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BEHIND THE VEIL
IN PERSIA

ENGLISH DOCUMENTS

AMSTERDAM 1917
C. L. VAN LANOENHUYSEN

Contents:

Page

Introduction 7—9

I. Anglo-Russian violations of treaties in Persia from the death

of Muzaffer-eddin Shah until the dismissal of Morgan Shuster 10—32
II. Anglo-Russian violations of treaties in Persia since the dismissal

of Morgan Shuster until the beginning of the year 1914 . 33 — 42

III. Persia at the outbreak of the world-war, according to the
confidential circulars of the British Minister in Teheran 43 — 57

IV. The Persian Gendarmerie and their Swedish instructors . . 58—72
V. Persia during the world-war (January to August 1915) :

letters from the former chief of the Persian police force,

J. N. Merrill, to Major O'Connor, British Consul in Shiraz 73—89
VI. English Imperialism in the Persian Gulf district and the

thwarting of Russian politics by the English 90—99

Appendix:

Facsimiles of important documents, quoted in the text .... 103 — 122

Original text of documents used 125—158

Wording of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907 relating to Persia 159 — 161
Wording of the English Note, handed to the Persian Government

on September 4th. 1907 by Sir Cecil Spring Rice 162

Sketch map of Persia

Introduction.

The systematic strangling of Greece by a group of powers
who allege to be guided in their actions by the desire "to
protect small nations", and who seek by means of this catch-
word to enlist the moral support of their own people and that
of other countries, is being achieved by methods which have
been found effective by the Entente powers in their long joint
practice of oppression.

The fate that England and Russia have mapped out for
Persia since 1907 affords a striking example of such methods.

All that is now being experienced by Greece and more,
Persia had to go through. Not only from Russia, whose breaches
of law and contracts in its dealings with that unhappy country
have few parallels in recent history. Infinitely more grave
is the attitude of England who, beneath the mask of the "friendly
mediator and protector of the weak", as in the case of Greece,
cautiously confers the role of executioner on an allied nation
to save the remnant of her own prestige.

The double game played by England for nearly a decade
has long deceived many an intelligent and patriotic Persian,
and gave reason to hope that the well-meaning English medi-
ation so often appealed to in times of great stress would save
Persia from incessant humiliation. In England itself and not
least from the group of English members of the "Persia
Committee" criticism of British policy in Persia made the
leading statesmen in Downing Street very uncomfortable.
Professor Edward G. Browne, the most eloquent advocate
of the cause of Persia in England, has again and again
entered the lists for a more chivalrous policy towards Persia
in his famous book "Persian Revolution" and in his
numerous other works. Indeed he often addressed hard and
bitter words to England and Russia, whereby he touched and
soothed many a wounded Persian heart. Grey, however, who
was responsible for the English zig-zag course in Persia, could
afford to let this severe critic have his say. By allowing

these apostles of a higher level of British humanity to appeal,
in the full glare of publicity, to the British sense of justice,
hke any Hyde Park orator, a safety valve was provided for
public indignation, which, by the way, never went beyond
the limits of good breeding, and thus absolution was obtained
for troubled consciences. In order to put the whole responsi-
bihty for the dismemberment of Persia on Russia, and to
represent their own conduct as a case of "dira necessitas",
the whole correspondence relating to Persian affairs between
ministers and the diplomatic agents since December 1906 was
published in Blue Books of quite unusual dimensions. The
history of Young Persia is described in these volumes almost
without a gap. A government which had so little to fear from
the light of publicity as to directly invite investigation of its
acts blunted the arrows of its most persistent aggressors.

At first sight such means of defence appear most effective
and successful, but upon closer investigation, none are deceiv-
ed as to the unparalleled guilt of England regarding the tra-
gic and unmerited fate of Persia save the ignorant, the casual
and prejudiced portion of the general public. For the
letters and telegrams of these very Blue Books, although
intended as pleadings for the defence, are, if read with care,
inculpating material and documentary evidence of breach of
agreements, such as a nation has hardly ever confessed to
more openly or, shall we say, more shamelessly. The United
States of America, lately so ready to watch for every alleged
offence against the rights of nations, raised no word of protest
at the time.

Nor is this the whole of the incriminating material. As the
contents of the Blue Books approach the times of the greatest
breach of agreements, during those years when Persia saw
herself a prey to a real policy of strangling from two sides, the
remark preceding the telegrams: "conveys the substance of the
following despatch" becomes more frequent. The impression
thus created as if much were suppressed, is intensified by the
fact that reference is made in these telegrams and despatches
of English diplomatists to documents which, although dated,
are looked for in vain under these dates in the Blue Books,
The most striking, though by no means the only example of

this, is the often quoted note which Sir Cecil Spring Rice handed
to the Persian Government four days after the signing of the
Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907.

To show from their own facts with what unscrupulousness
the English Government has trampled on the most funda-
mental rights of an Oriental people awakening to a remarkable
sense of responsibility, even depriving them of rights which this
Government had procured for Persia when it appeared oppor-
tune, is the purpose of this publication. It is founded, as has
been remarked, on the documents published by the Enghsh
Government, but not only on these.

For the most recent period the documents found in the
British Consulate at Shiraz are adduced as evidence, docu-
ments, the greater part of which marked or designed as "con-
fidential" would hardly have found their way into the English
Blue Books.

The temporary arrest of the British Consul at Shiraz by
Persian gendarmes im November 1915 (on which occasion his
documents fell into German hands), was commented on by
the English and their press with vociferous indignation. Lord
Grey called Major O'Connor's arrest by Persian gendarmes
an unprovoked act of robbery. As usual, he passed over in
silence the misdeeds which the English themselves had com-
mitted against Consular officials and subjects of the Central
Powers before the arrest of their Consul. In the beginning of
March 1915, the Imperial German Consul Wassmuss barely
escaped a plot instigated by the English when setting out for
Shiraz to take up his duties, on which occasion his companion
Dr. Lenders was made a prisoner by the English. About
the same time the Imperial Consul in Bushire, Dr. Listemann,
and the local manager of the firm of Wonckhaus, Herr Eisenhut,
with his wife, were arrested in the most brutal manner du-
ring the night, by English officers and Consular officials, and
taken together with Dr. Lenders by way of Basra to India
where Herr Listemann, Herr Eisenhut and Herr Lenders
are interned in the Civilians' Camp of Ahmednagar.

The Russians, in order not to be behind their allies, did
not hesitate to arrest the Turkish Consul at Resht and carry
him off to Russia.

Ihe death of Muzaffar Eddin left Persia in a deplorable
but not quite hopeless state.

To a certain extent, Nasir-Eddin had been successful in
maintaining the balance of power amongst the various nations
all more or less jealous of each other's privileges. He had
played them off cleverly one against the other, in order
to further the interests of Persia, but his son, Muzaffar-
Eddin, who was a weakling and became a tool in the hands
of the reactionary circles, was not so skilful.

His own and his ministers' incessant need of funds caused
him to accept loans on terms which greatly endangered the
independent development of Persia. Gradually he allowed
the reins of government to slacken and drop into the hands
of Russia and England and their diplomatic agents in Persia.

The costly experience gained by Nasir-Eddin over a loan
might well have served as a warning to Muzaffar-Eddin, as
it proved very clearly that the Persian people at the close of
the 19th century had already awakened to a clear comprehen-
sion of political factors and that the constitutional movement
was far better prepared than paid writers (like D. Eraser) wished
the European public to believe.

In 1890 Shah Nasir-Eddin had sold the monopoly of the
entire tobacco trade in Persia to a British Company in con-
sideration of a quarter of the anticipated yearly profits
estimated at about £ 500,000. Upon this the Persian Priests
issued a decree which caused all tobacconists in Persia to close
their shops and the people to give up smoking, so that in a
very short time the tobacco trade was absolutely paralyzed.

In consequence of this, the Shah found himself constrained
to cancel the monopoly, which could only be made possible
by the payment of an indemnity to the British Company of
£ 500,000 which was raised on a 6 % loan and this — the only
Persian loan — was left as a disastrous inheritance by Nasir-
Eddin to his son.

When Muzaffar-Eddin died, after ten and a half years of
mismanagement, he had added to it a long list of new financial
obUgations which were a heavy burden on the state. Over
* 3,500,000 had been obtained in the shape of Russian and
Anglo-Indian loans, without furthering national prosperity in
the least.

A survey of the Persian National Debt in 1906, which at
the same time shows the rigorous conditions on which the
loans were granted, gives the following picture:

Persia's loans at the death of Muzaffar-Eddin Shah
1891 Government Nasir-Eddin Shah:

Indemnity for Tobacco monopoly . £ 500,000
1900 Government Muzaffar-Eddin Shah:
First Russian loan (5%) for 75 years
not redeemable within 10 years,

issued at 85 Rbl. 22^ miUions

£ 2,200,000
Terms :

1. All Persian debts to be paid to foreigners.

2. An engagement to arrange loans exclusively with Russia.

3. All customs revenues, except those from the Persian Gulf
to be paid to the Banque du Prets which, after retaining
the interest due, pays half-yearly the remainder, if
any, to the Persian Government.

1902 Second (Russian) loan on the same

terms as above Rbl. 10 millions

£ 1,075,000

1904 Third (English) loan by the Imperial
Bank of Persia from the Indian Go-
vernment with the sanction of Russia £ 190,000

1905 Fourth (Enghsh) loan, from the same

source £ 100,000

Guarantees :

1. Revenues derived from fisheries (about 60,000 Tomans
yearly) yielded by the fishing rights on the Caspian
shores and the rivers flowing into them, granted some
30 years before to the Russian Liazanoff.

2. In the case of these not jHelding enough, (in fact they
did) the revenues from all the Persian telegraphs to be
given as further security.

3. In the case of these not proving sufficient, the customs
revenues from the Persian Gulf were to be pledged.

(Owing to clauses 2 and 3, Persia lost the free disposal of
revenues from the Persian telegraphs and the Persian Gulf
customs.)

The last-named loans were subsequently amalgamated
with the later ones of 191 1.

A debt of £ 4,000,000 might have appeared insignificant
for a country Hke Persia in view of the possibihties offered to
a skilful financial reformer by the undeveloped wealth of the
soil and the primitive system of taxation which was capable
of great expansion, but it pressed sorely on the country and
the condition wrung from Persia that she must not enter upon
a fresh loan without Russia's consent for 10 or 75 years (in
the case of the nonpayment of the 1900 loan) proved a great
calamity.

iln spite of all these drawbacks, a new era dawned for
Persia even before the death of Muzaffar-Eddin. Tired of
bartering away their rights to Russia and England, the people
in July 1906, by means of that passive resistance, which is a
favourite and most effective weapon of defence with Orientals,
had obtained a constitution and a Parliament which was opened
on August 19th. In Europe where information on the matter
was principally provided through Anglo-Russian channels, this
Parliament was much derided, because its history was not
known and the driving forces were hidden which for so long
a time frustrated all positive parhamentary work. Europe
showed scant patience towards this Oriental people who appa-
rently had emerged in one night from an autocratic into a
constitutional state of government. This treatment was very
unlike that meted out to the Duma.

It is a fact that already in the first month of the session
the Persian representatives of the people declined to vote
the proposed Anglo-Russian loan of £ 400,000, a paltry sum
which would speedily have found its way into the pockets of
the courtiers.

In 1907 Mohammed Ali succeeded Muzaffar-Eddin. He
was known as a Russophile and an enemy of the Constitution
and feared and hated by his people as the despotic ruler of the
Azerbaijan province. The Parliament, which Europe derided
and which the Shah affected to ignore, gave evidence of itself
soon after his accession, by a patriotic resolve. It forced the
Shah to dismiss the Belgian Naus, who, like the other Belgians
in the service of Persia, had provoked the greatest indignation
of the Persians by administrative measures which were
contrary to all Persian interests. To this Belgian Naus^) may
be traced the conclusion of the two Russian loans which shook
the foundations of Persian independence. He is the author
of that unfortunate customs tariff, conceived solely in Russian
interests, the absurdly low rates of which lost Persia one of
her most important sources of income 2).

On August 31, 1907, England and Russia signed the well-
known treaty which divided Persia into two spheres of interest
and a neutral zone. It was a treaty in the conclusion of which
the most largely interested party, the sovereign state of Persia,
was never consulted. On the day of the publication of the

^) Even David Fraser, the correspondent of the Times who showed
such a prejudice against Persia, condemns Naus (Persia in Revolt, p. 31)
and his activity : " He well deserved his fate ". His fate, by the -way, is bearable
When Naus had radically mismanaged Persian finances, he was able to pur-
chase from his "takings" in Persia magnificent chateaux and property in
Belgium (v. Shuster " Stranghng of Persia", p. 63).

") Morgan Shuster (Stranghng of Persia, p. 271) calls the Naus tariff
"the most conspicuouly imsuccessful tariff of the world" from the Persian
point of view. Shuster gives figures; The import and export duties brought
in 1909/10 only 4%%. Russia who participated with 50% in the entire
mport and export of Persia only had to pay 3 % on its chief article of importa-
tion: sugar, and on refined petrol only ^% duty. Besides, Russia forbade all
transit traffic destined for Persia which was non- Russian. This exclusion of
the non-Russian goods, non-Russian merchants sought to circumvent, by
sending merchandise by parcels post which according to international rules
had to pass through Russia unopened.

treaty, Atabeg-i-Azam — the exiled Prime Minister (an uncom-
promising reactionary) — called back by the Shah against the
will of the people, was assassinated. The indignation of the
Persians at the dividing up of their country was so great that
Sir Cecil Spring Rice, the English Minister at Teheran, had to
hand the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs a note of con-
ciliation, the text of which is suppressed in the English Blue
Books, but which nevertheless was later on authenticated in
the British House of Commons ^) . Some leading sentences of
this classical document are herewith reproduced: —

"Neither of the two Powers seeks anything from Persia,
so that Persia can concentrate all her energies on the settle-
ment of her internal affairs This agreement is inju-
rious neither to the interests of Persia nor to those of any
other foreign nation, since it binds only England and Russia
not to embark on any course of action in Persia calculated
to injure the interests of the other and so in the future
to deliver Persia from those demands which in the past have
proved so injurious to the progress of her political aspirations ....
Henceforth Persia, aided and assisted by these two powerful
neighbouring States can employ all her powers in internal

reforms The object of the two Powers is not in any

way to attack, bnt rather to assure for ever the indepen-
dence of Persia .... Their object was not to allow one
another to intervene on the pretext of safeguarding their interests . . .
Persia will thus be perfectly free to manage her own affairs
in her own way."

It will soon be shown how Russia and England kept to
these promises, especially as regards non-intervention in the
internal affairs of the country under the pretext of protecting
their own interests.

The parliamentary government, which Shah Mohammed- Ali
had recognised on oath proved a thorn in his side. He sum-
marily arrested the Prime Minister Nasr-ul-Mulk on December
15, 1907. Neither this proceeding nor a rising incited by doubtful
elements against Parliament led to the desired result: volun-

^) Given by Browne, Persian Revolution, in the Teheran paper,
Habl-ul-Matin, (Sept. 14 th 1907) and by Shuster, Strangling of Persia,
P. 28. See also appendix (P. 162).

teers in large numbers guarded the building and the deputies.
Half a year later however, on June 2"^, 1908, the first flagrant
breach took place of the promise given by Sir Cecil Spring
Rice not to intervene in Persia's internal affairs. The Russian
Minister von Hartwig, well known by his intrigues in Belgrade
at the outbreak of the world-war, and Marling, the English
charge d'affaires, threatened the Persian Government with
forcible measures if the resistance against the Shah's wishes
did not cease, by which of course was meant the surrender of
the last Persian rights as guarantees for Anglo-Russian loans.

Backed up by this terrorisation of Cabinet and ParUament
the Shah, having previously retired to a safe retreat outside
the capital, induced various dignitaries to follow him and
having kept them prisoners he proceeded to the well known
coup d'etat of the 23rd of June 1908.

By his orders the parliamentary building was shelled by
a brigade of Cossacks under the command of Colonel Liakhoff
and the occupants were partly killed, partly taken prisoner
or put to flight.

The consequence was open revolt, especially in Northern
Persia. Tabriz, its chief seat, was unsuccessfully besieged for
nearly a year. Something unexpected happened in this year
of revolution; the Shah's own General Sipahdar-i-Azam i)
joined the nationalists and the warlike tribe of the Bakhtiaris
did likewise. Teheran was occupied by the Bakhtiaris; Liakhoff
and the Persian Cossack brigade under his orders left the
Shah in the lurch and surrendered. The whole of Persia rose
like one man against the Shah. He saw that he had lost the game
and abdicated on July 16th, 1909, in favour of his son, Ahmed.

The opportunity for intervention was however too fa-
vourable for Russia not to seize it in spite of given promises.
Although such a frantic detractor of all things Persian (and
Oriental in general) as David Fraser, had to confess that
the Nationalists had behaved in an exemplary manner
towards Europeans^) and to agree against his will, after

^) Who later on went over again to the reactionaries.

2) Persia and Turkey in Revolt (p. 131). '"Both M. SabUne (the
Russian charg6 d'affaires) and Sir George Barclay (the EngUsh Minister)
were satisfied, that foreigners had nothing to fear."

traducing the Bakhtiaris thoroughly i) that they, like the other
nationalists ,,kept excellent order and observed the usages of
civiHsation scrupulously", Russia declared the interests of its
subjects as threatened and sent to Tabriz, Resht, Kazvin and
other places in Northern Persia thousands of troops considerable
numbers of which were never withdrawn. When the tribe of the
Shasevans threatened Ardebil, time was not granted to the
Persian punitive expedition, for which the impoverished country
had raised £ 25,000 to restore order which even the Times
(Nov. 7, 1909) regretted. Just as if Ardebil were a Rus-
sian town, 3200 Russian troops were sent there again for the
protection of the Russian inhabitants 2). The chmax of this
breach of treaty was reached when the leader of the united
tribes of the Shasevans and Karadaghis, Rahim Khan,
was allowed to escape across the frontier when hard pressed
by the Persian troops.

The request of the Persian government to deliver into
their hands, according to the treaty of Turkmantchai ^) this
bandit against whom Russia after all had despatched troops,
was ignored by Russia^). After these expensive internal disturb-
ances, which were only rendered worse by the incessant massing
of Russian troops, the new Cabinet and the newly elected
members of parliament were faced by the heavy task of finan-
cing the budget. It is true that the simplest roads to an amehora-
tion of Persian finances had been blocked by England in 1908

^) They are (he says p. 88. and 89) entirely without education

constitution .... brings loot to the tribesmen and fat appointments to their

chiefs His ambition was satisfied by sitting quietly in Isfahan . . . and

milk the people. Almost in the same breath on the following page, he con-
tradicts himself by saying "for these highland cateroms to have kept their
hands off the fat burgesses of Isfahan was truly a triumph of self denial."

2) None of whom suffered the slightest injury, as the English Blue
Book, Persia Nr. i (igio) Nr. 263 expressly states.

3) The peace of TurkmcUitchai put an end to the Ru££o-Persian Cam-
paign of 1828. According to this treaty Persian rebels who had crossed the
frontier into Russia had to be extradited.

■•) English Blue Books. Persia No. i (191 1) Sir A. Nicholson, English
Ambassador at St. Petersburg telegraphs to Grey: "The Russian Govern-
ment will naturally refuse to comply with this request". — It would be more
natural for compacts to be adhered to. See also: Shuster (Stranghngof Persia,
p. 44).

when the then minister of finance, Sani-ed-Dowleh, who had
been educated in Europe, presented his budget in Parhament
independently of the financial adviser Bizot, a Frenchmen,
whom Shuster has sufficiently characterised i) . Sani-ed-Dowleh
pleaded at the time for a tax on town-property and for an in-
crease of the import duties on tea and sugar, the proceeds of
which he wished to see devoted to the re-estabhshment of
public order, the making of roads and educational purposes.
Against such "a prejudice to their own interests" the diplo-
matic agent of England, MarUng^), strongly protested. He
reported with naive indignation and surprise to Grey, that
the Persian minister of finance was not considering a foreign
loan (against adequate concessions of course) but in the first
instance an increase of revenue, which might serve as guarantee
for loans later on!

The possibility of opening up new sources of revenue
being destroyed and the collecting of the taxes itself requiring
a strict organization which in its turn could only be maintained
by a regular payment of the salaries of officials, there remained
at last only the unpleasant resource of a new loan. Relations
were entered into with France and Germany; a private London
Bank was negotiated with; the pawning of the crown jewels
was taken into consideration; every means seemed justifiable
to save Persia from a new Anglo-Russian loan with its extor-
tionate terms. But England and Russia prepared an untimely
end for these negotiations by their note, which was presented
to the Persian Government on April 7th 1910. This note with
its elastic paragraphs allowed England and Russia to put
their veto against every foreign loan which implied concessions,
on the ground of political or strategical interests^) . On May 20*^
Russia and England— not Russia alone, as Browne would have

^) Shuster, Strangling of Persia, p. 66.

*) English Blue Books Persia No. i (1909) No. 113. Marlings report to
Grey is one of the most striking instances that England endeavoured to pre-
vent every attempt at financial reform by bringing forward the vainest ob-
jections and reasons even before Shuster's ingenious attempt at reorganisa-
tion. Marling's report on his brutal treatment of the Persian minister to
whose ideas Shuster reverted, concludes with the contemptuous phrase:
"It is unnecessary to give a detailed account of Sani-ed-DowIeh's Budget."

3) Enghsh Blue Books Persia No. i (191 1) No. 87 with enclosure.

it — extorted from Persia the agreement that no railway con-
cessions must be granted^).

It cannot therefore be a matter of surprise that indignant
Persia declined the new Anglo-Russian loan^) and tried to
meet the ever increasing financial needs of the country by the
flotation ol an internal loan of £ 1.000,000. Behind this refusal
stood the increasing indignation of the whole country with ihe
patronizing attitude of the two neighbouring empires, which
was in opposition to all international law and usage. It need
not be said that the driving power of this national movement
were the supporters of the most prominent and capable
members of parliament, men whom the report of the English
minister [Nov. 1909^)] attested to be men of integrity who
should become a useful force for reform if led properly by
capable party leaders. But as they as patriots would not
agree to anti-Persian politics. Marling, the Enghsh chaige
d'affaires makes this unbending parliamentary party respon-
sible for the wrecking of the Anglo-Russian plans, identical in
his opinion with Persian welfare. He cables to London in
comical anger on July 24th, 1910 "they have sacrificed the
interests of the country to their unjustified mistrust of the
motives of the two Governments*)".

The necessarily negative policy of Parliament would natu-
rally increase the chaos which an empty exchequer produces
anywhere. Russian interference (the characteristic case ofDarab
Mirza^) — 1910 — may just be mentioned) seemed practically to
authorize unruly tribes (which had from time immemorial
threatened the security of Persian caravan-routes), to increase
their means of existence at the expense of the weak govern-
ment by extensive raiding expeditions.

Month after month the lamentable spectacle is repeated:
the Persian Government to whom England denies the means

^) English Blue Books Persia No. i (191 1) No. 81 further No. 91 and
No. 106 where it is confirmed that Russia and England must be consulted
before other powers are granted concessions !

*) Grey (English Blue Books Persia No. i (191 1) No. 107 calls these
extortionate terms "very moderate".

') English Blue Books Persia No. i (1910) No. 269.

*) English Blue Books Persia No. i (1911) No. 133.

'') See Shuster, Stranghng of Persia, p. 45.

of maintaining order, and in fact whose slender receipts they
curtail by claims for compensation, must submit with angelic
patience to the constantly repeated Anglo-Russian admoni-
tions and threats concerning a restoration of order. Marling,
the English charge d'affaires, never tires of cabling reports
to London on the general insecurity in the towns and the
deplorable state of the high roads.

These complaints are at last condensed on Oct. i6tii,
1910, into the well known ultimatum of England that "un-
less by three months from now order has been restored to
the satisfaction of His Majesty's Government" on the
Southern commercial high roads, England would take this
task in hand with troops of 1000 to 1200 men under the
command of British-Indian officers. The expense entailed
by these troops would have to be met by an increase of 10 %
on the import-duties of the Southern ports and from the reve-
nues of the province of Fars^). In plain words: England de-
mands merely for her commerce in Persia the formation,
equipment and maintenance of a police troop under British
command and that from the revenues of the sovereign state
of Persia ! —

England did not deny that this ultimatum provoked sheer
indignation not only in Persia but also in Constantinople,
where meetings of protest of Persians and Turks were held
and that it estranged even such Englishmen who endeavour
desperately and vainly to maintain the legend of Enghsh
justice 2). The reply of the Persian minister for Foreign Affairs
Hussein Kuli Khan Nawwab^) to the English ultimatum was
an expose of the Anglo-Russian debit account, clothed in

1) English Blue Books Persia No. i (191 1) No. 194 and enclosure.

2) The English minister (Barclay) writes to Grey on Nov. 20th 1910.)
"The suggestions which have been made in a portion of the European press
as to the recent note being the forerunner of the partition of Persia by Great
Britain and Russia have not fallen unheeded in this country (Persia). Tlie
articles have been translated and published in full, while the comments thereon
have in some cases been even more exaggerated than those which appeared
in the European papers." (English Blue Books, Persia No. i [i9ii]No. 270

^) Now minister in Berlin.

diplomatic language, but clear enough to anyone who knows
how to read between the lines i).

While refuting the presumption that England could on
its own initiative increase by io% the import duties of the
sovereign State of Persia and designating this measure, which in
itself could only be welcome to Persia, as being within the pow-
er of its government alone, he opposes to the English complaints
about commercial losses the fact that in spite of the general
"insecurity" the import into Persia in the preceding year had
gone up 10 %!

England at last carried through its demands, even if in
a modified shape, jointly with Russia and of course in return for
new loans being made for which security was offered by pledg-
ing in the first place the entire customs revenue and secondly
the receipts from the telegraphs and the mint. In these
loans the payment of the pension to the ex-Shah — the mainten-
ance of the Cossack-Brigade (which since the beginning
of the constitutional movement had been used by Russia for
its suppression) the payment and arming of the troops, especi-
ally the creation of a gendarmerie occupied a large space.
Italy had declined to furnish instructors, but from Sweden
a consent had been received. On August 15*11,1911, Hjalmarson,
the general instructor of the Persian Gendarmerie together
with two comrades arrived in Teheran; other Swedish officers
soon followed him. Thus the foundation was laid of that
Persian Gendarmerie whose acts aroused so much attention in the
world war— a body which had been created through the pressure
of England for the security of Persian trade routes of commerce
under the command of Swedish officers in the pay of Persia.

The year 191 1 becomes one of the most remarkable in the
more recent history of Persia through the arrival of the American
Morgan Shuster whose services as Treasurer General had been
acquired by the mediation of the American Government and by
resolution of Parhament and who replaced the Frenchman Bizot^) .

^) English Blue Books Persia No. i (iQii) Nc. 199 and enclosure.

-) Shuster (Strangling of Persia, p. 66) characterises Bizots activity with
American outspokenness: "Bizot bequeathed to the patient and trusting
Persian government a type-written report of 30 pages, edited in beautiful
French and expressing Bizots opinion as to what somebody should do to reor-
ganize Persia's fi.=cal system."

Shuster's arrival took place at a very lively period, A
murderous attempt had been committed against the Governor
of Isfahan and his nephew in which the former had been gravely
and the latter mortally wounded. Asylum had been given to
the murderers, who were Russian subjects, by the Russian
Consul General; their extradition was refused to the Per-
sian authorities. Five days later the Persian minister of
finance, Sani-ed-Dowleh, "persona ingratissima " with the
Russian as well as with the English legation^), was shot by two
men who while being arrested, also wounded four Persian
policemen. These murderers also stated themselves to be
Russian subjects and the Russian legation enforced their extra-
dition by Persia and got them across the frontier. By these
by no means isolated murders, which were in a way
sanctioned by Russia in protecting their authors, every endea-
vour of the Persian Government to enforce order and respect
for the law which were constantly demanded under threats
by England, was completely frustrated and the unrest in the
country became constantly greater. The state of general in-
security reached its culminating point when the Ex-shah re-
turned. The Shah who had been living in exile in Odessa had
landed on the Persian coast, under a false name and a disguise,
as it was said, with arms and ammunition which were declared as
" mineral water " and at once started in cooperation with his
brother who was operating further west, on his brief and un-
fortunate campaign against the troops of the Persian ge-
neral Yeprim Khan. On September yi^,igii, he fled, repeatedly
defeated, on board a Russian Steamer across the Caspian lake
to Russia.

In this attempt of Mohammed Ali to recover the Crown
of Persia, Russia and England played a remarkable part. Both
these powers had signed jointly with Persia the deed in which
the abdication and pension of the Shah were laid down. He
was to forfeit this pension by any proved attempt to cause

^) See Browne: the Press and Poetry of modern Persia, p. 322, April
20. 1910, Marling, Englands charge d'affaires writes to Grey on May 22.
igo8 when there was a prospect of Sani-ed-Dowleh becoming Prime Minister :
"It seems difficult to conceive a more unfortunate choice" (English Blue Books
Persia No. i (1909) No. 121).

unrest in Persia. The Russian Government had further ex-
pressly promised to take "efficient steps" to suppress every
poUtical agitation on the part of the Ex-shah against Persia.

On July i8tii, 191 1, Grey cabled to Sir G. Buchanan at
St. Petersburg "we both recognised the new Shah. I do not
see how we or Russia can acquiesce in return of Ex-shah. You
should ask Russian Government w^hether they will notify Ex-
shah that under no circumstances can his return be allowed "i).

On July 28th the captain and mate of the Russian
Steamer " Christophoros " are dismissed from their posts be-
cause they had communicated to the Press particulars of the
passage of the Ex-shah across the Caspian lake to Persia 2).

On July 29th the Persian Government puts a price on the
head of the Ex-shah of 100,000 Tomans and 25,000 Tomans
each for the seizure of his brothers Shua-es-Sultaneh and
Salar-ed-Do wleh .

On July 31st the EngUsh and Russian ministers hand a
note to the Persian government stating : as the Shah has re-
turned to Persia the British Government recognize that the Shah
has forfeited his right to the pension .... in the struggle . . .
they will take no part whatever^).

In February and March 1912 England and Russia force
Persia to pay to the Shah whose Turkoman and Caucasian
bands (again for the most part Russian subjects) plunder the
Persian province of Mazanderan and have destroyed much pro-
perty, a pension of 75,000 Tomans a year. Indeed they have
the effrontery to demand that Persia do not only grant an am-
nesty to the Russo-Persian robber bands but reward them
with 70,000 Tomans for the troubles caused by them*). And
this thieves' money is extorted by a new Anglo-Russian loan
on which Persia is to pay interest at the rate of 8 %!

The activity of Shuster, which preceded these sad Anglo-
Russian breaches of trust had lasted eight months only. It
began as full of promise as perhaps that of no other statesman
in recent times. With undisguised surprise which soon in-

*) English Blue Books Persia No. 3 (1912) No. 191.

*) Browne, Persian Press and Poetry, p. 330, July 28th 191 1.

') English Blue Books Persia No. 3 (1912) No. 246.

•) English Blue Books Persia No. 5 (1912) No. 238.

creased to admiration and enthusiam, those Persians who
had their countrys welfare at heart, saw that Shuster — unlike
in this to the Belgians and Frenchmen Naus, Mornard, Bizot
and others — looked upon himself as a servant of the Persian
state, that he tried to justify the confidence placed in him
by America and Persia by not contenting himself with pocket-
ing his salary but that he actually began to work for it and
to reorganize.

The spectacle of a subject of the European- American
nations subordinating his own or Russo-Enghsh interests to
those of Persia was unheard of in this sham.cfuUy exploited
country! With tense expectation and undisguised joy Parlia-
ment followed all his actions which were prompted by an upright
sense of duty and an unusual measure of energy and clear insight,
combined with a brilliant gift of organization. It conferred
on the 13th June 191 1 unanimously on this new Treasurer Ge-
neral the highest controlling power over all in and outgoing
funds. For the first time Persia had put its fate — for it de-
pended and still depends on its economical conditions— of
its own free will into the hands of a Non- Persian.

As Shuster had unlimited powers he forced the Belgian
Mornard, the Director General of customs, to subordinate him-
self to him in spite of the protests of the Belgian Government.
He obtained that the pay for the socalled "Central Army"
which hitherto had passed through the hands of high func-
tionaries, was paid out by himself direct. The consequence
was a considerable saving. He financed the troops which were
sent against the Ex-shah and his seditious brothers and caused
a previously ordered consignment of arms and munitions
which had just arrived to be seized and with it the troops
mentioned were equipped.

It is to his energetic measures that Persia owes the quelling
of the sedition planned by the Shah and his Turkomans
and Caucasians. As a statesman who provides for the future
he stored corn in Government magazines in view of the un-
favourable harvest in order to prevent hunger-revolts (a measure
copied by Mornard later on) and to be prepared for a just
distribution to the poor. For part of the direct taxes
is paid in natural produce in Persia and this produce had

hitherto been generally cornered by reactionary grandees and
had become a source of yearly enrichment.

The confidence reposed in him by young Persia was limitless
and Umitless also (but unfortunately only too fallacious) were
the hopes which Persia's patriots founded on the career of this
meteor. The Enghsh minister (Sir G. Barclay) wrote on July
nth, 1911, to Grey: ''Mr. Morgan Shuster has now been two
months in Teheran and his influence is already a leading factor
in the situation."

His chief care was to get out of Persia, with the help of his
plenipotentiary powers, for its welfare all that hitherto
had been neglected. A more even distribution and a more
careful collection of taxes appeared urgent. In order to carry
it through he created a treasury gendarmerie which was sta-
tioned at different points in the country and had to carry out
a just but rigorous collection of taxes, if necessaiy by force of
arms. Enormously wealthy Persian grandees, such as Ala-ed-
Dowleh, the Sipahdar, Farman-Farma, etc., men with enormous
ground property had so far got out of paying any taxes at
all. One must read the comical episode in Shuster's book^)
in which he describes, how the multi-millionaire Farman-Farma,
Russia's dearest friend, adjures the state council with tears
to remit him the taxes demanded by the Treasurer- General.
Shusti^r remained inexorable.

Thus it came to pass that for the first time for many
years the diplomatic representatives of Persia received their
salaries regularly from the public exchequer which was empty
on Shuster's arrival but which now slowly filled.

The opposition Shuster met with would quickly have
discouraged any weaker man. The request addressed by him
to England to let him have Major Stokes, the military attach^
at the court of Teheran, as chief of the treasury-gendarmerie
led to that gentleman being allowed to leave the Anglo-Indian
service. When Russia protested against his entering Persian
service, England also withdrew her consent and forbade him
to accept the office although the appointment had already been

strangling of Persia, p. 259.

approved of by parliament^). Again the assurance of Sir Cecil
Spring-Rice given in September 1907 that neither Russia nor
England would be allowed to intervene under pretext of safe-
guarding their interests, was put on one side.

Russia had made as much capital as possible out of the
disturbances which the Ex-shah with his band of followers
and prince Salar-el-Dowleh had caused in the threatened
districts of Persia and had committed breaches of faith on these
occasions, which England's elastic policy parried by joining in
the perpetration of these actions. For Russia it was the North,
especially Tabriz, for England the South, especially Ears and
the gulf coast which became the scene of arbitrary acts which
mocked the sovereignty of Persia.

On July 27*11, 191 1, the Russian Consul at Tabriz with
the help of hundreds of troops liberated Rashid-ul-Mulk who
had been arrested by the authorities for high treason and
took him under Russian protection 2).

In the province of Gilan the Persian governor was in-
formed by the Russian Consul that he "would arrest and im-
prison any suspected person whom he considered to be a Russian
subject, wherever he may be and in whatever costume he may
be," On the day of the Anglo-Russian declaration of neu-
trality the Persian government received the information that
the Russian Vice-consul had informed the authorities and in-
habitants of Ardebil of the approach of the Ex-shah and praised
his means of fighting and pecuniary resources. He urged them:
"not to do various acts as the result will be detrimental
to them."^)

On September loth the Russian Consul General warned
the authorities and inhabitants of Tabriz, in view of the
robber chief Shuja-ed-Dowleh who was a Pro -Russian

^) Even the Times of Aug. 4. 191 1 says: "neither the British nor the
Indian Government has any power to prevent Captain Stokes accepting
the appointment."

'^) Enghsh Blue Books Persia No. 3 (1912) No. 251.

^) Ibidem: The Persian minister of foreign affairs who forwarded this
information to Grey with the request to make representations to Russia says
rightly: "In view of the neutrality which the Russian Government profess
to maintain, one does not know how to explain these acts."

and had openly gone over to the Ex-shah, threatening the
town, "not to construct barricades or fight within the walls.
If they wished to fight they must do so outside the town"^).

When the defeated Ex-shah fled to the Caspian Sea (ready
to land at any centres of fresh disorder as Grey cabled to Sir
G. Buchanan on September 14th) 2) the Persian Government
repeatedly pointed out to England and Russia that the sheltering
of the Shah on Russian soil would constitute a violation of the
protocol of 1909, article 10, signed by Persia, England and
Russia and also of the recent declaration of neutrality.^)
M. N^ratof replied to this that the Ex- Shah would be kept under
surveillance, but it was not possible for the Russian govern-
ment to give a guarantee that his recent attempt would never
be renewed!*)

England, who booked to her moral credit all Persian
appeals for mediation, but refrained from giving practical
assistance, now took advantage of the straits Persia was in
owing to the military situation, to turn to account to the fullest
possible extent the struggle between the rival chieftains in
the South which had always existed. In the first place the
Enghsh consular troops in the South were re-enforced. On
October 24th, 191 1, the Persian Government was informed by
England that 400 troops of cavalry were on their way to Persia
to protect English interests. The moving requests of the Per-
sian Government that it might itself be allowed to restore
order and that the work of the gendarmerie under Swedish
orders, which had been so urgently desired by England, should
not be forestalled were in vain 5). The EngUsh measures gave
an opportunity for Russia to increase by 250 men its consular
troops in Isfahan and Resht*).

The mask was dropped on October i8th, 1911, when Neratof
declared to the Enghsh charge d'affaires in St. Petersburg,

^) English Blue Books Persia No. 3 (1912) No. 332.

2) English Blue Books Persia No. 3 (1912) No. 343.

3) English Blue Books Persia No. 3 (1912) No. 340 and 350.
*) Enghsh Blue Books Persia No. 3 (1912) No. 361.

*) Enghsh Blue Books Persia No. 4 (191 2) No. 29 and 37.

•) English Blue Books Persia No. 4 (1912) No. 67:

O'Beirne^) that according to his view the Russian government
could not hold back any longer with measures of extreme
rigour which would be equivalent to "an occupation of Persian
territory".

The reasons which Neratof gave for this resolve had no
justification whatsoever, they could not have been clear even
to the English diplomatist. They became apparent however in
the course of the conversation^) . It was Morgan Shuster's too
successful activity which went counter to Russian interests.
"He (Neratof) complained strongly of that gentleman's
attempt to obtain a control over the whole Persian administra-
tion such as was quite incompatible with Russian interests."
And the classic words fell: "The Persian reforms must be pro-
ceeded with gradually and in such a manner as to take Russian
interests into account."

Shuster was actually almost on the point of carrying order
into the Persian chaos. Far-reaching but well thought-out plans
of reform had been prepared by his energetic hand. Neither
Russia nor England, who in her blind hatred of Germany had
declared herself in agreement with every step of Russian policy
in Persia, could do with Persia reverting to secure conditions, a
Persia perhaps with its own railways, its own mines, with a
justly distributed taxation, with incorruptible ministers and a
gendarmerie serving pre-eminently Persian interests. Nothing
could deter Shuster and his ever encreasing body of helpers
from their planned out work — neither the disturbance caused
by the Ex-shah and the princes in the north, nor the raids of
their half Russian Shahsevans and Turkomans, whose pay-
ment by the injured Persian Government Russia and England
took steps to assure nor the interference with the people by
Anglo-Russian contingents of troops nor playing off Kawam-
ul-Mulk, the head of the Khamseh-tribes against the governor
of Ears and his follower Soulet-ed-Dowleh , the chief of the
Kashgai-tribe, nor constantly repeated demands for in-
demnification for looting raids which in a sense were the answer
of nomadic tribes to Anglo- Russian presumption. There is no ble-
mish on this work, behind which parliament stood in serried ranks.

^) went down on the "Hampshire" with Lord Kitchener.
2) EngUsh Blue Books Persia No. 3 (1912) No. 45.

As constant pin pricks were of no avail, recourse was taken
to open brutality. Sir Edward Grey gave the signal: "Persia's
independence" he cables to St. Petersburg at the end of October
1911I) when Morgan Shuster was negotiating with the Banking
House of Seligmann Bros, in London for a loan of £ 4,000,000
"cannot be allowed to be marked by unfriendliness either to
Great Britain or to Russia and it is obvious that in view of the
geographical situation no Government which refused to re-
spect interests of Russia could be tolerated by the latter at
Teheran. This we shall certainly impress on Shuster when the
occasion arises." By this act England had given Russia full
power against Shuster.

The first opportunity which presented itself was eagerly
seized. Europe was still occupied with the after effects of the
Morocco crisis and there was little fear that indignation over
ill-treated Persia would be of more than a few days' duration.

On the orders of the State Council the Treasurer General
had, with the help of his gendarmes, proceeded to the confis-
cation of the property of Prince Shua-es-Sultaneh who had for-
feited it by his open revolt against the Persian Government.

The day after the confiscation Pokhitanoff, the Russian
consul general 2), drove away Shuster's gendarmes by Cossacks,
pretending that the prince's Castle was mortgaged by the
Russian Banque d'Escompte^). Shuster's gendarmes took
possession anew of the castle on the following day. There
was no blood shed, but insults were rife from the Russian side ;
the two Russian Vice-consuls distinguished themselves spe-
cially in this. They did not succeed however in drawing Shuster's
gendarmes, who maintained a correct attitude throughout*).

Shortly afterwards, after the Times ^) had just stated
that the Russian minister had "corrected" and that the Per-
sian Government had protested against the action of Consul
General Pokhitanoff, Russia demands a solemn apology from
the Persian Government to whom every inquiry into the case

1) English Blue Books Persia No. 4 (191 2) No. 65.

*) The day he assumed office the deserving minister of foreign affairs
Hussein Kuli Khan Nawwab resigned his post.

2) This assertion is proved false by Shuster (Stranghng of Persia p. 153).
*) See Shuster (Strangling) p. 145 and on.

*) 9. and 10. Oct. 191 1.

is refused^). The English minister again accepts the request
of the Persians for mediation, but seconds the Russian demand 2).
On the evasive reply of Persia follows the first Russian ulti-
matum on November loth.

Consequent upon the gathering of Russian troops on the
Persian frontier in which England is interested solely in view
of a threatening occupation of Persia by the rival, Grey telegraphs
on November i6th, 1911, to Sir G. Buchanan: "If the Russian
Government thought that no satisfactory settlement could
be reached without the dismissal of Shuster I could urge
no objection. I did not wish to suggest the dismissal of Mr.
Shuster but I mentioned it lest there should be an impression
in St. Petersburgh that I was prepossessed in his favour,"^)

The proposal to demand Shuster's dismissal and thus to
wreck the work of reorganization constructed under such dif-
ficulties does not therefore emanate from Russia, as England
would have it believed, but from Sir Edward Grey himself
according to all the evidence*).

Events now follow each other precipitately. Russia breaks
off diplomatic relations with Persia. 4000 Russians stand
already in Kazvin and new contingents are on the march. On
November 17th, 191 1, Grey confirms once more that Shuster's
dismissal has the consent of England 5).

On November 24^^^ occurs a memorable spectacle in Teheran,
such as the world had never witnessed before ; on the assurance
of the EngUsh minister that Russia's troops would not advance
further if a sufficient apology were tendered, the representative
of Persia apologizes to the Russian minister for a wrong com-
mitted by Russia. The latter declares diplomatic relations to be
resumed but annonnces at the same time a second ultimatum*)

^) English Blue Books Persia No. 4 (1912) No. 76.

2) English Blue Books Persia No. 4 {1912) No. 81.

2) English Blue Books Persia No. 4 (1912) No. 122. See also No. 65.

*) The "Times" had already violently attacked Shuster on Oct. 18.

5) English Blue Books Persia No. 4 (1912) No. 127. You can therefore
make it quite clear to M. Neratof that any demand on Russia's part for
Shuster's dismissal will be met with no objection by His Majesty's Government.

®) English Blue Books Persia No. 4 (1912) No. 163 : Shuster describes
this for England the "protector of small nations" humihating act with bitter
and eloquent words (StrangUng of Persia, p. 163 and on).

It is presented on November 29th, 1911, and expires
48 hours later. It contains the following chief demands:

1. Dismissal of Shuster.

2. Persia is prohibited from taking Non-Persians into its
service without Anglo-Russian consent.

3. Money indemnity for the ordering of Russian troops
Shuster's description of the reception which these humi-
liating demands met with in parliament deserves to be saved
from oblivion:

"A few minutes before noon the public vote was taken
As each name was called the deputy rose in his place and
gave his vote; there was no secret ballot here. And when the
roll call was ended every man, priest or layman, youth or
octogenarian had cast his own die of fate and had staked the
safety of himself and family and hurled back into the teeth
of the Great Bear from the North the unanimous answer of a
desperate and down trodden people who preferred a future
of unknown terror to the voluntary sacrifice of their national
dignity and of their recently earned right to work out their
own salvation^)."

The sombre December days which Persia lived through
after this manly refusal of grave violations of right, shall not
be depicted here in detail. It is sufficient to state that Russia
occupied Resht, Enzeli and Tabriz and that in this largest
city of the North the Russian usurpers executed every nationalist
they could get hold of, that shooting, hanging, torturing,
binding and blowing men from the cannon's mouth, brutal
massacres of women and children were the order of the day
according to the account given by the "Novoie Vremia" on
this occasion: "True humanity requires cruelty." Professor
Browne whose gorge rose at the indifference of his government,
published a pamphlet on the Tabriz atrocities 2) in which quite
a series of these Russian deeds of heroism were illustrated.
Even the English consul had to admit that some of the persons
executed had suffered innocently^) and calls the method used

^) Strangling ol Persia, p. 176.

2) The Keign of Terror in Tabriz: England's Responsibility.

') English Blue Books Persia No. 1 (1913) No. 464.

"barbaric". The Russian army of occupation crowned its deeds
by an act of violence which can only be mentioned in the same
breath with such acts as the cutting up of the Mahdi's body by
the EngHsh: on the most sacred day of the Shiites, the loth
Muharram (January i^*^ 1912) the venerable Sikat-ul-Islam
the highest priest of the province of Azerbaijan was hanged
together with seven other persons on a gallows which was
decorated with Russian flags as for a holiday'). A British
joumaUst compares the effect of this execution on the Persians
with that which would be produced on the English by the
execution of the Archbishop of Canterbury on Good Friday-).
Even in Downing Street these excesses were painfully resented,
not from feelings of humanity but because it was feared that
the execution would deeply hurt the feelings of the British
Mahommedans and principally because their consequences
might lead to an occupation of Teheran by the Russians *).
Sir G. Buchanan declared to the Russian foreign minister:
"The execution of this highplaced ecclesiastic struck me as
being a most unfortunate occurrence as well as a grave blunder.
It was almost certain to arouse intense indignation throughout
Persia and one of the first consequences would be that the
present Government who had done so much to conciliate Russia
would be unable to face the storm and would have to resign. It
also seemed probable that the Russian authorities would be re-
presented as having caused Sikat-ul-Islam to be executed for
the express purpose of provoking popular resentment and
thus bringing about fresh disorders which would furnish them
with the necessary pretext for occupying Teheran *)."

While these atrocities which were continued for months
held the population of the North in a state of abject terror
and complety intimidated them, the curtain descends showly
on Teheran and the Shuster episode. Parliament was forcibly
closed, public meetings and the majority of the newspapers

^) See Browne Persian Press and Poetry, p. 335 ; English Blue Books
Persia No. 5 (1912) No. 44.

*) As Shuster quotes (Strangling of Persia, p. 202). Tlie comparison
was first made by Professor Browne.

') English Blue Books Persia No. 5 (1912) No. 52.

*) EngHsh Blue Books Persia No. 5 (1912) No. 32.

were prohibited and at Christmas 191 1 Shuster's dismissal
took place and with it the acceptance of the Russian ultimatum.

With this the most hopeful chapter in the more recent
history of Persia came to a close. Shuster himself terminates
the reminiscences contained in his book with a bitter resume
addressed to England and Russia^).

"With a knowledge of the facts of Persia's downfall the
scales will drop from the eyes of the most incredulous and it
is clear that Persia was the helpless victim of the wretched
game of cards which a few European powers with the skiU
of centuries of practice still play with weaker nations as the
stake and the lives, honour, and progress of whole races as
the forfeit."

^) Shuster, Strangling of Persia, p. 192.

Parliament was broken up and remained so. It was not
called together again for two years. Ministers changed half a
dozen times in a year according to how Russia and England
were satisfied with their readiness to obey their wishes. When-
ever Anglo-Russian demands met with resistance, fresh troops
were ordered into the country and Persia had to give way.

After the dismissal of Shuster, when Europe was com-
pletely occupied with its own troubles, England and Russia
first of all cleared the Persian administration of all undesirables.
Shuster's American helpers had declared themselves in agree-
ment with him and had left of their own accord with one single
exception, that of the instructor of the Gendarmerie, Merrill,
whom we shall meet again later on. Shuster was replaced by
the Belgian Mornard, until then Director General of Customs,
who now, strange to say united in his person his previous
office and the very onerous post of Treasurer General, drawing
of course the salaries attached to both positions. The English
minister had "always found him satisfactory " i) and declared
"in view of the harmonious manner in which he has hitherto
worked with the two legations his appointment would be the
most practical in the circumstances" 2). The Persians who op-
posed to the utmost the appointment of an Anglo-Russian
protege 3) were faced by the accomplished fact.

*) Six months later Sir W. Townley cabled a report on Mornard to Grey
which is hardly an acknowledgment of his services (English Blue Books
Persia No. i (1913) No. 275.

2) English Blue Books Persia No. 3 (1912) No. 245a.

3) English Blue Books (Persia) No. 3 (1912) No. 35. The English
minister to Grey: ,,A provisional committee has been appointed by the Persian
Government to take over from Shuster. This committee consists of
5 persons and excludes Mornard." See also No. 65 of this Blue Book. "Persian
Government objects to appointment of Mornard as Treasurer General.
They express the hope that this appointment will not be pressed by the
two Governments" (Grey to English Ambassador at St. Petersburg).

The next preoccupation was the removal of people who
in other countries are called patriots, as their desires, which
were directed only towards the welfare of their own country
rather than the "harmonious manner of working with the
two legations" (as Sir G. Barclay expressed it so charmingly),
traversed the pretty design of a rapid partition of Persia: the
leaders of the democratic party.

Twenty of these inconvenient patriots were exiled from
Teheran in the spring of 1912 or at least urgently invited to
take a trip to Europe! ^) Amongst them there were Hussein
Kuli Khan Nawwab-) Wahid-ul-Mulk, Suleiman Mirza and
Sardar Mohy, the hopes of the Young- Persian party ^).

According to the opinion of England and Russia, the final
word on the subject of the definite destruction of Persian
liberty could now be pronounced. The empty state of the Per-
sian exchequer and the claims to compensation which the
two powers (who had really caused the disturbances by
concentrating their troops) made on the Persian Government
for damage done to Anglo-Russian property, offered a welcome
pretext for extorting new demands in return for the payment
of insignificant amounts. Grey is prepared to grant an Anglo-
Russian loan of £ 200,000 (!) if Persia:

1. employs the £ 100,000 granted by England for the
organisation of the Swedish Gendarmerie in the South, that
is to say chiefly for British commercial purposes.

2. If the Shah who had fled to Russia and whose friend-
hness towards Russia was feared by Grey, again received a
pension from Persia.

*) English Blue Books Persia No. i (1913) No, 128. The new English
minister Sir W. Townley having admitted that nothing could be proved
against these men, adds: "The moment was considered a favourable one
to pay off old scores and to eliminate from the political arena all the leading
members of the party which had made itself conspicuous in the former
Assembly by its adherance to the Shuster programme and by its uncom-
promising hostility to Russia."

*) Now Persian Minister in BerUn. The "New Statesman" calls
him (Nov. 29th 1915) one of the most estimable of Persian statesmen.

') English Blue Books No. i (1913) No. 126.

3- If an amnesty were granted to the Shah's bands and if
all irregular troops (who might perhaps fight for the cause of
Persia) were disarmed.

4. If Persia recognize the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907^).

Sir G. Barclay cannot refrain from calUng Russia's pro-
posal to pay these £ 200,000 in small instalments and to make
the interest 8% a "clum.sy arrangement" 2). He even ad-
vocates, for chivalry is Englands greatest virtue, lowering
the rate of interest to 7%(!) and Persia yielding to "force
majeure" after a really pitiable struggle about the wording
of the recognition of the assurances given in the Anglo-Russian
treaty of 19072), accepts on March 20th, 1912, the new Anglo-
Russian note on condition that the Anglo -Russian troops
be withdrawn from Persia territory in the shortest possible
time*).

Neither Russia nor England dreamt of complying with
this request which was only too well justified. In nearly every
more important note of Persia the attention of England and
Russia was drawn to the fact that the general insecurity in the
country was chiefly to be traced to the disturbing effect of the
presence of foreign troops. Even Sir G. Buchanan represented
to Mr. Sazonoff on January 20*^, 1912, that Russia has given
the assurance of a withdrawal of her troops from Kazvin and
that the state of the Southern trade routes so frequently pointed
out by England would not have become so neglected, if Russias'
proceedings in the North had not had a disturbing effect on the
people ^) .

Russia's reply after obtaining information from the Russian
minister at Teheran, M. Poklewsld-Koziell ®) was a cruel mockery
of the Persian point of view. "The Persian Government," Sir
G. Buchanan was informed on February 23 ^^ 1912, "would be

^) English Blue Books, Persia No. 5 (1912) No. 154.

2) English Blue Books Persia No. 5 (1912) No. 181.

5) Grey bad proposed that the Persian Government should "gladly"
recognize the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907.

*) English Blue Books Persia No. 5 (1912) No. 316.

^) English Blue Books Persia No. 5 (1912) No. iii.

*) M. Poklewski-Koziell, perhaps the only Polish Diplomatist of Russia,
was a friend of King Edward VII.

glad to have a Russian force at hand that could reach the
. capital in three days".i)

It need hardly be said that it was jealousy, not sympathy
for Persia, or respect for f airplay, that made England propose
the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Persia. It will
be proved later on how little England really troubled about
the agreement made with Russia in 1907. From the perusal
of the Blue Books the impression is gained that England feared
the return of the Shah more than Persia did. For the Ex-shah
is pro -Russian.

England did not dream of withdrawing her own troops
from Southern Persia in spite of Persia's repeated requests,
in spite of the attacks made on these troops ^), and of the
excitement among the warlike tribes of Ears. The English
minister made the withdrawal of these troops conditional on
the support which the gendarmerie under the command of
the Swedish officers would find^).

In July 1912 there were collected in Tabriz alone 1500
Russian troops with artillery, although no state of war existed
in Persia and thousands more were stationed on different
points of Northern Persia. Every unfriendly act directed
against Russia, every local dispute was used by these troops
as a pretext for violating the local authorities concerned.
In Resht Russian troops destroyed the plant of the newspapers
and prohibited the latter. At Meshed there occurred in March
1 91 2 an excess which was the culmination of these horrors
and produced an indescribably painful impression throughout
the Mushm world. *)

A priest together with his adherents had taken refuge in
the shrine of the Imam Riza and was therefore according to
the old Persian law, observed for centuries, inviolable. Even
England and Russia had appealed over and over again to
the validity of this old Persian tradition, which ranks as an
international agreement and of which they took advantage

^) English Blue Books Persia No. 5 (1912) No. 222.
-) For which handsome indemnities were extorted from Persia.These
were deducted in the first place from the new loans.

') English Blue Books Persia No. i (1913) No. 39.
*) Browne, Persian Press and Poetry, page 336.

for their own proteges. The commander of the Russian troops
thereupon ordered the Persian National Sanctuary ^) to be
bombarded, whereby many innocent people and pilgrims were
killed and wounded.

The notorious chief of a band, Shuja-ed-Dowleh had with
Russian help arbitrarily appointed himself Governor of the
town and excercised a reign of terror for miles around for
years which stifled every movement towards freedom ^). It
was owing to him and Russian arbitrariness that Khorassan
and principally Azerbaijan, the richest province of Persia,
did not contribute a single penny in 1911/12 towards the re-
quirements of the Central Government. When the Cabinet sent
the Sipahdar as Governor of Azerbaijan to Tabriz, Shuja-
ed-Dowleh forced prominent citizens to put their names to
declarations of sympathy for himself which he did not, as might
have been presumed, forward to his own government but to
the Russian foreign minister, to the Viceroy of the Caucasus,
to the Russian minister at Teheran and to the French consuP).
Only when the Persian Government conceded the increase
of the Cossack-Brigade, which Persia had to finance and which
never had fought for Persian but for Russian interests alone,
Russia exercised pressure on Shuja-ed-Dowleh in favour
of the governor nominated by the Persian Government*).
Since 1912 Persia obtained fresh funds from the only lenders
to whom it was allowed to apply only at a rate of 7 %. Owing
to the muddle to which the Teheran Government had been
forced, things came to such a pass that recourse was had every
few weeks to relatively small sums, which were subsequently
to be wiped out by a larger loan, the price of which rose, however.

1) Lord Curzon devotes no less than 7 pages to the description of this
shrine in his work "Persia" (II page 154 and onwards).

2) How many executions this obedient adept of Russia has on his
conscience it would be difficult to ascertain. His bloodthirstiness went too
far even for the rather "biases" English consuls at Tabriz. When Shuja
ed-Dowleh in September 1913 again held orgies of executions of completely
innocent subjects, the English consul wrote: "A painful impression is
created among the European colony here by such executions." English
Blue Books Persia No. i (191 4) No. 313.

2) English Blue Books Persia No. i {1913) No. 239.
*) English Blue Books Persia No. i (1913) No. 236

in proportion to Anglo-Russian cupidity. In July already
Russia announced the demand for the Julfa- Tabriz -Urmia
railway concession, which the Persian Government primarily
designated as undebatable ^) but which it made dependent
afterwards upon the consent of parliament (which at the time
was non-existent ^).

The advances on loans were generally used up rapidly
owing to the growing demands of Russia and England in Persia.
An idea is obtained of the greed with which the two great
powers threw themselves on defenceless Persia, when one
reads the note of the English minister dictated by Grey and
addressed to the Persian Government on September 20 *^^
1912^). First conies the announcement that the Anglo-Indian
troops would presently be ordered from Isfahan to Shiraz and
that on the Persian Goverimient would devolve the duty of
"securing suitable accomodation" for the English troops,
otherwise barracks would be erected in Shiraz at the expense
of Persia!

Russia as well as England, who in order to balance the
Russian concession claims wanted to force from Persia the
railway concession Mohammerah-Khoremabad, was angered
at the hesitation of the Persian Cabinet.

fivj A complaisant man was looked for and they reverted to
Saad-ed-Dowleh,that reactionary minister of the Ex- Shah, whom
the stormy indignation of the people had swept from the country
together with that personage. This cynical idea was hatched and
discussed by Sazonoff, Grey and Crewe in London. The terms
agreed upon on the appointment of this minister were a mockery
of all decent feeling. They were (in Grey's words) :

1. an undertaking by Saad not to place obstacles in the
way of the effective and honest administration of the finan-
ces of Persia and:

2. an assurance that in this event both he and the go-
vernors appointed by him will receive the moral (!) support of
both governments and of their agents in all parts of Persia*).

*) English Blue Books Persia No. i (191 3) No. 233,

2) English Blue Books Persia No. i (1913) No. 276.

3) English Blue Books Persia No. i (1913) No. 349.
*) English Blue Books Persia No. i (191 3) No. 346.

The self appointed arbiters of Persia's destinies did not
feel any too happy in defending this mean proposal. On October
5^^ already Grey admitted that Saad-ed-Dowlehs' past was
"none too perfect" and he added when this minister "by the
grace of England and Russia" had arrived in Teheran and was
now to be forced on the Persian Government, who resisted with
might and main: "The only justification for the action which
we have taken with a view to the appointment of Saad-ed-
Dowleh as Prime Minister is the fact that money is absolutely
necessary to the Persian Government". To remove all doubt,
why it was intended to help Persia once more, he adds in
the same breath, that immediately on the acceptance of
the Anglo Russian demands for concessions through Saad-ed-
Dowleh, advances would be granted^).

In this race for concessions Russia won. The concession
of the Julfa-Tabriz-Urmia Railway was signed on February
6*^, 1913; England later on obtained at first only an option
on the Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway. Both concessions,
having been granted without the consent of Parliament, were
according to the new Persian constitution invalid. The convo-
cation of Parliament was prevented by Sazonoff, who was
anxious that a more stable government (meaning Saad-ed-
Dowleh) should be formed 2). A considerable time passed
before a cabinet could be found which was ready to take upon
itself this trading in the well established and sworn rights of
the people ^).

The Anglo Russian system, already sufficiently charac-
terized, of keeping the existing cabinet above water by dearly
bought loans and advances of a completely insufficient nature
— from which were deducted at once all manners of claims
for damages, the expense of the Cossack Brigade or the Gen-
darmerie, which were used for these powers own ends — ne-
cessarily caused a complete stoppage of all Persian government
business and that weakening of the central power, which had

1) English Blue Books Persia No. i (191 3) No. 423.

2) English Blue Books Persia No. i (1913) No. 361.

') English Blue Books Persia No. i (1913) No. 513. "The new cabinet
will draw down great unpopularity on its head by granting the railway
concessions" (Townley to Grey, January 6tb. 1913.)

always been aimed at by the Anglo-Russian neighbours. The
relations of the governors of the provinces to the Government
at Teheran became more indefinite. Where funds could not
be brought in at once in the old Oriental way, the governor —
if he did not want to use his own fortune — saw himself degraded
to a dummy, with whom the powerful heads of tribes or such
disturbers of the peace, as Salar-ed Dowleh, who still haunted
Persia, could do as they liked.

The part for instance, played for months by the Governor
General of Kermanshah, Prince Farman Farma, in his dealings
with Salar-ed-Dowleh was absolutely pitiable. There were
no means at his disposal for supporting reliable troops; the
volunteers had long been disarmed by Anglo-Russian orders.
So battles occurred for months between the men collected by
Farman Farma and the followers of Sadar-ed- Dowleh which
the English consul describes as follows: "The two armies,
when they came in sight of each other, fired at each other,
then fled incontinently, Mujallal winning, because he looked
round first and discovered that he and the enemy were playing
the same game ^) . " At last Prince Salar-ed-Dowleh who had been
defeated a dozen times and whom the English minister Townley
called a "slippery customer", Ala-es-Sultaneh "a lunatic ^) and
the Russian charge d'affaires an "impossible person" ^) was
offered the post of Governor of the Ghilan Province and then
that of Resht upon pressure from St. Petersburg and in spite
of all protests from the Persian Government !

The disturbances provoked by this princely rebel, who
always turned up again, continued well into 1913. He was,
to complete the mockery, supported by the Persian cossacks *)
stationed in Astrabad, men of that brigade which Russia
wanted to have augmented in December 1912 to 4300 men ^)
and for whose sUght value Persia had to pay heavily, according

*) English Blue Books Persia No. i {191 3) No. 166.

2) English Blue Books Persia No. i (1914) No. 89.

3) English Blue Books Persia No. i (1914) No. 216.
*) English Blue Books Persia No. i (1914) No. 88.
•) English Blue Books Persia No. i (1914) No. 520.

to the words of the Russian charge d'affaires i). Russian officers
were in command of these troops !

This edif png comedy only came to an end in the autumn of
1913. Salar-ed-Dowleh, who had taken refuge in the Russian Con-
sulate of Kermanshah was conducted to Russia and thence de-
parted to Switzerland, with a yearly pension extorted from Persia.

While Russia, with the help of jealous agents and complai-
sant governors like Shuja-ed-Dowleh, who about the end of
1913 suppressed by approved Russian methods the parlia-
mentary elections in Azerbaijan claimed by the Bakhtiars,
got ready to swallow the fat North Persian morsel and fur-
thered the peaceful penetration "by purchase" of North Persian
villages and settlement of Russian families 2) , England thought
to have won in the person of Mukhber-es-Siiltaneh a Governor
General for Fars who through his system of government should
make good the "prejudice" to English commercial interests
in the South about which England had complained for years.
"A man possessed of sound ideas and theories" he was called
by Major O'Connor, the British Consul at Shiraz ^) and the
English minister attributed to his quiet and unobtrusive work
the reconciliation of the most divergent groups of interests and
the furtherance of general welfare in the Fars province *) ,

Months passed of course before Mukhber could enter upon
his position. In consequence of the miserable finance of the
Treasurer General, Mornard, there were not even funds for the
instalment of the Governor General of Fars. England helped
by making him a direct advance, which was naturally to be
deducted from future loans and to be refunded from receipt
of taxes in the province^). The expenses were checked by

1) English Blue Books Persia No. i (1914) No. 131 M. Sabline says
on April 3rd, 1917, to Sir W. Townley: More use should be made of the
Cossack Brigade which costs the Persian Government a large sum of money
and is of small practical value. And he adds ingenuously: It is generally
recognised that Russia is behind the Cossack Brigade.

*) In the spring of 1913 the Russians bought the villages Shirenk,
Marakalateh, Bagharabad, Fazilabad, and Nukan and settled 360 families
there. English Blue Books Persia No. i (1914) No. 143.

3) English Blue Books Persia No. i (191 3) No. 512.

*) English Blue Books Persia No. i (1914) No. 234.

*) English Blue Books Persi^ No. i (1913) No. 416.

Mornard's agent in Shiraz, a man named Stas, a Belgian like
Mornard himself.

England, by rendering the governor financially dependent
on London and independent of Teheran, as Russia did in Ker-
manshah^), transferred her policy of thumbscrews which had
proved so successful with the central government to the province.
A similar course was followed in the case of the Persian gendar-
merie under Swedish command. A separate account was opened
at the "Imperial Persian Bank" (a purely English concern) from
which (under the control of the Treasurer General) all payments
to the Gendarmerie-Commandos were to be made. These funds
were of course supplied by Persia out of an English advance at
the rate of 7 % on the next large loan.

In this way the highest official of the province and the
police troops, who unlike the Persian Cossack Brigade were
quite popular with the Persians ^), and the only reaUy useful
military force, appeared to be entirely at the mercy of England
and her Belgian henchmen.

The net was spread and regardless of Persian protests
England committed another violation of rights in spite of the
recognizedly good work of the Gendarmerie^), viz the removal
of the 7. Radjputs from Baluchistan to Bushire *).

Seized by two pincers, whose prongs closed tighter and
tighter, with a depleted exchequer, deprived of her most capable
pohticians, without a parliament ^), and with a ruler not yet
of age, Persia saw the horrible dawn of the world war.

^) Which transferred about £ 6000 monthly through the Russian Bank
direct to the Governor General for administrative purposes (See English
Blue Book Persia i (19 13) No. 500.

^) On the occasion of a review the English ambassador reports to
London: "The review in the presence of the Shah aroused enthusiasm
among all classes of Persians, who had watched a Persian Cossack review oa
the previous day with marked indifference."

') The English minister Sir Walter Townley reported on January
17th, 191 3, to Grey: They (the Swedes) are all smart soldiers keen on their
work." English Blue Books Persia No. i (1914) No. 539.

*) Protest of the Persian Government in the English Blue Books
Persia No. i (1914) No. 204.

*) The new elections were again postponed end of 191 3. English
Blue Books Persia No. i (1914) No. 336.

III

England's policy in Persia before the outbreak of the
World war was in the main determined by one factor: jealousy.
When France, in agreement with the Sultan of Mascat, at-
tempted to create a point of support for her fleet in the Persian
Gulf near Jissa, the EngHsh admiral intervened and threatened
to bombard the place. England had been watching with the most
intense displeasure the construction of the Baghdad railroad,
which she had declined to finance jointly with Turkey and
Germany. According to the Times of May 23"^ 191 1, she
had no right to tell any state what railways it should build.
England tried to retard as much as lay in her power the con-
struction of the last part of the line (Baghdad-Bazra) ^). When
the German firm of Woenckhaus & Co. successfully appUed
itself in the Persian Gulf to the buying and exporting of mother
of pearl shells, the English regarded this peaceful commerce in
their "mare clausum" as an infringement of their rights. They
opposed it by armed force, basing their action on their elastic
treaties with the East- Arabian chieftains. The first sailing
of the"Hapag", took place in 1906. Arrangements for regular
service from Hamburg to Arabia and the Persian Gulf were
greeted by the "Times" with ill concealed annoyance. It was
imputed to the Hamburg-America Line that it was subsidised
by government and that consequently political interests were
at stake. Every means seemed justified to weaken German
trade which, meanwhile, attained third place among the
nations trading with Persia.

^) Whigham (The Persian problem, London 1903). The correspondent
of "The Morning Post" says: Because we gave up the idea of a Mesopotamian
Railway ourselves, we cannot with any show of reason oppose the German
or the so-called German scheme. We are right, however, to bring it about,
if possible, that such a railway should terminate at a port more or less
under British protection. If it terminates on Turkish soil, we may be
bothered with innumerable complications in the future.

England's principal opponent, however, was Russia.
Together they had marked out the boundary limits in the
notorious treaty of 1907 — within which peaceful
penetration of Persia was to have been carried out. England
had repeatedly protested against the Ex- Shah's attempts
to return to power whilst Russia had received extensive
promises from him in case of his recovering the throne.

Protests had also been made by England against the
occupation of the Northern provinces by Russian troops, as
well as against the illegal collection of taxes in Persia by Russian
Consular officials. The wishes thus formulated which were quite
in accordance with those of the Persian Government itself, were
not inspired by a desire for Persias welfare. England as ever
only thought of herself. For the consequences of the miserable
compact of 1907, which could only have been dictated by a
fear of Germany, are becoming more fatal. England is forced
to sanction every Russian act of transgression and exposes
herself in consequence to a considerable loss of prestige in the
Mohammetan world. In spite of, or perhaps because of yiel-
ding, she sees the Russian steamroller approaching steadily
nearer from Northern Persia and her monopoly in the
Persian Gulf threatened by the allied power to which she has
given herself over body and soul. The work of her cleverest
Oriental politicans is gravely endangered. George Brandes
sums up Grey's policy in his essay on Persia in "Politiken"
of November 29 *i\ 1916, pointedly : "A political action must be
salutary at least, if it be not moral. Grey's Persian policy is
neither."

England sought her own interests in Persia, by secretly
putting obstacles in the way of the Russian partner. She
brought her influence to bear on throwing over pro -Russian
ministers and governors and on replacing them by anglophile
officials and an anglophile Cabinet. She frustrated Russian
railway and road schemes. She intentionally dragged out the
negotiations regarding the ominous Trans-Persian Railway
project. No money is spared to win over the most warlike
tribe in Persia, the Bakhtiars, to whom she had already given
an interest in the proceeds of the oilfields, so as to play off their
weighty influence against Russia. As the latter has the Persian

Cossack Brigade, Persian only in name, under her absolute
control, England attempts to create a counterpart against
these troops in the shape of the Gendarmerie, commanded
by Swedish officers, whom she pays out of the Persian loans
for which usurious interests are charged and to ensure its use
throughout the whole of Persia. If the gendarmerie does not
at once obey every wave of an English hand, their pay is kept
back, in spite of the agreement made with Persia and Sweden,
and a loud complaint is voiced about the impossibility of ob-
taining funds for these troops called into being by the
pressure of England.

The strictly confidential reports on the situation in Persia
of the English minister in Teheran afford an interesting insight
into the backstairs Politics of England. These documents are
also a source of graphic information as to the events during
the last months before the war and at its outbreak. Sir Walter
Townley, like his colleague Marling, has replaced "too sen-
sitive" diplomatic representatives of England at the court
of Teheran. He has recently been sent to the Hague, as the man
with the strong hand "to shake up the patriotic and national
spirit of the Dutch people, and to show them that this spirit ought
to be on the allies' side." (Morning Post.)

We herewith give Townley 's circular in the original.
Circular No. i. Tehran, 23 '"^- March 1914.

The following resume of the political situation is being
sent to British Consuls at Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, Meshed,
Kerman and Bushire for their very confidential information.
A similar circular will be addressed to them, monthly if possible,
though no definite period can as yet be fixed.

"Political situation is as follows: —

Persian affairs are giving rise to some awkward questions
between Russia and England. Relations locaUy are not quite
so united as in past. New Russian minister i) is somewhat pecu-

1) Korostovetz: Minister at Peking in 1912. where he created a highly-
unpleasant sensation in the European colony, by eloping, although a married
man, with the daughter of the Chinese Postmaster- General Piry. The
father forced him, revolver in hand, to a divorce. Korostovetz was then
sent to Urga as diplomatic agent for Mongolia by way of a disciplinary
punishment.

liar in his attitude — see interview in the Persian newspaper
copy, of which is being sent to you. We support Ain-ed-Dowleh,
gendarmerie, and the Bakhtiaris. Russians are now opposed
to Ain-ed-Dowleh: talk of hmiting the gendarmerie by keeping
them out of the north and are becoming jealous of our friend-
liness with the Bakthiaris, Ain-ed-Dowleh is held in office by us
and will do anything for us. H. M. G. are negotiating about
the Gendarmerie at Petersburg with a view to their being
employed throughout Persia. Russia wants Cossack brigade
to be increased so that they may take place of the gendarmerie
in the north. Bakhtiaris are all well in hand. Their recent
appointments to Isfahan and Kerman and the return of the
Illkhani^) to his duties were brought about by this legation.
Shaokats appointment to Seistan and Hashmat-ul-Mulk's
arrest^) were arranged through Ain-ed-Dowleh's subserviency.
Regents' main object is to crown Shah next July and to leave
country. He feared that new Me j lis might vote postponement
of the Shah's majority involving the Regent's resignation and
the election of a tool of their own: he therefore put off elec-
tions so that opening of the Mejlis might be as near coronation
as possible: Tehran elections are now completed. Democratic
element is entirely eUminated. Provincial elections will follow
at once but Tabriz is almost certain to refuse to send deputies') .

Position at Tabriz is most unsatisfactory owing to attitude
of defiance and the independence of Shuja supported by Russia.

Persian Govt's financial difficulties are very great. Mor-
nard is doing good work. It is hard to find money for the gen-
darmerie whose budget now amounts to about £600,000 per
annum.

*) The chief Khan of the Bachtiaxs: Sardar-i-Jang to whom was
intrusted the maintenace of security of the so-called "Lynch Road".

*) The Persians mentioned here are old rivals : Shaokat passes as Anglo-
phile, hence his nomination as Governor of Seistan. Hashmat-ul-Mulk who
was arrested at the instigation of England is reactionary and Russophile.

3) As already mentioned, the usurper of Tabriz, the Russian prot6g6
Shuja-ed-Dowleh prevented the parliamentary elections in Tabriz, from
taking place.

Trans-Persian railway scheme^) is causing difficulties, and
negotiations in London and Petersburg do not seem to lead
to an agreement. Russia desires line to run from Kerman to
Charhar but H. M. G. are opposed to terminus being east of
Bender Abbas.

P. G. can obtain £ 100,000 from a British syndicate for
the Kerman mining concession 377^) augmentation 3021 of
private 8430 by Russia acting on behalf of Societe d'Etudes.

Gendarmerie have sent force of 1200 men to Burajird.
Nizam-es-Sultaneh^) is to go there as Governor of Arabistan
and Luristan.

Yezd is promised to Bakhtiaris in April.

Naib*) Hussein is getting anxious at Kashan owing to gra-
dual closing in around him and is appealing to P. G. to be
allowed to proceed to Kerbela.

Gendarmerie have sent officer to Isfahan to prepare for
extension there.

Fars' situation continues to give anxiety. B. C.^) does
not hesitate to show his authority when necessary. G. G.^)
has not proved success and a more pliable person is being
sought. Present minister of Finance may be found most suitable
person"^) and his absence from the capital will strengthen Ain-
ed-Dowleh of whom he is an opponent. Recent affairs at Ka-
zerun and the regrettable loss of a Swedish officer will not I
hope have any far reaching results though trouble is not yet
at an end.

^) Reference is made here to a question of the railway project of
Baku-Nushki (Baluchistan) which was to be financed by the Soci6t6 d'Etudes,
Paris, with Anglo-French-Russian money.

^) The British Consul in Shiraz has left the original cipher and has
put a note of interrogation in the margin of his draft, applying to this
number and the next three words.

3) The former Governor- General of Fars, whence he was driven by
English intrigue, is now Commander- General of the Persian forces fighting
on the Turkish side.

*) Reference is made to Naib Hussein, the notorious Bandit chief.

^) British Consul.

fi) Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, Governor General.

'^) Vossuk-ed-Dowleh, now again Prime Minister.

There is some anxiety lest ex- Shah may return but the
Russian Govt have given most categorical assurances that he
will not have Russian support. Salar^) also threatens to return.

The peculiar remarks made by the Russian Minister in
the course of the interview displeased the English Minister
so much that he thought it necessary to send a copy of the
article to the British Consul. The Persian journalist put the
most awkward questions to the Minister, questions which for a
long time have been causing anxiety to the Persian Government :
the withdrawal of Russian troops from Northern Persia; the
return of the Ex- Shah; the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907,
Constitutionalism, the Gendarmerie, the New Loan, and the
Railway Concession extorted by means of the same and finally
the deposition of the Russian favorite Shuja-ed-Dowleh,
that monster who, with the consent of his Russian masters
"subjected to torture, put to the wheel and hanged members
of the Diet, put to the wheel and gouged out the eyes of priests
still alive and who had cut one of the National Volunteers
right in two, exposing both halves of the body in different
places" (George Brandes, PoUtiken, November 29th, 1916.)

To most of these questions Korostovetz had cheerful,
equivocal answers at hand. The Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907
guaranteed in the first place Persia's integrity. (The English-
man, Whigham, remarked sarcastically that no Under-secretary
of State was legitimized, unless he had the words "integrity"
or "status quo" on his lips). But it was questionable whether in-
tegrity could be maintained. The Persian Constitution was
recognized by the protecting powers. But perhaps it would
become necessary to alter the Constitution. Magnificent, however,
and really dazzling in its Muscovite honesty is his observation
on the question of the unlawful occupation of Northern Persia
by Russian troops, to which special emphasis is given by the
Persian journalist. "The Russian Government" says Korosto-
vetz, "would do better to spend the five milUon roubles for
the benefit of their own people rather than on splitting up their
troops in a foreign country".

*) Salar-ed-Dowleh, brother of the Ex- Shah, after causing protracted
revolts, was pensioned off by the Persian Government owing to the pressure
of Ru3^a and England, and afterwards lived in exile in Switzerland.

The interview given in the leading article of the Tehran
newspaper "Raad" of March lo^^^ 1914, is reproduced he-
rewith from the copy attached by Sir Walter Townley.

Resume of leading article in the journal " Raad" No. 41 —34
of March lo^^^ 1914^)-

Interview with M. Korostovetz, the Russian minister
at Teheran.

In asking the opinion of the minister on the merits and
characteristics of the Persians he said they were very kind,
hospitable and pleasant, and contrary to his former belief they
were not fanatic and had no anti-European feelings. But they
were not industrious and naturally prefer idleness to activity.

The correspondent asked the minister to explain, if possible,
the policy of the Russian Govt, to him which he said he could
not do so, but he has been instructed to strengthen the friendly
relations and cooperate in carrying out reforms. The corre-
spondent asked him about the Russian military occupation
of Northern Persia. The minister said that he was in favour of
evacuation of Persian territories by Russian troops, and his
Majesty has also instructed him to faciliate means of this pur-
pose and the F. O.^) has also instructed him to do so. The
viceroy of Caucasia and the ex-prime minister who is the
Minister of Finance joined him in that belief. It would he
better that the 5,000,000 roubles, which is spent on troops in Persia,
should be spent on the progress and civilization of the country
of Russia.

He asked him about the ex-shah. The minister replied
that he had lately gone to St. Petersburg and asked for assistance
of the Russian Govt, to return to Persia, but he was replied
that he had to leave the idea of returning to Persia entirely.
The minister was sure that the Russian authorities won't support
him at all.

The minister was asked if he thought Persian Constitution
injurious to economical and political interests of Russia. He

^) This English translation of the interview was enclosed with the
circular of the British minister. We reproduce the translation, which evi-
dently has been made by a Persian, word for word.

2) Foreign Office.

said that the two neighbouring powers had recognized the Persian
constitution, therefore they had no opposition to it. But
they were afraid the country would go into anarchy again.
If the anarchy returns, the Russian authorities intend to modify
the constitution and change the ParUamentary laws.

Regarding the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 the
Russian minister said that the first aim of it was to preserve
integrity of Persia. But as regards its future effects on Persia
it was impossible to say and it was difficult to prophecy. The
Persians had to put aside their personal interest and try for the
country. He was sure that there were persons in Persia who
were so competent that none could be found even in Russia.
If Persians were helpless to administer their own country, of
course natural proceedings would be unexpected.

The correspondent asked him about the Russian Govts'
policy in the neutral zone, which be said they had no definite
policy.

When he was asked about Persian Gendarmerie he replied
that he had no opposition to it. But in the beginning it was said
that the Gendarmerie was meant for roads only, but now the
scheme is quite changed, and it is understood that the Gendar-
merie in future will take the place of a big force. Therefore it is
necessary that he should enter into the question with the Per-
sian, British and Swedish Govts.

As regards the big Persian loan, he said that its fulfillment
depends on two points: —

1. that the budget should be regulated.

2. that the question of Railways shd. settled.
Regarding the Trans-Persian Railway he said that the British

Govt, wants it to be constructed from northwestern parts to the
south and the Persian Gulf, but the Russian Govt, should like
it to be made from the north-west to the south-east.

Regarding Haji Shuja-ed-Dowleh and Azerbaijan, the
minister said that it was Shuja-ed-Dowleh only who could
restore orders in Tabriz and the province.

In his next circular of June 26*^, 1914, dated from his
summer residence Gulhek the English Ministei shows the Anglo-
Russian cards still more. Persia, living from hand to mouth.

requires money. Already on December 25^^, 1915, Sir Walter
Townley, confident of victory, telegraphed to Sir E. Grey:
"Want of money may compel the Persian Government to
sign the railway concessions any day." When no cabinet could
be found to take upon itself this new squandering of Persian
rights, Saad-ed-Dowleh, whom the hatred of the people had
driven out of the country together with the Ex-Shah, was
recalled from exile to Teheran on the suggestion of Grey as a
most pliable tool. But the Regent Nasr-ul-Mulk, — he was
a friend of Grey's although not as unscrupulous as he, —refused
to recognise a cabinet formed by Saad-ed-Dowleh. Russia
by an advance of funds precipitately granted, obtained the
Julfa-Tabriz railway concession; English appetite was only
half appeased by the option on the Mohammerah-Khoremabad
railway line which had been extorted with difficulty.
The circular runs as fallows:

Very Confidential.
Circular Nr. 2. Gulhek, June 26. 1914.

Ref. my Confdl. Circular of March 23.

"With the approach of the date of the Coronation the
situation in the capital is very obscure. The Govt: is in sore
financial difficulty and it is not apparent from what source money
can be found. H. M. G. appears indisposed to give any assistance
and the P. G. will not seek the help of Russia, because it is
feared that assistance rendered from that quarter would be
accompanied by demands for certain concessions, notably
those of the navigation of Lake Urumia, the rectification of the
Russo —Persian frontier in the neighbourhood of the Moghan
Steppes, together with certain irrigation works and a land
concession, and the Karkunan irrigation scheme for diverting
the waters of the Karun from a source near the Kuh-i-Rang
into the Isfahan Plain.

•') Governor Genera).

practically independent of the Tehran Government and where,
under orders from St. Petersburg, the Russian Consulate
General collects the land tax from Russian subjects, protected
persons, and from Persians who have leased their lands to
such persons. The same mode of collection has been put in
force in other places in the Russian zone. Post Offices have also
been opened by Russia at Tehran, Tabriz and, it is said, at
Meshed.

Reports received from the provinces show that the elections
are proceeding very slowly, and there would appear to be but
small hope that the necessary quorum of the new Majliss will
be present in Tehran in time for the Shah to take the constitu-
tional oath before that body. It is therefore proposed to have
recourse to a mixed assembly of the old and new Majliss for the
purpose, a somewhat doubtful proceeding which may possibly
give rise in the future to a question as to the vaUdity of the
Coronation. The Regent is, however, determined that the
ceremony must not be postponed, and proposed to leave for
Europe immediately after it. It is not clear who will form the
first Cabinet of the new reign. The Russians strongly support
Saad - ud - Dowleh, but there is reason to believe that the
young Shah favours rather Mustofi-ul-Mamalek."

The closing passage of this circular in which Townley
announces the second division of Persia and the revision of
the treaty of 1907, after having just waxed indignant
at Azerbaijan having been laid under contribution
by the Russians in opposition to all international law,
must be read with special attention as an example of the
manner in which England and Russia maintain the prin-
ciple of nationalities announced by them just before the
outbreak of the world war:

"There is reason to believe that London & St. Petersburg
are about to go thoroughly into the Persian question, with
a view to seeing in what way it may be necessary to revise or
qualify the understanding of 1907 in such a manner as to meet
present requirements. The necessity for this action has been
caused by the attitude lately assumed by Russia in N. Persia,
and also partly perhaps by the fact that H. M. G., by the
arrangement recently made with the A. P. O, C, has assumed

certain fresh responsibilities in S. Persia which must be pro-
tected.

There are indications that some of the important tribes
of the S. are seeking to band themselves together, presumably
in anticipation of possible developments in the N. after the
Coronation, which they fear may affect their interests adversely.
There are also indications that certain of these tribes are desirous
of entering upon closer relations with H. M. G.

Sd-W.Townley."

In other words, as Russia has avowedly committed breaches
of international law in Northern Persia, England demands
concessions from her at the expense of Persia in the neutral
zone as balm for her wounded sense of justice. For, of what
nature are the obhgations, so delicately hinted at, which England
took over? What agreement has the English Government
arrived at with the A. P, O. C. ?

The A. P. O. C. (Anglo Persian Oil Company) is nothing
but the English Government itself, who stands behind the
Company founded in 1909, when the immense oil wells in South-
ern Persia were opened (extending in the direction of Shushter
to Bender Abbas). On June 18 ^^\ 1914, the proposal of the
English government that Great Britain should participate to
the amount of £ 2,001 000 in the enterprise was accepted by
254 against 18 votes in the House of Commons.

The distribution of the share capital is the following:

English Government £ 2 001 000

Other interests, preeminently the English Bur mah

Oil Co £ I 999 000

£ 4 000 000

The English Government, who have a representative of
the Treasury and the Admiralty on the Board, who has the
right of veto, have the majority with £ 2000 shares.

For the protection of these oil fields which according to the
statement of the president of the A. P. O. C, Greenway, "are
of such a yield as to be able to cope with more than all the
requirement of the British Navy" the English advance into the

Irak was inaugurated. The "Economist" of December ii^^^
1915, writes: The unfortunate Mesopotamian campaign was
undertaken principally to protect the interests of the important
oil fields which the admiralty had acquired.

The Persian Government was indemnified by 16 %of the yearly
net profits, and the tribe of the Bakhtiars in whose territory
were the wells of the also purely English offshoot the Bakhtiari
Oil Co, with 3 % of the shares and a payment of £ 3000 p. a.
What remains of this net-profit for the Persian Government
when as in 1915 the working of the wells is disturbed by the
cutting of pipes (the work of some uncontrollable tribes), appears
from the words of the chairman at the annual meeting of the
A. P. O. C. (Morning Post December 21^^ 1915,)^ "The Persian
Government were liable to make good to the company and to
the producing companies the whole of the losses consequent
upon the destruction of this oil and for the extra expendi-
ture the company would be put to in consequence of the

interruption."

* ♦ »

The third circular of the English Minister Townley brings
us right into the period of the world-war. The young Shah has
been crowned and immediately after this the cabinet has
resigned. The Regent, very accessible to English advice, has so
ordered the parliamentary elections, that the new parUament
is not fully assembled at the time of the coronation. Although
as is stated in the circular No. i of March 23 ^^, 1914 "the
democratic element is entirely eliminated in the new elections",
that patriotic element which is so hostile to the Anglo-Russian
loans at usurious rates of interest and to the bartering away
of the last of the Persian rights^), no absolute security is felt
even with respect to this new parliament. There are still too
many patriots in Persia! The shortness of funds persists, that
is to say, the danger of a new loan on ruinous terms, and besides,
as Russia is plundering the richest province of Persia, Azer-

1) Seethe periodical "The New statesman" January ist, 191 6, where
it is stated : All competent observers have however admitted that the honester
side in Persian politics, which is now along with much outlawed riff-raff
pro-German, is the democratic one. For the parties and persons mentioned
as being pro- Ally no respect can be entertained.

baijan, in a manner opposed to all international law, as England
herself recognized, the new Prime Minister is unable to secure
capable politicians for his cabinet, who naturally will not
assume the responsibility for the unheard of brutalisation of
a weak people by the honest heralds of the "principle of natio-
nality."

Also the Gendarmerie under Swedish commanders, the
eUte troops of Persia, threatens to disband as the pay is not
forthcoming regularly. Why is the pay not forthcoming?
The Swedes in common with their Persian troops, unlike the
Persian Cossack Brigade, do not consider themselves as in the
employ of a foreign power, but rather as, in the first place, the
protectors of Persia's welfare. But this does not agree with
English interests and consequently they are kept on short
commons by the Belgian creatures of England such as the
Treasurer General Heynsens. The Colonel of Gendarmerie
Merrill, the only American who had not declared himself in
agreement with his chief and his compatriots, when the affair
Morgan Shuster came to a head, writes on March 4 t^, 1915,
to Major O'Connor, the British Consul at Shiraz: "From con-
fidential and very reliable sources I learn that Heynsens,
Treasurer General, will do his best in the next few weeks
to prevent the Swedes getting any money for the gendar-
merie so as to force all of the Swedes to go." And some months
later the English Secretary of Legation Kerr^) informs this
same Merrill, who immediately reports the remark to Shiraz,
that they would now "see the gendarmerie in buggary" before

they would let them get a shie of English money

(Merrill to Major O'Connor August 14^^, 1915.) Thus the
diplomatic representatives of England treat Swedish officers
who have been called into the country at their own instigation !

We now reproduce the third circular of the EngUsh minister:

Nr. 3 Circular Gulhek 22nd. Aug, 1914.

Very confidential
My confidential circular of June 26 th.
Coronation passed off without any hitch and quite quietly.
There not being a quorum of 70 of new Mejlis at Tehran, the

^) previously in Berlin and Rome.

oath of allegiance to constitution was taken before some 68
conjectural members of ? (the query is O'Connors) old
Mejhs under a perhaps somewhat strained interpretation
of that clause of the constitution which says that in the event
of demise of a sovereign whilst a Me j lis is not in being the oath
should be taken before old MejUs. Ceremonial observed on
occasion of coronation was very simple. Innovation was a
banquet which Shah gave to heads of foreign missions all of
whom with the exception of Italian charg^ d'affaires had
special letters 6915 ingi) them as special representa-
tives of their respective sovereigns for occasion, and their
wives. Vahliad and cabinet-ministers were present at banquet
as also Shah's uncle. Prince Nusrat-es-Saltaneh. Ala-es-Sal-
taneh continued in office after coronation but resignation
of M. F. A.2), Vossuk-ed-Dowleh, became effective and there
was complete stagnation . . . . ^) decisive affairs.

Cabinet was formed a few days ago by Mustafi-ul-
Mamalik. Ala-es-Saltanah has assumed office of M. F. A.
Prime Minister himself has taken over Home affairs. Remaining
members of Cabinet are men of small importance. Muhtashem-
es-Saltaneh is Minister of Finance, Sahab Ektiyar Minister
of War, Zokar-el-Mulk Minister of Justice, Muhandes-el-
Mamalik Minister of Commerce, and Shahab-ed-Dowleh Minister
of Public Works, posts and telegraphs. In view of money string-
ency and situation created by Russia Prime minister was unable
to secure cooperation of certain prominent politicians upon
whom he had counted in accepting task of forming a cabinet.

*) These words the British consul was unable to decipher,
*) Minister Foreign Affairs.
') His Majesty's Government

shall remain in Persia until next March has disapproved of
minatory step taken but it is hard to see how service can
be carried on if funds are not found. Arrangement made with
H. M. G, is in sense that between now and next March some
settlement will be made under which scope of action of gen-
darmerie will be satisfactorily determined with Russia and
financial question established on a sound basis. H. M. G. have
advanced £ 50,000 for use of gendarmerie in Fars and Kerman.
Activity of finance administration is hampered by action
of Russian consuls in Russian zone, MeHat due from Russians,
Russian protected persons 9638^) from lands leased to or held
by such persons is collected by Russian consuls and paid into
Russian bank, on account of P. G., who has so far heard no
more of those moneys since their collection. Russian Consul
interferes largely in provincial administrations where lands
held or leased by Russians and Russian protected persons are
concerned.

This word the British consul was unable to decipher.

IV.

On the 16^^ of October 1910 England presented Persia
with that memorable ultimatum which demanded in the first
instance for the Southern trade-routes the training, arming
and maintenance of a body of police under British command,
unless the security of the trade-routes which were supposed
to be endangered by tribal robbers could be restored within
three months. The fact that the impotency of the Persian
Goverrmient against these unruly tribes was a consequence of
the Anglo-Russian policy of strangling was ignored as well
as the circumstance that the gathering of the Anglo-Russian
troops and their provoking attitude in Persia was the chief
eause of the troubles, though Persia made just representations
on the subject to England. England insisted on her demands
that Persia must establish — in the so-called neutral zone —
a body of Gendarmerie at her own expense, and she modified
the ultimatum only in so far that she allowed officers of a smaller
power to be engaged as instructors in the place of the British
officers. Grey adduced as a reason for these incessant mo-
lestations of the Persian Government that he could no longer
disregard the complaints of the Manchester merchants about
the bad state and the insecurity of the Bushire — Shiraz —Ispahan-
trade-route. These complaints were not founded on facts, as
appears from the telegram of the English minister in Teheran Sir
G. Barclay May 28^11, 1911^) ,,0n the Bushire-Isfahan road-and
I presume that complaints of Manchester firms refer parti-
cularly to this route — His Majesty's consular officers at
Bushire and Shiraz report considerable improvement since
last year. I can only suppose, therefore, that firms in question
must be under misapprehension — . No robbery has been
reported on the Bushire- Shiras section for a considerable
time, no robbery occasioning the loss of British goods has
taken place since December last. This year the telegraph line

*) EngliBh Blue Books Persia No. 3 (1912) No. 123.

was not damaged as is usual during the tribal migration which
has taken place."

Italy who had in the first place been approached for in-
structors declined. Sweden who had assured herself of consent
from all sides, sent a number of tried officers with Colonel
Hjalmarson at their head, who was appointed chief of the
Gendarmerie and who arrived at Teheran on August i$^^,
1911.

Hjalmarson and his comrades (there were twenty of them
in 1912) — set to work zealously. They succeeded within a
comparatively short time in training the troops who not only
gained the respect of the people but even won a certain popu-
larity by intelligently turning local conditions to account.
Young tribesmen, for instance, who took to highway robbery
from want of work and poverty, were just as ready for em-
ployment in the road-police against payment of small wages.
Contrary to the dissolute Cossack Brigade who requisitioned
at every opportunity which offered and made itself
guilty of other gross offences against property (quite apart
from the fact that it took its orders from Tiflis and from the
Russian legation in Teheran), the Gendarmerie had placed
itself from the beginning on an exclusively Persian footing.
Anyone who knows the Swedish army will understand that the
Swedish officers who were employed and paid by the Persian
Government did their very best to justify the confidence reposed
in them if only because their failure might easily have cast a
slur on the Swedish army.

And the work succeeds. The number of officers and men
is being constantly increased; the sphere of activity becomes
greater from month to month. A state of order reigns on the
caravan-routes. England whose trade in the South of Persia
profits not least by the re-establishment of security recognises
unreservedly the efforts of the Swedes through the Teheran
minister in January 1913: "They are all smart soldiers, keen
on their work." And on the occasion of a parade in April 1913
in the presence of the young Shah the Gendarmerie is stormily
acclaimed by all classes of the Persian people while on the
previous day the Cossack Brigade had been received in

chilly silence ^). Persia which had been incessantly humiliated
and misused by two European powers, sees a new hope arise
— the nucleus of a reliable military troop which grows to be
a support of the Government instead of giving way to ma-
rauding instincts and which balances the loss of the troop of
Yeprim Khan, the vanquisher of the Ex- Shah and the de-
fender of national liberty.

The financing of this Gendarmerie had been settled by
the pressure of England in the following way: Their cost of
maintenance was to be defrayed in the first instance out of
the Persian loans at high interest. Grey had telegraphed on
May 4^^^ 1911 *) to the English minister: "Urge Persian Go-
vernment that proposed Gendarmerie for policing of roads
should have the first call on the loan." England how-
ever cunningly arranged that a Gendarmerie account
was opened with the so-called Imperial Bank of Persia, a
purely British concern by whom all payments were made
direct to the Gendarmerie under the control of the Belgian
Treasurer General of Persia ; that is to say the Persian Central
Government and the Governor General of Ears were left out
of account. The motives become apparent when it is realised
that the English Ambassador, as well as his adviser for Ears,
the British Consul Major O'Connor in Shiraz, stood in much
closer relationship to the Treasurer General and his agent
at Shiraz^) than to the manyheaded Persian Government
which in the main was too intent upon furthering Persian
interests.

The conditions however were steadily becoming more
unsound, as Nasr-ul-Mulk, the Regent, steadfastly refused
to take the reactionary Saad-ed-Dowleh (who was an unscrupulous
promoter of the Anglo-Russian schemes for concessions) into
the ministry. When Sir W. Townley in his circular complains

^) English Blue Books Persia No. i (191 4) No. 237.

*) English Blue Books Persia No. 3 1912, No. 98.

') This is also apparent from intercepted private letters, which the
Comptroller of Customs of Shiraz, the Belgian Stas, wrote from London,
when on leave, to the British Consul at Shiraz. The Britisli Consul had
provided Stas with letters of recommendation for London and had introduced
him by these means into his own family.

about the general situation which prevents money being
obtained for the Gendarmerie, this means merely that the
usurious terms of the loans offered are too high for the Persian
Government to accept. The Swedish officers, many of them
men of private means, rightly think that the situation brought
about by the Anglo-Russian pressure on Persia, degrades
them to the role of mendicants, they threaten to resign, but
they are quieted b3^ their own Government and Englands'
promise to put the finances of the Gendarmerie on a sound basis.

England had now arrived at the point for which she had
been striving. Exactly like the Persian Government itself
the Gendarmerie was stalled off with small advances (which
were chargeable to the Persian budget) . The preliminary con-
ditions for making the Persian Government a dependent were
obtained by undermining its authority quite systematicallv .
The Swedes were intended to help English ends and were
highly welcomed particular y as a counterpressure against
the Cossack Brigade. In fact in St. Petersburg plans were
discussed by England, the most powerful financiers of the
Gendarmerie, for the entire elimination of the Brigade. The
English minister informed the consular officials under his
orders by a confidential circular dated March 1914 that: "His
Majesty's Government are negotiating about the Gendarmerie
at Petersburg with a view to their being employed throughout
Persia" and in the same circular the dispatch of a body of
1200 gendarmes and the extension of their activity in
Isfahan is referred to.

If the English diplomatists in Teheran had previously
acknowledged the excellent work of the Swedes, the English
Consul General at Isfahan, Grahame, gave them a brilliant
testimonial on the occasion of a journey from Bushire to
Isfahan, the most noteworthy passages of which may be quoted
here. In a letter adressed by Grahame to the English minister
and dated December 25 ^^\ 1914. he says: "It is scarcely too
much to say that the Bushire- Shiraz-Isfahan road is now
the Gendarmerie, so completely has that force overshadowed

the road, absorbing or dissipating all other elements

The feelings of the men towards their Swedish officers appeared
to be universally good (Major Lundberg in the Kaseroon and

Captain Killander in the Abadeh district being apparently

prime favorites) All along the line from Bushire to Isfahan

absolute security appeared to prevail and all the local in-
habitants whom I questioned as to the outcome of the Gen-
darmerie system spoke of it in the highest terms, contrasting
the present conditions on the road with those which prevailed
before the force was established and expressing their gratitude
for the enormous amelioration effected by it. Of the courtesy
and attention received by me personally from the Gendarmerie
in the course of my recent journey I cannot speak too highly and
other British travellers have spoken to me in a similar s ense . ' '

These words of a Consul who had travelled extensively
in Persia and the facts made apparent by them might have
been sufficient for England, if she was serious in her efforts
to restore order in the country. But it was British order that
was wanted, not Persian order. The experience made with
Shuster seemed about to be repeated: again an attempt at
reorganisation pressed on Persia from selfish motives turned
to the disadvantage of England in so far as the reorganizers
would not allow themselves to be shifted about as pawns in
the English policy of control but considered themselves as
servants in Persia's interests.

Thus, in order to have a pretext for weakening this organi-
sation whose popularity was steadily increasing, by keeping
back the pay assured them by agreement, England had re-
course to besmirching their conduct and calumnies of the Swedish
officers found ready listeners. On the occasion of leaving his
post Townley however said on April 7^^', 1915: "I cannot . . .
divest myself of a belief that the actions of the Swedes said
to be hostile to us have been exaggerated and that too ready
an ear has been lent to interested calumniators."

The transporting of munition in 1913 for the Gen-
darmerie from Bushire into the interior which was part of that
forces duty, offered the sought-for opportunity. This munition
had been ordered with the knowledge of England and had
been waiting about a year in Bushire on account of uncertain
means of transport. England having once before ordered
back unlawfully 200 000 cartridges on the way from Mo-
hammerah to Ahwaz, which munition had been intended for

Isfahan by the Persian Government, two Swedish officers,
Lundberg and Pousette, who were entrusted with the transport
of this new consignment, took some precautionary measures
which England immediately interpreted as a suspicious or
even hostile act. And this in spite of Major Pravitz, the chief
of the regiment stationed at Shiraz, having made no secret
of the reason of the dispatch of the two officers i). For the
British Consul at Shiraz sent on Januar 6^^', 1915, a telegram
of the following tenor to Teheran and Bushire:

"Prodrome, Tehran^) Knox, Bushire^)."
"Major Pravitz informed me to-day that Captains Lundberg
and Pousette who were to have left Shiraz to-morrow morning
for Tehran, have now received instructions from Tehran to
proceed to Bushire in order to bring up one million of cartridges
and for other purposes. O'Connor."

The "calumnies" (such is the expression used by the
British minister himself) of the absolutely loyal Swedish officers
are allowed to take effect as evidenced by the reply of the
Resident of Bushire dated Januar 17th, 1915. Lt. Col. Knox
cables to the British minister, to Basrah, Shiraz and Delhi (!)-

Tel. S. D.

From Knox, Bushire 17. 1. 1915.
C. Shiraz Telegram Nr. i January 6*^.
Lundberg left Bushire with 463 mules laden with am-
munition on January I5*'\ He stopped a very short time

1) The reproach to the Swedish officers of "smuggling munition"
is further refuted by a letter from the late Commandant of the Gendarmerie
at Fars, Uggla; this letter was found in the British Consulate at Shiraz.
This Swedish officer writes to Major O'Connor from Peking on April 18 th
1915: „For the moment I can only give you my word of honour that I (and
I am convinced, all my Swedish officers) never have done anything of the
kind, never have tried to disturb the internal peace of Persia, nor acted
against whomever be it England, Russia or Germany. Neither have we
transported arms or ammunition except for the Gendarmerie. On the other
hand we (or at least myself) have never been approached by any German
with proposals of this nature."

*) Telegraphic code word during war time for the English legation,
Teheran.

') Resident and Consul General for Bushire and the gulfports.

here and is reported to have conducted his operations with
extraordinary secrecy which deceived nobody but produced
various extravagant rumours of contemplated action by Swedes
and by P. G.^) Latter's objective is sometimes Turks sometimes
Russians while one rumour has it that Turks and Swedes
inspired by Germans will turn against Persians. It adds that
Hjalmarson is acting treacheroulsy under order of Swedish
government.

My Russian colleague has manifested keen interest in
Swedish movements and frequently asks me for news on this
subject.

Addressed Minister, repeated Basrah, Shiraz, India.

The offence of which the Swedish officers are accused, is
quickly defined. It is the crime, unpardonable even in neutral
countries, of sympathy with Germany or perhaps even a mutual
understanding. As appears from the foregoing telegram, no
hesitation is shown to impute a breach of neutrality to the
Swedish Government although the officers on the active
list had received orders of recall in consequence of the Swedish
mobilisation. But there is still a hesitating doubt whether the
eUmination of the Swedish officers would not be too dearly
bought by the chaos which their disappearance might create;
in consequence of the excellent work of the Gendarmerie
English commerce which had almost entirely vanished in the
first six months of the war is again in a flourishing state ("bu-
siness "evidently was not quite" as usual"). Indeed a possibility
had been discovered of securing a respectable portion of the
tea trade hitherto in the Russian allys hands. The English mi-
nister cables on Jan. 2y^, 1915, to the Foreign Of f ice in London:

"Even if Russian answer is not satisfactory it would appear
to me desirable that we should endeavour to obtain consent
of Swedish Govt, to leave Major Folke and Major Carlberg or
Moeller here^) in order that Isfahan — Bushire section of road
may be suitably controlled. Other arrangements if necessary

^) Persian Government.

*) The Swedish Government had recalled them.

can be made after war. Road is open now and custom authorities
at Bushire report large increase in customs dues. All tea that
used to come via north is now entering by south. Sugar is
likely to follow if the embargo on export of commodity from
India is raised. We may thus recover large proportion of our
vanished trade if the security of the road can be maintained.
This is I think assured if competent officers are in command
at Isfahan Shiraz."

The old English game of intrigues now starts: There is
an attempt to play off a seemingly more pliable officer against
those of his comrades whom one cannot trust to carry out
a policy entirely in the English interests. In a characteristic
telegram from the British Consul at Shiraz to the British Resident
in Bushire and to the Minister at Teheran the attitude is also
touched upon of the highest official in the province, the Governor
General Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, an attitude which explains the
continued efforts to undermine his position:

January 31 ^^, 1915.

"Principal offenders in matter of pro- German talk are

Capts. Lundberg and Killanderi). Former has left Shiraz for

Tehran, and latter has fallen foul of Major Pravitz and will

also, I hope soon depart from Ears

G. G.^) also is very pro- German and is source whence emanate
many German and Turkish reports.

German and Turkish news reach Shiraz from Tehran by
Persian wires and by post."

The wrath of the EngHsh fell upon the head of the Chief
of Gendarmerie, General Hjalmarson. He became tired of the
British-Belgian game of intrigue ^) by which his officers and
men were kept without their pay for months, and one day
ordered Major Pravitz without any more ado to get himself

1) They had been designated by Ccnsul- General Grahameas the officers
most popular with their men.

2) The British Consul at Shiraz telegraphs on February 18 th, 1915,
to his Minister: "The men (the gendarmerie of Fars) have not been paid
for two months and Pravitz fears a general break up.

paid by collecting taxes "eventually with the help of the finan-
cial agent". Pravitz thereupon seized lo ooo Tomans which
were deposited with the Belgian customs agent in Abadeh and
which were receipts of taxes out of which the expenses of the
Gendarmerie were to be defrayed according to the British-
Persian agreement. The English Minister was beside himself
with rage at this proceeding, which was quite comprehensible
on the part of these officers whose dignity was constantly being
slighted. The deserving commander, a Swedish officer of the
General staff who, two years earlier, was a ,, smart soldier"
became "a madman with an enfeebled brain". Sir Walter
Townley telegraphs on Februar I3^^\ 1915. to Shiraz and
Bushire :

„Hjalmarson seems to have lost his head and to be seeking
to wreck his own work whilst doing as much harm generally
as he can. We hope to get rid of him soon, but this must
be done in such a way that he cannot call all Swedes to
follow him.

,,He has himself announced that Swedish Government
has recalled all officers on active list. At the request of British
and Russian Governments, Folke has been allowed to remain
as Officer Commanding so it will be hard for Hjalmarson to
hang on.

"Belgians are naturally up in arms and see a political
design in General's madness. I doubt this although his enfeebled
brain may well be spurred on to be troublesome by Turkish
and German advisers."

It had been for some time the intention of the English
Government to remove General Hjalmarson, as all the other
reorganizers and politicians who had been working for the
best interests of Persia had been removed. The American
"Colonel" Merrill whom we shall get to know still better in
the role of an indefatigable intriguer and talebearer, had
reported confidentially to the British Consul at Shiraz on
February i^*: "The quarrel at Kazvine between gendarmes
and Russian troops was over the barracks of the gendarmerie

which the Russians wanted to occupy . . . Hjalmarson sent
an impudent letter a few days ago to Korostovetz, which
Korostovetz showed to Townley wherein Hjalmarson said
that unless the Russians wanted to cause a clash, they had
better leave the gendarmes at Kazvine alone. Townley
said to Korostovetz: "Do your best to get Hjalmarson out
at once and I will give you my full support."

In March 191 5 the Swedish officers on the active list who
had been recalled by their government, had left Persia; only
officers of the reserve remained behind. The high command
was transferred to Colonel Edwall. The acknowledgment of
his and his subordinates' work from their arch enemy, Merrill,
who was incessantly striving for the Swedes' dismissal, weighs,
therefore, all the heavier. "I must say", he writes on March
6ti> to the British Consul at Shiraz, "the Swede reserve officers
seem to be doing well." Nevertheless, the old system of
thumbscrews is also applied to them, particularly by the
Belgian financial administrators, as they are suspected of
being pro-German. Merrill reports on March 4^^ to Shiraz:
"From confidential, and very reliable sources I learn that
Heynsens, Treasurer- General, will do his best in the next
few weeks to prevent the Swedes getting any money for the
Gendarmerie so as to force all of the Swedes to go."

Although pro- German utterances by the Swedes were
considered to be such grave charges that they gave rise to
a busy exchange of cablegrams between Teheran and London,
neither the Belgians nor the English could bring home to the
Swedish officers disloyal actions. Again and again the alter-
native had to be faced, either to worry the Swedish officers,
who were so popular with the Persians, into taking their
departure or to revert to the former chaos, which would have
handed over British commerce and probably all political
advantages which England had gained in Southern Persia
to Russia. The lesser evil was chosen, although with gnashing
of teeth. Grey, the much travelled psychologist, hit upon a
proposal which would have been fine had it been made to the
grandees of Bukarest and Constanza, instead of Swedish
subjects. He offered the Swedish officers money through his

diplomatic agent ^) to entice them over to the English side.
On March 3, 1915, the English Minister informed the consuls
of Shiraz, Bushire and Bazrah of a telegram addressed by him
to Grey, the contents of which were rather compromising:

". . . .At the same time it has impressed on me that Swedes
are not so generally pro- German as is supposed and one officer
who has been accused of showing his bias called on me to-day
to say that he is of French origin and has all his family ties
in England and . , . . '^) called pro-German. All are probably
anti-Russian.

It would appear to me a most unfavourable moment to
change foreign officers for gendarmerie. British officers are
probably not available and imposition of them on Persia at
present moment would make a bad impression. Task is too
big for an American officer.

I venture to deny suggestion that Swedes

and won to my side by pecuniary assistance."

Grey's proposal is declined by the British Minister at
Teheran after having also been declined by the Swedish
officers. The British Consul at Shiraz, Major O'Connor, who
according to the circular of Sir W. Townley does not fail to
show his authority where necessary, the "strong man of Ears",
resents particularly this view of Townley 's as communicated
to London: Task is too heavy for an American officer. For
it is he who wants to put his own creature, the former Colonel
of Police, Merrill, at the head of the Gendarmerie at Ears.
Merrill had to leave his post as instructor of the police at
Shiraz on the action of the Governor- General Mukhber-es-
Sultaneh, one of the most capable of Persian statesmen and
an irreproachable patriot (the British Minister when leaving
his post calls him a pillar of the constitutional Government).

^) Edwall and Pousette received these offers, which were of course
ignored by them.

*) Words difficult to decipher in English original, but evident from
context.

3) Here the British Consul could not decipher a line in the Mi-
nister's communication.

The explanation of this animosity is given by this late employee
of the Persian Government himself in a letter addressed to
O'Connor, dated March 4, 1915. "I did my best to serve
English interests in Fars." All levers were used by O'Connor
to bring this servant of Enghsh interests in Persia to Shiraz.
"YourMin. and Churchill i) both told me that you 2) were
constantly "hammering away" to have me returned to Fars.
There is no doubt that your Min. is willing if he can find a way.
Hope you will succeed in ousting the G. G.^) soon."

(Letter from Merrill to the British Consul at Shiraz of
July 8, 1915.)

Thus nothing remained for the "strong man" at Fars
but to settle down to the idea of these uncomfortable Swedes
who could not understand that England's welfare is identical
with that of all the other nations. He telegraphs in a fit
of bad temper on March 5, 191 5, to his Minister: "I trust
that if the Swedes are to remain it may be impressed upon
officers in Fars that not only should they maintain attitude
of strictest neutrality whatever their own individual sympathies
may be but that it is their duty to discourage all pro- German
and Turkish propaganda amongst their native officers and
men and to take active steps to suppress agitators and to
ensure preservation of order . . . ."

If anything could contribute to the elimination of the
last spark of sympathy for England felt by the Gendarmerie,
it was the treatment which the English diplomatists and their
Belgian henchmen were meting out to that force in the following
months. Merrill at Teheran registers these events gleefully
in his letters to O'Connor.

April 14^^, 1915. "The gendarmerie is five months behind
in pay and the police 100 000 tomans behind in pay "

P. S. "Townley and Korostovetz have continued opposing
each other up to the last minute except that they agreed on
getting the Swedes out."

^) The Dragoman of the English Legation.

*) O'Connor.

■') Governor General.

May 31 ^^ 1915. "Last night the Farman farmar Min.
of the Interior told Mirzayantz, a prominent Armenian who
is a friend of mine, that the Persian govt, was determined to
send off the Swedes but were obUged to go slowly with the
matter as the public were so overwhelmingly in favor of the
Swedes."

July 8 th, 1^15. "The only reason he held on to them was
because of their ability to control the Persian officers who
were all pro- German. He said that Ed wall was completely
in the hands of the Germans and that he is "a most awful
fool."

July 25*^1, 1915. "The gendarmes are having a hard
time to exist at all. They are getting for all the gendarmes
here from one to three hundred ts. a day (Fridays and Mon-
days excepted!!!). It is a slow process but they are slowly
being strangled "

August 14th, 1915. "Last night Kerr ^) said that they
would "see the gendarmerie in buggary" before they would
let them get a shie of English money "

And these subjects of a nation esteemed throughout the
world, whose pay is retained by England's and Russia's Bel-
gian creatures, who are vilified by English diplomatists, these
Swedish officers are nevertheless expected to maintain loyal,
that is to say, friendly feelings towards England!

But the measure of the insults they were subjected to
is not yet full. In order to obtain new material for accusations,
the British Consul at Shiraz obtains, on July5t'\ 1915, extracts
of the private accounts of the Swedish officers from the manager
of the Imperial Bank at Shiraz, Ferguson. The manager com-
putes contrary to all commercial usage "for private information
and confidential use, if necessary", what private funds belonging
to Swedish officers had passed through his hands.

On April 8t'\ the Commander of the Shiraz Regiment,
Major Pravitz, addressed a letter of warning to the General
Treasury at Shiraz in which he explains that the fact was well
known to him that the Treasury was owing the money for the

*) Archibald Kerr, the English Secretary of Legation.

pay, although much had been spent lately for other purposes.
"It must be well known to the Treasury, that the Gendarmerie
was legally guaranteed the receipt of the money required by
it before the police and other institutions were paid "

This letter concludes: "as however our financial position
is becoming more difficult every day and although the Treasury
will not do its duty in spite of everything to that part of the
administration of our country which is called the gendarmerie,
it will be my first duty to tell my subordinates, and the people
whose security depends upon the gendarmerie, about the hostile
attitude of the Treasury and in order to avoid misunderstandings
to give them also the names of the persons who work against
the Persian interests."

Pravitz, a level-headed officer, who had been called by
the British Consul "a sensible man who confines himself to his
work" was brought to this by the creatures of Belgium and
Russia. The latter, who were in Persian service, drew their
pay from Persia and had it attested in writing that they were
working against the interests of Persia.

Indeed, the Treasury at Shiraz refused at last to receive
calls from the officers about their backpay. When Captain
Oertengren thereupon addressed violent reproaches to the
Financial Comptroller at Shiraz, the British Consul at Shiraz
demanded the recall of Oertengren in a letter flaming with
indignation which culminated in an insult to the whole Swedish
nation. The passage runs: "Captain Oertengren, who is an
officer of an unusually inferior type even for a Swede — "

This sad chapter of English chivalry towards a staff of
deserving officers, whom the English minister would have been
only too pleased to treat to a kick (Townley put it more
delicately by using the expression a "coup de pied") as a re-
cognition of their professional achievements, which had been
appreciated by all Persians and even by the English, could not
close more suitabh'' than with the resume of the English minister
Sir Walter Townley on the occasion of his leaving his post in
April 1915:

"The Swedes, probably because they are pro-German,
have become the darlings of the Persian people and can do

no wrong. It would be very hard for any Cabinet to take strong
action against them. All that can be hoped is that we may
get them out through the Swedish Government, but that
would be out of all Persia, and then the question arises would
not the last state of that man be worse than the first ? With
the Swedes gone, and no one available to take their place
troubles would soon break out again on the road. Well, I shall
not be here to see what will happen, and as I could not imagine
that all you gentlemen in the South i) would have cooked the
charges against them, I had to lift up my voice at last in hostile
language. The Belgians appear to be all going, at least all
those in financial administration. The Swedes have had no
small share in this result, which appears to me an unfortunate
one at this moment of chaos when Persia, as usual, is sorely
in need of financial assistance that no one can well give her
unless sure that there is a financial administration capable
and honest enough to handle the money ^). What a hopeless
task it is indeed! Here have I been three years bolstering up
and supporting against all sorts of antagonists, including my
best friends, these two European administrations only to find
myself during my last days here unable to keep one on its feet,
and administering a coup de pied with all my force to the
other. It seems to have been a sad waste of much time and
energy to produce such a poor result. I cannot at the same
time divest myself of a behef that the actions of the Swedes
said to be hostile to us have been exaggerated, and that too
ready an ear has been lent to interested calumniators. I fully
reahze all the mischief the Swedes have done by their open
expressions of conviction that the Germans must win. This
opinion coming from what are considered as impartial military
critics has had a great influence on the unreasoning public
opinion of Persia who has gladly accepted as an accompUshed
fact the total overthrow of the hated Russian."

^) The letter is addressed to the consul at Shiraz.
2) This the English minister says after Russia and England had
driven the capable administration of Shuster out of Persia.

The American, Merrill, is the chronicler who recorded the
intrigues and the state of feeling at Teheran during the first
half of the year 1915. He had come to Persia with his greater
compatriot, Shuster, and was the only American amongst the
helpers of the late Treasurer- General who had not declared
his solidarity with him after the presentation of the Russian
ultimatum.

Shuster and his staff went ; Merrill remained behind. The
British Legation got him at once into the gendarmerie com-
manded by Hjalmarson, and in February 1913 he was proposed
to Grey by Sir Walter Townley as Chief of the Police force of
the Governor- General of Fars^). An illustration of how tliis
honest person, who was in the pay of Persia, went about his
work is given in his own words : " I did my best to serve English
interests in Fars. "

Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, a statesman who had been edu-
cated in Germany and in whose honourability the English
had great confidence, or they would not have advocated his
appointment to the post of Governor General of Fars, one of
great importance in their eyes, soon discovered that Merrill
had been put to spy upon him. Merrill with his inferior menta-
lity looked down with contempt on all Orientals. Already
in September 19 14 he was relieved of his post and went to
Teheran where he plotted modes of destruction against the
Governor General of Fars and the Swedish officers.

In Teheran he hved the life of a fortune hunter of the
type, many and varied specimens of which are to be met
with in Oriental capitals. He was charmed when he was asked
to tea or dinner by the EngUsh minister and could snatch some
information from his small talk; he conversed and dined with
foreign ministers and secretaries of legation ; he hobnobbed with
the Persian Armenians, went to the receptions of Persian

^) English Blue Books Persia No. i (1914) No. 2. ,,I have proposed Co-
lonel Merrill, an American who remained behind when Shuster went."

grandees, such as the Russophile Farman Farma. He studied
the newspapers and the state of public feeling; in brief, he
sought for knowledge, but not only on his own behalf. What-
ever came to his ears (" My sources of information are excellent ",
he writes on March i6, 1915) he reported red hot to the English
Consul at Shiraz, Major O'Connor, for whom he tried occasionally
to do a little business in motor cars as well. He was particularly
delighted to have an occasional dig at Europeans who were
not on friendly terms with O'Connor, for instance, Churchill
for many years Dragoman of the English Legation. "Sir
W. Townley does not trust Churchill quite, he has repeatedly
shown dislike for you (O'Connor) and he receives bribes, as
the Secretary of Legation, Kerr, knows", is one of his reports.

This eavesdropper of Teheran secrets was a welcome
source of information for Major O'Connor. It is well known
that the English Consuls in latitudes which were to be ^^peace-
fully penetrated" are generally of military rank. He learned
from the American that the German wireless station was "still
working successfully", that Persian popular sentiment always
excited anew by arbitrary acts of England, such as the arrest
of the German Consul Listemann at Bushire, was quite openly
demanding an alliance with Turkey and that Russian forces
were always ordered to march whenever a ministry tried to
assert itself, which was disliked by Russia or England. He
also heard that the British minister at Teheran "was going to
make a big row" to have the Governor- General of Fars removed
from office, and how badly the British and Russian ministers
were getting on together.

Is Merrill only an idle gossip? The good fairies were
indeed absent from the cradle of this adventurer. His witless
cynicism, the cynicism of one of those unscrupulous profit hun-
ters who have done so much to discredit the European-American
race with the peoples of the Orient, has produced this grotesque
passage in one of his letters: "I am afraid this policy of letting
the Persians do as they please may cause them, like all Orientals,
to mistake kindness for fear and proceed to take affairs in their
own hands to the detriment of both Russia and England."

It is just the want of imagination of this American which
is a guarantee of his correspondence reproducing the game

of intrigues at Teheran clearly and faithfully. The words
attributed by him to foreign diplomatists, principally Townley,
Marling and Korostovetz, have undoubtedly been spoken. On
July 8, 1915 Merrill wrote to the British Consul at Shiraz and
on May 17, 1915 the British Minister, Marling, to the same
address :

Merrill to O'Connor: Marling to O'Connor:

"Your Min. Marling and "We quite see that your

Churchill both told me that Governor General has got to
you were constantly "ham- be got rid of, and I have been
mering away" to have me hammering at it since my
returned to Fars"i). arrival."

Much light is thrown on Townley's conflicts with his
Russian colleague, Korostovetz, and on the policy prompted
by jealousy between the two "Protecting Powers" who have
struck their claws deep into the flesh of the defenceless Persian
victim. This policy was continued even during the world-
war. Korostovetz was like a red rag to a bull not only to
Townley but also to his successor, Marling (who held Persia
in greater contempt perhaps than any man whom Great Bri-
tain ever sent to Teheran on a diplomatic mission). "Korosto-
vetz was a misfortune" Marling wrote on May I7^'\ 1915, to
the British Consul at Shiraz, and he supplements his sharp
criticism in a letter addressed to the British ambassador in
St. Petersburgh, Sir George Buchanan, dated June 20 1^, 1916,
by these words: "As to Korostovetz, I'm sorry I cant share

your belief in his sincerity I have no belief in Korostovetz.

Everyone here describes him as impossible to get on with for
long, the kind of man who acts out of "cussedness" and for
the pleasure of doing what no one else would do. No one here
seems to regret his departure, least of all his own Legation!
He will not help us at the Russian Bank and his idea of co-
operation between the Banque d'Escompte and the Imperial
Bank of Persia will merely be that the latter should share
its good business with the former, which if it were a private
institution would have gone bankrupt years ago ..."

^) The removal of the Governor General was the conditio sine qua non
of Merrill's recall to Fars.

We will now let the American, Merrill, speak, whom
England in 1916 entrusted with the organization of a force
similar to the Cossack Brigade and who was soon after appointed
Commander of the forces of Prince Nusrat-es-Sultaneh^) :

Teheran, Jan. 20. 1915.
Dear Major:

To-day is the third day that the treasury has been closed
here as a protest against the high handed proceedings of the
gendarmerie in collecting taxes in the provinces. I understand
that the Belgians say that either the Swedes go or they go: in
all probability some of both sides will go : rather think the govt,
is rather pleased at the situation as it gives them a chance to
get rid of the detested Belgians. I beheve the report is true
that Hjalmarson has a signed contract in his pocket to orga-
nize a gendarmerie in China! poor China! The situation at
Kennan Sir Walter told me was "rotten": the gendarmerie
running wild in the streets : he said in all probability an inde-
pendent force would have to be organized there: hinting I
think that I might have it ! The Birjand post is at my command
if I want, but the situation is changing very rapidly and I am
awaiting the adjustments sure to follow the departure of the
Swedish regular army officers. Niestrom, Moller, Folke, An-
den, Hjalmarson will go, leaving only reservist officers or
militiamen. Poursette is I hear to be chief gendarmerie ac-
countant here: ach Gretchen!! The air literally hums with
intrigue now in Teheran. For a time there was a bit of an
anti foreigner feeling visible but that has practically passed
away: there is a small group at work to induce Persia to de-
clare war against Turkey. Even among the Bakhtiaris, as I
told Sir Walter, I have found German sympathizers : the cabinet
is spineless, incompetent and helpless; the medjiless is yet
occupied with passing on the credentials of its members; one
rarely hears the parliament mentioned except contemptuously
even by Persians^).

') Russkoje Slowo, April gth, 1916

2) The British minister characterizes the new Parhament with the
words: "Democratic element is entirely eliminated." Compare also the
passage already quoted from "The New Statesman", Jan. ist, 1916: "The
honest er side in Persian politics is the democratic one."

I am hoping Shiraz will be my command once more: I
hope the report I put in about my stay at Shiraz will get the
Moakber-es-saltaneh out of Fars; Sir Walter saw it as did
Churchill. I left little untold; it went to the Ministry of War
to-day; included in the report was a lot re Kazeroon except
that I did not mention the Swedes anywhere in the report
in connection with Kazeroon. Churchill through Persians has
spread word all over Teheran that if the G. G. of Fars does
not resign my report will be pubUshed in full in all of the seven
Teheran newspapers and in the papers in England and Europe.
Sir Walter has a (confidential) scheme to put me in charge
of 500 Bakhtiari horsemen here at Teheran but although
it is acceptable still I think it will only be a temporary
command to be discharged once the need of them has
passed

There has been a lot of "fuss" over Tabriz; the Persian
govt, is making desperate efforts to get the Crown Prince
started for there; they got together a ragged collection oi miscel-
laneous soldiers that are a comic opera troupe and some thirty
or forty thousand tomans for expenses. The coming of the
Turks to Tabriz has been welcomed by the Persians who say
the Turks have delivered them from the Russians ; the Persians
believe the Turks will leave Persia when the VaUat arrives
at Tabriz ; a great part of the Valiats' escort will return to Te-
heran after he arrives safely at Tabriz.

The Russian Minister, Korostovetz, has been rather alarmed
for his safety. He is said to have declared that if the Russian
troops left Kazvine that he would not remain in Teheran but
would go to Zergandeh in Shimran as being safer than the
legation in town. A well informed Armenian told Sir Walter^)
that one Russian defeat at the hands of the Turks would very
likely precipitate Persia into the conflict on the side of Turkey.

I am trying to get Americans brought here for both the
gendarmerie and Treasury. I have told Sir Walter that the
Persians are decidedly in favor of such a plan but fear Russia's
opposition ......

Sincerely yours j. n. Merrill

^) Probably Mirzayantz with whom Merrill as he says later on was on
friendly terms.

Confidential. _ , ^ ,

Teheran, Feb. i. 1915.
Dear Major:

A determined effort has been made to put me in as chief
of the gendarmerie to succeed Hjalmarson, but Sir Walter
has decided I think upon retaining Col. Folke, chief at present
at Ispahan, as chief of the gendarmerie, assisted by Majors
MoeUer and Carlberg; all of the rest of the Swedes to go. As
you have heard no doubt Townley and Korostovetz are ordered
away: to replace the Russian Min. a mild little man will come
from London. . .

The opinion of the Persians is that if Townley goes it
means that England is turning Persia over to the tender mercies
of the Russians. Borgrave^) and Lecomte^) have wired their
respective govts, saying that Sir Edward Grey should be in-
formed that it is their opinion that if Townley leaves and his
personal influence is removed that they believe that Persia

will join with Turkey in the war If Townley remains

I am sure that Korostovetz will remain too. A new cabinet
is being formed. Current opinion is that it will very hkely be
a strong pro-Russian cabinet. In that case I do not believe
a single Swede will be allowed to remain in Persia

The Russians re-entered Tabriz two days ago without
opposition; both Townley and Churchill admit that there is
a pro- German sentiment among the Bakhtiaris

My opinion is that if she dared Persia would join the
I'urks and if she does the Bakhtiaris and all other tribes will
go along too

The Armenians want me to command a mixed force of
1000 cavalry (Bakhtiaris and Armenians) here at Teheran
to be ready in case Russia should meet a defeat at the hands
of Germany and Persia start to join Turkey. . . .

Hjalmarson sent an impudent letter a few days ago to
Korostovetz which Korostovetz showed to Townley wherein
Hjalmarson said that unless the Russians wanted to cause a
clash they had better leave the gendarmes at Kazvine alone.

*) The Belgian Minister.

*) The French Minister formerly in Berlin, known through the Eulen-
burg case.

Townley said to Korostovetz "Do your best to get Hjalmarson

out at once and I will give you my full support."

The trouble at Kazvine between gendarmes and Russian
troops was over the barracks of the gendarmerie which the
Russians wanted to occupy as they said they heard the Swedes
were leaving The Kazvine gendarmes and police yester-
day stopped work because of no funds ....

Sincerely yours j ;^ ^^^-^^

Teheran, March 4. 1915.
P. S. // the Swedes all go I will, I am sure, be the chief
of the gendarmerie. I think that in the future the gendarmes
will mainly be used on the Teheran —Bushire road. Russia
does not want them in the north.

Teheran, March, 4^^\ IQIS-
Dear Major:

.... For some reason unknown to me Sir Walter has en-
dorsed the remaining of the Swedes in and at the head of the
gendarmerie. Possibly he does not want to make any changes
before his relief arrive. Would it be possible for Sir Walter
(if you wrote to him explaining what happened at Shiraz) to
speak privately to Heynsens, Treasurer General, and ask him
to release 1) me from responsibility for property at Shiraz? I
did my best to serve English interests in Fars

The Austrian Min. Logatetti and Prince Reis,

German Min. each accompanied by a military attache are
reported to be returning to Teheran via Kermanshah. If your
fleet succeeds in taking Constantinople it will have a great
moral effect here as undoubtedly the Persians are intensely
pro German and pro Turkish .... From confidential and very
reliable sources I learn that Heynsens, Treasurer General, will
do his best in the next few w^eks to prevent the Swedes get-
ting any money for the gendarmerie so as to force all of the
Swedes to go. All of the active officers (i. e. officers of the
Swedish regular army) have now left Persia and Major Edouall
who is in command is a great enemy of Heynsens. It is an

^) Merrill had been accused by the Belgian financial agent Stas in Shiraz,
of having tampered with Persian Government property.

unconfirmed report that the Swedes now remaining have said
that they will remain until the end of April and that they
will then leave Persia if no better arrangements have been made
by that time for supplying money for the gendarmerie. If Sweden
should enter this war on the side of Germany of course all of
the Swedes would be recalled from Persia, There has been
some confidential talk of Russia and England supplying arms
to Persia with which to fight Turkey. The cabinet is favorably
disposed to the idea but are afraid I believe to accept the pro-
position because of what the mass of the people think and

what they would say I am positive that the Russian

Legation is entirely opposed to the present cabinet and that
it is working for its overthrow ....

Sincerely yours

J. N. Merrill.

P. S. It is rumored in the diplomatic colony here that
Churchill is to be shipped off to a consulate in Italy as he is
not too well trusted by Sir Walter^).

Confidential. Teheran, March 6. 1915.

Dear Major:

.... Two days ago the Prime Min, gave orders that no
one should accept any checks signed by the Treasurer General
(He5msens) and the understanding is that the Min. of Finance

will sign checks hereafter Sir Walter left Wednesday

with Churchill for a place beyond Verramin to do some ex-
cavating 2). They will be away ten days. The day after they
left the order was issued by the Prime Min. about the Treasurer

Generals' signing checks Sir Walter said one day to

Wad: "I wish there was a man in the Persian cabinet with
force of character enough to kick out all the Swedes and Bel-
gians and replace them by Americans." ... I must say the
Swede reserve officers seem to be doing well. I have noticed

already an improvement in the discipline of the gendarmes

Sir Walter I hear has been trying to appease without success

*) Sir Walter Townley, the British Minister, Churchill's chief.

*) Although France had secured the rights of excavating in Persia.

the dislike of the Russians for the present cabinet The

two legations are now fighting each other at every point of
contact

Sincerely yours _ -^ ._ .,,

•^ ' J. N. Merrill.

Teheran, March i6. 15.
Dear Major:

My sources of information are excellent. As I pre-
dicted the last cabinet did not last long. The present prime
Min. is believed to be pro-Russian and the other Mins. are not

anti- Russian Opinion is that the Russian Legation

now is the controUing factor here. On excellent authority I
have it that Russia effects to make a loan to Persia in a month
or so and also to control the expenditures and the finances.
At the time the loan is made a big effort will also be made to
induce Persia to abandon her neutrality. Confidential opinion
is that the Russians will not be able to accomplish this plan
as although the cabinet may be willing nevertheless for fear
of the Persian people no cabinet will dare to enter the war

on the side of Russia He5msensi) has distributed a lot

of money I am told (I am inclined to beheve it) among the
members of the Medjiless to insure the Belgians remaining in
office. I suspect the money is Russian. The Russians will do
their best to oust all Swedes. The Persians hate the Belgians
and will get them out if it is possible Teheran news-
papers are very indignant at the capture of the German consuP)
by your forces at Bushire. . . .

With best salaams

Sincerely yours J. N. Merrill.

Dear Major: Teheran, March 21. 1915.

This afternoon I was over at your legation for tea and also
had a talk with Sir Walter. He said "I yesterday recommended
to the Prime Minister that he take the Moakber-es-Saltaneh^)

^) The Treasurer General, a Belgian.

2) Consul Listemann was illegally arrested and interned in India by the
English.

^) Governor General of Fars.

out of Shiraz and that the Swedes be recalled from Fars and
that you be sent to command the gendarmerie there"

All Persia is seething. The situation as regards all of the
tribes is very critical. Everywhere in the provinces the tribes
are on the point of rising; east, north, south, west — all around.
Teheran will probably be kept in hand by Russian troops.
I believe it is true that 1400 Baghtiaries have joined the Turks. .

The Russians are still doing their utmost to oust the Swedes

and prevent their getting any money Churchill^)

is surely going to leave Persia. Good riddance. Zarimar!

Sincerely yours

J. N. MerriU.

P. S. Why not recommend that the Army of Fars be
abohshed and merged with the gendarmerie? We need the
field guns. Also that I be given control of the poUce. That is
important in these unsettled times in order to have a hand on
the pulse of Shiraz. Please ask that I get something extra in
pay on acct. of the poHce.

Teheran, March 26. 1915.
Dear Major:

Townley yesterday told me that Sir Edward Grey on
March 24 th asked Stockholm to recall the Swedes from Fars.
Townley told me he believed he had succeeded yesterday in
frightening the Persian government. He told the Persians that
there was imminent danger that 10 000 Russian troops might
occupy Teheran to enforce their demands as to Persia's neutrahty.
He said he had received yesterday a conciHatory reply from the
Prime Minister. The Prime Min. said to Townley "Well,
of course the Russians can send troops here and change the
cabinet and put in whom they Hke as ministers but if they do
all the tribes will rise and it will take 100 000 Russian troops
to deal with the situation. Townley said he believed the Russians
were taking advantage of the present situation and were
pleased because it gave them a good excuse to bring in

troops The present cabinet is showing a great

deal of independence and disregard of both legations

*) The dragoman of the English Legation.

Romero^) told me this morning that the Russians have presented
a note to the Persian govt, demanding that Persia put 150 000
men in the field against Turkey. In return Russia wiU cancel
Persia's debt to Russia and loan Persia more money. I am
sure that the present cabinet will be afraid to accept this pro-
position. Three days ago one of the Teheran papers here con-
tained an open appeal to the Persians to enter the war on the
side of Turkey.

Townley said yesterday that your govt, was only worried
about Persia's actions on the ground of the effect Persia's entry
into the war might have on Afghanistan, that if Persia did go
to war in aU probability Russia would let things sHde and would
withdraw from Persia and that after the war both Russia and
England would settle with Persia. That if Afghanistan revolted
the Indian govt, planned to withdraw to the plains of India
and there await and give battle to the Afghans and to also wait
until the end of the war before invading and punishing Af-
ghanistan Townley said that the Baghtiarie

Khans had assured him that even if they received orders from
the Persian govt, to fight against England and Russia that
they would not obey. Townley is sceptical about this. I doubt
very much if the Khans here could prevent their tribesmen
from entering the war if it once started.

With best regards sincerely yours

J. N. MerriU.

Teheran, April 6. 1915.
Dear Major:

— . . . . I am afraid this policy of letting the Persians
do as they please may cause them Uke aU Orientals to mistake
kindness for fear and proceed to take affairs in their own hands

to the detriment of both Russia and England Teheran

is outwardly quiet but inwardly there is a lot of unrest. Com-
mittees are scattered aU over the city who are anxious to have
Persia enter the war on the side of Turkey and the tone of the

^) De Romero Dusmet, Charge d'affaires up to August 1913, then ap-
pointed Spanish Minister.

Persian newspapers is openly and frankly hostile to Russia.
The press says anything it pleases

With best regards sincerely yours

J. N. Merrill.

Teheran, April 14. 1915.
Dear Major:

Ramsden of your legation said to me that they

think the Russians are trying to promote a scare in order to

bring in troops German opinion here is that the

Russians will remain quiet allowing the Kurds to advance
pillaging and murdering even up to Teheran when they will

throw their troops in here and make an end of Persia

The gendarmerie is five months behind in pay and the police
100 000 tomans behind in pay

Sincerely yours

J. N. MerriU.

P. S. Townley and Korostovetz have continued opposing
each other up to the last minute except that they agreed on
getting the Swedes out.

Teheran, May 31. 1915.
Dear Major:

the cabinet seems disposed to do what they are

told by the two legations The 1500 veteran cossack

troops with artillery and automobiles, said to include 2 armored
cars, have arrived at Kazvine. These troops have recently
been fighting on the Warsaw front. I was at dinner two nights
ago at your legation. After dinner Churchill told me that "the
Swedes are going and going very soon. Have patience. You
will have work to do." Last night the Farman farmar Min.
of the Interior told Mirzayantz, a prominent Armenian who
is a friend of mine, that the Persian govt, was determined to
send off the Swedes but were obUged to go slowly with the
matter as the public were so overwhelmingly in favor of the

Swedes I was told last night by a Persian that the P. G.

had recalled the Zil-es-sultan^) to be governor-general of Fars. . .
There are rather persistent rumors that the Germans
intend to retire to Ispahan and fortify the place (how?) and
that they hope the Swedes will join them. It is said that the
Persian govt, may also withdraw there in case they refuse to

abide by the wishes of the two legations Both Marling^)

and Etter^) with whom I am on the best of terms both tell me
that they are confident and not worried over the German
intrigues. Frankly I don't believe either of them. Personally
I think they are both keeping quiet since the Russian troops
have come to Kazvine and that they hope the Germans will
start a row so that Russia can once for aU seize North Persia.
In that case the P. G. will go to Ispahan. I think the report
above mentioned has something to do with this last possibility.
It would not surprise me a bit if it develops that your govt,
has already agreed to the partition of Persia, the removal of
the P. G. to Ispahan and the giving of the control of all south
of and including Ispahan (perhaps Hamadan and Kermanshah
too) to your govt, but that your govt, has asked Russia to
wait until a crisis occurs in north Persia before occupying the
country. I believe that under present conditions the sooner

^) Eldest son of Shah Nasr-Eddin. He lived lo years in exile in France.
When attempting to return to Persia he was detained in Resht by the Per-
sians and he was only allowed to go back to Europe on payment of a large
sum. His recall took place of course owing to the pressure of Russia and Eng-
land. The "Morning Post", May 26th, 1916, writes: The English Government;
I learn, relies on his abilities as a ruler for restoring somewhat ordered con-
ditions in the Southern sphere of English influence." On his return in May
1 916 by way of London and St. Petersburg he was received by the king of
England and the Czar. The Bakhtiars are his arch-enemies, as the assassination
of the highest Khan is due to him. The English Minister Marling in a private
letter writes on June 20th, 1916, in an ill-humoured way to Sir G. Buchanan,
the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg: "I am not surprised to learn
that the Zil retains his anti-Bakhtiari sentiments, but it is a bit of a
shock that he should air them at Petrograd only ten days after protesting
in London that he loved them as his children. I fear very much that we
have to be prepared to see the Zil more friendly to the Russians than to
us, but we must keep the pretence of seeing in him a "gros bonnet" en-
joying and deserving equal favour from both Powers".

2) Townley's successor.

3) The new Russian Minister.

this happens the better. There seems to be no hope of a Lord
Cromer appearing upon the scene to put this distracted land
upon its feet.

Sincerely yours j ^^ ^^^

Zarguendeh (Shimran), July 8. 1915.
Dear Major:

Yesterday morning I had a long talk with your Minister.
He said nothing would please him more than to have me return
to Shiraz; that it was possible that he could get the G. G.
dismissed in the next two weeks ; that the Ain-ed dowleh*) was
quite wiUing to do it, but every time he attempted it the G. G.
got at the Shiraz deputies of the medjiless who aroused the

Democrats and succeeded in blocking the work The

only reason he held on to them was because of their ability
to control the Persian officers who were all pro- German. He
said that Edouall was completely in the hands of the Germans
and that he is "a most awful fool". He told me that Edwall
takes his orders from the Moen-el-Vezareh^) whom the Minister
characterized as "one of the most dangerous men in Persia,
a rabid Democrat" and "a friend of the Germans". A short
time ago your min. told me that he and the Russ. Min. were
determined to get the Moen out of a place in the P. G. as soon

as they could Your Min. said that the P. G. does not

seem to realize that they are almost on the verge of war with
England

Your Min. and Churchill both told me that you were

constantly "hammering away" to have me returned to Fars.

There is no doubt that your Min. is wiUing if he can find a way.

Hope you will succeed in ousting the G. G. soon.

With best regards

yours sincerely

J. N. MerriU.

^) Minister of the reactionary type. Shah Muzaffar-eddin was forced
by the nation to dismiss him in 1906. Ain-ed-Dowleh was restored to influence
after the ehmination of the democrats and was Cabinet Minister at various
times. The British Minister said of him in a confidential circular: "Ain-ed-
Dowleh is held in office by us and will do anything for us."

2) Chief of the cabinet in the Foreign Office for some years.

Zarguendeh, July 25. 1915.
Dear Major:

I hear the cabinet will probably be determined

upon in a few days but no one can tell for certain as aU of the
big Persians seem to be afraid to accept places on the cabinet. . . .

Teheran is quiet. The gendarmes are having a hard time
to exist at all. They are getting for all the gendarmes here
from one to three hundred ts. a day (Fridays and Mondays
excepted!!!). It is a slow process but they are slowly being
strangled

Lecomte tells me Rimbaud has gone with his regiment,
horses and all to the Dardanelles and that he is most fortunate
as his regiment is one of the very few using their horses as, as
you know, the greater part of the cavalry are employed in

trench warfare

Sincerely yours

J. N. Merrill

Teheran, August 14. 1915.
Dear Major:

I saw Kerr^), the secretary of your legation last night, and
he said that as soon as a cabinet is formed the very first demand
to be made by your legation wiU be for the dismissal at once
of the Moukber-es-saltaneh and that if the cabinet does not
grant the demand that your legation intends "to make a great
row" over it

Last night Kerr said that they would now "see the gen-
darmerie in buggary" before they would let them get a shie
of English money

Since the fall of Warsaw the Persian papers have been
very nasty. They are openly talking of concentrating all of
their gendarmes at Teheran to resist the advance of a Russian

force that might come from Kazvine I have every reason

to beUeve that the German wireless receiving station outside
of Ispahan is still working successfully. . . . Kerr told me that
if an unsatisfactory cabinet was formed your legation and the
Russian legation would break it up in a week .... Your lega-

^) Archibald Kerr, formerly in Rome and Berlin.

tion wants the Ain-ed-dowleh^) and Farman farmar'^) and the
Russians would Uke to have the Saad-ed-dowleh^) as prime

minister New, director of Persian telegraphs told me

confidentially that the reason 2000 Russian troops a few days
ago marched eight farsaks out of Kazvine towards Teheran
was because an adverse move was being made in the formation
of the cabinet and the movement of the troops was a threat
and so understood by the higher Persian officials. The move
threw Teheran more or less into a panic

I told Kerr last night that I was very suspicious of the
deaUngs of Churchill with the Persians in regard to the re-
moval of the G. G. of Fars. Kerr said he knew ChurchiU got
bribes. I suggested that the next time your legation tried to
get the Moakber-es-saltaneh removed that they send a European
but not Churchill to arrange the matter. I told Kerr also that
Churchill has more than once shown to me his disUke for you
and a disposition to excuse the doings of the G. G.

I am sending Kerr to-day my sixty two page report about
my work in Fars so that he can get a better idea of the G. G.
I do not mince words in the report . . .
Sincerely yours

J. N. Merrill.

Zarguendeh (Teheran), August 23. 1915.
Dear Major:

Last night I saw Kerr and he said that the prime minister
had agreed to remove the G. G. It now remains to be seen if
the prime minister will do as he promises or is strong enough
to do it. Kerr says they want the Farman farmar as G. G.
and that he is keen to go. The F. f. and I are good friends

The situation in Teheran in the last few days has been
changing for the worse. Large meetings in the mosques urging

^) Confirmed by Townley in his circular March 23rd , 1914: "Ain-ed-
Dowleh is held in office by us and will do anything for us."

') Prince Farman Farma, reactionary, characterised by Shuster (Strang-
ling of Persia, page 259).

2) The ultra-reactionary Minister of the Ex- Shah, recalled from exile
by Russia and England to Teheran. He was to have been forced on the Persian
Ministry, but this did not succeed.

arming and resistance to the Russians — noisy crowds in front
of the Medjiless howhng for the assassinations of prominent

pro Russian Persians

The German wireless receiving station is still

working at Shulgistan not far from Ispahan. This is accurate
information.

Sincerely yours

J. N. Merrill.

VI.

The aims of the English colonial poHcy in Asia, for the
promotion of which Lord Curzon undertook his famous de-
monstrative cruise in the Persian Gulf in 1904, are given with
striking terseness in Curzon's imperative "India must have
the Euphrates as her boundary". The cordon drawn round
India, the crown jewel, had been extended further. Having
secured control of the Suez-Canal by the purchase of the ma-
jority of shares and having occupied Egypt, England estabhshed
bases for her fleet at the entrance of the Red Sea. Steps were
also taken to dominate the entrance of the Persian Gulf.
Treaties were concluded with the heads of tribes of South
and East Arabia for grants of territory and protectorates:
the islands of Sokotra, Kuria-Muria and Mesirah were taken
possession of by England; Bahrein, Oman and Hadramaut
became English protectorates by treaty. At Koweit whose
Sheikh, a vassal of England had been won over by England
with money, arms, and the bait of a title, the British Consul
raised the Enghsh flag at the entrance of the port and on two
small islands lying just outside the harbour. In order to detach
El-Ahsa from the Turkish Empire, England amply supported
the Sheikh of the Wahabites with EngUsh gold ever since 1904.

In this way, secret treaties being also concluded with the
Sheikh of Mohammerah, the Persian Gulf became a ,,mare
clausum" and nothing was wanting in the fortification of the
bulwarks erected westward of India but two coping stones:
Mesopotamia and the securing of the Afghan-Indian Glacis,
viz. Persia.

England did not allow the opportunity of the world-war
to escape her; while the allied French and Russians were bleeding
to death at the western and eastern fronts, she tried to realise
the Curzon programme and to make Mesopotamia an "ap-
pendage of India".

England's insatiable greed for territory is again revealed
by the perusal of a letter from one of the best known Oriental

politicians, Sir Valentine Chirol, which was written by him on
the occasion of a voyage undertaken by the Viceroy of India ^),
and dated February 9^i\ 1915, on board the S. S. "North-
brook" in the Persian Gulf and addressed to the Consul at
Shiraz: "Nothing was more remote from my thoughts than that
I should be so soon travelling once more over these familiar
waters with another Viceroy to carry a stage further towards the
appointed goal the policy to which Curzon first gave definite
shape and form when I was with him here eleven years ago.
But what a crowd of difficult problems must arise out of every
new development. We went up in the Lawrence 2) as for as Kurna
and from the outposts saw the Turkish camp on the far horizon.
They will doubtless soon be shifted out of that — though the
floods are beginning to make operations equally difficult for
both sides — but where are we ultimately to stop ? It will be
the problem of Persia over again, for even if we want to stop
at ... ^) what chance is there of being able to set up any permanent
authority beyond our Une?. . . .We have every reason to congratu-
late ourselves on the good leadership and organisation —and
the good luck— which have distinguished the Mesopotamian

^) The "Pioneer" makes the following observations on this voyage cf
the Viceroy: The Viceroy reached Koweit on January 31, where he received
the British resident in the Persian Gulf, Sir Percy Scott, in private audience
on board the S. S. "Northbrook". This audience was followed by a visit from
Sheikh Tabir, the son of the Sheikh of Koweit. who appeared on behalf of his
father and was accompanied by Col. Gray. Sheikh Abdullah Bin-Esa, son of
the Sheikh of Bahrein, aiso came to a private audience at which Capt- Keyes,
the political representative in Bahrein, was present. In the evening there was
a little dinner party onboard the "Northbrook". On February ist^ the official
visit of the ruler of Koweit, Sheikh Sir Mubarak Bin Subah, and of Sheikli
Abdullah Bin-Esa of Bahrein took place on which occasion the former was
created Knight of the Star of India, and the latter received the cross of the
Order of the Indian Empire. On February 3rd, the Viceroy went to the mouth
of the Shat-el-Arab, inspected the works of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company
situated on the island of Abadan, and then continued his voyage to Basrah.
"The fact", adds this paper (on February 22nd, 1915), "that the Governor-
General of India has visited Basrah, will not fail to make an impression on
the feelings of the local Arab tribes who have so long been quarrelling with
the Turks. A glance into the future shows us Basrah as the terminus of the
Baghdad Railway, the completion of which is now no longer in German hands."

*) Steamboat.

*) The word omitted is difficult to read, perhaps Baghdad is meant.

expedition so far^) the exact antipodes of the E. African fiasco.
Our troubles will, I fancy, begin with the cHmatic conditions
during the hot weather and with the administrative questions
which will have pretty soon to be faced, and though Meso-
potamia must obviously be an Indian appendage, it would be,
I think, a deplorable mistake to import hard and fast methods
of Indian bureaucracy."

Persia is designated here also as the most difficult problem.
Much indeed had been done for its solution. The finances of
Iran had been ruined systematically, the most dangerous
patriots had been driven into exile after years of English in-
trigue. Reactionary statesmen, obedient to EngUsh behests,
were played off cleverly against ministers who outwardly
appeared able and pliable, but who in reality were still too
Persian. A high degree of skill had also been attained in turning
tribal opposition to account. And yet the consciousness re-
mained that Persia, more perhaps than even the Suez Canal, was
one of the most vulnerable spots of the British world empire 2)
which, if once set alight by the world-war, might easily spread
its flames eastward to Afghanistan and India— "loyal" India.

Sir Walter Townley said on March 25*'\ 1915, to the
American Colonel of gendarmerie, Merrill ^) : "The British Govern-
ment was only worried about Persia's action on the ground
of the effect Persia's entry into the war might have on Afghani-
stan. That if Afghanistan revolted, the Indian Government
planned to withdraw into the plains of India and there await
and give battle to the Afghans."

The effect on India of an Afghan rising stands as a terri-
fying spectre before the eyes of the English diplomatists who

1) Written before the faU of Kut.

*) To which decades ago. Sir W. Rawlinson (quoted by Lord Curzon in
"Persia"!. page6i2 as a " competent authority ") had drawn warning attention.
"The Persian", he says, "considered as a mere animal, is so very superior
to any other Asiatic that it is impossible to avoid foreseeing that, as any
European war becomes developed in the East, the military resources of Persia
must be called into action. In fact it seems that we could not have a more
formidable engine of attack and offence launched against India than a Persian
army commanded by Russian officers."

*) Who reports on this in a letter to the British Consul at Shiraz.

are so uncertain of that country that Indians with or without
the Enghsh title of knighthood are incessantly induced by
some bait or other to trumpet forth in pamphlets the loyalty
of India to England. "Here in India", writes the Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in India, A. H. Grant, on
December 7th, 1914, from Delhi to the British Consul at Shiraz,
"things are fairly quiet, though there is a good deal
of smouldering Moslem feeling. —The Sikhs and
seditionists are restless. The frontier is fairly quiet
though (a second though) there has been an ebullition
in the Tochi. If the Ameer can keep Afghanistan as
a whole quiet all will be well. He is doing his
best— but he is up against a good deal of
hotheaded fanaticism and Turkish intrigue. Persian
complications would be a great bore at this
moment." —

The trouble was that England did not feel sure at any
moment of her ally and neighbour. The treaty of 1907, it is
true, had sharply defined the spheres of interest of the two
protecting powers in Persia.

But this did not prevent the English, who were annoyed
at Russia's having got the best of the bargain, from working
underhand as much as possible against Russia's peaceful pene-
tration of her zone. They employed means which, like a boome-
rang, rebounded on themselves, but this was because in their
greed they went too far all round!

The removal of the Ex-shah, the institution of a consti-
tutional regime, the support of the Bakhtiaris and of their |
Khans Samsam-es-Saltaneh and Sardar-i-Jang, the appoint-
ment of American financial organisers and Swedish instructors
of Gendarmerie were well forged weapons not prepared, as so
many Persians perhaps believed at first, for the benefit of the
people of Iran, but directed against Russia. In his farewell
letter to the British consul at Shiraz of April 7th, 1915, the
English minister Sir Walter Townley avowed this quite frankly :
"I felt sure that our friends on the banks of the Neva would
get tired of somebody who would not sit down and see them
quietly absorb aU Persia. Azerbaijan was bad enough but
not nearly sufficient for the Muscovite appetite, and after

having a good bite at Isfahan the scheme was in course of
elaboration to lay hands on Fars through the same channel
as they had tried to incorporate Isfahan in their sphere of
complete control. The only thing to do to check them was
to carry the war into their own stronghold, Azerbaijan, to
make them hold their hand in the centre and south. This I
did to some purpose and got them much on the raw by showing
up various of their scandals. Two things they could not forgive
i) the appointment of Samsam^) to Isfahan which served to
show up the hollowness of their position there. It will take
them some time to reestablish it, though dear old Grahame^)
wiU help them all he can by his blunders. 2) The presence of
the Imperial Bank in the Russian zone as the agency through
which the revenues were transferred to Tehran. They won't
shake loose from A. O. Wood*) for some time."

England saw with ill-concealed anger that Russia was
advancing her railway-system nearer and nearer to the North
Persian frontier and when she obtained on February 5*^^ 1913,
the railway concession for the Julf a —Tabriz —Urmia lake^)
Grey cabled angrily to the British minister at Teheran: " H.M. G.
has learnt with great regret and surprise that the Persian
Government did not accept their very moderate proposals
for an option only^) though granting the concession for the
Julfa-Tabriz-Railway ".

The correspondent of the Morning Post H. J. Whigmore
in his book "The Persian Problem" which appeared in 1903
had sUghtly altered an expression of Curzon's and called any
minister a traitor who would tolerate Russia's/building a railway
line from Teheran or any other port of Northern Persia to the
Gulf or to the Indian Ocean. Russia had been coming con-
siderably nearer to such a plan by the first railway line within
Persia. This under current is plainly perceptible from the
passage in which Townley announces the slow progress of the

^) Samsam-es-Sultaneh, Khan of the Bakhtiars.

^) The English Consul General at Ispahan.

^) The manager of the Imperial Bank at Teheran.

*) The Julfa-Tabriz-Railway was opened in February 1916. A branch
line leads to the Urmia lake. The railway serves today strategical purposes
in the first place.

^) For the Mohammerah-Khoremabad railway planned by England.

railway negotations in his confidential circular. "Trans-
Persian railway scheme is causing difficulties and negotiations
in London and Petersburg do not seem to lead to an agreement.
Russia desires line to run from Kerman to Charhar but H. M. G.
are opposed to terminus being east of Bender Abbas."

In the notorious Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907 Englands*
duties towards Russia were sharply defined in the first
paragraph: "Great Britain engages not to seek for herself and
not to support in favour of British subjects or in favour of the
subjects of third powers, any concessions of a political or com-
mercial nature, such as concessions for railways, banks, tele-
graphs, roads, transport, insurance, &c. — beyond a line starting
from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Isfahan, Yezd, Kakhk,
and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the inter-
section of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose,
directly or indirectly, demands for similar concessions in this
region which are supported by the Russian Government. It
is understood that the above mentioned places are included in the
region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the concessions
referred to."

Isfahan was thus clearly designated as a Russian sphere
of interest. England confirms expressly once more that Isfahan
is in the Russian zone in an "aide-memoire" which the English
Charge d' Affaires O'Brien handed the Persian Government on
October 7*^, 1911^).

The British commercial documents found in the Shiraz
Consulate show how little England cared about the para-
graphs of signed treaties — and particularly the treaty of 1907 ! —
and how she took advantage of every opportunity to under-
mine the enterprise of the countries in peaceful competition
with herself and specially of Russia.

A question of transport, solved in the interest of England,
the fixing of maximum prices for the forwarding of goods by
means of transport animals on the Bushire— Shiraz road, led
in 1913 and 1914 to a long correspondence between Bushire —
Shiraz— Teheran— Delhi and London. The disagreements
between Bushire and Shiraz are answerable for the long memo-

^) English Blue Books Persia No. 3 (1912) No. 18: "in view of the fact
that this last town (Isfahan) is situated in the Russian sphere".

randums elaborated which all have one guiding motive: the
ousting of non-British commerce in Persia by England.

It is Russian commerce mainly which England attacks
with great vehemence. The commercial adviser of the Resident
of Bushire has already in February 1912 elaborated a con-
fidential memorandum for the Indian Government and the
Foreign Office in London in which he urges a scheme for the
transport of goods on the Bushire— Shiraz road, that is to
say, in the neutral zone, as being the most useful for English
interests.

It concludes with the words: "Our chief aim must he to
check as long as possible the conquest of the Isfahan market by
Russian commerce." "H. M. minister at Teheran" it is further
stated in a memorandum of the resident of Bushire of Sep-
tember 28*11, igi3, to Grey "recently expressed the opinion
that Russia's pretensions to a larger share of the neutral zone
will become the greater according as Russian influence is given
time to extend southwards". And immediately afterwards
follows: "We are confronted with the proposition how to pre-
vent a further increase of Russian trade in the Isfahan province
and southwards and how to win back, if possible, what Russian
trade has recently captured in that province."

In this one memorandum reference is made no less than
a dozen times to the "Russian acts of transgression", to the
"attack by Russian trade on Ispahan and her pressure south-
wards" to the necessity of "bringing Russian trade on a de-
cline" "of checking its development" and "not only in the
province of Ispahan in North Fars, but elsewhere^)."

Jealous of every budding enterprise, especially of those
behind which they suspect Russian or other capital, the English
watched their development no matter whether they took place
in the Russian or the neutral zone. Persian merchants for in-
stance planned the foundation of a company which was to
have constructed a railway between Shiraz and Bushire: "I
have reason to think," the British consul at Shiraz telegraphs
to the minister at Teheran" — "that the scheme was sug-
gested by the German Consul during his stay here last summer.

^) "If then we are to prevent further increases of Russian trade in the
Ispahan province and in northern Fars and elsewhere "

Idea would be that the Company should pose as Persian
Company but that considerable portion of the capital should
be raised in Germany. I scarcely think that the project can
come to anything but it is worth watching."

In March 1913 mention is made in a memorandum from
the British Residency Bushire to Grey of a plan of the Persian
Postmaster General concerning the installation of an automobile
service between Teheran and Shiraz, To this and other pro-
posals for promoting British and putting obstacles in the way
of non-British trade the Indian Government takes up an at-
titude which is apparent from their communication to the
Foreign Office in London, the most important passages of
which are as follows: —

Confidential. India Office to Foreign Office

(9837) India Office, March 4, 1914.

Sir

I am directed by the Secretary of State for India in
Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the
12*^1 November last, enclosing copy of a despatch from His
Majesty's Consul- General at Bushire, covering a memorandum
by his Commercial Adviser on the existing insufficiency of
transport in Southern Persia and the means of improving
it, and also your letters of the aa'^'i December, 1913, and
20*^ January, 1914, forwarding the comments respectively of
the Board of Trade and His Majesty's Minister at Teheran
on Mr. Chick's memorandum.

In reply I am to transmit, to be laid before the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a secret letter from
the Government of India containing a statement of their views
on the general position of British commerce in Southern Persia
in relation to the extension southwards of Russian trade influence.

The Marquess of Crewe concurs generally in the opinions held
by the Government of India, and would invite special attention
to the last three paragraphs of their letter.

I remain, &c.

(signed) T. W. Holderness.

From the enclosures referred to we emphasize the most
important paragraphs (2, 5, 6 and 7).

Confidential.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

Delhi, January 22, 1914.
My Lord Marquess,

With reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 17^^^
November, 1913, we have the honour to submit the following
remarks in regard to the prospect of Russian trade competition
in Southern Persia i)

2. We entirely agree as to the desirability of taking all
reasonable steps to facilitate and encourage trade from the
south on the Bushire—Shiraz— Ispahan line, not only in the
interests of Indian commerce, but on political grounds, as a
safeguard against the extension of Russian trade, and thereby
of Russian influence from the north.

5. We have fuUy considered the other measures that
have from time to time been suggested for the encouragement
of Indian trade on the Shiraz —Ispahan route, as, for instance,
the grant of State aid to traders, the possibility of inducing
the British India Steam Navigation and other steamer com-
panies to lower their freight charges on Indian tea to Persia,
and the estabUshment of a motor service on the road. But
we cannot at present advocate any of these measures.

6. As regards the proposed Persian motor service from
Tehran to Shiraz, to which Sir P. Cox 2) alludes, we trust that,
if the scheme is Ukely to materialise. His Majesty's Govern-
ment will do what may be possible to discourage it, or at any
rate to press for similar action or concessions in directions in
which our interest Hes.

7. It is becoming increeisingly evident, especially in view
of the activity that Russia is now showing in regard to the
construction of railway lines from the north, that the only
really effective means of safeguarding and promoting British

*) The paragraphs begin with No. 2.

2) The British Resident and Consul General of Bushire.

trade in Persia is the simultaneous construction of railway
lines into Persia from the south coast.
"We have, &c.

Hardinge of Penshurst
O'M Creagh
S. A. Imam
W. H. Clark
R. H. Craddock
W. S. Meyer.
This is the real aspect of the "peaceful competition" of
the Enghsh, this is their respect for treaties!

After humiliating Persia politically and committing her
to financial servitude, they frustrate every attempt to open
up Persian roads for trading purposes, unless the result is
beneficial exclusively to English capital. England's "cant"
so clever at clothing even her robbing decrees in hypocritical
parlance blinds the world to her insatiable greed and un-
scrupulousness, which have brought a nation, emerging to
new life and prosperity, to the verge of ruin. —

The words of John Galsworthy addressed to England in
1912 pleading mercy for Persia have been all in vain!
Are we with panic so deep-rotted down
In self, that we can feel no longer shame
To league and steal a nation's hope of youth?
Oh Sirs! Is our star merely cynical?
Is God reduced? That we must darken truth
And break our honour with this creeping fall?

THE LIBRARY.
MirnSTRY OI

iNFCru,:A?IOH.

Supplement

Facsimiles of important documents
quoted in the text

103

SHIRAZ.

Very Confidential.

Circular No. 2. Gulhek,Jnne 26.1914,

Ref.my Confdl. Circular of March 23.

With the approach of the date of the Coronation
the situation in the 9apital is very obscure. The
Govt; is in sore financial difficulty and it is not
apparent from what source money can be found. H.M.G.
appears indisposed to give any assistance and the
P.G. will not seek the help of Russia, because it is
feared that assistance rendered from that quarter
would be accompanied by demands for certain con -
cessions, notably those of the navigation of Lake
itHiii Uruinia»the rectification of the Russo-Persiar
frontier in the neighbourhood of the Moghan Steppes,

Confidential circular from the English Minister in Teheran, Sir W. Townley,

to the consular Ag-ents of Great Britain in Persia

Compare p. 51

104

together with certain irrigation works & a land
concession, and the Karkunan irrigation schftme for
diverting the waters of the fiarun from a source
n«Qr the Kuh-i-Rang into the Isfal^an Plain.

The Cabinet is very disunited on the vari-
ous quest ions, but wore especially ipon the method
that should be adopted to protest against Russian
action in the Province of Azerbaijan, where the G.G.
under j^ussian protection, has made himself practically
independent of the !Cehran Government and where, under
orders from St. Petersburg, the Russian Consulate Genera!
collects the land tax from Russian subjects, protected
persons, and from Persians who have leased their lands
to such persons. The same mpde of collection has been
put in force in other places in the Russian zone. Post
Offices have also been opened by Russia at Tehran
Tabriz and, it is said, at Meshed.

105

/l/v J. Cv^uu^U^ . ) y ^iyJ^tJUJy. 22 ^/u^r^

/tvu-

2.^^.

«->.

!^LoCTw /(X.-^,^ /<^ /^A^^*^^ is./evui-«/>-A /*-t*-^a^o

Confidential circular from the English Minister in Teheran,

Sir W, Townley, to the consular Agents of Great Britain in Persia.

Deciphered and written by the British Consul in Shiraz, Major O'Connor

Compare p. 55

106

>^i^-t/

/vXeA-o ^

Telegram from the English Resident of Bushire, Consul General Knox,
to the English Minister in Teheran, to the Consuls of Basrah and Shiraz
and to the Indian Government. The telegram has been deciphered by the
English Consul in Shiraz, Major O'Connor, and the text written by him

Compare p. 63

107

A-J% A^-^t-^

Telegram from the Consul in Shiraz, Major O'Connor, to the English

, Resident of Bushire, Knox, and the English Minister in Teheran.

O'Connor's handwriting

Compare p. 65

108

^,^-^'f^va/^O-^ /^A-^r^^x^»^X^•^

Telegram from the English Minister in Teheran to the Consul in Shiraz
and the English Resident of Bushire. Deciphered and written by O'Connor

Compare p. 66

109

7^ -^

7- :>- ^r

Telegram from the English Minister in Teheran, to the English Consul in
Shiraz, the Consuls in Bushire and Basrah. Deciphered and written by
O'Connor. The note of interrogation refers to the line which O'Connor

did not decipher
Compare p. 68

Letters from the manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia (Shiraz branch),

Ferguson, to the British Consul in Shiraz, Major O'Connor

Compare p. 70

Ill

Ju^y^T'T'-.t/v.-^yi-, fy-^^o^^^^^

/«-

(T^l^^y^

t-^-y^X-V^"

Letter from the English Consul in Shiraz, Major O'Connor,

to the English Minister in Teheran, written by O'Connor

Compare p. 71

112

JBritis^ Jitf^siian,

rss.

/; A^^f/j-

Ac ^^u l^atvH^^ /Aaj J^tJ (4^ hwi^)

j<(n\^ ^ .* ^ • l^ ^ /^ J^ 'Ucl
c4 N^vwa ^ ^xi-uV^l .

%ir^.u^ t^ft^^i^^OAdci

Letter from the English Minister in Teheran, C. M. Marling, to the

British Consul in Shiraz, Major O'Connor

Compare p. 75

113

June 20, 1916,

Ify aear Buchanan,

Many thanke for your letter of May 22

(receivea June 17), and enclosure of May 11.

I an not surpt'lBed to learn that the Zil retains
hlB antl-Bokhtiaxl sentimentB, but It is a bit- of a shock

that ha should air then at Petrograd only ten da^B after
protesting in London that ha loved them as his children.
I fear very much that we have to be prepared to see Vne
Zil aore friendly to the Russians than to us, but we must
keep the pretence of seeing In him a "gros bonnet" enjoy-
ing and deserving equal favour from both Powers.

Sir G. Buchanan, G.C.B; G.C.M.G; G.C.V.O.
&c. &c. &c.

Letter from the English Minister in Teheran, C. M. Marling, to the

English Ambassador in St. Petersburgh, Sir G. Buchanan

Compare p. 75 and p. 85, foot note

114

1 have no boilef in KoroBtovetz. Bveiyone hare des-
cribes him as in«X)«8ibla to get on-wiUi for long, the
kind of man who acts out of "cuBsednesB" and for the

pleafiurg of doing what no one e»»e would do. I knew him
in R1& jreara ago, and have pleasant enough memoriea of him
there, but no one here Beems to regret hie departure,

least of all hla own Legationl He will not help ub at the
BuBsIan Bank, and hie idea of cooperation between the
Banqus d'Eeoonpte and the Imperial Bank of Poreia will
sternly be that the latter Bhould Bhai:e its good buftlnees
with t^e former, i^ioh if it were a private inBt-ltutlon
would have gone bankrupt yeax« ago.

(^M. ^

115

Letters from the former Colonel of the Persian Gendarmerie, J. N. Merrill,

to the British Consul in Shiraz, Major O'Connor

Compare p. 78 and p. 79

116

^y^yt^i^ a^*^^ UA^xy^

^^^^

Letters from the former Colonel of the Persian Gendarmerie, J. N. Merrill,

to the British Consul in Shiraz, Major O'Connor

Compare p. 83

117

^^i/«-^

/^^^^^'^I^A.jejt.— ^**«<-<s'^-.^i*^^

CU^Xji^

Letters from the former Colonel of the Persian Gendarmerie, J. N. Merrill,

to the British Consul in Shiraz, Major O'Connor

Compare p. 83 and p. 87

118

^yCCyf ^^^C— V_

Letters from the former Colonel of the Persian Gendarmerie, J. N. Merrill,

to the British Consul in Shiraz, Major O'Connor

Compare p. 87 and p. 88

119

M^ S. kiMJtfu^ V.cERor's Camp,

/^ h^ Z^.^^**— ^

Viceroy's Camp,

i-yy^^^i^ ..fc*^^^^*-^*-^

Letter from Sir Valentine Chirol to the English Consul in Shiraz,

Major O'Connor

Compare p. 91 and p. 92

120

/rw^uC. Delhi.

7. /i.. /^.

hy.

/<C^ir 0' Cot-'m.^nr

A.H^ /u*»^ UaS^ C4*^^^u^t./i::^ ^ '*y.

^ /f >L,^u^/".

Letter from the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in India, A. H. Grant,

to the British Consul in Shiraz, Major O'Connor

Compare p. 93

121

'dTTw

Letter from the English Minister in Teheran, Sir W. Townley,
to the British Consul in Shiraz, Major O'Connor

122

Original text of documents used

125

Confidential Circular of the English Minister in Teheran,
Sir Walter Townley, to the Consular Representatives of Great
Britain in Persia, dated March, 23rd, igi4 with enclosure.
(Interview from "Raad.")

Circular No. i. Tehran, 23rd, March 1914.

"Political situation is as follows: —

Persian affairs are giving rise to some awkward questions
between Russia and England. Relations locally are not quite
so united as in past. New Russian minister is somewhat pecu-
liar in his attitude — see interview in the Persian newspaper
copy of which is being sent to you. We support Ain-ed-Dowleh,
gendarmerie, and the Bakhtiaris. Russians are now opposed
to Ain-ed-Dowleh: talk of limiting the gendarmerie by keeping
them out of the north and are becoming jealous of our friend-
liness with the Bakthiaris. Ain-ed-Dowleh is held in office by us
and will do anything for us. H. M. G. are negotiating about
the Gendarmerie at Peteisbuig with a view to their being
employed throughout Persia. Russia wants Cossack brigade
to be increased so that they may take place of the gendarmerie
in the north. Bakhtiaris are all well in hand. Theii- recent
appointments to Isfahan and Kerman and the return of the
Illkhani to his duties were brought about by this legation.
Shaokats appointment to Seistan and Hashmat-ul-Mulk's
arrest were arranged through Ain-ed-Dovvleh's subserviency.
Regents' main object is to crown Shah next July and to leave
country. He feared that new Mejlis might vote postponement
of the Shah's majority involving the Regent's resignation and

126

the election of a tool of their own: he therefore put off elec-
tions so that opening of the Mejlis might be as near coronation
as possible: Tehran elections are now completed. Democratic
element is entirely eliminated. Provincial elections will follow
at once but Tabriz is almost certain to refuse to send deputies.

Position at Tabriz is most unsatisfactory owing to attitude
of defiance and the independence of Shuja supported by Russia.

Persian Govt's financial difficulties are very great. Mor-
nard is doing good work. It is hard to find money for the gen-
darmerie whose budget now amounts to about £ 600,000 per
annum.

Trans-Persian railway scheme is causing difficulties, and
negotiations in London and Petersburg do not seem to lead
to an agreement. Russia desires line to run from Kerman to
Charhar but H. M. G. are opposed to terminus being east of
Bender Abbas.

P. G. can obtain £ 100,000 from a British syndicate for
the Kerman mining concession 377 augmentation 3021 of
private 8430 ^) by Russia acting on behalf of Soci6t6 d'Etudes.

Gendarmerie have sent force of 1200 men to Burajird.
Nizam-es-Saltaneh is to go there as Governor of Arabistan
and Luristan.

Yezd is promised to Bakhtiaris in April.

Naib Hussein is getting anxious at Kashan owing to gra-
dual closing in around him and is appealing to P. G. to be
allowed to proceed to Kerbela.

Gendarmerie have sent officer to Isfahan to prepare for
extension there.

Fars' situation continues to give anxiety. B. C. ^) does
not hesitate to show his authority when necessary. G. G. *)
has not proved success and a more pHable person is being
sought. Present minister of Finance may be found most suitable
person and his absence from the capital will strengthen Ain-
ed-Dowleh of whom he is an opponent. Recent affairs at Ka-
zerun and the regrettable loss of a Swedish officer will not I

*) The British Consul in Shiraz could not quite decipher this passage.
') British Consul.
•) Governor General.

127

hope have any far reaching results though trouble is not yet
at an end.

There is some anxiety lest ex- Shah may return but the
Russian Govt, have given most categorical assurances that
he will not have Russian support. Salar also threatens to
return.

Resume of leading article in the journal " Raad " No. 41 —34
of 10 March 1914 ^}.

It was the first time that a correspondent of a Persian
paper presented himself in the Russian Legation before the
minister to ask questions regarding the country. This interview
lasted I hour and 10 minutes. The details are to be seen in this
same page and one has to ponder over the points which the
minister dealt with, which contains some truths which have
been concealed from most of Persians up to now.

Though the behaviours of the former officials of the Russian
Govt, did not coincide with the talk of the minister, but we
hope that in future words and actions will correspond.

We are glad to hear from the tongue of the Russian Minister
and the representative of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia
that it would be better that the Russian Govt, should expend 5 million
roubles for progress and benefit of their own people and not for a
detachment of their troops in a foreign country.

Interview with M. Korostovetz, the Russian minister at Tehr.

In asking the opinion of the minister on the merits and
characteristics of the Persians he said they were very kind,
hospitable and pleasant, and contrary to his former belief they
were not fanatic and had no anti-European feehngs. But they
were not industrious and naturally prefer idleness to activity.

The correspondent asked the minister to explain, if possible,
the poHcy of the Russian Govt, to him which he said he could
not do so, but he has been instructed to strengthen the friendly
relations and cooperate in carr5dng out reforms. The corre-
spondent asked him about the Russian military occupation

^) This English translation of the interview was enclosed with the circular
of the British Ambassador. We give the translation obviously done by a Persian,
word for word.

128

of Northern Persia. The minister said that he was in favour of
evacuation of Persian territories by Russian troops, and his
Majesty has also instructed him to faciUate means of this pur-
pose and the F. O. ^) has also instructed him to do so. The
viceroy of Caucasia and the ex-prime minister who is the
Minister of Finance joined him in that belief. It would be
better that the 5,000,000 roubles, which is spent on troops in Persia,
should be spent on the progress and civilization of the country
of Russia.

The minister was asked if he thought Persian Constitution
injurious to economical and political interests of Russia. He
said that the two neighbouring powers had recognized the Persian
constitution, therefore they had no opposition to it. But
they were afraid the country would go into anarchy again.
If the anarchy returns, the Russian authorities intend to modify
the constitution and change the Parliamentary laws.

Regarding the Anglo - Russian Agreement of 1907 the
Russian minister said that the first aim of it was to preserve
integrity of Persia. But as regards its future effects on Persia
it was impossible to say and it was difficult to prophecy. The
Persians had to put aside their personal interest and try for the
country. He was sure that there were persons in Persia who
were so competent that none could be found even in Russia.
If Persians were helpless to administer their own country ,^of
course natural proceedings would be unexpected.

The correspondent asked him about the Russian Govts'
policy in the neutral zone, which be said they had no definite
poUcy.

When he was asked about Persian Gendarmerie he repUed
that he had no opposition to it. But in the beginning it was said
that the Gendarmerie was meant for roads only, but now the
scheme is quite changed, and it is understood that the Gendar-

^) Foreign Office.

129

merie in future will take the place of a big force. Therefore it is
necessary that he should enter into the question with the Per-
sian, British and Swedish Govts.

As regards the big Persian loan, he said that its fulfillment
depends on two points: —

1. that the budget should be regulated.

2. that the question of Railways shd. settled.
Regarding the Trans-Persian Railway he said that the British

Govt, wants it to be constructed from northwestern parts to the
south and the Persian Gulf, but the Russian Govt., should like
it to be made from the north-west to the South-East.

Regarding Haji Shuja-ed-Dowleh and Azerbaijan, the
minister said that it was Shuja-ed-Dowleh only who could
restore orders in Tabriz and the province.

Confidential Circular of the English Minister in Teheran,
Sir Walter Townley, to the Consular Representatives of Great
Britain in Persia, dated June 26 th, igi4.

Shiraz.

Official Stamp of the British Embassy.

Very Confidential
Circular Nr. 2. Gulhek, June 26. 1914.

Ref. my Confdl. Circular of March 23.

With the approach of the date of the Coronation the
situation in the capital is very obscure. The Govt: is in sore
financial difficulty and it is not apparent from what source money
can be found. H. M. G. appears indisposed to give any assistance
and the P. G. will not seek the help of Russia, because it is
feared that assistance rendered from that quarter would be
accompanied by demands for certain concessions, notably
those of the navigation of Lake Urumia, the rectification of the
Russo —Persian frontier in the neighbourhood of the Moghan
Steppes, together with certain irrigation works and a land
concession, and the Karkunan irrigation scheme for diverting

130

the waters of the Karun from a source near the Kuh-i-Rang
into the Isfahan Plain.

The Cabinet is very disunited on the various questions,
but more especially upon the method that should be adopted
to protest against Russian action in the Province of Azerbaijan,
where the G. G. ^) under Russian protection, has made himself
practically independent of the Tehran Government and where,
under orders from " St. Petersburg, the Russian Consulate
General collects the land tax from Russian subjects, protected
persons, and from Persians who have leased their lands to
such persons. The same mode of collection has been put in force
in other places in the Russian zone. Post Offices have also been
opened by Russia at Tehran, Tabriz and, it is said, at Meshed.

Reports received from the provinces show that the elections
are proceeding very slowly, and there would appear to be but
small hope that the necessary quorum of the new Majliss will
be present in Tehran in time for the Shah to take the constitu-
tional oath before that body. It is therefore proposed to have
recourse to a mixed assembly of the old and new MajUss for the
purpose, a somewhat doubtful proceeding which may possibly
give rise in the future to a question as to the validity of the
Coronation. The Regent is, however, determined that the
ceremony must not be postponed, and proposed to leave for
Europe immediately after it. It is not clear who will form the
first Cabinet of the new reign. The Russians strongly support
Saad - ud - Dowleh, but there is reason to beUeve that the
young Shah favours rather Mustofi-ul-Mamalek.

There is reason to believe that London and St. Petersburg
are about to go thoroughly into the Persian question, with
a view to seeing in what way it may be necessary to revise or
qualify the understanding of 1907 in such a manner as to meet
present requirements. The necessity for this action has been
caused by the attitude lately assumed by Russia in N. Persia,
and also partly perhaps by the fact that H. M. G., by the
arrangement recently made with the A. P. O. C. 2), has assumed
certain fresh responsibilities in S. Persia which must be pro-
tected.

^) Governor General.

*) Anglo-Persian-Oil-Company.

131

Sd— W. Townlev.

Confidential Circular of the English Minister in Teheran,
Sir Walter Townley, to the Consular Representatives of Great
Britain in Persia, dated August 22 nd, igi4.

Nr. 3 Circular Gulhek 22nd. Aug. 1914.

Very confidential

My confidential circular of June 26th.

Coronation passed off without any hitch and quite quietly.
There not being a quorum of 70 of new Mejlis at Tehran, the
oath of allegiance to constitution was taken before some 68
conjectural members of ? (the query is O'Connors) old
Mejlis under a perhaps somewhat strained interpretation
of that clause of the constitution which says that in the event
of demise of a sovereign whilst a Mejlis is not in being the oath
should be taken before old Mejlis. Ceremonial observed on
occasion of coronation was very simple. Innovation was a
banquet which Shah gave to heads of foreign missions all of
whom with the exception of Italian charge d'affaires had
special letters 6915 ^) ing them as special representa-
tives of their respective sovereigns for occasion, and their
wives. VahUad and cabinet-ministers were present at banquet
as also Shah's uncle, Prince Nusrat-es-Saltaneh. Ala-es-Sal-
taneh continued in office after coronation but resignation
of M. F. A. 2), Vossuk-ed- Dowleh, became effective and there
was complete stagnation .... decisive affairs.

1) not deciphered by O'Connor.

2) Minister Foreign Affairs.

132

Cabinet was formed a few days ago by Mustafi-ul-
Mamalik. Ala-es-Saltanah has assumed office of M. F. A.
Prime Minister himself has taken over Home affairs. Remaining
members of Cabinet are men of small importance. Muhtashem-
es-Saltaneh is Minister of Finance, Sahab Ektiyar Minister
of War, Zokar-el-Mulk Minister of Justice, Muhandes-el-
Mamahk Minister of Commerce, and Shahab ed Dowleh Minister
of Public Works, posts and telegraphs. In view of money string-
ency and situation created by Russia Prime minister was unable
to secure cooperation of certain prominent pohticians upon
whom he had counted in accepting task of forming a cabinet.

Financial situation remains most critical. Treasury is
entirely? (the query is O'Connors) depleted and it
seems hard to imagine? whence? 8800 8158 ^) money can be
found in present state of things in Europe. Swedish officers
are making constant complaints that they cannot be held
responsible for good behaviour of their men if they are not paid.
They have threatened to seek permission of Swedish Govt,
to withdraw if money is not forthcoming more regularly. Swedish
Govt, having made an arrangement with H. M. G. that officers
hall remain in Persia until next March has disapproved of
minatory step taken but it is hard to see how service can
be carried on if funds are not found. Arrangement made with
H. M. G. is in sense that between now and next March some
settlement will be made under which scope of action of gen-
darmerie will be satisfactorily determined with Russia and
financial question estabhshed on a sound basis. H. M. G. have
advanced £ 50,000 for use of gendarmerie in Fars and Kerman.

Activity of finance administration is hampered by action
of Russian consuls in Russian zone, Meliat due from Russians,
Russian protected persons 96382) from lands leased to or held
by such persons is collected by Russian consuls and paid into
Russian bank, on account of P. G., who has so far heard no
more of those moneys since their collection. Russian Consul
interferes largely in provincial administrations where lands
held or leased by Russians and Russian protected persons are
concerned.

^) *) not deciphered by O'Connor.

133

Report of the English Consul General in Isfahan, G. Grahame,
to Sir Walter Townley, dated December 2^th, igi4.

Copy
Bushire-Shiras-Isfahan road
Gendarmerie

observations on

Isfahan, December 25th 1914.
Sir,

Having recently (viz. from November 27th to 18*
instant) travelled by caravan over the Bushire-Shiras-
Isfahan road — with which, or with some portions of which,
I was fairly familiar during my term of office at Shiraz — I
venture to think that my impressions of the present condition
of that road as compared with its condition during the period
1903—08 may not be devoid of interest at this moment. I
have accordingly the honour to submit some observations
thereon.

It is scarcely too much to say that the Bushire-Shiras-
Isfahan road is now the Gendarmerie, so completely has that
force overshadowed the road, absorbing or dissipating all other
elements. Here and there a few tufankjis linger on, survivals
of the former regime, now mere dependents of the Gendarmerie
and destined soon to disappear entirely. The local Khans have
receded into the background and the local Deputy Governors
have experienced a powerful check in their treatment of the
inhabitants of their districts.

The Governor of the Gulf Ports replying to a notification
of my intended departure from Bushire on the 27th ultimo in-
formed the Acting British Resident at that place that arran-
gements would be made that I should be escorted by a gendarme
from post to post all the way from Bushire to Shiras. Except
on one stage this order was faithfully carried out. The escorting
gendarme or gendarmes (for often more than one accompanied
me) were sometimes mounted and sometimes, viz. on the kotals,
on foot. On nearing the post where they were to be relieved
these gendarmes would generally ask permission to go on ahead
of me to warn their reliefs to be ready. There was no delay at
any post and at none was any attempt direct or indirect made

134

to extort a gratuity. On one occasion when I offered one it
was refused.

In most cases I questioned the gendarmes escorting me
about their age, birthplace, time of service in the Gendarmerie
etc. etc. etc., thus eliciting some expression of their feelings
towards their Corps. In other cases I overheard scraps of con-
versation between them in Tourki (a majority of the gendarmes
in Fars appear to be natives of Aserbaijan or Fars tribesmen
speaking Tourki) a language which they could not suspect me
of understanding.

There were many complaints more particularly south of
Shiras e. g. about clothing overdue, about not being dismissed
at the end of their contracts, about favouritism in promotion,
about arrears of pay — these last chiefly in the tract between
Bushire and Kazeroon where some of the men averred that
they had not been paid for three months. The feeling of the
men towards their Swedish officers appeared to be universally
good (Major Lundberg in the Kaseroon and Captain Xillander
in the Abadeh district being apparently prime favourites) . . .

The organization of the Corps in Fars territory appeared
to be very complete. The gendarmes, who at almost every
post turned out to salute as I passed, and those whom I came
across along the road, presented a very purposeUke appearance
if not up to our idea of smartness. In some cases e. g. at Burj-
i-Vizhdaneh and Yezdikhast I was invited to inspect the posts
or quarters. The standard of order and neatness afforded a
pleasing contrast to the usual Persian neglect and laissez-aller ;
the arrangements for the officers and men appeared to be good,
the stabling for the horses much the reverse, the stables in
some cases being built and maintained on the usual Persian
principle of excluding all light and air in order to secure a high
degree of warmth in cold weather.

All along the Hne from Bushire to Isfahan absolute security
appeared to prevail and all the local inhabitants whom I
questioned as to the outcome of the Gendarmerie system spoke
of it in the highest terms, contrasting the present conditions
on the road with those which prevailed before the force was
established and expressing their gratitude for the enormous
amelioration effected by it.

135

I was assured that robberies had practically ceased entirely
within the field of operations of the Gendarmerie

Of the courtesy and attention received by me personally
from the Gendarmerie (more particularly from Captain Xillander
at Abadeh) in the course of my recent journey I cannot speak
too highly, and other British travellers who traversed the road
about the same time as myself have spoken to me in a similar
sense. I took an early opportunity of expressing to Captain
Xillander (now at Isfahan) my appreciation of the services of
the Gendarmerie, but I venture to suggest that — if you think
fit — my thanks might also be transmitted to General
Hjalmarson

I have the honour to be,
Sir, Your Excellency's most obedient,
humble servant
Sd. G. Grahame.

H. E. Sir W. Townley, K. C. M. G.
etc, etc. etc.

Telegram from the English Consul in Shiraz, Major O'Connor,
to the English Minister in Teheran. January 6 th, 191 5.

Tel. S. D.

1. Prodrome, Tehran ^)

2. Knox, Bushire.

6. I. 1914 (mistake of O'Connors, should be 1915).
Major Pravitz informed me to-day that Captains Lundberg
and Pousette who were to have left Shiraz to-morrow morning
for Tehran have now received instructions from Tehran to
proceed to Bushire in order to bring up one million of cartridges
and for other purposes.

Addressed Tehran 4, repeated Bushire i
O'Connor.

1) Address for war telegrams of the British Embassy, Teheran.

136

Telegram from the British Resident of Bushire, Consul
General Knox, to the English Minister in Teheran. January
lyth, igi5.

Tel. S. D.

From Knox, Bushire 17. 1. 1915.
C. Shiraz Telegram Nr. i January 6*^.

Lundberg left Bushire with 463 mules laden with am-
munition on January 15*''. He stopped a very short time
here and is reported to have conducted his operations with
extraordinary secrecy which deceived nobody but produced
various extravagant rumours of contemplated action by Swedes
and by P. G.^) Latter 's objective is sometimes Turks sometimes
Russians while one rumour has it that Turks and Swedes
inspired by Germans will turn against Persians. It adds that
Hjalmarson is acting treacherously under order of Swedish
government.

My Russian colleague has manifested keen interest in
Swedish movements and frequently asks me for news on this
subject.

Addressed Minister, repeated Basrah, Shiraz, India.

Telegram from the English Minister in Teheran to the
Foreign Office in London. January 31st, igi^.

Tel. S. D.

from Townley, Tehran.

23. 1. 1915.
Your telegram etc.

Even if Russian answer is not satisfactory it would appear
to me desirable that we should endeavour to obtain consent
of Swedish Govt, to leave Major Folke and Major Carlberg or
Moeller here in order that Isfahan —Bushire section of road
may be suitably controlled. Other arrangements if necessary

^) Persian Government.

137

Addressed F. O.^)

Telegram from the English Consul in Shiraz, Major O'Connor,
to the English Resident of Bushire and to the English Minister
in Teheran. January 31st, igi^.

Tel. S. D. 31. I- 15.

to I. Knox, Bushire 8
2. Prodrome, Tehran 12.

Your telegram 22. c.

Principal offenders in matter of pro- German talk are
Capts. Lundberg and Killander. Former has left Shiraz for
Tehran and latter has fallen foul of Major Pravitz and wiU
also Ihope soon depart from Fars, Pravitz is sensible man who
confines himself to his work. I have represented to him necessity
for Swedes to preserve strictly neutral attitude and he quite
agrees. Gr. G. ^) also is very pro-German and is source whence
emanate many German and Turkish reports.

German and Turkish news reach Shiraz from Tehran by
Persian wires and by post.

Addressed Bushire 8 repeated Tehran 12.

O'Connor.

^) Foreign Office. A copy of the telegram was sent to the British
Consul in Shiraz, Major O'Connor.
*) Governor General.

138

Telegram from the English Minister in Teheran to the
English Consul in Shiraz and to the English Resident in Bushire.
February 13 th, igi^.

Tel. S. D.

From Townley, Tehran.

13. 2. 1915.

Similar incidents to one reported in your tel. 20 have
occurred in north lately. Hjalmarson seems to have lost his
head and to be seeking to wreck his own work whilst doing
as much harm generally as he can. We hope to get rid of him
soon but this must be done in such a way that he cannot call
all Swedes to follow him.

He has himself announced that Swedish Govt, has recalled
all officers on active Ust. At the request of British and Russian
Govt. Folke has been allowed to remain as O. C. ^) so it will
be hard for Hjalmarson to hang on.

Belgians axe naturally up in arms and see a political design
in General's madness. I doubt this though his enfeebled brain
may well be spurred on to be troublesome by Turkish and
German advisers.

Addressed Shiraz.
Repeated Bushire.

Telegram from the English Minister in Teheran to the
Consuls in Shiraz, Bushire and Basrah. March 3rd, igi^.

Tel. S. D.

From Townley, Tehran

3- 3. 15-
23. Substance of your tel 32 repeated to Sir E. Grey, see
file No. 13, with following addition which begins with a refe-
rence to last paragraph of your telegram. Begins:

This has already been done and assurance received that
Swedish officers will be named. At the same time it has im-

^) Officer Commanding.

139

pressed on me that Swedes are not so generally pro- German
as is supposed and one officer who has been accused of showing
his bias called on me to-day to say that he is of French origin
and has all his family ties in England and . . . . ^) called pro-
German. All are probably anti-Russian.

I venture to deny suggestion that Swedes ^)

and won to my side by pecuniary assistance. Distribution of
money could be made through legation and consuls as before.

Addressed Shiraz repeated Bushire and Basrah.

Telegram from the English Consul in Shiraz to the English
Minister in Teheran. March 5 th, igi^.

Tel. S. D.
To Prodrome. Thr. , 5. 3. 15.

Knox, Bushire.
Your tel. 23.

I fully reahse that moment is inopportune for change in
foreign officers of gendarmerie but I trust that if the Swedes
are to remain it may be impressed upon officers in Fars that
not only should they maintain attitude of strictest neutrahty
whatever their own individual sympathies may be but that it
is their duty to discourage all pro- German and Turkish pro-
paganda amongst their native officers and men and to take
active steps to suppress agitators and to ensure preservation
of order.

As regards future financial support I venture to express
entire agreement with Y. E'.s view. Whoever the foreign offi-

1) Word iUegible.

2) not deciphered by O'Connor.

140

cers may be, we cannot afford to let the Gendarmery go to
pieces through want of money and besides pro\dsion of funds
gives us certain standing in all questions connected with the
force. . . .

Addressed Tehran 38 repeated Bushire 26

O'Connor.

Letter from the English Minister, Sir Walter Townley,
to the Consul in Shiraz, Major O'Connor, April yth, igi5.

Private British Legation

Tehran
April 7. 1915.
My dear O'Connor,

WeU, my time in Persia is coming rapidly to an end
and in a little more than a week I turn my face homeward
and the so-called land of the Rose will see me no more. I am
going home on leave granted me in most encouraging language,
but without my having asked for it, and because Korostovetz
and I could not hit it off. Who could hit it off with poor old
Korostovetz? Anyhow I am going and of course I have no
intention of ever returning though I am nominally going on
leave, I have been expecting this termination to my sojourn
in Persia for some time, almost ever since I am here, because
I felt sure that our friends on the banks of the Neva would
get tired of somebody who would not sit down and see them
quietly absorb all Persia. Azerbaijan was bad enough but
not nearly sufficient for the Muscovite appetite, and after
having a good bite at Isfahan the scheme was in course of
elaboration to lay hands on Fars through the same channel
as they had tried to incorporate Isfahan in their sphere of
complete control. The only thing to do to check them was
to carry the war into their own stronghold, Azerbaijan, to
make them hold their hand in the centre and south. This I
did to some purpose and got them much on the raw by showing

141

up various of their scandals. Two things they could not forgive
i) the appointment of Samsam to Isfahan which served to
show up the hoUowness of their position there. It will take
them some time to reestabUsh it, though dear old Grahame
will help them all he can by his blunders. 2) The presence of
the Imperial Bank in the Russian zone as the agency through
which the revenues were transferred to Tehran. They won't
shake loose from A. O. Wood for some time. Then came the
war, and their opportunity to represent that at such a parlous
time the two Legations must be in closer touch than is pos-
sible as long as Korostovetz and I both remained. So we both
go. As a matter of fact we have been on close and cordial terms
ever since the war started, whatever may have been the situ-
ation previously. Of course as soon as it was known that I
was to go the Persian public tumbled to the right conclusion
that I had been sacrificed to Russia, but as it was clear that
I had lost confidence of my government of course my in-
fluence disappeared. The war has served to show the deep
hatred of all classes for Russia: as the latter's ally we have
come in for a good deal of the same

I have spoken openly once or twice to Mushir-ed-Dowleh,
and I think that I have now frightened him by the thought
that Persia may forfeit the sympathy of her British friends,
if she does not mend her ways. He has become much more
amenable and has done several things I asked him to do, if
he wished the ^) check the growing belief that the government
were not sincere in their assurance. He is afraid to recall Mukhber
who has many friends here, and who is looked upon as a pillar
of constitutionalism . . . His task is by no means an easy one
as he has to govern with the Majliss which is so far under
his brother's control, but as you know a Persian majliss is a fickle
body and he may any day find a strong opposition against him.

The Swedes, probably because they are pro- German,
have become the darlings of the Persian people and can do
no wrong. It would be very hard for any Cabinet to take strong
action against them. All that can be hoped is that we may

1) Mistake in writing.

142

get them out through the Swedish Government, but that
would be out of all Persia, and then the question arises would
not the last state of that man^) be worse than the first ? With
the Swedes gone, and no one available to take their place
troubles would soon break out again on the road. Well, I shall
not be here to see what will happen, and as I could not imagine
that all you gentlemen in the South would have cooked the
charges against them, I had to Uft up my voice at last in hostile
language. The Belgians appear to be all going, at least all
those in financial administration. The Swedes have had no
small share in this result, which appears to me an unfortunate
one at this moment of chaos when Persia, as usual, is sorely
in need of financial assistance that no one can well give her
unless sure that there is a financial administration capable
and honest enough to handle the money. What a hopeless
task it is indeed! Here have I been three years bolstering up
and supporting against all sorts of antagonists, including my
best friends, these two European administrations only to find
myself during my last days here unable to keep one on its feet,
and administering a coup de pied with all my force to the
other. It seems to have been a sad waste of much time and
energy to produce such a poor result. I cannot at the same
time divest myself of a beUef that the actions of the Swedes
said to be hostile to us have been exaggerated, and that too
ready an ear has been lent to interested calumniators. I fully
reaHze all the mischief the Swedes have done by their open
expressions of conviction that the Germans must win. This
opinion coming from what are considered as impartial miUtary
critics has had a great influence on the unreasoning pubhc
opinion of Persia who has gladly accepted as an accomphshed
fact the total overthrow of the hated Russian, without reahzing
that if beaten Russia would probably repay herself at the
expense of Persia for any loss of territory she might suffer.
I must now stop with my very best thanks for all your loyal
cooperation, and much hoping to meet you ere long in England
or at least in Europe.

Yours very sincerely

Walter Townley.

*) Mistake in writing.

143

The English Minister in Teheran, C. M. Marling, to the
English Consul in Shiraz, Major O'Connor. May lyth, igi5.

British Legation. Tehran, 17. May 1915.

My dear O'Connor, (may I drop out the Major?)

Many thanks for your letter. Yes I quite well remember
that you were at Constantinople on the way out to this rather
hectic country, and it was a pleasure to get your lines.

Tho' I think we understand the situation at Shiraz fairly
well in its main features, a private letter always tells one some-
thing, or corrects an impression. We quite see that your Gov.
Gen. has got to be got rid of, and I have been hammering at
it since my arrival. With the late Cabinet it was useless, and
as I feel fairly confident that the present ministers mean to
see that Persia does not get hustled into a war that doesn't
concern her, I have not cared to urge them too much, which
indeed I don't think their position would make it prudent to
do, but have preferred to leave Ain ed D.^) to bring it about
his own way. I wish it could be done quicker for I reaHse that
your position is not precisely comfortable ....

Is there any chance of your coming this way this summer.
Gulahek is cool and we could find you a crib somehow, tho'
we fill the house pretty full.

Yours very sincerely

C. M. MarUng.

The English Minister in Teheran, C. M. Marling, to the
English Ambassador in St. Peter sburgh, Sir G. Buchanan, June
20 th, igi6.

Stamped :

British Legation, Tehran.

June, 20. 1916.
My dear Buchanan,

Many thanks for your letter of May 22 (received June 17)
and enclosure of May 11.

^) Ain-ed-Dowleh.

144

I am not surprised to learn that the Zil retains his anti-
Bakhtiari sentiments, but it is a bit of a shock that he should
air them at Petrogiad only ten days after protesting in London
that he loved them as his children. I fear very much that we
have to be prepared to see the Zil more friendly to the Russians
than to us, but we must keep the pretence of seeing in him a
jjgros bonnet" enjoying and deserving equal favour from
both Powers.

As to Korostovetz, I'm sorry I cant share your belief in
his sincerity . . .

I have no behef in Korostovetz. Everyone here describes
him as impossible to get on with for long, the kind of man
who acts out of "cussedness" and for the pleasure of doing
what no one else would do. I knew him in Rio years ago, and
have pleasant enough memories of him there, but no one here
seems to regret his departure, least of all his own Legation!
He will not help us at the Russian Bank, and his idea of coope-
ration between the Banque d'Escompte and the Imperial
Bank of Persia will merely be that the latter should share its
good business with the former, which if it were a private insti-
tution would have gone bankrupt years ago . . .

Yours very sincerely and with best regards to Lady
Georgina.

C. M. Marling.

Envelope :^ ^
On His Majesty's Service

Private \

His Excellency
Sir George Buchanan G. C. B; G. C. V. O; G. C. M. S.

Petrograd.

145

Letter from Sir Valentine Chirol to the British Consul in
Shiraz, Major O'Connor, gth February igi^.

H. M. S. Northbrook
Persian Gulf.

Viceroy's Camp, India, Febr. 9. 15.
My dear O'Connor.

This morning we could just see in the dim distance the
outline of the Koh-tals above Bushire and I thought of you
sitting I fear rather disconsolate in your lonely outpost with
nothing much to do but to keep things going and watch and
wait until Armageddon decides the fate of Fars and Iran together
with that of many mightier empires. It is a wonderful time
to have lived through, even as a mere spectator, though one
cannot help fretting sometimes that one is unable to play a
more active part in the drama. To me, of course, who have
for so many years past made rather a hobby of the Gulf, this
has been an extraordinarily interesting cruise though it is
after all merely a small side show. I forget when I last wrote
to you — some time during the autumn — but whenever it was,
nothing was more remote from my thoughts than that I should
be so soon travelling once more over these familiar waters
with another Viceroy to carry a stage further towards the
appointed goal the policy to which Curzon first gave definite
shape and form when I was with him here eleven years ago.
But what a crowd of difficult problems must arise out of every
new development. We went up in the Lawrence as far as Kurna
and from the outposts saw the Turkish camp on the far horizon.
They will doubtless soon be shifted out of that — though the
floods are beginning to make operations equally difficult for
both sides — but where are we ultimately to stop ? It will be
the problem of Persia over again, for even if we want to stop

at 1) what chance is there of being able to set up any

permanent authority beyond our line, whatever it may be,
which will be adequate to maintain any decent measure of
law and order?

However it is no use looking now beyond the immediate
future, and we have every reason to congratulate ourselves

*) The word omitted is difficult to decipher, perhaps Baghdad is meant.

146

on the good leadership and organisation — and the good luck —
which have distinguished the Mesopotamian expedition so
far— the exact antipodes of the E. African fiasco. Our troubles
will, I fancy, begin with the cHmatic conditions during the
hot weather and with the administrative questions which will
have pretty soon to be faced, and though Mesopotamia must
obviously be an Indian appendage, it would be, I think, a
deplorable mistake to import hard and fast methods of Indian
bureaucracy. One point by the way, which should be to your
advantage. The Gulf will cease to play such a prominent
part as most of the questions connected with it will have solved
themselves, and it will be quite impossible to treat Southern
Persia beyond the coast line as an offshoot of Mesopotamia . . ,

Yours very sincerely

(sign.) Valentine Chirol.

Letter from the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign A j fairs
in India, A. H. Grant, to the British Consul in Shiraz, Major
O'Connor, y th Dec. 1914.

Letter stamped:

Foreign and Political Department

India Delhi, 7. 12. 14.

Private.

My dear O'Connor,

Many thanks for your letter and most kind congratulations
on my acting appointment as Foreign Secretary. It has hap-
pened at a very strenuous — but intensely interesting time
and candidly I shall be sorry — apart from all questions of
filthy lucre — when the time comes to revert to second string.

It is a great comfort that the situation in Shiraz and Fars
generally has been so comparatively peaceful of late, thanks
doubtless in a great measure to your personal efforts and in-
fluence. We have all hands quite full enough as it is — and
Persian complications would be a great bore at this moment

147

when the ill-advised entry of Turkey into the war has added
so seriously to the possibilities of trouble. As regards the
Shiraz appointment I quite agree with you that is should be
brought under the Government of India — but I think there
are objections to its complete severance from Bushire, There
are overlapping interests which seem to me can only be safe-
guarded, if the Shiraz Consul works in direct relation with
the Resident Bushire. However the question is in abeyance
for the present. When it is again taken up you may be sure
that your views which are on the file will be fully considered.

As regards a Vice-Consul it is difficult to see what can
be done at present. But if you can make a really strong case,
there is no objection to your pressing reconsideration of the
matter and coming up again. But the Finance Dept. are not
in a very sympathetic frame of mind at present, with such
enormous expenses and such loss of railway and other revenue
owing to the war. The occupation of Basra is satisfactory
and should have a good effect in the Gulf generally. But the
question of advancing much beyond is fraught with difficulty.

Here in India things are fairly quiet — though there is a
good deal of smouldering Moslem f eeUng — and the Sikhs and
seditionists are restless. The Frontier is fairly quiet — though
there has been an ebullition in the Tochi. If the Amir can
keep Afghanistan as a whole quiet all will be well. He is doing
his best— but he is up against a good deal of hot-headed fanati-
cism and Turkish intrigue. Delhi is very pleasant at present
and we get a good deal of shooting of a sort round about.

I quite agree with you that a personal interview would
help to clear the air — but it is difficult to see how you could
get away at present. But we may hope that in the not distant
future we can arrange a meeting somehow or other.

With all good wishes

Your sincerely

A. H. Grant.

10*

148

Memorandum from the British First Assistant Resident of
Bushire, Captain L. Birdwood, to the Officiating Secretary to the
Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated October
^th, igi3, with two enclosures: i. Letter from the Resident of
Bushire, Sir P. Cox, to Sir Edward Grey , 2.Memoi'andumfrom the
Commercial Adviser to the Residency of Bushire, H. C. Chick.

Stamped :
British Residency
Receipt
No.

Date 30. Oct. 1913
Persian Gulf.
No. 3048, dated Bushire, the 5th (received 13th) October 1913.
From —Captain L. Birdwood, I. A., First Assistant Resident

(in the absence of the Resident),
To — The Officiating Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign Department.
With reference to this office letter No. 553, dated February
nth, 1913, I have the honour to forward for the information
of the Government of India, a copy of the marginally noted
despatch, which Sir Percy Cox has addressed to His Majesty's
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, together with a Memo-
randum by the Commercial Adviser to this Residency on the
subject of the insufficiency for the needs of British trade of
transport animals on the road between Bushire and Ispahan,
and the utiUty of more precise statistics of caravan traffic
from the South to the interior, on the several main caravan
routes.

Enclosure No. i.

No. 14 — Commercial, dated Bushire, the 28 th September 1913

From — Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Cox, K. C. S. I., C. I. E.,

PoUtical Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's

Consul- General for Fars, &c.
To— The Right Honourable Sir Edward Grey, Bart, K. G.,

M. P., His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for.

Foreign Affairs, Foreign Office, London.

149

With reference to my despatsch No. 4 — Commercial of
February 12 th last, reporting an agreement come to among
merchants at Bushire by which they were enabled to control
and reduce to a normal level rates of transport hire on goods
forwarded to Shiraz, and the formation of a forwarding depart-
ment under the control of the Local Government advised by
His Majesty's Vice-Consul, I now have the honour to enclose
a Memorandum by Mr. Chick on the subject of the insufficiency
of transport animals on the road between Bushire and Ispahan.

His Majesty's Minister at Tehran recently expressed the
opinion that Russia's pretensions to a larger share of the neutral
zone win become the greater according as Russian influence is
given time to extend southwards.

The suggestion advanced in the present Memorandum is,
put shortly, that the state of the caravan route between Bushire
and Ispahan has been much improved, during the Summer
of 1913, and rates of hire have been reduced to more reasonable
figures by concerted action; the disastrous diminution of trans-
port animals resulting from the years of disorder is now the
real factor which militates against goods from the Gulf reaching
Ispahan in the quantities prevailing previous to 1908, and
facilitates Russian commercial encroachment and develop-
ment from the north ....

The question of the provision of more rehable statistics
of the traffic over aU Southern roads seems also very impor-
tant for Government, and merits the small outlay suggested
in Mr. Chick's Memorandum which I trust His Majesty's Govern-
ment will see fit to sanction.

Since this Memorandum was written I have learnt of the
proposal of M. MoUtor, The Persian Director- General of Posts,
to establish a motor service between Tehran and Shiraz. This
project lends point to the remarks made by Mr. Chick anent
the desire of Persian circles here to obtain motor traction
between here and Daliki, 3 stages distant on the Shiraz road;
for it is obvious that faciUties for motor transport from Tehran
to Shiraz, without corresponding improvements between Bushire
and Shiraz would but accentuate the disadvantages in transport
matters of our trade vis a vis Russian trade from the north.

150

Memorandum.
Enclosure No. 2.

His Majesty's Minister at Tehran in a recent telegram gave
prominence to the increase of Russian influence in the Isfahan
province resulting from the increase of Russian trade by reason
of the deplorable condition of the Southern Trade Routes,
and added that in proportion as Russian influence is given
time to extend southwards, so will the justifiable pretensions
of Russia to a larger share of the neutral zone become greater.

Starting therefore with this axiom, we are confronted
with the proposition how to prevent a further increase of Russian
Trade in the Isfahan province and southwards, and how to
win back, if possible, what Russian Trade has recently cap-
tured in that province.

For some months past conditions on the Bushire — Shiraz —
Isfahan road have shown great improvement. The Bushire —
Shiraz section has been practically free from robberies since
the beginning of 1913 and illegal exactions from muleteers,
"Rahdari", "Tufangchigeri", &c. have been confined to the
Kumarij —Bushire section and to very reduced figures since
March. As to the Shiraz —Isfahan section, we are informed
that it has been quite safe since May 1913.

Caravans have circulated continuously on the Bushire —
Shiraz road and between Shiraz and Isfahan since the begin-
ning of June 1913.

On the Ahwaz —Isfahan road there have been no Kuhgilu
raids during 1913, and since the Sardar-i-Jang has decided
to continue in the Ilkhani-ship, the amount of traffic has been
very fair, considering the insufficiency of transport animals.

In the latter half of 1912, the exorbitant rates of transport
hire were killing trade from the Gulf to Central Persia as much
as, and perhaps more than, insecurity and oppression on the
road. Rates of hire then averaged about 450 Krans per 100 Bu-
shire mans from Bushire to Shiraz, and 350 up to 450 Krans
per 100 Shiraz mans from Shiraz to Isfahan.

The Mule Hire Agreement, to which all merchants in Bushire
were got to adhere last November, and the formation of a For-
warding Department by the local Government for distributing
mules and donkeys proportionately between merchants (by

151

which the Mule Hire Agreement could alone be maintained)
put merchants in a position to get rates of mule hire reduced
forthwith from 440 Krans to 300 Krans per Bushire mans
and has enabled them to keep rates steady whilst lowering
them slowly and perceptibly. ...

From the point of view of the security of the roads, and
the rates of hire, conditions are thus at present — though the
possibility of trouble and hostilities in the autumn must not
be discounted —fairly normal and distinctly favourable to the
recapture of the Isfahan market for trade via the Persian Gulf,
and the check of Russian trade.

If compared with 7 years ago, imports to the Isfahan pro-
vince via the Gulf are being severely restricted; and if under
otherwise favourable conditions British Trade is unable to
check the extension of Russian Trade southwards, it is due
solely to the dearth of pack animals between Bushire and
Isfahan, and Ahwaz and Isfahan. . . .

If His Majesty's Government agree that insufficiency of
transport animals from the south is largely to blame for the
poor resistance that is being offered by trade from the south
to the downward progress of Russian Trade, then the course
outlined above might form a basis for improving conditions. . .

... When, as is hoped, the Muhammerah — Dizf ul —
Khurramabad railway is, in 3 years time, well under construc-
tion, it will be desirable to expedite a decision as to next
line from the sea to be built. Both Captain Wilson and the
writer, in their railway reports of 1912, urged, from different
points of view, that it was essential that Great Britain should
regard the trade of Isfahan as an objective of capital import-
ance. Fresh statistics since those reports make it clear that
the transport hire paid of late between Bushire and Shiraz
is enormous and affords substantial grounds for thinking that
a railway between these two towns would pay its way before
long. This attack of Russian trade on Isfahan, and pressure
southwards makes it imperative that the railway from the
coast to Shiraz should be taken in hand without delay

There has recently been some discussion among Persian
merchants here for reviving the project of a motor transport

152

company between Bushire and the foot of the kutals, and
between Shiraz and Dashtarjin. This would dispense with
animal transport over 3 stages of the 10 now traveUed, and
would materially quicken transport up-country. The suitability
of the Shiras —Isfahan road to motor transport has been shown
by Dr. Pugin, a German commercial agent, covering the dis-
tance between the two places in 3 days.

In this connection it wiU be remembered: —

1. That the German Legation in Tehran in 1906 made
enquiries of His Majesty's Legation as to whether there
were any British concessionary rights in the road from
Isfahan to Bushire, and intended to lay the matter
before his Government as a possible opening for German
enterprise in Persia.

2. That a concession was granted on June 22nd, 1906,
for running Renard road trains over nearly all the car-
riageable roads of Persia to a group of Persian notables
including the present Grand Vizier His Highness Ain-
ud-Dowleh, His Highness Firma Farma, the Sipahdar,
the Muin-ut-Tujjar.

The concession stipulated that the concessionaires were
to work in Persia at least ten trains within two years from
June 22nd, 1906; that within a year the construction of the
roads must be undertaken; that after 7 years all such roads
must be made carriageable or else would be excluded from
the terms of the concession. On the Bushire road work was
to begin in one year and had to be finished 5 years from the
date of the concession.

It would presumably always be open to British capital
to furnish the necessary backing, and to British subjects to
co-operate in such a Persian enterprise; just as the scheme
by Isfahan Notables for diverting the headwaters of the
Karun may have Russian support behind it. The con-
struction of a road for motor traffic between Bushire and
Daliki would be an easy matter, but a raised and metalled
road 'would have to be built over the great salt marsh behind
Bushire —and the outlay for rolHng stock, motor lorries and
wagons, would be beyond the capabilities of the local Persian
merchants or Tehran Notables.

153

It is not desired to draw any "red herrings" across the track
of the scheme for railway enterprise from Bushire to the in-
terior. I merely state the methods for improving transport
from the south of the centre of Persia, in the order of their
relative importance, viz: —

(i) Railway traction between Bushire and Shiraz.

(2) Motor traction between Bushire —Daliki ; Dashtarjin —
Shiraz ; Shiraz —Isfahan.

(3) Measures for providing a regular and larger supply of
mules and donkeys.

(c) Import of Tea to Persia. —After Cotton-goods and
Sugar, the most important article of import to Persia is Tea.
The quantity of Tea imported into the north of Persia via
Russia was 940 Tons.

In 1911— 12 the quantity imported via

Russia was 2,286

In 1911— 12 the quantity imported via

the Gulf was 828

It is well known that the greater part of the Tea im-
ported via Russia, and appearing as a Russian import in the
Persian Customs statistics, is now Indian (Calcutta) Tea which
has come by sea via Batoum.

The "state of the southern roads" has not been the prin-
cipal reason for the great increase of import of Tea via Russia,
and decline in the Persian Gulf.

It would appear that, while the freight by sea from: —
Calcutta to Bushire— 35 rupees per ton of 50 cubic feet;
Calcutta to Baghdad, (i.e., for Kirmanshah import) —

45 rupees per ton of 50 cubic feet;
Calcutta to Bombay per lb, 9 pies approx. — Rs. 33

per ton of 40 cubic feet;
Bombay to Bushire per chest Rs.i^— 2 = Rs.io34— 14
per ton of 40 cubic feet; Rs. 43V2 — 47

the freight by Austrian Lloyd steamer, transhipment at Trieste
from Calcutta to Batoum == only 31 rupees per ton; and by
French Messageries, transhipment at Colombo and Marseilles,
from Calcutta to Batoum only 28 rupees per ton (the French

154

line is less patronised owing to expenses of transhipment at
Colombo, in the open sea).

On the other hand, freight by P. and O. steamer and the
City Line and Conference steamers from Calcutta to Batoum
costs 40 rupees, as freight from Port Said to Batoum by Russian
steamers (British vessels not saiUng direct) is dear.

The Government of India have hardly given the import
of Tea to the Persian Gulf the attention that it was hoped;
it is discouraging to hear in Foreign Department letter No. 317 —
E. A., of February 18, that the Indian Tea trade with Persia,
north and south, is insignificant from the poUtical point of
view. But if the Government of India is anxious to see checked
the spread of Russian trade, and so Russian influence, to Is-
fahan and southwards, the reduction of the import duty on
Tea into Persia, and above all, representations to the British
India Steam Navigation Company and others as to the harmful
effect on our political position of charging such high freights
to Baghdad and Bushire, in comparison with the rates from
Calcutta to Batoum will be two effective preventive methods,
so far as the Tea trade is concerned.

British Commercial Position in Southern and Central
Persia in General.

Perhaps more than any other remedy, an overhauling of
the position of British firms in Southern and Central Persia
is needed before the spread of Russian commercial influence
can be really checked. It cannot be generally realised how
few are the British Trading firms with European agencies in
Persia, and what empty shells they are —conservative in the
extreme, restricted in their operations: and in this connection
the Board of Trade are already aware of several which threaten
to withdraw altogether from trade with Persia. Thus: —

Messrs. Gray Paul and Company do no business with
the interior of Persia, sometimes seU a little sugar ; do not touch
exports (except grain sometimes); confine themselves entirely
to shipping business.

Messrs. Ziegler and Company sell Belgian Sugar at Bu-
shire (but do not send it up-country); seU Manchester and
Dutch piece goods at Shiraz and Isfahan; a little copper at
times, candles rarely. No exports (except grain rarely).

Piece goods only,
native agent.

155

Messrs. Dixon and Company. Piece goods only. Export
grain when season favourable.

Messrs. Livingstone, Zeytoon and Company Limited im-
port piece goods to Shiraz (small quantities); haberdashery
little. Export Gum, Carpet, Opium.

Messrs. Lynch Brothers; Muhammerah, Ahwaz. Sugar.

Messrs. Strick, Scott and Company, Muhammerah. Ge-
neral imports, small. Export grain when season favourable.

Messrs. D. E. Somech and Company

Messrs. Holdsworth, Hougie and
Company

Messrs. A. and T. J. Malcolm. Candles.

This represents the range of activities, and the number
of British firms with special representatives in Southern Persia
from Bunder Abbas to Ahwaz and Isfahan.

As a consequence, it will be seen how much more important
relatively are those Persian merchants, who either deal direct
with British firms, or else are the legally appointed represen-
tatives of British firms in the United Kingdom, or India, to
what an extent the whole fabric of our trade is in Persian hands.

This is not as it should be. Greater variety of enterprise
is needed for the British firms with special representatives in
Persia. At present, if Consular Officers desire to have any
trade experiments made, or special wares pushed in Southern
Persia, or new sorts of produce exported, they have to apply
to Armenian or Persian merchants. Some of the greatest draw-
backs to British firms' offices in Persia are the way in which
the firms' representatives are firstly, not encouraged and
obHged to learn the language, or mix with the people ; secondly,
are not allowed to leave their offices and travel in the imme-
diate neighbourhood in order to find out for themselves new
openings for business; thirdly, youth and inexperience of most
agents sent from England.

But the greatest needs are a decision to deal more widely
and extensively than at present, and greater activity by all
firms in the export trade of Persia.

H. G. Chick
Commercial Adviser.

156

Confidential letter from the Indian Government to the Marquess
of Crewe, dated January 22 nd, igi4.
Confidential.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

Delhi, January 22, 1914.
My Lord Marquess,

With reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 17th

November, 19 13, we have the honour to submit the following

remarks in regard to the prospect of Russian trade competition

in Southern Persia, as adumbrated in Mr. Chick's memorandum

which accompanied Sir P. Cox's despatch No. 14, Commercial.

dated the 28th September, 1913, addressed to the London

Foreign Office.

3. It is satisfactory to note that there has been of late a
marked improvement in the general security of the route in
question. This should give a stimulus to Indian trade enter-
prise, which is at present sadly apathetic. Another satisfactory
feature is the reduction in the rates of carriage effected by
the mule hire agreement. Against these, however, must be
set the very serious diminution of transport animals, which
cramps and cripples such enterprise as there is. To combat
this Mr. Chick proposes —

(i.) To organise transport and systematise transport con-
ditions ;
(2.) To employ donkeys and camels on the Shiraz —Ispahan
road, as accessories to mules, more extensively than
at present.
These measures, he recommends, should be effected by
cooperation between His Majesty's consular officers at Shiraz
and Bushire and the local authorities. With this we are in full
agreement. The organisation of transport service on theNushki —

157

Seistan trade route has been the cause of a steady increase in
trade, and we think that His Majesty's consular officers at
Bushire and Shiraz should be authorised at once to approach
the local authorities on the lines suggested by Mr. Chick.

4. We agree also that the provision of more reliable statis-
tics of the traffic over the southern roads is important, and,
with your Lordship's sanction, we are prepared to meet the
cost, viz., £100 per annum, of the proposals to this end put
forward in Mr. Chick's memorandum.

5. We have fully considered the other measures that
have from time to time been suggested for the encouragement
of Indian trade on the Shiraz —Ispahan route, as, for instance,
the grant of State aid to traders, the possibility of inducing
the British India Steam Navigation and other steamer com-
panies to lower their freight charges on Indian tea to Persia,
and the establishment of a motor service on the road. But
we cannot at present advocate any of these measures.

6. As regards the proposed Persian motor service from
Tehran to Shiraz, to which Sir P. Cox alludes, we trust that,
if the scheme is likely to materialise, His Majesty's Govern-
ment will do what may be possible to discourage it, or at any
rate to press for similar action or concessions in directions in
which our interest lies.

7. It is becoming increasingly evident, especially in view
of the activity that Russia is now showing in regard to the
construction of railway lines from the north, that the only
really effective means of safeguarding and promoting British
trade in Persia is the simultaneous construction of railway
lines into Persia from the south coast.

It is in this direction that we consider our efforts should
be directed, but in the meantime the minor measures we have
now recommended may be adopted with advantage
We have, &c.

Hardinge of Penshurst

O'M Creagh

S. A. Imam

W. H. Clark

R. H. Craddock

W. S. Meyer.

158

Telegram from the English Consul in Shiraz to the English
Minister in Teheran, February J2th, igi4.

Copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz, to
His Majesty's Minister, Tehran (repeated to the Political Resi-
dent in the Persian Gulf) No. 20, dated (and received) the
I2th February 1914.

There has been some talk here lately among Persian mer-
chants of starting company for constructing railway between
Shiraz and Bushire. I have reason to think that the scheme
was suggested by the German Consul during his stay here
last summer. Idea would be that the Company should pose
as Persian Company but that considerable portion of the capital
should be raised in Germany, I scarcely think that the project
can come to anything but it is worth watching.

159

Wording of the Anglo- Russian Treaty of igoy relating to
Persia.
Convention between the United Kingdom and Russia relating

to Persia, Afghanistan and Thibet,
Signed at St. Petersburgh, August 31, 1907, and ratified

September 23, 1907.
Convention.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the
Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of All
the Russias, animated by the sincere desire to settle by mutual
agreement different questions concerning the interests of their
States on the Continent of Asia have determined to conclude
Agreements destined to prevent all cause of misunderstanding
between Great Britain and Russia in regard to the questions
referred to, and have nominated for this purpose their respec-
tive Plenipotentiaries, to wit:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the
Seas, Emperor of India, the Right Honourable Sir Arthur
Nicolson, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias.

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Master
of his Court Alexander Iswolsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers^
found in good and due form, have agreed on the following: —
Agreement concerning Persia.

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having
mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence
of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of order
throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well
as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the
trade and industry of all other nations ;

Considering that each of them has, for geographical and
economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace
and order in certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the
neighbourhood of, the Russian frontier on the one hand, and
the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other

160

hand ; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between
their respective interests in the above-mentioned provinces
of Persia;

Have agreed on the following terms: —

I. Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not
to support in favour of British subjects, or in favour of the
subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a poUtical or
commercial nature — such as Concessions for railways, banks,
telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, &c. — beyond a Une
starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Isfahan, Yezd,
Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the
intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to
oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions
in this region which are supported by the Russian Government.
It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included
in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the
Concessions referred to.

II. Russia, on her part engages not to seek for herself and
not to support, in favour of Russian subjects, or in favour of
the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political
or commercial nature-such as Concessions for railways, banks,
telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, &c. — beyond a line
going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand,
Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose,
directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this
region which are supported by the British Government. It is
understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the
region in which Russia engages not to seek the Concessions
referred to.

III. Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without
previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any
Concessions whatever to British subjects in the regions of
Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles I and II.

Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards
the grant of Concessions to Russian subjects in the same regions
of Persia.

All Concessions existing at present in the regions indicated
in Articles I and II are maintained.

161

IV. It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian
customs, with the exception of those of Farsistan and of the
Persian Gulf, revenues guaranteeing the amortization and the
interest of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah
with the "Banque d'Escompte et des Prets de Perse" up to
the date of the signature of the present Agreement, shall be
devoted to the same purpose as in the past.

It is equally understood that the revenues of the Persian
customs of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those
of the fisheries on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea and
those of the Posts and Telegraphs, shall be devoted, as in the
past, to the service of the loans concluded by the Government
of the Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of
the signature of the present Agreement.

V. In the event of irregularities occurring in the amortiza-
tion or the payment of the interest of the Persian loans conclu-
ded with the "Banque d'Escompte et des Prets de Perse" and
with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature
of the present Agreement, and in the event of the necessity aris-
ing for Russia to estabUsh control over the sources of revenue
guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with
the first-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in
Article II of the Present Agreement, or for Great Britain to
establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the
regular service of the loans concluded with the second-named
bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article I of the
present Agreement, the British and Russian Governments
undertake to enter beforehand into a friendly exchange of
ideas with a view to determine, in agreement with each other,
the measures of control in question and to avoid all interference
which would not be in conformity with the principles governing
the present Agreement.

162

Wording of the English Note, handed to the PersianGovernmcnt
September 4th, igoy by Sir Cecil Spring Rice.

Translation of the official communication concerning the
nature and objects of the Anglo- Russian Convention, trans-
mitted in Persian by the British Minister in Teheran to the
Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 4 th September, 1907.

Information has reached me that the report is rife in
Persia that the result of the Agreement concluded between
England and Russia will be the intervention of these two
Powers in Persia, and the partition of Persia between them.
Your Excellency is aware that the negotiations between England
and Russia are of a wholly different character, since the
Mushiru'1-Mulk recently visited both St. Petersburg and London,
and discussed the matter with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs
of both Powers, who explicitly declared to him the objects
aimed at by their respective Governments in Persia, which
assurances he has no doubt duly reported.

Sir Edward Grey has informed me of the substance of
his conversations with the Mushiru'1-Mulk, and also of the
substance of M. Iswolsky's declarations, officially communicated
to the British Government.

Sir Edward Grey informs me that he has explained to the
Mushiru'1-Mulk that he and M. Iswolsky are completely in
accord on two fundamental points.

Firstly, neither of the two Powers will interfere in the
affairs of Persia unless injury is inflicted on the persons or
property of their subjects.

Secondly, negotiations arising out of the Anglo- Russian
Agreement must not violate the integrity and independence
of Persia.

Sir Edward Grey also observes that hitherto antagonism
has existed between England and Russia, each of whom has
endeavoured to prevent the continuance of the other in Persia,
and had this antagonism been prolonged in the present uncertain
state of Persia, one or both of these two Powers might have

163

been tempted to interfere in the internal affairs of Persia, so
as not to allow the other to profit by the existing state of
things, or to profit by it to the detriment of others. The object
of the present negotiations between England and Russia is
to prevent such difficulties from arising between them, and these
negotiations are in no wise directed against Persia, as M. Iswolsky
has clearly explained to the Mushiru'1-Mulk, saying: "Neither
of the two Powers seeks anything from Persia, so that Persia
can concentrate all her energies on the settlement of her internal
affairs." Both Ministers are entirely in accord as to the policy of
non-intervention in Persia, and have left no possible ground
for doubt in the matter. M. Iswolsky's words, which include
the intentions of England, are as follows: "Russia's general
principle will be to refrain from any kind of intervention in the
internal affairs of other countries so long as nothing injurious
to her interests is done; and it is quite impossible that she
should deviate from this principle in this present case."

As to the reported partition of Persia between Russia and
England, concerning which it is asserted that the two Powers
above mentioned wish to define spheres of influence for them-
selves. Sir Edward Grey and M. Iswolsky have explicitly declared
that these reports have no foundation. What the two Powers
desire is to come to an agreement which will prevent future
difficulties and disputes from arising, by guaranteeing that
neither Power will aim at acquiring influence in those parts of
Persia which are adjacent to the frontier of the other. This
Agreement is injurious neither to the interests of Persia nor to
those of any other foreign nation, since it binds only Eng-
land and Russia not to embark on any course of action in
Persia calculated to injure the interests of the other, and so in
the future to deliver Persia from those demands which in the
past have proved so injurious to the progress of her poUtical
aspirations. This is what M. Iswolsky says: —

"This Agreement between the two European Powers
which have the greatest interests in Persia, based as it is on a
guarantee of her independence and integrity, can only serve
to further and promote Persian interests, for henceforth Persia,
aided and assisted by these two powerful neighbouring States,
can employ all her powers in internal reforms."

164

From the above statements you will see how baseless and
unfounded are these rumours which have lately prevailed in
Persia concerning the political ambitions of England and Russia
in this country. The object of the two Powers in making this
Agreement is not in any way to attack, but rather to assure for
ever the independence of Persia. Not only do they not wish
to have at hand any excuse for intervention, but their object
in these friendly negotiations was not to allow one another to
intervene on the pretext of safeguarding their interests. The
two Powers hope that in the future Persia wiU be for ever
deUvered from the fear of foreign intervention, and will thus
be perfectly free to manage her own affairs in her own way,
whereby advantage will accrue both to herself and to the
whole world.

iBINDrNG SECT. JAN 2 1 1971

DS Behind the veil in Persia

315

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