fae-simile of the Conclusion of General Dix's ••American Flan" Dispatch, from the
original lent by the Rev. Morgan Dix, D. D.— Arrival of the New York 7th at Annapolis (Thco. R.
Davis) — Uniform of the 6th Massachusetts (H. A. Ogden) — "And the Corporal did" < /■:. W. Eemble)—A
Mother's Parting Gift (E. W. Kcmble) — Militia Uniform of '61, from photo, of the statue by J. Q. A.
Ward — The New York 7th Marching down Broadway (W. Taber) — Federal Hill, Baltimore (F. H.
Sehell) — Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, in '61 (Theo. R. Davis) — The New York 7th at (amp Cam-
eron, Washington (J/. J. Bums).
VIRGINIA SCENES IN "6i MRS. BURTON HARRISON. 160
Illustrations: Confederate Battle-flag, from original flag lent by Mrs. Harrison (E. J. Meeker)— A
Virginia Homestead, from sketch lent by Mrs. Harrison (E. J. Meeker) —Confederates on the Way to
Manassas (E. W. Kemble) — Listening for the First Gun (E. W. Kemble) — Fac-simile of Autographic
Copy of the First Stanza of " My Maryland."
CAMPAIGN OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
McDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN GENERAL JAMES B. FRY 167
Illustrations: Scrutinising a Pass at the Long Bridge, based on photo. (W.H. SJ> .out — Uniform
of the llth New York at Bull Run (W. Taber) — Simon Cameron, Secretary of War rom Brady photo.
— Uniform of the 1st Massachusetts at Bull Run (H. A. Oydcn)— General Irvin McLowell, from photo.
by Fredericks — Uniform of the 2d Ohio at Bull Run (H.A. Ogden) — Map of the Defenses of Washing-
tor., July, 1861 (Jacob Wells)— Fac-simile of a Washington Pass of 1861 (obverse and reverse), lent by
Murat Halstcad— View of Washington from the Signal Camp, two cuts (Tlieo. R. Daris) — The Stone
Church, Centreville, from Gardner photo. (Harry Fenn) — Unif drm of the nth New York (Fire Zouaves)
at Bull Run (H. A. Oydcn) —Outline Map of the Rattle-field of Bull Run (Jacob Wells) — Sudley Springs
Hotel (Joseph Fennell) — Sudley Springs Ford in 1884 (Joseph J>ennct!)—*nd\ey Springs Ford, from
Gardner photo. (Harry Fenn)— The Stone Bridge over Bull Run (Joseph Pennell) — Fatigim Uniform
and Kilts of the 79th New York (11. A . Oydcn) — The Sudley Springs Road, from photo, by Captain J. E.
Barr (J. D. Woodward) — Major-General Charles Griffin, and Major-Genera] James B. Ricketts, from
photo's lent by General James B. Fry — The Contest for the Henry Hill ( W. Taber) — Uniform of the
Garibaldi Guards (H. A. Oyden) — Uniform of Blenker's 8th New York Volunteers (H. A. Oydcn) —
Brig.-General Louis Bleuker, from Brady photo.
THE OPPOSING ARMIES AT THE FIRST BULL RUN. Table of Strength, Composition,
and Losses 194
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN GENERAL G. T. BEAUREGARD 196
Illustrations: A Louisiana "Tiger" (A. C. Redwood) —Arlington, the Home of General Robert E.
Lee (J. H. Cocks) — Map of the Bull Run Campaign (Jacob Wells) — The McLean House, General Beaure-
gard's Headquarters, near Manassak from Gardner photo. (W. Taber) —Topographical Map of the Bull
Ruu Battle-Held (Jacob Wells) — Rally ing the Troops of Bee, Bartow, and Evans behind the Robinson
House fT. de Thulstrup) A Louisiana "Pelican" (A. G. Redwood) — The Robiusou House, from Gardner
photo. (J. 1>. Woodward)— The Main Battle-ground, two views, from photo's (Harry Fenn) — Colonel
F. S. Bartow, from photo, lent by Georgia Historical Society — Fairfax Court-house, from Gardi
photo. (W. Taber)— Ruins of the Stone Bridge, looking along the Warrenton Turnpike toward the Battle-
field, from Gardner photo.— Confederate Quaker Guns, from Gardner photo. (A. O. Redioood) — Generals
R. E. Lee and J. E. Johnston, from photo, by D. J. Ryan (with Autographs).
r
xvi CON TEN IS OF VOLUME ONE.
PAGE
INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN GENERAL JOHN D. IMBODEN 2-29
Illustrations: The New Henry House and the Monument of the First Battle, from photo. (W.
Taber) — Confederate Fortifications about Manassas Junction, and the Stone House on the Warrenton
Turnpike, from Gardner photo's (Harry Fenn) — Plan of the Bull Run Battle-field (Jacob Wells) — Briga-
dier-General Barnard E. Bee, from photo, by Tucker & Perkins.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN GENERAL JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON 240
Illustrations: Quaker Gun found in the Confederate Works at Manassas, from Gardner photo.
(W. Taber) — General Samuel Cooper, from photo, by Davis lent by General Marcus J. WrigM— Lieuten-
ant-General Richard 8. Ewell, from Anderson-Cook photo.— " Stonewall" Jackson as First-Lieutenant
of Artillery, from daguerreotype lent by his niece, Miss Alice E. Underwood.
GENERAL E WELL AT BULL RUN MAJOR CAMPBELL BROWN 259
THE CONFEDERATE COMMISSARIAT AT MANASSAS COLONEL L. B. NORTHROP 261
WILSON'S CREEK, LEXINGTON, AND PEA RIDGE.
THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI COLONEL THOMAS L. SNEAD 202
Illustrations: A Very Raw Recruit (E. W. Kemble) — Map of Operations in Missouri, 18C1 (Jacob
Writs) — Governor Claiborne F. Jackson, from phototype lent by General Marcus J. Wright — Brigadier-
General D. M. Frost, from photo, by Scholten — Fac-simile of Missouri War Scrip, lent by R. I. Hol-
combe — Major-General Sterling Price, from Anderson-Cook photo. — Major-General David Hunter, from
Brady photo. — Major-< ieneial Henry W. Halleck, from photo.
IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI GENERAL JOHN C. FREMONT 278
Illustrations: Off to the War (TT. Taber) —Major-General F. P. Blair, Jr., from Brady photo.— Brig. -
General Nathaniel Lyon, from Brady photo. — Major General Franz Sigel, from photo. — Major-General
John C. Fremont, from steel portrait lent by Mrs. Fremont.
DEATH OF LYON GENERAL WILLIAM M. WHERRY 289
i of the United States Regulars in 1861 (H. A. Ogden) — Map of Wilson's
ells) — Major-General John M. Schofield, from Brady photo. — Battle-field
tl Pearee's Camp, from photo's (E. J. Meeker) —Brigadier-General N. B.
loto.
tATTLE )
■ GENERAL N. B. PEARCE 208
Illustrations: Bloody Hill from the East, from photo, by Sittler lent by R. I. Holcombe (]}'.
Taber) — Major-General Ben. McCulloeh, C. S. A., from photo.— Brigadier-General W. Y. slack, ('. S. A.,
from Brady photo.
^HH FLANKING COLUMN AT WILSON'S CREEK. . . GENERAL FRANZ SIGEL 304
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT WILSON'S CREEK, MO. Composition, Strength, and Losses 306
THE SIEGE OF LEXINGTON COLONEL JAMES A. MULLIGAN :i07
Illustrations: Confederates Fighting behind Hemp-bales (TT. Taber) — Map of the Siege of Lexing-
ton (Jacob Wells) — Battle of Lexington, as seen from Parsons's position, after sketch by F. B. Wilkie in
"Frank Leslie's " (F. II. Schell) — Colonel James A. Mulligan, from photo. (Sidney L. Smith).
THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN GENERAL FRANZ SIGEL 314
Illustrations: Uniform of the United States Regulars in 1861, from photo. (H. A. Oyden) — Major-
General Samuel R. Curtis, from photo.— Major-General Earl Van Horn, C. S. A., from photo, by Earle &
Son (with Autograph) — Map of the Battle-field of Pea Ridge, or Elkhorn Tavern (Jacob Wells) — Major-
General Peter J. Osterhaus, from photo, by Fredericks — Major-General Eugene A. Carr, from Brady
photo.— Brigadier-General James Mcintosh, C. S. A., from photo.— The Union Right under General Carr
at Pratt's Store, Second Day of the Battle — and Last Hour of the Battle of Pea Ridge, from paintings by
Hunt P. Wilson owned by Southern Historical Society of St. Louis (Scliell and Hogati) — Brigadier-
General Albert Pike, C. S. A., from photo, by Scholl, and Brigadier-General Stand Waitie, C. S. A., from
photo's lent by General Mareu
CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE. xvii
UNION AND CONFEDERATE INDIANS 1 1>AGE
IN THE CIVIL WAR } WILEY BRITTON 335
Illustration: Elkhorn Tavern, Pea Ridge, from photo. (W. Taber).
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT PEA RIDGE. Composition, Strength, and Losses 337
BELMONT AND FORT HENRY.
RECOLLECTIONS OF FOOTE AND THE GUN-BOATS . . CAPTAIN JAMES B. BADS 338
Illustrations: Building the Eads Gim-hoats at Carondelet (Then. R. Davis) — The "De Kalb," for-
merly the "St. Louis" (Type of the "Carondelet," " Cincinnati," " Louisville," " Mound City," " Cairo,"
and "Pittsburgh"), from photo, lent by Captain Eads — Captain James B. Eads, from photo.— The
"Osage" (Twin of the "Neosho") — and the "Chickasaw" (Type of the "Milwaukee," "Winnebago,"
and " Kickapoo "), from photo's lent by Captain Eads (E. J. Meeker) — Rear-Admiral Andrew Hull Foote,
from photo, by E. Anthony — Rear- Admiral Henry Walke. from ambrotype.
NOTES ON THE LIFE OF ADMIRAL FOOTE. )
By his Brother \ .... JOHN A. FOOTE 347
GENERAL POLK AND THE BATTLE OF BELMONT. )
By Mg Son } CAPTAIN WILLIAM M. POLK 348
[From the MS. of the " Life of Leonidas Polk"' (unpublished).]
Illustrations : Portraits of Confederate Privates of the West, from ainbrotypes (II. A. Ogden)—Map
of the Battle-held near Belmont, Mo. (J. S. Kemp) — Lieutenant-General Leonidas Polk, Bishop of
Louisiana, from photo, hj Morse— Brigadier-General U. 8. Grant (18(51), from photo, lent by O. Hufelai '
— Tlie Gun-boats -Tyler" and "Lexington" fighting the Columbus Latteries during the B
Belmont, from drawing by Rear- Admiral Walke (F. U. Sehell and T. Hogan) — Confi
tions at Columbus, Ky., from sketch made for "Frank Leslie's" and lent by G.
Woodward) — Captain John A. Rawlins (1861), from photo, lent by O. Hn
Grant's Troops alter the Battle, from drawing by Rear-Admiral Walke (/■'. H. !
THE GUN-BOATS AT BELMONT AND FORT HENRY REAR-ADMIRAL HENRY WALKE 358
Illustrations: Army Transports at the Cairo Levee (Theo. B. Daris) — Flag-Onicer Foote in the
Wheel-house of the "Cincinnati" at Fort Henry (W. Taber) — Wharf-boat at Cairo, from photo, lent
by Major J. H. Benton ( ir. (looter) —The Gun-boats " Tyler " and " Lexington" engaging the Batteries
of Columbus, from sketch by Rear-Admiral Walke (Harry Venn) — Map of the Region of Foote's Opera-
tions (Jacob Writs) United States Gun-boat "Tyler," from drawing by Rear-Admiral Walke — Map of
Fort Henry (Jacob Wells) — Cross-section of a Confederate Torpedo found in the Tennessee River (E.
J. Meeker) — Between Decks: Serving the Guns, from drawing by Rear-Admiral Walke (A. C. lied 'wood >
— General Lloyd Tilghman, from photo.
THE DEFENSE OF FORT HENRY CAPTAIN JESSE TAYLOR 368
Illustration : The Attack upon Fort Henry, from drawing by Rear-Admiral Walke.
MILL SPRINGS, THE BIG SANDY, AND FORT DONELSON.
HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION COLONEL R. M. KELLY 37:;
Illustrations: Military Water-sled (Frank H. Sehell) — Rev. Robert J. Breckinridge, D. D., from
steel portrait — Major-General William Nelson, from Brady photo. — Major-General John C. Breckin-
ridge, C. 8. A., from daguerreotype lent by Anson Maltby— Map of Kentucky and Tennessee (Jacob Wells)
— John C. Crittenden, from daguerreotype — Camp Dick Robinson — The Farm-house, from sketch lent
by .Mrs. M. B. Robinson — Major-General Lovell H. Rousseau, from Brady photo.— Major-Gem •
George B. Crittenden, C. S. A., from photo. —Major-General D. C. Buell, from photo, lent by Gem ral
James B. Fry— Map of the Battle of Logan's Cross Roads, or Mill Springs, Ky. (Jacob Wells) — Brigadier-
General Felix K. Zollicoffer, C. B. A., from photo. — Brigadier-General Speed S. Fry,- from photo, taken
in 1802 —National Cemetery at Logan's Cross Roads, from photo. (E. J. Meeker) — View on the Battle-
field of Logan's Cross Roads, from photo. (E. J. Meeker).
xviii CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE.
PAGE
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT LOGAN'S CROSS ROADS, KY. (MILL SPRINGS OR FISHING
CREEK). Composition, Strength, and Losses 392
MARSHALL AND GARFIELD IN 1
EASTERN KENTUCKY } ^ BDWARD °' ARRANT 393
Illustrations: Confederate Private, from ambrotype (Frank Day)— Map of Big Sandy River and
Middle Creek Battle-field (Jacob Wells)— Brigadier-General James A. Garfield, from Brady photo. —
Brigadier-General Humphrey Marshall, C. S. A., from photo.
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON GENERAL LEW WALLACE 398
Illustrations: Headquarters in the Field (B. F. Zogoaum) — the Town of Dover from Robinson's
Hill, from photo. ( W. H. Drake) — Map of Fort Donelson as Invested by General Grant (Jacob Wells) —
Glimpse of the Cumberland River where the Gun-boats first appeared, from photo. (Harry Fenn) —
Major-General John A. McClernand, from photo. — Major-General Simon B. Buckner, C. S. A., from
photo, by Anthony— Dover Tavern, General Buckner's Headquarters and the Scene of the Surrender,
from photo. (Harry Fenn) — Major-General Morgan L. Smith, from photo, lent by Miss D. Morgan Smith
— Major-General C. F. Smith, from Brady photo.— The Crisp Farm — General Grant's Headquarters —
Front View of Mrs. Crisp's House, from photo's (W. H. Drake) — The Position of the Gun-boats and
the West Bank, from photo's (Harry Fenn)— The Bivouac in the Snow on the Line of Battle (R. F.
Zogbaum) —Branch of Hickman's Creek near James Crisp's House, the Left of Generate. P. Smith's
Line, from photo. (Harry Fenn) — McAllister's Battery in Action (W. Taber)— Yi&w on the Line of
Pillow's Defenses in front of McClernand, showing Water in the Old Trenches, from photo. (Harry
Fenn) --Major-General Gideon J. Pillow, C. S. A., from Anderson-Cook photo.— Rowlett's Mill, from
photo. (W. Taber)— Fac-stmile of the original "Unconditional Surrender'" Dispatch— View from the
National Cemetery, from photo. (G. H. Stephens).
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT FORT DONELSON, TENN. Composition, Strength, and Losses. . .429
THE RIVER GUN-BOATS FROM FORT DONELSON TO
NEW MADRID.
THE WESTERN FLOTILLA AT FORT )
DONELSON, ISLAND NUMBER TEN, > REAR-ADMIRAL HENRY IVALKE 430
FORT PILLOW, AND MEMPHIS. .. . S
Illustrations : The " Carondelet " Fighting Fort Donelson, from sketch by Rear-Admiral Walke
(F. H. Schell and T. Hoy an) — Explosion of a Gun on board the " Carondelet " during the Attack on
Fort Donelson, from sketch by Bear- Admiral Waike (M. J. Burns) — The Gun-boats at Fort Donelson—
The Land Attack in the Distance, from sketch by Rear-Admiral Walke (Harry Fenn) — Map of the
Region of the Flotilla Operations (Jacob Wells)— Map of Military and Naval Operations about Island
Number Ten (Jacob Wells) —The Mortar-boats at Island Number Ten (E. J. Meeker) —The "Caron-
delet " Running the Confederate Batteries at Island Number Ten, from sketch by Rear-Admiral Walke
(Harry Fenn) —The Levee at New Madrid (A. B. Wand) —Major-General John Pope, from Brady
photo.— Brigadier-General W. W. Mackall, C. S. A., from photo, by G. W. Davis — The "Carondelet"
and "Pittsburgh" Capturing the Confederate Batteries below New Madrid, from drawing by Rear-
Admiral Walke (F. H. Schell and T. Hogan) — Flag-Ofneer Charles Henry Davis, from Brady photo.— Fort
Pillow and the Water-battery, and the Battle of Fort Pillow, from sketches by Rear-Admiral Walke (F. H.
Schell ami T. Hogan ) —The Battle of Memphis (looking South), from drawing by Rear-Admiral Walke
(Frank H. Schell) — Brigadier-General M. Jeff. Thompson, C. S. A., from photo.
ELLET AND HIS STEAM-RAMS AT MEMPHIS GENERAL ALFRED IV. ELLET 453
Illustrations : The Battle of Memphis (looking North) — Retreat of the Confederate Fleet, from draw-
ing by Rear-Admiral Walke (F. H Schell anil T. Hogan) — Colonel Charles Ellet, Jr., from photo, by Rehn
& Hum — Close of the Battle of Memphis, from drawing by Rear-Admiral Walke (F. H. Schell and T.
Hogan) — Practicing on a River Picket ( W. Taber).
SAWING OUT THE CHANNEL ABOVE ISLAND )
NUMBER TEN \ ... .COLONEL J. IV. BISSELL 460
Illustrations : Method of Cutting t he Channel ( W. Taber) — Map of the Corrected Line of t he Channel
above Island Number Ten, cut by the Engiueer Regiment (Jacob Wells).
COMMENT ON COLONEL BISSELL'S PAPER GENERAL SCHUYLER HAMILTON . . .462
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT NEW MADRID (ISLAND NUMBER TEN), FORT PILLOW, AND
MEMPHIS Composition, Strength, and Losses -±63
CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE. xix
SHILOH.
PAGE
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT 465
Illustrations : General U. S. Grunt, from photo, (with Autograph) — On the Skirmish Line fW. Tuber)
— Outline Map of the Shiloh Campaign (Jacob Wells) — Mrs. Crump's House and the Landing below the
House, from photo'.- (George Gibson) —New Shiloh Church and shiloh Spring, in the Ravine South of the
Chapel, from photo's (W. II. T>rake) — Map of the Field of Shiloh, from General Grant's "Memoirs"—
First Position of Waterhouse's Battery, from sketch by E. W. Andrews, M. D. (E. J. Meeker) — Con-
federate Charge upon Prentiss's (amp on Sunday Morning (A. G. Redwood) — Checking the Confederate
Advance on the Evening of the First Day (Edwin Forbes) —Present Aspect of the Old Hamburg Road
which led up to the '-Hornets' Nest," from photo. (Fred. B. Schell)— Major-General B. M. Prentiss,
from Brady photo.— Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace, from photo.— Ford where the Hamburg Road
Crosses Lick Creek, from photo. (Fred. B. Schell) — Bridge over Snake Creek by which General Lew-
Wallace's Troops reached the Field, from photo. (Fred. B. ScJiell) — Bivouac of the Federal Troops (T.
de Thulstrup) —Wounded and Stragglers on the Way to the Landing (T. de Thulstrup) — Above the
Landing: The Store, ami a part of the National Cemetery, from photo, lent by Captain A. T. Andreas
(E. J. Meeker).
SHILOH REVIEWED GENERAL DON CARLOS BUELL 487
Illustrations: Battery Forward! (W. Taber)— Pittsburg Landing, viewed from the Ferry Landing
on the opposite Shore, from photo. Ienl by Captain A. T. Andreas (E. J. Meeker) —Pittsburg Landing,
from photo, lent by W. II. Chamberhn (J. 0. Davidson) —The Landing at Savannah, from photo. (F. B.
Schell) — Major-General Alexander McD. McCook, from Brady photo.— Pittsburg Landing in the
Summer of 1884, from photo. (F. B. Schell) — Map Showing the Union Camps at Shiloh, fac-simile of
original— Map of the Field of shiloh. revised and amended by General Buell (Jacob Wells)— The.
"Hornets' Nest": Prentiss's Troops and Hickenlooper's Battery repulsing Hardee's Troops, and Gib-
son's Brigade charging Hurlbut's Troops in the "Hornets' Nest," from the Cyclorama of Shiloh at
Chicago (II. A. Ogden) — The Official, or Thorn, Map of the Battle of Shiloh (Jacob Wells) — In the
" Hornets Nest " (two views on W.H. L. Wallace's Line), from the Cyclorama at Chicago (H. C. Edwards)
— The Siege-battery, above the Landing, from photo. Lent by W. H. Chamberlin (W. Taber) — Buell's
Troops debarking at Pittsburg Landing (T.de Thulstrup) — Major-General Thomas J. Wood, from .steel
portrait, by permission of D. Van Nostrand— Major General Thomas L. Crittenden, from Brady photo.
— Capture of a Confederate Battery (T. de Thulstrup) — Scene in a Union Field-hospital (A. C. Redwood).
SKIRMISHING IN SHERMAN'S FRONT ROBERT IV. MEDKIRK 537
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT SHILOH. Composition, Strength, ami Losses 537
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH. » COL. WILLIAM PRESTON JOHNSTON . :^
By his Son S
Illustrations: Albert Sidney Johnston at the Age of Thirty-five, from miniature — General Albert
Sidney Johnston at the Ageof Fifty-seven, from photo.— Fac-simile of Autograph found inside the Cover
of General Johnston's Pocket-map of Tennessee — Birthplace of Albert Sidney Johnston, Washington,
Ky., from photo. (C. A. Xandcrhoof) —Fort Anderson, Paducah, in April, 1862, after lithograph from
sketch '.y A. E. Mathews (H. C. Edwards) — Camp Burgess, Bowling Green, after lithograph from
sketch by A. E. Mathews (E. J. Meeker) — Map of Kentucky and Tennessee (Jacob Wells) — Battle of
Logan's Cross Roads, or Mill Springs, after lithograph from drawing by A. E. Mathews ( II'. Taber) — Col-
onel Sehoepf's Troops crossing Fishing Creek on the way to join General Thomas, after lithograph from
sketch by A. E. Mathews (E. J. Meeker) —Confederate Types of 1862 (A. C. Redwood) — Map used by the
Confederate Generals a* Shiloh, by permission of D. Appleton & Co.— Lieutenant-General W. J. Hardee,
C. 8. A., from photo, lent by < lolonel Charles C. Jones, Jr.— Map of Battle of Shiloh (Part I.) and Map of
Battle of Shiloh (Part II.), by permission of D. Appleton & Co.— Vicinity of the " Hornets' Nest," from
photo's lent by Captain A. T. Andreas (W. L. Lathrop) — Scene of General Albert Sidney Johnston's
Death, from photo. (W. Taber)— Map of Battle of Shiloh (Part III.), by permission of D. Apple-
ton & Co.
THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH GENERAL G. T. BEAUREGARD 569
Illustrations : Preaching at the Union Camp Dick Robinson, Kentucky, after lithograph from sketch
by A. E. Mathews (E. J. Meeker) — Lieutenant-General John C. Breckinridge, C. S. A., from Anderson-
(ook photo.— Slaves Laboring at Night on the Confederate Earth- works at Coiinth ( W. L. Sheppard) —
Five Corinth Dwellings, from photo's ( II'. J. Fenn)— Major-General Bushrod R. Johnson, C. S. A., from
Andersen-Cook photo.— The "Hornets' Nest," from photo, lent by Captain A. T. Andreas (E. J. Meeker)
— The Union Gun-boats at Shiloh on the Evening of the First Day, after lithograph from sketch by A. E.
Mathews (H. M. Eaton).
N0TESaT)F,M„ n°„NFEDERATE STAFF-°FFICER I . .GENERAL THOMAS JORDAN
AT SHILOH S
Illustrations: A Confederate Private of the West, from ambrotype — A Union Battery taken by
Surprise (R. F. Zoybaum J— The Last Stand made by the Confederate Line (R. F. Zogbaum).
xx CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE.
PAGE
SURPRISE AND WITHDRAWAL AT SHILOH COLONEL S. H. LOCKETT 604
Illustration: Initial (R. /•'. Zogbaum).
THE SHILOH BATTLE ORDER AND THE f
WITHDRAWAL SUNDAY EVENING . I COLONEL A. R. CHISOLM 606
THE MARCH OF LEW WALLACE'S DIVISION TO SHILOH.
With Documents submitted by General Lew Wallace 607
Map <>f the Routes l>y which General Grant was reenforced (Jacob Wills).
NAVAL PREPARATIONS.
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES PROFESSOR J. R. SOLEY 611
Illustrations: A Frigate of the Olden Time: the "Independence," built in 181-1, from photo. (Gran-
ville Perkins) — Roman War Galley — Liue-of-battle Ship of the 17th Century — The U. S. Frigate "Mer-
rimac " before and after Conversion into an Iron-clad (J. O. Davidson) — The Navy Yard, Washington, in
1861, from war-time sketch (A. R. Waud) — The Old Navy Department Building, Washington, from photo.
(W. Tabcr) — Launch of the " Dictator," from photo, lent by Delamater <fc Co. Cir. Taber) —Monitor
"Weehawken" in a Storm (Granville Perkins) — Gideon Welles, Secretary of the U. S. Navy, from
Brady photo.— Gustavus V. Fox, Assistant-Secretary of the U. S. Navy, from photo.— William Faxon,
Chief Clerk of the U. S. Navy Department during the War, from photo, by Prescott & White.
COAST OPERATIONS IN THE CAROLINAS.
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA. . GENERAL RUSH C. HAIVKINS 632
(Including Capture and Defense of Hatteras Island, Land and Water Fighting at Koanoke
Island, the Two Squadrons at Elizabeth City, Battle of New Berne, Siege of Fort Maeou, Battle
of South Mills, and other Operations.)
Illustrations: Uniform of Hawkins's Zouaves, from photo. (H. A. Ogden) — Rear-Admiral Silas H.
Stringham, from Brady photo. — Map of Early Coast Operations in North Carolina (Jacob Wells) — Forts
Hatteras and Clark, froin war-time sketch (A. R. Waud) —The " Cumberland " Sailing into Action, and
Union Fleet Bombarding Forts Hatteras and Clark, from war-time sketches (F. H. Schell and Thomas
Flof/an) — Retreat of the Confederates to their Boats after their Attack upon Hatteras ( ir. Taber) — Land-
ing of the Union Troops at Hatteras, from war-time sketch (A. If. Waud) — Map of the Operations
at Roanoke Island, from Official Records — Map of the Battle-held of Roanoke Island, from Official
Records — Union Assault upon the Three-gun Battery, Roanoke Island, from war-time sketch (F. B.
Schell) — Vice-Admiral S. C. Rowan, from Brady photo.— Brigadier-General L. O'B. Branch, from
photo.— Bombardment of Fort Thompson during the Battle of New Berne, from war-time sketch (F. H.
Schell) — Major-General John G. Foster, from Brady photo.— Map of Operations in the Battle of New
Berne (Jacob Wells) — Assault of Union Troops upon Fort Thompson, from war-time sketch (F. H. Schell)
— Fort Macon after its Capture by the Union Forces, from war-time sketch by F. H. Schell (Thomas
lUxjan) — Map of the Engagement at South Mills (Fred. E. Sitts) — Passage, of the Union Boats through
the Dismal Swamp Canal, from war-time sketch by Horatio L. Wait (E. J. Meeker).
THE BURNSIDE EXPEDITION GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE 660
Illustrations : Union Lookout, Hatteras Beach, froni war-time sketch (A. R. Waud) —Uniform of the
First Rhode Island (H. A. Ogden) — Brevet Brigadier-General Rush C. Hawkins, from Brady photo.—
Rear-Admiral L. M. Goldsborough, from photo, lent by Henry Carey Baird — General Burnside's Head-
quarters, Roanoke Island, from war-time sketch by F. H. Schell (Thomas Hogan) — General Burnside at
the Confederate Cotton Battery, New Berne, from war-time sketch by F. H. Schell (Thomas Hogan) —
Brigadier-General Robert B. Vance, from tintype.
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT ROANOKE ISLAND AND NEW BERNE, NORTH C/
DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION REAR-ADMIRAI 071
Illustrations : General View of Hilton Head after its Capture by the U v lew of Post-
Office, Hilton Head, from war time sketches (Xanthus Smith) — Brevet L Thomas W. Sher-
man, from Brady photo.— Map of the Coast of South Carolina and i>e arolina (Jacob Wells)
— Rear-Admiral Samuel F. Du Pont, from photo, lent by Hora< tin-boat i" Seneca ." and
Sloop of War "Vandalia," from war-time sketches (Xanthus ' ■■ Naval Attack at Hilton
CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE. xxi
PAGE
Head, Nov. 7, 1861 (Jacob Wells) — Gun-boat " Mohawk," the Guard-ship at Port Royal — Attack of the
Union Fleet at Hilton Head — Ten-inch Shell-gun which threw the Opening Shot from the Flag-ship
"Wabash" — Bay Point and Fort Beauregard after Capture, and Rifle-gun at Fort Beauregard, Ave
pictures from war-time sketches (Xanthus Smith ) — Battle of the Union Fleet with Forts Beauregard
and Walker, and Hoisting the Stars and Stripes over Fort Walker, from war-time sketches (Frank H.
Schell) — Brigadier-General Thomas F. Drayton, C. S. A., from Brady photo.— Captain Percival Drayton,
U. S. N., from Brady photo. — Old Headquarters, Hilton Head, and Pope's House, Hilton Head, used by
the Union Army as Signal Station, from war-time sketches (Xanthus Sm ith) — Union Signal Station,
Beaufort, S. C, House of J. G. Barnwell and Fuller's House, Beaufort, S. C, from Gardner photo's
(T. F. Moessner),
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT PORT ROYAL. Composition and Losses 691
kk MONITOR" AND "MERRIMAC/"
THE FIRST FIGHT OF IRON-CLADS COLONEL JOHN TA YLOR WOOD 692
Illustrations: Head-piece (W. H. Drake)— Burning of Frigate "Merrimac" and of GosportNavy
Yard, and Remodeling " Merrimac " at Gosport Navy Yard (J. O. Davidson) — Fac-simile of sketch of
"Merrimac" made the day lief ore the fight by Lieutenant B. L. Blackford — Lieutenant Catesby ap R.
Jones, from photo, by Courret Hermans, Lima, Peru — Admiral Franklin Buchanan, C. S. N., and
Commodore Josiah Tattnall, C. S. N., from photo, by D. J. Ryan— Colonel John Taylor Wood, from oil-
portrait by Gait —Map of Hampton Roads and Adjacent Shores (Jacob Wells)— The "Merrimac " ramming
the "Cumberland" (J. <>. Davidson) — Lieutenant George U. Morris, from photo. —The "Merrimac"
driving the "Congress" from her anchorage (J. O Davidson)— Escape of part of the Crew of the "Con-
gress" (J. O. Davidson) — Explosion on the burning "Congress" (J. 0. Davidson) — Lieutenant Joseph
B. Smith, from photo, by Black and Batchelder— Encounter between the "Monitor" and the "Merri-
mac" at short range (J. <>. Davidson)— Captain G. J. Van Brunt, from photo. — The "Monitor" in
Battle-trim, from tracing lent by Commander S. D. Greene.
WATCHING THE "MERRIMAC" GENERAL R. E. COLSTON 712
Illustr YTIOK : The "Merrimac" passing the Confederate Battery on Craney Island (J. <>. Davidson).
HOW THE GUN-BOAT "ZOUAVE" AIDED THE »
1(^^dccc« ACTING MASTER HENRY REANEY. . .714
CONGRESS I
THE PLAN AND CONSTRUCTS OK THE \ COMMANDER JOHN M. BROOKE 715
" MERRIMAC " \ CONSTRUCTOR JOHN L. PORTER. . . 71 6
Illustration: Cross-section of the •• Merrimac," From a drawing by John L. Porter.
NOTES ON THE "MONITOR "-"MERRIMAC" FIGHT. .SURGEON DINWIDDIE B. PHILLIPS. ..718
IN THE "MONITOR " TURRET COMMANDER S. DANA GREENE 719
Illustrations: Arrival of the "Monitor" at Hampton Roads (J. O. Davidson) — Rear- Admiral
John L. Worden, from photo. —Side Elevation and Deck-plan of the "Monitor," lent by Captain John
Ericsson — Bird's-eye view of " Monitor "-" Merrimac " Fight (J. o. Davidson) —Fart of the Crew of the
" Monitor," from Gardner photo.— Commander Samuel Dana Greene, from photo, by Halleck.
THh BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR" CAPTAIN JOHN ERICSSON 730
Illustrations: Captain John Ericsson, from Brady photo.— Longitudinal Plan through Center Line
of Original Monitor: 1, aft section; 2, central section; 3, forward section — Plan of Berth-deck of
Original Monitor — auu .transverse Section of Hull of Original Monitor, from drawings lent by Captain
Ericsson — View showing Effect of Shot on the "Monitor" Turret, from Gardner photo.— Side Eleva-
tion of Floating Revolving Circular Tower, published by Abraham Bloodgood in 1807 — Floating
Circular Citadel submitted to French Directory in 1798, from "Engineering" (W. Tdber) — Side Eleva-
tion and Transverse Section of Iron-clad Steam Battery proposed by Captain Ericsson to Napoleon
III. in 1854, lent by Captain Ericsson — Engineer Isaac Newton, from medallion portrait by Launt
Thompson— Transverse section of the "Monitor" through the center of the turret, lent by Captain
Ericsson — Sinking of the "Monitor." December 22, 1862 (J. O. Davidson).
THE LOSS OF THE " MONITOR " FRANCIS B. BUTTS 745
NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE BUILDING OF THE " MONITOR" 748
(Including Letters from C. S. Bushnell, Captain John Ericsson, and Secretary Gideon S. Welles.)
Illustration: Union Soldier's Candlestick (W. Taber).
xxii CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE.
MAPS.
PAGE
I S-UirvTxriTir* TiAofc r\nnTtr\\ar\ liv 1 Si tvnmiQ .Ton 1 Si ft 1 • limit nf +ov_
THE UNITED STATES
( Showing posts occupied by U. 8. troops Jan. 1, 1861; limit of ter-
( ritoi'i
i'y controlled by U. S. forces Jidy, 1S61 ; and blockade stations. . 8
PENSACOLA HARBOR, FLORIDA, MAY 27, 1861 28
CHARLESTON HARBOR AND VICINITY, SOUTH CAROLINA 44
EASTERN VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND 113
HARPER'S FERRY, VIRGINIA 115
CAMPAIGNS IN WEST VIRGINIA, 1801 129
COMBAT AT RICH MOUNTAIN, WEST VIRGINIA 131
GAULEY BRIDGE AND VICINITY, WEST VIRGINIA 142
AFFAIR AT CARNIFEX FERRY, WEST VIRGINIA 145
DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON, D. C, JULY, 1861 172
OUTLINE MAP OF THE FIRST BULL RUN BATTLE-FIELD 180
THE FIRST BULL RUN CAMPAIGN 1 99
TOPOGRAPHICAL MAP OF THE FIRST BULL RUN BATTLE-FIELD .* 204
PLAN OF THE FIRST BULL RUN BATTLE-FIELD 233
OPERATIONS IN MISSOURI, 1861 203
BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK, OR OAK HILLS, MISSOURI 290
SIEGE OF LEXINGTON, MISSOURI 309
BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE, OR ELKHORN TAVERN, ARKANSAS 322
BATTLE-FIELD NEAR BELMONT, MISSOURI 350
REGION OF FOOTE'S OPERATIONS 361
FORT HENRY, TENNESSEE 363
KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE 378
BATTLE OF LOGAN'S CROSS ROADS, OR MILL SPRINGS, KENTUCKY 38.8
BIG SANDY RIVER AND MIDDLE-CREEK BATTLE-FIELD, KENTUCKY 394
FORT DONELSON, TENNESSEE 402
REGION OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE WESTERN FLOTILLA 436
MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS ABOUT ISLAND NUMBER TEN, MISSISSIPPI RIVER, 437
CORRECTED LINE OF THE CHANNEL ABOVE ISLAND NUMBER TEN 401
OUTLINE MAP OF THE SHILOH CAMPAIGN, WEST TENNESSEE 400
THE FIELD OF SHILOH. From General Grant's "Personal Memoirs." „ 470
LOCATION OF THE UNION CAMPS AT SHILOH 490—497
THE FIELD OF SHILOH. Prom the Official Map, revised and amended by Gen. D. C. Buell, 502—503
OFFICIAL, OR THOM, MAP OF SHILOH 508
KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE 545
MAP USED BY THE CONFEDERATE GENERALS AT SHILOH 551
BATTLE OF SHILOH. PART I. From Col. W. P. Johnston's "Life of Gen. A. S. Johnston." 556
" << " " II. " " '•■ " 560
" " " <• |H. " " ''• " 566
ROUTES BY WHICH GENERAL GF r WAS REENFORCED AT PITTSBURG LANDING . . . 008
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS i NOR I I ! CAROLINA 034
OPERATIONS AT ROANOKE ISLAND, NORTH CAROLINA 041
BATTLE-FIELD OF ROANOKE 1SL AN ^ 043
BATTLE OF NEW BERNE, NORTH ( AROLINA 651
CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE. xxiii
PAGE
ENGAGEMENT AT SOUTH MILLS, NORTH CAROLINA 656
COAST OF NORTH AND SOUTH CAROLINA 673
NAVAL ATTACK AT HILTON HEAD, SOUTH CAROLINA 678
HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA, AND ADJACENT SHORES 699
ARTISTS
BRIDIVELL, H. L.
BURNS, M. J.
COCKS, J. H.
DAVIDSON, J. O.
DAVIS, THEO. R.
DAY, FRANK
DRAKE, WILL. H.
EATON, HUGH M.
EDWARDS, G. W.
EDWARDS, H. C.
FENN, HARRY
FENN, IV A L TER J.
FORBES, EDWIN
GIBSON, GEORGE
GO ATE R, WALTER H.
HOGAN, THOMAS
HOSIER, ABRAM
HUNT, WILLIAM M.
KEMBLE, E. W.
LATHROP, W. L.
MEEKER, EDWIN J.
MOESSNER, T. F.
OGDEN, HENRY A.
PENNELL, JOSEPH
PERKINS, GRANVILLE
REDWOOD, ALLEN C.
SCHELL, FRANK H.
SCHELL, FRED. B.
SH ELTON, W. H.
SHEPPARD, W. L.
SMITH, SIDNEY L.
SMITH, XANTHUS
STEPHENS, C. H.
TABER, WALTON
THULSTRUP, T. DE
VANDERHOOF, C. A.
VOLCK, A. J.
WALKE, HENR Y,
U. S. N
WAUD, ALFRED R.
WAUD, WILLIAM
WOODWARD, J. D.
ZOGBAUM, RUFUS F.
BROWN, G. H.
DRAUGHTSMEN.
KEMP, J S. SITTS, FRED. E.
WELLS, JACOB
ENGRAVERS
AITKEN, PETER
ANDREWS, JOHN
AT WOOD, K. C.
BABCOCK, H. E.
BARTLE, G. P.
BOGERT, J. A.
BUTLER, T. A.
CLEMENT, E.
CLEMENT, J.
COLE, TIMOTHY
COLLINS, R. C.
DANA, W. J.
DAVIDSON, H.
DAVIS, SAMUEL
ERTZ, EDWARD
EVANS, J. W.
FAY, GASTON
FILLEBROWN, .F. E.
GARDNER, E. D.
HAY MAN, ARTHUR
HEARD, T. H
HEINEMANN, E.
HELD, E. C.
HIRSCHMANN, W. A.
HO SKINS, ROBERT
IRWIN, ALLEN
JOHNSON, THOMAS
JUNGLING, J. F.
KARST, JOHN
KILBURN, S. S.
KINGSLEY, E LB RIDGE
KLASEN, W.
KRUELL, G.
LINDSAY, A.
LOCKHARDT, A..
MOLLIER, WILLIAM
MORSE, WILLIAM H.
MULLER, R. A.
NAY LOR, JESSIE
NEGRI, A.
NICHOLS, DAVID
OWENS, MARY L.
PECK WELL, H. W.
POWELL, C. A.
REED, C. H.
ROBERTS, W.
SCHUSSLER, T.
SCHWARTZBURGER, C.
SPIEGLE, CHARLES
STATE, CHARLES
SYLVESTER, H. E.
TICHENOR, E. R.
TIETZE, R. G.
TYNAN, JAMES
VELTEN, H.
WHITNEY, J. H. E.
WILLIAMS, G. P.
WINHAM, E. A.
WOLF, HENRY
WRIGHT, C.
4*
W--y^ ••
• ■
: ■ ■ '
PRELIMINARY EVENTS.
FROM THE CHARLESTON CONVENTION TO THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
APRIL 23. The National Convention of the
Democratic Party assembled at Charleston,
■ S. C. Dissensions arising in regard to the
question of congressional protection of slavery
in the territories, the Southern delegates with-
drew, organized another convention in Charles-
ton, and adjourned May 4th. to meet in Rich-
mond, Va., June 11th.
May 3. The Douglas, or Northern, wing of the
Convention adjourned, to reassemble at Balti-
more, Md., June 18th.
May 9. The Convention of the Constitutional
Union Party (formerly the American, or "Know-
Nothing," Party), held at Baltimore, Md., nomi-
nated John Bell, of Tennessee, for President,
and Edward Everett, of Massachusetts, for Vice-
President, and adopted a platform evading the
slavery issue.
May 18. The National Convention of the Repub-
lican Party, held at Chicago, nominated Abraham
Lincoln, of Illinois, for President, and Hannibal
Hamlin, of Maine, for Vice-President, and pro-
nounced in favor of congressional prohibition of
slavery in the territories.
June 23. The Northern " Democratic National
Convention," at Baltimore, nominated Stephen
A. Douglas, of Illinois, for President, and Ben-
jamin Fitzpatrick, for Vice-President. (The
latter declined, and the National Committee
substituted Herschel V. Johnson, of Georgia.)
The convention declared in favor of leaving the
question of slavery in the territories to the
people of the territories, or to the Supreme
Court of the United States.
June 28. The Southern " Democratic National
Convention" (adjourned from Richmond) nomi-
nated, at Baltimore, Md., John C. Breckinridge,
of Kentucky, for President, and Joseph Lane,
of Oregon, for Vice-President. The conven-
tion declared that neither Congress nor a ter-
ritorial legislature had the right to prohibit
slavery in a territory, and that it was the duty
of the Federal Government, in all its depart-
1860.
ments, to protect slavery in the territories when
necessary.
November 6. Presidential election, resulting as
follows :
States.
Lincoln 17
Breckinridge 11
Douglas 2
BeL 3
Electoral
Votes.
. . ' 180
72
Popular
Vote.
. 1,866,352
845,763
12 1,375,157
39 589,581
December 3. Meeting of Congress. Message from
President Buchanan arguing against the right of
secession, but expressing doubt as to the con-
stitutional power of- Congress to make war upon
a State.
December 6. Select Committee of Thirty-three
appointed by the House of Representatives to
take measures for the perpetuity of the Union.
(See " February 28.")'
December 10. Resignation of Howell Cobb, of
Georgia, Secretary of the Treasury.
December 12. Arrival of General Winfield Scott
in Washington, to advise with the President.
December 14. Resignation of Lewis Cass, of
Michigan, Secretary of State. «
December 20. Ordinance of secession adopted in
South Carolina by a convention called by the
Legislature of the State.
December 26. United States troops, under Major
Robert Anderson, transferred from Fort Moul-
trie to Fort Sumter, S. C.
December 27. Castle Pinckney and Fort Moul-
trie, Charleston Harbor, seized by the South
Carolina authorities.
December 27. Surrender
Revenue cutter William
ties of South Carolina.
December 27. Arrival in Washington of Messra
Barnwell, Orr, and Adams, Commissioners from
South Carolina, to treat with the administration.
December 29. Resignation of John B. Floyd, of
Virginia, Secretary of War.
December 30. United States Arsenal, at Charles-
ton, S. C, seized by the State authorities.
of the United States
Aiken to the authori-
PRELIMINARY EVENTS.
1861.
January 2. Fort Johnson, Charleston Harbor,
seized by State authorities.
January 3. Fort Pulaski, Ga., seized by State
authorities.
January 4. United States Arsenal, at Mt. Vernon,
Ala., seized by State authorities.
January 5. Forts Morgan and Gaines, Mobile Bay,
Ala., seized by State authorities.
January 5. Departure of first expedition for re-
lief of Fort Sumter, S. C, from N. Y. Harbor.
January 6. United States Arsenal, at Apalachi-
cola, Fla., seized by State authorities.
January 7. Fort Marion, St. Augustine, Fla.,
seized by State authorities.
January 8. Resignation of Jacob Thompson, of
Mississippi, Secretary of the Interior.
January 9. Ordinance of secession adopted in
Mississippi.
January 9. Fort Johnston, N. C, seized by citi-
zens of Smithville.
January 9. The Star of the West, conveying relief
to Fort Sumter, fired upon at the entrance to
Charleston Harbor and driven back.
January 10. Fort Caswell, N. C, seized by citi-
zens of Smithville and Wilmington.
January 10. Ordinance of secession adopted in
Florida.
January 10. United States troops, under Lieut.
Adam J. Slemmer, transferred from Barrancas
Barracks to Fort Pickens, Pensacola, Fla.
January 10. Reenforcements for the troops at
Pensacola sailed from Boston, Mass.
January 10. United States Arsenal and Barracks
at Baton Rouge, La., seized by State authorities.
January 11. Ordinance of secession adopted in
Alabama.
January 11. Surrender of Fort Sumter, S. C,
demanded by Governor Pickens, of South Caro-
lina, and refused by Major Anderson.
January 11. Forts Jackson and St. Philip, La.,
seized by State authorities.
January 11. United States Marine Hospital, near
New Orleans, La., seized by State authorities.
Januai-y 12. Barrancas Barracks, Forts Barran-
cas and McRee, and the Navy Yard at Pensa-
cola, Fla., seized by State authorities.
January 12. Surrender of Fort Pickens, Fla.,
demanded by the Governors of Florida and Ala-
bama and refused by Lieutenant Slemmer.
January 14. Fort Taylor, Key West, Fla., gar-
risoned by United States troops.
January 14. Fort Pike, La., seized by State
authorities.
January 15. United States Coast Survey steamer
Dana seized at St. Augustine, Fla.
January 15. Second demand for the surrender of
Fort Pickens, Fla.
January 18. Third demand for the surrender of
Fort Pickens, Fla.
January 19. Ordinance of secession adopted in
Georgia.
January 20. Fort on Ship Island, Miss., seized
by State authorities.
January 24. Reenforcements for Fort Pickens,
Fla., sailed from Fort Monroe, Va.
January 24. United States Arsenal, at Augusta,
Ga., seized by State authorities.
January 26. Oglethorpe Barracks and Fort Jack-
son, Ga., seized by State authorities.
January 26. Ordinance of secession adopted in
Louisiana.
January 28. Fort Macomb, La., seized by State
authorities.
January 28. United States property in hands of
army officers seized at New Orleans, La.
February 1. Ordinance of secession adopted in
Texas.
February 1. United States Mint and Custom
House, at New Orleans, La., seized by State
authorities.
February 4. Meeting at Washington of a Peace
Conference, representing 13 Free and 7 Border
States, called at the request of the Virginia
Legislature. (See " February 28.")
February 4. Convention of seceded States met
at Montgomery, Ala.
February 6. Tke^Brooklyn arrived off Pensacola
with reenforcements for Fort Pickens, Fla.
February 7. The Choctaw Nation of Indians de-
clared its adherence to the Southern States.
February 8. United States Arsenal, at Little
Rock, Ark., seized by State authorities.
February 8. A " Constitution for the Provisional
Government of the Confederate States of Amer-
ica" adopted at Montgomery, Ala., by deputies
from the States of Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina.
February 9. Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi,
elected President, and Alexander H. Stephens,
of Georgia, Vice-President, of " the Confederate
States of America," by the Montgomery Con-
vention, or Provisional Congress.
February 13. Abraham Lincoln and Hannibal
Hamlin officially declared elected President and
Vice-President of the United States.
February 15. Resolution passed by Confederate
Congress for appointment of Commissioners
to the Government of the United States.
February 16. United States Arsenal and Bar-
racks at San Antonio, Tex., seized by State
authorities.
February 18. All United States military posts in
Texas surrendered to the State authorities by
General David E. Twiggs, U. S. Army.
February 18. Jefferson Davis and Alexander H.
Stephens inaugurated at Montgomery, Ala
February 20. Act passed by Confederate Con-
gress to provide munitions of war.
February 21. Camp Cooper, Texas, abandoned
by United States troops. (During the next six
months other United States military posts in
Texas and New Mexico were abandoned. — See
map, page 8.)
February 23. Abraham Lincoln arrived in Wash-
ington.
February 26. Act passed by Confederate Con-
gress to organize a general staff for the army.
February 28. Adoption by the United States
House of Representatives of the amendment
offered by the Committee of Thirty-three, for-
PRELIMINARY EVENTS.
bidding any interference by Congress with
slavery in the States. (This amendment was
adopted by the Senate March 2, but was never
adopted by the necessary number of States.)
February 28. Act passed by Confederate Con-
gress to raise provisional forces.
March 1. The President of the Confederate States
assumed control of military affairs in the States
of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi, South Carolina, and Texas.
March 2. United States Revenue cutter Dodge
seized at Galveston, Tex., by State authorities.
March 2. Texas admitted as a member of the
Confederate States of America.
March 3. Brig. -General G. T. Beauregard, C. S.
Army, assumed command at Charleston, S. C.
March 4. Abraham Lincoln inaugurated as Presi-
dent of the United States.
March 6. Confederate Congress passed act for
the establishment of an army, not to exceed
100,000 men, for 12 months' service.
March 7. Ringgold Barracks, Tex., abandoned.
March 7. Camp Verde, Tex., abandoned.
March 11. Brig. -General Braxton Bragg assumed
command of the Confederate forces in Florida.
March 11. Adoption of the "Constitution of the
Confederate States of America," at Montgomery,
Ala., following in general the Constitution of
the United States, but prohibiting the passage
of any "law denying or impairing the right of
property in negro slaves"; prohibiting "the im-
portation of negroes of the African race from
any foreign country other than the slave-holding
States and territories of the United States of
America," and giving to the Confederate Con-
gress "power to prohibit the introduction of
slaves from any State not a member of, or terri-
tory not belonging to," the Confederacy. The
preamble included a declaration of the "sover-
eign and independent character" of each State.
March 15. Confederate Congress passed act au-
thorizing the construction or purchase of ten
gun-boats.
April 7. Reinforcements for Fort Pickens sailed
from New York.
April 10. Second expedition for the relief of Fort
Sumter sailed from New York.
April 11. Evacuation of Fort Sumter demanded
by General Beauregard.
April 12. Reenforcements from Fort Monroe,
Va., landed at Fort Pickens, Fla.
Apr'! 12. Bombardment of Fort Sumter com-
menced.
April 13. Fort Sumter surrendered.
April 14. Fort Sumter evacuated by its garrison
and occupied by Confederate troops.
April 15. President Lincoln issued a call for
75,000 militia for 3 months' service, and a
summons to Congress to assemble on July 4th.
April 15. Fort Macon, N. C, seized by State
authorities.
April 16. FortsCaswell and Johnston, N.C., seized
by State authorities.
April 17. Reenforcements from New York landed
at Fort Pickens, Fla.
April 17. Confederate President called for 32,000
troops, and offered letters of marque against
United States commerce.
April 17. Oi*dinance of secession adopted in Vir-
ginia by Convention, subject to popular vote.
April 1 8. United States Armory at Harper's Ferry
abandoned and burned.
April 19. President Lincoln announced the
blockade of Southern ports, from South Carolina
to Texas inclusive.
April 19. Conflict between U. S. troops and mob
in Baltimore, Md.
April 19. Major-General Robert Patterson, Penn-
sylvania Militia, assigned to command over the
States of Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Maryland,
and the District of Columbia.
April 20. Expedition from Fort Monroe to destroy
dry-dock at Norfolk, Va.
April 20. United States Arsenal at Liberty, Mo.,
seized by armed secessionists.
April 21 . United States Branch Mint at Charlotte,
N. C, seized by State authorities.
April 21. Colonel Earl Van Dorn, C. S. Army,
assumed command in Texas.
April 22. United States Arsenal at Fayetteville,
N. C, seized by State authorities.
April 23. Fort Smith, Ark., seized by State au-
thorities.
April 23. United States army officers at San An-
tonio, Tex., seized as prisoners of war.
April 23. Company of 8th U. S. Infantry (Lee's)
captured near San Antonio, Tex.
April 23. Captain Nathaniel Lyon, U. S. Army,
assumed temporary command of the Department
of the West.
April 23. Major-General Robert E. Lee assigned
to the command of the forces of Virginia.
April 26. Major-General Joseph E. Johnston, Vir-
ginia Volunteers, assigned to command of the
State forces in and about Richmond, Va.
April 27. Blockade of Virginia and North Caro-
lina ports announced.
April 27. Major-General Robert Patterson, Penn-
sylvania Militia, assigned to command of the
Department of Pennsylvania.
April 27. Brig.-General B. F. Butler, Massachu-
setts Militia, assigned to command of the
Department of Annapolis.
April 27. Colonel J. K. F. Mansfield, U. S. Army,
assigned to command of the Department of
Washington.
April 27. Colonel T. J. Jackson, Virginia Volun-
teers, assigned to command at Harper's Ferry.
May 1. Volunteer forces called for by the Gov-
ernor of Virginia.
May 3. Additional forces called for in Virginia.
May 3. President Lincoln issued call for volun-
teers to serve three years ; ordered the regular
army to be increased, and directed the enlist-
ment of additional seamen.
May 4. Colonel G. A. Porterfield, Virginia Vols.,
assigned to command in Northwestern Virginia.
May 6. Ordinance of secession adopted in Ar-
kansas.
May 6. Confederate Congress passed act ''rec-
ognizing the existence of war between the
United States and the Confederate States, and
PRELIMINARY EVENTS.
concerning letters of marque, prizes, and prize
goods."
May 7. Tennessee entered into military league
with the Confederate States.
May 7. Arlington Heights, Va., occupied by Vir-
ginia troops.
May 7. Virginia admitted as a member of the
Confederate States of America.
May 9. Exchange of shots between U.S. steamer
Yankee and the batteries at Gloucester Point, Va.
May 10. Major-General Robert E. Lee assigned
to command of Confederate forces in Virginia.
May 10. Camp Jackson, St. Louis, Mo., captured
by U. S. forces under Captain Nathaniel Lyon.
May 11. Riot in St. Louis, Mo.
May 11. Brig.-General W. S. Harney, U. S. Army,
resumed command of the Department of the West.
May 13. Brig.-General Ben. McCulloch,C. S. Army,
assigned to command in the Indian Territory.
May 13. Baltimore occupied by General Butler.
May 13. Major-General G. B. McClellan, U. S.
Army, assigned to command of the Department of
Ohio, including a portion of West Virginia.
May 15. Brig.-General J. E. Johnston, C. S. Army,
assigned to command near Harper's Ferry, Va.
May 15. Brevet Major-General George Cadwal-
ader, Pennsylvania Militia, superseded General
Butler in the Department of Annapolis.
May 17. Acts passed by Confederate Congress
providing, upon certain conditions, for the ad-
mission of North Carolina and Tennessee as
members of the Confederate States of America.
May 18. Naval attack on batteries at Sewell's
Point, Va.
May 20. Ordinance of secession adopted in North
Carolina.
May 21. Brig.-General M. L. Bonham, C. S.
Army, assigned to command on the "Alex-
andria Line," Va.
May 21. Colonel J. B.Magruder, Provisional Army
of Virginia, assigned to command at Yorktown.
May 21. Convention between General Harney,
U. S. Army, and General Sterling Price, Mis-
souri State Guard, with a view to the preserva-
tion of order in the State.
May 22. Brig.-General B. F. Butler assigned to
command at Fort Monroe, Va.
May 23. Demonstration against Hampton, Va.
May 23. Brig.-General Benj. Huger, Virginia Vol-
unteers, assigned to command at Norfolk, Va.
May 24. Resolutions of mediation and neutrality
adopted in Kentucky.
May 24. Union troops advanced into Virginia and
occupied Arlington Heights and Alexandria.
May 26-30. Union troops advanced from the
Ohio River and occupied Grafton, West Virginia.
May 27-29. Union troops advanced from Fort
Monroe and occupied Newport News, Va.
May 28. Brig.-General Irvin McDowell, IT. S.
Army, assumed command of the Department of
Northeastern Virginia.
May 31. Brig.-General Nathaniel Lyon super-
seded General W. S. Harney in command of the
Department of the West.
May 31. Naval attack on batteries at Aquia
Creek, Va.
June 1. Skirmishes at Arlington Mills and Fair-
fax Court House, Va.
June 2. Brig.-General Beauregard superseded Gen-
eral Bonham in command on the "Alexandria
Line."
June 3. Action at Philippi, W. Va.
June 5. Naval attack on batteries at Pig Point, Va.
June 6. Brig.-General Henry A. Wise, C. S. Army,
ordered to command in the Kanawha Valley,
W. Va.
June 6. Virginia State military and naval forces
transferred to the Confederate States.
June 7. Confederate reeonnoissance from York-
town to Newport News, Va.
June 8. Brig.-General R. S. Garnett, C. S. Army,
assigned to command in Northwestern Va.
June 10. Engagement at Big Bethel, or Bethel
Church, Va.
June 10. Brig.-General Beauregard in command
of all Confederate forces in Prince William, Fair-
fax, and Loudoun counties, Va.
June 11. Maj. -General Cadwalader superseded
by Maj. -General Banks in Department of An-
napolis.
June 13. Descent of Uniorutroops upon Romney,
W. Va.
June 15. Harper's Ferry, Va., evacuated by Con-
federate forces.
June 17. Engagement at Booneville, Mo.
June 17. Action at Camp Cole, Mo.
June 17. Action at Vienna, Va.
July 2. General Patterson's command crossed the
Potomac at Williamsport.
July 2. Advance of General George H. Thomas's
command , and engagement at Falling Waters, Va.
July 5. Engagement near Carthage, Mo.
July 8. Brig.-General Henry H. Sibley, C. S.
Army, ordered to Texas to expel Union forces
from New Mexico.
\
July 9. Skirmish at Vienna, Va.
July 10. Skirmish at Laurel Hill, W. Va.
July 11. Engagement at Rich Mountain, W. Va.
July 13. Major-General Leonidas Polk. C. S. Army,
assumed command of Department No. 2, with
headquarters at Memphis.
July 13. Action at Carrick's Ford, W. Va.
July 13. Surrender of Pegram's Confederate forces
in Western Virginia.
July 14. Brig.-General H. R. Jackson ordered to
command of Confederate forces in Western Va.
July 15. Military forces, stores, etc., of Arkansas
transferred to the Confederate States.
July 16. Union advance toward Manassas, Va.
July 17. Confederate army Retired to the lint of
Bull Run, Va.
July 17. Skirmish at Fairfax Court House, Va.
July 18. Skirmish at Mitchell's Ford, Va.
July 18. Action at Blackburn's Ford, Va.
July 18-21. Confederate forces' from the Shenan-
doah Valley, under General Joseph E. Johnston,
reenforced the army of General Beauregard at
Manassas, Va.
July 20. Brig.-General William W. Loring, C. S.
Army, assigned to command of "Northwestern
Army" (Western Virginia).
July 21. Battle of Bull Run, or Manassas, Va.
ORGANIZATION OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.
I. THE BUCHANAN ADMINISTRATION.
(1857-1861.)
President: James Buchanan (Pa.)
Vice-President : John C. Breckinridge* (Ky.)
Secretary of State.: Lewis Cass (Mich.); Jeremiah S.
Black (Pa.), appointed Dec. 17, i860.
Secretary of War: John B. Floyd* (Va.) ; Jo'seph
Holt (Ky.) fad interim}, Dec. 31, 1860; regularly ap-
pointed Jan. 18, 1861.
Secretary of the Navy: Isaac Toucey (Conn.)
Secretary of the Treasury: Howell Cobb* (Georgia) ;
Philip F. Thomas (Md.), appointed Dec. 12, 1860; John
A. Dix (N. Y.), appointed Jan. 11, 1861.
Attorney-General : Jeremiah S. Black; Edwin M.
Stanton (Pa.), appointed Dec. 20, 1860.
Secretary of the Interior: Jacob Thompson* (Miss.)
Postmaster- General : Aaron V. Brown (Tenn.), died
Mar. 8, 1859 ; Joseph Holt (Ky.), appointed Mar. 14, 1859 ;
Horatio King (Maine), appointed Feb. 12, 1861.
II. THE LINCOLN ADMINISTRATION.
(1861-1865.)
President : Abraham Lincoln (111.)
Vice-President : Hannibal Hamlin (Maine).
Secretary of State : William H. Seward (New York).
Secretary of War: Simon Cameron (Pa.); Edwin M.
Stanton (Pa.), appointed Jan. 15,1862.
Secretary of the Navy : Gideon Welles (Conn.)
Secretary of the Treasury: Salmon P. Chase (Ohio);
W. P. Fessenden (Maine), appointed July 1, 1864; Hugh
McCclloch (Ind.), appointed March 7, 1865.
Secretary of the Interior: Caleb B. Smith (Ind.);
John P. Usher (Ind.), appointed January 8, 1863.
Attorney- General: Edward Bates (Mo.) ; James Speed
(Ky.), appointed Dec. 2, 1864.
Postmaster-General : Montgomery Blair (Md.) ;
William Dennison (Ohio), appointed September 24,
1864.
THE UNITED STATES WAR DEPARTMENT.
Secretary of War : Joseph Holt (appointed Jan. 18,
1861) ; Simon Cameron (appointed March 5, 1861) ; Edwin
M. Stanton (appointed January 15, 1862).
Assistant Secretaries of War: Thomas A. Scott (ap-
pointed Aug. 3, 1861; Peter II. Watson (appointed Jan.
24, 1862) ; John Tdcker (appointed Jan. 29, 1862) ; Chris-
topher P. Wolcott (appointed .Tune 12. 1862; resigned
Jan. 23, 1863); Charles A. Dana (appointed August,
1863). (Colonel Scott wns regularly commissioned
under the act of August 3, 1861, authorizing the ap-
pointment of one assistant secretary of war. Sub-
sequently three assistant secretaries were authorized
by law.)
Adjutant- General's Department: Colonel Samuel
Cooper* (resigned March 7, 1861); Brig.-Gen. Lorenzo
Thomas (assigned to other duty March 23, 1863) ; Colonel
Edward D. Townsend.
Quartermaster's Department : Brig.-Gen. Joseph F.
Johnston* (resigned April 22, 1861); Brig.-Gen. Mont-
gomery C. Meigs.
Subsistence Department: Colonel George Gibson
(died Sept. 29, 1861) ; Brig.-Gen. Joseph P. Taylor (died
Jan. 29, 1864) ; Brig.-Gen. Amos B. Eaton.
Medical Department: Colonel Thomas Lawson (died
May 15, 1861) ; Colonel Clement A. Finley (retired April
14. 1862) ; Brig.-Gen. William A. Hammond; Brig.-Gen.
Joseph K. Barnes (appointed Aug. 22, 1864).
Pay Department : Colonel Benjamin F. Larned (died
Sept. 6, 1862); Colonel Timothy" P. Andrews (retired
Nov. 29, 1864); Brig.-Gen. Benjamin W. Brice.
Corps of Topographical Engineers: Colonel John J.
Abert (retired Sept. 9, 1861); Colonel Stephen H. Long.
(This corps was consolidated with the "Corps of En-
gineers," under act of March 3. 1863.)
Coips of Engineers: Brig.-Gen. Joseph G. Totten
(died April 22, 1864) ; Brig.-Gen. Richard Delafield.
Ordnance Department: Colonel Henry" K. Craig
(until April 23, 1861) ; Brig.-Gen. James W. Ripley (re-
tired Sept. 15, 1863); Brig.-Gen. George D. Ramsay
(retired Sept. 12, 1864); Brig.-Gen. Alexander B. Dyer.
Bun mi of Military Justice: Major John F. Lee (re-
signed Sept. 4, 1862); Brig.-Gen. Joseph Holt.
Bureau of the Provost Marshal General (created by
act of March 3, 1863) : Brig.-Gen. James B. Fry.
General Officers of the United States Army, January 1,
1861 : Brevet Lieut. -Gen. Winfield Scott (General-in-
chief) ; Brig.-Generals : John E. Wool, David E.
Twiggs,* William S. Harney. (Note.— E. V. Sumner
was promoted Brigadier-General March 16, 1861, rice
David E. Twiggs, dismissed March 1, 1861.)
THE UNITED STATES NAVY DEPARTMENT.
Secretary of the Nary : Gideon Welles.
Assistant Secretary: Gustavus V. Fox.
Yards and Docks : Rear- Admiral Joseph Smith.
Ordnance and Hydrography : Captain George A. Ma-
grcder (dismissed April 22, 1861) ; Captain Andrew A.
Harwood (relieved July 22, 1862) ; Rear- Admiral J< >hn A.
Dahlgren (relieved June 24, 1863) ; Commander Henry
A. Wise. (By act of Congress of July 5, 1862, " Hydrog-
raphy " was transferred to the Bureau of Navigation.)
Navigation (established by act of July 5, 1862) : Rear-
Admiral Charles A. Davis.
Equipment and Recruiting (established by act of July
5, 1862) : Bear-Admiral Andrew H. Foote (relieved
June 3, 1863) ; Commander Albert N. Smith.
Construction, Equipment, and Repair : Chief Naval
Constructor John Lentiiall. (By act of July 5, 1862,
the "Equipment and Recruiting" Bureau was organ-
ized, and thereafter the old bureau was designated as
" Construction and Repair.")
Provisions and Clothing: Pay-Director Horatio
Bridge.
Medicine and Surgery: Surgeon William Whelan.
Steam-Engineering (established by act of July 5. 1862) :
Engineer-in-Chief Benjamin F. Isherwood.
* Afterward in the Confederate service.
6
ORGANIZATION OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.
THE CONFEDERATE STATES GOVERNMENT.
President: Jefferson Davis (Miss.) Vice-President: Alexander H. Stephens (Ga.)
II. REORGANIZATION.
I. PROVISIONAL ORGANIZATION.
(Feb. 8, 1861.)
Secretary of State: Robert Toombs (Ga.), Feb. 21,
1861 ; R. M. T. Hunter, (Va.) July 24, 1861.
Secretary of War: Leroy P. Walker (Ala.), Feb. 21,
1861; Judah P. Benjamin (La.), Sept. 17, 1861.
Secretary of the Navy: Stephen R. Mallory (Fla.),
Feb. 25, 1861.
Secretary of the Treasury : Charles G. Memminger
(S. C), Feb. 21, 1861.
Attorney-General : Judah P. Benjamin, Feb. 25, 1861 ;
Thomas Bragg, (Ala.), Sept. 17, 1861.
Postmaster-General: J. H. Reagan (Texas), March 6,
1861.
(Feb. 22, 1862, to April, 1865.)
Secretary of State : R. M. T. Hunter, July 24, 1861 ;
Judah P. Benjamin, March 17, 1862.
Secretary of War: Judah P. Benjamin, Sept. 17, 1861;
George W. Randolph, March 17, 1862; Gustavus W.
Smith, acting, Nov. 17, 1862; James A. Seddon, Nov.
20, 1862; JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, Jan. 28, 1865.
Secretary of the Navy : Stephen R. Mallory.
Secretary of the Treasury : C. G. Memminger ; George
A. Trenholm, June, 1864.
Attorney-General : Thomas Bragg; Thomas H. Watts
(Ala), March 17, 1862 ; George Davis (N. C), 1864-5.
Postmaster-General : John H. Reagan.
THE CONFEDERATE STATES WAR DEPARTMENT.
Secretary of War: (see above).
Assistant Secretary of War: Albert T. Bledsoe
(April l, 1862) ; John A. Campbell (October 20, 1862).
Adjt. and Insp. -Gen's Dep't: General Samtjel Cooper.
Quarter 'master-General's Dep't: Colonel Abram C.
Myeks (March 15, 1861); Brig.-Gen. A. R. Lawton (Aug.
10, 1863).
Commissary-General's Dep't: Colonel Lucius B Nor-
throp (March 16, 186D ; Brig.-Gen. I. M. St. John (Feb-
ruary 16, 1865).
Ordnance Dep't: Brig.-Gen. Josiah Gorgas.
Engineer Bureau : Maj.-Gen. Jeremy F. Gilmer.
Medical Dep't: Brig.-Gen. Samuel P. Moore.
Nitre and Mining Bureau : Brig.-Gen. I. M. St. John;
Colonel Richard Morton (Feb. 16, 1865).
Conscription Bur earn : Brig.-Gen. John S. Preston,
Chief; Col. T. P. August, Siipt.
Prison Camps: Brig.-Gen. John H. Winder.
Exchange of Prisoners : Col. Robert Ould, Chief.
Commissioner of Patents : Rufus R. Rhodes.
THE CONFEDERATE STATES NAVY DEPARTMENT.
Assis't Surgeon John De
Secretary of the Navy : Stephen R. Mallory.
Orders and Detail: Captain French Forrest; Com-
mander John K. Mitchell.
Ordnance and Hydrography : Commander George
Minor; Commander John M. Brooke:.
Provisions and Clothing.
Bree.
Medicine and Surgery: Surgeon W.
WOOD.
A. W. Spots-
GOVERNORS OF THE STATES DURING THE WAR.
UNION STATES: California, John G. Downey
(1860-1), Leland Stanford (1861-3), Frederick F. Low
(1863-8); Co7inecticut, William A. Buckingham (1858-66) ;
Delaware, William Burton (1859-63), William Cannon
(1863-7) ; Illinois, Richard Yates (1861-5) ; Indiana,
Oliver P. Morton (1861-7) ; Iowa, Samuel J. Kirk wood
(1860-4), William M. Stone (1864-8); Kansas, Charles
Robinson (1861-3), Thomas Carney (1863-5); Maine, Is-
rael Washburn, Jr. (1861-3), Abner Coburn (1863-4),
Samuel Cony (1864-7) ; Massachusetts, John A. Andrew
(1861-6) ; Michigan, Austin Blair (1861-4), Henry H.
Crapo (1865-9) ; Minnesota, Alexander Ramsey (1859-63).
Stephen Miller (1863-6) ; Nevada (State admitted 1864),
Henry G. Blasdell (1864-71); New Hampshire, Icha-
bod Goodwin (1859-61), Nathaniel S. Berry' (1861-3),
Joseph A. Gilmore (1863-5) ; New Jersey, Charles 8.
Olden (1860-3), Joel Parker (1863-6) ; New York, Edwin
D.Morgan (1859-63), Horatio Seymour (1863-5), Reu-
ben E. Fenton (1865-9); Ohio, William Dennison
(1860-2), David Tod (1862-4), John Brough (1864-5);
Oregon, John Whittaker (1859-62), Addison C Gibbs
(1862-6); Pennsylvania, Andrew G. Curtin (1861-7);
Rhode Island, William Sprague (1860-1), John R. Bart-
lett, acting (1861-2), William C. Cozzens, acting (1863).
James Y. Smith (1863-5); Vermont, Erastus Fairbanks
(1860-1), Frederic Holbrook (1861-3), J. Gregory
Smith (1863-5) ; West Virginia (admitted 1863), Provi-
sional Governor, Francis H. Peirpoint (1861-3), Ar-
thur I. Boreman (1863-9) ; Wisconsin, Alexander W.
Randall (1857-61), Louis P. Harvey (1861-2), Edward
Salomon (1862-3), James T. Lewis (1863-6).
CONFEDERATE STATES: Alabama, Andrew B.
Moore (1857-61), John Gill Shorter (1861-3), Thomas
H. Watts (1863-5) ; Arkansas, Henry M. Rector (1860-3),
Harris Flanagin (1863-4), Isaac Murphy (1864-8);
Florida, Madison S. Perry (1857-61), John Milton
(1861-5); Georgia, Joseph E. Brown (1857-65) ; Louisiana,
Thomas O. Moore (1860-4), Henry w. Allen i 1864-5);
Union Military Governors, George F. Shepley (1862-4),
Michael Hahn (1864-5) ; Mississip2)i, John J. Pettus
(1860-2), Charles Clarke (1863), Jacob Thompson
(1863-4) ; North Carolina, John W. Ellis (1859-61), H. T.
Clark, acting (1861-2), ZebulonB. Vance (1862-5) ; South
Carolina, Francis W. Pickens (1860-2), M. L. Bonham
(1862-4), A. G. Magrath (1864-5) ; Tennessee, Isham G.
Harris (1857-65), Andrew Johnson, Uniou Military
Governor (1862-5); Texas, Samuel Houston (1859-61),
Edward Clark, acting (1861), Francis R. Lubbock
1861-3), Pendleton Miirrah (1863-5) ; Virginia, John
Letcher (1860-4), William Smith, (1864-5).
BORDER STATES : Kentucky, Beriah Magoffin
(1859-62), James F. Robinson (1862-3) ; Thomas E. Bram-
lette (1863-7) ; Maryland, Thomas H. Hicks (1857-61),
A. W. Bradford (1861-5) ; Missouri, C. F. Jackson (1861) ;
Union, H. E. Gamble (1861-4), T. C. Fletcher (1864-8).
N. B.— The Confederate Government of Kentucky was provisional in its character. George W. Johnson was
elected Governor by the Russellville Convention in November, 1861. He served until he was killed in action at
the battle of Shiloh. Richard Hawes was elected by the Provisional Council of Kentucky to succeed him, and
acted as the Confederate Provisional Governor of Kentucky from 1862 until the close of the war.— In Missouri
Thomas C. Reynolds was the Confederate Governor from 1862 to 1865 ; but after 1861 a Confederate Governor of
Missouri was little more than a name.— In Tennessee, Governor Harris being ineligible to a fourth term, Robert
L. Caruthers was elected Governor in August, 1863. Tennessee and ber capital being then occupied by the United
States forces, Mr. Caruthers was never inaugurated, and Governor Harris held over under the law.
WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR.
BY CHARLES P. STONE, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V.
ALL who knew Washington in the clays of December,
^*- 1860, know what thoughts reigned in the minds of
thinking men. Whatever then daily occupations, they
went about them with their thoughts always bent on
the possible disasters of the near future. The country
was in a curious and alarming condition : South Caro-
lina had already passed an ordinance of secession, and
other States were preparing to follow her lead. The
' '?';:. ^jw^l|p3Tv-' only regular troops near the capital of the country were
300 or 400 marines at the marine barracks, and 3 offi
cers and 53 men of ordnance at the Washington arsenal.
:\
ROTUNDA OF THE CAPITOL IN 18
The old militia system had been abandoned (without being legally abolished),
and Congress had passed no law establishing a new one. The only armed vol-
unteer organizations in the District of Columbia were : The Potomac Light
Infantry, 1 company, at Georgetown; the National Rifles, 1 company, in
Washington ; the Washington Light Infantry, of about 160 men, and another
small organization called the National Guard Battalion. It had been evident
for months that, on assembling in December, Congress would have far dif-
ferent work to consider than the organization of the District of Columbia
militia. Nor in the delicate position of affairs would it be the policy of Presi-
dent Buchanan, at the outset of the session, to propose the military organiza-
tion of the Federal District. It was also evident that, should he be so disposed,
the senators and representatives of the Southern States would oppose and
denounce the project.
What force, then, would the Government have at its disposal in the Federal
District for the simple maintenance of order in case of need ? Evidently but a
handful ; and as to calling thither promptly any regular troops, that was out
of the question, since they had already all been distributed by the Southern
sympathizers to the distant frontiers of the Indian country, — Texas, Utah,
New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington Territory, ft Months would have been
•& hi December, 18GO, the military forces of the
United States consisted of 1108 officers and 15,-
259 men of the regular army; total, 16,367.
The distribution of the army may be inferred
from the map printed on page S, and from the
.following "memorandum" (made on the 6th of
December, 1875), by Adjutant-General E. D.
Townsend, exhibiting " certain changes in the sta-
tions of troops made under the orders of the Sec-
retary of War, John B. Floyd, during the years
1858-60":
" After the removal of the troops to Kansas
and Utah at the close of Indian hostilities in
Florida, in June, 1858, there were left in the coun-
try east of the Mississippi River 16 companies of
artillery. From that time (June, 1858) till Decem-
ber 31, 1860, some changes of stations occurred,
by which the Department of the East gained 3 com-
panies (2 of artillery and 1 of engineers), so that
at the end of 1860 there were 18 companies of
artillery and 1 of engineers serving east of the
Mississippi River. There were no troops in the
neighborhood of Washington during the whole of
Secretary Floyd's term of office. In the spring and
summer of 1860 the force in Utah was reduced to
3 companies of dragoons, 3 companies of artillery,
and 4 companies of infantry. The remainder (13
companies of infantry and 2 of dragoons) were sent
to New Mexico, relieving 1 regiment of infantry al-
ready there, which thereupon proceeded to Texas.
No other changes of importance were made during
the period in question."— Editors.
WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR.
9
necessary to concentrate at Washington, in that season, a force of three
thousand regular troops. Even had President Buchanan been desirous of bring-
ing troops to the capital, the feverish condition of the public mind would, as
the executive believed, have been badly affected by any
movement of the kind, and the approaching crisis might
have been precipitated. I saw at once that the only force
which could be readily made of service was a volunteer
force raised from among the well-disposed men of the Dis-
trict, and that this must be organized, if at all, under the
old law of 1799. By consultation with gentlemen well
acquainted with the various classes of Washington society,
I endeavored to learn what proportion of the able-bodied
population could be counted on to sustain the Government
should it need support from the armed and organized
citizens.
On the 31st of December, 1860, Lieutenant-General
Scott, General-in-Chief of the army (who had his head-
quarters in New York), was in Washington. The Presi-
dent, at last thoroughly alarmed at the results of continued
concessions to secession, had summoned him for consulta-
tion. On the evening of that day I went to pay my respects
to my old commander, and was received by him at Worm-
ley's hotel. He chatted pleasantly with me for a few
minutes, recalling past service in the Mexican war, etc.;
and when the occasion presented itself, I remarked that
I was glad to see him in good spirits, for that proved to
me that he took a more cheerful view of the state of public
affairs than he had on his arrival — more cheerful than we
of Washington had dared to take during the past few days.
" Yes, my young friend," said the general, " I feel more
cheerful about the affairs of the country than I did this
morning ; for I believe that a safer policy than has hith-
erto been followed will now be adopted. The policy of
entire conciliation, which has so far been pursued, would
soon have led to ruin. We are now in such a state that a
policy of pure force would precipitate a crisis for which we
are not prepared. A mixed policy of force and concilia-
tion is now necessary, and I believe it will be adopted and
carried out." He then looked at his watch, rose, and said :
" I must be with the President in a quarter of an hour,"
and ordered his carriage. He walked up and down the
dining-room, but suddenly stopped and faced me, saying:
" How is the feeling in the District of Columbia I What
proportion of the population would sustain the Govern-
ment by force, if necessary ? "
" It is leral," I replied, " that two-thirds of
INIFORM OF THE NATIONAL
RIFLES. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)
UNIFORM OF THE POTOMAC
LIGHT INFANTRY.
(FROM A, PHOTOGRAPH.)
IO
WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR.
WINFIELD SCOTT, BREVET LIEUTENANT-GENERAL, TJ. S. A. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)
General Scott was General-in-Cbief of the army until November 1, 1861, when he was placed upon the
retired list on his own application, and was succeeded by Major-General George B. McClellan.
He died at West Point in May, 1866, in his eightieth year.
the fighting stock of this population would sustain the Government in defend-
ing itself, if called upon. But they are uncertain as to what can be done or
what the Government desires to have done, and they have no rallying-point."
The general walked the room again in silence. The carriage came to the
door, and I accompanied him toward it. As he was leaving, he turned sud-
denly, looked me in the face, placed his hand on my shoulder, and t
1
W ASHING TON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR.
1 1
f;.T.
"These people have no rallying -point, Make yourself that rallying -
point ! "
The next day I was commissioned by the President colonel in the staff and
Inspector-G-eneral of the District of Columbia. I was mustered into the service
of the United States from the 2d day of January, 1861, on the special requisi-
tion of the General-in-Chief, and thus was the first of two and a half millions
called into the mili-
tary service of the _____
Government to de-
fend it against seces-
sion.
I immediately en-
tered upon my duties,
commencing by in-
spections in detail of
the existing organi-
zations of volunteers.
The Potomac Light
Infantry company,
of Georgetown, I
found fairly drilled,
well armed, and,
from careful infor-
mation, it seemed to
me certain that the majority of its members could be depended upon in case
of need, but not all of them.
On the 2d of January, I met, at the entrance of the Metropolitan Hotel,
Captain Schaeffer, of the " National Rifles " of Washington, and I spoke to
him about his company, which was remarkable for drill. Schaeffer had been
a lieutenant in the Third United States Artillery, and was an excellent drill-
master.
He had evidently not yet heard of my appointment as Inspector-General,
and he replied to rny complimentary remarks on his company :
" Yes, it is a good company, and I suppose I shall soon have to lead it to
the banks of the Susquehanna ! "
" Why so f " I asked.
" Why ! To guard the frontier of Maryland and help to keep the Yankees
from coming down to coerce the South ! "
I said to him quietly that I thought it very imprudent in him, an employee
of the Department of the Interior and captain of a company of District of
Columbia volunteers, to use such expressions. He replied that most of his
men were Marylanders, and would have to defend Maryland. I told him that
he would soon learn that he had been imprudent, and advised him to think
more seriously of his position, but did not inform him of my appointment,
which he would be certain to learn the f olio wing morning from the newspapers.
It must be admitted that this was not a very cheerful beginning.
HEADQUARTERS OF GENERAL WINFIEM) SCOTT, WASHINGTON.
(FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.)
12
WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR.
cpf^
ifrw-am
Ml
i* -
1/ "^
It!
i »J*i
i:
"•
■^
THE WASHINGTON ARSENAL. (FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.)
On inspecting the " National Rifles," I found that Schaeffer had more than
100 men on his rolls, and was almost daily adding to the number, and that he
had a full supply of rifles with 200 rounds of ball cartridges, two mountain
howitzers with harness
and carriages, a supply
of sabers and of revolv-
ers and ammunition, all
drawn from the United
States arsenal. I went
to the Chief of Ordnance,
to learn how it was that
this company of riflemen
happened to be so un-
usually armed ; and I
found at the Ordnance
Office that an order had
been given by the late
Secretary of War (John
B. Floyd) directing the
Chief of Ordnance to cause to be issued to Captain Schaeffer "all the
ordnance and ordnance stores that he might require for his company ! "
I ascertained also that Floyd had nominated Captain Schaeffer to the
President for the commission of major in the District of Columbia militia,
and that the commission had already been sent to the President for his
signature.
I immediately presented the matter to the new Secretary of War (Joseph
Holt), and procured from him two orders, — one, an order to the Chief of
Ordnance to issue no arms to any militia or volunteers in the District of
Columbia unless the requisition should be countersigned by the Inspector-
General; the other, an order that all commissions issued to officers of the
District of Columbia should be sent to the Inspector-General for delivery.
An office was assigned me in the War Department, convenient to the army-
registers and near the Secretary of War, who kindly gave orders that I should
at all times be admitted to his cabinet without waiting, and room was made
for me in the office of Major-General Weightman, the senior major-general
of the District, where each day I passed several hours in order to confer
with him, and to be able promptly to obtain his authority for any necessary
order.
The Washington Light Infantry organization and the National Guard were
old volunteers composed of Washington people, and were almost to a man
faithful to the Government. Of their officers, Major-General Weightman,
though aged, and Major-General Force, aged and infirm, were active, and
true as steel ; Brigadier-Generals Bacon and Carrington were young, active,
and true. Brigadier-General Robert Ould, who took no part in the preparations
of the winter, joined the Confederates as soon as Virginia passed her ordinance
of secession, and his known sentiments precluded consultation with him.
WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR.
*3
Having thus studied the ground, and taken the first necessary steps toward
security, I commenced the work of providing a force of volunteers. I
addressed individual letters to some forty well-known and esteemed gentle-
men of the District, informing each one that it would be agreeable to the
Government should he in his neighborhood raise and organize a company of
volunteers for the preservation of order in the District. To some of these let-
ters I received no replies ; to some I received replies courteously declining
the service ; to some I received letters sarcastically declining ; but to many
I received replies enthusiastically accepting the service, In about six weeks
thirty-three companies of infantry and riflemen and two troops of cavalry
were on the lists of the District volunteer force ; and aU had been uniformed,
equipped, and put under frequent drill.
The Northern Liberties fire companies brought their quota ; the Lafayette
Hose Company was prompt to enroll; the masons, the carpenters,, the stone-
cutters, the painters, and the German turners responded: each corporation
formed its companies and drilled industriously. Petty rivalries disappeared,
and each company strove to excel the others in drill and discipline. While
the newly organized companies thus strove to perfect themselves, the older
organizations resumed their drills and filled their ranks with good recruits.
The National Rifles company (Captain Schaeffer's) was carefully observed,
and it was found that its ranks received constant accessions, including the
most openly declared secessionists and even members of Congress from the
Southern States. This company was very frequently drilled in its armory,
and its recruits were drilled nearly every night.
Having, as Inspector-General, a secret service force at my disposition, I
placed a detective in the company, and had regular reports of the proceed-
ings of its captain. He was evidently pushing for an independent command
of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, having his rifles, cannon, sabers, and revolv-
ers stored in his armory. He also began to prepare for action, ordering his
men to take their rifles and equipments home with them, with a supply
of ammunition, so that even should his armory be occupied, they could
assemble on short notice, ready for action. Meantime, his commission as
major was signed by the President and sent to me.
I reported these matters to General Scott, who ordered me to watch these
proceedings carefully, and to be ready to suppress any attempt at violence ;
but to avoid, if pos-
sible, any shock, for,
said he, "We are now
in such a state that a
dog-fight might cause
the gutters of the
capital to run with
blood."
While the volunteer
force for the support
of the Government
THE COLUMBIAN ARMORY, WASHINGTON. (FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH. )
M
WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR.
JOSEPH HOLT, SECRETARY OF WAR FROM DEC. 31,
1860, UNTIL MARCH i, 1861. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)
was organizing, another force with exactly the opposite purpose was in course
of formation. I learned that the great hall over Beach's livery stable was nightly
filled with men who were actively drilled. Doctor B , of well-known seces-
sion tendencies, was the moving spirit of these men, and he was assisted by
other citizens of high standing, among whom was a connection of Governor
Letcher of Virginia. The nnmbers of these occupants of Beach's hall increased
rapidly, and I found it well to have a
skillful New York detective officer, who
had been placed at my disposition, en-
rolled among them. These men called
lselves "National Volunteers," and
in their meetings openly discussed the
lire of the national capital at the
proper moment. They drilled industri-
ously, and had regular business meetings,
full reports of which were regularly laid
before me every following morning by
" the New York member." In the meet-
ing at which the uniform to be adopted
was discussed, the vote was for gray Ken-
tucky jeans, with the Maryland button.
A cautious member; suggested that they
must remember that, in order to procure
arms, it would be " necessary to get the requisition signed by ' Old Stone,'
and if he saw that they had adopted the Maryland button, and not that of
the United States, he might suspect them and refuse the issue of arms ! "
Doctor B supported the idea of the Maryland button, and said that, if
Stone refused the arms, the Governor of Virginia would see them furnished,
etc. These gentlemen probably little thought that a f idl report of their
remarks would be read the next morning by " Old Stone " to the General-
in-Chief.
The procuring of arms was a difficult matter for them, for it required the
election of officers, the regular enrolling of men, the certificate of elections,
and the muster-rolls, aU to be reported to the Inspector-General. The subject
was long discussed by them, and it was finally arranged that, out of the 360
men, a pretended company should be organized, officers elected, and the
demand for arms made. This project was carried out, and my member
brought to me early the next morning the report of the proceedings, inform-
ing me that Doctor B had been elected captain, and would call on the
Inspector-General for arms. Sure enough Doctor B presented himself in
my office and informed me that he had raised a company of volunteers, and
desired an order for arms. He produced a certificate of election in due form.
I received him courteously, and informed him that I could not give an order
for arms without having a muster-roll of his men, proving that a full one
hundred had signed the rolls. It was desirable to have the names of men
holding such sentiments and nursing such proje^J • were known to be theirs.
\
WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. i5
He returned, I think, on the following day, with a muster-roll in due form,
containing the names of one hundred men. This was all that I wanted,
looked him full in the face, smiled, and locked the muster-roll in a drawer of
my desk, saying :
" Doctor B , I am very happy to have obtained this list, and I wish yc
good-morning."
The gallant doctor evidently understood me. He smiled, bowed, and lef the
office, to which he never returned. He subsequently proved the sincerity
principles by abandoning his pleasant home in Washington, his large and ^
able property, and giving his earnest service to the Confederate car The
" National Volunteer " organization broke up without further trou
Next came the turn of Captain Schaeffer. He entered my offi< • 'ay
with the air of an injured man, holding in his hand a requisitio d
ammunition, and saying, that, on presenting it at the Orel 1
been informed that no arms could be issued to him v- . al. I
informed him that that w^as certainly cor] the l of the Sec-
retary of War was general. I told hath ..ay in his possession
more rifles than were re< i11 : .nat he could have no more.
He then said, sulki] ith his pany he could easily take the arms
he wanted. I • • hi • . :; and he replied :
" You i . tiers guarding the Columbian armory, where there
are plenty of am , and those four- men could not prevent my taking them."
"Ah!" I replied, "in what part of the armory are those arms kept?" He
said they were on the upper floor, which was true.
" Well," said I, " you seem to be well informed. If you think it best, just
try taking the arms by force. I assure you that if you do you shall be fired
on by 150 soldiers as you come out of the armory."
The fact was, that only two enlisted men of ordnance were on duty at the
Columbian armory, so feeble was the military force at the time. But Barry's
battery had just arrived at the Washington arsenal, and on my application
General Scott had ordered the company of sappers and miners at West Point
to come to Washington to guard the armory ; but they had not yet arrived.
The precautions taken in ordering them were thus clearly proved advisable.
The time had evidently come to disarm Captain Schaeffer ; and when he
reached his office after leaving mine, he found there an order directing him to
deposit in the Columbian armory, before sunset on that day, the two howitz-
ers with their carriages which he had in his possession, as well as the sabers
and revolvers, as these weapons formed no part of the proper armament of a
company of riflemen. He was taken by surprise, and had not time to call
together men enough to resist ; so that nothing was left to him but to comply
with the order. He obeyed it, well knowing that if he did not I was prepared
to take the guns from his armory by means of other troops.
Having obeyed, he presented himself again in my office, and before he had
time to speak I informed him that I had a commission of major for his name.
He was much pleased, and said : " Yes, I heard that I had been appointed."
I then handed him a slip of paper on which I had written out the form of
i6
WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR.
oath which the old law required to be taken by officers, that law never having
been repealed, and said to him :
" Here is the form of oath yon are to take. Yon wiU find a justice of the
peace on the next
floor. Please qualify,
sign the form in du-
plicate, and bring
both to me. One wiU
be filed with your let-
ter of acceptance, the
other will be filed in
the clerk's office of the
Circuit Court of the
District."
He took the paper
with a sober look, and
stood near my table
several minutes look-
ing at the form of
oath and turning the
paper over, while I,
apparently very busy
with my papers, was
observing him closely.
I then said :
"Ah, Schaeft'er, have
you already taken the
oath P
" No," said he.
"Well, please be
quick about it, as I
have no time to
spare."
He hesitated, and
said slowly :
" In ordinary times
I would not mind tak-
ing it, but in these
times "
"Ah ! " said I, " you
decline to accept your
commission of major.
Very well !" and I returned his commission to the drawer and locked it in.
" Oh, no," said Schaeffer, " I want the commission."
" But, sir, you cannot have it. Do you suppose that, in these times, which
are not, as you say, ' ordinary times,' I would think of delivering a commission
JAMES BUCHANAN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES FROM MARCH i, 1857,
UNTIL MARCH i, 1861. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR.
17
of field-officer to a man who hesitates about taking the oath of office f Do
you think that the Government of the United States is stupid enough to allow
a man to march armed men about the Federal District under its authority,
when that man hesitates to take the simple oath of office I No, sir, you can-
not have this commission ; and more than that, I now inform you |hat you
hold no office in the District of Colum-
bia volunteers."
" Yes, I do ; I am captain, and have
my commission as such, signed by the
President and delivered to me by the
major-general."
" I am aware that such a paper was
delivered to you, but you failed legally
to accept it."
" I wrote a letter of acceptance to
the adjutant-general, and forwarded
it through the major-general."
" Yes, I am aware that you did ; but
I know also that you failed to inclose
in that letter, according to law, the
form of oath required to accompany
all letters of acceptance; and on the
register of the War Department, while
the issuance of your commission is
recorded, the acceptance is not re-
corded. You have, never legally ac-
cepted your commission, and it is now
too late. The oath of a man who
hesitates to take it will not now be
accepted."
So Captain Schaeffer left the " Na-
tional Rifles," and with him left the
secession members of the company. I induced quite a number of true men to
join its ranks ; a new election was ordered, and a strong, loyal man (Lieu-
tenant Smead of the 2d Artillery) was elected its captain. Smead was
then on duty in the office of the Coast Survey, and I easily procured from
the War Department permission for him to accept the position.
If my information was correct, the plan had been formed for seizing the
public departments at the proper moment and obtaining possession of the seals
of the Government. Schaeffer's part, with the battalion he was to form, was
to take possession of the Treasury Department for the benefit of the new Pro-
visional Government. Whatever may have been the project, it was effectually
foiled. With the breaking up of the " National Volunteers " ; with the trans-
formation of the secession company of " National Rifles" into a thoroughly
faithful and admirably drilled company ready for the service of the Govern-
ment ; with the arrival from West Point of the company of sappers and
Vol. I.— 2
CHARLES I'
STONE, BRIG U>IER-GENERAL, TJ.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)
S. V.
1 8 WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR.
miners, and, later, the arrival of the Military Academy battery under Griffin ;
ind with the formation in the District of thirty new companies of infantry
1 riflemen from among the citizens of Washington and Georgetown, the
i : things in the capital had much changed before the 4th of March.
st now go back a little in time, to mention one fact which will show in
k and dangerous a condition our Government was in the latter part of
•b and the early part of February, 1861. The invitations which I had
issu f< >r the raising of companies of volunteers had, as already stated, been
enthusiastically responded to, and companies were rapidly organized. The
preparatory drills were carried on every night, and I soon found that the men
were sufficiently advanced to receive their arms. I began to approve the
requisitions for arms ; but, to my great astonishment, the captains who first
received the orders came back to me, stating that the Ordnance Department
had refused to issue any arms ! On referring to the Ordnance Office, I was
informed by the Chief of Ordnance that he had received, the day before, an
order not to issue any arms to the District of Columbia troops, and that this
order had come from the President !
I went immediately to the Secretary of War (Mr. Holt) and informed him
of the state of affairs, telling him at the same time that I did not feel disposed
to be employed in child's play, organizing troops which could not be armed,
and that unless the order in question should be immediately revoked there
was no use for me in my place, and that I must at once resign. Mr. Holt told
me that I was perfectly right ; that unless the order should be revoked there
was no use in my holding my place, and he added, with a smile, " and I will
also say, Colonel, there will be no use in my holding my place any longer. Go
to the President, Colonel, and talk to him as you have talked to me."
I went to the White House, and was received by Mr. Buchanan. I found
him sitting at his writing-table, in his dressing-gown, wearied and worried.
I opened at once the subject of arms, and stated the necessity of immediate
issue, as the refusal of arms would not only stop the instruction of the volun-
teers, which they needed sadly, but would make them lose all confidence in
the Government and break up the organizations. I closed by saying that,
while I begged his pardon for saying it, in case he declined to revoke his
order I must ask him to accept my resignation at once.
Mr. Buchanan was evidently in distress of mind, and said :
" Colonel, I gave that order acting on the advice of the District Attorney,
Mr. Robert Ould."
" Then, Mr. President," I replied, " the District Attorney has advised your
Excellency very badly."
" But, Colonel, the District Attorney is an old resident of Washington, and
he knows all the little jealousies which exist here. He tells me that you have
organized a company from the Northern Liberty Fire Company."
" Not only one, but two excellent companies in the Northern Liberty, your
Excellency."
"And then, the District Attorney tells me you have organized another com-
pany from among the members of the Lafayette Hose Company."
FROM AN AMBROTYPE TAKEN FOR MARCUS L. WARD (AFTERWARD GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY) IN
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., MAY 20, 18C0, TWO DAYS AFTER MR. LINCOLN'S FIRST NOMINATION.
19
20 WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR.
" Yes, your ncy, another excellent company."
"And the Di, ttorney tells me, Colonel, that there is a strong feeling
of enmity between those fire companies, and, if arms are put in their hands,
there will be dant. ' I loodshed in the city."
" Will your Ex< excuse me if I say that the District Attorney talks
nonsense, or wors ' If the Northern Liberties and the Lafayette Hose
men wish to *' not procure hundreds of arms in the shops along
the avenue? d, [r. President, that the people of this District are
thinking l i thi gs than old ward feuds. They are thinking
whether or >nt of the United States is to allow itself to
crumble oul . its own weakness. And I believe that the
District Att no is well as I do. If the companies of volunteers
are not arm : wii and the Government will have nothing to
protect it in even a < tisturbance. Is it not better for the public
peace, your . icy, even if the bloody feud exists (which I believe is for-
gotten in a g question), — is it not better to have these men organized
and under th line of the Government ? "
The Presid it - itated a moment, and then said:
" I don't kn I you are right, Colonel ; but you must take the responsi-
bility on you no bloodshed results from arming these men."
I willingly a bed this responsibility. The prohibitory order was revoked.
My companies ] d their arms, and made good use of them, learning the
manual of arms purprisingly short time. Later, they made good use of
them in susta he Government which had furnished them against
.the faction which s< on became its public enemy, including Mr. Robert
Ould, who, following his convictions (no doubt as honestly as I was
following mine) his earnest services to his State against the Federal
Government.
I think that t. ountry has never properly appreciated the services of
those District of Columbia volunteers. It certainly has not appreciated the
difficulties surmoun ■ < i in their organization. Those volunteers were citizens of
the Federal District, and therefore had not at the time, nor have they ever had
since, the powerful stimi lant of State feeling, nor the powerful support of a
State government , tai s's pride, a State press to set forth and make much
of their services. They did their duty quietly, and they did it well and faith-
fully. Although not mustered into the service and placed on pay until after the
fatal day when the flag was tired upon at Sumter, yet they rendered great ser-
vice before that time in giving confidence to the Union men, to members of
the national legislature, and also to the President in the knowledge that there
was at least a small force at its disposition ready to respond at any moment to
his call. It should also be remembered of them, that the first troops mustered
into the service were sixteen companies of these volunteers ; and that, during
the dark days when Washington was cut off from communication with the
North, when railway b1 ' lo,es were burned and tracks torn up, when the Poto-
mac was blockaded, i " were the only reliance of the Government
for guarding the pu 'or ^reserving order and for holding
WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR.
21
the bridges and other outposts ; that these were the troops which recovered
possession of the railway from Washington to Annapolis Junction and made
practicable the reopening of communications. They also formed the advance
guard of the force which first crossed the Potomac into Virginia and captured
the city of Alexandria.
Moreover, these were the troops which insured the regular inauguration on
the steps of the Capitol of the constitutionally elected President. I firmly
believe that without them Mr. Lincoln
would never have been inaugurated. I
believe that tumults would have been cre-
ated, during which he would have been
killed, and that we should have found our-
selves engaged in a struggle, without prep-
aration, and without a recognized head
at the capital. In this I may be mistaken,
of course, as any other man may be mis-
taken; but it was then my opinion, when
I had many sources of information at my
command, and it remains my opinion now,
when, after the lapse of many years and
a somewhat large experience, I look back
in cool blood upon those days of political
madness.
One day, after the official declaration of
the election of Mr. Lincoln, my duties
called me to the House of Representa-
tives ; and while standiug in the lobby waiting for the member with whom
I had business, I conversed with a distinguished officer from New York. We
were leaning against the sill of a window which overlooked the steps of the
Capitol, where the President-elect usually stands to take the oath of office.
The gentleman grew excited as we discussed the election of Mr. Lincoln, and
pointing to the portico he exclaimed :
" He will never be inaugurated on those steps ! "
"Mr. Lincoln," I replied, " has been constitutionally elected President of the
United States. You may be sure that, if he lives until the fourth day of
March, he will be inaugurated on those steps."
As I spoke, I noticed for the first time how perfectly the wings of the Capi-
tol flanked the steps in question; and on the morning of the -4th of March I
saw to it that each window of the two wings was occupied by two riflemen.
I received daily numerous communications from various parts of the coun-
try, informing me of plots to prevent the arrival of the President-elect at the
capital. These warnings came from St. Louis, from Chicago, from Cincin-
nati, from Pittsburgh, from New York, from Philadelphia, and especially from
Baltimore. Every morning I reported to General Scott on the occurrences of
the night and the information received by the morning's mail; and every
evening I rendered an account of the day's work and received instructions for
HANNIBAL HAMLIN, VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES FROM MARCH 4, 1861, TO
MARCH 4, 18(35. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH I
22
WASHINGTON ON '
EVE OF THE WAR.
the night. General Scott also received numerous warnings of danger to the
President-elect, which he would give me to study and compare. Many of the
communications were anonymous and vague. But, on the other hand, many
were from calm and wise men, one of whom became, shortly afterward, a cabi-
net minister;
one was a
railway presi-
dent, another
a distinguish-
ed ex-gover-
nor of a State,
etc. In every
case where
the indica-
tions were
distinct, they
were followed
up to learn if
real danger
existed.
So; many
clear indica-
tions pointed
to Baltimore,
that three good detectives of the New York police force were constantly em-
ployed there. These men reported frequently to me, and their statements
were constantly compared with the information received from independent
sources.
Doubtless, Mr. Lincoln, at his home in r Springfield, 111., received many and
contradictory reports from the capital, for he took his own way of obtaining
information. One night, between 11 'o'clock and midnight, while I was busy
in my study over the papers of the day and evening, a card was brought to
me, bearing the name " Mr. Leonard Swett," and upon it was written in the
well-known hand of General Scott, " Colonel Stone, Inspector-General, may
converse freely with Mr. Swett." Soon a tall gentleman of marked features
entered my room. At first I thought it was Mr. Lincoln himself, so much, at
first glance, did Mr. Swett's face resemble the portraits I had seen of Jfy. Lin-
coln, and so nearly did his height correspond with that attributea to the
President-elect. But I quickly found that the gentleman's card bore his true
name, and that Mr. Swett had come directly from Mr. Lincoln, having his full
confidence, to see for him the state of affairs in Washington, and report to
him in person.
Mr. Swett remained several days in the capital, had frequent and long con-
versations with General Scott and myself (and I suppose also with many
others), and with" me visited the armories of some of the volunteer companies.
As he drove with me to the railway station on his departure, Mr. Swett said :
SOUTH OK GARDEN SIDE OF THE WHITE HOUSE.— TREASURY BUILDING IN THE DISTANCE.
WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR.
23
" Mr. Lincoln, and in fact almost everybody, is ignorant of the vast amount
of careful work which has been done here this winter, by General Scott and
yourself, to insure the existence of the Government and to render certain and
safe the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln. He will be very grateful to both."
I replied, with more sincerity than tact :
"Mr. Lincoln has no cause to be grateful to me. I was opposed to his elec-
tion, and believed in advance that it would bring on what is evidently coming,
a fearful war. The work which I have done has not been done for him, and
he need feel under no obligations to me. I have done my best toward saving
the Government of the country and to insure the regular inauguration of the
constitutionally elected President on the 4th of next month."
As President Lincoln approached the capital, it became certain that desper-
ate attempts woidd be made to prevent his arriving there. To be thoroughly
informed as to what might be expected in Baltimore, I directed a detective to
be constantly near the chief of police and to keep up relations with him ;
while two others were instructed to watch, without the knowledge and
independent of the chief of police. The officer who was near the chief of
police reported regularly, until near the last, that there was no danger in Bal-
timore ; but the others discovered a band of desperate men plotting for the
destruction of Mr. Lincoln during his passage through the city, and by affilia-
ting wth them, these detectives obtained the details of the plot.
Mr. Lincoln passed through Baltimore in advance of the time announced
for the journey (in accordance with advice given by me to Mr. Seward and
THE WHITE HOUSE AT NIGHT.
24
WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR.
INAUGURATION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, MARCH 4, 1861. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)
•which was carried by Mr. Frederick W. Seward to Mr. Lincoln), and arrived
safe at Washington on the morning of the day he was to have passed through
Baltimore. Bnt the plotting to prevent his inauguration continued ; and there
was only too good reason to fear that an attempt would be made against his
life during the passage of the inaugural procession from Willard's hotel, where
Mr. Lincoln lodged, to the Capitol.
On the afternoon of the 3d of March, General Scott held a conference at
his headquarters, there being present his staff, General Sumner, and myself,
and then was arranged the programme of the procession. President
Buchanan was to drive to Willard's hotel, and call upon the President-elect.
The two were to ride in the same carriage, between double files of a squadron
of the District of Columbia cavalry. The company of sappers and miners
wrere to inarch in front of the presidential carriage, and the infantry and rifle-
men of the District of Columbia were to follow it. Riflemen in squads were
to be placed on the roofs of certain commanding houses which I had selected,
WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. 25
along Pennsylvania Avenue, with orders to watch the windows on the oppo-
site side and to fire upon them in case any attempt should be made to fire from
those windows on the presidential carriage. The small force of regular cav-
alry which had arrived was to guard the side-street crossings of Pennsylvania
Avenue, and to move from one to another during the passage of the proces-
sion. A battalion of District of Columbia troops were to be placed near the
steps of the Capitol, and riflemen in the windows of the wings of the Capitol.
On the arrival of the presidential party at the Capitol, the troops were to be
stationed so as to return in the same order after the ceremony.
To illustrate the state of uncertainty in which we were at that time con-
cerning men, I may here state that the lieutenant-colonel, military secretary
of the General-in-Chief, who that afternoon recorded the conclusions of the
General in conference, and who afterward wrote out for me the instructions
regarding the disposition of troops, resigned his commission that very night,
and departed for the South, where he joined the Confederate army.
During the night of the 3d of March, notice was brought me that an
attempt would be made to blow up the platform on which the President
would stand to take the oath of office. I immediately placed men tinder
the steps, and at daybreak a trusted battalion of District troops (if I remem-
ber rightly, it was the National Guard, under Colonel T.ait) formed in a semi-
circle at the foot of the great stairway, and prevented all entrance from
without. When the crowd began to assemble in front of the portico, a large
number of policemen in plain clothes were scattered through the mass to
observe closely, to place themselves near any person who might act suspi-
ciously, and. to strike down any hand which might raise a weapon.
At the appointed hour, Mr. Buchanan was escorted to Willard's hotel,
which he entered. There I found a number of mounted "marshals of the
day," and posted them around the carriage, within the cavalry guard. The
two Presidents were saluted by the troops as they came out of the hotel and
took their places in the carriage. The procession started. During the march
to the Capitol I rode near the carriage, and by an apparently clumsy use of
my spurs managed to keep the horses of the cavalry in an uneasy state, so
that it would have been very difficult for even a good marksman to get an aim
at one of the inmates of the carriage between the prancing horses.
After the inaugural ceremony, the President and the ex-President were
escorted in the same order to the White House. Arrived there, Mr. Buchanan
walked to the door with Mr. Lincoln, and there bade him welcome to the
House and good-morning. The infantry escort formed in line from the gate
of the White House to the house of Mr. Ould, whither Mr. Buchanan drove,
and the cavalry escorted his carriage. The infantry line presented arms to
the ex-President as he passed, and the cavalry escort saluted as he left the
carriage and entered the house. Mr. Buchanan turned on the steps, and grace-
fully acknowledged the salute. The District of Columbia volunteers had given
to President Lincoln his first military salute and to Mr. Buchanan his last.
LIGHT-HOUSE.
FORT BARRANCAS.
NAVY YARD.
PENSACOLA.
FORT M^REE.
THE POWHATAN." FORT PICKENS, SANTA ROSA ISLAND.
PENSACOLA HARBOR FROM THE BAR. (FROM A SKETCH MADE IN MAY, 1862.)
WITH SLEMMER IN PENSACOLA HARBOR.
BY J. H. GILMAN, BREVET LIEUTENANT-COLONEL, U. 8. A. j
NTERINGr Pensaeola Harbor from the Gulf of Mexico, one sees
as he crosses the bar, immediately to his left, Fort McRee on
the mainland, or west shore of the bay, and to his right Fort
Pickens on the western extremity of Santa Eosa Island, which
is about forty miles in length, nearly parallel to the shore
of the mainland, and separated from it by Pensaeola Bay.
On the mainland, directly opposite Fort Pickens, about a
mile and a half from it and two miles north-east of Fort
McRee, stands Fort Barrancas, and, now forming a part of it,
the little old Spanish fort, San Carlos de Barrancas. About
a mile and a half east of this is the village of Warrington,
adjoining the Navy Yard, and seven miles farther up the
bay is the town of Pensaeola. Near Fort Barrancas, and
between it and the Navy Yard, is the post of Barrancas
Barracks, and there, in January, 1861, was stationed Company G, 1st
United States Artillery, the sole force of the United States army in the har-
bor to guard and hold, as best it might, the property of the United States.
The captain of this company, John H. Winder (afterward brigadier-general
in the Confederate army, and widely known in connection with the military
prisons in the South), and the senior first lieutenant, A. R. Eddy, were absent
4- Lieut. Slemmer's report says of Lieut. Giltuan : " During the whole affair we have stood side by side,
and if any credit is due for the course pursued, he is entitled [to it] equally with myself."— Editors.
26
WILLIAM CONWAY, THE MAN WHO
REFUSED TO HAUL DOWN THE
UNION FLAG AT THE PENSACOLA
NAVY YARD. (FROM A
FROM LIFE BY WILLIAM WAUD.t
WITH SLEMMER IN PENSACOLA HARBOR. 27
on leave, and the only officers with it were First Lieutenant Adam J. Slemmer
and the writer of this sketch, — then the second lieutenant of the company,
who, by virtue of that high rank, was also the post treasurer, post quarter-
master, post commissary, and post adjutant.
With the new year, 1861, came to us at that quiet little post the startling
news of the seizure of United States property at various points by State troops,
and by January 7th rumors, to us still more startling, reached our ears, to the
effect that the Navy Yard and forts in Pensacola Harbor were to be seized by
troops already preparing, in Florida and Alabama, to march against us. As
yet no orders had come to Lieutenant Slemmer for his guidance in this emer-
gency, and, as may be imagined, we had frequent conversations as to what
should or could properly be done. As it would be useless to attempt to hold
Barrancas, the occupation of Fort Pickens was suggested and considered; but
Lieutenant Slemmer, thinking that he would not be justified in changing his
station without authority, decided to remain where he was.
On January 8th the first step indicating to outsiders an intention on our
part to resist was taken, by the removal of the powder from the Spanish
fort to Fort Barrancas, where on the same night a guard was placed with
loaded muskets. It was none too soon, for about midnight a party of twenty
men came to the fort, evidently with the intention of taking possession,
expecting to find it unoccupied as usual. Being challenged and not answer-
ing nor halting when ordered, the party was fired upon by the guard and ran
in the direction of Warrington, their footsteps resounding on the plank walk
as the long roll ceased and our company started for the fort at double-quick.
This, I believe, was the first gun in the war fired on our side.
Next day, January 9th, an order came from General Scott to Lieutenant
Slemmer to do all in his power to prevent the seizure of the public property
and to cooperate with Commodore James Armstrong at the yard. The latter
received orders on the same day to cooperate with the army; but he was already
so greatly under the influence of Captain Ebenezer Farrand and other seces-
sionist officers of his command that he dared not take any very active part in
aiding us, not even so far as to let us have the marines, as he had promised.
The excitement at the yard and in the village of Warrington was intense and
was increasing daily, and the commodore was nearly distracted. He was
desirous of doing his duty, and apparently saw it clearly while we were with
him ; but as soon as we left, became demoralized, and was thwarted in his
plans by his own officers and others about him, who advised and warned him
not to inaugurate civil war and bloodshed by aiding us in what they called
the mad scheme of resisting the State authorities.
Fearing that, as soon as the determination to occupy Pickens became
known, attempts would be made to prevent it, Lieutenant Slemmer decided
to move at once, and the commodore promised to have the Wyandotte at
Barrancas to take us across at 1 p. m. that day. She did not come, however,
and we had to visit the commodore twice more that day to counteract the
influence of those about him. The steamer was again promised at 5 p. m.,
but did not arrive until next morning. In a large flat-boat or scow, and
28
WITH SLEMMER IN PENSACOLA HARBOR.
several small boats loaded with our men, provisions, brass field-pieces, ammu-
nition, tools, and whatever public property was most needed and could
be carried, including, I remember, an old mule and cart (which afterward
proved of great service to us), we were towed over to Pickens and landed there
about 10 a. m. January 10th, 1861, the day that Florida seceded from the Union.
Lieutenant Slemmer's family and mine were sent on board the storeship
Supply, on which, a few days later, they sailed for New York. All our men
U.S. NAVY YARD
GULF OF MEXICO
SCALE OF MILES
This map shows the Union and Confederate batteries as they existed May 27, 1861. The shore batteries were
constructed by the Confederates after Slemmer's crossing to Fort Pickens. Two other Union batteries
near Fort Pickens— batteries Scott and Totten — were added after the date of this map.
were compelled to leave behind more or less personal property, those who
were married leaving their houses and families as they were. Under such cir-
cumstances, when so many inducements were held out for men to desert, and
when so many men in higher places failed, it speaks well for their character,
loyalty, and discipline that none of our men deserted. No company of men
could work better or with more enthusiasm, and they were not at all disposed
to give information to those outside. The day before we left, a civilian, visit-
ing the post to see what news he could gather, asked one of them : " What is
all this stir about 1 You men are not going to fight, are you 1 " " Faith, you
needn't ask me; I'm not the man that gives orders here!" "What are they
moving these gun-carriages out for?" "Well, sir, I hear they are to be
painted to-morrow." " How many men are there here now ? " ■ " Sure, I'm
not the baker, and don't know how many he bakes for."
Next to the commodore, the most thoroughly excited and demoralized man
I saw was our old Spanish friend, Francisco Gomez, who was well known in
all that region, and had long lived in a little cottage just in front of the bar-
racks. He was the friend of all army officers, but his hero was General Jack-
. on, and his great delight was to spin yarns to us about Jackson's capture of
i aisacola from the British. Gomez was a true " original Jackson man,"
WITH SLEMMER IN PENSACOLA HARBOR. 29
having as a youth seen him at Pensacola. The morning we left, I met him
walking to and fro in front of his cottage, and said: "Good-bye, Mr. Gomez;
you must take care of things here now ! " He replied, with upturned eyes,
" My God ! My God ! it is awful; nothing can be saved; we shall all be killed
— everything destroyed. I am afraid to say anything. How I wish General
Jackson was here." And the old man straightened himself up as if the mere
mention of the name gave him strength and courage.
On the 12th we saw the flag at the Navy Yard lowered, and then knew that
it had been quietly and tamely surrendered. Seeing our flag thus lowered to
an enemy caused intense excitement and emotion, a mingled feeling of shame,
anger, and defiance. Not yet having a flag-staff up, we hung our flag over
the north-west bastion of the fort, that all might see " that our flag was still
there." The Supply (Captain Henry Walke) immediately hoisted extra flags,
and soon after was towed out of the harbor by the Wyandotte (Captain O. H.
Berryman). With the capture of the Navy Yard everything on shore fell into
the enemy's hands, including the large fine dry dock — the workshops, material,
and supplies of all sorts. Fortunately, the Supply and Wyandotte, the only
United States vessels in the harbor, were commanded by loyal men, and
were saved.
We now felt sure that an attack on the fort would not long be delayed.
The enemy was in possession of everything on the mainland, and Fort
Pickens alone was left, and it was in a very dilapidated condition, not having
been occupied since the Mexican war. We numbered, all told, including the
30 ordinary seamen, only 81 men. Our first attention was given to the flank
casemate guns, loading with grape and canister such as could be worked,
and at other points closing the embrasures.
Just before sundown that evening, four gentlemen landed, and demanded
of the corporal on guard, outside the gate, admittance to the fort as " citizens
of Florida and Alabama." Lieutenant Slemmer and myself went to the gate
and found Mr. Abert, civil engineer of the yard, whom we knew very well,
and three officers, strangers to us, whom he introduced as Captain Randolph,
Major Marks, and Lieutenant Rutledge. Captain Randolph said : " We have
been sent by the governors of Florida and Alabama to demand a peaceable
surrender of this fort." Lieutenant Slemmer replied: "I am here by authority
of the President of the United States, and I do not recognize the authority
of any governor to demand the surrender of United States property, — a
governor is nobody here." One of them exclaimed sharply : " Do you say the
governor of Florida is nobody, the governor of Alabama nobody I " Lieu-
tenant Slemmer replied : "I know neither of them, and I mean to say that
they are nothing to me." They soon left, the conference being very short.
The next night (the 13th) a small party of armed men was discovered near
the fort by our patrol, and a few shots were fired. We had little fear of an
attack by day, but had every reason to expect a night attack, an attempt to
surprise us and carry the place by storm. All the men had to work by day
mounting guns, preparing fire-balls, hand-grenades, etc., and by night do
picket or patrol duty or stand by the guns. They were nearly tired out
3°
WITH SLEMMER IN PENSACOLA HARBOR.
.CS.w»
-- ■>" :■
CONPEnERATK WATER BATTERY NEAR WARRINGTON, PENSACOLA HARBOR.
(FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH CAPTURED AT MOBILE IN 1864 BY ADMIRAL FARRAGTJT.)
with hard work and want of sleep, not having had a night's rest since the
night of January 7th.
On the 15th Colonel W. H. Chase, commanding the enemy's forces at the
yard and Barrancas, came over in a small boat with Captain Farrand (late
of the United States navy, and next in rank at the yard to Commodore
Armstrong) and landed at the Pickens wharf, where Lieutenant Slemmer
and myself met them, and the following conversation took place :
Colonel Chase: "I have come on business which may occupy some time,
and, if you have no objection, we had better go inside to your quarters."
Lieutenant Slemmer : "I have objections, and it could hardly be expected
that I would take you into the fort."
Colonel Chase : "As I built the fort and know all its weak and strong points,
I would learn nothing new by going in, and had no such object in proposing it."
Lieutenant Slemmer : "I understand that perfectly, but it would be improper
for me to take you in; and, however well you may have known the fort before,
you do not know what it now contains, nor what I have done inside."
Colonel Chase : " That is true, and I will state my business here. It is a
most distressing duty to me. I have come to ask of you young officers, officers
of the same army in which I have spent the best and happiest years of my life,
the surrender of this fort. I would not ask it if I did not believe it right and
necessary to save bloodshed ; and fearing that I might not be able to say it
as I ought, and in order, also, that you may have it in proper form, I have
put it in writing and will read it."
WITH SLEMMER IN PENSACOLA HARBOR.
3i
He then took the manuscript from his pocket and began to read, but, after
reading a few lines, his voice shook, and his eyes filled with tears. He stamp* s< i
his foot, as if ashamed of exhibiting such weakness, and said, " I can't read it.
Here, Farrand, you read it." Captain Farrand took it, and, remarking that he
hadn't his glasses and his eyes were poor (they looked watery), passed the
paper to me, saying, " Here, Oilman, you have good eyes ; please read it." I
took the paper and read aloud the demand for the surrender. As soon as I
finished, I handed the paper to Lieuten-
ant Slemmer, when he and I went a few
paces away; and, after talking the mat--
ter over, it was decided, in order to gain
time and give our men a night's rest, to
ask until next day to consider the matter.
We returned to Colonel Chase, and the
following conversation took place :
Lieutenant Slemmer : " Colonel, how
many men have you ?"
Colonel Chase : " To-night I shall have
800 or 900."
Lieutenant Slemmer : " Do you imagine
you could take this fort with that num-
ber f "
Colonel Chase : " I certainly do. I could
carry it by storm. I know every inch of
this fort and its condition."
Lieutenant Slemmer : " With your
knowledge of the fort and of your troops, what proportion of them, do you
imagine, would be killed in such an attack?"
Colonel Chase (shrugging his shoulders) : " If you have made the best pos-
sible preparations, as I suppose you have, and should defend it, as I presume
you would, I might lose one-half of my men."
Lieutenant Slemmer : "At least, and I don't believe you are prepared to
sacrifice that many men for such a purpose."
Colonel Chase : " You must know very well that, with your small force,
you are not expected to, and cannot, hold this fort. Florida cannot permit it,
and the troops here are determined to have it; and if not surrendered peace-
ably, an attack and the inauguration of civil war cannot be prevented. If it
is a question of numbers, and eight hundred is not enough, I can easily
bring thousands more."
Lieutenant Slemmer: "I will give this letter due consideration, and as I
wish to consult with the captains of the Supply and Wyandotte before reply-
ing, I will give you my answer to-morrow morning."
The next day the reply, refusing to surrender, was sent, Captain Berry-
man of the Wyandotte taking it to the yard. Immediately after, the Wyan-
dotte steamed out of the harbor, and, the same day, I think, the Supply sailed
for New York.
LIEUTENANT ADAM J. SLEMMER, U. B. A.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)
32
WITH SLEMMER IN PENSACOLA HARBOR.
On the 18th another, and the last, demand for surrender was received from
Colonel Chase, and next day Lieutenant Slemmer sent the following reply :
"In reply to your communication of yesterday, I have the honor to state
that, as yet, I know of no reason why my answer of the 16th inst. should
be changed, and I therefore very respectfully refer you to that reply for
an answer to this."
With his small command, Lieutenant Slemmer continued to hold Fort
Pickens until he was reenforced about the middle of April. He remained
there until about the middle of May, when our company, on the recommenda-
tion of the surgeon, the men being much broken down by the severe labor,
incessant watching, exposure, and want of proper food of the past four months,
was ordered to Fort Hamilton, New York Harbor, to recruit. The order was
a humane one, and came none too soon, as scurvy had already appeared among
the men. On the way North one of them died, and few of them ever entirely
recovered from the effects of the severe physical and mental strain they had
endured with Slemmer in Pensacola Harbor.
During the remainder of the war Fort Pickens
continued to be held by the United States troops,
assisted by various vessels of the blockading squad-
ron. Lieutenant Slemmer was reenforced on the
6th of February by one company under Captain
Israel Vogdes in the Brooklyn, and on the 17 th of
April by five companies in the Atlantic, under Col-
onel Harvey Brown, who had been appointed to the
command of the Department of Florida, with head-
quarters at Fort Pickens, and continued in com-
mand until February 2 2d, 1862, when he was
succeeded by General Lewis G. Arnold. The Con-
federates continued to hold the opposite shore until
the 9th of May, 1862, when it was evacuated by
them, the Union forces taking possession the next
day. On the 11th of March, 1861, General Brax-
ton Bragg assumed command of the Confederate
forces. He was succeeded in command of the Army
of Pensacola on the 27th of January, 1862, by
General Samuel Jones, who, on the 8th of March,
was succeeded in command of the post by Colonel
Thomas M. Jones, under whom the evacuation took
place, whereupon the position was occupied by the
United States troops, and the headquarters of the
West Gulf Squadron, which had been at Ship Isl-
and, were transferred to Pensacola. The harbor
was considered the best on the Gulf.
The chief events during the Confederate occu-
pation were :
September 2d, 1 8 6 1 . Destruction of the dry-dock
at Pensacola by order of Colonel Harvey Brown.
September 1-lth. Destruction .of the Confeder-
ate war schooner Judah by a night expedition.
The Judah was moored to the wharf at the Navy
Yard under the protection of a battery and a eolum-
biad, and was armed with a pivot and four broad-
side guns. The expedition, which was matured by
Captain Theodoras Bailey of the Colorado, con-
sisted of 100 men in 4 boats, under the com-
mand of Lieutenant John H. Russell, U. S. Navy.
Lieutenant Sproston and Gunner Borton, from one
of the boats, succeeded in spiking the columbiad.
The others of the force, after receiving in their
boats a volley from the Judah, boarded her fore
and aft and engaged in a hand-to-hand conflict
with her crew, consisting of 75 men, who made a
brave resistance, but were driven off to the wharf,
where they rallied and, joined by the guard, kept
up a continuous fire upon the vessel, which had
been set on fire in several places by Lieutenant
Russell's men. The alarm roll was sounded, and
rockets were sent up by the Confederates. The
enemy's forces being aroused, the Colorado's boats
pulled away, rallying at a short distance from the
shore to fire six charges of canister from their
howitzers, under cover of which they returned to
the fort. The Judah burned to the water's edge,
and, having been set free from her moorings by
the fire, drifted down opposite Fort Barrancas,
where she sank. The Union loss was 3 men killed
and 13 wounded. For his gallantry in the execu-
tion of the plan Lieutenant Russell wras promoted.
October 9th. Night attack by a Confederate force
of one thousand men, under General R. H. _Ander-
son,upon the camp of Colonel William Wilson's 6th
New York (Zouave) regiment on Santa Rosa Island.
The Confederates landed on the island at 2 A. M.,
burned a part of the camp four miles from Fort
Pickens, and retired to their boats after encounter-
ing Union reinforcements from the fort. The losses
in killed, wounded, and missing were: Union, 67;
Confederate, 87.
November 22d and 23d. Bombardment of the
Confederate lines by the United States vessels
Niagara (Flag-Officer McKean) and Richmond
(Captain Ellison), and by Fort Pickens and the
neighboring Union batteries. Although Fort Mc-
Ree was so badly injured that General Bragg en-
tertained the idea of abandoning it, the plan of
the Union commanders to "take and destroy" it
was not executed.
January 1st, 1862. Bombardment of Forts Mc-
Ree and Barrancas by Union batteries.
May 9th. Burning and evacuation of Pensacola.
Editors.
RECOLLECTIONS OF THE TWIGGS SURRENDER.
BY MRS. CAROLINE BALDWIN DARROW.
'
A TEXAS RANGER— FROM AN AMBROTYPE.
ARLY in December, 1860, a rumor reached San
Antonio, Texas, that Captain John R. Baylor, well
known throughout the State, was organizing a
company of one thousand men for a buffalo-hunt. ■&
As Captain Baylor's secession sentiments were well
known, this was believed to be a mere pretense,
and his real design to be to surprise and seize the
arsenal in San Antonio, in time to prevent any
resistance on the part of the United States, should
Texas go out of the Union. The Union citizens,
alarmed lest the few soldiers stationed there should
prove insufficient, appealed to General David E.
Twiggs, then commanding the Department of
Texas, to increase the force. He accordingly fur-
nished several hundred men, consisting of Knights of the Golden Circle (a
secret secession organization), the Alamo Rifles, two other citizen com-
panies, and an Irish and a German company. This quieted apprehension
for a time, but in January these troops were quietly withdrawn. At this
time General Twiggs's loyalty to the United States Government began to be
questioned, as he was known to be often in consultation with prominent
secessionists, some of them ladies. Toward the end of January the Union
men again appealed to General Twiggs, but nothing was accomplished,
whereupon they armed themselves, waiting with undefined dread for the next
move. Meanwhile no one trusted his neighbor, since spies and informers
abounded, and to add to the terror, there were fears of insurrection among
the negroes, some of whom were arrested ; while all of them were forbidden
to walk or talk together on the streets, or to assemble as they had been
accustomed to do.
Late in January was held the election for delegates to a State convention
which should consider the question of secession. San Antonio was crowded.
Women vied with each other in distributing the little yellow ballots, on which
were printed in large type, "For Secession," or "Against Secession." Many
an ignorant Mexican received instructions that the ballot " with the longest
words" was the right one. The cart eras from New Mexico, who were in town
with their wagon-trains, were bought by the secessionists, and some were
known to have voted three times. It was well known that the Federal civil
officers were loyal; the French and German citizens were emphatically so; and
■fc August 2d, 1861. John R. Baylor, then Lieu- government being at Mesilla, and the authority
tenant-Colonel, commanding the Confederate army of governor being assumed by him. This action
in New Mexico, organized that part of the Terri- was approved by General Henry H. Sibley, then
tory lying south of the thirty-fourth parallel, as in command of the Confederate department. —
the Confederate Territory of Arizona, the seat of Editors.
Vol. I.— 3
33
34 RECOLLECTIONS OF THE TWIGGS SURRENDER.
yet against the will of the people, " by superior political diplomacy," secession
triumphed in San Antonio by a small majority. Many Germans gave up their
business and left the town, taking refuge in New Braunfels, 31 miles away.
Many of these men were political refugees of rare culture and scholarly
attainments.
On the 1st of February, the ordinance of secession was adopted by the
Texas Convention, J and on the 4th commissioners were appointed "to confer
with General Twiggs, with regard to the public arms, stores, munitions of
war, etc., under his control, and belonging to the United States, with power
to demand [them] in the name of the people of the State of Texas." To meet
this commission, which consisted of Thomas J. Devine, P. N. Luckett,^ and
Samuel A. Maverick, | on the 9th of February Greneral Twiggs appointed a
commission consisting of Major David H. Vinton, Major Sackfield Maclin
(secessionist), and Captain R. H. K. Whiteley. By this time the news of
Greneral Twiggs's disaffection had reached the Government, and Colonel
C. A. Waite was sent to supersede him.
One day, accidentally overhearing parts of a conversation between Greneral
Twiggs and a prominent Southern lady, I felt no longer any doubt that he
was about to betray his trust, and reported the matter to Major Vinton. He
sought an interview with Greneral Twiggs, and told me that he could find no
suspicion of disloyalty, and that I was entirely mistaken. Getting information
a few days later, which led me to believe that the day for the surrender was
fixed, I again informed Major Vinton. He then decided to remove at once
from his safe all papers that would give valuable information to the State
authorities, and the moneys belonging to the Government, and he intrusted
them to his confidential clerk, Charles Darrow. They were sent at midnight
to his wife, J) who was waiting to receive them, and who buried part of them
in a deserted garden ; the rest, secreted in the ashes of an unused stove and
in the tester of a bed, were guarded by her till the information was no longer
valuable.
General Twiggs had succeeded in completely blinding his brother-officers
as to his plans ; but he now had no time to lose before Colonel Waite's arrival.
On the 15th news came that some of the passengers on the mail-coach had
alighted at the crossing of the Salado and joined a large company of Texas
Rangers who, under the command of Ben McCulloch, had been encamped
there for several days. Captain Baylor's buffalo-hunt had at last assumed a
tangible shape.
To be prepared for any emergency, for many nights we had kept our fire-
arms beside us. On the night of the 15th, worn out with anxious watch-
ing, we fell asleep, to be suddenly roused about 4 o'clock by the screams
of the negroes, who were coming home from market, " We're all going to be
J The secession of Texas was not legally com- & James H. Rogers, also appointed, was a com-
pleted until the ratification of this ordinance by missioner,' but it appears from the Official Records
the people, February 23d, but the secession party that he did not serve. — Editors.
considered the authority of the convention suffi- | From whom stray cattle were styled "Maver-
cient for the prior seizure of United States prop- icks."
erty. — Editors. ]) The writer.
RECOLLECTIONS OF THE TWIGGS SURRENDER.
35
-^rffc
THE ALAMO, SAN ANTONIO.
killed ! " I grasped my revolver, and, springing to my feet, looked ont npon
the plaza. In the dim light I saw the revolutionists appearing, two by two,
on muleback and horseback, mounted and on foot, — a motley though quite
orderly crowd, carrying the Lone Star flag before them, and surrounded and
supported by armed men. The nights had been cold, and a week on the
Salado without comforts had not added to their valorous appearance.
Some had coats, but others were in their shirt-sleeves, and not a few were
wrapped in old shawls and sad-
dle-blankets. Their arms were of
every description. By daylight
more had appeared, perhaps a
thousand in all, and so great was
the enthusiasm of two women
who had aided General Twiggs
in his arrangements that they
mounted their horses, in male
attire, and with pistols in their
belts rode out to meet their
friends. Coffee and refreshments
had been provided, and blankets
and clothing were lavishly dis-
tributed. All the stores were
closed ; men, women, and children
armed themselves, and the excitement was intense. Companies of Union
citizens, well drilled and well armed, were marching and countermarching,
presenting an imposing contrast to the other party, and a conflict seemed
inevitable. The arsenal building had been opened and was swarming with
Rangers. Early in the morning General Twiggs drove down to the main
plaza, where he was instantly surrounded by secessionists demanding the
Government property, whereupon he went through the form of refusing their
request. He then held a conference with Major W. A. Nichols, his assistant
adjutant-general, and Ben McCulloch, and was given six hours in which to
reconsider. By noon he had surrendered all the United States posts and
stores in Texas. When the result was known there was great indignation
against him among the citizens. Two or three hours later he left for New
Orleans, where he was received with public honors.
Orders were sent to all the outposts to turn over the military property
to the State. The officers and men were widely scattered, and many of them
were taken completely by surprise. The Federal troops in town gave their
parole " not to take up arms " against the Confederacy, and were ordered to
leave the post in the afternoon. By this time the German company had
refused to act against the United States, and the citizen companies had dis-
banded. The Irish company had twice torn down the Stars and Stripes from
the Alamo, and had raised the Lone Star flag in its place. An attempt was
made to disarm the troops, but they declared that they would kill any man
who interfered, and marched away under Major Larkin Smith and Captain
36 RECOLLECTIONS OF THE TWIGGS SURRENDER.
John H. King, with the stained and bullet-riddled old flag of the 8th Regi-
ment flying over them, while the band played national airs. Strong men
wept ; the people cheered them along the streets, and many followed them to
the head of the San Pedro, where they encamped. By 6 o'clock the Rangers
had returned to their camp on the Salado, and the day ended without further
excitement.
About 2 o'clock that afternoon, Colonel Robert E. Lee arrived in his ambu-
lance from Fort Mason, Texas, on his way to Washington, whither he had
been ordered by General Scott. As he approached the Read House I went
out to greet him. At the same time some of the Rangers gathered around
his wagons, and, attracted, no doubt, by their insignia of rank, the red flannel
strips sewed on their shoulders, he asked, " Who are those men ! " " They
arc McCulloch's," I answered. "General Twiggs surrendered everything to
the State this morning, and we are all prisoners of war." I shall never
forget his look of astonishment, as with his lips trembling and his eyes full of
tears, he exclaimed, " Has it come so soon as this ? " In a short time I saw
him crossing the plaza on his way to headquarters, and noticed particularly
that he was in citizen's dress. He returned at night and shut himself in his
room, which was over mine, and I heard his footsteps through the night, and
sometimes the murmur of his voice, as if he were praying. He remained at
the hotel a week, and in conversations declared that the position he held was
a neutral one. When he left it was my firm belief that no one could per-
suade or compel him to change his decision. \
During the next two days the Rangers were drinking and shooting about the
streets, recklessly shooting any one who happened to displease them. From
this time on, Union men were in danger, and Northerners sent their families
away. Some who were outspoken were imprisoned and barely escaped with
their lives ; among them, Charles Anderson, brother of Robert Anderson.
On the 26th of February a dozen men of the State troops were stationed
on guard over the offices of the disbursing officers, and the occupants were
ordered to leave, but forbidden to take away papers or effects, though allowed
to keep the keys to their safes. Colonel Waite had now arrived and assumed
command, and the secessionist commissioners made a second demand for
tt
\ On this pointCaptainR.M.Potter,U.S.A., says: cause for revolution), then I will still follow my na-
I saw General Lee (then Colonel Lee) when he took tive State with my sword, and, if need be, with my
leave of his friends to depart for Washington some life. I know you think and f e*d very differently, but
days after the surrender of Twiggs. I have seldom I can't help it. These are my principles, and I must
seen a more distressed man. He said, ' When I follow them." Colonel Anderson, in the course of
get to Virginia I think the world will have one sol- a high tribute to General Lee's character, gives
dier less. I shall resign and go to planting corn.' " Gen*ra4--Scatt._a«-Ms-aut4K>rity for the statement
Colonel Charles Anderson, U. S. V., who is referred th«rtrtn^rwminmHd-oli.he United States forces (un-
to above, and who talked with General Lee on the der Scott) was-offered to Lee, and was declined by
same day, thus gives the substance of his parting Mm-on-the same ground, — that he must be guided
words (see "Texas Before and on the Eve of the wboliy in his action by that t>f Virginia. Colonel
Rebellion." Cincinnati, 1884): "I still think . . . Albert G. Brackett, U. S. A., says: "When the
that my loyalty to Virginia ought to take precedence civil war broke out, Lee was filled with sorrow
over that which is due to the Federal Government, at the condition of affairs, and, in a letter to me
and I shall so report myself at Washington. If Vir- deploring the war in which we were about to en-
ginia stands by the old Union, so will I. But if she gage, he made use of these words: ' I fear the liber-
secedes (though I do not believe in secession as ties of our country will be buried in the tomb of
•a constitutional right, nor that there is a sufficient a great nation.' "—Editors.-
RECOLLECTIONS OF THE TWIGGS SURRENDER.
37
" a statement of the amount of indebtedness and funds on hand and required
a promise from each officer that he would pay outstanding debts with funds
and turn the balance over to the State": it being very desirable to the enemy
to possess the Grovernment records, which exhibited the number of troops and
the condition of the whole department. Imprisonment and death were to
be the penalty in case of refusal ; but Major Vinton of the quartermaster's
department declared that he did not fear
either, would do nothing dishonorable and
would not comply. Major Daniel Mc-
Clure of the pay department it and Cap-
tain Whiteley of the ordnance department
also refused, but several officers did com-
ply and were returned to their offices.
The larger responsibilities of the quarter-
master's department detained Major Vin-
ton after the above-named officers had
left, and thus he fought his battle almost
alone. His office was transferred to his
own house, where with the aid of Mr. Dar-
row he transacted his business. He soon
became so ill that it was impossible for
him to leave his bed. Both were after-
ward arrested and given ten days in
which to surrender the papers and funds
or be shot. These threats were not executed, for on the morning of the
tenth day we were gladdened by the news that United States troops from
the different outposts were within a few miles of the town, having been
three weeks on the way. They were met at the San Pedro and paroled not
to take arms against the Confederacy or serve in any capacity during the
war. These troops, representing the army in Texas, were loyal almost to a
man, while all but forty of the officers went over to the Confederacy. The
commissioners had promised to furnish facilities for the transportation of
these troops to the coast, but so great had been the confusion and so many
supplies had been carried off, that the soldiers were left almost destitute. I
visited their camp and found them cursing the man who had placed them
in this position."
Major Vinton and family, with my husband and myself, were the last to
leave. On thq morning of oui' departure, the 11th of May, as the ambulances
and baggage wagons stood at the door, to add to the gloom, a storm broke
over the city, enveloping us in midnight darkness. The thunder and light-
ning was so loud and incessant as to seem like the noise of battle. For two
weeks we journeyed over the park-like prairies, fragrant and brilliant with
COLOSEL DANIEL II. VINTON, F. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
•fa Captain Potter says: " The officers detained brother officers, when no public funds were acces-
iu San Antonio were much indebted to Major sible. He, of course, had no office in which to
McClure for his successful efforts to raise money, transact business, and paid the officers covertly
on his own responsibility, for the pay of his in holes and corners."
38
RECOLLECTIONS OF THE TWIGGS SURRENDER.
flowers. We forded streams and rivers, crossed the Brazos by a rope ferry,
and, taking the railroad train from Harrisburg to Galveston, canght the last
steamer before the blockade of New Orleans. We went np the Mississippi in
the steamer Hiawatha, which was crowded with refugees, who made no sign
until, in answer to a shot from shore at Cairo, the steamer rounded to and we
found ourselves once more under the protection of our own flag.
On the 13th of December, 1860, General David
E. Twiggs, of the United States Army, who had
served with distinction in the war with Mexico,
and who was at that date in command of the De-
partment of Texas, wrote the following letter to
General Scott from San Antonio :
" I think tliere can be no doubt that many of the
Southern States will secede from the Union. The State
of Texas will be among the number, and, from all ap-
pearances at present, it will be at an early day ; certainly
before the 4th of March next. What is to be done with
public property in charge of the army % The arsenal at
this place has some ordnance and other munitions of
war. I do not expect an order for the present for the
disposition of them, but I would be pleased to receive
your views and suggestions. My course, as respects
myself, will be to remain at nry post and protect this
frontier as long as I can, and then when turned adrift
make my way home, if I have one. I would be pleased
to hear from you at your earliest convenience."
At this time it took from ten to fifteen days for a
letter to pass between San Antonio and army head-
quarters. December 2Sth, General Scott replied:
" In cases of political disturbance involving local
conflict with the authority of the general government,
the geueral-in-chief considers that the military ques-
tions, such as you suggest, contain a political element,
with due regard to which, and in due deference to the
chief executive authority, no extraordinary instructions
cop^ dug them must be issued without the consent
authority. He has labored hard in suggesting
g proper measures to vindicate the laws and
°> property of the United States without
raror acting offensively against any State or
-iiinity. All such suggestions, though long since
j±ade in good time to have been peaceably and efficiently
carried out, have failed to secure the favorable attention
of the Government. The President has listened to him
with due friendliness and respect, but the War Depart-
ment has been little communicative. [Mr. Floyd was
then Secretary of War.] Up to this time he has not been
shown the written instructions of Major Anderson, nor
been informed of the. purport of those more recently
conveyed to Fort Moultrie verbally by Major Buell.
Probably the policy of the Government in regard to the
forts and depots within the limits of seceding States
will have been clearly indicated before events can have
caused a practical issue to be made up in Texas. The
general does not see, at this moment, that he can tender
you any special advice, but leaves the administration
of your command in your own hands, with the laws and
* Captain Potter (before quoted), in a written memorandum
to the Editors, says :
"It was on the evening before McCulloeh entered San
Antonio, or, perhaps, two evenings before, that I met Gen-
eral Twiggs at a wedding party. He said to me: 'It is
rumored that Ben McCulloeh has been in town; have you
seen Iiiiu '.' I replied, no. After a few more words on the
state of affairs, he said : ' There is no need of sending him to
coerce me. If an old woman with a broomstick should
come with full authority from the State of Texas to demand
the public property, I would give it up to her.' " Captain Pot-
ter further says : "From the date of Twiggs's return from
New Orleans [about the 27th of November] there was no
regulations to guide, in the full confidence that your
discretion, firmness, and patriotism will effect all of
good that the sad state of the times may permit."
December 27th, and January 2d, 7th, and 23d,
General Twiggs wrote similar letters to army head-
quarters, making urgent requests for instructions.
January 15th, after the receipt of the above
letter from General Scott, General Twiggs wrote
to him again, this time expressing sympathy with
the secession movement, and asking to be re-
lieved from command of the department on or
before the 4th of March. The order relieving
him, and appointing Colonel Waite as his suc-
cessor, is dated 'January 28th, and was received
by General Twiggs on the loth of February.
Meanwhile the secession party in Texas had
made decided progress toward carrying the State
out of the Union. Late in January an election
had been held for delegates to a State convention
to consider the question of secession. This con-
vention had met on the 28th of January, at Aus-
tin, and on the 1st of February had passed an
ordinance of secession which was to take effect
on the 2d of March, if it should be ratified by the
people on the 23d of February. General Twiggs
did not wait till the ordinance was in operation, or
even till its ratification, to surrender the military
posts and public property under his charge. Feb-
ruary 9th he appointed a military commission to
treat with a commission from the convention, — as
his order of that date announced, "to transact
such business as relates to the disposition of the
public property upon the demand of the State of
Texas." February 16th, three days before the
arrival of Colonel Waite, the actual surrender took
place, nominally to superior forces under Colonel
Ben McCulloeh, then in command of 1000 to
1500 men, and acting under the authority, not
of the governor (General Sam Houston, a Union
man), but of the commissioners appointed by the
convention.* On the 17th the State Commissioners
wrote to General Twiggs :
" In our communication of the 16th instant we required
a delivery up by you of the positions held and public
property held by or under your control as commander
doubt of his intention not to withstand any insurrectionary
movement on the part of the state. He constantly said that
the break-up was coming, and that there was no one living
who could resist the secession movement successfully."
On the same point, Colonel Charles Anderson says: "It
must be remembered distinctly, on this, my testimony, and
that of very many others, that from the time of his. return,
with increasing frequency and vehemence of his speeches,
General Twiggs had not only declared that he 'would never
fire on American citizens under any circumstances,' but that
he would surrender the United states property in his depart-
ment to the State of Texas whenever it was demanded." —
(" Texas, Before and on the Eve of the Rebellion.")
RECOLLECTIONS OF THE TWIGGS SURRENDER.
39
in this department. As no reply save your verbal
declaration (which declaration was that you '.nave up
everything') has been given to onrnote, . . . we agaiu
demand the surrender . . . "
To this General Twiggs replied the same day:
" I have to say that youare already aware of my views
in regard to the delivery of the public property of this
department, and I now repeat that I will direct the
positions held by the Federal troops to be turned over to
the authorized agents of the State of Texas, provided
the troops retain their arms and clothing, camp and
garrison ecpiipage, quartermaster's stores, subsistence,
medical, hospital stores, and such means of transporta-
tion of every kind as may be necessary for an efficient
and orderly movement of the troops from Texas, pre-
pared for attack or defense" against aggression from any
source."
The commissioners then wrote, making two fur-
ther conditions : that the troops should leave Texas
by way of the coast, and that t hey should there sur-
render all means of transportation as well as the
artillery. General Twiggs responded, consenting to
the first condition, but objecting to the second so
far as it related to the guns of the light batteries,
and it was to that extent waived by the commis-
sioners. Thus the formal smrender was consum-
mated-on the 18th of February, five days before
the ratification of the ordinance of secession by
the people of Texas. In a letter to Mr. Davis,
dated New Orleans, February 25th, IS 61, Gen-
eral Braxton Bragg says: "General Twiggs was
ordered to turn over the command to Colonel
Waite, a Northern man, but preferred surrender-
ing to Texas." March 1st, General Twiggs was
dismissed from the United States army. He was
appointed major-general in the Confederate serv-
ice, and was placed in command at New Orleans.
He died September 15th, 1862, at Augusta,
Georgia, his own State.
On the 28th of January, General Twiggs's suc-
cessor, Colonel Waite, was in command at Camp
Verde, 65 miles from San Antonio. In a letter
of that date to General Twiggs's assistant adju-
tant-general at San Antonio, Colonel Waite said :
" For the purpose of making some defensive arrange-
ments, I have deemed it proper to order the remainder
of Captain Brackett'a company to this place without
waiting foi further instructions from your office. . . .
I respectfully request that 1 or 2 pieces of artillery
. . . may be sent here as early as practicable. In
making this application I assume that there is a prob-
ability, or at least a possibility, that a mob of reckless
men may attempt to seize the public property here,
the most valuable of which consists of 5:! camels, . . .
worth some $20,000. ... I hold it to be the duty of
every commanding officer to be at all times, mid under
all circumstances, prepared as far as possible for any
and every emergency. To this end he must anticipate
his wants and take timely measures to meet them."
February 1 2th, he wrote again :
"Being desirous of concentrating my regiment (the
1st Infantry) so as to bring the companies more under
my control, I respectfully request permission to move
out of the department with the live companies now serv-
ing here and join the remainder of the regiment which is
in the Department of the West."
February 26th, in his report of the situation
after he had assumed command, he says :
"To concentrate a sufficient number [of troops] to
make a successful resistance after the Texans had taken
the held was not practicable. Besides, we had no large
depot of provisions to move upon, and the means .if
transportation at the posts were so limited that the
troops could have taken with them a supply for only a
few days. An attempt to bring them together under
these circumstances would have no doubt resulted in
their being cut up in detail before they could get out of
the country. Under these circumstances, I felt it my
dutyto comply with the agreement entered into by Gen-
eral Twiggs, and remove the troops from the country as
early as possible."
For this purpose Colonel Waite continued at San
Antonio. The troops (except those mentioned
below) marched to the coast, where vessels char-
tered by the United States awaited them.
Concerning the advantages which General
Twiggs's surrender conferred upon the cause of
secession, Colonel Charles Anderson says :
" Of its successes, the first was that it carried the so-
called election five days afterward. Without this brill-
iant coup (lc main (the first victory of rebellion) the
majority would have surely been in Texas for the Union
cause. As it was, only 42,000 votes (less than half the
total vote of the State) was polled, of which 13,000 votes
were given by the now confounded and dismayed
Unionists. [The exact vote was: for ratification, 34,794 ;
against, 11,235. — Editors.] And just here (a second
and great success) was the beginning of that series of
tlockings pari passu, with every disaster to the Union
cause, of our Douglas Democrats, and our Bell and
Everett men to the winning side — the Breckinridge
Democrats. ... A third gain to the rebellion was
the immense money and military values of the public
arms and other war properties on the very verge of the
coming war, which it hastened, if it did not determine.
Fourthly, our national prestige lost was a vast and
instant impulse to secession and rebellion in every
slave State."
The number of posts surrendered was 10. The
number of troops "to be removed, in compli-
ance with General Twiggs's agreement," was re-
ported by Colonel Waite, February 26th, at 2328.
This agreement was not respected by the Con-
federate authorities, who, on the 11th of April,
on the ground " that hostility exists between the
United States and Confederate States," gave in-
structions to Colonel Earl Van Dorn " to intercept
and prevent the movement of the United States
troops from the State of Texas." Under these
orders 815 officers and men were captured, in-
cluding Colonel Waite and his staff, who accepted
parole under protest. Many of the private soldiers
were kept in confinement for nearly two years.
The San Antonio "Herald," of February 23d,
1861, estimated the total value of the property
surrendered at $1,209,500, " exclusive of public
buildings to which the Federal Government has a
title." Tins property included mules, wagons,
horses, harness, tools, corn, clothing, commissary
and ordnance stores.
In the main the authority for the foregoing state-
ments is Volume I. of the "Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Armies," issued by the
War Department, under the editorship of Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Robert N. Scott, U. S. A. This
work will be referred to hereafter in these pages
as "Official Records."— Editors.
y
s
"i „_
Av&ilMnMLiiX.
VIEW OF CHARLESTON FROM THE RAMPART OF CASTLE PINCKNEY.- FROM A SKETCH MADE IN 1861.
FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER.
BY ABNER DOUBLEDAY, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. 8. A., RETIRED.
AS senior captain of the 1st Regiment of United States Artillery, I had been
-£*- stationed at Fort Moultrie, Charleston Harbor, two or three years previ-
ous to the outbreak of 1861. There were two other forts in the harbor. Of
these, Fort Sumter was unoccupied, being in an unfinished state, while Castle
Pinckney was in charge of a single ordnance sergeant. The garrison of Fort
Moultrie consisted of 2 companies that had been reduced to 65 men, who
with the band raised the number in the post to 73. Fort Moultrie had
no strength ; it was merely a sea battery. No one ever imagined it would be
attacked by our own people ; and if assailed by foreigners, it was supposed
that an army of citizen-soldiery would -be there to defend it. It was very
low, the walls having about the height of an ordinary room. It was little
more, in fact, than the old fort of Revolutionary time of which the father of
Major Robert Anderson had been a defender. The sand had drifted from the
sea against the wall, so that cows would actually scale the ramparts. In 1860
we applied to have the fort put in order, but the quartermaster-general,
afterward the famous Joseph E. Johnston, said the matter did not pertain
to his department. We were then apprehending trouble, for the signs of the
times indicated that the South was drifting toward secession, though the
Northern people could not be made to believe this, and regarded our repre-
sentation to this effect as nonsense. I remember that at that time our engi-
neer officer, Captain J. Gr. Foster, was alone, of the officers, in thinking there
would be no trouble. We were commanded by a Northern man of advanced
age, Colonel John L. Gardner, who had been wounded in the war of 1812 and
had served with credit in Florida and Mexico. November 15th, 1860, Mr.
40
FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER.
4i
Floyd, the Secretary of War, relieved liim and put in command Major
Robert Anderson of Kentucky, who was a regular officer and the owner
of a slave plantation in Georgia. Floyd thought the new commander could
be relied upon to carry out the Southern programme, but we never believed
that Anderson took com-
mand with a knowledge of
1 luit programme or a desire JIB
that it should succeed. He
simply obeyed orders; he
had to obey or leave the
army. Anderson was a
Union man and, in the
incipiency, was perfectly
willing to chastise South
Carolina in case she should
attempt any revolutionary
measures. His feeling as
to coercion changed when
he found that all the South-
ern States had joined South
Carolina, for he looked up-
on the conquest of the South
as hopeless.
Soon after his arrival,
which took place on the
21st of November, Anderson
wanted the sand removed
from the walls of Moultrie,
and urged that it be done.
Suddenly the Secretary of
War seemed to adopt this
view. He pretended there
was danger of war with Eng-
land, with reference to Mex-
ico, which was absurd ; and
under this pretext was seized
with a sudden zeal to put the
harbor of Charleston in con-
dition,— to be turned over to the Confederate forces. He appropriated $150,-
000 for Moultrie and $80,000 to finish Sumter. There was not much to be
made out of Fort Moultrie, with all our efforts, because it was hardly defen-
sible ; but Major Anderson strove to strengthen it. He put up heavy gates to
prevent Charleston secessionists from entering, and made a little man-hole
through which visitors had to crawl in and out.
We could get no additional ammunition, but Colonel Gardner had man-
aged to procure a six months' supply of food from the North before the trouble
MAJOR ROBERT ANDEKXIN.
FItOM A PHOTOGRAPH.
42
FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER.
BREV.-CAPT. TRUMAN SEYMOUR. LIEUT. G. W. SNYOER.
LIEUT. JEFF. C. DAVIS. 20 LIEUT. R. K. MEADE, JR. LIEUT. THEO. TALBOT.
CAPT. ABNER DOUBLEDAY. MAJOR ROBERT ANDERSON. SURGEON S. W. CRAWFORD. CAPT. J. G. FOSTER.
MAJOR ANDERSON AND HIS OFFICERS. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN BEFORE THE BOMBARDMENT.
Second Lieutenant Norman J. Hall, who was present
at the bombardment, was absent when the photo-
graph was taken. Lieutenant Talbot had been sent
to Washington, and had returned with a message from
President Lincoln announcing to Governor Pickens
that the Government would attempt to provision
Fort Sumter; he was not permitted to rejoin Major
Anderson.
came. The Secretary of War would not let us have a man in the way of rein-
forcement, the plea being that reinforcements would irritate the people. The
secessionists could hardly be restrained from attacking us, but the leaders kept
them back, knowing that our workmen were laboring in their interests, at the
expense of the United States. When Captain Truman Seymour was sent with
a party to the United States arsenal in Charleston to get some friction primers
and a little ammunition, a crowd interfered and drove his men back. It became
evident, as I told Anderson, that we could not defend the fort, because the
houses around us on Sullivan's Island looked down into Moultrie, and could
be occupied by our enemies. At last it was rumored that two thousand
riflemen had been detailed to shoot us down from the tops of those houses. I
proposed to anticipate the enemy and burn the dwellings, but Anderson would
not take so decided a step at a time when the North did not believe there
was going to be war. It was plain that the only thing to be done was to slip
over the water to Fort Sumter, but Anderson said he had been assigned to
Fort Moultrie, and that he must stay there. We were then in a very peculiar
position. It was commonly believed that we would not be supported even by
the North, as the Democrats had been bitterly opposed to the election of
Lincoln ; that at the first sign of war twenty thousand men in sympathy
with the South would rise in New York. Moreover, the one to whom we
FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER.
43
THE SEA BATTERY OF FORT MOULTRIE.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN BEFORE THE WAR.
soldiers always looked up as to a father, — the Secretary of War, seemed to be
devising arrangements to have us made away with. We believed that in
the event of an outbreak from Charleston few of us would survive ; but it
did not greatly concern us, since that risk was merely a part of our business,
and we intended to make the best fight we could. The officers, upon talk-
ing the matter over, thought they might control any demonstration at
Charleston by throwing shells into the city from Castle Pinckney. But, with
only sixty-four soldiers and a
brass band, we could not de-
tach any force in that direction.
Finally, Captain Foster, who
had misapprehended the whole
situation, and who had orders to
put both Moultrie and Sumter
in perfect order, brought sever-
al hundred workmen from Bal-
timore. Unfortunately, these
were nearly all in sympathy
with the Charlestonians, many
even wearing secession badges.
Bands of secessionists were
now patrolling near us by day
and night. We were so worn out with guard-duty — watching them — that on
one occasion my wife and Captain Seymour's relieved us on guard, all that
was needed being some one to give the alarm in case there was an attempt
to break in. Foster thought that out of his several hundred workmen he
could get a few Union men to drill at the guns as a garrison in Castle Pinck-
ney, but they rebelled the moment they found they were expected to act as
artillerists, and said that they were not there as warriors. It was said that
when the enemy took possession of the castle, some of these workmen were
hauled from under beds and from other hiding-places.
The day before Christmas I asked Major Anderson for wire to make an
entanglement in front of my part of the fort, so that any one who should charge
would tumble over the wires and could be shot at our leisure. I had already
caused a sloping picket fence to be projected over the parapet on my side of
the works so that scaling-ladders could not be raised against us. The dis-
cussion in Charleston over our proceedings was of an amusing character.
This wopden fraise puzzled the Charleston militia and editors; one of the
latter said, " Make ready your sharpened stakes, but you will not intimidate
freemen. ''
When \L asked Anderson for the wire, he said I should have a mile of it, with
a peculiar smile that puzzled me for the moment. He then sent for Hall, the
post quartermaster, bound him to secrecy, and told him to take three schooners
and sorqe barges which had been chartered for the purpose of taking the
women and children and six months' supply of provisions to Fort Johnson,
opposite1 Charleston. He was instructed when the secession patrols should
s/
44
FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER.
ask what this meant, to tell them we were sending off the families of the
officers and men to the North because they were in the way. The excuse
was plausible, and no one interfered. We were so closely watched that we
could make no movement without demands being; made as to the reason
of it. On the day we left — the day after Christmas — Anderson gave up
his own mess, and came to live with me as my guest. In the evening of
that day I went to notify the major that tea was ready. Upon going to
the parapet for that purpose, I found all the officers there, and noticed
something strange in their manner. The problem was solved when Ander-
son walked up to me and said : " Captain, in twenty minutes you will leave
this fort with your company for Fort Sumter." The order ^as startling and
unexpected, and I thought of the immediate hostilities of whi^i the movement
FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER. 45
would be the occasion. I rushed over to my company quarters and informed
my men, so that they might put on their knapsacks and have everything in
readiness. This took about ten minutes. Then I went to my house, told my
wife that there might be fighting, and that she must get out of the fort as soon
as she could and take refuge behind the sand-hills. I put her trunks out of the
sally-port, and she followed them. Then I started with my company to join
Captain Seymour and his men. We had to go a quarter of a mile through the
little town of Moultrieville to reach the point of embarkation. It was about
sunset, the hour of the siesta, and fortunately the Charleston militia were
taking their afternoon nap. We saw nobody, and soon reached a low
line of sea-wall under which were hidden the boats in charge of the three
engineers, for Lieutenants Snyder and Meade had been sent by Floyd to help
Captain Foster do the work on the forts. The boats had been used in going
back and forward in the work of construction, manned by ordinary work-
men, who now vacated them for our use. Lieutenant Snyder said to me in a
low tone : " Captain, those boats are for your men." So saying, he started
with his own party up the coast. When my thirty men were embarked I
went straight for Fort Sumter. It was getting dusk. I made slow work in
crossing over, for my men were not expert oarsmen. Soon I saw the lights
of the secession guard-boat coining down on us. I told the men to take off
their coats and cover up then* muskets, and I threw my own coat open to
conceal my buttons. I wished to give the impression that it was an officer in
charge of laborers. The guard-ship stopped its paddles and inspected us in
the gathering darkness, but concluded we were all right and passed on. My
party was the first to reach Fort Sumter.
We went up the steps of the wharf in the face of an excited band of seces-
sion workmen, some of whom were armed with pistols. One or two Union
men among them cheered, but some of the others said angrily : " What are
these soldiers doing here ? what is the meaning of this ! " Ordering my men
to charge bayonets, we drove the workmen into the center of the fort. I took
possession of the guard-room commanding the main entrance and placed
sentinels. Twenty minutes after, Seymour arrived with the rest of the men.
Meantime Anderson had crossed in one of the engineer boats. As soon
as the troops were all in we fired a cannon, to give notice of our arrival
to the quartermaster, who had anchored at Fort Johnson with the schooners
carrying the women and children. He immediately sailed up to the wharf
and landed his passengers and stores. Then the workmen of secession sym-
pathies were sent aboard the schooners to be taken ashore.
Lieutenant Jefferson C. Davis of my company had been left with a rear-
guard at Moultrie. These, with Captain Foster and Assistant-Surgeon Craw-
ford, stood at loaded columbiads during our passage, with orders to fire upon
the guard-boats and sink them if they tried to run us down. On withdraw-
ing, the rear-guard spiked the guns of the fort, burned the gun-carriages on
the front looking toward Sumter, and cut down the flag-staff. Mrs. Doubleday
first took refuge at the house of the post sutler, and afterward with the family
of Chaplain Harris, with whom she sought shelter behind the sand-hills.
46 FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER.
When all was quiet they paced the beach, anxiously watching Fort Sumter.
Finding that the South Carolinians were ignorant of what had happened,
we sent the boats back to procure additional supplies. J
The next morning Charleston was furious. Messengers were sent out to
ring every door-bell and convey the news to every family. The governor sent
two or three of his aides to demand that we return to Moultrie. Anderson
replied in my hearing that he was a Southern man, but that he had been
assigned to the defense of Charleston Harbor, and intended to defend it.
Chaplain Harris was a spirited old man. He had lived at Charleston most
of his life and knew the South Carolinians well. He visited Fort Sumter on
our first day there and made a prayer at the raising of the flag, after which
he returned to his home at Moultrieville. One day he went to the com-
mander of Fort Moultrie and said to him : " Will any impediment be put in
the way of my going over to Fort Sumter ? " The reply was : " Oh, no, par-
son ; I reckon we'll give you a pass." The chaplain answered : " I didn't ask
you for a pass, sir. I am a United States officer, and will go to any United
States fort without your permission. I asked you a different question: whether
you would prevent my going by force." He was not allowed to cross, after that.
We had no light and were obliged to procure some if possible, for the win-
ter nights were long. There was much money due the workmen who had been
discharged, and the secessionists sent them over to demand their pay. Mrs.
Doubleday came in the same boat with them, and managed to ship us a
box of candles at the same time ; she also brought a bandbox full of
matches. At the same time Mrs. Seymour reached us stealthily in a boat
rowed by two little boys. Mrs. Foster was already there. Anderson thought
there was going to be trouble, so he requested the ladies to return to Moultrie-
ville that night. The next day they went to a Charleston hotel, where they
were obliged to keep very quiet and have their meals served privately in then-
rooms. After a day or two they left for the North, on account of the feeling
in the city.
From December 26th until April 12th we busied ourselves in preparing for
the expected attack, and our enemies did the same on all sides of us. Ander-
son apparently did not want reinforcements, and he shrank from civil war.
He endured all kinds of hostile proceedings on the part of the secessionists,
in the hope that Congress would make some compromise that would save
slavery and the Union together.
Soon after daylight on the 9th of January, with my glass I saw a large
steamer pass the bar and enter the Morris Island Channel. It was the Star
of the West, with reinforcements and supplies for us. When she came near
the upper part of the island the secessionists fired a shot at her. I hastened
} 1 will give an incident here to show how successful transit to Fort Sumter, went back to
completely even our own people were deceived by Moultrie in small boats to procure additional sup-
the celerity and secrecy of Major Anderson's plies, Davis walked over to the mess. He was
movement. Lieutenant Davis and some other received very indignantly by the woman, for coming
officers had a mess, which was in charge of the to supper when everything was cold. Nothing could
wife of one of the soldiers. She had prepared the exceed her astonishment when she learned that the
evening meal as usual and was amazed that no entire garrison was in Fort Sumter. Davis carried.
one came to eat it. When the officers, after their her and her pots and kettles back with him.
FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER. 47
to Major Anderson's room, and was ordered by him to have the long roll
beaten and to post the men at the barbette gnns. By the time we reached
the parapet the transport coming to our relief had approached so near
that Moultrie opened fire. Major Anderson would not allow us to return
the fire, so the transport turned about and steamed seaward. Ander-
son asked for an explanation of the firing from Governor Pickens, and
announced that he would allow no vessel to pass within range of the guns of
Sumter if the answer was unsatisfactory. Governor Pickens replied that he
would renew the firing under like circumstances. I think Major Anderson
had received an intimation that the Star of the West was coming, but did not
believe it. He thought General Scott would send a man-of-war instead of a
merchant vessel. Great secrecy was observed in loading her, but the purpose
of the expedition got into the newspapers, and, of course, was telegraphed to
Charleston. Bishop Stevens of the Methodist Church stated in a speech
made by him on Memorial Day in the Academy of Music, New York, that
he aimed the first gun against the Star of the West. I aimed the first gun on
our side in reply to the attack on Fort Sumter.
Sure that we would all be tasked to the utmost in the coming conflict, and
be kept on the alert by day and night, I desired to get all the sleep I could
beforehand, and lay down on a cot bedstead in the magazine nearest to
Morris Island, — one of the few places that would be shell-proof when the fire
opened. About 4 a. m. on the 12th, Major Anderson came to me as his
executive officer, and informed me that the enemy would fire upon us as soon
as it was light enough to see the fort. He said he would not return it until
it was broad daylight, the idea being that he did not desire to waste his
ammunition.
We have not been in the habit of regarding the signal shell fired from Fort
Johnson as the first gun of the conflict, although it was undoubtedly aimed
at Fort Sumter. Edmund Rufhn of Virginia is usually credited with opening
the attack by firing the first gun from the iron-clad battery on Morris Island.
The ball from that gun struck the wall of the magazine where I was lying,
penetrated the masonry, and burst very near my head. As the smoke from
this explosion came in through the ventilators of the magazine, and as the
floor was strewn with powder where the flannel cartridges had been filled,
I thought for a moment the place was on fire.
When it was fully light we took breakfast leisurely before going to the
guns, our food consisting of pork and water.
The first night after the bombardment we expected that the naval vessels
outside would take advantage of the darkness to send a fleet of boats with
reinforcements of men and supplies of provisions, and as it was altogether
probable that the enemy would also improvise a fleet of small boats to meet
those of the navy, it became an interesting question, in case parties came to
us in this way, to decide whether we were admitting friends or enemies.
However, the night passed quietly away without any demonstration.
Captain Chester, in his paper which follows, has omitted a fact that I will
mention. As the fire against us came from all directions, a shot from
48
FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER.
THE HOT-SHOT FURNACE, FORT MOULTRIE — FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
Sullivan's Island struck near the lock of the magazine, and bent the copper
door, so that all access to the few cartridges we had there was cut off. Just
previous to this the officers had been engaged, amid a shower of shells, in
vigorous efforts to cut away wood-work which was dangerously near the
magazine.
After the surrender we were allowed to salute our flag with a hundred
guns before marching out, but it was very dangerous and difficult to do so ;
for, owing to the recent conflagration, there were fire and sparks ali around
the cannon, and it was not easy to find a safe place of deposit for the car-
tridges. It happened that some flakes of fire had entered the muzzle of one
of the guns after it was sponged. Of course, when the gunner attempted to
ram the cartridge down it exploded prematurely, killing Private Daniel
Hough instantly, and setting fire to a pile of cartridges underneath, which
also exploded, seriously wounding five men. Fifty guns were fired in the
salute.
With banners flying, and with drums beating "Yankee Doodle,'' we
marched on board the transport that was to take us to the steamship Baltic,
which drew too much water to pass the bar and was anchored outside. We
were soon on our way to New York.
With the first shot against Sumter the whole North became united. Mobs
went about New York and made every doubtful newspaper and private house
display the Stars and Stripes. When we reached that city we had a royal
reception. The streets were alive with banners. Our men and officers were
seized and forced to ride on the shoulders of crowds wild with enthusiasm.
When we purchased anything, merchants generally refused ail compensation.
FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER.
49
Fort Hamilton, where we were stationed, was besieged with visitors, many of
whom were among the most highly distinguished in all walks of life. The
Chamber of Commerce of New York voted a bronze medal to each officer and
soldier of the garrison.
We were soon called upon to take an active part in the war, and the two
Sumter companies were sent under my command to reenforce General Patter-
son's column, which was to serve in the Shenandoah Valley. Our march through
Pennsylvania was a continuous ovation. Flowers, fruits, and delicacies of all
kinds were showered upon us, and the hearts of the people seemed overflow-
ing with gratitude for the very little we had been able to accomplish.
Major Anderson was made a brigadier-general in the regular army, and
assigned to command in his native State, Kentucky ; but his system had been
undermined by his great responsibilities ; he was threatened with softening
of the brain, and was obliged to retire from active service. The other officers
were engaged in battles and skirmishes in many parts of the field of war.
Anderson, Foster, Seymour, Crawford, Davis, and myself became major-
generals of volunteers. Norman J. Hall, who rendered brilliant service at
Gettysburg, became a colonel, and would doubtless have risen higher had lie
not been compelled by ill health to retire. Talbot became an assistant
adjutant-general with the rank of captain, but died before the war had fairly
begun. He was not with us during the bombardment, as he had been sent as
a special messenger to Washington with dispatches. Lieutenant Snyder of
the engineers, a most promising young officer, also died at the very com-
mencement of hostilities.
Only one of our number left us and joined the Confederacy, — Lieutenant
R. K. Meade of the engineers, a Virginian. His death occurred soon after.
SUMTER. GUARD-BOAT. CHARLESTON. CASTLE PINCKNEY. MOULTRIE.
MAJOR ANDERSON'S MEN CROSSING IN BOATS TO FORT SUMTER. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH,
Vol. I.— 4.
;**fi?SSfI¥SS?¥ifTOf^
THE SOUTH-WEST OR GORGE FRONT OF FORT SUMTER, SHOWING THE GATE WHARF, AND ESPLANADE, MACHICOULIS GALLERIES ON THE PARAPET,
AND THE EFFECT OF THE FIRE FROM CUMMING'S POINT AND FORT JOHNSON. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
INSIDE SUMTER IN '61.
BY JAMES CHESTER, CAPTAIN THIRD ARTILLERY, U. S. A.
TOWARD the close of 1860, the national defenses of Charleston Harbor,
consisting of Castle Pinckney, Fort Moultrie, and Fort Sumter, were
garrisoned by an army of 65 men instead of the 1050 men that were required.
Fort Moultrie alone, where the 65 soldiers were stationed, required 300 men
for its defense, and Fort Sumter, to which they were ultimately transferred,
was designed for a garrison of 650.
Fort Moultrie, at the time of which we write, was considered a rather pleas-
ant station, Sullivan's Island being a favorite summer resort. Many of the
wealthy citizens of Charleston had their summer residences there, and indeed
some of them lived there all the year round. There was a large summer hotel
on the beach half-way up the island, and a horse railway connected the steam-
boat wharf and the hotel. The military reservation stretched across the island
from the front to the back beach, like a waistbelt of moderate width, and
the fort looked like a big buckle at the front end. It was a brick structure,
or rather an earthen structure revetted with brick. It was bastioned on the
land side, and had a scarp wall perhaps fifteen feet high ; but the sand had
drifted against it at some points so as almost to bury its masonry. With
its full complement of men it could hardly have been held against a numerous
and enterprising enemy, and with 65 men it was plainly untenable. ^
This garrison consisted of two skeleton companies and the regimental band
of the 1st Artillery. They had occupied the fort since 1857, and were fairly
well acquainted in the neighborhood. Indeed, several of the men had been
enlisted at the post, and were native Carolinians. As the political pot began
to boil toward the close of 1860 and secession was openly discussed, the social
position of the garrison became anomalous. Army officers had alwa37s been
favorites in the South ; and as they were discreet and agreeable, it is not sur-
prising, perhaps, that their society continued to be sought after, even by the
most outspoken secessionists, up to the actual commencement of hostilities.
But enlisted men, even in the South, were social outcasts. It was rather sur-
prising, therefore, to find them receiving attentions from civilians. But the
fact is that the soldiers of the army were never before treated with such
consideration in the South as on the eve of the rebellion, ft The secession-
ft An amusing incident which illustrates this always peculiar. It could hardly be said that
occurred during the election excitement in Novem- there were two parties, but there generally were
ber, 1860. Elections in South Carolina were two candidates tor every office in the State. In
50
INSIDE SUMTER IN '61. 51
ists were determined to have the fort, and they wanted to get it without
bloodshed. They had failed with the commissioned officers, and they had
no better success with the soldiers : every enlisted man remained faithful
to the Union.
The old commander of Fort Moultrie, Colonel John L. Gardner, was
removed; the new one, Major Robert Anderson of Kentucky, arrived on
November 21st. As a Southern man, he was expected to be reasonable. If he
had scruples upon the question of qualified allegiance, he might surrender
on demand, 011 purely professional grounds. No one doubted Major Ander-
son's professional ability, and of course he could see the hopelessness of
his situation at Moultrie. Moreover, he was a humane man, and would be
unwilling to shed blood needlessly. But his actions clearly indicated that he
would not surrender on demand. He continued defensive preparations with
as much energy and zeal as his predecessor, and manifestly meant to fight.
This was very discouraging to the preachers of bloodless secession, and when
he transferred his command to Sumter their occupation was completely gone.
Nothing but war would now get him out. Hence the efforts to get him
ordered back again by President Buchanan — efforts which almost succeeded.
The transfer of Major Anderson's command from Moultrie to Sumter was
neatly executed early in the evening of December 26th, 1860. It was a few
minutes after sunset when the troops left Moultrie ; the short twilight was
about over when they reached the boats; fifteen or twenty minutes more car-
ried them to Sumter. The workmen had just settled down to an evening's
enjoyment when armed men at the door startled them. There was no par-
leying, no explaining ; nothing but stern commands, silent astonishment, and
prompt obedience. The workmen were on the wharf, outside the fort, before
they were certain whether their captors were secessionists or Yankees.
Meantime the newly arrived troops were busy enough. Guards were
posted, embrasures secured, and, as far as practicable, the place was put in
a defensible condition against any storming-party which chagrin might drive
the guard-boat people to send against it. Such an attempt was perfectly
feasible. The night was very dark ; the soldiers were on unknown ground
such cases the candidates would each give a barbe- had had his eyes on the fragment of ham for some
cue or feast of some kind to the voters, at which time, deliberately mounted the table at the lower
stump speeches were delivered in a somewhat end, and carefully picking his steps among the
florid style. The whole body of voters attended dishes, walked to the chairman's end, picked up
both entertainments, and it is to be feared decided the coveted fragment, and started on the return
rather upon the merits of the feast than the fitness trip. The audacity of the man stunned the audi-
of the candidate. At one of these entertainments on ence for a moment, but indignation soon got the
Sullivan's Island, the regimental band attended, — better of astonishment, and the soldier was in
hired as an attraction, — and such soldiers as were some danger of rough treatment. But the chairman
on pass gathered around the outskirts of the crowd had his revolver out in a second, and holding it
which surrounded the open-air supper table. The aloft proclaimed: "111 shoot the first man who
supper was over, and the speaking had begun, interferes with that soldier." And the soldier
Everything eatable had been devoured except a carried off the fragment. Of course he was
remnant of ham which rested on a platter in front drunk; but he could not have done the same thing
of the chairman — who perhaps was also the can- without a drubbing in 1859. This anecdote —
didate — atone end of the long table. The chairman and others might be related — indicates the policy
was speaking, and the audience was enthusiastic, and perhaps the expectations of the secession-
A storm of applause had just broken out at some- ists in connection with the soldiers of Fort Moul-
thing the speaker had said, when a soldier, who trie.— J. C.
52 INSIDE SUMTER. IN '61.
and could not find their way about readily ; many of the embrasures could
not be closed; and there were at least a hundred willing guides and helpers
already on the wharf and in a fine frame of mind for such work. But nothing
was attempted, and when the soldiers felt themselves in a position to repel
any attempt against them that night, two guns were fired as a signal to
friends that the occupation had been successfully accomplished, and that they
might proceed with their part of the programme. This was the first intima-
tion the guard-boat people had of the transfer; and, indeed, it told them
nothing, except that some soldiers must have got into Sumter. But they
blew their alarm- whistle all the same, and burned blue-lights ; signal-rockets
were sent up from various points, and there was great excitement everywhere
in the harbor until morning.
When the signal-guns were fired, the officer in charge of the two schooners
which had carried provisions and ammunition to Fort Johnson (under the
pretense that they were subsistence for the women and children, whom he had
also carried there as a cloak) cast loose his lines and made all speed for
Sumter, and the old sergeant who had been left in Moultrie for the purpose
set fire to the combustibles which had been heaped around the gun-carriages,
while another man spiked the guns. The garrison from the ramparts of its
new nest grimly approved of the destruction of the old one.
At dawn of December 27th the men were up and ready for any emergency;
indeed, most of them had been up all night. Captain Foster had been spe-
cially busy with his former employees. Among them he found several loyal
men, and also some doubtful ones who were willing to share the fortunes
of the garrison. These constituted an acceptable addition to our work-
ing strength, although those classed as doubtful woidd have been an ele-
ment of weakness in case of a fight. However, they did much good work
before hostilities began, and the worst ones were weeded out before we were
closely invested. Those who remained to the end were excellent men. They
endured the hardships of the siege and the dangers of the bombardment without
a murrnur, and left Sumter with the garrison — one of them, John Swearer,
severely wounded — with little besides the clothes they stood in. They were
the first volunteers for the Union, but were barred from the benefits secured
by legislation for the national soldiers, having never been " mustered in."
Fort Sumter was unfinished, and the interior was filled with building
materials, guns, carriages, shot, shell, derricks, timbers, blocks and tackle,
and coils of rope in great confusion. Few guns were mounted, and these
few were chiefly on the lowest tier. The work was intended for three tiers
of guns, but the embrasures of the second tier were incomplete, and guns
could be mounted on the first and third tiers only.
The complete armament of the work had not yet arrived, but there were
more guns on hand than we could mount or man. The first thing to be con-
sidered was immediate defense. The possibility of a sudden dash by the
enemy, under cover of darkness and guided by the discharged workmen then
in Charleston, demanded instant attention. It was impossible to spread 65
men over ground intended for 650, so some of the embrasures had to be
INSIDE SUMTER IN '61.
53
the
because
7&mZt*Saiia&m&
THE SALLY-PORT OP FORT SUMTER.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN FROM THE WHARF.
bricked up. Selecting those, therefore, essential to artillery defense, and
mounting guns in them, Anderson closed the rest. This was the work of
many days ; but we were in no immediate danger of an artillery attack. The
armament of Moultrie was destroyed ; its guns were spiked, and their car-
riages burned ; and it would take a longer time to put them in condition than
it would to mount the guns of Sumter.
On the parade were quantities of flag-stones standing on end in
masses and columns everywhere. We dared not leave them where they
were, even if they had not _
been in tne way,
mortar shells bursting
among them would have
made the very bomb-proofs
untenable. A happy idea
occurred to some one in au-
thority, and the flag-stones
were arranged two tiers
high in front of the case-
mates, and just under the
arches, thus partly closing
the casemates and making
excellent splinter-proofs.
This arrangement, no doubt,
saved the garrison from many wounds similar to that inflicted on John
Swearer, for it was in passing an opening unprotected by the screen that
he was struck by a fragment of shell.
Moving such immense quantities of material, mounting guns, distributing
shot, and bricking up embrasures kept us busy for many weeks. But order
was coining out of chaos every day, and the soldiers began to feel that they
were a match for their adversaries. Still, they could not shut their eyes to
the fact that formidable works were growing up around them. The seces-
sionists were busy too, and they had the advantage of unlimited labor and
material. Fort Moultrie had its armament again in position, and was receiv-
ing the framework of logs which formed the foundation for its sandbag bomb-
proofs. The Stevens' Point floating battery was being made impregnable by
an overcoat of railroad iron ; and batteries on Morris, James, and Sullivan's
islands were approaching completion. But our preparations were more
advanced than theirs ; and if we had been permitted to open on them at
this time, the bombardment of Sumter would have had a very different ter-
mination. But our hands were tied by policy and instructions.
The heaviest guns in Sumter were three ten-inch columbiads — considered
very big guns in those days. They weighed fifteen thousand pounds each,
and were intended for the gorge and salient angles of the work. We found
them skidded on the parade ground. Besides these there was a large number
of eight-inch columbiads — more than we could mount or man — and a full
supply of 42, 32, and 24-pounders, and some eight-inch sea-coast howitzers.
54
INSIDE SUMTER IN '61
Scale or feet
esplanase
5ALLr-P0RT
ESPLANADE
WHARF
GROUND-PLAN OP FORT SUMTER.
BASED ON AN OFFICIAL DRAWING.
There was an ample supply of shot and shell, and plenty of powder in the
magazines, but friction primers were not abundant and cartridge-bags were
scarce. The scarcity of cartridge-bags drove us to some strange makeshifts.
During the bombardment several tailors were kept busy making cartridge-
bags out of soldiers' flannel shirts, and we
fired away several dozen pairs of woolen
socks belonging to Major Anderson. In the
matter of friction primers strict economy
had to be observed, as we had no means of
improvising a substitute.
Our first efforts in preparation were di-
rected toward mounting the necessary guns
on the lowest tier. These consisted of 42 and
32-pounders, and as the necessary trucks,
gins, and tackle were on hand, the work
went on rapidly. The men were in fine con-
dition and as yet well fed; besides, they
had the assistance of the engineer workmen,
who soon became experts at this kind of work. Meantime a party of
mechanics were making the main gate secure. This was situated at the
middle of the gorge or base of the pentagon (the trace of the work was pen-
tagonal), which was also the south-west side. It was closed by two heavy
iron-studded gates, the outer a folding pair, and the inner arranged on
pulleys, so that it could be raised or lowered at will. It was clear that the
enemy, if he meant to bombard us, would erect batteries on Morris Island,
and thus would be able to deliver an oblique fire on the gate sufficient to
demolish it in a very few minutes. The gate once demolished, a night
assault would become practicable.
To meet this possible emergency the main entrance was closed by a sub-
stantial brick wall, with a man-hole in the middle two feet wide and opposite
to the man-hole in the gate. This wall was about six feet high, and to increase
the security and sweep the wharf, an eight-inch sea-coast howitzer was
mounted on its upper carriage without any chassis, so as to fire through the
man-hole. The howitzer was kept loaded with double canister. To induce
the belief that the folding gates were our sole dependence at this point, their
outer surface was covered with iron.
The lower tier of guns being mounted, the more difficult operation of send-
ing guns up to the third tier began. The terre-plein of the work was about
fifty feet above parade level, — a considerable hoist, — but a pair of shears being
already in position, and our tackle equal to the weight of eight-inch colum-
biads, the work went on amidst much good humor until all the guns of that
caliber were in position.
We had now reached a problem more difficult to solve, namely, sending up
our ten-inch columbiads. We were extremely desirous to have them — or at
least two of them — on the upper tier. They were more powerful guns than
any the enemy had at that time, and the only ones in our possession capable
INSIDE SUMTER IN '61. 55
of smashing the iron-clad defenses which might be constructed against us.
We had rumors that an iron-clad floating battery was being built in Charles-
ton, Avhich the enemy proposed to anchor in some convenient position so as
to breach Sumter at his leisure. We had no faith in the penetrating power
of the eight-inch guns, and if we wished to demolish this floating adversary,
it was necessary that the ten-inch guns should be mounted. Besides, an iron-
clad battery was well on the road to completion at Cumming's Point (twelve
hundred yards from the weakest side of Sumter), which, from what we could
see of it, would be impervious to any less powerful gun.
There was in the fort a large coil of very heavy rope, new, and strong
enough to sustain fifteen thousand pounds, but some of the doubtful work-
men had cut several strands of it at various points on the outside of the coil;
at least we could account in no other way for the damage. Besides, we had
no blocks large enough to receive the rope even if it had been uninjured.
The rope was uncoiled and examined. The portion on the inner side of the
coil was found uninjured, and a few splices gave rope enough for a triple
tackle sixty feet long. The improvisation of blocks of sufficient size and
strength now became the sole remaining difficulty, and it was overcome in
this way : the gun-carriages of those days were made of well-seasoned oak,
and one of them was cut up and the material used for the construction of
blocks. When the blocks were finished the iron-clad battery was shorn of
half its terrors.
The tackle thus improvised was rigged on the shears, the first gun was
rolled into position for hoisting, the sling was attached, and the windlass was
manned. After carefully inspecting every knot and lashing, the officer in
charge gave the word, " Heave away," and the men bent to their work steadily
and earnestly, feeling, no doubt, that the battle with the iron-clad had really
begun. Every eye watched the ropes as they began to take the strain, and
when the gun had fairly left the skids, and there was no accident, the song
which anxiety had suspended was resumed, all hands joining in the chorus,
" On the plains of Mexico," with a sonorous heartiness that might well have
been heard at Fort Moultrie. The gun made the vertical passage of fifty feet
successfully, and was safely landed on the terre-plein. The chassis and
carriage were then sent up, transported to the proper emplacement, and put
in position, and the gun was mounted.
The ten-inch columbiad threw a shot weighing one hundred and twenty-eight
pounds, and it was now necessary that a supply of such shot should be raised.
Of course, they could have been sent up at the derrick, but that would have been
a slow process, and, moreover, it would have required the derrick and the men,
when they were needed for other work. So after retreat roll-call, when the
day's work was over, the men were bantered by some designing sergeant as to
their ability to carry a ten-inch shot up the stairway. Some of the soldiers, full
of confidence and energy, shouldered a shot each and started. They accom-
plished the feat, and the less confident, unwilling to be outdone by comrades no
bigger than themselves, shouldered a shot each and made the passage. In a few
minutes sixty shot were deposited near the gun ; and it became the custom to
56 INSIDE SUMTER. IN '61.
cany up a ten-inch shot after retreat — just for fun — as long as there were
any to carry.
These trivial incidents serve to show the spirit and humor of the men
better than any description. There never was a happier or more contented
set of men in any garrison than the Sumter soldiers. There was no sulkiness
among them, and no grumbling until they had to try then teeth on spun
yarn as a substitute for tobacco. This occurred long before the ration was
reduced, and it produced some of the loudest grumbling ever listened to.
The second ten-inch columbiad was less fortunate than its fellow. It
reached the level of the terre-plein without accident, but almost at the first
haul on the watch tackle to swing it in, it broke away and fell with a dull
thud. There was no mirth in the faces of the men at the watch tackle as
they looked over the edge of the parade wall to see how many of the men at
the windlass were left. The gun had descended, breech first, like a bolt from
a catapult, and had buried itself in the sand up to the trunnions ; but beyond
breaking the transoms of the derrick, no damage was done. The cause of
tho accident was easily discovered. The amateur block-maker, unwilling to
weaken the blocks by too much trimming, had left their upper edges too
sharp, and the strap of the upper block had been cut in consequence. In four
days the derrick was repaired, and the gun safely landed on the terre-plein.
The third ten-inch columbiad was not sent up. It was mounted as a mortar
on the parade, for the purpose of shelling Charleston should that become
advisable. A mortar platform already existed there. A ten-inch top carriage
was placed on it and the gun mounted pointing toward the city.
A laughable incident occurred in connection with this gun soon after it
was mounted. Some of the officers were anxious to try how it would work,
and perhaps to see how true its alignment was, and to advertise to the enemy
the fact that we had at least one formidable mortar in Fort Sumter. At any
rate they obtained permission from Major Anderson to try the gun with a
" very small charge." So, one afternoon the gun was loaded with a blind
shell, and what was considered a " very small charge " of powder. The regu-
lation charge for the gun, as a gun, was eighteen pounds. On this occasion two
pounds only were used. It was not expected that the shell would be thrown over
a thousand yards, and as the bay was clear no danger was anticipated. Every-
thing being in readiness, the gun was fired, and the eyes of the garrison
followed the shell as it described its graceful curve in tho direction of the
city. By the time it reached the summit of its trajectory, tho fact that tho
charge used was not a " very small" one for the gun fired as a mortar became
painfully apparent to every observer, and fears were entertained by somo
that the shell would reach the city, or at least the shipping near the wharves.
But fortunately it fell short, and did no damage beyond scaring the seces-
sionist guard-boat then leaving the wharf for her nightly post of observation.
The guard-boat put back and Sumter was visited by a flag of truce, perhaps
to find out the meaning of our performance. No doubt the explanations
given were satisfactory. No more experiments for range were tried with that
gun, but we knew that Charleston was within range.
INSIDE SUMTER IN '61.
37
Although the full armament of Sumter was not on hand, there were many
more guns than places to put them. This resulted from the fact that
no guns were mounted on the second tier, and because many embrasures on
the first tier were bricked up. There were four unplaced eight-inch colum-
biads after the fort had been satisfactorily garnished with guns. But we
were entirely without mortars. Perhaps this serious defect in our armament,
and perhaps our success with the ten-inch gun mounted as a mortar, induced
Major Anderson to mount his extra eight-inch guns in that way. Morris
Island, twelve hun-
dred yards away, was
the nearest terra
firma to Fort Sumter,
and there the enemy
would plant his most
important batteries.
The more searching
and severe the fire
that could be brought
to bear upon that
island, therefore, the
better. So the four
extra columbiads
were mounted as
mortars to fire in
that direction. "We
had no carriages for
the guns and no plat-
forms. So a trench
was dug in the parade at right angles to the proposed line of fire. A heavy
timber was then embedded in the sand at the bottom of the trench, and
another on the Morris Island side of it, in such a way that a gun resting on
the one and leaning on the other would be supjjorted at an angle of forty-
five degrees. The guns were then placed in notches at equal intervals along
the trench. We had no opportunity to try this novel mortar battery, but
everybody was satisfied that it could have done good service.
It was expected that the walls of Fort Sumter would be able to withstand
the guns which we knew the enemy possessed, but we did not anticipate
importations from abroad. During the bombardment a Whitworth gun of
small caliber, just received from England, was mounted in one of the Morris
Island batteries, and in a few rounds demonstrated its ability to breach the
work. Fortunately its supply of ammunition was limited, and the fire stopped
short of an actual breach. But a few hours more of that Whitworth Im-
pounder would have knocked a hole in our defenses.
A breach was not dreaded by the garrison, for, weak as it was, it could have
given a good account of itself defending a breach. The greatest danger was a
simultaneous attack on all sides. Sixty-four men could not be made very
INTERIOR OF SUMTER AFTER THE SURRENDER, SHOWING THE 8-INCH COI.DMI5IADS
PLANTED \s MORTARS, AND THE CONFEDERATE FLAG FLYING FROM THE DERRICK
BY WHICH THE GUNS WERE RAISED TO THE UPI'ER TIER. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
58 INSIDE SUMTER. IN '61.
effective at a dozen different points. The possibility of the enemy, under
cover of darkness, getting a foothold in force on the narrow bit of riprapping
between tide-water and the foundation of the scarp was ever present in
our minds.
The most likely place to land was the wharf, a stone structure in front of
the main entrance. There an assaulting column might be formed and the
main gate stormed, while the bulk of the garrison was defending the embra-
sures. To checkmate any such attempt, means of blowing the wharf out of
existence were devised. Two five-gallon demijohns filled with powder were
planted as mines, well under the wharf pavement, in such a way as to insure
the total demolition of the structure by their explosion. These mines were
arranged so that both should explode at the same instant. The means of firing
were twofold : first, a powder-hose leading from the mines through a wooden
trough buried under the pavement, and terminating in a dry well just inside
the gate ; second, a long lanyard connected with friction primers inserted in
the corks of the powder demijohns, and extending through the trough into the
well, whence it branched like a bell wire to convenient points inside the fort.
Another place offering special advantages to a storming party was the
esplanade. This was a broad promenade extending the whole length of the
gorge wall on the outside, and paved with immense blocks of dressed granite.
As Fort Sumter was not designed to resist attack by storm, the esplanade
was unswept by any fire. To remedy this defect the stone fougasse was
resorted to. To the uninitiated the " fougasse " looked like a harmless pile
of stones resting against the scarp wall. The only thing that would be likely
to attract his attention was the bin-like inclosure of solid masonry open at
the outer side, which looked like an immense dust-pan, and which he might
think was a rather elaborate arrangement to hold merely a pile of stones
together. There was nothing to indicate that beneath the stones, in the angle
close to the scarp wall, a magazine of gunpowder lay concealed, and that
behind were arrangements for firing it from the inside of the works. These
harmless-looking piles of stones were mines of the deadliest kind. In addi-
tion, two eight-inch sea-coast howitzers were mounted on their upper carriages
only, and placed in front of the main entrance, pointing to the right and left
so as to sweep the esplanade.
The possibility of a hostile landing on the narrow strip of riprapping
between the scarp wall and tide-water still remained to be provided for.
Before secondary defenses were constructed, this was a continuous dead space
on which a thousand men could have found a safe lodgment perfectly screened
from fire and observation. The danger from such a lodgment was, that from
it all our embrasures could have been assaulted at the same time. It was
all-important, therefore, that the entrance by an embrasure should be made as
difficult as possible. The ledge of riprapping was little more than four feet
below the sills of the embrasures, and there would have been no difficulty in
stepping in, if the two or three guards inside were disposed of. This fact was
well known to the enemy, and we felt certain that, if he decided to attempt an
assault in this way, he would consider scaling-ladders unnecessary. In order
INSIDE SUMTER IN '61
59
INTERIOR OF SFMTER AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT, SHOWING THE GATE AND THE GORGE WALL : ALSO ONE
OF THE 8-INCH COLUMBIADS SET AS MORTARS, BEARING ON MORRIS ISLAND. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
to disappoint him, therefore, we removed the riprapping in front of each
embrasure to the depth of four or five feet, rolling the large stones irjto the
water. This gave a height of eight or nine feet to the embrasure sills.
Machicoulis galleries were also erected on all the flanks and faces of the
work. The machicoulis when completed looked like an immense dry-goods
box, set upon the parapet so as to project over the wall some three or four
feet. The beams upon which it rested extended inward to the terre-plein
and were securely anchored down. But the dry-goods box was deceptive.
Inside it was lined with heavy iron plates to make it bullet-proof. That portion
of the bottom which projected beyond the wall was loop-holed for musketry,
and a marksman in the machicoulis could shoot a man, however close he
might be to the scarp wall. But musketry from the machicoulis could hardly
be expected to beat off a determined assault upon the flanks and faces of
the work. To meet this difficulty, hand-grenades were improvised. Shells of
all sizes, from 12-pounders to 10-inch, were loaded, and the fuse-holes stopped
with wooden plugs. The plugs were then bored through with a gimlet, and
friction primers inserted. Behind the parapet at short intervals, and
wherever it was thought they might be useful, numbers of these shell-grenades
were stored under safe cover in readiness for any emergency. The method
of throwing them was simple. Lanyards of sufficient length to reach to
within about four feet of the riprapping were prepared, and fastened securely
at the handle end near the piles of shell-grenades. To throw a grenade, the
soldier lifted it on the parapet, hooked the lanyard into the eye of the friction
primer, and threw the shell over the parapet. When the lanyard reached
its length, the shell exploded. Thus a very few men would be more than a
match for all that could assemble on the riprapping.
60 INSIDE SUMTER IN '6i.
Another contrivance, the " flying fougasse," or bursting barrel, a device of
Captain Truman Seymour, consisted of an ordinary cask or barrel filled with
broken stones, and having in its center a canister of powder, sufficient to
burst the barrel and scatter its contents with considerable force. A fuse con-
nected the powder in the canister with a friction primer in the bung, and the
barrel was exploded by attaching a lanyard to the eye of the primer, and
letting the barrel roll over the parapet, as in the case of the shell-grenade. If
one experiment can justify an opinion, the flying fougasse would have been a
success. When it became known in the fort that one of the barrels was about
to be fired as an experiment, the novelty of the thing attracted most of the
men to the place, and the little crowd attracted the attention of the enemy.
No doubt glasses were focused on the party from every battery within sight.
When everything was ready the barrel was allowed to roll over the parapet,
and an instant afterward a terrific explosion took place. The stones were
thrown in every direction, and the surface of the water was lashed into foam
for a considerable distance. The effect as seen by the secessionists must
have appeared greater than it did to us, although we thought it quite satis-
factory. The Charleston newspapers described the effect of the "infernal
machine" as simply terrific1. Only three of them were constructed, yet for
moral effect an empty barrel set upon the parapet would have been just as good.
In war, plan as we may, much depends upon accident, and the moral effect
of very insignificant incidents is often considerable. For this reason " Witty-
man's Masterpiece" deserves to be mentioned. Wittyman was a German
carpenter, not very familiar with English, and wholly ignorant of military
engineering. His captain had conceived the idea that a cheval-de-frise across
the riprapping at the salient angles of the fort would confine the enemy on
whatever face he landed until he had been treated liberally with shell-
grenades. So Wittyman was ordered to build a cheval-de-frise at the angle
of tha gorge nearest Morris Island. It was easy to see that Wittyman was not
familiar with elievaax-de-frise1 so the captain explained and roughly illustrated
the construction. At last Wittyman seemed to grasp the idea and went to
work upon it forthwith, Perhaps the work was not examined during con-
struction, nor seen by any one but Wittyman until it was placed. But from that
day forward it was the fountain of amusement for the men. No matter how
sick or sad a man might be, let him look at the masterpiece and his ailments
were forgotten. Not a steamer passed, — and they were passing almost every
hour, — but every glass on board was leveled at the masterpiece. But it baffled
every one of them. Not one could guess what it was, or what it was intended
to be ; and after the bombardment was over we learned, quite accidentally,
that it had been set down by the enemy as a means of exploding the mines.
Any description of the siege of Sumter would be incomplete without some
sort of reference to the Star of the West fiasco. At reveille on the 9th of
Januaiy, it became generally known among the men that a large steamer
flying the United States flag was off the bar, seemingly at anchor. There
had been some talk among the men, based upon rumors from Charleston,
that the garrison would either be withdrawn from the harbor or returned to
INSIDE SUMTER IN '61.
61
fliffl
£f»Sr
Fort Moultrie; and there were some who believed the rumors. These
believers were now confident that withdrawal had been determined on, and
that the steamer oft' the liar was the transport come to take them away.
There was no denying that appearances favored the theory, yet there was no
enthusiasm. The men were beginning to feel that they were a match for
their adversaries, and they were loath to leave without proving it. And,
indeed, at that time Sumter was master of the situation. Moultrie had very
few guns mounted, — only one, according to report, — and that fact ought to
have been known to the people
on the Star of the West. It was
known officially in Washington
that fourteen days previously
Major Anderson had spiked the
guns and burned the carriages
at Moultrie, and gun-carriages
cannot be replaced in two weeks
when they have to be fabricat-
ed. Hence Moultrie could not
have been formidable, and as
soon as it should have passed
the battery on Morris Island, it
would have been comparatively
safe.
When the Star of the West
was seen standing in, the nov-
elty of a steamer carrying the
national flag had more attrac-
tions for the men than the breakfast table. They soon made her out to be
a merchant steamer, as the walking-beam, plainly visible as she rounded into
the channel, was unknown on a man-of-war. She had taken the Morris Island
channel, and was approaching at a fair rate of speed. Perhaps every man in
Sumter was on the ramparts, but there was no excitement. But when the
blue puff of smoke from a hidden battery on Morris Island advertised the fact
that she was being tired on, there was great scurrying and scampering among
the men. . The long roll was beaten, and the batteries were manned almost
before the guns of the hidden battery had fired their second shot. As she
approached, a single gun at Fort Moultrie opened at extreme long range, its
shot falling over half a mile short. There seemed to be much perplexity
among our officers, and Major Anderson had a conference with some of
them in a room used as a laundry which opened on the terre-plein of the
sea-flank. The conference was an impromptu one, as Captain Doubleday
and Lieutenant Davis were not of it. But Captain Foster was there, and by
his actions demonstrated his disappointment at the result. He left the laun-
dry, bounding up the two or three steps that led to the terre-plein, smashing his
hat, and muttering something about the flag, of which the words " trample on
it " reached the ears of the men at the guns, and let them know that there was
INTERIOR OF FORT SUMTER — THE 10-INCH COLUMBIA]) BEARING
ON CHARLESTON. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
62 INSIDE SUMTER IN '61.
to be no fighting, on their part at least. Meantime the steamer had worn
ship, and was standing ont again, receiving the fire of the hidden battery in
passing. This is abont all the men saw or knew about the strange vessel
at the time, although she came near enough for them to look down upon her
decks and see that there were no troops visible on her.-fr
With the exception of the mounting of the guns, the preparations described
were chiefly intended to ward off assault. The actions of the enemy now
indicated that he proposed to bombard the work at an early day. If we
would meet Moultrie, and the numerous batteries which were being con-
structed against us, on anything like even terms, we must be prepared to
shoot accurately.
Few artillerymen, without actual experience, have any idea of the diffi-
culty of aiming a gun during a bombardment. They may be able to hit a
target in ordinary practice with absolute certainty, and yet be unable to
deliver a single satisfactory shot in a bombardment. The error from smoke is
difficult to deal with, because it is a variable, depending upon the density of
the smoke clouds which envelop your own and your adversary's batteries.
(Within the writer's experience, a thin veil of fog protected a mass of army
wagons — 900, it was said — from the fire of some 8 or 10 guns, during a
whole forenoon, although the guns were within easy range, and the wagons
could be distinctly seen. Refraction saved them, every shot going over.)
Then danger and its consequent excitement are also disturbing elements,
especially where delicate instruments have to be used. It is easier to lead a
forlorn hope than to set a vernier under a heavy artillery fire. Fortunately,
we had officers of experience in Sumter, and fortunately, too, we had very
few instruments ; one gunner's level and two old quadrants being the extent
of the outfit, with perhaps some breech-sights and tangent-scales. The paucity
of aiming-instruments, and perhaps the experience of some of the officers, led
to the devising of instruments and methods which neither smoke nor excite-
ment could disturb ; and as some of them, in a much more perfect form,
have since been adopted, the rude originals may as well be described here.
Ahning cannon consists of two distinct operations: namely, alignment and
elevation. In the former, according to instructions and practice, the gunner
depends upon his eye and the cannon-sights. But for night firing or when
the enemy is enveloped in smoke, — as he is sure to be in any artillery duel, —
the eye cannot be depended on. Visual aiming in a bombardment is a delusion
and a snare. To overcome this difficulty, on clear days, when all the conditions
were favorable to accuracy, and we could work at our leisure, every gun
in the armament was carefully aimed at all the prominent objects within its
field of fire, and its position marked on the traverse circle, the index being a
pointer securely fastened to the traverse fork. After this had been done,
alignment became as easy as setting a watch, and could be done by night or
day, by the least intelligent soldier in the garrison.
The elevation was more difficult to deal with. The ordinary method by the
use of a breech-sight could not be depended on, even if there had been a
•fc The troops on the Star of the West consisted of 200 men, under Lieut. Ch les R. Woods.— Editors.
INSIDE SUMTER IN '61.
63
v;m;i?
' it -
EFFECT OF THE BOMBARDMENT OX THE BARBETTE GUNS OF
THE SEA FRONT OF" SDMTER. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
sufficient supply of such instruments, because darkness or smoke would render
it inapplicable or inaccurate ; and the two quadrants in the outfit could not be
distributed all over the fort.
Before the correct elevation to carry a shot to a given object can be deter-
mined, it is necessary to know the exact distance of the object. This was
obtained from the coast-survey
chart of the harbor. The neces-
sary elevation was then calcu-
lated, or taken from the tables,
and the gun elevated accord-
ingly by means of the quad-
rant. The question then became,
How can the gunner bring the
gun to this elevation in the heat
of action, and without the use
of a quadrant! There was an
abundance of brass rods, per-
haps a quarter-inch in diame-
ter, in the fort. Pieces of such
rods, eighteen inches long, were
prepared by shaping one end to
fit into a socket on the cheek of
the carriage, and the other into a chisel edge. They were called by the men
pointing rods. A vertical line was then drawn on the right breech of the gun,
and painted white. The non-commissioned officer who attended to this prep-
aration, having carefully elevated the gun with the quadrant for a particular
object, set the pointing rod in the socket, and brought its chisel end down on
the vertical line. The point thus cut was marked and the initials of the object
to be struck with that elevation written opposite. These arrangements,
which originated with Captain Doubleday, were of great value during the
bombardment.
The preparation of Sumter for defense afforded a fine field for ingenuity,
because nothing connected with its equipment was complete. As another
illustration of this ingenuity, the following is in point. It might become
desirable to continue a bombardment into the night, and the casemates,
owing to the partial closing up of the arches with flagstones, were as dark as
dungeons, even on very clear nights. Lights of some kind were absolutely
necessary, but there were no candles and no lamps. There was a light-house
on the fort, however, and the light-keeper had several barrels of oil on hand.
Small tubes of tin, to receive wicks, were made, and fitted into disks of cork
sufficiently large to float them on the surface of the oil. Coffee-cups were
then filled with oil and the floats laid on the surface.
Among the many incidents of the siege may be mentioned the mishap of an
ice-laden Yankee schooner that strayed within range of the secession batteries ;
the accidental solid shot fired at Fort Sumter by an impatient secessionist
in the Cumming's Point battery, and the daring generosity of Mclnerny, a
64
INSIDE SUMTER IN '61,
THE STAR OP THE WEST."
THE SUMTEK GARRISON WATCHING THE FIRING ON THE "STAR OF THE WEST."
Fort Moultrie is shown oil the left, and the smoke of the Morris Island battery on the extreme right.
warm-hearted and loyal Irishman, who did not " cross the broad Atlantic to
become the citizen of only one Shtate," and who cheerfully risked his life
and ruined his Sunday shirt by tearing a white flag from it, that he might
be able to deliver in person his donation of tobacco to the besieged
soldiers. There is one other incident which should find a place in these
reminiscences.
Major Anderson was fully impressed with the solemn responsibilities which
rested upon him when he transferred his command to Sumter. When he
reached Sumter there were no halliards to the flag-staff, and as there was
more pressing work on hand for several days, some time elapsed before
it became possible to display the national flag. At length, however,
halliards were rigged, and everything was ready for the flag. The usual
method of proceeding in such a case would have been to order the sergeant of
the guard to send up the flag, but it was otherwise arranged on this occasion.
A dress-parade was ordered, and the little garrison formed around the
flag-staff, the officers in the center. Presently Major Anderson, with Chap-
lain Harris of Fort Moultrie, who perhaps had been summoned for the
purpose, approached the flag-staff, and the command was brought to
"Attention." The flag, already bent to the halliards, was held by one officer,
and another held the hoisting end of the halliards. The chaplain then, in a
few words, invited those present to join with him in prayer, and Major Ander-
son, receiving the halliards from the officer who till that time had held them,
knelt beside the chaplain, most of the officers and some of the men in the
ranks following his example. Prayers being ended, all rose, and the flag of
INSIDE SUMTER IN '61. 65
Fort Sumter was raised by Major Anderson, and the halliards secured. He
then turned toward the officers and directed that the companies be dismissed.
If any of those who doubted the loyalty to the Union of Major Anderson
could have had but one glimpse of that impressive scene, they would have
doubted no longer.
The weary waiting for war or deliverance which filled up the few weeks
that intervened between the preparations and the actual bombardment
developed no discontent among the men, although food and fuel were getting
scarce. The latter was replenished from time to time by tearing down
sheds and temporary workshops, but the former was a constantly dimin-
ishing quantity, and the men could count on their fingers the number
of days between them and starvation. It was a favorite belief among the
secessionists that the pinchings of hunger would arouse a spirit of mutiny
among the soldiers, and compel Major Anderson to propose terms of
evacuation. But no such spirit manifested itself. On the contrary, the
men exhibited a devotion to their Government and the officers appointed
over them which surprised their enemies, but attracted little attention from
their friends. J
The opening of the bombardment was a somewhat dramatic event. A reliev-
ing fleet was approaching, aU unknown to the Sumter garrison, and General
Beauregard, perhaps with the hope of tying Major Anderson's hands in the
expected fight with that fleet, had opened negotiations with him on the 11th
of April looking toward the evacuation of the fort. But Major Anderson
declined to evacuate his post till compelled by hunger. The last ounce of
breadstuffs had been consumed, and matters were manifestly approaching
a crisis. It was evident from the activity of the enemy that something
important was in the wind. That night we retired as usual. Toward half-
past three on the morning of the 12th we were startled by a gun fired in the
immediate vicinity of the fort, and many rose to see what was the matter.
It was soon learned that a steamer from the enemy desired to communicate
with Major Anderson, and a small boat under a flag of truce was received
and delivered the message. Although no formal announcement of the fact
was made, it became generally known among the men that in one hour
General Beauregard would open his batteries on Sumter.
The men waited about for some time in expectation of orders, but
received none, except an informal order to go to bed, and the information that
reveille would be sounded at the usual hour. This was daylight, fully two
hours off, so some of the men did retire. The majority perhaps remained up,
anxious to see the opening, for which purpose they had all gone on the ram-
parts. Except that the flag was hoisted, and a glimmer of light was visible
at the guard-house, the fort looked so dark and silent as to seem deserted.
The morning was dark and raw. Some of the watchers surmised that
Beauregard was " bluffing," and that there would be no bombardment. But
J So faithful and true have the soldiers of the which were abandoned by all the commissioned
army always been that even very striking exhibi- officers, at which not one of the enlisted men
tions of these qualities are not considered worthy proved untrue. The loyalty of the latter has
of notice. There were military posts in 1861 never been properly appreciated. — J. C.
VOL. I. 5.
66
INSIDE SUMTER IN '61.
CONFEDERATE FLOATING BATTERY IN ACTION AT THE WEST END OF SULLIVAN'S ISLAND.
Colonel Joseph A. Yates, who was a lieutenant in
the attach on Fort Sumter, says in a letter accom-
panying the plan on the next page: "I send a rough
sketch of the floating battery which I commanded ; it is
rough, but from my recollection it is very like her. The
battery was substantially built, flat, heavily timbered
on her shield, with railroad iron laid on it— two courses
of rails tinned inward and outward, so as to form a
pretty smooth surfaee. The bags of sand represented
on the deck were to counterweigh the guns, which
were 32 and 42-pounders. She was struck many timer.,
several shot going entirely through the shield."
promptly at 4:30 a. m. a flash as of distant lightning in the direction of Mount
Pleasant, followed by the dull roar of a mortar, told us that the bombardment
had begun. The eyes of the watchers easily detected and followed the burning
fuse which marked the course of the shell as it mounted among the stars, and
then descended with ever-increasing velocity, until it landed inside the fort
and burst. It was a capital shot. Then the batteries opened on all sides,
and shot and shell went screaming over Sumter as if an army of devils were
swooping around it. As a rule the guns were aimed too high, but all the
mortar practice was good. In a few minutes the novelty disappeared in a
realizing sense of danger, and the watchers retired to the bomb-proofs,
where they discussed probabilities until reveille.
Hal tits of discipline are strong among old soldiers. If it had not been for
orders to the contrary, the men would have formed for roll-call on the open
parade, as it was their custom to do, although mortar-shells were bursting
there at the lively rate of about one a minute. But they were formed under
the bomb-proofs, and the roll was called as if nothing unusual was going on.
They were then directed to get breakfast, and be ready to fall in when
" assembly " was beaten. The breakfast part of the order was considered a
grim joke, as the fare was reduced to the solitary item of fat pork, very
rusty indeed. But most of the men worried down a little of it, and were
" ready " when the drum called them to their work.
INSIDE SUMTER IN '61,
67
By this time it was daylight, and the effects of the bombardment became
visible. No serious damage was being done to the fort. The enemy had
concentrated their fire on the barbette batteries, but, like most inexperienced
gunners, they were firing too high. After daylight their shooting improved,
until at 7:30 a. m., when " assembly " was beaten in Sumter, it had become
fairly good. At " assembly " the men were again paraded, and the orders
of the day announced. The garrison was divided into two reliefs, and the
tour of duty at the guns was to be four hours. Captain Doubleday being
the senior captain, his battery took the first tour.
There were three points to be fired upon, — the Morris Island batteries, the
James Island batteries, and the Sullivan's Island batteries. With these last
was included the famous iron-clad floating battery, which had taken up a
position off the western end of Sullivan's Island to command the left flank of
Sumter. Captain Doubleday divided his men into three parties : the first,
under his own immediate command, was marched to the casemate guns bear-
ing on Morris Island ; the second, under Lieutenant Jefferson C. Davis,
manned the casemate guns bearing on the James Island batteries ; and the
third — without a commissioned officer until Dr. Crawford joined it — was
marched by a sergeant^ to the guns bearing on Sullivan's Island. The
guns in the lower tier, which were the only ones used during the bombard-
ment,— except surreptitiously without orders, — were 32 and 42-pounders,
and some curiosity was felt as to the effect of such shot on the iron-clad
battery. The gunners made excellent practice, but the shot were seen to
bounce off its sides like pease. After battering it for about an hour and a half,
no visible effect had been produced, although it had perceptibly slackened
its fire, perhaps to save ammunition. But it was evident that throwing
32-pounder shot at it, at a mile range, was a waste of iron, and the attention
of the gunners was transferred to Fort Moultrie.
Moultrie was, perhaps, a less satisfactory target than the iron-clad. It
was literally buried under sand-bags, the
very throats of the embrasures being
closed with cotton-bales. The use of cot-
ton-bales was very effective as against
shot, but would have beeii less so against
shell. The fact that the embrasures were
thus closed was not known in Sumter :
tilt after the bombardment. It explained —
what was otherwise inexplicable. Shot
would be seen to strike an embrasure,
and the gunner would feel that he had settled one gun for certain, but even
while he was receiving the congratulations of his comrades the supposed
THE IRON-CLAD FLOATING BATTERY.
FROM A PLAN BYT COLONEL JOSEPH A. YATES.
% The non-cotmnissioned officers in Fort Sumter
were Ordnance-Sergeant James Kearney, U. S. A.,
Quartermaster-Sergeant William H. Hammer, 1st
U. S. Artillery; Regimental Band, 1st Artillery:
Sergeant James E. Galway, Corporal Andrew
Smith; Company E, 1 st Artillery : First Sergeant
Eugene Scheibner, Sergeants Thomas Kirnan,
William A. Harn, and James Chester, Corporals
Owen M'G-uire, Francis J. Oakes, Charles Bring-
hurst, and Henry Ellerbrook ; Company H, 1st
Artillery : First Sergeant John Renehan, Sergeants
James M'Mahon, John Carmody, and John Otto,
Corporal Christopher Costolan. — Editors.
68 INSIDE SUMTER IN '61.
disabled gun would reply. That the cotton-bales could not be seen from
Sumter is not surprising. The sand-bag casemates which covered the guns
were at least eighteen feet thick, and the cotton-bale shutter was no doubt
arranged to slide up and down like a portcullis inside the pile of sand-bags.
The gunners of Sumter, not knowing of the existence of these shutters,
directed their shot either on the embrasures for the purpose of disabling
the enemy's guns, or so as to graze the sand-bag parapet for the purpose of
reaching the interior of the work. The practice was very good, but the effect,
for reasons already stated, was iu considerable.
At the end of the first four hours, Doubleday's men were relieved from
the guns and had an opportunity to look about them. Not a man was visible
near any of the batteries, but a large party, apparently of non-combatants,
had collected on the beach of Sullivan's Island, well out of the line of fire,
to witness the duel between Sumter and Moultrie. Doubleday's men were
not in the best of temper. They were irritated at the thought that they
had been unable to inflict any serious damage on their adversary, and
although they had suffered no damage in return they were dissatisfied. The
crowd of unsympathetic spectators was more than they could bear, and two
veteran sergeants determined to stir them up a little. For this purpose they
directed two 42-pounders on the crowd, and, when no officer was near, fired.
The first shot struck about fifty yards short, and, bounding over the heads of
the astonished spectators, went crashing through the Moultrie House. The
second followed an almost identical course, doing no damage except to the
Moultrie House, and the spectators scampered off in a rather undignified
manner. The Moultrie House was flying a yellow flag at the time, and the
Charleston newspapers discoursed upon the barbarity of firing upon a hospital
flag, forgetting, perhaps, that we also had a hospital in Sumter, which they
treated to red-hot shot during the bombardment. Of course, none of the
officers of Sumter knew anything about the two 42-pounder shot.
The smoke which enveloped the Confederate batteries during the first day,
while not so thick as entirely to obscure them, was sufficiently so to make
visual aiming extremely unreliable ; and during the second day, when Sumter
was on fire, nothing could be seen beyond the muzzles of our own guns. But
the aiming arrangements, due to the foresight and ingenuity of Captain
Doubleday, enabled us to fire with as much accuracy when we could not see
the object as when we could.
Early on the first day several vessels of the fleet were observed off the bar,
and orders were given to dip the flag to them. This was done, and the salute
was returned, but while our flag was being hoisted after the third dip, a shell
burst near the flag-staff and cut the halliards. This accident put the flag
beyond our control. It ran down until the kinky halliards jammed in the
pulley at the mast-head, and the flag remained at about half-staff. This has
been interpreted as a signal of distress, but it was only an accident; There
was no special distress in Sumter, and no signal to that efl intended.
Major Anderson had given orders that only the casern eries should
be manned. While this was undoubtedly prompted by a to save his
INSIDE SUMTER IN '61,
69
men, \t operated also, in some degree, to save the Confederates. Our most pow-
erful batteries and all our shell guns were on the barbette tier, and, being for-
bidden their use, we were compelled to oppose a destructive shell fire with solid
*hot alone. This, especially as we had no mortars, was a great disadvantage.
SEEGEANT JOHN CAEMODY FIRING THE BARBETTE GUNS.
Had we been permitted to use our shell guns we could have set fire to the
barracks and quarters in Moultrie ; for, as it was, we wrecked them badly with
solid shot, although we could not see them. Then the cotton-bale shutters would
have been destroyed, and we could have made it much livelier generally for
our adversaries. This was so apparent to the men, that one of them — a man
v named Carmody — stole up on the ramparts and deliberately fired every bar-
bette gun in position on the. Moultrie side of the work. The guns were already
loaded and roughly aimed, and Carmody simply discharged them in succession;
hence, the effect was less than it would have been if the aim had been care-
fully rectified. But Carmody's effort aroused the enemy to a sense of his dan-
ger. He supposed, no doubt, that Major Anderson had determined to open
his barbette batteries, so he directed every gun to bear on the barbette tier
of Fort Sumter, and probably believed that the vigor of his fire induced
Major Anderson to change his mind. But the contest was merely Carmody
against the Confederate States ; and Carmody had to back down, not because
he was beaten, but because he was unable, single-handed, to reload his guns.
Another amusing incident in this line occurred on the Morris Island side of
the fort. There, in the gorge angle, a ten-inch columbiad was mounted, en
barbette, and re 42-pounders of the casemate battery were making no
70 INSIDE SUMTER IN '6t.
impression on the Cmnming's Point iron battery, the two veteran sergeants
who had surreptitiously fired upon the spectators, as already related, deter-
mined to try a shot at the iron battery from the big gun. As this was a direct
violation of orders, caution was necessary. Making sure that the major was
out of the way, and that no officers were near, the two sergeants stole upstairs
to the ten-inch gun. It was loaded and aimed already, they very well knew,
so all they would have to do was to fire it. This was the work of a few
seconds only. The gun was fired, and those in the secret down below watched
the flight of the shot in great expectations of decided results. Unfortunately
the shot missed; not a bad shot — almost grazing the crest of the battery —
but a miss. A littleness elevation, a very little, and the battery would have
been smashed: so thought the sergeants, for they had great faith in the
power of their gun ; and they determined to try a second shot. The gun was
reloaded, a feat of some difficulty for two men, but to run it " in battery " was
beyond their powers. It required the united efforts of six men to throw the
carriage "in gear," and the two sergeants could not budge it. Things were
getting desperate around them. The secessionists had noticed the first shot,
and had now turned every gun that would bear on that ten-inch gun. They
were just getting the range, and it was beginning to be uncomfortable for the
sergeants, who in a fit of desperation determined to fire the gun " as she was."
The elevating screw was given half a turn less elevation, and the primer was
inserted in the vent. Then one of the sergeants ran down the spiral stairs to
see if the coast were clear, leaving his comrade in a very uncomfortable posi-
tion at the end of the lanyard, and lying flat on the floor. It was getting
hotter up there every second, and a perfect hurricane of shot was sweeping
over the prostrate soldier. Human nature could stand it no longer. The
lanyard was pulled and the gun was fired. The other sergeant was hastening
up the stairway, and had almost reached the top, when he met the gun com-
ing down, or at least trying to. Having been fired " from battery," it had
recoiled over the counter-hurters, and, turning a back somersault, had landed
across the head of the stairway. Realizing in a moment what had happened,
and what would be to pay if they were found out, the second sergeant crept
to the head of the stairway and called his comrade, who, scared almost to
death, — not at the danger he was in, but at the accident, — was still hugging
the floor with the lanyard in his hand. Both got safely down, swearing
eternal secrecy to each other; and it is doubtful if Major Anderson ever
knew how that ten-inch gun came to be dismounted. It is proper to add
that the shot was a capital one, striking just under the middle embrasure
of the iron battery and half covering it with sand. If it had been a trifle
higher it would have entered the embrasure.
The first night of the bombardment was one of great anxiety. The fleet
might send reinforcements ; the enemy might attempt an assault. Both
would come in boats; both would answer in English. It would be horrible
to fire upon friends ; it would be fatal not to fire upon enemies. The night
was dark and chilly. Shells were dropping into the fort at regular intervals,
and the men were tired, hungry, and out of temper. Any party that
1
^
INSIDE SUMTER IN '61.
7i
approached that night would have been rated as enemies upon general prin-
ciples. Fortunately nobody appeared; reveille sounded, and the men oiled
then appetites with the fat pork at the usual hour by way of breakfast.
TJe second day's bombardment began at the same hour as did the first; that
is, on the Sumter side. The enemy's mortars had kept up a very slow fire all
night, which gradually warmed up after daylight as their 1 >atteries seemed to
awaken, until its vigor was about equal
to their fire of the day before. The
fleet was still off the bar — perhaps wait-
ing to see the end. Fire broke out once
or twice in the officers' quarters, and
was extinguished. It broke out again
in several places at once, and we real-
ized the truth and let the quarters burn.
They were firing red-hot shot. This was
about 9 o'clock. As soon as Sumter
was noticed to be on fire the secession-
ists increased the fire of their batteries
to a maximum. In the perfect storm of
shot and shell that beat upon us from
all sides, the flag-staff was shot down,
but the old flag was rescued and nailed
to a new staff. This, with much diffi-
culty, was carried to the ramparts and
lashed to some chassis piled up there
for a trciVerse.
We were not sorry to see the quarters
burn. They were a nuisance. Built for
fire-proof buildings, they were not fire-proof. Neither would they burn up in
a cheerful way. The principal cisterns were large iron tanks immediately under
he roof. These had been riddled, and the quarters below had been deluged
with water. Everything was wet and burned badly, yielding an amount of
pungent piney smoke which almost suffocated the garrison.
The scene inside the fort as the fire gained headway and threatened the
.agazine was an exciting one. It had already reached some of our stores of
loaded shells and shell-grenades. These must be saved at all hazard. Soldiers
brought their blankets and covered the precious projectiles, and thus the most
of them were saved. But the magazine itself was in danger. Already it was
full of smoke, and the flames were rapidly closing in upon it. It was evident
that it must be closed, and it would be many hours before it could be opened
again. During these hours the fire must be maintained with such powder
as we could secure outside the magazine. A number of barrels were roLled
out for this purpose, and the magazine door — already almost too hot to
handle — was closed.
It was the intention to store the powder taken from the magazine in several
safe corners, covering it with damp soldiers' blankets. But safe corners were
A CASEMATE GUN DIKING THE CONFLAGRATION.
72
INSIDE SUMTER IN '61
hard to find, and most of the blankets were already in nse covering loaded
shells. The fire was raging more fiercely than ever, and safety demanded that
the uncovered powder be thrown overboard. This was instantly done, and if
the tide had 1 >een high we should have been well rid of it. But the tide was
low, and the pile of powder-barrels rested on the riprapping in front of the
embrasure. This was observed by the enemy, and some shell guns were
turned upon the pile, producing an explosion which blew the gun at that
embrasure clear out of battery, but did no further damage.
The fire had now enveloped the magazine, and the danger of an explosion
was imminent. Powder had been carried out all the previous day, and it was
more than likely that
enough had sifted
through the cartridge-
bags to carry the fire
into the powder-
chamber. Major An-
derson, his head erect
as if on parade, called
the men around him ;
RUINS OF THE CASEMATES NEAR THE SALLY-PORT, AND OF THE
FLAG-STAFF. FROM PHOTOGRAPHS.
directed that a shot be
fired every five min-
utes ; and mentioned
that there was some
danger of the maga-
zine exploding. Some
of the men, as soon as
they learned what the
real danger was, rushed
to the door of the magazine and hurriedly dug a trench in front of it, which
they kept filled with water until the danger was considered over.
It was during this excitement that ex-Senator Wigfall of Texas visited the
fort. It came the turn of one of the guns on the left face of the work to
fire, — we were now firing once in five minutes, — and as the cannoneer
approached for the purpose of loading, he discovered a man looking in at the
embrasure. The mroi must have raised himself to the level of the embrasure
by grasping the bill with his hands. A short but lively altercation ensued
between the man and the cannoneer, the man pleading to be taken in lest he
should be killed with his own shot and shell. He was hauled in, Thompson,
the cannoneer, first receiving his sword, to the point of which a white hand-
kerchief was attached, not by way of surrender, but for convenience. Once
THE FIRST STEP IN THE WAR.
11
mortar woke the echoes from every nook and corner of the harbor, and in
this the dead hour of night, before dawn, that shot was a sound of alarm
that brought every soldier in the harbor to his feet, and every man, woman,
and child in the city
of Charleston from
their beds. A thrill
went through the
whole city. It was
felt that the Rubi-
c( >n was passed. No
one thought of go-
ing home ; unused
as their ears were
to the appalling
sounds, or the vivid
flashes from the bat-
teries, they stood
for hours fascinated
with horror. After
the second shell the
different batteries
opened their fire on
Fort Sumter, and
by 4: 45 a.m. the fir-
ing was general and
regular. It was a
hazy, foggy morn-
g. About day-
ht, the boat with
aides reached
'eston, and they
ed to General
^ard.
? Sumter did
spond with
ns till 7:30
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1863.
fcring continued without intermission during the 12th, and
|fcg the night of the 12th and 13th. No material change
fkancis w. pickens, go-* a. M. on the 13th, when the barracks in Fort Sumter
CAROLINA, 1861. FROM A ^ ^^ ^^ ^ ^^ rf j,^ ^^g. Ag goon ag
78
THE FIRST STEP IN THE WAR.
this was discovered, the Confederate
batteries redoubled their efforts, to
prevent the fire being extinguished.
Fort Sumter fired at little longer in-
tervals, to enable the garrison to fight
the flames. This brave action, under
such a trying ordeal, aroused great
sympathy and admiration on the part
of the Confederates for Major Ander-
son and his gallant garrison ; this
feeling was shown by cheers when-
ever a gun was fired from Sumter.
It was shown also by loud reflec-
tions on the " men-of-war" outside
the harbor. 3)
About 12:30 the flag-staff of Fort
Sumter was shot down, but it was
soon replaced. As soon as General
Beauregard heard that the flag was
no longer flying, he sent three of his
aides, William Porcher Miles, Roger
A. Pryor, and myself, to offer, and
also to see if Major Anderson would
receive or needed, assistance, in sub-
duing the flames inside the fort. Before we reached it, we saw the United
States flag again floating over it, and began to return to the city. Before
going far, however, we saw the Stars and Stripes replaced by a white
flag. We turned about at once and rowed rapidly to the fort. We were
directed, from an embrasure, not to go to the wharf, as it was mined, and
the fire was near it. We were assisted through an embrasure and conducted
to Major Anderson. Our mission being made known to him, he replied,
"Present my compliments to General Beauregard, and say to him I thank him
for his kindness, but need no assistance." He further remarked that he hoped
the worst was over, that the fire had settled over the magazine, and, as it had
not exploded, he thought the real danger was about over. Continuing, he said,
" Gentlemen, do I understand you come direct from General Beauregard 1 "
The reply was in the affirmative. He then said, " Why ! Colonel Wigfall has
just been here as an aide too, and by authority of General Beauregard, and
SECESSION HALL, CHARLESTON, SCENE OF THE PASSAGE
OF THE ORDINANCE OF SECESSION.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
J, These vessels, part of the second expedition
for the relief of Fort Sumter, were the Baltic (no
guns), the Pawnee (8 9-inch guns), and the Harriet
Lane (1 8-inch gun and 4 32-pounders). The
Pocahontas did not arrive till the afternoon of the
13th. The expedition was in charge of Captain
Gustavus V. Fox (afterward Assistant Secretary of
the Navy), who had visited the fort on the 21st of
March. It had been understood between Secre-
tary Welles and Captain Fox that the movement
should be supported by the Powhatan (1 11 -inch
and 10 9-inch guns) ; but, unknown to Mr. Welles,
and perhaps without full understanding of this
plan, President Lincoln had consented to the
dispatch of the ship to the relief of Fort Pickens,
for which destination it had sailed from New York,
April 6th, under command of Lieutenant Dav' 3
D. Porter. This conflict of plans deprived Capt a i
Fox of the ship which he calls the "fightin
portion " of his fleet ; and to this circumstanc
he attributed the failure of the expedition.
Editors.
THE FIRST STEP IN THE WAR.
79
proposed the same terms of evacuation offered on the 11th instant." We
informed the major that we were not authorized to offer terms ; that we v.
direct from General Beauregard, and that Colonel Wigfall, although an aide-
de-camp to the general, had been detached, and had not seen the general for
several days. Major Anderson at once stated, " There is a misunderstanding
on my part, and I will at once run up my flag and open fire again." After con-
sultation, we requested him not to do so, until the matter was explained to
General Beauregard, and requested Major Anderson to reduce to writing his
understanding with Colonel Wigfall, which he did. However, before we
left the fort, a boat arrived from Charleston, bearing Major D. R. Jones,
assistant adjutant-general on General Beauregard's staff, who offered sub-
stantially the same terms to Major Anderson as those offered on the 11th, and
also by Colonel Wigfall, and which were now accepted.
Thus fell Fort Sumter, April 13th, 1861. At this time fire was still raging in
the barracks, and settling steadily over the magazine. All egress was cut off
except through the lower embrasures. Many shells from the Confederate bat-
teries, which had fallen in the fort and had not exploded, as well as the hand-
grenades used for defense, were exploding as they were reached by the fire. The
wind was driving the heat and smoke down into the fort and into the case-
mates, almost causing suffocation. Major Anderson, his officers, and men were
blackened by smoke and cinders, and showed signs of fatigue and exhaustion,
from the trying ordeal through which they had passed.
It was soon discovered, by conversation, that it was a bloodless battle ; not a
man had been killed or seriously wounded on either side during the entire bom-
bardment of nearly forty hours. Congratulations were exchanged on so happy
a result. Major Anderson stated that he had instructed his officers only to
fire on the batteries and forts, and not to fire on private property.
The terms of evacuation offered by General Beauregard were generous, and
were appreciated by Major Anderson. The garrison was to embark on the
14th, after running up and saluting the United States flag, and to be carried
1
zMl %
FORT SUMTER AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT. FROM A SKETCH MADE IN APRIL, 1861.
JEFFERSON DAVIS, PRESIDENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF Ai>
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
80
THE FIRST STEP IN THE WAR.
81
to the United States fleet. A soldier killed during the salute was buried
inside the fort, the new Confederate garrison uncovering during the impres-
sive ceremonies. Major Anderson and his command left the harbor, bearing
with them the respect and admiration of the Confederate soldiers.]. It was
conceded that he had done his duty as a soldier holding a most delicate trust.
This first bombardment of Sumter was but its " baptism of fire." During
subsequent attacks by land and water, it was battered by the heaviest Union
artillery. Its walls were completely crushed, but the tons of iron projectiles
imbedded in its ruins added strength to the inaccessible mass that surrounded
it and made it impregnable. It was never taken, but the operations of Gen-
eral Sherman, after his march to the sea, compelled its evacuation, and the
Stars and Stripes were again raised over it, April 14th, 1865. ^
J. The officers, uiider General Beauregard, of
the batteries surrounding Fort Sumter were :
Sullivan's Island, Brigadier-General E. G. M.
Dunovant commanding, Lieutenant-Colonel Ros-
well S. Ripley, commanding the artillery: Five-gun
Battery (east of Fort Moultrie), Captain S. Y.
Tupper; Maffit Channel Battery (2 guns) and Mor-
tar Battery Xo. 2 (2 10-inch mortars), Captain
William Butler, Lieutenant J. A. Huguenin; Fort
Moultrie (30 guns), Captain W. R. Calhoun: con-
sisting of Channel Battery, Lieutenants Thomas
M. Wagner, Preston, and Sitgreaves, Sumter
Battery, Lieutenants Alfred Rhett and John
Mitchell, and Oblicpie Battery, Lieutenant C. W.
Parker; Mortar BatteryNo. 1 (2 10-inch mortars)
and Enfilade Battery (4 guns), Captain James H.
Hallonquist, Lieutenants Flemming, Jacob Valen-
tine, and B. S. Burnet ; the Point Battery (1 9-inch
Bahlgren) and the Floating Iran-clad Battery (2
42-pounders and 2 32-pounders), Captain John R.
Hamilton and Lieutenant Joseph A. Yates; the
Moun t Pleasan t Battery ( 2 1 0-inchmortars), Captain
Robert Martin, Lieutenant George N. Reynolds.
Morris Island, Brigadier-General James Simons
commanding, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilmot G. Be
Saussure, commanding the artillery: Major P. F.
Stevens, commanding Cumming's Point Battery
(Blakely gun, which arrived from Liverpool*April
9th, Captain J. P. Thomas; 2 42-pounders, Lieu-
tenant T. Sumter Brownfield; and 3 10-inch
mortars, Lieutenants C. R. Holmes and N. Arm-
strong) and the Stevens Iron-clad Battery (3 8-inch
columbiads), Captain George B. Cuthbert, Lieu-
tenant G. L. Buist ; Trapier Battery (3 10-inch
mortars), Captain J. Gadsden King, Lieutenants
W. D. H. Kirkwood, J. P. Strohecker, A. M. Huger,
and E. L. Parker.
James Island. Major N. G. Evans commanding;
Fort Johnson (battery of 21-pounders), Captain
George S. James : Mortar Batter//, Lieutenants W.
H. Gibbes, H. S. Farley, J. E. McP. Washington,
and T. B. Hayne ; Upper Battery (2 I O-inch mor-
tars), flower Battery (2 10-inch mortars), Captain
S. C. Thayer. — Editors.
j) Under an order from Secretary Stanton, the
same flag that was lowered, April 14th, 1861,
was raised again over Sumter, by Major (then
General) Anderson, on April 14th, 1865, the day
President Lincoln was shot. Of Major Anderson's
former officers, Generals Abner Doubleday and
Norman J. Hall and Chaplain Matthias Harris
were present. The Rev. Henry Ward Beecher
delivered an oration, and other prominent anti-
slavery men attended the ceremony. — Editors.
f»J-M,".-.
VIEW OF CUMMING'S POINT. FKOM A SKETCH MADE AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT.
VOL. I. 6.
NOTES ON THE SURRENDER OF FORT SUMTER.
BY A. R. CHISOLM, COLONEL, C. S. A.
VERY soon after Major Robert Anderson moved with his command into
Fort Sumter from Fort Moultrie, Governor Francis W. Pickens sent
James Fraser, of the Charleston Light Dragoons, to me at my plantation,
fifty miles south of Charleston, with the request that I would assist with my
negroes in constructing batteries on Morris Island. Taking my own negro
men and others from the plantation of my uncle, Robert Chisolm, and that
of Nathaniel Heyward, I was engaged in this work when General Beauregard
arrived to take command. I then informed the governor that it would be
necessary for General Beauregard to have an aide-de-camp who was familiar
with the harbor and with boating; that I was the owner of a large six-oared boat
and six superior oarsmen, that were at his service free of cost. I was thereupon
commissioned lieutenant- colonel, and ordered to report to General Beauregard.
Having visited Fort Sumter five times under a flag of truce, and once after
the surrender, I became well acquainted with most of its officers. During a
visit in company with Captain Samuel W. Ferguson, the officers jokingly
complained of being short of cigars and like luxuries. With General Beau-
regard's approval, the next time duty called us to the fort we presented them
with several cases of claret and boxes of cigars.
April 12th, 1861, I visited the fort in company with James Chesnut, Jr.,
and Captain Stephen D. Lee with the demand for its surrender, and heard
Major Anderson say in conversation with us, "I shall await the first shot, and
if you do not batter us to pieces we shall be starved out in a few days." These
words being communicated to General Beauregard, we were again sent to the
fort, arriving there about 1 : 30 a. m., April 12th. After waiting nearly two hours
for a reply, we sent word to Major Anderson that our orders did not admit of
our waiting any longer. He came to where we were in the guard-room, and
informed us " that we had twice fired on his flag, and that if we did so again
he would open his fire on our batteries." Under our instructions this reply
admitted of no other answer than the one dated April 12th, 1861, 3 : 20 a. m.
[see page 76], which was dictated by Chesnut, written by Lee, and copied by
me. Roger A. Pryor was with us on the second visit, but did not enter the fort,
giving me as a reason that his State, Virginia, had not yet seceded. For
the same reason he declined to fire the signal shot. Moreover, I believe he
was then a member of Congress, and may have been unwilling to compro-
mise himself.
The facts of the surrender of Fort Sumter to ex-Senator Wigf all are these :
General Beauregard, seeing the fort on fire, sent me with a note to General
James Simons, commanding on Morris Island, in which he directed him, if he
could do so without risk to his command, to offer assistance in extinguishing
the .fire. I passed down between Fort Sumter and our batteries ; delivering
my dispatches, I volunteered to go to Fort Sumter, which offer was accepted.
82
NOTES ON THE SURRENDER OF FORT SUMTER. 83
Colonel Wigfall, of Texas, volunteered to accompany me. While bringing my
boat from its moorings in a creek, Wigfall, who was very much excited,
jumped into a small skiff. The flag of the fort, which had been shot away,
reappeared, and Wigfall was ordered to return, but he was out of hearing. I
was ordered to return, and obeyed. Colonel Wigfall climbed through an
embrasure, and, assuming authority from General Beauregard, called upon
Major Anderson to surrender. Major Anderson did not realize the unauthor-
ized nature of Wigfall's mission until the arrival of Captain Stephen D. Lee,
William Porcher Miles, and Roger A. Pryor with an offer direct from Gen-
eral Beauregard, similar to the one Greneral Simons was authorized to make.
Major Anderson was about to renew the action, when Major David R.
Jones arrived with the offer of terms for the surrender of the fort, which were
virtually almost anything that Anderson might ask, in order that we might
get possession before the fleet could reenforce and provision the garrison.
I have always been of the opinion that Major Anderson should not have
surrendered when he did. The fire only consumed the officers' and mens
quarters; the two magazines were uninjured, only one man had been wounded,
the walls were secure, and he still had provisions which would have sustained
his small command until the fleet could both have provisioned and reenforced
him. I was present with Captain Hartstene during the evacuation, and was
astonished to see barrels of pork\ being rolled out and shipped on board the
Isabel, the steamer furnished by General Beauregard to transport Anderson's
men to the fleet. My duty often required that I should pass Fort Sumter
and our guard-boats at night to visit Hartstene, who commanded the poor
boats we used. 1 was rarely seen and had such a contempt for our guards
that on one occasion, having a strong tide in my favor, we did not halt when
shots were fired at us. In fact, we were seldom seen until close to the guards
of the boat we sought. Captain Hartstene was well aware how easy it was to
pass to Fort Sumter and expressed to me his uneasiness on this point; in fact,
one bold officer in command of a navy barge, armed with a boat howitzer,
could have easily cleared the way for a hundred barges with men and sup-
plies to pass to the fort. The night but one previous to the surrender was
very dark. I was ordered to Hartstene between the fort and the fleet in the
main ship-channel, and my boat touched his guards before it was seen. Later
in the war, when Beauregard defended the fort, one of the bravest officers in
his command pronounced the work untenable. Beauregard then informed
me that if necessary he would go there and hold the fort with his staff; that
on no condition would he consent to give it up to General Gillmore. It was
after this that General (then Major) Stephen Elliott made his gallant defense
of the ruins ; when, with the exception of some guns buried under the ruins
of the casemate facing Fort Moultrie, but one small gun remained mounted,
and that was pointed toward the city, being used merely to fire the salutes.
\ Captain J. G. Foster in his report says that the the fort, but with plenty of cartridges [referring to
supply of bread in Sumter failed April 10th, and the lack of material for cartridge-bags] the men
that the last of the damaged rice was served at would have cheerfully fought five or six days, and,
breakfast on the 13th. " The want of provisions," if necessary, much longer, on pork alone, of which
he adds, " would soon have caused the surrenderof we had a sufficient supply." — Editors.
IKjgrjM iilW^£:?4k
THE AWKWARD SQUAD.
WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH.
BY JACOB D. COX, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V., EX-GOVERNOR OF OHIO,
EX-SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
THE wonderful outburst of national feeling in the North in the spring of
1861 has always been a thrilling and almost supernatural thing to those
who participated in it. The classic myth that the resistless terror which some-
times unaccountably seized upon an army was the work of the god Pan might
seem to have its counterpart in the work of a national divinity rousing a
whole people, not to terror, but to a sublime enthusiasm of self-devotion.
To picture it as a whole is impossible. A new generation can only approxi-
mate a knowledge of the "feelings of that time by studying in detail some sep-
arate scenes of the drama that had a continent for its stage. The writer can
only tell what happened under his eye. The like was happening everywhere
from Maine to Kansas. What is told is simply a type of the rest, j
On Friday, the twelfth day of April, 1861, the Senate of Ohio was in session,
trying to go on in the ordinary routine of business, but with a sense of
anxiety and strain which was caused by the troubled condition of national
J In those opening days of the war, the National
Government seemed for the moment to be subor-
dinated to the governments of the States. A rev-
olution in the seceding South had half destroyed
the national legislature, and the national executive
was left without a treasury, without an army, and
without laws adequate to create these at once. At
no time since the thirteen colonies declared their
independence have the State governors and the
State legislators found so important a field of duty
as then. A little hesitation, a little lukewarmness,
would have ended all. Then it was that the in-
tense zeal and high spirit of Governor Andrew of
Massachusetts led all New England, and was ready
to lead the nation, as the men of Concord and Lex-
ington had led in 1775. Then it was that Gov-
ernor Morton of Indiana came to the front with a
masculine energy and burly weight of character
and of will which was typical of the force which
the Great West could throw into the struggle.
Ohio was so situated with regard to West Vir-
ginia and Kentucky that the keystone of the Union
might be said to be now west of the mountains.
Governor Dennison mediated, like the statesman
Le was, between East and West ; and Tod and
Brough, following him by the will of the people
in votes that ran up to majorities of near a hun-
dred thousand, gave that vigorous support to Mr.
Lincoln which showed the earnest nationality of
the "war Democrats" of that day. — J. D. C.
84
WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH. 85
affairs. The passage of " ordinances of secession" by one after another of the
Southern States, and even the assembling of a provisional Confederate govern-
ment at Montgomery, had not wholly destroyed the hope that some peaceful
way out of our troubles would be found ; yet the gathering of an army on the
sands opposite Fort Sumter was really war, and if a hostile gun were fired, we
knew it would mean the end of all effort at arrangement. Hoping almost
against hope that blood would not be shed, and that the pageant of military
array and of a secession government would pass by, we tried to give our
thoughts to business; but there was no heart in it, and the "morning
hour " lagged, for we could not work in earnest, and we were unwilling to
adjourn.
Suddenly a senator came in from the lobby in an excited way, and, catch-
ing the chairman's eye, exclaimed, "Mr. President, the telegraph announces that
the secessionists are bombarding Fort Sumter ! " There was a solemn and
painful hush, but it was broken in a moment by a woman's shrill voice from
the spectators' seats, crying, " Glory to God ! " It startled every one, almost
as if the enemy were in the midst. But it was the voice of a radical friend of
the slave, Abby Kelly Foster, who, after a lifetime of public agitation, believed
that only through blood could his freedom be won, and who had shouted the
fierce cry of joy that the question had been submitted to the decision of the
sword. With most of us, the gloomy thought that civil war had begun in
our own land overshadowed everything else ; this seemed too great a price
to pay for any good, — a scourge to be borne only in preference to yielding
what was to us the very groundwork of our republicanism, the right to
enforce a fair interpretation of the Constitution through the election of
President and Congress.
The next day we learned that Major Anderson had surrendered, and the
telegraphic news from all the Northern States showed plain evidence of a
popular outburst of loyalty to the Union, following a brief moment of dis-
may. That was the period when the flag — The Flag — flew out to the
wind from every housetop in our great cities, and when, in New York,
wildly excited crowds marched the streets demanding that the suspected
or the lukewarm should show the symbol of nationality as a committal to
the country's cause. He that is not for us is against us, was the deep,
instinctive feeling.
Judge Thomas M. Key of Cincinnati,^ chairman of the Judiciary Com-
mittee, was the recognized leader of the Democratic party in the Senate, and
at an early hour moved an adjournment to the following Tuesday, in order,
as he said, that the senators might have the opportunity to go home and
consult their constituents in the perilous crisis of public affairs. No objec-
tion was made to the adjournment, and the representatives took a similar
recess. All were in a state of most anxious suspense, — the Republicans to
know what initiative the Administration at Washington would take, and
the Democrats to determine what course they should follow if the President
should call for troops to put down the insurrection.
% Afterward aide-de-camp and acting judge-advocate on General McClellan's staff.
86 WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH.
Before we met again, Mr. Lincoln's proclamation and call for 75,000 men for
three months' service had been issued, and the great mass of the people of the
North, forgetting all party distinctions, answered with an enthusiasm that
swept politicians off their feet. When we met again on Tuesday morning,
Judge Key, taking my arm and pacing the floor outside the railing, broke out
impetuously, "Mr. Cox, the people have gone stark mad!" — "I knew they
would if a blow were struck against the flag," said I, reminding him of some
previous conversations we had had on the subject. He, with most of the poli-
ticians of the day, partly by sympathy with the overwhelming current of
public opinion, and partly by the reaction of their own hearts against the
theories which had encouraged the secessionists, determined to support the
war measures of the Government and to make no factious opposition to
such State legislation as might be necessary to sustain the Federal
Administration.
The attitude of Mr. Key is only a type of many others, and marks one of
the most striking features of the time. On the 8th of January the usual
Democratic convention and celebration of the battle of New Orleans had
taken place, and a series of resolutions had been passed, in which, professing
to speak in the name of " 200,000 Democrats of Ohio," the convention had
very significantly intimated that this vast organization of men would be found
in the way of any attempt to put down secession until the demands of the
South in respect to slavery were complied with. A few da}7s afterward I was
returning to Columbus from my home in Trumbull county, and meeting upon
the railway train with David Tod, then an active Democratic politician, but
afterward one of our loyal u war governors," the conversation turned on the
action of the convention which had just adjourned. Mr. Tod and I were per-
sonal friends and neighbors, and I freely expressed my surprise that the con-
vention should have committed itself to what must be interpreted as a threat
of insurrection in the North, if the Administration should, in o]3posing seces-
sion by force, follow the example of Andrew Jackson, in whose honor they had
assembled. He rather vehemently reasserted the substance of the resolution,
saying that we Eepublicans would find the 200,000 Ohio Democrats in front
of us, if we attempted to cross the Ohio River. My answer was, " We will give
up the contest if we cannot carry your 200,000 over the heads of you leaders."
The result proved how hollow the party assertions had been, or, perhaps, I
should say, how superficial was the hold of such doctrines upon the mass of
men in a great political organization. At the first shot from Beauregard's
guns in Charleston Harbor these men crowded to the recruiting stations to
enlist for the defense of the national flag and the national union. It was a
popular torrent which no leaders could resist ; but many of these should be
credited with the same patriotic impulse, and it made them nobly oblivious
of party consistency. A few days after the surrender of Sumter, Stephen A.
Douglas passed through Columbus on his way to Washington, and, in response
to the calls of a spontaneous gathering of people, spoke to them from the win-
dow of his bedroom in the hotel. There had been no thought for any of the
common surroundings of a public meeting. There were no torches, no music.
WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH.
87
A dark mass of men filled full the dimly lit street, and called for Douglas
with an earnestness of tone wholly different from the enthusiasm of common
political gatherings. He came half-dressed to his window, and, without any
light near him, spoke solemnly to the people upon the terrible crisis which
had come upon the nation. Men of all parties were there : his own followers
to get some light as to their duty ; the Breckinridge Democrats ready, most of
them, repentantly to follow a Northern leader now that their Southern asso-
ciates were in armed opposition to the Government ; the Republicans eager to
know whether so potent an influence was to be unreservedly on the side of the
nation. I remember well the serious solicitude with which I listened to his open-
ing sentences as I leaned against the railing of the State House park, trying
in vain to see more than a dim outline of the man as he stood at the unlighted
window. His deep, sonorous tones rolled down through the darkness from
above us, an earnest, measured voice, the more solemn, the more impressive,
because we could not see the speaker, and it came to us literally as " a voice
in the night," — the night of our country's unspeakable trial. There was no
uncertainty in his tone ; the Union must be preserved and the insurrection must
be crushed ; he pledged his hearty support to Mr. Lincoln's administration in
doing this ; other questions must stand
aside till the national authority should
be everywhere recognized. I do not
think we greatly cheered him, — it was,
rather, a deep Amen that went up
from the crowd. We went home
breathing more freely in the assur-
ance we now felt that, for a time at
least, no organized opposition to the
Federal Government and its policy of
coercion could be formidable in the
North.
Yet the situation hung upon us like
a nightmare. Garfield and I were lodg-
ing together at the time, our wives
being kept at home by family cares,
and when we reached our sitting-
room, after an evening session of the
Senate, we often found ourselves in-
voluntarily groaning, " Civil war in
our land ! " The shame, the folly, the
outrage, seemed too great to believe,
and we half hoped to wake from it as
from a dream. Among the painful remembrances of those days is the ever-
present weight at the heart which never left me till I found relief in the
active duties of camp life at the close of the month. I went about my
duties (and I am sure most of those with whom I associated did the same) with
the half -choking sense of a grief I dared not think of: like one who is
LIFE-MASK OP STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS. TAKEN BY
LEONARD VOLK SHORTLY BEFORE THE LINCOLN-
DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858.
88
WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH.
mm
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iiiiiiiiiiii
STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS. FROM A DAGUERREOTYPE TAKEN IN 1852.
dragging himself to the ordinary labors of life from some terrible and
recent bereavement.
We talked of onr personal dnty, and though both Garfield and myself had
young families, we were agreed that onr activity in the organization and sup-
port of the Republican party made the duty of supporting the Government
by military service come peculiarly home to us. He was, for the moment,
somewhat trammeled by his half-clerical position, but he very soon cut the
knot. My own path seemed unmistakably plain. He, more careful for his
friend than for himself, urged upon me his doubts whether my physical
strength was equal to the strain that would be put upon it. " I," said he, " am
big and strong, and if my relations to the church and the college can be
loosened, I shall have no excuse for not enlisting ; but you are slender and
WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH. 89
will break clown." It is true I then looked slender for a man six feet high ;
yet I had confidence in the elasticity of my constitution, and the result justi-
fied me, while it also showed how liable one is to mistake in such things.
Garfield found that he had a tendency to weakness of the alimentary system,
which broke him down on every campaign in which he served, and led to his
retiring from the army at the close of 1863. My own health, on the other
hand, was strengthened by outdoor life and exposure, and I served to the
end with growing physical vigor.
AVhen Mr. Lincoln issued his first call for troops, the existing laws made it
necessary that these should be fully organized and offieerefl by the several
States. Then, the treasury was in no condition to bear tlie burden of war
expenditures, and, till Congress could assemble, the President was forced to
rely on the States for means to equip and transport their own men. This
threw upon the governors and legislatures of the loyal States responsibilities
of a kind wholly unprecedented. A long period of profound peace had
made every military organization seem almost farcical. A few inde-
pendent companies formed the merest shadow of an army, and the State
militia proper was only a nominal thing. It happened, however, that I held
a commission as brigadier in this State militia, and my intimacy with
Governor Dennison led him to call upon me for such assistance as I could
render in the first enrollment and organization of the Ohio quota. Arrang-
ing to be called to the Senate chamber when my vote might be needed, I
gave my time chiefly to such military matters as the governor appointed.
Although, as I have said, my military commission had been a nominal thing,
and in fact I had never worn a uniform, I had not wholly neglected theoretic
preparation for such work. For some years, the possibility of a war of seces-
sion had been one of the things which were forced upon the thoughts of
reflecting people, and I had given some careful study to such books of tactics
and of strategy as were within easy reach. I had especially been led to read
military history with critical care, and had carried away many valuable ideas
from that most useful means of military education. I had, therefore, some
notion of the work before us, and could approach its problems with less loss
of time, at least, than if I had been wholly ignorant.
My commission as brigadier-general in the Ohio quota in national service
was dated the 23d of April. Just about the same time Captain George B.
McClellan was requested by Governor Dennison to come to Columbus for
consultation, and, by the governor's request, I met him at the railway station
and took him to the State House. I think Mr. Lars Anderson (brother of
Major Robert Anderson) and Mr. L'Hommedieu of Cincinnati were with
him. The intimation had been given me that he would probably be made
major-general of the Ohio contingent, and this, naturally, made me scan
him closely. He wras rather under the medium height, but inuscularly
formed, with broad shoulders and a well-poised head, active and graceful in
motion. His Whole appearance was quiet and modest, but when drawn out
he showed no lack of confidence in himself. He was dressed in a plain
traveling dress and wore a narrow-rimmed soft felt hat. In short, he seemed
90 WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH.
what he was, a railway superintendent in his business clothes. At the time,
his name was a good deal associated with Beauregard's, and they were spoken
of as young men of similar standing in the engineer corps of the army, and
great things were expected of them both because of their scientific knowledge
of their profession, though McClellan had been in civil life for some years.
McClellan's report on the Crimean war was one of the few important
memoirs our old army had produced, and was valuable enough to give a just
reputation for comprehensive understanding of military organization, and
the promise of ability to conduct the operations of an army.
I was present at the interview which the governor had with him. The des-
titution of the State of everything like military material and equipment was
very plainly put, and the magnitude of the task of building up a small army
out of nothing was not blinked. The governor spoke of the embarrassment
he felt at every step from the lack of practical military experience in his staff,
and of his desire to have some one on whom he could properly throw the
details of military work. McClellan showed that he fully understood the
difficulties there would be before him, and said no man could wholly master
them at once, although he had confidence that if a few weeks' time for prepara-
tion were given, he would be able to put the Ohio division into reasonable form
for taking the field. The command was then formally tendered and accepted.
All of us who were present felt that the selection was one full of promise and
hope, and that the governor had done the wisest thing practicable at the time.
The next morning McClellan requested me to accompany him to the State
arsenal, to see what arms and material might be there. We found a few boxes
of smooth-bore muskets which had once been issued to militia companies and
had been returned rusted and damaged. No belts, cartridge-boxes, or other
accouterments were with them. There were two or three smooth-bore brass
field-pieces, 6-pouuders, which had been honey-combed by firing salutes, and
of which the vents had been worn out, bushed, and worn out again. In a heap
in one corner lay a confused pile of mildewed harness which had been once
used for artillery horses, but was now not worth carrying away. There had
for many years been no money appropriated to buy military material or even
to protect the little the State had. The Federal Government had occasionally
distributed some arms which were in the iiands of the independent uniformed
militia, and the arsenal was simply an empty store-house. It did not take
long to complete our inspection. At the door, as we were leaving the build-
ing, McClellan turned, and, looking back into its emptiness, remarked, half
humorously and half sadly, "A fine stock of munitions on which to begin a
great war ! "
We went back to the State House where a room was assigned us, and we
sat down to work. The first task was to make out detailed schedules and
estimates of what would be needed to equip ten thousand men for the field.
This was a unit which could be used by the governor and Legislature in esti-
mating the appropriations needed then or subsequently. Intervals in this
labor were used in discussing the general situation and plans of campaign.
Before the close of the week McClellan drew up a paper embodying his own
WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH. 91
views, and forwarded it to Lieutenant-General Scott. He read it to me, and
my recollection of it is that he suggested two principal lines of movement
in the West : one to move eastward by the Kanawha Valley with a heavy
column to cooperate with an army in front of Washington; the other to
march directly southward and to open the Valley of the Mississippi. Scott's
answer was appreciative and flattering, without distinctly approving his plan,
and I have never donbted that the paper prepared the way for his appoint-
ment in the regular army, which followed at an early day.j
But in trying to give a connected idea of the first military organization of
the State, I have outrun some incidents of those days which are worth recol-
lection. From the hour the call for troops was published, enlistments began,
and recruits were parading the streets continually. At the capitol the rest-
less impulse to be doing something military seized even upon the members
of the Legislature, and a good many of them assembled every evening upon
the east terrace of the State House to be drilled in marching and facing by
one or two of their own number who had some knowledge of company tac-
tics. Most of the uniformed independent companies in the cities of the State
immediately tendered their services and began to recruit their numbers to the
hundred men required for acceptance. There was no time to procure uni-
forms, nor was it desirable ; for these companies had chosen their own, and
would have to change it for that of the United States as soon as this could
be furnished. For some days companies could be seen marching and drilling,
of which part would be uniformed in some gaudy style such as is apt to pre-
vail in holiday parades in time of peace, while another part would be dressed
in the ordinary working garb of citizens of all degrees. The uniformed files
would also be armed and accoutered, the others would be without arms or
equipments, and as awkward a squad as could well be imagined. The mate-
rial, however, was magnificent and soon began to take shape. The fancy
uniforms were left at home, and some approximation to a simple and useful
costume was made. The recent popular outburst in Italy furnished a useful
idea, and the " Garibaldi uniform " of a red flannel shirt with broad falling
collar, with blue trousers held by a leathern waist-belt, and a soft felt hat for
the head, was extensively copied and served an excellent purpose. It could
be made by the wives and sisters at home, and was all the more acceptable
for that. The spring was opening and a heavy coat would not be much
needed, so that with some sort of overcoat and a good blanket in an impro-
vised knapsack, the new company was not badly provided. The warm scar-
let color reflected from their enthusiastic faces as they stood in line made a
picture that never failed to impress the mustering officers with the splendid
character of the men.
The officering of these new troops was a difficult and delicate task, and, so
far as company officers were concerned, there seemed no better way at the
beginning than to let the enlisted men elect their own, as was in fact done.
In most cases where entirely new companies were raised, it had been by the
1 Scott's answer was dated May 3d, and is given by General E. D. Townsend (then on Scott's staff),
in his "Anecdotes of the Civil War."
92
WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH.
MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.
enthusiastic efforts of some energetic volunteers who were naturally made the
commissioned officers. But not always. There were numerous examples of
self-denial by men who remained in the ranks after expending much labor
and money in recruiting, modestly refusing the honors, and giving way to some
one supposed to have military knowledge or experience. The war in Mexico
in 1846-7 had been our latest conflict with a civilized people, and to have served
in it was a sure passport to confidence. It had often been a service more in
name than in fact ; but the young volunteers felt so deeply their own igno-
rance that they were ready to yield to any pretense of superior knowledge,
and generously to trust themselves to any one who would offer to lead them.
Hosts of charlatans and incompetents were thus put into responsible places at
WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH. 93
the beginning, but the sifting work went on fast after the troops were once
in the field. The election of field-officers, however, ought not to have been
allowed. Companies were necessarily regimented together of which each
could have little personal knowledge of the officers of the others ; intrigue
and demagogy soon came into play, and almost fatal mistakes were made in
selection. The evil worked its cure, but the ill effects of it were long visible.
The immediate need of troops to protect Washington caused most of the
uniformed companies to be united into the first two regiments, which were
quickly dispatched to the East. These off, companies began to stream in from
all parts of the State. On their first arrival they were quartered wherever
shelter could be had, as there were no tents or sheds to make a camp for them.
G-oing to my evening work at the State House, as I crossed the rotunda I saw
a company inarching in by the south door, and another disposing itself for
the night upon the marble pavement near the east entrance ; as I passed on to
the north hall, I saw another that had come a little earlier holding a prayer-
meeting, the stone arches echoing with the excited supplications of some one
who was borne out of himself by the terrible pressure of events around him,
while, mingling with his pathetic, beseeching tones as he prayed for his country,
came the shrill notes of the fife and the thundering din of the ubiquitous
bass-drum from the company marching in on the other side. In the Senate
chamber a company was quartered, and the senators were supplying them
with paper and pens with which " the boys " were writing their farewells to
mothers and sweethearts, whom they hardly dared hope they should see
again. A similar scene was going on in the Representatives' hall, another in
the Supreme Court-room. In the executive office sat the governor, the
unwonted noises, when the door was opened, breaking in on the quiet, business-
like air of the room, — he meanwhile dictating dispatches, indicating answers
to others, receiving committees of citizens, giving directions to officers of com-
panies and regiments, accommodating himself to the willful democracy of our
institutions which insists upon seeing the man in chief command, and will not
take its answer from a subordinate, until in the small hours of the night the
noises were hushed, and after a brief hour of effective, undisturbed work upon
the matters of chief importance, he could leave the glare of his gas-lighted
office and seek a few hoius' rest, only to renew his wearing labors on the
morrow.
On the streets the excitement was of a rougher if not more intense charac-
ter. A minority of unthinking partisans could not understand the strength
and sweep of the great popular movement, and would sometimes venture to
speak out their sympathy with the rebellion, or their sneers at some party
friend who had enlisted. In the boiling temper of the time the quick answer
was a blow ; and it was one of the common incidents of the day for those who
came into the State House to tell of a knock-down that had occurred here or
there, when this popular punishment had been administered to some indis-
creet " rebel-sympathizer."
Various duties brought young army officers of the regular service to the
State capital, and others sought a brief leave of absence to come and offer
94 WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH.
their services to the governor of their native State. Greneral Scott had
planted himself firmly on the theory that the regular army must be the prin-
cipal reliance for severe work, and that the volunteers could only be auxilia-
ries around this solid nucleus which would show them the way to perform
their duty, and take the brunt of every encounter. The young regulars who
asked leave to accept commissions in State regiments were therefore refused,
and were ordered to their own subaltern positions and posts. There can be
no doubt that the true policy would have been to encourage the whole of this
younger class to enter at once the volunteer service. They would have been
field-officers in the new regiments, and would have impressed discipline and
system upon the organization from the beginning. The Confederates really
profited by having no regular army. They gave to the officers who left our
service, it is true, commissions in their so-called "provisional" army, to
encourage them to expect permanent military positions if the war should end
in the independence of the South ; but this was only a nominal organization,
and their real army was made up (as ours turned out practically to be) from the
regiments of State volunteers. Less than a year afterward we changed our pol-
icy, but it was then too late to induce many of the regular officers to take regi-
mental positions in the volunteer troops. I hesitate to declare that this was
not, after all, for the best ; for, although the organization of our army would
have been more rapidly perfected, there are other considerations which have
much weight. The army would not have been the popular thing it was, its
close identification with the people's movement would have been weakened,
and it, perhaps, would not so readily have melted again into the mass of the
nation at the close of the war.
On the 29th of April I was ordered by McClellan to proceed next morning
to Camp Dennison, near Cincinnati, where he had fixed the site for a per-
manent camp of instruction. I took with me one full regiment and half of
another. The day was a fair one, and when about noon our railway train
reached the camping ground, it seemed an excellent place for our work. The
drawback was that the land was planted in wheat and corn, instead of being
meadow or pasture land. Captain Rosecrans (later the well-known general)
met us as McClellan's engineer officer, coming from Cincinnati with a train-
load of lumber. With his compass and chain, and by the help of a small
detail of men, he soon laid off the two regimental camps, and the general
lines of the whole encampment for a dozen regiments. The men of the
regiments shouldered the pine boards, and carried them up to the lines of the
company streets which were close to the hills skirting the valley, and which
opened into the parade and drill ground along the railway. Vigorous work
housed all the men before night, and it was well that it did so, for the weather
changed in the evening, a cold rain came on, and the next morning was a chill
and dreary one. My own headquarters were in a little brick school-house of one
story, and with a single aide (my only staff-officer) we bestowed ourselves for
the night in the little spaces between the pupils' desks and the teacher's pulpit.
The windy, cheerless night was a long one, but gave place at last to a fickle,
changeable day of drifting showers and occasional sunshine, and we were
WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH. 95
roused by our first reveille iu camp. A breakfast was made from some
cooked provisious brought with us, and we resumed the duty of organizing
and instructing the camp. With the vigorous outdoor life and the full
physical and mental employment, the depression which had weighed upon
me since the news of the guns at Sumter passed away, never to return.
New battalions arrived from day to day, the cantonments were built by
themselves, like the first, and the business of instruction and drill was systema-
tized. The men were not yet armed, so there was no temptation to begin too
soon with the manual of the musket, and they were kept industriously employed
in marching in single line, by file, in changing direction, in forming column of
fours from double line, etc., before their guns were put into their hands. Each
regiment was treated as a separate camp with its own chain of sentinels, and
the officers of the guard were constantly busy inspecting the sentinels on post
and teaching guard and picket duty theoretically to the reliefs oft* duty. Schools
were established in each regiment for field and staff as well as for company
officers, and Hardee's " Tactics " was in the hands of everybody who could pro-
cure a copy. One of the proofs of the unprecedented scale of our war prepara-
tion is found in the fact that the supply of the authorized " Tactics " was soon
exhausted, making it difficult to get the means of instruction in the company
schools. The arriving regiments sometimes had their first taste of camp life
under circumstances well calculated to dampen then ardor. The 4th Ohio, under
Colonel Lorin Andrews, president of Kenyon College, came just before a thunder-
storm one evening, and the bivouac that night was as rough a one as his men
were likely to experience for many a day. They made shelter by placing boards
from the fence-tops to the ground, but the fields were level and soon became a
mire under the pouring rain, so that they were a queer-looking lot when they
crawled out in the morning. The sun was then shining bright, however, and
they had better cover for their heads by the next night. The 7th Ohio,
which was recruited in Cleveland and on the "Western Reserve," sent a
party in advance to build some of their huts, and though they too came
in a rain-storm, they were less uncomfortable than some of the others.
In the course of a fortnight all the regiments of the Ohio contingent were
in the camp, except the two that had been hurried to Washington. They
were organized into three brigades. The brigadiers, besides myself, were
Generals J. H. Bates and Newton Schleich. General Bates, who was the
senior, and as such assumed command of the camp in McClellan's absence,
was a graduate of West Point who had served some years in the regular
army, but had resigned and adopted the profession of law. General Schleich
was a Democratic senator, who had been in the State militia, and had been
one of the drill-masters of the Legislative Squad, which had chilled upon the
Capitol terrace. McClellan had intended to make his own headquarters in
the camp ; but the convenience of attending to official business in Cincinnati
kept him in the city. His purpose was to make the brigade organizations
permanent, and to take them as a division to the field when they were a little
prepared for the work. Like many other good plans, it failed to be carried
out. I was the only one of the brigadiers who remained in the service after
96 WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH.
the first enlistment for ninety clays, and it was my fate to take the field with
new regiments, only one of which had been in my brigade in camp. After
General Bates's arrival my own lint was built on the slope of the hillside
behind my brigade, close under the wooded ridge, and here for the next six
weeks was my home. The morning brought its hour of business correspond-
ence relating to the command ; then came the drill, when the parade ground
was full of marching companies and squads. Officers' drill followed, with
sword exercise and pistol practice, and the evening was allotted to schools of
theoretic tactics, outpost duty, and the like.
The first fortnight in cam}3 was the hardest for the troops. The plowed
fields became deep with mud which nothing could remove till steady good
weather should allow them to be packed hard under the continued tramp of
thousands of men. The organization of camp-kitchens had to be learned by
the hardest experience also, and the men who had some aptitude for cook-
ing had to be found by a slow process of natural selection, during which
many an unpalatable meal had to be eaten. A disagreeable bit of informa-
tion soon came to us in the proof that more than half the men had never had
the contagious diseases of infancy. The measles broke out, and we had to
organize a camp-hospital at once. A large barn near by was taken for this
purpose, and the surgeons had their hands full of cases, which, however triv-
ial they might seem at home, were here aggravated into dangerous illness by
the unwonted surroundings, and the impossibility of securing the needed pro-
tection from exposure. The good women of Cincinnati took promptly in
hand the task of providing nurses for the sick and proper diet and delicacies
for hospital use. The Sisters of Charity, under the lead of Sister Anthony, a
noble woman, came out in force, and their black and white robes harmonized
picturesquely with the military surroundings, as they flitted about under the
rough timber framing of the old barn, carrying comfort and hope from one
rude couch to another.
As to supplies, hardly a man in a regiment knew how to make out a requi-
sition for rations or for clothing, and, easy as it is to rail at " red-tape," the
necessity of keeping a check upon embezzlement and wastefulness justified
the staff-bureaus at Washington in insisting upon regular vouchers to support
the quartermasters' and commissaries' accounts. But here, too, men were
gradually found who had special talent for the work. Where everybody had
to learn a new business, it would have been miraculous if grave errors had not
frequently occurred. Looking back at it, the wonder is that the blunders and
mishaps had not been tenfold more numerous than they were.
By the middle of May the confusion had given way to reasonable system,
but we now were obliged to meet the embarrassments of reorganization for three
years, under the President's second call for troops (May 3d). In every company
some discontented spirits wanted to go home, and, to avoid the odium of
going alone, they became mischief-makers, seeking to prevent the whole com-
pany from reenlisting. The growing discipline was relaxed or lost in the solici-
tations, the electioneering, the speech-making, and the other common ar
persuasion. In spite of all these discouragements, however, the daily d
WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH.
97
and instruction went on with some approach to regularity, and our raw
volunteers began to look more like soldiers. Captain Gordon Granger, of the
regular army, came to muster the reenlisted regiments into the three-years
service, and as he stood at the right of the 4th Ohio, looking down the line of
a thousand stalwart men, all in their Garibaldi shirts (for we had not yet got
our uniforms), he turned to me and exclaimed, "My God! that such men
should be food for powder ! " It certainly
was a display of manliness and intelli-
gence such as had hardly ever been seen
in the ranks of an army. There were in
camp at that time, three if not four com-
panies in different regiments that were
wholly made up of under-graduates of
colleges, who had enlisted together, their
officers being their tutors and professors.
And where there was not so striking evi-
dence as this of the enlistment of the best
of our youth, every company could still
show that it was largely recruited from
the best nurtured and most promising
young men of the community.
Granger had been in the South-west
when the secession movement began, and
had seen the formation of military compa-
nies everywhere, and the incessant drill-
ing which had been going on all winter ;
while we, in a strange condition of political paralysis, had been doing nothing.
His information was eagerly sought by us all, and he lost no opportunity of
impressing upon us the fact that the South was nearly six months ahead of us
in organization and preparation. He did not conceal his belief that we were
likely to find the war a much longer and more serious piece of business than
was commonly expected, and that, unless we pushed hard our drilling and
instruction, we should find ourselves at a disadvantage in our earlier encoun-
ters. What he said had a. good effect in making officers and men take more
willingly to the laborious routine of the parade ground and the regimental
school ; for such opinions as his soon ran through a camp, and they were com-
mented upon by the enlisted men quite as earnestly as among the officers.
Still, hope kept the upper hand, and I believe that three-fourths of us still
cherished the belief that a single campaign would end the war.
Though most of our men were native Ohioans, we had in camp two
regiments made up of other material. The 9th Ohio was recruited
from the Germans of Cincinnati, and was commanded by Colonel Robert
McCook. In camp, the drilling of the regiment fell almost completely into
the hands of the adjutant, Lieutenant August Willich (afterward a general of
division), and McCook, who humorously exaggerated his own lack of military
knowledge, used to say that he was only " clerk for a thousand Dutchmen," so
.MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON GRANGER.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
VOL. I. 7
98
WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH.
completely did the care of equipping and providing for his regiment engross
his time and labor. The 10th Ohio was an Irish regiment, also from Cincin-
nati, and its men were proud to call themselves the " Bloody Tinth." The
brilliant Lytle was its commander, and his control over them, even in the
beginning of their service and near the city of their home, showed that they
had fallen into competent hands. It happened, of course, that the guard-
house pretty frequently contained representatives of the 10th, who, on the
short furloughs that were allowed them, took a parting glass too many with
their friends in the city, and came to camp boisterously drunk. But the men
of the regiment got it into their heads that the 13th, which lay just opposite
them across the railroad, took a malicious pleasure in filling the guard-house
with the Irishmen. Some threats had been made that they would go over
and " clean out " the 13th, and one fine evening these came to a head. I sud-
denly got orders from General Bates to form my brigade and march them at
once between the 10th and 13th to prevent a collision that seemed imminent.
The long-roll was beaten as if the drummers realized the full importance of
the first opportunity to sound that warlike signal. tWe marched by the moon-
light into the space between the belligerent regiments ; but Lytle already had
got his own men under control, and the less mercurial 13th were not disposed
to be aggressive, so that we were soon dismissed, with a compliment for our
promptness.
The six weeks of our stay in Camp Dennison seem like months in the retro-
spect, so full were they crowded with new experiences. The change came in
an unexpected way. The initiative taken by the Confederates in West Vir-
ginia had to be met by prompt action, and McClellan was forced to drop his
own plans and meet the exigency. The organization and equipment of the
regiments for the three-years service was still incomplete, and the brigades
were broken up, to take across the Ohio the regiments best prepared to go.
This was discouraging to a brigade commander, for, even with veteran troops,
acquaintanceship between the officer and his command is a necessary condition
of confidence and a most important element of strength. My own assign-
ment to the Great Kanawha district was one I had every reason to be content
with, except that for several months I felt the disadvantage I suffered from
having command of troops which I had never seen till we met in the field.
OAMP DENNISON, NEAR CINCINNATI.
SiS^L. li^L
v ;■____ __
"GOMERY, ALABAMA, SHOWING THE STATE CAPITOL.
FROM A SKETCH MADE IN 1861.
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY.
BY R. BARNWELL RHETT (EDITOR OF THE CHARLESTON "MERCURY," 1860-62).
TWENTY-SIX years have passed since the delegates of six States of the
South that had seceded from the Union met in a convention or Pro-
visional Congress, at the Capitol, at Montgomery, Alabama. Twenty-one
years have elapsed since the close of the war between the States of the North
and the eleven States of the South that entered the Confederate Govern-
ment then and there organized. Most of the men who participated in the
deliberations of that convention are dead, and the few now left will before
long be laid away. Of the debates of that body there is no record, and the
proceedings in secret session have never been published. In Washington
the proceedings of the Congress of the United States were open, and at
the North there was an intelligent, well-informed, powerful public opinion
throughout the war. Not so at the South. Secret sessions were commenced
at Montgomery, and at Richmond almost all important business was trans-
acted away from the knowledge and thus beyond the criticism of the people.
Latterly, accounts of the battles fought have been written from every stand-
point ; but of the course and policy of the Confederate Government, which
held in its hands all the resources of the Southern people, and directed their
affairs, diplomatic, financial, naval, and military, little has been said. During
the war scarcely anything was known except results, and when the war ter-
minated, the people of the South, though greatly dissatisfied, were generally
as ignorant of the management of Confederate affairs as the people of the
North. The arrest and long imprisonment of the President of the Confed-
eracy made of him a representative martyr, and silenced the voice of criticism
at the South. And up to this time little has been done to point out the
causes of the events which occurred, or to develop the truth of history in this
direction. It very well suits men at the South who opposed secession to com-
pliment their own sagacity by assuming that the end was inevitable. Nor
do men identified with the Confederacy by office, or feeling obligation for its
appreciation of their personal merits, find it hard to persuade themselves
that all was done that could be done in " the lost cause." And, in general,
99
IOO
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY.
it may be an agreeable sop to Southern pride to take for granted that supe-
rior numbers alone effected the result. Yet, in the great wars of the world,
nothing is so little proved as that the more numerous always and necessarily
prevail. On the contrary, the facts of history show that brains have ever
been more potent than brawn.
The career of the Confederate
States exhibits no exception to
this rule. Eliminate the good
sense and unselfish earnestness of
Mr. Lincoln, and the great ability
and practical energy of Seward
and Adams, and of Stanton and
Chase from the control of the
affairs of the United States; con-
ceive a management of third-rate
and incompetent men in their
places — will any one doubt that
matters would have ended differ-
ently ? To many it may be unpal-
atable to hear that at the South all
was not done that might have been
done and that cardinal blunders
were made. But what is pleasing
is not always true, and there can be
no good excuse now for suppress-
ing important facts or perverting
history. The time has come when
public attention may with pro-
priety be directed to the realities of that momentous period at the South.
On the 20th of December, 1860, South Carolina passed unanimously the first
ordinance of secession, in these words :
" We, the people of the State of South Carolina in convention assembled, do declare and
ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained, that the ordinance adopted by us in convention
on the twenty-third day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-
eight, whereby the Constitution of the United States of America was ratified, and also, all
Acts and parts of Acts of the General Assembly of this State, ratifying amendments of the said
Constitution, are hereby repealed ; and that the Union now subsisting between South Carolina
and other States, under the name of ' the United States of America,' is hereby dissolved."
On her invitation, six other Southern States sent delegates to a conven-
tion in Montgomery, Alabama, for the purpose of organizing a Confederacy.
On the 4th of February, 1861, this convention assembled. The material
which constituted it was of a mixed character. There were members who
were constitutionally timid and unfit by character and temperament to par-
ticipate in such work as was on hand. Others had little knowledge of public
affairs on a large scale, and had studied neither the resources of the South
nor the conduct of the movement. A number of them, however, were men of
ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE
CONFEDERACY. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY.
101
ripe experience and statesmanlike grasp of the situation — men of large
knowledge, with calm, strong, clear views of the policies to be pursued.
Alexander H. Stephens characterized this convention as " the ablest body
with which he ever served, and singularly free from revolutionary spirit." J
In the organization of the convention, Howell Cobb was chosen to preside,
and J. J. Hooper, of Montgomery, to act as secretary. It was decided to
organize a provisional government under a provisional constitution, which
was adopted on the 8th of February. On the 9th a provisional President
and Vice-President were elected, who were installed in office on the 18th
t< > carry the government into effect. In regard to this election, it was agreed
that when four delegations out of the six should settle upon men, the elec-
tion should take place. Jef-
ferson Davis was put forward
by the Mississippi delega-
tion and Howell Cobb by
that of Georgia. The Florida
delegation proposed to vote for
whomsoever South Carolina
should support. The South
Carolina delegation offered no
candidate and held no meet-
ing to confer upon the matter.
The1 chairman, Mr. R. Barn-
well Rhett, % did not call them
together. Mr. Barnwell, how-
ever, was an active supporter
of Mr. Davis, and it was af-
terward said that while in
Washington in December, as
a commissioner to treat for
the evacuation of Fort Sum-
ter, he had committed himself
to Mr. Davis. At any rate, he
was zealous. Colonel Keitt
afterward stated to the writer
and others in Charleston that
WILLIAM L. YANCEY, MEMBER OF THE CONFEDERATE SENATE,
CONFEDERATE COMMISSIONER TO EUROPE IN 1861.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
J The deputies elected to meet at the Mont-
gomery convention were: South Carolina, E.
Barnwell Rhett, Lawrence M. Keitt, ( '. Gr. Mem-
minger, Thomas J. Withers, Robert W. Barnwell,
James Chesnut, Jr., W. Porcher Miles, and Will-
iam W. Boyce; Florida, Jackson Morton, James
B. Owens, and J. Patton Anderson; Mississippi,
Wiley P. Harris, W. S. Wilson, Walker Brooke,
Alexander M. Clayton, James T. Harrison, William
S. Barry, and J. A. P. Campbell ; Alabama,
Richard W. Walker, Colin J. McRae, William P.
Chilton, David P. Lewis, Robert H. Smith, John
Oill Shorter, Stephen F. Hale, Thomas Fearn, and
Jabez L. M. Curry; Georgia, Robert Toombs,
Martin J. Crawford, Benjamin H. Hill, Augustus
R. Wright, Augustus H. Kenan, Francis S. Bar-
tow, Eugenius A. Nisbet, Howell Cobb, Thomas R.
R. Cobb, and Alexander H. Stephens ; Louisiana,
John Perkins, Jr., Charles M. Conrad, Edward
Sparrow, Alexander De Clouet, Duncan F. Keu-
ner, and Henry Marshall. The Texas delegates
were not appointed until February 14th.
These delegates had been appointed by the con-
ventions of their respective States on the ground
that the people had intrusted the State conven-
tions with unlimited powers. They constituted
% Father of the writer. — Editors.
102
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY.
a majority of the delegation were opposed to Mr. Davis, but that, not having
compared opinions, they did not understand one another, and that Mr. Davis
received the vote of South Carolina, and was elected, by the casting vote of
Mr. Rhett. Personally Mr. Rhett knew little of Mr. Davis. He regarded him
as an accomplished man, but egotisti-
cal, arrogant, and vindictive, without
depth or statesmanship. Besides this,
he judged him not sufficiently in ac-
cord with the movement to lead it.
His speech on the 4th of July, 1858,
between New York and Boston, was
reported as denunciatory of secession-
ists, and as comparing them to " mos-
quitoes around the horns of an ox, who
could annoy, but could do no harm."
The strong Union sentiments uttered
in his New England electioneering torn-,
which secured to him the vote of B. F.
Butler and others at the Democratic
convention at Charleston, in 1860, were
confirmatory of the newspaper report.
As late as November 10th, 1860, after
the South Carolina convention was
called, Mr.*Davis had written a letter,
within the cognizance of Mr. Rhett,
and published by himself since the war,
in which he unmistakably indicated
the opinion that, if South Carolina
seceded, neither Georgia, nor Alabama,
nor Mississippi, nor Louisiana, nor
any other State would secede unless
negotiating friendly relations and for the settle-
ment of all questions of disagreement between the
two governments, was appointed and confirmed.
The commissioners were A. B. Roman, of Louisi-
ana, Martin J. Crawford, of Georgia, and John
Forsyth, of Alabama. An act of February 20th
provided for the repeal of all laws which forbade
the employment in the coasting trade of vessels
not enrolled or licensed, and all laws imposing
discriminating duties on foreign vessels or goods
imported in them. This Provisional Congress of
one House held four sessions, as follows: I. Feb-
ruary 4th-Mareh 16th, 1861; II. April 29th-
May 22d, 1861; III. July 20th-August 22d,
1861; IV. November 18th, 1861-February 17th,
1862 ; the first and second of these at Montgom-
ery, the third and fourth at Richmond, whither the
Executive Department was removed late in May,
1861, — because of "the hostile demonstrations of
the United States Government against Virginia,"
as Mr. Davis says in his "Rise and Fall of the
Confederate Government." — Editors.
ROBERT TOOMBS, FIRST SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE
CONFEDERACY ; MEMBER OF THE CONFEDERATE
SENATE; BRIGADIER-GENERAL, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
both the convention that organized the Confederacy
and its Provisional Congress. On the 8th of Feb-
ruary the Provisional Constitution was adopted,
to be in force one year. On the Oth was passed
the first enactment, providing "That all the
laws of the United States of America in force and
in use in the Confederate States of America
on the first day of November last, and not incon-
sistent with the Constitution of the Confederate
States, be and the same are hereby continued in
force until altered or repealed by the Congress."
The next act, adopted February 14th, continued
in office until April 1st all officers connected with
the collection of customs, and the assistant treas-
urers, with the same powers and functions as
under the Government of the United States. An
act of the 25th of February declared the peaceful
navigation of the Mississippi River free to the
citizens of any of the States upon its borders, or
upon the borders of its navigable tributaries. On
the 25th of February a commission to the Govern-
ment of the United States, for the purpose of
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY.
1 03
lerov pope walkkr, first confederate
m;< retary of war.
from a photograph.
the United States Government should
attempt to coerce South Carolina back
into the Union, or to blockade her ports.
His expectation, at that late period, ap-
parently was that South Carolina would
be left out of the Union alone, and that
the United States Government would
simply collect duties off the bars of
her seaports; and he expressed himself
" in favor of seeking to bring those [the
planting States] into cooperation before
asking for a popular decision upon a new
policy and relation to the nations of the
earth." These views did not strengthen
him with Mr. Rhett for the executive
head of the Southern Confederacy; nor
did the published report of his shedding
tears on retiring from the United States
Senate after the secession of Mississippi.
But Mr. Rhett's cotemporary and second
cousin, Mr. Barnwell, called three times to solicit his vote for Mr. Davis. The
impression was produced upon his mind that he, Mr. Rhett, was the only man
in the delegation opposed to Mr.
Davis. In reply to objections sug-
gested by Mr. Rhett, Mr. Barnwell
said that Mr. Rhett's standard of
the statesmanship requisite was
higher than he might be able to get.
He added that he knew Mr. Davis,
and although he considered him
not a man of great ability, yet
he believed him just and honorable,
and that he would utilize the best
ability of the country, as Monroe and
Polk and others had done, and would
administer the powers intrusted to
him as President, with an eye single
to the interests of the Confederacy.
Upon this presentment Mr. Rhett
concluded to forego his own mistrust,
and to give his vote for Mr. Davis,
along with the rest, as he supposed.
On taking the vote in the conven-
tion (February 9th) Georgia gave
hers to Mr. Cobb, and the other States theirs to Mr. Davis. Georgia then
changed her vote, which elected Mr. Davis unanimously. Mr. Alexander H.
ROBERT BARNWELL RHETT, CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CONFEDERATE PROVISIONAL
CONGRESS. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
104 THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY.
Stephens was chosen Vice-President. | Mr. Rhett was made chairman of the
committee to notify the President-elect, and to present him to the convention
for inauguration. This office he performed in complimentary style, reflecting
the estimate of Mr. Barnwell rather than his own fears. Within six weeks the
Provisional Congress found out that they had made a mistake, and that there
was danger of a division into an administration and an anti-adniinistration
party, which might paralyze the Government. To avoid this, and to confer
all power on the President, they resorted to secret sessions.
Mr. Davis offered the office of Secretary of State to Mr. Barnwell, but he
declined it, and recommended Mr. C. G. Memminger, also of South Carolina,
for the Treasury portfolio, which was promptly accorded to him. Both of
these gentlemen had been cooperationists, and up to the last had opposed
secession. Mr. Barnwell would not have been sent to the State convention
from Beaufort but for the efforts of Edmund Rhett, an influential State sen-
ator. Of Mr. Memminger it was said that when a bill was on its passage
through the Legislature of South Carolina in 1859, appropriating a sum of
money for the purchase of arms, he had slipped in an amendment which
had operated to prevent Governor Gist from drawing the money and procur-
ing the arms. In Charleston he was known as an active friend of the free-
school system and orphan house, a moral and charitable Episcopalian, and a
lawyer, industrious, shrewd, and thrifty. As chairman of the Committee on
Ways and Means in the House of Representatives, he was familiar with the
cut-and-dried plan of raising the small revenue necessary to carry on the
government of South Carolina. Such was his record and experience when
appointed to the cabinet of Mr. Davis. Mr. Memminger received no recom-
mendation for this office from the South Carolina delegation ; nor did the
delegation from any State, so far as known, attempt to influence the Presi-
dent in the choice of his cabinet.
Mr. Robert Toombs, of Georgia, was appointed Secretary of State. This
was in deference to the importance of his State and the public appreciation
of his great mental powers and thorough earnestness, not for the active part
he had taken in the State convention in behalf of secession. In public too
fond of sensational oratory, in counsel he was a man of large and wise views.
Mr. Leroy Pope Walker, of Alabama, was appointed Secretary of War on
the recommendation of Mr. William L. Yancey. Ambitious, without any
special fitness for this post, and overloaded, he accepted the office with the
understanding that Mr. Davis would direct and control its business, which
he did. After differing with the President as to the number of arms to be
imported, and the number of men to be placed in camp in the winter of 1861-62
(being in favor of very many more than the President), he wisely resigned.
Mr. Stephen R. Mallory, of Florida, was appointed Secretary of the Navy. He
was a gentleman of unpretending manners and ordinary good sense, who had
served in the Senate with Mr. Davis, and had been chairman of the Committee
4- The choice was provisional only, but was made permanent on the 6th of November, 1861, when
Mr. Davis and Mr. Stephens were unanimously elected for six years. The Confederate Constitution
made them ineligible to reelection. — Editors.
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY.
ios
State,
great
on Naval Affairs. With some acquaintance with officers of the United States
Navy, and some knowledge of nautical matters, he had small comprehen-
sion of the responsibilities of the office. His efforts were feeble and dilatory,
and he utterly failed to provide for keeping open the seaports of the Confed-
eracy. But he was one of the few who remained in the cabinet to the end.
Mr. Judah P. Benjamin, of Louisiana, was appointed Attorney-General, and
held that office until the resignation of Mr. Walker, when he was transferred
to the post of Secre-
tary of War. Upon
the fall of New Or-
leans, public indig-
nation compelled a
change, and he was
made Secretary of
A man of
fertility of
mind and resource
and of facile charac-
ter, he was the facto-
tum of the President,
performed his bid-
ding in various ways,
and gave him the
benefit of his brains
in furtherance of the
views of Mr. Davis. J)
Although a pro-
visional government
was more free to
meet emergencies
and correct mistakes,
it was determined to
proceed to the forma-
tion of a permanent
government. It was
apprehended that in
the lapse of time and
HOWELL COBB, PRESIDENT OF THE FIRST CONFEDERATE CONGRESS ;
MAJOR-GENERAL, C. S. A. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
j> Mr. Davis's reasons for the selection of the mem-
bers of the first Cabinet are given in his " Rise and
Pall of the Confederate Government " ( New York:
D. Appleton & Co., 1881), Vol. I., pp. 211-3, in
these words :
" After being inaugurated, I proceeded to the forma-
tion of my Cabinet, that is, the heads of the executive
departments authorized by the laws of the Provisional
Congress. The unanimity existing among our people
made this a much easier and more agreeable task than
where the rivalries in the party of an executive have to
be consulted aud accommodated, often at the expense
of the highest capacity and fitness. Unencumbered by
any other consideration than the public welfare, having
no friends to reward or enemies to punish, it resulted
that not one of those who formed my first Cabinet had
borne to me the relation of close personal friendship,
or had political claims upon me; indeed, with two of
them I had no previous acquaintance.
" It was my wish that the Hon. Robert W. Barnwell, of
South Carolina, should be Secretary of State. I had
known him intimately during a trying period of our
joint service in the United States Senate, and he had won
alike my esteem and regard. Before making known to
him my wish in this connection, the delegation of
South Carolina, of which he was a member, had
resolved to recommend one of their number to be
Secretary of the Treasury, and Mr. Barnwell, with
i ob
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY.
change of circumstances and of men, the cardinal points for which the
South had contended, and on which the separation of sections had occurred,
might be lost sight of ; so it was decided to impress at once upon the
new government the constitutional amendments regarded as essential.
The committee, of which Mr. Ehett
was chairman, agreed at its first
meeting that the Constitution of
the United States should "be adopt-
ed, with only such alterations as
experience had proved desirable,
and to avoid latitudinariaii con-
structions. Most of the important
amendments were adopted on mo-
tion of the chairman. But the
limits of this paper do not permit
a specific statement of their char-
acter ancT scope. \
The permanent constitution was
adopted on the 11th of March,
1861, and went into operation, with
the permanent government, at
Richmond, on the 18th of Febru-
ary, 1862, when the Provisional
Congress expired.
Those men who had studied the
situation felt great anxiety about
the keeping open of the ports of
the Confederacy. Much was said
and published about the immediate
" Mr. Memmiuger, of South Carolina, had a high repu-
tation for knowledge of finance. He bore an unimpeach-
able character for integrity and close attention to duties,
and, on the recommendation of the delegation from
South Carolina, he was appointed Secretary of the Treas-
ury, and proved himself entirely worthy of the trust.
"Mr. Walker, of Alabama, was a distinguished mem-
ber of the bar of north Alabama, and was eminent
among the politicians of that section. He was earnestly
recommended by gentlemen intimately and favorably
known to me, and was therefore selected for the War
Department. His was the only name presented from
Alabama." -n „ „
Editors.
\ One of them, offered by Mr. Rhett, and unani-
mously adopted, relates to civil-service reform,
and is in the following words :
" The principal officer In each of the executive depart-
ments, and all persons connected with the diplomatic
service, may be removed from office at the pleasure of
the President. All other civil officers of the executive
department may be removed at any time by the Presi-
dent or other appointing power, when their services are
unnecessary, or for dishonesty, incapacity, inefficiency,
misconduct, or neglect of duty ; and when so removed,
the removal shall be reported to the Senate, together
STEPHEN K. MALLORY, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TO THE
CONFEDERACY. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
characteristic delicacy, declined to accept my offer
to him.
" I had intended to offer the Treasury Department to
Mr. Toombs, of Georgia, whose knowledge on subjects of
finance had particularly attracted my notice when we
served together in the United States Senate. Mr. Barn-
well having declined the State Department, and a col-
league of his, said to be peculiarly qualified for the
Treasury Department, having been recommended for
it, Mr. Toombs was offered the State Department, for
which others believed him to be well qualified.
"Mr. Mallory, of Florida, had been chairman of the
( iommittee on Naval Affairs in the United States Senate,
was extensively acquainted with the officers of the
navy, and for a landsman had much knowledge of
nautical affairs ; therefore he was selected for Secretary
of the Navy.
" Mr. Benjamin, of Louisiana, had a very high reputa-
tion as a lawyer, and my acquaintance with him in the
Senate had impressed me with the lucidity of his intel-
lect, his systematic habits and capacity for labor. He
was therefore invited to the post of Attorney-General.
" Mr. Reagan, of Texas. I had known for a sturdy, hon-
est Representative in the United States Congress, and
his acquaintance with the territory included in the Con-
federate States was both extensive and accurate. These,
together with his industry and ability to labor, indicated
him as peculiarly tit for the office of Postmaster-Gen-
eral.
with the reasons therefor."
R. B. R.
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY.
107
necessity of providing gun-boats and shipping suitable for that purpose.
In the winter of 1801 Mr. C. K. Prioleau, of the firm of John Fraser &
Co., of Liverpool, found a fleet of ten first-class East Indiamen, available
to a buyer at less than half their cost. They belonged to the East India
Company, and had been built in Great Britain for armament if required,
or for moving troops and carrying valuable cargoes and treasure. Four
of them were vessels of great size and power and of the very first class;
and there were six others, which, although smaller, were scarcely inferior for
the required purpose. On surrendering their powers to the British throne,
the company had these steamships for sale. Mr. Prioleau secured the refusal
of this fleet. The total cost of buying, arming, and fitting out the ten ships
and putting them on the Southern coast ready for action was estimated at
$10,000,000, or, say, 40,000 bales of cotton. The harbor of Port Royal, selected
before the war as a coaling station for the United States Navy, with 26 feet
of water at mean low tide, was admirably adapted for a rendezvous and
point of supply. Brunswick, Georgia, was another good harbor, fit for such a
fleet. The proposal was submitted to the Government through a partner
of Mr. Prioleau in Charleston, Mr. George A. Trenholm, who forwarded the
proposition 1 >y his son, William L. Trenholm. Its importance was not at all
comprehended, and it was rejected
by the executive. Captain J. D.
Bulloch, the secret naval agent in
Europe, who had the Alabama built,
states that " the Confederate Gov-
ernment wanted ships to cruise and
to destroy the enemy's mercantile
marine." It was of infinitely more
importance to keep Southern ports
open, but this does not seem to
have been understood until too late.
The opportunity of obtaining these
ships was thrown away. They were
engaged by the British Govern-
ment.
To show the narrow spirit of those
in office, an incident concerning
Captain Maffit, who figured after-
ward in command of the Florida,
may be mentioned. In May, after
the reduction of Fort Sumter, Maf-
fit came from Washington to offer
his services, and when he met the
writer was in a state of indignation and disgust. He said that after having
been caressed and offered a command in the Pacific, he had sneaked away
from Washington to join the Confederacy, and that he had been received by
the Secretary of the Navy as if he (Maffit) had designs upon him.
JUDAH P. BENJAMIN, CONFEDERATE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
UNTIL SEPT. 17TH, 1861; SECOND SECRETARY OF WAR;
THIRD SECRETARY OF STATE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
io8
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY.
The Secretary of War has stated that before the Government moved from
Montgomery 366,000 men, the flower of the South, had tendered their services
in the army. Only a small fraction of the number were received. The Secretary
was worn out with personal applications of ardent officers, and himself
stated that in May, 1861, he was constantly waylaid, in walking the back
way from his office to the Exchange
Hotel, by men offering their lives in
the Confederate cause.
Another instance of narrowness may
be named in the case of William Cut-
ting Hey ward. He was a wealthy rice-
planter and an eminently practical and
efficient man, a graduate at West Point
in the class with Mr. Davis. He went
to Montgomery to tender a regiment.
He sent in his card to the President
and waited for days in the lobby with-
out obtaining an interview, and then
returned home. He finally died from
exposure, performing the duties of a
private in the Home Guard at Charles-
ton. The reason alleged for not ac-
cepting more men was the want of
arms, and Mr. Davis's book is an apol-
ogy for not procuring them. Insisting
that a great war was probable, and in-
augurated on the 18th of February, — there was no declaration of war before
the middle of April and no efficient blockade of the ports for many months, —
yet it was in May that he started Major Huse over to England with instruc-
tions to purchase 10,000 Enfield rifles ! By these facts may be gauged his
estimate of the emergency or of the purchasing ability of the Confederate
States. The provisional constitution provided that " Congress shall appro-
priate no money from the Treasury unless it be asked and estimated for by
the President or some one of the heads of departments, except for the purpose
of paying its own expenses and contingencies." The Congress could, therefore,
do nothing about the purchase of arms without a call from the executive.
But for the Treaty of Paris in 1778, made by Benjamin Franklin, Silas
Dean, and Arthur Lee, with France, the independence of the thirteen original
States would not have been established. It was deemed important in the Pro-
visional Congress of the Confederate States to send commissioners abroad to
negotiate for a recognition of their independence, and, in case of war with the
States of the North, perhaps for assistance. The chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ehett, reported such a resolution, which was unani-
mously adopted. As the treaty-making power of the Government belonged
to the President, Congress could not dictate to him the limit of authority that
should be conferred upon the commissioners, in the negotiations desired. But
CHARLES G. MEMMINGEE, FIRST SECRETARY OF
THE TREASURY TO THE CONFEDERACY.
FROM A STEEL ENGRAVING.
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY.
109
all those who had reflected upon the subject expected the President to give
extensive authority for making treaties. The views held by the chairman were
that the commissioners should be authorized to propose to Great Britain,
France, and other European nations, upon the conditions of recognition and
alliance, that the Confederate States for twenty years would agree to lay no
higher duties on productions imported than fifteen or twenty per cent, ad val-
orem; that for this period, no tonnage duties would be laid on their shipping,
entering or leaving Confederate ports, but such as should be imposed to keep
in order the harbors and rivers ; that the navigation between the ports of the
Confederate States for the same time should be free to the nations entering
into alliance with the Confederate States, while upon the productions and ton-
nage of all nations refusing to recognize their independence and enter into
treaty with them, a discriminating duty of ten per cent, would be imposed.
He believed, moreover, that they should be authorized to make an offen-
sive and defensive league, with special guarantees, as was done in 1778.
Here was a direct and powerful appeal to the interests of foreign nations,
especially England. Would any British Minister have dared to reject
a treaty offering such vast advantages to his country! And if so, when
the fact became known to Parliament, could he have retained his place !
Up to September, 1862, the United
States Government was committed,
both by diplomatic dispatches and by
the action of Congress, to the declara-
tion that the war was made solely to
preserve the Union and with the pur-
pose of maintaining the institutions of
the seceded States, unimpaired and
unaltered. Hence, at this period, the
issue of slavery had not been injected
into diplomacy, and was no obstacle to
negotiating treaties.
When Mr. Yancey received the ap-
pointment at the head of the commis-
sion, Mr. Rhett conferred with him at
length, and found that the commis-
sioner fully concurred in the views
just mentioned. But he surprised Mr.
Rhett by the statement that the Presi-
dent had given no powers whatever
to make commercial treaties, or to give
any special interest in Confederate trade or navigation to any foreign nations,
but relied upon the idea that " Cotton is King." " Then," rejoined Mr. Rhett,
" if you will take my advice, as your friend, do not accept the appointment.
For you will have nothing to propose and nothing to treat about, and must
necessarily fail. Demand of the President the powers essential to the success
of your mission, or stay at home.''
john h. reagan, confederate postmaster-
<;enerai.. from a steel engraving.
no THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY.
On the reassembling of the Provisional Congress in April, ascertaining that
these powers had not been conferred upon the commission, Mr. Ehett pre-
pared a resolution requesting the President to empower the commissioners to
propose to European nations, as the basis of a commercial treaty, a tariff of
duties for 20 years no higher than 20 per cent, ad valorem on their imports
into the Confederate States. This he submitted to Mr. Toombs, the Secretary
of State, who promptly approved it and appeared before the Committee on
Foreign Affairs to urge it. It was reported, with the indorsement of the com-
mittee, to the Congress, and was not opposed in debate ; but Mr. Perkins
moved, as an amendment, six years instead of twenty. As this was carried,
Mr. Rhett moved to lay the resolution on the table, which was done ; and this
was the only effort made to appeal to the interests of foreign nations, to secure
recognition of the independence of the Confederate States, or to obtain assist-
ance. Upon his return from abroad, Mr. Yancey met Mr. Rhett and said :
"You were right, sir. I went on a fool's errand." In December, 1863, at
Richmond, James L. Orr, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
Senate, said to the writer, " The Confederate States have had no diplomacy."
In March, 1863, proposals were made for a loan of $15,000,000 on 7 per cent,
bonds, secured by an engagement of the Confederate Grovernment to deliver
cotton at 12 cents per pound within 6 months after peace. The loan stood
in the London market at 5 per cent, premium ; and the applications for it
exceeded $75,000,000. In the Provisional Congress at Montgomery, Mr.
Stephens proposed that the Confederate Grovernment should purchase cot-
ton at 8 cents per pound, paying in 8 per cent, bonds, running 20 or 30
years. He believed that 2,000,000 bales of the crop of 1860 could be obtained
in that way from the planters, and that, of the crop of 1861, 2,000,000 more
bales might he obtained afterward. By using this cotton as security, or
shipping it abroad, he maintained the finances of the Confederate States
could at once be placed on a solid basis. His plan met with much favor, but
was opposed by the administration and was not carried through. Money for
the long war was to be raised by loans from Confederate citizens on bonds sup-
plemented by the issue of Treasury notes and by a duty on exported cotton.
In April, 1865, after the collapse of the Confederacy, Mr. Barnwell, who
had steadfastly supported Mr. Davis in the Confederate Senate, met the
writer at Greenville, S. C, where Governor Magrath had summoned the
Legislature of the State to assemble. There, in conversation, Mr. Barnwell
explicitly expressed his judgment in the following words : " Mr. Davis never
had any policy ; he drifted, from the beginning to the end of the war."
For practical regret at the issue of the secession movement, the time has
long passed by. The people of the South have reconciled themselves to the
restoration of the Union and to the abolishment of slavery. They have
bravely and strenuously endeavored to go through the transition period of
an enormous change without wreck. In complete harmony with the destinies
of the Union, they are working out the future of the United States faithfully.
This is set down to prevent the suppression of important facts in history,
and in justice to eminent men, now dead, who have been much misunderstood.
(Mb
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, IN 1861. FROM A SKETCH.
JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN 1861.
BY JOHN D. IMBODEN, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, C. S. A.
THE movement to capture Harper's Ferry, Virginia, and the fire-arms
manufactured and stored there was organized at the Exchange Hotel
in Richmond on the night of April 16th, 1861. Ex-Governor Henry A. Wise
was at the head of this purely impromptu affair. The Virginia Secession
Convention, then sitting, was by a large majority " Union " in its sentiment till
Sumter was fired on and captured, and Mr. Lincoln called for seventy-five thou-
sand men to enforce the laws in certain Southern States. Virginia was then,
as it were, forced to " take sides," and she did not hesitate. I had been one
of the candidates for a seat in that convention from Augusta county, but had
been overwhelmingly defeated by the " Union " candidates, because I favored
secession as the only " peace measure " Virginia could then adopt, our aim
being to put the State in an independent position to negotiate between the
United States and the seceded Gulf and Cotton States for a new Union, to
be formed on a compromise of the slavery question by a convention to be
held for that purpose.
Late on April 15th I received a telegram from " Nat " Tyler, the editor of
the "Richmond Enquirer," summoning me to Richmond, where I arrived
the next day. Before reaching the Exchange Hotel I met ex-Governor
Wise on the street. He asked me to find as many officers of the armed
and equipped volunteers of the inland towns and counties as I could,
and request them to be at the hotel by 7 in the evening to confer about
a military movement which he deemed important. Not many such
officers were in town, but I found Captains Turner Ashby and Richard
Ashby of Fauquier county, Oliver R. Funsten of Clarke county, all
commanders of volunteer companies of cavalry; also Captain John A.
Harman of Staunton — my home — and Alfred M. Barbour, the latter
ex-civil superintendent of the Government works at Harper's Ferry. •&
These persons, with myself, promptly joined ex-Governor Wise, and a plan
-& See page 125 for a letter of Mr. Barbour, regarding the security of the armory. — Editopr.
in
I 12
JACKSON AT HAKPEH'S FEURY IN 1861
for the capture of Harper's Ferry was at once discussed and settled upon.
The movement, it was agreed, should commence the next day, the 17th, as
soon as the convention voted to secede, — provided we could get railway
transportation and the concurrence of Governor Letcher. Colonel Edmund
Fontaine, president of the Virginia Central railroad, and John S. Barbour,
president of the Orange and Alexandria and Manassas Gap railroads, were
sent for, and joined us at the hotel near midnight. They agreed to put the
necessary trains in readiness
next day to obey any request
of Governor Letcher for the
movement of troops.
A committee, of which I was
chairman, waited on Governor
Letcher after midnight, and,
arousing him from his bed, laid
the scheme before him. He
stated that he would take no
step till officially informed that
the ordinance of secession was
passed by the convention. He
was then asked if contingent
upon the event he would next
day order the movement by
telegraph. He consented. We
then informed him what companies would be under arms ready to move at a
moment's notice. All the persons I have named above are now dead, except
John S. Barbour, " Nat " Tyler, and myself.
On returning to the hotel and reporting Governor Letcher's promise, it was
decided to telegraph the captains of companies along the railroads mentioned
to be ready next day for orders from the governor. In that way I ordered
the Staunton Artillery, which I commanded, to assemble at their armory by
4 p. M. on the 17th, to receive orders from the governor to aid in the capture
of the Portsmouth Navy Yard. This destination had been indicated in all
our dispatches, to deceive the Government at Washington in case there should
be a " leak " in the telegraph offices. Early in the evening a message had been
received by ex-Governor Wise from his son-in-law Doctor Garnett of Wash-
ington, to the effect that a Massachusetts regiment, one thousand strong, had
been ordered to Harper's Ferry. Without this reenforcement we knew the
guard there consisted of only forty-rive men, who could be captured or driven
away, perhaps without firing a shot, if we could reach the place secretly.
The Ashbys, Funsten, Harman, and I remained up the entire night. The
superintendent and commandant of the Virginia Armory at Richmond, Cap-
tain Charles Dimmock, a Northern man by birth and a West Point graduate,
was in full sympathy with us, and that night filled our requisitions for
ammunition and moved it to the railway station before sunrise. He also
granted one hundred stand of arms for the Martinsburg Light Infantry, a
THE PALMETTO REGIMENT PARADING IN CHARLESTON, 8. C,
EN ROUTE FOR RICHMOND. PROM A SKETCH.
JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN 1861,
"3
new company just formed. All these I receipted for and saw placed on the
train. Just before we moved out of the depot, Alfred Barbour made an
unguarded remark in the car, which was overheard by a Northern traveler, who
immediately wrote a message to President Lincoln and paid a negro a dollar
to take it to the telegraph office. This act was discovered by one of our party,
who induced a friend to follow the negro and take the dispatch from him.
This perhaps prevented troops being sent to head us off.
My telegram to the Staunton Artillery produced wild excitement, and spread
rapidly through the county, and brought thousands of people to Staunton
during the day. Augusta had been a strong Union county, and a doubt was
raised by some whether I was acting under the orders of Governor Letcher.
VOL. I.
u4
JACKSON AT HARPER' S FERRY IN 1861
To satisfy them, niy brother, George W. Imboden, sent a message to me at
Gordon sville, inquiring under whose authority I had acted. On the arrival of the
train at Gordonsville, Captain Harman received the message and replied to it
in my name, that I was acting by order of the governor. Harman had been of the
committee, the night before, that waited on Governor Letcher, and he assumed
that by that hour — noon — the convention must have voted the State out of
the Union, and that the governor had kept his promise to send orders by
wire. Before we reached Staunton, Harman handed me the dispatch and told
me what he had done. I was annoyed by his action till the train drew up at
Staunton, where thousands of people were assembled, and my artillery com-
pany and the West Augusta Guards (the finest infantry company in the
valley) were in line. Major-General Kenton Harper, a native of Pennsylvania,
" a born soldier," and Brigadier-General William H. Harman, both holding
commissions in the Virginia militia, — and both of whom had won their spurs
in the regiment the State had sent to the Mexican war, — met me as I alighted,
with a telegram from Governor Letcher ordering them into service, and
referring them to me for information as to our destination and troops. Until
I imparted to them confidentially what had occurred the night before, they
thought, as did all the people assembled, that we were bound for the Ports-
mouth Navy Yard. For prudential reasons, we said nothing to dispel this
illusion. The governor in his dispatch informed General Harper that he was
to take chief command, and that full written instructions would reach him en
route. He waited
till after dark,
and then set out
for Winchester
behind a good
team. Brigadier-
General Harman
was ordered to
take command of
the trains and of
all troops that
might report en
route. (See map,
page 113.)
About sunset we
took train ; our
departure was an
exciting and af-
teCting SCene. At THE COURT-HOUSE, CHARLESTOWN, VA., WHERE JOHN BROWN AND HIS ASSOCIATES
PVmvlrkTTaci-innfi in were tried and sentenced, from a photograph.
the night, the Monticello Guards, Captain W. B. Mallory, and the Albemarle
Rifles, under Captain R. T. W. Duke, came aboard. At Culpeper a rifle com-
pany joined us, and just as the sun rose on the 18th we reached Manassas.
The Ashbys and Funsten had gone on the day before to collect their
•*>"" #
-^:,
—\t'jh>>»
JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN 1861,
!15
MAP OF HARPER'S FERRY.
cavalry companies, and also the famous "Black Horse Cavalry," a superb
body of men and horses, under Captains John Scott and Welby Carter of
Fauquier. By marching across the Blue Ridge, they were to rendezvous near
Harper's Ferry.
Ashby had sent
men on the night
of the 17th to
cut the wires be-
tween Manassas
Junction and Al-
exandria, and to
keep them cut
for several days.
Our advent at
the Junction
astounded the
quiet people of
the village. Gen-
eral Harman at
once " impress-
ed" the Manassas
Gap train to take the lead, and switched two or three other trains to that line
in order to proceed to Strasburg. I was put in command of the foremost
train. We had not gone five miles when I discovered that the engineer could
not be trusted. He let his fire go down, and came to a dead standstill on a
slight ascending grade. A cocked pistol induced him to fire up and go ahead.
From there to Strasburg I rode in the engine-cab, and we made full forty
miles an hour with the aid of good dry wood and a navy revolver.
At Strasburg we left the cars, and before 10 o'clock the infantry com-
panies took up the line of march for Winchester. I now had to procure horses
for my guns. The farmers were in their corn-fields, and some of them agreed
to hire us horses as far as Winchester, eighteen miles, while others refused.
The situation being urgent, we took the horses by force, under threats of
being indicted by the next grand jury of the county. By noon we had a suffi-
cient number of teams. We followed the infantry down the Valley Turnpike,
reaching Winchester just at nightfall. The people generally received us very
coldly. The war spirit that bore them up through fom* years of trial and
privation had not yet been aroused.
General Harper was at Winchester, and had sent forward his infantry by
rail to Charlestown, eight miles from Harper's Ferry. In a short time a train
returned for my battery. The farmers got their horses and went home rejoic-
ing, and we set out for our destination. The infantry moved out of Charles-
town about midnight. We kept to our train as far as Halltown, only four miles
from the ferry. There we set down our guns to be run forward by hand
to Bolivar Heights, west of the town, from which we could shell the place if
necessary.
n6
JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN 1861,
MHIBI
lllllPilllllllli
-
%%5.
|%
The well-known raid of John Brown npon Har-
per's Ferry, Virginia, for the purpose of freeing
slaves by force of arms, occurred on the evening of
Sunday, the 17th of October, 1859. His party,
including himself and five negroes (three of whom
were fugitive slaves), consisted of 22 men, three of
whom remained at the rendezvous on the Mnrvland
side of the Potomac. The others crossed by the
bridge and seized the United States armory and
arsenal, and during the next eighteen hours were
busy in arousing slaves, cutting telegraph wires,
providing defenses against attack, and imprisoning
citizens. They were at last besieged in the engine-
house by a large number of citizeus and militia, to
JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN 1861,
117
A little before dawn of the next day, April 18th, a brilliant light arose
from near the point of confluence of the Shenandoah and Potomac rivers.
General Harper, who up to that moment had expected a conflict with the
Massachusetts regiment supposed to be at Harper's Ferry, was making his
dispositions for an attack at daybreak, when this light convinced him that
the enemy had fired the arsenal and fled. He marched in and took posses-
sion, but too late to extinguish the flames. Nearly twenty thousand rifles
and pistols were destroyed. The workshops had not been fired. The people
of the town told us the catastrophe, for such it was to us, was owing to
declarations made the day before by the ex-superintendent, Alfred Barbour.
He reached Harper's Ferry, via Washington, on the 17th about noon, and,
collecting the mechanics in groups, informed them that the place would be capt-
ured within twenty-four hours by Virginia troops. He urged them to protect
the property, and join the
Southern cause, promising,
if war ensued, that the place
would be held by the South, and
that they would be continued at
work on high wages. His influence
with the men was great, and most of
them decided to accept his advice. But
Lieutenant Roger Jones, who com-
manded the little guard of forty-
five men, hearing what was going
on, at once took measures
to destroy the place ^
if necessary. Trains
of gunpowder
I
u 4>\r*\e^i
-
THE ENGINE-HOUSE, HARPER'S FERRY — " JOHN BROWN'S FORT," IN' WHICH HE WAS CAPTURED.
whom were added, on the morning of Tuesday, a
force of United States marines, sent from Wash-
ington under Colonel Robert E. Lee and Lieuten-
ants Green and J. E. B. Stuart. The marines
battered down the door of the engine-house and
captured the insurgents, after a brave resistance.
In the conflict John Brown was wounded ; his sons
Watson and Oliver were mortally wounded, and
eight others of the party were killed. Five, in-
cluding another son, Owen Brown, escaped. Seven
were captured, and, after trial and conviction,
were hanged at Charlestown, Virginia, — John
Brown on the 2d of December, 1859; John E.
Cook, Edwin Coppoc, John A. Copeland (a mulat-
to), and Shields Green (a negro) on the 16th of
December ; and Aaron D. Stevens and Albert Haz-
lett on the lGth of the following March. Three
citizens and a number of negroes were killed by
the insurgents, and others were wounded.
Editors.
Xi.o-0
,x-
db-f 6
u8
JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN 1861.
were laid through the
buildings to be fired. In
the shops the men of
Southern sympathies
managed to wet the
powder in many places
during the night, render-
ing it harmless. Jones's
troops, however, held
the arsenal buildings
and stores, and when
their commander was
advised of Harper's rapid
approach the gunpowder
was fired, and he crossed
into Maryland with his
handful of men. So
we secured only the ma-
chinery and the gun and
pistol barrels and locks,
which, however, were
sent to Richmond and
Columbia, South Caro-
lina, and were worked
over into excellent arms.
[See note, page 125.]
Within a week about
thirteen hundred Vir-
ginia volunteers had as-
sembled there. As these
companies were, in fact, a
part of the State militia,
they were legally under
command of the three
brigadiers and one ma-
jor-general of militia, who had authority over this, that, or the other organiza-
tion. These generals surrounded themselves with a numerous staff, material
for which was abundant in the rank and file of the volunteers ; for instance, in
my battery there were at least a dozen college graduates of and below the grade
of corporal. Every fair afternoon the official display in Harper's Ferry of
" fuss and feathers " would have done no discredit to the Champs Elysees.
One afternoon, six or eight days after our occupation, General Harper
sent for me, as the senior artillery officer (we then had three batteries, but all
without horses), to say he had been told that a number of trains on the Balti-
more and Ohio railroad would try to pass us in the night, transporting
troops from the West to Washington, and that he had decided to prevent
COLONEL ROBERT E. LEE.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN BEFORE THE WAR.
April 23d, 1861, Robert E. Lee, with the rank of major-general, was
appointed by Governor Letcher commander-in-chief of the military and
naval forces of the State of Virginia, and assumed charge of the military
defenses of the State. June 8th, 1861, in accordance with the proclamation
of Governor Letcher, he transferred the command to the Confederate
States, but he remained the ranking officer of the Virginia military forces.
JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN 1861,
119
. .
MARYLANO HEIGHTS.
LOUDOUN HEIGHTS.
them at the risk of bringing on a battle. He ordered the posting of guns
so as to command the road for half a mile or more, all to be accurately
trained on the track by the light of clay, and ready to be discharged at any
moment. Infantry companies were stationed to fire into the trains, if the
artillery failed to stop them. Pickets were posted out two or three miles,
with orders to fire signal-guns as soon as the first troop-laden train should
pass. About 1 o'clock at night we heard the rumbling of an approach-
ing train. The long roll was beat; the men assembled at their assigned
positions and in
silence awaited the
sound of the sig-
nal-guns. A nerv-
ous cavalryman
was the vedette. As
the train passed
him (it was the
regular mail) he
thought he saw
soldiers in it, and
fired. Pop ! pop !
pop ! came down
tlie road from suc-
cessive sentries.
Primers were in-
serted and lan-
yards held taut, to be pulled when the engine should turn a certain point
four hundred yards distant from the battery. By great good luck Colonel
William S. H. Baylor, commanding the 5th Virginia regiment, was with
some of his men stationed a little beyond the point, and, seeing no troops
aboard the train, signaled it to stop. It did so, not one hundred yards beyond
where the artillery would have opened on it. When the first excitement was
over, he demanded of the conductor what troops, if any, were on board, and
was told there was "one old fellow in uniform asleep on the mail-bags
in the first car." Entering that car with a file of soldiers, he secured the
third prisoner of war taken in Virginia. It proved to be Brigadier-General
W. S. Harney, of the United States army, on his way from the West to
Washington, to resign his commission and go to Europe rather than engage
in a fratricidal war. He surrendered with a pleasant remark, and was taken
to General Harper's headquarters, where he spent the night. On his assur-
ance that he knew of no troops coming from the West, Harper ordered us
all to quarters. Next morning General Harney was paroled to report in
Richmond, and was escorted to a train about to leave for Winchester. He
was a fine-looking old soldier, and as he walked down the street to the depot
he saw all our forces except the cavalry. He was accompanied socially by
two or three of our generals and a swarm of staff-officers. He cast his
glance over the few hundred men in sight, and turning to General Harper,
I heard him inquire, with a merry twinkle in his eye, " Where is your army
HARPER'S FERRY, LOOKING DOWN THE POTOMAC.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN FROM THE HILL ABOVE THE TOWN.
120
JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN 1861
encamped, general?" Harper's face crimsoned as lie replied, "Excuse me
from giving information." Harney smiled, and said politely, "Pardon me
for asking an improper question, but I had forgotten I was a prisoner." He
went on to Richmond, was treated with marked courtesy, and in a day or
two proceeded to Washington.
In a few days our forces began to increase by the arrival of fresh volunteer
companies. Being only a captain, I was kept very busy in trying to get my
battery into the best condition. We had no caissons and but insufficient har-
ness. For the latter I sent to Baltimore, purchasing on my private credit. In the
same way I ordered from Richmond red flannel shirts and other clothing for
all my men, our uniforms being too fine for camp life. The governor subse-
quently ordered these bills to be paid by the State treasurer. We found at
the armory a large number of very strong horse-carts. In my battery were
thirty or more excellent young mechanics. By using the wheels and axles
of the carts they soon constructed good caissons, which served us till after
the first battle of Bull Run.
We had no telegraph line to Richmond except via Washington, and the
time of communication by mail was two days. General Harper found it so
difficult to obtain needed munitions and supplies, that about the last of April
he decided to send me to the governor, who was my intimate friend, with a
requisition for all we needed, and verbal instructions to make to him a full
statement of our necessitous and defenseless condition, in case General Robert
Patterson, who was re-
ported with a Federal
force at Chambers-
burg, should move
against us. When I
arrived in Richmond,
General Robert E. Lee
had been placed in
command of all the
Virginia forces by the
governor, and by an
ordinance every mi-
litia officer in the
State above the rank
of captain had been
decapitated, and the
governor and his mil-
itary council had been
authorized to fill va-
cancies thus created.
This was a disastrous blow to " the pomp and circumstance of glorious war" at
Harper's Ferry. Militia generals and the brilliant " staff " were stricken down,
and their functions devolved, according to Governor Letcher's order of
April 27th, upon Thomas J. Jackson, colonel commandant, and James W.
HARPER'S FERRY, FROM THE MARYLAND SIDE.
The railway bridge was destroyed by the Confederates on the 13th of June, 1861.
Two days later, on the approach of "Union forces under General Robert Patter-
son, near Williauisport, and under Colonel Lew Wallace at Romney (see foot-
note page 127), General Joseph E. Johnston (who had succeeded Colonel Jack-
son in command on the 23d of May), considering the position untenable, with-
drew the Confederate army to Winchester.
JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN 1861,
I 2 1
Massie, major aiicl assistant adjutant-general, who arrived during the first
week of May.
This was " Stonewall " Jackson's first appearance on the theater of the war.
I spent one day and night in Richmond, and then returned to camp, arriv-
ing about 2 p. m. What a revolution three or four days had wrought ! I could
scarcely realize the change. The militia generals were all gone, and the staff
had vanished. The commanding colonel and his adjutant had arrived, and
were occupying a small room in the little wayside hotel near the railroad
bridge. Knowing them both, I immediately sought an interview, and deliv-
ered a letter and some' papers I had brought from General Lee. Jackson and his
adjutant were at a little pine table figuring
upon the rolls of the troops present. They
were dressed in well-worn, dingy uniforms
of professors in the Virginia Military Insti-
tute, where both had recently occupied chairs.
Colonel Jackson had issued and sent to the
camps a short, simple order assuming the
command, but had had no intercourse with
the troops. The deposed officers had nearly
all left for home or for Richmond in a high
state of indignation. After an interview of
perhaps a half hour I proceeded to my camp
on the hill, and found the men of the 5th Vir-
ginia regiment, from my own county, in
assembly, and greatly excited. They were
deeply attached to their field-officers, and re-
garded the ordinance of the convention as an
outrage on freemen and volunteers, and were
discussing the propriety of passing denunci-
atory resolutions. On seeing me they called
for a speech. As I did not belong to the regiment, I declined to say any-
thing, but ordered the men of the Staunton Artillery to fall into line. Then I
briefly told them that we were required to muster into service either for twelve
months or during the war, at our option, and urged them to go in for the full
period of the war, as such action would be most creditable to them, and a good
example to others. They unanimously shouted, " For the war ! For the war!"
Before they were dismissed the ceremony of mustering in was completed, and
I proudly took the roll down to Colonel Jackson with the remark, "There,
colonel, is the roll of your first company mustered in for the war." He looked
it over, and, rising, shook my hand, saying, "Thank you, captain — thank you ;
and please thank your men for me." He had heard that there was dissatisfac-
tion in the camps, and asked me to act as mustering officer for two other artil-
lery companies present. Before sunset the rolls were returned. This prompt
action of the batteries was emulated the next day by the other troops, and all
were mustered in. Within a week Governor Letcher wisely appointed
Major-General Harper colonel of the 5th Virginia, Brigadier- General Har-
■
GENERAL THOMAS J. (" STONEWALL ")
JACKSON. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
122 JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN 1861.
man lieutenant-colonel, and Colonel Baylor major, and I venture to say no
regiment in either army was better officered, as the fame it won in the
" Stonewall " brigade will prove. The presence of a master mind was visible
in the changed condition of the camp. Perfect order reigned everywhere.
Instruction in the details of military duties occupied Jackson's whole time.
He urged the officers to call upon him for information about even the minutest
details of duty, often remarking that it was no discredit to a civilian to be
ignorant of military matters. He was a rigid disciplinarian, and yet as gen-
tle and kind as a woman. He was the easiest man in our army to get
along with pleasantly so long as one did his duty, but as inexorable as fate in
exacting the performance of it ; yet he would overlook serious faults if he saw
they were the result of ignorance, and would instruct the offender in a kindly
way. He was as courteous to the humblest private who sought an inter-
view for any purpose as to the highest officer in his command. He despised
superciliousness and self-assertion, and nothing angered him so quickly as to
see an officer wound the feelings of those under him by irony or sarcasm.
When Jackson found we were without artillery horses, he went into no
red-tape correspondence with the circumlocution offices in Richmond, but
ordered his quartermaster, Major John A. Harman, to proceed with men to
the Quaker settlements in the rich county of Loudoun, famous for its good
horses, and buy or impress as many as we needed. Harman executed his
orders with such energy and dispatch that he won Jackson's confidence, and
remained his chief quartermaster till the day of Jackson's death.
By Jackson's orders I took possession of the bridge across the Potomac
at Point of Rocks, twelve miles below Harper's Ferry, and fortified the Vir-
ginia end of the bridge, as we expected a visit any night from General B. F.
Butler, who was at the Relay House on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. It
was my habit to keep awake all night to be ready for emergencies, and to
sleep in the day-time, making daily reports, night and morning, to Jackson.
One Sunday afternoon, a little over a week after we occupied this post, I was
aroused from my nap by one of my men, who said there were two men in
blue uniforms (we had not yet adopted the gray) riding about our camp, and
looking so closely at everything that he believed they were spies. I went
out to see who they were, and found Jackson and one of his staff. As I
approached them, he put his finger on his lips and shook his head as a signal
for silence. In a low tone he said he preferred it should not be known he had
come there. He approved of all I had done, and soon galloped away. I after-
ward suspected that the visit was simply to familiarize himself with the line
of the canal and railroad from Point of Rocks to Harper's Ferry preparatory
to a sharp bit of strategy which he practiced a few days later.
From the very beginning of the war the Confederacy was greatly in need
of rolling-stock for the railroads. We were particularly short of locomo-
tives, and were without the shops to build them. Jackson, appreciating
this, hit upon a plan to obtain a good supply from the Baltimore and Ohio
road. Its line was double-tracked, at least from Point of Rocks to Martins-
burg, a distance of 25 or 30 miles. We had not interfered with the running
JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN 1861,
123
PEN SKETCH OF GENERAL JACKSON, DRAWN
FROM LIFE, NEAR HALL'S BLUFF,
PROBAHLV IN 1861.
of trains, except on the occasion of the arrest
of General Harney. The coal traffic from
Cumberland was immense, as the Washing-
ton government was accumulating supplies
of coal on the seaboard. These coal trains
passed Harper's Ferry at all hours of the day
and night, and thus furnished Jackson with
a pretext for arranging a brilliant " scoop."
When he sent me to Point of Rocks, he
ordered Colonel Harper with the 5th Vir-
ginia Infantry to Martinsburg. He then
complained to President Garrett, of the
Baltimore and Ohio, that the night trains,
eastward bound, disturbed the repose of
his camp, and requested a change of sched-
ule that would pass all east-bound trains by
Harper's Ferry between 11 and 1 o'clock in
the day-time. Mr. Garrett complied, and
thereafter for several days we heard the con-
stant roar of passing trains for an hour
before and an hour after noon. But since
the "empties" were sent up the road at
night, Jackson again complained that the nuisance was as great as ever, and,
as the road had two tracks, said he must insist that the west-bound trains
should pass during the same two hours as those going east. Mr. Garrett
promptly complied, and we then had, for two hours every day, the liveliest
railroad in America. One night, as soon as the schedule was working at its
best, Jackson sent me an order to take a force of men across to the Maryland
side of the river the next day at 11 o'clock, and, letting all west-bound trains
pass till 12 o'clock, to permit none to go east, and at 12 o'clock to obstruct
the road so that it would require several days to repair it. He ordered the
reverse to be done at Martinsburg. Thus he caught all the trains that were
going east or west between those points, and these he ran up to Winchester,
thirty-two miles on the branch road, where they were safe, and whence they
were removed by horse-power to the railway at Strasburg. I do not remem-
ber the number of trains captured, but the loss crippled the Baltimore and
Ohio road seriously for some time, and the gain to our scantily stocked
Virginia roads of the same gauge was invaluable.
While we held the Point of Rocks bridge, J. E. B. Stuarfc (afterward so
famous as a cavalry leader) was commissioned lieutenant-colonel, and reported
to Colonel Jackson for assignment to duty. Jackson ordered the consolidation
of all the cavalry companies into a battalion to be commanded by Stuart,
who then appeared more like a well-grown, manly youth than the mature
man he really was. This order was very offensive to Captain Turner Ashby,
at that time the idol of all the troopers in the field, as well he might be, for a
more brave and chivalrous officer never rode at the head of well-mounted
124
JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN 1861
troopers. Ashby was older than Stuart, and he thought, and we all believed,
that he was entitled to first promotion. When not absent scouting, Ashby spent
his nights with me at the bridge. He told me of Jackson's order, and that
he would reply to it with his resignation. I expostulated with him, although
he had all my sympathies. I urged him to call upon Colonel Jackson that
night. It was only twelve miles by the tow-path of the canal, and on his
black Arabian he could make it in less than an hour. I believed Jackson
would respect his feelings and leave his company out of Stuart's battalion. I
ventured to write a private letter
to Jackson, appealing in the strong-
est terms for the saving of Ashby
to the service. The result of his
night ride was that Jackson not
only relieved him from the obnox-
ious order, but agreed to divide the
companies between him and Stuart,
and to ask for his immediate pro-
motion, forming thus the nuclei of
two regiments of cavalry, to be
filled as rapidly as new companies
came to the front. One of these
regiments was commanded at first
by Colonel Angus McDonald,
with Ashby as lieutenant-colonel,
and in a few months Ashby was
promoted to its full command.
Ashby got back to Point of Rocks
about 2 in the morning, as happy
a man as I ever saw, and completely
enraptured with Jackson. From that night on, the affection and confidence of
the two men were remarkable. A trip Ashby had made a few days before to
Chambersburg and the encampment of General Robert Patterson was the
real reason for Jackson's favor. Ashby had rigged himself in a farmer's suit
of homespun that he had borrowed, and, hiring a plow-horse, had i^ersonated
a rustic horse-doctor. With his saddle-bags full of some remedy for spavin
or ringbone, he had gone to Chambersburg, and had returned in the night
with an immense amount of information. The career of Ashby was a romance
from that time on till he fell, shot through the heart, two days before the
battle of Cross Keys.
May 23d, 1861, Colonel Jackson was superseded in command at Harper's
Ferry by Brigadier-General Joseph E. Johnston. When General Johnston
arrived several thousand men had been assembled there, representing nearly all
the seceded States east of the Mississippi River. Johnston at once began the
work of organization on a larger scale than Jackson had attempted. He
brigaded the troops, and assigned Colonel Jackson to the command of the ex-
clusively Virginia brigade. The latter was almost immediately commissioned
COLONEL ROGER JONES. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN 1861
12',
brigadier-general, and when on the 15th of Jnne Johnston withdrew from Har-
per's Ferry to Winchester, he kept Jackson at the front along the Baltimore
and Ohio road to observe General Patterson's preparations. Nothing of mnch
importance occurred for several weeks, beyond a little affair near Martinsburg
in which Jackson captured about forty men of a reconnoitering party sent out
by Patterson. His vigilance was ceaseless, and General Johnston felt sure, at
Winchester, of ample warning of any aggressive movement of the enemy.
Ou the 2d of January, 1861, Alfred M. Barbour
(mentioned in the foregoing paper), Superinten-
dent of the United States Armory at Harper's
Ferry, wrote to Captain William Maynadier of the
Ordnance Bureau, Washington, in part as follows:
•• I have reason to apprehend that some assault will
be made upon the United States Armory at Harper's
Ferry. My reasons I do not feel at liberty to disclose.
They may or they may not be well founded. I deem it
my duty to inform you that there is no regularly organ-
ized defense for the post. The armorers have been formed
into volunteer companies, and arms and ammuni-
tion furnished them. . . . But the armory might be
taken and destroyed ; the arms might be abstracted and
removed or destroyed ; vast amount of damage might be
done to the Government property before the companies
could be notified or rallied. ... I cannot be held re-
sponsible for consequences at present, unless the Gov-
ernment itself sees to the protection of its property" by
placing reliable regularly drilled forces to sustain me. I
do not look to personal consequences at all. I look to the
duty of protecting the property of the Federal Govern-
ment now under my charge."
The next day Major (now General) Henry J.
Hunt was assigned to commaud at Harper's Ferry,
and Lieutenant Boger Jones was ordered to report-
to him with a small force from Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania. Major Hunt, in response to his re-
quest for instructions, accompanied by a statement
of the weakness of his position, was directed by the
Secretary of War (Holt) to avoid all needless irri-
tation of the public mind. April 2d Major Hunt
was ordered to other service, and the command
devolved upon Lieutenant Jones (now Colonel
and Inspector-General, I'. S. A.), who, in a letter
to the Editors, gives the following account of the
destruction of the armory :
" From an early day after I reported with my detachment
of sixty men from Carlisle, it became evident that a de-
fense of the valuable Government interests at Harper's
Ferry would be impracticable unless large reenforce-
lnents were sent there; and as there was every reason
for believing that this would not be done, I early became
convinced that there was but one course to pursue-
viz., to destroy what could not be defended. The chances
for the capture or destruction of my small force — re-
duced ou April 18th to 45 men — were overwhelming, but
I counted on the unorganized and undisciplined state of
the troops to be sent against me, on their surprise and
bitter disappointment, as circumstances favoring our
escape.
" On the Sunday preceding the seizure of the armory,
a wealthy miller of the village came to me and offered to
be the bearer of any message I might care to send to the
Secretary of War [Mr. Simon Cameron], sayiug he knew
him intimately and that he believed Mr. Cameron would
heed and give due consideration to any representation
coming from him. Having full confidence in the gentle-
man, I intrusted him with a message to Mr. Cameron,
to the effect that if he would save for the Government
the arms, etc., etc., at the armory, troops must be sent
there at once and by the thousand. I further charged
this gentleman to go to Washington that night, and not
delay until the next morning, as he had intended — all of
which he promised to do and none of which he did. But
of his failure and change of purpose I was ignorant until
his return to the Ferry Wednesday evening, when I
learned that fear of the consequences of his mission,
voluntarily assumed, had made him abandon it. Mon-
day was passed in anxious expectation; the silence of
Tuesday added to my anxiety, which culminated on the
following morning, when Ex-Superintendent Barbour,
fresh from the convention at Richmond, appeared upon
the scene, told \\ hal had been done, and announced that
within twenty-four hours the forces of the State of Vir-
nia would be iu possession of the armory.
" As I was acting entirety on my own judgment and
responsibility, it was apparent I must not act prema-
turely, before the danger was self-evident and imminent.
As the evening advanced, nearer and nearer came the
troops from Halltown, and finally, shortly after9 o'clock,
when theyr had advanced to within less than a mile of
the armory,— in time less than five minutes,— the torch
was applied, and before I could withdraw my men from
the village, the two arsenal buildings, containing- about
twenty thousand stand of rifles and rifle muskets, were
ablaze. But very few of these arms were saved, for the
constantly recurring explosions of powder which had
been distributed through the buildings kept the crowd
aloof. The fire in the shops was extinguished, but the
arms, which were then of incalculable value, were de-
stroyed. Tlie spirit, devotion, and loyalty of my men, ex-
except two deserters, were admirable; four of them
were captured at their posts, but they all eventually
escaped,— one by swimming the river,— and reported to
me at Carlisle. I have heard that within a few minutes
after my command had crossed the Potomac to the Mary-
land side of the river, a train was heard starting off for
Baltimore, and that it was assumed by the Virginia
troops and their officers that my command had been
taken off by that train, and that, consequently, pursuit
was useless."
Lieutenant Jones's action was warmly approved
by the President in a congratulatory letter from
Secretary Cameron.
Governor Letcher estimated the value of the
property secured to the State by the seizure of
the Gosport Navy Yard and the Harper's Ferry
Arsenal at $25,000,000 to $30,000,000.
Editors.
AN AFFAIR OF OUTPOSTS.1
MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA
BY JACOB I). COX, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. B. V.
THE reasons which made it important to occupy West Virginia with
national troops were twofold — political and strategic. The people were
strongly attached to the Union, and had opposed the secession of Virginia,
of which State they were then a part. But few slaves were owned by them,
and all their interests bound them more to Ohio and Pennsylvania than to
eastern Virginia. Under the influence of Lincoln's administration, strongly
backed, and, indeed, chiefly represented, by Governor Dennison of Ohio, a
movement was on foot to organize a loyal Virginia government, repudiating
that of Governor Letcher and the State convention as self -destroyed by the
act of secession. Governor Dennison had been urging McClellan to cross the
Ohio to protect and encourage the loyal men when, on the 26th of May, news
came that the Confederates had taken the initiative, and that some bridges
had been burned on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad a little west of Grafton,
the crossing of the Monongahela River, where the two western branches of the
railroad unite, viz., the line from "Wheeling and that from Parkersburg. [See
map, p. 129.] The great line of communication between Washington and the
west had thus been cut, and action on our part was made necessary. .Governor
Dennison had anticipated the need of more troops than the thirteen regiments
which had been organized as Ohio's quota under the President's first call. He
had organized nine other regiments, numbering them consecutively with those
mustered into the national service, and had put them in camps near the Ohio
River, where they could occupy Wheeling, Parkersburg, and the mouth of the
Great Kanawha at a moment's notice. Two Union regiments were also
organizing in West Virginia itself, at Wheeling and Parkersburg, of which
the first was commanded by Colonel (afterward General) B. F. Kelley.
West Virginia was in McClellan's department, and the formal authority to
act had come from Washington on the 24th, in the shape of an inquiry from
General Scott whether the enemy's force at Grafton could be counteracted.
126
MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA.
127
The dispatch directed McClellan to "act promptly." On the 27th Colonel
Kelley was sent by rail from Wheeling to drive off! the enemy and protect
the railroad. The hostile parties withdrew at Kelley's approach, and the
bridges were quickly rebuilt. At the same time several of the Ohio regi-
ments were ordered across the river, and a brigade of Indiana volunteers
under Brigadier-General Thomas A. Morris was sent forward by rail from
Indianapolis. Morris reached Grafton on the 1st of June, and was intrusted
with the command of all the troops in West Virginia. He found that Colonel
Kelley had already planned an expedition against the enemy, who had retired
southward to Philippi, about thirty miles from Grafton. Morris approved
the plan, but enlarged it by sending another column under Colonel Ebenezer
Dumont of the 7th Indiana to cooperate with Kelley. Both columns were
directed to make a night march, starting from points on the railroad about
twelve miles apart, and converging on Philippi, which they were to attack
at daybreak of June 3d. Each column consisted of about 1500 men, and
Dumont's had with it 2 field-pieces of artillery, smooth 6-pounclers.
The Confederate force was commanded by Colonel G. A. Porterfield, of
the Virginia volunteers, and was something less than a thousand strong,
about one-f ourth cavalry. J
The night was dark and stormy, and Porterfield's raw troops had not
learned picket duty. The concerted movement against them was more suc-
cessful than such marches commonly are, and Porterfield's first notice of
danger was the opening of the artillery
upon his sleeping troops. It had been ex-
pected that the two columns would inclose
the enemy's camp and capture the whole ;
but, though in disorderly rout, Porterfield
succeeded, by personal coolness and cour-
age, in getting them off with but few casu-
alties and the loss of a few arms. The camp
equipage and supplies were, of course,
captured. Colonel Kelley was wounded
by a pistol-shot in the breast, which was
the only injury reported on the National
side ; no prisoners were taken, nor did any
dead or wounded fall into our hands. Por-
terfield retreated to Beverly, some thirty
miles farther to the south-east, and the
National forces occupied Philippi. The
telegraphic reports had put the Confed-
erate force at 2000 and their loss at 15
MAJOR-GENERAL LEW WALLACE.].
FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.
\ A Confederate Court of Inquiry reported that
he had " 600 effective infantry (or thereabouts)
ami 173 cavalry (or thereabouts)." — Official
Records, II., p. 72.
4- The 11th Indiana Zouaves, Colonel Lew Wal-
lace, passed through Cincinnati June 7th on their
way to the front. They belonged to General Mor-
ris's First Indiana Brigade (which also included the
6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Indiana regiments),
but were placed on detached service at Cumber-
land, on the Potomac. Under instructions from
General Robert Patterson, Colonel Wallace led an
128 MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA.
killed. This implied a considerable list of wounded and prisoners also, and
the newspapers gave it the air of a considerable victory. The campaign
thus opened with apparent eclat for McClellan, and the " Philippi races," as
they were locally called, greatly encouraged the Union men of West Virginia
and correspondingly depressed the secessionists.
McClellan, however, was still of the opinion that his most promising line of
operations would be by the Great Kanawha Valley, and he retained in their
camp of instruction the Ohio regiments which were mustered into the service
of the United States, sending into Virginia only those known as the State
forces. Another reason for this was that the older regiments were now nearly
at the end of their three-months' enlistment, and were trying to reorganize
under the President's second call, which required enlistment for " three years
or the war." | Nearly a month elapsed, when, having received reports that
forces of the enemy were gathering at Beverly, McClellan determined to pro-
ceed in person to that region with his best-prepared troops, postponing his
Kanawha plan till north-western Virginia should be cleared of hostile forces.
Reference to the map will show that as the Potomac route was usually in
the hands of the Northern forces, a Confederate occupation of West Virginia
must be made either by the Staunton and Beverly road, or by the Kanawha
route, of which the key-point west of the mountains was G-auley Bridge.
General Lee determined to send columns upon both these lines — General
Henry A. Wise upon the Kanawha route, and Greneral Robert S. Garnett to
Beverly. Upon Porterfield's retreat to Beverly after the "Philippi races,"
Garnett, who had been an officer in the United States army, was ordered to
Beverly to assume command and to stimulate the recruiting and organization
of regiments from the secession element of the population. Some Virginia
regiments, raised on the eastern slope of the mountains, were sent with him,
expedition against a force of about five hundred into a position that soon drove the enemy from the house
Confederates at Eomney, which influenced General and lnto a mountain to its rear. My attention was then
TTriTi i • X.- a ' ' 4. j-tj » turned to the battery on the hili. ... I pushed five
J. E. Johnston in his decision to evacuate Harper s „„ ....■'.,. . , , , * , ,
. * companies in skirmishing order, and at double-quick
Ferry (see note, page 120). In his report of the time, up a hill to the right, intending to get around the
Eomney engagement Colonel Wallace says : left flank of the enemy, and cut off their retreat. . . .
. , Between their position and that of my men was a deep,
" I left Cumberland at 10 o clock on the night of the precipitous gorge, the crossing of which occupied about
12th June with 8 companies, in all about 500 men, and ten minutes. When the opposite ridge was gained we
by railway went to New Creek station, 21 miles distant, discovered tne rebels indiscriminately blent, with a
A little after 4 o'clock I started my men across the ma88 of W(jmeu aml cMMren flying a8 for lite from the
mountains, 23 miles off, intending to reach the town by town Hftvi no „ uit of the camloneers wa8
6 o clock m the morning. The road Lwas very fatiguing imp088ible. . . . After searching the town for arms,
and rough. . . . With the utmost industry I did not c equipage, etc., I returned to Cumberland by the
get near Romney until about 8 o'clock. . . I after- game road reacMng oamp at u 0-clock at night." '
ward learned that they had notice of my coming full an
hour before my arrival. In approaching the place, it EDITORS,
was necessary for me to cross abridge over the South . T, . , ,, . ,.
Branch of the Potomac. A reconnaissance satisfied me i Tt ls necessary to remember that at this time
that the passage of the bridge would be the chief obstacle the Virginia State Government at Eichmond was
in my way, although I could distinctly see the enemy trying to keep up an appearance of independence,
drawn up on the bluff, which is the town site, support- and that Robert E. Lee had been made major-
ing a battery of two guns, planted so as to sweep the , »Tr. . . . •, ,• .
,.,^w„,o^Li T /i- ?j j , * general of Virginia troops, conducting a campaign
road completely. I directed mv advance guard to cross &, ., , ,.-.■,.,. «^ T F ,
the bridge on the run, leap down an embankment at the ostensibly under the direction of Governor Letcher,
farther entrance, and observe the windows of a large and not of the Confederate authorities. A simil-
brick house not farther off than seventy-five yards. Their acrum of neutrality was still preserved, and a
appearance was the signal for an assault. A warm fire shadow of doubt regarding Virginia's ultimate
opened from the house, which the guard returned, with ..... , , . «• . • , ,
no other loss than the wounding of a sergeant. The firing attitude had some effect in delaying active opera-
continued several minutes. I led a second company tions along the Ohio as well as upon the Potomac,
across the bridge, and by following up a ravine got them — J. D. C.
MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA.
I 2q
and to these was soon added the 1st Georgia. On the 1st of July he reported
his force as 4500 men, but declared that his efforts to recruit had proven a
complete failure, only 23 having joined. The West Virginians, he says, " are
thoroughly imbued with an ignorant and bigoted Union sentiment." Other
reenforcements were promised Garnett, but none reached him except the
44th Virginia regiment, which arrived at Beverly the very day of the action,
but which did not take
part in the fighting.
Tygart's Valley, in
which Beverly lies, is
between Cheat Mountain
on the east, and
Rich Mountain on
the west. The
river, of the same
name as the val-
ley, flows north-
ward about fifteen miles, then turns westward, breaking through the ridge,
passes by Philippi, and afterward crosses the railroad at Grafton. The
Staunton and Parkersburg Turnpike divides at Beverly, the Parkersburg
route passing over a saddle in Rich Mountain, and the Wheeling route
following the river to Philippi. The ridge north of the river at the gap is
known as Laurel Mountain, and the road passes over a spur of it. Garnett
regarded the two positions at Rich Mountain and Laurel Mountain as the
gates to all the region beyond, and to the West. A rough mountain road,
barely passable, connected the Laurel Mountain position with Cheat River
on the east, and it was possible to go by this way northward through St.
George to the Northwestern Turnpike, turning the mountain ranges. [See
map, p. 131.]
Garnett thought the pass over Rich Mountain much the stronger and more
easily held, and he therefore intrenched there about 1300 of his men and
VOL. I. 9
no
MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA.
#
4 cannon, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram. The position
chosen was on a spur of the mountain near its western base, and it was
rudely fortified with breastworks of logs covered with an abattis of slashed
timber along its front. The remainder of his force he placed in a similar
fortified position on the road at Laurel Mountain, where he also had four
guns, of which one was rifled. Here
he commanded in person. His depot
of supplies was at Beverly, which was
16 miles from the Laurel Mountain
position and 5 from that at Rich
Mountain. He was pretty accurately
informed of McClellan's forces and
movements, and his preparations had
barely been completed by the 9th of
July, when the Union general ap-
peared in his front.
McClellan entered West Virginia in
person on the 22d of June, and on the
23d issued from Grafton a proclama-
tion to the inhabitants. He had grad-
ually collected his forces along the
Baltimore and Ohio railroad, which,
at the time of the affair at Rich Moun-
tain, consisted of 16 Ohio regiments,
9 from Indiana and 2 from West Virginia; in all, 27 regiments with 4 batteries
of artillery of 6 guns each, 2 troops of cavalry, and an independent company
of riflemen. Of his batteries, one was of the regular army, and another, a
company of regulars (Company I, 4th IT. S. Artillery), was with him awaiting
mountain howitzers, which arrived a little later. ^ The regiments varied
somewhat in strength, but all were recently organized, and must have aver-
aged at least 700 men each, making the whole force about 20,000. Of these,
about 5000 were guarding the railroad and its bridges for some 200 miles,
under the command of Brigadier-General C. W. Hill, of the Ohio Militia ; a
strong brigade under Brigadier-General Morris, of Indiana, was at Philippi, and
the rest were in three brigades forming the immediate command of McClellan,
the brigadiers being General W. 8. Rosecrans, U. S. A., General Newton
Schleich, of Ohio, and Colonel Robert L. McCook, of Ohio. On the date of his
proclamation McClellan intended, as he informed General Scott, to move his
principal column to Buckhannon on June 25th, and thence at once upon
Beverly ; but delays occurred, and it was not till July 2d that he reached
Buckhannon, which is 24 miles west of Beverly, on the Parkersburg branch
BRIGADIER GENERAL THOMAS A. MOHRIS.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
]) As part of the troops were State troops not
mustered into the United States service, no report
of them is found in the War Department ; but the
following are the numbers of the regiments found
named as present in the correspondence and re-
ports,—viz., 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th,
13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th,
and 22d Ohio; 6th, 7th, Sth, 9th, 10th, 11th,
13th, 14th, 15th Indiana, and 1st and 2d Vir-
ginia ; also Howe's United States battery, Bar-
nett's Ohio battery, Loomis's Michigan battery,
and Damn's Virginia battery; the cavalry were
Burdsal's Ohio Dragoons and Barker's Illinois
Cavalry. — J . D. C.
MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA.
131
of the turnpike. Before leaving Grafton the rumors he heard had made him
estimate Garnett's force at 6000 or 7000 men, of which the larger part were at
Laurel Mountain in front of General Morris. On the 6th of July he moved
McCook with two regiments to Middle Fork Bridge, about half-way to
Beverly, and 011 the same day ordered Morris to march with his brigade
from Philippi to a position one and a half miles in front of Garnett's princi-
pal camp, which was promptly done. Three days later, McClellan concen-
trated the three brigades of his own column at Roaring Creek, about two
miles from Colonel Pegram's position at the base of Rich Mountain. The
advance on both lines had been made with only a skirmishing resistance, the
Confederates being aware of McClellan's great superiority in numbers, and
choosing to await his attack in their fortified positions. The National com-
mander was now convinced that his opponent was 10,000 strong, of which
about 2000 were before him at Rich Mountain. A reconnoissance made on
the 10th showed that Pegram's position would be difficult to assail in front,
but preparations were made to attack the next day, while Morris was directed
to hold firmly his position before Garnett, watching for the effect of the
attack at Rich Mountain. In the evening Rosecrans took to McClellan a
young man named Hart, whose father lived on the top of the mountain two
miles in rear of Pegrarn, and who thought he could guide a column of
infantry to his father's farm by a circuit around Pegram's left flank south of the
turnpike. The paths were so difficult that cannon could not go by them, but
Rosecrans offered to lead a column of
infantry and seize the road at the Hart
farm. After some discussion McClellan
adopted the suggestion, and it was
arranged that Rosecrans should march
at daybreak of the 11th with about
two thousand men, including a troop
of horse, and that upon the sound of
his engagement in the rear of Pegrarn,
McClellan would attack in force in
front. By a blunder in one of the
regimental camps, the reveille and
assembly were sounded at midnight,
and Pegrarn was put on the qui vive.
He, however, believed that the attempt
to turn his position would be by a path
or country road passing round his
right, between him and Garnett (of
which the latter had warned him), and
his attention was diverted from Rose-
crans's actual route, which he thought
impracticable. The alert which had
occurred at midnight made Rosecrans
think it best to make a longer circuit
M Beverly ^m:
A Garnetts Position
^rcTT-'8- " COMBAT AT
uMcClcllans " JL _ . _ . . ,.„ . . . ._. .
^.Morris's " k» RIGHMOUNTAII
F Rosecrans' Line ofjfarch
SCALE OF MILES
132
MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA.
r-
than he at first intended, and it took ten hours of severe marching and
mountain climbing to reach the Hart farm. The turning movement was
made, but he found an enemy opposing him. Pegrarn had detached about
350 men from the 1300 which he had, and had ordered them to guard the
road at the mountain summit. He sent with them a single cannon from the
four which constituted his only battery,
and they threw together a breastwork of
logs. The turnpike at Hart's runs in a
depression of the summit, and as Rose-
crans, early in the afternoon, came out upon
the road, he was warmly received by both
musketry and cannon. The ground was
rough, the men were for the first time under
fire, and the skirmishing combat varied
through two or three hours, when a charge
by part of Rosecrans's line, aided by a few
heavy volleys from another portion of his
forces which had secured a good position,
broke the enemy's line. Reinforcements
from Pegram were nearly at hand, with
another cannon, but they did not come into
action, and the runaway team of the caisson
on the hill-top, dashing into the gun that brigadier-general john pegram, c. s. a.
-I •, ^ ,-, (KILLED AT HATCHER'S RUN, NEAR PETERS-
WaS COmillg Up, Capsized it dOWll the niOUIl- burg, February 6, 1865). from a
tain-side where the descending road was photograph.
scarped diagonally along it. Both guns fell into Rosecrans's hands, and he
was in possession of the field. The march and the assault had been made
in rain and storm. Nothing was heard from McClellan, and the enemy, rally-
ing on their reinforcements, made such show of resistance on the crest a
little farther on, that Rosecrans directed his men to rest upon their arms
till next morning. When day broke on the 12th, the enemy had disappeared
from the mountain-top, and Rosecrans, feeling his way down to the rear of
Pegram's position, found it also abandoned, the two remaining cannon being
spiked, and a few sick and wounded being left in charge of a surgeon. Still
nothing was seen of McClellan, and Rosecrans sent word to him, in his camp
beyond Roaring Creek, that he was in possession of the enemy's position.
Rosecrans's loss had been 12 killed and 49 wounded. The Confederates left
20 wounded on the field, and 63 were surrendered at the lower camp,
including the sick. No trustworthy report of their dead was made.
The noise of the engagement had been heard in McClellan's camp, and he
formed his troops for attack, but the long continuance of the cannonade and
some signs of exultation in Pegram's camp seem to have made him think
Rosecrans had been repulsed. The failure to attack in accordance with the
plan has never been explained. Rosecrans's messengers had failed to reach
McClellan during the 11th, but the sound of the battle was sufficient notice
that he had gained the summit and was engaged ; and he was, in fact, left to
MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. 133
win his own battle or to get out of his embarrassment as he could. Toward
evening McClellan began to cut a road for artillery to a neighboring height,
from which he hoped his twelve guns would make Pegram's position unten-
able ; but his lines were withdrawn again beyond Roaring Creek at nightfall,
and all further action postponed to the next day.
About half of Pegram's men had succeeded in passing around Rosecrans's
right mink during the night and had gained Beverly. These, with the newly
arrived Confederate regiment, fled southward on the Staunton road. Garnett
had learned in the evening by messenger from Beverly that Rich Mountain
summit was carried, and evacuated his camp in front of Morris about mid-
night. He first marched toward Beverly, and was within five miles of that
place when he received information (false at the time) that the National
forces already occupied it. He then retraced his steps nearly to his camp,
and, leaving the turnpike at Leadsville, he turned off upon a country road over
Cheat Mountain into Cheat River Valley, following the stream northward
toward St. George and West Union, in the forlorn hope of turning the moun-
tains at the north end of the ridges and regaining his communications by a
very long detour. He might have continued southward through Beverly
almost at leisure, for McClellan did not enter the town till past noon on the 12th.
Morris learned of Garnett's retreat at dawn, and started in pursuit as soon
as rations could be issued. He marched first to Leadsville, where he halted
to communicate with McClellan at Beverly and get further orders. These
reached him in the night, and at daybreak of the 13th he resumed the pur-
suit. His advance-guard of three regiments, accompanied by Captain H. W.
Benham of the Engineers, overtook the rear of the Confederate column about
noon and continued a skirmishing pursuit for some two hours. Garnett him-
self handled his rear-guard with skill, and at Carrick's Ford a lively
encounter was had. A mile or two farther, at another ford and when the
skirmishing was very slight, he was killed while withdrawing his skirmishers
from behind a pile of driftwood which he had used as a barricade. One of
his cannon had become stalled in the ford, and, with about forty wagons,
fell into Morris's hands. The direct pursuit was here discontinued, but
McClellan had sent a dispatch to General Hill at Grafton, to collect the gar-
risons along the railway and block the way of the Confederates where they
must pass around the northern spurs of the mountains.
His military telegraph terminated at the Roaring Creek camp, and the dis-
patch written in the evening of the 12th was not forwarded to Hill till near
noon of the 13th. This officer immediately ordered the collection of the
greater part of his detachments at Oakland and called upon the railway
officials for special trains to hurry them to the rendezvous. About one
thousand men under Colonel James Irvine of the 16th Ohio were at West
Union where the St. George road reaches the Northwestern Turnpike,
and Hill's information was that a detachment of these held Red House, a
crossing several miles in advance by which the retreating enemy might go.
Irvine was directed to hold his positions at all hazards till he could be reen-
f orced. Hill himself hastened with the first train from Grafton to Oakland with
134
MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA.
about 500 men and 3 cannon, reached his destination at nightfall, and hurried
his detachment forward by a night march to Irvine, 10 or 12 miles over rough
roads. It turned out that Irvine did not occupy Red House, and the preva-
lent belief that the enemy was about eight thousand in number, with the
uncertainty of the road he would take, made it proper to keep the little force
concentrated till reenf orcements should come. The
first of these reached Irvine about 6 o'clock on
the morning of the 14th, raising his command to
1500, but a few moments after their arrival he
learned that the enemy had passed Red House
soon after daylight. He gave chase, but did not
overtake them.
Meanwhile, General Hill had spent the night
in trying to hasten forward the railway trains,
but none were able to reach Oakland till morn-
ing, and Garnett's forces had now more than
twenty miles the start, and were on fairly good
roads, moving southward on the eastern side of brigadier-general robert selden
the mountains. McClellan still telegraphed that GA™' from a SSSZZES. '*'
Hill had the one opportunity of a lifetime to cap-
ture the fleeing army, and that officer hastened in pursuit, though unprovided
with wagons or extra rations. When, however, the Union commander learned
that the enemy had fairly turned the mountains, he ordered the pursuit
stopped. Hill had used both intelligence and energy in his attempt to con-
centrate his troops, but it proved simply impossible for the railroad to carry
them to Oakland before the enemy had passed the turning-point, twenty
miles to the southward.
During the 12th Pegram's situation and movements were unknown. He
had intended, when he evacuated his camp, to follow the line of retreat taken
by the detachment already near the mountain-top, but, in the darkness of the
night and in the tangled woods and thickets of the mountain-side, his column
got divided, and, with the rear portion of it, he wandered all day on the 12th,
seeking to make his way to Garnett. He halted at evening at the Tygart
Valley River, six miles north of Beverly, and learned from some country
people of G-atnettfs retreat. It was still possible to reach the mountains east
of the valley, but beyond was a hundred miles of wilderness and half a dozen
mountain ridges on which little, if any, food could be found for his men. He
called a council of war, and, by advice of his officers, sent to McClellan, at
Beverly, an offer of surrender. This was received on the 13th, and Pegram
brought in 30 officers and 525 men. McClellan then moved southward him-
self, following the Staunton road, by which the remnant of Pegram's little
force had escaped, and on the 14th occupied Huttonsville. Two regiments
of Confederate troops were hastening from Staunton to reenf orce Garnett.
These were halted at Monterey, east of the principal ridge of the Alleghanies,
and upon them the retreating forces rallied. Brigadier-General H. R. Jackson
was assigned to command in Garnett's place, and both Governor Letcher and
General Lee made strenuous efforts to increase this army to a force sufficient
MCCLELLAN IN W EST VIRGINIA. 135
to resume aggressive operations. On MeClellan's -part nothing further was
attempted, till, on the 22d, he was summoned to Washington to assume com-
mand of the army, which had retreated to the capital after the panic of the
first Bull Run battle.
The affair at Rich Mountain and the subsequent movements were among
the minor events of a great war, and would not warrant a detailed descrip-
tion, were it not for the momentous effect they had upon the conduct of the
war, by being the occasion of MeClellan's promotion to the command of the
Potomac army. The narrative which has been given contains the " unvar-
nished tale," as nearly as official records of both sides can give it, and it is a
curious task to compare it with the picture of the campaign and its results
which was then given to the world in the series of proclamations and dis-
patches of the young general, beginning with his first occupation of the
country and ending with his congratulations to his troops, in which he
announced that they had " annihilated two armies, commanded by educated
and experienced soldiers, intrenched in mountain fastnesses fortified at their
leisure." The country was eager for good news, and took it as literally true.
McClellan was the hero of the moment, and when, but a week later, his suc-
cess was followed by the disaster to McDowell at Bull Run, he seemed pointed
out by Providence as the ideal chieftain, who could repair the misfortune am I
lead our armies to certain victory. His personal intercourse with those about
him was so kindly, and his bearing so modest, that his dispatches, proclama-
tions, and correspondence are a psychological study, more puzzling to those
who knew him well than to strangers. Their turgid rhetoric and exaggerated
pretense did not seem natural to him. In them he seemed to be composing for
stage effect, something to be spoken in character by a quite different person
from the sensible and genial man we knew in daily life and conversation. The
career of the great Napoleon had been the study and the absorbing admira-
tion of young American soldiers, and it was, perhaps, not strange that when
real war came they should copy his bulletins and even his personal bearing.
It was, for the moment, the bent of the people to be pleased with MeClellan's
rendering of the role; they dubbed him the young Napoleon, and the
photographers got him to stand with folded arms, in the historic pose. For
two or three weeks his dispatches and letters were all on fire with enthusiastic
energy. He appeared to be in a morbid condition of mental exaltation.
When he came out of it, he was as genial as ever, as can be seen by the con-
trast between his official communications and that private letter to General
Burnside, written just after the evacuation of Yorktown, which, oddly enough,
has found its way into the official records of the war.\ The assumed dash
\ Letter of May 21st, 1862. "My Dear Burn : arms, and rely far more on his goodness than I do
Your dispatch and kind letter received. I have on my own poor intellect. I sometimes think now-
instructed Seth [Williams] to reply to the official that I can almost realize that Mahomet was sin-
letter, and now acknowledge the kind private cere. When I see the hand of Clod guarding one
note. It always does me good, in the midst of so weak as myself, I can almost think myself a
my cares and perplexities, to see your wretched chosen instrument to carry out his schemes,
old scrawling. I have terrible troubles to contend Would that a better man had been selected,
with, but have met them with a good heart, like . . . Good-bye, and God bless you, Burn,
your good old self, and have thus far struggled With the sincere hope that we may soon shake
through successfully. . . . The crisis cannot hands, I am as ever,
long be deferred. I pray for God's blessing on our Your sincere friend, McClellan." — J. T>. C.
MAJOR-GKNEKAL W. S. ROSECRANS. FROM A WAIi-TIME THOTOGRAPH.
13S
MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. 137
and energy of his first campaign made the disappointment and the reaction
more painful, when the excessive caution of his conduct in command of the
Army of the Potomac was seen. But the Rich Mountain affair, when
analyzed, shows the same characteristics which became well known later.
There was the same overestimate of the enemy, the same tendency to inter-
pret unfavorably the sights and sounds in front, the same hesitancy to throw
in his whole force, when he knew that his subordinate was engaged. If
Garnett had been as strong as McClellan believed him, he had abundant time
and means to overwhelm Morris, who lay four days in easy striking distance,
while the National commander delayed attacking Pegram ; and had Morris
been beaten, Grarnett would have been as near Clarksburg as his opponent,
and there would have been a race for the railroad. But, happily, Garnett
was less strong and less enterprising than he was credited with * being.
Pegram was dislodged, and the Confederates made a precipitate retreat.
-^
THE KANAWHA VALLEY
When McClellan reached Buckhannon, on the 2d of July, the rumors he
heard of Garnett's strength, and the news of the presence of General Wise
with a considerable force in the Great Kanawha Valley, made him conclude
to order a brigade to that region for the purpose of holding the lower part
of the valley defensively till he might try to cut off Wise's army after Gar-
nett should be disposed of. This duty was assigned to me. The brigade
which I had organized had all been taken for his own campaign, except the
11th Ohio (only five companies present), but the 12th Ohio, which was still
at Camp Dennison, was ordered to report to me, and these two regiments
were to be sent by rail to Gallipolis as soon as the railways could furnish
transportation. At Gallipolis we should find the 21st Ohio militia, and the
1st and 2d Kentucky volunteers were also to join me there, coming by steam-
boat from Cincinnati. The two Kentucky regiments had been organized in
Cincinnati, and were made up chiefly of steamboat crews and "longshore-
men " thrown out of employment by the stoppage of commerce on the river.
There were in them some companies of other material, but these gave the
distinctive character to -the regiments as a whole. The colonels and part of
the field-officers were Kentuckians, but the organizations were Ohio regi-
ments in nearly everything but the name. The men were mostly of a rough
and reckless class, and gave a good deal of trouble by insubordination ; but
they did not lack courage, and, after they had been under discipline for a
while, became good fighting regiments.
The troops moved the moment transportation could be furnished, and
those going by rail were at Gallipolis and Point Pleasant (the mouth of the
Great Kanawha) on the 10th. My only artillery was a section of 2 bronze
rifles, altered from smooth 6-pounders, and my only cavalry some 30
raw recruits, useful only as messengers. Meanwhile, my orders had been
changed, and in accordance with them I directed the 2d Kentucky to land
at Guyandotte, on the Ohio, about 70 miles below the Kanawha, the
i38
MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA.
1st Kentucky to proceed to Ripley, landing at Ravenswood, about 50 miles
above, while with two and a half regiments I myself should move up the
Kanawha Valley. The two detachments would join me after a time by
lateral roads. My total force, when assembled, would be a little over three
thousand men, the regiments having the same average strength as those with
McClellan. The opposing force under
General Wise was four thousand by the
time the campaign was fully opened,
though somewhat less at the begin-
ning.^
The Kanawha River was navigable
for small steamboats about 70 miles, to
a point 10 or 12 miles above Charleston,
the only important town of the region
and lying at the confluence of the Kan-
awha and Elk rivers. Steamboats were
plenty, owing to the interruption of
trade, and wagons were wholly lacking,
so that my column was accompanied
and partly carried by a fleet of stern-
wheel steamers.
On the 11th of July the movement
from Point Pleasant began. An advance-
guard was sent out on each side of the
river, marching upon the roads which were near its banks. The few horse-
men were divided and sent with them as messengers, and the boats followed,
steaming slowly along in rear of the marching men. Most of two regiments
were carried on the steamers, to save fatigue to the men, who were as yet
unused to their work, and many of whom were footsore from their first long
march of 25 miles to Gallipolis, from the station where they left the railway.
The arrangement was also a good one in a military point of view, for if an
enemy were met on either bank of the stream, the boats could land in a
moment and the troops disembark without delay.
Our first day's sail was thirteen miles up the river, and it was the very
romance of campaigning. I took my station on top of the pilot-house of the
leading boat, so that I might see over the banks of the stream and across
the bottom-lands which bounded the valley. The afternoon was a lovely
one. Summer clouds lazily drifted across the sky, the boats were dressed
in their colors, and swarmed with men as a hive with bees. The bands played
national tunes, and as we passed the houses of Union citizens, the inmates
would wave their handkerchiefs to us and were answered by cheers from the
troops. The scenery was picturesque, the gently winding river making
beautiful reaches that opened new scenes upon us at every turn. On either
BRIGADIER-GENERAL HENRY A. WISE, C. S. A.,
EX-GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
•fc Wise reported his force on 17th July as
3500 "effective" men and 10 cannon, and says
he received "perhaps 300" in reinforcements
on the 18th. When he abandoned the valley
ten days later he reported his force 4000 in
round numbers. — J. D. C.
MCCLELLAN IN W EST VIRGINIA. 139
side the advance-guard could be seen in the distance, the main body in the
road, with skirmishers exploring the way in front and flankers on the sides.
Now and then a horseman would bring some message to the shore from the
front, and a small boat would be sent to receive it, giving us the rumors with
which the country was rife, and which gave just enough of excitement and of
the spice of possible danger to make this our first day in the enemy's country
key everybody to a pitch that doubled the vividness of every sensation. The
landscape seemed more beautiful, the sunshine more bright, and the exhilara-
tion of outdoor life more joyous than any we had ever before known.
Our first night's camp was in a picturesque spot in keeping with the beauties
of the day's progress, and was enlivened by a report that the enemy was
advancing to attack us in force. It was only a rumor, based upon the actual
approach of a reconnoitering party of cavalry, and the camp was not allowed
to be disturbed except to send a small reconnoissance forward on our own part.
Two more days' advance, in the face of a slight skirmishing resistance, brought
us to the Pocotalico, a stream entering the Kanawha from the north.
Wise had placed his principal camp at Tyler Mountain, a bold spur which
reaches the river on the northern side (011 which is also the turnpike road)
about 12 miles above my position, while he occupied the south side with
a detachment above Scary Creek some 3 miles from us. The hills closing in
nearer to the river make it easy to stop steamboat navigation with a small
force, and it became necessary to halt a little and await the arrival of the
wagons which had not yet been sent me, and of the 2d Kentucky regiment,
which was marching to me from Barboursville, where one wing of it, com-
manded by Lieutenant-Colonel Neff , had a brilliant little affair with a body of
Confederate recruits occupying the place. \ On the afternoon of the 17th, the
Kentuckians having arrived, and a reconnoissance having been made of the
Scary Creek position, which was found to be held by about 500 of the enemy
with 1 or 2 cannon, Colonel John W. Lowe of the 12th Ohio was ferried over
the river with his own regiment and 2 companies of the 21st Ohio with our
2 cannon, and directed to occupy the attention of the enemy in front at the
creek, which was unfordable at its mouth, while he tried to turn the position
with part of his command. The enemy at first retreated, leaving one cannon
disabled, but, being reenforced, they rallied, and, no good crossing of the creek
being found, Lowe was foiled in his effort to dislodge them after a sharp
engagement across the stream.
The wagons reached us a few at a time, but by the 24th I was able to move
from our strong position behind Pocotalico, and, taking circuitous country
roads among the hills, to come upon the rear of Wise's camp at Tyler Mountain.
The march was a long and difficult one, but was successful. As soon as his
outposts were driven in, the enemy decamped in a panic, leaving his camp-
kettles and supper over the fires. We had also cut off a steamboat with
troops which was just below us as we came to the bluff, and which, under the
fire of our cannon, was run ashore and burned, while the detachments on the
other side of the river hastened by country roads to rejoin Wise at Charleston.
It was now nightfall, and we bivouacked upon the mountain-side. Wise
140
MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA.
BRIGADIER -GENERAL JOHN B. FLOYD, C. S. A.
SECRETARY OF WAR UNDER PRESIDENT
BUCHANAN. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
abandoned Charleston in the night and re-
treated toward Grauley Bridge. On the 25th
I occupied Charleston without resistance, and
moved on, ordering the 1st Kentucky up from
Ripley to garrison the place and establish my
dej)ot there.
At every mile above Charleston the scenery
grows wilder, the mountains crowding in
upon the river, often with high, beetling cliffs
overhanging it, and offering numerous posi-
tions where a small detachment might hold
an army in check. Wise, however, made no
resistance worth naming, except to fell timber
into the road, and he passed the Gauley, burn-
ing the important bridge there and continu-
ing his hasty retreat to the White Sulphur
Springs, hurried, no doubt, by the fear that
McClellan might intercept him by way of
Huntersville and Lewisburg. McClellan had
recognized the fact that he was asking me to
face the enemy with no odds in my favor, and as soon as he heard that
Wise was disposed to make a stand, he had directed me not to risk attacking
him in front, but rather to await the result of his own movement toward
the Upper Kanawha. Rosecrans did the same when he assumed com-
mand ; but I knew the hope had been that I could reach Gauley Bridge,
and I felt warranted, as soon as wagons reached me, in attempting the turning
movement which seems to have thrown Wise into a panic from which he
did not recover till he got out of the valley. Rosecrans ordered me to
remain on the defensive at Charleston, but his dispatches did not reach me,
fortunateh^, till I was close to Gauley Bridge, some forty miles above Charles-
ton, and was quite sure of my ability to take possession of that defile, as I did
on the 29th of July. Another reason for haste was that the .time of enlist-
ment of the 21st Ohio had expired, and I was ordered by the governor to send
it back to Ohio for reorganization, which would make a reduction of one-
fourth of my numbers.
At my first night's encampment above Charleston, in a lovely nook
between spurs of the hills, I was treated to a little surprise on the part of
three of my subordinates which was an unexpected enlargement of my mil-
itary experience, and which is worth preserving to show some of the con-
ditions attending the beginning of a war with undisciplined troops. The
camp was nicely organized for the night and supper was over, when I was
waited upon at my tent by these gentlemen. Their spokesman informed me
that after consultation they had concluded that it was foolhardy to follow
the Confederates into the gorge we were traveling, and, unless I could show
them satisfactory reasons for changing their opinion, they would not lead
their commands farther into it. I dryly asked if he was quite sure he under-
MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA.
141
stood the nature of his communication. There was probably something in
the tone of my question which was not altogether expected, and his compan-
ions began to look a little uneasy. He then protested that they meant no
disrespect, but, as their military experience was about as extensive as my own,
they thought I ought to make no movement but on consultation with them
and by their consent. The others seemed better pleased with this way of put-
ting it. My answer was that whether they meant it or not, their action was
mutinous, and only their ignorance of military law could palliate it. The
responsibility for the movement of the army was with me, and, while glad to
confer freely with them, I should call no council of war and submit nothing to
vote till I felt incompetent to decide for myself. If they apologized for their
conduct and showed earnestness in military obedience, what they had now
said would be overlooked, but on any recurrence of insubordination I should
enforce my power by arresting the offender at once. I dismissed them with
this, and immediately sent out orders through my adjutant-general to march
early next morning. Before they slept, one of the three had come to me with
an earnest apology for his part in the matter, and a short time made them all
as subordinate as I could wish. The incident could not have occurred in the
brigade which had
been under my c< >m-
mand at Camp Den-
and was the
nison
-,,'
i
m
fiy
«*a
natural result of the
sudden assembling
of inexperienced
men under a bri-
gade commander of
whom they knew
nothing except that
at the beginning of
the war he had been
a civilian like them-
selves.
The same march
enabled me to make
the acquaintance of
another army "insti-
tution,"— the news-
paper correspond-
ent. At Charleston
I was joined by two
men representing
influential newspapers, who wished to know on what terms they might accom-
pany the column. The answer was that the quartermaster would furnish
them with a tent and with transportation, and that their letters should be
submitted to one of the staff to protect us from the publication of facts which
POST HOSPITAL AND WAGON-SHOP AT KANAWHA FALLS, NEAR
GACTLEY BRIDGE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
142
MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA.
_
N
A
cbble
of*,,*
w
fff§ I
a - - T"^ y>A^' "f*/"--
; \ '%^kjf fLOYOS] H D. QRS
SCALE Of Ml LES
Fayette C
GAULEY BRIDGE & VICINITY.
might aid the enemy. This seemed
unsatisfactory, and they intimated that
they expected to be taken into my
mess, and to be announced as volun-
teer aides with military rank. They
were told that military position or
rank could only be given by authority
much higher than mine, and that they
could be more honestly independent
if free from personal obligation and
from temptation to repay favors with
flattery. My only purpose was to put
the matter upon the foundation of
public right and of mutual self-re-
spect. The day before we reached
Gauley Bridge they opened the matter
again to my adjutant-general, but were
informed that I had decided it upon
a principle by which I meant to abide. Their reply was, " Very well ; General
Cox thinks he can get along without us. We will show him. We will write
him down ! " They left the camp the same evening and wrote letters to their
papers, describing the army as a rabble of ruffians, burning houses, ravishing
women, robbing and destroying property, and the commander as totally incom-
petent. As to the troops, more baseless slander was never uttered. Their
march had been orderly, no willful injury had been done to private property,
and no case of personal violence to any non-combatant, man or woman, had
been even charged. Yet the publication of such communications in widely
read journals was likely to be as damaging as if it were true. My nomination
as brigadier-general was then before the Senate for confirmation, and "the
pen" would probably have proved "mightier than the sword" but for McClel-
lan's knowledge of the nature of the task we had accomplished, as he was
then in the flood-tide of power at Washington, and had expressed his satisfac-
tion at the performance of our part of the campaign which he had planned.
ROSECRANS IN COMMAND.
General Rosecrans had succeeded McClellan as ranking officer in West
Virginia, but it was not until the beginning of November, 1861, that the region
was made a department and he was regularly assigned to command. Meanwhile
the three-months' enlistments were expiring, many regiments were sent home,
new ones were received, and a complete reorganization of his forces took
place. Besides holding the railroad, he fortified the Cheat Mountain Pass
looking toward Staunton, and the pass at Elkwater on the mountain summit
between Huttonsville and Huntersville. In similar manner I was directed
to fortify the camp at Gauley Bridge, and to cover the front in every direc-
tion with active detachments, constantly moving from the central position.
MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA.
M3
By the middle of August, Rosecrans had established a chain of posts, with
a regiment or two at each, on a line upon which he afterward marched
from Weston, by way of Bulltown, Sutton, and Summersville, to Gauley
Bridge.
The Confederates had also been straining every nerve to collect a force that
might give us an effective return blow, and Robert E. Lee was expected to
lead their forces in person. After ten days' quiet occupation of Grauley
Bridge, in which I had reconnoitered the country nearly forty miles in front
and on each flank, we learned that General John B. Floyd had joined Wise
with a brigade, and that both were moving toward the Kanawha. At the same
time the militia of Raleigh, Mercer, and Fayette counties were called out,
making a force of two thousand men under General Chapman. The total force
confronting us was thus about eight thousand. J To resist these I kept 2
regiments at Grauley Bridge, an advance-guard of 8 companies vigorously
skirmishing toward Sewell Mountain, a regiment distributed on the Kanawha
to cover the steamboat communications, and some West Virginia recruits
organizing at the mouth of the river. By extreme activity these were able
to baffle the enemy and impose upon him the belief that our numbers were
more than double our actual force.
Rosecrans had informed me of his
purpose to march a strong column to
join me as soon as Lee's plans were
fully developed, and I accumulated sup-
plies and munitions at Grauley Bridge,
determined to stand a siege if neces-
sary. On the 13th of August the 7th
Ohio, Colonel E. B. Tyler, was ordered
by Rosecrans to Cross Lanes, covering
Carnifex Ferry on the Grauley
River about twenty miles above
us, where a road from Lewis-
burg meets that going up the
Gauley to Summersville. I was author-
ized to call Tyler to me if seriously
attacked. On the 20th Wise made a
strong demonstration in front, but was
met at Pig Creek, three miles up the
On the 26th Floyd, having raised a
flat-boat which Tyler had sunk, crossed the. Gauley at Carnifex Ferry with
2000 or 3000 men, and surprised him, routing the regiment with a loss to us
of 15 killed and about 100 captured, of which 50 were wounded. The
greater part of the regiment was rallied by Major Casement, and led over the
^On the 1-ith of August Wise reported to force 3100. At that time lie gives Floyd's force at
General Lee that he had 2000 ready to move, 1200, with 2 strong regiments coming up, besides
and could have 2500 ready in 5 days; that 550 2000 militia under General Chapman, as stated
of his cavalry were with Floyd, besides an artil- above. The aggregate force operating on the Kana-
lery detachment of 50. This makes his total wha line he gives as 7800, Sept. 9th. — J. D. C.
--.-t-1
GAULEY BRIDGE, LOOKING DOWN STREAM.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
New River, and easily repulsed.
144
MCCLELLAN IN W EST VIRGINIA.
-^h
NEW RIVER CLIFFS, NEAR GAUEEY BRIDGE.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
ished the enemy's cavalry in a very
the river and stop our steamboats, kept
mountains to Elk River, and thence
to Charleston. Floyd intrenched
his position, and built a foot-bridge
to connect it with the eastern side
of the wild gorge. Wise's failure to
cooperate was Floyd's reason for
abandoning his announced purpose
of marching upon my rear ; but he
was on my northern line of commu-
nication with Rosecrans, and the
latter hastened his preparations to
come to my relief.
On the 3d of September, Wise and
Chapman attempted a concerted
attack upon Grauley Bridge, the first
pushing in upon the turnpike,
while Chapman advanced from
Fayette by Cotton Hill and a road
to the river a little below Kanawha
Falls. Wise was again met at Pig-
Creek and driven back; Chapman
reached the bluffs overlooking the
river in rear of us, driving in our
outposts, but did us little mischief,
except to throw a few shells into our
lower camp, and on Wise's repulse
he also withdrew. Our detachments
followed them up on both lines with
daily warm skirmishes, and the
advance-guard ambushed and pun-
demoralizing way. Efforts to reach
the posts and detachments below us
MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA.
145
on the alert, and an expedition of half the 1st Kentucky, under Lieutenant-
Colonel D. A. Enyart, sent to break irp a Confederate militia encampment at
Boone Court House, 40 miles southward, routed the enemy, who left 25 dead
upon the field. The march and attack had been swift and vigorous, and the
terror of the blow kept that region quiet for some time afterward.
I was puzzled at Floyd's inaction at Carnifex Ferry, but the mystery is
partly solved by the publication of the Confederate records. There was no
cooperation between the commanders, and Wise refused the assistance Floyd
demanded, nor could even the authority of Lee reduce the ex-governor of
Virginia to real subordination. The letters of Wise show a capacity for
keeping a command in hot water which was unique. If he had been half as
troublesome to me as he was to Floyd, I should, indeed, have had a hot time
of it. But he did me royal service by preventing anything approaching
unity of action between the two principal Confederate columns.
Rosecrans now began his march from Clarksburg with three brigades,
having left the Upper Potomac line in command of Greneral Kelley, and the
Cheat Mountain region in command of Greneral J. J. Reynolds. His route
(already indicated) was a rough one, and the portion of it between Sutton
and Summersville, over Birch Mountain, was very wild and difficult. He
left his bivouac on the morning of the 10th of September, before daybreak,
and, marching through Summersville, reached Cross Lanes about 2 o'clock
in the afternoon. Floyd's position was now about two miles distant, and
waiting only for his column to close
up, he again pressed forward. Gren-
eral Benham's brigade was in front,
and soon met the enemy's pickets.
Gretting the impression that Floyd
was in retreat, Benham pressed for-
ward rather rashly, deploying to the
left, and coming under a sharp fire
from the right of the enemy's works.
The woods were dense and tangled,
it was too late for a proper recon-
noissance, and Rosecrans could only
hasten the advance and deployment
of the other brigades under Colonels
McCook and Scammon. Benham had
sent a howitzer battery and two rifled
cannon with his head of column at
the left, and these soon got a position,
from which, in fact, they enfiladed
part of Floyd's line, though it was
impossible to see much of the situa-
tion. Charges were made by portions
of Benham's and McCook's brigades
as they came up, but they lacked
SCA LE
AFFAIR AT
CARNIFEX FERRY
Jhe Continuous doulk lines areF/i'/di etttrencJiments
ROSECRANS' FORCES ARE MARKED THUS
a 3^10'^iz^oido b iz^aa'tia'tOMo
C Scammons briga.de moving up.
D Schneider's buttery in position
E 3fjfu7!zn's hattf.ry movin<j up
VOL. I. 10
146
MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA.
unity, and Rosecrans was dissatisfied that his head of column should be
engaged before he had time to plan an attack. Colonel Lowe, of the 12th
Ohio, had been killed at the head of his regiment, and Colonel W. H. Lytle,
of the 10th, had been severely wounded; darkness was rapidly coming on,
and Rosecrans ordered the troops withdrawn from fire, till positions could
be rectified, and the attack renewed in the morning. Seventeen had been
killed and 141 had been wounded in the sharp but irregular combat. Floyd,
however, had learned that his position could be subjected to a destructive
cannonade; he was himself slightly wounded, and his officers and men
were discouraged. He therefore retreated across the Grauley in the night,
having great difficulty in carrying his artillery down the cliffs by a
wretched road in the darkness. He had built a slight foot-bridge for
infantry, in the bit of smooth water known as the Ferry, though both
above and below the stream is an impassable mountain torrent. Once over,
the bridge was broken up and the ferry-boat was destroyed. He reported
but twenty casualties, and threw much of the responsibility upon Wise, who
had not obeyed orders to reenforce him. His hospital, containing the
wounded prisoners taken from Tyler, fell into Rosecrans's hands.
On the 12th of September we first heard, at Grauley Bridge, of the engagement
at Carnif ex Ferry, and I at once moved with two regiments to attack Wise, who
retired as we advanced, till I occupied the junction of the turnpike with the
Sunday road. The whole hostile force had retreated to Sewell Mountain, and
Rosecrans halted me until he could create means of crossing the Grauley.
McCook's brigade joined me on the 16th of September, and my own command
was increased by bringing up another of my regiments from below. With
^f^^.'J^
• Lyy w. sit' *, -.*- *^ - ^» < Hsu-? 1 - "ir- ^s. ~ \ , ~ss ? a^<*
1':' y — • ' •' '■■ ■ '"-
FLOYD'S COMMAND RECROSSING THE GAULEY RIVER AFTER THE FIGHT OF SEPTEMBER 10TH,
AT CARNIFEX FERRY. AFTER A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.
MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA.
147
the two brigades I
advanced to Spy
Rock, a strong posi-
tion overlooking a
valley several miles
broad, beyond which
was Big Sewell
Mountain, the crest
of which we occu-
pied with an ad-
vance-guard on the |y
20th and in force on
the 24th. Before the
1st of October Rose-
crans had concentra-
ted his force at the
mountain, the four
brigades being so
reduced by sickness
and by detachments
that he reported the
whole as making
only 5200 effective
men. Immediately
in front, across a
deep gorge, lay the
united forces of
Floyd and Wise,
commanded by Lee
in person. The autumn rains set in upon the very day of Rosecrans's arrival,
and continued without intermission. The roads became so difficult that the
animals of the wagon trains were being destroyed in the effort to supply the
command. The camp was 35 miles from Gauley Bridge, and our stores were
landed from steamboats 25 miles below that post, making 60 miles of wagoning.
The enemy was as badly off, and no aggressive operations were possible on
either side. This became so evident that on the 5th of October Rosecrans
withdrew his forces to camps within 3 or 4 miles of Gauley Bridge.
Lee had directed an effort to be made by General Loring, his subordinate
on the Staunton line, to test the strength of the posts under Reynolds at
Cheat Mountain and Elkwater, and lively combats had resulted on the 12th
and 14th of September. Reynolds held firm, and Rosecrans had not been
diverted from his own plans. On October 2d Reynolds delivered a return
blow upon the Confederate position at Greenbrier River, but found it too
strong to be carried. Both parties now remained in observation till the end
of October. Floyd reported to his Government that the eleven days of cold
storms at Sewell Mountain had " cost more men, sick and dead, than the
A DETACHMENT FROM GENERAL FLOYD'S COMMAND PREPARING TO SHELL GENERAL
ROSECRANS'S CAMP AT GADLEY I5RIDGE. FROM A MvETCH MADE AT THE TIME.
148
MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA.
battle of Manassas Plains." More enterprising in plans than resolute or
skillful in carrying them out, he determined upon another effort, with Lee's
consent. Taking advantage of Rosecrans's neglect to occupy Fayette Court
House and Cotton Hill, a mountainous mass in the angle of the Kanawha
and New rivers, he moved with a column of about five thousand men across
New River and down its left bank, and startled the Union commander 1 > y
opening with cannon upon the post at Gauley Bridge on the 1st of Novem-
ber. The demonstration was more noisy than dangerous, for Floyd had no
means of crossing the river. The ordnance stores at the post were moved
into a gorge out of the range of fire, and a battery was established high up
on Gauley Mount to reply to the enemy. Rosecrans had hopes of capturing
Floyd, by turning his position from below by Benham's and Robert C.
Sehenek's (formerly Scammon's) brigades. Delays occurred which Rosecrans
attributed to failure to obey orders on the part of Benham. On the 10th
detachments from my brigade at Gauley Bridge crossed the river and scaled
the heights, attacking Floyd in front and securing apposition on the top of
the mountain. Floyd withdrew his artillery, and on the 12th, learning that
Schenck and Benham were moving toward his rear, decamped, and did not
cease his retreat till he reached the Holston Valley railroad.
Lee returned to Richmond, and portions of the troops on both sides were
sent to other fields, where military operations in winter were thought to be more
practicable. The remnant went into winter quarters, and though some com-
bats occurred, the most noteworthy of which was Milroy's attack upon the
Confederates in front of Cheat Mountain Pass in December, these engage-
ments did not change the situation. West Virginia had organized as a free
State within the Union, and this substantial result of the campaign crowned
it with success. The line of the Alleghanies became the northern frontier
of the Confederacy in Virginia, and was never again seriously broken.
VIEW OF ROMNET, VA. FROM A SKETCH.
On October 26th, 1861, Brigadier-General B. F. Kelley, gagement, the Confederates were driven from their in-
with a small force of infantry and cavalry, advanced
upon Romncy from New Creek Station, 26 miles distant,
on the Potomac (see map, page 129). After a sharp en-
trenchments and the town was captured. The Union
forces lost 1 killed and 20 wounded. In the sketch are
shown the camps of General Kelley's troops.
fjoawrft^
1$4&££>
6VU
<f\
'ffiJiAa/jfc/,
FAC-SIMILE OF THE CONCLUSION OF GENERAL DIX'S "AMERICAN FLAG" DISPATCH
GOING TO THE FRONT.
RECOLLECTIONS OP A PRIVATE — I. BY WARREN LEE GOSS.
BEFORE I reached the point of enlisting, I had read and been " enthused "
by General Dix's famous " shoot him on the spot " dispatch ; I had
attended flag-raisings, and had heard orators declaim of " undying devotion to
the Union." One speaker to whom I listened declared that " human life must
be cheapened " ; but I never learned that he helped on the work experiment-
ally. When men by the hundred walked soberly to the front and signed the
enlistment papers, he was not one of them. As I came out of the hall, with
conflicting emotions, feeling as though I should have to go Anally or forfeit
my birthright as an American citizen, one of the orators who stood at the
door, glowing with enthusiasm and patriotism, and shaking hands effusively
with those who enlisted, said to me :
" Did vou enlist % " " No," I said. " Did you ! "
" No ; they won't take me. I have got a lame leg and a widowed mother
to take care of."
I remember another enthusiast who was eager to enlist others. He
declared that the family of no man who went to the front should suffer. After
■& January ISth, 1861, three days after he had
entered on his duties as Secretary of the Treasury
to President Buchanan, General Dix sent W.
Hemphill Jones, chief clerk of one of the Treasury
bureaus, to the South, for the purpose of saving
the revenue-cutters at New Orleans, Mobile, and
Galveston. January 29th, Mr. Jones telegraphed
from New Orleans that the captain of the revenue-
cutter McClelland refused to obey the Secretary's
orders. It was seven in the evening when the
dispatch was received. Immediately, Secretary
Dix wrote the following reply: "Treasury De-
partment, January 29, IS 01. Tell- Lieutenant
Caldwell to arrest Captain Breshwood, assume
command of the cutter, and obey the order I gave
through you. If Captain Breshwood, after ai'rest,
undertakes to interfere with the command of the
cutter, tell Lieutenant Caldwell to consider him as
a mutineer, and treat him accordingly. If any one
attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot
him on the spot. John A. Dix, Secretary of the
Treasury." — Editors.
149
ISO
GOING TO THE FRONT.
ARRIVAL OF THE SEVENTH NEW TORK AT ANNAPOLIS, APRIL 20, 1861, ON THE WAY TO WASHINGTON.
PROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.
the war he was prominent among those who at town-meeting voted to refund
the money to such as had expended it to procure substitutes. He has, moreover,
been fierce and uncompromising toward the ex-Confederates since the war.
From the first I did not believe the trouble would blow over in " sixty
days"; ,1 nor did I consider eleven dollars a month, % and the promised glory,
large pay for the services of an able-bodied young man.
It was the news that the 6th Massachusetts regiment had been mobbed by
roughs on their passage through Baltimore which gave me the war fever. |
} Mr. Seward, speaking in New York two days
after the secession of South Carolina, said : " Sixty
days' more suns will give you a much brighter and
more cheerful atmosphere."
& The monthly pay of Union privates was :
cavalry $12, artillery and infantry $11 ; from
August 6th, 1861, $13 for all arms, and from
May 1st, 1864, $16. Confederate privates re-
ceived: in the cavalry and light batteries $12 ; in
the artillery and infantry $11 ; increased June
9th, 1864, to $19 and $18 per month for a
period of one year from that date. — Editors.
4 Concerning this encounter Colonel Edward F.
Jones, of the 6th Massachusetts, says in his report :
"After leaving Philadelphia I received intimation
that our passage through the city of Baltimore would
be resisted. I caused ammunition to be distributed
and arms loaded, and went personally -through the
cars, and issued the following order, viz., 'The regi-
ment will march through Baltimore in column of sec-
tions, arms at will. You will undoubtedly be insulted,
abused, and perhaps assaulted, to which you must pay
no attention whatever, but march with your faces
square to the trout and pay no attention to the mob,
even if they throw stones, bricks, or other missiles;
but if you are fired upon and any one of you is hit, your
officers will order you to fire. Do not Are into any pro-
miscuous crowds, but select any man whom you may
Bee aiming at you, and be sure you drop him.' Reach-
ing Baltimore, horses were attached the instant that
the locomotive was detached, and the cars were driven
at a rapid pace across the city. After the cars con-
taining seven companies had reached the Washington
depot the track behind them was barricaded, and the
cars containing . . . the following companies, viz.,
Company C, of Lowell, Captain Follansbee ; Company
D, of Lowell, Captain Hart; Company I, of Lawrence,
Captain Pickering, and Company L, of Stonehain, Cap-
tain Dike, were vacated, and they proceeded but a short
distance before they were furiously attacked by a shower
of missiles, which came faster as they advanced. They
increased their steps to double-quick, which seemed to
infuriate the mob, as it evidently impressed the mob
with the idea that the soldiers dared not fire or had no
ammunition, and pistol-shots were numerously fired
into the ranks, and one soldier fell dead. The order
' Fire ' was given, and it was executed. In conse-
quence, several of the mob fell, and the soldiers again
advanced hastily. The mayor of Baltimore placed him-
self at the head of the column beside Captain Follans-
bee, and proceeded with them a short distance." . . .
The Hon. George William Brown, then mayor of
Baltimore, in his volume entitled "Baltimore and
the 19th of April, 1861," thus describes the march
of the soldiers after he joined the column :
" They were firing wildly, sometimes backward, over
their shoulders. So rapid was the march that they
could not stop to take aim. The mob, which was not
very large, as it seemed to me, was pursuing with
shouts and stoues, and, I think, an occasional pistol-
shot. The uproar was furious. I ran at once to the
head of the column, some persons in the crowd shout-
ins, ' Here comes the mayor.' I shook hands with the
officer in command. Captain Follansbee, saying, as 1 did
so, 'I am the mayor of Baltimore.' The captain greeted
me cordially. I at once objected to the double-quick,
which was immediately stopped. I placed myself by his
side, and marched with him. He said, 'We have been
attacked without provocation,' or words to that effect. I
replied, ' You must defend yourselves.' I expected that
he would face his men to the rear, and, after giving
warving, would fire if necessary. But I said no more,
for I immediately felt that, as mayor of the city, it was
GOING TO THE FRONT.
151
And yet when I read Governor John A. Andrew's instructions to have
the hero martyrs "preserved in ice and tenderly sent forward," somehow,
though I felt the pathos of it, I could not reconcile myself to the ice.
Ice in connection with patriotism did not give me agreeable impressions
of war, and when I came to think of it, the stoning of the heroic " Sixth "
didn't suit me; it detracted from my desire to die a
soldier's death.
I lay awake all night thinking the matter over, with
the " ice " and " brick-bats " before my mind. How-
ever, the fever culminated that night, and I resolved
to enlist.
" Cold chills " ran up and down my back as I got out of
bed after the sleepless night, and shaved, preparatory to
other desperate deeds of valor. I was twenty years of
age, and when anything unusual was to be done, like
fighting or courting, I shaved.
With a nervous tremor convulsing my system, and
my heart thumping like muffled drum-beats, I stood
before the door of the recruiting-office, and, before turn-
ing the knob to enter, read and re-read the advertisement
for recruits posted thereon, until I knew all its pecu-
liarities. The promised chances for " travel and promo-
UNIFORM OF THE SIXTH
MASSACHUSETTS.
FROM A THOTOGRAPH.
not my province to volunteer such advice. Once before
in my lite I bad taken part in opposing a formidable
riot, and had learned by experience that the safest and
most humane manner of quelling a mob is to meet it at
the beginning with armed resistance. The column con-
tinued its march. There was neither concert of action
nor organization among the rioters. They were armed
only with such stones or missiles as they could pick up,
and a few pistols. My presence for a short time had
some effect, but very soon the attack was renewed with
greater violence. The mob grew bolder. Stones flew
thick and fast. Rioters rushed at the soldiers and at-
tempted to snatch their muskets, and at least on two
occasions succeeded. With one of these muskets a sol-
dier was killed. Men fell ou both sides. A young law-
yer, then and now known as a quiet citizen, seized a
flag of one of the companies and nearly tore it from its
staff. He was shot through the thigh, and was carried
home apparently a dying man, but he survived to enter
the army of the Confederacy ,where he rose to the rank of
captain, and he afterward returned to Baltimore, where
he still lives. The soldiers tired at will. There was no
firing by platoons, and I heard no order given to fire.
I remember that at the corner of South street several
citizens standing in a group fell, either killed or
wounded. It was impossible for the troops to discrimi-
nate between the rioters and the by-standers, but the
latter seemed to suffer most. . . . Marshal Kane,
with about fifty policemen (as I then supposed, but I
have since ascertained that, in fact, there were not so
many), came at a run from the direction of the Camden
street station, and throwing themselves in the rear of
the troops, they formed a line in front of the mob, and
with drawn revolvers kept it back. This was between
Light and Charles streets. Marshal Kane's voice
shouted, ' Keep back, men, or I shoot! ' This movement,
which I saw myself, was gallantly executed, and was
perfectly successful. The mob recoiled like water from
a rock. One of the leading rioters, then a young man,
now a peaceful merchant, tried, as he has hhnserf told
me, to pass the line, but the marshal seized him, and
vowed he would shoot if the attempt was made. This
nearly ended the fight, and the column passed on under
the protection of the police, without serious molesta-
tion, to Camden statiou "
Sumner H. Needham, of Lawrence, Addison O.
Whitney and Luther C. Ladd, of Lowell, and
Charles A. Taylor were the killed, and thirty-six
of their comrades were wounded. Twelve citi-
zens were killed, and an unknown number were
wounded. Col. Jones continues :
"As the men went into the cars I caused the blinds to
the cars to be closed, and took every precaution to pre-
vent any shadow of offense to the people of Baltimore ;
but still the stones flew thick and fast into the train,
and it was with the utmost difficulty that I could pre-
vent the troops from leaving the cars and revenging
the death of their comrades. . . . On reaching
Washington we were quartered at the Capitol, in the
Senate Chamber."
This regiment, the 6th Massachusetts, were the
first armed troops to reach Washington in re-
sponse to the call of the President'.
The 27th Pennsylvania Regiment (unarmed)
arrived at Baltimore by the same train as the
Massachusetts troops. It was attacked by a mob
and obliged to remain at the President street
station, from which point it was sent back the
same day in the direction of Philadelphia. The
same night, by order of the Board of Police Com-
missioners, with the concurrence of Governor
Hicks and Mayor Brown, the railways from the
north were obstructed, so that the 8th Massa-
chusetts, with General B. F. Butler, and the 7th
New York were compelled to go to Annapolis by
water and march thence to Washington. — Editors.
I 52
GOING TO THE FRONT.
tion" seemed good, and I thought I might have made a mistake in con-
sidering war so serious after all. " Chances for travel ! " I must confess
now, after four years of soldiering, that the " chances for travel " were no
myth ; but " promotion " was a little un-
certain and slow.
I was in no hurry to open the door.
Though determined to enlist, I was half
inclined to put it off awhile ; I had a fluc-
tuation of desires; I was faint-hearted
and brave; I wanted to enlist, and yet
Here I turned the knob, and was
relieved. I had been more prompt, with
all my hesitation, than the officer in his
duty ; he wasn't in. Finally he came, and
said: "What do you want, my boy?" "I
want to enlist," I responded, blushing
deeply with upwelling patriotism and
bashfulness. Then the surgeon came to
strip and examine me. In justice to my-
self, it must be stated that I signed the
rolls without a tremor. It is common to
the most of humanity, I believe, that,
when confronted with actual danger, men
have less fear than in its contemplation.
I will, however, make one exception in
favor of the first shell I heard uttering its
blood-curdling hisses, as though a steam
locomotive were traveling the air. With
this exception I have found the actual
dangers of war always less terrible face to
face than on the night before the battle.
My first uniform was a bad fit : my trousers were too long by three
or four inches; the flannel shirt was coarse and unpleasant, too large
at the neck and too short elsewhere. The forage cap was an un-
gainly bag with pasteboard top and leather visor; the blouse was
the only part which seemed decent ; while the overcoat made me feel
like a little nubbin of corn in a large preponderance of husk. Nothing
except " Virginia mud " ever took down my ideas of military pomp quite
so low.
After enlisting I did not seem of so much consequence as I had expected.
There was not so much excitement on account of my military appearance as
I deemed justly my due. I was taught my facings, and at the time I thought
the drill-master needlessly fussy about shouldering, ordering, and presenting
arms. At this time men were often drilled in company and regimental
evolutions long before they learned the manual of arms, because of the diffi-
culty of obtaining muskets. These we obtained at an early day, but we
r
" AND THE CORPORAL DID ! "
GOING TO THE FRONT.
•53
would willingly have resigned them after carrying them for a few hours.
The musket, after an hour's drill, seemed heavier and less ornamental
than it had looked to be. The first day I went out to drill, getting tired of
doing the same things over and over, I said to the drill-sergeant : " Let's stop
this fooling and go over to the grocery." His only reply was addressed to a
corporal :*" Corporal, take this man out and drill him like h — 1 " ; and the cor-
poral did ! I found that suggestions were not so well appreciated in the army
as in private life, and that no wisdom was equal to a drill-master's " Right
face," " Left wheel," and "Right, oblique, march." It takes a raw recruit
some time to learn that he is not to think or suggest, but obey. Some
never do learn. I acquired it at last, in humility and mud, but it was tough.
Yet I doubt if my patriotism, during my first three weeks' drill, was quite
knee-high. Drilling looks easy to a spectator, but it isn't. Old soldiers who
read this will remember their green recruithood and smile assent. After a
time I had cut down my uniform so that I could see out of it, and had con-
quered the drill sufficiently to see through it. Then the word came: On
to Washington !
Our company was quartered at a large hotel near the railway station in
the town in which it had been recruited. Bunks had been fitted up within a
part of the hotel but little used. We took
our meals at the public table, and found
fault with the style. Six months later we
would have considered ourselves aristo-
cratic to have slept in the hotel stables
with the meal-bin for a dining-table. One
morning there was great excitement at the
report that we were going to be sent to
the front. Most of us obtained a limited
pass and went to see our friends for the
last time, returning the same night.
Many of our schoolmates came in tears
to say good-bye. We took leave of
them all with heavy hearts, for, lightly
as I may here seem to treat the sub-
ject, it was no light thing for a boy
of twenty to start out for three years
into the unknown dangers of a civil war.
Our mothers — Clod bless them! — had
brought us something good to eat, — pies,
cakes, doughnuts, and jellies. It was
one way in which a mother's heart
found utterance. The young ladies
(sisters, of course) brought an invention, usually made of leather or cloth,
containing needles, pins, thread, buttons, and scissors, so that nearly every
recruit had an embryo tailor's shop, with the goose outside. One old lady,
in the innocence of her heart, brought her son an umbrella. We did not see
A MOTHERS PARTING GIFT.
154
GOING TO THE FRONT.
anything particularly laughable about it at the time, but our old drill-sergeant
did. Finally we were ready to move ; our tears were wiped away, our buttons
were polished, and our muskets were as bright as emery paper could make them.
" Wad " Eider, a member of our company, had come from a neighboring
State to enlist with us. He was about eighteen years of age, red-headed,
freckled-faced, good-natured and rough, with a wonderful aptitude for crying
or laughing from sympathy. Another comrade, whom I will call Jack, was
honored with a call from his mother, a little woman, hardly reaching up to
his shoulder, with a sweet, motherly, care-worn face. At the last moment,
though she had tried hard to preserve her composure, as is the habit of New
England people, she threw her arms around her boy's neck, and with an
outburst of sobbing and crying, said : " My dear boy, my dear boy, what will
your ]Door old mother do without you!
You are going to fight for your country.
Don't forget your mother, Jack; God
bless you, Gk>d bless you ! " We felt as if
the mother's tears and blessing were a
benediction over us all. There was a touch
of nature in her homely sorrow and solici-
tude over her big boy, which drew tears
of sympathy from my eyes as I thought
of my own sorrowing mother at home.
The sympathetic Wad Eider burst into
tears and sobs. His eyes refused, as he
expressed it, to " dry up," until, as we were
moving off, Jack's mother, rushing toward
him with a bundle tied like a wheat-sheaf,
called out in a most pathetic voice,
" Jack ! Jack ! you've forgotten to take
your pennyroyal." We all laughed, and
so did Jack, and I think the laugh helped
him more than the cry did. Everybody
had said his last word, and the cars were
off. Handkerchiefs were waved at us
from all the houses we passed; we
cheered till we were hoarse, and then set-
tled back and swung our handkerchiefs.
Just here let me name over the con-
tents of my knapsack, as a fan sample of
what all the volunteers started with. There
were in it a pair of trousers, two pairs of
drawers, a pair of thick boots, four pairs
of stockings, four flannel shirts, a blouse,
a looking-glass, a can of peaches, a bottle
of cough-mixture, a button-stick, chalk,
razor and strop, the " tailor's shop "
A MILITIA UNIFORM OF '61. —AFTER THE NEW
YORK SEVENTH'S MEMORIAL STATUE IN
THE CENTRAL PARK.
GOING TO THE FRONT.
iss
THE NEW YORK SEVENTH MARCHING DOWN BROADWAY, APRIL 19, 1861.
spoken of above, a Bible, a small volume of Shakspere, and writing utensils.
To its top was strapped a double woolen blanket and a rubber one. Many other
things were left behind because of lack of room in or about the knapsack, j]
On our arrival in Boston we were marched through the streets — the first
march of any consequence we had taken with our knapsacks and equipments.
Our dress consisted of a belt about the body, which held a cartridge-box
and bayonet, a cross-belt, also a haversack and tin drinking-cup, a canteen,
and, last but not least, the knapsack strapped to the back. The straps ran
over, around, and about one, in confusion most perplexing to our unsophisti-
cated shoulders, the knapsack constantly giving the wearer the feeling that he
was being pulled over backward. My canteen banged against my bayonet,
both tin cup and bayonet badly interfered with the butt of my musket, while
my cartridge-box and haversack were constantly flopping up and down — the
whole jangling like loose harness and chains on a runaway horse. As we
marched into Boston Common, I involuntarily cast my eye about for a bench.
But for a former experience in offering advice, I should have proposed to the
captain to " chip in " and hire a team to carry our equipments. Such was my
first experience in war harness. Afterward, with hardened muscles, rendered
athletic by long marches and invigorated by hardships, I could look back
upon those days and smile, while carrying a knapsack as lightly as my heart.
That morning my heart was as heavy as my knapsack. At last the welcome
| It is said by one of the " Mouticello Guards," that most of its members started for Bull Run with a
trunk and an abundant supply of fine linen shirts. — Editors., ■
is6
GOING TO THE FRONT.
1-1,1
r-#-C.'
AmA
FEDERAL HILL, BALTIMORE. FROM A SKETCH MADE ON THE DAY OF THE OCCUPATION BY GENERAL BUTLER.
On the 27th of April, 1861, General B. F. Butler was
assigned to the command of the Department of Anna-
polis, which did not include Baltimore. On the 5th of
May, with two regiments and a battery of artillery, he
moved from Washington to the Relay House, on the
Baltimore and Ohio Railway, 1 miles from Baltimore, at
the junction of the Washington branch. He fortified
this position, and on the 13th entered Baltimore and
occupied and fortified Federal Hill, overlooking the
harbor and commanding the city. On the 15th he was
followed in command of the Department by General
George Cadwalader, who was succeeded on the 11th of
Juiie by General N. P. Banks, who administered the
Department until succeeded by General John A. Dix,
July 23d, 1861. On the 22d of May General Butler
assumed command at Fort Monroe, Va.
orders came : " Prepare to open ranks ! Rear, open order, march ! Right
dress ! Front ! Order arms ! Fix bayonets ! Stack arms ! Unsling knapsacks !
In place, rest ! "
The tendency of raw soldiers at first is to overload themselves. On the first
long march the reaction sets in, and the recruit goes to the opposite extreme,
not carrying enongh, and thereby becoming dependent upon his comrades.
Old soldiers preserve a happy medium. I have seen a new regiment start out
with a lot of indescribable material, including sheet-iron stoves, and come back
after a long march covered with more mud than baggage, stripped of every-
thing except blankets, haversacks, canteens, muskets, and cartridge-boxes.
During that afternoon in Boston, after marching and countermarching, or,
as one of our farmer-boy recruits expressed it, after "hawing and geeing"
about the streets, we were sent to Fort Independence for the night for safe-
keeping. A company of regulars held the fort, and the guards walked their
post with an uprightness that was astonishing. Our first impression of them
was that there was a needless amount of " wheel about and turn about, and
walk just so," and of saluting, and presenting arms. We were all marched to
GOING TO THE FRONT. 157
our quarters within the fort, where we unsluug our knapsacks. After the
first day's struggle with a knapsack, the general verdict was, " got too much
of it." At supper-time we were marched to the dining-barracks, where our
bill of fare was beefsteak, coffee, wheat bread, and potatoes, but not a sign
of milk or butter. It struck me as queer when I heard that the army was
never provided with butter and milk.
The next day we started for Washington, by rail. We marched through New
York's crowded streets without awakening the enthusiasm we thought our
due ; for we had read of the exciting scenes attending the departure of the
New York 7th for Washington, on the day the 6th Massachusetts was
mobbed in Baltimore, and also of the march of the 12th Massachusetts down
Broadway on the 2-tth of July, when the regiment sang the then new and
always thrilling lyric, "John Brown's Body." The following morning we
took breakfast in Philadelphia, where we were attended by matrons and
maidens, who waited upon us with thoughtful tenderness, as if they had been
our own mothers and sweethearts instead of strangers. They feasted us and
then filled our haversacks. God bless them ! If we did not quite appreciate
them then, we did afterward. After embarking on the cars at Philadelphia,
the waving of handkerchiefs was less and less noticeable along the route.
We arrived in Baltimore late at night ; Union troops now controlled the city,
and we marched through its deserted streets unmolested. On our arrival at
Washington the next morning, we were marched to barracks, dignified by the
name of " Soldiers' Ketreat," where each man received a half loaf of " soft-
tack," as we had already begun to call wheat bread, with a piece of " salt
junk," about as big and tough as the heel of my government shoe, and a
quart of coffee, — which constituted our breakfast. Our first day in Wash-
ington was spent in shaving, washing, polishing our brasses and buttons, and
cleaning-up for inspection. A day or two later we moved to quarters not
far from the armory, looking out on the broad Potomac, within sight of Long
Bridge and the city of Alexandria.
Here and there the sound of a gun broke the serenity, but otherwise the
quiet seemed inconsistent with the war preparations going on around us. In
the distance, across the wide river, we could see the steeples and towers of the
city of Alexandria, while up stream, on the right, was the Long Bridge. Here
and there was to be seen the moving panorama of armed men, as a regiment
crossed the bridge ; a flash of sunlight on the polished muskets revealed them
to the eye; while the white-topped army baggage-wagons filed over in con-
stant procession, looking like sections of whitewashed fence in motion. The
overgrown country village of that period, called Washington, can be described
in a few words. There were wide streets stretching out from a common center
like a spider's web. The Capitol, with its unfinished dome ; the Patent Office,
the Treasury, and the other public buildings, were in marked and classic con-
trast with the dilapidated, tumble-down, shabby look of the average homes,
stores, groceries, and groggeries, which increased in shabbiness and dirty dilapi-
dation as they approached the suburbs. The climate of Washington was
genial, but in the winter months the mud was fearful. I have drilled in it,
i58
GOING TO THE FRONT.
*4Mm '"'•■■>■■. a
0J;yS!!i5
MS
7^
PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, WASHINGTON. FROM A SKETCH MADE IN 1861.
marched in it, and run from the provost-guard in it, and I think I appreciate
it from actual and familiar knowledge. In the lower quarter of the city
there was not a piece of sidewalk. Even Pennsylvania Avenue, with its side-
walks, was extremely dirty ; and the cavalcade of teams, artillery caissons,
and baggage-wagons, with their heavy wheels, stirred the mud into a stiff
batter for the pedestrian.
Officers in tinsel and gold lace were so thick on Pennsylvania Avenue that
it was a severe trial for a private to walk there. The salute exacted by
officers, of bringing the hand to the visor of the cap, extending the arm to its
full length, and then letting it drop by the side, was tiresome when followed
up with the industry required by this horde. Perhaps I exaggerate, but in a
half -hour's walk on the avenue I think I have saluted two hundred officers.
Brigadier-generals were more numerous there than I ever knew them to be at
the front. These officers, many of whom won their positions by political
wire-pulling at Washington, we privates thought the great bane of the war ;
they ought to have been sent to the front rank of battle, to serve as privates
until they had learned the duties of a soldier. Mingled with these gaudy,
useless officers were citizens in search of fat contracts, privates, " non-com's "
and officers whose uniforms were well worn and faded, showing that they
were from encampments and active service. Occasionally a regiment passed
through the streets, on the way to camp; all surged up and down wide
Pennsylvania Avenue.
The soldiers of this period were eager to collect mementoes of the war.
One of my acquaintances in another regiment made sketches of the different
camps he had visited around Washington, including " Brightwood " and Camp
GOING TO THE FRONT.
159
Cameron ; the latter he termed " a nursery for brigadier-generals." Another
friend hoarded specimens of official signatures and passes issued in Wash-
ington, conspicuous among which was a pass with the well-known John-
Hancock-like signature of Drake De Kay. (See page 173.)
Before enlisting, and while on a visit to a neighboring town, I was one even-
ing at the village store, when the talk turned upon the duration of the war.
Jim Tinkham, the clerk of the grocery store, announced his belief in a sixty
days' war. I modestly asked him for more time. The older ones agreed with
Jim and argued, as was common at that time, that the Government would
soon blockade all the rebel ports and starve them out. Tinkham proposal
to wager a supper for those present, if the rebels did not surrender before
snow came that year. I accepted. Neither of us put up any money, and
in the excitement of the weeks which followed I had forgotten the wager.
During my first week in Washington, whom should I meet but Jim Tinkham,
the apostle of the sixty-day theory. He was In-own with sunburn, and clad
in a rusty uniform which showed service in the field. He was a veteran, for
he had been at the battle of Bull Run. He confidentially declared that
after getting the order to retreat at that battle, he should not have stopped
short of Boston if he had not been halted by a soldier with a musket, after
crossing Long Bridge.
THE SEVENTH NEW YORK AT CAMP CAMERON, WASHINGTON.
VIRGINIA SCENES IN '61
BY CONSTANCE CARY HARRISON.
THE
Virj
CONFEDERATE BATTLE-FLAG. SEE PAGE 167.
IHE only association I have with my old home in
rginia that is not one of unmixed happiness
ty j\ relates to the time immediately succeeding the exe-
| cution of John Brown at Harper's Ferry. Our
: 4»i homestead was in Fairfax, at a considerable dis-
tance from the theater of that tragic episode ; and,
■Lv, belonging as we did to a family among the first in
^'JiMv ^"' ^';l1,i t° manumit slaves, — our grandfather hav-
^Ktif ing set free those that came to him by inheritance,
and the people who served us being hired from their
owners and remaining in our employ through years of kindliest relations, —
there seemed to be no especial reason for us to share in* the apprehension of an
uprising of the blacks. But there was the fear — unspoken, or pooh-poohed
at by the men who were mouth-pieces for our community — dark, boding,
oppressive, and altogether hateful. I can remember taking it to bed with me
at night, and awaking suddenly oftentimes to confront it through a vigil of
nervous terror, of which it never occurred to me to speak to any one. The
notes of whip-poor-wills in the sweet-gum swamp near the stable, the mut-
terings of a distant thunder-storm, even the rustle of the night wind in the
oaks that shaded my window, filled me with nameless dread. In the day-
time it seemed impossible to associate suspicion with those familiar tawny or
sable faces that surrounded us. We had seen them for so many years smil-
ing or saddening with the family joys or sorrows ; they were so guileless, so
patient, so satisfied. What subtle influence was at work that should trans-
form them into tigers thirsting for our blood ? The idea was preposterous.
But when evening came again, and with it the hour when the colored people
(who in summer and autumn weather kept astir half the night) assembled
themselves together for dance or prayer-meeting, the ghost that refused to be
laid was again at one's elbow. Rusty bolts were drawn and rusty fire-arms
loaded. A watch was set where never before had eye or ear been lent to such
a service. In short, peace had flown from the borders of Virginia.
Although the newspapers were full of secession talk and the matter was
eagerly discussed at our tables, I cannot remember that, as late as Christmas-
time of the year 1860, coming events had cast any definite shadow on our
homes. The people in our neighborhood, of one opinion with their dear and
honored friend, Colonel Robert E. Lee, of Arlington, were slow to accept the
startling suggestion of disruption of the Union. At any rate, we enjoyed the
usual holiday gathering of kinsfolk in the usual fashion. The old Vaucluse
house, known for many years past as a center of cheerful hospitality in the
county, threw wide open its doors to receive all the members who could be
gathered there of a large family circle. The woods about were despoiled of
160
VIRGINIA SCENES IN '61.
ibi
holly and spruce, pine and cedar, to deck the walls and wreathe the picture-
frames. On Christmas Eve we had a grand rally of youths and boys belonging
to the " clan," as they loved to call it, to roll in a yule log, which was deposited
upon a glowing bed of coals in the big " red-parlor" fire-place, and sit about it
afterward, welcoming the Christmas in with goblets of egg-nog and apple-toddy.
" Where shall we be a year hence ? " some one asked at a pause in the merry
chat ; and, in the brief silence that followed, arose a sudden spectral thought
of war. All felt its presence ; no one eared to speak first of its grim possibilities.
On Christmas Eve of the following year the old house lay in ruins, a sacri-
fice by Union troops to- military necessity ; the forest giants that kept watch
around her walls had been cut down and made to serve as breastworks for a
fort erected on the Vaueluse property as part of the defenses of Washington.
Of the young men and boys who took part in that holiday festivity, all were
in the active service of the South, — one of them, alas ! soon to fall under a
rain of shot and shell beside his gun at Fredericksburg ; the youngest of the
number had left his mother's knee to fight at Manassas, and found himself,
before the year was out, a midshipman aboard the Confederate steamer
Nashville, on her cruise in distant seas !
My first vivid impression of war-days was during a ramble in the neigh-
boring woods one Sunday afternoon in spring, when the young people in
a happy band set out in search of wild flowers. Pink honeysuckles, blue
lupine, beds of fairy flax, anemones, and ferns in abundance sprung under
VOL. I. 11
162 VIRGINIA SCENES IN '61.
the canopy of young leaves on the forest boughs, and the air was full of the
song of birds and the music of running waters. We knew every mossy path
far and near in those woods ; every tree had been watched and cherished by
those who went before us, and dearer than any other spot on earth was our
tranquil, sweet Vaucluse. Suddenly the shrill whistle of a locomotive struck
the ear, an unwonted sound on Sundav. " Do you know what that means ? "
said one of the older cousins who accompanied the party. " It is the special
train carrying Alexandria volunteers to Manassas, and to-morrow I shall
follow with my company." Silence fell upon our little band. A cloud
seemed to come between us and the sun. It was the beginning of the end
too soon to come.
The story of one broken circle is the story of another at the outset of such
a war. Before the week was over, the scattering of our household, which no
one then believed to be more than temporary, had begun. Living as we did
upon ground likely to be in the track of armies gathering to confront each
other, it was deemed advisable to send the children and young girls into a
place more remote from chances of danger. Some weeks later the heads of
the household, two widowed sisters whose sons were at Manassas, drove
away from their home in their carriage at early morning, having spent the
previous night in company with a half -grown lad digging in the cellar hasty
graves for the interment of two boxes of old English silver-ware, heirlooms
in the family, for which there was no time to provide otherwise. Although
the enemy were long encamped immediately above it after the house was
burnt the following year, this silver was found there when the war had ended ;
it was lying loose in the earth, the boxes having rotted away.
The point at which our family reunited within the Confederate lines was
Bristoe, the station next beyond Manassas, a cheerless railway inn ; a part of
the premises was used as a country grocery store ; and there quarters were
secured for us with a view to being near the army. By this time all our
kith and kin of fighting age had joined the volunteers. One cannot pic-
ture accommodations more forlorn than these eagerly taken for us and for
other families attracted to Bristoe by the same powerful magnet. The sum-
mer sun poured its burning rays upon whitewashed walls unshaded by a tree.
Our bedrooms were almost uninhabitable by day or night, our fare the plain-
est. From the windows we beheld only a flat, uncultivated country, crossed
by red-clay roads, then ankle-deep in dust. We learned to look for all excite-
ment to the glittering lines of railway track, along which continually thun-
dered trains bound to and from the front. It was impossible to allow such a
train to pass without running out upon the platform to salute it, for in this
way we greeted many an old friend or relative buttoned up in the smart gray
uniform, speeding with high hope to the scene of coming conflict. Such shouts
as went up from sturdy throats while we stood waving hands, handkerchiefs,
or the rough woolen garments we were at work upon ! Then fairly awoke the
spirit that made of Southern women the inspiration of Southern men through-
out the war. Most of the young fellows we knew and were cheering onward
wore the uniform of privates, and for the right to wear it had left homes of
VIRGINIA SCENES IN '61.
163
rs- - • " ' ■ j/
■ - »*
-r' - !— - - I "
ON THE WAT TO MANASSAS.
ease and luxury. To such we gave our best homage ; and from that time forth
the youth who was lukewarm in the cause or unambitious of military glory
fared uncomfortably in the presence of the average Confederate maiden.
Thanks to our own carriage, we were able during those rallying days of
June to drive frequently to visit " the boys " in camp, timing the expeditions
to include battalion drill and dress parade, and taking tea afterward in the
different tents. Then were the gala days of war, and our proud hosts has-
tened to produce home dainties dispatched from the far-away plantations —
tears and blessings interspersed amid the packing, we were sure ; though I
have seen a pretty girl persist in declining other fare, to make her meal upon
raw biscuit and huckleberry pie compounded by the bright-eyed amateur cook
of a well-beloved mess. Feminine heroism could no farther go.
And so the days wore on until the 17th of July, when a rumor from the
front sent an electric shock through our circle. The enemy were moving for-
ward ! On the morning of the 18th those who had been able to sleep at all
awoke early to listen for the first guns of the engagement of Blackburn's Ford.
Abandoned as the women at Bristoe were by every male creature old
enough to gather news, there was, for us, no way of knowing the progress
of events during the long, long day of waiting, of watching, of weeping, of
praying, of rushing out upon the railway track to walk as far as we dared in
the direction whence came that intolerable booming of artillery. The cloud of
dun smoke arising over Manassas became heavier in volume as the day pro-
gressed. Still, not a word of tidings, till toward afternoon there came limping
i6/|
VIRGINIA SCENES IN '61,
up a single, very dirty, soldier with his arm in a sling. What a heaven-
send he was, if only as an escape-valve for our pent-up sympathies ! We seized
him, we washed him, we cried over him, we glorified him until the man was
fairly bewildered. Our best endeavors could only develop a pin-scratch of a
wound on his right hand ; but when our hero had laid in a substantial meal
of bread and meat, we plied him with trembling questions, each asking news
of some staff or regiment or
company. It has since oc-
curred to me that he was a
humorist in disguise. His
invariable reply, as he looked
from one to the other of his
satellites, was : " The
Virginia, marm ? Why, of
coase. They warn't no two
ways o' thinkin' 'bout that ar
reg'ment. They just kivered
tharselves with glory ! "
A little later two wagon-
loads of slightly wounded
claimed our care, and with
them came authentic news
of the day. Most of us re-
ceived notes on paper torn
from a soldier's pocket-book and grimed with gunpowder, containing
assurance of the safety of our own. At nightfall a train carrying more
wounded to the hospitals at Culpeper made a halt at Bristoe ; and, preceded
by men holding lanterns, we went in among the stretchers with milk, food,
and water to the sufferers. One of the first discoveries I made, bending over
in that fitful light, was a young officer whom I knew to be a special object of
solicitude with one of my comrades in the search ; but he was badly hurt, and
neither he nor she knew the other was near until the train had moved on.
The next day, and the next, were full of burning excitement over the impend-
ing general engagement, which people then said would decide the fate of the
young Confederacy. Fresh troops came by with every train, and we lived only
to turn from one scene to another of welcome and farewell. On Saturday even-
ing arrived a message from General Beauregard, saying that early on Sunday
an engine and car would be put at our disposal, to take us to some point more
remote from danger. We looked at one another, and, tacitly agreeing the gal-
lant general had sent not an order but a suggestion, declined his kind proposal.
Another unspeakably long day, full of the straining anguish of suspense.
Dawning bright and fair, it closed under a sky darkened by cannon-smoke.
The roar of guns seemed never to cease. First, a long sullen boom ; then a
sharper, rattling fire, painfully distinct ; then stragglers from the field, with
varying rumors; at last, the news of victory; and, as before, the wounded,
to force our numbed faculties into service. One of our group, the mother of
LISTENING FOR THE FIRST GCN.
VIRGINIA SCENES IN '61. 165
an only son barely fifteen years of age, heard that her boy, after being in action
all the early part of the day, had through sheer fatigue fallen asleep upon
the ground, where he was found resting peacefully amidst the roar of the guns.
A few days later we rode over the field. The trampled grass had begun
to spring' again, and wild flowers were blooming around carelessly made
graves. From one of these imperfect mounds of clay I saw a hand extended ;
and when, years afterward, I visited the tomb of Rousseau beneath the
Pantheon in Paris, where a sculptured hand bearing a torch protrudes from
the sarcophagus, I thought of that mournful spectacle upon the field of
Manassas. Fences were everywhere thrown down; the undergrowth of the
woods was riddled with shot; here and there we came upon spiked guns,
disabled gun-carriages, cannon-balls, blood-stained blankets, and dead horses.
We were glad enough to turn away and gallop homeward.
With August heats and lack of water, Bristoe was forsaken for quarters
near Culpeper, where my mother went into the soldiers' barracks, sharing
soldiers' accommodations, to nurse the wounded. In September quite a party
of us, upon invitation, visited the different headquarters. We stopped over-
night at Manassas, five ladies, sleeping upon a couch made of rolls of car-
tridge-flannel, in a tent guarded by a faithful sentry. I remember the comical
effect of the five bird-cages (of a kind without which no self-respecting young
woman of that day would present herself in public) suspended upon a line
running across the upper part of our tent, after we had reluctantly removed
them in order to adjust ourselves for repose. Our progress during that mem-
orable visit was royal; an ambulance with a picked troop of cavalrymen had
been placed at our service, and the convoy was " personally conducted " by a
pleasing variety of distinguished officers. It was at this time, after a supper
at the headquarters of the " Maryland line " at Fairfax, that the afterward uni-
versal war-song, " My Maryland !" was put afloat upon the tide of army favor.
We were sitting outside a tent in the warm starlight of an early autumn night,
when music was proposed. At once we struck up Randall's verses to the
tune of the old college song, " Lauriger Horatius," — a young lady of the party,
Jennie Cary, of Baltimore, having recently set them to this music before
leaving home to share the fortunes of the Confederacy. All joined in the ring-
ing chorus ; and, when we finished, a burst of applause came from some soldiers
listening in the darkness behind a belt of trees. Next day the melody was
hummed far and near through the camps, and in due time it had gained
the place of favorite song in the army. Other songs sung that evening,
which afterward had a great vogue, were one beginning " By blue Patapsco's
billowy dash," and "The years glide slowly by, Lorena."
Another incident of note, during the autumn of '61, was that to my cousins,
Hetty and Jennie Cary, and to me was intrusted the making of the first three
battle-flags of the Confederacy. They were jaunty squares of scarlet crossed
with dark blue edged with white, the cross bearing stars to indicate the
number of the seceded States. We set our best stitches upon them, edged
them with golden fringes, and, when they were finished, dispatched one
to Johnston, another to Beauregard, and the third to Earl Van Dorn, then
1 66 VIRGINIA SCENES IN '61.
commanding infantry at Manassas. The banners were received with all
possible enthusiasm; were toasted, feted, and cheered abundantly. After
two years, when Van Dorn had been killed in Tennessee, mine came back
to me, tattered and storm-stained from long and honorable service in the
field. But it was only a little while after it had been bestowed that there
arrived one day at our lodgings in Culpeper a huge, bashful Mississippi
scout, — one of the most daring in the army, — with the frame of a Hercules
and the face of a child. He had been bidden to come there by his general,
he said, to ask, if I would not give him an order to fetch some cherished
object from my dear old home — something that would prove to me "how
much they thought of the maker of that flag!" A week later I was the
astonished recipient of a lamented bit of finery left "within the lines," a
wrap, brought to us by Dillon himself, with a beaming face. Mounted on
a load of fire-wood, he had gone through the Union pickets, and while
peddling poultry had presented himself at the house of my uncle, Dr. Fairfax,
in Alexandria, whence he carried oft' his prize in triumph, with a letter in
its folds telling us how relatives left behind longed to be sharing the joys and
sorrows of those at large in the Confederacy.
<^%t^r/tc t&^-o
y^€, S^tl ^I7^££g^ ~<^<^^~^ ^^VT-tS-
FAC-SIMILE OF AUTOGRAPHIC COPY OF THE FIRST STANZA OF " MY MARYLAND ! "
^^z^L^
WjU'hetto
SCRUTINIZING A PASS AT THE WASHINGTON END OF THE LONG BRIDGE.
McDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
BY JAMES B. FRY, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, IT. S. A. (AT BULL RUN, CAPTAIN AND ASSISTANT
ADJUTANT-GENERAL ON MCDOWELL'S STAFF).
S President Buchanan's administration was drawing to a
close, he was forced by the action of the South to decide
whether the power of the general Government should be
used to coerce into submission States that had attempted
to secede from the Union. His opinion was that the con-
tingency was not provided for, that while a State had no
right to secede, the Constitution gave no authority to
coerce, and that he had no right to do anything except
hold the property and enforce the laws of the United
States.
Before he went out of office the capital of the nation
seemed to be in danger of seizure. For its protection, and
in order to consult about holding Southern forts and
arsenals, General Scott was in December called to Wash-
ington, from which he had been absent since the inaugu-
ration of Pierce, who had defeated him for the presidency.
Jefferson Davis, Pierce's Secretary of War, and General Scott had quarreled,
and the genius of acrimony controlled the correspondence which took place
I The battle of Bull Run was notable in a minor by their several States. The Confederate uniforms
way for the variety of uniforms worn on both exhibited similar variety ; some regiments were in
sides — a variety greater than was shown in any citizens' dress, and several of the general officers
UNIFORM OF THE 14TH NEW YORK
AT BULL RUN.]
later engagement. The Federal blue had not yet
been issued, and the troops wore either the uni-
forms of their militia organizations (including vari-
ous patterns of Zouave dress) or those furnished
who had been in the old service — including, we
are informed, Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and
Longstreet — still wore the dress of the United
States Army. — Editors.
167
1 68
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
between them. Notwithstanding the fact that on account of his age and
infirmities he was soon overwhelmed by the rush of events, General Scott's
laurels had not withered at the outbreak of the war, and he brought to the
emergency ability, experience, and prestige. A high light in the whole mili-
tary world, he towered above the rest of our army at that time profession-
ally as he did physically. As the effect of his unusual stature was increased
by contrast with a short aide-de-camp (purposely chosen, it was suspected),
so was his exalted character marked by
one or two conspicuous but not very
harmful foibles. With much learning,
great military ability, a strict sense of
justice, and a kind heart, he was vain
and somewhat petulant. He loved the
Union and hated Jefferson Davis.
By authority of President Buchanan,
Scott assembled a small force of regulars
in the capital, and for the first time in
the history of the country the electoral
count was made and a President was in-
augurated under the protection of sol-
diery. But before the inauguration of
Lincoln, March 4th, the secession move-
ment had spread through the "cotton-
belt" and delegates from the secession
States had met as a congress at Mont-
gomery, Alabama, February 4th. On the
8th they had organized the " Provisional
Government of the Confederate States of
America," and on the 9th had elected Jefferson Davis President and Alex-
ander H. Stephens Vice-President.
When the news of the firing upon Sumter reached Washington, President
Lincoln prepared a proclamation, and issued it April 15th, convening Con-
gress and calling forth 75,000 three-months militia to suppress combinations
against the Government. The Federal situation was alarming. Sumter fell on
the 13th of April, and was evacuated on the 14th. Virginia seceded on the 17th,
and seized Harper's Ferry on the 18th and the Norfolk Navy Yard on the 20th.
On the 19th a mob in Baltimore assaulted the 6th Massachusetts volunteers
as it passed through to Washington, and at once bridges were burned and
railway communication was cut off between Washington and the North.
Lincoln had had no experience as a party leader or executive officer, and
was without knowledge of military affairs or acquaintance with military men.
Davis at the head of the Confederacy was an experienced and acknowledged
Southern leader ; he was a graduate of the Military Academy; had commanded
a regiment in the Mexican war; had been Secretary of War under Presi-
dent Pierce, and had been chairman of the Military Committee in the United
States Senate up to the time he left Congress to take part with the South.
.SIMON CAMERON, SECRETARY OF WAR FROM
MARCH i. 1861, UNTIL JAN. 15, 1862.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
169
He was not only well versed in everything relating to war, but was
thoroughly informed concerning the character and capacity of prominent
and promising officers of the army. There was nothing experimental in
his choice of high military commanders. With but few exceptions, those
appointed -at the beginning retained command until they lost their lives or
the war closed.
The Southern States, all claiming to be independent republics after seces-
sion, with all their governmental machinery, including militia and volunteer
organizations, in complete working order, transferred themselves as States
from the Union to the Confederacy. The organization of a general govern-
ment from such elements, with war as its immediate purpose, was a simple
matter. Davis had only to accept and arrange, according to his ample infor-
mation and well-matured judgment, the abundant and ambitious material
at hand in the way that he thought would best secure his purposes. Lincoln
had to adapt the machinery of a conservative old government, some of it
unsuitable, some unsound, to sudden demands for which it was not designed.
The talents of Simon Cameron, his first Secretary of War, were political, not
military. He was a kind, gentle, placid man, gifted with powers to persuade,
not to command. Shrewd and skilled in the management of business and
personal matters, he had no knowledge of military affairs,
and could not give the President much assistance in as-
sembling and organizing for war the earnest and impa-
tient, but unmilitary people of the North.
Officers from all departments of the Federal civil service
hurried to the Confederacy and placed themselves at the
disposal of Davis, and officers from all the corps of the
regular army, most of them full of vigor, with the same
education and experience as those who remained, went
South and awaited assignment to the duties for which
Davis might regard them as best qualified. All Confed-
erate offices were vacant, and the Confederate President
had large if not absolute power in filling them. On the
other hand, the civil offices under Lincoln were occupied
or controlled by party, and in the small regular army of
the Union the law required that vacancies should as a
rule be filled by seniority. There was no retired list for
the disabled, and the army was weighed down by lon-
gevity, by venerated traditions ; by prerogatives of service
rendered in former wars ; by the firmly tied red-tape of military bureauism,
and by the deep-seated and well-founded fear of the auditors and comp-
trollers of the treasury. Nothing but time and experience — possibly nothing
but disaster — could remove from the path of the Union President difficulties
from which the Confederate President was, by the situation, quite free. In
the beginning of the war, the military advantage was on the side of the Con-
federates, notwithstanding the greater resources of the North, which produced
their effect only as the contest was prolonged.
UNIFORM OF THE 1ST MASS.
AT BULL RUN. FROM
A PHOTOGRAPH.
170
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
■
^^rmrk'
;3»T
S«j5
'MWB
:;,-:l
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
*~2u*~*D<
After the firing of the first gun upon Sumter, the two sides were equally
active in marshaling their forces on a line along the border States from
the Atlantic coast of Virginia in the east to Kansas in the west. Many
of the earlier collisions along this line were due rather to special causes or
local feeling than to general military considerations. The prompt advance
of the Union forces under McClellan to West Virginia was to protect that
new-born free State. Patterson's movement to Hagerstown and thence to
Harper's Ferry was to prevent Maryland from joining or aiding the rebellion,
to re-open the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and prevent invasion from the
Shenandoah Valley. The Southerners having left the Union and set up the
Confederacy upon the principle of State rights, in violation of that principle
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
171
invaded the State of Kentucky in opposition to her apparent purpose of
armed neutrality. That made Kentucky a field of early hostilities and helped
to anchor her to the Union. Missouri was rescued from secession through the
energy of General F. P. Blair and her other Union men, and by the indomi-
table will of Captain Lyon of the regular army, whose great work was accom-
plished under many disadvantages. In illustration of the difficulty with which
the new condition of affairs penetrated the case-hardened bureauism of long
peace, it may be mentioned that the venerable adjutant-general of the army,
when a crisis was at hand in Missouri, came from a consultation with the
President and Secretary Cameron, and with a sorry expres-
sion of countenance and an ominous shake of the head
exclaimed, " It's bad, very bad ; we're giving that young
man Lyon a great deal too much power in Missouri."
Early in the contest another young Union officer came
to the front. Major Irvin McDowell was appointed briga-
dier-general May 14th. He was forty-three years of age,
of unexceptionable habits and great physical powers. His
education, begun in France, was continued at the United
States Military Academy, from which he was graduated in
1838. Always a close student, he was well informed out-
side as well as inside his profession. Distinguished in the
Mexican war, intensely Union in his sentiments, full of
energy and patriotism, outsjioken in his opinions, highly
esteemed by General Scott, on whose staff he had served,
he at once secured the confidence of the President and the
Secretary of War, under whose observation he was serv-
ing in Washington. Without political antecedents or
acquaintances, he was chosen for advancement on account of his record,
his ability, and his vigor.
Northern forces had hastened to Washington upon the call of President
Lincoln, but prior to May 21th they had been held rigidly on the north side of
the Potomac. On the night of May 23d-21th, the Confederate pickets being
then in sight of the Capitol, three columns were thrown across the river by
General J. K. F. Mansfield, then commanding the Department of Washing-
ton, and a line from Alexandria below to chain-bridge above Washington
was intrenched under guidance of able engineers. On the 27th Brigadier-
General Irvin McDowell was placed in command south of the Potomac. ^>
By the 1st of June the Southern Government had been transferred from
Montgomery to Richmond, and the capitals of the Union and of the Confed-
eracy stood defiantly confronting each other. General Scott was in chief com-
mand of the Union forces, with McDowell south of the Potomac, confronted
by his old classmate, Beauregard, hot from the capture of Fort Sumter.
^ The aspect of affairs was so threatening after and without waiting for the meeting of Congress,
President Lincoln's call of April 15th for 75,000 the President entered upon the creation of an
three-months militia, and General Scott was so additional volunteer army to be composed of
averse to undertaking any active operations with 42,034 three-years men, together with an increase
such short-term troops, that, as early as May 3d, of 22,714 regulars and 18,000 seamen. — J. B. F.
IXIFORM OF THE 2D OHIO
AT BULL RUN.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
172
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
.*£*&"
if. WELLS
MAP OF THE VICINITY OF WASHINGTON, JULY, 1861.
General Patterson, of Pennsylvania, a veteran of the war of 1812 and the
war with Mexico, was in command near Harper's Ferry, opposed by General
Joseph E. Johnston. The Confederate President, Davis, then in Richmond,
with General R. E. Lee as military adviser, exercised in person general
military control of the Southern forces. The enemy to be engaged by
McDowell occupied what was called the "Alexandria line," with head-
quarters at Manassas, the junction of the Orange and Alexandria with the
Manassas Gap railroad. The stream known as Bull Run, some three miles
in front of Manassas, was the line of defense. On Beauregard's right, 30
miles away, at the mouth of Aquia Creek, there was a Confederate bri-
gade of, 3000 men and 6 guns under General Holmes. The approach to
Richmond from the Lower Chesapeake, threatened by General B. F. Butler,
was guarded by Confederates under Generals Huger and Magrudei\
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
'73
On Beauregard's left,
sixty miles .distant, in
the Lower Shenandoah
Valley and separated
from him .by the Bine
Eidge Mountains, was
the Confederate army of
the Shenandoah under
command of General
Johnston. Beauregard's
authority did not extend
over the forces of John-
ston, Huger, Magrucler,
or Holmes, but Holmes
was with him before the
battle of Bull Run, and
so was Johnston, who,
as will appear more fully
hereafter, joined at a
decisive moment.
Early in June Patter-
son was pushing his
column against Harper's
Ferry, and on the 3d of
that month McDowell
was called upon by Gen-
eral Scott to submit " an
estimate of the number
and composition of a
column to be pushed
toward Manassas Junc-
tion and perhaps the
Gap, say in 4 or 5 days,
to favor Patters* >n's
attack upon Harper's
Ferry." McDowell had
then been in command
at Arlington less than a
week, his raw regiments
south of the Potomac
were not yet brigaded,
and this was the first
FAC-SIMILE OF THE FACE OF A WASHINGTON PASS OF 1861. |
4 The bold signature of "Drake De Kay" ou
the passes issued by General Mansfield while com-
manding the Department at Washington, gave ce-
lebrity to the young aide-de-camp whose duty it
was to sign them. At the outbreak of the war
Drake De Kay, who was the son of Commodore
George C. De Kay, closed his shipping and com-
mission office in New York, with no more ceremony
than to pin to the door the statement, "Gone to
Washington. Back at close of war." He took with
•74
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
intimation he had of offensive operations.
He reported, June 4th, that 12,000 infantry,
2 batteries, 6 or 8 companies of cavalry,
and a reserve of 5000 ready to move from
Alexandria would be required. John-
ston, however, gave up Harper's Ferry
to Patterson, and the diversion by Mc-
Dowell was not ordered. But the public
demand for an advance became impera-
tive— stimulated perhaps by the success-
ful dash of fifty men of the 2d United
States Cavalry, under Lieutenant C. H.
Tompkins, through the enemy's outposts
at Fairfax Court House on the night of
June 1st, and by the unfortunate result of
the movement of a regiment under Gen-
eral Schenck toward Vienna, June 9th,
as well as by a disaster to some of Gen-
eral Butler's troops on the 10th at Big
Bethel, near Fort Monroe. On the 24th
of June, in compliance with verbal in-
structions from General Scott, McDowell
submitted a "plan of operations and
the composition of the force required
to carry it into effect." He estimated
the Confederate force at Manassas Junc-
tion and its dependencies at 25,000
men, assumed that his movements could
not be kept secret and that the enemy
him a detachment of his employees and offered his own
and their services to General Scott " free of charge."
Of course he was not allowed to bear the expense of his
contingent, but his services were accepted, and he
received as lieutenant the first appointment to the
army from civil life during the war. He accepted a
position on General Mansfield's staff and accompanied
that officer to Newport News, where, as captain on the
staff, he distinguished himself in several daring adven-
tures, sometimes undertaken with the object of getting
information of the enemy. In the second Bull Run
campaign he was aide-de-camp to General Pope.
Afterward he joined his regiment, the 1-lth Regulars,
and he was brevetted major and lieutenant-colonel for
gallant service at the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania.
We are indebted to Mr. Murat Hal stead, editor of
the Cincinnati " Commercial Gazette," for the "Drake
I)e Kay Pass," here reproduced in fac-simile. Of the
uses of a bold signature on the passes, Mr. Halstead
writes with a characteristic touch of humor : "A state-
ment I have heard, that the famous Drake De Kay
passes were written to be read by torchlight at picket
posts, reminds me that I have preserved one among
I
I
^
N*
*
i
^
S
X
&
S
^
%>
<S
FAC-SIMILE OF THE BACK OF THE PASS.
my papers. It is inclosed. My recollection
is that the pass was gotten up in this style
that it might not be easily imitated. It was
intended to supersede all other passes, and
did so. The effect was to check the promis-
cuous running through the lines. It was
regarded at the time as something oracular
and formidable, and as likely to convey a
salutary impression of the power and majesty
of the United States of America. It was said
that General Winfield Scott was much im-
pressed by it." — Editors.
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. 175
would call up additional forces from all quarters, and added : " If General
J. E. Johnston's force is kept engaged by Major-General Patterson, and
Major-General Butler occupies the force now in his vicinity, I think they
will not be able to bring up more than 10,000 men, so we may calculate
upon having to do with about 35,000 men." And as it turned out, that was
about the number he " had to do with." For the advance, McDowell asked
" a force of 30,000 of all arms, with a reserve of 10,000." He knew that Beau-
regard had batteries in position at several places in front of Bull Run and
defensive works behind the Run and at Manassas Junction. The stream being
fordable at many places, McDowell proposed in his plan of operations to
turn the enemy's position and force him out of it by seizing or threatening
his communications. Nevertheless, he said in his report :
" Believing the chances are greatly in favor of the enemy's accepting battle between this and
the Junction and that the consequences of that battle will be of the greatest importance to the
country, as establishing the prestige in this contest, on the one side or the other, —the more so as
the two sections will be fairly represented by regiments from almost every State, — I think it of
great consequence that, as for the most part our regiments are exceedingly raw and the best of
them, with few exceptions, not over steady in line, they be organized into as many small fixed
brigades as the number of regular colonels will admit, ... so that the men may have as
fair a chance as the nature of things and the comparative inexperience of most will allow."
This remarkably sound report was approved, and McDowell was directed
to carry his plan into effect July 8th. But the government machinery
worked slowly and there was jealousy in the way, so that the troops to bring
his army up to the strength agreed upon did not reach him until the 16th.
Beauregard's Army of the Potomac at Manassas consisted of the brigades
of Holmes, Bonham, Ewell, D. R. Jones, Longstreet, Cocke and Early, and of
3 regiments of infantry, 1 regiment and 3 battalions of cavalry, and 6 bat-
teries of artillery, containing in all 27 guns, making an aggregate available
force on the field of Bull Run of about 23,000 men. Johnston's army from
the Shenandoah consisted of the brigades of Jackson, Bee, Bartow, and
Kirby Smith, 2 regiments of infantry not brigaded, 1 regiment of cavalry
(12 companies), and 5 batteries (20 guns), making an aggregate at Bull Run
of 8340. ^
McDowell's army consisted of 5 divisions, Tyler's First Division, containing
4 brigades (Keyes's, Schenck's, W. T. Sherman's, and Richardson's) ; Hunter's
Second Division, containing 2 brigades (Andrew , Porter's and Burnside's) ;
Heintzelman's Third Division, containing 3 brigades (Franklin's, Willcox's, and
Howard's) ; Runyon's Fourth Division (9 regiments not brigaded) ; and Miles's
Fifth Division, containing 2 brigades (Blenker's and Davies's), — 10 batteries of
artillery, besides 2 guns attached to infantry regiments, 49 guns in all, and 7
$ Beauregard himself has said that on the 18th 30,000 men of all arms." The figures are probably
of July he had "along the line of Bull Run about under the mark, as Hampton's Legion, McRea's
17,000 men; that on the 19th General Holmes'joined regiment, a North Carolina "regiment and two
him with about 3000 men " ; and that he " received battalions of Mississippi and Alabama " joined
from Richmond between the 18th and 21st about between the 17th and 21st. Beauregard's force
2000 more"; and that Johnston brought about 8000 may fairly be placed at 32,000; and the opposing
more, the advance arriving " on the morning of the armies, both in the aggregate and in the parts
20th and the remainder about noon of the 21st," engaged, were nearer equal in that than in any
making his whole force, as he states it, "nearly other battle in Virginia. — J. B. F.
176
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
WHITE HOUSE. CANAL. WASHINGTON MONUMENT.
VIEW OF WASHINGTON FROM THE SIGNAL CAMP, GEORGETOWN HEIGHTS.— I.
companies of regular cavalry. Of the foregoing forces, 9 of the batteries and 8
companies of infantry were regulars, and 1 small battalion was marines.
The aggregate force was about 35,000 men. Runyon's Fourth Division was
6 or 7 miles in the rear guarding the road to Alexandria, and, though counted
in the aggregate, was not embraced in McDowell's order for battle.\
There was an ill-suppressed feeling of sympathy with the Confederacy in the
Southern element of Washington society ; but the halls of Congress resounded
with the eloquence of Union speakers. Martial music filled the air, and war
was the topic wherever men met. By day and night the tramp of soldiers was
heard, and staff-officers and orderlies galloped through the streets between
the headquarters of Generals Scott and McDowell. Northern enthusiasm was
unbounded. " On to Eichmond " was the war-cry. Public sentiment was
irresistible, and in response to it the army advanced. It was a glorious
spectacle. The various regiments were brilliantly uniformed according to
the aesthetic taste of peace, and the silken banners they flung to the breeze were
uii soiled and untorn. The bitter realities of war were nearer than we knew.
McDowell marched on the afternoon of July 16th, the men carrying three
days' rations in their haversacks ; provision wagons were to follow from
Alexandria the next day. On the morning of the 18th his forces were con-
centrated at Centreville, a point about 20 miles west of the Potomac and
\ The average length of service of McDowell's men prior to the battle was about sixty days. The
longest in service were the three-months men, and of these he had fourteen regiments. — J. B. F.
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
177
ALEXANDRIA.
ARLINGTON.
?3
TS
LONG BRIDGE. GEORGETOWN OBSERVATORY.
VIEW FROM THE SIGNAL CAMP. — II. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.
6 or 7 miles east of Manassas Junction. Beauregard's outposts fell back
without resistance. Bull Run, flowing south-easterly, is about half-way
between Centreville and Manassas Junction, and, owing to its abrupt
banks, the timber with which it was fringed, and some artificial defenses
at the fords, was a formidable obstacle. The stream was fordable, but
all the crossings for eight miles, from Union Mills on the south to the Stone
Bridge on the north, were defended by Beauregard's forces. [See map, page
180.] The Warrenton Turnpike, passing through Centreville, leads nearly due
west, crossing Bull Run at the Stone Bridge. The direct road from Centre-
ville to Manassas crosses Bull Run at Mitchell's Ford, half a mile or so above
another crossing known as Blackburn's Ford. Union Mills was covered by
Ewell's brigade, supported after the 18th by Holmes's brigade; McLean's
Ford, next to the north, was covered by D. R. Jones's brigade ; Blackburn's
Ford was defended by Longstreet's brigade, supported by Early's brigade ;
Mitchell's Ford was held by Bonham's brigade, with an outpost of two guns
and an infantry support east of Bull Run; the stream between Mitchells
Ford and the Stone Bridge was covered by Cocke's brigade ; the Stone Bridge
on the Confederate left was held by Evans with 1 regiment and Wheat's special
battalion of infantry, 1 battery of 4 guns, and 2 companies of cavalry, -fc
■& The state of General Beauregard's mind at the enemy has assaulted my outposts in heavy force,
time is indicated by the following telegram on the I have fallen back on the line of Bull Run and will
17th of July from him to Jefferson Davis : "The make a stand at Mitchell's Ford. If his force is over-
VOI, I. 12
1 78
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
THE STONE CHURCH, CENTREVILLE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN MARCH, 1862.
McDowell was compelled to wait at Centreville until his provision wagons
arrived and he could issue rations. His orders having carried his leading
division under Tyler no farther than Centreville, he wrote that officer at
8:15 a. m. on the 18th, "Observe well the roads to Bull Run and to Warren-
ton. Do not bring on an engagement, but keep up the impression that we
are moving on Manassas." McDowell then went to the extreme left of his
line to examine the country with reference to a sudden movement of the
army to turn the enemy's right flank. The reconnoissance showed him that
the country was unfavorable to the movement, and he abandoned it. While
he was gone to the left, Tyler, presumably to " keep up the impression that
we were moving on Manassas," went forward from Centreville with a squadron
of cavalry and two companies of infantry for the purpose of making a recon-
noissance of Mitchell's and Blackburn's fords along the direct road to Manas-
sas. The force of the enemy at these fords has just been given. Reaching
the crest of the ridge overlooking the valley of Bull Run and a mile or so
from the stream, the enemy was seen on the opposite bank, and Tyler
brought up Benjamin's artillery, 2 20-pounder rifled guns, Ayres's field
battery of 6 guns, and Richardson's brigade of infantry. The 20-pounders
opened from the ridge and a few shots were exchanged with the enemy's
batteries. Desiring more information than the long-range cannonade afforded,
whelming, I shall retire to Rappahannock railroad
bridge, saving my command for defense there and
future operations. Please inform Johnston of this
via Staunton, and also Holmes. Send forward any
reinforcements at the earliest possible instant and
by every possible means." The alarm in this dis-
patch and the apprehension it shows of McDowell's
"overwhelming" strength are not in harmony
with the more recent assurance of the Confederate
commander, that through sources in Washington
treasonable to the Union, and in other ways, he
"was almost as well informed of the strength
of the hostile army in my [his] front as its com-
mander."—J. B. F.'
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
179
Tyler ordered Richardson's brigade and a section of Ayres's battery, sup-
ported by a squadron of cavalry, to move from the ridge across the open
bottom of Bull Run and take position near the stream and have skirmishers
" scour the thick woods " which skirted it. Two regiments of infantry, 2 pieces
of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry moved down the slope into the woods
and opened fire, driving Bonham's outpost to the cover of intrenchments across
the stream. The brigades of Bonham and Longstreet, the latter being reen-
forced for the occasion by Early's brigade, responded at short range to the
fire of the Federal reconnoitering force and drove it back in disorder. Tvler
reported that having satisfied himself " that the enemy
was in force," and ascertained " the position of his bat-
teries," he withdrew. J This unauthorized reconnoissance,
called by the Federals the affair at Blackburn's Ford, was
regarded at the time by the Confederates as a serious
attack, and was dignified by the name of the " battle of
Bull Run," the engagement of the 21st being called by
them the battle of Manassas. The Confederates, feeling
that they had repulsed a heavy and real attack, were
encouraged by the result. The Federal troops, on the
other hand, were greatly depressed. The regiment which
suffered most was completely demoralized, and McDowell
thought that the depression of the repulse was felt
throughout his army and produced its effect upon the
Pennsylvania regiment and the New York battery
which insisted (their terms having expired) upon their uniform of the hth new
discharge, and on the 21st, as he expressed it, " inarched ™s^™x?0f£omaT
to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon." Even photograph. %
Tyler himself felt the depressing effect of his repulse, if we may judge by
his cautious and feeble action on the 21st when dash was required.
The operations of the 18th confirmed McDowell in his opinion that with
his raw troops the Confederate position should be turned instead of attacked
in front. Careful examination had satisfied him that the country did not
favor a movement to turn the enemy's right. On the night of the 18th
\ The casualties in the affair were : Union, 1
officer and 18 enlisted men killed ; 1 officer and 37
enlisted men wounded ; 26 enlisted men missing, —
aggregate, 83. Confederate (Beauregard in his
official report of 1861^), "15 killed and 53 wounded
men, several of whom have since died." — J. B. F.
& The 11th New York, or " The First Fire Zou-
aves," was recruited in April, 1861, from among
the firemen of New York City by Colonel E. Elmer
Ellsworth, a young man of twenty-four, who, before
the war, had organized in Chicago a fine body of
Zouaves and exhibited the Zouave drill in several
cities of the North. President Lincoln, who hadbeen
escorted to Washington by Ellsworth, appointed
him to a second lieutenancy in the regular army.
Ou the morning of May 24th, when the Union
forces crossed into Virginia, Ellsworth's Zoiiaves
occupied the city of Alexandria. The colonel, with
the secretary and the chaplain of the regiment, a
correspondent of the New York " Tribune," and a
sergeant's squad were proceeding toward the center
of the town, when they saw a secession flag flying
from the Marshall house. With his two com-
panions Ellsworth ascended to the roof, leaving
Private Francis E. Brownell at the foot of the
garret stairs. On descending those stairs with the
flag in his hands, Ellsworth was shot through the
heart by James T. Jackson, the keeper of the hotel,
who emptied the second barrel of his shot-gun at
Brownell. The latter, who was not hit, shot Jackson
through the head. Colonel Ellsworth had endeared
himself to Pi'esident Lincoln, who was deeply af-
fected by his death. For several hours the remains
lay in state in the East Eoom of the White House.
His death made a profound impression and greatly
stimidated the war feeling in the North. — Editors.
i8o
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
A, A, A, A, A. General line of Confederate disposi-
tions during the skirmish at Mitchell's and Blackburn's
Fords (July 18th), and until the morning of the main
engagement (July 2lst).
B, B, B. General line of Confederate dispositions.
OUTLINE MAP OF THE BATTLE-FIELD OF BULL RUN.
made to repel McDowell's flank attack by the Sudley
and Newmarket Road.
The Union dispositions are represented as they
were at the climax of the fighting on the Henry
plateau.
the haversacks of his men were empty, and had to be replenished from the
provision wagons, which were late in getting np. Nor had he yet determined
upon his point or plan of attack. While resting and provisioning his men,
he devoted the 19th and 20th to a careful examination by his engineers of
the enemy's position and the intervening country. His men, not soldiers,
but civilians in uniform, unused to marching, hot, weary, and footsore,
dropped down as they had halted and bivouacked on the roads about Centre-
ville. Notwithstanding Beauregard's elation over the affair at Blackburn's
Ford on the 18th, he permitted the 19th and 20th to pass without a move-
ment to follow up the advantage he had gained. During these two days,
McDowell carefully examined the Confederate position, and made his plan
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
181
to manoeuvre the enemy out of it, Beauregard ordered no aggressive move-
ment until the 21st, and then, as appears from his own statement, through
miscarriage of orders and lack of apprehension on the part of subordinates,
the effort was a complete fiasco, with the comical result of frightening his
own troops^ who, late in the afternoon, mistook the return of one of their
brigades for an attack by McDowell's left, and the serious result of inter-
fering with the pursuit after he had gained the battle of the 21st.
But Beauregard, though not aggressive on the 19th and 20th, was not idle
within his own lines. The Confederate President had authorized Johnston,
Beauregard's senior, to use
his discretion in moving to
the support of Manassas, and
Beauregard, urging Johnston
to do so, sent railway trans-
portation for the Shenan-
doah forces. But, as he
states, "he at the
same time submit-
ted the alter-
native proposi-
tion to Johnston
that, having pass-
ed the Blue Ridge,
he should assemble his
forces, press forward by
way of Aldie, north-west
of Manassas, and fall upon
McDowell's right rear," while he, Beauregard, " prepared for the operation
at the first sound of the conflict, should strenuously assume the offensive
in front." "The situation and circumstances specially favored the signal
success of such an operation," says Beauregard. An attack by two armies
moving from opposite points upon an enemy, with the time of attack for one
depending upon the sound of the other's cannon, is hazardous even with well-
disciplined and well-seasoned troops, and is next to fatal with raw levies.
Johnston chose the wiser course of moving by rail to Manassas, thus preserv-
ing the benefit of " interior lines," which, Beauregard says, was the " sole
military advantage at the moment that the Confederates possessed."
The campaign which General Scott required McDowell to make was under-
taken with the understanding that Johnston should be prevented from join-
ing Beauregard. With no lack of confidence in himself, McDowell was
dominated by the feeling of subordination and deference to General Scott
which at that time pervaded the whole army, and General Scott, who con-
trolled both McDowell and Patterson, assured McDowell that Johnston should
not join Beauregard without having "Patterson on his heels." Yet John-
ston's army, nearly nine thousand strong, joined Beauregard, Bee's brigade
and Johnston in person arriving on the morning of the 20th, the remainder
SUDLEY SPRINGS HOTEL,
ON THE LINE OF
M'DOWELL'S FLANK
ATTACK UPON THE
CONFEDERATE FORCES.
SKETCHED FROM THE
MILL, A FEW RODS
ABOVE THE FORD.
182
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
SUDLKY SPRINGS FORD, LOOKING NORTH. FROM A SKETCH MADE IN 1884.
This stream is the Cat Harpin Run, which empties
into Bull Run a short distance below the Smiley Springs
Ford. Iu making the flank movement the Union troops,
under Generals Hunter and Heintzelman, crossed this
ford, followed later in the day by the ambulances and
munition wagons. The retreat, also, was largely by
this ford. The ruins of the Sudley Sulphur Spring
House are shown on the left. The Sudley church,
which was the main hospital after the fight, is a short
distance south.— Editors.
about noon on the 21st. Although the enforced delav at Centreville enabled
McDowell to provision his troops and gain information upon which to base
an excellent plan of attack, it proved fatal by affording time for a junction of
the opposing forces. On the 21st of July General Scott addressed a dispatch
to McDowell, saying : " It is known that a strong reenf orcement left Winches-
ter on the afternoon of the 18th, which you will also have to beat. Four new
regiments will leave to-day to be at Fairfax Station to-night. Others shall
follow to-morrow — twice the number if necessary." "When this dispatch was
penned, McDowell was fighting the " strong reenforcement " which left
Winchester on the 18th. General Scott's report that Beauregard had been
reenforced, the information that four regiments had been sent to McDowell,
and the promise that twice the number would be sent if necessary, all came
too late — and Patterson came not at all. |
4 On the 17th of July Patterson, with some
16,000 three-months men, whose terms began to
expire on the 24th, was at Charlestown, and John-
ston, with about the same number, was at Winches-
ter. On that 'lay General Scott telegraphed
Patterson, " McDowell's first day's work has driven
the enemy behind Fairfax Court House. Do not
let the enemy amuse and delay you with a small
force in front while he reenforces the Junction with
his main body." To this Patterson replied at half-
past 1 o'clock in the morning of the 18th, stating
his difficulties and asking, " Shall I attack ?" Gen-
eral Scott answered on the same day : " I have
certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy,"
or that you "at least had occupied him by threats
and demonstrations. You have been at least his
equal and I suppose superior in numbers. Has he
not stolen a march and sent reinforcements toward
Manassas Junction '? " Patterson replied on the
same day (18th), " The enemy has stolen no march
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
183
During the 19th and 20th the bivouacs of McDowell's army at Centreville,
almost within cannon range of the enemy, were thronged by visitors, official
and unofficial, who came in carriages from Washington, bringing their own
supplies. They were under no military restraint, and passed to and fro
among the 'troops as they pleased, giving the scene the appearance of a
monster military picnic. J) Among others, the venerable Secretary of War,
Cameron, called upon McDowell. Whether due to a naturally serious
expression, to a sense of responsibil-
ity, to a premonition of the fate of his
brother who fell upon the field on the
21st, or to other cause, his countenance
showed apprehension of evil ; but men
generally were confident and jovial.
McDowell's plan of battle promul-
gated on the 20th, was to turn the
enemy's left, force him from his de-
fensive position, and, "if possible,
destroy the railroad leading from
Manassas to the Valley of Virginia,
where the enemy has a large force."
He did not know when he issued
this order that Johnston had joined
Beauregard, though he suspected it. Miles's Fifth Division, with Richard-
son's brigade of Tyler's division, and a strong force of artillery was to
SUDLEY SPRINGS FORD, LOOKING TOWARD THE BATTLE-
FIELD. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAl'Il.
On the tight are the ruins of the Sudley Sulphur
Spring House. The building on the hill is Sudley Church.
It is a mile by the Sudley and Manassas road from
the ford ti> where the battle began.— Editors.
upon me. I have caused him to be reenf orced " ;
and at 1 o'clock p. M. on that day he added : " I have
succeeded, in accordance with the wishes of the Gen-
eral-in-Chief, in keeping General Johnston's force
at Winchester." At the very hour that Patterson
was writing this dispatch Johnston's advance was
leaving Winchester. On the 18th Johnston tele-
graphed to Richmond that Patterson was at Charles-
town, and said : "Unless he prevents it, we shall
move toward General Beauregard to-day." He
moved accordingly, and the Confederate armies
were united for battle. It rested, however, with
higher authority than Patterson to establish be-
tween his army and McDowell's the relations that
the occasion called for. In considering the require-
ments for McDowell's movement against Manassas,
General Scott gave great weight to the general
and irresistible fear then prevailing in Washing-
ton that the capital might be seized by a dash. Its
direct defense was the first purpose of the three-
months militia. The Potomac at Washington was
itself a strong barrier, and with the field-works on
its south bank afforded security in that quarter.
The danger was thought to be from the Shenan-
doah, and that induced the Government to keep
Patterson in the valley. Indeed, on the 30th of
June Colonel C. P. Stone's command was ordered
from Point of Rocks to Patterson at Martins-
burg, where it arrived on the 8th of July ; where-
as the offensive campaign against Manassas,
ordered soon after, required Patterson to go to
Stone, as he proposed to do June 21st, instead of
Stone to Patterson. The campaign of McDowell
was forced upon General Scott by public opinion,
but did not relieve the authorities from the fear
that Johnston might rush down and seize Wash-
ington. General Scott, under the pressure of the
offensive in one quarter and the defensive in
another, imposed upon Patterson the double task,
difficult if not impossible, of preventing Johnston
from moving on the capital and from joining Beau-
regard. If that task was possible, it could have
been accomplished only by persistent fighting, and
that General Scott was unwilling to order; though
in his dispatch of the lxth in reply to Patterson's
question, " Shall I attack f " he said, "I have cer-
tainly been expecting you to beat the enemy."
Prior to that, his instructions to Patterson had
enjoined caution. As soon as McDowell advanced,
Patterson was upon an exterior line and in a false
military position. Admitting that he might have
done more to detain Johnston, bad strategy was
probably more to blame for the result than any action
or lack of action on Patterson's part. — J. B. F.
J) The presence of senators, congressmen, and
other civilians upon the field oh the 21st gave rise
to extravagant and absurd stories, in which alleged
forethought and valor among them are contrasted
with a lack of these qualities in the troops. The
plain truth is that the non-combatants and their
vehicles merely increased the confusion and
demoralization of the retreat. — J. B. F.
1 84
MCDOWELLS ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
remain in reserve at Centreville, prepare defensive works there and threaten
Blackburn's Ford. Tyler's First Division, which was on the turnpike
in advance, was to move at 2:30 a. m., threaten the Stone Bridge and open fire
upon it at daybreak. This demonstration was to be vigorous, its first purpose
being to divert attention from the movements of the turning column.
As soon as Tyler's
troops cleared the
way, Hunter's Sec-
ond Division, follow-
ed by Heintzelman's
Third Division, was
to move to a point
on the Warrenton
Turnpike about 1 or
2 miles east of Cen-
treville and there
take a country road
to the right, cross
the Run at Sudley
Springs, come down
upon the flank and
rear of the enemy at
the Stone Bridge, and
force him to open
the way for Tyler's di-
vision to cross there
and attack, fresh and
in full force.
Tyler's start was so
late and his advance
was so slow as to hold
Hunter and Heintzel-
man 2 or 3 hours on
the mile or two of
the turnpike between
their camps and the point at which they were to turn off for the flank march.
This delay, and the fact that the flank march proved difficult and some 12
miles instead of about 6 as was expected, were of serious moment. The flank-
ing column did not cross at Sudley Springs until 9 : 30 Instead of 7, the long
march, with its many interruptions, tired out the men, and the delay
gave the enemy time to discover the turning movement. Tyler's opera-
tions against the Stone Bridge were feeble and ineffective. By 8 o'clock
Evans was satisfied that he was in no danger in front, and perceived the
movement to turn his position. He was on the left of the Confederate line,
guarding the point; where the Warrenton Turnpike, the great highway to the
field, crossed Bull Run, the Confederate line of defense. He had no instruc-
THE STONE BRIDGE OVER BULL RUN, LOOKING TOWARD CENTREVILLE.
FROM A SKETCH MADE IN 1884.
MCDOWELLS ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
185
tions to guide him in the emergency that had arisen. But he did not hesitate.
Reporting his information and purpose to the adjoining commander, Cocke,
and leaving -4 companies of infantry to deceive and hold Tyler at the bridge,
Evans before 9 o'clock turned his back upon the point he was set to guard,
marched a mile away, and, seizing the high ground to the north of Young's
Branch of Bull Run, formed line of battle at right angles to his former line,
his left resting near the Sudley Springs road, by which Burnside with the
head of the turning column was approaching, thus covering the Warrenton
Turnpike and opposing a determined front to the Federal advance upon the
Confederate left and rear.\ In his rear to the south lay the valley of
Young's Branch, and rising from that was the higher ridge or plateau on
which the Robinson house and the Henry house were situated, and on which
the main action took place in the afternoon. Burnside, finding Evans across
his path, promptly formed line of battle and attacked about 9:45 a. m.
Hunter, the division commander, who was at the head of Burnside's brigade
directing the formation of the first skirmish line, was severely wounded and
taken to the rear at the opening of the action. Evans not only repulsed but
pursued the troops that made the attack upon him. Andrew Porter's brigade
of Hunter's division followed Burnside closely and came
to his support. In the mean time Bee had formed a
Confederate line of battle with his and Bartow's bri-
gades of Johnston's army on the Henry house plateau,
a stronger position than the one held by Evans, and
desired Evans to fall back to that line; but Evans,
probably feeling bound to cover the Warrenton Turn-
pike and hold it against Tyler as well as against the
flanking column, insisted that Bee should move across
the valley to his support, which was done.
After Bee joined Evans, the preliminary battle con-
tinued to rage upon the ground chosen by the latter.
The opposing forces were Burnside's and Porter's bri-
gades, with one regiment of Heintzelman's division on
the Federal side, and Evans's, Bee's, and Bartow's
brigades on the Confederate side. The Confederates
were dislodged and driven back to the Henry house
plateau, where Bee had previously formed line and where what Beauregard
called "the mingled remnants of Bee's, Bartow's, and Evans's commands" were
re-formed under cover of Stonewall Jackson's brigade of Johnston's army.
FATIGUE UNIFORM AND KILTS
OF THE 79TH NEW TORK.^
\ Evans's action was probably one of the best
pieces of soldiership on either side during the
campaign, but it seems to have received no special
commendation from his superiors. — J. B. F.
ix William Todd, of Company B. 79th New
York (Highlanders), writing to correct a statement
to the effect " that the 79th New York wore the
Highland dress at the battle of Bull Run," says :
" If by that is meant the ' kilts,' it is an error. It
is true that all the officers and many of the men
did wear that uniform when we left the city in
June, IS 61, and on dress-parade occasions in
Washington, but when we went into Virginia it
was laid aside, together with the plaid trousers
worn by all the men on ordinary occasions, and we
donned the ordinary blue. Captain was the
only one who insisted on wearing the kilts on the
march to Bull Run, but the day before we reached
Centreville the kilts were the cause of his drawing
upon himself much ridicule, and when we started
for the battle-field on that Sundaymoraing he, also,
appeared in ordinary blue uniform." — Editors.
1 8b
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
THE SDDLEY SPRINGS ROAD, LOOKING NORTH FROM THE SLOPE OF THE HENRY HOUSE HILL.
In the middle-ground on the Warrenton turnpike
stands the Stone house, a central landmark in both
battles of Bull Run. The bank in the right foreground
was a cover during the first battle for some of the sap-
ports of (irittin's and Ricketts's batteries that were
on the Henry house hill, the crest of which is two hun-
dred and fifty yards fioni the right of the picture. In
the first battle the fighting began on the Matthews hill,
seen in the background behind the Stone house, and
was most desperate on the Henry hill. Young's Branch
(see map, page 180) crosses the Sudley road near its .junc-
tion with the turnpike, and flows near the Stone house.
The time of this repulse, as proved by so accurate an authority as Stone-
wall Jackson, was before 11 : 30 a. m., and this is substantially confirmed by
Beauregard's official report made at the time. Sherman and Keyes had
nothing to do with it. They did not begin to cross Bull Run until noon.
Thus, after nearly two hours' stubborn fighting with the forces of Johnston,
which General Scott had promised should be kept away, McDowell won the
first advantage ; but Johnston had cost him dearly.
During all this time Johnston and Beauregard had been waiting near
Mitchell's Ford for the development of the attack they had ordered by their
right upon McDowell at Centreville. The gravity of the situation upon
their left had not yet dawned upon them. What might the result have been
if the Union column had not been detained by Tyler's delay in moving
out in the early morning, or if Johnston's army, to which Bee, Bartow, and
Jackson belonged, had not arrived !
But the heavy firing on the left soon diverted Johnston and Beauregard
from all thought of an Offensive movement with their right, and decided them,
as Beauregard has said, "to hurry up all available reinforcements, includ-
ing the reserves that were to have moved upon Centreville, to our left, and
fight the battle out in that quarter." Thereupon Beauregard ordered " Ewell,
Jones, and Longstreet to make a strong demonstration all along their front on
the other side of Bull Run, and ordered the reserves, Holmes's brigade with
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. 187
six guns, and Early's brigade, to move swiftly to the left," and he and John-
ston set out at full speed for the point of conflict, which they reached while
Bee was attempting to rally his men about Jackson's brigade on the Henry
house plateau. McDowell had waited in the morning at the point on the
Warrenton 'Turnpike where his flanking column turned to the right, until
the troops, except Howard's brigade, which he halted at that point, had
passed. He gazed silently and with evident pride upon the gay regiments
as they filed briskly but quietly past in the freshness of the early morning,
and then, remarking to his staff, " Gentlemen, that is a big force," he mounted
and moved forward to the field by way of Sudley Springs. He reached the
scene of actual conflict somewhat earlier than Johnston and Beauregard did,
and, seeing the enemy driven across the valley of Young's Branch and
behind the Warrenton Turnpike, at once sent a swift aide-de-camp to Tyler
with orders to " press the attack " at the Stone Bridge. Tyler acknowledged
that he received this order by 11 o'clock. It was Tyler's division upon which
McDowell relied for the decisive fighting of the day. He knew that the march
of the turning column would be fatiguing, and when by a sturdy fight it had
cleared the Warrenton Turnpike for the advance of Tyler's division, it had,
in fact, done more than its fair proportion of the work. But Tyler did not
attempt to force the passage of the Stone Bridge, which, after about 8 o'clock,
was defended by only four companies of infantry, though he admitted that by
the plan of battle, when Hunter and Hemtzelman had attacked the enemy in
the vicinity of the Stone Bridge, " he was to force the passage of Bull Kim at
that point and attack the enemy in flank." J Soon after McDowell's arrival
at the front, Burnside rode up to him and said that his brigade had borne the
brunt of the battle, that it was out of ammunition, and that he wanted per-
mission to withdraw, refit and fill cartridge-boxes. McDowell in the excite-
ment of the occasion gave reluctant consent, and the brigade, which certainly
had done nobly, marched to the rear, stacked arms, and took no further
part in the fight. Having sent the order to Tyler to press his attack
and orders to the rear of the turning column to hurry forward, McDowell,
like Beauregard, rushed in person into the conflict, and by the force of cir-
cumstances became for the time the commander of the turning column and
the force actually engaged, rather than the commander of his whole army.
With the exception of sending his adjutant-general to find and hurry Tyler
forward, his subsequent orders were mainly or wholly to the troops under his
own observation. Unlike Beauregard, he had no Johnston in rear with full
authority and knowledge of the situation to throw forward reserves and
reinforcements. It was not until 12 o'clock that Sherman received orders
from Tyler to cross the stream, which he did at a ford above the Stone
Bridge, going to the assistance of Hunter. Sherman reported to McDowell
\ After the affair at Blackburn's Ford on the ished for my leniency to that man ! If there is
18th and Tyler's action in the battle of the 21st, anything clearer to me than anything else with
a bitterness between Tyler and McDowell grew up reference to our operations in that campaign, it is
which lasted till they died. As late as 1884, that if we had had another commander for our
McDowell, writing to me of Tyler's criticism of right we should have had a complete and brilliant
him after the war, said, "How I have been pun-
1 88
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
CAPTAIN CHARLES GRIFFIN, AFTERWARD
MAJOR-GENERAL.
on the field and joined in the pursuit
of Bee's forces across the valley of
Young's Branch. Keyes's brigade, ac-
companied by Tyler in person, followed
across the stream where Sherman ford-
ed, but without uniting with the other
forces on the field, made a feeble
advance upon the slope of the plateau
toward the Robinson house, and then
about 2 o'clock filed off by flank to its
left and, sheltered by the east front
of the bluff that forms the plateau,
marched down Young's Branch out of
sight of the enemy and took no further
part in the engagement. McDowell
did not know where it was, nor did he
then know that Schenck's brigade of
Tyler's division did not cross the Bun
at all.
The line taken up by Stonewall
Jackson upon which Bee, Bartow, and
Evans rallied on the southern part of
the plateau was a very strong one. The ground was high and afforded the
cover of a curvilinear wood with the concave side toward the Federal line
of attack. According to Beauregard's official report made at the time, he had
upon this part of the field, at the beginning, 6500 infantry, 13 pieces of
artillery, and 2 companies of cavalry, and this line was continuously reen-
forced from Beauregard's own reserves and by the arrival of the troops from
the Shenandoah Valley.
To carry this formidable position, McDowell had at hand the brigades
of Franklin, Willcox, Sherman, and Porter, Palmer's battalion of regular cav-
alry, and Ricketts's and Griffin's regular batteries. Porter's brigade had been
reduced and shaken by the morning fight. Howard's brigade was in reserve
and only came into action late in the afternoon. The men, unused to field ser-
vice, and not yet over the hot and dusty march from the Potomac, had been
under arms since midnight. The plateau, however, was promptly assaulted,
the northern part of it was carried, the batteries of Ricketts and Griffin were
planted near the Henry house, and McDowell clambered to the upper story
of that structure to get a glance at the whole field. Upon the Henry house
plateau, of which the Confederates held the southern and the Federals the
northern part, the tide of battle ebbed and flowed as McDowell pushed in
Franklin's, Willcox's, Sherman's, Porter's, and at last Howard's brigades, and
as Beauregard put into action reserves which Johnston sent from the right
and reinforcements which he hurried forward from the Shenandoah Valley
as they arrived by cars. On the plateau, Beauregard says, the disadvantage
of his " smooth-bore guns was reduced by the shortness of range." The
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
189
short range was due to the Federal advance, and the several struggles for the
plateau were at close quarters and gallant on both sides. The batteries of
Ricketts and Griffin, by their fine discipline, wonderful daring, and matchless
skill, were th'e prime features in the fight. The battle was not lost till they
were lost. When in their advanced and perilous position, and just after their
infantry supports had been driven over the slopes, a fatal mistake occurred.
A regiment of infantry came out of the woods on Griffin's right, and as he was
in the act of opening upon it with canister, he was deterred by the assurance
of Major Barry, the chief of artillery, that it " was a regiment sent by Colonel
Heintzelman to support the battery." & A moment more and the doubtful regi-
ment proved its identity by a deadly volley, and, as Griffin states in his official
report, " every cannoneer was cut down and a large number of horses killed,
leaving the battery (which was without
support excepting in name) perfectly
helpless." The effect upon Ricketts was
equally fatal. He, desperately wounded,
and Ramsay, his lieutenant, killed, lay
in the wreck of the battery. Beauregard
speaks of his last advance on the plateau
as "leaving in our final possession the
Robinson and Henry houses, with most
of Ricketts's and Griffin's batteries, the
men of which were mostly shot down
where they bravely stood by their guns."
Having become separated from Mc-
Dowell, I fell in with Barnard, his chief
engineer, and while together we ob-
seiwed the New York Fire Zouaves, who
had been supporting Griffin's battery,
fleeing to the rear in their gaudy uni-
forms, in utter confusion. Thereupon
CAPTAIN JAMES B. RICKETTS, AITERWARD
MAJOR-GENERAL.
o as we rode together
& Griffin himself told me
after leaving Centreville. He and I were class-
mates and warm friends. — J. B. F.
Major Win. F. Barry gives, in his report, this
explanation of the disaster to the batteries :
" Returning to the position occupied by Ricketts' and
Griffin's batteries, I received an order from General
McDowell to advance two batteries to an eminence [the
Henry Hill] specially designated by him, about eight
hundred yards in front of the line previously occupied
by our artillery, and very near the position first occupied
by the enemy's batteries. I therefore ordered these two
batteries to move forward at once, and, as soon as they
were in motion, went for and procured as supports the
lltli (Fire Zouaves) and the Uth (Brooklyn) New York
regiments. I accompanied the former regiment to guide
it to its proper position, and Colonel Heintzelman, 17th
U. S. Infantry, performed the same service for the 14th,
on the right of the 11th. A squadron of United States
cavalry under Captain Colburn, 1st Cavalry, was subse-
quently ordered as additional support. We were soon
upon the ground designated, and the two batteries at
once opened a very effective lire upon the enemy's left.
The new position had scarcely been occupied when a
troop of the enemy's cavalry, debouching from a piece
of woods close upon our right flank, charged down upon
the New York 11th. The Zouaves, catching sight of the
cavalry a few moments before they were upon them,
broke ranks to such a degree that the cavalry dashed
through without doing them much harm. The Zouaves
gave them a scattering fire as they passed, which empt i< td
five saddles and killed three horses. A few minutes after-
ward a regiment of the enemy's infantry, covered by a
high fence, presented itself in line on the left and front
of the two batteries at not more than sixty or seventy
yards' distance, and delivered a volley full upon the bat-
teries and their supports. Lieutenant Ramsay, 1st Artil-
lery, was killed, and Captain Ricketts, 1st Artillery, was
wounded, and a number of men and horses were killed
or disabled by this close, and well-directed volley. The
llth and 14th regiments instantly broke and fled in con-
fusion to the rear, and in spite of the repeated and ear-
nest efforts of Colonel Heintzelman with the latter, and
myself with the former, refused to rally and return to
the support of the batteries. The enemy, seeing the guns
thus abandoned by their supports, rushed upon them,
and driving off the cannoneers, who, with their officers,
stood bravely at their posts until the last moment, cap-
tured them, ten in number. These were the only guns
taken by the enemy on the field." — Editors.
190
MCDOWELLS ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
THE CONTEST FOR THE HENRY HILL.
Colonel William T. Sherman, who commanded the
Third Brigade of Tyler's division, describes as follows
some of the efforts to regain the Henry Hill after the
capture of Griffin's and Ricketts's batteries: "Before
reaching the crest of this [Henry] hill, the roadway [see
picture, page 186] was worn deep enough to afford shelter,
and I kept the several regiments in it as long as possible ;
but when the Wisconsin 2d was abreast of the enemy, by
order of Major Wadsworth, of General McDowell's staff,
I ordered it to leave the roadway by the left flank, and
to attack the enemy. This regiment ascended to the
brow of the hill steadily, received the severe lire of the
enemy, returned it with spirit, and advanced delivering
its tire. This regiment is uniformed in gray cloth,
almost identical with that of the great bulk of the seces-
sion army, and when the regiment fell into confusion
and retreated toward the road, there was an universal
cry that they were being tired on by our owu men. The
regiment rallied asaiu, passed the brow of the hill a
second time, but was agnin repulsed in disorder. By
this time the New York 79th had closed up, and in like
manner it was ordered to cross the brow of the hill and
drive the enemy from cover. It was impossible to get a
good view of this ground. In it there was one battery
of artillery, which poured an incessant fire upon our
advancing columns, and the ground was very irregular,
with small clusters of pines, affording shelter, of which
the enemy took good advantage. The fire of rifles and
musketry was very severe. The 79th, headed by its
colonel (Cameron), charged across the hill, and for a
short time the contest was severe. They rallied several
times under tire, but finally broke and gained the cover
of the hill. This left the field open to the New York
69th, Colonel Corcoran, who in his turn led his regiment
over the crest, and had in full open view the ground so
severely contested. The firing was very severe, and the
roar of cauuon, muskets, and rifles incessant. It was
manifest the enemy was here in great force, far supe-
rior to us at that point. The 69th held the ground for
some time, but finally fell back in disorder. . . .
Here, about 3: 30 p. m., began the scene of confusion and
disorder that characterized the remainder of the day."
I rode back to where I knew Burnside's brigade was at rest, and stated to
Burnside the condition of affairs, with the suggestion that he form and move
his brigade to the front. Returning, I again met Barnard, and as the battle
seemed to him and me to be going against us, and not knowing where
McDowell was, with the concurrence of Barnard, as stated in his official
report, I immediately sent a note to Miles, telling him to move two brigades
of his reserve up to the Stone Bridge and telegraph to Washington to send
forward all the troops that could be spared.
After the arrival of Howard's brigade, McDowell for the last time pressed
up the slope to the plateau, forced back the Confederate line, and regained
possession of the Henry and Robinson houses and of the lost batteries. But
there were no longer cannoneers to man or horses to move these guns that
had done so much. By the arrival upon this part of the field of his own
reserves and Kirby Smith's brigade of Johnston's army about half-past 3,
MCDOWELLS ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
191
UNIFORM OF THE GARI-
BALDI GUARDS,
COLONEL D'UTASSY.
Beauregard extended his left to outflank McDowell's shattered, shortened, and
disconnected line, and the Federals left the field about half -past 4. Until then
they had fought wonderfully well for raw troops. There were no fresh forces on
the field to support or encourage them, and the men seemed
to be seized simultaneously by the conviction that it was no
use to do anything more and they might as well start
home. Cohesion was lost, the organizations with some ex-
ceptions being disintegrated, and the men quietly walked off.
There was no special excitement except that arising from
the frantic efforts of officers to stop men who paid little
or no attention to anything that was said. On the high
ground by the Matthews house, about where Evans had
taken position in the morning to check Burnside, Mc-
Dowell and his staff, aided by other officers, made a
desperate but futile effort to arrest the masses and form
them into line. There, I went to Arnold's battery as it
came by, and advised that he unlimber and make a stand as
a rallying-poiut, which he did, saying he was in fair con-
dition and ready to fight as long as there was any fighting
to be done. But all efforts failed. The stragglers moved
past the guns, in spite of all that could be done, and, as
stated in his report, Arnold at my direction joined Sykes's battalion of infan-
try of Porter's brigade and Palmer's battalion of cavalry, all of the regular
army, to cover the rear, as the men trooped back in
great disorder across Bull Run. There were some hours
of daylight for the Confederates to gather the fruits of
victory, but a few rounds of shell and canister checked
all the pursuit that was attempted, and the occasion called
for no sacrifices or valorous deeds by the stanch regulars
of the rear-guard. There was no panic, in the ordinary
meaning of the word, until the retiring soldiers, guns,
wagons, congressmen, and carriages were fired upon, on
the road east of Bull Run. Then the panic began, and
the bridge over Cub Run being rendered impassable for
vehicles by a wagon that was upset upon it, utter con-
fusion set in : pleasure-carriages, gun-carriages, and am-
munition wagons which could not be put across the Run
were abandoned and blocked the way, and stragglers
broke and threw aside their muskets and cut horses
from their harness and rode off upon them. In leaving
the field the men took the same routes, in a general way,
by which they had reached it. Hence when the men
of Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions got back to Cen-
treville, they had walked about 25 miles. That night they walked back to
the Potomac, an additional distance of 20 miles ; so that these undisciplined
and unseasoned ""en within 36 hours walked fully 45 miles, besides fighting
UNIFORM OF BLENKER'S 8TH
NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS.
192
MCDOWELLS ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
from about 10 a. m. until 4 p. m. on a hot and dusty day in July. McDowell
in person reached Centreville before sunset, | and found there Miles's division
with Richardson's brigade and 3 regiments of Runyon's division, and Hunt's,
Tidball's, Ayres's, and Greene's batteries and 1 or 2 fragments of batteries,
making about 20 guns. It was a formidable force, but there was a lack
of food and the mass of the army was
completely demoralized. Beauregard
had about an equal force which had
not been in the fight, consisting of
Ewell's, Jones's, and Longstreet's bri-
gades and some troops of other brigades.
McDowell consulted the division and
brigade commanders who were at hand
upon the question of making a stand or
retreating. The verdict was in favor of
the latter, but a decision of officers one
way or the other was of no moment;
the men had already decided for them-
selves and were streaming away to the
rear, in spite of all that could be done.
They had no interest or treasure in
Centreville, and their hearts were not
there. Their tents, provisions, baggage,
and letters from home were upon the
banks of the Potomac, and no power could have stopped them short of
the camps they had left less than a week before. As before stated, most
of them were sovereigns in uniform, not soldiers. McDowell accepted the
situation, detailed Richardson's and Blenker's brigades to cover the retreat,
and the army, a disorganized mass, with some creditable exceptions, drifted
BRIGADIER-GENERAL LOUIS BLENKER.|
lliOM A PHOTOGRAPH.
1 1 left the field with General Franklin. His
brigade had dissolved. We moved first northerly,
crossed Bull Run below the Sudley Spring Ford,
and then bore south and east. Learning by inquir-
ies of the men I passed that McDowell was ahead
of me, I leftFranklin and hurried on to Centreville,
where I found McDowell, just after sunset, re-
arranging the positions of his reserves. — J. B. F.
I Colonel Louis Blenker, commanding the First
Brigade of Miles's division, covered the retreat of
the army from Centreville, which he describes as
follows: "In this position the brigade remained
until about 4 o'clock p. m., when I received orders
to advance upon the road from Centreville to War-
renton. This order was executed with great diffi-
culty, as the road was nearly choked up by the
retreating baggage-wagons of several divisions,
and by the vast numbers of flying soldiers belong-
ing to various regiments. . . . The 8th [New
York Volunteer] Regiment took position one and a
half miles south of Centreville, on both sides of the
road leading to Bull Run. The 29th [New York]
Regiment stood half a mile behind the 8th, en
cchitpiicr by companies. The Garibaldi Guard stood
as reserve in line behind the 29th Regiment.
The retreat of great numbers of flying soldiers
continued till 9 o'clock in the evening, the great
majority in wild confusion, but few in collected
bodies. Soon afterward several squadrons of the
enemy's cavalry advanced along the road and
appeared before the outposts. They were chal-
lenged by ' Who comes there ? ' and remaining
without any answer, I, being just present at the
outposts, called, 'Union forever.' Whereupon the
officer of the enemy's cavalry commanded, ' En
avant; en avant. Knock him down!' Now the
skirmishers fired, when the enemy turned around,
leaving several killed and wounded on the spot.
About nine prisoners, who were already in their
hands, were liberated by this action. Afterward
we were several times molested from various sides
by the enemy's cavalry. At about midnight the
command to leave the position and march to
Washington was given by General McDowell.
The brigade retired in perfect order, and ready
to repel any attack on the road from Centre-
ville to Fairfax Court House, Annandale to Wash-
ington."— Editors.
MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
*93
as the men pleased away from the scene of action. There was no pur-
suit, and the march from Centreville was as barren of opportunities for the
rear-guard as .the withdrawal from the field of battle had been.\ When
McDowell reached Fairfax Court House in the night, he was in communica-
tion with Washington and exchanged telegrams with General Scott, in one of
which the old hero said, " We are not discouraged " ; but that dispatch did
not lighten the gloom in which it was received. McDowell was so tired that
while sitting on the ground writing a dispatch he fell asleep, pencil in hand,
in the middle of a sentence. His adjutant-general aroused him ; the dispatch
was finished, and the weary ride to the Potomac resumed. When the unfortu-
nate commander dismounted at Arlington next forenoon in a soaking rain,
after 32 hours in the saddle, his disastrous campaign of 6 days was closed.
The first martial effervescence of the country was over. The three-
months men went home, and the three-months chapter of the war ended —
with the South triumphant and confident; the North disappointed but
determined.
\ The revised losses are as follows: Federal,
16 officers and 444 enlisted men killed; 78 offi-
cers and 1046 enlisted men wounded ; 50 officers
and 1262 enlisted men missing; 25 pieces of artil-
* The scene in Washington after the battle has
been graphically described bj Walt Whitman, from
whose "Specimen Days audCollect" (Philadelphia:
Rees, Welch & Co.) we make these extracts :
" The defeated troops commenced pouring into Wash-
ington over the Long Bridge at daylight on Monday,
22d— day drizzling all through with rain. The Saturday
and Sunday of the battle (20th, 21st) had been parched
and hot to an extreme — the dust, the grime and smoke,
in layers, sweated in, follow'd by other layers again
sweated in, absorb'd by those excited souls — their
clothes all saturated with the clay-powder filling the
air — stirr'd up everywhere on the dry roads and trod-
den fields by the regiments, swarming wagons, artillery,
etc. — all the men with this coating of murk and sweat
and rain, now recoiling back, pouring over the Long
Bridge — a horrible march of twenty miles, returning to
Washington baffled, humiliated, panic-struok. Where
are the vaunts and the proud boasts with which you
went forth? Where are your banners, and your bands
of music, and your ropes to bring back your prisoners?
Well, there isn't a band playing — and there isn't a flag
but clings ashamed and lank to its staff.
" The sun rises, but shines not. The men appear, at
first sparsely and shame-faced enough, then thicker, in
the streets of Washington — appear in Pennsylvania
Avenue, and on the steps and basement entrances. They
come along in disorderly mobs, some in squads, strag-
glers, companies. Occasionally, a rare regiment, in per-
fect order, with its officers (some gaps, dead, the true
braves), marching in silence, with lowering faces, stern,
weary to sinking, all black and dirty, but every man
with his musket, and stepping alive ; but these are the
exceptions. Sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue, Four-
teenth street, etc., crowded, jainin'd with citizens, dar-
kies, clerks, everybody, lookers-on ; women in the win-
dows, curious expressions from faces, as those swarms
of dirt-cover'd return'd soldiers there (Will they never
end?) move by; but nothing said, no comments; (half
our lookers-on ' secesh ' of the most venomous kind —
lery and a large quantity of small arms. Confeder-
ate, 25 officers and 362 enlisted men killed; 63
officers and 1519 enlisted men wounded; 1 officer
and 12 enlisted men missing. — J. B. F.
they say nothing; but the devil snickers in their faces).
During the forenoon, Washington gets all over motley
with these defeated soldiers — queer-looking objects,
strange eyes and faces, dreuch'd (the steady rain drizzles
on all day) and fearfully worn, hungry, haggard, blister'd
in the feet. Good people (but not over-many of them
either) hurry up something for their grub. They put
wash-kettles on the fire, for soup, for coffee. They set
tables on the sidewalks — wagon-loads of bread are pur-
chas'd, swiftly cut in stout chunks. Here are two aged
ladies, beautiful, the first in the city for culture and
charm, they stand with store of eating and drink at an
improvis'd table of rough plank, and give food, and have
the store replenish'd from their house every half-hour
all that day; and there in the rain they stand, active,
silent, white-hair'd, and give food, though the tears
stream down their cheeks, almost without intermission,
the whole time. Amid the deep excitement, crowds ami
motion, and desperate eagerness, it seems strange to see
many, very many, of the soldiers sleeping — in the midst
of all, sleeping sound. They drop down anywhere, on
the steps of houses, up close by the basements or fences,
on the sidewalk, aside on some vacant lot, and deeply
sleep. A poor seventeen or eighteen year old boy lies
there, onthe stoop of a grand house; he sleeps so calmly,
so profoundly. Some clutch their muskets firmly even in
sleep. Some in squads; comrades, brothers, close to-
gether— and on them, as they lay, sulkily drips the
rain. . . .
"But the hour, the day, the night pass'd, and what-
ever returns, an hour, a day, a night like,that can never
again return. The President, recovering himself, begins
that very night — sternly, rapidly sets about the task- of
reorganizing his forces, and placing himself in positions
for future and surer work. If there were nothing else of
Abraham Lincoln for history to stamp him with, it is
enough to send him with his wreath to the memory of all
future time, that he endured that hour, that day, bitterer
than gall — indeed a crucifixion day — that it did not
conquer him— that he unflinchingly stemm'd it, and
resolv'd to lift himself and the Union out of it."
VOL. I. 13
THE OPPOSING ARMIES AT THE FIRST BULL RUN.
[The composition and losses of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records.
K stands for killed ; w for wounded; m for captured or missing ; c for captured.— Editors.]
COMPOSITION AND LOSSES OF THE UNION ARMY.
Brig.-Gen. Irviu McDowell, staff loss: w, l. (Capt. O. H. TiUingnast, mortally wounded.)
Fikst Division, Brig.-Gen. Daniel Tyler. Staff loss:
w, 2. First Brigade, Col. Erasmus D. Keyes : 2d Me.,
Col. C. D. Jameson; 1st Conn., Col. G. S. Burnham; 2d
Conn., Col. A. H. Terry ; 3d Conn., Col. John L. Chat-
fleld. Brigade loss: k, 19; w, 50; ru, 154 = 223. Scroti)/
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Robert C. Schenek: 2d N.Y. (militia),
Col. G. W. B. Tompkins ; 1st Ohio, Col. A. McD. MeCook ;
2d Ohio, Lieut. -Col. Rodney Mason; E, 2d IT. S. Arty.,
( apt. J. H. Carlisle. Brigade loss : k, 21 ; w, 25 ; ni, 52 =
98. Third Brigade, Col. W. T. Sherman: 13th N. Y., Col.
I. F. Quiuby ; 69th N. Y., Col. M. Corcoran (w and <■ .
Capt. James Kelly; 79th N. Y., Col. James Cameron (k) ;
2d Wis., Lieut.-Col. H. W. Peek; E, 3d U. S. Arty., Capt.
R. B. Ayres. Brigade loss : k, 107 ; w, 205 ; m, 293 = 605.
Fourth Brigade, Col. Israel B. Richardson : 1st Mass.,
Col. Robert Cowdin; 12th N. Y., Col. Ezra L. Walrath ;
2d Mich., Major A. W. Williams ; 3d Mich., Col. Daniel
McCoiinell; G, 1st U. S. Arty., Lieut. John Edwards;
M, 2d U. S. Arty., Capt. Henry J. Hunt. This brigade was
only slightly engaged in front of Blackburn's Ford, with
the loss of one officer killed.
Second Division, Col. D. Hunter (w), Col. Andrew
Porter. Staff loss : w, 1; m, 1 = 2. First Brigade, Col.
Andrew Porter : 8th N. Y*. (militia), Col. Geo. Lyons ; 14th
N. Y. (militia), Col. A. M. Wood (w and c), Lieut.-Col. E.
B. Fowler; 27th N. Yr., Col. H. W. Slocum (w), Major J.
J. Bartlett ; Battalion U. S. Infantry, Major George
Sykes; Battalion U. S. Marines, Major J. G. Reynolds;
Battalion U. S. Cavalry, Major I. N. Palmer ; D, 5th U
S. Arty., Capt. Charles Griffin. Brigade loss: k, 86; w,
177; m, 201 = 464. Second Brigade, Col. Ambrose E.
Burnside : 2dN. H, Col. Gilman Marston (w), Lieut.-Col.
F. S. Fiske; 1st R. I., Major J. P. Balch; 2d R. I. (with
battery), Col. John S. Slocum (k), Lieut.-Col. Frank
Wheaton ; 71st N. Y. (with two howitzers), Col. H. P.
Martin. Brigade loss : k, 58 ; w, 171 ; m, 134 = 363.
Third Division, Col. Samuel P. Heintzelman. First
Brigade, Col. W. B. Franklin : 5th Mass., Col. S. C. Law-
rence; 11th Mass., Col. George Clark, Jr.; 1st Minn.,
Col. W. A. Gorman ; 1, 1st U. S. Arty., Capt. J. B. Rick-
etts (w and c), Lieut. Edmund Kirby. Brigade loss : k,
70; w, 197; m, 92=359. Second Brigade, Col. Orlando
B. Willcox (w and c), Col. J. H. H.Ward: llth N. Y.,
Lieut.-Col. N. L. Farnham ; 38th N. Y\, Col. J. H. H.
Ward, Lieut.-Col. A. Farnsworth; 1st Mich., Major A. F.
Bidwell ; 4th Michigan, Col. D. A. Woodbury; D, 2d U. S.
Arty., Capt. Richard Arnold. Brigade loss: k, 65; w,
177; m, 190=432. Third Brigade, Col. Oliver O. How-
ard: 3d Me., Major H. G. Staples; 4th Me., Col. H. <;.
Berry ; 5th Me., Col. M. H. Duunell ; 2d Vt., Col. Henry
Whiting. Brigade loss: k, 27 ; w, 100; m, 98 = 225.
Fourth (Reserve) Division. [Not on the field of bat-
tle.] Brig.-Gen. Theodore Ruuyon. Militia : 1st N. J.,
Col. A. J. Johnson ; 2d N. J., Col. H. M. Baker; 3d N. J.,
Col. Win Napton ; 4th N. J., Col. Matthew Miller, Jr.
Volunteers: 1st N. J., Col. W. R. Montgomery; 2d N.
J., Col. Geo. W. McLean ; 3d N. J., Col. George W. Taylor ;
41st N. Y., Col. Leopold von Gilsa.
Fifth Division. [In reserve at Centreville and not
engaged in the battle pioper. It had some skirmishing
during the day and while covering the retreat of the
army.] Col. Dixon S. Miles. First Brigade, Col. Louis
Blenker : 8th N. Y. (Vols.) Lieut.-Col. Julius Stahel; 29tb
N. Yr., Col. Adolph von Steinwehr; 39th N. Y. (Garibaldi
Guards), Col. F. G. D'Utassy ; 27th Penna.. Col. Max
Einstein ; A, 2d U. S. Arty., Capt. John C. Tidball ; Book-
wood's N. Y. battery, Captain Charles Bookwood. Bri-
gade loss : k, 6 ; w, 16 ; m, 96 = 118. Second Brigade, Col.
Thomas A. Davies : 16th N.Y., Lieut.-Col. Samuel Marsh ;
ISth N.Yr., Col. W. A. Jackson ; 31st NY., Col. C. E. Pratt ;
32d N. Y\, Col. R. Mathesou; G, 2d U. 8. Arty., Lieut.
O. D. Greene. Brigade loss : w, 2 ; m, 1 = 3.
Total loss of the Union army : killed, 460; wounded, 1124; captured or missing, 1312,— grand total, 2896.
STRENGTH OF THE UNION ARMY.
General James B. Fry, who was General McDowell's
adjutant-general, prepared in October, 1884, a statement
of the strength of the army, in brief as follows :
" It was not practicable at the time to ascertain the
strength of the army with accuracy ; and it is impossible
now to make a return which can be pronounced abso-
lutely correct.
" The abstract which appears on page 309, vol. ii., ' Offi-
cial Records,' is not a return of McDowell's army at the
battle of Bull Run, and was not prepared by me, but, as
I understand, has been compiled since the war. It pur-
ports to give the strength of the ' Department of North-
eastern Virginia,' July 16th and 17th, not of McDowell's
army, July 21st. It does not show the losses resulting
from the discharge of the 4th Pennsylvania Infantry and
Varian's New York battery, which marched to the rear
on the morning of the 21st, nor the heavy losses inci-
dent to the march of the army from the Potomac ; it
embraces two regiments — the 21st and 25th New York In-
fantry — which were not with the army in the field ; and
it contains the strength of Company E, Second United
States Cavalry, as a special item, whereas that company
is embraced in the strength of the Second (Hunter's)
Division, to which it, with the rest of the cavalry,
belonged.
"In his report of the battle (p. 324, vol. ii.. 'Official
Records') General McDowell says he crossed Bull Run
' with about eighteen thousand men.' I collected infor-
mation to that effect for him at the time. His statement
is substantially correct. The following is an exhibit in
detail of the forces actually engaged :
Commands.
Officers.
19
284
252
341
E n listed
men.
First Division, two brigades ...
Second Division, two brigades. . . •
Third Division, three brigades. . ..
5,068
5,717
6,891
Total — seven brigades
896
17,676
"Only Keyes's and Sherman's brigades of the four
brigades of the First Division crossed Bull Run.
" The Fifth Division, with Richardson's brigade of the
First Division attached, was in reserve at and in front
of Centreville. Some of it was lightly engaged on our
side of Bull Run in repelling a feeble advance of the
enemy. The Fourth (Reserve) Divisiou was left to
guard our communications with the Potomac, its ad-
vance being seven miles in rear of Centreville.
194
THE OPPOSING ARMIES AT THE FIRST BULL RUN.
19s
"That is to say, McDowell crossed Bull Run with 896
officers, 17,676 rank aud rile, and 24 pieces of artillery.
" The artillerymen who crossed Bull Run are embraced
in the figures of the foregoing table. The guns were as
follows : Ricketts's Battery, 6 10-pounder rifle guns ;
Griffin's Battery, 4 10-pounder rifle guns, 2 12-pounder
howitzers; Arnold's Battery, 2 13-pounder rifle guns,
2 6-pounder smooth-bores ; R. I. Battery, 6 13-pounder
rifles ; 71st N. Y. Reg't's Battery, 2 Dahlgren howitzers.
" The artillery, in addition to that which crossed Bull
Run, was as follows : Hunt's Battery, 4 12-pounder
rifle guns; Carlisle's Battery, 2 13-pounder rifle guns, 2
6-pounder smooth-bore guns ; Tidball's Battery, 2
6-pounder smooth-bore guns, 2 12-pounder howitzers;
Greene's Battery, 4 10-pounder rifle guns ; Ayres's Bat-
tery, 2 10-pounder rifle guns, 2 6-pounder smooth-bore
guns, 2 12-pounder howitzers ; Edwards's Battery, 2 20-
pounder rifle guns, 1 30-pounder rifle gun."
COMPOSITION AND LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.
General Joseph E. Johnston.
Army of the Potomac, Brig.-Gen. G. T. Beauregard.
Firs! Brigade, Brig.-Gen. M. L. Bonham : 11th N. C, Col.
W. W. Kirkland ; 2d S. C, Col. J. B. Kershaw ; 3d S. C,
Col. J. H. Williams ; 7th S. C, Col. Thomas G. Bacon;
8th S. C, Col. E. B. C. Cash. Loss: k, 10; w, 66 = 76.
Second Brigade [not actively engagedj, Brig.-Gen. R. 8.
Ewell: 5th Ala., Col. R. E. Rodes; 6th Ala., Col. J. J.
Seibels ; 6th La., Col. J. G. Seymour. Third Brigade,
Brig.-Gen. D. R. Jones : 17th Miss., Col. W. S. Feather-
ston ; 18th Miss., Col. E. R. Burt : 5th S. C. Col. M. Jen-
kins. Loss: k, 13; w, 62=75. Fourth Brigade [not act-
ively engaged], Brig.-Gen. James Longstreet : 5th N. ('.,
Lieut .-Col. Jones; 1st Va,, Major F. G. Skinner; 11th Va..
Col. S. Garland. Jr.; 17th Va., Col. M.D. Corse. Loss: k.2;
w, 12=14. Fifth Brigade, Col. P. St. Geo. Cocke: 8th Va.,
Col. Eppa Hunton; 18th Va., Col. R.E. Withers; 19th Va.,
Lieut.-Col. J. B. Strange; 28th Va., Col. R. T. Preston;
49th Va. (3 cos.), Col.Wm. Smith. Loss: k, 23; w, 79; m,2
= 104. Sixth Brigade, Col. Jubal A. Early : 7th La., Col.
Harry T. Hays; 13th Miss., Col. Win. Barksdale; 7th Va .
Col. J. L. Kemper; 24th Va.. Lieut.-Col. P. Hairston, Jr.
Loss: k, 12; w, 67 = 79. Evans's command (temporarily
organized), Col. N. G. Evans : 1st La. Battalion. Major C.
R. Wheat (w) ; 4th S. C, Col. J. B. E. Sloan ; Cavalry, Capt.
W. R. Terry ; Artillery, Lieut. G. S. Davidson. Loss: k,
20 ; w, 118 ; m, 8 = 146. Reserve Brigade \\\o\ actively en-
gaged], Brig.-Gen. T. H. Holmes: 1st Arkansas and 2d
Tennessee. Unatlachnl Infantry. 8th La. : Col. H. B.
Kelly; Hampton's (S. C.) Legion, Col. Wade nampton.
Loss : k, 19; w, 100 ; m, 2 = 121. Cavalry : 30th Virginia,
Col. R. C. W. Radford ; Harrison's Battalion ; Ten inde-
pendent companies. Loss : k, 5 ; w, 8 = 13. Artillery :
Battalion Washington Artillery (La.), Major J. B. Wal-
ton ; Alexandria (Va.) Battery, Capt. Del Kemper ; La-
tham's (Va.) Battery, Capt. H. G. Latham ; Loudoun
(Va.) Artillery, Capt. Arthur L. Rogers; Shields's (Va.)
Battery, Capt. J. C. Shields. Loss : k. 2 ; w, 8 = 10. Total
loss Army of the Potomac: k, 105 ; w, 519 ; m, 12 = 636.
Army of the Shenandoah, General Joseph E.
Johnston. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. J. Jackson: 2d
Va., Col. J. W. Allen; 4th Va,, Col. J. F. Preston; 5th
Va., Col. Kenton Harper; 27th Va., Lieut.-Col. John
Echols; 33d Va,, Col. A. C. Cummings. Loss: k, 119; w,
4 12 = 561. Second Brigade, Col. F. S. Bartow (k) : 7th Ga.,
Col. Lucius J. GartreU; 8th Ga., Lieut.-Col. W. M. Gard-
ner. Loss: k, 60; w, 293=353. Third Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. B. E. Bee (k) : 4th Ala., Col. Jones (k). Col. S. R.
Gist; 2d Miss., Col. W. C. Falkner; llth Miss. (2 cos.),
Lieut.-Col. P. F. Liddell ; Gth N. C, Col. C. F. Fisher (k).
Loss: k, 95; w, 309; in, 1 =405. Fourth Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. E. K. Smith (w), Col. Arnold Elzey : 1st Md. Bat-
talion, Lieut.-Col. George H. Steuart; 3d Tennessee,
Col. John C. Vaughn ; 10th Va., Col. S. B. Gibbous ; 13th
Va.. Col. A. P. Hill. Loss: k, 8; w, 19 = 27. Artillery:
Imboden's, Stanard's, Pendleton's, Alburtis's, aud Beck-
ham's batteries. Cavalry : 1st Va., Col. J. E. B. Stuart.
(Loss not specifically reported.) Total loss Army of the
Shenandoah : k. 282 ; w, 1063 ; m, 1 = 1346.
Total loss of the Confederate Army : killed, 387; wounded, 1582 ; captured or missing, 13,— grand total, 1982.
STRENGTH OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.
In October, 1884, General Thomas Jordan, who was
General Beauregard's adjutant-general, prepared a
statement of the strength of the Confederate army at
Bull Run or Manassas, of which the following is a con-
densation :
"So far as the troops of Beauregard's immediate Army
of the Potomac are concerned, this statement is con-
densed from two that I prepared with the sub-returns
of all the commands before me as the adjutant-gen-
eral of that army, September 25th, 1861, and I will
vouch for its exactness. In respect to the Army of the
Shenandoah, I have been obliged to present an estimate
of 8340 as the total of the rank and file of Johnston's
army, my authority for which is a statement written
by me in the official report of the battle, and based, as I
distinctly recollect, upon official documents and returns
in my hands at the time, of the accuracy of which I was
and am satisfied. The totals of General Beauregard's
Army of the Potomac are :
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC AVAILABLE ON THE FIELD.
Generals and Staff 37
Infantry, Rank and File 19,569
Cavalry, " " 1,468
Artillery, " " 826
21,900
Field Guns 27
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC ACTIVELY ENGAGED.
Generals and Staff 10
Infantry, Rank aud File 8,415
Cavalry, " " 1,000
Artillery, " " 288
9,713
Field Guns 17
RECAPITULATION.
Infantry.
Army of the Potomac — Rank and File engaged 8,415 .
" " Shenandoah, " " " (estimated) 7,684 ..
Total Rank and File, both Confederate armies, engaged .... 16,099
Cavalry.
Artillery.
Staff.
Total
1,000 . .
288
10
. 9,713
300 .
350 ...
6 ...
. 8,340
1,300
638
16
18,053 '
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN
BY G. T. BEAUREGARD, GENERAL, C. S. A.
A LOUISIANA
SOON after the first conflict between the authorities of the
Federal Union and those of the Confederate States had
occurred in Charleston Harbor, by the bombardment of Fort
Sumter, — which, beginning at 4:30 A. M. on the 12th of April,
1861, forced the surrender of that fortress within thirty hours
thereafter into my hands, — I was called to Richmond, which
by that time had become the Confederate seat of government,
and was directed to " assume command of the Confederate
troops on the Alexandria line." Arriving at Manassas
Junction, I took command on the 2d of June, forty-nine
days after the evacuation of Fort Sumter.
Although the position at the time was strategically of
commanding importance to the Confederates, the mere
$ terrain was not only without natural defensive advan-
tages, but, on the contrary, was absolutely unfavorable.
Its strategic value was that, being close to the Federal
capital, it held in observation the chief army then being
assembled near Arlington by General McDowell, under the immediate eye of
the commander-in-chief, General Scott, for an offensive movement against
Richmond ; and while it had a railway approach in its rear for the easy accu-
mulation of reinforcements and all the necessary munitions of war from the
southward, at the same time another (the Manassas Gap) railway, diverging
laterally to the left from that point, gave rapid communications with the fer-
tile valley of the Shenandoah, then teeming with live stock and cereal subsist-
ence, as well as with other resources essential to the Confederates. There was
this further value in the position to the Confederate army : that during the
period of accumulation, seasoning, and training, it might be fed from the fat
fields, pastures, and garners of Loudoun, Fauquier, and the Lower Shenandoah
Valley counties, which otherwise must have fallen into the hands of the enemy.
But, on the other hand, Bull Run, a petty stream, was of little or no defen-
sive strength ; for it abounded in fords, and although for the most part its
banks were rocky and abrupt, the side from which it would be approached
offensively in most places commanded the opposite ground.
At the time of my arrival at Manassas, a Confederate army under General
Joseph E. Johnston was in occupation of the Lower Shenandoah Valley, along
the line of the Upper Potomac, chiefly at Harper's Ferry, which was regarded
as the gateway of the valley and of one of the possible approaches to Rich-
mond ; a position from which he was speedily forced to retire, however, by a
flank movement of a Federal army, under the veteran General Patterson,
thrown across the Potomac at or about Martinsburg. On my other or right
flank, so to speak, a Confederate force of some 2500 men under General
196
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
197
ARLINGTON, THE HUME Ufc\ GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE.
Holmes occupied the position of Aquia Creek on the lower Potomac, upon
the line of approach to Richmond from that direction through Fredericks-
burg. The other approach, that by way of the James Eiver, was held by
Confederate troops under
Generals Huger and Ma-
gruder. Establishing small
outposts at Leesburg to ob-
serve the crossings of the
Potomac in that quarter,
and at Fairfax Court House
in observation of Arlington,
with other detachments in
advance of Manassas toward
Alexandria on the south
side of the railroad, from
the very outset I was anx-
iously aware that the sole
military advantage at the
moment to the Confeder-
ates was that of holding the
interior Hues. On the Fed-
eral or hostile side were all material advantages, including superior numbers,
largely drawn from the old militia organizations of the great cities of the
North, decidedly better armed and equipped than the troops under me, and
strengthened by a small but incomparable body of regular infantry as well
as a number of batteries of regular field artillery of the highest class, and a
very large and thoroughly organized staff corps, besides a numerous body
of professionally educated officers in command of volunteer regiments, J —
all precious military elements at such a juncture.
Happily, through the foresight of Colonel Thomas Jordan, — whom General
Lee had placed as the adjutant-general of the forces there assembled
before my arrival, — arrangements were made which enabled me to receive
regularly, from private persons at the Federal capital, most accurate infor-
mation, of which politicians high in council, as well as War Department
clerks, were the unconscious ducts. On the 4th of July, my pickets hap-
pened upon and captured a soldier of the regulars, who proved to be a clerk
in the adjutant-general's office of General McDowell, intrusted with the special
duty of compiling returns of his army — a work which he confessed, without
reluctance, he had just executed, showing the forces under McDowell about
the 1st of July. His statement of the strength and composition of that force
tallied so closely with that which had been acquired through my Washington
agencies, already mentioned, as well as through the leading Northern news-
papers (regular files of which were also transmitted to my headquarters from
the Federal capital), that I could not doubt them.
J The professionally educated officers on the Confederate side at Bull Run included Generals Johnston,
Beauregard, Stonewall Jackson, Longstreet, Kirby Smith, Ewell, Early, Bee, D. R. Jones, Holmes,
Evans, Elzey, and Jordan, all in high positions, besides others not so prominent. — Editors.
i98 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
In these several ways, therefore, I was almost as well advised of the
strength of the hostile army in my front as its commander, who, I may men-
tion, had been a classmate of mine at West Point. Under those circumstances
I had become satisfied that a well-equipped, well-constituted Federal army at
least 50,000 strong, of all arms, confronted me at or about Arlington, ready
and on the very eve of an offensive operation against me, and to meet which
I could muster barely 18,000 men with 29 field-guns. %
Previously, — indeed, as early as the middle of June, — it had become appar-
ent to my mind that through only one course of action could there be a well-
grounded hope of ability on the part of the Confederates to encounter
successfully the offensive operations for which the Federal authorities were
then vigorously preparing in my immediate front, with so consummate a
strategist and military administrator as Lieutenant-General Scott in general
command at Washington, aided by his accomplished heads of the large Gen-
eral Staff Corps of the United States Army. This course was to make the
most enterprising, warlike use of the interior lines which we possessed, for the
swift concentration at the critical instant of every available Confederate force
upon the menaced position, at the risk, if need were, of sacrificing all minor
places to the one clearly of major military value — there to meet our adversary
so offensively as to overwhelm him, under circumstances that must assure
immediate ability to assume the general offensive even upon his territory,
and thus conquer an early peace by a few well-delivered blows.
My views of such import had been already earnestly communicated to the
proper authorities ; but about the middle of July, satisfied that McDowell was
on the eve of taking the offensive against me, I dispatched Colonel James
Chesnut, of South Carolina, a volunteer aide-de-camp on my staff who had
served on an intimate footing with Mr. Davis in the Senate of the United
States, to urge in substance the necessity for the immediate concentration of
the larger part of the forces of Johnston and Holmes at Manassas, so that
the moment McDowell should be sufficiently far detached from Washing-
ton, I would be enabled to move rapidly round his more convenient flank
upon his rear and his communications, and attack him in reverse, or get
between his forces, then separated, thus cutting off his retreat upon Arling-
ton in the event of his defeat, and insuring as an immediate consequence
the crushing of Patterson, the liberation of Maryland, and the capture of
Washington.
This plan was rejected by Mr. Davis and his military advisers (Adjutant-
General Cooper and General Lee), who characterized it as " brilliant and com-
prehensive," but essentially impracticable. Furthermore, Colonel Chesnut
came back impressed with the views entertained at Richmond, — as he com-
municated at once to my adjutant-general, — that should the Federal army
soon move offensively upon my position, my best course would be to retire
behind the Rappahannock and accept battle there instead of at Manassas.
In effect, it was regarded as best to sever communications between the two chief
Confederate armies, that of the Potomac and that of the Shenandoah, with the
3>For the forces actually engaged in the campaign and on the field, see pp. 194-5. — Editors.
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
199
inevitable immediate result that Johnston would be forced to leave Patterson
in possession of the Lower Shenandoah Valley, abandoning to the enemy so
large a part of the most resourceful
sections of Virginia, and to retreat
southward by way of the Luray Val-
ley, pass across the Blue Ridge at
Thornton's Grap and unite with me
after all, but at Fredericksburg,
much nearer Richmond than Manas-
sas. These views, however, were not
made known to me at the time, and
happily my mind was left free to the
grave problem imposed upon me by
the rejection of my plan for the im-
mediate concentration of a materially
larger force, — i. e., the problem of
placing and using my resources for
a successful encounter behind Bull
Run with the Federal army, which I
was not permitted to doubt was about
to take the field against me.
It is almost needless to say that I
had caused to be made a thorough
reconnoissance of all the ground in
my front and flanks, and had made
myself personally acquainted with the
most material points, including the
region of Sudley's Church on my left,
where a small detachment was posted in observation. Left now to my own
resources, of course the contingency of defeat had to be considered and pro-
vided for. Among the measures of precaution for such a result, I ordered
the destruction of the railroad bridge across Bull Run at Union Mills, on my
right, in order that the enemy, in the event of my defeat, should not have the
immediate use of the railroad in following up their movement against Rich-
mond — a railroad which could have had no corresponding value to us
eastward beyond Manassas in any operations on our side with Washington
as the objective, inasmuch as any such operations must have been made by
the way of the Upper Potomac and upon the rear of that city.
Just before Colonel Chesnut was dispatched on the mission of which I have
spoken, a former clerk in one of the departments at Washington, well known
to him, had volunteered to return thither and bring back the latest informa-
tion of the military and political situation from our most trusted friends.
His loyalty to our cause, his intelligence, and his desire to be of service being
vouched for, he was at once sent across the Potomac below Alexandria, merely
accredited by a small scrap of paper bearing in Colonel Jordan's cipher the
two words, " Trust bearer," with which he was to call at a certain house in
MAP OF THE EDLL RUN CAMPAIGN.
200 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
Washington within easy rifle-range of the White House, ask for the lady of
the house, and present it only to her. This delicate mission was as fortunately
as it was deftly executed. In the early morning, as the newsboys were cry-
ing in the empty streets of Washington the intelligence that the order was
given for the Federal army to move at once upon my position, that scrap of
paper reached the hands of the one person in all that city who could extract
any meaning from it. With no more delay than was necessary for a hurried
breakfast and the writing in cipher by Mrs. G of the words, "Order
issued for McDowell to march upon Manassas to-night," my agent was placed
in communication with another friend, who carried him in a buggy with a
relay of horses as swiftly as possible down the eastern shore of the Potomac
to our regular ferry across that river. Without untoward incident the
momentous dispatch was quickly delivered into the hands of a cavalry
courier, and by means of relays it was in my hands between 8 and 9 o'clock
that night. Within half an hour my outpost commanders, advised of what
was impending, were directed, at the first evidence of. the near presence of
the enemy in their front, to fall back in the manner and to positions already
prescribed in anticipation of such a contingency in an order confidentially
communicated to them four weeks before, and the detachment at Leesburg
was directed to join me by forced marches. Having thus cleared my decks
for action, I next acquainted Mr. Davis with the situation, and ventured once
more to suggest that the Army of the Shenandoah, with the brigade at Fred-
ericksburg or Aquia Creek, should be ordered to reenf orce me, — suggestions
that were at once heeded so far that General Holmes was ordered to carry his
command to my aid, and General Johnston was given discretion to do like-
wise. After some telegraphic discussion with me, General Johnston was
induced to exercise this discretion in favor of the swift march of the Army
of the Shenandoah to my relief; and to facilitate that vital movement, I
hastened to accumulate all possible means of railway transport at a desig-
nated point on the Manassas Gap railroad at the eastern foot of the Blue
Ridge, to which Johnston's troops directed their march. However, at the
same time, I had submitted the alternative proposition to General Johnston,
that, having passed the Blue Ridge, he should assemble his forces, press
forward by way of Aldie, north-west of Manassas, and fall upon McDowell's
right rear ; while I, prepared for the operation, at the first sound of the con-
vict, should strenuously assume the offensive in my front. The situation and
circumstances specially favored the signal success of such an operation. The
larch to the point of attack could have been accomplished as soon as the
rces were brought ultimately by rail to Manassas Junction ; our enemy,
uiius attacked so nearly simultaneously on his right flank, his rear, and his
front, naturally would suppose that I had been able to turn his flank while
attacking him in front, and therefore, that I must have an overwhelming
superiority of numbers ; and his forces, being new troops, most of them
under fire for the first time, must have soon fallen into a disastrous panic.
Moreover, such an operation must have resulted advantageously to the Con-
federates, in the event that McDowell should, as might have been antici-
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
20 1
pated, attempt to strike the Manassas Gap railway to my left, and thus cut
off railway communications between Johnston's forces and my own, instead
of the mere effort to strike my left flank which he actually essayed. |
It seemed, however, as though the deferred attempt at concentration
was to go for naught, for 011 the morning of the 18th the Federal forces
were massed around
Centreville, but three
miles from Mitchell's
Ford, and soon were
seen advancing upon
the roads leading to
that and Blackburn's
Ford. [See map, page
180.] My order of bat-
tle, issued in the night
of the 17th, contem-
plated an offensive
return, particularly
from the strong bri-
gades on the right and
"cj.. '•&'.'
THE MCLEAN HOUSE, GENERAL BEAUREGARD'S HEADQUARTERS
NEAR MANASSAS. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
right center. The Fed-
eral artillery opened
in front of both fords,
and the infantry,
while demonstrating in front of Mitchell's Ford, endeavored to force a pas-
sage at Blackburn's. Their column of attack, Tyler's division, was opposed
by Longstreet's forces, to the reenforcement of which Early's brigade, the
reserve line at McLean's Ford, was ordered up. The Federals, after sev-
eral attempts to force a passage, met a final repulse and retreated. After
their infantry attack had ceased, about 1 o'clock, the contest lapsed into an
artillery duel, in which the Washington Artillery of New Orleans won credit
against the renowned batteries of the United States regular army. A comical
effect of this artillery fight was the destruction of the dinner of myself and
staff by a Federal shell that fell into the fire-place of my headquarters at
the McLean House. J)
Our success in this first limited collision was of special prestige to my army'
of new troops, and, moreover, of decisive importance by so increasing Gen-
eral McDowell's caution as to give time for the arrival of some of General
4. "I am, however, inclined to believe he [the
enemy] may attempt to turn my left flank by a
movement in the direction of Vienna, Frying-
pan Church, and, possibly, Gum Spring, and thus
cut off Johnston's line of retreat and commu-
nication with this place [Manassas Junction]
via the Manassas Gap railroad, while threaten-
ing my own communications with Richmond
and depots of supply by the Alexandria and
Orange railroad, and opening his communica-
tions with the Potomac through Leesburg and
Edward's Ferry." — (Extract from a letter ad-
dressed by Genei*al Beauregard to Jefferson Davis,
July 11th, 1861.)
\ It is denied that a serious attempt "to force
a passage" was made on the 18th. (Seepage 178.)
This engagement was called by the Confederates
the battle of Bull Run, the main fight on the 21st
being known in the South as the battle of Manassas
(pronounced Ma-nass'-sa). — Editors.
202 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
Johnston's forces. But while on the 19th I was awaiting a renewed and gen-
eral attack by the Federal army, I received a telegram from the Richmond
military authorities, urging me to withdraw my call on General Johnston on
account of the supposed impracticability of the concentration — an abiding
conviction which had been but momentarily shaken by the alarm caused by
McDowell's march upon Richmond. \ As this was not an order in terms, but
an urgency which, notwithstanding its superior source, left me technically
free and could define me as responsible for any misevent, I preferred to keep
both the situation and the responsibility, and continued every effort for the
prompt arrival of the Shenandoah forces, being resolved, should they come
before General McDowell again attacked, to take myself the offensive. Gen-
eral McDowell, fortunately for my plans, spent the 19th and 20th in recon-
noissances ; -ft and, meanwhile, General Johnston brought 8340 men from
the Shenandoah Valley, with 20 guns, and General Holmes 1265 rank and
file, with 6 pieces of artillery, from Aquia Creek. As these forces arrived
(most of them in the afternoon of the 20th) I placed them chiefly so as
to strengthen my left center and left, the latter being weak from lack of
available troops.
The disposition of the entire force was now as follows [see map, page
180] : At Union Mills Ford, E well's brigade, supported by Holmes's ; at
McLean's Ford, D. R. Jones's brigade, supported by Early's ; at Blackburn's
Ford, Longstreet's brigade ; at Mitchell's Ford, Bonham's brigade. Cocke's bri-
gade held the line in front and rear of Bull Run from Bonham's left, covering-
Lewis's, Ball's, and Island fords, to the right of Evans's demi-brigade, which
covered the Stone Bridge and a farm ford about a mile above, and formed
part also of Cocke's command. The Shenandoah forces were placed in
reserve — Bee's and Bartow's brigades between McLean's and Blackburn's
fords, and Jackson's between Blackburn's and Mitchell's fords. This force
mustered 29,188 rank and file and 55 guns, of which 21,923 infantry, cavalry,
and artillery, with 29 guns, belonged to my immediate forces, i. e., the Army
of the Potomac.
The preparation, in front of an ever-threatening enemy, of a wholly volun-
teer army, composed of men very few of whom had ever belonged to any
military organization, had been a work of many cares not incident to the
command of a regular army. These were increased by the insufficiency of
my staff organization, an inefficient management of the quartermaster's
department at Richmond, and the preposterous mismanagement of the com-
missary-general, who not only failed to furnish rations, but caused the
removal of the army commissaries, who, under my orders, procured food from
\ [telegram.] Bichmond, July 19, 1861. as transportation permits. The enemy is advised
General Beauregard, Manassas, Va. at Washington of the projected movement of Gen-
We have no intelligence from General Johnston, erals Johnston and Holmes, and may vary his
If the enemy in front of you has abandoned an plans in conformity thereto,
immediate attack, and General Johnston has not S. Cooper, Adjutant-General,
moved, you had better withdraw your call upon
him, so that he may be left to his full discretion. -fcLack of rations, as well as the necessity for
All the troops arriving at Lynchburg are ordered information, detained McDowell at Centreville
to join you. From this place we will send as fast during these two days. — Editors.
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 203
the country in front of us to keep the army from absolute want — supplies
that were otherwise exposed to be gathered by the enemy. So specially
severe had been the recent duties at headquarters, aggravated not a little by
night alarms arising from the enemy's immediate presence, that, in the even-
ing of the 20th, I found my chief -of -staff sunken upon the papers that covered
his table, asleep in sheer exhaustion from the overstraining and almost shun-
berless labor of the last days and nights. I covered his door with a guard
to secure his rest against any interruption, after which the army had the
benefit of his usual active and provident services.
There was much in this decisive conflict about to open, not involved in
any after battle, which pervaded the two armies and the people behind them
and colored the responsibility of the respective commanders. The political
hostilities of a generation were now face to face with weapons instead of
words. Defeat to either side would be a deep mortification, but defeat to the
South must turn its claim of independence into an empty vaunt ; and the
defeated commander on either side might expect, though not the personal
fate awarded by the Carthaginians to an unfortunate commander, at least a
moral fate quite similar. Though disappointed that the concentration I had
sought had not been permitted at the moment and for the purpose preferred
by me, and notwithstanding the non-arrival of some five thousand troops of
the Shenandoah forces, my strength was now so increased that I had good
hope of successfully meeting my adversary.
General Johnston was the ranking officer, and entitled, therefore, to assume
command of the united forces ; but as the extensive field of operations was
one which I had occupied since the beginning of June, and with which I was
thoroughly familiar in all its extent and military bearings, while he was
wholly unacquainted with it, and, moreover, as I had made my plans and dis-
positions for the maintenance of the position, ( reneral Johnston, in view of
the gravity of the impending issue, preferred not to assume the responsi-
bilities of the chief direction of the forces during the battle, but to assist me
upon the field. Thereupon, I explained my plans and purposes, to which
he agreed.,)
Sunday, July 21st, bearing the fate of the new-born Confederacy, broke
brightly over the fields and woods that held the hostile forces. My scouts,
thrown out in the night toward Centreville along the Warrenton Turnpike, had
reported that the enemy was concentrating along the latter. This fact,
together with the failure of the Federals in their attack upon my center at
Mitchell's and Blackburn's fords, had caused me to apprehend that they would
attempt my left flank at the Stone Bridge, and orders were accordingly issued
by half-past 4 o'clock to the brigade commanders to hold their forces in
readiness to move at a moment's notice, together with the suggestion that the
Federal attack might be expected in that quarter. Shortly afterward the
enemy was reported to be advancing from Centreville on the Warrenton
\ See General Beauregard's postscript (page 226), and General Johnston's consideration of the
same topic in the paper to follow (page 245), and his postscript (page 258).— Editors.
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TOPOGRAPHICAL MAP OF THE BULL RUN BATTLE-FIELD.
The original of this map was made for General Beauregard, soon after the battle, from actual surveys by
Captain D. B. Harris, assisted by Mr. John Grant.
204
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 205
Turnpike, and at half -past 5 o'clock as deploying a force in front of Evans.
As their movement against my left developed the opportunity I desired, I
immediately sent orders to the brigade commanders, both front and reserves,
on my right and center to advance and vigorously attack the Federal left
flank and rear at Centreville, while my left, under Cocke and Evans with
their supports, would sustain the Federal attack in the quarter of the Stone
Bridge, which they were directed to do to the last extremity. The center was
likewise to advance and engage the enemy in front, and directions were given
to the reserves, when without orders, to move toward the sound of the heaviest
firing. The ground in our front on the other side of Bull Run afforded par-
ticular advantage for these tactics. Centreville was the apex of a triangle —
its short side running by the Warrenton Turnpike to Stone Bridge, its base
Bull Run, its long side a road that ran from Union Mills along the front of my
other Bull Run positions and trended off to the rear of Centreville, where
McDowell had massed his main forces ; branch roads led up to this one from
the fords between Union Mills and Mitchell's. My forces to the right of the
latter ford were to advance, pivoting on that position; Bonham was in
advance from Mitchell's Ford, Lougstreet from Blackburn's, D. R. Jones from
McLean's, and Ewell from Union Mills by the Centreville road. Ewell, as hav-
ing the longest march, was to begin the movement, and each brigade was to
be followed by its reserve. In anticipation of this method of attack, and to
prevent accidents, the subordinate commanders had been carefully instructed
in the movement by me, as they were all new to the responsibilities of com-
mand. They were to establish close communication with each other before
making the attack. About half-past 8 o'clock I set out with General John-
ston for a convenient position, — a hill in rear of Mitchell's Ford, — where we
waited for the opening of the attack on our right, from which I expected a
decisive victory by midday, with the result of cutting off the Federal army
from retreat upon Washington.
Meanwhile, about half -past 5 o'clock, the peal of a heavy rifled gun was
heard in front of the Stone Bridge, its second shot striking through the tent
of my signal-officer, Captain E. P. Alexander ; and at 6 o'clock a full rifled
battery opened against Evans and then against Cocke, to which our artillery
remained dumb, as it had not sufficient range to reply. But later, as the
Federal skirmish-line advanced, it was engaged by ours, thrown well forward
on the other side of the Run. A scattering musketry fire followed, and
meanwhile, about 7 o'clock, I ordered Jackson's brigade, with Imboden's and
five guns of Walton's battery, to the left, with orders to support Cocke as
well as Bonham ; and the brigades of Bee and Bartow, under the command
of the former, were also sent to the support of the left.
At half -past 8 o'clock Evans, seeing that the Federal attack did not increase
in boldness and vigor, and observing a lengthening line of dust above the
trees to the left of the Warrenton Turnpike, became satisfied that the attack
in his front was but a feint, and that a column of the enemy was moving
around through the woods to fall on his flank from the direction of Sudley
Ford. Informing his immediate commander, Cocke, of the enemy's move-
20b THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
nient, and of his own dispositions to meet it, he left 4 companies under cover
at the Stone Bridge, and led the remainder of his force, 6 companies of
Sloan's 4th South Carolina and Wheat's battalion of Louisiana Tigers, with 2
6-pounder howitzers, across the valley of Young's Branch to the high ground
beyond it. Resting his left on the Sudley road, he distributed his troops on
each side of a small copse, with such cover as the ground afforded, and look-
ing over the open fields and a reach of the Sudley road which the Federals
must cover in their approach. His two howitzers were placed one at each
end of his position, and here he silently awaited the enemy now drawing near.
The Federal turning column, about 18,000 strong, with 24 pieces of artil-
lery, had moved down from Centreville by the Warrenton Turnpike, and
after passing Cub Run had struck to the right by a forest road to cross Bull
Run at Sudley Ford, about 8 miles above the Stone Bridge, moving by a
long circuit for the purpose of attacking my left flank. The head of the col-
umn, Burnside's brigade of Hunter's division, at about 9:45 a. m. debouched
from the woods into the open fields, in front of Evans. Wheat at once
engaged their skirmishers, and as the Second Rhode Island regiment
advanced, supported by its splendid battery of 6 rifled guns, the fronting
thicket held by Evans's South Carolinians poured forth its sudden volleys,
while the 2 howitzers flung their grape-shot upon the attacking line, which
was soon shattered and driven back into the woods behind. Major Wheat,
after handling his battalion with the utmost determination, had fallen severely
wounded in the lungs. Burnside's entire brigade was now sent forward in a
second charge, supported by 8 guns ; but they encountered again the unflinch-
ing fire of Evans's line, and were once more driven back to the woods, from
the cover of which they continued the attack, reenforced after a time by the
arrival of 8 companies of United States regular infantry, under Major Sykes,
with 6 pieces of artillery, quickly followed by the remaining regiments of
Andrew Porter's brigade of the same division. The contest here lasted
fully an hour; meanwhile Wheat's battalion, having lost its leader, had
gradually lost its organization, and Evans, though still opposing these
heavy odds with undiminished firmness, sought reenforcement from the
troops in his rear.
General Bee, of South Carolina, a man of marked character, whose com-
mand lay in reserve in rear of Cocke, near the Stone Bridge, intelligently
applying the general order given to the reserves, had already moved toward
the neighboring point of conflict, and taken a position with his own and Bar-
tow's brigades on the high plateau which stands in rear of Bull Run in the
quarter of the Stone Bridge, and overlooking the scene of engagement upon
the stretch of high ground from which it was separated by the valley of
Young's Branch. This plateau is inclosed on three sides by two small water-
courses, which empty into Bull Run within a few yards of each other, a half
mile to the south of the Stone Bridge. Rising to an elevation of quite 100
feet above the level of Bull Run at the bridge, it falls off on three sides to the
level of the inclosing streams in gentle slopes, but furrowed by ravines of
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 207
irregular directions and length, and studded with clumps and patches of young
pine and oaks. The general direction of the crest of the plateau is oblique to
the course of Bull Run in that quarter and to the Sudley and turnpike roads,
which intersect each other at right angles. On the north- western brow, over-
looking Young's Branch, and near the Sudley road, as the latter climbs over
the plateau, stood the house of the widow Henry, while to its right and for-
ward on a projecting spur stood the house and sheds of the free negro Robin-
son, just behind the turnpike, densely embowered in trees and shrubbery and
environed by a double row of fences on two sides. Around the eastern and
southern brow of the plateau an almost unbroken fringe of second-growth
pines gave excellent shelter for our marksmen, who availed themselves of it
with the most satisfactory skill. To the west, adjoining the fields that sur-
rounded the houses mentioned, a broad belt of oaks extends directly across
the crest on both sides of the Sudley road, in which, during the battle, the
hostile forces contended for the mastery. General Bee, with a soldier's eye to
the situation, skillfully disposed his forces. His two brigades on either side
of Imboden's battery — which he had borrowed from his neighboring reserve,
Jackson's brigade — were placed in a small depression of the plateau in
advance of the Henry house, whence he had a full view of the contest on the
opposite height across the valley of Young's Branch. Opening with his
artillery upon the Federal batteries, he answered Evans's request by advising
him to withdraw to his own position on the height; but Evans, full of the
spirit that would not retreat, renewed his appeal that the forces in rear
would come to help him hold his ground. The newly arrived forces had
given the Federals such superiority at this point as to dwarf Evans's means
of resistance, and General Bee, generously yielding his own better judgment
to Evans's persistence, led the two brigades across the valley under the fire
of the enemy's artillery, and threw them into action — 1 regiment in the copse
held by Colonel Evans, 2 along a fence on the right, and 2 under General
Bartow on the prolonged right of this line, but extended forward at a right
angle and along the edge of a wood not more than 100 yards from that
held by the enemy's left, where the contest at short range became sharp and
deadly, bringing many casualties to both sides. The Federal infantry,
though still in superior numbers, failed to make any headway against this
sturdy van, notwithstanding Bee's whole line was hammered also by the
enemy's powerful batteries, until Heintzelman's division of 2 strong brigades,
arriving from Sudley Ford, extended the fire on the Federal right, while its
battery of 6 10-pounder rifled guns took an immediately effective part from a
position behind the Sudley road. Against these odds the Confederate force
was still endeavoring to hold its ground, when a new enemy came into the
field upon its right. Major Wheat, with characteristic daring and restless-
ness, had crossed Bull Run alone by a small ford above the Stone Bridge, in
order to reconnoiter, when he and Evans had first moved to the left, and, fall-
ing on some Federal scouts, had shouted a taunting defiance and withdrawn,
not, however, without his place of crossing having been observed. This dis-
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208
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
209
closure was now utilized by Sherman's (W. T.) and Keyes's brigades of
Tyler's division ; crossing at this point, they appeared over the high bank of
the stream and moved into position on the Federal left. There was no choice
now for Bee but to retire — a movement, however, to be accomplished under
different circumstances than when urged by him upon Evans. The three
leaders endeavored to preserve the stead-
iness of the ranks as they withdrew over
the open fields, aided by the fire of Im-
boden's guns on the plateau and the
retiring howitzers ; but the troops were
thrown into confusion, and the greater
part soon fell into rout across Young's
Branch and around the base of the
height in the rear of the Stone Bridge.
Meanwhile, in rear of Mitchell's Ford,
I had been waiting with General John-
ston for the sound of conflict to open in
the quarter of Centreville upon the Fed-
eral left flank and rear (making allow-
ance, however, for the delays possible
to commands unused to battle), when I
was chagrined to hear from General D.
R. Jones that, while he had been long
ready for the movement upon Centre-
ville, General Ewell had not come up to
form on his right, though he had sent
him between 7 and 8 o'clock a copy of
his own order which recited that Ewell
had been already ordered to begin the
movement. I dispatched an immediate
order to Ewell to advance ; but within a
quarter of an hour, just as I received
a dispatch from him informing me that
he had received no order to advance in
the morning, the firing on the left began to increase so intensely as to indi-
cate a severe attack, whereupon General Johnston said that he would go
personally to that quarter.
After weighing attentively the firing, which seemed rapidly and heavily
increasing, it appeared to me that the troops on the right would be unable to
get into position before the Federal offensive should have made too much
progress on our left, and that it would be better to abandon it altogether,
maintaining only a strong demonstration so as to detain the enemy in front
of our right and center, and hurry up all available reinforcements — includ-
ing the reserves that were to have moved upon Centreville — to our left and
fight the battle out in that quarter. Communicating this view to General
Johnston, who approved it (giving his advice, as he said, for what it was
■rX- '■'"''"'
A LOUISIANA " PELICAN.
VOL. I. 14
210 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
worth, as lie was not acquainted with the country), I ordered Ewell, Jones,
and Longstreet to make a strong demonstration all along their front on the
other side of the Run, and ordered the reserves below our position, Holmes's
brigade with 6 guns, and Early's brigade, also 2 regiments of Bonham's
brigade, near at hand, to move swiftly to the left. General Johnston and I
now set out at full speed for the point of conflict. We arrived there just as
Bee's troops, after giving way, were fleeing in disorder behind the height in
rear of the Stone Bridge. They had come around between the base of the
hill and the Stone Bridge into a shallow ravine which ran up to a point on
the crest where Jackson had already formed his brigade along the edge of the
woods. We found the commanders resolutely stemming the further flight of
the routed forces, but vainly endeavoring to restore order, and our own
efforts were as futile. Every segment of line we succeeded in forming was
again dissolved while another was being formed ; more than two thousand men
were shouting each some suggestion to his neighbor, their voices mingling with
the noise of the shells hurtling through the trees overhead, and all word of
command drowned in the confusion and uproar. It was at this moment that
General Bee used the famous expression, " Look at Jackson's brigade ! It
stands there like a stone wall " — a name that passed from the brigade to its
immortal commander. The disorder seemed irretrievable, but happily the
thought came to me that if their colors were planted out to the front the men
might rally on them, and I gave the order to carry the standards forward
some forty yards, which was promptly executed by the regimental officers,
thus drawing the common eye of the troops. They now received easily the
orders to advance and form on the line of their colors, which they obeyed
with a general movement ; and as General Johnston and myself rode forward
shortly after with the colors of the 4th Alabama by our side, the line that
lad fought all morning, and had fled, routed and disordered, now advanced
igain into position as steadily as veterans. The 4th Alabama had previ-
ously lost all its field-officers; and noticing Colonel S. R. Gist, an aide to
General Bee, a young man whom I had known as adjutant-general of South
Carolina, and whom I greatly esteemed, I presented him as an able and brave
[ommander to the stricken regiment, who cheered their new leader, and main-
ained under him, to the end of the day, their previous gallant behavior. We
lad come none too soon, as the enemy's forces, flushed with the belief of
victory, were already advancing across the valley of Young's
up the slope, where they had encountered for a while the fire of
Legion, which had been led forward toward the Robinson house
and the turnpike in front, covering the retreat and helping materially to check
the panic of Bee's routed forces.
As soon as order was restored I requested General Johnston to go back to
Portici (the Lewis house), and from that point — which I considered most
favorable for the purpose — forward me the reinforcements as they would
come from the Bull Run lines below and those that were expected to arrive
from Manassas, while I should direct the field. General Johnston was disin-
clined to leave the battle-field for that position. As I had been compelled to
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 211
leave my chief-of-staff, Colonel Jordan, at Manassas to forward any troops
arriving there, I felt it was a necessity that one of us should go to this duty,
and that it was h'is place to do so, as I felt I was responsible for the battle.
He considerately yielded to my urgency, and we had the benefit of his energy
and sagacity in so directing the reenf orcernents toward the field, as to be readily
and effectively assistant to my pressing needs and insure the success of the day.
As General Johnston departed for Portici, I hastened to form our line of
battle against the on-coming enemy. I ordered up the 49th and 8th Vir-
ginia regiments from Cocke's neighboring brigade in the Bull Run lines.
Gartrell's 7th Georgia I placed in position on the left of Jackson's bri-
gade, along the belt of pines occupied by the latter on the eastern rim of the
plateau. As the 49th Virginia rapidly came up, its colonel, ex-Governor William
Smith, was encouraging them with cheery word and manner, and, as they
approached, indicated to them the immediate presence of the commander.
As the regiment raised a loud cheer, the name was caught by some of the
troops of Jackson's brigade in the immediate wood, who rushed out, calling
for General Beauregard. Hastily acknowledging these happy signs of sym-
pathy and confidence, which reenf orce alike the capacity of commander and
troops, I placed the 49th Virginia in position on the extreme left next
to Gartrell, and as I paused to say a few words to Jackson, while hurry-
ing back to the right, my horse was killed under me by a bursting shell, a
fragment of which carried away part of the heel of my boot. The Hampton
Legion, which had suffered greatly, was placed on the right of Jackson's
brigade, and Hunton's 8th Virginia, as it arrived, upon the right of Hampton ;
the two latter being drawn somewhat to the rear so as to form with Jackson's
right regiment a reserve, and be ready likewise to make defense against any
advance from the direction of the Stone Bridge, whence there was imminent
peril from the enemy's heavy forces, as I had just stripped that position almost
entirely of troops to meet the active crisis on the plateau, leaving this quarter
now covered only by a few men, whose defense was otherwise assisted solely
by the obstruction of an abatis.
With 6500 men and 13 pieces of artillery, I now awaited the onset of the
enemy, who were pressing forward 20,000 strong, % with 24 pieces of superior
artillery and 7 companies of regular cavalry. They soon appeared over the
farther rim of the plateau, seizing the Robinson house on my right and the
Henry house opposite my left center. Near the latter they placed in position
the two powerful batteries of Ricketts and Griffin of the regular army, and
pushed forward up the Sudley road, the slope of which was cut so deep below
the adjacent ground as to afford a covered way up to the plateau. Supported
by the formidable lines of Federal musketry, these 2 batteries lost no time in
making themselves felt, while 3 more batteries in rear on the high ground
beyond the Sudley and Warrenton cross-roads swelled the shower of shell
that fell among our ranks.
^ According to General Fry (page 188), the Union force in the seizure of the Henry hill consisted of
four brigades, a cavalry battalion, and two batteries, .or (as we deduce from General Fry's statements
of the strength of McDowell's forces, page 195) about 11,000 men. — Editors.
212 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
Our own batteries, Imboden's, Stanard's, five of Walton's guns, reenforced
later by Pendleton's and Alburtis's (their disadvantage being reduced by the
shortness of range), swept the surface of the plateau from their position on
the eastern rim. I felt that, after the accidents of the morning, much depended
on maintaining the steadiness of the troops against the first heavy onslaught,
and rode along the lines encouraging the men to unflinching behavior, meet-
ing, as I passed each command, a cheering response. The steady fire of their
musketry told severely on the Federal ranks, and the splendid action of our
batteries was a fit preface to the marked skill exhibited by our artillerists
during the war. The enemy suffered particularly from the musketry on
our left, now further reenforced by the 2d Mississippi — the troops in this
quarter confronting each other at very short range. Here two companies of
Stuart's cavalry charged through the Federal ranks that filled the Sudley
road, increasing the disorder wrought upon that flank of the enemy. But
with superior numbers the Federals were pushing on new regiments in the
attempt to flank my position, and several guns, in the effort to enfilade ours,
were thrust forward so near the 33d Virginia that some of its men sprang
forward and captured them, but were driven back by an overpowering force
of Federal musketry. Although the enemy were held well at bay, their press-
ure became so strong that I resolved to take the offensive, and ordered a
charge on my right for the purpose of recovering the plateau. The movement,
made with alacrity and force by the commands of Bee, Bartow, Evans, and
Hampton, thrilled the entire line, Jackson's brigade piercing the enemy's
center, and the left of the line under Grartrell and Smith following up the
charge, also, in that quarter, so that the whole of the open surface of the
plateau was swept clear of the Federals.
Apart from its impressions on the enemy, the effect of this brilliant onset
was to give a short breathing-spell to our troops from the immediate strain
of conflict, and encourage them in withstanding the still more strenuous
offensive that was soon to bear upon them. Reorganizing our line of battle
under the unremitting fire of the Federal batteries opposite, I prepared to
meet the new attack which the enemy were about to make, largely reen-
forced by the troops of Howard's brigade, newly arrived on the field. The
Federals again pushed up the slope, the face of which partly afforded good
cover by the numerous ravines that scored it and the clumps of young
pines and oaks with which it was studded, while the sunken Sudley road
formed a good ditch and parapet for their aggressive advance upon my left
flank and rear. Gradually they pressed our lines back and regained possession
of their lost ground and guns. With the Henry and Robinson houses once
more in their possession, they resumed the offensive, urged forward by their
commanders with conspicuous gallantry.
The conflict now became very severe for the final possession of this position,
which was the key to victory. The Federal numbers enabled them so to
extend their lines through the woods beyond the Sudley road as to outreach
my left flank, which I was compelled partly to throw back, so as to meet the
attack from that quarter ; meanwhile their numbers equally enabled them to
outflank my right in the direction of the Stone Bridge, imposing anxious
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
213
THE ROBINSON HOUSE. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.
watchfulness in that direction. I knew that I was safe if I could hold out
till the arrival of reinforcements, which was but a matter of time ; and, with
the full sense Of my own responsibility, I was determined to hold the line of
the plateau, even if surrounded on all sides, until assistance should come,
unless my forces were sooner overtaken by annihilation.
It was now between half -past 2 and 3 o'clock; a scorching sun increased
the oppression of the troops, exhausted from incessant fighting, many of
them having been
engaged since the
morning. Fearing
lest the Federal of-
fensive should se-
cure too firm a grip,
and knowing the
fatal result that
might spring from
any grave infrac-
tion of my line, I
determined to make
another effort for
the recovery of the
plateau, and ordered
a charge of the en-
tire line of battle,
including the re-
serves, which at this
crisis I myself led into action. The movement was made with such keep-
ing and dash that the whole plateau was swept clear of the enemy, who
were driven down the slope and across the turnpike on our right and the
valley of Young's Branch on our left, leaving in our final possession the
Robinson and Henry houses, with most of Rieketts's and Griffin's batteries,
the men of which were mostly shot down where they bravely stood by their
guns. Fisher's 6th North Carolina, directed to the Lewis house by Colonel
Jordan from Manassas, where it had just arrived, and thence to the field by
General Johnston, came up in happy time to join in this charge on the left.
Withers's 18th Virginia, which I had ordered up from Cocke's brigade,
was also on hand in time to follow and give additional effect to the charge,
capturing, by aid of the Hampton Legion, several guns, which were immedi-
ately turned and served upon the broken ranks of the enemy by some of our
officers. This handsome work, which broke the Federal fortunes of the day,
was done, however, at severe cost. The soldierly Bee, and the gallant,
impetuous Bartow, whose day of strong deeds was about to close with such
credit, fell a few rods back of the Henry house, near the very spot whence
in the morning they had first looked forth upon Evans's struggle with the
enemy. Colonel Fisher also fell at the very head of his troops. Seeing
Captain Ricketts, who was badly wounded in the leg, and having known him
in the old army, I paused from my anxious duties to ask him whether I could
214 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
do anything for him. He answered that he wanted to be sent back to Wash-
ington. As some of our prisoners were there held under threats of not being
treated as prisoners of war, I replied that that must depend upon how our
prisoners were treated, and ordered him to be carried to the rear. I mention
this, because the report of the Federal Committee on the Conduct of the
War exhibits Captain Ricketts as testifying that I only approached him to
say that he would be treated as our prisoners might be treated. I sent my
own surgeons to care for him, and allowed his wife to cross the lines and
accompany him to Richmond; and my adjutant-general, Colonel Jordan,
escorting her to the car that carried them to that city, personally attended to
the comfortable placing of the wounded enemy for the journey.
That part of the enemy who occupied the woods beyond our left and
across the Sudley road had not been reached by the headlong charge which
had swept their comrades from the plateau ; but the now arriving reinforce-
ments (Kershaw's 2d and Cash's 8th South Carolina) were led into that
quarter. Kemper's battery also came up, preceded by its commander,
who, while alone, fell into the hands of a number of the enemy, who took
him prisoner, until a few moments later, when he handed them over to some
of our own troops accompanying his battery. A small plateau, within the
south-west angle of the Sudley and turnpike cross-roads, was still held by
a strong Federal brigade — Howard's troops, together with Sykes's battalion
of regulars ; and while Kershaw and Cash, after passing through the skirts
of the oak wood along the Sudley road, engaged this force, Kemper's bat-
tery was sent forward by Kershaw along the same road, into position near
where a hostile battery had been captured, and whence it played upon the
enemy in the open field.
Quickly following these regiments came Preston's '28th Virginia, which,
passing through the woods, encountered and drove back some Michigan
troops, capturing Brigadier-General Willcox. It was now about 3 o'clock,
when another important reenforcement came to our aid — Elzey's brigade,
1700 strong, of the Army of the Shenandoah, which, coming from Pied-
mont by railroad, had arrived at Manassas station, 6 miles in rear of the
battle-field, at noon, and had been without delay directed thence toward
the field by Colonel Jordan, aided by Major T. G. Rhett, who that morning
had passed from General Bonham's to General Johnston's staff. Upon
nearing the vicinity of the Lewis house, the brigade was directed by a staff-
officer sent by General Johnston toward the left of the field. As it reached
the oak wood, just across the Sudley road, led by General Kirby Smith, the
latter fell severely wounded; but the command devolved upon Colonel
Elzey, an excellent officer, who was now guided by Captain D. B. Harris
of the Engineers, a highly accomplished officer of my staff, still farther to
the left and through the woods, so as to form in extension of the line of the
preceding reinforcements. Beckham's battery, of the same command, was
hurried forward by the Sudley road and around the woods into position near
the Chinn house ; from a well-selected point of action, in full view of the
enemy that filled the open fields west of the Sudley road, it played with
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 21s
deadly and decisive effect upon their ranks, already under the fire of Elzey's
brigade. Keyes's Federal brigade, which had made its way across the turn-
pike in rear of 'the Stone Bridge, was lurking along under cover of the ridges
and a wood in order to turn my line on the right, but was easily repulsed by
Latham's battery, already placed in position over that approach by Captain
Harris, aided by Alburtis's battery, opportunely sent to Latham's left by
General Jackson, and supported by fragments of troops collected by staff-
officers. Meanwhile, the enemy had formed a line of battle of formidable
proportions on the opposite height, and stretching in crescent outline, with
flanks advanced, from the Pittsylvania (Carter) mansion on their left across
the Sudley road in rear of Dogan's and reaching toward the Chinn house.
They offered a fine spectacle as they threw forward a cloud of skirmishers
down the opposite slope, preparatory to a new assault against the line on the
plateau. But their right was now severely pressed by the troops that had
successively arrived ; the force in the south-west angle of the Sudley and
Warrenton cross-roads were driven from their position, and, as Early's
brigade, which, by direction of General Johnston, had swept around by the
rear of the woods through which Elzey had passed, appeared on the field, his
line of march bore upon the flank of the enemy, now retiring in that quarter.
This movement by my extreme left was masked by the trend of the
woods from many of our forces on the plateau ; and bidding those of my
staff and escort around me raise a loud cheer, I dispatched the information
to the several commands, with orders to go forward in a common charge.
Before the full advance of the Confederate ranks the enemy's whole line,
whose right was already yielding, irretrievably broke, fleeing across Bull Run
by every available direction. Major Sykes's regulars, aided by Sherman's
brigade, made a steady and handsome withdrawal, protecting the rear of the
routed forces, and enabling many to escape by the Stone Bridge. Having
ordered in pursuit all the troops on the field, I went to the Lewis house, and,
the battle being ended, turned over the command to General- Johnston.
Mounting a fresh horse, — the f ourth on that day, — I started to press the
pursuit which was being made by our infantry and cavalry, some of the
latter having been sent by General Johnston from Lewis's Ford to intercept
the enemy on the turnpike. I was soon overtaken, however, by a courier
bearing a message from Major T. G. Rhett, General Johnston's chief -of -staff
on duty at Manassas railroad station, informing me of a report that a large
Federal force, having pierced our lower line on Bull Run, was moving upon
Camp Pickens, my depot of supplies near Manassas. I returned, and com-
municated this important Hews to General Johnston. Upon consultation
it was deemed best that I should take Ewell's and Holmes's brigades, which
were hastening up to the battle-field, but too late for the action, and fall on
this force of the enemy, while reenforcements should be sent me from the
pursuing forces, who were to be recalled for that purpose. To head off the
danger and gain time, I hastily mounted a force of infantry behind the
cavalrymen then present, but, on approaching the line of march near
McLean's Ford, which the Federals must have taken, I learned that the news
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
THE MAIN BATTLE-GROUND.— NO. I.
View of the Henry house, looking west from the spot parallel with the rail fence (in the middle ground on the
where General Bee fell. The Bull Run mountains and left). Just within the rail fence is where Griffin's and
Thoroughfare Gap appear in the distance. The Sudley Ricketts's batteries were planted. Near the house
road, a few rods beyond the house, under the hill, runs stands the Union Monument, commemorating the battle.
was a false alarm caught from the return of General Jones's forces to this
side of the Run, the similarity of the uniforms and the direction of their
march having convinced some nervous person that they were a force of the
enemy. It was now almost dark, and too late to resume the broken pursuit;
on my return I met the coming forces, and, as they were very tired, I ordered
them to halt and bivouac for the night where they were. After giving such
attention as I could to the troops, I started for Manassas, where I arrived
about 10 o'clock, and found Mr. Davis at my headquarters with General
Johnston. Arriving from Eichmond late in the afternoon, Mr. Davis had
immediately galloped to the field, accompanied by Colonel Jordan. They
had met between Manassas and the battle-field the usual number of strag-
glers to the rear, whose appearance belied the determined array then sweep-
ing the enemy before it, but Mr. Davis had the happiness to arrive in time
to witness the last of the Federals disappearing beyond Bull Run. The next
morning I received from his hand at our breakfast-table my commission,
dated July 21st, as General in the Army of the Confederate States, and after
his return to Richmond the kind congratulations of the Secretary of War
and of General Lee, then acting as military adviser to the President.
It was a point made at the time at the North that, just as the Confederate
troops were about to break and flee, the Federal troops anticipated them by
doing so, being struck into this precipitation by the arrival upon their flank
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
217
-f^*'
~$~>~
'-r
o*y ^?5-
•■■
PKP*X«
~t5^^^, 5£ '
THE MAIN BATTLE-GROUND.— NO. 2.
View of the Robinson house, looking north from the
spot on the Henry plateau where General Bee fell. At
1 p. m. this ground lay between the hostile lines, which
were (roughly speaking) parallel with the sides of the
picture : Con federates on the right, Union forces on the
left. The foreground was between the centers of the
positions.
As these two views are taken from the same spot, the
reader will best understand their relation by holding
the pages at a right angle to each other.
of the Shenandoah forces marching from railroad trains halted en route with
that aim — errors that have been repeated by a number of writers, and by
an ambitious but superficial French author.
There were certain sentiments of a personal character clustering about this
first battle, and personal anxiety as to its issue, that gladly accepted this
theory. To this may' be added the general readiness to accept a sentimental
or ultra-dramatic explanation — a sorcery wrought by the delay or arrival of
some force, or the death or coming of somebody, or any other single magical
event — whereby history is easily caught, rather than to seek an understanding
of that which is but the gradual result of the operation of many forces, both of
opposing design and actual collision, modified more or less by the falls of
chance. The personal sentiment, though natural enough at the time, has no
place in any military estimate, or place of any kind at this day. The battle
of Manassas was, like any other battle, a progression and development from the
deliberate counter-employment of the military resources in hand, affected by
accidents, as always, but of a kind very different from those referred to.
My line of battle, which twice had not only withstood the enemy's attack,
but had taken the offensive and driven him back in disorder, was becoming
momentarily stronger from the arrival, at last, of the reinforcements provided
for : and if the cnemv had remained on the field till the arrival of Ewell and
218
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
COLONEL F. S. BARTOW. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
Holmes, they would have been so strongly outflanked that many who escaped
would have been destroyed or captured.
Though my adversary's plan of battle was a good one as against a passive
defensive opponent, such as he may have deemed I must be from the respec-
tive numbers and positions of our forces, it would, in my judgment, have
been much better if, with more dash, the flank attack had been made by the
Stone Bridge itself and the ford immedi-
ately above it. The plan adopted, how-
ever, favored above all things the easy
execution of the offensive operations I
had designed and ordered against his left
flank and rear at Centreville. His turning
column — 18,000 strong, and presumably
his best troops — was thrown off by a long
ellipse through a narrow forest road to
Sudley Ford, from which it moved down
upon my left flank, and was thus dislo-
cated from his main body. This severed
movement of his forces not only left his
exposed left and rear at Centreville weak
against the simultaneous offensive of my
heaviest forces upon it, which I had or-
dered, but the movement of his returning
column would have been disconcerted and paralyzed by the early sound
of this heavy conflict in its rear, and it could not even have made its way
back so as to be available for manoeuvre before the Centreville fraction had
been thrown back upon it in disorder. A new army is very liable to panic,
and, in view of the actual result of the battle, the conclusion can hardly be
resisted that the panic which fell on the Federal army would thus have
seized it early in the day, and with my forces in such a position as wholly to
cut off its retreat upon Washington. But the commander of the front line on
my right, who had been ordered to hold himself in readiness to initiate the
offensive at a moment's notice, did not make the move expected of him
because through accident he failed to receive his own immediate order to
advance. | The Federal commander's flanking movement, being thus uninter-
rupted by such a counter-movement as I had projected, was further assisted
through the rawness and inadequacy of our staff organization through which
I was left unacquainted with the actual state of affairs on my left. The
Federal attack, already thus greatly favored, and encouraged, moreover, by
the rout of General Bee's advanced line, failed for two reasons : their forces
were not handled with concert of masses (a fault often made later on both
sides), and the individual action of the Confederate troops was superior, and
for a very palpable reason. That one army was fighting for union and the
other for disunion is a political expression ; the actual fact on the battle-field, in
the face of cannon and musket, was that the Federal troops came as invaders,
4. General E. S. Ewell. See statement of Major Campbell Brown, pag< ! ditors.
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 219
and the Southern troops stood as defenders of their homes, and further than
this we need not go. The armies were vastly greater than had ever before
fought on this continent, and were the largest volunteer armies ever assem-
bled since the era of regular armies. The personal material on both sides
was of exceptionally good character, and collectively superior to that of any
subsequent period of the war. \ The Confederate army was filled with
generous youths who had answered the first call to arms. For certain
kinds of field duty they were not as yet adapted, many of them having at
first come with their baggage and servants ; these they had to dispense with,
but, not to offend their susceptibilities, I then exacted the least work from
them, apart from military drills, even to the prejudice of important field-
works, when I could not get sufficient negro labor ; they " had come to fight,
and not to handle the pick and shovel," and their fighting redeemed well their
shortcomings as intrenchers. Before I left that gallant army, however, it had
learned how readily the humbler could aid the nobler duty.
As to immediate results and trophies, we captured a great many stands of
arms, batteries, equipments, standards, and flags, one of which was sent to
me, through General Longstreet, as a personal compliment by the Texan
" crack shot," Colonel B. F. Terry, who lowered it from its mast at Fairfax
Court House, by cutting the halyards by means of his unerring rifle, as our
troops next morning reoccupied that place. We captured also many pris-
oners, including a number of surgeons, whom (the first time in war) we
treated not as prisoners, but as guests. Calling attention to their brave
devotion to their wounded, I recommended to the War Department that
they be sent home without exchange, together with some other prisoners,
who had shown personal kindness to Colonel Jones, of the 4th Alabama,
who had been mortally wounded early in the day.
SUBSEQUENT RELATIONS OF ME. DAVIS AND THE WRITER.
The military result of the victory was far short of what it should have
been. It established as an accomplished fact, on the indispensable basis of
military success, the Government of the Confederate States, which before
was but a political assertion ; but it should have reached much further. The
immediate pursuit, but for the false alarm which checked it, would have con-
tinued as far as the Potomac, but must have stopped there with no greater
result than the capture of more prisoners and material. The true immediate
fruits of the victory should have been the dispersion of all the Federal forces
south of Baltimore and east of the Alleghanies, the liberation of the State of
Maryland, and the capture of Washington, which could have been made only
by the Upper Potomac. And from the high source of this achievement other
decisive results would have continued to flow. From my experience in the
j> This battle was noteworthy for the number ton, Fitzhugh Lee, Thomas Jordan, R. E. Rodes,
of participants whose names are now prominently E. P. Alexander, and others. On the Federal side
associated with the war. On the Confederate side, were Generals McDowell, W. T. Sherman, Burn-
besides Generals Johnston and Beauregard, were side, Hunter, Heintzelman, Howard, Franklin,
Generals Stonewall Jackson, Longstreet, Ewell, Slocum, Keyes, Hunt, Barry, Fry, Sykes, Barnard,
Early, J. E. B. Stuart, Kirby Smith, Wade Hamp- Wadsworth, and others. — Editors.
220
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
Mexican war I had great confidence in intelligent volunteer troops, if rightly
handled; and with such an active and victorious war-engine as the Con-
federate Army of the Potomac could have immediately been made, — reen-
forced, as time went, by numbers and discipline, — the Federal military
power in the East could never have reached the head it took when McClellan
was allowed to organize and discipline at leisure the powerful army that,
in the end, wore out
the South. In war
one success makes
another easier, and
its right use is as
the step to another,
until final achieve-
ment. This was the
use besought by me
in the plan of cam-
paign I have men-
tioned as presented
to Mr. Davis on the
14th of July, a few
days before the bat-
tle, but rejected by
him as impractica-
ble, and as rather of-
fering opportunity
to the enemy to crush us. To supply the deficiency of transportation (our
vehicles being few in number, and many so poor as to break down in ordinary
camp service), I myself had assigned to special duty Colonel (since Governor)
James L. Kemper, of Virginia, who quickly obtained for me some two hundred
good wagons, to which number I had limited him so as not to arouse again
the jealousy of the President's staff . If my plan of operations for the capture
of Washington had been adopted, I should have considered myself thereby
authorized and free to obtain, as I readily could have done, the transportation
necessary. As it was — though the difficult part of this " impracticable " plan
of operations had been proven feasible, that is, the concentration of the Shen-
andoah forces with mine (wrung later than the eleventh hour through the
alarm over the march upon Richmond, and discountenanced again nervously
at the twelfth hour by another alarm as to how " the enemy may vary his
plans" in consequence), followed by the decisive defeat of the main Federal
forces — nevertheless the army remained rooted in the spot, although we
had more than fifteen thousand troops who had been not at all or but little
in the battle and were perfectly organized, while the remaining commands,
in the high spirits of victory, could have been reorganized at the tap of the
drum, and many with improved captured arms and equipments. I had
already urged my views with unusual persistency, and acted on them against
all but an express order to the contrary ; and as they had been deliberately
FAIRFAX COURT HODSE.
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 221
rejected in their ultimate scope by Mr. Davis as the commander-in-chief, I
did not feel authorized to urge them further than their execution had been
allowed, unless the subject were broached anew by himself. But there was
no intimation of any such change of purpose, and the army, consistently
with this inertia, was left unprovided for manoeuvre with transportation for
its ammunition ; its fortitude, moreover, as a new and volunteer army, while
spending sometimes 24 hours without food, being only less wonderful than
the commissary administration at Richmond, from which such a state of
affairs could proceed even two weeks after the battle of Manassas. Although
certain political superstitions about not consolidating the North may then
have weighed against the action I proposed, they would have been light
against a true military policy, if such had existed in the head of the Govern-
ment. Apart from an active material ally, such as the colonies had afield
and on sea in the War of Independence with Great Britain, a country in fatal
war must depend on the vigor of its warfare ; the more inferior the country,
the bolder and more enterprising the use of its resources, especially if its
frontiers are convenient to the enemy. I was convinced that our success lay
in a short, quick war of decisive blows, before the Federals, with their vast
resources, could build up a great military power ; to which end a concerted
use of our forces, immediate and sustained, was necessary, so that, weaker
though we were at all separate points, we might nevertheless strike with
superior strength at some chosen decisive point, and after victory there
reach for victory now made easier elsewhere, and thus sum up success.
Instead of this, which in war we call concentration, our actual policy was
diffusion, an inferior Confederate force at each separate point defensively
confronting a superior Federal force ; our power daily shrinking, that of the
enemy increasing ; the avowed Federal policy being that of " attrition," their
bigger masses grinding our smaller, one by one, to naught. Out of this
state we never emerged, when the direction of the Government was, as almost
always, necessary, excepting when "Richmond" was immediately in danger.
Thus, in the fall of 1861, about three months after the battle of Manassas, —
after throwing my whole force forward to Fairfax Court House, with out-
posts flaunting our flags on the hills in sight of Washington, in order to chafe
the Federals to another battle, but without success, — I proposed that the
army should be raised to an effective of 60,000 men, by drawing 20,000 for the
immediate enterprise from several points along the seaboard, not even at that
time threatened, and from our advanced position be swiftly thrown across
the Potomac at a point which I had had carefully surveyed for that purpose,
and moved upon the rear of Washington, thus forcing McClellan to a decisive
engagement before his organization (new enlistments) was completed, and
while our own army had the advantage of discipline and prestige — seasoned
soldiers, whose term, however, would expire in the early part of the coming
summer. This plan, approved by General Gustavus W. Smith (then imme-
diately commanding General Johnston's own forces) as well as by General
Johnston, was submitted to Mr. Davis in a conference at my headquarters,
but rejected because he would not venture to strip those points of the troops
222 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
we required. Even if those points had been captured, though none were then
even threatened, they must have reverted as a direct consequence to so deci-
sive a success. I was willing, then, should it have come to that, to exchange
even Richmond temporarily for Washington. Yet it was precisely from simi-
lar combinations and elements that the army was made up, to enable it the
next spring, under General Lee, to encounter McClellan at the very door of
Richmond. If that which was accepted as a last defensive resort against an
overwhelming aggressive army had been used in an enterprising offensive
against that same army while yet in the raw, the same venture had been
made at less general risk, less cost of valuable lives, and with greater
certain results. The Federal army would have had no chance meanwhile
to become tempered to that magnificent military machine which, through
all its defeats and losses, remained sound, and was stronger, with its
readily assimilating new strength, at the end of the war than ever before ;
the pressure would have been lifted from Kentucky and Missouri, and
we should have maintained what is called an active defensive warfare,
that is, should have taken and kept the offensive against the enemy,
enforcing peace.
No people ever warred for independence with more relative advantages
than the Confederates ; and if, as a military question, they must have failed,
then no country must aim at freedom by means of war. We were one in
sentiment as in territory, starting out, not with a struggling administration
of doubtful authority, but with our ancient State governments and a fully
organized central government. As a military question, it was in no sense a
civil war, but a war between two countries — for conquest on one side, for
self-preservation on the other. The South, with its great material resources,
its defensive means of mountains, rivers, railroads, and telegraph, with the
immense advantage of the interior lines of war, would be open to discredit
as a people if its failure could not be explained otherwise than by mere
material contrast. The great Frederick, at the head of a little people, not
only beat back a combination of several great military powers, but conquered
and kept territory; and Napoleon held combined Europe at the feet of
France till his blind ambition overleaped itself. It may be said that the
South had no Fredericks or Napoleons ; but it had at least as good com-
manders as its adversary. Nor was it the fault of our soldiers or people.
Our soldiers were as brave and intelligent as ever bore arms ; and, if only
for reasons already mentioned, they did not lack in determination. Our
people bore a devotion to the cause never surpassed, and which no war-mak-
ing monarch ever had for his support; they gave their all — even the last
striplings under the family roofs filling the ranks voided by the fall of their
fathers and brothers. But the narrow military view of the head of the Grovern-
ment, which illustrated itself at the outset by ordering from Europe, not 100,000
or 1,000,000, but 10,000 stands of arms, as an increase upon 8000, its first
estimate, was equally narrow and timid in its employment of our armies.
The moral and material forces actually engaged in the war made our success
amoral certainty, but for the timid policy which — ignoring strategy as a
science and boldness of enterprise as its ally — could never be brought to
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 223
view the whole theater of war as one subject, of which all points were but
integral parts, or to hazard for the time points relatively unimportant for the
purpose of gathering for an overwhelming and rapid stroke at some decisive
point ; and which, again, with characteristic mis-elation, would push a vic-
torious force directly forward into unsupported and disastrous operations,
instead of using its victory to spare from it strength sufficient to secure an
equally important success in another quarter. The great principles of war
are truths, and the same to-day as in the time of Csesar or Napoleon, notwith-
standing the ideas of some thoughtless persons — their applications being but
intensified by the scientific discoveries affecting transportation and commu-
nication of intelligence. These principles are few and simple, however
various their deductions and application. Skill in strategy consists in seeing
through the intricacies of the whole situation, and bringing into proper com-
bination forces and influences, though seemingly unrelated, so as to apply
these principles, and with boldness of decision and execution appearing with
the utmost force, and, if possible, superior odds, before the enemy at some
strategic, that is, decisive point. And although a sound military plan
may not be always so readily conceived, yet any plan that offers decisive
results, if it agree with the principles of war, is as plain and intelligible as
these principles themselves, and no more to be rejected than they. There
still remains, of course, the hazard of accident in execution, and the appre-
hension of the enemy's movements upsetting your own ; but hazard may also
favor as well as disfavor, and will not unbefriend the enterprising any more
than the timid. It was this fear of possible consequences that kept our forces
scattered in inferior relative strength at all points of the compass, each hold-
ing its bit of ground till by slow local process our territory was taken and
our separate forces destroyed, or, if captured, retained by the enemy without
exchange in their process of attrition. To stop the slow consumption of this
passive mode of warfare I tried my part, and, at certain critical junctures,
proposed to the Government active plans of operation looking to such results
as I have described, — sometimes, it is true, in relation to the employment of
forces not under my control, as I was the soldier of a cause and people, not of
a monarch nor even of a government. Two occasions there were when cer-
tain of the most noted Federal operations, from their isolated or opportune
character, might, with energy and intelligent venture on the Confederate
side, have been turned into fatal disaster ; among them Grant's movement in
front of Vicksburg, and his change of base from the north to the south of the
James River, where I was in command, in his last campaign against Rich-
mond. I urged particularly that our warfare was sure of final defeat unless
we attempted decisive strokes that might be followed up to the end, and that,
even if earlier defeat might chance from the risk involved in the execution of
the necessary combinations, we ought to take that risk and thereby either
win or end an otherwise useless struggle. But, in addition to the radical
divergence of military ideas, — the passive defensive of an intellect timid of
risk and not at home in war, and the active defensive reaching for success
through enterprise and boldness, according to the lessons taught us in the
campaigns of the great masters, — there was a personal feeling that now gave
224
THE FIUST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
RUINS OF THE STONE BRIDGE, LOOKING ALONG THE WARRENTON TURNPIKE TOWARD THE BATTLE-FIELD.
This view is from a photograph taken in March, 18G2, the
region having been left open to the Union forces by the
withdrawal of the Confederates. The Confederate bat-
tery which in the first battle of Bull Run commanded
the bridge was placed on the left in the felled timber,
which formed an abatis across the road. The battle
■was opened from beyond the small house, Van Pelt's,
on the right, by the Rhode Island troops.— Editors.
cold hearing, or none, to any recommendations of mine. Mr. Davis's friend-
ship, warm at the early period of the war, was changed, some time after the
battle of Manassas, to a corresponding hostility from several personal causes,
direct and indirect, of which I need mention but one. My report of Manassas
having contained, as part of its history, a statement of the submission of
the full plan of campaign for concentrating our forces, crushing successively
McDowell and Patterson and capturing Washington, Mr. Davis strangely
took offense thereat; and, now that events had demonstrated the practica-
bility of that plan, he sought to get rid of his self -accused responsibility for
rejecting it, by denying that any such had been submitted — an issue, for
that matter, easily settled by my production of the contemporaneous report
of Colonel James Chesnut, the bearer of the mission, who, moreover, at the
time of this controversy was on Mr. Davis's own staff, where he remained.
Mr. Davis made an endeavor to suppress the publication of my report of the
battle of Manassas. The matter came up in a secret debate in the Confeder-
ate Congress, where a host of friends were ready to sustain me ; but I sent
a telegram disclaiming any desire for its publication, and advising that the
safety of the country should be our solicitude, and not personal ends.
Thenceforth Mr. Davis's hostility was watchful and adroit, neglecting no
opportunity, great or small ; and though, from motives all its opposite, it was
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 223
not exposed during the war by any murmurs of mine, it bruited sometimes in
certain quarters of its own f orce. Thus, when in January, 1862, the Western .
representatives 'expressed a desire that I should separate myself for a time
from my Virginia forces and go to the defense of the Mississippi Valley from
the impending offensive of Halleck and Grant, it was furthered by the Execu-
tive with inducements which I trusted, — in disregard of Senator Toombs's
sagacious warning, that under this furtherance lurked a purpose to effect my
downfall, urged in one of his communications through his son-in-law, Mr.
Alexander, in words as impressive as they proved prophetic : " Urge General
Beauregard to decline all proposals and solicitations. The Blade of Joab.
Verhum SapientiP After going through the campaign of Shiloh and Corinth,
not only with those inducements unfulfilled, but with vital drawbacks from
the Government, including the refusal of necessary rank to competent suboiv
dinates to assist in organizing my hastily collected and mostly raw troops, I
was forced, the following June, in deferred obedience to the positive order of
my physicians, to withdraw from my immediate camp to another point in my
department for recovery from illness, leaving under the care of my lieuten-
ant, General Bragg, my army, then unmenaced and under reorganization with
a view to an immediate offensive I had purposed. In anticipation and exclu-
sion of the receipt of full dispatches following my telegram, the latter was
tortuously misread, in a manner not creditable to a school-boy and repug-
nant to Mr. Davis's exact knowledge of syntax, so as to give pretext to the
shocking charge that I had abandoned my army, and a telegram was sent in
naked haste directly to General Bragg, telling him to retain the permanent
command of the army. The " Blade of Joab " had given its thrust. The repre-
sentatives in Congress from the West and South-west applied to Mr. Davis in
a body for my restoration ; and when, disregarding his sheer pretext that I had
abandoned my army, they still insisted, Mr. Davis declared that I should not
be restored if the whole world should ask it ! This machination went to such
length that it was given out in Richmond that I had softening of the brain
and had gone crazy. So carefully was this report fostered (one of its tales
being that I would sit all day stroking a pheasant \) that a friend of mine,
a member of the Confederate Congress, thought it his duty to write me a
special letter respecting the device, advising me to come directly to Rich-
mond to confound it by my presence — a proceeding which I disdained
to take. I had not only then, but from later, still more offensive prov-
ocation, imperative cause to resign, and would have done so but for
a sense of public obligation. Indeed, in my after fields of action the
same hostility was more and more active in its various embarrassments,
reckless that the strains inflicted upon me bore upon the troops and
country depending 011 me and relatively upon the cause, so that I often
\ This silly tale was borrowed from an incident to place it in a cage, as I intended sending it as a
of Shiloh. Toward the end of the first day's hat- pleasant token of the battle to the family of Judge
tie a soldier had found a pheasant cowering, ap- Milton Brown, of Jackson, Tennessee, from whom
parently paralyzed under the ceaseless din, and I had received as their guest, while occupying that
brought it to my headquarters as a present to place, the kindest attentions ; but in the second
me. It was a beautiful bird, and I gave directions day's conflict the poor waif was lost. — G. T. B.
vol. 1. 15
226 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
dreaded failure more from my own Government behind me than from the
enemy in my front ; and, when success came in spite of this, it was acknowl-
edged only by some censorious official " inquiry " contrasting with the repeated
thanks of the Congress. I was, however, not the only one of the highest
military rank with whom Mr. Davis's relations were habitually unwholesome.
It is an extraordinary fact that during the four years of war Mr. Davis did
not call together the five generals [see page 241 ] with a view to determining
the best military policy or settling upon a decisive plan of operations involv-
ing the whole theater of war, though there was often ample opportunity for it.
We needed for President either a military man of a high order, or a politician of
the first class without military pretensions, such as Howell Cobb. The South
did not fall crushed by the mere weight of the North ; but it was nibbled
away at all sides and ends because its executive head never gathered and
wielded its great strength under the ready advantages that greatly reduced
or neutralized its adversary's naked physical superiority. It is but another
of the many proofs that timid direction may readily go with physical cour-
age, and that the passive defensive policy may make a long agony, but can
never win a war.
Postscript. — Since the publication of the foregoing pages in " The Century "
for November, 1884, General J. E. Johnston, in the course of a paper also con-
tributed to " The Century" [see page 240], took occasion, for the first time, to
set up with positiveness and circumstantiality the claim to having exercised
a controlling connection with the tactics of all the phases of the battle of the 21st
of July, 1861. Respecting such a pretension I shall be content for the present
to recall that, while entirely at variance with the part I have ascribed to him
in relation to that field, it is logically untenable, at this day, when confronted
with the records of the period. In my own official report of the battle closely
contemporaneous with the events narrated — a report that was placed in his
hands for perusal before transmission — it is distinctly related that for certain
reasons, chiefly military, General Johnston had left in my hands for the
impending conflict the command of the Confederate forces. The precise cir-
cumstances of my direct conduct of and responsibility for the battle are
stated in such terms that, had I not been in actual direction of the day's
operations on the part of the Confederates, General Johnston must have made
the issue squarely then and there in his own official report. And all the more
incumbent upon him was the making of such an issue, it seems to me, then
or never, in view of the fact that the Confederate Secretary of War on the
24th of July, 1861, wrote me in these words :
" My Dear General : Accept my congratulations for the glorious and most brilliant victory
achieved by you. The country will bless and honor you for it. Believe me, dear General,
" Truly your friend, L. P. Walker."
Further, General Lee thus addressed me :
" My Dear General : I cannot express the joy I feel at the brilliant victory of the 21st. The
skill, courage, and endurance displayed by yourself excite my highest admiration. You and
your troops have the gratitude of the whole country, and I offer to all my heartfelt congratula-
tions at their success. . . . Very truly yours, R. E. Lee."
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
227
Of the exact purport of these two letters General Johnston could not have
been ignorant when he wrote his report of the battle. Nor could he have
been unaware that the leading Southern newspapers had in effect attributed
to me the chief direction of that battle on the Confederate side. Therefore,
if it were the gross historical error which, twenty odd years after the affair,
General Johnston characterizes it to be, and one that imputed to him the
shirking of a duty which he could not have left unassumed without personal
baseness, certainly that was the time for him by a few explicit words in his
official report to dispose of so affronting an error. In that report, however,
no such exigent, peremptory statement of his relation to the battle is to be
found. On the other hand, upon page 57 of his "Narrative" published in
1874 (D. Appleton & Co.), may be found, I fear, the clew to the motive of
his actual waiver of command in this curious paragraph :
" If the tactics of the Federals had been equal to their strategy, we should have been beaten.
If, instead of being brought into action in detail, their troops had been formed in two lines,
with a proper reserve, and had assailed Bee and Jackson in that order, the two Southern
brigades must have been swept from the field iu a few minutes, or enveloped. General
McDowell would have made such a formation, probably, had he not greatly underestimated the
strength of his enemy."
Coupled with the disquieting, ever-apprehensive tenor of his whole corre-
spondence with the Confederate War Department, from the day he assumed
command in the Valley of Virginia in May, 1861, down to the close of the
struggle in 1865, the fair inference from such language as that just cited from
his " Narrative " is that General Johnston came to Manassas beset with the
idea that our united forces would not be able to cope with the Federal army,
and that we should be beaten — a catastrophe in which he was not solicitous
to figure on the pages of history as the leading and responsible actor. Origi-
nally and until 1875, 1 had regarded it as a generous though natural act on the
part of General Johnston, in such a juncture, to leave me in command and
responsible for what might occur. The history of military operations abounds
in instances of notable soldiers who have found it proper to waive chief com-
mand under similar conditions.
CONFEDERATE QUAKER GUNS. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
C<iii federate fortifications, near Centreville, after their evacuation in the spring of 1862. The muzzle of the log was
painted black and the hreech was covered with brush to conceal its character from observation by balloon.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN AFTER THE WAR.
228
''~.'.' htif&f'- *7-''"V"', PUT;;-
_ - -- - ;g§^^ff^;>-- ~
THE NEW HENRY HOUSE AND THE MONUMENT OF THE FIRST BATTLE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.
INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN,
BY JOHN D. IMBODEN, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, C. S. A.
FROM the day of his arrival at Winchester [see page 124], General John-
ston was ceaseless in his labors to improve the efficiency of his little
army, in which he was greatly assisted by several staff-officers who afterward
rose to high distinction. The two most active of these subordinates were
Majors W. H. C. Whiting and E. Kirby Smith, the former of whom as a
major-general fell mortally wounded at the capture of Fort Fisher in North
Carolina, and the latter as a lieutenant-general commanded the Trans-
Mississippi army when the final collapse came. During our withdrawal from
Harper's Ferry, on June 16th, we were denectelT from our direct line of
march, and held in line of battle a day at Bunker Hill, a few miles north of
Winchester, to receive an expected assault from General Patterson, who had
crossed the Potomac, but who went back without attacking us. Again on
July 2d we were marched to Darksville, about midway to Martinsburg, to
meet Patterson, where we lay in line of battle till the 5th, when General
Patterson, after a slight " brush " with Jackson, again recrossed the Potomac.
We returned to Winchester, and to our arduous drilling.
After midnight of July 17th, General Bee, my brigade commander, sent for
me to go with him to headquarters, whither he had been summoned. Several
brigade commanders were assembled in a room with General Johnston, and a
conference of one or two hours was held. When General Bee joined me on the
porch to return to our quarters, I saw he was excited, and I asked him, " What
is up ? " He took my arm, and, as we walked away, told me we would march
next day to the support of General Beauregard. He repeated a telegram
General Johnston had received from Adjutant-General Cooper about mid-
night. This was the famous dispatch that has led to so much controversy
between Mr. Davis and General Johnston, as to whether it was a peremptory
order, or simply permission to Johnston to go to Beauregard's support. I
quote it, and leave the reader to his own construction :
" General Beauregard is attacked ; to strike the enemy a decisive blow, a junction of all your
effective-force' will be needed. If practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and
b gage to Culpeper Court House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In all the arrange-
ments exercise your discretion."
229
230 INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
On the next day, the 18th of July, we left Winchester for Manassas. It
was late in the afternoon before my battery took up the line of march — as I
now recollect, with the rear-guard, as had been the case when we left Harper's
Ferry a month before. It was thought probable that Patterson, who was
south of the Potomac, and only a few miles distant, would follow us. But J.
E. B. Stuart and Ashby with the cavalry so completely masked our movement
that it was not suspected by Patterson until July 20th, the day before the
Bull Run fight, and then it was too late for him to interfere.
On the second day of the march an order reached me at Rectortown,
Virginia, through Brigadier-General Barnard E. Bee, to collect the four field-
batteries of Johnston's army into one column, and, as senior artillery captain,
to march them by country roads that were unobstructed by infantry or trains
as rapidly as possible to Manassas Junction, and to report my arrival, at any
hour, day or night, to General Bee, who was going forward by rail with his
brigade. Having assembled the batteries in the night, I began the march at
dawn of Saturday, July 20th, the day before the battle. About 8 in the
morning we reached a village in Fauquier county — Salem, I think it was.
The whole population turned out to greet us. Men, women, and children
brought us baskets, trays, and plates loaded with their own family breakfasts.
With the improvidence of raw campaigners, we had finished the night before
our three days' cooked rations ; so I ordered a halt for thirty minutes to enjoy
the feast. The Staunton Artillery J (my own battery) was at the head of the
column, and, being largely composed of young men of high social standing,
was especially honored by the ladies of the village, conspicuous among whom
were the young daughters of Colonel John A. Washington, late of Mount Ver-
non. I noticed that some of the young fellows of the battery, lingering round
the baskets borne by these young ladies, who bade them die or conquer in the
fight, seemed very miserable during the remainder of the march. No doubt
many of them, during the battle, felt that it would be better to die on the
field than retreat and live to meet those enthusiastic girls again. I make
special note of that breakfast because it was the last food any of us tasted till
the first Bull Run had been fought and won, 36 hours later.
It was 1 o'clock that night when the head of my little column reached
General Bee's headquarters, about one mile north-east of Manassas Junction.
He was established in the log-cabin to which afterward he was brought when
he was mortally wounded, and to which I shall again allude. General Bee
ordered us to unharness the horses and bivouac in the fence corners, adding,
" You will need all the rest you can get, for a great battle will begin in the
morning."
A little after daybreak we were aroused by the sharp, ringing report of a
great Parrott gun across Bull Run, two miles away, and the whizzing of a
30-pounder elongated shell over the tree- tops, 400 or 500 yards to our left.
Instantly every man was on his feet, and in five minutes the horses were
\ It numbered 140 officers and men. Six were col- chanics, whose mechanical skill was of much ser-
lege graduates, and several had left college to enter vice. I had provided them with red flannel shirts at
the army. The majority were young men of leisure Harper's Ferry, because our uniforms were too fine
or mercantile clerks. About forty were young me- for camp life and for service in the field. — J. D. I.
INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
231
harnessed and hitched to the gnns and caissons. General Bee beckoned to me
to come np to the porch, where he was standing in his shirt-sleeves, having
also been aroused by the shot. He rapidly informed me of the disposition of
our troops of Johnston's army so far as they had arrived at Manassas. His
own brigade had been brought forward by rail the evening before. Above
all, he was dissatisfied at the prospect of not participating prominently in the
battle, saying that he had been ordered to the Stone Bridge, three or four
miles away on our extreme left, to cover the left flank of the army from any
movement that might be made against it. And as he had been directed to take
a battery with him, he had selected mine, and wished me to move at once. He
gave me a guide, and said he would follow immediately with his infantry.
When I told him we had been 24 hours without food for men or horses,
he said he would order supplies to follow, remarking, " You will have plenty
of time to cook and eat, to the music of a battle in which we shall probably
take little or no part."
Away we went, retracing our steps to the Junction, and by a westerly detour
striking into the Sudley road, at a point half-way between the Junction and
the scene of the battle. After an hour or so we ascended the hill to the Lewis
house, or " Portici." Here a courier at full speed met us with news that the
whole Federal army seemed to be marching north-westerly on the other side
of Bull Run. Halting my men, I rode to the top of the hill, and had a full
view of a long column of glittering bayonets moving up on the north side of
the creek. Glancing down the valley, I saw Bee's brigade advancing, and
galloped to meet him and report what I had seen. He divined the plans of
.v-v.
ill
■p[ if'
-
m
j yfig!
m*
ft v-
<u
f-i
_ .
c - ■ .0-
CONFEDERATE FORTIFICATIONS ABOUT MANASSAS JUNCTION.
This view is from a photograph taken in March, 1862. It represents the works substantially as they
were at the time of the battle.
*
2^2
INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
yr&
mm
fly THE STONE HOUSE
ON THE WARRENTON TURNPIKE.
PROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN MARCH, 1862.
The stream in the foreground is Young's Branch.
The Sndley road crosses a little to the left of
the picture. See map, page 204.
McDowell, and, asking me to accompany him, rode rapidly past the Lewis
house, across the hollow beyond it, and up the next hill through the pines,
emerging on the summit immediately east of the Henry house. As the beau-
tiful open landscape in front burst upon his vision, he exclaimed with enthu-
siasm : " Here is the battle-field, and we are in for it ! Bring up your guns as
quickly as possible, and I'll look round for a good position."
In less than twenty minutes I and my battery had passed the Lewis house,
when I discovered Bee coming out of the pines. He stopped, and, placing his
cap on his sword-point, waved it almost frantically as a signal to hurry for-
ward. We went at a gallop, and were guided to a depression in the ground
about one hundred yards to the north-east of the Henry house, where we
unlimbered. With his keen military eye, General Bee had chosen the best
possible position for a battery on all that field. We were almost under cover
by reason of a slight swell in the ground immediately in our front, and not
fifty feet away. Our shot passed not six inches above the surface of the
ground on this " swell," and the recoil ran the guns back to still lower ground,
where as we loaded only the heads of my men were visible to the enemy.
We went into position none too soon ; for, by the time we had unlimbered,
Captain Rieketts, appearing on the crest of the opposite hill, came beautifully
and gallantly into battery at a gallop, a short distance from the Matthews
INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
213
Scale of 1000 feet
PRINCIPAL RPA22 •
/,-A EDGAR MATTHEWS
'5^
\ RICKETTS'
\ BATTERY
\f
GRIFFI.NS ^
BATTERY ^
JOGANS -,
;.iXHINNS
Z.En/S 'Mouse
house on our side of the Sudley road, aud about fifteen hundred yards to our
front. I wanted to open on him while he was milhnbering, but General Bee
objected till we had received a fire, and had thus ascertained the character
and caliber of the enemy's guns. Mine, four in number, were all brass smooth-
bore 6-pounders. The first round or two from the enemy went high over
us. Seeing this, Greneral
Bee directed us to fire
low and ricochet our
shot and shrapnel on
the hard, smooth, open
field that sloped toward
the Warrenton turnpike
in the valley between
us. We did this, and the
effect was very destruc-
tive to the enemy.
The rapid massing of
Federal troops in our
front soon led to very
heavy fighting. My lit-
tle battery was under a
pitiless fire for a long
time. Two guns from
an Alexandria battery —
Latham's, I think —
took part in the conflict
on the north side of
Young's Branch to our
right and across the
turnpike, so long as Bee, Bartow, Evans, and Wheat were on that side, we
firing over their heads ; and about 11 o'clock two brass 12-pounder Napoleons
from the New Orleans Washington Artillery unlimbered on our right, retiring,
however, after a few rounds.
We were hardly more than fairly engaged with Ricketts when Griffin's splen-
did battery came to his aid, and took position full five hundred yards nearer
to us, in a field on the left of the Sudley road. Ricketts had 6 Parrott guns, and
Griffin had as many more, and, I think, 2 12-pounder howitzers besides.
These last hurt us more than all the rifles of both batteries, since the shot
and shell of the rifles, striking the ground at any angle over 15 or 20
degrees, almost without exception bored their way in several feet and did no
harm. It is no exaggeration to say that hundreds of shells from these fine
rifle-guns exploded in front of and around my battery on that day, but so
deep in the ground that the fragments never came out. After the action the
ground looked as though it had been rooted up by hogs. %
% I venture the opinion, after a good deal of or, at 1500 to 1800 yards, a similar battery of 12-
observation during the war, that in open ground, pounder Napoleons, well handled, will in one hour
at 1000 yards, a G-pounder battery of smooth guns, discomfit double the number of the best rifles ever
PLAN OF THE BULL KUN BATTLE-FIELD.
Imboden'e second position is on the line of the Confederate front as formed
by Jackson. Finally the Confederate line reached from behind the
Robinson house to the left along the edse of the pines, and (as reen-
forcements came up) made a concave arc to a point behind the Chinn
house. General Iinboden counted twenty-six Confederate guns
in the semicircle east of the Sudley road, when Griffin and
Ricketts had taken position near the Henry house.— Editors.
234 INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
For at least a half -hour after our forces were driven across Young's Branch
no Confederate soldier was visible from our position near the Henry house.
The Staunton Artillery, so far as we could see, was " alone in its glory." Gen-
eral Bee's order had been, " Stay here till you are ordered away." To rny
surprise, no orders had come, though, as I afterward learned, orders to with-
draw had been sent three-quarters of an hour before through Major Howard,
of Bee's staff, who had fallen, desperately wounded, on the way.
Infantry was now massing. near the Stone house on the turnpike, not five
hundred yards away, to charge and capture us. On making this discovery and
learning from the sergeants of pieces that our ammunition was almost entirely
exhausted, there remained but one way to save our guns, and that was to run
them off the field. More than half of our horses had been killed, only one
or two being left in several of my six-horse teams. Those that we had were
quickly divided among the guns and caissons, and we limbered up and fled.
Then it was that the Henry house was riddled, and the old lady, Mrs. Henry,
was mortally wounded;| for our line of retreat was so chosen that for 200 or
300 yards the house would conceal us from Griffin's battery, and, in a
measure, shelter us from the dreaded fire of the infantry when they should
reach the crest we had just abandoned. Several of Griffin's shot passed
through the house, scattering shingles, boards, and splinters all around us.
A rifle-shot from Ricketts broke the axle of one of our guns and dropped
the gun in the field, but we saved the limber. The charging infantry
gained the crest in front of the Henry house in time to give us one volley,
but with no serious damage.
We crossed the summit at the edge of the pines, midway behind the Henry
and Robinson houses, and there met " Stonewall " Jackson at the head of his
brigade, marching by the flank at a double-quick. Johnston and Beauregard
had arrived upon the field, and were hurrying troops into position, but we
had not yet seen them.
When I met Jackson I felt very angry at what I then regarded as bad treat-
ment from General Bee, in leaving us so long exposed to capture, and I
expressed myself with some profanity, which I could see was displeasing to
Jackson. He remarked, " I'll support your battery. Unlimber right here."
We did so, when a perfect lull in the conflict ensued for 20 or 30 minutes —
at least in that part of the field.
It was at this time that McDowell committed, as I think, the fatal blunder
of the day, by ordering both Ricketts's and Griffin's batteries to cease firing and
move across the turnpike to the top of the Henry Hill, and take position on the
west side of the house. The short time required to effect the change enabled
Beauregard to arrange his new line of battle on the highest crest of the hill,
put in the field. A smooth-bore gun never buries the battle opened near the Matthews house, Mrs.
its projectiles in the ground, as the rifle does inva- Henry was carried into a ravine below the Sudley
riably when fired against sloping ground. Of course, road. A little later the house seemed to be the
this advantage of the smooth-bore gun is limited safest place, and she was carried back to her bed.
to its shorter range, and to an open field fight, de- For a time the house was in the line of the artillery
fensive works not being considered. — J. D. I. fire from both sides. Mrs. Henry received five
4> Mrs. Judith Henry, bedridden from old age, wounds from fragments of shells, and died two
was living in the house with her children. When hours after the battle. — Editors.
INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
235
m
f$fr south-east of the Henry and Robinson
houses, in the edge of the pines. If
one of the Federal batteries had been
left north of Young's Branch, it could
have so swept the hill-top where we
re-formed, that it would have greatly
delayed, if not wholly have prevented,
us from occupying the position. And if
we had been forced back to the next
hill, on which stands the Lewis house,
Sherman, who had crossed Bull Run
not far above the Stone Bridge at a
farm ford, would have had a fair
swing at our right flank, to say noth-
ing of the effect of the artillery playing
upon us from beyond Bull Run.
When my retiring battery met Jack-
son, and he assumed command of us,
I reported that I had remaining only
three rounds of ammunition for a sin-
gle gun, and suggested that the cais-
sons be sent to the rear for a supply.
He said, "No, not now — wait till other
guns get here, and then you can with-
draw your battery, as it has been so torn to pieces, and let your men rest."
During the lull in front, my men lay about, exhausted from want of water
and food, and black with powder, smoke, and dust. Lieutenant Harman and I
had amused ourselves training one of the guns on a heavy column of the enemy,
who were advancing toward us, in the direction of the Chinn house, but were
still 1200 to 1500 yards away. While we were thus engaged, General Jackson
rode up and said that three or four batteries were approaching rapidly, and
that we might soon retire. I asked permission to tire the three rounds of
shrapnel left to us, and he said, " Gro ahead." I picked up a charge (the fuse
was cut and ready) and rammed it home myself, remarking to Harman, " Tom,
put in the primer and pull her off." I forgot to step back far enough from the
muzzle, and, as I wanted to see the shell strike, I squatted to be under the
smoke, and gave the word " Fire." Heavens ! what a report. Finding myself
full twenty feet away, I thought the gun had burst. But it was only the
pent-up gas, that, escaping sideways as the shot cleared the muzzle, had struck
my side and head with great violence. I recovered in time to see the shell
explode in the enemy's ranks. The blood gushed out of my left ear, and from
that day to this it has been totally deaf. The men fired the other two rounds,
and limbered up and moved away, just as the Rockbridge Artillery, under
Lieutenant Brockenbrough, came into position, followed a moment later by the
Leesburg Artillery, under Lieutenant Henry Heaton. Pendleton, supposed by
me still to be captain of the first, as Rogers was of the second, were not with
BRIG.-GEN. BARNARD E. BEE (IN THE UNIFORM OF A
CAPTAIN OF INFANTRY OF THE OLD SERVICE).
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
2j6 INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
their batteries when they iinlimbered.| But Heaton and Brockenbrough were
equal to the occasion. Heaton had been under my command with his battery
at the Point of Rocks, below Harper's Ferry, the previous May, and was a
brave and skillful young officer. Several other batteries soon came into line,
so that by the time Griffin and Ricketts were in position near the Henry
house, we had, as I now remember, 26 fresh guns ready for them.
The contest that ensued was terrific. Jackson ordered me to go from bat-
tery to battery and see that the guns were properly aimed and the fuses cut
the right length. This was the work of but a few minutes. On returning
to the left of the line of guns, I stopped to ask General Jackson's permis-
sion to rejoin my battery. The fight was just then hot enough to make him
feel well. His eyes fairly blazed. He had a way of throwing up his left
hand with the open palm toward the person he was addressing. And as he
told me to go, he made this gesture. The air was full of flying missiles, and
as he spoke he jerked down his hand, and I saw that blood was streaming
from it. I exclaimed, " General, you are wounded." He replied, as he drew
a- handkerchief from his breast-pocket, and began to bind it up, " Only a
scratch — a mere scratch," and galloped away along his line.
To save my horse, I had hitched him in a little gully some fifty yards or
more in the rear. And to reach him, I had to pass the six hundred infantry
of Hampton's Legion, who were lying down in supporting distance of our
artillery, then all in full play. While I was untying my horse, a shell exploded
in the midst of Hampton's infantry, killing several and stampeding 15 or 20
nearest the spot. I tried to rally them ; but one huge fellow, musket in hand,
and with bayonet fixed, had started on a run. I threw myself in his front
with drawn sword, and threatened to cut him down, whereupon he made a
lunge at me. I threw up my left arm to ward off the blow, and the bayonet-
point ran under the wristband of my red flannel shirt, and raked the skin
of my arm from wrist to shoulder. The blow knocked me sprawling on the
ground, and the fellow got away. I tore off the dangling shirt-sleeve, and
was bare-armed as to my left, the remainder of the fight.
I overtook my battery on the hill near the Lewis house, which was used as
a hospital. In a field in front I saw General Johnston and his staff grouped
on their horses, and under fire from numerous shells that reached that hill. I
rode up to him, reported our ammunition all gone, and requested to know
where I could find the ordnance wagons and get a fresh supply. Observing
the sorry plight of the battery and the condition of the surviving men and
horses, he directed me to remove them farther to the rear to a place of
perfect safety, and return myself to the field, where I might be of some
service.
I took the battery back perhaps a mile, where we found a welcome little
stream of water. Being greatly exhausted, I rested for perhaps an hour, and
returned to the front with Sergeant Thomas Shumate.
j) Captain, afterward General, Pendleton had the Eockbridge Artillery. Captain Rogers, I also
recently been made a colonel and chief of artillery learn, had a section somewhere lower down on
to General Johnston, which separated him from Bull Run with the troops at the fords. — J. D. I.
INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. 237
When we regained the crest of the Henry plateau, the enemy had been
swept from it, and the retreat had begun all along the line. We gazed upon
the scene for a time, and, hearing firing between the Lewis house and the
Stone Bridge, we rode back to see what it meant. Captain Lindsay Walker
had arrived from Fredericksburg with his six-Parrott-gun battery, and from
a high hill was shelling the fugitives beyond Bull Run as they were fleeing in
wild disorder to the shelter of the nearest woods. Colonel J. E. B. Stuart,
at the head of a body of yelling cavalry with drawn sabers, was sweeping,
round the base of the hill we were on, to cross the Run and fall upon
the enemy.
When Stuart disappeared in the distance, Shumate and I rode slowly back
toward the battery. Nearing the Lewis house, we saw General Johnston and
his staff coming toward us slowly, preceded a little by a gentleman 011 horse-
back, who was lifting his hat to every one he met. From the likeness I had
seen of President Jefferson Davis, I instantly recognized him and told Shumate
who it was. With the impulsiveness of his nature, Shumate dashed up to the
President, seized his hand, and huzzaed at the top of his voice. I could see
that Mr. Davis was greatly amused, and I was convulsed with laughter. When
they came within twenty steps of me, where I had halted to let the group
pass, Shumate exclaimed, to the great amusement of all who heard him : "Mr.
President, there's my captain, and I want to introduce you to him." The Presi-
dent eyed me for a moment, as if he thought I was an odd-looking captain.
I had on a battered slouch hat, a red flannel shirt with only one sleeve, cordu-
roy trousers, and heavy cavalry boots, and was begrimed with burnt powder,
dust, and the blood from my ear and arm, and must have been about as
hard-looking a specimen of a captain as was ever seen. Nevertheless, the
President grasped my hand with a cordial salutation, and after a few words
passed on.
We found our battery refreshing themselves on fat bacon and bread.
After a hasty meal, I threw myself on a bag of oats, and slept till broad
daylight next morning, notwithstanding a drenching rain which beat irpon
me during the night.
In fact, I was aroused in the morning by a messenger from ex-Governor
Alston, of South Carolina, summoning me to the side of my gallant com-
mander, Brigadier-General Bee, who had been mortally wounded near the
Henry house, where Bartow had been instantly killed almost at the same
moment. When I reached General Bee, who had been carried back to the
cabin where I had joined him the night before, he was unconscious ; in a few
minutes, while I was holding his hand, he died. Some one during the night
had told him that I had reflected on him for leaving our battery so long
exposed to capture; and, at his request, messengers had been for hours
hunting me in the darkness, to bring me to him, that I might learn from his
own lips that he had sent Major Howard to order me to withdraw, when he
was driven back across Young's Branch and the turnpike. I was grieved
deeply not to have seen him sooner. Possibly the failure of his order to
reach me was providential. For full three-quarters of an hour we had kept up
2}8 INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
a fire that delayed the enemy's movement across Young's Branch. But for
that, they might have gained the Henry plateau, before Jackson and Hamp-
ton came up, and before Bee and Bartow had rallied their disorganized troops.
Minutes count as hours under such circumstances, and trifles often turn the
scale in great battles.
General Jackson's wound became very serious when inflammation set in.
On hearing, three days after the fight, that he was suffering with it, I rode to
his quarters, a little farm-house near Centreville. Although it was barely
sunrise, he was out under the trees, bathing the hand with spring water. It
was much swollen and very painful, but he bore himself stoically. His wife
had arrived the night before. Of course, the battle was the only topic dis-
cussed at breakfast. I remarked, in Mrs. Jackson's hearing, " General, how
is it that you can keep so cool, and appear so utterly insensible to danger in
such a storm of shell and bullets as rained about you when your hand was
hit ? " He instantly became grave and reverential in his manner, and
answered, in a low tone of great earnestness : " Captain, my religious belief
teaches me to feel as safe in battle as in bed. God has fixed the time for
my death. I do not concern myself about that, but to be always ready,
no matter when it may overtake me." He added, after a pause, looking me
full in the face : " Captain, that is the way all men should live, and then all
would be equally brave."
I felt that this last remark was intended as a rebuke for my profanity,
when I had complained to him on the field of the apparent abandonment of
my battery to capture, and I apologized. He heard me, and simply said,
" Nothing can justify profanity." \
The battle was mainly fought by Johnston's troops from the Shenandoah.
Two-thirds of the killed and wounded were his men and officers. Beau-
regard's troops were strung out for several miles down the valley of Bull
Run, and did not get up to our aid till near the end of the day. General
Beauregard himself, who was in the thickest of the fight, came upon the field
long before any of his troops arrived, except those he had posted under
Evans to guard the Stone Bridge, and which, with Bee's troops, bore the
brunt of the first attack.
\ I never knew Jackson to let profanity pass with- of wagons, and, in the voice of a stentor, poured
out a rebuke but once. The incident was reported to out a volume of oaths that would have excited the
me by the chief actor in it, Major John A. Harman, admiration of the most scientific mule-driver. The
who was Jackson's chief quartermaster. It happened effect was electrical. The drivers were frightened
at Edwards Ferry, on the Potomac, when our army and swore as best they could, but far below the
was crossing into Maryland in the Antietam cam- major's standard. The mules caught the inspira-
paign. On the march to the river, for some in- tion from a chorus of familiar words, and all at
fraction of orders about the manner of marching once made a break for the Maryland shore, and in
his division, Major-General A. P. Hill had been five minutes the ford was cleared, Jackson wit-
ordered in arrest by Jackson. This probably had nessed and heard it all. Harman rode back to
put Jackson in a ruffled frame of mind. The day join him, expecting a lecture, and, touching his
was very hot, and the ford was completely blocked hat, said: "The ford is clear, general! There's
with a wagon train, either of Hill's or some other only one language that will make mules under-
division. On seeing the state of affairs, Jackson stand on a hot day that they must get out of the
turned to Major Harman, and ordered him to clear water." The general smiled, and said: "Thank
the ford. Harman dashed in among the wagoners, you, major," and dashed into the water at the head
kicking mules, and apparently inextricable mass of his staff, and rode across. — J. D. I.
INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. 239
The uninformed, North and South, have wondered why Johnston and Beau-
regard did not follow on to Washington. General Johnston, in his "Nar-
rative," has clearly and conclusively answered that question. It was simply
impossible. We had neither the food nor transportation at Manassas neces-
sary to a forward movement. This subject was the cause of sharp irritation
between our commanding generals at Manassas on the one hand, and Mr.
Davis and his Secretary of War, Mr. Benjamin, on the other. There was a
disposition in the quartermaster's and commissary departments at Richmond
to deny the extent of the destitution of our army immediately after the bat-
tle. To ascertain the exact facts of the case, General Johnston organized a
board of officers to investigate and report the condition of the transportation
and commissariat of the army at Manassas on the 21st of July, and their
daily condition for two weeks thereafter. That Board was composed of
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert B. Lee (a cousin of General R. E. Lee), represent-
ing the commissary department, Major (afterward Major-General) W. L.
Cabell, representing the quartermaster's department, and myself from the
line. My associates on this Board were old United States army officers of
acknowledged ability and large experience. We organized early in August,
and made an exhaustive investigation and detailed report. I have a distinct
recollection that we found that on the morning of the battle there was not at
Manassas one full day's rations for the combined armies of Johnston and
Beauregard, and that on no single day for the succeeding two weeks was
there as much as a three days' supply there. We found that there were not
wagons and teams enough at any time to have transported three days' sup-
plies for the troops if they had been put in motion away from the railroad.
We found that for weeks preceding the 21st of July General Beauregard had
been urgent and almost importunate in his demands on the quartermaster
and commissary generals at Richmond for adequate supplies. We found that
Colonel Northrop, the commissary general, had not only failed to send forward
adequate supplies for such an emergency as arose when General Johnston
brought his army from the valley, but that he had interfered with and inter-
dicted the efforts of officers of the department who were with General Beau-
regard to collect supplies from the rich and abundant region lying between
the hostile armies. After reporting the facts, we unanimously concurred in
the opinion that they proved the impossibility of a successful and rapid
pursuit of the defeated enemy to Washington. This report, elaborately
written out and signed, was forwarded to Richmond, and in a few days was
returned by Mr. Judah P. Benjamin, Secretary of War, with an indorsement
to the effect that the Board had transcended its powers by expressing an
opinion as to what the facts did or did not prove, and sharply ordering us to
strike out all that part of the report, and send only the facts ascertained by
us. We met and complied with this order, though indignant at the repri-
mand, and returned our amended report. This was the last I ever heard of
it. It never saw daylight. Who suppressed it I do not know.-&
■& See statement from Colonel Northrop, page 261 . — Editors.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN,
BY JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, GENERAL, C. 8. A.
QUAKER GUN FOUND IN THE CONFEDERATE
WORKS AT MANASSAS. FROM
A PHOTOGRAPH.
^f TTHEN the State of Virginia seceded, being a citizen of
* » that State, I resigned my office in the United States
Army; and as I had seen a good deal of military
service, in the Seminole and Mexican wars and in the
West, the President of the Confederacy offered me a
commission in the highest grade in his army. I ac-
cepted the offer because the invasion of the South
was inevitable. Bnt I soon incurred Mr. Davis's dis-
pleasure by protesting against an illegal act of his by
which I was greatly wronged. J Still he retained me in
important positions, although his official letters were' harsh. In 1864, how-
ever, he degraded me to the utmost of his power by summarily removing
me from a high command. Believing that hb was prompted to this act by
animosity, and not by dispassionate opinion, I undertake to prove this ani-
mosity by many extracts from his " Rise and Fall of the Confederacy " ( D.
Appleton & Co. : 1881), and my comments thereon.
Mr. Davis recites ("R. and F.," I., \x 307) the law securing to officers
who might leave the United States Array to enter that of the Confederacy
the same relative rank in the latter which they had in the former, provided
their resignations had been offered in the six months next following the
14th of March, and then adds :
" The provisions hereof are in the view entertained that the army was of the States, not of
the Government, and was to secure to officers adhering to the Confederate States the same
relative rank which they had before those States had withdrawn from the Union. . . .
" How well the Government of the Confederacy observed both the letter and spirit of the
law will be seen by reference to its action in the matter of appointments."
Those of the five generals were the most prominent, of course. All had
resigned within the time prescribed. Their relative rank in the United States
I The letter of protest covered nine sheets of
letter-paper, and the ninth sheet (to quote from
the original) sums up the matter in these words :
" My commission is made to bear such a date that my
once interiors in the service of the United States and of
the Confederate States shall be above.me. But it must
not be dated as of the 21st of July nor be suggestive of
the victory of Manassas. I return to my tirst position.
I repeat that my right to my rank as General is estab-
lished by the Acts of Congress of the 14th of March, 1861,
and the 16th of May. 1861, and not by the nomination and
confirmation of the 31st of August, 1861. To deprive me of
that rank it was necessaiy for Congress to repeal those
laws. That could be done by express legislative act alone.
It was not done, it could not be done, by a mere vote in
secret session upon a list of nominations. If the action
against which I have protested be legal, it is not for me
to question the expediency of degrading one who has
served laboriously from the commencement of the war
on this frontier, and borne, a prominent part in the
only great event of that war for the benefit of persons
neither of whom has yet struck a blow for this Con-
federacy. These views and the freedom with which
they are presented may be unusual. So likewise is the
occasion which calls them forth. I have the honor to
be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"J. E. Johnston, General.
" To His Excellency, Jefferson Davis, President of the
Confederate States, Richmond."
This ninth sheet is all of the original letter that
can be found by the present owner, Mrs. Bledsoe,
widow of Dr. Albert T. Bledsoe, who, at the time
the letter was written, was Assistant-Secretary of
War. Dr. Bledsoe told his wife that President
Davis handed the letter to him, with the remark
that it would not go upon the official files, and
that he might keep it if he liked. — Editors.
240
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
241
Army just before secession had been : 1st, J. E. .Johnston, Brigadier-General ;
2d, Samuel Cooper, Colonel ; 3d, A. S. Johnston, Colonel ; 4th, E. E. Lee, Lieu-
tenant-Colonel ; and 5th, G. T. Beauregard, Major. All of them but the third
had had previous appointments, when, on the 31st of August, the Confederate
Government announced new ones : Cooper's being dated May 16th, A. S.
Johnston's May 28th, Lee's
June 14th, J. E. Johnston's
July 4th, and Beauregard's
July 21st. So the law was
violated, 1st, by disregard-
ing existing commissions ; 2d,
by giving different instead of
the same dates to commis-
sions; and 3d, by not recogniz-
in g previous rank in the United
States Army. The only effect
of this triple violation of law
was to reduce J. E. Johnston
from the first to the fourth
place, which, of course, must
have been its object. Mr.
Davis continues :
"It is a noteworthy fact that the
three highest officers in rank . . .
were all so indifferent to any ques-
tion of personal interest that they
had received their appointment be-
fore they were aware it was to be
conferred" (p. 307).
This implies that the con-
duct described was unusual.
On the contrary, it was that
of the body of officers who left
the United States Army to en-
ter that of the Confederacy.
It is strange that the author
should disparage so many honorable men. He states ("R. and F.," I., 309)
that General Lee, when ordered from Richmond to the South for the first
time, asked what rank he held in the army : " So wholly had his heart and
his mind been consecrated to the public service that he had not remembered,
if he ever knew, of his advancement."
As each grade has its duties, an officer cannot know his duty if ignorant of
his rank. Therefore General Lee always knew his rank, for he never failed
in his duty. Besides, his official correspondence at the time referred to shows
that he knew that he was major-general of the Virginia forces until May
25th, 1861, and a Confederate general after that date.
VOL. I. HI
GENERAL SAMUEL COOPEH, ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR-GENERAL,
C. S. A., RANKING OFFICER IN THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
242 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
Describing the events which immediately preceded the battle of Manassas,
Mr. Davis says (" Rise and Fall," L, 340) :
'The forces there assembled [in Virginia] were divided into three armies, at positions the
most important and threatened : one, under General J. E. Johnston, at Harper's Ferry, cover-
ing the valley of the Shenandoah. . . . Harper's Ferry was an important position both for
military and political considerations. . . . The demonstrations of General Patterson, com-
manding- the Federal army in that region, caused General Johnston earnestly to insist on
being allowed to retire to a position nearer to Winchester."
Harper's Ferry is 22 miles east of the route into the Shenandoah Valley,
and could be held only by an army strong enough to drive an enemy from
the heights north and east of it. So it is anything but an important
position. These objections were expressed to the Government two days after
my arrival, and I suggested the being permitted to move the troops as might
be necessary. All this before Patterson had advanced from Chambersburg.
On page 341, " R. and F.," Mr. Davis quotes from an official letter to me
from General Cooper, dated June 13th, 1861, which began thus :
" The opinions expressed by Major Whiting in his letter to you, and on which you have
indorsed your concurrence, have been duly considered. You had been heretofore instructed
to exercise your discretion as to retiring from your position at Harper's Ferry." 5>
This latter statement is incorrect. No such instructions had been given.
The last instructions on the subject received by me were in General Lee's
letter of June 7th. | On page 341 Mr. Davis says :
" The temporary occupation [of Harper's Ferry] was especially needful for the removal of
the valuable machinery and material in the armory located there."
The removal of the machinery was not an object referred to in General
Cooper's letter. But the presence of our army anywhere in the Valley within
a day's march of the position, would have protected that removal. That
letter (page 341) was received two days after the army left Harper's Ferry
to meet General McClellan's troops, believed by intelligent people of Win-
chester to be approaching from the west.
On page 345 Mr. Davis says it was a difficult problem to know which army,
whether Beauregard's at Manassas or Johnston's in the Valley, should be
reenforced by the other, because these generals were " each asking reinforce-
ments from the other." All that was written by me on the subject is in the
letter (page 345) dated July 9th :
"I have not asked for reenforcements because I supposed that the War Department,
informed of the state of affairs everywhere, could best judge where the troops at its disposal
^ This letter of Major Whiting to General John- per's Ferry giving him permission to use his dis-
ston, and General Johnston's letter (probably re- cretion which is to he found in the Official Records,
ferred to as the indorsement), are both dated May is the one of June 7th from General Lee, in which
28th, 1861. The phrase of General Cooper, "You he says : "It is hoped that you will be able to be
had been heretofore instructed," should have read timely informed of the approach of troops against
either, "You had been theretofore [before May you, and retire, provided they cannot be success-
28th] instructed," or, " You have been heretofore fully opposed. You must exercise your discretion
[before June 13th] instructed." The latter is and judgment in this respect." — Editors.
probably what was meant, as the only letter of
instructions to General Johnston received at Har- j" Official Records," II., 910.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN 243
are most required. . . . If it is proposed to strengthen us against the attack I suggest as
soon to be made, it seems to me that General Beauregard might with great expedition furnish
5000 or 6000 men for a few days."
Mr. Davis says, after quoting from this letter :
" As soon as I became satisfied that Manassas was the objective point of the enemy's move-
ment. I wrote to General Johnston urging him to make preparations for a junction with
General Beauregard/'
There is abundant evidence that the Southern President never thought
of transferring the troops in the " Valley " to Manassas until the proper time
to do it came — that is, when McDowell was known to be advancing. This
fact is shown by the anxiety he expressed to increase the number of those
troops. ^ And General Lee, writing [from South Carolina] to Mr. Davis,
November 24th, 1861 (" Official Records," II., 515), says in regard to General
Beauregard's suggestion that he be reenforced from my army :
" You decided that the movements of the eueniy in and about Alexandria were not suf-
ficiently demonstrative to warrant the withdrawing of any of the forces from the Shenandoah
Valley. A few days afterward, however, — I think three or four, — the reports from General
Beauregard showed so clearly the enemy's purpose, that you ordered General Johnston, with
his effective force, to march at once to the support of General Beauregard,"
This letter is in reply to one from Mr. Davis, to the effect that statements
had been widely published to show that General Beauregard's forces had
been held inactive by his (Mr. Davis's) rejection of plans for vigorous offen-
ive operations proposed to him by the general, and desiring to know of
General Lee what those plans were, and why they were rejected.
"On the 17th of July, 1861," says Mr. Davis ("R. and F." I., 316), "the
following telegram was sent by the adjutant-general" to General Johnston,
Winchester, Va. :
" General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow, a junction of all
your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and
baggage to Culpeper Court House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In all the arrange-
ments exercise your discretion. S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General."
Mr. Davis asserts that I claim that discretion was given me by the words
" all the arrangements." I claimed it from what he terms the only positive
part of the order, viz., "If practicable, make the movement, sending your
sick to Culpeper Court House." Mr. Davis adds:
" The sending the sick to Culpeper Court House might have been after or before the effect-
ive force had moved to the execution of the main and only positive part of the order."
" Make the movement " would have been a positive order, but " if prac-
ticable " deprived it of that character, and gave the officer receiving it a cer-
tain discretion. But, as the movement desired was made promptly, it was
surely idle to discuss, twenty years after, whether the officer could lawfully
have done what he did not do. At the time the decision of such a question
might have been necessary ; but, as Mr. Davis will give no more orders to
generals, and as the officer concerned will execute no more, such a discussion
I See "Official Records," II., 924, 935, 940, 973, 976-977.
244 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
is idle now. The use of the wagons required in the march of the army would
have been necessary to remove the sick to the railroad station at Strasburg,
eighteen miles distant ; so this removal could not have been made after the
march. There being seventeen hundred sick, this part of their transportation
would have required more time than the transfer of the troops to Manas-
sas, which was the important thing. The sick were, therefore, properly and
quickly provided for in Winchester. I was the only judge of the " practicable " ;
and " if practicable" refers to the whole sentence — as much to sending the sick
to Culpeper as to " make the movement." Still he says ("R. and F.," I., 347) :
' ' His [my] letters of the 12th and 15th expressed his doubts about his power to retire from
before the superior force of General Patterson. Therefore, the word ' practicable ' was in that
connection the equivalent of ' possible.' "
It is immaterial whether " if practicable " or " if possible " was written. I
was the only judge of the possibility or practicability ; and, if General Pat-
terson had not changed his position after the telegram was received, I might
have thought it necessary to attack him, to " make the movement practicable."
But as to my power to retire. On the 15th General Patterson's forces were
half a day's inarch from us, and on the 12th more than a day's march ; and,
as Stuart's cavalry did not permit the enemy to observe us, retreat would
have been easy, and I could not possibly have written to the contrary. \
As to Mr. Davis's telegram ("R. and F.," I., 348) ft, and the anxiety in
Mr. Davis's mind lest there should be some unfortunate misunderstanding
between General Beauregard and me, — my inquiry was intended and calcu-
lated to establish beyond dispute our relative positions. As a Confederate
brigadier-general I had been junior to General Beauregard, but had been
created general by act of Congress. But, as this had not been published to
the army, it was not certain that it was known at Manassas. If it was not,
the President's telegram gave the information, and prevented what he seems
to have apprehended.
THE BATTLE OF BULL KUN.
On page 349, to the end of the chapter, the President describes his visit to
the field of battle near Manassas. "As we advanced," he says, " the storm of
battle was rolling westward." But, in fact, the fighting had ceased before he
left Manassas. He then mentions meeting me on a hill which commanded a
general view of the field, and proceeding farther west, where he saw a Federal
" column," which a Confederate squadron charged and put to flight. But the
\ Mr. Davis has a few words of praise for Gen- "Richmond, July 20, 1861. General J. E. John-
eral Johnston, which, in this connection, will be ston, Manassas Junction, Virginia : You are a gen-
of interest to the reader: "It gives me pleasure era] in the Confederate Army, possessed of the
to state that, from all the accounts received at the power attaching to that rank. You will know how
time, the plans of General Johnston for masking to make the exact knowledge of Brigadier-Gen-
his withdrawal to form a junction with General eral Beauregard, as well of the ground as of the
Beauregard were conducted witli marked skill " troops and preparation, avail for the success of
("R. and P.," I., 347).— Editors. the object in which you cooperate. The zeal of
•fe This telegram, sent in response to an inquiry both assures me of harmonious action. Jefferson
from General Johnston, read as follows : Davis."
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. 24s
captain in command of this squadron % says in his report that the column seen
was a party of our troops. Mr. Davis also dilates on the suffering of our
troops for want' of supplies and camp equipage, and on his efforts to have
them provided for. After the battle ended, officers were duly directed by me
to have food brought to the ground where the troops were to pass the night.
I was not in the conference described by Mr. Davis ("R. and F.," I., 353,
354, 355). Having left the field after 10 o'clock, and ridden in the dark slowly,
it was about half-past 1 1 when I found the President and General Beauregard
together, in the latter's quarters at Manassas. We three conversed an hour
or more without referring to pursuit or an advance upon Washington. The
" conference " described by him must have occurred before my arrival, and
Mr. Davis may very well have forgotten that I was not present then.
But, when the President wrote, he had forgotten the subject of the confer-
ence he described ; for the result, as he states it, was an order, not for pursuit
by the army, but for the detail of two parties to collect wounded men and
abandoned property near the field of battle. This order (pages 355, 356) is
"to the same effect," Mr. Davis says, as the one he wrote, and which he terms
a direction to pursue the Federal army at early dawn.
It is asserted (" R. and F.," I., 354) | that I left the command over both Con-
federate armies in General Beauregard's hands during the engagement. Such
conduct would have been as base as flight from the field in the heat of battle,
and would have brought upon me the contempt of every honorable soldier. It
is disproved by the fact that General Beauregard was willing to serve under me
there, and again in North Carolina, near the close of the war ; and that he
associated with me. As this accusation is published by the Southern Pres-
ident, and indorsed by General Beauregard, it requires my contradiction.
Instead of leaving the command in General Beauregard's hands, I assumed
it over both armies immediately after my arrival on the 20th, showing General
Beauregard as my warrant the President's telegram defining my position.
The usual order ^ assuming command was written and sent to General
Beauregard's office for distribution. He was then told that as General
Patterson would no doubt hasten to join General McDowell as soon as he
discovered my movement, we must attack the Federal army next morning.
General Beauregard then" pointed out on a map of the neighborhood the roads
leading to the enemy's camp at Centreville from the different parts of our
line south of the stream, and the positions of the brigades near each road ;
and a simple order of march, by which our troops would unite near the
Federal position, was sketched. Having had neither sleep nor recumbent
rest since the morning of the 17th, I begged General Beauregard to put this
order of march on paper, and have the necessary copies made and sent to me
for inspection in a grove, near, where I expected to be resting — this in time
& Captain John F. Lay. See " Official Records," events, says: "During the 20th, General Johnston
II., 573. — Editors. arrived at Manassas Junction by the railroad, and
4. Not by Mr. Davis, but in a letter from Gen- that day we received the order from him assuming
eral Thomas Jordan, quoted by Mr. Davis for an- command of the combined armies of General
other purpose. — Editors. Beauregard and himself." — J. E. J.
I General J. A. Early, in his narrative of these
246 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
for distribution before night. This distribution was to be by him, the imme-
diate commander of most of the troops. Seeing that 8 brigades were on the
right of the line to Centreville, and but 1 to the left of it at a distance of 4
miles, I desired General Beauregard to have Bee's and Jackson's brigades
placed in this interval near the detached brigade.
The papers were brought to me a little before sunrise next morning. They
differed greatly from the order sketched the day before ; but as they would
have put the troops in motion if distributed, it would have been easy then
to direct the course of each division. By the order sketched the day before,
all our forces would have been concentrated near Centreville, to attack the
Federal army. By that prepared by General Beauregard but 4 brigades
were directed " to the attack of Centreville," of which one and a half had not
yet arrived from the Valley, while 6 brigades were to move forward to the
Union Mills and Centreville road, there to hold themselves in readiness to
support the attack on Centreville, or to move, 2 to Sangster's cross-roads, 2
to Fairfax Station, and 2 to Fairfax Court House. The two and a half bri-
gades on the ground, even supported by the half brigade of the reserve also
on the ground, in all probability would have been defeated by the whole
Federal army before the three bodies of 2 brigades each could have come to
their aid, over distances of from 3 to 5 miles. Then, if the enemy had provi-
dentially been defeated by one-sixth or one-eighth of their number, Sangster's
cross-roads and Fairfax Station would have been out of their line of retreat.
Soon after sunrise on the 21st, it was reported that a large body of Federal
troops was approaching on the Warrenton Turnpike. This offensive move-
ment of the enemy would have frustrated our plait of the day before, if the
orders for it had been delivered to the troops. It appears from the reports of
the commanders of the six brigades on the right that but one of them, General
Longstreet, received it. Learning that Bee's and Jackson's brigades were
still on the right, I again desired General Beauregard to transfer them to the
left, which he did, giving the same orders to Hampton's Legion, just arrived.
These, with Cocke's brigade then near the turnpike, would necessarily receive
the threatened attack.
General Beauregard then suggested that all our troops on the right should
move rapidly to the left and assail the attacking Federal troops in flank.
This suggestion was accepted ; and together we joined those troops. Three
of the four brigades of the first line, at Mitchell's, Blackburn's, and McLean's
fords, reported strong bodies of United States troops on the wooded heights
before them. This frustrated the second plan. Two Federal batteries — one
in front of Bonham's brigade at Mitchell's Ford, the other before Longstreet's
at Blackburn's Ford — were annoying us, although their firing was slow.
About 8 o'clock, after receiving such information as scouts could give, I
left General Beauregard near Longstreet's position, and placed myself on
Lookout Hill, in rear of Mitchell's Ford, to await the development of the
enemy's designs. About 9 o'clock the signal officer, Captain Alexander,
reported that a column of Federal troops could be seen crossing the valley of
Bull Run, two miles beyond our left.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. 247
General McDowell had been instructed by his general-in-chief to pass the
Confederate right and seize the railroad in our rear. But, learning that the
district to be passed through was rugged and covered with woods, and there-
fore unfavorable to a large army, he determined, after devoting three days to
reconnoissance, to operate on the open and favorable ground to his right,
and turn our left. He had another object in this second plan, and an impor-
tant one — that this course would place his between the two Confederate armies,
and prevent their junction ; and if it had been made a day or two sooner,
this manoeuvre would have accomplished that object.
General McDowell marched from Centreville by the Warrenton Turnpike
with three divisions, sending a fourth division to deceive us by demonstra-
tions in front of our main body. Leaving the turnpike a half mile from the
Stone Bridge, he made a long detour to Sudley Ford, where he crossed Bull
Run and turned toward Manassas. Colonel Evans, who commanded fourteen
companies near the Stone Bridge, discovered this manoeuvre, and moved with
his little force along the base of the hill north of the turnpike, to place it
before the enemy near the Sudley and Manassas road. Here he was assailed
by greatly superior numbers, which he resisted obstinately.
General Beauregard had joined me on Lookout Hill, and we could distinctly
hear the sounds and see the smoke of the fight. But they indicated no hostile
force that Evans's troops and those of Bee, Hampton, and Jackson, which we
could see hurrying toward the conflict in that order, were not adequate to resist.
On reaching the broad, level top of the hill south of the turnpike, Bee,
appreciating the strength of the position, formed his troops (half of his own
and half of Bartow's brigade ) on that ground. But seeing Evans struggling
against great odds, he crossed the valley and formed on the right and a little
in advance of him. Here the 5 or 6 regiments, with 6 field-pieces, held their
ground for an hour against 10,000 or 12,000 United States troops,\ when, find-
ing they were overlapped on each flank by the continually arriving enemy,
General Bee fell back to the position from which he had moved to rescue
Evans — crossing the valley, closely pressed by the Federal army.
Hampton with his Legion reached the valley as the retrograde movement
began. Forming it promptly, he joined in the action, and contributed greatly
to the orderly character of the retreat by his courage and admirable soldier-
ship, seconded by the excellent conduct of the gentlemen composing his
command. Imboden and his battery did excellent service on this trying
occasion. Bee met Jackson at the head of his brigade, on the position he had
first taken, and he began to re-form and Jackson to deploy at the same time.
In the mean time I had been waiting with General Beauregard on Lookout
Hill for evidence of General McDowell's design. The violence of the firing on
the left indicated a battle, but the large bodies of troops reported by chosen
scouts to be facing our right kept me in doubt. But near 11 o'clock reports
that those troops were felling trees showed that they were standing on the
\ General Fry (page 185) states that these troops Reckoning by the estimate of strength given by
were Andrew Porter's and Burnside's brigades, General Fry on page 1 94 these would have made
and one regiment of Heintzelman's division, a total of about G500 men. — Editors.
248 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
defensive ; and new clouds of dust on the left proved that a large body of
Federal troops was arriving on the field. It thus appeared that the enemy's
great effort was to be against our left. I expressed this to General Beaure-
gard, and the necessity of reenforcing the brigades engaged, and desired him
to send immediate orders to Early and Holmes, of the second line, to hasten
to the conflict with their brigades. General Bonham, who was near me, was
desired to send up two regiments and a battery. I then set off at a rapid
gallop to the scene of action. General Beauregard joined me without a word.
Passing on the way Colonel Pendleton with two batteries, I directed him to
follow with them as fast as possible.
It now seemed that a battle was to be fought entirely different in place
and circumstance from the two plans previously adopted and abandoned as
impracticable. Instead of taking the initiative and operating in front of
our line, we were compelled to fight on the defensive more than a mile in
rear of that line, and at right angles to it, on a field selected by Bee, —
with no other plans than those suggested by the changing events of battle.
While we were riding forward General Beauregard suggested to me to
assign him to the immediate command of the troops engaged, so that my
supervision of the whole field might not be interrupted, to which I assented.
So he commanded those troops under me ; as elsewhere, lieutenant-generals
commanded corps, and major-generals divisions, under me.
When we were near the ground where Bee was re-forming and Jackson
deploying his brigade, I saw a regiment in line with ordered arms and facing
to the front, but 200 or 300 yards in rear of its proper place. On inquiry
I learned that it had lost all its field-officers ; so, riding on its left flank, I
easily marched it to its place. It was the 4th Alabama, an excellent regiment;
and I mention this because the circumstance has been greatly exaggerated.
After the troops were in good battle order I turned to the supervision of
the whole field. The enemy's great numerical superiority was discouraging.
Yet, from strong faith in Beauregard's capacity and courage, and the high
soldierly qualities of -Bee and Jackson, I hoped that the fight would be main-
tained until I could bring adequate reinforcements to their aid. For this
Holmes and Early were urged to hasten their march, and Ewell was ordered to
follow them with his brigade with all speed. Broken troops were reorganized
and led back into the fight with the help of my own and part of General
Beauregard's staff. Cocke's brigade was held in rear of the right to observe a
large body of Federal troops in a position from which Bee's right flank could
have been struck in a few minutes.
After these additions had been made to our troops then engaged, we had
9 regiments of infantry, 5 batteries, and 300 cavalry of the Army of the
Shenandoah, and about 2 regiments and a half of infantry, 6 companies of
cavalry, and 6 field-pieces of the Army of the Potomac, holding at bay 3
divisions of the enemy. The Southern soldiers had, however, two great advan-
tages in the contest : greater skill in the use of fire-arms, and the standing
on the defensive, by which they escaped such disorder as advancing under
fire produced in the ranks of their adversaries, undisciplined like themselves.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. 249
A report received about 2 o'clock from General Beauregard's office that
another United States army was approaching from the north-west, and but a
few miles from us, caused me to send orders to Bonham, Longstreet, and
Jones to hold their brigades south of Bull Run, and ready to move.
When Bonham's two regiments appeared soon after, Cocke's brigade was
ordered into action on our right, Fisher's North Carolina regiment coming
up, Bonham's two regiments were directed against the Federal right, and
Fisher's was afterward sent in the same direction ; for the enemy's strong-
est efforts seemed to be directed against our left, as if to separate us from
Manassas Junction.
About 3:30 o'clock, General E. K. Smith arrived with three regiments of
Elzey's brigade, coming from Manassas Junction. He was instructed, through
a staff-officer sent forward to meet him, to form on the left of our line, his left
thrown forward, and to attack the enemy in flank. At his request I joined
him, directed his course, and gave him these instructions. Before the forma-
tion was completed, he fell severely wounded, and while falling from his
horse directed Colonel Elzey to take command. That officer appreciated
the manoeuvre and executed it gallantly and well. General Beauregard
promptly seized the opportunity it afforded, and threw forward the whole
line. The enemy was driven from the long-contested hill, and the tide of
battle at length turned. But the first Federal line driven into the valley was
there rallied on a second, the two united presenting a formidable aspect. In the
mean time, however, Colonel Early had come upon the field with his brigade.
He was instructed by me to make a detour to the left and assail the Federal
right in flank. He reached the ground in time, accompanied by Stuart's cav-
alry and Beckham's battery, and made his attack with a skill and courage
which routed the Federal right in a moment. General Beauregard, charging
in front, made the rout complete. The Federal right fled in confusion toward
the Sudley Ford, and the center and left marched off rapidly by the turnpike.
Stuart pursued the fugitives on the Sudley road, and Colonel Radford, with
two squadrons which I had held in reserve near me during the day, was
directed to cross Bull Run at Ball's Ford, and strike the column on the turn-
pike in flank. The number of prisoners taken by these parties of cavalry
greatly exceeded their own numbers. But they were too weak to make a
serious impression on an army, although a defeated one.
At twenty minutes before 5, when the retreat of the enemy toward Centre-
ville began, I sent orders to Brigadier-General Bonham by Lieutenant-Col-
onel Lay, of his staff, who happened to be with me, to march with his own
and Longstreet's brigade (which were nearest Bull Run and the Stone Bridge),
by the quickest route to the turnpike, and form them across it to intercept
the retreat of the Federal troops. But he found so little appearance of rout
in those troops as to make the execution of his instructions seem impractica-
ble ; so the two brigades returned to their camps. When the retreat began,
the body of United States troops that had passed the day on the Centreville
side of Bull Run made a demonstration on the rear of our right ; which was
repelled by Holmes's brigade just arrived.
2 so RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
Soon after the firing ceased, General Ewell reported to me, saying- that his
brigade was about midway from its camp near Union Mills. He had ridden
forward to see the part of the held on which he might be required to serve, to
prepare himself to act intelligently.
The victory was as complete as one gained in an open country by infantry
and artillery can be. Our cavalry pursued as far as they could effectively ;
but when they encountered the main column, after dispersing or capturing
little parties and stragglers, they could make no impression.
General Beauregard's first plan of attack was delivered to me by his aide-
de-camp, Colonel Chisolm, when I was thirty-four miles from Manassas. It
was, that I should leave the railroad at Piedmont station, thirty-six miles
from the enemy at Centreville, and attack him in rear, and when our artillery
announced that we had begun the fight, General Beauregard would move up
from Bull Run and assail the enemy on that side. I rejected the plan, because
such a one would enable an officer of ordinary sense and vigor to defeat our
two armies one after the other. For McDowell, by his numerical superiority,
could have disposed of my forces in less than two hours; that is to say, before
Beauregard could have come up, when he also could have been defeated and
the campaign ended.
An opinion seems to prevail with spme persons who have written about the
battle, that important plans of General Beauregard were executed by him. It
is a mistake; the first intention, announced to General Beauregard by me
when we met, was to attack the enemy at Centreville as early as possible on
the 21st. This was anticipated by McDowell's early advance. The second,
to attack the Federals in flank near the turnpike with our main force, sug-
gested by General Beauregard, was prevented by the enemy's occupation of
the high ground in front of our right.
As fought, the battle was made by me ; Bee's and Jackson's brigades were
transferred to the left by me. I decided that the battle was to be there, and
directed the measures necessary to maintain it ; a most important one being
the assignment of General Beauregard to the immediate command of this
left, which he held. In like manner the senior officer on the right would have
commanded there, if the Federal left had attacked.
These facts in relation to the battle are my defense against the accusation
indorsed by General Beauregard and published by Mr. Davis.
In an account of the battle published in " The Century" for November, 1884,
General Beauregard mentions offensive operations which he " had designed
and ordered against his [adversary's] left flank and rear at Centreville," and
censures my friend General R. S. Ewell for their failure. At the time referred
to, three of the four Federal divisions were near Bull Run, above the turn-
pike, and the fourth facing our right, so that troops of ours, going to Centre-
ville then, if not prevented by the Federal division facing them, would have
found no enemy. And General Ewell was not, as he reports, " instructed in
the plan of attack " ; for he says in his official report : ". . . I first received
orders to hold myself in readiness to advance at a moment's notice. I next
received a copy of an order sent to General Jones and furnished me by him,
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
251
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL RICHAKD S. EVVELL, C. 8. A. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
in which it was stated I had been ordered at once to proceed to his support."
Three other orders, he says, followed, each contradictory of its predecessor.
General Ewell knew that a battle was raging ; but knew, too, that between
him and it were other unengaged brigades, and that his commander was near
enough to give him orders. But he had no reason to suppose that his com-
mander desired him to move to Centreville, where there was then no enemy.
There could have been no greater mistake on General Ewell's part than mak-
ing the movement to Centreville.
A brief passage in my official report of this battle displeased President
Davis. In referring to his telegraphic order I gave its meaning very briefly,
but accurately — "directing me, if practicable, to go to [General Beauregard's]
assistance, after sending my sick to Culpeper Court House." Mr. Davis
objected to the word after. Being informed of this by a friend, I cheerfully
consented to his expunging the word, because that would not affect the
meaning of the sentence. But the word is still in his harsh indorsement. He
also had this passage stricken out : " The delay of sending the sick, nearly
2^2 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
seventeen hundred in number, to Culpeper, would have made it impossible to
arrive at Manassas in time. They were therefore provided for in Winches-
ter " ; and substituted this : " Our sick, nearly seventeen hundred in number,
were provided for in Winchester." Being ordered to send the sick to Cul-
peper as well as to move to Manassas, it was necessary to account for
disobedience, which my words did, and which his substitute for them did
not.
Mr. Davis ("R. and F.," I., 359) expresses indignation that, as he says,
" among the articles abandoned by the enemy . . . were handcuffs, the
fit appendage of a policeman, but not of a soldier." I saw none, nor did I
see any one who had seen them.
Mr. Davis says (page 359) : " On the night of the 22d, I held a second con-
ference with Grenerals Johnston and Beauregard." I was in no conference
like that of which account is given on page 360. And one that he had with
me on that day proved conclusively that he had no thought of sending our
army against Washington; for in it he offered me the command in West
Virginia, promising to increase the forces there adequately from those
around us. He says (page 361) :
'• What discoveries would have been made, and what results would have ensued from the
establishment of our guns upon the south bank of the river to open Are upon the capital, are
speculative questions upon which it would be useless to enter."
Mr. Davis seems to have forgotten what was as well known then as now —
that our army was more disorganized by victory than that of the United
States by defeat ; that there were strong fortifications, well manned, to cover
the approaches to Washington and prevent the establishment of our guns on
the south bank of the river. He knew, too, that we had no means of can-
nonading the capital, nor a disposition to make barbarous war. He says
(" R. and F.," I., 362) :
" When the smoke of battle had lifted from the field . . . some . . . censoriously asked
why the fruits of the victory had not been gathered by the capture of Washington City. Then
some indiscreet friends of the generals commanding in that battle . . . induced the allega-
tion that the President had prevented the generals from making an immediate and vigorous
pursuit of the routed enemy."
Mr. Davis has no ground for this assertion ; the generals were attacked
first and most severely. It was not until the newspapers had exhausted
themselves upon us that some of them turned upon him. On November 3d
he wrote to me that reports were circulated to the effect that he
" prevented General Beauregard from pursuing the enemy after the battle of Manassas, and
had subsequently restrained him from advancing upon Washington City. . . . . I call upon
you, as the commanding general, and as a party to all the conferences held by me on the 21st
and 22d of July, to say whether I obstructed the pursuit of the enemy after the victory at
Manassas, or have ever objected to an advance or other active operation which it was feasible
for the army to undertake." (" R. and F.," L, 363.)
I replied on the 10th, answering the first question in the negative, and added
an explanation which put the responsibility on myself. I replied to the second
question, that it had never been feasible for the army to advance fp1^
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. 253
toward Washington than it had done, and referred to a conference at Fairfax
Court House [October 1st, 1861] in reference to leading the army into
Maryland, in which he informed the three senior officers that he had not
the means of giving the army the strength which they considered necessary
for offensive operations.
Mr. Davis was displeased by my second reply, because in his mind there
was but one question in his letter. I maintain that there are two ; namely,
(1) Did he obstruct the pursuit of the enemy after the victory at Manassas ?
(2) Had he ever objected to an advance or other active operation which it
was feasible for the army to undertake f
The second matter is utterly unconnected with the battle of Manassas, and
as the question of advance or other active operation had been discussed
nowhere by him, to my knowledge, but at the conference at Fairfax Court
House, I supposed that he referred to it. He was dissatisfied with my silence
in regard to the conferences which he avers took place on July 21st and 22d,
the first knowledge of which I have derived from his book.
THE WITHDRAWAL FROM CENTREVILLE TO THE PENINSULA.
Mr. Davis refers (" Rise and Fall," I., 444-5) to the instructions for the
reorganization of the army given by him to the three general officers whom
he met in conference at Fairfax Court House on October 1st, 1861. But the
correspondence urging the carrying out of the orders was carried on with
Generals Beauregard and G. W. Smith (my subordinates) in that same
October. He neither conversed nor corresponded with me on the subject
then, the letter to me being dated May 10th, 1862. The original order was
dated October 22d, 1861, to be executed " as soon as, in the judgment of the
commanding general, it can be safely done under present exigencies." As
the enemy was then nearer to our center than that center to either flank of
our army, and another advance upon us by the Federal army was not
improbable 011 any day, it seemed to me unsafe to make the reorganization
then. From May 10th to 26th, when the President renewed the subject, we
were in the immediate presence of the enemy, when reorganization would
have been infinitely dangerous, as was duly represented by me. But, allud-
ing to this conference at Fairfax Court House, he says (p. 449) : " When,
at that time and place, I met General Johnston for conference, he called
in the two generals next in rank to himself, Beauregard and G. W. Smith."
These officers were with Mr. Davis in the quarters of General Beauregard,
whose guest he was, when I was summoned to him. I had not power to
bring any officer into the conference. If such authority had belonged to my
office, the personal relations lately established between us by the President
would not have permitted me to use it.
He says (pp. 448-9) : " I will now proceed to notice the allegation that I was
responsible for inaction of the Army of the Potomac in the latter part of 1861
and in the early part of 1862." I think Mr. Davis is here fighting a shadow.
I have never seen or heard of the "allegation" referred to; I believe that
2S4 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
that conference attracted no public attention, and brought criticism upon no
one. I have seen no notice of it in print, except the merely historical one in
a publication made by me in 1874, -ft without criticism or comment.
In the same paragraph Mr. Davis expresses surprise at the weakness of
the army. He has forgotten that in Richmond he was well informed of the
strength of the army by periodical reports, which showed him the prevalence
of epidemics which, in August and part of September, kept almost thirty per
cent, of our number sick, He must have forgotten, too, his anxiety on this
subject, which induced him to send a very able physician, Dr. Cartwright, to
find some remedy or preventive.
He asserts also that " the generals " had made previous suggestions of a
"purpose to advance into Maryland." There had been no such purpose. On
the contrary, in my letter to the Secretary of War, suggesting the conference,
I wrote :
" Thus far the numbers aud condition of this army have at no time justified our assuming-
the offensive. . . . The difficulty of obtaining the means of establishing a battery near Evans-
port ^ . . . has given me the impression that you cannot at present put this army in condition
to assume the offensive. If I am mistaken in this, and you can furnish those means, I think it
important that either his Excellency the President, yourself, or some one representing you,
should here, upon the ground, confer with me on this all-important question."
Ill a letter dated September 29.th, 1861, the Secretary wrote that the Presi-
dent would reach my camp in a day or two for conference. He came for that
object September 30th, and the next evening, by his appointment, he was waited
on by Generals Beauregard, Gustavus W. Smith, and myself. In discussing
the question of giving our army strength enough to assume the offensive in
Maryland, it was proposed to bring to it from the South troops enough to
raise it to the required strength. The President asked what was that strength.
General Smith thought 50,000 men, General Beauregard 60,000, and I 60,000,
all of us specifying soldiers like those around us. The President replied that
such reinforcements could not be furnished; he could give only as many
recruits as we could arm. This decided the question. Mr. Davis then pro-
posed an expedition against Hooker's division, consisting, we believed, of
10,000 men. It was posted on the Maryland shore of the Potomac, opposite
Dumfries. [See map, p. 199.] But I objected that we had no means of
ferrying an equal number of men across the river in a day, even if undis-
turbed by ships of war, which controlled the river ; so that, even if we should
succeed in landing, those vessels of war would inevitably destroy or capture
our party returning. This terminated the conference. Mr. Davis says, in
regard to the reinforcements asked for ("R. and F.," I., 449): "I had no
power to make such an addition to that army without a total disregard of the
safety of other threatened positions." We had no threatened positions ; and
we could always discover promptly the fitting out of naval expeditions
against us. And he adds (p. 451), with reference to my request for a con-
ference in regard to reenforcements :
ft See " Johnston's Narrative" (New York: D. Appleton & Co.), pp. 78, 79.
I Evansport is on the Potomac below Alexandria, at the mouth of Quantico Creek.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
2'^
" Very little experience, or a fair amount of modesty without any experience, would, serve to
prevent one from announcing1 his conclusion that troops could be withdrawn from a place or
places without knowing how many were there, and what was the necessity for their presence."
The refutation of this is in General Gr. W. Smith's memorandum of the dis-
cussion : " General Johnston said that he did not feel at liberty to express an
opinion of the practica-
bility of reducing the
strength of our forces
at points not within the
limits of his command."
On page 452 [referring to
possible minor offensive
operations. — Editors ]
Mr. Davis says he
"particularly indicated the
lower part of Maryland, where
a small force was said to be
ravaging the country."
He suggested nothing
so impossible. Troops of
ours could not have been
ferried across the broad
Potomac then. We had
no steamer on that river,
nor could we have used
one. Mr. Davis says (" E.
and F.," I., 452) : *
" . . . Previously, General
Johnston's attention had been
called to possibihties in the
Valley of the Shenandoah, and
that these and other like things
were not done, was surely due
to other causes than ' the policy
STONEWALL" JACKSON AS FIRST LIEUTENANT OF ARTILLERY, U. 8. A. Q£ ^g Administration.'"
FROM AN AMBROTYPE TAKEN AUGUST 20, 1847.
Then he quotes from a letter to me, dated August 1st, 1861, as follows :
"... The movement of Banks | will require your attention. It may be a ruse, but if a real
movement, when your army has the requisite strength and mobility, you will probably find an
opportunity, by a rapid movement through the passes, to strike him in rear or flank."
It is matter of public notoriety that no incursion into the " Valley " worth
the notice of a Confederate company was made until March, 1862. That the
4 By orders dated July 19th, 1861, General N. P. Ferry, General Patterson being by the same orders
Banks had been assigned to the command of the "honorably discharged from the service of the
Department of the Shenandoah, relieving General United States," on the expiration of his term of
Patterson in command of the army at Harper's duty. — Editors.
2^6 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
Confederate President should be ignorant of this is inconceivable. Mr. Davis
says (p. 462) :
" .... I received from General Johnston notice that his position [at Centre ville] was consid-
ered nnsafe. Many of his letters to me have been lost, and I have thus far not been able to And
the one giving the notice referred to, but the reply which is annexed clearly indicates the sub-
stance of the letter which was answered : ' General J. E. Johnston : . . . Your opinion that
your position may be turned whenever the enemy chooses to advance,' etc."
The sentence omitted by him after my name in his letter from which he
quotes as above contains the dates of three letters of mine, in neither of which
is there allusion to the safety (or reverse) of the position. They are dated
22d, 23d, and 25th of February, and contain complaints on my part of the
dreadful condition of the country, and of the vast accumulation by the Gov-
ernment of superfluous stores at Manassas. There is another omission in
the President's letter quoted, and the omission is this :
"... with your present force, you cannot secure your communications from the enemy, and
may at any time, when he can pass to your rear, be compelled to retreat at the sacrifice of your
siege train and army stores. . . . Threatened as we are by a large force on the south-east, you
must see the hazard of your position, by its liability to isolation and attack in rear."
By a singular freak of the President's memory, it transferred the substance
of these passages from his letter to my three.
Referring again to the conference at Fairfax Court House [October 1st],
Mr. Davis says (p. 464) :
" Soon thereafter, the army withdrew to Centreville, a better position for defense, but not for
attack, and thereby suggestive of the abandonment of an intention to advance."
The President forgets that in that conference the intention to advance was
abandoned by him first. He says on the same page :
" On the 10th of March I telegraphed to General Johnston : ' Further assurance given to me
this day that you shall be promptly and adequately reenforced, so as to enable you to maintain
your position, and resume first policy when the roads will permit.' The first policy was to
cany the war beyond our own border."
The roads then permitted the marching of armies, so we had just left
Manassas. J)
On the 20th of February, after a discussion in Richmond, his Cabinet being
present, the President had directed me to prepare to fall back from Manassas,
and do so as soon as the condition of the country should make the marching
of troops practicable. I returned to Manassas February 21st, and on the
22d ordered the proper officers to remove the public property, which was
begun on the 23d, the superintendent of the railroad devoting himself to the
work under the direction of its president, the Hon. John S. Barbour. The
Government had collected three million and a quarter pounds of provisions
there, I insisting on a supply of but a million and a half. It also had two
million pounds in a meat-curing establishment near at hand, and herds of
j) Between the 7th and 11th of March, 1862, the the Kappahannock. On the 11-1 2th Stonewall
Confederate forces in north-eastern Virginia, under Jackson evacuated Winchester and fell back to
General Johnston, were withdrawn to the line of Strasburg. — Editors.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. 2S7
live stock besides. On the 9th of March, when the ground had become firm
enough for military operations, I ordered the army to march that night,
thinking then, as I do now, that the space of fifteen days was time enough in
which to subordinate an army to the Commissary Department. About one
million pounds of this provision was abandoned, and half as much more was
spoiled for want of shelter. This loss is represented (" E. and F.," I., 468) \
as so great as to embarrass us to the end of the war, although it was only
a six days' supply for the troops then in Virginia. Ten times as much was in
North Carolina railroad stations at the end of the war. Mr. Davis says (p. 467) :
" It was regretted that earlier and more effective means were not employed for the mobiliza-
tion of the army, ... or at least that the withdrawal was not so deliberate as to secure the
removal of our ordnance, subsistence, and quartermaster's stores."
The quartermaster's and ordnance stores were brought off ; and as to sub-
sistence, the Government, which collected immediately on the frontier five
times the quantity of provisions wanted, is responsible for the losses. The
President suggested the time of the withdrawal himself, in the interview in his
office that has been mentioned. The means taken was the only one available, —
the Virginia Midland Railroad. Mr. Davis says ("R. and F.," I., 465) :
" To further inquiry from General Johnston as to where he should take position, I replied that
I would go to his headquarters in the field, and found him on the south bank of the river, to
which he had retired, in a position possessing great natural advantages."
There was no correspondence in relation to selecting a defensive position.
I was not seeking one ; but, instead, convenient camping-grounds, from
which my troops could certainly unite with other Confederate forces to meet
McClellan's invasion. I had found and was occupying such grounds, one
division being north of Orange Court House, another a mile or two south of
it, and two others some six miles east of that place ; a division on the south
bank of the Rappahannock, and the cavalry beyond the river, and about 13,000
troops in the vicinity of Fredericksburg. Mr. Davis's narrative [of a visit
to Fredericksburg at this time, the middle of March. — Editors] that follows
is disposed of by the proof that, after the army left Manassas, the President
did not visit it until about the 14th of May.& But such a visit, if made, could
not have brought him to the conclusion that the weakness of Fredericksburg
as a military position made it unnecessary to find a strong one for the army.
Mr. Davis ("R. and F.," II., 81) credits me with expecting an attack
which he shows General McClellan never had in his mind :
" In a previous chapter, the retreat of our army from Centreville has been described, and ref-
erence has been made to the anticipation of the commanding general, J. E. Johnston, that the
enemy would soon advance to attack that position."
This refers, I suppose, to a previous assertion (" R. and F.," I., 462), my
comments upon which prove that this " anticipation " was expressed in the
\Not by Mr. Davis, but iu a statement quoted •& In "The Century" magazine for May, 1885,
at the above page from General J. A. Early, who General Johnston, to support his assertion, quoted
said, " The loss . . . was a very serious one to us, statements by Major J. B. Washington, Dr. A. M.
and embarrassed us for the remainder of the war, Fauntleroy, and Colonel E. J. Harvie, which are
as it put us at once on a running stock." — Editors, now omitted for want of space. — Editors.
vol. 1. 17
2^8 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.
President's letter to me, dated February 28th, 1862. He says (" R. and F.,"
II., 83):
" The withdrawal of our forces across the Rappahannock was fatal to the [Federal] programme
of landing on that river and marching to Richmond before our forces could be in position to
resist an attack on the capital."
This withdrawal was expressly to enable the army to unite with other Con-
federate troops to oppose the expected invasion. I supposed that General
McClellan would inarch down the Potomac on the Maryland side, cross it
near the mouth of Aquia Creek, and take the Fredericksburg route to Rich-
mond. The position of Hooker, about midway between Washington and
this crossing-place, might well have suggested that he had this intention.
Postceipt. — In the first paragraph of Greneral Beauregard's postcript, it is
asserted that I did not claim to have commanded in the first battle of Manas-
sas until May, 1885, and that my official report of that action contains no
such claim. It is, nevertheless, distinctly expressed in that report — thus :
"In a brief and rapid conference, General Beauregard was assigned to the command of the
left, which, as the younger officer, he claimed, while I returned to that of the whole field."
And in " Johnston's Narrative," published in 1874, it is expressed in these
words, on page 49 :
" After assigning General Beauregard to the command of the troops immediately engaged,
which he properly suggested belonged to the second in rank, not to the commander of the army,
I returned to the supervision of the whole field."
So much for my not having claimed to have commanded at the " first
Manassas " until May, 1885.
General Beauregard in his official report states the circumstance thus :
" . . .1 urged General Johnston to leave the immediate conduct of the field to me, while
he, repairing to Portici, the Lewis house, should urge reinforcements forward."
This language would certainly limit his command as mine does. He did
not attempt to command the army, while I did command it, and disposed
of all the troops not engaged at the time of his assignment.
In his official report of the battle, General Beauregard further states :
" Made acquainted with my plan of operations and dispositions to meet the enemy, he gave
them his entire approval, and generously directed their execution under my command."
The only " plan " that he offered me [to move via Aldie] was rejected —
on the 14th, before my arrival. The battle fought was on McDowell's plan,
not General Beauregard's. The proof of this is, that at its commencement
little more than a regiment of Beauregard's command was on the ground
where the battle was fought, and, of his 7 brigades, 1 was a mile and 6 were
from 4 to 7 or 8 miles from it. The place of the battle was fixed by Bee's and
Jackson's brigades, sent forward by my direction. At my request General
Beauregard did write an order of march against the Federal army, finished a
little before sunrise of the 21st. In it I am invariably termed commander-in-
chief, and he (to command one of the wings) " second in command," or General
Beauregard — conclusive proof that the troops were not "under his command."
GENERAL EWELL AT BULL RUN.
259
Two letters, from General Lee and Mr. Walker, Secretary of "War, are cited
as evidence that General Beauregard commanded. Those gentlemen were
in a position to know if I relinquished the command or not. But I had
this letter from General Lee :
" Richmond, July 2J:th, 1861. My Dear General : I almost wept for joy at the glorious victory
achieved by our brave troops. The feelings of my heart could hardly be repressed on learning
the brilliant share you had in its achievement. I expected nothing else, and am truly grateful
for your safety. . . ."
In conclusion, I cannot discover that my unfavorable opinion of the Fed-
eral general's tactics, quoted by General Beauregard, indicates a fear to
command against him.
C4ENERAL EWELL AT BULL RUN. ,!
BY MAJOR CAMPBELL BROWN, AIDE-DE-CAMP AND ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL TO GENERAL EWELL.
In General Beauregard's article on Bull Run, in
"The Century" for November [18S1], is this
severe criticism of one of his subordinates, the
late Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell :
" Meanwhile, in rear of Mitchell's Ford, I bad been
waiting with General Johnston for the sound of conflict
to open in the quarter of Centrevillc, upon the Federal
left flank and rear (making allowance, however, for the
delays possible to commands unused to battle), when I
was chagrined to hear from General D. R. Jones that,
while he had been long ready for the movemeut upon
Ceutreville, General Ewell had not come up to form on
his right, though he had sent him between 7 and 8 o'clock
a copy of his own order, which recited that Ewell had
been already ordered to begiu the movement. I dis-
patched an immediate order to Ewell to advance; but
within a quarter of an hour, just as I received a dispatch
from him informing me that he had received no order to
advance in the morning, the firing on the left began to
increase so intensely as to indicate a severe attack,
whereupon General Johnston said that he would go
personally to that quarter."
This contains at least three errors, so serious
that the/ should not be allowed to pass uncor-
rected among the materials from which history
will one day be constructed :
1 . That Ewell failed to do what a good soldier
would have done — namely, to move forward im-
mediately on hearing from D. R. Jones.
2. That Beauregard was made aware of this sup-
posed backwardness of Ewell by a message from
D. R. Jones.
3. That on receiving this message he at once
ordered Ewell to advance.
The subjoined correspondence, | now [March,
1S85] first in print, took place four days after
the battle. It shows that Ewell did exactly what
Beauregard says he ought to have done — namely,
move forward promptly ; that his own staff-officer,
sent to report this forward movement, carried also
to headquarters the first intelligence of the failure
^ This article appeared substantially as here printed iu
'•The Century " for March, 1885.— Editors.
4 [correspondence.]
Union Mills, July 25th, 1861.
General Beauregard.
Sir: In a conversation with Major James, Louisiana
6th Regiment, he has left the impression on my mind
that you think some of your orders on the 21st were
either not carried out or not received by ine.
My first order on that day was to hold myself in readi-
ness to attack — this at sunrise. About 10, General Jones
sent a copy of an order received by him in which it was
stated that I had been ordered to cross and attack, and
on receipt of this I moved on until receiving the fol-
lowing: 10 & 1-2 A.M.
On account of the difficulties of the ground in our front, it
is thought advisable to fall back to our former position.
(Addressed) General Ewell. (Signed) G. T. B.
If any other order was sent to me, I should like to have
a copy of it, as well as the name of the courier who
brought it.
Every movement I made was at once reported to you
at the time, and this across Bull Run, as well as the
advance in the afternoon, I thought were explained in
my report sent in to-day.
If an order were sent earlier than the copy through
General Jones, the courier should be held responsible,
as neither General Holmes nor myself received it. I
send the original of the order to fall back in the morn-
ing. The second advance iu the afternoon and recall to
Stone Bridge were in consequence of verbal orders.
My chief object in writing to you is to ask you to leave
nothing doubtful in your report, both as regards my
crossing in the morning and recall — and not to let it be
inferred by any possibility that I blundered on that day.
I moved forward as soon as notified by General Jones
that I was ordered and he had been.
2bo
GENERAL EWELL AT BULL RUN.
of orders to reach him ; that no such message was
received from D. R. Jones as is here ascribed to
him ; and that the order sent back by Beauregard
to Ewell was not one to advance, but to retire from
an advance already begun.
It is not easy to understand these mistakes, as
General Beauregard has twice given a tolerably ac-
curate though meager account of the matter — once
in his official report, and once in his biography pub-
lished by Colonel Roman in 1884. Neither of these
accounts can be reconciled with the later attitude.
Upon reading General Beauregard's article, I
wrote to General Fitzhugh Lee, who was Ewell's
assistant adjutant-general at Manassas, asking his
recollection of what took place. I have liberty to
make the following extracts Hm his reply. After
stating what troops composed the brigade, he goes
on :
" These troops were all in position at daylight on the
21st July, ready for any duty, and held the extreme
right of General Beauregard's liue of battle along Bull
Run, at Union Mills. As hour after hour passed, General
Ewell grew impatient at not receiving any orders (be-
yond those to be ready to advance, which came at sun-
rise), and sent me between 9 and 10 A. m. to see General
P. R. Jones, who commanded the brigade next on his
left at McLean's Ford, to ascertain if that officer had any
news or had received any orders from army headquar-
ters. I found General Jones making preparations to
cross Bull Run, and was told by him that, in the order he
had received to do so, it was stated that General Ewell
had been sent similar instructions.
"Upon my report of these facts, General Ewell at
once issued the orders for his command to cross the Run
and move out on the road to Centreville."
General Lee then describes the recall across Bull
Run and the second advance of the brigade to make
a demonstration toward Centreville, and adds that
the skirmishers of Rodes's 5th Alabama Regi-
ment, which was in advance, had actually become
engaged, when we were again recalled and ordered
to " move by the most direct route at once, and as
rapidly as possible, for the Lewis house" — the
field of battle on the left. Ewell moved rapidly,
If there was an order sent me to advance before the
one I received through General Jones, it is more than
likely it would have been given to the same express.
Respectfully,
R. S. Ewell, B. G.
Manassas, Va., July 26th, 1861.
General: Your letter of the 25th iust. is received. I
do not attach the slightest blame to you for the failure
of the movement on Centreville, but to the guide who
did not deliver the order to move forward, sent at about
8 A. M. to General Holmes and then to you — correspond-
ing in every respect to the one sent to Generals Jones,
Bouham, and Longstreet — only their movements were
subordinate to yours. Unfortunately no copy, in the
hurry of the moment, was kept of said orders ; and so
many guides, about a dozen or more, were sent off in
different directions, that it is next to impossible to find
out who was the bearer of the orders referred to. Our
guides and couriers were the worst set I ever employed,
whether from ignorance or over-anxiety to do well and
quickly I cannot say; but many regiments lost their
way repeatedly on their way toward the field of battle,
and of course I can attach no more blame to their com-
manding officers than I could to you for not executing
an order which I am convinced you did not get.
I am fully aware that you did all that could have been
expected of you or your command. I merely expressed
sending General Lee and another officer ahead to
report and secure orders. On his arrival near the
field they brought instructions to halt, when he
immediately rode forward with them to General
Beauregard, "and General Ewell begged General
Beauregard to be allowed to go in pursuit of the
enemy, but his request was refused."
As to the real causes of the miscarriage of Gen-
eral Beauregard's plan of attack there need be
little doubt. They are plainly stated by his imme-
diate superior in command, General Joseph E.
Johnston, in his official report, as being the " early
movements of the enemy on that morning and the
non-arrival of the expected troops " from Harper's
Ferry. He adds: " General Beauregard afterward
proposed a modification of the abandoned plan,
to attack with our right, while the left stood
on the defensive. This, too, became impractica-
ble, and a battle ensued, different in place and
circumstances from any previous plan on our side."
There are some puzzling circumstances con-
nected with the supposed miscarriage of the order
for our advance. , The delay in sending it is unex-
plained. General Beauregard says it was sent " at
about 8 a. M.," but D. R. Jones had received his
corresponding order at 10 minutes past 7, and firing
had begun at half-past 5.
The messenger was strangely chosen. It was
the most important order of the day, for the move-
ments of the army were to hinge on those of our
brigade. There was no scarcity of competent
staff-officers; yet it was intrusted to "a guide,"
presumably an enlisted man, perhaps even a citi-
zen, whose very name was unknown.
His instructions were peculiar. Time was all-
important. He was ordered not to go direct to
Ewell, but first to make a detour to Holmes, who
lay in reserve nearly two miles in our rear.
His disappearance is mysterious. He was never
heard of after receiving the order ; yet his route
lay wholly within our lines, over well-beaten roads
and far out of reach of the enemy.
my regret that my original plan could not be carried into
effect, as it would have been a most complete victory
with only half the trouble and fighting.
The true cause of countermanding your forward move-
ment after you had crossed was that it was then too late,
as the enemy was about to annihilate our left flank, and
had to be met and checked there, for otherwise he would
have taken us in flank and rear and all would have been
lost. Yoiu-s truly,
G. T. Beauregard.
General R. S. Ewell, Union Mills, Va.
P. R. Please read the above to Major James.
N. B. The order sent you at about 8 a. m., to com-
mence the movement on Centreville, was addressed to
General Holmes and yourself, as he was to support you,
but being nearer Camp Pickens, the headquarters, than
Union Mills, where you were, it was to be communicated
to him first, and then to you; but he has informed me
that it never reached him. With regard to the order sent
you in the afternoon to recross the Bull Run (to march
toward the Stone Bridge), it was sent you by General J.
E. Johnston, as I am informed by him, for the purpose
of supporting our left, if necessary. G. T. B.
Do not publish until we know what the enemy is goins
to do —or reports are out — which I think will make it
all right. B.
THE CONFEDERATE COMMISSARIAT AT MANASSAS.
261
Lastly, General Beauregard, in his official report,
gives as his reason for countermanding the move-
ment begun by Ewell at 10 o'clock, that in his
judgment it would require quite three hours for the
troops to get into position for attack. Had the
messenger dispatched at 8 been prompt, Ewell
might have had his orders by 9. But at 9 we find
Beauregard in rear of Mitchell's Ford, waiting
for an attack which, by his own figures, he should
not have expected before 12.
It is not for me to reconcile these contradic-
tions.
THE CONFEDEEATE COMMISSARIAT AT MANASSAS.
BY COLONEL L. B. NORTHROP, COMMISSARY-GENERAL, C. S. A.
Generals Beauregard, Imboden, and Johnston
in the foregoing articles [see pages 221, 239, and
256] criticise the management of my department
in the matter of supplies for the Confederate
army at Manassas either before or after the first
battle. In the statements of these generals, there
is some conflict, but they all concur in making me
appear a preposterous imbecile, whom Mr. Davis
was guilty of retaining. General Imboden in
effect charges Mr. Benjamin with suppressing, in
order to shield my incapacity, an official report of
a board of officers convened by Johnston.
July 29th, 1861, General Beauregard wrote to
his aides, Colonels Chesnut and Miles, — the latter
read the letter in the Confederate Congress, —
about his vision of capturing Washington, and
thus laid the foundation of the cabal against Mr.
Davis which made the Confederate Government a
"divided house." It produced a resolution of
inquiry, followed soon by a standing committee,
and afterward, in January, 1865, by a unanimous
resolution, in secret session of both houses, to
appoint a joint select committee to investigate
the condition and management of all the Bureaux
of the War Department. The session of this com-
mittee on commissary affairs was held January
23d, 1865. During the war the investigations
of the standing committee into my policy and
methods were frequent ; several were long taking
testimony, for one member, H. S. Foote, — who
when I was myself in prison published me as cruel
to Federal prisoners, — was ever zealous to attack.
Every investigation ended in approval. I have a
letter from Mr. John B. Baldwin, chairman of the
joint select committee, stating that he had declared
in Congress, as the result of their examination,
"that the commissary department of subsistence,
under the control of Colonel Northrop, the Commis-
sary-General, had been managed with a foresight
and sagacity, and a far-reaching, comprehensive
grasp of its business, such as we had found in no
other bureau connected with the army supply,
with perhaps a single exception."
The facts are that the engineer, General Beau-
regard, neglected his communications, so that
"troops for the battle" and "supplies" were
"retarded" ; but the supplies were at the depot.
" Eighteen heavy cannon, called for two weeks
before," occupied unloaded cai's at Fredericksburg,
where there was a large supply of flour that had
been accumulating since early June. Numerous
cars were retained as stationary storehouses " for
provisions," "useless baggage," and "trunks";
one hundred and thirty-three cars were abstracted
by the "military" power from the use of the rail-
roads for two weeks and more before the battle
until returned by the Quartermaster-General and
Mr. Ashe, the Government agent. There was plenty
of lumber available to construct a storehouse. Gen-
eral Beauregard was not " urgent on the Commis-
sary-General for adequate supplies before the bat-
tle," for there was no ground of complaint. It was
after the battle, when the vision of capturing Wash-
ington had seduced him, that he tried to construct
a gi'ound of complaint anterior to the battle.
General Beauregard made but one demand on me
(July 8th, by a telegram which I have) for a com-
missary of the old service. Lieutenant-Colonel
Robert B. Lee was added; no one was removed.
On the 6th day of July I ordered Fowle to buy all
the corn-meal, and soon after all the bacon, he
could. July 7th, Beauregard ordered him to keep
in advance a two weeks' supply for 25,000 men,
and Major Noland was ready to supply any number
of beeves. The findings of the Board (on which
Colonel Lee sat) are incoherent as stated by
Imboden. The interdictions alleged by him are
refuted by Colonel Ruffin (my chief assistant), and
by all the letters sent officially to me in August,
1861. I have Fowle's detailed report of the ra-
tions at Manassas ; there was plenty of provision
for a march on Washington. If I had removed his
commissaries as he alleges, or had "interdicted"
them as General Imboden states, General Beau-
regard need not have been hampered, in a country
which all the generals have declared abounded in
the essentials of food.
General Johnston's comments on the commis-
sariat are unfounded. He "requested" an in-
crease of provisions which his commissary alone
could determine, and allowed the accumulation to
go on for twelve days after he knew that he had
more than he wanted. When I was informed, I
did what he should have done — telegraphed the
shippers to stop. Two weeks before his move he
promised my officer, Major Noland, the transpor-
tation deemed siifficient, and of which he had as-
sumed direct control. Empty trains passed the
meat which had been laid in piles, ready for ship-
ment. Empty trains lay idle at Manassas for
days, in spite of Noland's efforts to get them.
General Johnston says the stores of the other de-
partments were brought off. Eight hundred new
army saddles, several thousand pairs of new shoes,
and a large mimber of new blankets were burned —
Quartermaster's stores then difficult of attainment.
THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI.
BY COLONEL THOMAS L. SNEAD. -ft
■y
wm?m
I
I
C '.'
*"
A VERY RAW RECRUIT.
SOUTH CAROLINA had just seceded and the whole coun-
try was in the wildest excitement when the General
Assembly of Missouri met at Jefferson City on the last
day of the year 1860. Responding to the recommenda-
tions of Governor Jackson and to the manifest will of
the people of the State, it forthwith initiated measures
for ranging Missouri with the South in the impending
conflict. A State Convention was called; bills to organize,
arm, and equip the militia were introduced ; and the Fed-
eral Government was solemnly warned that if it sent an
army into South Carolina, or into any other slavehold-
ing State, in order to coerce it to remain in the Union,
or to force its people to obey the laws of the United
States, " the people of Missouri would instantly rally on
the side of such State to resist the invaders at all hazards
and to the last extremity."
The most conspicuous leader of this movement was
Claiborne F. Jackson, who had just been inaugurated
Governor. He had for many years been one of the fore-
most leaders of the Democrats of Missouri, and had been
elected Governor in August. In the late canvass he had
supported Douglas for President, not because he either liked him or approved
his policy on the slavery question, but because Douglas was the choice of
the Missouri Democrats, and to have opposed him would have defeated his
own election ; for in August, 1860, the people of Missouri were sincerely
desirous that the questions at issue between the North and the South
should be compromised and settled upon some fair basis, and were opposed
to the election to the Presidency of any man — whether Lincoln or Breck-
inridge— whose success might intensify sectional antipathies and imperil the
integrity of the Union.
But while loyally supporting the candidacy of Douglas, Jackson abated
none of his devotion to the political principles which had been the constant
guide of his life. He was a true son of the South, warmly attached to the
land that had given him birth, and to her people, who were his own kindred.
He was now nearly fifty-five years of age, tall, erect, and good-looking ; kind-
hearted, brave, and courteous ; a thoughtful, earnest, upright man ; a political
leader, but not a soldier.
The Governor urged the people of Missouri to elect to the Convention men
who would place Missouri unequivocally on the side of the South. He was
■fe Colonel Suead was at different times aide-de-camp to Governor Jackson, acting Adjutant-General
of the Missouri State Guard, Chief-of-Staff of tbe Army of the West, and member of the Confederate
Congress. He was made by General Price the custodian of his private and official papers. — Editors.
262
THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI.
26)
disappointed. Francis P. Blair, Jr., banded together
the unconditional Union men of the State ; while the
St. Louis "Republican," Sterling Price, Hamilton R.
Gamble, James S. Rollins, William A. Hall, and John B. Clark consolidated
the conservatives, and together these elected on the 18th of February a Con-
vention not one member of which would say that he was in favor of the
secession of Missouri. To the courage, moderation, and tact of Francis P.
Blair this result was greatly due.
Blair was just forty years of age. His father, the trusted friend of Andrew
Jackson, had taken him to Washington City when he was about seven years
old, and there he had been bred in politics. In 1843 he had come to St. Louis,
where his brother Montgomery was already practicing law. For that profes-
sion, to which he too had been educated, Frank had no taste, and, having in
it no success, quickly turned his attention to politics. In 1852 he was elected
to the Legislature as a Benton Democrat. Shortly afterward he and B. Gratz
Brown established the St. Louis " Democrat." When the Kansas conflict
broke out in 1854, he identified himself with the Free-soil party, and in 1856
supported Fremont for the Presidency, though Senator Benton, Fremont's
father-in-law, refused to do this. He was elected to Congress that year, for
the first time. In the presidential canvass of 1860 he had been the leader of
the Republicans of Missouri, and it was through him chiefly that Lincoln
received 17,000 votes in the State. Immediately after the secession of South
2b4
THE FIRST YEAR. OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI.
Carolina, he had begun to organize his adherents as Home Guards and had
armed some of them, and was drilling the rest for the field, when the election
of delegates to the State Convention took place. To complete the arming of
these men was his first aim. In the city of St. Louis the United States had
an arsenal within which were more than enough arms for this purpose —
60,000 stand of arms and a great abundance of other munitions of war. So
long as Buchanan was President, Blair could not get them, but the 4th of
March was near at hand and he could well wait till then, for the Southern-
rights men had been so demoralized by the defeat which they had sustained
in the election of delegates to the Convention, that they were in no condition
to attack the arsenal, as they had intended
to do if the election had gone in their
favor. It was, indeed, more than a month
after the inauguration of Lincoln before
the Southern-rights men ventured to make
any move in that direction. The Governor
then came to St. Louis to concert with
General D. M. Frost (who commanded a
small brigade of volunteer militia) meas-
ures for seizing the arsenal in the name of
the State. While the matter was still under
consideration the bombardment of Fort
Sumter took place, and the President called
for 75,000 troops to support the Govern-
ment. To his call upon Missouri for her
quota of such troops, the Governor replied
that the requisition was, in his opinion,
" illegal, unconstitutional, and revolution-
ary in its object, inhuman and diabolical,"
and that Missouri would not furnish one
man "to carry on such an unholy crusade."
A few days later he convened the General Assembly, to adopt measures
for the defense of the State.
In the consultation with Frost it had been decided that the Governor, in
pursuance of an existing law of the State, should order all its militia into
encampment for the purpose of drill and discipline; and that, under cover of
this order, Frost should camp his brigade upon the hills adjacent to and com-
manding the arsenal, so that when the opportunity occurred he might seize
it and all its stores. A great difficulty in the way of the execution of
this plan was the want of siege-guns and mortars. To remove this difficulty
the Governor sent Captains Colton Greene and Basil W. Duke to Mont-
gomery, Alabama, and Judge Cooke to Virginia to obtain these things By
Mr. Davis's order the arms were turned over to Duke and Greene at Baton
Rouge, and were by them taken to St. Louis. Before they arrived there,
however, the scheme to seize the arsenal had been completely frustrated by
its commandant, Captain Nathaniel Lyon, who distributed a part of the
IIPIIPIS
GOVERNOR CLAIBORNE F. JACKSON.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI.
26 s
P.KIGADIEU-GENERAL D. M. FROST, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
coveted arms to Blair's Home Guards and removed the rest to Illinois, and
then occupied with his own troops the hills around the arsenal. Frost con-
sequently established Camp Jackson in a grove in the western part of
the city, remote from the arsenal, and was drilling and disciplining his
men there in conformity to the laws of the State and under the flag of the
Union, when Jefferson Davis's gift to
Missouri was taken into the camp.
Blair and Lyon, to whom every de-
tail of the Governor's scheme had been
made known, had been waiting for this
opportunity. They had made up their
minds to capture the camp and to hold
the officers and men as prisoners of war.
Frost went into camp on the 6th of
May. The arms from the Confederacy
were taken thither on the 8th. On Sat-
urday, the 11th, the camp was to break
up. Lyon had no time to lose. On
Thursday he attired himself in a dress
and shawl and other apparel of Blair's
mother-in-law, Mrs. Alexander, and
having completed his disguise by hid-
ing his red beard and weather-beaten
features under a thickly veiled sun-bonnet, took on his arm a basket, filled,
not with eggs, but with loaded revolvers, got into a barouche belonging to
Blair's brother-in-law, Franklin A. Dick, and was driven out to Camp
Jackson and through it. Eeturning to the city, he called the Union Safety
Committee together, and informed them that he intended to capture the
camp the next day. Some of the committee objected, but Blair and James
O. Broadhead sustained him, and he ordered his men to be in readiness to
move in the morning. Just as they were about to march, Colonel John
S. Bowen came to Lyon with a protest from Frost. Lyon refused to
receive it, and, marching out to the camp with about 7000 men, surrounded
it and demanded its surrender. Frost, who had only 635 men, was obliged
to comply.
While the surrender was taking place a great crowd of people, among
whom were U. S. Grant and W. T. Sherman, hurried to the scene. Most of
the crowd sympathized with the prisoners, and some gave expression to their
indignation. One of Lyon's German regiments thereupon opened fire upon
them, and twenty-eight men, women, and children were killed. The prisoners
were then marched to the arsenal, and paroled the next day.
The capture of Camp Jackson and the bloody scenes that followed — the
shooting down then and the next day of unoffending men, women, and
children — aroused the State. J The General Assembly, which had reconvened
in extra session, enacted instantly a law for organizing, arming, and equip-
$ Lyon officially states that on both days the firing was in response to attacks by mobs. — Editors.
266 THE FIRST YEAR. OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI.
ping the militia, created a military fund, and conferred dictatorial power
upon the Governor.
Hardly less important than these things — for it was what gave effect to
them all — was the fact that the capture of the camp caused ex-Governor
Sterling Price, President of the State Convention, and up to that time a
Union man, to tender his services to the Governor. The General Assembly
forthwith authorized the Governor to create a major-general to command
all the forces which the State might put into the field, and Price was
appointed to that position. ^
In the Convention Price had been opposed under all circumstances to the
secession of Missouri, but just as earnestly opposed to the invasion and con-
quest of the South by the Federal Government. To that position he still
adhered even when Mr. Lincoln, after the bombardment of Port Sumter, had
called for troops with which to repossess the Federal forts and enforce the
laws of the Union within the seceded States. But considering Lyon's attack
upon the State militia and his killing peaceable citizens an "unparalleled
insult and wrong to the State," he believed it was the duty of Missouri to
resent such wrongs.
The State now sprang to arms. Volunteers began to crowd the streets of
Jefferson City, and everything indicated the opening of hostilities. Blair and
Lyon would have met these demonstrations with force, would have driven
Jackson and Price from the capital, would have dispersed the militia wherever
it dared to show itself, would have occupied the State with Federal garrisons,
and would have held her in unresisting obedience to the Union ; but, unfor-
tunately for the execution of their plans, General William S. Harney, who
commanded the Military Department of the West, of which Missouri was
part, had returned to St. Louis the day after the capture of Camp Jackson,
and had resumed command there. Instead of using force Harney used con-
ciliation. Instead of making war he made a truce with Price.
Blair now caused Harney to be relieved of the command of the Federal
troops in Missouri, and on the 31st of May he was superseded by Lyon. As
soon as this was made known to the Governor and General Price, they
ordered the militia to be gotten in readiness for the field, for they knew that
&Born in Prince Edward County, Virginia, in ing presence, — he was also a parliamentarian by
1809, Price was now fifty-one years of age. He had instinct, understood intuitively the rules that
been carefully educated in the schools of his native govern deliberative bodies, and knew how to
State and at Hampden-Sidney College, and had enforce them with promptness and vigor. He
afterward attended the Law School of one of the occupied this position till 1844, and was then
most eminent jurists of Virginia, the venerable elected to Congress. He took his seat in December,
Chancellor Creed Taylor. He removed with his 1845; but when the war with Mexico broke out,
father's family to Chariton County, Missouri, in a few months latei*, he left Congress, returned to
1831, and had resided there ever since. Elected Missouri, raised a regiment and led it to New
to the Legislature in 1840, he was at once chosen Mexico, where he was placed in command. For
Speaker of the House, an honor rarely conferred his good conduct and gallantry in several battles
upon so young a man, and particularly upon one that he fought and won there, and in recognition of
who had never before been a member of a delibera- the military and civic ability which he displayed
tive assembly. But he was preeminently fitted for in completing the conquest of that part of the
the position. Well born and well bred, courteous Mexican territory, he was appointed brigadier-
and dignified, well educated, and richly endowed general by President Polk. In 1852 he was
with that highest of all mental faculties, common elected Governor of Missouri, and he held that
sense ; tall, straight, handsome, and of a command- office till the beginning of 1857. — T. L. S.
THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI.
267
FAC-SIMILE OF WAR SCRIP ISSUED BY THE CONFEDERATE LEGISLATURE OP MISSOURI.
Blair and Lyon would quickly attack them. Some well-meaning gentlemen,
who vainly imagined that Missouri could maintain her neutrality in the midst
of war, now sought to establish a truce between Price and Lyon. Through
them a conference was agreed upon, and the Governor and General Price came
to St. Louis under Lyon's safe conduct. They met him and Blair at the Planters'
House. Lyon was accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Major Horace A. Conant,
and I was present as the Governor's aide. The interview, which lasted several
hours, was at last terminated by Lyon's saying that he would see every man,
woman, and child in Missouri under the sod before he would consent that the
State should dictate to "his Government" as to the movement of its troops
within her limits, or as to any other matter however unimportant. "This,"
said he, "means war. One of my officers will conduct you out of my lines in
an hour." So saying, he left without another word, without even a salutation.
He had hardly left us when he was issuing orders for the movement of his
troops. Sweeny and Sigel were sent with about 3000 men to the south-west
to intercept the retreat of Jackson and Price if they should undertake to
effect a junction with General Ben. McCulloch, who was believed to be con-
centrating a Confederate army in north-western Arkansas for the invasion of
Missouri. Lyon would himself move up the Missouri after Jackson.
The conference was held on the 11th of June. On the 13th Lyon was
on his way to Jefferson City with about 2000 men. Arriving there the next
day, he found that the Governor had fled to Boonville. Leaving a garrison
at Jefferson City, he pushed on to Boonville, where some 1300 militia had ren-
dezvoused. Attacking these on the 17th, he dispersed them and drove the
Governor southward with some two or three hundred men who still adhered
to him and to the cause which he represented. General Price had meanwhile
gone to Lexington, where several thousand militia had assembled.
From a military standpoint the affair at Boonville was a very insignificant
thing, but it did in fact deal a stunning blow to the Southern-rights men of
268 THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI.
Missouri, and one which weakened the Confederacy during all of its brief
existence. It was indeed the consummation of Blair's statesmanlike scheme to
make it impossible for Missouri to secede, or out of her great resources to
contribute liberally of men and material to the South, as she would have done
could her people have had their own way. It was also the most brilliant
achievement of Lyon's well-conceived campaign. The capture of Camp
Jackson had disarmed the State, and completed the conquest of St.
Louis and all the adjacent counties. The advance upon Jefferson City had
put the State government to flight and taken away from the Governor the
prestige which sustains established and acknowledged authority. The dis-
persion of the volunteers that were flocking to Boonville to fight under Price
for Missouri and the South extended Lj^on's conquest at once to the borders
of Iowa, closed all the avenues by which the Southern men of North Missouri
could get to Price and Jackson, made the Missouri River a Federal highway
from its source to its mouth, and put an end to Price's hope of holding the
rich and friendly counties in the vicinity of Lexington till the Confederacy
could send an army to his support, and arms and supplies for the men whom,
he was concentrating there.
Price had, indeed, no alternative now but to retreat in all haste to the
south-western part of the State, so as to organize his army within supporting
distance of the force which McCulloch was assembling in western Arkansas
for the protection of that State and the Indian Territory. He accordingly
ordered Brigadier-General James S. Rains to take command of the militia at
and near Lexington, and to move southward so as to effect a junction with
the Governor in the vicinity of Lamar, toward which place the latter was
retreating with Generals M. M. Parsons and John B. Clark and what was
left of their commands. General Price himself, accompanied by his staff and
a small escort, hastened rapidly toward Arkansas in order to bring McCulloch
to the rescue of both the Governor and Rains. On the way he was joined,
almost daily, by squads or companies, and by the time he reached Cowskin
Prairie, in the extreme south-western corner of the State, he had collected
about 1200 men.
On the 3d of July Rains reached Lamar, near which place the Governor
and his followers were already encamped. The combined force amounted to
about 6000 men, of whom 4000 were armed, and they had seven pieces of
artillery. Halting until the 5th in order to rest and organize, they pushed on
that morning toward Carthage, having heard that a Federal force had occu-
pied that place, which lay in their line of retreat. They had inarched but a
few miles when, as they were passing through the open prairie, they descried,
some three miles away, on the declivity of a hill over which they had them-
selves to pass, a long line of soldiers with glistening bayonets and bright
guns. These were part of the force which Lyon, on marching against Jeffer-
son City, had sent under General Sweeny and Colonel Sigel to the south-west
to intercept the Governor's retreat toward Arkansas. Sigel, in executing
this plan, had first attempted to intercept Price. Failing in that, he had
now, with more boldness than discretion, thrown himself, with about 1100
THE FIRST YEAR OF THE V/AR IN MISSOURI. 26c)
men and eight pieces of artillery, in front of the Governor, hoping either to
defeat him or to hold him in check till Lyon could arrive and destroy
him. Halting' his column in the prairie, and deploying his armed men
(about 4000), the Governor awaited Sigel's attack. The fight (known as the
battle of Carthage) did not last long, for Sigel was outnumbered four to one,
and the Missourians quickly put him to flight. He retreated, however, in
perfect order, carrying off almost everything that he had brought with him.
But he did not stop running till he had made forty miles. That night the
State troops rested in Carthage. The next day they resumed their southward
march, and soon met Price and McCulloch. Price now assumed command
of the Missourians and led them to Cowskin Prairie, in the south-western
corner of the State, while McCulloch went into camp near Maysville in
Arkansas.
Lyon left Boonville in pursuit of the Governor, on the 3d of July, with
about 2350 men, and directed his course toward Clinton in Henry county,
where he had ordered Major Sturgis, who was following Rains with about
2500 regulars and Kansas troops, to unite with him. The two columns came
together near Clinton on the 7th of July and pushed on after the Missourians.
Lyon did not learn till the 9th that they had defeated Sigel and effected a
junction with McCulloch. He then made in all haste for Springfield, fearing
that the Confederates would attack that place. Arriving there on the 13th
of July, he made it his headquarters.
Lyon, on the one hand, and Price on the other now began to get their
armies in readiness for active operations. For Lyon this was a simple under-
taking ; for Price it was one of great complexity and great difficulty. Of the
7000 or 8000 men that he had, only a few had been organized into regiments.
Several thousand of them had no arms of any kind. The rest were for the
most part armed with the shot-guns and rifles which they had brought
from their homes. Of powder and lead they had an abundance, but no fixed
ammunition for either their seven pieces of artillery or for their small-arms.
Tents they had none, nor camp equipage of any kind. There were no quar-
termasters' supplies, nor subsistence; and neither the quartermaster-general
nor the chief commissary had a dollar of funds. The men were not fighting
for pay, they wanted none, nor did they get any; but they and their thou-
sands of horses and mules had to be fed. For their animals there was nothing
but the grass of the prairies, and for themselves nothing but a scant supply
of lean beef and coarse corn-meal. There were enough good officers to
organize and command the men ; but it would have puzzled almost any one
to drill a company of raw recruits, armed, some with shot-guns, some with
rifles, a few with old-fashioned flint-lock muskets, and here and there a man
with a percussion musket. No better proof could be given of the dearth of
material for the Staff, than the fact that I was myself assigned to duty by Gen-
eral Price as chief of ordnance of the army, though I told him at the time that
I did not know the difference between a howitzer and a siege-gun, and had
never seen a musket-cartridge in all my life ; and a few days later I was
assigned to the still more important position of acting Adjutant-General of
270 THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI.
the State Guard, though I had never then heard of a " morning report," and
did not know the right of a company from its left. Had Hardee or any other
West Pointer been in command, he would have kept us in camp six
months, drilling and disciplining us, getting together wagons and teams,
tents and cartridge-boxes, uniforms and haversacks, quartermasters and red
tape, and all the other equipments and impedimenta of an army in the field,
and then we would have gone into winter quarters ; Lyon would have had his
own way in Missouri, and the Federal armies that were sent thither to whip
us would have been sent to fight in Virginia or in Tennessee instead, and
the Confederacy might have been vanquished sooner than it was. But Price
had us all ready for the field in less than three weeks. We had no tents, it
is true, but tents would only have been in our way ; we had no uniforms, but
a bit of flannel or calico fastened to the shoulder of an officer designated his
rank sufficiently for all practical purposes ; the ripening corn-fields were our
depots of subsistence ; the prairies furnished forage, and the people in defense
of whose homes we were eager to fight gladly gave us of all their stores.
McCulloch, one of the bravest of men and best of scouts, looking at us
through the eyes of the young army officers whom Mr. Davis had sent to
teach him how to organize, equip, and fight an army scientifically, saw in the
Missourians nothing but a half-armed mob, led by an ignorant old militia
general, but he consented to go with Price in search of Lyon, who was at
Springfield and not hard to find. General N. B. Pearce, commanding a
brigade of Arkansas State troops, agreed to go along with them.
Hardee, who was at Pitman's Ferry, Arkansas, within a few hundred
yards of the Missouri line, and almost as near to Springfield as were Price
and McCulloch, and who had with him several thousand good soldiers, was
begged by both Price and McCulloch to cooperate in the movement against
Lyon, but he replied that he " did not wish to march to their assistance with
less than 5000 men, well appointed, and a full complement of artillery " !
By order of General Polk, made at the earnest personal solicitation of
Governor Jackson, who had gone to Memphis for that purpose, General
Pillow moved into Missouri from Tennessee, with twelve thousand men, and
occupied New Madrid on the 28th of July, with the intent to unite in the
effort to repossess the State.
On the same day, Price, McCulloch, and Pearce, relying upon the cooper-
ation of both Hardee and Pillow, concentrated their forces at Cassville,
within about fifty miles of Springfield. There Price was reenforced by
General McBride's command, consisting of two regiments of foot and three
companies of mounted men, about 700 in all. They had come from
the hill country lying to the south and south-east of Springfield, and
were a unique body of soldiers. Very few of the officers had any knowledge
whatever of military principles or practices, and only the most superficial
experience in company tactics. The staff was composed chiefly of country
lawyers who took the ways of the court-room with them into the field.
Colonels could not drill their regiments, nor captains their companies; a
drum and a fife — the only ones in the entire command — sounded all the calls,
THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI. 271
and companies were paraded by the sergeant's calling out, " Oh, yes ! Oh, yes !
all you who belong to Captain Brown's company fall in here." Officers and
men messed together, and all approached McBride without a salute, lounged
around his quarters, listened to all that was said, and when they spoke
to him called him " Jedge." Their only arms were the rifles with which they
hunted the squirrels and other small game that abounded in their woods, but
these they knew how to use. A powder-horn, a cap-pouch, " a string of
patchin'," and a hunter's knife completed their equipment. I doubt whether
among them all there was a man that had ever seen a piece of artillery. But,
for all this, they were brave and intelligent. Like all frontiersmen, they were
shrewd, quick-witted, wary, cunning, and ready for all emergencies, and like
all backwoodsmen, their courage was serene, steady, unconscious. While there
was no attempt at military discipline, and no pretense of it, the most perfect
order was maintained by McBride's mere force of character, by his great good
sense, and by the kindness with which he exercised his patriarchal authority.
Leaving Cassville on the 31st of July, the combined Southern armies, nearly
11,000 strong, advanced toward Springfield. On the way they encountered
Lyon, who had come out to meet them. McCulloch, who could not compre-
hend the Missourians or the able soldier who commanded them, refused to
attack unless Price and Pearce would confer upon him the chief command.
Price had been a brigadier-general in Mexico, when McCulloch was but a cap-
tain of scouts, and had won more battles there than McCulloch had ever wit-
nessed; he was now a major-general with more than 5000 men, and McCulloch
had barely 3000 ; and in intellect, in experience, and in generalship he was
worth a dozen McCullochs ; nevertheless, he cheerfully placed himself and
his army under the Texan's command. The order to advance was then given.
Lyon had been encamped six miles in front with between 5000 and 6000 men.
McCulloch moved at midnight, hoping to fall upon him unexpectedly, and to
defeat him. To his amazement he learned, on approaching the spot, that
Lyon had left twenty hours before, and must now be almost in sight of
Springfield. The Confederates kept on, and on the 6th of August went into
camp on Wilson's Creek, within ten miles of Springfield. They were still
lying there on the morning of the 10th of August, when they were surprised
and suddenly attacked on the north by Lyon, and on the south by Sigel. |
One of the stubbornest and bloodiest battles of the war now took place.
Lyon's main attack was met by Price with about 3200 Missourians, and
Churchill's regiment and Woodruff's battery, both, from Arkansas. His left
was met and driven back by Mcintosh with a part of McCulloch's brigade
(the Third Louisiana and Mcintosh's regiment). McCulloch then took some
companies of the Third Louisiana and parts of other commands, and with them
attacked and routed Sigel (who had been sent to attack the rear), capturing
five of his guns. This done, Pearce's Arkansas brigade, which up to this
time had not fired a gun, was sent to reenforce Price. Lyon, seeing that
I For maps and more specific descriptions of see the papers by Generals Pearce and Wherry,
the three chief engagements of this "first year," Colonel Mulligan, and General Sigel, to follow. —
— Wilson's Creek, Lexington, and Pea Ridge, — Editors.
272
THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI.
MAJOR-GENERAL STERLING PRICE, C. S. A. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
the supreme moment had come, and that the day would be surely lost if he
did not overwhelm Price before the Arkansans could reenforce him, now
brought forward every available man, and was putting them into the fight,
when his horse was killed, and himself wounded in the head. Dazed by the
blow, dazed and stunned, his heart gave way for a moment under the sudden
shock, but quickly coming to his senses he mounted another horse, and,
swinging his hat in the air, called on his men to follow. Closing around
him they dashed with him into the thick of the fight. But a moment later
a bullet pierced his heart, and he fell from his horse into the arms of his
orderly, and in an instant was dead. It was vain that the Federals tried to
prolong the battle. Sturgis, on whom the command devolved, ordered a
retreat, and before the Confederates knew that the battle was ended he
was a mile away, having withdrawn his men unseen through the dense
undergrowth of the woods in which the battle mainly was fought. In the
THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI. 273
haste of their retreat, the Federals left Lyon's dead body on the field. I
delivered it myself an hour or two later to a flag-of-truce party that had been
sent to ask for it, I saw it again the next day in Springfield, where it had
been again abandoned by his men. [See foot-note, page 297.]
Rarely have I met so extraordinary a man as Lyon, or one that has
interested me so deeply. Coming to St. Louis from Kansas on the 6th of
February, this mere captain of infantry, this little, rough-visaged, red-bearded,
weather-beaten Connecticut captain, by his intelligence, his ability, his energy,
and his zeal, had at once acquired the confidence of all the Union men of
Missouri, and had made himself respected, if not feared, by his enemies. In
less than five months he had risen to the command of the Union armies in
Missouri, had dispersed the State government, had driven the Governor and
his adherents into the extremest corner of the State, had almost conquered
the State, and would have completely conquered it had he been supported
by his Government ; and now he had given his life willingly for the Union
which he revered, and to the cause of Human Freedom to which he was
fanatically devoted.
The Federal force in the battle amounted to about 5400 officers and men.
The Confederates had over 10,000 armed men on the ground, but 3000 of
them took little or no part in the fight. The Confederates lost 279 killed
and 951 wounded. The Federal loss was 258 killed, 873 wounded, and 186
captured or missing.
McCulloch refused to pursue, and Price resumed command of the Missouri
troops. The next day he took possession of Springfield, and sent Rains with
a mounted force to clear the western counties of the State of the marauding
bands that had come into them from Kansas. On the 25th of August he
moved northward with his army. On the 2d of September he met a part of
Lane's Kansas Brigade under Colonel Montgomery on the banks of the Big
Dry Wood. Montgomery had about 500 men and gave battle, but was forced
to retreat before Price's superior force. The loss on either side was trifling.
Price now hastened toward Lexington, joined at every step by recruits.
Reaching the city on the 12th of September with his mounted men, he drove
Colonel Mulligan within his intrenchments, and as soon as his main body
came up, completed the investment of the place. On the 20th he caused a
number of hemp-bales saturated with water to be rolled to the front and
converted them into movable breastworks, behind which his men advanced
unharmed against the enemy. Colonel Mulligan was forced to surrender the
next day. Price's loss was 25 killed and 72 wounded. Fremont reported to
the War Department that the Union loss was 39 killed and 120 wounded.
The Missourians captured about 3500 prisoners, five pieces of artillery, two
mortars, 3000 stand of small-arms, a large number of sabers, about 750
horses, many sets of cavalry equipments, ammunition, many wagons and
teams, more than $100,000 worth of commissary stores, and a large amount
of other property. Price also recovered $900,000 that had been taken by the
enemy from the Bank at Lexington, and restored it to the Bank. His force
amounted to about 18,000 men, Mulligan's to about 3600.
VOL. I. 18
274
THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI.
Tn order to obtain the cooperation of the Confederate armies, the Governor
and General Price sent me to Richmond, after the capture of Lexington, as a
special commissioner to explain to President Davis the condition of affairs in
Missouri, and to negotiate a treaty of alliance with the Confederate States,
inasmuch as Missouri had not seceded nor been admitted into the Confederacy.
By their direction I went by way of
McCulloch's headquarters, in order
to make one more effort to secure
his cooperation, and failing in that,
to get from him certain supplies
which General Price greatly needed,
particularly caps for the muskets
which we had captured at Lexing-
ton. To all my entreaties McCulloch
replied that Price had gone to the
Missouri against his advice; that the
movement was unwise and would re-
sult in disaster, and that he would
not endanger his own army by going
to his assistance ; and that as for
musket-caps, he had none to spare.
General John C. Fremont, who had
assumed command of the Union ar-
mies in the West on the 25th of July,
now began to concentrate his forces against Price. Sending about 40,000
men, with 100 pieces of artillery, to attack him in front, and others to cut
off his retreat, he took the field himself. His plan was magnificent — to
capture or disperse Price's army; march to Little Rock and occupy the
place; turn the Confederates under Polk, Pillow, Thompson, and Hardee, and
compel them to fall back southward ; push on to Memphis with his army
and Foote's flotilla ; capture that city; and then make straight for New Orleans.
Price left Lexington on the 29th of September, after advising his unarmed
men to return to their homes, and to wait for a more convenient time to rise.
Marching as rapidly as his long train would permit, he reached the Osage on
the 8th of October with about 7000 men. To cross his troops and trains over
that difficult river on a single flat-boat was a tedious operation, but Fremont
gave him all the time that he needed, and he got them safely over.
After crossing the Osage, Price marched quickly to Neosho, where the
General Assembly had been summoned by Governor Jackson to meet.
Fremont continued to follow till the 2d of November, when he was super-
seded by Major-General David Hunter, who immediately stopped the pursuit
and turned the army back to St. Louis. On the 19th of November Major-
General Halleck assumed command of the Federal Department.
When I returned from Richmond, Price had gone into winter quarters on
the Sac River near Osceola. Many of his men had been furloughed so that
they might go to their homes, where they could subsist themselves during
MAJOR-GENEKAL DAVID HUKTER. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI. 27s
the winter and provide for their families. McCulloch's brigade was on the
Arkansas River; and Pearce's had been disbanded. Under the treaty which
had been negotiated at Richmond, the enlistment of Missourians in the
Confederate army was at once begun and was continued at Springfield,
whither Price moved his army just before Christmas. Before the end of
January, 1862, two regiments of infantry (Bnrbridge's and Rives's), one regi-
ment of cavalry (Gates's), and two batteries (Wade's and Clark's) had been
mustered into the Confederate service, and on the 28th I started to Richmond
to deliver the muster-rolls to the Secretary of War, and to inform the President
as to the strength and condition of the army in Missouri, and to communi-
cate to him Price's views as to the future conduct of the war in that State.
On the way I met Major-General Earl Van Dorn at Jacksonport in Arkansas.
He had just assumed command (January 29th) of the District of the Trans-
Mississippi, constituting a part of General Albert Sidney Johnston's extensive
department. He was a dashing soldier, and a very handsome man, and his
manners were graceful and fascinating. He was slight of stature and his
features were almost too delicately refined for a soldier, but this defect, if it
was a defect, was converted into a charm by the martial aspect of his mustache
and imperial, and by an exuberant growth of brownish hair. Quitting the
United States army when Mississippi seceded, he first entered her service,
and was afterward appointed to that of the Confederacy and placed in com-
mand of Texas. Transferred thence to Virginia in September, 1861, he was
commissioned major-general and ordered to report to General J. E. Johnston,
commanding the Army of the Potomac. Johnston ordered him to Beau-
regard, and Beauregard assigned him to the command of a division, October
4th, 1861. He was assigned to the command of the Trans-Mississippi District,
January 10th, 1862. We Missourians were delighted ; for he was known to be
a fighting man, and we felt sure he would help us to regain our State. I
explained to him the condition of affairs in Missouri, and General Price's views.
Van Dorn had already decided upon a plan of campaign, and in execution
of it ordered General Albert Pike, a few days afterward, to Lawrence county,
Missouri, with a mixed command of whites and Indians estimated at 7000
men; ordered Mcintosh to report to Price at Springfield with McCulloch's
infantry, ordered McCulloch to Pocahontas with his mounted men; and
called upon Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas to send reinforcements. Hope-
ful and enthusiastic by nature, he believed that Price would have 15,000
effective men at Springfield by the last of March, and himself 18,000 at Poca-
hontas, and that they could then march against St. Louis. The two col-
umns were to effect a junction north of Ironton, and, moving thence rapidly
without tents or baggage, take the city by assault. Possession of the city
would give him possession of the State, and the enemy would supply the
arms for the thousands of volunteers that would flock to his standard.
From this day-dream he was rudely awakened a few days later by news
that Price had been driven from Springfield on the 12th of February, and was
hotly pursued by a Federal army which Halleck had sent against him under
General S. R. Curtis. With this army was Captain P. H. Sheridan, doing duty
276
THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI.
MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY W. HALLE CK. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
as quartermaster. Price sought refuge in the mountains of Arkansas, and
February 21st was within thirty miles of Van Buren, near which place was
McCulloch.
On learning all this Van Dorn hastened to Van Buren and thence to
Price's headquarters, which he reached on the 1st of March. After a hurried
consultation with Price and McCulloch, he decided to instantly attack Curtis,
who had taken a strong position among the mountains near Benton ville. He
moved on the 4th of March with about 16,000 men, of whom 6800 were
Missourians under Price, and the rest Confederates under McCulloch and
Pike. When almost within reach of Curtis (who reported his own strength at
10,500 infantry and cavalry and forty-nine pieces of artillery) Van Dorn
unwisely divided his army, and leaving McCulloch with his own command
and Pike's to attack Curtis in front, himself made with Price and the Mis-
sourians a long circuit to the rear of Curtis, and out of communication with
McCulloch. Both columns attacked about the same time on the 7th. Price
was completely successful and carried everything before him, taking during
THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI. 277
the afternoon seven pieces of cannon and about 200 prisoners, and at night
bivouacked near Elkhorn Tavern. But morning revealed the enemy in a new
and strong position, then- forces united and offering battle. The Confederates
soon learned that McCulloch and Mcintosh had been killed the day before
and their force routed and dispersed. The battle was renewed nevertheless,
and the Missourians fought desperately and were still holding their ground
when about 10 o'clock Van Dorn ordered a retreat, and the army leaving
Missouri to her fate began to fall back toward Van Buren.
In this battle, sometimes called the battle of Pea Ridge, and at other
times the battle of Elkhorn, the Federal general reported his losses at 203
killed, 980 wounded, and 201 missing. Van Dorn's were probably greater,
and he lost heavily in good officers. McCulloch and Mcintosh were killed ;
General Price was again wounded and narrowly escaped death; General
W. Y. Slack, whom his men idolized and whom the whole army held in honor,
was fatally wounded; and Colonel B. A. Rives, one of the knightliest of sol-
diers and bravest of gentlemen, and Churchill Clark, a heroic boy, were killed.
Halleck, who had determined to make the Tennessee "the great strategic
line of the Western campaign," now began to concentrate all of his forces on
that river and the Mississippi, in order "to fight a great battle on the
Tennessee," one which would "settle the campaign in the West." He con-
sequently ordered Curtis not to advance any farther into Arkansas ; and
sent out of Missouri all the troops that could be safely taken thence, some
of them to Pope 011 the Mississippi, and others to Grant on the Tennessee.
The concentration of Federal armies on the Mississippi portended such
danger to Beauregard, who had lately assumed command of the defenses
of that river, that General Albert Sidney Johnston ordered Van Dorn to move
his army to within supporting distance of Beauregard. This Van Dorn began
to do on the 17th of March, on which day he wrote to General Johnston that
he would soon " relieve Beauregard by giving battle to the enemy near New
Madrid," or, by marching " boldly and rapidly toward St. Louis, between
Ironton and the enemy's grand depot at Rolla."
While he was executing this plan, and while the greater part of the army
that had survived Elkhorn was on the march across the mountains of North
Arkansas toward Jacksonport, Van Dorn was suddenly ordered by General
Johnston on the 23d of March to move his entire command by " the best and
most expeditious route " to Memphis. His forces, to which he had given the
name of " the Army of the West," were accordingly concentrated in all haste
at Des Arc, on the White River, whence they were to take boats for Memphis.
The first division of this army, to the command of which General Price
had been assigned, was the first to move, Little's Missouri Brigade embark-
ing on the 8th of April for Memphis, just as Pope was taking possession
of Island No. 10, and Beauregard was leading Johnston's army back to
Corinth from the fateful field of Shiloh.
i,
r> d .'1,1 >" Aj&frJX?
OFF TO THE WAR.
IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI.
BY JOHN C. FREMONT, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.
AT the outbreak of the war, in the spring of '61, being then in England, I
■jL±- offered my services to the Government, and was appointed one of the
four major-generals of the regular army. General McClellan and myself were
commissioned of even date, ranking next after General Scott. On my arrival
I reported to the President, using a few days to arrange in some order the
business which had carried me abroad. There was great confusion and indeci-
sion in affairs, and the people in power were slow to realize the actuality of
war ; it was long before they realized its magnitude. Several commands in the
East were suggested to me, but I preferred the West, which I knew, and I held
the opinion that the possession of the immediate valley of the Mississippi
river would control the result of the war. Who held the Mississippi would
hold the country by the heart.
A command was agreed upon between President Lincoln, Montgomery
Blair, his Postmaster-General, who was a graduate of West Point, and
myself, of which the great object was the descent of the Mississippi river.
Necessary to this was first the firm possession of the State of Missouri, freed
and protected from the secession forces within and around it. In pursuance
of this plan " The Western Department " was created, comprehending, with
Illinois, the states and territories west of the Mississippi river to the Rocky
Mountains, including New Mexico. For reasons not wholly military, the
President reserved the State of Kentucky, but assured me that so soon as I
had succeeded in raising and organizing an army for the descent of the
Mississippi river, he would extend my command over that State and the left
bank of the Mississippi.
The President had gone carefully over with me the subject of my intended
campaign, and this with the single desire to find out what was best to do and
278
IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI. 279
how to do it. This he did in the unpretending and kindly manner which
invited suggestion, and which with him was characteristic. When I took
leave of him he accompanied me down the stairs, coming out to the steps of
the portico. I asked him then if there was anything further in the way
of instruction that he wished to say to me. " No," he answered. " I have
given you carte blanche. You must use your own judgment and do the
best you can. I doubt if the states will ever come back."
Governor Yates, of Illinois, then in Washington, informed me fully of the
unarmed and unprepared condition of the West. I immediately began a
search for arms at Washington, and out of those at hand was able to obtain
an order for only seven thousand stand.
Arriving at New York, I found that the order for the seven thousand
stand of arms had been countermanded. Upon my complaint to Washing-
ton, and through the personal interposition of the President, Major Peter
V. Hagner was sent to aid me in procuring what I judged immediately
necessary for my department. With him I arranged for gathering from
various arsenals and forwarding to St. Louis arms and equipments for
23,000 men. This detained me some weeks in New York. Before leaving,
I telegraphed to Lieutenant-General Scott, to ask if he had any instructions
to give me. He replied that he had none.
At Philadeljjhia we heard the news of the disaster of Bull Run. On
the 25th of July I reached St. Louis, and at the start I found myself in an
enemy's country, the enemy's flag displayed from houses and recruiting
offices. St. Louis was in sympathy with the South, and the State of Mis-
souri was in active rebellion against the national authority. The Bull Run
defeat had been a damaging blow to the prestige of the Union.
In this condensed sketch I can give only the strong outline of the threaten-
ing situation I found, and, in part, the chief measures I adopted to convert
our defensive position into one that was vigorously offensive, going into detail
only enough to show some of the difficulties that beset me.
There was a wide difference between the situation here and that at Wash-
ington. The army of the East was organized under the eyes of the President
and Congress; in the midst of loyal surroundings and loyal advisers where
there was no need to go' outside of prescribed military usage, or to assume
responsibilities. But in Missouri all operations had to be initiated in the
midst of upturned and revolutionary conditions and a rebellious people,
where all laws were set at defiance. In addition to the bodies of armed men
that swarmed over the State, a Confederate force of nearly 50,000 men was
already on the Southern frontier : Pillow, with 12,000, advancing upon
Cairo ; Thompson, with 5000, upon Girardeau ; Hardee, with 5000, upon Iron-
ton ; and Price, with an estimated force of 25,000, upon Lyon, at Springfield.
Their movement was intended to overrun Missouri, and, supported by a
friendly population of over a million, to seize upon St. Louis and make that
city a center of operations for the invasion of the loyal States.
To meet this advancing force I had 23,000 men of all arms. Of this only
some 15,000 were available, the remainder being three-months men whose
28o IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI.
term of service was expiring. General John Pope was fully occupied in North
Missouri with nearly all my disposable force, which was required to hold in
check rebellion in that quarter. For the defense of Cairo B. M. Prentiss had
8 regiments, but 6 were three-months men, at the end of their term, unpaid,
and unwilling to reenlist. At Springfield General Lyon had about 6000
men, unpaid and badly fed, and in need of clothing. In this condition he
was in hourly expectation of being attacked by the enemy, who was advanc-
ing in three times his nominal strength.
This was the situation to be met at the outset. The arms and equipments
for 23,000 men which I had gathered at New York I now found had been
diverted from my department and sent to Virginia. I had no money and
the Government no credit ; but the chief difficulty was the want of arms.
There was no want of men. The loyal population of the North-western
States flocked to the Union standard ; the German population with a noble
unanimity.
Having these conditions to face, on the 26th of July I telegraphed my needs
to Montgomery Blair, whom I had known intimately. In reply he telegraphed,
" I find it impossible to get any attention to Missouri or Western matters
from the authorities here. You will have to do the best you can and take
all needful responsibility to defend and protect the people over whom you
are specially set." Two days afterward Secretary Seward telegraphed to ask
what disposition I had made of the arms I had purchased in Europe, asking
for an invoice. I telegraphed him that I needed to use these arms for my
department, that I had absolutely no arms, and that the situation of the State
was critical. On the 30th I sent to the President, as had been arranged, an
unofficial letter setting forth the condition of my command. I informed him
that the treasurer of the United States at St, Louis had $300,000 entirely
unappropriated, but had refused my request for $100,000 to be delivered to
my paymaster-general. I said to him that there were three courses open to
me : "First, to let the enemy possess himself of some of the strongest points
in the State and threaten St. Louis, which is insurrectionary ; second, to force
a loan from the secession banks here ; third, to use the mo^iey belonging to
the Government which is in the treasury. . . . This morning I will order
the treasurer to deliver the money in his possession to General Andrews and
will send a force to the treasury to take the money, and will direct such
payments as the exigency requires. I will hazard everything for the defense
of the department you have confided to me, and I trust to you for support."
To the propositions of this letter the President' gave the tacit approval of not
replying, and I acted upon it.
I had no time to lose. The situation of Lyon at Springfield was critical, and
the small disintegrating garrison at Cairo was hourly exposed to assault by
an overpowering force. Among the various points threatened, Cairo was the
key to the success of my operations. The waterways and the district around
Cairo were of first importance. Upon the possession of this district depended
the descent and control of the Mississippi Valley by the Union armies, or
the inroad by the Confederate forces into the loyal States.
IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI.
281
I now sent within the Con-
federate lines a capable en-
gineer officer possessed of the
necessary military knowledge,
with instructions to go into
the States of Kentucky and
Tennessee to observe the situ-
ation of the enemy, ascertain
his strength and probable
plans, and make rough maps
of important localities occu-
pied by troops or likely to be.
Five days after my arrival,
hearing that Pillow was mov-
ing upon Cairo, I left St.
Louis for that place, with all
my available force, 3800 men.
I distributed my command
over a transport fleet of eight
large steamboats, in order to
create in the enemy an im-
pression of greater strength
than I possessed. I found the
garrison demoralized. From
the chief of artillery I learned
there were only about six hundred effective men under arms. These troops
had enlisted for three months, which had now expired. They had not been
paid, and there was much sickness among them. The reenforcement I
brought, and such assurances as I was able to give, restored confidence ; and
I prevailed on one of the garrison regiments to remain.
Cair< > was the most unhealthy post within my command. Fever and dysen-
tery were prevailing. The roomy, shaded decks and convenient cabins of the
large steamboats which brought the reinforcements, and the breeze from the
water blowing through them, were in strong contrast with the steaming heat
of the low, moist grounds of Cairo. This suggested the idea of floating hospi-
tals. Before the sun went down the greater number of the sick were carried to
one of the roomiest boats, thus securing good ventilation and perfect drainage.
The sudden relief of Cairo and the exaggerated form in which the news of
it reached Pillow had the intended effect. He abandoned his proposed attack,
and gave time to put it effectually beyond reach of the enemy, and eventually
to secure a firm hold on the whole of that important district.
Having secured the initial point in my campaign, I returned to St. Louis on
August 4th". Meantime I had ordered Stevenson's 7th Missouri regiment
from Boonville, and Montgomery's Kansas regiment near Leavenworth, to
the support of Lyon at Springfield. Amidst incessant and conflicting
demands, my immediate care was to provide aid for him.
MAJOR-GENERAL FRANCIS P. BLAIR, JK. FROM A rilOTOGRAFH.
282 IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI.
Governor Oliver P. Morton, of Indiana, answering my urgent request for
troops, telegraphed that if leave were granted from Washington he would send
five regiments made up of river boatmen, well adapted for the Mississippi
expedition. In answer to my request they were ordered to me. But the
order was changed, and instead of joining me they were sent to General
Robert Anderson, then in command at Louisville. The same day I asked
Senator Latham, at Washington, to aid my application for three thousand
men from California, to be placed at El Paso, to operate against Texas troops
moving into Arkansas. On the 5th Marsh reported from Girardeau that the
enemy was close upon him, 5000 strong, and would attack him before morning.
At midnight a heavy battery of 6 twenty-four-pounders and 1000 men were
embarked to his aid under experienced officers, and Prentiss further reenf orced
him from below the same morning.
On the 6th General Scott telegraphed me that he had ordered all the
troops out of New Mexico, and directed me to confer immediately with the
governor of Kansas, and arrange for the safety of New Mexico, sending two
regiments " without delay," as the first detachment would leave on the 15th.
On the 9th I informed the Government that the greater part of the old
troops were going out of service, while the new levies, totally unacquainted
with the rudiments of military training, would be unmanageable before an
enemy. Therefore, I asked authority from the President to collect through-
out the states educated officers who had seen service. With them I could
make a framework on which to organize an army. My request was granted,
and I acted upon it at once.
On the 10th Prentiss reported from Cairo that the enemy were again con-
centrating and intrenching at New Madrid about ten thousand strong.
* Before my arrival at St. Louis General Lyon had borne a decisive and
important part in Missouri. Together with Francis P. Blair, the younger, he
had saved Missouri from secession. For this reason I had left his movements
to his own discretion, but had myself made every possible effort to reenforce
him. The defeat at Bull Run had made a change in affairs from that which
was existing when General Lyon left Boonville for Springfield on the 5th of
July. To any other officer in his actual situation, I should have issued per-
emptory orders to fall back upon the railroad at Rolla.
On the 6th I had sent an officer by special engine to Rolla, with dispatches
for Lyon, and for news of him. In his letter of August 9th, the day before
the battle, Lyon states, in answer to mine of the 6th, that he was unable to
determine whether he could maintain his ground or would have to retire. At
a council of war a fortnight before the battle, the opinion of his officers was
unanimous for retreating upon Rolla.
On the 13th news reached me of the battle fought at Wilson's Creek on
the 10th between about 6000 Union troops, under Lyon, and a greatly superior
force under Price and McCulloch. I was informed that General Lyon had been
killed, and that the Union troops under Sigel were retreating unmolested upon
Rolla. In telegraphing a report of the battle to Washington, I informed the
Department of the need of some organized force to repel the enemy, reported
IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI. 283
to be advancing on other points in considerable strength. I again asked the
Secretary of War for Groesbeck's 39th Ohio regiment, and to order from
the governors' of Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin their disposable force.
I informed him that we were badly in want of field artillery and that few
small-arms had arrived. I also asked the President to read my dispatches.
Dissensions in the camp of the enemy prevented them from nsing their
success, and I made and pushed forward as. rapidly as possible dispositions
for the defense of the city and State. I reenforced Rolla, which was the
receiving-place for troops destined for the South-west. The plan of defense
adopted was to fortify Girardeau and the termini of the railroads at Iron-
ton, Rolla, and Jefferson City, with St. Louis as a base ; holding these places
with sufficient garrisons and leaving the army free for operations in the field.
These points I connected by telegraph lines centering at headquarters. St.
Louis was the base and center of operations and depot of reserves. Six
thousand men, working night and day, were employed upon the fortifications,
which commanded the city itself, as well as the surrounding country, upon a
line of about ten miles. All the railroads entering the city I connected at
one depot, more cars were added, and on twenty-four hours' notice 10,000
men could have been moved upon them from any one point to the opposite
side of the State.
The officer who had been sent within the Confederate lines had returned,
bringing important information concerning the position of the enemy,
together with the rough maps required, indicating, among other points, the
positions of Forts Henry and Donelson, then in course of construction. I
sent him back immediately to make examinations of the Tennessee and Cum-
berland with reference to the use of those rivers by gun-boats, and also to
watch the enemy's moves toward the Cairo district.
In answer to my appeal to the loyal governors for troops, regiment after
regiment arrived at St. Louis from the whole North-west, but they were
entirely without tents or camp equipage. The chief quartermaster of my
department was an officer of the regular army, Major McKinstry, experienced,
able, and energetic. But there were no supplies on hand, of any kind, to meet
the necessities of the troops arriving without notice, and entirely unpro-
vided. In this exigency he made requisition on the head of his department
in Washington, but was informed in reply that the department could not
meet the requisitions that were being made by the Army of the Potomac ;
that the preservation of the capital was deemed of more importance than the
State of Missouri ; that their entire time and attention was devoted to meet-
ing requisitions made upon them; that General Fremont had full power,
and that he, as Fremont's chief quartermaster, must use his own judgment
and do the best he could toward meeting the wants of the department.
In July, at Washington, the subject of mortar-boats for the Mississippi
expedition had been discussed between General M. C. Meigs, Gustavus V.
Fox, afterward the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and myself, and had
been referred to me for decision, as having in charge military operations
on the Mississippi. On the 31st of July the Secretary of War directed
284
IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI.
that the 16 nine-inch guns made
at Pittsburg for the navy should
be forwarded to me with the great-
est dispatch, and that 30 thirteen-
inch mortars be made as soon as
possible and forwarded to me, to-
gether with shells for both guns
and mortars. On the 24th of
August I directed the construction
of 38 mortar-boats, and later of 8
steam-tugs to move them, and the
purchase and alteration into gun-
boats of two strongly built river
vessels, — the New Era, a large
ferry-boat, and the Submarine, a
powerful snag-boat ; they were re-
named Essex and Benton. At my
suggestion and order, the sides of
all these vessels were to be clad
with iron. On the 3d of September
General Meigs advised me to- order
from Pittsburg fifteen-inch guns
for my gun-boats, as "able to empty
any battery the enemy could make."
Work on these gun-boats was driv-
en forward night and day. As in
the case of the fortifications, the
work was carried on by torchlight.
August 25th an expedition was
ordered under Colonel G. Waagner
with one regiment, accompanied
by Commander John Rodgers with
two gun-boats, to destroy the enemy's fortifications that were being con-
structed at Belmont. [See map, page 263.]
August 28th I assigned Brigadier-General U. S. Grant to the command of
South-east Missouri, with headquarters at Cairo. He was fully instructed
concerning the actual and intended movements on the Mississippi and the
more immediate movements upon the Kentucky shore, together with the
intention to hold the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. In his
written instructions General Grant was directed to act in concert with Com-
mander Rodgers and Colonel Waagner, and to take possession of points
threatened by the Confederates on the Missouri and Kentucky shores.
August 31st Captain Neustadter was ordered to Cairo, to select a site opposite
Paducah for a battery to command the mouth of the Tennessee river.
September 4th I sent heavy guns and an artillery officer to Cairo, where
General Grant had just arrived from Girardeau. I telegraphed the President
informing him that the enemy was beginning to occupy, on the Kentucky
BRIGADIER-GENERAL NATHANIEL LYON.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI. 28 s
shore, every good point between Padneah and Hickman, and that Paducah
should be occupied by us. I asked him now to include Kentucky in my
command.
September 5th I sent to General Grant a letter of instruction, in which I
required him to push forward with the utmost speed all work on the point
selected on the Kentucky shore ten miles from Paducah, to be called Fort
Holt. In this letter I directed him to take possession of Paducah if he felt
strong enough to do so ; but if not, then to plant a battery opposite Paducah
on the Illinois side to command the Ohio River and the mouth of the Tennes-
see. On the evening of the day on which this letter was sent to General Grant,
the officer who had been sent by me within the Confederate lines reached
Cairo on his way to St. Louis to let me know that the enemy was advancing
on Paducah. He judged it right to inform General Grant, urging him to take
Paducah without delay. General Grant decided to do so, and in accordance
with his instructions of the 28th immediately moved on Paducah with an
adequate force and two gun-boats. He reached the town on the morning of
the 6th, having only about six hours' advance of the enemy. Taking undis-
puted possession, he returned to Cairo the same day.
In answer to my persistent application for Colonel C. F. Smith he was
ordered to join me, having meantime been made by the President a brigadier-
general at my special request. I at once sent him forward to the command I
had designed for him, — Paducah and the Kentucky shore of the Mississippi.
His letter of instructions made known to him all the previous measures taken
to hold the Kentucky shore and the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumber-
land. The execution of this part of my plans broke in upon the Confederate
lines, drove them back, and dispersed their combinations for transferring the
war to the loyal States.
I now on the 8th of September wrote to the President, giving him in the
following extract the general features of my plan of campaign :
. . . . "As the rebel forces outnumber ours, and the counties of Kentucky between
the Mississippi and Tennessee rivers, as well as those along the latter and the Cumberland,
are strongly secessionist, it becomes imperatively necessary to have the cooperation of the
loyal Union forces under Generals Anderson and Nelson, as well as of those already encamped
opposite Louisville, under Colonel Rousseau. I have reenforced, yesterday, Paducah with two
regiments, and will continue to strengthen the position with men and artillery. As soon as
General Smith, who commands there, is reenforced sufficiently to enable him to spread his
forces, he will have to take and hold Mayfield and Lovelaceville, to be in the rear and flank of
Columbus, and to occupy Smithland, controlling in this way the mouths of both the Tennessee
and the Cumberland rivers. At the same time Colonel Rousseau should bring his force, in-
creased if possible, by two Ohio regiments, in boats to Henderson, and, taking the Henderson
and Nashville railroad, occupy Hopkiasville ; while General Nelson should go with a force of
five thousand by railroad to Louisville, and from there to Bowling Green. As the population in
all the counties through which the above railroads pass are loyal, this movement could be made
without delay or molestation to the troops. Meanwhile General Grant would take possession
of the entire Cairo and Fulton railroad, Piketon, New Madrid, and the shore of the Mississippi
opposite Hickman and Columbus. The foregoing disposition having been effected, a combined
attack will be made upon Columbus, and, if successful in that, upon Hickman, while Rousseau
and Nelson will move in concert by railroad to Nashville, Tenn., occupying the State capital,
and, with an adequate force, New Providence. The conclusion of this movement would be a
combined advance toward Memphis, on the Mississippi, as well as the Memphis and Ohio railroad."
286
IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI.
Meantime the untoward and obstructing conduct of the people of Missouri
had decided me to assert the power of the Government. Accordingly, on
the 30th of August, I issued a proclamation affixing penalties to rebellion
and extending martial law over the State of Missouri. By this proclamation
the property of persons in rebellion against the United States was held to
be confiscated, and their slaves were declared free. As a war measure this,
in my opinion, was equal to winning a
deciding battle. The President disap-
proved it, as likely to lose us Kentucky,
the loyalty of which was so strained and
the temper of which was so doubtful,
that he had agreed to the neutral atti-
tude Kentucky demanded. He desired
me to withdraw it as of my own motion.
Unwilling to put myself in this position,
I asked him to order it withdrawn, which
he did. Shortly following upon this act, I
was in many ways made to feel the with-
drawal from me of the confidence and
support of the Administration, but, ac-
ceding to strong representations from
leading citizens of St. Louis, I did not
resign my command.
I had already been brought into col-
lision with the intrigues of men who were
in confidential relations with the President, and the occasion was promptly
seized by them to urge misrepresentations which were readily accepted
as reasons for my removal. The visits of high officers charged with inquiry
into the affairs of my department, and the simultaneous and sustained
attacks of leading journals, accumulated obstructions and weakened my
authority. In fact, my command at the end of August had virtually
existed little over a month ; but the measures which I had initiated had
already taken enduring shape, and eventually worked their intended result.
The inadequate space to which I am restricted compels me to pass over
here the circumstances which made inevitable the loss of Lexington, upon
which Price advanced after his victory at Wilson's Creek. All possible efforts
were made to relieve Colonel Mulligan, but, notwithstanding the large concen-
tration of troops for his relief, these efforts were baffled by absolute want of
transportation and by river obstructions. To the Confederate general it was
a barren success, and he was shortly forced to retreat to the south-west. As
a military position Lexington was of no value to him. In the midst of the
demand for troops for Lexington, I was on the 14th ordered by General Scott
to " send five thousand well-armed infantry to Washington without a moment's
delay." Two thousand were sent.
At the end of September I left St. Louis to take the field against Price. The
army numbered 38,000 men. To complete the defenses of St. Louis, after
MA.TOR-<;ENERAL FRANZ SIGEL.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI. 287
the advance of the army, I left 5 regiments of infantry, with 1 battalion of
cavalry, and 2 batteries of field artillery. The five divisions which com-
posed it were 'assigned positions, their lines of march converging to Spring-
field; and in the beginning of October I moved against Price. Transportation
and, consequently, supplies were very inadequate ; but in exigencies an army
sometimes moves without either. The Sejitember rains were over ; the fine
weather of the Indian summer had come ; the hay was gathered, and the corn
was hardening, and we were about to carry out the great object of the cam-
paign with fewer hardships from exposure, and fewer impediments from
want of transport, than could have been expected at any other season. The
spirit of the army was high. A finer body of men could not have been
brought together, and we had every reason to believe that the campaign
would open with a signal victory in the defeat or dispersion of the enemy,
with a move on Memphis as the immediate result. Had I possessed means
of transport when Price moved on Lexington I should have compelled him
to give me battle on the north side of the Osage ; as he could not cross the
Missouri without exposing himself to certain defeat, 110 other course would
have remained open to him. In fact, when I did go forward, the appearance
of my advance at Sedalia was the signal for his precipitate retreat. The
first contact now with the enemy was at Fredericktown and Springfield, — the
former one of the most admirably conducted engagements of the war, and the
latter action a glorious victory. Along the whole extent of our lines we
were uniformly successful against the enemy.
At the end of October I was in Springfield with 21,000 effective men.
Price had terminated his retreat, and his movements showed that he had
decided to offer battle. This was confirmed by information obtained from
his headquarters that the Missourians were refusing to leave the State.
Recognizing the rights of humanity, and remembering that this conflict was
among our own people, and that the whole State of Missouri was a battle-field,
General Price and myself had been engaged in arranging the terms of a con-
vention which was concluded and signed by us on the 1st of November. It
provided : 1st, for an exchange of prisoners, hitherto refused by our Govern-
ment ; 2d, that guerrilla fighting should be suppressed, and the war confined
to the organized armies in the field ; 3d, that there should be no arrests for
opinion, the preservation of order being left to the State courts.
Generals Asboth and Sigel, division commanders, now reported that the
enemy's advance-guard was at Wilson's Creek, nine miles distant, several
thousand strong ; his main body occupying the roads in the direction of Cass-
ville, at which place General Price had his headquarters with his reserves.
On November 2d the dispositions for the expected battle were being planned,
when late in the evening a messenger arrived bearing an order from General
Scott which removed me from my command. This order had been hurried
forward by General Hunter, who superseded me, and who was behind with
his division. The next day, Hunter not arriving, the plan of battle was
agreed on, the divisions were assigned conformably, and in the evening
the troops began to occupy their positions. About 10 o'clock at night
288
IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI.
Hunter arrived at my
headquarters, where the
officers were assembled.
I handed to him the plan
of battle and turned over
my command.
The order which gave
my command to General
Hunter was dated Octo-
ber 24th, and had been
sent to one of my sub-
ordinate officers in St.
Louis, to be served on
me at his discretion. Ac-
companying it was a
letter from the President
in which he directed that
it should not be served
on me if I had fought a
battle or was about to
fight one. His intention
was disregarded ; the or-
der was put in force
when both ourselves
and the enemy were
ready and intending bat-
tle. In the face of posi-
tive knowledge, General Hunter assumed that there was no enemy near
and no battle possible, and withdrew the army, ^r
The correctness of the operations in this campaign to meet the intended
movements of the enemy, have all been corroborated and proved by subse-
quent information. My expenditures^) raise and equip this army were
vindicated and sustained by decisions of the United States courts. The
establishment of martial law at St. Louis, which was denounced as arbitrary
and unnecessary, was maintained and acted upon by all my successors until
peace was declared ; and the fortifications of that city, upon which all lines of
defense rested, aided its enforcement and made the dyke between the North-
west and the South. The taking of Paducah, for which I was censured, has
since been made the pivot of success to others. And the gun-boats, for the
preparation of which, also, I was censured, the work being countermanded as
a " useless extravagance," became historic in the progress of the war.
lllllilllll!llllllllli||IIIHIIIIIIIl!lllllllll||llllll|i||||llll|lllllllll|[|IIIHIIIIIII|i|
MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN C. FREMONT.
POSSESSION OF 31 RS.
FROM A STEEL PLATE
FREMONT.
IN
Q In support of the facts, I quote from the
report of General McCulloch to his Secretary of
War, at the close of this Missouri campaign: "We
met next day at a point between the two armies
where it was agreed upon by all the Missouri gen-
erals that we should wait an attack from the enemy.
the ground to be selected by General Price and
myself." Official Eecords, III., 748.— J. C. F.
Hunter's withdrawal was in pursuance of in-
structions of a general nature from President Lin-
coln, dated October 24th, 1801, and accompanying
the orders relieving General Fremont. — Editors.
WILSON'S CREEK, AND THE DEATH OF LYON.
BY WILLIAM M. WHERRY, SIXTH U. S. INFANTRY, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. 8. V
AT WILSON'S CREEK AIDE-DE-CAMP TO GENERAL LYON.
CAVALRYMAN OF THE UNITED STATES
REGULARS, IN 1861.
BOUT the middle of July,~1861, the Army of the Union in
south-west Missouri, under General Nathaniel Lyon, was
encamped in and near the town of Springfield, and num-
bered approximately 6200 men, of whom about 500 were
ill-armed and undisciplined " Home Guards." The organ-
ized troops were in all 5868, in four brigades. By the
9th of August these were reduced to an aggregate of
about 5300 men, with the 500 Home Guards additional.
Of these troops, the 1st Iowa regiment was entitled to
discharge on the 14th of August, and the 3d and 5th
Missouri, Sigel's and Salomon's, at different periods, by
companies, from the 9th to the 18th of August. All
except the regulars had been enrolled since the attack on
Sumter in April, and but little time had been possible for
drill and instruction. They had been moved and marched
from St. Louis and points in Kansas, taking part in sev-
eral spirited but minor engagements, and were ill-provided with clothing and
food, but their spirits were undaunted, and they were devoted to their leader.
The latter part of July was spent by Lyon in drilling his troops and
procuring supplies, the mills in the neighborhood having been seized and
employed in grinding flour for the troops. He continued to send urgent
appeals to St. Louis for reinforcements.
On the 1st of August, however, having received information of an advance
by the enemy, in superior numbers, Lyon moved down the Fayetteville road
(also known as the Cassville road) to meet and attack the largest and most
advanced force, hoping to drive it back and then strike the others in detail.
A lively skirmish with Price's advance-guard, under Rains, took place at
Dug Springs on the 2d of August ; and on the 3d a more insignificant affair
occurred with the rear-guard of Rains's forces at McCullah's farm, which had
been his headquarters, but from which he retired without resistance. Here
Lyon became convinced he was being drawn farther and farther from his
base, without supplies, and he determined to fall back to Springfield, which
place he reached on the 5th. During those blistering August days the men
inarched with bleeding feet and parched lips, Lyon himself urging forward
the weary and footsore stragglers.
On the 8th a march in force was planned for the following night, to make
an attack on the enemy's front at Wilson's Creek at daylight. From this
intention General Lyon was dissuaded, after having called together the
principal officers to receive their instructions. Many of the troops were
exhausted, and all were tired ; moreover, some supplies having arrived from
VOL. I. 19 289
2QO
WILSON'S CREEK, AND THE DEATH OF LYON.
Note to the Map.
The engagement began at 5:30 a.m., Lyon's ad-
vance driving Rains over Bloody Hill. Price's lino
as formed to confront the main attack by Lyon
about 6:30 was, from left to right, as follows: .Mo-
Bride, Parsons i with Guibor'sbattery), Clark, Slack,
and Rains. This force numbered 3168 men with i
guns, and was opposed by nearly 2000 men with 10
gnus. The right of the first Union line was hold by
the 1st Missouri; on its left were Totten's batten
Osterhaus's battalion, the 1st Kansas, DuBois's bat-
tery, and Steele's battalion. Later, the 1st Kansas
was relieved by the 1st Iowa (800), and the 1st Mis-
souri by the 2d Kansas ifiOOi, and by Steele. This
brought the Union strength at this point up to 3550.
Meanwhile, Robert's 3d Louisiana and Mcintosh's
regiment and McRae's battalion, together num-
bering 1320, moved down from their encampment
(marked " McCulloch's bri-
gade"), crossed the road,
and repulsed Plummer's 300
in the corn-field, but were
driven back by DuBois's bat-
tery. By this hour (8 o'clock)
Sigel had attacked on the
rear and had driven Church-
ill's infantry and Greer's
and Major's cavalry out of
their camps. McCullocb
now gathered up part of
the 3d Louisiana and routed
Sigel's troops, who were at
Sharp's farm. He was aided
in this by the fire of Keid's
and Bledsoe's batteries.
Woodruff's battery had
from the start chiefly en-
gaged Totten; and now
Churchill, and next Greer's
and Carroll's cavalry, and
afterward Gratiot's regi-
ment (of Pearce's brigade)
were conducted to the aid
of Price, raising his force
to 4239, exclusive of Greer
and Carroll, who had been
quickly repulsed by Totten ;
Lyon's being as above,
3550, exclusive of 220 of
Plummer's and 350 of the
Mounted Reserve. General
Lyon was killed at 10 : 30.
just as Pearce's fresh regi-
ments (under Walker and
Locke ry) and the 3d Loui-
siana were coming up. At
11:30 Major Sturgis with-
drew the Union army, which
was then outnumbered two
t0 °ne' EDITORS.
/GELS BATTERY
^ imposition. »
9 * &.
GEN. SIGELG
ENTRY
WILSON'S CREEK, AND THE DEATH OF LYON. 291
Rolla, it was deemed wise to clothe and shoe the men as far as practicable,
and to give them another day for recuperation.
On the 9th it was intended to march that evening with the whole force
united, as agreed upon the 8th, and attack the enemy's left at daylight, and
Lyon's staff were busied in visiting the troops and seeing that all things were
in order. During the morning Colonel Sigel visited Lyon's headquarters, and
had a prolonged conference, the result of which was that Colonel Sigel was
ordered to detach his brigade, the 3d and 5th Missouri, one six-gun bat-
tery, one company of the 1st U. S. Cavalry, under Captain Eugene A. Carr,
and one company of the 2d Dragoons, under Lieutenant Charles E. Farrand,
for an attack upon the enemy from the south, while Lyon with the remainder
of his available force should attack on the north.
The troops were put in march in the evening; those about Springfield
immediately under General Lyon moving out to the west on the Little York
road until joined by Sturgis's command from their camps, when they turned
to the south across the prairie. The head of the main column reached the
point where the enemy's pickets were expected to be found, about 1 a. m., and
went into bivouac. Sigel's force, consisting of 1200 men and six pieces of
artillery, moved four miles down the Fayetteville road, and then, making a
long detour to the left by a by-road, arrived within a mile of the enemy's
(•amp and rear at daylight.
In the vicinity of the Fayetteville road crossing, the creek acquires con-
siderable depth, and in most places has rough, steep, and rather high banks,
rendering fording difficult. On the left side the hills assume the proportion
of bluffs ; on the right or western bank the ground is a succession of broken
ridges, at that time covered for the most part with trees and a stunted growth
of scrub oaks with dense foliage, which in places became an almost impene-
trable tangle. Rough ravines and deep gullies cut up the surface.
The Confederates were under command of General Ben. McCulloch. On
the west side of the stream, " Old Pap " Price, .with his sturdy Missourians,
men who in many later battles bore themselves with a valor and determina-
tion that won the plaudits of their comrades and the admiration of their
foes, was holding the point south of Wilson's Creek, selected by Lyon for
attack. Price's command consisted of five bodies of Missourians, under Slack,
Clark, Parsons, McBride, and Rains, the last-named being encamped farther
up the stream. On the bluffs on the east side of the creek were Hebert's
3d Louisiana and Mcintosh's Arkansas regiment, and, farther south, Pearce's
brigade and two batteries, while other troops, under Greer, Churchill, and
Major, were in the valley along the Fayetteville road, holding the extreme
of the Confederate position.
Lyon put his troops in motion at early dawn on the 10th, and about 4
o'clock struck Rains's most advanced picket, which escaped and gave warning
of the attack, of which General Price was informed just as he was about to
breakfast. Captain Plummer's battalion of regular infantry was the advance,
followed by Osterhaus's two companies of the 2d Missouri Volunteers, and
Totten's battery. A body of 200 mounted Home Guards was on Plummer's left.
2Q2 WILSON'S CREEK, AND THE DEATH OF LYON.
Having reached the enemy's pickets, the infantry was deployed as skirmish-
ers, Plummer to the left and Osterhans to the right, and Lientenant-Colonel
Andrews, with the 1st Missouri Infantry, was brought up in support of the
battery. Advancing a mile and a half and crossing a brook tributary to the
creek, the Union skirmishers met and pushed the Confederate skirmishers up
the slope. This disclosed a considerable force of the enemy, along a ridge per-
pendicular to the line of march and to the valley of the creek, which was
attacked by the 1st Missouri and the 1st Kansas, assisted by Totten's battery,
who drove back the Confederates on the right to the foot of the slope beyond.
Plummer on the left early became separated from the main body by a deep
ravine terminating in a swampy piece of ground, beyond which lay a corn-
field which he entered, encountering a large force, the main part of which
was the Louisiana regiment. These troops fought with determined valor
and checked Plummer's progress. DuBois's battery was moved up to a hill
on the left, supported by Osterhaus's battalion, the 1st Iowa, and the 2d Kan-
sas, and opened a deadly fire with shells upon the corn-field, with such
marked effect as to throw the Confederates into disorder and enable Plum-
mer to draw off his command in good order across the ravine.
A momentary lull occurred at this time, except on our extreme right, where
Price's Missourians opposed the 1st Missouri and attempted to turn that flank,
1 )ut the 2d Kansas by its timely arrival and gallant attack bore back Price's
overwhelming numbers and saved the flank. Meanwhile Totten's battery,
which had been brought into action by section and by piece as the conforma-
tion of the ground would admit, performed extraordinary service. Steele's
regular infantry was added to its support. Price's troops had fought with
great bravery and determination, advancing and retiring two or three times
before they were compelled to give way on the lower slope of the ridge they
had occupied. Many times the firing was one continuous roar.
The lull enabled the enemy to re-adjust his lines and bring up fresh troops,
having accomplished which, Price made a determined advance along nearly
the whole of Lyon's front. He charged fiercely in lines of three or four
ranks, to within thirty or forty yards, pouring in a galling fire and directing
his most determined efforts against Totten's battery, for which Woodruff's,
which was pitted against it, was no match at all. J
Every available man of Lyon's was now brought into action and the bat-
tle raged with redoubled energy on both sides. For more than an hour the
balance was about even, one side gaining ground only to give way in its turn
to the advance of the other, till at last the Confederates seemed to yield, and
a suspension of the fury took place.
Ceneral Lyon had bivouacked near the head of his column on the
night of the 9th, sharing a rubber-coat with Major (now Major-Greneral)
John M. Schofield, his chief of staff, between two rows of corn in a field by
the roadside, his other staff-officers near by. He did not seem hopeful, but was
\ Woodruff's Little Rock battery was composed had been in command. Woodruff and his gun-
of guns which had been captured at the seizure of ners had, in fact, been drilled and instructed by
the Little Bock arsenal, of which Captain Totten Totten. — Editors.
WILSON'S CREEK, AND THE DEATH OF LYON.
293
oppressed with the responsibility
of his situation, with anxiety for
the cause, and with sympathy for
the Union people in that section,
when he should retreat and leave
to their fate those who could not
forsake their homes. He repeat-
edly expressed himself as having
been abandoned by his superi-
ors. When the troops were put
in motion, he went at the head
of the column, and when the
action opened he kept his place
at the front, entering the heat
of the engagement with the line,
near Totten's battery. He main-
tained an imperturbable cool-
ness, and his eye shone with the
ardor of conflict. He directed, < >n-
couraged, and rallied his troops
in person, sending his staff in all
directions, and was frequently
without an attendant except one
or two faithful orderlies. Early
in the attack while on the line to the left of Totten's battery, rallying a part
of the 1st Missouri Infantry, his horse, which he was leading, was killed
and he received a slight wound in the leg. Shortly afterward he was wounded
in the head. He continued dismounted dming the contest above described,
and walking a few paces toward the rear with his chief of staff, Major Seho-
field, who had also lost his horse, shot under him, Lyon said, " I fear the day
is lost." Schofield encouraged him to take a more hopeful view of the case,
assuring him that the troops were easily rallied and were gaining confidence,
and that the disorder was only temporary, and then proceeded to another
part of the line in search" of a mount.
About 9 o'clock, during a brief cessation in the firing, Lyon started
toward the top of the ridge, accompanied by an aide, who was urging him to
accept his horse, when they met Major Sturgis and a few troopers. One of
these was dismounted, and his horse was given to General Lyon. Lyon also
expressed himself despondingly to Sturgis, and was by him encouraged.
Sturgis proceeded to another quarter, and Lyon toward DuBois's battery.
About this time great anxiety began to be felt for the fate of Sigel's command.
Shortly after Lyon's attack the sound of battle had been heard in the rear of
the enemy's line. It continued but a short time, and was renewed shortly after-
ward for a very brief period only, when it ceased altogether. Sigel had pro-
ceeded to within a mile of the camps, and his cavalry had cut off the enemy's
small parties and thus suppressed information of his coming. He then
MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN M. SCHOFrEI.D. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
294
WILSON'S CREEK, AND THE DEATH OF LYON.
advanced his infantry toward the point
where the by-road crosses the creek, his
flanks supported by the cavalry on the
right and dragoons on the left, four
guns being placed on a hill overlooking
the tents. At about 5:30 a. m., hear-
ing the musketry on Lyon's front, he
opened fire with his guns, pushing his
infantry across the creek and into the
lower camp, whence they had fled, over-
whelmed by the suddenness of the at-
tack. Sigel crossed his guns and pushed
with infantry and artillery forward a
short distance in pursuit, meeting with
slight resistance. He advanced from his
first position near the creek, by a road
west of the deserted camp, and formed
line of battle in a field between the
road and the camp. Afterward he
advanced to Sharp's house. The Ar-
kansans and Texans retired to the
northward, fell in with Price's Missouri
line, and assisted in the fight against
Lyon. Meanwhile McCulloch called
upon a battalion of mounted Missouri-
ans, and upon a part of the Louisiana
regiment which had been confronting
Plummer in the corn-field, and with
these attacked Sigel's men, who were
in line at Sharp's farm, and drove them
from the field. When the attack by
the Confederates, from the direction of
Lyon's front, was made, the confusion
of Sigel's men was brought about by
the enfilading fire of Reid's battery east
of the creek, and by the belief that
the infantry in their front were friends.
Sigel went back the way he came with
a part of his command, including Carr's
cavalry. All but the cavalry, who were
ahead, were ambuscaded and, for the
most part, killed or captured; Sigel
narrowly escaped capture. Colonel Sal-
omon with 450 of the troops retreated,
by a detour to the west, to the Little
York road, as did also Lieutenant Far-
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JVILSON'S CREEK, AND THE DEATH OF LYON. 29 s
rand, with the dragoons. The latter, finding himself with his company
alone, forcibly detained a guide, and made up teams for one gun and one
caisson of the' abandoned artillery, He was finally compelled to unhorse
and leave the caisson, in order to put the animals to the gun. Thus by 10
o'clock Sigel was out of the fight, and the enemy could turn his whole force
upon Lyon.
Meantime a body of troops was observed moving down the hill on the east
bank of Wilson's Creek toward Lyon's left, and an attack by other troops
from that direction was anticipated. Schofield deployed eight companies of
the 1st Iowa and led them in person to repel this. They did so most gallantly
after a sanguinary contest, effectually assisted by the fire from DuBois's bat-
tery, which alone drove back the column on the opposite side of the stream
before it began a crossing.
Lyon, accompanied by an aide | and his six or eight orderlies, followed closely
the right of the Iowa regiment. After proceeding a short distance, his atten-
tion was called by the aide to a line of men drawn up on the prolongation of
the left of our main line and nearly perpendicular to the 1st Iowa as it moved
to the eastward. A party of horsemen came out in front of this line of the
enemy and proceeded to reconnoiter. General Price and Major Emmett
Mac Donald (who had sworn that he would not cut his hair till the Confed-
eracy was acknowledged) were easily recognized. General Lyon started as if to
confront them, ordering his party to " draw pistols and follow" him, when the
aide protested against his exposing himself to the fire of the line, which was
partly concealed by the mass of dense underbrush, and asked if he should
not bring up some other troops. To this Lyon assented, and directed the
aide to order up the 2d Kansas. The general advanced a short distance,
joining two companies of the 1st Iowa, left to protect an exposed position.
Colonel Mitchell of the 2d Kansas, near DuBois's battery, sent his lieutenant-
colonel, Blair, to Lyon to ask to be put in action, and the two messengers
passed each other without meeting. Lyon repeated his order for the regiment
to come forward. The regiment moved promptly by the flank, and as it
approached Lyon he directed the two companies of Iowa troops to go forward
with it, himself leading the column, swinging his hat. A murderous fire was
opened from the thick brush, the 2d Kansas deployed rapidly to the front
and with the two companies of the 1st Iowa swept over the hill, dislodging
the enemy and driving them back into the next ravine ; but while he was at
the head of the column, and pretty nearly in the first fire, a ball penetrated
Lyon's left breast, inflicting a mortal wound. He slowly dismounted, and as
he fell into the arms of his faithful orderly, Lehmann, he exclaimed, " Leh-
mann, I am killed," and almost immediately expired. Colonel Mitchell was
also severely wounded about the same time and removed to the rear.
Lieutenant Gustavus Schreyer and two of his men of the 2d Kansas bore
the body of Lyon through the ranks, Lehmann bearing the hat and loudly
bemoaning the death of his chief. In the line of file-closers the returning aide
was met, who, apprehensive of the effect upon the troops, stopped the clamor
I The writer. — Editors.
2q6
IVILSON'S CREEK, AND THE DEATH OF LYON.
of the orderly, covered the general's features with his coat, and had the body
carried to a sheltered spot near DuBois's battery. Surgeon Florence M. Cornyn
was found and called upon to examine the lifeless body of the dead general,
and having pronounced life extinct, the aide went to seek Sehofield and inform
him of the calamity. He was met return-
ing from the successful charge he had
led, and at once announced that Major
Sturgis should assume command, but vis-
ited the remains of Lyon on his way to
find Sturgis. These were taken charge
of by the aide, and conveyed to the field-
hospital, where the body was placed in a
wagon and carefully covered. Strict or-
ders were given that under no circum-
stances was the body to be removed till
the army returned to Springfield, after
which the aide returned to the front to
report to Major Sturgis for duty.
The engagement on different parts of
the line lasted about half an hour after
Lyon's death, when the Confederates gave
way, and silence reigned for nearly the
same length of time. Many of the senior
officers having been disabled, Sturgis as-
sumed command, and the principal officers were summoned for consultation.
This council and the suspended hostilities were soon abruptly terminated
by the appearance of the Confederates along our entire front, where the
troops had been readjusted in more compact form and were now more
determined and cooler than ever. A battery planted on a hill in the front
began to use shrapnel and canister, a species of ammunition which, so far
as I know, the enemy had not fired before at the troops who were with
General Lyon.
DuBois's battery continued on the left supported by Osterhaus's battalion
and the 1st Missouri ; the 1st Iowa, 1st Kansas, and the regular infantry sup-
ported Totten's battery in the center, and the 2d Kansas held the extreme
right. With unabated ardor and impetuosity the Confederates assailed this
front and endeavored to gain the rear of the right flank, but Totten's battery
in the center was the main point of assault. For the first time during this
bloody day, the entire line maintained its position without flinching, the
inexperienced volunteers vieing with the seasoned regulars in tenacity and
coolness. J) The flash and roar were incessant, and the determined Southrons
repeatedly advanced nearly to the muzzles of the pieces of their foes, only to
]) This engagement is considered one of the se- fought upon American soil ; seldom has a bloodier
verest of the war. Colonel Snead (in "The Fight one been fought on any modern field." Another
for Missouri") says: " Never before — considering participant, a Confederate officer, described it
the number engaged — had so bloody a battle been as " a mighty mean-fowt fight." — Editors.
BRIGADIKR-GENERAL N. B. PEARCE, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
WILSON'S CREEK, AND THE DEATH OF LYON. 297
be hurled back before the withering fire as from the blast of a furnace and to
charge again with a like result.
At a moment when the contest seemed evenly balanced, except for the
overwhelming numbers of the Confederates on the field, Captain Gordon
Granger, noted for his daring and intrepidity, rushed to the rear and brought
up the supports of DuBois's battery, hurling them upon the enemy's right
flank, into which they poured a murderous, deadly volley, which created a
perfect rout along the whole front. \ Our troops continued to send a galling
fire into the disorganized masses as they fled, until they disappeared, and the
battle was ended.
The order to withdraw was then given, and DuBois's battery with its sup-
ports was moved to a hill and ridge in rear to cover the movement. Before
the withdrawal of the main body took place, Captain Granger and others
urged remaining on the ground, but Sturgis had received information of
Sigel's rout, and in view of his depleted, worn-out forces and exhausted
ammunition,, persisted in a return to Springfield. The infantry and artillery,
as soon as Totten's disabled horses were replaced, left the scene of conflict,
and, passing through the troops placed in rear, took up the march for Spring-
field. On reaching the Little York road, a body of horsemen was seen to the
west, which proved to be Lieutenant Farrand with his dragoons, leading in
a remnant of Sigel's brigade, with the one piece of artillery he had saved.
In his hand he carried a captured flag, which he trailed by his side. He was
received with vociferous cheering, and became for the time the admiration
of all, having marched around both armies and brought his command in safe, is
On reaching Springfield, Sturgis found that Sigel had arrived there half
an hour earlier. Regarding him as the senior, the command was given over
to him. On the following morning the army withdrew.
\ In his report Major Sturgis gave great praise the late general's staff, who carefully cared for it.
to Gordon Granger, saying that he was "now sight- The house belonged to Governor John S. Phelps,
ing a gun of DuBois's battery, and before the and as it had been determined early in the even-
smoke had cleared away sighting one of Totten's ; ing that the troops would take up the retreat for
at one moment reconnoitering the enemy, and the Eolla before daylight the n-ext morning, Mrs.
next either bringing up reinforcements or rallying Phelps, a warm personal friend of General Lyon
some broken line. To whatever part of the field during his sojourn in the town, was communicated
I might direct my attention, there would I find with at her home in the country, and asked to have
Captain Granger, hard at work at some important the remains buried on her farm till they could be
service."— Editors. removed. To this she gladly consented. The body
•fa About, this time, too, it was discovei'ed that was left in custody of surgeons who were to remain
in order to gather up the wounded on the field behind, and the next day Mrs. Phelps took posses-
the body of General Lyon had been taken from sion of it, and General Lyon was laid to rest in her
the wagon in which it was placed and had been garden, just outside the town. His body was sub-
left at the field-hospital. Lieutenant Canfield sequently removed to his home in Connecticut and
with his company B, 1st Cavalry, was dispatched buried with military and civic honors. — W. M.W.
with a wagon to recover the general's body, and Lyon was born in Ashford, Conn., July 14th,
the army moved on into Springfield, arriving 1818. He was graduated at West Point in 1841 ,
about 5 P. at. Lieutenant Canfield proceeded to and served in the army in Florida and in the war
the battle-field, and before reaching there found with Mexico. He was bre vetted captain for gallant
the Confederates had returned and engaged in gath- conduct at Churubusco and Contreras. From 1849
ering their own wounded, and had foimd General to 1ST.:! he served in California, winning special
Lyon's body. It was delivered by the enemy and mention for his services in frontier warfare. He
was brought into the town to the house occupied as served afterward in Kansas, and from that State was
Lyon's headcmarters, and was placed in charge of ordered to St. Louis in January, 18 61. — Editors.
^Wf^^^^^m^m^
— i»*
-fl m:^u
m- ■ rm&tfSfUi .. . iV^l
'<•&?"' 4W -'I'^V^x.'^
■:-/■* >^.;^
BLOODY HILL," FROM THE EAST. FROM A RECENT PHOTOGRAPH.
ARKANSAS TROOPS IN THE BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK.
BY N. B. PEARCE, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, C. S. A.
I STYLE this short account of my personal recollections of the battle of
"Oak Hills" (as the Confederates named the engagement) as above, because
I was identified with the State of Arkansas and her soldiers. I also
believe that subsequent events, developed by the prominence of some of the
commanders engaged in this fight, have had a tendency to obscure that just
recognition which the Arkansas troops so nobly earned in this, one of the first
great battles of our civil war.
The ninth day of August, 1861, found the Confederate army under General
Ben. McCulloch, camped on Wilson's Creek, ten miles south of Springfield,
in south-west Missouri. It consisted of a Louisiana regiment under Colonel
Louis Hebert (a well-drilled and well-equipped organization, chiefly from the
north part of the State); Greer's Texas regiment (mounted); Churchill's
Arkansas cavalry, and Mcintosh's battalion of Arkansas mounted rifles
(Lieutenant-Colonel Embry), under the immediate charge of the commanding
general ; General Price's command of Missouri State Guards, with Bledsoe's
and Guibor's batteries, and my three regiments of Arkansas infantry, with
Woodruff's and Reid's batteries. More than half the Missourians were
mounted, and but few of the troops in the whole command were well armed.
The army numbered in all about 11,500 men, — perhaps, 6000 to 7000 of
whom were in semi-fighting trim, and participated in the battle.
The Federal forces under General Nathaniel Lyon, between 5000 and 6000
strong, occupied the town of Springfield, and General McCulloch was expect-
ing them to advance and give him battle. General McCulloch's headquarters
were on the right of the Springfield road, east of Wilson's Creek, rather in
advance of the center of the camp. General Price occupied a position
immediately west, and in the valley of the creek, with his command mostly
north of the Springfield road. I had established my headquarters on the
heights east and south of Wilson's Creek and the Springfield road, with my
forces occupying the elevated ground immediately adjacent.
Detailed reports as to the strength and movements of Lyon's command
were momentarily expected, through spies sent out by General Price, as
298
ARKANSAS TROOPS IN THE BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK. 299
McCulloch relied upon the native Missourians to furnish such knowledge;
but it was not until late in the afternoon that two "loyal" ladies succeeded
in passing out of the Federal lines, by permission of General Lyon, and,
coming in a circuitous route by Pond Springs, reached General Price's head-
quarters with the desired information. General McCulloch at once called a
council of war of the principal officers, where it was decided, instead of wait-
ing for the enemy, to march with the whole command, at 9 o'clock that
night, and attack General Lyon at Springfield. As soon as the orders of
General McCulloch had been properly published by his adjutant-general,
Colonel Mcintosh, the camp was thrown into a ferment of suppressed
excitement. It was ordered that the advance be made in three divisions,
under the separate commands of General Price, Adjutant-General Mcintosh,
and myself. The scene of preparation, immediately following the orders so
long delayed and now so eagerly welcomed by the men, was picturesque and
animating in the extreme. The question of ammunition was one of the most
important and serious, and as the Ordnance Department was imperfectly
organized and poorly supplied, the men scattered about in groups, to impro-
vise, as best they could, ammunition for their inefficient arms. Here, a group
would be molding bullets — there, another crowd dividing percussion-caps, and,
again, another group fitting new flints to their old muskets. They had little
thought then of the inequality between the discipline, arms, and accouterments
of the regular United States troops they were soon to engage in battle, and
their own homely movements and equipments. It was a new thing to most
of them, this regular way of shooting by word of command, and it was, per-
haps, the old-accustomed method of using rifle, musket, or shot-gun as game-
sters or marksmen that won them the battle when pressed into close quarters
with the enemy. All was expectancy, and as the time sped on to 9
o'clock, the men became more and more eager to advance. What was their
disappointment when, as the hour finally arrived, instead of the order to
march, it was announced that General McCulloch had decided, on account of
a threatened rain, which might damage and destroy much of their ammuni-
tion, to postpone the movement. The men did not " sulk in their tents," but
rested on their arms in no amiable mood. This condition of uncertainty and
suspense lasted well through the night, as the commanding officers were
better informed than the men of the risks to be encountered, and of the prob-
able result, in case they should make an aggressive fight against disciplined
forces when only half prepared. Daybreak, on the 10th of August, found
the command still at Wilson's Creek, cheerlessly waiting, many of the troops
remaining in position, in line of march, on the road, and others returning' to
camp to prepare the morning meal.
Perhaps it was 6 o'clock when the long-roll sounded and the camp was
called to arms. A few minutes before this, Sergeant Hite, of my body-guard,
dashed up to my headquarters, breathless with excitement, hatless, and his
horse covered with foam, exclaiming hurriedly, " General, the enemy is com-
ing ! " " Where ! " said I, and he pointed in the direction of a spring, up a
ravine, where he had been for water. He had been fired at, he said, by a
3oo ARKANSAS TROOPS IN THE BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK.
jfH^y.
picket of some troops advancing on the right flank. I ordered the sergeant
to ride in haste to General McCulloch with this information, and proceeded
to place my command in position. I was the better enabled to do this with-
out delay, because I had on the day before, with Colonel R. H. Weightman,
made a careful reconnoissance of the ground in the direction from which the
enemy was said to be approaching. The colonels commanding were imme-
diately notified, and the regiments m
were formed and posted so as to meet
his advance. Captain Woodruff's Lit-
tle Rock (Ark.) battery was ordered
to occupy a hill commanding the
road to Springfield, and the 3d Ar-
kansas Infantry (Colonel John R.
Gratiot) was ordered to support him.
I placed Captain Reid's Fort Smith
(Ark.) battery on an eminence to
command the approaches to our right
and rear, and gave him the 5th Ar-
kansas Infantry (Colonel T. P. Dock-
ery) as a support. I then advanced
the 4th Arkansas Infantry (Colonel
J. D. Walker) north of this battery
to watch the approach down the
ravine, through which Sergeant Hite
had reported that the enemy was
coming. Thus, the Arkansas troops
under my command had all been
placed in favorable position, ready for action, within a very short time after
the first alarm.
While these events were taking place under my immediate notice, General
McCulloch had been actively making disposition of the troops more nearly
opposed to the first advance of the enemy, under General Lyon. He had
posted the 3d Louisiana Infantry (Colonel Hebert) and Mcintosh's "2d
Arkansas Rifles (dismounted) to meet the earliest demonstration from the
direction of Springfield. General Price had also been industriously engaged
in placing his troops to intercept the advancing foe. General Rains's (Mis-
souri) command had the honor of giving the first reception to the main col-
umn under General Lyon. He was ably supported by the gallant Missouri
generals, Slack, McBride, Parsons, and Clark, with their respective brigades.
The fighting at this juncture — perhaps about 7 o'clock — was confined to
the corn-field north of Wilson's Creek, where the Louisiana infantry, with
Lieutenant-Colonel Embry's 2d Arkansas Mounted Rifles (dismounted), all
under the immediate command of Colonel Mcintosh, effectually charged and
drove back the enemy. Simultaneously the battle opened farther west and
south of Wilson's Creek, where the Missouri troops were attacked by the main
column or right wing of the enemy. Totten's (Federal) battery was pushed
MAJOR-GENERAL BEX. MCCULLOCH, C. S. A., KILLED IN
THE BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE, MARCH 7, 1862.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
ARKANSAS TROOPS IN THE BATTLE OF IVILSON'S CREEK. 301
forward, and took its first position on the side of Oak Hill, north of where the
main fight afterward took place. I had directed Captain Woodruff, who was
posted within easy range, to give attention to Totten, and the two batteries were
soon engaged in a lively artillery duel, being well matched in skill and mettle.
Lieutenant Weaver, of Woodruff's battery, was killed, and 4 of Totten's men
were killed and 7 wounded in this engagement. General Lyon's right, although
it had gained a temporary advantage in the early morning by surprising
the Missourians, was roughly handled when they had recovered themselves.
They were reenforced by Churchill's regiment, which had moved up from the
extreme right, and the battle raged several hours while they held their ground.
At this juncture a gallant charge was made by Greer's and Carroll's mounted
regiments on Totten's battery, but it was not a complete success, as the
gunners turned about and recovered their guns.
In the early morning, perhaps simultaneously with the advance of Lyon,
General Sigel, commanding the left column of the advance from Springfield,
came upon our right and rear, first attacking Colonel Churchill's camp, as the
men were preparing for breakfast, obliging them to retreat to an adjacent
wood, where they were formed in good order. The surprise resulted from the
movement of the night before, when pickets had been withdrawn that were
not re-posted in the morning. Sigel did not wait for a fight, however, but
advanced to, and had his battery unlimbered near, the Fayetteville road, west
of Wilson's Creek, opposite and within range of Reid's battery as it was then
in position as originally placed. Before he had discovered us, and perhaps in
ignorance of our position, Reid attacked him, under my personal orders and
supervision. Sigel's movement was a bold one, and we really could not tell,
on his first appearance (there having been no fight with Churchill), whether
he was friend or foe. An accidental gust of wind having unfurled his flag,
we were no longer in doubt. Reid succeeded in getting his range accurately,
so that his shot proved very effective. At this juncture, General McCulloch
in person led two companies of the Louisiana infantry in a charge and capt-
ured five of the guus.-^r General Sigel was himself in command, and made vain
attempts to hold his men, who were soon in full retreat, back over the road
they came, pursued by the Texas and Missouri cavalry. This was the last of
Sigel for the day, as his retreat was continued to Springfield. As a precau-
tion, however, not knowing how badly we had defeated Sigel, I immediately
posted the 4th Arkansas Infantry (Colonel Walker) along the brow of the hill,
commanding the road over which he had fled, which regiment remained on
duty until the battle was over.
There seemed now to be a lull in the active fighting ; the bloody contest in
the corn-field had taken place; the fight "mit Sigel" had resulted satisfac-
torily to us, but the troops more immediately opposed to General Lyon had
not done so well. General Price and his Missouri troops had borne the brunt
of this hard contest, but had gained no ground. They had suffered heavy
■& General McCulloeh's report says: " When we and soon the Louisianians were gallantly charging
arrived near the enemy's battery we found that among the guns and swept the cannoneers away.
Reid's battery had opened upon it, and it was Five guns were here taken."
already in confusion. Advantage was taken of it,
302 ARKANSAS TROOPS IN THE BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK.
losses, and were running short of ammunition. I had watched anxiously for
signs of victory to come from the north side of the creek, but Totten's bat-
tery seemed to belch forth with renewed vigor, and was advanced once or
twice in its imsition. The line of battle on our left was shortening, and the
fortunes of war appeared to be sending many of our gallant officers and soldiers
to their death. There was no de-
moralization— no signs of wavering
or retreat, but it was an hour of great
anxiety and suspense. No one then
knew what the day would bring forth.
As the sun poured down upon our
devoted comrades, poised and rest-
ing, as it were, between the chapters
of a mighty struggle not yet com-
pleted, the stoutest of us almost
weakened in our anxiety to know the
outcome.
Just at this time, General Lyon
appeared to be massing his men for
a final and decisive movement. I
had been relieved of Sigel, and Eeid's
battery was inactive because it could
not reach Totten. This was fortu-
nate, for my command, in a measure
fresh and enthusiastic, was about
to embrace an opportunity — such a
one as will often win or lose a battle — by throwing its strength to the
weakened line at a critical moment and winning the day. Colonel Mcin-
tosh came to me from General McCulloch, and Captain Greene from General
Price, urging me to move at once to their assistance. General Lyon was
in possession of Oak Hill ; his lines were forward, his batteries aggres-
sive, and his charges impetuous. The fortunes of the day were balanced
in the scale, and something must be done or the battle was lost. My men
were eager to go forward, and when I led the 3d Arkansas Infantry (Colonel
Gratiot) and the right wing of the 5th Arkansas Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel
Neal) across the creek, and pushed rapidly up the hill in the face of the enemy,
loud cheers went up from our expectant friends that betokened an enthusiasm
which, no doubt, helped to win the fight. Colonel Mcintosh, with two pieces
of Reid's battery, and with a part of Dockery's 5th Arkansas Infantry, sup-
ported my right ; the Federal forces occupied two lines of battle, reaching
across the crest of Oak Hill ; and at this juncture our troops in front were
composed of the Missouri forces, under General Price (occupying the center) ;
Texas and Louisiana troops, under General McCulloch (on the right), and
my forces thrown forward (on the left), when a combined advance was ordered
by General McCulloch. This proved to be the decisive engagement, and as
volley after volley was poured against our lines, and our gallant boys were
BRIGADIER-GENERAL WH. Y. SLACK, C. S. A., MORTALLY
WOUNDED AT PEA RIDGE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
ARKANSAS TROOPS IN THE BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK. 303
cut down like grass, those who survived seemed to be nerved to greater effort
and a determination to win or die. At about this time (11 : 30 a. m.) the first
line of battle before us gave way. Our boys charged the second line with a
yell, and were soon in possession of the field, the enemy slowly withdrawing
toward Springfield. This hour decided the contest and won for us the day.
It was in our front here, as was afterward made known, that the brave com-
mander of the Federal forces, General Lyon, was killed, gallantly leading his
men to what he and they supposed was victory, but which proved (it may be
because they were deprived of his enthusiastic leadership) disastrous defeat.
In the light of the present day, even, it is difficult to measure the vast results
had Lyon lived and the battle gone against us.
General McCulloch, myself, and our staff-officers now grouped ourselves
together upon the center of the hill. Woodruff's battery was again placed in
position, and Totten, who was covering the retreat of Sturgis (who had
assumed command of the Federal forces after the death of General Lyon),
received the benefit of his parting shots. We watched the retreating enemy
through our field-glasses, and were glad to sec Mm go. Our ammunition was
exhausted, our men undisciplined, and we feared to risk pursuit. It was also
rumored that reenf orcein ents were coming to the Federal army by forced
marches, but it was found the next day that the disaster to the retreating
army was greater than we had supposed, and a few fresh cavalry troops could
doubtless have followed and captured many more stragglers and army stores,
Next day the enemy evacuated Springfield, and Price, with his Missouri
troops, occupied it, and had his supplies and wounded moved to that point.
The Arkansans in this battle were as brave, as chivalrous, and as successful
as any of the troops engaged. They bore out, on many a hard-fought field
later on in the struggle, the high hopes built upon their conduct here.
The "body of the army remained at Springfield taut one to take. General Price left Springfield on
until the beginning of General Price's march upon the 25th of August, dispersed Lane's forces at
Lexington, on the 25th of August. A few days Drywood, September 2d, and reached Warrensburg
after the battle Pearce's brigade of Arkansas mili- in pursuit of Colonel Peabody at daybreak, Sep-
tia was disbanded on the expiration of their term temberlOth; Peabody getting into Lexington first,
of enlistment. General McCulloch moved west- Price, after a little skirmishing with Mulligan's
ward with his own brigade, and then to Maysville, outpost, bivouacked within 21., miles of Lexington.
Arkansas, being influenced in his return by the In the morning (12th) Mulligan sent out a small
general tenor of his instructions from the Confed- force which burnt a bridge in Price's path. Price
erate Government to avoid, if possible, operating then crossed to the Independence Eoad, and
in the State of Missouri, which had not seceded, waited for his infantry and artillery. These came
General Price, upon being informed of his decision, up in the afternoon, and Price then advanced to-
issued an order re-assuming command, and the ward Lexington, and drove Mulligan behind his
operations in the State which followed, including defenses. There was a little skirmishing in a
tin- capture of Lexington, were conducted with corn-field and in a cemetery through which Price
Missouri troops alone. At this time the Federal advanced, and in the streets of Lexington, where
troops held the Missouri river by a cordon of mili- he opened upon Mulligan with 7 pieces of artil-
tary posts. The object of this line was to prevent lery. Price's movement into Lexington in the af-
file crossing of the river by the secessionists of ternoon of September 12th was only a reconnois-
north Missouri, who, to the number of 5000 or sance in force. Toward dark he retired to the Fair
<iui>0, were armed and organized and desirous of Ground, and waited for his trains to come up, and
joining the army of General Price in south-west for reenforcements that were hurrying to him from
Missouri. To break this blockade became the ob- all directions, including Harris's and Green's com-
ject of General Price. Of the four Federal posts, mands from north of the Missouri. The invest-
Jefferson City, Boonville, Lexington, and Kansas nient of Mulligan's position was made as shown on
City, Lexington was the easiest and most impor- the map, page 309. — Editors.
THE FLANKING COLUMN AT WILSON'S CREEK.
BY FRANZ SIGEL, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.
/ \N August 9th, 1861, the day before the battle
^^ at Wilson's Creek, my brigade, consisting of
the 3d and 5th Missouri Infantry, commanded re-
spectively by Lieutenant-Colonel Anselm Albert
and Charles E. Salomon, and two batteries of artil-
lery, each of 4 pieces, under the command of
Lieutenants Schaefer and Schuetzenbach, was en-
camped on the south side of Springfield, near the
Yokermill road. On our right was encamped the
1st Iowa Infantry, a regiment clad in militia gray.
The bulk of General Lyon's forces wei*e on the
west side of the city. During the morning I sent
a staff-officer to General Lyon's headquarters for
orders, and on his return he reported to me that
a forward movement would take place, and that we
must hold ourselves in readiness to march at a
moment's warning directly from our camp, toward
the south, to attack the enemy from the rear. I
immediately went to General Lyon, who said that
we would move in the evening to* attack the enemy
in his position at Wilson's Creek, and that I was to
be prepared to move with my brigade; the 1st
Iowa would join the main column with him, while
I was to take the Yokermill (Forsyth) road, then
turn toward the south-west and try to gain the en-
emy's rear. At my request, he said that he would
procure guides aud some cavalry to assist me ; he
would also let me know the exact time when I
should move. I then asked him whether, on our
an*ival near the enemy's position, we should attack
immediately or wait until we were apprised of the
fight by the other troops. He reflected a moment
and then said : " Wait until you hear the firing on
our side." The conversation did not last longer
than about ten minutes. Between 4 and 5 o'clock
in the afternoon I received the order to move at
6:30 P. M. At 6 o'clock two companies of cavalry,
under Captain Eugene A. Carr and Lieutenant
Charles E. Farrand, joined us, also several guides.
My whole force now consisted of 8 companies of
the 3d and 9 companies of the 5th Missouri (912
men), 6 pieces of artillery (85 men), and the 2
companies of cavalry (121), — in all, 1118 men.
Precisely at 6 : 30 o'clock the brigade moved out
of its camp ; after following the Yokermill road for
about five miles we turned south-west into the
woods, and found our way, with difficulty, to a point
south of the enemy's camp, where we arrived be-
tween 1 1 and 1 2 o'clock at night. There we rested.
It was a dark, cloudy night, and a drizzling rain be-
gan to fall. So far no news of our movement had
reached the enemy's camp, as the cavalry in ad-
vance had arrested every person on the road, and
put guards before the houses in its neighborhood.
At the first dawn of day we continued our advance
for about a mile and a half, the cavalry patrols in
front capturing forty men who had strolled into our
line while looking for food and water, and who said
that twenty regiments of Missouri, Arkansas, and
Lotusiana troops were encamped not far distant in
the valley beyond. Moving on, we suddenly found
ourselves near a hill, from which we gained a full
view of the camp. We halted a few moments,
when I directed four pieces of our artillery to take
position on the top of the hill, commanding the
camp, while the infantry, with the other two pieces
and preceded by Lieutenant Farrand's cavalry
company, continued its march down the road to
the crossing of Wilson's Creek.
It was now 5:30 a. m. At this moment some
musket-firing was heard from the north-west, an-
nouncing the approach of General Lyon's troops ;
I therefore ordered the four pieces to open fire
against the camp, which had a " stirring" effect
on the enemy, who were preparing breakfast.
The surprise was complete, except that one of
the enemy's cavalrymen made good his retreat
from Lieutenant Farrand's dragoons and took the
news of our advance to the other side (General
Pearce's headquarters). I became aware of his
escape, and believing that no time should be lost
to lend assistance to our friends, we crossed Wil-
son's Creek, took down the fences at Dixon's
farm, passed through it and crossed Terrel (or
Tyrel) Creek. (See map, page 290.) Not know-
ing whether it would be possible to bring all our
pieces along, I left the four pieces on the hill, with
a support of infantry, and continued our march
until we reached the south side of the valley, which
extends northward to Sharp's house, about 3000
paces, aud from west to east about 1000. We
took the road on the west side of the valley, along
the margin of the woods, and within a fence run-
ning nearly parallel with the open fields.
During this time a large body of the enemy's
cavalry, about 2500 strong, was forming across
the valley, not far distant from its northern ex-
tremity ; I therefore halted the column on the
road, sent for the four pieces left on the other
side of the creek, and, as soon as their approach
was reported to me, I directed the head of our
column to the right, left the road, and formed the
troops in line of battle, between the road and the
enemy's deserted camp, — the infantry on the left,
the artillery on the right, and the cavalry on the
extreme right, toward Wilson's Creek. A lively
cannonade was now opened against the dense
masses of the hostile cavalry, which lasted about
twenty minutes, and forced the enemy to retire in
disorder toward the north and into the woods. We
now turned back into the road, and, advancing,
made our way through a number of cattle near
Sharp's house, and suddenly struck the Fayette-
ville road, leading north to that part of the battle-
field on which General Lyon's troops were engaged.
We were now on the principal line of retreat of the
enemy, and had ai'rived there in perfect order and
discipline. Up to this time we had made fifteen
miles, had been constantly in motion, had had a suc-
cessful engagement, and the troops felt encouraged
30-1
THE FLANKING COLUMN AT WILSON'S CREEK.
305
by what they had accomplished. It is, therefore,
totally false, as rumor had it after the battle, that
"Sigel's men" gave, themselves up to plundering
the camp, became scattered, and were for this
reason surprised by the " returning enemy."
When we had taken our position ou the plateau
near Sharp's, a cannonade was opened by me
against a part of the enemy's troops, evidently
forming the left of their line, confronting Lyon, as
we could observe from the struggle going on in that
direction. The firing lasted about 30 minutes. $
Suddenly the firing on the enemy's side ceased,
and it seemed as if we had directed our own fire
against Lyon's forces. I therefore ordered the
pieces to cease firing. Just at this time — it was
between 9 and 10 o'clock — there was a lull in the
fight on the north side, and not a gun was heard,
while squads of the enemy's troops, unarmed, came
streaming up the road from Skegg's Brauch
toward us and were captured. Meanwhile a part
of McCulloch's force was advancing against us at
Sharp's farm, while Eeid's battery moved into po-
sition on the hill east of Wilson's Creek, and oppo-
site our right flank, followed by some cavalry.
All these circumstances — the cessation of the
firing in Lyon's front, the appearance of the ene-
my's deserters, and the movement of Eeid's artil-
lery and the cavalry toward the south — led us into
the belief that the enemy's forces were retreating,
and this opinion became stronger by the report of
Dr. Melcher, who was in advance on the road
to Skegg's Branch, that " Lyon's troops " were
coming up the road and that we must not fire.
So uncertain was I in regard to the character of
the approaching troops, now oidy a few rods dis-
tant, that I did not trust to my own eyes, but sent
Corporal Tod, of the 3d Missouri, forward to chal-
lenge them. He challenged as ordered, but was
immediately shot and killed. I instantly ordered
the artillery and infantry to fire. But it was
too late — the artillery fired one or two shots, but
the infantry, as though paralyzed, did not fire ; the
3d Louisiana, which we had mistaken for the gray-
clad 1st Iowa, rushed up to the plateau, while
Bledsoe's battery in front and Eeid's from the
heights on our right flank opened with canister at
point-blank against us. As a matter of precaution
I had during the last moment brought four of
our pieces into battery on the right against the
troops on the hill and Eeid's battery; but after
answering Eeid's fire for a few minutes, the horses
and drivers of three guns suddenly left their posi-
tion, and with their caissons galloped down the
Fayetteville road, in their tumultuous flight carry-
ing panic into the rauks of the infantry, which
turned back in disorder, and at the same time re-
ceived the fire of the attacking Hue.
On our retreat the right wing, consisting mostly
of the 3d Missouri Infantry and one piece of artil-
lery, followed the road we came, while the left
} Colonel Graves, commanding the First Brigade, Mo.
State Guards, says in his report: " Colonel Rosser, com-
manding the 1st Regiment and Fourth Battalion, with
Captain Bledsoe's artillery, being stationed on the ex-
treme left, was attacked by Colonel Sigel's battery, and
his men exposed to a deadly fire for thirty minutes."— F. S.
VOL. I. 20.
wing, consisting of the 5th Missouri Infantry and
another piece, went down the Fayetteville road,
then, turning to the right (north-west), made its
way toward Little York and Springfield ; on its
way the latter column was joined by Lieutenant
Farrand's cavalry company. Colonel Salomon was
also with this column, consisting in all of about
450 men, with 1 piece and caisson. I remained with
the right wing, the 3d Missouri, which was consid-
erably scattered. I re-formed the men duringtheir
retreat into 4 companies, in all about 250 men, and,
turning to the left, into the Fayetteville road, was
joined by Captain Carr's company of cavalry. After
considering that, by following the left wing toward
Little York, we might be cut off from Springfield
and not be able to join General Lyon's forces, we
followed the Fayetteville road until we reached a
road leading north-east toward Springfield. This
road we followed. Captain Carr, with his cavalry,
was leading; he was instructed to remain in ad-
vance, keep his flankers out, and report what
might occur in front. One company of the 3d
Missouri was at the head of our little column of
infantry, followed by the piece of artillery and two
caissons, behind them the remainder of the infantry,
the whole flanked on each side by skirmishers. So
we marched, or rather dragged along as fast as the
exhausted men could go, until we reached the ford
at James Fork of the White Eiver. Carr had al-
ready crossed, but his cavalry was not in sight ; it
had hastened along without waiting for us ; & a
part of the infantry had also passed the creek ; the
piece and caissons were just crossing, when the
rattling of musketry announced the presence of
hostile forces on both sides of the creek. They
were detachments of Missouri and Texas cavalry,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Major, Captains Mabry
and Eussell, that lay in ambush, and now pounced
upon our jaded and extended column. It was in
vain that Lieutenant-Colonel Albert and myself
tried to rally at least a part of them ; they left the
road to seek protection, or make good their escape
in the woods, and were followed and hunted down
by their pursuers. In this chase the greater part of
our men were killed, wounded, or made prisoners,
among the latter Lieutenant-Colonel Albert and
my orderly, who were with me in the last moment
of the affray. I was not taken, probably because
I wore a blue woolen blanket over my uniform and
a yellowish slouch-hat, giving me the appearance
of a Texas Banger. I halted on horseback, pre-
pared for defense, in a small strip of corn-field on
the west side of the creek, while the hostile
cavalrymen swarmed around and several times
passed close by me. When we had resumed our
way toward the north-east, we were immediately
recognized as enemies, and pursued by a few
horsemen, whose number increased rapidly. It was
a pretty lively race for about six miles, when our
pursuers gave up the chase. We reached Spring-
3» Colonel Carr says in his official report : " It is
a subject of regret with me to have left him [Sigel]
behind, but I supposed all the time that he was close
behind me till I got to the creek, and it would have done
no good for my company to have been cut to pieces
also."— Editors.
306
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT WILSON'S CREEK.
field at 4 : 30 in the afternoon, in advance of Stur-
gis, who with Lyon's troops was retreating from
the battle-field, and who arrived at Springfield, as
he says, at 5 o'clock. The circumstance of my
arrival at the time stated gave rise to the insinua-
tion that I had forsaken my troops after their re-
pulse at Sharp's house, and had delivered them to
their fate. Spiced with the accusation of " plun-
der," this and other falsehoods were repeated be-
fore the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and
a letter defamatory of me was dispatched to the
Secretary of War (dated February 14th, 1862,
six months after the battle of Wilson's Creek).
I had no knowledge of these calumnies against me
until long after the war, when I found them in print.
In support of my statements, I would direct at-
tention to my own reports on the battle and to the
Confederate reports, especially to those of Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Hyams and Captain Vigilini, of the
3d Louisiana ; also to the report of Captain Carr,
in which he frankly states that he abandoned me
immediately before my column was attacked at
the crossing of James Fork, without notifying
me of the approach of the enemy's cavalry. I
never mentioned this fact, as the subsequent
career of General Carr, his cooperation with me
during the campaigns of General Fremont, and
his behavior in the battle of Pea Ridge vindi-
cated his character and ability as a soldier and
commander.
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT WILSON'S CREEK, MO.
The composition and losses of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the official records.
K stands for killed ; w for wounded ; m w mortally wounded ; in for captured or missing ; c for captured.— Editors.
COMPOSITION AND LOSSES OF THE UNION ARMY.
Brig.-Gen. Nathaniel Lyon (k). Major Samuel D. Sturgis.
First Brigade, Major Samuel D. Sturgis: Regular Bat-
talion (B. C, and D, 1st Infantry and Wood's company
Rifle Recruits), Capt. Joseph B. Plummer; Battalion 2d
Mo. Infantry, Major P. J. Osterhaus; F, 2d U. S. Arty..
Capt. James Totten ; Kansas Rangers, Capt. S. N. Wood ;
B, let U. S. Cavalry, Lieut. Charles W. Canfleld. Second
Brigade, Lieut. -Col. George L. Andrews : Regular Bat-
talion (B and E, 2d Infant ry, Lotlirop's company General
Service Recruits, andMoriue's company Rifle Recruits),
Capt. Frederick Steele; DuBois's Battery (improvised),
Lieut. John V. DuBois ; 1st Mo. Infantry, Lieut-Col.
Geo. L. Andrews. Third Brigade, Col. Geo. W. Deitzler :
1st Kansas, Col. Geo. W. Deitzler (w), Major J. A Haider-
man; 2d Kansas, Col. R. B. Mitchell (w), Lieut.-Col. Chas.
W. Blair. Missouri Volunteers, Second Brigade, Colonel
Franz Sigel : 3d Mo., Lieut.-Col. Auselm Albert ; 5th Mo.,
Col. C. E. Salomon; I, let TJ. S. Cavalry, Capt. Eugene
A. Carr ; C, 2d U. S. Dragoons, Lieut. C. E. Farrand ;
Backof's Mo. Arty, (detachment), Lieutenants G. A.
Schaefer and Edward Schuetzenbach. Unattached Or-
ganizations : 1st Iowa Infantry, Lieut.-Col. William H.
Merritt ; Wright's and Switzler's Mo. Home Guard Cav-
alry; detachment D, 1st U. S. Cavalry; Mo. Pioneers,
Capt. J. D. Voerster.
The Union loss, as officially reported, was 223 killed, 721 wounded, and 291 missing,— total, 1235.
COMPOSITION AND LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.
Brig.-Gen. Ben. McCulloch.
Missouri State Guard, Major-Gen. Sterling Price.
Rains's Division, Brig. -Gen. James S. Rains. First Bri-
gade, Col. R. H. Weightman (m w), Col. John R. Graves :
1st Infantry, Lieut.-Col. Thomas H. Rosser ; 3d Infantry,
Col. Edgar V. Hurst; 4th Infantry (battalion), Major
Thomas H. Murray ; 5th Infantry, Col. J. J. Clarkson ;
Graves's Infantry, Col. John R. Graves, Major Brashear;
Bledsoe's Battery, Capt. Hiram Bledsoe. Second Bri-
gade, Col. Cawthon (m w). [Composition of brigade not
given in the official records.] Parsons's Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. M. M. Parsons: Kelly's Infantry, Col. Kelly (w) ;
Brown's Cavalry, Col. Ben. Brown (k) ; Guibor's Battery,
Capt. Henry Guibor. Clark's Division, Brig.-Gen. John
B. Clark : Burbridge's Infantry, Col. J. Q. Burbridge
(w), Major John B. Clark, Jr. ; 1st Cavalry (battalion),
Lieut.-Col. J. P. Major. Slack's Division, Brig.-Gen. W.
Y. Slack (w): Hughes's Infantry, Col. John T. Hughes;
Thornton's Infantry (battalion), Major J. C. Thornton ;
Rives's Cavalry, Col. B. A. Rives. McBride's Division,
Brig.-Gen. James H. McBride: Wingo's Infantry ; Fos-
ter's Infantry, Col. Foster (w) ; Campbell's Cavalry,
Capt. Campbell.
Arkansas Forces, Brig.-Gen. N. B. Pearce, 1st Cav-
alry, Col. De Rosey Carroll; Carroll's Company Cavalry,
Capt. Charles A. Carroll; 3d Infantry, Col. John R.
Gratiot ; 4th Infantry, Col. J. D. Walker ; 5th Infantry,
Col. Tom P. Doekeyy ; Woodruff's Battery. Capt, W. E.
Woodruff; Reid's Battery, Capt. J. G. Reirl.
McCulloch's Brigade: 1st Ark. Mounted Riflemen,
Col. T. J. Churchill; 2d Ark. Mounted Riflemen, Col.
James McTntosh, Lieut.-Col. B. T. Einbry ; Arkansas
Infantry (battalion), Lieut.-Col. Dandridge McRae ;
South Kansas-Texas Mounted Regiment, Col. E. Greer ;
3d La. Infantry, Col. Louis Hebert.
The Confederate loss, as officially reported, was 265 killed, 800 wounded, and 30 missing,— total, 1095.*
STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING FORCES.
The Union forces are estimated from official returns
at 5400 (with 16 guns). Of these 1118 were with Sigel and
350 mounted reserve. The Confederate forces are more
difficult to estimate, but Colonel Snead, General Price's
adjutant-general during the battle, gives in his volume,
" The Fight for Missouri " (Charles Scribner's Sons), the
following estimate, which is doubtless as near the facts
as it is possible to get : Price's force (Missouri State
Guard), 5221 ; McCulloch's brigade, 2720, and Pearce's bri-
gade, 2234,— total, 10,175 (with 15 guns).
* NOTE.— Colonel Snead, with unusual facilities for ascertaining the facts, gives the losses as follows : Union, (k), 258 ;
(w), 873; (m), 186,— total, 1317. Confederate, (k), 279: (w), 951,— total, 1230. The Union reports do not include Oster-
haus's battalion, which lost (k), 15 ; (w), 40; and give Sigel's loss at 26 less than Colonel Snead's estimate.— EDITORS.
■7>
$OT
a«a
CONFEDERATES FIGHTING BEHIND HEMP BALES AT LEXINGTON. SEE PAGE 3U.
THE SIEGE OF LEXINGTON, MO J
BY COLONEL JAMES A. MULLIGAN.
ON the night of the 30th of August, 1861, as the " Irish Brigade" ( 23d Illinois
Volunteers) lay encamped just outside of Jefferson City, Mo., I received
orders to report to General Jefferson C. Davis, commanding in the town.
On doing so, I was informed by General Davis that the cavalry regiment of
Colonel Thomas A. Marshall, which had left for the South-west some days
before, had reached Tipton, where it was hemmed in by the enemy, and
could neither advance nor return, and that he wished me to go to Tipton,
join Colonel Marshall, take command of the combined forces, cut my way
through the enemy, go to Lexington, and hold it at all hazards.
The next morning the " Irish Brigade " started with forty rounds of ammu-
nition and three days' rations for each man. "We marched for nine days
without meeting an enemy, foraging upon the country for support. We
reached Tipton, but found neither Colonel Marshall nor the enemy, and we
passed on to a pleasant spot near Lexington where we prepared for our entry
into the city. The trouble was not so much the getting into Lexington as the
getting out. At Lexington we found Colonel Marshall's cavalry regiment and
about 350 of a regiment of Home Guards. On the 10th of September we
received a letter from Colonel Everett Peabody, of the 13th Missouri Regi-
ment, saying that he was retreating from Warrensburg, 34 miles distant,
and that the rebel General Price was in full pursuit with an army of 10,000
men. A few hours later Colonel Peabody joined us.
There were then at this post the " Irish Brigade," Colonel Marshall's Illinois
cavalry regiment (full), Colonel Peabody's regiment, and a part of the 14th
Missouri — in all about 2780 men, with one six-pounder, | forty rounds of
,i Reprinted, with revision, from newspaper re-
ports of a lecture by Colonel Mulligan, who was
killed during the war (see page 313). In cer-
tain important particulars, the text has been
altered to free it from clearly demonstrable er-
rors.— Editors.
\. Doubtless an accidental mistake. Colonel Mul-
ligan had 7 six-pounders (Waldschmidt, 2 ; Adams,
3, and Pirner, 2) ; Pirner also had 2 brass mor-
tars for throwing six-inch spherical shells, of which
he had but 40, which were soon exhausted. The
Confederate artillery consisted of 16 guns in five
307
3o8 THE SIEGE OF LEXINGTON.
ammunition, and but few rations. We then dispatched a courier to Jefferson
City to inform General Davis of our condition, and to pray for reenf orcements
or even rations, whereupon we would hold out to the last. At noon of the
11th we commenced throwing up intrenchments on College Hill, an eminence
overlooking Lexington and the broad Missouri. All daylong the men worked
untiringly with the shovel. That evening, but six or eight hours after we had
commenced, our pickets were driven in and intimation was given that the
enemy were upon us. Colonel Peabody was ordered out to meet them, and
two six-pounders were planted in a position to command a covered bridge
by which the enemy were obliged to enter the town. It was a night of
fearful anxiety ; none knew at what moment the enemy would be upon our
devoted little band, and the hours passed in silence. We waited until the
morning of the 12th, vigilantly and without sleep, when a messenger rushed
in, saying, " Colonel, the enemy are pushing across the bridge in overwhelm-
ing force." With a glass we could see them as they came, General Price
riding up and down the lines, urging his men on. Two companies of the
Missouri 13th were ordered out, and, with Company K of the Irish Brigade,
quickly checked the enemy, drove him back, burned the bridge, and gallantly
ended their work before breakfast.
The enemy now made a detour, and approached the town once more, by
the Independence road. Six companies of the Missouri 13th and the Illinois
Cavalry were ordered out, and met them in the Lexington Cemetery, just
outside the town, where the fight raged furiously over the dead. We suc-
ceeded in keeping the enemy in check, and in the mean time the work with
the shovel went bravely on until we had thrown up breastworks three or
four feet high.
At 3 o'clock in the afternoon the engagement opened with artillery. A
volley of grape from the enemy was directed at a group of our officers who
were outside the breastworks. Our men returned the volley. The contest
raged about an hour and a half, when we had the satisfaction, by a lucky shot,
of knocking over the enemy's big gun, exploding a powder caisson, and other-
wise doing much damage. The fight was continued until dusk, and, as the
moon rose, the enemy retired to camp in the Fair Ground, two miles away,
and Lexington was our own again.
On Friday, the 13th, though a drenching rain had set in, the work of
throwing up intrenchments went on, and the men stood almost knee-deep
in mud and water, at their work. We had taken the basement of the Masonic
College, a building from which the eminence took its name; powder was
ol rtained, and the men commenced making cartridges. A foundry was fitted
up, and 150 rounds of shot — grape and canister — were cast for each of our
six-pounders.
batteries, as follows : Bledsoe, 4 guns ; Churchill not include in his estimate either his officers or the
Clark, 2; Guibor, 4; Kelly, 4; Kueisley, 2.— ("His- body of Home Guards who assisted in the defense,
tory of Lafayette County, Missouri.") Colonel Snead states positively that, as adjutant-
The lack of agreement between the numbers of general of the Missouri troops, he paroled about
the Union forces as here stated, and as given by Col- 3500 prisoners. Among these may have been
onel Snead on page 273, is accounted for by the many not reckoned as effectives by Colonel Mulli-
latter on the supposition that Colonel Mulligan did gan. — Editors.
THE SIEGE OF LEXINGTON.
309
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DIAGRAM OF THE HOSPITAL POSITION.
FROM THE "HISTORY OF LAFAYETTE COUNTY, MISSOURI.
Captain Joseph A. "Wilson, of Lexington, tuns describes the Union posi-
tion: " The college is on a bluff about 200 feet above low- water mark, and
from 15 to 30 feet higher than North or Main street. Third street rims along
the top of the bluff. Close to and surrounding the college building was a
rectangular fort of sods and earth about 12 feet thick and 12 feet high ; with
bastions at the angles and embrasures for guns. At a distance of 200 to
800 feet was an irregular line of earthworks protected by numerous trav-
erses, occasional redoubts, a good ditch, trous-de-loup, wires, etc., etc. Still
farther on the west and north were rifle-pits. The works would have re-
quired 10,000 or 15,000 men to occupy them fully. All the ground from the
fortifications to the river was then covered with scattering timber. The
spring just north and outside of fortifications, was in a deep wooded ra-
vine, and was the scene of some sharp skirmishing at night, owing to the
attempts of the garrison to get water there when their cisterns gave out."
Explanation of the Diagram of the Hospital Position : " a is the Anderson house or hospital ; 6 a smaller brick
house back of it; c an outlying low earthwork, projecting down nearly into the ravine, represented by the dotted
line, while the inclosed earthwork was built up around the head of the ravine, as shown by the plain line; d the
sally-port in the earthworks, about one hundred yards from the hospital; e a canal-like carriageway leading
up to the house, and in which the sharp-shooters lay secure, only about eighty feet from the front door of the
hospital; the brackets represent Federal picket-guard stations with a little dirt thrown up for protection; the
dotted line sss shows deep gorge or ravine which was full of Confederate sharp-shooters."
Sunday had now arrived. "We had found no provisions at Lexington, and
our 2700 men were getting short of rations. Father Thaddeus J. Butler, our
chaplain, celebrated mass on the hillside, and all were considerably strength-
ened and encouraged by his words, and after services were over we went back
to work, actively casting shot and stealing provisions from the inhabitants
round about. Our pickets were all the time skirmishing with the enemy,
while we were making preparations for defense against the enemy's attack,
which was expected on the morrow.
At 9 o'clock on the morning of the 18th the enemy were seen approach-
ing. The Confederate force had been increased to 18,000 men with 16 pieces
of cannon. They came as one dark moving mass, their guns beaming in
the sun, their banners waving, and then' drums beating — everywhere, as
far as we could see, were men, men, men, approaching grandly. Our earth-
works covered an area of about eighteen acres, surrounded by a ditch, and
protected in front by what were called " confusion pits," and by mines. Our
men stood firm behind the breastworks, none trembled or paled, and a solemn
3io
THE SIEGE OF LEXINGTON.
THE HOSPITAL.
THE COLLEGE, FRONTING SOUTH.
THE BATTLE OF LEXINGTON, MO., AS SEEN FROM GENERAL PARSONS' POSITION. AFTER A CONTEMPORARY DRAWING.
silence prevailed. As Father Butler went round among- them, they asked his
blessing, received it with uncovered heads, then turned and sternly cocked
their muskets.
The enemy opened a terrible fire with their cannon on all sides, which we
answered with determination and spirit. Our spies had brought intelligence,
and had all agreed that it was the intention of the enemy to make a grand
rush, overwhelm us, and bury us in the trenches of Lexington.
At noon, word was brought that the enemy had taken the hospital. We
had not fortified that ; it was situated outside the intrenchments, and I had
supposed that the little white flag was sufficient protection for the wounded
and dying soldiers who had finished their service and were powerless for harm.
The hospital contained our chaplain, our surgeon, and a number of wounded.
The enemy took it without opposition, filled it with their sharp-shooters, and
from every window, every door, from the scuttles in the roof, poured right
into our intrenchments a deadly drift of lead. A company of the Home
Guards, then a company of the Missouri 14th, were ordered to retake the
hospital, but refused. The Montgomery Guards, a company of the Irish
Brigade, was then ordered out. Their captain admonished them to uphold
the gallant name they bore, and the order was given to charge. The distance
across the plain from the intrenchments to the hospital was about eighty
yards. They started ; at first quick, then double-quick, then on a run, then
THE SIEGE OF LEXINGTON. 311
faster. Still the deadly fire poured into their ranks. But on they went ; a
wild line of steel, and, what is better than steel, irresistible human will.
They reached the hospital, burst open the door, without shot or shout, until
they encountered the enemy within, whom they hurled out and sent flying
down the hill. ])
Our surgeon was held by the enemy, although we had released the Con-
federate surgeon on his mere pledge that he was such. It was a horrible thing
to see those brave fellows, mangled and wounded, without skillful hands to
bind their ghastly wounds ; and Captain David P. Moriarty, who had been a
physician in civil life, was ordered to lay aside his sword and go into the
hospital. He went, and through all the siege worked among the wounded
with no other instrument than a razor. Our supply of water had given out
and the scenes in the hospital were fearful to witness, wounded men suffering-
agonies from thirst and in their frenzy wrestling for the water in which
the wounded had been bathed.\
On the morning of the 19th the firing was resumed, and continued all day.
Our officers had told the men that if they could hold out until the 19th we
should certainly be reenforced, and all through that day the men watched
anxiously for the appearance of the friendly flag under which aid was to
reach them, and listened eagerly for the sound of friendly cannon. But they
looked and listened in vain, and all day long they fought without water, their
parched lips cracking, their tongues swollen, and the blood running down
their chins when they bit their cartridges and the saltpeter entered their blis-
tered lips. But not a word of murmuring.
The morning of the 20th broke, but no reinforcements had come, and still
the men fought on. & The enemy appeared that day with an artifice which
I The Union force held the building an hour or erals had no military right to expect that a strategic
two, when they were again dislodged. In regard Position so important to their opponents as the Anderson
to the capture of the hospital by the Confederates, ^T& ™d Premi8es .manif e8*ly ,were- wo!!1(I °,r should be
, . ., ..;,_• , „ ' left in quiet possession merely because they had seen fit
and to its recapture by the Union forces, we find to use some partof it tor hospital purposes. Nevertheless,
the following in the ' ' History of Lafayette County, that first false scent has been followed and barked after
Missouri" ( St. Louis : Missouri Historical Com- for twenty years — the Federals erroneously claiming
pany, 1881), a work which, in its treatment of the an ""Justifiable attack on the hospital, and the Confed-
e t ■ t--T.-i • j.- i-x ^ erates erroneously claiming that they were first fired
siege of Lexington exhibits impartiality and a on by Fe(](.rals f;.oni in.i(whe building, and that for
painstaking research, the more valuable by reason that reason the attack was made." Editors.
of the meagerness of the official reports of the a. .f, ,, ,, TT . - ,
f \ After the investment, the Union forces being
engagement *
° ' entirely cut off from the river, " Marshall's cavalry-
JZ^l !l°8ilital ma>er hil8,l5r1 ™nch a,nl,nai!v^d men and some of the teamsters had watered their
upon by partisan writers on both sides. Colonel Mulli- , . , , ,,
gan assumed that the Confederates were guilty of a horses out of the cisterns at the college, and there
breach of civilized warfare in firing on a hospital : and, was Dut little water left, what there was being
consequently, when his meu retook the building, having muddy. Two springs at the foot of the bluffs —
this belief firmly fixed in their minds, they gave no one on the north and one on the south — were
quarter, but killed every armed man caught in the „!„„„!„ -, a t, ., ^ »
building. Some of the minor Confederate officers seemed ^osely guarded by the enemy. . . . One of
to labor under the same impression, and claimed, as an Colonel Mulligan's men, in an account of the battle,
excuse or justification for the capture, that the Federals said: 'On the morning of the 19th it rained
had fired upon them from inside the building; but this heavilv for about two hours, saturating our
rZ^^Z^VV^ "T^' **? 8UrSe°°' ST' blankets, which we wrung out into our canteens
Coolej , and the priest, Father Butler, who were in the „ •, . ,. .. ,,iTT. . ° „ , „
hospital, and by Major Meet, Mr. H. Boothman, and for drinking"' ("History of Lafayette County,
others, still living in Lexington, who were at the time Missouri'' ). — Editors.
«J^£a£L°f 5? i"trei^nm1ent *™™at tne hospital. £ No reenforcements reached Colonel Mulligan,
But, aside from this, the official report of General Harris, +-.** , & , , .. ,. a ?
made at the time, shows that there was no such reason tnouSh efforts were made to relieve him. Septem-
for the capture; but that it was deliberately planned ^er 16th, Sturgis with 1100 men, but without ar-
and ordered as a rightful military movement. The Fed- tillery or cavalry, was ordered by Geueral Pope to
M2
THE SIEGE OF LEXINGTON.
was destined to overreach us and secure to them the possession of our
intrenchments. They had constructed a movable breastwork of hemp bales,
rolled them before then lines up the hill, and advanced under this cover.
All our efforts could not retard the advance of these bales. Round-shot and
bullets were poured against them, but they would only rock a little and then
settle back. Heated shot were fired
with the hope of setting them on fire,
but they had been soaked and would
not burn. Thus for hours the fight
continued. J Our cartridges were now
nearly used up, many of our brave
fellows had fallen, and it was evident
that the fight must soon cease, when
at 3 o'clock an orderly came, saying
that the enemy had sent a flag of
truce. With the flag came a note
from General Price, asking " why the
firing had ceased." I returned it, with
the reply written on the back, " Gen-
eral, I hardly know, unless you have
surrendered." He at once took pains
to assure me that this was not the
case. I then discovered that the ma-
jor of another regiment, in spite of
orders, had raised a white flag.
Our ammunition was about gone.
We were out of rations, and had been
without water for days, and many of
the men felt like giving up the post, which it seemed impossible to hold
longer. They were ordered back to the breastworks, and told to use up all
their powder, then defend themselves as best they could, but to hold their
place. Then a council of war was held in the college, and the question of
COLONEL JAMES A. MULLIGAN.
proceed from Macon City for the purpose. He did
so, but his messenger to Mulligan being intercepted
by General Price, the latter, on the 19th, dispatched
a force of 3000 men or more under General Par-
sons and Colonel Congreve Jackson across the
river to repel Sturgis's advance, then within fifteen
miles of Lexington. Sturgis, being informed of
Mulligan's situation, retreated to Port Leaven-
worth. Parsons recrossed the river and took part
in the fighting during the afternoon. — Editors.
I There are many claimants for the credit of
having first suggested the hemp-bale strategy.
General Harris's official report says :
" I directed the bales to be wet in the river to protect
them against the casualties of tire of our troops and of
the enemy, but it was soon found that the wetting so
materially increased the weight as to prevent our men,
in their exhausted condition, from rolling it to the crest
of the hill. I then adopted the idea of wetting the hemp
after it had been transported to its position."
As to the date of the use of these, which is given
both by Colonel Mulligan and by Colonel Snead
as the morning of the 20th, we quote the follow-
ing circumstantial account from the official report
of Colonel Hughes :
"On the morning of the 19th, we arose from our
' bivouac ' upon the bills to renew the attack. This day
we continued the fighting vigorously all day, holding
possession of the hospital buildings, and throwing large
wings froin both sides of the house, built up of bales of
hemp saturated wit li water, to keep them from taking
fire. These portable benrp-bales were extended, like the
wings of a partridge net, so as to cover and protect
several hundred men at a time, and a most terrible and
galling and deadly fire was kept up from them upon the
wTorks of the enemy by my men. I divided my forces
intoreliefs and kept some three hundred of them pouring
in a heavy fire incessantly upon the enemy, supplying
the places of the weary with fresh troops. On the night
of the 19th we enlarged and advanced our defensive
works very near to the enemy's intrenchments, and at
daybreak opened upon their line with most fatal effect."
Editors.
THE SIEGE OF LEXINGTON.
313
surrender was put to the officers, and a ballot was taken, only two out of six
votes being cast in favor of fighting on. Then the flag of truce was sent out
with our surrender.
Colonel Snead (see page 262) writes us as
follows in regard to the circumstances of the
surrender :
" The surrender of Lexington was negotiated on the
part of Colonel Mulligan by Colonel Marshall of the 1st
Illinois Cavalry, and on the part of General Price by
me. We met inside of the Union lines. Of course I
demanded the unconditional surrender of the post, with
its officers and men and material of war. Colonel Mar-
shall hesitated, and at last said that he would have to sub-
mit the matter to Colonel Mulligan. As we knew that
reinforcements were on the way to Mulligan, and as I
feared that Mulligan was only practicing a ruse in order
to gain time, I said to Colonel Marshall that if the terms
which I offered were not accepted within ten minutes I
should return to our lines and order fire to be reopened.
He left me, but returned just as the ten minutes were
expiring, and said that the surrender would be made as
demanded. I immediately sent one of the officers, whom
I had taken with me, to announce the fact to General
Price and to ask when he would accept the surrender.
He came over at once, and notified Colonel Mulligan that
he would himself accept the surrender of him and his
field-officers forthwith, and assign one of his division
commanders to accept the surrender of the men and
their company officers. Mulligan and his field-officers
came forward immediately, on foot, and offered to sur-
render their swords. General Price (next to whom I
was sitting) replied instantly, 'You gentlemen have
fought so bravely that it would be wrong to deprive you
of your swords. Keep them. Orders to parole you and
your men will be issued, Colonel Mulligan, without un-
necessary delay.' The only officer or man that was not
paroled, and the only one who was taken South, was
Colonel Mulligan."
Colonel Mulligan was held as a prisoner until
the 30th of October, being accompanied by his
wife, who had been an eye-witness of the siege
from the town. They journeyed in General Price's
private carriage, and (Mrs. Mulligan says) received
"every possible courtesy from the general and his
staff." They returned to St. Louis under escort of
forty men and a flag of truce. In Chicago and
elsewhere Colonel Mulligan was received with en-
thusiastic honors.
Colonel Mulligan, after his exchange, was placed
in command along the Baltimore and Ohio Rail-
road, in western Virginia. During this period he
engaged in many skirmishes with the enemy. In
the battle of Winchester, July 24th; 1864, Colonel
Mulligan received three mortal wounds. Some of
the officers, among whom was his brother-in-law,
Lieutenant James H. Nugent, nineteen years of
age, attempted to carry him from the field. Seeing
the colors in danger the colonel said: "Lay me
down and save the flag." Lieutenant Nugent res-
cued the colors and returned to the colonel's side,
but in a few moments fell, mortally wounded. Col-
onel Mulligan died forty-eight hours after, at the
age of thirty-four. After his death, his widow re-
ceived from President Lincoln Colonel Mulligan's
commission of Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V.,
dated July 24th, "for gallant and meritorious ser-
vices at the battle of Winchester." — Editors.
Note : The seizure of the money of the Lexing-
ton Bauk referred to by Colonel Snead on page 273
is treated in full in the " History of Lafayette
County," from which we condense the following
statement : Governor Jackson having appropri-
ated the school fund of the State to the arming
and equipment of the State troops, and the pro-
posal having been made to force loans from certain
banks for the same purpose, General Fremont, in
order to checkmate this action of the Governor,
ordered the funds of certain banks to be sent to
St. Louis, not for the use of the Federal author-
ities, but to prevent their employment to aid the
enemy. By his order, Colonel Marshall secured
the funds of the State Bank of Lexington against
the protest of the officers, giving a receipt for the
amount, which was $960,159.60, of which $165,-
659.60 was in gold. The money was buried in the
fort under Colonel Mulligan's tent, and upon the
surrender every dollar of the gold was delivered to
General Price, but $15,000 in notes of the bank
was missing. Governor Jackson and General Price
ordered all the money to be restored to the bank,
but on the 30th of September made a demand
upon the bank for, and under threat of force re-
ceived, the sum of $37,337.20 in gold, claimed to
be due to the State under an act of the Legislature
of Missouri, which permitted of the suspension of
certain banks on the condition that they should
loan the State on its bonds a certain portion of
their fund. At the time of the capture of Lexing-
ton the State Convention of Missouri had deposed
Governor Jackson and elected in his place Hamil-
ton R. Gamble. The Union State Government
made demand afterward for the same sum, which
was paid and bonds of the State issued therefor,
which were redeemed at their face value when due.
The sum given to Governor Jackson was charged
by the bank to "profit and loss." See also page
280 for General Fremont's declaration of policy
in this respect. " The funds of other banks of the
State were taken possession of by the Federal
authorities, transported to St. Louis, and in due
time every dollar returned." — Editors.
THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN
BY FRANZ SIGEL, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.
UNIFORM OF THE UNITED STATES
REGULARS IN 1861.
HE battle of Pea Ridge (or Elkhorn Tavern, as the Confed-
erates named it) was fought on the 7th and 8th of March,
1862, one month before the battle of Shiloh. It was the
first clear and decisive victory gained by the North in a
pitched battle west of the Mississippi River, and until Price's
invasion of 1864 the last effort of the South to carry the
war into the State of Missouri, except by abortive raids.
Since the outbreak of the rebellion, Missouri, as a border
and slave State, had represented all the evils of a bitter civil
strife. The opening events had been the protection of the
St. Louis arsenal, the capture of Camp Jackson, the minor
engagements at Boonville and Carthage, the sanguinary
struggle at Wilson's Creek on the 10th of August, forever
memorable by the heroic death of General Lyon. The re-
treat of our little army of about 4500 men to Rolla, after
that battle, ended the first campaign and gave General
Sterling Price, the military leader of the secessionist
forces of Missouri, the opportunity of taking possession of Springfield, the
largest city and central point of south-west Missouri, and of advancing with
a promiscuous host of over 15,000 men as far as Lexington, on the Missouri
River, which was gallantly defended for three days by Colonel Mulligan.
Meanwhile, General Fremont, who on the 25th of July had been placed in
command of the Western Department, had organized and put in motion an
army of about 30,000 men, with 86 pieces of artillery, to cut off Price's forces,
but had only succeeded in surprising and severely defeating about a thousand
recruits of Price's retiring army at Springfield by a bold movement of 250
horsemen (Fremont's body-guard and a detachment of " Irish Dragoons ")
under the lead of Major Zagonyi. Our army, in which I commanded a divis-
ion, was now concentrated at Springfield, and was about to follow and attack
the forces of Price and McCnlloch, who had taken separate positions, the one
(Price) near Pineville in the south-western corner of Missouri, the other
(McCulloch) near Keetsville, on the Arkansas line. Although McCnlloch was
at first averse to venturing battle, he finally yielded to the entreaties of Price,
and prepared himself to cooperate in resisting the further advance of Fremont.
Between Price and McCulloch it was explicitly understood that Missouri
should not be given up without a struggle. Such was the condition of things
when the intended operations of General Fremont were cut short by his
removal from the command of the army (November 2d), his successor being-
General David Hunter. The result of this change was an immediate and
uncommonly hasty retreat of our army in a northerly and easterly direction,
to Sedalia on the 9th, and to Rolla on the loth ; in fact, the abandonment of
the whole south-west of the State by the Union troops, and the occupation of
314
THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN.
315
the city of Springfield for the second time by the enemy, who were greatly in
need of more comfortable winter quarters. They must have been exceed-
ingly glad of the sudden disappearance of an army which by its numerical
superiority, excellent organization, and buoyant spirit had had a very good
chance of at least driving them out of Mis-
souri. As it was, the new-fledged " Confed-
erates " % utilized all the gifts of good for-
tune, organized a great portion of their
forces for the Confederate service, and
provided themselves with arms, ammuni-
tion, and equipments for the field, while
the Northern troops were largely reduced
by the hardships of miserable winter
quarters, and the Union refugees who had
left their homes were in great part huddled
together in tents in the public places and
streets of Rolla and St. Louis, and were de-
pendent on the charity of their sympathiz-
ing friends or on municipal support. The
whole proceeding was not only a most
deplorable military blunder, but also a
political mistake. To get rid of Fremont,
the good jn'ospects and the honor of the
army were sacrificed. It would be too mild
an expression to say that the Union peo-
ple of Missouri, or rather of the whole West, felt disappointed; there was
deep and bitter indignation, even publicly manifesting itself by demonstra-
tions and protests against the policy of the Administration, and especially
against its political and military advisers and intriguers, who sacrificed the
welfare of the State to their jealousy of an energetic and successful rival.
To regain what was lost, another campaign — the third in the course of eight
months — was resolved upon. It was undertaken by the very same army,
but under a different commander, and greatly reduced on account of the
prevalence of diseases and the extraordinary mortality in the different cainps
during the months of inactivity ; in truth, the campaign from September to
November had " to be done over again " in January, February, and March,
in the midst of a very severe winter, and with the relations of numerical
strength reversed. Toward the end of December, '61, when not fully restored
from a severe illness, I was directed by General Halleck (who, on November 9th,
had succeeded General Hunter, the command now being called the Depart-
ment of the Missouri) to proceed to Rolla, to take command of the troops
encamped there, including my own division (the Third, afterward the First)
& On the 29th of October, when I was engaged federate Congress by the Rump Legislature of
in a recoimoissance on Bloody Hill, at Wilson's Missouri. — F. S.
Creek, I heard the salute of one. hundred guns This body was composed of 39 representatives
fired at Neosho in celebration of the act of seces- and 10 senators — each number being far short of
sion, and of the sending of delegates to the Con- a lawful quorum. — Editors.
MAJOR-GENERAL SAMUEL R. CURTIS.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
3 16 THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN.
and General Asboth's (the Fourth, afterward the Second), and to prepare
them for active service in the field. I arrived at Rolla on the 23d of December,
and on the 27th, when the organization was completed, I was superseded by
General Samuel R. Curtis, who had been appointed by Halleck to the com-
mand of the District of South-west Missouri, including the troops at Rolla.
The campaign was opened by the advance of a brigade of cavalry under
Colonel E. A. Carr on the 29th of December from Rolla to Lebanon, for the
purpose of initiating a concentration of forces, and to secure a point of sup-
port for the scouting parties to be pushed forward in the direction of Spring-
field, the supposed headquarters of the enemy. (See map, p. 263.)
On January 9th, after toilsome marching, all the disposable forces were
assembled at Lebanon. Here, by order of General Curtis, the army was
organized into 4 divisions of 2 brigades each, besides a special reserve. |
Before we reached Lebanon I was doubtful about my personal relations to
General Curtis, which had been somewhat troubled by his sudden appearance
at Rolla and the differences in regard to our relative rank and position, but
the fairness he showed in the assignment of the commands before we left
Lebanon, and his frankness and courtesy toward me, dispelled all appre-
hensions on my part, and with a light heart and full confidence in the new
commander, I entered into the earnest business now before us.
The army left Lebanon on the 10th of February, arrived at Marshfield on
the 11th, at McPherson's Creek, about 12 miles from Springfield, on the
12th, where a light engagement with the rear-guard of the enemy's troops
occurred, and took possession of Springfield on the 13th. Price's army of
Missourians, about 8000 strong, had retired and was on its way to Cassville.
On entering Springfield we found it pitifully changed, — the beautiful "Gar-
den City " of the South-west looked desolate and bleak ; most of the houses
were empty, as the Union families had followed us to Rolla after the retreat
of General Hunter in November, 1861, and the secessionists had mostly fol-
lowed Price. The streets, formerly lined with the finest shade trees, were
bereft of their ornament, and only the stumps were left. General Price had
applied his vacation-time well in organizing two brigades under Colonel Little
and General Slack for the Southern Confederacy, had spread out his com-
mand as far as, and even beyond, the Osage River, and would have been
reenforced by several thousand recruits from middle Missouri, if they had
not been intercepted on their way South by Northern troops. As it was, he
took whatever he found to his purpose, destroyed what he could not use, and
feeling himself not strong enough to venture battle, withdrew to Arkansas to
seek assistance from McCulloch. We followed him in two columns, the left
wing (Third and Fourth Divisions) by the direct road to Cassville, the right
wing (First and Second Divisions), under my command, by the road to Little
York, Marionsville, and Verona, both columns to unite at McDowell's, north
of Cassville.
I advanced with the Benton Hussars during the night of the 13th % Lit-
tle York, and as it was a very cold night, the road being covered with a
4 For details of the composition and losses of both armies, see page 337. — Editors.
THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN. 317
crust of ice, we had to move slowly. On this night march about eighteen
horsemen, including myself, had their feet frozen. In the neighborhood of
Marionsville we captured a wagon train and 150 stragglers of the enemy, and
arrived at McDowell's just at the moment when, after a short engagement,
the left wing had driven Price's rear-guard out of the place. From this
time our army moved, united, to Cassville and Keetsville, forced without
great trouble Cross Timber HoUows, a defile of about ten miles in length
across the Missouri-Arkansas State line, leading to Elkhorn Tavern, and
arrived at Sugar Creek on the 18th of February. We were now over 320 miles
from St. Louis, and 210 miles from our base at Rolla. The Third and Fourth
Divisions advanced from this position 12 miles farther south to Cross Hol-
lows, where also the headquarters of General Curtis were established, and
the First and Second to Bentonville, 12 miles to the south-west, while a
strong cavalry force under General Asboth went to Osage Springs. On the
23d General Asboth made a dash into Fayetteville, twenty miles in advance,
found the city evacuated, and planted the Union flag on the court-house.
To balance things somewhat, a raiding party of the enemy surprised our
foragers near Huntsville, and another party ventured as far as Keetsville,
in our rear, playing havoc with the drowsy garrison of the place.
On March 1st Colonel Jeff. C. Davis's division withdrew from Cross Hollows
and took position immediately behind Little Sugar Creek, covering the road
which leads from Fayetteville, Arkansas, by Elkhorn Tavern to Springfield,
and as an approach of the enemy was expected to take place on that road from
the south, Colonel Davis made his position as strong as possible by crowning
the hills north of the creek with abatis and parapets of felled trees ; he also
protected one of his batteries in the rear of the bridge with intrenchments.
As we shall see, these works never became of any practical value.
On the 2d of March the First and Second Divisions moved 4£ miles south
of Bentonville to McKissick's farm. Colonel Schaefer, with the 2d Missouri
Infantry and a detachment of cavalry, was sent to Smith's Mills (Osage
Mills), 7 miles east of McKissick's farm, as a post of observation toward Elm
Sp rings, and for the purpose of protecting and working the mill — at that
time and under our circumstances a very important " strategic object."
Another detachment of cavalry was stationed at Osage Springs to hold
connection with the division at Cross Hollows (south of Elkhorn Tavern),
and to scour the country toward Fayetteville and Elm Springs. On the 5th,
a detachment under Major Conrad was on its way from McKissick's farm to
Maysville, 30 miles west of McKissick's farm; by order of General Curtis,
another detachment under Major Mezaros went to Pineville, 25 miles north-
west, while from Carr's division a detachment under Colonel Vandever had
been sent as far east as Huntsville, 40 miles from Cross Hollows, making the
line of our front about seventy miles from Maysville in the west to Hunts-
ville ° 1 the east. Since the 18th of February, when we took our first position
at Sugar Creek, Price had made his way to the Boston Mountains (Cove
Creek), between Fayetteville and the Arkansas Eiver, where he united
with McCulloch.
3i8
THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN.
Although serving the same cause, there never existed an entente cordiale
between the two champions of Missouri and Arkansas; the two men were too
different in their character, education, and military policy to understand each
other perfectly, to agree in their aims and ends, and to subordinate them-
selves cheerfully one to the other. McCulloch was a " rough-and-ready " man,
not at all speculative, but very
practical, to the point, and rich
in resources to reach it. In his
youth he was a hunter and trap-
per; he served under Sam Hous-
ton, with the artillery, in the
battle of San Jacinto, partici-
pated in the Mexican war as
captain of a company of Texas
rangers, and when the war for
the Union broke out, he was
very active in Texas in secur-
ing much war material from
the United States, and forcing
United States troops to surren-
der. He was a good fighter,
energetic in battle, and quick
in discerning danger or espying
the weak point of his antagon-
ist; an excellent organizer, dis-
ciplinarian, and administrator,
indefatigable in recruiting and
equipping troops. His care for
them was proverbial, and his
ability in laying out encampments was extraordinary, and challenged the
admiration of our troops.
In a strategical point of view, McCulloch was more bent to the defense of
the Trans-Mississippi region, especially Arkansas and the Indian Territory,
which district had been put under his command, than to aggressive move-
ments beyond the borders of Arkansas. Price had also had military experience
in the Mexican war, which circumstance, combined with his political position,
his irreproachable personal character and sincere devotion to the cause
which he embraced, after the catastrophe of Camp Jackson, had made him the
military head of the secession forces in the State. Brave, and gifted with the
talent of gaining the confidence and love of his soldiers, he was undoubtedly
MAJOR-GENERAL EARL VAN DORN, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
9^
GENERAL VAN DORN'S SIGNATURE.
THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN. 319
the proper man to gather around him and hold together the heterogeneous
military forces; but, having no organized State or Government to back
him, he seldom could rise above the effectiveness of a guerrilla chief, doing
business on a large scale and almost on his own account. His army was
an ever-changing body, varying from week to week, advancing and retreat-
ing, without stability of quarters and security of resources, and therefore
not disciplined in a manner to be desired. Sometimes there were men and
no arms for them, or muskets without caps and horses without riders ; at
other times the army of camp-followers and poorly mounted infantry was
almost as large as the fighting force of infantry. No wonder then that in
spite of the great popularity of the champion of Missouri, McCulloch
became disgusted in meeting the half-starved "State Guards" of Missouri
with their " huckleberry " cavalry and their great crowd of unarmed, noisy
camp-followers.
It was therefore fortunate for the Confederates that 011 the 10th of Jan-
uary, 1862, Major-General Earl Van Dorn was appointed by Jefferson
Davis to the command of the Trans-Mississippi Department, and that he
took charge of the combined forces about to confront Curtis. He was a
graduate of West Point and had served with honors in the Mexican war as
lieutenant of infantry, and was in the United States service as major at the
opening of the war. Having joined the Confederacy, he was appointed
colonel, and already in Texas had been of great service to his cause. On the
14th of February, 1862, — the very day when the Army of the South-west
took possession of Springfield, — he wrote to Price from his headquarters
at Pocahontas, stating in detail his plan for " attempting St. Louis and car-
rying the war into Illinois." Our appearance in Arkansas suddenly changed
the situation. Van Dorn at once hastened from Jacksonport to Van Buren
on the 24th of February, issued a very flourishing proclamation on the 2d of
March, and on the 3d the Confederate army was on its way from the Boston
Mountains to Fayetteville and Elm Springs, at which latter place its advance
arrived on the evening of the 5th. On this march Price's troops were lead-
ing, followed by the division of McCulloch, while General Albert Pike, who
had come from the Indian Territory by way of Evansville with a brigade of
Indians, brought up the rear. The secrecy of the movement was so well kept
that positive news did not reach us until the 5th, when the Confederates
were about a day's march from my position at McKissick's farm. It was the
intention of Van Dorn to move early on the 6th and " gobble up " my two
divisions before they could prepare for defense or make good their retreat ;
I had, however, ample time to guard myself against the attempted cap-
ture, as I had not only been advised by General Curtis on the 5th, after
nightfall, of the advance of the enemy, but also had received positive proof
of the movement from Colonel Schaefer at Smith's Mill, whose outposts had
been attacked on the evening of the same day, which fact he immediately
reported. It was now necessary for us to concentrate to meet the enemy's
advance, and Colonel Schaefer was then directed to fall back during the
night to Bentonville and aWait further instructions. The time for the two
320 THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN.
divisions to leave McKissiek's farm and march by Bentonville to Sugar
Creek was fixed for 2 o'clock a. m. of the 6th, but, before the movement
began, the commanders of divisions and brigades, with their staff-officers,
met at my headquarters at 1 o'clock a. m. of that day, to be informed
of the enemy's movements and to receive verbal instructions respecting
the order of march, and the precautions to be taken during the retreat.
At precisely 2 o'clock a. m. of the 6th, General Asboth's division left
McKissiek's farm with the whole train, foUowed by the division of Colonel
Osterhaus. They passed through Bentonville from 4 to 8 o'clock a. m., and
arrived at the camp behind Sugar Creek at 2 p. m., where the Union army
was to concentrate.
For the purpose of defending the main column on its retreat, and with the
intention of finding out whether the enemy was approaching in strong force,
and whether he was advancing from Smith's Mill on the road to Bentonville,
or by Osage Springs, or on both roads at the same time, I remained at
Bentonville with about 600 men, and a battery of 6 pieces, after all the
troops had left the place. J)
During this time Colonel Nemett, who had been sent out with the
Benton Hussars to reconnoiter, reported to me that he had met the enemy's
cavalry, and that several thousand men, cavalry, and infantry were forming
in line of battle about a mile from Bentonville on the open fields south of
the village. From personal observation I found out that this was correct,
and, therefore, had not the least doubt that we had the advance of an army
before us. This was at precisely 10 o'clock. I state these facts to show
how egregiously Van Dorn was mistaken in supposing that if he had arrived
an hour sooner — Maury says 30 minutes sooner — "he would have cut me off
with my whole force [of 7000 men], and certainly have beaten the enemy
[our army at Sugar Creek] the next day." As it really was, he only found
my rear-guard of 600 men in his front, because at the hour when his troops
advanced against Bentonville, the leading division (Asboth's) of our retreating
column crossed Sugar Creek, 10 miles from Bentonville. Van Dorn officially
says, "We followed him [Sigel], our advance skirmishing with his rear-
guard, which was admirably handled, until we gained a point on Sugar Creek,
about 7 miles beyond Bentonville, and within 1 or 2 miles of the strongly
intrenched camp of the enemy." Van Dorn then ascertained, in a conference
with McCulloch and Mcintosh, that by making a detour of eight miles he could
outflank our position on Sugar Creek, and reach the Telegraph road in our
rear, which movement he commenced soon after dark, Price's division leading.
He expected to reach the point in our rear, north of Elkhorn Tavern, before
daylight, but on account of obstructions placed on the road by Colonel
Dodge's Iowa regiment his march was so impeded that Price's division did
not gain the Telegraph road until nearly 10 a. m. of the 7th, the first day
of the battle, while McCulloch's division, and the Indian brigade under Pike,
J) Colonel Frederick Sehaefer's 2d Missouri regi- lowed the division of Colonel Osterhaus toward
ment was also to be retained, to form a part of the Sugar Creek ; he was ambuscaded on the way,
rear-guard, but by some misunderstanding he fol- and lost thirty-seven men. — F. S.
THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN. 521
had only reached a point opposite Leetown, about five miles distant from
where Price struck the Telegraph road. (See map, p. 322.)
During the night of the 6th our army rested quietly in its position behind
Sugar Creek. General Asboth's division held the extreme right, on the
entrance of the Bentonville road, Colonel Osterhaus's was on his left, Colonel
Davis's in the center, and Colonel Carr's, which during the 5th had retreated
from Cross Hollows (Camp Halleck) behind Sugar Creek, was posted on the
extreme left. Asboth's division was facing west and south-west ; the other
two divisions were facing toward the south. Curtis expected to be attacked
from the south, and had made all his preparations accordingly. I was,
however, doubtful whether the enemy would knock his head against a
position naturally so strong, and for this reason expected the main attack
from the direction of Bentonville against Asboth's division, i. e., against our
right flank and rear. To ascertain, therefore, what was going on during the
night in the direction mentioned, I sent out two of my scouts (Brown and
Pope) with some cavalry, to proceed as far as possible toward the west and
north-west, and report any movement of hostile troops immediately. Toward
morning they reported that during the night troops and trains were moving
on the back road, around our position toward Cross Timber; that they
had heard the noise of wagons or artillery, but they had not seen the
troops. I then ordered Lieutenant Schramm, of my staff, to go out with
an escort and bring in more information. This was at 5 o'clock in the
morning. His report, made a little after 6 o'clock, left no doubt in my
mind that the enemy was moving around our position toward the north-
east (Springfield road). I now went out myself and saw clearly trains and
troops moving in the direction mentioned. At about the same time when
the flanking movement of the enemy was discovered on our right, Major
Weston of the 24th Missouri Infantry, who was posted in our rear, at Elk-
horn Tavern, was informed by his outposts of the advance of some of the
enemy's cavalry on the roads from Bentonville and Cassville, toward his
position. Between 6 and 7 in the morning, skirmishing had begun near the
tan-yard, on the Cassville road, north of Elkliorn Tavern, so that his reports
and those sent in by myself reached General Curtis during the early morning
of the 7th. A meeting of the division commanders was called by him for
8 o'clock at Pratt's store, and after a short consultation he directed Colonel
Carr to take position at Elkliorn Tavern, while Colonel Bussey was directed to
proceed with the cavalry of the different commands (except the 3d Illinois), and
with three pieces of Elbert's battery to move by Leetown against the enemy,
supjDOsed to be advancing in that direction. Colonel Osterhaus was also
requested to accompany Colonel Bussey for the purpose of taking control of
the movement. As up to that time not even a demonstration had been made
against our front on Little Sugar Creek, and there was no doubt in my mind
that the main forces of the enemy were working around our flank, I suggested
the necessity of supporting our cavalry by at least a brigade of infantry and
another battery of my command, because a repulse of the cavalry might
lead to serious consequences. The proposition was immediately accepted,
VOL. I. '-'1
322
THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN.
323
[Mr. Hunt P. Wilson, who was a member of Gui-
bor's Confederate battery, has given the following
description in the " St. Louis Republican " of the
contest on the Confederate right in the first day's
fight. He also describes the ground where the
principal fighting on both days took place, for
which reason his account is useful in connection
with the map on the preceding page and the cut
on page 330 :
" The Missouri army by a loug night march had passed
completely around the Federal right flank, marching to
the north-east of Big Mountain, then forming line of bat-
tle facing south on the Keetsville and Fayetteville or
'Win-' road, directly in General Curtis's rear. The
couutry on this side of the hill is broken with high
ridges and deep hollows through which the Wire road
runs. The column entered by what is called Cross
Timber Hollow. Some of the ridges are 150 feet high.
In the valley of this defile is located what is known as
the tan-yard, three-quarters of a mile from Elkhorn
Tavern. From the tan-yard there is a gradual ascent,
and alongside the road runs a deep hollow reaching up
to the spring near the tavern. At the head of this and
crossing it is a 'bench' along the base of the mountain.
Along this bench was the United States Cavalry under
General Carr. Along the road leading down from the
tavern were the Iowa troops with artillery, and on their
right, reaching to the east of the Van Winkle road, on
which there are a few clearings, General Curtis pro-
longed his line of battle. Another hollow leads from the
tan-yard to the south-east, and at the head of this hollow
rested the Federal right. . . . The battle was opened
by the Iowa Battery [Hayden's] of 4 guns, on the Wire
road, supported by the Iowa troops with 2 suns 150 feci
further up the road, to which Guibor's battery re-
sponded from the opposite ridge at a distance of 250
yards. The other Confederate batteries with the infan-
try arriving by the same road, took position further to
the left, aud opened on the enemy's right wing."
Mr. Wilson says of the first Confederate line :
"Some State Guard Cavalry under Bob McCuI Loch
and Congreve Jackson formed on the extreme left. Then
on their right came Bledsoe's and Clark's and McDonald's
batteries, Rains's infantry, Wade's battery, a regiment
of infantry, and then Guibor's battery. This filled out
the ridge. Little's Confederate brigade was on the right
across the tan-yard hollow. Within an hour the Iowa
Battery was obliged to withdraw. Soon after, Gates's
regiment of cavalry came up the hollow in front of the
guns, and went half-way up the slope, dismounted, every
fourth man holding the horses, then formed and moved
up the brow of the hill. At the same time. Little's Con-
federate brigade, which had by this time come into line,
opened on the Iowa troops in their rear, with Gates in
their front. After a fierce contest of musketry, Little's
brigade swung around and cut off part of the Federal
line, the remainder retreating up to the tavern. Guibor's
battery now moved around to the position which had
been held by the Iowa Battery. Guibor's battery had
gone up with Little's line and the fight was renewed on
the new line."
He thus describes the Confederate advance :
"The fire in front began to lull, and Slack's brigade
witli Rives's and Burbridge's regiments came up on a
left-wheel, with Rains on their left, across to the hollow,
and the whole line charged up with a wild cheer. Cap-
tain Guibor, who well understood how to tight artillery
in the brush, took all the canister he could lay his hands
on, and with two guns went up in the charge with the
infantry. General Rains's brigade on the left, led by
Colonel Walter Scott O'Kane, and Major Rainwater made
a brilliant dash at the redoubt and battery which had
been throwing on them for an hour or more from its
position in an old held. Eight guns were captured along
the line. £he Federal troops being dislodged from the
woods began forming in the fields aud planted some new
batteries back of the knobs in the rear. And now the
fight grew furious. Gorham's battery could not ho' 1 its
position, and fell back to its old place. Guibor p) mted
his two guns directly in front of the tavern and opened
at close quarters with grape and canister on the Federal
line, in which great confusion was evident, r ? officers
could be seen trying to rally and re-form theiv men.
"The entire Confederate line was charg1' gup to the
Elkhorn Tavern; Colonel Carr, the Federa1 cavalry com-
mander, had withdrawn his command from the bench
of the mountain on the Confederate els* it. The Illinois
Battery, at first planted in the hor.le-lot west of the
tavern, had limbered to the rear and taken a new posi-
tion in the fields. The Federal Mountain Howitzer Bat-
tery had also moved away. The 3th Iowa Battery, which
had poured such a hot fire down the road upon Guibor
and Gorham, had by this t'.-.ie lost the. use of two of its
guns, dismounted by the tire of Guibor's battery, but
continued to fight its two remaining guns until the Con-
federate regiment of Colonel Clint Burbridge was upon
them; when, their horses being killed, that regiment
took them in, and at nightfall brought them down the
road. To the left on the Van Winkle road the [Confeder-
ate] batteries of McDonald. Bledsoe, and Wade had been
engaged in a severe artillery duel in which the Federal
batteries held their own until the Confederate infantry
got within range, when they were forced back, leaving
two guns captured by Rains's men led by the gallant
O'Kane. The cavalry on the extreme left, under General
John B. Clark aud Colonel Robert MeCulloch, had
turned the Federal right wing, and the hitter's entire
line was falling back to meet re-enforcements hurrying
to their assistance from Sugar Creek on their left rear.
The Federals placed 18 or 20 guns to command the
tavern. Guibor moved up with the Confederate line,
or a little in advance, and formed in battery in the nar-
row road iu front of the tavern, losing several horses in
the movement. And now commenced a hot fight. The
rapid fire of the twenty pieces of Federal artillery . . .
commenced waving and blazing in his front, while the
two guns were replying with grape and canister. Now
came the crisis. A regiment of United States infantry
moved out of the timber on the left front of the guns, about
one hundred yards distant, with a small field intervening,
the fences around it leveled to the ground. On Guibor's
right was the tavern, on his left a blacksmith's shop,
and in the lot some corn-cribs. Behind these buildings
'Rock' Champion had placed his company of cavalry
to protect their horses from thickly flying bullets. Rock's
quick eye saw the bright bayonets as they were pushing
through the brush, and, riding up, he yelled in his rough-
and-ready style, ' Guibor, they're nankin' you ! ' ' I know
it, but I can't spare a gun to turn on them,' was the reply.
There was no supporting infantry on his left. Said Rock,
' I'll charge them ! ' This meant to attack a full regiment
of infantry advancing in line, 700 or 800 strong, with 22
men. . . . Galloping back a few paces to his little
band, his deal-, ringing voice could be heard by friend
and enemy. 'Battalion, forward, trot, march, gallop,
march, charge ! ' and with a wild yell in they went, their
gallant chief in the lead, closely followed by ' Sabre Jack'
Murphy, an old regular dragoon ; Fitzsimmons.Coggins,
O'Flaherty, Pomeroy, and the others. The last named
were old British dragoons ; three of them had ridden with
the heavy squadrons at Balaklava and all well knew
what was in front of them. . . . Within thirty seconds
they were right in the midst of the surprised Federal
infantry, shouting, slashing, shooting. Corporal Casey
charged on foot. Guibor's two gnus were at the same
time turned left oblique and deluged the Federal left
with canister. The result was precisely what Champion
had foreseen, and proved his reckless courage was di-
rected by good judgment. The attack was a clear sur-
prise, the result a stampede; the infantry fired an aimless,
scattering volley, then, expecting a legion of horsemen
to fall on them, fled in confusion. Champion did not
follow. Knowing when to stop as well as to commence,
he secured their flag and quickly returned to the battery
which he had saved, with a loss of only three of his gal-
lant rough-riders."]
THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN.
< happened that after the disaster which befell our cavalry, \ the
ao (I onslaught of McCulloch's troops were checked by the command
of L . The speedy arrival of Colonel Jeff. C. Davis's division on the
right rhaus, and its energetic advance, turned a very critical moment
into a > victory of our arms. McCulloch and Mcintosh fell while
leading t] >s in a furious attack against Osterhaus and Davis. Hebert
and a nun -is officers and men
were captui Lckets of the 36th
Illinois (cavai. , r Captain Smith
and of the 44th I infantry under
Captain Eussell. - the whole of Mc-
Culloch's column, depri ved of its leaders
and without unity of <nand, was
thrown into confusion ■•! beaten back.
During the night of the 7th scarcely
two-thirds of it reached the wing under
Price, near Elkhorn Tavern. •&
Though a great advantage was gained
on our side by the death or capture of
those leaders, the principal cause of
our success was rather the quick ral-
lying and the excellent manoeuvring of
Osterhaus's and Davis's forces, as well
as the coolness and bravery of their
infantry, supported by Welfley's, Hoff-
mann's, and Davidson's batteries. Os-
terhaus changed his front twice under the fire of the enemy, to meet the
dangerous flank attack and pressure of Heberfs Louisiana and Arkansas
infantry, while the brigades of Davis, by striking the left of McCulloch's
advancing column, threw it into disorder and forced it to retreat. It was
during this conflict that two officers, Major John C. Black of the 37th Illinois
and Major Sidney Post of the 59th Illinois, although both severely wounded
in the right arm, refused to leave the field until peremptorily ordered to
do so. Here fell Lieutenant-Colonel John A. Hendricks of the 2k2d Indiana,
receiving two mortal wounds.
While our left wing was thus successful against about 11,500 of the enemy,
the right wing under Carr had been sorely pressed by the 6500 Missourians
under Van Dorn and Price. In spite of the heroic resistance of the two bri-
gades of Dodge and Yandever, and the reinforcements sent to luring
MAJOR-GENERAL PETER J. OSTERHAUS.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
\ Elbert, Bussey, and the Hussars were repulsed
by Pike with Drew's and Stand Watie's Indian
regiments, and Sims's and Welch's cavalry. Mc-
Culloch was farther to the left with Hebert and
Mcintosh, who became engaged with Davis's di-
vision— at first with the brigade of Julius White,
who retired a short distance when Pattison
came up and aided him in flanking McCulloch's
line. — Editors.
-& Of McCulloch's column, Drev d to the
south-west toward Bentonville. W ch, and
Greer joined Van Dorn in the ni Watie
retreated to Bentonville during day's
fight. Pike himself remained. G L > suc-
ceeded McCulloch in command of th loved
with the remainder of the force aL Van
Dorn, taking position on the left, as , i the
map, page 322. — Editors.
THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN.
325
mm
the afternoon, J they were forced back from position to position, until Elk-
horn Tavern was taken by the enemy, and our crippled forces, almost without
ammunition, their artillery reduced by losses of guns, men, and horses, their
infantry greatly reduced, had to seek a last shelter in the woods and behind
the fences, separated from the enemy's position by open fields, but not farther
than a mile from our trains. There they formed a contracted and curved
line, determined to resist, not dis-
heartened, but awaiting with some
apprehension another attack. Fortu-
nately, the enemy did not follow up
his success, and night fell in, closing
this terrible conflict. While this en-
gagement of our right wing was in
progress, I received an order from
General Curtis at 2 o'clock p. m. to
reenforce Colonels Osterhaus and
Davis with the remainder of the
troops of the First and Second Di-
visions, held in reserve near our orig-
inal position, between Sugar Creek
and Elkhorn Tavern. Before receiv-
ing this order I sent Major Poten with
the 17th Missouri, 2 companies of the
15th, 2 companies of the 3d Missouri,
a section of artillery (Elbert's 2 pieces),
and a squadron of Beirton Hussars un-
der Major Heinrich, toward the south-
west, to try to gain the rear of a hostile force stationed there. Leaving a
small detachment as a guard in our camp, I moved with all the other troops
by Leetown to the battle-field, north of the town. We arrived just in time
to give a send-off to the retreating hostile forces, and, joined by Osterhaus's
brigade, advanced toward the east, parallel with the curve formed by the
chain of hills called Pea Ridge, with the intention of bringing assistance
to our right wing, where the noise of the engagement with Van Dorn and
Price was unabating.
We had to move slowly and cautiously, as a part of the enemy's forces
evidently tried to rally on our left flank but withdrew after some little skir-
mishing with the 44th Illinois. Reaching finally an open field about half a
mile from the last spur of the hills, looking down upon Elkhorn Tavern, we
halted, and report was sent to General Curtis's headquarters, describing our
position and asking for orders. At that time it had becomre dark, firing on
the right had almost ceased, and as we had not sufficient knowledge of
the position of the enemy, or our own troops on the right, I concluded to
^ Five companies of the 8th Indiana and 3 pieces Chapman's battery, 5 companies of the 25th Illi-
of F muss's Indiana battery; part of the Second Di- nois, a section of Hoffmann's battery, Bowen's cav-
visioj, 4 companies of the 2d Missouri, 4 pieces of airy battalion, and mountain howitzers. — F. S.
MAJOR-GENEBAL EUGENE A. CAKR.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
326
THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN.
stay where we were, and took the
necessary precautions to make our
position secure. To conceal it as
much as possible, no camp-fires were
allowed, and the troops lay silently
on the field resting on their arms.
Between 12 and 1 o'clock the out-
posts reported some noise at a dis-
tance from our left, as if troops were
moving toward the north-east. I
therefore went out with one of my
staff-officers as far as our line of out-
posts, and remained there about half
an hour, but could hear nothing. I,
however, saw distinctly the camp-fires
of Price's troops extending from the
heights near Elkhorn Tavern far down
toward the south-east. Toward the
west and south-west the sky was illu-
mined by two large, isolated camp-
fires, one about midway between Elk-
horn Tavern and Leetown, and the
other four or five miles farther off in
the direction of Bentonville. This, in
connection with what we had seen during the afternoon, when some of the
enemy's troops were moving along the heights of Pea, Ridge toward Elk-
horn Tavern, and others toward the south-west, and with what the outposts
had reported, made it clear to my mind that the enemy would not venture
battle again near Leetown, but that McCulloch's troops would join those
of Price, and by a united effort try to overwhelm our right wing at Elk-
horn Tavern. For this reason, and to give our worn-out and hungry troops
something to eat, good camp-fires and rest, I resolved to withdraw them
from their position, move them back to our camp, and lead them forward
again in the morning to the same ground, to fall upon the enemy's right flank
and rear, as soon as he should begin his attack. Leaving the Benton Hussars
and a line of outposts with a reserve of infantry on the field, to guard our
position, I marched off from the left, called in all the detachments from
wherever they were, and formed the two divisions in such a manner on the
road leading from my headquarters to the ground we had left, that, by reach-
ing it with the head of our column, we could bring it in the shortest possible
time on the rigtit into line, and come into action at the very moment the first
regiment and battery had taken their position. All these preparations were
completed before daybreak of the 8th.
During the night of the 7th the division of Colonel Davis had been called
in by General Curtis from Leetown, and in the morning it took position
on the Telegraph road, in place of Carr's division, which had borne the brunt
BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES JMNTOSH.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN. 327
of the battle of the day before, and was now withdrawn, and the greater part
of it held in reserve. Pattison's brigade, of Davis's division, formed on the
right of the Telegraph road, with Klanss's battery before the center of the
line; the second brigade (the 37th and 59th Illinois), under Colonel White,
formed on the left of the road, supported by Davidson's battery. Colonel
Carr, although wounded, assisted in placing these troops.
It was a little after 6 o'clock in the morning when I sent out Colonel Oster-
haus with Captain Asmussen of my staff to reconnoiter the ground on which
I intended to deploy, and to find the nearest road leading to it. The 44th
Illinois followed the two officers for the purpose of marking the right of the
position to be taken, but with orders to keep concealed as much as possible,
and not to enter into an engagement unless attacked. Half an hour later, I was
standing in front of my tent, ready to mount, and anxiously awaiting the
return of the staff-officers, when suddenly a few cannon-shots in our front,
from Davidson's Union battery, announced the conflict. At this moment Gen-
eral Curtis, to whom I had sent word during the night where my two divisions
were assembling, and that they would be ready for action in the morning,
rode toward me from the direction where the firing had begun, and, some-
what excitedly, said : " General, I have opened the battle ; it will be a hard
fight ; Davis is already there. Please bring your troops in line as quickly as
possible." I confess that I did not understand the reason why a cannonade
was commenced on our side when we were not ready to meet a counter-attack
of the enemy with a good chance of success, the more so, as I had been out
in our front before General Curtis met me, and had found that our line was
weak, stretched out in an open field, the Telegraph road obstructed by artil-
lery, ammunition-wagons, and other vehicles, and that there was no room to
deploy my divisions, except behind the first line and masked by it ; nor on
the left, unless immediately exposed to and raked by the fire of the enemy,
whose batteries were supposed to be-posted in the margin of the woods, whence
they could reach my troops at point-blank range. I explained this to General
Curtis, made him acquainted with the object in view, told him that I expected
Colonel Osterhaus and Captain Asmussen back every moment, and finally
asked him to give me ten minutes' time to wait for them, when I would move
immediately to the position selected and commence the attack. Even if our
troops on the right should be compelled to yield, it could only be momenta-
rily, as the enemy would have to direct his whole attention to my attack on
his flank and rear. I never felt more relieved than when General Curtis, evi-
dently encouraged by this proposition, said : "Well, General, do what you pro-
pose." I must add here that I had not seen General Curtis during the night
and before I met him near my tent ; he could, therefore, not have been fully
aware of what I had experienced in my position away from him on the left,
and what my intention was to do in the morning, although I had sent Captain
Asmussen to his headquarters to report to him, receiving, however, no orders
from him in return. After our conversation, which lasted only a few minuter
the two officers came back in all haste, and reported that they had found an
excellent position ; that no enemy was in sight, and that Colonel Knobels-
328
THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN.
■ .'7. life
■
dorn2, with his regiment, was posted as directed. General Curtis declared
himself satisfied and rode off, but scarcely had he left me when the can-
nonade in front became very brisk, some of the hostile missiles bursting
over our heads.
I mounted, told Colonel Osterhaus to take charge of our column and move
it to the position to be occupied ; then, accompanied by Captain Asmussen,
I rode to the front, where Davis's
division had formed into line, to
see what was going on. I found
one of our batteries hotly engaged,
but compelled to withdraw, which
exposed the infantry on the right
to an enfilading fire, and also
forced it to change its position.
One of the regiments — I think it
was the 2'2d or the 8th Indiana —
was throw momentary dis-
se, and the men
I bok eminence on
right of the road on which I
was halting. I assisted their brave
commander to rally them, which
did not take long, and spoke a few
words to them, saying that if the
right could hold out for half an
hour, assistance would come, and
all would be well. Meanwhile an-
other regiment had formed on the
left, the battery had taken position
again and was supported by four
other guns (of White's brigade),
farther to the left, diverting the
enemy's fire. The line stood firm,
and as no hostile infantry appeared, I took leave of the commander of the
" Indiana boys," and hastened to my own troops. I reached the head of the
column when it was just debouching from the woods, and the first battery
that arrived took position on the left of the 44th Illinois, which was kneeling
behind a fence. In about 15 minutes the First Division (Osterhaus's) was
formed into line, with the artillery in the intervals between the infantry,
the Second Division in reserve, about 250 paces behind our right, with
G-eneral Asboth at its head, who, in spite of his wound received on the 7th,
was again in the saddle. Our position, in full view of the open fields, which
sloped gently down toward the long skirt of woods, where the enemy's artil-
lery and infantry were posted, was excellent, and allowed the full develop-
ment of our forces. The enemy's batteries received us well, but many of their
shots were either aimed too high, or struck the ground and were buried a short
PRATT'S STORE.
30 IOWA CAVALRY.
RESERVE. GUARD-HOUSE. TROTT'S HILL.
GEN. CURTIS'S HEADQUARTERS. PEORIA BATTERY.
THE UNION RIGHT WING UNDER GENERAL CARR AT
PRATT'S STORE, SECOND DAY OF THE BATTLE.
FROM A PANEL TO THE PICTURE ON PAGE 330.
THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN. 329
distance in front of us. When well in action, we advanced slowly from posi-
tion to position, at the same time contracting our line, the infantry following,
rising quickly, and as soon as they had reached a new position lying down
again. During this time the whole cavalry force of the two divisions had
formed behind the extreme left of our line, supported by the 2d Missouri and
Elbert's flying battery of General Asboth's command. The 17th Missouri,
under Major Poten, also came up from the Benton ville road, and was posted
on the left. On our right, communication was established with the right
wing, and the two batteries of Klauss and Davidson were brought into line
with our own, while the two brigades of Colonels Julius White and Thomas
Pattison held the left of the enemy's line in check until our whole line advanced.
It was now a little after 11 o'clock ; most of the enemy's batteries (about
fifty guns) were silenced one after another, by our concentric fire ; his infantry,
not venturing out of the woods into the open fields, was now treated with a
shower of shell and shrapnel. Opposite our extreme left, however, near
Elkhorn Tavern, Van Dorn made a determined effort to hold the high spur of
hills, the top of which was crowned and protected by rocks and bowlders.
Some of Price's infantry had already taken possession of it, and a battery was
being placed in position, when Hoffmann's and Elbert's batteries were
to direct their fire against them chiefly with solid shot. Not m
fifteen minutes elapsed before the enemy evacuated this last strong
while our infantry on the left — the 36th Illinois, and the 2d, 3d, and 17th
Missouri — rushed up the steep hill and forced the remnants of the enemy's
troops down into Cross Timber Hollow. Almost simultaneously the 12th
Missouri, the 25th and the 44th Illinois advanced in double-quick from the
center and right into the woods, engaged the enemy's infantry, drove it back,
and one of our regiments (the 12th Missouri) captured the " Dallas Battery."
On the extreme right, where General Curtis had directed the movements of
the troops, Davis's division and a part of Carr's, assisted by Hayden's and
Jones's batteries (the latter commanded by Lieutenant David), pushed forward
against the left wing of the enemy and forced it to leave the field. The army
of Van Dorn and Price, including about two-thirds of McCulloch's troops
under Churchill and Greer, and one-third of Pike's Indian Brigade, all of
whom had joined Price during the night, were now in precipitate retreat in
all directions, pursued by the First and Second Divisions as far as Keets-
ville, 9 miles to the north, and by a cavalry force under Colonel Bussey with
2 mountain howitzers to the south-west beyond Bentonville. So ended the
battle of Pea Ridge, and our little army, instead of being " beaten and com-
pelled to surrender," had gained a decisive victory. %
5^ The picture on the next page shows Big across the fields from east to west, with its highest
Mountain in the right background, as it appeared elevation in the center, and on which my artillery
in March, 1862. When I visited the battle-field a was posted, shows at once how great our advan-
few weeks ago (July 6th, 1887) the whole range tage must have been against the hostile batteries,
of mountains was covered by a dense forest, and which were planted behind the margin of the woods
the rocky summits of Big Mountain were not dis- in the lower ground. The surface of the cultivated
cernible from the fields below, where our troops fields is now widened by the clearing of the adjacent
had been posted. In other respects there were not woods, so that the whole interior space of the bat-
great changes. The rising ground stretching tie-field seems much larger. The house and barn
330
THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN. 331
The losses of our army were : killed, 203 ; wounded, 980 ; missing, 201, —
total, 1384. The enemy's losses on the battle-field were about equal, if not
greater than, ours, but they have never been accurately stated. On the 7th
we lost more on our right, against Price, than he did ; the enemy (McCul-
loch's troops) more on his right against our left. On the 8th, when our
forces were concentrated against Van Dorn and Price, the enemy's loss was
much more severe than ours.
In reviewing the period from the 13th of June, 1861, when the first expedi-
tions started from St. Louis to the north-west and south-west of Missouri, and
comprising the three campaigns under Generals Lyon, Fremont, and Curtis,
we must acknowledge the extraordinary activity represented in these move-
ments. As war in its ideal form is nothing else than a continuous series
of action and reaction, that side which develops the greater energy will,
other conditions being equal, become master of the situation. It was the
energy of the South in the first period of the War of the Rebellion which in
less than three months organized a powerful insurrection and threatened the
existence of the Union. And so, on a smaller scale, isolated and left almost
to its own resources at the beginning of the conflict, the Union element of
Missouri, led by a few energetic men, saved the city of St. Louis, then the
chief city of the West, and by successive, rapid blows became master of
the whole State. In no other State of the North was greater activity shown,
or more undertaken, endured, or accomplished. There were regiments which
traversed the State three times in 8 months, forward and backward, a distance
of over 1200 miles (the line of railroad from St. Louis to Rolla not taken into
account), and this, especially during the first few months, with the most miser-
able outfit, — without tents, without knapsacks and other accouterments,
the men carrying their cartridges in their pockets and sleeping on the bare
ground, braving hunger and disease.
The battle of Pea Ridge was the first respite gained by the almost incessant
activity and the unflinching courage of our little army, — the Army of the
South-west. It was not a " great " battle, like that of Gettysburg or Chatta-
nooga; it was not of such preponderating national importance; it did not
" break the backbone of the Rebellion," but it virtually cleared the South-west
of the enemy, gave peace to the people of Missouri, at least for the next two
years, and made it possible for our veterans to reenforce the armies under
Buell, Rosecrans, Grant, 'and Sherman. It was a battle of all kinds of sur-
prises and accidents, of good fighting and good manoeuvring. Van Dorn
was evidently " surprised " when he found that his plan to take St. Louis,
and to carry the war into Illinois in April, 1862, was anticipated by our
to which our extreme left extended on the second the plan of the old one, and still lives there. He
day (March 8th) are still standing, and even the is, of course, familiar with the battle-field, and
new Elkhorn Tavern stands on the old site. Mr. tramped over it with me and my driver. Pratt's
Cox, who lived there in 1862, was obliged, with his store, near which General Curtis's headquarters
mother and his young wife, to seek protection in tent was pitched, is still there. — F. S.
the cellar, where they remained for two days, Note.— The cut opposite, the reader may be re-
being under fire thirteen hours. Late in the war minded, represents also the ground of the first daj's
the tavern was burned, but Mr. Cox rebuilt it after fighting by Price's troops. — Editors.
332
THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN.
\ :;:;:;■; :;:
» i«i i iw .I ; ijhip' i
unexpected appearance ; he was badly
"surprised" when on the 6th of March,
instead of " gobbling up " my two di-
visions at McKissick's farm, as he
confidently expected, he only met a
rear-guard of 600 men, which he could
not gobble up during nearly 6 hours
of its march of 6 miles ; he was also
surprised to find, on his detour around
our left flank and rear, that the road
was at different places so blocked up,
that instead of arriving in our rear, on
the road to Springfield, with the divis-
ions of Price, at daylight of the 7th,
he did not reach that point before 10
o'clock in the morning, by which delay
Price's and McGullocli's forces became
separated and could not assist each
other at the decisive moment, while
we gained time to make our prep-
arations for the reception of both.
Finally, on the 8th, Van Dorn was
greatly " surprised to find himself suddenly confronted by a new, unexpected
force," attacked in flank and rear, and compelled to retreat. On the other
hand, Curtis was "surprised" by the sudden turn things had taken, and much
disappointed because the enemy did not make the attack against our front, a
position not only very strong by nature, presenting a chain of high hills, but
also strengthened by intrenchments and abatis, the access to it being also
protected and impeded by a deep creek running along our line of defense.
He would have been much more "surprised" had it not been for the dis-
covery, by our scouting parties, of the enemy's flanking movement. \
BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALRERT PIKE, C. S. A.,
COMMANDER OF THE INDIAN FORCES AT PEA RIDGE.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
4. The reports of Generals Van Dorn and Price
make it evident that they intended and were pre-
pared to renew the battle, or, as Van Dorn says,
"to accept the gage," on the morning of the 8th;
the determination to retreat was therefore forced
upon them during the course of the morning by the
advantages we gained. The results obtained in this
three-days struggle consisted not only in the imme-
diate losses, which, as mentioned before, were about
equal, but also, and much more so, in the condition
into which the Southern forces were thrown at the
beginning of and after their retreat from the battle-
field; their separation by following diverging lines,
the disorganization of their artillery, the dissolution
of the "Indian Brigade," and of a part of the Ar-
kansas troops, and finally by the impossibilty of re-
storing order and bringing together all their forces
north of the Boston Mountains. A report of the ac-
tual strength of McCulloch's division on March 1 1 tli,
three days after the battle, shows only 2894 men out
of a total effective of 8384, present at " Strickler's,"
March 2d, four days before the battle. On the 1 2th
of March Van Dorn wrote or telegraphed from Van
Buren to Colonel B. W. Share, 3d Texas Cavalry,
to join " the army " at its encampment on the Frog
Bayou road, about seven miles from that town (Van
Buren), which shows that the Southern army was
very considerably scattered for several days after
the battle, and that Curtis could have followed it
as far as the Boston Mountains without meeting any
serious resistance. If Van Dorn had succeeded in
his bold manoeuvre against us, had "cornered" our
army and forced it to surrender, he would have come
into possession of such material of war as would
have enabled him to move with thirty thousand men
to Springfield and "Rolla, and, by at least " threat-
ening" St. Louis, he might have seriously dis-
concerted the plans of Halleck. The consideration
of such an exigency lends additional importance to
the success of the Union forces at Pea Ridge. — F. S.
THE PEA KIDGE CAMPAIGN.
335
In a strategical and tactical point of view, the battle of Pea Ridge forms
a counterpart to the battle of Wilson's Creek. In the latter battle we were
the outflanking party, approaching the camp of McCulloch and Price, by a
night march, completely surprising and attacking their forces in the morning,
but making our attack in front and rear, without being able to communicate
with and assist each other. My own brigade of 1118 men, which had gained
the enemy's rear, was beaten first, and then the forces of General Lyon, 4282
men, after a heroic resistance were compelled to leave the field. The enemy
held the " interior lines," and could throw readily his forces from one point
to the other. At Pea Ridge the same advantage was with our army, although
the enemy had better facilities of communication between his left and right
wing, by the road leading from Bentonville
to Elkhorn Tavern, than we had had at
Wilson's Creek. There we had had to meet
substantially the same troops we encoun-
tered at Pea Ridge, with the exception of
the Indian Brigade under Pike.
From the result of the battles of Wilson's
Creek and Pea Ridge, it will be seen that
the manoeuvre of outflanking and " march-
ing into the enemy's rear" is not always
successful. It was not so at Wilson's Creek,
when we had approached, unobserved, within
cannon-shot of the enemy's lines ; however,
we were only 5400 against about 11,000,
while at Pea Ridge the enemy had 16,202
men in action against our 10,500. In a
manoeuvre of that kind, the venture of a
smaller army to surprise and "bag" an
enemy, whose forces are concentrated and
who holds the "interior lines" or "inside track," will always be great, unless
the enemy's troops are inferior in quality, or otherwise at a disadvantage. J)
BRIGADIER-GENERAL STAND WATIE, C. S. A.,
OF THE INDIAN FORCES. FROM V PHOTOGRAPH.
]) During the war there was not, I believe, a single
ease where an army tried such a " bagging" proc-
ess and succeeded in it, except in the attack of
posts and intrenched positions, as, for instance, at
Harper's Ferry during the advance of Lee into
Maryland in September, 1*02, and with partial
success at Winchester, June loth, ISO;;. There
are instances where flanking manoeuvres of great
detachments from the main army have been success-
ful, but more through non-interference with them
than for other reasons. Jackson's detour into the
rear of the Army of Virginia, in August, 1862, was
a strategical surprise, that was only successfully
executed because it was not discovered in time,
or rather because, when discovered, it was not
properly met. The flanking movement and attack
by Jackson, against the Eleventh Corps at the
battle of Chaneellorsville, was very successfnl
from a strategical and tactical point of view, as
the enemy not only gained the right flank of our
army without being interfered with, but also fell
on the Eleventh Corps before proper arrangements
were made to meet the attack. It may therefore
be said, that in all such manoeuvres going on at a
reaching distance from our own position, we arc
as much on the flank of the enemy as he is on
ours. The case is similar, when an army has suc-
ceeded in gaining the rear of another, at the same
time giving up its own base ; because the two par-
ties have then simply exchanged their positions
and are in each other's rear. So it was at Pea
Ridge, when, after the defeat of McCulloch, Van
Dorn and Price had " settled down " on our line
of communication with Springfield, while we
held theirs to Fayetteville. The chances were
equal, relative to position, and it was only by
good fortune that the Confederates came off as
well as they did. — F. S.
334 THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN.
The movement of Van Dorn during the night of the 6th was bold, well
conceived, and would probably have been more successful if it had not
been pushed too far out. If Van Dorn had formed his line with the left of
Price's forces resting on the heights, west of Elkhorn Tavern, and McCul-
loch's immediately on its right, he would have gained three or four hours'
time, and could have swept down upon us before 8 o'clock in the morning,
when no preparations had been made to receive him ; his two wings (Price's
and McCulloch's) would not have been separated from each other by an
interval of several miles, and his communications between Bentonville and his
position would have been protected. Instead of following this course of action
demanded by the unforeseen impediment on the road, he passed several miles
farther to the north-east, and after gaining the Springfield road, he shifted the
whole of Price's forces around to the south-east (toward the Huntsville road),
consuming again much valuable time. In fact, instead of commencing his attack
by the left at daylight on the 7th, as he expected to do, he did not commence
it earnestly before 2 p. m., and instead of gaining the desirable position on the
heights and fields which my divisions occupied the next day, he made his
attack in Cross Timber Hollow, where our inferior forces had the advantage
of defense and of concealing their weakness in the woods, ravines, and gullies
of that wilderness. Price's troops fought very bravely, but so did ours ; it
therefore happened that when Carr's division had been forced back, even half
a mile beyond Elkhorn Tavern, the assailants had spent so much of their
force and sustained so great a loss, that they were unable to follow up their
success by a last assault on our reduced and contracted line. Price's 6500
men with 38 guns could not overwhelm about 4500 with 23 guns (including the
reinforcements from the First and Second Divisions). The fight on this part
of the field was, at the beginning, a wild, isolated, irregular struggle of single
batteries and their supports, sometimes almost hand to hand, instead of in ser-
ried and well-defined lines; — this accounts for the great losses on both sides.
It was here that the two brigades of Vandever and Dodge, with the 9th and
4th Iowa, the 35th Illinois, the 24th and Phelps's Missouri regiment, Hayden's
and Jones's batteries, and two mountain howitzers of Bowen's battalion,
assisted by a part of the 1st Missouri and 3d Illinois Cavalry, withstood the
incessant onslaught of the two Confederate brigades of Colonel Little and
General Slack and the Missouri State Guards with the greatest tenacity, yield-
ing only step by step, when exhausted by losses and without ammunition.
The death of McCulloch was not only fatal to his troops, but also a most
serious blow to Van Dorn. Until 2 o'clock on the 7th, the latter had confidently
expected to hear of successful action against our left wing ; but he received
no answer to the dispatch he had sent, and began to push forward his own
wing. He succeeded, and when night fell made his headquarters at Elkhorn
Tavern, where Carr and Major Weston of our army had been in the morning.
But here he stopped. He says that by some misunderstanding the troops in
the advance were called back (as they were at Shiloh) ; the true re, •- r
their withdrawal, however, seems to have been their satisfaction wjth t
they had done, and the assurance of completing the work in the mori
UNION AND CONFEDERATE INDIANS IN THE CIVIL WAR.
BY WILEY BRITTON.
ELKHORN TWERN, PEA RIDGE.
FROM A RECENT PHOTOGRAPH.
THE Cherokee, Creek,
Choctaw, Chickasaw,
and Seminole tribes
were the only In-
dian tribes who
took an active part
in the civil war.
Before the war very
few of the Indians
of these tribes mani-
fested any interest
in the question of
slavery, and only a small number owned slave prop-
erty. Slavery among them was not regarded in
the same light as among the whites, for in many
instances the slaves acted as if they were on an
equality with their masters. But the tribes named
occupied valuable territory, and the Confederate
authorities lost no time in sending agents among
them to win them over. When the Confederate
agents first approached the full-blood leaders of
the Cherokee and Creek tribes on the subject of
severing their relations with the United States,
the Indians expressed themselves cautiously but
decidedly as preferring to remain neutral.
Conspicuous among those who took a decided
stand against organizing the Indians to oppose the
Federal Government was Hopoeithleyohola, the
old chief of the Creek tribe. The Confederate
agents had succeeded in winning over ex-Chief
Mcintosh, by appointing him colonel, but, per-
haps, two-thirds of the people preferi'ed to be
guided by the advice of their venerable old chief,
Hopoeithleyohola.
In the fall of 1861, Colonel Douglas H. Cooper,
commanding the department of Indian operations
under authority from the Confederate Govern-
ment, made several ineffectual efforts to have a
conference with the old chief for the purpose of
effecting a peaceful settlement of the difficulties
that were dividing the nation into two hostile
camps. Finding Hopoeithleyohola unwavering in
his loyalty to the United States, Colonel Cooper
determined to force him into submission, destroy
his power, or drive him out of the country, and
at once commenced collecting forces, composed
mostly of white troops, to attack him. In Novem-
ber and December, 1861, the battles of Chusto
Talasah and Chustenahlah were fought, and the
loyal Indians finally were defeated and forced to
retire to Kansas in midwinter.
In the spring of 1862 the United States Govern-
ment sent an expedition of five thousand men
under Colonel William Weer, 10th Kansas In-
fantry, int) the Indian Territory to drive out the
Confederate forces of Pike and Cooper, and to re-
store tht refugee Indians to their homes. After
a short action at Locust Grove, near Grand Sa-
line, Cherokee Nation, July 2d, Colonel Weer's
cavalry captured Colonel Clarkson and part of his
regiment of Missourians. On the 16th of July
Captain Greeno, 6th Kansas Cavalry, captured
Tahlequah, the capital of the Cherokee Nation,
and on the 19th of July Colonel Jewell, 6th Kan-
sas Cavalry, captured Fort Gibson, the most im-
portant point in the Indian Territory.
The Confederate forces were now driven out of
all that part of the Indian country north of the
Arkansas River, and the loyal Indians of the Cher-
okee, Creek, and Seminole nations were organized,
by authority of the United States Government,
into three regiments, each fully a thousand strong,
for the defense of their country. The colonel and
part of the field and line officers of each regiment
were white officers. Most of the captains of com-
panies were Indians. Colonel William A. Phillips,
of Kansas, who was active in organizing these In-
dian regiments, commanded the Indian brigade
from its organization to the close of the war. He
took part with his Indian troops in the action at
Locust Grove, C. N., and in the battles of New-
tonia, Mo., Maysville, Ark., Prairie Grove, Ark.,
Honey Springs, C. N., Perryville, C. N., besides
many other minor engagements.
In all the operations in which they participated
they acquitted themselves creditably, and to the
satisfaction of the Federal commander in the In-
dian Territory.
On the Confederate side, General Albert Pike and
Colonel Douglas H. Cooper, in the fall and winter
of 1861, organized three regiments of Indians
from the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek,
and Seminole nations or tribes, for service in the
Indian Territory. These regiments, under Gen-
eral Pike, participated in the battle of Pea Ridge,
Ark., on the 7th and 8th of March, 1862. In the
five tribes named a battalion and parts of four
regiments were raised for the Confederate service,
but these amounted in all to perhaps not over
3500 men.
At the close of Mr. Buchanan's administration
nearly all the United States Indian agents in the
Indian Territory were secessionists, and the mo-
ment the Southern States commenced passing
ordinances of secession, these men exerted their
influence to get the five tribes committed to the
Confederate cause. Occupying territory south of
the Arkansas River, and having the secessionists
of Arkansas on the east and those of Texas on the
south for neighbors, the Choctaws and Chiekasaws
offered no decided opposition to the scheme. With
theCherokees, the most powerful and most civilized
of the tribes of the Indian Territory, it was differ-
ent. Their chief, John Ross, was opposed to
335
336
UNION AND CONFEDERATE INDIANS IN THE CIVIL WAR.
hasty action, and at first favored neutrality, and
in the summer of 1861 issued a proclamation,
enjoining his people to observe a strictly neutral
attitude during the war between the United States
and the Southern States. In June, 1861, Albert
Pike, a commissioner of the Confederate States,
and General Ben. MeCulloch, commanding the
Confederate forces in western Arkansas and the
Department of Indian Territory, visited Chief
Ross with the view of having him make a treaty
with the Confederacy. But he declined to make
a treaty, and in the conference expressed himself
as wishing to occupy, if possible, a neutral po-
sition during the war. A majority of the Cher-
okees, nearly all of whom were full-bloods, were
known as Pin Indians, and were opposed to the
South.
Commissioner Pike went away to make treaties
with the less civilized Indian tribes of the plains,
and in the mean time the battle of Wilson's Creek
was fought, General Lyon killed, and the Union
army defeated aud forced to fall back from Spring-
field to Rolla.
Chief Ross now thought that the South would
probably succeed in establishing her independ-
ence, and expressed a willingness to enter into
a treaty with the Confederate authorities. On
his return from the West in September, 1861,
Commissioner Pike, at the request of Mr. Ross,
went to Park Hill and made a treaty with the
Cherokees. The treaties made with each tribe
provided that the troops it raised should be used
for home protection, and should not be taken out
of the Indian Territory. Even before the treaty
with Commissioner Pike, Chief Ross had com-
menced to organize a regiment composed nearly
altogether of Pin Indians. John Drew, a stanch
secessionist, was commissioned colonel, and
William P. Ross lieutenant-colonel, of this reg-
iment. Colonel Stand Watie, the leader of the
secession party, had also commenced to raise a
regiment of half-breeds for General McCulloch's
division. As already stated, there were two
factions among the Creeks, one of which was led
by Hopoeithleyohola and the other by D. N. and
Chitty Mcintosh, who were sons of General Will-
iam Mcintosh, killed in 1825 by Hopoeithleyohola
and his followers in Georgia, for making the
treaty of Indian Springs. It is asserted by General
Pike and others that with Hopoeithleyohola it
was not a question of loyalty or disloyalty to the
United States, but simply one of self-preservation ;
\ The position chosen by Hopoeithleyohola at Chusto
Talasali, where he determined to make a stand and fight
tho Confederate forces, was naturally a very strong one
to resist an attack made with small-arms. It was at a
gorge of a bend of Bird Creek, the bend being in the
? form of a horse-shoe, and four hundred yards in length.
The creek made up to the prairie on the side approached
by the Confederate forces in an abrupt and precipitous
hank about thirty feet high. On the opposite side of
this precipitous bank was the inside of the horse-shoe
or bend, which was densely covered witli heavy tim-
ber, cane, and tangled thickets. The position was also
strengthened by felled trees aud by the creek forming the
bend or horse-shoe. The creek was deep and was ford-
able only at certain places known to the Union Tndiaus.
that when he found the Confederate authorities
had commissioned D. N. Mcintosh as colonel of a
Creek regiment, and Chitty Mcintosh as lieu-
tenant-colonel of a battalion of Ci'eeks, he felt
certain that the Indian troops thus being raised
would be used to persecute and destroy him and
his followers. In November, 1861, he started
for Kansas, and was pursued and overtaken by
the Confederate Creeks, Choctaws, Chiekasaws,
Cherokees, and Texans under Colonel Douglas H.
Cooper. A fight took place in the night, and
Colonel Drew's regiment of Cherokees, which had
been raised by Chief Ross, went over to Hopoeith-
leyohola, and fought with him in the next day's
desperate battle (known as the battle of Chusto
Talasah), in which five hundred of the Union In-
dians were reported by Colonel Cooper to have
been killed and wounded. \ The Confederate
Indians of Colonel Stand Watie's regiment, and
those of Colonel Drew's regiment who had re-
turned to the Confederate service under Pike
and Cooper, also participated in the battle of
Pea Ridge in March, 1862, where they were
charged with scalping; and mutilating the Federal
dead ou the field. General Pike, hearing of the
scalping, called on the surgeon and assistant-
surgeon of his field-hospital for reports, and in
their reports they stated that they found one of
the Federal dead who had been scalped. General
Pike then issued an order, denouncing the outrage
in the strongest language, and sent a copy of the
order to General Curtis. General Pike claimed
that part of the Indians were in McCulloch's
corps in the first day's battle ; and that the scalp-
ing was done at night in a quarter of the field not
occupied by the Indian troops under his immediate
command. After Pea Ridge the operations of the
Confederate Indians under General Cooper and
Colonel Stand Watie were confined, with a few
exceptions, to the Indian Territory. In connec-
tion with white troops from Texas, they partici-
pated in several engagements with the Federal
Indian brigade under Colonel Phillips, after he
recaptured Fort Gibson in the spring of 1863;
and they made frequent efforts to capture Federal
supply trains from Fort Scott to Fort Gibson and
Fort Smith, but were always unsuccessful. They
fought very well when they had an opportunity to
take shelter behind trees and logs, but could not
easily be brought to face artillery, and a single
shell thrown at them was generally sufficient to
demoi'alize them and put them to flight.
In this bend Hopoeithleyohola's forces were posted after
they were obliged to fall back in the preliminary skir-
mish. A house and crib at the mouth of the bend served
as a shelter for a while, from which his sharp-shooters
kept back the Confederates. The Union Indians, how-
ever, were finally driven from this position back into
the bend, contesting the ground with much obstinacy.
The Confederate t rodps made repeated efforts to dislodge
them from the bend, but without success. Every time
a detachment of Hopoeithleyoliola's war ' . ved
themselves in an opening or in the prairie ed-
erates charged them to the timber, when ; om
the concealed Union Indians threw the chai nn
into confusion and sent it back in a hasty re lit
coming on put an end to the fight.— W. B.
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT PEA RIDGE, ARK.
The composition and losses of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records.
K stands for killed ; w for wounded ; m w for mortally wounded ; m for captured or missing ; c for captured.— EDI tors.
COMPOSITION AND LOSSES OF THE UNION ARMY.
Brig.-Gen. Samuel R. Curtis.
First and Second Divisions, Brig.-Gen. Franz Sigel.
First Division, Col. Peter J. Osterhaus. Firs! Brigade :
25th 111., Col. William N. Coler; 44th 111., Col. Charles
Knobelsdorff; 17th Mo., Major August H. Poten. Bri-
gade loss : k, 4 ; w, 22 ; m, 11 = 37. Second Brigade, Col.
Nicholas Greusel. 36th 111., Col. Nicholas Greusel; 12th
Mo., Major Hugo Wangeliu; Illinois Cavalry (2 Cos.),
Captains Albert Jenks and Henry A. Smith. Brigade
loss: k, 7; w. 66; m, 36=109. Artillery: Mo. Battery,
Capt. Martin Weirley; 4th Ohio Battery, Capt. Louis
Hoffmann. Loss: w, 6 ; m, 4 = 10. Second Division,
Brig.-Gen. Alexander Asboth (w). Staff loss: w, 1. First
Brigade, Col. Frederick Sekaefer: 2d Mo., Lieut.-Col.
Bernard Laiboldt ; 15th Mo., Col. Francis J. Joliat.
Brigade loss : k, 8; w, 34; m, 22=64. Unattached : Fre-
mont Hussars Mo. Cavalry, Major Emeric Meszaros;
5th Mo. Cavalry (Benton Hussars), Col. Joseph Nemett;
1st Mo. Horse Battery, Capt. G. M. Elbert; 2d Ohio
Battery, Lieut. W. B. Chapman. Loss: k, 12; w, 29: in,
14=55.
Third Division, Col. Jefferson C.Davis. First Brigade,
( ol. Thomas Pattison : 8th Ind., Col. William P. Benton;
18th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Henry D. Washburn; 22d Ind.,
Lieut.-Col. John A. Hendricks (m w), Major David W.
Daily, Jr. ; 1st Ind. Battery, Capt. Martin Klauss. Bri-
gade loss : k, 17 ; w, 88 ; m, 6 = 111. Second Brigade, Col.
Julius White : 37th 111., Lieut.-Col. M. S. Barnes; 59th 111.,
Lieut.-Col. C. H. Frederick; Peoria 111. Battery, Capt. P.
Davidson. Brigade loss: k, 29; w, 195 ; m, 3 = 227. Cav-
alry : 1st Mo., Col. C. A. Ellis. Loss : k, 2 ; w, 2 ; m, 2 = 6.
Fourth Division, Col. Eugene A. Carr (w). Staff loss :
w, 1. First Brigade, Col. Grenville M. Dodge: 35th 111.,
Col. Gustavus A. Smith (w), Lieut.-Col. William P. Chand-
ler (c); 4th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. John Galligan (w) ; 1st
Iowa Battery, Capt. Junius A. Jones (w), Lieut. V. J.
David. Brigade loss: k, 35 ; w, 200 ; m, 55 = 290. Second
Brigade, Col. William Vaudever : 9th Iowa, Lieut.-Col.
Francis J. Herrou (w and c), Major William H. Coyl (w) ;
Phelps's Mo., Col. John S. Phelps (w); 3d 111. Cavalry,
Major John McConnell ; 3d Iowa Battery, Captain Mor-
timer M. Hayden. Brigade loss : k, 61 ; w, 300; in, 30 =
391. Unattached ; 3d Iowa Cavalry, Col. Cyrus Bussey
i during a part of the battle Col. Bussey had command
of other troops in addition to his own regiment), Lieut.-
Col. Henry H. Trimble (w) ; Bowen's Battalion Mo.
Cavalry, Major Wm. D. Bowen ; 3d Mo. Infantry, Major
Joseph Conrad ; 24th Mo. Infantry. Major Eli W. Wes-
ton. Loss: k, 28 ; w, 30 ; m, 18 = 82.
Total loss in the Union Army (revised returns) : 203 killed, 980 wounded, and 201 captured or missing, — total, 1384.
COMPOSITION AND LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.
Major-General Earl Van Dorn.
Missouri State Guard, Major-General sterling Price.
Confederate Volunteers: Escort, Cearnal's Bat-
talion Cavalry, Lieut.-Col. J. T. Cearnal (w). First Bri-
gade, Col. Henry Little: 1st Cavalry, Col. Elijah Gates;
1st Infantry, Col. John Q. Burliridge; 2d Infantry, Col.
Benjamin A. Rives (m w), Lieut.-Col. J. A. Pritchard ;
1st Battery, Capt. William Wade; 2d Battery, Capt. S.
Churchill Clark (k), Lieut. James L. Farris. Second Bri-
gade, Brig.-Gen. William Y. Slack (m w), Col. Thomas H.
Rosser: Battalion Infantry, Col. John T. Hughes; Bat-
talion Infantry, Major R. S. Bevicr; Battalion Infantry,
Col. Thomas H. Rosser ; Battalion Cavalry. Col. G. W.
Biggins ; Light Battery, Capt. Wm. Lucas. Brigade
loss : k, 5 ; w,37 = 42. Third Brigade, Col. Colton Greene.
Brigade loss: k, 6: w, 59 = 65. State Troops, Second
Division, Brig.-Gen. Martin E. Green. Third Division,
Col. John B. Clark, Jr. : 1st Infantry, Major Rucker (w) ;
2d Infantry, Col. Congreve Jackson ; 3d Infantry, Major
Hutchinson; 4th and 5th Infantry (consolidated), Col. J.
A. Poiudexter (w) ; 6th Infantry," Lieut.-Col. Poacher.
Division loss: k, 11 ; w, 101 ; m, 35 = 147. Fifth Division,
Col. James P. Saunders: detachments of infantry,
cavalry, and Kelly's battery of artillery. Division loss :
k, 9 ; w, 32 = 41. Sixth l>irision, Major D. H. Lindsay :
detachments of infantry and Gorham's battery of artil-
lery. Division loss: w, 13; m, 34 = 47. Seventh and
Ninth Divisions, Brig.-Gen. D. M. Frost: detachments
of infantry and cavalry and Guibor's and Mac-Donald's
batteries of artillery; also included the Third Brigade
of Volunteers given above. Eighth Division, Brig.-
Gen. James S. Rains: Infantry under Col. William II.
Erwin, Lieut. -Cols. John P. Bowman, A. J. Pearcy, and
Stemmons ; Bledsoe's battery, and Shelby's company of
cavalry. Division loss : k, 2 ; w, 26 = 28.
McCi'li.och's Division, Brig.-Gen. Ben. McCulloch
(k), Col. E. Greer. Infantry Brigade, Col. Louis Hcbert
(c), Col. Evander McNair: 4th Ark., Col. Evander Mc-
Nair, Lieut.-Col. Samuel Ogden; 14th Ark., Col. M. C.
Mitchell; 16th Ark., Col. J. .F Hill; 17th Ark., Col. F. A.
Rector; 21st Ark., Col. D. McRae ; 3d Louisiana, Major
W. F. Tunuard (c), Capt. W. S. Gunnell. Cavalry Bri-
gade, Brig.-Gen. James Mcintosh (k) : 1st Ark. Mounted
Rifles, Col. J. T. Churchill; 2d Ark. Mounted Rifles, Col.
B. T. Embry ; 3d Texas, ( !ol. E. Greer, Lieut.-Col. Walter
P. Lane; 4th Texas, Col. Win. B. Sims (w), Lieut.-Col.
William Quayle ; 6th Texas, Col. B. W. Stone ; llth^Pexas,
Lieut.-Col. James J. Diniond. Artillery: Hart's, Pro-
vence's, Gaines's, and Good's batteries.
Pike's Command, Brig.-Gen. Albert Pike. Cherokee
Regiment, Col. Stand Watie; Cherokee Regiment, Col.
John Drew; Creek Regiment, Col. D. N. Mcintosh;
Scpiadrou Texas Cavalry, (apt. O. G. Welch.
Other Troops (not included in preceding roster) :
1st Battalion Ark. Cavalry, Major W. H. Brooks ; Bat-
talion Texas Cavalry, Major R. 1'. Crump; Battalion
Texas Mounted Rifles, Major J. W. Whitfield; Ted's
Texas Battery; 19th Ark. Infantry, Lieut.-Col. P. R.
Smith ; 22d Ark. Infantry, Col. G. W. King.
The Confederate loss is reported at 800 to 1000 killed and wounded, and between 200 and 300 prisoners.
STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING FORCES.
The effective force of the Union Army did not exceed
10,500 infantry and cavalry, with 49 pieces of artillery.
CSee "Official Records," VIII.. p. 196.)
The effective strength of the Confederate Army was
B follows : Price's command, 6818, with 8 batteries of
Vol.. i. 22 337
artillery ("Official Records," VIII., p. 305) ; McCulloch's
command, 8384, with 4 batteries of 18 pieces ("Official
Records," VIII., p. 763) ; and Pike's command, 1000 ('• ( >f-
flcial Records," VIII., p. 288), making an aggregate of
16,202 infantry and cavalry.
t
.-.
■ - . :
ft
S»SIll •
wmt^>-
BUILDING THE EADS GUN-BOATS AT CARONDELET. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
RECOLLECTIONS OF FOOTE AND THE GUN-BOATS.
BY CAPTAIN JAMES B. EADS. \
SOON after the surrender of Fort Sumter, while in St. Louis, I received a
letter from Attorney-General Bates, dated Washington, April 17th, in
which he said : " Be not surprised if you are called here suddenly by telegram.
If called, come instantly. In a certain contingency it will be necessary to
have the aid of the most thorough knowledge of our Western rivers and the
use of steam on them, and in that event I have advised that you should be
consulted." The call by telegraph followed close upon the letter. I hurried
\ Of the services of Captain Eads to the Western
flotilla, the Reverend C. B. Boynton says, in his
" History of the Navy " :
"During the month of July, 1861, the Quartermaster-
General advertised for proposals to construct a nmnuer
of iron-clad gun-boats for service on the Mississippi
River. The bids were opened on the 5th of August, and
Mr. Eads was found to he the best bidder for the whole
number, both in regard to the time of completion and
price. ... On the 7th of August, 1861, Mr. Eads
signed a contract with Quartermaster-General Meigs to
construct these seven vessels ready for their crews and
armaments in sixty-five days. At this early period the
people in the border States, especially in the slave States,
had not yet learned to accommodate themselves to a
state of war. The pursuits of peace were interrupted;
but the energy and enterprise which were to provide
the vast material required for an energetic prosecution
of the war hadnot then been aroused. None could fore-
see the result, and a spirit of doubt and distrust per-
vaded financial and commercial circles. It was at this
time that the contractor returned to St. Louis with an
obligation to perform what, under ordinary circum-
stances, would have been deemed by most men an im-
possibility. Rolling-mills, machine-shops, foundries,
forges, and saw-mills were all idle. The demands of
peace had ceased for months before, and the working-
men were enlisting, or seeking in States more quiet their
accustomed employment. The engines that were to
drive this our first iron-clad fleet were yet to be built.
The timber to form their hulls was uncut in the forests.
and the huge rollers and machinery that were to form
their iron armor were not yet constructed. The rapidity
with which all these various parts were to be supplied
forbade depending alone on any two or three establish-
ments in the country, no matter how great were their
resources. The signatures were scarcely dry upon this
important contract before persons in different parts of
the country were employed upon the work through tele-
graphic orders issued from Washington. Special agents
were dispatched in every direction, and saw-mills were
simultaneously occupied in cutting the timber required
in the construction of the vessels, in Kentucky, Ten-
nessee, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Minnesota, and Missouri;
and railroads, steamboats, and barges were engaged
for its immediate transportation. Nearly all of the
largest machine-shops and foundries in St. Louis, and
many small ones, were at once set at work day and
night, and the telegraph lines between St. Louis and
Pittsburgh and Cincinnati were occupied frequently for
hours in transmitting instructions to similar establish-
ments in those cities for the construction of the twenty-
one steam-engines and the five-and-thirty steam-boilers
that were to propel the fleet. . . . Within two weeks
not less than four thousand men were engaged in
the various details of its construction. Neither the
sanctity of the Sabbath nor the darkness of night was
permitted to interrupt it. The workmen on the hull-
were promised a handsome bonus in money for each on
who stood steadfastly at the work until it was cor
pleted, and many thousands of dollars were thus grat
tously paid by Mr. Kails when it was finished. On
12th of October, 1861, the first United States iron-c
338
RECOLLECTIONS OF FOOTE AND THE GUN-BOATS. 339
to Washington, where I was introduced to the Secretary of the Navy, the
Hon. Gideon Welles, and to Captain Gr. V. Fox, afterward Assistant Secretary.
In the August following I was to construct 7 gun-boats, which, according to
the contract, were to draw 6 feet of water, carry 13 heavy guns each, be plated
with 2^-inch iron, and have a speed of 9 miles an hour. The Be Kalb (at
first called the St. Louis) was the type of the other six, named the Caron-
delet, Cincinnati, Louisville, Mound City, Cairo, and Pittsburgh. They were
175 feet long, 51£ feet beam; the flat sides sloped at an angle of about
thirty-five degrees, and the front and rear casemates corresponded with the
sides, the stern- wheel being entirely covered by the rear casemate. Each
was pierced for three bow guns, eight broadside guns (four on a side), and
two stern guns. Before these seven gun-boats were completed, I engaged to
convert the snag-boat Benton into an armored vessel of still larger dimensions.
After completing the seven and dispatching them down the Mississippi to
Cairo, I was requested by Foote (who then went by the title of " flag-officer,"
the title of admiral not being recognized at that time in our navy), as a special
favor to him, to accompany the Benton, the eighth one of the fleet, in her
passage down to Cairo. It was in December, and the water was falling rapidly.
The Benton had been converted from the IT. S. snag-boat Benton into the
most powerful iron-clad of the fleet. She was built with two hulls about
twenty feet apart, very strongly braced together. She had been purchased
by General Fremont while he was in command of the Western Department,
and had been sent to my ship-yard for alteration into a gun-boat. I
had the space between the two hulls planked, so that a continuous bottom
extended from the outer side of one hull to the outer side of the other. The
upper side was decked over in the same manner ; and by extending the outer
sides of the two hulls forward until they joined each other at a new stem,
which received them, the twin boats became one wide, strong, and substan-
tial hull. The new bottom did not extend to the stern of the hull, but was
brought up to the deck fifty feet forward of the stern, so as to leave a space for
with her boilers and engines on board, was launched in It is to be regretted, however, that the promptness and
Carondelet, Missouri, in forty-five days from the laying energy of the man who thus ereated an iron-clad navy
of her keel.* She was named the St. Louis, by Rear- on the Mississippi were not met on the part of the Gov-
Admiral Foote, in honor of the city. When the fleet was eminent with an equal degree of faithfulness in per-
transf erred from the War Department to the Navy, this forming its part of the contract. On one pretext or
name was changed to Baron de Kalb, there being at another, the stipulated payments for the work were
that time a vessel commissioned in" the Navy called the delayed by the War Department until the default as-
St. Louis. In ten days after the De Kalb the Carondelet sunied such magnitude that nothing but the assistance
was launched, and the Cincinnati, Louisville, Mound rendered by patriotic and confiding friends enabled the
City, Cairo, and Pittsburgh followed in rapid succession, contractor, after exhausting his own ample means, to
An eighth vessel [the Benton], larger, more powerful complete the fleet. Besides the honorable reputation
and superior in every respect, was also undertaken which flows from success iu such a work, he has the
before the hulls of the first seven had fairly assumed satisfaction of reflecting that it was with vessels at the
shape. . .• . Thus one individual put in construe- time his_ own property that the brilliant capture of Fort
tion and pushed to completion within one hundred days Henry was accomplished, and the conquest of Donelson
a powerful squadron of eight steamers, aggregating five and Island Number Ten achieved. The ever-memorable
thousand tons, capable of steaming at nine knots per midnight passage of Number Ten by the Pittsburgh and
hour, each heavily armored, fully equipped, and all Carondelet, which compelled the surrender of that pow-
ready for their armament of one hundred and seven erful stronghold, was performed by vessels furnished
large guns. The fact that such a work was done is four or five mouths previous by the same contractor,
nobler praise than any that can be bestowed by words, and at the time unpaid for." EDITORS.
r It was stipulated in the contract that the gunboats should part due to lack of funds and in part to the necessity of alter-
in- delivered, October 10th, at Cairo. Asa matter id' fact, they ation in the design of the vessels. Hail they been completed
were not sent to ( 'aire until the latter pari of November, and in the time specified, the Mississippi campaign, from Island
considerable woi-k still remained to be done before llieir eoni- Number Ten to Vicksburg, would probably have been over
pletion. They were finished and accepted. January loth. before Farragut passed the forts at New Orleans.
1862, and put in commission the next day. The delay was iu EDITORS.
340
RECOLLECTIONS OF FOOTE AND THE GUN-BOATS.
THE " DE KALB," FORMERLY THE "ST. LOUIS" (TYPE OF THE " CARONDELET," "CINCINNATI," "LOUISVILLE,"
"MOUND CITY," "CAIRO," AND "PITTSBURGH"). FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
a central wheel with which the boat was to be propelled. This wheel was
turned by the original engines of the snag-boat, each of the engines having
formerly turned an independent wheel on the outside of the twin boat. In
this manner the Benton became a war vessel of about seventy-five feet beam,
a greater breadth, perhaps, than that of any war vessel then afloat. She was
about two hundred feet long. A slanting casemate, covered with iron plates,
was placed on her sides and across her bow and stern ; and the wheel was
protected in a similar manner. The casemate on the sides and bow was cov-
ered with iron 3£ inches thick ; the wheel-house and stern with lighter plates,
like the first seven boats built by me. She carried 16 guns, — 7 32-pounders,
2 9-inch guns, and 7 army 42-pounders.
The wish of Admiral Foote to have me see this boat safely to Cairo was
prompted by his knowledge that I had had experience in the management of
steamboats upon the river, and his fear that she would be detained by
grounding. Ice had just begun to float in the Mississippi when the Benton
put out from my ship-yard at Carondelet for the South. Some 30 or 40 miles
below St. Louis she grounded. Under the direction of Captain Winslow, who
commanded the vessel, Lieutenant Bishop, executive officer of the ship, an
intelligent and energetic young man, set the crew at work. An anchor was
put out for the purpose of hauling her off. My advice was not asked with
reference to this first proceeding, and although I had been requested by
Admiral Foote to accompany the vessel, he had not instructed the captain,
so far as I knew, to be guided by my advice in case of difficulty. After they
had been working all night to get the boat afloat, she was harder on than
ever; moreover, the water had fallen about six inches. I then volunteered
the opinion to Captain Winslow that if he would run hawsers ashore in a cer-
RECOLLECTIONS OF FOOTE AND THE GUN-BOATS.
Mi
tain direction, directly opposite to that in which he had been trying to move
the boat, she could be got off. He replied, very promptly, " Mr. Eads, if you
will undertake to get her off, I shall be very willing to place the entire crew
under your direction.'" I at once accepted the offer ; and Lieutenant Bishop
was called up and instructed to obey my directions. Several very large haw-
sers had been put on board of the boat for the fleet at Cairo. One of the larg-
est was got out and secured to a large
tree on the shore, and as heavy a strain
was put upon it as the cable would be
likely to bear. As the water was still
falling, I ordered out a second one, and
a third, and a fourth, until live or
six eleven-inch hawsers were heavily
strained in the effort to drag the broad-
bottomed vessel off the bar. There were
three steam capstans on the bow of the
vessel, and these were used in tighten-
ing the strain by luffs upon the hawsers.
One of the hawsers was led through a
snatch-block fastened by a large chain
to a ring-bolt in the side of the vessel.
I was on the upper deck of the vessel
near Captain Winslow when the chain
which held this block broke. It was
made of iron one and one-eighth inches
in diameter, and the link separated into
three pieces. The largest, being one-half
of the link, was found on the shore at a
distance of at least five hundred feet.
Half of the remainder struck the iron
plating on the bow of the boat, making an indentation half the thickness
of one's finger in depth. The third piece struck Captain Winslow on the
fleshy part of the arm, cutting through his coat and the muscles of his
arm. The wound was a very painful one, but he bore it as might be expected.
The iron had probably cut an inch and a half into the arm between the
shoulder and the elbow. In the course of the day the Benton was floated,
and proceeded on her voyage down the river without further delay. Captain
Winslow soon after departed for his home on leave of absence. On his recov-
ery he was placed in command of the Kearsarge, and to that accident he
owed, perhaps, the fame of being the captor of the Alabama.
When the Benton arrived at Cairo she was visited by all the officers of the
army and navy stationed there, and was taken, on that or the following day,
on a trial trip a few miles down the river. The Essex, in command of Captain
William D. Porter, was lying four or five miles below the mouth of the Ohio on
the Kentucky shore. As the Benton passed up, on her return from this little
expedition. Captain Porter offered his congratulations to Foote on the apparent
excellence of the boat. " Yes," replied Foote, " but she is almost too slow."
34-2
RECOLLECTIONS OF FOOTE AND THE GUN-BOATS.
" Plenty fast enough to fight with," was Porter's rejoinder.
Very soon after this (early in the spring of 1862) I was called to Washing-
ton, with the request to prepare plans for still lighter iron-clad vessels, the
draught of those which I had then completed being only about six feet. The
later plans were for vessels that should be capable of going up the Tennes-
see and the Cumberland. As rapidly as possible I prepared and presented
for the inspection of Secretary Welles and his able assistant, Captain
Fox, plans of ves-
sels drawing five
feet. They were
not acceptable to
Captain Fox, who
said : " We want
vessels much
lighter than that."
" But yon want
them to carry a
certain thickness
THE "OSAGE" (TWIN OF
THE "NEOSHO").
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
of iron?" I re-
plied.
"Yes, we want
them to be proof
against heavy
shot — to be plat-
ed and heav-
ily plated, — but
they must be
of much lighter THE "chickasaw" (type of the" Milwaukee," "winnebago," and "kickapoo").
® FROM A PHOTOGKAFH.
draught."
After the interview I returned with the plans to my hotel, and
commenced a revision of them; and in the course of a few days I pre-
sented the plans for the Osage and the Neosho. These vessels, accord-
ing to my recollection, were about forty-five feet beam on deck, their
sides slanting outward, and the tops of the gunwales rising only about
six inches above the surface of the water, so as to leave very little
space to be covered with the plating, which extended two and a half feet
down under water on these slanting sides. The deck of the vessel, rising
from six inches above water, curved upward about four feet higher at
center ; and this was covered all over with iron an inch thick. The plating
on the sides was two and a half inches thick. Each vessel had a rotating
RECOLLECTIONS OF FOOTE AND THE GUN-BOATS. 343
turret, carrying two eleven-inch guns, the turret being six inches thick, but
extending only a few feet above the deck of the vessel. I was very anxious
to construct these turrets after a plan which I had devised, quite different
from the Ericsson or Coles systems, and in which the guns should be oper-
ated by steam. But, within a month after the engagement at Fort Donelson,
the memorable contest between the Merrimac and the Monitor occurred,
whereupon the Navy Department insisted on Ericsson turrets being placed
upon these two vessels.
At the same time the department was anxious to have four larger vessels
for operations on the lower Mississippi River, which should have two turrets
each, and it consented that I should place one of my turrets on each of two
of these vessels (the Chickasaw and the Milwaukee) at my own risk, to be re-
placed with Ericsson's in case of failure. These were the first turrets in which
the guns were manipulated by steam, and they were tired every forty-five
seconds. The Osage and Neoslio, with their armaments, stores, and everything
011 board, drew only three and a half feet of water, and steamed about nine
miles an hour. While perfecting those plans, I prepared the designs for the
larger vessels (the CMcJcasaw, Milwaukee, Winnebago, and Kickapoo), and
when these wTere approved by Captain Fox and the officers of the navy to
whom they were submitted at Washington, Mr. Welles expressed the wish
that I should confer with Admiral Foote about them before proceeding to
build them, inasmuch as the experience which he had had at Forts Henry and
Donelson and elsewhere would be of great value, and might enable him to
suggest improvements in them. I therefore hastened from Washington to
Island Number Ten, a hundred miles below Cairo, 011 the Mississippi River,
where Foote's flotilla was then engaged.
In the railway train a gentleman who sat in front of me, learning that I
had constructed Foote's vessels, introduced himself as Judge Foote of Cleve-
land, a brother of the Admiral. Among other interesting matters, he related
an anecdote of one of his little daughters who was just learning to read.
After the capture of Fort Henry the squadron wras brought back to Cairo for
repairs, and, on the Sunday following, the crews, with their gallant flag-officer,
attended one of the churches in Cairo. Admiral Foote was a thorough Chris-
tian gentleman and an. excellent impromptu speaker. Upon this occasion,
after the congregation had assembled, some one whispered to him that the min-
ister was ill and would be unable to officiate ; whereupon the admiral went up
into the pulpit himself, and after the usual prayer and hymn he selected as
the text John xiv. 1, " Let not your heart be troubled : ye believe in God,
believe also in me." Upon this text he delivered what was declared to be an
excellent sermon, or exhortation, after which he dismissed the congregation.
An account of the sermon was widely published in the papers at the time,
and came into the hands of the little niece just referred to. After she had
read it, she exclaimed to her father : " Uncle Foote did not say that right."
" Say what right f " asked the father. " Why, when he preached." " What
did he say 1 " " He said, l Let not your heart be troubled : ye believe in
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
KEAR-ADMIKAL ANDREW HULL FOOTE.
344
RECOLLECTIONS OF FOOTE AND THE GUN-BOATS. 345
God, believe also in me!" "Well, what should he have said?" inquired the
father. " Why, he ought to have said, ' Let not your heart be troubled : ye
believe in God, believe also in the gun-boats!"
On arriving at Cairo, I found Representative Elihu B. Washburne, after-
ward our minister to France, waiting for an opportunity to visit the army,
then in Missouri, in the neighborhood of Island Number Ten, cooperating
with Admiral Foote in the reduction of that stronghold. We embarked
together on a small tug-boat which carried the mail down to the fleet. We
arrived and landed alongside the flag-ship He it ton, and were cordially greeted
by Admiral Foote. I presented a letter which I had brought from the Secre-
tary of the Navy. We withdrew to his cabin to consider the plans of the
four new gun-boats. Mr. Washburne was sent to the Missouri shore. After
discussing the plans of the new boats for fifteen or twenty minutes, we
returned to the deck.
At the time we landed, the Benton and the other boats of the fleet were
anchored between two and three miles above the Confederate forts, and were
then throwing their shells into the enemy's works. When we boarded the
Benton Admiral Foote had his lorgnette in his hand, and through it was
watching the flight of each shell discharged from the guns of his ship. He
resumed this occupation when we came up on deck, until, after a shot or two
had been fired, one of his officers approached and handed him a dozen or
more letters which had been brought down in the mail. While still convers-
ing with me, his eye glanced over them as he held them in his hand, and he
selected one which he proceeded to open. Before reading probably four lines,
he turned to me with great calmness and composure, and said, " Mr. Eads,
I must ask you to excuse me for a few minutes while I go down to my cabin.
This letter brings me the news of the death of my son, about thirteen years
old, who I had hoped would live to be the stay and support of his mother."
Without further remark, and without giving the slightest evidence of his
feelings to any one, he left me and went to his cabin. I was, of course,
deeply grieved; and when he returned after an absence of not more than
fifteen minutes, still perfectly composed, I endeavored to divert his mind
from his affliction by referring to the plans and to my interview with his
brother. I told him also the anecdote of his little niece which his brother
had related, and this served to clothe his face with a temporary smile. I
then asked him if he would be kind enough to assign me some place where
I could sleep on the Benton that night. It was then probably 3 o'clock in
the day. He replied that I must not stay on board. I said that I had come
down for that very purpose, since I wanted to see how the Benton and the
other boats worked under fire. I was not particular where I slept ; any place
would do for me ; I did not want to turn any of the officers out of their rooms.
With a look of great gravity and decision, he replied :
" Mr. Eads, I cannot permit you to stay here a moment after the tug is
ready to return. There is no money in the world which would justify me
in risking my life here ; and you have no duty here to perform, as I have,
which requires you to risk yours. You must not stay," emphasizing the
346
RECOLLECTIONS OF FOOTE AND THE GUN-BOATS.
words very distinctly ! " You must return, both you and Mr. Washburne, as
soon as the tug is ready to go."
I felt somewhat disappointed at this, for I had fully expected to spend a day
at least on board the Benton, and to visit the other vessels of the fleet, with
many of the officers of which I was well acquainted. I did not believe there was
much danger in remaining, for the shells of the enemy seemed to fall short ;
but, within fifteen minutes after
this, one of these interesting
missiles struck the water fifty
or a hundred feet from the side
of the Benton. This satisfied
me that Foote was right, and I
did not insist on staying.
The Admiral was a great suf-
ferer from sick headache. I re-
member visiting him in his room
at the Planter's House in St.
Louis, a day or two after the
battle of Belmont, when he was
suffering very severely from one
of these attacks, which lasted
two days. He was one of the
most fascinating men in com-
pany that I have ever met, being
full of anecdote, and having a
graceful, easy flow of language.
He was likewise, ordinarily, one
of the most amiable-looking of
men; but when angered, as I
once saw him, his face impressed me as being most savage and demoniacal,
and I can imagine that at the head of a column or in an attack he would have
been invincible. Some idea of the moral influence that he possessed over men
may be gained from the fact that, long before the war, when commanding the
United States fleet of three vessels in Chinese waters, he converted every
officer and man in the fleet to the principles of temperance, and had every one
of them sign the pledge. I believe that this was the beginning of the reform
movement in the navy which led to the disuse of the rations of grog which
used to be served to the sailors on shipboard at stated hours every day.
From my knowledge of Foote, I think that there is no doubt that if his
health had not given way so early in the war, he would have gained laurels
like those so gallantly won by Farragut. And, aside from his martial charac-
ter, no officer ever surpassed him in those evidences of genuine refinement
and delicacy which mark the true gentleman.
REAR-ADMIRAL HENRY WALKE, COMMANDER OF THE
" TYLER," AND AFTERWARD OF THE " CARON-
DELET." FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
NOTES ON THE LIFE OF ADMIRAL FOOTE.
BY HIS BROTHER, JOHN A. FOOTE.
THERE were six boys and no girls in my father's
family. I was the eldest and am the only sur-
vivor. The Admiral was next to me in age. We
were brought up, I think, upon purely patriarchal
and Puritan principles, so I was surprised that my
father, on taking me to the law school at Litch-
field, should so far unbend as to say to me, "John,
I think I have been able to control my family
pretty well, all except Andrew — I have never tried
to do more than to guide him." In subsequent life
I have thought that in that avowal I find the
secret of the Admiral's unconquerable will and of
his success as a naval commander. He was very
genial and good-natured, and as a subaltern im-
plicitly obedient. His interest in the Christian
religion transformed him by subduing his will.
There never was any cant about him, and he
seemed to enjoy life and to get much out of it.
A younger brother of ours said to me, " The
world is a clog to me, but it seems to be a help
to Andrew." This justly expressed my opinion of
his very decided and cheerful Christian character.
I once visited him when he was stationed at the
Naval Asylum at Philadelphia. Asking of the sen-
tinel before the door for Lieutenant Foote, I was
answered that he was in his church, which proved
to be only a large room, at the end of the hall,
where I halted to catch his earnest entreaties to
his hearers to become good men. Such meetings,
or a Sunday-school, or both, he sustained at all his
stations ashore or afloat. At one time he doubted
whether he could conscientiously continue in the
navy. My father having asked him if he did not
think a navy necessary, he replied, "Certainly, the
seas must be policed." Then added my father,
" Should the navy be in charge of good or bad
men ?" " Of good men," he replied — and declared
that this view removed his doubts.
Later in life he got bravely over such doubts.
It was enough for him that as an officer of the
Government he was bound to do and dare every-
thing to put down the rebellion. I was trying still
further to intensify him, by other reasons, wdien
he turned on me and said : " John, will you fight V
He saw that I hesitated, and at once added : " I
will fight — my life is in my hand for this cause ;
and if you won't fight, don't talk quite so loud."
When he began to descend the Mississippi I
noticed that he went very slowly, and lay off at a
distance when attacking any position. I informed
him that I thought the people wanted dash and
close fighting — something sharp and decisive.
He replied : " Don't you know that my boats are
the only protection you have upon your rivers
against the rebel gun-boats — that without my flo-
tilla everything on your rivers, your cities and
towns would be at the mercy of the enemy ? My
first duty t^en is to care for my boats, if I am to
protect you. Now when I ran up the Tennessee
and the < 'umberlaud, and attacked Fort Henry and
Fort Donelson, if my boats were rendered un-
manageable as my flag-ship was at Donelson, the
current took care of me by cai'rying me away
from the enemy's works. But all this is changed
when I descend the Mississippi. Then my boats,
if they become unmanageable, are carried directly
into the hands of the enemy." I saw the point
and had to give in. As to the comparative value
of the two arms of the service — the Army and
the Navy — in clearing the Western rivers of the
Confederates, my brother said they werelike blades
of shears — united, invincible ; separated, almost
useless.
About the middle of May, 1862, being much
enfeebled by his wounds received at Fort Donel-
son and by illness, he made his home at my house
in Cleveland, Ohio, until about midsummer of that
year. During this time he retained his command,
and was in constant receipt of reports from the fleet.
June 17th he wrote to the Navy Department:
"If it will not he considered premature, I wish fur-
ther to remark, that when this rebellion is crushed
and a squadron is fitted out to enforce the new treaty
for the suppression of the African slave-trade, I should
be pleased to have command. But so long as the re-
bellion continues, it will be my highest ambition to be
actively employed in aiding its suppression."
His interest in Africa was intense. His one
book was called "Africa and the American Flag."
In a message to Congress, dated July (3th, 1862,
President Lincoln recommended a vote of thanks
to Admiral Foote, which was given. After his
return to duty he was for several months at the
head of one of the new bureaus of the Navy De-
partment, and notwithstanding the state of his
health, after the failure of the attack with mon-
itors and iron-clads upon the Charleston defenses,
Admiral Foote was appointed, June 4th, 1863, to
the command of the South Atlantic Squadron ;
but he was stricken down on his way to his com-
mand. I was told that Professor Bache — of the
Medical Staff at the New York Navy Yard, where
Foote had been stationed at the commencement
of the war — said that he dreaded to tell the Ad-
miral that his attack was a fatal one, as he thought
his heart was set upon attempting to take Charles-
ton. But, instead of his being affected by the
solemn intelligence, Foote replied that he felt he
was prepared and that he was glad to be through
with guns and war. He died at the Astor House,
in the city of New York, on the 26th of the same
month. The mother of General Tilghman, who sur-
rendered Fort Henry, was at the hotel, and, learning
of his illness, tendered her sympathies. His native
city of New Haven gave a public funeral, which
was attended by the governor and legislature.
347
GENERAL POLK AND THE BATTLE OF BELMONT.
BY HIS SON, DR. WILLIAM M. POLK, CAPTAIN, C. S. A.
ON the 1st of November, 1861, General Fremont ordered General Grant at
Cairo, and General C. F. Smith at Paducah, to hold their commands
in readiness for a demonstration upon Columbus, Kentucky, a strong posi-
tion then occupied by about ten thousand Confederate troops under General
Leonidas Polk. The object of the proposed demonstration was to cover an
effort to be made to drive General Jeff. Thompson from south-east Missouri ;
and at the same time to check the sending of reinforcements to Price. In
accordance with this general plan, on the 4th and 6th Grant moved Colonels
R. J. Oglesby, W. H. L. Wallace, and J. B. Plummer in the direction of the
town of Sikeston, Mo. Next he ordered the garrison at Fort Holt opposite
Cairo to advance in the direction of Columbus, and early on the morning
of, the 7th, with a force of about 3500 men of all arms,, convoyed by the gun-
boats Lexington and Tyler, he steamed down the Mississippi River toward the
same objective point. Smith meanwhile from the direction of Paducah threw
forward his column of 2000 men.
The mobilization of these various commands, some 12,000 men in all, was
duly reported to Polk, and with the report came rumors of the enemy's
designs. Polk, however, did not believe that so extensive a movement was
directed against Thompson, whose entire force numbered not more than 1500
men, then encamped far down toward Arkansas. Nor could he think that
the plea of preventing the sending of reinforcements to Price was genuine,
as he knew that there were no troops then (nor were there likely to be any)
in motion to join Price. On the other hand, having for some weeks had
every reason to expect a determined effort on Grant's part to dislodge him,
he naturally supposed that the looked-for attack was at hand.
The force at his disposal, including the garrison of Columbus, was then
about 10,000 men of all arms. At Belmont, opposite Columbus, Polk had
established a camp of observation, which was then occupied by one regiment
of infantry, a battery of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry. In order to
command the approaches to this position by the batteries on the high ground
at Columbus, the trees had been felled for some distance along the west bank,
and the fallen timber had been so placed as to form an abatis capable of
obstructing the advance of an enemy. This camp Grant decided to attack.
Accordingly, at about 8 o'clock on the morning of t\\Q 7th he disembarked
his force on the Missouri shore, some five miles above Belmont, and ordered
the gun-boats to drop below and engage the batteries at Columbus. Quickly
forming his column, Grant pushed for the Confederate camp.
Polk meanwhile sent General McCown with a force of infantry and artil-
lery up the east bank of the river, and, learning of the landing of the enemy
on the west shore, dispatched General Pillow with four regiments to the aid
of the camp, thus providing this officer with a force (2700 of all arms) but little
348
GENERAL POLK AND THE BATTLE OF BELMONT.
349
PORTRAITS OF CONFEDERATE PRIVATES OF THE WEST.— I.
From tintypes found at the close of the war in the dead-letter office, Richmond. Letters accompanying the tintypes-
suggest that the warlike attitude was a favorite pose for pictures intended for sisters and sweethearts.
inferior to that which was about to attack him. Anxious, however, to give Pil-
low all the men that he deemed, necessary, Polk moved over another regiment
(five hundred men), which landed on the Missouri shore just as the battle
began (10:30 a. m.) Thus in all fairness it must be stated, that when the bat-
tle of Belmont commenced the opposing forces were virtually equal. The
engagement became general a few minutes before 11 o'clock. With his line
well extended Grant bore down upon the Confederate position, and, though
stubbornly resisted, he gradually fought his way forward, driving the Con-
federates to the river bank and capturing the camp.
Polk had been deterred from sending in the first instance a larger force to
meet Grant's attack by the reports which his scouts made of the movements
of the transports upon the river, and of the position and numbers of the
columns from. Fort Holt and Paducah, — all tending to show that the landing
it] ion the opposite side of the river was a mere feint, while the real design
was an attack upon Columbus. In spite of this, however, as we have seen,
he placed at Belmont a force fully equal to that with which Grant was acting.
Finding now that this force was being defeated, and learning at the same
time that there was no enemy upon the Kentucky shore near enough to
threaten seriously his position, he promptly moved over to Belmont additional
reinforcements. Striking Grant upon the flank and rear, he drove him from
ImkA
Mm
PORTRAITS OF CONFEDERATE PRIVATES OF THE WEST.— II.
y->o
GENERAL POLK AND THE BATTLE OF BELMONT.
the field and pursued him to his transports. The heavy guns upon the high
ground at Columbus aided materially in Grant's discomfiture ; as, after the
Confederates were driven to the river bank, they were able to rake the Fed-
eral position. & These batteries also had an opportunity to test their fire upon
gun-boats, and the ease with which they repulsed the two attacks which the
% General Grant, in his "Personal Memoirs"
(New York: C. L. Webster & Co.), says: "The
officers and men engaged at Belmont were then
under fire for the first time. Veterans could not
have behaved better than they did up to the mo-
ment of reaching the rebel camp. At this point
they became demoralized from their victory and
failed to reap its full reward. The enemy had been
followed so closely that when he reached the clear
ground on which his camp was pitched he beat a
hasty retreat over the river bank, which protected
him from our shots and from view. This precipi-
tate retreat at the last moment enabled the Na-
tional forces to pick their way without hindrance
through the abatis — the only artificial defense
the enemy had. The moment the camp was reached
our men laid down their arms and commenced
rummaging the tents to pick up trophies. Some
of the higher officers were little better than the
privates. They galloped about from one cluster
of men to another, and at every halt delivered a
short eulogy upon the Union cause and the achieve-
ments of the command. All this time the troops
we had been engaged with for four hours lay
crouched under cover of the river bank, ready to
come up and surrender if summoned to do so ; but,
finding that they were not pursued, they worked
their way up the river and came up on the bank
between us and our transports. I saw at the same
time two steamers coming from the Columbus side
toward the west shore, above us, black, or gray,
with soldiers from boiler-deck to roof. Some
of my men were engaged in firing from captured
guns at empty steamers down the river, out of
range, cheering at every shot. I tried to get them
to turn their guns upon the loaded steamers above
and not so far away. My efforts were in vain. At
last I directed my staff-officers to set fire to the
camps. This drew the fire of the enemy's guns
located on the heights of Columbus. They had
abstained from firing before, probably because they
were afraid of hitting their own men ; or they may
have supposed, until the camp was on fire, that it
was still in the possession of their friends. About
this time, too, the men we had driven over the
bank were seen in line up the river between us
and our transports. The alarm ' surrounded '
was given. The guns of the enemy and the report
of being surrounded brought officers and men com-
pletely under control. At first some of the officers
seemed to think that to be surrounded was to be
placed in a hopeless position, where there was
MAPOFTHE
BATTLEFIELD NEAR BELMONT
MTSSOURJ.
t/Aireh Srtrrs FqhceS
GENERAL POLK AND THE BATTLE OF BELMONT.
351
boats attempted argued
well for the efficiency of
their service. In closing
his report of this battle,
General Polk says :
" On landing I was met by
General Pillow and General
Cheatham, whom I directed,
with the regiments of Gener-
al Cheatham's command and
portions of others, to press
the enemy to his boats. This
order was executed with alac-
rity and in double-quick time.
The route over which we
passed was strewn with the
dead and wounded of the con-
flicts of Colonel Marks and
General Cheatham, already
alluded to, and with arms,
knapsacks, overcoats, etc. On
arriving at the point where
his transports lay, I ordered
the column, headed by the
154th Regiment of Tennessee
Volunteers, under cover of a
field thickly set with corn, to
be deployed along the river bank within easy range of the boats. This being accomplished,
a heavy fire was opened upon them simultaneously, riddling them with balls, and, as we have
reason to believe, with heavy loss to the enemy. Under this galling fire he cut his lines and
retreated from the shore, many of his soldiers being driven overboard by the rush of those
behind them. Our fire was returned by heavy cannonading from his gun-boats, which dis-
charged upon our lines showers of grape, canister and shell, as they retired with their convoy
in the direction of Cairo."
General Polk was mistaken in concluding that all the Federal force had
reembarked.. The 27th Illinois regiment, whose colonel, N. B. Buford, was
one of Polk's old West Point friends, had been separated from the rest of the
command in the hurry of the retreat, and, taking a road that lay some little
distance from the river," made its way northward. Coming back to the river
at a point above that at which General Grant had so precipitately taken to
his boats, it succeeded, at al >out dark, in getting on board a transport without
molestation. The absence of the Confederate cavalry and the confusion of
the pursuit alone prevented the discovery and capture of this force. |
GENERAL LEONIDAS POLK, BISHOP OF LOUISIANA (KILLED NEAR
KENESAW, JUNE, 18(>-t). FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
nothingto do but surrender. But when I announced
that we had cut our way in and could cut our way
out just as well, it seemed a new revelation to of-
ficers and soldiers. They formed line rapidly and
we started back to our boats, with the men deployed
as skirmishers as they had beeu on entering camp.
The enemy was soon encountered, but his resist-
ance this time was feeble."
4- General Grant thus describes the return to the
boats : " The corn-field in front of our transports
terminated at the edge of a dense forest. Before I
got back the enemy had entered this forest and had
opened a brisk fire upon the boats. Our men, witli
the exception of details that had gone to the front
after the wounded, were now either aboard the
transports or very near them. Those who were
not aboard soon got there, and the boats pushed
off. I was the only man of the National army be-
352
GENERAL POLK AND THE BATTLE OF BELMONT.
551 ■
■ 1 HI lllllll
' I' I I III
■■J ■ i>'i i if
dH ■ Hill
HAH
iiiiilif
isi
mMrnmmm^
BRIGADIER-GENERAL V. S. GRANT. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1861.
In a note to the editors Colonel Frederick D. Grant
says of this picture : " It was taken in Cairo, 111., in 1861,
and is a remarkably good picture of General Grant as
he looked at that time. He had always worn his beard
trimmed short until he was appointed colonel of the
21st Illinois ; but during the time that he was serving in
Missouri he did not trim his beard, nor did he do so on
being stationed at Cairo after his appointment as briga-
dier-general. After he had fought the battle of Belmont,
he scut for his family to come on from Galena and make
him a visit. This picture had been taken just before
the visit, and one of the first things that my mother
said to him was, that she did not like the length of
his beard. Later in the winter, and a short time after
our arrival in Cairo, General Grant got permission
to go to St. Louis on business connected with his com-
mand. During that visit he was shaved — the first
time in my recollection that he ever was shaved;
the second and only other instance was when he was
President. "
The battle of Belmont was long and severe. Beginning at half-past 10
o'clock in the morning, it did not end imtil snnset. The losses on both sides
bear evidence of the character of the fighting. The Confederate loss was
tween the rebels and our transports. The captain
of a boat that had just pushed out, but bad not
started, recognized me and ordered the engineer
not to start the engine ; he then bad a plank run
out for me. My horse seemed to take in the sit-
uation. There was no path down the bank, and
every one acquainted with the Mississippi River
knows that its banks, in a natural state, do not
vary at any great angle from the perpendicular.
My horse put his fore feet over the bank without
hesitation or urging, and, with bis hind feet well
under him, slid down the bank and trotted aboard
the boat, twelve or fifteen feet away, over a single
gang-plank." — [" Personal Memoirs."]
GENERAL POLK AND THE BATTLE OF BELMONT.
353
642 in killed, wounded, and missing. That of the Federals, owing to the
differences in their figures, is more difficult to determine ; but, accepting the
reports of the brigade and regimental commanders as correct, it must be
placed at about six hundred [see page 355]. It is, however, not easy to
place entire confidence in these figures. One thing is certain : the Federal
dead and nearly all their wounded were left upon the field. General Pillow
reports that he buried 295 of them, and that, under a fiag of truce, the
Federals were similarly engaged " a good part of the day." General Grant
states that he carried 175 prisoners from the field, and General Polk, that
after a liberal exchange, by which he recovered all of his own men, he had
still 100 prisoners in his hands. The substantial fruits of victory were, there-
fore, with the Confederates, and their Congress, in acknowledgment of the
fact, passed resolutions commending Polk, his commanders, and the troops
for the service rendered.
The chief objects of General Grant's attack, as stated by himself, had
been, first to assist a movement against General Thompson's command, and
second, to break up the camp at Belmont. He failed in both, for the camp
was continued, and the disaster to his command caused him to recall the
troops sent after Thompson. He carried off two cannon and a number
of the sick and wounded Confederates found in their camp ; but he fled
the field, virtually abandoning one of his regiments, leaving his dead
and wounded, a large preponderance of prisoners, a stand of his colors,
one thousand stand of arms, and the caissons of his battery in the
hands of the Confederates. His fight had, however, been a gallant one,
and, at one time, the entire Confederate line was swept before his onset.
THE GUN-BOATS "TYLER" AND "LEXINGTON" FIGHTING THE COLUMBUS BATTERIES DURING THE
BATTLE OF BELMONT. FROM A DRAWING BY REAR-ADMIRAL WALKE.
VOL. I. 23
3S4
GENERAL POLK AND THE BATTLE OF BELMONT.
He has estimated his force at 3114 men, while the commander of his First
Brigade states it as 3500. The discrepancy is, no doubt, accounted for
by the fact that five companies were left to guard the transports, thus
leaving, for the actual engagement, the number of troops stated by himself.
When the battle began General Pillow had in line 2500 men, exclusive of a
squadron of cavalry and a battery, and by 11 o'clock he was joined by Walker's
regiment, numbering about 500, thus giving the Confederates a force fully
equal to that of their antagonists ; and yet they were driven in much con-
fusion from their jx>sition. To account for this three reasons have been
assigned : It has been said, first, that the Federal force was largely superior
in numbers ; secondly, that the Confederates were insufficiently supplied with
ammunition; and thirdly, that they were at a disadvantage owing to the
exposed position in
which their line was
formed. The first of
these reasons is, as
has just been shown,
clearly incorrect; the
second is equally so,
as regards the in-
fantry, although the
field-battery certain-
ly was short of pow-
der and ball. Proof
of this may be found
in the reports of
the several regiment-
al commanders who
took part in the en-
gagement. On the
third point the evi-
dence shows that
most of the line of battle, especially the center, was placed in an exposed
position, in an open field, with a heavy wood only about eighty yards distant
in its front. Under the cover of this wood the Federal force moved for-
ward its line of battle and, halting at the timber's edge, raked the field
with its fire. The Confederates had been on the ground for several weeks,
and the advantageous positions should have been familiar to them. The
force sent over to aid in opposing Grant was on the ground quite long
enough before the battle began to have found out a better position on which
to form, and it stood in line of battle one hour before the Federal attack was
made. There were several positions at hand, any one of which would have
been better. This was especially the case with the ground in the rear of the
abatis of felled trees. It is difficult to account for this error, without taking
into consideration the characteristics of General r ^w, the officer command-
ing upon the field. Pillow was a man of un personal courage, and
CONFEDERATE FORTIFICATIONS AT COEUMBUS, KT.
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
GENERAL POLK AND THE BATTLE OF BELMONT.
355
■
upon this occasion, the first,
in this war, in which he had
had an opportunity to come
to blows with his enemy,
he no doubt mentally in-
vested his soldiers with the
same capacity for resist-
ance that he felt within
himself, overlooking the
fact that they were fresh
levies and that it was their
first engagement. Be this
as it may, he soon found
that he was unable to hold
his position and therefore
attempted to dislodge the
concealed foe by a series
of gallant charges. These
proved of no avail, and,
after losing heavily, he had
to give way. In the mean
time he must have in-
flicted heavy loss upon the
enemy, for it required the
pressure of but two addi-
tional regiments, which ar-
rived about 12 o'clock, and numbered together but 1000 men, to drive Grant
from the field. The force which won the battle of Belmont was, then, about
4000 men. It is true that an additional reenforcement of 2 regiments of
about 500 men each was sent across the river, but they arrived after the
Federal force had been defeated, and took part only in the pursuit.
In short, it maybe said that the battle was fought by 3114 Federals against
4000 Confederates, the result being a victory for the latter ; and that, subse-
quently, the Confederates were reenforced by 1000 men with whom they took
up the pursuit, thus bringing the total upon the field to 5000 of all arms. J) In
CAPTAIN JOHN A. RAWLINS, ASSISTANT-ADJUTANT
GEN. GRANT'S STAFF. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH
GENER
TAKEN
AL ON BRIG-
IN 1861.
j) A recent revision of the official tables of losses
shows that the estimates as given in the official
records are under the mark. The official records
and the officially revised estimates furnish the
following data :
The Union forces engaged at Belmont, Mo., un-
der Brig. -Gen. U. S. Grant, were composed of the
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John A. McClernaiul :
27th Illinois, Col. N. B. Buford ; 30th Illinois, Col.
Philip B. Fouke ; 31st Illinois, Col. John A. Lo-
gan ; Dollins' Co. Illinois Cavalry, Capt. J. J.
Dollins ; Delano's Co. Illinois Cavalry, Lient. J. K.
Catlin; Battery B, 1st Illinois Lt. Artillery, Capt.
Ezra Taylor. Second Brigade, Col. Henry Dough-
erty : 22d Illinois, Lieut.-Col. H. E. Hart, and 7th
Iowa, Col. J. G. Lauman, — the whole command
numbering 3114 men.
The gun-boats Tyler, Capt. Henry Walke, and Lex-
ington, Capt. R.N. Stembel, also bore a part in the
engagement.
The loss sustained by the Union troops, accord-
ing to the revised official returns, was 120 killed,
383 wounded, and 104 captured or missing, —
total, 0O7. The navy lost 1 killed and 2 wounded.
The superior officer on the Confederate side was
Maj.-Gen. Leonidas Polk, with Brig.-Gens. G. J.
Pillow and B. F. Cheatham in subordinate com-
mand. The troops under them immediately en-
gaged consisted of the 13th Arkansas, Col. James
C. Tappan ; 11th Louisiana, Col. S. F. Marks (com-
356 GENERAL POLK AND THE BATTLE OF BELMONT.
comparing this engagement with other battles of the war the points of
resemblance between it and that of Shiloh, fought six months later and
upon a much more extended scale, must strike every observer. If Shiloh
was a defeat for the Confederates, then, by a similar chain of occurrences
and conclusions, Grant was defeated at Belmont. \
Soon after the battle of Belmont a painful accident occurred at Columbus
by which the commanding general nearly lost his life. During the progress
of the battle a 128-pounder rifled gun had been charged while hot ; but, no
opportunity offering to use it to advantage, it was allowed to cool and remain
charged four days. When fired it burst. This caused the explosion of its
magazine, killing seven persons and severely wounding General Polk and
other officers.
In a letter to his wife, dated November 12th, General Polk says :
" I and others of my officers have spent pretty much the whole day in my boat on the river
with Buford [Colonel N. B. Buford, 27th Illinois] and his officers, discussing the principles
of exchange, and other matters connected with the war. He is as good a fellow as ever lived,
and most devotedly my friend — a true Christian, a true soldier, and a gentleman every inch
of him. He said it did him good to come down and talk with me, and hoped it might be the
means of peace and so on. I was very plain and clear in my position, as you may know, but
very kind.
"After completing my exchange, I had still about 100 of their prisoners in my keeping, and
among them 15 or 20 of his regiment. These he was very anxious I should let him take back.
He urged me in every way, even on the score of our friendship, but I could not yield, especially
to such a plea, which would have subjected me to the charge of consulting individual preference
to public duty. He admitted it, and was obliged to leave without them, but we had a very
pleasant day. I went up with him nearly to Cairo. He wanted me to go and spend the night
with him ; so you see how much we have done on this line toward ameliorating the severities of
this unfortunate and wretched state of things."
In another letter to Mrs. Polk, dated November 15th, he says :
"Since the accident I have been up the river on two occasions to meet flags of truce; once to
meet Grant, and to-day to meet my friend Buford. My interview with General Grant was, on
the whole, satisfactory. It was about an exchange of prisoners. He looked rather grave, I
thought, like a man who was not at his ease. We talked pleasantly and I succeeded in getting
a smile out of him and then got on well enough. I discussed the principles on which I thought
manding brigade), Lieut. -Col. R. H. Barrow ; Cown's coinrnand on the Kentucky side of the
Blythe's Mississippi, Col. A. K. Blythe ; 2d Ten- river, also participated.
nessee, Col. J. Knox Walker (commanding brigade), The Confederate loss was 105 killed, 419
Lieut-Col. W. B. Ross; 12th Tennessee, Col. R. wounded, and 117 missing, — in all, 641.
M. Russell (commanding brigade), Lieut.-Col. T. The whole number of Confederates on the field is
H. Bell; 13th Tennessee, Col. John V. Wright ; not officially reported. The 5 regiments originally
1 5th Tennessee, Maj. J. W. Hambleton ; 21st engaged numbered about 2500 men. Allowing
Tennessee, Col. Ed. Pickett, Jr. ; 22d Tennessee, the same average of strength for the reenforce-
Col. Thomas J. Freeman ; 154th Senior Tennes- ments subsequently sent across the river, and
see, Col. Preston Smith (commanding brigade), more or less engaged, the Confederates may be
Lieut.-Col. Marcus J. Wright ; Watson (La.) Bat- estimated atnot less than five thousand.— Editors.
tery, Lieut.-Col. D. Beltzhoover ; Mississippi and \ Of the result of the battle, General Grant says :
Tennessee Cavalry, Lieut-Cols. John H. Miller and " Belmont was severely criticised in the North
T. H. Logwood. as a wholly unnecessary battle, barren of results
The Point Coupee (Louisiana) Battery, Captain or the possibility of them from the beginning. If
R. A. Stewart ; Mississippi Battery, Captain Me- it had not been fought, Colonel Oglesby would
lancthon Smith; Siege Battery, Captain S. H. 1). probably have been captured or destroyed with his
Hamilton, and the Fort Artillery, Major A. P. three thousand men. Then I should have been
Stewart, all of Brigadier-General John P. Mc- culpable indeed." — ["Personal Memoirs."]
GENERAL POLK AND THE BATTLE OF BELMONT.
357
REEMBARKATION OF GRANT'S TROOPS AFTER THE BATTLE. FROM A DRAWING BY REAR-ADMIRAL WAI.KE.
the war should be conducted: denounced all barbarity, vandalism, plundering, and all that,
and got him to say that he would join in putting' it down. I was favorably impressed with him ;
he is undoubtedly a man of much force. We have now exchanged five or six flags, and he
grows more civil and respectful every time."
It was at one of these conferences that an amusing incident occurred which,
so far from marring the harmony of the occasion, afforded much merriment
to all present. The jest chanced to be at Colonel Buford's expense. The
matters of the flag of truce had all been discussed, and the party had ad-
journed to partake of a simple luncheon which the Confederates had provided.
As the company rose from the table the gallant colonel, raising his glass,
proposed : " George Washington, the Father of his Country." General Polk,
with a merry twinkle in his eye, quickly added : "And the first Rebel ! " The
Federal officers, caught in their own trap, gracefully acknowledged it by
drinking the amended toast.
A little later General Cheatham, who was an ardent follower of the turf,
discovered symptoms of a like weakness in General Grant. After they had
been conversing for some time upon official matters, the conversation drifted
upon the subject of horses. This congenial topic was pursued to the satisfac-
tion of each until it finally ended in a grave proposition from Cheatham
to Grant that, as this thing of fighting was a troublesome affair, they had
best settle the vexing questions about which they had gone to war, by a
grand, international horse-race over on the Missouri shore. Grant laughingly
answered that he wished it might be so.
ARMY TRANSPORTS AT THE CAIRO LEVEE. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
THE GUN-BOATS AT BELMONT AND FORT HENRY.
BY HENRY WALKE, REAR-ADMIRAL, U. 8. N.
FLAG-OFFICER FOOTE IN THE WHEEL-HOUSE OF
THE "CINCINNATI " AT FORT HENRY.
AT the beginning of the war, the army and navy
- were mostly employed in protecting the loyal
people who resided on the borders of the disaffected
States, and in reconciling those whose sympathies
were opposed. Bnt the defeat at Manassas and other
reverses convinced the Government of the serions
character of the contest, and of the necessity of more
vigorous and extensive preparations for war. Our
navy yards were soon filled with workmen ; recruit-
ing stations for unemployed seamen were established, and we soon had more
sailors than were required for the ships that could be fitted for service. Artil-
lerymen for the defenses of Washington being scarce, five hundred of these
sailors, with a battalion of marines (for guard duty), were sent to occupy
the forts on Shuter's Hill, near Alexandria. The Pensacola and the Potomac
flotilla and the seaboard navy yards required nearly all of the remaining
unemployed seamen.
While Foote was improvising a flotilla for the Western river
ing urgent appeals to the Government for seamen. Finally sc
Navy Department thought of the five hundred tars stranded 01
and obtained an order for their transfer to Cairo, where they 1
the receiving ship Maria Denning. There they met fresh-wal
our great lakes, and steamboat hands from the Western river
,s mak-
3 at the
r's Hill,
aced on
>rs from
the sea-
358
THE GUN-BOATS AT BELMONT AND FORT HENRY. 359
men from the East, there were Maine lumbermen, New Bedford whalers, New
York liners, and Philadelphia sea-lawyers. The foreigners enlisted were
mostly Irish, with a few English and Scotch, French, Germans, Swedes,
Norwegians, and Danes. The Northmen, considered the hardiest race in the
world, melted away in the Southern sun with surprising rapidity.
On my gun-boat, the ( 'arondelet, were more young men perhaps than on any
other vessel in the fleet. Philadelphians were in the majority; Bostonians
came next, with a sprinkling from other cities, and just enough men-o'- war's
men to leaven the lump with naval dis-
cipline. The Be Kalh had more than its
share of men-o'-war's men, Lieutenant-Com-
mander Leonard Paulding having had the
first choice of a full crew, and having se-
cured all the frigate Sabine's reenlisted men
who had been sent West.
During the spring and summer of 1861, wharf-boat at cairo.
Commander John Rodgers purchased, and
he, with Commander Roger N. Stembel, Lieutenant S. L. Phelps, and Mr.
Eads, altered, equipped, and manned, for immediate service on the Ohio
and Mississippi rivers, 3 wooden gun-boats — the Tyler, of 6 8-inch shell-guns
and 2 32-pounders ; the Lexington, of 4 8-inch shell-guns and 2 32-pounders,
and the Gonestoga, of 4 32-pounder guns. This nucleus of the Mississippi
flotilla (like the fleets of Perry, Macdonough, and Chauncey in the war of 1812)
was completed with great skill and dispatch ; they soon had full possession of
the Western rivers above Columbus, Kentucky, and rendered more important
service than as many regiments could have done. On October 12th, 1861, the
St. Louis, afterward known as the Be Kalb, the first of the seven iron-clad gun-
boats ordered of Mr. Eads by the Government, was launched at Carondelet,
near St. Louis. The other iron-clads, the Cincinnati, Carondelet, Louisville,
Mound City, Cairo, and Pittsburgh, were launched soon after the St. Louis,
Mr. Eads having pushed forward the work with most commendable zeal and
energy. Three of these were built at Mound City, 111. To the fleet of iron-
clads above named were added the Benton (the largest and best vessel of the
Western flotilla), the Essex, and a few smaller and partly armored gun-boats.
Flag-Officer Foote arrived in St. Louis on September 6th, and assumed
command of the Western flotilla. He had been my fellow-midshipman in 1827,
on board the United States ship Natchez, of the West India squadron, and was
then a promising young officer. He was transferred to the Hornet, of the
same squadron, and was appointed her sailing-master. After he left the Natchez,
we never met again until February, 1861, at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, where
he was the executive officer. Foote, Schenck, and myself were then the only
survivors of the midshipmen of the Natchez, in her cruise of 1827, and now
I am the only officer left.
During the cruise of 1827, while pacing the deck at night, on the lonely seas,
and talking with a pious shipmate, Foote became convinced of the truth of
the Christian religion, of which he was an earnest professor to the last. He
360
THE GUN-BOATS AT BELMONT AND FORT HENRY.
THE GUN-BOATS "TYLER" AND "LEXINGTON" ENGAGING THE BATTERIES OF COLUMBUS, U.Y., DURING
THE BATTLE OF BELMONT. AFTER A SKETCH BY REAR-ADMIRAL WALKE.
In a letter written early in January, 1862, General Polk
says of the works at Columbus: "We are still quiet
here. I ant employed in making more and more difficult
tbe task to take this place. ... I have now, mounted
and in position, all round my works, 140 cannon of
various calibers, and they look not a little formidable.
Besides this, I am paving tbe bottom of tbe river with
submarine batteries, to say nothing of a tremendous,
heavy chain across tbe river. I am planting mines out
in the roads also."
rendered important service while in command of the brig Perry, on the coast
of Africa, in 1849, in suppressing the slave-trade, and he greatly distinguished
himself by his skill and gallantry in the attack upon the Barrier Forts, near
Canton (1856), which he breached and carried by assault, leading the assailing
column in person. He was slow and cautious in arriving at conclusions, but
firm and tenacious of purpose. He has been called " the Stonewall Jackson
of the Navy." He often preached to his crew on Sundays, and was always
desirous of doing good. He was not a man of striking personal appearance,
but there was a sailor-like heartiness and frankness about him that made his
company very desirable.
Flag-Officer Foote arrived at Cairo September 12th, and relieved Commander
John Rodgers of the command of the station. The first operations of the
Western flotilla consisted chiefly of reconnoissances on the Mississippi, Ohio,
Cumberland, and Tennessee rivers. At this time it was under the control of
the War Department, and acting in cooperation with the army under General
Grant, whose headquarters were at Cairo.
On the evening of the 6th of November, 1861, I received instructions from
General Grant to proceed down the Mississippi with the wooden gun-boats
Tyler and Lexington on a reconnoissance, and as convoy to some half-
dozen transport steamers ; but I did not know the character of the service
expected of me until I anchored for the night, seven or, eight miles below
Cairo. Early the next morning, while the troops were being landed near
Belmont, Missouri, opposite Columbus, Kentucky, I attacked the Confederate
batteries, at the request of General Grant, as a diversion, which was done
THE GUN-BOATS AT BELMONT AND FORT HENRY.
361
with some effect. But the superiority of the enemy's batteries on the bluffs
at Columbus, both in the number and the quality of his guns, was so great
that it would have been too hazardous to have remained long under his fire
with such frail vessels as the Tyler and Lexington, which were only expected
to protect the land forces in case of a repulse. Having accomplished the
object of the attack, the gun-boats withdrew, but returned twice during the
day and renewed the contest. During the last of these engagements a
cannon-ball passed obliquely through the side, deck, and scantling of the
Tylqr, killing one man and wounding others. This convinced me of the
necessity of withdrawing my vessels, which had been moving in a circle to
confuse the enemy's gunners. We fired a few more broadsides, therefore,
and, perceiving that the firing had ceased at Belmont, an ominous circum-
stance, I returned to the landing, to protect the army and transports. In fact,
the destruction of the gun-boats would have involved the loss of our army
and our depot at Cairo, the most important one in the West.
Soon after we returned to the landing-place our troops began to appear, and
the officers of the gun-boats were warned by General McClernand of the
approach of the enemy. The Confederates came en masse through a corn-
field, and opened with musketry and light artillery upon the transports,
which were filled or being filled with our retreating soldiers. A well-directed
fire from the gun-boats made the enemy fly in the greatest confusion.
Flag-Officer Foote was at St. Louis when the battle of Belmont was fought,
and made a report to the Secretary of the Navy of the part which the
gun-boats took in the action, forwarding my official report to the Navy
Department. The officers of the vessels were highly complimented by
General Grant for the important aid they rendered in this battle; and
in his second official report of the ac-
tion he made references to my report.
It was impossible for me to inform the
flag-officer of the general's intentions,
which were kept perfectly secret.
During the winter of 1S61-62, an ex-
pedition was planned by Flag-Officer
Foote and Generals Grant and Mc-
Clernand against Fort Henry, situ-
ated on the eastern bank of the
Tennessee River, a short distance
south of the line between Kentucky
and Tennessee. In January the iron-
clads were brought down to Cairo,
and great efforts were made to pre-
pare them for immediate service, but
only four of the iron-clads could be
made ready as soon as required.
On the morning of the 2d of Febru-
ary the flag-officer left Cairo with the
SCALE OF STATUTE MILES
C" ) Holly Springs
M I s s'\ S S I P p'T-rj^umW--
J> A A L .Decatur
MAI' OF THE REGION OF FOOTE'S OPERATIONS.
362
THE GUN-BOATS AT BELMONT AND FORT HENRY.
four armored vessels above named, and the wooden gun-boats Tyler, Lexington,
and Conestoga, and in the evening reached the Tennessee River. On the 4th
the fleet anchored six miles below Fort Henry. The next day, while recon-
noitering, the Essex received a shot which passed through the pantry and the
officers' quarters and visited the steerage. ■& On the 5th the flag-officer inspected
the officers and crew at quarters, addressed them, and offered a prayer.
Heavy rains had been
falling, and the river had
risen rapidly to an un-
usual height; the swift
current brought down
an immense quantity of
heavy drift-wood, lum-
ber, fences, and large
trees, and it required all
the steam-power of the
Gurondelet, with both an-
chors down, and the most
strenuous exertions of
the officers and crew,
working day and night,
to prevent the boat from
being dragged down-
stream. This adversity appeared to dampen the ardor of our crew, but when the
next morning they saw a large number of white objects, which through the fog-
looked like polar bears, coming down the stream, and ascertained that they were
the enemy's torpedoes forced from their moorings by the powerful current, they
took heart, regarding the freshet as providential and as a presage of victory.
The overflowing river, which opposed our progress, swept away in broad day-
light this hidden peril ; for if the torpedoes had not been disturbed, or had
broken loose at night while we were shoving the drift-wood from our bows,
some of them would surely have exploded near or under our vessels.
The 6th dawned mild and cheering, with a light breeze, sufficient to clear
away the smoke. At 10:20 the flag-officer made the signal to prepare for
battle, and at 10:50 came the order to get under w,ay and steam up to Panther
Island, about two miles below Fort Henry. At 11 : 35, having passed the foot
of the island, we formed in line and approached the fort four abreast, — the
Essex on the right, then the Cincinnati, Carondelet, and St. Louis. For want
of room the last two were interlocked, and remained so during the fight.
UNITED STATES GUN-BOAT " TYLER.' FROM A DRAWING BY
BEAR-ADMIRAL WALKE.
■fe Composition and losses of the Union fleet at
Fort Henry : Flag-Officer A. H. Foote, command-
ing. First Division: Flagship Cincinnati, Com-
mander R. N. Stembel: 6 32-pounders, 3 8-inch,
4 rifled army 42-pounders, 1 12-pounder boat-
howitzer; Essex, Commander W. D. Porter: 1
32-pounder, 3 1 1-inch, 1 10-inch, 1 12-pounder
boat-howitzer ; Carondelet, Commander H. Walke
(same armament as the Cincinnati); St. Louis,
Lieut. -Commanding L. Paulding: 7 32-pounders,
2 8-inch, 4 rifled 42-pounders, 1 rifled boat-
howitzer. Second Division : Lieut. S. L. Phelps,
commanding: Conestoga, Lieut. -Commanding S.L.
Phelps: 4 32-pounders; Tyler, Lieut. -Command-
ing William Gwin: 1 32-pounder, 6 8-inch; Lexing-
ton, Lieut.-Commanding J. W. Shirk : 2 32-pound-
ers, 4 8-inch. The Union loss as officially reported
was : Cincinnati, killed, 1 ; wounded, 9. Essex,
killed, 6 ; wounded, 18 ; missing, 5. Total killed,
7; wounded, 27; missing, 5. Total, 39.— Editors.
THE GUN- BO ATS AT BELMONT AND FOKT HENRY.
.363
As we slowly passed up this narrow stream, not a sound could be heard nor
a moving object seen in the dense woods which overhung the dark and swollen
river. The gun-crews of the Carondelet stood silent at their posts, impressed
with the serious and important character of the service before them. About
noon the fort and the Confederate flag came suddenly into view, the barracks,
the new earth-works, and the great guns well manned. The captains of our
guns were men-of-war's men, good shots, and had their men well drilled.
The flag-steamer, the Cincinnati, fired the first shot as the signal for the
others to begin. At once the fort was ablaze with the flame of her eleven
heavy guns. The wild whistle of their rifle-shells was heard on every side
of us. On the Carondelet not a word was spoken more than at ordinary
drill, except when Matthew Arthur, captain of the starboard bow-gun, asked
permission to fire at one or two of the enemy's retreating vessels, as he
could not at that time bring his gun to bear on the fort. He fired one shot,
which passed through the upper cabin of a hospital-boat, whose flag was not
seen, but injured no one. The Carondelet was struck in about thirty places
by the enemy's heavy shot and shell. Eight struck within two feet of the
bow-ports, leading to the boilers, around which barricades had been 1 milt —
a precaution which I always took before going into action, and which on
several occasions prevented an explosion. The Carondelet fired 107 shell and
solid shot ; none of her officers or crew was killed or wounded.
The firing from the armored vessels was rapid and well sustained from the
beginning of the attack, and seemingly accurate, as we could occasionally
» see the earth thrown in
s
SCALE OF
■ -J". -
YARDS
■
'
f;e:_
A A A A \ '
.__ JJoqJ to''' FortBaneUon. Z,/
*%% r:
great
emy's
MAP OF FOKT HENRY, FEBRUARY 6, 1862.
heaps over the en-
guns. Nor was the
fire of the Confederates to
be despised ; their heavy
shot broke and scattered
our iron-plating as if it
had been putty, and often
passed completely through
the casemates. But our old
men-of-war's men, captains
of the guns, proud to show
their worth in battle, in-
fused life and courage into
their young comrades.
When these experienced
gunners saw a shot coming
toward a port, they had
the coolness and discretion
to order their men to bow
down, to save their heads.
After nearly an hour's
hard fighting, the captain
364
THE GUN-BOATS AT BELMONT AND FORT HENRY.
of the EssepOj going below, and complimenting the First Division for their
splendid execution, asked them if they did not want to rest and give three
cheers, which were given with a will. But the feelings of joy on board the
Essex were suddenly changed by a calamity which is thus described in a
letter to me from James Laniiig, second master of the Essex :
" A shot from the enemy pierced the casemate just above the port-hole on the port side, then
through the middle boiler, killing in its flight Acting Master's Mate S. B. Brittan, Jr., and opening
a chasm for the escape of the scalding steam and water. The scene which followed was alm< >st
indescribable. The writer, who had gone aft in obedience to orders only a few moments before
(and was thus providentially saved), was met by Fourth Master Walker, followed by a crowd
of men rushing aft. Walker called to me to go back ; that a shot from the enemy had carried
away the steam-pipe. I at once ran to the stern of the vessel, and, looking out of the stern-
port, saw a number of our brave fellows struggling in the water. The steam and hot water in
the forward gun- deck had driven all who were able to get out of the ports overboard, except a
few who were fortunate enough to cling to the casemate outside. When the explosion took
place Captain Porter was standing directly in front of the boilers, with his aide, Mr. Brittan,
at his side. He at once rushed for the port-hole on the starboard side, and threw himself
out, expecting to go into the river. A seaman, John Walker, seeing his danger, caught him
around the waist, and supporting him with one hand, clung to the yessel with the other, until,
with the assistance of another seaman, who came to the rescue, they succeeded in getting the
captain upon a narrow guard or projection which ran around the vessel, and thus enabled him
to make his way outside to the after-port, where I met him. Upon speaking to him, he told me
he was badly hurt, and that I must hunt for Mr. Riley,
the First Master, and if he was disabled I must take
command of the vessel, and man the battery again. Mr.
Riley was unharmed, and already in the discharge of his
duties as Captain Porter's successor. In a very few min-
utes after the explosion our gallant ship (which, in the
language of Flag-Officer Foote, had fought most effect-
ively through two-thirds of the engagement) was drift-
ing slowly away from the scene of action ; her commander
badly wounded, a number of her officers and crew dead
at their post, while many others were writhing in their
last agony. As soon as the scalding steam would admit,
the forward gun-deck was explored. The pilots, who were
both in the pilot-house, were scalded to death. Marshall
Ford, who was steering when the explosion took place,
was found at his post at the wheel, standing erect, his
left hand holding the spoke and his right hand grasp-
ing the signal-bell rope. A seaman named James Coffey,
who was shot-man to the No. 2 gun, was on his knees, in
the act of taking a shell from the box to be passed to the
loader. The escaping steam and hot water had struck
him square in the face, and he met death in that position.
When I told Captain Porter that we were victorious, he
immediately rallied, and, raising himself on his elbow,
called for three cheers, and gave two himself, falling ex-
hausted on the mattress in his effort to give the third.
A seaman named Jasper P. Breas, who was badly scalded,
sprang to his feet, exclaiming : ' Surrender ! I must see
that with my own eyes before I die.' Before any one
could interfere, he clambered up two short flights of stairs
to the spar-deck. He shouted ' Glory to God ! 'and sank
exhausted on the deck. Poor Jasper died that night."
CKOSS-SECTION OF A CONFEDERATE TORPEDO
FOUND IN THK TENNESSEE RIVER.
A, iron rod armed with prongs to fasten
upon the bottom of boats going up-stream
and act upon B, a lever connecting with
trigger to explode a cap and ignite the pow-
der. C, canvas bag containing 70 lbs. of
powder. D, anchors to hold torpedo in place.
This torpedo consisted of a stout sheet-
iron cylinder, pointed at both ends, about
5J6 feet long and l foot in diameter. The
iron lever was 3% feet long, and armed with
prongs to catch in the bottom of a boat.
Tins lever was constructed to move the iron
rod on the inside of the cylinder, thus acting
upon the trigger of the lock to explode the cap
and Are the powder. The machine was an-
chored, presenting the prongs in such away
that boats going down-stream should slide
over them, but those coming up should catch.
THE GUN-BOATS AT BELMONT AND FORT HENRY.
36 s
BETWEEN DECKS— SERVING THE (JUNS. AFTER A SKETCH BV REAR-ADMIRAL WALKE.
The Essex before the accident had fired seventy shots from her two
9-inch gnns. A powder boy, Job Phillips, fourteen years of age, coolly
marked down upon the casemate every shot his gun had fired, and his
account was confirmed by the gunner in the magazine. Her loss in killed,
w< >unded, and missing was thirty-two.
The St. Louis was struck seven times. . She fired one hundred and seven
shots during the action. No one on board the vessel was killed or
wounded.
Flag-Officer Foote during the action was in the pilot-house of the Cincin-
nati, which received thirty-two shots. Her chimneys, after-cabin, and boats
were completely rid< Lied. Two of her guns were disabled. The only fatal
shot she received passed through the larboard front, killing one man and
wounding several others. I happened to be looking at the flag-steamer
when one of the enemy's heavy shot struck her. It had the effect, appar-
ently, of a thunder-bolt, ripping her side-timbers and scattering the splinters
over the vessel. She did not slacken her speed, but moved on as though
nothing unexpected had happened.
From the number of times the gun-boats were struck, it would appear that
the Confederate artillery practice, at first, at least, was as good, if not better,
than ours. This, however, was what might have been expected, as the Con-
federate gunners had the advantage of practicing on the ranges the gun-boats
would probably occupy as they approached the fort. The officers of the gun-
boats, on the contrary, with guns of different caliber and unknown range,
366
THE GUN-BOATS AT BELMONT AND FORT HENRY.
and without practice, could not point their guns with as much accuracy. To
counterbalance this advantage of the enemy, the gun-boats were much better
protected by their casemates for distant firing than the fort by its fresh earth-
works. The Confederate soldiers fought as valiantly and as skillfully as the
Union sailors. Only after a most determined resistance, and after all his
heavy guns had been silenced, did Gen-
eral Tilghman lower his flag. The Con-
federate loss, as reported, was 5 killed,
11 wounded, and 5 missing. The pris-
oners, including the general and his
staff, numbered 78 in the fort and 16 in
a hospital-boat ; the remainder of the
garrison, a little less than 12600, having
escaped to Fort Donelson.
Our gun-boats continued to approach
the fort until General Tilghman, with
two or three of his staff, came off in a
small boat to the Cincinnati and sur-
rendered the fort to Mag-Officer Foote,
who sent for me, introduced me to
General Tilghman, and gave me orders
to take command of the fort and hold
it until the arrival of General Grant.
General Tilghman was a soldierly-
looking man, a little above medium
height, with piercing black eyes and a
resolute, intelligent expression of coun-
tenance. He was dignified and courte-
ous, and won the respect and sympathy
of all who became acquainted with him.
In his official report of the battle he
said that his officers and men fought
with the greatest bravery until 1:50
p. m., when seven of his eleven
guns
GENERAL LLOYD TILGHMAN. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
were disabled ; and, finding it impos-
sible to defend the fort, and wishing to spare the lives of his ga men,
after consultation with his officers he surrendered the fort.
It was reported at the time that, in surrendering to Flag-Off >ote,
the Confederate general said, " I am glad to surrender to so galla offi-
cer," and that Foote replied, " You do perfectly right, sir, in sur ng,
but you should have blown my boat out of the water before I w< ive
surrendered to you." I was with Foote soon after the surrender, a in-
not believe that such a reply was made by him. He was too much of le-
man to say anything calculated to wound the feelings of an officer id
defended his post with signal courage and fidelity, and whose spii *e
clouded by the adverse fortunes of war.
THE DEFENSE OF FORT HENRY. 369
acquiesce, but the accidental observation of a water-mark left on a tree
caused me to look carefully for this sign above, below, and in the rear of the
fort ; and my investigation convinced me that we had a more dangerous force
to contend with than the Federals, — namely, the river itself. Inquiry among
old residents confirmed my fears that the fort was not only subject to overflow,
but that the highest point within it would be — in an ordinary February rise —
at least two feet under water. This alarming fact was also communicated to
the State authorities, only to evoke the curt notification that the State forces
had been transferred to the Confederacy, and that I should apply to General
Polk, then in command at Columbus, Ky. This suggestion was at once acted
on, — not once only, but with a frequency and urgency commensurate with its
seeming importance, — the result being that I was again referred, this time to
General A. S. Johnston, who at once dispatched an engineer (Major Jeremy
F. Gilmer) to investigate and remedy; but it was now too late to do so effect-
ually, though an effort was made looking to that end, by beginning to
fortify the heights on the west bank (Fort Heiman). The armament of the
fort at the time I assumed command consisted of 6 smooth-bore 32-pounders
and 1 6-pounder iron-gun ; February 1st, 1862, by the persistent efforts of
General Lloyd Tilghman and Colonel A. Heiman, this had been increased to
8 32-, 2 42-, 1 128-pounders (Columbiad), 5 18-pounder siege guns, all smooth-
bore, and 1 6-inch rifle ; we also had 6 12-pounders, which looked so much like
pot-metal that it was deemed best to sul >jeet them to a test, and as two of them
burst with an ordinary charge, the others were set aside as useless incum-
brances. The powder supplied was mostly of a very inferior quality, so much
so that it was deemed necessary to adopt the dangerous expedient of adding
to each charge a proportion of quick-burning powder. That this was necessary
will, I think, be admitted when it is understood that with the original charge
it was almost impossible to obtain a random shot of a little over one mile
(that being the distance to a small island below the fort).
During the winter of 1861 and 1862 the Federal gun-boats, notably the Lex-
\ ington and Gonestoga^ made frequent appearances in the Tennessee, and coming
up under the cover of this island would favor the fort with an hour or more
I of shot and shell, but, as their object was to draw our fire and thus obtain
the position of our guns, we, though often sorely tempted by the accuracy of
their fire, deemed it best not to gratify them. On the 1th of February the
\ Federal fleet of gun-boats, followed by countless transports, appeared below
the fort. Far as eye could see, the course of the river could be traced by the
, dense volumes of smoke issuing from the flotilla — indicating that the long-
yr threatened attempt to break our lines was to be made in earnest. The gun-
boats took up a position about three miles below and opened a brisk fire, at
the same time shelling the woods on the east bank of the river, thus covering
the debarkation of their army. The 5th was a day of unwonted animation
on the hitherto quiet waters of the Tennessee ; all day long the flood-tide of
arriving and the ebb of returning transports continued ceaselessly. Late in
the afternoon three of the gun-boats, two on the west side and one on the
east at the foot of the island, took position and opened a vigorous and well-
VOL. I. 24
37Q THE DEFENSE OF FORT HENRY.
directed fire, which was received in silence until the killing of one man and
the wounding of three provoked an order to open with the Columbiad and the
rifle. Six shots were fired in return, — three from each piece, — and with such
effect that the gun-boats dropped out of range and ceased firing.
At night General Tilghman called his leading officers in consultation —
Colonels Heiman, Forrest, and Drake are all that I can now recall as having
been present. The Federal forces were variously estimated by us, 25,000 being,
I think, the lowest. To oppose this force General Tilghman had less than four
thousand men, — mostly raw regiments armed with shot-guns and hunting-
rifles; in fact, the best-equipped regiment of his command, the 10th Ten-
nessee, was armed with old flint-lock " Tower of London " muskets that had
"done the state some service" in the war of 1812. The general opinion and
final decision was that successful resistance to such an overwhelming force
was an impossibility, that the army must fall back and unite with Pillow and
Buckner at Fort Donelson. General Tilghman, recognizing the difficulty of
withdrawing undisciplined troops from the front of an active and superior
opponent, turned to me with the question, " Can you hold out for one hour
against a determined attack ? " I replied that I could. " Well, then, gentle-
men, rejoin your commands and hold them in readiness for instant motion."
The garrison left at the fort to cover the withdrawal consisted of part of
Company B, 1st Tennessee Artillery, Lieutenant Watts, and fifty-four men.
The forenoon of February 6th was spent by both sides in making needful
preparations for the approaching struggle. The gun-boats formed line of
battle abreast under the cover of the island. The Essex, the Cincinnati, the
Carondelet, and the St. Louis, the first with 1 and the others each with 13
guns, formed the van ; the Tyler, Conestoga, and Lexington, with 15 guns
in all, formed the second or rear line. Seeing the formation of battle I
assigned to each gun a particular vessel to which it was to pay its especial
compliments, and directed that the guns be kept constantly trained on the
approaching boats. Accepting the volunteered services of Captain Hayden
(of the engineers) to assist at the Columbiad, I took personal supervision of (
the rifle. When they were out of cover of the island the gun-boats opened j
fire, and as they advanced they increased the rapidity of their fire, until as they (
swung into the main channel above the island they showed one broad and
leaping sheet of flame. At this point, the van being a mile distant, the com-
mand was given to commence firing from the fort ; and here let me say that
as pretty and as simultaneous a "broadside" was delivered as I ever saw flash
from the sides of a frigate. The action now became general, and for the next
twenty or thirty minutes was, on both sides, as determined, rapid, and accurate
as heart could wish, and apparently inclined in favor of the fort. The iron-clad
Essex, disabled by a shot through her boiler, dropped out of line ; the fleet
seemed to hesitate, when a succession of untoward and unavoidable acci-
dents happened in the fort; thereupon the flotilla continued to advance.
First, the rifle gun, from which I had just been called, burst, not only with
destructive effect to those working it, but with disabling effect on those in
its immediate vicinity. Going to the Columbiad as the only realh -^^tive
}
THE DEFENSE OF FORT HENRY. 371
gun left, I met General Tilghman and for the first time knew that he had
returned to the fort; I supposed that he was with his retreating army.
AVhile consulting with him a sudden exclamation drew me to the Columbiad,
which I found spiked with its own priming wire, completely disabled for the
day at least. The Federal commander, observing the silence of these two
heavy guns, renewed his advance with increased precision of fire. Two of
the 32-pounders were struck almost at the same instant, and the flying frag-
ments of the shattered guns and bursted shells disabled every man at the two
guns. His rifle shot and shell penetrated the earth-works as readily as a ball
from a navy Colt would pierce a pine board, and soon so disabled other guns
as to leave us but four capable of being served.
General Tilghman now consulted with Major Gilmer and myself as to the
situation, and the decision was that further resistance would only entail a
useless loss of life. He therefore ordered me to strike the colors, now a
dangerous as well as a painful duty. The flag-mast, which had been the
center of fire, had been struck many times ; the top-mast hung so far out of
the perpendicular that it seemed likely to fall at any moment ; the flag hal-
yards had been cut by shot, but had fortunately become " foul " at the cross-
trees. I beckoned — for it was useless to call amid the din — to Orderly-
Sergeant Jones, an old " man-o'-war's man," to come to my assistance, and we
ran across to the flag-staff and up the lower rigging to the cross-trees, and
by our united efforts succeeded in clearing the halyards and lowering the
flag. The view from that elevated position at the time was grand, exciting,
and striking. At our feet the fort with her few remaining guns was sullenly
hurling her harmless shot against the sides of the gun-boats, which, now
\ apparently within two hundred yards of the fort, were, in perfect security,
and with the coolness and precision of target practice, sweeping the entire fort ;
to the north and west, on both sides of the river, were the hosts of " blue
coats," anxious and interested spectators, while to the east the feeble forces
of the Confederacy could be seen making their weary way toward Donelson.
( )n the morning of the attack, we were sure that the February rise of the
Tennessee had come ; when the action began, the lower part of the fort was
already flooded, and when the colors were hauled down, the water was waist-
deep there ; and when the cutter came with the officers to receive the formal
\ surrender, she pulled into the "sally-port"; between the fort and the posi-
tion which had been occupied by the infantry support was a sheet of water a
quarter of a mile or more wide, and " running like a mill-race." If the attack
had been delayed forty-eight hours, there would hardly have been a hostile
shot fired; the Tennessee would have accomplished the work by drowning the
magazine.
The fight was over; the little garrison were prisoners; but our army had
been saved. We had been required to hold out an horn- ; we had held out
for over two.
We went into the fight with nine guns bearing on the river approach, — we
had two more 42-pounders, but neither shot nor shell for them ; of these all
were disabled but four. Of the 54 men who went into action [see General
372 THE DEFENSE OF FORT HENRY.
Tilghman's report], 5 were killed, 11 wounded or disabled, and 5 missing.
When the Essex dropped out of the fight I could see her men wildly throwing
themselves into the swollen river. Admiral Foote reported that his flag-ship
was struck thirty-eight times, and the commanding officers of gun-boats (with
several of whom I had enjoyed a warm personal acquaintance) complimented
me highly on what they termed the extraordinary accuracy of the fire. I
believe that with effective guns the same precision of fire would have sunk or
driven back the flotilla.
The formal surrender was made to the naval forces; Lieutenant-Commander
Phelps acting for Flag-Officer Foote, and I representing General Tilghman.
The number captured, including Tilghman and staff, hospital attendants and
some stragglers from the infantry, amounted to about seventy.
During the evening a large number of army officers came into the fort, to
whom I was introduced by my old messmates, Lieutenant-Commanders
Gwin and Shirk. Here I first saw General Grant, who impressed me, at the
time, as a modest, amiable, kind-hearted but resolute man. While we were at
headquarters an officer came in to report that he had not as yet found any
papers giving information of our forces, and, to save him further looking, I
informed him that I had destroyed all the papers bearing on the subject, at
which he seemed very wroth, fussily demanding, " By what authority ? " Did
I not know that I laid myself open to punishment, etc., etc. Before I could
reply fully, General Grant quietly broke in with, " I would be very much sur-
prised and mortified if one of my subordinate officers should allow informa-
tion which he could destroy to fall into the hands of the enemy."
We were detained for several days at the fort and were confined to the
same steamer on which General Grant had established his headquarters, and
as the officers, Confederate and Federal, messed together, I saw much of the
general during that time. We were treated with every courtesy ; so our con-
finement was less irksome than we had anticipated and was only marred by
one incident. Two of the younger Confederate officers having obtained
liquor became vociferous. At dinner General Grant did not take his seat with
the rest, and this restraint being removed, the young men, despite frowns and
nudges, persisted in discussing politics, military men and movements, etc.
While they were thus engaged General Grant, unobserved by them, entered,
took his seat, and dined without appearing to notice their conversation, but
when the youngsters left the table they were dumfounded to meet a corporal
and file of men, who ceremoniously conducted them to the " nursery " and
left them under guard, where I shortly visited them. At last I promised to
intercede, which 1 did, carrying with me regrets, explanations, and apologies.
The general smiled and said that he had confined them partly for their own
sakes, lest they might fall in with some of his own men in a similar condi-
tion ; that he did not believe the young men knew of his presence, and
that he would order their release so soon as they became sober, which he did.
HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION
BY E. M. KELLY, COLONEL, U. S. V.
T
MILITARY WATER-SLED. FROM A WAR-TIME
SKETCH.
HE military situation in Kentucky in September,
1861, cannot be properly understood without a
brief sketch of the initial political struggle which
resulted in a decisive victory for the friends of the
Union. The State Legislature had assembled on the
17th of January in called session. The governor's
proclamation convening it was issued immediately
after he had received commissioners from the States
of Alabama and Mississippi, and was followed by the
publication of a letter from Vice-President Breckinridge advising the calling of
a State convention and urging that the only way to prevent war was for Ken-
tucky to take her stand openly with the slave States. About this time the
latter's uncle, the Rev. Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge, an eminent Presbyterian
minister, addressed a large meeting at Lexington in favor of the Union. The
division of sentiment is further illustrated by the fact that one of his sons,
Colonel W. C. P. Breckinridge, followed his cousin into the Confederate army,
while another son, Colonel Joseph C. Breckinridge, fought for the Union.
The position of the Union men was very difficult. They knew that Governor
Magoffin was in sympathy with the secession movement and that the status
of the Legislature on the question was doubtful. The governor had under
his orders a military force called the State Guard, well armed and disciplined,
and under the immediate command of General Simon B. Buckner, a graduate
of West Point. There was a small Union element in it, but a large majority of
its membership was known to be in favor of secession. Suspicious activity
in recruiting for this force began as soon as the governor issued his call for
the Legislature, and it was charged that new companies of known secession
proclivities could get arms promptly from the State arsenal, while those
supposed to be inclined toward the Lxnion were subjected to annoying delays.
The State Guard at its strongest numbered about only four thousand men,
but it was organized and ready while the Union men had neither arms nor
organization to oppose it.
When the Legislature assembled it was soon ascertained that it was very
evenly divided in sentiment. Old party lines promptly disappeared, and
members were classed as "Union" or "Southern Rights." In the Senate there
was a safe majority against calling a convention. In the house on a test
question the Union men prevailed by only one vote. There were some half-
dozen waverers who always opposed any decisive step toward secession but
were equally unwilling to give any active support to the Government. Out-
side pressure was brought to bear. Large delegations of secessionists
assembled at Frankfort, to be speedily confronted by Union men, just as
determined, summoned by telegraph from all parts of the State. Argument
373
374
HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR. THE UNION.
«
4?
was met by argument, threat by threat, appeals to sentiment and prejudice
on one side by similar appeals on the other. The leading public men of the
State, however, had been trained in a school of compromises, and they long
cherished themselves, and kept alive in the people, the hope that some settle-
ment would be reached that would avert war and save Kentucky from becom-
ing the battle-field of contending armies. This hope accounts in a large
degree for the infrequency of personal affrays during those exciting days.
The struggle, kept up during three sessions of the Legislature, demonstrated
that the State could not be carried out of the Union by storm, and terminated
in adopting the policy of neutral-
ity as a compromise. The Union
men, however, had gained some
decided advantages. They had con
sented to large appropriations for
arming the State, but on condition
that the control of military affairs
should be taken from the governor
and lodged in a military board of
five members, the majority being-
Union men ; they provided for or-
ganizing and arming Home Guards,
outside of the militia force, and
not subject, as such, to the gov-
ernor's orders, and they passed an
act requiring all the State Guard
to take the oath required of offi-
cers, this measure being mainly
for the purpose of allowing the
Union members of that organiza-
tion to get rid of the stringent
obligations of their enlistment.
As in most compromises, the terms of the neutrality compromise were dif-
ferently interpreted by the parties, but with both the object was to gain time.
The secessionists believed that neutrality, as they interpreted it, would educate
the people to the idea of a separation from the Union and result in alliance
with the new Confederacy ; the Union men expected to gain time to organize
their forces, elect a new legislature in sympathy with their views, and put the
State decisively on the side of the Government. Events soon showed that
the Union men best understood the temper of the people. The Legislature
adjourned May 24th, four days after the governor had issued his neutrality
proclamation. At the special congressional election, June 20th, nine Union
representatives were chosen to one secessionist by an aggregate majority of
over 54,000 votes. The legislative election in August resulted in the choice
of a new body three-fourths of whose members in each house were Union men.
Under the first call for troops, Kentucky was required to furnish four regi-
ments for the United States service. These Governor Magoffin indignantly
THE REV. ROBERT J. BRECKINRIDGE, D. D.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION. 375
refused to furnish. Shortly afterward he was asked by the Secretary of
War of the Confederacy for a regiment. He declined this request as beyond
his power to grant. His course did not suit the more ardent of the young
men on either side. Blanton Duncan had already procured authority to
recruit for the Confederacy, and in various portions of the State men were
publicly engaged in raising companies for him. Before the end of April he
had started with a regiment for Harper's Ferry by way of Nashville. An
incident connected with this movement shows how strong the belief still
was that the war was to be short, and that Kentucky might keep out of it.
As Desha's company of Duncan's regiment was leaving Cynthiana, Ky., by
rail, one of the privates said to a friend who was bidding him farewell:
"Be sure to vote for Crittenden [then the Union candidate for delegate
to the Border State Conference] and keep Kentucky out of the fuss. We
are just going to Virginia 011 a little frolic and will be back in three months."
On the other side, immediately after Magoffin's refusal to furnish troops,
J. Y. Guthrie, of Covington, went to Washington and got authority for
himself and W. E. Woodruff, of Louisville, to raise two regiments. They
established a camp just above Cincinnati, on the Ohio side of the river, and
began recruiting in Kentucky. They soon filled two regiments, afterward
known as the 1st and 2d Kentucky, which were sent early in July to take
part in the West Virginia campaign.
The Union Club in Louisville was an important factor in organizing Union
sentiment. Originating in May, in six weeks it numbered six thousand
members in that city, and spread rapidly through the State and into East
Tennessee. It was a secret society, the members of which were bound by an
oath to be true to the flag and Government of the United States.
One of the most striking figures of the period was Lieutenant William
Xelson of the navy. He was a man of heroic build, six feet four inches
high, and carrying lightly his weight of three hundred pounds ; he had many
accomplishments, spoke several languages, and was endowed with a strong
intellect and a memory which enabled him to repeat, verbatim, page after
page of his favorite authors. A fluent and captivating talker, when he
wished to please, no man could be more genial and companionable, but he
had a quick and impetuous temper and an overbearing disposition, and
when irritated or opposed was offensively dictatorial and dogmatic. A
native of Kentucky and an ardent friend of the Union, he visited the State
several times in the course of the spring to watch the course of events. As
a result of his observations he reported to Mr. Lincoln that the arms of the
State were in the hands of the secessionists, and that the Union men could
not maintain themselves unless they were also furnished with arms. Mr.
Lincoln placed at his disposal ten thousand muskets with means for their
transportation. Toward the end of April he met in consultation at Frank-
fort a number of the leading Union men of the State and arranged for the
distribution of the arms. When, shortly afterward, the organization of the
Lmion Home Guards began, it was from this source they were armed. In
Louisville, on the initiative of J. M. Delph, the Union mayor, a brigade of
376
HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION.
MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM NELSON. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
On the morning of Sept. 29th, 1862, General Nelson had an altercation with General Jefferson C. Davis in the
Gait House, Louisville. General Davis shot General Nelsou, who died almost instantly.— Editors.
two full regiments and a battery were organized, which were destined to play
a very useful part.
When the Legislature of which he was a member had finally adjourned,
Lovell H. Rousseau went to Washington and obtained authority to recruit a
brigade, and, in order to avoid possibly injurious effects on the approaching
election, established his camp on the Indiana shore, opposite Louisville.
Nelson, after making arrangements for the distribution of guns to the Union
men of the State, was authorized by the President to do a similar service for
HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION.
377
the Union men of East Tennessee, and for an escort was empowered to recruit
three regiments of infantry and one of cavalrv in eastern Kentucky. He
selected his colonels, commissioning them "for the Tennessee expedition" and
appointing a' rendezvous at Hoskin's Cross Roads, in Garrard county, on the
farm of Richard M. Robinson, a stanch Union man, for the day after the legis-
lative elections in August.
During this period of neutrality Kentucky history seemed to be repeating
itself. As. before its occupation by white men it was the common hunting-
ground for the Indian of the North and of
the South on which by tacit agreement
neither was to make a permanent home.
so now it had become the common re-
cruiting-ground of Northern and South-
ern armies on which neither was to
establish a camp. The Kentucky seces-
sionists had opened a recruiting rendez-
vous near Clarksville, Tennessee, a few
miles from the Kentucky border, which
they called Camp Boone, and recruits
began to gather there early in July.
Buckner resigned from the State Gruard
a few days after the battle of Bull Run
and soon took his way southward. J His
example was followed by most of the
higher officers, and the State Guard be-
gan rapidly to disintegrate. It was no
uncommon sight in Louisville, shortly
after this, to see a squad of recruits for
the Union service marching up one side
of a street while a squad destined for the
Confederacy was moving down the other.
In the interior, a train bearing a company destined for Nelson's camp took
aboard at the next county town another company which was bound for
Camp Boone. The officers in charge made a treaty by which their men were
kept in separate cars.
On the day after the August election Nelson's recruits began to gather at
his rendezvous. Camp Dick Robinson was situated in a beautiful blue-grass
country, near where the pike for Lancaster and Crab Orchard leaves the Lex-
ington and Danville Pike, between Dick's River and the Kentucky. By Sep-
tember 1st, there had gathered at this point four full Kentucky regiments and
nearly two thousand East Tennesseeans, who had been enlisted by Lieutenant
JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, M AJOR-GENERAL, C. S. A.
VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1857-61 ; CONFEDERATE SECRETARY OF
WAR, APPOINTED JAN. 28, 186.5.
FROM A DAGUERREOTYPE TAKEN ABOUT 1850.
J During the neutrality period it would appear
that the Union authorities were in doubt as to
which side General Buckner would espouse, since
on August 17th, 1861, President Lincoln wrote
to the Secretary of War : " Unless there be reason
to the contrary, not known to me, make out a com-
mission for Simon [B. ] Buckner, of Kentucky, as
a brigadier-general of volunteers. It is to be put
into the hands of General Anderson, and delivered
to General Buckner or not, at the discretion of
General Anderson. Of course it is to remain a
secret unless and until the commission is de-
livered." This letter bears the indorsement, '"this
day made." — Editors.
378
HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION.
S. P. Carter. This officer, like Nelson, belonging to the navy, was a native of
East Tennessee, and it was part of the original plan of the East Tennessee
expedition that he should enter that section and organize men to receive the
arms that Nelson was to bring. This was found to be impracticable, and he
opened his camp at Barboursville and the men began to come to him.
In August, W. T. Ward, a prominent lawyer of Green sburg, commenced re-
cruiting a brigade and soon had twenty-two companies pledged to rendezvous
when he should obtain the necessary authority from Washington. In Chris-
tian county, Colonel J. F. Buckner, a wealthy lawyer and planter, recruited
a regiment from companies which organized originally as Home Guards, but
soon determined to enter the volunteeer service. He established a camp five
miles north of Hopkinsville, where a few companies remained at a time.
Christian county was strongly Unionist, while all the counties west of it were
overwhelmingly secessionist. Camp Boone was only a few miles from its
southern border, and Fort Donelson about twenty miles south-west. Colonel
Buckner had a 6-pounder cannon, which could be heard at Camp Boone and
made his vicinity additionally disagreeable to those neighbors.
The neutrality proclaimed by Governor Magoffin on the 20th of May had
been formally recognized by the Confederate authorities and treated with
respect by those of the United States, but it was destined to speedy termina-
tion. It served a useful purpose in its time, and a policy that had the respect-
ful consideration of the leading men of that day could not have been so
absurd as it seems now.
On the 3d of September General Polk, who was in command in western
Tennessee, caused Columbus, Kentucky, to be occupied, on account of the
appearance of a body of Union troops on the opposite side of the Missis-
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HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION. 379
sippi. $ Hearing of this, on the 5th General Grant moved from Cairo and
occupied Paducah. A few days afterward General Zollicoffer advanced with
four Confederate regiments through Cumberland Gap to Cumberland Ford.
The Union Legislature had met on the 2d. Eesolutions were passed on the
11th requiring the governor to issue a proclamation ordering the Confederate
troops to leave the State. They were promptly vetoed and promptly passed
over the veto, and the proclamation was issued. In spite of the governor's
opposition, acts were passed putting the State in active support of the Gov-i
eminent. The governor was reduced to a nullity. General Robert Anderson,
who was assigned 011 May 28th to command the Department of Kentucky,
was invited to remove his headquarters to Louisville, and the State's full
quota of volunteers was called for. Recruiting was pushed with energy,
and by the end of the year 28 regiments of infantry, 6 of cavalry, and 3
batteries had been organized.
On September 15th General Albert Sidney Johnston assumed command of
the Confederate forces in the West, and at once ordered General Buckner with
five thousand men from Camp Boone and another camp in the vicinity to
proceed by rail and occupy Bowling Green. Buckner reached that point
early on the 18th, having sent in advance one detachment by rail to seize the
bridge over Green River at Munfordville, and another to go as far as Eliza-
bethtown and bring back all the rolling-stock possible. This was success-
fully accomplished, a part of the advance detachment going as far as the
bridge over the Rolling Fork of Salt River, within thirty-three miles of Louis-
ville, and burning the bridge.
Buckner's movement was supposed in Louisville to have that city for its
objective, and great excitement prevailed there. Rumor magnified his forces,
but there was abundant ground for apprehension without that. General
Anderson was in command, but he was without troops. The only forces in
his department in Kentucky were the unorganized regiment of Colonel Buck-
ner near Hopkinsville, the few hundred recruits gathered at Greensburg by
General Ward, and Nelson's forces at Camp Dick Robinson, — none of which
were ready for service, — the Home Guard Brigade of Louisville, and the scat-
tered companies of Home Guards throughout the State. Opposite Louisville
was Rousseau's camp, in which were some two thousand men not yet prepared
for the field. Very few troops were in reach. Owing to the neutrality of
Kentucky, the regiments recruited in Ohio, Indiana, and the North-west gen-
erally had been sent as fast as organized to the Potomac or Missouri armies.
Fortunately, Governor Oliver P. Morton, of Indiana, had received infor-
mation, about the 1st, which had led him to reserve a few regiments for
Kentucky, and in response to General Anderson's appeal he hurried them
forward. Anderson had learned of Buckner's intended advance the day it
was made, and the non-arrival of the regular train from the south showed him
that it had begun. The Home Guards of Louisville were at once ordered out
for ten days, and, assembling at midnight, eighteen hundred of them under
Colonel A. Y. Johnson, Chief of the Fire Department, started by rail for Mul-
& Thus the neutrality of Kentucky was first broken by the Confederates. — Editors.
380
HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION.
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JOHN J. CHITTENDEN, DURING FOUR TERMS UNITED STATES SENATOR FROiM KENTUCKY; TWICE
ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES; EX-GOVERNOR OF KENTUCKY.
FROM A DAGUERREOTYPE TAKEN ABOUT 1851.
Iii the session of 1860-61 Senator Crittenden iutro- and never interfered with by Congress south of that
duced resolutions called the " Crittenden Compromise," line. Though this was the most promising of the nu-
proposing as an unalterable Constitutional Amendment merous plans for a compromise, the resolutions failed
that slavery be prohibited north of the parallel of 36° 30', for want of agreement.— Editors.
draugh's Hill. Rousseau, with twelve hundred men, followed in a few hours.
The whole force was under Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman, who had shortly
before, at Anderson's request, been assigned to duty with him. On arriving
at Lebanon Junction Sherman learned that Rolling Fork Bridge, a few miles
farther on, had just been destroyed. The Home Guards debarked at the junc-
tion, and Rousseau moved forward to the bridge, finding it still smoking. A
reconnoissance in force, carried for some distance beyond the river, found no
enemy, and the burning of the bridge indicated that no farther advance was
intended immediately.
General Sherman's army was rather a motley crew. The Home Guards did
not wear regulation uniforms, and Rousseau's men were not well equipped.
Muldraugh's Hill had been occupied for six weeks or more during the summer
by a regiment of the State Guard, and the people in the vicinity were gener-
HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION.
381
ally in sympathy with the rebellion. Sherman's attention was attracted to a
young man, without any uniform, who was moving around with what he con-
sidered suspicious activity, and he called him up for question. The young fellow
gave a prompt account of himself. His name was Griffiths, he was a medical
student from Louisville acting as hospital steward, and he had been called out in
such a hurry that he had had no time to get his uniform. As he moved away he
muttered something in a low tone to an officer standing by, and Sherman at
once demanded to know what it was. "Well, General," was the reply, "he said
that a general with such a hat as you have on had no right to talk to him
a 1 m >ut a uniform." Sherman was wearing a battered hat of the style known as
" stovepipe." Pulling it
off, he looked at it, and,
bursting into a laugh,
called out: "Young man,
you are right about the
hat, but you ought to
have your uniform."
On the '20th, the 38th
Indiana (Colonel B. F.
Scribner) arrival, and
soon after four other
regiments. Sherman
moved forward to Eliz-
abethtown, not finding
any available position
at Muldraugh's Hill. A
few days afterward, hav-
ing 011 October 8th suc-
ceeded Anderson, who had been relieved by General Scott in these terms, "To
give you rest necessary to restoration of health, call Brigadier-General Sher-
man to command the Department of the Cumberland," Sherman ordered
Rousseau to advance along the railroad to Nolin, fifty-three miles from Louis-
ville, and select a position for a large force.
While Sherman was at Elizabethtown, Buckner, with several thousand men,
moved rapidly to Rochester, on Green River, and destroyed the locks there, and
then moved against Colonel Buckner's camp near Hopkinsville. Warned of his
approach, Colonel Buckner directed his men, who had not yet been regularly
enrolled, to disperse and make their way to the Union camp near Owensboro'.
They succeeded, but Colonel Buckner himself was taken prisoner. Occupy-
ing Hopkinsville after a slight skirmish with the Home Ouards, Buckner left
a garrison there under General Alcorn and returned to Bowling Green.
Rousseau's advance to Nolin and the arrival of large reenforcements there
induced Johnston to move his headquarters from Columbus to Bowling Green,
and on October 15th he sent Hardee with 1200 men from that place against
Ward at Greensburg, who, hearing of Hardee's approach, fell back with his
recruits 20 miles to Campbellsville.
CAMP DICK ROBINSON— THE FARM-HOUSE.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1887.
382
HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION.
No material change in this position of affairs in western Kentucky occurred
while General Sherman remained in command, though there were several
sharp skirmishes between bodies of Kentucky recruits and Confederate scout-
ing parties in the Lower Green River country.
In the mean time the East Tennessee expedition was not progressing. Nel-
son, whose arbitrary temper had made him enemies among influential politi-
cians, was sent to eastern Kentucky
,& to superintend recruiting camps, and
Brigadier-General George H. Thomas
took command at Camp Dick Robinson.
Thomas was an ardent advocate of the
movement on East Tennessee and bent
all his energies to getting ready for it,
but his command was not hah equip-
ped and was wholly without transpor-
tation; staff-officers were scarce, and
funds were not furnished. More pa-
tient than Nelson, he was yet greatly
tried by the importunities of the East
Tennessee troops, and of the promi-
nent politicians from that region, who
made his camp their rendezvous, as well
as by military suggestions from civil-
ians more zealous than wise in such
matters. The speech -making of dis-
tinguished visitors became a burden to
him. On one occasion, when General Sherman visited his camp, Ex-Senator
J. J. Crittenden, Senator Andrew Johnson, and Horace Maynard were there.
A band came from the camp to serenade them, and the soldiers, not yet rid of
their civilian characteristics, began calling for speeches from one after another.
Thomas withdrew from the orators to the seclusion of a little room used as
an office, on one side of the piazza from which they were speaking. One of
his aides was writing in a corner, but Thomas did not see him, and began
striding up and down the floor in growing irritation. At last Sherman, who
was not then such an orator as he is now, finished speaking, and cries arose for
"Thomas." He blurted out, " this speech-making! I won't speak! What
does a man want to make a speech for, anyhow?" Observing that he had
an auditor, he strode from the room slamming the door behind him, and kept
his own quarters for the rest of the evening.
Accustomed to the discipline of the regular army, and fresh from the well-
organized army of General Patterson on the upper Potomac, Thomas had
little confidence in the raw recruits whom, for lack of a mustering officer, he
mustered in himself. He was willing to advance into East Tennessee with
half a dozen well-drilled regiments, and asked for and obtained them, but
they came without transportation, and he had none for them. While he was
struggling to get ready for an advance, Zollicoffer had made several demon-
strations, and to oppose him Garrard's regiment had been thrown forward to
MAJOR-GENERAL LOVELL H. ROUSSEAU.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION.
383
a strong position on Wild Cat Mountain just beyond Rockcastle River, sup-
ported by a detachment of Wolford's cavalry. On the 17th of October,
Garrard reported that Zollicoft'er was advancing in force, and asked for
reenforcernents. Thomas hurried forward several regiments under General
Schoepf, who had reported to him shortly before. Schoepf arrived with the
33d Indiana, in time to help in giving Zollicoft'er, who had attacked vigorously
with two regiments, a decisive repulse. Zollieoffer retired, apparently satisfied
with developing Garrard's force, and Thomas moved Schoepf with Carter's
East Tennesseeans and several other regiments forward in pursuit, till stopped
by order of General Sherman, at London.
On the 12th of November, Sherman, having received information from his
advance that a large force was moving between him and Thomas, apparently
toward Lexington, ordered the latter to withdraw all his forces north of the
Kentucky River. Making arrangements to obey, Thomas at the same time
sent an officer to Sherman, urging the impolicy of the move unless absolutely
necessary, and controverting the information on which it was based. The
order was revoked, but the revocation did not reach Schoepf until his troops
had begun the movement. The East Tennessee regiments had received it
with an indignation that carried
them to the verge of mutiny. They
threw their guns to the ground and
swore they would not obey. Many
actually left the command, though
they returned in a few days. It
required all of Carter's influence to
keep them to their standards, and
hundreds of them wept as they
turned their backs on their homes.
Andrew Johnson was with them,
and his indignation had added fuel
to their discontent. He was so in-
discreet that Thomas seriously con-
templated his arrest. On the rev-
ocation of the order Carter returned
to London, while Schoepf took po-
sition soon after at Somerset.
In September Colonel John S.
Williams had begun to gather a
Confederate force at Prestonburg,
in eastern Kentucky, threatening
incursions into the central part of
the State. On the 8th of November
General Nelson, who had advanced against him with two Ohio and detach-
ments of several Kentucky regiments, with a part of his force encountered a
large detachment thrown forward by Williams to cover his retreat, in a strong
position on Ivy Creek. After a well-contested engagement Williams was
forced from his position, and retired through Pound Gap [see map, page 394]
MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. CHITTENDEN, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
General Crittenden wasa son of Senator Jolm J. Crittenden.
His brother, Thomas L. Crittenden, was a major-
general in the Union army.
384
HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION.
I
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
/v^7b . t^L^t^
into Virginia. Nelson with the Ohio regiments was then ordered to join the
column in front of Louisville, where he was assigned to command the Fourth
Division. On this expedition Nelson reported as part of his force, " thirty-
six gentlemen volunteers," probably the latest appearance in history of that
description of soldier. One of them, of strong bibulous propensities, acting
as his private secretary, brought about an altercation between Nelson and a
wagoner nearly as large, which narrowly missed fatal results. He was
anxious to get the driver away from his wagon in which there was a jug of
whisky, and directed him to Nelson's tent to find a big fellow who was
employed to unhitch teams for tired drivers. He warned him that the big
fellow was cross, but told him he must insist on his rights. The driver was
just tipsy enough to be reckless, and he roused Nelson with little ceremony.
HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION. 385
There was a terrible outburst of fury 011 both sides, which brought inter-
ference just in time to prevent a conflict between the two giants, one armed
with a sword, and the other with a loaded whip-handle. The aide, not
reporting next morning, was, after some search, found sound asleep in a
wagon with the jug beside him. He was a noted wag, and Nelson, recognizing
him at once as the author of the trick, dismissed him to his home.
A visit from Secretary Cameron and Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas,
on their return from St. Louis in the latter part of October, resulted in the
removal of General Sherman. In explaining the needs of his department to
the Secretary, Sherman expressed the opinion that two hundred thousand men
would be required for successful operations on his line. This estimate, which,
as events showed, evinced remarkable foresight, then discredited his judgment.
On their way to St. Louis, on the same tour, the Secretary had ordered General
O. M. Mitchel to take charge of the East Tennessee expedition, superseding
General Thomas, but General Sherman succeeded in having the order recalled.
On November 15th, General Don Carlos Buell assumed command of the
Department of the Ohio, enlarged so as to include the States of Ohio, Mich-
igan, and Indiana. I He was given the advantage, not enjoyed by his prede-
cessors, of controlling the new troops organized in those States. By one of
his first orders, General Thomas was directed to concentrate his command at
Lebanon. The new commander began at once the task of creating an efficient
army out of the raw material at hand. He organized the regiments into bri-
gades and divisions, and subjected them to a system of drill and discipline
the beneficial effects of which endured throughout the war.
The advance into East Tennessee remained a favorite project with the author-
ities at Washington. Buell's instructions presented Knoxville as the objective
of his first campaign. McClellan wrote several times urging that the seizing
of the East Tennessee and Virginia, railroad was essential to the success of his
plans, and that the political results likely to follow success in that direction
made the movement of the first importance. Buell did not consider East
Tennessee important enough to be his principal objective ; he wanted it to
be a subordinate feature in a great campaign. He submitted his plans to
McClellan in a personal letter. They were comprehensive and required a large
force, and it was already seen that Sherman's estimate was not so far out of
the way. Buell proposed that a heavy column should be moved up the Ten-
nessee and Cumberland rivers by steamer, to unite with another moving on
Nashville, to the eastward of Bowling Green. Demonstrations were to be
made in front of Columbus and Bowling Green, sufficient to keep the forces
holding them fully occupied until their retreat was cut off by the marching-
columns. At the same time an expedition from Lebanon, moving by way
of Somerset, was to be directed against East Tennessee. Until he was ready
to move, he desired to do nothing to put the enemy on the alert. His bri-
gades and regiments were allowed to remain in apparently objectless disper-
f General Buell was a graduate of West Point, severely wounded. May 20th, 1861. to August
In the Mexican war he twice received promotion 9th he was on duty in California, and from Sept.
for gallant and meritorious conduct, and was 14th to Nov. 9th in the defenses of Washington.
vol. i. 25 Editors.
386 HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION.
sion. He did not care if some isolated posts were occasionally raided by the
enemy. But his regiments were frequently inspected and required to keep
constantly ready for a movement the day and hour of which he proposed to
keep to himself. The notion that Buckner or Zollicotfer contemplated an
advance, which so frequently agitated the military mind before he came, was
dismissed b}r him as idle. " I would as soon," he wrote to McClellan, " expect
to meet the Army of the Potomac marching up the road, as Johnston."
His policy of quiet had to be laid aside when, early in December, Morgan
and Helm burned the Bacon Creek bridge in his front. He advanced his
lines to Munfordville and threw forward a small force beyond Green Eiver.
This resulted in a skirmish between a portion of the 32d Indiana, deployed
as skirmishers, and Terry's Texas Cavalry — notable as one of the few fights
of the war between infantry skirmishers in the open and cavalry.
Nothing else of moment occurred on Buell's main line until the capture of
Forts Henry and Donelson compelled Johnston to retire from Bowling Green
and leave the road to Nashville open.]) Daring November Buell reviewed
Thomas's command at Lebanon, and advised with him. about an attack on
Zollicotfer, who to meet a rumored advance had left Cumberland Gap in
charge of a strong garrison, had made his appearance on the Cumberland at
Mill Springs, a few miles south-west of Somerset, had crossed the river, and
after some picket-firing with Schoepf had intrenched himself on the north side.
General Thomas left Lebanon on the 1st of January. As far as Colum-
bia there was a good turnpike; beyond, only mud roads. It rained incessantly,
and artillery carriages and wagons sank to their axles in the soft soil. On one
part of the route eight days were consumed in advancing forty miles.
]) The letter which follows shows Mr. Lincoln's want of perfect knowledge of the enemy's movements,
ideas of what was demanded by the situation : This had its part in the Bull Kim case ; hut worse in
that case was the expiration of the terms of the three-
" Executive Mansion, Washington, January 13th, 1862. months men. Applying the principle to your case, my
Brigadier-General Buell : My dear sir,— Your dis- idea is that Halieck shall menace Columbus, and ' down-
patch of yesterday is received, in which you say, ' I have river' generally, while you menace Bowling Green and
received your letter and General McClellan's, and will East Tennessee. If the enemy shall concentrate at
at once devote all my efforts to your views and his.' In Bowliug Green, do not retire from his front, yet do not
the midst of my many cares, I have not seen or asked to tight him there either, hut seize Columbus and East
see General McClellan's letter to you. For my own Tennessee, one or both, left exposed by the concentra-
views, 1 have not offered, and do not now offer them, as tion at Bowling Green. It is a matter of no small
orders; and while I am glad to have them respectfully anxiety to me, and one which I am sure you will not
considered, I would blame you to follow them contrary overlook, that the East Tennessee line is so long and
to your own clear judgment, unless I should put them over so bad a road. Yours, very truly, A. Lincoln.
in the form of orders. As to General McClellan's views, [Indorsement] : January 13th, 1862. Having to-day writ-
you understand your duty in regard to them better than ten General Buell a letter, it occurs to me to send Gen-
X' »
I do. With this preliminary I state my general idea of eral Halieck a copy of it. A. Lincoln.
this war to be that we have the greater numbers and
the enemy lias the greater facility of concentrating On February 5th, the day before the capture of
Corces upon points of collision ; that we must fail unless Fort Henry, General Buell wrote thus to General
we can find some way of making our advantage an over- Halieck in a correspondence with regard to co-
match for his ; and that this can only be done by menac- , .
ing him with superior forces at different points at the °Peration .
same time, so that we can safely attack one or both if he " I think it is quite plain that the center of the ene-
makes no change; and if he weakens one to strengthen my's line — that part which you are now moving
the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but against — is the decisive point of his whole front, as it
seize and hold the weakened one, gaining so much. To is also the most vulnerable. If it is held, or even the
illustrate: Suppose last summer, when Winchester ran bridges on the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers de-
away to reenforec Manassas, we had forborne to attack stroyed, and your force maintains itself near those
Manassas, but had seized and held Winchester. I men- points, Bowliug Green will speedily fall, and Columbus
tion this to illustrate, and not to criticise. I did not lose will soon follow. The work which you have undertaken
confidence in McDowell, and I think less harshly of Pat- is therefore of the very highest importance, without
terson than some others seem to. In application of the reference to the injurious effects of a failure. There is not
general rule I am suggesting, every particular case will in the whole field of operations a point at which every
have its modifyingcircumstances, among which the most man you can raise can be employed with more effect or
constantly present and most difficult to meet will he the with the prospect of as important results." EDITORS.
HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION. 387
On the 17th of January Thomas reached Logan's Cross Roads, ten miles
north of Zollicoffer's intrenched camp (on the north side of the Cumberland,
opposite Mill Springs) and about the same distance west of Somerset, with the
9th Ohio and 2d Minnesota of Robert L. McCook's brigade, the 10th Indiana of
Man son's brigade, Kenny's battery, and a battalion of Wolford's cavalry. The
4th Kentucky, 10th Kentucky, the 14th Ohio, Wetmore's battery, and the 18th
regulars were still detained in the rear by bad roads. Halting at the cross
roads, Thomas communicated with Sehoepf and ordered him to send across
Fishing Creek to his camp the 12th Kentucky, the 1st and 2d East Tennessee
regiments, and Standart's battery, to remain until the arrival of his delayed
force. Hearing that a large wagon train, sent on a foraging expedition by
Zollicoffer, was on a road about six miles from the camp of Steedman, of the
14th Ohio, he ordered that officer to take his own regiment and Harlan's 10th
Kentucky and attempt its capture. On the evening of the 18th the 4th Ken-
tucky, the battalion of Michigan Engineers, and the battery arrived and went
into camp near the 10th Indiana.
THE BATTLE OF LOGAN'S CROSS ROADS (MILL SPRINGS).
A few days before this General George B. Crittenden had arrived at Zolli-
coffer's camp and assumed command. Hearing of the arrival of Thomas
with part of his command, and believing that Fishing Creek, which was a
troublesome stream at any stage of water, was unfordable from recent rains,
he called a council of his brigade and regimental commanders to consider
the propriety of making an attack on Thomas before he could be reached by
Sehoepf or his regiments in the rear. There was little delay in coming to a
decision. Their camp on the north side of the river was not tenable against
a strong attack, and the means of crossing the river were so insufficient that
a withdrawal without great loss, could not have been effected, in the face of
an enterprising enemy. The only chance for a satisfactory issue was to
attack Thomas before he could concentrate. Crittenden ordered a move-
ment to begin at midnight on the 18th in the following order : General Zolli-
coffer's brigade, consisting of two cavalry companies, a Mississippi regiment,
three Tennessee regiments, and a battery in front ; next, the brigade of General
Carroll, composed of three Tennessee regiments and a section of artillery.
An Alabama regiment and two cavalry regiments, intended as a reserve,
closed the column. After a march of nine miles over muddy roads and
through the rain, his cavalry about daylight encountered Wolford's pickets,
who after firing fell back on the reserve, consisting of two companies of the
10th Indiana, and with them made a determined stand, in which they were
promptly supported by Wolford with the rest of his battalion, and soon
after by the rest of the 10th Indiana, ordered up by Manson, who had been
advised by courier from Wolford of the attack. Colonel Manson proceeded
in person to order forward the 4th Kentucky and the battery of his brigade
and to report to General Thomas. On his way he notified Colonel Van
Cleve, of the 2d Minnesota. As Manson dashed through the camp of the
4th Kentucky shouting for Colonel Speed S. Fry, and giving warning of the
388
HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION.
UNION CONFEDERATE
' ' Forces mm
attack, the men, wearied with the muddy march of the day before, were just
beginning to crawl out of their tents to roll-call. Forming rapidly, Fry led
them at double-quick in the direction of the firing. Having no one to place
him, on coming in sight of the enemy, he took position along a fence in
the edge of the woods, with his right resting near the Mill Springs road. In
front of him was an open field, across which the enemy were advancing from
the shelter of woodland on the opposite side. A ravine ran through the open
field parallel to Fry's front, heading near the road on his right, with steep
sides in his front, but sloping gradually beyond his left. Before Fry's arrival
Zollicoffer had deployed his brigade, and had forced Wolford and the 10th
Indiana to fall back, almost capturing the horses of Wolford's men, who were
fighting on foot. A portion of Wolford's command, under his immediate
charge, and Vanarsdall's company of the 10th Indiana, rallied on the 4th
Kentucky when it appeared, the remainder of the 10th falling back to its
encampment, where it re-formed its lines. Fry was at once subjected to a
severe attack. The enemy in his front crawled up under shelter of the
ravine to within a short dis-
tance of his lines before deliver-
ing their fire, and Fry, mounting
the fence, in stentorian tones de-
nounced them as dastards, and
defied them to stand up on their
feet and come forward like men.
A little lull in the firing oc-
curring at this juncture, Fry
rode a short distance to the
right to get a better view of the
movement of the enemy in that
direction. The morning was a
lowering one, and the woods
were full of smoke. As Fry
turned to regain his position he
encountered a mounted officer
whose uniform was covered
with a water-proof coat. After
approaching till their knees
touched, the stranger said to
Fry : " We must not fire on our
own men"; and nodding his
head to his left, he said, " Those
are our men." Fry said, "Of
course not. I would not do so
intentionally"; and he began
to move toward his regiment,
when turning he saw another
mounted man riding from the
BATTLE OF
LOGAN'S CROSS ROADS
OR \
MILL SPRINGS, KY.
HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION.
389
trees who fired and wounded Fry's horse. Fry at once fired on the man
who had accosted him, and several of his men, observing the incident,
fired at the same time. The shots were fatal, and the horseman fell dead,
pierced by a- pistol-shot in his breast and by two musket-balls. It was
soon ascertained that it was Zollicoffer himself who had fallen. In the
mean time, the enemy were pressing Fry in front and overlapping his
right. On his right front only the fence separated the combatants. The left
of his regiment not being assailed, he moved
two companies from that flank to his right.
As he was making this change General
Thomas appeared on the field, and at once
placed the 10th Indiana in position to cover
Fry's exposed flank.
The fall of Zollicoffer and the sharp firing
that followed caused two of his regiments to
retreat in confusion. Crittenden then brought
up Carroll's brigade to the support of the other
two, and ordered a general advance. Thomas
met this by placing a section of Kenny's bat-
tery on the left of the 4th Kentucky, which
was overlapped by Carroll's line, ordered the
12th Kentucky to the left of Kenny's two
guns, and Carter with the two East Tennessee
regiments, and Wetmore's battery still farther
to the left, in front of the Somerset road.
Standards battery and Kenny's remaining
guns were held in the rear of the center, and McCook's two regiments were
ordered up, the 9th Ohio on the right of the 10th Indiana, and the 2d Minne-
sota in reserve behind the latter regiment and the 4th Kentucky. During
these movements Kenny's section was so threatened that it was withdrawn
some distance to the rear. There was little opportunity for the effective use
of artillery on either side, and that arm played an insignificant part in the
engagement, Thomas's superiority in that particular availing him little. Car-
roll's attack was pressed with great courage, and the ammunition of the 4th
Kentucky and 10th Indiana beginning to fail, the 2d Minnesota was ordered
to relieve them, which it did under severe fire. Both of McCook's regiments
were admirably drilled and disciplined, and moved to the attack with the
order and steadiness of veterans. Thomas's disposition of his troops had
begun to tell. The advance of the 12th Kentucky on the left, the firing of
Wetmore's battery, and the movement of Carter's East Tennesseeans checked
the enemy's right, and it soon began to give back. The 2d Minnesota was
slowly pushing forward over the ground that had been the scene of the most
persistent fighting from the first, and the 9th Ohio, on the right, was forcing-
back the enemy through open ground, when, slightly changing direction, it
made a bayonet charge against the enemy's left, which gave way in confusion.
Their whole line then broke into a disorderly retreat. After replenishing
BRIG.-GEN. FELIX K. ZOLLICOFFER, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
390
HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR. THE UNION.
panic
cartridge-boxes, Thomas pushed forward in pursuit. Within a few miles, a
small body of the enemy's cavalry attempted to make a stand, but were scat-
tered by a few shells from Standart. The road which the retreating force
followed was strewn with evidences that the retreat had degenerated into a
A piece of artillery was found abandoned in a mud hole, hundreds
of muskets were strewn along the road and
in the fields, and, most convincing proof of
all, the flying foe had thrown away their
haversacks filled with rations of corn pone
and bacon. Those were the days when sto-
ries of "rebel atrocities" in the way of poison-
ing wells and food were current, and the
pursuers, who had gone into the fight break-
fastless, were doubtful about tasting the con-
tents of the first haversacks they observed.
Their great number, however, soon became
a guarantee of good faith, and the hungry
soldiers seized on them with avidity. As
Crittenden in his report mentioned the loss
of all the cooked rations carried to the field
as enhancing the distress of his subsequent
retreat, the abundance of the supply obtained
by the pursuing force may be inferred. On
arriving near the enemy's intrenchments
the division was deployed in line of battle,
advancing to the summit of the hill at Moulden's, which commanded the
enemy's intrenchments. From this point Standart and Wetmore's batteries
kept up a cannonade till dark, while Kenny's on the left, at Russell's house,
fired upon their ferry to keep them from crossing. The 14th Ohio and the
lUth Kentucky had come up during the pursuit, and were placed in advance
for the assault ordered for daybreak. General Schoepf arrived about dark
with the 17th, 31st, and 38th Ohio.
At daybreak next morning Wetmore's Parrot t guns, which had been moved
to Russell's, began firing on the steamer which was evidently engaged in
crossing troops, and it was soon abandoned and set on fire by the enemy.
The assaulting columns moved forward, the 10th Kentucky and the 14th
Ohio in advance, and reaching the intrenchments found them abandoned.
In the bottom near the ferry-crossing were found 11 pieces of artillery, with
their caissons, battery- wagons, and forges, hitched up and ready to move
but abandoned by the artillerymen, more than 150 wagons, and over 1000
horses and mules. All the troops had escaped. The steep road on the other
bank was strewn with abandoned baggage and other evidences of disorderly
flight. The boats used for crossing having been destroyed by the retreating
enemy, no immediate pursuit was possible; but during the day means were
improvised for getting the 14th Ohio across for a reconnoissance and to
secure abandoned property.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL SPEED S. FRY.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION.
39»
fe^s*,
Thomas reported his loss in action as 39 killed and 207 wounded, the
casualties being confined entirely to the 10th Indiana, 4th Kentucky, 2d
Minnesota, 9th Ohio, and Wolford's cavalry. Colonels McCook and Fry
were among the wounded. The enemy's loss he reported as 192 killed, 89
prisoners not wounded, and 68 prisoners wounded. Crittenden's report
stated his own loss at 125 killed, 309 wounded, and 99 missing, much the
heaviest loss being in the 15th Mississippi (Lieutenant-Colonel E. C. Wal-
thall), of Zollicoffer's brigade, which had led the attack on Fry and fought
through the whole engagement.
Besides the property mentioned above, a large amount of ammunition, com-
missary stores, intrenching tools, eamp and garrison equipage and muskets,
and five stands of colors were found in the camp. The demoralization was
acknowledged by Crittenden in his report, in which he says : " From Mill
Springs and on the first steps of my march officers and men, frightened by
false rumors of the movements of the enemy, shamefully deserted, and, steal-
ing horses and mules to ride, fled to Knoxville, Nashville, and other places
in Tennessee." Of one cavalry battalion, he reported that all had deserted
except twenty-five. On his retreat his sick-list increased greatly from lack of
food and fatigue, and the effective force of his army was practically destroyed.
After entrance into his intrenchments had demonstrated the panic that ex-
isted in the enemy's
forces, Fry said -i- ; i ' ^\T?
to Thomas : "Gen-
eral, why didn't
you send in a de-
mand for surren-
der last night % "
Looking at him a
moment as if re-
flecting, Thomas
replied : " Hang it,
Fry, I never once
thought of it." At
this time origina-
ted a saying often
heard in the West-
ern army after-
ward. A sprightly
young prisoner slightly wounded was allowed the freedom of the camp. To
some soldiers chaffing him about his army being in such a hurry as even to
throw away their haversacks, he replied: "Well, we were doing pretty
good fighting till old man Thomas rose up in his stirrups, and we heard
him holler out : ' Attention, Creation ! By kingdoms right wheel ! ' and then
we knew you had us, and it was no time to carry weight."
Thomas's victory was complete, and the road was opened for the advance into
East Tennessee which he had so long endeavored to make and which was
*§81 as
"'•A::'
■'■'-'•■
V
NATIONAL CEMETERY AT LOGIN'S CROSS ROADS.
FROM A RECENT PHOTOGRAPH.
392
HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION.
d&i
i- ' ---
2
rZ7>2
fz%^
'&A
sS%%
^O:.
Wfc
VIEW ON THE BATTLE-FIELD OF LOGAN'S CROSS ROADS. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH, 1887.
contemplated by his instructions, but the scarcity of provisions, the badness
of the roads, and the difficulty of crossing the river made progress on that
line impracticable, and shortly afterward Carter was ordered with his brigade
against Cumberland Gap and Thomas to rejoin Buell's main column, and the
East Tennessee expedition, which Nelson had devised and McClellan had
strongly urged and Thomas had labored so to put in motion, was definitively
abandoned.
While Thomas was marching against Zollicoffer, Colonel Garfield was
driving Humphrey Marshall from the mountainous region along the Virginia
border. With Marshall's retreat the last Confederate force was driven from
the State, and Garfield with his brigade joined the army in Tennessee.
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT LOGAN'S CROSS ROADS, KNOWN AS MILL SPRINGS
AND ALSO AS FISHING CREEK, KY.
The composition and losses of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records.
K stands for killed ; w for wounded ; m w for mortally wounded ; m for captured or missing ; c for captured.— Editors.
The Union Army, Brig. -Gen. George H. Thomas.
Second Brigade, Col. Mahlon D. Manson: 10th Ind.,
Lt.-Col. William C. Rise; 4th Kj\, Col. Speed S. Fry (w) ;
10th Ky., Col. John M. Harlan ; 14th Ohio, Col. James B.
Steedman. [The two latter regiments were engaged
only in the pursuit of the enemy.] Brigade loss: k, 19;
w, 127 = 146. Third Brigade, Col. Robert L. McCook (w) :
2d Minn.. Col. Horatio P. Van Cleve; 9th Ohio, Major
Gustave Kammerling. Brigade loss : k, 18; -w, 61 = 79;
Twelfth Brigade, Acting Brig.-Gen. Samuel P. Carter:
12th Ky., Col. William A. Hoskins ; 1st Tennessee, Col.
Robert K. Byrd ; 2d Tennessee, Col. J. P. T. Carter;
1st Ky. Cavalry, Col. Frank Wolford. Brigade loss:
k, 3 ; w, 19 ; m, 15 = 37. Artillery : Battery B, 1st Ohio,
Capt. William E. Btandart ; Battery C, 1st Ohio, Capt.
Dennis Kenny, Jr.: 9th Ohio Battery, Capt, Henry S.
Wetruore. Camp Guard: D, F, and K, Michigan En-
gineers and Mechanics, Lieut.-Col. K. A. Hunton ; A,
38th Ohio, Capt. Charles Greenwood.
Brig.-Gen. A. Schoepf joined Thomas on the evening
of the battle, after the lighting had ceased, with the
17th, 31st, and 38th Ohio.
The total loss of the Union forces was 40 killed, 207 wounded, and 15 captured or missing,— aggregate, 262.
In the Official Records, vol. VTL, p. 86, Col. Manson reports that " the Federal force actually engaged did not
exceed at anytime over 2500." Gen. Thomas's entire command on the field during the engagement probably
numbered about four thousand effectives.
The Confederate Army, Major-Gen. George B.
Crittenden. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. F. K. Zollicoffer (k).
Col. D. H. Cummings: 15th Miss., Lieut.-Col. E. C. Wal-
thall; 19th Tenn., Col. D. H. Cummings, Lieut.-Col.
Francis M. Walker ; 20th Tenn., Col. Joel A. Battle ; 25th
Tenn., Col. S. S. Stanton (w) ; Tenn. Battery, Capt. A. M.
Rutledge; Tnd'p't Co. Tenn. Cav., Capt. W. S. Bledsoe;
Ind'p't Co. Tenn. Cav., Capt, T. C. Sanders. Brigade
loss : k, 98 ; w, 265 ; m, 66 = 429. Second Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. Wm. H. Carroll : 16th Ala., Col. Wm. B. Wood; 17th
Tenn., Lieut.-Col. T. C. H. Miller ; 28th Tenn., Col. J. P.
Murray ; 29th Tenn., Col. Saml. Powell (w). Major Horace
Rice: Tenn. Battery (2 guns), Capt. Hugh L.W. McClung;
4th Battalion Tenn. Cav.. Lieut.-Col. B. M. Branner.
Brigade loss: k, 28; W, 46; m, 29 = 103. Reserve: 5th
Battalion Tenn. Cav., Lieut.-Col. George R. McClellan.
The total Confederate loss was 125 killed, 309 wounded, and 99 captured or missing,— aggregate, 533.
Gen. Crittenden says : " In the then condition of my command I could array for battle about 4000 effective men."
MARSHALL AND GARFIELD IN EASTERN KENTUCKY.
CONFEDERATE PRIVATE. FROM A TINTYPE.
BY THE REV. EDWARD O. GUERRANT, ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL TO GENERAL MARSHALL.
ON the 10th of September, 1861, General Albert Sidney
Johnston, one of the five officers who then held the rank
of " General " in the Confederate army, was assigned
to the command of Department No. 2, embracing the
States of Tennessee and Arkansas, and that part of
the State of Mississippi west of the New Orleans, Jack-
son and Great Northern and Central Railroad; also,
the military operations in Kentucky, Missouri, Kansas,
and the Indian country immediately west of Missouri
and Arkansas. Tennessee had entered into a league
with the Confederacy on the 7th of May, 1861, and
although the efforts of the Confederates to take Ken-
tucky out of the Union had been defeated, the State
contained a large element friendly to secession, from
which was recruited at an early day a number of regiments. In order to
afford securer opportunities for such enlistments, it was necessary to make
an effort to occupy eastern Kentucky. This was desirable, also, in order to
protect vital interests of the Confederacy in south-western Virginia, where
were situated the great salt-works and lead-mines of the South, and where
ran the chief line of railway, connecting Virginia with the Gulf States.
With these objects in view, on the 1st of November, 1861, Brigadier-Gen-
eral Humphrey Marshall was sent by the Confederate Government to take
command of certain troops at Prestonburg, Ky., then under command of
Colonel (afterward General) John S. Williams. These consisted of a regi-
ment and a battalion in a camp on the Big Sandy, which had been organ-
ized in the fall of 1861, by Colonel Williams. The regiment was the 5th Ken-
tucky, the famous " Ragamuffin Regiment," composed almost exclusively of
mountain men, and one of the finest corps of soldiers ever enlisted in the
army. They were hardy, raw-boned, brave mountaineers, trained to hard-
ships, and armed with long rifles. Colonel Williams had also organized a
battalion of mounted riflemen from the famous " Blue Grass " country in
central Kentucky, composed of young men of education and fortune, — the
class of men who afterward made John Morgan famous as a raider. This
force was further increased by the 54th Virginia, under Colonel John H.
Trigg, the 29th Virginia, under Colonel A. C. Moore, and a battery of field
artillery, under Captain W. C. Jeffress. In General Marshall's official reports,
he states that during the campaign of 1861-62 his force never exceeded 1800
effective men of all arms. J The force assigned to him was very small,
considering the interests involved and the objects to be attained. The
^ Yet, on the 30th of December, 1 861, General Marshall had reported his force as " equal to 3000,"
including " battery of four pieces, equal to 600 men." — Editors.
393
394
MARSHALL AND GARFIELD IN EASTERN KENTUCKY.
SG&V-t DT W\\_^.S
occupation of eastern Kentucky would have
required an army of several thousand men.
In response to his request for reinforcements,
President Davis wrote to General Marshall that
they " were sorely pressed on every side," and
were unable to send him any troops.
It was a very severe winter, and Marshall's
men were poorly clad, and many of the soldiers
were nearly naked. One regiment had 350 bare-
footed men and not over 100 blankets for 700
men. General Albert Sidney Johnston, observ-
ing their condition, sent them one thousand suits
of clothes, including hats and shoes. These sup-
plies reached the army at Whitesburg, Ky. An
incident connected with the distribution of them
will serve to illustrate the poverty of the Quar-
termaster's Department, and the ready genius of
General Marshall. When the quartermaster dis-
tributed the clothing among the soldiers, it was
noticed that they examined with suspicion the
peculiar color and texture of the cloth. General
Marshall discovering that it was cotton, and
fearing the result of such a discovery by his
men, rose to the occasion with a stirring speech,
in which he eulogized the courage, endurance,
and patriotism of his men, and commended the
Government for its thoughtful care of them, and
relieved their fears as to the quality of the goods
by assuring them that they were "woven out of the best quality of Southern
wool, with which, doubtless, many of the Kentuchians were not acquainted?
The men took the general's word for it (with a grain of salt) and walked
off to their quarters with their cottonade suits. The general often remarked
afterward that the deception nearly choked him, adding, "but something had
to be done."
The army was not only badly clothed, but in general badly armed. Many
of the men had only shot-guns and squirrel rifles. Requisitions on the War
Department were not filled for want of supplies; and General Lee wrote
that owing to the scarcity of arms he was having pikes made, which he
offered to furnish General Marshall for his unarmed troops.
The field of operations lay in the Cumberland Mountains, along the sources
of the Big Sandy River, — a poor, wild, thinly settled country. The roads ran
along the water-courses between the mountains, and were often rendered
impassable by the high waters, and during this winter were ruined by the
passage of cavalry, wagons, and artillery. Captain Jeffress was three days
moving his battery from Gladesville to Pound Gap, only sixteen miles. Gen-
eral Marshall's report states that his wagons were sometimes unable to make
^^ver
u ±
MAP OF BIG SANDY RIVER AND
MIDDLE-CREEK BATTLE-FIELD
(.JANUARY 10, 18G2).
MARSHALL AND GARFIELD IN EASTERN KENTUCKY.
39S
over four miles a day. An unusual amount of rain fell, drenching the unpro-
tected soldiers, most of them raw recruits, and keeping the roads deep and
the waters high. This first winter was the worst of the war, and the scanty
rations and great hardships made hundreds of the men sick. Besides, the
measles and mumps broke out in the camps, and many died from these
diseases and from exposure. The command at Prestonburg was over one
hundred miles from its base of supplies at Abingdon, Va., with the Cumber-
land Mountains between. The farms were generally small and poor, lying
along the mountain-sides or in narrow
valleys. During January, 1862, corn was
worth ten dollars per barrel, and had to
be hauled thirty miles over desperate
roads. For weeks they subsisted upon
mountain beef and parched corn. These
privations General Marshall shared, giv-
ing up his tent to the sick and wounded,
and sleeping beneath a wagon.
On the 17th of December, 1861, Gen-
eral Don Carlos Buell, then in com-
mand of the Department of the Ohio,
including Kentucky, assigned Colonel
(afterward General and President) James
A. Garfield, of Ohio, to command his
Eighteenth Brigade, and sent him
against General Marshall. Colonel Gar-
field concentrated his forces at Louisa,
at the forks of the Sandy, from which place he began his advance movement
on the 23d of December. His army consisted of his own regiment, the 42d
Ohio, uuder Lieutenant-Colonel L. A. Sheldon, the 1st Squadron Ohio Cav-
alry, Major William McLaughlin, the 14th Kentucky, Colonel L. T. Moore,
the 22d Kentucky, Colonel D. W. Lindsey, 2d Virginia Cavalry (6 companies),
Lieutenant-Colonel W. M. Bolles, the 40th Ohio, Colonel Jonathan Cranor,
and 300 of the 1st Kentucky Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Letcher,
numbering in all some- three thousand men. Garfield having found the road
up the river impassable for wagons, many were taken to pieces and con-
veyed on boats ; others, that were empty, were pulled by the men. His sup-
plies were brought up on steam-boats and push-boats.
On the 6th of January, 1862, Garfield arrived within seven miles of Paints-
ville, where Marshall had established his camp and headquarters. It had
been Marshall's intention to offer battle at Hagar's farm, near Paintsville,
but he had intercepted a letter from Garfield to Cranor, who, with his regi-
ment and some 400 cavalry, was advancing upon Marshall's left and rear
from the direction of Salyersville. He then decided to fall back to the forks
of Middle Creek, where he awaited the approach of the Federal forces. Gar-
field and Cranor made a junction near Paintsville, and all moved up to
Marshall's front on the 10th of January.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES A. GARFIELD.
FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.
396
MARSHALL AND GARFIELD IN EASTERN KENTUCKY.
General Marshall had selected a strong position along a high ridge south
of Middle Creek, and covering the road to Virginia by way of Beaver Creek.
Jeffress's battery was placed in a gorge of the left fork of Middle Creek; the
5th Kentucky and 29th Virginia regiments and part of the Kentucky Bat-
talion of Mounted Riflemen occupied the spurs and heights to the right of
the artillery; the 54th Virginia occupied a height covering the battery, with two
cavalry companies in reserve ; two other cavalry companies (dismounted and
armed with Belgian rifles) were placed across Middle Creek, on a height com-
manding the valley. Skirmishing between the two commands began about
10 a. m., but the action began in earnest
about noon by a charge of Federal cav-
alry, supported by infantry. This at-
tack was repulsed, the artillery putting
the cavalry to flight, and it appeared
no more during the engagement.
The men probably dismounted and
fought on foot, as the ground was not
suitable for cavalry operations. Col-
onel Garfield then endeavored to take
the ridge occupied by the 5th Ken-
tucky and 29th Virginia, on the right
wing of General Marshall's position.
He moved his infantry up the side
of the mountain, above Spurlock's
Branch, and made a desperate attempt
to dislodge the Confederate forces,
commanded by Colonel Williams, but
was repulsed. The attack was renewed
three times, with the same result. The ascent was steep, the top of the
mountain was covered with trees and rocks affording good protection to the
Confederate forces. The engagement lasted until dark, both sides claiming
the victory, and both withdrawing from the field of battle.
General Marshall estimated Colonel Garfield's forces at 5000, ^> and states
his own at not over 1500. In his official report to the War Department he
gives his losses at 11 killed and 15 wounded.
General Marshall withdrew his forces next day, taking three days to reach
Martin's Mill on Beaver Creek, — sixteen miles from the battle-field. This was
the nearest point at which he could get provisions for his men, some of whom
had fasted for thirty hours before the action.
Colonel Garfield withdrew his forces, February 22d, to the Big Sandy River,
where he remained until March. This was the only engagement between the
BRIGADIER-GENERAL HUMPHREY MARSHALL.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
% Garfield's strength on the field did not exceed
1700 men. He says in his report : "Not more than
900 of my force were actually engaged." Mar-
shall's estimate of his own (1 500) is probably cor-
rect. The Union loss was 2 killed and 25 wounded.
Garfield's reports exhibit no doubt of his success
in the engagement. He says : "At 4.30 he ordered
a retreat. My men drove him down the slopes of
the hills, and at 5 o'clock he had been driven from
every point It was growing dark, and I
deemed it unsafe to pursue him." Garfield with-
drew to Paintsville on the 1 2th and 13th, to procure
supplies, having on the 11th occupied Preston-
burg, which the enemy had abandoned.' — Editors.
MARSHALL AND GARFIELD IN EASTERN KENTUCKY. 397
two forces. The next month General Marshall sent the bulk of his command
south of the Cumberland Mountains, to go into winter quarters, because all
supplies were exhausted in the mountains of Kentucky. General Marshall's
forces would probably have been compelled to return to Virginia in order to
secure supplies, even if they had not been opposed by an enemy. The
occupation of the Sandy Valley by a largely superior force so crippled
his resources that he could hardly have subsisted his troops among the
impoverished mountains. Indeed, Colonel Garfield could not have main-
tained his position a week, without the aid of the river, by which sup-
plies were brought on steamboats. On the 16th of March, 1862, Garfield
with 750 men made an attack on a battalion of Virginia militia, occupying-
Pound Gap, and drove them away and burned the log-huts built for win-
ter quarters. Soon after this he was ordered to report to General Buell,
who had gone to the relief of General Grant at Pittsburg Landing. This
he did on the 7th of April, 1862, in time to take part in the second day's
contest.
General Marshall was born January loth, 1812, in Frankfort, Ky., and
came of a most distinguished family, which included Chief-Justice John
Marshall of Virginia, the historian Humphrey Marshall of Kentucky, and the
orator and lawyer Thomas F. Marshall. He was four times elected to Congress
from the Louisville District, and was Minister to China under President Fill-
more. In his profession of law Humphrey Marshall had probably no superior
and few equals among the jurists of Kentucky. As an orator he fully inherited
the talent of a family which was famous in the forum. As a soldier he enjoyed
the confidence of General Lee, who wrote him frequently in reference to mili-
tary operations, and earnestly opposed his retirement from the army. He
was a graduate of West Point, and both he and General Williams had won
distinction in the Mexican war — Marshall at Buena Vista and Williams at
Cerro Gordo.
General Marshall personally was not adapted to mountain warfare, owing to
his great size ; nor was he qualified to command volunteers, being the most
democratic of men. Moreover, his heart was tender as a woman's. For these
reasons he could not enforce the rigorous discipline of an army. So well
known was his leniency, that an officer of his staff made a standing offer to
eat the first man the general should shoot for any crime. Speaking to Col-
onel Leigh about military dignity and discipline, Marshall said he " regarded
these things as the decrepitudes of the military art." General Williams, who
was his ablest lieutenant, was a man of very different mold, proud, imperi-
ous, a born soldier, who believed in discipline to its last extremity.
With his little command Marshall afterward successfully defended the vital
interests of the Confederacy in south-west Virginia, so long as he remained
in the service. In the summer of 1863 he was transferred to the Mississippi
Department, but resigned his commission because he believed that he had
been badly treated by President Davis in not having received the govern-
mental support which he thought he deserved and which the necessities of
his command required.
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON
BY LEW WALLACE, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. 8. V.
HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD.
3/fi
THE village of Dover was — and j^jM.
for that matter yet is — what our
English cousins would call the " shire-
town " of the county of Stewart, Tennessee. In 1860 it
was a village unknown to fame, meager in population,
architecturally poor. There was a court-house in the
place, and a tavern, remembered now as double-storied,
unpainted, and with windows of eight-by-ten glass,
which, if the panes may be likened to eyes, were both squint and cataractous.
Looking through them gave the street outside the appearance of a sedgy
slough of yellow backwater. The entertainment furnished man and beast
was good of the kind ; though at the time mentioned a sleepy traveler, espe-
cially if he were of the North, might have been somewhat vexed by the
explosions which spiced the good things of a debating society that nightly
took possession of the bar-room, to discuss the relative fighting qualities of
the opposing sections.
If there was a little of the romantic in Dover itself, there was still less of
poetic quality in the country round about it. The only beautiful feature was
the Cumberland River, which, in placid current from the south, poured its
waters, ordinarily white and pure as those of the springs that fed it, past the
village on the east. Northward there was a hill, then a small stream, then a
bolder hill round the foot of which the river swept to the west, as if court-
eously bent on helping Hickman's Creek out of its boggy bottom and cheer-
less ravine. North of the creek all was woods. Taking in the ravine of the
creek, a system of hollows, almost wide and deep enough to be called valleys,
inclosed the town and two hills, their bluffest ascents being on the townward
side. Westward of the hollows there were woods apparently interminable.
From Fort Henry, twelve miles north-west, a road entered the village, stop-
ping first to unite itself with another wagon-way, now famous as the Wynn's
Ferry road, coming more directly from the west. Still another road, leading
398
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. 399
off to Charlotte and Nashville, had been cut across the low ground near the
river on the south. These three highways were the chief reliances of the
people of Dover for communication with the country, and as they were more
than supplemented by the river and its boatage, the three were left the year
round to the guardianship of the winds and rains.
However, when at length the Confederate authorities decided to erect a mil-
itary post at Dover, the town entered but little into consideration. The real
inducement was the second hill on the north — more properly a ridge. As it
rose about a hundred feet above the level of the inlet, the reconnoitering engi-
neer, seeking to control the navigation of the river by a fortification, adopted it
at sight. And for that purpose the bold bluff was in fact a happy gift of nature,
and we shall see presently how it was taken in hand and made terrible.
It is of little moment now who first enunciated the idea of attacking the
rebellion by way of the Tennessee River ; most likely the conception was
simultaneous with many minds. The trend of the river ; its navigability for
large steamers ; its offer of a highway to the rear of the Confederate hosts in
Kentucky and the State of Tennessee ; its silent suggestion of a secure pas-
sage into the heart of the belligerent land, from which the direction of move-
ment could be changed toward the Mississippi, or, left, toward Richmond;
its many advantages as a line of supply and of general communication, must
have been discerned by every military student who, in the summer of 1861,
gave himself to the most cursory examination of the map. It is thought
better and more consistent with fact to conclude that its advantages as a
strategic line, so actually obtrusive of themselves, were observed about the
same time by thoughtful men on both sides of the contest. With every
problem of attack there goes a counter problem of defense.
A peculiarity of the most democratic people in the world is their hunger for
heroes. The void in that respect had never been so gaping as in 1861. Gen-
eral Scott was then old and passing away, and the North caught eagerly at
the promise held out by George B. McClellan ; while the South, with as much
precipitation, pinned its faith and hopes on Albert Sidney Johnston. There
is little doubt that up to the surrender of Fort Donelson the latter was con-
sidered the foremost soldier of all who chose rebellion for their part. When
the shadow of that first great failure fell upon the veteran, President Davis
made haste to reassure him of his sympathy and unbroken confidence. In
the official correspondence which has survived the Confederacy there is
nothing so pathetic, and at the same time so indicative of the manly great-
ness of Albert Sidney Johnston, as his letter in reply to that of his chief. J
) In this letter dated Decatur, Ala., March 18th, but convinced that it was better to endure them for the
1862, General Johnston says in part : present, and defer to a more propitious time an inves-
tigation of the conduct of the generals ; for in the mean
"The blow [Fort Donelson] was most disastrous and time their services were required and their influence
almost without remedy. I therefore in my first report useful. For these reasons Generals Floyd and Pillow
remained silent. This silence you were kind enough to were assigned to duty, for I still felt confidence in their
attribute to my generosity. I will not lay claim to the gallantry, their energy, and their devotion to the Con-
motive to excuse my course. I observed silence, as it federacy. . . . The test of merit, in my profession, with
seemed to me the best way to serve the cause and the the people, is success. It is a hard rule, but I think it
country. The facts were not fully known, discontent right. If I join this corps to the forces of Beauregard
prevailed, and criticism or condemnation were more (I confess a hazardous experiment), those who are now
likely to augment than to cure the evil. I refrained, declaiming against ine will be without an argument."
well knowing that heavy censures would fall upon me, EDITORS.
400
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
THE TOWN OF DOVER FROM ROBINSON'S HILL.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.
This view was taken from the site of a house on McClernand's right, which was destroyed for camp purposes after
the surrender. The house is said to have been used by McClernaud as headquarters. It was near the
Wynn's ferry road, which reaches the river perhaps a quarter of a mile to the right of the picture.
When General Johnston assumed command of the Western Department,
the war had ceased to be a new idea. Battles had been fought. Prepara-
tions for battles to come were far advanced. Already it had been accepted
that the North was to attack and the South to defend. The Mississippi River
was a central object ; if opened from Cairo to Fort Jackson (New Orleans),
the Confederacy would be broken into halves, and good strategy required
it to be broken. The question was whether the effort would be made directly
or by turning its defended positions. Of the national gun-boats afloat above
Cairo, some were formidably iron-clad. Altogether the flotilla was strong
enough to warrant the theory that a direct descent would be attempted ; and
to meet the movement the Confederates threw up powerful batteries, notably
at Columbus, Island Number Ten, Memphis, and Vicksburg. So fully were
they possessed of that theory that they measurably neglected the possibili-
ties of invasion by way of the Cumberland and Tennessee riyers. Not until
General Johnston established his headquarters at Nashville was serious
attention given to the defense of those streams. A report to his chief of engi-
neers of November 21st, 1861, establishes that at that date a second battery
on the Cumberland at Dover had been completed ; that a work on the ridge
had been laid out, and two guns mounted; and that the encampment was then
surrounded by an abatis of felled timber. Later, Brigadier-General Lloyd
Tilghman was sent to Fort Donelson as commandant, and on January 25th
he reports the batteries prepared, the entire field-works built with a trace of
2900 feet, and rifle-pits to guard the approaches were begun. The same offi-
cer speaks further of reinforcements housed in four hundred log-cabins, and
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. 401
adds that while this was being done at Fort Donelson, Forts Henry and
Heiman, over on the Tennessee, were being thoroughly strengthened. Janu-
ary 30th, Fort Donelson was formally inspected by Lieutenant-Colonel Gil-
mer, chief engineer of the Western Department, and the final touches were
ordered to be given it.
It is to be presumed that General Johnston was satisfied with the defenses
thus provided for the Cumberland River. From observing General Buell at
Louisville, and the stir and movement of multiplying columns under General
U. S. Grant in the region of Cairo, he suddenly awoke determined to fight
for Nashville at Donelson. To this conclusion he came as late as the begin-
ning of February; and thereupon the brightest of the Southern leaders
proceeded to make a capital mistake. The Confederate estimate of the Union
force at that time in Kentucky alone was 119 regiments. The force at Cairo,
St. Louis, and the towns near the mouth of the Cumberland River was judged
to be about as great. It was also known that we had unlimited means of
transportation for troops, making concentration a work of but few hours.
Still General Johnston persisted in fighting for Nashville, and for that
purpose divided his thirty thousand men. Fourteen thousand he kept in
observation of Buell at Louisville. Sixteen thousand he gave to defend Fort
Donelson. The latter detachment he himself called " the best part of his
army." It is difficult to think of a great master of strategy making an error
so perilous.
Having taken the resolution to defend Nashville at Donelson, he intrusted
the operation to three chiefs of brigade — John B. Floyd, Gideon J. Pillow,
and Simon B. Buckner. Of these, the first was ranking officer, and he
was at the time under indictment by a grand jury at Washington for mal-
versation as Secretary of War under President Buchanan, and for complicity
in an embezzlement of public funds. As will be seen, there came a crisis
when the recollection of the circumstance exerted an unhappy influence over
his judgment. The second officer had a genuine military record ; but it is
said of him that he was of a jealous nature, insubordinate, and quarrelsome.
His bold attempt to supersede General Scott in Mexico was green in the
memories of living men. To give pertinency to the remark, there is reason
to believe that a personal misunderstanding between him and General Buck-
ner, older than the rebellion, was yet unsettled when the two met at Donelson.
All in all, therefore, there is little doubt that the junior of the three com-
manders was the fittest for the enterprise intrusted to them. He was their
equal in courage; while in devotion to the cause and to his profession of
arms, in tactical knowledge, in military bearing, in the faculty of getting the
most service out of his inferiors, and inspiring them with confidence in his
ability, — as a soldier in all the higher meanings of the word, — he was greatly
their superior.
The 6th of February, 1862, dawned darkly after a thunder-storm. Pacing
the parapets of the work on the hill above the inlet formed by the junction
of Hickman's Creek and the Cumberland River, a sentinel, in the serviceable
butternut jeans uniform of the Confederate army of the West, might that
VOL. I. 26 *
402
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
FED.HOSPITAL
. at £.
SCALE
:
100 300
YA R DS
a* CONFEDERATE TENTS
"S i, LOG HUTS
MAP OF FORT DONELSON, AS INVESTED BY GENERAL GRANT; BASED ON THE OFFICIAL MAP
BY GENERAL J. B. MCPHERSON.
day have surveyed Fort Donelson almost ready for battle. In fact, very
little was afterward done to it. There were the two water-batteries sunk
in the northern face of the bluff, about thirty feet above the river ; in the
lower battery 9 32-pounder guns and 1 10-inch Columbiad, and in the
upper another Columbiad, bored and rifled as a 32-pounder, and 2 32-
pounder carronades. These guns lay between the embrasures, in snug
revetment of sand in coffee-sacks, flanked right and left with stout traverses.
The satisfaction of the sentry could have been nowise diminished at seeing
the backwater lying deep in the creek ; a more perfect ditch against assault
could not have been constructed. The fort itself was of good profile, and
admirably adapted to the ridge it crowned. Around it, on the landward side,
ran the rifle-pits, a continuous but irregular line of logs, covered with yellow
clay. From Hickman's Creek they extended far around to the little run just
outside the town on the south. If the sentry thought the pits looked shallow,
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. * 403
he was solaced to see that they followed the coping of the ascents, seventy or
eighty feet in height, np which a foe must charge, and that, where they were
weakest, they were strengthened by trees felled outwardly in front of them,
so that the interlacing limbs and branches seemed impassable by men under
fire. At points inside the outworks, on the inner slopes of the hills, defended
thus from view of an enemy as well as from his shot, lay the huts and log-
houses of the garrison. Here and there groups of later comers, shivering in
their wet blankets, were visible in a bivouac so cheerless that not even morn-
ing fires could relieve it. A little music would have helped their sinking
spirits, but there was none. Even the picturesque effect of gay uniforms was
wanting. In fine, the Confederate sentinel on the ramparts that morning,
taking in the whole scene, knew the jolly, rollicking picnic days of the war
were over.
To make clearer why the 6th of February is selected to present the first
view of the fort, about noon that day the whole garrison was drawn from
their quarters by the sound of heavy guns, faintly heard from the direction
of Fort Henry, a token by which every man of them knew that a battle was
on. The occurrence was in fact expected, for two days before a horseman
had ridden to General Tilghman with word that at 4 : 30 o'clock in the morn-
ing rocket signals had been exchanged with the picket at Bailey's Landing,
announcing the approach of gun-boats. A second courier came, and then a
third; the latter, in great haste, requesting the general's presence at Fort
Henry. There was quick mounting at headquarters, and, before the camp
could be taken into confidence, the general and his guard were out of sight.
Occasional guns were heard the day following. Donelson gave itself up to
excitement and conjecture. At noon of the 6th, as stated, there was continuous
and "heavy cannonading at Fort Henry, and greater excitement at Fort Donel-
son. The polemicists in Dover became uneasy and prepared to get away. In the
evening fugitives arrived in groups, and told how the gun-boats ran straight
upon the fort and took it. The polemicists hastened their departure from
town. At exactly midnight the gallant Colonel Heinian marched into Fort
Donelson with two brigades of infantry rescued from the ruins of Forts
Henry and Heiman. The officers and men by whom they were received then
knew that their turn was at hand ; and at daybreak, with one mind and firm
of purpose, they set about the final preparation.
Brigadier-General Pillow reached Fort Donelson on the 9th; Brigadier-
General Buckner came in the night of the 11th ; and Brigadier-General Floyd
011 the 13th. The latter, by virtue of his rank, took command.
The morning of the 13th — calm, spring-like, the very opposite of that of
the 6th — found in Fort Donelson a garrison of 28 regiments of infantry: 13
from Tennessee, 2 from Kentucky, 6 from Mississippi, 1 from Texas, 2 from
Alabama, 4 from Virginia. There were also present 2 independent battalions,
1 regiment of cavalry, and artillerymen for 6 light batteries, and 17 heavy
guns, making a total of quite 18,000 effectives. [See page 430.]
General Buckner's division — 6 'regiments and 2 batteries — constituted
the right wing, and was posted to cover the land approaches to the water-bat-
404
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
teries. A left wing was or-
ganized into six brigades,
commanded respectively
by Colonels Heiman, Da-
vidson, Drake, Wharton,
McCausland, and Baldwin,
and posted from right to
left in the order named.
Four batteries were dis-
tributed amongst the left
wing. General Bnshrod R.
Johnson, an able officer,
served the general com-
manding as chief-of-staff.
Dover was converted into a
depot of supplies and ord-
nance stores. These dispo-
sitions made, Fort Donel-
son was ready for battle.
It may be doubted if
General Grant called a
council of war. The near-
est approach to it was a
convocation held on the
New Uncle Sam, a steamboat that was afterward trans-
formed into the gun-boat Blackhawk. The morning of the
11th of February, a staff-officer visited each commandant
of division and brigade with the simple verbal message :
^ "General Grant sends his compliments, and requests to see
you this afternoon on his boat." Minutes of the proceedings
were not kept; there was no adjournment; each person retired when he
got ready, knowing that the march would take place next day, probably
in the forenoon.
There were in attendance on the occasion some officers of great subsequent
notability. Of these Ulysses S. Grant was first. The world knows him now;
then his fame was all before him. A singularity of the volunteer service in
that day was that nobody took account of even a first-rate record of the Mex-
ican War. The battle of Belmont, though indecisive, was a much better ref-
erence. A story was abroad that Grant had been the last man to take boat
at the end of that affair, and the addendum that he had lingered in face of
the enemy until he was hauled aboard with the last gang-plank, did him great
good. From the first his silence was remarkable. He knew how to keep hi,<
temper. In battle, as in camp, he went about quietly, speaking in a convei
sational tone ; yet he appeared to see everything that went on, and was s
ways intent on business. He had a faithful assistant adjutant-general, a
appreciated him ; he preferred, however, his own eyes, word, and hand. 7
GLIMPSE OF THE CUMBERLAND RIV-
ER WHERE THE GUN-BOATS FIRST
APPEARED, LOOKING NORTH
FROM THE HIGHEST EARTH-
WORKS OF FORT DONELSON.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH
TAKEN IN 1884.
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
405
aides were little more than messengers. In dress he was plain, even negligent ;
in partial amendment of that his horse was always a good one and well kept.
At the council — calling it such by grace — he smoked, but never said a word.
In all probability he was framing the orders of march which were issued that
night.
Charles F. Smith, of the regular army, was also present. He was a person
of superb physique, very tall, perfectly proportioned, straight, square-shoul-
dered, ruddy-faced, with
eyes of perfect blue, and
long snow-white mus-
taches. He seemed to know
the army regulations by
heart, and caught a tac-
tical mistake, whether of
command or execution, by
a kind of mental coup
drmil. He was naturally
kind, genial, communica-
tive, and never failed to
answer when information
was sought of him ; at the
same time he believed in
" hours of service " regu-
larly published by the
adjutants as a rabbi be-
lieves in the Ten Tables,
and to call a court-martial
on a " bummer " was in his
eyes a sinful waste of sta-
tionery. On the occasion
of a review General Smith had the bearing of a marshal of France. He
could ride along a line of volunteers in the regulation uniform of a briga-
dier-general, plume, chapeau, epaulets and all, without exciting laughter —
something nobody else could do in the beginning of the war. He was at first
accused of disloyalty, and when told of it, his eyes flashed wickedly ; then he
laughed, and said, "Oh, never mind! They'll take it back after our first
battle." And they did. At the time of the meeting on the New Uncle Sam
he was a brigadier-general, and commanded the division which in the land
operations against Fort Henry had marched up the left bank of the river
against Fort Heiman.
Another officer worthy of mention was John A. McClernand, also a briga-
dier. By profession a lawyer, he was in his first of military service. Brave,
industrious, methodical, and of unquestioned cleverness, he was rapidly
acquiring the art of war.
There was still another in attendance on the New Uncle Sam not to be
passed — a young man who had followed General Grant from Illinois, and
MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN A. M'CLERNAND. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
406 THE CAPTURE OF FORT DO NELSON.
was seeing his first of military service. No soldier in the least familiar with
headquarters on the Tennessee can ever forget the slender figure, large black
eyes, hectic cheeks, and sincere, earnest manner of John A. Rawlins, then
assistant adjutant-general, afterward major-general and secretary of war.
He had two special devotions — to the cause and to his chief. He lived to see
the first triumphant and the latter first in peace as well as in war. Probably
no officer of the Union was mourned by so many armies.
Fort Henry, it will be remembered, was taken by Flag-Officer Foote on
the 6th of February. The time up to the 12th was given to reconnoitering
the country in the direction of Fort Donelson. Two roads were discovered:
one of twelve miles direct, the other almost parallel with the first, but, on
account of a slight divergence, two miles longer.
By 8 o'clock in the morning, the First Division, General McClernand com-
manding, and the Second, under General Smith [see page 429], were in full
march. The infantry of this command consisted of twenty-five regiments in
all, or three less than those of the Confederates. Against their six field-bat-
teries General Grant had seven. In cavalry alone he was materially stronger.
The rule in attacking fortifications is five to one ; to save the Union com-
mander from a charge of rashness, however, he had also at control a fighting
quality ordinarily at home on the sea rather than the land. After receiving
the surrender of Fort Henry, Flag-Officer Foote had hastened to Cairo to
make preparation for the reduction of Fort Donelson. With six of his boats,
he passed into the Cumberland River; and on the 12th, while the two divis-
ions of the army were marching across to Donelson, he was hurrying, as
fast as steam could drive him and his following, to a second trial of iron
batteries afloat against earth batteries ashore. The Garondelet, Commander
Walke, having preceded him, had been in position below the fort since the
12th. By sundown of the 12th, McClernand and Smith reached the point
designated for them in orders.
On the morning of the 13th of February General Grant, with about twenty
thousand men, was before Fort Donelson. $ We have had a view of the army
in the works ready for battle ; a like view of that outside and about to go into
position of attack and assault is not so easily to be given. At dawn the latter
host rose up from the bare ground, and, snatching bread and coffee as best
they could, fell into lines that stretched away over hills, down hollows, and
through thickets, making it impossible for even colonels to see their regi-
ments from flank to flank.
Pausing to give a thought to the situation, it is proper to remind the
reader that he is about to witness an event of more than mere historical
interest; he is about to see the men of the North and North-west and of the
South and South-west enter for the first time into a strife of arms ; on one
side, the best blood of Tennessee, Kentucky, Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas,
aided materially by fighting representatives from Virginia; on the other, the
best blood of Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and Nebraska.
J. General Grant estimates his available forces at this time at about 15,000, and on the last day at
27,000, 5000 or 6000 of whom were guarding transportation trains in the rear. — Editors.
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. 407
We have now before us a spectacle seldom witnessed in the annals of
scientific war — an army behind field-works erected in a chosen position wait-
ing quietly while another army very little superior in numbers proceeds at
leisure to place it in a state of siege. Such was the operation General Grant
had before him at daybreak of the 13th of February. Let us see how it was
accomplished and how it was resisted.
In a clearing about two miles from Dover there was a log-house, at the
time occupied by a Mrs. Crisp. As the road to Dover ran close by, it was
made the headquarters of the commanding general. All through the night
of the 12th, the coining and going was incessant. Smith was ordered to find
a position in front of the enemy's right wing, which would place him face
to face with Buckner. McClernaud's order was to establish himself on the
enemy's left, where he would be opposed to Pillow.
A little before dawn Birge's sharp-shooters were astir. Theirs was a
peculiar service. Each was a preferred marksman, and carried a long-range
Henry rifle, with sights delicately arranged as for target practice. In action
each was perfectly independent. They never manoeuvred as a corps. When
the time came they were asked, "Canteens full?" "Biscuits for all day?"
Then their only order, "All right; hunt your holes, boys." Thereupon they
dispersed, and, like Indians, sought cover to please themselves behind rocks
and stumps, or in hollows. Sometimes they dug holes; sometimes they
climbed into trees. Once in a good location, they remained there the day.
At night they would crawl out and report in camp. This morning, as I have
said, the sharp-shooters dispersed early to find places within easy range of
the breastworks.
The movement by Smith and McClernand was begun about the same time.
A thick wood fairly screened the former. The latter had to cross an open
valley under fire of two batteries, one on Buckner's left, the other on a high
point jutting from the line of outworks held by Colonel Heiman of Pillow's
command. Graves commanded the first, Maney the second; both were of
Tennessee. As always in situations where the advancing party is ignorant
of the ground and of the designs of the enemy, resort was had to skirmishers,
who are to the main body what antennas are to insects. Theirs it is to unmask
the foe. Unlike sharp-shooters, they act in bodies. Behind the skirmishers,
the batteries started out to find positions, and through the brush and woods,
down the hollows, up the hills the guns and caissons were hauled. Nowadays
it must be a very steep bluff in face of which the good artillerist will stop or
turn back. At Donelson, however, the proceeding was generally slow and
toilsome. The officer had to find a vantage-ground first ; then with axes a
road to it was hewn out ; after which, in many instances, the men, with the
prolongs over their shoulders, helped the horses along. In the gray of the
dawn the sharp-shooters were deep in their deadly game; as the sun came
up, one battery after another opened fire, and was instantly and gallantly
answered; and all the time behind the hidden sharp-shooters, and behind
the skirmishers, who occasionally stopped to take a hand in the fray, the
regiments marched, route-step, colors flying, after their colonels.
408
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
About 11 o'clock Com-
mander Walke, of the
Carondelet, engaged the
water-batteries. The air
was then full of the
stunning music of bat-
tle, though as yet not
a volley of musketry
had been heard. Smith,
nearest the enemy at
starting, was first in
place; and there, leav-
ing the fight to his
sharp-shooters and skir-
mishers and to his bat-
teries, he reported to
the chief in the log-
house, and, like an old
soldier, calmly waited
orders. McClernand, fol-
lowing a good road,
pushed on rapidly to
the high grounds on the
right. The appearance
of his column in the
valley covered by the
two Confederate batter-
ies provoked a furious
shelling from them. On
the double-quick his
men passed through it ; and when, in the wood beyond, they resumed the
route-step and saw that nobody was hurt, they fell to laughing at them-
selves. The real baptism of fire was yet in store for them.
When McClernand arrived at his appointed place and extended his brigades,
it was discovered that the Confederate outworks offered a front too great for
him to envelop. To attempt to rest his right opposite their extreme left would
necessitate a dangerous attenuation of his line and leave him without reserves.
Over on their left, moreover, ran the road already mentioned as passing from
Dover on the south to Charlotte and Nashville, which it was of the highest
importance to close hermetically so that there would be no communication
left General Floyd except by the river. If the road to Charlotte were left to
the enemy, they might march out at their pleasure.
The insufficiency of his force was thus made apparent to General Grant,
and whether a discovery of the moment or not, he set about its correction.
He knew a reenf orcement was coming up the river under convoy of Foote ;
besides which a brigade, composed of the 8th Missouri and the 11th Indiana
MAJOR-GENERAL SIMON B. BDCKNER, C. S. A. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
409
infantry and Battery A, Illinois, had been left behind at Forts Henry and
Heiman nnder myself. A courier was dispatched to nie with an order to
bring my command to Donelson. I ferried my troops across the Tennessee
in the night, and reported with them at headquarters before noon the next
day. The brigade was transferred to General Smith; at the same time an
order was put into my hand assigning me to command the Third Division,
which was conducted to a position between Smith and McClernand, enabling
the latter to extend his line well to the left and cover the road to Charlotte.
Thus on the 14th of February the Confederates were completely invested,
except that the river above Dover remained to them. The supineness of
General Floyd all this while is to this day incomprehensible. A vigorous
attack on the morning of the 13th might have thrown Grant back upon Fort
Henry. Such an achievement would have more than offset Foote's conquest.
The morale to
be gained would
have alone justi-
fied the attempt.
But with McCler-
nand's strong di-
vision on the
right, my own in
the center, and C.
F. Smith's on the
left, the opportu-
nity was gone. On
the side of Gen-
eral Grant, the
possession of the
river was all that
was wanting ;
with that Grant
could force the
fighting, or wait
the certain ap-
proach of the
grimmest enemy
of the besieged
— starvation.
It is now — morning of the 14th — easy to see and understand with some-
thing more than approximate exactness the oppositions of the two forces.
Smith is on the left of the Union army opposite Buckner. My division, in
the center, confronts Colonels Heiman, Drake, and Davidson, each with a
brigade. McClernand, now well over on the right, keeps the road to Char-
lotte and Nashville against the major part of Pillow's left wing. The infantry
on both sides are in cover behind the crests of the hills or in thick woods,
listening to the ragged fusillade which the sharp-shooters and skirmishers
■; rat?™
%%
DOVER TAVERN — GENERAL BUCKNER'S HEADQUARTERS AND THE SCENE OF
THE SURRENDER. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.
4io
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
:.'j- .*! i:, ' ii i'i'iVm"'! ' :
I'LJiJii. i.HI! N
MA.JOR-GENERAL MORGAN L. SMITH. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
maintain against each other al-
most without intermission. There
is little pause in the exchange of
shells and round shot. The care-
ful chiefs have required their men
to lie down. In brief, it looks as
if each party were inviting the
other to begin.
These circumstances, the sharp-
shooting and cannonading, ugly
as they may seem to one who
thinks of them under comfort-
able surroundings, did in fact
serve a good purpose the day in
question in helping the men to
forget their sufferings of the
night before. It must be remem-
bered that the weather had
changed during the preceding
afternoon : from suggestions of
spring it turned to intensified
winter. From lending a gentle hand in bringing Foote and his iron-clads
up the river, the wind whisked suddenly around to the north and struck
both armies with a storm of. mixed rain, snow, and sleet. All night the
tempest blew mercilessly upon the unsheltered, tireless soldier, making
sleep impossible. Inside the works, nobody had overcoats ; while thou-
sands of those outside had marched from Fort Henry as to a summer fete,
leaving coats, blankets, and knapsacks behind them in the camp. More
than one stout fellow has since admitted, with a laugh, that nothing was so
helpful to him that horrible night as the thought that the wind, which seemed
about to turn his blood into icicles, was serving the enemy the same way;
they, too, had to stand out and take the blast. Let us now go back to the
preceding day, and bring up an incident of McClernand's swing into position.
About the center of the Confederate outworks there was a V-shaped hill,
marked sharply by a ravine on its right and another on its left. This Col-
onel Herman occupied with his brigade of five regiments — all of Tennessee
but one. The front presented was about 2500 feet. In the angle of the V, on
the summit of the hill, Captain Maney's battery, also of Tennessee, had been
planted. Without protection of any kind, it nevertheless completely swept
a large field to the left, across which an assaulting force would have to come
in order to get at Heiman or at Drake, next on the south.
Maney, on the point of the hill, had been active throughout the preceding
afternoon, and had succeeded in drawing the fire of some of McClernand's
guns. The dnel lasted until night. Next morning it was renewed with
increased sharpness, Maney being assisted on his right by Graves's battery
of Buckner's division, and by some pieces of Drake's on his left.
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
411
McClernand's advance was necessarily slow and trying. This was not
merely a logical result of unacquaintance with the country and the disposi-
tions of the enemy ; he was also under an order from General Grant to avoid
everything calculated to bring on a general engagement. In Maney's well-
served guns he undoubtedly found serious annoyance, if not a positive
obstruction. Concentrating guns of his own upon the industrious Confeder-
ate, he at length fancied him silenced and the enemy's infantry on the right
thrown into confusion — circumstances from which he hastily deduced a
favorable chance to deliver an assault. For that purpose he reenforced his
Third Brigade, which was nearest the offending battery, and gave the neces-
sary orders.
Up to this time, it will be observed, there had not been any fighting involv-
ing infantry in line. This was now to be changed. Old soldiers, rich with
experience, would have regarded the
work proposed with gravity ; they
woiild have shrewdly cast up an ac-
count of the chances of success, not
to speak of the chances of coming out
alive ; they would have measured the
distance to be passed, every foot of
it, under the guns of three batteries,
Maney's in the center, Graves's on their
left, and Drake's on their right — a
direct line of fire doubly crossed. Nor
would they have omitted the recep-
tion awaiting them from the rifle-pits.
They were to descend a hill entangled
for two hundred yards with under-
brush, climb an opposite ascent partly
shorn of timber; make way through an abatis of tree-tops; then, sup-
posing all that successfully accomplished, they would be at last in face of
an enemy whom it was possible to reenforce with all the reserves of the
garrison — with the whole garrison, if need be. A veteran would have
surveyed the three regiments selected for the honorable duty with many
misgivings. Not so the men themselves. They were not old soldiers.
Recruited but recently from farms and shops, they accepted the assign-
ment heartily and with youthful confidence in their prowess. It may be
doubted if a man in the ranks gave a thought to the questions, whether
the attack was to be supported while making, or followed up if successful,
or whether it was part of a general advance. Probably the most they knew
was that the immediate objective before them was the capture of the bat-
tery on the hill.
The line when formed stood thus from the right : the 49th Illinois, then the
17th, and then the 48th, Colonel Haynie. At the last moment, a question of
seniority arose between Colonels Morrison and Haynie. The latter was of
opinion that he was the ranking officer. Morrison replied that he would
.MAJOR-GEXLH A I. C. F. SMITH. FROM A l'HOTOtiRAPH.
412 THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
conduct the brigade to the point from which the attack was to be made, after
which Haynie might take the command, if he so desired.
Down the hill the three regiments went, crashing and tearing through the
undergrowth. Heiman, on the lookout, saw them advancing. Before they
cleared the woods, Maney opened with shells. At the foot of the descent, in
the valley, Graves joined his fire to Maney's. There Morrison reported to
Haynie, who neither accepted nor refused the command. Pointing to the
hill, he merely said, " Let us take it together." Morrison turned away, and
rejoined his own regiment. Here was confusion in the beginning, or worse,
an assault begun without a head. Nevertheless, the whole line went forward.
On a part of the hillside the trees were yet standing. The open space fell to
Morrison and his 49th, and paying the penalty of the exposure, he outstripped
his associates. The men fell rapidly ; yet the living rushed on and up, firing
as they went. The battery was the common target. Maney's gunners, in
relief against the sky, were shot down in quick succession. His first lieuten-
ant (Burns) was one of the first to suffer. His second^ lieutenant (Massie) was
mortally wounded. Maney himself was hit; still he staid, and his guns
continued their punishment ; and still the farmer lads and shop boys of Illi-
nois clung to their purpose. With marvelous audacity they pushed through
the abatis and reached a point within forty yards of the rifle-pits. It actu-
ally looked as if the prize were theirs. The yell of victory was rising in their
throats. Suddenly the long line of yellow breastworks before them, covering
Herman's five regiments, crackled and turned into flame. The forlorn-hope
stopped — staggered — braced up again — shot blindly through the smoke at
the smoke of the new enemy, secure in his shelter. Thus for fifteen minutes
the Illinoisans stood fighting. The time is given on the testimony of the
opposing leader himself. Morrison was knocked out of his saddle by a mus-
ket-ball, and disabled ; then the men went down the hill. At its foot they
rallied round their flags and renewed the assault. Pushed down again, again
they rallied, and a third time climbed to the enemy. This time the battery
set fire to the dry leaves on the ground, and the heat and smoke became
stifling. It was not possible for brave men to endure more. Slowly, sullenly,
frequently pausing to return a shot, they went back for the last time ; and
in going their ears and souls were riven with the shrieks of their wounded
comrades, whom the flames crept down upon and smothered and charred
where they lay.
Considered as a mere exhibition of courage, this assault, long maintained
against odds, — twice repulsed, twice renewed, — has been seldom excelled.
One hundred and forty-nine men of the 17th and 49th were killed and
wounded. Haynie reported 1 killed and 8 wounded.
There are few things connected with the operations against Fort Doiielson
so relieved of uncertainty as this : that when General Grant at Fort Henry
became fixed in the resolution to undertake the movement, his primary object
was the capture of the force to which the post was intrusted. To effect their
complete environment, he relied upon Flag-Officer Foote and his gun-boats,
whose astonishing success at Fort Henry justified the extreme of confidence.
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
413
FRONT VIEW OF MRS. CRISP'S HOUSE.
FROM PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN IN 1884.
THE CRISP FARM— GENERAL GRANT'S
HEADQUARTERS.
Foote arrived on the 14th, and
made haste to enter upon his work.
The Carondelet (Commander Walke)
had been in position since the 12th.
Behind a low output of the shore,
for two days, she maintained a fire
from her rifled guns, happily of
greater range than the best of those
of the enemy.
At 9 o'clock on the 14th, Captain
Culbertson, looking from the para-
pet of the upper battery, beheld the river below the first bend full of transports,
landing troops under cover of a fresh arrival of gun-boats. The disembarka-
tion concluded, Foote was free. He waited until noon. The captains in the
batteries mistook his deliberation for timidity. The impinging of their shot
on his iron armor was heard distinctly in the fort a mile and a half away.
The captains began to doubt if he would come at all. But at 3 o'clock
the boats took position under fire : the Louisville on the right, the St. Louts
next, then the Pittsburgh, then the Carondelet, all iron-clad.
Five hundred yards from the batteries, and yet Foote was not content ! In
the Crimean war the allied French and English fleets, of much mightier ships,
undertook to engage the Eussian shore batteries, but little stronger than those
at Donelson. The French on that occasion stood off 1800 yards. Lord Lyons
fought his Agamemnon at a distance of 800 yards. Foote forged ahead within
400 yards of his enemy, and was still going on. His boat had been hit
between wind and water; so with the Pittsburgh and Carondelet. About the
guns the floors were slippery with blood, and both surgeons and carpenters
were never so busy. Still the four boats kept on, and there was great cheer-
ing; for not only did the fire from the shore slacken; the lookouts reported
the enemy running. It seemed that fortune would smile once more upon the
fleet, and cover the honors of Fort Henry afresh at Fort Donelson. Unhap-
pily, when about 350 yards off the hill a solid shot plunged through the pilot-
house of the flag-ship, and carried away the wheel. Near the same time the
414
THE Cs
E OF FORT DONELSON.
tiller-ropes of the Louisville were disabled. Both vessels became unmanage-
able and began floating down the current. The eddies turned them round like
logs. ThePittsbiii(/h and ( 'arondelet closed in and covered them with their hulls.
Seeing this turn in the tight, the captains of the batteries rallied their men,
who cheered in their turn, and renewed the contest with increased will and
energy. A ball got lodged in their best rifle. A corporal and some of his
men took a log fitting the bore, leaped out on the parapet, and rammed the
missile home. " Now, boys," said a gunner in Bidwell's battery, "see me take
a chimney ! " The flag of the boat and the chimney fell with the shot.
When the vessels were out of range, the victors looked about them. The
fine form of their embrasures was gone ; heaps of earth had been cast over
their platforms. In a space of twenty-four feet they had picked up as many
shot and shells. The air had been full of flying missiles. For an hour and a
half the brave fellows had been rained upon ; yet their losses had been trifling
in numbers. Each gunner had selected a ship and followed her faithfully
throughout the action, now and then uniting fire on th,e Carondelet. The Con-
federates had behaved with astonishing valor. Their victory sent a thrill of
joy through the army. The assault on the outworks, the day before, had
been a failure. With the repulse of the gun-boats the Confederates scored
success number two, and the communication by the river remained open to
Nashville. The winds that blew sleet and snow over Donelson that night
were not so unendurable as they
might have been.
The night of the 14th of Febru-
ary fell cold and dark, and under
the pitiless sky the armies re-
mained in position so near to each
other that neither dared light
fires. Overpowered with watching,
THE POSITION OF THE GUN-BOATS AND THE WEST BANK. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.
Fort Donelson is in the farther distance on the extreme left — Hickman's Creels empties into the Cumberland in
the middle distance — mid way are the remains of the obstructions placed in the river by the Confederates.
The upper picture, showing Isaac Williams's house, is a continuation of the right of the lower view.
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. 415
fatigue, and the lassitude of spirits which always follows a strain upon
the faculties of men like that which is the concomitant of battle, thousands
on both sides lay down in the ditches and behind logs and whatever else
would in the least shelter them from the cutting wind, and tried to sleep.
Very few closed their eyes. Even the horses, after their manner, betrayed
the suffering they were enduring.
That morning General Floyd had called a council of his chiefs of brigades
and divisions. He expressed the opinion that the post was untenable, except
with fifty thousand troops. He called attention to the heavy reinforcements
of the Federals, and suggested an immediate attack upon their right wing to
reopen land communication with Nashville, by way of Charlotte. The pro-
posal was agreed to unanimously. General Buckner proceeded to make dis-
positions to cover the retreat, in the event the sortie should be successful.
Shortly after noon, when the movement should have begun, the order was
countermanded at the instance of Pillow. Then came the battle with the
gun-boats.
In the night the council was recalled, with general and regimental officers
in attendance. The situation was again debated, and the same conclusion
reached. According to the plan resolved upon, Pillow was to move at dawn
with his whole division, and attack the right of the besiegers. General
Buckner was to be relieved by troops in the forts, and with his command to
support Pillow by assailing the right of the enemy's center. If he succeeded,
he was to take post outside the intrenchments on the Wynn's Ferry road to
cover the retreat. He was then to act as rear-guard. Thus early, leaders in
Donelson were aware of the mistake into which they were plunged. Their
resolution was wise and heroic. Let us see how they executed it.
Preparations for the attack occupied the night. The troops for the most
part were taken out of the rifle-pits and massed over on the left to the
number of ten thousand or more. The ground was covered with ice and
snow; yet the greatest silence was observed. It seems incomprehensible
that columns mixed of all arms, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, could have
engaged in simultaneous movement, and not have been heard by some listener
outside. One would think the jolting and rumble of the heavy gun-carriages
would have told the story. But the character of the night must be remem-
bered. The pickets of the Federals were struggling for life against the blast,
and probably did not keep good watch.
Oglesby's brigade held McClernand's extreme right. Here and there the
musicians were beginning to make the woods ring with reveille, and the
numbed soldiers of the line were rising from their icy beds and shaking the
snow from their frozen garments. As yet, however, not a company had
"fallen in." Suddenly the pickets fired, and with the alarm on their lips
rushed back upon their comrades. The woods on the instant became alive.
The regiments formed, officers mounted and took their places ; words of
command rose loud and eager. By the time Pillow's advance opened fire on
Oglesby's right, the point first struck, the latter was fairly formed to receive
it. A rapid exchange of volleys ensued. The distance intervening between
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416
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. 417
the works on one side and the bivouac on the other was so short that the
action began before Pillow could effect a deployment. His brigades came
up in a kind of echelon, left in front, and passed " by regiments left into line,"
one by one, however ; the regiments quickly took their places, and advanced
without halting. Oglesby's Illinoisans were now fully awake. They held
their ground, returning in full measure the lire that they received. The
Confederate Forrest rode around as if to get in their rear, ^ and it was then
give and take, infantry against infantry. The semi-echelon movement of the
Confederates enabled them, after an interval, to strike W. H. L. Wallace's
brigade, on Oglesby's left. Soon Wallace was engaged along his whole front,
now prolonged by the addition to his command of Morrison's regiments.
The first charge against him was repulsed ; whereupon he advanced to the
top of the rising ground behind which he had sheltered his troops in the
night. A fresh assault followed, but, aided by a battery across the valley to
his left, he repulsed the enemy a second time. His men were steadfast, and
clung to the brow of the hill as if it were theirs by holy right. An hour
passed, and yet another hour, without cessation of the fire. Meantime the
woods rang with a monstrous clangor of musketry, as if a million men were
beating empty barrels with iron hammers.
Buckner flung a portion of his division on McClernand's left, and sup-
ported the attack with his artillery. The enfilading fell chiefly on W. H. L.
Wallace. McClernand, watchful and full of resources, sent batteries to meet
Buckner's batteries. To that duty Taylor rushed with his Company B ; and
McAllister pushed his three 24-pounders into position and exhausted his
ammunition in the duel. The roar never slackened. Men fell by the score,
reddening the snow with their blood. The smoke, in pallid white clouds,
clung to the underbrush and tree-tops as if to screen the combatants from
each other. Close to the ground the flame of musketry and cannon tinted
everything a lurid red. Limbs dropped from the trees on the heads below,
and the thickets were shorn as by an army of cradlers. The division was
under peremptory orders to hold its position to the last extremity, and
Colonel Wallace was equal to the emergency.
It was now 10 o'clock, and over on the right Oglesby was beginning to fare
badly. The pressure 011 his front grew stronger. The "rebel yell," after-
ward a familiar battle-cry on many fields, told of ground being gained against
him. To add to his doubts, officers were riding to him with a sickening story
that their commands were getting out of ammunition, and asking where they
could go for a supply. All he could say was to take what was in the boxes
of the dead and wounded. At last he realized that the end was come. His
right companies began to give way, and as they retreated, holding up their
empty cartridge-boxes, the enemy were emboldened, and swept more fiercely
around his flank, until finally they appeared in his rear. He then gave the
order to retire the division.
j) Colonel John McArthur, originally of General comfited, his men beat the cavalry off, and af ter-
C. F. Smith's division, but then operating with ward shared the full shock of the tempest with
McClernand, was there, and though at first dis- Oglesby's troops. — L. W.
vol. 1. 27
4i8
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
W. H. L. Wallace from his position looked off to his right and saw hut one
regiment of Oglesby's in place, maintaining the fight, and that was John A.
Logan's 31st Illinois. Through the smoke he could see Logan riding in a gal-
lop behind his line ; through the roar in his front and the rising yell in his
rear, he could hear Logan's voice in fierce entreaty to his " boys." Near the
31st stood W. H. L. Wallace's regiment, the 11th Illinois, under Lieutenant-
Colonel Ransom. The gaps in the ranks of the two were closed up always
toward the colors. The ground at their feet was strewn with their dead and
wounded ; at length the common misfortune overtook Logan. To keep men
without cartridges under fire sweeping them front and flank would be cruel,
if not impossible ; and seeing it, he too gave the order to retire, and followed
his decimated companies to the rear. The 11th then became the right of the
brigade, and had to go in turn. Nevertheless, Ransom changed front to rear
coolly, as if on parade, and joined in the general retirement. Forrest charged
them and threw them into a brief confusion. The greater portion clung to
their colors, and made good their retreat. By 11 o'clock Pillow held the road
to Charlotte and the
whole of the position
occupied at dawn by
the First Division, and
with it the dead and
all the wounded who
could not get away.
Pillow's part of the
programme, arranged
in the council of the
night before, was ac-
complished. The coun-
try was once more
open to Floyd. Why
did he not avail him-
self of the dearly
bought opportunity,
and march his army
out?
Without pausing to
consider whether the
Confederate general
could now have es-
caped with his troops,
it must be evident that
he should have made the effort. Pillow had discharged his duty well. With
the disappearance of W. H. L. Wallace's brigade, it only remained for the
victor to deploy his regiments into column and march into the country.
The road was his. Buckner was in position to protect Colonel Head's with-
drawal from the trenches opposite Greneral Smith on the right ; that done,
BRANCH OF HICKMAN'S CREEK NEAR JAMES CRISP'S HOUSE— THE LEFT
OF GENERAL C. F. SMITH'S LINE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
419
MAI. LISTER'S BATTERY IN ACTION.
Captain Edward McAllister's Illinois battery did good
service on the 13th. In his report he describes the man-
ner of working the battery : " I selected a point, and
about noon opened on the four-gun battery [see map,
page 402] through an opening in which I could see the
foe. Our lire was promptly returned with such preci-
sion that thcv cut our right wheel on howitzer number
three in t wo. r had no spare wheel, and had to take one
off the liniherto continue the fight. I then moved all my
howitzers over to the west slope of the ridge and loaded
under cover of it, and ran the pieces up by hand until I
could get the exact elevation. The recoil would throw
the guns back out of sight, and thus we continued the
fight until the enemy's battery was silenced."
he was also in position to cover the retreat. Bnckner had also faithfully
performed his task.
On the Union side the situation at this critical time was favorable to the
proposed retirement. My division in the center was weakened by the dis-
patch of one of my brigades to the assistance of General McClernand; in
addition to which my orders were to hold my position. As a point of still
greater importance, Greneral Grant had gone on board the St. Louis at the
request of Flag-Officer Foote, and he was there in consultation with that
officer, presumably uninformed of the disaster which had befallen his right.
It would take a certain time for him to return to the field and dispose his
forces for pin suit. It may be said with strong assurance, consequently, that
Floyd could have put his men fairly en route for Charlotte before the Federal
commander could have interposed an obstruction to the movement. The real
difficulty was in the hero of the morning, who now made haste to blight his
laurels. Greneral Pillow's vanity whistled itself into ludicrous exaltation.
Imagining General Grant's whole army defeated and fleeing in rout for Fort
Henry and the transports on the river, he deported himself accordingly. He
began by ignoring Floyd. He rode to Buckner and accused him of shameful
420 THE CAPTURE OF FORT D0NELS0N.
conduct. He sent an aide to the nearest telegraph station with a dispatch to
Albert Sidney Johnston, then in command of the Department, asseverating,
" on the honor of a soldier,'' that the day was theirs. Nor did he stop at that.
The victory, to be available, required that the enemy should be followed with
energy. Such was a habit of Napoleon. Without deigning even to consult
his chief, he ordered Buckner to move out and attack the Federals. There
was a gorge, up which a road ran toward our central position, or rather what
had been our central position. Pointing to the gorge and the road, he told
Buckner that was his way and bade him attack in force. There was nothing
to do but obey ; and when Buckner had begun the movement, the wise pro-
gramme decided upon the evening before was wiped from the slate.
When Buckner reluctantly took the gorge road marked out for him by
Pillow, the whole Confederate army, save the detachments on the works, was
virtually in pursuit of McClernand, retiring by the Wynn's Ferry road —
falling back, in fact, upon my position. My division was now to feel the
weight of Pillow's hand ; if they should fail, the fortunes of the day would
depend upon the veteran Smith.
When General McClernand perceived the peril threatening him in the
morning, he sent an officer to me with a request for assistance. This request
I referred to General Grant, who was at the time in consultation with Foote.
Upon the turning of Oglesby's flank, McClernand repeated his request, with
such a representation of the situation that, assuming the responsibility, I
ordered Colonel Cruft to report with his brigade to McClernand. Craft set
out promptly. Unfortunately a guide misdirected him, so that he became
involved in the retreat, and was prevented from accomplishing his object.
I was in the rear of my single remaining brigade, in conversation with
Captain Rawlins, of Grant's staff, when a great shouting was heard behind
me on the Wynn's Ferry road, whereupon I sent an orderly to ascertain the
cause. The man reported the road and woods full of soldiers apparently in
rout. An officer then rode by at full speed, shouting, "All's lost! Save your-
selves ! " A hurried consultation was had with Rawlins, at the end of which
the brigade was put in motion toward the enemy's works, on the very road
by which Buckner was pursuing under Pillow's mischievous order. It hap-
pened also that Colonel W. H. L. Wallace had dropped into the same ropp
with such of his command as staid by their colors. He came up ridim
at a walk, his leg over the horn of his saddle. He was perfectly
looked like a farmer from a hard day's plowing. "Good-morn
" Good-morning," was the reply. "Are they pursuing yo . xiow
far are they behind 1 " That instant the head of my con ed on
the road. The colonel calculated, then answered : " Y xbout
time to form line of battle right here." " Thank you. G ; lood-
day."
At that point the road began to dip into the gorge ; on the ri 1 left
there were woods, and in front a dense thicket. An order was di 3d to
bring Battery A forward at full speed. Colonel John A. Thayer, and-
ing the brigade, formed it on the double-quick into line ; the Is iska
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
421
and the 58th Illinois 011 the right, and the 58th Ohio, with a detached com
pany, on the left. The battery came up on the run and swung across the road,
which had been left open for it. Hardly had it unlimbered, before the enemy
appeared, and firing began. For ten minutes or thereabouts the scenes of the
morning were reenacted. The Confederates struggled hard to perfect their
deployments. The woods rang with musketry and artillery. The brush on
the slope of the hill was mowed away with bullets. A great cloud arose and
^>.
--k.
VIEW ON THE LINE OF PILLOW'S DEFENSES IN FRONT OF MCCLERNAND, SHOWING WATER IN THE OLD TRENCHES.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.
shut out the woods and the narrow valley below. Colonel Thayer and his
regiments behaved with great gallantry, and the assailants fell back in con-
fusion and returned to the intrenchments. W. H. L. Wallace and Oglesby
re-formed their commands behind Thayer, supplied them with ammunition,
and stood at rest waiting for orders. There was then a lull in the battle.
Even the cannonading ceased, and everybody was asking, What next ?
Just then General Grant rode up to where General McClernand and I were
in conversation. He was almost unattended. In his hand there were some
422 THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
papers, which looked like telegrams. Wholly unexcited, he saluted and
received the salutations of his subordinates. Proceeding at once to busi-
ness, he directed them to retire their commands to the heights out of cannon
range, and throw up works. Reinforcements were en route, he said, and it
was advisable to await their coming. He was then informed of the mishap
to the First Division, and that the road to Charlotte was open to the enemy.
In every great man's career there is a crisis exactly similar to that which
now overtook General Grant, and it cannot be better described than as a
crucial test of his nature. A mediocre person would have accepted the news
as an argument for persistence in his resolution to enter upon a siege. Had
General Grant done so, it is very probable his history would have been then
and there concluded. His admirers and detractors are alike invited to study
him at this precise juncture. It cannot be doubted that he saw with painf id
distinctness the effect of the disaster to his right wing. His face flushed
slightly. With a sudden grip he crushed the papers in his hand. But in an
instant these signs of disappointment or hesitation — as the reader pleases —
cleared away. In his ordinary quiet voice he said, addressing himself to both
officers, "Gentlemen, the position on the right must be retaken." With that
he turned and galloped off.
Seeing in the road a provisional brigade, under Colonel Morgan L. Smith,
consisting of the 11th Indiana and the 8th Missouri Infantry, going, by order
of General C. F. Smith, to the aid of the First Division, I suggested that if
General McClernand would order Colonel Smith to report to me, I would
attempt to recover the lost ground; and the order having been given, I
reconnoitered the hill, determined upon a place of assault, and arranged my
order of attack. I chose Colonel Smith's regiments to lead? and for that pur-
pose conducted them to the crest of a hill opposite a steep bluff covered by
the enemy. The two regiments had been formerly of my brigade. I knew
they had been admirably drilled in the Zouave tactics, and my confidence in
Smith and in George F. McGinnis, colonel of the 11th, was implicit. I was
sure they would take their men to the top of the bluff. Colonel Cruf t was put
in line to support them on the right. Colonel Ross, with his regiments, the
17th and 49th, and the 46th, 57th, and 58th Illinois, were put as support on
the left. Thayer's brigade was held in reserve. These dispositions filled the
time till about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, when heavy cannonading, mixed with
a long roll of musketry, broke out over on the left, whither it will be necessary
to transfer the reader.
The veteran in command on the Union left had contented himself with
allowing Buckner no rest, keeping up a continual sharp-shooting. Early in
the morning of the 11th he made a demonstration of assault with three of his
regiments, and though he purposely withdrew them, he kept the menace
standing, to the great discomfort of his vis-a-vis. With the patience of an
old soldier, he waited the pleasure of the general commanding, knowing that
when the time came he would be called upon. During the battle of the gun-
boats he rode through his command and grimly joked with them. He who
never permitted the slightest familiarity from a subordinate, could yet indulge
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. 425
in fatherly pleasantries with the ranks when he thought circumstances jus-
tified them. He never for a moment doubted the courage of volunteers ;
they were not regulars — that was all. If properly led, he believed they would
storm the gates of his Satanic Majesty. Their hour of trial was now come.
From his brief and characteristic conference with McClernand and myself,
General Grant rode to General C. F. Smith. What took place between them
is not known, further than that he ordered an assault upon the outworks as a
diversion in aid of the assardt about to be delivered on the right. General
Smith personally directed his chiefs of brigade to get their regiments ready.
Colonel John Cook by his order increased the number of his skirmishers
already engaged with the enemy.
Taking Lauman's brigade, General Smith began the advance. They were
under fire instantly. The guns in the fort joined in with the infantry who
were at the time in the rifle-pits, the great body of the Confederate right wing
being with General Buckner. The defense was greatly favored by the ground,
which subjected the assailants to a double fire from the beginning of the
abatis. The men have said that "it looked too thick for a rabbit to get
through." General Smith, on his horse, took position in the front and center
of the line. Occasionally he turned in the saddle to see how the alignment was
kept. For the most part, however, he held his face steadily toward the enemy.
He was, of course, a conspicuous object for the sharp-shooters in the rifle-pits.
The air around him twittered with minie-bullets. Erect as if on review, he
rode on, timing the gait of his horse with the movement of his colors. A
soldier said : " I was nearly scared to death, but I saw the old man's white
mustache over his shoulder, and went on."
On to the abatis the regiments moved without hesitation, leaving a trail of
dead and wounded behind. There the fire seemed to get trebly hot, and there
some of the men halted, whereupon, seeing the hesitation, General Smith put
his cap on the point of his sword, held it aloft, and called out, " No flinching
now, my lads ? — Here — this is the way ! Come on ! " He picked a path
through the jagged limbs of the trees, holding his cap all the time in sight ;
and the effect was magical. The men swarmed in after him, and got through
in the best order they could — not all of them, alas ! On the other side of the
obstruction they took the semblance of re-formation and charged in after
their chief, who found himself then between the two fires. Up the ascent he
rode ; up they followed. At the last moment the keepers of the rifle-pits
clambered out and fled. The four regiments engaged in the feat — the 25th
Indiana, and the 2d, 7th, and 14th Iowa — planted their colors on the breast-
work. Later in the day, Buckner came back with his division : but all his
efforts to dislodge Smith were vain.
We left my division about to attempt the recapture of the hill, which had
been the scene of • the combat between Pillow and McClernand. If only on
account of the results which followed that assault, in connection with the
heroic performance of General C. F. Smith, it is necessary to return to it.
Riding to my old regiments, — the 8th Missouri and the 11 th Indiana, — I
asked them if they were ready. They demanded the word of me. Waiting
424
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
a moment for Mor-
gan L. Smith to light
a cigar, I called
out, " Forward it is,
then ! " They were
directly in front of
the ascent to be
climbed. Without
stopping for his sup-
ports, Colonel Smith
led them down into
a broad hollow, and
catching sight of the
advance, Craft and
Ross also moved for-
ward. As the two
regiments began the
climb, the 8th Mis-
souri slightly in the
lead, a line of fire
ran along the brow
of the height. The
fla.nk companies
cheered while de-
ploying as skirmish-
ers. Their Zouave
practice proved of
excellent service to them. Now on the ground, creeping when the fire was hot-
test, running when it slackened, they gained ground with astonishing rapidity,
and at the same time maintained a fire that was like a sparkling of the earth.
For the most part the bullets aimed at them passed over their heads and
took effect in the ranks behind them. Colonel Smith's cigar was shot off
close to his lips. He took another and called for a match. A soldier ran and
gave him one. " Thank you. Take your place now. We are almost up," he
said, and, smoking, spurred his horse forward. A few yards from the crest
of the height the regiments began loading and firing as they advanced. The
defenders gave way. On the top there was a brief struggle, which was ended
by Cruft and Ross with their supports.
The whole line then moved forward simultaneously, and never stopped
until the Confederates were within the works. There had been no occasion
to call on the reserves. The road to Charlotte was again effectually shut, and
the battle-field of the morning, with the dead and wounded 'lying where they
had fallen, was in possession of the Third Division, which stood halted within
easy musket-range of the rifle It was then about half -past 3 o'clock in
the afternoon. I was reconn x, the? works of the enemy preliminary
to charging them, when Colon >ster, of General Grant's staff, came to
MA.IOR-GEXERAL GIDEON J. PILLOW, C.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
425
me and repeated the order to fall back out of cannon range and throw up
breastworks. "The general does not know that we have the hill," I said.
Webster replied: "I give you the order as he gave it to me." "Very well,"
said I, " give him my compliments, and say that I have received the order."
Webster smiled and rode away. The ground was not vacated, though the
assault was deferred. In assuming the responsibility, I had no doubt of my
ability to satisfy General Grant of the correctness of my course ; and it was
subsequently approved.
When night fell, the command bivouacked without fire or supper. Fatigue
parties were told off to look after the wounded ; and in the relief given there
was no distinction made between friend and foe. The labor extended through
the whole night, and the surgeons never rested. By sunset the conditions
of the morning were all restored. The Union commander was free to order
a general assault next day or resort to a formal siege.
A great discouragement fell upon the brave men inside the works that
night. Besides suffering from wounds and bruises and the dreadful weather,
they were aware that though they had done their best they were held in a
close grip by a superior enemy. A council of general and field officers was
held at headquarters, which re-
sulted in a unanimous resolution
that if the position in front of
General Pillow had not been
reoccupied by the Federals in
strength, the army should effect
its retreat. A reconnoissance was
ordered to make the test. Colonel
Forrest conducted it. He report-
ed that the ground was not only
reoccupied, but that the enemy
were extended yet farther around
the Confederate left. The council
then held a final session.
General Simon B. Buckner, as
the junior officer present, gave
his opinion first ; he thought he
could not successfully resist the
assault which would be made at
daylight by a vastly superior force.
But he further remarked, that
as he understood the principal
object of the defense of Donelson was to cover the movement of General
Albert Sidney Johnston's army from Bowling Green to Nashville, if that
movement was not completed he was of opinion that the defense should be
continued at the risk of the destruction of the entire force. General Floyd
replied that General Johnston's army had already reached Nashville, where-
upon General Buckner said that " it would be wrong to subject the army
ROWLETT'S MILL (SEE MAP, PAGE 402).
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN IKS-t.
426 THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
to a virtual massacre, when no good could result from the sacrifice, and that
the general officers owed it to their men, when further resistance was una-
vailing, to obtain the best terms of capitulation possible for them."
Both Generals Floyd and Pillow acquiesced in the opinion. Ordinarily
the council would have ended at this point, and the commanding general
would have addressed himself to the duty of obtaining terms. He would
have called for pen, ink, and paper, and prepared a note for dispatch to the
commanding general of the opposite force. But there were circumstances
outside the mere military situation which at this juncture pressed themselves
into consideration. As this was the first surrender of armed men banded
together for war upon the general government, what would the Federal
authorities do with the prisoners % This question was of application to all
the gentlemen in the council. It was lost to view, however, when General
Floyd announced his purpose to leave with two steamers which were to be
down at daylight, and to take with him as many of his division as the
steamers could carry away.
General Pillow then remarked that there were no two persons in the Con-
federacy whom the Yankees would rather capture than himself and General
Floyd (who had been Buchanan's Secretary of War, and was under indict-
ment at Washington). As to the propriety of his accompanying General
Floyd, the latter said, coolly, that the question was one for every man to
decide for himself. Buckner was of the same view, and added that as for
himself he regarded it as his duty to stay with his men and share their fate,
whatever it might be. Pillow persisted in leaving. Floyd then directed Gen-
eral Buckner to consider himself in command. Immediately after the council
was concluded, General Floyd prepared for his departure. His first move
was to have his brigade drawn up. The peculiarity of the step was that,
with the exception of one, the 20th Mississippi regiment, his regiments were
all Virginians. A short time before daylight the two steamboats arrived.
Without loss of time the general hastened to the river, embarked with his
Virginians, and at an early hour cast loose from the shore, and in good time,
and safely, he reached Nashville. He never satisfactorily explained upon
what principle he appropriated all the transportation on hand to the use of
his particular command.
Colonel Forrest was present at the council, and when the final resolution
was taken, he promptly announced that he neither could nor would surren-
der his command. The bold trooper had no qualms upon the subject. He
assembled his men, all as hardy as himself, and after reporting once more at
headquarters, he moved out and plunged into a slough formed by backwater
from the river. An icy crust covered its surface, the wind blew fiercely,
and the darkness was unrelieved by a star. There was fearful floundering
as the command followed him. At length he struck dry land, and was safe.
He was next heard of at Nashville.
General Buckner, who throughout the affair bore himself with dignity,
ordered the troops back to their positions and opened communications
with General Grant, whose laconic demand of " unconditional surrender,"
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
427
3.
n
P
r
cr
F AC-SIMILE OF THE ORIGINAL "UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER" DISPATCH.
The original of the dispatch was obtained by Charles
L. Webster & Co., publishers of General Grant's " Mem-
oirs," from Dr. James K. Wallace, of Litchfield, Conn.,
who received it, November 28th, 1868, from his relative
by marriage, General John A . Rawlins, who, as chief of
staff to General Grant, had the custody, after the cap-
ture, of General Buckner's papers. General Rawlins told
Dr. Wallace that it was the original dispatch. The
above is an exact reproduction of the original dispatch
in every particular, except that, in order to adapt it
to the width of the page, the word, " Sir," has been
lowered to the line beneath, and the words, " I am,
sir, very respectfully," have been raised to the line
above.— Editors.
428
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
in his reply to General Bnckner's overtures, became at once a watchword
of the war.
The Third Division was astir verv early on the 16th of February. The
regiments began to form and close up the intervals between them, the inten-
tion being to charge the breastworks south of Dover about breakfast-time.
In the midst of the preparation a bugle was heard and a white flag was seen
coining from the town toward the pickets. I sent my adjutant-general to
meet the flag half-way and inquire its purpose. Answer was returned that
General Bnckner had capitulated during the night, and was now sending
information of the fact to the commander of the troops in this quarter, that
there might be no further bloodshed. The division was ordered to advance
and take possession of the works and of all public property and prisoners.
Leaving that agreeable duty to the brigade commanders, I joined the officer
bearing the flag, and with my staff rode across the trench and into the town,
till we came to the door of the old tavern already described, where I dis-
mounted. The tavern was the headquarters of General Luckner, to whom I
sent my name ; and being an acquaintance, I was at once admitted.
I found General Buckner with his staff at breakfast. He met me with
politeness and dignity. Turning to the officers at the table, he remarked :
" General Wallace, it is not necessary to introduce you to these gentle-
men ; you are acquainted with them all." They arose, came forward one by
one, and gave their hands in salutation. I was then invited to breakfast,
which consisted of corn bread and coffee, the best the gallant host had in his
kitchen. We sat at the table about an hour and a half, when General
Grant arrived and took temporary possession of the tavern as his head-
quarters. Later in the morning the army marched in and completed the
possession.
1MB
L
„«.
VIEW FROM THE NATIONAL CEMETERY, WITHIN THE HEDGE ON THE RIGHT, ACROSS TO THE HILL
WHERE WERE SITUATED THE INTERIOR WORKS OF FORT DONELSON (SEE MAP, PAGE 402).
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT FORT DONELSON, TENN.
The composition and losses of each army as here stated give the gist of all th<- data obtainable in the Official Records.
K stands for killed ; W for wounded ; in w for mortally wounded ; m for captured or missing ; e for captured.— Editors.
COMPOSITION AND LOSSES OF THE UNION AEMY.
Brig.-Gen. Ulysses 8. Grunt.
Fikst Division, Brig.-Gen. John A. McClernand. First
Brigade, Col. Richard J. Oglesby: 8th 111., Lient.-Col.
Frank L. Rhoads; 18th 111., Col. Michael K. Lawler (w),
Capt. Daniel H. Brush (w), Capt. Samuel B. Marks; 29th
HI., Col. James S. Rearden ; 30th 111., Lieut. -Col. Elias
S.Dennis; 31st 111. , Col. John A. Logan (w) ; Battery A,
111. Lt. Arty., Capt. Jasper M. Dresser; Battery E, 2d
111. Lt. Artillery, Lieut. G. C. Gurnbart ; A and B, 2d
111. Cavalry, Capts. John R. Hotaling and Thomas J.
Larrison ; C, 2d, and I, 4th U. S. Cavalry, Lieut. James
Powell ; Iud'p't companies III. Cavalry, Capts. E. Car-
michael, James J. Dollins, M. J. O'Harnett, and Lieut.
Ezra King. Brigade loss : k, 184 ; w, 603; m, 66 = 853.
Second Brigade, Col. W. H. L. Wallace: 11th 111., Lieut.-
Col. T. E. G. Ransom (w). Major Garrett Nevins (tem-
porarily) ; 20th 111., Col. C. Carroll Marsh ; 45th 111., Col.
John E. Smith : 48th 111., Col. Isham N. Haynie (tempo-
rarily commanding Third Brigade), Lieut.-Col. Thomas
H. Smith (k) ; Battery B, 1st 111. Lt. Artillery, Capt. Ezra
Taylor ; Battery D, 1st 111. 'Lt. Artillery, Capt. Edward
McAllister; 4th 111. Cavalry, Col. T. Lyle Dickey. Bri-
gade loss : k, 99 ; w, 350 ; m, 98 = 547. Th ird Brigade, Col.
Win. R. Morrison (w), Col. Leonard F.Ross: 17th 111.,
Major Francis M. Smith, Capt. Henry H. Bush ; 49th 111.,
Lieut.-Col. Phiueas Pease. Brigade loss: k, 28 ; w, 105;
m, 19 = 152.
Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Charles F. Smith. First
Brigade, Col. John McArthur : 9th 111., Lieut.-Col. Jesse
J. Phillips; 12th 111., Lieut.-Col. Augustus L. Chetlain;
4lst 111., Col. Isaac C. Pugh. Brigade loss : k, 69; w, 340;
m, 20 = 429. Third Brigade, Col. John Cook : 7th 111.,
Lieut.-Col. Andrew J. Babcock ; 50th 111., Col. Moses M.
Bane ; 52d Ind., Col. James M. Smith : 12th Iowa, Col. J.
J. Woods ; 13th Mo., Col. Crafts J. Wright ; Batteries D,
H.and K, 1st Mo. Lt. Artillery, Capts. Henry Richardson,
F. Welker, and George H. Stone. Brigade loss : k, 10; w,
The total loss of the Union forces (army and navy) was
109 ; m, 2 = 121. Fourth Brigade, Col. Jacob G. Lauman :
25th Ind., Col. James C. Veatch ; 2d Iowa, Col. James M.
Tattle; 7th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. James C. Parrott ; 14th
Iowa, Col. William T. Shaw ; Birge's Mo. Sharp-shooters.
Brigade loss : k, 55 ; w, 301 ; m, 1 = 357. Fifth Brigade,
Col. Morgan L. Smith: 11th Ind., Col. George F. McGin-
nis ; 8th Mo., Major John McDonald. Brigade loss : k, 11 ;
w, 69 = 80.
Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Lew Wallace. First
Brigade, Col. Charles Cruft : 31st Ind., Lieut.-Col. John
Osborn, Major Fred. Am ; 44th Ind., Col. Hugh B. Reed ;
17th Ky, Col. John H. McHenry, Jr.; 25th Ky., Col. James
M. Shackelford. Brigade loss : k, 35 ; w, 182 ; m, 16 = 233.
Second Brigade [attached to the Third Brigade]: 46th
111., Col. John A. Davis; 57th III., Col. Silas D. Baldwin;
58th 111., Col. William F. Lynch; 20th Ohio, Col. Charles
Whittlesey. Brigade loss : k, 6 ; w, 15 ; m, 1 =22. Third
Brigade, Col. John M. Thayer: 1st Neb., Lieut.-Col.
Win. D. McCord; 58th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. F. F. Rempel;
68th Ohio, Col. S. H. Steedman ; 76th Ohio, Col. Wm.
B. Woods. Brigade loss: k, 3; w, 24 ; m, 1=28. Unat-
tached: Battery A, 1st 111. Lt. Artillery, Lieut P. P.
Wood; A, 32d 111. Infantry, Capt. Henry Davidson.
Loss : w, 10.
Ironclads and Gcn-boats, Flag-Officer Andrew H.
Foote (w). St. Louis (flag-ship), Lieut. Leonard Paul-
ding, k, 2; w, 8; Carondelet, Commander Henry Walke.
k, 5; w, 28; Louisrilte, Commander Benjamin M. Dove,
k, 4;w, 5; Pittsburgh, Lieut. Egbert Thompson, w, 2;
Tglcr. Lieut. -Cum. William Gwin ; Oonestoga, Lieut. -Com.
S.L.Phelps. Total loss: k, 11; w, 43 = 54. The vessels
which had been in action at Fort Henry (see page 362)
carried the same armament at Fort Donelson. The Louis-
ville and Pittsburgh were each armed with 6 32-pounders,
3 8-inch, and 4 rifled 42-pounders. The Louisville had also
1 12-pomider boat-howitzer.
510 killed, 2152 wounded. 224 captured or missing =2886.
COMPOSITION AND LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.
1 Brig.-Gen. Gideon J. Pillow, 2 Brig-Gen. John B. Floyd, 3 Brig-Gen. Simon B. Buckner (c).
Buckner's Division. Second Brigade, Col. Wm. E.
Baldwin: 2d Ken.. Col. R. \V. Hanson; 14th Miss., Maj.
W. L. Doss: 20th Miss., Maj. W. N. Brown; 26th Miss.,
Col. A. E. Reynolds; 26th Teun., Col., John M. Lillard ;
41st Tenu., Col. Robert Farquharson. Third Brigade,
Col. John C. Brown : 3d Tenn., Lieut. -Col. T. M. Gordon
(w), Maj. N. F. Cheairs; 18th Tenn., Col. J. B. Palmer;
32d Tenn., Col. E. C. Cook. Artillery: Kentucky Lat-
tery. Capt. R. E. Graves ; Tenn. Battery, Capt. T. K.
Porter (w), Lieut. John W. Morton; Jackson's Va. Bat
tery. Division loss: k and w, 577 (approximate).
Johnson's Command (left wing), Brig-Gen. BushrodR.
Johnson. Seiman's Brigade. Col. A. Heiman : 27th Ala...
Col. A. A. Hughes; 10th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. R W. Mac-
Gavock ; 42d Tenu., Col. W. A. Quarles ; 48th Tenn., Col.
W. M. Voorhies; 53d Tenn., Col. A. H. Abernathy,
Lieut.-Col. Thomas F. Winston; Tenn. Battery, Capt.
Frank Maney (w). Davidson's Brigade. Col. T. J. David-
son. Col. J. M. Simonton: 8th Ky., Lieut-Col. II. B.
Lyon ; 1st Miss., Col. J. M. Simonton, Lieut-Col. A S.
Hamilton; 3d Miss., Lieut.-Col. J. M. Wells; 7th Texas,
Col. John Gregg. Brigade loss: k, 68; w, 218=286.
Drake's Brigade, Col. Joseph Drake: Ala. Battalion,
Maj. John S. Garvin ; 15th Ark., Col. J. J.. Gee ; 4th Miss.,
Maj. T. N. Adair; Tenn. Battalion, Col. B. M. Browder.
Floyd's Division. First Brigade, Col. G. C. Wharton :
51st Va., Lieut-Col. J. M. Massie : 56th Va., Capt. G. W.
Davis. Brigade loss : k, 17; w, 80; 111, 120 = 217. Second
Brigade, Col. John McCausland : 36th Va., Lieut.-Col.
L. W. Reid; SOth Va., Maj. Thomas Smith. Brigade loss:
k, 24; w, 91 = 115. Artillery: Va. Batteries, Captains D.
A. French and J. H. Guy; Green's Ken. Battery.
Garrison Forces, Col. J. W. Head, Col. J. E. Bailey :
30th Tenn., Maj. J. J. Turner; 49th Tenn., Col. J. E.
Bailey ; 50th Tenn., Col. C. A. Sugg. Fort Batteries, Capt.
Joseph Dixon (k), Capt. Jacob Culbertson : A, 30th
Tenn., Capt. B. G. Bidwell ; A, 50th Tenn., Capt. T. W.
Beaumont; Maury (Tenn.) Battery, Capt. R. R. Ross.
Cavalry; Tenn. Regiment, Col. N. B. Forrest; 9th
Tenn. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. George Gantt ; Milton's
Company Tennessee. Unattached : Tennessee Battalion
Infantry, Major S. H. Colms.
The total loss of the Confederate army is not definitely stated. General Gideon J. Pillow says, in his report, that
in killed and wounded it was about two thousand. With regard to the number of Confederates captured, General
Grant says in his " Memoirs " : "I asked General Buckner about what force he had to surrender. He replied that
he could not tell with any degree of accuracy ; that all the sick and weak had been sent to Nashville while we were
about Fort Henry ; that Floyd and Pillow had left during the night, taking many men with them ; and that Forrest,
and probably others, had also escaped during the preceding night ; the number of casualties he could not tell ; but
he said I would not find fewer than 12,000, nor more than 15,000." But General Buckner says, in his official report,
that " the aggregate of the army, never greater than 12,000, was now reduced to less than 9000 after the departure
of General Floyd's brigade."
429
mmm
is
THE " CARONDELET " FIGHTING FORT DONELSON, FEBRUARY 13, 1862. FROM A SKETCH BY REAR-ADMIRAL WALKE.
THE WESTERN FLOTILLA AT FORT DONELSON, ISLAND
NUMBER TEN, FORT PILLOW AND MEMPHIS.
BY HENRY WALKE, REAR-ADMIRAL, U. 8. N.
ON the 7th of February, the day after the capture of Fort Henry, I received
on board the Carondelet Colonels Webster, Rawlins, and McPherson, with
a company of troops, and under instructions from General Grant proceeded
up the Tennessee River, and completed the destruction of the bridge of the
Memphis and Bowling Green Railroad.
On returning from that expedition General Grant requested me to hasten
to Fort Donelson with the Carondelet, Tyler, and Lexington, and announce
my arrival by firing signal guns. The object of this movement was to take
possession of the river as soon as possible, to engage the enemy's attention
by making formidable demonstrations before the fort, and to prevent it
from being reenforced. On February 10th the Carondelet alone (towed by the
transport Alps) proceeded up the Cumberland River, and on the 12th arrived
a few miles below the fort.
Fort Donelson occupied one of the best defensive positions on the river.
It was built on a bold bluff about 120 feet in height, on the west side of the
river, where it makes a slight bend to the eastward. It had 3 batteries,
mounting in all 15 guns: the lower, about twenty feet above the water; the
second, about fifty feet above the water ; the third, on the summit. ,1
^The armament of the fort consisted of "ten Captain Jacob Culbertson, with Captains Ross,
32-pounder guns (two of them ship carronades), Beaumont, and Bidwell in separate command of
one 8-inch howitzer, two nondescript 9-pounders, the guns of the lower batteries. Captain Dixon
one 10-inch Columbiad, and one rifled gun throwing was killed in the action the 13th with the Caron-
a conical shell of 128 pounds." The garrison was (Met by a shot wh unted one of his guns —
commanded by Colonel J. E. Bailey, the artillery "the only damage the batteries during the
by Captain Joseph Dixon, and after his death by siege." (Captain C i 's report.) — Editors.
430
THE WESTERN FLOTILLA. 43 '
When the Carondelet, her tow being cast off, came in sight of the fort and
proceeded np to within long range of the batteries, not a living creature
could be seen. The hills and woods on the west side of the river hid part of
the enemy's formidable defenses, which were lightly covered with snow ; but
the black rows of heavy guns, pointing down on us, reminded me of the dis-
mal-looking sepulchers cut in the rocky cliffs near Jerusalem, but far more
repulsive. At 12 : 50 p. m., to unmask the silent enemy, and to announce my
arrival to General Grant, I ordered the bow-guns to be fired at the fort.
Only one shell fell short. There was no response except the echo from the
hills. The fort appeared to have been evacuated. After firing ten shells
into it, the Carondelet dropped down the river about three miles and anchored.
But the sound of her guns aroused our soldiers on the southern side of the
fort into action ; one report says that when they heard the guns of the avant-
courrier of the fleet, they gave cheer upon cheer, and rather than permit the
sailors to get ahead of them again, they engaged in skirmishes with the en-
emy, and began the battle of the three days following. On the Carondelet.we
were isolated and beset with dangers from the enemy's lurking sharp-shooters.
On the 13th a dispatch was received from General Grant, informing me
that he had arrived the day before, and had succeeded in getting his army in
position, almost entirely investing the enemy's works. " Most of our bat-
teries," he said, " are established, and the remainder soon will be. If you
will advance with your gun-boat at 10 o'clock in the morning, we will be
ready to take advantage of any diversion in our favor."
I immediately complied with these instructions, and at 9:05, with the
Carondelet alone and under cover of a heavily wooded point, fired 139
70-pound and 64-pound shells at the fort. We received in return the
fire of all the enemy's guns that could be brought to bear on the Caron-
delet, which sustained but little damage, except from two shots. One, a
128-pound solid, at 11 : 30 struck the corner of our port broadside casemate,
passed through it, and in its progress toward the center of our boilers
glanced over the temporary barricade in front of the boilers. It then passed
over the steam-drum, struck the beams of the upper deck, carried away the
railing around the engine-room and burst the steam-heater, and, glancing
back into the engine-room, " seemed to bound after the men," as one of the
engineers said, " like a wild beast pursuing its prey." I have preserved this
ball as a souvenir of the fight at Fort Donelson. When it burst through the
side of the Carondelet, it knocked down and wounded a dozen men, seven of
them severely. An immense quantity of splinters was blown through the
vessel. Some of them, as fine as needles, shot through the clothes of the
men like arrows. Several of the wounded were so much excited by the sud-
denness of the event and the sufferings of their comrades, that they were not
aware that they themselves had been struck until they felt the blood run-
ning into their shoes. Upon receiving this shot we ceased firing for a while.
After dinner we sent the wounded on board the Alps, repaired damages,
and, not expecting any assistance, at 12:15 we resumed, in accordance with
General Grant's request, and bombarded the fort until dusk, when nearly all
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432
THE WESTERN FLOTILLA. 433
our 10-iiieh and 15-ineli shells were expended. The firing from the shore
having ceased, we retired.
At 11:30 on the night of the 13th Flag-Officer Foote arrived below Fort
Donelson with the iron-clads St. Louis, Louisville, and Pittsburgh, and the
wooden gun-boats Tyler and GonesUga. On the 14th all the hard materials
in the vessels, such as chains, lumber, and bags of coal, were laid on the upper
decks to protect them from the plunging shots of the enemy. At 3 o'clock in the
afternoon our fleet advanced to attack the fort, the Louisville being on the
west side of the river, the St. Louis (flag-steamer) next, then the Pittsburgh
and Caroii <l rid on the east side of the river. The wooden gun-boats were
about a thousand yards in the rear. When we started in line abreast at a
moderate speed, the Louisville and Pittsburgh, not keeping up to their posi-
tions, were hailed from the flag-steamer to " steam up." At 3:30, when about
a mile and a half from the fort, two shots were fired at us, both falling short.
When within a mile of the fort the St. Louis opened fire, and the other iron-
clads followed, slowly and deliberately at first, but more rapidly as the fleet
advanced. The flag-officer hailed the Carondelet, and ordered us not to fire
so fast. Some of our shells went over the fort, and almost into our camp
beyond. As we drew nearer, the enemy's fire greatly increased in force and
effect. But, the officers and crew of the Carondelet having recently been
long under fire, and having become practiced in fighting, her gunners were as
cool and composed as old veterans. We heard the deafening crack of the
bursting shells, the crash of the solid shot, and the whizzing of fragments of
shell and wood as they sped through the vessel. Soon a 128-pounder struck
our anchor, smashed it into flying bolts, and bounded over the vessel, taking
away a part of our smoke-stack; then another cut away the iron boat-davits
as if they were pipe-stems, whereupon the boat dropped into the water.
Another ripped up the iron plating and glanced over ; another went through
the plating and lodged in the heavy casemate; another struck the pilot-house,
knocked the plating to pieces, and sent fragments of iron and splinters into
the pilots, one of whom fell mortally wounded, and was taken below ; another
shot took away the remaining boat-davits and the boat with them; and still
they came, harder and faster, taking flag-staffs and smoke-stacks, and tearing
off the side armor as lightning tears the bark from a tree. Our men fought
desperately, but, under the excitement of the occasion, loaded too hastflv, and
the port rifled gun exploded. One of the crew, in his account of the explosion
soon after it occurred, said: "I was serving the gun with shell. When it
exploded it knocked us all down, killing none, but wounding over a dozen men
and spreading dismay and confusion among us. For about two minutes I was
stunned, and at least five minutes elapsed before I could tell what was the
matter. When I found out that I was more scared than hurt, although suffering
from the gunpowder which I had inhaled, I looked forward and saw our gun
lying on the deck, split in three pieces. Then the cry ran through the boat
that we were on fire, and my duty as pump-man called me to the pumps.
While I was there, two shots entered our bow-ports and killed four men and
wounded several others. They were borne past me, three with their heads
VOL I. 28
434 THE IVESTERN FLOTILLA.
off. The sight almost sickened ine, and I turned my head away. Our master's
mate came soon after and ordered us to our quarters at the gun. I told him
the gun had burst, and that we had caught fire on the upper deck from the
enemy's shell. He then said: 'Never mind the fire; go to your quarters.'
Then I took a station at the starboard tackle of another rifled bow-gun and
remained there until the close of the fight." The carpenter and his men extin-
guished the flames.
When within four hundred yards of the fort, and while the Confederates
were running from their lower battery, our pilot-house was struck again and
another pilot wounded, our wheel was broken, and shells from the rear boats
were bursting over us. All four of our boats were shot away and dragging
in the water. On looking out to bring our broadside guns to bear, we saw
that the other gun-boats were rapidly falling back out of line. The Pittsburgh
in her haste to turn struck the stern of the Carondelet, and broke our star-
board rudder, so that we were obliged to go ahead to clear the Pittsburgh and
the point of rocks below. The pilot of the St. Louis was killed, and the pilot
of the Louisville was wounded. Both vessels had their wheel-ropes shot
away, and the men were prevented from steering the Louisville with the
tiller-ropes at the stern by the shells from the rear boats bursting over them.
The St. Louis and Louisville, becoming unmanageable, were compelled to
dropout of battle, and the Pittsburgh followed; all had suffered severely
from the enemy's fire. Mag-Officer Foote was wounded while standing by
the pilot of the St. Louis when he was killed. We were then about 350 yards
from the fort.
There was no alternative for the Carondelet in that narrow stream but to
keep her head to the enemy and fire into the fort with her two bow-guns, to
prevent it, if possible, from returning her fire effectively. The enemy saw
that she was in a manner left to his mercy, and concentrated the fire of all
his batteries upon her. In return, the Carondelet1 s guns were well served to
the last shot. Our new acting gunner, John Hall, was just the man for the
occasion. He came forward, offered his services, and with my sanction took
charge of the starboard-bow rifled gun. He instructed the men to obey his
warnings and follow his motions, and he told them that when he saw a shot
coming he would call out " Down " and stoop behind the breech of the gun as
he did so ; at the same instant the men were to stand away from the bow-
ports. Nearly every shot from the fort struck the bows of the Carondelet.
Most of them were fired on the ricochet level, and could be plainly seen skip-
ping on the water before they struck. The enemy's object, was to sink the
gun-boat by striking her just below the water-line. They soon succeeded in
planting two 32-pound shots in her bow, between wind and water, which made
her leak badly, but her compartments kept her from sinking until we could
plug up the shot-holes. Three shots struck the starboard casemating ; four
struck the port casemating forward of the rifle-gun ; one struck on the star-
board side, between the water-line and plank-sheer, cutting through the
planking ; six shots struck the pilot-house, shattering one section into pieces
and cutting through the iron casing. The smoke-stacks were riddled.
THE IVES TERN FLOTILLA
THE GUN-BOATS AT FORT DONELSON (FEBRUARY 14, 1862)
THE LAND ATTACK IN THE DISTANCE.
AFTER A SKETCH BY REAR-ADMIRAL WALKE.
Our gunners kept up a constant firing
while we were falling back ; and the warn-
ing words, " Look out ! " " Down ! " were
often heard, and heeded by nearly all the gun-crews. On one occasion, while
the men were at the muzzle of the middle bow-gun, loading it, the warning-
came just in time for them to jump aside as a 32-pounder struck the lower
sill, and glancing up struck the upper sill, then, falling on the inner edge of
the lower sill, bounded on deck and spun around like a top, but hurt no one.
It was very evident that if the men who were loading had not obeyed the
order to drop, several of them would have been killed. So I repeated the
instructions and warned the men at the guns and the crew generally to bow
or stand off from the ports when a shot -was seen coming. But some of the
young men, from a spirit of bravado or from a belief in the doctrine of fatal-
ism, disregarded the instructions, saying it was useless to attempt to dxxlge
a cannon-ball, and they would trust to luck. The warning words, " Look
out!" "Down!" were again soon heard; down went the gunner and his men,
as the whizzing shot glanced on the gun, taking off the gunner's cap and the
heads of two of the young men who trusted to luck, and in defiance of the
order were standing up or passing behind him. This shot killed another man
also, who was at the last gun of the starboard side, and disabled the gun. It
came in with a hissing sound ; three sharp spats and a heavy bang told the
sad fate of three brave comrades. Before the decks were well sanded, there
was so much blood on them that our men could not work the guns without
slipping.
We kept firing at the enemy so long as he was within range, to prevent
him from seeing us through the smoke.
436
THE WESTERN FLOTILLA.
SCALE OF STATUTE MILES
The Carondelet was the first in and
the last out of the fight, and was more
damaged than any of the other gun-
boats, as the boat-carpenters who re-
paired them subsequently informed
me. She was much longer under fire
than any other vessel of the flotilla;
and, according to the report of the
Secretary of the Navy, her loss in
killed and wounded was nearly twice
as great as that of all the other gun-
boats together. She fired more shot
and shell into Fort Donelson than
any other gun-boat, and was struck
fifty -four times. These facts are given
because a disposition was shown by
correspondents and naval historians
to ignore the services of the Caron-
delet on this and other occasions.
In the action of the 14th all of the
armored vessels were fought with the greatest energy, skill, and courage, until
disabled by the enemy's heavy shot. In his official report of the battle the flag-
officer said: " The officers and men in this hotly contested but unequal fight be-
haved with the greatest gallantry and determination." [For losses, see p. 429.]^
Although the gun-boats were repulsed in this action, the demoralizing
effect of their cannonade, and of the heavy and well-sustained fire of the
Carondelet on the day before, must have been very great, and contributed in
no small degree to the successful operations of the army on the following day.
After the battle I called upon the flag-officer, and found him suffering
from his wounds. He asked me if I could have run past the fort, something
I should not have ventured upon without permission.
The 15th was employed in the burial of our slain comrades. I read the
Episcopal service on board the Carondelet, under our flag at half-mast; and
the sailors bore their late companions to a lonely field within the shadows of
Decatur
MAP OF THE REGION OF THE FLOTILLA
OPERATIONS.
% From the report of Captain B. Gr. Bidwell,
" the only officer connected with the heavy batter-
ies of Fort Donelson who was fortunate enough to
escape," we take this account of the engagement:
"All was quiet until the evening of the 14th (Friday),
when 4 boats came around the point, arranged them-
selves in line of battle, and advanced slowly, but stead-
ily, ui> the river to within 200 yards of our battery, and
halted, when a. must incessant tire was kept up for
some time. We were ordered to hold our lire until they
got within range of our 32-pounders. We remained per-
fectly silent, while they came over about one and a half
miles, pouring a heavy fire of shot and shell upon us all
the time. Two more boats came around the point and
threw shell at us. Our gunners were inexperienced and
kuew very little of the firing of heavy guns. They,
however, did some excellent shooting. The rifled gun
was disabled by the ramming of a cartridge while the
wire was in the vent, it being left in there by a careless
gunner, — being bent, it could not be got out, — but the
two center boats were both disabled, the left-center (I
think) by a ricochet shot entering one of the port-holes,
which are tolerably large. The right-center boat was
very soon injured by a ball striking her on top, and also
a direct shot in the port hole, when she fell back, the
two flank boats closing in behind them and protecting
them from our Are in retreat. 1 think these two were
not seriously injured. They must have tired near two
thousand sliot and shell at us. Our Columbiad tired
about 27 times, the rifled gun very few times, and the
32-pounders about 45 or 50 rounds each. A great many
of our balls took effect, being well aimed. I am confi-
dent the efficiency of the gun-boat is in the gun it carries
rather than in the boat itself. We can whip them always
if our men will only stand to their guns. Not a man
of all ours was hurt, notwithstanding they* threw grape
at us. Their fire was more destructive to our works at
2 miles than at 200 yards. They over-fired us from that
distance."
THE IVESTERN FLOTILLA.
437
the hills. When they were about to lower the first coffin, a Soman Catholic
priest appeared, and his services being accepted, he read the prayers for the
dead. As the last service was ended, the sound of the battle being waged by
General Grant, like the rumbling of distant thunder, was the only requiem
for our departed shipmates.
On Sunday, the 16th, at dawn, Fort Donelson surrendered and the gun-
boats steamed up to Dover. After religious services the Carondelet proceeded
back to Cairo, and arrived there on the morning of the 17th, in such a dense fog-
that she passed below the town unnoticed, and had great difficulty in finding
the landing. There had been a report that the enemy was coming from
Columbus to attack Cairo during the absence of its defenders ; and while the
( 'arondelet was cautiously feeling her way back and blowing her whistle, some
people imagined she was a Confederate gun-boat about to land, and made
hasty preparations to leave the place. Our announcement of the victory at
Fort Donelson changed their dejection into joy and exultation. On the fol-
lowing morning an order congratulating the officers and men of the Carondelet
was received from Flag-Officer Foote.
A few days later the Carondelet was taken up on the ways at Mound
City, Illinois, — six or seven miles above Cairo on the Ohio River, — for
repairs ; and a crowd of carpenters worked on her night and day. After the
repairs were completed, she was ordered to make the experiment of backing
ROAD TO union CITY
Scale
soooTaTuS
* JlllC'i
MAP OF MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS ABOUT ISLAND NUMBER TEN. (BASED ON THE TWO MAPS
BY CAPTAIN A. B. GRAY, C. S. A., MADE IN MARCH, 1862, AND ON OFFICIAL REPORTS.)
FOR CORRECTION OF THE LINE OF THE CANAL, SEE PAGE 461.
438
THE WESTERN FLOTILLA.
up-stream, which proved a laughable failure. She would sheer from oue side
of the river to the other, aud with two anchors astern she could not be held
steady enough to fight her bow-guns down-stream. She dragged both anchors
alternately, until they came together, and the experiment failed completely.
On the morning of the 23d the flag-officer made a reconnoissance to Colum-
bus, Kentucky, with four gun-boats and two mortar-boats, accompanied by
the wooden gun-boat Cones- toga, convoying five trans-
ports. The fortifications
than ever. The enemy
sent up a transport
was said, of effect-
ing an exchange
. 4 v-
J
looked
fired
1 ^ %
more formidable
two guns, and
with the pretext, it
THE MOKTAR-BOATS AT ISLAND
NUMBER TEN.
of prisoners. | But
at that time, as we
learned afterward from
a credible source, the evac-
uation of the fort (which
General Grant's successes at
Forts Henry and Donelson had made necessary) was going on, and the last
raft and barge loads of all the movable munitions of war were descending
the river, which, with a large quantity previously taken away, could and
would have been captured by our fleet if we had received this information
in time. On the 4th of March another reconnoissance in force was made
with all the gun-boats and four mortar-boats, and the fortress had still a for-
midable, life-like appearance, though it had been evacuated two days before. ])
| The ostensible object was a request to permit
the families of officers captured at Fort Donelson
to pass through the Union lines. The request was
granted on the following day, but General George W.
Cullum (General Halleck's chief of staff) and Flag-
Officer Foote remonstrated with General Polk for
the use made of the flag of truce. — Editors.
j) On the 3d of March the evacuated works had
been occupied by a scouting party of the 2d Illi-
nois Cavalry, sent from Padueah by Brigadier-
General W. T. Sherman, who had succeeded Briga-
dier-General Grant in command of the District of
Cairo (February 14, 1862) on the assignment of
General Grant to the command of the District of
West Tennessee. The fact of the occupation was
not known at the time of the gun-boat reconnois-
sance, which included a land force accompanied
by General Sherman and by Brigadier-General
Cullum. This detachment landed and took formal
possession. In his report of the occupation, Gen-
eral Cullum speaks of Columbus as "the Gibraltar
of the West." See also note, p. 367.— Editors.
THE WESTERN FLOTILLA. 439
On the 5th of March, while we were descending the Mississippi in a dense
fog, the flag-steamer leading, the Confederate gun-boat Grampus, or Bare-devil
Jack, the sauciest little vessel on the river, suddenly appeared across our track
and "close aboard." She stopped her engines and struck her colors, and we
all thought she was ours at last. But when the captain of the Grampus saw
how slowly we moved, and as no gun was fired to bring him to, he started off
with astonishing speed and was out of danger before the flag-steamer could
fire a gun. She ran before us yawing and flirting about, and blowing her
alarm- whistle so as to announce our approach to the enemy who had now re-
tired to Island Number Ten, a strong position sixty miles below Columbus
(and of the latitude of Forts Henry and Donelson), where General Beauregard,
who was now in general command of our opponents, had determined to con-
test the possession of the river.
On March 15th the flotilla and transports continued on their way to Island
Number Ten, arriving in its vicinity about nine in the morning. The strong
and muddy current of the river had overflowed its banks and carried away
every movable thing. Houses, trees, fences, and wrecks of all kinds were
being swept rapidly down-stream. The twists and turns of the river near
Island Number Ten are certainly remarkable. Within a radius of eight
miles from the island it crosses the boundary line of Kentucky and Tennessee
three times, running on almost every point of the compass. We were greatly
surprised when we arrived above Island Number Ten and saw on the bluffs
a chain of forts extending for four miles along the crescent-formed shore, with
the white tents of the enemy in the rear. And there lay the island in the
lower corner of the crescent, with the side fronting the Missouri shore lined
with heavy ordnance, so trained that with the artillery 011 the opposite shore
almost every point on the river between the island and the Missouri bank
could be reached at once by all the enemy's batteries.
On the 17th an attack was made on the upper battery by all the iron-clads
and mortar-boats. The Benton (flag-steamer), lashed between the Cincinnati
and St. Bonis, was on the east side of the river ; the Mound City, Carondelet,
and Pittsburgh were on the west side ; the last, however, changed her position
to the east side of the river before the firing began. We opened fire on the
upper fort at 1 : 20, and by order of the flag-officer fired one gun a minute.
The enemy replied promptly, and some of his shot struck the Benton, but,
owing to the distance from which they were fired, did but little damage. We
silenced all the guns in the upper fort except one. During the action one of
the rifled guns of the St. Louis exploded, killing and wounding several of the
gunners, — another proof of the truth of the saying that the guns furnished
the Western flotilla were less destructive to the enemy than to ourselves.
From March 17th to April 4th but little progress was made in the reduc-
tion of the Confederate works — the gun-boats firing a few shot now and
then at long range, but doing little damage. The mortar-boats, however,
were daily throwing 13-inch bombs, and so effectively at times that the
Confederates were driven from their batteries and compelled to seek refuge
in caves and other places of safety. But it was very evident that the
440
THE WESTERN FLOTILLA.
"HE "CARONDELET" RUNNING THE CONFEDERATE
BATTERIES AT ISLAND NUMBER TEN (APRIL 4, 1862).
AFTER A SKETCH BY REAR-ADMIRAL WALKE.
great object of the expedition — the
reduction of the works and the cap-
ture of the Confederate forces —
could not be effected by the gun-boats alone, owing to their mode of
structure and to the disadvantage under which they were fought in the
strong and rapid current of the Mississippi. This was the opinion not only
of naval officers, but also of General Pope and other army officers.
On the 23d of March the monotony of the long and tedious investment
was unfortunately varied in a very singular manner. The ( 'arondelet being
moored nearest the enemy's upper fort, under several large cottonwood trees,
in order to protect the mortar-boats, suddenly, and without warning, two of
the largest of the trees fell across her deck, mortally wounding one of the
crew and severely wounding another, and doing great damage to the vessel.
This was twelve days before I ran the gauntlet at Island Number Ten with
the Carondelet.
To understand fully the importance of that adventure, some explanation
of the military situation at and below Island Number Ten seems necessary.
After the evacuation of New Madrid, which General Pope had forced by
blockading the river twelve miles below, at Point Pleasant, the Confederate
forces occupied their fortified positions on Island Number Ten and the east-
ern shore of the Mississippi, where they were cut off by impassable swamps
on the land side. They were in a cul-de-sac, and the only way open for them
to obtain supplies or to effect a retreat was by the river south of Island
Number Ten. General Pope, with an army of twenty thousand men, was on
THE WESTERN FLOTILLA.
441
the western side of the river below the island. Perceiving the defect in the
enemy's position, he proceeded with great promptness and ability to take
advantage of it. It was his intention to cross the river and attack the enemy
from below, bnt he could not do this without the aid of a gun-boat to silence
the enemy's batteries opposite Point Pleasant and protect his army in cross-
ing. He wrote repeatedly to Flag-Officer Foote, urging him to send down a
gun-boat past the enemy's batteries on Island Number Ten, and in one of his
letters expressed the belief that a boat could pass down at night under cover
of the darkness. But the flag-officer invariably declined, saying in one of his
letters to General Pope that the attempt " would result in the sacrifice of the
boat, her officers and men, which sacrifice I would not be justified in making."
During this correspondence the bombardment still went on, but was
attended with such poor results that it became a subject of ridicule among
the officers of Pope's army, one of whom (Colonel Gilmore, of Chillicothe,
Ohio) is reported to have said that often when they met, and inquiry was
made respecting the operations of the flotilla, the answer would generally be :
"Oh! it is still bombarding the State of Tennessee at long range." And a
Confederate officer said that no casualties resulted and no damage was sus-
tained at Island Number Ten from the fire of tin1 gun-boats.
On March 20th Flag-Officer Foote consulted his commanding officers,
through Commander Stembel, as to the practicability of taking a gun-boat
past the enemy's forts to New Madrid, and all except myself were opposed
to the enterprise, believing with Foote that the attempt to pass the batteries
would result in the almost certain destruction of the boat. I did not think
so, but believed with General Pope that, under the cover of darkness and
other favorable circumstances, a gun-boat might be run past the enemy's
'-:V:^
CT'-uw5'
THE LEVEE AT NEW MADRID. FROM A SKETCH MADE SOON AFTER THE CAPTCRK OF ISLAND NUMBER TEN.
442 THE WESTERN FLOTILLA.
batteries, formidable as they were with nearly fifty guns. And although
fully aware of the hazardous nature of the enterprise, I knew that the aid of
a gun-boat was absolutely necessary to enable General Pope to succeed in
his operations against the enemy, and thought the importance of this success
would justifiy the risk of running the gauntlet of the batteries on Island
Number Ten and on the left bank. The army officers were becoming impa-
tient, and it was well known that the Confederates had a number of small
gun-boats below, and were engaged in building several large and powerful
vessels, of which the renowned Arkansas was one. And there was good
reason to apprehend that these gun-boats would ascend the river and pass
or silence Pope's batteries, and relieve the Confederate forces on Island
Number Ten and the eastern shore of the Mississippi. That Pope and
Foote apprehended this, appears from the correspondence between them. J
The flag-officer now called a formal council of war of all his commanding
officers. It was held on board the flag-steamer, on the '28th or 29th of March,
and all except myself concurred in the opinion formerly expressed that the
attempt to pass the batteries was too hazardous and ought not to be made.
When I was asked to give my views, I favored the undertaking, and advised
compliance with the requests of General Pope. When asked if I was willing
to make the attempt with the Carondelet, I replied in the affirmative. Foote
accepted my advice, and expressed himself as greatly relieved from a heavy
responsibility, as he had determined to send none but volunteers on an expedi-
tion which he regarded as perilous and of very doubtful success.
Having received written orders from the flag-officer, under date of March
30th, I at once began to prepare the Carondelet for the ordeal. All the loose
material at hand was collected, and on the 4th of April the decks were cov-
ered with it, to protect them against plunging shot. Hawsers and chain
cables were placed around the pilot-house and other vulnerable parts of the
vessel, and every precaution was adopted to prevent disaster. A coal-barge
laden with hay and coal was lashed to the part of the port side on which
there was no iron plating, to protect the magazine. It was truly said that
the Carondelet at that time resembled a farmer's wagon prepared for mar-
ket. The engineers led the escape-steam, through the pipes aft, into the
wheel-house, to avoid the puffing sound it made when blown through the
smoke-stacks.
All the necessary preparations having been made, I informed the flag-offi-
cer of my intention to run the gauntlet that night, and received his approval.
Colonel N. B. Buford, who commanded the land forces temporarily with the
flotilla, assisted me in preparing for the trip, and on the night of the 4th
brought on board Captain Hottenstein, of the 42d Illinois, and twenty-three
sharp-shooters of his command, who volunteered their services, which were
gratefully accepted. Colonel Buford remained on board until the last moment,
to encourage us. I informed the officers and crew of the character of the
^ An interesting and important enterprise in to complete a water-way for the Union transports
this campaign was the sawing out, under great across Madrid Bend. See paper by Colonel J. W.
difficulties, of a channel, twelve miles in length, Bissell and corrected map, page 460.— Editors.
THE WESTERN FLOTILLA.
443
undertaking, and
all expressed a
readiness to make
the venture. Inor-
( ier to resist board-
ing parties, in case
of being disabled,
the sailors were
well armed, and
pistols, cutlasses,
muskets, board-
ing-pikes, and
hand-grenades
were within reach.
Hose was attached
to the boilers for
throwing scalding
water over any
who might at-
tempt to board.
If it should be
found impossible
to save the vessel,
it was designed to
sink rather than
burn her. Dur-
ing the afternoon
there was a £>rom-
ise of a clear,
moonlight night,
and it was determined to wait until the moon was down, and then to make
the attempt, whatever the chances. Having gone so far, we could not abandon
the project without an effect on the men almost as bad as failure.
At 10 o'clock the moon had gone down, and the sky, the earth, and the
river were alike hidden in the black shadow of a thunder-storm, which had
now spread itself over all the heavens. As the time seemed favorable, I
ordered the first master to cast off. Dark clouds now rose rapidly over us and
enveloped us in almost total darkness, except when the sky was lighted up by
the welcome flashes of vivid lightning, to show us the perilous way we were
to take. Now and then the dim outline of the landscape could be seen, and
the forest bending under the roaring storm that came rushing up the river.
With our bow pointing to the island, we passed the lowest point of land
without being observed, it appears, by the enemy. All speed was given to
the vessel to drive her through the tempest. The flashes of lightning con-
tinued with frightful brilliancy, and " almost every second," wrote a corre-
spondent, "every brace, post, and outline could be seen with startling
MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN POPE.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN EARLY IN THE WAR.
444
THE WESTERN FLOTILLA.
distinctness, enshrouded by a bluish
white glare of light, and then her
form for the next minute would be-
come merged in the intense darkness."
When opposite Battery No. 2, on the
mainland, \ the smoke-stacks blazed
up, but the fire was soon subdued. It
was caused by the soot becoming dry,
as the escape-steam, which usually
kept the stacks wet, had been sent
into the wheel-house, as already men-
tioned, to prevent noise. With such
vivid lightning as prevailed during
the whole passage, there was no pros-
pect of escaping the vigilance of the
enemy, but there was good reason to
hope that he would be unable to
point his guns accurately. Again
the smoke-stacks took fire, and were
soon put out ; and then the roar of
the enemy's guns began, and from
Batteries Nos. 2, 3, and 4 on the
mainland came the continued crack
and scream of their rifle-shells, which
seemed to unite with the electric bat-
teries of the clouds to annihilate us.
While nearing the island or some shoal point, during a few minutes of
total darkness, we were startled by the order, " Hard a-port ! " from our
brave and skillful pilot, First Master William R. Hoel. We almost grazed the
island, and it appears were not observed through the storm until we were
close in, and the enemy, having no time to point his guns, fired at random.
In fact, we ran so near that the enemy did not, probably could not, depress
his guns sufficiently. While close under the lee of the island and during a
lull in the storm and in the firing, one of our pilots heard a Confederate officer
shout, " Elevate your guns ! " It is probable that the muzzles of those guns
had been depressed to keep the rain out, and that the officers ordered the guns
elevated just in time to save us from the direct fire of the enemy's heaviest
fort ; and this, no doubt, was the cause of our remarkable escape.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. W. MACKALL, C. S. A., IN
COMMAND AT ISLAND NDMBER TEN, PREVIOUSLY
ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL TO GEN-
ERAL ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
\ The Confederate land batteries above New
Madrid were ten in number — five on the eastern
side of Island Number Ten ; four (Batteries No. 5,
4, 3, and 2) opposite the island on the mainland,
as shown on the map (p. 437), besides Battery No.
1, two miles above the island. — Editors.
During the dark and stormy night of April 1st
Colonel George W. Roberts, of the 4 2d Illinois Reg-
iment, executed a brilliant exploit. Forty picked
men, in five barges, with muffled oars, left for Bat-
tery No. 1 . They proceeded in silence, and were un-
observed until within a few rods of the fort, when a
flash of lightning discovered them to the sentries,
who fired. Our men, who did not reply, were soon
climbing up the slippery bank, and in three min-
utes more the six guns were spiked, Colonel Rob-
erts himself spiking a huge SO-poun<ler pivot-gun.
Some of these guns had been previously dismount-
ed by our fleet, and were now rendered doubly use-
less.—H. W.
THE WESTERN FLOTILLA. 44^
Having passed the principal batteries, we were greatly relieved from sus-
pense, patiently endured, however, by the officers and crew. But there was
another formidable obstacle in the way — a floating battery, which was the
great " war elephant " of the Confederates, built to blockade the Mississippi
permanently. As we passed her she fired six or eight shots at us, but without
effect. One ball struck the coal-barge, and one was found in a bale of hay ;
we found also one or two musket-bullets. We arrived at New Madrid about
midnight with no one hurt, and were most joyfully received by our army.
At the suggestion of Paymaster Nixon, all hands " spliced the main brace."
On Sunday, the 6th, after prayers and thanksgiving, the Carondelet, with
General Gordon Granger, Colonel J. L. Kirby Smith of the 43d Ohio, and
Captain Louis H. Marshall of General Pope's staff on board, made a recon-
noissance twenty miles down, nearly to Tiptonville, the enemy's forts firing
on her all the way down. We returned their fire, and dropped a few shells
into their camps beyond. On the way back, we captured and spiked the guns
of a battery of one 32-pounder and one 24-pounder, in about twenty-five min-
utes, opposite Point Pleasant. Before we landed to spike the guns, a tall Con-
federate soldier, with cool and deliberate courage, posted himself behind a
large cottonwood tree, and repeatedly fired upon us, until our Illinois sharp-
shooters got to work on him from behind the hammock nettings. He had
two rifles, which he soon dropped, fleeing into the woods with his head down.
The next day he was captured and brought into camp at Tiptonville, with
the tip of his nose shot off. After the capture of this battery, the enemy
prepared to evacuate his positions on Island Number Ten and the adja-
cent shores, and thus, as one of the historians of the civil war says, the
Carondelet struck the blow that secured that victory.
Returning to New Madrid, we were instructed by General Pope to attack
the enemy's batteries of six 64-pounders which protected his rear; and besides,
another gun-boat was expected. The Pittsburgh (Lieutenant-Commander
Thompson) ran the gauntlet without injury, during a thunder-storm, at 2 in
the morning of April 7th, and arrived at 5 o'clock ; but she was not ready
for service, and the Carondelet attacked the principal batteries at Watson's
Landing alone and had nearly silenced them when the Pittsburgh came up
astern and fired nearly over the Carondelet' s upper deck, after she and the Con-
federates had ceased firing. I reported to General Pope that we had cleared the
opposite shores of the enemy, and were ready to cover the crossing of the
river and the landing of the army. Seeing themselves cut off, the garrison at
Island Number Ten surrendered to Foote on the 7th of April, the day of the
Confederate repulse at Shiloh. The other Confederates retreating before
Pope's advance, were nearly all overtaken and captured at 4 o'clock on the
morning of the 8th ; and about the same time the cavalry under Colonel W. L.
Elliott took possession of the enemy's deserted works on the Tennessee shore.
The result of General Pope's operations in connection with the services
of the Carondelet below Island Number Ten was the capture of three generals
(including General W. W. Mackall, who ten days before the surrender had
succeeded General John P. McCown in the command at Madrid Bend), over
446
THE IVES TERN FLOTILLA.
THE "CAKONDELET" AND "PITTSBURGH" CAPTURING THE CONFEDERATE BATTERIES BELOW NEW MADRID.
AFTER A DRAWING BY REAR-ADMIRAL WALKE.
5000 men, 20 pieces of heavy artillery, 7000 stand of arms, and a large quan-
tity of ammunition and provisions, without the loss of a man on our side.
On the 12th the Benton (flag-steamer), with the Cincinnati, Mound City,
Cairo, and *SY. Louis, passed Tiptonville and signaled the Carondelet and Pitts-
hurf/h to follow. Five Confederate gun-boats came up the next day and
ottered battle ; but after the exchange of a few shots at long range they retired
down the river. We followed them all the way to Craighead's Point, where
they were under cover of their fortifications at Fort Pillow. I was not aware
at the time that we were chasing the squadron of my esteemed shipmate of
the U. S. Frigates Cumberland and Merrimac, Colonel John W. Dunnington,
who afterward fought so bravely at Arkansas Post.
On the 14th General Pope's army landed about six miles above Craighead's
Point, near Osceola, under the protection of the gun-boats. While he was pre-
paring to attack Fort Pillow, Foote sent his executive officer twice to me on
the Carondelet to inquire whether I would undertake, with my vessel and two
or three other gun-boats, to pass below the fort to cooperate with General
Pope, to which inquiries I replied that I was ready at any time to make the
attempt. But Pope and his army (with the exception of 1500 men) were or-
dered away, and the expedition against Fort Pillow was abandoned. Between
the 14th of April and the 10th of May two or three of the mortar-boats were
towed down the river and moored near Craighead's Point, with a gun-boat to
protect them. They were employed in throwing 13-inch bombs across the
point into Fort Pillow, two miles distant. The enemy returned our bombard-
ment with vigor, but not with much accuracy or effect. Several of their bombs
fell near the gun-boats when we were three miles from the fort.
THE IVES TERN FLOTILLA. 447
The Confederate fleet called the " River Defense " having been reenf orced,
they determined upon capturing the mortar-boats or giving us battle. On the
8th three of their vessels came to the point from which the mortar-boats had
thrown their bombs, but, finding none, returned. Foote had given special
orders to keep up steam and be ready for battle any moment, day or night.
There was so much illness at that time in the flotilla that about a third of the
officers and men were under medical treatment, and a great many were unfit
for duty. On the 9th of May, at his own request, our distinguished com-
mander-in-chief, Foote, was relieved from his arduous duties. He had become
very much enfeebled from the wounds received at Fort Donelson and from
illness. He carried with him the sympathy and regrets of all his command.
He was succeeded by Flag-Officer Charles Henry Davis, a most excellent officer.
This paper would not be complete without some account of the naval
battles fought by the flotilla immediately after the retirement of Flag-Officer
Foote, under whose supervision and amid the greatest embarrassments it had
been built, organized, and equipped. On the morning of the 10th of May a
mortar-boat was towed down the river, as usual, at 5 a. m., to bombard Fort
Pillow. The Cincinnati soon followed to protect her. At 6:35 eight Con-
federate rams came up the river at full speed, is The Carondelet at once
prepared for action, and slipped her hawser to the " bare end," ready for
orders to " go ahead." No officer was on the deck of the Benton (flag-steamer)
except the pilot, Mr. Birch, who informed the flag-officer of the situation, and
passed the order to the Carondelet and Pittsburgh to proceed without waiting
for the flag-steamer. General signal was also made to the fleet to get under
way, but it was not visible on account of the light fog.
The Carondelet started immediately after the first verbal order ; the others,
for want of steam or some other cause, were not ready, except the Mound
City, which put off soon after we were fairly on our way to the rescue of the
Cincinnati We had proceeded about a mile before our other gun-boats left
their moorings. The rams were advancing rapidly, and we steered for the
leading vessel, General Bragg, a brig-rigged, side-wheel steam ram, far in
advance of the others, and apparently intent on striking the Cincinnati. When
about three-quarters of a mile from the General Bragg, the Carondelet and
Mound City fired on her. with their bow-guns, until she struck the Cincinnati
on the starboard quarter, making a great hole in the shell-room, through
which the water poured with resistless force. The Cincinnati then retreated
up the river and the General Bragg drifted down, evidently disabled. The
General Price, following the example of her consort, also rammed the Cincin-
nati. We fired our bow-guns into the General Price, and she backed off,
disabled also. The Cincinnati was again struck by one of the enemy's rams,
the General Sumter. Having pushed on with all speed to the rescue of the
Cincinnati, the Carondelet passed her in a sinking condition, and, rounding to,
we fired our bow and starboard broadside guns into the retreating General
Bragg and the advancing rams, General Jeff. Thompson, General Beauregard,
^•The mortar-boat, No. 16, which was the first object of attack, was defended with great spirit by
Acting-Master Gregory, who fired his mortar eleven times, reducing the charge and diminishing the
elevation. (See cut, p. 450.) — Editors.
448
THE IVESTERN FLOTILLA.
and General Lovell. Heading up-stream, close to a shoal, the Curondelet
brought her port broadside guns to bear on the Sumter and Price, which were
dropping down-stream. At this crisis the Van Born and Little Rebel had run
above the Carondelet ; the Bragg, Jeff.
Thompson, Beauregard, and Lord!
were below her. The last three, com-
ing up, fired into the Carondelet ; she
returned their fire with her stern-
guns ; and, while in this position, I
ordered the port rifled 50-pounder
Dahlgren gun to be leveled and fired
at the center of the Si outer. The shot
struck the vessel just forward of her
wheel-house, and the steam instantly
poured out from her ports and all
parts of her casemates, and we saw
her men running out of them and fall-
ing or lying down on her deck. None
of our gun-boats had yet come to the
assistance of the Carondelet. The Ben-
ton and Pittsburgh had probably gone
to aid the Cincinnati, and the St.
Louis to relieve the Mound City, which
had been badly rammed by the Van
Lorn. The smoke at this time was so
dense that we could hardly distinguish the gun-boats above us. The upper
deck of the Carondelet was swept with grape-shot and fragments of broken
shell ; some of the latter were picked up by one of the sharp-shooters, who
told me they were obliged to lie down under shelter to save themselves from
the grape and other shot of the Pittsburgh above us, and from the shot and
broken shell of the enemy below us. Why some of our gun-boats did not fire
into the Van Bom and Little Rebel while they were above the Carondelet,
and prevent their escape, if possible, I never could make out. J
As the smoke rose we saw that the enemy was retreating rapidly and in
great confusion. The Carondelet dropped down to within half a mile above
( Yaighead's Point, and kept up a continual fire upon their vessels, which were
very much huddled together. When they were nearly, if not quite, beyond
gunshot, the Benton, having raised sufficient steam, came down and passed
the Carondelet; but the Confederates were under the protection of Fort Pil-
low before the Benton could reach them. Our fleet returned to Plum Point,
except the Carondelet, which dropped her anchor on the battle-field, two
miles or more below the point, and remained there two days on voluntary
^Flag-Officer Davis says in his report: "All of so disproportionate to the bulk of the vessels that
these vessels might easily have been captured if they can accomplish but little beyond overcom-
we had possessed the means of towing them out ing the strength of the current, even when unin-
of action ; but the steam-power of our gun-boats is cumbered." — Editors.
FLAG-OFFICER CHARLES HENRY DAVIS (AFTERWARD
REAR-ADMIRAL AND CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF
NAVIGATION). FKOM A PHOTOGRAPH.
THE WESTERN FLOTILLA.
449
guard duty. This engagement was sharp, but not decisive. From the first to
the last shot fired by the Carondelet, one hour and ten minutes elapsed. After
the battle, long-range firing was kept up until the evacuation of Fort Pillow.
On the 25th seven of Colonel Ellet's rams arrived, — a useful acquisition to
our fleet. During the afternoon of June 4th heavy clouds of smoke were
observed rising from Fort Pillow, followed by explosions, which continued
through the night; the last of which, much greater than the others, lit up
the heavens and the Chickasaw bluffs with a brilliant light, and convinced
us that this was the parting salute of the Confederates before leaving for the
lower Mississippi. At dawn next morning the fleet was all astir to take pos-
session of Fort Pillow, the flag-steamer leading. We found the casemates,
magazines, and breastworks blown to atoms.
On our way to Memphis the enemy's steamer Sovereign was intercepted by
one of our tugs. She was run ashore by her crew, who attempted to blow
her up, but were foiled in their purpose by a boy of sixteen whom the enemy
had pressed into service, who, after the abandonment of the vessel, took the
extra weights from the safety-valves, opened the fire-doors and flue-caps,
and put water on the fires, and, having procured a sheet, signaled the tug,
which came up and took possession. It may be proper to say that on our
way down the river we respected private property, and did not assail or
molest any except those who were in arms against us.
The morning of the 6th of June we fought the battle of Memphis, which
lasted one hour and ten minutes. It was begun by an attack upon our fleet by
the enemy, whose vessels were in double line of battle opposite the city. We
were then at a distance of a mile and a half or two miles above the citv. Their
fire continued for a quarter of an hour, when the attack was promptly met by
FORT PILLOW AND THE WATER BATTERY. AFTER A SKETCH BY REAR-ADMIRAL WALKE.
VOL. I. 29
4SO
,,,E WESTERN FLOTILLA.
' MOUND CITY.1
CARONDELET.'
MORTAR NO. 16.
PRICE."
' VAN DORN."
SUMTER."
" LITTLE REBEL.'
THE BATTLE OF FORT FILLOW, MAY 10, 1862 (LOOKING NORTH). AFTER A SKETCH BY REAR-ADMIRAL WALKE.
two of our ram squadron, the Queen of the West (Colonel Charles Ellet) lead-
ing, and the Monarch (Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Ellet, younger brother of the
leader). These vessels fearlessly dashed ahead of our gun-boats, ran for the
enemy's fleet, and at the first plunge succeeded in sinking one vessel and dis-
abling another. The astonished Confederates received them gallantly and
effectively. The Queen of the West and Monarch were followed in line of battle
by the gun-boats, under the lead of Flag-Officer Davis, and all of them opened
fire, which was continued from the time we got within good range until the
end of the battle — two or three tugs keeping all the while a safe distance astern.
The Queen of the West was a quarter of a mile in advance of the Monarch,
and after having rammed one of the enemy's fleet, she was badly rammed
by the Beauregard, which then, in company with the General Price, made a
dash at the Monarch as she approached them. The Beauregard, however,
missed the Monarch and struck the General Price instead on her port side,
cutting her down to the water-line, tearing off her wheel instantly, and
placing her hors de combat. The Monarch then rammed the Beauregard,
which had been several times raked fore and aft by the shot and shell of
our iron-clads, and she quickly sank in the river opposite Memphis. The
General Lovell, after having been badly rammed by the Queen of the West,
was struck by our shot and shell, and, at about the same time and place
as the Beauregard, sank to the bottom so suddenly as to take a consider-
able number of her officers and crew down with her, the others being saved
by small boats and our tugs. The Price, Little Rebel (with a shot-hole
THE WESTERN FLOTILLA.
4>i
through her steam-chest), and our Queen of the West, all disabled, were run
on the Arkansas shore opposite Memphis; and the Monarch afterward ran
into the Little Bebel just as our fleet was passing her in pursuit of the
remainder of the enemy's fleet, then retreating rapidly down the river. The
Jeff. Thompson, below the point and opposite President's Island, was the next
boat disabled by our shot. She was run ashore, burned, and blown up. The
Confederate ram Stouter was also disabled by our shell and captured. The
Bragg soon after shared the same fate and was run ashore, where her officers
abandoned her and disappeared in the forests of Arkansas. All the Con-
federate rams which had been run on the Arkansas shore were captured.
The Van Dorn, having a start, alone escaped down the river. The rams
CARONDELET." BENTON." ST. LOUIS."
IN THE DISTANCE CONFEDERATE FLEET ADVANCING.
LOUISVILLE." OUEEN OF THE
WEST." " MONARCH."
THE BATTLE OF MEMPHIS (JUNE 0, 1802), LOOKING SOUTH. AFTER A DRAWING BY REAK-ADMIKAL WALKE.
Monarch and Switzerland were dispatched in pursuit of her and a few trans-
ports, but returned without overtaking them, although they captured another
steamer. %
The scene at this battle was rendered most sublime by the desperate nature
of the engagement and the momentous consequences .that followed very
speedily after the first attack. Thousands of people crowded the high bluffs
overlooking the river. The roar of the cannon and shell shook the houses on
shore on either side for many miles. First wild yells, shrieks, and clamors,
then loud, despairing murmurs, filled the affrighted city. The screaming,
plunging shell crashed into the boats, blowing some of them and their crews
into fragments, and the rams rushed upon each other like wild beasts in
% See paper on " Ellet and his Steam-rams at Memphis," page 453.— Editors.
452
THE WESTERN FLOTILLA.
deadly conflict. Blinding smoke hov-
ered about the scene of all this con-
fusion and horror ; and, as the battle
progressed and the Confederate fleet
was destroyed, all the cheering voices
on shore were silenced. When the last
hope of the Confederates gave way, the
lamentations which went np from the
spectators were like cries of anguish:
Boats were put off from our vessels
to save as many lives as possible. No
serious injury was received by any
one on board the United States fleet.
Colonel Ellet received a pistol-shot in
the leg; a shot struck the Carondelet
in the bow, broke up her anchor
and anchor-stock, and fragments were
scattered over her deck among her
officers and crew, wounding slightly
Acting-Master Gribson and two or three
others who were standing at the time
on the forward deck with me. The
heavy timber which was suspended at
the water-line, to protect the boats from
the Confederate rams, greatly impeded our progress, and it was therefore
cut adrift from the Carondelet when that vessel was in chase of the Bragg
and Sunder. The latter had just landed a number of her officers and crew,
some of whom were emerging from the bushes along the bank of the river,
unaware of the Carondelet1 s proximity, when I hailed them through a trum-
pet, and ordered them to stop or be shot. They obeyed immediately, and by
my orders were taken on board a tug and delivered on the Benton.
General Jeff. Thompson, noted in partisan or border warfare, having sig-
nally failed with those rams at Fort Pillow, now resigned them to their
fate. It was said that he stood by his horse watching the struggle, and seeing
at last his rams all gone, captured, sunk, or burned, he exclaimed, philosoph-
ically, " They are gone, and I am going," mounted his horse, and disappeared.
An enormous amount of property was captured by our squadron ; and, in
addition to the Confederate fleet, we captured at Memphis six large Missis-
sippi steamers, each marked " C. S. A." We also seized a large quantity of
cotton in steamers and on shore, and the property at the Confederate Navy
Yard, and caused the destruction of the Tennessee, a large steam-ram, on the
stocks, which was to have been a sister ship to the renowned Arkansas.
About one hundred Confederates were killed and wounded and one hundred
and fifty captured. Chief of all results of the work of the flotilla was the
opening of the Mississippi River once for all from Cairo to Memphis, and the
complete possession of Western Tennessee by the Union forces.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL M. JEFF. THOMPSON.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
IN THE DISTANCE :
" VAN DORN "
PRICE," LITTLE REBEL,"
' JEFF. THOMPSON."
QUEEN OF THE WEST,1
BRAGG."
AND MONARCH.1
" SUMTER."
UNION GUN-BOATS.
LOVELL " (SUNK).
THE BATTLE OF MEMPHIS, JUNE 6, 1862 (LOOKING NORTH'.
BEAUREGARD " (SINKINGS
RETREAT OF THE CONFEDERATE FLEET. AFTER A SKETCH BY REAR-ADMIRAL WALKE.
ELLET AND HIS STEAM-RAMS AT MEMPHIS.
BY ALFRED W. ELLET, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V. 4-
ON the 8th of March, 1862, occurred the memorable catastrophe at Hamp-
ton Roads. The possibility of such a disaster had been repeatedly urged
in warning terms by a gentleman who had vainly endeavored to avert it. I
refer to the late eminent civil engineer, Charles Ellet, Jr., the inventor of the
steam-ram as a vehicle of war destruction. On the 6th of February, 1862,
Mr. Ellet wrote in a pamphlet as follows :
" It is not generally known that the rebels now have five steam-rams nearly ready for use. Of
these five, two are on the lower Mississippi, two are at Mobile, and one is at Norfolk. The
last of the five, the one at Norfolk, is doubtless the most formidable, being the United States
steam-frigate Merrimac, which has been so strengthened that, in the opinion of the rebels, it
may be used as a ram. But we have not yet a single vessel at sea, nor, so far as I know, in
course of construction, able to cope at all with a well-built ram. If the Merrimac is permitted
to escape from Elizabeth River, she will be almost certain to commit great depredations on our
armed and unarmed vessels in Hampton Roads, and may even be expected to pass out under
the guns of Fortress Monroe and prey upon our commerce in Chesapeake Bay. Indeed, if the
alterations have been skillfully made, and she succeeds in getting to sea, she will not only be a
terrible scourge to our commerce, but may prove also to be a" most dangerous visitor to our
blockading squadrons off the harbors of the southern coasts. I have attempted to call the
attention of the Navy Department and the country so often to this subject during the last seven
years, that I almost hesitate to allude to it again ; and I would not do so here but that I think
the danger from these tremendous engines is very imminent but not at all appreciated. Experience,
4- After the death of Colonel Ellet, the command of the ram-fieet was conferred upon the writer, by
order of the Secretary of War. — Editors.
453
454
ELLET AND HIS STEAM-RAMS AT MEMPHIS.
COLONEL CHARLES ELLET, JK. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
derived from accidental collisions,
shows that a vessel struck in the waist
by a steam-rani at sea will go down
almost instantaneously, and involve,
as has often happened, the loss of
nearly all on board."
Upon the startling verifica-
tion of his neglected admoni-
tions afforded by the Merrimac,
Mr. Ellet was called to the War
Department, and, after a short
conference with Secretary
Stanton, was given authority
to purchase, refit, man, and
command, with the rank of
colonel, any number of vessels
deemed, in his judgment, neces-
sary to meet and defeat the
fleet of -iron-clad rams then
known to be in process of con-
struction on the lower Missis-
sippi River.
Never was work more promptly or more effectually performed. Colonel
Ellet purchased a number of steamboats at different points on the Ohio River,
the best he could find in the short time at his disposal. He took some old
and nearly worn-out boats, strengthened their hulls and bows with heavy
timbers, raised bulkheads of timber around the boilers, and started them down
the river to Cairo as fast as they could be got off the ways. They were the
Dick Fulton, Lancaster, Lioness, Mingo, Monarch, Queen of the West, Samson,
Switzerland, and T. D. Horner.
While the work was progressing, and before any one of the rams was nearly
completed, information was received that the Confederate fleet had come out
from under the batteries of Fort Pillow, had attacked our fleet of gun-boats
lying near Craighead's Point, and had disabled two of them. |) Colonel
Ellet received most urgent telegrams from the Secretary of War to hurry
the rams forward at the earliest possible moment. In consequence of these
demands, five of them were immediately dispatched down the river under my
command, work upon them being continued as they proceeded and for several
days after their arrival at Fort Pillow. The other rams followed, and about
the 25th of May Colonel Ellet joined the fleet on board the Switzerland, and
the ram-fleet was now ready for action.
Colonel Ellet at once conferred with Flag-Officer Charles H. Davis on the
propriety of passing Fort Pillow, and engaging the enemy's fleet wherever
found. Flag-Officer Davis did not approve the plan suggested, but offered
no objection to Colonel Ellet's trying the experiment. Accordingly, imme-
j)The Cincinnati and the Mound City. See page -447. — Edit
ELLET AND HIS STEAM-RAMS AT MEMPHIS.
455
diate preparations were begun for running the batteries with the entire ram-
fleet. During this period of preparation, constant wateli was kept upon
the fort and the enemy's fleet. On the night of the 4th of June I crossed the
timber point in front of the fort, and reported to the colonel commanding
my conviction that the fort was being evacuated. About 2 o'clock in the
morning I obtained permission, with many words of caution from Colonel
Ellet, to run down opposite the fort in a yawl and, after lying off in order to
become assured that the place was abandoned, to land, with the assurance
that the rams would follow in case my yawl did not return before daylight.
SUMTER " AND BRAGG
(CAPTURED).
THOMPSON »» (BLOWING UP).
MEMPHIS.
EENTON.1
CAIRO.'
LOUISVILLE.'
BURNING OF
UNFINISHED CONFEDERATE RAM.
ST. LOUIS."
" CARONDELET."
CLOSE OF THE BATTLE OF MEMPHIS, JUNE 6, 1802 (LOOKING NORTH).
AFTER A DRAWING BY REAR-ADMIRAL WALKE.
I landed with my little band, only to find the fort entirely deserted; and after
planting the National colors upon the ruins of one of the magazines, we sat
down to wait for the coming of daylight and the rams. They came, followed
by the entire fleet, and after a short stop all proceeded down the river, the
rams taking the lead, to Fort Randolph, where they delayed long enough to
plant the National flag and to examine the abandoned fortifications, the gun-
boats at this point taking the advance. J
After leaving Fort Randolph the ram-fleet proceeded without incident to
within about twenty-five miles of Memphis, where they all rounded to and
J The advance of Halleek upon Corinth after
Shiloh, and its evacuation on May 30th, gave the
Union forces possession of the Memphis and
Charleston railroad, broke the second line of Con-
federate defense, and turned all the jwsitions on
the river above Memphis. Fort Pillow and Fort
Randolph were thus made untenable (just as Co-
lumbus had become untenable after the fall of Forts
Henry and Donelson on the Confederate first line
of defense) and hence were evacuated. — Editors.
40 ELLET AND HIS STEAM- RAMS AT MEMPHIS.
tied up for the night, with orders of sailing issued to each commander ; instruc-
tions to be ready to round out at the signal from the flag-ship, and that " each
boat should go into the anticipated fight in the same order they maintained
in sailing." At the first dawn of day (June 6th) the fleet moved down the river,
and at sunrise the flag-ship rounded the bend at "Paddy's Hen and Chickens,"
and immediately after came in sight of the Federal" gun-boats anchored in
line across the river, about a mile above Memphis. Colonel Ellet promptly
signaled his vessels to tie up on the Arkansas shore, in the order of their sail-
ing, as he desired to confer with Flag-Officer Davis before passing further.
The Queen of the West came to first, followed by the Monarch and other
rams in regular succession. The Queen of the West had made the land, and
passed out line to make fast ; the Monarch was closing in just above, but had
not yet touched the shore. At this moment, and as the full orb of the sun
rose above the horizon, the report of a gun was heard from around the point
and down the river. It was the first gun from the Confederate River Defense
Fleet moving to attack us. Colonel Ellet was standing on the hurricane-deck
of the Queen of the West. He immediately sprang forward, and, waving his
hat to attract my attention, called out : " I;;, is a gun from the enemy ! Round
out and follow me ! Now is our chance ',7 Without a moment's delay, the
Queen moved out gracefully, and the Monarch followed. By this time our
gun-boats had opened their batteries, and the reports of guns on both sides
were heavy and rapid.
The morning was beautifully clear and perfectly still; a heavy wall of
smoke was formed across the river, so that the position of our gun-boats
could only be seen by the flashes of their guns. The Queen plunged forward,
under a full head of steam, right into this wall of smoke and was lost sight
of, her position being known only by her tall pipes which reached above the
smoke. The Monarch, following, was greeted, while passing the gun-boats, with
wild huzzas from our gallant tars. When freed from the smoke, those of us
who were on the Monarch could see Colonel Ellet's tall and commanding form
still standing on the hurricane-deck, waving his hat to show me which one
of the enemy's vessels he desired the Monarch to attack, — namely, the General
Price, which was on the right wing of their advancing line. For himself he
selected the General Lovell and directed the Queen straight for her, she being
about the middle of the enemy's advancing line. The two vessels came
toward each other in most gallant style, head to head, prow to prow ;
and had they met in that way, it is most likely that both vessels would have
gone down. But at the critical moment the General Lovell began to turn ;
and that moment sealed her fate. The Queen came on and plunged straight
into the LovelVs exposed broadside ; the vessel was cut almost in two and
disappeared under the dark waters in less time than it takes to tell the story.
The Monarch next struck the General Price a glancing blow which cut her
starboard wheel clean off, and completely disabled her from further participa-
tion in the fight.\
\ It is impossible to reconcile this statement conflicting, but it has always been the general
with that of Admiral Walke, on page 450, q. v. impression that the Price received her disabling
The reports of the engagement are meager and blow in an accidental collision with the Beaure-
ELLET AND HIS STEAM-RAMS AT MEMPHIS. 457
As soon as the Queen was freed from the wreck of the sinking Lovell, and
before she could recover headway, she was attacked on both sides by the
enemy's vessels, the Beauregard on one side and the Sumter on the other. In
the melee one of the wheels of the Queen was disabled so that she could not
use it, and Colonel Ellet, while still standing on the hurricane-deck to view
the effects of the encounter with the General Lovell, received a pistol-ball in
his knee, and, lying prone on the deck, gave orders for the Queen to be run
on her one remaining wheel to the Arkansas shore, whither she was soon fol-
lowed by the General Price in a sinking condition. Colonel Ellet sent an
officer and squad of men to meet the General Price upon her making the shore,
and received her entire crew as prisoners of war. By this time consternation
had seized upon the enemy's fleet, and all had turned to escape. The fight
had drifted down the river, below the city.^-
The Monarch, as soon as she could recover headway after her conflict with
the General Price, drove down upon the Beauregard, which vessel, after her
encounter with the Queen of the West, was endeavoring to escape. She was
thwarted by the Monarch coming down upon her with a well-directed blow
which crushed in her side and completely disabled her from further hope of
escape. Men on the deck waved a ^hite flag in token of surrender, and the
Monarch passed on down to intercept the Little Rebel, the enemy's flag-ship.
She had received some injury from our gnn-boats' fire, and was making for
the Arkansas shore, which she reached at the moment when the Monarch,
with very slight headway, pushed her hard and fast aground ; her crew
sprang upon shore and ran into the thick woods, making their escape. Leav-
ing the Little Rebel fast aground, the Monarch turned her attention to the
sinking Beauregard, taking the vessel in tow, and making prisoners of her
crew. The Beauregard was towed by the Monarch to the bar, where she sank
to her boiler-deck and finally became a total loss.
The others of the enemy's fleet were run ashore and fired by the crews be-
fore they escaped into the adjoining Arkansas swamps. The Jeff. Thompson
burned and blew up with a tremendous report ; the General Bragg was secured
by our gun-boats before the fire gained headway, and was saved. The Van
Bom alone made her escape, and was afterward burned by the enemy at Liver-
pool Landing, upon the approach of two of our rams in Yazoo Eiver, in order
to prevent her from falling into our hands. Two other rebel boats were
burned at the same time, — the Polk and the Livingston.
After the Monarch had towed the Beauregard into shoal water, from which,
it was hoped, she might be raised, I received the first intelligence, from a dis-
gard, as has been stated by Captain Hurt, com- proceeded immediately to quarters. The Confed-
mander of the Beauregard. The reports of Flag- erate fleet opened at 5, and at 5 : 20 the gun-boats
Officer Davis and of General M. Jeff. Thompson, were returning the fire and steaming down the
commander of the Confederate troops at Memphis, river. The higher speed of Colonel Ellet's rams
agree in saying that the Price was rammed by enabled them to pass through the intervals in
one of her consorts, — General Thompson adding . Davis's flotilla, and the latter, coming after them,
that the blow, which he states was delivered by completed with its batteries the work which the
the Beauregard, knocked off the Price's wheel and rams had so successfully begun. The guns of the
entirely disabled her.— Editors. flotilla were well served, and both the Beauregard
-$■ The gun-boat flotilla, under Flag-Officer and Little Bebel were disabled by shots in their
Davis, had weighed anchor at 4:30 A. m. and boilers.— Editors.
458 ELLET AND HIS STEAM-RAMS AT MEMPHIS.
patch-boat bearing orders, that Colonel Ellet was wounded. The orders I
received from him were : " Continue the pursuit as long as there is any hope
of overtaking the flying enemy."
One other episode of this day should not be omitted. Toward the close of
the engagement, Colonel Ellet was informed that a white flag had been raised
in Memphis, and he immediately sent his young son, Medical Cadet Charles
Rivers Ellet, ashore with a party of three men and a flag of truce, to demand
the surrender of the city. They landed in a row-boat and delivered Colonel
Ellet's dispatch to the mayor, and received his reply ; then, surrounded by
an excited and threatening crowd, they proceeded to the post-office, ascended
to the top of the building, and, while stoned and fired upon by the mob below,
young Ellet lowered the Confederate colors and raised the National flag over
the city of Memphis. This incident occurred a considerable length of time
before the formal surrender of the city into the possession of the United
States troops under command of Colonel Gr. N. Fitch.
At first, Colonel Ellet's wound was not considered necessarily dangerous,
but a few days showed us all how futile was the hope that our brave com-
mander would ever again tread the decks of his victorious fleet. He continued
to send dispatches and issue necessary orders from his bed as long as he
could receive the reports of his subordinates. Finally, his rapidly failing
strength gave way; the Switzerland, to which he had been removed, and
on board which he had been joined by his heart-broken wife and his young
daughter, left Memphis on the night of the 18th of June, and as the vessel
neared Cairo on the 21st, his gallant spirit passed away. He was accorded a
state funeral in Independence Hall. J
The boats constituting the ram-fleet of the Mississippi River were not
built for the purpose they were to serve ; they were simply such river steam-
ers as could be purchased under the urgency then pressing. Some were
side -wheelers, others stern -wheel tugs, with strong machinery and great
power, and were hurriedly strengthened and braced to sustain a severe
headlong blow. In a letter to the Secretary of "War respecting the rams,
while they were being fitted out, Colonel Ellet wrote : " The boats I have
purchased are illy adapted for the work I shall require of them ; it is not
their strength upon which I rely, but upon the audacity of our attack, for
success."
His idea of an effective "steam-ram" was not a hermaphrodite thing, half
ram, half gun-boat, nor did he favor those sharp knife-like prows which, if
they cut a hole in an enemy, would plug it at the same time. He wanted a
vessel of medium size, easy to handle, and of great speed; she should be
built very strongly, fitted with machinery of great power, and have weight
sufficient when projected against an enemy to crush the side of any vessel
that could float. Colonel Ellet did not rely on heavy ordnance, and did not
recommend arming his rams. At the battle of Memphis there were no fire-
arms on board the ram-fleet except a few short carbines and some pocket-
j His devoted wife, stricken by grief, survived him but a few days. Both are buried at Laurel Hill
Cemetery, Philadelphia. — A. W. E.
ELLET AND HIS STEAM-RAMS AT MEMPHIS. 4S9
revolvers ; his reliance was upon the prow of his vessel. % He desired, as far
as possible, to protect the vulnerable parts of his ship, the boilers and engines,
and with simply enough men as crew to handle the boat with certainty and
dispatch, to run the gauntlet of any fire that could be precipitated upon him,
and drive his ram deep into his unwieldy adversary. At the battle of Mem
phis the enemy concentrated their fire upon the Queen of the West and
the Monarch, but their missiles passed harmlessly by. Not a splinter was
raised off either of the rams, and not a man sustained the slightest injury
except Colonel Ellet, whose fatal wound was received from a pistol-ball.
The battle of Memphis was, in many respects, one of the most remarkable
naval victories on record. For two unarmed, frail, wooden river steamboats,
with barely men enough on board to handle the machinery and keep the fur-
nace-fires burning, to rush to the front, between two hostile fleets, and into
the enemy's advancing line of eight iron-clad, heavily armed, and fully
manned steam-rams, sinking one, disabling and capturing three, and carrying
consternation to the others, was a sight never before witnessed.
The River Defense Fleet was composed of strong, well-built ocean steamers,
well strengthened and protected with railroad iron so as to be almost invul-
nerable to shot when advancing. The intention was apparent to repeat at
Memphis the tactics which had proved so successful at Fort Pillow, — to
ram the Union gnn-boats at anchor; and had the rams Queen of the West
and Mo 1/ arch not run through the line of gun-boats and attacked the Defense
Fleet as it approached, sinking, disabling, and scattering its vessels, and thus
removing the fight half a mile 'below, the result of the affair might have been
very different. The Defense Fleet was advancing up-stream, thus exposing
the strongest and best-protected portions of each vessel ; the gun-boats, rely-
ing upon their guns, were at anchor, with their sterns, their most vulnerable
part, pointing down-steam and consequently exposed to the tremendous
attack of the enemy. Had the Confederate commanders trusted only to the
strength of their vessels, ceased firing, and with every pound of steam on
plunged at full speed into our anchored gun-boat fleet, who could doubt what
the result would have been ?
& The Monarch had 11 sharp-shooters out of a detail of 50 from the 59th Illinois regiment, who
constituted the sole armed force of the ram-fleet. — Editors.
PRACTICING ON A RIVER PICKET.
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pife : I
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^1
METHOD OF CUTTING THE CHANNEL.
SAWING OUT THE CHANNEL ABOVE ISLAND NUMBER TEN.
BY J. W. BISSELL, COLONEL, U. S. V., IN CHARGE OF THE WORK.
THE Engineer Regiment of the West was an
organization composed of twelve full com-
panies of carefully selected workmen, chiefly me-
chanics, and officered by men capable of directing
such skilled labor. Most of the officers and about
six hundred of the men were engaged in the opera-
tions about New Madrid and Island Number Ten.
In all the operations of that regiment I am not
aware that any of its officers ever made a report
beyond a verbal notification to the general in com-
mand that the work required of it was done. This
narrative is therefore made entirely from mem-
ory, aided by reference to letters written to my
family.
It is perhaps proper to state here that the term
" canal," as used in all the letters and reports re-
lating to the opening of this waterway, conveys
an entirely wrong idea. No digging was done
except by way of slightly widening a large break
in the levee, and those who speak of "working
waist-deep in the water" knew nothing of it.
The enemy held Island Number Ten and the left
bank opposite, and the same bank from New
Madrid down to Tiptonville, a ridge of high land
between the back swamp and the river. In rear
of their position was Reelfoot Lake and the over-
flow, extending from above them to a point below
Tiptonville. Escape by land was impossible, New
Madrid and the right bank below being occupied
by General Pope. The gun-boats under Foote
held the river above, and our heavy batteries
commanded the only place of debarkation below.
Having accomplished this much, the problem for
General Pope to solve was to cross his army to
make an attack, for which purpose he judged
that two gun-boats, to be used as ferry-boats,
would be sufficient. The general was so confident
that his letter to Foote would bring the boats that
he directed me to go back to the fleet at Island
Number Eight by dug-out across the overflow, and
come down with them past the batteries.
I reached the flag-ship in the afternoon about
dark, and that evening Foote called together all
his commanders in council. One or two wanted to
run the blockade, but the commodore flatly refused.
He explained that his boats, since they were
armored solely about the bows, were invincible
fighting up-stream, but fighting down-stream were
of little account ; and that if one of them should
be boarded and captured, she could be turned
against us, and could whip the whole fleet and
place Cairo, Louisville, and St. Louis at her
mercy ! One of the captains said that if he were
allowed to go, he would blow the vessel out of water
if the enemy got on board. Another, I think, was
cpiite as emphatic, but Foote was firm.
The next day, with two of the tugs of the fleet,
I explored the shore carefully on each side : first
on the eastern shore, to see if the enemy were se-
curely shut in, which I found to be the case ; and
then on the western, to see if St. James's Bayou,
which emptied into the river seven miles above
Island Number Eight, in any way communicated
with St. John's Bayou, which debouched at New
Madrid. Here I found no possible way across.
Early the next morning wdiile standing on the
levee, chagrined at my failure to obtain a gun-boat,
and while waiting for the guide to get the dug-out
ready to take me back to camp, I spied, directly
opposite me across the submerged fields, an open-
ing in the timber ; and the thought flashed upon
me that there was the place to take the transports
through. This proved to be an old wagon-road ex-
tending half a mile into the woods ; beyond and
around wasa dense forest of heavy timber. The guide
said it was two miles to the nearest bayou. I asked
him to make a map upon my memorandum-book,
which he did, showing a straight cut to the first
bayou and the general route of the bayous to New
Madrid. This route we carefully explored, and I
reached Pope's headquarters about dark. When
in my report of the interview I mentioned Foote's
refusal, the general gave vent to his disappointment
and indignation. Some officer present making some
suggestion about a " canal, " I immediately pulled
out my memorandum-book, and, showingthesketch,
said the whole thing was provided for, and that I
would have the boats through in fourteen days.
460
SAWING OUT THE CHANNEL ABOVE ISLAND NUMBER TEN. 461
General Pope then gave me an order on the author-
ities at Cairo for steamboats and material. That
evening Captain William Tweeddale, Lieutenant
Mahlon Randolph, and I sat up till a late hour
arranging all the details, including barges to be
fitted with heavy artillery to be used as gun-boats,
and the next morning they started with one hun-
dred men for Cairo, to meet me at Island Num-
ber Eight with all the materials they could get
-S\!k-\TE.VA\^-
CORRECTED LINE OF THE CHANNEL ABOVE ISLAND NO.
TEN CUT BY THE ENGINEER REGIMENT. (See p. 437.)
the first day. Other officers and men started by
the same route daily, until the six hundred men of
my force had returned, and my stock of supplies
was complete. I returned in the dug-out through
the selected channel, and in due time found at the
proposed starting-point four stern-wheel steam-
boats, drawing thirty to thirty-six inches of water,
and six large coal-barges, besides one Columbiad,
three large siege-guns with carriages and ammuni-
tion, saws, lines, and all kinds of tools and tackle,
and fully two million feet of timber and lumber.
The way through the submerged corn-field and
the half-mile of road was easy enough, but when
we reached the timber the labor of sawing out a
channel commenced. The one steamer which had a
powerful steam-capstan was put in the lead, and
the others having hand-capstans were fastened
single file in the rear, and then the six barges in like
order, so that the progress of the first controlled
all the others. Captain Tweeddale took charge of
the cutting in front, while Lieutenant Randolph
was fitting up the improvised gun-boats astern.
About three hundred men were assigned to each,
and they worked in relays from dawn until dark.
First of all, men standing on platforms on small
rafts cut off the trees about eight feet above the
water. As soon as a tree was down, another set
of men, provided with boats and lines, adjusted
about it a line which ran through a snatch-block
and back to the steam-capstan, and hauled it out
of the way ; thus a partial cut was made forward,
the lines always working more than two hundred
feet ahead of the capstan, so as to leave plenty of
room for the saws. It took about four sets of lines
to keep pace with twelve saws.
When the space about the stumps allowed suf-
ficient room, a raft about forty feet long was
lashed to a stump, and the saw set at work in a
frame attached by a pivot and working in an arc as
shown in the sketch [page 460] — two men working
the saw at opposite ends by a rope, and a fifth on
the farther side of the tree guiding its teeth into the
tree. Where the stumps were too close, or irregu-
lar, three yawl-boats were used instead of the raft.
No trouble was experienced with stumps a foot
or less in diameter. With the larger ones it was
different ; the elms spread out so much at the bot-
tom that the saw almost always would run crooked
and pinch. If it ran up, we notched the top and set
the frame farther in ; if down, we put in powerful
tackle, and pulled the top of the stump over.
Here was where tli° ingenuity of the officers and
men was exercised , as the saws were working
four and a half feet beneath the surface, and the
water was quite turbid, the question was how to
ascertain what was interfering with the saw, and
then to apply the remedy. But I found Captain
Tweeddale equal to the most obstinate stump. I
think two and a half hours was the longest time
ever expended upon any one, while about two
minutes would dispose of some small ones when
the saw was ready. It took eight days to cut the
two miles.
When we reached the bayous the hard and wet
work began. The river had begun to fall, and the
water was running very rapidly. We had to get
rid of great drift-heaps from the lower side with
our machinery all on the upper side. Small pieces
of drift would be disposed of by the yawl-boats, or
a single line and snatch-block would take them
right out ; but sometimes a great swamp-oak,
three feet through, and as heavy as lignum-vita?,
lying right across our channel a foot or so under
water, would try our tackle. We had then to raise
them up to the surface, and hold them there till
they could be chopped in pieces. In one of the
bayous for about two miles the current was so
swift that all the men who were out on logs, or in
exposed places, had safety-lines tied around them ;
and as the timber was slippery, some were indebted
to these lines for their lives. During the whole
work not a man was killed, injured, or taken sick.
While all this was being done in front of the
boats, Lieutenant Randolph was at work with his
detachment in the rear in improvising gun-boats
to supply the lack of Foote's. The barges used
were coal-barges, about eighty feet long and twenty
wide, scow-shaped, with both ends alike. The sides
were six inches thick, and of solid timber. The
original plan was to use three of the steamboats
with a barge on each side — the other steamer to
be kept as a reserve. One Columbiad and three
32-pounders were mounted on platforms, and
arrangements were made to use a considerable
number of field-guns to be taken on board at New
Madrid. Six hundred men of the Engineer Regi-
ment, using one of the steamers with her two
4b2 SAWING OUT THE CHANNEL ABOVE ISLAND NUMBER. TEN.
barges, were to land at break of day at the mouth
of the slough about a mile below and opposite
Fort Thompson, aud with their intrenching tools
dig a line of rifle-pits as soon as possible. About
the same number of picked men were to be with
them to help fight or dig, as occasion might require.
The other two sections of the flotilla were to be
filled with men, and landed just below, us best
could be done when the resistance was developed.
The reserve steamer with her men, not being
incumbered with barges, could move rapidly and
take advantage of any opening to land the force.
When about half-way through the channel, 1 left
the flotilla and reported progress to General Pope.
Upon a reexamination of the ground from Fort
Thompson, he concluded that it would be best to
make the leading boat a fighting boat that could
not be disabled; so he telegraphed to Cairo and
St. Louis for a great number of coal-oil barrels,
whicli were laid in two tiers all over the bottoms
of two barges ; the interstices were filled with dry
rails, the whole well secured in place by a heavy
floor. In the mean time the steamer was so bulk-
headed with lumber that her engines and boilers
were secure from damage from field-artillery, and
the forward part of the hull, which projected be-
yond the barges, was bulkheaded off and filled with
dry rails, to keep her from being disabled. On the
steamer and barges protection was prepared for a
large number of sharp-shooters.
The boats and barge gun-boats were kept con-
cealed in the bayou, just back from New Madrid, for
a day or two, till the soldiers could be prepared for
the passage and attack. Meanwhile Foote con-
cluded to risk the passage of the island with the
■fc The effort to cut the canal was known to the Con-
federates as early as March 31st, the day General Mack-
all relieved General McCown of the command at Madrid
Bend ; for General Mackall says in his report, that
General McCown then informed him "that they [the
Carondelet and afterward with the Pittsburgh, and
the whole plan was changed ; the gun-boats could
move so much more rapidly that they were to
silence the Confederate field-guns, while the trans-
ports could land the troops wherever an opening
could be found. The barges were not used at all ;
nor did any of the Engineer Eegiment cross; they
were kept on the right bank, ready in case of disaster.
Several of the captured officers told me that
after the gun-boats had run their batteries, nearly
their whole force was withdrawn from about Island
Number Ten and kept concealed in the woods back
of the practicable landing-places, and they were
prepared to pick off all the men that could be
landed ; but when they saw the four transports,
loaded with troops, steam out from the bayou, the
word was given for each man to take care of him-
self. A few hundred did manage to make their way
through the swamps in the rear, but the most of
them quietly yielded to the inevitable. So well
had the movement been concealed that they had
not the least idea of what was being done.-j^
Postscript : The Official Records, which, since
writing the above, I have just seen for the first
time, contain a letter from General Pope to me,
which I never before heard of (dated the day I was
on my way back from the gun-boat with the plan
fully matured), asking if I could not dig a c<oial, a
" mere ditch of a foot wide which the water of the
river would soon wash out," from a point one mile
above Island Number Ten to a point one mile be-
low. That land was at this time ten feet under
water. — J. W. Bissell.
December, 1884.
Union forces] were endeavoring to cut a canal across
the opposite peninsula for the passage of transports, in
order to land helow the bend; that they would fail, and
that the position was safe until the river fell, and no
longer."— Editors.
COMMENT BY GENERAL SCHUYLER HAMILTON, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V
I have read Colonel J. W. Bissell's article on the
" Sawing out a Channel above Island Number Ten." I
desire to call attention to what he says :
" Some officer making some suggestion about a 'canal,' I
immediately pulled out my memorandum-book, and, showing
the sketch, said the whole thiug was provided for."
This on the evening of March 19th, 1862, which is the
date of General Pope's letter to which Colonel Bissell
refers in a foot-note, saying he did not receive the letter
because he (Colonel Bissell) was on his return from the
reconnoissance he had been ordered to make. To the
public this reads as though the plan originated with
Colonel Bissell, while I am ready to show that while the
colonel directed the work, " some officer," as he says, —
or to be exact I myself,— was the sole inventor of the
project. My own official report, dated Headquarters
Second Divison Ariny of the Mississippi, Pittsburg Land-
ing, April 22d, 1862, reads as follows :
"Transports having reached us through a channel cut
with enormous labor under the direction of Colonel Bissell,
on a suggestion advanced by the subscriber, March 17th, 1862,
the Second Division embarked on them, April 7th, to cross the
Mississippi, which was accomplished in gallant style, but
without opposition, the gun-boats Carondelet and Pittsburgh,
under Captain Walke, having in dashing style silenced the
enemy's shore batteries."
General Pope wrote to General Halleck, under date
New Madrid, Mo., April 9th, 1862 :
"The canal across the peninsula opposite Island Number
Ten, and for the idea of which I am indebted to General
Schuyler Hamilton, was completed by Colonel Bissell's
Engineer Regiment, and four steamers brought through on
the night.of the 6th."
General Pope again, iu his official report to General
Halleck of May 2d, 1862, writes :
"On the 16th of March I received your dispatch, directing
me, if possible, to construct a road through the swamps to a
point on the Missouri shore opposite Island Number Ten,
aud transfer a portion of my force sufficient to erect batteries
at that point to assist in the artillery practice on the enemy's
batteries. I accordingly dispatched Colonel J. W. Bissell,
Engineer Regiment, to examine the country with this view,
directing him at the same time, if he found it impracticable
to build a road through the swamps and overflow of the river.
to ascertain whether it were possible to dig a canal across the
peninsula from some point, above Island Number Ten to New
Madrid, in order that steam transports might be brought to
me, which would enable my command to cross the river. The
idea of the canal was suggested to me by General Schuyler
Hamilton in a conversation upon the necessity of crossing
the river and assailing the enemy's batteries near Island
Number Ten in the rear."
The New York " Herald," in its issue of April 13th, 1862,
published an article in reference to this channel, en-
titled "The Schuyler Hamilton Canal."
NEW YORK, June 16th, 1885.
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT NEW MADRID (ISLAND NUMBER
TEN), FORT PILLOW, AND MEMPHIS.
The composition and losses of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records.
K stands for killed ; w for wounded ; in w mortally wounded ; m for captured « ir missing ; c for captured.— Editoks.
Union Army at New Madrid. Major-Gen. John Pope.
First Division, Brig.-Gen. David S. Stanley. First
Brigade, Col. John Groesbeck: 27th Ohio, Col. John \V.
Fuller; 39th Ohio, Major Edward F. Noyes. Brigade
loss: k, 2; w, 5 = 7. Second Brigade, Col. J. L. Kirby
Smith: 43d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Wager Swayue ; 63d Ohio,
Col. John W. Sprague. Brigade loss : w, 5.
Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Schuyler Hamilton. First
Brigade, Col. W. H. Worthington: 59th Ind., Col. J. I.
Alexander; 5th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Charles L. Matthies.
Brigade loss : k, 2 ; w, 4 =0. Second Brigade, Col. Nicholas
Perczel : 10th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. William E. Small ; 20th
Mo., Col. George B. Boomer. Artillery: nth Ohio Bat-
tery, Capt. Frank C. Sands. Loss: k, l.
Third Division, Brig.-Gen. John M. Palmer. First
Brigade, Col. James R. Slack: 34th Ind., Col. Townsend
Ryan; 47th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Milton S. Robinson. Second
Brigade, Col. Graham N. Fitch : 43d Ind., Col. William
E. McLean ; 46th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Newton G. Scott. Cav-
alry : 7th 111., Col. Wm. P. Kellogg. Loss : w, 1 ; m, 2 = 3.
Artillery: G, 1st Mo., Capt Henry Hescock.
Fodrtii Division, Brig.-Gen. E. A. Paine. First Bri-
gade, Col. James D. Morgan : 10th 111., Lieut.-Col. John
Tillson; 16th 111., Col. Robert F. Smith. Brigade less:
k. 1 ; w, 1=2. Second Brigade, Col. Gilbert W. Cuinming:
22d 111., Lieut.-Col. Harrison E. Hart; 51st 111., Lieut.-
Col. Luther P. Bradley. Cavalry : 11 and I, 1st 111.,
Major D. P. Jenkins. Sharp-shooters: 64th 111., Major
F. W. Matteson.
Fifth Division, Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Plummer. First
Brigade, Col. John Bryner : 47th 111., Lieut.-Col. Daniel L.
Miles ; 8th Wis., Lieut.-Col. George W. Bobbins. Second
Brigade, Col. John M. Loomis : 26th 111., Lieut.-Col.
Charles J. Tinkham ; 11th Mo., Lieut.-Col. William E.
Panabaker. Artillery: M, 1st Mo., Capt. Albert. M.
Powell.
Cavalry Division, Brig.-Gen. Gordon Granger : 2d
Mich., Lieut.-Col. Selden H. Gorham ; 3d Mich., Lieut.-
Col. R. H. G. Minty, Col. John K. Mizuer.
Artillery Division, Major Warren L. Lothrop : 2d
Iowa, Capt. N. T. Spoor ; 5th Wis., Capt. Oscar F. Pinney ;
6th Wis., Capt. Henry Dillon ; 7th Wis., ('apt. Richard R.
Griffiths; C, 1st Mich., Capt. A. W. Dees; H, 1st Mich.,
Capt. SamuelDe Golyer; C, 1st HI., Capt. Charles Hough-
taling; F, 2d U. S., Lieut. John A. Darling, Lieut. D. P.
Walling.
Unassigned Troops : Engineer Regt. of the West,
Col. Josiah W. Bissell; 22d Mo., Li.ut.-Col. John D.
Foster; 2d Iowa Caw, Col. W. L. Elliott; 2d 111. Cav. (4
cos.), Lieut.-Col. Harvey Hogg ; 4th U. S. Cav. (3 cos.),
Lieut. M. J. Kelly; 1st U. S. Infantry (6 cos.), Capt.
George A. Williams. Loss of latter regiment: k, 2 ; w,
5 ; m, 1 = 8.
Flotilla Brigade, Col. Napoleon B. Buford: 27th
111., Lieut.-Col. F. A. Harrington; 42d 111., Col. George
W. Roberts; 15th AVis., Col. Hans C. Heg; G, 1st 111.
Artillery, Capt. Arthur O'Leary ; G, 2d. 111. Artillery,
Capt. Frederick Sparrestrom.
Union Naval Forces at Island Number Ten. Flag-
Officer A. H. Foote : Benton (flag-ship), Lieut. -Comr. S. L.
Phelps; St. Louis, Lieut. -Comr. Leonard Paulding
Cincinnati, Comr. R. N. Stembel; Pittsburgh, Lieut.-
Comr. Egbert Thompson; Mound City, Comr. A. H.
Kilty ; Carondelet, Comr. Henry Walke ; Eleven Mortar-
boats, Capt. Henry E. Maynadier.
The total Union loss (including 2 killed and 13 wounded
on the St. Louis, by the bursting of a gun March 17) was
17 killed, 34 wounded, and 3 captured or missing.
Confederate Army at Island Number Ten. (1)
Major-Gen. John P. McCown ; (2) Brig.-Gen. W. W.
Mackall. Subordinate General Officers: Brig. -Generals
A. P. Stewart, L. M. Walker, E. W. Gautt, and James
Trudeau. Infantry: 1st Ala., Tenn., and Miss., Col.
Alpheus Baker; 1st Ala., Col. J. G. W. Steedman; 4th
Ark. Battalion, Major M. M. McKay ; 5th Ark. Battalion,
Lieut.-Col. F. A. Terry ; 11th Ark., Col. J. M. Smith ; 12th
Ark.. Lieut.-Col. W. D. S. Cook; 11th La., Col. S. F.
Marks; 12th La., Col. Thomas M. Scott; 5th La. Battal-
ion, Col. J. B. G. Kennedy ; 4th Tenn., Col. E. P. Neely ;
5th Tenn., Col. W. E. Travis; 31st Tenn., Col. W. M.
Bradford; 40th Tenn., Col. C. C. Hendersou ; 46th Tenn.,
Col. John M. Clark; 55th Tenn., Col. A. J. Brown.
Cavalry: Hudson's ami Wheeler's companies, Miss.;
Neely'sand Haywood's companies, Tenn. Light Artil-
lery : Point Coup6e, La. Battery, Capt. R. A.Stewart;
Tenn. Battery, Capt. Smith P. Bankhead. Tenn. Heavy
Artillery: Companies of Captains Jackson, Sterling,
Humes, Hoadley, Caruthers, Jones, Dismuke, Rueker,
Fisher, Johnston, and Upton. Engineer Corps: Captains
A. B. Gray and D. B. Harris. Sappers and Miners:
Capt. D. Winttcr.
Confederate Naval Forces at Island Number
Tex. Flag-Officer I reorge N. Hollins. Mcliae (flag-ship),
Lieut. Thomas B. Huger, 6 32-pounders, 1 9-inch, 1 24-
pouuder rifle; Livingston, Comr. R. F. Pinkney; Folic,
Lieut. -Comr. J. II. Carter, 5 guns; Pontchartrain, Lieut. -
Comr. John W. Dunnington; Maurepas, Lieut. Joseph
Fry, 5 rifled guns ; Jackson, Lieut. F. B. Renshaw, 2
guns ; Floating Battery, New Orleans, Lieut. S. W. Aver-
ott. No loss reported. The fleet, with the exception of
the Floating Battery, was not actively engaged.
The total Confederate loss in killed and wounded is
estimated at about 30. Of the number of Confederates
captured the Confederate and Union reports range from
2000 to 7000, respectively.
Union Fleet at Fort Pillow, May 10th, 1862. Capt.
Charles Henry Davis, commanding pro tern. Benton
(flagship), Lieut. S. L. Phelps ; Carondelet, Comr. Henry
Walke; Mound City, Comr. A. H. Kilty; Cincinnati,
Comr. R. N. Stembel (w) ; St. Louis, Lieut. Henry Erbcn ;
Cairo, [Lieut. N. C. Bryant; Pittsburgh, Lieut. Egbert
Thompson.
The Union loss as officially reported was : Cincinnati,
wounded, 3 (1 mortally). Mound City, wounded, 1.
Total. 4.
Union Fleet at Memphis, June 6th, 1862. Flag-Of-
licer Charles Henry Davis, commanding. Gun-boats —
Benton (flagship), Lieut. S. L. Phelps; Louisville, Comr.
B. M. Dove ; Carondelet, Comr. Henry Walke ; Cairo,
Lieut. N. C. Bryant ; St. Louis, Lieut. Wilson McGuune-
gle. Ram fleet — Queen of the West (flag-ship), Col.
Charles Ellet, Jr. ; Monarch, Lieut.-Col. Alfred W. Ellet ;
Switzerland, First Master David Millard.
The. Union loss as officially reported was : Gun-boats —
wounded, 3. Ram fleet — wounded, 1 (Col. Ellet, who
subsequently died). Total, 4.
Confederate River Defense Fleet, at Fort Pil-
low and Memphis. Capt. J. E. Montgomery, com-
manding. Little Rebel (flag-ship), Capt. Montgomery;
General Bragg, Capt. William H. H. Leonard, General
Sterling Price, First Officer, J. E. Henthorne ; Sumter,
Capt. W. W. Lamb ; General Earl Van Dorn, Capt. Isaac
D. Fulkerson; General M. Jeff. Thompson, Capt. John
H. Burke ; General Lovell, Capt. James C. Delancy ;
General Beauregard , Capt. James Henry Hurt. Each
vessel carried one or more guns, probably 32-pounders.
The Confederate loss in the action off Fort Pillow,
May 10th, as officially reported, was : killed, 2 ; wounded,
1 = 3. No report was made of the Confederate loss in
the action at Memphis of June 6th, nor is it possible, in
view of the irregular organization of the fleet, the na-
ture of the conflict, and the dispersal of the survivors,
to form even an approximate estimate of it.
463
FROM A PHOTOGR^TH TAKEN, PROBABLY, IN 1o63.
464
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
BY ULYSSES S. GRANT, GENERAL. U. S. A.
ON ThE SKIRMISH LINE.
THE battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Lauding,
fought on Sunday and Monday, the 6th and
7th of April, 1862, has been perhaps less
understood, or, to state the case more accu-
rately, more persistently misunderstood,
than any other engagement between Na-
tional and Confederate troops during the
entire rebellion. Correct reports of the
battle have been published, notably by
Sherman, Badeau, and, in a speech be-
fore a meeting of veterans, by General
Prentiss ; but all of these appeared long subsequent to
the close of the rebellion, and after public opinion had
been most erroneously formed.
Events had occurred before the battle, and others sub-
sequent to it, which determined me to make no report
to my then chief, General Halleck, further than was contained in a letter,
written immediately after the battle, informing him that an engagement
had been fought, and announcing the result. The occurrences alluded to
are these : After the capture of Fort Donelson, with over fifteen thousand
effective men and all their munitions of war, I believed much more could
be accomplished without further sacrifice of life.
Clarksville, a town between Donelson and Nashville, in the State of Tennes-
see, and on the east bank of the Cumberland, was garrisoned by the enemy.
Nashville was also garrisoned, and was probably the best-provisioned depot
at the time in the Confederacy. Albert Sidney Johnston occupied Bowling
Green, Ky., with a large force. I believed, and my information justified the
belief, that these places' would fall into our hands without a battle, if threat-
ened promptly. I determined not to miss this chance. But being only a
district commander, and under the immediate orders of the department
commander, General Halleck, whose headquarters were at St. Louis, it was
my duty to communicate to him all I proposed to do, and to get his approval,
if possible. I did so communicate, and, receiving no reply, acted upon my
own judgment. The result proved that my information was correct, and
sustained my judgment. What, then, was my surprise, after so much had
been accomplished by the troops under my immediate command between the
time of leaving Cairo, early in February, and the 4th of March, to receive
from my chief a dispatch of the latter date, saying: "You will place Major-
General C. F. Smith in command of expedition, and remain yourself at Fort
Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to report strength and positions of
vol. I. 30
465
466
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
OUTLINE MAP OF THE SHILOH CAMPAIGN.
your command?" I was left virtually
in arrest on board a steamer, without
even a guard, for about a week, when
I was released and ordered to resume
my command.
Again : Shortly after the battle of
Shiloh had been fought, General Hal-
leck moved his headquarters to Pitts-
burg Landing, and assumed command
of the troops in the field. Although
next to him in rank, and nominally
in command of my old district and
army, I was ignored as much as if
I had been at the most distant point
of territory within my jurisdiction; and although I was in command of
all the troops engaged at Shiloh, I was not permitted to see one of the
reports of General Buell or his subordinates in that battle, until they were
published by the War Department, long after the event. In consequence, I
never myself made a full report of this engagement.
When I was restored to my command, on the 13th of March, I found it on
the Tennessee River, part at Savannah and part at Pittsburg Landing, nine
miles above, and on the opposite or western bank. 1 generally spent the day
at Pittsburg, and returned by boat to Savannah in the evening. I was intend-
ing to remove my headquarters to Pittsburg, where I had sent all the troops
immediately upon my reassuming command, but Buell, with the Army of the
Ohio, had been ordered to reenforce me from Columbia, Tenn. He was
expected daily, and would come in at Savannah. I remained, therefore, a few
days longer than I otherwise should have done, for the purpose of meeting
him on his arrival.
General Lew Wallace, with a division, had been placed by General Smith
at Crump's Landing, about five miles farther down the river than Pittsburg,
and also on the west bank. His position I regarded as so well chosen that he
was not moved from it until the Confederate attack in force at Shiloh.
The skirmishing in our front had been so continuous from about the 3d of
April up to the determined attack, that I remained on the field each night
until an hour when I felt there would be no further danger before morning. In
fact, on Friday, the 4th, I was very much injured by my horse falling with
me and on me while I was trying to get to the front, where firing had been
heard. The night was one of impenetrable darkness, with rain pouring down
in torrents; nothing was visible to the eye except as revealed by the frequent
flashes of lightning. Under these circumstances I had to trust to the horse,
without guidance, to keep the road. I had not gone far, however, when I
met General W. H. L. Wallace and General (then Colonel) McPherson coming
from the direction of the front. They said all was quiet so far as the enemy
was concerned. On the way back to the boat my horse's feet slipped from
under him, and he fell with my leg under his body. The extreme softness of
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
467
the ground, from the excessive rains of the few preceding days, no doubt
saved me from a severe injury and protracted lameness. As it was, my
ankle was very much injured; so much so, that my boot had to be cut off.
During the battle, and for two or three days after, I was unable to walk
except with crutches.
On the 5th General Nelson, with a division of Buell's army, arrived at
Savannah, and I ordered him to move up the east bank of the river, to be
in a position where
he could be ferried
over to Crump's
Landing or Pitts-
burg Landing, as
occasion required.
I had learned that
General Buell him-
self would be at
Savannah the next
MRS. CRUMP'S HOUSE.
day, and desired to
meet me on his ar-
rival. Affairs at
Pittsburg Landing
had been such for
several days that I
did not want to be
away during the
day. I determined,
therefore, to take a
very early breakfast and ride out to meet Buell, and thus save time. He had
arrived on the evening of the 5th, but had not advised me of the fact, and I was
not aware of it until some time after. While I was at breakfast, however,
heavy firing was heard in the direction of Pittsburg Landing, and I hastened
there, sending a hurried note to Buell, informing him of the reason why I
could not meet him at Savannah. On the way up the river I directed the
dispatch-boat to run in close to Crump's Landing, so that I could communi-
cate with General Lew Wallace. I found him waiting on a boat, apparently
expecting to see me, and I directed him to get his troops in line ready to
THE LANDING BELOW THE HOUSE. FROM PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN IN 1884.
Crump's Landing is, by river, about live miles below (north of) Pittsburg Land-
ing. Here one of General Lew Wallace's three brigades was encamped on the
morning of the battle, another brigade bein^ two miles back, on the road to Purdy,
and a third brigade half a mile farther advanced. The Widow Crump's house
is about a quarter of a mile above the landing.
r
468 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
execute any orders lie might receive. He replied that his troops were already
under arms and prepared to move.
Up to that time I had felt by no means certain that Crump's Landing
might not be the point of attack. On reaching the front, however, about 8
A. m., I found that the attack on Shiloh was unmistakable, and that nothing
more than a small guard, to protect our transports and stores, was needed at
Crump's. Captain A. S. Baxter, a quartermaster on my staff, was accordingly
directed to go back and order General Wallace to march immediately to Pitts-
burg, by the road nearest the river. Captain Baxter made a memorandum
of his order. About 1 p. m., not hearing from Wallace, and being much in
need of reinforcements, I sent two more of my staff, Colonel James B.
McPherson and Captain W. R. Rowley, to bring him up with his division.
They reported finding him marching toward Purdy, Bethel, or some point
west from the river, and farther from Pittsburg by several miles than when
he started. The road from his first position was direct, and near the river.
Between the two points a bridge had been built across Snake Creek by our
troops, at which Wallace's command had assisted, expressly to enable the
troops at the two places to support each other in case of need. Wallace did
not arrive in time to take part in the first day's fight. General Wallace has
since claimed that the order delivered to him by Captain Baxter was simply
to join the right of the army, and that the road over which he marched
would have taken him to the road from Pittsburg to Purdy, where it crosses
Owl Creek, on the right of Sherman ; 1 >ut this is not where I had ordered
him nor where I wanted him to go. I never could see, and do not now see,
why any order was necessary further than to direct him to come to Pitts-
burg Landing, without specifying by what route. His was one of three vet-
eran divisions that had been in battle, and its absence was severely felt.
Later in the war, General Wallace would never have made the mistake that
he committed on the 6th of April, 1862. I presume his idea was that by
taking the route he did, he would be able to come around on the flank or
rear of the enemy, and thus perform an act of heroism that would redound to
the credit of his command, as well as to the benefit of his country. %
& Since the publication in "The Century " of my where our right rested. In this letter General Lew
article on " The Battle of Shiloh " I have received Wallace advises General W. H. L. Wallace that he
from Mrs. W. H. L. Wallace, widow of the gallant will send "to-morrow " (and his letter also says
general who was killed in the first day's fight at "April nth," which is the same day the letter was
that battle, a letter from General Lew Wallace to dated and which, therefore, must have been writ-
him, dated the morning of the 5th. At the date ten on the 4th) some cavalry to report to him at
of this letter it was well known that the Confeder- his headquarters, and suggesting the propriety of
ates had troops out along the Mobile and Ohio rail- General W. H. L. Wallace's sending a company
road west of Crump's Landing and Pittsburg back with them for the purpose of having the cav-
Landing, and were also collecting near Shiloh. airy at the two landings familiarize themselves
This letter shows that at that time General Lew with the road, so that they could "act promptly
Wallace was making preparations for the emer- in case of emergency as guides to and from the
gency that might happen for the passing of reen- different camps."
forcements between Shiloh and his position, ex- This modifies very materially what I have said,
tending from Crump's Landing westward; and and what has been said by others, of the conduct
he sends the letter over the road running from of General Lew Wallace at the battle of Shiloh.
Adamsville to the Pittsburg Landing and Purdy It shows that he naturally, with no more experi-
road. These two roads intersect nearly a mile ence than he had at the time in the profession of
west of the crossing of the latter over Owl Creek, arms, would take the particular road that he did
THE BATTLE OF SH1L0H.
469
Shiioh was a log meeting-
house, some two or three
miles from Pittsburg Land-
ing, and on the ridge which
divides the waters of Snake
and Lick creeks, the former
entering into the Tennes-
see just north of Pittsburg
Landing, and the latter
south. Shiloh was the key
to our position, and was
held by Sherman. His di-
vision was at that time
NEW SHILOH CHURCH, ON THE SITE OF
THE LOG CHAPEL WHICH WAS DE
STROYED AFTER THE BATTLE.
wholly raw, no part of
ever having been in an en-
gagement, but I thought this
deficiency was more than
made up by the superiority
of the commander. McCler-
nand was on Sherman's
left, with troops that had
been engaged at Fort Don-
elson, and were therefore
veterans so far as Western
troops had become such
at that stage of the war.
Next to McClernand came
Prentiss, with a raw division,
and on the extreme left,
Stuart, with one brigade of Sherman's division. Hurlbut was in rear of
Prentiss, massed, and in reserve at the time of the onset. The division of
General C. F. Smith was on the right, also in reserve. General Smith was
SHILOH SPRING, IN THE RAVINE SOUTH OF THE CHAPEL.
FROM PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN IN 1884.
Tlie spring is on the Confederate side of the ravine. Hard lighting
took place here, in the early morning of Sunday,
hetween Sherman's and Hardee's troops.
start upon in the abseuce of orders to move by a
different road.
The mistake he made, and which probably
caused his apparent dilatoriness, was that of ad-
vancing some distance after he found that the
tiring, which would be at first directly to his front
and then off to the left, had fallen back until it had
got very much in rear of the position of his advance.
This falling back had taken place before I sent
General Wallace orders to move up to Pittsburg
Landing, and, naturally, my order was to follow the
road nearest the river. But my order was verbal,
and to a staff-officer who was to deliver it to Gen-
eral Wallace, so that I am not competent to say
just what order the general actually received.
General Wallace's division was stationed, the
First Brigade at Crump's Landing, the Second out
two miles, and the Third two and a half miles out.
Hearing the sounds of battle, General Wallace early
ordered his First and Third brigades to concen-
trate on the Second. If the position of our front
had not changed, the road which Wallace took
would have been somewhat shorter to our right
than the River road.
U. S. Grant.
Mount McGregor, N. Y., June 21, 1885.
The map used with General Grant's article on sequently General Grant, through his son, Colonel
Shiloh, as first printed in "The Century" Magazine Frederick D. Grant, furnished the editors with
for February, 18S5, was a copy of the official map a revision of the official map, agreeing in every
(see page 508) which was submitted by the editors respect with the map printed in the " Memoirs,"
to General Grant and was approved by him. Sub- here reproduced. In response to an inquiry by the
470
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
47 1
FIRST POSITION OF WATERHOUSE'S BATTERY. FROM A SKETCH MADE SHORTLY AFTER THE BATTLE.
Major Ezra Taylor, General Sherman's cliief of artil-
lery, says in his report: "Captain A. C. W'ateihonx's
battery [was placed] near the left of the division [Sher-
man's] — four guns on the right hank of the Owl Creek
[to the left and front of General Sherman's headquar-
ters] and two guns on the left hank of Owl Creek [about
150 yards to the front]. The enemy appearing in large
masses, and opening a battery to the front and right of
the two guns, advanced across Owl Creek. I instructed
Captain Waterhouse to retire the two guns to the posi-
tion occupied by the rest of his battery, about which
time the enemy appeared in large force in the open held
directly in front of the position of this battery, bearing
aloft, as I supposed, the American flag, and their men
and officers wearing uniforms so similar to ours that
I hesitated to open tire on them until they passed into
tlie woods and were followed by other troops who wore
a uniform not to be mistaken. I afterward learned that
the uniform jackets worn by these troops were black.
As soon as I was certain as to the character of the
troops, I ordered the tiring to commence, which was
done in tine style and with excellent precision." Both
Captain Waterhouse and Lieutenant A. K. Abbott were
severely wounded.— Editors.
sick in bed at Savannah, some nine miles below, but in hearing of our guns.
His services on those two eventful days would no doubt have been of
inestimable value had his health permitted his presence. The command
of his division devolved upon Brigadier-Greneral W. H. L. Wallace, a most
estimable and able officer, — a veteran, too, for he had served a year in
the Mexican war, and had been with his command at Henry and Donelson.
Wallace was mortally wounded in the first day's engagement, and with the
editors for the reasons which influenced General
Grant in making the substitution, Colonel Grant
wrote as follows, under date of Chicago, 111., March
20th, 1887: " Father was very ill when the map
used with his article, on Shiloh, by ' The Century '
Co., was submitted to him. He looked at the
topography and found it about as he remembered
the ground; but after you published it, he read
some of the criticisms upon both the article
and the map. Thus having his attention called
to the subject, he revised the article, making
it more forcible, and directed me to get for his
book the map which was in the possession of
Colonel Dayton, Secretary of the Society of the
Army of the Tennessee, and which he had heard
of or seen.
"This map proved to be more satisfactory to him
than the one he had first used, as it agreed more
perfectly with his statements and recollection of
the positions occupied by the troops at the end
of the first day's battle. Therefore, the only
reason that can be assigned for General Grant's
change of maps is that the one used in his book
['Memoirs'] was more satisfactory to him, his deli-
cate health having prevented his thorough inves-
tigation of the map in the first place."
472
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
CONFEDERATE CHARGE UPON PRENTISS'S CAMP ON SUNDAY MORNING.
Of the capture of General Prentiss's camp, Colonel
Francis Quinn (Twelfth Michigan Infantry) says in his
official report dated April 9th: "About daylight the
dead and wounded began to be brought in. The firing
grew closer and closer, till it became manifest a heavy
force of the enemy was upon us. The division was
ordered into line of battle by General Prentiss, and im-
mediately advanced in line about one-quarter of a mile
from the tents, where the enemy were met in short-
filing distance. Volley after volley was given and re-
turned, and many fell on both sides, but their numbers
were, too heavy for our forces. I could see to the right
and left. They were visible in line, and every hill-top
in the rear was covered with them. It was manifest
they were advancing, in not only one, but several lines
of battle. The whole division fell back to their tents
aud again rallied, and, although no regular line was
formed, yet from behind every tree a deadly fire was
poured out upon the enemy, which held them in check
for about one half-hour, when, reenforcements coming
to their assistance, they advanced furiously upon our
camp, and we were forced again to give way. At this
time we lost four pieces of artillery. The. division fell
back about one half-mile, very much scattered and
broken. Here we were posted, being drawn up in line
behind a dense clump of bushes."— Editors.
change of commanders thus necessarily effected in the heat of battle, the
efficiency of his division was mnch weakened.
The position of onr troops made a continnons line from Lick Creek, on the
left, to Owl Creek, a branch of Snake Creek, on the right, facing nearly south,
and possibly a little west. [See map, page 470.] The water in all these streams
was very high at the time, and contributed to protect our flanks. The enemy
was compelled, therefore, to attack directly in front. This he did with great
vigor, inflicting heavy losses on the National side, but suffering much heavier
on his own.
The Confederate assaults were made with such disregard of losses on their
own side, that our line of tents soon fell into their hands. The ground on
which the battle was fought was undulating, heavily timbered, with scattered
clearings, the woods giving some protection to the troops on both sides.
There was also considerable underbrush. A number of attempts were made
by the enemy to turn our right flank, where Sherman was posted, but every
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 473
effort was repulsed with heavy loss. But the front attack was kept up so
vigorously that, to prevent the success of these attempts to get on our flanks,
the National troops were compelled several times to take positions to the rear,
nearer Pittsburg Landing. When the filing ceased at night, the National line
was all of a mile in rear of the position it had occupied in the morning.
In one of the backward moves, on the 6th, the division commanded by
General Prentiss did not fall back with the others. This left his flanks exposed,
and enabled the enemy to capture him, with about 2200 of his officers and
men. General Badeau gives -4 o'clock of the 6th as about the time this cap-
ture took place. He may be right as to the time, but my recollection is that
the hour was later. General Prentiss himself gave the hour as half -past five.
I was with him, as I was with each of the division commanders that day,
several times, and my recollection is that the last time I was with him was
about half -past four, when his division was standing up firmly, and the gen-
eral was as cool as if expecting victory. But no matter whether it was four or
later, the story that he and his command were surprised and captured in their
camps is without any foundation whatever. If it had been true, as currently
reported at the time, and yet believed by thousands of people, that Prentiss
and his division had been captured in their beds, there would not have been
an all-day struggle with the loss of thousands killed and wounded on the
Confederate side.
"With the single exception of a few minutes after the capture of Prentiss,
a continuous and unbroken line was maintained all day from Snake Creek or
its tributaries on the right to Lick Creek or the Tennessee on the left, above
Pittsburg. There was no hour during the day when there was not heavy
firing and generally hard fighting at some point on the line, but seldom at all
points at the same time. It was a case of Southern dash against Northern
pluck and endurance.
Three of the five divisions engaged on Sunday were entirely raw, and
many of the men had only received their arms on the way from their States
to the field. Many of them had arrived but a day or two before, and were
hardly able to load their muskets according to the manual. Their officers
were equally ignorant of their duties. Under these circumstances, it is not
astonishing that many of the regiments broke at the first fire. In two cases,
as I now remember, colonels led their regiments from the field on first
hearing the whistle of the enemy's bullets. In these cases the colonels were
constitutional cowards, unfit for any military position. But not so the officers
and men led out of danger by them. Better troops never went upon a battle-
field than many of these officers and men afterward proved themselves to be
who fled panic-stricken at the first whistle of bullets and shell at Shiloh.
During the whole of Sunday I was continuously engaged in passing from
one part of the field to another, giving directions to division commanders.
In thus moving along the line, however, I never deemed it important to stay
long with Sherman. Although his troops were then under fire for the first
time, their commander, by his constant presence with them, inspired a confi-
dence in officers and men that enabled them to render services on that bloody
474 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
battle-field worthy of the best of veterans. McClernand was next to Sherman,
and the hardest fighting was in front of these two divisions. McClernand
told me on that day, the 6th, that he profited mnch by having so able a com-
mander supporting him. A casualty to Sherman that would have taken
him from the field that day would have been a sad one for the troops engaged
at Shiloh. And how near we came to this! On the 6th Sherman was shot
twice, once in the hand, once in the shoulder, the ball cutting his coat and
making a slight wound, and a third ball passed through his hat. In addition
to this he had several horses shot during the day.
The nature of this battle was such that cavalry could not be used in front;
I therefore formed ours into line, in rear, to stop stragglers, of whom there
were many. When there would be enough of them to make a show, and after
they had recovered from their fright, they would be sent to reenforce some
part of the line which needed support, without regard to their companies,
regiments, or brigades.
On one occasion during the day, I rode back as far as the river and met
General Buell, who had just arrived; I do not remember the hour, but at
that time there probably were as many as four or five thousand stragglers
lying under cover of the river-bluff, panic-stricken, most of whom would
have been shot where they lay, without resistance, before they would have
taken muskets and marched to the front to protect themselves. This
meeting between General Buell and myself was on the dispatch-boat used to
run between the landing and Savannah. It was brief, and related specially
to his getting his troops over the river. As we left the boat together, Buell's
attention was attracted by the men lying under cover of the bank. I saw
him berating them and trying to shame them into joining their regiments.
He even threatened them with shells from the gun-boats near by. But it was
all to no effect. Most of these men afterward proved themselves as gallant
as any of those who saved the battle from which they had deserted. I have
no doubt that this sight impressed General Buell with the idea that a line of
retreat would be a good thing just then. If he had come in by the front
instead of through the stragglers in the rear, he would have thought and felt
differently. Could he have come through the Confederate rear, he would
have witnessed there a scene similar to that at our own. The distant rear of
an army engaged in battle is not the best place from which to judge cor-
rectly what is going on in front. Later in the war, while occupying the
country between the Tennessee and the Mississippi, I learned that the panic
in the Confederate lines had not differed much from that within our own.
Some of the country people estimated the stragglers from Johnston's army
as high as twenty thousand. Of course, this was an exaggeration.
The situation at the close of Sunday was as follows: Along the top
of the bluff just south of the log-house which stood at Pittsburg Landing,
Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff, had arranged twenty or more pieces
of artillery facing south, or up the river. This line of artillery was on the
crest of a hill overlooking a deep ravine opening into the Tennessee. Hurlbut,
with his division intact, was on the right of this artillery, extending west and
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
475
%m '
m
ilHfe ; £
mm
-ratlin
11 ittPPP
*tfl«u»-
,
CHECKING THE CONFEDERATE ADVANCE ON THE EVENING OF THE FIRST DAY.
Above this ravine, near the landing, the Federal reserve artillery was posted, and it was on this line the
Confederate advance was checked, about sunset, Sunday evening. The Confederates
then fell back and bivouacked in the Federal camps.
possibly a little north. McClernaud came next in the general line, looking
more to the west. His division was complete in its organization and ready
for any duty. Sherman came next, his right extending to Snake Creek. His
command, like the other two, was complete in its organization and ready, like
its chief, for any service it might be called upon to render. All three divisions
were, as a matter of course, more or less shattered and depleted in numbers
from the terrible battle of the day. The division of W. H. L. Wallace, as much
from the disorder arising from changes of division and brigade commanders,
under heavy fire, as from any other cause, had lost its organization, and did
not occupy a place in the line as a division ; Prentiss's command was gone as
a division, many of its .members having been killed, wounded, or captured.
But it had rendered valiant service before its final dispersal, and had contrib-
uted a good share to the defense of Shiloh .
There was, I have said, a deep ravine in front of our left. The Tennessee
River was very high, and there was water to a considerable depth in the
ravine. Here the enemy made a last desperate effort to turn our flank,
but was repelled. The gun-boats Tyler and Lexington, Gwin and Shirk
commanding, with the artillery under Webster, aided the army and effectu-
ally checked their further progress. Before any of Buell's troops had reached
the west bank of the Tennessee, firing had almost entirely ceased ; anything
like an attempt on the part of the enemy to advance had absolutely ceased.
There was some artillery firing from an unseen enemy, some of his shells
passing beyond us ; but I do not remember that there was the whistle of a
47^
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
single musket -ball heard. As his troops arrived in the dusk, General
Buell marched several of his regiments part way down the face of the
hill, where they fired briskly for some minutes, but I do not think a single
man engaged in this firing received an injury; the attack had spent its force.
Greneral Lew
Wallace, with 5000
effective men, ar-
rived after firing-
had ceased for
the day, and was
placed on the
right. Thus night
came, Wallace
came, and the ad-
vance of Nelson's
division came,
but none — unless
night — in time to
be of material ser-
vice to the gallant
men who saved
Shiloh on that
first day, against
large odds. Buell's
loss on the 6th of
April was two men
killed and one
wounded, all mem-
bers of the 36th
Indiana Infantry.
The Army of the
Tennessee lost on that day at least 7000 men. The presence of two or three
regiments of his army on the west bank before firing ceased had not the
slightest effect in preventing the capture of Pittsburg Landing.
So confident was I before firing had ceased on the 6th that the next day
would bring victory to our arms if we could only take the initiative, that I
visited each division commander in person before any reeiiforcements had
reached the field. I directed them to throw out heavy lines of skirmishers in
the morning as soon as they could see, and push them forward until they
found the enemy, following with their entire divisions in supporting distance,
and to engage the enemy as soon as found. To Sherman I told the story of
the assault at Fort Donelson, and said that the same tactics would win at Shi-
loh. Victory was assured when Wallace arrived even if there had been no other
support. The enemy received no reinforcements. He had suffered heavy losses
in killed, wounded, and straggling, and his commander, General Albert Sidney
Johnston, was dead. I was glad, however, to see the reeiiforcements of Buell
wmt' wm.
PRESENT ASPECT OF THE OLD HAMBURG ROAD (TO THE LEFT OF THE NEW
ROAD) WHICH LED UP TO "THE HORNETS' NEST."
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
All
and credit them with doing all there was for them to do. During the night of the
(Jtli the remainder of Nelson's division, Buell's army, crossed the river, and were
ready to advance in the morning, forming the left wing. Two other divisions,
Crittenden's and McCook's, came np the river from Savannah in the trans-
ports, and were on the west bank early on the 7th. Buell commanded them
in person. My command was tlms nearly doubled in numbers and efficiency.
During the night rain fell in torrents, and our troops were exposed to the
storm without shelter. I made my headquarters under a tree a few hundred
yards back from the river-bank. My ankle was so much swollen from the
fall of my horse the Friday night preceding, and the bruise was so painful,
that I could get no rest. The drenching rain would have precluded the pos-
sil tility of sleep, without this additional cause. Some time after midnight,
growing restive under the storm and the continuous pain, I moved back to
the log-house on the bank. This had been taken as a hospital, and all night
wounded men were being brought in, their wounds dressed, a leg or an arm
amputated, as the case might require, and everything being done to save life
or alleviate suffering. The sight was more unendurable than encountering
the enemy's fire, and I returned to my tree in the rain.
The advance on the morning of the 7th developed the enemy in the camps
occupied by our troops before the battle began, more than a mile back from
the most advanced position of the Confederates on the day before. It is
known now that they had not yet learned of the arrival of Buell's com-
mand. Possibly they fell back so far to get the shelter of our tents during
the rain, and also to get away from the
shells that were dropped upon them by
the gun -boats every fifteen minutes
during the night.
The position of the Union troops on
the morning of the 7th was as follows:
General Lew Wallace on the right, Sher-
man on his left ; then McClernand, and
then Hurlbut. Nelson, of Buell's army,
was on our extreme .left, next to the
river; Crittenden was next in line after
Nelson, and on his right ; McCook fol-
lowed, and formed the extreme right of
Buell's command. My old command thus
formed the right wing, while the troops
directly under Buell constituted the left
wing of the army. These relative positions
were retained during the entire day, or un-
til the enemy was driven from the field.
In a very short time the battle became general all along the line. This day
everything was favorable to the Federal side. We had now become the
attacking party. The enemy was driven back all day, as we had been the day
before, until finally he beat a precipitate retreat. The last point held by him
MAJOR-GENERAL B. M. PREXTISS.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
478
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
was near the road leading from the landing to Corinth, on the left of Sherman
and right of McGlernand. About 3 o'clock, being near that point and seeing
that the enemy was giving way everywhere else, I gathered np a couple of
regiments, or parts of regiments, from troops near by, formed them in line of
battle and marched them forward, going in front myself to prevent prema-
ture or long-range firing. At this point there was a clearing between us and
the enemy favorable for charging, although
exposed. I knew the enemy were ready to
break, and only wanted a little encourage-
ment from us to go quickly and join their
friends who had started earlier. After march-
ing to within musket -range, I stopped and let
the troops pass. The command, Charge, was
given, and was executed with loud cheers, and
with a run, when the last of the enemy broke.
During this second day of the battle I had
been moving from right to left and back, to
see for myself the progress made. In the
early part of the afternoon, while riding
with Colonel James B. McPherson and Major
J. P. Hawkins, then my chief commissary,
we got beyond the left of our troops. We
were moving along the northern edge of a
clearing, very leisurely, toward the river above
the landing. There did not appear to be an
enemy to our right, until suddenly a battery
with musketry opened upon us from the edge of the woods on the other side
of the clearing. The shells and balls whistled about our ears very fast for
about a minute. I do not think it took us longer than that to get out of range
and out of sight. In the sudden start we made, Major Hawkins lost his hat.
He did not stop to pick it up. When we arrived at a perfectly safe position
we halted to take an account of damages. McPherson's horse was panting as
if ready to drop. On examination it was found that a ball had struck him
forward of the flank just back of the saddle, and had gone entirely through.
In a few minutes the poor beast dropped dead ; he had given no sign of
injury until we came to a stop. A ball had struck the metal scabbard of my
sword, just below the hilt, and broken it nearly off ; before the battle was
over, it had broken off entirely. There were three of us : one had lost a
horse, killed, one a hat, and one a sword-scabbard. All were thankful that
it was no worse.
After the rain of the night before and the frequent and heavy rains for
some days previous, the roads were almost impassable. The enemy, carrying
his artillery and supply trains over them in his retreat, made them still worse
for troops following. I wanted to pursue, but had not the heart to order the
men who had fought desperately for two days, lying in the mud and rain
whenever not fighting, and I did not feel disposed positively to order Buell,
BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. H. L. WALLACE
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH,
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
479
or any part of his command, to pursue. Although the senior in rank at the
time, I had been so only a few weeks. Buell was, and had been for some
time past, a department commander, while I commanded only a district. I
did not meet Buell in person until too late to get troops ready and pursue
with effect ; but, had I seen him at the moment of the last charge, I should
have at least requested him to follow.
The enemy had hardly started in retreat from his last position, when, look-
ing back toward the river, I saw a division of troops coming up in beautiful
order, as if going on parade or review. The commander was at the head
of the column, and the staff seemed to be disposed about as they would
have been had they been going on parade. When the head of the column
came near where I was standing, it was halted, and the commanding officer,
General A. McD. McCook, rode up to where I was and appealed to me not to
send his division any farther, saying that they were worn out with marching
and fighting. This division had marched on the 6th from a point ten or
twelve miles east of Savannah, over bad roads. The men had also lost rest
< luring the night while crossing the Tennessee, and had been engaged in the
1 tattle of the 7th. It was not, however, the rank and file or the junior officers
who asked to be excused, but the division commander. % I rode forward sev-
eral miles the day after the battle, and found that the enemy had dropped
much, if not all, of their provisions, some ammunition, and the extra wheels
of their caissons, lightening their loads to enable them to get off their guns.
About five miles out we found their field-hospital abandoned. An immediate
pursuit must have resulted in the capture of a considerable number of prison-
ers and probably some guns.
Shiloh was the severest battle fought at the West during the war, and but
few in the East equaled it for hard, determined fighting. I saw an open
field, in our possession on the second day, over which the Confederates had
made repeated charges the day before, so covered with dead that it would
have been possible to walk across the clearing, in any direction, stepping on
dead bodies, without a foot touching the ground. On our side National and
Confederate were mingled together in about equal proportions ; but on the
remainder of the field nearly all were Confederates. On one part, which had
evidently not been plowed for several years, probably because the land was
% In an article on the battle of Shiloh, which I battle of the second day, and did as good service
wrote for " The Century" magazine, I stated that as its position allowed. In fact, an opportunity oc-
General A. McD. McCook, who commanded a di- curred for it to perform a conspicuous act of gal-
vision of Buell's army, expressed some unwilling- lantry which elicited the highest commendation
ness to pursue the enemy on Monday, April 7th, from division commanders in the Army of the Ten-
because of the condition of his troops. General nessee. General Sherman, both in his memoirs
Badeau, in his history, also makes the same and report, makes mention of this fact. General
statement, on my authority. Out of justice to McCook himself belongs to a family which fur-
General McCook and his command, I must say nished many volunteers to the army. I refer to
that they left a point twenty-two miles east of these circumstances with minuteness because I did
Savannah on the morning of the 6th. From the General McCook injustice in my article in " The
heavy rains of a few days previous and the pas- Century," though not to the extent one would sup-
sage of trains and artillery, the roads were neces- pose from the public press. I am not willing to do
sarily deep in mud, which made marching slow, any one an injustice, and if convinced that I have
The division had not only marched through this done one, I am always willing to make the fullest
mud the day before, but it had been in the rain admission. -ry g GrAnt
all night without rest. It was engaged in the Mount McGregor, N.Y., June 21, 1885.
480
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
FORD WHERE THE HAMBURG ROAD CROSSES LICK CREEK, LOOKING FROM COLONEL STUART'S
POSITION ON THE FEDERAL LEFT.
Lick Creek at this point was fordable on the first clay of the battle, but the rains on Sunday night rendered
it impassable on the second day.
poor, bushes had grown up, some to the height of eight or ten feet. There
was not one of these left standing unpierced by bullets. The smaller ones
were all cut down.
Contrary to all my experience up to that time, and to the experience of the
army I was then commanding, we were on the defensive. We were without
intrenchments or defensive advantages of any sort, and more than half the
army engaged the first day was without experience or even drill as soldiers.
The officers with them, except the division commanders, and possibly two or
three of the brigade commanders, were equally inexperienced in war. The
result was a Union victory that gave the men who achieved it great con-
fidence in themselves ever after.
The enemy fought bravely, but they had started out to defeat and destroy
an army and capture a position. They failed in both, with very heavy loss in
killed and wounded, and must have gone back discouraged and convinced
that the " Yankee " was not an enemy to be despised.
After the battle I gave verbal instructions to division commanders to let
the regiments send out parties to bury their own dead, and to detail parties,
under commissioned officers from each division, to bury the Confederate
dead in their respective fronts, and to report the numbers so buried. The
latter part of these instructions was not carried out by all ; but they were
THE BATTLE OF SH1L0H.
481
by those sent from Sherman's division, and by some of the parties sent ont
by McClernand. The heaviest loss sustained by the enemy was in front of
these two divisions.
The criticism has often been made that the Union troops should have been
intrenched at Shiloh ; but up to that time the pick and spade had been but
little resorted to at the West. I had, however, taken this subject under con-
sideration soon after reassuming command in the field. McPherson, my only
military engineer, had been directed to lay out a line to intrench. He did so,
but reported that it would have to be made in rear of the line of encampment
as it then ran. The new line, while it would be nearer the river, was yet too
far away from the Tennessee, or even from the creeks, to be easily supplied
with water from them ; and in case of attack, these creeks would be in the
hands of the enemy. Besides this, the troops with me, officers and men,
needed discipline and drill more than they did experience with the pick,
shovel, and axe. Reinforcements were arriving almost daily, composed of
troops that had been hastily thrown 'together into companies and regiments —
fragments of incomplete organizations, the men and officers strangers to each
other. Under all these circumstances I concluded that drill and discipline
were worth more to our men than fortifications.
General Buell was a brave, intelligent officer, with as much professional
pride and ambition of a commendable sort as I ever knew. I had been two
years at West Point with him, and had served with him afterward, in garrison
JB Schcll
BRIDGE OVER SNAKE CREEK BY WHICH GENERAL LEW WALLACE'S TROOPS REACHED THE FIELD,
SUNDAY EVENING. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.
Pittsburg Landing is nearly two miles to the left. Owl Creek empties from the left into Snake Creek,
a short distance above the bridge.
VOL. I. 31
482
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
BIVOUAC OF THE FEDERAL TROOPS, SUNDAY NIGHT.
and in the Mexican war, several years more. He was not given in early
life or in mature years to forming intimate acquaintances. He was studious
by habit, and commanded the confidence and respect of all who knew him.
He was a strict disciplinarian, and perhaps did not distinguish sufficiently
between the volunteer who " enlisted for the war " and the soldier who
serves in time of peace. One system embraced men who risked life for a
:,>ciple, and often men of social standing, competence, or wealth, and
apendence of character. The other includes, as a rule, only men who
aid not do as well in any other occupation. General Buell became an
object of harsh criticism later, some going so far as to challenge his loyalty.
No one who knew him ever believed him capable of a dishonorable act, and
nothing could be more dishonorable than to accept high rank and command
in war and then betray the trust. When I came into command of the army,
in 1864, I requested the Secretary of War to restore General Buell to duty.
After the war, during the summer of 1865, 1 traveled considerably through
the North, and was everywhere met by large numbers of people. Every one
had his opinion about the manner in which the war had been conducted ;
who among the generals had failed, how, and why. Correspondents of the
press were ever on hand to hear every word dropped, and were not always
disposed to report correctly what did not confirm their preconceived notions,
either about the conduct of the war or the individuals concerned in it. The
opportunity frequently occurred for me to defend General Buell against what
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 483
I believed to be most unjust charges. On one occasion a correspondent put
in my mouth the very charge I had so often refuted — of disloyalty. This
brought from General Buell a very severe retort, which I saw in the New
York " World " some time before I received the letter itself. I could very
well understand 'his grievance at seeing untrue and disgraceful charges
apparently sustained by an officer who, at the time, was at the head of the
army. I replied to him, but not through the press. I kept no copy of my
letter, nor did I ever see it in print, neither did I receive an answer.
General Albert Sidney Johnston, who commanded the Confederate forces
at the beginning of the battle, was disabled by a wound in the afternoon of
the first day. His wound, as I understood afterward, was not necessarily
fatal, or even dangerous. But he was a man who would not abandon what
he deemed an important trust in the face of danger, and consequently con-
tinued in the saddle, commanding, until so exhausted by the loss of blood
that he had to be taken from his horse, and soon after died. The news was
not long in reaching our side, and, I suppose, was quite an encouragement
to the National soldiers. I had known Johnston slightly in the Mexican war,
and later as an officer in the regular army. He was a man of high char-
acter and ability. His contemporaries at West Point, and officers generally
who came to know him personally later, and who remained on our side,
expected him to prove the most formidable man to meet that the Confederacy
would produce. Nothing occurred in his brief command of an army to prove
or disprove the high estimate that had been placed upon his military ability. |
General Beauregard was next in rank to Johnston, and succeeded to the
command, which he retained to the close of the battle and during the subse-
quent retreat on Corinth, as well as in the siege of that place. His tactics
have been severely criticised by Confederate writers, but I do not believe his
fallen chief could have done any better under the circumstances. Some of
these critics claim that Shiloh was won when Johnston fell, and that if he had
not fallen the army under me would have been annihilated or captured. Ifs
defeated the Confederates at Shiloh. There is little doubt that we would have
been disgracefully beaten if all the shells and bullets fired by us had passed
harmlessly over the enemy, and if all of theirs had taken effect. Command-
ing generals are liable to be killed during engagements ; and the fact that
when he was shot Johnston was leading a brigade to induce it to make a
charge which had been repeatedly ordered, is evidence that there was neither
the universal demoralization on our side nor the unbounded confidence on
theirs which has been claimed. There was, in fact, no hour during the day
when I doubted the eventual defeat of the enemy, although I was disappointed
that reinforcements so near at hand did not arrive at an earlier hour.
The Confederates fought with courage at Shiloh, but the particular skill
claimed I could not, and still cannot, see ; though there is nothing to criticise
4 In his "Personal Memoirs" General Grant orders and dispatches of Johnston I am compelled
says: "I once wrote that 'nothing occurred iu to materially modify my views of that officer's
his brief command of an army to prove or dis- qualifications as a soldier. My judgment now
prove the high estimate that had been placed is that he was vacillating and undecided in his
upon his military ability'; but after studying the actions."
484
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
WOUNDED AND STRAGGLERS ON THE WAT TO THE LANDING, AND AMMUNITION-WAGONS GOING TO THE FRONT.
except the claims put forward for it since. But the Confederate claimants for
superiority in strategy, superiority in generalship, and superiority in dash and
prowess are not so unjust to the Union troops engaged at Shiloh as are many
hern writers. The troops on both sides were American, and united they
not fear any foreign foe. It is possible that the Southern man started
in "w ith a little more dash than his Northern brother ; but he was correspond-
ingly less enduring.
The endeavor of the enemy on the first day was simply to hurl their men
against ours — first at one point, then at another, sometimes at several points
at once. This they did with daring and energy, until at night the rebel troops
were worn out. Our effort during the same time was to be prepared to resist
assaults wherever made. The object of the Confederates on the second day
was to get away with as much of their army and material as possible. Ours
then was to drive them from our front, and to capture or destroy as great a
part as possible of their men and material. We were successful in driving
them back, but not so successful in captures as if further pursuit could have
been made. As it was, we captured or recaptured on the second day about
as much artillery as we lost on the first ; and, leaving out the one great cap-
ture of Prentiss, we took more prisoners on Monday than the enemy gained
from us on Sunday. On the 6th Sherman lost 7 pi 3 of artillery, McCler-
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 485
nand 6, Prentiss 8, and Hmibut 2 batteries. On the 7th Sherman captured
7 guns, McClernand 3, and the Army of the Ohio 20.
At Shiloh the effective strength of the Union force on the morning of the
6th was 33,000. .Lew Wallace brought five thousand more after nightfall.
Beauregard reported the enemy's strength at 40,955. According to the custom
of enumeration in the South, this number probably excluded every man
enlisted as musician, or detailed as guard or nurse, and all commissioned
officers, — everybody who did not carry a musket or serve a cannon. With
us everybody in the field receiving pay from the Government is counted.
Excluding the troops who fled, panic-stricken, before they had fired a shot,
there was not a time during the 6th when we had more than 25,000 men in
line. On the 7th Buell brought twenty thousand more. Of his remaining
two divisions, Thomas's did not reach the field during the engagement;
Wood's arrived before firing had ceased, but not in time to be of much service.
Our loss in the two-days fight was 1754 killed, 8408 wounded, and 2885
missing. Of these 2103 were in the Army of the Ohio. Beauregard reported
a total loss of 10,699, of whom 1728 were killed, 8012 wounded, and 959
missing. This estimate must be incorrect. We buried, by actual count,
more of the enemy's dead in front of the divisions of McClernand and Sher-
man alone than here reported, and four thousand was the estimate of the
burial parties for the whole field. Beauregard reports the Confederate force
on the 6th at over 40,000, and their total loss during the two days at 10,699;
and at the same time declares that he could put only 20,000 men in battle
on the morning of the 7th.
The navy gave a hearty support to the army at Shiloh, as indeed it always
did, both before and subsequently, when I was in command. The nature
of the ground was such, however, that on this occasion it could do nothing
in aid of the troops until sundown on the first day. The country was broken
and heavily timbered, cutting off all view of the battle from the river, so that
friends would be as much in danger from fire from the gun-boats as the foe.
But about sundown, when the Natioual troops were back in their last position,
the right of the enemy was near the river and exposed to the fire of the two
gun-boats, which was delivered with vigor and effect. After nightfall, when
firing had entirely ceased on land, the commander of the fleet informed himself,
proximately, of the position of our troops, and suggested the idea of drop-
ping a shell within the lines of the enemy every fifteen minutes during the
night. This was done with effect, as is proved by the Confederate reports.
Up to the battle of Shiloh, I, as well as thousands of other citizens, believed
that the rebellion against the Government would collapse suddenly and soon
if a decisive victory could be gained over any of its armies. Henry and
Donelson were such victories. An army of more than 21,000 men was cap-
tured or destroyed. Bowling Green, Columbus, and Hickman, Ky., fell in
consequence, and Clarksville and Nashville, Tenn., the last two with an
immense amount of stores, also fell into our hands. The Tennessee and
Cumberland rivers, from their mouths to the head of navigation, were secured*
But when Confederate armies were collected which not only attempted to hold
486
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
a line farther south, from Memphis to Chattanooga, Knoxville and on to the
Atlantic, but assumed the offensive, and made such a gallant effort to regain
what had been lost, then, indeed, I gave up all idea of saving the Union except
by complete conquest. Up to that time it had been the policy of our army,
certainly of that portion commanded by me, to protect the property of the citi-
zens whose territory was invaded, without regard to their sentiments, whether
Union or Secession. After this, however, I regarded it as humane to both
sides to protect the persons of those found at their homes but to consume
everything that could be used to support or supply armies. Protection was
still continued over such supplies as were within lines held by us, and which
we expected to continue to hold. But such supplies within the reach of Con-
federate armies I regarded as contraband as much as arms or ordnance stores.
Their destruction was accomplished without bloodshed, and tended to the
same result as the destruction of armies. I continued this policy to the close
of the war. Promiscuous pillaging, however, was discouraged and punished.
Instructions were always given to take provisions and forage under the direc-
tion of commissioned officers, who should give receipts to owners, if at home,
and turn the property over to officers of the quartermaster or commissary
departments, to be issued as if furnished from our Northern depots. But
much was destroyed without receipts to owners when it could not be brought
within our lines, and would otherwise have gone to the support of secession
and rebellion. This policy, I believe, exercised a material influence in
hastening; the end.
— - -*?&
ABOVE THE LANDING — THE STORE, AND A PART OF THE NATIONAL CEMETERY.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.
SHILOH REVIEWED.
BY DON CARLOS BUELL, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.
mm ■ -.
/
BATTERY, FORWARD :
HYENTY-THREE years ago the banks of the Ten-
nessee witnessed a remarkable occurrence. There
was a wage of battle. Heavy blows were given and
received, and the challenger failed to make his cause
good. But there were peculiar circumstances which
distinguished the combat from other trials of strength
in the rebellion : An army comprising 70 regiments of
infantry, 20 batteries of artillery, and a sufficiency of cavalry, lay for two
weeks and more in isolated camps, with a river in its rear and a hostile army
claimed to be superior in numbers 20 miles distant in its front, while the
commander made his headquarters and passed his nights 9 miles away on
the opposite side of the river. It had no line or order of battle, no defensive
works of any sort, no outposts, properly speaking, to give warning, or check
the advance of an enemy, and no recognized head during the absence of the
regular commander. On a Saturday the hostile force arrived and formed in
order of battle, without detection or hindrance, within a mile and a half of the
unguarded army, advanced upon it the next morning, penetrated its discon-
nected lines, assaulted its camps in front and flank, drove its disjointed mem-
bers successively from position to position, capturing some and routing others,
in spite of much heroic individual resistance, and steadily drew near the land-
ing and depot of its supplies in the pocket between the river and an impass-
able creek. At the moment near the close of the day when the remnant of
the retrograding army was driven to refuge in the midst of its magazines,
with the triumphant enemy at half -gunshot distance, the advance division of
a reenforcing army arrived on the opposite bank of the river, crossed, and
took position under fire at the point of attack ; the attacking force was
checked, and the battle ceased for the day. The next morning at dawn the
reenforcing army and a fresh division belonging to the defeated force
advanced against the assailants, followed or accompanied by such of the
broken columns of the previous day as had not lost all cohesion, and after
ten hours of conflict drove the enemy from the captured camps and the field.
487
48;
SHILOH REVIEWED.
Such are the salient points in the popular conception and historical record
of the battle of Shiloh. Scarcely less remarkable than the facts themselves
are the means by which the responsible actors in the critical drama have
endeavored to counteract them. At society reunions and festive entertain-
ments, in newspaper interviews and dispatches, in letters and contributions
to periodicals, afterthought official reports, biographies, memoirs, and other
popular sketches, the subject of Shiloh, from the first hour of the battle to the
present time, has been invaded by pretensions and exculpatory statements
which revive the discussion only to confirm the memory of the grave faults
that brought an army into imminent peril. These defenses and assumptions,
starting first, apparently half suggested, in the zeal of official attendants and
other partisans, were soon taken up more or less directly by the persons in
whose behalf they were put forward ; and now it is virtually declared by the
principals themselves, that the Army of the Ohio was an unnecessary intruder
in the battle, and that the blood of more than two thousand of its members
shed on that field was a gratuitous sacrifice.
With the origin of the animadversions that were current at the time upon
the conduct of the battle, the Army of the Ohio had little to do, and it has
not generally taken a willing part in the subsequent discussion. They com-
menced in the ranks of the victims, and during all the years that have given
unwonted influence to the names which they affected, the witnesses of the
first reports have without show of prejudice or much reiteration firmly
adhered to their earlier testimony. It does not impair the value of that testi-
mony if extreme examples were cited to illustrate the general fact ; nor con-
stitute a defense that such examples were not the general rule. I have
myself, though many years ago, made answer to the more formal pleas that
PITTSBURG LANDING, VIEWED FROM THE FERRY LANDING ON THE OPPOSITE SHORE.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1885.
SHILOH RECEIVED.
489
PITTSBURG LANDING. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN A FEW DAYS AFTER THE BATTLE.
Of the six transports, the one farthest up stream, on the right, is the Tycoon, which was dispatched by the
Cincinnati Branch of the Sanitary Commission with stores for the wounded. The next steamer
is the Tiyrcss, which was General Grant's headquarters boat during the 8hiloh cam-
paign. On the opposite side of the river is seen the gun-boat Tyler:
concerned the army which I commanded, and I am now called upon in the
same cause to review the circumstances of my connection with the battle, and
investigate its condition when it was taken up by the Army of the Ohio.
When by the separate or concurrent operations of the forces of the Depart-
ment of the Missouri," commanded by General Halleck, and of the Department
of the Ohio, commanded by myself, the Confederate line had been broken, first
at Mill Springs by General Thomas, and afterward at Fort Henry and at Fort
Donelson by General Grant and the navy, and Nashville and Middle Tennessee
were occupied by the Army of the Ohio, the shattered forces of the enemy
fell back for the formation of a new line, and the Union armies prepared to
follow for a fresh attack. It was apparent in advance that the Memphis and
Charleston railroad between Memphis and Chattanooga would constitute the
new line, and Corinth, the point of intersection of the Memphis and Charles-
ton road running east and west, and the Mobile and Ohio road running north
and south, soon developed as the main point of concentration.
While this new defense of the enemy and the means of assailing it by the
Union forces were maturing, General Halleck's troops, for the moment under
49°
SHILOH REVIEWED.
the immediate command of General C. F. Smith, were transported up the
Tennessee by water to operate on the enemy's railroad communications. It
was purely an expeditionary service, not intended for the selection of a
rendezvous or depot for future operations. After some attempts to debark at
other points farther up the river, Pittsburg Landing was finally chosen as the
most eligible for the temporary object; but when the concentration of the
enemy at Corinth made that the objective point of a deliberate campaign, and
the cooperation of General Halleck's troops and mine was arranged, Savan-
nah, on the east bank of the river, was designated by Halleck as the point
of rendezvous. This, though not as advisable a point as Florence, or some
point between Florence and Eastport, was in a general sense proper. It placed
the concentration under the shelter of the river and the gun-boats, and left
the combined force at liberty to choose its point of crossing and line of attack.
On the restoration of General Grant to the immediate command of the
troops, and his arrival at Savannah on the 17th of March, he converted the
expeditionary encampment at Pittsburg Landing into the point of rendez-
vous of the two armies, by placing his whole force on the west side of the
river, apparently on the advice of General Sherman, who, with his division,
was already there. Nothing can be said upon any rule of military art or
common expediency to justify that arrangement. An invading army may,
indeed, as a preliminary step, throw an inferior force in advance upon the
enemy's coast or across an intervening river to secure a harbor or other
necessary foothold ; but in such a case the first duty of the advanced force
is to make itself secure by suitable works. Pittsburg Landing was in no
sense a point of such
necessity or desirabil-
ity as to require any
risk, or any great ex-
penditure of means for
its occupation. If the
force established there
was not safe alone, it
had no business there ;
but having been placed
there, still less can any
justification be found
for the neglect of all
proper means to make
it secure against a su-
perior adversary. Gen-
eral Grant continued his
headquarters at Savan-
THE LANDING AT SAVANNAH, NINE MILES BELOAV (NORTH OF) 11 all leaving GeUd'al
PITTSBURG LANDING. ' .
r, ,„■+,*.** « ™ « • w Sherman with a sort
General Grant's headquarters were in the Cherry mansion, on the right ;
the portico has since been added. The building on the left is a new hotel. of (^Olltrol at Pittsburg
The town lies about a quarter of a mile back from the bluff, and is much ^
changed since the war— Editors. Laildm Sherman's
SHILOH RECEIVED.
491
rank did not allow him. the command, but he was authorized to assign the
arriving regiments to brigades and divisions as he might think best, and
designate the camping-grounds. In these and other ways he exercised an
important influence upon the fate of the army.
The movement of the Army of the Ohio from Nashville (which I had occu-
pied on February 25th) for the appointed junction was commenced on the
night of the 15th of March by a rapid
march of cavalry to secure the bridges
in advance, which were then still
guarded by the enemy. It was fol-
lowed on the 16th and successive days
by the infantry divisions, McCook be-
iDg in advance with instructions to
move steadily forward; to ford the
streams where they were fordable, and
when it was necessary to make repairs
on the roads, such as building bridges
over streams which were liable to fre-
quent interruption by high water, to
leave only a sufficient working party
and guard for that purpose; to use all
possible industry and energy, so as
to move forward steadily and as rap-
idly as possible without forcing the
march or straggling ; and to send for-
ward at once to communicate with General Smith at Savannah, and learn
his situation.
When the cavalry reached Columbia the bridge over Duck River was
found in flames, and the river at flood stage. General McCook immediately
commenced the construction of a frame bridge, but finding, after several
days, that the work was progressing less rapidly than had been expected, I
ordered the building of a boat bridge also, and both were Completed on the
30th. On the same day the river became fordable. I arrived at Columbia
on the 26th. General Nelson succeeded in getting a portion of his division
across by fording on the 29th, and was given the advance. Most of his
troops crossed by fording on the 30th. The other divisions followed him on
the march with intervals of six miles, so as not to incommode one another —
in all 5 divisions ; about 37,000 effective men. On the first day of April,
General Halleck and General Grant were notified that I would concentrate at
Savannah 011 Sunday and Monday, the 6th and 7th, the distance being ninety
miles. On the 1th General Nelson received notification from General Grant
that he need not hasten his march, as he could not be put across the river
before the following Tuesday ; but the rate of march was not changed.
After seeing my divisions on the road, I left Columbia on the evening of
the 3d, and arrived at Savannah on the evening of the 5th with my chief of
staff, an aide-de-camp (Lieutenant C. L. Fitzhugh), and an orderly, leaving
MAJOR-GENERAL ALEXANDER JPD. BPCOOK.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
492 SHILOH REVIEWED.
the rest of my staff to follow rapidly with the headquarters train. Nelson
had already arrived and gone into camp, and Crittenden was close in his
rear. We were there to form a junction for the contemplated forward move-
ment under the command of General Halleck in person, who was to leave
St. Louis the first of the following week to join us. General Grant had been
at Nelson's camp before my arrival, and said he would send boats for the
division "Monday or Tuesday, or some time early in the week." " There
will," he said, " be no fight at Pittsburg Landing ; we will have to go to
Corinth, where the rebels are fortified. If they corne to attack us we can
whip them, as I have more than twice as many troops as I had at Fort Don-
elson." I did not see General Grant that evening — probably because he was
at Pittsburg Landing when I arrived, but he had made an appointment to
meet me next day.
We were finishing breakfast at Nelson's camp Sunday morning, when the
sound of artillery was heard up the river. We knew of no ground to appre-
hend a serious engagement, but the troops were promptly prepared to march,
and I walked with my chief of staff, Colonel James B. Fry, to Grant's quar-
ters at Savannah, but he had started up the river. I there saw General C.
F. Smith, who was in his bed sick, but apparently not dangerously ill. He
had no apprehension about a battle, thought it an affair of outposts, and said
that Grant had sixty thousand men. This would agree approximately with
the estimate which Grant himself made of his force, at Nelson's camp.
As the firing continued, and increased in volume, I determined to go to
the scene of action. Nelson only waited for the services of a guide to march
by land. The river bottom between Savannah and Pittsburg Landing was a
labyrinth of roads from which the overflows had obliterated all recent signs
of travel, and left them impassable except in certain places, and it was with
great difficulty that a guide could be obtained. The artillery had to be left
behind to be transported by water. After disposing of these matters and
sending orders for the rear divisions to push forward without their trains, I
took a small steamer at the landing and proceeded up the river, accompa-
nied only by my chief of staff. On the way we were met by a descending
steamer which came alongside and delivered a letter from General Grant
addressed to the " Commanding Officer, advanced forces, near Pittsburg,
Tenn.," and couched in the following words :
" Pittsburg, April 6, 1862.
" General : The attack on my forces has been very spirited since early this morning. The
appearance of fresh troops on the field now would have a powerful effect, both by inspiring'
our men and disheartening the enemy. If you will get upon the field, leaving all your baggage
on the east bank of the river, it will be a move to our advantage, and possibly save the day to
us. The rebel forces are estimated at over one hundred thousand men. My headquarters will
be in the log-building on the top of the hill, where you will be furnished a staff-officer to guide
you to your place on the field. Respectfully, &c, U. S. Grant, Maj.-Gen."
About half-way up we met a stream of fugitives that poured in a con-
stantly swelling current along the west bank of the river. The mouth of
Snake Creek was full of them swimming across. We arrived at the landing
about 1 o'clock. I inquired for General Grant and was informed that he was
on his headquarters boat, nearly against which we had landed. I went on
SHILOH RECEIVED.
493
board, and was met by him at the door of the ladies' cabin, in which there
were besides himself two or three members of his staff. Other officers may
have entered afterward. He appeared to realize that he was beset by a
pressing danger, and manifested by manner more than in words that he was
relieved by my arrival as indicating the near approach of succor ; but there
was nothing in his deportment that the circumstances would not have justi-
fied without disparagement to the character of a courageous soldier. Cer-
tainty there was none of that masterly confidence which has since been
assumed with reference to the occasion. After the first salutation, and as I
walked to a seat, he remarked that he had-just come in from the front, and
held up his sword to call my attention to an indentation which he said the
scabbard had received from a shot. I did not particularly notice it, and
after inquiring about the progress of the battle and requesting him to send
steamers to bring up Crittenden's division, which was coming into Savannah
as I left, I proposed that we should go ashore. As we reached the gangway
I noticed that the horses of himself and his staff were being taken ashore.
He mounted and rode away, while I walked up the hill ; so that I saw him
no more until the attack occurred at the landing late in the evening. I
state these particulars of our meeting with so much detail because a totally
incorrect version of the place, manner, and substance of the interview has
been used to give a false impression of the state of the battle, and a false
coloring to personal traits which are assumed to have had the issue in control, jj
| About two weeks after the battle of Shiloh
there appeared in some newspaper that was
shown to me a report of a conversation assumed
to have taken place between General Grant and
myself soon after the battle, in which I was repre-
sented as rallying him upon the narrowness of his
escape, and saying that he had not transports
enough to carry off ten thousand men ; to which
he was reported as replying, in substance, that
when it came to retreating transportation would
nut have been required for more than ten thousand.
The story had been colored for popular effect, but
was traceable to a conversation in a vein of pleas-
antry that occurred at my camp, after the battle,
among a party of officers in which I had taken but
little part.
Some time afterward it took on a modification
which suited the alleged conversation, to my meet-
ing with General Grant on my arrival at Pittsburg
Landing during the battle. This changed materi-
ally the character of the report, but I continued to
treat it with the indifference which I thought it
deserved, though the story has been freely circu-
lated. I never knew until within a few months
past, through the publication of the "War Eec-
ords," that in its modified form it had the indorse-
ment of an official authorship.
From that publication it appears that a year
after the battle General Grant called upon three
of his staff-officers to make reports concerning the
movements of General Lew Wallace's division on
the day of the battle, in answer to a complaint of
(lif latter officer that injustice had been done him
in General Grant's reports. Two of the officers,
namely, General McPherson and Captain Eowley,
in their replies confined themselves to that sub-
ject. The third, Colonel Rawlins, on the other
hand, made it the occasion of a specific defense, or
explanation, or commendation, or whatever it may
be called, of General Grant's relation to the battle.
Among other things that have since been more or
less disputed, he said :
" General Nelson's division of the Army of the Ohio
readied Savannah on the afternoon of the 5th of April,
hut General Buell himself did not arrive. . . . You [Gen-
eral Grant] then rode back to the house near the river
that had been designated for headquarters, to learn
what word if any had been received from General Nel-
son, whose division you expected soon to arrive at the
landing on the opposite side of the river; and you there
met Maj.-Gen. D. C. Buell, who had arrived at Savannah
and taken a steamer and come up to see you, and learn
how the battle was progressing in advance of his force.
Among his first inquiries was : ' What preparations
have you made for retreating? ' To which you replied,
' I have not yet despaired of whipping them, general ' ;
and went on to state to him your momentary expecta-
tion of the arrival of General Wallace, to whom orders
had been timely and repeatedly sent, and that General
Nelson's division might soon be expected by the wagon-
road from Savannah," etc.
This statement, ridiculous and absurd in its
principal feature, is incorrect in every particular.
It is well known that I arrived at Savannah
on the 5th of April ; General Grant did not, as
might be inferred, find me at the landing at
Pittsburg — I found Mm there ; we did not meet at
" the house near the river," but on his headquarters
steamer.
I mention these points only to show the ten-
dency of the statement to error, and I aver that no
such conversation as is described ever occurred,
and that the contingency of a retreat was not
brought forward by General Grant or by me.
My attention has within a few days been called
494
SHILOH REVIEWED.
T. B-Sohell
PITTSBURG LANDING IN THE SUMMER OF 1884. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
: The central or main landing is here shown. On the hill to the right is seen the flag-staff of the National
Cemetery ; in the rear and to the left of the cemetery is the steamboat-store and
post-office, where the roads from the landings meet.
On the shore I encountered a scene which has often been described. The
face of the bluff was crowded with stragglers from the battle. The number
there at different hours has been estimated at from five thousand in the
morning to fifteen thousand in the evening. The number at nightfall would
not have fallen short of fifteen thousand, including those who had passed
down the river, and the less callous but still broken and demoralized frag-
ments about the camps on the plateau near the landing. At the top of the
bluff all was confusion. Men mounted and on foot, and wagons with their
teams and excited drivers, all struggling to force their way closer to the
river, were mixed up in apparently inextricable confusion with a battery of
artillery which was standing in park without men or horses to man or move
it. The increasing throng already presented a barrier which it was evidently
necessary to remove, in order to make way for the passage of my troops when
they should arrive. In looking about for assistance I fell upon one officer,
the quartermaster of an Ohio regiment, who preserved his senses, and was
anxious to do something to abate the disorder. I instructed him to take con-
trol of the teams, and move them down the hill by a side road which led to
the narrow bottom below the landing, and there park them. He went to
work with alacrity and the efficiency of a strong will, and succeeded in clear-
to the fact that an article, in a recent number of
" The Century " magazine [General Adam Badeau's
paper on "General Grant," in the number for
May, 1SS5], has given fresh circulation to the
story, and has combined the official and the origi-
nal phraseology of it. I have regarded it as a
trivial question, of little moment to either General
Grant or myself ; but perhaps the value attached
to it by others makes it proper for me to give it an
attention which I have not heretofore chosen to
bestow upon it. — D. C. Buell.
Airdrik, Kentucky, July 10th, 1885.
SHILOH REVIEWED.
495
ing the ground of the wagons. It proved before night to have been a more
important service than I had expected, for it not only opened the way for
Nelson's division, but extricated the artillery and made it possible to get it
into action when the attack occurred at the landing about sunset.
It is now time to glance at the circumstances which had brought about and
were urging on the state of affairs here imperfectly portrayed.
Upon learning on the 2d of April of the advance of the Army of the Ohio
toward Savannah, General Sidney Johnston determined to anticipate the
junction of that army with General Grant's force, by attacking the latter,
and at once gave orders for the movement of his troops on the following day.
It was his expectation to reach the front of the army at Pittsburg Landing
on Friday, the 4th, and make the attack at daylight on Saturday; but the
condition of the roads, and some confusion in the execution of orders, pre-
vented him from getting into position for the attack until 3 o'clock p. m. on
Saturday. This delay and an indiscreet reconnoissance which brought on a
sharp engagement with the Federal pickets, rendered it so improbable that
the Union commander would not be prepared for the attack, that General
Beauregard advised the abandonment of the enterprise, to the success of
which a surprise was deemed to be essential. General Johnston overruled
the proposition, however, and the attack was ordered for the following morn-
ing. The army was drawn up in three parallel lines, covering the front of
the Federal position. Hardee commanded the first line, Bragg the second,
and Polk and Breckinridge the third, the latter being intended as a reserve.
The locality on which the storm of battle was about to burst has often
been described with more or less of inaccuracy or incompleteness. It is an
undulating table-land, quite broken in places, elevated a hundred feet or
thereabout above the river ; an irregular triangle in outline, nearly equilateral,
with the sides four miles long, bordered on the east by the river, which here
runs nearly due north, on the north-west by Snake Creek and its tributary,
Owl Creek, and on the south, or south-west, by a range of hills which immedi-
ately border Lick Creek on the north bank, two hundred feet or more in
height, and sloping gradually toward the battle-field. In these hills rise the
eastern tributaries of Owl Creek, one of them called Oak Creek, extending
half-way across the front or south side of the battle-field, and interlocking
with a ravine called Locust Grove Creek, which runs in the opposite direction
into Lick Creek a mile from its mouth. Other short, deep ravines start from
the table-land and empty into the river, the principal among them being Dill's
Branch, six hundred yards above the landing. Midway in the front, at the
foot of the Lick Creek hills, start a number of surface drains which soon
unite in somewhat difficult ravines and form Tillman's Creek, or Brier Creek.
It runs almost due north, a mile and a quarter from the river, in a deep
hollow, which divides the table-land into two main ridges. Tillman's Creek
empties into Owl Creek half a mile above the Snake Creek bridge by which
the division of Lew Wallace arrived. Short, abrupt ravines break from the
main ridges into Tillman's Hollow, and the broad surface of the west ridge
496
SHILOH RECEIVED.
is further broken by larger
branches which empty into
Owl Creek. Tillman's Hollow,
only about a mile long, is a
marked feature in the topog-
raphy, and is identified with
some important incidents of
the battle.
Pittsburg Landing is three-
quarters of a mile above the
mouth of Snake Creek, and
two and a quarter miles be-
low the mouth of Lick Creek.
Shiloh Church is on Oak
Creek two miles and a half
south-west of Pittsburg Land-
ing. The table-land comes up
boldly to the river at the land-
ing and for a mile south. Be-
yond those limits the river
bends away from the high
land, and the bottom gradu-
ally widens.
The principal roads are the
River road, as it will here be
called, which crosses Snake
Creek at the bridge before
mentioned, and running a mile
west of Pittsburg Landing,
obliquely along the ridge east
of Tillman's Creek, crosses
Lick Creek three-quarters of
a mile from the river at the
east end of the Lick Creek
hills; the Hamburg and Purdy
road, which branches from the
River road a mile and two-
thirds in a straight line south
of Pittsburg Landing, and ex-
tends north-west 400 yards
north of Shiloh Church; and
two roads that start at the
landing, cross the River road
two-thirds of a mile apart, and
also cross or run into the Ham-
burg and Purdy road nearly
x
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SHILOH REVIEWED.
497
opposite the church.
In the official reports
these various roads
are called with some
confusion, but not
altogether inaccurate-
ly, Crump's Landing
road, Hamburg road,
Corinth road or Pur-
dy road, even over
the same space, ac-
cording to the idea of
the writer. The Cor-
inth road from the
landing has two prin-
cipal branches. The
western branch passes
by the church, and
the eastern passes a
mile east of the church
into the Bark road,
which extends along
the crest of the Lick
Creek hills. The mili-
tary maps show many
other roads, some of
them farm-roads, and
some only well-worn
tracks made in haul-
ing for the troops. In
some places the old
roads were quite ob-
literated, and are im-
properly represented
on the maps, as in
the case of the Eiver
road, which is not
shown on the official
map between McAr-
thur's and Hurlbut's
headquarters, imme-
diately west of the
landing. It is shown
on Sherman's camp
map, and its existence
is not doubtful. At
VOL. I. 32
498 SHILOH REVIEWED.
the time of the battle, much the largest part of the ground was in forest,
sometimes open, sometimes almost impenetrable for horsemen, with occa-
sional cleared fields of from 20 to 80 acres ; and these variations operated in
a signal manner upon the fortune of the combatants. There was not a
cleared field within the limits of the battle that has not its history.
We may now locate the troops in their encampments, for there is where the
battle found them, and its currents and eddies will frequently be discovered
by the reference to certain camps in the official reports. The camp map
which I received from General Sherman will serve as a useful guide, subject
to some necessary modifications, to make a field sketch agree with an actual
survey. But the regimental camps did not always conform to the lines laid
down for the brigades and divisions. Sometimes they were in front, some-
times in rear of the general line. I have not pretended generally to intro-
duce these variations into the map which I have prepared to accompany
this article.
Starting at the landing, we find the Second Division, commanded by W.
H. L. Wallace, in the space bounded by the river, Snake Creek, the River
road, and the right-hand road leading west from the landing. Along that
road are, in this order, the camps of the 12th, 7th, 14th, and 2d Iowa, and
the 52d and 9th Illinois. At the point where that road crosses the River
road, in the south-west angle of the intersection, are the headquarters of Gen-
eral McArthur. On the east side of the River road, north of McArthur are,
first, the 14th Missouri, called "Birge's sharp-shooters" (not on the Sherman
camp map), and next the 81st Ohio. The 16th Wisconsin has been assigned
to Prentiss's division since the Sherman map was made, and the 13th Missouri
has probably taken that ground. All these points are particularly mentioned
in the reports of the battle and have been verified.
On the left-hand road where it crosses the River road, three-quarters of a
mile from the landing, is the Fourth Division (Hurlbut's), its Third Brigade
between the road and the river, and the line of the two other brigades bearing
off to the north-west. I have located the 3d Iowa, of that division, on the
ground just in front of which Crittenden's division was first formed in line
Monday morning, because it was stated to me at the time that General Pren-
tiss was killed at that camp ; the fact being that near that point Prentiss was
captured and W. H. L. Wallace mortally wounded.
At the fork of the River road and the Hamburg and Purdy road, is the
camp of Sherman's Second Brigade, commanded by Colonel Stuart, two
miles from the division to which it belongs, and one mile from Hurlbut's
division. On both sides of the eastern Corinth road, half a mile south of the
Hamburg and Purdy road, is Prentiss's division (the Sixth) of 2 brigades.
It is not shown on the Sherman map. Stretching across the western Corinth
road at the church, along Oak Creek, are the other three brigades of the
Fifth Division (Sherman's) — Hildebrand's brigade being on the east side of
the road, Buckland's next on the west side, and John A. McDowell's next
on Buckland's right. Only one regiment (the 6th Iowa) of 1VT-r»^well's brigade
is shown on the Sherman map.
SHILOH REVIEWED. 499
The official reports and other authority locate the First Division (McCler-
nand's) as follows : The right of the Third Brigade is at the point where
the western Corinth road crosses the Hamburg and Purdy road, 500 yards
from the church, and the left is 200 yards from Hildebrand's brigade, which
is thus obliquely in its front. The other 2 brigades, on a general line start-
ing from the right of the Third, form an obtuse angle with the Third, and
are along the ridge nearly parallel with Tillman's Creek, the extreme right
being not far from the bluff overlooking Owl Creek bottom. The First
Brigade is on the east side of the adjacent field instead of the west side, as
the Sherman map, according to the road, would seem to place it, though
that map does not show the field. It remains to be added that 3 of the 5
divisions were for that period of the war old and experienced troops.
Hurlbut's Third Brigade belonged to the Army of the Ohio, and had been
sent to reenforce Grant before Donelson. Eight other regiments were fur-
nished by me for the first movement up the Tennessee, and remained with
Grant's army. Sherman's division, one of the newest, had been under his
command more than a month, and ought to have been in a tolerably efficient
state of discipline. Prentiss's division, composed largely of raw regiments,
had only been organized a few days; yet it was posted in the most exposed
and assailable point on the front. The effective force at the date of the
battle, exclusive of Lew Wallace's division, which was at or near Crump's
Landing, 6 miles below, is stated by General Sherman at 32,000 men ; by
General Grant at 33,000. General Wallace left 2 regiments of his division
and a piece of artillery at Crump's Landing, and joined the army Sunday
evening, with, as he states, not more than 5000 men.
I proceed now, in the light of the official reports and other evidence, to
explain briefly what happened : the object being not so much to criticise the
manner of the battle, or give a detailed description of it, as to trace it to its
actual condition at the close of the first day, and outline its progress during
the second. With this object the question of a surprise has little to do. I
stop, therefore, only to remark that each revival of that question has placed
the fact in a more glaring light. The enemy was known to be at hand, but
no adequate steps were taken to ascertain in what force or with what design.
The call to arms blended with the crash of the assault, and when the whole
forest on the rising ground in front flashed with the gleam of bayonets, then
General Sherman, as he reports, " became satisfied for the first time that the
enemy designed a determined attack." Yet among the more watchful offi-
cers in the front divisions, there was a nervous feeling that their superiors
were not giving due heed to the presence of hostile reconnoitering parties,
though they little imagined the magnitude of the danger that impended. On
Saturday General Sherman was notified of these parties. He answered that
the pickets must be strengthened, and instructed to be vigilant ; that he was
embarrassed for the want of cavalry; his cavalry had been ordered away, and
the cavalry he was to have instead had not arrived ; as soon as they reported
he would send them to the front and find out what was there. In one of his
brigades the regimental commanders held a consultation, at which it was
500 SHILOH REl/IEWED.
determined to strengthen the pickets. These are curious revelations to a
soldier's ear.
Prentiss's vigilance gave the first warning of the actual danger, and in fact
commenced the contest. On Saturday, disquieted by the frequent appearance
of the enemy's cavalry, he increased his pickets, though he had no evidence
of the presence of a large force. Early Sunday morning one of these picket-
guards, startled no doubt by the hum of forty thousand men half a mile dis-
tant, waking up for battle, went forward to ascertain the cause, and soon
came upon the enemy's pickets, which it promptly attacked. It was then a
quarter past 5 o'clock, and all things being ready, the Confederate general,
accepting the signal of the pickets, at once gave the order to advance. Pre-
viously, however, General Prentiss, still apprehensive, had sent forward Col-
onel Moore of the 21st Missouri, with five companies to strengthen the
picket-guard. On the way out Colonel Moore met the guard returning to
camp with a number of its men killed and wounded. Sending the latter on
to camp and calling for the remaining companies of his regiment, he pro-
ceeded to the front in time to take a good position on the border of a cleared
field and opened fire upon the enemy's skirmishers, checking them for a
while ; but the main body forced him back upon the division with a con-
siderable list of wounded, himself among the number. All this occurred in
front of Sherman's camp, not in front of Prentiss's. This spirited beginning,
unexpected on both sides, gave the first alarm to the divisions of Sherman
and Prentiss. The latter promptly formed his division at the first news
from the front, and moved a quarter of a mile in advance of his camp, where
he was attacked before Sherman was under arms. . He held his position until
the enemy on his right passed him in attacking Sherman, whose left regi-
ment immediately broke into rout. He then retired in some disorder, renew-
ing the resistance in his camp but forced back in still greater disorder, until
at 9 o'clock he came upon the line which Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace were
forming half a mile in rear.
Upon the first alarm in his camp, which was simultaneous with the attack
upon Sherman, McClernand rapidly got under arms, and endeavored to
support Sherman's left with his Third Brigade, only two hundred yards in
rear, while he placed his First and Second Brigades in inverted order still
farther to the rear and left, to oppose the enemy's columns pouring in upon
his left flank through the opening on Sherman's left ; but his Third Brigade
was forced back with the fugitives from Sherman's broken line by the
advancing enemy, and endeavored with only partial success to form on the
right of McClernand's line, which at first was formed with the left a little
south, and the center north of the Corinth road. Before the formation was
completed the line was compelled to retire by the pressure on its front and left
flank, with the loss of 6 pieces of artillery, but it re-formed 300 yards in rear.
Hildebrand's brigade had now disappeared in complete disorder from the
front, leaving three pieces of artillery in the hands of the enemy. Buckland
formed promptly at the first alarm, and in order to keep the enemy back
endeavored by Sherman's direction to throw a regiment beyond Oak Creek,
SHILOH REVIEWED. 501
which covered his front at a distance of two hundred yards, but on reaching
the brow of the low hill bordering the stream the enen 7 was encountered on
the hither side. Nevertheless the brigade resisted effectively for about two
hours the efforts of the assailants to cross the boggy stream in force. The
enemy suffered great loss in these efforts, but succeeded at last. Before
being quite forced back, Buckland received orders from Sherman to form
line on the Purdy road four hundred yards in rear, to connect with McCler-
nand's right. Orders were also given to McDowell, who had not yet been
engaged, to close to the left on the same line. These orders were in effect
defeated in both cases, and five pieces of artillery lost by faults in the execu-
tion and the rapid advance of the enemy. Sherman's division as an organ-
ized body disappeared from the field from this time until the close of the day.
McDowell's brigade preserved a sort of identity for a while. Sherman reports
that at "about 10:30 a. m. the enemy had made a furious attack on General
McClernand's whole front. Finding him pressed, I moved McDowell's bri-
gade against the left flank of the enemy, forced him back some distance, and
then directed the men to avail themselves of every cover — trees, fallen
timber, and a wooded valley to our right.''' It sounds like the signal to dis-
perse, and a little after 1 o'clock the brigade and regiments are seen no more.
Some fragments of the division and the commander himself attached them-
selves to McClernand's command, which now, owing to its composite and
irregular organization, could hardly be denominated a division.
The contest which raged in McClernand's camp was of a fluctuating char-
acter. The ground was lost and won more than once, but each ebb and flow
of the struggle left the Union side in a worse condition. In his fifth posi-
tion McClernand was driven to the camp of his First Brigade, half of his
command facing to the south and half to the west, to meet the converging
attack of the enemy. His nominal connection with the left wing of the army
across the head of Tillman's Hollow had been severed, by the dispersion or
defeat of the detached commands that formed it. Another reverse to his
thinned ranks would drive him over the bluff into Owl Creek bottom, and
perhaps cut him off from the river. He determined, therefore, between 2
and 3 o'clock to retire across Tillman's Hollow in the direction of the land-
ing. That movement was effected with a good deal of irregularity, but
with the repulse of a small body of pursuing cavalry, and a new line was
formed on the opposite ridge along the River road, north of Hurlbut's head-
quarters. I shall have occasion farther along to remark upon the display of
force on the right of this line in the vicinity of McArthur's headquarters.
The movement must have been completed about 3 o'clock. Leaving the right
wing, as it may be called, in this position prior to the attack of 4 o'clock,
which drove it still farther back, we will return to the current of events in
the left wing.
With Stuart on the extreme left, as with the other commanders, the pres-
ence of the enemy was the first warning of danger. He was soon compelled
to fall back from his camp to a new position, and presently again to a third,
which located him on the prolongation and extreme left of the line formed
502
MAP OF THE FIELi
HILOH,
Near Pittsburg Landing-, Tenn., showing ':e positions of the U. S. forces under
aj.-Gen'l U. S. Grant, U. S. Vol., and Maj.-Gen'l D. C. Buell, U. S. Vol., on the 6th and 7th of April, 1862.
Surveyed under the direction of Col. Geo. Thorn, Chief of Top'l Eng'rs, Dept. of the Mississippi.
REVISED AND AMENDED BY GEN. D. C. BUELL.
The topography is substantially that of the original Thorn, or "Official Map" (see p. 508),
with some proper corrections taken from a survey made under the direction of Capt. A. T.
Andreas, an officer in the battle, and now President of the Western Art Association ; and
from the official map of the Army of the Ohio, made by Captain Michler, Topographical En-
gineers.
The camps are located partly in accordance with a camp map made prior to the battle by
Gen. \V. T. Sherman (see fac-simile, p. 406); partly from information, original or confirmatory,
obligingly furnished by Capt. Andreas, and from other authority. All camps referred to in
the official reports have been carefuly identified.
The positions A. B, and C, numbers 3 and 9, agree with the positions of McCook,
Nelson, and Crittenden for " the morning" and " evening of the jt/i " on the Thorn
map, and also on the Michler map.
The positions of Terrill's, Mendenhall's, and Bartlett's batteries also corre-
spond with those maps.
The other positions of the Army of the Ohio are not on the Thorn map,
but are copied from the Michler map, excepting numbers 2 and 7, which.
with the positions of the Army of the Tennessee, prior to number 4, and
between numbers 4 and 9, have been determined from the official reports.
The position number 4 (10 o'clock A. M. ) of McClernand, Wallace,
and Sherman, after four hours of fighting, corresponds with their
position on the Thom map for the " morning of the jth."
The first position of the Army of the Tennessee on the morn-
ing of the 6th conformed substantially to the camps of Stuart
on the left, Prentiss in the center, and Sherman on the right.
At 4 P. M. of the 6th, McClernand, Sherman, and one
brigade of Hurlbut were on the River road north of Hnrl-
but's headquarters. The remainder of the army that
was in ranks at that hour — Hurlbut, W. H. L. Wal-
lace, and Prentiss — was almost exactly in the posi-
tion, number 4, occupied on the7th by Crittenden,
and the right and center brigades of Nelson,
extending from the western Corinth road
across to and a little beyond the River
road. The "Hornets' Nest" was in
front of Crittenden's left brigade and
Nelson's right brigade. — D. C. B.
AIRDRIE, KENTUCKY, June, 1885.
This edition includes a fete corrections
which do not appear in the map as printed in
" The Century " magazineyi»- March, 1886.
503
504
SHILOH REVIEWED.
(,!, « JT*
THE " HORNETS' NEST " — PRENTISS'S TROOPS AND HICKENLOOPER'S BATTERY REPULSING HARDEE'S TROOPS.
This cut and the one on tlie next page form one picture relating to the battle of the first day.
by Huiibut and W. H. L. Wallace, but without having any connection with
it. As soon as the first advance of the enemy was known, these two com-
manders were called upon by those in front for support. In the absence of
a common superior it was sent forward by regiments or brigades in such
manner as seemed proper to the officer appealed to, and after that was left to
its own devices. It seldom formed the connection desired, or came under the
direction of a common superior. Indeed, the want of cohesion and concert
in the Union ranks is conspicuously indicated in the official reports. A
regiment is rarely overcome in front, but falls back because the regiment on
its right or left has done so, and exposed its flank. It continues its back-
ward movement at least until it is well under shelter, thus exposing the flank
of its neighbor, who then must also needs fall back. Once in operation, the
process repeats itself indefinitely. In a broken and covered country which
affords occasional rallying-poiiits and obstructs the pursuit, it proceeds step
by step. On an open field, in the presence of light artillery and cavalry, it
would run rapidly into general rout.
This outflanking, so common in the Union reports at Shiloh, is not a mere
excuse of the inferior commanders. It is the practical consequence of the
absence of a common head, and the judicious use of reserves to counteract
partial reverses and preserve the front of battle. The want of a general
direction is seen also in the distribution of Hurlbut's and Wallace's divisions.
Hurlbut sent a brigade under Colonel Veatch to support Sherman's left;
Wallace sent one under General McArthur to the opposite extreme to sup-
SHILOH REVIEWED.
505
GIBSON'S BRIGADE CHARGING HURLBUT'S TROOPS IN THE " HORNETS' NEST."
From tlie Cyclorama of Shiloli at Chicago. By permission.
port Stuart; and the two remaining brigades of each were between the
extremes — Wallace on Veatch's left but not in connection with it, and Hurl-
but on McArthur's right, also without connection. Stuart himself with his
brigade was two miles to the left of Sherman's division to which he belonged.
When the three Confederate lines were brought together successively at the
front, there was, of course, a great apparent mingling of organizations ; but it
was not in their case attended with the confusion that might be supposed,
because each division area was thereby supplied with a triple complement of
brigade and division officers, and the whole front was under the close super-
vision of four remarkably efficient corps commanders. The evils of dis-
jointed command are plainly to be seen in the arrangement of the Federal
line, but the position of the left wing after the forced correction of the first
faulty disposition of Hurlbut's brigades was exceedingly strong, and in the
center was held without a break against oft-repeated assaults from 9 o'clock
until 5 o'clock. From 12 until 2 it was identical with the second position
taken by Nelson and Crittenden on Monday, and it was equally formidable
against attack from both directions. Its peculiar feature consisted in a wood
in the center, with a thick undergrowth, flanked on either side by open fields,
and with open but sheltering woods in front and rear. The Confederates gave
the name of "Hornets' Nest" to the thicket part of it on Sunday, and it was in
the open ground on the east flank that General Sidney Johnston was killed.
On this line, between and under the shelter of Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wal-
lace, Prentiss rallied a considerable force, perhaps a thousand men, of his
506 SHILOH REVIEWED.
routed division at 9 o'clock, and fought stubbornly until near the close of the
day. By 3 o'clock the withdrawal of the right wing, accompanied by Veatch's
brigade, exposed W. H. L. Wallace's right flank, which also partially crumbled
away; and the retirement of Stuart about the same hour before the strong
attack brought against him, and of Hurlbut at 4 o'clock under the same pow-
erful pressure upon his left flank, left Prentiss and Wallace with his remain ■
ing regiments isolated and unsupported. Still they held their ground while
the enemy closed upon each flank. As they were about being completely
enveloped, Wallace endeavored to extricate his command, and was mortally
wounded in the attempt at 5 o'clock. Some of his regiments under Colonel
Tuttle fought their way through the cross-fire of the contracting lines of the
enemy, but 6 regiments of the 2 divisions held fast until the encompass-
ment was complete, and one by one with Prentiss, between half -past 5 and
6 o'clock, they were forced to surrender. This gallant resistance, and the
delay caused by the necessary disposition of the captives, weakened the force
of the attack which McClernand sustained in his seventh position on the
River road at 4 o'clock, and retarded the onward movement of the enemy for
nearly 3 hours after the retirement of the right wing from the west side
of Tillman's Creek.
Before the incumbrance of their success was entirely put out of the way the
Confederates pressed forward to complete a seemingly assured victory, but it
was too late. John K. Jackson's brigade and the 9th and 10th Mississippi
of Chalmers's brigade crossed Dill's ravine, and their artillery on the south
side swept the bluff at the landing, the missiles falling into the river far
beyond. Hurlbut had hurriedly got into line in rear of the siege-guns, as
they are called in the official reports posted half a mile from the river, but
for five hundred yards from the landing there was not a soldier in ranks or
any organized means of defense. \ Just as the danger was perceived, Colonel
Webster, Grant's chief of artillery, rapidly approached Colonel Fry and
myself. The idea of getting the battery which was standing in park into
action was expressed simultaneously by the three, and was promptly exe-
cuted by Colonel Webster's immediate exertion. General Grant came up a
few minutes later, and a member of his escort was killed in that position.
Chalmers's skirmishers approached to within one hundred yards of the bat-
tery. The number in view was not large, but the gunners were already
abandoning their pieces, when Ammen's brigade, accompanied by Nelson, came
into action. The attack was repelled, and the engagement ended for the day.
In his report of April 9th, to Halleck, General Grant says of this incident :
" At a late hour in the afternoon a desperate effort was made by the enemy to turn our left
and get possession of the landing, transports, etc. This point was guarded by the gun-boats
Tyler and Lexington, Captains Gwin and Shirk, U. S. Navy, commanding, four 20-pounder Parrott
guns, and a battery of rifled guns. As there is a deep and impassable ravine for artillery or
cavalry, and very difficult for infantry, at this point, no troops were stationed here, except the
necessary artillerists and a small infantry force for their support. Just at this moment the
\ In studying the Official Eeports these " siege-guns " must not be confounded with the battery of
rifle field-guns nearer the river ; to all of these the term "Eeserve Artillery" has been given on the map
(page 503).— D. C. B.
SHILOH REVIEWED. 507
advance of Major- General Buell's column (a part of the division under General Nelson) arrived,
the two generals named both being present. An advance was immediately made upon the
point of attack and the enemy soon driven back. In this repulse, much is due to the presence
of the gun-boats Tyler and Lexington, and their able commanders, Captains Gwin and Shirk."
My own official report is to the same effect. In a calm review of the
battle, not unfriendly to General Grant, and written some years after the
occurrence, General Hurlbut said:
" About 6 p. M. this movement (for a final attack at the landing) was reported to General
Hurlbut. He at once took measures to change the front of 2 regiments, or parts of regiments,
of which the 55th Illinois was one, and to turn 6 pieces of artillery to bear upon the point
of danger. At that instant, he being near the head of the Landing road, General Grant came
up from the river, closely followed by Ammen's brigade of Nelson's division. Information of
the expected attack was promptly given, and two of Ammen's regiments deployed into hue, moved
rapidly forward, and after a few sharp exchanges of volleys from them, the enemy fell back, and
the bloody series of engagements of Sunday at Pittsburg Landing closed with that last repulse."
The reports of all the officers who took part in the action at the landing, Nel-
son, Ammen, and the regimental commanders, fully sustain the main point in
these accounts, and are totally at variance with General Grant's statement in
his "Century" article [see page 465]. I have myself never described the attack
at the landing as " a desperate effort " of the enemy ; but I have said that the
condition of affairs at that point made the occasion critical. We know from
the Confederate reports that the attack was undertaken by Jackson's and
Chalmers's brigades as above stated ; that the reserve artillery could effect
nothing against the attacking force under the shelter of Dill's ravine ; that
the fire of the gun-boats was equally harmless on account of the elevation
which it was necessary to give the guns in order to clear the top of the bluff ;
and that the final assault, owing to the show of resistance, was delayed.
Jackson's brigade made its advance without cartridges. When they came to
the crest of the hill and found the artillery supported by infantry, they
shrank from the assault with bayonets alone, and Jackson went in search of
cooperation and support. In the meantime the attack was superseded by
the order of the Confederate commander calling off his troops for the night.
The attack was poorly organized, but it was not repelled until Ammen arrived,
and it cannot be affirmed under the circumstances that the action of his
brigade in delaying and repelling the enemy was not of the most vital im-
portance. Had the attack been made befor Nelson could arrive, with the
means which the enemy had abundantly at han would have succeeded
beyond all question.
As fast as Nelson's division arrived it was form tie in front
of Grant's troops, pickets were thrown across Dill's ra 1 of
another day was awaited to begin the second stage in the ba^
more correctly, to fight the second battle of Shiloh. Let us in the meanti
examine more in detail the condition in which the first day had left Gen.
Grant's command, and its prospects unaided for the morrow.
The evidence relied upon to refute the accepted belief in the critical con-
dition of G eneral Grant's command on Sunday evening is of two sorts : first,
THE OFFICIAL, OH TIIOM, MAP OF THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
On Nov. 28th, 1884, two weeks before the Official Map
■was sent to press with General Grant's Shiloh article (in
"The Century" magazine for February, ±885), inquiry
was made of General George Thorn concerning its his-
tory, lie replied, Dec. 5th, that it was prepared under
his direction as Chief of Topographical Engineers on
Halleck's staff soon after the battle, while the Union
troops were still encamped on and near the battle-
ground, and that Generals Grant, Buell, and Sherman
furnished him with information as to the positions occu-
pied by the troops in the battle. On Dec. 15th, General
Thorn "called the attention of General Grant to certain
criticisms which General Sherman published on the
Official Map ... of that battle-field, at a meeting of
the Army of the Tennessee held in Cincinnati on the 6th
and 7th of April, 1881." In reply, General Grant wrote :
"3 E. 66th St., N. Y. City, Dec. 30th, 1884.
" My Deak Gkneuai.Thom : Your letter of the loth instant
was duly received, and I now have yours of the 28th. In
regard to the matter of the map which 'The Century' mag-
azine is to use in illustration of the article which I have fur-
nished on the battle of Shiloh, I have examined it, and see
nothing to criticise. I was not aware before the receipt of
your hist letter that General Sherman had ever criticised
your map of the battle-field of Shiloh. I have not spoken to
Sherman on that particular subject recently, nor ever that I
remember of. 'The Century,' as I understand, has taken
the Official Map to illustrate my article. Very truly yours,
U. S. GRANT."
General Grant's approval of the use of the Official
Map with his article was given in an interview with one
of the editors over the map, at his house early in Nov.,
1884. On June 24th, 1885, live months after the appear-
ance of the article, Colonel F. D. Grant wrote to the
editor from Mount McGregor, inclosing notes for the
revision of the map, and saying: "He [General Grailt]
would like you to make the changes in the map, jdi-
catcd." For General Grant's map and Colonel Grant's
explanation, see page 470.— Editors.
508
SH1L0H REVIEWED. 509
the official map, as it is called, and second, the personal statements and
assumptions of General Grant and General Sherman. I shall examine these
data upon the evidence of the official reports and my own observation.
The official map was prepared, after the arrival of General Halleck at Pitts-
burg Landing, by his topographical engineer, General George Thorn. The topo-
graphical part of it was made from an -approximate survey, and, though not
strictly accurate, is sufficiently so for an intelligent study of the battle. For
the errors in the location of the troops General Thorn cannot be supposed to
be responsible, since he could have no knowledge of the facts except what he
derived from the statements of others ; but in what is given and what is
withheld they are of a very misleading nature. They consist, first, in the
extension of Grant's line on the evening of the 6th a full half-mile to the west
of its true limit — placing Hurlbut's division on the front actually occupied
by McClernand, McClernand on and four hundred yards beyond Sherman's
ground, and Sherman entirely on the west side of Tillman's Hollow on the
right of the camping-ground of McGlernand's division, and within the lines
occupied by the Confederates. On the morning of the 7th they place from
left to right, McClernand, then Sherman, then Lew Wallace, along the bluff
bordering Owl Creek bottom, all west of Tillman's Creek, and on ground
which we did not possess until after four hours of fighting ; followed on the
left by Hurlbut's division ; thus occupying a solid front of a mile and a third,
in comparison with which the undeveloped front of my army presents a very
subordinate appearance, They give no account of the positions during, the
battle, in which the right of that army was substantially in contact with
Wallace's division on the extreme right. They give two of its positions, — one
in the first formation before its front was developed, and the other at the
close of the day, when Gi-ant's troops had taken possession of their camps
again, and mine had been withdrawn from the ground on which they fought.
These two positions are taken from my official map, but not the intermediate
positions shown on that map. Below the copy of the Thorn map, as published
with General Grant's article in the February number of "The Century" (1885),
it was stated that " the positions of the troops were indicated in accordance with
information furnished at the time by Generals Grant, Buell, and Sherman."
It would be presumed "that Grant and Sherman, the latter especially, in con-
sequence of his intimate relations with Halleck's headquarters, were consulted
about the location of the troops ; and it is not to be doubted that their infor-
mation was the guide. If any information of mine was adopted, it was only
through the map that accompanied my report, and with reference to the
position of my own troops.
Nineteen years after the battle General Sherman revised the official map,
and deposited his version with the archives of the Society of the Army of
the Tennessee for historical use. Ostensibly it accepts the topography of
the Thorn map, but modifies the positions of the troops in the most radical
manner. On the Thorn map the line of battle Sunday evening is represented
as )eing along the right-hand road leading west from the landing, with the
reserve artillery and Nelson's and Crittenden's divisions on the left, and
5io
SHILOH REVIEWED.
CONFEDERATES.
IN THE "HORNETS' NEST "— W. H. L. WALLACE'S LINE.
This cut and the one on the next page form one picture relating to the first day's battle.
Hurlbut, McClernand, and Sherman in the order mentioned, toward the right.
The modification of this position of the troops by the Sherman edition, may
be described as follows [see map, page 470] : Looking west over the map, we
see a line on the east bank of the river marked "Buell." No part of my army
is represented on the west bank. On the west side of the river, 400 yards back
from the landing and parallel with the river, is a line 100 yards long marked
" Grant." Extending back from the river along Dill's Branch, is a line half
a mile long marked " Detachments." This might mean the reserve artillery.
From the onter extremity of the "Detachments" is a line two-thirds of a mile
long running west, but swelling in the center well to the south, with its right
resting on Tillman's Creek, and marked "Hurlbut." On the right of Hurlbut
extending in the same west course, and entirely on the west side of Tillman's
Creek, is a double line one-eighth of a mile long marked " McClernand."
Then commencing one hundred yards north-west of McClernand's right and
extending due north, along the edge of the field in front of the camp of
McClernand's First Brigade, is a line two-thirds of a mile long marked
" Sherman." On the right of this line are three houses covered in front by a
sort of demi-lune and wing, between which and the mafin Sherman line is a
bastion-like arrangement. The demi-lune figure Sherman designates as a
"strong flank," and says it was occupied by Birge's sharp-shooters. Off to the
right is seen Lew Wallace's division crossing Snake Creek bridge, and march-
ing toward the demi-lune by a road which had no existence in fact or on the
original Thorn map. At the angle between Sherman and McClernand is a
SHILOH REVIEWED.
511
-a
isf-PC v :iz^r~- '■■■ • ' /'-I ■•
GEN. W. H. L. WALLACE.
IN THE "HORNETS' NEST" — W. H. L. WALLACE'S LINE.
From the Cyclorama of Shiloh at Chicago. By permission.
ravine which extends into the camp of McClernand's division, and along the
sides of this ravine from the right and left respectively of McClernand and
Sherman are two dotted lines terminating in a point at the head of the ravine.
In his speech submitting his map to the society, Sherman explains how that
horn-like projection was formed, with other particulars, as follows :
" In the very crisis of the battle of April 6, about 4 o'clock p. M., when my division occupied
the line from Snake Creek bridge to the forks of the Corinth and Purdy road, there occurred
an incident I have never seen recorded. Birge's sharp-shooters, or ' Squirrel Tails,' occupied
the stables, granaries, and house near the bridge as a strong flank. My division occupied a
double line from it along what had once been a lane with its fences thrown down, and the
blackberry and sassafras bushes still marking the border of an open cotton -field in front, and
the left was in a ravine near which Major Ezra Taylor had assembled some ten or twelve guns.
This ravine was densely wooded and extended to the front near two hundred yards, and I feared
it might be occupied by the enemy, who from behind the trees could drive the gunners from
then- posts. I ordered the colonel of one of my regiments to occupy that ravine to anticipate
the enemy, but he did not quickly catch my meaning or comprehend the tactics by which he
could fulfill my purpose. I remember well that Colonel Thomas W. Sweeny, a one-armed offi-
cer who had lost an arm in the Mexican War and did not belong to my command, stood near by
and quickly spoke up : ' I understand perfectly what you want ; let me do it.' ' Certainly,'
said I, ' Sweeny, go at once and occupy that ravine, converting it into a regular bastion.' He
did it, and I attach more importance to that event than to any of the hundred achievements
which I have since heard ' saved the day,' for we held that line and ravine all night, and the
next morning advanced from them to certain victory."
And yet it will be seen that this new line, prepared with such elaboration
of detail and introduced with such richness of anecdotal embellishment, was
512 SHILOH RECEIVED.
a thorough delusion ; that Birge's sharp-shooters were not there, and that
General Sherman was in a different place ! Setting aside historical accu-
racy, however, the advantage of the revised arrangement is obvious. It
extended General Grant's territory a half-mile to the south, fully as much to
the west, taking in Tillman's Hollow, one-third of McClernand's captured
camp, and a large part of the Confederate army, giving a battle front of two
miles and a half instead of one mile, and requiring no greater power of imagi-
nation to man it than to devise it. In presenting his map to the Society,
Sherman said : " The map as thus modified tells the story of the battle ! "
There can be no doubt that General Sherman's position will carry unhesi-
tating credence to his naked assertion in the minds of a considerable number
of persons; while the more cautious but still unsearching readers will say
that until the accuracy of the official map is disproved, it must be accepted
as the standard representation of the battle. It is proper, therefore, to cite
the proof which rejects both, and establishes a materially different version.
The investigation may be confined, for the present, to the location of the
Federal line of battle on Sunday evening. The other errors in the maps will
be developed incidentally as the general subject progresses. Moreover, the
inquiry will be directed specifically to the Sherman map, as that includes
the faults of the Thorn map as well as its own peculiar errors.
It is unnecessary to remark upon the exclusion of Nelson's leading brigade
from the west bank of the river on the Sherman map. Its presence there at
the time in question is as notorious as the battle itself. The distance from
the landing to Dill's Branch is six hundred yards. Sherman places his
" Detachments," i. e., the " reserve artillery," exactly on the line of that
branch, whereas they were five hundred yards north of it. During the
engagement the Confederates passed the ravine and reached the crest of the
hill on the north side. After the engagement Nelson's division occupied the
ravine, and his pickets held ground beyond it during the night. None of
Grant's troops were ever in that position.
In adducing evidence from the official reports to determine the further
position of the Union line, the extracts will be somewhat extended when the
context is pertinent, in order to show at the same time the number and con-
dition of the troops occupying it. The reader will be spared the impression
of some irrelevancy if he will keep these additional objects in mind.
Of the position of General Hurlbut's division, the next on the right of the
"Detachments," that officer says in his official report :
" On reaching the 24-pounder siege-guns in battery near the river, I again succeeded in
forming line of battle in rear of the guns.''''
That brought his division on the line of the right-hand road leading back
from the river, but not entirely to the right of the artillery where the Thorn
map places it. He adds :
" I passed to the right and found myself in communication with General Sherman, and received
his instructions. In a short time the enemy appeared on the crest of the ridge, led by the 18th
Louisiana," etc. ..." General Sherman's artillery also tvas rapidly engaged, and after an
artillery contest of some duration, the enemy fell back." . . . " About dark the firing
SHILOH RECEIVED. 513
ceased. I advanced my division one hundred yards to the front, threw out pickets, and officers
and men bivouacked in a heavy storm of rain. About 12 p. m. General Nelson's leading columns
passed through my line and went to the front, and I called in my advance-guard."
The next division in the regular order is McClernand's, though the reader
will not have failed to observe the presence of General Sherman, with at least a
portion of his command, in communication with Hurlbut's right. General Sher-
man, it will he remembered, locates this division (McClernand's) on the west
side of Tillman's Creek. We trace its retrogression step by step, from its
permanent camp, across Tillman's Hollow, at the close of the day, by the fol-
lowing extracts from General McClernand's report :
" Continuing this sanguinary conflict until several regiments of my division had exhausted
their ammunition, and its right flank had been borne back, and it was in danger of being turned,
the remainder of my command . . . also feU back to the camp of the First Brigade. Here
the portion that had first fallen back re-formed parallel with the camp, and fronting the
approach of the enemy from the west, while the other portion fox-med at right angles with it,
still fronting the approach of the enemy from the south. ... It was 2 o'clock when my
fifth line had been thus formed. . . . Deterred from direct advance, he (the enemy) moved
a considerable force by the right flank, with the evident intention of turning my left. To defeat
this purpose, i" ordered my Command to fall back in the direction of the landing, across a deep hollow,
and to re-form on the east side of another field, in the skirts of a ivood. This was my sixth line. Here
we rested a half -hour, continuing to supply our men with ammunition, until the enemy's cav-
alry wei*e seen rapidly crossing the field to the charge. Waiting until they approached within
some thirty paces of our line, I ordered a fire, which was delivered with great coolness and
destructive effect. First halting, then wavering, they turned and fled in confusion, leaving
behind a number of riders and horses dead on the field. The 29th Illinois Infantry, inspired by
the courageous example of their commanding officer, Lieutenant- Colonel Ferrell, bore the chief
part in this engagement. ... In the meantime, under cover of this demonstration strength-
ened by large additions from other portions of the field yielded by our forces, the enemy con-
tinued his endeavors to turn the flanks of my line, and to cut me off from the landing. To
prevent this I ordered my left wing to fall back a short distance and form an obtuse angle with
the center, opposing a double front to the enemy's approach. Thus disposed, my left held the
enemy in check, while my whole line slowly fell back to my seventh position. Here I re-formed the
lenm and famished remnant of my division, on favorable ground along a north and south road, sup-
ported on my right by fragments of General Sher mail's division, and on my left bg the [14th Illinois and
25th Indiana] under command of Colonel Veatch, acting brigadier-generaV
The identity of this seventh position of McClernand is determined by
the following extracts.- Colonel Marsh, commanding McClernand's Second
Brigade, says :
"At this time, my command having been reduced to a merely nominal one, I received orders to fall
a short distance to the rear and form a new line, detaining all stragglers, portions of commands,
and commands which should attempt to pass. In obedience to this, though with some difficulty
as regarded portions of some commands, whose officers seemed little inclined to halt short of the
river, . . . I had gathered quite a force, and formed a line near the camp of the Second Divis-
ion, concealing my men in the timber facing an open field. I here requested Colonel Davis, of the '4:6th
Illinois, to fake position on my right. He promptly and cheerfully responded. . . . In a short
time General McClernand, with portions of the First and Third Brigades of his own division, and two
regiments of Ohio troops, came up and formed on the left of the line I had already established."
Colonel Davis, of the 46th Illinois, says :
" It being now ' o'clock, my ammunition exhausted, the men tired and hungry, and myself
exhausted, ha it my horse in the first engagement, and compelled to go on foot the
VOL. i.
5*4
SH1L0H REVIEWED.
THE SIEGE-BATTERY, ABOVE THE LANDING, THAT WAS A PART OF THE " LAST LINE " IN THE FIRST
DAY'S BATTLE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN A FEW DAYS AFTER THE BATTLE.
balance of the time, and finding myself within one-half mile of my regimental encampment, I marched
my men to it and (jot dinner for them. Calling my men into line immediately after dinner, I formed them
upon, the rigid of the brigade commanded by Colonel C. C. Marsh, at his request, in front and to the left
of my camp, where we again met the enemy on Sunday evening."
Colonel Engelmann, of the 43d Illinois, whose report in many respects is a
remarkably clear and interesting one, says :
"We now fell back by degrees [from McClernand's sixth position], and a new line being
formed, tee found ourselves posted between the 46th Illinois and the 13th Missouri, our position being
midway between the encampments of the ±Qth and 9th Illinois."
Colonel Wright, 13th Missouri, of Mc Arthur's brigade, Second Division, but
attached during the battle to Sherman's division, says :
" After advancing and falling back several times, the regiment was forced to retire, with all
the others there, to the road which crosses the Purdy road at right angles near General McArthur's
headquarters. We here took up quarters for the night, bivouacking without fires within four hundred
yards of our regimental camp.''''
•
The " Purdy road " here mentioned is the continuation of the right-hand
road leading from the landing. The camp of the 9th Illinois was in the
north-east angle of the intersection of that road with the River road, and
G-eneral McArthur's headquarters were in the south-west angle of the same
intersection. The camp of the 46th Illinois was located in the south-east
angle of the intersection of the River road and a middle road leading west
from the landing, about five hundred yards from McArthur's headquarters.
These reports plainly identify General McClernand's seventh position, of
which General Sherman formed part, with the River road between McAr-
thur's and Hurlbut's headquarters. It is a full half-mile in rear of the posi-
tion given to Sherman's division on the Thorn map, and of ition which
SHILOH REVIEWED. Si 5
General Sherman assigns to himself on his edition, with the deep hollow of
Tillman's Creek intervening.
The struggle which drove General McClernand from his seventh position
is described by that officer as follows :
'• The enemy renewed the contest by trying to shell us from our position. . . . Advancing
in heavy columns led by the Louisiana Zouaves to break our center, we awaited his approach
within sure range, and opened a terrific fire upon him. The head of the column was instantly
mowed down ; the remainder of it swayed to and fro for a few seconds, and turned and fled.
This second success of the last two engagements terminated a conflict of ten and a hah hours'
duration, from 6 o'clock A. M. to 4:30 o'clock P. M., and probably saved our army, transports
and all, from capture. Strange, however, at the very moment of the flight of the enemy, the
right of our line gave way, and immediately after, notwithstanding the indignant and heroic
resistance of Colonel Veatch, the left, comprising the [14th Illinois and 25th Indiana] was irre-
sistibly swept back by the tide of fugitive soldiers and trains seeking vain security at the land-
ing. . . . Left unsupported and alone, the 20th and 17th Illinois, together with other portions of
my division not home Intel; by the retreating multitude, retired in good order under the immediate com-
mand of Colonel Marsh mid Lieutenant- Colonel Wood, and re-formed under my direction, the right
resting near the former line, and the left at an acute angle with it. A more extended line, comprising
portions of regiments, brigades, and divisions, was soon formed on this nucleus by the efforts of Gen end
Sherman, myself, and other officers. Here, in the eighth position occupied by my division during the
day, we rested in line of battle upon our arms, uncovered and exposed to a drenching rain during the night:'1
This last position would locate McClernand, excepting his First Brigade,
perhaps three hundred yards south of, and obliquely with reference to the
right-hand road leading from the landing, facing a little to the west. His
First Brigade is traced to within half a mile of the river, where it was rallied
by its commander " in front of the camp-ground of the 14th Iowa," on the
road to the landing. It did not join the division again until after the battle,
but acted in connection with my troops. Colonel Veatch, who was on
McClernand's left with the 14th Illinois and 25th Indiana in the seventh
position, fell back and took " position on the road leading to the landing near
the heavy siege-guns," and became reunited there with Hurlbut's division, to
which he belonged. The space along the road in rear of McClernand was
filled in with various fragments which constituted Sherman's command,
including at last Buckland's two regiments. General Sherman says that
Colonel Sweeny was with him. No doubt some of Sweeny's men also were
there. It was the camp-ground of his brigade — the camp of his own regi-
ment, the 52d Illinois, being immediately on the road. Two of his regiments
were captured with Prentiss, and the remainder had been driven back from
W. H. L. Wallace's right and virtually broken up. One of his regiments,
the 50th Illinois, was sent in the morning to support Colonel Stuart on the
extreme left, and shared the fate of the sufferers in that quarter. The space
along the road between Sherman and Hurlbut was occupied by the remnant
of Colonel Tuttle's brigade and a portion of McClernand's First Brigade which
united itself to Tuttle. It was Tuttle's camp-ground. Two of his regiments
had been captured with Prentiss.
From the reports of the 13th Missouri and 43d Illinois it is inferred that
those two regiments did not move from their position on the Eiver road in
the last falling back. But that, if certain, is not important. They were at
sib SH1L0H REVIEWED.
any rate substantially on the general line above indicated. The same, in a
careless reading, might be presumed of the 46th Illinois, which was imme-
diately on the left of the 43d. The report of that regiment says : " The regi-
ments both on my right and left fell lack, but my line did not ivaver under the
fire of I he enemy? But it evidently fell back at last, for the report continues :
"After breakfast on Monday morning, still retaining my position on the
right of Colonel Marsh's brigade, I moved with him until I reached and went
beyond the ground of our last engagement of Sunday, where our pickets were
driven in," etc. It remains now to determine the question of the extreme
right of the general line.
General Sherman says, and his statement on that point is sustained by the
reports, that Birge's sharp-shooters were immediately on his right and con-
stituted the extreme right of the line. The official report of that regiment
shows that during the afternoon it occupied a "position near Colonel
Me Arthur's headquarters " in an open field. Its camp was in its rear along the
opposite or east side of the River road. This would fix General Sherman's
right at the cross-roads near McArthur's headquarters. It is more than a
mile from the Snake Creek bridge. Other evidence confirms these positions.
The official reports of Lew Wallace's division show that he marched along
the River road from the bridge, and formed in line of battle, facing Tillman's
Creek in front of the camp of Birge's sharp-shooters and the 81st Ohio, the
right of the division being in front of the latter, and the left in front of the
former ; and that it came in actual contact with the " sharp-shooters," who
occupied their camp that night and received the new-comers with cheers.
This is clearly and more circumstantially explained by General Force in his
book entitled " From Fort Henry to Corinth," page 163. He was present
and commanded the right regiment of Lew Wallace's division on that occa-
sion. The position thus assigned to Wallace must have taken his left well
up to the cross-road at McArthur's headquarters, and covered the entire field
toward the north ; for the distance from the cross-road to the right of the
camp of the 81st Ohio was only half a mile.
It is particularly to be observed that in no report, either from Sherman's
division or from Lew Wallace's, is there any mention of actual contact or of
any definite proximity of these two divisions on the evening of the 6th, or
earlier than 10 o'clock on the morning of the 7th. The inference is, that
at the time of Wallace's arrival and subsequently, no part of Sherman's
division was on the River road, or anywhere along the heights of Tillman's
Creek north of McArthur's headquarters. General Sherman, in his report,
says : " General Wallace arrived from Crump's Landing shortly after dark
and formed his line to my right and rear." That relative position could only
exist by assuming that Sherman's command was on the road leading to the
landing east of McArthur's headquarters, and nearly at right angles with
Wallace, — a supposition which is strengthened by the condition indicated
in Sherman's revised map,- that Birge's sharp-shooters were on his right —
not entirely in his front, as they would have been if his front had been on
the River road. It is also sustained by General Buckland's statement in the
SHILOH REVIEWED. 517
"Journal of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee" for 1881, p. 82.
"About dark," he says, "General Wallace's division commenced arriving,
and formed to the right of my brigade." Buckland states in his report and
in the " Journal ". that he lay "on the road." If he had been on the Eiver
road, Wallace would have come in contact with him, and when he formed in
line would have been entirely in his front — not in rear or on his right. Buck-
land seems to know nothing about Birge's sharp-shooters. The probable
explanation is that when he came along the road from the bridge they were
on the west side of the road, in the field near McArthur's headquarters.
After Lew Wallace arrived and formed in front of them, they probably
retired to their camp on the east side of the road. The explanation of Buck-
land's position is that, after the retreat across Tillman's Creek from the west
side, he found himself, as he says, near Snake Creek bridge " late in the
afternoon, after the repulse of the right of the line," entirely apart from the
rest of the army, and that to reestablish his connection with it he started on
the road to the landing, where one of his regiments actually went and
remained overnight ; and that he came upon the outer flank of the new line
where General Sherman soon after found him, east of McArthur's headquar-
ters, and thus placed himself where he is described by Sherman as being,
between Birge's sharp-shooters and the rest of the line.
The Confederate reports mention a considerable appearance of force in a
camp opposite their extreme left in the afternoon, evidently referring to
McArthur's camp. The student of the reports will not be misled by this
appearance ; it was the force that clustered with Sherman on McCler-
nand's right near McArthur's headquarters; by the 9th Illinois, 81st Ohio,
and Birge's sharp-shooters, all belonging to McArthur's brigade; and by
the movement of Buckland's regiments from the bridge as already explained.
The sharp-shooters and the 81st Ohio had been posted at the bridge, and
returned to their camps probably at the time of the retreat from the west
side of Tillman's Creek. The 9th Illinois had during the morning been
engaged on the extreme left under its brigade commander. It had lost
250 men out of 550, and was ordered to its camp " to replenish cartridge-
boxes, clean guns, and be ready for action." While there at 3 o'clock it was
ordered " to support the right wing of General Sherman's division," as the
report expresses it, and in the subsequent engagements retired to within half
a mile of the landing. Birge's sharp-shooters retained their position at or
in front of their camp. The movements of the 81st Ohio are not very clearly
defined, but in the advance next morning it is found on McClernand's left.
The "10 or 12 guns" mentioned by General Sherman in his map-presentation
speech as being near a ravine on his left, Sunday afternoon, were Taylor's
battery, as it was called, though commanded by Captain Barrett, and Bou-
ton's battery. The former had retired for ammunition from McClernand's
camp, probably to near McArthur's headquarters, but afterward evidently,
went near the river, where it received " 1 lieutenant and 21 men with 3
horses " from Fitch's battery. Bouton's battery was taken into action in the
field in front of McClernand's right about 1 o'clock, and was forced to retire,
5i8
SHILOH REVIEWED.
its support helping to draw off its guns. Both the battery and the support
went back toward the river, for in the advance next morning the support is
found on McClernand's left, and the battery was brought into service with
McCook in the afternoon. Sherman had no artillery with him on Monday
until about 10 o'clock. Major Taylor then brought up three pieces of an Illi-
nois battery under Lieutenant Wood, not belonging to Sherman's command.
The final retreat from McClernand's seventh position, Sunday evening,
undoubtedly carried with it all of the fragments connected with Sherman
near McArthur's headquarters, along the road toward the river, where I
found him about dark, excepting Birge's sharp-shooters, the 13th Missouri,
and the 43d Illinois. The latter belonged to McClernand's Third Brigade,
but remained with the 13th Missouri Sunday night. After crossing Till-
man's Creek next morning, both were brought into line on McClernand's
left, and did not form with Sherman, though the 13th Missouri subsequently
joined him.
My own observation as to the position and extent of General Grant's line
accords substantially with the evidence of the reports. In the dusk of the
evening after the close of the engagement on Sunday, I walked out with my
chief-of -staff, following the road and the line of
the troops. My object was to gain information
by which to determine the formation of my
divisions, and I not only observed all that I
could see at such an hour, but I made inquiry as
I passed along. I came to Hurlbut's left five
hundred yards from the river ; I passed along
its front and came to troops that answered as
McClernand's, and which I supposed at the time
to constitute his division, but which were proba-
bly his First Brigade
only; I passed to
the front of these
troops, and when I
turned in toward the
road again, I came
upon Sherman's line,
as it happened, not
far from where he
was, and I was con-
ducted to him. It was
then growing dark.
I judge the distance
to have been about
three-quarters of a
mile from the river
— less than half a
mile from Hurlbut's
BUELL'S TROOPS DEBARKING AT PITTSBURG LANDING, SUNDAY NIGHT.
SHILOH REVIEWED.
Si9
left, and I think now that it was near the camp of Colonel Sweeny's regiment,
the 52d Illinois, that I foimd General Sherman.
The impression made npon my mind by that interview has remained as
vivid as the circumstances were peculiar. I had no thought of seeing Gen-
eral Sherman when I set out, but on every score I was glad to meet him, and
I was there to gain information. By what precise words I sought and he
gave it, I would not pretend at this day to repeat. It is sufficient for the
present to say that I learned the nature of the ground in front ; that his
right flank was some three hundred yards
from us ; and that the bridge by which
Lew Wallace was to cross Snake Creek
was to his right and rear at an angle, as
he pointed, of about forty degrees. I do
not know whether I asked the question,
but I know now that it was a mile and
a quarter from his flank, and that he
did not cover it in any practical sense,
though in advancing Wallace would ap-
proach by his right and rear. I also see
now that I was mistaken in supposing
that these several commands retained a
regular organization and had distinct lim-
its ; whereas they were in fact much in-
termixed.
Of course we talked of other incidental
matters. In all his career he has, I ven-
ture to say, never appeared to better ad-
vantage. There was the frank, brave
soldier, rather subdued, realizing the critical situation in which causes of
some sort, perchance his own fault chiefly, had placed him, but ready,
without affectation or bravado, to do anything that duty required of him.
He asked me what the plans were for the morrow. I answered that I was
going to attack the enemy at daylight, and he expressed gratification at my
reply, though apparently not because of any unmixed confidence in th<>
result. I had had no consultation with General Grant, and knew nothing of
his purpose. I presumed that we would be in accord, but I had been only a
few hours within the limits of his authority, and I did not look upon him as
my commander, though I would zealously have obeyed his orders. General
Sherman allowed me to take with me the map of which a fac-simile accompa-
nies this article [page 496]. I never imagined that in the future it would
have the interest which now attaches to it, and after the battle it was laid
aside and forgotten.
Within two years after that meeting, quite contrary opinions developed
themselves between General Sherman and myself concerning the battle of
Shiloh, and his Memoirs give a different account of the interview above
described. He says that he handed the map to my engineer-officer, Captain
MA.JOR-GENEKAL THOMAS J. WOOD.
COPIED FROM AN ENGRAVING.
520 SHILOH REVIEWED.
Michler, who, in fact, was not present, and complains that it was never
returned to him. He says that I grumbled about the stragglers, and that he
feared I would not bring my army across the river. One would suppose that
his fears would have been allayed by the fact that, at that very moment, my
troops were arriving and covering his front as fast as legs and steamboats
could carry them.
In the execution of the retreat described in the reports of McClernand and
Sherman, from the west to the east side of Tillman's Creek, there was a quite
thorough disintegration of divisions and brigades, lacking nothing but the
pressure of a vigorous pursuit to convert it into a complete rout. In its
seventh position, McClernand's division recovered some force and preserved
a recognized organization ; but not so with Sherman's. Indeed, in that divi-
sion the disorganization occurred, as has already been stated, at an earlier
period. In Hildebrand's brigade it was almost coincident with the enemy's
first assault. With McDowell's it commenced with the unsuccessful attempt
to form line of battle along the Purdy road, and was complete very soon
after 1 o'clock; and these two brigades never recovered their aggregation
again until after the battle. With Buckland's brigade also it occurred at
the miscarriage at the Purdy road, about 10 o'clock, but it was not so thor-
ough as in the other brigades — at least it was afterward partially repaired
during the first day, as his report explains. He says, after the retreat from
his camp about 10 o'clock :
" We formed line on the Purdy road, but the fleeing mass from the left broke through our
lines, and many of our men caught the infection and fled with the crowd. Colonel Cockerill
became separated from Colonel Sullivan and myself, and was afterward engaged with part of
his command at McClernand's camp. Colonel Sullivan and myself kept together, and made
every effort to rally our men, but with very poor success. They had become scattered in all
directions. We were borne considerably to the left, but finally succeeded in forming a line,
and had a short engagement with the enemy, who made his appearance soon after our line was
formed. The enemy fell back, and we proceeded to the road where you [General Sherman]
found us. At this point I was joined by Colonel Cockerill, and we there formed line of battle
and slept on our arms Sunday night. Colonel Sullivan, being out of ammunition, marched to
the lauding for a supply, and while there was ordered to support a battery at that point."
It is only after a close examination of the records that we can understand
the full significance of the following passage in General Sherman's report :
" In this position we rested for the night. My command had become decidedly of a mixed
character. Buckland's brigade was the only one with me that retained its organization.
Colonel Hildebrand was personally there, but his brigade was not. Colonel McDowell had
been severely injured by a fall from his horse, and had gone to the river, and the three regi-
ments of his brigade were not in line. The 13th Missouri, Colonel Crafts J. Wright, had
reported to me on the field, and fought well, retaining its regimental organization, and it formed
part of my line during Sunday night and all of Monday ; other fragments of regiments and
companies had also fallen into my division, and acted with it during the remainder of the battle."
It thus appears that from about 1 o'clock until the time when General Sher-
man found Colonel Buckland with two regiments on the road from the bridge
to the landing, not a single regiment of his division excepting Cockerill's, and
not one prominent individual representative of it excepting that officer and
/
SHILOH RECEIVED. tfti
Colonel Hildebrand, was present with him. The only body of troops besides
Cockerill's regiment having any recognized organization was the 13tll Mis-
souri, which belonged to another division. All the rest were squads or
individual stragglers. In all the official reports, not a regiment or par\ < >f a
regiment is described as being with him at this juncture or for several lrtmrs
before. Of the 9 regiments that composed the 3 brigades under his inn Me-
diate command at the church, only 5 rendered reports, and 3 of these were
from Buckland's brigade. The division did not exist except in the person of
its commander. Such is the story of the official reports. The nu'nber of
men present could not have been large. Less than 1000, including Buck-
land's 2 regiments after they were found, would have told the number that
lay on their arms in Sherman's ranks on Sunday night.
This explains the close relation of McClernand and Sherman during the
last five hours of Sunday, and the identity of their experiences. General
Sherman has nothing to report of his own command distinctively. Every-
thing is conjunctive and general as between McClernand and himself. "We
held this position, General McClernand and myself acting in perfect concert.''
" General McClernand and I, on consultation, selected a new line." " We fell
back as well as we could." "The enemy's cavalry charged us, and was hand-
somely repulsed." General MeClernand's account of this incident has been
quoted on a preceding page. When Colonel Hildebrand lost his brigade, it is
not with General Sherman that he is identified, but with McClernand, on
whose staff he served part of the day. Hildebrand seems to have been active,
but not under the direction of his division commander. "About 3 o'clock,"
he says, "I assumed command of a regiment already formed of fragmentary
regiments. I marched in a north-western direction, where I aided a regiment
of sharp-shooters in defeating the enemy in an attempt to flank our rear."
This movement was evidently made from MeClernand's and Sherman's seventh
position, and the troops assisted were Birge's sharp-shooters. General Sher-
man makes no mention of this significant if not important occurrence. His
right flank was threatened, and the regiment of sharp-shooters posted in the
field near McArtlmr's headquarters met, and, in conjunction with Hildebrand's
temporary regiment, repelled the danger.
We have in the official reports a good clew to the condition of MeClernand's
division also. It was in a far better state. It was shattered and worn, but
it was represented by at least some recognized following of regiments and
brigades. One of the brigades had five hundred men, and another, the com-
mander reports, was "merely nominal," not long before McClernand took up
his seventh position. In the last collision, one of the brigades became
entirely separated from the division, and did not return to it until after the
battle. Fifteen hundred, exclusive of that brigade, would cover the number
of men that rested that night under MeClernand's colors.
Hurlbut's division was in a somewhat better condition than either of the
others. Its loss in killed and wounded was greater than MeClernand's, but
it had not, like the latter, been affected in its organization by oft-repeated
shocks sustained in a cramped and embarrassing position, and his command
^22 SHILOH REVIEWED.
had received some accessions from the driftings of other divisions. The esti-
mate which he makes of his force is wholly fallacious. It could not have
stood on the space which he occupied. There may have been two thousand
men in his line on the night of the 6th. These three divisions, if they
may be so called, and Tuttle's command, with Birge's sharp-shooters on the
extreme right, and the reserve artillery on the left, which, according to Gen-
eral Grant's report; consisted of "four 20-pounder Parrott guns and a battery
of rifled guns," constituted the line of battle, which extended a mile from the
river. Five thousand men occupied it. Other partially organized fragments
were crowded together about the river and the camps on the plateau, and
with proper effort could have been fitted for good service; but no steps to
that end were taken. The defect in the command that opened the way for
the disaster, facilitated its progress at every step — the want of a strong execu-
tive hand guided by a clear organizing head. Some of these fragmentary com-
mands sought puaces for themselves in the advance next day. The remnant
of the Second Division under Colonel Tuttle was one of these. Indeed, it
deserves a higher limine. It presented itself to me on the field without orders,
and rendered efficient '-service with my divisions. There may have been
1500 or 2000 men of thesfe unrecognized commands that went to the front
on Monday without instructions. Seven thousand men at the utmost, besides
Lew Wallace's 5000, were ready Sunday night to take part in the struggle
which was to be renewed in the morning. Of the original force, 7000 were
killed or wounded, 3000 were prisoners, at least 15,000 were absent from the
ranks and hopelessly disorganized, and about YiO pieces of artillery were in the
hands of the enemy. /
The physical condition of the army was an exact type of its moral con-
dition. The ties of discipline, not yet of long enough duration or rigidly
enough enforced to be very strong, were in much the largest part of the army
thoroughly severed. An unbroken tide of disaster had obliterated the dis-
tance between grades, and brought all men to the standard of personal
qualities. The feeble groups that still clung together were held by force of
individual character more than by discipline, and a disbelief in the ability of
the army unaided to extricate itself from the peril that environed it, was, I
do not hesitate to affirm, universal. In my opinion, that feeling was shared
by the commander himself. A week after the battle the army had not recov-
ered from its shattered and prostrated condition. On the 14th, three days
after Halleck's arrival, he instructed Grant : " Divisions and brigades should,
where necessary, be reorganized and put in position, and all stragglers re-
turned to their companies and regiments. Your army is not now in condition
to resist an attack." We are told that the enemy had stragglers too. Yes,
every cause which demands effort and sacrifice will have them ; but there is
a difference between the straggling which is not restrained by the smile of
fortune, and that which tries to elude the pursuit of fate — it is the difference
between victory and defeat. The Confederates in their official reports make no
concealment of their skeletons, but when the time for action arrived they were
vital bodies, and, on Sunday, always in sufficient force to do the work at last.
e
SH1L0H REVIEWED. S23
General McClernand, it will have been observed, ascribes the breaking np
of his seventh position to a panic among the troops, but the other reports
show a different reason. Colonel Veatch on McClernand's left says :
" Our men were much encouraged by the strength of our position, and our fire was telling with
terrible effect. Our forces were eager to advance and charge him [the enemy], when we were
surprised by his driving back the whole left wing of our army, and advancing close to our rear
near General Hurll nit's headquarters. A dense mass of baggage wagons and artillery crowded
upon our ranks, while we were exposed to a heavy fire of the enemy both in front and rear."
G-eneral Hurlbut thus describes the crisis at that stage of the battle :
" I had hoped to make a stand on the line of my camp, but masses of the enemy were press-
ing rapidly on each flank, while their light artillery was closing rapidly in the rear. On reach-
ing the 24-pounder siege-guns in battery near the river, I again succeeded in forming line of
battle in rear of the guns."
We see here that there was a stern cause for the falling back. It was the
tide of defeat and pursuit from the left wing of the army, and was compul-
sory in the strictest sense. How fortunate that it did not set in an hour
earlier, and strike in flank the disorganized material of the right wing as it
struggled across the ravines of Tillman's Creek ! How more than fortunate
that the onward current of the victor was obstructed still an hour longer by
the unyielding tenacity of the remaining regiments of Wallace and Prentiss !
From the self-assuring interview in which, according to one of General
Sherman's reminiscences, it was " agreed that the enemy had expended the
furor of his attack" at 4 o'clock, and General Grant told the "anecdote of
his Donelson battle," that officer was aroused by the renewal of the din of
the strife, and made his way to the river through the disorganized throng
of his retreating army. While those mutual felicitations were in progress,
the enemy, a mile to the left, was disarming and marching six captured
regiments to the rear. Thus disembarrassed, his furor revived, and mani-
fested itself at last at the very landing. What worse state of affairs than
this could have existed when at noon General Grant wrote : " If you will get
upon the field, leaving all your baggage on the east bank of the river, it will
be a move to our advantage, and possibly save the day to us"!
Under the circumstances here described, General Grant and General Sher-
man have said that reinforcements other than Lew Wallace's division were
in nowise necessary at the close of the first day, and that, without reference
to them, General Grant would have assumed the offensive and defeated the
Confederate army next morning. Those who study the subject attentively
will find no ground to accept that declaration as regards either the purpose
or the result. The former indeed presents an intangible question which it
would seem to be useless to discuss. At the time it is alleged to have been
entertained, the reinforcements were actually at hand, and their presence
gives to the announcement the semblance of a vain boast, which could never
have been put to the test of reality. That with the reinforcements from my
army, General Grant confidently expected that the enemy would be defeated
the following day, it is impossible to doubt ; but it was not known, Sunday
night, that the enemy had withdrawn from our immediate front, and the evi-
524 SH1L0H REVIEWED.
dence establishes that General Grant had not determined upon or had not
promulgated a plan of action in the morning. Not an order was given or a
note of preparation sounded for the struggle which, with or without his
assistance, was to begin at daybreak. To my certain knowledge, if words
and actions were not wholly misleading, General Sherman, when I saw him
on the night of the 6th, did not consider that any instructions had been given
for battle, and if he had such instructions he did not obeyttheni. His report
sustains the impression which I derived from our interview. "At daylight
on Monday," he says, " I received General Grant's orders to advance and
recapture our original camps." Then only it was that he dispatched several
members of his staff to bring up all the men they could find. Is that the
way in which General Sherman would have acquitted himself of the obliga-
tion of orders received the day before to engage in battle 1 I answer unhesi-
tatingly, No ! The reports of the other division commanders are to the same
effect. General McClernand says: "Your [General Grant's] order of the
morning of the 7th for a forward movement," etc. The hour of the delivery
of this order is indicated approximately by the following passage in the
report of Colonel Marsh :
"At daylight on Monday morning the men in line were supplied with some provisions.
While this was being: done firing opened on our right, afterwards ascertained to come from a
portion of General Lew Wallace's command. Directly afterwards, firing commenced to our
left and front, both artillery and musketry, supposed by me to be a portion of General Buell's
command, who, I had been informed during the night, had taken position on our left and con-
siderably in advance. I now received orders from General McClernand to throw out skirmish-
ers and follow with my whole command."
We must presume that General McClernand proceeded to the execution of
General Grant's order as soon as it was received, which must then have been
after the commencement of the battle in front of Nelson.
General Hurlbut says : " On Monday, about 8 a. m., my division was
formed in line close to the river-bank, and I obtained a few crackers for my
men. About 9 a. m. I was ordered by General Grant to move up to the sup-
port of General McClernand." Colonel Tuttle, commanding the Second Divi-
sion, acted without any orders. He says : "On Monday morning I collected
all of the division that could be found, and such other detached regiments as
volunteered to join me, and formed them in column by battalion closed in
mass as a reserve for General Buell." The action of General Lew Wallace
was not the result of orders, but proceeded from his own motion on discover-
ing the enemy in his front at daylight across Tillman's Hollow. While that
action was in progress, General Grant came up and gave Wallace "the direc-
tion of his attack." Nelson had been in motion an hour, and was sharply
engaged before these orders were given.
General Grant's official reports of the battle are in accord with the subor-
dinate reports upon this question. In his first telegraphic announcement of
the battle to General Halleck, he says :
" Yesterday the rebels attacked us here with an overwhelming force, driving our troops in
from their advanced position to near the landing. General Wallace was immediately ordered up
SHILOH REVIEWED. 525
from Crump's Landing, and in the evening, one division of General Buell's army and General
Buell in person arrived. During the night one other division arrived, and still another to-day.
This morning, at the break of day, I ordered an attack, which resulted in a fight, which contimied
until late this afternoon, with severe loss on both sides, but a complete repulse of the enemy.
I shall follow to-morrow far enough to see that no immediate renewal of an attack is contemplated.1'1
In his more detailed report of April 9th he says:
" During the night [Sunday] all was quiet, and feeling that a great moral advantage would be
gained by becoming the attacking party, an advance was ordered as soon as dag dawned. The result
was a gradual repulse of the enemy at all parts of the line from morning until probably 5
o'clock in the afternoon, when it became evident that the enemy was retreating. Before the
close of the action the advance of General T. J. Wood's division arrived in time to take part in
the action. My force was too much fatigued, from two days1 hard fighting and exposure in the open
air to a drenching rain during the intervening night, to pursue immediately. Night closed in cloudy
and with heavy rain, making the roads impracticable for artillery by the next morning. Gen-
eral Sherman, however, followed the enemy, finding that the main part of the army had retreated
in good order.1''
Several points worthy of note present themselves in these dispatches of
General Grant. There is still, at the close of the second day, the impression
of the enemy's overwhelming force, which the day before he "estimated at
over one hundred thousand men." He felt on Monday, after the arrival of
reinforcements to the number of 25,000 fresh troops, that " a great moral
advantage would be gained by becoming the attacking party." There was,
then, a question in his mind, namely, to attack, or to await attack ; it was
necessary to consider all the advantages, moral and physical ; he concluded
to secure the former at least, and accordingly gave the order, not on Sunday,
but on Monday " at break of day," to attack. The severity of the contest on
Monday is affirmed in both dispatches ; it was of such a nature as to prevent
an immediate pursuit, which at any rate he would only make the next morn-
ing after the battle, far enough to see that no immediate renewal of the attack
was contemplated. The pursuit was made on that plan, and found " that the
main part of the army had retreated in good order." If the fact were not
duly authenticated, one would wonder whether these dispatches were actually
written by an officer who, twenty-three years afterward, said with boastful
assurance over his own signature, u Victory was assured when Wallace arrived
with his division of 5000 effective veterans, even if there had been no other
support ! "
With this tedious but necessary review of the results of the first day, I take
up the story of the second.
The engagement was brought on, Monday morning, not by General Grant's
order, but by the advance of Nelson's division, along the River road in line
of battle, at the first dawn of day, followed by Crittenden's division in column.
The enemy was encountered at 5: 20 o'clock, and a little in advance of Hurlbut's
camp Nelson was halted while Crittenden came into line on his right. By this
time the head of McCook's division came up and was formed on the right of
Crittenden. Before McCook's rear brigade was up the line moved forward,
pushing back the enemy's light troops, until Nelson and Crittenden reached
the very position occupied by Hurlbut, Prentiss, and W. H. L. Wallace at 4
=,26
SHILOH REVIEWED.
MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS L. CRITTENDEN.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
o'clock the previous day, where the
enemy was found in force. McCook
was on the north side of the western
Corinth road, and eventually swept
across half of McClernand's camp
and released his headquarters from
the grasp of the enemy. The " Hor-
nets' Nest" was in front of Critten-
den's left brigade, and " the peach
orchard" and the ground where Al-
bert Sidney Johnston fell were in
front of Nelson.
Without following the vicissitudes
of the struggle in this part of the
field, I enter with a little more de-
tail, but still, cursorily, upon the
operations of Grant's troops, which
have not been connectedly explained
in any official report. The action
here was commenced by Lew "Wal-
lace, one of whose batteries at half-
past 5 o'clock opened fire on the
enemy, who was discovered on the
high ground across Tillman's Hollow. There is some diversity of state-
ment among the official reports as to the priority of artillery firing in front
of Nelson and Wallace. Colonel Hovey, who was in immediate support of
Wallace's battery, gives the priority to Nelson, while Colonel Marsh, who was
half a mile farther to the left, gives it to Wallace. But this is unimportant.
Nelson was in motion three-quarters of an hour before that time, and had
been engaged with the enemy's light troops. The first artillery fire was from
the enemy, Nelson at first having no artillery. Wallace's action was not yet
aggressive, no orders having been given for his advance ; but while the firing
was in progress General Grant came up, and gave him his " direction of
attack, which was formed at a right angle with the river, with which at the
time his line ran almost parallel." The enemy's battery and its supports
having been driven from the opposite height by the artillery of Wallace, the
latter moved his line forward about 7 o'clock, crossed the hollow, and gained
the crest of the hill almost without opposition. " Here," he says, " as General
Sherman's division, next on my left, had not made its appearance to support
my advance, a halt was ordered for it to come up." Wallace was now on the
edge of the large oblong field which was in front of the encampment of
McClernand's right brigade.
The next of Grant's commands to advance was McClernand's. The orders
to that effect have already been cited, and their execution is explained by
Colonel Marsh, into whose brigade what was present of McClernand's division
seems to have merged. He says :
SHILOH REVIEWED.
527
" Moving steadily forward for half a mile, I discovered a movement of troops on the hill
nearly a quarter of a mile in front. Dispatching scouts to ascertain who they were, they were
met by a message from Colonel Smith, commanding a [the left] brigade of the Third Division
[Wallace's], informing me that he would take position on the right and wait my coming up."
Sherman, it thus appears, was not yet in motion. Hmibut moved out abont
9 o'clock, and formed one brigade* on McClernand's left.
When Lew Wallace advanced across Tillman's Hollow, followed next on
the left by McClernand, the force opposed to him fell gradually back upon
reinforcements beyond the field on the edge of which was the encampment
of McClernand's First Brigade; the enemy's left then clinging a little to the
bluffs of Owl Creek in that quarter, but yielding without a very stul >born
resistance, chiefly because of McCook's vigorous pressure along the western
Corinth road, until it fell into a general line running through the center of
McClernand's camp, and
nearly parallel with the
Hamburg and Purdy
road. This swinging
back of the enemy's left,
and the direction of the
Owl Creek bluffs, natu-
rally caused a change in
the direction of Wal-
lace's front, until about
10 o'clock it faced south,
at right angles to its
direction in the begin-
ning. A sharp artillery
contest and some infan-
try fighting had been
going on all the time.
It was at 10 o'clock, ac-
cording to Sherman's
report, that McClernand
formed line obliquely in
rear of the camp of his
First Brigade, to ad-
vance against the ene-
my's position. Here for
the first time Sherman's
division appears in the
movement, from which
its absence at an earlier
period is mentioned by both McClernand and Wallace. The statement in
General Sherman's report, in regard to its movements, is as follows :
"At daylight I received General Grant's orders to advance and recapture our original
camps. I dispatched several members of my staff to bring up all the men they could find.
CAPTURE OF A CONFEDERATE BATTERT.
Colonel Robert H. Rturgess (8th Illinois Infantry) says in his official re-
port that while awaiting orders on the Purdy road, during the morning of
the second day's fight, "General Crittenden ordered the Eighth and
Eighteenth (Illinois) to take a rebel battery which some regiment had en-
deavored to capture, but had been driven back with heavy loss. The men
received the order with a cheer, and charged on a double-quick. The
enemy, after filing a few shots, abandoned his guns and retreated to the
woods. My color-bearer rushed up and planted his colors on one of the
guns, and the color-bearer of the Eighteenth took possession of another."
528 SHILOH REVIEWED.
and especially the brigade of Colonel Stuart, which had been separated from the division all
tbe day before ; and at the appointed time the division, or, rather, what remained of it, with
the 13th Missouri and other fragments, marched forward and reoccupied the ground on the
extreme right of General McClernand's camp, where we attracted the fire of a battery located
near Colonel McDowell's former headquarters. Here I remained patiently waiting for the
sound of General Buell's advance upon the main Corinth road. About 10 A. M. the heavy
firing in that direction and its steady approach satisfied me, and General Wallace being on
our right flank with his well-conducted division, I led the head of my column to General
McClernand's right, formed line of battle, facing south, with Buckland's brigade directly
across the ridge, and Stuart's brigade on its right in the woods, and thus advanced slowly
and steadily under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery.''
The contest thus inaugurated in and around McClernand's camp involved
the whole of Grant's available force and McCook's division of the Army of
the Ohio, and continued with great violence from 10 until -4 o'clock. The
significant facts connected with it are, the narrowness of the space covered
by the interior divisions, — McClernand's, Hurlbut's, and Sherman's, — the
lapping over them by McCook, so as to form, in fact, a connection with the
division of Wallace on the extreme right, and the decisive part ascribed to
McCook's division in that part of the field in the reports of McClernand,
Wallace, and Sherman. General McClernand says :
" Here one of the severest conflicts ensued that occurred during the two days. We drove the
enemy back ... to the edge of a field . . . where reserves came to his support. Our
position at this moment was most critical, and a repulse seemed inevitable ; but fortunately the
Louisville Legion, forming part of General Rousseau's brigade, came up at my request and
succored me. Extending and strengthening my line, this gallant body poured into the enemy's
ranks one of the most terrible fires I ever witnessed. Thus breaking its [his] center, it [he]
fell back in disorder, and thenceforth he was beaten at all points."
Wallace mentions particularly an important service rendered to the left
of his division at a crisis in its operations, by one of McCook's regiments.
Colonel McGinnis, of the 11th Indiana, whose regiment was on Wallace's
extreme left, describes this incident as follows :
"At 2 : 30 o'clock I discovered that the Federal forces on our left were falling back and the
rebels advancing, and that they were nearly in rear of our left flank. I immediately notified
you [the brigade commander] of their position, changed front with our left wing, opened our
fire upon them, and sent to you for assistance. During this the most trying moment to us of
the day, I received your order to fall back if it got too hot for us. . . . Fortunately and
much to our relief, at this critical moment the 32d Indiana, Colonel Willich, came up on our
left, aud with their assistance the advancing enemy was compelled to retire."
General Sherman says:
'' We advanced until we reached the point where the Corinth road crosses the line of McCler-
nand's camp, aud here I saw for the first time the well-ordered and compact columns of General
Buell's Kentucky forces, whose soldierly movements at once gave confidence to our newer and
less-disciplined forces. Here I saw Willich's regiment advance upon a point of water-oaks and
thicket, behind which I knew the enemy was in great strength, and enter it in beautiful style.
Then arose the severest musketry fire I ever heard, which lasted some twenty minutes, when
this splendid regiment had to fall back. This green point of timber is about five hundred yards
east of Shiloh Meeting House, and it was evident that here was to be the struggle. The enemy
could be seen forming his lines to the south. . . . This was about 2 o'clock p. M. Willich's
regiment had been repulsed, but a whole brigade of McCook's division advanced beautifully,
deployed, and entered this dreaded woods. . . . Rousseau's brigade moved in splendid order
steaddy to the front, sweeping everything before it."
SHILOH REVIEWED. 529
This occurred in front of Sherman, who was between McClernand and
Wallace, for he says : " I ordered my Second Brigade ... to form on
its right, and my Fourth Brigade, Colonel Buckland, on its right, all to
advance abreast with this Kentucky brigade." Of the action of McCook's
division, General Sherman further says : "I concede that General McCook's
splendid division from Kentucky drove back the enemy along the Corinth
road, which was the great central line of this battle."
The conclusion to be drawn from these several reports is that at this stage
of the battle McCook's division reached across and practically connected the
Army of the Ohio with Wallace's division, which formed the extreme right of
Grant's force, and that its steady valor and effective service, not without the
cooperation of McClernand's, Hurlbut's, and Sherman's commands, decided
the issue of the conflict on that portion of the field. The result, however, was
not brought about without the concurrence of decisive action at other points.
While the battle was going on in McClernand's camp, it raged with great
fury from an earlier hour in front of Nelson and Crittenden on the left, and
vigorously but with less destructive effects in front of Wallace on the right.
As soon as the enemy's right began to yield, the splendid batteries of Men-
denhall and Terrill directed an enfilading fire upon the Confederate batteries
playing fiercely upon McCook, and they were soon silenced. General Sher-
man ascribes that result to the action of two pieces of artillery to which he
says he gave personal direction, but it is probable that he mistook the prin-
cipal cause. A Confederate view of the contest in front of Nelson and Crit-
tenden is seen in the report of Colonel Trabue, whose brigade at a certain
stage of the battle (about 1 o'clock) was moved with Anderson's brigade to their
right, in front of Crittenden. The report describes the conflict at this point as
terrific, the ground being crossed and recrossed four times in the course of it.
I refer to it, chiefly because in some accounts of the battle it has erroneously
been identified with McCook's front, where Trabue's brigade was first engaged.
Without going further into details in which the official reports abound, it
may be sufficient to add briefly, that at 4 o'clock the flag of the Union floated
again upon the line from which it had been driven the previous day, and
General Grant's troops at once resumed their camps.
What more need be said ? Must I sketch the scenes with twentv thousand
of the soldiers of the Army of the Ohio left out of their place in the combat,
as it is described by General Grant and his own officers ? Shall I not, indeed,
already have wearied the reader with the citation of evidence to substantiate a
view of the case which unbiased intelligence is forbidden to deny ?
But if the Army of the Ohio had not arrived, and General Grant had
remained on the defensive, what then f Some of those who frankly acknowl-
edge the reality of their discomfiture on Sunday, like now to believe with
natural pride, the difficulties that beset them then being far in the past, that
they would have been more successful the second day; and it has been
argued that the withdrawal of the Confederates from their advanced posi-
tions on the night of the 6th threw doubt upon the final result. A news-
paper interviewer has even said for General Grant that they were then
VOL. I. 34
530 SHILOH REVIEWED.
preparing to retreat. The inconsistency of that observation is evident. A
general who stops to fight a fresh army is not likely to have had it in con-
templatation to flee before one that he had already defeated on the same
ground. The published reports show that the withdrawal on Sunday night
did not proceed from any faltering of the Confederate commander. On the
contrary, he believed the victory to have been substantially won, and that
the fruit would certainly be gathered the following day. His confidence in
that respect was shared in the fullest manner by his entire army, backed
by a particularly able body of high officers. All demanded to be led against
the last position: not one doubted the result. We can imagine the effort
such an army would have put forth when animated by such a spirit.
With the usual apologies for defeat on Monday, they rated their strength
at 20,000 men, but, with the fruits of victory in view, it will be safe to say
they would have brought at least 25,000 into action ; and it has been claimed
that 25,000, according to the Confederate method of computation, would have
been equal to about 28,000 according to the Federal method. Their relative
strength would have been materially increased by the large accession of cap-
tured cannon. They had also improved their condition by having exchanged
their inferior arms for better ones which they had captured. Comparatively,
the enemy was in a more efficient state than before the battle.
The Union ranks might have been swelled to 15,000 — not more. That
force on such ground could not have ventured to cover a line of more than a
mile — its left at the river, and its right near the ravines of Tillman's Creek.
The high ground beyond the creek would have enfiladed it, and the ravines
would have afforded a lodgment and shelter for the enemy. Dill's ravine on
the left might also have proved an element of weakness, and though that
flank could not be turned, the peculiar advantage of position that aided the
Union troops on the left so much on Sunday, would not have existed on Mon-
day— the field of action in front was a uniform wooded surface.
Nowhere in history is the profane idea that, in a fair field fight, Providence
is on the side of the strongest battalions, more uniformly sustained than in
our Civil War. It presents no example of the triumph of 15,000 or even
20,000 men against 25,000. It affords some such instances where the stronger
force was surprised by rapid and unexpected movements, and still others
where it was directed with a want of skill against chosen positions strength-
ened by the art of defense; but nowhere else. The weaker force is uniformly
defeated or compelled to retire. In this case the missiles of the assailant
would have found a target in the battle-line of the defense, and in the trans-
portation and masses of stragglers crowded together about the landing.
The height of the bluff would have rendered the gun-boats powerless ; the
example of Belmont could only have been partially repeated, if at all ; the
bulk of the defeated force must have laid down its arms. There are those
who argue that General Grant's personal qualities were a guarantee for his
triumph. That is a poor sort of logic, and thousands of patriotic citizens, not
unfriendly to General Grant, would drawback in alarm from the contempla-
tion of any contingency that would have deprived the Union cause of its
superior numbers at more than one period of his career.
SHILOH REVIEWED. 531
In the usual extravagant newspaper dispatches from the field of battle,
there was a statement of charges led by General Grant and his staff, which
were assumed to have decided the fate of the day on Monday, or at least to
have given a crowning touch to the victory. It would be a satire to repro-
duce that statement in its original form at this time Its adoption, however,
by various books and sketches, and especially the reference to such an inci-
dent by General Grant in his recent " Century" article [see page 465], makes
it properly an object of inquiry. Such an act as leading a charge is a con-
spicuous incident rarely resorted to by the commander of an army. General
Grant in some former newspaper interview is made to assume that General
Sidney Johnston lost his life under such circumstances, from which he
argues the failing fortune of the Confederate attack on Sunday. General
Johnston's conduct in that affair is described in the Confederate reports.
It was an outburst of impatient valor not caused by any crisis in the battle,
though an attack by his troops at a certain point had been repulsed. He did
not lose his life in the attack, and the most substantial successes of the Con-
federates were achieved at a later hour. We likewise naturally look in the
official reports for a circumstantial account of the charge said to have been
led by General Grant, for no colonel of a regment is likely to overlook the
honor of having been led in a charge by the commander of the army.
In the report of Colonel Veatch of Hurlbut's division, there occurs the fol-
lowing passage : " Maj.-Gen. Grant now ordered me forward to charge the
enemy. I formed my brigade in column of battalions, and moved forward
in double-quick through our deserted camps and to the thick woods beyond
our lines in pursuit of the retreating enemy, following until we were in
advance of our other forces, and were ordered to fall back by General Buell."
It is proper to remark that I witnessed this movement. I was in advance on
the line toward which it was made, and understand its bearing. It does not
answer the description of a charge led by General Grant, since he is not said
to have been present in it.
In the report of General Rousseau occurs the following :
" When thus repulsed, the enemy fell back and his retreat began : soon after which I saw
two regiments of Government troops advancing in double-quick time across the open fields in
our front, and saw that one of them was the 1st Ohio, which had been moved to our left to wait
for ammunition. I galloped to the regiment and ordered it to halt, as I had not ordered the
movement, but was informed that it was advancing by order of General Grant, whom I then
saw in rear of the line with his staff. I ordered the regiment to advance with the other, which
it did some two or three hundred yards fai'ther, when it was halted, and a fire was opened upon
it from one of our camps, then occupied by the enemy. The fire was instantly returned, and
the enemy soon fled, after wounding eight men of the 1st Ohio."
There is in the official reports no other mention of such an occurrence.
This must have been the charge referred to, though it does not satisfy the
description, since it appears that General Grant was not taken into the
enemy's fire ; and there is nothing in it which fills the definition of a charge.
The professional soldier at least understands that the term implies something
more serious than a movement of troops upon the field of battle, even at a
rapid pace, in the presence of an enemy. But putting out of the question all
532 SH1L0H REVIEWED.
appropriate distinctions in the use of terms, there was nothing in the occa-
sion or in these simple movements which promised any advantage, or entitled
them to the slightest prominence. The enemy had retired from the last line,
and was believed to be in retreat ; but he had withdrawn in good order, and
it is known that he halted a half-mile beyond, fully prepared to repel a care-
less pursuit. The topographical feature of larger fields and intervening
woods, made the left and left-center of the battle-field more difficult for attack
than the ground about McClernand's camp, as was illustrated by the battle
of the previous day. The antagonists, except when in immediate contact,
were kept at a greater distance apart, and were more screened from the
observation of each other. The resistance, quelled for the moment, would
be renewed unexpectedly by reinforcements or on a new line with increased
vigor, and did not always allow the assailant to retain the advantage he
had gained.
Nelson and Crittenden were working their way step by step over this diffi-
cult ground, when the cheers of victory commenced on the right where the
enemy could be better observed. It was my misfortune to know nothing
about the topography in front, and when at that moment the enemy on the
left was found to be yielding readily to our advance, it was my mistake to
suppose that the retirement was more precipitate and disordered than proved
to be the case. On that supposition Nelson was ordered rapidly to the lower
ford of Lick Creek, by which I supposed a part of the enemy had advanced
and would retreat, and was thus out of position for the state of the case as it
turned out. The last attack of Crittenden was made through thick woods,
and his division had become a good deal scattered ; but a brigade of Wood's
division came up just then and was pushed forward on the eastern Corinth
road. It soon came upon and engaged the enemy's skirmishers, and was
attracting a flank fire from a battery a considerable distance off on the right.
The orderly withdrawal of the enemy was now discovered, and indicated
that a single brigade unsupported would be insufficient for a pursuit. Wood's
brigade was therefore halted while its skirmishers occupied the enemy's
cavalry, and orders were sent to McCook and Crittenden to form on the new
line. Just at that moment a feeble column was seen to the right and rear of
Wood's brigade, moving in a direction which would bring it into the flank
fire of the enemy's artillery on the right. I therefore ordered it to be halted
until other dispositions were made ; but, misapprehending the object of the
order, or deeming perhaps that enough had been done for one day, it with-
drew altogether, and, like the rest of Grant's troops, retired to its camp.
Following the same example, and most probably with General Grant's
authority, McCook's division had started to the river. Before these mis-
conceptions could be corrected, and my divisions got into position, night
came on, and the time for a further forward movement passed for the day.
Indeed, while my troops were being called up, I received from General Grant,
who had retired to the landing, the following letter :
" Headquarters Dist. of W. Tenn., Pittsburg, April 7, 1862. Major-General D. C. Buell.
Gen. : When I left the field this evening, my intention was to occupy the most advanced
SHILOH REVIEWED. 533
position possible for the night, with the infantry engaged through the day, and follow up our
success with cavalry and fresh troops expected to arrive during my last absence on the field.
The great fatigue of our men — they having been engaged in two days' fight, and subject to a
march yesterday and a fight to-day — woidd preclude the idea of making any advance to-night
without the arrival of the expected reinforcements. My plan, therefore, will be to feel out in
the morning, with all the troops on the outer lines, until our cavalry force can be organized
(one regiment of your army will finish crossing soon), and a sufficient artillery and infantry
support to follow them are ready for a move. Under the instructions which I have previously
received, and a dispatch also of to-day from Major-General Halleck, it will not then do to
advance beyond Pea Ridge, or some point which we can reach and return in a day. General
Halleck will probably be here himself to-morrow. Instructions have been sent to the division com-
manders not included in your command, to be ready in the morning either to find if an enemy
was in front, or to advance. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. Grant, Major-General Commanding."
This letter implies the hypothesis expressed also in General Grant's dis-
patch of the same evening to General Halleck, that the enemy might still be
in onr front with the intention of renewing the attack. I make no comment
on that point further than to contrast it with the later pretensions with
which the battle has been reviewed by General Grant and his friends. The
idea is again indicated in his orders to his division commanders on the 8th:
" I have instructed Taylor's cavalry to push out the road toward Corinth to ascertain if the
enemy have retreated. . . . Should they be retreating, I want all the cavalry to follow them."
Something in the same vein, which I would by no means be understood as
dwelling upon censoriously, is seen in a dispatch of the next day to Halleck.
" I do not " [he says] " like to suggest, but it appears to me that it would be demoralizing
upon our troops here to be forced to retire upon the opposite bank of the river, and unsafe to
remain on this many weeks without large reinforcements."
The passage is chiefly noteworthy as showing that the fault of Shiloh was
not in an excess of rashness or contempt for the adversary, and that the les-
son of the occasion had not yet pointed out a means of security other than
in reinforcements or retreat. The introduction of the evidence is not to be
ascribed to any motive of disparagement. It is entirely pertinent to the sub-
ject under consideration.
General Grant has recently admitted that a pursuit ought to have been
made, and vaguely intimates that somebody else than himself was responsible
that it was not done. The reason given in his letter to me is, of course, insuf-
ficient. General McCook may have told him that his men were hungry and
tired ; but if the order had been issued, both McCook and his troops would
cheerfully have shown how much tired and hungry soldiers can do when an
emergency demands it. If General Grant meant to imply that I was respon-
sible that the pursuit was not made, I might perhaps answer that it is
always to be expected that the chief officer in command will determine the
course to be pursued at such a juncture, when he is immediately upon the
ground ; but I inwardly imposed upon myself the obligation of employing
the army under my command as though the whole duty of the occasion
rested upon it. There was no doubt in my mind or hesitation in my conduct
as to the propriety of continuing the action, at least as long as the enemy
534
SHILOH REVIEWED.
SCENE IN A UNION FIEUD-HOSPITAL.
was hi our presence, as I considered him still to be ; and I make no attempt
to excuse myself or blame others when I say that General Grant's troops, the
lowest individual among them not more than the commander himself, appear
to have thought that the object of the battle was sufficiently accomplished
when they were reinstated in their camps ; and that in some way that idea
obstructed the reorganization of my line until a further advance that day
became impracticable.
Much harsh criticism has been passed upon General Lew Wallace for hav-
ing failed to reach the field in time to participate in the battle on Sunday.
The naked fact is apt to be judged severely, and the reports made a year
afterward by General Grant's staff-officers — the report of Colonel Rawlins
especially — are calculated to increase the unfavorable impression. But some
qualification of that evidence must be made, on account of the anxiety pro-
duced in the minds of those officers by their peculiar connection with the
exciting circumstances of the battle. The statement of Rawlins is particu-
larly to be received with reservation. They found Wallace on a different
road from the one by which they expected him, and assumed that he was
wrongfully there. Rawlins pretends to give the words of a verbal order that
would have taken him to a different place. Wallace denies that version of
the order, and the circumstances do not sustain it. [See page 607.] He was
SHILOH REVIEWED. 535
on the roacl to and not far from the upper ford of Owl Creek, which would
have brought him on the right flank of the Federal line, as it was in the
morning, and as he presumed it still to be. It would have been at least an
honest if not a reasonable interpretation of the order, that took him to a
point where the responsibility and danger were liable to be greatly increased.
The impression of Major Rowley, repeated more strongly by General Grant
in his " Century " article, that when found he was farther from the battle-field
than when he started, the map shows to have been incorrect. The statement
of Rawlins, that he did not make a mile and a half an hour, is also not correct
of the whole day's march. He actually inarched nearly 15 miles in six hours
and a half. That is not particularly rapid inarching, but it does not indicate
any loitering. At the same time it must be said that, under the circum-
stances, the manner in which the order was given to Wallace is liable to
unqualified disapproval, both as it concerned the public interest and the
good name of the officer.
To these qualifying facts it must be added that a presumption of honest
endeavor is due to Wallace's character. He did good service at Donelson,
and at Shiloh on the 7th, and on no other occasion have his zeal and courage
been impugned. The verdict must perhaps remain that his action did not
respond to the emergency as it turned out, but that might fall far short of a
technical criminality, unless under a more austere standard of discipline than
prevailed at that, or indeed at any other period of the war. If he had moved
energetically after McPherson and Rawlins arrived and informed him of the
urgency of the occasion, no just censure could be cast upon his conduct.
The reports of those officers imply that he did not do so ; but McPherson,
who was more likely to be correct, is least positive on that point. It would
probably be easy in any of the armies to point to similar examples of a lack
of ardent effort which led to grave disappointment without being challenged,
and to many more that would have been attended with serious consequences
if any emergency had arisen. It was a defect in the discipline which it was
not possible at that time to remedy completely.
When this article was urged upon me by the recent revival of the discus-
sion, I was advised by friends in whose judgment I have great confidence, to
write an impersonal account of the battle. The idea was perfectly in har-
mony with my disposition, but a moment's reflection showed me that it was
impracticable. It would ignore the characteristics which have made the bat-
tle of Shiloh the most famous, and to both sides the most interesting of the
war. The whole theme is full of personality. The battle might be called,
almost properly, a personal one. It was ushered in by faults that were per-
sonal, and the resistance that prolonged it until succor came was personal.
This does not pretend to be a history of it, but only a review of some of the
prominent facts which determined its character and foreshadowed its result.
Even this fragmentary treatment of the subject would be incomplete without
a revision of the roll of honor. The task is not difficult, for the evidence is
not meager or doubtful. It says of McClernand, that, crippled at the start by
536 SHILOH REVIEWED.
the rudeness of the unexpected attack and the wreck of the division in his front,
before he had time well to establish his line, he struggled gallantly and long
with varying fortune to keep back the columns of the enemy; and though he
failed in that, he was still able to present an organized nucleus which
attracted the disrupted elements of other divisions: of Hurlbut, that he posted
the two brigades under his immediate command, not in the strongest manner
at first, but with judgment to afford prompt shelter to the defeated division
of Prentiss, and maintained his front with some serious reverses to his left
flank, for 7 hours and until his left was turned, with a greater list of mor-
tality than any other division sustained : of W. H. L. Wallace, that, never
dislodged, he sacrificed his life in a heroic effort with Prentiss to maintain his
front between the enemy and the landing : of Prentiss, that with the rawest
troops in the army his vigilance gave the earliest warning of the magnitude
of the danger, and offered a resolute resistance to its approach ; that, though
overwhelmed and broken in advance, he rallied in effective force on the line
of Hurlbut and Wallace, and firmly held his ground until completely sur-
rounded and overpowered : and of Sherman, that he, tob, strove bravely, but
from an early hour with a feeble and ineffective force1, to stay the tide of dis-
aster for which his shortcoming in the position of an advanced guard was
largely responsible ; but it discloses no fact to justify the announcement of
General Halleck that he "saved the fortune of the day on the 6th." On the
contrary it shows, that, of all the division commanders, not one was less enti-
tled to that distinction. This will be a strange and may seem like a harsh utter-
ance to many readers, but it is the verdict of the record. The similar indorsement
of General Grant a year later, that "he held the key-point to the landing," is
equally alien to the evidence, and still further without intelligent meaning.
If the key-point was any other than the landing itself, it was on the left
where the attack was strongest and the resistance longest maintained.
Into the list of brave men in the inferior grades — captains and even lieu-
tenants who for the moment led the wrecks of regiments and brigades, and
field-officers who represented brigades and divisions, and who poured out
their lives on the field or survived its carnage — I cannot here pretend to
enter, though it is a most interesting chapter in the battle.
And of Grant himself — is nothing to be said ? The record is silent and
tradition adverse to any marked influence that he exerted upon the fortune
of the day. The contemporaneous and subsequent newspaper accounts of
personal adventure are alike destitute of authenticity and dignity. If he
could have done anything in the beginning, he was not on the ground in
time. The determining act in the drama was completed by 10 o'clock. From
Sherman's report and later reminiscences we learn that he was with that
officer about that hour, and again, it would seem, at 3 and 5 o'clock, and he
was with Prentiss between 10 and 11 ; but he is not seen anywhere else in
front. We read of some indefinite or unimportant directions given without
effect to straggling bodies of troops in rear. That is all. But he was one of
the many there who would have resisted while resistance could avail. That
is all that can be said, but it is an honorable record.
Airdrie, Kentucky, June, 1885.
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT SHILOH.
537
THE SKIRMISHING IN SHERMAN'S FRONT.
Robert W. Medkirk, of Co. E, 72d Ohio Vols.,
wrote, March 22d, 1886, from Indianapolis, Ind. :
" On Friday afternoon, April 4th, two days before the
battle of Shiloh, while our regiment of Bucklantl's bri-
gade was drilling on the west side of Rea Creek {see map,
paw 502], about a mile from our camp, rapid firing was
heard from the direction of our brigade pickets, from
the 70th Ohio, Colonel Cockerill. Our commander, Ma-
jor Crockett, was conversing with Colonel Bucklaud,
who soon rode rapidly in the direction of the firing.
Major Crockett ordered the regiment to double-quick
toward the outposts. When we arrived at the picket
post, we found that it had been captured. Major Crock-
ett, with part of our regiment, started in pursuit of the
enemy. In a little while a soldier came back, out of
breath, and asked that the rest of the regiment be seut
to the major's aid. Then we heard the roar of artillery,
and felt that the enemy was there in force. Colonel
Cockerill sent an orderly back to camp, with orders
for the 70th Ohio to hurry out to the front. The
remainder of our regiment pushed on to the assistance
of Major Crockett. After wandering in the woods for
a time, night came on, and \vre returned to the outpost.
There wre found the 70th Ohio, and General Sherman
with them. The general was enraged at what he desig-
nated indiscreet conduct, and ordered us all back to
camp. That portion of the 72d Ohio which had been
with Major Crockett came straggling in. Then it was
that we learned of the capture of the major and eight
men.
" The nest day, Saturday, my company, ' E,' and Com-
pany 'C constituted the brigade picket. We were
stationed on the east side of the Howell farm [see page
502]. All day the enemy kept in oar front. We tired
on them frequently, but they did not return the fire
until toward evening, when they had a brush with a
squadron of the 5th Ohio Cavalry. Late Saturday after-
noon, a Confederate officer witli his staff rode up on a
knoll on the west side of the Howell farm, and with his
glass began to take observations; in a few minutes we
opened fire on them and they rode rapidly away. To
show that no serious attack was expected, a detail from
Colonel Buckland's brigade worked all day Saturday,
April 5th, building two bridges in front of Buckland's
brigade, one over the east branch of Oak Creek and
one over the west branch of Rett Creek, which bridges
were used by the enemy to cross their artillery on Sun-
day, after our brigade fell back from its first line."
General Sherman's report of the affair of April
4th to Grant's headquarters, written on the 5th,
says: " I infer that the enemy is in some consid-
erable force at Pea Ridge," or Monterey, about
eight miles from Shiloh Church. — Editors.
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT SHILOH,
The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official
Records. K stands for killed ; w for wounded ; in w for mortally wounded ; in fur captured or missing ; c for captured.
THE UNION ARMY.
ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE.— Brigadier-General Ulysses S. Grant.
fikst division, Major-Gen. John A. McClernand. Staff
loss : w, 2.
First Brigade, Col. A. M. Hare (w), Col. M. M. Crocker:
8th 111., ('apt. James M. Ashmore (w), Capt. William H.
Harvey (k),Capt. R. H. Sturgess ; 18th 111., Major Samuel
Eaton (W), Capt. Daniel H. Brush fw), (apt. William J.
Dillon (k), Capt. J.J.Anderson; 11th Iowa, Lieut.-Col.
William Hall; 13th Iowa, Col. Marcellus M. Crocker;
Battery D, 2d 111. Artillery, Capt. James P. Timony.
Brigade loss : k, 104 ; w, 467 ; m, 9 = 580. Second Brigade,
Col. C. Carroll Marsh : 11th 111., Lieut.-Col. T. E. G. Ran-
som (W), Major Garrett Nevins (w), Capt. Lloyd D.
Waddell, Major Garrett Nevins ; 20th 111., Lieut.-Col.
Evan Richards (w), Capt. Orton Frisbie ; 45th 111., Col.
John E. Smith ; 48th 111., Col. Isham N. Haynie (w), Maj.
Manning Mayfleld. Brigade loss : k, 80 ; w, 475; m, 30 =
585. Third Brigade, Col. Julius Raith (m w), Lieut.-
Col. Enos P. Wood, Col. C. Carroll Marsh: 17th 111.,
Lieut.-Col. Enos P. Wood, Maj. Francis M. Smith; 29th
111., Lieut.-Col. Charles M. Ferrell; 43d 111., Lieut.-Col.
Adolph Engelmaun ; 49th 111., Lieut.-Col. Phincas Pease;
Company 111. Cavalry, Capt. E. Carmichael. Brigade
loss: k,96; \v,393; m, 46 =535. Unattached: Stewart's Co.
III. Cav., Lieut. Ezra King; D, 1st HI. Artillery, Capt.
Edwa ill McAllister (wi ; E, 2d HI. Artillery, Lieut. George
L. Nispel; 14th Ohio Battery, Capt. J. B. Burrows (w).
Unattached loss : k, 5 ; w, 35 = 40
second division, Brig.-Gen. W. H. L. Wallace (in w),
Col. James M. Tattle. Staff loss : w, 1.
First Brigade, Col. James M. Tuttle: 2d Iowa, Lieut.-
Col. James Baker ; 7th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. James C. Parrott ;
12th Iowa, Col. Joseph J. Woods (w), Capt. Samuel R.
Edgington ; 14th Iowa, Col. William T. Shaw. Brigade
loss : k, 39 ; w, 143 ; m, 676 = 858. (A number of the captured
or missing were also wounded.) Second Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. John McArthur (w), Col. Thomas Morton: 9th 111.,
Col. August Mersy; 12th 111., Lieut.-Col. Augustus L.
Chetlaiu, Capt. James R. Hugunin ; 81st Ohio, Col.
Thomas Morton; 13th Mo., Col! Crafts J. Wright; 14th
Mo. (Birge's Sharp-shooters), Col. B. S. Compton. Bri-
gade loss : k, 99; w, 470; m, 11 = 580. Third Brigade, Col.
Thomas W. Sweeny (w), Col. Silas D. Baldwin : 8th Iowa,
Col. James L. Geddes (w and c) ; 7th HI., Maj. Richard
Rowctt; 50th 111., Col. Moses M. Bane (w); 52d 111., Maj.
Henry Stark, Capt. Edwin A. Bowen; 57th 111., Col. Silas
D. Baldwin, Lieut.-Col. F. J. Hurlbut ; 58th 111., Col.
William F. Lynch (c). Brigade loss : k, 127 ; w, 501 ; m,
019= 1247. (A number of the captured or missing were
also wounded.) Cavalry : C, 2d, and I, 4th U. 8., Lieut.
James Powell; A andB, 2d 111., Capt's John R. Hotaling
and Thomas J. Larrison. Cavalry loss: k, 1; w, 5 = 6.
Artillery: A, 1st 111., Lieut. Peter P. Wood; D, 1st Mo.,
(apt. Henry Richardson; H, 1st Mo., Capt. Frederick
Welker ; K, 1st Mo., Capt, George H. Stone. Artillery
loss : k, 4 ; w, 53 = 57.
thiijd division, Major-General Lew Wallace.
First Brigade, Col. Morgan L. Smith : 11th Ind., Col.
G. F. McGinnis ; 24th Ind., Col. Alvin P. Hovey ; 8th Mo.,
Lieut.-Col. James Peckham. Brigade loss : k, 18; w, 114 =
132. Second Brigade, Col. John M. Thayer : 23d Ind., Col.
W. L. Sanderson; 1st Neb., Lieut.-Col. William D. McCord ;
5fith Ohio (at Crump's Landing), Col. Peter Kinney ; 58th
Ohio, Col. Valentine Bausenwein. Brigade loss: k, 20;
w, 99; m, 3= 122. Third Brigade, Col. Charles Whittle-
sey : 20th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Manning F. Force; 68th Ohio
(at Crump's Landing), Col. S. H. S teed in an ; 76th Ohio,
Col. Charles R. Woods ; 78th Ohio, Col. M. D. Leggett.
Brigade loss : k, 2 ; w, 32 ; m, 1 = 35. A rtillery: 9th Ind.
Battery, Capt. N. S.Thompson; 1,1st Mo., Lieut. Charles
H. Thurber. Artillery loss : k, 1 ; w. 6= 7. Cavalry : 3d
Battalion, 11th 111., Maj. James F. Johnson ; 3d Battalion,
5th Ohio, Maj. C. S. Hayes.
FOURTH division, Brig-Gen. Stephen A. Hurlbut.
First Brigade, Col. N. G. Williams (w), Col. Isaac C.
Pugh : 28th 111 , Col. A. K. Johnson ; 32d 111., Col. John
Logan (w) ; 41st 111., Col. Isaac C. Pugh, Lieut.-Col.
Ansel Tupper (k), Maj. John Warner, Capt, John H.
Nale; 3d Iowa, Maj. William M. Stone (c), Lieut- G. W.
S38
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT SHILOH.
Crosley. Brigade loss: k, 112; w, 532; in, 43=687.
Second Brigade, Col. James C. Veatch: 14th 111., Col.
Cyrus Hall; 15th 111., Lieut.-Col. E. F. W. Ellis (k), Capt.
Louis D. Kelley, Lieut.-Col. William Cam; 46th 111., Col.
Jolm A. Davis (\v), Lieut.-Col. Jons J. Jones; 25th Ind.,
Lieut.-Col. William II. Morgan (w), Maj. JohnW. Foster.
Brigade loss: k, 130; w, 492; m, 8= 630. Third Brigade,
Brig.-Geu. Jacob G. Lauman: 31st Ind., Col. Charles
Cruft (w), Lieut. -Col. John Osborn; 44th Ind., Col. Hugh
B. Reed; 17th Ky., Col. John II. Mellenry, Jr.; 25th Ky.,
Lieut.-Col. B. H. Bristow, Maj. Win. B. Wall (w), Col.
John H. Mellenry, Jr. Brigade loss: k, 70; w, 384; in,
4 = 458. Cavalry: 1st and 2d Battalions, 5th Ohio, Col.
W. H. H. Taylor. Loss: k, 1: w, 6 = 7. Artillery: 2d
Mich. Battery, Lieut. C. W. Laing; Mann's Mo. Battery,
Lieut. Edward Brotzniann ; 13th Ohio Battery, Capt.
John B. Myers. Artillery loss : k, 4 ; w, 27 ; m, 56 = 87.
fifth division, Brig.-Gen. William T. Sherman (wi.
Staff loss: w, 1.
First Brigade, Col. Johu A. McDowell : 40th 111., Col.
Stephen G. Hicks (w), Lieut.-Col. James W. Boothe; 6th
Iowa, Capt. John Williams (w), Capt. Madison M.
Waldeu ; 46th Ohio, Col. Thomas Worthington ; 6th Iud.
Battery, Capt. Frederick Behr (k). Brigade loss: k,
137; w, 444; in, 70 = 651. Second Brigade, Col. David
Stuart (w), Lieut.-Col. Oscar Malmborg (temporarily),
Col. T. Kilby Smith : 55th 111., Lieut.-Col. Oscar Malm-
borg; 54th Ohio, Col. T. Kilby Smith, Lieut.-Col. James
A. Farden ; 71st Ohio. Col. Rodney Masou. Brigade loss:
k, 80; w, 380; m, 90 = 550. Third Brigade, Col. Jesse
Hildebrand : 53d Ohio, Col. J. J. Appier, Lieut.-Col.
Robert A.Fultou; 57th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Americas V.
Rice; 77th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Wills De Hass, Maj. Benja-
min D. Fearing. Brigade loss: k, 70; w, 222 ; m, 65 =
356. Fourth Brigade, Col. Ralph Backhand : 48th Ohio,
Col. Peter J. Sullivan ( w), Lieut.-Col. Job R. Parker ; 70th
Ohio, Col. Joseph R. Cockerill ; 72d Ohio, Lieut.-Col.
Herman Cautield (k), Col. Ralph P. Buckland. Brigade
loss: k, 36; w, 203; m, 74 = 313. Cavalry: 1st and 2d
Battalions, 4th 111., Col. T. Lyle Dickey. Cavalry loss:
w, 6. Artillery, Maj. Ezra Taylor : B, 1st 111., Capt. Sam-
uel E, Barrett ; E, 1st 111., Capt. A. C. Waterhouse <w),
Lieut. A. R. Abbott (w), Lieut. J. A. Fitch. Artillery
loss : k, 2 ; w, 22 = 24.
sixth division, Brig.-Gen. Benjamin M. Prentiss (c).
Staff loss: k, l ; in, 2 =3.
First Brigade, Col. Everett Peabody (k) : 12th Mich.,
Col. Francis Quinn ; 21st Mo., Col. David Moore (w),
Lieut.-Col. II. M. Woodyard; 25th Mo., Col. Robert T.
Van Horn; 16th Wis., Col. Benjamin Allen (w). Brigade
loss: k, 113; w, 372; m, 236= 721. Second Brigade, Col.
Madison Miller (c) : 61st 111., Col. Jacob Fry; 16th Iowa,
Col. Alexander Chambers (wi, Lieut.-Col A. H. Sanders;
18th Mo., Lieut.-Col. Isaac V. Pratt (C). Brigade loss : k,
44; w, 228; m, 178=450. Cavalry: nth 111. (8 co's), Col.
Robert G. Ingersoll. Cavalry loss : k, 3 ; w, 3 = 6. Artil-
lira: 1st Minn Battery, Capt. Emil Munch (w), Lieat.
William Pfaender; 5th Ohio Battery, Capt. A. Hicken-
looper. Artillery loss : k. 4; w, 27 = 31. Unattached In-
fantry: 15th Iowa, Col. Hugh T. Reid ; 23d Mo., Col.
Jacob T. Tindall (k), Lieat. -Col. Quin Mortoa (c);
18th Wis., Col. James S. Alban (k). Loss Unattached
Infantry: k, 71; w, 298; in, 592 = 961. (Some of the
captured or missing [1008] of this division were also
wounded. )
unassigned troops : 15th Mich., Col. John M. Oliver ;
14th Wis., Col. David E. Wood; H, 1st 111. Artillery,
(apt. Axel Silf versparre ; I, 1st 111. Artillery, Capt. Ed-
ward Bouton ; B, 2d 111. Artillery, Capt. Relly Madison ;
F, 2d 111. Artillery, ('apt. John W. Powell (w) ; 8th Ohio
Battery, Capt. Louis Markgraf. Loss uuassigned troops :
k, 39 ; w, 159 ; m, 17 = 215. The total loss of the Army of
the Tennessee was 1513 killed, 6601 wounded, aud 2830
captured or missing = 10,944.
UNION GUN-BOATS. Tyler, Lieut. -Com. William
Gwin ; Lexington, Lieut. -Com. James W. Shirk.
ARMY OF THE OHIO-
second division. Brig.-Gen. Alexander McD. McCook.
Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau: 6th
Ind., Col. Thomas T. Crittenden; 5th Ky., Col. H. M.
Buckley; 1st Ohio, Col. B.F. Smith; 1st Battalion, 15th U.
S. (Capt, Peter T. Swainej, and 1st Battalion, 16th U. S.
(Capt, Edwin F. Townsend), Major Johu H. King; 1st
Battalion, 19th U. S., Maj. S. D. Carpenter. Brigade loss :
k. 28; w, 280; m, 3=311. Fifth Brigade, Col. Edward N.
Kirk (w) : 34th 111., Maj. Charles N. Levauway (k), Capt.
Hiram W. Bristol ; 29th Ind., Lieut.-Col. David M. Dunn;
30th Ind., Col. Sion S. Bass (m w), Lieut.-Col. Joseph B.
Dodge; 77th Pa., Col. Fred. S. Stumbaugh. Brigadeloss:
k, 21 ; w, 310 ; in, 2 = 346. Sixth Brigade, Col. William H.
Cibson: 32d Ind., Col. August Wiilich ; 39th Ind., Col.
Thomas J. Harrison: 15th Ohio, Maj. William Wallace:
49th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Albert M. Blackmail. Brigade loss :
k, 25 ; w, 220 ; in, 2 =247, Artillery : II, 5th U. S., Capt,
William R. Terrill. Artillery loss : k, 1 ; w, 13 = 14.
FOURTH division, Brig.-Gen. William Nelson.
Tenth Brigade, Col. Jacob Amines : 36th Ind., Col.
William Grose ; 6th Ohio. Lieut.-Col. Nicholas L. Ander-
son; 24th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Frederick C. Jones. Brigade
loss: k, 16; w, lo»; m, 8 = 130. Nineteenth Brigade, Col.
William B. Hazen : 9th Ind.. Col. Gideon C. Moody; 6th
Ky., Col. Walter C. Whitaker; 41st Ohio, Lieut.-Col.
George S. Mygatt. Brigadeloss: k, 48; w, 357; m, 1 =
The total loss of the Army of the Ohio was 241 killed, 1807 wounded, and 55 captured or missing = 2103.
The grand total of Union loss was 1754 killed, 8408 wounded, and 2885 captured or missing = 13,047.
The only official statement of Grant's strength at Shiloh is on page 112, Vol. X., "Official Records," which is com-
piled from division returns of April 4th and 5th, and shows (exclusive of two regiments and one battery not reported),
an aggregate, " present for duty," of 44,895. Included, however, in these figures are such non-combatants as medi-
cal officers, quartermasters, chaplains, musicians, hospital stewards, buglers, etc., etc, Deducting from the total
above given the "present for duty" of Lew Wallace's division (7504), leaves 37,331 as the "present for duty"
(combatant and non-combatant) in Grant's army on the morning of April 6th. The actual number of effectives
is nowhere officially reported, nor do the " Official Records " afford any information as to the number of men
brought by Buell to Grant's assistance, General Buell speaks in a general way of "25,000 re-enforcements," in-
eluding " Lew Wallace's 5000." General Grant says : " At Shiloh, the effective strength of the Union forces on the
morning of the 6th was 33,000 men. Lew Wallace brought 5000 more after nightfall. . . . Excluding the troops who
fled, panic-stricken, before they had fired a shot, there was not a time during the 6th when we h""1 more than
Major-General Dou Carlos Buell.
406. Twenty-second Brigade, Col. Sanders D. Bruce : 1st
Ky., Col. David A. Enyart ; 2d Ky., Col. Thomas D.
Sedgewick ; 20th Ky., Lieut.-Col. Charles S. Hanson.
Brigade loss : k, 29 ; w, 138 ; m, 11= 178. Cavalry : 2d Ind.
(not actively engaged), Lieut.-Col. Edward M. McCook.
fifth division, Brig.-Geu. Thomas L. Crittenden.
Eleventh Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Jeremiah T. Boyle: 9th
Ky., Col. Benjamin C. Grider; 13th Ky., Col. Edward
II. Hobson ; 19th Ohio, Col. Samuel Beatty ; 59th Ohio,
Col. James P. Fyffe. Brigade loss : k, 33 ; w, 212; m, 18=
263. Fourteenth Brigade, Col. William Sooy Smith : 11th
Ky.. Col. Pierce B. Hawkins; 26th Ky., Lieut.-Col.
Cicero Maxwell; 13th Ohio, Lieut. -Col. Joseph G. Haw-
kins. Brigade loss: k, 25; w, 157; m, 10=192. Artil-
lery : G, 1st Ohio, Capt. Joseph Bartlett ; II and M. 4th
U.S., Capt. John Mendenhall. Artillery loss: k, 2; w,
8 = 10. Cavalry : 3d Ky. (not actively engaged), Col.
James S. Jackson.
sixth division, Brig.-Geu. Thomas J. Wood.
Twentieth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. James A. Garfield: 13th
Mich., Col. Michael Shoemaker ; 64th Ohio, Col. John
Ferguson ; 65th Ohio, Col. Charles G. Harker. Twenty-
first Brigade, Col. George D. AVaguer: 15th Ind., Lieut.-
Col. Gustavus A. Wood ; 40th Ind.. Col. John W. Blake ;
57th Ind., Col. Cyrus C. Ilines; 24th Ky., Col. Lewis B.
Grigsby. Brigadeloss: w, 4.
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT SHILOH.
S39
25,000 men inline. On the 7th Buell brought 20,000 more (Nelson's, Crittenden's, and McCook's divisions). Of his
remaining two divisions Thomas's did not reach the held during the engagement : Wood's arrived before firing
had ceased, but not in time to be of much service." General M. F. Force, in •• From Fort Henry to Corinth"
(Charles Scribner's Sons), says: "The reinforcements of Monday numbered, of Buell's army about 25,000; Lew
Wallace's 6500; other regiments about 1400." General Lew Wallace says in his report that his command "did not
exceed 5000 men of all arms."
THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.
ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI.— General Albert Sidney Johnston do. General G. T. Beauregard.
FIRST ARMY CORPS.— Major-Gen. Leonidas Folk.
first division, Brig. -Gen. Charles Clark (w), Brig.-
Gen. Alexander P. Stewart, staff loss: w, l.
First Brigade, Col. R. M. Russell: 11th La., Col. S. F.
Marks iw), Lieut. -Col. Robert II. Barrow; 12th Tenn.,
Lieut.-Col. T. H. Bell, Major R. P. Caldwell; 13th Teuu.,
Col. A. J. Vaughan, Jr.; 22d Tenn., Col. T. J. Freeman
(w); Tenn. Battery, Capt. Smith P. Bankhead. Brigade
loss: k, 97 ; w, 512 =609. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alex-
ander P. Stewart: 13th Ark., Lieut.-Col. A. D. Grayson
(k), Major James A. McNeely (wi. Col. J. C. Tappan; 4th
Tenn.,' Col. R. P. Neely, Lieut.-Col. O. F. Strahl; 5th
Tenn., Lieut.-Col. C. P. Venable; 33d Tenn., Col. Alex-
ander W. Campbell (w) ; Miss. Battery, Capt. T. J. Stan-
ford. Brigade loss : k, 93 ; w, 121 ; in, 3 = 517.
SECONi" division, Major-Cen. B. F. Cheatham (w).
Staff loss : w, 1.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson (wi.
( !oi. Preston Smith (w) : Blythe's Miss., Col. A. K. Blythe
(k), Lieut.-Col. D. L. Herron (k). Major James Moore; 2d
Tenn., Col. J. Knox Walker; 15th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. R.
C. Tyler (w), Major John F. Beam; 154th Tenn. (senior),
Col. Prestou Smith, Lieut.-Col. Marcus J. Wright; Tenn.
Battery, Capt. Marshall T. Polk (w). Brigade loss: k,
120; w, 607; m, 13 = 740. Second Brigade, Col. William
H. Stephens, Col. G( orge Maney : 7th Ky.. Col. Charles
Wickliffe (m. W), Lieut.-Col. W. 1). Lannoni ; 1st Tenn.
(battalion), Col. George Maney. Major H. R. Field ; 6th
Tenn., Lieut.-Col. T. P. Jones. Col. W. II. Stephens ; 91 h
Tenn., Col. II. L. Douglass ; Miss. Battery, Capt. Melanc-
thon Smith. Brigade loss: k, 75 ; w, 413; in, 3=491. Cae-
alry: 1st Miss., Col. A. J. Lindsay; Miss, and Ala. Bat-
la lion, Lieut.-Col. R.H. Brewer. Cavalry loss: k, 5; w, 12;
m,2 = l9. Unattached: 47th Tenn., Col. M. R. Hill.
SECOND ARMY CORPS. Major-Gen. Braxton Bragg.
Escort: Alabama. Cavalry, Capt. R. W. Smith.
first division-, Brig.-Gen. Daniel Ruggles. First
Brigade, Col. Randall L. Gibson: 1st Ark., Col. James
P. Pagan; 4th La.. Col. II. W. Allen (w), Lieut.-Col. s.
E. Hunter; 13th La.. Major A. P. Avegno mi w), (apt.
S. O'Leary nvi, (apt. E. M. Dubroea; 19th La., Col. Ben-
jamin L. Hodge, Lieut, (ol. .1. M. Hollingsworth. Bri-
gade loss: k, 97; w, 488; m, 97=682. Second Brigade,
Brig.-Geh. Patton Anderson : 1st Fla. Battalion, Major T.
A. McDonell (w), Capt. W. c. Poole, Capt. W C. Bird;
17th La., Lieut.-Col. Charles Jones (w); 20th La., Col.
August Reichard; 9th Texas, Col. W. A. Stanley; Con-
federate Guards Response Battalion. Major Franklin
H. Clack; 5th Company Washington (La.) Artillery,
Capt. W. I. Hodgson. Brigade loss: k, 69; w, 313; m,
52 = 434. Third Brigade, Col. Preston Pond, Jr.: 16th
La,, Maj. Daniel Gober; 18th La., Col. Alfred Monton
(w), Lieut.-Col. A. Roman; Crescent (La.) Regt,, Col.
Marshall J. Smith; Orleans Guard Battalion. Major
Leon Querouze iw) ; 38th Tenn., Col. R. F. Looney ; Ala.
[lattery, Capt. ffm. H. Ketchum. Brigade loss: k, 89;
w, 336 : m, 169= 594. Cavalry : Ala. Battalion, Capt. T.
F. Jenkins. Cavalry loss, k, 2 ; w, 6 ; m, 1 = 9.
SECOND division. Brig.-Gen. Jones M. Withers. First
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. A. H. Gladden (m w). Col. Daniel
W. Adams (w), Col. Z. C. Deas (w) : 21st Ala.. Lieut.-Col.
S. W. Cayce, Maj. F. Stewart ; 22d Ala., Col. Z. C. Deas,
Lieut.-Col. John C. Marrast : 25th Ala.. Col. J. Q. Loomis
<w), Maj. George D. Johnston; 26th Ala., Col. J. G. Col-
The total Confederate loss, as officially reported, was 1728 killed, 8012 wounded, and 959 missing =10,699.
According to a field return for April 3d, 1862 (" Official Records," Vol. X, 398), the effective strength of the Con-
federate forces that marched from Corinth was as follows: Infantry, 34,727; artillery, 1973 ; cavalry, 2073,— or an
aggregate of 38,773. The 47th Tennessee Regiment reached the field on the 7th with probably 550 men, making in
all 39,323. Another return (" Official Records," Vol. X., 396) gives the following " effective total before the battle " :
Infantry and artillery, 35,953; cavalry, 4382,— grand total, 40,335.
tart iw), Lieut.-Col. William D. Chadick; 1st La., Col.
Daniel W. Adams, Maj. F. II. Farrar, Jr.; Ala, Battery,
Capt. F. H. Robertson. Brigade loss : k, 129 ; w, 597 ; in,
103 = 829. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. James R. Chal-
mers: :.th .Miss., Col. A. E. Pant; 7th Miss., Lieut.-Col.
H. Mayson ; 9th Miss., Lieut.-Col. William A. Rankin
mi w) ; 10th Miss., Col. R. A. Smith; 52d Tenn., Col.B. J.
Lea ; Ala. Battery, Capt, Charles P. Gage. Brigade loss :
k, 83; w, 343; m, 19=445. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen.
John K. Jackson : 17th Ala,, Lieut.-Col. Robert C. Farris ;
18th Ala,, Col. Eli S. Shorter; 19th Ala., Col. Joseph
Wheeler ; 2d Tex., Col. John C. Moore, Lieut.-Col. W. P.
Rogers, Maj. H. G. Runnels; Ga. Battery, Capt, I. P.
Girardey. Brigade loss : k,86; w,364; m, 194 = 644.
THIRD ARMY CORPS, Maj. -Gen. Wm. J.Hardee (w).
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. C. Hindinan (commanded
his own and the Third Brigade), Col. R. G. Shaver: 2d
Ark., Col. D. C. Govan, Maj. R. F. Harvey; 6th Ark.,
(ul. A. T. Hawthorn; 7th Ark., Lieut.-CoL John M.
Dean (k), Maj. James T. Martin; 3d Confederate, Col.
John S. Marinaduke ; Miss. Battery, Capt. Charles
Swi tt. Brigade loss: k, 109; w, 546; m, 38 = 693. Second
Brigade. Brig.-Gen. P. R. Cleburne: 15th Ark., Lieut. -
Col. A. K. Patton (k); 6th Miss., Col. J. J. Thornton (w),
Capt. W. A. Harper; 2d Tenn.. Col. W. B.Bate (w), Lieut.-
Col. 1). L. Goodall; 5th Tenn., Col. Ben. J. Hill; 23d Tenn.,
Lieut.-Col. James F. Neill (w); 24th Tenn., Lieut.-Col.
Thomas II. Peebles; Ark. Batteries, Capts. J.T.Trigg and
J. H. Calvert. Brigade loss : k. 188 ; w, 790; in, 65 = 1043.
Third Brigade. Brig.-Gen. S. A. M. Wood, Col. W. K. Pat-
terson (temporarily) : 16th Ala,, Lieut.-Col. J. W. Harris;
8th Ark., Col. W. K. Patterson; 9th Ark. (battalion), Maj.
J. H. Kelly; 3d Miss. Battalion, Maj. A. B. Hardcastle ;
27th Tenn., Col. Chris. IT. Williams (k), Maj. Samuel T.
Love (in w) ; 44th Tenn., Col. C. A. McDaniel; 55th Teuu.,
Col. James L. McKoin ; Miss. Battery, Capt. W. L. Harper
(w), Lieut. Put. Harden : Ga. Dragoons, Capt. I.W.Avery.
Brigade loss : k, 107 ; w, 600; m, 38 = 745.
RESERVE COUPS, Brig.-Gen. John C. Breckinridge.
First Brigade. Col. Robert P. Trabue: 4th Ala. Butt..
Maj. J. M. Clifton ; 31st Ala., Lieut.-Col. Galbraith ;
3d Ky., Lieut.-Col. Ben. Anderson (w) ; 4th Ky.,
Lieut.-Col. A. R. Hypes (w) ; 5th Ky., Col. Thomas
H. Hunt; 6th Ky.. Col. Joseph H. Lewis; Tenn. Battal.
ion, Lieut.-Col. J. M. Crews; Ky. Battery, Capt. Ed-
ward P. Byrne; Ky. Battery, Capt. Robert Cobb.
Brigade loss : k, 151 ; w, 557; m, 92= 800. Second Brigade.
Brig.-Gen. John S. Boweu (w), Col. John D. Martin : 9th
Ark., Col. Isaac L. Dunlop ; 10th Ark., Col. T. D. Merrick ;
2d Confederate. Col. John D. Martin, Maj. Thomas II.
Mangum; 1st Mo., Col. Lucius L. Rich; Miss. Battery,
Capt. Alfred Hudson. Brigade hiss: k,98; w, 498; in, 28 =
624. Third Brigade, Col. W. S. Stathain : 15th Miss. ; 22d
Miss. ; 19th Tenn.. Col.D H. Cummings: 20th Tenn.. Col.
J. A. Battle (c) ; 28th Tenn. ; 45th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. E.
F. Lytle; Tenn. Battery, Capt. A M. Rutledge. Brigade
hiss: k, 137; w, 627 ; m, 45 = 809.
TROOPS NOT MENTIONED IN THE FOREGOING LIST. Cav-
alry : Tenn. Regt., Col. N. B. Forrest (w) ; Ala. Regt.,
Col. James II. Clanton; Texas Regt., Col. John A. Whar-
ton (w) ; Ky. Squadron, Capt. John H. Morgan. Artil-
lery : Ark. Battery, Capt. George T. Hubbard ; Tenn.
Battery, Capt. II. L. W. McClung.
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOHJ
BY HIS SON, WILLIAM PRESTON JOHNSTON, COLONEL, C. S. A.
D
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT THE AGE OF 35.
FROM A MINIATURE BY THOMAS CAMPBELL, PAINTED IN
LOUISVILLE, KV., IN 1633 OR 1839.
URHSTG the angry political strife which pre-
ceded the contest of arms, General Albert
Sidney Johnston § remained silent, stern, and sor-
rowful. He determined to stand at his post in
San Francisco, performing his full duty as an
officer of the United States, until events should
require a decision as to his course. When
Texas — his adopted State — passed the ordi-
nance of secession from the Union, the alterna-
tive was presented, and, on the day he heard the
news, he resigned his commission in the army.
He kept the fact concealed, however, lest it
might stir up disaffection among the turbulent
population of the Pacific Coast. He said, " I shall do my duty to the last,
and, when absolved, shall take my course." All honest and competent wit-
nesses now accord that he carried out this purpose in letter and spirit.
General Sumner, who relieved him, reported that he found him " carrying
out the orders of the Government."
Mr. Lincoln's Administration treated General Johnston with a distrust
which wounded his pride to the quick, but afterward made such amends as it
could, by sending him a major-general's commission. He was also assured
through confidential sources that he would receive the highest command in
the Federal army. But he declined to take part against his own people, and
retired to Los Angeles with the intention of farming. There he was sub-
jected to an irritating surveillance ; while at the same time there came
i For extended treatment of this subject, see
" The Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston,"
by William Preston Johnston (D. Appleton & Co.),
upon which Colonel Johnston has drawn freely in
the preparation of this paper. — Editors.
& General Johnston was of New England de-
scent, though both he and his mother were of
pioneer stock, and natives of Kentucky. His
father was the village physician. He was born
February 3d, 1803, in Mason County, Kentucky.
He was " a handsome, proud, manly, earnest, and
self-reliant boy," "grave and thoughtful." His
early education was desultory, but was continued
at Transylvania and at West Point, where he
evinced superior talents for mathematics, and was
graduated in 1826. He was a lieutenant of the
6th Infantry, from 1827 to 1834, when he re-
signed. His only active service during this period
was the Black Hawk war, in which he won consid-
erable distinction. In 1829 he married Miss Hen-
rietta Preston, who died in 1835. In 1836 he
joined the army of the young republic of Texas,
and rapidly rose to the chief command. In 1839
he was Secretary of War, and expelled the intrud-
ing United States Indians, after two battles on the
River Neches. He served one campaign in Mexico
under General Taylor, and was recommended by
that commander as a brigadier-general for his con-
duct at Monterey, but was allowed no command
by the Administration. In 1843 he married Miss
Eliza Griffin, and retired to a plantation in Brazoria
County, Texas, where he spent three years in se-
clusion and straitened circumstances. In 1849 he
was appointed a paymaster by President Taylor,
and served in Texas until 1855, when he was
made colonel of the 2d Cavalry by President
Pierce. In 1857 he conducted the remarkable
expedition to Utah, in which he saved the United
States army there from a frightful disaster by his
prudence and executive ability. He remained in
command in Utah until the summer of 1860, which
he passed with his family in Kentucky. In Decem-
ber of that year he was assigned to the command
of the Pacific Coast.— W. P. J.
540
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH.
541
across mountain and desert the voice of the Southern people calling to him
for help in their extremity. | His heart and intellect both recognized their
claim upon his services, and he obeyed. At this time he wrote, " No one
could feel more sensibly the calamitous condition of our country than my-
self, and whatever part I may take hereafter, it will always be a subject of
gratulation with me that no act of mine ever contributed to bring it about.
I suppose the difficulties now will only be adjusted by the sword. In my
humble judgment, that was not the remedy."
When he arrived in the new Confederacy, his coming was welcomed with
a spontaneous outburst of popular enthusiasm, and deputations from the
West preceded him to Richmond, entreating his assignment to that depart-
ment. President Davis said that he regarded his coming as of more worth
than the accession of an army of ten thousand men ; and on the 10th of Sep-
tember, 1861, he was intrusted with the defense of that part of the Confed-
erate States which lay west of the Alleghany Mountains, except the Gulf Coast
(Bragg having control of the coast of West Florida and Alabama, and Mans-
field Lovell of the coast of Mississippi and Louisiana). His command was
4 The following statement was written in re-
sponse to an inquiry by the editors as to the details
of the offer of high command referred to by Colo-
nel Johnston :
"The circumstances which gave rise to Hie ex-
pressed desire of the Administration in 1861 to
retain General Albert Sidney Johnston in the
Federal army were as follows :
"Early in April, 1861, while on duty in the ad-
jutant-general's office in Washington, I learned
that Colonel Sumner had been dispatched incog.
to California, with secret orders to assume com-
mand of the Department of the Pacific, and that
this unusual course had been prompted by the
fear that the forts and arsenals and garrisons
on that coast would be placed in the hands of
the secessionists by General Johnston, the then
commander, who was reported to be arranging
to do so.
" I had just received a letter from General John-
ston expressing his pleasure at the large and
handsome parade of State troops in San Fran-
cisco, on February 22d, and at the undoubted
loyalty to the Union cause of the whole Pacific
coast, and also his earnest hope that the patriotic
spirit manifested in California existed as strongly
in all other States, and would as surely be main-
tained by them as it would be in the Pacific States
in case of attempted secession.
"Fearing the effect of the superseding orders
upon a high-toned and sensitive officer, one whom
I esteemed as a brother, and earnestly desired to
be secured to our cause, I induced Major McDow-
ell to show the letter to Secretary Cameron, and
to urge every effort to keep General Johnston
from leaving the service. His superior qualifica-
tions, his influence among prominent citizens at
the South, and especially among his relatives in
his native State, Kentucky, — which it was exceed-
ingly desirable to keep in the Union, — were strong
inducements to these efforts. My desire was met
as cordially and earnestly as it existed, and I
was authorized to send, as I did through my
friend ' Ben ' Holliday, in New York, for trans-
mission by telegraph to St. Louis, and thence by
his ' pony express ' to San Francisco, the follow-
ing message : ' I take the greatest pleasure in
assuring you, for the Secretary of War, that he
has the utmost confidence in you, and will give
you the most important command and trust on
your arrival here. Sidney is appointed to the
Military Academy.' This message reached Gen-
eral Johnston after the arrival of Colonel Sumner.
"In response to the above, and by the same
channel of communication, I received this mes-
sage : ' I thank you and my friends for efforts in
my behalf. I have resigned, and resolved to follow
the fortunes of my State.' His letter of resigna-
tion was soon received, and put an end to all
hope, especially as Texas — which had then se-
ceded— was his adopted State.
" I felt in 1861, as I now know, that the asser-
tion that General Johnston intended to turn over
to the secessionists the defenses of California, or
any part of the regular army, was false and ab-
surd. Under no circumstances, even if intended,
could such a plan have succeeded, especially with
the regular army. But no such breach of trust
was intended, nor would any graduate of West
Point in the army have committed or permitted it.
It had no better foundation than the statement of
Senator Conness of California, who three years
later urged and secured the assignment of Gen-
eral McDowell to command on the Pacific coast,
on the ground that after the war for the Union
sl\ould have ended there would be in California a
more powerful rebellion than that then existing
among the Southern States.
" Fitz John Porter.
"New Yokk, December 8, 1884."
S42
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH.
GENERAL ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT THE AGE OF FIFTY-SEVEN.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN SALT LAKE CITY IN 1860.
The appearance of General Albert Sidney Johnston
before the war in described as both commanding and
attractive. In some respects the bust of Alexander
Hamilton is the best extant likeness of him, a resem-
blance very frequently remarked. His cheek-bones were
rather high, and with his nose and complexion save him
a Scotch look. His chin was delicate and handsome;
his teeth were white and regular, and his mouth was
square and firm. In the portrait by Bush taken about
this time, his lips seem rather full, but as they are
best remembered, they were somewhat thin and very
firmly set. Light-brown hair clustered over a noble
forehead, and from under heavy brows his deep-set
but clear, steady eyes looked straight at you with a
regard kind and sincere, yet penetrating. In repose his
eyes were as blue as the sky, but in excitement thej
flashed to a steel-gray, and exerted a remarkable power
over men. He was six feet and an inch in height, of
about one hundred and eighty pounds weight, straight
as an arrow, with broad, square shoulders and a mass-
ive chest. He was strong and active, and of a military
bearing.— W. P. J.
imperial in extent, and his powers and discretion as large as the theory of
the Confederate Government permitted. He lacked nothing except men,
munitions of war, and the means of obtaining them. He had the right to ask
for anything, and the State Executives had the power to withhold everything.
The Mississippi River divided his department into two distinct theaters of
war. West of the river, Fremont held Missouri with a force of from 60,000
to 80,000 Federals, confronted by Price and McCulloch in the extreme south-
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH.
543
3
_^_
-£*—^^—r
west corner of the State with 6000 men, and by Hardee, in north-eastern
Arkansas, with about as many raw recruits down with camp diseases and
unable to move. East of the Mississippi, the northern boundary of Ten-
nessee was barely* in his possession, and was held under sufferance from
an enemy who, for various reasons, hesitated to advance. The Mississippi
opened the way to a ruinous naval
invasion unless it could be de- su
fended and held. Grant was at
Cairo and Paducah with 20,000
men ; and Polk, to oppose his in-
vasion, had seized Coluinbus, Ky.,
with about 11,000 Confederates,
and had fortified it. Tennessee autograph found inside the cover of general john-
STON'S POCKET-MAP OF TENNESSEE, AND WRITTEN
was twice divided : first by the three days before the battle of shiloh—
m t-»- 1 j_1 1 - 1 PROBABLY HIS LAST AUTOGRAPH.
Tennessee River, and then by the
Cumberland, both of which invited the advance of a hostile force. Some
small pretense of fortifications had been made on both rivers at Forts Henry
and Donelson, near the boundary line, but practically there was nothing to
prevent the Federal army from capturing Nashville, then the most important
depot of supplies west of the Alleghanies. Hence the immediate and press-
ing question for General Johnston was the defense of the Tennessee border.
The mock neutrality of Kentucky, which had served as a paper barrier, was
terminated, on the 13th of September, by a formal defiance from the Union
Legislature of Kentucky. The United States Government had about 34,000
volunteers and about 0000 Kentucky Home Guards assembled in the State
under General Robert Anderson, of Fort
Sumter fame, who had with him such en-
terprising corps commanders as Sherman,
Thomas, and Nelson.
The Confederacy had some four thousand
ill-armed and ill-equipped troops at Cum-
berland Gap under General Zollicoffer,
guarding the only line of railroad com-
munication between Virginia and Tennes-
see, and overawing the Union population
of East Tennessee. This hostile section
penetrated the heart of the Confederacy
like a wedge and flanked and weakened
General Johnston's line of defense, requir-
ing, as it did, constant vigilance and
repression.
Besides Zollicoffer's force, General John-
ston found only 4000 men available to pro-
tect his ^whole line against 40,000 Federal
troops. There were, it is true, some four
thousand more raw recruits in camps of
--.
BIRTHPLACE OF ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON,
WASHINGTON, KY. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
544
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH.
jL
W si8 §[|3'I**li®;
instruction, but they were sick
and not half armed. Of course
he might have abandoned the
Mississippi Eiver to Grant and
brought Polk to his aid, but
he had no thought of that;
that would have been all which
the Federals could have asked.
The boldest policy seemed to
him the best, and he resolved
on a daring step. On Septem-
ber 17th he threw forward his
whole force of four thousand
men under Buckner by rail
into Kentucky and seized Bowling Green. It was a mere skirmish line to mask
his own weakness. But if he could maintain it, even temporarily, it gave him
immense strategic and political advantages, and, most of all, time to collect or
create an army. And then (I hold in spite of some dilettante criticism) it gave
him a formidable line, with Cumberland Gap and Columbus as the extremities
and Bowling Green as the salient.
The result more than answered his expectations. Buckner's advance pro-
duced the wildest consternation in the Federal lines. Even Sherman, writing
thirteen years later, speaks of a picket which burned a bridge thirty miles from
Louisville as a " division." As late as November 10th, 1861, he said : " If John-
ston chooses, he could march into Louisville any day." The effect of the move-
ment was for a time to paralyze the Federal army and put it on the defensive.
FORT ANDERSON, PADUCAH, IN APRIL, 1802. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.
■Jgpfei
CAMP BURGESS, BOWLING GREEN — THE 70TH INDIANA ON DRESS PARADE. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.
Oil the hill are seen the Confederate fortifications erected by General Buckner.
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH.
54*>
-^W7
wensboro .* PcrrvviHeOaniiJvpickK „
^p^ ■W.J,,.; U SSI ^ Mf v ,
^*,-lle rU»rs .Mt.Vernnn
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: / V^ „ ,. "'*-*„ . Jamestown R^vv-cd? o.- S*l'-Nf
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g Hopkinsville ^ ..■■■■ ' , S >'' f^ Springs'
• Iranklin "v ,-*V-J
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'Greenville
S / . S «.../ E imu.lon E ,-l: *£« "
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Tullahoma
• y* -aw- -v.
- .■> S ,<<J C; \
O
B
*o R r • s0Vits^
General Johnston had made the opportunity required by the South, if it
meant seriously to maintain its independence. He had secured time for prep-
aration ; but it neglected the chance, and never recovered it. He at once
strongly fortified Bowling Green, and used every measure to stir up and rally
the Kentuckians to his standard. He brought Hardee with four thousand
men from Arkansas, and kept his little force in such constant motion as to
produce the impression of a large army menacing an attack. Even before
Bnckner advanced, General Johnston had sent to the Southern governors an
appeal for arms and a call for fifty thousand men. Harris of Tennessee-
alone responded heartily, and the Government at Richmond seemed unable
to reenforce him or to arm the troops he had. Many difficulties embarrassed
it, and not half his men were armed that winter ; while up to the middle of
November he received only three new regiments. General Johnston realized
the magnitude of the struggle, but the people of the South only awoke to it
when it was too late. Calamity then stirred them to an ineffectual resist-
ance, the heroism of which removed the reproach of their early vainglory
and apathy. General Johnston never was able to assemble more than 22,000
men at Bowling Green, to confront the 100,000 troops opposed to him on
that line.
The only battle of note that occurred that fall was at Belmont, opposite
Columbus, in which Polk scored a victory over Grant. General Johnston
wrote as follows to the Secretary of War, on Christmas Day, from Bowling
Green : " The position of General Zollicoffer on the Cumberland holds in
check the meditated invasion and hoped-for revolt in East Tennessee ; but I
can neither order Zollicoffer to join me here nor withdraw any more force
from Columbus without imperiling our communications toward Richmond
VOL. I. 3g
546
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH.
n
IBIf •
n
COL. SPEED S. FRY.
DEATH OF GENERAL ZOLLICOFFER.
BATTLE OF LOGAN'S CROSS ROADS, OR MILL SPRINGS (SEE MAP, l'AGE 388). EROM A LITHOGRAPH.
or endangering Tennessee and the Mississippi Valley. This I have resolved
not to do, but have chosen, on the contrary, to post my inadequate force
in such a manner as to hold the enemy in check, guard the frontier, and
hold the Barren [River] till the winter terminates the campaign ; or, if any
fault in his movements is committed, or his lines become exposed when
his force is developed, to attack him as opportunity offers." This sums the
situation.
In January, 1862, General Johnston found himself confronted by Halleck
in the West, and by Buell, who had succeeded Sherman, in Kentucky. With
the exception of the army under Curtis in Missouri, about twelve thousand
strong, the whole resources of the North-west, from Pennsylvania to the
plains, were turned against General Johnston's lines in Kentucky. Halleck,
with armies at Cairo and Paducah, under Grant and C. F. Smith, threatened
equally Columbus, the key of the Mississippi River, and the water-lines
of the Cumberland and Tennessee, with their defenses, at Forts Donelson and
Henry. Buell's right wing also menaced Donelson and Henry, while his cen-
ter was directed against Bowling Green, and his left was advancing against
Zollicoffer at Mill Springs, on the Upper Cumberland. If this last-named
position could be forced, the way seemed open to East Tennessee on the one
hand, and to Nashville on the other.
The campaign opened with the defeat of the Confederates under Crittenden
and Zollicoffer, January 19th, 1862, by General Thomas, at Mill Springs, or
Fishing Creek. The fighting was forced by the Confederates, but the whole
affair was in disregard of General Johnston's orders. The loss was not severe,
but it ended in a rout which left General Johnston's right flank exposed.
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SH1LOH.
^47
There has been much discussion as to who originated the movement up
the Tennessee River. Grant made it, and it made Grant. It was obvious
enough to all the leaders on both sides. General Johnston wrote, January 22d :
" To suppose, with 'the facilities of movement by water which the well-filled rivers of the
Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennessee give for active operations, that they will suspend them in
Tennessee and Kentucky during- the winter months is a delusion. All the resources of the
Confederacy are now needed for the defense of Tennessee.1'
Great efforts were made to guard against it, but the popular fatuity and
apathy prevented adequate preparations. General Polk says in a report,
"The principal difficulty in the way of a successful defense of the rivers
in question was the want of an adequate force." It was only one of a number
of possible and equally fatal movements, which could not have been properly
met and resisted except by a larger force than was to be had. General John-
ston could not reduce the force at Columbus without imperiling the Missis-
sippi River, and this was not even debatable. Nor could he hazard the loss of
Nashville, if it could be saved. He was compelled, therefore, to take the risk
at Forts Henry and Donelson. The thrust was made at Henry, and it fell.
As soon as General Johnston learned of the movement against Fort Henry
he resolved to fall back to the line of the Cumberland, and make the defense
of Nashville at Donelson. Buell was in his front with 90,000 men, and to
save Nashville — Buell's objective point — he had to fall back upon it with part
of his army. He kept for this purpose 14,000 men, including his sick, — only
8500 effectives in all, — to confront Buell's 90,000 men, and concentrated at
Fort Donelson 17,000 men under Floyd, Pillow, and Buckncr, his three most
experienced generals, to meet Grant, who had 28,000 troops, but was reported
& i
m
:■'.■' !-«'' ''M. ' ft r ;
'mmv fc
m
' '"sstS
>f ■ >. . 'ri; ■■■}>.
i &5T
N*
Mi*
COLONEL SCHOEPF'S TROOPS CROSSING FISHING CREEK ON THE WAY TO JOIN GENERAL THOMAS
AT LOGAN'S CROSS ROADS, OR MILL SPRINGS. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.
S48
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SH1L0H.
as having only 12,000. He certainly reserved for himself the more difficult
task, the place of greater hazard, leaving the chance of glory to others. The
proposition that he should have left Nashville open to capture by Buell, and
should have taken all his troops to Donelson, could not have been seriously
considered by any general of even
that he urged
Beauregard
alleges
COXFEDEItATE TYPES OF 1862.
moderate military capacity. General
General Johnston to concentrate all
his available forces and
attack Grant at Fort
Henry. Conclusive con-
temporary evidence de-
monstrates that General
Beauregard's memory is
at fault. But, this aside,
no more fatal plan of
campaign could have
been proposed. Such
a concentration was im-
practicable within the
limits of the time re-
quired for success. The
Confederates would have
been met by a superior
force under General
Grant, whose position,
flanked by the batteries
of Fort Henry, covered
by gun-boats, and to be
approached only over
causeways not then con-
an utter disregard of
It requires
structed, was absolutely impregnable.
facts seriously to consider such a project. Moreover, this movement would
have been an abandonment to Buell of Nashville, the objective point of the
Federal campaign. And, finally, this desperate project, commended by Gen-
eral Beauregard, was exactly what the Union generals were striving, hoping,
planning, to compel General Johnston to do. The answer to any criticism as
to the loss of the army at Donelson is that it ought not to have been lost. That
is all there is of it.
At midnight of February 15th-16th General Johnston received a telegram
announcing a great victory at Donelson, and before daylight information
that it would be surrendered. His last troops were then arriving at Nashville
from Bowling Green. His first words were : " I must save this army." He
at once determined to abandon the line of the Cumberland, and concentrate
all available forces at Corinth, Mississippi, for a renewed struggle. He had
indicated this movement as a probable event to several distinguished officers
some time previous ; it was now to be carried into effect. He had remain-
ing only his little army from Bowling Green, together with the fragments of
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SH1L0H. 549
Crittenden's army, and the fugitives from Donelson. These he reorganized
at Murfreesboro' within a week. He saved the most of his valuable stores
and munitions, which fully absorbed his railroad transportation to Stevenson,
Alabama, and moved his men over the mud roads to Corinth, Mississippi,
by way of Decatur, in a wet and stormy season. Nevertheless, he assembled
his army of 23,000 — about 16,000 effectives — at Corinth, on the 25th day of
March, full of enthusiasm and the spirit of combat. In the meantime the
Confederate Government lent him all the aid in its power, reenforcing him
with an army ten thousand strong, from the Southern coast, under General
Braxton Bragg, who had been in command at Pensacola [see note, page 32],
and with such arms as could be procured.
General Beauregard has claimed that he raised, concentrated, and organ-
ized the army which fought at Shiloh ; that he persuaded General Johnston
to turn aside from a retreat toward Stevenson and join him at Corinth, and
substituted an offensive campaign for a defensive one projected by General
Johnston ; and that he likewise planned the battle of Shiloh, induced Gen-
eral Johnston to fight it, and executed all the general movements on the field,
and that General Johnston was merely the ostensible commander. I have
elsewhere fully confuted each of these absurd pretenses; and as this rapid
survey is historical, not controversial, the space at my disposal does not per-
mit me to argue here the points involved ; I shall, therefore, merely state the
facts, which rest upon unimpeachable contemporary evidence. The final
verdict I am satisfied to leave to the soldiers of both armies who fought there,
to the careful analysis of impartial military criticism, or to the ultimate arbit-
rament of history.
When the capture of Fort Henry separated Tennessee into two distinct
theaters of war, General Johnston assigned the district west of the Ten-
nessee River to General Beauregard, who had been sent to him for duty.
This officer had suddenly acquired a high reputation at the battle of Bull
Run, and General Johnston naturally intrusted him with a large discre-
tion. He sent him with instructions to concentrate all available forces
near Corinth, a movement previously begun. His own plan was to defend
Columbus to the last extremity with a reduced garrison, and withdraw
Polk and his army for active movements. Beauregard made the mistake,
however, of evacuating Columbus, and making his defense of the Missis-
sippi River at Island Number Ten, which proved untenable and soon sur-
rendered with a garrison of 6000 or 7000 men. He was ill most of the time
and intrusted the actual command to Bragg, but did what he could from
his sick-bed.
Besides the reinforcements brought by Bragg, General Beauregard found
in the western district 17,500 effectives under Polk, and at or near Corinth
3000 men under Pope Walker and Chalmers, and 5000 under Ruggles sent
from Louisiana by Lovell. He made eloquent appeals, which brought him
several regiments more. Thus he had nearly 40,000 men collected for him,
10,000 of whom he disposed in river defenses, and the remainder to pro-
tect the railroads from Grant's force which was concentrating at Pittsburg
5 so ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SH1L0H.
Landing. General Johnston's arrival increased the force at Corinth to abont
50,000 men, abont 40,000 of whom were effectives.
After the surrender at Donelson, the South, but especially the important
State of Tennessee, was in a delirium of rage and terror. As the retreat from
Nashville to the Tennessee River went on, the popular fury rose to a storm
everywhere. The people who had refused to listen to his warnings, or answer
his appeals for aid, now denounced General Johnston as an idiot, coward, and
traitor. Demagogues joined in the wild hunt for a victim, and deputations
waited on President Davis to demand his removal. To such a committee of
congressmen he replied: "If Sidney Johnston is not a general, I have none."
General Johnston was too calm, too just, and too magnanimous to misappre-
hend so natural a manifestation. His whole life had been a training for this
occasion. To encounter suddenly and endure calmly the obloquy of a whole
nation is, to any man, a great burden. To do this with a serenity that shall
not only not falter in duty, but restore confidence and organize victory, is
conclusive proof of greatness of soul.
But while the storm of execration raged around him, the men who came
into immediate contact with General Johnston never for a moment doubted
his ability to perform all that was possible to man in the circumstances.
To a friend who urged him to publish an exi^lanation of his course he replied:
"I cannot correspond with the people. What the people want is a battle
and a victory. That is the best explanation I can make. I require no vin-
dication. I trust that to the future." J)
General Johnston's plan of campaign may be summed up in a phrase. It
was to concentrate at Corinth and interpose his whole force in front of the
great bend of the Tennessee, the natural base of the Federal army : this effected,
to crush Grant in battle before the arrival of Buell. This meant immediate
and decisive action. The army he had brought from Nashville was ready for
the contest, but Generals Beauregard and Bragg represented to him that the
troops collected by them were unable to move without thorough reorganiza-
tion. Ten days were consumed in this work of reorganization. Moments
were precious, but there was the hope of reenforcement by Van Dorn's army,
which might arrive before Buell joined Grant, and which did arrive only a
day or two later. [See page 277.] But Buell's movements were closely
watched, and, hearing of his approach on the 2d of April, General Johnston
resolved to delay no longer, but to strike at once a decisive blow.
In the reorganization of the army, he assigned General Bragg as chief of
staff, with command of a corps. To Beauregard he tendered the immediate
command of the army in the impending battle. Though General Beauregard
declined the offer, he evidently misinterpreted its spirit and intention. He
imagined it was a confession of inadequacy for the duty, in which case he
ought to nave accepted it. The truth was that, coming into this district
which he had assigned to Beauregard, Johnston felt disinclined to deprive
him of any reputation he might acquire from a victory. He had not the
j) For part of his much-quoted letter of March ISth to President Davis, written at Decatur, in
regard to the loss of Donelson, see foot-note, page 399.— Editors.
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH.
SSI
slightest idea,
however, of ab-
dicating the
supreme com-
mand, and said
to friends who
remonstrated
with him : "I
will be there to
see that all goes
right." He was
willing to yield
to another the
glory, if thereby
anything was
added to the
chance of vic-
tory. The offer
was rather quix-
otic, but char-
acteristic ; he
FROM THE " LIFE OF oErsERAL A. S. JOHNSTON," BY W. P. JOHNSTON. (D. APPLETON &. CO.)
He then gave
had done the same thing in his victories on the Neches in 1S40
General Beauregard the position of second in command, without special assign-
ment. Indeed, as is shown by his own frequent statements, General Beauregard
was, from severe and protracted ill-health, inadequate to anymore serious duty.
General Grant's army had been moved up the Tennessee River by boat, and
had taken position on its left bank at Pittsburg Landing. It had been landed
by divisions, and Bragg had proposed to Beauregard to attack Grant before
he assembled his whole force. Beauregard forbade this, intending to await
events, and attack him away from his base if possible, though he now insists
that his plan of campaign was offensive. Grant's first object was to destroy
the railroads which centered at Corinth, and, indeed, to capture that place if
he could. But his advance was only a part of a grand plan for a combined
movement of his own and Buell's army. With Pittsburg Landing as a base,
this army was to occupy North Mississippi and Alabama, command the entire
railroad system of that section, and take Memphis in the rear, while Halleck
forced his way down the Mississippi River. General Johnston divined
the movement before it was begun, and was there to frustrate it. Indeed,
Grant's army was assembled at Pittsburg Landing only one week before
Johnston completed the concentration.
Grant has been severely criticised for placing his army with the river at its
back. But he was there to take the initiative. He had the larger army,
under cover, too, of his gun-boats ; he was expecting Buell daily ; and the
ground was admirable for defense. Indeed, his position was a natural strong-
hold. Flanked by Owl and Lick creeks, with their marshy margins, and with
his front protected by a swampy valley, he occupied a quadrilateral of great
552 ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SH1L0H.
strength. His troops were stationed on wooded heights, generally screened
by heavy undergrowth and approached across boggy ravines or open fields.
Each camp was a fortress in itself, and the line of retreat afforded at each
step some like point to rally on. He did not fortify his camps, it is true ; but
he was not there for defense, but for attack. It must be admitted that he
undervalued his enemy's daring and celerity ; but he was a young general,
exultant in his overwhelming victory at Donelson ; and his generals and army
shared his sense of security. He had an army of 58,000 men in camp, nearly
50,000 of whom were effectives. Buell was near at hand with 37,000 more,
and Mitchel was moving against the railroad at Florence, Alabama, not far
distant, with an additional force of 18,000. In all Grant had 105,000 effectives.
Opposed to him were 50,000 Confederate troops, less than 40,000 of whom were
available for combat. General Johnston's aggregate was 60,000 men, opposed
to about 200,000 Federals in all, but the effective forces were as above. As
these figures are disputed I invite a rigid examination of the Official Eecords.\
Such was the position on April 2d, when General Johnston, learning that
Buell was rapidly approaching, resolved to advance next day and attack
Grant before his arrival. His general plan was very simple in outline. It
seems to have been to march out and attack the Federals by columns of
corps, to make the battle a decisive test, and to crush Grant utterly or lose
all in the attempt ; this effected, to contend with Buell for the possession of
Tennessee, Kentucky, and possibly the North-west.
General Beauregard also, it seems, had a plan, which, however, must have
differed widely from that of General Johnston, as it was evidently tentative in
its nature, — " a reconnoissance in force," with a retreat on Corinth as one of its
features, — and which admitted the possibility of finishing on Monday a battle
which had to be won on Sunday or never. This was not in any sense General
Johnston's plan, and much useless discussion has arisen from a confusion of
the two. But, as General Johnston intended to fight, and did fight, on his
own plan as long as he lived, the battle may be considered his until Beau-
regard's order of retreat, about 5 o'clock Sunday evening, substituted " the
reconnoissance in force" in place of the decisive test of victory or defeat.
General Beauregard had been on the ground some six weeks, and his pres-
tige as an engineer and a victor of Bull Run warranted General Johnston
in committing to him the elaboration of the details of the march and order of
battle. Unfortunately he changed what seems evidently General Johnston's
original purpose of an assault by columns of corps into an array in three paral-
lel lines of battle, which produced extreme confusion when the second and third
lines advanced to support the first and intermingled with it, Johnston's
original plan is summed up in the following dispatch to President Davis:
" Corinth, April 3d, 1862. General Buell in motion thirty thousand strong, rapidly from
Columbia by Clifton to Savannah. Mitchel behind him with ten thousand. Confederate forces-
forty thousand — ordered forward to offer battle near Pittsburg. Division from Bethel, main
\ By careful and thorough examination of the greatly overestimates the Union strength. Before
Official Records we have not been able to verify January, 1863 (when a new form was adopted),
Colonel Johnston's estimates of forces. In im- the Union returns did not show the number of
portant particulars the Eecords are not explicit, effectives separate from the " present for duty," a
and in places they indicate that Colonel Johnston term that included the non-combatants.— Editors.
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SH1L0H.
553
body from Corinth, reserve from Burnsville, converging- to-morrow near Monterey on Pittsburg.
Beauregard second in command, Polk the left, Bragg the center, Hardee the right wing, Breck-
inridge the reserve. Hope engagement before Buell can form junction."
In the original dispatch, the words italicised are in General Johnston's own
handwriting. The words, " the left," " the center," " the right wing," " the
reserve," clearly point to a formation by columns of corps. Moreover, owing
to ignorance of the country, the march was so ordered that the corps inter-
fered with each other in their advance,
and by a detention the battle was delayed
an entire day, an almost fatal loss of time.
If it be asked why General Johnston ac-
cepted and issued an order of march and
battle which he had not contemplated, the
reply is that it had been prepared by his
second in command, who was presuma-
bly more familiar with the country and
the roads than himself, and hence with
the necessities of the case. But the over-
ruling reason was the question of time.
Buell was at hand, and Johnston's plan
was not to manoeuvre, but to attack ; and
any plan which put him front to front
with Grant was better than the best two
days later. Besides, the written orders
were not shown him until the morning of
the 4th, after he had mounted to start to the front, and when his advance was
near its position on the field. It was then obviously too late to apply a remedy.
General Johnston did not undervalue the importance of details. No man
regarded more closely all the details subsidiary to a great result than he.
But, important as were the preliminaries, — the maps, the roads, the methods
of putting his army face to face with the enemy, which General Johnston
had to take on trust, — he knew that the chief strategy of the battle was in
the decision to fight. Once in the presence of the enemy, he knew that the
result would depend on the way in which his troops were handled. This was
his part of the work, and he felt full confidence in his own ability to carry it
out successfully. The order was issued, as elaborated by Beauregard, and
the army was moved against the enemy, April 3d, 1862. Said General Bragg :
" The details of that plan, arranged after General Sidney Johnston decided on delivering
battle, and had given his instructions, were made up and published to the army in full from the
adjutant-general's office. My first knowledge of them was derived from this general order, the
authorship of which has been claimed by General Beauregard. . . . In this case, as I under-
stood then, and still believe, Johnston gave verbal instructions for the general movement. . . .
Over his [Colonel Jordan, the adjutant-general's] signature, they reached the army. The general
plan (General Johnston's) was admirable — the elaboration simply execrable.
"When the time arrived for execution, you know well what occurred. In spite of opposition
and prediction of failure, Johnston firmly and decidedly ordered and led the attack in the execu-
tion of his general plan, and, notwithstanding the faulty arrangement of troops, was eminently
successful up to the moment of his fall. The victory teas iron. How it was lost, the official
reports will show, and history has recorded." [Bragg to W. P. Johnston, December 16th, 1874.]
LIEDTENANT-GENERAL W. J. HARDEE, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
SS4 ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH.
The President of the Confederate States has repeatedly and positively
asserted that he received from General Johnston a dispatch which gave the
plan of battle, exactly as it was fought, and that this dispatch was not that
of April 3d already quoted, but was lost. General Beauregard and his staff-
officer^ Colonel Jordan, have taken issue with Mr. Davis on this point,
vehemently insisting that no such dispatch was, or could have been, sent.
Their denial rests merely upon a priori objections to the probability of Mr.
Davis's assertion. On the other hand, Mr. Davis's clear and positive statement
made many years ago, and often repeated since, is confirmed by contem-
porary documentary evidence. On April 5th he sent a telegram to General
Johnston, in which he acknowledges his telegram of " yesterday," April
4th. This telegram of "yesterday" was plainly the "lost dispatch," for
" yesterday " was April 4th, not April 3d. If, as I have sought to show, impor-
tant changes had occurred in the plan of battle, nothing could be more
natural and proper for the commanding general than instantly to inform his
friend and commander-in-chief ; and even if no change had occurred, still it
would have been right for him to keep his chief fully advised of the progress
of the movement. I have always said that General Johnston's original plan
was probably to attack by columns of corps, as indicated in his telegram of
April 3d. Special Orders, No. 8 directed an attack in three lines parallel to
the enemy's front. Jordan tells us General Johnston did not see these orders
as published until the morning of the 4th. What more natural than that he
should then communicate the changes made, and add his purpose to turn the
enemy's left, not mentioned in the telegram of April 3d. A curious corrobora-
tion, hitherto unobserved, occurs in Mr. Davis's telegram of April 5th, that it
was in reply to a lost dispatch. On April 'Id General Beauregard wrote to
General Johnston, saying that he had telegraphed to the War Depart-
ment for generals, and adding, " Would it not be well for you to telegraph
also for the generals you may require if" We have no record of any such
request made upon this suggestion, but Mr. Davis, in his telegram of April
5th, says : " Brigadiers have been recently appointed ; among them, Bowen.
Do you require others ? " This seems to be a response to a request ; Bowen
was commanding a brigade in General Johnston's army. But as there was
no request in General Johnston's telegram of April 3d, it is reasonable to
suppose that it was contained in one of the 4th, which has been lost. But I
am giving an importance to this question which it would not merit except
for the prominence given it in the pages of " The Century Magazine." Whether
sent or not, it is entirely irrelevant to the main issue. Its whole importance
consists in showing, not who made the plan of battle, but that the plan
having been given to his subordinates, General Johnston, so long as he lived,
held them to the steady and successful execution of it. When General
Beauregard succeeded to the command he abandoned the vital principle of
that plan, which was to push the contest to a final decision that day, and
took a course of his own, not embraced or contemplated in General John-
ston's designs — a policy of withdrawal and delay which led to defeat instead
of victory.
ALBER T SIDNEY JOHNS TON A T SHILOH. s s s
General Johnston gave orders about 1 o'clock on the night of Wednesday,
the 2d of April, for the advance. But much time was spent in their elabora-
tion, and the troops did not receive them from the adjutant-general's office
until the next afternoon. When the soldiers learned that they were going
out to fight, their long-restrained ardor burst into a blaze of enthusiasm, and
they did all that was possible for inexperienced troops in both marching and
fighting. Some of the arms were not distributed till that afternoon. With
hasty preparations the movement began, and Hardee's corps was at Mick-
ey's, within four or five miles of Pittsburg, next morning. But some of
the troops did not move until the morning of Saturday, the 5th, owing to a
still further delay in the delivery of orders by the adjutant-general's office,
and all were impeded by the heavy condition of the roads, through a dense
forest, and across sloughs and marshes.
The order was to attack at 3 o'clock on the morning of Saturday, the 5th ; but
the troops were not in position until late that afternoon. All day Friday the
advancing columns had pushed on over the tangled, miry roads, hindered and
embarrassed by a pelting rain. After midnight a violent storm broke upon them
as they stood under arms in the pitch darkness, with no shelter but the trees.
From detention by the rain, ignorance of the roads, and a confusion produced by
the order of march, some divisions failed to get into line, and the day was
wasted.
As they were waiting the disposition of troops late Saturday afternoon, a
council of war occurred, in which Johnston, Beauregard, Bragg, Polk, Breck-
inridge and Gilmer took part, which added greatly to General Johnston's
responsibilities, and the heavy burden he had already incurred by his experi-
ment of concentration, and his resolve to fight a pitched battle. The Confed-
erate army was in full battle array, within two miles of Shiloh Church and
Grant's line, when General Beauregard suddenly proposed that the army
should be withdrawn and retreat to Corinth. He maintained that the delay
and noise must have given the enemy notice, and that they would be found
intrenched " to their eyes " and ready for attack. General Johnston seemed
to be much surprised at the suggestion. Polk and Bragg differed with Beau-
regard, and a warm discussion ensued between him and Polk, in which
General Johnston took little part, but closed it with the simple remark,
" Gentlemen, we shall attack at daylight to-morrow," which he uttered with
great decision. Turning to one of his staff-officers, he said, " I would fight
them if they were a million. They can present no greater front between
these two creeks than we can, and the more men they crowd in there, the
worse we can make it for them. Polk is a true soldier and a friend."
General Bragg, in a monograph prepared for the use of the writer, says :
" The meeting then dispersed upon an invitation of the commanding
general to meet at his tent that evening. At that meeting a further dis-
cussion elicited the same views, and the same firm, decided determina-
tion. The next morning, about dawn of day, the 6th, as the troops
were being put in motion, several generals again met at the camp-fire
of the- general-in-ehief . The discussion was renewed, General Beauregard
556
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SH1L0H.
BATTLE OF
SHILOH
Part I.
1st. Position (Morning > Gth April
Federal ^— — ^—
Confederate — ^— —
again expressing his dissent, when, rapid firing in front indicating that the
attack had commenced, General Johnston closed the discnssion by remark-
ing, ' The battle has opened, gentlemen ; it is too late to change our disposi-
tions.' He proposed to move to the front, and his subordinates promptly
joined their respective commands, inspired by his coolness, confidence,
, and determina-
tion. Few men
have equaled
him in the pos-
session and dis-
play at the
proper time of
these great qual-
ities of the sol-
dier."
It will read-
ily be seen how
much General
Beauregard's ur-
gent opposition
to fighting must
have added to
the weight of
General John-
ston's responsi-
bility. Beaure-
gard was in the
full tide of pop-
ular favor, while
Johnston was
laboring under
the load of pub-
lic obloquy and
odium. Nothing
short of com-
FROM THE LIFE OF GENERAL A. S. JOHNSTON," BY W. P. JOHNSTON. (D. APPLET0N & CO.)
plete and overwhelming victory would vindicate him in differing with so
famous a general. A reverse, even a merely partial success, would leave
him under condemnation. Nevertheless, without a moment's hesitation, he
resolved to fight.
The sun set on Saturday evening in a cloudless sky, and night fell calm,
clear, and beautiful. Long before dawn the forest was alive with silent prep-
arations for the ensuing contest, and day broke upon a scene so fair that it
left its memory on thousands of hearts. The sky was clear overhead, the air
fresh, and when the sun rose in full splendor, the advancing host passed the
word from lip to lip that it was the " sun of Austerlitz."
General Johnston, usually so self-contained, felt the inspiration of the
ALBER T SIDNE Y JOHNS TON A T SHJLOH. 5 5 7
scene, and welcomed with exultant joy the long-desired day. His presence
inspired all who came near him. His sentences, sharp, terse, and clear, had
the ring of victory in them. Turning to his staff, as he mounted, he
exclaimed : " To-night we will water our horses in the Tennessee River." It
was thus that he formulated his plan of battle ; it must not stop short of entire
victory. To Randall L. Gibson, who was commanding a Louisiana brigade,
he said: "I hope you may get through safely to-day, but we must win a
victory." To Colonel John S. Marmaduke, who had served under him in
Utah, he said, placing his hand on his shoulder : " My son, we must this day
conquer or perish." To the ambitious Hindman, who had been in the van-
guard from the beginning, he said: "You have earned your spurs as a
major-general. Let this day's work win them." With such words, as he
rode from point to point, he raised a spirit in that host which swept away
the serried lines of the conquerors of Donelson. Friend and foe alike testify
to the enthusiastic courage and ardor of the Southern soldiers that day.
General Johnston's strategy was completed. He was face to face with his
foe, and that foe all unaware of his coming. His front line, composed of the
Third Corps and Gladden's brigade, was under Hardee, and extended from
Owl Creek to Lick Creek, more than three miles. (See maps.) Hindman's
division of two brigades occupied the center, Cleburne's brigade had the left,
and Gladden's the right wing — an effective total in the front line of 9024. The
second line was commanded by Bragg. He had two divisions : Withers's, of
two brigades, on the right, and Ruggles's, of three brigades, on the left. The
brigades were, in order from right to left, as follows : Chalmers, Jackson,
Gibson, Anderson, Pond. This second line was 10,731 strong. The third line,
or reserve, was composed of the First Corps, under Polk, and three brigades
under Breckinridge. Polk's command was massed in columns of brigades
on the Bark road near Mickey's, and Breckinridge's on the road from Mon-
terey toward the same point. Polk was to advance on the left of the Bark
road, at an interval of about eight hundred paces from Bragg' s line ; and
Breckinridge, to the right of that road, was to give support wherever it
should become necessary. Polk's corps, 9136 strong in infantry and artillery,
was composed of two divisions : Cheatham's on the left, made up of Bushrod
R. Johnson's and Stephens's brigades, and Clark's 011 his right, formed of
A. P. Stewart's and Russell's brigades. It followed Bragg's line at a distance
of about eight hundred yards. Breckinridge's reserve was composed of Tra-
bue's, Bowen's, and Statham's brigades, with a total, infantry and artillery, of
6439. The cavalry, about 4300 strong, guarded the flanks or was detached on
outpost duty ; but, both from the newness and imperfection of their organiza-
tion, equipment, and drill, and from the rough and wooded character of the
ground, they could do little service that day. The effectives of all arms that
marched out to battle were about 39,630, or, exclusive of cavalry, 35,330.
The Federal army numbered present 49,232, and present for duty 41,543.
But at Crump's Landing, five or six miles distant, was General Lew Wallace's
division with 8820 present, and 7771 men present for duty. [See page 538.]
General Nelson's division of Buell's army had arrived at Savannah on Satur-
558 ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH.
day morning, and was now about five miles distant ; Crittenden's division also
had arrived on the morning of the 6th. So that Grant, with these three
divisions, may be considered as having abont 22,000 men in immediate reserve,
without counting the remainder of Buell's army, which was near by. ,)
As General Johnston and his staff were taking their coffee, the first gun of
the battle sounded. " Note the hour, if you please, gentlemen," said General
Johnston. It was fourteen minutes past 5. They immediately mounted and
galloped to the front.
Some skirmishing on Friday between the Confederate cavalry and the
Federal outposts, in which a few men were killed, wounded, and captured on
both sides, had aroused the vigilance of the Northern commanders to some
extent. Sherman reported on the 5th to Grant that two regiments of infantry
and one of cavalry were in his front, and added : "I have no doubt that
nothing will occur to-day more than some picket-firing. ... I do not
apprehend anything like an attack on our position." In his " Memoirs " he
says : ." I did not believe they designed anything but a strong demonstration."
He said to Major Rieker that an advance of Beauregard's army "could not be
possible. Beauregard was not such a fool as to leave his base of operations and
attack us in ours, — mere reconnoissance in force." This shows a curious
coincidence with the actual state of General Beauregard's mind on that day.
And Grant telegraphed Halleck on Saturday night : " The main force of the
enemy is at Corinth. . . . One division of Buell's column arrived yester-
day. ... I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one)
being made upon us."
Nevertheless, some apprehension was felt among the officers and men of the
Federal army, and General Prentiss had thrown forward Colonel Moore, with
the 21st Missouri regiment, on the Corinth road. Moore, feeling his way
cautiously, encountered Hardee's skirmish-line under Major Hardcastle, and,
thinking it an outpost, assailed it vigorously. Thus really the Federals
began the fight. The struggle was brief, but spirited. The 8th and 9th
Arkansas came up. Moore fell wounded. The Missourians gave w^ay, and
Shaver's brigade pursued them. Hindman's whole division moved on, follow-
ing the ridge and drifting to the right, and drove in the grand guards and
outposts until they struck Prentiss's camps. Into these they burst, over-
throwing all before them.
To appreciate the suddenness and violence of the blow, one must read the
testimony of eye-witnesses. General Bragg says, in a sketch of Shiloh made
for the writer : " Contrary to the views of such as urged an abandonment of
the attack, the enemy was found utterly unprepared, many being surprised
and captured in their tents, and others, though on the outside, in costumes
better fitted to the bedchamber than to the battle-field." General Preston says :
" General Johnston then went to the camp assailed, which was carried between
7 and 8 o'clock. The enemy were evidently surprised. The breakfasts were
J General Grant takes no account of these in his narratives of the battle, and talks as though he
were outnumbered instead of outgeneraled. It was his business to get these troops there in time,
especially if he was not surprised. — W. P. J.
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH. 559
on the mess tables, the baggage unpacked, the knapsacks, stores, colors, and
ammunition abandoned."
The essential feature of General Johnston's strategy had been to get at his
enemy as quickly as possible, and in as good order. In this he had succeeded.
His plan of battle was as simple as his strategy. It had been made known in
his order of battle, and was thoroughly understood by every brigade com-
mander. The orders of the 3d of April were, that " every effort should be
made to turn the left flank of the enemy, so as to cut off his line of retreat to
the Tennessee River and throw him back on Owl Creek, where he will be obliged
to surrender.1,1 It is seen that, from the first, these orders were carried out in
letter and spirit ; and, so long as General Johnston lived, the success of this
movement was complete. The battle was fought precisely as it was planned.
The first, and almost only, censure of this plan was made by Colonel Jordan,
confidential adviser and historian of General Beauregard, who now claims
to have made this plan. The instructions delivered to General Johnston's
subordinates, on the previous day were found sufficient for their conduct
on the battle-field. But, to accomplish this, his own personal presence and
inspiration and direction were often necessary with these enthusiastic but
raw troops. He had personal conference on the field with most of his gen-
erals, and led several brigades into battle. The criticism upon this conduct,
that he exposed himself unnecessarily, is absurd to those who know how
important rapid decision and instantaneous action are in the crisis of conflict.
His lines of battle were pushed rapidly to the front, and as gaps widened
in the first lines, they were filled by brigades of the second and third. One
of Breckinridge's brigades (Trabue's) was sent to the left to support Cle-
burne and fought under Polk the rest of the day ; and the other two were led
to the extreme right, only Chalmers being beyond them. Gladden, who was
on Hindman's right, and had a longer distance to traverse to strike some of
Prentiss's brigades further to the left, found them better prepared, but,
after a sanguinary resistance, drove them from their camps. In this bitter
struggle Gladden fell mortally wounded. Chalmers's brigade, of Bragg's line,
came in on Gladden's right, and his Mississippians drove the enemy, under
Stuart, with the bayonet half a mile. He was about to charge again, when
General Johnston came up, and moved him to the right, and brought John
K. Jackson's brigade into the interval. Prentiss's left and Stuart's brigade
retreated sullenly, not routed, but badly hammered.
With Hindman as a pivot, the turning movement began from the moment
of the overthrow of Prentiss's camps. While the front attacks were made all
along the line with a desperate courage which would have swept any ordinary
resistance from the field, and with a loss which told fearfully on the assail-
ants, they were seconded by assaults in flank which invariably resulted in
crushing the Federal line with destructive force and strewing the field with
the wounded and the dead. The Federal reports complain that they were
flanked and outnumbered, which is true; for, though fewer, the Confederates
were probably stronger at every given point throughout the day except at
the center called the Hornets' Nest, where the Federals eventually massed
s6o
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH.
s
BATTLE OP
MIL OH
Part II.
Sd. Position (Noon) 6th. April
]'■ <h ral
Con/cdtrutt — — — — —
nearly two divisions. The iron flail of war beat upon the Federal front and
right flank with the regular and ponderous pulsations of some great engine,
and these assaults resulted in a crumbling process which was continually but
slowly going on, as regiment and brigade and division yielded to the continu-
ous and successive blows. There has been criticism that there were no grand
assaults by divisions and corps. In a broken, densely wooded and unknown
country, and with the mode of attack in parallel lines, this was impossible,
but the attack
was unremitting
and the fact is
that there were
but few lulls
in the contest.
The fighting was
a grapple and
a death-struggle
all day long, and,
as one brigade
after another
wilted before
the deadly fire
of the stubborn
Federals, still
another was
pushed into the
combat and kept
up the fierce as-
sault. A breath-
ing - spell, and
FROM THE "LIFE OF GENERAL A. S. JOHNSTON," BY W. P. JOHNSTON. (D. APPLETON & CO.)
the shattered command would gather itself up and resume its work of
destruction. These were the general aspects of the battle.
When the battle began Hindman, following the ridge, had easy ground to
traverse; but Cleburne's large brigade, on his left, with its supports, moving
over a more difficult country, was slower in getting upon Sherman's front.
That general and his command were aroused by the long roll, the advancing
musketry, and the rush of troops to his left, and he got his division in line of
battle and was ready for the assault of Cleburne, which was made about 8
o'clock. General Johnston, who had followed close after Hindman, urging on
his attack, saw Cleburne's brigade begin its advance, and then returned to
where Hindman was gathering his force for another assault. Hardee said of
Cleburne that he "moved quickly through the fields, and, though far outflanked
by the enemy on our left, rushed forward under a terrific fire from the serried
ranks drawn up in front of the camp. A morass covered his front, and, being-
difficult to pass, caused a break in this brigade. Deadly volleys were poured
upon the men from behind bales of hay and other defenses, as they advan< ;
and after a series of desperate charges they were compelled to fall back.
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH.
'-,6i
VICINITY OF THE " HORNETS' NEST."
FROM PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN IN 1885.
The stump in the field on the right is
s:ii<l to mark the spot where General
Albert Sidney Johnston was killed.
The point of woods beyond the field i«
supposed to be the place which the
Confederates called the " Hornets'
Nest." The "peach orchard" was a
Little to the left of the field in the mid-
dle ground, and behind the house (in
the lower picture) which is across the
road from the field iu which General
Johnston was killed. — Editors.
Supported by the arrival of the second line, Cleburne, with the remainder of
his troops, . . . entered the enemy's encampment, which had been forced on
the center and right by . . . Gladden's, Wood's, and Hindman's brigades."
"While Sherman was repelling Cleburne's attack, McClernand sent up three
Illinois regiments to reenforce his left. But General Polk led forward Bushrod
R. Johnson's brigade, and General Charles Clark led Russell's brigade, against
Sherman's left, while General Johnston himself put A. P. Stewart's brigade in
position on their right. Supported by part of Cleburne's line, they attacked
Sherman and McClernand fiercely. Polk said : " The resistance at this point
was as stubborn as at any other point on the field." Clark and Bushrod
R. Johnson fell badly wounded. Hildebrand's Federal brigade was swept from
the field, losing in the onslaught 300 killed and wounded, and 94 missing.
Wood's brigade, of Hindman's division, joined in this charge on the right.
As they hesitated at the crest of a hill, General Johnston came to the front
and urged them to the attack. They rushed forward with the inspiring
"rebel yell," and with Stewart's brigade enveloped the Illinois troops. In
ten minutes the latter melted away under the fire, and were forced from the
field. In this engagement John A. McDowell's and Veatch's Federal bri-
gades, as well as Hildebrand's, were demolished and heard of no more. Buck-
land retreated and took position with McClernand. In these attacks
Anderson's and Pond's Confederate brigades joined with great vigor and
severe loss, but with unequal fortune. The former had one success after
VOL. I. 36
562 ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH.
another ; the latter suffered a series of disasters ; and yet an equal courage
animated them. Gladden's brigade made a final desperate and successful charge
on Prentiss's line. The whole Federal front, which had been broken here and
there, and was getting ragged, gave way under this hammering process on front
and flank, and fell back across a ravine to another strong position behind the
Hamburg and Purdy road in rear of Shiloh. Sherman's route of retreat was
marked by the thick-strewn corpses of his soldiers. At last, pressed back
toward both Owl Creek and the river, Sherman and McClernand found safety
by the interposition on their left flank of W. H. L. Wallace's fresh division.
Hurlbut and Wallace had advanced about 8 o'clock, so that Prentiss's com-
mand found a refuge in the intervals of the new and formidable Federal line,
with Stuart on the left and Sherman's shattered division on the right.
General Johnston had pushed Chalmers to the right and front, sweeping
down the left bank of Lick Creek, driving in pickets, until he encountered
Stuart's Federal brigade on the Pittsburg and Hamburg road. Stuart was
strongly posted on a steep hill near the river, covered with thick undergrowth,
and with an open field in front. McArtlrar was to his right and rear in the
woods. Jackson attacked Mc Arthur, who fell back ; and Chalmers went at
Stuart's brigade. This command reserved its fire until Chalmers's men were
within forty yards, and then delivered a heavy and destructive volley ; but,
after a hard fight, the Federals were driven back. Chalmers's right rested on
the Tennessee Eiver bottom-lands, and he fought down the bank toward
Pittsburg Landing. The enemy's left was completely turned, and the Fed-
eral army was now crowded on a shorter line, a mile or more to the rear of
its first position, with many of their brigades hors de combat. The new line
of battle was established before 10 o'clock. All the Confederate troops were
then in the front line, except two of Breckinridge's brigades, Bo wen's and
Statham's, which were moving to the Confederate right, and soon occupied
the interval to the left of Chalmers and Jackson. Hardee, with Cleburne
and Pond, was pressing Sherman slowly but steadily back. Bragg and Polk
met about half -past 10 o'clock, and by agreement Polk led his troops against
McClernand, while Bragg directed the operations against the Federal center.
A gigantic contest now began which lasted more than five hours. In the
impetuous rush forward of regiments to fill the gaps in the front line, even
the brigade organization was broken ; but, though there was dislocation of
commands, there was little loss of effective force. The Confederate assaults
were made by rapid and often unconnected charges along the line. They
were repeatedly checked, and often repulsed. Sometimes counter-charges
drove them back for short distances ; but, whether in assault or recoil, both
sides saw their bravest soldiers fall in frightful numbers. The Confederates
came on in motley garb, varying from the favorite gray and domestic " but-
ternut" to the blue of certain Louisiana regiments, which paid dearly the
penalty of doubtful colors. Over them waved flags and pennons as various
as their uniforms. At each charge there went up a wild yell, heard above the
roar of artillery ; only the Kentuckians, advancing with measured step, sang
in chorus their war-song : " Cheer, boys, cheer ; we'll march away to battle."
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH.
563
1
C-,
1 =\» iri^
SCENE OF GENERAL
ALBERT SIDNEY
JOHNSTON'S DEATH.
T&9&
^V^f-
5wi
jj
r^'
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN
IN THE SUMMER OF
1884.
On the Federal ■„ * "X^^mm^C left center W. H. L.
Wallace's and Hmi- lJ^-v '^ ™A)'^v1'As ^utfs divisions were
massed, with Pren- >rr tiss's fragments, in a
position so impregnable, and thronged with such fierce defenders, that it
won from the Confederates the memorable title of the "Hornets' Nest."
[See pages 504-5, 510, and 588.] Here, behind a dense thicket on the crest of
a hill, was posted a strong force of as hardy troops as ever fought, almost
perfectly protected by the conformation of the ground, and by logs and other
rude and hastily prepared defenses. To assail it an open field had to be
passed, enfiladed by the fire of its batteries. No figure of speech would
be too strong to express the deadly peril of assault upon this natural fortress.
For five hours brigade after brigade was led against it. Hindman's brigades,
which earlier had swept everything before them, were reduced to fragments,
and paralyzed for the remainder of the day. A. P. Stewart's regiments made
fruitless assaults. Then Bragg ordered up Gibson's brigade. Gibson him-
self, a knightly soldier, was aided by colonels three of whom afterward
became generals. The brigade made a gallant charge ; but, like the others,
recoiled from the fire it encountered. Under a cross-fire of artillery and
musketry it at last fell back with very heavy loss. Gibson asked that artillery
should be sent him ; but it was not at hand, and Bragg sent orders to charge
again. The colonels thought it hopeless ; but Gibson led them again to the
attack, and again they suffered a bloody repulse.
The brigade was four times repulsed, but maintained its ground steadily,
until W. H. L. Wallace's position was turned, when, renewing its forward
movement in conjunction with Cheatham's command, it helped to drive back
its stout opponents. Cheatham, charging with Stephens's brigade on Gibson's
right, across an open field, had been caught under a murderous cross-fire, but
fell back in good order, and, later in the day, came in on Breckinridge's left
in the last assault when Prentiss was captured. This bloody fray lasted till
nearly 4 o'clock, without making any visible impression on the Federal center.
But when its flanks were turned, these assaulting columns, crowding in on its
front, aided in its capture.
564 ALBERT SIDNEY JC 'STON AT SHILOH.
General Johnston was with the right of Statham's brigade, confronting the
left of Hurlbut's division, which was behind the crest of a hill, with a depres-
sion filled with chaparral in its front. Bowen's brigade was further to the
right in line with Statham's, touching it near this point. The Confederates
held the parallel ridge in easy musket-range ; and " as heavy fire as I ever
saw during the war," says Governor Harris, was kept up on both sides for
an hour or more. It was necessary to cross the valley raked by this deadly
ambuscade and assail the opposite ridge in order to drive the enemy from
his stronghold. When General Johnston came up and saw the situation, he
said to his staff : " They are offering stubborn resistance here. I shall have
to put the bayonet to them." It was the crisis of the conflict. The Federal
key was in his front. If his assault were successful, their left would be com-
pletely turned, and the victory won. He determined to charge. He sent
Governor Harris, of his staff, to lead a Tennessee regiment; and, after a
brief conference with Breckinridge, whom he loved and admired, that officer,
followed by his staff, appealed to the soldiers. As he, encouraged them with
his fine voice and manly bearing, General Johnston rode out in front and
slowly down the line. His hat was off. His sword rested in its scabbard. In
his right hand he held a little tin cup, the memorial of an incident that had
occurred earlier in the day. Passing through a captured camp, he had taken
this toy, saying, " Let this be my share of the spoils to-day." It was this
plaything which, holding it between two fingers, he employed more effect-
ively in his natural and simple gesticulation than most men could have
used a sword. His presence was full of inspiration. He sat his thorough-
bred bay, "Fire-eater," with easy command. His voice was persuasive,
encouraging, and compelling. His words were few; he said: "Men! they
are stubborn ; we must use the bayonet." When he reached the center of
the line, he turned. " I will lead you ! " he cried, and moved toward the
enemy. The line was already thrilling and trembling with that irresistible
ardor which in battle decides the day. With a mighty shout Bowen's and
Statham's brigades moved forward at a charge. A sheet of flame and a
mighty roar burst from the Federal stronghold. The Confederate line with-
ered; but there was not an instant's pause. The crest was gained. The
enemy were in flight.
General Johnston had passed through the ordeal seemingly unhurt. His
horse was shot in four places ; his clothes were pierced by missiles ; his boot-
sole was cut and torn by a minie ; but if he himself had received any severe
wound, he did not know it. At this moment Governor Harris rode up from
the right. After a few words, General Johnston sent him with an order to
Colonel Statham, which having delivered, he speedily returned. In the mean-
time, knots and groups of Federal soldiers kept up a desultory fire as they
retreated upon their supports, and their last line, now yielding, delivered
volley after volley as they sullenly retired. By the chance of war, a minie-
ball from one of these did its fatal work. As he sat there, after his wound,
Captain Wickham says that Colonel O'Hara, of his staff, rode up, and General
Johnston said to him, "We must go to the left, where the firm aviest,"
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH. 565
and then gave him an order, which O'Hara rode off to obey. Governor
Harris returned, and, finding him very pale, asked him, " General, are yon
wounded ? " He answered, in a very deliberate and emphatic tone : " Yes,
and, I fear, seriously." These were his last words. Harris and Wiekham led
his horse back under cover of the hill, and lifted him from it. They searched
at random for the wound, which had cut an artery in his leg, the blood flow-
ing into his boot. When his brother-in-law, Preston, lifted his head, and
addressed him with passionate grief, he smiled faintly, but uttered no word.
His life rapidly ebbed away, and in a few moments he was dead.
His wound was not necessarily fatal. General Johnston's own knowledge
of military surgery was adequate for its control by an extemporized tourni-
quet had he been aware or regardful of its nature. Dr. D. W. Yandell, his
surgeon, had attended his person during most of the morning ; but, finding a
large number of wounded men, including many Federals, at one point, Gen-
eral Johnston had ordered Yandell to stop there, establish a hospital, and give
them his services. He said to Yandell : " These men were our enemies a
moment ago ; they are our prisoners now. Take care of them." Yandell
remonstrated against leaving him, but he was peremptory. Had Yandell
remained with him, he would have had little difficulty with the wound.
Governor Harris, and others of General Johnston's staff, promptly informed
General Beauregard of his death, and General Beauregard assumed command,
remaining at Shiloh Church, awaiting the issue of events.
Up to the moment of the death of the commander-in-chief, in spite of the
dislocation of the commands, there was the most perfect regularity in the
development of the plan of battle. In all the seeming confusion there was
the predominance of intelligent design ; a master mind, keeping in clear view
its purpose, sought the weak point in the defense, and, by massing his troops
upon the enemy's left, kept turning that flank. With the disadvantage of
inferior numbers, General Johnston brought to bear a superior force on each
particular point, and, by a series of rapid and powerful blows, broke the
Federal army to pieces.
Now was the time for the Confederates to push their advantage, and, clos-
ing in on the rear of Prentiss and Wallace, to finish the battle. But, on the
contrary, there came a lull in the conflict on the right, lasting more than an
hour from half-past 2, the time at which General Johnston fell. It is true
that the Federals fell back and left the field, making some desultory resist-
ance, and the Confederates went forward deliberately, occupying their posi-
tions, and thus helping to envelop the Federal center ; but Breckinridge's two
brigades did not make another charge that day, and there was no further
general direction or concerted movement. The determinate purpose to cap-
ture Grant that day was lost sight of. The strong arm was withdrawn, and
the bow remained unbent. Elsewhere there were bloody, desultory combats,
but they tended to nothing.
About half-past 3 the contest, which had throbbed with fitful violence
for five hours, was renewed with the utmost fury. While an ineffectual
struggle was going" on at the center, a number of batteries opened upon
^66
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH.
Prentiss's right flank, the center of what remained of the Federals. The open-
ing of so heavy a fire, and the simultaneous though unconcerted advance of
the whole Confederate line, resulted at first in the confusion of the enemy,
and then in the death of W. H. L. Wallace and the surrender of Prentiss.
These generals have received scant justice for their stubborn defense. They
agreed to hold their position at all odds, and did so until Wallace received
BATTLE OF
SHILOH
Part III.
3rd. Position (Sunset) 6th. April
Ft >h I'd — — ^—^^~
Confederate — — —
FROM THE " LIFE OF GENERAL A. S. JOHNSTON," BY W. P. JOHNSTON. CD. APPLETON & CO.)
his fatal wound and Prentiss was surrounded and captured with nearly three
thousand men. This delay was the salvation of Grant's army.
General Breckinridge's command closed in on the Federal left and rear ;
General Polk crushed their right center by the violence of his assault,
and in person, with Marshall J. Smith's Crescent regiment, received the sur-
render of many troops. General Prentiss gave up his sword to Colonel
Russell. Bragg's troops, wrestling at the front, poured in over the Hornets'
Nest, and shared in the triumph. Polk ordered his cavalry to charge the
fleeing enemy, and Colonel Miller rode down and ca a 6-gun battery*
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH. 567
His men " watered their horses in the Tennessee River." All now felt that
the victory was won. Bragg, Polk, Hardee, Breckinridge, all the corps com-
manders, were at the front, and in communication. Their generals were
around them. The hand that had launched the thunder-bolt of war was
cold, but its influence still nerved this host and its commanders. A line
of battle was formed, and all was ready for the last fell swoop, to compel
an "unconditional surrender" by General Grant.
The only position on the high grounds left to the Federals was held by Col-
onel Webster, of Grant's staff, who had collected some twenty guns or more
and manned them with volunteers. Soon after 4 o'clock Chalmers and Jack-
son, proceeding down the river-bank while Prentiss's surrender was going on,
came upon this position. The approaches were bad from that direction ; never-
theless, they attacked resolutely, and, though repeatedly repulsed, kept up their
assaults till nightfall. At one time they drove some gunners from their guns,
and their attack has been generally mistaken by Federal writers for the final
assault of the Confederate army — which was never made. The Federal gen-
erals and writers attribute their salvation to the repulse of Chalmers, and the
honor is claimed respectively for Webster's artillery and for Ammen's brigade
of Buell's army, which came up at the last moment. But neither they nor all
that was left of the Federal army could have withstood five minutes the united
advance of the Confederate line, which was at hand and ready to deal the
death-stroke. Their salvation came from a different quarter. Bragg, in his
monograph written for the use of the writer in preparing the " Life of A. S.
Johnston," gives the following account of the close of the battle :
" Concurring testimony, especially that of the prisoners on both sides, — our captured being1
present and witnesses to the demoralization of the enemy, and their eagerness to escape or avoid
further slaughter by surrender, - left no doubt but that a persistent, energetic assault would
soon have been crowned by a general yielding of his whole force. About one hour of daylight
was left to us. The enemy's gun-boats, his last hope, took position opposite us in the river, and
commenced a furious cannonade at our supposed position. From the elevation necessary to
reach the high bluff on which we were operating, this proved ' all sound and fury signifying
nothing,' and did not in the slightest degree mar our prospects or our progress. Not so, how-
ever, in our rear, where these heavy shells fell among the reserves and stragglers ; and to the
utter dismay of the commanders on the field, the troops were seen to abandon their inspiring
work, and to retire sullenly from the contest when danger was almost past, and victory, so
dearly purchased, was almost certain."
Polk, Hardee, Breckinridge, Withers, Gibson, Gilmer, and all who were
there confirm this statement. General Buell says of Grant's army that there
were " not more than five thousand men in ranks and available on the battle-
field at nightfall. . . . The rest were either killed, wounded, captured, or
scattered iu inextricable and hopeless confusion for miles along the banks of
the river." General Nelson describes them as " cowering under the river-
bank, . . . frantic with fright and utterly demoralized."
At this crisis came from General Beauregard an order for the withdrawal
of the troops, of which his chief of staff says : " General Beauregard, in the
meantime, observing the exhausted, widely scattered condition of his army,
directed it to be brought out of battle, collected and restored to order as far
568 ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SH1L0H.
as practicable, and to occupy for the night the captured encampments of the
enemy. This, however, had been done in chief part by the officers in immediate
command of the troops before the order was generally distributed." For this last
allegation, or that the army was exhausted, there is not the slightest warrant.
When Beauregard's staff-officer gave Bragg this order he said: "Have you
promulgated this order to the command? " The officer replied : " I have." Gen-
eral Bragg then said : " If you had not I would not obey it. The battle is lost."
The concurrent testimony of the generals and soldiers at the front is at one
on all essential points. General Beauregard at Shiloh, two miles in the rear,
with the debris of the army surging back upon him, the shells bursting
around him, sick with his two months' previous malady, pictured in his
imagination a wreck at the front, totally different from the actual condition
there. Had this officer been with Bragg, and not greatly prostrated and
suffering from severe sickness, I firmly believe his order would have been to
advance, not to retire. And this in spite of his theory of his plan of battle,
which he sums up as follows, and which is so different from General John-
ston's : " By a rapid and vigorous attack on General Grant, it was expected
he would be beaten back into his transports and the river, or captured in
time to enable us to profit by the victory, and remove to the rear all the
stores and munitions that would fall into our hands in such an event before
the arrival of General Buell's army on the scene. It was never contemplated,
however, to retain the position thus gained and abandon Corinth, the strategic
point of the campaign." Why, then, did General Beauregard stop short in his
career ! Sunday evening it was not a question of retaining, but of gaining,
Pittsburg Landing. Complete victory was in his grasp, and he threw it away.
General Gibson says : " General Johnston's death was a tremendous catas-
trophe. There are no words adequate to express my own conception of the
immensity of the loss to our country. Sometimes the hopes of millions of
people depend upon one head and one arm. The West perished with Albert
Sidney Johnston, and the Southern country followed."
Monday was General Beauregard's battle, and it was well fought. But in
recalling his troops from the heights which commanded the enemy's landing,
he gave away a position which during the night was occupied by Buell's
twenty thousand fresh troops, who thus regained the high grounds that had
been won at such a cost. Lew Wallace, too, had come up 6500 strong, ^r More-
over, the orders had been conveyed by Beauregard's staff to brigades and
even regiments to withdraw, and the troops wandered pack over the field,
without coherence, direction, or purpose, and encamped where chance pro-
vided for them. All array was lost, and, in the morning, they met the attack
of nearly thirty thousand fresh and organized troops, with no hope of suc-
cess except from their native valor and the resolute purpose roused by the
triumph of Sunday. Their fortitude, their courage, and the free offering of
their lives were equal to the day before. But it was a retreat, not an assault.
They retired slowly and sullenly, shattered, but not overthrown, to Corinth,
the strategic point of General Beauregard's campaign.
•fe General Wallace, in his report to General Halleck, says that his whole command "did not exceed
5000 men of all arms."— Editors.
PREACHING AT THE UNION CAMP DICK ROBINSON, KENTUCKY (SEE PAGE 377). SKETCHEO FROM A LITHOGRAPH.
THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOHJ
BY G. T. BEAUREGARD, GENERAL, ('. 8. A.
ON the 22d of January, 1862, Colonel Roger A. Pryor, a member of the Mili-
tary Committee of the lower branch of the Confederate Congress, visited
my headquarters at Centreville, Virginia, and in his own name, as also for the
representatives in Congress of the Mississippi Valley States, urged me to
consent to lie transferred from the Army of the Potomac to the command
of the Confederate forces at Columbus, Kentucky, within the Department of
Kentucky and Tennessee, under the superior command of General Albert
Sidney Johnston, — a transfer which he said Mr. Davis would not direct
unless it was agreeable to me, but which was generally desired at Richmond
because of the recent crushing disaster at Mill Springs, in eastern Kentucky:
the defeat and death of Zollicoffer. Against the monitions of some of my
friends at Richmond, and after much hesitation and disinclination to sever
my relations with such an army as that of the Potomac, but upon the
assurance that General Johnston's command embraced an aggregate of at
least seventy thousand men of all arms, which, though widely scattered,
might, by virtue of the possession of the " interior lines," be concentrated and
operated offensively, I gave Colonel Pryor authority to inform Mr. Davis of
my readiness to be thus transferred. Upon the return of Colonel Pryor to
Richmond, I was, on the 26th of January, ordered to proceed at once "to
report to General A. S. Johnston at Bowling Green, Kentucky," and thence
} Recast and revised from the "North American Review "for January and February, 1886. — Editors.
569
57© THE CAMPAIGN OF SH1L0H.
as promptly as possible to assume my new command at Columbus, " which,"
said my orders, " is threatened by a powerful force, and the defense of which
is of vital importance."
Dispatching Colonel Thomas Jordan, my chief of staff, to Richmond, with
a view to secure from the War Department certain aids to the proper organ-
ization of the troops I was to command, I left Centreville on the 2d of Feb-
ruary and reached Bowling Green about the 5th. General Johnston, whom
I had never seen before, welcomed me to his department with a cordiality and
earnestness that made a deep impression on me at the time. As he informed
me, General Buell's army, fully 75,000 strong, was on the line of Bacon Creek,
on the Louisville and Nashville railroad, about 40 miles from Bowling Green.
General Grant had about 20,000 men in hand at or about Cairo, ready to
move either upon Fort Henry or Fort Donelson. General Pope, having a
force of not less than 30,000 men in Missouri, was menacing General Polk's
positions, including New Madrid, while General Halleck, exercising command
over the whole of this force of 125,000 men of all arms, had his headquarters
at St. Louis.
On the other hand, General Johnston (as he stated, to my surprise) had
an " aggregate effective " of not over 45,000 men of all arms, thus distributed :
at Bowling Green, his headquarters, not over 14,000 ; at Forts Henry and
Donelson, 5500 ; in the quarter of Clarksville, Tennessee, 8000 ; besides 17,000
under General Polk, chiefly at Columbus, and for the most part imperfectly
organized, badly armed and equipped. As may be seen from any map of the
region, the chief part of this force occupied a defensive line facing north-
wardly, the two salient extremities of which were Bowling Green, some 70 miles
by railway in advance of Nashville, and Columbus, about 110 miles west of
Bowling Green. This line was penetrated, almost centrally, by the Cumber-
land and Tennessee rivers, respectively, at points in Tennessee just south of
the Kentucky line, twelve miles apart, at which Fort Henry had been estab-
lished on the east bank of the Tennessee, and Fort Donelson on the west
bank of the Cumberland, thus constituting the reentering angle of the line.
These vital works General Johnston described as defective in more than one
respect and unready, but said that he had sent his chief engineer to improve
their effectiveness as far as possible. So unpromising was the situation and
so different from what had been represented before I left Virginia, that my
first impulse was to return at once ; but this idea was abandoned at the ear-
nest request of General Johnston. However, after an inspection of the works
at and around Bowling Green, I found that while strong against any direct
attack, they could be readily turned on their right, and I so stated to General
Johnston. His reply was, that in the event of a serious flank movement he
must evacuate the position, having no relieving army to support it. In the
face of this self-evident military proposition, I recommended the immediate
evacuation of a position so salient as Bowling Green, that must fall from its
own weight if turned, — leaving there only a cavalry force in observation, and
concentrating at once all our available strength at Henry and Donelson,
information having just reached us of the aggressive presence of General
THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH. 571
Grant on the Tennessee River. That recommendation was not adopted, for
the alleged reason that, in the event of a failure to defeat G-eneral Grant as
proposed, our forces thus assembled might be caught and crushed between
the armies of Grant and Buell, and that it would also expose to capture the
large stock of military supplies collected so far in advance as Bowling Green
and Clarksville, as weU as at Nashville. In this decision sight was certainly
lost of the facts that, having no pontoon-train, General Buell could not possi-
bly throw his army across the Cumberland, between Donelson and Nashville,
so as to prevent the Confederates from falling safely back behind Duck
River, or retreating upon Nashville behind the Cumberland, as we would hold
the interior or shorter lines.
Fort Henry having fallen after an ineffective but gallant defense of twenty-
four hours, immediately thereafter the railroad bridge across the Tennessee,
about twelve miles southward of the surrendered fortress, was destroyed. The
direct line of communication between our forces eastward of that stream and
those at Columbus having thus been broken, on the 7th of February I again
urged as imperative the swift concentration of ail our then available forces
upon Donelson. General Johnston, however, asserting that Fort Donelson
was not " tenable," would only support the position by directing the force at
Clarksville to cross to the south side of the Tennessee River, and ordered
immediate "preparations " to be made for the " removal" of the arm}1- at Bowl-
ing Green, "to Nashville, in rear of the Cumberland River." % He also pre-
scribed that, "from Nashville, should any further retrograde movement
become necessary," it should be " made to Stevenson and thence according to
circumstances."^ He further declared that as "the possession of the Ten-
nessee River by the enemy, resulting from the fall of Fort Henry, separated
the army at Bowling Green from the one at Columbus," henceforth the forces
thus sundered must "act independently of each other until they can again
be brought together." ^
Fort Henry fell on the 6th of February, but General Grant, failing to press
the signal advantage thus gained, did not advance against Fort Donelson
until the 12th, and then with but 15,000 men, having dispatched, at the same
time, 6 regiments under General Lew Wallace by water. The investment of
the position was not Completed, however, until early on the 13th of February,
the Confederate commander having had a whole week for preparation. On
the 6th of February the Confederate garrison at Fort Donelson embraced
about 600 artillerists and 3 regiments of infantry, or at most 2350 officers
and men; to this force Heiman's brigade and other troops, some 2500 men,
were added that night, having been detached that morning from Fort
Henry. Between the morning of the 7th of February and the investment of
the position by the Federal army of 15,000 men, on the morning of the 13th,
it was further increased from the troops on the east and north side of the
Cumberland, under Brigadier-General Floyd, to whom the command of the
defense was now intrusted, so as to be, in numbers, about equal to that of the
enemy on the land side, until the latter was reenforced by General Wallace's
& See p. 487, "Life of General A. S. Johnston," by W. P. Johnston. New York: D. Appleton & Co.
572 THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.
division, nearly 10,000 strong, later in the afternoon of the 14th. By that
time the evacuation of Bowling Green, determined upon, as I have said, on the
7th, — and commenced on the 11th of February, — had been completed, the Con-
federate rear-guard having marched out of the town at 3 : 30 p. m. on the 14th.
Satisfied, as affairs stood, that Nashville and the Valley of the Cumberland
could only be defended successfully at Donelson and by the crushing defeat
of General Grant in that quarter, an end to which all other considerations
were evidently of minor military importance, I had insisted, as I may repeat,
upon that as the one evident exigent operation. That the resolution to give
up Bowling Green and to begin such a movement as early as the 11th of Feb-
ruary ought to have removed every possible objection on the part of General
Johnston to going at once in person with fully ten thousand of his Bowling
Green army, I am very sure must be the ultimate professional lesson taught
by the history of that most disastrous Confederate campaign ! Nothing were
easier in the exigency than the transfer from Bowling Green to Donelson by
the night of the 13th of February of ten thousand men, after General Johnston
had decided that the immediate abandonment of Kentucky was an imperative
necessity. \ Thus, on the morning of the 14th, General Grant's army of 15,000
men could and should have been confronted with nearly if not quite 25,000
men, who, promptly handled, must have so effectually beaten their adversary,
taken at such disadvantage, before the advent of Lew Wallace that afternoon,
as to have enhanced the victory for the Confederates by the immediate defeat
of Wallace also.
What happened from the policy adopted by the Confederate general in
chief may be briefly stated : Fort Donelson was surrendered at 2 a. m. on the
16th of February, and with it 11,600 men. In the expressive words of Gen-
eral Johnston's telegram, which reached me at Corinth, " We lost all." And
as in the business of war, as in all other material human affairs, " the omis-
sion to do that which is necessary seals a commission to a blank of dangers,"
so was it now. The failure to employ opportunely all possible available
resources against General Grant, and the consequent loss of Donelson, with
its invaluable garrison, carried immediately in its train the irrevocable loss
of Nashville also, with the early abandonment of Middle Tennessee. Another
irrevocable consequence was the evacuation of Columbus, with incalculable
moral detriments. And had the stroke consummated at Donelson been vigor-
ously pressed to its proper military corollary, — Buell being left to look after the
remains of Johnston's army, — General Grant's victorious army of 25,000 men,
with the resources of transportation at its disposal, might have been thrown
within ten days, at latest, after the fall of Donelson, upon the rear of General
Polk's forces at Columbus and their easy capture thus have been assured.
Going no farther in the direction of Columbus than Jackson, in West Ten-
nessee, fifty-seven miles north of Corinth, I there established my head-
quarters, and called thither Colonel Jordan, my chief of staff, who had gone
to Columbus direct from Virginia (with Captain D. B. Harris, my chief engi-
4- It is noteworthy that in the movement to Nashville from Bowling Green, Breckinridge's division
was marched twenty-seven miles one day. — G. T. B.
THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH. 573
neer) to inspect the command. His report npon rejoining me about the 17th
of February, and that of Captain Harris, regarding the exaggerated exten-
sion of the lines, coupled with a faulty location, imperfect command of the
river, and defective organization of the troops, confirmed my opinion that
the place could not be evacuated too soon. General Polk, whom I also called
to Jackson, I found possessed with a belief in the defensive capacity of the
position and averse to its abandonment. However, upon my exposition of
its saliency, and the ease with which its communications, both by railway
and water, might be broken, he changed his views. As, meanwhile General
Johnston had telegraphed that I must do with respect to Columbus as my
" judgment dictates " ; and also, that " the separation of our armies is now
complete " ; and further, as upon my report of the situation at Columbus the
Confederate War Department had consented, on the 19th of February Gen-
eral Polk was directed to prepare to evacuate the position without delay.
It was only to be held long enough to remove its invaluable ordnance
to the batteries erected or under construction at Island Number Ten
and Madrid Bend, to New Madrid and to Fort Pillow, upon which the
ultimate defense of the Mississippi River must depend thereafter. The
preparation of these works for the vital service hoped from them was now
intrusted to Captain D. B. Harris, who subsequently left so brilliant a rec-
ord as a consummate engineer at Charleston and Savannah, Drewry's Bluff
and Petersburg.
On the 25th of February commenced the evacuation of a position the
attempt to hold which must have resulted in the loss by capture of the corps
of at least 13,000 men thus isolated, or, on the other hand, if left intact or
unassailed by the enemy, must have been rendered wholly unavailable in the
formation of a Confederate army for the recovery of what had been lately
lost, — a corps without which no such army could have been possibly assem-
bled at Corinth as early as the 1st of April, 1862.
Because of a severe bronchial affection contracted by exposure before leav-
ing Bowling Green, I had not assumed formal command of the military dis-
trict assigned to me, though virtually directing all the movements within it,
and arduously endeavoring to become acquainted with the chief points within
its limits, — a course specially requested of me by General Johnston through
his adjutant-general, in the event that I should not feel "well enough to
assume command."
Meanwhile, threatened by Buell's presence with a large army in front of
Nashville, General Johnston, following the line of retreat (marked out as
early as February 7th) to Stevenson, in north-eastern Alabama, had moved
as far in that direction as Murfreesboro', where he assembled about 17,000
men by the 23d of February, who were there subdivided into 3 divisions each
of 2 brigades, with a " reserve " under Brigadier-General Breckinridge, and
several cavalry regiments unattached.
As the system of the "passive defensive" hitherto pursued had only led
us to disaster, — the natural fruits, in fact, of the system, — encouraged by the
latitude that was given me in General Johnston's telegram of February 18th,
574 THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.
I resolved to exert myself to the utmost, despite all that was so unpromising,
to secure the means for an aggressive campaign against the enemy, of whose
early movement up the Tennessee there were already such indications that
there should be no doubt as to its objective.
But as General Johnston's projected line of retrograde upon Stevenson
must with each day's march widen the distance between that army and the
corps of General Polk, while General Grant, naturally flushed with his recent
signal successes, would be left free at any moment to move up the Tennessee
to Hamburg or, indeed, to Eastport, and thus, by seizing the Memphis and
Charleston railroad, effectually separate and virtually neutralize the two Con-
federate armies, — my sole force left available for the protection of that
important railway, exclusive of General Polk's forces at Columbus and else-
where, would be but 2500 men under Chalmers, in the quarter of Iuka, with
3000 men recently arrived at Corinth from New Orleans, under Ruggles.
With a view to avoiding such a catastrophe as the enforced permanent
separation of our two armies, I urged General Johnstpn, about the 22d of
February, to abandon his line of inarch toward Stevenson, and to hasten to
unite his army with such troops as I might be able to assemble, meanwhile, at
the best point to cover the railroad center at Corinth together with Memphis,
while holding Island Number Ten and Fort Pillow. This plan, of course,
required more troops than our united armies would supply. Therefore, on the
22d of February, I dispatched staff-officers with a circular addressed to the
governors of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee respecting the
supreme urgency and import of the situation, in all its phases, and invoking
their utmost exertions to send me, each of them, from 5000 to 10,000 men as
well armed and equipped as possible, enrolled for 90 days, within which period,
by timely, vigorous action, I trusted we might recover our losses, and assure
the defense of the Mississippi River. |) At the same time I appealed to Gen-
eral Bragg for such troops as he could possibly spare temporarily in such an
exigency, from Mobile and Pensacola; and to General Lovell for the like aid
from New Orleans. To General Van Dorn, represented to have an army
twenty thousand strong in Arkansas, I likewise sent, on the 21st of February,
a most pressing invitation to come in haste to our aid with as many men as
possible, by way of New Madrid. To him I wrote (" 0. R.," VII., 900) : " The
fate of Missouri necessarily depends on the successful defense of Columbus
and of Island Number Ten; hence we must, if possible, combine our opera-
tions not only to defend those positions, but also to take the offensive as soon
as practicable to recover some lost ground."
General Johnston acceded to my views and request, though he did not
put his troops in motion until the 28th of February, and although he
regarded the projected attempt to unite his army with mine a " hazardous
experiment." \
\ See ''Military Operations of General Beaure- those who are declaiming against me will be
gard" (N. Y. : Harper & Brothers), I., 240-241. without an argument." — "Life of General A. S.
\ "If I join this corps to the forces of Beaure- Johnston." Letter dated Decatur, Alabama, March
gard (I confess a hazardous experiment), then ISth, 1862, p. 521. — G. T. B.
THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH. 575
The evacuation of Columbus was successfully completed on the 2d of March,
apparently without any suspicion on the part of our adversary in that quar-
ter that such an operation had been going on, or without the least show of
that vigilance and vigor that were to be apprehended from him after the
series of most serious disasters for the Confederate arms which had character-
ized the month of February, 1862. About seven thousand men were now
placed at New Madrid, and in the quarter of Island Number Ten, under the
command of General McCown, while the rest of General Polk's force was with-
drawn along the line of the Mobile and Ohio railroad as far south as Hum-
boldt, and there held in observation, with a small detachment of infantry
left at Union City, and some five hundred cavalry thrown well out toward
Hickman, on the Mississippi below Columbus, and extending across to the
Tennessee Eiver in the quarter of Paris, to watch and report all material
movements upon either river.
Reliable information reached me that while General Pope was on his march
on the Missouri side of the Mississippi, to strike at New Madrid, such was
the urgency of the danger impending by way of the Tennessee River that it
threatened the fatal hindrance of the conjunction of our forces, as already
arranged about the 23d of February, in response to my dispatch through my
aide-de-camp, Captain Ferguson. Growing profoundly apprehensive, on the
2d of March I dispatched Captain Otey, an assistant adjutant-general on
my staff, with a note to General Johnston which contained these words:
"I send herewith inclosed a slip showing intended movements of the
enemy, no doubt against the troops in Western Tennessee. I think
you ought to hurry up your troops to Corinth by railroad, as soon as prac-
ticable, for [t]here ix or thereabouts will be fought the great battle of this
controversy."
I thus fixed upon Corinth as the Confederate base, because the recent
movements of our enemy up the Tennessee could only be intelligently con-
strued as having the Memphis and Charleston railroad primarily, and such
a railway center as Corinth later, as their immediate objectives. ,1
•fe Evidently the word " here," as it appears in to foretell in January, 1862, that a battle would be
the original letter as it reached General John- fought at "Shiloh Church," General Johnston must
ston, did not refer and could not possibly have also have foreseen at that moment that within the
referred to Jackson, but to Corinth, as is shown next thirty days General Grant would strike and
by the context of that letter and of others rel- capture the Confederate center at Forts Henry and
ative to Corinth as the evident Federal objec- Donelson, with one-fourth of the entire force under
five. — G. T. B. General Johnston's command at the time, as also
J To say, as has been done, with apparent seri- obtain the control of both the Tennessee and Cum-
ousness, by Colonel W. P. Johnston [see p. 549 of berland rivers as far as navigable; thus forcing
the present work], that his father "sent "me at any the immediate loss by abandonment of the ContVd-
time, "with instructions to concentrate all avail- crates in turn of Bowling Green, Nashville, and Co-
able forces near Corinth, — a movement previously lumbus ; foreseen also that General Grant would
begun," — is a sheer invention that is twin-born straightway establish himself at so unfavorable a
with the fable concerning General Johnston and base of opei'ations as Pittsburg Landing rather
the map upon which in January, 1862, it is alleged, than at Hamburg, which was really about to be
he pointed out a position which had been marked by made the Federal base of operations when the bat-
the engineers " Shiloh Church," and said in effect : tie of Shiloh interrupted the movement. Under no
"Here the great battle of the South-east will be other conditions could there have been a battle at
fought" ("Life of General A. S. Johnston," by Shiloh Church, a mere log-cabin, unmarked on any
W. P. Johnston, pp. 488-490). Now, to be able map existing in January, 1862. — G. T. B.
576
THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, C. S. A
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH. (SEE ALSO PAGE 377.)
On the 5th of March I formally as-
sumed command of the district, retain-
ing my headquarters for the time at
Jackson as the most central point
of observation and the junction of
two railroads. General Bragg's forces
began to arrive at Corinth on the 6th,
when they, with the other troops reach-
ing there from other quarters, were
organized as fast as possible into bri-
gades and divisions.
As a material part of the history of
the campaign? I might here dwell upon
the perplexing, inexplicable lack of
cordial cooperation, in many ways, in
the essential work of organizing the
Confederate army being assembled at
Corinth, as efficiently and speedily as
possible for the work ahead, that was
manifested by the War Department at
Richmond, but it must suffice to say
that a drawback was encountered from
that quarter which served to delay us, while helping to make the operation
which we finally took in hand fall greatly short of its momentous aim.
Five Federal divisions (reenforced a few days later) had reached Savannah,
twelve miles below Pittsburg Landing, on the east bank of the Tennessee, by
the 13th of February. This force, aggregating some 43,000 men of all arms,
was under the direct command of General C. F. Smith, and embraced the
greater part of the army that had triumphed at Donelson. One division,
without landing at Savannah, was dispatched, under General W. T. Sherman,
to endeavor to land, and to reach and cut some trestle-work near Burnsville,
on the Memphis and Charleston railroad. Effecting a landing, short, however,
of Eastport, the intervening country was found so inundated as to be seem-
ingly impracticable. So, this expedition, hardly characterized by a really
vigorous effort to reach the railroad, was abortive — a result aided somewhat
by the opportune presence on the ground of Brigadier-General Chalmers with
a Confederate force of 2500 infantry. On his way upon this expedition, Gen-
eral Sherman had wisely sent back from Pittsburg Landing a request that
a Federal division should be dispatched at once to that point, to prevent the
Confederate forces from occupying it and obstructing his return; consequently
Hurlbut's division was sent thither, and it was found on its transports at that
point by Sherman on his return that far down the river on the 16th of March.
Sherman, landing there his own division, made an apparently objectless short
inarch into the interior and back on the 17th of March. Making his report the
same day to General Grant, who had just reached Savannah, General Sherman
stated that he was "strongly impressed with the position" of Pittsburg Land-
THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.
577
SLAVES LABORING AT NIGHT ON THE CONFEDERATE EARTHWORKS AT CORINTH.
ing, "for its land advantages and its strategic character. The ground itself
admits of easy defense by a small command, and yet affords admirable camping-
ground for one hundred thousand men." Unquestionably, it was upon this
report that Pittsburg, rather than Hamburg, was made the Federal base ; for
Hurlbut's and Sherman's divisions were immediately ordered ashore to
encamp upon a prescribed line, while, on the same day General Grant directed
all the other troops at Savannah except one division to be immediately sent
to the same point; Wallace's division being left, however, at Cramp's Land-
ing. About the position thus taken by the Federal army, there can hardly
be two professional opinions. It gave their adversary an opportunity for an
almost fatal counterstroke such as has rarely been afforded to the weaker of
two belligerents in all the sinews and resources of war. A narrow cul de sac,
formed by Snake Creek and Lick Creek, with the broad bank-full river form-
ing its bottom, tactically as well as strategically it was a false position for an
invading army, and I may add that, having been occupied, the exigent pre-
caution, under the circumstances, of making a place (Pannes of it was wholly
overlooked, though it was barely twenty-three miles distant from Corinth,
where, according to the Federal general's reports of the period, a supposed
Confederate army of from 50,000 to 60,000 men were concentrated.
Previously, or as early as the 3d of March, Pope, with about 19,000 " present
for duty," had appeared before New Madrid, in Missouri,, the essentially
weak or most vulnerable point of our upper Mississippi defenses. & Delaying
& Five divisions each of 2 brigades, 3 regiments of cavalry, a body of unattached troops, including
some "regulars," and 11 batteries of field-artillery. "Official Eecords," VIIL, 91.— G. T. B.
VOL. I. 37
S78 THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.
his attack, however, until the 12th, — until siege-guns could be brought
up, — the works there were easily made so untenable that General McCown
abandoned them and transferred his forces, at night, across the river to sup-
port the heavy batteries at Madrid Bend and Island Number Ten.
About the time Pittsburg Landing was made General Grant's base, I had
collected within easy marches of Corinth about 23,000 men of all arms of the
service, independent of the forces of General Polk, — giving, with his troops
and including those at Forts Pillow and Madrid Bend, an aggregate of at
most 44,000 men, of excellent personality but badly armed — particularly the
cavalry, some of whom had no arms at all. The new forces, with the excep-
tion of those from Mobile, Pensacola, and New Orleans, were raw and undis-
ciplined. Made aware by the great number of transports! that were now
plying up and down the Tennessee of the magnitude of the invasion that
clearly threatened the seizure of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, the delay
on the part of the Bowling Green forces filled both General Bragg and myself
with great solicitude. Meanwhile, on the 15th of March, General Johnston
addressed me by telegraph : " Have you had the south bank of the Hatchee
examined near Bolivar ? I recommend it to your attention. It has, besides
the other advantages, that of being further from the enemy's line," — that
is, Pittsburg Landing. As the essential point for us, however, was to
strike a blow at General Grant so soon as General Johnston's troops were
united with mine, but before BuelPs junction with the exposed army at
Pittsburg, I could see no possible advantage in the least increase of dis-
tance from our real objective so soon as the advent of General Johnston's
troops should give us the power to undertake the offensive. Exposing these
features of the situation, I again urged General Johnston to hurry his forces
forward.
On the 22d of March he reached Corinth with his staff, and I went down
from Jackson to meet him. Proceeding at once to explain to him what
resources had been collected and all that was known of the position and
numbers of our adversary at Pittsburg, as also my views of the imperative
necessity for an immediate movement against that adversary lest Buell's
forces should become a fatal factor in the campaign, to my surprise General
Johnston, with much emotion, informed me that it was his purpose to turn
over to me the command of the entire force being assembled at Corinth, and
thereafter confine himself to the duties of department commander, with his
headquarters either at Memphis or Holly Springs, in Mississippi. This course,
as he explained, he felt called upon to take in order to restore confidence to
the people and even the army, so greatly impaired by reason of recent disas-
ters. Thoroughly understanding and appreciating his motives (and about
these and his words there could be no possible misinterpretation), I declined as
altogether unnecessary the unselfish tender of the command, but agreed, after
some further exchange of views touching the military situation, to draw up
a plan for the organization of our forces, and, as second in command, to
supervise the task of organization.
4 Sixty-one of these transports were reported to have passed by a point known as Coffee.— G. T. B.
THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.
579
By the 27th of March the last of General Hardee's corps reached the vicinity
of Corinth, — about 8000 men, — while Crittenden's division of 5000 men was
halted at Burnsville and Iuka, eastward of Corinth. The order of organiza-
tion, signed by General Johnston, was published on the 29th of March. Based
on my notes, it had been drawn up by Colonel Jordan, and subdivided the
armies of Kentucky and Mississippi, now united, into three army corps,
with reserves of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, the corps under Major-Gen-
erals Polk, Bragg, and Hardee respectively, and the reserve (two brigades)
under Major-General G. B. Crittenden. On the 30th of March, Colonel
Mackall having been promoted and assigned to the command of the river
defenses at Madrid Bend, Colonel Jordan was formally announced as the
adjutant-general of the "Army of the Mississippi," and on the following day
Brigadier-General Breckinridge was substituted for General Crittenden in the
command of the reserve.
So much longer time than I had anticipated had been taken in effecting
the junction of the " Central Army " with mine, agreed upon as far back as
the 23d of February, that we were scarcely as ready for assuming the offen-
sive as I had hoped to be, at latest by the 1st of April.
However, on the night of the 2d of April, after 10 o'clock, a dispatch from
Brigadier-General Cheatham, in command at Bethel Station, twenty odd
miles north of Corinth, reached me through General Polk, to the effect that
he was being menaced by General Lew Wallace's division. Assuming that the
enemy had divided his forces for an operation against the Mobile and Ohio
railroad at Bethel, I thus indorsed the dispatch: "Now is the moment to
advance and strike the enemy at Pittsburg Landing." Colonel Jordan
was then asked to carry it at once to General Johnston, who, after reading
both dispatch and indorsement, accompanied by Colonel Jordan, went
to General Bragg's quarters near by. That officer, already in bed, imme-
diately agreed with my recommendation. General Johnston presented objec-
tions in effect that our forces were not as yet ready for the movement, and
that we could not move up our reserve in time. Colonel Jordan, however,
was able to reassure him on these points by expressing my conviction that
we were as ready now as we could hope to be for some time to come, whereas
the union of Buell's forces with Grant, which might be anticipated at an
early day, would make any offensive operation on our side out of the ques-
tion. Thereupon, General Johnston instructed Colonel Jordan to issue the
orders for the movement. This was done in General Bragg's bed-chamber,
in a "circular" to the three corps commanders directing them "to hold their
commands in hand, ready to advance upon the enemy in the morning by
6 A. m., with 3 days' cooked rations in haversacks, 100 rounds of ammunition
for small arms, and 200 rounds for field-pieces. Carry 2 days' cooked sub-
sistence in wagons and 2 tents to the company." These orders reached the
hands of Generals Polk and Hardee by 1 : 30 a. m., and General Breckinridge
was notified to the same effect by telegraph that night.
As it had been agreed between General Johnston and myself, the day
after his arrival at Corinth, that all orders relating to our operations in that
s8o
THE CAMPAIGN OF SHJLOH.
ing on the battle, which I hand-
ed to Colonel Jordan soon after
daylight the next morning.
Those notes served as the basis
of Special Orders, No. 8 of that
date, issned in the name of
General Johnston. However,
before these orders were finally
quarter, as, also, touching re-
organization, should be left in
my hands, during the night of
the 2d of April I had made
notes regulating the order of
march from Corinth to Pitts-
burg, and the manner of bring-
Sfeii
wm.m '"
?»££.
CORINTH DWELLINGS.
I. Bragg's headquarters, afterward Halleck's, later Hood's. 2. Beauregard's
headquarters. 3. Grant's headquarters, June, 1862. 4. Kosecrans's head-
quarters, October, 1862. 5. House in which Albert Sidney Johnston's body lay
in state after the battle of Shiloh.
THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.
S8i
written, all the details were explained to and discussed by me with Gen-
eral Johnston, who came early to my headquarters ; next, before 10 a. m.,
I explained to and instructed Generals Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, also, at
my headquarters, in the presence of General Johnston and of one another,
precisely what each of them had to do with their respective corps that
day, and they were severally directed to put their corps in motion by the
described roads in the direction of the enemy, by 12 meridian, without
further order.
Though the distance to be traversed was barely twenty-three miles, it was
no easy matter to move an army of thirty odd thousand essentially raw troops,
with their artillery, through so densely wooded a country as that intervening
between Corinth and our objective. Of the two narrow country roads that
existed, the shorter was assigned to Bragg's corps, because it was the one
immediately contiguous to it ; while to Hardee's corps was given the initiation
of the movement, with the longest line of march as well as the front line
in the approaching onset, because it was made up of troops most hardened
by long marches, and the best trained in field service. Polk's corps
followed Hardee's necessarily, because there was no other way for it, J)
| As for marching upon Pittsburg in three sep-
arate columns of corps, as would seem to be indi-
cated in the cipher dispatch to Mr. Davis of the
3d of April, the terrain to be passed over made
such a movement an absolute impossibility. And
I must add, that another pretension set up by
Colonel Johnston, supported by Mr. Davis, is flatly
contradicted by the official reports of the corps
commanders, which show that they entered battle
exactly as prescribed in Special Orders, No. 8.
Apropos of the alleged missing dispatch of April
4th, Mr. Davis has asseverated as recently as the
spring of 1887, that it was in a different cipher
from that of April 3d, which erroneously described
the manner of march, not only in date and matter,
but in the character of cipher used, being in a
cipher that he had sent General Johnston specially
for such a dispatch: a fatal statement in view of the
fact that there is to be found (p. 365, Vol. X., Part
II.," Official Eecords") this postscriptum to a letter
from Mr. Davis to General Johnston, dated as late
as March 26th, 1862:
" I send you [by Mr. Jack] a dictionary, of which I have
the duplicate, so that you may communicate with me by
cipher, telegraphic or written, as follows: First give the
page by its number; second, the column by the letter L,
M, or K, as it may be, in the left-hand, middle, or right-
hand column ; third, the number of the word in the
column, counting from the top. Thus, the word junc-
tion would be designated by 146, L, 20."
That is, Mr. Davis sent him the very diction-
ary which supplied the cipher into which the
original of General Johnston's dispatch to Mr.
Davis of April 3d was translated, by one of my
staff, for transmission, having been handed over
to me for that purpose by General Johnston ; and
a copy of the translation into that cipher is to be
seen, in its due order of date, in my telegraph-book
of the period. That Captain Jack reached Corinth
before General Johnston advanced against Pitts-
burg is stated, page 522 of Col. Johnston's Life of
his father, on which page, I may notice, is the very
letter from Davis of the 20th of March, but with
the material postscriptum omitted. After General
Johnston's death, the original of the telegram of
April 3d was found, but no record of another later
one, which Mr. Davis claims to have received,
basing that claim, manifestly, only on the fact that
in his own reply, dated April 5th, he had referred
to a telegram "of yesterday," which plainly could
only be that of April 3d, received, however, on
the 4th, which he erroneously supposed to be of that
date. That Mr. Davis's telegram was an answer
to no other dispatch than that of the 3d of April
is plain from the text of that answer, for it clearly
echoes its language. For the clear understanding
of this much-mooted matter, I give the exact cipher
text of the dispatch of April 3d, as it reached Mr.
Davis, as I insist, not until April nth, and as it is
of record in my official telegram-book in its regu-
lar order of date as follows :
"Corinth, April 3d, 1862, 3 P. M.
"To the President, Richmond. Va.
"General Buell 132. E. r> — 166 L 26 — 250.
M 20 — 250 R g — 239 M 32 — 1 1 1 M 28 —Colum-
bia 43 M 6— Clifton 252 M 6.— 218 M. 26. Mit-
chell 32. R. 22 — 124. R, 32.-276 R 27—248
M, 1 — 250 R. 9—59 R. 17 — 108 — M. 20 —
1 09. R.l 6 — 175 R 6 ed — 109 R. 18— 252. M 6-
1 74 L. 2s — 31 M. 19— 09. L. 12 — Pittsburg—
84 M. 4 — 111. M. 28 — Bethel— 159 M. 4 — 37
M. 20—111. M. 28 Corinth— L> 10 M. 16 111 M.
28— Burnsville — 63 R. 25— LT.2 R. 11 — 169.
L 12 — Monterey — 1 74. R. 14 — Pittsburg. Beau-
regard, 221 R. 10 — 132 R. 5 — 56, M. 14 —
Polk 150. M. 7 — Hardee, 48. M. 3— Bragg 213
M. 6 — 276. M. 22. Breckinridge 210 M. 16 —
126 M. 4 — 92. R. 18 — 32. M. 28 — Buell 44. M
13 — 109 M. 6 — 146. L. 20 — (Signed) A. S.
Johnston, General C. S. A.''
The translated text, as given both by Mr. Davis
582 THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.
and next to Hardee's troops those under Polk had been most seasoned
by marching.
Although our troops were under arms at an early hour on the 3d of April,
as prescribed in the "circular" order, it is a part of the history of the cam-
paign that the commanders of the two leading corps not only failed to put
their troops in motion at least as early as meridian on the 3d of April, but
did not move until so late in the afternoon as in effect to cause our army, to
reach the presence of its objective twenty-four hours later than there was
every reason to expect, considering the shortness of the distance to be over-
come. What led to this delay of the outset of the Second and Third corps
has certainly never been explained in any official document which has yet
seen the light. Their preparations necessary for such a movement were of
the slightest, or only to cook five days' rations, and to load a few wagons, for
the amount of ammunition to be carried was no more than they had been
directed some days previously to have and keep in possession of the troops.
Moreover, Hardee's corps (Polk's also), " with all detached brigades," had been
under orders of "readiness for a field movement" ever since the 1st of April
("Official Records," Vol. X., Part II., p. 381). Be this as it may, Bragg's corps
did not quit the vicinage of Corinth until so late that afternoon that none of it
reached Monterey, twelve miles away, until the next morning at 8:30, and
one division (Withers's) was not there until late on the 4th of April. Har-
dee's corps, though dilatory in quitting Corinth, would have easily reached its
destination early enough on the second day's march to have been deployed on
the same ground that it occupied on the night of the 5th, twenty-four hours
later, had not General Bragg interposed his authority to check its advance.
The march on the 4th was unaccountably slow and confused, especially that of
the Second Corps, in view of the numerous staff attached to the headquarters
of each corps. The roads were extremely narrow and rendered excessively
bad for artillery in some places by the rains, while the Second Corps was
unused to marching; but all this hardly made it out of the power of that army
to reach its objective by the night of April 4th, had there been a closer
personal attention given to the movement during that day by those whose
duty it was to execute Special Orders, No. 8. And the cost was an irreme-
diable loss of twenty-four hours. Another misadventure, that might have
brought us sore disaster, was a cavalry reconnoissance with two pieces of artil-
lery pushed forward without authority on the 4th, from Bragg's corps into
and Colonel Johnston, is in these words : " Cor- In publishing it as found among his father's
inth, April 3d, 18G2. General Buell in motion papers, the son presents this telegram as "contain-
30,000 strong, rapidly from Columbia by Clifton ing the plan of battle as General Johnston had
to Savannah. Mitchel behind him with 10,000. originally devised, but not as he had fought it;
Confederate forces — 40,000 — ordered forward doubtless in deference to General Beauregard's
to offer battle near Pittsburg. Division from opinion in the matter, and for reasons which
Bethel, main body from Corinth, reserve from seemed sufficient at the time." On the other hand,
Bivrnsville, converging to-morrow near Monterey Mr. Davis gives it not as a plan of battle, but merely
on Pittsburg. Beauregard second in command, of the march from Corinth to the field, — while the
Polk the left, Bragg the center, Hardee the right alleged missing dispatch of the 4th of April gave
wing, Breckinridge the reserve. Hope engage- not only the plan of battle as devised, but as it
ment before Buell can form junction, was fought up to the moment of General John-
"To the President, Richmond." ston's death. — G. T. B.
THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH. 583
collision with the enemy with such aggressiveness that it ought to have given
the Federal general full notice that an offensive army was close behind it, and
led to immediate preparation for our onset, including intrenchments.
. After the Third Corps had reached its assigned position, on the after-
noon of the 5th of April, and the other corps were in supporting distance,
including the reserve that had encountered a much more difficult road
between Burnsville and Monterey than had been traversed by the other
troops, naturally their commanders were called together at a point not two
miles distant from Shiloh Church, — as it turned out, not far in the rear of
Hardee's line.
Of course, it was recognized to be too late for an attack that day. More-
over, it was reported that the First Corps was already nearly out of provisions,
and that the ammunition train was still so far to the rear as to be unprom-
ising. The loss of twenty-four hours, when every hour was precious because
of the imminent danger of Buell's conjunction, the maladroit manner in
which our troops had been handled on the march, and the blunder of the
noisy, offensive reconnoissance, coupled with these reports of corps com-
manders, served to satisfy me that the purpose for which we had left Corinth
had been essentially frustrated and should be abandoned as no longer fea-
sible. The military essence of our projected operation was that it should be
a surprise, whereas, now, I could not believe the enemy was still ignorant
of our near presence with an aggressive intention, and if now attacked would
be found intrenched beyond the possibility of being beaten in assault by so
raw and undisciplined an army as ours was, however intrepid. Hence, an
imperative prudence that included the necessity for preserving that army
essentially intact for further operations forced me to advise against any
attempt now to attack the enemy in position and to retrace our steps toward
our* base with the possible result of leading him to follow us away from his
own and thus giving us a probable opening to the retrieval of the present
lost opportunity.
General Johnston listened needfully to what I said, but answered that he
hoped not only we should find our enemy still unready for a sudden onslaught,
but that there was yet time for it before Buell could come up ; therefore, he
should decide to adventure the enterprise as early after dawn the next day
as possible, adding his opinion that now our troops were partly in line of
battle it were " better to make the venture." The opinions of the corps com-
manders, I may add, were neither asked nor given. That my views were
based on sound military principles it seems to me could be readily deduced
from what followed at the battle of Shiloh itself, were this the place for such
a discussion.
So soon as General Johnston's decision was announced, the conference
ended with the understanding on all sides that the battle should be ventured
at dawn on the 6th of April, according to the manner already prescribed in
Special Orders, No. 8, to which end every exertion should be made to place
our troops in the best shape possible for the attack. No further conference
was held that night by General Johnston with myself, or with the reserve
584 THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.
or corps commanders ; nor did he issue any order at all concerning the
impending battle.
At the first flush of dawn on the 6th, the Confederate army was promptly
formed in the three lines directed in Special Orders, No. 8, except that unto-
wardly the left of Hardee's corps, which, reenforced by Gladden's division of
Bragg's corps, constituted the advance, did not rest on Owl Creek, as pre-
scribed. Nine thousand and twenty-four men were in this line, deployed for
battle, and formed, as it were, a heavy skirmish line thrown forward to
embrace the whole Federal front. Five hundred yards rearward was Bragg's
corps (less Gladden's division), 10,731 men, exclusive of cavalry, in a line, as
far as the nature of the ground admitted, of regiments massed in double col-
umns at half distance — not deployed in line of battle, as some writers have
stated, coupled with criticisms based thereon. General Polk's corps of 9036
men, exclusive of cavalry, came next, some 800 yards behind Bragg in a col-
umn of brigades deployed in line of battle on the left of the Pittsburg road,
each brigade having its own battery, and there was cavalry protecting the
left of his line. The reserve, under Breckinridge, of 7062 men, exclusive of
cavalry, marched in the rear of Bragg's right or between the Pittsburg 'road
and Lick Creek. The troops of the third line were to be thrown forward
according to the exigencies of the battle. The total force thus sent for-
ward against the Federal position numbered 40,335 rank and file, of all
arms, including 4382 cavalry, more than half of whom were of no other
military value except for observation or outpost service that did not involve
skirmishing. [See estimates, page 557.]
On the other hand, the force to be assailed occupied "a continuous line
from Lick Creek, on the [Federal] left, to Owl Creek, a branch of Snake
Creek, on the [Federal] right, facing nearly south, and possibly a little west,"
says General Grant. Their first line, reaching from the bridge on Owl Creek
to the Lick Creek ford, was held by the divisions of Generals Sherman
and Prentiss ; three of Sherman's brigades holding the Federal right, while
the other (Stuart's) was on the extreme left, with its left resting on Lick Creek.
This division had from 16 to 18 guns, and also a cavalry support. Prentiss
occupied the intervening space. These two divisions numbered at least seven-
teen thousand men, exclusive of cavalry.\
About half a mile behind Sherman and Prentiss came McClernand's divis-
ion of 7028 effectives ; nearer the river were the divisions of C. F. Smith,
(under W. H. L. Wallace) and of Hurlbut, aggregating 16,000 men with 34
guns. There was also a cavalry force including detachments from two " regu-
lar " regiments. Thus the force encountered must have numbered forty thou-
sand men, infantry and artillery, supported by sixty odd guns. The ground
occupied was an undulating table-land embraced between Owl Creek and
Lick Creek, that run nearly in the same general direction and are about four
miles apart at their mouths. This area, rising in some places about one hun-
dred feet above the low-water level of the river, was from three to five miles
\ Prentiss's division is reported ("Official Eecords," Vol. X., Part I., 112) as numbering but 54G3
men " present for duty " April 5th, but 2 regiments and a battery joined during the battle. — G. T. B.
THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.
585
broad. Interlaced by a network of ravines, which, near the river, are deep,
with abrupt sides, the ground rises somewhat ridge-like in the quarter of
Lick Creek, and recent rains had made all these depressions boggy and diffi-
"cult for the movement of artillery across them. A primitive forest, dense
with undergrowth, spread over the whole space except a few scattered farm
fields of from fifty
to seventy-five acres.
Pittsburg Landing,
near the mouth of
Snake Creek, was
about three miles
from that of Lick
Creek. The two roads
from Corinth, while
crossing Lick Creek
about a mile asunder,
come together two
miles from Pittsburg.
A road from Purdy,
crossing Owl Creek by
a bridge near Sher-
man's right, gave one
way to reach the field
from Crump's Land-
ing, but the shortest
road between the two
landings was one near
the river leading over
a bridge across Snake
Creek.
As it has been de-
nied in the highest
quarters that the Con-
federate attack on the '6th of April was of the nature of a surprise, it belongs
to the history of the day's operations to give here these words of a note from
General Sherman to his chief, in the afternoon of the 5th. The " enemy is
saucy, but got the worst of it yesterday. . . . I do not apprehend any-
thing like an attack upon our position." General Grant thereupon wrote
to his superior, General Halleck: "Our outposts have been attacked in con-
siderable force. I immediately went up, but found all quiet. ... I have
scarcely the faintest idea of an attack upon us." Moreover, at 3 o'clock
p. m., having visited the encampment of Colonel Ammen near Savannah,
General Grant informed that officer that water transportation would be
furnished for his brigade of Nelson's division, Army of the Ohio, on the
7th or 8th of April, or some time early in the week, and also that there
would be " no fight " at Pittsburg, but at " Corinth, where the rebels were
MAJOR-GENERAL BUSHROD R. JOHNSON, C. S. A.
FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.
586 THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.
fortified." ■& Further, even when leaving Savannah the next morning, General
Grant scarcely at first can have believed that his army was being seriously
attacked, for instead of dispatching to the field the whole of Nelson's division
by steamers, he ordered it to march thither by a wretched road, a march
that occupied nearly the whole day. Aside, however, from such documen-
tary evidence, or did none exist, the absence of all those ordinary precautions
that habitually shield an army in the field must forbid the historian from
regarding it as other than one of the most surprising surprises ever achieved.
About 5 a. m. the Confederate lines were set in motion. The first collision
was in the quarter of Gladden's brigade, on our right, and with a battalion
of five companies of the 21st Missouri of Prentiss's division dispatched well
to the front by General Prentiss, of his own motion, as early as 3 a. m. But
for this incident, due solely to the intelligent, soldierly forethought of an
officer not trained to the business of war, the whole Federal front would
have been struck wholly unawares, for nowhere else had such prudence
been shown.
Exactly at 6 a. m. Prentiss's whole division was under fire, and the battle
of Shiloh began in earnest.
As soon as the outburst of musketry and artillery gave notice that Hardee's
line was engaged, General Johnston said that he should go to the front,
leaving me in the general direction, as the exigencies of the battle might
arise. J Then he rode forward with his personal staff and the chief engineer
of the army, Colonel Gilmer, the only officer of the general staff in his suite,
Colonel Jordan, remaining with me. At 7:30 a. m., by which time the battle
was in full tide, as was evident from the play of artillery and the heavy, con-
tinuous rattle of small arms, I ordered Generals Polk and Breckinridge to
hasten forward, the first to the support of our now engaged left, and the latter
in a like service affecting our right. Adjutant-General Jordan, whom I had
early in the morning directed to impress personally on the corps commanders
the value of fighting their artillery massed twelve guns at a point, was also
now dispatched forward to overlook the field and urge on the attack con-
tinuously at as many points as possible.
When our attack reached Sherman's division, owing to the failure of
Hardee to keep his left near Owl Creek as was intended, only the left bri-
gade of that division on the Federal right was struck, leaving intact the other
two to the left of our left flank, which were swiftly formed by General
Sherman on strong ground with a small watercourse in his front. But the
other stricken brigade was swept out of its encampment, scattered, and took
no further part as an organization in the battle of either day.
While Hardee's left failed to touch the enemy's right, on his own right
there was left a vacant space between it and Lick Creek, to fill which Chal-
mers's brigade of Withers's division, Bragg's corps, was ordered up from the
second line, with a battery ; and a hot, urgent conflict ensued in that quarter,
in which General Johnston was present, after Chalmers had carried at least
& Diary of Col. Jacob Ammen, "Official Eecords," Vol. X., Part I., p. 331.
J See report of Col. Thompson, A. D. C, p. 570, " Life of General A. S. Johnston," by W. P. Johnston.
THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH. 587
one encampment. In the same quarter of the field all of Withers's division,
including Grladden's brigade, reenforced by Breckinridge's whole reserve, soon
became engaged, and Prentiss's entire line, though fighting stoutly, was
pressed back in confusion. We early lost the services of the gallant
Gladden, a man of soldierly aptitudes and experience, who, after a marked
influence upon the issue in his quarter of the field, fell mortally wounded.
His immediate successor, Colonel D. W. Adams, was also soon seriously
disabled. Meantime, on our left (Federal right) Ruggles's division of Bragg's
corps was so strenuously pressing the two brigades of Sherman's division,
that at the moment McClernand's division came up, Sherman was giving
way with the loss of five or six guns. McClernand could not stay the retro-
grade, and the Federal right was forced back to the line of the road from
Purdy to Hamburg. There a foothold was gained on a thickly wooded
ridge, with a ravine in front, from which two favorably posted batteries
were used with deadly effect for a time upon our assailing force, now com-
posed of Ruggles's three brigades reenforced by several of Polk's. Here,
again, the Federal line had to give way, with the loss of some guns.
By 7:30 Hurlbut, sending Veatch's brigade of his division to the help of
Sherman and McClernand, had gone, in person with his two other brigades, to
the support of Preutiss, and with him went 8 companies of cavalry and 3
batteries. Prentiss's division was met, however, in a somewhat fragmentary
condition, but was rallied in the immediate rear of a line which Hurlbut
formed along the edge of a field on favorable ground on the Hamburg road,
southward of the position last taken up by McClernand. Meanwhile (9:30
a. m.) I had advanced my headquarters to a point about a quarter of a mile in
advance of the Shiloh Meeting House, whence I dispatched my staff in all
directions to gather reports of the progress of the battle with its exigencies
and needs on our side, as, also, in quest of stragglers, whose numbers had
become dangerously large under the temptations of the abundant stores of
food and other articles left in the abandoned Federal camps. % In the work
of cleaning these encampments of stragglers and dispatching them to the
front, my cavalry escort was also effectively employed.
As designated by Special Orders, No. 8, Hardee's corps having developed the
enemy's position, Bragg's troops first and then Polk's on our left and left
center, Withers's division of Bragg's corps and Breckinridge's reserves on the
right, had been thrown forward to fill intervening gaps and to aid the
onset. At all points from the right to the left, the opposing forces had been
stoutly engaged on ground in rear of the line of McClernand's encampment
since 9 a. m., when W. H. L. Wallace had carried forward his division into
action; a division that, trained by so thorough a soldier as General C. F.
Smith, had done most soldierly work at Donelson, and which Wallace now
handled with marked vigor. Its influence seemed to stiffen the Federal
%A.t the conference in the afternoon of April The best-disciplined troops do not fight well
5th, I had said in support of my recommenda- on empty stomachs. And this is all the more
tions to retire without attacking the enemy : true of raw troops unaccustomed to the hardships
"Nature has claims that cannot be disregarded, of war."— G. T. B.
588
THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.
WOOD AND UNDERBRUSH CALLED THE "HORNETS' NEST." FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1885.
center and left center. Stuart, commanding one of Sherman's brigades strongly
posted on the extreme Federal left, also, had made so obstinate a stand that
he was not forced from the position until three times his numbers, of Withers's
division, diverted from the main current of the attack, were brought to bear
against him. For some time General Johnston was with that division, but he
shifted to Breckinridge's division about 11 a. m., and remained closely in rear
alternately of either Bowen's or Statham's brigade until mortally wounded
near the latter, a little after 2 p. m. He took post and remained on our
extreme right, and at no time does it appear from the reports of subordi-
nates in any other part of the field that, either personally or by his staff,
General Johnston gave any orders or concerned himself with the general
movements of our forces. In fact, engrossed as he soon became with the
operations of two or three brigades on the extreme right, it would have been
out of his power to direct our general operations, especially as he set no
machinery in motion with which to gather information of what was being
done elsewhere, or generally, by the Confederate army, in order to enable
him to handle it intelligently from his position on the field.
Learning about 1 p. m. that the Federal right (Sherman and McClernand)
seemed about to give way, I ordered General Hardee to employ his cavalry
(Wharton's Texas Rangers) to turn their flank and cut off their retreat to the
river, an operation not effected because a proper or sufficient detour to the
left was not made; and the gallant Texans under a heavy fire became involved
in ground impracticable for cavalry, and had to fall back. But Colonel Whar-
ton soon afterward dismounted half of his regiment and, throwing it forward
on foot, drove his adversary from the position.
The falling back of Sherman's and McClernand's troops under stress from
several brigades of Hardee's corps with a part of Ruggles's division of Bragg's,
aided by some of Polk's troops, left Wallace (W. H. L.) on the advanced Fed-
eral right, where, with Hurlbut and Prentiss on his left, in a strong, sheltered
THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH. 589
position, well backed by artillery, and held with great resolution, they
repulsed a series of uncombined assaults made against them. Here General
Bragg was directing operations in person; and it was here that, after Hindman
had suffered severely in several ineffectual efforts, Gibson's brigade of Bragg's
own corps was employed in four unavailing assaults, when finding himself
unable to carry the position, General Bragg, as he reports, desisted from any
further attempt, leaving that part of the field in charge of a staff-officer with
authority to act in his name, and going farther to the right to find that
General Johnston was dead. However, having previously learned, from his
aide-de-eamp, Colonel Urquhart, that Adjutant-General Jordan was near by, he
requested that officer, through Colonel Urquhart, to collect and employ some
of our troops to turn the left of the position that obstructed his advance
toward the river, as just described. Upon that service Colonel Jordan, in a
few moments, employed Statham's brigade, which was fortunately found near
by, resting at ordered arms, General Breckinridge, to whom the order was
given, being with it at the time. This happened, be it noted, at 2:30 p. m.,
or about the moment that General Johnston was bleeding to death in the
covert of a deep ravine a very short distance from Statham's brigade, in the
immediate rear of which it was that his wound had been inflicted. |
General Breckinridge quickly became engaged with the enemy in his front,
covered by a thick underbrush that edged an open field over which the Con-
federate advance was made. The conflict was sharp for a few moments, but
the Federals had to give way. \ About this time, under my orders, Cheatham
came up with his Second Brigade on the left of Breckinridge. Moreover, a
few moments later, or as early as 3 p. m., Withers, of Bragg's corps, having
found that his adversary (Stuart's brigade) which had so long occupied him on
the extreme right had disappeared toward Pittsburg Landing, and having
moved across the intervening ravines and ridges with his division to where the
sound of artillery and musketry showed the main battle was now raging, — was
brought opportunely into cooperation with Cheatham's and Breckinridge's
operations directly upon Hurlbut's left flank — a movement which Hurlbut
resisted stoutly until, justly apprehensive of being cut off, he fell back, after
4 p. m., upon Pittsburg Landing.\ This left Prentiss's left flank exposed;
Wallace, whose unflinching handling of his division had done so much to keep
the Federal army from being driven to the river-side by midday, now also, to
4. General Johnston was not wounded while that event, there was in effect a lull in the
leading a charge, as has been so frequently operations on the Confederate right of which Gen-
asserted, but while several hundred yards in the eral Johnston had hitherto been the soul— a lull
rear of Statham's brigade after it had made a of an hour ; whereas it is manifest there cannot
successful advance, and during the absence of have been a cessation of the operations of
Governor Harris of his staff, whom he had dis- General Breckinridge's troops for more than
patched to Colonel Statham, some two hundred fifteen minutes at most,— the only troops whom
yards distant, with orders to charge and take a General Johnston had been directing in any way
Federal battery on his left. (See letter of Isham since 11a. m.— G. T. B.
G. Harris, April 13th, 1876, p. 537, Vol. I. "The \ This saved him from sharing the fate of Pren-
Military Operations of General Beauregard.")— tiss, for the strength of the Confederate force that
G. T. B. had now been brought to bear upon the remains of
j) Colonel W. P. Johnston has sought to make it Wallace's, Hurlbut's, and Prentiss's divisions was
appear that immediately upon the death of his sufficient to assure their environment and cap-
father [see page 565], and in consequence of ture. — G. T. B.
590 THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.
avoid being surrounded, gave orders for it to retire, and soon fell mortally
wounded ; but a part of his division remained with Prentiss.
Sometime previously I had ordered General Hardee to gather all the forces
he could and press the enemy on .our own left. Stragglers that had been
collected by Colonels Brent and Chisolm and others of my staff, were also sent
forward extemporized into battalions, and Colonel Marshall J. Smith with the
New Orleans Crescent Regiment was added, with orders to " Drive the enemy
into the Tennessee."
Meantime, or shortly after 3 p. m., Governor Harris and Captain Wicliffe,
both of General Johnston's staff, had reached me with information of his
death. Staff-officers were immediately dispatched to acquaint the corps com-
manders of this deplorable casualty, with a caution, however, against other-
wise promulgating the fact. They were also urged to push the battle with
renewed vigor and, if possible, to force a speedy close, to which end my staff
were energetically employed in pushing up the stragglers or regiments or
parts of regiments that had become casually sej)arate(l from their organiza-
tions because of the nature of the battle-field.
As I have said, by five o'clock the whole Federal army except Prentiss's
division, with a part of Wallace's, had receded to the river-bank, and the indom-
itable force which under Prentiss still contested the field was being environed
on its left by brigades from the divisions of Breckinridge, Cheatham, and
Withers in that quarter. It remains to be said that Prentiss was equally
encompassed on the other flank by a part of Ruggles's division, together
with some of General Polk's corps. Thus surrounded on all sides, that
officer, whose division had been the first to come into collision with us that
morning, stoutly keeping the field to the last, was now forced to surrender in
person, just after 5:30 p. m., with some 2200 officers and men.
We had now had more than eleven hours of continuous fighting, fighting
without food except that hastily snatched up in the abandoned Federal
encampments. In the meantime Colonel J. D. Webster, the Federal chief of
staff, had massed his reserve artillery, some sixty guns, on a ridge about
three hundred yards in advance of the landing which commanded all the
approaches thereto from the landward, with a deep ravine on the side facing
the Confederates. Moreover, much of the ground in front of this position
was swept by the guns of the steamers Lexington and Tyler, properly posted
for that purpose. Near by had gathered the remnants of Wallace's, Hurlbut's,
and McClernand's divisions, from which gunners had been taken to man the
artillery. At this critical instant, Colonel Ammen's brigade of Nelson's divi-
sion of Buell's army was brought across the Tennessee and placed as a support,
on the ridge, in a position selected by General Buell himself, just at the
instant that the Confederates attempted to storm this last foothold to which
they had finally driven their adversary after eleven hours of unceasing battle.
This was the situation at 6 p. m., and that the Confederate troops were
not in a condition to carry such a position as that which confronted them
at that late hour becomes clearly apparent from the official reports. After
the capture of General Prentiss no serious effort was made to press the
THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH. 591
victory by the corps commanders. In fact the troops had got ont of the
hands either of corps, divisional, or brigade commanders, and for the most
part, moreover, at the front, were out of ammunition. Several most gallant
uncombined efforts (notably by Chalmers) were made to reach and carry the
Federal battery, hut in ever// instance the effort failed.
Comprehending the situation as it was, at six p. m. I dispatched staff-offi-
cers with orders to cease hostilities, withdraw the troops from under fire of
the Federal gun-boats, and to sleep on their arms. However, before the
order was received many of the regiments had already been withdrawn out
of action, and really the attack had practically ceased at every point, it
My headquarters for the night were established at the Shiloh Meeting
House, in the tent that General Sherman had occupied. There several of
the corps and division commanders called for orders, and all evinced and
expressed much satisfaction with the results, while no one was heard to
express or suggest that more might have been achieved' had the battle
been prolonged. All seemed to believe that our troops had accomplished
as much as could have been hoped for.
Of the second day's battle my sketch shall be very brief. It began with
daylight, and this time Buell's army was the attacking force.
Our widely scattered forces, which it had been impossible to organize in the
night after the late hour at which they were drawn out of action, were gath-
ered in hand for the exigency as quickly as possible. Generals Bragg, Hardee,
and Breckinridge hurried to their assigned positions, — Hardee now to the
extreme right, where were Chalmers's and Jackson's brigades of Bragg's corps ;
General Bragg to the left, where were assembled brigades and fragments of
his own troops, as also of Clark's division, Polk's corps, with Trabue's brigade
of Kentuckians ; Breckinridge was on the left of Hardee. This left a vacant
space to be occupied by General Polk, who during the night had gone with
Cheatham's division back nearly to Hardee's position on the night of the
5th of April. But just at the critical time, to my great pleasure, General
Polk came upon the field with that essential division.
By 7 p. M. the night before, all of Nelson's division had been thrown across
the Tennessee, and during the night had been put in position between General
Grant's disarrayed forces and our own ; Crittenden's division, carried from
Savannah by water and disembarked at midnight, was forced through the
mob of demoralized soldiers that thronged the river-side and established half
a mile in advance, to the left of. Nelson. Lew Wallace's division of General
Grant's army also had found its way after dark' on the 6th across Snake
Creek from Crump's Landing to the point near the bridge where General Sher-
man had rallied the remains of two of his brigades. Rousseau reached the
field by water, at daylight, while two other brigades of the same division
•& Colonel William Preston Johnston has in position, a statement that flies in the face of
effect asserted [see page 567] that my order to all the reports of the division, brigade, and regi-
retire ont of action prevented a concentrated mental commanders but one (Withers), as may
organized operation on the part of the corps be readily seen from the official documentary his-
commanders about to be launched at the Federal tory of the battle. — CI. T. B.
'^2
THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.
THE UNION GUN-BOATS AT SHILOH ON' THE EVENING OF THE FIRST DAY. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.
(McCook's) were close at hand. Thus, at the instant when the battle was
opened we had to face at least 23,000 fresh troops, including 3 battalions
of regulars, with at least 48 pieces of artillery. J On the Confederate
side there was not a man who had not taken part in the battle of the day
before. The casualties of that day had not been under 6500 officers and
men, independent of stragglers; consequently not more than 20,000 infan-
try could be mustered that morning. The Army of the Ohio in General
Buell's hands had been made exceptionally well-trained soldiers for that
early period of the war.
The extreme Federal right was occupied by General Lew Wallace's division,
while the space intervening between it and Rousseau's brigade was filled
with from 5000 to 7000 men gathered during the night and in the early morn-
ing from General Grant's broken organizations.
After exchanging some shots with Forrest's cavalry, Nelson's division was
confronted with a composite force embracing Chalmers's brigade, Moore's
Texas Regiment, with other parts of Withers's division, also the Crescent
Regiment of New Orleans and the 26th Alabama, supported by well-posted
batteries, and so stoutly was Nelson received that his division had to recede
somewhat. Advancing again, however, about 8 o'clock, now reenforced by
Hazen's brigade, it was our turn to retire with the loss of a battery. But
rallying and taking the offensive, somewhat reenforced, the Confederates were
I General Lew Wallace's division numbered "5000 men of all arms," with 12 guns; Nelson's divi-
sion, " 4541 strong," officers and men, with 18 guns. The strength of Crittenden's division maybe
estimated at G750, rank and file, and Rousseau's brigade of McCook's division at 2250. — G. T. B.
THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH. 59}
able to recover their lost ground and guns, inflicting a sharp loss on Hazen's
brigade, that narrowly escaped capture. Amnien's brigade was also seriously
pressed and must have been turned but for the opportune arrival and effec-
tive use of Terrill's regular battery of McCook's division.
In the meantime Crittenden's division became involved in the battle, but
was successfully kept at bay for several hours by the forces under Hardee
and Breckinridge, until it was reenforcedby two brigades of McCook's division
which had been added to the attacking force on the field, after the battle had
been joined, the force of fresh troops being thus increased by at least five
thousand men. $ Our troops were being forced to recede, but slowly ; it was
not, however, until we were satisfied that we had now to deal with at least
three of Buell's divisions as well as with General Lew Wallace's, that I deter-
mined to yield the field in the face of so manifestly profitless a combat.
By 1 o'clock General Bragg's forces on our left, necessarily weakened by the
withdrawal of a part of his troops to reenforce our right and center, had
become so seriously pressed that he called for aid. Some remnants of Loui-
siana, Alabama, and Tennessee regiments were gathered up and sent forward
to support him as best they might, and I went with them personally. Gen-
eral Bragg, now taking the offensive, pressed his adversary back. This was
about 2 p. m. My headquarters were still at Shiloh Church.
The odds of fresh troops alone were now too great to justify the prolonga-
tion of the conflict. So, directing Adjutant-General Jordan to select at once
a proper position in our near rear, and there establish a covering force includ-
ing artillery, I dispatched my staff with directions to the several corps com-
manders to prepare to retreat from the field, first making a show, however,
at different points of resuming the offensive. These orders were executed, I
may say, with no small skill, and the Confederate army began to retire at
2 : 30 p. m. without apparently the least perception on the part of the enemy
that such a movement was going on. There was no flurry, no haste shown by
officers or men; the spirit of all was admirable. Stragglers dropped into line;
the caissons of the batteries were loaded up with rifles ; and when the last of
our troops had passed to the rear of the covering force, from the elevated
ground it occupied and which commanded a wide view, not a Federal regiment
or even a detachment of cavalry was anywhere to be seen as early as 4 p. m.
General Breckinridge, with the rear-guard, bivouacked that night not more
than two miles from Shiloh. He withdrew three miles farther on the 8th,
and there remained for several days without being menaced.
Our loss in the two days was heavy, reaching 10,699. [See page 539.]
The field was left in the hands of our adversary, as also some captured
guns, which were not taken away for want of horses, but in exchange we car-
ried off at least 30 pieces of his artillery with 26 stands of colors and
nearly 3000 prisoners of war, also a material acquisition of small arms and
accouterments which our men had obtained on Sunday instead of their
inferior weapons.
& The fresh Federal troops now engaged aggregated at least 25,000 rank and file, further increased,
about 1 o'clock, by Wagner's brigade of Wood's division, say 2500 strong. — G. T. B.
VOL. I. 38
NOTES OF A CONFEDERATE STAFF-OFFICER AT SHILOH
BY THOMAS JORDAN, BRIGADIER-GENERAL (AT SHILOH, ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE
CONFEDERATE ARMY).
^FEDERATE PRIVATE OF THE WEST.
FROM A TINTYPE.
AFTEE 10 o'clock at night, on the 2d of April, 1862,
- while in my office as adjutant-general of the Con-
federate army assembled at Corinth, a telegram was
brought to me from General Cheatham, command-
ing an outpost on our left flank at Bethel, on the
Mobile and Ohio railway, some twenty odd miles
northward of Corinth. General Cheatham had ad-
dressed it to General Polk, his corps commander,
informing him that a Federal division, under Gen-
eral Lew Wallace, had been manoeuvring in his
proximity during the day. ( General Polk had in
due course sent the message to General Beauregard,
from whom it came to me with his indorsement,
addressed to General A. S. Johnston, in substance: "Now is the time to
advance upon Pittsburg Landing." And below were these words, in effect,
if not literally: " Colonel Jordan had better carry this in person to General
Johnston and explain the military situation. — G. T. B."
At the time Colonel Jacob Thompson, formerly Secretary of the Interior of
the United States, was in my office. I read the telegram aloud to him and
immediately thereafter proceeded to General Johnston's quarters, nearly a
quarter of a mile distant, where I found the general surrounded by his per-
sonal staff, in the room which the latter habitually occupied. I handed him
the open dispatch and the indorsements, which he read without comment. He
then asked me several questions about matters irrelevant to the dispatch or
what might naturally grow out of it, and rose, saying that he would cross the
street to see General Bragg. I asked if I should accompany him. " Certainly,"
was his answer. We found that General Bragg had already gone to bed, but he
received us in dishabille, General Johnston handing him the dispatch at once,
without remark. Bragg, having read it, immediately expressed his agreement
with Beauregard's advisement. General Johnston thereupon very clearly
stated strongly some objections, chiefly to the effect that as yet our troops were
too raw and incompletely equipped for an offensive enterprise, such as an
attack upon the Federal army in a position of their own choosing, and also that
he did not see from what quarter a proper reserve could be assembled in time
As General Beauregard had discussed with me repeatedly within a week
the details of such an offensive operation in all its features, and the neces-
sity for it before the Federal army was itself ready to take the offensive, I
was able to answer satisfactorily the objections raised by General Johnston,
including the supposed difficulty about a reserve — for which use I pointed
out that the Confederate forces posted under General Breckinridge at several
points along the line of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, to the east-
594
NOTES OF A CONFEDERATE STAFF-OFFICER AT SH1L0H. 595
ward of Corinth, could be quickly concentrated at Burnsville, and be moved
thence direct to Monterey, and there effect a junction with our main force.
General Johnston at last assented to the undertaking. Thereupon I turned
to a table in General Bragg's chamber, and wrote a circular order to the three
corps commanders, Major-Generals Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, directing that
each should hold his corps under arms by 6 a. m., on the 3d of April, ready
to march, with one hundred rounds of ammunition ; three days' cooked pro-
visions per man in their haversacks, with two more to be transported in
wagons. This circular also prescribed the ammunition for the artillery, and
the number of tents each company should be provided with; all of which
was approved by General Johnston when I read the rough draught of it.
Afterward the copies were made by an aide-de-camp on the staff of General
Bragg.
These orders were delivered to Generals Polk and Hardee by 1 : 40 a. m., as
shown by their receipts, which I required to be taken. The orders to Gen-
eral Breckinridge were given by telegraph, he having been called by me to
the military telegraph office nearest his headquarters to receive them and to
answer queries regarding his command. J Thus did it happen that the Con-
federate army was brought to undertake the offensive at Pittsburg Landing.
11.
Upon quitting General Bragg's quarters I proceeded immediately to the
tent of Colonel A. R. Chisolm, aide-de-camp to General Beauregard, sepa-
rated from my office by some thirty or forty yards, roused him from sleep,
and asked him to inform the general at daylight that the order to advance
at midday had been issued.
Soon after sunrise I was called to the quarters of General Beauregard,
whom I found with the notes of the plan of operations and orders of engage-
ment. These, I may add, had just been copied by Colonel Chisolm from
the backs of telegrams and envelopes upon which the general had made them
during the night while in bed. Taking these notes and the general's sketch-
map of the roads leading from all surrounding quarters to Monterey and
thence to Pittsburg Landing, I returned to my office and began to draw up
the order for the battle (Special Orders, No. 8), which will be found in the
" Official Records," X., 392-395. %
Called to my breakfast before the order could be framed, I met General
Johnston en route for General Beauregard's quarters, where I said I would
meet him as quickly as possible, and where I soon joined him. General
Beauregard was explaining the details as to the roads by which the several
corps would have to move through the somewhat difficult, heavily wooded
country, both before and after leaving Monterey ; and to make this clear, as
J As I find from a paper officially signed by me leon's order for the battle of Waterloo, and, in
April 21st, 1862, this reserve consisted of 6436 attention to ante-battle details, took those of
rank and file effectives. ("Official Records," Series such soldiers as Napoleon and Soult for model — a
I., Vol. X., p. 396.) — T. J. fact which I here mention because the ante-Shiloh
& As I framed this order, I had before me Napo- order has been hypercriticised. — T. J.
596 NOTES OF A CONFEDERATE STAFF-OFFICER. AT SH1L0H.
I had from General Beauregard the only sketch extant, General Beauregard
drew a rough sketch on his camp-table top. Meanwhile, General Bragg
and afterward Generals Polk and Hardee had joined the conference. As I
remarked that it would take me some time to formulate the order and issue
all the requisite copies, General Beauregard explained orally to the three
generals their routes of march for the first day, so that they might not wait
for receipt of the written orders, which would be in all proper hands before
night. Accordingly, these explanations were carefully made, and the corps
commanders went away with distinct instructions to begin the movement at
midday, as prescribed in the written orders subsequently issued. Pursuant
to the terms of the circular order which I had written and issued from
General Bragg's headquarters the night before, the troops were brought under
arms before noon, by which time the streets and all approaches to the rail-
way station, as well as the roads leading from Corinth, were densely packed
with troops, wagons, and field-batteries ready for the march. But no move-
ment was made; General Polk's corps in some way blocked the line of
march, — as was reported to General Beauregard at a late hour in the after-
noon by General Hardee in person. Thereupon, an aide-de-camp was sent to
General Polk, who, to the surprise of all, explained that he had kept his
corps at a stand awaiting the written order. Thus it was so late before the
movement actually began, that, coupled with the really inexplicable tardiness
with which Bragg's corps was moved, it caused the arrival of the Confederate
army in the near presence of their adversary twenty-four hours later than
was intended, as, by reason of this tardiness, it was not until the late after-
noon of the 5th of April that the head of the Confederate column reached a
point within less than two miles of the Federal lines, instead of on the 4th, in
which case the battle would have been fought with General Grant alone, or
without the material and moral help derived from the advent of Buell on the
field, as happened on the night of April 6th and morning of the 7th.
in.
Geneeal Beauregard with his staff left Corinth the afternoon of the 4th of
April, and reaching Monterey, twelve miles distant, found the Confederate corps
massed in that quarter. He was hardly encouraged, however, by the man-
ner in which they had been handled to that stage in the operation. General
Johnston and his staff were already at the same point, in occupation of a house
at which we dismounted just as some cavalry brought from the front a sol-
dierly young Federal volunteer officer, Major Le Roy Crockett, of the 72d Ohio,
who had been captured a few hours before in a sharp skirmish in close prox-
imity to the Federal lines, brought on by a Confederate reconnoitering force
pressed most indiscreetly from General Bragg's corps almost upon the Federal
front line. As this officer rode beside his captors through the mass of Con-
federate infantry and batteries, and his eyes rested intelligently on the war-
like spectacle, he exclaimed, " This means a battle " ; and he involuntarily
added, " They don't expect anything of this kind back yonder." He was taken
NOTES OF A CONFEDERATE STAFF-OFFICER AT SHILOH. 597
in charge by myself, and, assisted by Major Gilmer, chief engineer on the
staff, I interrogated him with the least possible semblance of so doing, with
the result of satisfying me, as I reported to Generals Johnston and Beaure-
gard, that we should have no earth-works to encounter, and an enemy wholly
unaware of what was so near at hand.
IV.
It has more than once been represented with pencil, as well as with pen,
that there was a somewhat dramatic conference of the Confederate generals
around the camp-fire the night before the battle of the 6th of April. The
simple fact is this : Hardee, whose corps was to be in the advance in the
attack, having reached a point known to be somewhat less than two miles
from our adversary, was halted and deployed in line of battle across the
Pittsburg road to await the arrival and formation in his rear of the rest of
the army as prescribed in the battle order. As this was not effected until
after 3 o'clock, it was too late to make the attack that day. As a matter of
course in such a contingency, the corps commanders were called to meet Gen-
erals Johnston and Beauregard, who, having gone from Monterey together
with the general staff and their respective personal staffs, had taken a position,
dismounted, on the Pittsburg road, somewhat to the rear of Hardee's corps.
The meeting took place about 4 o'clock. General Polk now reported that
his men were almost destitute of provisions, having either already consumed
or thrown them away. General Bragg reported that his own men had been
more provident, and therefore could spare enough for the emergency. Deeply
dissatisfied with the inexplicable manner in which both Bragg's and Polk's
c< >rps had been delayed, both before reaching and after leaving Monterey, as
well as by the injudicious manner in which a reconnoissance had been made
with such aggressiveness and use of artillery as ought to have apprised any
sharp-sighted enemy that an offensive army was not far distant, General
Beauregard — though it had been upon his urgent instance that the advance
had been made — did not hesitate to say that, inasmuch as it was scarcely
possible for the enemy to 1 >e unaware of our presence and purpose, should we
attack next morning we would find the Federals ready for us intrenched
to the eyes ; whereas the whole success of the movement had depended on
our ability to assail our enemy unexpectedly. Therefore he advised the
return of the Confederate army to Corinth, as it assuredly was not in a
condition to attack an army superior in numbers and behind the intrench-
ments that would now be thrown up in expectation of our approach.
General Johnston listened attentively to what General Beauregard said,
and at length replied in substance that he recognized its weight ; neverthe-
less, as he hoped the enemy was not suspecting our proximity, he felt bound,
as he had put the army in motion for a battle, to venture the hazard. Where-
upon the officers rapidly dispersed to their respective commands for that
venture. As I have seen it intimated, among others by General Bragg, that
this conference was a mere casual or " partly accidental meeting of general
598
NOTES OF A CONFEDERATE STAFF-OFFICER AT SHILOH.
A UNION BATTERY TAKEN BY SURPRISE. (SEE PAGE 601.)
officers," it may not be amiss to recall that such a conference was the inevi-
table consequence of the arrival of the Confederate army at the point from
which it was to spring upon the enemy, as it were from an ambush. Naturally,
moreover, by a conference with their corps commanders, Johnston and Beau-
regard could best ascertain the condition of all the troops and determine the
best course to be pursued. It was after the reports thus made with the
mutual blame of each other of two of the corps commanders for the delay,
that Beauregard, confirmed in hijs apprehension that the campaign had mis-
carried, urged that its objective should be given up, — much as Wellington
once, in Spain, after taking the field to attack Massena, finding the latter
more strongly .posted and prepared than he had been misled to believe,
had not hesitated to retire without fighting. The course of events demon-
strated the correctness of Beauregard's judgment.
v.
That night, soon after supper, an aide-de-camp from General Johnston
informed me of the general's desire to see rne, and guided me to where he was
bivouacking in the open air. I was wanted to issue the order for the imme-
diate transfer of Maney's regiment of Tennessee infantry from a brigade in
NOTES OF A CONFEDERATE STAFF-OFFICER AT SHILOH. 599
Bragg's corps to a certain brigade in Polk's corps, of which Colonel Maney
would have the command as senior officer, which order I wrote, in the
absence of any table or other convenience, outstretched upon General John-
ston's blankets, which were spread at the foot of a tree. After this was done,
and the order dispatched by a special courier so that the transfer might be
made in time to place C ilonel Maney at the head of the brigade in the com-
ing battle, something led us to talk of the Pacific Coast, in which quarter I
had served eight years. Having been at Washington during the momentous
winter of 1860-61, I spoke of the fact that when Colonel Sumner had been
sent via the Isthmus of Panama to supersede him (Johnston) in the com-
mand of the Department of the Pacific in April, 1861, Sumner's berth in the
steamer had been taken under an assumed name, so that the newspapers
might not get and divulge the fact of his departure on that errand in time for
intelligence of it to reach the Pacific Coast by the overland route, and lead
General Johnston to act with a supposed powerful disunion party in Cali-
fornia in a revolt against the Federal authority before Sumner's arrival.
" Yes," answered the general, with much quiet feeling in his manner, " while
distrusting me sufficiently to act thus toward me, my former adjutant-general,
Fitz John Porter, was induced to write me of their great confidence in me, and
to say that it was their purpose to place me in command of the Federal army,
immediately next to General Scott." He had evidently been deeply hurt that
his personal character had not shielded him from the suspicion of doing aught
while holding a commission that could lead his superiors to suppose it neces-
sary to undertake his supersedure by stealth. [See p. 511.]
VI.
The next morning, as the Confederate army, deployed in the three lines
prescribed in the order of march and battle, moved before sunrise down the
gentle wooded slope toward Shiloh Chapel, Generals Johnston and Beaure-
gard, with the general staff as well as aides-de-camp, stood upon a slight
eminence, delighted with the evident alacrity, animated faces, and elastic gait
with which all moved forward into action. Hardly had the last line passed
them before the rattle" of musketry annoi need that Hardee's corps was en-
gaged. General Johnston now informed General Beauregard that he would
go to the front with the troops engaged, leaving General Beauregard to take
the proper central position from which to direct the movement as the exigen-
cies of the battle might require. Then General Johnston rode off with his
personal staff exclusively, except possibly Major Gilmer, the chief engineer.
Soon the sound of battle became general ; and, as during the battle of Manas-
sas, I had been left at headquarters to send reinforcements into action as they
came up by rail, I reminded General Beauregard of the fact, and requested
to be dispatched to join General Johnston. He assented, and I set off,
accompanied by my friend Colonel Jacob Thompson. In a little time I found
that the corps commanders were ahead of or separated from a material part
of their troops, whom I repeatedly found halted for want of orders. In all
600 NOTES OF A CONFEDERATE STAFF -OFFICER AT SH1L0H.
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THE LAST STAND MADE BY THE CONFEDERATE LINE.
General Beauregard at Shiloh Chapel sending his aides to the corps commanders with orders to begin the
retreat. This was at two o'clock on Monday (see page 603). The tents are part of
Sherman's camp, which was reoccupied by him Monday evening.
such cases, assuming the authority of nay position, I gave the orders in the
name of General Johnston. At one time I had with me the chiefs-of-staff of
Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, Colonel David Urquhart, the chief aide-de-camp of
Bragg, and Colonel William Preston, the chief aide-de-camp of General John-
ston, all of whom I employed in assisting to press the Confederate troops
toward the heaviest firing, and to keep the batteries advancing. Colonels
Preston and Urquhart remained with me the longer time and assisted greatly.
Finally, however, Urquhart, learning from some of the troops encountered
that he was in proximity to his chie" ?ral Bragg, left me to join him,
NOTES OF A CONFEDERATE STAFF -OFFICER AT SHILOH. 60 1
while I, accompanied by Colonel Preston, rode to the right wing in the
direction of sharp battle. Soon we came in near view of a deserted Federal
encampment in an open field, with a Federal battery of four or six guns
unlimbered and horseless, while in advance of it were to be seen a brigade of
Confederate troops at a halt. Urquhart now galloped up and informed me
that General Bragg had sent him to me with the request that I should
find and order forward some troops to turn and capture some batteries
just in his front which obstructed his advance. I at once pushed across a
deep ravine with Urquhart and Preston to the troops in view, which proved
to be Statham's brigade of the reserve under General Breckinridge; but
because it belonged to the reserve, I hesitated to take the responsibility to
employ it, and said so ; however, asking Colonel Preston — the brother-in-
law as well as aide-de-camp of General Johnston — the hour, he replied, from
his watch, twenty minutes after 2 o'clock. I then said that the battle ought
to be won by that time, and " I think the reserve should be used." Colonel
Preston expressed his agreement with me, and I rode at once to General
Breckinridge, who was not far to the rear of his troops, surrounded by a
number of officers.
Accosting him, I said, "General Breckinridge, it is General Johnston's
order that you advance and turn and take those batteries," pointing in the
direction indicated by Urquhart, and where was to be heard the din of their
discharges. As the order was given, General Breckinridge, clad in a well-
fitting blouse of dark-colored Kentucky jeans, straightened himself in his
stirrups. His dark eyes seemed to illuminate his swarthy, regular features,
and as he sat in his saddle he seemed to me altogether the most impressive-
looking man I ever had seen.
1 then turned, accompanied both by Urquhart and Preston, with the
purpose of going to the camp and battery previously mentioned, and from
that point to observe the movement. On reaching the ravine, which we
had crossed, Colonel Preston, who possibly had just heard from some of
the officers of the command just set in motion of General Johnston's
recent presence with them, said to me, "I believe I will make another
attempt to find General Johnston," and rode down the ravine toward the
left, and as it so happened, did find General Johnston, but already uncon-
scious, if not dead.
General Johnston had received his death-wound near the very troops I had
found standing at ordered arms, but who were unaware of the fact, and there-
fore were not, as has been written, brought to a stand-still by reason of that
catastrophe, and who undeniably were put in effective forward movement by
me within twenty minutes after his wounding.
A striking incident of the first day's battle may be here mentioned for
its novelty on battle-fields. A completely equipped Federal battery was
so suddenly turned and environed by the Confederates, that it was cap-
tured with all the guns limbered up en regie for movement as upon drill,
before its officers could possibly unlimber and use its guns in self-defense.
The drivers were in their saddles, the gunners seated side by side in their
602 NOTES OF A CONFEDERATE STAFF-OFFICER AT SHILOH.
places upon the ammunition-boxes of the caissons, grinning over the situa-
tion, and the officers with their swords drawn were mounted on their horses.
Not a horse had been disabled.
VII.
At the time of the reception of the order given as the sun was setting on the
6th of April by General Beauregard for his greatly disarranged and scattered
troops to withdraw from action and reorganize for the next day's operations,
I had reached a point very close to the Tennessee River where it was densely
wooded. The large ordnance of the gun-boats was raking this position, cre-
ating more noise in some quarters than harm to the Confederates, as the
heavy projectiles tore and crashed in all directions through the heavy forest.
Riding slowly backward to the point at which I understood I should find
General Beauregard, it was after sunset when I dismounted at the tent of a
Federal officer, before which the general was standing with some of his staff
and with an officer in the uniform of a Federal general, to whom I was intro-
duced. It was General Prentiss. Several hours previously a telegraphic
dispatch addressed by Colonel Helm to General Johnston (as well as I now
remember, from the direction of Athens, in Tennessee) was brought me
from Corinth by a courier, saying that scouts employed in observing Gen-
eral Buell's movements reported him to be marching not toward a junc-
tion with Grant, but in the direction of Decatur, North Alabama. This
assuring dispatch I handed to General Beauregard, and then, at his order, I
wrote a telegraphic report to the Confederate adjutant-general, Cooper,
at Richmond, announcing the results of the day, including the death of
Johnston.
Meanwhile, it had become so dark that I could barely see to write, and it
was quite dark by the time Generals Hardee and Breckinridge came to see
General Beauregard for orders for the next day's operations. General Bragg,
who had also come from the front, had taken up his quarters for the night
in a tent which General Sherman had previously occupied at the Shiloh
Chapel. This chapel, a rude log-hut of one story, was only two or three hun-
dred yards distant from the spot at which I had found General Beauregard.
Leaving General Prentiss in my charge, General Beauregard soon after dark
took up his quarters for the night with General Bragg. The corps command-
ers had meanwhile been personally directed to assemble their respective com-
mands at the earliest possible moment in the morning to be ready for the
final stroke.
Colonel Thompson and myself, with General Prentiss sandwiched between
us, shared a rough makeshift of a bed made up of tents and captured
blankets. Prentiss and Thompson had been old acquaintances, and the
former talked freely of the battle, as also of the war, with a good deal of
intelligence and good temper. With a laugh, he said: "You gentlemen
have had your way to-day, but it will be very different to-morrow. You'll
see ! Buell will effect a junction with Grant to-night, and we'll turn the
tables on you in the morning."
NOTES OF A CONFEDERATE STAFF-OFFICER. AT SHILOH. 603
This was- said evidently with sincerity, and was answered in the same pleas-
ant spirit, and I showed him the dispatch that had reached me on the field.
He insisted, however, that it was a mistake, as we would see. Tired as we
were with the day's work, sleep soon overtook and held us all until early
dawn, when the firing first of musketry and then of field-artillery roused us,
and Greneral Prentiss exclaimed: "Ah! didn't I tell you so! There is Buell !"
And so it proved.
VIII.
Up to half -past two o'clock on the 7th of April, or second day's conflict,
General Beauregard had his headquarters at the Shiloh Chapel, or immedi-
ately at Sherman's former headquarters. The Confederate troops, now hardly
20,000 men, were all either directly in advance of that position, or, to the right
and left of it, somewhat in advance, hotly engaged, having only receded from
the places occupied during the night sufficiently to be better massed and
organized for fighting. But our losses were swelling perilously, and the strag-
gling was growing more difficult to restrain. A little after two o'clock, Gov-
ernor Harris of Tennessee, who, after the death of Greneral Johnston, had
joined the staff of Beauregard in action, taking me aside, asked if I did not
regard the day as going against us irremediably, and whether there was not
danger in tarrying so long in the field as to be unable to withdraw in good
order. I answered that I thought it would soon be our proper course to
retreat. Having an opportunity a moment later to speak to Greneral Beaure-
gard in private, I brought the subject before him in almost these words :
" General, do you not think our troops are very much in the condition of
a lump of sugar thoroughly soaked with water, but yet preserving its orig-
inal shape, though ready to dissolve? Would it not be judicious to get
away with what we have ? "
" I intend to withdraw in a few moments," was his reply.
Calling upon his aides-de-camp present, he dispatched them with orders to
the several corps commanders to begin the rearward movement. He also
directed me to collect as many of the broken organizations as I could, — both
of infantry and artillery, — post them in, the best position I might find, and
hold it until the whole army had passed to the rear of it. Such a position I
quickly found 011 an elevated ridge in full view of the chapel and the ground
to the right and left of it, am I also somewhat more elevated, rising abruptly
toward the enemy but receding gently toward Corinth. There I collected
and posted some two thousand infantry, making them lie down at rest. I
also placed in battery some twelve or fifteen guns, so as to command and
sweep the approach from the direction of the enemy. There also I remained
until after 4 o'clock, or until the entire Confederate force had retired,
General Breckinridge's troops being the last, and without seeing a single
Federal soldier within the wide range of my eyes. I then retired, carrying
from the field the caissons loaded down with muskets and rifles picked up on
the field.
SURPRISE AND WITHDRAWAL AT SHILOH.
BY S. H. LOCKETT, COLONEL, C. S. A. (AT SHILOH GENERAL BRAGG'S CHIEF ENGINEER).
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LT the time of the battle
of Shiloh I was on Gen-
eral Bragg's staff as his
chief engineer, with the
rank of captain. On the
night of April 5 th I ac-
companied him to General
Johnston's headquarters,
where the last council of
war was held. I was not
present at the meeting of
the generals, but with a
number of other staff-officers remained near by.
We could hear the low, earnest discussion of our
superiors, but could not distinguish the words
spoken.
When the council closed, and General Bragg
started to his own bivouac, I joined him, and
received the following instructions : That as the
attack would be made at daylight, the next morn-
ing at 4 o'clock I should proceed to the front along
the Bark road, with Lieutenant Steel, of the engi-
neers, and a squad of cavalry, until I came to the
enemy's camp ; that I should very carefully and
cautiously reconnoiter the camp from where I
struck it toward the enemy's left flank; that I
should by no means allow any firing by my little
force, or do anything to attract attention ; that my
duty was to get all the information possible about
the enemy's position and condition, and send it back
by couriers from point to point, as my judgment
should suggest. Those orders I carried out the
next morning. Lieutenant S. M. Steel, now Major
Steel, of Nashville, Tenn., had been a civil engi-
neer and surveyor in that section of the country,
had already made several daring and valuable
reconnoissances of the Federal camps, and knew
the country thoroughly. He was a splendid scout,
and as brave a man as ever lived. Under his skill-
ful guidance I reached in safety a point which he
said was not more than a few hundred yards from
the Federal camps. Here our cavalry escort and
our own horses were left, and we two, leaving the
road, passed down a narrow valley or gorge, got
beyond the Federal pickets, and came within a few
rods of a sleepy camp sentinel leaning against a
tree. In front of us was a large camp as still and
silent as the grave ; no signs of life except a few
smoldering fires of the last night's supper. Noting
these facts and without disturbing the man at the
tree, we returned to our cavalry squad, and I dis-
patched a courier to General Bragg with a note
telling what I had seen. We then moved by our
right flank through the woods, from a quarter to
half a mile, and repeated our former manoeuvre.
This time we found the cooks of the camp astir
preparing breakfast. While we were watching the
process reveille was sounded, and I saw one or two
regiments form by companies, answer to roll-call,
and then disperse to their tents. Once more I
returned to my cavalry and dispatched a courier.
A third time I made a descent from the hills,
down a narrow hollow, still farther to our right,
and saw Federal soldiers cleaning their guns and
accouterments and getting ready for Sunday morn-
ing inspection. By this time firing had begun on
our left, and I could see that it caused some com-
motion in the camps, but it was evident that it was
not understood. Soon the firing became more
rapid and clearer and closer, and I saw officers be-
gin to stir out of their tents, evidently anxious to
find out what it all meant. Then couriers began
to arrive, and there was great bustle and confu-
sion ; the long roll was beaten ; there was rapid
falling in, and the whole party in front of me was
so thoroughly awake and alarmed that I thought
my safest course was to retreat while I could and
send another courier to the rear.
How long all this took I cannot now recall, but
perhaps not more than an hour and a half or two
hours. When I reached my cavalry squad I knew
that the battle had opened in earnest, but I deter-
mined to have one more look at the Federal posi-
tion, and moved once more to the right. Without
getting as near as our former positions, I had a
good view of another camp with a line of soldiers
formed in front of it. Meantime the Confederate
troops had moved on down the hills, and I could
plainly see from the firing that there was hot and
heavy work on my left and in advance of my present
position. I then began to fear that the division in
front of me would swing around and take our
forces in flank, as it was manifest that the Federal
line extended farther in that direction than ours.
I therefore disposed my little cavalry force as
skirmishers, and sent a courier with a sketch of
the ground to General Bragg, and urged the im-
portance of having our right flank protected. How
long I waited and watched at this point it is hard
to say. Finally, becoming very uneasy at the state
of affairs, I left Lieutenant Steel with the cavalry
and rode to the left myself to make a personal
report. In this ride I passed right down the line
of battle of the Confederate forces, and saw some
splendid duels both of artillery and infantry.
Finally, as I have always thought about 11
o'clock, I came to General A. S. Johnston and his
staff standing on the brow of a hill watching the
conflict in their front. I rode up to General John-
ston, saluted him, and said I wished to make a
report of the state of affairs on our extreme right.
He said he had received that report and a sketch
from Captain Loekett, of the engineers. I told
him I was Captain Loekett. He replied, "Well,
sir, tell me as briefly and quickly as possible what
you have to say." When my report was finished
he said, " That .is what I gathered from your note
and sketch, and I have already ordered General
Breckinridge to send forces to fill up the space on
our right. Ride back, sir, toward the right, and
you will probably meet General Breckinridge ;
lead him to the position you indicate, and tell him
604
SURPRISE AND WITHDRAWAL AT SHILOH.
605
to drive the enemy he may find in his front into
the river. He needs no further orders.'1 The
words are, as near as I can remember them, ex-
actly the ones General Johnston used. I obeyed
the order given, met General Breckinridge, con-
ducted him to the place where I had left my
cavalry, but found both them and the Federal
division gone. I rode with General Breckinridge
a few hundred yards forward, and we soon received
a volley which let us know that the Federal forces
had retired but a very short distance from their
original position. General Breckinridge deployed
Bowen's and Statham's brigades, moved them for-
ward, and soon engaged the Federal forces. I
bade the General good-day and good luck, and
once more rode down the line of battle until I
found General Bragg. With him I remained, ex-
cepting when carrying orders and making reeon-
noissances, until the close of the first day's fight.
I witnessed the various bloody and unsuccessful
attacks on the " Hornets' Nest." During one of the
dreadful repulses of our forces, General Bragg di-
rected me to ride forward to the central regiment
of a brigade of troops that was recoiling across an
open field, to take its colors and carry them for-
ward. "The flag must not go back again," he
said. Obeying the order, I dashed through the
line of battle, seized the colors from the color-
bearer, and said to him, " General Bragg says
these colors must not go to the rear." While I was
talking to him the color-sergeant was shot down.
A moment or two afterward I was almost alone on
horseback in the open field between the two lines
of battle. An officer came up to me with a bullet-
hole in each cheek, the blood streaming from his
mouth, and asked, " What are you doing with my
colors, sir .'" "I am obeying General Bragg's or-
ders, sir, to hold them where they are," was my
reply. " Let me have them," he said. " If any man
but my color-bearer carries these colors, I am the
man. Tell General Bragg I will see that these col-
ors are in the right place. But he must attack this
position in flank ; we can never carry it alone from
the front." It was Colonel H. W. Allen, afterward
Governor Allen of Louisiana. I returned, miracu-
lously preserved, to General Bragg, and reported
Colonel Allen's words. I then carried an order to
the same troops, giving the order, I think, to Gen-
eral Gibson, to fall back to the fence in the rear
and reorganize. This was done, and then General
Bragg dispatched me to the right, and Colonel Frank
Gardner (afterward Major-General) to the left, to
inform the brigade and division commanders on
either side that a combined movement would be
made on the front and flanks of that position. The
movements were made, and Prentiss was captured.
As Colonel William Preston Johnston says, that
capture was a dear triumph to us — dear for the
many soldiers we had lost in the first fruitless at-
tacks, but still dearer on account of the valuable
time it cost us. The time consumed in gathering
Prentiss's command together, in taking their arms,
in marching them to the rear, was inestimably
valuable. Not only that ; the news of the capture
spread, and grew as it spread ; many soldiers and
officers believed we had captured the bulk of the
Federal army, and hundreds left their positions
and came to see the "captured Yanks." But after
a while the Confederates were gotten into ranks,
and a perfect line of battle was formed, with our
left wing resting on Owl Creek aud our right on the
Tennessee Biver. General Polk was on the left,
then Bragg, then Hardee, then Breckinridge. In
our front only one single point was showing fight,
a hill crowned with artillery. I was with General
Bragg, aud rode with him along the front of his
corps. I heard him say over and over again, "One
more charge, my men, and we shall capture them
all." While this was going on a staff-officer (or
rather, I think, it was one of the detailed clerks of
General Beauregard's headquarters, for he wore
no uniform) came up to General Bragg, and said,
"The General directs that the pursuit be stopped;
the victory is sufficiently complete ; it is needless
to expose our men to the fire of the gun-boats."
General Bragg said, "My God, was a victory ever
sufficiently complete ?" and added, "Have you
given that order to any one else?" "Yes, sir,"
was the reply, "to General Polk, on your left;
and if you will look to the left, you will see that
the order is being obeyed." General Bragg loolted.
and said, " My God, my God, it is too late!" and
turning to me, he said, "Captain, carry that order
to the troops on the right " ; and to Captain Frank
Parker, "You carry it to the left." In a short
time the troops were all falling back — and the vic-
tory was !<>sf. Captain Parker and myself were the
only members of General Bragg's staff who were
with him at that time. Captain Parker, I think, is
still living in South Carolina, and will surely re-
member all that I have narrated.
In this hasty sketch I have intentionally omitted
everything but the beginning and end of that day's
operations, to throw what light I can upon the
two great points of dispute : Was the Federal army
surprised by our attack ? and whose fault was it
that the victory was not sufficiently complete on
the first day ?
In regard to the second day's fight, I will touch
upon but one point. I, as a great many other
staff-officers, was principally occupied in the early
hours of the second day in gathering together our
scattered men and getting them into some sort of
manageable organization. In this duty I collected
and organized a body of men about a thousand
strong. They were composed of men of at least a
half-dozen different regiments. The 7th Kentucky,
with a tattered flag, and the 9th Arkansas were
the most numerously represented. We had not
one single field-officer in the command. When I
reported to General Beauregard that I had the
troops divided into companies, had assigned a
captain to duty as lieutenant-colonel and a first
lieutenant as major, he himself put me in com-
mand of them as colonel. In order that my com-
mand might have a name, I dubbed it the
"Beauregard Begiment," — a name that was re-
ceived with three rousing cheers. Not long after
my regiment was thus officered and christened, a
message came from General Breckinridge on our
6o6
THE SHILOH BATTLE-ORDER AND THE WITHDRAWAL.
extreme right that he was hard pressed, and needed
reinforcements. My regiment, which was at the
time just behind General Beauregard, held in re-
serve by his orders, was sent by him to General
Breckinridge's assistance. We marched down the
line of battle to the extreme right, passed beyond
General Breckinridge's right, wheeled by com-
panies into line of battle, and went in with the
"rebel yell." The men on our left took up the yell
and the charge, and we gained several hundred
yards of ground. From this point we fought back
slowly and steadily for several hours, until word
came that the army was ordered to retreat, that
the commands would fall back in succession from
the left, and that the right wing would be the rear-
guard. This order was carried out, and when night
came the right wing was slowly falling back with
face to the foe. We halted on the same ground we
had occupied on the morning of the 6th, just
before the battle began. If there was any "break-
ing" and "starting," as General Grant expresses
it, I did not witness it.
THE SHILOH BATTLE-ORDER AND THE WITHDRAWAL SUNDAY EVENING.
BY ALEXANDER ROBERT CHISOLM, COLONEL, C. S. A. (AT SHILOH ON GENERAL BEAUREGARD'S STAFF).
In the paper published in "The Century " for Feb-
ruary, 1885, Colonel William Preston Johnston,
assuming to give the Confederate version of the
campaign and battle of Shiloh, at which he was
not present, has adventured material statements
regarding operations on that field, which must have
been based on misinformation or misunderstand-
ing in essential particulars, as I take occasion to
assert from personal knowledge acquired as an eye-
witness and aide-de-camp on the staff of General
Beauregard. My personal knowledge runs counter
to many of his statements and deductions, but I
shall here confine myself to two points.
First, I must dispute that the battle-oi'der as
promulgated was in any wise different from the
one submitted by General Beauregard at his own
quarters at Corinth, early in the morning of the 3d
of April, to General A. S. Johnston, and which was
accepted without modification or suggestion. This
assertion I base on these facts : About 1 o'clock
in the morning the adjutant-general of the Confed-
erate forces, Colonel Jordan, aroused me from
sleep in my tent, close by General Beauregard's
chamber, and desired me to inform the general at
dawn that General Johnston had agreed to his
recommendation to move offensively against Pitts-
burg Landing early that same day, and that the
circular orders to the corps commanders had been
already issued by Colonel Jordan to that effect.
Acting upon this request, I found that General
Beauregard had already during the night made full
notes on loose sci'aps of paper of the order of inarch
and battle, from which he read aloud for me to
copy — my copy being given to Colonel Jordan as
soon as completed, as the basis of the official order
which he was to frame, and did frame and issue in
the name of General Johnston. And that is the
order which Colonel Johnston erroneously alleges
upon the posthumous authority of General Bragg
to differ essentially from the plan settled upon by
General Johnston for the battle. This allegation I
know to be unfounded, as the order as isstied varies
in no wise from the notes dictated to me by General
Beauregard, excepting the mere wording and some
details relating to transportation and ordnance
service added by Colonel Jordan ; that is to say, the
plan explained by General Beauregard and accepted
by General Johnston at the quarters of the former.
Being limited as to space, I shall pass over a
throng of facts within my personal knowledge,
which would establish that General Beauregard
was as actively and directly handling the Con-
federate forces engaged in their general conduct
of the battle before the death of General Johnston
as he was after that incident. I shall confine my-
self on this occasion to relating that after General
Beauregard became cognizant of the death of Gen-
eral Johnston, he dispatched me to the front with
orders that led to the concentration of the widely
scattered and disarrayed Confederate forces, which
resulted in the capture of General Prentiss and so
many of his division after 5 o'clock on the 6th.
I also, later in the day, carried orders to Hardee,
who was engaged on our extreme left, or Federal
right, where I remained with that officer until almost
dark, up to which time no orders had reached him
to cease fighting. On the contrary, he was doing
his best to force back the enemy in his front. As
he was without any of his staff about him, for the
nonce I acted as his aide-de-camp. Meantime the
gun-boats were shelling furiously, and their huge
missiles crushed through the branches of the trees
overhead with so fearful a din, frequency, and close-
ness that, despite the excitement of our apparently
complete victory, there was room left in our minds
for some most unpleasant sensations, especially
when the top of some lofty tree, cut off by a shell,
would come toppling down among the men.
Possibly, had Colonel Johnston been present on
the field at that last hour of the battle of the 6th,
a witness of the actually fruitless efforts made to
storm the last position held by the enemy upon
the ridge covering the immediate landing-place,
known as Pittsburg, he might be better informed
why it was that that position was not carried, and
be less disposed to adduce such testimony as that
of General Bragg, to the effect that but for the
order given by Beauregard to withdraw from action
he would have carried all before him.
It so happened that I rejoined General Beaure-
gard at a point near Shiloh Chapel (having escorted
General Prentiss from the field to General Beaure-
gard), when General Bragg rode up from the front,
and I heard him say in an excited manner : "Gen-
eral, we have carried everything before us to the
Tennessee River. I have ridden from Owl to Lick
Creek, and there is none of the enemy to be seen."
Beauregard quietly replied: "Then, General, do
not unnecessarily expose your command to the fire
of the gun -boats."
THE MARCH OF LEW WALLACE'S DIVISION TO SHILOH.
CIRCUMSTANCES AND CHARACTER OF THE ORDER.
As General Grant passed up from Savannah
on the Tigress on the 6th of April to the battle-field
of Shiloh, he found General Lew Wallace await-
ing him at Crump's Landing, the troops of his
division having been ordered under arms at the
sound of the battle. [For General Grant's state-
ments, see pages 467-8.] General Wallace in his
official report places the hour at which General
Grant reached Crump's at about 9, while General
Grant gives the hour of his arrival at Pittsburg
Landing as about 8. Grant left Wallace a direction
to hold himself in readiness for orders. In anticipa-
tion of the receipt of them, a horse was saddled at
Crump's for the use of the expected messenger,
the First Brigade having been already sent from
Crump's to join the Second at Stony Lonesome
(marked A on the map), General Wallace fol-
lowing about 9:15. To this point, at an hour
which has been variously stated by the officers
of the command at from 11 o'clock to noon
(Wallace says, "exactly 11:30"), came Captain
A. S. Baxter, quartermaster on Grant's staff,
with the order. Concerning the time, dispatch,
and character of this order there is much dis-
agreement. General Grant says that the order
was verbal ; that it was given after riding out to
the front, and that Baxter made a memorandum
of it, though he does not say that he saw Baxter.
Furthermore Rawlins says that the order was taken
by him back to the Landing, half a mile away, and
given verbally to Baxter, and afterward dictated
to him, at the latter's request, and that Baxter
stai'ted on the steamer not later than 9 o'clock.
Rowley states that Grant gave the order verbally
and in person to Baxter at once upon arriving at
the Landing, and then rode immediately to the
front. Wallace states that Baxter delivered an
unsigned order and said that "it had been given
to him verbally, but that in coming down the river
he had reduced it to writing."
Concerning the circumstances and character of
the order Captain Baxter made the following state-
ment in the New-York "Mail and Express" for
November 4th, 1886:
" r will give my own recollection of the event at Pitts-
burg Landing. On Sunday, between the hours of 8 and
9 o'clock A. M., April 6th, 1862, Adjutant-General Rawlins,
of General Grant's staff, requested me to so to Crump's
Landing (Ave miles below) and order General Lew Wal-
lace to march his command at once by the River Road to
Pittsburg Landing, and join the army on the right. At
the same time General Rawlins dictated the order to
General Wallace, which was written by myself and
signed by General Rawlins.
" Onmceting GeneralWallace I gavethe ordcrverbally,
also handed to him the written order. General Wallace
said ' he was waiting for orders, had heard the firing all
the morning, and was ready to move with his command
immediately — knew the road and had put it in good
order.'
" My stay with Lew Wallace did not exceed three min-
utes. I had no further conversation with him, and I re-
turned immediately to Pittsburg Landing."
As to the character of the order : General Grant's
statement (see page 468) is that the order as given
was " to march immediately to Pittsburg by the
road nearest the river." Captain Rowley says, "to
march with his division up the river, and into the
field on the right of our line, as rapidly as possible."
Rawlins says it read "substantially as follows:
' Major-General Wallace : You will move forward
your division from Crump's Landing, leaving a suffi-
cient force to protect the public property at that
place, to Pittsburg Landing, on the road nearest to
and parallel to the river, and form in line at right an-
gles with the river, immediately in rear of the camp
of Major-General C. F. Smith's division on our right
[W. H. L. Wallace's], and there wait further or-
ders.'" GeneralWallace says, that as received, it
directed him " to come up and take position on the
right of the army, and form my line of battle at a
right angle with the river," and "to leave a force
to prevent surprise at Crump's Landing." Colonel
James R. Ross says, " I very distinctly remember
that this order directed you to move forward and
join General Sherman's right on the Purdy Road,
and form your line of battle at right angles with the
river, and then act as circumstances would dic-
tate." •& General Fred. Knefler says, "It was a
written order to march and form a junction with
the right of the army." \ Captain Addison Ware
says it was "to move your division up and join
General Sherman's right on the road leading from
Pittsburg Landing to Purdy." fo General Knefler
adds, "The order was placed in my hands as As-
sistant Adjutant-General ; but where it is now, or
what became of it, I am unable to say. Very
likely, having been written on a scrap of paper, it
was lost."\
ROUTE AND LIMIT OP THE MARCH.
■&R08H to Wallace, January 25th, 1868.
All reports agree that the march of the two bri-
gades began at 12 o'clock, along the road ABC.
Wallace not ai*rivingat Pittsburg Landing, General
Grant sent Captain Rowley of his staff to hurry
him forward. Rowley went by the River Road al-
most to Crump's Landing, and then "a distance
of between five and six miles," when he reached
the rear of Wallace's division by the road ABC,
and passing the resting troops continued to the
head of the column, where he found Wallace and
delivered the orders, and gave him the first in-
formation that the right of the army had been
driven back. Wallace then ordered a counter-
march of the troops. The point at which this
turning took place is fixed by General Wallace at
D, half-way between the Purdy crossing and the
Owl Creek bridge. (This identification is fully con-
firmed by letters of October 5th and 6th, 1887,
written by Generals Fred. Knefler and G. F. Mc-
Ginnis, Captains Thomas C. Pursel and George F.
Brown, and Dr. S. L. Ensminger, all of whom took
part in the march, and the last two of whom exam-
ined the ground in 1884 to determine the point.)
In the "Official Records" is a sketch map, without
scale, by Colonel James B. McPherson, placing the
\ Knefler to Wallace, February 19th, 1868. & Ware to Wallace [1868].
607
6o8
THE MARCH OF LEW WALLACE'S DIVISION TO SHILOH
S avannali13
MAP OF THE ROUTES BY WHICH GENERAL GRANT WAS REENEORCED AT PITTSBURG LANDING.
Authorities : (1.) The Official or Thorn map (p. 508), for
roads and distances on the south side of Snake Creek ;
(2.) the Union Camp map (pp. 496-7), for the location of
camps morning of April 5th, 1862 ; (3.) the Shiloh map
in General Badeau's " Military History of U. S. Grant,"
for the main roads on the north side of Snake Creek,
that map also agreeing with General McPherson's
sketch map without scale in " Official Records," Vol. X.,
p. 183; (4.) General Wallace's statement to the editors,
1887, based on investigations and measurements in 1884,
limit of march at C. This was probably intended
for the point where Rowley came up with the rear
of the column, which must have covered a distance
of two miles or more ; but if intended for the
limit of the advance, it could not have been fixed
on McPherson's own knowledge, for when Rawlins
and McPherson, who were also sent by General
Grant (McPherson says at 2:30) to hasten the
movement, following Rowley's course, came up
with the division (Rawlins says about 3 : 30), the
First Brigade had passed across toward E and the
Second was passing. Some mystery attaches to the
inaction of the Third Brigade during the morning.
General Wallace states in his report that it was
concentrated on the Second, meaning, as he
explains to the editors, that the order for the
concentration had been sent, and, he presumed,
obeyed. Colonel Ross delivered the order to Colonel
Charles R. Woods, then in command at Adamsville,
and Captain Ware, Wallace's second aid, carried a
repetition of it — both during the morning. [Ross to
Wallace; January 25th, 1868, and Ware to Wallace,
1868.] Yet Colonel Whittlesey, who during the
day, by seniority of commission, succeeded to the
by Captain George F. Brown and Dr. S. L. Ensmin-
ger, for the roads from G to C and from C to E, and
for the point D as the limit of the march toward Owl
Creek. N. B.— No detailed survey appears to have been
made.
Key to routes of Wallace's division :
Route of First Brigade, morning of April 6th — F A.
Route of First and Second brigades to the battlefield,
afternoon— A BCD CHE K.
Route of Third Brigade, afternoon — G C H E K.
command of the brigade, says in his report that three
of the four regiments "received orders to march
with their trains about 2 P. M., and to advance to-
ward Pittsburg Landing in advance of the trains at
4 p. M." This they did (General Wallace informs us)
by the route shown on the map. The fourth regi-
ment went to Crump's to guard the public property-
The "Official Records" (Vol. X., p. 177) also
tain a rough sketch map, submitted by General con-
Wallace to General Halleck, accompanying a mem-
orandum dated March 14th, 1863. That map is
manifestly imperfect in representing but one
bridge between A and the right of the army, the
junction of Owl and Snake creeks being placed
above the upper Snake creek bridge, instead of
below it. General Wallace himself has informed
the editors that that map is incorrect, and that its
inaccuracy arose from a prevalent confusion of the
names of Snake and Owl creeks. That map, how-
ever, faithfully represents General Wallace's claim
that the head of his column advanced to within
a mile of what had been the right of the army.
This confusion of the two creeks has given am-
biguity to General Wallace's statement in his re-
THE MARCH OF LEW WALLACE'S DIVISION TO SHILOH.
bog
port, made five days after the battle, which he in-
forms us should read as bracketed :
" Selecting a road that led directly to the right of
the lines, as they were established around Pittsburg
Landing on Sunday morning, my column started im-
mediately, the distance being about six miles. The
cannonading, distinctly audible, quickened the steps of
the men. Snake Creek [Owl Creek], difficult of passage
at all times on account of its steep banks and swampy
bottoms, ran between me and the point of junction.
Short way from it [Owl Creek] Captain Rowley, from
General Grant, . . . overtook me It seemed, on
his representation, most prudent to carry the column
across to what is called the 'River Road.' . . . This
movement occasioned a counter-march, which delayed
my junction with the main army until a little after
nightfall."
CHARACTER OF THE MARCH.
Eowley, McPherson, and Rawlins report that
they represented the need of haste, and that the
march was slow :
" Of the character of the march, after I overtook Gen-
eral Wallace, I can only say that to mc it appeared in-
tolerably slow, resembling more a reconnoissance inthe
face of an enemy than a forced march to relieve a hard-
pressed army. So strongly did this impression take hold
of my mind, that I took the liberty of repeating to Gen-
eral Wallace that part of General Grant's order enjoin-
ing haste." [Rowley.]
"After I had reached the head of the column, I must
saj it seemed to me that the march was not as rapid as
the urgency of the case required. Perhaps this arose in
a great measure from my impatience and anxiety to get
this force on the field before dark. . . ." [.McPherson]
" Colonel McPherson and I came up to him about 3:30
o'clock p.m. He was then not to exceed four or four
and a half miles [two and a half miles >.] from the scene
of action; the roads were in fine condition; he was
marching light ; his men were in buoyant spirits, within
hearing of the musketry, aud eager to get forward. He
did not make a mile and a half an hour, although urged
and appealed to, to push forward. Had he moved with
the rapidity his command were able and anxious to have
moved after we overtook him, he would have reached
you [Grant] in time to have engaged the enemy before
the close of Sunday's tight." [Rawlins.]
General Wallace denies this last conclusion and
the statement about the condition of the road.
General Kuefler says [letter to Wallace] : "After
some hard marching over execrable roads, we
reached our position about dusk." Col. James
R. Ross says [letter to Wallace, January 25th,
1868] : "We had to march over the worst road
I ever remember to have seen. In many places
it was almost impossible to get artillery through."
The head of the column did not arrive at K until
after dark, probably at 7:15, sunset being at 6 : 30.
The total time of the march was about 7 hours.
The total distance traveled to the lower bridge (K)
was. according to our map, 1 1 miles. It is pos-
sible that a detailed survey of the field would in-
dicate the distance as somewhat greater. General
Wallace estimates it as " over 14 miles, of which
quite 5 miles were through mire so deep that the
axles of my guns left wakes behind them as if
mud-scows had been dragged that way." Cap-
tain Brown, who studied the route in 1884, esti-
mates if at between 13 and 14 miles. Not con-
sidering the comparative difficulties of the two
marches, the map indicates little difference in the
VOL. T. 39.
speed of Wallace's division and that of Nelson's
leading brigade (Ammen) from Savannah to Pitts-
burg Lauding (1:30 to 5). Ammen in his diary
dwells on the extreme difficulties of his route, which
lay largely through swamps impassable by artillery.
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY GENERAL WALLACE.
I. — Letter found on the person of General W. H.
L. Wallace, after he had received a mortal wound
at Shiloh, and sent by his widow to General Grant
[see foot-note, page 468; printed also in The
Century and in the " Personal Memoirs of U. S.
Grant"]:
•• Headquarters Third Division, Adamsville, April
5th, 1862. General W. H. L. Wallace, commanding Sec-
ond Division. Sir: Yours received. Glad to hear from
you. My cavalry from this point has been to and from
your post frequently. As my Third Brigade is here, five
miles from Crump's Landing, my Second two and a half
miles from it, I thought it would be better to open com-
munication with you from Adamsville. I will to-morrow
order Major Hays, of the 5th Ohio Cavalry, to report to
you at your quarters ; and, if you are so disposed, prob-
ably you had better send a company to return with him,
that they may familiarize themselves with the road, to
act in case of emergency as guides to and from our
camps.— I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Lewis Wallace, General Third Division."
General Wallace says : " As I was ignorant of the
position of W. H. L.Wallace's camp, this letter was
sent by way of Owl Creek. I knew Wallace, and did
not know Sherman, whose camp was nearer."
II. — Letter from General Grant to General Lew
Wallace, in 1868, after examining statements by
the latter and by the following officers of his com-
mand, touching the character of the order and
march: Generals Fred. Knefler, George F. Mc-
Ginnis, Daniel Macauley, John A. Strickland, John
M. Thayer, Colonel James R. Ross, and Captain Ad-
dison Ware :
" Headquarters Army of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C, March loth, 1868. My Dear General:
Inclosed herewith T return you letters from officers of
the army who served with you at the battle of Shiloh,
Tennessee, giving their statement of your action on
that occasion. I can only state that my orders to you
Avere given verbally to a staff-officer to communicate,
and that they were substantially as given by General
Badeau in his book. I always understood that the staff-
officer referred to, Captain Baxter, made a memorandum
of the orders he received, and left it with you. That
memorandum Inever saw.
" The statements which I now return seem to exoner-
ate you from the great point of blame, your taking the
wrong road, or different road from the one directed,
from Crump's Landing to Pittsburg Landing. All your
subsequent military career showed you active and ready
in the execution of every order you received. Your
promptness in moving from Baltimore to Monocacy,
Maryland, iu 1864, and meeting the enemy in force far
superior to your own when Washington was threat-
ened, is a case particularly in point. There you could
scarcely have hoped for a victory, but you delayed the
enemy, and enabled me to get troops from City Point,
Virginia, in time to save the city. That act I regarded
as most praiseworthy. I refer you to my report of 1865,
touching your course there. In view of the assault
made upon yon now, I think it due to you that you
should publish what your own staff and other subordi-
nate officers have to say in exoneration of your course.
—Yours truly, TT. S. Grant, General.
"To Major-General L. Wallace."
6io
THE MARCH OF LEW WALLACE'S DIVISION TO SHILOH.
III. — Letter from General Wallace to General
Grant, in 1884, referring to the whole controversy.
The omissions are made by the editors, for lack of
space :
" Crawfordsville, Ind., September I6tli, 1884. Dear
General: The Century Co. people inform me that
they have engaged you to write a paper for thein ou
Pittsburg Landing. Such a contribution from your hand
will lie important as wel] as most interesting. Probably
I ought not to trouble you touching the subject ; still, I
trust you will appreciate the anxieties natural to one
who has been so bitterly and continuously criticised in
the connection, and pardon me a few lines of request.
" The letter of exoneration you gave me some years ago
is not permitted to be printed in the volume of reports
published by the Government, though I earnestly sought
the favor of the Secretary of War. The terrible reflec-
tions in your indorsement on my official report of the
battle, and elsewhere, go to the world wholly unquali-
fied. It is not possible to exaggerate the misfortune thus
entailed upon me. But now you have it m power to make
correction, in a paper which will be read far more gen-
erally than the compilation of the department. May I
hope you will do it ?
"Since my return from Europe I have for the first time
read the reports of Generals Rawlins and McPherson, and
Major Rowley, touching my march the first day of the
battle. I shall regret aU my remaining days not pre-
viously knowing their tenor; for I think I could have
explained to the satisfaction of those geutlemen every
mystery of my conduct during their ride with me the
afternoon of the 6th April. They did not understand
that there was a mistake in your order as it was deliv-
ered to me, and while with them I supposed they knew
why I was where they found me. Consequently, no ex-
planation took place between us. I see now, they really
supposed me lost, aud wandering aimlessly about. Had
the correctness of the order been mooted, no doubt the
order itself could have been produced. I would not have
rested until my adjutant-general had produced it. Is
it to be supposed for an instant that, knowing their
thoughts of me during the hours of that ride, I could
have been indifferent to them ? As it is, you will observe
that neither of them pretends to explain my behavior.
Neither makes allusion to a theory of explanation. The
truth is, I all the time supposed the necessity for the
change of direction in my movement was simply due to
the bad turn of the battle after the order was dispatched
to me. The whole time I was in their company I thought
myself entitled to credit for the promptness with which
I was obeying your orders. It never occurred to me that
there was anything to explain, and I was wholly given
up to the movement of the division, which was urgent
business in hand.
" With reference to Major Rowley's statement, that I
had no knowledge of any other road than that by the old
mill, and his other statement, that I retained him as a
guide, the explanation is that I was speaking of a. cross-
road to the River Road. I had no knowledge of such a
road. In hopes of finding one, I countermarched instead
of facing column to the rear. One of my captains of artil-
lery has since gone over the entire route we took, from
Stony Lonesome, the place at which I received your
order to inarch, to Pittsburg Landing, and he finds me
mistaken in saying we countermarched back nearly to
the initial point of movement. Ho not only found the
cross-road taken, but measured the whole march, chain
in hand, making it a little more than fifteen miles. . . .
"As to my requiring a written order from you, I repeat
my absolute denial of the statement. The order I acted
upon was unsigned, and it is susceptible of proof that
when the young Illinois cavalryman overtook me I was
already on the inarch.
" As to the slowness referred to by McPherson, Raw-
lins and Rowley, please try that point by compari-
sons. • , • ■ • From 11 : 30 o'clock till just dusk my
march was quite fifteen miles. I refer the argument to
your calm judgment. I do not wonder my movement
seemed slow to your officers. With their anxieties quick-
ened by what they had seen on the field, it must have
seemed intolerable to them. They describe me correctly
as at the head of the column, and I did several times dis-
mount, but only to wait the closing up of the division and
reports of my own staff-officers, who were kept urging
the column through the mud aud mire.
"There is another point your officers seem not to have
understood, and that was my determination not to send
the division piecemeal into the battle. The whole di-
vision was what I supposed you wanted, and I was re-
solved to bring you the whole division. I paid no
attention to contrary suggestions from anybody. I
think you will justify this pertinacity of purpose by
the fact that it was impossible to tell the moment I
might be attacked en route. The chances of such an
occurrence grew sharper as I drew nearer Pittsburg
Landing. For you must remember, general, that from
the moment Major Rowley overtook me with the infor-
mation, then first received, that our army had been
driven from the line it occupied in the morning, and was
back far towards the river, I supposed it utterly unable
to help me. Then whether the enemy attacked me or I
them, it was only my division, and not a part of it, that
could have achieved your desires. . . .
" At your table at City Point we one day sat listening
to the comments of some officers upon the battle of Pitts-
burg Landing. After a while you remarked to me in a
low tone, ' If I had 'known then what I know now, I
would have ordered you where you were marching when
stopped.' The remark was made at your table, and in
a confidential manner, so that I have never felt at
liberty to repeat, much less publish, it. But times
innumerable since then I have wished that Rowley had
not overtaken me for another hour that afternoon. The
enemy had used the last of his reserves. I would have
taken the bluff ou which Sherman had been camped in
the morning and, without opposition, effected my de-
ployment. The first of the rebels struck would have
been the horde plundering the sutlers and drinking in
the streets of the camp. Their fears would have magni-
fied my command, and rushing to their engaged lines
they woidd have carried the word that Buell's army
was up and on their lines of retreat. For your sake and
my own, general, and for the cause generally, it was
unfortunate that Rowley had not lost his way, as it was
said I had mine.
" Finally, general, did you ever ask yourself what mo-
tive I could have had to play you falsely that day ? It
couldn't have been personal malice. Only a few weeks
before I had been promoted major-general on your
recommendation. It couldn't have been cowardice.
You had seen me under fire at Done! son, and twice the
second day at Pittsburg Landing you found me with my
division under fire. It couldn't have been lack of reso-
lution. I certainly showed no failiug of that kind at
Monocacy Junction, where my situation was quite as
trying as at any hour of the 6th of April of which I am
writing. The fact is, I was the victim of a mistake.
Captain Baxter's omission from the order you gave him
for transmission to me — the omission of the road you
wanted me to take in coming up — viz., the lower or River
Road to Pittslnlrg Landing, was the cause of my move-
ment at noon. It is also the key of explanation of all
that followed. That I took the directest and shortest
road to effect a junction with the right of the army, and
marched promptly upon receipt of the order, are the
liest evidence I could have furnished of an actual desire
to do my duty, and share the fortunes of the day with
you, whether they were good or bad.
"In all the years that have followed I have been
patient and uncomplaining, because, as you had shown
the will to exonerate me, I believed you would follow it
up on all proper occasions. And I submit to you if this
is not one of them. For the sake of the hundreds of sur-
vivors of my old division, as well as that justice may
be finally and completely done to me individually, I
presume to present the matter to you in this letter.
" Very respectfully, your friend, Lew Wallace."
I^km^^^^t 5
A FRIGATE OF THE OLDEN TIME - THE " INDEPENDENCE," BUILT IN 1814. RECEIVING-SHIP AT THE MARE ISLAND NAVY YARD IN 1872.
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES.
BY JAMES RUSSELL SOLEY, PROFESSOR, U. S. N.
I"X order to understand the condition of the United States navy in 1861, it
J- is necessary to glance at the state of affairs during the twenty years
before the war. Until the year 1840, naval science during a long period
had made but little progress. The various improvements in construction,
in equipment, and in ordnance that had been introduced before this date
had come about very slowly and gradually, and though numerous small
mechanical devices had been adopted from time to time, and old ones had
been rendered more efficient, no marked changes had taken place in the art
of naval war. Ships were essentially what they had been for two hundred
years, and they were rigged, propelled, armed, and fought upon essentially
the same principles. But toward the year 1840, the introduction of steam
as a motive power marked the beginning of a new era, — an era of develop-
ments so rapid and of changes so radical that only the most progressive
and elastic minds could follow them. The sailing vessel was about to be laid
aside, except for purposes of training. In the next few years it was replaced,
first by the paddle-wheel steamer, then by the screw, then by the twin-screw.
The rig of the ship was next altered, and her spars and sail-spread reduced
until they were merely auxiliary. Gradually it was realized that the danger
from falling spars in an engagement was a disadvantage often out of all pro-
portion to the benefits of auxiliary sail-power, and vessels were built with no
611
612 THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES
spars above the deck but a signal-pole forward and aft. Steam brought
with it also a new weapon. The ram, which had been the principal engine
of naval warfare in the Greek and Roman galleys, had disappeared in the
Middle Ages when galleys were superseded by sailing ships. The latter,
being dependent upon the wind for their motive power and direction, could
not attack an enemy end-on, and hence the ram became useless. Soon after
the introduction of steam a few men of inquiring and fertile minds, among
them Commodore Matthew Perry and Mr. Charles Ellet, a distinguished civil
engineer, perceived that the steam-engine placed a ship-of-war in the same
situation as the galleys of the classical period, and that the ram might be
employed on the modern vessel to much greater advantage than in ancient
times. Presently, the whole system of naval tactics underwent a change, due
to the same cause. The close-hauled line ahead, the order of battle for two
hundred years and more, gave place to the direct attack in line abreast. To
utilize the guns in this new order of battle, they must no longer be mounted
in broadside, but upon elevated citadels, giving them a wider sweep around
the horizon. Meantime the guns b#d undergone a change, and were becom-
ing vastly more powerful. First they were adapted to fire shells, which had
hitherto been confined to mortars; next the calibers were increased, then
rifling was adopted, giving greater range, accuracy, and penetration, and
finally breech-loaders came into use. Following closely upon the improve-
ments in guns, came the idea of protecting the sides of vessels with a light
armor, at first of bar iron or of two-inch plates, developed by experiment
after experiment into masses of solid steel, twenty-two inches in thickness.
Last of all came the torpedo, of which a slight and tentative use had been
made as early as 1776, but which only made its way into successful and
general employment in the war of 1861.
There were signs of the dawn of this revolution before 1840, and its culmi-
nation was only reached during the war. But the twenty years between 1840
and 1860 were those in which the movement was really accomplished. During
this period the naval administration had endeavored to follow the changes
that were taking place, but it had not fully caught up with them. It had
begun by building heavy side-wheelers, first the Mississippi and Missouri and
next the Powhatan and Susquehanna. Efficient as these latter vessels were
considered in 1847, when they were begun, and even in 1850, when they were
launched, their model was promptly dropped when the submarine screw was
introduced in place of the vulnerable paddle-wheel. The six screw-frigates
were accordingly built in 1855, and they were regarded with admiration
by naval men abroad as well as at
home. The Niagara, the largest of
these, was a ship of 4500 tons. The
other five, the Roanoke, Colorado, Mer-
rimac, Minnesota, and Wabash, had a
tonnage somewhat over 3000. All of
them were heavily armed, and they
FROM ANCIENT TERRA-COTTA MODEL. formed, 01" Wd'C SUppOSed tO fOl'm,
ROMAN WAH-GALLEY.
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES.
611
LINE-OF-BATTLE SHIP OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.
the chief element of naval strength of the United States. This reliance of
the Government upon its large frigates would seem to have been well
grounded, and if a war had arisen with a maritime enemy supplied with
vessels of the same general type, they would have given a good account of
themselves. In the civil war, however, the enemy had no ordinary vessels of
war to be met and conquered in ocean duels, and the waters upon his coast
at points vulnerable to naval attack were too shallow to admit the frigates.
Hence none of them performed any service at all proportionate to their size
and cost of maintenance, except in two or three isolated cases of bombard-
ment, as at Hatteras Inlet, Port Royal, and Fort Fisher. \
Of a much more useful type for general service were the twelve screw
sloops-of-war built in 1858. There were five of these of the first class, among
them the Hartford, Brooklyn, and Richmond, which gave and took so many
heavy blows while fighting in Farragut's West Gulf Squadron. Hardly less
important were the sloops of the second class, of which the Iroquois and
Dacotah were the largest and most typical examples. To the same group
belonged the Pawnee, a vessel of peculiar construction, whose constant service
was hardly surpassed in efficiency and importance by any other ship of her
size on the Atlantic coast. Besides the sloops, there were a few other
steamers of miscellaneous dimensions and character, some of which had
been purchased and altered for naval use; and these comprised all that
the Government had secured toward the creation of a modern steam fleet.
The noi*mal strength of the United States navy, if it is to be a navy at all,
cannot be figured at much less than from 80 to 100 vessels, and this was the
number in 1861. But of the actual total of 90, as shown by the navy list,
50 were sailing ships, — line-of -battle ships, frigates, sloops, and brigs, — which,
614
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES.
splendid vessels as they had been in their day, were now as obsolete as
the galleys of Themistocles. It was in placing a false reliance upon these
vessels that the Government was at f anlt : it should have recognized in the
course of twenty years that their day was gone forever, that they were of no
more use than if they did not exist, that they would only be the slaughter-
houses of their gallant crews in an encounter with a modern antagonist ;
and it should by that time have replaced every one of them by war-ships of
the period.
At the beginning of President Lincoln's administration, out of the forty
vessels composing the steam-fleet, one, the Michigan, was stationed on the
lakes, and five were from one cause or another unserviceable. The remain-
ing thirty-four, which comprised the whole of the effective force, were in the
scattered situation that is usual in time of profound peace. Nine were laid
up in ordinary, and with the traditional methods prevailing at the Navy
Department, it would have taken some months to fit them out for sea. No
orders had been issued for the general recall of the seventeen ships on foreign
service, an operation requiring considerable time in those days, when no
submarine cable existed. In the Home Squadron there were seven steamers,
two of which, the sloop-of-war Brooklyn and the small steamer Wyandotte, were
at Pensacola ; two others, the gun-boats Mohawk and Crusader, were at New
York ; the Pawnee, a second-class sloop, was at Washington ; and the Pow-
hatan, a side-wheeler of 1850, was on her way home from Vera Cruz in
company with the gun-boat Pocahontas. Five sailing ships were also
attached to this squadron, — the frigate Sabine and the sloop St. Louis, at
Pensacola ; the sloops Cumberland and Macedonian, at Vera Cruz or return-
ing thence, and the store-ship Supply, at New York. These twelve vessels,
together with the Anacostia, a small screw-tender, at the Washington Navy
Yard, were all that could
be' said to be at the im-
mediate disposal of the
Administration.
When the vessels abroad
were gathered in, and
those in ordinary were
fitted out, the Govern-
ment had a little squad-
ron of about 30 steamers,
of which the most im-
portant were 5 screw-
frigates (the sixth, the
Merr'unac, having been
abandoned at Norfolk),
6* sloops of
THE UNITED STATES FRIGATE " MERRIMAC " BEFORE
AND AFTER CONVERSION INTO AN IRON-CLAD.
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAMES. 615
the first or Hartford class, 4 large side-wheelers, and 8 sloops of the second or
Iroquois class. All these were exceedingly valuable as the nucleus of a fleet, but
for the War which the Grovernment had now on hand they could be considered
as nothing more than this. According to the position which the Adminis-
tration was very soon compelled to take, the struggle was one a outrance. In a
foreign war the conflict usually springs from a collision of rights or of inter-
ests, involving only a particular branch of the relations of the two contestants,
and the question is ultimately settled by some form of compromise, as soon
as financial or military exhaustion leads one party or the other to conclude that
a protraction of the contest is not worth its while. In the civil war, however,
no compromise was possible, and with the resolution shown by the Southern
people, nothing short of complete subjugation would insure the restoration
of the Union. In such a war, a little fleet capable of raids upon the
enemy's commerce or sea-ports might be advantageous to the insurgents, but
the Federal Government required materials and methods of a totally different
character. No mere raids would profit it a jot. It must blockade the insur-
gent territory ; and to do this it was not enough to keep a few ships cruising
in neighboring waters, but a cordon of fast and efficient steamers must be
stretched from end to end, without so much as a gap in the whole four
thousand miles of coast. The reduction or even the passage of fortifications
required powerful and well-equipped fleets engaged solely in these enter-
prises. The vast net-work of interior waterways in which the army's base
and communications must be protected, could only be occupied successfully
by another and equally numerous fleet. Finally, the protection of commerce
demanded, from the very nature of things, far more vessels than its destruction.
Had the material of the navy of 1861 been such as it ought to have been, —
composed, let us say, of ninety modern war-steamers of fair quality ; with
such an organization that those laid up in ordinary could have been fitted
out in two weeks at farthest, as should always be the case ; with a reserve of
a hundred, or even of fifty merchant-steamers, constructed with a view to
conversion into war- vessels at short notice, which is an easy matter to accom-
plish; with some system by which the latest problems in naval science,
especially in reference to iron-clads, had been considered and, in part at least,
carried to solution ; and finally, with a corps of officers graded more or less
by merit, or the promise of growing fitness for command, instead of by age,
or the promise of growing unfitness, — had all these plain, practicable, and
sensible measures found a place in the naval administration, it is perfectly
safe to say that a single year would have seen the opening of the Mississippi, the
occupation of North Carolina, the fall of Richmond, Charleston, Savannah,
and Mobile, and probably the end of the Confederacy. During the first six
months of the war, there was really nothing to oppose the vigorous attack of
such a force, and there was little more during the six months following.
As the naval material was not on a respectable peace-footing, and as no
provision had been made for its conversion to a war-footing, the measures
adopted for its increase were chiefly makeshifts to which the Grovernment
was driven by the exigencies of the moment. The vessels purchased by the
616 THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAMES.
Department during the war amounted to 418, and included every variety of
merchantman and river steamboat roughly adapted in the navy yards for war
service. Three types of wooden vessels were built : 14 screw sloops of the
Kearsarge, Shenandoah, and Ossipee classes ; 23 screw gun-boats, called from
the rapidity of their construction the " ninety-day " gun-boats ; and 47 side-
wheel steamers, known as " double-enders," for service in narrow channels,
where they could move ahead or astern without turning. J Later in the war
forty-eight additional sloops or corvettes of various sizes were projected, but
few of these were ever finished, and hardly any before the close of the struggle.
In the matter of iron-clads, the extreme slowness with which the Navy
Department moved shows that it failed to comprehend the magnitude of the
struggle, and that it was unfamiliar with the recent progress of naval warfare.
The advantages of a light armor-plating for vessels-of-war had been demon-
strated by the experience of the French floating batteries Devastation, Lave,
and Tonnante, in the attack on Kinburn in 1855, during the Crimean war.
These vessels were protected by 4^-inch plates, and the experiment had been
deemed so conclusive that both France and England had already constructed
new war-ships incased in armor. It was to be expected that a navy with a
war on its hands would have directed its attention from the first moment
when it was convinced of the probability of hostilities to seeming some of
these formidable vessels ; and if a hesitation due to the want of statutory
authority had led the Department to defer building until after Congress
met, it would at least by that time have digested its plans so thoroughly that
the work could begin at once. Nevertheless, for four months after Mr. Welles
entered upon his office no steps were taken, even of the most elementary
character, toward procuring iron-clads. In his report of July 4th, 1861, at the
opening of the special session of Congress, the Secretary, by way of calling at-
tention to the subject, makes the following somewhat ponderous observations :
" Much attention has been given within the last few years to the subject of floating batteries,
or iron-clad steamei's. Other governments, and particularly France and England, have made
it a special object in connection with naval improvements ; and the ingenuity and inventive
faculties of our own countrymen have also been stimulated by recent occurences toward the
construction of this class of vessel. The period is, perhaps, not one best adapted to heavy ex-
penditures by way of experiment, and the time and attention of some of those who are most
competent to investigate and form correct conclusions on the subject are otherwise employed.
I would, however, recommend the appointment of a proper and competent board to inquire
into and report in regard to a measure so important ; and it is for Congress to decide whether, on
a favorable report, they will order one or more iron-clad steamers, or floating batteries, to be
constructed, with a view to perfect protection from the effects of present ordnance at short
range, and make an appropriation for that purpose."
In consequence of this recommendation, which, it must be confessed, was
hardly such as the urgency of the measure demanded, Congress, a whole
month later, on the 3d of August, passed an act authorizing the Secretary to
appoint a board of officers to investigate the subject, a thing which was cer-
tainly within the scope of ministerial powers without any special legislation,
I Eight of the " double-enders" were built of iron.
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES.
617
THE NAVY YARD, WASHINGTON, IN 1861.
and appropriating $1,500,000 for the work. After another delay of five
precious days, on the 8th of August the board was appointed, composed of
Commodores Smith and Paulding and Commander Davis. The board took
occasion to remark that it approached the subject " with diffidence, having
no experience, and but scanty knowledge in this branch of naval architecture."
Inconceivable as it seems, this statement was literally true ; for although
five months had elapsed since the new administration had come in ; although
it knew, or should have known, what the Confederates were doing at Norfolk,
and that time was of vital moment, the very best men whom it could select
took six weeks to reach a conclusion on the subject. Even at the close of its
protracted deliberations, so little did the board understand the tremendous
importance of its work that in its final report it sagely remarked :
" Opinions differ amongst naval and scientific men as to the policy of adopting the iron arma-
ture for ships-of-war. For coast and harbor defense they are undoubtedly formidable
adjuncts to fortifications on land. As cruising vessels, however, we are skeptical as to their
advantages and ultimate adoption. But whilst other nations are endeavoring to perfect them,
we must not remain idle. . . . We, however, do not hesitate to express the opinion, notwith-
standing all we have heard or seen written on the subject, that no ship or floating battery,
however heavily she may be plated, can cope successfully with a properly constructed fortifica-
tion of masonry."
The same inability to understand the situation is shown in the Secretary's
report transmitted to Congress in December, in which he contents himself
with this perfunctory utterance :
"The subject of iron armature for ships is one of great general interest, not only to the navy
and country, but is engaging the attention of the civilized world."
The board selected three plans, offered respectively by Bushnell & Co., of
New Haven, Merrick & Sons, of Philadelphia, and John Ericsson, of New
York, from which were subsequently built the Galena, the New Ironsides, and
6i8
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES.
the Monitor. The choice of plans was wise, although the Galena totally
failed to accomplish what was expected of her, and neither she nor the Iron-
sides was afterward duplicated. The Ironsides, however, proved a very efficient
vessel within her sphere of action ; but so overwhelming was the success of
the Monitor that hardly any other model was afterward adopted.
The main features of the Monitor were the revolving turret, the low free-
board, and the projecting overhang. By means of these devices the ship was
made to present a very small target, and her engines, battery, screw, rudder,
and anchor, as well as her crew, were thoroughly protected, and neither rams
nor guns could make much impression on her. On the other hand, the low
freeboard had also one distinctive disadvantage, in that it reduced the vessel's
reserve of notation, thus making it possible for a small influx of water to
sink her. The idea of mounting guns in a revolving circular turret had
been suggested before at various times, but had never been carried to the
point of useful application. In 1842 Timby had proposed a system of coast
fortification based on this idea, but the plan had been found defective, and
had been rejected. In 1854 Captain Ericsson had submitted to the Emperor
Napoleon III. a design of an iron-clad battery with a hemispherical turret.
In the next year Captain Cowper Coles, R. N., had suggested a vessel in the
form of a raft with a stationary shield for protecting the guns ; and in 1859
he had improved upon this design by adding a revolving cupola. But it was
left to the genius of Ericsson to develop by itself the perfected application
of the principle, and to construct a navigable turret iron-clad which should be
nearly invulnerable to every weapon but the torpedo.
When the Navy Department finally understood Ericsson's plan, it immedi-
ately adopted it. According to Captain Ericsson, " The Committee of Naval
Commanders . . . occupied me less than two hours in explaining my new
system. In about two hours more the committee had come to a decision.
After their favorable report had been [made] to the Secretary I was called into
his office, where I was detained less than five minutes. In order not to lose any
-4
1
i?Ag
%8
:^i&L^L_JL^!i;
Go*>c
THE OLD NAVY DEPARTMENT BUILDING, W*SHINGTON. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAMES. 619
time, the Secretary ordered rue to i go ahead at once.' Consequently, while
the clerks of the department were engaged in drawing up the formal contract,
the iron which now forms the keel-plate of the Monitpr was drawn through
the rolling-mill."
The contract for the Monitor was finally signed on the 4th of October. The
extraordinary energy of the contractors when they had once undertaken the
work pushed it to completion with unexampled speed. But the time which
had been of the greatest value, namely, the six months from March to Sep-
tember, had been lost, and thus it happened that the new iron-clad was not
finished in season to prevent the raid of the Merrimac in Hampton Roads,
and the obliteration of the Congress and the Cumberland. In the battle of the
9th of March the presence of the Monitor, which had arrived late the night
before, saved the rest of the fleet from a like fate, to say nothing of other
disasters whose magnitude can only be conjectured.
It must be remembered that the Navy Department had possessed from the
beginning five frigates, sister ships of the Merrimac, any one of which could
have been armored more efficiently than she was, in half the time and with
half the money, and without waiting for congressional action. Evidently
the department little imagined, while it was dallying for six months with
the question of iron-clad s, that the first twenty-four hours of the Monitor1 s
career would be so big with fate.
In addition to the three vessels selected by the board of 1861, there were
built or projected during the war nearly sixty iron-clads, all of which were of
the Monitor type except three, — the huge ram Dunderberg, which was sold to
the French Government, and afterward called the Bochambeau; the Keokuk,
which sank off Charleston, immediately after the battle of April 7th, 1863,
and the converted frigate Roanoke. Of the fourteen double-turreted monitors,
including the Puritan, the Onondaga, the Kalamazoo class, the Monadnock class,
and the Winnebago class, only six were finished in time to take part in the
war. The single-tunvted monitors which saw the most service were those of
the Passaic class, most of which were stationed in the South Atlantic Squad-
ron. Besides these there were the Dictator, the nine vessels of the Canon icus
class, and the twenty light-draft monitors. The last were never of any use,
the calculations for their displacement having been so faulty that they could
not float their guns and coal.
Hitherto we have been speaking of vessels for service on the coast or 111 the
waters adjacent to the coast. The Mississippi flotilla deserves a place by
itself. This force, which included all the vessels operating on the Ohio, the
Mississippi, the Red River, and their tributaries, comprised altogether over a
hundred vessels, of the greatest variety in construction and character, — pro-
pellers, side-wheelers, stern-wheelers, rams, iron-clads, '; tin-clads," unarmored
boats, mortar-vessels. As the first demand for a flotilla came from the army, its
early organization was directed by the War Department, although a naval officer
was placed in command. The complications resulting from this arrangement,
under which, as Foote said, "every brigadier could interfere with him," were
obviated, October 1st, 1862, by the transfer of the force to the Navy Department.
02O
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAMES.
LAUNCH OF THE "DICTATOR" FROM THE DELAMATER IRON WORKS, NEW YORK, DECEMBER 27, 1863.
The first step in the creation of the Mississippi flotilla was taken in May,
1861, by Commander John Rodgers, who, acting under the authority of the
War Department, purchased at Cincinnati three river-steamboats, the Cones-
toga, Lexington, and Tyler, and altered them into gun-boats by strengthening
their frames, lowering their machinery, and protecting their decks by heavy
bulwarks. In August, the War Department made a contract with James B.
Eads [see page 338], the famous engineer of the Mississippi jetties, to build in
two months seven gun-boats, propelled by a central paddle-wheel, and covered
with armor two and a half inches thick, on the forward end of the casemates
and on the sides abreast of the engines. These may be said to have been our
first ii'on-clads, light as their plating was, and imperfectly as it covered the
vessels. In spite of all their defects, they performed constant service of incal-
culable importance throughout the war ; and there is not one among them
all — the Cairo, Carondelet, Cincinnati, Louisville, Mound City, Pittsbwgh, and
St. Louis or I)e Kalb — which failed to make her name famous in the incessant
conflicts of the Mississippi. Two larger vessels pruchased by the Government,
the Benton and the Essex, of one thousand tons each, and somewhat more
heavily armored, together with thirty-eight mortar-boats, complete the list of
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES. 621
vessels of the Mississippi flotilla during the period of Foote's command, which
extended to the summer of 1862. [See pages 358 and 430.]
During the following year important additions were made to the flotilla.
These were of two classes, light-draft boats and iron-clads. The light-drafts
were small stern-wheel boats armed with howitzers, which were peculiarly
useful for vedette and other light, flying service, but which in addition took
their full share of the brunt of battle in the numerous contests that took place
in the shoal waters of the Yazoo and the Red River. Drawing less than two
feet of water, they could go almost anywhere, and with their howitzer bat-
teries, and their light, bullet-proof plating, they were efficient vessels for
clearing the river-banks of field batteries and sharp-shooters. Their armor,
less than an inch in thickness, gave them the colloquial name of " tin-clads."
Many of them, such as the Forest Rose, Juliet, Marmora, Rattler, Romeo, and
Signal, became famous in the annals of the squadron, and the tiny Cricket,
under Grorriuge, fought in the Red River one of the hottest and most gallant
little battles of the Western campaign.
The second class of new acquisitions, which may be called by comparison
the heavily armored vessels, though more pretentious than their older con-
sorts, were hardly, as a whole, more efficient. Three of them, the Tuscumbia,
Indiauo/a, and Chitticothe,were side- wheel casemate iron-clads, carrying a some-
what thicker plating than the earlier boats and a much more formidable arma-
ment, but owing to poor and hasty workmanship they were occasionally found
unequal to the demands that were made upon them. Of a more satisfactory
performance were two large steamers, the Lafayette and Choctaw, of one
thousand tons each, well-built side-wheelers, which the Government pur-
chased and altered into casemate iron-clads fitted with rams. Still later, three
turreted iron-clads of light draft, the Osaye, Ozark, and Neosho [see page
342], were added to the squadron. The above, together with a number of
captured gun-boats, the foremost of which was the East/port, and a few
wooden steamers of various size and miscellaneous description, made up the
force with which Admiral Porter conducted his wonderful series of operations
from the autumn of 1862 until his transfer to the North Atlantic Squadron
in 1864.
In addition to these vessels, which constituted the regular naval force,
special mention must be made of the Ram Fleet, as it was called. This fleet
was the really brilliant conception of Colonel Charles Ellet, Jr., a civil
engineer who, as has been already said, had called attention, some years
before the war, to the renewed importance of the ram as a naval weapon.
Having been vested with rank and authority by the War Department,
Colonel Ellet, who was no less ready in execution than brilliant in concep-
tion, bought nine river-boats, which he strengthened and altered into rams
on a plan of his own. They were called the Queen of the West, Monarch,
Samson, Lioness, Switzerland, Lancaster, Mingo, T.D.LIorncr, and Dick Fulton.
Though they were hastily and imperfectly prepared, yet under the leadership
of Ellet and other members of his remarkable family, who shared with him a
native military instinct that was little short of genius, and a superb courage
622
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES.
MONITOR " WEEHAWKEN "IS A STORM.
that bordered upon recklessness, they performed services that gave them a
place apart in the history of the river operations. [See page 453.]
In its personnel, the navy was by no means so well prepared for war as it
should have been. Several circumstances combined to weaken the strength
of the corps. As there was no system of retirement, and as promotion for
many years had been made solely on the basis of seniority, the upper part of
the list was filled with officers who had grown too old for active service, but
who nevertheless felt that their position entitled them to important com-
mands at sea, or to high places in council or in administration. For these
duties most of them were peculiarly unfitted. At a time when conservatism
meant stagnation, the seventy-eight commodores and captains who were the
senior officers of the navy, through long adherence to routine had, with few
exceptions, become doubly conservative, and owing to the rapid development
of their profession, those whose early training belonged to the sail period
seemed almost the relics of a bygone age.
The consciousness of ignorance in some men begets modesty, but it seldom
has this effect upon the older members of a military hierarchy. Obedience
to the orders of a superior is, of course, the essence of military discipline,
without which it could not exist, and rank is the primary source of authority.
But a system which combines reliance upon rank as the sole source of
authority, and reliance upon age as the sole qualification for rank, contains
essential elements of weakness. Its tendency is to make the seniors grow
less capable and more despotic, while the juniors gradually lose all sense
of responsibility and all power of initiative, and when they at last reach
a position of command, their faculties have become paralyzed from long dis-
use. Especially is this the case in a long period of peace, such as followed
the war of 1812, and lasted, with only a brief intermission, until 1861.
During this time the navy was always grasping at the shadow and losing the
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAJ/IES. 623
substance. The commodore of the period was an august personage, who
went to sea in a great flag-ship, surrounded by a conventional grandeur which
was calculated to inspire a becoming respect and awe. As the years of peace
rolled on, this figure became more and more august, more and more conven-
tional. The fatal defects of the system were not noticed until 1861, when the
crisis came and the service was unprepared to meet it ; and to this cause was
largely due the feebleness of naval operations during the first year of the war.
In addition to the other elements of weakness, the junior grades at this time
were short of officers, owing to the recent establishment of the Naval Academy
and the limitation of the power of appointment ; and at the very moment when
stress was put upon the service, it lost through resignation a large number of
its members, many of them men of high professional reputation. To fill these
gaps, the course at the Academy was for the moment curtailed, and the upper
classes were ordered into active service. On the 1st of August, 1861, the
total number of officers of all grades and corps holding regular appointments
in the navy was 1457. This number was inadequate to supply the demands
of the newly expanded fleet, and it became necessary to employ volunteer
officers, 7500 of whom were enrolled in the navy during the war. These
came chiefly from the merchant marine. Many of them were brave and capable,
but their want of naval (as distinguished from merely nautical) training delayed
their development. A still larger increase took place in the force of enlisted
men. The normal strength of the corps of seamen was 7600, which rose
during the war to 51,500, although the utmost difficulty was found in obtain-
ing recruits, and it became necessary toward the end of the war to offer enor-
mous bounties. The same want of training was apparent in the blue- jackets
as in the volunteer officers, and while the army was able to rely from the
beginning upon a trained militia, the navy was compelled to create its militia
after the war had begun. Although the organization of a trained naval
reserve presents no serious difficulties, and although it is evident that such a
reserve is of prime importance in any considerable war, no steps had ever
been taken to form it.
This was, however, only one of the many points in which the workings of
the department were defective. There seems to have been a total want of
information at the central office of administration in reference to the existing
demands of naval war, and the measures necessary to put the machine into
efficient operation. Everything in relation to the plan of a campaign, to the
vulnerability of points on the coast, — and it must be remembered that this
was our own coast, whose capacity for resisting attack should have been bet-
ter known to the Navy Department than any other, — to the increase of the
force of officers and men, to the expansion of the fleet, to the acquisition of
the most modern instruments of warfare, — in short, all problems relating to
the conduct of hostilities, the only purpose for which a navy really exists, had
to be worked out and solved after the war had begun. Indeed, it would seem
that the one subject with which the direction of naval affairs had never con-
cerned itself was the subject of making war.
These circumstances placed the Secretary, at the opening of his adminis-
624 THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES.
tration, in a situation of peculiar difficulty. Although Mr. Welles had at one
time been connected with the Navy Department, having been the civil chief
of the Bureau of Provisions and Clothing from 1846 to 1849, he was in no
sense a naval expert, and he was obliged to rely upon others for expert advice
and assistance in his office. There was no one, however, at his office to give
such advice and assistance, except the five chiefs of bureau, who were con-
cerned only with the business of supplying materials, and who had really
nothing to do with the general direction of the fleet, — meaning thereby the
working force of ships, officers, and men actually employed in naval opera-
tions. To meet this difficulty, the Secretary wisely called Captain Gustavus
V. Fox to the post of chief professional adviser. Captain Fox had formerly
been an officer of the navy, and had borne a high reputation for professional
skill. His connection with manufacturing enterprises during the few years
preceding the war had emancipated him from the slavery of routine and had
given him a knowledge of affairs which naval officers in general could not
easily acquire. He had shown great inteUigence and zeal in the second relief-
expedition to Fort Sumter, where he acted in a semi-private capacity, and
Mr. Welles decided to take him into the department. The duties for which
he was wanted, and which he ultimately performed with such success, were
those which are commonly assigned to an officer known as the chief of staff,
namely, the disposition and direction of the fleet, and the conduct of naval
operations. It is hardly necessary to add that without his previous expe-
rience as a naval officer he could not have performed these duties for a day.
A temporary place was made for him on May 9th, 1861, as chief clerk. When
Congress met in July, it created the office of Assistant Secretary, to which
Fox was appointed on August 1st, and which he retained until after the close
of the war. He was succeeded in the chief clerkship by William Faxon.
The South entered upon the war without any naval preparation, and with
very limited resources by which its deficiencies could be promptly supplied.
Indeed, it would hardly be possible to imagine a great maritime country
more destitute of the means for carrying on a naval war than the Confeder-
ate States in 1861. No naval vessels, properly speaking, came into their
possession, except the Fulton, an old side-wheeler built in 1837, and at this
time laid up at Pensacola, and the sunken and half-destroyed hulks at Nor-
folk, of which only one, the Merrimac, could be made available for service.
The seizures of other United States vessels included six revenue-cutters, the
IJuane at Norfolk, the Wilt) am Aiken at Charleston, the Lewis Cass at Mobile,
the Robert McClelland and the Washington at New Orleans, and the Henry
Bodge at Galveston ;| three coast-survey vessels, the schooners Petrel and
Twilight, and the steam-tender Firefly ; and six or eight light-house tenders.
As all of these were small, and most of them were sailing vessels, they
were of little value.
Several coasting or river steamers belonging to private owners, which were
lying in Southern waters when the war broke out, were taken or pur-
4. The James C. Dobbin was also seized at Savannah, but was soon afterward released. — J. R. S.
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES.
62s
chased by the Confederate Gov-
ernment. The most important
were the Jamestown and the
Yorktown (afterward the Patrick
Henri/) at Richmond ; the Sel-
den at Norfolk ; the Beaufort,
Raleigh, Winslow, and Ellis,
screw-tugs plying on the Chesa-
peake and Albemarle Canal ;
the side-wheel passenger boats
Seabird and Curlew, in the
North Carolina Sounds; the
Nashville at Charleston, and the
Everglade at Savannah.
The Star of the West, whose
name had been on everybody's
lips after the attack made upon
her in January, 1861, while she
was attempting to relieve Fort
Sumter, had subsequently sailed
on transport service to Indian-
ola, Texas, where she was seized
in April by a party of Texan
volunteers. In the Confederate
navy she became the St. Philip.
She was stationed at New Or-
leans as a receiving-ship when
Farragut passed the forts, and
fled with other vessels up the
Mississippi River, taking refuge finally in the Yazoo. In March, 1863, when
the ships of the Yazoo Pass expedition descended the windings of the Talla-
hatchie to attack Fort Pemberton, they found the river barricaded by the hull
of a sunken vessel, which was no other than the once-famous Star of the West.
The purchases and seizures made at New Orleans enabled the Confederate
Government to equip at that point its only considerable fleet. The vessels
fitted out successively by Commodores Rousseau and Hollins included the
Habana, afterward the Sumter, in which Semmes made his first commerce-
destroying cruise; the Enoch Train, which was altered into a ram and called
the Manassas ; the Florida and Pamlico, employed on Lake Pontchartrain ;
the Marques de la Habana (McPuie), the Webb, Yankee (Jackson), Gros-tete
(Maurepas), Lizzie Simmons (Pontchartrain), Ivy, General Polk, and a few
others of smaller size. The State of Louisiana and the citizens of New
Orleans also made purchases of vessels on their own account. Thus the
Governor Moore and the General Quitman, which took part in the action at the
forts, were State vessels ; and the Enoch Train was originally purchased by
private subscription. There were also a large number of flat-boats or coal-
VOL. I. 40
GIDEON WELLES, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY
DURING THE WAR. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
626
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES.
barges, destined for use as fire-ships, upon which Commodore George N.
Hollins placed great reliance.
Another measure of defense adopted by the Confederate Government
deserves mention here, although the navy was in no way connected with it.
On the 14th of January, 1862, Secretary Benjamin, of the War Department,
telegraphed orders to General Lovell, who was in command at New Orleans,
to impress certain river steamboats, fourteen in number, for the public service.
On the 15th the vessels designated were seized. They were intended to form
a flotilla of rams for the defense of the Mississippi, in accordance with a plan
suggested by two steamboat captains, Montgomery and Townsend, who had
secured the adoption of their project at Richmond through the influence of
political friends in Congress. In the words of Secretary Benjamin, they were
" backed by the whole Missouri delegation." The scheme had its origin partly
in jealousy or distrust of the navy, and the direction of the " River Defense
Fleet," as it was called, was therefore intrusted to the army. The projectors
of the enterprise had taken
care, however, to limit the au-
thority of the army officers
over the fleet, and the War
Department wrote that when
it sailed it would be " subject
to the orders of General Beau-
regard, as regards the service
required of it, but of course
without any interference in
its organization." The original
cost of the vessels was $563,000,
and the cost of equipping and
fitting them out was $800,000.
The River Defense Flotilla
hardly accomplished results
that justified this heavy out-
lay. Its organization, as might
have been expected, was seri-
ously defective. In January,
Lovell was apprehensive that
" fourteen Mississippi River
captains and pilots will never agree about anything after they once get
under way." These fears were afterward realized. April 15th, Lovell wrote :
" The river pilots (Montgomery and Townsend), who are the head of the fleet, are men of
limited ideas, no system, and no administrative capacity whatever. I very much fear, too, that
their powei-s of execution will prove much less than has been anticipated, — in short, unless some
competent person of education, system, and brains is put over each division of this fleet, it will,
in my judgment, prove an utter failure. No code of laws or penalties has been established, and
it is difficult to decide how deserters from the fleet are to be tried and punished. There is little
or no discipline or subordination — too much ' steamboat ' and too little of the ' man-of-war ' to
be very effective."
GUSTAVUS V. FOX, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, UNITED STATES NAVY ,
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
V
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAMES.
527
t
When the River Defense Fleet was ready, eight of the vessels, commanded
bv Captain J. E. Montgomery, were sent up the river to meet the Union fleet,
then on its way down, under Flag-Officer Davis. After a gallant but ineffectual
brush near Fort Pillow, Montgomery's flotilla had a pitched battle at Mem-
phis, on the 6th of June, with the
Union force, now strengthened by the
addition of Colonel Ellet's ram-fleet,
and was literally wiped out of exist-
ence,— four of the vessels being cap-
tured and three destroyed. The Van
Born alone escaped, and fleeing to the
Yazoo River was soon afterward burnt.
The six vessels of the River Defense
Fleet, which had been retained by
General Lovell at New Orleans, were
sent down to assist in the defense of
the forts, but the only part they took
in the battle was to get out of the way
as quickly as possible. All of them
were captured or destroyed.
In addition to the vessels purchased
and altered, the Confederate author-
ities built several new ones at New
Orleans. Of these there were three
wooden boats, the Livingston, Bienville, and Carondelet, and two iron-clads,
the Louisiana and the Mississippi. The Bienville and ( 'arondelet were substan-
tially built side-wheelers of light draft, built on the lakes, and were only fin-
ished in March and April, 1862. They were unable to fill up their crews, and
hence took no part in the action at the forts. \ The Livingston, which had been
attached some time before to the flotilla in the upper Mississippi, made its
way to the Yazoo River, and was burnt there with the Polk and Van Born.
The two new iron-clads, however, were intended to be by far the most impor-
tant factors in the defense of New Orleans. If they had been finished in time,
this intention would doubtless have been realized. The Louisiana, built by
contract with E. C. Murray, was not begun until the middle of October, and
her machinery was transferred from the steamer Ingomar, which the contrac-
tors had bought for the purpose. She was 264 feet long, and from 400 to 500
tons of railroad iron were used in plating her with armor. The ship was in
several ways badly designed, and on the 20th of April, when she was sent from
New Orleans down the river to the forts, her engines would not work. During
the battle she could only serve as a stationary floating battery, and she was
blown up by Captain J. K. Mitchell on the day of the surrender of the forts.
The other iron-clad, the Mississippi, a still larger and more heavily armored
vessel, was constructed by the Messrs. Tift upon a very novel and peculiar
design. To obviate the want of ship-builders and designers, she was built
]) Report of Joint Confederate Committee on the affairs of the Navy Department, p. 28.
WILLIAM FAXON, CHIEF CLERK OF THE UNITED STATES
NAVY DEPARTMENT DURING THE WAR.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
628 THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAMES.
like a house, in straight lines and with pointed ends. Though there was
apparently no lack of steamers to tow the unfinished vessel up the river, she
was burnt just before the Federal fleet reached the city.
The total failure of the Confederate fleet on the Mississippi was largely due
to bad management and to the want of a proper organization. Authority was
divided between the State Government and the Confederate Government,
and still further between the army, the navy, and the steamboat captains.
The War and Navy Departments at Richmond did not work together. There
were some differences of opinion between General Lovell, in command at
New Orleans, and General Duncan, in command of the exterior defenses.
Four naval officers, Rousseau, Hollins, Mitchell, and Whittle, were succes-
sively in command of the " Naval Station," a command of vague and inde-
terminate limits, and there were plenty of sources of disagreement between
them and their colleagues of the army. They were perplexed and worried
by confusing orders, and by the presence of independent agents in their own
field of operations. They had no authority over the work of building the
iron-clads, although constantly urged to hurry their completion. The organ-
ization of the River Defense Fleet, under Montgomery, was a direct and
intentional blow at their authority, and left them without the aid of reserves
whose disposition they could direct. The naval operations suffered from the
lack of funds, so much so that on the 26th of February Governor Moore
telegraphed to Richmond, " The Navy Department here owes nearly a
million. Its credit is stopped." This condition of affairs was all the more
remarkable, since the strategic position of New Orleans and the river was
of vital importance to the Confederacy, and the post required above all
things unity of command, — indeed, one might well say a dictatorship. Had
one man of force and discretion been in full command and provided with
sufficient funds, the defense would at least not have presented a spectacle of
complete collapse.
The construction and equipment of vessels for the Confederate Govern-
ment at other points were executed with great difficulty, owing to the want
of iron and the absence of properly equipped workshops. In 1861 the only
foundry or rolling-mill of any size in the Confederacy was the Tredegar Iron
Works, at Richmond, and here the principal work in ordnance and armor was
done. By dint of great efforts, foundries and rolling-mills were established
at Selma, Atlanta, and Macon ; smelting-works and a rope-walk at Peters-
burg; a powder-mill at Columbia, and an ordnance-foundry and chemical
works at Charlotte. These works supplied what was needed in the way
of ordnance and equipment, but they could not build vessels. The spring
of 1862 saw the loss of Norfolk, Pensacola, and New Orleans, and after
this date the Confederacy had no well-appointed ship-yard. Neverthe-
less, numerous contracts were entered into with business firms all over
the country, and the construction of small vessels went on actively
during the war. On March 15th, 1861, the Provisional Congress had
authorized the construction or purchase of 10 steam gun-boats, of from
750 to 1000 tons. By the latter part of 1862 the Navy Department had
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES. 629
purchased and altered 44 vessels, and had built and completed 24, while 32
others were in process of construction.
Most of these vessels were small craft, only suitable for detached local
employment in rivers and harbors. Of the more formidable ships, the Ten-
nessee and Arkansas were built at Memphis in the winter of 1861-62. They
were covered with railroad iron. The Arkansas was completed and taken to
the Yazoo River in April, 1862. After a short and brilliant career under
Lieutenant Isaac N. Brown, she finally fell a victim in August to the defects of
her engines. The Tennessee, being still 011 the stocks at Memphis when
Davis's fleet descended the river, was burnt where she lay. At Mobile, the
second Tennessee, a much more powerful vessel, but with engines transferred,
like those of the Louisiana, from a river steamboat, was captured in her first
and only engagement, when she attacked single-handed the whole Federal
squadron. At Savannah, the Atlanta, a converted blockade-runner with a
casemate covered with four inches of armor, was disabled and defeated by
four shots from the monitor Weehawken. At Charleston, four casemate iron-
clads were built, the Palmetto State and Chieora in 1862, the Charleston in
1863, and the Columbia; the last, however, was still unfinished at the close
of the war, and was captured by Admiral Dahlgren at the evacuation of the
city. The other three were blown up at the same time. In the sounds of
North Carolina two iron-clads were projected, one to be built on the Neuse
River, the other on the Roanoke. The first was destroyed before completion,
but the second, the Albemarle, which the Union forces, through most culpable
negligence, suffered to remain undisturbed until she was fully armed and
equipped, captured the town of Plymouth, and fought a drawn battle with
the squadron of double-enders in the sound. After a career of six months,
she was destroyed by the expedition under Lieutenant Cushing.
The last, and in some ways the most useful naval force of the Confederates,
was the James River Squadron. After the destruction of the Merrimac in
May, 1862, and the abortive attempt of the Union vessels to pass up the
James River, a fleet was gradually constructed and fitted out for the defense
of Richmond. There were still in the river the Patrick Henry, which was
soon after assigned to the use of the Confederate Naval Academy, and the
Beaufort and Raleigh, which had come to Hampton Roads from the North
Carolina Sounds after the battles of Roanoke Island and Elizabeth City.
All three had taken part in the first day's engagement off Newport News,
when the Merrimac (Virginia) had destroyed the Congress and the Cumber-
laud, after which they withdrew to the James River. To these were added
the gun-boats Nansemond, Hampton, and Drum/. But by far the most impor-
tant division of the squadron consisted of the three iron-clads Richmond, the
second Virginia, and Fredericksburg. Of these the Fredericksburg was the
weakest and the Virginia the strongest. In fact, the Virginia was one of the
strongest vessels that the Confederates got afloat at any point, having six
inches of armor on the sides of her casemate and eight inches on the ends.
This fleet was an important element in the military situation in Virginia in
1864-65, though never brought into decisive action. At the evacuation of
630 THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES.
Richmond it was burned, and with its destruction the coast navy of the
Confederates came to an end.
In order to make war on the commerce of the United States, the Con-
federacy early resorted to privateering, which was then, as it is now, a legiti-
mate practice with all States not parties to the Declaration of Paris. In
accordance with the President's proclamation of April 17th, and the Act of
Congress of May 6th, letters of marque were issued by the Confederate
Government to owners of private vessels, authorizing them to cruise against the
United States. Under this authority, more than twenty privateers were
fitted out and made cruises during the summer and autumn of 1861, taking
sixty or more prizes. The exact number either of privateers or of prizes will
probably never be known. Charleston, New Orleans, and Hatteras Inlet were
the principal centers of privateering operations. Three of the privateers were
captured, — the Savannah by the brig Perry, the Petrel by the frigate St. Law-
rence, and the Beauregard by the bark IF. G. Anderson. The cessation of pri-
vateering after the first year was brought about by the blockade, which took
away the profits of the sale of prizes, and such of the privateers as were not
taken into the Government service were converted into blockade-runners.
After privateering came to an end, the Confederate Government depended
almost wholly upon Europe for sea-going cruisers. These were not privateers,
however, but commissioned ships-of-war of the Confederacy. Captain James
D. Bulloch resided in England as the Confederate naval agent, and his skill
and enterprise resulted in the acquisition of the Florida, Alabama, Georgia
and Shenandoah, all of which made successful commerce-destroying cruises.
Attempts to secure other vessels, including the Alexandra, the Pampero, the
iixm-clad contracted for by Captain North on the Clyde, and the two armored
rams built by the Messrs. Laird, failed through the intervention of the British
Government. Of the six vessels built in France, including four corvettes and
two iron-clads, only one of the latter, Stoneivall, passed into the hands of the
Confederates, and this was acquired so late in the war as to be of no value.
In its personnel, the Confederate navy was more fortunate than in its ves-
sels. The Secretary was Stephen E. Mallory [see p. 106], who had been for
several years before the war the chairman of the Naval Committee in the
Senate, — a position much better calculated to give its holder a knowledge of
the demands of a modern navy than that which Mr. Welles had filled from
1846 to 1849. He entered upon his task with vigor and intelligence, and he
was ably seconded by the officers around him, many of whom had been men
of conspicuous ability in the old navy. In the branches of ordnance and
torpedoes he relied largely upon two men, Commander John M. Brooke and
Lieutenant Hunter Davidson. To Brooke were due the banded guns which
proved of such signal use during the war, while Davidson did much to
develop the torpedo service, which probably contributed more to the defense
of the Confederacy than all the vessels of its navy. In 1862, some impatience
was shown by the press and the public of the South at the continued succes-
sion of naval disasters, and a Congressional committee made an exhaustive
investigation of the department. Nothing of importance was disclosed exc
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES. 631
the condition of affairs at New Orleans in 1861-62, already referred to, for
which the Navy Department was partly responsible, but which was largely
owing to the poverty of Confederate resources.
It was especially in his quick perception of the demands of modern naval
war, and his prompt and bold action to meet these demands, that Secretary
Mallory showed his ability and decision of character. No doubt this was in
great part due to good advisers, but it is not every man who has the wisdom
to perceive what good advice is, and the courage to act upon it, where his
action involves heavy responsibilities. Mr. Mallory's emphatic recommenda-
tions in reference to iron-clads contrast favorably with the halting sugges-
tions of Mr. Welles on the same subject. In a letter of May 8th, 1861, to Mr.
Conrad, the chairman of the Naval Committee, Mallory presents with precision
and force the history of the development of armored vessels, stating accurately
the essential facts, which certainly were either not known or not appreciated
at Washington. He closes his letter with these remarkable words :
" I regard the possession of an iron-armored ship as a matter of the first necessity. Such a
vessel at this time could traverse the entire coast of the United States, prevent all blockade,
and encounter, with a fair prospect of success, their entire navy.
" If, to cope with them upon the sea, we follow their example, and build wooden ships, we
shall have to construct several at one time, for one or two ships would fall an easy prey to her
comparatively numerous steam-frigates. But inequality of numbers may be compensated by
invulnerability, and thus not only does economy, but naval success, dictate the wisdom and
expediency of fighting with iron against wood without regard to first cost.
Ci Naval engagements between wooden frigates as they are now built and armed will prove
to be the forlorn hopes of the sea — simply contests in which the question, not of victory, but
who shall go to the bottom first is to be solved.
11 Should the committee deem it expedient to begin at once the construction of such a ship,
not a moment should be lost."
The result was that early in July the Merrimac had been raised and
docked, the details of the plan of reconstruction had been completed, and
the work had been begun without waiting for an appropriation. This early
start enabled her to destroy the Congress and the Cumberland unopposed.
The number of officers who left the United States navy, either by resigna-
tion or dismissal, to join the Southern cause, was 322, of whom 243 were line-
officers. In the beginning they were attached to the separate State organ iza-
tions, but during the spring of 1861 they were gradually enrolled in the navy
of the Confederate States. In 1863 a naval academy was established under
the command of Captain W. H. Parker, on board the Patrick Henry in the
James River, which turned out excellent junior officers. The personnel of
the Confederate navy was distinguished by enterprise, originality, and
resource, and to it were due some of the most gallant episodes of the war.
In seamen the South was deficient, not having a seafaring population.
The number of enlisted men in the navy at any given time was probably
less than four thousand, but as it took the offensive only in detached enter-
prises, no very extensive force was required. The four principal commerce-
destroyers were chiefly manned by foreign sailors.
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.,!
BY RUSH C. HAWKINS, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V.
UNIfORM OF HAWKINS'S ZOUAVES,
THE 9TH N. Y.
NE sultry afternoon in the last third of the month of
August, 1861, while stationed at Newport News, Virginia,
with my regiment, the 9th New York (Zouaves), a mes-
sage from General Benjamin F. Butler came through
the signal corps station from Fort Monroe asking if I
would like to go upon an expedition. An affirmative
answer brought General Butler to my headquarters the
same afternoon, and he explained the objects of the
proposed expedition, which was to be composed of mili-
tary and naval forces for joint offensive action on the
coast of North Carolina.
t
CAPTURE AND DEFENSE OF HATTERAS ISLAND.
At 11 o'clock in the forenoon of August 26th, 1861,
all arrangements having been completed, the combined
forces set sail for Hatteras Inlet, North Carolina, with
Flag-Officer Silas H. Stringham in command of the fleet and Major-General
B. F. Butler of the land forces. The same afternoon the fleet arrived off
Hatteras, and at 10 o'clock on the morning of the 28th began the bombard-
ment of Forts Clark and Hatteras (the latter mounting twenty-five guns),
which was continued throughout a part of the day, until several of the
ships were compelled to put out to sea for fear of being blown too near
the shore. During the bombardment, efforts were being made about three
miles north of the inlet to land the troops through the Hatteras breakers;
in these efforts all the available boats were smashed. Two hulks, which had
been towed from Fort Monroe for the purpose of assisting the landing, were
then filled with troops and slowly allowed to drift into the breakers by means
of a cable attached to an anchor and passed around a windlass fixed in the
deck of each hulk. Late in the afternoon, when the wind came to blow fresh
from the east, the position of the troops upon the hulks became most perilous,
and for a time there were serious doubts about a successful rescue. Finally
I " The State of North Carolina, Immediately after
passing the ordinance of secession, began the work of
defending the possession of the sounds. The steamer
Winslow, a small side-wheel steamboat, was fitted out
by the governor of the State, and on the outside of Hat-
teras began to annoy and destroy the commerce of the
United States, under Thomas M. Crossau, formerly of
the United States Navy. The Winsloio captured and
brought into the sounds for condemnation many prizes.
. . . The outcry that went up from commercial circles
at the North may Lave bad no little to do in influencing
the naval authorities to block the outlet from which the
little Winslow inflicted such damages. After the State
united herself to the Confederate States her navy, con-
sisting of the Winslow, the Ellis, the Raleigh, and the
Beaufort, all ordinary steamboats armed with one gun
each, was turned over to the Confederate States. The
defense of the entrances to these sounds was under-
taken by the erection of batteries at Hatteras and Ocra-
coke Inlet, and at Beaufort ; on the. interior waters
New Berne, Roanoke Island, and the mouth of the
Neuse River were defended under the State by small
batteries, which were not completed when the State
adopted the constitution of the Confederate States.
" Major R. C. Gatlin was commander of the Southern
Department Coast Defenses, with headquarters at Wil-
mington. North Carolina. Promoted to Brigadier-Gen-
eral in August, 1861, he was assigned to the command
of the Department of North Carolina and the coast
defenses of the State." [Scharf's "History of the Con-
federate States Navy." New-York : Rogers and Sher-
wood. I
632
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
033
the Fanny, after several unsuccessful
backings into the breakers, which
every moment were becoming more
dangerous, succeeded in getting lines
on board the hulks and towing them
to calmer water. But the few troops
(318) who had effected a landing were
left on shore in face of an enemy
twice their numbers. The next day
the vessels came in from sea and re-
commenced the action as early as 8
o'clock a. m., and by 11 o'clock the
last gun on Fort Hatteras had ceased
firing, and before noon the white flag
had taken the place of the Confeder-
ate colors. During the bombardment
our troops on shore gained possession
of Fort Clark, but were driven out by
our own guns, a fragment of a shell
striking private Lembrecht, of Com-
pany G, 9th New York, making a pain-
ful wound in the hand. This was the
only casualty among the Union forces.
The immediate results of this expe-
dition were the capture of 670 men,
1000 stand of arms, 35 cannon, and 2
strong forts ; the possession of the best
sea entrance to the inland waters of
North Carolina; and the stoppage of a favorite channel through which many
supplies had been carried for the use of the Confederate forces. %
The whole affair was conceived and carried out with simplicity and pro-
KEAK-ADMIRAL SILAS II. STKINGHAM.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
J. The vessels detailed were the Minnesota (flag-
ship), Captain G. J. Van Brunt; Wabash, Captain
Samuel Mercer ; Susquehanna, Captain I. S. Chaun-
cey ; Pawnee, Commander S. C. Rowan ; Monticello,
Commander J. P. Gillis ; Harriet Lane, Captain
John Faunce ; and the Cumberland (sailing-ship),
Captain John Marston, — carrying in all 143 guns.
For the transportation of troops there were the
chartered steamers Adelaide, Commander H. S.
Stellwagen, and Geore/c Peabody, Lieutenant R. B.
Lovvry, and the tug Fanny, Lieutenant Pierce
Crosby. Upon these were embarked detachments
of infantry from the 9th and 20th New York Volun-
teers, the Union Coast Guard, and a company of
the 2d U. S. Artillery, — in all numbering about
880 men.
Both the forts were under command of Major
W. S. G.Andrews, the North Carolina troops being
under Colonel Win. F. Martin. Flag-Officer Sam-
uel Barron, C. S. N., who was charged with the
defense of this coast, arrived during the attack,
and, taking command, was included in the capitu-
lation, of which he says in his report made on
board the Minnesota :
"During the first hoar the shells of the ships fell short,
we only firing occasionally to ascertain whether our
shots would reach them, and wishing to reserve our
very limited supply of ammunition until the vessels
might find it necessary to come nearer in; but they,
after some practice, got the exact range of the 9, 10, and
11 inch guns, and did not find it necessary to alter their
positions, while not a shot from our battery reached
them with the greatest elevation we could get. This
state of things — shells bursting over and in the fort
every few seconds — having continued for about three
hours, the men were directed to take shelter under the
parapet and traverses, and I called a council of officers,
at which it was unanimously agreed that holding out
hinder could only result in a greater loss of life. . . .
The personnel of the command are now prisoners of war
on board this ship, where everything is done to make
them as comfortable as possible under the circum-
stances, Flaff-OfRcer Stringhani, Captain Van Brunt, and
Commander Case extending to us characteristic cour-
tesy and kindness." Editors.
634
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CA-OLL /.
1 1 directness,
; [ the valuable re-
sults attained cost
the Government only
a small expenditure
for coal and ammu-
nition. Flag-Officer
Striiigharn fought
this action with ad-
mirable skill, worthy
of a great command-
er. Instead of an-
choring his ships, he
kept them moving
during the whole
engagement and,
as he came within
range of the enemy's
works, delivered his
fire, generally with
surprising accuracy,
while the gunners in
the forts were com-
pelled to make an
on - the - wing shot
with pieces of heavy
ordnance, and in
most instances their
shot fell short. |
On the 29th of Au-
gust articles of full
capitulation were
signed interchange-
ably by officers representing both forces, and General Butler and Flag-
Officer Stringham sailed away with the prisoners, leaving the Pawnee,
Captain S. C. Eowan, the MonticcUo, Lieutenant D. L. Braine, and the tug
Fanny, Lieutenant Pierce Crosby, as the sea forces ; and detachments of the
9th and 20th New York Volunteers and Union Coast Guard to garrison the
captured forts, of which I was left in command. Just before the squadron
sailed, General Butler sent word on shore that the three schooners left by
the enemy inside the inlet were loaded with provisions that could be used
MAP OF EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
4 Boynton, iu his " History of the Navy," says :
"So far as known this was tlie first trial in our navy
of tins movement, and the honor of introducing it be-
longs to Commodore Stringham. The little that was
known of the real character of the Hatteras expedi-
tion prevented the public from paying any attention
to the commodore's strategy, but when it was repeated
soon after by Commodore DuPont in a more brilliant
affair, its merit was duly recognized."
While DuPont rose to the highest point in public
estimation, Stringham was relegated to an obscure
official background and never after had a sea-
service command. — E. C. H.
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
635
by the troops. An examination proved that the only food-materials were
fruits from the West Indies, which were fast decaying. For the next ten days
the diet of the stranded soldiers consisted of black coffee, fresh fish, and a
" sheet-iron pancake " made of flour and salt-water. This diet was neither
luxurious nor nutritious, and it produced unpleasant scorbutic results. On the
10th of September relief arrived, and with it, under Lieut.-Colonel George
F. Betts, six more companies
of the 9th New York.
Until September 16th, noth-
ing occurred to disturb the
uneventful routine work in-
cident to military occupation
of an enemy's territory. On
that day a mixed expedition of
land and sea forces under com-
■'«*£.
"""f«m
h\
...
tf *S ^
..**m§ \.
m,-
FORTS HATTERAS AND CLARK. FROM WAR-TIME SKETCHES.
mand of Lieutenant
James G. Maxwell,
of the United States
navy, was sent to
destroy the forts
of Beacon Island
and Portsmouth,
near Ocracoke Inlet.
They were found to
have been deserted
by the Confeder-
ates, but twenty-
two guns of heavy caliber, that were left intact, were made useless by the
Union forces.
Soon after the capture of the forts the "intelligent contraband" began
to arrive, often bringing news of important military activity in several
directions.
Before the first week of our occupation had expired I became convinced
that the enemy was fortifying Roanoke Island, with the intention of making
it a base for immediate operations, and that his first offensive work would
be against the forces stationed at Hatteras Inlet, with the further purpose of
destroying the Hatteras light ; and that they would land a considerable force
at the upper end of the island, at a point near Chicamacomico, and march down.
Seeing the necessity of counter-action on the part of the Union forces, on
the 6th of September I wrote a full account of the situation to General John
63b
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLlh
E. Wool, commanding the Department of Virginia, in which occurred the
following suggestions :
" First. Eoanoke Island, which commands the Croatan Channel between Pamlico and Albe-
marle sounds, should be occupied at once. It is now held by the rebels. They have a battery
completed at the upper end of the island and another in course of erection at the southern
extremity. Second. A small force should be stationed at Beacon Island, which is in the mouth
of Ocracoke Inlet and commands it. Third. Two or three light- draught vessels should be
stationed between the mouths of the Neuse and Pamlico rivers. This would shut out all
commerce with New Berne and Washington. Fourth. There should be at least eight light-
draught gun-boats in Pamlico Sound. Fifth. Beaufort should be occupied as soon as possible.
All of these recommendations should be attended to immediately. Seven thousand men
judiciously placed upon the soil of North Carolina would, within the next three weeks, draw
20,000 Confederate troops from the State of Virginia.
" I wish, if you agree with me and deem it consistent with your duty, that you would impress
upon the Government the importance and necessity of immediate action in this department."
General Wool gave this letter the strongest possible indorsement, and sent
a copy to the Secretary of War.
In my next report (September 11th) I sent an account of the marked enter-
prise on the part of the enemy, setting forth that since the capture of Fort
Hatteras they had strengthened Fort Macon, obstructed the Neuse and
Pamlico rivers, mounted seventeen heavy guns at Roanoke Island and
landed a considerable number of troops at that place. I urged my former
suggestions and called for immediate action and reinforcements. A copy
of this letter, with a very strong approval, was also sent to the Secre-
tary of War, but neither brought any response beyond a merely formal
acknowledgment.
My policy from the moment of assuming command on Hatteras Island had
been to cultivate friendly relations with the inhabitants. As they were
mostly of a seafaring race, I concluded they could not have much sympathy
with the revolt against a government
which had been their constant friend.
Within ten days after the landing,
nearly all of the male adults had
taken the oath of allegiance, and
several professed their willingness to
carry proclamations to the mainland,
and to bring back such news of mili-
tary movements as they could obtain.
One of these volunteer spies succeeded
in opening communication with a rel-
ative, who lived at Roanoke Island
and from him I learned that, as I h
suspected, a force was to start fr
that point to make the attack upon Hatteras Island. In the meantime we '
done what we could to place the forts at the inlet in a better conditic
defense, and General Wool, of his own volition, had sent reinforcements,
seven remaining companies of the 9th New York, the 20th Indiana Voir 1
THE UNITED STATES SLOOP "CUMBERLAND" SAILING
INTO ACTION AT THE BOMBARDMENT OF FORTS HAT-
TERAS AND CLARK. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
637
xi
X
FORT HATTERAS. FLAG-SHIP " MINNESOTA." SUSQUEHANNA." PAWNEE."
THE UNION FLEET BOMBARDING FORTS HATTERAS AND CLARK. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
Colonel W. L. Brown, and one company of the 1st U. S. Artillery, under
Captain Lewis O. Morris.
In the latter days of September, information of the intended movement from
Roanoke Island made immediate action necessary. I had already apprised
General Wool of my intention to establish a post near Chicamacomico for the
purpose of protecting the natives who had taken the oath, and also to pre-
vent a surprise by the landing of a large force of the enemy to inarch down
the island. Accordingly, on the 29th of September, I embarked the 20th
Indiana regiment upon the gun-boats Putnam and Ceres, and accompanied it
to a point opposite Chicamacomico, saw the troops safely disembarked, and
returned with the gun-boats to the inlet. On the first day of October, the
Fanny was dispatched with supplies, and arrived at the point of disembarka-
tion the same afternoon. After preparations for landing had commenced,
a force of the enemy's gun-boats was discovered. The Fanny tried to
escape, but got aground and was captured, not, however, until after a
spirited resistance by the men and officers with the two small guns which
were mounted on her deck.
Flag-Officer W. F. Lynch, C. S. N., in his report says :
" Colonel Wright, of the 8th Georgia regiment, who commands the military forces of the island,
had agreed with me to make an attempt to destroy Hatteras Light-house, and we only waited
the return of an emissary I had sent to glean intelligence as to the force of the enemy in that
vicinity. But early in the forenoon of the 1st instant intelligence came that one of the Federal
steamers was at Chicamacomico, about forty miles distant on the eastern shore of Pamlico Sound,
and I determined to get after her. As Colonel Wright was anxious, however, to make the con-
templated attempt, I would not, in courtesy, refuse to wait for the embarkation of troops,
638
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
We Left here at 2 : 30 p. M. -with about two hun-
— , who is a man after my own heart in such
although two precious hours were thereby lost.
clred of the 8th Georgia regiment, Colonel W-
matters, accompanying them. A little before 5 P. M. we came in sight and soon after opened fire
upon the enemy, which was returned at first with spirit 5 but in about twenty minutes he
attempted to escape, and in the attempt ran aground, and shortly after surrendered."
The Fanny had 011 board, when captured, a captain and 30 men of the 20th
Indiana regiment, and the sergeant-major and 11 men of the 9th New York.
?he Confederate vessels engaged were the Curiae, Raleigh, and the little tug-
As soon as I heard of the disaster I sent an order for Colonel
>treat. On the 4th of October a large body of Confederates,
un< b A. E. Wright, assisted by gun-boats, landed at Chicamacomico,
and Co. 'ommenced a successful retreat down the island. Having
received ear! a native messenger, of the landing and Brown's
march, I mow ■ regiment, toward the north, and met Colonel
Brown's comnianu :t morning at the light-house. Colonel Wright
was closely following th< ; troops, but as soon as he saw the rein-
forcements he faced aboiu nenced a retreat which only ended in the
landing of his forces at Iw kq Island. During the march back the
steamer MonticeUo, from the ocean side, with her heavy guns, maintained
a fire at the Confederates across the low sand-fields, which may have
annoyed them without doing any serious damage. This was the end of an
elaborately conceived plan on the part of the enemy to capture our troops,
destroy Hatteras Light, and recapture the forts of the inlet. From that time
until the arrival of the "Burnside expedition," the Federal forces at the
inlet pursued the even quiet of routine duty.
The news of the loss of the Fanny created some excitement both at Fort
Monroe and at Washington, and I was severely censured for having divided
so small a force, and was superseded by Brigadier-Greneral J. K. F. Mansfield.
I am still of the opinion that my course was right, as no other disposition of
the small force at my command would have saved the light-house and pre-
vented the landing, opposite the light-house, where there was a wharf
and deep water, of the whole Confederate force of about two thousand men.
That landing would have given them a safe base for a decisive movement
against the Union troops at the inlet. I afterward heard that Colonel
KETREAT OF THE CONFEDERATES TO THEIR BOATS AFTER THEIR ATTACK UPON HATTERAS.
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
b_3<>
LANDING OF THE UNION TROOPS AT HATTERAS UNDER COVER OF THE FLEET. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
Wright intended to land part of his force above and the balance below the
camp of Colonel Brown, capture his regiment, destroy the light-house, and
then, in his discretion, move upon Hatteras Inlet. The prompt retreat frus-
trated the first part of the design, and Colonel Wright, seeing what he
believed to be a large reenforcement, retreated without undertaking the
other parts of his plan.
Until October 13th we had peace at the inlet. That day Brigadier-General
Thomas Williams relieved General Mansfield, and assumed command of
the post. The new commander was a man of many idiosyncrasies, and
outside of his staff was cordially disliked for his severe treatment of the
men. ^
On the 5th of November I was sent by General Wool on a special boat
to Washington to urge upon the President the importance of either aban-
doning Hatteras Inlet or erecting suitable accommodations for the troops.
The next morning after my arrival in Washington I reported to the Presi-
dent and presented my letter from General Wool, and was asked by the
President to appear before the Cabinet. I did so and explained fully the
situation at Hatteras Inlet and urged the importance of undertaking
further operations to hold that position, it being the threshold to the
j) I was arrested by General Williams for refus- ment from Governor E. D. Morgan. I denied the
ing to assign to duty, as captain in my regiment, right of appointment, and I was sustained by
a. disreputable officer who had received an appoint- General Wool and President Lincoln. — R. C. H.
640 EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
whole inland water system of North Carolina. At this meeting the Secre-
tary of War was represented by General McClellan, who had one end of the
long council-table to himself. After I had finished, he drew me into con-
versation about operations in the Department of Virginia, and as I had
often urged upon General Wool the importance of making Fort Monroe
a base for operations against Richmond, I was fully prepared to answer
his questions or to combat opposition. At his request I made a rough
drawing showing the old road up the peninsula, with a waterway on each
side for gun-boats and general transportation. He listened attentively to
all I had to say, talked but little himself, and put my drawing in his
pocket. I have always suspected that my animated advocacy of that route
may have had something to do with his change of base from Washing-
ton, and the undertaking of his unfortunate Peninsular Campaign. Before
the council dissolved it was decided to hold Hatteras Inlet and to erect
suitable quarters for the forces, and I was instructed to wait until neces-
sary orders could be prepared before returning to General Wool and my
command.^
LAND AND WATER FIGHTING AT ROANOKE ISLAND.
The Burnside expedition, the naval part being under command of Flag-
Officer L. M. Goldsborough, ,! had concentrated in Pamlico Sound by the 4th
of February, and on the 5th the welcome signal was hoisted for the whole
command to move up toward the Confederate stronghold. About sundown,
after a charming day's sail, the fleet came to anchor for the night, and started
again early the next morning, but in consequence of the inclemency of the
weather was soon compelled to seek another anchorage. On the morning
of the 7th the expedition got under way very early, the armed army boats
and naval part taking the lead several miles in advance. By 11 o'clock the
first division of army gun-boats, under Commander Hazard, arrived opposite
the forts on the west side of Roanoke Island, and commenced the bombard-
ment in earnest, and at the same time engaged the enemy's fleet. As the
naval vessels arrived they went into action, and by half-past 11 the whole
fleet of gun-boats was engaged. The engagement between the heavy guns
lasted all day without much damage having been done to either side. At the
close the gunners answered each other with about the same spirit displayed
at the commencement. The Confederate forts had, however, fared better
than their fleet. The latter was protected from an assault on the part of our
vessels by a row of piles driven across the navigable part of the channel,
and by sunken vessels; but, notwithstanding this protection, the accurate
fire of the Union fleet soon compelled it to retire out of range, with the loss
•& Captain W. H. Parker, C. S. N., who com- gun-boats, carrying one gun each. Two of the small
manded the Beaufort in these waters, says in his steamers, under Flag-officer Stringham, should have
-Recollections of a Naval Officer" (N. Y. : Charles So^sS."8' "^ a ^ "k^ ^ ^^
Scribner's Sons): ' .
"T>v,^ momw™n^„ „ + • * n • j. , • J For details of the origin and composition "f
" The enemy made a great mistake m not taking pos- , ■ ,.,. ,, &, . , , ~ r , ^
session of the sounds immediately after capturing Hat- tnis expedition, see the article by General -Bu
teras. There was nothing to prevent it but two small side, p. 660. — Editors.
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
641
MAT" OF THE OPERATIONS AT ROANOKE ISLAND — FROM THE OFFICIAL RECORDS.
Captain W. H. Parker, in his -" Recollections of a
Naval Officer" (Charles Scribner's Sons), thus de-
scribes the later Confederate defenses of Croatan
Sound :
"Three forts had been constructed on the [EoanokeJ
island to protect the channel. The upper one was on
Weir's Point, and "was named Fort Huger. It mounted
12 guns, principally 32-pounders of 33 cwt., and was com-
manded by Major John Taylor, formerly of the navy.
About one and three-quarter miles below, on Pork Point,
was Fort Bartow ; it mounted 7 [9 '.'] guns, 5 of which
were 32-pounders of 33 cwt., and 2 were rifled 32-pound-
ers. This fort, which was the only one subsequently en-
gagedin the defense, was in charge of Lieut. B. P. Loyall,
of the navy. Between these two points was a small bat-
tery. On the mainland opposite the island, at Bedstone
Point, was a battery called Fort Forrest. The guns,
which were 32-pounders, were mounted on the deck
of a canal-boat which had been hauled up in the mud
and placed so that the guns would command the chan-
nel. The channel itself was obstructed a little above
Vol. 1. 41
Fort Huger by piling. It was hoped that these batter-
ies, with the assistance of Commodore Lynch's squad-
ron, would be able to prevent the enemy's ships from
passing the island. The great mistake on our part was
in not choosing the proper point at which to dispute the
entrance to the sound. The fortifications and vessels
should have been at the ' marshes,' a few miles below,
where the channel is very narrow."
The attack by the Union fleet is thus described
by Captain Parker :
"At daylight the next morning, February 7th. the
Appomattox was dispatched to Edenton, and as she did
not return till sunset, and the Warrior did not take any
part in the action, this reduced our [Confederate] force
to seven vessels and eight guns. [See list, p. 670.] At
9 A. m. we observed the enemy to be under way and
coming up, and we formed 'line abreast,' in the rear of
the obstructions. At 11 : 30 the fight commenced at long
range. The enemy's fire was aimed at Fort Bartow and
our vessels, and we soon became warmly engaged. The
commodore at first directed his vessels to fall back, in
642 EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
of one of its vessels. A short time before sunset the Confederate boats came
near enough to fire a few more shots, but were again driven off, this time
making their last appearance as a fleet.
During the fight between the forts and the vessels the army transport fleet
was at anchor about three miles to the south, prepared for landing. A little
after 4 o'clock the troops began to land, General Foster's brigade taking
the lead, followed by Eeno's and Parke's. By 10 o'clock a force of about
7500 strong had been landed. One of the two sections of a boat-gun
battery manned by men of the Union Coast Guard, in charge of Midshipman
Porter, was stationed well out to the front, supported by the 21st Massa-
chusetts ; the other troops bivouacked in an open field, where before morning
they were thoroughly drenched by a most uncomfortable cold rain.
The morning was cold and cheerless and the breakfast was poor, but
the troops were in fine spirits. Foster was the first to move, the 25th
Massachusetts in the advance, followed by Midshipman Porter's guns. The
enemy's pickets gradually retired into an earth-work mounting three guns,
situated in the center of a morass, flanked on e^ch side by an almost
impenetrable swamp, and protected in front by an open field of deep mud,
in part covered by fallen trees with their limbs cut short and sharpened.
General Foster, as soon as he reached the earth- work, placed his troops and
the boat-guns in position, and by 8 o'clock the attack had commenced in
earnest. But no effective work was done until General Eeno came up and
with the 21st Massachusetts, the 51st New York, and the 9th New Jersey
began his effective attack upon the Confederate right. With great diffi-
culty he penetrated the swamp, covered with its thick interwoven growth of
briers, shrubs, and trees. At length he succeeded in delivering his fire from
the hope of drawing the enemy under the Are of Forts that the enemy's troops were landing to the south-
Huger and Forrest ; hut as they did not attempt to ad- ward of Pork Point, under the guns of a division of
vance, and evidently had no intention of passing the their fleet, and could not perceive that any successful
obstructions, we took up our first position and kept it resistance was being made to it. A little after sunset
during the day. At 2 p. M. the tiring was hot and heavy, the tiring ceased on both sides, and as we felt sure the
and continued so until sunset. Our gunners had had no enemy would not attempt to pass the obstructions by
practice with their rifled guns, and our firing was not night, as he had declined to attempt them by day, we
what it should have been. It was entirely too rapid, ran in and anchored under Fort Forrest. . . . Soon
and not particularly accurate. Early in the fight the after we anchored signal was made by the flag-ship for
Forrest was disabled in her machinery, and her gallant the captains to report on board. Upon my entering: the
young captain, Lieutenant Iloole, badly wounded in the cabin I was informed by Commodore Lynch that we
head by a piece of shell. She got in under Fort Forrest must retreat from Roanoke Island. Much surprised and
and anchored. Sometime in the afternoon, in the hot- mortified, I asked why, and was told that the vessels
test of the fire, reenforcements arrived from Wise's bri- generally wei*e out of ammunition. A council was held
gade, and were landed on the island. The Richmond as to whether the vessels should retreat to Norfolk,
Blues, Captain O. Jennings Wise, were, I think, a part through the Chesapeake and Albemarle Canal, or go to
of this force. Pork Point Battery kept up a constant Elizabeth City, on the Pasquotank River. We would
fire on the fleet, and the enemy could not silence it. The have saved the vessels by goingto the former place, but
garrison stood to their guns like men, encouraged by the the commodore's orders were to do his utmost to defend
spirited example of their instructor, Lieutenant B. P. the waters of North Carolina ; so we decided to go to the
Loyall. Forts Huger and Forrest did not fire, the ene- latter, where it was understood a fort had been built to
my being out of range ; but the small battery between protect the town. Elizabeth City was the terminus of
Pork Point and Weir's Point fired an occasional gun the Dismal Swamp Canal, and we hoped to get amnmni-
during the day. Toward 4 o'clock in the afternoon a tion that way fi'om Norfolk in time to act in conjunction
shot or shell struck the hurricane-deck of the Curlew with the fort. I was sent to Roanoke Island to commu-
[Captain Hunter] in its descent, and went through her nicate all this to Colonel Shaw, and confess did not relish
decks and bottom as though they had been made of my mission. It looked too much like leaving the army
paper. Hunter put his vessel ashore, immediately in in the lurch, and yet to have remained without ammu-
front of Port Forrest, completely masking its guns, nition would have been mere folly. . . . I met Colonel
and we could not tire her for fear of burning up the Shaw at his quarters, and stated the facts in relation to
battery, which, as I have said, was built on an old the vessels, and then returned to the Beaufort. All lights
canal-boat. . . . We, in the Beaufort, did our best in were now extinguished, and the squadron got under
maintaining our position. About 4 p. m. I observed way for Elizabeth City."
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
643
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MAP OF THE BATTLE-FIELD
OF ROANOKE ISLAND, FEB-
RUARY 8TH, 1862. DRAWN
BY I.IECT. W. S. ANDREWS,
OF THE 9TH N. Y. PUB-
LISHED BY AUTHORITY OF
THE SECRETARY OF WAR.
:2ST."MASS : '■■■ %°^i
<*.•.-
an unexpected di-
rection upon the
enemy inside the
work. They
turned their guns
upon his troops,
but failed to drive
them from their
position. While
General Reno was
maintaining the
left attack, Gen-
eral Foster, with
the 25th Massa-
chusetts and 10th
Connecticut, was
making a serious
demonstration in
front ; and the
23d and 27th Mas-
sachusetts, later
with the 51st
Pennsylvania,
were trying to
penetrate the
almost impassa-
ble wood aDd
swamp in the
far-off front of
the earth - work
the purpose
getting on
enemy's left.
While engaged
this rnove-
for
of
the
111
ment, the Massachusetts troops encountered a battalion of the enemy and
drove them inside their work.
About 11 o'clock General Parke with his brigade arrived upon the field,
aud the 4th Rhode Island was ordered to follow the regiments making the
demonstration on the enemy's left. " The 9th New York regiment, arriving
upon the ground, was ordered to follow." ..." The regiment, under the
lead of the colonel, Rush C. Hawkins, entered the clearing with great spirit."
Nearly two companies had' succeeded in getting into the clearing immediately
in front of the earth-work, where the mud was more than ankle-deep, and
where they were receiving the undivided attention of the enemy's three
pieces of artillery, and getting a shot now and then from the infantry. It
644
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
'-'.-:,.
-'*
UNION ASSAULT UPON THE THREE-GUN BATTERY, ROANOKE ISLAND. (SEE MAP, PAGE 642.)
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
was at this point that Colonel De Monteil was killed. Seeing* that it would
be almost impossible to get through the deep mud, I had made up my mind
to face to the front and make an effort to charge the work, and after a
moment's consultation with Lieutenant-Colonel Betts and Captain Jardine,
who commanded the right company, I ordered my bugler to sound the charge.
At that moment I heard a great cheer down the line, and, looking in that
direction, discovered that Major Kimball had broken the regiment in two
parts and was heading the left companies in a direct charge up a causeway
running through the center of the field of fallen timber directly to the sally-
port covered by a 24-pounder howitzer. Soon the right companies joined,
and all entered the work, pell-mell, together. As the column advanced,
the men crowded each other from the causeway, and soon the whole front of
the work was covered with an animated sea of red fezzes. The men of Com-
pany C were the first to cross the ditch and enter the work. About the same
time, the 21st Massachusetts and the 51st New York came into the work from
the left.
The officers of those two regiments claimed that their colors were the
first on the parapet ; if so, it was because the colors of the 9th New York
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA. 64s
were in the center of the column and did not get into the work with the men
on the right who led the charge. The regiments sent around to outflank
the enemy's left arrived at their objective point about the time the decisive
charge was made, and were entitled -to a fair share of credit for the success-
ful day's work.
The commands of Generals Foster and Reno pursued the enemy to a
point near the northern end of the island, where an unconditional surrender
was consummated. Soon after leaving the earth- work my regiment deflected
to the right and succeeded in capturing two boat-loads of the Eichmond
Blues, among them O. Jennings Wise, trying to escape to Nag's Head, on
the opposite shore. Company B in the meantime had taken possession of
a two-gun battery at Shallowbag Bay. Wise, severely wounded, was carried
to a farm-house, where he received the best attention attainable, but died
the next morning, defiant to the last, and wishing he had more lives to lose
in the defense of the Confederacy. Among the results of these two days'
fighting were the capture of 2675 officers and men of the Confederate army
and 5 forts mounting 32 heavy guns, the complete possession of Roanoke
Island, and with it the control of the inland waters of North Carolina. %
[For losses, see p. 679.]
THE TWO SQUADRONS AT ELIZABETH CITY.
The Confederate fleet, known as the " mosquito fleet," was under command
of Commodore William F. Lynch, who, after firing one of his own steamers, the
Curlew, and blowing up Fort Forrest, a work situated opposite Roanoke Island
on the mainland, retreated up the Pasquotank River, and concentrated his ves-
sels behind a four-gun battery at a 23oint a short distance below Elizabeth City.
At 8 o'clock on the morning of February 10th Commander Rowan came
up with the Union fleet, and the rebels opened fire upon him at a long range.
The Union forces continued their course uninterrupted by the enemy's fire
until within three-fourths of a mile of their position, when they opened fire
and dashed on at full speed. In a few minutes five of the enemy's six
vessels were either captured or destroyed, and Elizabeth City was in posses-
sion of the naval forces. | Two days later a small naval division under
Lieutenant Alexander Murray took possession of Edenton.
% The Confederate commander at Eoanoke Isl- between General Wise and Flag-Officer Lynch,
and was General Henry A. Wise, who, on the 7th General Wise being ill at Nag's Head on the day
of Janurry, ,1 862, had assumed command of the of the battle, the Confederate troops on the field
Chowan district;, General Benjamin Huger being were under command of Colonel H. M. Shaw,
in command of the department, that of Norfolk, who says in his report : "An unceasing and effect-
The official', illations of the two generals were ive fire was kept up from 7 a. m. until 12:20,
somewhat strained, and the responsibility for this when, our artillery ammunition having been ex-
disaster was afterward the subject of recrimina- hausted and our right flanks having been turned
tion between them. General Wise claimed that by an overwhelming force of the enemy, I was
lie had been deprived of his artillery by reason compelled to yield the place."
of the countermanding of his orders by General
Huger, and that, in general, there had been culpa- 4- Of this engagement Captain Parker, C. S. N.,
ble neglect on the part of the Confederate authori- in his " Recollections of a Naval Officer," writes
ties to aid the defense of Roanoke Island. " Noth- as follows :
ing! nothing!! nothing:!!!" he said. "That was «nn . * -,,
* ,. & s M • "The enemy were coming up at full speed and our
the disease which brought disaster at Roanoke Isl- vessels were under weigh ready to abide the shock, when
and." There was also lack of cordial agreement a boat came off from the shore with the bearer of a dis-
646 EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
The morning of February 9th, having heard that a portion of the command
of General Henry A. Wise still remained at Nag's Head, General Parke
ordered that I should take a battalion of my regiment, proceed to that point,
and, if possible, effect their capture. When we arrived at the place of debar-
kation we were surprised to meet with no resistance to our landing. The fact
was sufficiently accounted for when we learned that Wise with his whole com-
mand had retreated northward at sundown the day before.
From the time of the capture of Roanoke Island stories had come frequently
to the Union commanders setting forth the loyalty of the citizens of the town
of Winton on the Chowan River, and their desire to serve the Union cause.
On the 18th of February an expedition of eight gun-boats under Com-
mander Rowan, and a land force of which I had charge, started for the Chowan
River, for the purpose of encouraging our friends at Winton and destroying
two important bridges of the Seaboard and Roanoke Railroad. The morning
of the 19th we began to ascend the river, and as I had never believed in the
tales regarding the loyalty of the Wintonians, from the time of entering
the river, I assumed the position of volunteer lookout from the cross-trees
of the mainmast of the steamer Delaware. The day was beautiful, the
sail charming, and all went well until about half-past 3 o'clock. The
steamer had " slowed down " and taken a sheer in toward the Winton wharf,
where a negro woman stood waving a rag, when from my lofty perch I dis-
covered the glistening of many musket-barrels among the short shrubs that
covered the high bank, and farther back two pieces of artillery in position.
I shouted to the astonished native pilot at the helm, " Ring on, sheer off,
rebels on shore ! " fully half a dozen times before he could comprehend my
meaning. At last he rang 011 full speed, changed his course, and cleared
the wharf by about ten feet. At that moment the enemy opened fire, and
patch for me. It read : ' Captain Parker, with the crew on their side of the river. The Fanny was run on shore
of the Beaufort, will at once take charge of the fort.— and blown up by her commander, who with his crew
Lynch.' ' Where the devil,' I asked, ' are the men who escaped to the shore. . . . Captain Sims, of the
were in the fort? ' ' All run away,' said the messenger. Appomattox, kept up a sharp fire from his bow gun until
. . . Upon getting into the fort I hastily commenced it was accidentally spiked ; and he then had to run for
stationing the men at the guns, and as quickly as pos- it. He had a howitzer aft which he kept in play; but
sible opened tire upon the advancing enemy. Some of upon arriving at the mouth of the canal he found his
the officers and men of the Forrest made their way to us vessel was about two inches too wide to enter ; he there-
upon learning that the militia had fled. I must not for- fore set her on tire, and she blew up. The Beaufort got
get to say that the engineer officer who had been sent through to Norfolk.
from Richmond for service in the fort remained bravely "We in the fort saw this work of destruction going
at his post. . . . I found Commodore Lynch on shore; on without being able to prevent it. As soon as the
his boat had been cut in two by a shot and he could not vessels passed the fort we could not bring a gun to
get off to his ship, as he. informed me; and he further- bear on them, and a shot from them would have taken
more said I was to command the fort without reference us in reverse. A few rounds of grape would have killed
to his being there — that if he saw an opportunity to get and wounded all the men in the fort, for the distance
off to the Seabird, he should embrace it. The enemy's -was only a few hundred yards. Seeing this, I directed
vessels came on at full speed under a heavy fire from Johnson to spike the guns, to order every man to
our vessels aud the fort. The fire from the latter was shoulder his musket, and then to take down the flag,
ineffectual. The officers and men were cool enough; " All this was promptly and coolly done, and upon the
but they had not had time to look about them. Every- fart being reported to me by Johnson, I pointed to
thing was in bad working order, and it was difficult to some woods in our rear and told him to make the
train the guns. . . . Commodore Kowan's steamers best of his way there with the command. All this
did not reply to our tire until quite close; and without time Commodore Lynch had stood quietly looking on,
slackening their speed they passed the fort and fell upon but without uttering a word. As his command had
our vessels. They made short work of them. The Sea- just been destroyed under his eyes, T knew pretty well
bird was rammed and sunk by the Commodore Perry, what his feelings were. Turning to him I said: ' Com-
Tlie Ellis was captured after a desperate defense, in modore, I have ordered the fort evacuated.' ' Why so,
which her gallant commander, James Cooke, was badly sir?' he demanded. I pointed out the condition of
wounded. The schooner Btaek Warrior was set on tire affairs T have just stated, and he acquiesced. Arm in
and abandoned, her crew escaping through the marshes arm, we followed the retreating men."
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
647
before we passed out of range the low guards, wheel-house, and masts of
the Delaware were riddled. My descent from the cross-trees, with only the
mast to protect my body, was rapid and not graceful ; ratlines and shrouds
were cut by bullets as I went down, and my escape without injury was one
of the every-day miracles of war.
The Union forces withdrew down the river and anchored. Early the next
morning we returned, and after some pre-
liminary shelling, my regiment with two
boat-howitzers were landed, the enemy
was driven out, and the town was occu-
pied. We soon discovered that the court-
house and several other buildings were in
use for barracks and store-houses for
army supplies. They were all fired.
Then the expedition returned to Roanoke
Island.
The Winton expedition was, for the
time being, the last of active operations
haviug Roanoke Island for a base. The
army forces on shore were enjoying a
period of luxurious rest, while the naval
vessels were making pleasant excursions
to the towns on the shores of the sounds
before embarking in an enterprise second
only in importance to the capture of Roanoke Island. It was an open secret
that the next move would be against New Berne, a small city on the Neuse
River.
The morning of the 10th of March \> a letter was handed to me from General
Burnside containing the information that a new brigade, composed of the 9th
and 89th New York and the 6th New Hampshire, and designated as the Fourth,
had been formed for duty at Roanoke Island, which was to be left under my
command for the protection of that post. The formation of this new brigade
was the culmination of preparations for the departure of the New Berne
expedition.
THE BATTLE OF NEW BERNE.
VICE-ADMIRAL S. C. UOWAN.
The morning of the 11th the force detailed for the attack upon that city
embarked and that night, with the naval forces, rendezvoused at Hatteras Inlet.
On the 12th an early start was made, and that evening the whole fleet anchored
off the mouth of Slocum's Creek, about sixteen miles below New Berne.
The next morning was as unpleasant as a cold penetrating rain and dark sky
could make it, but, notwithstanding, at 6:30, after some preliminary shelling
of woods near the landing, the troops began to disembark, the majority
j) The 9th of March had been clear and sunny, quite distinctly, the roar of the guns engaged in
with a lit^ht breeze from the north. Although Iwas the action between the Merrimac and the Union
at Roanoke Island, some eighty miles away, I heard, fleet, including the Monitor. — R. C. H.
648
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN
H CAROLINA.
going in small boats, while others in their ea, 1 for the fray jumped from
the transports, which were fast on the mud bottoms, and, holding their car-
tridge-boxes and muskets over their heads, waded to tin1 land. In addition to
the 13 regiments of infantry, 8 pieces of artillery were landed, 6 in charge
of Lieutenant McGook, of the navy, and 2 commanded by Captains Dayton
and Bennett, of the Marine Artillery.
The enemy had chosen a strong position, well calculated for defensive pur-
poses. On Otter Creek, about seven miles up the river from the mouth of
Slocum's Creek, they had a line of intrenchments reaching from the Neuse
River to the Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad ; two miles beyond they had
erected a strong field-work for preventing a landing at that point ; three miles
farther on there was a battery mounting 4 heavy guns,
but bearing upon the river ; and one mile farther up to-
ward New Berne was their long line of strong works,
the chief defense against an attack upon that city. Fort
Thompson, a large and carefully planned flanking bas-
tion, located on the river, and mounting 13 heavy
guns, the enemy's extreme left, was the commencement
of their main line of breastworks, which extended a
mile and a quarter to the railroad; and commencing
the other side of the railroad was another series of de-
fensive works, consisting of rifle-pits and detached
intrenchments in the form of redans and lunettes, that
brigadier-general l. o'e terminated in a 2-gun battery, about two miles from
BRANCH, COMMANDING THE ° '
confederate roRCEs at new Fort Thompson. All were located upon a low, swampy
BERNE. KILLEP AT ANTIET\M, „ „,.. -. . „ . , . , ,, .-, -.
sept. 17, 1862. soil. The line from the river to the railroad was pro-
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH. ^^ by & ^^ ^ ^^g in frQnt? and the Qne
beyond by a swamp and underbrush along its whole length. These works
were armed with 41 heavy guns and 19 field-pieces, and had between
7000 and 8000 men for their defense. In the river, opposite Fort Thompson,
and crossing its channel, were a double row of piles and many sunken vessels,
formidable obstructions, to assist the fort in preventing an attack upon New
Berne from the river. The naval forces moved up the river along with the
troops while the light guns on shore were being dragged through the deep
mud of the road. The first day's inarch took "the whole Union force beyond
the, second deserted work, where the advance came in contact with the
enemy's pickets. It being then 8 o'clock, a halt was ordered for the night,
and the weary, hungry troops found a soldiers' resting-place in the mud, with
no better covering than a continuous downpour of cold water. The eight
pieces of artillery, although assisted on their way by the whole of the 51st
Pennsylvania, did not arrive on the ground until 3 o'clock the following
morning. [See map, p. 651.]
During the night it was ascertained from pickets, negroes, and others that
the enemy's fortified line was not far off ; and early on the morning of the
14th the positions of the Union forces were designated preparatory to a for-
ward movement for attack. General Foster was to move up the country
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
649
FORTS ELLIS ANQ LANE IN THE DISTANCE.
BOMBARDMENT OF THE CONFEDERATE FORT THOMPSON DURING THE BATTLE OF NEW BERNE.
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
road and attack the enemy's left ; General Reno was to advance by the rail-
road and attempt to turn the rebel right ; while General Parke was to follow
on the country road as a reserve, or to operate in the center. The heads of
the two advancing columns soon came within range, and a disposition of the
troops for a general engagement was immediately consummated. The 25th
Massachusetts had the extreme right ; second in line came the 24th Massa-
chusetts, its left resting on the country road, which was occupied by the
artillery commanded by Captain Dayton and Lieutenant McCook. The 27th
Massachusetts, with its right resting on the country road, was joined on its
left by the 23d Massachusetts, the whole parallel with the enemy's works. The
artillery and right regiments opened the engagement before those on the left
of the road got into position. The 10th Connecticut Volunteers, arriving a
little after the others, was ordered to the left of the 23d. The action along
the whole of General Foster's front had now commenced in earnest. The
27th Massachusetts soon exhausted its short supply of ammunition, and was
replaced by the 11th Connecticut, which had been ordered by General Parke
to assist in bringing up the guns.
Early in the morning General Reno, on the left, moved his brigade along the
railroad in the following order : 21st Massachusetts, 51st New York, 9th New
Jersey, and 51st Pennsylvania. The first encounter, about 8 o'clock, was with
a large detachment of the enemy who were bringing a gun to bear on the rail-
road. This move was checked by a well-maintained fire from the Union
skirmishers, and soon after the right wing of the 21st Massachusetts, under
6^o
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
Lieutenant-Colonel Clark, charged through an opening and captured a brick-
kiln within the enemy's line. The other regiments of the brigade were now
brought into line on the left of the 21st Massachusetts, with the 51st Pennsyl-
vania in reserve, supporting the extreme left of the line. On this part of the
field the action lasted for about three and a half hours, when the regiments
engaged had expended nearly all their ammunition. At that time the right
wing of the 51st Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant-Colonel T. S. Bell, was
ordered to relieve the 51st New York, which had suffered severely, to pass
in front of it, deliver one volley, and then
charge the enemy's works. This order was
gallantly executed. At the same time the
other wing of the 51st Pennsylvania and
the 9th New Jersey charged the intrench-
ments, and the enemy fled from their entire
left, leaving fifty prisoners. Just then
General Reno discovered the Stars and
Stripes waving from the works far off to
his right.
Lieutenant-Colonel Clark, after captur-
ing the brick-kiln, moved along the inside
of the works toward the right, came upon
a light battery of sixteen pieces which he
captured, but was driven back by an over-
whelming force of infantry.
General Parke's brigade, consisting of
the 4th and 5th Rhode Island and the
8th and 11th Connecticut regiments, was
assigned to the center in supporting distance of either end of the line, but
this command was destined to play a more important part than merely
supporting the troops. Soon after getting under fire Colonel Rodman, with
the 4th Rhode Island, offered to charge through an opening left in the in-
trenchments for the railroad to pass through. The offer was accepted, and
the 8th Connecticut and the 5th Rhode Island were ordered to his support.
Passing the rifle-pits, he entered the rear of the intrenchments, moving toward
the right, capturing nine brass guns and driving the enemy from his intrenched
position between the railroad and the river. Simultaneously with the move-
ment of Colonel Rodman, General Foster made a charge along his whole front,
when the enemy retreated. During the greater part of the action the gun-boats
cooperated by shelling the woods in the rear of the works. Rodman's
soldierly movement was the culminating point of the day, and ended a battle
most creditable for all the Union troops and the officers who commanded
them. Immediately after the close of the action, New Berne was occupied.
When the strength of the position is taken into consideration, the fatigue
of the Union forces, and the great difficulties they had to encounter in mak-
ing an infantry attack against a strong intrenched position, it is astonishing
that they came out of the action with a loss of only 90 killed and 380
MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN G. FOSTER.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
651
wounded. The loss to the enemy was 9 forts, mounting 41 heavy guns, over
2 miles of intrenchments, with 19 field-pieces in position, 6 32-pounders
not mounted, over 300 prisoners, more than 1000 stand of small arms, tents
and barracks for 10,000 troops, a large amount of army supplies and naval
stores, and the control of the second commercial city in the State of North
Carolina. The enemy's loss in killed, wounded, prisoners, and missing was
about 578. This complete success, coming so soon after that of Roanoke
Island, created an esprit de corps among the troops of the " Coast Division "
which they maintained to the end of their army career. \
\ The Confederate forces in this engagement
were all North Carolinians, and were commanded
by General L. O'B. Branch, who gives in his official
report this account of the battle :
"The defensive works were located and constructed
before I assumed command. The troops under my com-
mand had performed a large amount of work, hut it
was mainly on the river defenses, which were not as-
sailed by the enemy. They had been originally planned
for a force much larger than any ever placed at my
disposal, and I was for six weeks engaged in making
tin' necessary changes to contract them, but the failure
of all my efforts to obtain implements and tools with
which the troops could carry on the work prevented me
from making satisfactory progress. I had circulated
handbills over the State, calling on the citizens gener-
ally to assist me, and received from two counties a
small party of free negroes without implements. I
then inserted in the newspaper an advertisement call-
ing on the slave-owners to hire their slaves, with im-
plements, for a few days, and 1 got but a single negro.
During all this time I continued the troops at work, and
when the enemy came into the river, five hundred per
day were being detailed to construct breastworks, with
MAP OF THE BATTLE OP NEW BERNE, NORTH CAROLINA,
MARCH 14, 1862.
This map is based upon the sketch map accompanying General
Branch's official report of the Confederate operations in this engage-
ment, with the addition of the Union dispositions as indicated by the
official reports.
less than half that number of worn and broken shovels
and axes, without picks or grubbing-hoes. If the fate,
of New Berue shall prevent a similar supineness on the
part of citizens, and especially slave-owners, elsewhere,
it will be fortunate for the country. . . . At about 7:30
o'clock, Friday morning, the tire opened along the line
from the railroad to the river. I soon received a mes-
sage from Colonel Lee [commanding the Confederate,
left wins] that the enemy were attempting to turn our
left. This proved to be a feint, as I replied to him that
I thought it would. The next incident of the battle
was the appearance of the enemy's skirmishers in front of
Vance [26th N. C], and consequently on the prolongation
of the line held by the militia. It was to drive the enemy
from that position that I had directed the 24-pound bat-
tery to be placed there, and supposing' it was ready for
service, I sent Captain Rodman, with his company, to
man it, but they found the guns not mounted, and wire
ordered into position to act as infantry. The skirmish-
ers of the enemy, finding themselves on the flank of the,
militia, fired at them a few shots from their flank files,
which caused a portion of them to flee in great disorder.
I instantly ordered Colonel Avery [33d Regiment] to
send Ave companies to dislodge them. He sent them in-
stantly, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hoke; but before
Colonel Hoke had fully got into position,
though he moved with the greatest
promptness and celerity, I received a
message from Colonel Clark, of the mi-
litia, informing me that the enemy were
in line of battle in great force on his
right. I instantly ordered up the re-
maining five companies of Colonel
Avery's regiment, and the whole ten
opened a terrific fire from their En-
field rifles. The whole militia, how-
ever, had now abandoned their posi-
tions, and the utmost exertions of myself
and my staff could not rally them.
Colonel Sinclair's regiment [35th] very
quickly followed their example, retreat-
ing in the utmost disorder. This laid
open Haywood's right [7th], and a large,
portion of the breastwork was left va-
cant. I had not a man with whom to
reoccupy it, and the enemy soon poured
in a column along the railroad and
through a portion of the cut -down
ground in front, which marched up be-
hind the breastwork to attack what re-
mained of Campbell's command [7th].
The brave 7 th met them with the bay-
onet, and drove them headlong over
the parapet, inflicting heavy loss upon
them as they fled ; but soon returning
with heavy reinforcements, not less than
five or six regiments, the. 7th was obliged
to yield, falling back slowly and in or-
der. Seeing the enemy behind the breast-
work, without a single man to place in
the gap through which he was entering,
and finding the day lost, my next care
was to secure the retreat."
bj2
' COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH C A ROLL
ASSAULT OF THE UNION TROOPS UPON FORT THOMPSON, NEAR NEW BERNE. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
The enemy in their retreat destroyed bridges, and as they passed through
the town set fire to it, and left parts of it in a blaze ; and the first work of our
troops and sailors after landing was to assist the citizens in putting out the
flames, which was not done until much valuable property had been uselessly
destroyed. With the military machinery at his command it did not take
General Burnside long to establish order and give the captured city such a
government as the occasion required. The next and most important business
in hand was to make the captured position secure from a land attack ; and
in order to accomplish this, a portion of the railroad leading to Goldsboro'
had to be destroyed, and a line of fortifications built between the Neuse and
Trent rivers, which would completely insulate New Berne from the sur-
rounding country.
THE SIEGE OF FOET MACON.
The next and last objective point of any importance in the new depart-
ment of North Carolina was the capture of Fort Macon, an old-style, strong,
stone, casemated work, mounting 67 guns, garrisoned by above 500 men, com-
manded by Colonel Moses J. White, located on the eastern extremity of Bogue
Island, commanding the channel from the open sea to Beaufort Harbor, and
about forty miles from New Berne. [See map, p. 634.] To General Parke was as-
signed the duty of moving upon this work and undertaking its capture. March
18th, General Burnside and Lieutenant Williamson, of the Engineers, made
a reconnoissance to the east as far as Slocum's Creek, and occupied Ha
lock Station with one company of the 5th Rhode Island Battalion. The 2
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
653
FORT MACON AFTER ITS CAPTURE BY THE UNION
FORCES, SHOWING EFFECTS OF THE BOMBARD-
MENT. FROM WAR-TIME SKETCHES.
Carolina City, a small settlement
opposite Bogue Island, was occu-
pied; the 22d, two companies of
the 4th Rhode Island took pos-
session of Morehead City; the
night of the 25th, a detachment of
the same regiment, with a com-
pany of the 8th Connecticut, occupied Beaufort ; and the night of the 23d,
Newport was garrisoned by the 5th Rhode Island. Thus all the important
positions around or in the vicinity of Fort Macon had fallen into the posses-
sion of the Union forces without contest or the loss of a man. General Parke,
who had established his headquarters at Carolina City, demanded a surrender
of the fort, which was refused. The evidence of preparations completed and
in hand left no doubt upon the mind of General Parke that Colonel White
intended to make a desperate defense. It was therefore decided to besiege
the fort, and as soon as possible to make a combined land and sea attack.
In this important work General Parke was most ably assisted by Captain
Williamson and Lieutenant Flagler, of the Ordnance Corps. On the 29th a
part of the Third Brigade was landed upon Bogue Island, and operations for
besieging the fort were immediately commenced. The configuration of the
sand-hills was singularly well adapted to facilitate the operations of the Union
forces. These ridges or hills intervened between the working parties and the
fort to such an extent in height as to permit the erection of besieging works
to go on by day as well as by night, without any serious inconvenience from
the enemy's fire. By April 23d, the fort was entirely cut off from communi-
654 EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
cation with the outer world. On the ocean side the blockading division, con-
sisting of the steamers Daylight, State of Georgia, and Chippewa, and the bark
Gemsbok, under the command of Commander Samuel Lockwood, prevented
all intercourse from that direction. General Parke announced the works com-
pleted, and his readiness for an attack, and Colonel White was again sum-
moned, and again, in the tersest possible terms, declined to surrender.
The preparations for the reduction of the fort consisted of a battery of 3
rifled 30-pounder guns, under Captain L. 0. Morris; another of 4 8-inch
mortars, under Lieutenant D. W. Flagler ; and a third of 4 10-inch mortars,
commanded by Lieutenant M. F. Pronty, of the 25th Massachusetts. From
these works the bombardment commenced on the morning of the 25th,
and continued for ten hours. The fire from the Union batteries was not
only vigorous, but also accurate and effective. Shell after shell dropped
into the work and exploded. Many breaches were made, the ramparts
were swept clean of gunners, and seventeen guns were disabled and dis-
mounted. The naval forces, owing to the sudden coming on of a gale, after
participating in the early part of the bombardment, were compelled to seek
deeper water. On the morning of the 26th Colonel White, by the hanging-
out of a white flag, indicated his willingness to surrender. He and his troops
received honorable terms and marched out of the fort as the 5th Rhode Island
marched in, and so ended, in a comparatively bloodless victory, the siege of
Fort Macon, the combined losses of both sides being only 9 killed and 25
wounded.^
During the bombardment a detachment of the Signal Corps under Lieuten-
ant Andrews rendered most important assistance to the commanders of the
batteries. His position on the Bogue banks was nearly at right angles with
the line of fire. Early in the action he saw that the 10-inch shells were going-
three hundred yards beyond the fort, and that the 8-inch shells were falling-
short. By signaling his observations, the elevations of the pieces were corrected,
so that after 12 o'clock every projectile from the mortars fell inside the fort.
This was not only one of the first, but among the better, of the achievements
of the Signal Corps, proving its usefulness in war operations.
SOUTH MILLS AND OTHER OPERATIONS.
Soon after the capture of Roanoke Island rumors reached us of the build-
ing of rebel iron-clads which were to enter Albemarle Sound via the Dismal
Swamp Canal and Roanoke River. Commander Rowan and I were equally
■fe Colonel Moses J. White says in his report : up with great vigor, the enemy having immense advan-
tage from their superior force, being ahle to relieve tlieir
"At 6 A. m., on the 25th, the enemy's land batteries men at the guns, while our morning reports showed
opened upon the fort, and at 0 : 30 a. m. their vessels, only 263 men for duty. Our guns were well managed,
consisting of three war steamers and one sailing vessel, but being able to do little damage to water batteries and
commenced a cross-tire with rifle and 11-inch shell. The siege guns, tiring through very narrow embrasures,
tire from both directions was immediately returned, The enemy kept up a very vigorous and accurate tire
and at 7 A. M. the ships retired — one disabled and two from both rifles and mortars, dismounting guns, disa-
others in a damaged condition. [No such damage is re- liliug men, and tearing the parade, parapet, and walls of
ported by the commanders of the Union vessels. Com- the fort. At 6:30 p. m., finding that our loss had been
mander Lockwood, of the Daylight, the senior naval very great, and from the fatigue of our men being unable
officer, attributed the withdrawal to the rolling of the to keep up the lire with but two guns, a proposition
sea. He speaks, however, of the excellence of the Con- was made to General Parke for the surrender of Fort
federate aim.— Editors.] The attack from land was kept Macon."
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA. 655
anxious to protect the "pasteboard" vessels composing his fleet. We decided
it would be feasible to land a considerable force at Elizabeth City, make a
forced march to the south end of the Dismal Swamp Canal, and destroy the
lock that connected it with the river. In an interview with General Burn-
side the plan was submitted and approved ; he agreed to detail a necessary
additional force from New Berne to take part in the movement, and I was
ordered to have my entire command ready for April 14th. On the 17th I
received a personal letter from him, saying he had detailed the 21st Massachu-
setts and the 51st Pennsylvania, and ordering me to embark immediately with
at least eighteen hundred men, and closed by saying he would be up at once
or send orders. The morning of the 18th I was greatly surprised to receive a
call from General Eeno, who stated that he had with him two regiments and
was in command of the expedition.
The transports were soon under way, and reached the point of debarkation
at about 1 o'clock the next morning. My brigade, consisting of the 9th New
York, Lieutenant-Colonel Kimball ; the 89th New York, Colonel H. S. Fair-
child ; and the 6th New Hampshire, Colonel S. G. Griffin, was landed and on
the march by 3 o'clock. A light mulatto man for a guide came to me from
one of the gun-boats and by a circuitous route took us far out of the way,
so that we marched 30 miles to get at the rebel position, instead of 16 by
the direct road. J This detour led to the meeting of the Union commands
where two roads joined, about three or four miles from the enemy's position.
It was decided that General Reno should take the advance, and that I should
follow as rapidly as the fatigued condition of my men would permit.
Soon after 1 o'clock the rebels were discovered with a small detachment of
cavalry thrown to the front, their infantry and artillery in a concealed line
along the edge of a wood, facing an open field. The action was commenced
by rapid shell-firing from the enemy's guns, which was vigorously answered
by the four rifled pieces (two belonging to Company K, 9th New York), com-
manded by Colonel William A. Howard, of the Marine Artillery. The 21st
Massachusetts and the 51st Pennsylvania, coming in range, were deflected out
of a road, through a field, to a wood on the right. My command soon arrived,
when the 6th New Hampshire was ordered to the left, and the two other regi-
ments followed those on the right. The action had continued for about an
hour (chiefly artillery), when I concluded to make an observation in an open
corn-field, directly in front of the rebel center. I proceeded to a fence within
a hundred yards of the edge of the clearing, heard no firing of infantry,
concluded the rebels had been silently outflanked on their left by the 21st
Massachusetts and the 51st Pennsylvania, and thought my regiment might
get across the corn-field and capture the battery which still continued the
action.
I returned, and described what I proposed to do, and asked the men if
they thought they were equal to the undertaking. Although greatly fatigued,
I When it was discovered that the guide had and shot. A few days after, we heard that he had
led my brigade ten miles out of the way, he was been sent to us by the enemy for the purpose of
quietly taken to a wood out of sight of the troops leading our troops astray. — R. C. H.
6^6
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
INTRENCHMENT,
R(CHARDSONS%«n
MILLS M)
MAP OF THE ENGAGEMENT AT SOUTH MILES, N. C, BASED ON THE
MAP ACCOMPANYING GENERAL HUGER'S REPORT.
they answered, "We will
try." Arriving at the
fence, the regiment was
formed in line of battle,
and commenced to move
over the field. When
within fifty yards of the
edge of the clearing, the
right companies received
the concentrated fire of
the whole of the enemy's
infantry and artillery,
and in less than two min-
utes lost 9 killed and 58
wounded. I immediately
ordered a deflection to
ihe right, when suddenly
the rebels ceased firing,
and fell back to avoid
being outflanked by our
force that entered the
wood on their left. The
6th New Hampshire
gave them a parting vol-
, which caused their artillery to retreat, and so ended the battle of South
Mills, or Camden,^ as it is now known.
ley
&In his report of the fight at South Mills General
Huger thus describes the Confederate position :
" On the 19th, the enemy approaching. . . Col-
onel Wright moved forward with hi* three companies,
and at 9:30 o'clock was met by Colonel McComas with
his battery (1 rifled piece and 3 bronze 6-pounders).
After advancing 3 miles from South Mills the road
emerged from the woods, and the field on the right and
the left extended ICO to 180 yards to thick woods and
swamp. On the edge of the woods, on both sides of the
road and perpendicular to it, was a small ditch, the
earth from which was thrown up on the south side in n
ridge, upon which was a heavy rail fence. From this
point the road led through a narrow lane for one mile with
cleared land on both skies of it. Here he determined to
make his stand. About three hundred yards from the
woods ran a deep wide ditch parallel with the one first
mentioned and extending to the woods on either side of
the road, and a short distance beyond it were dwellings
and outhouses which would give cover for the enemy.
Colonel Wright therefore ordered them burned. The
large ditch in his front he tilled with fence rails and set
them on tire, his object being to have this ditch so hot
by the time the enemy came up they could not occupy
it. (This ditch is marked on sketch as ' Boasted Ditch.')
Two pieces of artillery (the road was too narrow for
more) were placed in the road just where it emerged
from the woods, which commanded the road — the range
of the suns. He also threw down the fences for three
hundred yards on each side of the road for three
hundred yards in front of the guns, and tossed the rails
into the road to destroy the effect of the enemy's ricochet
firing, and to deprive him of the cover of the fences. The
fences on the sides of the woods were taken down and
laid in heaps on the embankment in front of his men.
The smoke from the burning buildings and
fences rolled toward the enemy, thus masking the posi-
tion. . . ."
General Huger speaks of four repulses of the Union
troops between 112 and 3:35 P. M., and continues :
" They soon advanced again, two regiments skirting
the woods on our left, and approached near enough to
engage the skirmishers. One company from the right
was moved over, and Colonel Reid ordered to send one
company from the reserve. The enemy deployed in the
open flehl and bore down rapidly, but the heavy Are of
musketry caused them to waver, and they fell back to
the fence. Three regiments and a field-piece were in the
center and the 9th New York regiment on the right.
The fire was now brisk from one end of the line to tin-
other, and the enemy were held in check, when just at
this moment Captain McComas was killed by a niinie-
ball. and his men. who for four hours had fought with
most indomitable courage, became panic-stricken and
left the field, taking their pieces with them. Colonel
Wright succeeded in rallying them andgettingtwopieees
and a few men in position, and the enemy had advanced
so close that canister was fired on them with effect, and
they again fell back*. The ammunition in the limber-
boxes was exhausted, and during the temporary absence
of Colonel Wright the artillery left the field. The enemy
made a charge upon our line, but the steady fire at close
distance . . . caused them to break in confusion, and
they fell back."
The Confederate forces were the 3d Georgia,
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA. 657
I was helped off the field to a negro cabin, and heard nothing from General
Reno until about 9 o'clock, when he came to me with the information that he
had learned that reinforcements were coming from Norfolk; and we agreed,
under the circumstances, that it would be better to return to the gun-boats.
The command moved at once through the mud and rain, reached the point
of debarkation about 4 o'clock the next morning, and returned to Roanoke Isl-
and. My brigade had marched about 46 miles in a little less than 26 hours,
besides taking part in a severe action. Our entire loss was 14 killed and
100 wounded and missing. Among the former was Lieutenant Charles A.
Gadsden, adjutant of the 9th New York, an Americanized Englishman, who
had been with his command less than a week. He fell most gallantly at the
head of the first company that came under fire, where he had no right to be.
Chaplain Thomas W. Conway, of the 9th New York, who with Surgeon
George H. Humphreys remained behind with the wounded, discovered that the
rebel infantry, which gave us such a warm reception, were concealed in a
broad, deep drain which conformed to the edge of the wood, and was parallel
to my line of attack. The lock the expedition was sent to destroy remains
to this day intact, and no iron-clad has ever passed through it, and for the
best of all reasons, that none was ever built for that purpose.
May 7th, Captain O. W. Parisen, with Company C, 9th New York, embarked
on the gun-boat Shaicsh&en, proceeded to Catharine's Creek, which empties
into Chowan River, landed his command with a part of the gun-boat's crew,
marched about two miles back from the creek and destroyed a large store-
house filled with $50,000 worth of commissary supplies for the rebel army.
While returning to the gun-boat, Captain Parisen repelled an attack of rebel
cavalry, which after one volley retreated, with the commanding officer
mortally wounded.
Immediately after the first occupation of the inland waters of North Caro-
lina by the Union forces, great inconvenience had been experienced, and in
several instances movements had been retarded, because the only way of com-
munication with Washington was through the sometimes dangerous and always
unreliable channel of Hatteras Inlet. Knowing this, I had constantly urged
upon General Burnside the importance of opening connection with Norfolk
through the Currituck Sound and Dismal Swamp Canal, and, as a preliminary
to such an undertaking, had commenced blowing up the obstructions placed
by the enemy in the Currituck Canal. May 28th, I received permission from
General Burnside to make an attempt to get to Fort Monroe through my
proposed route, for the purpose of having an important conference with
General Wool. I embarked Company K of the 9th New York, with its
battery of rifled naval boat-guns, on board the small side-wheel steamer
Port Royal. All the canal obstructions not being removed, I decided to
*
some drafted militia under Colonel Ferebee, Mc- York Marine Artillery (4 pieces) ; and the losses
Comas's battery, and Gillette's company of cavalry, were: killed, 13 ; wounded, 101 ; captured, 13, —
The Confederate loss was G killed, 19 wounded, total, 127. General Jesse L. Reno says in hisre-
and 3 prisoners. The Union forces were the 6th port that the object of his expedition was to convey
New Hampshire, 21st Massachusetts, 9th and the idea that the entire Burnside expedition was
89th New York, 51st Pennsylvania, and 1st New marching upon Norfolk. — Editors.
VOL. I. 42
658
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.
/•A«W
tTOilny
PASSAGE OF UNION BOATS THROUGH THE DISMAL SWAMP CANAL. (SEE MAP, PAGE 634.)
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
pick my way outside in Currituck Sound through a narrow, crooked chan-
nel. The result can best be told by a dispatch to the New York " Tribune "
from Fort Monroe :
" May 30th, 1862. This morning the side-wheel steamer Port Royal arrived here from Roanoke
Island, via the Currituck Sound and Dismal Swamp Canal. Colonel Hawkins and a company
of his gallant Zouaves are the first to open communication between Generals Wood and Burn-
side. By this movement we can dispense with all seaward transportation, and forward supplies,
etc., in a safe and rapid manner to our troops in that vicinity."
When I was left in charge of Roanoke Island, Commander Rowan assigned
to the command of the naval division in Albemarle and Croatan sounds
Lieutenant Charles W. Flusser, who had been conspicuous for his efficiency
upon many occasions. A finer character than this officer possessed it is
impossible to imagine, — patriotic, sincere, manly, modest, considerate, and
truthful to an extent almost beyond description; and a braver man never
lived. Early in June he took possession of the town of Plymouth, situated
a short distance above the mouth of the Roanoke River, and held it unaided
by land forces until June 15th, when Company F of the 9th New York was
detailed for guard and observation duty at that post. It did not take a long
time for us to ascertain that there were among the non-slaveholding popula-
tion many who professed sentiments not hostile to the Union, and that they
had expressed a determination never to serve in the ranks of the rebel army.
Lieutenant-Commander Flusser constantly urged upon me the importance
of enlisting these men in the cause of the United States. Nearly all of the
poorer class of inhabitants were still devoted to the old government ; and
many had successfully resisted rebel conscription, and had never given their
allegiance to the rebel government.
Yery few of them were slave-owners, and consequently had little interest in
aiding the rebellion. They worked in their fields in groups, with arms near
at hand during the day, and at night resorted to the swamps for shelter
EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA. 6^,9
against conscripting parties of rebel soldiers ; and by thus constantly being
on the alert, they succeeded in rendering unavailing all efforts to force them
into the ranks of the Confederate army. In several interviews which I had
with Commander Flusser, he urged me in the strongest manner to occupy
the town of Plymouth, and to organize the Union men of that vicinity into
a regiment of soldiers.
I had several conversations with General Burnside in relation to this matter,
and the final result was that he placed the affair entirely in my hands. Accord-
ingly, by appointment, Commodore Rowan and I met some two hundred and
fifty Union men ; and a free interchange of views in relation to the affairs of
the country took place. The matter of great concern with them was, " What
will become of us in case we are captured by the rebels 1 " We assured them
that the Government of the United States would protect them and their
families to the last extreme, and that any outrage perpetrated upon them or
upon their families would be severely punished. An enlistment-roll was
accordingly made out, and about one hundred men signed their names at
once. Too much cannot be said of the devotion of these men under peculiar
dangers — of these men of the 1st North Carolina. |
Things remained in this condition until July, 1862, when General Burn-
side, with the Ninth Corps, of which my command was part, was ordered to
join the Army of the Potomac.
4. On the 1st of February, 1864, a large Con- me that the parole given by the armies laying
federate force, under the command of Major-Gen- down their arms protects them against punish-
eral G. E. Pickett, made an advance upon New ments for acts lawful for any other belligerents.
Berne, N. C, and after destroying the United In this case I know it is claimed that the men tried
States gun-boat Underwriter, burning a bridge or and convicted for the crime of desertion were
two, and capturing some prisoners, withdrew to Union men from North Carolina, who had found
Kiuston. Among the prisoners captured were refuge within our lines and in our service. The
several natives of North Carolina, who had en- punishment was a harsh one, but it was in time
listed in our service. A court-martial was con- of war, and when the enemy no doubt felt it neces-
vened, composed of Virginians, and twenty-two sary to retain by some power the services of every
of these loyal North Carolinians were convicted of man within their reach. General Pickett I know
and executed for (constructive) desertion. June personally to be an honorable man, but in this
1st, 1865, Pickett applied to President John- case his judgment prompted him to do what can-
son for a pardon. Secretary Stanton and Judge not well be sustained, though I do not see how
Advocate-General Holt were for trying him, and good, either to friends of the deceased or by fixing
his application hung fire. March 12th, 1866, he an example for the future, can be secured by his
wrote to Lieutenant-General .Grant, stating his trial now. It would only open up the question
grievances and again setting forth his claim for a whether or not the Government did not disregard
pardon. Upon the back of that letter General its contract entered into to secure the surrender
Grant made this singular indorsement : "During of an armed enemy." And the whole was referred to
the rebellion belligerent rights were acknowledged the President. The indorsement of General Grant
to the enemies of our country, and it is clear to was all-powerful, and nothing was done. — R. C. H.
THE BURNSIDE EXPEDITION J
BY AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.
UNION LOOKOUT, HATTERAS BEACH.
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
J CON after the 1st Rhode Island regiment was mus-
tered out of service, I was appointed by President
Lincoln to the office of brigadier-general. My com-
mission was given to me on the 6th of August, 1861,
and I was ordered to report to General McClellan,
who placed me in charge of the division and bri-
gades which were formed of the new troops as they
arrived in Washington. My duty was to look after
the drill and discipline of these brigades, with a view
to giving the men the efficiency necessary for assign-
ment to the older divisions of the army, which were
then organizing in Washington under the name of
the Army of the Potomac. The duty was interesting in some respects,
but was in the main somewhat tame, so that I very naturally desired more
active duty.
One evening in the following October, General McClellan and I were chat-
ting together over the affairs of the war, when I mentioned to him a plan for
the formation of a coast division to which I had given some thought. After
giving him a somewhat detailed account of the plan,
he asked me to put it in writing as soon as possible,
which was done. The next day it was presented
to him, and it met his approval. He laid it before
the Secretary of War, by whom it was also ap-
proved. The general details of the plan were briefly
as follows: To organize a division of from 12,000
to 15,000 men, mainly from States bordering on the
Northern sea-coast, many of whom would be famil-
iar with the coasting trade, and among whom would
be found a goodly number of mechanics ; and to fit
out a fleet of light-draught steamers, sailing vessels,
and barges, large enough to transport the division,
its armament and supplies, so that it could be rap-
idly thrown from point to point on the coast with
a view to establishing lodgments on the Southern
coast, landing troops, and penetrating into the
interior, thereby threatening the lines of trans-
portation in the rear of the main army then
J This paper was read by General Burnside before the Soldiers' and
Sailors' Historical Society of Rhode Island, July 7th, IS 80, and is
included here by permission of the Society, the text being somewhat
abridged to conform to the plan of this work. — Editors.
UNIFORM OP THE 1ST RHODE ISLAND,
COLONEL A. E. BIRNSIDE, WHICH
SERVED AT THE BATTLE OF
BULL RUN. (SEE ABOVE.)
CG0
THE BUKNSIDE EXPEDITION. 66 1
concentrating in Virginia, and holding possession of the inland waters on the
Atlantic coast.
After the approval of the plan, I was ordered to New York to fit out the
fleet ; and on the 23d of October orders were issued establishing my head-
quarters for the concentration of the troops of the division at Annapolis.
Troops arrived from time to time at Annapolis, and all went well in the
camp, which was established on beautiful grounds just outside the town.
The improvement in drill and discipline was very rapid, but affairs did not
progress so smoothly at the headquarters in New York. There was great
difficulty in procuring vessels of a light draught, almost everything of that
sort having already been called into service ; but after much difficulty I was
enabled to report to General McClellan on the 12th of December that a suf-
ficient amount of transportation and armament had been secured for the
division. It was a motley fleet. North River barges and propellers had been
strengthened from deck to keelson by heavy oak planks, and water-tight
compartments had been built in them : they were so arranged that parapets
of sand-bags or bales of hay could be built upon their decks, and each one
carried from four to six guns. Sailing vessels, formerly belonging to the coast-
ing trade, had been fitted up in the same manner. Several large passenger
steamers, which were guaranteed to draw less than eight feet of water, together
with tug and ferry boats, served to make up the fleet, which gave a capacity
to transport 15,000 troops, with baggage, camp-equipage, rations, etc. Light-
draught sailing vessels were also added to the fleet, on which were stored
building material for bridges, rafts, scows, intrenching implements, quarter-
masters' stores, tools, extra ordnance stores, etc. All of these vessels were
ordered to rendezvous at Fort Monroe. Coal and water vessels were chartered
in Baltimore, and ordered to rendezvous at the same place. The trans-
ports were ordered to Annapolis Harbor, at which point, after most morti-
fying and vexatious delays, they all arrived by the 4th of January, 1862,
and on this day were promulgated the orders for embarkation, which were
received with most enthusiastic cheers from one end of the camp to the other.
I had organized the division into three brigades, which were placed in com-
mand of General J. G. Foster, General Jesse L. Reno, and General John G.
Parke, three of my most trusted friends. We had been cadets together at
West Point, and I had always entertained for them the greatest confidence and
esteem. In all future operations in the expedition, our close friendly relations
were maintained, and I was never disappointed in any reliance which I placed
on their gallantry, skill, and integrity. I had been notified by General McClel-
lan that our destination would be Hatteras Inlet, with a view to operations in
the inland waters of North Carolina.
On the 5th of January the troops began to embark. During that day there
were some delays, which resulted from inexperience in the manoeuvring of the
vessels and in the new work to which they were unaccustomed. On that
night, snow to the depth of from two to three inches fell, which gave to the
camp and surrounding country, on the morning of the 6th, a most picturesque
appearance. Regiment after regiment struck their tents and marched to the
662
THE BURNSIDE EXPEDITION.
point of embarkation, with bands playing, colors Hying, and the men chee
and singing from lightness of heart. As they passed through the quaint
town of Annapolis, the lines of troops, with their dark uniforms and glil
ing bayonets, contrasted markedly with the snow-clad fields and trees. The
men were not cheered and encouraged by many friendly voices, such as they
had heard whilst coming from their homes to the seat of war ; but they were
not at all chilled by the reception,
^^^jjjjjjj^^ and cheerfully marched on to the
work before them. Embarkation
had become more easy to each regi-
ment than it was to the preceding
one, owing to the greater facility
with which the vessels were handled.
The order to break camp had been
obeyed with joyful alacrity, and
more troops poured into the Acad-
emy grounds during the day than
could be embarked, so that large
numbers remained there for the
night. This bivouac was one of the
most enlivening and beautiful that
I saw during the war. There was
very little sleep, but great joyous-
ness. Wednesday morning every
regiment was on board except the
6th New Hampshire, which arrived
late on the night of the 7th, and was
embarked on the next morning. The
scene in the harbor was inspiring
beyond description. The vessels, as
they passed each other from time to time, saluted with their steam- whistles,
while the bands played and the troops cheered, the decks being covered with
blue-coats, some chattering, some sleeping, others writing their last letters to
their loved ones at home. The whole fleet seemed to be under a mixed influ-
ence of excitement and contentment.
On the morning of the 9th, each vessel set sail, under orders to rendezvous
at Fort Monroe, and there, by the night of the 10th, all had joined the Supply
and other vessels, making altogether a fleet of more than eighty. The harbor
probably never presented a finer appearance than 071 that night. All the ves-
sels were illuminated, and the air was filled with the strains of martial music
and the voices of brave men. Not a man in the fleet knew his destination,
except myself, the brigade commanders, and two or three staff-officers, yet
there was no complaint or inquisitiveness, but all seemed ready for whatever
duty was before them.
Sealed orders were given to the commanders of each vessel, to be opened at
sea. Much discouragement was expressed by nautical men and by men high
BKEVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL RUSH C. HAWKINS.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
THE BURNSIDE EXPEDITION. bbj
in military authority as to the success of the expedition. The President and
General McClellan were both approached, and the President was frequently
warned that the vessels were unfit for sea, and that the expedition would be
a total failure. Great anxiety was manifested to know its destination, but
the secret had been well kept at Washington and at our headquarters. As
Mr. Lincoln afterward told me, one public man was very importunate, and,
in fact, almost demanded that the President should tell him where we were
going. Finally, the President said to him, "Now, I will tell you in great con-
fidence where they are going, if you will promise not to speak of it to any
one." The promise was given, and Mr. Lincoln said, " Well, now, my friend,
the expedition is going to sea ! " The inquirer left him without receiving any
further information. In this jocular manner Mr. Lincoln was in the habit of
throwing oft' the cares of state ; and it often occurs to me that but for that
habit he would have broken down under the great weight of public responsi-
bility which rested upon him from the first day of the war to the termination
of his noble life. In my opinion, no man has ever lived who could have
gone through that struggle as he did. At no period of his life, I believe, was
his heart ever stirred with a feeling of enmity or resentment against any one.
He was actuated by the simple desire and determination to maintain the
authority of the Government at all hazards.
On the night of the 11th the signal for sailing was given, and very soon
the fleet was under way. My headquarters were on board a large steamer,
the George Peabodi/ ; but, with two or three of my staff-officers, I took for my
headquarters during the voyage a small propeller called the Picket, in reality
the smallest vessel in the fleet. I was moved to do this because of the great
criticism which had been made as to the unseaworthiness of the vessels of
the fleet, and because of a desire to show my faith in their adaptability to the
service. Their weaknesses were known to me, but they were the best that
could be procured, and it was necessary that the service should be performed
even at the risk of losing life by shipwreck. The weather was threatening,
but I did not foresee the storm by which we were afterward overtaken. At
that time we had no weather signal reports ; but, in any event, the sailing-
would not have been delayed, because the orders to proceed to our work were
imperative. It was% of course, learned by all, after reaching the sea, that the
destination of the fleet was Hatteras Inlet.
Just before midnight the Picket weighed anchor, and we were soon at sea,
and it was not long before the little vessel was called upon to test her sea-
goiug ability. On rounding Gape Hatteras we met a very strong breeze, and
the little vessel got into the trough of the sea. It seemed for a time as if she
would surely be swamped ; but by skillful management the captain brought
her head-to, after which she behaved better. We passed a most uncomfortable
night. Everything on the deck that was not lashed was swept overboard ;
and the men, furniture, and crockery below decks were thrown about in a
most promiscuous manner. The breeze died away toward morning, soon
after which a heavy fog arose, which continued the greater part of the day.
The ocean's swell kept one in constant thought that the little vessel was in
664
THE BURN SIDE EXPEDITION.
momentary danger of going
under. Toward night the wind
arose, and within a short time
it increased to a terrible gale,
and we experienced more dis-
comfort and dread, if possible,
than on the preceding night.
At times, it seemed as if the
waves, which appeared to us
mountain high, would ingulf
us, but then the little vessel
would ride them and stagger
forward in her course.
During the day before (the
12th), the fog had hidden the
fleet, but at about midnight
we discovered a large steamer
upon our port bow. We fired
a shot astern of her, which
she answered by approaching
us. It was the Eastern Queen;
but we dared not go near her,
for fear of being crushed. She
seemed to us enormous, and
we were all delighted when
she answered the signal to lay
by us until daylight, but to
:eep off. In the morning more vessels were found to be in sight, and just
>efore noon of the 13th we hove to, off Hatteras Inlet. Soon after, a tug-boat
came out from the inlet, which, it will be remembered, had been occupied by
General Butler and Commodore Stringham. [See map, p. 634.] The little
boat undertook to do the duty of piloting the fleet over the bar. The Picket
led the way, and bravely fought the breakers until she was safely anchored
inside the harbor. Vessel after vessel followed us in, until we were ready
to wish that the fleet were not so large. At one time it seemed as if our
little boat would be crushed between two of the larger vessels which had
dragged their anchors and were coming down upon her. Fortunately, the
commanders of the vessels succeeded in checking them just as they came
in contact with us. Most of the fleet arrived inside the bar during the
afternoon.
The propeller City of New York, which was laden with supplies and ord-
nance stores, grounded on the bar, and proved a total loss. Her officers
and crew clung to the rigging until the next day, when they were rescued by
surf-boats sent to their assistance. One of the troop-vessels also grounded
on the bar, after nightfall, and it seemed for a time as if she and her precious
cargo would be lost. Some gallant volunteers went to her relief with a tug-
REAR-ADMIRAL GOLDSBOROUGH. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
THE BURN SIDE EXPEDITION. 66 s
boat, which succeeded in getting her off the bar and into the harbor. The water
and coal vessels did not approach the inlet, but went to sea as a matter of safety.
Such of the vessels as were of too heavy draught to pass over the bar anchored
under the protection of the cape. From one of these vessels, two officers, Col-
onel Joseph W. Allen and Surgeon Frederick A. Weller, of the 9th New Jersey,
started in a surf -boat to report to me. They succeeded in reaching my headquar-
ters, but on their return the boat was swamped by the breakers on the bar, and
they were lost. ^ The crew, who were more skilled in such service, clung to the
boat and were rescued. Strange to say, these were the only two of our force lost
during the entire voyage and entrance into the inlet, notwithstanding the
gloomy prognostications touching the seaworthiness of the vessels of the fleet.
Besides the propeller, we lost the ship Pocahontas, with over a hundred horses
on board. The gun-boat Zouave was sunk in the inlet after she crossed the bar,
and proved a total loss, but no lives were lost. From the 14th until the 26th
we had terrific weather, and it required the utmost care on the part of the
commanders of the vessels to prevent a general disaster. Many of the vessels
were jiriven from their anchors and grounded on the swash and the bar. Many
collisions occurred, which caused great damage to the fleet. At times it
seemed as if nothing could prevent general disaster. As I before said, the
water and most of the coal vessels were driven to sea by the stress of the
weather, and the entire fleet was for many days on short rations of water.
Much suffering resulted from this, and at one time a flag of distress was
hoisted on many of the vessels in consequence of the want of water. On one
of these dreary days I for a time gave up all hope, and walked to the bow of
the vessel that I might be alone. Soon after, a small black cloud appeared in
the angry gray sky, just above the horizon, and very soon spread so as to cover
the entire canopy, and in a few moments a most copious fall of rain came to
our relief. Signals were given to spread sails to catch the water, and in a
short time an abundance was secured for the entire fleet. I was at once
cheered up, but was very much ashamed of the distrust which I had allowed
to get the mastery of me.
From time to time we made efforts to cross the fleet from the inlet into
Pamlico Sound, over what was called the swash, which separated it from the
inlet. We had been led to believe that there were eight feet of water upon
the swash, but when we arrived we discovered to our sorrow that there were
but six feet ; and as most of our vessels, as well as the vessels of the naval
% The loss of these officers occasioned profound Deputy Quartermaster-General, where his energies
gloom throughout New Jersey, and especially at were devoted to the forwarding of troops. When
Trenton, where the colonel was widely known and asked if he could look at his family and still say,
esteemed. Colonel Joseph W. Allen was horn in "Country first," he replied : " In these times every
Bristol, Pa., in 1811. He had been for many man must say, 'Country first,' and that for the
years a citizen of New Jersey, residing at Borden- sake of his family." An evidence of the attachment
town. Educated as a civil engineer, he had exe- and respect of his comrades is furnished in the
cuted with signal ability many important works, monument erected to his memory by the officers
including numerous railroad enterprises. He had of his regiment two years after his death. Sur-
been prominently identified with political affairs, geon Weller was born at Paterson in 1817, and was
and for six years had represented his county in agentleman of greatintelligence and private worth,
the State Senate. From the firing upon Fort and his death was widely mourned. — Condensed
Sumter he gave all his thoughts and his time to the from "New Jersey and the Eebellion," by John
cause of the Union, at first in the position of Y. Foster.
666
THE BURN SIDE EXPEDITION.
fleet which we found at Hatteras Inlet on our arrival, drew more water than
that, it was necessary to deepen the channel by some process. The current
upon the swash was very swift, a circumstance which proved to be much in
our favor. Large vessels were sent ahead, under full steam, on the bar when
the tide was running out, and then anchors were carried out by boats in
advance, so as to hold the vessels in position. The swift current would wash
GENERAL BURNSIDE'S HEADQUARTERS, ROANOKE ISLAND. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
the sand from under them and allow them to float, after which they were
driven farther on by steam and anchored again, when the sand would again
wash out from under them. This process was continued for days, until a
broad channel of over eight feet was made, deep enough to allow the passage
of the fleet into the sound. On the 26th, one of our largest steamers got
safely over the swash and anchored in the sound, where some of the gun-boats
had preceded them. By the 4th of February the entire fleet had anchored
and had passed into the sound, and orders were given for the advance on
Roanoke Island. Detailed instructions were given for the landing of the
troops and the mode of attack.
At an early hour on the morning of the 5th the start was made. The naval
vessels, under Commodore Gi-oldsborough, were in advance and on the flanks.
The sailing vessels containing troops were taken in tow by the steamers.
There were in all sixty-five vessels. The fleet presented an imposing appear-
ance as it started up the sound. The day was most beautiful, and the sail
was enjoyed beyond measure by the soldiers, who had long been so penned
up in the desolate inlet. At sundown, signal was given to come to anchor
within ten miles of Roanoke Island. At 8 o'clock the next morning the
signal to weigh anchor was given, but our progress was very much retarded
by a gale that sprung up ; so we anchored, but very little in advance of our
position of the night before. During that night all lights were carefully
concealed. The naval vessels were well out in advance to protect the trans-
ports from the inroads of the rebel gun-boats.
THE BURNSIDE EXPEDITION.
667
GENERAL BURNSIDE AT THE CONFEDERATE COTTON BATTERY ON THE WHARF, NEW BERNE.
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
On the morning; of the 7th the gun-boats passed inside the narrow passage
known as Roanoke Sound, and were soon abreast of the lower part of Roa-
noke Island. Soon after the naval fleet had passed through, the transport
fleet began its passage. The rebel gun-boats were seen close inshore under
the batteries of the island. At half-past 10 o'clock a signal gun was fired
from one of the forts, announcing our approach. At half-past 11, one of
the naval vessels opened fire, which was replied to by the rebels. Signals
were given by the commodore of the fleet to begin the action. By noon
the firing became rapid, and soon after, the engagement became general. The
rebels had driven a line of piles across the main channel to obstruct the
progress of our vessels, leaving a narrow space for themselves to retreat
through ; and as our naval vessels pressed them, they availed themselves of
this means of safety. - Our guns soon got the range of their batteries, and, by
most extraordinary skill and rapidity of firing, almost silenced them. Just
before noon I ordered a reconnoissance by a small boat, with the view of
ascertaining a point of landing. A young negro, who had escaped from the
island on our arrival at Hatteras Inlet, had given me most valuable informa-
tion as to the nature of the shore of the island, from which I had determined
that our point of landing should be at Ashby's Harbor, which was nearly
midway up the shore. [See map, p. 611.]
At 1 o'clock, the quarters of the garrison in one of the forts were fired by
one of our shells. The rebel gun-boats retired up the sound, but still contin-
ued a brisk fire as they were followed by our vessels. Orders were given for
the troops to land at 3 o'clock. The ground in the rear of Ashby's Harbor
was cleared by shells from the naval vessels, and our large surf -boats were
668 THE BURNSIDE EXPEDITION.
lowered, rapidly filled with troops, and towed up in long lines by light-draught
vessels until they came near to the shore of the harbor, when each of the
surf-boats was cut loose and steered for the shore. There was no obstruction
to their landing. In less than an hour 4000 troops were ashore, and before
midnight the entirej force was landed, with the exception of one regiment,
which was landed on the morning of the 8th. The advance of our troops
was ordered on this morning, General Foster being in the advance and
center, General Reno on the left, and General Parke on the right. Just above
Ashby's Harbor the island from shore to shore was marshy, swampy ground.
A causeway had been built up the center of the island, and on this, about
one mile and a half from the harbor, was a fort, which was flanked by what
seemed to be impassable ground ; but it did not prove to be so to our troops.
General Poster pressed the rebels in front, General Reno passed around the left
with his brigade, often waist-deep in the marsh, through almost impenetrable
thickets, until he gained the right flank of the enemy's line. General Parke
performed equally good service on the right, and after advantageous positions
had been obtained, the work was carried by a simultaneous assault, and
from that time there was no hindrance to the march of our troops to the
head of the island and to the forts on the shore, where the entire garrison
was captured. The naval fleet pursued the rebel gun-boats, nearly all of
which, however, were destroyed by their crews, to prevent capture. The
results of this important victory were great, particularly in inspiring the
confidence of the country in the efficiency of its armies in the field.
The troops enjoyed their rest at Roanoke Island, but were not allowed to
remain idle long. On the 26th of February, orders were given to make
arrangements to embark for New Berne, and within four days they were all on
board. On the 12th of March, the entire command was anchored off the mouth
of Slocum's Creek, and about fourteen miles from New Berne. The approach
to the city had been obstructed by piles and sunken vessels. About four
miles from New Berne a large fort on the shore had been built, with a heavy
armament, and a line of earth- works extended from the fort inland a distance
of some two miles, wmere it ended in almost impassable ground.
On the night of the 12th, orders were given for landing, and on the morn-
ing of the 13th the troops were put ashore, in very much the same way that
they had been at Roanoke. By 1 o'clock the debarkation was finished, and
the troops were put in line of march. About this time the rain began to fall,
and the road became almost impassable. No ammunition could be carried
except what the men themselves could carry. No artillery could be taken
except the small howitzers, which were hauled by the troops with drag-ropes.
This was one of the most disagreeable and difficult marches that I witnessed
during the war. We came in contact with the enemy's pickets just before
dark, when it was decided to delay the attack until morning. That night a
most dreary bivouac followed. Early the next morning, notwithstanding the
fog, the disposition for the attack was made. General Foster was ordered to
engage the enemy on the right, General Reno to pass around on the extreme
left, and General Parke to occupy the center. We were much nearer to the
THE BURNSIDE EXPEDITION.
669
enemy than we expected, and were soon in contact with them. General Fos-
ter rapidly closed with them, and met with severe resistance. He asked for
reinforcements, but was told that every man had been ordered into action,
and that there were 110 reserves. The contest was sharp, but brief. The 4th
Rhode Island broke the enemy's line near where it crossed the railroad, after
which the enemy wavered, and a general
advance of our whole line placed us in
possession of the works. The enemy
fled to New Berne, burning the bridge
behind them. Our troops rapidly pur-
sued,' but the fact that they had to cross
the river in boats prevented them from
capturing the main body of the enemy.
As it was, large numbers of prisoners
and munitions fell into our hands. In
the meantime the naval vessels had
worked their way up to the city and
aided in the transportation of the troops
across, and New Berne was occupied on
the afternoon of the 14th.
It still remained for us to reduce Fort
colonel zEBui.oN- b. vance, goveknor of north Macon, Beaufort. To this work General
CAROLINA, 1862-5 ; AT THE BATTLE OF NEW BERNE, IN T> ,1 ) "U »" A < 1 > r\ TMlO^rmn
command of the 26th north Carolina regiment, r arke s brigade was orciereoi. j-iie coun-
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH. ^ between NeW Beme &n& Beaufort
was immediately occupied, and a passage by hand-car was made between
the two places, all the rolling-stock having been run off the road. By the
morning of the 11th of April regular siege operations had been begun by
General Parke and were pressed rapidly forward, and by the 26th of April
the garrison at Beaufort had been forced to surrender.
Thus another victory was to be inscribed upon our banner. The Rhode
Island troops bore a most honorable part in this conflict. After that, sev-
eral small expeditions were sent into the interior of the country, all of which
were successful.
Much to my sorrow, on the 3d of the following July I was ordered to go to
the Peninsula to consult with General McCleUan, and after that my duties as
commanding officer in North Carolina ended ; but a large proportion of the
troops of the expedition served under me during the remainder of the war, as
members of the gallant Ninth Corps.
The Burnside expedition has passed into history; its record we can be
proud of. No body of troops ever had more difficulties to overcome in the
same space of time. Its perils were both by land and water. Defeat never
bofll it. No gun was lost by it. Its experience was a succession of honor-
victories.
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT ROANOKE ISLAND AND
NEW BERNE, N. C.
The composition, losses, ami strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official
Records. K stands for killed ; w for wounded ; in w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing ; c for captured.
THE UNION FORCES.
ARMY.— Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside.
NAVY.— Flaff-Officer L. M. Goldsborough.
TROOPS. — First 'Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John G. Foster:
10th Conn., Col. Charles L. Russell (k at Roanoke), Lieut. -
Col. Albert W. Drake; 23d Mass., Col. John Kurtz; 24th
Mass., Col. Thomas G. Stevenson; 25th Mass., Col. Edwin
Upton ; 27th Mass., Col. Horace C. Lee. Brigade loss:
Roanoke, k, 19 ; w, 113 = 132. New Berne, k, 37; w, 145 =
182. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Jesse L. Reno: 21st
Mass., Lieut.-Col. Alberto C. Maggi (at Roanoke), Lieut.-
Col. William S. Clark (at New Berne); 9th N. J., Lieut.-
Col. Charles A. Heckman; 51st N. Y., Col. Edward Fer-
rero; 51st Pa., Col. John F. Hartranft. Brigade loss:
Roanoke, k, 15; w, 79; m, 13 = 107. New Berne, k, 30; w,
169 = 199. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John G. Parke: 8th
Conn., Col. Edward Harland; 11th Conn, (not at Roa-
noke), Lieut.-Col. Charles Mathewson ; 9th N. Y. (not at
New Berne), Col. Rush C. Hawkins; 4th R. I., Col. Isaac
P. Rodman; 5th R. I. (1st Battalion), Maj. John Wright.
Brigade loss : Roanoke, w, 17. New Berne, k, 21 ; w, 58 =
79. Unassigned : Detachment 1st N. Y. Marine Artillery,
Col. William A. Howard; Co. B, 99th N. Y. (Union Coast
Guard), Lieut. Charles W. Tillotson (c at New Berne).
Unassigned loss: Roanoke Island, k, 2; w, 5 = 7.
New Berne, k, 2; w, 8; m, 1 =11.
division of armed vessels, Capt. S. F. Hazard :
Picket, Capt. T. P. Ives; Videlle, Capt, John L. Foster ;
Hussar, Capt. Frederick Crocker ; Lancer, Capt. M.
B. Morley ; Ranger, Capt. Samuel Emerson; Chasseur,
Capt. John West ; Pioneer, Capt. Charles E. Baker.
[Only the Picket appears to have been used offensively
in the attack on New Berne.]
naval division, Commanders. C. Rowan:
Philadelphia (flag-steamer), Acting Master Com. Silas
Reynolds; Stars and Stripes, Lieut. -Com. Reed Werden ;
Louisiana, Lieut. -Com. A.Murray; Hetzel, Lieut. -Com.
H. K. Davenport ; Underwriter, Lieut. -Com. William N.
Jeffers (at Roanoke), Lieut.-Com. A. Hopkins (at New
Berne) ; Delaware, Lieut.-Com. S. P. Quackeubush ; Com-
modore Perry, Lieut.-Com. C. W. Flusser; Valley City,
Lieut.-Com. J. C. Chaplin ; Commodore Barney, Acting
Lieut.-Com. R. T. Reushaw ; Hunchback, Acting Vol.
Lieut.-Com. E. R. Colhouu ; South field (flag-steamer tem-
porarily at Roanoke), Acting Vol. Lieut. Com. C. F. W.
Behm ; Morse", Acting Master Com. Peter Hayes ; White-
head (at Roanoke), Acting Master Com. Charles A.
French ; Lockwood, Acting Master Com. G. W. Graves ;
Brinker, Acting Master Com. John E. Giddings ; Sey-
mour (at Roanoke), Acting Master Com. F. S. Wells ;
Ceres (at Roanoke), Acting Master Com. John McDiar-
mid; Putnam (at Roanoke), Acting Master Com. W. J.
Hotchkiss ; Shawsheen (at Roanoke), Acting Master
Com. Thomas J. Woodward ; Granite (at Roanoke), Act-
ing Master's Mate Com. E. Boomer.
The batteries of the Union vessels at Roanoke Island
and New Berne were as follows: Philadelphia, 2 twelve-
pounders ; Stars and Stripes, 4 eight-inch, 1 twenty-
pounder rifle, 2 twelve-pounders; Louisiana, 1 eight
inch, 3 thirty-two- pounders, 1 twelve-pounder ; Hetzel,
1 nine-inch, 1 eighty-pounder rifle; Underwriter, l
eight-inch, 1 eighty-pounder rifle, 2 twelve-pounders ;
Delaware, 1 nine-inch, 1 thirty-two pounder, 1 twelve-
pounder; Commodore Perry, 1 one-hundred-pounder
rifle, 4 nine-inch, 1 twelve-pounder ; Valley City, 4 thirty-
two-pounders, 1 twelve-pounder ; Commodore Barney,
4 nine-inch, 1 thirty-two-pounder. 1 twelve-pounder;
Hunchback, 3 nine-inch, 1 one-hundred-pounder rifle;
South field, 3 nine-inch, 1 one-hundred-pounder rifle;
Morse, 2 nine-inch; Whitehead, 1 nine-inch; Lockwood,
1 eighty-pounder rifle, 2 twelve-pounders; Henry
Brinker, 1 thirty -pounder rifle; Seymour, 1 thirty-
pounder rifle, 1 twelve-pounder ; Ceres, 1 thirty-pounder
rifle, l thirty-two-pouuder ; Putnam, 1 twenty-pounder
rifle, 1 thirty-two-pounder ; Shawsheen, 2 twenty-pounder
rifles; Granite, 1 thirty-two-pounder.
The total Union loss at Roanoke Island was 37 killed,
214 wounded, and 13 missing = 264 ; and at New Berne 90
killed, 380 wounded, and 1 missing = 471. At the former
place the navy lost (exclusive of details from the army) 3
killed and 11 wounded, and at the latter place 4 wounded.
THE CONFEDERATE FORCES.
roanoke island, Brig.-Gen. Henry A. Wise, Col. H.
M. Shaw (c), second in command.
Troops: 2d N. C. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Wharton J.
Green; 8th N. C, Col. H. M. Shaw; 17th N. C. (3 co's),
Maj. G. H. Hill; 31st N. C, Col. John V. Jordan; 46th
Va., Maj. H. W. Fry; 59th Va., Lieut.-Col. Frank P.
Anderson.
naval forces, Flag-Officer William F. Lynch :
Sea-Bird (flag-steamer), Lieut.-Com. Patrick McCar-
rick; Curlew, Com. Thomas T. Hunter; Ellis, Lieut.-
Com. J. W. Cooke ; Beaufort, Lieut.-Com. W. H. Parker;
Raleigh, Lieut.-Com. J. W. Alexander; Fanny, Mid-
shipman Tayloe ; Forrest, Lieut.-Com. James L. Hoole
(w). The Sea-Bird was armed with 1 thirty-two-pounder
smooth-bore and 1 thirty -pounder rifle. The other vessels
carried each 1 thirty-two-pounder rifle.
The total loss of the Confederate army is reported at
23 killed, 58 wounded, 62 missing, and about 2500 cap-
tured. The loss of the navy was 6 wounded.
new berne, Brig. -Gen. L. O'B. Branch.
Troops : 7th N. C, Col. R P. Campbell (commanded
the right wing), Lieut.-Col. E. G. Haywood ; 19th N. C.
(cavalry), Col. S. B. Spruill ; 26th N. C, Col. Zebulon B.
Vance; 27th N. C, Maj. John A. Gilmer, Jr. ; 28th N. C,
Lieut.-Col. Thomas L. Lowe; 33d N. C, Col. Clark M.
Avery (c), Lieut.-Col. R. F. Hoke ; 35th N. C, Col. James
Sinclair; 37th N. C, Col. Charles C. Lee (commanded the
left wing), Lieut.-Col. William M. Barbour; Company N.
C. Heavy Artillery, Captain C. C. Whitehurst ; Special
Battalion N. C. Militia, Col. H. J. B. Clark; N. C.
Batteries, Capts. T. H. Brem and A. C. Latham.
The total Confederate loss was 64 killed, 101 wounded,
413 captured or missing = 578. Branch says of the missing,
" About 200 are prisoners and the remainder at home."
There is no definite statement in the Official Records of the numbers engaged on either side, and the returns
furnish no satisfactory basis for an estimate.
670
^Ssii
HOSPITAL. FORT WALKER.
MONITOR "WEEHAWKEN."
POPE'S HOUSE OLD HEADQUARTERS.
NEW HEADQUARTERS AND STORES.
GENERAL VIEW OF HILTON HEAD IN 1863. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION..!
BY DANIEL AMMEN, REAR-ADMIRAL. IT. 8. N.
-.
1,
UNION POST-OFFICE, HILTON HEAD.
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
A FTEE the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln as Presi-
il dent of the United States, in March, 1861, a
painful lethargy seemed to pervade every branch of
the Administration, while the South was arming and
organizing with extraordinary activity for the avowed
pmpose of destroying the Government, which appar-
ently supinely awaited that event. The attack on
Fort Sumter broke the spell, after which an almost frantic energy mani-
fested itself at the North in raising troops and in the purchase and arma-
ment of vessels to blockade the thousands of miles of Southern coasts.
Naturally, the Navy Department sought the advice of Professor Alexander
D. Bache, Superintendent of the Coast Survey, and it was at his suggestion
that the department secured a board of conference composed of Captain S. F.
Du Pont, of the Navy, as President, and Major J. (1. Barnard, U. S. Engi-
neers, Professor Bache,and Commander Charles H. Davis, LT. S. Navy, as
members.
In a private letter Captain Du Pont wrote, on the 1st of June : " It may be
that I shall be ordered to Washington on some temporary duty, on a board
to arrange a programme of blockade — first suggested by Professor Bache."
The first memoir of the conference in the confidential letter-book of the Navy
Department is written in pencil, has many erasures and interlineations, and
is evidently the original draft of a paper, probably referred and never
returned. It closes as follows :
" Finally, we will repeat the remark made in the beginning of this report, that we think the
expedition to Fernandina should be undertaken simultaneously with a similar expedition having
a purely military character. We are preparing a brief report on the latter, which we shall have
the honor to submit in a few da vs."
/Recently, the private correspondence of Ad-
miral Du Pont has been kindly put within the
scope of my researches, and his very clear and
precise reports of the Port Royal expedition have
been carefully examined, together with the reports
of officers commanding vessels, the log-books of
most of the ships engaged, and other documentary
evidence. No labor has been spared in verifying
the events narrated, notwithstanding that my
presence throughout our operations, in command of
the gun-boat Seneca, gave me an intelligent per-
sonal view of the whole subject. — D. A.
671
672
^ONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
A carefully
the question o
one section, am
afterward the lii
*ed memoir, evidently the third, dated July 16th, discusses
ade of the coast from Cape Henry to Cape Romain in
thence to Cape Florida in another section. These were
the North and South Atlantic blockading squadrons.
A fourth report, aated July 26th, in treating of the methods to be employed
in carrying out the blockade, states :
" Our .second rueruoir, in which we discussed the occupation of Bull's Bay, St. Helena Sound,
and Port Royal Bay, has left us little to say on the first of those subsections. When the three
anchorages above mentioned are secured, the whole of this part of our coast will be under com-
plete control. But you are better aware
than ourselves of the favorable manner in
which our foreign political relations woidd
be affected by the possession of one or more
of the three points, the seizure of which was
the topic of the second memoir. ^> A pre-
ceding discussion would be incomplete, if we
were not to repeat at the conclusion that an
inland passage from Savannah to Fernan-
dina, long used by steamboats drawing five
feet of water, unites in one common interest
and intercourse all the bays, sounds, rivers,
and inlets of which we have given little more
than the names. A superior naval force
must command the whole of this division of
the coast."'
On July 25th, Captain Du Pont
wrote :
" They have our memoirs, and, Mr. Fox
tells me, are at them. We are to see the
Secretary, Mr. Welles, to-night, at our re-
quest, to talk over our labors." . . . [July
26th.] " Last night our conference had a
meeting with the Secretary of the Navy and
Mr. Fox, when the subject of the expeditions
was entered into. The Cabinet bad our papers again." [July 28th.] " I sat up last night in the
Navy Department until eleven, with Charles Davis, to prepare for this meeting, by condensing
into notes the pith of our reports, and to read them to the board when called upon ; but General
Meigs seemed to desire that our full reports should be read, which I could not, of course,
ask to be done, without seeming to attach too much importance to them. General Scott said
at the conclusion, they were of singular ability, and he adopted every word of them ; and
General Totten told me there was not a criticism made. The meeting consisted of General
Scott, General Totten, General Meigs, Colonel T. W. Sherman, Captain H. G. Wright, of the
Engineers, and Colonel Cullum, aide-de-camp to the general."
Memoirs dated August 9th, September 2d and 3d, follow, giving a discus-
sion of the blockade on the west coast of Florida, and to the border of Mexico.
A memoir dated September 12th discusses a proposition submitted from the
department in relation to the taking of Fort Macon, which closes as follows :
" We beg leave to observe that here, and in all our previous reports and memoirs, we have
confined ourselves to the treatment of cases, more or less special or general, connected with, and
% As it referred to a purely militai'y expedition, this memoir was probably referred to the War
Department, since it is not in the confidential files of the Navy Department. — D. A.
BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS W. SHERMAN.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
673
tending to promote, the efficiency and activity of the blockade of the
Southern shores. We have not entered upon the exclusive considera-
tion of the great military expeditions alone; we have treated mixed
expeditions compounded of military and naval operations, and re-
quiring combined naval and military action."
Iii the above extracts we can note the inception
of the Port Royal expedition, so ably executed and
so important in its results, as well as the crea-
tion of a systematic plan of blockade, practi-
cally extending from Cape Hatteras to the
Rio Grande. It seems just to the memory
of the late Rear- Admiral Dn Pont and
his associates in the conference, all of
whom have passed away, to present
these important facts in a substan-
tial and reliable form.
The early attempts at blockad-
coast from Hatteras to Florida
the necessity of the occupa-
many Southern ports as
blockade from within a
ing the
revealed
tion of as
possible. A
harbor may be
or more ships
and uncertainty
exterior blockade,
maintained beyond
guns of an enemy in
the adjacent coasts. Even
blockading the two < 'li-
the Cape Fear River were
prevent the frequent arrival
parture of blockade-runners.
The only possible policy for the
Navy Department was to secure the
cooperation of the army. And after
a well-outlined preliminary agreement.
General Thomas W. Sherman, on the 2d
of August, 1861, was directed "to proceed
immediately to New York and organize, in
connection with Captain Du Pont, of the navy,
an expedition of twelve thousand men. Its des-
tination," said his orders, "you and the naval com-
mander will determine after you have sailed."
A dozen or more small gun-boats were then under
construction in the Northern States on contract, and
vessels of every size, from a canal steamboat to the
VOL. I. 43
made effective by one
without the fatigue
attendant upon an
which must be
the range of the
possession of
thirty vessels
trances to
unable to
and de-
674 DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
largest coasting steamers, were purchased and fitted with batteries, shell-
rooms, and magazines, both for this expedition and to supply the general
wants of the service in establishing and maintaining the most extended and
effective blockade ever known in history. Under date of August 22d, 1861,
Captain Du Pont wrote from New York :
" We drove where several of the purchased vessels were being altered, and examined the
Alabama, Augusta, and Stars and Stripes. But, alas ! it is like altering a vest into a shirt to con-
vert a trading steamer into a man-of-war. Except that there is a vessel and a steam-engine, all
else is inadaptable ; but there is no help for it — the exigency of the blockade demands it."
[August 23d.] " The Tuscarora (new steam sloop-of-war) was launched at Philadelphia yester-
day. She was built in fifty-eight days, and thoroughly built too. Her keel was growing in
Sussex county, Delaware, seventy days ago."
On the 19th of October, 1861, eighty days after the date of the order to
General Sherman above quoted, Flag-Officer Du Pont (as officers in command
of squadrons were then styled) left New York on board of the steam-frigate
Wabash, followed by numerous men-of-war, among which were four small
vessels, the Unadilla, Ottawa, Pembina, and Seneca, built in great haste and
called " ninety-day gun-boats," as the contract had required their completion
within that time. Other vessels purchased and improvised for war purposes
proceeded when ready to Hampton Roads, where the large troop transports
had already congregated, as well as war vessels, regular, irregular, and defective.
Among them were ferry-boats and the old steamer Governor, never in her best
days adapted to a sea voyage, on board of which were six hundred marines,
sent as a force to operate speedily and without embarrassment in conjunction
with naval vessels. Twenty-five chartered schooners, laden with coal, were
also on hand, and, after being partially lightened by filling the bunkers of the
squadron, were sent to sea under convoy of the sailing sloop Vandalia the
day before the departure of the fleet.
On the morning of the 29th of October, the vessels of war and the army
transports of all classes steamed outside and formed in order of sailing,
which was the double echelon. The reader may know that this is in the
shape of an inverted V, the leading vessel being the point, and the other
vessels stretching out in lines but heading in a common direction. Our proc-
ess of formation was not complete when the gun-boat Unadilla became dis-
abled, and the signal was made to take her in tow. Our rate of speed was
quite slow, due to a head-wind, and to the varied character of the vessels
composing the fleet, which was larger than was ever before commanded by
an American officer. Cape Hatteras, little more than a hundred miles from
Cape Henry, was not reached until 1 o'clock on the morning of the 31st,
when two of the heavier transports struck slightly on the shoals, which
caused all of us to make for the south-east ; and soon after, when south of
the cape, we bore away. The wind had hauled more to the eastward before
we reached Hatteras, and that, with a rough sea, had caused considerable
indraught ; and the drift from the action of the wind on the large hulls, added
to our low speed, had set us considerably to leeward.
Hatteras is known to navigators as being subject to great and sudden
DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
67
changes in the weather : there are few nights in the year when lightning
cannot be seen from the top of the light-house, usually to seaward, over the
Gulf Stream, which here approaches nearer to the coast than at any other
point. An ocean depth of 2000 fathoms or more stretches almost in a direct
line from the low sand islands east of Nassau to within a distance of 12 miles
of the cape ; from the shore the
water deepens very rapidly to 100
fathoms, and then falls abruptly
to a depth of 2500 fathoms. This
great depth, so near the land,
and the Gulf Stream sweeping
even nearer, are the probable
causes of the sudden and violent
changes of the weather there
prevailing, which were discussed
in one of the memoirs of the
conference.
On rounding the cape, the wind
gradually rose, the sea became
heavy, a dull leaden sky shut
out the light, and not long after
midday there were assurances of
a south-east gale. About 2:30
p. m. the weather was so rough
that signal was made from the
flag-ship to commanders of ves-
sels to disregard the order of sailing and take care of their individual
commands.
In order to make the best of our way, and the better to avoid collisions
with other vessels of the fleet, the Seneca was kept on the port tack, and
" hove to," barely turning the engines, the vessel being under close-reefed
fore and main sails. Had she been square-rigged, the other tack would have
been necessary to her safety. In the drifting mists and rain, it soon grew
dark. The greater part' of that night I stood under the lee of the weather
bulwark, near the wheel, casting glances to windward, to be in readiness to
bear away should a vessel be seen coming down upon us. It was a long,
weary, and anxious night. On peering to windward, the rain-drops pelted the
face like sleet, and the phosphorescent spray broke over us in superlative
grandeur. At 3 o'clock I observed what had been an object of watchfulness —
an arch rising in the west, precursor of a sudden change of wind. The
mainsail was lowered, and when the squall struck us the foresheet was shifted
over. At 9 or 10 a. m. the gale had abated greatly, and the flag-ship was well
under our lee ; we then wore ship and were soon in her wake. Later in the
day several other vessels fell into line.
We will now note the actual losses from the gale, that became known to us
some days later. The Isaac Smith was disabled and her commander forced
REAR-ADMIRAL SAMUEL F. DU PUNT. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
676
DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
UNION GUN-BOAT " SENECA," CAPTAIN DANIEL AMMEN'S VESSEL AT PORT ROYAL. FI!OM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
to throw his battery overboard, with the exception of one 30-ponnder rifle, to
enable him to go to the assistance of the Governor, which foundered at sea.
The Young Mover, fortunately coming up, was able to signal to the sailing
frigate Sabine in the distance, and, after most strenuous exertions, the marine
battalion and crew of the Governor, with the exception of seven who were lost,
were transferred to the Sabine. Of the army transports, the Peerless, laden
with stores, went down, the crew being rescued by the Mohican. The steamers
Belvidere, Union, and Osceola, having army stores on board, but no troops,
either sank or never reached their destination. The large army transport Win-
field Scott was so disabled that she never left Port Royal harbor after entering.
The morning of November 3d was a bright Sunday, with a moderate breeze
and a smooth sea. Several others of the small steamers with the Seneca were
following in the wake of the flag-ship. In obedience to signal, I went on board
that vessel, and received orders to be delivered to Captain Lardner of the Sus-
quehanna, the senior officer blockading Charleston, distant about thirty miles.
These directed certain vessels to rendezvous off Port Royal entrance, but not
to leave the line of blockade until after nightfall. No sooner was the Seneca
fairly in sight of Sumter than the signal guns were fired, to announce the
arrival of the avant-courier of the fleet that they knew was intended for
the attack of Port Royal. After passing Bull's Bay, I had the belief that we
were bound for Port Royal, but no actual knowledge of the fact until going
on board of the Wabash, as my orders were marked "Confidential — not to
be opened unless separated from the flag-ship." At the very time we were
weathering the gale, the following telegram was sent :
" Richmond, Nov. 1, '61. Gov. Pickens, Columbia, S. C. I have just received information,
which I consider entirely reliable, that the enemy's expedition is intended for Port Royal.
J. P. Benjamin, Acting Secretary of War."
The same telegram was sent to Generals Drayton and Ripley, command-
ing respectively at Port Royal and Charleston.
It was a charming mild afternoon when I stepped on the deck of the Sus-
quehanna. Captain Lardner was delighted with his orders, and, after giving
DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
077
liim such information as would be of interest, I obtained permission to
go np to the entrance to the swash channel, which was well known to
me previously, when sounding out the bar on Coast Survey duty. After
the sun went down, all the vessels designated left the line of blockade,
proceeding, like ourselves, to the entrance of Port Royal harbor, some
sixty miles away. Following the seven-fathom curve, the Seneca rounded
the shoal lying east of the main channel, known as " Martin's Industry," at
early daylight, and soon after found a small black barrel-buoy, which, we
rightly conjectured, had been put there by the enemy. An hour after sunrise,
aided by the refraction, the tops of the pine-trees on both sides of the head-
lands were plainly in sight, although twelve miles off. At that hour the
flag-ship Wabash was at anchor with several other vessels about two miles
distant, and the eastern horizon was flecked
with approaching vessels. We steamed
out to the flag-ship at a later hour, re-
ported the finding of the barrel-buoy, and
were informed that the entrance would
soon be sounded out. About noon, Cap-
tain C. A. Boutelle, in the Coast Survey
steamer Vixen, with the gun-boats Pair-
nee, Ottawa, Pevnbina, Curlew, and Seneca,
crossed the bar and went far enough in
to have a good view of the faces and
embrasures of the earth-works that we
were soon to engage, the one on Hilton
Head known as Fort Walker and the
other on Bay Point as Fort Beauregard. &
After the surveying steamer had planted
some buoys, to serve as general guides,
the four gun-boats last named anchored
in the channel some distance apart, as
additional guides, the one farthest in being
some three miles from Fort Beauregard, the Vixen and the Pawnee going out
to pilot the vessels across the bar. This was done without delay ; all of
them that came in had no more than eighteen feet draught. They anchored
a mile or so outside of the gun-boats, and from the shoal ground to seaward.
Near sunset three steamers came outside of the headlands and fired at our
gun-boats at long range. The steamers were under the command of Josiah
Tattnall, a commodore in the Confederate service, who had been a distinguished
officer of our navy, and had resigned some time before, on the secession of
Georgia, of which State he was a citizen. His vessels were river boats ; as
men-of-war they were in every respect of the most vulnerable class. The four
advanced gun-boats of our squadron got under way, pivoted their heavy
shell-guns over the starboard bow, and headed to the westward so as to bring
■&On Nov. 15th, 1861, General T. W. Sherman changed the name of Fort Walker to Fort Welles
(after Secretary Welles), and of Fort Beauregard to Fort Seward (after the Secretary of State).
SLOOP OF WAR "VANDALIA," REAR SHIP OF THE
LINE AT PORT ROVAL.
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
678
DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
Sfi ♦ Confed-VessHs
jz. 0o«o
V 3 lfe
-V
v
*jr
•if
-«ur
^o-
>
v,w-
r.
''-.-1- I
* %**
+*♦♦
their guns to bear. This course
with that of the enemy would
soon have brought Tattnall's
steamers in unpleasant proxim-
ity, and in consequence they
turned abruptly, passed between
the headlands, and disappeared
in the distance.
Soon after sunrise the next
day, three steamers commanded
by Tattnall made their appear-
ance in like manner. It so hap-
pened that General H. GT. Wright,
of the army, and Captain John
Rodgers, of the navy, had gone
on board of the Ottawa, under
the instructions of their com-
manding officers, to make a
reconnoissance of the forts, and
had brought within supporting
distance the Pawnee, carrying
a heavy battery, and the Isaac
Smith, carrying one 30-pounder
rifle. They were approaching
when Tattnall was pretty well
out, and had opened fire on the
smaller gun-boats. Signal was
made to the Seneca, Pembina,
and Curlew to follow the movements of the Ottawa, and we went in, follow-
ing Tattnall's steamers, then in retreat, and firing on them, until we were
nearly on an air-line between the two earth-works before named. They
opened fire on us, at rather too long a range for effective work, with smooth-
bore guns ; several rifles were also used by the forts, as well as by the Con-
federate vessels. One of our shells blew up a caisson in Fort Beauregard,
and we soon became fairly informed of the number of the enemy's guns bear-
ing on the entrance, and in a measure as to their caliber. On signal, we went
out of action and anchored, without having received any material damage ; the
rigging of all of the vessels was cut more or less. After seven bells, " when the
sun is over the foreyard," Tattnall's flag-ship Savannah, accompanied by a
steamer, came out on the flats, or shoaler waters, to the westward of the
channel. They flew about somewhat wildly, had considerable headway, and
threw a rifle-shell occasionally, firing " promiscuously," but mostly at the
nearest vessel, which was the Seneca. Her executive officer was directed to
call the eleven-inch pivot gun's crew to quarters and fire a shell at ricochet,
the distance supposed to be about 2500 yards. The gun was at once reported
ready, and the request made to fire at an elevation. Appreciating the fact that
1 M abash
2 SiiAcfuehctnnct
«3 Mohicctrt,
4 •SerrvitzoZe
5 Pawnee
f> UnadillcL
7 Ottawa,
6 Petrvhurtct,
B TanoZalia
"Lower? bylsrtac <S>rt itit
Nautical Miles
10 Bienville
11 Settee a
12 Curlew
J.J Fent/utrv
14 A wy listen
15 PoccthorvtcdS
16 R.BJ^or-hes
J7Jlfercu,7y Tzu7
MAP OF THE NAVAL ATTACK AT HILTON HEAD, NOV. 7, 18G1.
DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
679
one rarely does well when not doing what he thinks best, I took the matter per-
sonally in hand, had the gun leveled and trained as desired, and pulled the
lanyard. The huge shell skipped along the surface of a glassy sea, and, as
reported from aloft, struck the vessel abaft the starboard wheel-house. In a
moment the head of the flag-ship was turned for the harbor, and she lost no
time in entering, followed by her consort. It was soon afterward known that
the captain of the vessel had availed himself of the temporary absence of
Tattnall, and had sallied out to have a little diversion, which would have
proved serious had the shell exploded that lodged in the hog-braces.
About the time of this occurrence, the flag-ship Wabash crossed the bar,
followed by all of
the heavy vessels,
including the trans-
ports, and anchored
some two miles out-
side of Fishing Rip
Shoal, some five
miles from the forts,
the bar being about
twelve miles outside
of the headlands.
Very soon after the
flag-ship anchored,
signal was made for
officers commanding
vessels to come aboard. On their arrival, those who commanded vessels detailed
for the main line were invited into the cabin, and instructions were given as
to position and plan of battle ; and afterward those commanding vessels in
the flanking line received their instructions, which differed as to the duties to
be performed after passing within and beyond the earth-works. It was the
intention of the flag-officer at that time to go at once into action, although
the hour would of necessity be late.
The main line was to be on the west or Hilton Head side, in line ahead, and
the vessels one ship's-length apart. The report of the flag-officer states : "The
order of battle comprised a mam squadron ranged in line ahead, and a flank-
ing squadron, which was to be thrown off 011 the northern section of the
harbor to engage the enemy's flotilla, and prevent their raking the rear ships
of the line when it turned to the southward, or cutting off a disabled vessel."
The leading ship of the main squadron was the frigate Wabash, Commander
C. E. P. Rodgers, followed by the frigate Susquehanna, Captain J. L. Lardner;
sloop Mohican, Commander S. W. Codon ; sloop Seminole, Commander J. P.
Grillis ; sloop Pawnee, Lieutenant Commanding R. H. Wyman ; gun-boat
Unadilla, Lieutenant Commanding N. Collins ; gun-boat Ottawa, Lieutenant
Commanding T. H. Stevens; gun-boat Pembina, Lieutenant Commanding J.
P. Bankhead; and the sailing sloop Vandalia, Commander F. S. Haggerty,
towed by the Isaac Smith, Lieutenant Commanding J. W. A. Nicholson. The
UNION GUN-BOAT
MOHAWK," THE GUARD-SHIP AT PORT ROYAL.
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
68o
DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
8
H
Id
id
flanking squadron was led
by the gun-boat Bienville,
Commander Charles Steed-
man, followed by the Seneca,
Lieutenant Commanding
Daniel Ammen ; gun-boat
Curiae, Lieutenant Com-
manding P. G. Watmough ;
gun-boat Penguin, Lieuten-
ant Commanding T. A.
Budd ; and the gun-boat
Augusta, Commander E. Gr.
Parrott.
The plan of attack was
to pass up midway between
Forts Walker and Beaure-
gard, receiving and return-
ing the fire of both, to about
two and one-half miles north
of the forts, then to turn to-
ward and close in with Fort
Walker, encountering it on
its weakest flank, and at the
same time enfilading its two
water faces. While stand-
ing to the southward the
vessels would be head to
tide, with just enough head-
way to preserve the order
of battle in passing the bat-
teries in slow succession,
and to avoid becoming a
fixed mark for the enemy's
fire. On reaching the ex-
tremity of Hilton Head and
the shoal ground making off
from it, the line was to turn
to the north by the east,
and, passing northward, to
engage Fort Walker with
the port battery, but nearer
than on entering. These
evolutions were to be re-
peated. A plan of battle
was sent to the Navy De-
partment. The " New York
DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
68 1
TEX-INCH SHELL GUN WHICH THREW THE OPENING SHOT FROM
THE FLAG-SHIP "WABASH." FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
Herald" of November 20th, 1861, contains a diagram in accord with the
above statement, and was probably taken from the official one. There was
another point in the instructions given by the flag-officer to officers com-
manding vessels in the flanking line that is not mentioned in his report.
He said in substance, if not in words, that, in passing in, the flanking line
was to deliver its fire against the fort on Bay Point, and then to guard the
fleet of transports within the bar from any attempts of Tattnall ; that he knew
him well ; that he had cour-
age and power to plan, and
in the heat of action might
try to run out to destroy the
transports which it was the
special duty of the flanking
squadron to protect ; and
that when Tattnall was dis-
posed of, the vessels would
take an enfilading position
somewhere to the north-
ward of the Hilton Head fort.
After receiving our in-
structions, the officers com-
manding vessels returned without delay to their commands, and made prep-
arations for immediate movement. Soon after, the flag-ship made signal and
got under way, as did all of the men-of-war. The Wabash stood in toward
the forts, and got aground. " In our anxiety to get the outline of the forts
before dark," the flag-officer reported, " we stood in too near to Fishing Eip
Shoal, and the vessel grounded. By the time she was gotten off it was too
late, in my judgment, to proceed, and I made signal for the squadron to
anchor out of gunshot of the enemy." The shoal where the Wabash grounded
was a little short of three miles from the forts. The vessels anchored in
convenient positions for the formation of the lines when signaled, and
were sufficiently inside of the transports to be unembarrassed by them in
forming.
The following day [November 7th] we had a heavy westerly wind. The
report of General Thomas F. Drayton, the Confederate commander, states:
"On the 6th, the fleet and transports, which had increased to about forty-five
sail, would probably have attacked us had not the weather been very boister-
ous." This conjecture was quite right. The flag-officer was impatiently await-
ing the abatement of the wind, and about noon was almost on the point of
going in, but wisely deferred the attack until we could make it without dis-
advantage. Drayton's picturesque report of the engagement continues: "At
last the memorable 7th dawned upon us, bright and serene ; not a ripple upon
the broad expanse of water to disturb the accuracy of fire from the broad
decks of that magnificent armada about advancing, in battle array, to vomit
forth its iron hail, with all the spiteful energy of long-suppressed rage and
conscious strength."
682
DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
*0K JK&&
m^^^^m^^^^-
LUNETTE BATTERY. LUNETTE BATTERY. FORT BEAUREGARD.
BAY POINT AND FORT BEAUREGARD, AFTER CAPTURE. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
On the 7th, as soon as the morning light permitted, signals were made
indicating that we would soon move. The flag-ship was then at anchor near
where she had grounded, nearly three miles from the forts. In consequence
of a hawser fouling her propeller, some delay occurred in forming after the
vessels were under way, and it was 9 o'clock when signal was made for
close order. Tattnall's flotilla at that time was nearly jn line between the
forts. | As we advanced, at 9:26, the forts, as well as the enemy's vessels,
lying right ahead, opened fire on the foremost ships. Soon after, the flag-ship
yawed sufficiently to bring a heavy pivot gun on her bow to bear on Tattnall's
command, which forced him to retreat, as his vessels would soon have been
within reach of our broadside guns. At that time our rate of speed was
about six miles, and we were soon making good use of our batteries ; the
enemy on both sides of the bay had the full benefit of all the shells that both
lines could send with precision. So great was the cannons' roar that it was
distinctly heard at Fernandina, seventy miles away. There was deafening
music in the air, which came from far and near and all around ; heavy
clouds of dust and smoke, due to our bursting shells and the enemy's fire,
partly obscured the earth-works, while our vessels were but dimly seen
through the smoke from their own guns which hung over the water. The log-
book of the flag-ship states : "At 9:45 the Bienville ranged alongside our star-
board beam." This was eighteen minutes after the enemy had opened fire on
the fleet, and eight minutes before the flag-ship ceased firing and turned toward
Hilton Head to repass the fort in heading toward the sea. This was the oppor-
tunity for the Bienville to open wide her throttles : with her great speed, pos-
sibly she might have run down Tattnall's vessels before they could have been
pointed fairly and reached the entrance to Scull Creek. The log-book of the
Bienville states: "At 10:30 the flag-ship winded the line, turning to the
southward, when we engaged for a few minutes three steamers that were
within long range up the river. We soon put them to flight, and then followed
the line in the order of battle, down within close range of the large battery
4 A friend of many years, who was in command of
one of Tattnall's vessels, writes as follows: "There
is one touching incident that I think deserves rec-
ord. When the old hero Tattnall got in good range
of Du Pout's flag-ship, and was about to receive
his fire, he said to the signal quartermaster : 'Dip
my broad pennant to my old messmate,' and it
was dipped thrice. In the confusion it was not
noticed by Du Pont, which I am sure he would
have regretted had he known it." — D. A.
DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
683
on Hilton Head. . . ." The same authority establishes the fact that the
Bienville thereafter, during the engagement, followed in the main line. ^
The report of the Seneca states :
" Ou the morning of the 7th we took position assigned us in the line, and, passing up, deliv-
ered our fire at Bay Point, and on arriving out of the fire of the enemy's batteries, made chase,
as directed by instructions, on the rebel steamers. They, being river boats, soon left us."
The log-book of the same vessel states that when she turned to join in the
attack on Hilton Head, Tattnall's steamers turned also and came toward the
fleet, only retreating when she again steamed toward them, so as to make an
engagement unavoidable should they advance farther. They then entered
the intricate channel to Scull Creek and disappeared behind a wooded point,
after which the Seneca, with other vessels of the flanking line, took up an
enfilading position to the northward of Fort Walker, as previously instructed.
Several vessels of the main line were also delivering an enfilading fire, among
others the Mohican, properly next in the main line to the Susquehanna. G-odon,
who commanded her, was very excitable, and it may be on seeing a strange
vessel ahead in his
line, imagined that
the well-planned at-
tack had been trans-
formed into a "free
fight," and the best
he could do was to
serve his battery well
from the most effect-
ive point he could
take up.
As an exhibition
of physical force, al-
lied to human action,
RIFLE-GUN AT FORT BEAUREGARD. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
j) Rear-Admiral Steedinan sends to the editors the
following explanation of the movements of his ves-
sel: " The Bienville was the leading ship in the flank-
ing or starboard column. After the fleet had
passed into Port Royal Sound, and as the Wabash
was turning to pass out, Tattnall's gun-boats were
seen approaching from the mouth of Scull Creek.
The Bienville was at once pointed in that direction,
and opened fire from the 30-pounder Parrott on
the forecastle. The gun-boats replied with an in-
effectual fire at long range. None of the shots
reached her. A brisk fire was kept up from the
Parrott gun, and as the shells began to fall among
the gun-boats they turned and stood up toward
Scull Creek. Here the Bienville could not safely
follow them, as she drew over sixteen feet and had
neither chart nor pilot for the channel; while
Tattnall's river steamers, with their light draught
and the familiarity of the officers with the waters,
could retreat to a position where the Bienville, in
following them, would almost certainly have taken
the ground. Moreover, the Bienville was within
hail of the flag-ship, and a word from the flag-
officer would have sent her up Broad River had
he desired her to assume the risk. After the sec-
ond turn within the forts, the Wabash was proceed-
ing slowly down, followed by the Susquehanna,
when the Mohican and the vessels astern of her
left the line and took up a position above Fort
Walker. The position enabled these ships to en-
filade the works ; but the movement was a depart-
ure from the order of battle, and it continued, not-
withstanding signals to close up from the flag-ship.
The Bienville took her position astern of the Susque-
hanna, and these two were the only vessels that fol-
lowed the Wabash on her third circuit ; or, to speak
more precisely, on her second passage out and her
third passage in, under the fire of the forts.
" Charles Steedman,
" Rear-Admiral, Retired."
684
DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
FORT WALKER.
FORT BEAUREGARD.
1.— BATTLE OF THE UNION FLEET WITH FORTS WALEEB AND BEAUREGARD. 2.— HOISTING THE STARS
AND STRIPES OVER FORT WALKER. FROM WAR-TIME SKETCHES.
I can conceive nothing more grand than a view of the main deck of the
Wabash on this occasion. The hatches being battened down, a faint light
only came through the ports, as did the flashes from the discharged guns,
which recoiled violently with a heavy thud. As far as the smoke would
DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION. 685
permit, hundreds of men were visible in very rapid motion, loading and
running out the guns with the greatest energy. Such a view, accompanied
by the noise of battle, is weird and impressive to the highest degree.
The vessels in the main line slowly passed toward the sea, throwing their
shells into the earth-work with the utmost precision, and this destruction
was supplemented by the fire of ten of the vessels from an enfilading position.
As the main line headed seaward, the enemy may have had an idea that his
fire was so destructive that the vessels were retreating, and Tattnall, with his
three weak vessels, was then disposed to swoop down and pick up " lame
ducks " ; but, being confronted by one small gun-boat, he thought it best to
enter Scull Creek, where at least he would be available for carrying off the
Southern troops, if they were defeated. Though Tattnall was a brave and
skillful seaman, the law of force was inexorable ; and when an officer is a free
agent, looking only to the success of his cause, he should not lead his command
into destruction without being able to secure a commensurate advantage.
Arriving at the shoal ground off Hilton Head, the flag-ship and her follow-
ers turned again within the harbor, and in passing northward availed them-
selves of the occasion to give Fort Beauregard the benefit of their broadsides.
Meantime the enfilading vessels had been steadily throwing their shells into
Fort Walker. In relation to this hour [about 10 a. m.], General Drayton states :
" Besides this moving battery, the fort was enfiladed by two gun-boats anchored to the north,
off the mouth of Fish Hall Creek, and another at a point on the edge of the shoals to the south.
This enfilading fire, on so still a sea, annoyed and damaged us excessively, particularly as we
had no gun on either flank of the bastion to reply with."
The vessel near the shoal, to the south, was probably the Pocahontas, com-
manded by Percival Drayton, brother of the general in command of the Con-
federate forces ; she only crossed the bar about noon, having been delayed by
deranged machinery.
The main line passed nearer Fort Walker than on entering, and delivered
its fire " with all the spiteful energy of long-suppressed rage and conscious
strength." Arriving at the turning-point, signal was again made to its vessels
to take position, when the Wabash led once more, and to within six hundred
yards of the fort. The nearness of the ships was the probable cause of their
suffering so little damage, the enemy's shots passing over the hulls. The flag-
ship was naturally the most conspicuous target, but the shots received by her
were high up, the enemy presumably delivering his fire for a distance of a
thousand yards or more. At this time a shell was seen to pass between the
flag-officer and the captain of the vessel, who were standing on the " bridge "
extending across the vessel, just forward of the mainmast.
The flag-officer expressed officially his great admiration of the firing of the
batteries of the Wabash and of the Susquehanna, which was next in line.
In a private letter, written just after the engagement, he said of the former :
" In our first attack I was not satisfied with the execution of this ship, though the effect
turned out to be much greater than I thought, but in the second attack I can remember nothing
in naval history that came up to this ship in the terrific repetitions of her broadsides, and, to
use the illustration of the reporter of the ' London News,' ' the rising of the dust on shore in
perpendicular columns looked as if we had suddenly raised from the dust a grove of poplars.' ';
686
DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
At 1:15 the Ottawa signaled that the enemy was leaving the fort, and
fifteen minutes later the same signal was made by the Pembina. At this
time the flag-ship and her followers had returned from their tour, and were
again ready to swoop down and deliver other broadsides. Two pivot guns
fired from the flag-ship received no response, and signal was made to cease
firing. Captain John Rodgers, who was serving as aide to the flag-officer, was
sent on shore with a flag of truce. On landing he found no garrison, and
at 2:20 p. m. hoisted the Union flag
over the fort. When that honored
emblem appeared, the rigging was
manned in an instant on board the
flag-ship and on all of the vessels
of war at anchor ; three cheers were
wafted over the waters, so loud that
they startled the defenders of Fort
Beauregard. \ Commander C. R. P.
Rodgers, with the marines of the
flag-ship and a division of small-arm
men, landed and threw out pickets.
The transports at once steamed in.
Soon after sunset the fort was de-
livered by the naval force to General
H. G. Wright, who now held watch
and ward as far as the pine-trees
some hundreds of yards distant.
Soon after the hoisting of our flag,
a vessel was directed to make a re-
connoissance of Bay Point, but at
nightfall, as nothing had been heard from her, the Seneca was sent to
ascertain the situation. When we arrived in front of Fort Beauregard,
it was so dark that the bow of the vessel was run up on the low beach.
There, outlined on the horizon, was the earth-work lying in grim repose, the
embrasures being plainly visible. The silence was unbroken ; the work had
evidently been abandoned. The flood-tide was setting in strongly. The crew
of one hundred men were sent as far aft as possible and the engines backed. We
at once slid off, and the flag-officer was fully informed as soon as we could steam
over. Orders were then given to return to Bay Point at early daylight to
reconnoiter, and, if we were not met by force, to hoist our flag at sunrise. This
was duly executed, and at noon the fort was turned over to General Isaac I. Ste-
\ Captain Stephen Elliott, Jr., who was at Fort fire, the flag-ship has steamed up and delivered a
single shot, whicli was unanswered, and that there-
upon cheering was heard from the fleet.' — 'Then,
sir, it having been proved that these works cannot
accomplish the end for which they were designed
(that of protecting the harbor) you will prepare
to retire from a position from which our retreat
may readily be cut off, and which onr small force
will not enable us to hold against a land attack.'"
BRIG.-GEN. THOMAS F. DRAYTON, C. S. A., COMMANDER
OF THE CONFEDERATE FORCES AT FORT ROYAL.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
Beauregard, reported: "Colonel Dunovant [who
commanded the forces] entered the fort, and said
to me: 'Captain Elliott, what is the condition of
things over the river V I replied, 'Fort Walker
has been silenced, sir.' — 'By what do you judge ."
' By the facts that the fort has been subjected to a
heavy enfilade and direct fire, to which it has ceased
to reply ; that the vessels having terminated their
DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
687
vens, of the army. The flag- staff was 011 the gable of a small frame-house fifty
yards from the fort. I went within, saw some books lying on a table, and
went out and toward some tents in the distance. In a few minutes an
explosion was heard, and, on turning, I saw a cloud of smoke where the
house had stood. A quantity of powder had been put under it, arranged so
as to ignite from a friction-tube, and a sailor, in passing along outside, had
struck his foot against a small wire attached to the tube, thus causiDg the
explosion. He was knocked over, and partially stunned, but soon revived. It
may be said that it is natural in warfare to harm your enemy as much as
possible, but it strikes the man who has escaped being blown up that such
devices are essentially mean.
The armament found on Fort Walker was as follows : on the right angle
of the sea-face, a 6-inch rifled-gun, six 32-pounders (three dismounted and
with carriages ruined and another with the cascabel knocked off), one 10-inch
and one 8-inch Columbiad, three sea-coast 7-inch howitzers; on the left
angle of the sea-front, a 6-inch rifle ; on the left wing, one 32-pounder and one
sea-coast howitzer ; on the outer work, in rear, two 32-pounders, one 8-inch
heavy howitzer, and two English siege 12-pounders ; on the right wing, three
32-pounders, — total, 23 guns. Twenty guns were found in Fort Beauregard,
one of which was a 6-inch rifle, burst,
and the carriage entirely destroyed.
The heaviest guns were a 10-inch and
an 8-inch Columbiad ; the other guns
mostly 32-pounders. ft The armaments
of the attacking vessels, and the losses on
both sides, will be found on page 691.
In his report General T. W. Sherman
states :
" The beautifully constructed work on Hilton
Head was severely crippled and many of the
guns dismounted. Much slaughter had evi-
dently been made there, many bodies having
been buried in the fort, and some twenty or 'i
thirty were found some half-mile distant. . . . M
The number of pieces of ordnance that have
fallen into our hands is fifty-two, the bulk of
which is of the largest caliber, all with fine car-
riages, etc., except eight or nine, that were
ruined by our fire, which dismounted their
pieces."
CAPTAIN PEKCIVAL DRAYTON, COMMANDER OF THE
On the afternoon of the 8th General u- s. steamer "pocahontas" at port royal-
. BROTHER OF THE COMMANDER OF THE CON-
Sherman made a reconnoissance, on federate forces, from a photograph.
•fc General Drayton thus describes the resistance
made to the attack of the Union fleet, referring at
the outset to the first shot from Fort Walker :
"The( shell from the Dahlgren exploded near the
muzzle, and was harmless. Other shots followed from
both forts, and soon the lire became general on land and
water. In spite of our Are, directed with deliberation
and coolness, the fleet soon passed both batteries appar-
ently unharmed, and, then returning, delivered in their
changing rounds a terrific shower of shot and shell in
flank and front. Besides this moving battery, the fort
was enfiladed by two .inm-boats anchored to the north, off
the mouth of Fish Hall Creek, and another at a point on
the edge of the shoals to the south. This enfilading fire,
on so still a sea, annoyed and damaged us excessively,
688
DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
THE OLD HEADQUARTERS, HILTON HEAD. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
board of the Seneca, several miles up the Beaufort River. On the following
day that vessel was sent to Beaufort, supported by two gun-boats. This visit
brought to view an extraordinary scene. On the wharves were hundreds of
negroes, wild with excitement, engaged in carrying movables of every char-
acter, and packing them in scows. As the gun-boats appeared, a few mounted
white men rode away rapidly. A very beautiful rural town had been abandoned
by all of the white inhabitants, quite as though fire and sword awaited them had
they remained. Instead of that, I was directed by the flag-officer to assure the
peaceable inhabitants that they would be protected in life and property. This
particularly as we had no gun on either flank of the
bastion to reply with, for the 32-pounder on the right
flank was shattered very early toy a round shot, and on
the north flank for want of a carriage no gun had toeen
mounted. After the fourth Are the 10-inch Columbiad
hounded over the limber and became useless. The 24-
pounder rifled cannon was choked while ramming down
a shell, and lay idle during nearly the whole engage-
ment. The shells for the 9-inch Dahlgren were also too
large. The fourth shell attempted to toe rammed home
could not be driven below the trunnions, and was then
at sreat risk discharged. Thus far the tire of the enemy
had been endured and replied to with the unruffled
courage of veterans. At 10:30 our gunners became so
fatigued that I left the fort, accompanied by one of my
volunteer aides, Captain H. Rose, and went back to Cap-
lain Read's battery (one and three-quarter miles to the
rear of t lie fort) and brought the greater part of his men
back to take the places of our exhausted men inside the
fort. . . . Two o'clock had now arrived, when I noticed
our men coming out of the fort, which they had bravely
defended for four and a half hours asrainst fearful odds,
and then only retiring when all but three of the guns on
the water-front had been disabled, and only 500 pounds
of powder in the, magazine; commencing the action
with 220 men inside the fort, afterward increased to 255
by the accession from Read's battery. These heroic men
retired slowly and sadly from their well-fought guns,
which to have defended longer would have exhibited
the energy of despair rather than the manly pluck of
the true soldier."
Of the attack upon Fort Beauregard, General
Drayton says :
" The attack upon the fort, though not so concentrated
and heavy as that upon Walker, was nevertheless very
severe. Its armament was 19 guns, of which the follow-
ing, viz., 1 8-inch Rodman, bored to 24-pounder and
rifled, 2 42-pounders, 1 10-inch Columtoiad, 2 42-pouuders,
reamed to eight inches, and 1 32-pounder in hot-shot
battery, were the only guns capatole of toeing used against
the fleet. The force on Bay Point was 640 men, com-
maded toy Col. R. G. M. Dunovant, 12th Regiment South
Carolina Volunteers. Of the above, 149 garrisoned Fort
Beauregard, under the immediate command of Capt.
Stephen Elliott, Jr., Beaufort Volunteer Artillery, Com-
pany A 9th Regiment South Carolina Volunteers. The
infantry force of Colonel Dunovant's regiment was
intrusted with the protection of the eastern part of the
island, and of the defense of the bastion line at the
Island Narrows, where an attack was expected from the
enemy. "
Editors.
DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
bSq
POPE'S HOUSE, HILTON HEAD, USED BY THE UNION
ARMY AS A SIGNAL-STATION. FROM A
W u: -TIME SKETCH.
message was delivered to the only white man found, who sat in the post-office
and seemed quite dazed. At General Drayton's headquarters was found a
chart of the coast, and, in red-pencil marks, a very valuable addition, no less
than the position of all the earth- works within his command, the number of
guns being shown by the number of red marks in each locality. All of the
batteries indicated from North Edisto
south to Tybee were found to be aban-
doned; the guns, however, had been
removed, with the exception of some
inferior pieces. Wherever the gun-
boats penetrated, into harbors or
rivers, huge columns of white smoke
were seen on all sides from the burn-
ing cotton, far Out of our reach, had
it been the special object of our visit
to secure it. Thus the enemy inflicted
upon the inhabitants injuries they
would otherwise have escaped, even had it been within the power of the
crews of the gun-boats to inflict them.
On the 10th, on board the Sen era, the flag-officer paid a visit to Beaufort
and endeavored, by proclamation printed and distributed, to assure peaceable
inhabitants of his protection. A planter whose house was on Paris Island,
plainly in view from the anchorage at Port Royal, remained without molesta-
tion for weeks, and was then constrained to leave only under threats of dire
penalties from his Confederate friends.
After abandoning his works on Hilton Head, the enemy did not succeed in
getting off the island, at Seabrook Landing, only six miles from the fort, until
2 a. m. of the 8th. On the Bay Point side, owing to a much longer march and
the indifferent means of crossing a small stream, it was not until the follow-
ing afternoon that the force reached an adjacent island or the mainland. J
Every man of them, whether in the one fort or the other, was doubtless greatly
impressed with the power of gun-boats when 1 trough t face to face with those
batteries which only a few hours before they had regarded as quite capable
of sinking or driving off any force that would be brought against them.
The battle of Port Royal, occurring a little less than seven months after
the fall of Fort Sumter, was of surpassing value in its moral and political
effect, both at home and abroad. It gave us one of the finest harbors on the
Atlantic sea-board, affording an admirable base for future operations ; and, by
the establishment of coaling stations, shops, and supply depots, made it pos-
sible to maintain an effective blockade within the entrances of the diole
coast from Charleston to Cape Florida, except at Fernandina.
I General T. F. Drayton says, in his report :
"Notwithstanding the prompt measures adopted
by Colonel Dunovant to effect his retreat in the
direction of the Narrows, it is surprising that, with
the knowledge possessed by the enemy (through
Mr. [C. A.] Boutelle and others connected with
VOL. I. 44
Although
the Coast Survey), his retreat had not been inter-
cepted by gun-boats passing up toward Beaufort,
and mine by other steamers taking the passage
through Scull Creek toward the ferry landing.
Why they did not adopt this course must be left
to time to explain.'' Editors.
690
DU PONT AND THE POKT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
the casualties during the engagement were inconsiderable, military men
and readers who note results will not measure its importance by the small
number of the killed and wounded, indicative, in this case, of the profes-
sional ability and tactical skill with which the victory was won. The capture
of the forts at Hatteras Inlet, August 28th, 1861, was the result of a bombard-
ment rather than of a battle ; owing to shoal water, extending far to seaward,
the heavy vessels were held at so long a range that not a single projectile of
the enemy reached them. Al-
though 9-inch shells were
fired from the broadside guns
of the squadron the first day
of the bombardment, it is
doubtful if they reached the
forts : the pivot-guns, being of
•*&
L
FULLER'S HOUSE, BEAUFORT, S. C.
UNION SIGNAL-STATION, BEAUFORT, S. C— HOME OF
J. G. BARNWELL. FROM PHOTOGRAPHS.
larger caliber and having more ele-
vation, dropped heavy shells on weak
bomb-proofs and on insufficient cov-
erings to the magazine, and compelled
the surrender of the garrison. Nevertheless, the capture of Hatteras Inlet
was an event of great military importance.
So far as the relative merits of ships and earth-works were concerned, the bat-
tle of Port Royal asserted in such positive terms the power of shell-guns afloat
that the enemy at once abandoned all minor points of defense along the coast
not covered by difficult water approaches, and ever after seemed to regard the
obstruction of channels as the main element in successful defense.
The establishment and maintenance of our most efficient system of block-
ade along all the Southern coasts was largely due to the intelligence and
ability with which Rear- Admiral Du Pont and his co-laborers formulated
the principles involved at the very outset of the contest. His long experience
in blockade duty during the Mexican war was of the greatest value to the
conference, and indeed prompted his selection as its president.
In a private letter, dated on board the Ct/ane, July 27th, 1847, Du Pont
stated, quite prophetically, the value of his study of the subject of blockades :
" I have exhausted Kent,Wheaton, and Vattel on the subject, — a right good piece of profes-
sional work and study, which may be invaluable in the future. Three or four issues have been
started not covered at all by those authorities, of which I have made notes."
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT PORT ROYAL. 691
Previous to our civil war no higher rank was known in the American
navy than that of captain, although the law accorded the title of flag-officer,
with additional pay, to captains in command of recognized naval stations.
The engagement at Port Royal, the taking of New Orleans, and other suc-
cessful operations of our navy doubtless led to the creation of the higher
grades of commodore and rear-admiral, July 16th, 1862, on which date Flag-
Officer Du Pont became a rear-admiral, ranking second on the list.
Eminently adapted to command, he knew well how to secru-e the best
services of his subordinates. Intelligent, cheerful in manner, of tall and
commanding mien, he naturally invited and obtained the confidence of those
who were fortunate enough to serve under his orders. During the past half
century the navy of the United States has not had an officer of more dis-
tinguished appearance, or endowed with more manly virtues. Though fitted
by nature to be a leader among men, he thoroughly appreciated the necessity
for study to make himself equal to every professional requirement. It is not
given to man to be preeminent without an earnest exertion to that end, how-
ever much nature may have done in his behalf.
In the erection of a statue at Washington, and in the naming of Du Pont
Circle, in which it stands, the American people, through Congress, have paid a
proper tribute to the memory of this worthy representative of the naval service.
Ammendale, Mb., September, 1887.
THE OPPOSING FOECES AT PORT ROYAL, NOVEMBER 7th, 1861.
The Union Fleet, Flag-Officer S. F. Du Pont, command- Union Land Forces, Brig.-Gen. Thomas W. Sherman,
ing. Captain Charles Henry Davis, Fleet-Captain. First Br it/ad e, Brig.-Gen. Egbert L. ViehS: 8th Me.,
Flag-ship : frigate Wabash (2 10-inch, 28 9-inch, 14 8-inch, Col. Lee Strickland; 3d N. H., Col. Enoch Q. Fellows;
2 12-pounders), Commander C. R. P. Rodgers; side- 46th N. Y., Col. Rudolph Rosa; 47th N. Y., Col. Henry
wheel steamer Susquehanna <15 8-inch, 1 24-pounder, 2 Moore; 48th N. Y., Col. James H. Perry. Second Bri-
12-pounders), Captain J. L. Lardner; sloop Mohican (2 gade, Brig.-Gen. Isaac I. Stevens: 8th Mich., Col.
11-inch, 4 32-pounders, 1 12-pounder), Commander S. W. William M. Fenton ; 79th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. William H.
Godon; Seminole (1 11-inch, 4 32-pouuders), Commander Nobles; 50th Pa., Col. Benjamin C. Christ; 100th Pa.,
J. P. Gillis; Pocahontas (1 10-inch, 4 32-pounders), Com- Col. Daniel Leasure. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Hora-
mander Percival Drayton; Pawnee (8 9-inch, 2 12- tio G. Wright: 6th Conn., Col. John L. Chatfield; 7th
pounders), Lieutenant R. H. Wyman ; gun-boats Una- Conn., Col. Alfred H.Terry; 9th Me., Col. Rishworth
dillu. Lieutenant Napoleon Collins; Seneca, Lieutenant Rich; 4th N. H., Col. Thomas J. Whipple. Unattached:
Daniel Ammen ; Ottawa, Lieutenant T. H. Stevens; 3d R. I., Col. Nathaniel W. Brown ; 1st N. Y. Engineers,
Pembina, Lieutenant J. P. Bankhead (each of the four Col. Edward W. Serrell ; Battery E, 3d U. S. Art'y, Capt.
latter carried 1 11-inch, 1 20-pounder rifle, and 2 24- John Hamilton.
pounders); sailing sloop Yandalia (4 8-inch, 16 32- .
Pounders, Impounder), Commander F. S. Haggerty; Confederate Land Forces, Bng -Gen. ThomaH-
steamer Bienville (8 32-pounders, 1 30-pounder rifle), Won : 4th Ga Battalion Lieut.-Col W H. Sttles ; ,, ,
Commander Charles Steelman ; .1 ugusta(8 32-pounders, S. C (3 co"s), Col. William CHeyward; 12th 8. C Col.
1 12-pounder), Commander E (.Pan,,,,: Curlew (6 g- G. M. DnnovaDt; 15th S. C Cc d. W D. ^~^
32-pounders. 1 20-pounder rifle). Lieutenant P. G. Wat- Beanfort (S C ) Guerrillas Capt. J I Screven < Ga.
mougb ; Penguin (4 32-pounders, l 12-pounder), Lieuten- battery, Capt Jacob Read ; 1st s. c Mihtia Art y pro s),
ant T. A. Budd ; R. B. Forbes (2 32-pounders), Lieutenant CoL Jobl1 A' * ^™r- Lo88 : k> U ; w' 48 ; m' 7 ~ 66-
II. 8. Newcomb; Isaac Smith (8 8-inch, l 30-pounder Confederate Naval Forces, Flag-Officer Josiah
rifle, originally, but the broadside battery was thrown Tattnall: Savannah (flag-ship), Lieut. John N. Maffitt;
overboard on the way down from Hampton Roads), Sampson, Lieut. J. B. Kenuard; Resolute, Lieut. J.
Lieutenant J. W. A. Nicholson. Pembroke Jones. They were small side-wheel steamers,
The loss in the Union fleet, as officially reported, was and each carried 2 32-pounders (smooth-bore). There
8 killed, and 23 wounded. Total, 31. were no casualties.
THE FIRST FIGHT OF IRON-CLADS.
BY JOHN TAYLOR WOOD, COLONEL, C. 8. A.
THE engagement in Hampton Roads on the 8th of March, 1862, between
the Confederate iron-clad Virginia, or the Merrimac (as she is known at
the North), and the United States wooden fleet, and that on the 9th between
the Virginia and the Hon I tor, was, in its results, in some respects the most
momentous naval conflict ever witnessed. No battle was ever more widely
discussed or produced a greater sensation. It revolutionized the navies of the
world. Line-of -battle ships, those huge, overgrown craft, carrying from eighty
to one hundred and twenty guns and from five hundred to twelve hundred
men, which, from the destruction of the Spanish Armada to our time, had
done most of the fighting, deciding the fate of empires, were at once univer-
sally condemned as out of date. Rams and iron-clads were in future to decide
all naval warfare. In this battle old things passed away, and the experience
of a thousand years of battle and breeze was forgotten. The naval supremacy
of England vanished in the smoke of this fight, it is true, only to reappear
some years later more commanding than ever. The effect of the news was
best described by the London " Times," which said: " Whereas we had avail-
able for immediate purposes one hundred and forty-nine first-class war-ships,
we have now two, these two being the Warrior and her sister Ironside. There
is not now a ship in the English navy apart from these two that it would
not be madness to trust to an engagement with that little Monitor." The
Admiralty at once proceeded to reconstruct the navy, cutting down a num-
ber of their largest ships and converting them into turret or broadside
iron-clads.
The same results were produced in France, which had but one sea-going iron-
clad, La Gloire, and this one, like the Warrior, was only protected amidships.
The Emperor Napoleon promptly appointed a commission to devise plans for
rebuilding his navy. And so with all the maritime powers. In this race the
United States took the lead, and at the close of the war led all the others in
the numbers and efficiency of its iron-clad fleet. It is true that all the great
powers had already experimented with vessels partly armored, but very few
were convinced of their utility, and none had been tried by the test of battle,
if we except a few floating batteries, thinly clad, used in the Crimean War..
692
THE FIRST FIGHT OF I RON -CL ADS.
693
In the spring of 1861 Norfolk and its large naval establishment had been
hurriedly abandoned by the Federals, why no one could tell. It is about
twdve miles from Fort Monroe, which was then held by a large force of
regulars. A few companies of these, with a single frigate, could have
occupied and commanded the town and navy yard and kept the channel
open. However, a year later, it was as quickly evacuated by the Confed-
erates, and almost with as little reason. But of this I will speak later.
The yard was abandoned to a few volunteers, after it was partly destroyed,
and a large number of ships were burnt. Among the spoils were upward of
twelve hundred heavy guns, which were scattered among Confederate fortifi-
cations from the Potomac to the Mississippi. [See foot-note, p. 712]. Among
the ships burnt and sunk was the frigate Merrimac of 3500 tons and -10 guns,
afterward rechristened the Virginia, and so I will call her. During the summer
of 1861 Lieutenant John M. Brooke, an accomplished officer of the old navy,
who with many others had resigned, proposed to Secretary Mallory to raise and
rebuild this ship as an iron-clad. His plans were approved, and orders were
given to carry them out. She was raised and cut down to the old berth-deck.
Both ends for seventy feet were covered over, and when the ship was in fight-
ing trim were just awash. On the midship section, 170 feet in length, was built
at an angle of 45 degrees a roof of pitch-pine and oak 24 inches thick, extend-
ing from the water-line to a height over the gun-deck of 7 feet. [See pp. 715-
717.] Both ends of the shield were rounded so that the pivot-guns could be
XHE BURNING OF THE FRIGATE " MERRIMAC " AND OF THE GOSPORT NAVY-YARD. (SEE FOOT-NOTE, P. 712.)
694
THE FIRST FIGHT OF I HON -CL ADS.
REMODELING THE
"MERRIMAC" AT THE GOSPORT
NAVY YARD.
[For a statement of the details of the
vessel differing from them as shown in
this picture, see p. 717.]
used as bow and stern chasers or quartering. Over the gun-deck was a light
grating, making a promenade about twenty feet wide. The wood backing was
covered with iron plates, rolled at the Tredegar works, two inches thick and
eight wide. The first tier was put on horizontally, the second up and down, —
in all to the thickness of four inches, bolted through the wood-work and
clinched. The prow was of cast-iron, projecting four feet, and badly secured,
as events proved. The rudder and propeller were entirely unprotected. The
pilot-house was forward of the smoke-stack, and covered with the same thick-
ness of iron as the sides. The motive power was the same that had always
been in the ship. Both of the engines and boilers had been condemned on her
return from her last cruise, and were radically defective. Of course, the fire
and sinking had not improved them. We could not depend upon them for
six hours at a time. A more ill-contrived or unreliable pair of engines could
only have been found in some vessels of the United States navy.
Lieutenant Catesby ap R. Jones was ordered to superintend the armament,
and no more thoroughly competent officer could have been selected. To his
experience and skill as her ordnance and executive officer was due the charac-
ter of her battery, which proved so efficient. It consisted of 2 7-inch rifles,
heavily reenforced around the breech with 3-inch steel bands, shrunk on.
These were the first heavy guns so made, and were the bow and stern pivots.
There were also 2 6-inch rifles of the same make, and 6 9-inch smooth-bore
broadside, — 10 guns in all.
During the summer and fall of 1861 I had been stationed at the batteries
on the Potomac at Evansport and Aquia Creek, blockading the river as far
as possible. In January, 1862, I was ordered to the Virginia as one of the
lieutenants, reporting to Commodore French Forrest, who then commanded
the navy yard at Norfolk. Commodore Franklin Buchanan was appointed
to the command, — an energetic and high-toned officer, who combined with
daring courage great professional ability, standing deservedly at the head of
his profession. In 1845 he had been selected by Mr. Bancroft, Secretary of
THE FIRST FIGHT OF IRON -C LADS.
b95
the Navy, to locate and organize the Naval Academy, and he launched that
institution upon its successful career. Under him were as capable a set of
officers as ever were brought together in one ship. But of man-of-war's men
or sailors we had scarcely any. The South was almost without a maritime
population. In the old service the majority of officers were from the South,
and all the seamen from the North. %
Every one had flocked to the army, and to it we had to look for a crew.
Some few seamen were found iu Norfolk, who had escaped from the gun-boat
flotilla in the waters of North Carolina, on their occupation by Admiral Grolds-
borough and General Burnside. In hopes of securing some men from the army,
I was sent to the headquarters of General Magruder at Yorktown, who was
known to have under his command two battalions from New Orleans, among
whom might be found a number of seamen. The general, though pressed
for want of men, holding a long line with scarcely a brigade, gave me every
facility to secure volunteers. With one of his staff I visited every camp, and
the commanding officers were ordered to parade their men, and I explained
to them what I wanted. About 200 volunteered, and of this number I
selected 80 who had had some experience as seamen or gunners. Other
commands at Richmond and Petersburg were visited, and so our crew of
three hundred was made up. They proved themselves to be as gallant and
trusty a body of men as any one would wish to command, not only in battle,
but in reverse and retreat.
Notwithstanding every exertion to hasten the fitting out of the ship, the work
during the winter progressed but slowly, owing to delay in sending the iron
sheathing from Richmond. At this time the only establishment in the South
capable of rolling iron plates was the Tredegar foundry. Its resources were
& The officers of the Merrimac were : Flag-Officer,
Franklin Buchanan; Lieutenants, Catesby ap E.
Jones (executive and ordnance officer), Charles C.
Simms, R. D. Minor (flag), Hunter Davidson, John
Taylor Wood, J. R. Eggleston, Walter Butt; Mid-
shipmen, Foute, Marmaduke, Littlepage, Craig,
Long, and Rootes ; Paymaster, James Semple ;
Surgeon, Dinwiddie Phillips; Assistant-Surgeon,
Algernon S. Garnett ; Captain of Marines, Reuben
Thorn; Engineers, H. A. Ramsey, acting chief;
Assistants, Tynan, Campbell, Herring, Jack, and
White; Boatswain, Hasker; Gunner, Oliver; Car-
penter, Lindsey ; Clerk, Arthur Sinclair, Jr.; Vol-
unteer Aides, Lieutenant Douglas Forrest, C. S. A.,
Captain Kevil, commanding detachment of Norfolk
United Artillery ; Signal Corps, Sergeant Tabb.
a PROW, OF STEEL.
b WOODEN BULWARK.
h PILOT-HOUSE.
t.t. B. L. Blackford, del. March 7, 1862.
THE "MERRIMAC," FROM A SKETCH MADE THE DAY BEFORE dd iron under water.
THE FIGHT. / propeller.
bqb
THE FIRST FIGHT OF IHON-CLADS.
limited, and the demand for all kinds of war material most pressing. And
when we reflect upon the scarcity and inexperience of the workmen, and the
great changes necessary in transforming an ordinary iron workshop into
an arsenal in which all the machinery and tools had to be improvised, it is
astonishing that so much was accomplished. The unfinished state of the
vessel interfered so with the drills and exercises that we had but little oppor-
tunity of getting things into shape.
It should be remembered that the ship
was an experiment in naval archi-
tecture, differing in every respect
from any then afloat. The officers
and the crew were strangers to the
ship and to each other. Up to the
hour of sailing she was crowded with
workmen. Not a gun had been fired,
hardly a revolution of the engines
had been made, when we cast off
from the dock and started on what
many thought was an ordinary trial
trip, but which proved to be a trial
such as no vessel that ever floated
had undergone up to that time.
From the start we saw that she was
slow, not over five knots ; she steered
so badly that, with her great length,
it took from thirty to forty minutes
to turn. She drew twenty- two feet,
which confined us to a comparatively
narrow channel in the Roads ; and,
as I have before said, the engines were our weak point. She was as unman-
ageable as a water-logged vessel.
Tt was at noon on the 8th of March that we steamed down the Elizabeth
Passing by our batteries, lined with troops, who cheered us as we
•ad through the obstructions at Craney Island, we took the south
channel and headed for Newport News. At anchor at this time off Fort
Monroe were the frigates Minnesota, Roanoke, and St. Lawrence, and several
gun-boats. The first two were sister ships of the Virginia before the war;
the last was a sailing frigate of fifty guns. Off Newport News, seven miles
above, which was strongly fortified and held by a large Federal garrison,
were anchored the frigate Congress, 50 guns, and the sloop Cumberland, 30.
The day was calm, and the last two ships were swinging lazily by their anchors.
[The tide was at its height about 1 : 40 p. M.] Boats were hanging to the
lower booms, washed clothes in the rigging. Nothing indicated that we were
expected ; but when we came within three-quarters of a mile, the boats were
dropped astern, booms got alongside, and the Cumberland opened with her
heavy pivots, followed by the ( 'ongress, the gun-boats, and the shore batteries.
LIEUTENANT CATESBY AP R. JONES.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
FRANKLIN BUCHANAN, ADMIRAL, C. S. N. JOSIAH TATTNALL, COMMODORE, C. S. N.
COMMANDERS OF THE "VIRGINIA" (OR " MERRIMAC "). FROM A FHOTOGRAPH.
697
698
THE FIRST FIGHT OF IRON-CLADS.
We reserved our fire until
within easy range, when the
forward pivot was pointed and
fired by Lieutenant Charles
Simms, killing and wounding
most of the crew of the after
pivot-gun of the Cumberland.
Passing close to the Congress,
which received our starboard
broadside, and returned it
with spirit, we steered direct
for the Cumberland, striking
her almost at right angles,
under the fore-rigging on the
starboard side. The blow was
hardly perceptible on board
the Virginia. Backing clear
of her, we went ahead again,
heading up the river, helm
hard-a-starboard, and turned
slowly. As we did so, for the
first time I had an opportu-
nity of using the after-pivot,
of which I had charge. As we
swung, the Congress came in range, nearly stern on, and we got in three
raking shells. She had slipped her anchor, loosed her foretop-sail, run up
the jib, and tried to escape, Iffit grounded. Turning, we headed for her
and took a position within two hundred yards, where every shot told. In the
meantime the Cumberland continued the fight, though our ram had opened
her side wide enough to drive in a horse and cart. 80011 she listed to port
and filled rapidly. The crew were driven by the advancing water to the spar-
deck, and there worked her pivot-guns until she went down with a roar, the
colors still flying. No ship was ever fought more gallautly.| The Con-
gress continued the unequal contest for more than an hour after the sinking
of the Cumberland. Her losses were terrible, and finally she ran up the
white flag.
As soon as we had hove in sight, coming down the harbor, the Roanoke, St.
Lawrence, and JM'nmcsota, assisted by tugs, had got under way, and started up
from Old Point Comfort to join their consorts. They were under fire from
the batteries at Sewell's Point, but the distance was too great to effect much.
The first two, however, ran aground not far above Fort Monroe, and took
COLONEL JOHN TAYLOR WOOD, LIEUTENANT ON THE
"MEKRIMAC." FROM AN OIL PORTRAIT.
I According to the pilot of the Cumberland, A. B.
Smith : " Near the middle of the fight, when the
berth-deck of the Cumberland had sunk below
water, one of the crew of the Merrimac came out
of a port to the outside of her iron-plate roof, and
a ball from one of our guns instantly cut him in
two. . . . Finally, after about three-fourths of an
hour of the most severe fighting, our vessel sank, the
Stars and Stripes still waving. That flag was fi-
nally submerged, but after the hull grounded on the
sands, fifty-four feet below, . . . our pennant was
still flying from the top-mast above the waves."
THE FIRST FIGHT OF IRON-CLADS.
699
-r
Virgiru a
URNT& 5 UNA
MAP OF HAMPTON ROADS AND ADJACENT SHORES.
but little part in the fight. The Min-
nesota, taking the middle or swash
channel, steamed up half-way be-
tween Old Point Comfort and New-
port News, when she grounded, but in a position to be actively engaged.
Previous to this we had been joined by the James River squadron, which
had been at anchor a few miles above, and came into action most gallantly,
passing the shore batteries at Newport News under a heavy fire, and with
some loss. It consisted of the Yorktown (or Patrick Henry), 12 guns, Captain
John R. Tucker; Jamestown, '2 guns, Lieut.-Commander J. N. Barney; and
Teaser, 1 gun, Lieut.-Commander W. A. Webb.
As soon as the Congress surrendered, Commander Buchanan ordered the
gun-boats Beaufort, Lieut.-Commander W. H. Parker, and Raleigh, Lieut.-
Commander J. W. Alexander, to steam alongside, take off her crew, and set
fire to the ship. Lieutenant Pendergrast, who had succeeded Lieutenant
Smith, who had been killed, surrendered to Lieutenant Parker, of the Bean-
fort. Delivering his sword and colors, he was directed by Lieutenant Parker
to return to his ship and have the wounded transferred as rapidly as possible.
All this time the shore batteries and small-arm men were keeping up an inces-
sant fire on our vessels. Two of the officers of the Raleigh, Lieutenant Tayloe
700
THE FIRST FIGHT OF I RON -CL ADS.
:m
THE "MERHIMAC" RAMMING THE "CUMBERLAND.
and Midshipman Hntter, were killed while assisting the Union wounded out
of the Congress. A number of the enemy's men were killed by the same fire.
Finally it became so hot that the gun-boats were obliged to haul off with only
thirty prisoners, leaving Lieutenant Pendergrast and most of his crew on
board, and they all afterward escaped to the shore by swimming or in small
boats. While this was going on, the white flag was flying at her mainmast-
head. Not being able to take possession of his prize, the commodore ordered
hot shot to be used, and in a short time she was in flames fore and aft.
While directing this, both himself and his flag-lieutenant, Minor, were
severely wounded. The command then devolved upon Lieutenant Catesby
Jones.
It was now 5 o'clock, nearly two hours of daylight, and the Minnesota only
remained. She was aground and at our mercy. But the pilots would not
attempt the middle channel with the ebb tide and approaching night. So we
returned by the south channel to Sewell's Point and anchored, the Minnesota
escaping, as we thought, only until morning.
Our loss in killed and wounded was twenty-one. The armor was hardly
damaged, though at one time our ship was the focus on which were directed
at least one hundred heavy guns, afloat and ashore. But nothing outside
escaped. Two guns were disabled by having their muzzles shot off. The ram
was left in the side of the Cumberland. One anchor, the smoke-stack, and the
steam-pipes were shot away. Railings, stanchions, boat-davits, everything
was swept clean. The flag-staff was repeatedly knocked over, and finally a
THE FIRST FIGHT OF IRON-CLADS.
7or
boarding-pike was used. Commodore Buchanan and the other wounded were
sent to the Naval Hospital, and after making preparations for the next day's
fight, we slept at our guns, dreaming of other victories in the morning. J)
But at daybreak we discovered, lying between us and the Minnesota, a
strange-looking craft, which we knew at once to be Ericsson's Monitor, which
had long been expected in Hampton
Roads, and of which, from different
sources, we had a good idea. She could
not possibly have made her appearance
at a more inopportune time for us,
changing our plans, which were to
destroy the Minnesota, and then the
remainder of the fleet below Fort Mon-
roe. She appeared but a pigmy com-
pared with the lofty frigate which she
guarded. But in her size was one
great element of her success. I will
not attempt a description of the Moni-
tor; her build and peculiarities are well
known.
After an early breakfast, we got un-
der way and steamed out toward the
enemy, ' opening fire from our bow
pivot, and closing in to deliver our
starboard broadside at short range,
which was returned promptly from
her 11-inch guns. Both vessels then
turned and passed again still closer.
The Monitor was firing every seven or
eight minutes, and nearly every shot
struck. Our ship was working worse
and worse, and after the loss of the
smoke-stack, Mr. Ramsey, chief engi-
neer, reported that the draught was
so poor that it was with great diffi-
culty he could keep up steam. Once
or twice the ship was on the bottom.
Drawing 22 feet of water, we were
confined to a narrow channel, while
the Monitor, with only 12 feet immer-
sion, could take any position, and al-
ways have us in range of her guns. Orders were given to concentrate our
fire on the pilot-house, and with good result, as we afterward learned. More
than two hours had passed, and we had made no impression on the enemy
j> Lieutenant Joues reported : " It was not easy to keep a flag flying. The flag-staffs were repeatedly
shot away. The colors were hoisted to the smoke-stack and several times cut down from it." — Editors.
LIEUTENANT GEORGE U. MORRTS, ACTING COMMANDER
OF THE "CUMBERLAND."
Iu the absence of Captain Radford, the command of
the Cumberland devolved upon the executive officer,
Lieutenanl Morris, from whose official report we quote
the following : "At thirty minutes past three the wa-
ter had gained upon us, notwithstanding the pumps
were kept actively employed to a degree that, the for-
ward-magazine being drowned, we had to take powder
from the after-magazine for the ten-inch gun. At
thirty-five minutes past three the water had risen to
the main hatchway, and the ship canted to port, and
we delivered a parting fire— each man trying to save
himself by jumping overboard. Timely notice was
giveu, and all the wounded who could walk were or-
dered out of the cockpit; but those of the wounded
who had been carried iuto the sick-bay and on the
berth-deck were so mangled that it was impossible to
save them. ... I should judge we have lost up-
ward of one hundred men. I can only say. in conclu-
sion, that all did their duty, and we sank with the
American flag flying at the peak." When summoned
to surrender, Morris replied, "Never! I'll sink along-
side ! "— EditoksT""
702
THE FIRST FIGHT OF I RON -CL ADS.
THE " MERRIMAC " DRIVING THE " CONGRESS " FROM HER ANCHORAGE.
so far as we could discover, while our wounds were slight. Several times
the Monitor ceased firing, and we were in hopes she was disabled, but the
revolution again of her turret and the heavy blows of her 11-inch shot on
our sides soon undeceived us.
Coining down from the spar-deck, and observing a division standing " at
ease," Lieutenant Jones inquired :
" Why are you not firing, Mr. Eggleston ? "
" Why, our powder is very precious," replied the lieutenant ; " and after two
hours' incessant firing I find that I can do her about as much damage by
snapping my thumb at her every two minutes and a half."
Lieutenant Jones now determined to run her down or board her. For nearly
an hour we manoeuvred for a position. Now " Gro ahead ! " now " Stop ! " now
"Astern ! " The ship was as unwieldy as Noah's ark. At last an opportunity
offered. " Go ahead, full speed ! " But before the ship gathered headway, the
Monitor turned, and our disabled ram only gave a glancing blow, effecting
nothing. Again she came up on our quarter, her bow against our side, and
at this distance fired twice. Both shots struck about half-way up the shield,
abreast of the after pivot, and the impact forced the side in bodily two or three
inches. All the crews of the after guns were knocked over by the concussion,
and bled from the nose or ears. Another shot at the same place would have
penetrated. While alongside, boarders were called away ; but she dropped
astern before they could get on board. And so, for six or more hours, the
struggle was kept up. At length, the Monitor withdrew over the middle
ground where we could not follow, but always maintaining a position to
THE FIRST FIGHT OF I RON -CL ADS. 703
protect the Minnesota. \ To have run our ship ashore on a falling tide would
have been ruin. We awaited her return for an hour ; and at "2 o'clock p. m.
steamed to Sewell's Point, and thence to the dockyard at Norfolk, our crew
thoroughly worn out from the two days' fight. Although there is no doubt
that the Monitor first retired, — for Captain Van Brunt, commanding the
Minnesota, so states in his official report, — the battle was a drawn one, so far
as the two vessels engaged were concerned. But in its general results the
advantage was with the Monitor. Our casualties in the second day's fight
were only a few wounded.
This action demonstrated for the first time the power and efficiency of the
ram as a means of offense. The side of the Cumberland was crushed like an
egg-shell. The Congress and Minnesota, even with our disabled bow, would
have shared the same fate but that we could not reach them on account of
our great draught.
It also showed the power of resistance of two iron-clads, widely differing
in construction, model, and armament, under a fire which in a short time
would have sunk any other vessel then afloat.
The Monitor was well handled, and saved the Minnesota and the remainder
of the fleet at Fort Monroe. But her gunnery was poor. Not a single shot
struck us at the water-line, where the ship was utterly unprotected [see p.
717], and where one would have been fatal. Or had the fire been concentrated
on any one spot, the shield would have been pierced ; or had larger charges
been used, the result would have been the same. Most of her shot struck us
obliquely, breaking the iron of both courses, but not injuring the wood back-
ing. When struck at right angles, the backing would be broken, but not
penetrated. We had no solid projectiles, except a few of large windage, to
be used as hot shot, and, of course, made no impression on the turret. But
in all this it shoidd be borne in mind that both vessels were on their trial
trip, both were experimental, and both were receiving their baptism of fire.
On our arrival at Norfolk, Commodore Buchanan sent for me. I found him
at the Naval Hospital, badly wounded and suffering greatly. He dictated a
short dispatch to Mr. Mallory, Secretary of the Navy, stating the return of
the ship and the result of the two days' fight, and directed me to proceed to
Richmond with it and the flag of the Conf/ress, and make a verbal report of
the action, condition of the Virginia, etc.
I took the first train for Petersburg and the capital. The news had pre-
\ In his official report, Captain Van Brunt says was fired by the Monitor, which was returned with
of the fight, as viewed from the Minnesota : wholc "roadsides from the Rebels, with no more effect,
apparently, than so many pebble-stones thrown by a
" At 6 A. si. the enemy again appeared, . . . and I child. . . . The Merrimac, finding that she could make
beat to quarters ; but they ran past my ship and were nothing of the Monitor, turned her attention once more
heading for Fortress Monroe, and the retreat was beaten to me. Iu the morning she had put one eleven-inch shot
to enable my men to get something to eat. The Merri- under my counter, near the water-line, and now, on her
mac ran down near the Rip-Raps and then turned into second approach, I opened upon her with all my broad*
the channel through which I had come. Again all hands side-guns and ten-inch pivot — a broadside which would
were called to quarters, and opened upon her with my have blown out of water any timber-built ship in the
stern-guns, and made signal to the Monitor to attack world. She returned my fire with her rifled bow-gun,
the enemy. She immediately ran down in my wake, with a shell which passed through the chief engineer's
right within the range of the Merrimac, completely state-room, through the engineers' mess-room amid-
covering my ship, as far as was possible with her ships, and burst in the boatswain's room, tearing four
diminutive dimensions, and, much to my astonishment, rooms all into one, in its passage exploding two charges
laid herself right alongside of the Merrimac, and the of powder, which set the ship on fire, but it was promptly
contrast was that of a pigmy to a giant. Gun after gun extinguished by a party headed by my first lieutenant."
fiff;; J
P, *=i**? t<
;»s^fc 1l^S^W="
ESCAPE OF PAKT OF THE CREW OF THE " CONGRESS."
704
THE FIRST FIGHT OF IRON-CLADS. 705
ceded me, aid at every station I was warmly received, and to listening crowds
was forced to repeat the story of the fight. Arriving at Richmond, I drove to
Mr. Mallory's ohice and with him went to President Davis's, where we met Mr.
Benjamin, who, a few days afterward, became Secretary of State, Mr. Seddon,
afterward Secretary of War, General Cooper, Adjutant-General, and a num-
ber of others. I told at length what had occurred on the previous two days,
and what changes and repairs were necessary to the Virginia. As to the
future, I said that in the Monitor we had met our equal, and that the result
of another engagement would be very doubtful. Mr. Davis made many in-
quiries as regarded the ship's draught, speed, and capabilities, and urged the
completion of the repairs at as early a day as possible. The conversation
lasted until near midnight. During the evening the flag of the Congress,
which was a very large one, was brought in, and to our surprise, in unfold-
ing it, we found it in some places saturated with blood. On this discovery
it was quickly rolled up and sent to the Navy Department, where it remained
during the war ; it doubtless burned with that building when Richmond was
evacuated.
The news of our victory was received everywhere in the South with the
most enthusiastic rejoicing. Coming, as it did, after a number of disasters in
the south and west, it was particularly grateful. Then again, under the cir-
cumstances, so little was expected from the navy that this success was entirely
unlooked for. So, from one extreme to the other, the most extravagant
anticipations were formed of what the ship could do. For instance: the
blockade could be raised, Washington leveled to the ground, New York laid
under contribution, and so on. At the North, equally groundless alarm was
felt. As an example of this, Secretary Welles relates what took place at a
Cabinet meeting called by Mr. Lincoln on the receipt of the news.-& " ' The
Merrimacf said Stanton, ' will change the whole character of the war ; she will
destroy, seriatim, every naval vessel ; she will lay all the cities on the sea-
board under contribution. I shall immediately recall Burnside ; Port Royal
must be abandoned. I will notify the governors and municipal authorities in
the North to take instant measures to protect their harbors.' He had no
doubt, he said, that the monster was at this moment on her way to Washing-
ton ; and, looking out of the window, which commanded a view of the Poto-
mac for many miles, ' Not unlikely, we shall have a shell or cannon-ball from
one of her guns in the White House before we leave this room.' Mr. Seward,
usually buoyant and self-reliant, overwhelmed with the intelligence, listened
in responsive sympathy to Stanton, and was greatly depressed, as, indeed,
were all the members."
I returned the next day to Norfolk, and informed Commodore Buchanan
that he would be promoted to be admiral, and that, owing to his wound, he would
be retired from the command of the Virginia. Lieutenant Jones should have
been promoted, and should have succeeded him. He had fitted out the ship
and armed her, and had commanded during the second day's fight. However,
the department thought otherwise, and selected Commodore Josiah Tattnall ;
-^•The " news " was of the first day's battle before the Monitor had arrived. — Editors.
: I. 45
706
THE FIRST FIGHT OF IRON-CLADS.
THE EXPLOSION ON THE BURNING "CONGRESS."
except Lieutenant Jones he was the best man. He had distinguished him-
self in the wars of 1812 and with Mexico. No one stood higher as an ac-
complished and chivalrous officer. While in command of the United States
squadron in the East Indies, he was present as a neutral at the desperate fight
at the Peiho Forts, below Pekin, between the English fleet and the Chinese,
when the former lost nearly one-half of a force of twelve hundred engaged.
Seeing his old friend Sir James Hope hard pressed and in need of assistance,
having had four vessels sunk under him, he had his barge manned, and with
his flag-lieutenant, S. D. Trenchard, pulled alongside the flag-ship, through
the midst of a tremendous fire, in which his coxswain was killed and several
of his boat's crew were wounded. He found the gallant admiral desperately
wounded, and all his crew killed or disabled but six. When he offered his
services, surprise was expressed at his action. His reply was, "Blood is
thicker than water."
Tattnall took command on the 29th of March. In the meantime the Virginia
was in the dry dock under repairs. The hull four feet below the shield was
covered with 2-inch iron. A new and heavier ram was strongly secured to the
bow. The damage to the armor was repaired [see p. 717], wrought-iron port-
shutters were fitted, and the rifle-guns were supplied with steel-pointed solid
shot. These changes, with 100 tons more of ballast on her fan-tails, increased
her draught to 23 feet, improving her resisting powers, but correspondingly
decreasing her mobility and reducing her speed to 4 knots. The repairs were
not completed until the 4th of April, owing to our want of resources and the
difficulty of securing workmen. On the 11th we steamed down the harbor
to the Roads with six gun -boats, fully expecting to meet the Monitor again
and other vessels ; for we knew their fleet had been largely reenforced, by
THE FIRST FIGHT OF I RON -CL ADS.
707
the VanderUIt, among other vessels, a powerful side-wheel steamer fitted as
a ram. We were primed for a desperate tussle ; but to our surprise we had
the Roads to ourselves. We exchanged a few shots with the Rip-Baps bat-
teries, but the Monitor with the other vessels of the fleet remained below Fort
Monroe, in Chesapeake Bay, where we could not get at them except by pass-
ing between the forts.
The day before going down, Commodore Tattnall had written to Secretary
Mallory, " I see no chance for me but to pass the forts and strike elsewhere,
and I shall be gratified by your
authority to do so." This freedom
of action was never granted, and
probably wisely, for the result of
an action with the Monitor and
fleet, even if we ran the gauntlet
of the fire of the forts successfully,
was more than doubtful, and any
disaster would have exposed Nor-
folk and James River, and prob-
ably would have resulted in the
loss of Richmond. For equally
good reasons the Monitor acted on
the defensive; for if she had been
out of the way, General McClel-
lan's base and fleet of transports
in York River would have been
endangered; Observing three mer-
chant vessels at anchor close in-
shore and within the bar at Ham it-
ton, the commodore ordered Lieu-
tenant Barney in the Jamestown to
go in and bring them out. This
was promptly and successfully ac-
complished, under a fire from the
forts. Two were brigs loaded with
supplies for the army. The capture
of these vessels, within gun-shot of
their fleet, did not affect its movements. As the Jamestown towed her prizes
under the stern of the English corvette Rinaldo, Captain Hewett (now [1887]
Vice- Admiral Sir William Hewett, commanding the Channel Squadron), then
at anchor in the Roads, she was enthusiastically cheered. We remained below
all day, and at night returned and anchored off SewelPs Point.
A few days later we went down again to within gun-shot of the Rip-Raps,
and exchanged a few rounds with the fort, hoping that the Monitor would
come out from her lair into open water. Had she done so, a determined effort
would have been made to carry her by boarding. Four small gun-boats were
ready, each of which had its crew divided into parties for the performance of
LIEUTENANT JOSEPH B. SMITH, ACTING COMMANDEB OF THE
"CONGRESS." FROM A PHOTOGEAI'II.
According to the pilot of the Cumberland, Lieutenant
Smith was killed by a shot. His death was fixed at 4:20
p. M. by Lieutenant Pendergrast, next in command, who did
not bear of it until ten minutes later. When his father,
Commodore Joseph Smith, who was on duty at Washing-
ton, saw by the tiist dispatch from Fort Monroe that the
Congress had shown the white flag, be said, quietly, "Joe's
dead!" After speaking of the death of Lieutenant Smith,
Lieutenant Pendergrast says, in his official report : "Seeing
that our men were being killed without the prospect of any
relief from the Minnesota, . . . not being able to get a
single gun to bear upon the enemy, and the ship being on
fire in several places, upon consultation with Commander
William Smith we deemed it proper to haul down our col-
ors." Lieutenant Smith's sword was sent to his father by
the enemy under a flag of truce. — Editoes.
708
THE FIRST FIGHT OF IRON-CLADS. 709
certain duties after getting on board. Some were to try to wedge the turret,
some to cover the pilot-house and all the openings with tarpaulins, others to
scale with ladders the turret and smoke-stack, using shells, hand-grenades,
etc. Even if but two of the gun-boats should succeed in grappling her, we
were confident of success. Talking this over since with Captain S. D. Greene,
who was the first lieutenant of the Monitor, and in command after Captain
Worden was wounded in the pilot-house, he said they were prepared for any-
thing of this kind and that it would have failed. Certain it is, if an oppor-
tunity had been given, the attempt would have been made.
A break-down of the engines forced us to return to Norfolk. Having com-
pleted our repairs on May 8th, and while returning to our old anchorage, we
heard heavy firing, and, going down the harbor, found the Monitor, with the
iron-clads Galena, NaugatucJc, and a number of heavy ships, shelling our bat-
teries at Sewell's Point. We stood directly for the Monitor, but as we
approached they all ceased firing and retreated below the forts. We followed
close down to the Rip-Raps, whose shot passed over us, striking a mile or
more beyond the ship. We remained for some hours in the Roads, and finally
the commodore, in a tone of deepest disgust, gave the order : " Mr. Jones,
fire a gun to windward, and take the ship back to her buoy."
During the month of April, 1862, our forces, under General J. E. Johnston,
had retired from the Peninsula to the neighborhood of Richmond, to defend
the city against McClellan's advance by way of the Peninsula, and from time
to time rumors of the possible evacuation of Norfolk reached us. On the 9th
of May, while at anchor olf Sewell's Point, we noticed at sunrise that our
flag was not flying over the batteries. A boat was sent ashore and found
them abandoned. Lieutenant Pembroke Jones was then dispatched to Nor-
folk, some miles distant, to call upon General Huger, who was in command,
and learn the condition of affairs. He returned during the afternoon, report-
ing, to our great surprise, the town deserted by our troops and the navy yard
on fire. This precipitate retreat was entirely unnecessary, for while the Vir-
ginia remained afloat, Norfolk was safe, or, at all events, was not tenable by
the enemy, and James River was partly guarded, for we could have retired
behind the* obstructions in the channel at Craney Island, and, with the bat-
teries at that point, could have held the place, certainly until all the valuable
stores and machinery had been removed from the navy yard. Moreover, had
the Virginia been afloat at the time of the battles around Richmond, General
McClellan would hardly have retreated to James River ; for, had he done so,
we could at any time have closed it and rendered any position on it untenable.
Norfolk evacuated, our occupation was gone, and the next thing to be
decided upon was what should be done with the ship. Two courses of action
were open to us : we might have run the blockade of the forts and done some
damage to the shipping there and at the mouth of the York River, provided
they did not get out of our way, — for, with our great draught and low rate of
speed, the enemy's transports would have gone where we could not have fol-
lowed them ; and the Monitor and other iron-clads would have engaged us with
every advantage, playing around us as rabbits around a sloth, and the end
710
THE FIRST FIGHT OF I RON- CL ADS.
would have been the certain loss of the vessel. On the other hand, the pilots
said repeatedly, if the ship were lightened to eighteen feet, they could take her
up James River to Harrison's Landing or City Point, where she could have been
put in fighting trim again, and have been in a position to assist in the defense
of Richmond. The commodore decided upon this course. Calling all hands on
deck, he told them what he wished done.
Sharp and quick work was necessary ;
for, to be successful, the ship must be
lightened five feet, and we must pass the
batteries at Newport News and the fleet
below before daylight next morning.
The crew gave three cheers, and went to
work with a will, throwing overboard the
ballast from the fan-tails, as well as that
below, — all spare stores, water, indeed
everything but our powder and shot.
By midnight the ship had been light-
ened three feet, when, to our amaze-
ment, the pilots said it was useless to
do more, that with the westerly wind
blowing, the tide would be cut down so
that the ship would not go up even to
Jamestown Flats ; indeed, they would
not take the responsibility of taking her
up the river at all. This extraordinary
conduct of the pilots rendered some other plan immediately necessary.
Moral : All officers, as far as possible, should learn to do their own piloting.
The ship had been so lifted as to be unfit for action ; two feet of her hull
below the shield was exposed. She could not be sunk again by letting in
water without putting out the furnace fires and flooding the magazines.
Never was a commander forced by circumstances over which he had no
control into a more painful position than was Commodore Tattnall. But
coolly and calmly he decided, and gave orders to destroy the ship ; deter-
mining if he could not save his vessel, at all events not to sacrifice three
hundred brave and faithful men; and that he acted wisely, the fight at Drew-
ry's Bluff, which was the salvation of Richmond, soon after proved. She was
run ashore near Craney Island, and the crew landed with their small-arms
and two days' provisions. Having only two boats, it took three hours to dis-
embark. Lieutenant Catesby Jones and myself were the last to leave. Set-
ting her on fire fore and aft, she was soon in a blaze, and by the light of
our burning ship we pulled for the shore, landing at daybreak. We marched
22 miles to Suffolk and took the cars for Richmond.-
The news of the destruction of the Virginia caused a most profound feeling
of disappointment and indignation throughout the South, particularly as so
much was expected of the ship after our first success. On Commodore Tattnall
the most unsparing and cruel aspersions were cast. He promptly demanded
CAPTAIN G. J. VAN BRUNT, COMMANDER OF THE
"MINNESOTA." FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
THE FIRST FIGHT OF I RON -CL ADS. 711
a court of inquiry, and, not satisfied with this, a court-martial, whose unani-
mous finding, after considering the facts and circumstances, was : " Being
thus situated, the only alternative, in the opinion of the court, was to aban-
don and burn the ship then and there ; which, in the judgment of the
court, was deliberately and wisely done by order of the accused. Where-
fore, the court do award the said Captain Josiah Tattnall an honorable
acquittal."
It only remains now to speak of our last meeting with the Monitor. Arriv-
ing at Richmond, we heard that the enemy's fleet was ascending James
River, and the result was great alarm ; for, relying upon the Virginia, not a
gun had been mounted to protect the city from a water attack. We were
hurried to Drewry's Bluff, the first high ground below the city, seven miles
distant. Here, for two days, exposed to constant rain, in bottomless mud and
without shelter, on scant provisions, we worked unceasingly, mounting guns
and obstructing the river. In this we were aided by the crews of small vessels
which had escaped up the river before Norfolk was abandoned. The Jamestown
and some small sailing-vessels were sunk in the channel, but, owing to the high
water occasioned by a freshet, the obstructions were only partial. We had
only succeeded in getting into position three thirty-twos and two sixty-fours
(shell guns) and were without sufficient supply of ammunition, when on the
15th of May the iron-clad Galena, Commander John Rodgers, followed by
the Monitor and three others, hove in sight. We opened fire as soon as they
came within range, directing most of it on the Galena. This vessel was
handled very skillfully. Coming up within six hundred yards of the battery,
she anchored, and, with a spring from her quarter, presented her broadside ;
this under a heavy fire, and in a narrow river with a strong current. The
Monitor, and others anchored just below, answered our fire deliberately; but,
owing to the great elevation of the battery, their fire was in a great measure
ineffectual, though two guns were dismounted and several men were killed
and wounded. While this was going on, our sharp-shooters were at work on
both banks. Lieutenant Catesby Jones, in his report, speaks of this service :
" Lieutenant Wood, with a portion of the men, did good service as sharp-
shooters. The enemy were excessively annoyed by their fire. His position
was well chosen and gallantly maintained in spite of the shell, shrapnel, grape,
and canister fired at them." Finding they could make no impression on our
works, the Galena, after an action of four hours, returned down the river with
her consorts. Her loss was about forty killed and wounded. J
This was one of the boldest and best-conducted operations of the war, and
one of which very little notice has been taken. Had Commander Rodgers
been supported by a few brigades, landed at City Point or above on the south
side, Richmond would have been evacuated. The Virginia's crew alone barred
his way to Richmond ; otherwise the obstructions would not have prevented
his steaming up to the city, which would have been as much at his mercy as
was New Orleans before the fleet of Farragut.
I According to the official report, the loss on the Galena was 13 killed and 11 wounded ; on the Port
Royal, 1 wounded, and on the Naugatuck, 2 wounded. Total, 13 killed and 14 wounded. — Editors.
THE MONITOR" IN BATTLE TRIM.
WATCHING THE " MERKIMAC."
BY R. E. COLSTON, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, C. S. A.
IN March, 1862, I was in command of a Confed-
erate brigade and of a district on the south side
of the James River, embracing all the river forts
and batteries down to the mouth of Nansemond
River. My pickets were posted all along the shore
opposite Newport News. From my headquarters
at Smithfield I was in constant and rapid commu-
nication through relays of couriers and signal
stations with my department commander, Major-
General Huger, stationed at Norfolk. 3>
About 1 p. M. on the 8th of March, a courier
dashed up to my headquarters with this brief dis-
patch: "The Virginia is coming up the river."
Mounting at once, it took me but a very short time
to gallop twelve miles down to Ragged Island.
I had hardly dismounted at the water's edge
when I descried the Merrimac approaching. The
Congress was moored about a hundred yards below
the land batteries, and the Cumberland a little
above them. As soon as the Merrimac came
within range, the batteries and war-vessels opened
^ " The situation of affairs, both Federal and State, at
Norfolk, on the morning of the 19th of April [1861]," says
J. T. Scharf in his " History of the Confederate States
Navy," " was that the Federal authorities had there the
U. S. frigate Cumberland, 24 guns, full}' manned, ready
for sea, and under orders for Vera Cruz; the brig Dol-
phin, 4 guns, fully manned, and ready for sea; the sloop
Cermantown, 22 guns, fully manned, ready for sea; the
sloop Plymoutli , 22 guns, ready for sea ; themarines of the
navy yard, and the guards of the frigate Raritan , 60 guns,
in ordinary; the frigate Columbia, 50 guns, in ordinary;
the frigate United Slates, 50 guns, in ordinary ; the steam-
frigate Merrimac, 40 guns, under repairs ; the ship of the
line Delaware, 74 guns, in ordinary ; the ship of the line
CoUunbus, 74 guns, in ordinary; and the ship of the line
Pennsylvania, 120 guns, ' receiving-sliip ' ; — all lyiug at
the yard or in the stream. The yard was walled around
with a high brick inclosure, and protected by the Eliza-
beth River, and there were over 800 marines and sailors
with officers. On the side of Virginia the situation was:
that of General Taliaferro with his staff; Captain Heth
and Major Tyler, two volunteer companies,— the Blues
of Norfolk and the Grays of Portsmouth,— and Captains
Pegram and Jones, of the navy. These were the only
troops in Norfolk, until after the evacuation of the navy
yard and the departure of the Federal ships."
Captain H. G. Wright, of the Eugineers, who was on
the United States steamer Pawnee that had been sent to
secure the ships and property at the Gosport Navy
Yard, reached Norfolk after dark on April 20th. He re-
ported thus: " On reaching the yard it was found that all
the ships afloat except the Cumberland had been scuttled,
by order of Commodore McCauley, the commandant of
the yard, to prevent their seizure by the Virginia forces,
and that they were fast sinking. One of the objects of
the expedition— that of removing those vessels and tak-
ing them to sea —was, therefore, frustrated. On report-
ing to the commodore of the yard, I found him disposed
to defend the yard and property to the last, and
the troops were accordingly landed and some disposi-
fire. She passed on up, exchanging broadsides
with the Congress, and making straight for the
Cumberland, at which she made a dash, firing her
bow-guns as she struck the doomed vessel with her
prow. I could hardly believe my senses when I
saw the masts of the Cumberland begin to sway
wildly. After one or two lurches, her hull disap-
peared beneath the water, guns firing to the last
moment. Most of her brave crew went down with
their ship, but not with their colors, for the
Union flag still floated defiantly from the masts,
which projected obliquely for about half their
length above the water after the vessel had set-
tled unevenly upon the river-bottom. This first act
of the drama was over in about thirty minutes, but
it seemed to me only a moment.
The commander of the Congress recognized at
once the impossibility of resisting the assault of the
ram which had just sunk the Cumberland. With
commendable promptness and presence of mind,
he slipped his cables, and ran her aground upon
tions for defense taken. It was soon determined, how-
ever, by Commodore Paulding, who had come on the
Pawnee from Washington, to finish the destruction of the
scuttled ships, to burn and otherwise destroy, as far as
practicable, the property in the yard, and withdraw with
the frigate Cumberland, in tow of the Pawnee and a
st eam-tug which was lying at the yard. To Commander
John Rodgers, of the navy, and myself was assigned
the duty of blowing up the dry-dock, assisted by forty
men of the volunteers and a few men from the crew
of the Pawnee." Captain Wright and Commander
Rodgers lighted the matches, but the mine, as was aft-
erward learned, did not explode. The heat from the
burning buildings drove the men in the boats from the
landing, and the two officers, alone and hemmed in,
had to give themselves up to the commander of the
Virginia forces. They were taken to Richmond, and
released on April 24th.
In his "Recollections," Captain W. H. Parker, C. S.
N., says: " The evacuation of Norfolk by the Federals
was a most fortunate thing for the Confederates. Why
the Federal authorities did this was always beyond my
comprehension. They had the place, and with the force
nt their command could not have been driven out. No
batteries could have been put up by the Confederates
in the face of the broadsides of their ships, and it
being only twelve miles from Fort Monroe (Old Point
Comfort) it could have been reenforced to any extent.
But they did give it up, and had hardly done so when
they commenced making preparations to retake it. The
navy yard contained a large number of heavy cannon,
and these guns were used not only to fortify Norfolk and
the batteries on the York, Potomac, James, and Rappa-
hannock rivers, but were sent to North and South
Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and
Louisiana. They were to be found at Roanoke Island,
Wilmington, Charleston, Mobile, New Orleans, Vicks-
burg, and many other places. These guns, according
to J. T. Scharf, numbered 1198, of which 52 were nine-
inch Dahlgrens." Editors.
712
WATCHING THE " MERRIMAC"
71 3
..i
y.
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THE " MERRIMAC '
m'JJ?-
PASSING THE CONFEDERATE BATTERY ON CRANEY ISLAND, ON HER WAY
TO ATTACK THE FEDERAL FLEET.
the shallows, where the Merrimac, at that time
drawing twenty-three feet of water, was unable to
approach her, and could attack her with artillery
alone. But, although the Congress had more guns
than the Merrimac, and was also supported by the
land batteries, it was an unequal conflict, for the
projectiles hurled at the Merrimac glanced harm-
lessly from her iron-covered roof, while her rifled
guns raked the Congress from end to end.
A curious incident must be noted here. Great
numbers of people from the neighborhood of Rag-
ged Island, as well as soldiers from the nearest
posts, had rushed to the shore to behold the spec-
tacle. The cannonade was visibly raging with
redoubled intensity ; but, to our amazement, not
a sound was heard by us from the commencement
of the battle. A strong March wind was blowing
direct from us toward Newport News. We could
see every flash of the guns and the clouds of white
smoke, but not a single report was audible.
The Merrimac, taking no notice of the land bat-
teries, concentrated her fire upon the ill-fated Con-
gress. The latter replied gallantly until her
commander, Joseph B. Smith, was killed and her
decks were reeking with slaughter. Then her
colors were hauled down and white flags appeared
at the gaff and mainmast. Meanwhile, the James
River gun-boat flotilla had joined the Merrimac.
Through my field-glass I could see the crew of
the Congress making their escape to the shore over
the bow. Unable to secure her prize, the Merri-
mac set her on fire with hot shot, and turned to
face new adversaries just appearing upon the
scene of conflict.
As soon as it was known at Fort Monroe that
the Merrimac had come out, the frigates Min-
nesota, BoanoJce, and St. Laurence were ordered to
the assistance of the blockading squadron. The
Minnesota, assisted by two tugs, was the first to
reach the scene, but the Cumberland and the Con-
gress were already past help. As soon as she came
within range, a rapid cannonade commenced be-
tween her and the Merrimac, aided by the Patrick
Henry and the Jamestown, side-wheel river steamers
transformed into gun-boats. The Minnesota, draw-
ing nearly as much water as the Merrimac, grounded
upon a shoal in the North Channel. This at once
put an end to any further attacks by ramming;
but the lofty frigate, towering above the water,
now offered an easy target to the rifled guns of
the Merrimac and the lighter artillery of the gun-
boats. A shot from her exploded the Patrick Henry 's
boiler, causing much loss of life and disabling that
vessel for a considerable time.
In the meantime the Boanoke and St. Lawrence
were approaching, aided by steam-tugs. As they
passed Sewell's Point, its batteries opened fire
upon them, and they replied with broadsides. Just
at that moment the scene was one of unsurpassed
magnificence. The bright afternoon sun shone
upon the glancing waters. The fortifications of
Newport News were seen swarming with soldiers,
now idle spectators of a conflict far beyond the
range of their batteries, and the flames were just
bursting from the abandoned Congress. The
stranded Minnesota seemed a huge monster at bay,
surrounded by the Merrimac and the gun-boats.
The entire horizon was lighted up by the continual
flashes of the artillery of these combatants, the
broadsides of the Boanoke and St. Lawrence and
the Sewell's Point batteries; clouds of white smoke
rose in spiral columns to the skies, illumined by
the evening sunlight, while land and water seemed
to tremble under the thunders of the cannonade.
The Minnesota was now in a desperate situation.
It is true that, being aground, she could not sink,
but, looking through the glass, I could see a hole in
her side, made by the Merrimac's rifle shells. She
had lost a number of men, and had once been set
on fire. Her destruction or surrender seemed inev-
itable, since all efforts to get her afloat had failed.
But just then the Merrimac turned away from her
toward the Boanoke and the St. Lawrence. These
vessels had suffered but little from the distant fire
of the Sewell's Point batteries, but both had run
aground, and had not been floated off again with-
7i4 HOW THE GUN-BOAT "ZOUAVE" AIDED THE "CONGRESS.
out great difficulty, for it was very hazardous for
vessels of deep draught to manoeuvre over these
comparatively shallow waters. When the Merri-
miif approached, they delivered broadsides aud
were theu towed back with promptness. The
Merrimac pursued them but a short distance (for
by this time darkness was falling upon the scene
of action, the tide was ebbing, and there was gi'eat
risk of running aground), and then steamed toward
Norfolk with the Bean fort, leaving her wounded at
the Marine Hospital.
And now followed one of the grandest episodes
of this splendid yet somber drama. The moon in
her second quarter was just rising over the waters,
but her silvery light was soon paled by the con-
flagration of the Congress, whose glai*e was reflected
in the river. The burning frigate four miles away
seemed much nearer. As the flames crept up the
rigging, every mast, spar, andrope glittered against
the dark sky in dazzling lines of fire. The hull,
aground upon the shoal, was plainly visible, and
upon its black surface each port-hole seemed the
mouth of a fiery furnace. For hours the flames
raged, with hardly a perceptible change in the
wondrous picture. At irregular intervals, loaded
guns and shells, exploding as the fire reached them,
sent forth their deep reverberations. The masts
and rigging were still standing, apparently almost
intact, when, about 2 o'clock in the morning, a
monstrous sheaf of flame rose from the vessel to
an immense height. A deep report announced the
explosion of the ship's powder-magazine. Appar-
ently all the force of the explosion had been up-
ward. The rigging had vanished entirely, but the
hull seemed hardly shattered ; the only apparent
change in it was that in two places two or three
of the port-holes had been blown into one great
gap. It continued to burn until the brightness of
its blaze was effaced by the morning sun.
During the night I had sent an order to bring
down from Smithfield to Ragged Island the twelve-
oared barge that I used when inspecting the river
batteries, and at the first dawn of day I embarked
with some of my staff, and rowed in the direction
of the Minnesota, confident of witnessing her de-
struction or surrender ; and, in fact, nothing could
have saved her but the timely arrival of the anx-
iously expected Monitor.
The sun was just rising when the Merrimac,
having anchored for the night at Sewell's Point,
headed toward the Minnesota. But a most impor-
tant incident had taken place during the night. The
Monitor had reached Old Point about 10 o'clock ;
her commander had been informed of the events
of the day, and ordered to proceed at once to the
relief of the Minnesota.
As soon as the Merrimac approached her old
adversary, the Monitor darted out from behind the
Minnesota, whose immense bulk had effectually
concealed her from view. No words can express
the surprise with which we beheld this strange
craft, whose appearance was tersely and graphic-
ally described by the exclamation of one of my
oarsmen, "A tin can on a shingle!" Yet this insig-
nificant-looking object was at that moment the most
powerful war-ship in the world. The first shots
of the Merrimac were directed at the Minnesota,
which was again set on fire, while one of the tugs
alongside of her was blown up, creating gi'eat havoc
and consternation ; but the Meniitor, having the
advantage of light draught, placed herself between
the Merrimac and her intended victim, and from
that moment the conflict became a heroic single
combat between the two iron-clads. For an in-
stant they seemed to pause, as if to survey each
other. Then advancing cautiously, the two vessels
opened fire as soon as they came within range,
and a fierce artillery duel raged between them
without perceptible effect, although the entire fight
was within close range, from half a mile at the far-
thest down to a few yards. For four hours, from
8 to 12 (which seemed three times as long), the
cannonading continued with hardly a moment's
intermission. I was now within three-quarters of
a mile of them, and more than once stray shots
came near enough to dash the spray over my barge,
but the grandeur of the spectacle was so fasciuat-
ingthat theypassed by imheeded. During the evo-
lutions, in which the Monitor had the advantage
of light draught, the Merrimac ran aground. After
much delay and difficulty she was floated off. Find-
ing that her shot made no impression whatever
upon the Monitor, the Merrimac, seizing a favorable
chance, succeeded in striking her foe with her stem.
Soon afterward they ceased firing and separated as
if by common consent. The Monitor steamed away
toward Old Point. Captain Van Brunt, commander
of the Minnesota, states in his official report that
when he saw the Monitor disappear, he lost all
hope of saving his ship. But, fortunately for him,
the Merrimac steamed slowly toward Norfolk,
evidently disabled in her motive power. The
Monitor, accompanied by several tugs, returned
late in the afternoon, and they succeeded in float-
ing off the Minnesota and conveying her to Old
Point.
HOW THE GUN-BOAT " ZOUAVE" AIDED THE "CONGRESS."
BY HENRY REANEY, ACTING MASTER, U. S.
N.
The Zouave was a tug-boat built in Albany,
N. Y., for service on the Hudson River, of
great power and speed for that class of vessel.
On her purchase by the Government, she was
delivered at Hampton Roads by her original
owners to Admiral Goldsborough, at that time in
command of the North Atlantic Squadron. The en-
gineers and firemen who brought her from Albany
entered the naval service, both the former being
appointed acting second-assistant engineers, and
the latter first-class firemen. I was ordered to her
February 1st, 1862, and took with me from the
store-ship William Badger, of which I was execu-
tive, ten men, who, with the pilot, H. J. Phillips,
THE PLAN AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE " MERRIMAC"
7*5
who had been previously ordered, comprised the
crew. She had for armament a 30-pounder Par-
rott rifle forward and a 21-pounder howitzer aft.
We were ready for service early in February and
were assigued to picket duty in the James River,
which employed us only from sunset to sunrise.
During the daytime we acted as a tender for the
Cumberland and Congress. On the Sth of March,
after coming in from picket duty, we went to Fort
Monroe for the mail and fresh provisions, which we
got on the arrival of the mail-boat from Baltimore.
We returned to Newport News about 10 o'clock.
After delivering the stores belonging to the Congress
and Cumberland, we went to the wharf to lie until
wanted. A little after dinner, about 12:30, the
quartermaster on watch called my attention to
black smoke in the Elizabeth River, close to
Craney Island. We let go from the wharf and ran
alongside the Cumberland. The officer of the deck
ordered us to run down toward Pig Point and find
out what was coming down from Norfolk. It
did not take us long to find out, for we had not
gone over two miles when we saw what to all ap-
pearances looked like the roof of a very big barn
belching forth smoke as from a chimney on fire. We
were all divided in opinion as to what was coming.
The boatswain's mate was the first to make out
the Confederate flag, and then we all guessed it was
the Merrimac come at last. When we were satisfied
it was the enemy, we went to quarters and fired
our 30-pounder Parrott, which was not answered.
We fired again, taking deliberate aim, and were
rather surprised that it was unnoticed ; we fired, I
think, about six shots when our recall signal was
hoisted on the Cumberland. By this time the bat-
teries at Newport News had commenced firiiig, the
( 'ongrcss had gone to quarters and opened fire ;
when we got close to the Cumberland she also be-
gan firing. The Merrimac kept on until abreast the
( 'ongrcss, when she opened fire, pouring a broadside
in passing, and came right on for the Cumberland,
which vessel was using her guns as fast as they
could be fired. We were in rather a tight place,
being between the fire of the gun-boats from Nor-
folk and the Patrick Henry and Jamestown from
Richmond, and our own batteries on shore, the shot
from which were falling all round us. However,
we kept loading and firing as fast as we were able,
until, seeing that the Congress "had loosed her fore-
topsail and made signal for us to come alongside,
we ran down to her, leaving the Cumberland just
as the Merrimac was passing her bows. We made
fast to the port side of the Congress, passing our
tow-line through a scupper, and with our breast-
lines through a gun-port, she lying headed toward
Hampton Roads. There was hardly a breath of
wind, so that her topsail and jib were of no account
in moving her. It took us some time to get our
lines fast, owing to the horrible condition of affairs
on the gun-deck, which was on fire. The cries of the
wounded were terrible. The men were not all regu-
lar men-of-war's-rnen — I think some were soldiers :
but, anyhow, the tug's crew had to get on board to
make our lines fast. When everything was ready,
Lieut. Smith ordei'ed me to go ahead, with our
helm hard-a-starboard so as to get her into shoal
water. When we had her headed toward the shore,
the Merrimac got right astern of us and opened fire,
pouring broadside after broadside, that raked her
fore and aft, overthrowing several of the guns and
killing a number of the crew. About this time we
were in rather a bad plight ; the blood was running
from the Congress scuppers on to our deck, like
water on a wash-deck morning; the tallow-cup on
top of our cylinder, and the pilot-house and billet-
head on the stem were shattered by shot ; the pilot,
Mr. Phillips, was stunned. Our Zouave figure-head,
which was a fixture on top of the pilot-house, carried
away by a shot on its way over the bows, disabled
two of the crew of the rifle. It was about this time
that the Congress grounded and the white flag was
hoisted. Firing ceased and a rebel steamer was mak-
ing for us. I told Lieut. Pendergrast that if he did
not want me anymore, I'd leave and try to escape.
He told me to take care of myself, as they had sur-
rendered. We cut our lines and backed astern, and,
as soon as we got clear, commenced firing, which,
I think, gave rise to the charge of the Congress
firing after she had struck her colors. The Minne-
sota was aground in the North Channel, and had
my recall signal flying. We headed for her, keeping
as close to the beach on our side as possible, when
about half-way, after passing all the enemy's
vessels, we were struck by a shot which carried
away our rudder-post and one of the blades of
our propeller-wheel. Being then unable to use our
rudder, and heading directly for the enemy, we
stopped and backed so as to gel hei head right,
which we did, and with our large hawser out over
our port quarter, we kept her going in the right
direction, until the gun-boat Whitehall came to our
assistance. We lay that night alongside the Minne-
sota, and in the morning were towed to Fort Monroe.
I claim for the Zouave that she fired the first
shot at the Merrimac, and that but for her assist-
ance the Congress would have been captured ; in
evidence of which I refer to page 04 of Profes-
sor Soley's book, "The Blockade and the Cruisers,"
also to the "New York Herald" of March 10th,
1862. I held the appointment of acting master's
mate, and had been in the service from June, 1861.
Detroit, March 9th, 1884.
THE PLAN AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE
I.
MERRIMAC."
BY JOHN M. BROOKE, COMMANDER, C. S. N.
Early in June, 1861, the Secretary of the Navy
of the Confederate States asked me to design
an iron-clad, The first idea presenting itself was a
shield of timber, two feet thick, plated with three
or more inches of iron, inclined to the horizontal
plane at the least angle that would permit work-
ing the guns ; this shield, its eaves submerged to
the depth of two feet, to be supported by a hull of
7 1 6
THE PLAN AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE " MERRIMAC.
equal length. There was nothing novel in the use
of inclined iron-plating. It was apparent that to
support such a shield the ends of the vessel would
be so full as to prevent the attainment of speed ;
and that in moving end on even a small sea would
prevent working the bow or stern gun. It then
occurred to me that fineness of line, protection of
hull, and buoyancy with light draught, could be
obtained by extending the ends of the vessel under
water beyond the shield, provided the shield were
of sufficient length to give the requisite stability.
Considering, then, the liability to the banking up
of water over these submerged ends, I erected
upon each a decked superstructure of ship-iron,
carried up from the sides of the submerged parts
to a height above water not greater than would
permit free use of the guns, and of the usual form
of hull above water. Water could be admitted or
taken from them.
I submitted to the secretary outline drawings, —
sheer, body and deck plans, with explanations, —
and he approved and adopted this novel form. In
reply to my suggestion that Naval-Constructor John
L. Porter and Chief-Engineer William P. William-
son should be called to Richmond, that we might
put the plan in execution, he replied that a practi-
cal mechanic would be sent from the Norfolk yard.
This mechanic — a master ship-carpenter — came;
but as he was lacking in confidence and energy,
and was averse to performing unusual duty, he
was permitted to return to the yard.
Messrs. Porter and Williamson were ordered to
Richmond for consultation on the same general
subject, and to aid in the work. They met the
secretary and myself on the 23d of June, 1861.
Mr. Porter brought and submitted to the secretary
a model described by the latter in a report dated
March 29th, 1862, to the congress of the Confed-
erate States, as " a flat-bottomed light-draught pro-
peller, casemated battery, with inclined iron sides
and ends." The hull of this model did not extend
beyond the shield. The secretary then called the
attention of Messrs. Williamson and Porter to the
plan proposed by me, which had been adopted by
the department. The drawings were laid before
them, the reasons for extending the hull under
water beyond the shield were given, and both
approved it. As the drawings were in pencil, the
secretary directed me to make a clean drawing in
ink of the plan, to be filed in the department.
Messrs. Porter and Williamson were directed to
ascertain if suitable engines and boilers could be
obtained. Mr. Porter offered to make the clean
drawing, as "being more familiar with that sort
of work." Accepting the offer I went with Will-
iamson to the Tredegar works, where we learned
that there were no suitable engines in the South.
Williamson then said he thought the engines of
the Merrimac could be used, but that the vessel
would necessarily draw as much water as the
Merrimac, and it would not be worth while to build
a new hull, as enough of the old hull remained to
carry out the plan. Mr. Porter and I thought the
draught too great, but that we could not do better.
We so reported to the secretary, who concurred.
That there might be official record of results of
consultation, as there was of the original plan, he
directed us to consider and report upon the best
mode of making the Merrimac useful, which we
did in accordance with the views above stated.
Mr. Williamson and Mr. Porter returned to Nor-
folk, the former to adapt and repair the engines,
the latter to cut the ship down, submerge her
ends, etc. To me was'assigned the preparation of
armor, construction of guns, etc. On the 11th of
July Mr. Porter submitted to the secretary draw-
ings, based upon actual measurements of the ship
and on the plan of submerged extended ends, which
I had presented, and which had been unanimously
approved. Having reference to this working plan
and its details, the secretary issued the following
order :
Navy Department, Richmond, July 11, 1861. Flag-
Officer P. Forrest. Sir : You will proceed with all
practicable dispatch to make the changes in the form
of the Merrimac, and to build, equip, and fit her in
all respects according to the design and plans of the
constructor and engineer, Messrs. Porter and William-
son. . . . R. S. Mallory, Secretary of the C. S. Navy.
This and a similar order were construed by Mr.
Porter to credit him with the origin of the plan,
and served as a basis to a published claim after
the action in Hampton Roads, which led to a call
by the Confederate House of Representatives, upon
the Secretary of the Navy, for information as to
the origin of the plan, and to the settlement of the
question by a patent, No. 100, granted me by the
Confederate States, 29th July, 1862. This patent
is still in my possession.
Lexington, Va., October, 1887.
II.
BY JOHN L. PORTER, NAVAL CONSTRUCTOR, CONFEDERATE STATES.
IN June, 1861, I was ordered to Richmond by
Secretary Mallory, and carried up with me a
model of an iron-clad for harbor defense. Soon after
my arrival I was informed by the secretary that I
had been sent for to confer with Chief Engineer W.
P. Williamson and Lieutenant J. M. Brooke in
arranging an iron-clad. We went into Engineer
Williamson's office, and held a consultation, the
result of which was this report to the secretary :
" Navy Department, Richmond, June 25th, 1861. Sir :
In obedience to your order, we have carefully examined
and considered the various plans and propositions for
constructing a shot-proof steam-battery, and respect-
fully report that in our opinion the steam-frigate Merri-
mac, which is in such condition from the effect of fire as
to be useless for any other purpose without incurring a
very heavy expense in her rebuilding, can be made an
efficient vessel of that character, mounting 10 heavy
guns, 2 pivot and 8 broadside guns of her original bat-
tery, and from the further consideration that we cannot
procure a suitable engine and boilers for any other ves-
sel without building them, which woidd occupy too
much time, it would appear that this is our only chance
to get a suitable vessel in a short time. The bottom of
THE PLAN AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE "MERRIMAC.
717
the lm]l, boilers, and heavy and costly parts of the
engine being but little injured, reduce the cost of con-
struction to about one-third of the amount which would
be required to construct such a vessel anew.
" We cannot, without further examination, make an
accurate estimate of the cost of the proposed work, but
think it will be about one hundred and ten' thousand
dollars, the most of which will be for labor, the materials
being nearly all on hand in the yard, excepting the iron
plating to cover the shield. The plan to be adopted in
the arrangement of the shield for glancing shot, mount-
ing guns, arranging the hull, and plating to be in accord-
ance with the plan submitted for the approval of the
department. We are, with much respect, your obedient
servants, William P. Williamson, Chief Engineer;
John M. Brooke, Lieutenant; John L. Porter, Naval
Constructor."
I returned immediately to the Gosport Navy
Yard, and made a working drawing of the whole
thing, put my shield on it, which I had in my
model, and returned to the secretary, July 11th,
1861, who had the following order made out, and
placed in my hands by himself:
"Navy Department, Richmond, July nth, 1861. Flag-
Officer F. Forrest. Sir : You will proceed, with all
practicable dispatch, to make the changes in the Merri-
mac, and to build, ecpiip, and tit her in all respects
according to the designs and plans of the constructor
and engineer, Messrs. Porter and Williamson. As time
is of the first importance in the matter, you will see that
work progresses without delay to completion. S. R.
Mallory, Secretary of the Confederate States Navy."
I came immediately back to the Navy Yard and
commenced this great work, unassisted by mortal
man so far as the plans and responsibilities of the
hull and its workings were concerned as an iron-
clad. The second letter which came from the de-
partment about this great piece of work is as
follows :
"Confederate States Navi Department, Rich-
mond, August 18th, 1861. Flag-Officer F. Forrest,
Commanding Navy Yard, Gosport. Sir: The great
importance of the service expected from the Merrimac,
and the urgent necessity of her speedy completion, in-
duce me to call upon you to push forward the work with
the utmost dispatch. Chief Engineer Williamson and
Constructor Porter, severally in charge of the two
respective branches of this great work, and for which
they will be held personally responsible, will receive,
therefore, every possible facility at the expense and
delay of every other work on hand if necessary. Secre-
tary S. R. Mallory, Confederate States Navy."
In April, 1846, I had been stationed in Pitts-
burg superintending an iron steamer, when I con-
ceived the idea of an iron-clad, and made a model
with the exact shield which I placed on the Merri-
mac. Lieutenant Brooke tried for over a week to
carry out the wish of the department, but failed
entirely to produce anything, whereupon I was
called on by the secretary.
After I had made the plan of the Merrimac, and
had submitted it to the department, not to Lieuten-
ant Brooke, and when everything was fresh in the
mind of the secretary, he had the order of July
11th made out and placed in my hands, to Flag-
Officer Forrest, to proceed with the work with all
dispatch. No man save myself had anything to
do with the converting of that ship into an iron-
clad,— I calculated her displacement, weight, etc.,
and cut her down to suit, and no man save myself
knew what she would bear. Lieutenant Brooke
came to the yard once while the ship was being
prepared, and stated that he had tried experiments
on three inches of iron and it would not stand the
fire. I then told him to put on another inch, mak-
ing four inches ; he asked me if she would bear it.
I told him she would, and the armor was changed
to four inches. All the inboard plans and arrange-
ments were made by myself, and the whole work-
ing of the ship ; Lieutenant Brooke superintended
the armor and guns ; Engineer Williamson super-
intended the machinery, and John L. Porter the
construction of the hull. The accompanying draw-
ing is a correct representation of a cross-section
amidships. She had only decks, gun and berth.
Her shield sloped at an angle of 35 degrees; her
rudder and propeller were well protected by a
heavy fan-tail ; her prow was of cast-iron se-
curely fastened to the ship, and so well secured
that though it was
broken in two by !
striking the Cum-
berland a glancing
blow, the fasten-
ings to the vessel
were not broken
loose. Her deck
ends were two feet
below water and
not awash, and the
ship was as strong
and well protected
at her center-line
as anywhere else,
as her knuckle was
two feet below her
water-line, and her
plating ran down
to the knuckle and
was there clamped. Her draught of water was 21
feet forward and 22 feet aft.
After the engagements of the 8th and 9th of
March, 1862, I put her in the dry-dock and found
she had ?)7 indentations on her armor from shot,
20 of which were from the 1 0-inch guns of the Mon-
itor. Six of her top layer of plates were broken
by the Monitor's shots, and none by those of the
other vessels. None of the lower layer of plates
were injured. I removed those plates and replaced
them by others. Her wood-work underneath was
not hurt. Her smoke-stack was full of shot-holes.
She never had any boat-davits. Her pilot-house
was cast solid, and was not covered with plate-iron
like her shield. She had port shutters only at her
four quarter port-holes. It will thus be seen that
the conversion of the Merrimac into an iron-clad
was merely accidental, and grew out of the imprac-
ticability of building an engine within the time at
the disposal of the Confederacy, and no iron-clad,
with submerged ends, was afterward built.
Portsmouth, Va., October, 1887.
CROSS-SECTION OF "MERRIMAC.
FROM A DRAWING BY JOHN
L. PORTER, CONSTRUCTOR.
a — 4 inches of iron.
b — 22 inches of wood.
(
NOTES ON THE MONITOR- MERRIMAC EIGHT. ■&
BY DINWIDDIE B. PHILLIPS, SURGEON OF THE " MERRIMAC."
The Virginia (or Merrimac), with which I was
connected during her entire career, bore some
resemblance to a huge terrapin with a large round
chimney about the middle of its back. She was so
built as not to suit high winds and heavy seas, and
therefore could not operate outside the capes of
Virginia. In fact she was designed from the first
as a defense for the harbor of Norfolk, and for that
alone. In addition to our guns, we were armed
with an iron ram or prow. The prow, not being
well put on, was twisted off and lost in our first
encounter with the Cumberland. I am also satisfied
that had not our prow been lost, Ave should have
sunk the Monitor when we rammed her on the 9th
of March, 1862. Admiral Worden is of contrary
opinion. In a private letter to me, dated March
13th, 1882, he says:
"If the prow of the Merrimac had been intact at the
time she struck the Monitor, she could not have damaged
her a particle more by the blow with it than she did in
hitting her with her stem ; and for the folio wing reasons :
The hull of the Monitor was in breadth, at her midship
section, 34 feet, and the armored raft which was placed
on the hull was, at the same point, 41 feet 4 inches in
breadth, so that the raft extended on either side 3 feet 8
inches beyond the hull. The raft was 5 feet deep and
was immersed in the water 'i^o feet. The Merrimac's
prow, according to Jones, was 2 feet below the surface
of the water. The prow, therefore, if on, would have
struck the armored hull l's feet above its lowest part,
and could not have damaged it. Further, the prow
extended 2 feet forward from the stem, and had it been
low enough to reach below the armored raft, it could not
have reached the hull by 1 foot 8 inches."
Admiral Worden's theory, given above, like all
untested ones, is merely speculation ; and I doubt
not the commander of the Cumberland, previous
to a practical demonstration, would have thought
it impossible for our prow to have first crushed its
way through a strongly constructed raft projected
in front of that vessel as a protection against
torpedoes, and then to have penetrated her bow —
the strongest part of the ship — and to have made
a chasm in it large enough, according to Wood, to
admit a "horse and cart."
Most of our crew being volunteers from the
army and unused to ship-life, about twenty per
cent, of our men were usually ashore at the hos-
pital, and our effective force on the 8th of March
was about 250 or 260 men.
We left the Norfolk Navy Yard about 11a. m.
of that day. As our engines were very weak and
defective, having been condemned just before the
war as worthless, we were fortunate in having
favorable weather for our purpose. The day was
unusually mild and calm for the season, and the
water was smooth and glassy; and, except for the
unusually large number of persons upon the shores
watching our motions, there was nothing to indi-
cate a serious movement on our part. Our vessel
never having been tested before, and her model
being new and unheard of, many of those who
watched us predicted failure, and others suggested
that the Virginia was an enormous metallic burial-
case, and that we were conductingour own funeral.
Though we withdrew on the first i ie
battle, at 7 P. m., and went to our ai gt at
Sewell's Point, our duties kept us so constantly
engaged, that it was near midnight before we got
our supper, the only meal we had taken since 8
A.M. Afterward the attractiveness of the burning
Congress was such that we watched her till nearly
1 A. M., when she blew up, before we went to our
rest, so that when we were aroused to resume the
fight on Sunday morning, it seemed as though we
had scarcely been asleep. After a hurried break-
fast, and while the crew were getting up the
anchor, I landed Captain Buchanan, Lieutenant
Minor, and the seriously wounded men at Sewell's
Point, for transmission to the naval hospital at
Norfolk. Returning, I pulled around the ship be-
fore boarding her, to see how she had stood the
bombardment of Saturday and to what extent she
had been damaged. I found all her stanchions,
iron railings, and light work of every description
swept away, her smoke-stack cut to pieces, two
guns without muzzles, and ninety-eight indenta-
tions on her plating, showing where heavy solid
shot had struck, but had glanced off without doing
any injury. As soon as I had got on deck (about
6: 25 A. M.), we started again for Hampton Roads.
On our way to the Minnesota, and while we were
still too far off to do her much damage, the Moni-
tor came out to meet us. For some length of time
we devoted our attention to her, but having no
solid shot, and finding that our light shell were
making but little impression upon her turret, Jones
ordered the pilot to disregard the Monitor alto-
gether, and carry out his first instructions by plac-
ing the Virginia as near to the Minnesota as possi-
ble. Instead, however, of taking us within a half
mile of that ship, as we afterward learned he could
have done, he purposely ran us aground nearly two
miles off. This he did through fear of passing
under the Minnesota's terrible broadside, as he con-
fessed subsequently to Captain A. B. Fairfax, Con-
federate States navy, from whose lips I received it.
After fifteen or twenty minutes we were afloat
again. We sheered off from the Monitor in order
to get a chance to turn and ram her. This was the
time when Captain Van Brunt was under the im-
pression we were in retreat and "the little battery
chasing us." As soon as the move could be
effected, we turned and ran into the Monitor, and
at the same time gave her a shot from our bow
pivot-gun. Had our iron prow been intact, as I
have already said, we would have sunk her. As it
was, she staggered awhile under the shock, and,
sheering off from us was for a time inactive [see p.
725]. The battle was renewed, but shortly after
noon the Monitor again withdrew [see p. 727].
We continued our fire upon the Minnesota, at
long range, for about half an hour longer, when
we took advantage of the flood-tide and returned
slowly to Norfolk. That we did not destroy the
Minnesota was due solely to the fact that our pilot
assured us we could get no nearer to her than we
then were without grounding again.
•& Condensed from a paper in " The Southern Bivouac " for March, 1887.
718
ARRIVAL OF THE MONITOR " AT HAMPTON ROA03.
IN THE "MONITOR" TURRET.
BY S. DANA GREENE, COMMANDER. U. S. N.. EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE "MONITOR."
THE keel of the most famous vessel of modern times, Captain Ericsson's
first iron-clad, was laid in the ship-yard of Thomas F. Rowland, at
Greenpoint, Brooklyn, in October, 1861, and on the 30th of January, 1862,
the novel craft was launched. On the 25th of February she was commissioned
and turned over to the Government, and nine days later left New York for
Hampton Roads, where, on the 9th of March, occurred the memorable contest
with the Merrimac. On her next venture on the open sea she foundered off
Cape Hatteras in a gale of wind (December 29th). During her career of less
than a year she had no fewer than five different commanders; but it was the
fortune of the writer to serve as her only executive officer, standing upon her
deck when she was launched, and leaving it but a few minutes before she sank.
So hurried was the preparation of the Monitor that the mechanics worked
upon her day and night up to the hour of her departure, and little oppor-
tunity was offered to drill the crew at the guns, to work the turret, and to
become familiar with the other unusual features of the vessel. The crew
was, in fact, composed of volunteers. Lieutenant Worden, having been
authorized by the Navy Department to select his men from any ship-of-war
in New York harbor, addressed the crews of the North Carolina and Sabine,
stating fully to them the probable dangers of the passage to Hampton Roads
and the certainty of having important service to perform after arriving.
The sailors responded enthusiastically, many more volunteering than were
required. Of the crew Captain Worden said, in his official report of the
battle, "A better one no naval commander ever had the honor to command." |
| The Monitor's officers were : Lieut. J. L. Wor-
den, commanding; Lieut. S. D. Greene, executive
officer; Acting Master, L. N. Stodder; Acting Mas-
ter, J. N. Webber ; Acting Master's Mate, G. Fred-
erickson ; Acting Assistant Surgeon, D. C. Logue;
Acting Assistant Paymaster, W. F. Keeler ; Chief
Engineer, A. C. Stimers (inspector) ; First Assist-
ant Engineer, Isaac Newton (in charge of steam
machinery) ; Second Assist. Engineer, A. B. Camp-
bell; Third Assist. Engineer, R. W. Hands ; Fourth
Assist. Engineer, M. T. Sunstrom ; Captain's Clerk,
D. Toffey ; Quartermaster, P. Williams ; Gunner's
Mate, J. Crown; Boatswain's Mate, J. Stocking;
and 42 others,— a total of 58.— S. D. G.
719
720
IN THE "MONITOR" TURRET.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1875.
REAR-ADMIRAL, IT. S. N
The sword was presented to Admiral Worden hy the State of New York soon after the engagement
in Hampton Roads.— Editors.
We left New York in tow of the tug-boat Seth Low at 11 a. m. of Thursday,
the 6th of March. On the following day a moderate breeze was encountered,
and it was at once evident that the Monitor was unfit as a sea-going craft.
Nothing but the subsidence of the wind prevented her from being shipwrecked
before she reached Hampton Roads, The berth-deck hatch leaked in spite
of all we could do, and the water came down under the turret like a waterfall.
It would strike the pilot-house and go over the turret in beautiful curves, and
it came through the narrow eye-holes in the pilot-house with such force as to
knock the helmsman completely round from the wheel. The waves also
broke over the blower-pipes, and the water came down through them in such
IN THE "MONITOR" TURRET. 721
quantities that the belts of the blower-engines slipped, and the engines con-
sequently stopped for lack of artificial draught, without which, in such a
confined place, the fires could not get air for combustion. Newton and Sti-
mers, followed by the engineer's force, gallantly rushed into the engine-room
and fire-room to remedy the evil, but they were' unable to check the inflowing
water, and were nearly suffocated with escaping gas. They were dragged
out more dead than alive, and carried to the top of the turret, where the
fresh air gradually revived them. The water continued to pour through the
hawse-hole, and over and down the smoke-stacks and blower-pipes, in such
quantities that there was imminent danger that the ship would founder. The
steam-pumps could not be operated because the fires had been nearly extin-
guished, and the engine-room was uninhabitable on account of the suffocating
gas with which it was filled. The hand-pumps were then rigged and worked,
but they had not enough force to throw the water out through the top of the
turret, — the only opening, — and it was useless to bail, as we had to pass the
buckets up through the turret, which made it a very long operation. For-
tunately, toward evening the wind and the sea subsided, and, being again in
smooth water, the engine was put in operation. But at midnight, in pass-
ing over a shoal, rough water was again encountered, and our troubles were
renewed, complicated this time with the jamming of the wheel-ropes, so that
the safety of the ship depended entirely on the strength of the hawser which
connected her with the tug-boat. The hawser, being new, held fast; but
during the greater part of the night we were constantly engaged in fighting
the leaks, until we reached smooth water again, just before daylight.
It was at the close of this dispiriting trial trip, in which all hands had been
exhausted in their efforts to keep the novel craft afloat, that the Monitor
passed Cape Henry at 4 r. m. on Saturday, March 8th. At this point was
heard the distant booming of heavy guns, which our captain rightly judged
to be an engagement with the Merrimac, twenty miles away. He at once
ordered the vessel stripped of her sea-rig, the turret keyed up, and every prep-
aration made for battle. As we approached Hampton Roads we could see
the fine old Congress burning brightly, and soon a pilot came on board and
told of the arrival of the Merrimac, the disaster to the Cumberland and the
Congress, and the dismay of the Union forces. The Monitor was pushed with
all haste, and reached the Roanoke (Captain Marston), anchored in the Roads, at
9 p. m. Worden immediately reported his arrival to Captain Marston, who
suggested that he should go to the assistance of the Minnesota, then aground
off Newport News. |) As no pilot was available, Captain Worden accepted the
I Captain John Marston, of the Roanoke, who was Roanoke to report his arrival at Hampton Eoads,
the senior officer present during Flag-Officer Golds- Captain Marston took upon himself the responsi-
borough's absence on the sounds of North Caro- bility of retaining the Monitor to protect the fleet,
lina, had received peremptory orders to send the Under the circumstances, it is hard to see how he
Monitor to Washington without delay. ' Similar could have done otherwise, although his action in-
orders had been received by Commodore Pauld- volved him in a technical disobedience of orders,
ing in New York, but they only arrived after the In view of the spirit of routine which pervaded
Monitor's departure, and the tug by which Pauld- the older branch of the service at this time, Cap-
ing endeavored to communicate with her failed to tain Marston's action showed commendable spirit
overtake her. When Worden went on board the and good sense. — Editors.
VOL. I. 46
722
IN THE "MONITOR" TURRET.
volunteer services of Acting Master Samuel Howard, who earnestly sought
the duty. An atmosphere of gloom pervaded the fleet, and the pygmy aspect
of the new-comer did not inspire confidence among those who had witnessed
the destruction of the day before. Skillfully piloted by Howard, we proceeded
on our way, our path illumined by the blaze of the Congress. Reaching the
Minnesota, hard and fast aground, near midnight, we anchored, and Worden
reported to Captain Van Brunt. Between 1 and 2 a. m. the Congress blew up, —
not instantaneously, but successively. Her powder-tanks seemed to explode,
each shower of sparks rivaling the other in its height, until they appeared to
reach the zenith, — a grand but mournful sight. Near us, too, at the bottom
of the river, lay the Cumberland, with her silent crew of brave men, who
died while fighting their guns to the water's edge, and whose colors were still
flying at the peak.\
The dreary night dragged slowly on ; the officers and crew were up and alert,
to be ready for any emergency. At daylight on Sunday the Merrimac and
her consorts were discovered at
anchor near Sewell's Point. At
about half -past 7 o'clock the ene-
my's vessels got under way and
steered in the direction of the
Minnesota. At the same time the
Monitor got under way, and her
officers and crew took their sta-
tions for battle. Captain Van
Brunt, of the Minnesota, officially
reports, "I made signal to the
Monitor to attack the enemy,"
but the signal was not seen by
us ; other work was in hand, and Commander Worden required no signal.
The pilot-house of the Monitor was situated well forward, near the bow ; it
was a wrought-iron structure, built of logs of iron nine inches thick, bolted
through the corners, and covered with an iron plate two inches thick, which
was not fastened down, but was kept in place merely by its weight. The
sight-holes or slits were made by inserting quarter-inch plates at the corners
between the upper set of logs and the next below. The structure projected
four feet above the deck, and was barely large enough inside to hold three men
standing. It presented a flat surface on all sides and on top. The steering-
wheel was secured to one of the logs on the front side. The position and
shape of this structure should be carefully borne in mind.
Worden took his station in the pilot-house, and by his side were Howard,
the pilot, and Peter Williams, quartermaster, who steered the vessel through-
PROPELLER DLOWER- SMOKE-
WELL. PIPES. STACKS.
PILOT- ANCHOR
HOUSE. WELL.
SIDE ELEVATION AND DECK-PLAN OF THE "MONITOR."
\The fortune of civil war was illustrated in the
ease of the Merrimac. Commodore Buchanan's
brother was an officer of the Congress, and each
knew of the other's presence. The first and fourth
lieutenants of the Merrimac had each a brother
in the United States army. The father of the fifth
lieutenant was also in the United States army.
The father of one of the midshipmen was in the
United States navy. Lieutenant Butt, of the
Merrimac, had been the room-mate of Lieutenant
S. Dana Greene, of the Monitor, at the Naval Acad-
emy in Annapolis. — Editors.
IN THE "MONITOR" TURRET. 723
out the engagement. My place was in the turret, to work and fight the guns ;
with me were Stockier and Stimers and sixteen brawny men, eight to each
gun. John Stocking, boatswain's mate, and Thomas Lochrane, seaman, were
gun-captains. Newton and his assistants were in the engine and fire rooms,
to manipulate the boilers and engines, and most admirably did they perform
this important service from the beginning to the close of the action. Webber
had charge of the powder division on the berth-deck, and Joseph Crown,
gunner's-mate, rendered valuable service in connection with this duty.
The physical condition of the officers and men of the two ships at this time
was in striking contrast. The Merrimac had passed the night quietly near
Se well's Point, her people enjoying rest and sleep, elated by thoughts of the
victory they had achieved that day, and cheered by the prospects of another
easy victory on the morrow. The Monitor had barely escaped shipwreck twice
within the last thirty-six hours, and since Friday morning, forty-eight hours
before, few if any of those on board had closed their eyes in sleep or had any-
thing to eat but hard bread, as cooking was impossible. She was surrounded
by wrecks and disaster, and her efficiency in action had yet to be proved.
Worden lost no time in bringing it to test. Getting his ship under way, he
steered direct for the enemy's vessels, in order to meet and engage them as
far as possible from the Minnesota. As he approached, the wooden vessels
quickly turned and left. Our captain, to the u astonishment" of Captain Van
Brunt (as he states in his official report), made straight for the Merrimac,
which had already commenced firing; and when he came within short range,
he changed his course so as to come alongside of her, stopped the engine, and
gave the order, " Commence firing ! " I triced up the port, ran out the gun,
and, taking deliberate aim, pulled the lockstring. The Merrimac was quick to
reply, returning a rattling broadside (for she had ten guns to our two), and
the battle fairly began. The turrets and other parts of the ship were heavily
struck, but the shots did not penetrate ; the tower was intact, and it continued
to revolve. A look of confidence passed over the men's faces, and we believed
the Merrimac would not repeat the work she had accomplished the day before.
The fight continued with the exchange of broadsides as fast as the guns
could be served and at very short range, the distance between the vessels
frequently being not more than a few yards. Worden skillfully manoeuvred
his quick-turning vessel, trying to find some vulnerable point in his adversary.
Once he made a dash at her stern, hoping to disable her screw, which he
thinks he missed by not more than two feet. Our shots ripped the iron of
the Merrimac, while the reverberation of her shots against the tower caused
anything but a pleasant sensation. While Stodder, who was stationed at the
machine which controlled the revolving motion of the turret, was incau-
tiously leaning against the side of the tower, a large shot struck in the vicinity
and disabled him. He left the turret and went below, and Stimers, who had
assisted him, continued to do the work.
The drawbacks to the position of the pilot-house were soon realized. We
could not fire ahead nor within several points of the bow, since the blast
from our own guns would have injured the people in the pilot-house, only
724
IN THE "MONITOR" TURRET.
•i
•jh'v
-4*
I- O Y
cc S -J
O co O
a. I- n.
(0 (E £E
o o o
o a. z
a few yards off. Keeler and Toffey passed
the captain's orders and messages to me, and
my inquiries and answers to him, the speaking-
tube from the pilot-honse to the turret having
been broken early in the action. They per-
formed their work with zeal and alacrity, but,
both being landsmen, our technical communi-
cations sometimes miscarried. The situation
was novel : a vessel of war was engaged in des-
perate combat with a powerful foe; the cap-
tain, commanding and guiding, was inclosed in
one place, and the executive officer, working
and fighting the guns, was shut up in another,
and communication between them was difficult
and uncertain. It was this experience which
caused Isaac Newton, immediately after the en-
gagement, to suggest the clever plan of putting
the pilot-house on top of the turret, and making
it cylindrical instead of square; and his sug-
gestions were subsequently adopted in this type
of vessel. [But see p. 736. — Editoks.]
As the engagement continued, the working of
the turret was not altogether satisfactory. It
was difficult to start it revolving, or, when once
started, to stop it, on account of the imperfec-
tions of the novel machinery, which was now
undergoing its first trial. Stimers was an active,
muscular man, and did his utmost to control
the motion of the turret; but, in spite of his
efforts, it was difficult, if not impossible, to
secure accurate firing. The conditions were
very different from those of an ordinary broad-
side gun, under which we had been trained on
wooden ships. My only view of the world out-
side of the tower was over the muzzles of the
guns, which cleared the ports by only a few
inches. When the guns were run in, the port-
holes were covered by heavy iron pendulums,
pierced with small holes to allow the iron ram-
mer and sponge handles to protrude while they
were in use. To hoist these pendulums required
the entire gun's crew and vastly increased the
work inside the turret.
The effect upon one shut up in i ~ ving
drum is perplexing, and it is not a sir atter
V
IN THE "MONITOR" TURRET. 725
to keep the bearings. White marks had been placed upon the stationary
deck immediately below the turret to indicate the direction of the star-
board and port sides, and the bow and stern; but these marks were oblit-
erated early in the action. I would continually ask the captain, "How
does the Merrimac bear \ " He replied, " On the starboard-beam," or " On
the port-quarter," as the case might be. Then the difficulty was to deter-
mine the direction of the starboard-beam, or port-quarter, or any other bear-
ing. It finally resulted, that when a gun was ready for firing, the turret
would be started on its revolving journey in search of the target, and when
found it was taken " on the fly," because the turret could not be accurately
controlled. Once the Merrimac tried to ram us; but Worden avoided the
direct impact by the skillful use of the helm, and she struck a glancing blow,
which did no damage. At the instant of collision I planted a solid 180-
pound shot fair and square upon the forward part of her casemate. Had the
gun been loaded with thirty pounds of powder, which was the charge sub-
sequently used with similar guns, it is probable that this shot would have
penetrated her armor; but the charge being limited to fifteen pounds, in
accordance with peremptory orders to that effect from the Navy Department,
the shot rebounded without doing any more damage than possibly to start
some of the beams of her armor-backing.
It is stated by Colonel Wood, of the Merrimac, that when that vessel
rammed the Cumberland her ram, or beak, was broken off and left in that
vessel. In a letter to me, about two years since, he described this ram as "of
castiron, wedge-shaped, about 1500 pounds in weight, 2 feet under water,
and projecting 2 £ feet from the stem." A ram of this description, had it been
intact, would have struck the Monitor at that part of the upper hull where
the armor and backing were thickest. It is very doubtful if, under any head-
way that the Merrimac could have acquired at such short range, this ram
could have done any injury to this part of the vessel. That it could by no
possibility have reached the thin lower hull is evident from a glance at the
drawing of the Monitor, the overhang or upper hull being constructed for the
express purpose of protecting the vital part of the vessel.
The battle continued at close quarters without apparent damage to either
side. After a time, the supply of shot in the turret being exhausted, Worden
hauled off for about fifteen minutes to replenish. The serving of the car-
tridges, weighing but fifteen pounds, was a matter of no difficulty ; but the
hoisting of the heavy shot was a slow and tedious operation, it being neces-
sary that the turret should remain stationary, in order that the two scuttles,
one in the deck and the other in the floor of the turret, should be in line.
Worden took advantage of the lull, and passed through the port-hole upon
the deck outside to get a better view of the situation. He soon renewed the
attack, and the contest continued as before.
Two important points were constantly kept in mind : first, to prevent the
enemy's projectiles from entering the turret through the port-holes, — for the
explosion of side, by disabling the men at the guns, would have
ended the fi, re was no relief gun's crew on board ; second, not to
72t>
IN THE "MONITOR" TURRET.
PART OF THE CREW OP THE "MONITOR."^ PROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN SOON AFTER THE FIGHT.
fire into our own pilot-house. A careless or impatient hand, during the con-
fusion arising from the whirligig motion of the tower, might let slip one of
our big shot against the pilot-house. For this and other reasons I fired every
gun while I remained in the turret.
Soon after noon a shell from the enemy's gun, the muzzle not ten yards
distant, struck the forward side of the pilot-house directly in the sight-hole,
or slit, and exploded, cracking the second iron log and partly lifting the top,
leaving an opening. Worden was standing immediately behind this spot,
and received in his face the force of the blow, which partly stunned him, and,
filling his eyes with powder, utterly blinded him. The injury was known only
•fc The pride of Worden in his erew was warmly
reciprocated by his men, and found expression in
the following letter, written to him while he was
lying in Washington disabled by his wound. We
take it from Professor Soley's volume, "The
Blockade and the Cruisers" (Charles Scribner's
Sons).— Editors :
Hampton Eo yds, April 24th, 1862. U. S. Monitor.
To Our Dear and Honored Captain. Dear Sir :
Those few lines is from your own crew of the Monitor,
with their kindest Love to you their Honored Captain,
hoping to God that they will have the pleasure of wel-
coming you hack to us again soon, for we are all ready
able and willing to meet Death or anything else, only
give us back our Captain again. Dear Captain, we have
got your Pilot-house fixed and all ready for you when
you get well again; and we all sincerely hope that
soon we will have the pleasure of welcoming you back
to it. . . . We are waiting very patiently to engage
our Antagonist if we could only get a chance to do so.
The last time she came out we all thought we would
have the Pleasure of sinking her. But we all got dis-
appointed, for we did not fire one shot, and the Norfolk
papers says we are cowards in the Monitor — and all
, we want is a chance to show them where it lies with
you for our Captain We can teach them who is cow-
ards. But there is a great deal that we would like to
write to you but we think you will soon be with us
again yourself. But we all join in with our kindest
love to you, hoping that God will restore you to us
again and hoping that your sufferings is at an end
now, and we are all so glad to hear that your eyesight
will be spaired to you again. We would wish to write
more to you if we have your kind Permission to do so
but at present we all conclude by tendering to you our
kindest Love and affection, to our Dear and Honored
Captain. We remain untill Death your Affectionate
Crew.
The Monitor Boys.
To Captain Worden.
IN THE "MONITOR" TURRET. 727
to those in the pilot-house and its immediate vicinity. The flood of light
rushing through the top of the pilot-house, now partly open, caused Word en,
blind as he was, to believe that the pilot-house was seriously injured, if not
destroyed ; he therefore gave orders to put the helm to starboard and " sheer
off." Thus the Monitor retired temporarily from the action, in order to ascer-
tain the extent of the injuries she had received. At the same time Worden
sent for me, and leaving Stimers the only officer in the turret, I went forward
at once, and found him standing at the foot of the ladder leading to the pilot-
house.
He was a ghastly sight, with his eyes closed and the blood apparently rush-
ing from every pore in the upper part of his face. He told me that he was
seriously wounded, and directed me to take command. I assisted in leading
him to a sofa in his cabin, where he was tenderly cared for by Doctor Logue,
and then I assumed command. Blind and suffering as he was, Worden's for-
titude never forsook him ; he frequently asked from his bed of pain of the
progress of affairs, and when told that the Minnesota was saved, he said,
" Then I can die happy."
When I reached my station in the pilot-house, I found that the iron log
was fractured and the top partly open ; but the steering gear was still intact,
and the pilot-house was not totally destroyed, as had been feared. In the
confusion of the moment resulting from so serious an injury to the command-
ing officer, the Monitor had been moving without direction. Exactly how
much time elapsed from the moment that Worden was wounded until I had
reached the pilot-house and completed the examination of the injury at that
point, and determined what course to pursue in the damaged condition of the
vessel, it is impossible to state ; but it could hardly have exceeded twenty
minutes at the utmost. During this time the Merrimac, which was leaking
badly, had started in the direction of the Elizabeth River ; and, on taking
my station in the pilot-house and turning the vessel's head in the direction
of the Merrimac, I saw that she was already in retreat. A few shots were
fired at the retiring vessel, and she continued on to Norfolk. I returned with
the Monitor to the side of the Minnesota, where preparations were being made
to abandon the ship, which was still aground. Shortly afterward Worden
was transferred to a tug, and that night he was carried to Washington.
The fight was over. We of the Monitor thought, and still think, that we
had gained a great victory. This the Confederates have denied. But it has
never been denied that the object of the Merrimac on the 9th of March was
to complete the destruction of the Union fleet in Hampton Roads, and that
she was completely foiled and driven off by the Monitor; nor has it been
denied that at the close of the engagement the Merrimac retreated to Nor-
folk, leaving the Monitor in possession of the field. J
I " My men and myself were perfectly black down. . . . My nerves and muscles twitched
with smoke and powder. All my underclothes as though electric shocks were continually pass-
were perfectly black, and my person was in the ing through them. ... I lay down and tried
same condition. ... I had been up so long, to sleep — I might as well have tried to fly."
and been under such a state of excitement, From a private letter of Lieutenant Greene, writ-
that ray nervous system was completely run ten just after the fight. — Editors.
728
IN THE "MONITOR" TURRET.
In this engagement Captain Worden displayed the highest qualities as an
officer and man. He was in his prime (forty-four years old), and carried with
him the ripe experience of twenty-eight years in the naval service. He joined
the ship a sick man, having but recently left a prison in the South. He was
nominated for the command by the late Admiral Joseph Smith, and the result
proved the wisdom of the choice. Having accepted his orders against the
protests of his physicians and the entreat-
ies of his family, nothing would deter him
from the enterprise. He arrived on the bat-
tle-ground amidst the disaster and gloom,
almost despair, of the Union people, who
had little faith that he could beat back the
powerful Merrimac, after her experience
with the Cumberland and Congress. Without
encouragement, single-handed, and with-
out specific orders from any source, he rose
above the atmosphere of doubt and de-
pression which surrounded him, and with
unflinching nerve and undaunted courage
he hurled his little untried vessel against
his huge, well-proved antagonist, and won
the battle. He was victor in the first iron-
clad battle of the world's history.
The subsequent career of the Monitor
needs but a few words.
On the day after the fight I received the following letter from Mr. Fox,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy :
" U. S. Steamer Boanoke, Old Point, March 10th, 1862.
" My Dear Mr. Greene : Under the extraordinary circumstances of the contest of yester-
day, and the responsibilities devolving upon me, and your extreme youth, & I have suggested
to Captain Marston to send on board the Monitor, as temporary commanding, Lieutenant Sel-
fridge, until the arrival of Commodore Goldsborough, which will be in a few days. I appre-
ciate your position, and you must appreciate mine, and serve with the same zeal and fidelity.
With the kindest wishes for you all, most truly, Gr. V. Fox."
For the next two months we lay at Hampton Roads. Twice the Merrimac
came out of the Elizabeth Eiver, but did not attack. We, on our side, had
received positive orders not to attack in the comparatively shoal waters
above Hampton Roads, where the Union fleet could not manoeuvre. The
Merrimac protected the James River, and the Monitor protected the Chesa-
peake. Neither side had an iron-clad in reserve, and neither wished to
bring on an engagement which might disable its only armored vessel in
those waters.
With the evacuation of Norfolk and the destruction of the Merrimac, the
Monitor moved up the James River with the squadron under the command
COMMANDER SAMUEL DANA GREENE, EXECUTIVE
OFFICER OF THE "MONITOR." FROM A
WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.
& I was tweiity-two years of age, and previous to joining the Monitor had seen less than three
^■ars of active service, with the rank of midshipman. — S. D. G.
IN THE "MONITOR" TURRET. 729
of Commander John Rodgers, in connection with McClellau's advance upon
Richmond by the Peninsula. We were engaged for four hours at Fort Dar-
ling, but were unable to silence the guns or destroy the earth-works.
Probably no ship was ever devised which was so uncomfortable for her
crew, and certainly no sailor ever led a more disagreeable life than we did
on the James River, suffocated with heat and bad air if we remained below,
and a target for sharp-shooters if we came on deck.
With the withdrawal of McClellau's army, we returned to Hampton Roads,
and in the autumn were ordered to Washington, where the vessel was
repaired. We returned to Hampton Roads in November, and sailed thence
(December 29th) in tow of the steamer Rhode Island, bound for Beaufort,
N. C. Between 11 p. m. and midnight on the following night the Monitor went
down in a gale, a few miles south of Cape Hatteras. Four officers and twelve
men were drowned, forty-nine people being saved by the boats of the
steamer. It was impossible to keep the vessel free of water, and we presumed
that the upper and lower hulls thumped themselves apart.
No ship in the world's history has a more imperishable place in naval
annals than the Monitor. Not only by her providential arrival at the right
moment did she secure the safety of Hampton Roads and all that depended
on it, but the idea which she embodied revolutionized the system of naval
warfare which had existed from the earliest recorded history. The name of
the Monitor became generic, representing a new type ; and, crude and defec-
tive as was her construction in some of its details, she yet contained the
idea of the turret, which is to-day the central idea of the most powerful
armored vessels. |
4 Ou account of the death of the writer of this officers and officers of the mercantile marine as to the
paper, which occurred December 11th, L884, soon great probability of her sinking at sea, volunteered to
t. •■ ,• ,1 ,. j. j . ,„• „ so in her, and, at my request, was ordered. From the
atter its preparation, the proofs did not receive ° . „,. ' , - J. , '. .„ ^
£ »,. ■ m, date ot Ins orders he applied himself unremittingly and
the benefit of his revision. The article appears intelligently to the study of her peculiar qualities and to
substantially in the form in which it was writ- herfitting and equipment. . . . Lieutenant Greene,
ten, without changes other than verbal ones and after taking his place in the pilot-house and finding the
a slight rearrangement of paragraphs. injuries there less serious than I had supposed had
/-us ii ■ * -%r <-. . .. .,-, turned the vessel's head again in the direction of the
Of the services of Mr. Greene in connection with enemy t() continue the engagement ; but before he could
the Monitor, Captain Worden made the following get at close quarters with her she retired. He therefore
official record in a letter to the Secretary of the very properly returned to the Minnesota and lay by her
Navy : until she. floated. . . . Lieutenant Greene, the execu-
tive officer, had charge in the turret, and handled the
" I was ordered to her (the Monitor) on the 13th of Jan- guns with great courage, coolness, and skill; and
nary, 1862, when she was still on stocks. -Prior to that throughout the engagement, as in the equipment of the
date Lieutenant S. D. Greene had interested himself in vessel and on her passage to Hampton Roads, he ex-
her and thoroughly examined her construction and hibited an earnest devotion to duty unsurpassed in my
design and informed himself as to her qualities, and, experience."
notwithstanding the many gloomy predictions of naval EDITORS.
THE BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR."
BY CAPTAIN JOHN ERICSSON, INVENTOR OF THE "MONITOR."
CAPTAIN JOHN ERICSSON. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
THE introduction of General Paixhans's brill-
iant invention, the shell-gun, in 1824, fol-
lowed, in 1858, by the successful application of
armor-plating to the steam-frigate La Gloire,
under Napoleon III., compelled an immediate
change in naval construction which startled
the maritime countries of Europe, especially
England, whose boasted security behind her
" wooden walls " was shown to be a complete
delusion. The English naval architects, how-
ever, did not overlook the fact that their French
rivals, while producing a gun which rendered
wooden navies almost useless, had also by their
armor-plating provided an efficient protection
against the destructive Paixhans shell.
Accordingly, the Admiralty without loss of time laid the keel of the
Warrior, an armored iron steam-frigate 380 feet long, 58 feet beam, 26 feet
draught, and 9200 tons displacement. The work being pushed with extraor-
dinary vigor, this iron-clad ship was speedily launched and equipped, the
admiration of the naval world.
Shortly after the adoption of armor-plating as an essential feature in the
construction of vessels of war, the Southern States seceded from the Union,
some of the most efficient of the United States naval officers resigning their
commissions. Their loss was severely felt by the Navy Department at Wash-
ington ; nor was it long before the presence of great professional skill among
the officers of the naval administration of the Confederate States became
manifest. Indeed, the utility of the armor-plating adopted by France and
England proved to be better understood at Eichmond than at Washington.
While the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Welles, and his advisers were discuss-
ing the question of armor, news reached Washington that the partly burnt
and scuttled steam-frigate Merrimae, at the Norfolk Navy Yard, had been,
raised and cut down to her berth-deck, and that a very substantial structure
of timber, resembling a citadel with inclined sides, was being erected on that
deck.
The Navy Department at Washington early in August advertised for plans
and offers for iron-clad steam-batteries to be built within a stipulated time.
My attention having been thus called to a subject which I had thoroughly
considered during a series of years, I was fully prepared to present plans of
an impregnable steam-battery of light draught, suitable to navigate the shal-
low rivers and harbors of the Confederate States. Availing myself of the
services of a friend who chanced to be in Washington at the time. | ^rjosals
730
THE BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR." 73 »
were at once submitted to a board of naval officers appointed by the Presi-
dent ; and the plans presented by my friend being rejected by the board, I
immediately set out for Washington and laid the matter personally before
its members, all of whom proved to be well-informed and experienced naval
experts. Contrary to anticipation, the board permitted me to present a theo-
retical demonstration concerning the stability of the new structure, doubt of
which was the principal consideration which had caused the rejection of the
plan presented. In less than an hour I succeeded in demonstrating to the
entire satisfaction of the board appointed by President Lincoln that the
design was thoroughly practical, and based 011 sound theory. The Secretary
of the Navy accordingly accepted my proposal to build an iron-clad steam-
battery, and instructed me verbally to commence the construction forthwith.
Returning immediately to New York, I divided the work among three
leading mechanical establishments, furnishing each with detailed drawings of
every part of the structure ; the understanding being that the most skillful
men and the best tools should be employed ; also that work should be con-
tinued during night-time when practicable. The construction of nearly every
part of the battery accordingly commenced simultaneously, all hands work-
ing with the utmost diligence, apparently confident that their exertions would
result in something of great benefit to the national cause. Fortunately no
trouble or delay was met at any point ; all progressed satisfactorily ; every
part sent on board from the workshops fitted exactly the place for which
it was intended. As a consequence of these favorable circumstances, the
battery, with steam-machinery complete, was launched in one hundretl days
from the laying of the keel-plate. It should be mentioned that at the mo-
ment of starting on the inclined ways toward its destined element, the
novel fighting-machine was named Monitor. J
Before entering on a description of this fighting-machine I propose to
answer the question frequently asked : What circumstances dictated its size
and peculiar construction 1
1. The work on the Merrimac had progressed so far that no structure of
large dimensions could possibly be completed in time to meet her.
2. The well-matured plan of erecting a citadel of considerable dimensions on
the ample deck of the razeed Merrimac admitted of a battery of heavy ord-
nance so formidable that no vessel of the ordinary type, of small dimensions,
could withstand its fire.
3. The battery designed by the naval authorities of the Confederate States,
in addition to the advantage of ample room and numerous guns, presented a
i The origin of the name Monitor is given in the " The iron-clad intruder will thus prove a severe moni-
following letter to Gustavus V. Fox, Assistant tor to those leaders. But there are other leaders who
c , f fi -vr . wl'l a'H0 be startled and admonished by the booming ot
Secretary ot the JNavy : the gUns from the impregnable iron turret. ' Downing
" New- York, January 20th, 1862. Sir : In accordance Street' will hardly view with indifference this last
with your request, I now submit for your approbation 'Yankee notion,' this monitor. To the Lords of the
a name for the floating battery at Green Point. The Admiralty the new craft will be a monitor suggesting
impregnable and aggressive character of this structure doubts as to the propriety of completing those four
will admonish the leaders of the Southern Rebellion steel-clad ships at three-and-a-half millions apiece. On
that the batteries on the banks of their rivers will no these and many similar grounds I propose to name
longer present barriers to the entrance of the Union the new battery Monitor. Your obedient servant, J.
forces. Ericsson." Editors.
732
THE BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR."
formidable front to an opponent's fire by being inclined to such a degree that
shot would be readily deflected. Again, the inclined sides, composed of heavy
timbers well braced, were covered with two thicknesses of bar iron, ingen-
iously combined, well calculated to resist the spherical shot peculiar to the
Dahlgren and Rodman system of naval ordnance adopted by the United
States navy.
4. The shallow waters on the coast of the Southern States called for very
light draught ; hence the upper circumference of the propeller of the battery
would be exposed to the enemy's fire unless thoroughly protected against
shot of heavy caliber. A difficulty was thus presented which apparently
could not be met by any device which would not seriously impair the effi-
ciency of the propeller.
5. The limited width of the navigable parts of the Southern rivers and
inlets presented an obstacle rendering manoeuvring impossible ; hence it
would not be practicable at all times to turn the battery so as to present a
broadside to the points to be attacked.
0. The accurate knowledge possessed by the adversary of the distance
between the forts on the river-banks within range of his guns, would enable
him to point the latter with such accuracy that unless every part of the sides
of the battery could be made absolutely shot-proof, destruction would be
certain. It may be observed that the accurate knowledge of range was an
advantage in favor of the Southern forts which placed the attacking steam-
batteries at great disadvantage.
7. The difficulty of manipulating the anchor within range of powerful fixed
batteries presented difficulties which called for better protection to the crew
of the batteries than any previously known.
Several minor points familiar to the naval artillerist and naval architect
presented considerations which could not be neglected by the constructor of
the new battery ; but these must be omitted in our brief statement, while the
foregoing, being of vital importance, have demanded special notice.
The plans on pages 732-3 represent a longitudinal section through the cen-
ter line of the battery, which, for want of space on the page, has been divided
into three sections, viz., the aft, central, and forward sections, which for ready
reference will be called aft, central, and forward.
Referring particularly to the upper and lower sections, it will be seen that the
hull consists of an upper and lower body joined together in the horizontal
plane not far below the water-line. The length of the upper part of the hull
is 172 feet, beam 41 feet ; the length of the lower hull being 122 feet, beam
1. AFT SECTION. LONGITUDINAL PLAN THROUGH THE CENTER LINE OF THE ORIGINAL MONITOR.
THE BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR.
733
2. CENTRAL SECTION, SAME PLAN.
34 feet. The depth from the underside of deck to the keel-plate is 11 feet
2 inches, draught of water at load-line 10 feet.
Let us now examine separately the three sectional representations.
Forward Section. The anchor-well, a cylindrical perforation of the over-
hanging deck, near the bow, first claims our attention. The object of this
well being to protect the anchor when raised, it is lined with plate iron
backed by heavy timbers, besides being protected by the armor-plating bolted
to the outside of the overhang. It should be noticed that this method proved
so efficient that in no instance did the anchor-gear receive any injury during
the several engagements with the Confederate batteries, although nearly all of
the monitors of the Passaic class were subjected to rapid fire at short range
in upward of twenty actions. It will be remembered that the unprotected
anchor of the Merrimac was shot away during the short battle with the Con-
gress and the Cumberland. Having described the method of protecting the
anchors, the mechanism adopted for manipulating the same remains 1 o be
explained. Referring to the illustration, it will be seen that a windlass is
secured under the deck-beams near the anchor-well. The men working :he
handles of this mechanism were stationed in the hold of the vessel, aid
hence were most effectually protected against the enemy's shot, besides being
completely out of sight. The Confederate artillerists were at first mucn sur-
prised at witnessing the novel spectacle of vessels approaching their batteries,
then stopping and remaining stationary for an indefinite time while firing,
and then again departing, apparently without any intervention of anchor-
gear. Our examination of this gear and the anchor-well affords a favorable
opportunity of explaining the cause of Lieutenant Greene's alarm, mentioned
3. FORWARD SECTION, SAME PLAN.
734 THE BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR."
in a statement recently published by a military journal, concerning a mysteri-
ous sound emanating from the said well during the passage of the Monitor
from New York to Fort Monroe. Lieutenant Greene says that the sound
from the anchor-well " resembled the death-groans of twenty men, and was
the most dismal, awful sound [ he ] ever heard." Let us endeavor to trace to
some physical cause this portentous sound. The reader will find, on close
examination, that the chain cable which suspends the anchor passes through
an aperture ( " hawse-pipe" ) on the after side of the well, and that this pipe is
very near the water-line ; hence the slightest vertical depression of the bow
will occasion a flow of water into the vessel. Obviously, any downward
motion of the overhang wiU cause the air confined in the upper part of the
well, when covered, to be blown through the hawse-pipe along with the ad-
mitted water, thereby jn'oducing a very discordant sound, repeated at every
rise and fall of the bow during pitching. Lieutenant Greene also states that,
apart from the reported sound, the vessel was flooded by the water which
entered through the hawse-pipe ; a statement suggesting that this flooding was
the result of faulty construction, whereas it resulted from gross oversight on
the part of the executive officer, — namely, in going to sea without stopping
the opening round the chain-cable at the point where it passes through the side
of the anchor-well.
The pilot-house is the next important object represented in the forward
section of the illustration now under consideration. This structure is situated
10 feet from the anchor-well, its internal dimensions being 3 feet 6 inches
long, 2 feet 8 inches wide, 3 feet 10 inches high above the plating of the deck ;
the sides consisting of solid blocks of wrought iron, 12 inches deep and 9
inches thick, firmly held down at the corner by 3-inch bolts passing through
the ii jn-plated deck and deck-beams. The wheel, which by means of ordi-
nary tiller-ropes operates the rudder, is placed within the pilot-house, its axle
being supported by a bracket secured to the iron blocks as shown by the illus-
tration. An ordinary ladder resting on the bottom of the vessel leads to the
grated floor of the pilot-house. In order to afford the commanding officer and
the pilot a clear view of objects before and on the sides of the vessel, the
first and second iron blocks from the top are kept apart by packing pieces at
the corners; long and narrow sight-holes being thereby formed extending
round the pilot-house, and giving a clear view which sweeps round the entire
horizon, all but that part which is hidden by the turret, hardly twelve degrees
on each side of the line of keel. Regarding the adequacy of the elongated
sight-hole formed between the iron blocks in the manner described, it should
be borne in mind that an opening of five-eighths of an inch affords a vertical
view 80 feet high at a distance of only 200 yards. More is not needed, a fact
established during trials instituted by experts before the constructor delivered
the vessel to the Government. Unfortunately the sight-holes were subse-
quently altered, the iron blocks being raif nd the opening between them
increased to such an extent that at sea, t Lieutenant Greene's report,
the water entered " with such force as ,ck the helmsman completely
round from the wheel." It may be shov h out for the injudicious increase
THE BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR."
735
PLAN' OF THE BERTH-DECK OF THE ORIGINAL MONITOR, DRAWN TO SCALE.
a, captain's cabin ; &, hie state-room ; c. state-rooms of the officers : w, ward-
room; d, quarters of the crew, with store-rooms on the sides.
of the sight-holes, the commander of the Monitor would not have been tem-
porarily blinded during the conflict at Hampton Roads, although he placed
his vessel in such an extraordinary position that, according to Lieutenant
Greene's report, " a shell from the enemy's gun, the muzzle hot ten yards dis-
tant [from the side of the Monitor], struck the forward side of the pilot-
house." The size of the sight-hole, after the injudicious increase, may be
inferred from the reported fact that the blast caused by the explosion of
the Confederate shell on
striking the outside of
the pilot-house had the
power of " partly lifting
the top." This " top," it
should be observed, con-
sisted of an iron plate
two inches thick, let
down into an appro-
priate groove, but not
bolted down — a circum-
stance which called forth
Lieutenant Greene's dis-
approbation. The ob-
ject of the constructor
in leaving the top plate of the pilot-house loose, so as to be readily pushed
up from below, was that of affording egress to the crew in case of acci-
dent. Had the monitor Tecumseh, commanded by Captain T. A. M. Craven,
when struck by a torpedo during the conflict in Mobile Bay, August 5th,
1864, been provided with a similar loose plate over the main hatch, the
fearful calamity of drowning officers and crew would have been prevented.
In referring to this untoward event, it should be observed that means
had been provided in all the sea-going monitors to afford egress in case of
injury to the hidl : an opening in the turret-floor, when placed above a cor-
responding opening in the deck, formed a free passage to the turret, the top
of which was provided with sliding hatches. Apparently the officer in charge
of the turret-gear of Captain Craven's vessel was not at his post, as he ought
to have been during action, or else he had not been taught the imperative
duty of placing the turret in such a position that these openings would
admit of a free passage from below. $
Lieutenant Greene's report with reference to the position of the pilot-house
calls for particular notice, his assertion being that he " could not fire ahead
within several points of the bow." The distance between the center of the
turret and the pilot-house being fifty-five feet, while the extreme breadth
of the latter is only five feet, it will be found that by turning the turret
through an angle of only six degrees from the center line of the vessel, the
shot will clear the pilot-house, a structure too substantial to suffer from
& Under the circumstances of the sinking of the Tecumseh, the turret was no doubt being worked to
meet the necessities of the battle, not to afford egress for the crew. — Editors.
736
THE BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR."
the mere aerial current produced by the flight of the shot. Considering
that the Monitor, as reported by Lieutenant Greene, was a "quick-turning
vessel," the disadvantage of not being able to fire over the bow within six
degrees of the line of keel is insignificant. Captain Coles claimed for his
famous iron-clad turret-ship the advantage of an all-round fire, although the
axis of his turret-guns had many times greater deviation from the line of keel
than that of the Monitor.
The statement published by Lieutenant Greene, that the chief engineer of
the vessel immediately after the engagement in Hampton Roads " suggested
the clever plan of putting the pilot-house on top of the turret," is incorrect and
calls for notice. The obvious device of placing the pilot-house in the center
and above the turret was carefully considered before the Monitor turret was
constructed, but could not be carried out for these reasons :
1. The turret of the battery was too light to support a structure large
enough to accommodate the commanding officer, the pilot, and the steering-
gear, under the severe condition of absolute impregnability against solid shot
from guns of 10-inch caliber employed by the Confederates.
2. A central stationary pilot-house connected with the turret involved so
much complication and additional work (see description of turret and pilot-
houses further on), that had its adoption not been abandoned the Monitor
would not have been ready to proceed to Hampton Roads until the beginning
of April, 1862. The damage to the national cause which might have resulted
from that delay is beyond computation.
The next important part of the battery delineated on the forward section
of the illustration, namely, the quarters of the officers and crew, will now be
considered ; but before entering on a description it should be mentioned that
in a small turret-vessel built for fighting, only one-half of the crew need be
accommodated at a time, as the other half should be in and on the turret, the
latter being always covered with a water-proof awning. Referring again to
the forward and to part of the central section, it will be seen that the quarters
TRANSVERSE SECTION OF THE HULL OF THE ORIGINAL MONITOR.
The diagram gives a front view of the boilers and furnaces; also a side elevation of the rotating cylindrical turret
■which proved impregnable against ten-inch solid shot fired with battering charges at very short range.
THE BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR."
in
VIEW SHOWING THE EFFECT OF SHOT ON THE "MONITOR" TURRET.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN SOON AFTER THE ENGAGEMENT.
The ridges shown in the nearer port are significant of
the haste with which the vessel was built. An opening
of this shape is usually made by catting three circles
one above another and intersecting, and then trimming
the edges to an oval. In this instance there was no time
for the trimming process. It was originally designed
that the armament should be 15-inch guns, but as these
were not to be had in time, the 11-inch Dahlgrens were
substituted.— Editors.
extend from the transverse bulkhead under the turret to within five feet
of the pilot-house, a distance of fifty feet ; the forward portion, twenty-four
feet in length, being occupied by the officers' quarters and extending across
the battery from side to side. The height of the aft part of these quarters
is 8 feet 6 inches under the deck-beams ; while the height of the whole of the
quarters of the crew is 8 feet 6 inches. A mere glance at the illustrations
showing a side elevation [p. 733] and top view of internal arrangement
[p. 735] gives a correct idea of the nature of the accommodations prepared
for the officers and crew of the vessel which Lieutenant Greene regards
as a "crude" structure, and of which he says: "Probably no ship was ever
devised which was so uncomfortable for the crew." If this opinion were
well founded, it would prove that submerged vessels like the monitors are
unfit to live in.
Fortunately, the important question whether crews can live permanently
below water-line has been set at rest by the report of the chief of the Bureau
of Medicine and Surgery to the Secretary of the Navy, 1864. This minute
and carefully considered report enabled the naval administration, organized
by President Lincoln, to prove the healthfulness of the monitors, by the fol-
lowing clear presentation of the subject : " The monitor class of vessels, it is
well known, have but a few inches of their hulls above the water-line, and in
a heavy sea are entirely submerged. It has been doubted whether under such
circumstances it would be possible long to preserve the health of the men on
board, and consequently maintain the fighting material in a condition for
effective service. It is gratifying, therefore, to know that an examination of
the sick-reports, covering a period of over thirty months, shows that, so far
from being unhealthy, there was less sickness on board the monitors than
on the same number of wooden ships with an equal number of men and in
VOL. I. 47
738
THE BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR.
similar exposed positions. The exemption from sickness upon the iron-clads
in some instances is remarkable. There were on board the Saugus, from
November 25th, 1864, to April 1st, 1865, a period of over four months, but
four cases of sickness (excluding accidental injuries), and of these two were
diseases with which the patients had suffered for years. On the Montauk, for
a period of one hundred and sixty-five days prior to the 29th of May, 1865,
there was but one case of disease on board. Other vessels of the class exhibit
equally remarkable results, and the conclusion is reached that no wooden ves-
sels in any squadron throughout the world can show an equal immunity from
disease."
Apart from the ample size of the quarters on board the vessel, shown by
the illustration, it should be mentioned that the system adopted for ventilat-
ing those quarters furnishes an abundant supply of fresh air by the following
means. Two centrifugal blowers, driven by separate steam-engines, furnished
seven thousand cubic feet of atmospheric air per minute by the process of
suction through standing pipes on deck. Part of the air thus drawn in sup-
ported the combustion of the boiler furnaces, the remainder entering the
lower part of the hull, gradually expelling the heated and vitiated air within
the vessel. It has been imagined that the fresh air supplied by the blowers
ought to have been conveyed to the quarters at the forward end of the vessel,
by a system of conducting pipes. The laws of static balance, however, ren-
der the adoption of such a method unnecessary, since agreeably to those laws
the fresh cold air, unless it be stopped by closed doors in the bulkheads, will
find its way to every part of the bottom of the hull, gradually rising and
expelling the upper heated strata through the hatches, and lastly through the
grated top of the turret. Naval constructors who speculate on the cause
of the extraordinary healthful ness of the monitors need not extend their
researches beyond a thorough investigation of the system of ventilation just
described.
Turret Department. The most important object delineated on the central
section of the illustration, namely, the rotating turret, will now be considered ;
but before describing this essential part of the monitor system, it will be well
to observe that the general belief is quite erroneous that a revolving platform,
open or covered, is a novel design. So far from that being the case, this
obvious device dates back to the first introduction of artillery. About
1820 the writer was taught by an instructor in fortification and gunnery
that under certain conditions a position assailable from all sides should be
defended by placing the guns on a turn-
table. Long before building the Moni-
tor I regarded the employment of a
revolving structure to operate guns on
board ships as a device familiar to all
well-informed naval artillerists. But
although constructors of revolving
circular gun-platforms for naval pur-
poses, open or covered, have a right to
SIDE ELEVATION OF A FLOATING REVOLVING CIR-
CULAR TOWER, PUBLISHED BY ABRAHAM
BLOODGOOD IN 1807.
THE BUILDING OF THE ''MONITOR."
739
FLOATING CIRCULAR CITADEL, SUBMITTED TO THE FRENCH DIRECTORY IN 1798.
employ this ancient device, it will be demonstrated further on that the tur-
ret of the monitors is a distinct mechanical combination differing from
previous inventions. The correctness of the assumption that revolving
batteries for manipulating guns on board floating structures had been
constructed nearly a century ago will be seen by the following reference to
printed publications.
The "Nautical Chronicle" for 1805 contains an account of a "movable
turning impregnable battery, invented by a Mr. Gillespie, a native of Scot-
land, who completed the model of a movable impregnable castle or battery,
impervious to shot or bombs, provided with a cannon and carriage calculated
to take a sure aim at any object." It is further stated that " the invention
proposed will be found equally serviceable in floating batteries. Its machin-
ery is adapted to turn the most ponderous mortars with the greatest ease,
according to the position of the enemy." Again, the Transactions of the
Society for the Promotion of Useful Arts in the State of New York, 1807,
contains an illustration representing a side elevation of a circular revolving
floating battery constructed by Abraham Bloodgood. The guns of this bat-
tery, as the inventor points out, " would be more easily worked than is com-
mon, as they would not require any lateral movement." It is also stated, as
a peculiar feature of this floating battery, that " its rotary motion would
bring all its cannon to bear successively, as fast as they could be loaded, on
objects in any direction "; and that " its circular form would cause every shot
that might strike it, not near the center, to glance." Thirty-five years after
the publication of the illustration and description of the circular floating
revolving tower of Abraham Bloodgood, Theodore R. Timby proposed to build
a tower on land for coast defense, to be composed of iron, with several floors
74©
THE BUILDING OF THE ''MONITOR:-
SIDE ELEVATION AND TRANSVERSE SECTION (THROUGH THE CENTER LINE OF ITS REVOLVING SEMI-SPHERICAL
TURRET) OF AN IRONCLAD STEAM-BATTERY, PLANS OF WHICH WERE SUBMITTED
BY CAPTAIN ERICSSON TO NAPOLEON III. IN SEPTEMBBR, 1854.
and tiers of guns, the tower to turn on a series of friction-rollers under its
base. The principal feature of Tirnby's " invention " was that of arranging
the guns radially within the tower, and firing each gun at the instant of its
coming in line with the object aimed at during the rotary motion of the
tower, precisely as invented by Bloodgood. About 1865 certain influential
citizens presented drawings of Tirnby's revolving tower to the authorities
at Washington, with a view of obtaining orders to build such towers for
coast defense; but the plan was found to be not only very expensive,
but radically defective in principle. The slides of the gun-carriages being-
fixed permanently in a radial direction within the tower, the guns, of
course, are directed to all points of the compass. Hence, during an attack
by a hostile fleet, with many ships abreast, only one assailant can be fired at,
its companions being scot-free in the dead angle formed between the effec-
tive gun and the guns on either side. In the meantime the numerous
guns, distributed round the tower on the several floors, cannot be fired until
their time comes during the revolution of the tower. The enemy's fleet con-
tinuing its advance, of course, calls for a change of elevation of the pieces,
which, considering the constant revolution of the tower and the different
altitudes above the sea of the several tiers, presents perplexing difficulties.
Nothing further need be said to explain why the Grovernment did not accept
the plans for Tirnby's revolving towers.
The origin of rotating circular gun-platforms being disposed of, the con-
sideration of the central section of the illustration will now be resumed. It
will be seen that the turret which protects the guns and gunners of the
Monitor consists simply of a short cylinder resting on the deck, covered with
a grated iron roof provided with sliding hatches. This cylinder is composed of
eight thicknesses of wrought-iron plates, each one inch thick, firmly riveted
together, the inside course, which extends below the rest, being accurately
faced underneath. A flat, broad ring of broi? ; into the deck, its upper
THE BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR.
74i
face being very smooth in order to form, a water-tight joint with the base of
the turret without the employment of any elastic packing, a peculiar feature
of the turrets of the monitors, as will be seen further on. Unfortunately,
before the Monitor left New York for Hampton Roads, it was suggested at the
Navy Yard to insert a plaited hemp rope between the base of the turret and
the bronze ring, for the purpose of making the joint perfectly water-tight.
As might have been supposed, the rough and uneven hemp rope did not
form a perfect joint ; hence during the passage a great
leak was observed at intervals as the sea washed over
the decks. " The water came down under the turret
like a waterfall," says Lieutenant Greene in his report.
It will be proper to observe in this place that the
" foundering " of the Mod '/tor on its way to Charleston
was not caused by the " separation of the upper and
lower part of the hull," as was imagined by persons
who possessed no knowledge of the method adopted
by the builders in joining the upper and lower hulls.
Again, those who asserted that the plates had been
torn asunder at the junction of the hulls did not
consider that severe strain cannot take place in a
structure nearly submerged. The easy motion at sea,
peculiar to the monitors, was pointed out by several
of their commanders. Lieutenant Greene in his report
to the Secretary of the Navy, dated on board the Moni-
tor, March 27th, 1862, says with reference to sea-going
qualities :
" During' her passage from New York her roll was very easy and
slow and not at all deep. She pitched very little and with no
strain whatever."
ISAAC NEWTON, FIRST ASSIST-
ANT-ENGINEER OF THE "MON-
ITOR." FROM A MEDALLION
PORTRAIT BT LAUNT
THOMPSON.
At the time of Mr. Newton's
death (September 25, 1884) he
had been for several years
Chief Engineer of the Croton
Aqueduct. The plans which
have been adopted for the new
aqueduct were his, both in the
general features and the de-
tails.—Editors.
Captain John Rodgers's report to the Secretary of the Navy, dated on
board of the monitor Weehawken, January 22d, 1863, refers specially to the
easy motion of his vessel :
" On Tuesday night, when off Chincoteague shoals, we had a very heavy gale from the E. N.
E. with a very heavy sea, made confused and dangerous by the proximity of the land. The
waves I measured after the sea abated ; I found them twenty-three feet high. They were cer-
tainly seven feet higher in the midst of the storm. During the heaviest of the gale I stood upon
the turret and admired the behavior of the vessel. She rose and fell to the waves, and I con-
cluded that the monitor form had great sea-going qualities. If leaks were prevented no hur-
ricane coidd injure her.'1
The true cause of the foundering of the Monitor was minutely explained to
the writer some time after the occurrence by the engineer, a very intelligent
person, who operated the centrifugal pumping-engine of the vessel at the
time. According to his statement, oakum was packed under the base of the
turret before going to sea, in order to make sure of a water-tight joint ; but
this expedient failed altogether, the sea gradually washing out the oakum in
those places where it had been loosely packed, thereby permitting so large a
742
THE BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR."
TRANSVERSE SECTION OF THE "MONITOR" THROUGH THE CENTER OF THE TURRET.
quantity of water to enter under the turret, fully sixty-three feet in circum-
ference, that the centrifugal pumping- engine had not sufficient power to expel
it. The hull consequently filled gradually and settled, until at the expiration
of about four hours the Monitor went to the bottom. It will be asked, in view
of the preceding explanation of the construction of the monitor turrets,
namely, that the smooth base of the turret forms a water-tight joint with the
ring on the deck, why was oakum packed under the turret before going to
Charleston f The commander of the vessel, Captain Bankhead, in his report
of the foundering, adverts to the admission of water under the turret, but
does not duly consider the serious character of the leak, sixty-three feet in
length. Captain Bankhead evidently had not carefully investigated the mat-
ter when he attributed the accident to an imaginary separation of the upper
and lower hull.| It should be observed, in justice to this officer, that having
commanded the Monitor only during a brief period he possessed but an imper-
fect knowledge of his vessel, and probably knew nothing regarding the con-
sequence of employing packing, — namely, that it might cause "water to
come down under the turret like a waterfall," as previously reported by the
second officer in command. It is proper to mention as a mitigating circum-
stance in favor of the second officer, Lieutenant Greene, that previous to the
battle in Hampton Eoads he had "never performed any but midshipman
duty." The important question, therefore, must remain unanswered, whether
in the hands of an older and more experienced executive officer the Monitor,
like the other vessels of her type, might not have reached Charleston in
safety.
Referring again to the central part of the illustration [p. 733] and the sec-
tional representation of the turret [above], it will be found that the guns are
4- Captain J. P. Bankhead says in his report :
'• Found [in the morning] that the packing of oakuin
undcrand around the base had loosened somewhat from
the working of the tower as the vessel pitched and rolled
. . . towards evening the swell somewhat decreased,
the bilge-pumps being found amply sufficient to keep
her clear of the water that penetrated through the sight-
hole of the pilot-house, hawse-hole, and base of tower
(all of winch had been well calked previous to leaving;.
At 7:30 the wind hauled more to the south . . . Found
the vessel towed badly, yawing very much, and with
the increased motion making somewhat more water
around the base of the tower. . . . 8 p. M. ; the sea
about this time commenced to rise very rapidly, causing
the vessel to plunge heavily, completely submerging the
pilot-house, and washing over and into the turret, and
at times into the blower-pipes. Observed that when she
rose to the swell, the flat under-surface of the projecting
armor would come down with great force, causing a
considerable shock to the vessel and turret, thereby
loosening still more the packing around its base. . . .
I am finnly of the opinion that the Monitor must have
sprung a leak somewhere in the forward part, where the
hull joins on to the armor, and that it was caused by
the heavy shocks received as she came down upon the
sea-" Editors.
THE BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR." 743
placed across the vessel; consequently only the end of the breech and upper
part of the port-hole are seen. The object of the pendulum port-stoppers
suspended under the roof is to afford protection to the turret crew while
loading the guns. Generally, however, the turret should be moved, and the
port-holes thereby turned away from the enemy. Much time was lost during
the conflict with the Merrimac by closing the port-stoppers in place of merely
moving the turret, the latter operation being performed by a small steam-
engine controlled by a single hand; while opening and closing the port-
stoppers, as reported by Lieutenant Greene, required the entire gun-crew.
The slow fire of the Monitor during the action, complained of by critics, was
no doubt occasioned by an injudicious manipulation of the port-stoppers.
There are occasions, however, when the turret should not be turned, in which
case the port-stoppers are indispensable. The method adopted for turning
the turret will be readily understood. The small steam-engine controlled by
one man, before referred to, (hives a double train of cog-wheels connected
with the vertical axle of the turret, this axle being stepped in a bronze bear-
ing secured to the central bulkhead of the vessel. The mechanism thus
described was carefully tested before the Monitor left New York for Hamp-
ton Roads, and was found to move very freely, the turret being turned and
the guns accurately pointed by the sailing-master without aid. The trouble
reported by Lieutenant Greene regarding the manipulation of the turret
was caused by inattention during the passage from New York, the working-
gear having been permitted to rust for want of proper cleaning and oiling
while exposed to the action of salt-water entering under the turret, from
causes already explained.
Having thus briefly described the turret and its mechanism, our investiga-
tion of the central part of the sectional view of the battery will be completed
by a mere reference to the steam-boilers placed aft of the turret. There are
two of these boilers placed side by side, as shown in the cut on page 736.
Two views being thus presented, the nature of the boilers will be understood
without further explanation. It should be mentioned, however, that they
proved very economical and efficient.
Aft Section. The following brief reference to this section of the sectional
illustration, showing the motive engine, propeller, and rudder, will complete
our description :
1. The motive engine, the construction of which is somewhat peculiar,
consists of only one steam-cylinder with pistons applied at opposite ends, a
steam-tight partition being introduced in the middle. The propeller-shaft
has only one crank and one crank-pin, the difficulty of " passing the centers "
being overcome by the expedient of placing the connecting-rods, actuated by
the steam-pistons, at right angles to each other. Much space is saved within
the vessel by employing only one steam-cylinder, an advantage of such
importance in the short hulls of the monitors that the entire fleet built during
the war was provided with engines of the stated type.
2. The propeller, being of the ordinary four-bladed type, needs no desci'ip-
tion ; but the mode of protecting it against shot demands full explanation.
744 THE BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR."
Referring to the illustration, it will be seen that the under side of the over-
hang near the stern is cut out in the middle, forming a cavity needed to
give free sweep to the propeller-blades ; the slope of the cavity on either side
of the propeller being considerably inclined in order to favor a free passage
of the water to and from the propeller-blades.
3. The extreme beam at the forward side of the propeller-well is 31 feet,
while the diameter of the propeller is only 9 feet; it will therefore be
seen that the deck and side armor projects 11 feet on each side, thus pro-
tecting most effectually the propelling instrument as well as the equipoise
rudder applied aft of the same. It will be readily admitted that no other
vessel constructed here or elsewhere has such thorough protection to rudder
and propeller as that just described.
The foregoing description of the hastily constructed steam-battery proves
that, so far from being, as generally supposed, a rude specimen of naval con-
struction, the Mod Uor displayed careful planning, besides workmanship of
superior quality. Experts who examined the vessel and machinery after com-
pletion pronounced the entire structure a fine specimen of naval engineering.
The conflict in Hampton Roads, and the immediate building of a fleet of
sea-going monitors by the United States Government, attracted great atten-
tion in all maritime countries, especially in the north of Europe. Admiral
Lessoffsky, of the Russian navy, was at once ordered to be present during the
completion and trial of our sea-going monitors. The report of this talented
officer to his government being favorable, the Emperor immediately ordered a
fleet of twelve vessels on the new system, to be constructed according to copies
the working-dra wings from which the American sea-going monitors had
)en built, Sweden and Norway also forthwith laid the keels of a fleet of
ven vessels of the new type, Turkey rapidly following the example of the
northern European nations. It will be remembered that during the naval
contest on the Danube the Russian batteries and torpedo-boats subjected the
Turkish monitors to severe tests. England, in due course, adopted our turret
system, discarding the turn-table and cupola.
SINKING OF THE "MONITOR," DECEMBER 29, 1862.
THE LOSS OF THE " MONITOR." Jj
BY FRANCIS B. BUTTS, A SURVIVOR OF THE "MONITOR'S'' CREW.
AT daybreak ou the 29th of December, 1862,
^» at Fort Monroe, the Monitor hove short her
anchor, and by 10 o'clock in the forenoon she was
under way for Charleston, South Carolina, in
charge of Commander J. P. Bankhead. The Rhode
Island, a powerful side-wheel steamer, was to be
our convoy, and to hasten our speed she took us
in tow with two long 12-inch hawsers. The
weather was heavy with dark, stormy-looking
clouds and a westerly wind. We j>assed out of the
Roads and rounded Cape Henry, proceeding on our
eourse with but little change in the weather up
to the next day at noon, when the wind shifted to
the south-south-west and increased to a gale. At
12 o'clock it was my trick at the lee wheel, and
being a good hand I was kept there At dark we
were about seventy miles at sea, and directly off
•Cape Hatteras. The sea rolled high and pitched
together in the peculiar manner only seen at Hat-
teras. The Rhode Island steamed slowly and
steadily ahead. The sea rolled over us as if our
vessel were a rock in the ocean only a few inches
above the water, and men who stood abaft on the
deck of the Rhode Island have told me that several
times we were thought to have gone down. It
seemed that for minutes we were out of sight, as
the heavy seas entirely submerged the vessel. The
wheel had been temporarily rigged on top of the
turret, where all the officers, except those on duty
in the engine-room, now were. I heard their
remarks, and watched closely the movements of
the vessel, so that I exactly understood our condi-
tion. The vessel was making very heavy weather,
riding one huge wave, plunging through the next
as if shooting straight for the bottom of the ocean,
and splashing down upon another with such force
that her hull would tremble, and with a shock that
would sometimes take us off our feet, while a
fourth would leap upon us and break far above
the turret, so that if we had not been protected by
a rifle-armor that was securely fastened and rose
to the height of a man's chest, we should have
been washed away. I had volunteered for service
on the Monitor while she lay at the Washington
Navy Yard in November. This going to sea in an
iron-clad I began to think was the dearest part of
my bargain. I thought of what I had been taught
in the service, that a man always gets into trouble
if he volunteers.
"About 8 o'clock, while I was taking a mes-
sage from the captain to the engineer, I saw the
water pouring in through the coal-bunkers in sud-
den volumes as it swept over the deck. About
that time the engineer reported that the coal was
too wet to keep up steam, which had run down
from its usual pressure of SO pounds to 20. The
]) By the courtesy of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Histori-
cal Society, of Rhode Island, we are permitted to print
the following interesting paper condensed from one of
its pamphlets.— Editors.
\ The method of communication f'-oin the Monitor
water in the vessel was gaining rapidly over the
small pumps, and I heard the captain order the
chief engineer to start the main pump, a very
powerful one of new invention. This was done,
and I saw a stream of water eight inches in diame-
ter spouting up from beneath the waves.
About half-past 8 the first signals of distress to
the Rhode Island were burned. She lay to, and we
rode the sea more comfortably than when we were
being towed. The Rhode Island was obliged to
turn slowly ahead to keep from drifting upon us
and to prevent the tow-lines from being caught in
her wheels. At one time, when she drifted close
alongside, our captain shouted through his trum-
pet that we were sinking, and asking the steamer
to send us her boats. The Monitor steamed ahead
again with renewed difficulties, and I was ordered
to leave the wheel and was kept employed as mes-
senger by the captain. The chief engineer re-
ported that the coal was so wet that he could not
keep up steam, and I heard the captain order him
to slow down and put all steam that could be
spared upon the pumps. As there was danger of
being towed under by our consort, the tow-lines
were ordered to be cut, and I saw James Fenwiek,
quarter-gunner, swept from the deck and carried
by a heavy sea leeward and out of sight in attempt-
ing to obey the order. Our daring boatswain's mate,
John Stocking, then succeeded in reaching the
bows of the vessel, and I saw him swept by a heavy
sea far away into the darkness.
About half -past 10 o'clock our anchor was let
go with all the cable, and struck bottom in about
sixty fathoms of water ; this brought us out of the
trough of the sea, and we rode it more comfortably.
The fires could no longer be kept up with the wet
coal. The small pumps were choked up with water,
or, as the engineer reported, were drowned, and
the main pump had almost stopped working from
lack of power. This was reported to the captain,
and he ordered me to see if there was any water
in the ward-room. This was the first time I had
been below the berth-deck. I went forward, and
saw the water running in through the hawse-pipe,
an 8-inch hole, in full force, as in dropping the
anchor the cable had torn away the packing that
had kept this place tight. I reported my observa-
tions, and at the same time heard the chief engineer
report that the water had reached the ash-pits and
was gaining very rapidly. The captain ordered him
to stop the main engine and turn all steam on the
pumps, which I noticed soon worked again.
The clouds now began to separate, a moon of
about half-size beamed out upon the sea, and the
Rhode Island, now a mile away, became visible.
Signals were being exchanged, \ and I felt that
was by writing in chalk on a black-board which was
held up to view ; the Monitor had no mast on which to
hoist the regular naval code used by the Rhode Island.
As night approached, the captaiu of the Monitor wrote,
while we could yet see, that if they were forced to
745
746
THE LOSS OF THE "MONITOR
P
the Monitor would be saved, or at least that the
captain would not leave his ship until there was
no hope of saving her. I was sent below again to
see how the water stood in the ward-room. I went
forward to the cabin and found the water just
above the soles of my shoes, which indicated that
there must be more than a foot in the vessel. I re-
ported this to the captain, and all hands were set
to bailing, — bailing out the ocean as it seemed, —
but the object was to employ the men, as there
now seemed to be danger of excitement among
them. I kept employed most of the time, taking
the buckets from them through the hatchway on top
of the turret. They seldom would have more than
a pint of water in them, however, the remainder
having been spilled in passing from one man to
another [see foot-note, p. 742].
The weather was clear, but the sea did not cease
rolling in the least, and the Ehode Island, with the
two lines wound tip in her wheel, was tossing at
the mercy of the sea, and came drifting against
our sides. A boat that had been lowered was
caught between the vessels and crushed and lost.
Some of our seamen bravely leaped down on deck
to guard our sides, and lines were thrown to them
from the deck of the Rhode Island, which now lay
her whole length against us, •& floating off astern,
but not a man would be the first to leave his ship,
although the captain gave orders to do so. I was
again sent to examine the water in the ward-room,
which I found to be more than two feet above the
deck ; and I think I was the last person who saw
Engineer G. H. Lewis as he lay seasick in his bunk,
apparently watching the water as it grew deeper
and deeper, and aware what his fate must be. He
called me as I passed his door, and asked if the
pumps were working. I replied that they were.
" Is there any hope ? " he asked ; and feeling a lit-
tle moved at the scene, and knowing certainly
what must be his end, and the darkness that stared
at us all, I replied, "As long as there is life there
is hope." "Hope and hang on when you are
wrecked "is an old saying among sailors. I left
the ward-room, and learned that the water had
gained so as to choke up the main pump. As I
was crossing the berth-deck I saw our ensign,
Mr. Frederickson, hand a watch to Master's Mate
Williams, saying, "Here, this is yours; I may
be lost " — which, in fact, was his fate. The watch
aud chain were both of unusual value. Williams
abandon their ship, they would hum a red light as a sig-
nal. About 10 o'clock the signal was given. When the
steamer stopped to allow the hawsers to be cast off,
the Monitor forged ahead under the impetus of her
headway, and came so close up under the steamer's
stern, that there was great danger of her running into
and cutting the steamer down. When the engines of
the Rhode Island were started to go ahead to get out
of the way, it was discovered that the hawser had got
afoul of the paddle-wheel, and when they were put in
motion, instead of getting clear of her, the rope wound
up on the wheel and drew the vessels together. This
was an extremely dangerous position, for they were be-
ing pitched and tossed about so much by the heavy seas
that if the iron-clad had once struck the steamer they
must both have gone down together. However, a lire-
man went into the wheel at the risk of his life, and with
an axe cut the hawser away so that the steamer was
received them into his hand, then with a hesitat-
ing glance at the time-piece said, " This thing may
be the means of sinking me," and threw it upon the
deck. There were three or four cabin-boys pale
and prostrate with seasickness, and the cabin-cook,
an old African negro, under great excitement, was
scolding them most profanely.
As I ascended the turret-ladder the sea broke
over the ship, and came pouring down the hatch-
way with so much force that it took me off my
feet ; and at the same time the steam broke from
the boiler-room, as the water had reached the
fires, and for an instant I seemed to realize that
we had gone down. Our fires were out, and I
heard the water blowing out of the boilers. I re-
ported my observations to the captain, and at the
same time saw a boat alongside. The captain
again gave orders for the men to leave the ship,
and fifteen, all of whom were seamen and men
whom I had placed my confidence upon, were the
ones who crowded the first boat to leave the ship.
I was disgusted at witnessing the scramble, and,
not feeling in the least alarmed about myself, re-
solved that I, an "old haymaker," as landsmen
are called, would stick to the ship as long as my
officers. I saw three of these men swept from the
deck and carried leeward on the swift current.
Bailing was now resumed. I occupied the turret
all alone, and passed buckets from the lower
hatchway to the man on'the top of the turret. I
took off my coat — one that I had received from
home only a few days before (I could not feel that
our noble little ship was yet lost) — and, rolling it
up with my boots, drew the tompien from one of
the guns, placed them inside, and replaced the
tompion. A black cat was sitting on the breech
of one of the guns, howling one of those hoarse
and solemn tunes which no one can appreciate
who is not filled with the superstitions which I
had been taught by the sailors, who are always
afraid to kill a cat. I would almost as soon have
touched a ghost, but I caught her, and, placing her
in another gun, replaced the wad and tompion ;
but I could still hear that distressing howl. As I
raised my last bucket to the upper hatchway no
one was there to take it. I scrambled up the lad-
der and found that we below had been deserted. I
shouted to those on the berth-deck, " Come up ; the
officers have left the ship, and a boat is alongside."
As I reached the top of the turret I saw a boat
enabled to get away at a safe distan ce. — From a letter to
the Editors from H. ft. Smith, then of the Rhode Island.
*fc The boat lowered was not lost, as I well know,
since I was in command of her. The gunwale on the
starboard side was crushed by the Rhode Island as she
tossed helplessly about with two lines wound up in her
wheel, but the boat kept above water, and brought off
sixteen men, among them Surgeon Weeks. The men did
not leap down upon the deck to guard the side, which
would have been sheer folly, but remained in the turret,
and were with difficulty urged to come on deck and be
taken off. The stern of the Monitor lay under the Rhode
Island's quarter — at no time were the vessels parallel.
The Monitor should not have been lost. She was going
against a id-sea. Had she turned back before dark
she woul *d uo difficulty, as all the officers of the
Rhode J "■ — A. O. Taylor, Acting Ensign
of the
THE LOSS O
'•MONITOR."
1A1
made fast on the weather quarter filled with m>
Three others were standing on deck trying to g
on board. One man was floating leeward, shou
mg in vain for help; another, who hurriedly passe*
me and jumped down from the turret, was swept
off by a breaking wave and never rose. I was
excited, feeling that it was the only chance to be
saved. I made a loose line fast to one of the
stanchions, and let myself down from the turret,
the ladder having been washed away. The mo-
ment I struck the deck the sea broke over it and
swept me as I had seen it sweep my shipmates. I
grasped one of the smoke-stack braces and, hand-
over-hand, ascended, to keep my head above water.
It required all my strength to keep the sea from
tearing me away. As it swept from the vessel I
found myself dangling in the air nearly at the top
of the smoke-stack. I let myself fall, and suc-
ceeded in reaching a life-line that encircled the
deck by means of short stanchions, and to which
the boat was attached. The sea again broke over
us. lifting me feet upward as I still clung to the
life-line. I thought I had neai'ly measured the
depth of the ocean, when I felt the turn, and as my
head rose above the water I was somewhat dazed
from being so nearly drowned, and spouted up, it
seemed, more than a gallon of water that had
found its way into my lungs. I was then about
twenty feet from the other men, whom I found to
be the captain and one seaman; the other had
been washed overboard and was now struggling in
the water. The men in the boat were pushing
back on their oars to keep the boat from being
washed on to the Monitor's deck, so that the boat
had to be hauled in by the painter about ten or
twelve feet. The first lieutenant, S. D. Greene, and
other officers in the boat were shouting, "Is the
captain on board?" and, with severe struggles to
have our voices heard above the roar of the wind
and sea, we were shouting, "No," and trying to
haul in the boat, which we at last succeeded in
doing. The captain, ever earing for his men,
requested us to get in, but we both, in the same
voice, told him to get in first. The momont he was
over the bows of the boat Lieutenant Greene
cried, "Cut the painter! cut the painter!" I
thought, "Now or lost," and in less time than I
can explain it, exerting my strength beyond im-
agination, I hauled in the boat, sprang, caught on
the gunwale, was pulled into the boat with a boat-
hook in the hands of one of the men, and took my
seat with one of the oarsmen. The other man,
named Thomas Joice, managed to get into the
boat in some way, I cannot tell how, and he was
the last man saved from that ill-fated ship. As we
were cut loose I saw several men standing on top
of the turret, apparently afraid to venture down
upon deck, and it may have been that they were
deterred by seeing others washed overboard while
I was getting into the boat. I
After a fearful and dangerous passage over the
frantic seas, we reached the Rhode Island, which
still had the tow-line catight in her wheel and had
drifted perhaps two miles to leeward. We came
•side under the lee bows, where the first boat,
uul left the Monitor nearly an hour before,
Lst discharged its men; but we found that
• on board the Rhode Island was a harder
in getting from the Monitor. We were car-
the sea from stem to stem, for to have
st would have been fatal; the boat was
against the ship's sides ; sometimes it
T the wheel, and then, on the summit of
, , ivave, far above the decks ; then the two
boats would crash together ; and once, while Sur-
geon Weeks was holding on to the rail, he lost his
fingers by a collision which swamped the other
boat. Lines were thrown to us from the deck of
the Rhode Island, which were of no assistance, for
not one of us could climb a small rope ; and besides,
the men who threw them would immediately let
go their holds, in their excitement, to throw an-
other— which I found to be the case when I kept
landing in rope instead of climbing.
It must be understood that two vessels lying side
by side, when there is any motion to the sea, move
alternately ; or, in other words, one is constantly
passing the other up or down. At one time, when
our boat was near the bows of the steamer, we
would rise upon the sea until we could touch
her rail ; then in an instant, by a very rapid de-
scent, we could touch her keel. While we were
thus rising and falling upon the sea, I caught a
rope, and, rising with the boat, managed to reach
within a foot or two of the rail, when a man, if
there had been one, could easily have hauled me on
board. But they had all followed after the boat,
which at that instant was washed astern, and I
hung dangling in the air over the bow of the Rhode
Island, with Ensign Norman Atwater hanging to
the cat-head, three or four feet from me, like my-
self, with both hands clinching a rope and shout-
ing for some one to save him. Our hands grew
painful and all the time weaker, until I saw his
strength give way. He slipped a foot, caught
again, and with Ids last prayer, " O God!" I saw
him fall and sink, to rise no more. The ship rolled,
and rose upon the sea, sometimes with her keel out
of water, so that I was hanging thirty feet above
the sea, and with the fate in view that had befallen
our much-beloved companion, which no one had
witnessed but myself. 1 still clung to the rope with
aching hands, calling in vain for help. But I could
not be heard, for the wind shrieked far above my
voice. . My heart here, for the only time in my life,
gave up hope, and home and friends were most
tenderly thought of. While I was in this state,
within a few seconds of giving up, the sea rolled
forward, bringing with it the boat, and when I would
have fallen into the sea, it was there. I can only
recollect hearing an old sailor say, as I fell into
the bottom of the boat, "Where in did he
come from?"
When I became aware of what was going on, no
one had succeeded in getting out of the boat, which
then lay just forward of the wheel-house. Our
captain ordered them to throw bow-lines, which
was immediately done. The second one I caught,
nander Bankhead reports Thomas Joice among the missing.— Editors.
74^
NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR.-
and, placing myself within the loop, was haul d on
board. I assisted in helping the others out jf the
boat, when it again went back to the Monitor ; ic
did not reach it, however, and after drifting about
on the ocean several days it was picked up by
a passing vessel and carried to Philadelphia. &
It was half-past 12, the night of the 31st of
December, 1862, when I stood on the forecastle of
the Rhode Island, watching the red and white lights
that hung from the pennant-staff above the turret,
3> After making two trips there were still four offi-
cers and twelve men on the Monitor, and the gallant
boat's crew, although well-nigh exhausted by their
labors, started for the third time on its perilous trip, but
it never reached them, for while all on board the steamer
were anxiously watching the light in the turret and
vainly peermg into the darkness for a glimpse of the
and which now and then were seen as we would
perhaps both rise on the sea together, until at last,
just as the moon had passed below the horizon,
they were lost, and the Monitor, whose history is
familiar to us all, was seen no more.
The Rhode Island cruised about the scene of the
disaster the remainder of the night and the next
forenoon in hope of finding the boat that had been
lost ; then she returned direct to Fort Monroe,
where we arrived the next day.
rescuing boat, the light suddenly disappeared and for-
ever, for after watching for a long time to try and find
it again, they were forced to the conclusion that the
Monitor had gone to the bottom with all that remained
on board. The position of the Rhode Island at this
time was about eight or ten miles off the coast directly
east of Cape Hatteras.—H. R. Smith.
NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR."
IN 1877, at the request of ex-Secretary Gideon
Welles, C. S. Bushnell, of New Haven, one of
the associate owners of the Monitor, embodied, in
a letter to the former, his recollections of the
negotiations which led to the building of that ves-
sel. That letter immediately following, and letters
of comment by Captain Ericsson and ex-Secretary
Welles, have been sent to the editors for publica-
tion, by the Reverend Samuel C. Bushnell, son
of the builder:
" Honorahle Gideon Welles. Dear Sir : Some
time since, during a short conversation in regard to the
ttle first Monitor, you expressed a desire to learn from
some of the unwritten details of her history ; par-
ticularly, how the plan of the boat came to be pre-
sented to the Government and the manner in which the
contract for her construction was secured.
" You doubtless remember handing me in August, 1801,4-
at Willard's Hotel in Washington, D. C, the draft of a
bill which you desired Congress should pass, in ref-
erence to obtaining some kind of iron-clad vessels to
meet the formidable preparations the Rebels were mak-
ing at Norfolk, Mobile, and New Orleans. At that time
you stated that you had already called the attention of
Congress to this matter, but without effect.
" I presented this bill to the Honorable James E. Eng-
lish, member of Congress from my district, who fortu-
nately was on the Naval Committee and untiringly urged
the matter on their attention. The chairman of the
committee, A. H. Rice, of Massachusetts, j) also cooper-
ated most heartily, so that in about thirty daysA it I
remember correctly, the bill passed both Houses, and
was immediately signed by President Lincoln. The bill
required all plans of iron-clad vessels to be submitted to
a board of naval officers appointed by yourself. The
board consisted of Admirals Smith and Paulding and
Captain Davis, who examined hundreds of plans, good
and bad, and among others that of a plated iron gun-
boat called the Galena, contrived by Samuel H. Pook,
now a constructor in the Navy Department. The partial
protection of iron bars proposed for her seemed so bur-
densome that many naval officers warned me against
the possibility of the Galena's being able to carry the
additional weight of her armament.
" C. II. Delamater, of New York, advised me to consult
with the engineer, Captain John Ericsson, on the matter.
■J- Mr. Buslinell's recollection of the dates is inexact. The
bill (Senate, 36) was introduced July 19th, in the Senate, by
Mr. Grimes of Iowa, "at the instance of the Department."
(Congressional Globe, 1st Session, 37th Congress, pp. 205,
344). It became a law August 3d.— EniTOUs.
i As Mr. Welles points out in his letter (see below), this
This I proceeded at once to do, and on supplying him
with the data necessary for his calculations promptly
gained the answer, ' She will easily carry the load you
propose, and stand a G-iuch shot — if fired from a
respectable distance.' At the close of this interview,
Captain Ericsson asked if I had time just then to ex-
amine the plan of a floating battery absolutely impreg-
nable to the heaviest shot or shell. I replied that the
problem had been occupying me for the last three
months, and that, considering the time required for con-
struction, the Galena was the best result that I had beeu
able to attain. He then placed before me the plan of the
Monitor, explained how quickly and powerfully she
could be built, and exhibited with characteristic pride
a medal and letter of thanks received from Napoleon III.
For it appears that Ericsson had invented the battery
when France and Russia were at war, and out of hos-
tility to Russia had presented it to France, hoping
thereby to aid the defeat of Sweden's hereditary foe.
The invention, however, came too late to be of service,
and was preserved for another issue.
" You no doubt remember my delight with the plan of
the Monitor when first Captain Ericsson intrusted it to
my care ; how I followed you to Hartford and astounded
you by saying that the country was safe because 1 had
found a battery which would make us master of the
situation so far as the ocean was concerned. You were
much pleased, and urged me to lose no time in present-
ing the plan to the Naval Board at Washington. I se-
cured at once the cooperation of wise and able associates
in the person of the late Honorable John A. Griswold of
[Troy] N. Y., and John F. Winslow of Troy, both of
them friends of Governor Seward and large manufac-
turers of iron plates, etc. Governor Seward furnished
us with a strong letter of introduction to President
Lincoln, who was at once greatly pleased with the sim-
plicity of the plan and agreed to accompany us to the
Navy Department at 11 A. M. the following day, and aid
us as best he could. Ho was on hand promptly at 11
o'clock — the day before you returned from Hartford.
Captain Fox, together with a part of the Naval Board,
was present. ■& All were surprised at the novelty of the
plan. Some advised trying it ; others ridiculed it. The
conference was finally closed for that day by Mr Lin-
coln's remarking, 'All T have to say is what the girl
said when she put her foot into the stocking, " It strikes
me there's something in it."' The following day Admiral
Smith convened the whole board, when I presented as
best I could the plan and its merits, carefully noting the
was an error of Mr. Busluiell's. The chairman of the Naval
Committee was Charles P,. Sedgwick, of Syracuse, New
York. Mr. Rice came second on the committee.— Editoks.
\ The time was actually fifteen days.— EniTORS.
■$T Several naval officers were also present unofficially.—
Editors.
NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE BUILDING OF THE
sNITOR.
749
remarks of each member of the board. I then went to
my hotel quite .sanguine of success, but only to be disap-
pointed on the following day. For during the hours fol-
lowing the last session, I found that the air had been
thick with croakings that the department was about to
father another Ericsson failure. Never was I more
active than now in the effort to prove that Ericsson had
never made a failure ; that, oh the contrary, he. had
built for the Government the first steam war-propeller
ever made; that the bursting of the gam was no fault of
his, but of the shell, which had not been made strong
enough to prevent its flattening up with the pressure of
the explosion behind it, making the bursting of the gun
unavoidable ; that his caloric principle was a triumph-
ant success, but that no metal had yet been found to
utilize it on a large scale. I succeeded at length in get-
ting Admirals Smith and Paulding to promise to sign a
report advising the building of one trial battery, pro-
vided Captain Davis would join with them. On goingto
him, I was informed that I might ' take the little thing
home and worship it, as it would not be idolatry, because
it was made in the image of nothing in the heaven above
or on the earth below or in the waters under the earth.'
One thing only yet remained which it was possible to do :
this was to get Ericsson to come to Washington and
plead the case himself. This I was sure would win the
case, and so informed you, for Ericsson is a full electric
battery in himself. You at once promised to have aineet-
ing in your room if I could succeed in inducing him to
come. This was exceedingly doubtful, for so badly had
he been treated and so unmercifully maligned in regard
to the Princeton that he had repeatedly declared that he
would never set foot in Washington again.
" Nevertheless I appeared at his house the next morn-
ing precisely at 9 o'clock, and heard his sharp greeting:
'Well! How is it?' ' Glorious,' said 1. ' Go on. go on,'
said he with much impatience. 'What did they say?'
'Admiral Smith says it is worthy of the genius of an
Ericsson.' The pride fairly gleamed in his eyes. 'But
Paulding— what did he say of it ? ' 'He said, " It's just
the thing to clear the 'Rebs' out of Charleston with."'
'How about Davis?' he inquired, as I appeared to
hesitate a moment. 'Oh, Davis,' said I, 'he wanted
two or three explanations in detail which I couldn't
give him, and so Secretary Welles proposed that I should
come and get you to come to Washington and explain
these few points to the entire board in his room to-mor-
row.' ' Well, I'll go — I'll go to-night.'
" From that moment I knew that the success of the
affair was assured. You remember how he thrilled every
person present in your room with his vivid description of
what the little boat would be and what she could do;
and that in ninety days' time she could be built, although
the Rebels had already been four months or more on the
Mcrrimae with all the appliances of the Norfolk Navy
Yard to help them.
" You asked him how much it would cost to complete
her. ' Two hundred and seventy -five thousand dollars,'
he said. Then you promptly turned to the members
of the board, and one by one asked them if they would
recommend that a contract be entered into, for her
construction, with Captain- Ericsson and his associates.
Each one answered, ' Yes, by all means.' Then you told
Captain Ericsson to start her immediately. On the next
day in New York a large portion of every article used
in her construction was ordered, and a contract at once
entered into between Captain Ericsson and his asso-
ciates and T. F. Rowland, at Green Point, for the ex-
peditious construction of the most formidable vessel,
ever made. It was arranged that after a few days I
should procure a formal documentary contract from the
Naval Board to be signed and executed by the Secre-
tary of the Navy, Captain John Ericsson and associates.
" I regret that this part of the matter has been mis-
understood, as though you had made terms heavier or
the risk greater than you ought. The simple fact was
that after we had entered upon the work of constructii >n,
and before the formal contract had been awarded, a
great clamor arose, much of it due to interested parties,
to the effect that the battery would prove a failure and
disgrace the members of the board for their action iu
recommending it. For their own protection, therefore,
and out of their superabundant caution they insisted on
inserting in the contract a clause requiring us to guaran-
tee the complete success of the battery, so that, in ease
she proved, a failure, the Government might be refunded
the amounts advanced to us from time to time during
her construction. To Captain Ericsson and myself, this
was never an embarrassment ; but to Mr. Winslow, as
indeed to Mr. Griswold also, it appeared that the board
had asked too much. But I know that the noble old
Admiral Smith never intended that we should suffer,
and among the many fortunate things for which the
nation had occasion to be grateful — such as the provi-
dential selection as President in those dark days of the
immortal Lincoln and his wisely chosen Cabinet — was
the appointment of Admiral Smith to the charge of the
navy yards, who always seemed to sleep with one eye
open, so constant was his watchfulness and so eager his
desire that the entire navy should be always iu readiness
to do its part in the overthrow of the rebellion.
" lam confident that no native-born child of this coun-
try will ever forget the proud son of Sweden who could
sit iu his own house and contrive the three thousand dif-
ferent parts that go to make up the complete hull of the
steam-battery Dictator, so that when the mechanics came
to put the parts together not a single alteration iu any
particular was required to be made. What the little
rtrst Monitor and the subsequent larger ones achieved is
a part of history. . . Very respectfully, C. S.
BUSHNELL."
The date of the following letter from Captain
Ericsson to the son of Mr. C. S. Bushnell indicates
that the above letter was submitted to Captain
Ericsson before it was sent to Ex-Secretary Welles :
"New York, March 2d, 1877.
"Ericsson F. Bushnell, Esq., New Haven. Mt
Dear Sir : I have read with much pleasure your father's
statement to Mr. Welles concerning the construction of
the original Monitor. I do not think any changes or
additions are needed, the main facts being well stated.
. . . Yours very truly, J. Ericsson."
Ex-Secretary Welles, under date of Hartford,
19th March, 1877, addressed the following letter
to Mr. C. S. Bushnell :
" My Dear Sir : I received on the 16th inst. your
interesting communication without date — relative to
the construction of the Monitor. Many of the incidents
narrated by you I remember, although more than fifteen
years have gone by since they transpired. Some errors,
not very essential and caused by lapse of years, occur
— Sedgwick, not Rice, was chairman of the Naval Com-
mittee; Griswold resided in Troy, not New York, and
subsequently represented the Troy District in Congress,
etc., etc.
"I well remember asking you to put in writing the
facts in your possession concerning the construction
of the Monitor. Some statements of General Butler,
Wendell Phillips, and others, to disparage the Navy
Department, pervert the truth and deny us all credit,
led Admiral Smith, in the autumn of 1868 to address to
me a communication reciting the facts, for he said,
when we were gone, those of us who took the responsi-
bility and would have incurred the disgrace had Erics-
son's invention proved a failure, would be ignored and
history misstated. As you were more intimate with the
case at its inception, were the first to bring it to the
attention of the department, it seemed to me proper
that your recollection and knowledge of the transaction
should be reduced to writing. I am greatly obliged to
you for the full and satisfactory manner in which you
have complied with my request. Next, after Ericsson
himself, you are entitled to bringing his invention to
the knowledge of the department. I would not know-
ingly do injustice to any one, and I am well aware that
the official in civil life, and who in administering the
75o
NB
IONS FOR THE BUlLDi.
THE "MONITOR:'
government dir. bents by which naval and
military men ac ....wn, is often by the passing
multitude little thought of and scarcely known ; but the
truth should not bi suppressed.
"The civilians of the Navy Department -who adopted
and pursued through ridicule and assa ult the Monitor
experiment, Butler and others would slight and defame.
In the historii a of the war, the Navy Department, which
originated, planned, and carried forward the naval
achievement 8 from Hatteras to New Orleans, and finally
Fort Fisher, is scarcely known or mentioned. The
heroes who (ought the 1 ;.ttlcs and periled their lives to
carry into effect the plans which the department de-
vised have deservedly honorable remembrance— but the
originators and movers are little known. I remember,
my dear sir, your earnest efforts in the early days of the
war and the comfort they gave me.
" Yours, Gideon Welles."
Captain Ericsson's version of the visit to Wash-
ington, as given in Colonel William C. Church's
paper on "John Ericsson" in "The Century"
magazine for A^ril, 1879, is as follows:
" With his previous experience of the waste of time
and patience required to accomplish anything at Wash-
ington, Captain Ericsson, who is not, it must be said,
like the man Moses, 'exceeding meek,' would not him-
self go to the capital to secure attention to his ideas.
There were associated with him three men of practical
experience, great energy and wealth, who had become
interested in the Monitor and were determined that it
should have a trial. One of these was Mr. C. S. Bushnell,
of Connecticut. He went to Washington, but tailed in
the attempt to persuade the iron-clad board that the
designer of the Princeton was worthy of a hearing.
Nothing remained except to induce Ericsson to visit
Washington in person and plead his own cause with
hal rude but forcible eloquence which, has seldom failed
him in an emergency. To move him was only less diffi-
cult than to convince the Navy Department without
him. At last a subterfuge was adopted. Ericsson was
giyen to understand that Mr. Bushnell's reception at
WasLington had been satisfactory and that nothing re-
mained but for him to go on and complete the details of
a contract for one of his vessels. Presenting himself
before the board, what was his astonishment to find
that he was not only an unexpected but apparently an
unwu. .....o , x.,itor ! It was evident that the board were
asking themselves what could have brought him there.
He was not left long in doubt as to the meaning of this
reception. To his indignation, as well as his astonish-
ment, he was informed that the plan of a vessel submit-
ted by him had already been rejected. The first impulse
was to withdraw at once. Mastering his anger, how-
ever, he stopped to inquire the reason for the deter-
mination of the board. The vessel had not sufficient
stability, Commodore Smith exclaimed ; in fact, it would
upset and place her crew in the inconvenient and unde-
sirable position of submarine divers. Now, if there is
anything which especially distinguishes the Monitor,
with its low free-board, it is the peculiarity which it has
in common with the raft it resembles — its inability to
upset. In a most earnest and lucid argument, Captain
Ericsson proceeded to explain this. Perceiving that his
explanation had its effect, and his blood being well
warmed by this time, he ended by declaring to the board
with great earnestness : ' Gentlemen, after what I have
said, 1 consider it to be your duty to the country to
give me an order to build the vessel before I leave this
room.' Withdrawing to one corner, the board consulted
together and invited Captain Ericsson to call again at
1 o'clock. Promptly at the hour named he appeared
at the Navy Department. In the board-room he found
Commodore Paulding alone The commodore received
him in the most friendly manner, invited him into his
private office, and asked that he would repeat the expla-
nation of the morning as to the stability of the vessel.
Between the two interviews, Ericsson had found time to
make at his hotel a diagramt presenting the question of
stabilityin a form easily understood. With this diagram,
he repeated his previous demonstration. Commodore
(afterward Admiral) Paulding was thoroughly con-
vinced, and with frankness which did him great credit
said : ' Sir, I have learnt more about the stability of a
vessel from what you have now said than all I knew
before." This interview ended with a request to call
again at 3 o'clock. Calling at 3, Ericsson was at once
invited to pass into the room of secretary Welles. Here,
without farther parley, the secretary informed him that
the board now reported favorably upon his plan of a
vessel, and wished him to return to New York and com-
mence work upon it at once. The contract would be
sent on for signature. Before this contract was re-
ceived, the keel-plates for the first Monitor had passed
through the rolling-mill." EDITORS.
END OF VOLUME I.
UNION SOLDIER'S CANDLESTICK.
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
3 9999 05690 3352