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Copyright, 1887, 
By The Century Co. 

The De Vinne Press. 


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TTTITH the main purpose in its origin of interesting veterans in their own 
T memories and of instructing the generation which has grown up since 
the War for the Union, the " Century War Series," through peculiar circum- 
stances, has exerted an influence in bringing about a better understanding 
between the soldiers who were opposed in that conflict. This influence, of 
which substantial evidence has been given, North and South, lends additional 
historical interest to the present work. Many commanders and subordinates 
have here contributed to the history of the heroic deeds of which they were a 
part. General Grant, who, in accord with the well-known purpose of President 
Lincoln, began at Appomattox the work of reconciliation, contributed to the 
\\ ar Series four papers on his greatest campaigns, and these are here included. 
They Were written before his severe illness, and became the foundation of 
his " Personal Memoirs." The narrative of his battles, continued under the 
tragic circumstances of the last year of his life, retrieved his fortunes and 
added a new laurel to his fame. The good temper and the unpartisan char- 
acter of his articles, and of the papers by the leading writers on both sides, 
arc the most significant signs in these pages. For the most part, each side 
has confined controversy to its own ranks, and both have emphasized the 
benefit as well as the glory of the issue. Coincident with the progress ol .he 
series during the past three years, may be noted a marked increase in the 
number of fraternal meetings between Union and Confederate veterans, 
enforcing the conviction that the nation is restored in spirit as in fact, and 
that each side is contributing its share to the new heritage of manhood and 

On the 17th of July, 1883, Mr. Buel, Assistant-Editor of " The Century" 
magazine, proposed in detail a magazine series by prominent generals of 



both sides. The original suggestion (based upon the success of two articles 
from different points of view on the John Brown raid, s n " The Century" fo\ 
that month) was of eight or ten articles on the decisive battles of the wa 
and included in the main the features of the expanded ^pu'es. Mr. R. ^ 
Gilder, the Editor-in-Chief, at once cordially adopted the suggestion, now 
mitting the charge of its execution to Mr. Johnson, the Associate-Editor, 
assisted by Mr. Buel ; from the start Mr. Gilder has aided the work by his 
counsel, and by the support of his confidence in its success and public use- 
fulness ends which could not have been attained except for the liberal and 
continued support of Roswell Smith, Esq., President of The Century Co. The 
elaboration of the first plan, the securing of the contributions, and the 
shaping and editing of the series were shared by Mr. Johnson and Mr. Buel, 
the former devoting the more time to the work during the months of organ- 
ization, and the latter having entire charge of the editing for nearly the whole 
of the second year. The course of the series in magazine form was from 
November, 1884, to November, 1887. 

That the plan and the time of the enterprise were alike fortunate, may be 
estimated from the unprecedented success of the articles. Within six months 
from the appearance of the first battle paper, the circulation of " The Century " 
advanced from 127,000 to 225,000 copies, or to a reading audience estimated 
at two millions. A part of this gain was the natural growth of the periodical. 
The still further increase of the regular monthly issue during the first year 
of the serial publication of Messrs. Nicolay and Hay's Life of Lincoln (1886-87) 
has proved the permanent character of the interest in important contribu- 
tions to the history of the Civil War. 

The present work is a natural sequence of the magazine series, and was 
provided for before the publication of the first paper. Both the series and this 
expansion of it in book form are, in idea as well as in execution, an outgrowth 
of the methods and convictions belonging to the editorial habit of " The Cen- 
tury" magazine. The chief motive has been strict fairness to the testimony of 
both sides, and the chief endeavors have been to prove every important state- 
ment by the " Official Records " and other trustworthy documents, and to spare 
no pains in the interest of elucidation and accuracy. These ends could not have 
been attained without the cordial cooperation as writers, and assistance as 
interested actors, of the soldiers of both sides; in these respects the aid 
rendered by veterans, from the highest rank to the lowest, has been unstinted, 
and would be deserving of particular mention if such were possible within 
' f an ordinary preface. Nearly every writer in the work, and 
thers whose names do not appear, have been willing sources 
or suggestion and information. Special aid has been received from General 
James B. Fry, from the late Colonel Robert N. Scott, who was the editorial 
head of the " War Records " office, and from his successor, Colonel H. M. 
Lazelle ; and thanks are due to General Adam Badeau, George E. Pond, 
Colonel John P. Nicholson, Colonel G. C. Kniffin, and to General Marcus 
J. Wright, Agent of the War Department for the Collection, of Confederate 


Material for the illustrations, which form a m< t striking and not the least 
important feature of the work, has been received from all sides, as will be 
noted in the table of contents. Special acknowledgment is due to the Boston 
Commandery of the Loyal Legion, to whose complete set of the Gardner and 
the Brady photographs, as well as to other material, access has been had 
from the beginning of the series. Colonel Arnold A. Band, Secretary of the 
Boston Commandery, and General Albert Ordway have rendered valuable 
aid in connection with the Brady and the Gardner photographs and in other 
ways. The importance of accuracy has been kept constantly in view in 
the preparation of the illustrations a laborious work which has been exe- 
cuted under the direction of Alexander W. Drake, Superintendent, and W. 
Lewis Fraser, Manager, of the Art Department of The Century Co. 

The Editors. 

New York, November, 1887. 


Page 5. For Admiral Charles A. Davis (so printed in part of the edition), read Admiral Charles H. Davis. 


Page 6 and page 108. For Charles G. Memminger, read Christopher G. Memminger. 

Page 41. "From Moultrie to Sumter," by General Doubleday. Concerning the statement that Major Robert 
Anderson, of Kentucky, " was a regular officer and owner of a slave plantation in Georgia," 
Major Anderson's widow writes to the Editors that he never owned a plantation anywhere, and 
that he never resided in Georgia. She adds, " He inherited slaves in Kentucky from his father, 
Colonel Richard Clough Anderson, and these he liberated immediately on coming into possession of 
them, which was a few years after he was graduated at the Military Academy of West Point." 
General Doubleday will modify the statement for other editions. 

Page 81. For Lieutenant James A. Yates (so printed in part of the edition), read Lieutenant Joseph A. Yates. 

Page 236. For Sergeant Thomas Shumate (so printed in part of the edition), read Sergeant Joseph Shumate. 

Page 261. " The Confederate Commissariat at Manassas," by Colonel Northrup. Near the middle of the second 
column for "Lieutenant-Colonel Robert B. Lee was added," read "Lieutenant-Colonel Richard B. 
Lee was added." 

Page 438. In the foot-note: For General George W. Cullom (so printed in part of the edition), read General 
George W. Ctillum. 

Page 576. "The Campaign of Shiloh," by General G. T. Beauregard. Line 27 for the 13th of February, read the 
13th of March. 

Page 669. Title to portrait. For Colonel Zebulou B. Vance, read Brigadier-General Robert B. Vance. 




FRONTISPIECE, "THE BUGLE CALL." Prom the lithograph by D. C. Fabronius of the painting 

by William M. Hunt VT 


Illustrations: Camp Gossip, from Gardner photo. ; and Confederate Wooden Canteen (W. Taber). 






PRELIMINARY EVENTS. From the Charleston Convention to the first Bull Run 

Illustration: The Reveille (W. Taber). 


The United States Government : The Buchanan Administration ; The Lincoln Administra- 
tion; The United States War Department ; The United States Navy Department. 

The Confederate States Government: Provisional Organization; Reorganization: Confed- 
erate States War Department : Confederate States Navy Department. 

Governors of the States during the War. 



Illustrations: Rotunda of the Capitol in 1861, from photo, lent by General M. C. Meigs (E. J. Meeker) 
Map of the United States in 1861, showing Military Posts occupied by United States Troops January l, 
1861, ami Approximate Limit of Territory controlled by the United States Forces .Inly, 1861 (Jacob 
Wells) Uniform of the National Rifles; Uniform of the Potomac Light Infantry <H. A. Ogden) Brevet , 
Lieut. -General Wintield Scott, from Brady photo. Headquarters of General Scott (TJieo. It. Diiris) 
Washington Arsenal, from Russell photo. (E. J. Meeker) The Columbian Armory (T. If. Davis) Joseph 
Holt. Secretary of War. from Brady photo. President Buchanan, from Brady photo. General Charles 
P. Stone, from Brady photo. President Lincoln, from ambrotype taken May 20, 1860 Vice-Preside) 1 1 
Hamlin, from Brady photo. South or Garden Side of the White House (F. 11. Cocks) The White House 
at Night (Joseph Pennell) Inauguration of President Lincoln, from plioto. lent by General M. C. Meigs. 


Illustrations : Peusacola Harbor from the Bar (Thco. R. Davis) The Man who refused to haul 
down the Union Flag ( William Waud) Map of Peusacola Bay, redrawn from "Frank Leslie's" (Fred. 
E. Sitts) Confederate, Water-battery, from photo, lent by Loyal) Farragut (W. Taber) Lieutenant 
Adam J. Slemmer, from Brady photo. 


Illu stratioxs : A Texau Ranger, from ambrotype i.l. ('. Redwood) The Alamo, Sail Antonio 
(Abram Hosier) Colonel Daniel H. Vinton, from photo. 

^r In onler to save much repetition, particular credit is here given to the Boston Commandery of the Loyal Legion, to ( 'ol- 
nel Arnold A. Rand, General Albert Midway. Charles B. Hall, and W. H. Whiton, for the use of photographs and drawings. 
War-time photographers whose work is of the greatest historical value, and lias been freely drawn upon in the preparation- 
f the illustrations, are M. B. Brady, Alexander Gardner, and Captain A. J. Russell in the North ; and D. H. Anderson of 
ichmond, Va.. and George S. < look of Charleston, S. C the latter since the war having succeeded to the ownership of the 
nderson negatives. 









Illustrations: View of Charleston from Castle Pinckney (T. R. Davis) Major Robert Anderson, 
from Bradj photo. Major Anderson and his Officers, from Cook photo. The Sea-battery at Fort Moul- 
trie, from photo. Map of Charleston Harbor (Jacob Wills) The Hot-shot Furnace, Fort Moultrie, from 
photo. Major Anderson's Men Crossing to Fort Sumter (Theo. R. Davis). 


Illustrations : South-west or Gorge Front of Fort Sumter, from photo, lent by the Washington Light 
Infantry, Charleston, S. C. (^Y. Tuber) The Sally-port of Fort Sumter, from photo. Ground Plan of 
Fort Sumter (F. E. Sitts) Interior of Fort Sumter after the Surrender, from photo. (W. Tuber) 
Interior of Fort Sumter after the Bombardment, showing the Gate and the Gorge Wall, from photo. 
Interior of Fort Sumter, showing the 10-iuch Colnmbiad bearing on Charleston, from photo, lent by G. L. 
G. Cook C W. Tuber) Eft'eet of the Bombardment on the Barbette Guns, from photo, lent by the Rev. John 
Johnson (E. J. Meeker) The Sumter Garrison Watching the Firing on the "Star of the West" (T. B. 
Davis) Confederate Floating Battery in Action (T. It Davis) Plan of the Floating Battery, from a 
Sketch by Colonel Joseph A. Yates Sergeant Carmody Firing the Barbette Guns of Sumter (T. li. Davis) 
A Casemate Gun during the Conflagration (T, R. Davis) Ruins of the Casemates and of the Barbette 
Tier of Guns, from photo's. 


Illustrations : Bursting of the Signal-shell from Fort Johnson over Fort Sumter (T. R. Davis) 
Governor Francis W. Pickens, from photo, lent by Louis Manigault Confederate Mortar-battery on 
Morris Island, from photo. General G. T. Beauregard, from Anderson-Cook photo. Secession Hall, 
Charleston, from Cook photo. (E. J. Meeker) Fort Sumter at the close of the Bombardment (T. R. Davis) 
Jefferson Davis, from Brady photo. View of Cumming's Point (T. R. Davis). 




-Life-mask of Stephen A. Douglas, from photo. 
Port rait ot Steph taken in 1852 Major-General George B. McClellan, 

from photo, by R. W. Addis ......, m Granger, from Brady photo. Camp Dennison, 

near Cincinnati, based upon photo, r W. Tuber). 


GOMERY. By the Editor of the Charleston >../?. BARNWELL RHE/'T 90 

" Mercury" in 1SG0-2 ) 

Illustrations: Montgomery, Alabama, in 1861, showing the Confederate Capitol (T. R. Duvis) 
Alexander H. Stephens, from Brady photo. William L. Yancey, from Cook photo. Robert Toombs, 
from photo. Leroy Pope Walker, from Brady photo. R. Barnwell Rhett, from Cook photo. Howell 
Cobb, from photo, lent by General Marcus J. Wright Stephen R. Mallory, from daguerreotype 
Judah P. Benjamin, from photo, lent by James Blair Charles G. Memminger and John H. Reagan, 
from steel-engravings, by permission of D. Appletou & Co. 



Illustrations : Richmond, Va., in 1861 (Theo. R. Duvis) Palmetto Regiment parading in Charleston, 
S. C, en route for Richmond (Theo. R. Davis) Map of Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland (Jacob 
Wells) Court-house, Charleston, Va., where John Brown and his Associates were Tried and Sentenced, 
from photo, by W. G. Reed (Harry Venn) Map of Harper's Ferry (<S. H. Brown) Portrait of John 
Brown, from photo, by J. W. Black & Co. (with Autograph) ^""ine-house. Harper's Ferry (Joseph 
Pennell) Portrait of Colonel Robert E. Lee, from photo, ta the War, lent by General G. W. 

C. Lee View of Harper's Ferry looking down the Potomac >to. CTF. Tn her) Harper's Ferry 

from the Maryland wide, from photo, (W. Tuber) Lieut.-C ,omas J. ("Stonewr ikson, 

C. S. A., from phntn i>\- Tanner & Van Ness General Jai 61, from pen sketcl . Mrs. 

Harriet Coxe Ble Voivk) Colonel Roger Jones, ly photo. 




Illustrations: An Affair of Outposts (W. Taber) Majov-( al Lew Wallace, from Brad;, 

photo. Map of Campaigns in West Virginia (Jacob Wells) Brig.-General T. A. Morris, from Brady 
photo. Plan of Combat at Rich Mountain (J. W ells) Brig.-Geni ohn Pegram, C. S. A., from 

Anderson-Cook photo. Brig.-Geueral R. S. Garnett, C. S. A., from photo. Major-General W. S. Rose- 
erans, from photo, by Bogardns Brig.-General H. A. Wise, C. 8. A., froi 1 Brady photo. Brig.-General 
J. B. Floyd, C. S. A., from photo. Post-hospital and Wagon-shop at Kanawha Falls, from photo, lent 
by General J. D. Cox (Harry Fe n n ) Plan of Gauley Bridge and Vicinity (Jacob Wells) View ot 
Gauley Bridge and New River Cliffs, from photo's lent by General J. D. Cox (Harry Fenn) Plan of 
Affair at Carnifex Ferry (Jacob Wells ) Floyd's Command Recrossing the < tauley River, and Preparing 
to Shell Rosecrans's Camp at Gauley Bridge, from sketches by W. D. Washington owned by J. F. 
Gibson ("IF. L. Shepjpard) View of Rornney, Va. (A. E. Waud). 


GOING TO THE FRONT (Recollections of a Private 1 ) . WARREN LEE GOSS 1-49 

Illustrations: Fae-simile of the Conclusion of General Dix's American Flan" Dispatch, from the 
original lent by the Rev. Morgan Dix, D. D. Arrival of the New York 7th at Annapolis (Thco. R. 
Davis) Uniform of the 6th Massachusetts (H. A. Ogden) "And the Corporal did" < /:. W. Eemble)A 
Mother's Parting Gift (E. W. Kcmble) Militia Uniform of '61, from photo, of the statue by J. Q. A. 
Ward The New York 7th Marching down Broadway (W. Taber) Federal Hill, Baltimore (F. H. 
Sehell) Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, in '61 (Theo. R. Davis) The New York 7th at (amp Cam- 
eron, Washington (J/. J. Bums). 


Illustrations: Confederate Battle-flag, from original flag lent by Mrs. Harrison (E. J. Meeker) A 
Virginia Homestead, from sketch lent by Mrs. Harrison (E. J. Meeker) Confederates on the Way to 
Manassas (E. W. Kemble) Listening for the First Gun (E. W. Kemble) Fac-simile of Autographic 
Copy of the First Stanza of " My Maryland." 



Illustrations: Scrutinising a Pass at the Long Bridge, based on photo. (W.H. SJ> .out Uniform 
of the llth New York at Bull Run (W. Taber) Simon Cameron, Secretary of War rom Brady photo. 
Uniform of the 1st Massachusetts at Bull Run (H. A. Oydcn) General Irvin McLowell, from photo. 
by Fredericks Uniform of the 2d Ohio at Bull Run (H.A. Ogden) Map of the Defenses of Washing- 
tor., July, 1861 (Jacob Wells) Fac-simile of a Washington Pass of 1861 (obverse and reverse), lent by 
Murat Halstcad View of Washington from the Signal Camp, two cuts (Tlieo. R. Daris) The Stone 
Church, Centreville, from Gardner photo. (Harry Fenn) Unif drm of the nth New York (Fire Zouaves) 
at Bull Run (H. A. Oydcn) Outline Map of the Rattle-field of Bull Run (Jacob Wells) Sudley Springs 
Hotel (Joseph Fennell) Sudley Springs Ford in 1884 (Joseph J>ennct!)*nd\ey Springs Ford, from 
Gardner photo. (Harry Fenn) The Stone Bridge over Bull Run (Joseph Pennell) Fatigim Uniform 
and Kilts of the 79th New York (11. A . Oydcn) The Sudley Springs Road, from photo, by Captain J. E. 
Barr (J. D. Woodward) Major-General Charles Griffin, and Major-Genera] James B. Ricketts, from 
photo's lent by General James B. Fry The Contest for the Henry Hill ( W. Taber) Uniform of the 
Garibaldi Guards (H. A. Oyden) Uniform of Blenker's 8th New York Volunteers (H. A. Oydcn) 
Brig.-General Louis Bleuker, from Brady photo. 

THE OPPOSING ARMIES AT THE FIRST BULL RUN. Table of Strength, Composition, 

and Losses 194 


Illustrations: A Louisiana "Tiger" (A. C. Redwood) Arlington, the Home of General Robert E. 
Lee (J. H. Cocks) Map of the Bull Run Campaign (Jacob Wells) The McLean House, General Beaure- 
gard's Headquarters, near Manassak from Gardner photo. (W. Taber) Topographical Map of the Bull 
Ruu Battle-Held (Jacob Wells) Rally ing the Troops of Bee, Bartow, and Evans behind the Robinson 
House fT. de Thulstrup) A Louisiana "Pelican" (A. G. Redwood) The Robiusou House, from Gardner 
photo. (J. 1>. Woodward) The Main Battle-ground, two views, from photo's (Harry Fenn) Colonel 
F. S. Bartow, from photo, lent by Georgia Historical Society Fairfax Court-house, from Gardi 
photo. (W. Taber) Ruins of the Stone Bridge, looking along the Warrenton Turnpike toward the Battle- 
field, from Gardner photo. Confederate Quaker Guns, from Gardner photo. (A. O. Redioood) Generals 
R. E. Lee and J. E. Johnston, from photo, by D. J. Ryan (with Autographs). 





Illustrations: The New Henry House and the Monument of the First Battle, from photo. (W. 
Taber) Confederate Fortifications about Manassas Junction, and the Stone House on the Warrenton 
Turnpike, from Gardner photo's (Harry Fenn) Plan of the Bull Run Battle-field (Jacob Wells) Briga- 
dier-General Barnard E. Bee, from photo, by Tucker & Perkins. 


Illustrations: Quaker Gun found in the Confederate Works at Manassas, from Gardner photo. 
(W. Taber) General Samuel Cooper, from photo, by Davis lent by General Marcus J. WrigM Lieuten- 
ant-General Richard 8. Ewell, from Anderson-Cook photo. " Stonewall" Jackson as First-Lieutenant 
of Artillery, from daguerreotype lent by his niece, Miss Alice E. Underwood. 





Illustrations: A Very Raw Recruit (E. W. Kemble) Map of Operations in Missouri, 18C1 (Jacob 
Writs) Governor Claiborne F. Jackson, from phototype lent by General Marcus J. Wright Brigadier- 
General D. M. Frost, from photo, by Scholten Fac-simile of Missouri War Scrip, lent by R. I. Hol- 
combe Major-General Sterling Price, from Anderson-Cook photo. Major-General David Hunter, from 
Brady photo. Major-< ieneial Henry W. Halleck, from photo. 


Illustrations: Off to the War (TT. Taber) Major-General F. P. Blair, Jr., from Brady photo. Brig. - 
General Nathaniel Lyon, from Brady photo. Major General Franz Sigel, from photo. Major-General 
John C. Fremont, from steel portrait lent by Mrs. Fremont. 


i of the United States Regulars in 1861 (H. A. Ogden) Map of Wilson's 
ells) Major-General John M. Schofield, from Brady photo. Battle-field 
tl Pearee's Camp, from photo's (E. J. Meeker) Brigadier-General N. B. 



Illustrations: Bloody Hill from the East, from photo, by Sittler lent by R. I. Holcombe (]}'. 
Taber) Major-General Ben. McCulloeh, C. S. A., from photo. Brigadier-General W. Y. slack, ('. S. A., 
from Brady photo. 


THE OPPOSING FORCES AT WILSON'S CREEK, MO. Composition, Strength, and Losses 306 


Illustrations: Confederates Fighting behind Hemp-bales (TT. Taber) Map of the Siege of Lexing- 
ton (Jacob Wells) Battle of Lexington, as seen from Parsons's position, after sketch by F. B. Wilkie in 
"Frank Leslie's " (F. II. Schell) Colonel James A. Mulligan, from photo. (Sidney L. Smith). 


Illustrations: Uniform of the United States Regulars in 1861, from photo. (H. A. Oyden) Major- 
General Samuel R. Curtis, from photo. Major-General Earl Van Horn, C. S. A., from photo, by Earle & 
Son (with Autograph) Map of the Battle-field of Pea Ridge, or Elkhorn Tavern (Jacob Wells) Major- 
General Peter J. Osterhaus, from photo, by Fredericks Major-General Eugene A. Carr, from Brady 
photo. Brigadier-General James Mcintosh, C. S. A., from photo. The Union Right under General Carr 
at Pratt's Store, Second Day of the Battle and Last Hour of the Battle of Pea Ridge, from paintings by 
Hunt P. Wilson owned by Southern Historical Society of St. Louis (Scliell and Hogati) Brigadier- 
General Albert Pike, C. S. A., from photo, by Scholl, and Brigadier-General Stand Waitie, C. S. A., from 
photo's lent by General Mareu 




Illustration: Elkhorn Tavern, Pea Ridge, from photo. (W. Taber). 
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT PEA RIDGE. Composition, Strength, and Losses 337 



Illustrations: Building the Eads Gim-hoats at Carondelet (Then. R. Davis) The "De Kalb," for- 
merly the "St. Louis" (Type of the "Carondelet," " Cincinnati," " Louisville," " Mound City," " Cairo," 
and "Pittsburgh"), from photo, lent by Captain Eads Captain James B. Eads, from photo. The 
"Osage" (Twin of the "Neosho") and the "Chickasaw" (Type of the "Milwaukee," "Winnebago," 
and " Kickapoo "), from photo's lent by Captain Eads (E. J. Meeker) Rear-Admiral Andrew Hull Foote, 
from photo, by E. Anthony Rear- Admiral Henry Walke. from ambrotype. 


By his Brother \ .... JOHN A. FOOTE 347 



[From the MS. of the " Life of Leonidas Polk"' (unpublished).] 

Illustrations : Portraits of Confederate Privates of the West, from ainbrotypes (II. A. Ogden)Map 
of the Battle-held near Belmont, Mo. (J. S. Kemp) Lieutenant-General Leonidas Polk, Bishop of 
Louisiana, from photo, hj Morse Brigadier-General U. 8. Grant (18(51), from photo, lent by O. Hufelai ' 

Tlie Gun-boats -Tyler" and "Lexington" fighting the Columbus Latteries during the B 
Belmont, from drawing by Rear- Admiral Walke (F. U. Sehell and T. Hogan) Confi 

tions at Columbus, Ky., from sketch made for "Frank Leslie's" and lent by G. 
Woodward) Captain John A. Rawlins (1861), from photo, lent by O. Hn 
Grant's Troops alter the Battle, from drawing by Rear-Admiral Walke (/'. H. ! 


Illustrations: Army Transports at the Cairo Levee (Theo. B. Daris) Flag-Onicer Foote in the 
Wheel-house of the "Cincinnati" at Fort Henry (W. Taber) Wharf-boat at Cairo, from photo, lent 
by Major J. H. Benton ( ir. (looter) The Gun-boats " Tyler " and " Lexington" engaging the Batteries 
of Columbus, from sketch by Rear-Admiral Walke (Harry Venn) Map of the Region of Foote's Opera- 
tions (Jacob Writs) United States Gun-boat "Tyler," from drawing by Rear-Admiral Walke Map of 
Fort Henry (Jacob Wells) Cross-section of a Confederate Torpedo found in the Tennessee River (E. 
J. Meeker) Between Decks: Serving the Guns, from drawing by Rear-Admiral Walke (A. C. lied 'wood > 

General Lloyd Tilghman, from photo. 


Illustration : The Attack upon Fort Henry, from drawing by Rear-Admiral Walke. 



Illustrations: Military Water-sled (Frank H. Sehell) Rev. Robert J. Breckinridge, D. D., from 
steel portrait Major-General William Nelson, from Brady photo. Major-General John C. Breckin- 
ridge, C. 8. A., from daguerreotype lent by Anson Maltby Map of Kentucky and Tennessee (Jacob Wells) 
John C. Crittenden, from daguerreotype Camp Dick Robinson The Farm-house, from sketch lent 
by .Mrs. M. B. Robinson Major-General Lovell H. Rousseau, from Brady photo. Major-Gem 
George B. Crittenden, C. S. A., from photo. Major-General D. C. Buell, from photo, lent by Gem ral 
James B. Fry Map of the Battle of Logan's Cross Roads, or Mill Springs, Ky. (Jacob Wells) Brigadier- 
General Felix K. Zollicoffer, C. B. A., from photo. Brigadier-General Speed S. Fry,- from photo, taken 
in 1802 National Cemetery at Logan's Cross Roads, from photo. (E. J. Meeker) View on the Battle- 
field of Logan's Cross Roads, from photo. (E. J. Meeker). 




CREEK). Composition, Strength, and Losses 392 



Illustrations: Confederate Private, from ambrotype (Frank Day) Map of Big Sandy River and 
Middle Creek Battle-field (Jacob Wells) Brigadier-General James A. Garfield, from Brady photo. 
Brigadier-General Humphrey Marshall, C. S. A., from photo. 


Illustrations: Headquarters in the Field (B. F. Zogoaum) the Town of Dover from Robinson's 
Hill, from photo. ( W. H. Drake) Map of Fort Donelson as Invested by General Grant (Jacob Wells) 
Glimpse of the Cumberland River where the Gun-boats first appeared, from photo. (Harry Fenn) 
Major-General John A. McClernand, from photo. Major-General Simon B. Buckner, C. S. A., from 
photo, by Anthony Dover Tavern, General Buckner's Headquarters and the Scene of the Surrender, 
from photo. (Harry Fenn) Major-General Morgan L. Smith, from photo, lent by Miss D. Morgan Smith 
Major-General C. F. Smith, from Brady photo. The Crisp Farm General Grant's Headquarters 
Front View of Mrs. Crisp's House, from photo's (W. H. Drake) The Position of the Gun-boats and 
the West Bank, from photo's (Harry Fenn) The Bivouac in the Snow on the Line of Battle (R. F. 
Zogbaum) Branch of Hickman's Creek near James Crisp's House, the Left of Generate. P. Smith's 
Line, from photo. (Harry Fenn) McAllister's Battery in Action (W. Taber) Yi&w on the Line of 
Pillow's Defenses in front of McClernand, showing Water in the Old Trenches, from photo. (Harry 
Fenn) --Major-General Gideon J. Pillow, C. S. A., from Anderson-Cook photo. Rowlett's Mill, from 
photo. (W. Taber) Fac-stmile of the original "Unconditional Surrender'" Dispatch View from the 
National Cemetery, from photo. (G. H. Stephens). 

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT FORT DONELSON, TENN. Composition, Strength, and Losses. . .429 






Illustrations : The " Carondelet " Fighting Fort Donelson, from sketch by Rear-Admiral Walke 
(F. H. Schell and T. Hoy an) Explosion of a Gun on board the " Carondelet " during the Attack on 
Fort Donelson, from sketch by Bear- Admiral Waike (M. J. Burns) The Gun-boats at Fort Donelson 
The Land Attack in the Distance, from sketch by Rear-Admiral Walke (Harry Fenn) Map of the 
Region of the Flotilla Operations (Jacob Wells) Map of Military and Naval Operations about Island 
Number Ten (Jacob Wells) The Mortar-boats at Island Number Ten (E. J. Meeker) The "Caron- 
delet " Running the Confederate Batteries at Island Number Ten, from sketch by Rear-Admiral Walke 
(Harry Fenn) The Levee at New Madrid (A. B. Wand) Major-General John Pope, from Brady 
photo. Brigadier-General W. W. Mackall, C. S. A., from photo, by G. W. Davis The "Carondelet" 
and "Pittsburgh" Capturing the Confederate Batteries below New Madrid, from drawing by Rear- 
Admiral Walke (F. H. Schell and T. Hogan) Flag-Ofneer Charles Henry Davis, from Brady photo. Fort 
Pillow and the Water-battery, and the Battle of Fort Pillow, from sketches by Rear-Admiral Walke (F. H. 
Schell ami T. Hogan ) The Battle of Memphis (looking South), from drawing by Rear-Admiral Walke 
(Frank H. Schell) Brigadier-General M. Jeff. Thompson, C. S. A., from photo. 


Illustrations : The Battle of Memphis (looking North) Retreat of the Confederate Fleet, from draw- 
ing by Rear-Admiral Walke (F. H Schell anil T. Hogan) Colonel Charles Ellet, Jr., from photo, by Rehn 
& Hum Close of the Battle of Memphis, from drawing by Rear-Admiral Walke (F. H. Schell and T. 
Hogan) Practicing on a River Picket ( W. Taber). 



Illustrations : Method of Cutting t he Channel ( W. Taber) Map of the Corrected Line of t he Channel 
above Island Number Ten, cut by the Engiueer Regiment (Jacob Wells). 



MEMPHIS Composition, Strength, and Losses -63 





Illustrations : General U. S. Grunt, from photo, (with Autograph) On the Skirmish Line fW. Tuber) 

Outline Map of the Shiloh Campaign (Jacob Wells) Mrs. Crump's House and the Landing below the 
House, from photo'.- (George Gibson) New Shiloh Church and shiloh Spring, in the Ravine South of the 
Chapel, from photo's (W. II. T>rake) Map of the Field of Shiloh, from General Grant's "Memoirs" 
First Position of Waterhouse's Battery, from sketch by E. W. Andrews, M. D. (E. J. Meeker) Con- 
federate Charge upon Prentiss's (amp on Sunday Morning (A. G. Redwood) Checking the Confederate 
Advance on the Evening of the First Day (Edwin Forbes) Present Aspect of the Old Hamburg Road 
which led up to the '-Hornets' Nest," from photo. (Fred. B. Schell) Major-General B. M. Prentiss, 
from Brady photo. Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace, from photo. Ford where the Hamburg Road 
Crosses Lick Creek, from photo. (Fred. B. Schell) Bridge over Snake Creek by which General Lew- 
Wallace's Troops reached the Field, from photo. (Fred. B. ScJiell) Bivouac of the Federal Troops (T. 
de Thulstrup) Wounded and Stragglers on the Way to the Landing (T. de Thulstrup) Above the 
Landing: The Store, ami a part of the National Cemetery, from photo, lent by Captain A. T. Andreas 
(E. J. Meeker). 


Illustrations: Battery Forward! (W. Taber) Pittsburg Landing, viewed from the Ferry Landing 
on the opposite Shore, from photo. Ienl by Captain A. T. Andreas (E. J. Meeker) Pittsburg Landing, 
from photo, lent by W. II. Chamberhn (J. 0. Davidson) The Landing at Savannah, from photo. (F. B. 
Schell) Major-General Alexander McD. McCook, from Brady photo. Pittsburg Landing in the 
Summer of 1884, from photo. (F. B. Schell) Map Showing the Union Camps at Shiloh, fac-simile of 
original Map of the Field of shiloh. revised and amended by General Buell (Jacob Wells) The. 
"Hornets' Nest": Prentiss's Troops and Hickenlooper's Battery repulsing Hardee's Troops, and Gib- 
son's Brigade charging Hurlbut's Troops in the "Hornets' Nest," from the Cyclorama of Shiloh at 
Chicago (II. A. Ogden) The Official, or Thorn, Map of the Battle of Shiloh (Jacob Wells) In the 
" Hornets Nest " (two views on W.H. L. Wallace's Line), from the Cyclorama at Chicago (H. C. Edwards) 

The Siege-battery, above the Landing, from photo. Lent by W. H. Chamberlin (W. Taber) Buell's 
Troops debarking at Pittsburg Landing ( Thulstrup) Major-General Thomas J. Wood, from .steel 
portrait, by permission of D. Van Nostrand Major General Thomas L. Crittenden, from Brady photo. 

Capture of a Confederate Battery (T. de Thulstrup) Scene in a Union Field-hospital (A. C. Redwood). 


THE OPPOSING FORCES AT SHILOH. Composition, Strength, ami Losses 537 


By his Son S 

Illustrations: Albert Sidney Johnston at the Age of Thirty-five, from miniature General Albert 
Sidney Johnston at the Ageof Fifty-seven, from photo. Fac-simile of Autograph found inside the Cover 
of General Johnston's Pocket-map of Tennessee Birthplace of Albert Sidney Johnston, Washington, 
Ky., from photo. (C. A. Xandcrhoof) Fort Anderson, Paducah, in April, 1862, after lithograph from 
sketch '.y A. E. Mathews (H. C. Edwards) Camp Burgess, Bowling Green, after lithograph from 
sketch by A. E. Mathews (E. J. Meeker) Map of Kentucky and Tennessee (Jacob Wells) Battle of 
Logan's Cross Roads, or Mill Springs, after lithograph from drawing by A. E. Mathews ( II'. Taber) Col- 
onel Sehoepf's Troops crossing Fishing Creek on the way to join General Thomas, after lithograph from 
sketch by A. E. Mathews (E. J. Meeker) Confederate Types of 1862 (A. C. Redwood) Map used by the 
Confederate Generals a* Shiloh, by permission of D. Appleton & Co. Lieutenant-General W. J. Hardee, 
C. 8. A., from photo, lent by < lolonel Charles C. Jones, Jr. Map of Battle of Shiloh (Part I.) and Map of 
Battle of Shiloh (Part II.), by permission of D. Appleton & Co. Vicinity of the " Hornets' Nest," from 
photo's lent by Captain A. T. Andreas (W. L. Lathrop) Scene of General Albert Sidney Johnston's 
Death, from photo. (W. Taber) Map of Battle of Shiloh (Part III.), by permission of D. Apple- 
ton & Co. 


Illustrations : Preaching at the Union Camp Dick Robinson, Kentucky, after lithograph from sketch 
by A. E. Mathews (E. J. Meeker) Lieutenant-General John C. Breckinridge, C. S. A., from Anderson- 
(ook photo. Slaves Laboring at Night on the Confederate Earth- works at Coiinth ( W. L. Sheppard) 
Five Corinth Dwellings, from photo's ( II'. J. Fenn) Major-General Bushrod R. Johnson, C. S. A., from 
Andersen-Cook photo. The "Hornets' Nest," from photo, lent by Captain A. T. Andreas (E. J. Meeker) 

The Union Gun-boats at Shiloh on the Evening of the First Day, after lithograph from sketch by A. E. 
Mathews (H. M. Eaton). 



Illustrations: A Confederate Private of the West, from ambrotype A Union Battery taken by 
Surprise (R. F. Zoybaum J The Last Stand made by the Confederate Line (R. F. Zogbaum). 




Illustration: Initial (R. /'. Zogbaum). 




With Documents submitted by General Lew Wallace 607 

Map <>f the Routes l>y which General Grant was reenforced (Jacob Wills). 



Illustrations: A Frigate of the Olden Time: the "Independence," built in 181-1, from photo. (Gran- 
ville Perkins) Roman War Galley Liue-of-battle Ship of the 17th Century The U. S. Frigate "Mer- 
rimac " before and after Conversion into an Iron-clad (J. O. Davidson) The Navy Yard, Washington, in 
1861, from war-time sketch (A. R. Waud) The Old Navy Department Building, Washington, from photo. 
(W. Tabcr) Launch of the " Dictator," from photo, lent by Delamater <fc Co. Cir. Taber) Monitor 
"Weehawken" in a Storm (Granville Perkins) Gideon Welles, Secretary of the U. S. Navy, from 
Brady photo. Gustavus V. Fox, Assistant-Secretary of the U. S. Navy, from photo. William Faxon, 
Chief Clerk of the U. S. Navy Department during the War, from photo, by Prescott & White. 



(Including Capture and Defense of Hatteras Island, Land and Water Fighting at Koanoke 
Island, the Two Squadrons at Elizabeth City, Battle of New Berne, Siege of Fort Maeou, Battle 
of South Mills, and other Operations.) 

Illustrations: Uniform of Hawkins's Zouaves, from photo. (H. A. Ogden) Rear-Admiral Silas H. 
Stringham, from Brady photo. Map of Early Coast Operations in North Carolina (Jacob Wells) Forts 
Hatteras and Clark, froin war-time sketch (A. R. Waud) The " Cumberland " Sailing into Action, and 
Union Fleet Bombarding Forts Hatteras and Clark, from war-time sketches (F. H. Schell and Thomas 
Flof/an) Retreat of the Confederates to their Boats after their Attack upon Hatteras ( ir. Taber) Land- 
ing of the Union Troops at Hatteras, from war-time sketch (A. If. Waud) Map of the Operations 
at Roanoke Island, from Official Records Map of the Battle-held of Roanoke Island, from Official 
Records Union Assault upon the Three-gun Battery, Roanoke Island, from war-time sketch (F. B. 
Schell) Vice-Admiral S. C. Rowan, from Brady photo. Brigadier-General L. O'B. Branch, from 
photo. Bombardment of Fort Thompson during the Battle of New Berne, from war-time sketch (F. H. 
Schell) Major-General John G. Foster, from Brady photo. Map of Operations in the Battle of New 
Berne (Jacob Wells) Assault of Union Troops upon Fort Thompson, from war-time sketch (F. H. Schell) 

Fort Macon after its Capture by the Union Forces, from war-time sketch by F. H. Schell (Thomas 
lUxjan) Map of the Engagement at South Mills (Fred. E. Sitts) Passage, of the Union Boats through 
the Dismal Swamp Canal, from war-time sketch by Horatio L. Wait (E. J. Meeker). 


Illustrations : Union Lookout, Hatteras Beach, froni war-time sketch (A. R. Waud) Uniform of the 
First Rhode Island (H. A. Ogden) Brevet Brigadier-General Rush C. Hawkins, from Brady photo. 
Rear-Admiral L. M. Goldsborough, from photo, lent by Henry Carey Baird General Burnside's Head- 
quarters, Roanoke Island, from war-time sketch by F. H. Schell (Thomas Hogan) General Burnside at 
the Confederate Cotton Battery, New Berne, from war-time sketch by F. H. Schell (Thomas Hogan) 
Brigadier-General Robert B. Vance, from tintype. 



Illustrations : General View of Hilton Head after its Capture by the U v lew of Post- 
Office, Hilton Head, from war time sketches (Xanthus Smith) Brevet L Thomas W. Sher- 
man, from Brady photo. Map of the Coast of South Carolina and i>e arolina (Jacob Wells) 

Rear-Admiral Samuel F. Du Pont, from photo, lent by Hora< tin-boat i" Seneca ." and 
Sloop of War "Vandalia," from war-time sketches (Xanthus ' Naval Attack at Hilton 



Head, Nov. 7, 1861 (Jacob Wells) Gun-boat " Mohawk," the Guard-ship at Port Royal Attack of the 
Union Fleet at Hilton Head Ten-inch Shell-gun which threw the Opening Shot from the Flag-ship 
"Wabash" Bay Point and Fort Beauregard after Capture, and Rifle-gun at Fort Beauregard, Ave 
pictures from war-time sketches (Xanthus Smith ) Battle of the Union Fleet with Forts Beauregard 
and Walker, and Hoisting the Stars and Stripes over Fort Walker, from war-time sketches (Frank H. 
Schell) Brigadier-General Thomas F. Drayton, C. S. A., from Brady photo. Captain Percival Drayton, 
U. S. N., from Brady photo. Old Headquarters, Hilton Head, and Pope's House, Hilton Head, used by 
the Union Army as Signal Station, from war-time sketches (Xanthus Sm ith) Union Signal Station, 
Beaufort, S. C, House of J. G. Barnwell and Fuller's House, Beaufort, S. C, from Gardner photo's 
(T. F. Moessner), 

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT PORT ROYAL. Composition and Losses 691 



Illustrations: Head-piece (W. H. Drake) Burning of Frigate "Merrimac" and of GosportNavy 
Yard, and Remodeling " Merrimac " at Gosport Navy Yard (J. O. Davidson) Fac-simile of sketch of 
"Merrimac" made the day lief ore the fight by Lieutenant B. L. Blackford Lieutenant Catesby ap R. 
Jones, from photo, by Courret Hermans, Lima, Peru Admiral Franklin Buchanan, C. S. N., and 
Commodore Josiah Tattnall, C. S. N., from photo, by D. J. Ryan Colonel John Taylor Wood, from oil- 
portrait by Gait Map of Hampton Roads and Adjacent Shores (Jacob Wells) The "Merrimac " ramming 
the "Cumberland" (J. <>. Davidson) Lieutenant George U. Morris, from photo. The "Merrimac" 
driving the "Congress" from her anchorage (J. O Davidson) Escape of part of the Crew of the "Con- 
gress" (J. O. Davidson) Explosion on the burning "Congress" (J. 0. Davidson) Lieutenant Joseph 
B. Smith, from photo, by Black and Batchelder Encounter between the "Monitor" and the "Merri- 
mac" at short range (J. <>. Davidson) Captain G. J. Van Brunt, from photo. The "Monitor" in 
Battle-trim, from tracing lent by Commander S. D. Greene. 


Illustr YTIOK : The "Merrimac" passing the Confederate Battery on Craney Island (J. <>. Davidson). 






Illustration: Cross-section of the Merrimac," From a drawing by John L. Porter. 



Illustrations: Arrival of the "Monitor" at Hampton Roads (J. O. Davidson) Rear- Admiral 
John L. Worden, from photo. Side Elevation and Deck-plan of the "Monitor," lent by Captain John 
Ericsson Bird's-eye view of " Monitor "-" Merrimac " Fight (J. o. Davidson) Fart of the Crew of the 
" Monitor," from Gardner photo. Commander Samuel Dana Greene, from photo, by Halleck. 


Illustrations: Captain John Ericsson, from Brady photo. Longitudinal Plan through Center Line 
of Original Monitor: 1, aft section; 2, central section; 3, forward section Plan of Berth-deck of 
Original Monitor auu .transverse Section of Hull of Original Monitor, from drawings lent by Captain 
Ericsson View showing Effect of Shot on the "Monitor" Turret, from Gardner photo. Side Eleva- 
tion of Floating Revolving Circular Tower, published by Abraham Bloodgood in 1807 Floating 
Circular Citadel submitted to French Directory in 1798, from "Engineering" (W. Tdber) Side Eleva- 
tion and Transverse Section of Iron-clad Steam Battery proposed by Captain Ericsson to Napoleon 
III. in 1854, lent by Captain Ericsson Engineer Isaac Newton, from medallion portrait by Launt 
Thompson Transverse section of the "Monitor" through the center of the turret, lent by Captain 
Ericsson Sinking of the "Monitor." December 22, 1862 (J. O. Davidson). 



(Including Letters from C. S. Bushnell, Captain John Ericsson, and Secretary Gideon S. Welles.) 
Illustration: Union Soldier's Candlestick (W. Taber). 



I S-UirvTxriTir* TiAofc r\nnTtr\\ar\ liv 1 Si tvnmiQ .Ton 1 Si ft 1 limit nf +ov_ 


( Showing posts occupied by U. 8. troops Jan. 1, 1861; limit of ter- 
( ritoi'i 

i'y controlled by U. S. forces Jidy, 1S61 ; and blockade stations. . 8 





























THE FIELD OF SHILOH. From General Grant's "Personal Memoirs." 470 


THE FIELD OF SHILOH. Prom the Official Map, revised and amended by Gen. D. C. Buell, 502503 




BATTLE OF SHILOH. PART I. From Col. W. P. Johnston's "Life of Gen. A. S. Johnston." 556 

" << " " II. " " ' " 560 

" " " < |H. " " '' " 566 


















U. S. N 






DANA, W. J. 

HELD, E. C. 

REED, C. H. 




: ' 



APRIL 23. The National Convention of the 
Democratic Party assembled at Charleston, 
S. C. Dissensions arising in regard to the 
question of congressional protection of slavery 
in the territories, the Southern delegates with- 
drew, organized another convention in Charles- 
ton, and adjourned May 4th. to meet in Rich- 
mond, Va., June 11th. 

May 3. The Douglas, or Northern, wing of the 
Convention adjourned, to reassemble at Balti- 
more, Md., June 18th. 

May 9. The Convention of the Constitutional 
Union Party (formerly the American, or "Know- 
Nothing," Party), held at Baltimore, Md., nomi- 
nated John Bell, of Tennessee, for President, 
and Edward Everett, of Massachusetts, for Vice- 
President, and adopted a platform evading the 
slavery issue. 

May 18. The National Convention of the Repub- 
lican Party, held at Chicago, nominated Abraham 
Lincoln, of Illinois, for President, and Hannibal 
Hamlin, of Maine, for Vice-President, and pro- 
nounced in favor of congressional prohibition of 
slavery in the territories. 

June 23. The Northern " Democratic National 
Convention," at Baltimore, nominated Stephen 
A. Douglas, of Illinois, for President, and Ben- 
jamin Fitzpatrick, for Vice-President. (The 
latter declined, and the National Committee 
substituted Herschel V. Johnson, of Georgia.) 
The convention declared in favor of leaving the 
question of slavery in the territories to the 
people of the territories, or to the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 

June 28. The Southern " Democratic National 
Convention" (adjourned from Richmond) nomi- 
nated, at Baltimore, Md., John C. Breckinridge, 
of Kentucky, for President, and Joseph Lane, 
of Oregon, for Vice-President. The conven- 
tion declared that neither Congress nor a ter- 
ritorial legislature had the right to prohibit 
slavery in a territory, and that it was the duty 
of the Federal Government, in all its depart- 


ments, to protect slavery in the territories when 
November 6. Presidential election, resulting as 
follows : 


Lincoln 17 

Breckinridge 11 

Douglas 2 

BeL 3 


. . ' 180 

. 1,866,352 
12 1,375,157 

39 589,581 

December 3. Meeting of Congress. Message from 
President Buchanan arguing against the right of 
secession, but expressing doubt as to the con- 
stitutional power of- Congress to make war upon 
a State. 

December 6. Select Committee of Thirty-three 
appointed by the House of Representatives to 
take measures for the perpetuity of the Union. 
(See " February 28.")' 

December 10. Resignation of Howell Cobb, of 
Georgia, Secretary of the Treasury. 

December 12. Arrival of General Winfield Scott 
in Washington, to advise with the President. 

December 14. Resignation of Lewis Cass, of 
Michigan, Secretary of State. 

December 20. Ordinance of secession adopted in 
South Carolina by a convention called by the 
Legislature of the State. 

December 26. United States troops, under Major 
Robert Anderson, transferred from Fort Moul- 
trie to Fort Sumter, S. C. 

December 27. Castle Pinckney and Fort Moul- 
trie, Charleston Harbor, seized by the South 
Carolina authorities. 

December 27. Surrender 
Revenue cutter William 
ties of South Carolina. 

December 27. Arrival in Washington of Messra 
Barnwell, Orr, and Adams, Commissioners from 
South Carolina, to treat with the administration. 

December 29. Resignation of John B. Floyd, of 
Virginia, Secretary of War. 

December 30. United States Arsenal, at Charles- 
ton, S. C, seized by the State authorities. 

of the United States 
Aiken to the authori- 



January 2. Fort Johnson, Charleston Harbor, 
seized by State authorities. 

January 3. Fort Pulaski, Ga., seized by State 

January 4. United States Arsenal, at Mt. Vernon, 
Ala., seized by State authorities. 

January 5. Forts Morgan and Gaines, Mobile Bay, 
Ala., seized by State authorities. 

January 5. Departure of first expedition for re- 
lief of Fort Sumter, S. C, from N. Y. Harbor. 

January 6. United States Arsenal, at Apalachi- 
cola, Fla., seized by State authorities. 

January 7. Fort Marion, St. Augustine, Fla., 
seized by State authorities. 

January 8. Resignation of Jacob Thompson, of 
Mississippi, Secretary of the Interior. 

January 9. Ordinance of secession adopted in 

January 9. Fort Johnston, N. C, seized by citi- 
zens of Smithville. 

January 9. The Star of the West, conveying relief 
to Fort Sumter, fired upon at the entrance to 
Charleston Harbor and driven back. 

January 10. Fort Caswell, N. C, seized by citi- 
zens of Smithville and Wilmington. 

January 10. Ordinance of secession adopted in 

January 10. United States troops, under Lieut. 
Adam J. Slemmer, transferred from Barrancas 
Barracks to Fort Pickens, Pensacola, Fla. 

January 10. Reenforcements for the troops at 
Pensacola sailed from Boston, Mass. 

January 10. United States Arsenal and Barracks 
at Baton Rouge, La., seized by State authorities. 

January 11. Ordinance of secession adopted in 

January 11. Surrender of Fort Sumter, S. C, 
demanded by Governor Pickens, of South Caro- 
lina, and refused by Major Anderson. 

January 11. Forts Jackson and St. Philip, La., 
seized by State authorities. 

January 11. United States Marine Hospital, near 
New Orleans, La., seized by State authorities. 

Januai-y 12. Barrancas Barracks, Forts Barran- 
cas and McRee, and the Navy Yard at Pensa- 
cola, Fla., seized by State authorities. 

January 12. Surrender of Fort Pickens, Fla., 
demanded by the Governors of Florida and Ala- 
bama and refused by Lieutenant Slemmer. 

January 14. Fort Taylor, Key West, Fla., gar- 
risoned by United States troops. 

January 14. Fort Pike, La., seized by State 

January 15. United States Coast Survey steamer 
Dana seized at St. Augustine, Fla. 

January 15. Second demand for the surrender of 
Fort Pickens, Fla. 

January 18. Third demand for the surrender of 
Fort Pickens, Fla. 

January 19. Ordinance of secession adopted in 

January 20. Fort on Ship Island, Miss., seized 
by State authorities. 

January 24. Reenforcements for Fort Pickens, 
Fla., sailed from Fort Monroe, Va. 

January 24. United States Arsenal, at Augusta, 
Ga., seized by State authorities. 

January 26. Oglethorpe Barracks and Fort Jack- 
son, Ga., seized by State authorities. 

January 26. Ordinance of secession adopted in 

January 28. Fort Macomb, La., seized by State 

January 28. United States property in hands of 
army officers seized at New Orleans, La. 

February 1. Ordinance of secession adopted in 

February 1. United States Mint and Custom 
House, at New Orleans, La., seized by State 

February 4. Meeting at Washington of a Peace 
Conference, representing 13 Free and 7 Border 
States, called at the request of the Virginia 
Legislature. (See " February 28.") 

February 4. Convention of seceded States met 
at Montgomery, Ala. 

February 6. Tke^Brooklyn arrived off Pensacola 
with reenforcements for Fort Pickens, Fla. 

February 7. The Choctaw Nation of Indians de- 
clared its adherence to the Southern States. 

February 8. United States Arsenal, at Little 
Rock, Ark., seized by State authorities. 

February 8. A " Constitution for the Provisional 
Government of the Confederate States of Amer- 
ica" adopted at Montgomery, Ala., by deputies 
from the States of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. 

February 9. Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, 
elected President, and Alexander H. Stephens, 
of Georgia, Vice-President, of " the Confederate 
States of America," by the Montgomery Con- 
vention, or Provisional Congress. 

February 13. Abraham Lincoln and Hannibal 
Hamlin officially declared elected President and 
Vice-President of the United States. 

February 15. Resolution passed by Confederate 
Congress for appointment of Commissioners 
to the Government of the United States. 

February 16. United States Arsenal and Bar- 
racks at San Antonio, Tex., seized by State 

February 18. All United States military posts in 
Texas surrendered to the State authorities by 
General David E. Twiggs, U. S. Army. 

February 18. Jefferson Davis and Alexander H. 
Stephens inaugurated at Montgomery, Ala 

February 20. Act passed by Confederate Con- 
gress to provide munitions of war. 

February 21. Camp Cooper, Texas, abandoned 
by United States troops. (During the next six 
months other United States military posts in 
Texas and New Mexico were abandoned. See 
map, page 8.) 

February 23. Abraham Lincoln arrived in Wash- 

February 26. Act passed by Confederate Con- 
gress to organize a general staff for the army. 

February 28. Adoption by the United States 
House of Representatives of the amendment 
offered by the Committee of Thirty-three, for- 


bidding any interference by Congress with 
slavery in the States. (This amendment was 
adopted by the Senate March 2, but was never 
adopted by the necessary number of States.) 

February 28. Act passed by Confederate Con- 
gress to raise provisional forces. 

March 1. The President of the Confederate States 
assumed control of military affairs in the States 
of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mis- 
sissippi, South Carolina, and Texas. 

March 2. United States Revenue cutter Dodge 
seized at Galveston, Tex., by State authorities. 

March 2. Texas admitted as a member of the 
Confederate States of America. 

March 3. Brig. -General G. T. Beauregard, C. S. 
Army, assumed command at Charleston, S. C. 

March 4. Abraham Lincoln inaugurated as Presi- 
dent of the United States. 

March 6. Confederate Congress passed act for 
the establishment of an army, not to exceed 
100,000 men, for 12 months' service. 

March 7. Ringgold Barracks, Tex., abandoned. 

March 7. Camp Verde, Tex., abandoned. 

March 11. Brig. -General Braxton Bragg assumed 
command of the Confederate forces in Florida. 

March 11. Adoption of the "Constitution of the 
Confederate States of America," at Montgomery, 
Ala., following in general the Constitution of 
the United States, but prohibiting the passage 
of any "law denying or impairing the right of 
property in negro slaves"; prohibiting "the im- 
portation of negroes of the African race from 
any foreign country other than the slave-holding 
States and territories of the United States of 
America," and giving to the Confederate Con- 
gress "power to prohibit the introduction of 
slaves from any State not a member of, or terri- 
tory not belonging to," the Confederacy. The 
preamble included a declaration of the "sover- 
eign and independent character" of each State. 

March 15. Confederate Congress passed act au- 
thorizing the construction or purchase of ten 

April 7. Reinforcements for Fort Pickens sailed 
from New York. 

April 10. Second expedition for the relief of Fort 
Sumter sailed from New York. 

April 11. Evacuation of Fort Sumter demanded 
by General Beauregard. 

April 12. Reenforcements from Fort Monroe, 
Va., landed at Fort Pickens, Fla. 

Apr'! 12. Bombardment of Fort Sumter com- 

April 13. Fort Sumter surrendered. 

April 14. Fort Sumter evacuated by its garrison 
and occupied by Confederate troops. 

April 15. President Lincoln issued a call for 
75,000 militia for 3 months' service, and a 
summons to Congress to assemble on July 4th. 

April 15. Fort Macon, N. C, seized by State 

April 16. FortsCaswell and Johnston, N.C., seized 
by State authorities. 

April 17. Reenforcements from New York landed 
at Fort Pickens, Fla. 

April 17. Confederate President called for 32,000 

troops, and offered letters of marque against 
United States commerce. 

April 17. Oi*dinance of secession adopted in Vir- 
ginia by Convention, subject to popular vote. 

April 1 8. United States Armory at Harper's Ferry 
abandoned and burned. 

April 19. President Lincoln announced the 
blockade of Southern ports, from South Carolina 
to Texas inclusive. 

April 19. Conflict between U. S. troops and mob 
in Baltimore, Md. 

April 19. Major-General Robert Patterson, Penn- 
sylvania Militia, assigned to command over the 
States of Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, 
and the District of Columbia. 

April 20. Expedition from Fort Monroe to destroy 
dry-dock at Norfolk, Va. 

April 20. United States Arsenal at Liberty, Mo., 
seized by armed secessionists. 

April 21 . United States Branch Mint at Charlotte, 
N. C, seized by State authorities. 

April 21. Colonel Earl Van Dorn, C. S. Army, 
assumed command in Texas. 

April 22. United States Arsenal at Fayetteville, 
N. C, seized by State authorities. 

April 23. Fort Smith, Ark., seized by State au- 

April 23. United States army officers at San An- 
tonio, Tex., seized as prisoners of war. 

April 23. Company of 8th U. S. Infantry (Lee's) 
captured near San Antonio, Tex. 

April 23. Captain Nathaniel Lyon, U. S. Army, 
assumed temporary command of the Department 
of the West. 

April 23. Major-General Robert E. Lee assigned 
to the command of the forces of Virginia. 

April 26. Major-General Joseph E. Johnston, Vir- 
ginia Volunteers, assigned to command of the 
State forces in and about Richmond, Va. 

April 27. Blockade of Virginia and North Caro- 
lina ports announced. 

April 27. Major-General Robert Patterson, Penn- 
sylvania Militia, assigned to command of the 
Department of Pennsylvania. 

April 27. Brig.-General B. F. Butler, Massachu- 
setts Militia, assigned to command of the 
Department of Annapolis. 

April 27. Colonel J. K. F. Mansfield, U. S. Army, 
assigned to command of the Department of 

April 27. Colonel T. J. Jackson, Virginia Volun- 
teers, assigned to command at Harper's Ferry. 

May 1. Volunteer forces called for by the Gov- 
ernor of Virginia. 

May 3. Additional forces called for in Virginia. 

May 3. President Lincoln issued call for volun- 
teers to serve three years ; ordered the regular 
army to be increased, and directed the enlist- 
ment of additional seamen. 

May 4. Colonel G. A. Porterfield, Virginia Vols., 
assigned to command in Northwestern Virginia. 

May 6. Ordinance of secession adopted in Ar- 

May 6. Confederate Congress passed act ''rec- 
ognizing the existence of war between the 
United States and the Confederate States, and 


concerning letters of marque, prizes, and prize 

May 7. Tennessee entered into military league 
with the Confederate States. 

May 7. Arlington Heights, Va., occupied by Vir- 
ginia troops. 

May 7. Virginia admitted as a member of the 
Confederate States of America. 

May 9. Exchange of shots between U.S. steamer 
Yankee and the batteries at Gloucester Point, Va. 

May 10. Major-General Robert E. Lee assigned 
to command of Confederate forces in Virginia. 

May 10. Camp Jackson, St. Louis, Mo., captured 
by U. S. forces under Captain Nathaniel Lyon. 

May 11. Riot in St. Louis, Mo. 

May 11. Brig.-General W. S. Harney, U. S. Army, 
resumed command of the Department of the West. 

May 13. Brig.-General Ben. McCulloch,C. S. Army, 
assigned to command in the Indian Territory. 

May 13. Baltimore occupied by General Butler. 

May 13. Major-General G. B. McClellan, U. S. 
Army, assigned to command of the Department of 
Ohio, including a portion of West Virginia. 

May 15. Brig.-General J. E. Johnston, C. S. Army, 
assigned to command near Harper's Ferry, Va. 

May 15. Brevet Major-General George Cadwal- 
ader, Pennsylvania Militia, superseded General 
Butler in the Department of Annapolis. 

May 17. Acts passed by Confederate Congress 
providing, upon certain conditions, for the ad- 
mission of North Carolina and Tennessee as 
members of the Confederate States of America. 

May 18. Naval attack on batteries at Sewell's 
Point, Va. 

May 20. Ordinance of secession adopted in North 

May 21. Brig.-General M. L. Bonham, C. S. 
Army, assigned to command on the "Alex- 
andria Line," Va. 

May 21. Colonel J. B.Magruder, Provisional Army 
of Virginia, assigned to command at Yorktown. 

May 21. Convention between General Harney, 
U. S. Army, and General Sterling Price, Mis- 
souri State Guard, with a view to the preserva- 
tion of order in the State. 

May 22. Brig.-General B. F. Butler assigned to 
command at Fort Monroe, Va. 

May 23. Demonstration against Hampton, Va. 

May 23. Brig.-General Benj. Huger, Virginia Vol- 
unteers, assigned to command at Norfolk, Va. 

May 24. Resolutions of mediation and neutrality 
adopted in Kentucky. 

May 24. Union troops advanced into Virginia and 
occupied Arlington Heights and Alexandria. 

May 26-30. Union troops advanced from the 
Ohio River and occupied Grafton, West Virginia. 

May 27-29. Union troops advanced from Fort 
Monroe and occupied Newport News, Va. 

May 28. Brig.-General Irvin McDowell, IT. S. 
Army, assumed command of the Department of 
Northeastern Virginia. 

May 31. Brig.-General Nathaniel Lyon super- 
seded General W. S. Harney in command of the 
Department of the West. 

May 31. Naval attack on batteries at Aquia 
Creek, Va. 

June 1. Skirmishes at Arlington Mills and Fair- 
fax Court House, Va. 

June 2. Brig.-General Beauregard superseded Gen- 
eral Bonham in command on the "Alexandria 

June 3. Action at Philippi, W. Va. 

June 5. Naval attack on batteries at Pig Point, Va. 

June 6. Brig.-General Henry A. Wise, C. S. Army, 
ordered to command in the Kanawha Valley, 
W. Va. 

June 6. Virginia State military and naval forces 
transferred to the Confederate States. 

June 7. Confederate reeonnoissance from York- 
town to Newport News, Va. 

June 8. Brig.-General R. S. Garnett, C. S. Army, 
assigned to command in Northwestern Va. 

June 10. Engagement at Big Bethel, or Bethel 
Church, Va. 

June 10. Brig.-General Beauregard in command 
of all Confederate forces in Prince William, Fair- 
fax, and Loudoun counties, Va. 

June 11. Maj. -General Cadwalader superseded 
by Maj. -General Banks in Department of An- 

June 13. Descent of Uniorutroops upon Romney, 
W. Va. 

June 15. Harper's Ferry, Va., evacuated by Con- 
federate forces. 

June 17. Engagement at Booneville, Mo. 

June 17. Action at Camp Cole, Mo. 

June 17. Action at Vienna, Va. 

July 2. General Patterson's command crossed the 
Potomac at Williamsport. 

July 2. Advance of General George H. Thomas's 
command , and engagement at Falling Waters, Va. 

July 5. Engagement near Carthage, Mo. 

July 8. Brig.-General Henry H. Sibley, C. S. 
Army, ordered to Texas to expel Union forces 

from New Mexico. 


July 9. Skirmish at Vienna, Va. 

July 10. Skirmish at Laurel Hill, W. Va. 

July 11. Engagement at Rich Mountain, W. Va. 

July 13. Major-General Leonidas Polk. C. S. Army, 

assumed command of Department No. 2, with 

headquarters at Memphis. 
July 13. Action at Carrick's Ford, W. Va. 
July 13. Surrender of Pegram's Confederate forces 

in Western Virginia. 
July 14. Brig.-General H. R. Jackson ordered to 

command of Confederate forces in Western Va. 
July 15. Military forces, stores, etc., of Arkansas 

transferred to the Confederate States. 
July 16. Union advance toward Manassas, Va. 
July 17. Confederate army Retired to the lint of 

Bull Run, Va. 
July 17. Skirmish at Fairfax Court House, Va. 
July 18. Skirmish at Mitchell's Ford, Va. 
July 18. Action at Blackburn's Ford, Va. 
July 18-21. Confederate forces' from the Shenan- 
doah Valley, under General Joseph E. Johnston, 

reenforced the army of General Beauregard at 

Manassas, Va. 
July 20. Brig.-General William W. Loring, C. S. 

Army, assigned to command of "Northwestern 

Army" (Western Virginia). 
July 21. Battle of Bull Run, or Manassas, Va. 





President: James Buchanan (Pa.) 
Vice-President : John C. Breckinridge* (Ky.) 
Secretary of State.: Lewis Cass (Mich.); Jeremiah S. 

Black (Pa.), appointed Dec. 17, i860. 
Secretary of War: John B. Floyd* (Va.) ; Jo'seph 

Holt (Ky.) fad interim}, Dec. 31, 1860; regularly ap- 
pointed Jan. 18, 1861. 
Secretary of the Navy: Isaac Toucey (Conn.) 
Secretary of the Treasury: Howell Cobb* (Georgia) ; 

Philip F. Thomas (Md.), appointed Dec. 12, 1860; John 

A. Dix (N. Y.), appointed Jan. 11, 1861. 
Attorney-General : Jeremiah S. Black; Edwin M. 

Stanton (Pa.), appointed Dec. 20, 1860. 
Secretary of the Interior: Jacob Thompson* (Miss.) 
Postmaster- General : Aaron V. Brown (Tenn.), died 

Mar. 8, 1859 ; Joseph Holt (Ky.), appointed Mar. 14, 1859 ; 

Horatio King (Maine), appointed Feb. 12, 1861. 



President : Abraham Lincoln (111.) 

Vice-President : Hannibal Hamlin (Maine). 

Secretary of State : William H. Seward (New York). 

Secretary of War: Simon Cameron (Pa.); Edwin M. 
Stanton (Pa.), appointed Jan. 15,1862. 

Secretary of the Navy : Gideon Welles (Conn.) 

Secretary of the Treasury: Salmon P. Chase (Ohio); 
W. P. Fessenden (Maine), appointed July 1, 1864; Hugh 
McCclloch (Ind.), appointed March 7, 1865. 

Secretary of the Interior: Caleb B. Smith (Ind.); 
John P. Usher (Ind.), appointed January 8, 1863. 

Attorney- General: Edward Bates (Mo.) ; James Speed 
(Ky.), appointed Dec. 2, 1864. 

Postmaster-General : Montgomery Blair (Md.) ; 
William Dennison (Ohio), appointed September 24, 


Secretary of War : Joseph Holt (appointed Jan. 18, 
1861) ; Simon Cameron (appointed March 5, 1861) ; Edwin 
M. Stanton (appointed January 15, 1862). 

Assistant Secretaries of War: Thomas A. Scott (ap- 
pointed Aug. 3, 1861; Peter II. Watson (appointed Jan. 
24, 1862) ; John Tdcker (appointed Jan. 29, 1862) ; Chris- 
topher P. Wolcott (appointed .Tune 12. 1862; resigned 
Jan. 23, 1863); Charles A. Dana (appointed August, 
1863). (Colonel Scott wns regularly commissioned 
under the act of August 3, 1861, authorizing the ap- 
pointment of one assistant secretary of war. Sub- 
sequently three assistant secretaries were authorized 
by law.) 

Adjutant- General's Department: Colonel Samuel 
Cooper* (resigned March 7, 1861); Brig.-Gen. Lorenzo 
Thomas (assigned to other duty March 23, 1863) ; Colonel 
Edward D. Townsend. 

Quartermaster's Department : Brig.-Gen. Joseph F. 
Johnston* (resigned April 22, 1861); Brig.-Gen. Mont- 
gomery C. Meigs. 

Subsistence Department: Colonel George Gibson 
(died Sept. 29, 1861) ; Brig.-Gen. Joseph P. Taylor (died 
Jan. 29, 1864) ; Brig.-Gen. Amos B. Eaton. 

Medical Department: Colonel Thomas Lawson (died 
May 15, 1861) ; Colonel Clement A. Finley (retired April 

14. 1862) ; Brig.-Gen. William A. Hammond; Brig.-Gen. 
Joseph K. Barnes (appointed Aug. 22, 1864). 

Pay Department : Colonel Benjamin F. Larned (died 
Sept. 6, 1862); Colonel Timothy" P. Andrews (retired 
Nov. 29, 1864); Brig.-Gen. Benjamin W. Brice. 

Corps of Topographical Engineers: Colonel John J. 
Abert (retired Sept. 9, 1861); Colonel Stephen H. Long. 
(This corps was consolidated with the "Corps of En- 
gineers," under act of March 3. 1863.) 

Coips of Engineers: Brig.-Gen. Joseph G. Totten 
(died April 22, 1864) ; Brig.-Gen. Richard Delafield. 

Ordnance Department: Colonel Henry" K. Craig 
(until April 23, 1861) ; Brig.-Gen. James W. Ripley (re- 
tired Sept. 15, 1863); Brig.-Gen. George D. Ramsay 
(retired Sept. 12, 1864); Brig.-Gen. Alexander B. Dyer. 

Bun mi of Military Justice: Major John F. Lee (re- 
signed Sept. 4, 1862); Brig.-Gen. Joseph Holt. 

Bureau of the Provost Marshal General (created by 
act of March 3, 1863) : Brig.-Gen. James B. Fry. 

General Officers of the United States Army, January 1, 
1861 : Brevet Lieut. -Gen. Winfield Scott (General-in- 
chief) ; Brig.-Generals : John E. Wool, David E. 
Twiggs,* William S. Harney. (Note. E. V. Sumner 
was promoted Brigadier-General March 16, 1861, rice 
David E. Twiggs, dismissed March 1, 1861.) 


Secretary of the Nary : Gideon Welles. 

Assistant Secretary: Gustavus V. Fox. 

Yards and Docks : Rear- Admiral Joseph Smith. 

Ordnance and Hydrography : Captain George A. Ma- 
grcder (dismissed April 22, 1861) ; Captain Andrew A. 
Harwood (relieved July 22, 1862) ; Rear- Admiral J< >hn A. 
Dahlgren (relieved June 24, 1863) ; Commander Henry 
A. Wise. (By act of Congress of July 5, 1862, " Hydrog- 
raphy " was transferred to the Bureau of Navigation.) 

Navigation (established by act of July 5, 1862) : Rear- 
Admiral Charles A. Davis. 

Equipment and Recruiting (established by act of July 

5, 1862) : Bear-Admiral Andrew H. Foote (relieved 
June 3, 1863) ; Commander Albert N. Smith. 

Construction, Equipment, and Repair : Chief Naval 
Constructor John Lentiiall. (By act of July 5, 1862, 
the "Equipment and Recruiting" Bureau was organ- 
ized, and thereafter the old bureau was designated as 
" Construction and Repair.") 

Provisions and Clothing: Pay-Director Horatio 

Medicine and Surgery: Surgeon William Whelan. 

Steam-Engineering (established by act of July 5. 1862) : 
Engineer-in-Chief Benjamin F. Isherwood. 

* Afterward in the Confederate service. 




President: Jefferson Davis (Miss.) Vice-President: Alexander H. Stephens (Ga.) 



(Feb. 8, 1861.) 

Secretary of State: Robert Toombs (Ga.), Feb. 21, 
1861 ; R. M. T. Hunter, (Va.) July 24, 1861. 

Secretary of War: Leroy P. Walker (Ala.), Feb. 21, 
1861; Judah P. Benjamin (La.), Sept. 17, 1861. 

Secretary of the Navy: Stephen R. Mallory (Fla.), 
Feb. 25, 1861. 

Secretary of the Treasury : Charles G. Memminger 
(S. C), Feb. 21, 1861. 

Attorney-General : Judah P. Benjamin, Feb. 25, 1861 ; 
Thomas Bragg, (Ala.), Sept. 17, 1861. 

Postmaster-General: J. H. Reagan (Texas), March 6, 

(Feb. 22, 1862, to April, 1865.) 

Secretary of State : R. M. T. Hunter, July 24, 1861 ; 
Judah P. Benjamin, March 17, 1862. 

Secretary of War: Judah P. Benjamin, Sept. 17, 1861; 
George W. Randolph, March 17, 1862; Gustavus W. 
Smith, acting, Nov. 17, 1862; James A. Seddon, Nov. 

20, 1862; JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, Jan. 28, 1865. 

Secretary of the Navy : Stephen R. Mallory. 

Secretary of the Treasury : C. G. Memminger ; George 
A. Trenholm, June, 1864. 

Attorney-General : Thomas Bragg; Thomas H. Watts 
(Ala), March 17, 1862 ; George Davis (N. C), 1864-5. 

Postmaster-General : John H. Reagan. 


Secretary of War: (see above). 

Assistant Secretary of War: Albert T. Bledsoe 
(April l, 1862) ; John A. Campbell (October 20, 1862). 

Adjt. and Insp. -Gen's Dep't: General Samtjel Cooper. 

Quarter 'master-General's Dep't: Colonel Abram C. 
Myeks (March 15, 1861); Brig.-Gen. A. R. Lawton (Aug. 
10, 1863). 

Commissary-General's Dep't: Colonel Lucius B Nor- 
throp (March 16, 186D ; Brig.-Gen. I. M. St. John (Feb- 
ruary 16, 1865). 

Ordnance Dep't: Brig.-Gen. Josiah Gorgas. 

Engineer Bureau : Maj.-Gen. Jeremy F. Gilmer. 

Medical Dep't: Brig.-Gen. Samuel P. Moore. 

Nitre and Mining Bureau : Brig.-Gen. I. M. St. John; 
Colonel Richard Morton (Feb. 16, 1865). 

Conscription Bur earn : Brig.-Gen. John S. Preston, 
Chief; Col. T. P. August, Siipt. 

Prison Camps: Brig.-Gen. John H. Winder. 

Exchange of Prisoners : Col. Robert Ould, Chief. 

Commissioner of Patents : Rufus R. Rhodes. 


Assis't Surgeon John De 

Secretary of the Navy : Stephen R. Mallory. 

Orders and Detail: Captain French Forrest; Com- 
mander John K. Mitchell. 

Ordnance and Hydrography : Commander George 
Minor; Commander John M. Brooke:. 

Provisions and Clothing. 
Medicine and Surgery: Surgeon W. 


A. W. Spots- 


UNION STATES: California, John G. Downey 
(1860-1), Leland Stanford (1861-3), Frederick F. Low 
(1863-8); Co7inecticut, William A. Buckingham (1858-66) ; 
Delaware, William Burton (1859-63), William Cannon 
(1863-7) ; Illinois, Richard Yates (1861-5) ; Indiana, 
Oliver P. Morton (1861-7) ; Iowa, Samuel J. Kirk wood 
(1860-4), William M. Stone (1864-8); Kansas, Charles 
Robinson (1861-3), Thomas Carney (1863-5); Maine, Is- 
rael Washburn, Jr. (1861-3), Abner Coburn (1863-4), 
Samuel Cony (1864-7) ; Massachusetts, John A. Andrew 
(1861-6) ; Michigan, Austin Blair (1861-4), Henry H. 
Crapo (1865-9) ; Minnesota, Alexander Ramsey (1859-63). 
Stephen Miller (1863-6) ; Nevada (State admitted 1864), 
Henry G. Blasdell (1864-71); New Hampshire, Icha- 
bod Goodwin (1859-61), Nathaniel S. Berry' (1861-3), 
Joseph A. Gilmore (1863-5) ; New Jersey, Charles 8. 
Olden (1860-3), Joel Parker (1863-6) ; New York, Edwin 
D.Morgan (1859-63), Horatio Seymour (1863-5), Reu- 
ben E. Fenton (1865-9); Ohio, William Dennison 
(1860-2), David Tod (1862-4), John Brough (1864-5); 
Oregon, John Whittaker (1859-62), Addison C Gibbs 
(1862-6); Pennsylvania, Andrew G. Curtin (1861-7); 
Rhode Island, William Sprague (1860-1), John R. Bart- 
lett, acting (1861-2), William C. Cozzens, acting (1863). 
James Y. Smith (1863-5); Vermont, Erastus Fairbanks 
(1860-1), Frederic Holbrook (1861-3), J. Gregory 
Smith (1863-5) ; West Virginia (admitted 1863), Provi- 
sional Governor, Francis H. Peirpoint (1861-3), Ar- 

thur I. Boreman (1863-9) ; Wisconsin, Alexander W. 
Randall (1857-61), Louis P. Harvey (1861-2), Edward 
Salomon (1862-3), James T. Lewis (1863-6). 

Moore (1857-61), John Gill Shorter (1861-3), Thomas 
H. Watts (1863-5) ; Arkansas, Henry M. Rector (1860-3), 
Harris Flanagin (1863-4), Isaac Murphy (1864-8); 
Florida, Madison S. Perry (1857-61), John Milton 
(1861-5); Georgia, Joseph E. Brown (1857-65) ; Louisiana, 
Thomas O. Moore (1860-4), Henry w. Allen i 1864-5); 
Union Military Governors, George F. Shepley (1862-4), 
Michael Hahn (1864-5) ; Mississip2)i, John J. Pettus 
(1860-2), Charles Clarke (1863), Jacob Thompson 
(1863-4) ; North Carolina, John W. Ellis (1859-61), H. T. 
Clark, acting (1861-2), ZebulonB. Vance (1862-5) ; South 
Carolina, Francis W. Pickens (1860-2), M. L. Bonham 
(1862-4), A. G. Magrath (1864-5) ; Tennessee, Isham G. 
Harris (1857-65), Andrew Johnson, Uniou Military 
Governor (1862-5); Texas, Samuel Houston (1859-61), 
Edward Clark, acting (1861), Francis R. Lubbock 
1861-3), Pendleton Miirrah (1863-5) ; Virginia, John 
Letcher (1860-4), William Smith, (1864-5). 

BORDER STATES : Kentucky, Beriah Magoffin 
(1859-62), James F. Robinson (1862-3) ; Thomas E. Bram- 
lette (1863-7) ; Maryland, Thomas H. Hicks (1857-61), 
A. W. Bradford (1861-5) ; Missouri, C. F. Jackson (1861) ; 
Union, H. E. Gamble (1861-4), T. C. Fletcher (1864-8). 

N. B. The Confederate Government of Kentucky was provisional in its character. George W. Johnson was 
elected Governor by the Russellville Convention in November, 1861. He served until he was killed in action at 
the battle of Shiloh. Richard Hawes was elected by the Provisional Council of Kentucky to succeed him, and 
acted as the Confederate Provisional Governor of Kentucky from 1862 until the close of the war. In Missouri 
Thomas C. Reynolds was the Confederate Governor from 1862 to 1865 ; but after 1861 a Confederate Governor of 
Missouri was little more than a name. In Tennessee, Governor Harris being ineligible to a fourth term, Robert 
L. Caruthers was elected Governor in August, 1863. Tennessee and ber capital being then occupied by the United 
States forces, Mr. Caruthers was never inaugurated, and Governor Harris held over under the law. 



ALL who knew Washington in the clays of December, 
^*- 1860, know what thoughts reigned in the minds of 
thinking men. Whatever then daily occupations, they 
went about them with their thoughts always bent on 
the possible disasters of the near future. The country 
was in a curious and alarming condition : South Caro- 
lina had already passed an ordinance of secession, and 
other States were preparing to follow her lead. The 

' '?';:. ^jw^l|p3Tv-' only regular troops near the capital of the country were 
300 or 400 marines at the marine barracks, and 3 offi 
cers and 53 men of ordnance at the Washington arsenal. 



The old militia system had been abandoned (without being legally abolished), 
and Congress had passed no law establishing a new one. The only armed vol- 
unteer organizations in the District of Columbia were : The Potomac Light 
Infantry, 1 company, at Georgetown; the National Rifles, 1 company, in 
Washington ; the Washington Light Infantry, of about 160 men, and another 
small organization called the National Guard Battalion. It had been evident 
for months that, on assembling in December, Congress would have far dif- 
ferent work to consider than the organization of the District of Columbia 
militia. Nor in the delicate position of affairs would it be the policy of Presi- 
dent Buchanan, at the outset of the session, to propose the military organiza- 
tion of the Federal District. It was also evident that, should he be so disposed, 
the senators and representatives of the Southern States would oppose and 
denounce the project. 

What force, then, would the Government have at its disposal in the Federal 
District for the simple maintenance of order in case of need ? Evidently but a 
handful ; and as to calling thither promptly any regular troops, that was out 
of the question, since they had already all been distributed by the Southern 
sympathizers to the distant frontiers of the Indian country, Texas, Utah, 
New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington Territory, ft Months would have been 

& hi December, 18GO, the military forces of the 
United States consisted of 1108 officers and 15,- 
259 men of the regular army; total, 16,367. 
The distribution of the army may be inferred 
from the map printed on page S, and from the 
.following "memorandum" (made on the 6th of 
December, 1875), by Adjutant-General E. D. 
Townsend, exhibiting " certain changes in the sta- 
tions of troops made under the orders of the Sec- 
retary of War, John B. Floyd, during the years 

" After the removal of the troops to Kansas 
and Utah at the close of Indian hostilities in 
Florida, in June, 1858, there were left in the coun- 
try east of the Mississippi River 16 companies of 
artillery. From that time (June, 1858) till Decem- 

ber 31, 1860, some changes of stations occurred, 
by which the Department of the East gained 3 com- 
panies (2 of artillery and 1 of engineers), so that 
at the end of 1860 there were 18 companies of 
artillery and 1 of engineers serving east of the 
Mississippi River. There were no troops in the 
neighborhood of Washington during the whole of 
Secretary Floyd's term of office. In the spring and 
summer of 1860 the force in Utah was reduced to 
3 companies of dragoons, 3 companies of artillery, 
and 4 companies of infantry. The remainder (13 
companies of infantry and 2 of dragoons) were sent 
to New Mexico, relieving 1 regiment of infantry al- 
ready there, which thereupon proceeded to Texas. 
No other changes of importance were made during 
the period in question." Editors. 



necessary to concentrate at Washington, in that season, a force of three 
thousand regular troops. Even had President Buchanan been desirous of bring- 
ing troops to the capital, the feverish condition of the public mind would, as 

the executive believed, have been badly affected by any 
movement of the kind, and the approaching crisis might 
have been precipitated. I saw at once that the only force 
which could be readily made of service was a volunteer 
force raised from among the well-disposed men of the Dis- 
trict, and that this must be organized, if at all, under the 
old law of 1799. By consultation with gentlemen well 
acquainted with the various classes of Washington society, 
I endeavored to learn what proportion of the able-bodied 
population could be counted on to sustain the Government 
should it need support from the armed and organized 

On the 31st of December, 1860, Lieutenant-General 
Scott, General-in-Chief of the army (who had his head- 
quarters in New York), was in Washington. The Presi- 
dent, at last thoroughly alarmed at the results of continued 
concessions to secession, had summoned him for consulta- 
tion. On the evening of that day I went to pay my respects 
to my old commander, and was received by him at Worm- 
ley's hotel. He chatted pleasantly with me for a few 
minutes, recalling past service in the Mexican war, etc.; 
and when the occasion presented itself, I remarked that 
I was glad to see him in good spirits, for that proved to 
me that he took a more cheerful view of the state of public 
affairs than he had on his arrival more cheerful than we 
of Washington had dared to take during the past few days. 
" Yes, my young friend," said the general, " I feel more 
cheerful about the affairs of the country than I did this 
morning ; for I believe that a safer policy than has hith- 
erto been followed will now be adopted. The policy of 
entire conciliation, which has so far been pursued, would 
soon have led to ruin. We are now in such a state that a 
policy of pure force would precipitate a crisis for which we 
are not prepared. A mixed policy of force and concilia- 
tion is now necessary, and I believe it will be adopted and 
carried out." He then looked at his watch, rose, and said : 
" I must be with the President in a quarter of an hour," 
and ordered his carriage. He walked up and down the 
dining-room, but suddenly stopped and faced me, saying: 
" How is the feeling in the District of Columbia I What 
proportion of the population would sustain the Govern- 
ment by force, if necessary ? " 

" It is leral," I replied, " that two-thirds of 








General Scott was General-in-Cbief of the army until November 1, 1861, when he was placed upon the 

retired list on his own application, and was succeeded by Major-General George B. McClellan. 

He died at West Point in May, 1866, in his eightieth year. 

the fighting stock of this population would sustain the Government in defend- 
ing itself, if called upon. But they are uncertain as to what can be done or 
what the Government desires to have done, and they have no rallying-point." 
The general walked the room again in silence. The carriage came to the 
door, and I accompanied him toward it. As he was leaving, he turned sud- 
denly, looked me in the face, placed his hand on my shoulder, and t 



1 1 

f ; .T. 

"These people have no rallying -point, Make yourself that rallying - 

point ! " 

The next day I was commissioned by the President colonel in the staff and 
Inspector-G-eneral of the District of Columbia. I was mustered into the service 
of the United States from the 2d day of January, 1861, on the special requisi- 
tion of the General-in-Chief, and thus was the first of two and a half millions 
called into the mili- 
tary service of the _____ 
Government to de- 
fend it against seces- 

I immediately en- 
tered upon my duties, 
commencing by in- 
spections in detail of 
the existing organi- 
zations of volunteers. 
The Potomac Light 
Infantry company, 
of Georgetown, I 
found fairly drilled, 
well armed, and, 
from careful infor- 
mation, it seemed to 
me certain that the majority of its members could be depended upon in case 
of need, but not all of them. 

On the 2d of January, I met, at the entrance of the Metropolitan Hotel, 
Captain Schaeffer, of the " National Rifles " of Washington, and I spoke to 
him about his company, which was remarkable for drill. Schaeffer had been 
a lieutenant in the Third United States Artillery, and was an excellent drill- 

He had evidently not yet heard of my appointment as Inspector-General, 
and he replied to rny complimentary remarks on his company : 

" Yes, it is a good company, and I suppose I shall soon have to lead it to 
the banks of the Susquehanna ! " 
" Why so f " I asked. 

" Why ! To guard the frontier of Maryland and help to keep the Yankees 
from coming down to coerce the South ! " 

I said to him quietly that I thought it very imprudent in him, an employee 
of the Department of the Interior and captain of a company of District of 
Columbia volunteers, to use such expressions. He replied that most of his 
men were Marylanders, and would have to defend Maryland. I told him that 
he would soon learn that he had been imprudent, and advised him to think 
more seriously of his position, but did not inform him of my appointment, 
which he would be certain to learn the f olio wing morning from the newspapers. 
It must be admitted that this was not a very cheerful beginning. 







i* - 

1/ "^ 


i J *i 





On inspecting the " National Rifles," I found that Schaeffer had more than 
100 men on his rolls, and was almost daily adding to the number, and that he 
had a full supply of rifles with 200 rounds of ball cartridges, two mountain 

howitzers with harness 
and carriages, a supply 
of sabers and of revolv- 
ers and ammunition, all 
drawn from the United 
States arsenal. I went 
to the Chief of Ordnance, 
to learn how it was that 
this company of riflemen 
happened to be so un- 
usually armed ; and I 
found at the Ordnance 
Office that an order had 
been given by the late 
Secretary of War (John 
B. Floyd) directing the 
Chief of Ordnance to cause to be issued to Captain Schaeffer "all the 
ordnance and ordnance stores that he might require for his company ! " 
I ascertained also that Floyd had nominated Captain Schaeffer to the 
President for the commission of major in the District of Columbia militia, 
and that the commission had already been sent to the President for his 

I immediately presented the matter to the new Secretary of War (Joseph 
Holt), and procured from him two orders, one, an order to the Chief of 
Ordnance to issue no arms to any militia or volunteers in the District of 
Columbia unless the requisition should be countersigned by the Inspector- 
General; the other, an order that all commissions issued to officers of the 
District of Columbia should be sent to the Inspector-General for delivery. 

An office was assigned me in the War Department, convenient to the army- 
registers and near the Secretary of War, who kindly gave orders that I should 
at all times be admitted to his cabinet without waiting, and room was made 
for me in the office of Major-General Weightman, the senior major-general 
of the District, where each day I passed several hours in order to confer 
with him, and to be able promptly to obtain his authority for any necessary 

The Washington Light Infantry organization and the National Guard were 
old volunteers composed of Washington people, and were almost to a man 
faithful to the Government. Of their officers, Major-General Weightman, 
though aged, and Major-General Force, aged and infirm, were active, and 
true as steel ; Brigadier-Generals Bacon and Carrington were young, active, 
and true. Brigadier-General Robert Ould, who took no part in the preparations 
of the winter, joined the Confederates as soon as Virginia passed her ordinance 
of secession, and his known sentiments precluded consultation with him. 



Having thus studied the ground, and taken the first necessary steps toward 
security, I commenced the work of providing a force of volunteers. I 
addressed individual letters to some forty well-known and esteemed gentle- 
men of the District, informing each one that it would be agreeable to the 
Government should he in his neighborhood raise and organize a company of 
volunteers for the preservation of order in the District. To some of these let- 
ters I received no replies ; to some I received replies courteously declining 
the service ; to some I received letters sarcastically declining ; but to many 
I received replies enthusiastically accepting the service, In about six weeks 
thirty-three companies of infantry and riflemen and two troops of cavalry 
were on the lists of the District volunteer force ; and aU had been uniformed, 
equipped, and put under frequent drill. 

The Northern Liberties fire companies brought their quota ; the Lafayette 
Hose Company was prompt to enroll; the masons, the carpenters,, the stone- 
cutters, the painters, and the German turners responded: each corporation 
formed its companies and drilled industriously. Petty rivalries disappeared, 
and each company strove to excel the others in drill and discipline. While 
the newly organized companies thus strove to perfect themselves, the older 
organizations resumed their drills and filled their ranks with good recruits. 

The National Rifles company (Captain Schaeffer's) was carefully observed, 
and it was found that its ranks received constant accessions, including the 
most openly declared secessionists and even members of Congress from the 
Southern States. This company was very frequently drilled in its armory, 
and its recruits were drilled nearly every night. 

Having, as Inspector-General, a secret service force at my disposition, I 
placed a detective in the company, and had regular reports of the proceed- 
ings of its captain. He was evidently pushing for an independent command 
of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, having his rifles, cannon, sabers, and revolv- 
ers stored in his armory. He also began to prepare for action, ordering his 
men to take their rifles and equipments home with them, with a supply 
of ammunition, so that even should his armory be occupied, they could 
assemble on short notice, ready for action. Meantime, his commission as 
major was signed by the President and sent to me. 

I reported these matters to General Scott, who ordered me to watch these 
proceedings carefully, and to be ready to suppress any attempt at violence ; 

but to avoid, if pos- 
sible, any shock, for, 
said he, "We are now 
in such a state that a 
dog-fight might cause 
the gutters of the 
capital to run with 

While the volunteer 
force for the support 
of the Government 





was organizing, another force with exactly the opposite purpose was in course 
of formation. I learned that the great hall over Beach's livery stable was nightly 
filled with men who were actively drilled. Doctor B , of well-known seces- 
sion tendencies, was the moving spirit of these men, and he was assisted by 
other citizens of high standing, among whom was a connection of Governor 
Letcher of Virginia. The nnmbers of these occupants of Beach's hall increased 
rapidly, and I found it well to have a 
skillful New York detective officer, who 
had been placed at my disposition, en- 
rolled among them. These men called 
lselves "National Volunteers," and 
in their meetings openly discussed the 
lire of the national capital at the 
proper moment. They drilled industri- 
ously, and had regular business meetings, 
full reports of which were regularly laid 
before me every following morning by 
" the New York member." In the meet- 
ing at which the uniform to be adopted 
was discussed, the vote was for gray Ken- 
tucky jeans, with the Maryland button. 
A cautious member; suggested that they 
must remember that, in order to procure 
arms, it would be " necessary to get the requisition signed by ' Old Stone,' 
and if he saw that they had adopted the Maryland button, and not that of 
the United States, he might suspect them and refuse the issue of arms ! " 

Doctor B supported the idea of the Maryland button, and said that, if 

Stone refused the arms, the Governor of Virginia would see them furnished, 
etc. These gentlemen probably little thought that a f idl report of their 
remarks would be read the next morning by " Old Stone " to the General- 

The procuring of arms was a difficult matter for them, for it required the 
election of officers, the regular enrolling of men, the certificate of elections, 
and the muster-rolls, aU to be reported to the Inspector-General. The subject 
was long discussed by them, and it was finally arranged that, out of the 360 
men, a pretended company should be organized, officers elected, and the 
demand for arms made. This project was carried out, and my member 
brought to me early the next morning the report of the proceedings, inform- 
ing me that Doctor B had been elected captain, and would call on the 

Inspector-General for arms. Sure enough Doctor B presented himself in 

my office and informed me that he had raised a company of volunteers, and 
desired an order for arms. He produced a certificate of election in due form. 
I received him courteously, and informed him that I could not give an order 
for arms without having a muster-roll of his men, proving that a full one 
hundred had signed the rolls. It was desirable to have the names of men 
holding such sentiments and nursing such proje^ J were known to be theirs. 



He returned, I think, on the following day, with a muster-roll in due form, 
containing the names of one hundred men. This was all that I wanted, 
looked him full in the face, smiled, and locked the muster-roll in a drawer of 
my desk, saying : 

" Doctor B , I am very happy to have obtained this list, and I wish yc 


The gallant doctor evidently understood me. He smiled, bowed, and lef the 
office, to which he never returned. He subsequently proved the sincerity 
principles by abandoning his pleasant home in Washington, his large and ^ 
able property, and giving his earnest service to the Confederate car The 

" National Volunteer " organization broke up without further trou 

Next came the turn of Captain Schaeffer. He entered my offi< 'ay 

with the air of an injured man, holding in his hand a requisitio d 

ammunition, and saying, that, on presenting it at the Orel 1 

been informed that no arms could be issued to him v - . al. I 

informed him that that w^as certainly cor] the l of the Sec- 

retary of War was general. I told hath ..ay in his possession 

more rifles than were re< i 11 : .nat he could have no more. 

He then said, sulki] ith his pany he could easily take the arms 

he wanted. I hi . :; and he replied : 

" You i . tiers guarding the Columbian armory, where there 

are plenty of am , and those four- men could not prevent my taking them." 

"Ah!" I replied, "in what part of the armory are those arms kept?" He 
said they were on the upper floor, which was true. 

" Well," said I, " you seem to be well informed. If you think it best, just 
try taking the arms by force. I assure you that if you do you shall be fired 
on by 150 soldiers as you come out of the armory." 

The fact was, that only two enlisted men of ordnance were on duty at the 
Columbian armory, so feeble was the military force at the time. But Barry's 
battery had just arrived at the Washington arsenal, and on my application 
General Scott had ordered the company of sappers and miners at West Point 
to come to Washington to guard the armory ; but they had not yet arrived. 
The precautions taken in ordering them were thus clearly proved advisable. 

The time had evidently come to disarm Captain Schaeffer ; and when he 
reached his office after leaving mine, he found there an order directing him to 
deposit in the Columbian armory, before sunset on that day, the two howitz- 
ers with their carriages which he had in his possession, as well as the sabers 
and revolvers, as these weapons formed no part of the proper armament of a 
company of riflemen. He was taken by surprise, and had not time to call 
together men enough to resist ; so that nothing was left to him but to comply 
with the order. He obeyed it, well knowing that if he did not I was prepared 
to take the guns from his armory by means of other troops. 

Having obeyed, he presented himself again in my office, and before he had 
time to speak I informed him that I had a commission of major for his name. 
He was much pleased, and said : " Yes, I heard that I had been appointed." 
I then handed him a slip of paper on which I had written out the form of 



oath which the old law required to be taken by officers, that law never having 
been repealed, and said to him : 

" Here is the form of oath yon are to take. Yon wiU find a justice of the 

peace on the next 
floor. Please qualify, 
sign the form in du- 
plicate, and bring 
both to me. One wiU 
be filed with your let- 
ter of acceptance, the 
other will be filed in 
the clerk's office of the 
Circuit Court of the 

He took the paper 
with a sober look, and 
stood near my table 
several minutes look- 
ing at the form of 
oath and turning the 
paper over, while I, 
apparently very busy 
with my papers, was 
observing him closely. 
I then said : 

"Ah, Schaeft'er, have 
you already taken the 
oath P 
" No," said he. 
"Well, please be 
quick about it, as I 
have no time to 

He hesitated, and 
said slowly : 

" In ordinary times 
I would not mind tak- 
ing it, but in these 

times " 

"Ah ! " said I, " you 
decline to accept your 
commission of major. 
Very well !" and I returned his commission to the drawer and locked it in. 
" Oh, no," said Schaeffer, " I want the commission." 

" But, sir, you cannot have it. Do you suppose that, in these times, which 
are not, as you say, ' ordinary times,' I would think of delivering a commission 




of field-officer to a man who hesitates about taking the oath of office f Do 
you think that the Government of the United States is stupid enough to allow 
a man to march armed men about the Federal District under its authority, 
when that man hesitates to take the simple oath of office I No, sir, you can- 
not have this commission ; and more than that, I now inform you |hat you 
hold no office in the District of Colum- 
bia volunteers." 

" Yes, I do ; I am captain, and have 
my commission as such, signed by the 
President and delivered to me by the 

" I am aware that such a paper was 
delivered to you, but you failed legally 
to accept it." 

" I wrote a letter of acceptance to 
the adjutant-general, and forwarded 
it through the major-general." 

" Yes, I am aware that you did ; but 
I know also that you failed to inclose 
in that letter, according to law, the 
form of oath required to accompany 
all letters of acceptance; and on the 
register of the War Department, while 
the issuance of your commission is 
recorded, the acceptance is not re- 
corded. You have, never legally ac- 
cepted your commission, and it is now 
too late. The oath of a man who 
hesitates to take it will not now be 

So Captain Schaeffer left the " Na- 
tional Rifles," and with him left the 
secession members of the company. I induced quite a number of true men to 
join its ranks ; a new election was ordered, and a strong, loyal man (Lieu- 
tenant Smead of the 2d Artillery) was elected its captain. Smead was 
then on duty in the office of the Coast Survey, and I easily procured from 
the War Department permission for him to accept the position. 

If my information was correct, the plan had been formed for seizing the 
public departments at the proper moment and obtaining possession of the seals 
of the Government. Schaeffer's part, with the battalion he was to form, was 
to take possession of the Treasury Department for the benefit of the new Pro- 
visional Government. Whatever may have been the project, it was effectually 
foiled. With the breaking up of the " National Volunteers " ; with the trans- 
formation of the secession company of " National Rifles" into a thoroughly 
faithful and admirably drilled company ready for the service of the Govern- 
ment ; with the arrival from West Point of the company of sappers and 
Vol. I. 2 



S. V. 


miners, and, later, the arrival of the Military Academy battery under Griffin ; 

ind with the formation in the District of thirty new companies of infantry 

1 riflemen from among the citizens of Washington and Georgetown, the 

i : things in the capital had much changed before the 4th of March. 

st now go back a little in time, to mention one fact which will show in 

k and dangerous a condition our Government was in the latter part of 

b and the early part of February, 1861. The invitations which I had 

issu f< >r the raising of companies of volunteers had, as already stated, been 

enthusiastically responded to, and companies were rapidly organized. The 

preparatory drills were carried on every night, and I soon found that the men 

were sufficiently advanced to receive their arms. I began to approve the 

requisitions for arms ; but, to my great astonishment, the captains who first 

received the orders came back to me, stating that the Ordnance Department 

had refused to issue any arms ! On referring to the Ordnance Office, I was 

informed by the Chief of Ordnance that he had received, the day before, an 

order not to issue any arms to the District of Columbia troops, and that this 

order had come from the President ! 

I went immediately to the Secretary of War (Mr. Holt) and informed him 
of the state of affairs, telling him at the same time that I did not feel disposed 
to be employed in child's play, organizing troops which could not be armed, 
and that unless the order in question should be immediately revoked there 
was no use for me in my place, and that I must at once resign. Mr. Holt told 
me that I was perfectly right ; that unless the order should be revoked there 
was no use in my holding my place, and he added, with a smile, " and I will 
also say, Colonel, there will be no use in my holding my place any longer. Go 
to the President, Colonel, and talk to him as you have talked to me." 

I went to the White House, and was received by Mr. Buchanan. I found 
him sitting at his writing-table, in his dressing-gown, wearied and worried. 

I opened at once the subject of arms, and stated the necessity of immediate 
issue, as the refusal of arms would not only stop the instruction of the volun- 
teers, which they needed sadly, but would make them lose all confidence in 
the Government and break up the organizations. I closed by saying that, 
while I begged his pardon for saying it, in case he declined to revoke his 
order I must ask him to accept my resignation at once. 

Mr. Buchanan was evidently in distress of mind, and said : 

" Colonel, I gave that order acting on the advice of the District Attorney, 
Mr. Robert Ould." 

" Then, Mr. President," I replied, " the District Attorney has advised your 
Excellency very badly." 

" But, Colonel, the District Attorney is an old resident of Washington, and 
he knows all the little jealousies which exist here. He tells me that you have 
organized a company from the Northern Liberty Fire Company." 

" Not only one, but two excellent companies in the Northern Liberty, your 

"And then, the District Attorney tells me you have organized another com- 
pany from among the members of the Lafayette Hose Company." 




" Yes, your ncy, another excellent company." 

"And the Di, ttorney tells me, Colonel, that there is a strong feeling 

of enmity between those fire companies, and, if arms are put in their hands, 
there will be dan t . ' I loodshed in the city." 

" Will your Ex< excuse me if I say that the District Attorney talks 

nonsense, or wors ' If the Northern Liberties and the Lafayette Hose 

men wish to *' not procure hundreds of arms in the shops along 

the avenue? d, [r. President, that the people of this District are 

thinking l i thi gs than old ward feuds. They are thinking 

whether or >nt of the United States is to allow itself to 

crumble oul . its own weakness. And I believe that the 

District Att no is well as I do. If the companies of volunteers 

are not arm : wii and the Government will have nothing to 

protect it in even a < tisturbance. Is it not better for the public 

peace, your . icy, even if the bloody feud exists (which I believe is for- 

gotten in a g question), is it not better to have these men organized 

and under th line of the Government ? " 

The Presid it - itated a moment, and then said: 

" I don't kn I you are right, Colonel ; but you must take the responsi- 

bility on you no bloodshed results from arming these men." 

I willingly a bed this responsibility. The prohibitory order was revoked. 
My companies ] d their arms, and made good use of them, learning the 

manual of arms purprisingly short time. Later, they made good use of 

them in susta he Government which had furnished them against 

.the faction which s< on became its public enemy, including Mr. Robert 
Ould, who, following his convictions (no doubt as honestly as I was 
following mine) his earnest services to his State against the Federal 


I think that t. ountry has never properly appreciated the services of 
those District of Columbia volunteers. It certainly has not appreciated the 
difficulties surmoun < i in their organization. Those volunteers were citizens of 
the Federal District, and therefore had not at the time, nor have they ever had 
since, the powerful stimi lant of State feeling, nor the powerful support of a 
State government , tai s's pride, a State press to set forth and make much 
of their services. They did their duty quietly, and they did it well and faith- 
fully. Although not mustered into the service and placed on pay until after the 
fatal day when the flag was tired upon at Sumter, yet they rendered great ser- 
vice before that time in giving confidence to the Union men, to members of 
the national legislature, and also to the President in the knowledge that there 
was at least a small force at its disposition ready to respond at any moment to 
his call. It should also be remembered of them, that the first troops mustered 
into the service were sixteen companies of these volunteers ; and that, during 
the dark days when Washington was cut off from communication with the 
North, when railway b 1 ' lo, es were burned and tracks torn up, when the Poto- 
mac was blockaded, i " were the only reliance of the Government 
for guarding the pu 'or ^reserving order and for holding 



the bridges and other outposts ; that these were the troops which recovered 
possession of the railway from Washington to Annapolis Junction and made 
practicable the reopening of communications. They also formed the advance 
guard of the force which first crossed the Potomac into Virginia and captured 
the city of Alexandria. 

Moreover, these were the troops which insured the regular inauguration on 
the steps of the Capitol of the constitutionally elected President. I firmly 

believe that without them Mr. Lincoln 
would never have been inaugurated. I 
believe that tumults would have been cre- 
ated, during which he would have been 
killed, and that we should have found our- 
selves engaged in a struggle, without prep- 
aration, and without a recognized head 
at the capital. In this I may be mistaken, 
of course, as any other man may be mis- 
taken; but it was then my opinion, when 
I had many sources of information at my 
command, and it remains my opinion now, 
when, after the lapse of many years and 
a somewhat large experience, I look back 
in cool blood upon those days of political 

One day, after the official declaration of 
the election of Mr. Lincoln, my duties 
called me to the House of Representa- 
tives ; and while standiug in the lobby waiting for the member with whom 
I had business, I conversed with a distinguished officer from New York. We 
were leaning against the sill of a window which overlooked the steps of the 
Capitol, where the President-elect usually stands to take the oath of office. 
The gentleman grew excited as we discussed the election of Mr. Lincoln, and 
pointing to the portico he exclaimed : 

" He will never be inaugurated on those steps ! " 

"Mr. Lincoln," I replied, " has been constitutionally elected President of the 
United States. You may be sure that, if he lives until the fourth day of 
March, he will be inaugurated on those steps." 

As I spoke, I noticed for the first time how perfectly the wings of the Capi- 
tol flanked the steps in question; and on the morning of the -4th of March I 
saw to it that each window of the two wings was occupied by two riflemen. 

I received daily numerous communications from various parts of the coun- 
try, informing me of plots to prevent the arrival of the President-elect at the 
capital. These warnings came from St. Louis, from Chicago, from Cincin- 
nati, from Pittsburgh, from New York, from Philadelphia, and especially from 
Baltimore. Every morning I reported to General Scott on the occurrences of 
the night and the information received by the morning's mail; and every 
evening I rendered an account of the day's work and received instructions for 







the night. General Scott also received numerous warnings of danger to the 
President-elect, which he would give me to study and compare. Many of the 
communications were anonymous and vague. But, on the other hand, many 
were from calm and wise men, one of whom became, shortly afterward, a cabi- 
net minister; 
one was a 
railway presi- 
dent, another 
a distinguish- 
ed ex-gover- 
nor of a State, 
etc. In every 
case where 
the indica- 
tions were 
distinct, they 
were followed 
up to learn if 
real danger 

So ; many 
clear indica- 

tions pointed 
to Baltimore, 

that three good detectives of the New York police force were constantly em- 
ployed there. These men reported frequently to me, and their statements 
were constantly compared with the information received from independent 

Doubtless, Mr. Lincoln, at his home in r Springfield, 111., received many and 
contradictory reports from the capital, for he took his own way of obtaining 
information. One night, between 11 'o'clock and midnight, while I was busy 
in my study over the papers of the day and evening, a card was brought to 
me, bearing the name " Mr. Leonard Swett," and upon it was written in the 
well-known hand of General Scott, " Colonel Stone, Inspector-General, may 
converse freely with Mr. Swett." Soon a tall gentleman of marked features 
entered my room. At first I thought it was Mr. Lincoln himself, so much, at 
first glance, did Mr. Swett's face resemble the portraits I had seen of Jfy. Lin- 
coln, and so nearly did his height correspond with that attributea to the 
President-elect. But I quickly found that the gentleman's card bore his true 
name, and that Mr. Swett had come directly from Mr. Lincoln, having his full 
confidence, to see for him the state of affairs in Washington, and report to 
him in person. 

Mr. Swett remained several days in the capital, had frequent and long con- 
versations with General Scott and myself (and I suppose also with many 
others), and with" me visited the armories of some of the volunteer companies. 
As he drove with me to the railway station on his departure, Mr. Swett said : 




" Mr. Lincoln, and in fact almost everybody, is ignorant of the vast amount 
of careful work which has been done here this winter, by General Scott and 
yourself, to insure the existence of the Government and to render certain and 
safe the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln. He will be very grateful to both." 

I replied, with more sincerity than tact : 

"Mr. Lincoln has no cause to be grateful to me. I was opposed to his elec- 
tion, and believed in advance that it would bring on what is evidently coming, 
a fearful war. The work which I have done has not been done for him, and 
he need feel under no obligations to me. I have done my best toward saving 
the Government of the country and to insure the regular inauguration of the 
constitutionally elected President on the 4th of next month." 

As President Lincoln approached the capital, it became certain that desper- 
ate attempts woidd be made to prevent his arriving there. To be thoroughly 
informed as to what might be expected in Baltimore, I directed a detective to 
be constantly near the chief of police and to keep up relations with him ; 
while two others were instructed to watch, without the knowledge and 
independent of the chief of police. The officer who was near the chief of 
police reported regularly, until near the last, that there was no danger in Bal- 
timore ; but the others discovered a band of desperate men plotting for the 
destruction of Mr. Lincoln during his passage through the city, and by affilia- 
ting wth them, these detectives obtained the details of the plot. 

Mr. Lincoln passed through Baltimore in advance of the time announced 
for the journey (in accordance with advice given by me to Mr. Seward and 





which was carried by Mr. Frederick W. Seward to Mr. Lincoln), and arrived 
safe at Washington on the morning of the day he was to have passed through 
Baltimore. Bnt the plotting to prevent his inauguration continued ; and there 
was only too good reason to fear that an attempt would be made against his 
life during the passage of the inaugural procession from Willard's hotel, where 
Mr. Lincoln lodged, to the Capitol. 

On the afternoon of the 3d of March, General Scott held a conference at 
his headquarters, there being present his staff, General Sumner, and myself, 
and then was arranged the programme of the procession. President 
Buchanan was to drive to Willard's hotel, and call upon the President-elect. 
The two were to ride in the same carriage, between double files of a squadron 
of the District of Columbia cavalry. The company of sappers and miners 
w r ere to inarch in front of the presidential carriage, and the infantry and rifle- 
men of the District of Columbia were to follow it. Riflemen in squads were 
to be placed on the roofs of certain commanding houses which I had selected, 


along Pennsylvania Avenue, with orders to watch the windows on the oppo- 
site side and to fire upon them in case any attempt should be made to fire from 
those windows on the presidential carriage. The small force of regular cav- 
alry which had arrived was to guard the side-street crossings of Pennsylvania 
Avenue, and to move from one to another during the passage of the proces- 
sion. A battalion of District of Columbia troops were to be placed near the 
steps of the Capitol, and riflemen in the windows of the wings of the Capitol. 
On the arrival of the presidential party at the Capitol, the troops were to be 
stationed so as to return in the same order after the ceremony. 

To illustrate the state of uncertainty in which we were at that time con- 
cerning men, I may here state that the lieutenant-colonel, military secretary 
of the General-in-Chief, who that afternoon recorded the conclusions of the 
General in conference, and who afterward wrote out for me the instructions 
regarding the disposition of troops, resigned his commission that very night, 
and departed for the South, where he joined the Confederate army. 

During the night of the 3d of March, notice was brought me that an 
attempt would be made to blow up the platform on which the President 
would stand to take the oath of office. I immediately placed men tinder 
the steps, and at daybreak a trusted battalion of District troops (if I remem- 
ber rightly, it was the National Guard, under Colonel T.ait) formed in a semi- 
circle at the foot of the great stairway, and prevented all entrance from 
without. When the crowd began to assemble in front of the portico, a large 
number of policemen in plain clothes were scattered through the mass to 
observe closely, to place themselves near any person who might act suspi- 
ciously, and. to strike down any hand which might raise a weapon. 

At the appointed hour, Mr. Buchanan was escorted to Willard's hotel, 
which he entered. There I found a number of mounted "marshals of the 
day," and posted them around the carriage, within the cavalry guard. The 
two Presidents were saluted by the troops as they came out of the hotel and 
took their places in the carriage. The procession started. During the march 
to the Capitol I rode near the carriage, and by an apparently clumsy use of 
my spurs managed to keep the horses of the cavalry in an uneasy state, so 
that it would have been very difficult for even a good marksman to get an aim 
at one of the inmates of the carriage between the prancing horses. 

After the inaugural ceremony, the President and the ex-President were 
escorted in the same order to the White House. Arrived there, Mr. Buchanan 
walked to the door with Mr. Lincoln, and there bade him welcome to the 
House and good-morning. The infantry escort formed in line from the gate 
of the White House to the house of Mr. Ould, whither Mr. Buchanan drove, 
and the cavalry escorted his carriage. The infantry line presented arms to 
the ex-President as he passed, and the cavalry escort saluted as he left the 
carriage and entered the house. Mr. Buchanan turned on the steps, and grace- 
fully acknowledged the salute. The District of Columbia volunteers had given 
to President Lincoln his first military salute and to Mr. Buchanan his last. 









NTERINGr Pensaeola Harbor from the Gulf of Mexico, one sees 
as he crosses the bar, immediately to his left, Fort McRee on 
the mainland, or west shore of the bay, and to his right Fort 
Pickens on the western extremity of Santa Eosa Island, which 
is about forty miles in length, nearly parallel to the shore 
of the mainland, and separated from it by Pensaeola Bay. 
On the mainland, directly opposite Fort Pickens, about a 
mile and a half from it and two miles north-east of Fort 
McRee, stands Fort Barrancas, and, now forming a part of it, 
the little old Spanish fort, San Carlos de Barrancas. About 
a mile and a half east of this is the village of Warrington, 
adjoining the Navy Yard, and seven miles farther up the 
bay is the town of Pensaeola. Near Fort Barrancas, and 
between it and the Navy Yard, is the post of Barrancas 
Barracks, and there, in January, 1861, was stationed Company G, 1st 
United States Artillery, the sole force of the United States army in the har- 
bor to guard and hold, as best it might, the property of the United States. 
The captain of this company, John H. Winder (afterward brigadier-general 
in the Confederate army, and widely known in connection with the military 
prisons in the South), and the senior first lieutenant, A. R. Eddy, were absent 

4- Lieut. Slemmer's report says of Lieut. Giltuan : " During the whole affair we have stood side by side, 
and if any credit is due for the course pursued, he is entitled [to it] equally with myself." Editors. 




on leave, and the only officers with it were First Lieutenant Adam J. Slemmer 
and the writer of this sketch, then the second lieutenant of the company, 
who, by virtue of that high rank, was also the post treasurer, post quarter- 
master, post commissary, and post adjutant. 

With the new year, 1861, came to us at that quiet little post the startling 
news of the seizure of United States property at various points by State troops, 
and by January 7th rumors, to us still more startling, reached our ears, to the 
effect that the Navy Yard and forts in Pensacola Harbor were to be seized by 
troops already preparing, in Florida and Alabama, to march against us. As 
yet no orders had come to Lieutenant Slemmer for his guidance in this emer- 
gency, and, as may be imagined, we had frequent conversations as to what 
should or could properly be done. As it would be useless to attempt to hold 
Barrancas, the occupation of Fort Pickens was suggested and considered; but 
Lieutenant Slemmer, thinking that he would not be justified in changing his 
station without authority, decided to remain where he was. 

On January 8th the first step indicating to outsiders an intention on our 
part to resist was taken, by the removal of the powder from the Spanish 
fort to Fort Barrancas, where on the same night a guard was placed with 
loaded muskets. It was none too soon, for about midnight a party of twenty 
men came to the fort, evidently with the intention of taking possession, 
expecting to find it unoccupied as usual. Being challenged and not answer- 
ing nor halting when ordered, the party was fired upon by the guard and ran 
in the direction of Warrington, their footsteps resounding on the plank walk 
as the long roll ceased and our company started for the fort at double-quick. 
This, I believe, was the first gun in the war fired on our side. 

Next day, January 9th, an order came from General Scott to Lieutenant 
Slemmer to do all in his power to prevent the seizure of the public property 
and to cooperate with Commodore James Armstrong at the yard. The latter 
received orders on the same day to cooperate with the army; but he was already 
so greatly under the influence of Captain Ebenezer Farrand and other seces- 
sionist officers of his command that he dared not take any very active part in 
aiding us, not even so far as to let us have the marines, as he had promised. 
The excitement at the yard and in the village of Warrington was intense and 
was increasing daily, and the commodore was nearly distracted. He was 
desirous of doing his duty, and apparently saw it clearly while we were with 
him ; but as soon as we left, became demoralized, and was thwarted in his 
plans by his own officers and others about him, who advised and warned him 
not to inaugurate civil war and bloodshed by aiding us in what they called 
the mad scheme of resisting the State authorities. 

Fearing that, as soon as the determination to occupy Pickens became 
known, attempts would be made to prevent it, Lieutenant Slemmer decided 
to move at once, and the commodore promised to have the Wyandotte at 
Barrancas to take us across at 1 p. m. that day. She did not come, however, 
and we had to visit the commodore twice more that day to counteract the 
influence of those about him. The steamer was again promised at 5 p. m., 
but did not arrive until next morning. In a large flat-boat or scow, and 



several small boats loaded with our men, provisions, brass field-pieces, ammu- 
nition, tools, and whatever public property was most needed and could 
be carried, including, I remember, an old mule and cart (which afterward 
proved of great service to us), we were towed over to Pickens and landed there 
about 10 a. m. January 10th, 1861, the day that Florida seceded from the Union. 
Lieutenant Slemmer's family and mine were sent on board the storeship 
Supply, on which, a few days later, they sailed for New York. All our men 




This map shows the Union and Confederate batteries as they existed May 27, 1861. The shore batteries were 

constructed by the Confederates after Slemmer's crossing to Fort Pickens. Two other Union batteries 

near Fort Pickens batteries Scott and Totten were added after the date of this map. 

were compelled to leave behind more or less personal property, those who 
were married leaving their houses and families as they were. Under such cir- 
cumstances, when so many inducements were held out for men to desert, and 
when so many men in higher places failed, it speaks well for their character, 
loyalty, and discipline that none of our men deserted. No company of men 
could work better or with more enthusiasm, and they were not at all disposed 
to give information to those outside. The day before we left, a civilian, visit- 
ing the post to see what news he could gather, asked one of them : " What is 
all this stir about 1 You men are not going to fight, are you 1 " " Faith, you 
needn't ask me; I'm not the man that gives orders here!" "What are they 
moving these gun-carriages out for?" "Well, sir, I hear they are to be 
painted to-morrow." " How many men are there here now ? " " Sure, I'm 
not the baker, and don't know how many he bakes for." 

Next to the commodore, the most thoroughly excited and demoralized man 
I saw was our old Spanish friend, Francisco Gomez, who was well known in 
all that region, and had long lived in a little cottage just in front of the bar- 
racks. He was the friend of all army officers, but his hero was General Jack- 
. on, and his great delight was to spin yarns to us about Jackson's capture of 
i aisacola from the British. Gomez was a true " original Jackson man," 


having as a youth seen him at Pensacola. The morning we left, I met him 
walking to and fro in front of his cottage, and said: "Good-bye, Mr. Gomez; 
you must take care of things here now ! " He replied, with upturned eyes, 
" My God ! My God ! it is awful; nothing can be saved; we shall all be killed 
everything destroyed. I am afraid to say anything. How I wish General 
Jackson was here." And the old man straightened himself up as if the mere 
mention of the name gave him strength and courage. 

On the 12th we saw the flag at the Navy Yard lowered, and then knew that 
it had been quietly and tamely surrendered. Seeing our flag thus lowered to 
an enemy caused intense excitement and emotion, a mingled feeling of shame, 
anger, and defiance. Not yet having a flag-staff up, we hung our flag over 
the north-west bastion of the fort, that all might see " that our flag was still 
there." The Supply (Captain Henry Walke) immediately hoisted extra flags, 
and soon after was towed out of the harbor by the Wyandotte (Captain O. H. 
Berryman). With the capture of the Navy Yard everything on shore fell into 
the enemy's hands, including the large fine dry dock the workshops, material, 
and supplies of all sorts. Fortunately, the Supply and Wyandotte, the only 
United States vessels in the harbor, were commanded by loyal men, and 
were saved. 

We now felt sure that an attack on the fort would not long be delayed. 
The enemy was in possession of everything on the mainland, and Fort 
Pickens alone was left, and it was in a very dilapidated condition, not having 
been occupied since the Mexican war. We numbered, all told, including the 
30 ordinary seamen, only 81 men. Our first attention was given to the flank 
casemate guns, loading with grape and canister such as could be worked, 
and at other points closing the embrasures. 

Just before sundown that evening, four gentlemen landed, and demanded 
of the corporal on guard, outside the gate, admittance to the fort as " citizens 
of Florida and Alabama." Lieutenant Slemmer and myself went to the gate 
and found Mr. Abert, civil engineer of the yard, whom we knew very well, 
and three officers, strangers to us, whom he introduced as Captain Randolph, 
Major Marks, and Lieutenant Rutledge. Captain Randolph said : " We have 
been sent by the governors of Florida and Alabama to demand a peaceable 
surrender of this fort." Lieutenant Slemmer replied: "I am here by authority 
of the President of the United States, and I do not recognize the authority 
of any governor to demand the surrender of United States property, a 
governor is nobody here." One of them exclaimed sharply : " Do you say the 
governor of Florida is nobody, the governor of Alabama nobody I " Lieu- 
tenant Slemmer replied : "I know neither of them, and I mean to say that 
they are nothing to me." They soon left, the conference being very short. 

The next night (the 13th) a small party of armed men was discovered near 
the fort by our patrol, and a few shots were fired. We had little fear of an 
attack by day, but had every reason to expect a night attack, an attempt to 
surprise us and carry the place by storm. All the men had to work by day 
mounting guns, preparing fire-balls, hand-grenades, etc., and by night do 
picket or patrol duty or stand by the guns. They were nearly tired out 




-- >" : 


with hard work and want of sleep, not having had a night's rest since the 
night of January 7th. 

On the 15th Colonel W. H. Chase, commanding the enemy's forces at the 
yard and Barrancas, came over in a small boat with Captain Farrand (late 
of the United States navy, and next in rank at the yard to Commodore 
Armstrong) and landed at the Pickens wharf, where Lieutenant Slemmer 
and myself met them, and the following conversation took place : 

Colonel Chase: "I have come on business which may occupy some time, 
and, if you have no objection, we had better go inside to your quarters." 

Lieutenant Slemmer : "I have objections, and it could hardly be expected 
that I would take you into the fort." 

Colonel Chase : "As I built the fort and know all its weak and strong points, 
I would learn nothing new by going in, and had no such object in proposing it." 

Lieutenant Slemmer : "I understand that perfectly, but it would be improper 
for me to take you in; and, however well you may have known the fort before, 
you do not know what it now contains, nor what I have done inside." 

Colonel Chase : " That is true, and I will state my business here. It is a 
most distressing duty to me. I have come to ask of you young officers, officers 
of the same army in which I have spent the best and happiest years of my life, 
the surrender of this fort. I would not ask it if I did not believe it right and 
necessary to save bloodshed ; and fearing that I might not be able to say it 
as I ought, and in order, also, that you may have it in proper form, I have 
put it in writing and will read it." 



He then took the manuscript from his pocket and began to read, but, after 
reading a few lines, his voice shook, and his eyes filled with tears. He stamp* s< i 
his foot, as if ashamed of exhibiting such weakness, and said, " I can't read it. 
Here, Farrand, you read it." Captain Farrand took it, and, remarking that he 
hadn't his glasses and his eyes were poor (they looked watery), passed the 
paper to me, saying, " Here, Oilman, you have good eyes ; please read it." I 
took the paper and read aloud the demand for the surrender. As soon as I 
finished, I handed the paper to Lieuten- 
ant Slemmer, when he and I went a few 
paces away; and, after talking the mat-- 
ter over, it was decided, in order to gain 
time and give our men a night's rest, to 
ask until next day to consider the matter. 
We returned to Colonel Chase, and the 
following conversation took place : 

Lieutenant Slemmer : " Colonel, how 
many men have you ?" 

Colonel Chase : " To-night I shall have 
800 or 900." 

Lieutenant Slemmer : " Do you imagine 
you could take this fort with that num- 
ber f " 

Colonel Chase : " I certainly do. I could 
carry it by storm. I know every inch of 
this fort and its condition." 

Lieutenant Slemmer : " With your 
knowledge of the fort and of your troops, what proportion of them, do you 
imagine, would be killed in such an attack?" 

Colonel Chase (shrugging his shoulders) : " If you have made the best pos- 
sible preparations, as I suppose you have, and should defend it, as I presume 
you would, I might lose one-half of my men." 

Lieutenant Slemmer : "At least, and I don't believe you are prepared to 
sacrifice that many men for such a purpose." 

Colonel Chase : " You must know very well that, with your small force, 
you are not expected to, and cannot, hold this fort. Florida cannot permit it, 
and the troops here are determined to have it; and if not surrendered peace- 
ably, an attack and the inauguration of civil war cannot be prevented. If it 
is a question of numbers, and eight hundred is not enough, I can easily 
bring thousands more." 

Lieutenant Slemmer: "I will give this letter due consideration, and as I 
wish to consult with the captains of the Supply and Wyandotte before reply- 
ing, I will give you my answer to-morrow morning." 

The next day the reply, refusing to surrender, was sent, Captain Berry- 
man of the Wyandotte taking it to the yard. Immediately after, the Wyan- 
dotte steamed out of the harbor, and, the same day, I think, the Supply sailed 
for New York. 




On the 18th another, and the last, demand for surrender was received from 
Colonel Chase, and next day Lieutenant Slemmer sent the following reply : 
"In reply to your communication of yesterday, I have the honor to state 
that, as yet, I know of no reason why my answer of the 16th inst. should 
be changed, and I therefore very respectfully refer you to that reply for 
an answer to this." 

With his small command, Lieutenant Slemmer continued to hold Fort 
Pickens until he was reenforced about the middle of April. He remained 
there until about the middle of May, when our company, on the recommenda- 
tion of the surgeon, the men being much broken down by the severe labor, 
incessant watching, exposure, and want of proper food of the past four months, 
was ordered to Fort Hamilton, New York Harbor, to recruit. The order was 
a humane one, and came none too soon, as scurvy had already appeared among 
the men. On the way North one of them died, and few of them ever entirely 
recovered from the effects of the severe physical and mental strain they had 
endured with Slemmer in Pensacola Harbor. 

During the remainder of the war Fort Pickens 
continued to be held by the United States troops, 
assisted by various vessels of the blockading squad- 
ron. Lieutenant Slemmer was reenforced on the 
6th of February by one company under Captain 
Israel Vogdes in the Brooklyn, and on the 17 th of 
April by five companies in the Atlantic, under Col- 
onel Harvey Brown, who had been appointed to the 
command of the Department of Florida, with head- 
quarters at Fort Pickens, and continued in com- 
mand until February 2 2d, 1862, when he was 
succeeded by General Lewis G. Arnold. The Con- 
federates continued to hold the opposite shore until 
the 9th of May, 1862, when it was evacuated by 
them, the Union forces taking possession the next 
day. On the 11th of March, 1861, General Brax- 
ton Bragg assumed command of the Confederate 
forces. He was succeeded in command of the Army 
of Pensacola on the 27th of January, 1862, by 
General Samuel Jones, who, on the 8th of March, 
was succeeded in command of the post by Colonel 
Thomas M. Jones, under whom the evacuation took 
place, whereupon the position was occupied by the 
United States troops, and the headquarters of the 
West Gulf Squadron, which had been at Ship Isl- 
and, were transferred to Pensacola. The harbor 
was considered the best on the Gulf. 

The chief events during the Confederate occu- 
pation were : 

September 2d, 1 8 6 1 . Destruction of the dry-dock 
at Pensacola by order of Colonel Harvey Brown. 

September 1-lth. Destruction .of the Confeder- 
ate war schooner Judah by a night expedition. 

The Judah was moored to the wharf at the Navy 
Yard under the protection of a battery and a eolum- 
biad, and was armed with a pivot and four broad- 
side guns. The expedition, which was matured by 
Captain Theodoras Bailey of the Colorado, con- 
sisted of 100 men in 4 boats, under the com- 
mand of Lieutenant John H. Russell, U. S. Navy. 
Lieutenant Sproston and Gunner Borton, from one 
of the boats, succeeded in spiking the columbiad. 

The others of the force, after receiving in their 
boats a volley from the Judah, boarded her fore 
and aft and engaged in a hand-to-hand conflict 
with her crew, consisting of 75 men, who made a 
brave resistance, but were driven off to the wharf, 
where they rallied and, joined by the guard, kept 
up a continuous fire upon the vessel, which had 
been set on fire in several places by Lieutenant 
Russell's men. The alarm roll was sounded, and 
rockets were sent up by the Confederates. The 
enemy's forces being aroused, the Colorado's boats 
pulled away, rallying at a short distance from the 
shore to fire six charges of canister from their 
howitzers, under cover of which they returned to 
the fort. The Judah burned to the water's edge, 
and, having been set free from her moorings by 
the fire, drifted down opposite Fort Barrancas, 
where she sank. The Union loss was 3 men killed 
and 13 wounded. For his gallantry in the execu- 
tion of the plan Lieutenant Russell w r as promoted. 

October 9th. Night attack by a Confederate force 
of one thousand men, under General R. H. _Ander- 
son,upon the camp of Colonel William Wilson's 6th 
New York (Zouave) regiment on Santa Rosa Island. 
The Confederates landed on the island at 2 A. M., 
burned a part of the camp four miles from Fort 
Pickens, and retired to their boats after encounter- 
ing Union reinforcements from the fort. The losses 
in killed, wounded, and missing were: Union, 67; 
Confederate, 87. 

November 22d and 23d. Bombardment of the 
Confederate lines by the United States vessels 
Niagara (Flag-Officer McKean) and Richmond 
(Captain Ellison), and by Fort Pickens and the 
neighboring Union batteries. Although Fort Mc- 
Ree was so badly injured that General Bragg en- 
tertained the idea of abandoning it, the plan of 
the Union commanders to "take and destroy" it 
was not executed. 

January 1st, 1862. Bombardment of Forts Mc- 
Ree and Barrancas by Union batteries. 

May 9th. Burning and evacuation of Pensacola. 






ARLY in December, 1860, a rumor reached San 
Antonio, Texas, that Captain John R. Baylor, well 
known throughout the State, was organizing a 
company of one thousand men for a buffalo-hunt. & 
As Captain Baylor's secession sentiments were well 
known, this was believed to be a mere pretense, 
and his real design to be to surprise and seize the 
arsenal in San Antonio, in time to prevent any 
resistance on the part of the United States, should 
Texas go out of the Union. The Union citizens, 
alarmed lest the few soldiers stationed there should 
prove insufficient, appealed to General David E. 
Twiggs, then commanding the Department of 
Texas, to increase the force. He accordingly fur- 
nished several hundred men, consisting of Knights of the Golden Circle (a 
secret secession organization), the Alamo Rifles, two other citizen com- 
panies, and an Irish and a German company. This quieted apprehension 
for a time, but in January these troops were quietly withdrawn. At this 
time General Twiggs's loyalty to the United States Government began to be 
questioned, as he was known to be often in consultation with prominent 
secessionists, some of them ladies. Toward the end of January the Union 
men again appealed to General Twiggs, but nothing was accomplished, 
whereupon they armed themselves, waiting with undefined dread for the next 
move. Meanwhile no one trusted his neighbor, since spies and informers 
abounded, and to add to the terror, there were fears of insurrection among 
the negroes, some of whom were arrested ; while all of them were forbidden 
to walk or talk together on the streets, or to assemble as they had been 
accustomed to do. 

Late in January was held the election for delegates to a State convention 
which should consider the question of secession. San Antonio was crowded. 
Women vied with each other in distributing the little yellow ballots, on which 
were printed in large type, "For Secession," or "Against Secession." Many 
an ignorant Mexican received instructions that the ballot " with the longest 
words" was the right one. The cart eras from New Mexico, who were in town 
with their wagon-trains, were bought by the secessionists, and some were 
known to have voted three times. It was well known that the Federal civil 
officers were loyal; the French and German citizens were emphatically so; and 

fc August 2d, 1861. John R. Baylor, then Lieu- government being at Mesilla, and the authority 

tenant-Colonel, commanding the Confederate army of governor being assumed by him. This action 

in New Mexico, organized that part of the Terri- was approved by General Henry H. Sibley, then 

tory lying south of the thirty-fourth parallel, as in command of the Confederate department. 

the Confederate Territory of Arizona, the seat of Editors. 

Vol. I. 3 



yet against the will of the people, " by superior political diplomacy," secession 
triumphed in San Antonio by a small majority. Many Germans gave up their 
business and left the town, taking refuge in New Braunfels, 31 miles away. 
Many of these men were political refugees of rare culture and scholarly 

On the 1st of February, the ordinance of secession was adopted by the 
Texas Convention, J and on the 4th commissioners were appointed "to confer 
with General Twiggs, with regard to the public arms, stores, munitions of 
war, etc., under his control, and belonging to the United States, with power 
to demand [them] in the name of the people of the State of Texas." To meet 
this commission, which consisted of Thomas J. Devine, P. N. Luckett,^ and 
Samuel A. Maverick, | on the 9th of February Greneral Twiggs appointed a 
commission consisting of Major David H. Vinton, Major Sackfield Maclin 
(secessionist), and Captain R. H. K. Whiteley. By this time the news of 
Greneral Twiggs's disaffection had reached the Government, and Colonel 
C. A. Waite was sent to supersede him. 

One day, accidentally overhearing parts of a conversation between Greneral 
Twiggs and a prominent Southern lady, I felt no longer any doubt that he 
was about to betray his trust, and reported the matter to Major Vinton. He 
sought an interview with Greneral Twiggs, and told me that he could find no 
suspicion of disloyalty, and that I was entirely mistaken. Getting information 
a few days later, which led me to believe that the day for the surrender was 
fixed, I again informed Major Vinton. He then decided to remove at once 
from his safe all papers that would give valuable information to the State 
authorities, and the moneys belonging to the Government, and he intrusted 
them to his confidential clerk, Charles Darrow. They were sent at midnight 
to his wife, J) who was waiting to receive them, and who buried part of them 
in a deserted garden ; the rest, secreted in the ashes of an unused stove and 
in the tester of a bed, were guarded by her till the information was no longer 

General Twiggs had succeeded in completely blinding his brother-officers 
as to his plans ; but he now had no time to lose before Colonel Waite's arrival. 

On the 15th news came that some of the passengers on the mail-coach had 
alighted at the crossing of the Salado and joined a large company of Texas 
Rangers who, under the command of Ben McCulloch, had been encamped 
there for several days. Captain Baylor's buffalo-hunt had at last assumed a 
tangible shape. 

To be prepared for any emergency, for many nights we had kept our fire- 
arms beside us. On the night of the 15th, worn out with anxious watch- 
ing, we fell asleep, to be suddenly roused about 4 o'clock by the screams 
of the negroes, who were coming home from market, " We're all going to be 

J The secession of Texas was not legally com- & James H. Rogers, also appointed, was a com- 
pleted until the ratification of this ordinance by missioner,' but it appears from the Official Records 
the people, February 23d, but the secession party that he did not serve. Editors. 
considered the authority of the convention suffi- | From whom stray cattle were styled "Maver- 
cient for the prior seizure of United States prop- icks." 
erty. Editors. ]) The writer. 





killed ! " I grasped my revolver, and, springing to my feet, looked ont npon 
the plaza. In the dim light I saw the revolutionists appearing, two by two, 
on muleback and horseback, mounted and on foot, a motley though quite 
orderly crowd, carrying the Lone Star flag before them, and surrounded and 
supported by armed men. The nights had been cold, and a week on the 
Salado without comforts had not added to their valorous appearance. 
Some had coats, but others were in their shirt-sleeves, and not a few were 
wrapped in old shawls and sad- 
dle-blankets. Their arms were of 
every description. By daylight 
more had appeared, perhaps a 
thousand in all, and so great was 
the enthusiasm of two women 
who had aided General Twiggs 
in his arrangements that they 
mounted their horses, in male 
attire, and with pistols in their 
belts rode out to meet their 
friends. Coffee and refreshments 
had been provided, and blankets 
and clothing were lavishly dis- 
tributed. All the stores were 
closed ; men, women, and children 
armed themselves, and the excitement was intense. Companies of Union 
citizens, well drilled and well armed, were marching and countermarching, 
presenting an imposing contrast to the other party, and a conflict seemed 
inevitable. The arsenal building had been opened and was swarming with 
Rangers. Early in the morning General Twiggs drove down to the main 
plaza, where he was instantly surrounded by secessionists demanding the 
Government property, whereupon he went through the form of refusing their 
request. He then held a conference with Major W. A. Nichols, his assistant 
adjutant-general, and Ben McCulloch, and was given six hours in which to 
reconsider. By noon he had surrendered all the United States posts and 
stores in Texas. When the result was known there was great indignation 
against him among the citizens. Two or three hours later he left for New 
Orleans, where he was received with public honors. 

Orders were sent to all the outposts to turn over the military property 
to the State. The officers and men were widely scattered, and many of them 
were taken completely by surprise. The Federal troops in town gave their 
parole " not to take up arms " against the Confederacy, and were ordered to 
leave the post in the afternoon. By this time the German company had 
refused to act against the United States, and the citizen companies had dis- 
banded. The Irish company had twice torn down the Stars and Stripes from 
the Alamo, and had raised the Lone Star flag in its place. An attempt was 
made to disarm the troops, but they declared that they would kill any man 
who interfered, and marched away under Major Larkin Smith and Captain 


John H. King, with the stained and bullet-riddled old flag of the 8th Regi- 
ment flying over them, while the band played national airs. Strong men 
wept ; the people cheered them along the streets, and many followed them to 
the head of the San Pedro, where they encamped. By 6 o'clock the Rangers 
had returned to their camp on the Salado, and the day ended without further 

About 2 o'clock that afternoon, Colonel Robert E. Lee arrived in his ambu- 
lance from Fort Mason, Texas, on his way to Washington, whither he had 
been ordered by General Scott. As he approached the Read House I went 
out to greet him. At the same time some of the Rangers gathered around 
his wagons, and, attracted, no doubt, by their insignia of rank, the red flannel 
strips sewed on their shoulders, he asked, " Who are those men ! " " They 
arc McCulloch's," I answered. "General Twiggs surrendered everything to 
the State this morning, and we are all prisoners of war." I shall never 
forget his look of astonishment, as with his lips trembling and his eyes full of 
tears, he exclaimed, " Has it come so soon as this ? " In a short time I saw 
him crossing the plaza on his way to headquarters, and noticed particularly 
that he was in citizen's dress. He returned at night and shut himself in his 
room, which was over mine, and I heard his footsteps through the night, and 
sometimes the murmur of his voice, as if he were praying. He remained at 
the hotel a week, and in conversations declared that the position he held was 
a neutral one. When he left it was my firm belief that no one could per- 
suade or compel him to change his decision. \ 

During the next two days the Rangers were drinking and shooting about the 
streets, recklessly shooting any one who happened to displease them. From 
this time on, Union men were in danger, and Northerners sent their families 
away. Some who were outspoken were imprisoned and barely escaped with 
their lives ; among them, Charles Anderson, brother of Robert Anderson. 

On the 26th of February a dozen men of the State troops were stationed 
on guard over the offices of the disbursing officers, and the occupants were 
ordered to leave, but forbidden to take away papers or effects, though allowed 
to keep the keys to their safes. Colonel Waite had now arrived and assumed 
command, and the secessionist commissioners made a second demand for 


\ On this pointCaptainR.M.Potter,U.S.A., says: cause for revolution), then I will still follow my na- 
I saw General Lee (then Colonel Lee) when he took tive State with my sword, and, if need be, with my 
leave of his friends to depart for Washington some life. I know you think and f e*d very differently, but 
days after the surrender of Twiggs. I have seldom I can't help it. These are my principles, and I must 
seen a more distressed man. He said, ' When I follow them." Colonel Anderson, in the course of 
get to Virginia I think the world will have one sol- a high tribute to General Lee's character, gives 
dier less. I shall resign and go to planting corn.' " Gen*ra4--Scatt._a-Ms-aut4K>rity for the statement 
Colonel Charles Anderson, U. S. V., who is referred thrtrtn^rwminmHd-oli.he United States forces (un- 
to above, and who talked with General Lee on the der Scott) was-offered to Lee, and was declined by 
same day, thus gives the substance of his parting Mm-on-the same ground, that he must be guided 
words (see "Texas Before and on the Eve of the wboliy in his action by that t>f Virginia. Colonel 
Rebellion." Cincinnati, 1884): "I still think . . . Albert G. Brackett, U. S. A., says: "When the 
that my loyalty to Virginia ought to take precedence civil war broke out, Lee was filled with sorrow 
over that which is due to the Federal Government, at the condition of affairs, and, in a letter to me 
and I shall so report myself at Washington. If Vir- deploring the war in which we were about to en- 
ginia stands by the old Union, so will I. But if she gage, he made use of these words: ' I fear the liber- 
secedes (though I do not believe in secession as ties of our country will be buried in the tomb of 
a constitutional right, nor that there is a sufficient a great nation.' "Editors.- 



" a statement of the amount of indebtedness and funds on hand and required 
a promise from each officer that he would pay outstanding debts with funds 
and turn the balance over to the State": it being very desirable to the enemy 
to possess the Grovernment records, which exhibited the number of troops and 
the condition of the whole department. Imprisonment and death were to 
be the penalty in case of refusal ; but Major Vinton of the quartermaster's 

department declared that he did not fear 
either, would do nothing dishonorable and 
would not comply. Major Daniel Mc- 
Clure of the pay department it and Cap- 
tain Whiteley of the ordnance department 
also refused, but several officers did com- 
ply and were returned to their offices. 
The larger responsibilities of the quarter- 
master's department detained Major Vin- 
ton after the above-named officers had 
left, and thus he fought his battle almost 
alone. His office was transferred to his 
own house, where with the aid of Mr. Dar- 
row he transacted his business. He soon 
became so ill that it was impossible for 
him to leave his bed. Both were after- 
ward arrested and given ten days in 
which to surrender the papers and funds 
or be shot. These threats were not executed, for on the morning of the 
tenth day we were gladdened by the news that United States troops from 
the different outposts were within a few miles of the town, having been 
three weeks on the way. They were met at the San Pedro and paroled not 
to take arms against the Confederacy or serve in any capacity during the 
war. These troops, representing the army in Texas, were loyal almost to a 
man, while all but forty of the officers went over to the Confederacy. The 
commissioners had promised to furnish facilities for the transportation of 
these troops to the coast, but so great had been the confusion and so many 
supplies had been carried off, that the soldiers were left almost destitute. I 
visited their camp and found them cursing the man who had placed them 
in this position." 

Major Vinton and family, with my husband and myself, were the last to 
leave. On thq morning of oui' departure, the 11th of May, as the ambulances 
and baggage wagons stood at the door, to add to the gloom, a storm broke 
over the city, enveloping us in midnight darkness. The thunder and light- 
ning was so loud and incessant as to seem like the noise of battle. For two 
weeks we journeyed over the park-like prairies, fragrant and brilliant with 


fa Captain Potter says: " The officers detained brother officers, when no public funds were acces- 

iu San Antonio were much indebted to Major sible. He, of course, had no office in which to 

McClure for his successful efforts to raise money, transact business, and paid the officers covertly 

on his own responsibility, for the pay of his in holes and corners." 



flowers. We forded streams and rivers, crossed the Brazos by a rope ferry, 
and, taking the railroad train from Harrisburg to Galveston, canght the last 
steamer before the blockade of New Orleans. We went np the Mississippi in 
the steamer Hiawatha, which was crowded with refugees, who made no sign 
until, in answer to a shot from shore at Cairo, the steamer rounded to and we 
found ourselves once more under the protection of our own flag. 

On the 13th of December, 1860, General David 
E. Twiggs, of the United States Army, who had 
served with distinction in the war with Mexico, 
and who was at that date in command of the De- 
partment of Texas, wrote the following letter to 
General Scott from San Antonio : 

" I think tliere can be no doubt that many of the 
Southern States will secede from the Union. The State 
of Texas will be among the number, and, from all ap- 
pearances at present, it will be at an early day ; certainly 
before the 4th of March next. What is to be done with 
public property in charge of the army % The arsenal at 
this place has some ordnance and other munitions of 
war. I do not expect an order for the present for the 
disposition of them, but I would be pleased to receive 
your views and suggestions. My course, as respects 
myself, will be to remain at nry post and protect this 
frontier as long as I can, and then when turned adrift 
make my way home, if I have one. I would be pleased 
to hear from you at your earliest convenience." 

At this time it took from ten to fifteen days for a 
letter to pass between San Antonio and army head- 
quarters. December 2Sth, General Scott replied: 

" In cases of political disturbance involving local 
conflict with the authority of the general government, 
the geueral-in-chief considers that the military ques- 
tions, such as you suggest, contain a political element, 
with due regard to which, and in due deference to the 
chief executive authority, no extraordinary instructions 
cop^ dug them must be issued without the consent 
authority. He has labored hard in suggesting 
g proper measures to vindicate the laws and 
> property of the United States without 
raror acting offensively against any State or 
-iiinity. All such suggestions, though long since 
jade in good time to have been peaceably and efficiently 
carried out, have failed to secure the favorable attention 
of the Government. The President has listened to him 
with due friendliness and respect, but the War Depart- 
ment has been little communicative. [Mr. Floyd was 
then Secretary of War.] Up to this time he has not been 
shown the written instructions of Major Anderson, nor 
been informed of the. purport of those more recently 
conveyed to Fort Moultrie verbally by Major Buell. 
Probably the policy of the Government in regard to the 
forts and depots within the limits of seceding States 
will have been clearly indicated before events can have 
caused a practical issue to be made up in Texas. The 
general does not see, at this moment, that he can tender 
you any special advice, but leaves the administration 
of your command in your own hands, with the laws and 

* Captain Potter (before quoted), in a written memorandum 
to the Editors, says : 

"It was on the evening before McCulloeh entered San 
Antonio, or, perhaps, two evenings before, that I met Gen- 
eral Twiggs at a wedding party. He said to me: 'It is 
rumored that Ben McCulloeh has been in town; have you 
seen Iiiiu '.' I replied, no. After a few more words on the 
state of affairs, he said : ' There is no need of sending him to 
coerce me. If an old woman with a broomstick should 
come with full authority from the State of Texas to demand 
the public property, I would give it up to her.' " Captain Pot- 
ter further says : "From the date of Twiggs's return from 
New Orleans [about the 27th of November] there was no 

regulations to guide, in the full confidence that your 
discretion, firmness, and patriotism will effect all of 
good that the sad state of the times may permit." 

December 27th, and January 2d, 7th, and 23d, 
General Twiggs wrote similar letters to army head- 
quarters, making urgent requests for instructions. 
January 15th, after the receipt of the above 
letter from General Scott, General Twiggs wrote 
to him again, this time expressing sympathy with 
the secession movement, and asking to be re- 
lieved from command of the department on or 
before the 4th of March. The order relieving 
him, and appointing Colonel Waite as his suc- 
cessor, is dated 'January 28th, and was received 
by General Twiggs on the loth of February. 
Meanwhile the secession party in Texas had 
made decided progress toward carrying the State 
out of the Union. Late in January an election 
had been held for delegates to a State convention 
to consider the question of secession. This con- 
vention had met on the 28th of January, at Aus- 
tin, and on the 1st of February had passed an 
ordinance of secession which was to take effect 
on the 2d of March, if it should be ratified by the 
people on the 23d of February. General Twiggs 
did not wait till the ordinance was in operation, or 
even till its ratification, to surrender the military 
posts and public property under his charge. Feb- 
ruary 9th he appointed a military commission to 
treat with a commission from the convention, as 
his order of that date announced, "to transact 
such business as relates to the disposition of the 
public property upon the demand of the State of 
Texas." February 16th, three days before the 
arrival of Colonel Waite, the actual surrender took 
place, nominally to superior forces under Colonel 
Ben McCulloeh, then in command of 1000 to 
1500 men, and acting under the authority, not 
of the governor (General Sam Houston, a Union 
man), but of the commissioners appointed by the 
convention.* On the 17th the State Commissioners 
wrote to General Twiggs : 

" In our communication of the 16th instant we required 
a delivery up by you of the positions held and public 
property held by or under your control as commander 

doubt of his intention not to withstand any insurrectionary 
movement on the part of the state. He constantly said that 
the break-up was coming, and that there was no one living 
who could resist the secession movement successfully." 

On the same point, Colonel Charles Anderson says: "It 
must be remembered distinctly, on this, my testimony, and 
that of very many others, that from the time of his. return, 
with increasing frequency and vehemence of his speeches, 
General Twiggs had not only declared that he 'would never 
fire on American citizens under any circumstances,' but that 
he would surrender the United states property in his depart- 
ment to the State of Texas whenever it was demanded." 
(" Texas, Before and on the Eve of the Rebellion.") 



in this department. As no reply save your verbal 
declaration (which declaration was that you '.nave up 
everything') has been given to onrnote, . . . we agaiu 
demand the surrender . . . " 

To this General Twiggs replied the same day: 

" I have to say that youare already aware of my views 
in regard to the delivery of the public property of this 
department, and I now repeat that I will direct the 
positions held by the Federal troops to be turned over to 
the authorized agents of the State of Texas, provided 
the troops retain their arms and clothing, camp and 
garrison ecpiipage, quartermaster's stores, subsistence, 
medical, hospital stores, and such means of transporta- 
tion of every kind as may be necessary for an efficient 
and orderly movement of the troops from Texas, pre- 
pared for attack or defense" against aggression from any 

The commissioners then wrote, making two fur- 
ther conditions : that the troops should leave Texas 
by way of the coast, and that t hey should there sur- 
render all means of transportation as well as the 
artillery. General Twiggs responded, consenting to 
the first condition, but objecting to the second so 
far as it related to the guns of the light batteries, 
and it was to that extent waived by the commis- 
sioners. Thus the formal smrender was consum- 
mated -on the 18th of February, five days before 
the ratification of the ordinance of secession by 
the people of Texas. In a letter to Mr. Davis, 
dated New Orleans, February 25th, IS 61, Gen- 
eral Braxton Bragg says: "General Twiggs was 
ordered to turn over the command to Colonel 
Waite, a Northern man, but preferred surrender- 
ing to Texas." March 1st, General Twiggs was 
dismissed from the United States army. He was 
appointed major-general in the Confederate serv- 
ice, and was placed in command at New Orleans. 
He died September 15th, 1862, at Augusta, 
Georgia, his own State. 

On the 28th of January, General Twiggs's suc- 
cessor, Colonel Waite, was in command at Camp 
Verde, 65 miles from San Antonio. In a letter 
of that date to General Twiggs's assistant adju- 
tant-general at San Antonio, Colonel Waite said : 

" For the purpose of making some defensive arrange- 
ments, I have deemed it proper to order the remainder 
of Captain Brackett'a company to this place without 
waiting foi further instructions from your office. . . . 
I respectfully request that 1 or 2 pieces of artillery 
. . . may be sent here as early as practicable. In 
making this application I assume that there is a prob- 
ability, or at least a possibility, that a mob of reckless 
men may attempt to seize the public property here, 
the most valuable of which consists of 5:! camels, . . . 
worth some $20,000. ... I hold it to be the duty of 
every commanding officer to be at all times, mid under 
all circumstances, prepared as far as possible for any 
and every emergency. To this end he must anticipate 
his wants and take timely measures to meet them." 

February 1 2th, he wrote again : 

"Being desirous of concentrating my regiment (the 
1st Infantry) so as to bring the companies more under 
my control, I respectfully request permission to move 
out of the department with the live companies now serv- 
ing here and join the remainder of the regiment which is 
in the Department of the West." 

February 26th, in his report of the situation 
after he had assumed command, he says : 

"To concentrate a sufficient number [of troops] to 
make a successful resistance after the Texans had taken 
the held was not practicable. Besides, we had no large 
depot of provisions to move upon, and the means .if 
transportation at the posts were so limited that the 
troops could have taken with them a supply for only a 
few days. An attempt to bring them together under 
these circumstances would have no doubt resulted in 
their being cut up in detail before they could get out of 
the country. Under these circumstances, I felt it my 
dutyto comply with the agreement entered into by Gen- 
eral Twiggs, and remove the troops from the country as 
early as possible." 

For this purpose Colonel Waite continued at San 
Antonio. The troops (except those mentioned 
below) marched to the coast, where vessels char- 
tered by the United States awaited them. 

Concerning the advantages which General 
Twiggs's surrender conferred upon the cause of 
secession, Colonel Charles Anderson says : 

" Of its successes, the first was that it carried the so- 
called election five days afterward. Without this brill- 
iant coup (lc main (the first victory of rebellion) the 
majority would have surely been in Texas for the Union 
cause. As it was, only 42,000 votes (less than half the 
total vote of the State) was polled, of which 13,000 votes 
were given by the now confounded and dismayed 
Unionists. [The exact vote was: for ratification, 34,794 ; 
against, 11,235. Editors.] And just here (a second 
and great success) was the beginning of that series of 
tlockings pari passu, with every disaster to the Union 
cause, of our Douglas Democrats, and our Bell and 
Everett men to the winning side the Breckinridge 
Democrats. ... A third gain to the rebellion was 
the immense money and military values of the public 
arms and other war properties on the very verge of the 
coming war, which it hastened, if it did not determine. 
Fourthly, our national prestige lost was a vast and 
instant impulse to secession and rebellion in every 
slave State." 

The number of posts surrendered was 10. The 
number of troops "to be removed, in compli- 
ance with General Twiggs's agreement," was re- 
ported by Colonel Waite, February 26th, at 2328. 
This agreement was not respected by the Con- 
federate authorities, who, on the 11th of April, 
on the ground " that hostility exists between the 
United States and Confederate States," gave in- 
structions to Colonel Earl Van Dorn " to intercept 
and prevent the movement of the United States 
troops from the State of Texas." Under these 
orders 815 officers and men were captured, in- 
cluding Colonel Waite and his staff, who accepted 
parole under protest. Many of the private soldiers 
were kept in confinement for nearly two years. 
The San Antonio "Herald," of February 23d, 
1861, estimated the total value of the property 
surrendered at $1,209,500, " exclusive of public 
buildings to which the Federal Government has a 
title." Tins property included mules, wagons, 
horses, harness, tools, corn, clothing, commissary 
and ordnance stores. 

In the main the authority for the foregoing state- 
ments is Volume I. of the "Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies," issued by the 
War Department, under the editorship of Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Robert N. Scott, U. S. A. This 
work will be referred to hereafter in these pages 
as "Official Records." Editors. 



"i _ 





AS senior captain of the 1st Regiment of United States Artillery, I had been 
-*- stationed at Fort Moultrie, Charleston Harbor, two or three years previ- 
ous to the outbreak of 1861. There were two other forts in the harbor. Of 
these, Fort Sumter was unoccupied, being in an unfinished state, while Castle 
Pinckney was in charge of a single ordnance sergeant. The garrison of Fort 
Moultrie consisted of 2 companies that had been reduced to 65 men, who 
with the band raised the number in the post to 73. Fort Moultrie had 
no strength ; it was merely a sea battery. No one ever imagined it would be 
attacked by our own people ; and if assailed by foreigners, it was supposed 
that an army of citizen-soldiery would -be there to defend it. It was very 
low, the walls having about the height of an ordinary room. It was little 
more, in fact, than the old fort of Revolutionary time of which the father of 
Major Robert Anderson had been a defender. The sand had drifted from the 
sea against the wall, so that cows would actually scale the ramparts. In 1860 
we applied to have the fort put in order, but the quartermaster-general, 
afterward the famous Joseph E. Johnston, said the matter did not pertain 
to his department. We were then apprehending trouble, for the signs of the 
times indicated that the South was drifting toward secession, though the 
Northern people could not be made to believe this, and regarded our repre- 
sentation to this effect as nonsense. I remember that at that time our engi- 
neer officer, Captain J. Gr. Foster, was alone, of the officers, in thinking there 
would be no trouble. We were commanded by a Northern man of advanced 
age, Colonel John L. Gardner, who had been wounded in the war of 1812 and 
had served with credit in Florida and Mexico. November 15th, 1860, Mr. 




Floyd, the Secretary of War, relieved liim and put in command Major 
Robert Anderson of Kentucky, who was a regular officer and the owner 
of a slave plantation in Georgia. Floyd thought the new commander could 
be relied upon to carry out the Southern programme, but we never believed 
that Anderson took com- 
mand with a knowledge of 

1 luit programme or a desire JIB 

that it should succeed. He 
simply obeyed orders; he 
had to obey or leave the 
army. Anderson was a 
Union man and, in the 
incipiency, was perfectly 
willing to chastise South 
Carolina in case she should 
attempt any revolutionary 
measures. His feeling as 
to coercion changed when 
he found that all the South- 
ern States had joined South 
Carolina, for he looked up- 
on the conquest of the South 
as hopeless. 

Soon after his arrival, 
which took place on the 
21st of November, Anderson 
wanted the sand removed 
from the walls of Moultrie, 
and urged that it be done. 
Suddenly the Secretary of 
War seemed to adopt this 
view. He pretended there 
was danger of war with Eng- 
land, with reference to Mex- 
ico, which was absurd ; and 
under this pretext was seized 
with a sudden zeal to put the 
harbor of Charleston in con- 
dition, to be turned over to the Confederate forces. He appropriated $150,- 
000 for Moultrie and $80,000 to finish Sumter. There was not much to be 
made out of Fort Moultrie, with all our efforts, because it was hardly defen- 
sible ; but Major Anderson strove to strengthen it. He put up heavy gates to 
prevent Charleston secessionists from entering, and made a little man-hole 
through which visitors had to crawl in and out. 

We could get no additional ammunition, but Colonel Gardner had man- 
aged to procure a six months' supply of food from the North before the trouble 









Second Lieutenant Norman J. Hall, who was present 
at the bombardment, was absent when the photo- 
graph was taken. Lieutenant Talbot had been sent 
to Washington, and had returned with a message from 

President Lincoln announcing to Governor Pickens 
that the Government would attempt to provision 
Fort Sumter; he was not permitted to rejoin Major 

came. The Secretary of War would not let us have a man in the way of rein- 
forcement, the plea being that reinforcements would irritate the people. The 
secessionists could hardly be restrained from attacking us, but the leaders kept 
them back, knowing that our workmen were laboring in their interests, at the 
expense of the United States. When Captain Truman Seymour was sent with 
a party to the United States arsenal in Charleston to get some friction primers 
and a little ammunition, a crowd interfered and drove his men back. It became 
evident, as I told Anderson, that we could not defend the fort, because the 
houses around us on Sullivan's Island looked down into Moultrie, and could 
be occupied by our enemies. At last it was rumored that two thousand 
riflemen had been detailed to shoot us down from the tops of those houses. I 
proposed to anticipate the enemy and burn the dwellings, but Anderson would 
not take so decided a step at a time when the North did not believe there 
was going to be war. It was plain that the only thing to be done was to slip 
over the water to Fort Sumter, but Anderson said he had been assigned to 
Fort Moultrie, and that he must stay there. We were then in a very peculiar 
position. It was commonly believed that we would not be supported even by 
the North, as the Democrats had been bitterly opposed to the election of 
Lincoln ; that at the first sign of war twenty thousand men in sympathy 
with the South would rise in New York. Moreover, the one to whom we 




soldiers always looked up as to a father, the Secretary of War, seemed to be 
devising arrangements to have us made away with. We believed that in 
the event of an outbreak from Charleston few of us would survive ; but it 
did not greatly concern us, since that risk was merely a part of our business, 
and we intended to make the best fight we could. The officers, upon talk- 
ing the matter over, thought they might control any demonstration at 
Charleston by throwing shells into the city from Castle Pinckney. But, with 
only sixty-four soldiers and a 
brass band, we could not de- 
tach any force in that direction. 

Finally, Captain Foster, who 
had misapprehended the whole 
situation, and who had orders to 
put both Moultrie and Sumter 
in perfect order, brought sever- 
al hundred workmen from Bal- 
timore. Unfortunately, these 
were nearly all in sympathy 
with the Charlestonians, many 
even wearing secession badges. 

Bands of secessionists were 
now patrolling near us by day 
and night. We were so worn out with guard-duty watching them that on 
one occasion my wife and Captain Seymour's relieved us on guard, all that 
was needed being some one to give the alarm in case there was an attempt 
to break in. Foster thought that out of his several hundred workmen he 
could get a few Union men to drill at the guns as a garrison in Castle Pinck- 
ney, but they rebelled the moment they found they were expected to act as 
artillerists, and said that they were not there as warriors. It was said that 
when the enemy took possession of the castle, some of these workmen were 
hauled from under beds and from other hiding-places. 

The day before Christmas I asked Major Anderson for wire to make an 
entanglement in front of my part of the fort, so that any one who should charge 
would tumble over the wires and could be shot at our leisure. I had already 
caused a sloping picket fence to be projected over the parapet on my side of 
the works so that scaling-ladders could not be raised against us. The dis- 
cussion in Charleston over our proceedings was of an amusing character. 
This wopden fraise puzzled the Charleston militia and editors; one of the 
latter said, " Make ready your sharpened stakes, but you will not intimidate 
freemen. '' 

When \L asked Anderson for the wire, he said I should have a mile of it, with 
a peculiar smile that puzzled me for the moment. He then sent for Hall, the 
post quartermaster, bound him to secrecy, and told him to take three schooners 
and sorqe barges which had been chartered for the purpose of taking the 
women and children and six months' supply of provisions to Fort Johnson, 
opposite 1 Charleston. He was instructed when the secession patrols should 




ask what this meant, to tell them we were sending off the families of the 
officers and men to the North because they were in the way. The excuse 
was plausible, and no one interfered. We were so closely watched that we 
could make no movement without demands being; made as to the reason 
of it. On the day we left the day after Christmas Anderson gave up 
his own mess, and came to live with me as my guest. In the evening of 
that day I went to notify the major that tea was ready. Upon going to 
the parapet for that purpose, I found all the officers there, and noticed 
something strange in their manner. The problem was solved when Ander- 
son walked up to me and said : " Captain, in twenty minutes you will leave 
this fort with your company for Fort Sumter." The order ^as startling and 
unexpected, and I thought of the immediate hostilities of whi^i the movement 


would be the occasion. I rushed over to my company quarters and informed 
my men, so that they might put on their knapsacks and have everything in 
readiness. This took about ten minutes. Then I went to my house, told my 
wife that there might be fighting, and that she must get out of the fort as soon 
as she could and take refuge behind the sand-hills. I put her trunks out of the 
sally-port, and she followed them. Then I started with my company to join 
Captain Seymour and his men. We had to go a quarter of a mile through the 
little town of Moultrieville to reach the point of embarkation. It was about 
sunset, the hour of the siesta, and fortunately the Charleston militia were 
taking their afternoon nap. We saw nobody, and soon reached a low 
line of sea-wall under which were hidden the boats in charge of the three 
engineers, for Lieutenants Snyder and Meade had been sent by Floyd to help 
Captain Foster do the work on the forts. The boats had been used in going 
back and forward in the work of construction, manned by ordinary work- 
men, who now vacated them for our use. Lieutenant Snyder said to me in a 
low tone : " Captain, those boats are for your men." So saying, he started 
with his own party up the coast. When my thirty men were embarked I 
went straight for Fort Sumter. It was getting dusk. I made slow work in 
crossing over, for my men were not expert oarsmen. Soon I saw the lights 
of the secession guard-boat coining down on us. I told the men to take off 
their coats and cover up then* muskets, and I threw my own coat open to 
conceal my buttons. I wished to give the impression that it was an officer in 
charge of laborers. The guard-ship stopped its paddles and inspected us in 
the gathering darkness, but concluded we were all right and passed on. My 
party was the first to reach Fort Sumter. 

We went up the steps of the wharf in the face of an excited band of seces- 
sion workmen, some of whom were armed with pistols. One or two Union 
men among them cheered, but some of the others said angrily : " What are 
these soldiers doing here ? what is the meaning of this ! " Ordering my men 
to charge bayonets, we drove the workmen into the center of the fort. I took 
possession of the guard-room commanding the main entrance and placed 
sentinels. Twenty minutes after, Seymour arrived with the rest of the men. 
Meantime Anderson had crossed in one of the engineer boats. As soon 
as the troops were all in we fired a cannon, to give notice of our arrival 
to the quartermaster, who had anchored at Fort Johnson with the schooners 
carrying the women and children. He immediately sailed up to the wharf 
and landed his passengers and stores. Then the workmen of secession sym- 
pathies were sent aboard the schooners to be taken ashore. 

Lieutenant Jefferson C. Davis of my company had been left with a rear- 
guard at Moultrie. These, with Captain Foster and Assistant-Surgeon Craw- 
ford, stood at loaded columbiads during our passage, with orders to fire upon 
the guard-boats and sink them if they tried to run us down. On withdraw- 
ing, the rear-guard spiked the guns of the fort, burned the gun-carriages on 
the front looking toward Sumter, and cut down the flag-staff. Mrs. Doubleday 
first took refuge at the house of the post sutler, and afterward with the family 
of Chaplain Harris, with whom she sought shelter behind the sand-hills. 


When all was quiet they paced the beach, anxiously watching Fort Sumter. 
Finding that the South Carolinians were ignorant of what had happened, 
we sent the boats back to procure additional supplies. J 

The next morning Charleston was furious. Messengers were sent out to 
ring every door-bell and convey the news to every family. The governor sent 
two or three of his aides to demand that we return to Moultrie. Anderson 
replied in my hearing that he was a Southern man, but that he had been 
assigned to the defense of Charleston Harbor, and intended to defend it. 

Chaplain Harris was a spirited old man. He had lived at Charleston most 
of his life and knew the South Carolinians well. He visited Fort Sumter on 
our first day there and made a prayer at the raising of the flag, after which 
he returned to his home at Moultrieville. One day he went to the com- 
mander of Fort Moultrie and said to him : " Will any impediment be put in 
the way of my going over to Fort Sumter ? " The reply was : " Oh, no, par- 
son ; I reckon we'll give you a pass." The chaplain answered : " I didn't ask 
you for a pass, sir. I am a United States officer, and will go to any United 
States fort without your permission. I asked you a different question: whether 
you would prevent my going by force." He was not allowed to cross, after that. 

We had no light and were obliged to procure some if possible, for the win- 
ter nights were long. There was much money due the workmen who had been 
discharged, and the secessionists sent them over to demand their pay. Mrs. 
Doubleday came in the same boat with them, and managed to ship us a 
box of candles at the same time ; she also brought a bandbox full of 
matches. At the same time Mrs. Seymour reached us stealthily in a boat 
rowed by two little boys. Mrs. Foster was already there. Anderson thought 
there was going to be trouble, so he requested the ladies to return to Moultrie- 
ville that night. The next day they went to a Charleston hotel, where they 
were obliged to keep very quiet and have their meals served privately in then- 
rooms. After a day or two they left for the North, on account of the feeling 
in the city. 

From December 26th until April 12th we busied ourselves in preparing for 
the expected attack, and our enemies did the same on all sides of us. Ander- 
son apparently did not want reinforcements, and he shrank from civil war. 
He endured all kinds of hostile proceedings on the part of the secessionists, 
in the hope that Congress would make some compromise that would save 
slavery and the Union together. 

Soon after daylight on the 9th of January, with my glass I saw a large 
steamer pass the bar and enter the Morris Island Channel. It was the Star 
of the West, with reinforcements and supplies for us. When she came near 
the upper part of the island the secessionists fired a shot at her. I hastened 

} 1 will give an incident here to show how successful transit to Fort Sumter, went back to 

completely even our own people were deceived by Moultrie in small boats to procure additional sup- 

the celerity and secrecy of Major Anderson's plies, Davis walked over to the mess. He was 

movement. Lieutenant Davis and some other received very indignantly by the woman, for coming 

officers had a mess, which was in charge of the to supper when everything was cold. Nothing could 

wife of one of the soldiers. She had prepared the exceed her astonishment when she learned that the 

evening meal as usual and was amazed that no entire garrison was in Fort Sumter. Davis carried. 

one came to eat it. When the officers, after their her and her pots and kettles back with him. 


to Major Anderson's room, and was ordered by him to have the long roll 
beaten and to post the men at the barbette gnns. By the time we reached 
the parapet the transport coming to our relief had approached so near 
that Moultrie opened fire. Major Anderson would not allow us to return 
the fire, so the transport turned about and steamed seaward. Ander- 
son asked for an explanation of the firing from Governor Pickens, and 
announced that he would allow no vessel to pass within range of the guns of 
Sumter if the answer was unsatisfactory. Governor Pickens replied that he 
would renew the firing under like circumstances. I think Major Anderson 
had received an intimation that the Star of the West was coming, but did not 
believe it. He thought General Scott would send a man-of-war instead of a 
merchant vessel. Great secrecy was observed in loading her, but the purpose 
of the expedition got into the newspapers, and, of course, was telegraphed to 
Charleston. Bishop Stevens of the Methodist Church stated in a speech 
made by him on Memorial Day in the Academy of Music, New York, that 
he aimed the first gun against the Star of the West. I aimed the first gun on 
our side in reply to the attack on Fort Sumter. 

Sure that we would all be tasked to the utmost in the coming conflict, and 
be kept on the alert by day and night, I desired to get all the sleep I could 
beforehand, and lay down on a cot bedstead in the magazine nearest to 
Morris Island, one of the few places that would be shell-proof when the fire 
opened. About 4 a. m. on the 12th, Major Anderson came to me as his 
executive officer, and informed me that the enemy would fire upon us as soon 
as it was light enough to see the fort. He said he would not return it until 
it was broad daylight, the idea being that he did not desire to waste his 

We have not been in the habit of regarding the signal shell fired from Fort 
Johnson as the first gun of the conflict, although it was undoubtedly aimed 
at Fort Sumter. Edmund Rufhn of Virginia is usually credited with opening 
the attack by firing the first gun from the iron-clad battery on Morris Island. 
The ball from that gun struck the wall of the magazine where I was lying, 
penetrated the masonry, and burst very near my head. As the smoke from 
this explosion came in through the ventilators of the magazine, and as the 
floor was strewn with powder where the flannel cartridges had been filled, 
I thought for a moment the place was on fire. 

When it was fully light we took breakfast leisurely before going to the 
guns, our food consisting of pork and water. 

The first night after the bombardment we expected that the naval vessels 
outside would take advantage of the darkness to send a fleet of boats with 
reinforcements of men and supplies of provisions, and as it was altogether 
probable that the enemy would also improvise a fleet of small boats to meet 
those of the navy, it became an interesting question, in case parties came to 
us in this way, to decide whether we were admitting friends or enemies. 
However, the night passed quietly away without any demonstration. 

Captain Chester, in his paper which follows, has omitted a fact that I will 
mention. As the fire against us came from all directions, a shot from 

4 8 



Sullivan's Island struck near the lock of the magazine, and bent the copper 
door, so that all access to the few cartridges we had there was cut off. Just 
previous to this the officers had been engaged, amid a shower of shells, in 
vigorous efforts to cut away wood-work which was dangerously near the 

After the surrender we were allowed to salute our flag with a hundred 
guns before marching out, but it was very dangerous and difficult to do so ; 
for, owing to the recent conflagration, there were fire and sparks ali around 
the cannon, and it was not easy to find a safe place of deposit for the car- 
tridges. It happened that some flakes of fire had entered the muzzle of one 
of the guns after it was sponged. Of course, when the gunner attempted to 
ram the cartridge down it exploded prematurely, killing Private Daniel 
Hough instantly, and setting fire to a pile of cartridges underneath, which 
also exploded, seriously wounding five men. Fifty guns were fired in the 

With banners flying, and with drums beating "Yankee Doodle,'' we 
marched on board the transport that was to take us to the steamship Baltic, 
which drew too much water to pass the bar and was anchored outside. We 
were soon on our way to New York. 

With the first shot against Sumter the whole North became united. Mobs 
went about New York and made every doubtful newspaper and private house 
display the Stars and Stripes. When we reached that city we had a royal 
reception. The streets were alive with banners. Our men and officers were 
seized and forced to ride on the shoulders of crowds wild with enthusiasm. 
When we purchased anything, merchants generally refused ail compensation. 



Fort Hamilton, where we were stationed, was besieged with visitors, many of 
whom were among the most highly distinguished in all walks of life. The 
Chamber of Commerce of New York voted a bronze medal to each officer and 
soldier of the garrison. 

We were soon called upon to take an active part in the war, and the two 
Sumter companies were sent under my command to reenforce General Patter- 
son's column, which was to serve in the Shenandoah Valley. Our march through 
Pennsylvania was a continuous ovation. Flowers, fruits, and delicacies of all 
kinds were showered upon us, and the hearts of the people seemed overflow- 
ing with gratitude for the very little we had been able to accomplish. 

Major Anderson was made a brigadier-general in the regular army, and 
assigned to command in his native State, Kentucky ; but his system had been 
undermined by his great responsibilities ; he was threatened with softening 
of the brain, and was obliged to retire from active service. The other officers 
were engaged in battles and skirmishes in many parts of the field of war. 
Anderson, Foster, Seymour, Crawford, Davis, and myself became major- 
generals of volunteers. Norman J. Hall, who rendered brilliant service at 
Gettysburg, became a colonel, and would doubtless have risen higher had lie 
not been compelled by ill health to retire. Talbot became an assistant 
adjutant-general with the rank of captain, but died before the war had fairly 
begun. He was not with us during the bombardment, as he had been sent as 
a special messenger to Washington with dispatches. Lieutenant Snyder of 
the engineers, a most promising young officer, also died at the very com- 
mencement of hostilities. 

Only one of our number left us and joined the Confederacy, Lieutenant 
R. K. Meade of the engineers, a Virginian. His death occurred soon after. 



Vol. I. 4. 





TOWARD the close of 1860, the national defenses of Charleston Harbor, 
consisting of Castle Pinckney, Fort Moultrie, and Fort Sumter, were 
garrisoned by an army of 65 men instead of the 1050 men that were required. 
Fort Moultrie alone, where the 65 soldiers were stationed, required 300 men 
for its defense, and Fort Sumter, to which they were ultimately transferred, 
was designed for a garrison of 650. 

Fort Moultrie, at the time of which we write, was considered a rather pleas- 
ant station, Sullivan's Island being a favorite summer resort. Many of the 
wealthy citizens of Charleston had their summer residences there, and indeed 
some of them lived there all the year round. There was a large summer hotel 
on the beach half-way up the island, and a horse railway connected the steam- 
boat wharf and the hotel. The military reservation stretched across the island 
from the front to the back beach, like a waistbelt of moderate width, and 
the fort looked like a big buckle at the front end. It was a brick structure, 
or rather an earthen structure revetted with brick. It was bastioned on the 
land side, and had a scarp wall perhaps fifteen feet high ; but the sand had 
drifted against it at some points so as almost to bury its masonry. With 
its full complement of men it could hardly have been held against a numerous 
and enterprising enemy, and with 65 men it was plainly untenable. ^ 

This garrison consisted of two skeleton companies and the regimental band 
of the 1st Artillery. They had occupied the fort since 1857, and were fairly 
well acquainted in the neighborhood. Indeed, several of the men had been 
enlisted at the post, and were native Carolinians. As the political pot began 
to boil toward the close of 1860 and secession was openly discussed, the social 
position of the garrison became anomalous. Army officers had alwa3 7 s been 
favorites in the South ; and as they were discreet and agreeable, it is not sur- 
prising, perhaps, that their society continued to be sought after, even by the 
most outspoken secessionists, up to the actual commencement of hostilities. 
But enlisted men, even in the South, were social outcasts. It was rather sur- 
prising, therefore, to find them receiving attentions from civilians. But the 
fact is that the soldiers of the army were never before treated with such 
consideration in the South as on the eve of the rebellion, ft The secession- 

ft An amusing incident which illustrates this always peculiar. It could hardly be said that 
occurred during the election excitement in Novem- there were two parties, but there generally were 
ber, 1860. Elections in South Carolina were two candidates tor every office in the State. In 



ists were determined to have the fort, and they wanted to get it without 
bloodshed. They had failed with the commissioned officers, and they had 
no better success with the soldiers : every enlisted man remained faithful 
to the Union. 

The old commander of Fort Moultrie, Colonel John L. Gardner, was 
removed; the new one, Major Robert Anderson of Kentucky, arrived on 
November 21st. As a Southern man, he was expected to be reasonable. If he 
had scruples upon the question of qualified allegiance, he might surrender 
on demand, 011 purely professional grounds. No one doubted Major Ander- 
son's professional ability, and of course he could see the hopelessness of 
his situation at Moultrie. Moreover, he was a humane man, and would be 
unwilling to shed blood needlessly. But his actions clearly indicated that he 
would not surrender on demand. He continued defensive preparations with 
as much energy and zeal as his predecessor, and manifestly meant to fight. 
This was very discouraging to the preachers of bloodless secession, and when 
he transferred his command to Sumter their occupation was completely gone. 
Nothing but war would now get him out. Hence the efforts to get him 
ordered back again by President Buchanan efforts which almost succeeded. 

The transfer of Major Anderson's command from Moultrie to Sumter was 
neatly executed early in the evening of December 26th, 1860. It was a few 
minutes after sunset when the troops left Moultrie ; the short twilight was 
about over when they reached the boats; fifteen or twenty minutes more car- 
ried them to Sumter. The workmen had just settled down to an evening's 
enjoyment when armed men at the door startled them. There was no par- 
leying, no explaining ; nothing but stern commands, silent astonishment, and 
prompt obedience. The workmen were on the wharf, outside the fort, before 
they were certain whether their captors were secessionists or Yankees. 

Meantime the newly arrived troops were busy enough. Guards were 
posted, embrasures secured, and, as far as practicable, the place was put in 
a defensible condition against any storming-party which chagrin might drive 
the guard-boat people to send against it. Such an attempt was perfectly 
feasible. The night was very dark ; the soldiers were on unknown ground 

such cases the candidates would each give a barbe- had had his eyes on the fragment of ham for some 

cue or feast of some kind to the voters, at which time, deliberately mounted the table at the lower 

stump speeches were delivered in a somewhat end, and carefully picking his steps among the 

florid style. The whole body of voters attended dishes, walked to the chairman's end, picked up 

both entertainments, and it is to be feared decided the coveted fragment, and started on the return 

rather upon the merits of the feast than the fitness trip. The audacity of the man stunned the audi- 

of the candidate. At one of these entertainments on ence for a moment, but indignation soon got the 

Sullivan's Island, the regimental band attended, better of astonishment, and the soldier was in 

hired as an attraction, and such soldiers as were some danger of rough treatment. But the chairman 

on pass gathered around the outskirts of the crowd had his revolver out in a second, and holding it 

which surrounded the open-air supper table. The aloft proclaimed: "111 shoot the first man who 

supper was over, and the speaking had begun, interferes with that soldier." And the soldier 

Everything eatable had been devoured except a carried off the fragment. Of course he was 

remnant of ham which rested on a platter in front drunk; but he could not have done the same thing 

of the chairman who perhaps was also the can- without a drubbing in 1859. This anecdote 

didate atone end of the long table. The chairman and others might be related indicates the policy 

was speaking, and the audience was enthusiastic, and perhaps the expectations of the secession- 

A storm of applause had just broken out at some- ists in connection with the soldiers of Fort Moul- 

thing the speaker had said, when a soldier, who trie. J. C. 


and could not find their way about readily ; many of the embrasures could 
not be closed; and there were at least a hundred willing guides and helpers 
already on the wharf and in a fine frame of mind for such work. But nothing 
was attempted, and when the soldiers felt themselves in a position to repel 
any attempt against them that night, two guns were fired as a signal to 
friends that the occupation had been successfully accomplished, and that they 
might proceed with their part of the programme. This was the first intima- 
tion the guard-boat people had of the transfer; and, indeed, it told them 
nothing, except that some soldiers must have got into Sumter. But they 
blew their alarm- whistle all the same, and burned blue-lights ; signal-rockets 
were sent up from various points, and there was great excitement everywhere 
in the harbor until morning. 

When the signal-guns were fired, the officer in charge of the two schooners 
which had carried provisions and ammunition to Fort Johnson (under the 
pretense that they were subsistence for the women and children, whom he had 
also carried there as a cloak) cast loose his lines and made all speed for 
Sumter, and the old sergeant who had been left in Moultrie for the purpose 
set fire to the combustibles which had been heaped around the gun-carriages, 
while another man spiked the guns. The garrison from the ramparts of its 
new nest grimly approved of the destruction of the old one. 

At dawn of December 27th the men were up and ready for any emergency; 
indeed, most of them had been up all night. Captain Foster had been spe- 
cially busy with his former employees. Among them he found several loyal 
men, and also some doubtful ones who were willing to share the fortunes 
of the garrison. These constituted an acceptable addition to our work- 
ing strength, although those classed as doubtful woidd have been an ele- 
ment of weakness in case of a fight. However, they did much good work 
before hostilities began, and the worst ones were weeded out before we were 
closely invested. Those who remained to the end were excellent men. They 
endured the hardships of the siege and the dangers of the bombardment without 
a murrnur, and left Sumter with the garrison one of them, John Swearer, 
severely wounded with little besides the clothes they stood in. They were 
the first volunteers for the Union, but were barred from the benefits secured 
by legislation for the national soldiers, having never been " mustered in." 

Fort Sumter was unfinished, and the interior was filled with building 
materials, guns, carriages, shot, shell, derricks, timbers, blocks and tackle, 
and coils of rope in great confusion. Few guns were mounted, and these 
few were chiefly on the lowest tier. The work was intended for three tiers 
of guns, but the embrasures of the second tier were incomplete, and guns 
could be mounted on the first and third tiers only. 

The complete armament of the work had not yet arrived, but there were 
more guns on hand than we could mount or man. The first thing to be con- 
sidered was immediate defense. The possibility of a sudden dash by the 
enemy, under cover of darkness and guided by the discharged workmen then 
in Charleston, demanded instant attention. It was impossible to spread 65 
men over ground intended for 650, so some of the embrasures had to be 







bricked up. Selecting those, therefore, essential to artillery defense, and 
mounting guns in them, Anderson closed the rest. This was the work of 
many days ; but we were in no immediate danger of an artillery attack. The 
armament of Moultrie was destroyed ; its guns were spiked, and their car- 
riages burned ; and it would take a longer time to put them in condition than 
it would to mount the guns of Sumter. 

On the parade were quantities of flag-stones standing on end in 
masses and columns everywhere. We dared not leave them where they 
were, even if they had not _ 

been in tne way, 
mortar shells bursting 
among them would have 
made the very bomb-proofs 
untenable. A happy idea 
occurred to some one in au- 
thority, and the flag-stones 
were arranged two tiers 
high in front of the case- 
mates, and just under the 
arches, thus partly closing 
the casemates and making 
excellent splinter-proofs. 
This arrangement, no doubt, 
saved the garrison from many wounds similar to that inflicted on John 
Swearer, for it was in passing an opening unprotected by the screen that 
he was struck by a fragment of shell. 

Moving such immense quantities of material, mounting guns, distributing 
shot, and bricking up embrasures kept us busy for many weeks. But order 
was coining out of chaos every day, and the soldiers began to feel that they 
were a match for their adversaries. Still, they could not shut their eyes to 
the fact that formidable works were growing up around them. The seces- 
sionists were busy too, and they had the advantage of unlimited labor and 
material. Fort Moultrie had its armament again in position, and was receiv- 
ing the framework of logs which formed the foundation for its sandbag bomb- 
proofs. The Stevens' Point floating battery was being made impregnable by 
an overcoat of railroad iron ; and batteries on Morris, James, and Sullivan's 
islands were approaching completion. But our preparations were more 
advanced than theirs ; and if we had been permitted to open on them at 
this time, the bombardment of Sumter would have had a very different ter- 
mination. But our hands were tied by policy and instructions. 

The heaviest guns in Sumter were three ten-inch columbiads considered 
very big guns in those days. They weighed fifteen thousand pounds each, 
and were intended for the gorge and salient angles of the work. We found 
them skidded on the parade ground. Besides these there was a large number 
of eight-inch columbiads more than we could mount or man and a full 
supply of 42, 32, and 24-pounders, and some eight-inch sea-coast howitzers. 



Scale or feet 






There was an ample supply of shot and shell, and plenty of powder in the 
magazines, but friction primers were not abundant and cartridge-bags were 
scarce. The scarcity of cartridge-bags drove us to some strange makeshifts. 
During the bombardment several tailors were kept busy making cartridge- 
bags out of soldiers' flannel shirts, and we 
fired away several dozen pairs of woolen 
socks belonging to Major Anderson. In the 
matter of friction primers strict economy 
had to be observed, as we had no means of 
improvising a substitute. 

Our first efforts in preparation were di- 
rected toward mounting the necessary guns 
on the lowest tier. These consisted of 42 and 
32-pounders, and as the necessary trucks, 
gins, and tackle were on hand, the work 
went on rapidly. The men were in fine con- 
dition and as yet well fed; besides, they 
had the assistance of the engineer workmen, 
who soon became experts at this kind of work. Meantime a party of 
mechanics were making the main gate secure. This was situated at the 
middle of the gorge or base of the pentagon (the trace of the work was pen- 
tagonal), which was also the south-west side. It was closed by two heavy 
iron-studded gates, the outer a folding pair, and the inner arranged on 
pulleys, so that it could be raised or lowered at will. It was clear that the 
enemy, if he meant to bombard us, would erect batteries on Morris Island, 
and thus would be able to deliver an oblique fire on the gate sufficient to 
demolish it in a very few minutes. The gate once demolished, a night 
assault would become practicable. 

To meet this possible emergency the main entrance was closed by a sub- 
stantial brick wall, with a man-hole in the middle two feet wide and opposite 
to the man-hole in the gate. This wall was about six feet high, and to increase 
the security and sweep the wharf, an eight-inch sea-coast howitzer was 
mounted on its upper carriage without any chassis, so as to fire through the 
man-hole. The howitzer was kept loaded with double canister. To induce 
the belief that the folding gates were our sole dependence at this point, their 
outer surface was covered with iron. 

The lower tier of guns being mounted, the more difficult operation of send- 
ing guns up to the third tier began. The terre-plein of the work was about 
fifty feet above parade level, a considerable hoist, but a pair of shears being 
already in position, and our tackle equal to the weight of eight-inch colum- 
biads, the work went on amidst much good humor until all the guns of that 
caliber were in position. 

We had now reached a problem more difficult to solve, namely, sending up 
our ten-inch columbiads. We were extremely desirous to have them or at 
least two of them on the upper tier. They were more powerful guns than 
any the enemy had at that time, and the only ones in our possession capable 


of smashing the iron-clad defenses which might be constructed against us. 
We had rumors that an iron-clad floating battery was being built in Charles- 
ton, Avhich the enemy proposed to anchor in some convenient position so as 
to breach Sumter at his leisure. We had no faith in the penetrating power 
of the eight-inch guns, and if we wished to demolish this floating adversary, 
it was necessary that the ten-inch guns should be mounted. Besides, an iron- 
clad battery was well on the road to completion at Cumming's Point (twelve 
hundred yards from the weakest side of Sumter), which, from what we could 
see of it, would be impervious to any less powerful gun. 

There was in the fort a large coil of very heavy rope, new, and strong 
enough to sustain fifteen thousand pounds, but some of the doubtful work- 
men had cut several strands of it at various points on the outside of the coil; 
at least we could account in no other way for the damage. Besides, we had 
no blocks large enough to receive the rope even if it had been uninjured. 
The rope was uncoiled and examined. The portion on the inner side of the 
coil was found uninjured, and a few splices gave rope enough for a triple 
tackle sixty feet long. The improvisation of blocks of sufficient size and 
strength now became the sole remaining difficulty, and it was overcome in 
this way : the gun-carriages of those days were made of well-seasoned oak, 
and one of them was cut up and the material used for the construction of 
blocks. When the blocks were finished the iron-clad battery was shorn of 
half its terrors. 

The tackle thus improvised was rigged on the shears, the first gun was 
rolled into position for hoisting, the sling was attached, and the windlass was 
manned. After carefully inspecting every knot and lashing, the officer in 
charge gave the word, " Heave away," and the men bent to their work steadily 
and earnestly, feeling, no doubt, that the battle with the iron-clad had really 
begun. Every eye watched the ropes as they began to take the strain, and 
when the gun had fairly left the skids, and there was no accident, the song 
which anxiety had suspended was resumed, all hands joining in the chorus, 
" On the plains of Mexico," with a sonorous heartiness that might well have 
been heard at Fort Moultrie. The gun made the vertical passage of fifty feet 
successfully, and was safely landed on the terre-plein. The chassis and 
carriage were then sent up, transported to the proper emplacement, and put 
in position, and the gun was mounted. 

The ten-inch columbiad threw a shot weighing one hundred and twenty-eight 
pounds, and it was now necessary that a supply of such shot should be raised. 
Of course, they could have been sent up at the derrick, but that would have been 
a slow process, and, moreover, it would have required the derrick and the men, 
when they were needed for other work. So after retreat roll-call, when the 
day's work was over, the men were bantered by some designing sergeant as to 
their ability to carry a ten-inch shot up the stairway. Some of the soldiers, full 
of confidence and energy, shouldered a shot each and started. They accom- 
plished the feat, and the less confident, unwilling to be outdone by comrades no 
bigger than themselves, shouldered a shot each and made the passage. In a few 
minutes sixty shot were deposited near the gun ; and it became the custom to 


cany up a ten-inch shot after retreat just for fun as long as there were 
any to carry. 

These trivial incidents serve to show the spirit and humor of the men 
better than any description. There never was a happier or more contented 
set of men in any garrison than the Sumter soldiers. There was no sulkiness 
among them, and no grumbling until they had to try then teeth on spun 
yarn as a substitute for tobacco. This occurred long before the ration was 
reduced, and it produced some of the loudest grumbling ever listened to. 

The second ten-inch columbiad was less fortunate than its fellow. It 
reached the level of the terre-plein without accident, but almost at the first 
haul on the watch tackle to swing it in, it broke away and fell with a dull 
thud. There was no mirth in the faces of the men at the watch tackle as 
they looked over the edge of the parade wall to see how many of the men at 
the windlass were left. The gun had descended, breech first, like a bolt from 
a catapult, and had buried itself in the sand up to the trunnions ; but beyond 
breaking the transoms of the derrick, no damage was done. The cause of 
tho accident was easily discovered. The amateur block-maker, unwilling to 
weaken the blocks by too much trimming, had left their upper edges too 
sharp, and the strap of the upper block had been cut in consequence. In four 
days the derrick was repaired, and the gun safely landed on the terre-plein. 

The third ten-inch columbiad was not sent up. It was mounted as a mortar 
on the parade, for the purpose of shelling Charleston should that become 
advisable. A mortar platform already existed there. A ten-inch top carriage 
was placed on it and the gun mounted pointing toward the city. 

A laughable incident occurred in connection with this gun soon after it 
was mounted. Some of the officers were anxious to try how it would work, 
and perhaps to see how true its alignment was, and to advertise to the enemy 
the fact that we had at least one formidable mortar in Fort Sumter. At any 
rate they obtained permission from Major Anderson to try the gun with a 
" very small charge." So, one afternoon the gun was loaded with a blind 
shell, and what was considered a " very small charge " of powder. The regu- 
lation charge for the gun, as a gun, was eighteen pounds. On this occasion two 
pounds only were used. It was not expected that the shell would be thrown over 
a thousand yards, and as the bay was clear no danger was anticipated. Every- 
thing being in readiness, the gun was fired, and the eyes of the garrison 
followed the shell as it described its graceful curve in tho direction of the 
city. By the time it reached the summit of its trajectory, tho fact that tho 
charge used was not a " very small" one for the gun fired as a mortar became 
painfully apparent to every observer, and fears were entertained by somo 
that the shell would reach the city, or at least the shipping near the wharves. 
But fortunately it fell short, and did no damage beyond scaring the seces- 
sionist guard-boat then leaving the wharf for her nightly post of observation. 
The guard-boat put back and Sumter was visited by a flag of truce, perhaps 
to find out the meaning of our performance. No doubt the explanations 
given were satisfactory. No more experiments for range were tried with that 
gun, but we knew that Charleston was within range. 



Although the full armament of Sumter was not on hand, there were many 
more guns than places to put them. This resulted from the fact that 
no guns were mounted on the second tier, and because many embrasures on 
the first tier were bricked up. There were four unplaced eight-inch colum- 
biads after the fort had been satisfactorily garnished with guns. But we 
were entirely without mortars. Perhaps this serious defect in our armament, 
and perhaps our success with the ten-inch gun mounted as a mortar, induced 
Major Anderson to mount his extra eight-inch guns in that way. Morris 
Island, twelve hun- 
dred yards away, was 
the nearest terra 
firma to Fort Sumter, 
and there the enemy 
would plant his most 
important batteries. 
The more searching 
and severe the fire 
that could be brought 
to bear upon that 
island, therefore, the 
better. So the four 
extra columbiads 
were mounted as 
mortars to fire in 
that direction. "We 
had no carriages for 
the guns and no plat- 
forms. So a trench 
was dug in the parade at right angles to the proposed line of fire. A heavy 
timber was then embedded in the sand at the bottom of the trench, and 
another on the Morris Island side of it, in such a way that a gun resting on 
the one and leaning on the other would be supjjorted at an angle of forty- 
five degrees. The guns were then placed in notches at equal intervals along 
the trench. We had no opportunity to try this novel mortar battery, but 
everybody was satisfied that it could have done good service. 

It was expected that the walls of Fort Sumter would be able to withstand 
the guns which we knew the enemy possessed, but we did not anticipate 
importations from abroad. During the bombardment a Whitworth gun of 
small caliber, just received from England, was mounted in one of the Morris 
Island batteries, and in a few rounds demonstrated its ability to breach the 
work. Fortunately its supply of ammunition was limited, and the fire stopped 
short of an actual breach. But a few hours more of that Whitworth Im- 
pounder would have knocked a hole in our defenses. 

A breach was not dreaded by the garrison, for, weak as it was, it could have 
given a good account of itself defending a breach. The greatest danger was a 
simultaneous attack on all sides. Sixty-four men could not be made very 





effective at a dozen different points. The possibility of the enemy, under 
cover of darkness, getting a foothold in force on the narrow bit of riprapping 
between tide-water and the foundation of the scarp was ever present in 
our minds. 

The most likely place to land was the wharf, a stone structure in front of 
the main entrance. There an assaulting column might be formed and the 
main gate stormed, while the bulk of the garrison was defending the embra- 
sures. To checkmate any such attempt, means of blowing the wharf out of 
existence were devised. Two five-gallon demijohns filled with powder were 
planted as mines, well under the wharf pavement, in such a way as to insure 
the total demolition of the structure by their explosion. These mines were 
arranged so that both should explode at the same instant. The means of firing 
were twofold : first, a powder-hose leading from the mines through a wooden 
trough buried under the pavement, and terminating in a dry well just inside 
the gate ; second, a long lanyard connected with friction primers inserted in 
the corks of the powder demijohns, and extending through the trough into the 
well, whence it branched like a bell wire to convenient points inside the fort. 

Another place offering special advantages to a storming party was the 
esplanade. This was a broad promenade extending the whole length of the 
gorge wall on the outside, and paved with immense blocks of dressed granite. 
As Fort Sumter was not designed to resist attack by storm, the esplanade 
was unswept by any fire. To remedy this defect the stone fougasse was 
resorted to. To the uninitiated the " fougasse " looked like a harmless pile 
of stones resting against the scarp wall. The only thing that would be likely 
to attract his attention was the bin-like inclosure of solid masonry open at 
the outer side, which looked like an immense dust-pan, and which he might 
think was a rather elaborate arrangement to hold merely a pile of stones 
together. There was nothing to indicate that beneath the stones, in the angle 
close to the scarp wall, a magazine of gunpowder lay concealed, and that 
behind were arrangements for firing it from the inside of the works. These 
harmless-looking piles of stones were mines of the deadliest kind. In addi- 
tion, two eight-inch sea-coast howitzers were mounted on their upper carriages 
only, and placed in front of the main entrance, pointing to the right and left 
so as to sweep the esplanade. 

The possibility of a hostile landing on the narrow strip of riprapping 
between the scarp wall and tide-water still remained to be provided for. 
Before secondary defenses were constructed, this was a continuous dead space 
on which a thousand men could have found a safe lodgment perfectly screened 
from fire and observation. The danger from such a lodgment was, that from 
it all our embrasures could have been assaulted at the same time. It was 
all-important, therefore, that the entrance by an embrasure should be made as 
difficult as possible. The ledge of riprapping was little more than four feet 
below the sills of the embrasures, and there would have been no difficulty in 
stepping in, if the two or three guards inside were disposed of. This fact was 
well known to the enemy, and we felt certain that, if he decided to attempt an 
assault in this way, he would consider scaling-ladders unnecessary. In order 




to disappoint him, therefore, we removed the riprapping in front of each 
embrasure to the depth of four or five feet, rolling the large stones irjto the 
water. This gave a height of eight or nine feet to the embrasure sills. 

Machicoulis galleries were also erected on all the flanks and faces of the 
work. The machicoulis when completed looked like an immense dry-goods 
box, set upon the parapet so as to project over the wall some three or four 
feet. The beams upon which it rested extended inward to the terre-plein 
and were securely anchored down. But the dry-goods box was deceptive. 
Inside it was lined with heavy iron plates to make it bullet-proof. That portion 
of the bottom which projected beyond the wall was loop-holed for musketry, 
and a marksman in the machicoulis could shoot a man, however close he 
might be to the scarp wall. But musketry from the machicoulis could hardly 
be expected to beat off a determined assault upon the flanks and faces of 
the work. To meet this difficulty, hand-grenades were improvised. Shells of 
all sizes, from 12-pounders to 10-inch, were loaded, and the fuse-holes stopped 
with wooden plugs. The plugs were then bored through with a gimlet, and 
friction primers inserted. Behind the parapet at short intervals, and 
wherever it was thought they might be useful, numbers of these shell-grenades 
were stored under safe cover in readiness for any emergency. The method 
of throwing them was simple. Lanyards of sufficient length to reach to 
within about four feet of the riprapping were prepared, and fastened securely 
at the handle end near the piles of shell-grenades. To throw a grenade, the 
soldier lifted it on the parapet, hooked the lanyard into the eye of the friction 
primer, and threw the shell over the parapet. When the lanyard reached 
its length, the shell exploded. Thus a very few men would be more than a 
match for all that could assemble on the riprapping. 


Another contrivance, the " flying fougasse," or bursting barrel, a device of 
Captain Truman Seymour, consisted of an ordinary cask or barrel filled with 
broken stones, and having in its center a canister of powder, sufficient to 
burst the barrel and scatter its contents with considerable force. A fuse con- 
nected the powder in the canister with a friction primer in the bung, and the 
barrel was exploded by attaching a lanyard to the eye of the primer, and 
letting the barrel roll over the parapet, as in the case of the shell-grenade. If 
one experiment can justify an opinion, the flying fougasse would have been a 
success. When it became known in the fort that one of the barrels was about 
to be fired as an experiment, the novelty of the thing attracted most of the 
men to the place, and the little crowd attracted the attention of the enemy. 
No doubt glasses were focused on the party from every battery within sight. 
When everything was ready the barrel was allowed to roll over the parapet, 
and an instant afterward a terrific explosion took place. The stones were 
thrown in every direction, and the surface of the water was lashed into foam 
for a considerable distance. The effect as seen by the secessionists must 
have appeared greater than it did to us, although we thought it quite satis- 
factory. The Charleston newspapers described the effect of the "infernal 
machine" as simply terrific 1 . Only three of them were constructed, yet for 
moral effect an empty barrel set upon the parapet would have been just as good. 

In war, plan as we may, much depends upon accident, and the moral effect 
of very insignificant incidents is often considerable. For this reason " Witty- 
man's Masterpiece" deserves to be mentioned. Wittyman was a German 
carpenter, not very familiar with English, and wholly ignorant of military 
engineering. His captain had conceived the idea that a cheval-de-frise across 
the riprapping at the salient angles of the fort would confine the enemy on 
whatever face he landed until he had been treated liberally with shell- 
grenades. So Wittyman was ordered to build a cheval-de-frise at the angle 
of tha gorge nearest Morris Island. It was easy to see that Wittyman was not 
familiar with elievaax-de-frise 1 so the captain explained and roughly illustrated 
the construction. At last Wittyman seemed to grasp the idea and went to 
work upon it forthwith, Perhaps the work was not examined during con- 
struction, nor seen by any one but Wittyman until it was placed. But from that 
day forward it was the fountain of amusement for the men. No matter how 
sick or sad a man might be, let him look at the masterpiece and his ailments 
were forgotten. Not a steamer passed, and they were passing almost every 
hour, but every glass on board was leveled at the masterpiece. But it baffled 
every one of them. Not one could guess what it was, or what it was intended 
to be ; and after the bombardment was over we learned, quite accidentally, 
that it had been set down by the enemy as a means of exploding the mines. 

Any description of the siege of Sumter would be incomplete without some 
sort of reference to the Star of the West fiasco. At reveille on the 9th of 
Januaiy, it became generally known among the men that a large steamer 
flying the United States flag was off the bar, seemingly at anchor. There 
had been some talk among the men, based upon rumors from Charleston, 
that the garrison would either be withdrawn from the harbor or returned to 





Fort Moultrie; and there were some who believed the rumors. These 
believers were now confident that withdrawal had been determined on, and 
that the steamer oft' the liar was the transport come to take them away. 
There was no denying that appearances favored the theory, yet there was no 
enthusiasm. The men were beginning to feel that they were a match for 
their adversaries, and they were loath to leave without proving it. And, 
indeed, at that time Sumter was master of the situation. Moultrie had very 
few guns mounted, only one, according to report, and that fact ought to 

have been known to the people 
on the Star of the West. It was 
known officially in Washington 
that fourteen days previously 
Major Anderson had spiked the 
guns and burned the carriages 
at Moultrie, and gun-carriages 
cannot be replaced in two weeks 
when they have to be fabricat- 
ed. Hence Moultrie could not 
have been formidable, and as 
soon as it should have passed 
the battery on Morris Island, it 
would have been comparatively 

When the Star of the West 
was seen standing in, the nov- 
elty of a steamer carrying the 
national flag had more attrac- 
tions for the men than the breakfast table. They soon made her out to be 
a merchant steamer, as the walking-beam, plainly visible as she rounded into 
the channel, was unknown on a man-of-war. She had taken the Morris Island 
channel, and was approaching at a fair rate of speed. Perhaps every man in 
Sumter was on the ramparts, but there was no excitement. But when the 
blue puff of smoke from a hidden battery on Morris Island advertised the fact 
that she was being tired on, there was great scurrying and scampering among 
the men. . The long roll was beaten, and the batteries were manned almost 
before the guns of the hidden battery had fired their second shot. As she 
approached, a single gun at Fort Moultrie opened at extreme long range, its 
shot falling over half a mile short. There seemed to be much perplexity 
among our officers, and Major Anderson had a conference with some of 
them in a room used as a laundry which opened on the terre-plein of the 
sea-flank. The conference was an impromptu one, as Captain Doubleday 
and Lieutenant Davis were not of it. But Captain Foster was there, and by 
his actions demonstrated his disappointment at the result. He left the laun- 
dry, bounding up the two or three steps that led to the terre-plein, smashing his 
hat, and muttering something about the flag, of which the words " trample on 
it " reached the ears of the men at the guns, and let them know that there was 



to be no fighting, on their part at least. Meantime the steamer had worn 
ship, and was standing ont again, receiving the fire of the hidden battery in 
passing. This is abont all the men saw or knew about the strange vessel 
at the time, although she came near enough for them to look down upon her 
decks and see that there were no troops visible on her.-fr 

With the exception of the mounting of the guns, the preparations described 
were chiefly intended to ward off assault. The actions of the enemy now 
indicated that he proposed to bombard the work at an early day. If we 
would meet Moultrie, and the numerous batteries which were being con- 
structed against us, on anything like even terms, we must be prepared to 
shoot accurately. 

Few artillerymen, without actual experience, have any idea of the diffi- 
culty of aiming a gun during a bombardment. They may be able to hit a 
target in ordinary practice with absolute certainty, and yet be unable to 
deliver a single satisfactory shot in a bombardment. The error from smoke is 
difficult to deal with, because it is a variable, depending upon the density of 
the smoke clouds which envelop your own and your adversary's batteries. 
(Within the writer's experience, a thin veil of fog protected a mass of army 
wagons 900, it was said from the fire of some 8 or 10 guns, during a 
whole forenoon, although the guns were within easy range, and the wagons 
could be distinctly seen. Refraction saved them, every shot going over.) 
Then danger and its consequent excitement are also disturbing elements, 
especially where delicate instruments have to be used. It is easier to lead a 
forlorn hope than to set a vernier under a heavy artillery fire. Fortunately, 
we had officers of experience in Sumter, and fortunately, too, we had very 
few instruments ; one gunner's level and two old quadrants being the extent 
of the outfit, with perhaps some breech-sights and tangent-scales. The paucity 
of aiming-instruments, and perhaps the experience of some of the officers, led 
to the devising of instruments and methods which neither smoke nor excite- 
ment could disturb ; and as some of them, in a much more perfect form, 
have since been adopted, the rude originals may as well be described here. 
Ahning cannon consists of two distinct operations: namely, alignment and 
elevation. In the former, according to instructions and practice, the gunner 
depends upon his eye and the cannon-sights. But for night firing or when 
the enemy is enveloped in smoke, as he is sure to be in any artillery duel, 
the eye cannot be depended on. Visual aiming in a bombardment is a delusion 
and a snare. To overcome this difficulty, on clear days, when all the conditions 
were favorable to accuracy, and we could work at our leisure, every gun 
in the armament was carefully aimed at all the prominent objects within its 
field of fire, and its position marked on the traverse circle, the index being a 
pointer securely fastened to the traverse fork. After this had been done, 
alignment became as easy as setting a watch, and could be done by night or 
day, by the least intelligent soldier in the garrison. 

The elevation was more difficult to deal with. The ordinary method by the 
use of a breech-sight could not be depended on, even if there had been a 

fc The troops on the Star of the West consisted of 200 men, under Lieut. Ch les R. Woods. Editors. 



v ; m;i? 

' it - 


sufficient supply of such instruments, because darkness or smoke would render 
it inapplicable or inaccurate ; and the two quadrants in the outfit could not be 
distributed all over the fort. 

Before the correct elevation to carry a shot to a given object can be deter- 
mined, it is necessary to know the exact distance of the object. This was 
obtained from the coast-survey 
chart of the harbor. The neces- 
sary elevation was then calcu- 
lated, or taken from the tables, 
and the gun elevated accord- 
ingly by means of the quad- 
rant. The question then became, 
How can the gunner bring the 
gun to this elevation in the heat 
of action, and without the use 
of a quadrant! There was an 
abundance of brass rods, per- 
haps a quarter-inch in diame- 
ter, in the fort. Pieces of such 
rods, eighteen inches long, were 
prepared by shaping one end to 
fit into a socket on the cheek of 
the carriage, and the other into a chisel edge. They were called by the men 
pointing rods. A vertical line was then drawn on the right breech of the gun, 
and painted white. The non-commissioned officer who attended to this prep- 
aration, having carefully elevated the gun with the quadrant for a particular 
object, set the pointing rod in the socket, and brought its chisel end down on 
the vertical line. The point thus cut was marked and the initials of the object 
to be struck with that elevation written opposite. These arrangements, 
which originated with Captain Doubleday, were of great value during the 

The preparation of Sumter for defense afforded a fine field for ingenuity, 
because nothing connected with its equipment was complete. As another 
illustration of this ingenuity, the following is in point. It might become 
desirable to continue a bombardment into the night, and the casemates, 
owing to the partial closing up of the arches with flagstones, were as dark as 
dungeons, even on very clear nights. Lights of some kind were absolutely 
necessary, but there were no candles and no lamps. There was a light-house 
on the fort, however, and the light-keeper had several barrels of oil on hand. 
Small tubes of tin, to receive wicks, were made, and fitted into disks of cork 
sufficiently large to float them on the surface of the oil. Coffee-cups were 
then filled with oil and the floats laid on the surface. 

Among the many incidents of the siege may be mentioned the mishap of an 
ice-laden Yankee schooner that strayed within range of the secession batteries ; 
the accidental solid shot fired at Fort Sumter by an impatient secessionist 
in the Cumming's Point battery, and the daring generosity of Mclnerny, a 





Fort Moultrie is shown oil the left, and the smoke of the Morris Island battery on the extreme right. 

warm-hearted and loyal Irishman, who did not " cross the broad Atlantic to 
become the citizen of only one Shtate," and who cheerfully risked his life 
and ruined his Sunday shirt by tearing a white flag from it, that he might 
be able to deliver in person his donation of tobacco to the besieged 
soldiers. There is one other incident which should find a place in these 

Major Anderson was fully impressed with the solemn responsibilities which 
rested upon him when he transferred his command to Sumter. When he 
reached Sumter there were no halliards to the flag-staff, and as there was 
more pressing work on hand for several days, some time elapsed before 
it became possible to display the national flag. At length, however, 
halliards were rigged, and everything was ready for the flag. The usual 
method of proceeding in such a case would have been to order the sergeant of 
the guard to send up the flag, but it was otherwise arranged on this occasion. 
A dress-parade was ordered, and the little garrison formed around the 
flag-staff, the officers in the center. Presently Major Anderson, with Chap- 
lain Harris of Fort Moultrie, who perhaps had been summoned for the 
purpose, approached the flag-staff, and the command was brought to 
"Attention." The flag, already bent to the halliards, was held by one officer, 
and another held the hoisting end of the halliards. The chaplain then, in a 
few words, invited those present to join with him in prayer, and Major Ander- 
son, receiving the halliards from the officer who till that time had held them, 
knelt beside the chaplain, most of the officers and some of the men in the 
ranks following his example. Prayers being ended, all rose, and the flag of 


Fort Sumter was raised by Major Anderson, and the halliards secured. He 
then turned toward the officers and directed that the companies be dismissed. 
If any of those who doubted the loyalty to the Union of Major Anderson 
could have had but one glimpse of that impressive scene, they would have 
doubted no longer. 

The weary waiting for war or deliverance which filled up the few weeks 
that intervened between the preparations and the actual bombardment 
developed no discontent among the men, although food and fuel were getting 
scarce. The latter was replenished from time to time by tearing down 
sheds and temporary workshops, but the former was a constantly dimin- 
ishing quantity, and the men could count on their fingers the number 
of days between them and starvation. It was a favorite belief among the 
secessionists that the pinchings of hunger would arouse a spirit of mutiny 
among the soldiers, and compel Major Anderson to propose terms of 
evacuation. But no such spirit manifested itself. On the contrary, the 
men exhibited a devotion to their Government and the officers appointed 
over them which surprised their enemies, but attracted little attention from 
their friends. J 

The opening of the bombardment was a somewhat dramatic event. A reliev- 
ing fleet was approaching, aU unknown to the Sumter garrison, and General 
Beauregard, perhaps with the hope of tying Major Anderson's hands in the 
expected fight with that fleet, had opened negotiations with him on the 11th 
of April looking toward the evacuation of the fort. But Major Anderson 
declined to evacuate his post till compelled by hunger. The last ounce of 
breadstuffs had been consumed, and matters were manifestly approaching 
a crisis. It was evident from the activity of the enemy that something 
important was in the wind. That night we retired as usual. Toward half- 
past three on the morning of the 12th we were startled by a gun fired in the 
immediate vicinity of the fort, and many rose to see what was the matter. 
It was soon learned that a steamer from the enemy desired to communicate 
with Major Anderson, and a small boat under a flag of truce was received 
and delivered the message. Although no formal announcement of the fact 
was made, it became generally known among the men that in one hour 
General Beauregard would open his batteries on Sumter. 

The men waited about for some time in expectation of orders, but 
received none, except an informal order to go to bed, and the information that 
reveille would be sounded at the usual hour. This was daylight, fully two 
hours off, so some of the men did retire. The majority perhaps remained up, 
anxious to see the opening, for which purpose they had all gone on the ram- 
parts. Except that the flag was hoisted, and a glimmer of light was visible 
at the guard-house, the fort looked so dark and silent as to seem deserted. 
The morning was dark and raw. Some of the watchers surmised that 
Beauregard was " bluffing," and that there would be no bombardment. But 

J So faithful and true have the soldiers of the which were abandoned by all the commissioned 

army always been that even very striking exhibi- officers, at which not one of the enlisted men 

tions of these qualities are not considered worthy proved untrue. The loyalty of the latter has 

of notice. There were military posts in 1861 never been properly appreciated. J. C. 

VOL. I. 5. 




Colonel Joseph A. Yates, who was a lieutenant in 
the attach on Fort Sumter, says in a letter accom- 
panying the plan on the next page: "I send a rough 
sketch of the floating battery which I commanded ; it is 
rough, but from my recollection it is very like her. The 
battery was substantially built, flat, heavily timbered 

on her shield, with railroad iron laid on it two courses 
of rails tinned inward and outward, so as to form a 
pretty smooth surfaee. The bags of sand represented 
on the deck were to counterweigh the guns, which 
were 32 and 42-pounders. She was struck many timer., 
several shot going entirely through the shield." 

promptly at 4:30 a. m. a flash as of distant lightning in the direction of Mount 
Pleasant, followed by the dull roar of a mortar, told us that the bombardment 
had begun. The eyes of the watchers easily detected and followed the burning 
fuse which marked the course of the shell as it mounted among the stars, and 
then descended with ever-increasing velocity, until it landed inside the fort 
and burst. It was a capital shot. Then the batteries opened on all sides, 
and shot and shell went screaming over Sumter as if an army of devils were 
swooping around it. As a rule the guns were aimed too high, but all the 
mortar practice was good. In a few minutes the novelty disappeared in a 
realizing sense of danger, and the watchers retired to the bomb-proofs, 
where they discussed probabilities until reveille. 

Hal tits of discipline are strong among old soldiers. If it had not been for 
orders to the contrary, the men would have formed for roll-call on the open 
parade, as it was their custom to do, although mortar-shells were bursting 
there at the lively rate of about one a minute. But they were formed under 
the bomb-proofs, and the roll was called as if nothing unusual was going on. 
They were then directed to get breakfast, and be ready to fall in when 
" assembly " was beaten. The breakfast part of the order was considered a 
grim joke, as the fare was reduced to the solitary item of fat pork, very 
rusty indeed. But most of the men worried down a little of it, and were 
" ready " when the drum called them to their work. 



By this time it was daylight, and the effects of the bombardment became 
visible. No serious damage was being done to the fort. The enemy had 
concentrated their fire on the barbette batteries, but, like most inexperienced 
gunners, they were firing too high. After daylight their shooting improved, 
until at 7:30 a. m., when " assembly " was beaten in Sumter, it had become 
fairly good. At " assembly " the men were again paraded, and the orders 
of the day announced. The garrison was divided into two reliefs, and the 
tour of duty at the guns was to be four hours. Captain Doubleday being 
the senior captain, his battery took the first tour. 

There were three points to be fired upon, the Morris Island batteries, the 
James Island batteries, and the Sullivan's Island batteries. With these last 
was included the famous iron-clad floating battery, which had taken up a 
position off the western end of Sullivan's Island to command the left flank of 
Sumter. Captain Doubleday divided his men into three parties : the first, 
under his own immediate command, was marched to the casemate guns bear- 
ing on Morris Island ; the second, under Lieutenant Jefferson C. Davis, 
manned the casemate guns bearing on the James Island batteries ; and the 
third without a commissioned officer until Dr. Crawford joined it was 
marched by a sergeant^ to the guns bearing on Sullivan's Island. The 
guns in the lower tier, which were the only ones used during the bombard- 
ment, except surreptitiously without orders, were 32 and 42-pounders, 
and some curiosity was felt as to the effect of such shot on the iron-clad 
battery. The gunners made excellent practice, but the shot were seen to 
bounce off its sides like pease. After battering it for about an hour and a half, 
no visible effect had been produced, although it had perceptibly slackened 
its fire, perhaps to save ammunition. But it was evident that throwing 
32-pounder shot at it, at a mile range, was a waste of iron, and the attention 
of the gunners was transferred to Fort Moultrie. 

Moultrie was, perhaps, a less satisfactory target than the iron-clad. It 
was literally buried under sand-bags, the 
very throats of the embrasures being 
closed with cotton-bales. The use of cot- 
ton-bales was very effective as against 
shot, but would have beeii less so against 
shell. The fact that the embrasures were 
thus closed was not known in Sumter : 
tilt after the bombardment. It explained 
what was otherwise inexplicable. Shot 
would be seen to strike an embrasure, 
and the gunner would feel that he had settled one gun for certain, but even 
while he was receiving the congratulations of his comrades the supposed 


% The non-cotmnissioned officers in Fort Sumter 
were Ordnance-Sergeant James Kearney, U. S. A., 
Quartermaster-Sergeant William H. Hammer, 1st 
U. S. Artillery; Regimental Band, 1st Artillery: 
Sergeant James E. Galway, Corporal Andrew 
Smith; Company E, 1 st Artillery : First Sergeant 
Eugene Scheibner, Sergeants Thomas Kirnan, 

William A. Harn, and James Chester, Corporals 
Owen M'G-uire, Francis J. Oakes, Charles Bring- 
hurst, and Henry Ellerbrook ; Company H, 1st 
Artillery : First Sergeant John Renehan, Sergeants 
James M'Mahon, John Carmody, and John Otto, 
Corporal Christopher Costolan. Editors. 


disabled gun would reply. That the cotton-bales could not be seen from 
Sumter is not surprising. The sand-bag casemates which covered the guns 
were at least eighteen feet thick, and the cotton-bale shutter was no doubt 
arranged to slide up and down like a portcullis inside the pile of sand-bags. 
The gunners of Sumter, not knowing of the existence of these shutters, 
directed their shot either on the embrasures for the purpose of disabling 
the enemy's guns, or so as to graze the sand-bag parapet for the purpose of 
reaching the interior of the work. The practice was very good, but the effect, 
for reasons already stated, was iu considerable. 

At the end of the first four hours, Doubleday's men were relieved from 
the guns and had an opportunity to look about them. Not a man was visible 
near any of the batteries, but a large party, apparently of non-combatants, 
had collected on the beach of Sullivan's Island, well out of the line of fire, 
to witness the duel between Sumter and Moultrie. Doubleday's men were 
not in the best of temper. They were irritated at the thought that they 
had been unable to inflict any serious damage on their adversary, and 
although they had suffered no damage in return they were dissatisfied. The 
crowd of unsympathetic spectators was more than they could bear, and two 
veteran sergeants determined to stir them up a little. For this purpose they 
directed two 42-pounders on the crowd, and, when no officer was near, fired. 
The first shot struck about fifty yards short, and, bounding over the heads of 
the astonished spectators, went crashing through the Moultrie House. The 
second followed an almost identical course, doing no damage except to the 
Moultrie House, and the spectators scampered off in a rather undignified 
manner. The Moultrie House was flying a yellow flag at the time, and the 
Charleston newspapers discoursed upon the barbarity of firing upon a hospital 
flag, forgetting, perhaps, that we also had a hospital in Sumter, which they 
treated to red-hot shot during the bombardment. Of course, none of the 
officers of Sumter knew anything about the two 42-pounder shot. 

The smoke which enveloped the Confederate batteries during the first day, 
while not so thick as entirely to obscure them, was sufficiently so to make 
visual aiming extremely unreliable ; and during the second day, when Sumter 
was on fire, nothing could be seen beyond the muzzles of our own guns. But 
the aiming arrangements, due to the foresight and ingenuity of Captain 
Doubleday, enabled us to fire with as much accuracy when we could not see 
the object as when we could. 

Early on the first day several vessels of the fleet were observed off the bar, 
and orders were given to dip the flag to them. This was done, and the salute 
was returned, but while our flag was being hoisted after the third dip, a shell 
burst near the flag-staff and cut the halliards. This accident put the flag 
beyond our control. It ran down until the kinky halliards jammed in the 
pulley at the mast-head, and the flag remained at about half-staff. This has 
been interpreted as a signal of distress, but it was only an accident; There 
was no special distress in Sumter, and no signal to that efl intended. 

Major Anderson had given orders that only the casern eries should 

be manned. While this was undoubtedly prompted by a to save his 



men, \t operated also, in some degree, to save the Confederates. Our most pow- 
erful batteries and all our shell guns were on the barbette tier, and, being for- 
bidden their use, we were compelled to oppose a destructive shell fire with solid 
*hot alone. This, especially as we had no mortars, was a great disadvantage. 


Had we been permitted to use our shell guns we could have set fire to the 
barracks and quarters in Moultrie ; for, as it was, we wrecked them badly with 
solid shot, although we could not see them. Then the cotton-bale shutters would 
have been destroyed, and we could have made it much livelier generally for 
our adversaries. This was so apparent to the men, that one of them a man 
v named Carmody stole up on the ramparts and deliberately fired every bar- 
bette gun in position on the. Moultrie side of the work. The guns were already 
loaded and roughly aimed, and Carmody simply discharged them in succession; 
hence, the effect was less than it would have been if the aim had been care- 
fully rectified. But Carmody's effort aroused the enemy to a sense of his dan- 
ger. He supposed, no doubt, that Major Anderson had determined to open 
his barbette batteries, so he directed every gun to bear on the barbette tier 
of Fort Sumter, and probably believed that the vigor of his fire induced 
Major Anderson to change his mind. But the contest was merely Carmody 
against the Confederate States ; and Carmody had to back down, not because 
he was beaten, but because he was unable, single-handed, to reload his guns. 

Another amusing incident in this line occurred on the Morris Island side of 
the fort. There, in the gorge angle, a ten-inch columbiad was mounted, en 
barbette, and re 42-pounders of the casemate battery were making no 


impression on the Cmnming's Point iron battery, the two veteran sergeants 
who had surreptitiously fired upon the spectators, as already related, deter- 
mined to try a shot at the iron battery from the big gun. As this was a direct 
violation of orders, caution was necessary. Making sure that the major was 
out of the way, and that no officers were near, the two sergeants stole upstairs 
to the ten-inch gun. It was loaded and aimed already, they very well knew, 
so all they would have to do was to fire it. This was the work of a few 
seconds only. The gun was fired, and those in the secret down below watched 
the flight of the shot in great expectations of decided results. Unfortunately 
the shot missed; not a bad shot almost grazing the crest of the battery 
but a miss. A littleness elevation, a very little, and the battery would have 
been smashed: so thought the sergeants, for they had great faith in the 
power of their gun ; and they determined to try a second shot. The gun was 
reloaded, a feat of some difficulty for two men, but to run it " in battery " was 
beyond their powers. It required the united efforts of six men to throw the 
carriage "in gear," and the two sergeants could not budge it. Things were 
getting desperate around them. The secessionists had noticed the first shot, 
and had now turned every gun that would bear on that ten-inch gun. They 
were just getting the range, and it was beginning to be uncomfortable for the 
sergeants, who in a fit of desperation determined to fire the gun " as she was." 
The elevating screw was given half a turn less elevation, and the primer was 
inserted in the vent. Then one of the sergeants ran down the spiral stairs to 
see if the coast were clear, leaving his comrade in a very uncomfortable posi- 
tion at the end of the lanyard, and lying flat on the floor. It was getting 
hotter up there every second, and a perfect hurricane of shot was sweeping 
over the prostrate soldier. Human nature could stand it no longer. The 
lanyard was pulled and the gun was fired. The other sergeant was hastening 
up the stairway, and had almost reached the top, when he met the gun com- 
ing down, or at least trying to. Having been fired " from battery," it had 
recoiled over the counter-hurters, and, turning a back somersault, had landed 
across the head of the stairway. Realizing in a moment what had happened, 
and what would be to pay if they were found out, the second sergeant crept 
to the head of the stairway and called his comrade, who, scared almost to 
death, not at the danger he was in, but at the accident, was still hugging 
the floor with the lanyard in his hand. Both got safely down, swearing 
eternal secrecy to each other; and it is doubtful if Major Anderson ever 
knew how that ten-inch gun came to be dismounted. It is proper to add 
that the shot was a capital one, striking just under the middle embrasure 
of the iron battery and half covering it with sand. If it had been a trifle 
higher it would have entered the embrasure. 

The first night of the bombardment was one of great anxiety. The fleet 
might send reinforcements ; the enemy might attempt an assault. Both 
would come in boats; both would answer in English. It would be horrible 
to fire upon friends ; it would be fatal not to fire upon enemies. The night 
was dark and chilly. Shells were dropping into the fort at regular intervals, 
and the men were tired, hungry, and out of temper. Any party that 





approached that night would have been rated as enemies upon general prin- 
ciples. Fortunately nobody appeared; reveille sounded, and the men oiled 
then appetites with the fat pork at the usual hour by way of breakfast. 

TJe second day's bombardment began at the same hour as did the first; that 
is, on the Sumter side. The enemy's mortars had kept up a very slow fire all 
night, which gradually warmed up after daylight as their 1 >atteries seemed to 
awaken, until its vigor was about equal 
to their fire of the day before. The 
fleet was still off the bar perhaps wait- 
ing to see the end. Fire broke out once 
or twice in the officers' quarters, and 
was extinguished. It broke out again 
in several places at once, and we real- 
ized the truth and let the quarters burn. 
They were firing red-hot shot. This was 
about 9 o'clock. As soon as Sumter 
was noticed to be on fire the secession- 
ists increased the fire of their batteries 
to a maximum. In the perfect storm of 
shot and shell that beat upon us from 
all sides, the flag-staff was shot down, 
but the old flag was rescued and nailed 
to a new staff. This, with much diffi- 
culty, was carried to the ramparts and 
lashed to some chassis piled up there 
for a trciVerse. 

We were not sorry to see the quarters 
burn. They were a nuisance. Built for 
fire-proof buildings, they were not fire-proof. Neither would they burn up in 
a cheerful way. The principal cisterns were large iron tanks immediately under 
he roof. These had been riddled, and the quarters below had been deluged 
with water. Everything was wet and burned badly, yielding an amount of 
pungent piney smoke which almost suffocated the garrison. 
The scene inside the fort as the fire gained headway and threatened the 
.agazine was an exciting one. It had already reached some of our stores of 
loaded shells and shell-grenades. These must be saved at all hazard. Soldiers 
brought their blankets and covered the precious projectiles, and thus the most 
of them were saved. But the magazine itself was in danger. Already it was 
full of smoke, and the flames were rapidly closing in upon it. It was evident 
that it must be closed, and it would be many hours before it could be opened 
again. During these hours the fire must be maintained with such powder 
as we could secure outside the magazine. A number of barrels were roLled 
out for this purpose, and the magazine door already almost too hot to 
handle was closed. 

It was the intention to store the powder taken from the magazine in several 
safe corners, covering it with damp soldiers' blankets. But safe corners were 


7 2 


hard to find, and most of the blankets were already in nse covering loaded 
shells. The fire was raging more fiercely than ever, and safety demanded that 
the uncovered powder be thrown overboard. This was instantly done, and if 
the tide had 1 >een high we should have been well rid of it. But the tide was 
low, and the pile of powder-barrels rested on the riprapping in front of the 
embrasure. This was observed by the enemy, and some shell guns were 
turned upon the pile, producing an explosion which blew the gun at that 
embrasure clear out of battery, but did no further damage. 

The fire had now enveloped the magazine, and the danger of an explosion 
was imminent. Powder had been carried out all the previous day, and it was 
more than likely that 
enough had sifted 
through the cartridge- 
bags to carry the fire 
into the powder- 
chamber. Major An- 
derson, his head erect 
as if on parade, called 
the men around him ; 


directed that a shot be 
fired every five min- 
utes ; and mentioned 
that there was some 
danger of the maga- 
zine exploding. Some 
of the men, as soon as 
they learned what the 
real danger was, rushed 
to the door of the magazine and hurriedly dug a trench in front of it, which 
they kept filled with water until the danger was considered over. 

It was during this excitement that ex-Senator Wigfall of Texas visited the 
fort. It came the turn of one of the guns on the left face of the work to 
fire, we were now firing once in five minutes, and as the cannoneer 
approached for the purpose of loading, he discovered a man looking in at the 
embrasure. The mroi must have raised himself to the level of the embrasure 
by grasping the bill with his hands. A short but lively altercation ensued 
between the man and the cannoneer, the man pleading to be taken in lest he 
should be killed with his own shot and shell. He was hauled in, Thompson, 
the cannoneer, first receiving his sword, to the point of which a white hand- 
kerchief was attached, not by way of surrender, but for convenience. Once 



mortar woke the echoes from every nook and corner of the harbor, and in 
this the dead hour of night, before dawn, that shot was a sound of alarm 
that brought every soldier in the harbor to his feet, and every man, woman, 
and child in the city 
of Charleston from 
their beds. A thrill 
went through the 
whole city. It was 
felt that the Rubi- 
c( >n was passed. No 
one thought of go- 
ing home ; unused 
as their ears were 
to the appalling 
sounds, or the vivid 
flashes from the bat- 
teries, they stood 
for hours fascinated 
with horror. After 
the second shell the 
different batteries 
opened their fire on 
Fort Sumter, and 
by 4: 45 a.m. the fir- 
ing was general and 
regular. It was a 
hazy, foggy morn- 

g. About day- 

ht, the boat with 

aides reached 

'eston, and they 

ed to General 


? Sumter did 
spond with 
ns till 7:30 


fcring continued without intermission during the 12th, and 
|fcg the night of the 12th and 13th. No material change 
fkancis w. pickens, go-* a. M. on the 13th, when the barracks in Fort Sumter 

CAROLINA, 1861. FROM A ^ ^^ ^^ ^ ^^ rf j,^ ^^g. Ag goon a g 



this was discovered, the Confederate 
batteries redoubled their efforts, to 
prevent the fire being extinguished. 
Fort Sumter fired at little longer in- 
tervals, to enable the garrison to fight 
the flames. This brave action, under 
such a trying ordeal, aroused great 
sympathy and admiration on the part 
of the Confederates for Major Ander- 
son and his gallant garrison ; this 
feeling was shown by cheers when- 
ever a gun was fired from Sumter. 
It was shown also by loud reflec- 
tions on the " men-of-war" outside 
the harbor. 3) 

About 12:30 the flag-staff of Fort 
Sumter was shot down, but it was 
soon replaced. As soon as General 
Beauregard heard that the flag was 
no longer flying, he sent three of his 
aides, William Porcher Miles, Roger 
A. Pryor, and myself, to offer, and 
also to see if Major Anderson would 
receive or needed, assistance, in sub- 
duing the flames inside the fort. Before we reached it, we saw the United 
States flag again floating over it, and began to return to the city. Before 
going far, however, we saw the Stars and Stripes replaced by a white 
flag. We turned about at once and rowed rapidly to the fort. We were 
directed, from an embrasure, not to go to the wharf, as it was mined, and 
the fire was near it. We were assisted through an embrasure and conducted 
to Major Anderson. Our mission being made known to him, he replied, 
"Present my compliments to General Beauregard, and say to him I thank him 
for his kindness, but need no assistance." He further remarked that he hoped 
the worst was over, that the fire had settled over the magazine, and, as it had 
not exploded, he thought the real danger was about over. Continuing, he said, 
" Gentlemen, do I understand you come direct from General Beauregard 1 " 
The reply was in the affirmative. He then said, " Why ! Colonel Wigfall has 
just been here as an aide too, and by authority of General Beauregard, and 




J, These vessels, part of the second expedition 
for the relief of Fort Sumter, were the Baltic (no 
guns), the Pawnee (8 9-inch guns), and the Harriet 
Lane (1 8-inch gun and 4 32-pounders). The 
Pocahontas did not arrive till the afternoon of the 
13th. The expedition was in charge of Captain 
Gustavus V. Fox (afterward Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy), who had visited the fort on the 21st of 
March. It had been understood between Secre- 
tary Welles and Captain Fox that the movement 
should be supported by the Powhatan (1 11 -inch 

and 10 9-inch guns) ; but, unknown to Mr. Welles, 
and perhaps without full understanding of this 
plan, President Lincoln had consented to the 
dispatch of the ship to the relief of Fort Pickens, 
for which destination it had sailed from New York, 
April 6th, under command of Lieutenant Dav' 3 
D. Porter. This conflict of plans deprived Capt a i 
Fox of the ship which he calls the "fightin 
portion " of his fleet ; and to this circumstanc 
he attributed the failure of the expedition. 




proposed the same terms of evacuation offered on the 11th instant." We 
informed the major that we were not authorized to offer terms ; that we v. 
direct from General Beauregard, and that Colonel Wigfall, although an aide- 
de-camp to the general, had been detached, and had not seen the general for 
several days. Major Anderson at once stated, " There is a misunderstanding 
on my part, and I will at once run up my flag and open fire again." After con- 
sultation, we requested him not to do so, until the matter was explained to 
General Beauregard, and requested Major Anderson to reduce to writing his 
understanding with Colonel Wigfall, which he did. However, before we 
left the fort, a boat arrived from Charleston, bearing Major D. R. Jones, 
assistant adjutant-general on General Beauregard's staff, who offered sub- 
stantially the same terms to Major Anderson as those offered on the 11th, and 
also by Colonel Wigfall, and which were now accepted. 

Thus fell Fort Sumter, April 13th, 1861. At this time fire was still raging in 
the barracks, and settling steadily over the magazine. All egress was cut off 
except through the lower embrasures. Many shells from the Confederate bat- 
teries, which had fallen in the fort and had not exploded, as well as the hand- 
grenades used for defense, were exploding as they were reached by the fire. The 
wind was driving the heat and smoke down into the fort and into the case- 
mates, almost causing suffocation. Major Anderson, his officers, and men were 
blackened by smoke and cinders, and showed signs of fatigue and exhaustion, 
from the trying ordeal through which they had passed. 

It was soon discovered, by conversation, that it was a bloodless battle ; not a 
man had been killed or seriously wounded on either side during the entire bom- 
bardment of nearly forty hours. Congratulations were exchanged on so happy 
a result. Major Anderson stated that he had instructed his officers only to 
fire on the batteries and forts, and not to fire on private property. 

The terms of evacuation offered by General Beauregard were generous, and 
were appreciated by Major Anderson. The garrison was to embark on the 
14th, after running up and saluting the United States flag, and to be carried 


zMl % 







to the United States fleet. A soldier killed during the salute was buried 
inside the fort, the new Confederate garrison uncovering during the impres- 
sive ceremonies. Major Anderson and his command left the harbor, bearing 
with them the respect and admiration of the Confederate soldiers.]. It was 
conceded that he had done his duty as a soldier holding a most delicate trust. 
This first bombardment of Sumter was but its " baptism of fire." During 
subsequent attacks by land and water, it was battered by the heaviest Union 
artillery. Its walls were completely crushed, but the tons of iron projectiles 
imbedded in its ruins added strength to the inaccessible mass that surrounded 
it and made it impregnable. It was never taken, but the operations of Gen- 
eral Sherman, after his march to the sea, compelled its evacuation, and the 
Stars and Stripes were again raised over it, April 14th, 1865. ^ 

J. The officers, uiider General Beauregard, of 
the batteries surrounding Fort Sumter were : 

Sullivan's Island, Brigadier-General E. G. M. 
Dunovant commanding, Lieutenant-Colonel Ros- 
well S. Ripley, commanding the artillery: Five-gun 
Battery (east of Fort Moultrie), Captain S. Y. 
Tupper; Maffit Channel Battery (2 guns) and Mor- 
tar Battery Xo. 2 (2 10-inch mortars), Captain 
William Butler, Lieutenant J. A. Huguenin; Fort 
Moultrie (30 guns), Captain W. R. Calhoun: con- 
sisting of Channel Battery, Lieutenants Thomas 
M. Wagner, Preston, and Sitgreaves, Sumter 
Battery, Lieutenants Alfred Rhett and John 
Mitchell, and Oblicpie Battery, Lieutenant C. W. 
Parker; Mortar BatteryNo. 1 (2 10-inch mortars) 
and Enfilade Battery (4 guns), Captain James H. 
Hallonquist, Lieutenants Flemming, Jacob Valen- 
tine, and B. S. Burnet ; the Point Battery (1 9-inch 
Bahlgren) and the Floating Iran-clad Battery (2 
42-pounders and 2 32-pounders), Captain John R. 
Hamilton and Lieutenant Joseph A. Yates; the 
Moun t Pleasan t Battery ( 2 1 0-inchmortars), Captain 
Robert Martin, Lieutenant George N. Reynolds. 

Morris Island, Brigadier-General James Simons 
commanding, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilmot G. Be 
Saussure, commanding the artillery: Major P. F. 
Stevens, commanding Cumming's Point Battery 

(Blakely gun, which arrived from Liverpool*April 
9th, Captain J. P. Thomas; 2 42-pounders, Lieu- 
tenant T. Sumter Brownfield; and 3 10-inch 
mortars, Lieutenants C. R. Holmes and N. Arm- 
strong) and the Stevens Iron-clad Battery (3 8-inch 
columbiads), Captain George B. Cuthbert, Lieu- 
tenant G. L. Buist ; Trapier Battery (3 10-inch 
mortars), Captain J. Gadsden King, Lieutenants 
W. D. H. Kirkwood, J. P. Strohecker, A. M. Huger, 
and E. L. Parker. 

James Island. Major N. G. Evans commanding; 
Fort Johnson (battery of 21-pounders), Captain 
George S. James : Mortar Batter//, Lieutenants W. 
H. Gibbes, H. S. Farley, J. E. McP. Washington, 
and T. B. Hayne ; Upper Battery (2 I O-inch mor- 
tars), flower Battery (2 10-inch mortars), Captain 
S. C. Thayer. Editors. 

j) Under an order from Secretary Stanton, the 
same flag that was lowered, April 14th, 1861, 
was raised again over Sumter, by Major (then 
General) Anderson, on April 14th, 1865, the day 
President Lincoln was shot. Of Major Anderson's 
former officers, Generals Abner Doubleday and 
Norman J. Hall and Chaplain Matthias Harris 
were present. The Rev. Henry Ward Beecher 
delivered an oration, and other prominent anti- 
slavery men attended the ceremony. Editors. 

f J -M,".-. 


VOL. I. 6. 



VERY soon after Major Robert Anderson moved with his command into 
Fort Sumter from Fort Moultrie, Governor Francis W. Pickens sent 
James Fraser, of the Charleston Light Dragoons, to me at my plantation, 
fifty miles south of Charleston, with the request that I would assist with my 
negroes in constructing batteries on Morris Island. Taking my own negro 
men and others from the plantation of my uncle, Robert Chisolm, and that 
of Nathaniel Heyward, I was engaged in this work when General Beauregard 
arrived to take command. I then informed the governor that it would be 
necessary for General Beauregard to have an aide-de-camp who was familiar 
with the harbor and with boating; that I was the owner of a large six-oared boat 
and six superior oarsmen, that were at his service free of cost. I was thereupon 
commissioned lieutenant- colonel, and ordered to report to General Beauregard. 

Having visited Fort Sumter five times under a flag of truce, and once after 
the surrender, I became well acquainted with most of its officers. During a 
visit in company with Captain Samuel W. Ferguson, the officers jokingly 
complained of being short of cigars and like luxuries. With General Beau- 
regard's approval, the next time duty called us to the fort we presented them 
with several cases of claret and boxes of cigars. 

April 12th, 1861, I visited the fort in company with James Chesnut, Jr., 
and Captain Stephen D. Lee with the demand for its surrender, and heard 
Major Anderson say in conversation with us, "I shall await the first shot, and 
if you do not batter us to pieces we shall be starved out in a few days." These 
words being communicated to General Beauregard, we were again sent to the 
fort, arriving there about 1 : 30 a. m., April 12th. After waiting nearly two hours 
for a reply, we sent word to Major Anderson that our orders did not admit of 
our waiting any longer. He came to where we were in the guard-room, and 
informed us " that we had twice fired on his flag, and that if we did so again 
he would open his fire on our batteries." Under our instructions this reply 
admitted of no other answer than the one dated April 12th, 1861, 3 : 20 a. m. 
[see page 76], which was dictated by Chesnut, written by Lee, and copied by 
me. Roger A. Pryor was with us on the second visit, but did not enter the fort, 
giving me as a reason that his State, Virginia, had not yet seceded. For 
the same reason he declined to fire the signal shot. Moreover, I believe he 
was then a member of Congress, and may have been unwilling to compro- 
mise himself. 

The facts of the surrender of Fort Sumter to ex-Senator Wigf all are these : 
General Beauregard, seeing the fort on fire, sent me with a note to General 
James Simons, commanding on Morris Island, in which he directed him, if he 
could do so without risk to his command, to offer assistance in extinguishing 
the .fire. I passed down between Fort Sumter and our batteries ; delivering 
my dispatches, I volunteered to go to Fort Sumter, which offer was accepted. 



Colonel Wigfall, of Texas, volunteered to accompany me. While bringing my 
boat from its moorings in a creek, Wigfall, who was very much excited, 
jumped into a small skiff. The flag of the fort, which had been shot away, 
reappeared, and Wigfall was ordered to return, but he was out of hearing. I 
was ordered to return, and obeyed. Colonel Wigfall climbed through an 
embrasure, and, assuming authority from General Beauregard, called upon 
Major Anderson to surrender. Major Anderson did not realize the unauthor- 
ized nature of Wigfall's mission until the arrival of Captain Stephen D. Lee, 
William Porcher Miles, and Roger A. Pryor with an offer direct from Gen- 
eral Beauregard, similar to the one Greneral Simons was authorized to make. 
Major Anderson was about to renew the action, when Major David R. 
Jones arrived with the offer of terms for the surrender of the fort, which were 
virtually almost anything that Anderson might ask, in order that we might 
get possession before the fleet could reenforce and provision the garrison. 

I have always been of the opinion that Major Anderson should not have 
surrendered when he did. The fire only consumed the officers' and mens 
quarters; the two magazines were uninjured, only one man had been wounded, 
the walls were secure, and he still had provisions which would have sustained 
his small command until the fleet could both have provisioned and reenforced 
him. I was present with Captain Hartstene during the evacuation, and was 
astonished to see barrels of pork\ being rolled out and shipped on board the 
Isabel, the steamer furnished by General Beauregard to transport Anderson's 
men to the fleet. My duty often required that I should pass Fort Sumter 
and our guard-boats at night to visit Hartstene, who commanded the poor 
boats we used. 1 was rarely seen and had such a contempt for our guards 
that on one occasion, having a strong tide in my favor, we did not halt when 
shots were fired at us. In fact, we were seldom seen until close to the guards 
of the boat we sought. Captain Hartstene was well aware how easy it was to 
pass to Fort Sumter and expressed to me his uneasiness on this point; in fact, 
one bold officer in command of a navy barge, armed with a boat howitzer, 
could have easily cleared the way for a hundred barges with men and sup- 
plies to pass to the fort. The night but one previous to the surrender was 
very dark. I was ordered to Hartstene between the fort and the fleet in the 
main ship-channel, and my boat touched his guards before it was seen. Later 
in the war, when Beauregard defended the fort, one of the bravest officers in 
his command pronounced the work untenable. Beauregard then informed 
me that if necessary he would go there and hold the fort with his staff; that 
on no condition would he consent to give it up to General Gillmore. It was 
after this that General (then Major) Stephen Elliott made his gallant defense 
of the ruins ; when, with the exception of some guns buried under the ruins 
of the casemate facing Fort Moultrie, but one small gun remained mounted, 
and that was pointed toward the city, being used merely to fire the salutes. 

\ Captain J. G. Foster in his report says that the the fort, but with plenty of cartridges [referring to 

supply of bread in Sumter failed April 10th, and the lack of material for cartridge-bags] the men 

that the last of the damaged rice was served at would have cheerfully fought five or six days, and, 

breakfast on the 13th. " The want of provisions," if necessary, much longer, on pork alone, of which 

he adds, " would soon have caused the surrenderof we had a sufficient supply." Editors. 

IKjgrjM iilW^:?4k 




THE wonderful outburst of national feeling in the North in the spring of 
1861 has always been a thrilling and almost supernatural thing to those 
who participated in it. The classic myth that the resistless terror which some- 
times unaccountably seized upon an army was the work of the god Pan might 
seem to have its counterpart in the work of a national divinity rousing a 
whole people, not to terror, but to a sublime enthusiasm of self-devotion. 
To picture it as a whole is impossible. A new generation can only approxi- 
mate a knowledge of the "feelings of that time by studying in detail some sep- 
arate scenes of the drama that had a continent for its stage. The writer can 
only tell what happened under his eye. The like was happening everywhere 
from Maine to Kansas. What is told is simply a type of the rest, j 

On Friday, the twelfth day of April, 1861, the Senate of Ohio was in session, 
trying to go on in the ordinary routine of business, but with a sense of 
anxiety and strain which was caused by the troubled condition of national 

J In those opening days of the war, the National 
Government seemed for the moment to be subor- 
dinated to the governments of the States. A rev- 
olution in the seceding South had half destroyed 
the national legislature, and the national executive 
was left without a treasury, without an army, and 
without laws adequate to create these at once. At 
no time since the thirteen colonies declared their 
independence have the State governors and the 
State legislators found so important a field of duty 
as then. A little hesitation, a little lukewarmness, 
would have ended all. Then it was that the in- 
tense zeal and high spirit of Governor Andrew of 
Massachusetts led all New England, and was ready 
to lead the nation, as the men of Concord and Lex- 

ington had led in 1775. Then it was that Gov- 
ernor Morton of Indiana came to the front with a 
masculine energy and burly weight of character 
and of will which was typical of the force which 
the Great West could throw into the struggle. 

Ohio was so situated with regard to West Vir- 
ginia and Kentucky that the keystone of the Union 
might be said to be now west of the mountains. 
Governor Dennison mediated, like the statesman 
Le was, between East and West ; and Tod and 
Brough, following him by the will of the people 
in votes that ran up to majorities of near a hun- 
dred thousand, gave that vigorous support to Mr. 
Lincoln which showed the earnest nationality of 
the "war Democrats" of that day. J. D. C. 



affairs. The passage of " ordinances of secession" by one after another of the 
Southern States, and even the assembling of a provisional Confederate govern- 
ment at Montgomery, had not wholly destroyed the hope that some peaceful 
way out of our troubles would be found ; yet the gathering of an army on the 
sands opposite Fort Sumter was really war, and if a hostile gun were fired, we 
knew it would mean the end of all effort at arrangement. Hoping almost 
against hope that blood would not be shed, and that the pageant of military 
array and of a secession government would pass by, we tried to give our 
thoughts to business; but there was no heart in it, and the "morning 
hour " lagged, for we could not work in earnest, and we were unwilling to 

Suddenly a senator came in from the lobby in an excited way, and, catch- 
ing the chairman's eye, exclaimed, "Mr. President, the telegraph announces that 
the secessionists are bombarding Fort Sumter ! " There was a solemn and 
painful hush, but it was broken in a moment by a woman's shrill voice from 
the spectators' seats, crying, " Glory to God ! " It startled every one, almost 
as if the enemy were in the midst. But it was the voice of a radical friend of 
the slave, Abby Kelly Foster, who, after a lifetime of public agitation, believed 
that only through blood could his freedom be won, and who had shouted the 
fierce cry of joy that the question had been submitted to the decision of the 
sword. With most of us, the gloomy thought that civil war had begun in 
our own land overshadowed everything else ; this seemed too great a price 
to pay for any good, a scourge to be borne only in preference to yielding 
what was to us the very groundwork of our republicanism, the right to 
enforce a fair interpretation of the Constitution through the election of 
President and Congress. 

The next day we learned that Major Anderson had surrendered, and the 
telegraphic news from all the Northern States showed plain evidence of a 
popular outburst of loyalty to the Union, following a brief moment of dis- 
may. That was the period when the flag The Flag flew out to the 
wind from every housetop in our great cities, and when, in New York, 
wildly excited crowds marched the streets demanding that the suspected 
or the lukewarm should show the symbol of nationality as a committal to 
the country's cause. He that is not for us is against us, was the deep, 
instinctive feeling. 

Judge Thomas M. Key of Cincinnati,^ chairman of the Judiciary Com- 
mittee, was the recognized leader of the Democratic party in the Senate, and 
at an early hour moved an adjournment to the following Tuesday, in order, 
as he said, that the senators might have the opportunity to go home and 
consult their constituents in the perilous crisis of public affairs. No objec- 
tion was made to the adjournment, and the representatives took a similar 
recess. All were in a state of most anxious suspense, the Republicans to 
know what initiative the Administration at Washington would take, and 
the Democrats to determine what course they should follow if the President 
should call for troops to put down the insurrection. 

% Afterward aide-de-camp and acting judge-advocate on General McClellan's staff. 


Before we met again, Mr. Lincoln's proclamation and call for 75,000 men for 
three months' service had been issued, and the great mass of the people of the 
North, forgetting all party distinctions, answered with an enthusiasm that 
swept politicians off their feet. When we met again on Tuesday morning, 
Judge Key, taking my arm and pacing the floor outside the railing, broke out 
impetuously, "Mr. Cox, the people have gone stark mad!" "I knew they 
would if a blow were struck against the flag," said I, reminding him of some 
previous conversations we had had on the subject. He, with most of the poli- 
ticians of the day, partly by sympathy with the overwhelming current of 
public opinion, and partly by the reaction of their own hearts against the 
theories which had encouraged the secessionists, determined to support the 
war measures of the Government and to make no factious opposition to 
such State legislation as might be necessary to sustain the Federal 

The attitude of Mr. Key is only a type of many others, and marks one of 
the most striking features of the time. On the 8th of January the usual 
Democratic convention and celebration of the battle of New Orleans had 
taken place, and a series of resolutions had been passed, in which, professing 
to speak in the name of " 200,000 Democrats of Ohio," the convention had 
very significantly intimated that this vast organization of men would be found 
in the way of any attempt to put down secession until the demands of the 
South in respect to slavery were complied with. A few da} 7 s afterward I was 
returning to Columbus from my home in Trumbull county, and meeting upon 
the railway train with David Tod, then an active Democratic politician, but 
afterward one of our loyal u war governors," the conversation turned on the 
action of the convention which had just adjourned. Mr. Tod and I were per- 
sonal friends and neighbors, and I freely expressed my surprise that the con- 
vention should have committed itself to what must be interpreted as a threat 
of insurrection in the North, if the Administration should, in o]3posing seces- 
sion by force, follow the example of Andrew Jackson, in whose honor they had 
assembled. He rather vehemently reasserted the substance of the resolution, 
saying that we Eepublicans would find the 200,000 Ohio Democrats in front 
of us, if we attempted to cross the Ohio River. My answer was, " We will give 
up the contest if we cannot carry your 200,000 over the heads of you leaders." 

The result proved how hollow the party assertions had been, or, perhaps, I 
should say, how superficial was the hold of such doctrines upon the mass of 
men in a great political organization. At the first shot from Beauregard's 
guns in Charleston Harbor these men crowded to the recruiting stations to 
enlist for the defense of the national flag and the national union. It was a 
popular torrent which no leaders could resist ; but many of these should be 
credited with the same patriotic impulse, and it made them nobly oblivious 
of party consistency. A few days after the surrender of Sumter, Stephen A. 
Douglas passed through Columbus on his way to Washington, and, in response 
to the calls of a spontaneous gathering of people, spoke to them from the win- 
dow of his bedroom in the hotel. There had been no thought for any of the 
common surroundings of a public meeting. There were no torches, no music. 



A dark mass of men filled full the dimly lit street, and called for Douglas 
with an earnestness of tone wholly different from the enthusiasm of common 
political gatherings. He came half-dressed to his window, and, without any 
light near him, spoke solemnly to the people upon the terrible crisis which 
had come upon the nation. Men of all parties were there : his own followers 
to get some light as to their duty ; the Breckinridge Democrats ready, most of 
them, repentantly to follow a Northern leader now that their Southern asso- 
ciates were in armed opposition to the Government ; the Republicans eager to 
know whether so potent an influence was to be unreservedly on the side of the 
nation. I remember well the serious solicitude with which I listened to his open- 
ing sentences as I leaned against the railing of the State House park, trying 
in vain to see more than a dim outline of the man as he stood at the unlighted 
window. His deep, sonorous tones rolled down through the darkness from 
above us, an earnest, measured voice, the more solemn, the more impressive, 
because we could not see the speaker, and it came to us literally as " a voice 
in the night," the night of our country's unspeakable trial. There was no 
uncertainty in his tone ; the Union must be preserved and the insurrection must 
be crushed ; he pledged his hearty support to Mr. Lincoln's administration in 
doing this ; other questions must stand 
aside till the national authority should 
be everywhere recognized. I do not 
think we greatly cheered him, it was, 
rather, a deep Amen that went up 
from the crowd. We went home 
breathing more freely in the assur- 
ance we now felt that, for a time at 
least, no organized opposition to the 
Federal Government and its policy of 
coercion could be formidable in the 

Yet the situation hung upon us like 
a nightmare. Garfield and I were lodg- 
ing together at the time, our wives 
being kept at home by family cares, 
and when we reached our sitting- 
room, after an evening session of the 
Senate, we often found ourselves in- 
voluntarily groaning, " Civil war in 
our land ! " The shame, the folly, the 
outrage, seemed too great to believe, 
and we half hoped to wake from it as 
from a dream. Among the painful remembrances of those days is the ever- 
present weight at the heart which never left me till I found relief in the 
active duties of camp life at the close of the month. I went about my 
duties (and I am sure most of those with whom I associated did the same) with 
the half -choking sense of a grief I dared not think of: like one who is 











fflHI 111 iffilif 



dragging himself to the ordinary labors of life from some terrible and 
recent bereavement. 

We talked of onr personal dnty, and though both Garfield and myself had 
young families, we were agreed that onr activity in the organization and sup- 
port of the Republican party made the duty of supporting the Government 
by military service come peculiarly home to us. He was, for the moment, 
somewhat trammeled by his half-clerical position, but he very soon cut the 
knot. My own path seemed unmistakably plain. He, more careful for his 
friend than for himself, urged upon me his doubts whether my physical 
strength was equal to the strain that would be put upon it. " I," said he, " am 
big and strong, and if my relations to the church and the college can be 
loosened, I shall have no excuse for not enlisting ; but you are slender and 


will break clown." It is true I then looked slender for a man six feet high ; 
yet I had confidence in the elasticity of my constitution, and the result justi- 
fied me, while it also showed how liable one is to mistake in such things. 
Garfield found that he had a tendency to weakness of the alimentary system, 
which broke him down on every campaign in which he served, and led to his 
retiring from the army at the close of 1863. My own health, on the other 
hand, was strengthened by outdoor life and exposure, and I served to the 
end with growing physical vigor. 

AVhen Mr. Lincoln issued his first call for troops, the existing laws made it 
necessary that these should be fully organized and offieerefl by the several 
States. Then, the treasury was in no condition to bear tlie burden of war 
expenditures, and, till Congress could assemble, the President was forced to 
rely on the States for means to equip and transport their own men. This 
threw upon the governors and legislatures of the loyal States responsibilities 
of a kind wholly unprecedented. A long period of profound peace had 
made every military organization seem almost farcical. A few inde- 
pendent companies formed the merest shadow of an army, and the State 
militia proper was only a nominal thing. It happened, however, that I held 
a commission as brigadier in this State militia, and my intimacy with 
Governor Dennison led him to call upon me for such assistance as I could 
render in the first enrollment and organization of the Ohio quota. Arrang- 
ing to be called to the Senate chamber when my vote might be needed, I 
gave my time chiefly to such military matters as the governor appointed. 
Although, as I have said, my military commission had been a nominal thing, 
and in fact I had never worn a uniform, I had not wholly neglected theoretic 
preparation for such work. For some years, the possibility of a war of seces- 
sion had been one of the things which were forced upon the thoughts of 
reflecting people, and I had given some careful study to such books of tactics 
and of strategy as were within easy reach. I had especially been led to read 
military history with critical care, and had carried away many valuable ideas 
from that most useful means of military education. I had, therefore, some 
notion of the work before us, and could approach its problems with less loss 
of time, at least, than if I had been wholly ignorant. 

My commission as brigadier-general in the Ohio quota in national service 
was dated the 23d of April. Just about the same time Captain George B. 
McClellan was requested by Governor Dennison to come to Columbus for 
consultation, and, by the governor's request, I met him at the railway station 
and took him to the State House. I think Mr. Lars Anderson (brother of 
Major Robert Anderson) and Mr. L'Hommedieu of Cincinnati were with 
him. The intimation had been given me that he would probably be made 
major-general of the Ohio contingent, and this, naturally, made me scan 
him closely. He w r as rather under the medium height, but inuscularly 
formed, with broad shoulders and a well-poised head, active and graceful in 
motion. His Whole appearance was quiet and modest, but when drawn out 
he showed no lack of confidence in himself. He was dressed in a plain 
traveling dress and wore a narrow-rimmed soft felt hat. In short, he seemed 


what he was, a railway superintendent in his business clothes. At the time, 
his name was a good deal associated with Beauregard's, and they were spoken 
of as young men of similar standing in the engineer corps of the army, and 
great things were expected of them both because of their scientific knowledge 
of their profession, though McClellan had been in civil life for some years. 
McClellan's report on the Crimean war was one of the few important 
memoirs our old army had produced, and was valuable enough to give a just 
reputation for comprehensive understanding of military organization, and 
the promise of ability to conduct the operations of an army. 

I was present at the interview which the governor had with him. The des- 
titution of the State of everything like military material and equipment was 
very plainly put, and the magnitude of the task of building up a small army 
out of nothing was not blinked. The governor spoke of the embarrassment 
he felt at every step from the lack of practical military experience in his staff, 
and of his desire to have some one on whom he could properly throw the 
details of military work. McClellan showed that he fully understood the 
difficulties there would be before him, and said no man could wholly master 
them at once, although he had confidence that if a few weeks' time for prepara- 
tion were given, he would be able to put the Ohio division into reasonable form 
for taking the field. The command was then formally tendered and accepted. 
All of us who were present felt that the selection was one full of promise and 
hope, and that the governor had done the wisest thing practicable at the time. 

The next morning McClellan requested me to accompany him to the State 
arsenal, to see what arms and material might be there. We found a few boxes 
of smooth-bore muskets which had once been issued to militia companies and 
had been returned rusted and damaged. No belts, cartridge-boxes, or other 
accouterments were with them. There were two or three smooth-bore brass 
field-pieces, 6-pouuders, which had been honey-combed by firing salutes, and 
of which the vents had been worn out, bushed, and worn out again. In a heap 
in one corner lay a confused pile of mildewed harness which had been once 
used for artillery horses, but was now not worth carrying away. There had 
for many years been no money appropriated to buy military material or even 
to protect the little the State had. The Federal Government had occasionally 
distributed some arms which were in the iiands of the independent uniformed 
militia, and the arsenal was simply an empty store-house. It did not take 
long to complete our inspection. At the door, as we were leaving the build- 
ing, McClellan turned, and, looking back into its emptiness, remarked, half 
humorously and half sadly, "A fine stock of munitions on which to begin a 
great war ! " 

We went back to the State House where a room was assigned us, and we 
sat down to work. The first task was to make out detailed schedules and 
estimates of what would be needed to equip ten thousand men for the field. 
This was a unit which could be used by the governor and Legislature in esti- 
mating the appropriations needed then or subsequently. Intervals in this 
labor were used in discussing the general situation and plans of campaign. 
Before the close of the week McClellan drew up a paper embodying his own 


views, and forwarded it to Lieutenant-General Scott. He read it to me, and 
my recollection of it is that he suggested two principal lines of movement 
in the West : one to move eastward by the Kanawha Valley with a heavy 
column to cooperate with an army in front of Washington; the other to 
march directly southward and to open the Valley of the Mississippi. Scott's 
answer was appreciative and flattering, without distinctly approving his plan, 
and I have never donbted that the paper prepared the way for his appoint- 
ment in the regular army, which followed at an early day.j 

But in trying to give a connected idea of the first military organization of 
the State, I have outrun some incidents of those days which are worth recol- 
lection. From the hour the call for troops was published, enlistments began, 
and recruits were parading the streets continually. At the capitol the rest- 
less impulse to be doing something military seized even upon the members 
of the Legislature, and a good many of them assembled every evening upon 
the east terrace of the State House to be drilled in marching and facing by 
one or two of their own number who had some knowledge of company tac- 
tics. Most of the uniformed independent companies in the cities of the State 
immediately tendered their services and began to recruit their numbers to the 
hundred men required for acceptance. There was no time to procure uni- 
forms, nor was it desirable ; for these companies had chosen their own, and 
would have to change it for that of the United States as soon as this could 
be furnished. For some days companies could be seen marching and drilling, 
of which part would be uniformed in some gaudy style such as is apt to pre- 
vail in holiday parades in time of peace, while another part would be dressed 
in the ordinary working garb of citizens of all degrees. The uniformed files 
would also be armed and accoutered, the others would be without arms or 
equipments, and as awkward a squad as could well be imagined. The mate- 
rial, however, was magnificent and soon began to take shape. The fancy 
uniforms were left at home, and some approximation to a simple and useful 
costume was made. The recent popular outburst in Italy furnished a useful 
idea, and the " Garibaldi uniform " of a red flannel shirt with broad falling 
collar, with blue trousers held by a leathern waist-belt, and a soft felt hat for 
the head, was extensively copied and served an excellent purpose. It could 
be made by the wives and sisters at home, and was all the more acceptable 
for that. The spring was opening and a heavy coat would not be much 
needed, so that with some sort of overcoat and a good blanket in an impro- 
vised knapsack, the new company was not badly provided. The warm scar- 
let color reflected from their enthusiastic faces as they stood in line made a 
picture that never failed to impress the mustering officers with the splendid 
character of the men. 

The officering of these new troops was a difficult and delicate task, and, so 
far as company officers were concerned, there seemed no better way at the 
beginning than to let the enlisted men elect their own, as was in fact done. 
In most cases where entirely new companies were raised, it had been by the 

1 Scott's answer was dated May 3d, and is given by General E. D. Townsend (then on Scott's staff), 
in his "Anecdotes of the Civil War." 

9 2 



enthusiastic efforts of some energetic volunteers who were naturally made the 
commissioned officers. But not always. There were numerous examples of 
self-denial by men who remained in the ranks after expending much labor 
and money in recruiting, modestly refusing the honors, and giving way to some 
one supposed to have military knowledge or experience. The war in Mexico 
in 1846-7 had been our latest conflict with a civilized people, and to have served 
in it was a sure passport to confidence. It had often been a service more in 
name than in fact ; but the young volunteers felt so deeply their own igno- 
rance that they were ready to yield to any pretense of superior knowledge, 
and generously to trust themselves to any one who would offer to lead them. 
Hosts of charlatans and incompetents were thus put into responsible places at 


the beginning, but the sifting work went on fast after the troops were once 
in the field. The election of field-officers, however, ought not to have been 
allowed. Companies were necessarily regimented together of which each 
could have little personal knowledge of the officers of the others ; intrigue 
and demagogy soon came into play, and almost fatal mistakes were made in 
selection. The evil worked its cure, but the ill effects of it were long visible. 

The immediate need of troops to protect Washington caused most of the 
uniformed companies to be united into the first two regiments, which were 
quickly dispatched to the East. These off, companies began to stream in from 
all parts of the State. On their first arrival they were quartered wherever 
shelter could be had, as there were no tents or sheds to make a camp for them. 
G-oing to my evening work at the State House, as I crossed the rotunda I saw 
a company inarching in by the south door, and another disposing itself for 
the night upon the marble pavement near the east entrance ; as I passed on to 
the north hall, I saw another that had come a little earlier holding a prayer- 
meeting, the stone arches echoing with the excited supplications of some one 
who was borne out of himself by the terrible pressure of events around him, 
while, mingling with his pathetic, beseeching tones as he prayed for his country, 
came the shrill notes of the fife and the thundering din of the ubiquitous 
bass-drum from the company marching in on the other side. In the Senate 
chamber a company was quartered, and the senators were supplying them 
with paper and pens with which " the boys " were writing their farewells to 
mothers and sweethearts, whom they hardly dared hope they should see 
again. A similar scene was going on in the Representatives' hall, another in 
the Supreme Court-room. In the executive office sat the governor, the 
unwonted noises, when the door was opened, breaking in on the quiet, business- 
like air of the room, he meanwhile dictating dispatches, indicating answers 
to others, receiving committees of citizens, giving directions to officers of com- 
panies and regiments, accommodating himself to the willful democracy of our 
institutions which insists upon seeing the man in chief command, and will not 
take its answer from a subordinate, until in the small hours of the night the 
noises were hushed, and after a brief hour of effective, undisturbed work upon 
the matters of chief importance, he could leave the glare of his gas-lighted 
office and seek a few hoius' rest, only to renew his wearing labors on the 

On the streets the excitement was of a rougher if not more intense charac- 
ter. A minority of unthinking partisans could not understand the strength 
and sweep of the great popular movement, and would sometimes venture to 
speak out their sympathy with the rebellion, or their sneers at some party 
friend who had enlisted. In the boiling temper of the time the quick answer 
was a blow ; and it was one of the common incidents of the day for those who 
came into the State House to tell of a knock-down that had occurred here or 
there, when this popular punishment had been administered to some indis- 
creet " rebel-sympathizer." 

Various duties brought young army officers of the regular service to the 
State capital, and others sought a brief leave of absence to come and offer 


their services to the governor of their native State. Greneral Scott had 
planted himself firmly on the theory that the regular army must be the prin- 
cipal reliance for severe work, and that the volunteers could only be auxilia- 
ries around this solid nucleus which would show them the way to perform 
their duty, and take the brunt of every encounter. The young regulars who 
asked leave to accept commissions in State regiments were therefore refused, 
and were ordered to their own subaltern positions and posts. There can be 
no doubt that the true policy would have been to encourage the whole of this 
younger class to enter at once the volunteer service. They would have been 
field-officers in the new regiments, and would have impressed discipline and 
system upon the organization from the beginning. The Confederates really 
profited by having no regular army. They gave to the officers who left our 
service, it is true, commissions in their so-called "provisional" army, to 
encourage them to expect permanent military positions if the war should end 
in the independence of the South ; but this was only a nominal organization, 
and their real army was made up (as ours turned out practically to be) from the 
regiments of State volunteers. Less than a year afterward we changed our pol- 
icy, but it was then too late to induce many of the regular officers to take regi- 
mental positions in the volunteer troops. I hesitate to declare that this was 
not, after all, for the best ; for, although the organization of our army would 
have been more rapidly perfected, there are other considerations which have 
much weight. The army would not have been the popular thing it was, its 
close identification with the people's movement would have been weakened, 
and it, perhaps, would not so readily have melted again into the mass of the 
nation at the close of the war. 

On the 29th of April I was ordered by McClellan to proceed next morning 
to Camp Dennison, near Cincinnati, where he had fixed the site for a per- 
manent camp of instruction. I took with me one full regiment and half of 
another. The day was a fair one, and when about noon our railway train 
reached the camping ground, it seemed an excellent place for our work. The 
drawback was that the land was planted in wheat and corn, instead of being 
meadow or pasture land. Captain Rosecrans (later the well-known general) 
met us as McClellan's engineer officer, coming from Cincinnati with a train- 
load of lumber. With his compass and chain, and by the help of a small 
detail of men, he soon laid off the two regimental camps, and the general 
lines of the whole encampment for a dozen regiments. The men of the 
regiments shouldered the pine boards, and carried them up to the lines of the 
company streets which were close to the hills skirting the valley, and which 
opened into the parade and drill ground along the railway. Vigorous work 
housed all the men before night, and it was well that it did so, for the weather 
changed in the evening, a cold rain came on, and the next morning was a chill 
and dreary one. My own headquarters were in a little brick school-house of one 
story, and with a single aide (my only staff-officer) we bestowed ourselves for 
the night in the little spaces between the pupils' desks and the teacher's pulpit. 
The windy, cheerless night was a long one, but gave place at last to a fickle, 
changeable day of drifting showers and occasional sunshine, and we were 


roused by our first reveille iu camp. A breakfast was made from some 
cooked provisious brought with us, and we resumed the duty of organizing 
and instructing the camp. With the vigorous outdoor life and the full 
physical and mental employment, the depression which had weighed upon 
me since the news of the guns at Sumter passed away, never to return. 

New battalions arrived from day to day, the cantonments were built by 
themselves, like the first, and the business of instruction and drill was systema- 
tized. The men were not yet armed, so there was no temptation to begin too 
soon with the manual of the musket, and they were kept industriously employed 
in marching in single line, by file, in changing direction, in forming column of 
fours from double line, etc., before their guns were put into their hands. Each 
regiment was treated as a separate camp with its own chain of sentinels, and 
the officers of the guard were constantly busy inspecting the sentinels on post 
and teaching guard and picket duty theoretically to the reliefs oft* duty. Schools 
were established in each regiment for field and staff as well as for company 
officers, and Hardee's " Tactics " was in the hands of everybody who could pro- 
cure a copy. One of the proofs of the unprecedented scale of our war prepara- 
tion is found in the fact that the supply of the authorized " Tactics " was soon 
exhausted, making it difficult to get the means of instruction in the company 
schools. The arriving regiments sometimes had their first taste of camp life 
under circumstances well calculated to dampen then ardor. The 4th Ohio, under 
Colonel Lorin Andrews, president of Kenyon College, came just before a thunder- 
storm one evening, and the bivouac that night was as rough a one as his men 
were likely to experience for many a day. They made shelter by placing boards 
from the fence-tops to the ground, but the fields were level and soon became a 
mire under the pouring rain, so that they were a queer-looking lot when they 
crawled out in the morning. The sun was then shining bright, however, and 
they had better cover for their heads by the next night. The 7th Ohio, 
which was recruited in Cleveland and on the "Western Reserve," sent a 
party in advance to build some of their huts, and though they too came 
in a rain-storm, they were less uncomfortable than some of the others. 
In the course of a fortnight all the regiments of the Ohio contingent were 
in the camp, except the two that had been hurried to Washington. They 
were organized into three brigades. The brigadiers, besides myself, were 
Generals J. H. Bates and Newton Schleich. General Bates, who was the 
senior, and as such assumed command of the camp in McClellan's absence, 
was a graduate of West Point who had served some years in the regular 
army, but had resigned and adopted the profession of law. General Schleich 
was a Democratic senator, who had been in the State militia, and had been 
one of the drill-masters of the Legislative Squad, which had chilled upon the 
Capitol terrace. McClellan had intended to make his own headquarters in 
the camp ; but the convenience of attending to official business in Cincinnati 
kept him in the city. His purpose was to make the brigade organizations 
permanent, and to take them as a division to the field when they were a little 
prepared for the work. Like many other good plans, it failed to be carried 
out. I was the only one of the brigadiers who remained in the service after 


the first enlistment for ninety clays, and it was my fate to take the field with 
new regiments, only one of which had been in my brigade in camp. After 
General Bates's arrival my own lint was built on the slope of the hillside 
behind my brigade, close under the wooded ridge, and here for the next six 
weeks was my home. The morning brought its hour of business correspond- 
ence relating to the command ; then came the drill, when the parade ground 
was full of marching companies and squads. Officers' drill followed, with 
sword exercise and pistol practice, and the evening was allotted to schools of 
theoretic tactics, outpost duty, and the like. 

The first fortnight in cam}3 was the hardest for the troops. The plowed 
fields became deep with mud which nothing could remove till steady good 
weather should allow them to be packed hard under the continued tramp of 
thousands of men. The organization of camp-kitchens had to be learned by 
the hardest experience also, and the men who had some aptitude for cook- 
ing had to be found by a slow process of natural selection, during which 
many an unpalatable meal had to be eaten. A disagreeable bit of informa- 
tion soon came to us in the proof that more than half the men had never had 
the contagious diseases of infancy. The measles broke out, and we had to 
organize a camp-hospital at once. A large barn near by was taken for this 
purpose, and the surgeons had their hands full of cases, which, however triv- 
ial they might seem at home, were here aggravated into dangerous illness by 
the unwonted surroundings, and the impossibility of securing the needed pro- 
tection from exposure. The good women of Cincinnati took promptly in 
hand the task of providing nurses for the sick and proper diet and delicacies 
for hospital use. The Sisters of Charity, under the lead of Sister Anthony, a 
noble woman, came out in force, and their black and white robes harmonized 
picturesquely with the military surroundings, as they flitted about under the 
rough timber framing of the old barn, carrying comfort and hope from one 
rude couch to another. 

As to supplies, hardly a man in a regiment knew how to make out a requi- 
sition for rations or for clothing, and, easy as it is to rail at " red-tape," the 
necessity of keeping a check upon embezzlement and wastefulness justified 
the staff-bureaus at Washington in insisting upon regular vouchers to support 
the quartermasters' and commissaries' accounts. But here, too, men were 
gradually found who had special talent for the work. Where everybody had 
to learn a new business, it would have been miraculous if grave errors had not 
frequently occurred. Looking back at it, the wonder is that the blunders and 
mishaps had not been tenfold more numerous than they were. 

By the middle of May the confusion had given way to reasonable system, 
but we now were obliged to meet the embarrassments of reorganization for three 
years, under the President's second call for troops (May 3d). In every company 
some discontented spirits wanted to go home, and, to avoid the odium of 
going alone, they became mischief-makers, seeking to prevent the whole com- 
pany from reenlisting. The growing discipline was relaxed or lost in the solici- 
tations, the electioneering, the speech-making, and the other common ar 
persuasion. In spite of all these discouragements, however, the daily d 



and instruction went on with some approach to regularity, and our raw 
volunteers began to look more like soldiers. Captain Gordon Granger, of the 
regular army, came to muster the reenlisted regiments into the three-years 
service, and as he stood at the right of the 4th Ohio, looking down the line of 
a thousand stalwart men, all in their Garibaldi shirts (for we had not yet got 
our uniforms), he turned to me and exclaimed, "My God! that such men 

should be food for powder ! " It certainly 
was a display of manliness and intelli- 
gence such as had hardly ever been seen 
in the ranks of an army. There were in 
camp at that time, three if not four com- 
panies in different regiments that were 
wholly made up of under-graduates of 
colleges, who had enlisted together, their 
officers being their tutors and professors. 
And where there was not so striking evi- 
dence as this of the enlistment of the best 
of our youth, every company could still 
show that it was largely recruited from 
the best nurtured and most promising 
young men of the community. 

Granger had been in the South-west 
when the secession movement began, and 
had seen the formation of military compa- 
nies everywhere, and the incessant drill- 
ing which had been going on all winter ; 
while we, in a strange condition of political paralysis, had been doing nothing. 
His information was eagerly sought by us all, and he lost no opportunity of 
impressing upon us the fact that the South was nearly six months ahead of us 
in organization and preparation. He did not conceal his belief that we were 
likely to find the war a much longer and more serious piece of business than 
was commonly expected, and that, unless we pushed hard our drilling and 
instruction, we should find ourselves at a disadvantage in our earlier encoun- 
ters. What he said had a. good effect in making officers and men take more 
willingly to the laborious routine of the parade ground and the regimental 
school ; for such opinions as his soon ran through a camp, and they were com- 
mented upon by the enlisted men quite as earnestly as among the officers. 
Still, hope kept the upper hand, and I believe that three-fourths of us still 
cherished the belief that a single campaign would end the war. 

Though most of our men were native Ohioans, we had in camp two 
regiments made up of other material. The 9th Ohio was recruited 
from the Germans of Cincinnati, and was commanded by Colonel Robert 
McCook. In camp, the drilling of the regiment fell almost completely into 
the hands of the adjutant, Lieutenant August Willich (afterward a general of 
division), and McCook, who humorously exaggerated his own lack of military 
knowledge, used to say that he was only " clerk for a thousand Dutchmen," so 


VOL. I. 7 

9 8 


completely did the care of equipping and providing for his regiment engross 
his time and labor. The 10th Ohio was an Irish regiment, also from Cincin- 
nati, and its men were proud to call themselves the " Bloody Tinth." The 
brilliant Lytle was its commander, and his control over them, even in the 
beginning of their service and near the city of their home, showed that they 
had fallen into competent hands. It happened, of course, that the guard- 
house pretty frequently contained representatives of the 10th, who, on the 
short furloughs that were allowed them, took a parting glass too many with 
their friends in the city, and came to camp boisterously drunk. But the men 
of the regiment got it into their heads that the 13th, which lay just opposite 
them across the railroad, took a malicious pleasure in filling the guard-house 
with the Irishmen. Some threats had been made that they would go over 
and " clean out " the 13th, and one fine evening these came to a head. I sud- 
denly got orders from General Bates to form my brigade and march them at 
once between the 10th and 13th to prevent a collision that seemed imminent. 
The long-roll was beaten as if the drummers realized the full importance of 
the first opportunity to sound that warlike signal. t We marched by the moon- 
light into the space between the belligerent regiments ; but Lytle already had 
got his own men under control, and the less mercurial 13th were not disposed 
to be aggressive, so that we were soon dismissed, with a compliment for our 

The six weeks of our stay in Camp Dennison seem like months in the retro- 
spect, so full were they crowded with new experiences. The change came in 
an unexpected way. The initiative taken by the Confederates in West Vir- 
ginia had to be met by prompt action, and McClellan was forced to drop his 
own plans and meet the exigency. The organization and equipment of the 
regiments for the three-years service was still incomplete, and the brigades 
were broken up, to take across the Ohio the regiments best prepared to go. 
This was discouraging to a brigade commander, for, even with veteran troops, 
acquaintanceship between the officer and his command is a necessary condition 
of confidence and a most important element of strength. My own assign- 
ment to the Great Kanawha district was one I had every reason to be content 
with, except that for several months I felt the disadvantage I suffered from 
having command of troops which I had never seen till we met in the field. 


SiS^L. li^L 

v ;___ _ __ 




TWENTY-SIX years have passed since the delegates of six States of the 
South that had seceded from the Union met in a convention or Pro- 
visional Congress, at the Capitol, at Montgomery, Alabama. Twenty-one 
years have elapsed since the close of the war between the States of the North 
and the eleven States of the South that entered the Confederate Govern- 
ment then and there organized. Most of the men who participated in the 
deliberations of that convention are dead, and the few now left will before 
long be laid away. Of the debates of that body there is no record, and the 
proceedings in secret session have never been published. In Washington 
the proceedings of the Congress of the United States were open, and at 
the North there was an intelligent, well-informed, powerful public opinion 
throughout the war. Not so at the South. Secret sessions were commenced 
at Montgomery, and at Richmond almost all important business was trans- 
acted away from the knowledge and thus beyond the criticism of the people. 
Latterly, accounts of the battles fought have been written from every stand- 
point ; but of the course and policy of the Confederate Government, which 
held in its hands all the resources of the Southern people, and directed their 
affairs, diplomatic, financial, naval, and military, little has been said. During 
the war scarcely anything was known except results, and when the war ter- 
minated, the people of the South, though greatly dissatisfied, were generally 
as ignorant of the management of Confederate affairs as the people of the 
North. The arrest and long imprisonment of the President of the Confed- 
eracy made of him a representative martyr, and silenced the voice of criticism 
at the South. And up to this time little has been done to point out the 
causes of the events which occurred, or to develop the truth of history in this 
direction. It very well suits men at the South who opposed secession to com- 
pliment their own sagacity by assuming that the end was inevitable. Nor 
do men identified with the Confederacy by office, or feeling obligation for its 
appreciation of their personal merits, find it hard to persuade themselves 
that all was done that could be done in " the lost cause." And, in general, 




it may be an agreeable sop to Southern pride to take for granted that supe- 
rior numbers alone effected the result. Yet, in the great wars of the world, 
nothing is so little proved as that the more numerous always and necessarily 
prevail. On the contrary, the facts of history show that brains have ever 

been more potent than brawn. 
The career of the Confederate 
States exhibits no exception to 
this rule. Eliminate the good 
sense and unselfish earnestness of 
Mr. Lincoln, and the great ability 
and practical energy of Seward 
and Adams, and of Stanton and 
Chase from the control of the 
affairs of the United States; con- 
ceive a management of third-rate 
and incompetent men in their 
places will any one doubt that 
matters would have ended differ- 
ently ? To many it may be unpal- 
atable to hear that at the South all 
was not done that might have been 
done and that cardinal blunders 
were made. But what is pleasing 
is not always true, and there can be 
no good excuse now for suppress- 
ing important facts or perverting 
history. The time has come when 
public attention may with pro- 
priety be directed to the realities of that momentous period at the South. 

On the 20th of December, 1860, South Carolina passed unanimously the first 
ordinance of secession, in these words : 

" We, the people of the State of South Carolina in convention assembled, do declare and 
ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained, that the ordinance adopted by us in convention 
on the twenty-third day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty- 
eight, whereby the Constitution of the United States of America was ratified, and also, all 
Acts and parts of Acts of the General Assembly of this State, ratifying amendments of the said 
Constitution, are hereby repealed ; and that the Union now subsisting between South Carolina 
and other States, under the name of ' the United States of America,' is hereby dissolved." 

On her invitation, six other Southern States sent delegates to a conven- 
tion in Montgomery, Alabama, for the purpose of organizing a Confederacy. 
On the 4th of February, 1861, this convention assembled. The material 
which constituted it was of a mixed character. There were members who 
were constitutionally timid and unfit by character and temperament to par- 
ticipate in such work as was on hand. Others had little knowledge of public 
affairs on a large scale, and had studied neither the resources of the South 
nor the conduct of the movement. A number of them, however, were men of 




ripe experience and statesmanlike grasp of the situation men of large 
knowledge, with calm, strong, clear views of the policies to be pursued. 
Alexander H. Stephens characterized this convention as " the ablest body 
with which he ever served, and singularly free from revolutionary spirit." J 

In the organization of the convention, Howell Cobb was chosen to preside, 
and J. J. Hooper, of Montgomery, to act as secretary. It was decided to 
organize a provisional government under a provisional constitution, which 
was adopted on the 8th of February. On the 9th a provisional President 
and Vice-President were elected, who were installed in office on the 18th 
t< > carry the government into effect. In regard to this election, it was agreed 
that when four delegations out of the six should settle upon men, the elec- 
tion should take place. Jef- 
ferson Davis was put forward 
by the Mississippi delega- 
tion and Howell Cobb by 
that of Georgia. The Florida 
delegation proposed to vote for 
whomsoever South Carolina 
should support. The South 
Carolina delegation offered no 
candidate and held no meet- 
ing to confer upon the matter. 
The 1 chairman, Mr. R. Barn- 
well Rhett, % did not call them 
together. Mr. Barnwell, how- 
ever, was an active supporter 
of Mr. Davis, and it was af- 
terward said that while in 
Washington in December, as 
a commissioner to treat for 
the evacuation of Fort Sum- 
ter, he had committed himself 
to Mr. Davis. At any rate, he 
was zealous. Colonel Keitt 
afterward stated to the writer 
and others in Charleston that 




J The deputies elected to meet at the Mont- 
gomery convention were: South Carolina, E. 
Barnwell Rhett, Lawrence M. Keitt, ( '. Gr. Mem- 
minger, Thomas J. Withers, Robert W. Barnwell, 
James Chesnut, Jr., W. Porcher Miles, and Will- 
iam W. Boyce; Florida, Jackson Morton, James 
B. Owens, and J. Patton Anderson; Mississippi, 
Wiley P. Harris, W. S. Wilson, Walker Brooke, 
Alexander M. Clayton, James T. Harrison, William 
S. Barry, and J. A. P. Campbell ; Alabama, 
Richard W. Walker, Colin J. McRae, William P. 
Chilton, David P. Lewis, Robert H. Smith, John 
Oill Shorter, Stephen F. Hale, Thomas Fearn, and 

Jabez L. M. Curry; Georgia, Robert Toombs, 
Martin J. Crawford, Benjamin H. Hill, Augustus 
R. Wright, Augustus H. Kenan, Francis S. Bar- 
tow, Eugenius A. Nisbet, Howell Cobb, Thomas R. 
R. Cobb, and Alexander H. Stephens ; Louisiana, 
John Perkins, Jr., Charles M. Conrad, Edward 
Sparrow, Alexander De Clouet, Duncan F. Keu- 
ner, and Henry Marshall. The Texas delegates 
were not appointed until February 14th. 

These delegates had been appointed by the con- 
ventions of their respective States on the ground 
that the people had intrusted the State conven- 
tions with unlimited powers. They constituted 

% Father of the writer. Editors. 



a majority of the delegation were opposed to Mr. Davis, but that, not having 
compared opinions, they did not understand one another, and that Mr. Davis 
received the vote of South Carolina, and was elected, by the casting vote of 
Mr. Rhett. Personally Mr. Rhett knew little of Mr. Davis. He regarded him 

as an accomplished man, but egotisti- 
cal, arrogant, and vindictive, without 
depth or statesmanship. Besides this, 
he judged him not sufficiently in ac- 
cord with the movement to lead it. 
His speech on the 4th of July, 1858, 
between New York and Boston, was 
reported as denunciatory of secession- 
ists, and as comparing them to " mos- 
quitoes around the horns of an ox, who 
could annoy, but could do no harm." 
The strong Union sentiments uttered 
in his New England electioneering torn-, 
which secured to him the vote of B. F. 
Butler and others at the Democratic 
convention at Charleston, in 1860, were 
confirmatory of the newspaper report. 
As late as November 10th, 1860, after 
the South Carolina convention was 
called, Mr.*Davis had written a letter, 
within the cognizance of Mr. Rhett, 
and published by himself since the war, 
in which he unmistakably indicated 
the opinion that, if South Carolina 
seceded, neither Georgia, nor Alabama, 
nor Mississippi, nor Louisiana, nor 
any other State would secede unless 

negotiating friendly relations and for the settle- 
ment of all questions of disagreement between the 
two governments, was appointed and confirmed. 
The commissioners were A. B. Roman, of Louisi- 
ana, Martin J. Crawford, of Georgia, and John 
Forsyth, of Alabama. An act of February 20th 
provided for the repeal of all laws which forbade 
the employment in the coasting trade of vessels 
not enrolled or licensed, and all laws imposing 
discriminating duties on foreign vessels or goods 
imported in them. This Provisional Congress of 
one House held four sessions, as follows: I. Feb- 
ruary 4th-Mareh 16th, 1861; II. April 29th- 
May 22d, 1861; III. July 20th-August 22d, 
1861; IV. November 18th, 1861-February 17th, 
1862 ; the first and second of these at Montgom- 
ery, the third and fourth at Richmond, whither the 
Executive Department was removed late in May, 
1861, because of "the hostile demonstrations of 
the United States Government against Virginia," 
as Mr. Davis says in his "Rise and Fall of the 
Confederate Government." Editors. 





both the convention that organized the Confederacy 
and its Provisional Congress. On the 8th of Feb- 
ruary the Provisional Constitution was adopted, 
to be in force one year. On the Oth was passed 
the first enactment, providing "That all the 
laws of the United States of America in force and 
in use in the Confederate States of America 
on the first day of November last, and not incon- 
sistent with the Constitution of the Confederate 
States, be and the same are hereby continued in 
force until altered or repealed by the Congress." 
The next act, adopted February 14th, continued 
in office until April 1st all officers connected with 
the collection of customs, and the assistant treas- 
urers, with the same powers and functions as 
under the Government of the United States. An 
act of the 25th of February declared the peaceful 
navigation of the Mississippi River free to the 
citizens of any of the States upon its borders, or 
upon the borders of its navigable tributaries. On 
the 25th of February a commission to the Govern- 
ment of the United States, for the purpose of 


1 03 

lerov pope walkkr, first confederate 

m;< retary of war. 

from a photograph. 

the United States Government should 
attempt to coerce South Carolina back 
into the Union, or to blockade her ports. 
His expectation, at that late period, ap- 
parently was that South Carolina would 
be left out of the Union alone, and that 
the United States Government would 
simply collect duties off the bars of 
her seaports; and he expressed himself 
" in favor of seeking to bring those [the 
planting States] into cooperation before 
asking for a popular decision upon a new 
policy and relation to the nations of the 
earth." These views did not strengthen 
him with Mr. Rhett for the executive 
head of the Southern Confederacy; nor 
did the published report of his shedding 
tears on retiring from the United States 
Senate after the secession of Mississippi. 
But Mr. Rhett's cotemporary and second 

cousin, Mr. Barnwell, called three times to solicit his vote for Mr. Davis. The 

impression was produced upon his mind that he, Mr. Rhett, was the only man 

in the delegation opposed to Mr. 

Davis. In reply to objections sug- 
gested by Mr. Rhett, Mr. Barnwell 

said that Mr. Rhett's standard of 

the statesmanship requisite was 

higher than he might be able to get. 

He added that he knew Mr. Davis, 

and although he considered him 

not a man of great ability, yet 

he believed him just and honorable, 

and that he would utilize the best 

ability of the country, as Monroe and 

Polk and others had done, and would 

administer the powers intrusted to 

him as President, with an eye single 

to the interests of the Confederacy. 

Upon this presentment Mr. Rhett 

concluded to forego his own mistrust, 

and to give his vote for Mr. Davis, 

along with the rest, as he supposed. 

On taking the vote in the conven- 
tion (February 9th) Georgia gave 

hers to Mr. Cobb, and the other States theirs to Mr. Davis. Georgia then 

changed her vote, which elected Mr. Davis unanimously. Mr. Alexander H. 





Stephens was chosen Vice-President. | Mr. Rhett was made chairman of the 
committee to notify the President-elect, and to present him to the convention 
for inauguration. This office he performed in complimentary style, reflecting 
the estimate of Mr. Barnwell rather than his own fears. Within six weeks the 
Provisional Congress found out that they had made a mistake, and that there 
was danger of a division into an administration and an anti-adniinistration 
party, which might paralyze the Government. To avoid this, and to confer 
all power on the President, they resorted to secret sessions. 

Mr. Davis offered the office of Secretary of State to Mr. Barnwell, but he 
declined it, and recommended Mr. C. G. Memminger, also of South Carolina, 
for the Treasury portfolio, which was promptly accorded to him. Both of 
these gentlemen had been cooperationists, and up to the last had opposed 
secession. Mr. Barnwell would not have been sent to the State convention 
from Beaufort but for the efforts of Edmund Rhett, an influential State sen- 
ator. Of Mr. Memminger it was said that when a bill was on its passage 
through the Legislature of South Carolina in 1859, appropriating a sum of 
money for the purchase of arms, he had slipped in an amendment which 
had operated to prevent Governor Gist from drawing the money and procur- 
ing the arms. In Charleston he was known as an active friend of the free- 
school system and orphan house, a moral and charitable Episcopalian, and a 
lawyer, industrious, shrewd, and thrifty. As chairman of the Committee on 
Ways and Means in the House of Representatives, he was familiar with the 
cut-and-dried plan of raising the small revenue necessary to carry on the 
government of South Carolina. Such was his record and experience when 
appointed to the cabinet of Mr. Davis. Mr. Memminger received no recom- 
mendation for this office from the South Carolina delegation ; nor did the 
delegation from any State, so far as known, attempt to influence the Presi- 
dent in the choice of his cabinet. 

Mr. Robert Toombs, of Georgia, was appointed Secretary of State. This 
was in deference to the importance of his State and the public appreciation 
of his great mental powers and thorough earnestness, not for the active part 
he had taken in the State convention in behalf of secession. In public too 
fond of sensational oratory, in counsel he was a man of large and wise views. 

Mr. Leroy Pope Walker, of Alabama, was appointed Secretary of War on 
the recommendation of Mr. William L. Yancey. Ambitious, without any 
special fitness for this post, and overloaded, he accepted the office with the 
understanding that Mr. Davis would direct and control its business, which 
he did. After differing with the President as to the number of arms to be 
imported, and the number of men to be placed in camp in the winter of 1861-62 
(being in favor of very many more than the President), he wisely resigned. 

Mr. Stephen R. Mallory, of Florida, was appointed Secretary of the Navy. He 
was a gentleman of unpretending manners and ordinary good sense, who had 
served in the Senate with Mr. Davis, and had been chairman of the Committee 

4- The choice was provisional only, but was made permanent on the 6th of November, 1861, when 
Mr. Davis and Mr. Stephens were unanimously elected for six years. The Confederate Constitution 
made them ineligible to reelection. Editors. 




on Naval Affairs. With some acquaintance with officers of the United States 
Navy, and some knowledge of nautical matters, he had small comprehen- 
sion of the responsibilities of the office. His efforts were feeble and dilatory, 
and he utterly failed to provide for keeping open the seaports of the Confed- 
eracy. But he was one of the few who remained in the cabinet to the end. 

Mr. Judah P. Benjamin, of Louisiana, was appointed Attorney-General, and 
held that office until the resignation of Mr. Walker, when he was transferred 

to the post of Secre- 
tary of War. Upon 
the fall of New Or- 
leans, public indig- 
nation compelled a 
change, and he was 
made Secretary of 
A man of 
fertility of 
mind and resource 
and of facile charac- 
ter, he was the facto- 
tum of the President, 
performed his bid- 
ding in various ways, 
and gave him the 
benefit of his brains 
in furtherance of the 
views of Mr. Davis. J) 
Although a pro- 
visional government 
was more free to 
meet emergencies 
and correct mistakes, 
it was determined to 
proceed to the forma- 
tion of a permanent 
government. It was 
apprehended that in 
the lapse of time and 


j> Mr. Davis's reasons for the selection of the mem- 
bers of the first Cabinet are given in his " Rise and 
Pall of the Confederate Government " ( New York: 
D. Appleton & Co., 1881), Vol. I., pp. 211-3, in 
these words : 

" After being inaugurated, I proceeded to the forma- 
tion of my Cabinet, that is, the heads of the executive 
departments authorized by the laws of the Provisional 
Congress. The unanimity existing among our people 
made this a much easier and more agreeable task than 
where the rivalries in the party of an executive have to 
be consulted aud accommodated, often at the expense 
of the highest capacity and fitness. Unencumbered by 

any other consideration than the public welfare, having 
no friends to reward or enemies to punish, it resulted 
that not one of those who formed my first Cabinet had 
borne to me the relation of close personal friendship, 
or had political claims upon me; indeed, with two of 
them I had no previous acquaintance. 

" It was my wish that the Hon. Robert W. Barnwell, of 
South Carolina, should be Secretary of State. I had 
known him intimately during a trying period of our 
joint service in the United States Senate, and he had won 
alike my esteem and regard. Before making known to 
him my wish in this connection, the delegation of 
South Carolina, of which he was a member, had 
resolved to recommend one of their number to be 
Secretary of the Treasury, and Mr. Barnwell, with 

i ob 


change of circumstances and of men, the cardinal points for which the 
South had contended, and on which the separation of sections had occurred, 
might be lost sight of ; so it was decided to impress at once upon the 
new government the constitutional amendments regarded as essential. 

The committee, of which Mr. Ehett 
was chairman, agreed at its first 
meeting that the Constitution of 
the United States should "be adopt- 
ed, with only such alterations as 
experience had proved desirable, 
and to avoid latitudinariaii con- 
structions. Most of the important 
amendments were adopted on mo- 
tion of the chairman. But the 
limits of this paper do not permit 
a specific statement of their char- 
acter ancT scope. \ 

The permanent constitution was 
adopted on the 11th of March, 
1861, and went into operation, with 
the permanent government, at 
Richmond, on the 18th of Febru- 
ary, 1862, when the Provisional 
Congress expired. 

Those men who had studied the 
situation felt great anxiety about 
the keeping open of the ports of 
the Confederacy. Much was said 
and published about the immediate 

" Mr. Memmiuger, of South Carolina, had a high repu- 
tation for knowledge of finance. He bore an unimpeach- 
able character for integrity and close attention to duties, 
and, on the recommendation of the delegation from 
South Carolina, he was appointed Secretary of the Treas- 
ury, and proved himself entirely worthy of the trust. 

"Mr. Walker, of Alabama, was a distinguished mem- 
ber of the bar of north Alabama, and was eminent 
among the politicians of that section. He was earnestly 
recommended by gentlemen intimately and favorably 
known to me, and was therefore selected for the War 
Department. His was the only name presented from 
Alabama." -n 


\ One of them, offered by Mr. Rhett, and unani- 
mously adopted, relates to civil-service reform, 
and is in the following words : 

" The principal officer In each of the executive depart- 
ments, and all persons connected with the diplomatic 
service, may be removed from office at the pleasure of 
the President. All other civil officers of the executive 
department may be removed at any time by the Presi- 
dent or other appointing power, when their services are 
unnecessary, or for dishonesty, incapacity, inefficiency, 
misconduct, or neglect of duty ; and when so removed, 
the removal shall be reported to the Senate, together 


characteristic delicacy, declined to accept my offer 
to him. 

" I had intended to offer the Treasury Department to 
Mr. Toombs, of Georgia, whose knowledge on subjects of 
finance had particularly attracted my notice when we 
served together in the United States Senate. Mr. Barn- 
well having declined the State Department, and a col- 
league of his, said to be peculiarly qualified for the 
Treasury Department, having been recommended for 
it, Mr. Toombs was offered the State Department, for 
which others believed him to be well qualified. 

"Mr. Mallory, of Florida, had been chairman of the 
( iommittee on Naval Affairs in the United States Senate, 
was extensively acquainted with the officers of the 
navy, and for a landsman had much knowledge of 
nautical affairs ; therefore he was selected for Secretary 
of the Navy. 

" Mr. Benjamin, of Louisiana, had a very high reputa- 
tion as a lawyer, and my acquaintance with him in the 
Senate had impressed me with the lucidity of his intel- 
lect, his systematic habits and capacity for labor. He 
was therefore invited to the post of Attorney-General. 

" Mr. Reagan, of Texas. I had known for a sturdy, hon- 
est Representative in the United States Congress, and 
his acquaintance with the territory included in the Con- 
federate States was both extensive and accurate. These, 
together with his industry and ability to labor, indicated 
him as peculiarly tit for the office of Postmaster-Gen- 

with the reasons therefor." 

R. B. R. 



necessity of providing gun-boats and shipping suitable for that purpose. 
In the winter of 1801 Mr. C. K. Prioleau, of the firm of John Fraser & 
Co., of Liverpool, found a fleet of ten first-class East Indiamen, available 
to a buyer at less than half their cost. They belonged to the East India 
Company, and had been built in Great Britain for armament if required, 
or for moving troops and carrying valuable cargoes and treasure. Four 
of them were vessels of great size and power and of the very first class; 
and there were six others, which, although smaller, were scarcely inferior for 
the required purpose. On surrendering their powers to the British throne, 
the company had these steamships for sale. Mr. Prioleau secured the refusal 
of this fleet. The total cost of buying, arming, and fitting out the ten ships 
and putting them on the Southern coast ready for action was estimated at 
$10,000,000, or, say, 40,000 bales of cotton. The harbor of Port Royal, selected 
before the war as a coaling station for the United States Navy, with 26 feet 
of water at mean low tide, was admirably adapted for a rendezvous and 
point of supply. Brunswick, Georgia, was another good harbor, fit for such a 
fleet. The proposal was submitted to the Government through a partner 
of Mr. Prioleau in Charleston, Mr. George A. Trenholm, who forwarded the 
proposition 1 >y his son, William L. Trenholm. Its importance was not at all 

comprehended, and it was rejected 
by the executive. Captain J. D. 
Bulloch, the secret naval agent in 
Europe, who had the Alabama built, 
states that " the Confederate Gov- 
ernment wanted ships to cruise and 
to destroy the enemy's mercantile 
marine." It was of infinitely more 
importance to keep Southern ports 
open, but this does not seem to 
have been understood until too late. 
The opportunity of obtaining these 
ships was thrown away. They were 
engaged by the British Govern- 

To show the narrow spirit of those 
in office, an incident concerning 
Captain Maffit, who figured after- 
ward in command of the Florida, 
may be mentioned. In May, after 
the reduction of Fort Sumter, Maf- 
fit came from Washington to offer 
his services, and when he met the 
writer was in a state of indignation and disgust. He said that after having 
been caressed and offered a command in the Pacific, he had sneaked away 
from Washington to join the Confederacy, and that he had been received by 
the Secretary of the Navy as if he (Maffit) had designs upon him. 






The Secretary of War has stated that before the Government moved from 
Montgomery 366,000 men, the flower of the South, had tendered their services 
in the army. Only a small fraction of the number were received. The Secretary 
was worn out with personal applications of ardent officers, and himself 
stated that in May, 1861, he was constantly waylaid, in walking the back 
way from his office to the Exchange 
Hotel, by men offering their lives in 
the Confederate cause. 

Another instance of narrowness may 
be named in the case of William Cut- 
ting Hey ward. He was a wealthy rice- 
planter and an eminently practical and 
efficient man, a graduate at West Point 
in the class with Mr. Davis. He went 
to Montgomery to tender a regiment. 
He sent in his card to the President 
and waited for days in the lobby with- 
out obtaining an interview, and then 
returned home. He finally died from 
exposure, performing the duties of a 
private in the Home Guard at Charles- 
ton. The reason alleged for not ac- 
cepting more men was the want of 
arms, and Mr. Davis's book is an apol- 
ogy for not procuring them. Insisting 
that a great war was probable, and in- 
augurated on the 18th of February, there was no declaration of war before 
the middle of April and no efficient blockade of the ports for many months, 
yet it was in May that he started Major Huse over to England with instruc- 
tions to purchase 10,000 Enfield rifles ! By these facts may be gauged his 
estimate of the emergency or of the purchasing ability of the Confederate 
States. The provisional constitution provided that " Congress shall appro- 
priate no money from the Treasury unless it be asked and estimated for by 
the President or some one of the heads of departments, except for the purpose 
of paying its own expenses and contingencies." The Congress could, therefore, 
do nothing about the purchase of arms without a call from the executive. 

But for the Treaty of Paris in 1778, made by Benjamin Franklin, Silas 
Dean, and Arthur Lee, with France, the independence of the thirteen original 
States would not have been established. It was deemed important in the Pro- 
visional Congress of the Confederate States to send commissioners abroad to 
negotiate for a recognition of their independence, and, in case of war with the 
States of the North, perhaps for assistance. The chairman of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ehett, reported such a resolution, which was unani- 
mously adopted. As the treaty-making power of the Government belonged 
to the President, Congress could not dictate to him the limit of authority that 
should be conferred upon the commissioners, in the negotiations desired. But 






all those who had reflected upon the subject expected the President to give 
extensive authority for making treaties. The views held by the chairman were 
that the commissioners should be authorized to propose to Great Britain, 
France, and other European nations, upon the conditions of recognition and 
alliance, that the Confederate States for twenty years would agree to lay no 
higher duties on productions imported than fifteen or twenty per cent, ad val- 
orem; that for this period, no tonnage duties would be laid on their shipping, 
entering or leaving Confederate ports, but such as should be imposed to keep 
in order the harbors and rivers ; that the navigation between the ports of the 
Confederate States for the same time should be free to the nations entering 
into alliance with the Confederate States, while upon the productions and ton- 
nage of all nations refusing to recognize their independence and enter into 
treaty with them, a discriminating duty of ten per cent, would be imposed. 
He believed, moreover, that they should be authorized to make an offen- 
sive and defensive league, with special guarantees, as was done in 1778. 
Here was a direct and powerful appeal to the interests of foreign nations, 
especially England. Would any British Minister have dared to reject 
a treaty offering such vast advantages to his country! And if so, when 
the fact became known to Parliament, could he have retained his place ! 

Up to September, 1862, the United 
States Government was committed, 
both by diplomatic dispatches and by 
the action of Congress, to the declara- 
tion that the war was made solely to 
preserve the Union and with the pur- 
pose of maintaining the institutions of 
the seceded States, unimpaired and 
unaltered. Hence, at this period, the 
issue of slavery had not been injected 
into diplomacy, and was no obstacle to 
negotiating treaties. 

When Mr. Yancey received the ap- 
pointment at the head of the commis- 
sion, Mr. Rhett conferred with him at 
length, and found that the commis- 
sioner fully concurred in the views 
just mentioned. But he surprised Mr. 
Rhett by the statement that the Presi- 
dent had given no powers whatever 
to make commercial treaties, or to give 

any special interest in Confederate trade or navigation to any foreign nations, 
but relied upon the idea that " Cotton is King." " Then," rejoined Mr. Rhett, 
" if you will take my advice, as your friend, do not accept the appointment. 
For you will have nothing to propose and nothing to treat about, and must 
necessarily fail. Demand of the President the powers essential to the success 
of your mission, or stay at home.'' 

john h. reagan, confederate postmaster- 
<;enerai.. from a steel engraving. 


On the reassembling of the Provisional Congress in April, ascertaining that 
these powers had not been conferred upon the commission, Mr. Ehett pre- 
pared a resolution requesting the President to empower the commissioners to 
propose to European nations, as the basis of a commercial treaty, a tariff of 
duties for 20 years no higher than 20 per cent, ad valorem on their imports 
into the Confederate States. This he submitted to Mr. Toombs, the Secretary 
of State, who promptly approved it and appeared before the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs to urge it. It was reported, with the indorsement of the com- 
mittee, to the Congress, and was not opposed in debate ; but Mr. Perkins 
moved, as an amendment, six years instead of twenty. As this was carried, 
Mr. Rhett moved to lay the resolution on the table, which was done ; and this 
was the only effort made to appeal to the interests of foreign nations, to secure 
recognition of the independence of the Confederate States, or to obtain assist- 
ance. Upon his return from abroad, Mr. Yancey met Mr. Rhett and said : 
"You were right, sir. I went on a fool's errand." In December, 1863, at 
Richmond, James L. Orr, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
Senate, said to the writer, " The Confederate States have had no diplomacy." 

In March, 1863, proposals were made for a loan of $15,000,000 on 7 per cent, 
bonds, secured by an engagement of the Confederate Grovernment to deliver 
cotton at 12 cents per pound within 6 months after peace. The loan stood 
in the London market at 5 per cent, premium ; and the applications for it 
exceeded $75,000,000. In the Provisional Congress at Montgomery, Mr. 
Stephens proposed that the Confederate Grovernment should purchase cot- 
ton at 8 cents per pound, paying in 8 per cent, bonds, running 20 or 30 
years. He believed that 2,000,000 bales of the crop of 1860 could be obtained 
in that way from the planters, and that, of the crop of 1861, 2,000,000 more 
bales might he obtained afterward. By using this cotton as security, or 
shipping it abroad, he maintained the finances of the Confederate States 
could at once be placed on a solid basis. His plan met with much favor, but 
was opposed by the administration and was not carried through. Money for 
the long war was to be raised by loans from Confederate citizens on bonds sup- 
plemented by the issue of Treasury notes and by a duty on exported cotton. 

In April, 1865, after the collapse of the Confederacy, Mr. Barnwell, who 
had steadfastly supported Mr. Davis in the Confederate Senate, met the 
writer at Greenville, S. C, where Governor Magrath had summoned the 
Legislature of the State to assemble. There, in conversation, Mr. Barnwell 
explicitly expressed his judgment in the following words : " Mr. Davis never 
had any policy ; he drifted, from the beginning to the end of the war." 

For practical regret at the issue of the secession movement, the time has 
long passed by. The people of the South have reconciled themselves to the 
restoration of the Union and to the abolishment of slavery. They have 
bravely and strenuously endeavored to go through the transition period of 
an enormous change without wreck. In complete harmony with the destinies 
of the Union, they are working out the future of the United States faithfully. 

This is set down to prevent the suppression of important facts in history, 
and in justice to eminent men, now dead, who have been much misunderstood. 





THE movement to capture Harper's Ferry, Virginia, and the fire-arms 
manufactured and stored there was organized at the Exchange Hotel 
in Richmond on the night of April 16th, 1861. Ex-Governor Henry A. Wise 
was at the head of this purely impromptu affair. The Virginia Secession 
Convention, then sitting, was by a large majority " Union " in its sentiment till 
Sumter was fired on and captured, and Mr. Lincoln called for seventy-five thou- 
sand men to enforce the laws in certain Southern States. Virginia was then, 
as it were, forced to " take sides," and she did not hesitate. I had been one 
of the candidates for a seat in that convention from Augusta county, but had 
been overwhelmingly defeated by the " Union " candidates, because I favored 
secession as the only " peace measure " Virginia could then adopt, our aim 
being to put the State in an independent position to negotiate between the 
United States and the seceded Gulf and Cotton States for a new Union, to 
be formed on a compromise of the slavery question by a convention to be 
held for that purpose. 

Late on April 15th I received a telegram from " Nat " Tyler, the editor of 
the "Richmond Enquirer," summoning me to Richmond, where I arrived 
the next day. Before reaching the Exchange Hotel I met ex-Governor 
Wise on the street. He asked me to find as many officers of the armed 
and equipped volunteers of the inland towns and counties as I could, 
and request them to be at the hotel by 7 in the evening to confer about 
a military movement which he deemed important. Not many such 
officers were in town, but I found Captains Turner Ashby and Richard 
Ashby of Fauquier county, Oliver R. Funsten of Clarke county, all 
commanders of volunteer companies of cavalry; also Captain John A. 
Harman of Staunton my home and Alfred M. Barbour, the latter 
ex-civil superintendent of the Government works at Harper's Ferry. & 
These persons, with myself, promptly joined ex-Governor Wise, and a plan 

-& See page 125 for a letter of Mr. Barbour, regarding the security of the armory. Editopr. 


I 12 


for the capture of Harper's Ferry was at once discussed and settled upon. 
The movement, it was agreed, should commence the next day, the 17th, as 
soon as the convention voted to secede, provided we could get railway 
transportation and the concurrence of Governor Letcher. Colonel Edmund 
Fontaine, president of the Virginia Central railroad, and John S. Barbour, 
president of the Orange and Alexandria and Manassas Gap railroads, were 
sent for, and joined us at the hotel near midnight. They agreed to put the 

necessary trains in readiness 
next day to obey any request 
of Governor Letcher for the 
movement of troops. 

A committee, of which I was 
chairman, waited on Governor 
Letcher after midnight, and, 
arousing him from his bed, laid 
the scheme before him. He 
stated that he would take no 
step till officially informed that 
the ordinance of secession was 
passed by the convention. He 
was then asked if contingent 
upon the event he would next 
day order the movement by 
telegraph. He consented. We 
then informed him what companies would be under arms ready to move at a 
moment's notice. All the persons I have named above are now dead, except 
John S. Barbour, " Nat " Tyler, and myself. 

On returning to the hotel and reporting Governor Letcher's promise, it was 
decided to telegraph the captains of companies along the railroads mentioned 
to be ready next day for orders from the governor. In that way I ordered 
the Staunton Artillery, which I commanded, to assemble at their armory by 
4 p. M. on the 17th, to receive orders from the governor to aid in the capture 
of the Portsmouth Navy Yard. This destination had been indicated in all 
our dispatches, to deceive the Government at Washington in case there should 
be a " leak " in the telegraph offices. Early in the evening a message had been 
received by ex-Governor Wise from his son-in-law Doctor Garnett of Wash- 
ington, to the effect that a Massachusetts regiment, one thousand strong, had 
been ordered to Harper's Ferry. Without this reenforcement we knew the 
guard there consisted of only forty-rive men, who could be captured or driven 
away, perhaps without firing a shot, if we could reach the place secretly. 

The Ashbys, Funsten, Harman, and I remained up the entire night. The 
superintendent and commandant of the Virginia Armory at Richmond, Cap- 
tain Charles Dimmock, a Northern man by birth and a West Point graduate, 
was in full sympathy with us, and that night filled our requisitions for 
ammunition and moved it to the railway station before sunrise. He also 
granted one hundred stand of arms for the Martinsburg Light Infantry, a 




new company just formed. All these I receipted for and saw placed on the 
train. Just before we moved out of the depot, Alfred Barbour made an 
unguarded remark in the car, which was overheard by a Northern traveler, who 
immediately wrote a message to President Lincoln and paid a negro a dollar 
to take it to the telegraph office. This act was discovered by one of our party, 
who induced a friend to follow the negro and take the dispatch from him. 
This perhaps prevented troops being sent to head us off. 

My telegram to the Staunton Artillery produced wild excitement, and spread 
rapidly through the county, and brought thousands of people to Staunton 
during the day. Augusta had been a strong Union county, and a doubt was 
raised by some whether I was acting under the orders of Governor Letcher. 

VOL. I. 

u 4 


To satisfy them, niy brother, George W. Imboden, sent a message to me at 
Gordon sville, inquiring under whose authority I had acted. On the arrival of the 
train at Gordonsville, Captain Harman received the message and replied to it 
in my name, that I was acting by order of the governor. Harman had been of the 
committee, the night before, that waited on Governor Letcher, and he assumed 
that by that hour noon the convention must have voted the State out of 
the Union, and that the governor had kept his promise to send orders by 
wire. Before we reached Staunton, Harman handed me the dispatch and told 
me what he had done. I was annoyed by his action till the train drew up at 
Staunton, where thousands of people were assembled, and my artillery com- 
pany and the West Augusta Guards (the finest infantry company in the 
valley) were in line. Major-General Kenton Harper, a native of Pennsylvania, 
" a born soldier," and Brigadier-General William H. Harman, both holding 
commissions in the Virginia militia, and both of whom had won their spurs 
in the regiment the State had sent to the Mexican war, met me as I alighted, 
with a telegram from Governor Letcher ordering them into service, and 
referring them to me for information as to our destination and troops. Until 
I imparted to them confidentially what had occurred the night before, they 
thought, as did all the people assembled, that we were bound for the Ports- 
mouth Navy Yard. For prudential reasons, we said nothing to dispel this 
illusion. The governor in his dispatch informed General Harper that he was 
to take chief command, and that full written instructions would reach him en 
route. He waited 
till after dark, 
and then set out 
for Winchester 
behind a good 
team. Brigadier- 
General Harman 
was ordered to 
take command of 
the trains and of 
all troops that 
might report en 
route. (See map, 
page 113.) 

About sunset we 
took train ; our 
departure was an 
exciting and af- 


PVmvlrkTTaci-innfi in were tried and sentenced, from a photograph. 

the night, the Monticello Guards, Captain W. B. Mallory, and the Albemarle 
Rifles, under Captain R. T. W. Duke, came aboard. At Culpeper a rifle com- 
pany joined us, and just as the sun rose on the 18th we reached Manassas. 
The Ashbys and Funsten had gone on the day before to collect their 

*>"" # 




!1 5 


cavalry companies, and also the famous "Black Horse Cavalry," a superb 
body of men and horses, under Captains John Scott and Welby Carter of 
Fauquier. By marching across the Blue Ridge, they were to rendezvous near 
Harper's Ferry. 
Ashby had sent 
men on the night 
of the 17th to 
cut the wires be- 
tween Manassas 
Junction and Al- 
exandria, and to 
keep them cut 
for several days. 

Our advent at 
the Junction 
astounded the 
quiet people of 
the village. Gen- 
eral Harman at 
once " impress- 
ed" the Manassas 

Gap train to take the lead, and switched two or three other trains to that line 
in order to proceed to Strasburg. I was put in command of the foremost 
train. We had not gone five miles when I discovered that the engineer could 
not be trusted. He let his fire go down, and came to a dead standstill on a 
slight ascending grade. A cocked pistol induced him to fire up and go ahead. 
From there to Strasburg I rode in the engine-cab, and we made full forty 
miles an hour with the aid of good dry wood and a navy revolver. 

At Strasburg we left the cars, and before 10 o'clock the infantry com- 
panies took up the line of march for Winchester. I now had to procure horses 
for my guns. The farmers were in their corn-fields, and some of them agreed 
to hire us horses as far as Winchester, eighteen miles, while others refused. 
The situation being urgent, we took the horses by force, under threats of 
being indicted by the next grand jury of the county. By noon we had a suffi- 
cient number of teams. We followed the infantry down the Valley Turnpike, 
reaching Winchester just at nightfall. The people generally received us very 
coldly. The war spirit that bore them up through fom* years of trial and 
privation had not yet been aroused. 

General Harper was at Winchester, and had sent forward his infantry by 
rail to Charlestown, eight miles from Harper's Ferry. In a short time a train 
returned for my battery. The farmers got their horses and went home rejoic- 
ing, and we set out for our destination. The infantry moved out of Charles- 
town about midnight. We kept to our train as far as Halltown, only four miles 
from the ferry. There we set down our guns to be run forward by hand 
to Bolivar Heights, west of the town, from which we could shell the place if 








The well-known raid of John Brown npon Har- 
per's Ferry, Virginia, for the purpose of freeing 
slaves by force of arms, occurred on the evening of 
Sunday, the 17th of October, 1859. His party, 
including himself and five negroes (three of whom 
were fugitive slaves), consisted of 22 men, three of 
whom remained at the rendezvous on the Mnrvland 

side of the Potomac. The others crossed by the 
bridge and seized the United States armory and 
arsenal, and during the next eighteen hours were 
busy in arousing slaves, cutting telegraph wires, 
providing defenses against attack, and imprisoning 
citizens. They were at last besieged in the engine- 
house by a large number of citizeus and militia, to 



A little before dawn of the next day, April 18th, a brilliant light arose 
from near the point of confluence of the Shenandoah and Potomac rivers. 
General Harper, who up to that moment had expected a conflict with the 
Massachusetts regiment supposed to be at Harper's Ferry, was making his 
dispositions for an attack at daybreak, when this light convinced him that 
the enemy had fired the arsenal and fled. He marched in and took posses- 
sion, but too late to extinguish the flames. Nearly twenty thousand rifles 
and pistols were destroyed. The workshops had not been fired. The people 
of the town told us the catastrophe, for such it was to us, was owing to 
declarations made the day before by the ex-superintendent, Alfred Barbour. 
He reached Harper's Ferry, via Washington, on the 17th about noon, and, 
collecting the mechanics in groups, informed them that the place would be capt- 
ured within twenty-four hours by Virginia troops. He urged them to protect 
the property, and join the 
Southern cause, promising, 
if war ensued, that the place 
would be held by the South, and 
that they would be continued at 
work on high wages. His influence 
with the men was great, and most of 
them decided to accept his advice. But 
Lieutenant Roger Jones, who com- 
manded the little guard of forty- 
five men, hearing what was going 
on, at once took measures 
to destroy the place ^ 
if necessary. Trains 
of gunpowder 


u 4>\r*\e^i 



whom were added, on the morning of Tuesday, a 
force of United States marines, sent from Wash- 
ington under Colonel Robert E. Lee and Lieuten- 
ants Green and J. E. B. Stuart. The marines 
battered down the door of the engine-house and 
captured the insurgents, after a brave resistance. 
In the conflict John Brown was wounded ; his sons 
Watson and Oliver were mortally wounded, and 
eight others of the party were killed. Five, in- 
cluding another son, Owen Brown, escaped. Seven 

were captured, and, after trial and conviction, 
were hanged at Charlestown, Virginia, John 
Brown on the 2d of December, 1859; John E. 
Cook, Edwin Coppoc, John A. Copeland (a mulat- 
to), and Shields Green (a negro) on the 16th of 
December ; and Aaron D. Stevens and Albert Haz- 
lett on the lGth of the following March. Three 
citizens and a number of negroes were killed by 
the insurgents, and others were wounded. 




db-f 6 



were laid through the 
buildings to be fired. In 
the shops the men of 
Southern sympathies 
managed to wet the 
powder in many places 
during the night, render- 
ing it harmless. Jones's 
troops, however, held 
the arsenal buildings 
and stores, and when 
their commander was 
advised of Harper's rapid 
approach the gunpowder 
was fired, and he crossed 
into Maryland with his 
handful of men. So 
we secured only the ma- 
chinery and the gun and 
pistol barrels and locks, 
which, however, were 
sent to Richmond and 
Columbia, South Caro- 
lina, and were worked 
over into excellent arms. 
[See note, page 125.] 

Within a week about 
thirteen hundred Vir- 
ginia volunteers had as- 
sembled there. As these 
companies were, in fact, a 
part of the State militia, 
they were legally under 
command of the three 
brigadiers and one ma- 
jor-general of militia, who had authority over this, that, or the other organiza- 
tion. These generals surrounded themselves with a numerous staff, material 
for which was abundant in the rank and file of the volunteers ; for instance, in 
my battery there were at least a dozen college graduates of and below the grade 
of corporal. Every fair afternoon the official display in Harper's Ferry of 
" fuss and feathers " would have done no discredit to the Champs Elysees. 

One afternoon, six or eight days after our occupation, General Harper 
sent for me, as the senior artillery officer (we then had three batteries, but all 
without horses), to say he had been told that a number of trains on the Balti- 
more and Ohio railroad would try to pass us in the night, transporting 
troops from the West to Washington, and that he had decided to prevent 


April 23d, 1861, Robert E. Lee, with the rank of major-general, was 
appointed by Governor Letcher commander-in-chief of the military and 
naval forces of the State of Virginia, and assumed charge of the military 
defenses of the State. June 8th, 1861, in accordance with the proclamation 
of Governor Letcher, he transferred the command to the Confederate 
States, but he remained the ranking officer of the Virginia military forces. 



. . 



them at the risk of bringing on a battle. He ordered the posting of guns 
so as to command the road for half a mile or more, all to be accurately 
trained on the track by the light of clay, and ready to be discharged at any 
moment. Infantry companies were stationed to fire into the trains, if the 
artillery failed to stop them. Pickets were posted out two or three miles, 
with orders to fire signal-guns as soon as the first troop-laden train should 
pass. About 1 o'clock at night we heard the rumbling of an approach- 
ing train. The long roll was beat; the men assembled at their assigned 
positions and in 
silence awaited the 
sound of the sig- 
nal-guns. A nerv- 
ous cavalryman 
was the vedette. As 
the train passed 
him (it was the 
regular mail) he 
thought he saw 
soldiers in it, and 
fired. Pop ! pop ! 
pop ! came down 
tlie road from suc- 
cessive sentries. 
Primers were in- 
serted and lan- 
yards held taut, to be pulled when the engine should turn a certain point 
four hundred yards distant from the battery. By great good luck Colonel 
William S. H. Baylor, commanding the 5th Virginia regiment, was with 
some of his men stationed a little beyond the point, and, seeing no troops 
aboard the train, signaled it to stop. It did so, not one hundred yards beyond 
where the artillery would have opened on it. When the first excitement was 
over, he demanded of the conductor what troops, if any, were on board, and 
was told there was "one old fellow in uniform asleep on the mail-bags 
in the first car." Entering that car with a file of soldiers, he secured the 
third prisoner of war taken in Virginia. It proved to be Brigadier-General 
W. S. Harney, of the United States army, on his way from the West to 
Washington, to resign his commission and go to Europe rather than engage 
in a fratricidal war. He surrendered with a pleasant remark, and was taken 
to General Harper's headquarters, where he spent the night. On his assur- 
ance that he knew of no troops coming from the West, Harper ordered us 
all to quarters. Next morning General Harney was paroled to report in 
Richmond, and was escorted to a train about to leave for Winchester. He 
was a fine-looking old soldier, and as he walked down the street to the depot 
he saw all our forces except the cavalry. He was accompanied socially by 
two or three of our generals and a swarm of staff-officers. He cast his 
glance over the few hundred men in sight, and turning to General Harper, 
I heard him inquire, with a merry twinkle in his eye, " Where is your army 




encamped, general?" Harper's face crimsoned as lie replied, "Excuse me 
from giving information." Harney smiled, and said politely, "Pardon me 
for asking an improper question, but I had forgotten I was a prisoner." He 
went on to Richmond, was treated with marked courtesy, and in a day or 
two proceeded to Washington. 

In a few days our forces began to increase by the arrival of fresh volunteer 
companies. Being only a captain, I was kept very busy in trying to get my 
battery into the best condition. We had no caissons and but insufficient har- 
ness. For the latter I sent to Baltimore, purchasing on my private credit. In the 
same way I ordered from Richmond red flannel shirts and other clothing for 
all my men, our uniforms being too fine for camp life. The governor subse- 
quently ordered these bills to be paid by the State treasurer. We found at 
the armory a large number of very strong horse-carts. In my battery were 
thirty or more excellent young mechanics. By using the wheels and axles 
of the carts they soon constructed good caissons, which served us till after 
the first battle of Bull Run. 

We had no telegraph line to Richmond except via Washington, and the 
time of communication by mail was two days. General Harper found it so 
difficult to obtain needed munitions and supplies, that about the last of April 
he decided to send me to the governor, who was my intimate friend, with a 
requisition for all we needed, and verbal instructions to make to him a full 
statement of our necessitous and defenseless condition, in case General Robert 

Patterson, who was re- 
ported with a Federal 
force at Chambers- 
burg, should move 
against us. When I 
arrived in Richmond, 
General Robert E. Lee 
had been placed in 
command of all the 
Virginia forces by the 
governor, and by an 
ordinance every mi- 
litia officer in the 
State above the rank 
of captain had been 
decapitated, and the 
governor and his mil- 
itary council had been 
authorized to fill va- 
cancies thus created. 
This was a disastrous blow to " the pomp and circumstance of glorious war" at 
Harper's Ferry. Militia generals and the brilliant " staff " were stricken down, 
and their functions devolved, according to Governor Letcher's order of 
April 27th, upon Thomas J. Jackson, colonel commandant, and James W. 


The railway bridge was destroyed by the Confederates on the 13th of June, 1861. 
Two days later, on the approach of "Union forces under General Robert Patter- 
son, near Williauisport, and under Colonel Lew Wallace at Romney (see foot- 
note page 127), General Joseph E. Johnston (who had succeeded Colonel Jack- 
son in command on the 23d of May), considering the position untenable, with- 
drew the Confederate army to Winchester. 


I 2 1 

Massie, major aiicl assistant adjutant-general, who arrived during the first 
week of May. 

This was " Stonewall " Jackson's first appearance on the theater of the war. 
I spent one day and night in Richmond, and then returned to camp, arriv- 
ing about 2 p. m. What a revolution three or four days had wrought ! I could 
scarcely realize the change. The militia generals were all gone, and the staff 
had vanished. The commanding colonel and his adjutant had arrived, and 
were occupying a small room in the little wayside hotel near the railroad 
bridge. Knowing them both, I immediately sought an interview, and deliv- 
ered a letter and some' papers I had brought from General Lee. Jackson and his 
adjutant were at a little pine table figuring 
upon the rolls of the troops present. They 
were dressed in well-worn, dingy uniforms 
of professors in the Virginia Military Insti- 
tute, where both had recently occupied chairs. 
Colonel Jackson had issued and sent to the 
camps a short, simple order assuming the 
command, but had had no intercourse with 
the troops. The deposed officers had nearly 
all left for home or for Richmond in a high 
state of indignation. After an interview of 
perhaps a half hour I proceeded to my camp 
on the hill, and found the men of the 5th Vir- 
ginia regiment, from my own county, in 
assembly, and greatly excited. They were 
deeply attached to their field-officers, and re- 
garded the ordinance of the convention as an 
outrage on freemen and volunteers, and were 
discussing the propriety of passing denunci- 
atory resolutions. On seeing me they called 
for a speech. As I did not belong to the regiment, I declined to say any- 
thing, but ordered the men of the Staunton Artillery to fall into line. Then I 
briefly told them that we were required to muster into service either for twelve 
months or during the war, at our option, and urged them to go in for the full 
period of the war, as such action would be most creditable to them, and a good 
example to others. They unanimously shouted, " For the war ! For the war!" 
Before they were dismissed the ceremony of mustering in was completed, and 
I proudly took the roll down to Colonel Jackson with the remark, "There, 
colonel, is the roll of your first company mustered in for the war." He looked 
it over, and, rising, shook my hand, saying, "Thank you, captain thank you ; 
and please thank your men for me." He had heard that there was dissatisfac- 
tion in the camps, and asked me to act as mustering officer for two other artil- 
lery companies present. Before sunset the rolls were returned. This prompt 
action of the batteries was emulated the next day by the other troops, and all 
were mustered in. Within a week Governor Letcher wisely appointed 
Major-General Harper colonel of the 5th Virginia, Brigadier- General Har- 



man lieutenant-colonel, and Colonel Baylor major, and I venture to say no 
regiment in either army was better officered, as the fame it won in the 
" Stonewall " brigade will prove. The presence of a master mind was visible 
in the changed condition of the camp. Perfect order reigned everywhere. 
Instruction in the details of military duties occupied Jackson's whole time. 
He urged the officers to call upon him for information about even the minutest 
details of duty, often remarking that it was no discredit to a civilian to be 
ignorant of military matters. He was a rigid disciplinarian, and yet as gen- 
tle and kind as a woman. He was the easiest man in our army to get 
along with pleasantly so long as one did his duty, but as inexorable as fate in 
exacting the performance of it ; yet he would overlook serious faults if he saw 
they were the result of ignorance, and would instruct the offender in a kindly 
way. He was as courteous to the humblest private who sought an inter- 
view for any purpose as to the highest officer in his command. He despised 
superciliousness and self-assertion, and nothing angered him so quickly as to 
see an officer wound the feelings of those under him by irony or sarcasm. 

When Jackson found we were without artillery horses, he went into no 
red-tape correspondence with the circumlocution offices in Richmond, but 
ordered his quartermaster, Major John A. Harman, to proceed with men to 
the Quaker settlements in the rich county of Loudoun, famous for its good 
horses, and buy or impress as many as we needed. Harman executed his 
orders with such energy and dispatch that he won Jackson's confidence, and 
remained his chief quartermaster till the day of Jackson's death. 

By Jackson's orders I took possession of the bridge across the Potomac 
at Point of Rocks, twelve miles below Harper's Ferry, and fortified the Vir- 
ginia end of the bridge, as we expected a visit any night from General B. F. 
Butler, who was at the Relay House on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. It 
was my habit to keep awake all night to be ready for emergencies, and to 
sleep in the day-time, making daily reports, night and morning, to Jackson. 
One Sunday afternoon, a little over a week after we occupied this post, I was 
aroused from my nap by one of my men, who said there were two men in 
blue uniforms (we had not yet adopted the gray) riding about our camp, and 
looking so closely at everything that he believed they were spies. I went 
out to see who they were, and found Jackson and one of his staff. As I 
approached them, he put his finger on his lips and shook his head as a signal 
for silence. In a low tone he said he preferred it should not be known he had 
come there. He approved of all I had done, and soon galloped away. I after- 
ward suspected that the visit was simply to familiarize himself with the line 
of the canal and railroad from Point of Rocks to Harper's Ferry preparatory 
to a sharp bit of strategy which he practiced a few days later. 

From the very beginning of the war the Confederacy was greatly in need 
of rolling-stock for the railroads. We were particularly short of locomo- 
tives, and were without the shops to build them. Jackson, appreciating 
this, hit upon a plan to obtain a good supply from the Baltimore and Ohio 
road. Its line was double-tracked, at least from Point of Rocks to Martins- 
burg, a distance of 25 or 30 miles. We had not interfered with the running 






of trains, except on the occasion of the arrest 
of General Harney. The coal traffic from 
Cumberland was immense, as the Washing- 
ton government was accumulating supplies 
of coal on the seaboard. These coal trains 
passed Harper's Ferry at all hours of the day 
and night, and thus furnished Jackson with 
a pretext for arranging a brilliant " scoop." 
When he sent me to Point of Rocks, he 
ordered Colonel Harper with the 5th Vir- 
ginia Infantry to Martinsburg. He then 
complained to President Garrett, of the 
Baltimore and Ohio, that the night trains, 
eastward bound, disturbed the repose of 
his camp, and requested a change of sched- 
ule that would pass all east-bound trains by 
Harper's Ferry between 11 and 1 o'clock in 
the day-time. Mr. Garrett complied, and 
thereafter for several days we heard the con- 
stant roar of passing trains for an hour 
before and an hour after noon. But since 
the "empties" were sent up the road at 
night, Jackson again complained that the nuisance was as great as ever, and, 
as the road had two tracks, said he must insist that the west-bound trains 
should pass during the same two hours as those going east. Mr. Garrett 
promptly complied, and we then had, for two hours every day, the liveliest 
railroad in America. One night, as soon as the schedule was working at its 
best, Jackson sent me an order to take a force of men across to the Maryland 
side of the river the next day at 11 o'clock, and, letting all west-bound trains 
pass till 12 o'clock, to permit none to go east, and at 12 o'clock to obstruct 
the road so that it would require several days to repair it. He ordered the 
reverse to be done at Martinsburg. Thus he caught all the trains that were 
going east or west between those points, and these he ran up to Winchester, 
thirty-two miles on the branch road, where they were safe, and whence they 
were removed by horse-power to the railway at Strasburg. I do not remem- 
ber the number of trains captured, but the loss crippled the Baltimore and 
Ohio road seriously for some time, and the gain to our scantily stocked 
Virginia roads of the same gauge was invaluable. 

While we held the Point of Rocks bridge, J. E. B. Stuarfc (afterward so 
famous as a cavalry leader) was commissioned lieutenant-colonel, and reported 
to Colonel Jackson for assignment to duty. Jackson ordered the consolidation 
of all the cavalry companies into a battalion to be commanded by Stuart, 
who then appeared more like a well-grown, manly youth than the mature 
man he really was. This order was very offensive to Captain Turner Ashby, 
at that time the idol of all the troopers in the field, as well he might be, for a 
more brave and chivalrous officer never rode at the head of well-mounted 



troopers. Ashby was older than Stuart, and he thought, and we all believed, 
that he was entitled to first promotion. When not absent scouting, Ashby spent 
his nights with me at the bridge. He told me of Jackson's order, and that 
he would reply to it with his resignation. I expostulated with him, although 
he had all my sympathies. I urged him to call upon Colonel Jackson that 
night. It was only twelve miles by the tow-path of the canal, and on his 
black Arabian he could make it in less than an hour. I believed Jackson 
would respect his feelings and leave his company out of Stuart's battalion. I 

ventured to write a private letter 
to Jackson, appealing in the strong- 
est terms for the saving of Ashby 
to the service. The result of his 
night ride was that Jackson not 
only relieved him from the obnox- 
ious order, but agreed to divide the 
companies between him and Stuart, 
and to ask for his immediate pro- 
motion, forming thus the nuclei of 
two regiments of cavalry, to be 
filled as rapidly as new companies 
came to the front. One of these 
regiments was commanded at first 
by Colonel Angus McDonald, 
with Ashby as lieutenant-colonel, 
and in a few months Ashby was 
promoted to its full command. 
Ashby got back to Point of Rocks 
about 2 in the morning, as happy 
a man as I ever saw, and completely 
enraptured with Jackson. From that night on, the affection and confidence of 
the two men were remarkable. A trip Ashby had made a few days before to 
Chambersburg and the encampment of General Robert Patterson was the 
real reason for Jackson's favor. Ashby had rigged himself in a farmer's suit 
of homespun that he had borrowed, and, hiring a plow-horse, had i^ersonated 
a rustic horse-doctor. With his saddle-bags full of some remedy for spavin 
or ringbone, he had gone to Chambersburg, and had returned in the night 
with an immense amount of information. The career of Ashby was a romance 
from that time on till he fell, shot through the heart, two days before the 
battle of Cross Keys. 

May 23d, 1861, Colonel Jackson was superseded in command at Harper's 
Ferry by Brigadier-General Joseph E. Johnston. When General Johnston 
arrived several thousand men had been assembled there, representing nearly all 
the seceded States east of the Mississippi River. Johnston at once began the 
work of organization on a larger scale than Jackson had attempted. He 
brigaded the troops, and assigned Colonel Jackson to the command of the ex- 
clusively Virginia brigade. The latter was almost immediately commissioned 




brigadier-general, and when on the 15th of Jnne Johnston withdrew from Har- 
per's Ferry to Winchester, he kept Jackson at the front along the Baltimore 
and Ohio road to observe General Patterson's preparations. Nothing of mnch 
importance occurred for several weeks, beyond a little affair near Martinsburg 
in which Jackson captured about forty men of a reconnoitering party sent out 
by Patterson. His vigilance was ceaseless, and General Johnston felt sure, at 
Winchester, of ample warning of any aggressive movement of the enemy. 

Ou the 2d of January, 1861, Alfred M. Barbour 
(mentioned in the foregoing paper), Superinten- 
dent of the United States Armory at Harper's 
Ferry, wrote to Captain William Maynadier of the 
Ordnance Bureau, Washington, in part as follows: 

I have reason to apprehend that some assault will 
be made upon the United States Armory at Harper's 
Ferry. My reasons I do not feel at liberty to disclose. 
They may or they may not be well founded. I deem it 
my duty to inform you that there is no regularly organ- 
ized defense for the post. The armorers have been formed 
into volunteer companies, and arms and ammuni- 
tion furnished them. . . . But the armory might be 
taken and destroyed ; the arms might be abstracted and 
removed or destroyed ; vast amount of damage might be 
done to the Government property before the companies 
could be notified or rallied. ... I cannot be held re- 
sponsible for consequences at present, unless the Gov- 
ernment itself sees to the protection of its property" by 
placing reliable regularly drilled forces to sustain me. I 
do not look to personal consequences at all. I look to the 
duty of protecting the property of the Federal Govern- 
ment now under my charge." 

The next day Major (now General) Henry J. 
Hunt was assigned to commaud at Harper's Ferry, 
and Lieutenant Boger Jones was ordered to report- 
to him with a small force from Carlisle Barracks, 
Pennsylvania. Major Hunt, in response to his re- 
quest for instructions, accompanied by a statement 
of the weakness of his position, was directed by the 
Secretary of War (Holt) to avoid all needless irri- 
tation of the public mind. April 2d Major Hunt 
was ordered to other service, and the command 
devolved upon Lieutenant Jones (now Colonel 
and Inspector-General, I'. S. A.), who, in a letter 
to the Editors, gives the following account of the 
destruction of the armory : 

" From an early day after I reported with my detachment 
of sixty men from Carlisle, it became evident that a de- 
fense of the valuable Government interests at Harper's 
Ferry would be impracticable unless large reenforce- 
lnents were sent there; and as there was every reason 
for believing that this would not be done, I early became 
convinced that there was but one course to pursue- 
viz., to destroy what could not be defended. The chances 
for the capture or destruction of my small force re- 
duced ou April 18th to 45 men were overwhelming, but 
I counted on the unorganized and undisciplined state of 
the troops to be sent against me, on their surprise and 
bitter disappointment, as circumstances favoring our 

" On the Sunday preceding the seizure of the armory, 
a wealthy miller of the village came to me and offered to 

be the bearer of any message I might care to send to the 
Secretary of War [Mr. Simon Cameron], sayiug he knew 
him intimately and that he believed Mr. Cameron would 
heed and give due consideration to any representation 
coming from him. Having full confidence in the gentle- 
man, I intrusted him with a message to Mr. Cameron, 
to the effect that if he would save for the Government 
the arms, etc., etc., at the armory, troops must be sent 
there at once and by the thousand. I further charged 
this gentleman to go to Washington that night, and not 
delay until the next morning, as he had intended all of 
which he promised to do and none of which he did. But 
of his failure and change of purpose I was ignorant until 
his return to the Ferry Wednesday evening, when I 
learned that fear of the consequences of his mission, 
voluntarily assumed, had made him abandon it. Mon- 
day was passed in anxious expectation; the silence of 
Tuesday added to my anxiety, which culminated on the 
following morning, when Ex-Superintendent Barbour, 
fresh from the convention at Richmond, appeared upon 
the scene, told \\ hal had been done, and announced that 
within twenty-four hours the forces of the State of Vir- 
nia would be iu possession of the armory. 

" As I was acting entirety on my own judgment and 
responsibility, it was apparent I must not act prema- 
turely, before the danger was self-evident and imminent. 
As the evening advanced, nearer and nearer came the 
troops from Halltown, and finally, shortly after9 o'clock, 
when they r had advanced to within less than a mile of 
the armory, in time less than five minutes, the torch 
was applied, and before I could withdraw my men from 
the village, the two arsenal buildings, containing- about 
twenty thousand stand of rifles and rifle muskets, were 
ablaze. But very few of these arms were saved, for the 
constantly recurring explosions of powder which had 
been distributed through the buildings kept the crowd 
aloof. The fire in the shops was extinguished, but the 
arms, which were then of incalculable value, were de- 
stroyed. Tlie spirit, devotion, and loyalty of my men, ex- 
except two deserters, were admirable; four of them 
were captured at their posts, but they all eventually 
escaped, one by swimming the river, and reported to 
me at Carlisle. I have heard that within a few minutes 
after my command had crossed the Potomac to the Mary- 
land side of the river, a train was heard starting off for 
Baltimore, and that it was assumed by the Virginia 
troops and their officers that my command had been 
taken off by that train, and that, consequently, pursuit 
was useless." 

Lieutenant Jones's action was warmly approved 
by the President in a congratulatory letter from 
Secretary Cameron. 

Governor Letcher estimated the value of the 
property secured to the State by the seizure of 
the Gosport Navy Yard and the Harper's Ferry 
Arsenal at $25,000,000 to $30,000,000. 





THE reasons which made it important to occupy West Virginia with 
national troops were twofold political and strategic. The people were 
strongly attached to the Union, and had opposed the secession of Virginia, 
of which State they were then a part. But few slaves were owned by them, 
and all their interests bound them more to Ohio and Pennsylvania than to 
eastern Virginia. Under the influence of Lincoln's administration, strongly 
backed, and, indeed, chiefly represented, by Governor Dennison of Ohio, a 
movement was on foot to organize a loyal Virginia government, repudiating 
that of Governor Letcher and the State convention as self -destroyed by the 
act of secession. Governor Dennison had been urging McClellan to cross the 
Ohio to protect and encourage the loyal men when, on the 26th of May, news 
came that the Confederates had taken the initiative, and that some bridges 
had been burned on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad a little west of Grafton, 
the crossing of the Monongahela River, where the two western branches of the 
railroad unite, viz., the line from "Wheeling and that from Parkersburg. [See 
map, p. 129.] The great line of communication between Washington and the 
west had thus been cut, and action on our part was made necessary. .Governor 
Dennison had anticipated the need of more troops than the thirteen regiments 
which had been organized as Ohio's quota under the President's first call. He 
had organized nine other regiments, numbering them consecutively with those 
mustered into the national service, and had put them in camps near the Ohio 
River, where they could occupy Wheeling, Parkersburg, and the mouth of the 
Great Kanawha at a moment's notice. Two Union regiments were also 
organizing in West Virginia itself, at Wheeling and Parkersburg, of which 
the first was commanded by Colonel (afterward General) B. F. Kelley. 
West Virginia was in McClellan's department, and the formal authority to 
act had come from Washington on the 24th, in the shape of an inquiry from 
General Scott whether the enemy's force at Grafton could be counteracted. 




The dispatch directed McClellan to "act promptly." On the 27th Colonel 
Kelley was sent by rail from Wheeling to drive off! the enemy and protect 
the railroad. The hostile parties withdrew at Kelley's approach, and the 
bridges were quickly rebuilt. At the same time several of the Ohio regi- 
ments were ordered across the river, and a brigade of Indiana volunteers 
under Brigadier-General Thomas A. Morris was sent forward by rail from 
Indianapolis. Morris reached Grafton on the 1st of June, and was intrusted 
with the command of all the troops in West Virginia. He found that Colonel 
Kelley had already planned an expedition against the enemy, who had retired 
southward to Philippi, about thirty miles from Grafton. Morris approved 
the plan, but enlarged it by sending another column under Colonel Ebenezer 
Dumont of the 7th Indiana to cooperate with Kelley. Both columns were 
directed to make a night march, starting from points on the railroad about 
twelve miles apart, and converging on Philippi, which they were to attack 
at daybreak of June 3d. Each column consisted of about 1500 men, and 
Dumont's had with it 2 field-pieces of artillery, smooth 6-pounclers. 

The Confederate force was commanded by Colonel G. A. Porterfield, of 
the Virginia volunteers, and was something less than a thousand strong, 
about one-f ourth cavalry. J 

The night was dark and stormy, and Porterfield's raw troops had not 
learned picket duty. The concerted movement against them was more suc- 
cessful than such marches commonly are, and Porterfield's first notice of 

danger was the opening of the artillery 
upon his sleeping troops. It had been ex- 
pected that the two columns would inclose 
the enemy's camp and capture the whole ; 
but, though in disorderly rout, Porterfield 
succeeded, by personal coolness and cour- 
age, in getting them off with but few casu- 
alties and the loss of a few arms. The camp 
equipage and supplies were, of course, 
captured. Colonel Kelley was wounded 
by a pistol-shot in the breast, which was 
the only injury reported on the National 
side ; no prisoners were taken, nor did any 
dead or wounded fall into our hands. Por- 
terfield retreated to Beverly, some thirty 
miles farther to the south-east, and the 
National forces occupied Philippi. The 
telegraphic reports had put the Confed- 
erate force at 2000 and their loss at 15 


\ A Confederate Court of Inquiry reported that 
he had " 600 effective infantry (or thereabouts) 
ami 173 cavalry (or thereabouts)." Official 
Records, II., p. 72. 

4- The 11th Indiana Zouaves, Colonel Lew Wal- 
lace, passed through Cincinnati June 7th on their 

way to the front. They belonged to General Mor- 
ris's First Indiana Brigade (which also included the 
6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Indiana regiments), 
but were placed on detached service at Cumber- 
land, on the Potomac. Under instructions from 
General Robert Patterson, Colonel Wallace led an 


killed. This implied a considerable list of wounded and prisoners also, and 
the newspapers gave it the air of a considerable victory. The campaign 
thus opened with apparent eclat for McClellan, and the " Philippi races," as 
they were locally called, greatly encouraged the Union men of West Virginia 
and correspondingly depressed the secessionists. 

McClellan, however, was still of the opinion that his most promising line of 
operations would be by the Great Kanawha Valley, and he retained in their 
camp of instruction the Ohio regiments which were mustered into the service 
of the United States, sending into Virginia only those known as the State 
forces. Another reason for this was that the older regiments were now nearly 
at the end of their three-months' enlistment, and were trying to reorganize 
under the President's second call, which required enlistment for " three years 
or the war." | Nearly a month elapsed, when, having received reports that 
forces of the enemy were gathering at Beverly, McClellan determined to pro- 
ceed in person to that region with his best-prepared troops, postponing his 
Kanawha plan till north-western Virginia should be cleared of hostile forces. 

Reference to the map will show that as the Potomac route was usually in 
the hands of the Northern forces, a Confederate occupation of West Virginia 
must be made either by the Staunton and Beverly road, or by the Kanawha 
route, of which the key-point west of the mountains was G-auley Bridge. 

General Lee determined to send columns upon both these lines General 
Henry A. Wise upon the Kanawha route, and Greneral Robert S. Garnett to 
Beverly. Upon Porterfield's retreat to Beverly after the "Philippi races," 
Garnett, who had been an officer in the United States army, was ordered to 
Beverly to assume command and to stimulate the recruiting and organization 
of regiments from the secession element of the population. Some Virginia 
regiments, raised on the eastern slope of the mountains, were sent with him, 

expedition against a force of about five hundred into a position that soon drove the enemy from the house 

Confederates at Eomney, which influenced General and lnto a mountain to its rear. My attention was then 

TTri Ti i X.- a ' ' 4. j-tj turned to the battery on the hili. ... I pushed five 

J. E. Johnston in his decision to evacuate Harper s ....'.,. . , , , * , , 

. * companies in skirmishing order, and at double-quick 

Ferry (see note, page 120). In his report of the time, up a hill to the right, intending to get around the 

Eomney engagement Colonel Wallace says : left flank of the enemy, and cut off their retreat. . . . 

. , Between their position and that of my men was a deep, 

" I left Cumberland at 10 o clock on the night of the precipitous gorge, the crossing of which occupied about 

12th June with 8 companies, in all about 500 men, and ten minutes. When the opposite ridge was gained we 

by railway went to New Creek station, 21 miles distant, discovered t n e rebels indiscriminately blent, with a 

A little after 4 o'clock I started my men across the ma88 of W(jmeu aml cMMren flying a8 for lite from the 

mountains, 23 miles off, intending to reach the town by town Hftvi no uit of the camloneers wa8 

6 o clock m the morning. The road Lwas very fatiguing imp088ible . . . . After searching the town for arms, 

and rough. . . . With the utmost industry I did not c equipage, etc., I returned to Cumberland by the 

get near Romney until about 8 o'clock. . . I after- game road reacMng oamp at u - clock at nigh t." ' 
ward learned that they had notice of my coming full an 

hour before my arrival. In approaching the place, it EDITORS, 
was necessary for me to cross abridge over the South . T , . , ,, . ,. 
Branch of the Potomac. A reconnaissance satisfied me i Tt ls necessary to remember that at this time 
that the passage of the bridge would be the chief obstacle the Virginia State Government at Eichmond was 
in my way, although I could distinctly see the enemy trying to keep up an appearance of independence, 
drawn up on the bluff, which is the town site, support- and that Robert E. Lee had been made major- 
ing a battery of two guns, planted so as to sweep the , Tr . . . . , , . 

,.,^w,o^Li T /i- ?j j , * general of Virginia troops, conducting a campaign 

road completely. I directed mv advance guard to cross & , ., , ,.-.,.,. ^ T F , 

the bridge on the run, leap down an embankment at the ostensibly under the direction of Governor Letcher, 

farther entrance, and observe the windows of a large and not of the Confederate authorities. A simil- 

brick house not farther off than seventy-five yards. Their acrum of neutrality was still preserved, and a 

appearance was the signal for an assault. A warm fire shadow of doubt regarding Virginia's ultimate 

opened from the house, which the guard returned, with ..... , , . . , , 

no other loss than the wounding of a sergeant. The firing attitude had some effect in delaying active opera- 
continued several minutes. I led a second company tions along the Ohio as well as upon the Potomac, 
across the bridge, and by following up a ravine got them J. D. C. 


I 2q 

and to these was soon added the 1st Georgia. On the 1st of July he reported 
his force as 4500 men, but declared that his efforts to recruit had proven a 
complete failure, only 23 having joined. The West Virginians, he says, " are 
thoroughly imbued with an ignorant and bigoted Union sentiment." Other 
reenforcements were promised Garnett, but none reached him except the 
44th Virginia regiment, which arrived at Beverly the very day of the action, 
but which did not take 
part in the fighting. 

Tygart's Valley, in 
which Beverly lies, is 
between Cheat Mountain 

on the east, and 
Rich Mountain on 
the west. The 
river, of the same 
name as the val- 
ley, flows north- 
ward about fifteen miles, then turns westward, breaking through the ridge, 
passes by Philippi, and afterward crosses the railroad at Grafton. The 
Staunton and Parkersburg Turnpike divides at Beverly, the Parkersburg 
route passing over a saddle in Rich Mountain, and the Wheeling route 
following the river to Philippi. The ridge north of the river at the gap is 
known as Laurel Mountain, and the road passes over a spur of it. Garnett 
regarded the two positions at Rich Mountain and Laurel Mountain as the 
gates to all the region beyond, and to the West. A rough mountain road, 
barely passable, connected the Laurel Mountain position with Cheat River 
on the east, and it was possible to go by this way northward through St. 
George to the Northwestern Turnpike, turning the mountain ranges. [See 
map, p. 131.] 

Garnett thought the pass over Rich Mountain much the stronger and more 
easily held, and he therefore intrenched there about 1300 of his men and 

VOL. I. 9 




4 cannon, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram. The position 
chosen was on a spur of the mountain near its western base, and it was 
rudely fortified with breastworks of logs covered with an abattis of slashed 
timber along its front. The remainder of his force he placed in a similar 
fortified position on the road at Laurel Mountain, where he also had four 
guns, of which one was rifled. Here 
he commanded in person. His depot 
of supplies was at Beverly, which was 
16 miles from the Laurel Mountain 
position and 5 from that at Rich 
Mountain. He was pretty accurately 
informed of McClellan's forces and 
movements, and his preparations had 
barely been completed by the 9th of 
July, when the Union general ap- 
peared in his front. 

McClellan entered West Virginia in 
person on the 22d of June, and on the 
23d issued from Grafton a proclama- 
tion to the inhabitants. He had grad- 
ually collected his forces along the 
Baltimore and Ohio railroad, which, 
at the time of the affair at Rich Moun- 
tain, consisted of 16 Ohio regiments, 
9 from Indiana and 2 from West Virginia; in all, 27 regiments with 4 batteries 
of artillery of 6 guns each, 2 troops of cavalry, and an independent company 
of riflemen. Of his batteries, one was of the regular army, and another, a 
company of regulars (Company I, 4th IT. S. Artillery), was with him awaiting 
mountain howitzers, which arrived a little later. ^ The regiments varied 
somewhat in strength, but all were recently organized, and must have aver- 
aged at least 700 men each, making the whole force about 20,000. Of these, 
about 5000 were guarding the railroad and its bridges for some 200 miles, 
under the command of Brigadier-General C. W. Hill, of the Ohio Militia ; a 
strong brigade under Brigadier-General Morris, of Indiana, was at Philippi, and 
the rest were in three brigades forming the immediate command of McClellan, 
the brigadiers being General W. 8. Rosecrans, U. S. A., General Newton 
Schleich, of Ohio, and Colonel Robert L. McCook, of Ohio. On the date of his 
proclamation McClellan intended, as he informed General Scott, to move his 
principal column to Buckhannon on June 25th, and thence at once upon 
Beverly ; but delays occurred, and it was not till July 2d that he reached 
Buckhannon, which is 24 miles west of Beverly, on the Parkersburg branch 


]) As part of the troops were State troops not 
mustered into the United States service, no report 
of them is found in the War Department ; but the 
following are the numbers of the regiments found 
named as present in the correspondence and re- 
ports, viz., 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 
13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 

and 22d Ohio; 6th, 7th, Sth, 9th, 10th, 11th, 
13th, 14th, 15th Indiana, and 1st and 2d Vir- 
ginia ; also Howe's United States battery, Bar- 
nett's Ohio battery, Loomis's Michigan battery, 
and Damn's Virginia battery; the cavalry were 
Burdsal's Ohio Dragoons and Barker's Illinois 
Cavalry. J . D. C. 



of the turnpike. Before leaving Grafton the rumors he heard had made him 
estimate Garnett's force at 6000 or 7000 men, of which the larger part were at 
Laurel Mountain in front of General Morris. On the 6th of July he moved 
McCook with two regiments to Middle Fork Bridge, about half-way to 
Beverly, and 011 the same day ordered Morris to march with his brigade 
from Philippi to a position one and a half miles in front of Garnett's princi- 
pal camp, which was promptly done. Three days later, McClellan concen- 
trated the three brigades of his own column at Roaring Creek, about two 
miles from Colonel Pegram's position at the base of Rich Mountain. The 
advance on both lines had been made with only a skirmishing resistance, the 
Confederates being aware of McClellan's great superiority in numbers, and 
choosing to await his attack in their fortified positions. The National com- 
mander was now convinced that his opponent was 10,000 strong, of which 
about 2000 were before him at Rich Mountain. A reconnoissance made on 
the 10th showed that Pegram's position would be difficult to assail in front, 
but preparations were made to attack the next day, while Morris was directed 
to hold firmly his position before Garnett, watching for the effect of the 
attack at Rich Mountain. In the evening Rosecrans took to McClellan a 
young man named Hart, whose father lived on the top of the mountain two 
miles in rear of Pegrarn, and who thought he could guide a column of 
infantry to his father's farm by a circuit around Pegram's left flank south of the 
turnpike. The paths were so difficult that cannon could not go by them, but 
Rosecrans offered to lead a column of 
infantry and seize the road at the Hart 
farm. After some discussion McClellan 
adopted the suggestion, and it was 
arranged that Rosecrans should march 
at daybreak of the 11th with about 
two thousand men, including a troop 
of horse, and that upon the sound of 
his engagement in the rear of Pegrarn, 
McClellan would attack in force in 
front. By a blunder in one of the 
regimental camps, the reveille and 
assembly were sounded at midnight, 
and Pegrarn was put on the qui vive. 
He, however, believed that the attempt 
to turn his position would be by a path 
or country road passing round his 
right, between him and Garnett (of 
which the latter had warned him), and 
his attention was diverted from Rose- 
crans's actual route, which he thought 
impracticable. The alert which had 
occurred at midnight made Rosecrans 
think it best to make a longer circuit 

M Beverly ^m: 

A Garnetts Position 

^rcTT-' 8 - " COMBAT AT 

uM c Clcllans " JL _ . _ . . ,. . . . ._. . 

^.Morris's " k RIGHMOUNTAII 

F Rosecrans' Line ofjfarch 





than he at first intended, and it took ten hours of severe marching and 

mountain climbing to reach the Hart farm. The turning movement was 

made, but he found an enemy opposing him. Pegrarn had detached about 

350 men from the 1300 which he had, and had ordered them to guard the 

road at the mountain summit. He sent with them a single cannon from the 

four which constituted his only battery, 

and they threw together a breastwork of 

logs. The turnpike at Hart's runs in a 

depression of the summit, and as Rose- 

crans, early in the afternoon, came out upon 

the road, he was warmly received by both 

musketry and cannon. The ground was 

rough, the men were for the first time under 

fire, and the skirmishing combat varied 

through two or three hours, when a charge 

by part of Rosecrans's line, aided by a few 

heavy volleys from another portion of his 

forces which had secured a good position, 

broke the enemy's line. Reinforcements 

from Pegram were nearly at hand, with 

another cannon, but they did not come into 

action, and the runaway team of the caisson 

on the hill-top, dashing into the gun that brigadier-general john pegram, c. s. a. 


WaS COmillg Up, Capsized it dOWll the niOUIl- burg, February 6, 1865). from a 

tain-side where the descending road was photograph. 

scarped diagonally along it. Both guns fell into Rosecrans's hands, and he 
was in possession of the field. The march and the assault had been made 
in rain and storm. Nothing was heard from McClellan, and the enemy, rally- 
ing on their reinforcements, made such show of resistance on the crest a 
little farther on, that Rosecrans directed his men to rest upon their arms 
till next morning. When day broke on the 12th, the enemy had disappeared 
from the mountain-top, and Rosecrans, feeling his way down to the rear of 
Pegram's position, found it also abandoned, the two remaining cannon being 
spiked, and a few sick and wounded being left in charge of a surgeon. Still 
nothing was seen of McClellan, and Rosecrans sent word to him, in his camp 
beyond Roaring Creek, that he was in possession of the enemy's position. 
Rosecrans's loss had been 12 killed and 49 wounded. The Confederates left 
20 wounded on the field, and 63 were surrendered at the lower camp, 
including the sick. No trustworthy report of their dead was made. 

The noise of the engagement had been heard in McClellan's camp, and he 
formed his troops for attack, but the long continuance of the cannonade and 
some signs of exultation in Pegram's camp seem to have made him think 
Rosecrans had been repulsed. The failure to attack in accordance with the 
plan has never been explained. Rosecrans's messengers had failed to reach 
McClellan during the 11th, but the sound of the battle was sufficient notice 
that he had gained the summit and was engaged ; and he was, in fact, left to 


win his own battle or to get out of his embarrassment as he could. Toward 
evening McClellan began to cut a road for artillery to a neighboring height, 
from which he hoped his twelve guns would make Pegram's position unten- 
able ; but his lines were withdrawn again beyond Roaring Creek at nightfall, 
and all further action postponed to the next day. 

About half of Pegram's men had succeeded in passing around Rosecrans's 
right mink during the night and had gained Beverly. These, with the newly 
arrived Confederate regiment, fled southward on the Staunton road. Garnett 
had learned in the evening by messenger from Beverly that Rich Mountain 
summit was carried, and evacuated his camp in front of Morris about mid- 
night. He first marched toward Beverly, and was within five miles of that 
place when he received information (false at the time) that the National 
forces already occupied it. He then retraced his steps nearly to his camp, 
and, leaving the turnpike at Leadsville, he turned off upon a country road over 
Cheat Mountain into Cheat River Valley, following the stream northward 
toward St. George and West Union, in the forlorn hope of turning the moun- 
tains at the north end of the ridges and regaining his communications by a 
very long detour. He might have continued southward through Beverly 
almost at leisure, for McClellan did not enter the town till past noon on the 12th. 

Morris learned of Garnett's retreat at dawn, and started in pursuit as soon 
as rations could be issued. He marched first to Leadsville, where he halted 
to communicate with McClellan at Beverly and get further orders. These 
reached him in the night, and at daybreak of the 13th he resumed the pur- 
suit. His advance-guard of three regiments, accompanied by Captain H. W. 
Benham of the Engineers, overtook the rear of the Confederate column about 
noon and continued a skirmishing pursuit for some two hours. Garnett him- 
self handled his rear-guard with skill, and at Carrick's Ford a lively 
encounter was had. A mile or two farther, at another ford and when the 
skirmishing was very slight, he was killed while withdrawing his skirmishers 
from behind a pile of driftwood which he had used as a barricade. One of 
his cannon had become stalled in the ford, and, with about forty wagons, 
fell into Morris's hands. The direct pursuit was here discontinued, but 
McClellan had sent a dispatch to General Hill at Grafton, to collect the gar- 
risons along the railway and block the way of the Confederates where they 
must pass around the northern spurs of the mountains. 

His military telegraph terminated at the Roaring Creek camp, and the dis- 
patch written in the evening of the 12th was not forwarded to Hill till near 
noon of the 13th. This officer immediately ordered the collection of the 
greater part of his detachments at Oakland and called upon the railway 
officials for special trains to hurry them to the rendezvous. About one 
thousand men under Colonel James Irvine of the 16th Ohio were at West 
Union where the St. George road reaches the Northwestern Turnpike, 
and Hill's information was that a detachment of these held Red House, a 
crossing several miles in advance by which the retreating enemy might go. 
Irvine was directed to hold his positions at all hazards till he could be reen- 
f orced. Hill himself hastened with the first train from Grafton to Oakland with 



about 500 men and 3 cannon, reached his destination at nightfall, and hurried 
his detachment forward by a night march to Irvine, 10 or 12 miles over rough 
roads. It turned out that Irvine did not occupy Red House, and the preva- 
lent belief that the enemy was about eight thousand in number, with the 
uncertainty of the road he would take, made it proper to keep the little force 
concentrated till reenf orcements should come. The 
first of these reached Irvine about 6 o'clock on 
the morning of the 14th, raising his command to 
1500, but a few moments after their arrival he 
learned that the enemy had passed Red House 
soon after daylight. He gave chase, but did not 
overtake them. 

Meanwhile, General Hill had spent the night 
in trying to hasten forward the railway trains, 
but none were able to reach Oakland till morn- 
ing, and Garnett's forces had now more than 
twenty miles the start, and were on fairly good 
roads, moving southward on the eastern side of brigadier-general robert selden 
the mountains. McClellan still telegraphed that GA ' from a SSSZZES. '*' 
Hill had the one opportunity of a lifetime to cap- 
ture the fleeing army, and that officer hastened in pursuit, though unprovided 
with wagons or extra rations. When, however, the Union commander learned 
that the enemy had fairly turned the mountains, he ordered the pursuit 
stopped. Hill had used both intelligence and energy in his attempt to con- 
centrate his troops, but it proved simply impossible for the railroad to carry 
them to Oakland before the enemy had passed the turning-point, twenty 
miles to the southward. 

During the 12th Pegram's situation and movements were unknown. He 
had intended, when he evacuated his camp, to follow the line of retreat taken 
by the detachment already near the mountain-top, but, in the darkness of the 
night and in the tangled woods and thickets of the mountain-side, his column 
got divided, and, with the rear portion of it, he wandered all day on the 12th, 
seeking to make his way to Garnett. He halted at evening at the Tygart 
Valley River, six miles north of Beverly, and learned from some country 
people of G-atnettfs retreat. It was still possible to reach the mountains east 
of the valley, but beyond was a hundred miles of wilderness and half a dozen 
mountain ridges on which little, if any, food could be found for his men. He 
called a council of war, and, by advice of his officers, sent to McClellan, at 
Beverly, an offer of surrender. This was received on the 13th, and Pegram 
brought in 30 officers and 525 men. McClellan then moved southward him- 
self, following the Staunton road, by which the remnant of Pegram's little 
force had escaped, and on the 14th occupied Huttonsville. Two regiments 
of Confederate troops were hastening from Staunton to reenf orce Garnett. 
These were halted at Monterey, east of the principal ridge of the Alleghanies, 
and upon them the retreating forces rallied. Brigadier-General H. R. Jackson 
was assigned to command in Garnett's place, and both Governor Letcher and 
General Lee made strenuous efforts to increase this army to a force sufficient 


to resume aggressive operations. On MeClellan's -part nothing further was 
attempted, till, on the 22d, he was summoned to Washington to assume com- 
mand of the army, which had retreated to the capital after the panic of the 
first Bull Run battle. 

The affair at Rich Mountain and the subsequent movements were among 
the minor events of a great war, and would not warrant a detailed descrip- 
tion, were it not for the momentous effect they had upon the conduct of the 
war, by being the occasion of MeClellan's promotion to the command of the 
Potomac army. The narrative which has been given contains the " unvar- 
nished tale," as nearly as official records of both sides can give it, and it is a 
curious task to compare it with the picture of the campaign and its results 
which was then given to the world in the series of proclamations and dis- 
patches of the young general, beginning with his first occupation of the 
country and ending with his congratulations to his troops, in which he 
announced that they had " annihilated two armies, commanded by educated 
and experienced soldiers, intrenched in mountain fastnesses fortified at their 
leisure." The country was eager for good news, and took it as literally true. 
McClellan was the hero of the moment, and when, but a week later, his suc- 
cess was followed by the disaster to McDowell at Bull Run, he seemed pointed 
out by Providence as the ideal chieftain, who could repair the misfortune am I 
lead our armies to certain victory. His personal intercourse with those about 
him was so kindly, and his bearing so modest, that his dispatches, proclama- 
tions, and correspondence are a psychological study, more puzzling to those 
who knew him well than to strangers. Their turgid rhetoric and exaggerated 
pretense did not seem natural to him. In them he seemed to be composing for 
stage effect, something to be spoken in character by a quite different person 
from the sensible and genial man we knew in daily life and conversation. The 
career of the great Napoleon had been the study and the absorbing admira- 
tion of young American soldiers, and it was, perhaps, not strange that when 
real war came they should copy his bulletins and even his personal bearing. 
It was, for the moment, the bent of the people to be pleased with MeClellan's 
rendering of the role; they dubbed him the young Napoleon, and the 
photographers got him to stand with folded arms, in the historic pose. For 
two or three weeks his dispatches and letters were all on fire with enthusiastic 
energy. He appeared to be in a morbid condition of mental exaltation. 
When he came out of it, he was as genial as ever, as can be seen by the con- 
trast between his official communications and that private letter to General 
Burnside, written just after the evacuation of Yorktown, which, oddly enough, 
has found its way into the official records of the war.\ The assumed dash 

\ Letter of May 21st, 1862. "My Dear Burn : arms, and rely far more on his goodness than I do 
Your dispatch and kind letter received. I have on my own poor intellect. I sometimes think now- 
instructed Seth [Williams] to reply to the official that I can almost realize that Mahomet was sin- 
letter, and now acknowledge the kind private cere. When I see the hand of Clod guarding one 
note. It always does me good, in the midst of so weak as myself, I can almost think myself a 
my cares and perplexities, to see your wretched chosen instrument to carry out his schemes, 
old scrawling. I have terrible troubles to contend Would that a better man had been selected, 
with, but have met them with a good heart, like . . . Good-bye, and God bless you, Burn, 
your good old self, and have thus far struggled With the sincere hope that we may soon shake 
through successfully. . . . The crisis cannot hands, I am as ever, 
long be deferred. I pray for God's blessing on our Your sincere friend, McClellan." J. T>. C. 




and energy of his first campaign made the disappointment and the reaction 
more painful, when the excessive caution of his conduct in command of the 
Army of the Potomac was seen. But the Rich Mountain affair, when 
analyzed, shows the same characteristics which became well known later. 
There was the same overestimate of the enemy, the same tendency to inter- 
pret unfavorably the sights and sounds in front, the same hesitancy to throw 
in his whole force, when he knew that his subordinate was engaged. If 
Garnett had been as strong as McClellan believed him, he had abundant time 
and means to overwhelm Morris, who lay four days in easy striking distance, 
while the National commander delayed attacking Pegram ; and had Morris 
been beaten, Grarnett would have been as near Clarksburg as his opponent, 
and there would have been a race for the railroad. But, happily, Garnett 
was less strong and less enterprising than he was credited with * being. 
Pegram was dislodged, and the Confederates made a precipitate retreat. 



When McClellan reached Buckhannon, on the 2d of July, the rumors he 
heard of Garnett's strength, and the news of the presence of General Wise 
with a considerable force in the Great Kanawha Valley, made him conclude 
to order a brigade to that region for the purpose of holding the lower part 
of the valley defensively till he might try to cut off Wise's army after Gar- 
nett should be disposed of. This duty was assigned to me. The brigade 
which I had organized had all been taken for his own campaign, except the 
11th Ohio (only five companies present), but the 12th Ohio, which was still 
at Camp Dennison, was ordered to report to me, and these two regiments 
were to be sent by rail to Gallipolis as soon as the railways could furnish 
transportation. At Gallipolis we should find the 21st Ohio militia, and the 
1st and 2d Kentucky volunteers were also to join me there, coming by steam- 
boat from Cincinnati. The two Kentucky regiments had been organized in 
Cincinnati, and were made up chiefly of steamboat crews and "longshore- 
men " thrown out of employment by the stoppage of commerce on the river. 
There were in them some companies of other material, but these gave the 
distinctive character to -the regiments as a whole. The colonels and part of 
the field-officers were Kentuckians, but the organizations were Ohio regi- 
ments in nearly everything but the name. The men were mostly of a rough 
and reckless class, and gave a good deal of trouble by insubordination ; but 
they did not lack courage, and, after they had been under discipline for a 
while, became good fighting regiments. 

The troops moved the moment transportation could be furnished, and 
those going by rail were at Gallipolis and Point Pleasant (the mouth of the 
Great Kanawha) on the 10th. My only artillery was a section of 2 bronze 
rifles, altered from smooth 6-pounders, and my only cavalry some 30 
raw recruits, useful only as messengers. Meanwhile, my orders had been 
changed, and in accordance with them I directed the 2d Kentucky to land 
at Guyandotte, on the Ohio, about 70 miles below the Kanawha, the 

i 3 8 


1st Kentucky to proceed to Ripley, landing at Ravenswood, about 50 miles 
above, while with two and a half regiments I myself should move up the 
Kanawha Valley. The two detachments would join me after a time by 
lateral roads. My total force, when assembled, would be a little over three 
thousand men, the regiments having the same average strength as those with 
McClellan. The opposing force under 
General Wise was four thousand by the 
time the campaign was fully opened, 
though somewhat less at the begin- 

The Kanawha River was navigable 
for small steamboats about 70 miles, to 
a point 10 or 12 miles above Charleston, 
the only important town of the region 
and lying at the confluence of the Kan- 
awha and Elk rivers. Steamboats were 
plenty, owing to the interruption of 
trade, and wagons were wholly lacking, 
so that my column was accompanied 
and partly carried by a fleet of stern- 
wheel steamers. 

On the 11th of July the movement 
from Point Pleasant began. An advance- 
guard was sent out on each side of the 
river, marching upon the roads which were near its banks. The few horse- 
men were divided and sent with them as messengers, and the boats followed, 
steaming slowly along in rear of the marching men. Most of two regiments 
were carried on the steamers, to save fatigue to the men, who were as yet 
unused to their work, and many of whom were footsore from their first long 
march of 25 miles to Gallipolis, from the station where they left the railway. 
The arrangement was also a good one in a military point of view, for if an 
enemy were met on either bank of the stream, the boats could land in a 
moment and the troops disembark without delay. 

Our first day's sail was thirteen miles up the river, and it was the very 
romance of campaigning. I took my station on top of the pilot-house of the 
leading boat, so that I might see over the banks of the stream and across 
the bottom-lands which bounded the valley. The afternoon was a lovely 
one. Summer clouds lazily drifted across the sky, the boats were dressed 
in their colors, and swarmed with men as a hive with bees. The bands played 
national tunes, and as we passed the houses of Union citizens, the inmates 
would wave their handkerchiefs to us and were answered by cheers from the 
troops. The scenery was picturesque, the gently winding river making 
beautiful reaches that opened new scenes upon us at every turn. On either 




fc Wise reported his force on 17th July as 
3500 "effective" men and 10 cannon, and says 
he received "perhaps 300" in reinforcements 

on the 18th. When he abandoned the valley 
ten days later he reported his force 4000 in 
round numbers. J. D. C. 


side the advance-guard could be seen in the distance, the main body in the 
road, with skirmishers exploring the way in front and flankers on the sides. 
Now and then a horseman would bring some message to the shore from the 
front, and a small boat would be sent to receive it, giving us the rumors with 
which the country was rife, and which gave just enough of excitement and of 
the spice of possible danger to make this our first day in the enemy's country 
key everybody to a pitch that doubled the vividness of every sensation. The 
landscape seemed more beautiful, the sunshine more bright, and the exhilara- 
tion of outdoor life more joyous than any we had ever before known. 

Our first night's camp was in a picturesque spot in keeping with the beauties 
of the day's progress, and was enlivened by a report that the enemy was 
advancing to attack us in force. It was only a rumor, based upon the actual 
approach of a reconnoitering party of cavalry, and the camp was not allowed 
to be disturbed except to send a small reconnoissance forward on our own part. 
Two more days' advance, in the face of a slight skirmishing resistance, brought 
us to the Pocotalico, a stream entering the Kanawha from the north. 

Wise had placed his principal camp at Tyler Mountain, a bold spur which 
reaches the river on the northern side (011 which is also the turnpike road) 
about 12 miles above my position, while he occupied the south side with 
a detachment above Scary Creek some 3 miles from us. The hills closing in 
nearer to the river make it easy to stop steamboat navigation with a small 
force, and it became necessary to halt a little and await the arrival of the 
wagons which had not yet been sent me, and of the 2d Kentucky regiment, 
which was marching to me from Barboursville, where one wing of it, com- 
manded by Lieutenant-Colonel Neff , had a brilliant little affair with a body of 
Confederate recruits occupying the place. \ On the afternoon of the 17th, the 
Kentuckians having arrived, and a reconnoissance having been made of the 
Scary Creek position, which was found to be held by about 500 of the enemy 
with 1 or 2 cannon, Colonel John W. Lowe of the 12th Ohio was ferried over 
the river with his own regiment and 2 companies of the 21st Ohio with our 
2 cannon, and directed to occupy the attention of the enemy in front at the 
creek, which was unfordable at its mouth, while he tried to turn the position 
with part of his command. The enemy at first retreated, leaving one cannon 
disabled, but, being reenforced, they rallied, and, no good crossing of the creek 
being found, Lowe was foiled in his effort to dislodge them after a sharp 
engagement across the stream. 

The wagons reached us a few at a time, but by the 24th I was able to move 
from our strong position behind Pocotalico, and, taking circuitous country 
roads among the hills, to come upon the rear of Wise's camp at Tyler Mountain. 
The march was a long and difficult one, but was successful. As soon as his 
outposts were driven in, the enemy decamped in a panic, leaving his camp- 
kettles and supper over the fires. We had also cut off a steamboat with 
troops which was just below us as we came to the bluff, and which, under the 
fire of our cannon, was run ashore and burned, while the detachments on the 
other side of the river hastened by country roads to rejoin Wise at Charleston. 
It was now nightfall, and we bivouacked upon the mountain-side. Wise 






abandoned Charleston in the night and re- 
treated toward Grauley Bridge. On the 25th 
I occupied Charleston without resistance, and 
moved on, ordering the 1st Kentucky up from 
Ripley to garrison the place and establish my 
dej)ot there. 

At every mile above Charleston the scenery 
grows wilder, the mountains crowding in 
upon the river, often with high, beetling cliffs 
overhanging it, and offering numerous posi- 
tions where a small detachment might hold 
an army in check. Wise, however, made no 
resistance worth naming, except to fell timber 
into the road, and he passed the Gauley, burn- 
ing the important bridge there and continu- 
ing his hasty retreat to the White Sulphur 
Springs, hurried, no doubt, by the fear that 
McClellan might intercept him by way of 
Huntersville and Lewisburg. McClellan had 
recognized the fact that he was asking me to 
face the enemy with no odds in my favor, and as soon as he heard that 
Wise was disposed to make a stand, he had directed me not to risk attacking 
him in front, but rather to await the result of his own movement toward 
the Upper Kanawha. Rosecrans did the same when he assumed com- 
mand ; but I knew the hope had been that I could reach Gauley Bridge, 
and I felt warranted, as soon as wagons reached me, in attempting the turning 
movement which seems to have thrown Wise into a panic from which he 
did not recover till he got out of the valley. Rosecrans ordered me to 
remain on the defensive at Charleston, but his dispatches did not reach me, 
fortunateh^, till I was close to Gauley Bridge, some forty miles above Charles- 
ton, and was quite sure of my ability to take possession of that defile, as I did 
on the 29th of July. Another reason for haste was that the .time of enlist- 
ment of the 21st Ohio had expired, and I was ordered by the governor to send 
it back to Ohio for reorganization, which would make a reduction of one- 
fourth of my numbers. 

At my first night's encampment above Charleston, in a lovely nook 
between spurs of the hills, I was treated to a little surprise on the part of 
three of my subordinates which was an unexpected enlargement of my mil- 
itary experience, and which is worth preserving to show some of the con- 
ditions attending the beginning of a war with undisciplined troops. The 
camp was nicely organized for the night and supper was over, when I was 
waited upon at my tent by these gentlemen. Their spokesman informed me 
that after consultation they had concluded that it was foolhardy to follow 
the Confederates into the gorge we were traveling, and, unless I could show 
them satisfactory reasons for changing their opinion, they would not lead 
their commands farther into it. I dryly asked if he was quite sure he under- 



stood the nature of his communication. There was probably something in 
the tone of my question which was not altogether expected, and his compan- 
ions began to look a little uneasy. He then protested that they meant no 
disrespect, but, as their military experience was about as extensive as my own, 
they thought I ought to make no movement but on consultation with them 
and by their consent. The others seemed better pleased with this way of put- 
ting it. My answer was that whether they meant it or not, their action was 
mutinous, and only their ignorance of military law could palliate it. The 
responsibility for the movement of the army was with me, and, while glad to 
confer freely with them, I should call no council of war and submit nothing to 
vote till I felt incompetent to decide for myself. If they apologized for their 
conduct and showed earnestness in military obedience, what they had now 
said would be overlooked, but on any recurrence of insubordination I should 
enforce my power by arresting the offender at once. I dismissed them with 
this, and immediately sent out orders through my adjutant-general to march 
early next morning. Before they slept, one of the three had come to me with 
an earnest apology for his part in the matter, and a short time made them all 
as subordinate as I could wish. The incident could not have occurred in the 
brigade which had 
been under my c< >m- 
mand at Camp Den- 
and was the 







natural result of the 
sudden assembling 
of inexperienced 
men under a bri- 
gade commander of 
whom they knew 
nothing except that 
at the beginning of 
the war he had been 
a civilian like them- 

The same march 
enabled me to make 
the acquaintance of 
another army "insti- 
tution," the news- 
paper correspond- 
ent. At Charleston 
I was joined by two 
men representing 
influential newspapers, who wished to know on what terms they might accom- 
pany the column. The answer was that the quartermaster would furnish 
them with a tent and with transportation, and that their letters should be 
submitted to one of the staff to protect us from the publication of facts which 










fff I 

a - - T"^ y>A^' "f*/"-- 

; \ '%^kjf fLOYOS] H D. QRS 


Fayette C 


might aid the enemy. This seemed 
unsatisfactory, and they intimated that 
they expected to be taken into my 
mess, and to be announced as volun- 
teer aides with military rank. They 
were told that military position or 
rank could only be given by authority 
much higher than mine, and that they 
could be more honestly independent 
if free from personal obligation and 
from temptation to repay favors with 
flattery. My only purpose was to put 
the matter upon the foundation of 
public right and of mutual self-re- 
spect. The day before we reached 
Gauley Bridge they opened the matter 
again to my adjutant-general, but were 
informed that I had decided it upon 
a principle by which I meant to abide. Their reply was, " Very well ; General 
Cox thinks he can get along without us. We will show him. We will write 
him down ! " They left the camp the same evening and wrote letters to their 
papers, describing the army as a rabble of ruffians, burning houses, ravishing 
women, robbing and destroying property, and the commander as totally incom- 
petent. As to the troops, more baseless slander was never uttered. Their 
march had been orderly, no willful injury had been done to private property, 
and no case of personal violence to any non-combatant, man or woman, had 
been even charged. Yet the publication of such communications in widely 
read journals was likely to be as damaging as if it were true. My nomination 
as brigadier-general was then before the Senate for confirmation, and "the 
pen" would probably have proved "mightier than the sword" but for McClel- 
lan's knowledge of the nature of the task we had accomplished, as he was 
then in the flood-tide of power at Washington, and had expressed his satisfac- 
tion at the performance of our part of the campaign which he had planned. 


General Rosecrans had succeeded McClellan as ranking officer in West 
Virginia, but it was not until the beginning of November, 1861, that the region 
was made a department and he was regularly assigned to command. Meanwhile 
the three-months' enlistments were expiring, many regiments were sent home, 
new ones were received, and a complete reorganization of his forces took 
place. Besides holding the railroad, he fortified the Cheat Mountain Pass 
looking toward Staunton, and the pass at Elkwater on the mountain summit 
between Huttonsville and Huntersville. In similar manner I was directed 
to fortify the camp at Gauley Bridge, and to cover the front in every direc- 
tion with active detachments, constantly moving from the central position. 



By the middle of August, Rosecrans had established a chain of posts, with 
a regiment or two at each, on a line upon which he afterward marched 
from Weston, by way of Bulltown, Sutton, and Summersville, to Gauley 

The Confederates had also been straining every nerve to collect a force that 
might give us an effective return blow, and Robert E. Lee was expected to 
lead their forces in person. After ten days' quiet occupation of Grauley 
Bridge, in which I had reconnoitered the country nearly forty miles in front 
and on each flank, we learned that General John B. Floyd had joined Wise 
with a brigade, and that both were moving toward the Kanawha. At the same 
time the militia of Raleigh, Mercer, and Fayette counties were called out, 
making a force of two thousand men under General Chapman. The total force 
confronting us was thus about eight thousand. J To resist these I kept 2 
regiments at Grauley Bridge, an advance-guard of 8 companies vigorously 
skirmishing toward Sewell Mountain, a regiment distributed on the Kanawha 
to cover the steamboat communications, and some West Virginia recruits 
organizing at the mouth of the river. By extreme activity these were able 
to baffle the enemy and impose upon him the belief that our numbers were 

more than double our actual force. 
Rosecrans had informed me of his 
purpose to march a strong column to 
join me as soon as Lee's plans were 
fully developed, and I accumulated sup- 
plies and munitions at Grauley Bridge, 
determined to stand a siege if neces- 
sary. On the 13th of August the 7th 
Ohio, Colonel E. B. Tyler, was ordered 
by Rosecrans to Cross Lanes, covering 
Carnifex Ferry on the Grauley 
River about twenty miles above 
us, where a road from Lewis- 
burg meets that going up the 
Gauley to Summersville. I was author- 
ized to call Tyler to me if seriously 
attacked. On the 20th Wise made a 
strong demonstration in front, but was 
met at Pig Creek, three miles up the 
On the 26th Floyd, having raised a 
flat-boat which Tyler had sunk, crossed the. Gauley at Carnifex Ferry with 
2000 or 3000 men, and surprised him, routing the regiment with a loss to us 
of 15 killed and about 100 captured, of which 50 were wounded. The 
greater part of the regiment was rallied by Major Casement, and led over the 

^On the 1-ith of August Wise reported to force 3100. At that time lie gives Floyd's force at 

General Lee that he had 2000 ready to move, 1200, with 2 strong regiments coming up, besides 

and could have 2500 ready in 5 days; that 550 2000 militia under General Chapman, as stated 

of his cavalry were with Floyd, besides an artil- above. The aggregate force operating on the Kana- 

lery detachment of 50. This makes his total wha line he gives as 7800, Sept. 9th. J. D. C. 

--.-t- 1 


New River, and easily repulsed. 





ished the enemy's cavalry in a very 
the river and stop our steamboats, kept 

mountains to Elk River, and thence 
to Charleston. Floyd intrenched 
his position, and built a foot-bridge 
to connect it with the eastern side 
of the wild gorge. Wise's failure to 
cooperate was Floyd's reason for 
abandoning his announced purpose 
of marching upon my rear ; but he 
was on my northern line of commu- 
nication with Rosecrans, and the 
latter hastened his preparations to 
come to my relief. 

On the 3d of September, Wise and 
Chapman attempted a concerted 
attack upon Grauley Bridge, the first 
pushing in upon the turnpike, 
while Chapman advanced from 
Fayette by Cotton Hill and a road 
to the river a little below Kanawha 
Falls. Wise was again met at Pig- 
Creek and driven back; Chapman 
reached the bluffs overlooking the 
river in rear of us, driving in our 
outposts, but did us little mischief, 
except to throw a few shells into our 
lower camp, and on Wise's repulse 
he also withdrew. Our detachments 
followed them up on both lines with 
daily warm skirmishes, and the 
advance-guard ambushed and pun- 
demoralizing way. Efforts to reach 
the posts and detachments below us 



on the alert, and an expedition of half the 1st Kentucky, under Lieutenant- 
Colonel D. A. Enyart, sent to break irp a Confederate militia encampment at 
Boone Court House, 40 miles southward, routed the enemy, who left 25 dead 
upon the field. The march and attack had been swift and vigorous, and the 
terror of the blow kept that region quiet for some time afterward. 

I was puzzled at Floyd's inaction at Carnifex Ferry, but the mystery is 
partly solved by the publication of the Confederate records. There was no 
cooperation between the commanders, and Wise refused the assistance Floyd 
demanded, nor could even the authority of Lee reduce the ex-governor of 
Virginia to real subordination. The letters of Wise show a capacity for 
keeping a command in hot water which was unique. If he had been half as 
troublesome to me as he was to Floyd, I should, indeed, have had a hot time 
of it. But he did me royal service by preventing anything approaching 
unity of action between the two principal Confederate columns. 

Rosecrans now began his march from Clarksburg with three brigades, 
having left the Upper Potomac line in command of Greneral Kelley, and the 
Cheat Mountain region in command of Greneral J. J. Reynolds. His route 
(already indicated) was a rough one, and the portion of it between Sutton 
and Summersville, over Birch Mountain, was very wild and difficult. He 
left his bivouac on the morning of the 10th of September, before daybreak, 
and, marching through Summersville, reached Cross Lanes about 2 o'clock 
in the afternoon. Floyd's position was now about two miles distant, and 

waiting only for his column to close 
up, he again pressed forward. Gren- 
eral Benham's brigade was in front, 
and soon met the enemy's pickets. 
Gretting the impression that Floyd 
was in retreat, Benham pressed for- 
ward rather rashly, deploying to the 
left, and coming under a sharp fire 
from the right of the enemy's works. 
The woods were dense and tangled, 
it was too late for a proper recon- 
noissance, and Rosecrans could only 
hasten the advance and deployment 
of the other brigades under Colonels 
McCook and Scammon. Benham had 
sent a howitzer battery and two rifled 
cannon with his head of column at 
the left, and these soon got a position, 
from which, in fact, they enfiladed 
part of Floyd's line, though it was 
impossible to see much of the situa- 
tion. Charges were made by portions 
of Benham's and McCook's brigades 
as they came up, but they lacked 




Jhe Continuous doulk lines areF/i'/di etttrencJiments 


a 3^10'^iz^oido b iz^aa'tia'tOMo 

C Scammons moving up. 
D Schneider's buttery in position 
E 3fjfu7!zn's hattf.ry movin<j up 

VOL. I. 10 



unity, and Rosecrans was dissatisfied that his head of column should be 
engaged before he had time to plan an attack. Colonel Lowe, of the 12th 
Ohio, had been killed at the head of his regiment, and Colonel W. H. Lytle, 
of the 10th, had been severely wounded; darkness was rapidly coming on, 
and Rosecrans ordered the troops withdrawn from fire, till positions could 
be rectified, and the attack renewed in the morning. Seventeen had been 
killed and 141 had been wounded in the sharp but irregular combat. Floyd, 
however, had learned that his position could be subjected to a destructive 
cannonade; he was himself slightly wounded, and his officers and men 
were discouraged. He therefore retreated across the Grauley in the night, 
having great difficulty in carrying his artillery down the cliffs by a 
wretched road in the darkness. He had built a slight foot-bridge for 
infantry, in the bit of smooth water known as the Ferry, though both 
above and below the stream is an impassable mountain torrent. Once over, 
the bridge was broken up and the ferry-boat was destroyed. He reported 
but twenty casualties, and threw much of the responsibility upon Wise, who 
had not obeyed orders to reenforce him. His hospital, containing the 
wounded prisoners taken from Tyler, fell into Rosecrans's hands. 

On the 12th of September we first heard, at Grauley Bridge, of the engagement 
at Carnif ex Ferry, and I at once moved with two regiments to attack Wise, who 
retired as we advanced, till I occupied the junction of the turnpike with the 
Sunday road. The whole hostile force had retreated to Sewell Mountain, and 
Rosecrans halted me until he could create means of crossing the Grauley. 

McCook's brigade joined me on the 16th of September, and my own command 
was increased by bringing up another of my regiments from below. With 


Lyy w. sit' *, -.*- *^ - ^ < Hsu-? 1 - "ir- ^s. ~ \ , ~ss ? a^<* 

1':' y ' ' ' '"- 




the two brigades I 
advanced to Spy 
Rock, a strong posi- 
tion overlooking a 
valley several miles 
broad, beyond which 
was Big Sewell 
Mountain, the crest 
of which we occu- 
pied with an ad- 
vance-guard on the |y 
20th and in force on 
the 24th. Before the 
1st of October Rose- 
crans had concentra- 
ted his force at the 
mountain, the four 
brigades being so 
reduced by sickness 
and by detachments 
that he reported the 
whole as making 
only 5200 effective 
men. Immediately 
in front, across a 
deep gorge, lay the 
united forces of 
Floyd and Wise, 
commanded by Lee 
in person. The autumn rains set in upon the very day of Rosecrans's arrival, 
and continued without intermission. The roads became so difficult that the 
animals of the wagon trains were being destroyed in the effort to supply the 
command. The camp was 35 miles from Gauley Bridge, and our stores were 
landed from steamboats 25 miles below that post, making 60 miles of wagoning. 
The enemy was as badly off, and no aggressive operations were possible on 
either side. This became so evident that on the 5th of October Rosecrans 
withdrew his forces to camps within 3 or 4 miles of Gauley Bridge. 

Lee had directed an effort to be made by General Loring, his subordinate 
on the Staunton line, to test the strength of the posts under Reynolds at 
Cheat Mountain and Elkwater, and lively combats had resulted on the 12th 
and 14th of September. Reynolds held firm, and Rosecrans had not been 
diverted from his own plans. On October 2d Reynolds delivered a return 
blow upon the Confederate position at Greenbrier River, but found it too 
strong to be carried. Both parties now remained in observation till the end 
of October. Floyd reported to his Government that the eleven days of cold 
storms at Sewell Mountain had " cost more men, sick and dead, than the 




battle of Manassas Plains." More enterprising in plans than resolute or 
skillful in carrying them out, he determined upon another effort, with Lee's 
consent. Taking advantage of Rosecrans's neglect to occupy Fayette Court 
House and Cotton Hill, a mountainous mass in the angle of the Kanawha 
and New rivers, he moved with a column of about five thousand men across 
New River and down its left bank, and startled the Union commander 1 > y 
opening with cannon upon the post at Gauley Bridge on the 1st of Novem- 
ber. The demonstration was more noisy than dangerous, for Floyd had no 
means of crossing the river. The ordnance stores at the post were moved 
into a gorge out of the range of fire, and a battery was established high up 
on Gauley Mount to reply to the enemy. Rosecrans had hopes of capturing 
Floyd, by turning his position from below by Benham's and Robert C. 
Sehenek's (formerly Scammon's) brigades. Delays occurred which Rosecrans 
attributed to failure to obey orders on the part of Benham. On the 10th 
detachments from my brigade at Gauley Bridge crossed the river and scaled 
the heights, attacking Floyd in front and securing apposition on the top of 
the mountain. Floyd withdrew his artillery, and on the 12th, learning that 
Schenck and Benham were moving toward his rear, decamped, and did not 
cease his retreat till he reached the Holston Valley railroad. 

Lee returned to Richmond, and portions of the troops on both sides were 
sent to other fields, where military operations in winter were thought to be more 
practicable. The remnant went into winter quarters, and though some com- 
bats occurred, the most noteworthy of which was Milroy's attack upon the 
Confederates in front of Cheat Mountain Pass in December, these engage- 
ments did not change the situation. West Virginia had organized as a free 
State within the Union, and this substantial result of the campaign crowned 
it with success. The line of the Alleghanies became the northern frontier 
of the Confederacy in Virginia, and was never again seriously broken. 


On October 26th, 1861, Brigadier-General B. F. Kelley, gagement, the Confederates were driven from their in- 

with a small force of infantry and cavalry, advanced 
upon Romncy from New Creek Station, 26 miles distant, 
on the Potomac (see map, page 129). After a sharp en- 

trenchments and the town was captured. The Union 
forces lost 1 killed and 20 wounded. In the sketch are 
shown the camps of General Kelley's troops. 









BEFORE I reached the point of enlisting, I had read and been " enthused " 
by General Dix's famous " shoot him on the spot " dispatch ; I had 
attended flag-raisings, and had heard orators declaim of " undying devotion to 
the Union." One speaker to whom I listened declared that " human life must 
be cheapened " ; but I never learned that he helped on the work experiment- 
ally. When men by the hundred walked soberly to the front and signed the 
enlistment papers, he was not one of them. As I came out of the hall, with 
conflicting emotions, feeling as though I should have to go Anally or forfeit 
my birthright as an American citizen, one of the orators who stood at the 
door, glowing with enthusiasm and patriotism, and shaking hands effusively 
with those who enlisted, said to me : 

" Did vou enlist % " " No," I said. " Did you ! " 

" No ; they won't take me. I have got a lame leg and a widowed mother 
to take care of." 

I remember another enthusiast who was eager to enlist others. He 
declared that the family of no man who went to the front should suffer. After 

& January ISth, 1861, three days after he had 
entered on his duties as Secretary of the Treasury 
to President Buchanan, General Dix sent W. 
Hemphill Jones, chief clerk of one of the Treasury 
bureaus, to the South, for the purpose of saving 
the revenue-cutters at New Orleans, Mobile, and 
Galveston. January 29th, Mr. Jones telegraphed 
from New Orleans that the captain of the revenue- 
cutter McClelland refused to obey the Secretary's 
orders. It was seven in the evening when the 
dispatch was received. Immediately, Secretary 

Dix wrote the following reply: "Treasury De- 
partment, January 29, IS 01. Tell- Lieutenant 
Caldwell to arrest Captain Breshwood, assume 
command of the cutter, and obey the order I gave 
through you. If Captain Breshwood, after ai'rest, 
undertakes to interfere with the command of the 
cutter, tell Lieutenant Caldwell to consider him as 
a mutineer, and treat him accordingly. If any one 
attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot 
him on the spot. John A. Dix, Secretary of the 
Treasury." Editors. 






the war he was prominent among those who at town-meeting voted to refund 
the money to such as had expended it to procure substitutes. He has, moreover, 
been fierce and uncompromising toward the ex-Confederates since the war. 

From the first I did not believe the trouble would blow over in " sixty 
days"; ,1 nor did I consider eleven dollars a month, % and the promised glory, 
large pay for the services of an able-bodied young man. 

It was the news that the 6th Massachusetts regiment had been mobbed by 
roughs on their passage through Baltimore which gave me the war fever. | 

} Mr. Seward, speaking in New York two days 
after the secession of South Carolina, said : " Sixty 
days' more suns will give you a much brighter and 
more cheerful atmosphere." 

& The monthly pay of Union privates was : 
cavalry $12, artillery and infantry $11 ; from 
August 6th, 1861, $13 for all arms, and from 
May 1st, 1864, $16. Confederate privates re- 
ceived: in the cavalry and light batteries $12 ; in 
the artillery and infantry $11 ; increased June 
9th, 1864, to $19 and $18 per month for a 
period of one year from that date. Editors. 

4 Concerning this encounter Colonel Edward F. 
Jones, of the 6th Massachusetts, says in his report : 

"After leaving Philadelphia I received intimation 
that our passage through the city of Baltimore would 
be resisted. I caused ammunition to be distributed 
and arms loaded, and went personally -through the 
cars, and issued the following order, viz., 'The regi- 
ment will march through Baltimore in column of sec- 
tions, arms at will. You will undoubtedly be insulted, 
abused, and perhaps assaulted, to which you must pay 
no attention whatever, but march with your faces 
square to the trout and pay no attention to the mob, 
even if they throw stones, bricks, or other missiles; 
but if you are fired upon and any one of you is hit, your 
officers will order you to fire. Do not Are into any pro- 
miscuous crowds, but select any man whom you may 
Bee aiming at you, and be sure you drop him.' Reach- 
ing Baltimore, horses were attached the instant that 
the locomotive was detached, and the cars were driven 
at a rapid pace across the city. After the cars con- 
taining seven companies had reached the Washington 
depot the track behind them was barricaded, and the 
cars containing . . . the following companies, viz., 
Company C, of Lowell, Captain Follansbee ; Company 

D, of Lowell, Captain Hart; Company I, of Lawrence, 
Captain Pickering, and Company L, of Stonehain, Cap- 
tain Dike, were vacated, and they proceeded but a short 
distance before they were furiously attacked by a shower 
of missiles, which came faster as they advanced. They 
increased their steps to double-quick, which seemed to 
infuriate the mob, as it evidently impressed the mob 
with the idea that the soldiers dared not fire or had no 
ammunition, and pistol-shots were numerously fired 
into the ranks, and one soldier fell dead. The order 
' Fire ' was given, and it was executed. In conse- 
quence, several of the mob fell, and the soldiers again 
advanced hastily. The mayor of Baltimore placed him- 
self at the head of the column beside Captain Follans- 
bee, and proceeded with them a short distance." . . . 

The Hon. George William Brown, then mayor of 
Baltimore, in his volume entitled "Baltimore and 
the 19th of April, 1861," thus describes the march 
of the soldiers after he joined the column : 

" They were firing wildly, sometimes backward, over 
their shoulders. So rapid was the march that they 
could not stop to take aim. The mob, which was not 
very large, as it seemed to me, was pursuing with 
shouts and stoues, and, I think, an occasional pistol- 
shot. The uproar was furious. I ran at once to the 
head of the column, some persons in the crowd shout- 
ins, ' Here comes the mayor.' I shook hands with the 
officer in command. Captain Follansbee, saying, as 1 did 
so, 'I am the mayor of Baltimore.' The captain greeted 
me cordially. I at once objected to the double-quick, 
which was immediately stopped. I placed myself by his 
side, and marched with him. He said, 'We have been 
attacked without provocation,' or words to that effect. I 
replied, ' You must defend yourselves.' I expected that 
he would face his men to the rear, and, after giving 
warving, would fire if necessary. But I said no more, 
for I immediately felt that, as mayor of the city, it was 



And yet when I read Governor John A. Andrew's instructions to have 
the hero martyrs "preserved in ice and tenderly sent forward," somehow, 
though I felt the pathos of it, I could not reconcile myself to the ice. 
Ice in connection with patriotism did not give me agreeable impressions 
of war, and when I came to think of it, the stoning of the heroic " Sixth " 
didn't suit me; it detracted from my desire to die a 
soldier's death. 

I lay awake all night thinking the matter over, with 
the " ice " and " brick-bats " before my mind. How- 
ever, the fever culminated that night, and I resolved 
to enlist. 

" Cold chills " ran up and down my back as I got out of 
bed after the sleepless night, and shaved, preparatory to 
other desperate deeds of valor. I was twenty years of 
age, and when anything unusual was to be done, like 
fighting or courting, I shaved. 

With a nervous tremor convulsing my system, and 
my heart thumping like muffled drum-beats, I stood 
before the door of the recruiting-office, and, before turn- 
ing the knob to enter, read and re-read the advertisement 
for recruits posted thereon, until I knew all its pecu- 
liarities. The promised chances for " travel and promo- 




not my province to volunteer such advice. Once before 
in my lite I bad taken part in opposing a formidable 
riot, and had learned by experience that the safest and 
most humane manner of quelling a mob is to meet it at 
the beginning with armed resistance. The column con- 
tinued its march. There was neither concert of action 
nor organization among the rioters. They were armed 
only with such stones or missiles as they could pick up, 
and a few pistols. My presence for a short time had 
some effect, but very soon the attack was renewed with 
greater violence. The mob grew bolder. Stones flew 
thick and fast. Rioters rushed at the soldiers and at- 
tempted to snatch their muskets, and at least on two 
occasions succeeded. With one of these muskets a sol- 
dier was killed. Men fell ou both sides. A young law- 
yer, then and now known as a quiet citizen, seized a 
flag of one of the companies and nearly tore it from its 
staff. He was shot through the thigh, and was carried 
home apparently a dying man, but he survived to enter 
the army of the Confederacy ,where he rose to the rank of 
captain, and he afterward returned to Baltimore, where 
he still lives. The soldiers tired at will. There was no 
firing by platoons, and I heard no order given to fire. 
I remember that at the corner of South street several 
citizens standing in a group fell, either killed or 
wounded. It was impossible for the troops to discrimi- 
nate between the rioters and the by-standers, but the 
latter seemed to suffer most. . . . Marshal Kane, 
with about fifty policemen (as I then supposed, but I 
have since ascertained that, in fact, there were not so 
many), came at a run from the direction of the Camden 
street station, and throwing themselves in the rear of 
the troops, they formed a line in front of the mob, and 
with drawn revolvers kept it back. This was between 
Light and Charles streets. Marshal Kane's voice 
shouted, ' Keep back, men, or I shoot! ' This movement, 
which I saw myself, was gallantly executed, and was 
perfectly successful. The mob recoiled like water from 
a rock. One of the leading rioters, then a young man, 
now a peaceful merchant, tried, as he has hhnserf told 
me, to pass the line, but the marshal seized him, and 

vowed he would shoot if the attempt was made. This 
nearly ended the fight, and the column passed on under 
the protection of the police, without serious molesta- 
tion, to Camden statiou " 

Sumner H. Needham, of Lawrence, Addison O. 
Whitney and Luther C. Ladd, of Lowell, and 
Charles A. Taylor were the killed, and thirty-six 
of their comrades were wounded. Twelve citi- 
zens were killed, and an unknown number were 
wounded. Col. Jones continues : 

"As the men went into the cars I caused the blinds to 
the cars to be closed, and took every precaution to pre- 
vent any shadow of offense to the people of Baltimore ; 
but still the stones flew thick and fast into the train, 
and it was with the utmost difficulty that I could pre- 
vent the troops from leaving the cars and revenging 
the death of their comrades. . . . On reaching 
Washington we were quartered at the Capitol, in the 
Senate Chamber." 

This regiment, the 6th Massachusetts, were the 
first armed troops to reach Washington in re- 
sponse to the call of the President'. 

The 27th Pennsylvania Regiment (unarmed) 
arrived at Baltimore by the same train as the 
Massachusetts troops. It was attacked by a mob 
and obliged to remain at the President street 
station, from which point it was sent back the 
same day in the direction of Philadelphia. The 
same night, by order of the Board of Police Com- 
missioners, with the concurrence of Governor 
Hicks and Mayor Brown, the railways from the 
north were obstructed, so that the 8th Massa- 
chusetts, with General B. F. Butler, and the 7th 
New York were compelled to go to Annapolis by 
water and march thence to Washington. Editors. 

I 5 2 


tion" seemed good, and I thought I might have made a mistake in con- 
sidering war so serious after all. " Chances for travel ! " I must confess 
now, after four years of soldiering, that the " chances for travel " were no 
myth ; but " promotion " was a little un- 
certain and slow. 

I was in no hurry to open the door. 
Though determined to enlist, I was half 
inclined to put it off awhile ; I had a fluc- 
tuation of desires; I was faint-hearted 
and brave; I wanted to enlist, and yet 

Here I turned the knob, and was 

relieved. I had been more prompt, with 
all my hesitation, than the officer in his 
duty ; he wasn't in. Finally he came, and 
said: "What do you want, my boy?" "I 
want to enlist," I responded, blushing 
deeply with upwelling patriotism and 
bashfulness. Then the surgeon came to 
strip and examine me. In justice to my- 
self, it must be stated that I signed the 
rolls without a tremor. It is common to 
the most of humanity, I believe, that, 
when confronted with actual danger, men 
have less fear than in its contemplation. 
I will, however, make one exception in 
favor of the first shell I heard uttering its 
blood-curdling hisses, as though a steam 
locomotive were traveling the air. With 
this exception I have found the actual 
dangers of war always less terrible face to 
face than on the night before the battle. 

My first uniform was a bad fit : my trousers were too long by three 
or four inches; the flannel shirt was coarse and unpleasant, too large 
at the neck and too short elsewhere. The forage cap was an un- 
gainly bag with pasteboard top and leather visor; the blouse was 
the only part which seemed decent ; while the overcoat made me feel 
like a little nubbin of corn in a large preponderance of husk. Nothing 
except " Virginia mud " ever took down my ideas of military pomp quite 
so low. 

After enlisting I did not seem of so much consequence as I had expected. 
There was not so much excitement on account of my military appearance as 
I deemed justly my due. I was taught my facings, and at the time I thought 
the drill-master needlessly fussy about shouldering, ordering, and presenting 
arms. At this time men were often drilled in company and regimental 
evolutions long before they learned the manual of arms, because of the diffi- 
culty of obtaining muskets. These we obtained at an early day, but we 





would willingly have resigned them after carrying them for a few hours. 
The musket, after an hour's drill, seemed heavier and less ornamental 
than it had looked to be. The first day I went out to drill, getting tired of 
doing the same things over and over, I said to the drill-sergeant : " Let's stop 
this fooling and go over to the grocery." His only reply was addressed to a 
corporal :*" Corporal, take this man out and drill him like h 1 " ; and the cor- 
poral did ! I found that suggestions were not so well appreciated in the army 
as in private life, and that no wisdom was equal to a drill-master's " Right 
face," " Left wheel," and "Right, oblique, march." It takes a raw recruit 
some time to learn that he is not to think or suggest, but obey. Some 
never do learn. I acquired it at last, in humility and mud, but it was tough. 
Yet I doubt if my patriotism, during my first three weeks' drill, was quite 
knee-high. Drilling looks easy to a spectator, but it isn't. Old soldiers who 
read this will remember their green recruithood and smile assent. After a 
time I had cut down my uniform so that I could see out of it, and had con- 
quered the drill sufficiently to see through it. Then the word came: On 
to Washington ! 

Our company was quartered at a large hotel near the railway station in 
the town in which it had been recruited. Bunks had been fitted up within a 
part of the hotel but little used. We took 
our meals at the public table, and found 
fault with the style. Six months later we 
would have considered ourselves aristo- 
cratic to have slept in the hotel stables 
with the meal-bin for a dining-table. One 
morning there was great excitement at the 
report that we were going to be sent to 
the front. Most of us obtained a limited 
pass and went to see our friends for the 
last time, returning the same night. 
Many of our schoolmates came in tears 
to say good-bye. We took leave of 
them all with heavy hearts, for, lightly 
as I may here seem to treat the sub- 
ject, it was no light thing for a boy 
of twenty to start out for three years 
into the unknown dangers of a civil war. 
Our mothers Clod bless them! had 
brought us something good to eat, pies, 
cakes, doughnuts, and jellies. It was 
one way in which a mother's heart 
found utterance. The young ladies 
(sisters, of course) brought an invention, usually made of leather or cloth, 
containing needles, pins, thread, buttons, and scissors, so that nearly every 
recruit had an embryo tailor's shop, with the goose outside. One old lady, 
in the innocence of her heart, brought her son an umbrella. We did not see 




anything particularly laughable about it at the time, but our old drill-sergeant 
did. Finally we were ready to move ; our tears were wiped away, our buttons 
were polished, and our muskets were as bright as emery paper could make them. 
" Wad " Eider, a member of our company, had come from a neighboring 
State to enlist with us. He was about eighteen years of age, red-headed, 
freckled-faced, good-natured and rough, with a wonderful aptitude for crying 
or laughing from sympathy. Another comrade, whom I will call Jack, was 
honored with a call from his mother, a little woman, hardly reaching up to 
his shoulder, with a sweet, motherly, care-worn face. At the last moment, 
though she had tried hard to preserve her composure, as is the habit of New 
England people, she threw her arms around her boy's neck, and with an 
outburst of sobbing and crying, said : " My dear boy, my dear boy, what will 

your ]Door old mother do without you! 
You are going to fight for your country. 
Don't forget your mother, Jack; God 
bless you, Gk>d bless you ! " We felt as if 
the mother's tears and blessing were a 
benediction over us all. There was a touch 
of nature in her homely sorrow and solici- 
tude over her big boy, which drew tears 
of sympathy from my eyes as I thought 
of my own sorrowing mother at home. 
The sympathetic Wad Eider burst into 
tears and sobs. His eyes refused, as he 
expressed it, to " dry up," until, as we were 
moving off, Jack's mother, rushing toward 
him with a bundle tied like a wheat-sheaf, 
called out in a most pathetic voice, 
" Jack ! Jack ! you've forgotten to take 
your pennyroyal." We all laughed, and 
so did Jack, and I think the laugh helped 
him more than the cry did. Everybody 
had said his last word, and the cars were 
off. Handkerchiefs were waved at us 
from all the houses we passed; we 
cheered till we were hoarse, and then set- 
tled back and swung our handkerchiefs. 

Just here let me name over the con- 
tents of my knapsack, as a fan sample of 
what all the volunteers started with. There 
were in it a pair of trousers, two pairs of 
drawers, a pair of thick boots, four pairs 
of stockings, four flannel shirts, a blouse, 
a looking-glass, a can of peaches, a bottle 
of cough-mixture, a button-stick, chalk, 
razor and strop, the " tailor's shop " 







spoken of above, a Bible, a small volume of Shakspere, and writing utensils. 
To its top was strapped a double woolen blanket and a rubber one. Many other 
things were left behind because of lack of room in or about the knapsack, j] 

On our arrival in Boston we were marched through the streets the first 
march of any consequence we had taken with our knapsacks and equipments. 
Our dress consisted of a belt about the body, which held a cartridge-box 
and bayonet, a cross-belt, also a haversack and tin drinking-cup, a canteen, 
and, last but not least, the knapsack strapped to the back. The straps ran 
over, around, and about one, in confusion most perplexing to our unsophisti- 
cated shoulders, the knapsack constantly giving the wearer the feeling that he 
was being pulled over backward. My canteen banged against my bayonet, 
both tin cup and bayonet badly interfered with the butt of my musket, while 
my cartridge-box and haversack were constantly flopping up and down the 
whole jangling like loose harness and chains on a runaway horse. As we 
marched into Boston Common, I involuntarily cast my eye about for a bench. 
But for a former experience in offering advice, I should have proposed to the 
captain to " chip in " and hire a team to carry our equipments. Such was my 
first experience in war harness. Afterward, with hardened muscles, rendered 
athletic by long marches and invigorated by hardships, I could look back 
upon those days and smile, while carrying a knapsack as lightly as my heart. 
That morning my heart was as heavy as my knapsack. At last the welcome 

| It is said by one of the " Mouticello Guards," that most of its members started for Bull Run with a 
trunk and an abundant supply of fine linen shirts. Editors., 







On the 27th of April, 1861, General B. F. Butler was 
assigned to the command of the Department of Anna- 
polis, which did not include Baltimore. On the 5th of 
May, with two regiments and a battery of artillery, he 
moved from Washington to the Relay House, on the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railway, 1 miles from Baltimore, at 
the junction of the Washington branch. He fortified 
this position, and on the 13th entered Baltimore and 

occupied and fortified Federal Hill, overlooking the 
harbor and commanding the city. On the 15th he was 
followed in command of the Department by General 
George Cadwalader, who was succeeded on the 11th of 
Juiie by General N. P. Banks, who administered the 
Department until succeeded by General John A. Dix, 
July 23d, 1861. On the 22d of May General Butler 
assumed command at Fort Monroe, Va. 

orders came : " Prepare to open ranks ! Rear, open order, march ! Right 
dress ! Front ! Order arms ! Fix bayonets ! Stack arms ! Unsling knapsacks ! 
In place, rest ! " 

The tendency of raw soldiers at first is to overload themselves. On the first 
long march the reaction sets in, and the recruit goes to the opposite extreme, 
not carrying enongh, and thereby becoming dependent upon his comrades. 
Old soldiers preserve a happy medium. I have seen a new regiment start out 
with a lot of indescribable material, including sheet-iron stoves, and come back 
after a long march covered with more mud than baggage, stripped of every- 
thing except blankets, haversacks, canteens, muskets, and cartridge-boxes. 

During that afternoon in Boston, after marching and countermarching, or, 
as one of our farmer-boy recruits expressed it, after "hawing and geeing" 
about the streets, we were sent to Fort Independence for the night for safe- 
keeping. A company of regulars held the fort, and the guards walked their 
post with an uprightness that was astonishing. Our first impression of them 
was that there was a needless amount of " wheel about and turn about, and 
walk just so," and of saluting, and presenting arms. We were all marched to 


our quarters within the fort, where we unsluug our knapsacks. After the 
first day's struggle with a knapsack, the general verdict was, " got too much 
of it." At supper-time we were marched to the dining-barracks, where our 
bill of fare was beefsteak, coffee, wheat bread, and potatoes, but not a sign 
of milk or butter. It struck me as queer when I heard that the army was 
never provided with butter and milk. 

The next day we started for Washington, by rail. We marched through New 
York's crowded streets without awakening the enthusiasm we thought our 
due ; for we had read of the exciting scenes attending the departure of the 
New York 7th for Washington, on the day the 6th Massachusetts was 
mobbed in Baltimore, and also of the march of the 12th Massachusetts down 
Broadway on the 2-tth of July, when the regiment sang the then new and 
always thrilling lyric, "John Brown's Body." The following morning we 
took breakfast in Philadelphia, where we were attended by matrons and 
maidens, who waited upon us with thoughtful tenderness, as if they had been 
our own mothers and sweethearts instead of strangers. They feasted us and 
then filled our haversacks. God bless them ! If we did not quite appreciate 
them then, we did afterward. After embarking on the cars at Philadelphia, 
the waving of handkerchiefs was less and less noticeable along the route. 
We arrived in Baltimore late at night ; Union troops now controlled the city, 
and we marched through its deserted streets unmolested. On our arrival at 
Washington the next morning, we were marched to barracks, dignified by the 
name of " Soldiers' Ketreat," where each man received a half loaf of " soft- 
tack," as we had already begun to call wheat bread, with a piece of " salt 
junk," about as big and tough as the heel of my government shoe, and a 
quart of coffee, which constituted our breakfast. Our first day in Wash- 
ington was spent in shaving, washing, polishing our brasses and buttons, and 
cleaning-up for inspection. A day or two later we moved to quarters not 
far from the armory, looking out on the broad Potomac, within sight of Long 
Bridge and the city of Alexandria. 

Here and there the sound of a gun broke the serenity, but otherwise the 
quiet seemed inconsistent with the war preparations going on around us. In 
the distance, across the wide river, we could see the steeples and towers of the 
city of Alexandria, while up stream, on the right, was the Long Bridge. Here 
and there was to be seen the moving panorama of armed men, as a regiment 
crossed the bridge ; a flash of sunlight on the polished muskets revealed them 
to the eye; while the white-topped army baggage-wagons filed over in con- 
stant procession, looking like sections of whitewashed fence in motion. The 
overgrown country village of that period, called Washington, can be described 
in a few words. There were wide streets stretching out from a common center 
like a spider's web. The Capitol, with its unfinished dome ; the Patent Office, 
the Treasury, and the other public buildings, were in marked and classic con- 
trast with the dilapidated, tumble-down, shabby look of the average homes, 
stores, groceries, and groggeries, which increased in shabbiness and dirty dilapi- 
dation as they approached the suburbs. The climate of Washington was 
genial, but in the winter months the mud was fearful. I have drilled in it, 

i 5 8 


*4Mm '"'>. a 

0J ; yS!!i5 




marched in it, and run from the provost-guard in it, and I think I appreciate 
it from actual and familiar knowledge. In the lower quarter of the city 
there was not a piece of sidewalk. Even Pennsylvania Avenue, with its side- 
walks, was extremely dirty ; and the cavalcade of teams, artillery caissons, 
and baggage-wagons, with their heavy wheels, stirred the mud into a stiff 
batter for the pedestrian. 

Officers in tinsel and gold lace were so thick on Pennsylvania Avenue that 
it was a severe trial for a private to walk there. The salute exacted by 
officers, of bringing the hand to the visor of the cap, extending the arm to its 
full length, and then letting it drop by the side, was tiresome when followed 
up with the industry required by this horde. Perhaps I exaggerate, but in a 
half -hour's walk on the avenue I think I have saluted two hundred officers. 
Brigadier-generals were more numerous there than I ever knew them to be at 
the front. These officers, many of whom won their positions by political 
wire-pulling at Washington, we privates thought the great bane of the war ; 
they ought to have been sent to the front rank of battle, to serve as privates 
until they had learned the duties of a soldier. Mingled with these gaudy, 
useless officers were citizens in search of fat contracts, privates, " non-com's " 
and officers whose uniforms were well worn and faded, showing that they 
were from encampments and active service. Occasionally a regiment passed 
through the streets, on the way to camp; all surged up and down wide 
Pennsylvania Avenue. 

The soldiers of this period were eager to collect mementoes of the war. 
One of my acquaintances in another regiment made sketches of the different 
camps he had visited around Washington, including " Brightwood " and Camp 



Cameron ; the latter he termed " a nursery for brigadier-generals." Another 
friend hoarded specimens of official signatures and passes issued in Wash- 
ington, conspicuous among which was a pass with the well-known John- 
Hancock-like signature of Drake De Kay. (See page 173.) 

Before enlisting, and while on a visit to a neighboring town, I was one even- 
ing at the village store, when the talk turned upon the duration of the war. 
Jim Tinkham, the clerk of the grocery store, announced his belief in a sixty 
days' war. I modestly asked him for more time. The older ones agreed with 
Jim and argued, as was common at that time, that the Government would 
soon blockade all the rebel ports and starve them out. Tinkham proposal 
to wager a supper for those present, if the rebels did not surrender before 
snow came that year. I accepted. Neither of us put up any money, and 
in the excitement of the weeks which followed I had forgotten the wager. 
During my first week in Washington, whom should I meet but Jim Tinkham, 
the apostle of the sixty-day theory. He was In-own with sunburn, and clad 
in a rusty uniform which showed service in the field. He was a veteran, for 
he had been at the battle of Bull Run. He confidentially declared that 
after getting the order to retreat at that battle, he should not have stopped 
short of Boston if he had not been halted by a soldier with a musket, after 
crossing Long Bridge. 






IHE only association I have with my old home in 
rginia that is not one of unmixed happiness 
ty j\ relates to the time immediately succeeding the exe- 
| cution of John Brown at Harper's Ferry. Our 
: 4i homestead was in Fairfax, at a considerable dis- 
tance from the theater of that tragic episode ; and, 
Lv, belonging as we did to a family among the first in 
^'JiMv ^"' ^' ;l1,i t manumit slaves, our grandfather hav- 
^Ktif ing set free those that came to him by inheritance, 
and the people who served us being hired from their 
owners and remaining in our employ through years of kindliest relations, 
there seemed to be no especial reason for us to share in* the apprehension of an 
uprising of the blacks. But there was the fear unspoken, or pooh-poohed 
at by the men who were mouth-pieces for our community dark, boding, 
oppressive, and altogether hateful. I can remember taking it to bed with me 
at night, and awaking suddenly oftentimes to confront it through a vigil of 
nervous terror, of which it never occurred to me to speak to any one. The 
notes of whip-poor-wills in the sweet-gum swamp near the stable, the mut- 
terings of a distant thunder-storm, even the rustle of the night wind in the 
oaks that shaded my window, filled me with nameless dread. In the day- 
time it seemed impossible to associate suspicion with those familiar tawny or 
sable faces that surrounded us. We had seen them for so many years smil- 
ing or saddening with the family joys or sorrows ; they were so guileless, so 
patient, so satisfied. What subtle influence was at work that should trans- 
form them into tigers thirsting for our blood ? The idea was preposterous. 
But when evening came again, and with it the hour when the colored people 
(who in summer and autumn weather kept astir half the night) assembled 
themselves together for dance or prayer-meeting, the ghost that refused to be 
laid was again at one's elbow. Rusty bolts were drawn and rusty fire-arms 
loaded. A watch was set where never before had eye or ear been lent to such 
a service. In short, peace had flown from the borders of Virginia. 

Although the newspapers were full of secession talk and the matter was 
eagerly discussed at our tables, I cannot remember that, as late as Christmas- 
time of the year 1860, coming events had cast any definite shadow on our 
homes. The people in our neighborhood, of one opinion with their dear and 
honored friend, Colonel Robert E. Lee, of Arlington, were slow to accept the 
startling suggestion of disruption of the Union. At any rate, we enjoyed the 
usual holiday gathering of kinsfolk in the usual fashion. The old Vaucluse 
house, known for many years past as a center of cheerful hospitality in the 
county, threw wide open its doors to receive all the members who could be 
gathered there of a large family circle. The woods about were despoiled of 




holly and spruce, pine and cedar, to deck the walls and wreathe the picture- 
frames. On Christmas Eve we had a grand rally of youths and boys belonging 
to the " clan," as they loved to call it, to roll in a yule log, which was deposited 
upon a glowing bed of coals in the big " red-parlor" fire-place, and sit about it 
afterward, welcoming the Christmas in with goblets of egg-nog and apple-toddy. 

" Where shall we be a year hence ? " some one asked at a pause in the merry 
chat ; and, in the brief silence that followed, arose a sudden spectral thought 
of war. All felt its presence ; no one eared to speak first of its grim possibilities. 

On Christmas Eve of the following year the old house lay in ruins, a sacri- 
fice by Union troops to- military necessity ; the forest giants that kept watch 
around her walls had been cut down and made to serve as breastworks for a 
fort erected on the Vaueluse property as part of the defenses of Washington. 
Of the young men and boys who took part in that holiday festivity, all were 
in the active service of the South, one of them, alas ! soon to fall under a 
rain of shot and shell beside his gun at Fredericksburg ; the youngest of the 
number had left his mother's knee to fight at Manassas, and found himself, 
before the year was out, a midshipman aboard the Confederate steamer 
Nashville, on her cruise in distant seas ! 

My first vivid impression of war-days was during a ramble in the neigh- 
boring woods one Sunday afternoon in spring, when the young people in 
a happy band set out in search of wild flowers. Pink honeysuckles, blue 
lupine, beds of fairy flax, anemones, and ferns in abundance sprung under 

VOL. I. 11 


the canopy of young leaves on the forest boughs, and the air was full of the 
song of birds and the music of running waters. We knew every mossy path 
far and near in those woods ; every tree had been watched and cherished by 
those who went before us, and dearer than any other spot on earth was our 
tranquil, sweet Vaucluse. Suddenly the shrill whistle of a locomotive struck 
the ear, an unwonted sound on Sundav. " Do you know what that means ? " 
said one of the older cousins who accompanied the party. " It is the special 
train carrying Alexandria volunteers to Manassas, and to-morrow I shall 
follow with my company." Silence fell upon our little band. A cloud 
seemed to come between us and the sun. It was the beginning of the end 
too soon to come. 

The story of one broken circle is the story of another at the outset of such 
a war. Before the week was over, the scattering of our household, which no 
one then believed to be more than temporary, had begun. Living as we did 
upon ground likely to be in the track of armies gathering to confront each 
other, it was deemed advisable to send the children and young girls into a 
place more remote from chances of danger. Some weeks later the heads of 
the household, two widowed sisters whose sons were at Manassas, drove 
away from their home in their carriage at early morning, having spent the 
previous night in company with a half -grown lad digging in the cellar hasty 
graves for the interment of two boxes of old English silver-ware, heirlooms 
in the family, for which there was no time to provide otherwise. Although 
the enemy were long encamped immediately above it after the house was 
burnt the following year, this silver was found there when the war had ended ; 
it was lying loose in the earth, the boxes having rotted away. 

The point at which our family reunited within the Confederate lines was 
Bristoe, the station next beyond Manassas, a cheerless railway inn ; a part of 
the premises was used as a country grocery store ; and there quarters were 
secured for us with a view to being near the army. By this time all our 
kith and kin of fighting age had joined the volunteers. One cannot pic- 
ture accommodations more forlorn than these eagerly taken for us and for 
other families attracted to Bristoe by the same powerful magnet. The sum- 
mer sun poured its burning rays upon whitewashed walls unshaded by a tree. 
Our bedrooms were almost uninhabitable by day or night, our fare the plain- 
est. From the windows we beheld only a flat, uncultivated country, crossed 
by red-clay roads, then ankle-deep in dust. We learned to look for all excite- 
ment to the glittering lines of railway track, along which continually thun- 
dered trains bound to and from the front. It was impossible to allow such a 
train to pass without running out upon the platform to salute it, for in this 
way we greeted many an old friend or relative buttoned up in the smart gray 
uniform, speeding with high hope to the scene of coming conflict. Such shouts 
as went up from sturdy throats while we stood waving hands, handkerchiefs, 
or the rough woolen garments we were at work upon ! Then fairly awoke the 
spirit that made of Southern women the inspiration of Southern men through- 
out the war. Most of the young fellows we knew and were cheering onward 
wore the uniform of privates, and for the right to wear it had left homes of 



rs- - " ' j/ 

- * 

-r' - ! - - I " 


ease and luxury. To such we gave our best homage ; and from that time forth 
the youth who was lukewarm in the cause or unambitious of military glory 
fared uncomfortably in the presence of the average Confederate maiden. 

Thanks to our own carriage, we were able during those rallying days of 
June to drive frequently to visit " the boys " in camp, timing the expeditions 
to include battalion drill and dress parade, and taking tea afterward in the 
different tents. Then were the gala days of war, and our proud hosts has- 
tened to produce home dainties dispatched from the far-away plantations 
tears and blessings interspersed amid the packing, we were sure ; though I 
have seen a pretty girl persist in declining other fare, to make her meal upon 
raw biscuit and huckleberry pie compounded by the bright-eyed amateur cook 
of a well-beloved mess. Feminine heroism could no farther go. 

And so the days wore on until the 17th of July, when a rumor from the 
front sent an electric shock through our circle. The enemy were moving for- 
ward ! On the morning of the 18th those who had been able to sleep at all 
awoke early to listen for the first guns of the engagement of Blackburn's Ford. 
Abandoned as the women at Bristoe were by every male creature old 
enough to gather news, there was, for us, no way of knowing the progress 
of events during the long, long day of waiting, of watching, of weeping, of 
praying, of rushing out upon the railway track to walk as far as we dared in 
the direction whence came that intolerable booming of artillery. The cloud of 
dun smoke arising over Manassas became heavier in volume as the day pro- 
gressed. Still, not a word of tidings, till toward afternoon there came limping 



up a single, very dirty, soldier with his arm in a sling. What a heaven- 
send he was, if only as an escape-valve for our pent-up sympathies ! We seized 
him, we washed him, we cried over him, we glorified him until the man was 
fairly bewildered. Our best endeavors could only develop a pin-scratch of a 
wound on his right hand ; but when our hero had laid in a substantial meal 
of bread and meat, we plied him with trembling questions, each asking news 
of some staff or regiment or 
company. It has since oc- 
curred to me that he was a 
humorist in disguise. His 
invariable reply, as he looked 
from one to the other of his 

satellites, was : " The 

Virginia, marm ? Why, of 
coase. They warn't no two 
ways o' thinkin' 'bout that ar 
reg'ment. They just kivered 
tharselves with glory ! " 

A little later two wagon- 
loads of slightly wounded 
claimed our care, and with 
them came authentic news 
of the day. Most of us re- 
ceived notes on paper torn 
from a soldier's pocket-book and grimed with gunpowder, containing 
assurance of the safety of our own. At nightfall a train carrying more 
wounded to the hospitals at Culpeper made a halt at Bristoe ; and, preceded 
by men holding lanterns, we went in among the stretchers with milk, food, 
and water to the sufferers. One of the first discoveries I made, bending over 
in that fitful light, was a young officer whom I knew to be a special object of 
solicitude with one of my comrades in the search ; but he was badly hurt, and 
neither he nor she knew the other was near until the train had moved on. 
The next day, and the next, were full of burning excitement over the impend- 
ing general engagement, which people then said would decide the fate of the 
young Confederacy. Fresh troops came by with every train, and we lived only 
to turn from one scene to another of welcome and farewell. On Saturday even- 
ing arrived a message from General Beauregard, saying that early on Sunday 
an engine and car would be put at our disposal, to take us to some point more 
remote from danger. We looked at one another, and, tacitly agreeing the gal- 
lant general had sent not an order but a suggestion, declined his kind proposal. 

Another unspeakably long day, full of the straining anguish of suspense. 
Dawning bright and fair, it closed under a sky darkened by cannon-smoke. 
The roar of guns seemed never to cease. First, a long sullen boom ; then a 
sharper, rattling fire, painfully distinct ; then stragglers from the field, with 
varying rumors; at last, the news of victory; and, as before, the wounded, 
to force our numbed faculties into service. One of our group, the mother of 



an only son barely fifteen years of age, heard that her boy, after being in action 
all the early part of the day, had through sheer fatigue fallen asleep upon 
the ground, where he was found resting peacefully amidst the roar of the guns. 

A few days later we rode over the field. The trampled grass had begun 
to spring' again, and wild flowers were blooming around carelessly made 
graves. From one of these imperfect mounds of clay I saw a hand extended ; 
and when, years afterward, I visited the tomb of Rousseau beneath the 
Pantheon in Paris, where a sculptured hand bearing a torch protrudes from 
the sarcophagus, I thought of that mournful spectacle upon the field of 
Manassas. Fences were everywhere thrown down; the undergrowth of the 
woods was riddled with shot; here and there we came upon spiked guns, 
disabled gun-carriages, cannon-balls, blood-stained blankets, and dead horses. 
We were glad enough to turn away and gallop homeward. 

With August heats and lack of water, Bristoe was forsaken for quarters 
near Culpeper, where my mother went into the soldiers' barracks, sharing 
soldiers' accommodations, to nurse the wounded. In September quite a party 
of us, upon invitation, visited the different headquarters. We stopped over- 
night at Manassas, five ladies, sleeping upon a couch made of rolls of car- 
tridge-flannel, in a tent guarded by a faithful sentry. I remember the comical 
effect of the five bird-cages (of a kind without which no self-respecting young 
woman of that day would present herself in public) suspended upon a line 
running across the upper part of our tent, after we had reluctantly removed 
them in order to adjust ourselves for repose. Our progress during that mem- 
orable visit was royal; an ambulance with a picked troop of cavalrymen had 
been placed at our service, and the convoy was " personally conducted " by a 
pleasing variety of distinguished officers. It was at this time, after a supper 
at the headquarters of the " Maryland line " at Fairfax, that the afterward uni- 
versal war-song, " My Maryland !" was put afloat upon the tide of army favor. 
We were sitting outside a tent in the warm starlight of an early autumn night, 
when music was proposed. At once we struck up Randall's verses to the 
tune of the old college song, " Lauriger Horatius," a young lady of the party, 
Jennie Cary, of Baltimore, having recently set them to this music before 
leaving home to share the fortunes of the Confederacy. All joined in the ring- 
ing chorus ; and, when we finished, a burst of applause came from some soldiers 
listening in the darkness behind a belt of trees. Next day the melody was 
hummed far and near through the camps, and in due time it had gained 
the place of favorite song in the army. Other songs sung that evening, 
which afterward had a great vogue, were one beginning " By blue Patapsco's 
billowy dash," and "The years glide slowly by, Lorena." 

Another incident of note, during the autumn of '61, was that to my cousins, 
Hetty and Jennie Cary, and to me was intrusted the making of the first three 
battle-flags of the Confederacy. They were jaunty squares of scarlet crossed 
with dark blue edged with white, the cross bearing stars to indicate the 
number of the seceded States. We set our best stitches upon them, edged 
them with golden fringes, and, when they were finished, dispatched one 
to Johnston, another to Beauregard, and the third to Earl Van Dorn, then 


commanding infantry at Manassas. The banners were received with all 
possible enthusiasm; were toasted, feted, and cheered abundantly. After 
two years, when Van Dorn had been killed in Tennessee, mine came back 
to me, tattered and storm-stained from long and honorable service in the 
field. But it was only a little while after it had been bestowed that there 
arrived one day at our lodgings in Culpeper a huge, bashful Mississippi 
scout, one of the most daring in the army, with the frame of a Hercules 
and the face of a child. He had been bidden to come there by his general, 
he said, to ask, if I would not give him an order to fetch some cherished 
object from my dear old home something that would prove to me "how 
much they thought of the maker of that flag!" A week later I was the 
astonished recipient of a lamented bit of finery left "within the lines," a 
wrap, brought to us by Dillon himself, with a beaming face. Mounted on 
a load of fire-wood, he had gone through the Union pickets, and while 
peddling poultry had presented himself at the house of my uncle, Dr. Fairfax, 
in Alexandria, whence he carried oft' his prize in triumph, with a letter in 
its folds telling us how relatives left behind longed to be sharing the joys and 
sorrows of those at large in the Confederacy. 

<^%t^r/tc t&^-o 

y^, S^tl ^I7^g^ ~<^<^^~^ ^^VT-tS- 








S President Buchanan's administration was drawing to a 
close, he was forced by the action of the South to decide 
whether the power of the general Government should be 
used to coerce into submission States that had attempted 
to secede from the Union. His opinion was that the con- 
tingency was not provided for, that while a State had no 
right to secede, the Constitution gave no authority to 
coerce, and that he had no right to do anything except 
hold the property and enforce the laws of the United 

Before he went out of office the capital of the nation 
seemed to be in danger of seizure. For its protection, and 
in order to consult about holding Southern forts and 
arsenals, General Scott was in December called to Wash- 
ington, from which he had been absent since the inaugu- 
ration of Pierce, who had defeated him for the presidency. 
Jefferson Davis, Pierce's Secretary of War, and General Scott had quarreled, 
and the genius of acrimony controlled the correspondence which took place 

I The battle of Bull Run was notable in a minor by their several States. The Confederate uniforms 
way for the variety of uniforms worn on both exhibited similar variety ; some regiments were in 
sides a variety greater than was shown in any citizens' dress, and several of the general officers 


later engagement. The Federal blue had not yet 
been issued, and the troops wore either the uni- 
forms of their militia organizations (including vari- 
ous patterns of Zouave dress) or those furnished 

who had been in the old service including, we 
are informed, Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and 
Longstreet still wore the dress of the United 
States Army. Editors. 


1 68 


between them. Notwithstanding the fact that on account of his age and 
infirmities he was soon overwhelmed by the rush of events, General Scott's 
laurels had not withered at the outbreak of the war, and he brought to the 
emergency ability, experience, and prestige. A high light in the whole mili- 
tary world, he towered above the rest of our army at that time profession- 
ally as he did physically. As the effect of his unusual stature was increased 
by contrast with a short aide-de-camp (purposely chosen, it was suspected), 
so was his exalted character marked by 
one or two conspicuous but not very 
harmful foibles. With much learning, 
great military ability, a strict sense of 
justice, and a kind heart, he was vain 
and somewhat petulant. He loved the 
Union and hated Jefferson Davis. 

By authority of President Buchanan, 
Scott assembled a small force of regulars 
in the capital, and for the first time in 
the history of the country the electoral 
count was made and a President was in- 
augurated under the protection of sol- 
diery. But before the inauguration of 
Lincoln, March 4th, the secession move- 
ment had spread through the "cotton- 
belt" and delegates from the secession 
States had met as a congress at Mont- 
gomery, Alabama, February 4th. On the 
8th they had organized the " Provisional 
Government of the Confederate States of 
America," and on the 9th had elected Jefferson Davis President and Alex- 
ander H. Stephens Vice-President. 

When the news of the firing upon Sumter reached Washington, President 
Lincoln prepared a proclamation, and issued it April 15th, convening Con- 
gress and calling forth 75,000 three-months militia to suppress combinations 
against the Government. The Federal situation was alarming. Sumter fell on 
the 13th of April, and was evacuated on the 14th. Virginia seceded on the 17th, 
and seized Harper's Ferry on the 18th and the Norfolk Navy Yard on the 20th. 
On the 19th a mob in Baltimore assaulted the 6th Massachusetts volunteers 
as it passed through to Washington, and at once bridges were burned and 
railway communication was cut off between Washington and the North. 

Lincoln had had no experience as a party leader or executive officer, and 
was without knowledge of military affairs or acquaintance with military men. 
Davis at the head of the Confederacy was an experienced and acknowledged 
Southern leader ; he was a graduate of the Military Academy; had commanded 
a regiment in the Mexican war; had been Secretary of War under Presi- 
dent Pierce, and had been chairman of the Military Committee in the United 
States Senate up to the time he left Congress to take part with the South. 


MARCH i. 1861, UNTIL JAN. 15, 1862. 




He was not only well versed in everything relating to war, but was 
thoroughly informed concerning the character and capacity of prominent 
and promising officers of the army. There was nothing experimental in 
his choice of high military commanders. With but few exceptions, those 
appointed -at the beginning retained command until they lost their lives or 
the war closed. 

The Southern States, all claiming to be independent republics after seces- 
sion, with all their governmental machinery, including militia and volunteer 
organizations, in complete working order, transferred themselves as States 
from the Union to the Confederacy. The organization of a general govern- 
ment from such elements, with war as its immediate purpose, was a simple 
matter. Davis had only to accept and arrange, according to his ample infor- 
mation and well-matured judgment, the abundant and ambitious material 
at hand in the way that he thought would best secure his purposes. Lincoln 
had to adapt the machinery of a conservative old government, some of it 
unsuitable, some unsound, to sudden demands for which it was not designed. 
The talents of Simon Cameron, his first Secretary of War, were political, not 
military. He was a kind, gentle, placid man, gifted with powers to persuade, 
not to command. Shrewd and skilled in the management of business and 
personal matters, he had no knowledge of military affairs, 
and could not give the President much assistance in as- 
sembling and organizing for war the earnest and impa- 
tient, but unmilitary people of the North. 

Officers from all departments of the Federal civil service 
hurried to the Confederacy and placed themselves at the 
disposal of Davis, and officers from all the corps of the 
regular army, most of them full of vigor, with the same 
education and experience as those who remained, went 
South and awaited assignment to the duties for which 
Davis might regard them as best qualified. All Confed- 
erate offices were vacant, and the Confederate President 
had large if not absolute power in filling them. On the 
other hand, the civil offices under Lincoln were occupied 
or controlled by party, and in the small regular army of 
the Union the law required that vacancies should as a 
rule be filled by seniority. There was no retired list for 
the disabled, and the army was weighed down by lon- 
gevity, by venerated traditions ; by prerogatives of service 
rendered in former wars ; by the firmly tied red-tape of military bureauism, 
and by the deep-seated and well-founded fear of the auditors and comp- 
trollers of the treasury. Nothing but time and experience possibly nothing 
but disaster could remove from the path of the Union President difficulties 
from which the Confederate President was, by the situation, quite free. In 
the beginning of the war, the military advantage was on the side of the Con- 
federates, notwithstanding the greater resources of the North, which produced 
their effect only as the contest was prolonged. 







; 3T 



: ;,-:l 



After the firing of the first gun upon Sumter, the two sides were equally 
active in marshaling their forces on a line along the border States from 
the Atlantic coast of Virginia in the east to Kansas in the west. Many 
of the earlier collisions along this line were due rather to special causes or 
local feeling than to general military considerations. The prompt advance 
of the Union forces under McClellan to West Virginia was to protect that 
new-born free State. Patterson's movement to Hagerstown and thence to 
Harper's Ferry was to prevent Maryland from joining or aiding the rebellion, 
to re-open the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and prevent invasion from the 
Shenandoah Valley. The Southerners having left the Union and set up the 
Confederacy upon the principle of State rights, in violation of that principle 



invaded the State of Kentucky in opposition to her apparent purpose of 
armed neutrality. That made Kentucky a field of early hostilities and helped 
to anchor her to the Union. Missouri was rescued from secession through the 
energy of General F. P. Blair and her other Union men, and by the indomi- 
table will of Captain Lyon of the regular army, whose great work was accom- 
plished under many disadvantages. In illustration of the difficulty with which 
the new condition of affairs penetrated the case-hardened bureauism of long 
peace, it may be mentioned that the venerable adjutant-general of the army, 
when a crisis was at hand in Missouri, came from a consultation with the 
President and Secretary Cameron, and with a sorry expres- 
sion of countenance and an ominous shake of the head 
exclaimed, " It's bad, very bad ; we're giving that young 
man Lyon a great deal too much power in Missouri." 

Early in the contest another young Union officer came 
to the front. Major Irvin McDowell was appointed briga- 
dier-general May 14th. He was forty-three years of age, 
of unexceptionable habits and great physical powers. His 
education, begun in France, was continued at the United 
States Military Academy, from which he was graduated in 
1838. Always a close student, he was well informed out- 
side as well as inside his profession. Distinguished in the 
Mexican war, intensely Union in his sentiments, full of 
energy and patriotism, outsjioken in his opinions, highly 
esteemed by General Scott, on whose staff he had served, 
he at once secured the confidence of the President and the 
Secretary of War, under whose observation he was serv- 
ing in Washington. Without political antecedents or 
acquaintances, he was chosen for advancement on account of his record, 
his ability, and his vigor. 

Northern forces had hastened to Washington upon the call of President 
Lincoln, but prior to May 21th they had been held rigidly on the north side of 
the Potomac. On the night of May 23d-21th, the Confederate pickets being 
then in sight of the Capitol, three columns were thrown across the river by 
General J. K. F. Mansfield, then commanding the Department of Washing- 
ton, and a line from Alexandria below to chain-bridge above Washington 
was intrenched under guidance of able engineers. On the 27th Brigadier- 
General Irvin McDowell was placed in command south of the Potomac. ^> 

By the 1st of June the Southern Government had been transferred from 
Montgomery to Richmond, and the capitals of the Union and of the Confed- 
eracy stood defiantly confronting each other. General Scott was in chief com- 
mand of the Union forces, with McDowell south of the Potomac, confronted 
by his old classmate, Beauregard, hot from the capture of Fort Sumter. 

^ The aspect of affairs was so threatening after and without waiting for the meeting of Congress, 

President Lincoln's call of April 15th for 75,000 the President entered upon the creation of an 

three-months militia, and General Scott was so additional volunteer army to be composed of 

averse to undertaking any active operations with 42,034 three-years men, together with an increase 

such short-term troops, that, as early as May 3d, of 22,714 regulars and 18,000 seamen. J. B. F. 







if. WELLS 


General Patterson, of Pennsylvania, a veteran of the war of 1812 and the 
war with Mexico, was in command near Harper's Ferry, opposed by General 
Joseph E. Johnston. The Confederate President, Davis, then in Richmond, 
with General R. E. Lee as military adviser, exercised in person general 
military control of the Southern forces. The enemy to be engaged by 
McDowell occupied what was called the "Alexandria line," with head- 
quarters at Manassas, the junction of the Orange and Alexandria with the 
Manassas Gap railroad. The stream known as Bull Run, some three miles 
in front of Manassas, was the line of defense. On Beauregard's right, 30 
miles away, at the mouth of Aquia Creek, there was a Confederate bri- 
gade of, 3000 men and 6 guns under General Holmes. The approach to 
Richmond from the Lower Chesapeake, threatened by General B. F. Butler, 
was guarded by Confederates under Generals Huger and Magrudei\ 



On Beauregard's left, 
sixty miles .distant, in 
the Lower Shenandoah 
Valley and separated 
from him .by the Bine 
Eidge Mountains, was 
the Confederate army of 
the Shenandoah under 
command of General 
Johnston. Beauregard's 
authority did not extend 
over the forces of John- 
ston, Huger, Magrucler, 
or Holmes, but Holmes 
was with him before the 
battle of Bull Run, and 
so was Johnston, who, 
as will appear more fully 
hereafter, joined at a 
decisive moment. 

Early in June Patter- 
son was pushing his 
column against Harper's 
Ferry, and on the 3d of 
that month McDowell 
was called upon by Gen- 
eral Scott to submit " an 
estimate of the number 
and composition of a 
column to be pushed 
toward Manassas Junc- 
tion and perhaps the 
Gap, say in 4 or 5 days, 
to favor Patters* >n's 
attack upon Harper's 
Ferry." McDowell had 
then been in command 
at Arlington less than a 
week, his raw regiments 
south of the Potomac 
were not yet brigaded, 
and this was the first 


4 The bold signature of "Drake De Kay" ou 
the passes issued by General Mansfield while com- 
manding the Department at Washington, gave ce- 
lebrity to the young aide-de-camp whose duty it 
was to sign them. At the outbreak of the war 

Drake De Kay, who was the son of Commodore 
George C. De Kay, closed his shipping and com- 
mission office in New York, with no more ceremony 
than to pin to the door the statement, "Gone to 
Washington. Back at close of war." He took with 



intimation he had of offensive operations. 
He reported, June 4th, that 12,000 infantry, 
2 batteries, 6 or 8 companies of cavalry, 
and a reserve of 5000 ready to move from 
Alexandria would be required. John- 
ston, however, gave up Harper's Ferry 
to Patterson, and the diversion by Mc- 
Dowell was not ordered. But the public 
demand for an advance became impera- 
tive stimulated perhaps by the success- 
ful dash of fifty men of the 2d United 
States Cavalry, under Lieutenant C. H. 
Tompkins, through the enemy's outposts 
at Fairfax Court House on the night of 
June 1st, and by the unfortunate result of 
the movement of a regiment under Gen- 
eral Schenck toward Vienna, June 9th, 
as well as by a disaster to some of Gen- 
eral Butler's troops on the 10th at Big 
Bethel, near Fort Monroe. On the 24th 
of June, in compliance with verbal in- 
structions from General Scott, McDowell 
submitted a "plan of operations and 
the composition of the force required 
to carry it into effect." He estimated 
the Confederate force at Manassas Junc- 
tion and its dependencies at 25,000 
men, assumed that his movements could 
not be kept secret and that the enemy 

him a detachment of his employees and offered his own 
and their services to General Scott " free of charge." 
Of course he was not allowed to bear the expense of his 
contingent, but his services were accepted, and he 
received as lieutenant the first appointment to the 
army from civil life during the war. He accepted a 
position on General Mansfield's staff and accompanied 
that officer to Newport News, where, as captain on the 
staff, he distinguished himself in several daring adven- 
tures, sometimes undertaken with the object of getting 
information of the enemy. In the second Bull Run 
campaign he was aide-de-camp to General Pope. 
Afterward he joined his regiment, the 1-lth Regulars, 
and he was brevetted major and lieutenant-colonel for 
gallant service at the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania. 
We are indebted to Mr. Murat Hal stead, editor of 
the Cincinnati " Commercial Gazette," for the "Drake 
I)e Kay Pass," here reproduced in fac-simile. Of the 
uses of a bold signature on the passes, Mr. Halstead 
writes with a characteristic touch of humor : "A state- 
ment I have heard, that the famous Drake De Kay 
passes were written to be read by torchlight at picket 
posts, reminds me that I have preserved one among 













my papers. It is inclosed. My recollection 
is that the pass was gotten up in this style 
that it might not be easily imitated. It was 
intended to supersede all other passes, and 
did so. The effect was to check the promis- 
cuous running through the lines. It was 
regarded at the time as something oracular 
and formidable, and as likely to convey a 
salutary impression of the power and majesty 
of the United States of America. It was said 
that General Winfield Scott was much im- 
pressed by it." Editors. 


would call up additional forces from all quarters, and added : " If General 
J. E. Johnston's force is kept engaged by Major-General Patterson, and 
Major-General Butler occupies the force now in his vicinity, I think they 
will not be able to bring up more than 10,000 men, so we may calculate 
upon having to do with about 35,000 men." And as it turned out, that was 
about the number he " had to do with." For the advance, McDowell asked 
" a force of 30,000 of all arms, with a reserve of 10,000." He knew that Beau- 
regard had batteries in position at several places in front of Bull Run and 
defensive works behind the Run and at Manassas Junction. The stream being 
fordable at many places, McDowell proposed in his plan of operations to 
turn the enemy's position and force him out of it by seizing or threatening 
his communications. Nevertheless, he said in his report : 

" Believing the chances are greatly in favor of the enemy's accepting battle between this and 
the Junction and that the consequences of that battle will be of the greatest importance to the 
country, as establishing the prestige in this contest, on the one side or the other, the more so as 
the two sections will be fairly represented by regiments from almost every State, I think it of 
great consequence that, as for the most part our regiments are exceedingly raw and the best of 
them, with few exceptions, not over steady in line, they be organized into as many small fixed 
brigades as the number of regular colonels will admit, ... so that the men may have as 
fair a chance as the nature of things and the comparative inexperience of most will allow." 

This remarkably sound report was approved, and McDowell was directed 
to carry his plan into effect July 8th. But the government machinery 
worked slowly and there was jealousy in the way, so that the troops to bring 
his army up to the strength agreed upon did not reach him until the 16th. 

Beauregard's Army of the Potomac at Manassas consisted of the brigades 
of Holmes, Bonham, Ewell, D. R. Jones, Longstreet, Cocke and Early, and of 

3 regiments of infantry, 1 regiment and 3 battalions of cavalry, and 6 bat- 
teries of artillery, containing in all 27 guns, making an aggregate available 
force on the field of Bull Run of about 23,000 men. Johnston's army from 
the Shenandoah consisted of the brigades of Jackson, Bee, Bartow, and 
Kirby Smith, 2 regiments of infantry not brigaded, 1 regiment of cavalry 
(12 companies), and 5 batteries (20 guns), making an aggregate at Bull Run 
of 8340. ^ 

McDowell's army consisted of 5 divisions, Tyler's First Division, containing 

4 brigades (Keyes's, Schenck's, W. T. Sherman's, and Richardson's) ; Hunter's 
Second Division, containing 2 brigades (Andrew , Porter's and Burnside's) ; 
Heintzelman's Third Division, containing 3 brigades (Franklin's, Willcox's, and 
Howard's) ; Runyon's Fourth Division (9 regiments not brigaded) ; and Miles's 
Fifth Division, containing 2 brigades (Blenker's and Davies's), 10 batteries of 
artillery, besides 2 guns attached to infantry regiments, 49 guns in all, and 7 

$ Beauregard himself has said that on the 18th 30,000 men of all arms." The figures are probably 

of July he had "along the line of Bull Run about under the mark, as Hampton's Legion, McRea's 

17,000 men; that on the 19th General Holmes'joined regiment, a North Carolina "regiment and two 

him with about 3000 men " ; and that he " received battalions of Mississippi and Alabama " joined 

from Richmond between the 18th and 21st about between the 17th and 21st. Beauregard's force 

2000 more"; and that Johnston brought about 8000 may fairly be placed at 32,000; and the opposing 

more, the advance arriving " on the morning of the armies, both in the aggregate and in the parts 

20th and the remainder about noon of the 21st," engaged, were nearer equal in that than in any 

making his whole force, as he states it, "nearly other battle in Virginia. J. B. F. 





companies of regular cavalry. Of the foregoing forces, 9 of the batteries and 8 
companies of infantry were regulars, and 1 small battalion was marines. 
The aggregate force was about 35,000 men. Runyon's Fourth Division was 
6 or 7 miles in the rear guarding the road to Alexandria, and, though counted 
in the aggregate, was not embraced in McDowell's order for battle.\ 

There was an ill-suppressed feeling of sympathy with the Confederacy in the 
Southern element of Washington society ; but the halls of Congress resounded 
with the eloquence of Union speakers. Martial music filled the air, and war 
was the topic wherever men met. By day and night the tramp of soldiers was 
heard, and staff-officers and orderlies galloped through the streets between 
the headquarters of Generals Scott and McDowell. Northern enthusiasm was 
unbounded. " On to Eichmond " was the war-cry. Public sentiment was 
irresistible, and in response to it the army advanced. It was a glorious 
spectacle. The various regiments were brilliantly uniformed according to 
the aesthetic taste of peace, and the silken banners they flung to the breeze were 
uii soiled and untorn. The bitter realities of war were nearer than we knew. 

McDowell marched on the afternoon of July 16th, the men carrying three 
days' rations in their haversacks ; provision wagons were to follow from 
Alexandria the next day. On the morning of the 18th his forces were con- 
centrated at Centreville, a point about 20 miles west of the Potomac and 

\ The average length of service of McDowell's men prior to the battle was about sixty days. The 
longest in service were the three-months men, and of these he had fourteen regiments. J. B. F. 









6 or 7 miles east of Manassas Junction. Beauregard's outposts fell back 
without resistance. Bull Run, flowing south-easterly, is about half-way 
between Centreville and Manassas Junction, and, owing to its abrupt 
banks, the timber with which it was fringed, and some artificial defenses 
at the fords, was a formidable obstacle. The stream was fordable, but 
all the crossings for eight miles, from Union Mills on the south to the Stone 
Bridge on the north, were defended by Beauregard's forces. [See map, page 
180.] The Warrenton Turnpike, passing through Centreville, leads nearly due 
west, crossing Bull Run at the Stone Bridge. The direct road from Centre- 
ville to Manassas crosses Bull Run at Mitchell's Ford, half a mile or so above 
another crossing known as Blackburn's Ford. Union Mills was covered by 
Ewell's brigade, supported after the 18th by Holmes's brigade; McLean's 
Ford, next to the north, was covered by D. R. Jones's brigade ; Blackburn's 
Ford was defended by Longstreet's brigade, supported by Early's brigade ; 
Mitchell's Ford was held by Bonham's brigade, with an outpost of two guns 
and an infantry support east of Bull Run; the stream between Mitchells 
Ford and the Stone Bridge was covered by Cocke's brigade ; the Stone Bridge 
on the Confederate left was held by Evans with 1 regiment and Wheat's special 
battalion of infantry, 1 battery of 4 guns, and 2 companies of cavalry, -fc 

& The state of General Beauregard's mind at the enemy has assaulted my outposts in heavy force, 
time is indicated by the following telegram on the I have fallen back on the line of Bull Run and will 
17th of July from him to Jefferson Davis : "The make a stand at Mitchell's Ford. If his force is over- 

VOI, I. 12 

1 7 8 



McDowell was compelled to wait at Centreville until his provision wagons 
arrived and he could issue rations. His orders having carried his leading 
division under Tyler no farther than Centreville, he wrote that officer at 
8:15 a. m. on the 18th, "Observe well the roads to Bull Run and to Warren- 
ton. Do not bring on an engagement, but keep up the impression that we 
are moving on Manassas." McDowell then went to the extreme left of his 
line to examine the country with reference to a sudden movement of the 
army to turn the enemy's right flank. The reconnoissance showed him that 
the country was unfavorable to the movement, and he abandoned it. While 
he was gone to the left, Tyler, presumably to " keep up the impression that 
we were moving on Manassas," went forward from Centreville with a squadron 
of cavalry and two companies of infantry for the purpose of making a recon- 
noissance of Mitchell's and Blackburn's fords along the direct road to Manas- 
sas. The force of the enemy at these fords has just been given. Reaching 
the crest of the ridge overlooking the valley of Bull Run and a mile or so 
from the stream, the enemy was seen on the opposite bank, and Tyler 
brought up Benjamin's artillery, 2 20-pounder rifled guns, Ayres's field 
battery of 6 guns, and Richardson's brigade of infantry. The 20-pounders 
opened from the ridge and a few shots were exchanged with the enemy's 
batteries. Desiring more information than the long-range cannonade afforded, 

whelming, I shall retire to Rappahannock railroad 
bridge, saving my command for defense there and 
future operations. Please inform Johnston of this 
via Staunton, and also Holmes. Send forward any 
reinforcements at the earliest possible instant and 
by every possible means." The alarm in this dis- 
patch and the apprehension it shows of McDowell's 

"overwhelming" strength are not in harmony 
with the more recent assurance of the Confederate 
commander, that through sources in Washington 
treasonable to the Union, and in other ways, he 
"was almost as well informed of the strength 
of the hostile army in my [his] front as its com- 
mander." J. B. F.' 



Tyler ordered Richardson's brigade and a section of Ayres's battery, sup- 
ported by a squadron of cavalry, to move from the ridge across the open 
bottom of Bull Run and take position near the stream and have skirmishers 
" scour the thick woods " which skirted it. Two regiments of infantry, 2 pieces 
of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry moved down the slope into the woods 
and opened fire, driving Bonham's outpost to the cover of intrenchments across 
the stream. The brigades of Bonham and Longstreet, the latter being reen- 
forced for the occasion by Early's brigade, responded at short range to the 
fire of the Federal reconnoitering force and drove it back in disorder. Tvler 
reported that having satisfied himself " that the enemy 
was in force," and ascertained " the position of his bat- 
teries," he withdrew. J This unauthorized reconnoissance, 
called by the Federals the affair at Blackburn's Ford, was 
regarded at the time by the Confederates as a serious 
attack, and was dignified by the name of the " battle of 
Bull Run," the engagement of the 21st being called by 
them the battle of Manassas. The Confederates, feeling 
that they had repulsed a heavy and real attack, were 
encouraged by the result. The Federal troops, on the 
other hand, were greatly depressed. The regiment which 
suffered most was completely demoralized, and McDowell 
thought that the depression of the repulse was felt 
throughout his army and produced its effect upon the 
Pennsylvania regiment and the New York battery 
which insisted (their terms having expired) upon their uniform of the hth new 
discharge, and on the 21st, as he expressed it, " inarched s^x? foma T 
to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon." Even photograph. % 
Tyler himself felt the depressing effect of his repulse, if we may judge by 
his cautious and feeble action on the 21st when dash was required. 

The operations of the 18th confirmed McDowell in his opinion that with 
his raw troops the Confederate position should be turned instead of attacked 
in front. Careful examination had satisfied him that the country did not 
favor a movement to turn the enemy's right. On the night of the 18th 

\ The casualties in the affair were : Union, 1 
officer and 18 enlisted men killed ; 1 officer and 37 
enlisted men wounded ; 26 enlisted men missing, 
aggregate, 83. Confederate (Beauregard in his 
official report of 1861^), "15 killed and 53 wounded 
men, several of whom have since died." J. B. F. 

& The 11th New York, or " The First Fire Zou- 
aves," was recruited in April, 1861, from among 
the firemen of New York City by Colonel E. Elmer 
Ellsworth, a young man of twenty-four, who, before 
the war, had organized in Chicago a fine body of 
Zouaves and exhibited the Zouave drill in several 
cities of the North. President Lincoln, who hadbeen 
escorted to Washington by Ellsworth, appointed 
him to a second lieutenancy in the regular army. 

Ou the morning of May 24th, when the Union 
forces crossed into Virginia, Ellsworth's Zoiiaves 
occupied the city of Alexandria. The colonel, with 

the secretary and the chaplain of the regiment, a 
correspondent of the New York " Tribune," and a 
sergeant's squad were proceeding toward the center 
of the town, when they saw a secession flag flying 
from the Marshall house. With his two com- 
panions Ellsworth ascended to the roof, leaving 
Private Francis E. Brownell at the foot of the 
garret stairs. On descending those stairs with the 
flag in his hands, Ellsworth was shot through the 
heart by James T. Jackson, the keeper of the hotel, 
who emptied the second barrel of his shot-gun at 
Brownell. The latter, who was not hit, shot Jackson 
through the head. Colonel Ellsworth had endeared 
himself to Pi'esident Lincoln, who was deeply af- 
fected by his death. For several hours the remains 
lay in state in the East Eoom of the White House. 
His death made a profound impression and greatly 
stimidated the war feeling in the North. Editors. 



A, A, A, A, A. General line of Confederate disposi- 
tions during the skirmish at Mitchell's and Blackburn's 
Fords (July 18th), and until the morning of the main 
engagement (July 2lst). 

B, B, B. General line of Confederate dispositions. 


made to repel McDowell's flank attack by the Sudley 
and Newmarket Road. 

The Union dispositions are represented as they 
were at the climax of the fighting on the Henry 

the haversacks of his men were empty, and had to be replenished from the 
provision wagons, which were late in getting np. Nor had he yet determined 
upon his point or plan of attack. While resting and provisioning his men, 
he devoted the 19th and 20th to a careful examination by his engineers of 
the enemy's position and the intervening country. His men, not soldiers, 
but civilians in uniform, unused to marching, hot, weary, and footsore, 
dropped down as they had halted and bivouacked on the roads about Centre- 
ville. Notwithstanding Beauregard's elation over the affair at Blackburn's 
Ford on the 18th, he permitted the 19th and 20th to pass without a move- 
ment to follow up the advantage he had gained. During these two days, 
McDowell carefully examined the Confederate position, and made his plan 



to manoeuvre the enemy out of it, Beauregard ordered no aggressive move- 
ment until the 21st, and then, as appears from his own statement, through 
miscarriage of orders and lack of apprehension on the part of subordinates, 
the effort was a complete fiasco, with the comical result of frightening his 
own troops^ who, late in the afternoon, mistook the return of one of their 
brigades for an attack by McDowell's left, and the serious result of inter- 
fering with the pursuit after he had gained the battle of the 21st. 

But Beauregard, though not aggressive on the 19th and 20th, was not idle 
within his own lines. The Confederate President had authorized Johnston, 
Beauregard's senior, to use 

his discretion in moving to 
the support of Manassas, and 
Beauregard, urging Johnston 
to do so, sent railway trans- 
portation for the Shenan- 
doah forces. But, as he 
states, "he at the 
same time submit- 
ted the alter- 
native proposi- 
tion to Johnston 
that, having pass- 
ed the Blue Ridge, 
he should assemble his 
forces, press forward by 
way of Aldie, north-west 
of Manassas, and fall upon 

McDowell's right rear," while he, Beauregard, " prepared for the operation 
at the first sound of the conflict, should strenuously assume the offensive 
in front." "The situation and circumstances specially favored the signal 
success of such an operation," says Beauregard. An attack by two armies 
moving from opposite points upon an enemy, with the time of attack for one 
depending upon the sound of the other's cannon, is hazardous even with well- 
disciplined and well-seasoned troops, and is next to fatal with raw levies. 
Johnston chose the wiser course of moving by rail to Manassas, thus preserv- 
ing the benefit of " interior lines," which, Beauregard says, was the " sole 
military advantage at the moment that the Confederates possessed." 

The campaign which General Scott required McDowell to make was under- 
taken with the understanding that Johnston should be prevented from join- 
ing Beauregard. With no lack of confidence in himself, McDowell was 
dominated by the feeling of subordination and deference to General Scott 
which at that time pervaded the whole army, and General Scott, who con- 
trolled both McDowell and Patterson, assured McDowell that Johnston should 
not join Beauregard without having "Patterson on his heels." Yet John- 
ston's army, nearly nine thousand strong, joined Beauregard, Bee's brigade 
and Johnston in person arriving on the morning of the 20th, the remainder 






This stream is the Cat Harpin Run, which empties 
into Bull Run a short distance below the Smiley Springs 
Ford. Iu making the flank movement the Union troops, 
under Generals Hunter and Heintzelman, crossed this 
ford, followed later in the day by the ambulances and 

munition wagons. The retreat, also, was largely by 
this ford. The ruins of the Sudley Sulphur Spring 
House are shown on the left. The Sudley church, 
which was the main hospital after the fight, is a short 
distance south. Editors. 

about noon on the 21st. Although the enforced delav at Centreville enabled 
McDowell to provision his troops and gain information upon which to base 
an excellent plan of attack, it proved fatal by affording time for a junction of 
the opposing forces. On the 21st of July General Scott addressed a dispatch 
to McDowell, saying : " It is known that a strong reenf orcement left Winches- 
ter on the afternoon of the 18th, which you will also have to beat. Four new 
regiments will leave to-day to be at Fairfax Station to-night. Others shall 
follow to-morrow twice the number if necessary." "When this dispatch was 
penned, McDowell was fighting the " strong reenforcement " which left 
Winchester on the 18th. General Scott's report that Beauregard had been 
reenforced, the information that four regiments had been sent to McDowell, 
and the promise that twice the number would be sent if necessary, all came 
too late and Patterson came not at all. | 

4 On the 17th of July Patterson, with some 
16,000 three-months men, whose terms began to 
expire on the 24th, was at Charlestown, and John- 
ston, with about the same number, was at Winches- 
ter. On that 'lay General Scott telegraphed 
Patterson, " McDowell's first day's work has driven 
the enemy behind Fairfax Court House. Do not 
let the enemy amuse and delay you with a small 
force in front while he reenforces the Junction with 
his main body." To this Patterson replied at half- 

past 1 o'clock in the morning of the 18th, stating 
his difficulties and asking, " Shall I attack ?" Gen- 
eral Scott answered on the same day : " I have 
certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy," 
or that you "at least had occupied him by threats 
and demonstrations. You have been at least his 
equal and I suppose superior in numbers. Has he 
not stolen a march and sent reinforcements toward 
Manassas Junction '? " Patterson replied on the 
same day (18th), " The enemy has stolen no march 



During the 19th and 20th the bivouacs of McDowell's army at Centreville, 
almost within cannon range of the enemy, were thronged by visitors, official 
and unofficial, who came in carriages from Washington, bringing their own 
supplies. They were under no military restraint, and passed to and fro 
among the 'troops as they pleased, giving the scene the appearance of a 
monster military picnic. J) Among others, the venerable Secretary of War, 
Cameron, called upon McDowell. Whether due to a naturally serious 
expression, to a sense of responsibil- 
ity, to a premonition of the fate of his 
brother who fell upon the field on the 
21st, or to other cause, his countenance 
showed apprehension of evil ; but men 
generally were confident and jovial. 

McDowell's plan of battle promul- 
gated on the 20th, was to turn the 
enemy's left, force him from his de- 
fensive position, and, "if possible, 
destroy the railroad leading from 
Manassas to the Valley of Virginia, 
where the enemy has a large force." 
He did not know when he issued 
this order that Johnston had joined 
Beauregard, though he suspected it. Miles's Fifth Division, with Richard- 
son's brigade of Tyler's division, and a strong force of artillery was to 


On the tight are the ruins of the Sudley Sulphur 
Spring House. The building on the hill is Sudley Church. 
It is a mile by the Sudley and Manassas road from 
the ford ti> where the battle began. Editors. 

upon me. I have caused him to be reenf orced " ; 
and at 1 o'clock p. M. on that day he added : " I have 
succeeded, in accordance with the wishes of the Gen- 
eral-in-Chief, in keeping General Johnston's force 
at Winchester." At the very hour that Patterson 
was writing this dispatch Johnston's advance was 
leaving Winchester. On the 18th Johnston tele- 
graphed to Richmond that Patterson was at Charles- 
town, and said : "Unless he prevents it, we shall 
move toward General Beauregard to-day." He 
moved accordingly, and the Confederate armies 
were united for battle. It rested, however, with 
higher authority than Patterson to establish be- 
tween his army and McDowell's the relations that 
the occasion called for. In considering the require- 
ments for McDowell's movement against Manassas, 
General Scott gave great weight to the general 
and irresistible fear then prevailing in Washing- 
ton that the capital might be seized by a dash. Its 
direct defense was the first purpose of the three- 
months militia. The Potomac at Washington was 
itself a strong barrier, and with the field-works on 
its south bank afforded security in that quarter. 
The danger was thought to be from the Shenan- 
doah, and that induced the Government to keep 
Patterson in the valley. Indeed, on the 30th of 
June Colonel C. P. Stone's command was ordered 
from Point of Rocks to Patterson at Martins- 
burg, where it arrived on the 8th of July ; where- 
as the offensive campaign against Manassas, 
ordered soon after, required Patterson to go to 

Stone, as he proposed to do June 21st, instead of 
Stone to Patterson. The campaign of McDowell 
was forced upon General Scott by public opinion, 
but did not relieve the authorities from the fear 
that Johnston might rush down and seize Wash- 
ington. General Scott, under the pressure of the 
offensive in one quarter and the defensive in 
another, imposed upon Patterson the double task, 
difficult if not impossible, of preventing Johnston 
from moving on the capital and from joining Beau- 
regard. If that task was possible, it could have 
been accomplished only by persistent fighting, and 
that General Scott was unwilling to order; though 
in his dispatch of the lxth in reply to Patterson's 
question, " Shall I attack f " he said, "I have cer- 
tainly been expecting you to beat the enemy." 
Prior to that, his instructions to Patterson had 
enjoined caution. As soon as McDowell advanced, 
Patterson was upon an exterior line and in a false 
military position. Admitting that he might have 
done more to detain Johnston, bad strategy was 
probably more to blame for the result than any action 
or lack of action on Patterson's part. J. B. F. 

J) The presence of senators, congressmen, and 
other civilians upon the field oh the 21st gave rise 
to extravagant and absurd stories, in which alleged 
forethought and valor among them are contrasted 
with a lack of these qualities in the troops. The 
plain truth is that the non-combatants and their 
vehicles merely increased the confusion and 
demoralization of the retreat. J. B. F. 

1 84 


remain in reserve at Centreville, prepare defensive works there and threaten 
Blackburn's Ford. Tyler's First Division, which was on the turnpike 
in advance, was to move at 2:30 a. m., threaten the Stone Bridge and open fire 
upon it at daybreak. This demonstration was to be vigorous, its first purpose 
being to divert attention from the movements of the turning column. 
As soon as Tyler's 
troops cleared the 
way, Hunter's Sec- 
ond Division, follow- 
ed by Heintzelman's 
Third Division, was 
to move to a point 
on the Warrenton 
Turnpike about 1 or 
2 miles east of Cen- 
treville and there 
take a country road 

to the right, cross 
the Run at Sudley 
Springs, come down 
upon the flank and 
rear of the enemy at 
the Stone Bridge, and 
force him to open 
the way for Tyler's di- 
vision to cross there 
and attack, fresh and 
in full force. 

Tyler's start was so 
late and his advance 
was so slow as to hold 
Hunter and Heintzel- 
man 2 or 3 hours on 
the mile or two of 
the turnpike between 
their camps and the point at which they were to turn off for the flank march. 
This delay, and the fact that the flank march proved difficult and some 12 
miles instead of about 6 as was expected, were of serious moment. The flank- 
ing column did not cross at Sudley Springs until 9 : 30 Instead of 7, the long 
march, with its many interruptions, tired out the men, and the delay 
gave the enemy time to discover the turning movement. Tyler's opera- 
tions against the Stone Bridge were feeble and ineffective. By 8 o'clock 
Evans was satisfied that he was in no danger in front, and perceived the 
movement to turn his position. He was on the left of the Confederate line, 
guarding the point; where the Warrenton Turnpike, the great highway to the 
field, crossed Bull Run, the Confederate line of defense. He had no instruc- 




tions to guide him in the emergency that had arisen. But he did not hesitate. 
Reporting his information and purpose to the adjoining commander, Cocke, 
and leaving -4 companies of infantry to deceive and hold Tyler at the bridge, 
Evans before 9 o'clock turned his back upon the point he was set to guard, 
marched a mile away, and, seizing the high ground to the north of Young's 
Branch of Bull Run, formed line of battle at right angles to his former line, 
his left resting near the Sudley Springs road, by which Burnside with the 
head of the turning column was approaching, thus covering the Warrenton 
Turnpike and opposing a determined front to the Federal advance upon the 
Confederate left and rear.\ In his rear to the south lay the valley of 
Young's Branch, and rising from that was the higher ridge or plateau on 
which the Robinson house and the Henry house were situated, and on which 
the main action took place in the afternoon. Burnside, finding Evans across 
his path, promptly formed line of battle and attacked about 9:45 a. m. 
Hunter, the division commander, who was at the head of Burnside's brigade 
directing the formation of the first skirmish line, was severely wounded and 
taken to the rear at the opening of the action. Evans not only repulsed but 
pursued the troops that made the attack upon him. Andrew Porter's brigade 
of Hunter's division followed Burnside closely and came 
to his support. In the mean time Bee had formed a 
Confederate line of battle with his and Bartow's bri- 
gades of Johnston's army on the Henry house plateau, 
a stronger position than the one held by Evans, and 
desired Evans to fall back to that line; but Evans, 
probably feeling bound to cover the Warrenton Turn- 
pike and hold it against Tyler as well as against the 
flanking column, insisted that Bee should move across 
the valley to his support, which was done. 

After Bee joined Evans, the preliminary battle con- 
tinued to rage upon the ground chosen by the latter. 
The opposing forces were Burnside's and Porter's bri- 
gades, with one regiment of Heintzelman's division on 
the Federal side, and Evans's, Bee's, and Bartow's 
brigades on the Confederate side. The Confederates 
were dislodged and driven back to the Henry house 
plateau, where Bee had previously formed line and where what Beauregard 
called "the mingled remnants of Bee's, Bartow's, and Evans's commands" were 
re-formed under cover of Stonewall Jackson's brigade of Johnston's army. 


\ Evans's action was probably one of the best 
pieces of soldiership on either side during the 
campaign, but it seems to have received no special 
commendation from his superiors. J. B. F. 

ix William Todd, of Company B. 79th New 
York (Highlanders), writing to correct a statement 
to the effect " that the 79th New York wore the 
Highland dress at the battle of Bull Run," says : 
" If by that is meant the ' kilts,' it is an error. It 
is true that all the officers and many of the men 
did wear that uniform when we left the city in 

June, IS 61, and on dress-parade occasions in 
Washington, but when we went into Virginia it 
was laid aside, together with the plaid trousers 
worn by all the men on ordinary occasions, and we 

donned the ordinary blue. Captain was the 

only one who insisted on wearing the kilts on the 
march to Bull Run, but the day before we reached 
Centreville the kilts were the cause of his drawing 
upon himself much ridicule, and when we started 
for the battle-field on that Sundaymoraing he, also, 
appeared in ordinary blue uniform." Editors. 

1 8b 



In the middle-ground on the Warrenton turnpike 

stands the Stone house, a central landmark in both 
battles of Bull Run. The bank in the right foreground 
was a cover during the first battle for some of the sap- 
ports of (irittin's and Ricketts's batteries that were 
on the Henry house hill, the crest of which is two hun- 

dred and fifty yards fioni the right of the picture. In 
the first battle the fighting began on the Matthews hill, 
seen in the background behind the Stone house, and 
was most desperate on the Henry hill. Young's Branch 
(see map, page 180) crosses the Sudley road near its .junc- 
tion with the turnpike, and flows near the Stone house. 

The time of this repulse, as proved by so accurate an authority as Stone- 
wall Jackson, was before 11 : 30 a. m., and this is substantially confirmed by 
Beauregard's official report made at the time. Sherman and Keyes had 
nothing to do with it. They did not begin to cross Bull Run until noon. 
Thus, after nearly two hours' stubborn fighting with the forces of Johnston, 
which General Scott had promised should be kept away, McDowell won the 
first advantage ; but Johnston had cost him dearly. 

During all this time Johnston and Beauregard had been waiting near 
Mitchell's Ford for the development of the attack they had ordered by their 
right upon McDowell at Centreville. The gravity of the situation upon 
their left had not yet dawned upon them. What might the result have been 
if the Union column had not been detained by Tyler's delay in moving 
out in the early morning, or if Johnston's army, to which Bee, Bartow, and 
Jackson belonged, had not arrived ! 

But the heavy firing on the left soon diverted Johnston and Beauregard 
from all thought of an Offensive movement with their right, and decided them, 
as Beauregard has said, "to hurry up all available reinforcements, includ- 
ing the reserves that were to have moved upon Centreville, to our left, and 
fight the battle out in that quarter." Thereupon Beauregard ordered " Ewell, 
Jones, and Longstreet to make a strong demonstration all along their front on 
the other side of Bull Run, and ordered the reserves, Holmes's brigade with 


six guns, and Early's brigade, to move swiftly to the left," and he and John- 
ston set out at full speed for the point of conflict, which they reached while 
Bee was attempting to rally his men about Jackson's brigade on the Henry 
house plateau. McDowell had waited in the morning at the point on the 
Warrenton 'Turnpike where his flanking column turned to the right, until 
the troops, except Howard's brigade, which he halted at that point, had 
passed. He gazed silently and with evident pride upon the gay regiments 
as they filed briskly but quietly past in the freshness of the early morning, 
and then, remarking to his staff, " Gentlemen, that is a big force," he mounted 
and moved forward to the field by way of Sudley Springs. He reached the 
scene of actual conflict somewhat earlier than Johnston and Beauregard did, 
and, seeing the enemy driven across the valley of Young's Branch and 
behind the Warrenton Turnpike, at once sent a swift aide-de-camp to Tyler 
with orders to " press the attack " at the Stone Bridge. Tyler acknowledged 
that he received this order by 11 o'clock. It was Tyler's division upon which 
McDowell relied for the decisive fighting of the day. He knew that the march 
of the turning column would be fatiguing, and when by a sturdy fight it had 
cleared the Warrenton Turnpike for the advance of Tyler's division, it had, 
in fact, done more than its fair proportion of the work. But Tyler did not 
attempt to force the passage of the Stone Bridge, which, after about 8 o'clock, 
was defended by only four companies of infantry, though he admitted that by 
the plan of battle, when Hunter and Hemtzelman had attacked the enemy in 
the vicinity of the Stone Bridge, " he was to force the passage of Bull Kim at 
that point and attack the enemy in flank." J Soon after McDowell's arrival 
at the front, Burnside rode up to him and said that his brigade had borne the 
brunt of the battle, that it was out of ammunition, and that he wanted per- 
mission to withdraw, refit and fill cartridge-boxes. McDowell in the excite- 
ment of the occasion gave reluctant consent, and the brigade, which certainly 
had done nobly, marched to the rear, stacked arms, and took no further 
part in the fight. Having sent the order to Tyler to press his attack 
and orders to the rear of the turning column to hurry forward, McDowell, 
like Beauregard, rushed in person into the conflict, and by the force of cir- 
cumstances became for the time the commander of the turning column and 
the force actually engaged, rather than the commander of his whole army. 
With the exception of sending his adjutant-general to find and hurry Tyler 
forward, his subsequent orders were mainly or wholly to the troops under his 
own observation. Unlike Beauregard, he had no Johnston in rear with full 
authority and knowledge of the situation to throw forward reserves and 
reinforcements. It was not until 12 o'clock that Sherman received orders 
from Tyler to cross the stream, which he did at a ford above the Stone 
Bridge, going to the assistance of Hunter. Sherman reported to McDowell 

\ After the affair at Blackburn's Ford on the ished for my leniency to that man ! If there is 

18th and Tyler's action in the battle of the 21st, anything clearer to me than anything else with 

a bitterness between Tyler and McDowell grew up reference to our operations in that campaign, it is 

which lasted till they died. As late as 1884, that if we had had another commander for our 

McDowell, writing to me of Tyler's criticism of right we should have had a complete and brilliant 
him after the war, said, "How I have been pun- 

1 88 



on the field and joined in the pursuit 
of Bee's forces across the valley of 
Young's Branch. Keyes's brigade, ac- 
companied by Tyler in person, followed 
across the stream where Sherman ford- 
ed, but without uniting with the other 
forces on the field, made a feeble 
advance upon the slope of the plateau 
toward the Robinson house, and then 
about 2 o'clock filed off by flank to its 
left and, sheltered by the east front 
of the bluff that forms the plateau, 
marched down Young's Branch out of 
sight of the enemy and took no further 
part in the engagement. McDowell 
did not know where it was, nor did he 
then know that Schenck's brigade of 
Tyler's division did not cross the Bun 
at all. 

The line taken up by Stonewall 
Jackson upon which Bee, Bartow, and 
Evans rallied on the southern part of 
the plateau was a very strong one. The ground was high and afforded the 
cover of a curvilinear wood with the concave side toward the Federal line 
of attack. According to Beauregard's official report made at the time, he had 
upon this part of the field, at the beginning, 6500 infantry, 13 pieces of 
artillery, and 2 companies of cavalry, and this line was continuously reen- 
forced from Beauregard's own reserves and by the arrival of the troops from 
the Shenandoah Valley. 

To carry this formidable position, McDowell had at hand the brigades 
of Franklin, Willcox, Sherman, and Porter, Palmer's battalion of regular cav- 
alry, and Ricketts's and Griffin's regular batteries. Porter's brigade had been 
reduced and shaken by the morning fight. Howard's brigade was in reserve 
and only came into action late in the afternoon. The men, unused to field ser- 
vice, and not yet over the hot and dusty march from the Potomac, had been 
under arms since midnight. The plateau, however, was promptly assaulted, 
the northern part of it was carried, the batteries of Ricketts and Griffin were 
planted near the Henry house, and McDowell clambered to the upper story 
of that structure to get a glance at the whole field. Upon the Henry house 
plateau, of which the Confederates held the southern and the Federals the 
northern part, the tide of battle ebbed and flowed as McDowell pushed in 
Franklin's, Willcox's, Sherman's, Porter's, and at last Howard's brigades, and 
as Beauregard put into action reserves which Johnston sent from the right 
and reinforcements which he hurried forward from the Shenandoah Valley 
as they arrived by cars. On the plateau, Beauregard says, the disadvantage 
of his " smooth-bore guns was reduced by the shortness of range." The 



short range was due to the Federal advance, and the several struggles for the 
plateau were at close quarters and gallant on both sides. The batteries of 
Ricketts and Griffin, by their fine discipline, wonderful daring, and matchless 
skill, were th'e prime features in the fight. The battle was not lost till they 
were lost. When in their advanced and perilous position, and just after their 
infantry supports had been driven over the slopes, a fatal mistake occurred. 
A regiment of infantry came out of the woods on Griffin's right, and as he was 
in the act of opening upon it with canister, he was deterred by the assurance 
of Major Barry, the chief of artillery, that it " was a regiment sent by Colonel 
Heintzelman to support the battery." & A moment more and the doubtful regi- 
ment proved its identity by a deadly volley, and, as Griffin states in his official 
report, " every cannoneer was cut down and a large number of horses killed, 

leaving the battery (which was without 
support excepting in name) perfectly 
helpless." The effect upon Ricketts was 
equally fatal. He, desperately wounded, 
and Ramsay, his lieutenant, killed, lay 
in the wreck of the battery. Beauregard 
speaks of his last advance on the plateau 
as "leaving in our final possession the 
Robinson and Henry houses, with most 
of Ricketts's and Griffin's batteries, the 
men of which were mostly shot down 
where they bravely stood by their guns." 
Having become separated from Mc- 
Dowell, I fell in with Barnard, his chief 
engineer, and while together we ob- 
seiwed the New York Fire Zouaves, who 
had been supporting Griffin's battery, 
fleeing to the rear in their gaudy uni- 
forms, in utter confusion. Thereupon 


o as we rode together 

& Griffin himself told me 
after leaving Centreville. He and I were class- 
mates and warm friends. J. B. F. 

Major Win. F. Barry gives, in his report, this 
explanation of the disaster to the batteries : 

" Returning to the position occupied by Ricketts' and 
Griffin's batteries, I received an order from General 
McDowell to advance two batteries to an eminence [the 
Henry Hill] specially designated by him, about eight 
hundred yards in front of the line previously occupied 
by our artillery, and very near the position first occupied 
by the enemy's batteries. I therefore ordered these two 
batteries to move forward at once, and, as soon as they 
were in motion, went for and procured as supports the 
lltli (Fire Zouaves) and the Uth (Brooklyn) New York 
regiments. I accompanied the former regiment to guide 
it to its proper position, and Colonel Heintzelman, 17th 
U. S. Infantry, performed the same service for the 14th, 
on the right of the 11th. A squadron of United States 
cavalry under Captain Colburn, 1st Cavalry, was subse- 
quently ordered as additional support. We were soon 
upon the ground designated, and the two batteries at 
once opened a very effective lire upon the enemy's left. 
The new position had scarcely been occupied when a 

troop of the enemy's cavalry, debouching from a piece 
of woods close upon our right flank, charged down upon 
the New York 11th. The Zouaves, catching sight of the 
cavalry a few moments before they were upon them, 
broke ranks to such a degree that the cavalry dashed 
through without doing them much harm. The Zouaves 
gave them a scattering fire as they passed, which empt i< td 
five saddles and killed three horses. A few minutes after- 
ward a regiment of the enemy's infantry, covered by a 
high fence, presented itself in line on the left and front 
of the two batteries at not more than sixty or seventy 
yards' distance, and delivered a volley full upon the bat- 
teries and their supports. Lieutenant Ramsay, 1st Artil- 
lery, was killed, and Captain Ricketts, 1st Artillery, was 
wounded, and a number of men and horses were killed 
or disabled by this close, and well-directed volley. The 
llth and 14th regiments instantly broke and fled in con- 
fusion to the rear, and in spite of the repeated and ear- 
nest efforts of Colonel Heintzelman with the latter, and 
myself with the former, refused to rally and return to 
the support of the batteries. The enemy, seeing the guns 
thus abandoned by their supports, rushed upon them, 
and driving off the cannoneers, who, with their officers, 
stood bravely at their posts until the last moment, cap- 
tured them, ten in number. These were the only guns 
taken by the enemy on the field." Editors. 




Colonel William T. Sherman, who commanded the 
Third Brigade of Tyler's division, describes as follows 
some of the efforts to regain the Henry Hill after the 
capture of Griffin's and Ricketts's batteries: "Before 
reaching the crest of this [Henry] hill, the roadway [see 
picture, page 186] was worn deep enough to afford shelter, 
and I kept the several regiments in it as long as possible ; 
but when the Wisconsin 2d was abreast of the enemy, by 
order of Major Wadsworth, of General McDowell's staff, 
I ordered it to leave the roadway by the left flank, and 
to attack the enemy. This regiment ascended to the 
brow of the hill steadily, received the severe lire of the 
enemy, returned it with spirit, and advanced delivering 
its tire. This regiment is uniformed in gray cloth, 
almost identical with that of the great bulk of the seces- 
sion army, and when the regiment fell into confusion 
and retreated toward the road, there was an universal 
cry that they were being tired on by our owu men. The 
regiment rallied asaiu, passed the brow of the hill a 
second time, but was agnin repulsed in disorder. By 
this time the New York 79th had closed up, and in like 

manner it was ordered to cross the brow of the hill and 
drive the enemy from cover. It was impossible to get a 
good view of this ground. In it there was one battery 
of artillery, which poured an incessant fire upon our 
advancing columns, and the ground was very irregular, 
with small clusters of pines, affording shelter, of which 
the enemy took good advantage. The fire of rifles and 
musketry was very severe. The 79th, headed by its 
colonel (Cameron), charged across the hill, and for a 
short time the contest was severe. They rallied several 
times under tire, but finally broke and gained the cover 
of the hill. This left the field open to the New York 
69th, Colonel Corcoran, who in his turn led his regiment 
over the crest, and had in full open view the ground so 
severely contested. The firing was very severe, and the 
roar of cauuon, muskets, and rifles incessant. It was 
manifest the enemy was here in great force, far supe- 
rior to us at that point. The 69th held the ground for 
some time, but finally fell back in disorder. . . . 
Here, about 3: 30 p. m., began the scene of confusion and 
disorder that characterized the remainder of the day." 

I rode back to where I knew Burnside's brigade was at rest, and stated to 
Burnside the condition of affairs, with the suggestion that he form and move 
his brigade to the front. Returning, I again met Barnard, and as the battle 
seemed to him and me to be going against us, and not knowing where 
McDowell was, with the concurrence of Barnard, as stated in his official 
report, I immediately sent a note to Miles, telling him to move two brigades 
of his reserve up to the Stone Bridge and telegraph to Washington to send 
forward all the troops that could be spared. 

After the arrival of Howard's brigade, McDowell for the last time pressed 
up the slope to the plateau, forced back the Confederate line, and regained 
possession of the Henry and Robinson houses and of the lost batteries. But 
there were no longer cannoneers to man or horses to move these guns that 
had done so much. By the arrival upon this part of the field of his own 
reserves and Kirby Smith's brigade of Johnston's army about half-past 3, 




Beauregard extended his left to outflank McDowell's shattered, shortened, and 
disconnected line, and the Federals left the field about half -past 4. Until then 
they had fought wonderfully well for raw troops. There were no fresh forces on 

the field to support or encourage them, and the men seemed 
to be seized simultaneously by the conviction that it was no 
use to do anything more and they might as well start 
home. Cohesion was lost, the organizations with some ex- 
ceptions being disintegrated, and the men quietly walked off. 
There was no special excitement except that arising from 
the frantic efforts of officers to stop men who paid little 
or no attention to anything that was said. On the high 
ground by the Matthews house, about where Evans had 
taken position in the morning to check Burnside, Mc- 
Dowell and his staff, aided by other officers, made a 
desperate but futile effort to arrest the masses and form 
them into line. There, I went to Arnold's battery as it 
came by, and advised that he unlimber and make a stand as 
a rallying-poiut, which he did, saying he was in fair con- 
dition and ready to fight as long as there was any fighting 
to be done. But all efforts failed. The stragglers moved 
past the guns, in spite of all that could be done, and, as 
stated in his report, Arnold at my direction joined Sykes's battalion of infan- 
try of Porter's brigade and Palmer's battalion of cavalry, all of the regular 
army, to cover the rear, as the men trooped back in 
great disorder across Bull Run. There were some hours 
of daylight for the Confederates to gather the fruits of 
victory, but a few rounds of shell and canister checked 
all the pursuit that was attempted, and the occasion called 
for no sacrifices or valorous deeds by the stanch regulars 
of the rear-guard. There was no panic, in the ordinary 
meaning of the word, until the retiring soldiers, guns, 
wagons, congressmen, and carriages were fired upon, on 
the road east of Bull Run. Then the panic began, and 
the bridge over Cub Run being rendered impassable for 
vehicles by a wagon that was upset upon it, utter con- 
fusion set in : pleasure-carriages, gun-carriages, and am- 
munition wagons which could not be put across the Run 
were abandoned and blocked the way, and stragglers 
broke and threw aside their muskets and cut horses 
from their harness and rode off upon them. In leaving 
the field the men took the same routes, in a general way, 
by which they had reached it. Hence when the men 
of Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions got back to Cen- 
treville, they had walked about 25 miles. That night they walked back to 
the Potomac, an additional distance of 20 miles ; so that these undisciplined 
and unseasoned ""en within 36 hours walked fully 45 miles, besides fighting 




from about 10 a. m. until 4 p. m. on a hot and dusty day in July. McDowell 
in person reached Centreville before sunset, | and found there Miles's division 
with Richardson's brigade and 3 regiments of Runyon's division, and Hunt's, 
Tidball's, Ayres's, and Greene's batteries and 1 or 2 fragments of batteries, 
making about 20 guns. It was a formidable force, but there was a lack 
of food and the mass of the army was 
completely demoralized. Beauregard 
had about an equal force which had 
not been in the fight, consisting of 
Ewell's, Jones's, and Longstreet's bri- 
gades and some troops of other brigades. 
McDowell consulted the division and 
brigade commanders who were at hand 
upon the question of making a stand or 
retreating. The verdict was in favor of 
the latter, but a decision of officers one 
way or the other was of no moment; 
the men had already decided for them- 
selves and were streaming away to the 
rear, in spite of all that could be done. 
They had no interest or treasure in 
Centreville, and their hearts were not 
there. Their tents, provisions, baggage, 
and letters from home were upon the 
banks of the Potomac, and no power could have stopped them short of 
the camps they had left less than a week before. As before stated, most 
of them were sovereigns in uniform, not soldiers. McDowell accepted the 
situation, detailed Richardson's and Blenker's brigades to cover the retreat, 
and the army, a disorganized mass, with some creditable exceptions, drifted 


1 1 left the field with General Franklin. His 
brigade had dissolved. We moved first northerly, 
crossed Bull Run below the Sudley Spring Ford, 
and then bore south and east. Learning by inquir- 
ies of the men I passed that McDowell was ahead 
of me, I leftFranklin and hurried on to Centreville, 
where I found McDowell, just after sunset, re- 
arranging the positions of his reserves. J. B. F. 

I Colonel Louis Blenker, commanding the First 
Brigade of Miles's division, covered the retreat of 
the army from Centreville, which he describes as 
follows: "In this position the brigade remained 
until about 4 o'clock p. m., when I received orders 
to advance upon the road from Centreville to War- 
renton. This order was executed with great diffi- 
culty, as the road was nearly choked up by the 
retreating baggage-wagons of several divisions, 
and by the vast numbers of flying soldiers belong- 
ing to various regiments. . . . The 8th [New 
York Volunteer] Regiment took position one and a 
half miles south of Centreville, on both sides of the 
road leading to Bull Run. The 29th [New York] 
Regiment stood half a mile behind the 8th, en 
cchitpiicr by companies. The Garibaldi Guard stood 

as reserve in line behind the 29th Regiment. 
The retreat of great numbers of flying soldiers 
continued till 9 o'clock in the evening, the great 
majority in wild confusion, but few in collected 
bodies. Soon afterward several squadrons of the 
enemy's cavalry advanced along the road and 
appeared before the outposts. They were chal- 
lenged by ' Who comes there ? ' and remaining 
without any answer, I, being just present at the 
outposts, called, 'Union forever.' Whereupon the 
officer of the enemy's cavalry commanded, ' En 
avant; en avant. Knock him down!' Now the 
skirmishers fired, when the enemy turned around, 
leaving several killed and wounded on the spot. 
About nine prisoners, who were already in their 
hands, were liberated by this action. Afterward 
we were several times molested from various sides 
by the enemy's cavalry. At about midnight the 
command to leave the position and march to 
Washington was given by General McDowell. 
The brigade retired in perfect order, and ready 
to repel any attack on the road from Centre- 
ville to Fairfax Court House, Annandale to Wash- 
ington." Editors. 



as the men pleased away from the scene of action. There was no pur- 
suit, and the march from Centreville was as barren of opportunities for the 
rear-guard as .the withdrawal from the field of battle had been.\ When 
McDowell reached Fairfax Court House in the night, he was in communica- 
tion with Washington and exchanged telegrams with General Scott, in one of 
which the old hero said, " We are not discouraged " ; but that dispatch did 
not lighten the gloom in which it was received. McDowell was so tired that 
while sitting on the ground writing a dispatch he fell asleep, pencil in hand, 
in the middle of a sentence. His adjutant-general aroused him ; the dispatch 
was finished, and the weary ride to the Potomac resumed. When the unfortu- 
nate commander dismounted at Arlington next forenoon in a soaking rain, 
after 32 hours in the saddle, his disastrous campaign of 6 days was closed. 

The first martial effervescence of the country was over. The three- 
months men went home, and the three-months chapter of the war ended 
with the South triumphant and confident; the North disappointed but 

\ The revised losses are as follows: Federal, 
16 officers and 444 enlisted men killed; 78 offi- 
cers and 1046 enlisted men wounded ; 50 officers 
and 1262 enlisted men missing; 25 pieces of artil- 

* The scene in Washington after the battle has 
been graphically described bj Walt Whitman, from 
whose "Specimen Days audCollect" (Philadelphia: 
Rees, Welch & Co.) we make these extracts : 

" The defeated troops commenced pouring into Wash- 
ington over the Long Bridge at daylight on Monday, 
22d day drizzling all through with rain. The Saturday 
and Sunday of the battle (20th, 21st) had been parched 
and hot to an extreme the dust, the grime and smoke, 
in layers, sweated in, follow'd by other layers again 
sweated in, absorb'd by those excited souls their 
clothes all saturated with the clay-powder filling the 
air stirr'd up everywhere on the dry roads and trod- 
den fields by the regiments, swarming wagons, artillery, 
etc. all the men with this coating of murk and sweat 
and rain, now recoiling back, pouring over the Long 
Bridge a horrible march of twenty miles, returning to 
Washington baffled, humiliated, panic-struok. Where 
are the vaunts and the proud boasts with which you 
went forth? Where are your banners, and your bands 
of music, and your ropes to bring back your prisoners? 
Well, there isn't a band playing and there isn't a flag 
but clings ashamed and lank to its staff. 

" The sun rises, but shines not. The men appear, at 
first sparsely and shame-faced enough, then thicker, in 
the streets of Washington appear in Pennsylvania 
Avenue, and on the steps and basement entrances. They 
come along in disorderly mobs, some in squads, strag- 
glers, companies. Occasionally, a rare regiment, in per- 
fect order, with its officers (some gaps, dead, the true 
braves), marching in silence, with lowering faces, stern, 
weary to sinking, all black and dirty, but every man 
with his musket, and stepping alive ; but these are the 
exceptions. Sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue, Four- 
teenth street, etc., crowded, jainin'd with citizens, dar- 
kies, clerks, everybody, lookers-on ; women in the win- 
dows, curious expressions from faces, as those swarms 
of dirt-cover'd return'd soldiers there (Will they never 
end?) move by; but nothing said, no comments; (half 
our lookers-on ' secesh ' of the most venomous kind 

lery and a large quantity of small arms. Confeder- 
ate, 25 officers and 362 enlisted men killed; 63 
officers and 1519 enlisted men wounded; 1 officer 
and 12 enlisted men missing. J. B. F. 

they say nothing; but the devil snickers in their faces). 
During the forenoon, Washington gets all over motley 
with these defeated soldiers queer-looking objects, 
strange eyes and faces, dreuch'd (the steady rain drizzles 
on all day) and fearfully worn, hungry, haggard, blister'd 
in the feet. Good people (but not over-many of them 
either) hurry up something for their grub. They put 
wash-kettles on the fire, for soup, for coffee. They set 
tables on the sidewalks wagon-loads of bread are pur- 
chas'd, swiftly cut in stout chunks. Here are two aged 
ladies, beautiful, the first in the city for culture and 
charm, they stand with store of eating and drink at an 
improvis'd table of rough plank, and give food, and have 
the store replenish'd from their house every half-hour 
all that day; and there in the rain they stand, active, 
silent, white-hair'd, and give food, though the tears 
stream down their cheeks, almost without intermission, 
the whole time. Amid the deep excitement, crowds ami 
motion, and desperate eagerness, it seems strange to see 
many, very many, of the soldiers sleeping in the midst 
of all, sleeping sound. They drop down anywhere, on 
the steps of houses, up close by the basements or fences, 
on the sidewalk, aside on some vacant lot, and deeply 
sleep. A poor seventeen or eighteen year old boy lies 
there, onthe stoop of a grand house; he sleeps so calmly, 
so profoundly. Some clutch their muskets firmly even in 
sleep. Some in squads; comrades, brothers, close to- 
gether and on them, as they lay, sulkily drips the 
rain. . . . 

"But the hour, the day, the night pass'd, and what- 
ever returns, an hour, a day, a night like,that can never 
again return. The President, recovering himself, begins 
that very night sternly, rapidly sets about the task- of 
reorganizing his forces, and placing himself in positions 
for future and surer work. If there were nothing else of 
Abraham Lincoln for history to stamp him with, it is 
enough to send him with his wreath to the memory of all 
future time, that he endured that hour, that day, bitterer 
than gall indeed a crucifixion day that it did not 
conquer him that he unflinchingly stemm'd it, and 
resolv'd to lift himself and the Union out of it." 

VOL. I. 13 


[The composition and losses of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. 
K stands for killed ; w for wounded; m for captured or missing ; c for captured. Editors.] 

Brig.-Gen. Irviu McDowell, staff loss: w, l. (Capt. O. H. TiUingnast, mortally wounded.) 

Fikst Division, Brig.-Gen. Daniel Tyler. Staff loss: 
w, 2. First Brigade, Col. Erasmus D. Keyes : 2d Me., 
Col. C. D. Jameson; 1st Conn., Col. G. S. Burnham; 2d 
Conn., Col. A. H. Terry ; 3d Conn., Col. John L. Chat- 
fleld. Brigade loss: k, 19; w, 50; ru, 154 = 223. Scroti)/ 
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Robert C. Schenek: 2d N.Y. (militia), 
Col. G. W. B. Tompkins ; 1st Ohio, Col. A. McD. MeCook ; 
2d Ohio, Lieut. -Col. Rodney Mason; E, 2d IT. S. Arty., 
( apt. J. H. Carlisle. Brigade loss : k, 21 ; w, 25 ; ni, 52 = 
98. Third Brigade, Col. W. T. Sherman: 13th N. Y., Col. 
I. F. Quiuby ; 69th N. Y., Col. M. Corcoran (w and < . 
Capt. James Kelly; 79th N. Y., Col. James Cameron (k) ; 
2d Wis., Lieut.-Col. H. W. Peek; E, 3d U. S. Arty., Capt. 
R. B. Ayres. Brigade loss : k, 107 ; w, 205 ; m, 293 = 605. 
Fourth Brigade, Col. Israel B. Richardson : 1st Mass., 
Col. Robert Cowdin; 12th N. Y., Col. Ezra L. Walrath ; 
2d Mich., Major A. W. Williams ; 3d Mich., Col. Daniel 
McCoiinell; G, 1st U. S. Arty., Lieut. John Edwards; 
M, 2d U. S. Arty., Capt. Henry J. Hunt. This brigade was 
only slightly engaged in front of Blackburn's Ford, with 
the loss of one officer killed. 

Second Division, Col. D. Hunter (w), Col. Andrew 
Porter. Staff loss : w, 1; m, 1 = 2. First Brigade, Col. 
Andrew Porter : 8th N. Y*. (militia), Col. Geo. Lyons ; 14th 
N. Y. (militia), Col. A. M. Wood (w and c), Lieut.-Col. E. 
B. Fowler; 27th N. Y r ., Col. H. W. Slocum (w), Major J. 
J. Bartlett ; Battalion U. S. Infantry, Major George 
Sykes; Battalion U. S. Marines, Major J. G. Reynolds; 
Battalion U. S. Cavalry, Major I. N. Palmer ; D, 5th U 
S. Arty., Capt. Charles Griffin. Brigade loss: k, 86; w, 
177; m, 201 = 464. Second Brigade, Col. Ambrose E. 
Burnside : 2dN. H, Col. Gilman Marston (w), Lieut.-Col. 
F. S. Fiske; 1st R. I., Major J. P. Balch; 2d R. I. (with 
battery), Col. John S. Slocum (k), Lieut.-Col. Frank 
Wheaton ; 71st N. Y. (with two howitzers), Col. H. P. 
Martin. Brigade loss : k, 58 ; w, 171 ; m, 134 = 363. 

Third Division, Col. Samuel P. Heintzelman. First 
Brigade, Col. W. B. Franklin : 5th Mass., Col. S. C. Law- 
rence; 11th Mass., Col. George Clark, Jr.; 1st Minn., 
Col. W. A. Gorman ; 1, 1st U. S. Arty., Capt. J. B. Rick- 
etts (w and c), Lieut. Edmund Kirby. Brigade loss : k, 
70; w, 197; m, 92=359. Second Brigade, Col. Orlando 
B. Willcox (w and c), Col. J. H. H.Ward: llth N. Y., 
Lieut.-Col. N. L. Farnham ; 38th N. Y\, Col. J. H. H. 
Ward, Lieut.-Col. A. Farnsworth; 1st Mich., Major A. F. 
Bidwell ; 4th Michigan, Col. D. A. Woodbury; D, 2d U. S. 
Arty., Capt. Richard Arnold. Brigade loss: k, 65; w, 
177; m, 190=432. Third Brigade, Col. Oliver O. How- 
ard: 3d Me., Major H. G. Staples; 4th Me., Col. H. <;. 
Berry ; 5th Me., Col. M. H. Duunell ; 2d Vt., Col. Henry 
Whiting. Brigade loss: k, 27 ; w, 100; m, 98 = 225. 

Fourth (Reserve) Division. [Not on the field of bat- 
tle.] Brig.-Gen. Theodore Ruuyon. Militia : 1st N. J., 
Col. A. J. Johnson ; 2d N. J., Col. H. M. Baker; 3d N. J., 
Col. Win Napton ; 4th N. J., Col. Matthew Miller, Jr. 
Volunteers: 1st N. J., Col. W. R. Montgomery; 2d N. 
J., Col. Geo. W. McLean ; 3d N. J., Col. George W. Taylor ; 
41st N. Y., Col. Leopold von Gilsa. 

Fifth Division. [In reserve at Centreville and not 
engaged in the battle pioper. It had some skirmishing 
during the day and while covering the retreat of the 
army.] Col. Dixon S. Miles. First Brigade, Col. Louis 
Blenker : 8th N. Y. (Vols.) Lieut.-Col. Julius Stahel; 29tb 
N. Y r ., Col. Adolph von Steinwehr; 39th N. Y. (Garibaldi 
Guards), Col. F. G. D'Utassy ; 27th Penna.. Col. Max 
Einstein ; A, 2d U. S. Arty., Capt. John C. Tidball ; Book- 
wood's N. Y. battery, Captain Charles Bookwood. Bri- 
gade loss : k, 6 ; w, 16 ; m, 96 = 118. Second Brigade, Col. 
Thomas A. Davies : 16th N.Y., Lieut.-Col. Samuel Marsh ; 
ISth N.Y r ., Col. W. A. Jackson ; 31st NY., Col. C. E. Pratt ; 
32d N. Y\, Col. R. Mathesou; G, 2d U. 8. Arty., Lieut. 
O. D. Greene. Brigade loss : w, 2 ; m, 1 = 3. 

Total loss of the Union army : killed, 460; wounded, 1124; captured or missing, 1312, grand total, 2896. 


General James B. Fry, who was General McDowell's 
adjutant-general, prepared in October, 1884, a statement 
of the strength of the army, in brief as follows : 

" It was not practicable at the time to ascertain the 
strength of the army with accuracy ; and it is impossible 
now to make a return which can be pronounced abso- 
lutely correct. 

" The abstract which appears on page 309, vol. ii., ' Offi- 
cial Records,' is not a return of McDowell's army at the 
battle of Bull Run, and was not prepared by me, but, as 
I understand, has been compiled since the war. It pur- 
ports to give the strength of the ' Department of North- 
eastern Virginia,' July 16th and 17th, not of McDowell's 
army, July 21st. It does not show the losses resulting 
from the discharge of the 4th Pennsylvania Infantry and 
Varian's New York battery, which marched to the rear 
on the morning of the 21st, nor the heavy losses inci- 
dent to the march of the army from the Potomac ; it 
embraces two regiments the 21st and 25th New York In- 
fantry which were not with the army in the field ; and 
it contains the strength of Company E, Second United 
States Cavalry, as a special item, whereas that company 
is embraced in the strength of the Second (Hunter's) 
Division, to which it, with the rest of the cavalry, 

"In his report of the battle (p. 324, vol. ii.. 'Official 
Records') General McDowell says he crossed Bull Run 
' with about eighteen thousand men.' I collected infor- 
mation to that effect for him at the time. His statement 
is substantially correct. The following is an exhibit in 
detail of the forces actually engaged : 




E n listed 

First Division, two brigades ... 
Second Division, two brigades. . . 
Third Division, three brigades. . .. 


Total seven brigades 



"Only Keyes's and Sherman's brigades of the four 
brigades of the First Division crossed Bull Run. 

" The Fifth Division, with Richardson's brigade of the 
First Division attached, was in reserve at and in front 
of Centreville. Some of it was lightly engaged on our 
side of Bull Run in repelling a feeble advance of the 
enemy. The Fourth (Reserve) Divisiou was left to 
guard our communications with the Potomac, its ad- 
vance being seven miles in rear of Centreville. 




"That is to say, McDowell crossed Bull Run with 896 
officers, 17,676 rank aud rile, and 24 pieces of artillery. 

" The artillerymen who crossed Bull Run are embraced 
in the figures of the foregoing table. The guns were as 
follows : Ricketts's Battery, 6 10-pounder rifle guns ; 
Griffin's Battery, 4 10-pounder rifle guns, 2 12-pounder 
howitzers; Arnold's Battery, 2 13-pounder rifle guns, 
2 6-pounder smooth-bores ; R. I. Battery, 6 13-pounder 
rifles ; 71st N. Y. Reg't's Battery, 2 Dahlgren howitzers. 

" The artillery, in addition to that which crossed Bull 
Run, was as follows : Hunt's Battery, 4 12-pounder 
rifle guns; Carlisle's Battery, 2 13-pounder rifle guns, 2 
6-pounder smooth-bore guns ; Tidball's Battery, 2 
6-pounder smooth-bore guns, 2 12-pounder howitzers; 
Greene's Battery, 4 10-pounder rifle guns ; Ayres's Bat- 
tery, 2 10-pounder rifle guns, 2 6-pounder smooth-bore 
guns, 2 12-pounder howitzers ; Edwards's Battery, 2 20- 
pounder rifle guns, 1 30-pounder rifle gun." 


General Joseph E. Johnston. 

Army of the Potomac, Brig.-Gen. G. T. Beauregard. 
Firs! Brigade, Brig.-Gen. M. L. Bonham : 11th N. C, Col. 
W. W. Kirkland ; 2d S. C, Col. J. B. Kershaw ; 3d S. C, 
Col. J. H. Williams ; 7th S. C, Col. Thomas G. Bacon; 
8th S. C, Col. E. B. C. Cash. Loss: k, 10; w, 66 = 76. 
Second Brigade [not actively engagedj, Brig.-Gen. R. 8. 
Ewell: 5th Ala., Col. R. E. Rodes; 6th Ala., Col. J. J. 
Seibels ; 6th La., Col. J. G. Seymour. Third Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. D. R. Jones : 17th Miss., Col. W. S. Feather- 
ston ; 18th Miss., Col. E. R. Burt : 5th S. C. Col. M. Jen- 
kins. Loss: k, 13; w, 62=75. Fourth Brigade [not act- 
ively engaged], Brig.-Gen. James Longstreet : 5th N. ('., 
Lieut .-Col. Jones; 1st Va,, Major F. G. Skinner; 11th Va.. 
Col. S. Garland. Jr.; 17th Va., Col. M.D. Corse. Loss: k.2; 
w, 12=14. Fifth Brigade, Col. P. St. Geo. Cocke: 8th Va., 
Col. Eppa Hunton; 18th Va., Col. R.E. Withers; 19th Va., 
Lieut.-Col. J. B. Strange; 28th Va., Col. R. T. Preston; 
49th Va. (3 cos.), Col.Wm. Smith. Loss: k, 23; w, 79; m,2 
= 104. Sixth Brigade, Col. Jubal A. Early : 7th La., Col. 
Harry T. Hays; 13th Miss., Col. Win. Barksdale; 7th Va . 
Col. J. L. Kemper; 24th Va.. Lieut.-Col. P. Hairston, Jr. 
Loss: k, 12; w, 67 = 79. Evans's command (temporarily 
organized), Col. N. G. Evans : 1st La. Battalion. Major C. 
R. Wheat (w) ; 4th S. C, Col. J. B. E. Sloan ; Cavalry, Capt. 
W. R. Terry ; Artillery, Lieut. G. S. Davidson. Loss: k, 
20 ; w, 118 ; m, 8 = 146. Reserve Brigade \\\o\ actively en- 
gaged], Brig.-Gen. T. H. Holmes: 1st Arkansas and 2d 
Tennessee. Unatlachnl Infantry. 8th La. : Col. H. B. 
Kelly; Hampton's (S. C.) Legion, Col. Wade nampton. 

Loss : k, 19; w, 100 ; m, 2 = 121. Cavalry : 30th Virginia, 
Col. R. C. W. Radford ; Harrison's Battalion ; Ten inde- 
pendent companies. Loss : k, 5 ; w, 8 = 13. Artillery : 
Battalion Washington Artillery (La.), Major J. B. Wal- 
ton ; Alexandria (Va.) Battery, Capt. Del Kemper ; La- 
tham's (Va.) Battery, Capt. H. G. Latham ; Loudoun 
(Va.) Artillery, Capt. Arthur L. Rogers; Shields's (Va.) 
Battery, Capt. J. C. Shields. Loss : k. 2 ; w, 8 = 10. Total 
loss Army of the Potomac: k, 105 ; w, 519 ; m, 12 = 636. 

Army of the Shenandoah, General Joseph E. 
Johnston. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. J. Jackson: 2d 
Va., Col. J. W. Allen; 4th Va,, Col. J. F. Preston; 5th 
Va., Col. Kenton Harper; 27th Va., Lieut.-Col. John 
Echols; 33d Va,, Col. A. C. Cummings. Loss: k, 119; w, 
4 12 = 561. Second Brigade, Col. F. S. Bartow (k) : 7th Ga., 
Col. Lucius J. GartreU; 8th Ga., Lieut.-Col. W. M. Gard- 
ner. Loss: k, 60; w, 293=353. Third Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. B. E. Bee (k) : 4th Ala., Col. Jones (k). Col. S. R. 
Gist; 2d Miss., Col. W. C. Falkner; llth Miss. (2 cos.), 
Lieut.-Col. P. F. Liddell ; Gth N. C, Col. C. F. Fisher (k). 
Loss: k, 95; w, 309; in, 1 =405. Fourth Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. E. K. Smith (w), Col. Arnold Elzey : 1st Md. Bat- 
talion, Lieut.-Col. George H. Steuart; 3d Tennessee, 
Col. John C. Vaughn ; 10th Va., Col. S. B. Gibbous ; 13th 
Va.. Col. A. P. Hill. Loss: k, 8; w, 19 = 27. Artillery: 
Imboden's, Stanard's, Pendleton's, Alburtis's, aud Beck- 
ham's batteries. Cavalry : 1st Va., Col. J. E. B. Stuart. 
(Loss not specifically reported.) Total loss Army of the 
Shenandoah : k. 282 ; w, 1063 ; m, 1 = 1346. 

Total loss of the Confederate Army : killed, 387; wounded, 1582 ; captured or missing, 13, grand total, 1982. 


In October, 1884, General Thomas Jordan, who was 
General Beauregard's adjutant-general, prepared a 
statement of the strength of the Confederate army at 
Bull Run or Manassas, of which the following is a con- 
densation : 

"So far as the troops of Beauregard's immediate Army 
of the Potomac are concerned, this statement is con- 
densed from two that I prepared with the sub-returns 
of all the commands before me as the adjutant-gen- 
eral of that army, September 25th, 1861, and I will 
vouch for its exactness. In respect to the Army of the 
Shenandoah, I have been obliged to present an estimate 
of 8340 as the total of the rank and file of Johnston's 
army, my authority for which is a statement written 
by me in the official report of the battle, and based, as I 
distinctly recollect, upon official documents and returns 
in my hands at the time, of the accuracy of which I was 
and am satisfied. The totals of General Beauregard's 
Army of the Potomac are : 


Generals and Staff 37 

Infantry, Rank and File 19,569 

Cavalry, " " 1,468 

Artillery, " " 826 

Field Guns 27 


Generals and Staff 10 

Infantry, Rank aud File 8,415 

Cavalry, " " 1,000 

Artillery, " " 288 

Field Guns 17 



Army of the Potomac Rank and File engaged 8,415 . 

" " Shenandoah, " " " (estimated) 7,684 .. 

Total Rank and File, both Confederate armies, engaged .... 16,099 





1,000 . . 



. 9,713 

300 . 

350 ... 

6 ... 

. 8,340 




18,053 ' 




SOON after the first conflict between the authorities of the 
Federal Union and those of the Confederate States had 
occurred in Charleston Harbor, by the bombardment of Fort 
Sumter, which, beginning at 4:30 A. M. on the 12th of April, 
1861, forced the surrender of that fortress within thirty hours 
thereafter into my hands, I was called to Richmond, which 
by that time had become the Confederate seat of government, 
and was directed to " assume command of the Confederate 
troops on the Alexandria line." Arriving at Manassas 
Junction, I took command on the 2d of June, forty-nine 
days after the evacuation of Fort Sumter. 

Although the position at the time was strategically of 
commanding importance to the Confederates, the mere 
$ terrain was not only without natural defensive advan- 
tages, but, on the contrary, was absolutely unfavorable. 
Its strategic value was that, being close to the Federal 
capital, it held in observation the chief army then being 
assembled near Arlington by General McDowell, under the immediate eye of 
the commander-in-chief, General Scott, for an offensive movement against 
Richmond ; and while it had a railway approach in its rear for the easy accu- 
mulation of reinforcements and all the necessary munitions of war from the 
southward, at the same time another (the Manassas Gap) railway, diverging 
laterally to the left from that point, gave rapid communications with the fer- 
tile valley of the Shenandoah, then teeming with live stock and cereal subsist- 
ence, as well as with other resources essential to the Confederates. There was 
this further value in the position to the Confederate army : that during the 
period of accumulation, seasoning, and training, it might be fed from the fat 
fields, pastures, and garners of Loudoun, Fauquier, and the Lower Shenandoah 
Valley counties, which otherwise must have fallen into the hands of the enemy. 
But, on the other hand, Bull Run, a petty stream, was of little or no defen- 
sive strength ; for it abounded in fords, and although for the most part its 
banks were rocky and abrupt, the side from which it would be approached 
offensively in most places commanded the opposite ground. 

At the time of my arrival at Manassas, a Confederate army under General 
Joseph E. Johnston was in occupation of the Lower Shenandoah Valley, along 
the line of the Upper Potomac, chiefly at Harper's Ferry, which was regarded 
as the gateway of the valley and of one of the possible approaches to Rich- 
mond ; a position from which he was speedily forced to retire, however, by a 
flank movement of a Federal army, under the veteran General Patterson, 
thrown across the Potomac at or about Martinsburg. On my other or right 
flank, so to speak, a Confederate force of some 2500 men under General 





Holmes occupied the position of Aquia Creek on the lower Potomac, upon 
the line of approach to Richmond from that direction through Fredericks- 
burg. The other approach, that by way of the James Eiver, was held by 
Confederate troops under 
Generals Huger and Ma- 
gruder. Establishing small 
outposts at Leesburg to ob- 
serve the crossings of the 
Potomac in that quarter, 
and at Fairfax Court House 
in observation of Arlington, 
with other detachments in 
advance of Manassas toward 
Alexandria on the south 
side of the railroad, from 
the very outset I was anx- 
iously aware that the sole 
military advantage at the 
moment to the Confeder- 
ates was that of holding the 
interior Hues. On the Fed- 
eral or hostile side were all material advantages, including superior numbers, 
largely drawn from the old militia organizations of the great cities of the 
North, decidedly better armed and equipped than the troops under me, and 
strengthened by a small but incomparable body of regular infantry as well 
as a number of batteries of regular field artillery of the highest class, and a 
very large and thoroughly organized staff corps, besides a numerous body 
of professionally educated officers in command of volunteer regiments, J 
all precious military elements at such a juncture. 

Happily, through the foresight of Colonel Thomas Jordan, whom General 
Lee had placed as the adjutant-general of the forces there assembled 
before my arrival, arrangements were made which enabled me to receive 
regularly, from private persons at the Federal capital, most accurate infor- 
mation, of which politicians high in council, as well as War Department 
clerks, were the unconscious ducts. On the 4th of July, my pickets hap- 
pened upon and captured a soldier of the regulars, who proved to be a clerk 
in the adjutant-general's office of General McDowell, intrusted with the special 
duty of compiling returns of his army a work which he confessed, without 
reluctance, he had just executed, showing the forces under McDowell about 
the 1st of July. His statement of the strength and composition of that force 
tallied so closely with that which had been acquired through my Washington 
agencies, already mentioned, as well as through the leading Northern news- 
papers (regular files of which were also transmitted to my headquarters from 
the Federal capital), that I could not doubt them. 

J The professionally educated officers on the Confederate side at Bull Run included Generals Johnston, 
Beauregard, Stonewall Jackson, Longstreet, Kirby Smith, Ewell, Early, Bee, D. R. Jones, Holmes, 
Evans, Elzey, and Jordan, all in high positions, besides others not so prominent. Editors. 


In these several ways, therefore, I was almost as well advised of the 
strength of the hostile army in my front as its commander, who, I may men- 
tion, had been a classmate of mine at West Point. Under those circumstances 
I had become satisfied that a well-equipped, well-constituted Federal army at 
least 50,000 strong, of all arms, confronted me at or about Arlington, ready 
and on the very eve of an offensive operation against me, and to meet which 
I could muster barely 18,000 men with 29 field-guns. % 

Previously, indeed, as early as the middle of June, it had become appar- 
ent to my mind that through only one course of action could there be a well- 
grounded hope of ability on the part of the Confederates to encounter 
successfully the offensive operations for which the Federal authorities were 
then vigorously preparing in my immediate front, with so consummate a 
strategist and military administrator as Lieutenant-General Scott in general 
command at Washington, aided by his accomplished heads of the large Gen- 
eral Staff Corps of the United States Army. This course was to make the 
most enterprising, warlike use of the interior lines which we possessed, for the 
swift concentration at the critical instant of every available Confederate force 
upon the menaced position, at the risk, if need were, of sacrificing all minor 
places to the one clearly of major military value there to meet our adversary 
so offensively as to overwhelm him, under circumstances that must assure 
immediate ability to assume the general offensive even upon his territory, 
and thus conquer an early peace by a few well-delivered blows. 

My views of such import had been already earnestly communicated to the 
proper authorities ; but about the middle of July, satisfied that McDowell was 
on the eve of taking the offensive against me, I dispatched Colonel James 
Chesnut, of South Carolina, a volunteer aide-de-camp on my staff who had 
served on an intimate footing with Mr. Davis in the Senate of the United 
States, to urge in substance the necessity for the immediate concentration of 
the larger part of the forces of Johnston and Holmes at Manassas, so that 
the moment McDowell should be sufficiently far detached from Washing- 
ton, I would be enabled to move rapidly round his more convenient flank 
upon his rear and his communications, and attack him in reverse, or get 
between his forces, then separated, thus cutting off his retreat upon Arling- 
ton in the event of his defeat, and insuring as an immediate consequence 
the crushing of Patterson, the liberation of Maryland, and the capture of 

This plan was rejected by Mr. Davis and his military advisers (Adjutant- 
General Cooper and General Lee), who characterized it as " brilliant and com- 
prehensive," but essentially impracticable. Furthermore, Colonel Chesnut 
came back impressed with the views entertained at Richmond, as he com- 
municated at once to my adjutant-general, that should the Federal army 
soon move offensively upon my position, my best course would be to retire 
behind the Rappahannock and accept battle there instead of at Manassas. 
In effect, it was regarded as best to sever communications between the two chief 
Confederate armies, that of the Potomac and that of the Shenandoah, with the 

3>For the forces actually engaged in the campaign and on the field, see pp. 194-5. Editors. 



inevitable immediate result that Johnston would be forced to leave Patterson 
in possession of the Lower Shenandoah Valley, abandoning to the enemy so 

large a part of the most resourceful 
sections of Virginia, and to retreat 
southward by way of the Luray Val- 
ley, pass across the Blue Ridge at 
Thornton's Grap and unite with me 
after all, but at Fredericksburg, 
much nearer Richmond than Manas- 
sas. These views, however, were not 
made known to me at the time, and 
happily my mind was left free to the 
grave problem imposed upon me by 
the rejection of my plan for the im- 
mediate concentration of a materially 
larger force, i. e., the problem of 
placing and using my resources for 
a successful encounter behind Bull 
Run with the Federal army, which I 
was not permitted to doubt was about 
to take the field against me. 

It is almost needless to say that I 
had caused to be made a thorough 
reconnoissance of all the ground in 
my front and flanks, and had made 
myself personally acquainted with the 
most material points, including the 
region of Sudley's Church on my left, 
where a small detachment was posted in observation. Left now to my own 
resources, of course the contingency of defeat had to be considered and pro- 
vided for. Among the measures of precaution for such a result, I ordered 
the destruction of the railroad bridge across Bull Run at Union Mills, on my 
right, in order that the enemy, in the event of my defeat, should not have the 
immediate use of the railroad in following up their movement against Rich- 
mond a railroad which could have had no corresponding value to us 
eastward beyond Manassas in any operations on our side with Washington 
as the objective, inasmuch as any such operations must have been made by 
the way of the Upper Potomac and upon the rear of that city. 

Just before Colonel Chesnut was dispatched on the mission of which I have 
spoken, a former clerk in one of the departments at Washington, well known 
to him, had volunteered to return thither and bring back the latest informa- 
tion of the military and political situation from our most trusted friends. 
His loyalty to our cause, his intelligence, and his desire to be of service being 
vouched for, he was at once sent across the Potomac below Alexandria, merely 
accredited by a small scrap of paper bearing in Colonel Jordan's cipher the 
two words, " Trust bearer," with which he was to call at a certain house in 



Washington within easy rifle-range of the White House, ask for the lady of 
the house, and present it only to her. This delicate mission was as fortunately 
as it was deftly executed. In the early morning, as the newsboys were cry- 
ing in the empty streets of Washington the intelligence that the order was 
given for the Federal army to move at once upon my position, that scrap of 
paper reached the hands of the one person in all that city who could extract 
any meaning from it. With no more delay than was necessary for a hurried 

breakfast and the writing in cipher by Mrs. G of the words, "Order 

issued for McDowell to march upon Manassas to-night," my agent was placed 
in communication with another friend, who carried him in a buggy with a 
relay of horses as swiftly as possible down the eastern shore of the Potomac 
to our regular ferry across that river. Without untoward incident the 
momentous dispatch was quickly delivered into the hands of a cavalry 
courier, and by means of relays it was in my hands between 8 and 9 o'clock 
that night. Within half an hour my outpost commanders, advised of what 
was impending, were directed, at the first evidence of. the near presence of 
the enemy in their front, to fall back in the manner and to positions already 
prescribed in anticipation of such a contingency in an order confidentially 
communicated to them four weeks before, and the detachment at Leesburg 
was directed to join me by forced marches. Having thus cleared my decks 
for action, I next acquainted Mr. Davis with the situation, and ventured once 
more to suggest that the Army of the Shenandoah, with the brigade at Fred- 
ericksburg or Aquia Creek, should be ordered to reenf orce me, suggestions 
that were at once heeded so far that General Holmes was ordered to carry his 
command to my aid, and General Johnston was given discretion to do like- 
wise. After some telegraphic discussion with me, General Johnston was 
induced to exercise this discretion in favor of the swift march of the Army 
of the Shenandoah to my relief; and to facilitate that vital movement, I 
hastened to accumulate all possible means of railway transport at a desig- 
nated point on the Manassas Gap railroad at the eastern foot of the Blue 
Ridge, to which Johnston's troops directed their march. However, at the 
same time, I had submitted the alternative proposition to General Johnston, 
that, having passed the Blue Ridge, he should assemble his forces, press 
forward by way of Aldie, north-west of Manassas, and fall upon McDowell's 
right rear ; while I, prepared for the operation, at the first sound of the con- 
vict, should strenuously assume the offensive in my front. The situation and 
circumstances specially favored the signal success of such an operation. The 
larch to the point of attack could have been accomplished as soon as the 
rces were brought ultimately by rail to Manassas Junction ; our enemy, 
uiius attacked so nearly simultaneously on his right flank, his rear, and his 
front, naturally would suppose that I had been able to turn his flank while 
attacking him in front, and therefore, that I must have an overwhelming 
superiority of numbers ; and his forces, being new troops, most of them 
under fire for the first time, must have soon fallen into a disastrous panic. 
Moreover, such an operation must have resulted advantageously to the Con- 
federates, in the event that McDowell should, as might have been antici- 


20 1 

pated, attempt to strike the Manassas Gap railway to my left, and thus cut 
off railway communications between Johnston's forces and my own, instead 
of the mere effort to strike my left flank which he actually essayed. | 

It seemed, however, as though the deferred attempt at concentration 
was to go for naught, for 011 the morning of the 18th the Federal forces 

were massed around 
Centreville, but three 
miles from Mitchell's 
Ford, and soon were 
seen advancing upon 
the roads leading to 
that and Blackburn's 
Ford. [See map, page 
180.] My order of bat- 
tle, issued in the night 
of the 17th, contem- 
plated an offensive 
return, particularly 
from the strong bri- 
gades on the right and 

"cj.. '&'.' 


right center. The Fed- 
eral artillery opened 
in front of both fords, 
and the infantry, 
while demonstrating in front of Mitchell's Ford, endeavored to force a pas- 
sage at Blackburn's. Their column of attack, Tyler's division, was opposed 
by Longstreet's forces, to the reenforcement of which Early's brigade, the 
reserve line at McLean's Ford, was ordered up. The Federals, after sev- 
eral attempts to force a passage, met a final repulse and retreated. After 
their infantry attack had ceased, about 1 o'clock, the contest lapsed into an 
artillery duel, in which the Washington Artillery of New Orleans won credit 
against the renowned batteries of the United States regular army. A comical 
effect of this artillery fight was the destruction of the dinner of myself and 
staff by a Federal shell that fell into the fire-place of my headquarters at 
the McLean House. J) 

Our success in this first limited collision was of special prestige to my army' 
of new troops, and, moreover, of decisive importance by so increasing Gen- 
eral McDowell's caution as to give time for the arrival of some of General 

4. "I am, however, inclined to believe he [the 
enemy] may attempt to turn my left flank by a 
movement in the direction of Vienna, Frying- 
pan Church, and, possibly, Gum Spring, and thus 
cut off Johnston's line of retreat and commu- 
nication with this place [Manassas Junction] 
via the Manassas Gap railroad, while threaten- 
ing my own communications with Richmond 
and depots of supply by the Alexandria and 
Orange railroad, and opening his communica- 

tions with the Potomac through Leesburg and 
Edward's Ferry." (Extract from a letter ad- 
dressed by Genei*al Beauregard to Jefferson Davis, 
July 11th, 1861.) 

\ It is denied that a serious attempt "to force 
a passage" was made on the 18th. (Seepage 178.) 
This engagement was called by the Confederates 
the battle of Bull Run, the main fight on the 21st 
being known in the South as the battle of Manassas 
(pronounced Ma-nass'-sa). Editors. 


Johnston's forces. But while on the 19th I was awaiting a renewed and gen- 
eral attack by the Federal army, I received a telegram from the Richmond 
military authorities, urging me to withdraw my call on General Johnston on 
account of the supposed impracticability of the concentration an abiding 
conviction which had been but momentarily shaken by the alarm caused by 
McDowell's march upon Richmond. \ As this was not an order in terms, but 
an urgency which, notwithstanding its superior source, left me technically 
free and could define me as responsible for any misevent, I preferred to keep 
both the situation and the responsibility, and continued every effort for the 
prompt arrival of the Shenandoah forces, being resolved, should they come 
before General McDowell again attacked, to take myself the offensive. Gen- 
eral McDowell, fortunately for my plans, spent the 19th and 20th in recon- 
noissances ; -ft and, meanwhile, General Johnston brought 8340 men from 
the Shenandoah Valley, with 20 guns, and General Holmes 1265 rank and 
file, with 6 pieces of artillery, from Aquia Creek. As these forces arrived 
(most of them in the afternoon of the 20th) I placed them chiefly so as 
to strengthen my left center and left, the latter being weak from lack of 
available troops. 

The disposition of the entire force was now as follows [see map, page 
180] : At Union Mills Ford, E well's brigade, supported by Holmes's ; at 
McLean's Ford, D. R. Jones's brigade, supported by Early's ; at Blackburn's 
Ford, Longstreet's brigade ; at Mitchell's Ford, Bonham's brigade. Cocke's bri- 
gade held the line in front and rear of Bull Run from Bonham's left, covering- 
Lewis's, Ball's, and Island fords, to the right of Evans's demi-brigade, which 
covered the Stone Bridge and a farm ford about a mile above, and formed 
part also of Cocke's command. The Shenandoah forces were placed in 
reserve Bee's and Bartow's brigades between McLean's and Blackburn's 
fords, and Jackson's between Blackburn's and Mitchell's fords. This force 
mustered 29,188 rank and file and 55 guns, of which 21,923 infantry, cavalry, 
and artillery, with 29 guns, belonged to my immediate forces, i. e., the Army 
of the Potomac. 

The preparation, in front of an ever-threatening enemy, of a wholly volun- 
teer army, composed of men very few of whom had ever belonged to any 
military organization, had been a work of many cares not incident to the 
command of a regular army. These were increased by the insufficiency of 
my staff organization, an inefficient management of the quartermaster's 
department at Richmond, and the preposterous mismanagement of the com- 
missary-general, who not only failed to furnish rations, but caused the 
removal of the army commissaries, who, under my orders, procured food from 

\ [telegram.] Bichmond, July 19, 1861. as transportation permits. The enemy is advised 

General Beauregard, Manassas, Va. at Washington of the projected movement of Gen- 

We have no intelligence from General Johnston, erals Johnston and Holmes, and may vary his 

If the enemy in front of you has abandoned an plans in conformity thereto, 
immediate attack, and General Johnston has not S. Cooper, Adjutant-General, 

moved, you had better withdraw your call upon 

him, so that he may be left to his full discretion. -fcLack of rations, as well as the necessity for 

All the troops arriving at Lynchburg are ordered information, detained McDowell at Centreville 

to join you. From this place we will send as fast during these two days. Editors. 


the country in front of us to keep the army from absolute want supplies 
that were otherwise exposed to be gathered by the enemy. So specially 
severe had been the recent duties at headquarters, aggravated not a little by 
night alarms arising from the enemy's immediate presence, that, in the even- 
ing of the 20th, I found my chief -of -staff sunken upon the papers that covered 
his table, asleep in sheer exhaustion from the overstraining and almost shun- 
berless labor of the last days and nights. I covered his door with a guard 
to secure his rest against any interruption, after which the army had the 
benefit of his usual active and provident services. 

There was much in this decisive conflict about to open, not involved in 
any after battle, which pervaded the two armies and the people behind them 
and colored the responsibility of the respective commanders. The political 
hostilities of a generation were now face to face with weapons instead of 
words. Defeat to either side would be a deep mortification, but defeat to the 
South must turn its claim of independence into an empty vaunt ; and the 
defeated commander on either side might expect, though not the personal 
fate awarded by the Carthaginians to an unfortunate commander, at least a 
moral fate quite similar. Though disappointed that the concentration I had 
sought had not been permitted at the moment and for the purpose preferred 
by me, and notwithstanding the non-arrival of some five thousand troops of 
the Shenandoah forces, my strength was now so increased that I had good 
hope of successfully meeting my adversary. 

General Johnston was the ranking officer, and entitled, therefore, to assume 
command of the united forces ; but as the extensive field of operations was 
one which I had occupied since the beginning of June, and with which I was 
thoroughly familiar in all its extent and military bearings, while he was 
wholly unacquainted with it, and, moreover, as I had made my plans and dis- 
positions for the maintenance of the position, ( reneral Johnston, in view of 
the gravity of the impending issue, preferred not to assume the responsi- 
bilities of the chief direction of the forces during the battle, but to assist me 
upon the field. Thereupon, I explained my plans and purposes, to which 
he agreed.,) 

Sunday, July 21st, bearing the fate of the new-born Confederacy, broke 
brightly over the fields and woods that held the hostile forces. My scouts, 
thrown out in the night toward Centreville along the Warrenton Turnpike, had 
reported that the enemy was concentrating along the latter. This fact, 
together with the failure of the Federals in their attack upon my center at 
Mitchell's and Blackburn's fords, had caused me to apprehend that they would 
attempt my left flank at the Stone Bridge, and orders were accordingly issued 
by half-past 4 o'clock to the brigade commanders to hold their forces in 
readiness to move at a moment's notice, together with the suggestion that the 
Federal attack might be expected in that quarter. Shortly afterward the 
enemy was reported to be advancing from Centreville on the Warrenton 

\ See General Beauregard's postscript (page 226), and General Johnston's consideration of the 
same topic in the paper to follow (page 245), and his postscript (page 258). Editors. 


M , 



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The original of this map was made for General Beauregard, soon after the battle, from actual surveys by 

Captain D. B. Harris, assisted by Mr. John Grant. 



Turnpike, and at half -past 5 o'clock as deploying a force in front of Evans. 
As their movement against my left developed the opportunity I desired, I 
immediately sent orders to the brigade commanders, both front and reserves, 
on my right and center to advance and vigorously attack the Federal left 
flank and rear at Centreville, while my left, under Cocke and Evans with 
their supports, would sustain the Federal attack in the quarter of the Stone 
Bridge, which they were directed to do to the last extremity. The center was 
likewise to advance and engage the enemy in front, and directions were given 
to the reserves, when without orders, to move toward the sound of the heaviest 
firing. The ground in our front on the other side of Bull Run afforded par- 
ticular advantage for these tactics. Centreville was the apex of a triangle 
its short side running by the Warrenton Turnpike to Stone Bridge, its base 
Bull Run, its long side a road that ran from Union Mills along the front of my 
other Bull Run positions and trended off to the rear of Centreville, where 
McDowell had massed his main forces ; branch roads led up to this one from 
the fords between Union Mills and Mitchell's. My forces to the right of the 
latter ford were to advance, pivoting on that position; Bonham was in 
advance from Mitchell's Ford, Lougstreet from Blackburn's, D. R. Jones from 
McLean's, and Ewell from Union Mills by the Centreville road. Ewell, as hav- 
ing the longest march, was to begin the movement, and each brigade was to 
be followed by its reserve. In anticipation of this method of attack, and to 
prevent accidents, the subordinate commanders had been carefully instructed 
in the movement by me, as they were all new to the responsibilities of com- 
mand. They were to establish close communication with each other before 
making the attack. About half-past 8 o'clock I set out with General John- 
ston for a convenient position, a hill in rear of Mitchell's Ford, where we 
waited for the opening of the attack on our right, from which I expected a 
decisive victory by midday, with the result of cutting off the Federal army 
from retreat upon Washington. 

Meanwhile, about half -past 5 o'clock, the peal of a heavy rifled gun was 
heard in front of the Stone Bridge, its second shot striking through the tent 
of my signal-officer, Captain E. P. Alexander ; and at 6 o'clock a full rifled 
battery opened against Evans and then against Cocke, to which our artillery 
remained dumb, as it had not sufficient range to reply. But later, as the 
Federal skirmish-line advanced, it was engaged by ours, thrown well forward 
on the other side of the Run. A scattering musketry fire followed, and 
meanwhile, about 7 o'clock, I ordered Jackson's brigade, with Imboden's and 
five guns of Walton's battery, to the left, with orders to support Cocke as 
well as Bonham ; and the brigades of Bee and Bartow, under the command 
of the former, were also sent to the support of the left. 

At half -past 8 o'clock Evans, seeing that the Federal attack did not increase 
in boldness and vigor, and observing a lengthening line of dust above the 
trees to the left of the Warrenton Turnpike, became satisfied that the attack 
in his front was but a feint, and that a column of the enemy was moving 
around through the woods to fall on his flank from the direction of Sudley 
Ford. Informing his immediate commander, Cocke, of the enemy's move- 


nient, and of his own dispositions to meet it, he left 4 companies under cover 
at the Stone Bridge, and led the remainder of his force, 6 companies of 
Sloan's 4th South Carolina and Wheat's battalion of Louisiana Tigers, with 2 
6-pounder howitzers, across the valley of Young's Branch to the high ground 
beyond it. Resting his left on the Sudley road, he distributed his troops on 
each side of a small copse, with such cover as the ground afforded, and look- 
ing over the open fields and a reach of the Sudley road which the Federals 
must cover in their approach. His two howitzers were placed one at each 
end of his position, and here he silently awaited the enemy now drawing near. 

The Federal turning column, about 18,000 strong, with 24 pieces of artil- 
lery, had moved down from Centreville by the Warrenton Turnpike, and 
after passing Cub Run had struck to the right by a forest road to cross Bull 
Run at Sudley Ford, about 8 miles above the Stone Bridge, moving by a 
long circuit for the purpose of attacking my left flank. The head of the col- 
umn, Burnside's brigade of Hunter's division, at about 9:45 a. m. debouched 
from the woods into the open fields, in front of Evans. Wheat at once 
engaged their skirmishers, and as the Second Rhode Island regiment 
advanced, supported by its splendid battery of 6 rifled guns, the fronting 
thicket held by Evans's South Carolinians poured forth its sudden volleys, 
while the 2 howitzers flung their grape-shot upon the attacking line, which 
was soon shattered and driven back into the woods behind. Major Wheat, 
after handling his battalion with the utmost determination, had fallen severely 
wounded in the lungs. Burnside's entire brigade was now sent forward in a 
second charge, supported by 8 guns ; but they encountered again the unflinch- 
ing fire of Evans's line, and were once more driven back to the woods, from 
the cover of which they continued the attack, reenforced after a time by the 
arrival of 8 companies of United States regular infantry, under Major Sykes, 
with 6 pieces of artillery, quickly followed by the remaining regiments of 
Andrew Porter's brigade of the same division. The contest here lasted 
fully an hour; meanwhile Wheat's battalion, having lost its leader, had 
gradually lost its organization, and Evans, though still opposing these 
heavy odds with undiminished firmness, sought reenforcement from the 
troops in his rear. 

General Bee, of South Carolina, a man of marked character, whose com- 
mand lay in reserve in rear of Cocke, near the Stone Bridge, intelligently 
applying the general order given to the reserves, had already moved toward 
the neighboring point of conflict, and taken a position with his own and Bar- 
tow's brigades on the high plateau which stands in rear of Bull Run in the 
quarter of the Stone Bridge, and overlooking the scene of engagement upon 
the stretch of high ground from which it was separated by the valley of 
Young's Branch. This plateau is inclosed on three sides by two small water- 
courses, which empty into Bull Run within a few yards of each other, a half 
mile to the south of the Stone Bridge. Rising to an elevation of quite 100 
feet above the level of Bull Run at the bridge, it falls off on three sides to the 
level of the inclosing streams in gentle slopes, but furrowed by ravines of 


irregular directions and length, and studded with clumps and patches of young 
pine and oaks. The general direction of the crest of the plateau is oblique to 
the course of Bull Run in that quarter and to the Sudley and turnpike roads, 
which intersect each other at right angles. On the north- western brow, over- 
looking Young's Branch, and near the Sudley road, as the latter climbs over 
the plateau, stood the house of the widow Henry, while to its right and for- 
ward on a projecting spur stood the house and sheds of the free negro Robin- 
son, just behind the turnpike, densely embowered in trees and shrubbery and 
environed by a double row of fences on two sides. Around the eastern and 
southern brow of the plateau an almost unbroken fringe of second-growth 
pines gave excellent shelter for our marksmen, who availed themselves of it 
with the most satisfactory skill. To the west, adjoining the fields that sur- 
rounded the houses mentioned, a broad belt of oaks extends directly across 
the crest on both sides of the Sudley road, in which, during the battle, the 
hostile forces contended for the mastery. General Bee, with a soldier's eye to 
the situation, skillfully disposed his forces. His two brigades on either side 
of Imboden's battery which he had borrowed from his neighboring reserve, 
Jackson's brigade were placed in a small depression of the plateau in 
advance of the Henry house, whence he had a full view of the contest on the 
opposite height across the valley of Young's Branch. Opening with his 
artillery upon the Federal batteries, he answered Evans's request by advising 
him to withdraw to his own position on the height; but Evans, full of the 
spirit that would not retreat, renewed his appeal that the forces in rear 
would come to help him hold his ground. The newly arrived forces had 
given the Federals such superiority at this point as to dwarf Evans's means 
of resistance, and General Bee, generously yielding his own better judgment 
to Evans's persistence, led the two brigades across the valley under the fire 
of the enemy's artillery, and threw them into action 1 regiment in the copse 
held by Colonel Evans, 2 along a fence on the right, and 2 under General 
Bartow on the prolonged right of this line, but extended forward at a right 
angle and along the edge of a wood not more than 100 yards from that 
held by the enemy's left, where the contest at short range became sharp and 
deadly, bringing many casualties to both sides. The Federal infantry, 
though still in superior numbers, failed to make any headway against this 
sturdy van, notwithstanding Bee's whole line was hammered also by the 
enemy's powerful batteries, until Heintzelman's division of 2 strong brigades, 
arriving from Sudley Ford, extended the fire on the Federal right, while its 
battery of 6 10-pounder rifled guns took an immediately effective part from a 
position behind the Sudley road. Against these odds the Confederate force 
was still endeavoring to hold its ground, when a new enemy came into the 
field upon its right. Major Wheat, with characteristic daring and restless- 
ness, had crossed Bull Run alone by a small ford above the Stone Bridge, in 
order to reconnoiter, when he and Evans had first moved to the left, and, fall- 
ing on some Federal scouts, had shouted a taunting defiance and withdrawn, 
not, however, without his place of crossing having been observed. This dis- 



























closure was now utilized by Sherman's (W. T.) and Keyes's brigades of 
Tyler's division ; crossing at this point, they appeared over the high bank of 
the stream and moved into position on the Federal left. There was no choice 
now for Bee but to retire a movement, however, to be accomplished under 
different circumstances than when urged by him upon Evans. The three 
leaders endeavored to preserve the stead- 
iness of the ranks as they withdrew over 
the open fields, aided by the fire of Im- 
boden's guns on the plateau and the 
retiring howitzers ; but the troops were 
thrown into confusion, and the greater 
part soon fell into rout across Young's 
Branch and around the base of the 
height in the rear of the Stone Bridge. 

Meanwhile, in rear of Mitchell's Ford, 
I had been waiting with General John- 
ston for the sound of conflict to open in 
the quarter of Centreville upon the Fed- 
eral left flank and rear (making allow- 
ance, however, for the delays possible 
to commands unused to battle), when I 
was chagrined to hear from General D. 
R. Jones that, while he had been long 
ready for the movement upon Centre- 
ville, General Ewell had not come up to 
form on his right, though he had sent 
him between 7 and 8 o'clock a copy of 
his own order which recited that Ewell 
had been already ordered to begin the 
movement. I dispatched an immediate 
order to Ewell to advance ; but within a 
quarter of an hour, just as I received 
a dispatch from him informing me that 
he had received no order to advance in 
the morning, the firing on the left began to increase so intensely as to indi- 
cate a severe attack, whereupon General Johnston said that he would go 
personally to that quarter. 

After weighing attentively the firing, which seemed rapidly and heavily 
increasing, it appeared to me that the troops on the right would be unable to 
get into position before the Federal offensive should have made too much 
progress on our left, and that it would be better to abandon it altogether, 
maintaining only a strong demonstration so as to detain the enemy in front 
of our right and center, and hurry up all available reinforcements includ- 
ing the reserves that were to have moved upon Centreville to our left and 
fight the battle out in that quarter. Communicating this view to General 
Johnston, who approved it (giving his advice, as he said, for what it was 

rX- ''"''"' 


VOL. I. 14 


worth, as lie was not acquainted with the country), I ordered Ewell, Jones, 
and Longstreet to make a strong demonstration all along their front on the 
other side of the Run, and ordered the reserves below our position, Holmes's 
brigade with 6 guns, and Early's brigade, also 2 regiments of Bonham's 
brigade, near at hand, to move swiftly to the left. General Johnston and I 
now set out at full speed for the point of conflict. We arrived there just as 
Bee's troops, after giving way, were fleeing in disorder behind the height in 
rear of the Stone Bridge. They had come around between the base of the 
hill and the Stone Bridge into a shallow ravine which ran up to a point on 
the crest where Jackson had already formed his brigade along the edge of the 
woods. We found the commanders resolutely stemming the further flight of 
the routed forces, but vainly endeavoring to restore order, and our own 
efforts were as futile. Every segment of line we succeeded in forming was 
again dissolved while another was being formed ; more than two thousand men 
were shouting each some suggestion to his neighbor, their voices mingling with 
the noise of the shells hurtling through the trees overhead, and all word of 
command drowned in the confusion and uproar. It was at this moment that 
General Bee used the famous expression, " Look at Jackson's brigade ! It 
stands there like a stone wall " a name that passed from the brigade to its 
immortal commander. The disorder seemed irretrievable, but happily the 
thought came to me that if their colors were planted out to the front the men 
might rally on them, and I gave the order to carry the standards forward 
some forty yards, which was promptly executed by the regimental officers, 
thus drawing the common eye of the troops. They now received easily the 
orders to advance and form on the line of their colors, which they obeyed 
with a general movement ; and as General Johnston and myself rode forward 
shortly after with the colors of the 4th Alabama by our side, the line that 
lad fought all morning, and had fled, routed and disordered, now advanced 
igain into position as steadily as veterans. The 4th Alabama had previ- 
ously lost all its field-officers; and noticing Colonel S. R. Gist, an aide to 
General Bee, a young man whom I had known as adjutant-general of South 
Carolina, and whom I greatly esteemed, I presented him as an able and brave 
[ommander to the stricken regiment, who cheered their new leader, and main- 
ained under him, to the end of the day, their previous gallant behavior. We 
lad come none too soon, as the enemy's forces, flushed with the belief of 
victory, were already advancing across the valley of Young's 
up the slope, where they had encountered for a while the fire of 
Legion, which had been led forward toward the Robinson house 
and the turnpike in front, covering the retreat and helping materially to check 
the panic of Bee's routed forces. 

As soon as order was restored I requested General Johnston to go back to 
Portici (the Lewis house), and from that point which I considered most 
favorable for the purpose forward me the reinforcements as they would 
come from the Bull Run lines below and those that were expected to arrive 
from Manassas, while I should direct the field. General Johnston was disin- 
clined to leave the battle-field for that position. As I had been compelled to 


leave my chief-of-staff, Colonel Jordan, at Manassas to forward any troops 
arriving there, I felt it was a necessity that one of us should go to this duty, 
and that it was h'is place to do so, as I felt I was responsible for the battle. 
He considerately yielded to my urgency, and we had the benefit of his energy 
and sagacity in so directing the reenf orcernents toward the field, as to be readily 
and effectively assistant to my pressing needs and insure the success of the day. 

As General Johnston departed for Portici, I hastened to form our line of 
battle against the on-coming enemy. I ordered up the 49th and 8th Vir- 
ginia regiments from Cocke's neighboring brigade in the Bull Run lines. 
Gartrell's 7th Georgia I placed in position on the left of Jackson's bri- 
gade, along the belt of pines occupied by the latter on the eastern rim of the 
plateau. As the 49th Virginia rapidly came up, its colonel, ex-Governor William 
Smith, was encouraging them with cheery word and manner, and, as they 
approached, indicated to them the immediate presence of the commander. 
As the regiment raised a loud cheer, the name was caught by some of the 
troops of Jackson's brigade in the immediate wood, who rushed out, calling 
for General Beauregard. Hastily acknowledging these happy signs of sym- 
pathy and confidence, which reenf orce alike the capacity of commander and 
troops, I placed the 49th Virginia in position on the extreme left next 
to Gartrell, and as I paused to say a few words to Jackson, while hurry- 
ing back to the right, my horse was killed under me by a bursting shell, a 
fragment of which carried away part of the heel of my boot. The Hampton 
Legion, which had suffered greatly, was placed on the right of Jackson's 
brigade, and Hunton's 8th Virginia, as it arrived, upon the right of Hampton ; 
the two latter being drawn somewhat to the rear so as to form with Jackson's 
right regiment a reserve, and be ready likewise to make defense against any 
advance from the direction of the Stone Bridge, whence there was imminent 
peril from the enemy's heavy forces, as I had just stripped that position almost 
entirely of troops to meet the active crisis on the plateau, leaving this quarter 
now covered only by a few men, whose defense was otherwise assisted solely 
by the obstruction of an abatis. 

With 6500 men and 13 pieces of artillery, I now awaited the onset of the 
enemy, who were pressing forward 20,000 strong, % with 24 pieces of superior 
artillery and 7 companies of regular cavalry. They soon appeared over the 
farther rim of the plateau, seizing the Robinson house on my right and the 
Henry house opposite my left center. Near the latter they placed in position 
the two powerful batteries of Ricketts and Griffin of the regular army, and 
pushed forward up the Sudley road, the slope of which was cut so deep below 
the adjacent ground as to afford a covered way up to the plateau. Supported 
by the formidable lines of Federal musketry, these 2 batteries lost no time in 
making themselves felt, while 3 more batteries in rear on the high ground 
beyond the Sudley and Warrenton cross-roads swelled the shower of shell 
that fell among our ranks. 

^ According to General Fry (page 188), the Union force in the seizure of the Henry hill consisted of 
four brigades, a cavalry battalion, and two batteries, .or (as we deduce from General Fry's statements 
of the strength of McDowell's forces, page 195) about 11,000 men. Editors. 


Our own batteries, Imboden's, Stanard's, five of Walton's guns, reenforced 
later by Pendleton's and Alburtis's (their disadvantage being reduced by the 
shortness of range), swept the surface of the plateau from their position on 
the eastern rim. I felt that, after the accidents of the morning, much depended 
on maintaining the steadiness of the troops against the first heavy onslaught, 
and rode along the lines encouraging the men to unflinching behavior, meet- 
ing, as I passed each command, a cheering response. The steady fire of their 
musketry told severely on the Federal ranks, and the splendid action of our 
batteries was a fit preface to the marked skill exhibited by our artillerists 
during the war. The enemy suffered particularly from the musketry on 
our left, now further reenforced by the 2d Mississippi the troops in this 
quarter confronting each other at very short range. Here two companies of 
Stuart's cavalry charged through the Federal ranks that filled the Sudley 
road, increasing the disorder wrought upon that flank of the enemy. But 
with superior numbers the Federals were pushing on new regiments in the 
attempt to flank my position, and several guns, in the effort to enfilade ours, 
were thrust forward so near the 33d Virginia that some of its men sprang 
forward and captured them, but were driven back by an overpowering force 
of Federal musketry. Although the enemy were held well at bay, their press- 
ure became so strong that I resolved to take the offensive, and ordered a 
charge on my right for the purpose of recovering the plateau. The movement, 
made with alacrity and force by the commands of Bee, Bartow, Evans, and 
Hampton, thrilled the entire line, Jackson's brigade piercing the enemy's 
center, and the left of the line under Grartrell and Smith following up the 
charge, also, in that quarter, so that the whole of the open surface of the 
plateau was swept clear of the Federals. 

Apart from its impressions on the enemy, the effect of this brilliant onset 
was to give a short breathing-spell to our troops from the immediate strain 
of conflict, and encourage them in withstanding the still more strenuous 
offensive that was soon to bear upon them. Reorganizing our line of battle 
under the unremitting fire of the Federal batteries opposite, I prepared to 
meet the new attack which the enemy were about to make, largely reen- 
forced by the troops of Howard's brigade, newly arrived on the field. The 
Federals again pushed up the slope, the face of which partly afforded good 
cover by the numerous ravines that scored it and the clumps of young 
pines and oaks with which it was studded, while the sunken Sudley road 
formed a good ditch and parapet for their aggressive advance upon my left 
flank and rear. Gradually they pressed our lines back and regained possession 
of their lost ground and guns. With the Henry and Robinson houses once 
more in their possession, they resumed the offensive, urged forward by their 
commanders with conspicuous gallantry. 

The conflict now became very severe for the final possession of this position, 
which was the key to victory. The Federal numbers enabled them so to 
extend their lines through the woods beyond the Sudley road as to outreach 
my left flank, which I was compelled partly to throw back, so as to meet the 
attack from that quarter ; meanwhile their numbers equally enabled them to 
outflank my right in the direction of the Stone Bridge, imposing anxious 




watchfulness in that direction. I knew that I was safe if I could hold out 
till the arrival of reinforcements, which was but a matter of time ; and, with 
the full sense Of my own responsibility, I was determined to hold the line of 
the plateau, even if surrounded on all sides, until assistance should come, 
unless my forces were sooner overtaken by annihilation. 

It was now between half -past 2 and 3 o'clock; a scorching sun increased 
the oppression of the troops, exhausted from incessant fighting, many of 

them having been 
engaged since the 
morning. Fearing 
lest the Federal of- 
fensive should se- 
cure too firm a grip, 
and knowing the 
fatal result that 
might spring from 
any grave infrac- 
tion of my line, I 
determined to make 
another effort for 
the recovery of the 
plateau, and ordered 
a charge of the en- 
tire line of battle, 
including the re- 
serves, which at this 
crisis I myself led into action. The movement was made with such keep- 
ing and dash that the whole plateau was swept clear of the enemy, who 
were driven down the slope and across the turnpike on our right and the 
valley of Young's Branch on our left, leaving in our final possession the 
Robinson and Henry houses, with most of Rieketts's and Griffin's batteries, 
the men of which were mostly shot down where they bravely stood by their 
guns. Fisher's 6th North Carolina, directed to the Lewis house by Colonel 
Jordan from Manassas, where it had just arrived, and thence to the field by 
General Johnston, came up in happy time to join in this charge on the left. 
Withers's 18th Virginia, which I had ordered up from Cocke's brigade, 
was also on hand in time to follow and give additional effect to the charge, 
capturing, by aid of the Hampton Legion, several guns, which were immedi- 
ately turned and served upon the broken ranks of the enemy by some of our 
officers. This handsome work, which broke the Federal fortunes of the day, 
was done, however, at severe cost. The soldierly Bee, and the gallant, 
impetuous Bartow, whose day of strong deeds was about to close with such 
credit, fell a few rods back of the Henry house, near the very spot whence 
in the morning they had first looked forth upon Evans's struggle with the 
enemy. Colonel Fisher also fell at the very head of his troops. Seeing 
Captain Ricketts, who was badly wounded in the leg, and having known him 
in the old army, I paused from my anxious duties to ask him whether I could 


do anything for him. He answered that he wanted to be sent back to Wash- 
ington. As some of our prisoners were there held under threats of not being 
treated as prisoners of war, I replied that that must depend upon how our 
prisoners were treated, and ordered him to be carried to the rear. I mention 
this, because the report of the Federal Committee on the Conduct of the 
War exhibits Captain Ricketts as testifying that I only approached him to 
say that he would be treated as our prisoners might be treated. I sent my 
own surgeons to care for him, and allowed his wife to cross the lines and 
accompany him to Richmond; and my adjutant-general, Colonel Jordan, 
escorting her to the car that carried them to that city, personally attended to 
the comfortable placing of the wounded enemy for the journey. 

That part of the enemy who occupied the woods beyond our left and 
across the Sudley road had not been reached by the headlong charge which 
had swept their comrades from the plateau ; but the now arriving reinforce- 
ments (Kershaw's 2d and Cash's 8th South Carolina) were led into that 
quarter. Kemper's battery also came up, preceded by its commander, 
who, while alone, fell into the hands of a number of the enemy, who took 
him prisoner, until a few moments later, when he handed them over to some 
of our own troops accompanying his battery. A small plateau, within the 
south-west angle of the Sudley and turnpike cross-roads, was still held by 
a strong Federal brigade Howard's troops, together with Sykes's battalion 
of regulars ; and while Kershaw and Cash, after passing through the skirts 
of the oak wood along the Sudley road, engaged this force, Kemper's bat- 
tery was sent forward by Kershaw along the same road, into position near 
where a hostile battery had been captured, and whence it played upon the 
enemy in the open field. 

Quickly following these regiments came Preston's '28th Virginia, which, 
passing through the woods, encountered and drove back some Michigan 
troops, capturing Brigadier-General Willcox. It was now about 3 o'clock, 
when another important reenforcement came to our aid Elzey's brigade, 
1700 strong, of the Army of the Shenandoah, which, coming from Pied- 
mont by railroad, had arrived at Manassas station, 6 miles in rear of the 
battle-field, at noon, and had been without delay directed thence toward 
the field by Colonel Jordan, aided by Major T. G. Rhett, who that morning 
had passed from General Bonham's to General Johnston's staff. Upon 
nearing the vicinity of the Lewis house, the brigade was directed by a staff- 
officer sent by General Johnston toward the left of the field. As it reached 
the oak wood, just across the Sudley road, led by General Kirby Smith, the 
latter fell severely wounded; but the command devolved upon Colonel 
Elzey, an excellent officer, who was now guided by Captain D. B. Harris 
of the Engineers, a highly accomplished officer of my staff, still farther to 
the left and through the woods, so as to form in extension of the line of the 
preceding reinforcements. Beckham's battery, of the same command, was 
hurried forward by the Sudley road and around the woods into position near 
the Chinn house ; from a well-selected point of action, in full view of the 
enemy that filled the open fields west of the Sudley road, it played with 


deadly and decisive effect upon their ranks, already under the fire of Elzey's 
brigade. Keyes's Federal brigade, which had made its way across the turn- 
pike in rear of 'the Stone Bridge, was lurking along under cover of the ridges 
and a wood in order to turn my line on the right, but was easily repulsed by 
Latham's battery, already placed in position over that approach by Captain 
Harris, aided by Alburtis's battery, opportunely sent to Latham's left by 
General Jackson, and supported by fragments of troops collected by staff- 
officers. Meanwhile, the enemy had formed a line of battle of formidable 
proportions on the opposite height, and stretching in crescent outline, with 
flanks advanced, from the Pittsylvania (Carter) mansion on their left across 
the Sudley road in rear of Dogan's and reaching toward the Chinn house. 
They offered a fine spectacle as they threw forward a cloud of skirmishers 
down the opposite slope, preparatory to a new assault against the line on the 
plateau. But their right was now severely pressed by the troops that had 
successively arrived ; the force in the south-west angle of the Sudley and 
Warrenton cross-roads were driven from their position, and, as Early's 
brigade, which, by direction of General Johnston, had swept around by the 
rear of the woods through which Elzey had passed, appeared on the field, his 
line of march bore upon the flank of the enemy, now retiring in that quarter. 
This movement by my extreme left was masked by the trend of the 
woods from many of our forces on the plateau ; and bidding those of my 
staff and escort around me raise a loud cheer, I dispatched the information 
to the several commands, with orders to go forward in a common charge. 
Before the full advance of the Confederate ranks the enemy's whole line, 
whose right was already yielding, irretrievably broke, fleeing across Bull Run 
by every available direction. Major Sykes's regulars, aided by Sherman's 
brigade, made a steady and handsome withdrawal, protecting the rear of the 
routed forces, and enabling many to escape by the Stone Bridge. Having 
ordered in pursuit all the troops on the field, I went to the Lewis house, and, 
the battle being ended, turned over the command to General- Johnston. 
Mounting a fresh horse, the f ourth on that day, I started to press the 
pursuit which was being made by our infantry and cavalry, some of the 
latter having been sent by General Johnston from Lewis's Ford to intercept 
the enemy on the turnpike. I was soon overtaken, however, by a courier 
bearing a message from Major T. G. Rhett, General Johnston's chief -of -staff 
on duty at Manassas railroad station, informing me of a report that a large 
Federal force, having pierced our lower line on Bull Run, was moving upon 
Camp Pickens, my depot of supplies near Manassas. I returned, and com- 
municated this important Hews to General Johnston. Upon consultation 
it was deemed best that I should take Ewell's and Holmes's brigades, which 
were hastening up to the battle-field, but too late for the action, and fall on 
this force of the enemy, while reenforcements should be sent me from the 
pursuing forces, who were to be recalled for that purpose. To head off the 
danger and gain time, I hastily mounted a force of infantry behind the 
cavalrymen then present, but, on approaching the line of march near 
McLean's Ford, which the Federals must have taken, I learned that the news 



View of the Henry house, looking west from the spot parallel with the rail fence (in the middle ground on the 

where General Bee fell. The Bull Run mountains and left). Just within the rail fence is where Griffin's and 

Thoroughfare Gap appear in the distance. The Sudley Ricketts's batteries were planted. Near the house 

road, a few rods beyond the house, under the hill, runs stands the Union Monument, commemorating the battle. 

was a false alarm caught from the return of General Jones's forces to this 
side of the Run, the similarity of the uniforms and the direction of their 
march having convinced some nervous person that they were a force of the 
enemy. It was now almost dark, and too late to resume the broken pursuit; 
on my return I met the coming forces, and, as they were very tired, I ordered 
them to halt and bivouac for the night where they were. After giving such 
attention as I could to the troops, I started for Manassas, where I arrived 
about 10 o'clock, and found Mr. Davis at my headquarters with General 
Johnston. Arriving from Eichmond late in the afternoon, Mr. Davis had 
immediately galloped to the field, accompanied by Colonel Jordan. They 
had met between Manassas and the battle-field the usual number of strag- 
glers to the rear, whose appearance belied the determined array then sweep- 
ing the enemy before it, but Mr. Davis had the happiness to arrive in time 
to witness the last of the Federals disappearing beyond Bull Run. The next 
morning I received from his hand at our breakfast-table my commission, 
dated July 21st, as General in the Army of the Confederate States, and after 
his return to Richmond the kind congratulations of the Secretary of War 
and of General Lee, then acting as military adviser to the President. 

It was a point made at the time at the North that, just as the Confederate 
troops were about to break and flee, the Federal troops anticipated them by 
doing so, being struck into this precipitation by the arrival upon their flank 






o*y ^?5- 


~ t5 ^^^, 5 ' 


View of the Robinson house, looking north from the 
spot on the Henry plateau where General Bee fell. At 
1 p. m. this ground lay between the hostile lines, which 
were (roughly speaking) parallel with the sides of the 
picture : Con federates on the right, Union forces on the 

left. The foreground was between the centers of the 

As these two views are taken from the same spot, the 
reader will best understand their relation by holding 
the pages at a right angle to each other. 

of the Shenandoah forces marching from railroad trains halted en route with 
that aim errors that have been repeated by a number of writers, and by 
an ambitious but superficial French author. 

There were certain sentiments of a personal character clustering about this 
first battle, and personal anxiety as to its issue, that gladly accepted this 
theory. To this may' be added the general readiness to accept a sentimental 
or ultra-dramatic explanation a sorcery wrought by the delay or arrival of 
some force, or the death or coming of somebody, or any other single magical 
event whereby history is easily caught, rather than to seek an understanding 
of that which is but the gradual result of the operation of many forces, both of 
opposing design and actual collision, modified more or less by the falls of 
chance. The personal sentiment, though natural enough at the time, has no 
place in any military estimate, or place of any kind at this day. The battle 
of Manassas was, like any other battle, a progression and development from the 
deliberate counter-employment of the military resources in hand, affected by 
accidents, as always, but of a kind very different from those referred to. 
My line of battle, which twice had not only withstood the enemy's attack, 
but had taken the offensive and driven him back in disorder, was becoming 
momentarily stronger from the arrival, at last, of the reinforcements provided 
for : and if the cnemv had remained on the field till the arrival of Ewell and 




Holmes, they would have been so strongly outflanked that many who escaped 
would have been destroyed or captured. 

Though my adversary's plan of battle was a good one as against a passive 
defensive opponent, such as he may have deemed I must be from the respec- 
tive numbers and positions of our forces, it would, in my judgment, have 
been much better if, with more dash, the flank attack had been made by the 
Stone Bridge itself and the ford immedi- 
ately above it. The plan adopted, how- 
ever, favored above all things the easy 
execution of the offensive operations I 
had designed and ordered against his left 
flank and rear at Centreville. His turning 
column 18,000 strong, and presumably 
his best troops was thrown off by a long 
ellipse through a narrow forest road to 
Sudley Ford, from which it moved down 
upon my left flank, and was thus dislo- 
cated from his main body. This severed 
movement of his forces not only left his 
exposed left and rear at Centreville weak 
against the simultaneous offensive of my 
heaviest forces upon it, which I had or- 
dered, but the movement of his returning 
column would have been disconcerted and paralyzed by the early sound 
of this heavy conflict in its rear, and it could not even have made its way 
back so as to be available for manoeuvre before the Centreville fraction had 
been thrown back upon it in disorder. A new army is very liable to panic, 
and, in view of the actual result of the battle, the conclusion can hardly be 
resisted that the panic which fell on the Federal army would thus have 
seized it early in the day, and with my forces in such a position as wholly to 
cut off its retreat upon Washington. But the commander of the front line on 
my right, who had been ordered to hold himself in readiness to initiate the 
offensive at a moment's notice, did not make the move expected of him 
because through accident he failed to receive his own immediate order to 
advance. | The Federal commander's flanking movement, being thus uninter- 
rupted by such a counter-movement as I had projected, was further assisted 
through the rawness and inadequacy of our staff organization through which 
I was left unacquainted with the actual state of affairs on my left. The 
Federal attack, already thus greatly favored, and encouraged, moreover, by 
the rout of General Bee's advanced line, failed for two reasons : their forces 
were not handled with concert of masses (a fault often made later on both 
sides), and the individual action of the Confederate troops was superior, and 
for a very palpable reason. That one army was fighting for union and the 
other for disunion is a political expression ; the actual fact on the battle-field, in 
the face of cannon and musket, was that the Federal troops came as invaders, 

4. General E. S. Ewell. See statement of Major Campbell Brown, pag< ! ditors. 


and the Southern troops stood as defenders of their homes, and further than 
this we need not go. The armies were vastly greater than had ever before 
fought on this continent, and were the largest volunteer armies ever assem- 
bled since the era of regular armies. The personal material on both sides 
was of exceptionally good character, and collectively superior to that of any 
subsequent period of the war. \ The Confederate army was filled with 
generous youths who had answered the first call to arms. For certain 
kinds of field duty they were not as yet adapted, many of them having at 
first come with their baggage and servants ; these they had to dispense with, 
but, not to offend their susceptibilities, I then exacted the least work from 
them, apart from military drills, even to the prejudice of important field- 
works, when I could not get sufficient negro labor ; they " had come to fight, 
and not to handle the pick and shovel," and their fighting redeemed well their 
shortcomings as intrenchers. Before I left that gallant army, however, it had 
learned how readily the humbler could aid the nobler duty. 

As to immediate results and trophies, we captured a great many stands of 
arms, batteries, equipments, standards, and flags, one of which was sent to 
me, through General Longstreet, as a personal compliment by the Texan 
" crack shot," Colonel B. F. Terry, who lowered it from its mast at Fairfax 
Court House, by cutting the halyards by means of his unerring rifle, as our 
troops next morning reoccupied that place. We captured also many pris- 
oners, including a number of surgeons, whom (the first time in war) we 
treated not as prisoners, but as guests. Calling attention to their brave 
devotion to their wounded, I recommended to the War Department that 
they be sent home without exchange, together with some other prisoners, 
who had shown personal kindness to Colonel Jones, of the 4th Alabama, 
who had been mortally wounded early in the day. 


The military result of the victory was far short of what it should have 
been. It established as an accomplished fact, on the indispensable basis of 
military success, the Government of the Confederate States, which before 
was but a political assertion ; but it should have reached much further. The 
immediate pursuit, but for the false alarm which checked it, would have con- 
tinued as far as the Potomac, but must have stopped there with no greater 
result than the capture of more prisoners and material. The true immediate 
fruits of the victory should have been the dispersion of all the Federal forces 
south of Baltimore and east of the Alleghanies, the liberation of the State of 
Maryland, and the capture of Washington, which could have been made only 
by the Upper Potomac. And from the high source of this achievement other 
decisive results would have continued to flow. From my experience in the 

j> This battle was noteworthy for the number ton, Fitzhugh Lee, Thomas Jordan, R. E. Rodes, 
of participants whose names are now prominently E. P. Alexander, and others. On the Federal side 
associated with the war. On the Confederate side, were Generals McDowell, W. T. Sherman, Burn- 
besides Generals Johnston and Beauregard, were side, Hunter, Heintzelman, Howard, Franklin, 
Generals Stonewall Jackson, Longstreet, Ewell, Slocum, Keyes, Hunt, Barry, Fry, Sykes, Barnard, 
Early, J. E. B. Stuart, Kirby Smith, Wade Hamp- Wadsworth, and others. Editors. 



Mexican war I had great confidence in intelligent volunteer troops, if rightly 
handled; and with such an active and victorious war-engine as the Con- 
federate Army of the Potomac could have immediately been made, reen- 
forced, as time went, by numbers and discipline, the Federal military 
power in the East could never have reached the head it took when McClellan 
was allowed to organize and discipline at leisure the powerful army that, 
in the end, wore out 
the South. In war 
one success makes 
another easier, and 
its right use is as 
the step to another, 
until final achieve- 
ment. This was the 
use besought by me 
in the plan of cam- 
paign I have men- 
tioned as presented 
to Mr. Davis on the 
14th of July, a few 
days before the bat- 
tle, but rejected by 
him as impractica- 
ble, and as rather of- 
fering opportunity 
to the enemy to crush us. To supply the deficiency of transportation (our 
vehicles being few in number, and many so poor as to break down in ordinary 
camp service), I myself had assigned to special duty Colonel (since Governor) 
James L. Kemper, of Virginia, who quickly obtained for me some two hundred 
good wagons, to which number I had limited him so as not to arouse again 
the jealousy of the President's staff . If my plan of operations for the capture 
of Washington had been adopted, I should have considered myself thereby 
authorized and free to obtain, as I readily could have done, the transportation 
necessary. As it was though the difficult part of this " impracticable " plan 
of operations had been proven feasible, that is, the concentration of the Shen- 
andoah forces with mine (wrung later than the eleventh hour through the 
alarm over the march upon Richmond, and discountenanced again nervously 
at the twelfth hour by another alarm as to how " the enemy may vary his 
plans" in consequence), followed by the decisive defeat of the main Federal 
forces nevertheless the army remained rooted in the spot, although we 
had more than fifteen thousand troops who had been not at all or but little 
in the battle and were perfectly organized, while the remaining commands, 
in the high spirits of victory, could have been reorganized at the tap of the 
drum, and many with improved captured arms and equipments. I had 
already urged my views with unusual persistency, and acted on them against 
all but an express order to the contrary ; and as they had been deliberately 



rejected in their ultimate scope by Mr. Davis as the commander-in-chief, I 
did not feel authorized to urge them further than their execution had been 
allowed, unless the subject were broached anew by himself. But there was 
no intimation of any such change of purpose, and the army, consistently 
with this inertia, was left unprovided for manoeuvre with transportation for 
its ammunition ; its fortitude, moreover, as a new and volunteer army, while 
spending sometimes 24 hours without food, being only less wonderful than 
the commissary administration at Richmond, from which such a state of 
affairs could proceed even two weeks after the battle of Manassas. Although 
certain political superstitions about not consolidating the North may then 
have weighed against the action I proposed, they would have been light 
against a true military policy, if such had existed in the head of the Govern- 
ment. Apart from an active material ally, such as the colonies had afield 
and on sea in the War of Independence with Great Britain, a country in fatal 
war must depend on the vigor of its warfare ; the more inferior the country, 
the bolder and more enterprising the use of its resources, especially if its 
frontiers are convenient to the enemy. I was convinced that our success lay 
in a short, quick war of decisive blows, before the Federals, with their vast 
resources, could build up a great military power ; to which end a concerted 
use of our forces, immediate and sustained, was necessary, so that, weaker 
though we were at all separate points, we might nevertheless strike with 
superior strength at some chosen decisive point, and after victory there 
reach for victory now made easier elsewhere, and thus sum up success. 
Instead of this, which in war we call concentration, our actual policy was 
diffusion, an inferior Confederate force at each separate point defensively 
confronting a superior Federal force ; our power daily shrinking, that of the 
enemy increasing ; the avowed Federal policy being that of " attrition," their 
bigger masses grinding our smaller, one by one, to naught. Out of this 
state we never emerged, when the direction of the Government was, as almost 
always, necessary, excepting when "Richmond" was immediately in danger. 
Thus, in the fall of 1861, about three months after the battle of Manassas, 
after throwing my whole force forward to Fairfax Court House, with out- 
posts flaunting our flags on the hills in sight of Washington, in order to chafe 
the Federals to another battle, but without success, I proposed that the 
army should be raised to an effective of 60,000 men, by drawing 20,000 for the 
immediate enterprise from several points along the seaboard, not even at that 
time threatened, and from our advanced position be swiftly thrown across 
the Potomac at a point which I had had carefully surveyed for that purpose, 
and moved upon the rear of Washington, thus forcing McClellan to a decisive 
engagement before his organization (new enlistments) was completed, and 
while our own army had the advantage of discipline and prestige seasoned 
soldiers, whose term, however, would expire in the early part of the coming 
summer. This plan, approved by General Gustavus W. Smith (then imme- 
diately commanding General Johnston's own forces) as well as by General 
Johnston, was submitted to Mr. Davis in a conference at my headquarters, 
but rejected because he would not venture to strip those points of the troops 


we required. Even if those points had been captured, though none were then 
even threatened, they must have reverted as a direct consequence to so deci- 
sive a success. I was willing, then, should it have come to that, to exchange 
even Richmond temporarily for Washington. Yet it was precisely from simi- 
lar combinations and elements that the army was made up, to enable it the 
next spring, under General Lee, to encounter McClellan at the very door of 
Richmond. If that which was accepted as a last defensive resort against an 
overwhelming aggressive army had been used in an enterprising offensive 
against that same army while yet in the raw, the same venture had been 
made at less general risk, less cost of valuable lives, and with greater 
certain results. The Federal army would have had no chance meanwhile 
to become tempered to that magnificent military machine which, through 
all its defeats and losses, remained sound, and was stronger, with its 
readily assimilating new strength, at the end of the war than ever before ; 
the pressure would have been lifted from Kentucky and Missouri, and 
we should have maintained what is called an active defensive warfare, 
that is, should have taken and kept the offensive against the enemy, 
enforcing peace. 

No people ever warred for independence with more relative advantages 
than the Confederates ; and if, as a military question, they must have failed, 
then no country must aim at freedom by means of war. We were one in 
sentiment as in territory, starting out, not with a struggling administration 
of doubtful authority, but with our ancient State governments and a fully 
organized central government. As a military question, it was in no sense a 
civil war, but a war between two countries for conquest on one side, for 
self-preservation on the other. The South, with its great material resources, 
its defensive means of mountains, rivers, railroads, and telegraph, with the 
immense advantage of the interior lines of war, would be open to discredit 
as a people if its failure could not be explained otherwise than by mere 
material contrast. The great Frederick, at the head of a little people, not 
only beat back a combination of several great military powers, but conquered 
and kept territory; and Napoleon held combined Europe at the feet of 
France till his blind ambition overleaped itself. It may be said that the 
South had no Fredericks or Napoleons ; but it had at least as good com- 
manders as its adversary. Nor was it the fault of our soldiers or people. 
Our soldiers were as brave and intelligent as ever bore arms ; and, if only 
for reasons already mentioned, they did not lack in determination. Our 
people bore a devotion to the cause never surpassed, and which no war-mak- 
ing monarch ever had for his support; they gave their all even the last 
striplings under the family roofs filling the ranks voided by the fall of their 
fathers and brothers. But the narrow military view of the head of the Grovern- 
ment, which illustrated itself at the outset by ordering from Europe, not 100,000 
or 1,000,000, but 10,000 stands of arms, as an increase upon 8000, its first 
estimate, was equally narrow and timid in its employment of our armies. 

The moral and material forces actually engaged in the war made our success 
amoral certainty, but for the timid policy which ignoring strategy as a 
science and boldness of enterprise as its ally could never be brought to 


view the whole theater of war as one subject, of which all points were but 
integral parts, or to hazard for the time points relatively unimportant for the 
purpose of gathering for an overwhelming and rapid stroke at some decisive 
point ; and which, again, with characteristic mis-elation, would push a vic- 
torious force directly forward into unsupported and disastrous operations, 
instead of using its victory to spare from it strength sufficient to secure an 
equally important success in another quarter. The great principles of war 
are truths, and the same to-day as in the time of Csesar or Napoleon, notwith- 
standing the ideas of some thoughtless persons their applications being but 
intensified by the scientific discoveries affecting transportation and commu- 
nication of intelligence. These principles are few and simple, however 
various their deductions and application. Skill in strategy consists in seeing 
through the intricacies of the whole situation, and bringing into proper com- 
bination forces and influences, though seemingly unrelated, so as to apply 
these principles, and with boldness of decision and execution appearing with 
the utmost force, and, if possible, superior odds, before the enemy at some 
strategic, that is, decisive point. And although a sound military plan 
may not be always so readily conceived, yet any plan that offers decisive 
results, if it agree with the principles of war, is as plain and intelligible as 
these principles themselves, and no more to be rejected than they. There 
still remains, of course, the hazard of accident in execution, and the appre- 
hension of the enemy's movements upsetting your own ; but hazard may also 
favor as well as disfavor, and will not unbefriend the enterprising any more 
than the timid. It was this fear of possible consequences that kept our forces 
scattered in inferior relative strength at all points of the compass, each hold- 
ing its bit of ground till by slow local process our territory was taken and 
our separate forces destroyed, or, if captured, retained by the enemy without 
exchange in their process of attrition. To stop the slow consumption of this 
passive mode of warfare I tried my part, and, at certain critical junctures, 
proposed to the Government active plans of operation looking to such results 
as I have described, sometimes, it is true, in relation to the employment of 
forces not under my control, as I was the soldier of a cause and people, not of 
a monarch nor even of a government. Two occasions there were when cer- 
tain of the most noted Federal operations, from their isolated or opportune 
character, might, with energy and intelligent venture on the Confederate 
side, have been turned into fatal disaster ; among them Grant's movement in 
front of Vicksburg, and his change of base from the north to the south of the 
James River, where I was in command, in his last campaign against Rich- 
mond. I urged particularly that our warfare was sure of final defeat unless 
we attempted decisive strokes that might be followed up to the end, and that, 
even if earlier defeat might chance from the risk involved in the execution of 
the necessary combinations, we ought to take that risk and thereby either 
win or end an otherwise useless struggle. But, in addition to the radical 
divergence of military ideas, the passive defensive of an intellect timid of 
risk and not at home in war, and the active defensive reaching for success 
through enterprise and boldness, according to the lessons taught us in the 
campaigns of the great masters, there was a personal feeling that now gave 




This view is from a photograph taken in March, 18G2, the 
region having been left open to the Union forces by the 
withdrawal of the Confederates. The Confederate bat- 
tery which in the first battle of Bull Run commanded 

the bridge was placed on the left in the felled timber, 
which formed an abatis across the road. The battle 
was opened from beyond the small house, Van Pelt's, 
on the right, by the Rhode Island troops. Editors. 

cold hearing, or none, to any recommendations of mine. Mr. Davis's friend- 
ship, warm at the early period of the war, was changed, some time after the 
battle of Manassas, to a corresponding hostility from several personal causes, 
direct and indirect, of which I need mention but one. My report of Manassas 
having contained, as part of its history, a statement of the submission of 
the full plan of campaign for concentrating our forces, crushing successively 
McDowell and Patterson and capturing Washington, Mr. Davis strangely 
took offense thereat; and, now that events had demonstrated the practica- 
bility of that plan, he sought to get rid of his self -accused responsibility for 
rejecting it, by denying that any such had been submitted an issue, for 
that matter, easily settled by my production of the contemporaneous report 
of Colonel James Chesnut, the bearer of the mission, who, moreover, at the 
time of this controversy was on Mr. Davis's own staff, where he remained. 
Mr. Davis made an endeavor to suppress the publication of my report of the 
battle of Manassas. The matter came up in a secret debate in the Confeder- 
ate Congress, where a host of friends were ready to sustain me ; but I sent 
a telegram disclaiming any desire for its publication, and advising that the 
safety of the country should be our solicitude, and not personal ends. 

Thenceforth Mr. Davis's hostility was watchful and adroit, neglecting no 
opportunity, great or small ; and though, from motives all its opposite, it was 


not exposed during the war by any murmurs of mine, it bruited sometimes in 
certain quarters of its own f orce. Thus, when in January, 1862, the Western . 
representatives 'expressed a desire that I should separate myself for a time 
from my Virginia forces and go to the defense of the Mississippi Valley from 
the impending offensive of Halleck and Grant, it was furthered by the Execu- 
tive with inducements which I trusted, in disregard of Senator Toombs's 
sagacious warning, that under this furtherance lurked a purpose to effect my 
downfall, urged in one of his communications through his son-in-law, Mr. 
Alexander, in words as impressive as they proved prophetic : " Urge General 
Beauregard to decline all proposals and solicitations. The Blade of Joab. 
Verhum SapientiP After going through the campaign of Shiloh and Corinth, 
not only with those inducements unfulfilled, but with vital drawbacks from 
the Government, including the refusal of necessary rank to competent suboiv 
dinates to assist in organizing my hastily collected and mostly raw troops, I 
was forced, the following June, in deferred obedience to the positive order of 
my physicians, to withdraw from my immediate camp to another point in my 
department for recovery from illness, leaving under the care of my lieuten- 
ant, General Bragg, my army, then unmenaced and under reorganization with 
a view to an immediate offensive I had purposed. In anticipation and exclu- 
sion of the receipt of full dispatches following my telegram, the latter was 
tortuously misread, in a manner not creditable to a school-boy and repug- 
nant to Mr. Davis's exact knowledge of syntax, so as to give pretext to the 
shocking charge that I had abandoned my army, and a telegram was sent in 
naked haste directly to General Bragg, telling him to retain the permanent 
command of the army. The " Blade of Joab " had given its thrust. The repre- 
sentatives in Congress from the West and South-west applied to Mr. Davis in 
a body for my restoration ; and when, disregarding his sheer pretext that I had 
abandoned my army, they still insisted, Mr. Davis declared that I should not 
be restored if the whole world should ask it ! This machination went to such 
length that it was given out in Richmond that I had softening of the brain 
and had gone crazy. So carefully was this report fostered (one of its tales 
being that I would sit all day stroking a pheasant \) that a friend of mine, 
a member of the Confederate Congress, thought it his duty to write me a 
special letter respecting the device, advising me to come directly to Rich- 
mond to confound it by my presence a proceeding which I disdained 
to take. I had not only then, but from later, still more offensive prov- 
ocation, imperative cause to resign, and would have done so but for 
a sense of public obligation. Indeed, in my after fields of action the 
same hostility was more and more active in its various embarrassments, 
reckless that the strains inflicted upon me bore upon the troops and 
country depending 011 me and relatively upon the cause, so that I often 

\ This silly tale was borrowed from an incident to place it in a cage, as I intended sending it as a 

of Shiloh. Toward the end of the first day's hat- pleasant token of the battle to the family of Judge 

tie a soldier had found a pheasant cowering, ap- Milton Brown, of Jackson, Tennessee, from whom 

parently paralyzed under the ceaseless din, and I had received as their guest, while occupying that 

brought it to my headquarters as a present to place, the kindest attentions ; but in the second 

me. It was a beautiful bird, and I gave directions day's conflict the poor waif was lost. G. T. B. 
vol. 1. 15 


dreaded failure more from my own Government behind me than from the 
enemy in my front ; and, when success came in spite of this, it was acknowl- 
edged only by some censorious official " inquiry " contrasting with the repeated 
thanks of the Congress. I was, however, not the only one of the highest 
military rank with whom Mr. Davis's relations were habitually unwholesome. 
It is an extraordinary fact that during the four years of war Mr. Davis did 
not call together the five generals [see page 241 ] with a view to determining 
the best military policy or settling upon a decisive plan of operations involv- 
ing the whole theater of war, though there was often ample opportunity for it. 
We needed for President either a military man of a high order, or a politician of 
the first class without military pretensions, such as Howell Cobb. The South 
did not fall crushed by the mere weight of the North ; but it was nibbled 
away at all sides and ends because its executive head never gathered and 
wielded its great strength under the ready advantages that greatly reduced 
or neutralized its adversary's naked physical superiority. It is but another 
of the many proofs that timid direction may readily go with physical cour- 
age, and that the passive defensive policy may make a long agony, but can 
never win a war. 

Postscript. Since the publication of the foregoing pages in " The Century " 
for November, 1884, General J. E. Johnston, in the course of a paper also con- 
tributed to " The Century" [see page 240], took occasion, for the first time, to 
set up with positiveness and circumstantiality the claim to having exercised 
a controlling connection with the tactics of all the phases of the battle of the 21st 
of July, 1861. Respecting such a pretension I shall be content for the present 
to recall that, while entirely at variance with the part I have ascribed to him 
in relation to that field, it is logically untenable, at this day, when confronted 
with the records of the period. In my own official report of the battle closely 
contemporaneous with the events narrated a report that was placed in his 
hands for perusal before transmission it is distinctly related that for certain 
reasons, chiefly military, General Johnston had left in my hands for the 
impending conflict the command of the Confederate forces. The precise cir- 
cumstances of my direct conduct of and responsibility for the battle are 
stated in such terms that, had I not been in actual direction of the day's 
operations on the part of the Confederates, General Johnston must have made 
the issue squarely then and there in his own official report. And all the more 
incumbent upon him was the making of such an issue, it seems to me, then 
or never, in view of the fact that the Confederate Secretary of War on the 
24th of July, 1861, wrote me in these words : 

" My Dear General : Accept my congratulations for the glorious and most brilliant victory 
achieved by you. The country will bless and honor you for it. Believe me, dear General, 

" Truly your friend, L. P. Walker." 

Further, General Lee thus addressed me : 

" My Dear General : I cannot express the joy I feel at the brilliant victory of the 21st. The 
skill, courage, and endurance displayed by yourself excite my highest admiration. You and 
your troops have the gratitude of the whole country, and I offer to all my heartfelt congratula- 
tions at their success. . . . Very truly yours, R. E. Lee." 



Of the exact purport of these two letters General Johnston could not have 
been ignorant when he wrote his report of the battle. Nor could he have 
been unaware that the leading Southern newspapers had in effect attributed 
to me the chief direction of that battle on the Confederate side. Therefore, 
if it were the gross historical error which, twenty odd years after the affair, 
General Johnston characterizes it to be, and one that imputed to him the 
shirking of a duty which he could not have left unassumed without personal 
baseness, certainly that was the time for him by a few explicit words in his 
official report to dispose of so affronting an error. In that report, however, 
no such exigent, peremptory statement of his relation to the battle is to be 
found. On the other hand, upon page 57 of his "Narrative" published in 
1874 (D. Appleton & Co.), may be found, I fear, the clew to the motive of 
his actual waiver of command in this curious paragraph : 

" If the tactics of the Federals had been equal to their strategy, we should have been beaten. 
If, instead of being brought into action in detail, their troops had been formed in two lines, 
with a proper reserve, and had assailed Bee and Jackson in that order, the two Southern 
brigades must have been swept from the field iu a few minutes, or enveloped. General 
McDowell would have made such a formation, probably, had he not greatly underestimated the 
strength of his enemy." 

Coupled with the disquieting, ever-apprehensive tenor of his whole corre- 
spondence with the Confederate War Department, from the day he assumed 
command in the Valley of Virginia in May, 1861, down to the close of the 
struggle in 1865, the fair inference from such language as that just cited from 
his " Narrative " is that General Johnston came to Manassas beset with the 
idea that our united forces would not be able to cope with the Federal army, 
and that we should be beaten a catastrophe in which he was not solicitous 
to figure on the pages of history as the leading and responsible actor. Origi- 
nally and until 1875, 1 had regarded it as a generous though natural act on the 
part of General Johnston, in such a juncture, to leave me in command and 
responsible for what might occur. The history of military operations abounds 
in instances of notable soldiers who have found it proper to waive chief com- 
mand under similar conditions. 


C<iii federate fortifications, near Centreville, after their evacuation in the spring of 1862. The muzzle of the log was 
painted black and the hreech was covered with brush to conceal its character from observation by balloon. 



''~.'.' htif&f'- *7-''"V"', PUT;;- 

_ - -- - ; g ^^ff^ ;>-- ~ 




FROM the day of his arrival at Winchester [see page 124], General John- 
ston was ceaseless in his labors to improve the efficiency of his little 
army, in which he was greatly assisted by several staff-officers who afterward 
rose to high distinction. The two most active of these subordinates were 
Majors W. H. C. Whiting and E. Kirby Smith, the former of whom as a 
major-general fell mortally wounded at the capture of Fort Fisher in North 
Carolina, and the latter as a lieutenant-general commanded the Trans- 
Mississippi army when the final collapse came. During our withdrawal from 
Harper's Ferry, on June 16th, we were denectelT from our direct line of 
march, and held in line of battle a day at Bunker Hill, a few miles north of 
Winchester, to receive an expected assault from General Patterson, who had 
crossed the Potomac, but who went back without attacking us. Again on 
July 2d we were marched to Darksville, about midway to Martinsburg, to 
meet Patterson, where we lay in line of battle till the 5th, when General 
Patterson, after a slight " brush " with Jackson, again recrossed the Potomac. 
We returned to Winchester, and to our arduous drilling. 

After midnight of July 17th, General Bee, my brigade commander, sent for 
me to go with him to headquarters, whither he had been summoned. Several 
brigade commanders were assembled in a room with General Johnston, and a 
conference of one or two hours was held. When General Bee joined me on the 
porch to return to our quarters, I saw he was excited, and I asked him, " What 
is up ? " He took my arm, and, as we walked away, told me we would march 
next day to the support of General Beauregard. He repeated a telegram 
General Johnston had received from Adjutant-General Cooper about mid- 
night. This was the famous dispatch that has led to so much controversy 
between Mr. Davis and General Johnston, as to whether it was a peremptory 
order, or simply permission to Johnston to go to Beauregard's support. I 
quote it, and leave the reader to his own construction : 

" General Beauregard is attacked ; to strike the enemy a decisive blow, a junction of all your 
effective-force' will be needed. If practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and 
b gage to Culpeper Court House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In all the arrange- 
ments exercise your discretion." 



On the next day, the 18th of July, we left Winchester for Manassas. It 
was late in the afternoon before my battery took up the line of march as I 
now recollect, with the rear-guard, as had been the case when we left Harper's 
Ferry a month before. It was thought probable that Patterson, who was 
south of the Potomac, and only a few miles distant, would follow us. But J. 
E. B. Stuart and Ashby with the cavalry so completely masked our movement 
that it was not suspected by Patterson until July 20th, the day before the 
Bull Run fight, and then it was too late for him to interfere. 

On the second day of the march an order reached me at Rectortown, 
Virginia, through Brigadier-General Barnard E. Bee, to collect the four field- 
batteries of Johnston's army into one column, and, as senior artillery captain, 
to march them by country roads that were unobstructed by infantry or trains 
as rapidly as possible to Manassas Junction, and to report my arrival, at any 
hour, day or night, to General Bee, who was going forward by rail with his 
brigade. Having assembled the batteries in the night, I began the march at 
dawn of Saturday, July 20th, the day before the battle. About 8 in the 
morning we reached a village in Fauquier county Salem, I think it was. 
The whole population turned out to greet us. Men, women, and children 
brought us baskets, trays, and plates loaded with their own family breakfasts. 
With the improvidence of raw campaigners, we had finished the night before 
our three days' cooked rations ; so I ordered a halt for thirty minutes to enjoy 
the feast. The Staunton Artillery J (my own battery) was at the head of the 
column, and, being largely composed of young men of high social standing, 
was especially honored by the ladies of the village, conspicuous among whom 
were the young daughters of Colonel John A. Washington, late of Mount Ver- 
non. I noticed that some of the young fellows of the battery, lingering round 
the baskets borne by these young ladies, who bade them die or conquer in the 
fight, seemed very miserable during the remainder of the march. No doubt 
many of them, during the battle, felt that it would be better to die on the 
field than retreat and live to meet those enthusiastic girls again. I make 
special note of that breakfast because it was the last food any of us tasted till 
the first Bull Run had been fought and won, 36 hours later. 

It was 1 o'clock that night when the head of my little column reached 
General Bee's headquarters, about one mile north-east of Manassas Junction. 
He was established in the log-cabin to which afterward he was brought when 
he was mortally wounded, and to which I shall again allude. General Bee 
ordered us to unharness the horses and bivouac in the fence corners, adding, 
" You will need all the rest you can get, for a great battle will begin in the 

A little after daybreak we were aroused by the sharp, ringing report of a 
great Parrott gun across Bull Run, two miles away, and the whizzing of a 
30-pounder elongated shell over the tree- tops, 400 or 500 yards to our left. 
Instantly every man was on his feet, and in five minutes the horses were 

\ It numbered 140 officers and men. Six were col- chanics, whose mechanical skill was of much ser- 

lege graduates, and several had left college to enter vice. I had provided them with red flannel shirts at 

the army. The majority were young men of leisure Harper's Ferry, because our uniforms were too fine 

or mercantile clerks. About forty were young me- for camp life and for service in the field. J. D. I. 



harnessed and hitched to the gnns and caissons. General Bee beckoned to me 
to come np to the porch, where he was standing in his shirt-sleeves, having 
also been aroused by the shot. He rapidly informed me of the disposition of 
our troops of Johnston's army so far as they had arrived at Manassas. His 
own brigade had been brought forward by rail the evening before. Above 
all, he was dissatisfied at the prospect of not participating prominently in the 
battle, saying that he had been ordered to the Stone Bridge, three or four 
miles away on our extreme left, to cover the left flank of the army from any 
movement that might be made against it. And as he had been directed to take 
a battery with him, he had selected mine, and wished me to move at once. He 
gave me a guide, and said he would follow immediately with his infantry. 
When I told him we had been 24 hours without food for men or horses, 
he said he would order supplies to follow, remarking, " You will have plenty 
of time to cook and eat, to the music of a battle in which we shall probably 
take little or no part." 

Away we went, retracing our steps to the Junction, and by a westerly detour 
striking into the Sudley road, at a point half-way between the Junction and 
the scene of the battle. After an hour or so we ascended the hill to the Lewis 
house, or " Portici." Here a courier at full speed met us with news that the 
whole Federal army seemed to be marching north-westerly on the other side 
of Bull Run. Halting my men, I rode to the top of the hill, and had a full 
view of a long column of glittering bayonets moving up on the north side of 
the creek. Glancing down the valley, I saw Bee's brigade advancing, and 
galloped to meet him and report what I had seen. He divined the plans of 



p[ if' 



j yfig! 


ft v- 



_ . 

c - .0- 


This view is from a photograph taken in March, 1862. It represents the works substantially as they 

were at the time of the battle. 








The stream in the foreground is Young's Branch. 
The Sndley road crosses a little to the left of 
the picture. See map, page 204. 

McDowell, and, asking me to accompany him, rode rapidly past the Lewis 
house, across the hollow beyond it, and up the next hill through the pines, 
emerging on the summit immediately east of the Henry house. As the beau- 
tiful open landscape in front burst upon his vision, he exclaimed with enthu- 
siasm : " Here is the battle-field, and we are in for it ! Bring up your guns as 
quickly as possible, and I'll look round for a good position." 

In less than twenty minutes I and my battery had passed the Lewis house, 
when I discovered Bee coming out of the pines. He stopped, and, placing his 
cap on his sword-point, waved it almost frantically as a signal to hurry for- 
ward. We went at a gallop, and were guided to a depression in the ground 
about one hundred yards to the north-east of the Henry house, where we 
unlimbered. With his keen military eye, General Bee had chosen the best 
possible position for a battery on all that field. We were almost under cover 
by reason of a slight swell in the ground immediately in our front, and not 
fifty feet away. Our shot passed not six inches above the surface of the 
ground on this " swell," and the recoil ran the guns back to still lower ground, 
where as we loaded only the heads of my men were visible to the enemy. 

We went into position none too soon ; for, by the time we had unlimbered, 
Captain Rieketts, appearing on the crest of the opposite hill, came beautifully 
and gallantly into battery at a gallop, a short distance from the Matthews 


2 13 

Scale of 1000 feet 









Z.En/S 'Mouse 

house on our side of the Sudley road, aud about fifteen hundred yards to our 
front. I wanted to open on him while he was milhnbering, but General Bee 
objected till we had received a fire, and had thus ascertained the character 
and caliber of the enemy's guns. Mine, four in number, were all brass smooth- 
bore 6-pounders. The first round or two from the enemy went high over 
us. Seeing this, Greneral 
Bee directed us to fire 
low and ricochet our 
shot and shrapnel on 
the hard, smooth, open 
field that sloped toward 
the Warrenton turnpike 
in the valley between 
us. We did this, and the 
effect was very destruc- 
tive to the enemy. 

The rapid massing of 
Federal troops in our 
front soon led to very 
heavy fighting. My lit- 
tle battery was under a 
pitiless fire for a long 
time. Two guns from 
an Alexandria battery 
Latham's, I think 
took part in the conflict 
on the north side of 
Young's Branch to our 
right and across the 
turnpike, so long as Bee, Bartow, Evans, and Wheat were on that side, we 
firing over their heads ; and about 11 o'clock two brass 12-pounder Napoleons 
from the New Orleans Washington Artillery unlimbered on our right, retiring, 
however, after a few rounds. 

We were hardly more than fairly engaged with Ricketts when Griffin's splen- 
did battery came to his aid, and took position full five hundred yards nearer 
to us, in a field on the left of the Sudley road. Ricketts had 6 Parrott guns, and 
Griffin had as many more, and, I think, 2 12-pounder howitzers besides. 
These last hurt us more than all the rifles of both batteries, since the shot 
and shell of the rifles, striking the ground at any angle over 15 or 20 
degrees, almost without exception bored their way in several feet and did no 
harm. It is no exaggeration to say that hundreds of shells from these fine 
rifle-guns exploded in front of and around my battery on that day, but so 
deep in the ground that the fragments never came out. After the action the 
ground looked as though it had been rooted up by hogs. % 

% I venture the opinion, after a good deal of or, at 1500 to 1800 yards, a similar battery of 12- 
observation during the war, that in open ground, pounder Napoleons, well handled, will in one hour 
at 1000 yards, a G-pounder battery of smooth guns, discomfit double the number of the best rifles ever 


Imboden'e second position is on the line of the Confederate front as formed 

by Jackson. Finally the Confederate line reached from behind the 

Robinson house to the left along the edse of the pines, and (as reen- 

forcements came up) made a concave arc to a point behind the Chinn 

house. General Iinboden counted twenty-six Confederate guns 

in the semicircle east of the Sudley road, when Griffin and 

Ricketts had taken position near the Henry house. Editors. 


For at least a half -hour after our forces were driven across Young's Branch 
no Confederate soldier was visible from our position near the Henry house. 
The Staunton Artillery, so far as we could see, was " alone in its glory." Gen- 
eral Bee's order had been, " Stay here till you are ordered away." To rny 
surprise, no orders had come, though, as I afterward learned, orders to with- 
draw had been sent three-quarters of an hour before through Major Howard, 
of Bee's staff, who had fallen, desperately wounded, on the way. 

Infantry was now massing. near the Stone house on the turnpike, not five 
hundred yards away, to charge and capture us. On making this discovery and 
learning from the sergeants of pieces that our ammunition was almost entirely 
exhausted, there remained but one way to save our guns, and that was to run 
them off the field. More than half of our horses had been killed, only one 
or two being left in several of my six-horse teams. Those that we had were 
quickly divided among the guns and caissons, and we limbered up and fled. 
Then it was that the Henry house was riddled, and the old lady, Mrs. Henry, 
was mortally wounded;| for our line of retreat was so chosen that for 200 or 
300 yards the house would conceal us from Griffin's battery, and, in a 
measure, shelter us from the dreaded fire of the infantry when they should 
reach the crest we had just abandoned. Several of Griffin's shot passed 
through the house, scattering shingles, boards, and splinters all around us. 
A rifle-shot from Ricketts broke the axle of one of our guns and dropped 
the gun in the field, but we saved the limber. The charging infantry 
gained the crest in front of the Henry house in time to give us one volley, 
but with no serious damage. 

We crossed the summit at the edge of the pines, midway behind the Henry 
and Robinson houses, and there met " Stonewall " Jackson at the head of his 
brigade, marching by the flank at a double-quick. Johnston and Beauregard 
had arrived upon the field, and were hurrying troops into position, but we 
had not yet seen them. 

When I met Jackson I felt very angry at what I then regarded as bad treat- 
ment from General Bee, in leaving us so long exposed to capture, and I 
expressed myself with some profanity, which I could see was displeasing to 
Jackson. He remarked, " I'll support your battery. Unlimber right here." 
We did so, when a perfect lull in the conflict ensued for 20 or 30 minutes 
at least in that part of the field. 

It was at this time that McDowell committed, as I think, the fatal blunder 
of the day, by ordering both Ricketts's and Griffin's batteries to cease firing and 
move across the turnpike to the top of the Henry Hill, and take position on the 
west side of the house. The short time required to effect the change enabled 
Beauregard to arrange his new line of battle on the highest crest of the hill, 

put in the field. A smooth-bore gun never buries the battle opened near the Matthews house, Mrs. 

its projectiles in the ground, as the rifle does inva- Henry was carried into a ravine below the Sudley 

riably when fired against sloping ground. Of course, road. A little later the house seemed to be the 

this advantage of the smooth-bore gun is limited safest place, and she was carried back to her bed. 

to its shorter range, and to an open field fight, de- For a time the house was in the line of the artillery 

fensive works not being considered. J. D. I. fire from both sides. Mrs. Henry received five 

4> Mrs. Judith Henry, bedridden from old age, wounds from fragments of shells, and died two 

was living in the house with her children. When hours after the battle. Editors. 


2 35 


f$f r south-east of the Henry and Robinson 

houses, in the edge of the pines. If 
one of the Federal batteries had been 
left north of Young's Branch, it could 
have so swept the hill-top where we 
re-formed, that it would have greatly 
delayed, if not wholly have prevented, 
us from occupying the position. And if 
we had been forced back to the next 
hill, on which stands the Lewis house, 
Sherman, who had crossed Bull Run 
not far above the Stone Bridge at a 
farm ford, would have had a fair 
swing at our right flank, to say noth- 
ing of the effect of the artillery playing 
upon us from beyond Bull Run. 

When my retiring battery met Jack- 
son, and he assumed command of us, 
I reported that I had remaining only 
three rounds of ammunition for a sin- 
gle gun, and suggested that the cais- 
sons be sent to the rear for a supply. 
He said, "No, not now wait till other 
guns get here, and then you can with- 
draw your battery, as it has been so torn to pieces, and let your men rest." 

During the lull in front, my men lay about, exhausted from want of water 
and food, and black with powder, smoke, and dust. Lieutenant Harman and I 
had amused ourselves training one of the guns on a heavy column of the enemy, 
who were advancing toward us, in the direction of the Chinn house, but were 
still 1200 to 1500 yards away. While we were thus engaged, General Jackson 
rode up and said that three or four batteries were approaching rapidly, and 
that we might soon retire. I asked permission to tire the three rounds of 
shrapnel left to us, and he said, " Gro ahead." I picked up a charge (the fuse 
was cut and ready) and rammed it home myself, remarking to Harman, " Tom, 
put in the primer and pull her off." I forgot to step back far enough from the 
muzzle, and, as I wanted to see the shell strike, I squatted to be under the 
smoke, and gave the word " Fire." Heavens ! what a report. Finding myself 
full twenty feet away, I thought the gun had burst. But it was only the 
pent-up gas, that, escaping sideways as the shot cleared the muzzle, had struck 
my side and head with great violence. I recovered in time to see the shell 
explode in the enemy's ranks. The blood gushed out of my left ear, and from 
that day to this it has been totally deaf. The men fired the other two rounds, 
and limbered up and moved away, just as the Rockbridge Artillery, under 
Lieutenant Brockenbrough, came into position, followed a moment later by the 
Leesburg Artillery, under Lieutenant Henry Heaton. Pendleton, supposed by 
me still to be captain of the first, as Rogers was of the second, were not with 





their batteries when they iinlimbered.| But Heaton and Brockenbrough were 
equal to the occasion. Heaton had been under my command with his battery 
at the Point of Rocks, below Harper's Ferry, the previous May, and was a 
brave and skillful young officer. Several other batteries soon came into line, 
so that by the time Griffin and Ricketts were in position near the Henry 
house, we had, as I now remember, 26 fresh guns ready for them. 

The contest that ensued was terrific. Jackson ordered me to go from bat- 
tery to battery and see that the guns were properly aimed and the fuses cut 
the right length. This was the work of but a few minutes. On returning 
to the left of the line of guns, I stopped to ask General Jackson's permis- 
sion to rejoin my battery. The fight was just then hot enough to make him 
feel well. His eyes fairly blazed. He had a way of throwing up his left 
hand with the open palm toward the person he was addressing. And as he 
told me to go, he made this gesture. The air was full of flying missiles, and 
as he spoke he jerked down his hand, and I saw that blood was streaming 
from it. I exclaimed, " General, you are wounded." He replied, as he drew 
a- handkerchief from his breast-pocket, and began to bind it up, " Only a 
scratch a mere scratch," and galloped away along his line. 

To save my horse, I had hitched him in a little gully some fifty yards or 
more in the rear. And to reach him, I had to pass the six hundred infantry 
of Hampton's Legion, who were lying down in supporting distance of our 
artillery, then all in full play. While I was untying my horse, a shell exploded 
in the midst of Hampton's infantry, killing several and stampeding 15 or 20 
nearest the spot. I tried to rally them ; but one huge fellow, musket in hand, 
and with bayonet fixed, had started on a run. I threw myself in his front 
with drawn sword, and threatened to cut him down, whereupon he made a 
lunge at me. I threw up my left arm to ward off the blow, and the bayonet- 
point ran under the wristband of my red flannel shirt, and raked the skin 
of my arm from wrist to shoulder. The blow knocked me sprawling on the 
ground, and the fellow got away. I tore off the dangling shirt-sleeve, and 
was bare-armed as to my left, the remainder of the fight. 

I overtook my battery on the hill near the Lewis house, which was used as 
a hospital. In a field in front I saw General Johnston and his staff grouped 
on their horses, and under fire from numerous shells that reached that hill. I 
rode up to him, reported our ammunition all gone, and requested to know 
where I could find the ordnance wagons and get a fresh supply. Observing 
the sorry plight of the battery and the condition of the surviving men and 
horses, he directed me to remove them farther to the rear to a place of 
perfect safety, and return myself to the field, where I might be of some 

I took the battery back perhaps a mile, where we found a welcome little 
stream of water. Being greatly exhausted, I rested for perhaps an hour, and 
returned to the front with Sergeant Thomas Shumate. 

j) Captain, afterward General, Pendleton had the Eockbridge Artillery. Captain Rogers, I also 
recently been made a colonel and chief of artillery learn, had a section somewhere lower down on 
to General Johnston, which separated him from Bull Run with the troops at the fords. J. D. I. 


When we regained the crest of the Henry plateau, the enemy had been 
swept from it, and the retreat had begun all along the line. We gazed upon 
the scene for a time, and, hearing firing between the Lewis house and the 
Stone Bridge, we rode back to see what it meant. Captain Lindsay Walker 
had arrived from Fredericksburg with his six-Parrott-gun battery, and from 
a high hill was shelling the fugitives beyond Bull Run as they were fleeing in 
wild disorder to the shelter of the nearest woods. Colonel J. E. B. Stuart, 
at the head of a body of yelling cavalry with drawn sabers, was sweeping, 
round the base of the hill we were on, to cross the Run and fall upon 
the enemy. 

When Stuart disappeared in the distance, Shumate and I rode slowly back 
toward the battery. Nearing the Lewis house, we saw General Johnston and 
his staff coming toward us slowly, preceded a little by a gentleman 011 horse- 
back, who was lifting his hat to every one he met. From the likeness I had 
seen of President Jefferson Davis, I instantly recognized him and told Shumate 
who it was. With the impulsiveness of his nature, Shumate dashed up to the 
President, seized his hand, and huzzaed at the top of his voice. I could see 
that Mr. Davis was greatly amused, and I was convulsed with laughter. When 
they came within twenty steps of me, where I had halted to let the group 
pass, Shumate exclaimed, to the great amusement of all who heard him : "Mr. 
President, there's my captain, and I want to introduce you to him." The Presi- 
dent eyed me for a moment, as if he thought I was an odd-looking captain. 
I had on a battered slouch hat, a red flannel shirt with only one sleeve, cordu- 
roy trousers, and heavy cavalry boots, and was begrimed with burnt powder, 
dust, and the blood from my ear and arm, and must have been about as 
hard-looking a specimen of a captain as was ever seen. Nevertheless, the 
President grasped my hand with a cordial salutation, and after a few words 
passed on. 

We found our battery refreshing themselves on fat bacon and bread. 
After a hasty meal, I threw myself on a bag of oats, and slept till broad 
daylight next morning, notwithstanding a drenching rain which beat irpon 
me during the night. 

In fact, I was aroused in the morning by a messenger from ex-Governor 
Alston, of South Carolina, summoning me to the side of my gallant com- 
mander, Brigadier-General Bee, who had been mortally wounded near the 
Henry house, where Bartow had been instantly killed almost at the same 
moment. When I reached General Bee, who had been carried back to the 
cabin where I had joined him the night before, he was unconscious ; in a few 
minutes, while I was holding his hand, he died. Some one during the night 
had told him that I had reflected on him for leaving our battery so long 
exposed to capture; and, at his request, messengers had been for hours 
hunting me in the darkness, to bring me to him, that I might learn from his 
own lips that he had sent Major Howard to order me to withdraw, when he 
was driven back across Young's Branch and the turnpike. I was grieved 
deeply not to have seen him sooner. Possibly the failure of his order to 
reach me was providential. For full three-quarters of an hour we had kept up 


a fire that delayed the enemy's movement across Young's Branch. But for 
that, they might have gained the Henry plateau, before Jackson and Hamp- 
ton came up, and before Bee and Bartow had rallied their disorganized troops. 
Minutes count as hours under such circumstances, and trifles often turn the 
scale in great battles. 

General Jackson's wound became very serious when inflammation set in. 
On hearing, three days after the fight, that he was suffering with it, I rode to 
his quarters, a little farm-house near Centreville. Although it was barely 
sunrise, he was out under the trees, bathing the hand with spring water. It 
was much swollen and very painful, but he bore himself stoically. His wife 
had arrived the night before. Of course, the battle was the only topic dis- 
cussed at breakfast. I remarked, in Mrs. Jackson's hearing, " General, how 
is it that you can keep so cool, and appear so utterly insensible to danger in 
such a storm of shell and bullets as rained about you when your hand was 
hit ? " He instantly became grave and reverential in his manner, and 
answered, in a low tone of great earnestness : " Captain, my religious belief 
teaches me to feel as safe in battle as in bed. God has fixed the time for 
my death. I do not concern myself about that, but to be always ready, 
no matter when it may overtake me." He added, after a pause, looking me 
full in the face : " Captain, that is the way all men should live, and then all 
would be equally brave." 

I felt that this last remark was intended as a rebuke for my profanity, 
when I had complained to him on the field of the apparent abandonment of 
my battery to capture, and I apologized. He heard me, and simply said, 
" Nothing can justify profanity." \ 

The battle was mainly fought by Johnston's troops from the Shenandoah. 
Two-thirds of the killed and wounded were his men and officers. Beau- 
regard's troops were strung out for several miles down the valley of Bull 
Run, and did not get up to our aid till near the end of the day. General 
Beauregard himself, who was in the thickest of the fight, came upon the field 
long before any of his troops arrived, except those he had posted under 
Evans to guard the Stone Bridge, and which, with Bee's troops, bore the 
brunt of the first attack. 

\ I never knew Jackson to let profanity pass with- of wagons, and, in the voice of a stentor, poured 
out a rebuke but once. The incident was reported to out a volume of oaths that would have excited the 
me by the chief actor in it, Major John A. Harman, admiration of the most scientific mule-driver. The 
who was Jackson's chief quartermaster. It happened effect was electrical. The drivers were frightened 
at Edwards Ferry, on the Potomac, when our army and swore as best they could, but far below the 
was crossing into Maryland in the Antietam cam- major's standard. The mules caught the inspira- 
paign. On the march to the river, for some in- tion from a chorus of familiar words, and all at 
fraction of orders about the manner of marching once made a break for the Maryland shore, and in 
his division, Major-General A. P. Hill had been five minutes the ford was cleared, Jackson wit- 
ordered in arrest by Jackson. This probably had nessed and heard it all. Harman rode back to 
put Jackson in a ruffled frame of mind. The day join him, expecting a lecture, and, touching his 
was very hot, and the ford was completely blocked hat, said: "The ford is clear, general! There's 
with a wagon train, either of Hill's or some other only one language that will make mules under- 
division. On seeing the state of affairs, Jackson stand on a hot day that they must get out of the 
turned to Major Harman, and ordered him to clear water." The general smiled, and said: "Thank 
the ford. Harman dashed in among the wagoners, you, major," and dashed into the water at the head 
kicking mules, and apparently inextricable mass of his staff, and rode across. J. D. I. 


The uninformed, North and South, have wondered why Johnston and Beau- 
regard did not follow on to Washington. General Johnston, in his "Nar- 
rative," has clearly and conclusively answered that question. It was simply 
impossible. We had neither the food nor transportation at Manassas neces- 
sary to a forward movement. This subject was the cause of sharp irritation 
between our commanding generals at Manassas on the one hand, and Mr. 
Davis and his Secretary of War, Mr. Benjamin, on the other. There was a 
disposition in the quartermaster's and commissary departments at Richmond 
to deny the extent of the destitution of our army immediately after the bat- 
tle. To ascertain the exact facts of the case, General Johnston organized a 
board of officers to investigate and report the condition of the transportation 
and commissariat of the army at Manassas on the 21st of July, and their 
daily condition for two weeks thereafter. That Board was composed of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert B. Lee (a cousin of General R. E. Lee), represent- 
ing the commissary department, Major (afterward Major-General) W. L. 
Cabell, representing the quartermaster's department, and myself from the 
line. My associates on this Board were old United States army officers of 
acknowledged ability and large experience. We organized early in August, 
and made an exhaustive investigation and detailed report. I have a distinct 
recollection that we found that on the morning of the battle there was not at 
Manassas one full day's rations for the combined armies of Johnston and 
Beauregard, and that on no single day for the succeeding two weeks was 
there as much as a three days' supply there. We found that there were not 
wagons and teams enough at any time to have transported three days' sup- 
plies for the troops if they had been put in motion away from the railroad. 
We found that for weeks preceding the 21st of July General Beauregard had 
been urgent and almost importunate in his demands on the quartermaster 
and commissary generals at Richmond for adequate supplies. We found that 
Colonel Northrop, the commissary general, had not only failed to send forward 
adequate supplies for such an emergency as arose when General Johnston 
brought his army from the valley, but that he had interfered with and inter- 
dicted the efforts of officers of the department who were with General Beau- 
regard to collect supplies from the rich and abundant region lying between 
the hostile armies. After reporting the facts, we unanimously concurred in 
the opinion that they proved the impossibility of a successful and rapid 
pursuit of the defeated enemy to Washington. This report, elaborately 
written out and signed, was forwarded to Richmond, and in a few days was 
returned by Mr. Judah P. Benjamin, Secretary of War, with an indorsement 
to the effect that the Board had transcended its powers by expressing an 
opinion as to what the facts did or did not prove, and sharply ordering us to 
strike out all that part of the report, and send only the facts ascertained by 
us. We met and complied with this order, though indignant at the repri- 
mand, and returned our amended report. This was the last I ever heard of 
it. It never saw daylight. Who suppressed it I do not know.-& 

& See statement from Colonel Northrop, page 261 . Editors. 






^f TTHEN the State of Virginia seceded, being a citizen of 
* that State, I resigned my office in the United States 
Army; and as I had seen a good deal of military 
service, in the Seminole and Mexican wars and in the 
West, the President of the Confederacy offered me a 
commission in the highest grade in his army. I ac- 
cepted the offer because the invasion of the South 
was inevitable. Bnt I soon incurred Mr. Davis's dis- 
pleasure by protesting against an illegal act of his by 
which I was greatly wronged. J Still he retained me in 
important positions, although his official letters were' harsh. In 1864, how- 
ever, he degraded me to the utmost of his power by summarily removing 
me from a high command. Believing that hb was prompted to this act by 
animosity, and not by dispassionate opinion, I undertake to prove this ani- 
mosity by many extracts from his " Rise and Fall of the Confederacy " ( D. 
Appleton & Co. : 1881), and my comments thereon. 

Mr. Davis recites ("R. and F.," I., \x 307) the law securing to officers 
who might leave the United States Array to enter that of the Confederacy 
the same relative rank in the latter which they had in the former, provided 
their resignations had been offered in the six months next following the 
14th of March, and then adds : 

" The provisions hereof are in the view entertained that the army was of the States, not of 
the Government, and was to secure to officers adhering to the Confederate States the same 
relative rank which they had before those States had withdrawn from the Union. . . . 

" How well the Government of the Confederacy observed both the letter and spirit of the 
law will be seen by reference to its action in the matter of appointments." 

Those of the five generals were the most prominent, of course. All had 
resigned within the time prescribed. Their relative rank in the United States 

I The letter of protest covered nine sheets of 
letter-paper, and the ninth sheet (to quote from 
the original) sums up the matter in these words : 

" My commission is made to bear such a date that my 
once interiors in the service of the United States and of 
the Confederate States shall be But it must 
not be dated as of the 21st of July nor be suggestive of 
the victory of Manassas. I return to my tirst position. 
I repeat that my right to my rank as General is estab- 
lished by the Acts of Congress of the 14th of March, 1861, 
and the 16th of May. 1861, and not by the nomination and 
confirmation of the 31st of August, 1861. To deprive me of 
that rank it was necessaiy for Congress to repeal those 
laws. That could be done by express legislative act alone. 
It was not done, it could not be done, by a mere vote in 
secret session upon a list of nominations. If the action 
against which I have protested be legal, it is not for me 
to question the expediency of degrading one who has 
served laboriously from the commencement of the war 

on this frontier, and borne, a prominent part in the 
only great event of that war for the benefit of persons 
neither of whom has yet struck a blow for this Con- 
federacy. These views and the freedom with which 
they are presented may be unusual. So likewise is the 
occasion which calls them forth. I have the honor to 
be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"J. E. Johnston, General. 
" To His Excellency, Jefferson Davis, President of the 
Confederate States, Richmond." 

This ninth sheet is all of the original letter that 
can be found by the present owner, Mrs. Bledsoe, 
widow of Dr. Albert T. Bledsoe, who, at the time 
the letter was written, was Assistant-Secretary of 
War. Dr. Bledsoe told his wife that President 
Davis handed the letter to him, with the remark 
that it would not go upon the official files, and 
that he might keep it if he liked. Editors. 




Army just before secession had been : 1st, J. E. .Johnston, Brigadier-General ; 
2d, Samuel Cooper, Colonel ; 3d, A. S. Johnston, Colonel ; 4th, E. E. Lee, Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel ; and 5th, G. T. Beauregard, Major. All of them but the third 
had had previous appointments, when, on the 31st of August, the Confederate 
Government announced new ones : Cooper's being dated May 16th, A. S. 

Johnston's May 28th, Lee's 
June 14th, J. E. Johnston's 
July 4th, and Beauregard's 
July 21st. So the law was 
violated, 1st, by disregard- 
ing existing commissions ; 2d, 
by giving different instead of 
the same dates to commis- 
sions; and 3d, by not recogniz- 
in g previous rank in the United 
States Army. The only effect 
of this triple violation of law 
was to reduce J. E. Johnston 
from the first to the fourth 
place, which, of course, must 
have been its object. Mr. 
Davis continues : 

"It is a noteworthy fact that the 
three highest officers in rank . . . 
were all so indifferent to any ques- 
tion of personal interest that they 
had received their appointment be- 
fore they were aware it was to be 
conferred" (p. 307). 

This implies that the con- 
duct described was unusual. 
On the contrary, it was that 
of the body of officers who left 
the United States Army to en- 
ter that of the Confederacy. 
It is strange that the author 
should disparage so many honorable men. He states ("R. and F.," I., 309) 
that General Lee, when ordered from Richmond to the South for the first 
time, asked what rank he held in the army : " So wholly had his heart and 
his mind been consecrated to the public service that he had not remembered, 
if he ever knew, of his advancement." 

As each grade has its duties, an officer cannot know his duty if ignorant of 
his rank. Therefore General Lee always knew his rank, for he never failed 
in his duty. Besides, his official correspondence at the time referred to shows 
that he knew that he was major-general of the Virginia forces until May 
25th, 1861, and a Confederate general after that date. 






Describing the events which immediately preceded the battle of Manassas, 
Mr. Davis says (" Rise and Fall," L, 340) : 

'The forces there assembled [in Virginia] were divided into three armies, at positions the 
most important and threatened : one, under General J. E. Johnston, at Harper's Ferry, cover- 
ing the valley of the Shenandoah. . . . Harper's Ferry was an important position both for 
military and political considerations. . . . The demonstrations of General Patterson, com- 
manding- the Federal army in that region, caused General Johnston earnestly to insist on 
being allowed to retire to a position nearer to Winchester." 

Harper's Ferry is 22 miles east of the route into the Shenandoah Valley, 
and could be held only by an army strong enough to drive an enemy from 
the heights north and east of it. So it is anything but an important 
position. These objections were expressed to the Government two days after 
my arrival, and I suggested the being permitted to move the troops as might 
be necessary. All this before Patterson had advanced from Chambersburg. 

On page 341, " R. and F.," Mr. Davis quotes from an official letter to me 
from General Cooper, dated June 13th, 1861, which began thus : 

" The opinions expressed by Major Whiting in his letter to you, and on which you have 
indorsed your concurrence, have been duly considered. You had been heretofore instructed 
to exercise your discretion as to retiring from your position at Harper's Ferry." 5> 

This latter statement is incorrect. No such instructions had been given. 
The last instructions on the subject received by me were in General Lee's 
letter of June 7th. | On page 341 Mr. Davis says : 

" The temporary occupation [of Harper's Ferry] was especially needful for the removal of 
the valuable machinery and material in the armory located there." 

The removal of the machinery was not an object referred to in General 
Cooper's letter. But the presence of our army anywhere in the Valley within 
a day's march of the position, would have protected that removal. That 
letter (page 341) was received two days after the army left Harper's Ferry 
to meet General McClellan's troops, believed by intelligent people of Win- 
chester to be approaching from the west. 

On page 345 Mr. Davis says it was a difficult problem to know which army, 
whether Beauregard's at Manassas or Johnston's in the Valley, should be 
reenforced by the other, because these generals were " each asking reinforce- 
ments from the other." All that was written by me on the subject is in the 
letter (page 345) dated July 9th : 

"I have not asked for reenforcements because I supposed that the War Department, 
informed of the state of affairs everywhere, could best judge where the troops at its disposal 

^ This letter of Major Whiting to General John- per's Ferry giving him permission to use his dis- 

ston, and General Johnston's letter (probably re- cretion which is to he found in the Official Records, 

ferred to as the indorsement), are both dated May is the one of June 7th from General Lee, in which 

28th, 1861. The phrase of General Cooper, "You he says : "It is hoped that you will be able to be 

had been heretofore instructed," should have read timely informed of the approach of troops against 

either, "You had been theretofore [before May you, and retire, provided they cannot be success- 

28th] instructed," or, " You have been heretofore fully opposed. You must exercise your discretion 

[before June 13th] instructed." The latter is and judgment in this respect." Editors. 
probably what was meant, as the only letter of 

instructions to General Johnston received at Har- j" Official Records," II., 910. 


are most required. . . . If it is proposed to strengthen us against the attack I suggest as 
soon to be made, it seems to me that General Beauregard might with great expedition furnish 
5000 or 6000 men for a few days." 

Mr. Davis says, after quoting from this letter : 

" As soon as I became satisfied that Manassas was the objective point of the enemy's move- 
ment. I wrote to General Johnston urging him to make preparations for a junction with 
General Beauregard/' 

There is abundant evidence that the Southern President never thought 
of transferring the troops in the " Valley " to Manassas until the proper time 
to do it came that is, when McDowell was known to be advancing. This 
fact is shown by the anxiety he expressed to increase the number of those 
troops. ^ And General Lee, writing [from South Carolina] to Mr. Davis, 
November 24th, 1861 (" Official Records," II., 515), says in regard to General 
Beauregard's suggestion that he be reenforced from my army : 

" You decided that the movements of the eueniy in and about Alexandria were not suf- 
ficiently demonstrative to warrant the withdrawing of any of the forces from the Shenandoah 
Valley. A few days afterward, however, I think three or four, the reports from General 
Beauregard showed so clearly the enemy's purpose, that you ordered General Johnston, with 
his effective force, to march at once to the support of General Beauregard," 

This letter is in reply to one from Mr. Davis, to the effect that statements 

had been widely published to show that General Beauregard's forces had 

been held inactive by his (Mr. Davis's) rejection of plans for vigorous offen- 

ive operations proposed to him by the general, and desiring to know of 

General Lee what those plans were, and why they were rejected. 

"On the 17th of July, 1861," says Mr. Davis ("R. and F." I., 316), "the 
following telegram was sent by the adjutant-general" to General Johnston, 
Winchester, Va. : 

" General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow, a junction of all 
your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and 
baggage to Culpeper Court House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In all the arrange- 
ments exercise your discretion. S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General." 

Mr. Davis asserts that I claim that discretion was given me by the words 
" all the arrangements." I claimed it from what he terms the only positive 
part of the order, viz., "If practicable, make the movement, sending your 
sick to Culpeper Court House." Mr. Davis adds: 

" The sending the sick to Culpeper Court House might have been after or before the effect- 
ive force had moved to the execution of the main and only positive part of the order." 

" Make the movement " would have been a positive order, but " if prac- 
ticable " deprived it of that character, and gave the officer receiving it a cer- 
tain discretion. But, as the movement desired was made promptly, it was 
surely idle to discuss, twenty years after, whether the officer could lawfully 
have done what he did not do. At the time the decision of such a question 
might have been necessary ; but, as Mr. Davis will give no more orders to 
generals, and as the officer concerned will execute no more, such a discussion 

I See "Official Records," II., 924, 935, 940, 973, 976-977. 


is idle now. The use of the wagons required in the march of the army would 
have been necessary to remove the sick to the railroad station at Strasburg, 
eighteen miles distant ; so this removal could not have been made after the 
march. There being seventeen hundred sick, this part of their transportation 
would have required more time than the transfer of the troops to Manas- 
sas, which was the important thing. The sick were, therefore, properly and 
quickly provided for in Winchester. I was the only judge of the " practicable " ; 
and " if practicable" refers to the whole sentence as much to sending the sick 
to Culpeper as to " make the movement." Still he says ("R. and F.," I., 347) : 

' ' His [my] letters of the 12th and 15th expressed his doubts about his power to retire from 
before the superior force of General Patterson. Therefore, the word ' practicable ' was in that 
connection the equivalent of ' possible.' " 

It is immaterial whether " if practicable " or " if possible " was written. I 
was the only judge of the possibility or practicability ; and, if General Pat- 
terson had not changed his position after the telegram was received, I might 
have thought it necessary to attack him, to " make the movement practicable." 
But as to my power to retire. On the 15th General Patterson's forces were 
half a day's inarch from us, and on the 12th more than a day's march ; and, 
as Stuart's cavalry did not permit the enemy to observe us, retreat would 
have been easy, and I could not possibly have written to the contrary. \ 

As to Mr. Davis's telegram ("R. and F.," I., 348) ft, and the anxiety in 
Mr. Davis's mind lest there should be some unfortunate misunderstanding 
between General Beauregard and me, my inquiry was intended and calcu- 
lated to establish beyond dispute our relative positions. As a Confederate 
brigadier-general I had been junior to General Beauregard, but had been 
created general by act of Congress. But, as this had not been published to 
the army, it was not certain that it was known at Manassas. If it was not, 
the President's telegram gave the information, and prevented what he seems 
to have apprehended. 


On page 349, to the end of the chapter, the President describes his visit to 
the field of battle near Manassas. "As we advanced," he says, " the storm of 
battle was rolling westward." But, in fact, the fighting had ceased before he 
left Manassas. He then mentions meeting me on a hill which commanded a 
general view of the field, and proceeding farther west, where he saw a Federal 
" column," which a Confederate squadron charged and put to flight. But the 

\ Mr. Davis has a few words of praise for Gen- "Richmond, July 20, 1861. General J. E. John- 

eral Johnston, which, in this connection, will be ston, Manassas Junction, Virginia : You are a gen- 

of interest to the reader: "It gives me pleasure era] in the Confederate Army, possessed of the 

to state that, from all the accounts received at the power attaching to that rank. You will know how 

time, the plans of General Johnston for masking to make the exact knowledge of Brigadier-Gen- 

his withdrawal to form a junction with General eral Beauregard, as well of the ground as of the 

Beauregard were conducted witli marked skill " troops and preparation, avail for the success of 

("R. and P.," I., 347). Editors. the object in which you cooperate. The zeal of 

fe This telegram, sent in response to an inquiry both assures me of harmonious action. Jefferson 

from General Johnston, read as follows : Davis." 


captain in command of this squadron % says in his report that the column seen 
was a party of our troops. Mr. Davis also dilates on the suffering of our 
troops for want' of supplies and camp equipage, and on his efforts to have 
them provided for. After the battle ended, officers were duly directed by me 
to have food brought to the ground where the troops were to pass the night. 

I was not in the conference described by Mr. Davis ("R. and F.," I., 353, 
354, 355). Having left the field after 10 o'clock, and ridden in the dark slowly, 
it was about half-past 1 1 when I found the President and General Beauregard 
together, in the latter's quarters at Manassas. We three conversed an hour 
or more without referring to pursuit or an advance upon Washington. The 
" conference " described by him must have occurred before my arrival, and 
Mr. Davis may very well have forgotten that I was not present then. 

But, when the President wrote, he had forgotten the subject of the confer- 
ence he described ; for the result, as he states it, was an order, not for pursuit 
by the army, but for the detail of two parties to collect wounded men and 
abandoned property near the field of battle. This order (pages 355, 356) is 
"to the same effect," Mr. Davis says, as the one he wrote, and which he terms 
a direction to pursue the Federal army at early dawn. 

It is asserted (" R. and F.," I., 354) | that I left the command over both Con- 
federate armies in General Beauregard's hands during the engagement. Such 
conduct would have been as base as flight from the field in the heat of battle, 
and would have brought upon me the contempt of every honorable soldier. It 
is disproved by the fact that General Beauregard was willing to serve under me 
there, and again in North Carolina, near the close of the war ; and that he 
associated with me. As this accusation is published by the Southern Pres- 
ident, and indorsed by General Beauregard, it requires my contradiction. 

Instead of leaving the command in General Beauregard's hands, I assumed 
it over both armies immediately after my arrival on the 20th, showing General 
Beauregard as my warrant the President's telegram defining my position. 
The usual order ^ assuming command was written and sent to General 
Beauregard's office for distribution. He was then told that as General 
Patterson would no doubt hasten to join General McDowell as soon as he 
discovered my movement, we must attack the Federal army next morning. 
General Beauregard then" pointed out on a map of the neighborhood the roads 
leading to the enemy's camp at Centreville from the different parts of our 
line south of the stream, and the positions of the brigades near each road ; 
and a simple order of march, by which our troops would unite near the 
Federal position, was sketched. Having had neither sleep nor recumbent 
rest since the morning of the 17th, I begged General Beauregard to put this 
order of march on paper, and have the necessary copies made and sent to me 
for inspection in a grove, near, where I expected to be resting this in time 

& Captain John F. Lay. See " Official Records," events, says: "During the 20th, General Johnston 

II., 573. Editors. arrived at Manassas Junction by the railroad, and 

4. Not by Mr. Davis, but in a letter from Gen- that day we received the order from him assuming 

eral Thomas Jordan, quoted by Mr. Davis for an- command of the combined armies of General 

other purpose. Editors. Beauregard and himself." J. E. J. 

I General J. A. Early, in his narrative of these 


for distribution before night. This distribution was to be by him, the imme- 
diate commander of most of the troops. Seeing that 8 brigades were on the 
right of the line to Centreville, and but 1 to the left of it at a distance of 4 
miles, I desired General Beauregard to have Bee's and Jackson's brigades 
placed in this interval near the detached brigade. 

The papers were brought to me a little before sunrise next morning. They 
differed greatly from the order sketched the day before ; but as they would 
have put the troops in motion if distributed, it would have been easy then 
to direct the course of each division. By the order sketched the day before, 
all our forces would have been concentrated near Centreville, to attack the 
Federal army. By that prepared by General Beauregard but 4 brigades 
were directed " to the attack of Centreville," of which one and a half had not 
yet arrived from the Valley, while 6 brigades were to move forward to the 
Union Mills and Centreville road, there to hold themselves in readiness to 
support the attack on Centreville, or to move, 2 to Sangster's cross-roads, 2 
to Fairfax Station, and 2 to Fairfax Court House. The two and a half bri- 
gades on the ground, even supported by the half brigade of the reserve also 
on the ground, in all probability would have been defeated by the whole 
Federal army before the three bodies of 2 brigades each could have come to 
their aid, over distances of from 3 to 5 miles. Then, if the enemy had provi- 
dentially been defeated by one-sixth or one-eighth of their number, Sangster's 
cross-roads and Fairfax Station would have been out of their line of retreat. 

Soon after sunrise on the 21st, it was reported that a large body of Federal 
troops was approaching on the Warrenton Turnpike. This offensive move- 
ment of the enemy would have frustrated our plait of the day before, if the 
orders for it had been delivered to the troops. It appears from the reports of 
the commanders of the six brigades on the right that but one of them, General 
Longstreet, received it. Learning that Bee's and Jackson's brigades were 
still on the right, I again desired General Beauregard to transfer them to the 
left, which he did, giving the same orders to Hampton's Legion, just arrived. 
These, with Cocke's brigade then near the turnpike, would necessarily receive 
the threatened attack. 

General Beauregard then suggested that all our troops on the right should 
move rapidly to the left and assail the attacking Federal troops in flank. 
This suggestion was accepted ; and together we joined those troops. Three 
of the four brigades of the first line, at Mitchell's, Blackburn's, and McLean's 
fords, reported strong bodies of United States troops on the wooded heights 
before them. This frustrated the second plan. Two Federal batteries one 
in front of Bonham's brigade at Mitchell's Ford, the other before Longstreet's 
at Blackburn's Ford were annoying us, although their firing was slow. 

About 8 o'clock, after receiving such information as scouts could give, I 
left General Beauregard near Longstreet's position, and placed myself on 
Lookout Hill, in rear of Mitchell's Ford, to await the development of the 
enemy's designs. About 9 o'clock the signal officer, Captain Alexander, 
reported that a column of Federal troops could be seen crossing the valley of 
Bull Run, two miles beyond our left. 


General McDowell had been instructed by his general-in-chief to pass the 
Confederate right and seize the railroad in our rear. But, learning that the 
district to be passed through was rugged and covered with woods, and there- 
fore unfavorable to a large army, he determined, after devoting three days to 
reconnoissance, to operate on the open and favorable ground to his right, 
and turn our left. He had another object in this second plan, and an impor- 
tant one that this course would place his between the two Confederate armies, 
and prevent their junction ; and if it had been made a day or two sooner, 
this manoeuvre would have accomplished that object. 

General McDowell marched from Centreville by the Warrenton Turnpike 
with three divisions, sending a fourth division to deceive us by demonstra- 
tions in front of our main body. Leaving the turnpike a half mile from the 
Stone Bridge, he made a long detour to Sudley Ford, where he crossed Bull 
Run and turned toward Manassas. Colonel Evans, who commanded fourteen 
companies near the Stone Bridge, discovered this manoeuvre, and moved with 
his little force along the base of the hill north of the turnpike, to place it 
before the enemy near the Sudley and Manassas road. Here he was assailed 
by greatly superior numbers, which he resisted obstinately. 

General Beauregard had joined me on Lookout Hill, and we could distinctly 
hear the sounds and see the smoke of the fight. But they indicated no hostile 
force that Evans's troops and those of Bee, Hampton, and Jackson, which we 
could see hurrying toward the conflict in that order, were not adequate to resist. 

On reaching the broad, level top of the hill south of the turnpike, Bee, 
appreciating the strength of the position, formed his troops (half of his own 
and half of Bartow's brigade ) on that ground. But seeing Evans struggling 
against great odds, he crossed the valley and formed on the right and a little 
in advance of him. Here the 5 or 6 regiments, with 6 field-pieces, held their 
ground for an hour against 10,000 or 12,000 United States troops,\ when, find- 
ing they were overlapped on each flank by the continually arriving enemy, 
General Bee fell back to the position from which he had moved to rescue 
Evans crossing the valley, closely pressed by the Federal army. 

Hampton with his Legion reached the valley as the retrograde movement 
began. Forming it promptly, he joined in the action, and contributed greatly 
to the orderly character of the retreat by his courage and admirable soldier- 
ship, seconded by the excellent conduct of the gentlemen composing his 
command. Imboden and his battery did excellent service on this trying 
occasion. Bee met Jackson at the head of his brigade, on the position he had 
first taken, and he began to re-form and Jackson to deploy at the same time. 

In the mean time I had been waiting with General Beauregard on Lookout 
Hill for evidence of General McDowell's design. The violence of the firing on 
the left indicated a battle, but the large bodies of troops reported by chosen 
scouts to be facing our right kept me in doubt. But near 11 o'clock reports 
that those troops were felling trees showed that they were standing on the 

\ General Fry (page 185) states that these troops Reckoning by the estimate of strength given by 
were Andrew Porter's and Burnside's brigades, General Fry on page 1 94 these would have made 
and one regiment of Heintzelman's division, a total of about G500 men. Editors. 


defensive ; and new clouds of dust on the left proved that a large body of 
Federal troops was arriving on the field. It thus appeared that the enemy's 
great effort was to be against our left. I expressed this to General Beaure- 
gard, and the necessity of reenforcing the brigades engaged, and desired him 
to send immediate orders to Early and Holmes, of the second line, to hasten 
to the conflict with their brigades. General Bonham, who was near me, was 
desired to send up two regiments and a battery. I then set off at a rapid 
gallop to the scene of action. General Beauregard joined me without a word. 
Passing on the way Colonel Pendleton with two batteries, I directed him to 
follow with them as fast as possible. 

It now seemed that a battle was to be fought entirely different in place 
and circumstance from the two plans previously adopted and abandoned as 
impracticable. Instead of taking the initiative and operating in front of 
our line, we were compelled to fight on the defensive more than a mile in 
rear of that line, and at right angles to it, on a field selected by Bee, 
with no other plans than those suggested by the changing events of battle. 

While we were riding forward General Beauregard suggested to me to 
assign him to the immediate command of the troops engaged, so that my 
supervision of the whole field might not be interrupted, to which I assented. 
So he commanded those troops under me ; as elsewhere, lieutenant-generals 
commanded corps, and major-generals divisions, under me. 

When we were near the ground where Bee was re-forming and Jackson 
deploying his brigade, I saw a regiment in line with ordered arms and facing 
to the front, but 200 or 300 yards in rear of its proper place. On inquiry 
I learned that it had lost all its field-officers ; so, riding on its left flank, I 
easily marched it to its place. It was the 4th Alabama, an excellent regiment; 
and I mention this because the circumstance has been greatly exaggerated. 

After the troops were in good battle order I turned to the supervision of 
the whole field. The enemy's great numerical superiority was discouraging. 
Yet, from strong faith in Beauregard's capacity and courage, and the high 
soldierly qualities of -Bee and Jackson, I hoped that the fight would be main- 
tained until I could bring adequate reinforcements to their aid. For this 
Holmes and Early were urged to hasten their march, and Ewell was ordered to 
follow them with his brigade with all speed. Broken troops were reorganized 
and led back into the fight with the help of my own and part of General 
Beauregard's staff. Cocke's brigade was held in rear of the right to observe a 
large body of Federal troops in a position from which Bee's right flank could 
have been struck in a few minutes. 

After these additions had been made to our troops then engaged, we had 
9 regiments of infantry, 5 batteries, and 300 cavalry of the Army of the 
Shenandoah, and about 2 regiments and a half of infantry, 6 companies of 
cavalry, and 6 field-pieces of the Army of the Potomac, holding at bay 3 
divisions of the enemy. The Southern soldiers had, however, two great advan- 
tages in the contest : greater skill in the use of fire-arms, and the standing 
on the defensive, by which they escaped such disorder as advancing under 
fire produced in the ranks of their adversaries, undisciplined like themselves. 


A report received about 2 o'clock from General Beauregard's office that 
another United States army was approaching from the north-west, and but a 
few miles from us, caused me to send orders to Bonham, Longstreet, and 
Jones to hold their brigades south of Bull Run, and ready to move. 

When Bonham's two regiments appeared soon after, Cocke's brigade was 
ordered into action on our right, Fisher's North Carolina regiment coming 
up, Bonham's two regiments were directed against the Federal right, and 
Fisher's was afterward sent in the same direction ; for the enemy's strong- 
est efforts seemed to be directed against our left, as if to separate us from 
Manassas Junction. 

About 3:30 o'clock, General E. K. Smith arrived with three regiments of 
Elzey's brigade, coming from Manassas Junction. He was instructed, through 
a staff-officer sent forward to meet him, to form on the left of our line, his left 
thrown forward, and to attack the enemy in flank. At his request I joined 
him, directed his course, and gave him these instructions. Before the forma- 
tion was completed, he fell severely wounded, and while falling from his 
horse directed Colonel Elzey to take command. That officer appreciated 
the manoeuvre and executed it gallantly and well. General Beauregard 
promptly seized the opportunity it afforded, and threw forward the whole 
line. The enemy was driven from the long-contested hill, and the tide of 
battle at length turned. But the first Federal line driven into the valley was 
there rallied on a second, the two united presenting a formidable aspect. In the 
mean time, however, Colonel Early had come upon the field with his brigade. 
He was instructed by me to make a detour to the left and assail the Federal 
right in flank. He reached the ground in time, accompanied by Stuart's cav- 
alry and Beckham's battery, and made his attack with a skill and courage 
which routed the Federal right in a moment. General Beauregard, charging 
in front, made the rout complete. The Federal right fled in confusion toward 
the Sudley Ford, and the center and left marched off rapidly by the turnpike. 

Stuart pursued the fugitives on the Sudley road, and Colonel Radford, with 
two squadrons which I had held in reserve near me during the day, was 
directed to cross Bull Run at Ball's Ford, and strike the column on the turn- 
pike in flank. The number of prisoners taken by these parties of cavalry 
greatly exceeded their own numbers. But they were too weak to make a 
serious impression on an army, although a defeated one. 

At twenty minutes before 5, when the retreat of the enemy toward Centre- 
ville began, I sent orders to Brigadier-General Bonham by Lieutenant-Col- 
onel Lay, of his staff, who happened to be with me, to march with his own 
and Longstreet's brigade (which were nearest Bull Run and the Stone Bridge), 
by the quickest route to the turnpike, and form them across it to intercept 
the retreat of the Federal troops. But he found so little appearance of rout 
in those troops as to make the execution of his instructions seem impractica- 
ble ; so the two brigades returned to their camps. When the retreat began, 
the body of United States troops that had passed the day on the Centreville 
side of Bull Run made a demonstration on the rear of our right ; which was 
repelled by Holmes's brigade just arrived. 


Soon after the firing ceased, General Ewell reported to me, saying- that his 
brigade was about midway from its camp near Union Mills. He had ridden 
forward to see the part of the held on which he might be required to serve, to 
prepare himself to act intelligently. 

The victory was as complete as one gained in an open country by infantry 
and artillery can be. Our cavalry pursued as far as they could effectively ; 
but when they encountered the main column, after dispersing or capturing 
little parties and stragglers, they could make no impression. 

General Beauregard's first plan of attack was delivered to me by his aide- 
de-camp, Colonel Chisolm, when I was thirty-four miles from Manassas. It 
was, that I should leave the railroad at Piedmont station, thirty-six miles 
from the enemy at Centreville, and attack him in rear, and when our artillery 
announced that we had begun the fight, General Beauregard would move up 
from Bull Run and assail the enemy on that side. I rejected the plan, because 
such a one would enable an officer of ordinary sense and vigor to defeat our 
two armies one after the other. For McDowell, by his numerical superiority, 
could have disposed of my forces in less than two hours; that is to say, before 
Beauregard could have come up, when he also could have been defeated and 
the campaign ended. 

An opinion seems to prevail with spme persons who have written about the 
battle, that important plans of General Beauregard were executed by him. It 
is a mistake; the first intention, announced to General Beauregard by me 
when we met, was to attack the enemy at Centreville as early as possible on 
the 21st. This was anticipated by McDowell's early advance. The second, 
to attack the Federals in flank near the turnpike with our main force, sug- 
gested by General Beauregard, was prevented by the enemy's occupation of 
the high ground in front of our right. 

As fought, the battle was made by me ; Bee's and Jackson's brigades were 
transferred to the left by me. I decided that the battle was to be there, and 
directed the measures necessary to maintain it ; a most important one being 
the assignment of General Beauregard to the immediate command of this 
left, which he held. In like manner the senior officer on the right would have 
commanded there, if the Federal left had attacked. 

These facts in relation to the battle are my defense against the accusation 
indorsed by General Beauregard and published by Mr. Davis. 

In an account of the battle published in " The Century" for November, 1884, 
General Beauregard mentions offensive operations which he " had designed 
and ordered against his [adversary's] left flank and rear at Centreville," and 
censures my friend General R. S. Ewell for their failure. At the time referred 
to, three of the four Federal divisions were near Bull Run, above the turn- 
pike, and the fourth facing our right, so that troops of ours, going to Centre- 
ville then, if not prevented by the Federal division facing them, would have 
found no enemy. And General Ewell was not, as he reports, " instructed in 
the plan of attack " ; for he says in his official report : ". . . I first received 
orders to hold myself in readiness to advance at a moment's notice. I next 
received a copy of an order sent to General Jones and furnished me by him, 




in which it was stated I had been ordered at once to proceed to his support." 
Three other orders, he says, followed, each contradictory of its predecessor. 
General Ewell knew that a battle was raging ; but knew, too, that between 
him and it were other unengaged brigades, and that his commander was near 
enough to give him orders. But he had no reason to suppose that his com- 
mander desired him to move to Centreville, where there was then no enemy. 
There could have been no greater mistake on General Ewell's part than mak- 
ing the movement to Centreville. 

A brief passage in my official report of this battle displeased President 
Davis. In referring to his telegraphic order I gave its meaning very briefly, 
but accurately "directing me, if practicable, to go to [General Beauregard's] 
assistance, after sending my sick to Culpeper Court House." Mr. Davis 
objected to the word after. Being informed of this by a friend, I cheerfully 
consented to his expunging the word, because that would not affect the 
meaning of the sentence. But the word is still in his harsh indorsement. He 
also had this passage stricken out : " The delay of sending the sick, nearly 


seventeen hundred in number, to Culpeper, would have made it impossible to 
arrive at Manassas in time. They were therefore provided for in Winches- 
ter " ; and substituted this : " Our sick, nearly seventeen hundred in number, 
were provided for in Winchester." Being ordered to send the sick to Cul- 
peper as well as to move to Manassas, it was necessary to account for 
disobedience, which my words did, and which his substitute for them did 

Mr. Davis ("R. and F.," I., 359) expresses indignation that, as he says, 
" among the articles abandoned by the enemy . . . were handcuffs, the 
fit appendage of a policeman, but not of a soldier." I saw none, nor did I 
see any one who had seen them. 

Mr. Davis says (page 359) : " On the night of the 22d, I held a second con- 
ference with Grenerals Johnston and Beauregard." I was in no conference 
like that of which account is given on page 360. And one that he had with 
me on that day proved conclusively that he had no thought of sending our 
army against Washington; for in it he offered me the command in West 
Virginia, promising to increase the forces there adequately from those 
around us. He says (page 361) : 

' What discoveries would have been made, and what results would have ensued from the 
establishment of our guns upon the south bank of the river to open Are upon the capital, are 
speculative questions upon which it would be useless to enter." 

Mr. Davis seems to have forgotten what was as well known then as now 
that our army was more disorganized by victory than that of the United 
States by defeat ; that there were strong fortifications, well manned, to cover 
the approaches to Washington and prevent the establishment of our guns on 
the south bank of the river. He knew, too, that we had no means of can- 
nonading the capital, nor a disposition to make barbarous war. He says 
(" R. and F.," I., 362) : 

" When the smoke of battle had lifted from the field . . . some . . . censoriously asked 
why the fruits of the victory had not been gathered by the capture of Washington City. Then 
some indiscreet friends of the generals commanding in that battle . . . induced the allega- 
tion that the President had prevented the generals from making an immediate and vigorous 
pursuit of the routed enemy." 

Mr. Davis has no ground for this assertion ; the generals were attacked 
first and most severely. It was not until the newspapers had exhausted 
themselves upon us that some of them turned upon him. On November 3d 
he wrote to me that reports were circulated to the effect that he 

" prevented General Beauregard from pursuing the enemy after the battle of Manassas, and 
had subsequently restrained him from advancing upon Washington City. . . . . I call upon 
you, as the commanding general, and as a party to all the conferences held by me on the 21st 
and 22d of July, to say whether I obstructed the pursuit of the enemy after the victory at 
Manassas, or have ever objected to an advance or other active operation which it was feasible 
for the army to undertake." (" R. and F.," L, 363.) 

I replied on the 10th, answering the first question in the negative, and added 
an explanation which put the responsibility on myself. I replied to the second 
question, that it had never been feasible for the army to advance fp 1 ^ 


toward Washington than it had done, and referred to a conference at Fairfax 
Court House [October 1st, 1861] in reference to leading the army into 
Maryland, in which he informed the three senior officers that he had not 
the means of giving the army the strength which they considered necessary 
for offensive operations. 

Mr. Davis was displeased by my second reply, because in his mind there 
was but one question in his letter. I maintain that there are two ; namely, 

(1) Did he obstruct the pursuit of the enemy after the victory at Manassas ? 

(2) Had he ever objected to an advance or other active operation which it 
was feasible for the army to undertake f 

The second matter is utterly unconnected with the battle of Manassas, and 
as the question of advance or other active operation had been discussed 
nowhere by him, to my knowledge, but at the conference at Fairfax Court 
House, I supposed that he referred to it. He was dissatisfied with my silence 
in regard to the conferences which he avers took place on July 21st and 22d, 
the first knowledge of which I have derived from his book. 


Mr. Davis refers (" Rise and Fall," I., 444-5) to the instructions for the 
reorganization of the army given by him to the three general officers whom 
he met in conference at Fairfax Court House on October 1st, 1861. But the 
correspondence urging the carrying out of the orders was carried on with 
Generals Beauregard and G. W. Smith (my subordinates) in that same 
October. He neither conversed nor corresponded with me on the subject 
then, the letter to me being dated May 10th, 1862. The original order was 
dated October 22d, 1861, to be executed " as soon as, in the judgment of the 
commanding general, it can be safely done under present exigencies." As 
the enemy was then nearer to our center than that center to either flank of 
our army, and another advance upon us by the Federal army was not 
improbable 011 any day, it seemed to me unsafe to make the reorganization 
then. From May 10th to 26th, when the President renewed the subject, we 
were in the immediate presence of the enemy, when reorganization would 
have been infinitely dangerous, as was duly represented by me. But, allud- 
ing to this conference at Fairfax Court House, he says (p. 449) : " When, 
at that time and place, I met General Johnston for conference, he called 
in the two generals next in rank to himself, Beauregard and G. W. Smith." 
These officers were with Mr. Davis in the quarters of General Beauregard, 
whose guest he was, when I was summoned to him. I had not power to 
bring any officer into the conference. If such authority had belonged to my 
office, the personal relations lately established between us by the President 
would not have permitted me to use it. 

He says (pp. 448-9) : " I will now proceed to notice the allegation that I was 
responsible for inaction of the Army of the Potomac in the latter part of 1861 
and in the early part of 1862." I think Mr. Davis is here fighting a shadow. 
I have never seen or heard of the "allegation" referred to; I believe that 


that conference attracted no public attention, and brought criticism upon no 
one. I have seen no notice of it in print, except the merely historical one in 
a publication made by me in 1874, -ft without criticism or comment. 

In the same paragraph Mr. Davis expresses surprise at the weakness of 
the army. He has forgotten that in Richmond he was well informed of the 
strength of the army by periodical reports, which showed him the prevalence 
of epidemics which, in August and part of September, kept almost thirty per 
cent, of our number sick, He must have forgotten, too, his anxiety on this 
subject, which induced him to send a very able physician, Dr. Cartwright, to 
find some remedy or preventive. 

He asserts also that " the generals " had made previous suggestions of a 
"purpose to advance into Maryland." There had been no such purpose. On 
the contrary, in my letter to the Secretary of War, suggesting the conference, 
I wrote : 

" Thus far the numbers aud condition of this army have at no time justified our assuming- 
the offensive. . . . The difficulty of obtaining the means of establishing a battery near Evans- 
port ^ . . . has given me the impression that you cannot at present put this army in condition 
to assume the offensive. If I am mistaken in this, and you can furnish those means, I think it 
important that either his Excellency the President, yourself, or some one representing you, 
should here, upon the ground, confer with me on this all-important question." 

Ill a letter dated September, 1861, the Secretary wrote that the Presi- 
dent would reach my camp in a day or two for conference. He came for that 
object September 30th, and the next evening, by his appointment, he was waited 
on by Generals Beauregard, Gustavus W. Smith, and myself. In discussing 
the question of giving our army strength enough to assume the offensive in 
Maryland, it was proposed to bring to it from the South troops enough to 
raise it to the required strength. The President asked what was that strength. 
General Smith thought 50,000 men, General Beauregard 60,000, and I 60,000, 
all of us specifying soldiers like those around us. The President replied that 
such reinforcements could not be furnished; he could give only as many 
recruits as we could arm. This decided the question. Mr. Davis then pro- 
posed an expedition against Hooker's division, consisting, we believed, of 
10,000 men. It was posted on the Maryland shore of the Potomac, opposite 
Dumfries. [See map, p. 199.] But I objected that we had no means of 
ferrying an equal number of men across the river in a day, even if undis- 
turbed by ships of war, which controlled the river ; so that, even if we should 
succeed in landing, those vessels of war would inevitably destroy or capture 
our party returning. This terminated the conference. Mr. Davis says, in 
regard to the reinforcements asked for ("R. and F.," I., 449): "I had no 
power to make such an addition to that army without a total disregard of the 
safety of other threatened positions." We had no threatened positions ; and 
we could always discover promptly the fitting out of naval expeditions 
against us. And he adds (p. 451), with reference to my request for a con- 
ference in regard to reenforcements : 

ft See " Johnston's Narrative" (New York: D. Appleton & Co.), pp. 78, 79. 
I Evansport is on the Potomac below Alexandria, at the mouth of Quantico Creek. 



" Very little experience, or a fair amount of modesty without any experience, would, serve to 
prevent one from announcing 1 his conclusion that troops could be withdrawn from a place or 
places without knowing how many were there, and what was the necessity for their presence." 

The refutation of this is in General Gr. W. Smith's memorandum of the dis- 
cussion : " General Johnston said that he did not feel at liberty to express an 

opinion of the practica- 
bility of reducing the 
strength of our forces 
at points not within the 
limits of his command." 
On page 452 [referring to 
possible minor offensive 
operations. Editors ] 
Mr. Davis says he 

"particularly indicated the 
lower part of Maryland, where 
a small force was said to be 
ravaging the country." 

He suggested nothing 
so impossible. Troops of 
ours could not have been 
ferried across the broad 
Potomac then. We had 
no steamer on that river, 
nor could we have used 
one. Mr. Davis says (" E. 
and F.," I., 452) : * 

" . . . Previously, General 
Johnston's attention had been 
called to possibihties in the 
Valley of the Shenandoah, and 
that these and other like things 
were not done, was surely due 
to other causes than ' the policy 



Then he quotes from a letter to me, dated August 1st, 1861, as follows : 

"... The movement of Banks | will require your attention. It may be a ruse, but if a real 
movement, when your army has the requisite strength and mobility, you will probably find an 
opportunity, by a rapid movement through the passes, to strike him in rear or flank." 

It is matter of public notoriety that no incursion into the " Valley " worth 
the notice of a Confederate company was made until March, 1862. That the 

4 By orders dated July 19th, 1861, General N. P. Ferry, General Patterson being by the same orders 

Banks had been assigned to the command of the "honorably discharged from the service of the 

Department of the Shenandoah, relieving General United States," on the expiration of his term of 

Patterson in command of the army at Harper's duty. Editors. 


Confederate President should be ignorant of this is inconceivable. Mr. Davis 
says (p. 462) : 

" .... I received from General Johnston notice that his position [at Centre ville] was consid- 
ered nnsafe. Many of his letters to me have been lost, and I have thus far not been able to And 
the one giving the notice referred to, but the reply which is annexed clearly indicates the sub- 
stance of the letter which was answered : ' General J. E. Johnston : . . . Your opinion that 
your position may be turned whenever the enemy chooses to advance,' etc." 

The sentence omitted by him after my name in his letter from which he 
quotes as above contains the dates of three letters of mine, in neither of which 
is there allusion to the safety (or reverse) of the position. They are dated 
22d, 23d, and 25th of February, and contain complaints on my part of the 
dreadful condition of the country, and of the vast accumulation by the Gov- 
ernment of superfluous stores at Manassas. There is another omission in 
the President's letter quoted, and the omission is this : 

"... with your present force, you cannot secure your communications from the enemy, and 
may at any time, when he can pass to your rear, be compelled to retreat at the sacrifice of your 
siege train and army stores. . . . Threatened as we are by a large force on the south-east, you 
must see the hazard of your position, by its liability to isolation and attack in rear." 

By a singular freak of the President's memory, it transferred the substance 
of these passages from his letter to my three. 

Referring again to the conference at Fairfax Court House [October 1st], 
Mr. Davis says (p. 464) : 

" Soon thereafter, the army withdrew to Centreville, a better position for defense, but not for 
attack, and thereby suggestive of the abandonment of an intention to advance." 

The President forgets that in that conference the intention to advance was 
abandoned by him first. He says on the same page : 

" On the 10th of March I telegraphed to General Johnston : ' Further assurance given to me 
this day that you shall be promptly and adequately reenforced, so as to enable you to maintain 
your position, and resume first policy when the roads will permit.' The first policy was to 
cany the war beyond our own border." 

The roads then permitted the marching of armies, so we had just left 
Manassas. J) 

On the 20th of February, after a discussion in Richmond, his Cabinet being 
present, the President had directed me to prepare to fall back from Manassas, 
and do so as soon as the condition of the country should make the marching 
of troops practicable. I returned to Manassas February 21st, and on the 
22d ordered the proper officers to remove the public property, which was 
begun on the 23d, the superintendent of the railroad devoting himself to the 
work under the direction of its president, the Hon. John S. Barbour. The 
Government had collected three million and a quarter pounds of provisions 
there, I insisting on a supply of but a million and a half. It also had two 
million pounds in a meat-curing establishment near at hand, and herds of 

j) Between the 7th and 11th of March, 1862, the the Kappahannock. On the 11-1 2th Stonewall 
Confederate forces in north-eastern Virginia, under Jackson evacuated Winchester and fell back to 
General Johnston, were withdrawn to the line of Strasburg. Editors. 


live stock besides. On the 9th of March, when the ground had become firm 
enough for military operations, I ordered the army to march that night, 
thinking then, as I do now, that the space of fifteen days was time enough in 
which to subordinate an army to the Commissary Department. About one 
million pounds of this provision was abandoned, and half as much more was 
spoiled for want of shelter. This loss is represented (" E. and F.," I., 468) \ 
as so great as to embarrass us to the end of the war, although it was only 
a six days' supply for the troops then in Virginia. Ten times as much was in 
North Carolina railroad stations at the end of the war. Mr. Davis says (p. 467) : 

" It was regretted that earlier and more effective means were not employed for the mobiliza- 
tion of the army, ... or at least that the withdrawal was not so deliberate as to secure the 
removal of our ordnance, subsistence, and quartermaster's stores." 

The quartermaster's and ordnance stores were brought off ; and as to sub- 
sistence, the Government, which collected immediately on the frontier five 
times the quantity of provisions wanted, is responsible for the losses. The 
President suggested the time of the withdrawal himself, in the interview in his 
office that has been mentioned. The means taken was the only one available, 
the Virginia Midland Railroad. Mr. Davis says ("R. and F.," I., 465) : 

" To further inquiry from General Johnston as to where he should take position, I replied that 
I would go to his headquarters in the field, and found him on the south bank of the river, to 
which he had retired, in a position possessing great natural advantages." 

There was no correspondence in relation to selecting a defensive position. 
I was not seeking one ; but, instead, convenient camping-grounds, from 
which my troops could certainly unite with other Confederate forces to meet 
McClellan's invasion. I had found and was occupying such grounds, one 
division being north of Orange Court House, another a mile or two south of 
it, and two others some six miles east of that place ; a division on the south 
bank of the Rappahannock, and the cavalry beyond the river, and about 13,000 
troops in the vicinity of Fredericksburg. Mr. Davis's narrative [of a visit 
to Fredericksburg at this time, the middle of March. Editors] that follows 
is disposed of by the proof that, after the army left Manassas, the President 
did not visit it until about the 14th of May.& But such a visit, if made, could 
not have brought him to the conclusion that the weakness of Fredericksburg 
as a military position made it unnecessary to find a strong one for the army. 

Mr. Davis ("R. and F.," II., 81) credits me with expecting an attack 
which he shows General McClellan never had in his mind : 

" In a previous chapter, the retreat of our army from Centreville has been described, and ref- 
erence has been made to the anticipation of the commanding general, J. E. Johnston, that the 
enemy would soon advance to attack that position." 

This refers, I suppose, to a previous assertion (" R. and F.," I., 462), my 
comments upon which prove that this " anticipation " was expressed in the 

\Not by Mr. Davis, but iu a statement quoted & In "The Century" magazine for May, 1885, 

at the above page from General J. A. Early, who General Johnston, to support his assertion, quoted 

said, " The loss . . . was a very serious one to us, statements by Major J. B. Washington, Dr. A. M. 

and embarrassed us for the remainder of the war, Fauntleroy, and Colonel E. J. Harvie, which are 

as it put us at once on a running stock." Editors, now omitted for want of space. Editors. 
vol. 1. 17 


President's letter to me, dated February 28th, 1862. He says (" R. and F.," 

II., 83): 

" The withdrawal of our forces across the Rappahannock was fatal to the [Federal] programme 
of landing on that river and marching to Richmond before our forces could be in position to 
resist an attack on the capital." 

This withdrawal was expressly to enable the army to unite with other Con- 
federate troops to oppose the expected invasion. I supposed that General 
McClellan would inarch down the Potomac on the Maryland side, cross it 
near the mouth of Aquia Creek, and take the Fredericksburg route to Rich- 
mond. The position of Hooker, about midway between Washington and 
this crossing-place, might well have suggested that he had this intention. 

Postceipt. In the first paragraph of Greneral Beauregard's postcript, it is 
asserted that I did not claim to have commanded in the first battle of Manas- 
sas until May, 1885, and that my official report of that action contains no 
such claim. It is, nevertheless, distinctly expressed in that report thus : 

"In a brief and rapid conference, General Beauregard was assigned to the command of the 
left, which, as the younger officer, he claimed, while I returned to that of the whole field." 

And in " Johnston's Narrative," published in 1874, it is expressed in these 
words, on page 49 : 

" After assigning General Beauregard to the command of the troops immediately engaged, 
which he properly suggested belonged to the second in rank, not to the commander of the army, 
I returned to the supervision of the whole field." 

So much for my not having claimed to have commanded at the " first 
Manassas " until May, 1885. 

General Beauregard in his official report states the circumstance thus : 

" . . .1 urged General Johnston to leave the immediate conduct of the field to me, while 
he, repairing to Portici, the Lewis house, should urge reinforcements forward." 

This language would certainly limit his command as mine does. He did 
not attempt to command the army, while I did command it, and disposed 
of all the troops not engaged at the time of his assignment. 

In his official report of the battle, General Beauregard further states : 

" Made acquainted with my plan of operations and dispositions to meet the enemy, he gave 
them his entire approval, and generously directed their execution under my command." 

The only " plan " that he offered me [to move via Aldie] was rejected 
on the 14th, before my arrival. The battle fought was on McDowell's plan, 
not General Beauregard's. The proof of this is, that at its commencement 
little more than a regiment of Beauregard's command was on the ground 
where the battle was fought, and, of his 7 brigades, 1 was a mile and 6 were 
from 4 to 7 or 8 miles from it. The place of the battle was fixed by Bee's and 
Jackson's brigades, sent forward by my direction. At my request General 
Beauregard did write an order of march against the Federal army, finished a 
little before sunrise of the 21st. In it I am invariably termed commander-in- 
chief, and he (to command one of the wings) " second in command," or General 
Beauregard conclusive proof that the troops were not "under his command." 



Two letters, from General Lee and Mr. Walker, Secretary of "War, are cited 
as evidence that General Beauregard commanded. Those gentlemen were 
in a position to know if I relinquished the command or not. But I had 
this letter from General Lee : 

" Richmond, July 2J:th, 1861. My Dear General : I almost wept for joy at the glorious victory 
achieved by our brave troops. The feelings of my heart could hardly be repressed on learning 
the brilliant share you had in its achievement. I expected nothing else, and am truly grateful 
for your safety. . . ." 

In conclusion, I cannot discover that my unfavorable opinion of the Fed- 
eral general's tactics, quoted by General Beauregard, indicates a fear to 
command against him. 



In General Beauregard's article on Bull Run, in 
"The Century" for November [18S1], is this 
severe criticism of one of his subordinates, the 
late Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell : 

" Meanwhile, in rear of Mitchell's Ford, I bad been 
waiting with General Johnston for the sound of conflict 
to open in the quarter of Centrevillc, upon the Federal 
left flank and rear (making allowance, however, for the 
delays possible to commands unused to battle), when I 
was chagrined to hear from General D. R. Jones that, 
while he had been long ready for the movemeut upon 
Ceutreville, General Ewell had not come up to form on 
his right, though he had sent him between 7 and 8 o'clock 
a copy of his own order, which recited that Ewell had 
been already ordered to begiu the movement. I dis- 
patched an immediate order to Ewell to advance; but 
within a quarter of an hour, just as I received a dispatch 
from him informing me that he had received no order to 
advance in the morning, the firing on the left began to 
increase so intensely as to indicate a severe attack, 
whereupon General Johnston said that he would go 
personally to that quarter." 

This contains at least three errors, so serious 
that the/ should not be allowed to pass uncor- 
rected among the materials from which history 
will one day be constructed : 

1 . That Ewell failed to do what a good soldier 
would have done namely, to move forward im- 
mediately on hearing from D. R. Jones. 

2. That Beauregard was made aware of this sup- 
posed backwardness of Ewell by a message from 
D. R. Jones. 

3. That on receiving this message he at once 
ordered Ewell to advance. 

The subjoined correspondence, | now [March, 
1S85] first in print, took place four days after 
the battle. It shows that Ewell did exactly what 
Beauregard says he ought to have done namely, 
move forward promptly ; that his own staff-officer, 
sent to report this forward movement, carried also 
to headquarters the first intelligence of the failure 

^ This article appeared substantially as here printed iu 
'The Century " for March, 1885. Editors. 

4 [correspondence.] 

Union Mills, July 25th, 1861. 
General Beauregard. 

Sir: In a conversation with Major James, Louisiana 
6th Regiment, he has left the impression on my mind 
that you think some of your orders on the 21st were 
either not carried out or not received by ine. 

My first order on that day was to hold myself in readi- 
ness to attack this at sunrise. About 10, General Jones 
sent a copy of an order received by him in which it was 
stated that I had been ordered to cross and attack, and 
on receipt of this I moved on until receiving the fol- 
lowing: 10 & 1-2 A.M. 

On account of the difficulties of the ground in our front, it 
is thought advisable to fall back to our former position. 

(Addressed) General Ewell. (Signed) G. T. B. 

If any other order was sent to me, I should like to have 
a copy of it, as well as the name of the courier who 
brought it. 

Every movement I made was at once reported to you 
at the time, and this across Bull Run, as well as the 
advance in the afternoon, I thought were explained in 
my report sent in to-day. 

If an order were sent earlier than the copy through 
General Jones, the courier should be held responsible, 
as neither General Holmes nor myself received it. I 
send the original of the order to fall back in the morn- 
ing. The second advance iu the afternoon and recall to 
Stone Bridge were in consequence of verbal orders. 

My chief object in writing to you is to ask you to leave 
nothing doubtful in your report, both as regards my 
crossing in the morning and recall and not to let it be 
inferred by any possibility that I blundered on that day. 
I moved forward as soon as notified by General Jones 
that I was ordered and he had been. 



of orders to reach him ; that no such message was 
received from D. R. Jones as is here ascribed to 
him ; and that the order sent back by Beauregard 
to Ewell was not one to advance, but to retire from 
an advance already begun. 

It is not easy to understand these mistakes, as 
General Beauregard has twice given a tolerably ac- 
curate though meager account of the matter once 
in his official report, and once in his biography pub- 
lished by Colonel Roman in 1884. Neither of these 
accounts can be reconciled with the later attitude. 

Upon reading General Beauregard's article, I 
wrote to General Fitzhugh Lee, who was Ewell's 
assistant adjutant-general at Manassas, asking his 
recollection of what took place. I have liberty to 
make the following extracts Hm his reply. After 
stating what troops composed the brigade, he goes 
on : 

" These troops were all in position at daylight on the 
21st July, ready for any duty, and held the extreme 
right of General Beauregard's liue of battle along Bull 
Run, at Union Mills. As hour after hour passed, General 
Ewell grew impatient at not receiving any orders (be- 
yond those to be ready to advance, which came at sun- 
rise), and sent me between 9 and 10 A. m. to see General 
P. R. Jones, who commanded the brigade next on his 
left at McLean's Ford, to ascertain if that officer had any 
news or had received any orders from army headquar- 
ters. I found General Jones making preparations to 
cross Bull Run, and was told by him that, in the order he 
had received to do so, it was stated that General Ewell 
had been sent similar instructions. 

"Upon my report of these facts, General Ewell at 
once issued the orders for his command to cross the Run 
and move out on the road to Centreville." 

General Lee then describes the recall across Bull 
Run and the second advance of the brigade to make 
a demonstration toward Centreville, and adds that 
the skirmishers of Rodes's 5th Alabama Regi- 
ment, which was in advance, had actually become 
engaged, when we were again recalled and ordered 
to " move by the most direct route at once, and as 
rapidly as possible, for the Lewis house" the 
field of battle on the left. Ewell moved rapidly, 

If there was an order sent me to advance before the 
one I received through General Jones, it is more than 
likely it would have been given to the same express. 

R. S. Ewell, B. G. 

Manassas, Va., July 26th, 1861. 

General: Your letter of the 25th iust. is received. I 
do not attach the slightest blame to you for the failure 
of the movement on Centreville, but to the guide who 
did not deliver the order to move forward, sent at about 
8 A. M. to General Holmes and then to you correspond- 
ing in every respect to the one sent to Generals Jones, 
Bouham, and Longstreet only their movements were 
subordinate to yours. Unfortunately no copy, in the 
hurry of the moment, was kept of said orders ; and so 
many guides, about a dozen or more, were sent off in 
different directions, that it is next to impossible to find 
out who was the bearer of the orders referred to. Our 
guides and couriers were the worst set I ever employed, 
whether from ignorance or over-anxiety to do well and 
quickly I cannot say; but many regiments lost their 
way repeatedly on their way toward the field of battle, 
and of course I can attach no more blame to their com- 
manding officers than I could to you for not executing 
an order which I am convinced you did not get. 

I am fully aware that you did all that could have been 
expected of you or your command. I merely expressed 

sending General Lee and another officer ahead to 
report and secure orders. On his arrival near the 
field they brought instructions to halt, when he 
immediately rode forward with them to General 
Beauregard, "and General Ewell begged General 
Beauregard to be allowed to go in pursuit of the 
enemy, but his request was refused." 

As to the real causes of the miscarriage of Gen- 
eral Beauregard's plan of attack there need be 
little doubt. They are plainly stated by his imme- 
diate superior in command, General Joseph E. 
Johnston, in his official report, as being the " early 
movements of the enemy on that morning and the 
non-arrival of the expected troops " from Harper's 
Ferry. He adds: " General Beauregard afterward 
proposed a modification of the abandoned plan, 
to attack with our right, while the left stood 
on the defensive. This, too, became impractica- 
ble, and a battle ensued, different in place and 
circumstances from any previous plan on our side." 

There are some puzzling circumstances con- 
nected with the supposed miscarriage of the order 
for our advance. , The delay in sending it is unex- 
plained. General Beauregard says it was sent " at 
about 8 a. M.," but D. R. Jones had received his 
corresponding order at 10 minutes past 7, and firing 
had begun at half-past 5. 

The messenger was strangely chosen. It was 
the most important order of the day, for the move- 
ments of the army were to hinge on those of our 
brigade. There was no scarcity of competent 
staff-officers; yet it was intrusted to "a guide," 
presumably an enlisted man, perhaps even a citi- 
zen, whose very name was unknown. 

His instructions were peculiar. Time was all- 
important. He was ordered not to go direct to 
Ewell, but first to make a detour to Holmes, who 
lay in reserve nearly two miles in our rear. 

His disappearance is mysterious. He was never 
heard of after receiving the order ; yet his route 
lay wholly within our lines, over well-beaten roads 
and far out of reach of the enemy. 

my regret that my original plan could not be carried into 
effect, as it would have been a most complete victory 
with only half the trouble and fighting. 

The true cause of countermanding your forward move- 
ment after you had crossed was that it was then too late, 
as the enemy was about to annihilate our left flank, and 
had to be met and checked there, for otherwise he would 
have taken us in flank and rear and all would have been 
lost. Yoiu-s truly, 

G. T. Beauregard. 

General R. S. Ewell, Union Mills, Va. 

P. R. Please read the above to Major James. 

N. B. The order sent you at about 8 a. m., to com- 
mence the movement on Centreville, was addressed to 
General Holmes and yourself, as he was to support you, 
but being nearer Camp Pickens, the headquarters, than 
Union Mills, where you were, it was to be communicated 
to him first, and then to you; but he has informed me 
that it never reached him. With regard to the order sent 
you in the afternoon to recross the Bull Run (to march 
toward the Stone Bridge), it was sent you by General J. 
E. Johnston, as I am informed by him, for the purpose 
of supporting our left, if necessary. G. T. B. 

Do not publish until we know what the enemy is goins 
to do or reports are out which I think will make it 
all right. B. 



Lastly, General Beauregard, in his official report, 
gives as his reason for countermanding the move- 
ment begun by Ewell at 10 o'clock, that in his 
judgment it would require quite three hours for the 
troops to get into position for attack. Had the 
messenger dispatched at 8 been prompt, Ewell 

might have had his orders by 9. But at 9 we find 
Beauregard in rear of Mitchell's Ford, waiting 
for an attack which, by his own figures, he should 
not have expected before 12. 

It is not for me to reconcile these contradic- 



Generals Beauregard, Imboden, and Johnston 
in the foregoing articles [see pages 221, 239, and 
256] criticise the management of my department 
in the matter of supplies for the Confederate 
army at Manassas either before or after the first 
battle. In the statements of these generals, there 
is some conflict, but they all concur in making me 
appear a preposterous imbecile, whom Mr. Davis 
was guilty of retaining. General Imboden in 
effect charges Mr. Benjamin with suppressing, in 
order to shield my incapacity, an official report of 
a board of officers convened by Johnston. 

July 29th, 1861, General Beauregard wrote to 
his aides, Colonels Chesnut and Miles, the latter 
read the letter in the Confederate Congress, 
about his vision of capturing Washington, and 
thus laid the foundation of the cabal against Mr. 
Davis which made the Confederate Government a 
"divided house." It produced a resolution of 
inquiry, followed soon by a standing committee, 
and afterward, in January, 1865, by a unanimous 
resolution, in secret session of both houses, to 
appoint a joint select committee to investigate 
the condition and management of all the Bureaux 
of the War Department. The session of this com- 
mittee on commissary affairs was held January 
23d, 1865. During the war the investigations 
of the standing committee into my policy and 
methods were frequent ; several were long taking 
testimony, for one member, H. S. Foote, who 
when I was myself in prison published me as cruel 
to Federal prisoners, was ever zealous to attack. 
Every investigation ended in approval. I have a 
letter from Mr. John B. Baldwin, chairman of the 
joint select committee, stating that he had declared 
in Congress, as the result of their examination, 
"that the commissary department of subsistence, 
under the control of Colonel Northrop, the Commis- 
sary-General, had been managed with a foresight 
and sagacity, and a far-reaching, comprehensive 
grasp of its business, such as we had found in no 
other bureau connected with the army supply, 
with perhaps a single exception." 

The facts are that the engineer, General Beau- 
regard, neglected his communications, so that 
"troops for the battle" and "supplies" were 
"retarded" ; but the supplies were at the depot. 
" Eighteen heavy cannon, called for two weeks 
before," occupied unloaded cai's at Fredericksburg, 
where there was a large supply of flour that had 
been accumulating since early June. Numerous 
cars were retained as stationary storehouses " for 
provisions," "useless baggage," and "trunks"; 

one hundred and thirty-three cars were abstracted 
by the "military" power from the use of the rail- 
roads for two weeks and more before the battle 
until returned by the Quartermaster-General and 
Mr. Ashe, the Government agent. There was plenty 
of lumber available to construct a storehouse. Gen- 
eral Beauregard was not " urgent on the Commis- 
sary-General for adequate supplies before the bat- 
tle," for there was no ground of complaint. It was 
after the battle, when the vision of capturing Wash- 
ington had seduced him, that he tried to construct 
a gi'ound of complaint anterior to the battle. 

General Beauregard made but one demand on me 
(July 8th, by a telegram which I have) for a com- 
missary of the old service. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Robert B. Lee was added; no one was removed. 
On the 6th day of July I ordered Fowle to buy all 
the corn-meal, and soon after all the bacon, he 
could. July 7th, Beauregard ordered him to keep 
in advance a two weeks' supply for 25,000 men, 
and Major Noland was ready to supply any number 
of beeves. The findings of the Board (on which 
Colonel Lee sat) are incoherent as stated by 
Imboden. The interdictions alleged by him are 
refuted by Colonel Ruffin (my chief assistant), and 
by all the letters sent officially to me in August, 
1861. I have Fowle's detailed report of the ra- 
tions at Manassas ; there was plenty of provision 
for a march on Washington. If I had removed his 
commissaries as he alleges, or had "interdicted" 
them as General Imboden states, General Beau- 
regard need not have been hampered, in a country 
which all the generals have declared abounded in 
the essentials of food. 

General Johnston's comments on the commis- 
sariat are unfounded. He "requested" an in- 
crease of provisions which his commissary alone 
could determine, and allowed the accumulation to 
go on for twelve days after he knew that he had 
more than he wanted. When I was informed, I 
did what he should have done telegraphed the 
shippers to stop. Two weeks before his move he 
promised my officer, Major Noland, the transpor- 
tation deemed siifficient, and of which he had as- 
sumed direct control. Empty trains passed the 
meat which had been laid in piles, ready for ship- 
ment. Empty trains lay idle at Manassas for 
days, in spite of Noland's efforts to get them. 
General Johnston says the stores of the other de- 
partments were brought off. Eight hundred new 
army saddles, several thousand pairs of new shoes, 
and a large mimber of new blankets were burned 
Quartermaster's stores then difficult of attainment. 







C '.' 



SOUTH CAROLINA had just seceded and the whole coun- 
try was in the wildest excitement when the General 
Assembly of Missouri met at Jefferson City on the last 
day of the year 1860. Responding to the recommenda- 
tions of Governor Jackson and to the manifest will of 
the people of the State, it forthwith initiated measures 
for ranging Missouri with the South in the impending 
conflict. A State Convention was called; bills to organize, 
arm, and equip the militia were introduced ; and the Fed- 
eral Government was solemnly warned that if it sent an 
army into South Carolina, or into any other slavehold- 
ing State, in order to coerce it to remain in the Union, 
or to force its people to obey the laws of the United 
States, " the people of Missouri would instantly rally on 
the side of such State to resist the invaders at all hazards 
and to the last extremity." 

The most conspicuous leader of this movement was 
Claiborne F. Jackson, who had just been inaugurated 
Governor. He had for many years been one of the fore- 
most leaders of the Democrats of Missouri, and had been 
elected Governor in August. In the late canvass he had 
supported Douglas for President, not because he either liked him or approved 
his policy on the slavery question, but because Douglas was the choice of 
the Missouri Democrats, and to have opposed him would have defeated his 
own election ; for in August, 1860, the people of Missouri were sincerely 
desirous that the questions at issue between the North and the South 
should be compromised and settled upon some fair basis, and were opposed 
to the election to the Presidency of any man whether Lincoln or Breck- 
inridge whose success might intensify sectional antipathies and imperil the 
integrity of the Union. 

But while loyally supporting the candidacy of Douglas, Jackson abated 
none of his devotion to the political principles which had been the constant 
guide of his life. He was a true son of the South, warmly attached to the 
land that had given him birth, and to her people, who were his own kindred. 
He was now nearly fifty-five years of age, tall, erect, and good-looking ; kind- 
hearted, brave, and courteous ; a thoughtful, earnest, upright man ; a political 
leader, but not a soldier. 

The Governor urged the people of Missouri to elect to the Convention men 
who would place Missouri unequivocally on the side of the South. He was 

fe Colonel Suead was at different times aide-de-camp to Governor Jackson, acting Adjutant-General 
of the Missouri State Guard, Chief-of-Staff of tbe Army of the West, and member of the Confederate 
Congress. He was made by General Price the custodian of his private and official papers. Editors. 




disappointed. Francis P. Blair, Jr., banded together 
the unconditional Union men of the State ; while the 
St. Louis "Republican," Sterling Price, Hamilton R. 
Gamble, James S. Rollins, William A. Hall, and John B. Clark consolidated 
the conservatives, and together these elected on the 18th of February a Con- 
vention not one member of which would say that he was in favor of the 
secession of Missouri. To the courage, moderation, and tact of Francis P. 
Blair this result was greatly due. 

Blair was just forty years of age. His father, the trusted friend of Andrew 
Jackson, had taken him to Washington City when he was about seven years 
old, and there he had been bred in politics. In 1843 he had come to St. Louis, 
where his brother Montgomery was already practicing law. For that profes- 
sion, to which he too had been educated, Frank had no taste, and, having in 
it no success, quickly turned his attention to politics. In 1852 he was elected 
to the Legislature as a Benton Democrat. Shortly afterward he and B. Gratz 
Brown established the St. Louis " Democrat." When the Kansas conflict 
broke out in 1854, he identified himself with the Free-soil party, and in 1856 
supported Fremont for the Presidency, though Senator Benton, Fremont's 
father-in-law, refused to do this. He was elected to Congress that year, for 
the first time. In the presidential canvass of 1860 he had been the leader of 
the Republicans of Missouri, and it was through him chiefly that Lincoln 
received 17,000 votes in the State. Immediately after the secession of South 



Carolina, he had begun to organize his adherents as Home Guards and had 
armed some of them, and was drilling the rest for the field, when the election 
of delegates to the State Convention took place. To complete the arming of 
these men was his first aim. In the city of St. Louis the United States had 
an arsenal within which were more than enough arms for this purpose 
60,000 stand of arms and a great abundance of other munitions of war. So 
long as Buchanan was President, Blair could not get them, but the 4th of 
March was near at hand and he could well wait till then, for the Southern- 
rights men had been so demoralized by the defeat which they had sustained 
in the election of delegates to the Convention, that they were in no condition 
to attack the arsenal, as they had intended 
to do if the election had gone in their 
favor. It was, indeed, more than a month 
after the inauguration of Lincoln before 
the Southern-rights men ventured to make 
any move in that direction. The Governor 
then came to St. Louis to concert with 
General D. M. Frost (who commanded a 
small brigade of volunteer militia) meas- 
ures for seizing the arsenal in the name of 
the State. While the matter was still under 
consideration the bombardment of Fort 
Sumter took place, and the President called 
for 75,000 troops to support the Govern- 
ment. To his call upon Missouri for her 
quota of such troops, the Governor replied 
that the requisition was, in his opinion, 
" illegal, unconstitutional, and revolution- 
ary in its object, inhuman and diabolical," 
and that Missouri would not furnish one 
man "to carry on such an unholy crusade." 
A few days later he convened the General Assembly, to adopt measures 
for the defense of the State. 

In the consultation with Frost it had been decided that the Governor, in 
pursuance of an existing law of the State, should order all its militia into 
encampment for the purpose of drill and discipline; and that, under cover of 
this order, Frost should camp his brigade upon the hills adjacent to and com- 
manding the arsenal, so that when the opportunity occurred he might seize 
it and all its stores. A great difficulty in the way of the execution of 
this plan was the want of siege-guns and mortars. To remove this difficulty 
the Governor sent Captains Colton Greene and Basil W. Duke to Mont- 
gomery, Alabama, and Judge Cooke to Virginia to obtain these things By 
Mr. Davis's order the arms were turned over to Duke and Greene at Baton 
Rouge, and were by them taken to St. Louis. Before they arrived there, 
however, the scheme to seize the arsenal had been completely frustrated by 
its commandant, Captain Nathaniel Lyon, who distributed a part of the 




26 s 


coveted arms to Blair's Home Guards and removed the rest to Illinois, and 
then occupied with his own troops the hills around the arsenal. Frost con- 
sequently established Camp Jackson in a grove in the western part of 
the city, remote from the arsenal, and was drilling and disciplining his 
men there in conformity to the laws of the State and under the flag of the 
Union, when Jefferson Davis's gift to 
Missouri was taken into the camp. 

Blair and Lyon, to whom every de- 
tail of the Governor's scheme had been 
made known, had been waiting for this 
opportunity. They had made up their 
minds to capture the camp and to hold 
the officers and men as prisoners of war. 
Frost went into camp on the 6th of 
May. The arms from the Confederacy 
were taken thither on the 8th. On Sat- 
urday, the 11th, the camp was to break 
up. Lyon had no time to lose. On 
Thursday he attired himself in a dress 
and shawl and other apparel of Blair's 
mother-in-law, Mrs. Alexander, and 
having completed his disguise by hid- 
ing his red beard and weather-beaten 
features under a thickly veiled sun-bonnet, took on his arm a basket, filled, 
not with eggs, but with loaded revolvers, got into a barouche belonging to 
Blair's brother-in-law, Franklin A. Dick, and was driven out to Camp 
Jackson and through it. Eeturning to the city, he called the Union Safety 
Committee together, and informed them that he intended to capture the 
camp the next day. Some of the committee objected, but Blair and James 
O. Broadhead sustained him, and he ordered his men to be in readiness to 
move in the morning. Just as they were about to march, Colonel John 
S. Bowen came to Lyon with a protest from Frost. Lyon refused to 
receive it, and, marching out to the camp with about 7000 men, surrounded 
it and demanded its surrender. Frost, who had only 635 men, was obliged 
to comply. 

While the surrender was taking place a great crowd of people, among 
whom were U. S. Grant and W. T. Sherman, hurried to the scene. Most of 
the crowd sympathized with the prisoners, and some gave expression to their 
indignation. One of Lyon's German regiments thereupon opened fire upon 
them, and twenty-eight men, women, and children were killed. The prisoners 
were then marched to the arsenal, and paroled the next day. 

The capture of Camp Jackson and the bloody scenes that followed the 
shooting down then and the next day of unoffending men, women, and 
children aroused the State. J The General Assembly, which had reconvened 
in extra session, enacted instantly a law for organizing, arming, and equip- 

$ Lyon officially states that on both days the firing was in response to attacks by mobs. Editors. 


ping the militia, created a military fund, and conferred dictatorial power 
upon the Governor. 

Hardly less important than these things for it was what gave effect to 
them all was the fact that the capture of the camp caused ex-Governor 
Sterling Price, President of the State Convention, and up to that time a 
Union man, to tender his services to the Governor. The General Assembly 
forthwith authorized the Governor to create a major-general to command 
all the forces which the State might put into the field, and Price was 
appointed to that position. ^ 

In the Convention Price had been opposed under all circumstances to the 
secession of Missouri, but just as earnestly opposed to the invasion and con- 
quest of the South by the Federal Government. To that position he still 
adhered even when Mr. Lincoln, after the bombardment of Port Sumter, had 
called for troops with which to repossess the Federal forts and enforce the 
laws of the Union within the seceded States. But considering Lyon's attack 
upon the State militia and his killing peaceable citizens an "unparalleled 
insult and wrong to the State," he believed it was the duty of Missouri to 
resent such wrongs. 

The State now sprang to arms. Volunteers began to crowd the streets of 
Jefferson City, and everything indicated the opening of hostilities. Blair and 
Lyon would have met these demonstrations with force, would have driven 
Jackson and Price from the capital, would have dispersed the militia wherever 
it dared to show itself, would have occupied the State with Federal garrisons, 
and would have held her in unresisting obedience to the Union ; but, unfor- 
tunately for the execution of their plans, General William S. Harney, who 
commanded the Military Department of the West, of which Missouri was 
part, had returned to St. Louis the day after the capture of Camp Jackson, 
and had resumed command there. Instead of using force Harney used con- 
ciliation. Instead of making war he made a truce with Price. 

Blair now caused Harney to be relieved of the command of the Federal 
troops in Missouri, and on the 31st of May he was superseded by Lyon. As 
soon as this was made known to the Governor and General Price, they 
ordered the militia to be gotten in readiness for the field, for they knew that 

&Born in Prince Edward County, Virginia, in ing presence, he was also a parliamentarian by 

1809, Price was now fifty-one years of age. He had instinct, understood intuitively the rules that 

been carefully educated in the schools of his native govern deliberative bodies, and knew how to 

State and at Hampden-Sidney College, and had enforce them with promptness and vigor. He 

afterward attended the Law School of one of the occupied this position till 1844, and was then 

most eminent jurists of Virginia, the venerable elected to Congress. He took his seat in December, 

Chancellor Creed Taylor. He removed with his 1845; but when the war with Mexico broke out, 

father's family to Chariton County, Missouri, in a few months latei*, he left Congress, returned to 

1831, and had resided there ever since. Elected Missouri, raised a regiment and led it to New 

to the Legislature in 1840, he was at once chosen Mexico, where he was placed in command. For 

Speaker of the House, an honor rarely conferred his good conduct and gallantry in several battles 

upon so young a man, and particularly upon one that he fought and won there, and in recognition of 

who had never before been a member of a delibera- the military and civic ability which he displayed 

tive assembly. But he was preeminently fitted for in completing the conquest of that part of the 

the position. Well born and well bred, courteous Mexican territory, he was appointed brigadier- 

and dignified, well educated, and richly endowed general by President Polk. In 1852 he was 

with that highest of all mental faculties, common elected Governor of Missouri, and he held that 

sense ; tall, straight, handsome, and of a command- office till the beginning of 1857. T. L. S. 




Blair and Lyon would quickly attack them. Some well-meaning gentlemen, 
who vainly imagined that Missouri could maintain her neutrality in the midst 
of war, now sought to establish a truce between Price and Lyon. Through 
them a conference was agreed upon, and the Governor and General Price came 
to St. Louis under Lyon's safe conduct. They met him and Blair at the Planters' 
House. Lyon was accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Major Horace A. Conant, 
and I was present as the Governor's aide. The interview, which lasted several 
hours, was at last terminated by Lyon's saying that he would see every man, 
woman, and child in Missouri under the sod before he would consent that the 
State should dictate to "his Government" as to the movement of its troops 
within her limits, or as to any other matter however unimportant. "This," 
said he, "means war. One of my officers will conduct you out of my lines in 
an hour." So saying, he left without another word, without even a salutation. 

He had hardly left us when he was issuing orders for the movement of his 
troops. Sweeny and Sigel were sent with about 3000 men to the south-west 
to intercept the retreat of Jackson and Price if they should undertake to 
effect a junction with General Ben. McCulloch, who was believed to be con- 
centrating a Confederate army in north-western Arkansas for the invasion of 
Missouri. Lyon would himself move up the Missouri after Jackson. 

The conference was held on the 11th of June. On the 13th Lyon was 
on his way to Jefferson City with about 2000 men. Arriving there the next 
day, he found that the Governor had fled to Boonville. Leaving a garrison 
at Jefferson City, he pushed on to Boonville, where some 1300 militia had ren- 
dezvoused. Attacking these on the 17th, he dispersed them and drove the 
Governor southward with some two or three hundred men who still adhered 
to him and to the cause which he represented. General Price had meanwhile 
gone to Lexington, where several thousand militia had assembled. 

From a military standpoint the affair at Boonville was a very insignificant 
thing, but it did in fact deal a stunning blow to the Southern-rights men of 


Missouri, and one which weakened the Confederacy during all of its brief 
existence. It was indeed the consummation of Blair's statesmanlike scheme to 
make it impossible for Missouri to secede, or out of her great resources to 
contribute liberally of men and material to the South, as she would have done 
could her people have had their own way. It was also the most brilliant 
achievement of Lyon's well-conceived campaign. The capture of Camp 
Jackson had disarmed the State, and completed the conquest of St. 
Louis and all the adjacent counties. The advance upon Jefferson City had 
put the State government to flight and taken away from the Governor the 
prestige which sustains established and acknowledged authority. The dis- 
persion of the volunteers that were flocking to Boonville to fight under Price 
for Missouri and the South extended Lj^on's conquest at once to the borders 
of Iowa, closed all the avenues by which the Southern men of North Missouri 
could get to Price and Jackson, made the Missouri River a Federal highway 
from its source to its mouth, and put an end to Price's hope of holding the 
rich and friendly counties in the vicinity of Lexington till the Confederacy 
could send an army to his support, and arms and supplies for the men whom, 
he was concentrating there. 

Price had, indeed, no alternative now but to retreat in all haste to the 
south-western part of the State, so as to organize his army within supporting 
distance of the force which McCulloch was assembling in western Arkansas 
for the protection of that State and the Indian Territory. He accordingly 
ordered Brigadier-General James S. Rains to take command of the militia at 
and near Lexington, and to move southward so as to effect a junction with 
the Governor in the vicinity of Lamar, toward which place the latter was 
retreating with Generals M. M. Parsons and John B. Clark and what was 
left of their commands. General Price himself, accompanied by his staff and 
a small escort, hastened rapidly toward Arkansas in order to bring McCulloch 
to the rescue of both the Governor and Rains. On the way he was joined, 
almost daily, by squads or companies, and by the time he reached Cowskin 
Prairie, in the extreme south-western corner of the State, he had collected 
about 1200 men. 

On the 3d of July Rains reached Lamar, near which place the Governor 
and his followers were already encamped. The combined force amounted to 
about 6000 men, of whom 4000 were armed, and they had seven pieces of 
artillery. Halting until the 5th in order to rest and organize, they pushed on 
that morning toward Carthage, having heard that a Federal force had occu- 
pied that place, which lay in their line of retreat. They had inarched but a 
few miles when, as they were passing through the open prairie, they descried, 
some three miles away, on the declivity of a hill over which they had them- 
selves to pass, a long line of soldiers with glistening bayonets and bright 
guns. These were part of the force which Lyon, on marching against Jeffer- 
son City, had sent under General Sweeny and Colonel Sigel to the south-west 
to intercept the Governor's retreat toward Arkansas. Sigel, in executing 
this plan, had first attempted to intercept Price. Failing in that, he had 
now, with more boldness than discretion, thrown himself, with about 1100 


men and eight pieces of artillery, in front of the Governor, hoping either to 
defeat him or to hold him in check till Lyon could arrive and destroy 
him. Halting' his column in the prairie, and deploying his armed men 
(about 4000), the Governor awaited Sigel's attack. The fight (known as the 
battle of Carthage) did not last long, for Sigel was outnumbered four to one, 
and the Missourians quickly put him to flight. He retreated, however, in 
perfect order, carrying off almost everything that he had brought with him. 
But he did not stop running till he had made forty miles. That night the 
State troops rested in Carthage. The next day they resumed their southward 
march, and soon met Price and McCulloch. Price now assumed command 
of the Missourians and led them to Cowskin Prairie, in the south-western 
corner of the State, while McCulloch went into camp near Maysville in 

Lyon left Boonville in pursuit of the Governor, on the 3d of July, with 
about 2350 men, and directed his course toward Clinton in Henry county, 
where he had ordered Major Sturgis, who was following Rains with about 
2500 regulars and Kansas troops, to unite with him. The two columns came 
together near Clinton on the 7th of July and pushed on after the Missourians. 
Lyon did not learn till the 9th that they had defeated Sigel and effected a 
junction with McCulloch. He then made in all haste for Springfield, fearing 
that the Confederates would attack that place. Arriving there on the 13th 
of July, he made it his headquarters. 

Lyon, on the one hand, and Price on the other now began to get their 
armies in readiness for active operations. For Lyon this was a simple under- 
taking ; for Price it was one of great complexity and great difficulty. Of the 
7000 or 8000 men that he had, only a few had been organized into regiments. 
Several thousand of them had no arms of any kind. The rest were for the 
most part armed with the shot-guns and rifles which they had brought 
from their homes. Of powder and lead they had an abundance, but no fixed 
ammunition for either their seven pieces of artillery or for their small-arms. 
Tents they had none, nor camp equipage of any kind. There were no quar- 
termasters' supplies, nor subsistence; and neither the quartermaster-general 
nor the chief commissary had a dollar of funds. The men were not fighting 
for pay, they wanted none, nor did they get any; but they and their thou- 
sands of horses and mules had to be fed. For their animals there was nothing 
but the grass of the prairies, and for themselves nothing but a scant supply 
of lean beef and coarse corn-meal. There were enough good officers to 
organize and command the men ; but it would have puzzled almost any one 
to drill a company of raw recruits, armed, some with shot-guns, some with 
rifles, a few with old-fashioned flint-lock muskets, and here and there a man 
with a percussion musket. No better proof could be given of the dearth of 
material for the Staff, than the fact that I was myself assigned to duty by Gen- 
eral Price as chief of ordnance of the army, though I told him at the time that 
I did not know the difference between a howitzer and a siege-gun, and had 
never seen a musket-cartridge in all my life ; and a few days later I was 
assigned to the still more important position of acting Adjutant-General of 


the State Guard, though I had never then heard of a " morning report," and 
did not know the right of a company from its left. Had Hardee or any other 
West Pointer been in command, he would have kept us in camp six 
months, drilling and disciplining us, getting together wagons and teams, 
tents and cartridge-boxes, uniforms and haversacks, quartermasters and red 
tape, and all the other equipments and impedimenta of an army in the field, 
and then we would have gone into winter quarters ; Lyon would have had his 
own way in Missouri, and the Federal armies that were sent thither to whip 
us would have been sent to fight in Virginia or in Tennessee instead, and 
the Confederacy might have been vanquished sooner than it was. But Price 
had us all ready for the field in less than three weeks. We had no tents, it 
is true, but tents would only have been in our way ; we had no uniforms, but 
a bit of flannel or calico fastened to the shoulder of an officer designated his 
rank sufficiently for all practical purposes ; the ripening corn-fields were our 
depots of subsistence ; the prairies furnished forage, and the people in defense 
of whose homes we were eager to fight gladly gave us of all their stores. 

McCulloch, one of the bravest of men and best of scouts, looking at us 
through the eyes of the young army officers whom Mr. Davis had sent to 
teach him how to organize, equip, and fight an army scientifically, saw in the 
Missourians nothing but a half-armed mob, led by an ignorant old militia 
general, but he consented to go with Price in search of Lyon, who was at 
Springfield and not hard to find. General N. B. Pearce, commanding a 
brigade of Arkansas State troops, agreed to go along with them. 

Hardee, who was at Pitman's Ferry, Arkansas, within a few hundred 
yards of the Missouri line, and almost as near to Springfield as were Price 
and McCulloch, and who had with him several thousand good soldiers, was 
begged by both Price and McCulloch to cooperate in the movement against 
Lyon, but he replied that he " did not wish to march to their assistance with 
less than 5000 men, well appointed, and a full complement of artillery " ! 

By order of General Polk, made at the earnest personal solicitation of 
Governor Jackson, who had gone to Memphis for that purpose, General 
Pillow moved into Missouri from Tennessee, with twelve thousand men, and 
occupied New Madrid on the 28th of July, with the intent to unite in the 
effort to repossess the State. 

On the same day, Price, McCulloch, and Pearce, relying upon the cooper- 
ation of both Hardee and Pillow, concentrated their forces at Cassville, 
within about fifty miles of Springfield. There Price was reenforced by 
General McBride's command, consisting of two regiments of foot and three 
companies of mounted men, about 700 in all. They had come from 
the hill country lying to the south and south-east of Springfield, and 
were a unique body of soldiers. Very few of the officers had any knowledge 
whatever of military principles or practices, and only the most superficial 
experience in company tactics. The staff was composed chiefly of country 
lawyers who took the ways of the court-room with them into the field. 
Colonels could not drill their regiments, nor captains their companies; a 
drum and a fife the only ones in the entire command sounded all the calls, 


and companies were paraded by the sergeant's calling out, " Oh, yes ! Oh, yes ! 
all you who belong to Captain Brown's company fall in here." Officers and 
men messed together, and all approached McBride without a salute, lounged 
around his quarters, listened to all that was said, and when they spoke 
to him called him " Jedge." Their only arms were the rifles with which they 
hunted the squirrels and other small game that abounded in their woods, but 
these they knew how to use. A powder-horn, a cap-pouch, " a string of 
patchin'," and a hunter's knife completed their equipment. I doubt whether 
among them all there was a man that had ever seen a piece of artillery. But, 
for all this, they were brave and intelligent. Like all frontiersmen, they were 
shrewd, quick-witted, wary, cunning, and ready for all emergencies, and like 
all backwoodsmen, their courage was serene, steady, unconscious. While there 
was no attempt at military discipline, and no pretense of it, the most perfect 
order was maintained by McBride's mere force of character, by his great good 
sense, and by the kindness with which he exercised his patriarchal authority. 

Leaving Cassville on the 31st of July, the combined Southern armies, nearly 
11,000 strong, advanced toward Springfield. On the way they encountered 
Lyon, who had come out to meet them. McCulloch, who could not compre- 
hend the Missourians or the able soldier who commanded them, refused to 
attack unless Price and Pearce would confer upon him the chief command. 
Price had been a brigadier-general in Mexico, when McCulloch was but a cap- 
tain of scouts, and had won more battles there than McCulloch had ever wit- 
nessed; he was now a major-general with more than 5000 men, and McCulloch 
had barely 3000 ; and in intellect, in experience, and in generalship he was 
worth a dozen McCullochs ; nevertheless, he cheerfully placed himself and 
his army under the Texan's command. The order to advance was then given. 
Lyon had been encamped six miles in front with between 5000 and 6000 men. 
McCulloch moved at midnight, hoping to fall upon him unexpectedly, and to 
defeat him. To his amazement he learned, on approaching the spot, that 
Lyon had left twenty hours before, and must now be almost in sight of 
Springfield. The Confederates kept on, and on the 6th of August went into 
camp on Wilson's Creek, within ten miles of Springfield. They were still 
lying there on the morning of the 10th of August, when they were surprised 
and suddenly attacked on the north by Lyon, and on the south by Sigel. | 

One of the stubbornest and bloodiest battles of the war now took place. 
Lyon's main attack was met by Price with about 3200 Missourians, and 
Churchill's regiment and Woodruff's battery, both, from Arkansas. His left 
was met and driven back by Mcintosh with a part of McCulloch's brigade 
(the Third Louisiana and Mcintosh's regiment). McCulloch then took some 
companies of the Third Louisiana and parts of other commands, and with them 
attacked and routed Sigel (who had been sent to attack the rear), capturing 
five of his guns. This done, Pearce's Arkansas brigade, which up to this 
time had not fired a gun, was sent to reenforce Price. Lyon, seeing that 

I For maps and more specific descriptions of see the papers by Generals Pearce and Wherry, 
the three chief engagements of this "first year," Colonel Mulligan, and General Sigel, to follow. 
Wilson's Creek, Lexington, and Pea Ridge, Editors. 




the supreme moment had come, and that the day would be surely lost if he 
did not overwhelm Price before the Arkansans could reenforce him, now 
brought forward every available man, and was putting them into the fight, 
when his horse was killed, and himself wounded in the head. Dazed by the 
blow, dazed and stunned, his heart gave way for a moment under the sudden 
shock, but quickly coming to his senses he mounted another horse, and, 
swinging his hat in the air, called on his men to follow. Closing around 
him they dashed with him into the thick of the fight. But a moment later 
a bullet pierced his heart, and he fell from his horse into the arms of his 
orderly, and in an instant was dead. It was vain that the Federals tried to 
prolong the battle. Sturgis, on whom the command devolved, ordered a 
retreat, and before the Confederates knew that the battle was ended he 
was a mile away, having withdrawn his men unseen through the dense 
undergrowth of the woods in which the battle mainly was fought. In the 


haste of their retreat, the Federals left Lyon's dead body on the field. I 
delivered it myself an hour or two later to a flag-of-truce party that had been 
sent to ask for it, I saw it again the next day in Springfield, where it had 
been again abandoned by his men. [See foot-note, page 297.] 

Rarely have I met so extraordinary a man as Lyon, or one that has 
interested me so deeply. Coming to St. Louis from Kansas on the 6th of 
February, this mere captain of infantry, this little, rough-visaged, red-bearded, 
weather-beaten Connecticut captain, by his intelligence, his ability, his energy, 
and his zeal, had at once acquired the confidence of all the Union men of 
Missouri, and had made himself respected, if not feared, by his enemies. In 
less than five months he had risen to the command of the Union armies in 
Missouri, had dispersed the State government, had driven the Governor and 
his adherents into the extremest corner of the State, had almost conquered 
the State, and would have completely conquered it had he been supported 
by his Government ; and now he had given his life willingly for the Union 
which he revered, and to the cause of Human Freedom to which he was 
fanatically devoted. 

The Federal force in the battle amounted to about 5400 officers and men. 
The Confederates had over 10,000 armed men on the ground, but 3000 of 
them took little or no part in the fight. The Confederates lost 279 killed 
and 951 wounded. The Federal loss was 258 killed, 873 wounded, and 186 
captured or missing. 

McCulloch refused to pursue, and Price resumed command of the Missouri 
troops. The next day he took possession of Springfield, and sent Rains with 
a mounted force to clear the western counties of the State of the marauding 
bands that had come into them from Kansas. On the 25th of August he 
moved northward with his army. On the 2d of September he met a part of 
Lane's Kansas Brigade under Colonel Montgomery on the banks of the Big 
Dry Wood. Montgomery had about 500 men and gave battle, but was forced 
to retreat before Price's superior force. The loss on either side was trifling. 

Price now hastened toward Lexington, joined at every step by recruits. 
Reaching the city on the 12th of September with his mounted men, he drove 
Colonel Mulligan within his intrenchments, and as soon as his main body 
came up, completed the investment of the place. On the 20th he caused a 
number of hemp-bales saturated with water to be rolled to the front and 
converted them into movable breastworks, behind which his men advanced 
unharmed against the enemy. Colonel Mulligan was forced to surrender the 
next day. Price's loss was 25 killed and 72 wounded. Fremont reported to 
the War Department that the Union loss was 39 killed and 120 wounded. 
The Missourians captured about 3500 prisoners, five pieces of artillery, two 
mortars, 3000 stand of small-arms, a large number of sabers, about 750 
horses, many sets of cavalry equipments, ammunition, many wagons and 
teams, more than $100,000 worth of commissary stores, and a large amount 
of other property. Price also recovered $900,000 that had been taken by the 
enemy from the Bank at Lexington, and restored it to the Bank. His force 
amounted to about 18,000 men, Mulligan's to about 3600. 

VOL. I. 18 



Tn order to obtain the cooperation of the Confederate armies, the Governor 
and General Price sent me to Richmond, after the capture of Lexington, as a 
special commissioner to explain to President Davis the condition of affairs in 
Missouri, and to negotiate a treaty of alliance with the Confederate States, 
inasmuch as Missouri had not seceded nor been admitted into the Confederacy. 
By their direction I went by way of 
McCulloch's headquarters, in order 
to make one more effort to secure 
his cooperation, and failing in that, 
to get from him certain supplies 
which General Price greatly needed, 
particularly caps for the muskets 
which we had captured at Lexing- 
ton. To all my entreaties McCulloch 
replied that Price had gone to the 
Missouri against his advice; that the 
movement was unwise and would re- 
sult in disaster, and that he would 
not endanger his own army by going 
to his assistance ; and that as for 
musket-caps, he had none to spare. 

General John C. Fremont, who had 
assumed command of the Union ar- 
mies in the West on the 25th of July, 
now began to concentrate his forces against Price. Sending about 40,000 
men, with 100 pieces of artillery, to attack him in front, and others to cut 
off his retreat, he took the field himself. His plan was magnificent to 
capture or disperse Price's army; march to Little Rock and occupy the 
place; turn the Confederates under Polk, Pillow, Thompson, and Hardee, and 
compel them to fall back southward ; push on to Memphis with his army 
and Foote's flotilla ; capture that city; and then make straight for New Orleans. 

Price left Lexington on the 29th of September, after advising his unarmed 
men to return to their homes, and to wait for a more convenient time to rise. 
Marching as rapidly as his long train would permit, he reached the Osage on 
the 8th of October with about 7000 men. To cross his troops and trains over 
that difficult river on a single flat-boat was a tedious operation, but Fremont 
gave him all the time that he needed, and he got them safely over. 

After crossing the Osage, Price marched quickly to Neosho, where the 
General Assembly had been summoned by Governor Jackson to meet. 
Fremont continued to follow till the 2d of November, when he was super- 
seded by Major-General David Hunter, who immediately stopped the pursuit 
and turned the army back to St. Louis. On the 19th of November Major- 
General Halleck assumed command of the Federal Department. 

When I returned from Richmond, Price had gone into winter quarters on 
the Sac River near Osceola. Many of his men had been furloughed so that 
they might go to their homes, where they could subsist themselves during 



the winter and provide for their families. McCulloch's brigade was on the 
Arkansas River ; and Pearce's had been disbanded. Under the treaty which 
had been negotiated at Richmond, the enlistment of Missourians in the 
Confederate army was at once begun and was continued at Springfield, 
whither Price moved his army just before Christmas. Before the end of 
January, 1862, two regiments of infantry (Bnrbridge's and Rives's), one regi- 
ment of cavalry (Gates's), and two batteries (Wade's and Clark's) had been 
mustered into the Confederate service, and on the 28th I started to Richmond 
to deliver the muster-rolls to the Secretary of War, and to inform the President 
as to the strength and condition of the army in Missouri, and to communi- 
cate to him Price's views as to the future conduct of the war in that State. 

On the way I met Major-General Earl Van Dorn at Jacksonport in Arkansas. 
He had just assumed command (January 29th) of the District of the Trans- 
Mississippi, constituting a part of General Albert Sidney Johnston's extensive 
department. He was a dashing soldier, and a very handsome man, and his 
manners were graceful and fascinating. He was slight of stature and his 
features were almost too delicately refined for a soldier, but this defect, if it 
was a defect, was converted into a charm by the martial aspect of his mustache 
and imperial, and by an exuberant growth of brownish hair. Quitting the 
United States army when Mississippi seceded, he first entered her service, 
and was afterward appointed to that of the Confederacy and placed in com- 
mand of Texas. Transferred thence to Virginia in September, 1861, he was 
commissioned major-general and ordered to report to General J. E. Johnston, 
commanding the Army of the Potomac. Johnston ordered him to Beau- 
regard, and Beauregard assigned him to the command of a division, October 
4th, 1861. He was assigned to the command of the Trans-Mississippi District, 
January 10th, 1862. We Missourians were delighted ; for he was known to be 
a fighting man, and we felt sure he would help us to regain our State. I 
explained to him the condition of affairs in Missouri, and General Price's views. 

Van Dorn had already decided upon a plan of campaign, and in execution 
of it ordered General Albert Pike, a few days afterward, to Lawrence county, 
Missouri, with a mixed command of whites and Indians estimated at 7000 
men; ordered Mcintosh to report to Price at Springfield with McCulloch's 
infantry, ordered McCulloch to Pocahontas with his mounted men; and 
called upon Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas to send reinforcements. Hope- 
ful and enthusiastic by nature, he believed that Price would have 15,000 
effective men at Springfield by the last of March, and himself 18,000 at Poca- 
hontas, and that they could then march against St. Louis. The two col- 
umns were to effect a junction north of Ironton, and, moving thence rapidly 
without tents or baggage, take the city by assault. Possession of the city 
would give him possession of the State, and the enemy would supply the 
arms for the thousands of volunteers that would flock to his standard. 

From this day-dream he was rudely awakened a few days later by news 
that Price had been driven from Springfield on the 12th of February, and was 
hotly pursued by a Federal army which Halleck had sent against him under 
General S. R. Curtis. With this army was Captain P. H. Sheridan, doing duty 




as quartermaster. Price sought refuge in the mountains of Arkansas, and 
February 21st was within thirty miles of Van Buren, near which place was 

On learning all this Van Dorn hastened to Van Buren and thence to 
Price's headquarters, which he reached on the 1st of March. After a hurried 
consultation with Price and McCulloch, he decided to instantly attack Curtis, 
who had taken a strong position among the mountains near Benton ville. He 
moved on the 4th of March with about 16,000 men, of whom 6800 were 
Missourians under Price, and the rest Confederates under McCulloch and 
Pike. When almost within reach of Curtis (who reported his own strength at 
10,500 infantry and cavalry and forty-nine pieces of artillery) Van Dorn 
unwisely divided his army, and leaving McCulloch with his own command 
and Pike's to attack Curtis in front, himself made with Price and the Mis- 
sourians a long circuit to the rear of Curtis, and out of communication with 
McCulloch. Both columns attacked about the same time on the 7th. Price 
was completely successful and carried everything before him, taking during 


the afternoon seven pieces of cannon and about 200 prisoners, and at night 
bivouacked near Elkhorn Tavern. But morning revealed the enemy in a new 
and strong position, then- forces united and offering battle. The Confederates 
soon learned that McCulloch and Mcintosh had been killed the day before 
and their force routed and dispersed. The battle was renewed nevertheless, 
and the Missourians fought desperately and were still holding their ground 
when about 10 o'clock Van Dorn ordered a retreat, and the army leaving 
Missouri to her fate began to fall back toward Van Buren. 

In this battle, sometimes called the battle of Pea Ridge, and at other 
times the battle of Elkhorn, the Federal general reported his losses at 203 
killed, 980 wounded, and 201 missing. Van Dorn's were probably greater, 
and he lost heavily in good officers. McCulloch and Mcintosh were killed ; 
General Price was again wounded and narrowly escaped death; General 
W. Y. Slack, whom his men idolized and whom the whole army held in honor, 
was fatally wounded; and Colonel B. A. Rives, one of the knightliest of sol- 
diers and bravest of gentlemen, and Churchill Clark, a heroic boy, were killed. 

Halleck, who had determined to make the Tennessee "the great strategic 
line of the Western campaign," now began to concentrate all of his forces on 
that river and the Mississippi, in order "to fight a great battle on the 
Tennessee," one which would "settle the campaign in the West." He con- 
sequently ordered Curtis not to advance any farther into Arkansas ; and 
sent out of Missouri all the troops that could be safely taken thence, some 
of them to Pope 011 the Mississippi, and others to Grant on the Tennessee. 

The concentration of Federal armies on the Mississippi portended such 
danger to Beauregard, who had lately assumed command of the defenses 
of that river, that General Albert Sidney Johnston ordered Van Dorn to move 
his army to within supporting distance of Beauregard. This Van Dorn began 
to do on the 17th of March, on which day he wrote to General Johnston that 
he would soon " relieve Beauregard by giving battle to the enemy near New 
Madrid," or, by marching " boldly and rapidly toward St. Louis, between 
Ironton and the enemy's grand depot at Rolla." 

While he was executing this plan, and while the greater part of the army 
that had survived Elkhorn was on the march across the mountains of North 
Arkansas toward Jacksonport, Van Dorn was suddenly ordered by General 
Johnston on the 23d of March to move his entire command by " the best and 
most expeditious route " to Memphis. His forces, to which he had given the 
name of " the Army of the West," were accordingly concentrated in all haste 
at Des Arc, on the White River, whence they were to take boats for Memphis. 
The first division of this army, to the command of which General Price 
had been assigned, was the first to move, Little's Missouri Brigade embark- 
ing on the 8th of April for Memphis, just as Pope was taking possession 
of Island No. 10, and Beauregard was leading Johnston's army back to 
Corinth from the fateful field of Shiloh. 


r> d .'1,1 >" Aj&frJX? 




AT the outbreak of the war, in the spring of '61, being then in England, I 
jL- offered my services to the Government, and was appointed one of the 
four major-generals of the regular army. General McClellan and myself were 
commissioned of even date, ranking next after General Scott. On my arrival 
I reported to the President, using a few days to arrange in some order the 
business which had carried me abroad. There was great confusion and indeci- 
sion in affairs, and the people in power were slow to realize the actuality of 
war ; it was long before they realized its magnitude. Several commands in the 
East were suggested to me, but I preferred the West, which I knew, and I held 
the opinion that the possession of the immediate valley of the Mississippi 
river would control the result of the war. Who held the Mississippi would 
hold the country by the heart. 

A command was agreed upon between President Lincoln, Montgomery 
Blair, his Postmaster-General, who was a graduate of West Point, and 
myself, of which the great object was the descent of the Mississippi river. 
Necessary to this was first the firm possession of the State of Missouri, freed 
and protected from the secession forces within and around it. In pursuance 
of this plan " The Western Department " was created, comprehending, with 
Illinois, the states and territories west of the Mississippi river to the Rocky 
Mountains, including New Mexico. For reasons not wholly military, the 
President reserved the State of Kentucky, but assured me that so soon as I 
had succeeded in raising and organizing an army for the descent of the 
Mississippi river, he would extend my command over that State and the left 
bank of the Mississippi. 

The President had gone carefully over with me the subject of my intended 
campaign, and this with the single desire to find out what was best to do and 



how to do it. This he did in the unpretending and kindly manner which 
invited suggestion, and which with him was characteristic. When I took 
leave of him he accompanied me down the stairs, coming out to the steps of 
the portico. I asked him then if there was anything further in the way 
of instruction that he wished to say to me. " No," he answered. " I have 
given you carte blanche. You must use your own judgment and do the 
best you can. I doubt if the states will ever come back." 

Governor Yates, of Illinois, then in Washington, informed me fully of the 
unarmed and unprepared condition of the West. I immediately began a 
search for arms at Washington, and out of those at hand was able to obtain 
an order for only seven thousand stand. 

Arriving at New York, I found that the order for the seven thousand 
stand of arms had been countermanded. Upon my complaint to Washing- 
ton, and through the personal interposition of the President, Major Peter 
V. Hagner was sent to aid me in procuring what I judged immediately 
necessary for my department. With him I arranged for gathering from 
various arsenals and forwarding to St. Louis arms and equipments for 
23,000 men. This detained me some weeks in New York. Before leaving, 
I telegraphed to Lieutenant-General Scott, to ask if he had any instructions 
to give me. He replied that he had none. 

At Philadeljjhia we heard the news of the disaster of Bull Run. On 
the 25th of July I reached St. Louis, and at the start I found myself in an 
enemy's country, the enemy's flag displayed from houses and recruiting 
offices. St. Louis was in sympathy with the South, and the State of Mis- 
souri was in active rebellion against the national authority. The Bull Run 
defeat had been a damaging blow to the prestige of the Union. 

In this condensed sketch I can give only the strong outline of the threaten- 
ing situation I found, and, in part, the chief measures I adopted to convert 
our defensive position into one that was vigorously offensive, going into detail 
only enough to show some of the difficulties that beset me. 

There was a wide difference between the situation here and that at Wash- 
ington. The army of the East was organized under the eyes of the President 
and Congress; in the midst of loyal surroundings and loyal advisers where 
there was no need to go' outside of prescribed military usage, or to assume 
responsibilities. But in Missouri all operations had to be initiated in the 
midst of upturned and revolutionary conditions and a rebellious people, 
where all laws were set at defiance. In addition to the bodies of armed men 
that swarmed over the State, a Confederate force of nearly 50,000 men was 
already on the Southern frontier : Pillow, with 12,000, advancing upon 
Cairo ; Thompson, with 5000, upon Girardeau ; Hardee, with 5000, upon Iron- 
ton ; and Price, with an estimated force of 25,000, upon Lyon, at Springfield. 
Their movement was intended to overrun Missouri, and, supported by a 
friendly population of over a million, to seize upon St. Louis and make that 
city a center of operations for the invasion of the loyal States. 

To meet this advancing force I had 23,000 men of all arms. Of this only 
some 15,000 were available, the remainder being three-months men whose 


term of service was expiring. General John Pope was fully occupied in North 
Missouri with nearly all my disposable force, which was required to hold in 
check rebellion in that quarter. For the defense of Cairo B. M. Prentiss had 
8 regiments, but 6 were three-months men, at the end of their term, unpaid, 
and unwilling to reenlist. At Springfield General Lyon had about 6000 
men, unpaid and badly fed, and in need of clothing. In this condition he 
was in hourly expectation of being attacked by the enemy, who was advanc- 
ing in three times his nominal strength. 

This was the situation to be met at the outset. The arms and equipments 
for 23,000 men which I had gathered at New York I now found had been 
diverted from my department and sent to Virginia. I had no money and 
the Government no credit ; but the chief difficulty was the want of arms. 
There was no want of men. The loyal population of the North-western 
States flocked to the Union standard ; the German population with a noble 

Having these conditions to face, on the 26th of July I telegraphed my needs 
to Montgomery Blair, whom I had known intimately. In reply he telegraphed, 
" I find it impossible to get any attention to Missouri or Western matters 
from the authorities here. You will have to do the best you can and take 
all needful responsibility to defend and protect the people over whom you 
are specially set." Two days afterward Secretary Seward telegraphed to ask 
what disposition I had made of the arms I had purchased in Europe, asking 
for an invoice. I telegraphed him that I needed to use these arms for my 
department, that I had absolutely no arms, and that the situation of the State 
was critical. On the 30th I sent to the President, as had been arranged, an 
unofficial letter setting forth the condition of my command. I informed him 
that the treasurer of the United States at St, Louis had $300,000 entirely 
unappropriated, but had refused my request for $100,000 to be delivered to 
my paymaster-general. I said to him that there were three courses open to 
me : "First, to let the enemy possess himself of some of the strongest points 
in the State and threaten St. Louis, which is insurrectionary ; second, to force 
a loan from the secession banks here ; third, to use the mo^iey belonging to 
the Government which is in the treasury. . . . This morning I will order 
the treasurer to deliver the money in his possession to General Andrews and 
will send a force to the treasury to take the money, and will direct such 
payments as the exigency requires. I will hazard everything for the defense 
of the department you have confided to me, and I trust to you for support." 
To the propositions of this letter the President' gave the tacit approval of not 
replying, and I acted upon it. 

I had no time to lose. The situation of Lyon at Springfield was critical, and 
the small disintegrating garrison at Cairo was hourly exposed to assault by 
an overpowering force. Among the various points threatened, Cairo was the 
key to the success of my operations. The waterways and the district around 
Cairo were of first importance. Upon the possession of this district depended 
the descent and control of the Mississippi Valley by the Union armies, or 
the inroad by the Confederate forces into the loyal States. 



I now sent within the Con- 
federate lines a capable en- 
gineer officer possessed of the 
necessary military knowledge, 
with instructions to go into 
the States of Kentucky and 
Tennessee to observe the situ- 
ation of the enemy, ascertain 
his strength and probable 
plans, and make rough maps 
of important localities occu- 
pied by troops or likely to be. 
Five days after my arrival, 
hearing that Pillow was mov- 
ing upon Cairo, I left St. 
Louis for that place, with all 
my available force, 3800 men. 
I distributed my command 
over a transport fleet of eight 
large steamboats, in order to 
create in the enemy an im- 
pression of greater strength 
than I possessed. I found the 
garrison demoralized. From 
the chief of artillery I learned 
there were only about six hundred effective men under arms. These troops 
had enlisted for three months, which had now expired. They had not been 
paid, and there was much sickness among them. The reenforcement I 
brought, and such assurances as I was able to give, restored confidence ; and 
I prevailed on one of the garrison regiments to remain. 

Cair< > was the most unhealthy post within my command. Fever and dysen- 
tery were prevailing. The roomy, shaded decks and convenient cabins of the 
large steamboats which brought the reinforcements, and the breeze from the 
water blowing through them, were in strong contrast with the steaming heat 
of the low, moist grounds of Cairo. This suggested the idea of floating hospi- 
tals. Before the sun went down the greater number of the sick were carried to 
one of the roomiest boats, thus securing good ventilation and perfect drainage. 
The sudden relief of Cairo and the exaggerated form in which the news of 
it reached Pillow had the intended effect. He abandoned his proposed attack, 
and gave time to put it effectually beyond reach of the enemy, and eventually 
to secure a firm hold on the whole of that important district. 

Having secured the initial point in my campaign, I returned to St. Louis on 
August 4th". Meantime I had ordered Stevenson's 7th Missouri regiment 
from Boonville, and Montgomery's Kansas regiment near Leavenworth, to 
the support of Lyon at Springfield. Amidst incessant and conflicting 
demands, my immediate care was to provide aid for him. 



Governor Oliver P. Morton, of Indiana, answering my urgent request for 
troops, telegraphed that if leave were granted from Washington he would send 
five regiments made up of river boatmen, well adapted for the Mississippi 
expedition. In answer to my request they were ordered to me. But the 
order was changed, and instead of joining me they were sent to General 
Robert Anderson, then in command at Louisville. The same day I asked 
Senator Latham, at Washington, to aid my application for three thousand 
men from California, to be placed at El Paso, to operate against Texas troops 
moving into Arkansas. On the 5th Marsh reported from Girardeau that the 
enemy was close upon him, 5000 strong, and would attack him before morning. 
At midnight a heavy battery of 6 twenty-four-pounders and 1000 men were 
embarked to his aid under experienced officers, and Prentiss further reenf orced 
him from below the same morning. 

On the 6th General Scott telegraphed me that he had ordered all the 
troops out of New Mexico, and directed me to confer immediately with the 
governor of Kansas, and arrange for the safety of New Mexico, sending two 
regiments " without delay," as the first detachment would leave on the 15th. 

On the 9th I informed the Government that the greater part of the old 
troops were going out of service, while the new levies, totally unacquainted 
with the rudiments of military training, would be unmanageable before an 
enemy. Therefore, I asked authority from the President to collect through- 
out the states educated officers who had seen service. With them I could 
make a framework on which to organize an army. My request was granted, 
and I acted upon it at once. 

On the 10th Prentiss reported from Cairo that the enemy were again con- 
centrating and intrenching at New Madrid about ten thousand strong. 
* Before my arrival at St. Louis General Lyon had borne a decisive and 
important part in Missouri. Together with Francis P. Blair, the younger, he 
had saved Missouri from secession. For this reason I had left his movements 
to his own discretion, but had myself made every possible effort to reenforce 
him. The defeat at Bull Run had made a change in affairs from that which 
was existing when General Lyon left Boonville for Springfield on the 5th of 
July. To any other officer in his actual situation, I should have issued per- 
emptory orders to fall back upon the railroad at Rolla. 

On the 6th I had sent an officer by special engine to Rolla, with dispatches 
for Lyon, and for news of him. In his letter of August 9th, the day before 
the battle, Lyon states, in answer to mine of the 6th, that he was unable to 
determine whether he could maintain his ground or would have to retire. At 
a council of war a fortnight before the battle, the opinion of his officers was 
unanimous for retreating upon Rolla. 

On the 13th news reached me of the battle fought at Wilson's Creek on 
the 10th between about 6000 Union troops, under Lyon, and a greatly superior 
force under Price and McCulloch. I was informed that General Lyon had been 
killed, and that the Union troops under Sigel were retreating unmolested upon 
Rolla. In telegraphing a report of the battle to Washington, I informed the 
Department of the need of some organized force to repel the enemy, reported 


to be advancing on other points in considerable strength. I again asked the 
Secretary of War for Groesbeck's 39th Ohio regiment, and to order from 
the governors' of Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin their disposable force. 
I informed him that we were badly in want of field artillery and that few 
small-arms had arrived. I also asked the President to read my dispatches. 

Dissensions in the camp of the enemy prevented them from nsing their 
success, and I made and pushed forward as. rapidly as possible dispositions 
for the defense of the city and State. I reenforced Rolla, which was the 
receiving-place for troops destined for the South-west. The plan of defense 
adopted was to fortify Girardeau and the termini of the railroads at Iron- 
ton, Rolla, and Jefferson City, with St. Louis as a base ; holding these places 
with sufficient garrisons and leaving the army free for operations in the field. 
These points I connected by telegraph lines centering at headquarters. St. 
Louis was the base and center of operations and depot of reserves. Six 
thousand men, working night and day, were employed upon the fortifications, 
which commanded the city itself, as well as the surrounding country, upon a 
line of about ten miles. All the railroads entering the city I connected at 
one depot, more cars were added, and on twenty-four hours' notice 10,000 
men could have been moved upon them from any one point to the opposite 
side of the State. 

The officer who had been sent within the Confederate lines had returned, 
bringing important information concerning the position of the enemy, 
together with the rough maps required, indicating, among other points, the 
positions of Forts Henry and Donelson, then in course of construction. I 
sent him back immediately to make examinations of the Tennessee and Cum- 
berland with reference to the use of those rivers by gun-boats, and also to 
watch the enemy's moves toward the Cairo district. 

In answer to my appeal to the loyal governors for troops, regiment after 
regiment arrived at St. Louis from the whole North-west, but they were 
entirely without tents or camp equipage. The chief quartermaster of my 
department was an officer of the regular army, Major McKinstry, experienced, 
able, and energetic. But there were no supplies on hand, of any kind, to meet 
the necessities of the troops arriving without notice, and entirely unpro- 
vided. In this exigency he made requisition on the head of his department 
in Washington, but was informed in reply that the department could not 
meet the requisitions that were being made by the Army of the Potomac ; 
that the preservation of the capital was deemed of more importance than the 
State of Missouri ; that their entire time and attention was devoted to meet- 
ing requisitions made upon them; that General Fremont had full power, 
and that he, as Fremont's chief quartermaster, must use his own judgment 
and do the best he could toward meeting the wants of the department. 

In July, at Washington, the subject of mortar-boats for the Mississippi 
expedition had been discussed between General M. C. Meigs, Gustavus V. 
Fox, afterward the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and myself, and had 
been referred to me for decision, as having in charge military operations 
on the Mississippi. On the 31st of July the Secretary of War directed 



that the 16 nine-inch guns made 
at Pittsburg for the navy should 
be forwarded to me with the great- 
est dispatch, and that 30 thirteen- 
inch mortars be made as soon as 
possible and forwarded to me, to- 
gether with shells for both guns 
and mortars. On the 24th of 
August I directed the construction 
of 38 mortar-boats, and later of 8 
steam-tugs to move them, and the 
purchase and alteration into gun- 
boats of two strongly built river 
vessels, the New Era, a large 
ferry-boat, and the Submarine, a 
powerful snag-boat ; they were re- 
named Essex and Benton. At my 
suggestion and order, the sides of 
all these vessels were to be clad 
with iron. On the 3d of September 
General Meigs advised me to- order 
from Pittsburg fifteen-inch guns 
for my gun-boats, as "able to empty 
any battery the enemy could make." 
Work on these gun-boats was driv- 
en forward night and day. As in 
the case of the fortifications, the 
work was carried on by torchlight. 

August 25th an expedition was 
ordered under Colonel G. Waagner 
with one regiment, accompanied 
by Commander John Rodgers with 

two gun-boats, to destroy the enemy's fortifications that were being con- 
structed at Belmont. [See map, page 263.] 

August 28th I assigned Brigadier-General U. S. Grant to the command of 
South-east Missouri, with headquarters at Cairo. He was fully instructed 
concerning the actual and intended movements on the Mississippi and the 
more immediate movements upon the Kentucky shore, together with the 
intention to hold the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. In his 
written instructions General Grant was directed to act in concert with Com- 
mander Rodgers and Colonel Waagner, and to take possession of points 
threatened by the Confederates on the Missouri and Kentucky shores. 

August 31st Captain Neustadter was ordered to Cairo, to select a site opposite 
Paducah for a battery to command the mouth of the Tennessee river. 

September 4th I sent heavy guns and an artillery officer to Cairo, where 
General Grant had just arrived from Girardeau. I telegraphed the President 
informing him that the enemy was beginning to occupy, on the Kentucky 



shore, every good point between Padneah and Hickman, and that Paducah 
should be occupied by us. I asked him now to include Kentucky in my 

September 5th I sent to General Grant a letter of instruction, in which I 
required him to push forward with the utmost speed all work on the point 
selected on the Kentucky shore ten miles from Paducah, to be called Fort 
Holt. In this letter I directed him to take possession of Paducah if he felt 
strong enough to do so ; but if not, then to plant a battery opposite Paducah 
on the Illinois side to command the Ohio River and the mouth of the Tennes- 
see. On the evening of the day on which this letter was sent to General Grant, 
the officer who had been sent by me within the Confederate lines reached 
Cairo on his way to St. Louis to let me know that the enemy was advancing 
on Paducah. He judged it right to inform General Grant, urging him to take 
Paducah without delay. General Grant decided to do so, and in accordance 
with his instructions of the 28th immediately moved on Paducah with an 
adequate force and two gun-boats. He reached the town on the morning of 
the 6th, having only about six hours' advance of the enemy. Taking undis- 
puted possession, he returned to Cairo the same day. 

In answer to my persistent application for Colonel C. F. Smith he was 
ordered to join me, having meantime been made by the President a brigadier- 
general at my special request. I at once sent him forward to the command I 
had designed for him, Paducah and the Kentucky shore of the Mississippi. 
His letter of instructions made known to him all the previous measures taken 
to hold the Kentucky shore and the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumber- 
land. The execution of this part of my plans broke in upon the Confederate 
lines, drove them back, and dispersed their combinations for transferring the 
war to the loyal States. 

I now on the 8th of September wrote to the President, giving him in the 
following extract the general features of my plan of campaign : 

. . . . "As the rebel forces outnumber ours, and the counties of Kentucky between 
the Mississippi and Tennessee rivers, as well as those along the latter and the Cumberland, 
are strongly secessionist, it becomes imperatively necessary to have the cooperation of the 
loyal Union forces under Generals Anderson and Nelson, as well as of those already encamped 
opposite Louisville, under Colonel Rousseau. I have reenforced, yesterday, Paducah with two 
regiments, and will continue to strengthen the position with men and artillery. As soon as 
General Smith, who commands there, is reenforced sufficiently to enable him to spread his 
forces, he will have to take and hold Mayfield and Lovelaceville, to be in the rear and flank of 
Columbus, and to occupy Smithland, controlling in this way the mouths of both the Tennessee 
and the Cumberland rivers. At the same time Colonel Rousseau should bring his force, in- 
creased if possible, by two Ohio regiments, in boats to Henderson, and, taking the Henderson 
and Nashville railroad, occupy Hopkiasville ; while General Nelson should go with a force of 
five thousand by railroad to Louisville, and from there to Bowling Green. As the population in 
all the counties through which the above railroads pass are loyal, this movement could be made 
without delay or molestation to the troops. Meanwhile General Grant would take possession 
of the entire Cairo and Fulton railroad, Piketon, New Madrid, and the shore of the Mississippi 
opposite Hickman and Columbus. The foregoing disposition having been effected, a combined 
attack will be made upon Columbus, and, if successful in that, upon Hickman, while Rousseau 
and Nelson will move in concert by railroad to Nashville, Tenn., occupying the State capital, 
and, with an adequate force, New Providence. The conclusion of this movement would be a 
combined advance toward Memphis, on the Mississippi, as well as the Memphis and Ohio railroad." 



Meantime the untoward and obstructing conduct of the people of Missouri 
had decided me to assert the power of the Government. Accordingly, on 
the 30th of August, I issued a proclamation affixing penalties to rebellion 
and extending martial law over the State of Missouri. By this proclamation 
the property of persons in rebellion against the United States was held to 
be confiscated, and their slaves were declared free. As a war measure this, 
in my opinion, was equal to winning a 
deciding battle. The President disap- 
proved it, as likely to lose us Kentucky, 
the loyalty of which was so strained and 
the temper of which was so doubtful, 
that he had agreed to the neutral atti- 
tude Kentucky demanded. He desired 
me to withdraw it as of my own motion. 
Unwilling to put myself in this position, 
I asked him to order it withdrawn, which 
he did. Shortly following upon this act, I 
was in many ways made to feel the with- 
drawal from me of the confidence and 
support of the Administration, but, ac- 
ceding to strong representations from 
leading citizens of St. Louis, I did not 
resign my command. 

I had already been brought into col- 
lision with the intrigues of men who were 
in confidential relations with the President, and the occasion was promptly 
seized by them to urge misrepresentations which were readily accepted 
as reasons for my removal. The visits of high officers charged with inquiry 
into the affairs of my department, and the simultaneous and sustained 
attacks of leading journals, accumulated obstructions and weakened my 
authority. In fact, my command at the end of August had virtually 
existed little over a month ; but the measures which I had initiated had 
already taken enduring shape, and eventually worked their intended result. 

The inadequate space to which I am restricted compels me to pass over 
here the circumstances which made inevitable the loss of Lexington, upon 
which Price advanced after his victory at Wilson's Creek. All possible efforts 
were made to relieve Colonel Mulligan, but, notwithstanding the large concen- 
tration of troops for his relief, these efforts were baffled by absolute want of 
transportation and by river obstructions. To the Confederate general it was 
a barren success, and he was shortly forced to retreat to the south-west. As 
a military position Lexington was of no value to him. In the midst of the 
demand for troops for Lexington, I was on the 14th ordered by General Scott 
to " send five thousand well-armed infantry to Washington without a moment's 
delay." Two thousand were sent. 

At the end of September I left St. Louis to take the field against Price. The 
army numbered 38,000 men. To complete the defenses of St. Louis, after 



the advance of the army, I left 5 regiments of infantry, with 1 battalion of 
cavalry, and 2 batteries of field artillery. The five divisions which com- 
posed it were 'assigned positions, their lines of march converging to Spring- 
field; and in the beginning of October I moved against Price. Transportation 
and, consequently, supplies were very inadequate ; but in exigencies an army 
sometimes moves without either. The Sejitember rains were over ; the fine 
weather of the Indian summer had come ; the hay was gathered, and the corn 
was hardening, and we were about to carry out the great object of the cam- 
paign with fewer hardships from exposure, and fewer impediments from 
want of transport, than could have been expected at any other season. The 
spirit of the army was high. A finer body of men could not have been 
brought together, and we had every reason to believe that the campaign 
would open with a signal victory in the defeat or dispersion of the enemy, 
with a move on Memphis as the immediate result. Had I possessed means 
of transport when Price moved on Lexington I should have compelled him 
to give me battle on the north side of the Osage ; as he could not cross the 
Missouri without exposing himself to certain defeat, 110 other course would 
have remained open to him. In fact, when I did go forward, the appearance 
of my advance at Sedalia was the signal for his precipitate retreat. The 
first contact now with the enemy was at Fredericktown and Springfield, the 
former one of the most admirably conducted engagements of the war, and the 
latter action a glorious victory. Along the whole extent of our lines we 
were uniformly successful against the enemy. 

At the end of October I was in Springfield with 21,000 effective men. 
Price had terminated his retreat, and his movements showed that he had 
decided to offer battle. This was confirmed by information obtained from 
his headquarters that the Missourians were refusing to leave the State. 

Recognizing the rights of humanity, and remembering that this conflict was 
among our own people, and that the whole State of Missouri was a battle-field, 
General Price and myself had been engaged in arranging the terms of a con- 
vention which was concluded and signed by us on the 1st of November. It 
provided : 1st, for an exchange of prisoners, hitherto refused by our Govern- 
ment ; 2d, that guerrilla fighting should be suppressed, and the war confined 
to the organized armies in the field ; 3d, that there should be no arrests for 
opinion, the preservation of order being left to the State courts. 

Generals Asboth and Sigel, division commanders, now reported that the 
enemy's advance-guard was at Wilson's Creek, nine miles distant, several 
thousand strong ; his main body occupying the roads in the direction of Cass- 
ville, at which place General Price had his headquarters with his reserves. 
On November 2d the dispositions for the expected battle were being planned, 
when late in the evening a messenger arrived bearing an order from General 
Scott which removed me from my command. This order had been hurried 
forward by General Hunter, who superseded me, and who was behind with 
his division. The next day, Hunter not arriving, the plan of battle was 
agreed on, the divisions were assigned conformably, and in the evening 
the troops began to occupy their positions. About 10 o'clock at night 



Hunter arrived at my 
headquarters, where the 
officers were assembled. 
I handed to him the plan 
of battle and turned over 
my command. 

The order which gave 
my command to General 
Hunter was dated Octo- 
ber 24th, and had been 
sent to one of my sub- 
ordinate officers in St. 
Louis, to be served on 
me at his discretion. Ac- 
companying it was a 
letter from the President 
in which he directed that 
it should not be served 
on me if I had fought a 
battle or was about to 
fight one. His intention 
was disregarded ; the or- 
der was put in force 
when both ourselves 
and the enemy were 
ready and intending bat- 
tle. In the face of posi- 
tive knowledge, General Hunter assumed that there was no enemy near 
and no battle possible, and withdrew the army, ^r 

The correctness of the operations in this campaign to meet the intended 
movements of the enemy, have all been corroborated and proved by subse- 
quent information. My expenditures^) raise and equip this army were 
vindicated and sustained by decisions of the United States courts. The 
establishment of martial law at St. Louis, which was denounced as arbitrary 
and unnecessary, was maintained and acted upon by all my successors until 
peace was declared ; and the fortifications of that city, upon which all lines of 
defense rested, aided its enforcement and made the dyke between the North- 
west and the South. The taking of Paducah, for which I was censured, has 
since been made the pivot of success to others. And the gun-boats, for the 
preparation of which, also, I was censured, the work being countermanded as 
a " useless extravagance," became historic in the progress of the war. 




Q In support of the facts, I quote from the 
report of General McCulloch to his Secretary of 
War, at the close of this Missouri campaign: "We 
met next day at a point between the two armies 
where it was agreed upon by all the Missouri gen- 
erals that we should wait an attack from the enemy. 

the ground to be selected by General Price and 
myself." Official Eecords, III., 748. J. C. F. 

Hunter's withdrawal was in pursuance of in- 
structions of a general nature from President Lin- 
coln, dated October 24th, 1801, and accompanying 
the orders relieving General Fremont. Editors. 




BOUT the middle of July,~1861, the Army of the Union in 
south-west Missouri, under General Nathaniel Lyon, was 
encamped in and near the town of Springfield, and num- 
bered approximately 6200 men, of whom about 500 were 
ill-armed and undisciplined " Home Guards." The organ- 
ized troops were in all 5868, in four brigades. By the 
9th of August these were reduced to an aggregate of 
about 5300 men, with the 500 Home Guards additional. 
Of these troops, the 1st Iowa regiment was entitled to 
discharge on the 14th of August, and the 3d and 5th 
Missouri, Sigel's and Salomon's, at different periods, by 
companies, from the 9th to the 18th of August. All 

except the regulars had been enrolled since the attack on 
Sumter in April, and but little time had been possible for 
drill and instruction. They had been moved and marched 
from St. Louis and points in Kansas, taking part in sev- 
eral spirited but minor engagements, and were ill-provided with clothing and 
food, but their spirits were undaunted, and they were devoted to their leader. 
The latter part of July was spent by Lyon in drilling his troops and 
procuring supplies, the mills in the neighborhood having been seized and 
employed in grinding flour for the troops. He continued to send urgent 
appeals to St. Louis for reinforcements. 

On the 1st of August, however, having received information of an advance 
by the enemy, in superior numbers, Lyon moved down the Fayetteville road 
(also known as the Cassville road) to meet and attack the largest and most 
advanced force, hoping to drive it back and then strike the others in detail. 
A lively skirmish with Price's advance-guard, under Rains, took place at 
Dug Springs on the 2d of August ; and on the 3d a more insignificant affair 
occurred with the rear-guard of Rains's forces at McCullah's farm, which had 
been his headquarters, but from which he retired without resistance. Here 
Lyon became convinced he was being drawn farther and farther from his 
base, without supplies, and he determined to fall back to Springfield, which 
place he reached on the 5th. During those blistering August days the men 
inarched with bleeding feet and parched lips, Lyon himself urging forward 
the weary and footsore stragglers. 

On the 8th a march in force was planned for the following night, to make 
an attack on the enemy's front at Wilson's Creek at daylight. From this 
intention General Lyon was dissuaded, after having called together the 
principal officers to receive their instructions. Many of the troops were 
exhausted, and all were tired ; moreover, some supplies having arrived from 

VOL. I. 19 289 



Note to the Map. 

The engagement began at 5:30 a.m., Lyon's ad- 
vance driving Rains over Bloody Hill. Price's lino 
as formed to confront the main attack by Lyon 
about 6:30 was, from left to right, as follows: .Mo- 
Bride, Parsons i with Guibor'sbattery), Clark, Slack, 
and Rains. This force numbered 3168 men with i 
guns, and was opposed by nearly 2000 men with 10 
gnus. The right of the first Union line was hold by 
the 1st Missouri; on its left were Totten's batten 
Osterhaus's battalion, the 1st Kansas, DuBois's bat- 
tery, and Steele's battalion. Later, the 1st Kansas 
was relieved by the 1st Iowa (800), and the 1st Mis- 
souri by the 2d Kansas ifiOOi, and by Steele. This 
brought the Union strength at this point up to 3550. 
Meanwhile, Robert's 3d Louisiana and Mcintosh's 
regiment and McRae's battalion, together num- 
bering 1320, moved down from their encampment 
(marked " McCulloch's bri- 
gade"), crossed the road, 
and repulsed Plummer's 300 
in the corn-field, but were 
driven back by DuBois's bat- 
tery. By this hour (8 o'clock) 
Sigel had attacked on the 
rear and had driven Church- 
ill's infantry and Greer's 
and Major's cavalry out of 
their camps. McCullocb 
now gathered up part of 
the 3d Louisiana and routed 
Sigel's troops, who were at 
Sharp's farm. He was aided 
in this by the fire of Keid's 
and Bledsoe's batteries. 
Woodruff's battery had 
from the start chiefly en- 
gaged Totten; and now 
Churchill, and next Greer's 
and Carroll's cavalry, and 
afterward Gratiot's regi- 
ment (of Pearce's brigade) 
were conducted to the aid 
of Price, raising his force 
to 4239, exclusive of Greer 
and Carroll, who had been 
quickly repulsed by Totten ; 
Lyon's being as above, 
3550, exclusive of 220 of 
Plummer's and 350 of the 
Mounted Reserve. General 
Lyon was killed at 10 : 30. 
just as Pearce's fresh regi- 
ments (under Walker and 
Locke ry) and the 3d Loui- 
siana were coming up. At 
11:30 Major Sturgis with- 
drew the Union army, which 
was then outnumbered two 

t0 ne ' EDITORS. 


^ imposition. 

9 * &. 



Rolla, it was deemed wise to clothe and shoe the men as far as practicable, 
and to give them another day for recuperation. 

On the 9th it was intended to march that evening with the whole force 
united, as agreed upon the 8th, and attack the enemy's left at daylight, and 
Lyon's staff were busied in visiting the troops and seeing that all things were 
in order. During the morning Colonel Sigel visited Lyon's headquarters, and 
had a prolonged conference, the result of which was that Colonel Sigel was 
ordered to detach his brigade, the 3d and 5th Missouri, one six-gun bat- 
tery, one company of the 1st U. S. Cavalry, under Captain Eugene A. Carr, 
and one company of the 2d Dragoons, under Lieutenant Charles E. Farrand, 
for an attack upon the enemy from the south, while Lyon with the remainder 
of his available force should attack on the north. 

The troops were put in march in the evening; those about Springfield 
immediately under General Lyon moving out to the west on the Little York 
road until joined by Sturgis's command from their camps, when they turned 
to the south across the prairie. The head of the main column reached the 
point where the enemy's pickets were expected to be found, about 1 a. m., and 
went into bivouac. Sigel's force, consisting of 1200 men and six pieces of 
artillery, moved four miles down the Fayetteville road, and then, making a 
long detour to the left by a by-road, arrived within a mile of the enemy's 
(amp and rear at daylight. 

In the vicinity of the Fayetteville road crossing, the creek acquires con- 
siderable depth, and in most places has rough, steep, and rather high banks, 
rendering fording difficult. On the left side the hills assume the proportion 
of bluffs ; on the right or western bank the ground is a succession of broken 
ridges, at that time covered for the most part with trees and a stunted growth 
of scrub oaks with dense foliage, which in places became an almost impene- 
trable tangle. Rough ravines and deep gullies cut up the surface. 

The Confederates were under command of General Ben. McCulloch. On 
the west side of the stream, " Old Pap " Price, .with his sturdy Missourians, 
men who in many later battles bore themselves with a valor and determina- 
tion that won the plaudits of their comrades and the admiration of their 
foes, was holding the point south of Wilson's Creek, selected by Lyon for 
attack. Price's command consisted of five bodies of Missourians, under Slack, 
Clark, Parsons, McBride, and Rains, the last-named being encamped farther 
up the stream. On the bluffs on the east side of the creek were Hebert's 
3d Louisiana and Mcintosh's Arkansas regiment, and, farther south, Pearce's 
brigade and two batteries, while other troops, under Greer, Churchill, and 
Major, were in the valley along the Fayetteville road, holding the extreme 
of the Confederate position. 

Lyon put his troops in motion at early dawn on the 10th, and about 4 
o'clock struck Rains's most advanced picket, which escaped and gave warning 
of the attack, of which General Price was informed just as he was about to 
breakfast. Captain Plummer's battalion of regular infantry was the advance, 
followed by Osterhaus's two companies of the 2d Missouri Volunteers, and 
Totten's battery. A body of 200 mounted Home Guards was on Plummer's left. 


Having reached the enemy's pickets, the infantry was deployed as skirmish- 
ers, Plummer to the left and Osterhans to the right, and Lientenant-Colonel 
Andrews, with the 1st Missouri Infantry, was brought up in support of the 
battery. Advancing a mile and a half and crossing a brook tributary to the 
creek, the Union skirmishers met and pushed the Confederate skirmishers up 
the slope. This disclosed a considerable force of the enemy, along a ridge per- 
pendicular to the line of march and to the valley of the creek, which was 
attacked by the 1st Missouri and the 1st Kansas, assisted by Totten's battery, 
who drove back the Confederates on the right to the foot of the slope beyond. 

Plummer on the left early became separated from the main body by a deep 
ravine terminating in a swampy piece of ground, beyond which lay a corn- 
field which he entered, encountering a large force, the main part of which 
was the Louisiana regiment. These troops fought with determined valor 
and checked Plummer's progress. DuBois's battery was moved up to a hill 
on the left, supported by Osterhaus's battalion, the 1st Iowa, and the 2d Kan- 
sas, and opened a deadly fire with shells upon the corn-field, with such 
marked effect as to throw the Confederates into disorder and enable Plum- 
mer to draw off his command in good order across the ravine. 

A momentary lull occurred at this time, except on our extreme right, where 
Price's Missourians opposed the 1st Missouri and attempted to turn that flank, 
1 )ut the 2d Kansas by its timely arrival and gallant attack bore back Price's 
overwhelming numbers and saved the flank. Meanwhile Totten's battery, 
which had been brought into action by section and by piece as the conforma- 
tion of the ground would admit, performed extraordinary service. Steele's 
regular infantry was added to its support. Price's troops had fought with 
great bravery and determination, advancing and retiring two or three times 
before they were compelled to give way on the lower slope of the ridge they 
had occupied. Many times the firing was one continuous roar. 

The lull enabled the enemy to re-adjust his lines and bring up fresh troops, 
having accomplished which, Price made a determined advance along nearly 
the whole of Lyon's front. He charged fiercely in lines of three or four 
ranks, to within thirty or forty yards, pouring in a galling fire and directing 
his most determined efforts against Totten's battery, for which Woodruff's, 
which was pitted against it, was no match at all. J 

Every available man of Lyon's was now brought into action and the bat- 
tle raged with redoubled energy on both sides. For more than an hour the 
balance was about even, one side gaining ground only to give way in its turn 
to the advance of the other, till at last the Confederates seemed to yield, and 
a suspension of the fury took place. 

Ceneral Lyon had bivouacked near the head of his column on the 
night of the 9th, sharing a rubber-coat with Major (now Major-Greneral) 
John M. Schofield, his chief of staff, between two rows of corn in a field by 
the roadside, his other staff-officers near by. He did not seem hopeful, but was 

\ Woodruff's Little Rock battery was composed had been in command. Woodruff and his gun- 
of guns which had been captured at the seizure of ners had, in fact, been drilled and instructed by 
the Little Bock arsenal, of which Captain Totten Totten. Editors. 



oppressed with the responsibility 
of his situation, with anxiety for 
the cause, and with sympathy for 
the Union people in that section, 
when he should retreat and leave 
to their fate those who could not 
forsake their homes. He repeat- 
edly expressed himself as having 
been abandoned by his superi- 
ors. When the troops were put 
in motion, he went at the head 
of the column, and when the 
action opened he kept his place 
at the front, entering the heat 
of the engagement with the line, 
near Totten's battery. He main- 
tained an imperturbable cool- 
ness, and his eye shone with the 
ardor of conflict. He directed, < >n- 
couraged, and rallied his troops 
in person, sending his staff in all 
directions, and was frequently 
without an attendant except one 
or two faithful orderlies. Early 
in the attack while on the line to the left of Totten's battery, rallying a part 
of the 1st Missouri Infantry, his horse, which he was leading, was killed 
and he received a slight wound in the leg. Shortly afterward he was wounded 
in the head. He continued dismounted dming the contest above described, 
and walking a few paces toward the rear with his chief of staff, Major Seho- 
field, who had also lost his horse, shot under him, Lyon said, " I fear the day 
is lost." Schofield encouraged him to take a more hopeful view of the case, 
assuring him that the troops were easily rallied and were gaining confidence, 
and that the disorder was only temporary, and then proceeded to another 
part of the line in search" of a mount. 

About 9 o'clock, during a brief cessation in the firing, Lyon started 
toward the top of the ridge, accompanied by an aide, who was urging him to 
accept his horse, when they met Major Sturgis and a few troopers. One of 
these was dismounted, and his horse was given to General Lyon. Lyon also 
expressed himself despondingly to Sturgis, and was by him encouraged. 
Sturgis proceeded to another quarter, and Lyon toward DuBois's battery. 

About this time great anxiety began to be felt for the fate of Sigel's command. 
Shortly after Lyon's attack the sound of battle had been heard in the rear of 
the enemy's line. It continued but a short time, and was renewed shortly after- 
ward for a very brief period only, when it ceased altogether. Sigel had pro- 
ceeded to within a mile of the camps, and his cavalry had cut off the enemy's 
small parties and thus suppressed information of his coming. He then 




advanced his infantry toward the point 
where the by-road crosses the creek, his 
flanks supported by the cavalry on the 
right and dragoons on the left, four 
guns being placed on a hill overlooking 
the tents. At about 5:30 a. m., hear- 
ing the musketry on Lyon's front, he 
opened fire with his guns, pushing his 
infantry across the creek and into the 
lower camp, whence they had fled, over- 
whelmed by the suddenness of the at- 
tack. Sigel crossed his guns and pushed 
with infantry and artillery forward a 
short distance in pursuit, meeting with 
slight resistance. He advanced from his 
first position near the creek, by a road 
west of the deserted camp, and formed 
line of battle in a field between the 
road and the camp. Afterward he 
advanced to Sharp's house. The Ar- 
kansans and Texans retired to the 
northward, fell in with Price's Missouri 
line, and assisted in the fight against 
Lyon. Meanwhile McCulloch called 
upon a battalion of mounted Missouri- 
ans, and upon a part of the Louisiana 
regiment which had been confronting 
Plummer in the corn-field, and with 
these attacked Sigel's men, who were 
in line at Sharp's farm, and drove them 
from the field. When the attack by 
the Confederates, from the direction of 
Lyon's front, was made, the confusion 
of Sigel's men was brought about by 
the enfilading fire of Reid's battery east 
of the creek, and by the belief that 
the infantry in their front were friends. 
Sigel went back the way he came with 
a part of his command, including Carr's 
cavalry. All but the cavalry, who were 
ahead, were ambuscaded and, for the 
most part, killed or captured; Sigel 
narrowly escaped capture. Colonel Sal- 
omon with 450 of the troops retreated, 
by a detour to the west, to the Little 
York road, as did also Lieutenant Far- 






























rand, with the dragoons. The latter, finding himself with his company 
alone, forcibly detained a guide, and made up teams for one gun and one 
caisson of the' abandoned artillery, He was finally compelled to unhorse 
and leave the caisson, in order to put the animals to the gun. Thus by 10 
o'clock Sigel was out of the fight, and the enemy could turn his whole force 
upon Lyon. 

Meantime a body of troops was observed moving down the hill on the east 
bank of Wilson's Creek toward Lyon's left, and an attack by other troops 
from that direction was anticipated. Schofield deployed eight companies of 
the 1st Iowa and led them in person to repel this. They did so most gallantly 
after a sanguinary contest, effectually assisted by the fire from DuBois's bat- 
tery, which alone drove back the column on the opposite side of the stream 
before it began a crossing. 

Lyon, accompanied by an aide | and his six or eight orderlies, followed closely 
the right of the Iowa regiment. After proceeding a short distance, his atten- 
tion was called by the aide to a line of men drawn up on the prolongation of 
the left of our main line and nearly perpendicular to the 1st Iowa as it moved 
to the eastward. A party of horsemen came out in front of this line of the 
enemy and proceeded to reconnoiter. General Price and Major Emmett 
Mac Donald (who had sworn that he would not cut his hair till the Confed- 
eracy was acknowledged) were easily recognized. General Lyon started as if to 
confront them, ordering his party to " draw pistols and follow" him, when the 
aide protested against his exposing himself to the fire of the line, which was 
partly concealed by the mass of dense underbrush, and asked if he should 
not bring up some other troops. To this Lyon assented, and directed the 
aide to order up the 2d Kansas. The general advanced a short distance, 
joining two companies of the 1st Iowa, left to protect an exposed position. 

Colonel Mitchell of the 2d Kansas, near DuBois's battery, sent his lieutenant- 
colonel, Blair, to Lyon to ask to be put in action, and the two messengers 
passed each other without meeting. Lyon repeated his order for the regiment 
to come forward. The regiment moved promptly by the flank, and as it 
approached Lyon he directed the two companies of Iowa troops to go forward 
with it, himself leading the column, swinging his hat. A murderous fire was 
opened from the thick brush, the 2d Kansas deployed rapidly to the front 
and with the two companies of the 1st Iowa swept over the hill, dislodging 
the enemy and driving them back into the next ravine ; but while he was at 
the head of the column, and pretty nearly in the first fire, a ball penetrated 
Lyon's left breast, inflicting a mortal wound. He slowly dismounted, and as 
he fell into the arms of his faithful orderly, Lehmann, he exclaimed, " Leh- 
mann, I am killed," and almost immediately expired. Colonel Mitchell was 
also severely wounded about the same time and removed to the rear. 

Lieutenant Gustavus Schreyer and two of his men of the 2d Kansas bore 
the body of Lyon through the ranks, Lehmann bearing the hat and loudly 
bemoaning the death of his chief. In the line of file-closers the returning aide 
was met, who, apprehensive of the effect upon the troops, stopped the clamor 

I The writer. Editors. 



of the orderly, covered the general's features with his coat, and had the body 
carried to a sheltered spot near DuBois's battery. Surgeon Florence M. Cornyn 
was found and called upon to examine the lifeless body of the dead general, 
and having pronounced life extinct, the aide went to seek Sehofield and inform 
him of the calamity. He was met return- 
ing from the successful charge he had 
led, and at once announced that Major 
Sturgis should assume command, but vis- 
ited the remains of Lyon on his way to 
find Sturgis. These were taken charge 
of by the aide, and conveyed to the field- 
hospital, where the body was placed in a 
wagon and carefully covered. Strict or- 
ders were given that under no circum- 
stances was the body to be removed till 
the army returned to Springfield, after 
which the aide returned to the front to 
report to Major Sturgis for duty. 

The engagement on different parts of 
the line lasted about half an hour after 
Lyon's death, when the Confederates gave 
way, and silence reigned for nearly the 
same length of time. Many of the senior 
officers having been disabled, Sturgis as- 
sumed command, and the principal officers were summoned for consultation. 
This council and the suspended hostilities were soon abruptly terminated 
by the appearance of the Confederates along our entire front, where the 
troops had been readjusted in more compact form and were now more 
determined and cooler than ever. A battery planted on a hill in the front 
began to use shrapnel and canister, a species of ammunition which, so far 
as I know, the enemy had not fired before at the troops who were with 
General Lyon. 

DuBois's battery continued on the left supported by Osterhaus's battalion 
and the 1st Missouri ; the 1st Iowa, 1st Kansas, and the regular infantry sup- 
ported Totten's battery in the center, and the 2d Kansas held the extreme 
right. With unabated ardor and impetuosity the Confederates assailed this 
front and endeavored to gain the rear of the right flank, but Totten's battery 
in the center was the main point of assault. For the first time during this 
bloody day, the entire line maintained its position without flinching, the 
inexperienced volunteers vieing with the seasoned regulars in tenacity and 
coolness. J) The flash and roar were incessant, and the determined Southrons 
repeatedly advanced nearly to the muzzles of the pieces of their foes, only to 

]) This engagement is considered one of the se- fought upon American soil ; seldom has a bloodier 

verest of the war. Colonel Snead (in "The Fight one been fought on any modern field." Another 

for Missouri") says: " Never before considering participant, a Confederate officer, described it 

the number engaged had so bloody a battle been as " a mighty mean-fowt fight." Editors. 



be hurled back before the withering fire as from the blast of a furnace and to 
charge again with a like result. 

At a moment when the contest seemed evenly balanced, except for the 
overwhelming numbers of the Confederates on the field, Captain Gordon 
Granger, noted for his daring and intrepidity, rushed to the rear and brought 
up the supports of DuBois's battery, hurling them upon the enemy's right 
flank, into which they poured a murderous, deadly volley, which created a 
perfect rout along the whole front. \ Our troops continued to send a galling 
fire into the disorganized masses as they fled, until they disappeared, and the 
battle was ended. 

The order to withdraw was then given, and DuBois's battery with its sup- 
ports was moved to a hill and ridge in rear to cover the movement. Before 
the withdrawal of the main body took place, Captain Granger and others 
urged remaining on the ground, but Sturgis had received information of 
Sigel's rout, and in view of his depleted, worn-out forces and exhausted 
ammunition,, persisted in a return to Springfield. The infantry and artillery, 
as soon as Totten's disabled horses were replaced, left the scene of conflict, 
and, passing through the troops placed in rear, took up the march for Spring- 
field. On reaching the Little York road, a body of horsemen was seen to the 
west, which proved to be Lieutenant Farrand with his dragoons, leading in 
a remnant of Sigel's brigade, with the one piece of artillery he had saved. 
In his hand he carried a captured flag, which he trailed by his side. He was 
received with vociferous cheering, and became for the time the admiration 
of all, having marched around both armies and brought his command in safe, is 

On reaching Springfield, Sturgis found that Sigel had arrived there half 
an hour earlier. Regarding him as the senior, the command was given over 
to him. On the following morning the army withdrew. 

\ In his report Major Sturgis gave great praise the late general's staff, who carefully cared for it. 
to Gordon Granger, saying that he was "now sight- The house belonged to Governor John S. Phelps, 
ing a gun of DuBois's battery, and before the and as it had been determined early in the even- 
smoke had cleared away sighting one of Totten's ; ing that the troops would take up the retreat for 
at one moment reconnoitering the enemy, and the Eolla before daylight the n-ext morning, Mrs. 
next either bringing up reinforcements or rallying Phelps, a warm personal friend of General Lyon 
some broken line. To whatever part of the field during his sojourn in the town, was communicated 
I might direct my attention, there would I find with at her home in the country, and asked to have 
Captain Granger, hard at work at some important the remains buried on her farm till they could be 
service." Editors. removed. To this she gladly consented. The body 

fa About, this time, too, it was discovei'ed that was left in custody of surgeons who were to remain 
in order to gather up the wounded on the field behind, and the next day Mrs. Phelps took posses- 
the body of General Lyon had been taken from sion of it, and General Lyon was laid to rest in her 
the wagon in which it was placed and had been garden, just outside the town. His body was sub- 
left at the field-hospital. Lieutenant Canfield sequently removed to his home in Connecticut and 
with his company B, 1st Cavalry, was dispatched buried with military and civic honors. W. M.W. 
with a wagon to recover the general's body, and Lyon was born in Ashford, Conn., July 14th, 
the army moved on into Springfield, arriving 1818. He was graduated at West Point in 1841 , 
about 5 P. at. Lieutenant Canfield proceeded to and served in the army in Florida and in the war 
the battle-field, and before reaching there found with Mexico. He was bre vetted captain for gallant 
the Confederates had returned and engaged in gath- conduct at Churubusco and Contreras. From 1849 
ering their own wounded, and had foimd General to 1ST.:! he served in California, winning special 
Lyon's body. It was delivered by the enemy and mention for his services in frontier warfare. He 
was brought into the town to the house occupied as served afterward in Kansas, and from that State was 
Lyon's headcmarters, and was placed in charge of ordered to St. Louis in January, 18 61. Editors. 



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I STYLE this short account of my personal recollections of the battle of 
"Oak Hills" (as the Confederates named the engagement) as above, because 
I was identified with the State of Arkansas and her soldiers. I also 
believe that subsequent events, developed by the prominence of some of the 
commanders engaged in this fight, have had a tendency to obscure that just 
recognition which the Arkansas troops so nobly earned in this, one of the first 
great battles of our civil war. 

The ninth day of August, 1861, found the Confederate army under General 
Ben. McCulloch, camped on Wilson's Creek, ten miles south of Springfield, 
in south-west Missouri. It consisted of a Louisiana regiment under Colonel 
Louis Hebert (a well-drilled and well-equipped organization, chiefly from the 
north part of the State); Greer's Texas regiment (mounted); Churchill's 
Arkansas cavalry, and Mcintosh's battalion of Arkansas mounted rifles 
(Lieutenant-Colonel Embry), under the immediate charge of the commanding 
general ; General Price's command of Missouri State Guards, with Bledsoe's 
and Guibor's batteries, and my three regiments of Arkansas infantry, with 
Woodruff's and Reid's batteries. More than half the Missourians were 
mounted, and but few of the troops in the whole command were well armed. 
The army numbered in all about 11,500 men, perhaps, 6000 to 7000 of 
whom were in semi-fighting trim, and participated in the battle. 

The Federal forces under General Nathaniel Lyon, between 5000 and 6000 
strong, occupied the town of Springfield, and General McCulloch was expect- 
ing them to advance and give him battle. General McCulloch's headquarters 
were on the right of the Springfield road, east of Wilson's Creek, rather in 
advance of the center of the camp. General Price occupied a position 
immediately west, and in the valley of the creek, with his command mostly 
north of the Springfield road. I had established my headquarters on the 
heights east and south of Wilson's Creek and the Springfield road, with my 
forces occupying the elevated ground immediately adjacent. 

Detailed reports as to the strength and movements of Lyon's command 
were momentarily expected, through spies sent out by General Price, as 



McCulloch relied upon the native Missourians to furnish such knowledge; 
but it was not until late in the afternoon that two "loyal" ladies succeeded 
in passing out of the Federal lines, by permission of General Lyon, and, 
coming in a circuitous route by Pond Springs, reached General Price's head- 
quarters with the desired information. General McCulloch at once called a 
council of war of the principal officers, where it was decided, instead of wait- 
ing for the enemy, to march with the whole command, at 9 o'clock that 
night, and attack General Lyon at Springfield. As soon as the orders of 
General McCulloch had been properly published by his adjutant-general, 
Colonel Mcintosh, the camp was thrown into a ferment of suppressed 
excitement. It was ordered that the advance be made in three divisions, 
under the separate commands of General Price, Adjutant-General Mcintosh, 
and myself. The scene of preparation, immediately following the orders so 
long delayed and now so eagerly welcomed by the men, was picturesque and 
animating in the extreme. The question of ammunition was one of the most 
important and serious, and as the Ordnance Department was imperfectly 
organized and poorly supplied, the men scattered about in groups, to impro- 
vise, as best they could, ammunition for their inefficient arms. Here, a group 
would be molding bullets there, another crowd dividing percussion-caps, and, 
again, another group fitting new flints to their old muskets. They had little 
thought then of the inequality between the discipline, arms, and accouterments 
of the regular United States troops they were soon to engage in battle, and 
their own homely movements and equipments. It was a new thing to most 
of them, this regular way of shooting by word of command, and it was, per- 
haps, the old-accustomed method of using rifle, musket, or shot-gun as game- 
sters or marksmen that won them the battle when pressed into close quarters 
with the enemy. All was expectancy, and as the time sped on to 9 
o'clock, the men became more and more eager to advance. What was their 
disappointment when, as the hour finally arrived, instead of the order to 
march, it was announced that General McCulloch had decided, on account of 
a threatened rain, which might damage and destroy much of their ammuni- 
tion, to postpone the movement. The men did not " sulk in their tents," but 
rested on their arms in no amiable mood. This condition of uncertainty and 
suspense lasted well through the night, as the commanding officers were 
better informed than the men of the risks to be encountered, and of the prob- 
able result, in case they should make an aggressive fight against disciplined 
forces when only half prepared. Daybreak, on the 10th of August, found 
the command still at Wilson's Creek, cheerlessly waiting, many of the troops 
remaining in position, in line of march, on the road, and others returning' to 
camp to prepare the morning meal. 

Perhaps it was 6 o'clock when the long-roll sounded and the camp was 
called to arms. A few minutes before this, Sergeant Hite, of my body-guard, 
dashed up to my headquarters, breathless with excitement, hatless, and his 
horse covered with foam, exclaiming hurriedly, " General, the enemy is com- 
ing ! " " Where ! " said I, and he pointed in the direction of a spring, up a 
ravine, where he had been for water. He had been fired at, he said, by a 



picket of some troops advancing on the right flank. I ordered the sergeant 
to ride in haste to General McCulloch with this information, and proceeded 
to place my command in position. I was the better enabled to do this with- 
out delay, because I had on the day before, with Colonel R. H. Weightman, 
made a careful reconnoissance of the ground in the direction from which the 
enemy was said to be approaching. The colonels commanding were imme- 
diately notified, and the regiments m 
were formed and posted so as to meet 
his advance. Captain Woodruff's Lit- 
tle Rock (Ark.) battery was ordered 
to occupy a hill commanding the 
road to Springfield, and the 3d Ar- 
kansas Infantry (Colonel John R. 
Gratiot) was ordered to support him. 
I placed Captain Reid's Fort Smith 
(Ark.) battery on an eminence to 
command the approaches to our right 
and rear, and gave him the 5th Ar- 
kansas Infantry (Colonel T. P. Dock- 
ery) as a support. I then advanced 
the 4th Arkansas Infantry (Colonel 
J. D. Walker) north of this battery 
to watch the approach down the 
ravine, through which Sergeant Hite 
had reported that the enemy was 
coming. Thus, the Arkansas troops 
under my command had all been 
placed in favorable position, ready for action, within a very short time after 
the first alarm. 

While these events were taking place under my immediate notice, General 
McCulloch had been actively making disposition of the troops more nearly 
opposed to the first advance of the enemy, under General Lyon. He had 
posted the 3d Louisiana Infantry (Colonel Hebert) and Mcintosh's "2d 
Arkansas Rifles (dismounted) to meet the earliest demonstration from the 
direction of Springfield. General Price had also been industriously engaged 
in placing his troops to intercept the advancing foe. General Rains's (Mis- 
souri) command had the honor of giving the first reception to the main col- 
umn under General Lyon. He was ably supported by the gallant Missouri 
generals, Slack, McBride, Parsons, and Clark, with their respective brigades. 
The fighting at this juncture perhaps about 7 o'clock was confined to 
the corn-field north of Wilson's Creek, where the Louisiana infantry, with 
Lieutenant-Colonel Embry's 2d Arkansas Mounted Rifles (dismounted), all 
under the immediate command of Colonel Mcintosh, effectually charged and 
drove back the enemy. Simultaneously the battle opened farther west and 
south of Wilson's Creek, where the Missouri troops were attacked by the main 
column or right wing of the enemy. Totten's (Federal) battery was pushed 





forward, and took its first position on the side of Oak Hill, north of where the 
main fight afterward took place. I had directed Captain Woodruff, who was 
posted within easy range, to give attention to Totten, and the two batteries were 
soon engaged in a lively artillery duel, being well matched in skill and mettle. 
Lieutenant Weaver, of Woodruff's battery, was killed, and 4 of Totten's men 
were killed and 7 wounded in this engagement. General Lyon's right, although 
it had gained a temporary advantage in the early morning by surprising 
the Missourians, was roughly handled when they had recovered themselves. 
They were reenforced by Churchill's regiment, which had moved up from the 
extreme right, and the battle raged several hours while they held their ground. 
At this juncture a gallant charge was made by Greer's and Carroll's mounted 
regiments on Totten's battery, but it was not a complete success, as the 
gunners turned about and recovered their guns. 

In the early morning, perhaps simultaneously with the advance of Lyon, 
General Sigel, commanding the left column of the advance from Springfield, 
came upon our right and rear, first attacking Colonel Churchill's camp, as the 
men were preparing for breakfast, obliging them to retreat to an adjacent 
wood, where they were formed in good order. The surprise resulted from the 
movement of the night before, when pickets had been withdrawn that were 
not re-posted in the morning. Sigel did not wait for a fight, however, but 
advanced to, and had his battery unlimbered near, the Fayetteville road, west 
of Wilson's Creek, opposite and within range of Reid's battery as it was then 
in position as originally placed. Before he had discovered us, and perhaps in 
ignorance of our position, Reid attacked him, under my personal orders and 
supervision. Sigel's movement was a bold one, and we really could not tell, 
on his first appearance (there having been no fight with Churchill), whether 
he was friend or foe. An accidental gust of wind having unfurled his flag, 
we were no longer in doubt. Reid succeeded in getting his range accurately, 
so that his shot proved very effective. At this juncture, General McCulloch 
in person led two companies of the Louisiana infantry in a charge and capt- 
ured five of the guus.-^r General Sigel was himself in command, and made vain 
attempts to hold his men, who were soon in full retreat, back over the road 
they came, pursued by the Texas and Missouri cavalry. This was the last of 
Sigel for the day, as his retreat was continued to Springfield. As a precau- 
tion, however, not knowing how badly we had defeated Sigel, I immediately 
posted the 4th Arkansas Infantry (Colonel Walker) along the brow of the hill, 
commanding the road over which he had fled, which regiment remained on 
duty until the battle was over. 

There seemed now to be a lull in the active fighting ; the bloody contest in 
the corn-field had taken place; the fight "mit Sigel" had resulted satisfac- 
torily to us, but the troops more immediately opposed to General Lyon had 
not done so well. General Price and his Missouri troops had borne the brunt 
of this hard contest, but had gained no ground. They had suffered heavy 

& General McCulloeh's report says: " When we and soon the Louisianians were gallantly charging 

arrived near the enemy's battery we found that among the guns and swept the cannoneers away. 

Reid's battery had opened upon it, and it was Five guns were here taken." 
already in confusion. Advantage was taken of it, 


losses, and were running short of ammunition. I had watched anxiously for 
signs of victory to come from the north side of the creek, but Totten's bat- 
tery seemed to belch forth with renewed vigor, and was advanced once or 
twice in its imsition. The line of battle on our left was shortening, and the 
fortunes of war appeared to be sending many of our gallant officers and soldiers 
to their death. There was no de- 
moralization no signs of wavering 
or retreat, but it was an hour of great 
anxiety and suspense. No one then 
knew what the day would bring forth. 
As the sun poured down upon our 
devoted comrades, poised and rest- 
ing, as it were, between the chapters 
of a mighty struggle not yet com- 
pleted, the stoutest of us almost 
weakened in our anxiety to know the 

Just at this time, General Lyon 
appeared to be massing his men for 
a final and decisive movement. I 
had been relieved of Sigel, and Eeid's 
battery was inactive because it could 
not reach Totten. This was fortu- 
nate, for my command, in a measure 
fresh and enthusiastic, was about 
to embrace an opportunity such a 
one as will often win or lose a battle by throwing its strength to the 
weakened line at a critical moment and winning the day. Colonel Mcin- 
tosh came to me from General McCulloch, and Captain Greene from General 
Price, urging me to move at once to their assistance. General Lyon was 
in possession of Oak Hill ; his lines were forward, his batteries aggres- 
sive, and his charges impetuous. The fortunes of the day were balanced 
in the scale, and something must be done or the battle was lost. My men 
were eager to go forward, and when I led the 3d Arkansas Infantry (Colonel 
Gratiot) and the right wing of the 5th Arkansas Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel 
Neal) across the creek, and pushed rapidly up the hill in the face of the enemy, 
loud cheers went up from our expectant friends that betokened an enthusiasm 
which, no doubt, helped to win the fight. Colonel Mcintosh, with two pieces 
of Reid's battery, and with a part of Dockery's 5th Arkansas Infantry, sup- 
ported my right ; the Federal forces occupied two lines of battle, reaching 
across the crest of Oak Hill ; and at this juncture our troops in front were 
composed of the Missouri forces, under General Price (occupying the center) ; 
Texas and Louisiana troops, under General McCulloch (on the right), and 
my forces thrown forward (on the left), when a combined advance was ordered 
by General McCulloch. This proved to be the decisive engagement, and as 
volley after volley was poured against our lines, and our gallant boys were 



cut down like grass, those who survived seemed to be nerved to greater effort 
and a determination to win or die. At about this time (11 : 30 a. m.) the first 
line of battle before us gave way. Our boys charged the second line with a 
yell, and were soon in possession of the field, the enemy slowly withdrawing 
toward Springfield. This hour decided the contest and won for us the day. 
It was in our front here, as was afterward made known, that the brave com- 
mander of the Federal forces, General Lyon, was killed, gallantly leading his 
men to what he and they supposed was victory, but which proved (it may be 
because they were deprived of his enthusiastic leadership) disastrous defeat. 
In the light of the present day, even, it is difficult to measure the vast results 
had Lyon lived and the battle gone against us. 

General McCulloch, myself, and our staff-officers now grouped ourselves 
together upon the center of the hill. Woodruff's battery was again placed in 
position, and Totten, who was covering the retreat of Sturgis (who had 
assumed command of the Federal forces after the death of General Lyon), 
received the benefit of his parting shots. We watched the retreating enemy 
through our field-glasses, and were glad to sec Mm go. Our ammunition was 
exhausted, our men undisciplined, and we feared to risk pursuit. It was also 
rumored that reenf orcein ents were coming to the Federal army by forced 
marches, but it was found the next day that the disaster to the retreating 
army was greater than we had supposed, and a few fresh cavalry troops could 
doubtless have followed and captured many more stragglers and army stores, 
Next day the enemy evacuated Springfield, and Price, with his Missouri 
troops, occupied it, and had his supplies and wounded moved to that point. 

The Arkansans in this battle were as brave, as chivalrous, and as successful 
as any of the troops engaged. They bore out, on many a hard-fought field 
later on in the struggle, the high hopes built upon their conduct here. 

The "body of the army remained at Springfield taut one to take. General Price left Springfield on 
until the beginning of General Price's march upon the 25th of August, dispersed Lane's forces at 
Lexington, on the 25th of August. A few days Drywood, September 2d, and reached Warrensburg 
after the battle Pearce's brigade of Arkansas mili- in pursuit of Colonel Peabody at daybreak, Sep- 
tia was disbanded on the expiration of their term temberlOth; Peabody getting into Lexington first, 
of enlistment. General McCulloch moved west- Price, after a little skirmishing with Mulligan's 
ward with his own brigade, and then to Maysville, outpost, bivouacked within 2 1 ., miles of Lexington. 
Arkansas, being influenced in his return by the In the morning (12th) Mulligan sent out a small 
general tenor of his instructions from the Confed- force which burnt a bridge in Price's path. Price 
erate Government to avoid, if possible, operating then crossed to the Independence Eoad, and 
in the State of Missouri, which had not seceded, waited for his infantry and artillery. These came 
General Price, upon being informed of his decision, up in the afternoon, and Price then advanced to- 
issued an order re-assuming command, and the ward Lexington, and drove Mulligan behind his 
operations in the State which followed, including defenses. There was a little skirmishing in a 
tin- capture of Lexington, were conducted with corn-field and in a cemetery through which Price 
Missouri troops alone. At this time the Federal advanced, and in the streets of Lexington, where 
troops held the Missouri river by a cordon of mili- he opened upon Mulligan with 7 pieces of artil- 
tary posts. The object of this line was to prevent lery. Price's movement into Lexington in the af- 
file crossing of the river by the secessionists of ternoon of September 12th was only a reconnois- 
north Missouri, who, to the number of 5000 or sance in force. Toward dark he retired to the Fair 
<iui>0, were armed and organized and desirous of Ground, and waited for his trains to come up, and 
joining the army of General Price in south-west for reenforcements that were hurrying to him from 
Missouri. To break this blockade became the ob- all directions, including Harris's and Green's com- 
ject of General Price. Of the four Federal posts, mands from north of the Missouri. The invest- 
Jefferson City, Boonville, Lexington, and Kansas nient of Mulligan's position was made as shown on 
City, Lexington was the easiest and most impor- the map, page 309. Editors. 



/ \N August 9th, 1861, the day before the battle 
^^ at Wilson's Creek, my brigade, consisting of 
the 3d and 5th Missouri Infantry, commanded re- 
spectively by Lieutenant-Colonel Anselm Albert 
and Charles E. Salomon, and two batteries of artil- 
lery, each of 4 pieces, under the command of 
Lieutenants Schaefer and Schuetzenbach, was en- 
camped on the south side of Springfield, near the 
Yokermill road. On our right was encamped the 
1st Iowa Infantry, a regiment clad in militia gray. 
The bulk of General Lyon's forces wei*e on the 
west side of the city. During the morning I sent 
a staff-officer to General Lyon's headquarters for 
orders, and on his return he reported to me that 
a forward movement would take place, and that we 
must hold ourselves in readiness to march at a 
moment's warning directly from our camp, toward 
the south, to attack the enemy from the rear. I 
immediately went to General Lyon, who said that 
we would move in the evening to* attack the enemy 
in his position at Wilson's Creek, and that I was to 
be prepared to move with my brigade; the 1st 
Iowa would join the main column with him, while 
I was to take the Yokermill (Forsyth) road, then 
turn toward the south-west and try to gain the en- 
emy's rear. At my request, he said that he would 
procure guides aud some cavalry to assist me ; he 
would also let me know the exact time when I 
should move. I then asked him whether, on our 
an*ival near the enemy's position, we should attack 
immediately or wait until we were apprised of the 
fight by the other troops. He reflected a moment 
and then said : " Wait until you hear the firing on 
our side." The conversation did not last longer 
than about ten minutes. Between 4 and 5 o'clock 
in the afternoon I received the order to move at 
6:30 P. M. At 6 o'clock two companies of cavalry, 
under Captain Eugene A. Carr and Lieutenant 
Charles E. Farrand, joined us, also several guides. 
My whole force now consisted of 8 companies of 
the 3d and 9 companies of the 5th Missouri (912 
men), 6 pieces of artillery (85 men), and the 2 
companies of cavalry (121), in all, 1118 men. 

Precisely at 6 : 30 o'clock the brigade moved out 
of its camp ; after following the Yokermill road for 
about five miles we turned south-west into the 
woods, and found our way, with difficulty, to a point 
south of the enemy's camp, where we arrived be- 
tween 1 1 and 1 2 o'clock at night. There we rested. 
It was a dark, cloudy night, and a drizzling rain be- 
gan to fall. So far no news of our movement had 
reached the enemy's camp, as the cavalry in ad- 
vance had arrested every person on the road, and 
put guards before the houses in its neighborhood. 

At the first dawn of day we continued our advance 
for about a mile and a half, the cavalry patrols in 
front capturing forty men who had strolled into our 
line while looking for food and water, and who said 
that twenty regiments of Missouri, Arkansas, and 
Lotusiana troops were encamped not far distant in 

the valley beyond. Moving on, we suddenly found 
ourselves near a hill, from which we gained a full 
view of the camp. We halted a few moments, 
when I directed four pieces of our artillery to take 
position on the top of the hill, commanding the 
camp, while the infantry, with the other two pieces 
and preceded by Lieutenant Farrand's cavalry 
company, continued its march down the road to 
the crossing of Wilson's Creek. 

It was now 5:30 a. m. At this moment some 
musket-firing was heard from the north-west, an- 
nouncing the approach of General Lyon's troops ; 
I therefore ordered the four pieces to open fire 
against the camp, which had a " stirring" effect 
on the enemy, who were preparing breakfast. 
The surprise was complete, except that one of 
the enemy's cavalrymen made good his retreat 
from Lieutenant Farrand's dragoons and took the 
news of our advance to the other side (General 
Pearce's headquarters). I became aware of his 
escape, and believing that no time should be lost 
to lend assistance to our friends, we crossed Wil- 
son's Creek, took down the fences at Dixon's 
farm, passed through it and crossed Terrel (or 
Tyrel) Creek. (See map, page 290.) Not know- 
ing whether it would be possible to bring all our 
pieces along, I left the four pieces on the hill, with 
a support of infantry, and continued our march 
until we reached the south side of the valley, which 
extends northward to Sharp's house, about 3000 
paces, aud from west to east about 1000. We 
took the road on the west side of the valley, along 
the margin of the woods, and within a fence run- 
ning nearly parallel with the open fields. 

During this time a large body of the enemy's 
cavalry, about 2500 strong, was forming across 
the valley, not far distant from its northern ex- 
tremity ; I therefore halted the column on the 
road, sent for the four pieces left on the other 
side of the creek, and, as soon as their approach 
was reported to me, I directed the head of our 
column to the right, left the road, and formed the 
troops in line of battle, between the road and the 
enemy's deserted camp, the infantry on the left, 
the artillery on the right, and the cavalry on the 
extreme right, toward Wilson's Creek. A lively 
cannonade was now opened against the dense 
masses of the hostile cavalry, which lasted about 
twenty minutes, and forced the enemy to retire in 
disorder toward the north and into the woods. We 
now turned back into the road, and, advancing, 
made our way through a number of cattle near 
Sharp's house, and suddenly struck the Fayette- 
ville road, leading north to that part of the battle- 
field on which General Lyon's troops were engaged. 
We were now on the principal line of retreat of the 
enemy, and had ai'rived there in perfect order and 
discipline. Up to this time we had made fifteen 
miles, had been constantly in motion, had had a suc- 
cessful engagement, and the troops felt encouraged 




by what they had accomplished. It is, therefore, 
totally false, as rumor had it after the battle, that 
"Sigel's men" gave, themselves up to plundering 
the camp, became scattered, and were for this 
reason surprised by the " returning enemy." 

When we had taken our position ou the plateau 
near Sharp's, a cannonade was opened by me 
against a part of the enemy's troops, evidently 
forming the left of their line, confronting Lyon, as 
we could observe from the struggle going on in that 
direction. The firing lasted about 30 minutes. $ 

Suddenly the firing on the enemy's side ceased, 
and it seemed as if we had directed our own fire 
against Lyon's forces. I therefore ordered the 
pieces to cease firing. Just at this time it was 
between 9 and 10 o'clock there was a lull in the 
fight on the north side, and not a gun was heard, 
while squads of the enemy's troops, unarmed, came 
streaming up the road from Skegg's Brauch 
toward us and were captured. Meanwhile a part 
of McCulloch's force was advancing against us at 
Sharp's farm, while Eeid's battery moved into po- 
sition on the hill east of Wilson's Creek, and oppo- 
site our right flank, followed by some cavalry. 

All these circumstances the cessation of the 
firing in Lyon's front, the appearance of the ene- 
my's deserters, and the movement of Eeid's artil- 
lery and the cavalry toward the south led us into 
the belief that the enemy's forces were retreating, 
and this opinion became stronger by the report of 
Dr. Melcher, who was in advance on the road 
to Skegg's Branch, that " Lyon's troops " were 
coming up the road and that we must not fire. 
So uncertain was I in regard to the character of 
the approaching troops, now oidy a few rods dis- 
tant, that I did not trust to my own eyes, but sent 
Corporal Tod, of the 3d Missouri, forward to chal- 
lenge them. He challenged as ordered, but was 
immediately shot and killed. I instantly ordered 
the artillery and infantry to fire. But it was 
too late the artillery fired one or two shots, but 
the infantry, as though paralyzed, did not fire ; the 
3d Louisiana, which we had mistaken for the gray- 
clad 1st Iowa, rushed up to the plateau, while 
Bledsoe's battery in front and Eeid's from the 
heights on our right flank opened with canister at 
point-blank against us. As a matter of precaution 
I had during the last moment brought four of 
our pieces into battery on the right against the 
troops on the hill and Eeid's battery; but after 
answering Eeid's fire for a few minutes, the horses 
and drivers of three guns suddenly left their posi- 
tion, and with their caissons galloped down the 
Fayetteville road, in their tumultuous flight carry- 
ing panic into the rauks of the infantry, which 
turned back in disorder, and at the same time re- 
ceived the fire of the attacking Hue. 

On our retreat the right wing, consisting mostly 
of the 3d Missouri Infantry and one piece of artil- 
lery, followed the road we came, while the left 

} Colonel Graves, commanding the First Brigade, Mo. 
State Guards, says in his report: " Colonel Rosser, com- 
manding the 1st Regiment and Fourth Battalion, with 
Captain Bledsoe's artillery, being stationed on the ex- 
treme left, was attacked by Colonel Sigel's battery, and 
his men exposed to a deadly fire for thirty minutes." F. S. 

VOL. I. 20. 

wing, consisting of the 5th Missouri Infantry and 
another piece, went down the Fayetteville road, 
then, turning to the right (north-west), made its 
way toward Little York and Springfield ; on its 
way the latter column was joined by Lieutenant 
Farrand's cavalry company. Colonel Salomon was 
also with this column, consisting in all of about 
450 men, with 1 piece and caisson. I remained with 
the right wing, the 3d Missouri, which was consid- 
erably scattered. I re-formed the men duringtheir 
retreat into 4 companies, in all about 250 men, and, 
turning to the left, into the Fayetteville road, was 
joined by Captain Carr's company of cavalry. After 
considering that, by following the left wing toward 
Little York, we might be cut off from Springfield 
and not be able to join General Lyon's forces, we 
followed the Fayetteville road until we reached a 
road leading north-east toward Springfield. This 
road we followed. Captain Carr, with his cavalry, 
was leading; he was instructed to remain in ad- 
vance, keep his flankers out, and report what 
might occur in front. One company of the 3d 
Missouri was at the head of our little column of 
infantry, followed by the piece of artillery and two 
caissons, behind them the remainder of the infantry, 
the whole flanked on each side by skirmishers. So 
we marched, or rather dragged along as fast as the 
exhausted men could go, until we reached the ford 
at James Fork of the White Eiver. Carr had al- 
ready crossed, but his cavalry was not in sight ; it 
had hastened along without waiting for us ; & a 
part of the infantry had also passed the creek ; the 
piece and caissons were just crossing, when the 
rattling of musketry announced the presence of 
hostile forces on both sides of the creek. They 
were detachments of Missouri and Texas cavalry, 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Major, Captains Mabry 
and Eussell, that lay in ambush, and now pounced 
upon our jaded and extended column. It was in 
vain that Lieutenant-Colonel Albert and myself 
tried to rally at least a part of them ; they left the 
road to seek protection, or make good their escape 
in the woods, and were followed and hunted down 
by their pursuers. In this chase the greater part of 
our men were killed, wounded, or made prisoners, 
among the latter Lieutenant-Colonel Albert and 
my orderly, who were with me in the last moment 
of the affray. I was not taken, probably because 
I wore a blue woolen blanket over my uniform and 
a yellowish slouch-hat, giving me the appearance 
of a Texas Banger. I halted on horseback, pre- 
pared for defense, in a small strip of corn-field on 
the west side of the creek, while the hostile 
cavalrymen swarmed around and several times 
passed close by me. When we had resumed our 
way toward the north-east, we were immediately 
recognized as enemies, and pursued by a few 
horsemen, whose number increased rapidly. It was 
a pretty lively race for about six miles, when our 
pursuers gave up the chase. We reached Spring- 

3 Colonel Carr says in his official report : " It is 
a subject of regret with me to have left him [Sigel] 
behind, but I supposed all the time that he was close 
behind me till I got to the creek, and it would have done 
no good for my company to have been cut to pieces 
also." Editors. 



field at 4 : 30 in the afternoon, in advance of Stur- 
gis, who with Lyon's troops was retreating from 
the battle-field, and who arrived at Springfield, as 
he says, at 5 o'clock. The circumstance of my 
arrival at the time stated gave rise to the insinua- 
tion that I had forsaken my troops after their re- 
pulse at Sharp's house, and had delivered them to 
their fate. Spiced with the accusation of " plun- 
der," this and other falsehoods were repeated be- 
fore the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and 
a letter defamatory of me was dispatched to the 
Secretary of War (dated February 14th, 1862, 
six months after the battle of Wilson's Creek). 
I had no knowledge of these calumnies against me 
until long after the war, when I found them in print. 

In support of my statements, I would direct at- 
tention to my own reports on the battle and to the 
Confederate reports, especially to those of Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Hyams and Captain Vigilini, of the 
3d Louisiana ; also to the report of Captain Carr, 
in which he frankly states that he abandoned me 
immediately before my column was attacked at 
the crossing of James Fork, without notifying 
me of the approach of the enemy's cavalry. I 
never mentioned this fact, as the subsequent 
career of General Carr, his cooperation with me 
during the campaigns of General Fremont, and 
his behavior in the battle of Pea Ridge vindi- 
cated his character and ability as a soldier and 


The composition and losses of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the official records. 
K stands for killed ; w for wounded ; m w mortally wounded ; in for captured or missing ; c for captured. Editors. 


Brig.-Gen. Nathaniel Lyon (k). Major Samuel D. Sturgis. 

First Brigade, Major Samuel D. Sturgis: Regular Bat- 
talion (B. C, and D, 1st Infantry and Wood's company 
Rifle Recruits), Capt. Joseph B. Plummer; Battalion 2d 
Mo. Infantry, Major P. J. Osterhaus; F, 2d U. S. Arty.. 
Capt. James Totten ; Kansas Rangers, Capt. S. N. Wood ; 
B, let U. S. Cavalry, Lieut. Charles W. Canfleld. Second 
Brigade, Lieut. -Col. George L. Andrews : Regular Bat- 
talion (B and E, 2d Infant ry, Lotlirop's company General 
Service Recruits, andMoriue's company Rifle Recruits), 
Capt. Frederick Steele; DuBois's Battery (improvised), 
Lieut. John V. DuBois ; 1st Mo. Infantry, Lieut-Col. 
Geo. L. Andrews. Third Brigade, Col. Geo. W. Deitzler : 

1st Kansas, Col. Geo. W. Deitzler (w), Major J. A Haider- 
man; 2d Kansas, Col. R. B. Mitchell (w), Lieut.-Col. Chas. 
W. Blair. Missouri Volunteers, Second Brigade, Colonel 
Franz Sigel : 3d Mo., Lieut.-Col. Auselm Albert ; 5th Mo., 
Col. C. E. Salomon; I, let TJ. S. Cavalry, Capt. Eugene 
A. Carr ; C, 2d U. S. Dragoons, Lieut. C. E. Farrand ; 
Backof's Mo. Arty, (detachment), Lieutenants G. A. 
Schaefer and Edward Schuetzenbach. Unattached Or- 
ganizations : 1st Iowa Infantry, Lieut.-Col. William H. 
Merritt ; Wright's and Switzler's Mo. Home Guard Cav- 
alry; detachment D, 1st U. S. Cavalry; Mo. Pioneers, 
Capt. J. D. Voerster. 

The Union loss, as officially reported, was 223 killed, 721 wounded, and 291 missing, total, 1235. 


Brig.-Gen. Ben. McCulloch. 

Missouri State Guard, Major-Gen. Sterling Price. 
Rains's Division, Brig. -Gen. James S. Rains. First Bri- 
gade, Col. R. H. Weightman (m w), Col. John R. Graves : 
1st Infantry, Lieut.-Col. Thomas H. Rosser ; 3d Infantry, 
Col. Edgar V. Hurst; 4th Infantry (battalion), Major 
Thomas H. Murray ; 5th Infantry, Col. J. J. Clarkson ; 
Graves's Infantry, Col. John R. Graves, Major Brashear; 
Bledsoe's Battery, Capt. Hiram Bledsoe. Second Bri- 
gade, Col. Cawthon (m w). [Composition of brigade not 
given in the official records.] Parsons's Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. M. M. Parsons: Kelly's Infantry, Col. Kelly (w) ; 
Brown's Cavalry, Col. Ben. Brown (k) ; Guibor's Battery, 
Capt. Henry Guibor. Clark's Division, Brig.-Gen. John 
B. Clark : Burbridge's Infantry, Col. J. Q. Burbridge 
(w), Major John B. Clark, Jr. ; 1st Cavalry (battalion), 
Lieut.-Col. J. P. Major. Slack's Division, Brig.-Gen. W. 
Y. Slack (w): Hughes's Infantry, Col. John T. Hughes; 

Thornton's Infantry (battalion), Major J. C. Thornton ; 
Rives's Cavalry, Col. B. A. Rives. McBride's Division, 
Brig.-Gen. James H. McBride: Wingo's Infantry ; Fos- 
ter's Infantry, Col. Foster (w) ; Campbell's Cavalry, 
Capt. Campbell. 

Arkansas Forces, Brig.-Gen. N. B. Pearce, 1st Cav- 
alry, Col. De Rosey Carroll; Carroll's Company Cavalry, 
Capt. Charles A. Carroll; 3d Infantry, Col. John R. 
Gratiot ; 4th Infantry, Col. J. D. Walker ; 5th Infantry, 
Col. Tom P. Doekeyy ; Woodruff's Battery. Capt, W. E. 
Woodruff; Reid's Battery, Capt. J. G. Reirl. 

McCulloch's Brigade: 1st Ark. Mounted Riflemen, 
Col. T. J. Churchill; 2d Ark. Mounted Riflemen, Col. 
James McTntosh, Lieut.-Col. B. T. Einbry ; Arkansas 
Infantry (battalion), Lieut.-Col. Dandridge McRae ; 
South Kansas-Texas Mounted Regiment, Col. E. Greer ; 
3d La. Infantry, Col. Louis Hebert. 

The Confederate loss, as officially reported, was 265 killed, 800 wounded, and 30 missing, total, 1095.* 


The Union forces are estimated from official returns 
at 5400 (with 16 guns). Of these 1118 were with Sigel and 
350 mounted reserve. The Confederate forces are more 
difficult to estimate, but Colonel Snead, General Price's 
adjutant-general during the battle, gives in his volume, 

" The Fight for Missouri " (Charles Scribner's Sons), the 
following estimate, which is doubtless as near the facts 
as it is possible to get : Price's force (Missouri State 
Guard), 5221 ; McCulloch's brigade, 2720, and Pearce's bri- 
gade, 2234, total, 10,175 (with 15 guns). 

* NOTE. Colonel Snead, with unusual facilities for ascertaining the facts, gives the losses as follows : Union, (k), 258 ; 
(w), 873; (m), 186, total, 1317. Confederate, (k), 279: (w), 951, total, 1230. The Union reports do not include Oster- 
haus's battalion, which lost (k), 15 ; (w), 40; and give Sigel's loss at 26 less than Colonel Snead's estimate. EDITORS. 







ON the night of the 30th of August, 1861, as the " Irish Brigade" ( 23d Illinois 
Volunteers) lay encamped just outside of Jefferson City, Mo., I received 
orders to report to General Jefferson C. Davis, commanding in the town. 
On doing so, I was informed by General Davis that the cavalry regiment of 
Colonel Thomas A. Marshall, which had left for the South-west some days 
before, had reached Tipton, where it was hemmed in by the enemy, and 
could neither advance nor return, and that he wished me to go to Tipton, 
join Colonel Marshall, take command of the combined forces, cut my way 
through the enemy, go to Lexington, and hold it at all hazards. 

The next morning the " Irish Brigade " started with forty rounds of ammu- 
nition and three days' rations for each man. "We marched for nine days 
without meeting an enemy, foraging upon the country for support. We 
reached Tipton, but found neither Colonel Marshall nor the enemy, and we 
passed on to a pleasant spot near Lexington where we prepared for our entry 
into the city. The trouble was not so much the getting into Lexington as the 
getting out. At Lexington we found Colonel Marshall's cavalry regiment and 
about 350 of a regiment of Home Guards. On the 10th of September we 
received a letter from Colonel Everett Peabody, of the 13th Missouri Regi- 
ment, saying that he was retreating from Warrensburg, 34 miles distant, 
and that the rebel General Price was in full pursuit with an army of 10,000 
men. A few hours later Colonel Peabody joined us. 

There were then at this post the " Irish Brigade," Colonel Marshall's Illinois 
cavalry regiment (full), Colonel Peabody's regiment, and a part of the 14th 
Missouri in all about 2780 men, with one six-pounder, | forty rounds of 

,i Reprinted, with revision, from newspaper re- 
ports of a lecture by Colonel Mulligan, who was 
killed during the war (see page 313). In cer- 
tain important particulars, the text has been 
altered to free it from clearly demonstrable er- 
rors. Editors. 

\. Doubtless an accidental mistake. Colonel Mul- 
ligan had 7 six-pounders (Waldschmidt, 2 ; Adams, 
3, and Pirner, 2) ; Pirner also had 2 brass mor- 
tars for throwing six-inch spherical shells, of which 
he had but 40, which were soon exhausted. The 
Confederate artillery consisted of 16 guns in five 



ammunition, and but few rations. We then dispatched a courier to Jefferson 
City to inform General Davis of our condition, and to pray for reenf orcements 
or even rations, whereupon we would hold out to the last. At noon of the 
11th we commenced throwing up intrenchments on College Hill, an eminence 
overlooking Lexington and the broad Missouri. All daylong the men worked 
untiringly with the shovel. That evening, but six or eight hours after we had 
commenced, our pickets were driven in and intimation was given that the 
enemy were upon us. Colonel Peabody was ordered out to meet them, and 
two six-pounders were planted in a position to command a covered bridge 
by which the enemy were obliged to enter the town. It was a night of 
fearful anxiety ; none knew at what moment the enemy would be upon our 
devoted little band, and the hours passed in silence. We waited until the 
morning of the 12th, vigilantly and without sleep, when a messenger rushed 
in, saying, " Colonel, the enemy are pushing across the bridge in overwhelm- 
ing force." With a glass we could see them as they came, General Price 
riding up and down the lines, urging his men on. Two companies of the 
Missouri 13th were ordered out, and, with Company K of the Irish Brigade, 
quickly checked the enemy, drove him back, burned the bridge, and gallantly 
ended their work before breakfast. 

The enemy now made a detour, and approached the town once more, by 
the Independence road. Six companies of the Missouri 13th and the Illinois 
Cavalry were ordered out, and met them in the Lexington Cemetery, just 
outside the town, where the fight raged furiously over the dead. We suc- 
ceeded in keeping the enemy in check, and in the mean time the work with 
the shovel went bravely on until we had thrown up breastworks three or 
four feet high. 

At 3 o'clock in the afternoon the engagement opened with artillery. A 
volley of grape from the enemy was directed at a group of our officers who 
were outside the breastworks. Our men returned the volley. The contest 
raged about an hour and a half, when we had the satisfaction, by a lucky shot, 
of knocking over the enemy's big gun, exploding a powder caisson, and other- 
wise doing much damage. The fight was continued until dusk, and, as the 
moon rose, the enemy retired to camp in the Fair Ground, two miles away, 
and Lexington was our own again. 

On Friday, the 13th, though a drenching rain had set in, the work of 
throwing up intrenchments went on, and the men stood almost knee-deep 
in mud and water, at their work. We had taken the basement of the Masonic 
College, a building from which the eminence took its name; powder was 
ol rtained, and the men commenced making cartridges. A foundry was fitted 
up, and 150 rounds of shot grape and canister were cast for each of our 

batteries, as follows : Bledsoe, 4 guns ; Churchill not include in his estimate either his officers or the 

Clark, 2; Guibor, 4; Kelly, 4; Kueisley, 2. ("His- body of Home Guards who assisted in the defense, 

tory of Lafayette County, Missouri.") Colonel Snead states positively that, as adjutant- 

The lack of agreement between the numbers of general of the Missouri troops, he paroled about 

the Union forces as here stated, and as given by Col- 3500 prisoners. Among these may have been 

onel Snead on page 273, is accounted for by the many not reckoned as effectives by Colonel Mulli- 

latter on the supposition that Colonel Mulligan did gan. Editors. 



* -< e I^ 





SEPT 18,19,20.1861. 

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Captain Joseph A. "Wilson, of Lexington, tuns describes the Union posi- 
tion: " The college is on a bluff about 200 feet above low- water mark, and 
from 15 to 30 feet higher than North or Main street. Third street rims along 
the top of the bluff. Close to and surrounding the college building was a 
rectangular fort of sods and earth about 12 feet thick and 12 feet high ; with 
bastions at the angles and embrasures for guns. At a distance of 200 to 
800 feet was an irregular line of earthworks protected by numerous trav- 
erses, occasional redoubts, a good ditch, trous-de-loup, wires, etc., etc. Still 
farther on the west and north were rifle-pits. The works would have re- 
quired 10,000 or 15,000 men to occupy them fully. All the ground from the 
fortifications to the river was then covered with scattering timber. The 
spring just north and outside of fortifications, was in a deep wooded ra- 
vine, and was the scene of some sharp skirmishing at night, owing to the 
attempts of the garrison to get water there when their cisterns gave out." 

Explanation of the Diagram of the Hospital Position : " a is the Anderson house or hospital ; 6 a smaller brick 
house back of it; c an outlying low earthwork, projecting down nearly into the ravine, represented by the dotted 
line, while the inclosed earthwork was built up around the head of the ravine, as shown by the plain line; d the 
sally-port in the earthworks, about one hundred yards from the hospital; e a canal-like carriageway leading 
up to the house, and in which the sharp-shooters lay secure, only about eighty feet from the front door of the 
hospital; the brackets represent Federal picket-guard stations with a little dirt thrown up for protection; the 
dotted line sss shows deep gorge or ravine which was full of Confederate sharp-shooters." 

Sunday had now arrived. "We had found no provisions at Lexington, and 
our 2700 men were getting short of rations. Father Thaddeus J. Butler, our 
chaplain, celebrated mass on the hillside, and all were considerably strength- 
ened and encouraged by his words, and after services were over we went back 
to work, actively casting shot and stealing provisions from the inhabitants 
round about. Our pickets were all the time skirmishing with the enemy, 
while we were making preparations for defense against the enemy's attack, 
which was expected on the morrow. 

At 9 o'clock on the morning of the 18th the enemy were seen approach- 
ing. The Confederate force had been increased to 18,000 men with 16 pieces 
of cannon. They came as one dark moving mass, their guns beaming in 
the sun, their banners waving, and then' drums beating everywhere, as 
far as we could see, were men, men, men, approaching grandly. Our earth- 
works covered an area of about eighteen acres, surrounded by a ditch, and 
protected in front by what were called " confusion pits," and by mines. Our 
men stood firm behind the breastworks, none trembled or paled, and a solemn 






silence prevailed. As Father Butler went round among- them, they asked his 
blessing, received it with uncovered heads, then turned and sternly cocked 
their muskets. 

The enemy opened a terrible fire with their cannon on all sides, which we 
answered with determination and spirit. Our spies had brought intelligence, 
and had all agreed that it was the intention of the enemy to make a grand 
rush, overwhelm us, and bury us in the trenches of Lexington. 

At noon, word was brought that the enemy had taken the hospital. We 
had not fortified that ; it was situated outside the intrenchments, and I had 
supposed that the little white flag was sufficient protection for the wounded 
and dying soldiers who had finished their service and were powerless for harm. 
The hospital contained our chaplain, our surgeon, and a number of wounded. 
The enemy took it without opposition, filled it with their sharp-shooters, and 
from every window, every door, from the scuttles in the roof, poured right 
into our intrenchments a deadly drift of lead. A company of the Home 
Guards, then a company of the Missouri 14th, were ordered to retake the 
hospital, but refused. The Montgomery Guards, a company of the Irish 
Brigade, was then ordered out. Their captain admonished them to uphold 
the gallant name they bore, and the order was given to charge. The distance 
across the plain from the intrenchments to the hospital was about eighty 
yards. They started ; at first quick, then double-quick, then on a run, then 


faster. Still the deadly fire poured into their ranks. But on they went ; a 
wild line of steel, and, what is better than steel, irresistible human will. 
They reached the hospital, burst open the door, without shot or shout, until 
they encountered the enemy within, whom they hurled out and sent flying 
down the hill. ]) 

Our surgeon was held by the enemy, although we had released the Con- 
federate surgeon on his mere pledge that he was such. It was a horrible thing 
to see those brave fellows, mangled and wounded, without skillful hands to 
bind their ghastly wounds ; and Captain David P. Moriarty, who had been a 
physician in civil life, was ordered to lay aside his sword and go into the 
hospital. He went, and through all the siege worked among the wounded 
with no other instrument than a razor. Our supply of water had given out 
and the scenes in the hospital were fearful to witness, wounded men suffering- 
agonies from thirst and in their frenzy wrestling for the water in which 
the wounded had been bathed.\ 

On the morning of the 19th the firing was resumed, and continued all day. 
Our officers had told the men that if they could hold out until the 19th we 
should certainly be reenforced, and all through that day the men watched 
anxiously for the appearance of the friendly flag under which aid was to 
reach them, and listened eagerly for the sound of friendly cannon. But they 
looked and listened in vain, and all day long they fought without water, their 
parched lips cracking, their tongues swollen, and the blood running down 
their chins when they bit their cartridges and the saltpeter entered their blis- 
tered lips. But not a word of murmuring. 

The morning of the 20th broke, but no reinforcements had come, and still 
the men fought on. & The enemy appeared that day with an artifice which 

I The Union force held the building an hour or erals had no military right to expect that a strategic 
two, when they were again dislodged. In regard Position so important to their opponents as the Anderson 

to the capture of the hospital by the Confederates, ^T & d P remi8es . manif e8 * ly , were - wo !! 1(I , r should be 

, . ., ..;,_ , ' left in quiet possession merely because they had seen fit 

and to its recapture by the Union forces, we find to use some partof it tor hospital purposes. Nevertheless, 

the following in the ' ' History of Lafayette County, that first false scent has been followed and barked after 

Missouri" ( St. Louis : Missouri Historical Com- for twenty years the Federals erroneously claiming 

pany, 1881), a work which, in its treatment of the an ""Justifiable attack on the hospital, and the Confed- 

e t t--T.-i j.- i-x ^ erates erroneously claiming that they were first fired 

siege of Lexington exhibits impartiality and a on by Fe(]( . rals f ;. oni in . i( whe building, and that for 

painstaking research, the more valuable by reason that reason the attack was made." Editors. 

of the meagerness of the official reports of the a. . f , ,, ,, TT . - , 

f \ After the investment, the Union forces being 
engagement * 

' entirely cut off from the river, " Marshall's cavalry- 

JZ^l !l 8 i lital ma > er hil8 , l5 r 1 nch a , n l ,nai ! v ^ d men and some of the teamsters had watered their 

upon by partisan writers on both sides. Colonel Mulli- , . , , ,, 

gan assumed that the Confederates were guilty of a horses out of the cisterns at the college, and there 

breach of civilized warfare in firing on a hospital : and, was Du t little water left, what there was being 

consequently, when his meu retook the building, having muddy. Two springs at the foot of the bluffs 

this belief firmly fixed in their minds, they gave no one on the north and one on the south were 

quarter, but killed every armed man caught in the !! -, a t, ., ^ 

building. Some of the minor Confederate officers seemed ^osely guarded by the enemy. . . . One of 

to labor under the same impression, and claimed, as an Colonel Mulligan's men, in an account of the battle, 

excuse or justification for the capture, that the Federals said: 'On the morning of the 19th it rained 

had fired upon them from inside the building; but this heavilv for about two hours, saturating our 

rZ^^Z^VV^ "T^' **? 8UrSe ' ST' blankets, which we wrung out into our canteens 

Coolej , and the priest, Father Butler, who were in the , . ,. .. ,, iTT . . , 

hospital, and by Major Meet, Mr. H. Boothman, and for drinking"' ("History of Lafayette County, 

others, still living in Lexington, who were at the time Missouri'' ). Editors. 

J^ a L f 5? i " trei ^ nm 1 ent * at tne hospital. No reenforcements reached Colonel Mulligan, 

But, aside from this, the official report of General Harris, +-.** , & , , .. ,. a ? 

made at the time, shows that there was no such reason tnou S h efforts were made to relieve him. Septem- 

for the capture; but that it was deliberately planned ^ er 16th, Sturgis with 1100 men, but without ar- 

and ordered as a rightful military movement. The Fed- tillery or cavalry, was ordered by Geueral Pope to 



was destined to overreach us and secure to them the possession of our 
intrenchments. They had constructed a movable breastwork of hemp bales, 
rolled them before then lines up the hill, and advanced under this cover. 
All our efforts could not retard the advance of these bales. Round-shot and 
bullets were poured against them, but they would only rock a little and then 
settle back. Heated shot were fired 
with the hope of setting them on fire, 
but they had been soaked and would 
not burn. Thus for hours the fight 
continued. J Our cartridges were now 
nearly used up, many of our brave 
fellows had fallen, and it was evident 
that the fight must soon cease, when 
at 3 o'clock an orderly came, saying 
that the enemy had sent a flag of 
truce. With the flag came a note 
from General Price, asking " why the 
firing had ceased." I returned it, with 
the reply written on the back, " Gen- 
eral, I hardly know, unless you have 
surrendered." He at once took pains 
to assure me that this was not the 
case. I then discovered that the ma- 
jor of another regiment, in spite of 
orders, had raised a white flag. 

Our ammunition was about gone. 
We were out of rations, and had been 
without water for days, and many of 
the men felt like giving up the post, which it seemed impossible to hold 
longer. They were ordered back to the breastworks, and told to use up all 
their powder, then defend themselves as best they could, but to hold their 
place. Then a council of war was held in the college, and the question of 


proceed from Macon City for the purpose. He did 
so, but his messenger to Mulligan being intercepted 
by General Price, the latter, on the 19th, dispatched 
a force of 3000 men or more under General Par- 
sons and Colonel Congreve Jackson across the 
river to repel Sturgis's advance, then within fifteen 
miles of Lexington. Sturgis, being informed of 
Mulligan's situation, retreated to Port Leaven- 
worth. Parsons recrossed the river and took part 
in the fighting during the afternoon. Editors. 

I There are many claimants for the credit of 
having first suggested the hemp-bale strategy. 
General Harris's official report says : 

" I directed the bales to be wet in the river to protect 
them against the casualties of tire of our troops and of 
the enemy, but it was soon found that the wetting so 
materially increased the weight as to prevent our men, 
in their exhausted condition, from rolling it to the crest 
of the hill. I then adopted the idea of wetting the hemp 
after it had been transported to its position." 

As to the date of the use of these, which is given 
both by Colonel Mulligan and by Colonel Snead 
as the morning of the 20th, we quote the follow- 
ing circumstantial account from the official report 
of Colonel Hughes : 

"On the morning of the 19th, we arose from our 
' bivouac ' upon the bills to renew the attack. This day 
we continued the fighting vigorously all day, holding 
possession of the hospital buildings, and throwing large 
wings froin both sides of the house, built up of bales of 
hemp saturated wit li water, to keep them from taking 
fire. These portable benrp-bales were extended, like the 
wings of a partridge net, so as to cover and protect 
several hundred men at a time, and a most terrible and 
galling and deadly fire was kept up from them upon the 
w T orks of the enemy by my men. I divided my forces 
intoreliefs and kept some three hundred of them pouring 
in a heavy fire incessantly upon the enemy, supplying 
the places of the weary with fresh troops. On the night 
of the 19th we enlarged and advanced our defensive 
works very near to the enemy's intrenchments, and at 
daybreak opened upon their line with most fatal effect." 




surrender was put to the officers, and a ballot was taken, only two out of six 
votes being cast in favor of fighting on. Then the flag of truce was sent out 
with our surrender. 

Colonel Snead (see page 262) writes us as 
follows in regard to the circumstances of the 
surrender : 

" The surrender of Lexington was negotiated on the 
part of Colonel Mulligan by Colonel Marshall of the 1st 
Illinois Cavalry, and on the part of General Price by 
me. We met inside of the Union lines. Of course I 
demanded the unconditional surrender of the post, with 
its officers and men and material of war. Colonel Mar- 
shall hesitated, and at last said that he would have to sub- 
mit the matter to Colonel Mulligan. As we knew that 
reinforcements were on the way to Mulligan, and as I 
feared that Mulligan was only practicing a ruse in order 
to gain time, I said to Colonel Marshall that if the terms 
which I offered were not accepted within ten minutes I 
should return to our lines and order fire to be reopened. 
He left me, but returned just as the ten minutes were 
expiring, and said that the surrender would be made as 
demanded. I immediately sent one of the officers, whom 
I had taken with me, to announce the fact to General 
Price and to ask when he would accept the surrender. 
He came over at once, and notified Colonel Mulligan that 
he would himself accept the surrender of him and his 
field-officers forthwith, and assign one of his division 
commanders to accept the surrender of the men and 
their company officers. Mulligan and his field-officers 
came forward immediately, on foot, and offered to sur- 
render their swords. General Price (next to whom I 
was sitting) replied instantly, 'You gentlemen have 
fought so bravely that it would be wrong to deprive you 
of your swords. Keep them. Orders to parole you and 
your men will be issued, Colonel Mulligan, without un- 
necessary delay.' The only officer or man that was not 
paroled, and the only one who was taken South, was 
Colonel Mulligan." 

Colonel Mulligan was held as a prisoner until 
the 30th of October, being accompanied by his 
wife, who had been an eye-witness of the siege 
from the town. They journeyed in General Price's 
private carriage, and (Mrs. Mulligan says) received 
"every possible courtesy from the general and his 
staff." They returned to St. Louis under escort of 
forty men and a flag of truce. In Chicago and 
elsewhere Colonel Mulligan was received with en- 
thusiastic honors. 

Colonel Mulligan, after his exchange, was placed 
in command along the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
road, in western Virginia. During this period he 
engaged in many skirmishes with the enemy. In 
the battle of Winchester, July 24th; 1864, Colonel 
Mulligan received three mortal wounds. Some of 
the officers, among whom was his brother-in-law, 
Lieutenant James H. Nugent, nineteen years of 
age, attempted to carry him from the field. Seeing 
the colors in danger the colonel said: "Lay me 
down and save the flag." Lieutenant Nugent res- 
cued the colors and returned to the colonel's side, 

but in a few moments fell, mortally wounded. Col- 
onel Mulligan died forty-eight hours after, at the 
age of thirty-four. After his death, his widow re- 
ceived from President Lincoln Colonel Mulligan's 
commission of Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V., 
dated July 24th, "for gallant and meritorious ser- 
vices at the battle of Winchester." Editors. 

Note : The seizure of the money of the Lexing- 
ton Bauk referred to by Colonel Snead on page 273 
is treated in full in the " History of Lafayette 
County," from which we condense the following 
statement : Governor Jackson having appropri- 
ated the school fund of the State to the arming 
and equipment of the State troops, and the pro- 
posal having been made to force loans from certain 
banks for the same purpose, General Fremont, in 
order to checkmate this action of the Governor, 
ordered the funds of certain banks to be sent to 
St. Louis, not for the use of the Federal author- 
ities, but to prevent their employment to aid the 
enemy. By his order, Colonel Marshall secured 
the funds of the State Bank of Lexington against 
the protest of the officers, giving a receipt for the 
amount, which was $960,159.60, of which $165,- 
659.60 was in gold. The money was buried in the 
fort under Colonel Mulligan's tent, and upon the 
surrender every dollar of the gold was delivered to 
General Price, but $15,000 in notes of the bank 
was missing. Governor Jackson and General Price 
ordered all the money to be restored to the bank, 
but on the 30th of September made a demand 
upon the bank for, and under threat of force re- 
ceived, the sum of $37,337.20 in gold, claimed to 
be due to the State under an act of the Legislature 
of Missouri, which permitted of the suspension of 
certain banks on the condition that they should 
loan the State on its bonds a certain portion of 
their fund. At the time of the capture of Lexing- 
ton the State Convention of Missouri had deposed 
Governor Jackson and elected in his place Hamil- 
ton R. Gamble. The Union State Government 
made demand afterward for the same sum, which 
was paid and bonds of the State issued therefor, 
which were redeemed at their face value when due. 
The sum given to Governor Jackson was charged 
by the bank to "profit and loss." See also page 
280 for General Fremont's declaration of policy 
in this respect. " The funds of other banks of the 
State were taken possession of by the Federal 
authorities, transported to St. Louis, and in due 
time every dollar returned." Editors. 




HE battle of Pea Ridge (or Elkhorn Tavern, as the Confed- 
erates named it) was fought on the 7th and 8th of March, 
1862, one month before the battle of Shiloh. It was the 
first clear and decisive victory gained by the North in a 
pitched battle west of the Mississippi River, and until Price's 
invasion of 1864 the last effort of the South to carry the 
war into the State of Missouri, except by abortive raids. 
Since the outbreak of the rebellion, Missouri, as a border 
and slave State, had represented all the evils of a bitter civil 
strife. The opening events had been the protection of the 
St. Louis arsenal, the capture of Camp Jackson, the minor 
engagements at Boonville and Carthage, the sanguinary 
struggle at Wilson's Creek on the 10th of August, forever 
memorable by the heroic death of General Lyon. The re- 
treat of our little army of about 4500 men to Rolla, after 
that battle, ended the first campaign and gave General 
Sterling Price, the military leader of the secessionist 
forces of Missouri, the opportunity of taking possession of Springfield, the 
largest city and central point of south-west Missouri, and of advancing with 
a promiscuous host of over 15,000 men as far as Lexington, on the Missouri 
River, which was gallantly defended for three days by Colonel Mulligan. 
Meanwhile, General Fremont, who on the 25th of July had been placed in 
command of the Western Department, had organized and put in motion an 
army of about 30,000 men, with 86 pieces of artillery, to cut off Price's forces, 
but had only succeeded in surprising and severely defeating about a thousand 
recruits of Price's retiring army at Springfield by a bold movement of 250 
horsemen (Fremont's body-guard and a detachment of " Irish Dragoons ") 
under the lead of Major Zagonyi. Our army, in which I commanded a divis- 
ion, was now concentrated at Springfield, and was about to follow and attack 
the forces of Price and McCnlloch, who had taken separate positions, the one 
(Price) near Pineville in the south-western corner of Missouri, the other 
(McCulloch) near Keetsville, on the Arkansas line. Although McCnlloch was 
at first averse to venturing battle, he finally yielded to the entreaties of Price, 
and prepared himself to cooperate in resisting the further advance of Fremont. 
Between Price and McCulloch it was explicitly understood that Missouri 
should not be given up without a struggle. Such was the condition of things 
when the intended operations of General Fremont were cut short by his 
removal from the command of the army (November 2d), his successor being- 
General David Hunter. The result of this change was an immediate and 
uncommonly hasty retreat of our army in a northerly and easterly direction, 
to Sedalia on the 9th, and to Rolla on the loth ; in fact, the abandonment of 
the whole south-west of the State by the Union troops, and the occupation of 




the city of Springfield for the second time by the enemy, who were greatly in 
need of more comfortable winter quarters. They must have been exceed- 
ingly glad of the sudden disappearance of an army which by its numerical 
superiority, excellent organization, and buoyant spirit had had a very good 
chance of at least driving them out of Mis- 
souri. As it was, the new-fledged " Confed- 
erates " % utilized all the gifts of good for- 
tune, organized a great portion of their 
forces for the Confederate service, and 
provided themselves with arms, ammuni- 
tion, and equipments for the field, while 
the Northern troops were largely reduced 
by the hardships of miserable winter 
quarters, and the Union refugees who had 
left their homes were in great part huddled 
together in tents in the public places and 
streets of Rolla and St. Louis, and were de- 
pendent on the charity of their sympathiz- 
ing friends or on municipal support. The 
whole proceeding was not only a most 
deplorable military blunder, but also a 
political mistake. To get rid of Fremont, 
the good jn'ospects and the honor of the 
army were sacrificed. It would be too mild 
an expression to say that the Union peo- 
ple of Missouri, or rather of the whole West, felt disappointed; there was 
deep and bitter indignation, even publicly manifesting itself by demonstra- 
tions and protests against the policy of the Administration, and especially 
against its political and military advisers and intriguers, who sacrificed the 
welfare of the State to their jealousy of an energetic and successful rival. 

To regain what was lost, another campaign the third in the course of eight 
months was resolved upon. It was undertaken by the very same army, 
but under a different commander, and greatly reduced on account of the 
prevalence of diseases and the extraordinary mortality in the different cainps 
during the months of inactivity ; in truth, the campaign from September to 
November had " to be done over again " in January, February, and March, 
in the midst of a very severe winter, and with the relations of numerical 
strength reversed. Toward the end of December, '61, when not fully restored 
from a severe illness, I was directed by General Halleck (who, on November 9th, 
had succeeded General Hunter, the command now being called the Depart- 
ment of the Missouri) to proceed to Rolla, to take command of the troops 
encamped there, including my own division (the Third, afterward the First) 

& On the 29th of October, when I was engaged federate Congress by the Rump Legislature of 

in a recoimoissance on Bloody Hill, at Wilson's Missouri. F. S. 

Creek, I heard the salute of one. hundred guns This body was composed of 39 representatives 

fired at Neosho in celebration of the act of seces- and 10 senators each number being far short of 

sion, and of the sending of delegates to the Con- a lawful quorum. Editors. 



and General Asboth's (the Fourth, afterward the Second), and to prepare 
them for active service in the field. I arrived at Rolla on the 23d of December, 
and on the 27th, when the organization was completed, I was superseded by 
General Samuel R. Curtis, who had been appointed by Halleck to the com- 
mand of the District of South-west Missouri, including the troops at Rolla. 
The campaign was opened by the advance of a brigade of cavalry under 
Colonel E. A. Carr on the 29th of December from Rolla to Lebanon, for the 
purpose of initiating a concentration of forces, and to secure a point of sup- 
port for the scouting parties to be pushed forward in the direction of Spring- 
field, the supposed headquarters of the enemy. (See map, p. 263.) 

On January 9th, after toilsome marching, all the disposable forces were 
assembled at Lebanon. Here, by order of General Curtis, the army was 
organized into 4 divisions of 2 brigades each, besides a special reserve. | 

Before we reached Lebanon I was doubtful about my personal relations to 
General Curtis, which had been somewhat troubled by his sudden appearance 
at Rolla and the differences in regard to our relative rank and position, but 
the fairness he showed in the assignment of the commands before we left 
Lebanon, and his frankness and courtesy toward me, dispelled all appre- 
hensions on my part, and with a light heart and full confidence in the new 
commander, I entered into the earnest business now before us. 

The army left Lebanon on the 10th of February, arrived at Marshfield on 
the 11th, at McPherson's Creek, about 12 miles from Springfield, on the 
12th, where a light engagement with the rear-guard of the enemy's troops 
occurred, and took possession of Springfield on the 13th. Price's army of 
Missourians, about 8000 strong, had retired and was on its way to Cassville. 
On entering Springfield we found it pitifully changed, the beautiful "Gar- 
den City " of the South-west looked desolate and bleak ; most of the houses 
were empty, as the Union families had followed us to Rolla after the retreat 
of General Hunter in November, 1861, and the secessionists had mostly fol- 
lowed Price. The streets, formerly lined with the finest shade trees, were 
bereft of their ornament, and only the stumps were left. General Price had 
applied his vacation-time well in organizing two brigades under Colonel Little 
and General Slack for the Southern Confederacy, had spread out his com- 
mand as far as, and even beyond, the Osage River, and would have been 
reenforced by several thousand recruits from middle Missouri, if they had 
not been intercepted on their way South by Northern troops. As it was, he 
took whatever he found to his purpose, destroyed what he could not use, and 
feeling himself not strong enough to venture battle, withdrew to Arkansas to 
seek assistance from McCulloch. We followed him in two columns, the left 
wing (Third and Fourth Divisions) by the direct road to Cassville, the right 
wing (First and Second Divisions), under my command, by the road to Little 
York, Marionsville, and Verona, both columns to unite at McDowell's, north 
of Cassville. 

I advanced with the Benton Hussars during the night of the 13th % Lit- 
tle York, and as it was a very cold night, the road being covered with a 

4 For details of the composition and losses of both armies, see page 337. Editors. 


crust of ice, we had to move slowly. On this night march about eighteen 
horsemen, including myself, had their feet frozen. In the neighborhood of 
Marionsville we captured a wagon train and 150 stragglers of the enemy, and 
arrived at McDowell's just at the moment when, after a short engagement, 
the left wing had driven Price's rear-guard out of the place. From this 
time our army moved, united, to Cassville and Keetsville, forced without 
great trouble Cross Timber HoUows, a defile of about ten miles in length 
across the Missouri-Arkansas State line, leading to Elkhorn Tavern, and 
arrived at Sugar Creek on the 18th of February. We were now over 320 miles 
from St. Louis, and 210 miles from our base at Rolla. The Third and Fourth 
Divisions advanced from this position 12 miles farther south to Cross Hol- 
lows, where also the headquarters of General Curtis were established, and 
the First and Second to Bentonville, 12 miles to the south-west, while a 
strong cavalry force under General Asboth went to Osage Springs. On the 
23d General Asboth made a dash into Fayetteville, twenty miles in advance, 
found the city evacuated, and planted the Union flag on the court-house. 
To balance things somewhat, a raiding party of the enemy surprised our 
foragers near Huntsville, and another party ventured as far as Keetsville, 
in our rear, playing havoc with the drowsy garrison of the place. 

On March 1st Colonel Jeff. C. Davis's division withdrew from Cross Hollows 
and took position immediately behind Little Sugar Creek, covering the road 
which leads from Fayetteville, Arkansas, by Elkhorn Tavern to Springfield, 
and as an approach of the enemy was expected to take place on that road from 
the south, Colonel Davis made his position as strong as possible by crowning 
the hills north of the creek with abatis and parapets of felled trees ; he also 
protected one of his batteries in the rear of the bridge with intrenchments. 
As we shall see, these works never became of any practical value. 

On the 2d of March the First and Second Divisions moved 4 miles south 
of Bentonville to McKissick's farm. Colonel Schaefer, with the 2d Missouri 
Infantry and a detachment of cavalry, was sent to Smith's Mills (Osage 
Mills), 7 miles east of McKissick's farm, as a post of observation toward Elm 
Sp rings, and for the purpose of protecting and working the mill at that 
time and under our circumstances a very important " strategic object." 

Another detachment of cavalry was stationed at Osage Springs to hold 
connection with the division at Cross Hollows (south of Elkhorn Tavern), 
and to scour the country toward Fayetteville and Elm Springs. On the 5th, 
a detachment under Major Conrad was on its way from McKissick's farm to 
Maysville, 30 miles west of McKissick's farm; by order of General Curtis, 
another detachment under Major Mezaros went to Pineville, 25 miles north- 
west, while from Carr's division a detachment under Colonel Vandever had 
been sent as far east as Huntsville, 40 miles from Cross Hollows, making the 
line of our front about seventy miles from Maysville in the west to Hunts- 
ville 1 the east. Since the 18th of February, when we took our first position 
at Sugar Creek, Price had made his way to the Boston Mountains (Cove 
Creek), between Fayetteville and the Arkansas Eiver, where he united 
with McCulloch. 

3 i8 


Although serving the same cause, there never existed an entente cordiale 
between the two