Presented to the
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
LIBRARY
by the
ONTARIO LEGISLATIVE
LIBRARY
>Y\
IQOO
Digitized by tine Internet Arcinive
in 2007 witin funding from
Microsoft Corporation
i
littp://www.archive.org/details/belgiumneutralloOOwaxwuoft
Belgium
/ Neutral and Loyal
^^il
^1
The War of 1914
By
Emile Waxweiler
Director of the Solway Institute of Sociology at Brussels
Member of the Royal Academy of Belgium
G. P. Putnam's Sons
New York and London
Zbc ftnicfierbocfter pxcee
^,
pi
Wot^w
tiVE
^
if,** V
Copyright, 1915
BY
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
'^^ Ubc •Rnfcl?erbocI?cr press, Hew JJotft
>-r'*
PUBLISHERS' NOTE
This book, which is now issued in an English
translation, appeared originally some months ago
in Switzerland, where the author had undertaken
to vindicate his fatherland before the public
opinion of that neutral country whose sympathy
Belgium so highly appreciates.
The book was published simultaneously in
French at Lausanne, and in German at Zurich.
Both editions met with an astonishing success and
were repeatedly reprinted.
The book penetrated extensively into Germany
where it made so deep an impression that the
socialist paper Vorwdrts, notwithstanding the
Imperial censorship, published an article comment-
ing on the book and advising all German socialists
to read it. Only recently a prominent lawyer in
Germany wrote to the Zurich Editor, Orell Fussli,
to express his sympathy with the book which
he said had been unjustly attacked in his country.
In all the leading Swiss papers, German as well as
French, important articles have expressed the
sincerest approval.
iv Publishers' Note
The author is well known by his numerous
publications on social problems, and the Solvay
Institute of Sociology in Brussels, of which he is
the organizer and leader, has won a well deserved
fame.
It is due to Professor Waxweiler*s scientific
attitude of mind and his special training that the
work possesses the calm objective character which
has so impressed neutral countries.
The book is based on the most authoritative
Belgian sources, and the latest information has
been taken into account in the preparation of the
English edition.
PREFACE
" Truth must constantly be re-
stated, for falsehood never ceases
to whisper in our ears, and works
not through individuals but through
masses."
Goethe:
" Conversations with
Eckermann."
When unjust accusations are made against the
honour of any one who is dear to us, when doubts are
thrown on his honesty and his loyalty is questioned,
we are carried away by an irrepressible feeling of
sorrow and anger. And if he undergoes moral
suffering at the same time that he is overwhelmed by
other misfortunes, our souls are wrung with such
anguish that it seems worth any effort to hasten
the work of reparation.
These are the feelings of every Belgian to-day on
the subject of his country.
That country has been given up to the devastation
and outrages of war. The confidence which she
placed in solemn promises has been betrayed. There
is no torture to which she has not been subjected.
Now charges are made against her loyalty and she
VI
Preface
becomes at once hateful to her enemies and an object
oj suspicion even to some of her friends. What
task could be sweeter than to undertake her full
defence? Not to write for her an apologia or even
a plea; but to state simply and frankly what she is
and what she has done. Germany seeks to throw
discredit upon the manner in which Belgium in-
terpreted her duties as a neutral before the war;
accusations are heaped upon her; she is spoken
of only in accents of hostility; Germany is appar-
ently making a deliberate attempt to prevent others
from entertaining for her feelings of affection and
respect.
In the universal turmoil of the present moment
public opinion is slow in forming; it is fostered
mainly by impressions. Perhaps the moment has
come to lay facts before it. To clear up every
doubt and furnish the material for a considered
judgment, it will not be superfluous to meet every
accusation, even those whose mere recital violates
common sense, and to bestow upon them more atten-
tion than might at first sight be considered appropriate.
Belgium has nothing with which to reproach herself;
it is due to her that this should be proved by evidence;
that no piece of testimony should be omitted and that
euery mistake and every slander should be exposed
firmly but dispassionately.
Preface
vu
Other nations besides my own have an equal
interest in this. To represent Belgium as having
Jailed to keep her promises strikes a blow at the cause
oj little nations and at the theory of perpetual
neutrality.
The history of the future will without doubt be that
of the free development of nations, jealous of their
independence and impatient to escape from the play
of intrigue and the hegemony of foreign influence.
The nations which have grown great under the shelter
of the sanction of law, as well as those who may perhaps
dream of attaining that benefit in the future, ought to
have full knowledge of the lessons of the experience
of Belgium.
These lines are dated from Switzerland. In this
country, which bears so strong a resemblance to my
own, I have found not only the moral support of
sympathy but also that moderate and critical attitude
of mind which is necessary for one who undertakes
a work in which so much restraint is necessarily
placed upon the feelings of the writer.
With a view to making this little work as valuable
as possible I have deliberately submitted all my
statements to the most searching criticism, for
the scientific mind is among the most scrupulous.
I thank very sincerely all those who, whether abroad
or in what remains of my country, have enabled me
VIU
Preface
to collect the truth, even when by its very nature, or
owing to the position of those from whom I learned
it, it was necessarily to he kept secret.
It is not without a certain regret that I bring to an
end this book. I found in writing it the pleasure of
one who dwells lingeringly on a misfortune by way
of consolation. I commit it to all those who have
preserved their minds from malice and prejudice.
Emile Waxweiler.
Geneva, December, 1914.
r
CONTENTS
PAGE
I. Up to 7 P.M. ON August 2, 1914 . . i
Public opinion in Belgium in regard to Germany —
The policy of the Government — The confidence of
Belgium in her neighbours — Effect of European
policy on those responsible for the Government of
Belgium — Reorganization of the Belgian Army —
Cordial relations of Belgium with Germany, Eng-
land, and France — The Austro-Serbian conflict:
The steps taken by Belgium — Public confidence.
II. To Be or Not To Be . ... 39
The " very confidential ' ' note of the German Govern-
ment to the Belgian Government — Had Belgium
the power to accede to the demand? The notion of
permanent neutrality — The bargain offered by the
"very confidential" note — The attempt of the
"very confidential" note to justify the terms of
the bargain — The true reason for the violation of
Belgian neutrality — The violation of Belgian
neutrality was premeditated — The reply of the
Belgian Government to the "very confidential"
note — The attitude of France — The German
Government's announcement that the German
Army intended to cross Belgium by force — The
appeal of Belgium to the Powers guaranteeing her
neutrality.
^11.
Belgian Neutrality before Europe . 83
The raison d'itre of the permanent neutrality of Bel-
gium— Declaration of neutrality in i87o-^-Great
ix
X Contents
PAGE
Britain as the guardian of Belgian neutrality — The
action of the British Government in 19 14 — The
German plot against Belgium — Main features
in the attitude of Germany, Great Britain, and
Belgium.
IV. Imputations against the Loyalty of
Belgium 129
To mitigate her action Germany endeavours to evade
the question of Belgium — Belgium had not merited
confidence in carrying out her international obliga-
tions: The administration of the Congo — The
suggested inadequacy of the Belgian military organi-
zation— Alleged subservience to France on the
military side; on the economic side — Alleged sub-
servience to Great Britain : Belgium would not have •
resisted Germany except at the instigation of Great
Britain — Conversations on military matters be-
tween the Belgian and British Chiefs of General
Staflfs.
V. German Rules of War and their Appli-
cation TO Belgium ..... 209
The peculiar situation of Belgium in the conflict en-
titled her to expect that Germany would exercise a
certain moderation in military operations — The
war has, on the contrary, been conducted by Ger-
many with a cruel vigour — Germany's attempt to
throw the responsibility on Belgium — Arguments
put forward by Germany to this end: (i). The par-
ticipation of the civil population in the hostilities
(francs-tireurs); (2). The treatment of the
wounded — The treatment of foreigners — The
German code of war — The "laws of war on land" —
The German contemporary doctrine — The arbi-
trary power of the command — The application of
this system in Belgium — Collective repression —
The taking of hostages — Conclusion.
Contents xi
PAGE
Appendix: Report of the Belgian Chief of
General Staff Respecting the Confiden-
tial Interviews with the British Military
Attache in 1906 ..... 301
Index 311
p
I
Up to 7 P. M. on August 2, 1914
The War of 1914
UP TO 7 P.M. ON AUGUST 2, I914
During the last twenty-five years there had
been a great change in the attitude of Belgian
public opinion toward matters German. That
kind of half-mystical admiration inspired by a
power which one does not understand was on the
wane; people had become anxious to get a nearer
view of this power and were curious to understand
it.
Belgians had seen Germans in many fields of
activity. In the first place, they had noticed the
arrival in their own country, in ever-increasing
numbers, of industrious and persevering young
men who sought for employment, often poorly
paid, in banks, manufactories, and shops. Side
by side with them there came men of technical
knowledge who had gone through a highly special-
ized professional education and were thus assured
I
2 The War of 1914
of the most coveted posts in factories and labora-
tories. Then came the great financial or commer-
cial firms in which a German staff managed German
capital, or representatives of German houses who
travelled through town and coimtry to establish
their business and strengthen their relations with
their customers. Even in the case of certain
enterprises which remained Belgian, either nomi-
nally or actually, the participation of German
financial groups introduced influences whose effect
was often very far-reaching.
This invasion, it is true, gave rise to a certain
amoimt of doubt and reserve among those who
were injured in their private interests by the
competition of the foreigner, but these formed only
a very small minority; the public at large set a
high value on the zeal and the exact and deep
knowledge of the young Germans, and these
foreigners were often held up as an example to the
young men of the coimtry who were too apt to
take no trouble to keep the places which the
invaders took from them.
Every year, in the summer, more than 20,000
German families visited the watering places on the
Belgian coast; Blankenberghe, Heyst, Knocke,
and even the more modern resorts of Westende
and Duinbergen were considered almost as German
August 2, 1 914 3
watering places. "You cannot imagine," wrote
a German lady in a letter published two years
ago in the weekly review, Die Woche^ "the charm
of life on the Belgian coast ; it is of the simple and
homely type to which we Germans attach so much
importance." The welcome given to these visitors
by the inhabitants was warm and cordial. The
latter enjoyed hearing in front of the hotels the
jolly or serious songs which the summer visitors
sung in chorus on the evenings of Liederabend,
When children's parties were organized on the
beach or among the dunes it was quite common to
see as many German as Belgian little flags.
A great number of German experts in different
subjects as well as ordinary tourists were attracted
also by Exhibitions and Congresses. Brussels
was the natural place for international gatherings
and associations, which found there obvious
political and geographical advantages. In particu-
lar, in 1 9 10, the German participations in the
Universal Exhibition and in the Congresses held
at that time greatly increased the intercourse
between Belgians and Germans, and the latter did
not fail to take every opportunity of expressing
their pleasure at being received with so much
sympathy.
German schools were established at Antwerp
4 The War of 1914
and Brussels. They benefited by the prestige of
German educational methods; they were directed
by men of ability and conducted with obvious care
for good education and did not fail to attract
a large number of Belgian children. At the
same time German publishing firms brought be-
fore the Belgian public extensive library facili-
ties in a thousand small ways and thus secured
a large trade in books and magazines.
Other circumstances also tended to bring the
two countries together.
Industrially, Belgium lives by its export trade;
in several markets of the world she was en-
countering more and more the competition of
German production. In self-defence she set her-
self to study, no longer superficially but deliber-
ately and carefully, the causes of the enormous
economic progress of Germany. Young people
who were intended for business were forced by the
imperative need of knowing the language of their
formidable competitor to learn to speak and write
German. Books on the training of German
merchants, manufacturers, and bankers were read
greedily. "Give us young men educated like
the Germans," said King Leopold 11. the last
time that he received the staff of the University
of Brussels at the Royal Palace on New
August 2, 1 91 4 5
Year's Day. Committees to study conditions in
Germany were sent to that country; close per-
sonal ties were formed. The true reason for the
economic activity of the present day became obvi-
ous. In Germany, just as in the United States,
it was through "Organization" that capital as
well as labour produced an unexpectedly pro-
ductive return.
German Organization and Co-ordination were
found in the powerful groups of manufacturers
which lined both frontiers, and were the cause
of the periodical meetings of representatives of
metal, glass, and chemical works as well as textile
manufactories from Belgium, Germany, and other
countries. They were found also in those modem
cities, like Dusseldorf or Frankfort, in which the
pressure of modern needs has produced a form of
municipal government whose successful results
cannot fail to be recognized.
In all these matters there was a free interchange
of ideas between the two countries. The Ger-
mans, somewhat surprised to find the Belgians
so receptive of the views of their neighbours,
threw open to them their reviews and daily
papers. They even came themselves with a view
to studying the conditions of the country and to
seeing at close quarters the little nation which
6 The War of 191 4
was growing up by their side, and they took
pleasure in discovering at the same time its great
qualities and extensive resources. For several
years the great German papers of Berlin, Frank-
fort, and Cologne had accredited correspondents
in Belgium who followed the vicissitudes of
the political and economic life of the coimtry
with skill and interest.
But it was in the realm of science that the
mutual currents of influence and thought became
most frequent and most regular.
For several years it has been true to say that
a young Belgian man of science was hardly en-
titled to serious consideration if he had not
attended a German University. Each of these
students in the course of his stay in Germany
established an outpost of scientific good-fellowship,
whither he often returned and whence emanated
mutual help and exchanges of correspondence.
In psychology, physiology, chemistry, medi-
cine, and the natural sciences those engaged in
research were grouped together by the periodical
publications, the Jahresberichte and regular meet-
ings of Congresses, or were divided into groups
in accordance with their various lines of study.
Vacation courses, particularly in the science
of education, attracted more and more the
August 2, 1 91 4 7
minds of those who were curious to study new
methods.
In the social sciences it was German science
which produced in Belgium the great thaw of
which the French economist, Charies Gide, spoke
in his memorable lecture. The famous manifesto
of Eisenach which gave a new direction to social
politics awakened a late but loud echo among
the generation in Belgium which was receiving
its education about 1890. In the more general
realm of sociology an agreement between my
German colleagues and myself had resulted quite
recently in the issuance of a periodical published
conjointly. Close ties united on the one hand
the leaders of Belgian socialism with those of
German social democracy, and on the other hand
the chiefs of the Catholic democracy in the two
countries.
None of these things was in any way surprising,
for it was inevitable that Belgium should be im-
pressed by the strong influence of Germany; but
they were novel. It was strange to all those who
had known Belgians at an earlier stage of their
development to see them now so well-informed on
all aspects of German life.
There were some who were annoyed at the de-
velopments which we have just described. Was
8 The War of 1914
there not a risk lest this attitude of welcome
should lend itself to an unfortunate subservience?
Was not this policy of the open door preparing
the way for an overwhelming influence of Germany
upon Belgium? In certain quarters, for example,
attempts were made to collect together evidence
of German predominance at Antwerp, the metro-
polis of sea-borne trade and the indispensable
centre for Belgian imports and exports.
But it was easy to allay this mistrust. After
all a great part of the hinterland of the Port of
Antwerp was geographically German; it was
natural and inevitable that German firms should
have installed branches in the city, and it was also
natural and inevitable that these branches should
have acquired considerable interests there. The
municipal and even the national authorities did
not hesitate to pay well-earned homage to the
activity and enterprising spirit of the Germans of
Antwerp ; a few years ago one of the most powerful
personalities in the business world, Herr von
Bary, had organized a banquet in honour of the
burgomasters of the principal German towns
along the Rhine ; Prince Albert, now the King of
Belgium, was present on that occasion. Still
more recently the anniversary of the foundation
of the Norddeutscher- Lloyd was made the occa-
August 2, 1 91 4 9
sion of a demonstration in Antwerp which was
attended by several members of the present
Cabinet.
Besides, it is in order to state that Germans
who had settled in Belgium were adapting them-
selves rapidly to the customs of the country ; they
did not interpose any obstacle to the spontaneous
development of national resources; they even did
not hide the satisfaction that they felt at living
in Belgium.
It is worth remarking that the hospitable
attitude of the Belgians towards the Germans did
not seem to diminish in any way the general
sympathy for the French; one had not grown at
the expense of the other. Belgium, which was
already swayed in two directions by the impulses
of the two races composing her population, had
arrived at a kind of equilibrium of tendencies;
perhaps the recent teaching of her historians had
led her to this compromise, by showing her the
double influence of the past on her national per-
sonality ; perhaps she was impelled to it by an in-
tuitive sense of the necessity of self-preservation.
But even among those few who had latterly been
taking an active part in a movement which was
directed to drawing closer the bonds of friendship
with France, there existed no real resentment
10 The War of 1914
against German}''; they were concerned for the
most part only with the pro-Flemish movement,
and the pro-Flemish movement, in spite of appear-
ances to the contrary, was in no way helped by
Germans in Belgiimi.
Such was the state of mind that had gradually
grown up among the Belgian population during
the course of the last twenty-five years. What had
been the attitude of Government policy during
this period?
King Leopold II. died at the end ot 1909.
King Albert succeeded him. It is an open secret
that during the latter part of the reign of Leopold
II. there was no particular cordiality between the
Belgian and the German Courts. The King's colo-
nial policy and various other circumstances had un-
favourably affected official circles in Berlin. With
the commencement of the new reign there was
a change. The personal relations between the
royal couple and the Crown Prince were well
known ; it is common knowledge that the Emperor
was very favourably disposed to the marriage
of Prince Albert with the Duchess Elizabeth in
Bavaria, and that he had a great affection for
the young Belgian King. A few months after
their accession in June, 1910 , the King and Queen
August 2, I914 II
paid a visit to Berlin ; toasts inspired by sentiments
of sincere mutual regard were exchanged.
The Crown Prince, after having offered to the
King and Queen of Belgium a cordial welcome in
the name of the Emperor, who was prevented
from attending, assured them *'of the feelings of
sincere respect which the German Government
and people entertained for their Majesties"; then
he added:
Historical memories bind our people together.
Our families are related by blood.
Your Majesty has found in the princely German
House a Consort with whom your Majesty offers
a brilliant example of happy family life.
Your Majesty must be convinced that every-
thing which contributes to strengthen the friend-
ship of our Houses finds a lively echo in the German
heart.
In the name of my father I wish to your Majesty
the enjoyment of a long and prosperous reign, by
the side of the Queen for the good of gentle Belgium.
King Albert replied by a toast, of which the
following are the important passages :
Your Highness' s words will find sympathetic
echo in Belgium, for the Belgians feel a true friend-
ship for the German people, a friendship which has
developed without interruption ever since Belgium
obtained her independence.
12 The War of 191 4
To our esteem and friendship for the German
nation itself there must be added our admiration
for the fine spirit which animates the Emperor in
the accomplishment of his duties as Sovereign.
The Emperor offers us a noble example of a life
dedicated wholly to the well-being of his subjects,
to the power of expansion and production of Ger-
many, to its brilliant representation in foreign lands,
and to universal peace.
I am convinced that the relations between the
two countries and the two ruling Houses will become
still closer and more cordial as the result of our visit.
A little time afterwards, in October, 19 10, the
Emperor and Empress, accompanied by Princess
Victoria Louise, came to Brussels to return the
visit which the Belgian sovereigns had paid to
them. The Emperor did not conceal his pleasure
at the welcome given to him by the population
of Brussels. At the dinner at the Royal Palace
cordial speeches were once more exchanged:
Sire [said the King], the Belgian people will value
highly the friendly interest which your Majesty
takes in them. They see and they salute in the
Emperor a monarch who is as far-sighted as he is
enlightened, and who has known so well how to
further the brilliant career of his country in every
realm of human activity.
They desire no less sincerely than I do that the
relations existing between the two reigning houses,
August 2, 1 91 4 13
which are those of confident trust, should fortify
the friendship between the two nations.
As for me, while I am connected with your
Imperial Majesty by blood as well as by affection,
as your Majesty was good enough to recall at
Potsdam, I know how valuable are the feelings
which your Majesty entertains towards the Queen
and myself.
The Emperor replied :
The brilliant reception which has been prepared
for us by your Majesties and the Belgian people
in this splendid capital has touched us deeply, and
has awakened sentiments of gratitude which are all
the more lively because we see in that welcome a
pledge of the close union which exists not only
between our families, but also between our peoples.
Filled with friendly sympathy I know and I observe,
like all Germany, the surprising success of the
Belgian people, with their untiring activity in every
department of commerce and industry, whose
climax we have been able to welcome at the universal
exhibition of this year, which was so brilliant and so
successful.
... May the relations between us of confident
trust and of neighbourly friendship, of which the
negotiations between our Governments have re-
cently given so friendly an example, bind us still
closer together!
This allusion in the Emperor^s speech was to the
Treaty of August 11, 19 10, delimiting the frontier
14 The War of 1914
of the German territory and Belgian Congo in the
neighbourhood of Lake Kivu.
It may be noted that sentiments similar to
those expressed in these speeches were shown also
at the time of the visits exchanged between the
King and the President of the French Republic.
At Paris, in July, 1910, King Albert, speaking of
the two neighbouring peoples said :
The closest relations have never ceased to exist
between them, and every day seems to create new
ones. Side by side with the commercial intercourse
between the countries, whose constant progress is
proved by statistics, they enjoy a continual inter-
change of ideas. Side by side with the trade be-
tween the two countries they are bound together
by relations of a less material kind.
The literary and artistic influence of France, and
her passionate devotion to progress in every branch
of human activity, have played a part even more
powerful than that of economic interests in drawing
our two countries together and a true intellectual
commerce draws us to that generous nation whose
fertile influence has made itself felt for cen-
turies on the whole of humanity. Our thinkers, our
artists, our writers in the French tongue, attached
though they be to the characteristics of their race,
know well what they owe to France, to the lucidity
of her genius, to the perfection of her taste, to that
sense of the artistic which adorns everything which
she produces.
August 2, 1 91 4 15
At Brussels in May, 191 1, President Falli^res
laid stress on the idea to which the King had given
expression, and said in his turn:
My visit is not only the fulfilment of a pleasant
duty of politeness; it is also the expression of the
high value which my country places upon the
friendship of yours. France watches with equal
interest and admiration the rapid and brilliant
career of your young nationality. She has seen its
birth and its growth in strength midst the greatest
difficulties. In every branch of human activity —
industry, commerce, politics, letters, the sciences,
and the arts, Belgium has made for herself a high
place among the nations; no one greets those suc-
cesses with greater warmth than ourselves, and we
unite with your Majesty in expressing the wish that,
through our common desires, both our countries
should advance towards an even closer concord of
all their economic interests.
Thus Belgium's attitude in official as well as un-
official matters was the same towards both her
great neighbours. Belgium's confidence in both was
so great that many politicians were of the opinion
that the country would never have to fear an
invasion. At one session of the commission set
up in 1900 to investigate the question of the
reorganization of the army, some ministers of state
and party leaders of great influence left the room
i6 The War of 1914
in which the Commission was held, thinking that
it was inopportune to make any change in the ex-
isting military arrangements which were then still
based on the system of conscription by lot. " Such
a change, " said one of them, "would be to weaken,
the force of the treaties which guarantee the
inviolability of Belgium, and to throw doubt upon
them."
Further, at this very time Germany had shown
that she was anxious that Belgian policy should
be kept within the strict limits of absolute neu-
trality. A proposal was set on foot by the burgo-
masters of the four great towns of Belgium for the
constitution of a body of volunteers intended to
defend Belgian interests in China which were then
threatened by the Boxer rising. Germany repre-
sented energetically that such a step was forbid-
den to Belgium by reason of her situation as a
neutral state. Belgium gave way, in spite of the
danger to which her political representatives and
her subjects were exposed. She believed, on the
other hand, that she had obtained decisive evi-
dence of the determined attitude which her power-
ful neighbour intended to take up as guarantor
of her neutrality.
At a later date this evidence was reinforced with
still greater strength. In 191 1, during the contro-
August 2, 1 91 4 17
versy which was aroused by the annotincement
of the Dutch plans for the fortification of Flushing,
certain papers had announced that in case of a
Franco-German war, Belgian neutrality would
be violated by Germany. The Belgian Minister
for Foreign Affairs suggested that a declaration
made in the German Parliament during the debate
on foreign policy would have the effect of quieting
public opinion and setting at rest the suspicions
which were regrettable from the point of view of
the relations between the two coimtries. Herr
von Bethmann-Hollweg replied that he highly
appreciated the feelings which had inspired the
request made by Belgium. He declared that
Germany had no intention of violating the neu-
trality of Belgium, but he thought that if a public
declaration to that effect were made, Germany
would weaken her military position vis-d-vis of
France who, reassured on her northern frontier,
would transfer all her troops to the eastern side. ^
This reply by the Imperial Chancellor was
communicated orally, in accordance with his
instructions, to the Belgian Government, which
gave way to the objections which the Chancellor
had raised on the subject of the public declaration
for which they had asked. ^
» See Grey Book, No. 12. » Ibid.
i8 The War of 1914
In 19 13 still more precise declarations were
made during the sitting of the Reichstag Com-
mittee on the Budget on April 29th. The Nord-
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, whose semi-ofi&cial
character is well known, reported it in the following
terms:'
A member of the Social Democrat Party said:
" The approach of a war between Germany and
France is viewed with apprehension in Belgium,
for it is feared that Germany will not respect the
neutraHty of Belgitmi/'
Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State, replied :
** Belgian neutrality is provided for by Inter-
national Conventions and Germany is determined
to respect those Conventions."
This declaration did not satisfy another member
of the Social Democrat Party. Herr von Jagow
said that he had nothing to add to the clear state-
ment he had made respecting the relations between
Germany and Belgiiun.
In answer to fresh enquiries by a member of the
Social Democrat Party, Herr von Heeringen, the
Minister of War, replied : ' * Belgium plays no part
in the causes which justify the proposed reor-
ganization of the German military system. That
proposal is based on the situation in the East.
Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the
neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by interna-
tional treaty."
A member of the Progressive Party having once
» See Grey Book, No. 12.
August 2, 19 1 4 19
again spoken of Belgium, Herr von Jagow repeated
that this declaration in regard to Belgium was
sufficiently clear.
All these declarations summed up and amplified
a statement made by the German Minister in
Belgium, Baron von Wallwitz, at a banquet at
Antwerp in 1905, the year of the seventy-fifth
anniversary of Belgian independence. "Respect
for Belgian neutrality," he said, "is a political
axiom for Germany and it could never be dis-
regarded without incurring the most serious
consequences."
In spite of these assurances, the course of
European politics made a deep impression on
those responsible for the Government of Belgium.
The long drawn-out Morocco crisis made a
sensation in the coimtry. At the same time the
formation of the two diplomatic groups of Great
Powers had brought together France and England
who, up to then, had reserved complete liberty
of action. There was a growing impression in
the chancelleries and military circles of certain
capitals that a European war was imminent. To
complete her uneasiness, in 1912 Belgium received
from a Sovereign who belonged neither to the
Triple Entente nor to the Triple Alliance, and
whose great wisdom and long experience of
20 The War of 1914
European politics was well-known in diplomatic
circles, King Charles of Roumania, the friendly
advice to keep a careful watch on the defence of
all her frontiers: "The miracle of 1870," he said,
"will not be repeated: Belgium runs a great
danger of seeing her neutrality violated by one
of her three neighbours." At the same time other
warnings reached Belgium; plans for a surprise
invasion of Belgian territory by German troops
were discovered, and the military arrangements
made by France on her northern frontier took a
definite form.
Moreover, these fears received disturbing con-
firmation from German military writers. For
instance, General von Bernhardi, who was widely
read in Germany, published, at the end of 191 1,
under the title of Deutschland und der ndchste
Kriegj a book which was full of statements which
were very alarming for Belgium. I repeat here
some of the most characteristic of them :
The conception of permanent neutrality is en-
tirely opposed to the essential nature of the State;
the State can only attain her high moral ends by
competition with other States.^
No natural obstacle or powerful barriers there
[in Belgium and Holland] stand in the way of
» Chapter V., page 120.
August 2, 1 91 4 21
hostile invasion, and neutrality is only a paper
bulwark. To the south also the Rhine barrier
could easily be turned by going through Switzerland,
although on this side there are serious geographical
natural obstacles.'
King Albert from the moment of his accession
laid stress on the necessity for Belgium to bring
her military organization into line with modem
progress. On many occasions he chose this as
the subject of his public speeches, and he took
pleasure in recalling the eloquent appeals which
King Leopold II. had himself addressed to the
nation, to arouse in it the consciousness of the
obligations of patriotism. Speaking to the Grena-
dier regiment, for example, King Albert said :
It is my earnest hope that the nation should
understand more and more with a clear view into
the future, the supreme and imperative obligation
which the very fact of neutrality lays upon her — a
continuous duty of sacrifice on a level comparable
to the duty which the army would have to fulfil if,
on some future date, international complications,
which are always possible, should force Belgium to
defend the inviolability of her territory.
At last, in 191 3, Parliament passed a measure
for a far-reaching reorganization of the army
» Chapter VII., page 169. ./f [t^M^y ' '{
22 The War of 1914
Before the public discussion of the question, the
Minister for War, Monsietir de Broqueville, was
careful to furnish to Parliament the confiden-
tial communications which, as stated above, the
Government had received. This was done during
a secret sitting, and these statements exercised
a decisive influence on the vote which was taken.
While these events were proceeding, the political
relations between Belgium and her three great
neighbours, Germany, Great Britain, and France,
developed on lines of very sincere sympathy.
King Albert, taking advantage of his passing
through Paris on his retiirn from a holiday, stayed
there to pay his respects to the President of the
Republic in the same spirit of courtesy which in
the course of that year also took him to Berne
dtiring one of his stays in Switzerland; in fact it
was always the King*s personal opinion that it is
his duty to be acquainted with the highest au-
thorities in the countries in which he frequently
travels. At Paris the King received from Presi-
dent Poincare a formal assurance that France was
resolved upon a peaceful policy and had no
thought of violating Belgian neutrality.
Great Britain little by little had realized the
firm determination of Belgium to carry out the
August 2, 1 91 4 23
reforms in the Congo which the new King had
solemnly promised on the day of his coronation.
[ Finally, in Germany, the King was present in
November, 1 913, at the anniversary celebrations of
the regiment of which he was Honorary-Colonel.
He sent his portrait to the regiment and the
Emperor in return forwarded his own to the
Belgian regiment of Grenadiers. In the course
of this stay in Germany the King had been invited
to Potsdam where the Emperor talked over with
him the general political situation in Europe, and
did not hide from him its gravity. He thought
that it would become difficult to avoid war with
France, who made no response to the conciliatory
overtures of the Emperor, and whose press openly
showed growing hostility. If it were inevitable
that war should come, he added, the triumph of
the German armies could not be doubted. This
conversation, which made a profoimd impression
on the King, was a proof of the confidence which
the Emperor continued to repose in him. This
confidence was manifested once again in this very
year of 19 14. The Emperor had invited the King
to be present at the manoeuvres which were to take
place in the neighbourhood of Cologne, on the 1 7th
of September, last. At the beginning of July the
King informed him that he would attend.
24 The War of 1914
In Belgium there was a growing desire that
Belgian policy should observe the strictest neu-
trality. For example, the leader of the Liberal
Party, M. Hymans, has recounted in the Outlook
(September 30th, page 255) how he had been
requested by the members of the majority to
recommend to the newspapers of his party reserve
and prudence in discussing German affairs.
To be frank, there was a portion of the Belgian
public which disliked these evidences of friendship
between the Courts of Berlin and Brussels, to
which a sensitive patriotism might attach a
significance which was certainly not in accordance
with the facts. The perfectly correct attitude
of the King and Queen furnished an answer to
these fanciful rumours, and they are only men-
tioned here so as to make the picture of public
opinion in Belgiimi exact in every essential.
On July 24, 1 9 14, the Belgian Minister at
Vienna forwarded to the Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs at Brussels the text of the ultimatum which
Austria-Hungary had just addressed to Servia.
This communication took place at the same time
as all those sent by the Ambassadors at Vienna
to their respective countries.
The sensation which this document caused in all
August 2, 1 91 4 25
the Chancelleries is well known. Very naturally a
profound impression was produced at Brussels also.
On the same day, July 24th, the Belgian
Government sent to its principal Ministers abroad
the following letter':
The Belgian Government have had under their
consideration whether, in present circumstances, it
would not be advisable to address to the Powers who
guaranteed Belgian independence and neutrality a
communication assuring them of Belgium's determi-
nation to fulfil the international obligations imposed
upon her by treaty in the event of a war breaking
out on her frontiers.
The Government have come to conclusion that
such a communication would be premature at
present, but that events might move rapidly and
not leave sufficient time to forward suitable instruc-
tions at the desired moment to the Belgian repre-
sentatives abroad.
In these circumstances I have proposed [wrote
the Minister for Foreign Affairs] to the King and
to my colleagues in the Cabinet, who have con-
curred, to give you now exact instructions as to the
steps to be taken by you if the prospect of a
Franco-German war became more threatening.
I enclose herewith a note, signed but not dated,
which you should read to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs and of which you should give him a copy,
if circumstances render such a communication
necessary.
* Grey Book, No. 27.
26 The War of 1914
I will inform you by telegram when you are to
act on these instructions.
This telegram will be despatched when the
order is given for the mobilization of the Belgian
army if, contrary to our earnest hope and to the
apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our
information leads us to take this extreme measure
of precaution.
The terms of this document are perfectly clear;
it was a question of guarding against the possibility
of being taken by surprise by the developments
of the situation. Since the arrangements which
Belgiimi might perhaps be forced to take ought
to be measures of defence, it was necessary at
any cost that she should be prepared for every
contingency.
During the following days diplomatic activity
in the Chancelleries became more and more
hurried; the British Blue Book, for example, gives
eighty documents between the 25th and 29th
July. The Belgian Government were kept in-
formed by their diplomatic agents of the course
of events. In particular, on Monday the 27th,
the Government received from the Belgian Min-
ister at Berlin alarming information on the course
which the Austro-Servian dispute was taking:
*'War," says Baron Bey ens in his message, "seems
inevitable, and we can only expect the worst con-
August 2, 1 91 4 27
sequences. Belgium must from now on take
thought for all the precautions required by the
situation." Next day, a telegram from the Bel-
gian Minister at Vienna annoimced that Austria-
Himgary had declared war on Servia.
At this moment the Belgian Government did
not hesitate. On Wednesday, the 29th July, they
decided to place the army on a strengthened peace
footing — a measure of simple precaution, as they
hastened to explain to the Belgian Ministers
abroad, in the following letter':
The Belgian Government have decided to place
the army upon a strengthened peace footing.
This step should in no way be confused with
mobilization.
Owing to the small extent of her territory, all
Belgium is, in some degree, a frontier zone. Her
army on the ordinary peace footing consists of
only one class of armed militia; on the strength-
ened peace footing, owing to the recall of three
classes, her army divisions and her cavalry division
comprise effective units of the same strength as
those of the corps permanently maintained in the
frontier zones of the neighbouring Powers.
This information will enable you to reply to any
questions which may be addressed to you.
Up to this moment nothing extraordinary had
happened in Belgiimi. But on the 31st July
» Grey Book, No. 8.
28 The War of 1914
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, had two inter-
views of the greatest importance.
The French Minister called to show him a
telegram from the Agence Havas announcing that
Kriegsgejahr (a state of danger of war) had been
proclaimed in Germany, a step which involved
certain measures of precaution caused by a state
of tension in the relations of Germany with
another country. The French Minister at
Brussels on this occasion made the following
declaration':
I seize th's opportunity to declare that no incur-
sion of French troops into Belgium will take place,
even if considerable forces are massed upon the
frontiers of your country. France does not wish
to incur the responsibility, as far as Belgium is
concerned, of taking the first hostile act. Instruc-
tions in this sense will be given to the French
authorities.
The Belgian Minister replied :
We had always had the greatest confidence in the
loyal observance by both our neighbouring States
of their engagements towards us. We have also
every reason to believe that the attitude of the
German Government will be the same as that of the
Government of the French Republic.
» Grey Book^ No. 9.
August 2, 1914 29
The second call made on July 31st was that of
the British Minister. '
He was directed to inform the Belgian Minister
that England expected that Belgium would do her
utmost to maintain her neutrality ; an early reply
was expected. The Minister also announced that
England had just asked Germany and France
separately if they were each of them ready to re-
spect Belgian neutrality so long as no other Power
violated it. England desired and expected that
the Powers would maintain and observe that
neutrality.
The Belgian Minister replied to this communica-
tion in terms similar to those of his reply to the
French Minister, and he added that the Belgian
military forces, which had been considerably
developed in consequence of the recent reorgan-
ization, were sufficient to enable the country
to defend herself energetically in the event of
violation of her territor>^ *
Lastly, on the same day, Friday, July 31st,
the Belgian railway authorities were informed by
the German railway administration that trains
could no longer cross the German frontier.
Thus the situation suddenly assumed a char-
acter of exceptional gravity. On the same day
^ Grey Book, No. 1 1. ' Ibid.
30 The War of 191 4
July 31st, the Government ordered the mobiliza-
tion of the army, and the Minister for Foreign
Affairs informed all the Belgian Legations abroad
of this position by telegram':
The Minister of War informs me that mobiliza-
tion has been ordered, and that Saturday, August
1st, will be the first day.
Next day, Saturday, August ist, the first
day of mobilization, in accordance with the
instructions which he had despatched on July
24th by telegram, the Foreign Minister directed
Ministers abroad to carry out the provisional
instructions which he had already given them.
These instructions were as follows':
The international situation is serious, and the
possibility of a war between several Powers naturally
preoccupies the Belgian Government.
Belgiiun has most scrupulously observed the
duties of a neutral State imposed upon her by the
treaties of April 19, 1839; and those duties she
will strive unflinchingly to fulfil, whatever the
circumstances may be.
The friendly feelings of the Powers towards her
have been so often reaffirmed that Belgium confi-
dently expects that her territory will remain free
from attack, should hostilities break out upon her
frontiers.
All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian
« Grey Book, No. lo. ' Ibid,, No. 2 Annex.
August 2, 1 91 4 31
neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the
Government. The Belgian army has been mo-
bilized and is taking up such strategic positions
as have been chosen to secure the defence of the
country and the respect of its neutrality. The
forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put
in a state of defence.
It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the nature
of these measures. They are intended solely to
enable Belgium to fulfil her international obliga-
tions; and it is obvious that they neither have
been nor can have been undertaken with any inten-
tion of taking part in an armed struggle between
the Powers or from any feeling of distrust of any
of those Powers.
At the same time the King, anxious that all the
guarantees upon which the country had a right to
depend should be fulfilled, and relying on the
warmth of his personal relations with the German
Emperor, wrote to the latter a personal letter,
reminding him of the right which Belgium
possessed to inviolability.
The Belgian Government, who as I have just
stated, had been informed on the previous evening
of the enquiry addressed by England to Germany
and France, awaited the reply to it with complete
confidence. In the course of the day the Minister
for Foreign Affairs received a telegram from the
Belgian Legation in London:
32 The War of 1914
Germany *s reply is awaited; France has replied
in the affirmative.'
On the same day, August ist, the French
Minister at Brussels called on the Minister for
Foreign Affairs and made to him the following
oral communication :
I am authorized to declare that in the event of an
international war, the French Government, in
accordance with the declarations they have always
made, will respect the neutrality of Belgium. In
the event of this neutrality not being respected by
another Power, the French Government to secure
their own defence might find it necessary to modify
their attitude.^
Having regard to the importance of this formal
declaration, the Minister for Foreign Affairs com-
municated it not only to the Belgian Ministers
in the principal capitals, but also to the German
Minister at Brussels, and the latter, meeting the
Minister for Foreign Affairs on the same day,
thanked him for his courtesy, adding that up to
the present he had not been directed to make
any official communication, but that his personal
opinion as to the feelings of security which Belgium
had the right to entertain towards her eastern
neighbours was well known. ^ To this the Belgian
Foreign Minister replied immediately :
^ Grey Book, No. 13. » Ihid.^ No. 15. 3 Jhid., No. 19.
August 2, 1 91 4 33
All that we know of the intentions of our eastern
neighbour, as indicated in numerous previous con-
versations, does not allow us to doubt their per-
fect correctness towards Belgium, but we should
attach the greatest importance to the possession of
a formal declaration which the Belgian nation would
hear with joy and gratitude.'
During the course of these interviews at Brussels,
which maintained a very friendly tenor, a telegram
from the Belgian Minister at Berlin announced
that
The Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs replied
that he was unable to answer the question asked by
England.^
Next day, Sunday, August 2d, the German
Minister called on the Director of the Political
Department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
early in the afternoon and discussed with him in a
friendly way the question of Germans living in
Belgium who had been recalled to their own
country by mobilization. The point in question
was that of facilitating their return by railways
which were already congested by Belgian mobili-
zation. "With great consideration the Director
undertook to authorize the Germans who had been
recalled to travel in any train, even if the effect of
^ Grey Book, No. 19. 'Ibid.^ No. 14.
34 The War of 1914
their doing so was to exceed the number allowed
to travel in the carriages. "Understand," added
the Director, " that what we are doing for Germany
we shall also do for France. We make a point of
respecting the susceptibilities of all parties.** "I
quite understand that,** replied the German
Minister, "but you know well that so far as we are
concerned you can have perfect confidence.*'
The departure of the young Germans took
place in the best conditions and with no mani-
festations of hostility at all on the part of the
public. The Kolnische Zeiiung of August 3d
(No. 881) even stated that on the Northern Rail-
way Station of Brussels the departing trains were
saluted by vigorous cheers from the German
families in the town, and another correspondent
writes to the same paper that Belgian women
and yoxmg girls mingled with these German
families (No. 888, August 6th). This corre-
spondent adds also that Belgians who have been
called to the colotirs by mobilization are in high
spirits, because they look forward to going to the
Frontier to perform only the easy work of sur-
veillance imposed by the neutrality of the country.
On the same day, vSunday, August 2d, the
German Minister interviewed by the paper Le
Soir guaranteed the friendly feelings of Germany
August 2, 191 4 35
towards Belgium and summed up his view in this
phrase: "Perhaps your neighbour's house will
bum, but your house will remain safe."
On the same day Captain Bringmann, German
Military Attache at Brussels, made a very courte-
ous request to the paper called Le XXme Stbcle to
deny categorically that Germany had declared
war on France or even on Russia:
"The news is false," said the Captain on the
telephone. "It has been spread by the enemies of
Germany. You will oblige me if you contradict
it without delay in large type under a heavy head
line in exactly the same way as you announced
it." "But, Captain," replied the editor, "your
troops to-night have invaded and occupied the
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg." "Impossible!
Wait a moment; I will go and find out." After a
silence of a few minutes the Military Attache
returned on the telephone: "What did I tell you?
It is absolute nonsense. Our troops have not
occupied the Grand Duchy. Perhaps a detach-
ment has by some mistake crossed the Grand
Ducal frontier. There is nothing to frighten the
Belgians ; besides, the relations of the two countries
to Germany are quite different. No doubt you
know that the Grand Ducal railways are German
and consequently we have to take precautions.
36 The War of 191 4
But do not let this disturb you. In any case
Germany has not declared war on any one; you
can say so, it is the absolute truth." *'Can we
give the source of our information? Can we say,
for example, in contradicting both stories, that it
is the German Military Attache who asks us to do
so?" "Certainly."
Consequently, on Sunday, August 2d, two Bel-
gian papers, Le Soir and Le XXme Si^cle, relying
on categorical statements, reasstued the public
of Brussels.
A few hours afterwards, on that same Sunday,
August 2d, the German Minister asked the Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs to grant him an interview
at seven in the evening in order that he might make
an important communication to him. Everyone
expected that this communication can be only a
formal renewal of the statement of Germany's in-
tention to respect the frontier of Belgium in the
coming war, as France had already promised
to do.
While the interview was going on, the King's
Secretary, in a conversation with a new Minister
of State, was congratulating himself that the
situation was clearing up.
Everywhere a feeling of optimism prevailed.
II
To Be or Mot To Be
37
II
TO BE OR NOT TO BE
The audience asked for on Sunday, August 2d,
at 7 o'clock in the evening by the German Minis-
ter at Brussels had for its object to hand to His
Majesty's Government the following note, to
reply to which they were given twelve hours.
The note was drawn up in German but on it were
written — a point which it is useful to mention
here — the words, "Very Confidential."
Reliable information has been received by the
German Government to the effect that French
forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by
Givet and Namur. This information leaves no
doubt as to the intention of France to march through
Belgian territory against Germany.
The German Government cannot but fear that
Belgium, in spite of the utmost goodwill, will be
unable, without assistance, to repel so considerable
a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success
to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to
Germany. It is essential for the self-defence of
Germany that she should anticipate any such
hostile attack. The German Government would,
39
40 The War of 1914
however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium re-
garded as an act of hostility against herself the
fact that the measures of Germany's opponents
force Germany, for her own protection, to enter
Belgian territory.
In order to exclude any possibility of misunder-
standing, the German Government make the
following declaration:
1. Germany has in view no act of hostility
against Belgium. In the event of Belgium being
prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude
of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the Ger-
man Government bind themselves, at the conclusion
of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independ-
ence of the Belgian Kingdom in full.
2. Germany undertakes, under the above-
mentioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory
on the conclusion of peace.
3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude,
Germany is prepared, in co-operation with the
Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessaries for
her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an
indemnity for any damage that may have been
caused by German troops.
4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops,
and in particular should she throw difficulties in the
way of their march by a resistance of the fortresses
on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tim-
nels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her re-
gret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.
In this event, Germany can undertake no obliga-
tions towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment
of the relations between the two States must be
left to the decision of arms.
To Be or Not To Be 41
The German Government, however, entertain the
distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur,
and that the Belgian Government will know how to
take the necessary measures to prevent the occur-
rence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this
case the friendly ties which bind the two neighbour-
ing States will grow stronger and more enduring.
It is essential to dwell at some length on this
document and to analyse separately its different
parts.
Germany was asking Belgium to open her
frontier to German armies.
Assuming that Belgium had the desire or
considered that it was to her interest to accede
to this demand, was it in her power to do so?
As a State, Belgium is a diplomatic creation.
After the Revolution of 1830 had violently sepa-
rated the southern provinces of the Kingdom of
the Netherlands which was established in 18 15,
the five great Powers — England, Austria, France,
Russia, and Prussia — met in conference at London
to elaborate the international statute of the new
State. It was created "Perpetually Neutral" by
the Treaty of 1839 (Article 7).
Perpetual Neutrality, or to use a more exact
expression. Permanent Neutrality, is a curious
notion of international law. It has been elabo-
rated entirely for the purpose of meeting certain
42 The War of 191 4
political necessities. It must not be confounded
with Occasional Neutrality which consists in
abstention from siding with any of the belligerents
during the course of a particular war. To say
that a State is protected by Permanent Neutrality
is to say that it is excluded from any war
whatsoever.
Permanent Neutrality tends essentially, as has
been said, to safeguard small States against the
encroachment of powerful neighboiirs in such a
way as to maintain equilibritmi between the great
countries.
With a view to this object. Permanent Neu-
trality binds by reciprocal obligations the
neutralized State and the States which have
sanctioned its neutrality.
I emphasize this point since it is decisive.
A State does not neutralize itself; it is neu-
tralized by others. The basis of the neutralization
of a State is an agreement, a consensus or a
convention between several States. These States
enter as between themselves and as regards the
neutralized State into engagements which will
guarantee the latter the privileged condition of
enjoying a permanent peace; in retimi the neu-
tralized State accepts, with regard to the others,
obligations which will ensure the realization of
To Be or Not To Be 43
that equilibrium of interests which they judge it
opportune to establish. This is exactly what took
place after the Belgian Revolution of 1830. In
order that, as in 1814, "the Belgian provinces
might contribute to the establishment of an
equitable equilibrium in Europe," the five Powers
agreed to "secure, by means of a new combina-
tion, that European tranquillity of which the union
of Belgiimi with Holland had constituted one of
the bases." The international constitution of
Belgium was defined in 1839 in a Treaty between
Belgium and the Netheriands, and the articles of
the Treaty were placed under the guarantee of the
five Powers in a Treaty concluded the same day
between those Powers and the Netherlands, as
well as in a Treaty concluded also the same day
between the Powers and Belgium.
The practical result of the system of reciprocal
obligations which I have defined is that it induces
each of the States which confer the neutraHty to
respect this neutrality in the State which accepts
it, that is to say, not to declare war against that
State or provoke it to abandon the condition of
peace, and, moreover, to defend it against any State
which, whether or no it was a party to the primary
convention, should cause it to abandon its neu-
trality. In a word one may say that each of the
44 The War of 191 4
States which creates a neutralized State becomes
its guarantor. The said guarantee necessarily ex-
tends at the same time to the inviolability of the
territory, for the violation of the territory is the
most summary means by which the neutrality
which protects it may be effectively destroyed.
In return the neutralized State is bound itself to
defend its neutrality when threatened, and to
take all the steps which may be necessary for
such defence. This is indeed its solemn duty, for
if it allowed itself to be induced by a State to
adopt towards its guarantors such an attitude
as might cause them prejudice it would tend
thereby to destroy the equilibrium of interest
which is the basis of the convention by which it
has boimd itself.
This obligation is so inherent in the very notion
of neutrality that a State which has acted on the
defensive is not considered in international law as
having committed an act of hostility against the
State which violated its neutrality. In fact. Arti-
cle X. of The Hague Convention of October 18,
1907, concerning the rights and duties of neutral
Powers and persons in general declares as follows :
The fact of a neutral power resisting, even by
force, attempts to violate its neutrality, cannot be
regarded as a hostile act.
To Be or Not To Be 45
The neutralized State could not avoid the
obligation of defending its neutrality unless at the
time when the neutrality had been conferred upon
it it had been forbidden to keep an army or to
construct fortifications. Such is the case with the
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
In particular, the neutralized State must pre-
vent the troops of belligerent States from passing
through its territory. This results from the very
nature of its obligations. There is no wavering in
regard to this in the interpretations given by
contemporary jurists, and we must admit that
their opinion alone has any weight. In a science
which like International Law develops under the
pressure of historical facts, it is out of place to
invoke, as the Kolnische Zeitung has done (No.
1 1 80, October i8th), Hugo Grotius, who has held
the distinction of a founder, but would never
have aspired to that of a perpetual authority.
Rivier' says, for example:
During war a passage across its territory could
not be granted by a neutral State to the sol-
diers of one of the belligerents, neither to individ-
ual soldiers nor to bodies of troops. Formerly, the
passage was claimed as a right ; later neutrals were
allowed to grant it provided that they granted it
' Principes du droit des gens, vol. ii., p. 399.
46 The War of 191 4
to both parties; subsequently this power was re-
stricted to the case where the passage could be
claimed in virtue of a treaty or servitude. The
right principle is that of absolute refusal to both
parties in all cases. It is the only solution which is
in conformity with impartiality. Moreover the
neutral State must actually prevent the passage.
Similarly GeflEcken' writes:
The first duty of a neutral Government is to
watch over the inviolability of its territory and,
consequently, not to allow one of the belligerents
to make use of it as a base of operations for hostili-
ties against the other party. Formerly, it is true,
it was admitted that neutrality had been respected
when the Government itself did not give any active
assistance to anyone of the belligerents but per-
mitted both parties without distinction to do certain
things. Experience has shown that it is impossible
to observe in this case a true impartiality. The
situation of a neutral country will in itself be more
favourable to one of the parties than to the other.
Belgium [Geffcken says further] has not hesitated
to make great efforts and has been put to consid-
erable expense with a view to the defence of the
inviolabiHty of her territory, and Switzerland in
1 87 1 prepared to fulfil her obligations as a neutral
State at the time when Bourbaki's army entered
the country.
« Die Neutralitdt in Handbuch des Vdlkerrechts, Holtzendorff,
vol. iv., p. 139.
To Be or Not To Be 47
«
The question of the passage of belligerent
armies has moreover been formally decided by The
Hague Convention to which I have just alluded.
Article V. declares in fact that a neutral Power
cannot allow troops or even the convoys of belliger-
ents to pass through its territory, and it is manifest
that this prohibition applies as well to permanent
as to occasional neutrality.
It is not necessary to add that only an independ-
ent State can be a neutralized State — independent
not only in form but in fact. As soon as a State
places itself or allows itself to be placed under the
protection of another; as soon as it accepts or
does not refuse systematic interference resulting
from foreign authority or influence, in whatever
domain it may be manifested, it ceases to contain
the essential elements of neutrality, for it thereby
destroys in one way or another the equilibrium of
the interest which the primary convention had
for its object to guarantee.
It would be inexact to say that the juridical
tenor of Permanent Neutrality is to-day precisely
defined; the notion is, as we have seen, a recent
one. There have been but few applications of it,
and one can only quote Switzerland as a country
of which the international situation is really
capable of comparison with that of Belgium.
48 The War of 191 4
Yet the permanent neutrality of Switzerland has
historical foundations resting on the free will
of the nation, whereas the permanent neutrality
of Belgium has been imposed upon her. It was
by the Treaty of Paris of November 20, 18 15,
that six Powers formally recognized the neu-
trality of Switzerland, and it is not without inter-
est to recall here the fact that they justified their
decision by declaring that "the independence
of Switzerland from all foreign influence was in
conformity with the true interest of European
politics. "
The theoretical considerations which precede
have not led us away from our object. They bring
us there in direct line, for they trace the attitude,
the only attitude, which Belgium as a State, that
is to say on the ground of international law, could
adopt in face of the German Note.
Belgium could not open her frontier to the
German armies because she had entered into a
formal obligation with regard to England, Austria-
Hungary, France, and Russia, Powers which were
co-contractors with Prussia, not to abandon the
neutrality that she had by convention accepted in
1839. To grant a passage to the German armies
was clearly to show favour to one of the belliger-
To Be or Not To Be 49
ents, namely Germany, to the detriment of the
other, namely France, both of whom moreover
were parties to the convention.
Again, Germany could not have really expected
that Belgiiim would accept her demand, for the
very day on which her armies were crossing the
Belgian frontier, namely on the 4th of August, she
received from Switzerland — the only nation, as
we have seen, whose international situation could
be compared with that of Belgium — a notification
that she would remain neutral during the war.
What did Germany reply?
The Government has had the honour to receive
the circular note addressed on the 4th of August of
this year to the signatory Powers of the Treaty of
1 815 in which the Federal Council declares that in
the course of the present war the Swiss Confedera-
tion will maintain and defend by all the means at
her disposal her neutrality and the inviolability of
her territory. The Imperial Government has taken
cognizance of this declaration with sincere satis-
faction and is convinced that the Confederation,
with the support of its strong army and the in-
domitable will of the entire Swiss people, will repel
every attempt to violate its neutrality.
Thus Germany counted upon Switzerland doing
exactly that which she was asking Belgiimi not to
do!
50 The War of 1914
Certain publicists whose insidious reasoning
has been supported with remarkable lucidity by
my colleague, the Swedish professor G. F. Steffen,
allege that if in fact Belgium opposed the Ger-
man armies with a resistance which "cost her her
annihilation" she did not do so in order to defend
her neutrality but for the reason that the Belgian
people are germanophobe and are convinced that
their future lies in a close friendship with France
and England.^
I trust that I have shown in the eariier pages of
this short study how little such a judgment is in
conformity with the real state of affairs before the
war, both as regards the public opinion of the
country and also as far as the ruling classes are
concerned. It betrays that strange need to find
some other explanation of acts than the simple
"heroism of righteousness" to adopt the expres-
sion of Paul Bourget in his stirring article on
"King Albert the Honest Man."
But the thesis defended by Steffen has also a
deeper meaning. It purports to place a sort of
barrier before the defence of neutrality beyond
which it would be sheer nonsense to think of
continuing it. It implies that when, in order to
^ See Le Suicide de la Belgiqiie, by G. F. Steffen, as reproduced
in L'Independance Roumaine, October 31, 191 3.
To Be or Not To Be 51
resist the violation of its neutrality, the State
would have to go the length of accepting an
alliance to the death with the enemies of the guilty
Power, it ought to consider whether it would not
be more in its interests to remain passive. By
this reasoning Belgium ought to have accepted the
"way of escape offered by Germany's demands,'*
and she would have been perfectly justified in so
doing. It is only necessary to sketch the broad
outlines of this thesis in order to perceive the
sophism on which it is constructed. It is not
the part of a neutralized State itself to define the
extent of the obligations by which it is bound by
reason of its neutrality. They are at the same
time the source and the safeguard of the obliga-
tions which the other contracting Powers, by
which I mean the guaranteeing Powers, have
assumed. An engagement to remain neutral is in
no way unilateral; it remains for all time that
which it was at the beginning, the expression of an
equilibrium of interests acting and reacting on one
another. Permanent neutrality is by definition a
complete notion; none of those who accept its
obligations or its advantages has the power of
impairing or mutilating it.
To return to the case of Belgium. It must be
added that even if she did not offer any opposi-
52 The War of 191 4
tion to the passage of the German armies she
would see her territory invaded by other armies,
not only those of the countries at war with Ger-
many but also those of the countries which guar-
anteed her neutrality. In fact the doctrine teaches,
though one sometimes forgets it in the contro-
versies to which the notion of neutrality gives
rise, that in cases of violation the intervention of
the guaranteeing States must take place ex officio
and even in spite of the opposition of the neutral
State ; for as Despagnet very truly says, "neutrality
is a right acquired by the guaranteeing States.'*'
Bluntschli in particular is very definite when
speaking expressly of Belgium.
The European Powers [he writes] in guaranteeing
in the interest of European peace the neutrality of
Belgium have clearly acquired the right of inter-
vening as against any Power threatening the
neutrality or the independence of that country,
even when intervention is not claimed by the party
interested.^
. . . The States which have guaranteed the
neutrality of Belgium and did not defend her against
an aggressor would not be holding to their engage-
* Despagnet et de Boeck, Droit international public, p. 185;
see in the same sense, for example, Descamps, "La Neutraliti
de la Belgique,*' p. 550; Hagerup, ''La Neutralite Permanente,'*
Revue genirale de droit international public, 1905, p. 601.
' Bluntschli, Droit international codifiS, livre vi., No. 432.
To Be or Not To Be 53
ments, and would be rendering themselves guilty of
a violation of the law.^
It was the duty, therefore of England, France,
and Russia, even without the consent of Belgium,
spontaneously to defend their interests which had
been injured by the violation of the Convention
concluded in common with Germany; and, conse-
quently, England and France at least would have
sent their troops across Belgium to meet the Ger-
man troops. In any case then, war must have
broken out on her territory.
But the consideration of such a contingency
could only be of a secondary character: in the
society of States as in that of individuals he who
has any regard for the esteem of others determines
his actions by faithfulness to the engagements
which he has undertaken.
That this path of honour and probity is rarely
the shortest, but that it is always the surest and
becomes in time the most profitable, has been
already admirably demonstrated by Tocqueville
in his study of the relations between morality and
politics.
The German Press has not failed to represent
that the Belgians made a great mistake in resisting
the advance of the German troops. %f.V'^' * <"~.
* Bluntschli, Droit international codifie, livre vi., No. 44j^a |S'?^4 %
54 The War of 1914
See [they say] the example of the Grand Duchy
of Luxembourg where prosperity and tranquillity
have not ceased to reign.'
It is not, however, difficult to show that at a
time when the relations between nations are
governed by factors of an economic order a State
which has lost the confidence of certain others
immediately experiences the very practical effects
of this circumstance. Whether she is attempting
to appeal to public credit and contract a loan,
whether she is endeavouring to carry on negotia-
tions regarding customs duties or transport tariffs,
or conditions of labour in the interest of national
trade ; whether she is seeking to gain for her busi-
ness men due participation in the allotment of
contracts for work to be done or goods to be fur-
nished, at every turn, her reputation like that of a
bankrupt in private life will go before her and she
will bear the burden of her disloyalty. She will
have no other recoiu-se than to seek for aid and
protection from the State whose designs she has
furthered, and from that moment she will have
subjected every most vital interest of all her citi-
zens to foreign interests. The penalty which they
will suffer may be less tragic than that inflicted by
* German Communique, published on the 30th October.
To Be or Not To Be 55
the war but it will be none the less severe and
irreparable.
Thus, from a general point of view, everything
bade Belgium not to accede to the demand of
Germany, — regard for her honour no less than
regard for the facts of the situation.
This resolute and deliberate attitude of resist-
ance which it was Belgium's duty to adopt was
dictated no less by the special points of view
raised by the German Note.
The actual terms as well as the general purport
of this Note suggested a bargain to Belgium.
Any one who is prepared to examine it in this
light will find it instructive.
The points of the proposal are somewhat
confused. The general term of the document
gives clear evidence of a certain enhancement in the
presentation of the ideas. But however that may
be, it is not difficult, as we shall see, to set out the
proposed bargain, leaving on one side circum-
stances of secondary importance.
In exchange for an attitude which must not be
merely passive or indifferent but benevolent,
friendly {wohlwollend, freundschaftlich), Germany
engages to guarantee "in full" {invollem Umfang)
the integrity (Besitzstand) and the independence
56 The War of 1914
(Unahhdngigkeit) of Belgium. Further she will
indemnify her for any damage caused by the
German troops.
On the other hand, if by any means whatever
Belgium places obstacles in the way of the advance
of the German troops the very existence of Bel-
gium as a State will be compromised, and Germany,
henceforth freed from every engagement, will
allow the decision of arms to determine the
relations between the two countries.
Let us consider the first contingency.
Belgium gives way. The German armies cross
her frontiers without meeting with resistance.
But France, who is menaced by the invasion, will,
to meet an undoubted strategic necessity, send
armies into Belgium; while England, bound, as I
have shown as a joint contractor to defend a
violated neutrality, will disembark troops to
oppose the German armies. And that will not be
merely a passage of soldiers through a forbidden
territory, it will be the outbreak of war on a
territory foreign to the belligerents. Germany
promises that directly there is peace {heim Frieden-
schluss) she will guarantee the integrity and
independence of the Kingdom. Will she be able to
do so?
Even if she is victorious, who can foresee the
To Be or Not To Be 57
issue of the conflict of interests and influences
which will determine the conditions of peace?
Who can guarantee that Germany, whether she
has unlimited or limited power to dictate her
conditions, will resist covetousness and intrigue at
a time when Belgium, abandoned by those whom
she will have betrayed in failing to keep her con-
tractual obligations, will no longer have at her
side to defend her right to existence any other than
the nation to whose overtures she submitted?
Again, what meaning will independence have
for a country who owes it to the omnipotence of
a single State? By what restrictions will such
independence be limited? What economic vassal-
age will it disguise? It will certainly be the re-
verse of that neutrality which is the raison d'etre
of Belgium and which, as we have seen, is only
compatible with the full autonomy of the country
which it safeguards.
And — for after all, when war breaks out,
nobody can foresee the issue — what if Germany
should not be victorious? What weight as against
the claims of the conqueror will attach to the
independence of a small country which, for fear
of the horrors of war or through interested calcu-
lations or in deference to a powerful neighbour,
became a willing party to the forfeiture of that
58 The War of 191 4
independence? What penalty in the form of
restrictions on her liberty will she not have to
pay for having consented to the surrender of her
national conscience?
Germany further promises that she will in-
demnify Belgium for all or any damage caused
by the German troops. But from the moment
that the war has, by the act of Germany, been
carried into Belgian territory, is it to be supposed
that the German troops alone will cause damage
there? It is even possible that the most serious
and most irreparable devastations will be caused
by other armies. Germany does not, of course,
enter into any engagement with regard to these
damages.
Such was the bargain.
Not for one moment was there in Belgium any
hesitation on the part of those who direct the
policy of the country or on the part of the people,
and nobody imagined that it would be possible
to adopt the attitude of the money dealers of the
temple. But even looking at the matter from a
basely mercantile point of view, it would be dif-
ficult to discern the advantage that Germany was
offering Belgium with a view to her^seduction. It
is manifest that the promises of Germany were
wholly out of proportion to the perils to which she
To Be or Not To Be 59
exposed Belgium, so that if the latter gave way,
she would be accepting, at the same time, the
certainty of being dishonoured and the risk of
being duped.
The German Note contained something else
besides the conditions of the bargain proposed to
Belgium. It attempted a justification of them.
This justification appears to be summed up in
two words, ''auch seiner seits'' with which Ger-
many expresses her regret to be obliged also to
violate the Belgian frontier. It is as though she
would say that she finds herself in the position
of a guaranteeing Power intervening ex officio — a
Power which, as I have explained above, draws
the sword at the moment that another Power
violates the common engagement.
But it is precisely on this ground that her
justification fails.
What, in fact, does Germany allege? She could
adduce no evidence that the Belgian frontier
would have been crossed by French troops; on
the day before the German Government already
had knowledge of the declaration by which the
French Government formally promised to respect
Belgian territory. They had knowledge of this
declaration from two sources at least: from the
6o The War of 1914
communication made to their minister at Brussels'
and from the conversation which the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs at London had had with
the German Ambassador.*
Hence, not being able to pretend that Belgian
neutrality had been violated by another Power,
Germany contents herself with apprehensions
that it might be so violated:
French forces intend to march on the line of the
Meuse by Givet and Namur; . . . this information
leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to
march through Belgian territory against Germany.
. . . The German Government cannot but fear that
Belgium, in spite of the utmost goodwill, will be
unable without assistance to repel so considerable
a French invasion. ^
All these apprehensions and all these presumptions
rest on no controllable data. Germany knew it her-
self. Therefore from this moment she was on the
lookout for any circumstances which it would
be possible to cite with a view to her exculpation.
Hence, no doubt, the strange step taken by the Ger-
man Minister at Brussels in the middle of the night
only a few hours after the Very Confidential Note
had been handed in. I borrow the account of it
from the diplomatic correspondence of Belgium. 4
' Grey Book, No. 19. • Blue Book, No. 123.
3 See p. 39. ^Grey Book, No. 21.
To Be or Not To Be 6i
At 1.30 A.M., the German Minister asked to see
Baron van der Elst. He told him that he had been
instructed by his Government to inform the Belgian
Government that French dirigibles had thrown
bombs and that a French cavalry patrol had crossed
the frontier in violation of international law, seeing
that war had not been declared.
The Secretary-General asked M. de Below where
these incidents had happened and was told that it
was in Germany. Baron van der Elst then observed
that in that case he could not understand the object
of this communication. Herr von Below stated
that these acts, which were contrary to international
law, were calculated to lead to the supposition that
other acts contrary to international law would be
committed by France.
To what does all that amount except to uncer-
tain assertions in support of hypotheses, of which
the object was to justify certain presumptions?
Be that as it may, let us spare the trouble of
considering to what extent the information which
Germany invokes was worthy of belief, or of
asking ourselves whether it did not require under
such grave circumstances some further form of
verification. Let us resist even the temptation
of comparing the German assertion with the events
which took place after the outbreak of hostilities
and which have shown that, far from operations
being carried on to the south of Belgium, the
concentration of the French forces took place in
62 The War of 1914
front of Alsace- Lorraine. Let us examine only the
assertion that France was preparing to violate
Belgian territory.
Not only does Germany assert this, but she
adds that Belgium, if abandoned to herself ^^ohne
Hiilfey' will without doubt be powerless to prevent
a movement carried out in the execution of so vast
a plan from becoming a menace to Germany. One
would therefore suppose that Germany was about
to give a friendly warning to Belgium of the
danger. She would ask if Belgitmi were prepared
to offer resistance to the passage of the French
armies and make it known that, if the contingency
feared were really to come about, she would assist
Belgium to repel the aggressor. By so doing, not
only would Germany defend her immediate in-
terests, but she would be carrying out the obliga-
tions by which Prussia is bound in consequence of
the Treaties of 1839, and she would safeguard the
rights of her co-contractors.
That would be in conformity on every point
with international law and with the procedure
imposed by that law in case of the violation of a
neutrality convention.
This was the correct step, and every considera-
tion demanded that it should be taken ; self-respect,
faithfulness to obligations, and, above all, the
To Be or Not To Be s 63
friendly ties which bind the two neighbouring
States, to which the Note itself cannot help
alluding {die freundschaftUchen Bdnde, die beide
Nachbarstaaten verbinden). This step Germany
did not take.
She declares — while giving to her communica-
tion a "very confidential" character, which would
singularly facilitate a discreet complicity — that
she intends to ''prevent " the advance of the French
armies and that she will cross Belgian territory
for the purpose of meeting them, not in virtue of
the rights which she might have acquired by the
Treaties of 1839 — she does not mention a word
about these Treaties — ^but solely with a view to
assuring her own safety which she considers to be
menaced.
What a strange conclusion to this preamble of
justification! How much more simple and more
frank it would have been to say to Belgium: "We
are going to cross your territory because it suits
us so to do; neither honour nor right can stop
us."
Moreover that is exactly what two days after-
wards, on Tuesday, August 4th, the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs of the German Empire,
Herr von Jagow, declared to the Belgian Minister
at Berlin, Baron Beyens, at the very beginning of
64 The War of 1914
the conversation in which things were said which
dominate the whole course of subsequent events.
Baron Beyens has been good enough to give me an
account of this conversation, the animated tone
of which I will endeavour to reproduce.
Early on Tuesday morning, the 4th of August,
the Belgian Minister had requested by telephone
that he might be received by the Secretary of
State. The audience was immediately granted.
The Belgian Minister had only uttered a few
words before Herr von Jagow exclaimed :
''Believe me that it is with acute grief that
Germany decides to violate the neutrality of
Belgiimi, and personally I feel the most profound
regret on that account. But there is no help for it.
It is a question of the life or death of the Empire.
If the German armies do not wish to be caught
between the hammer and the anvil they must
strike a severe blow in the direction of France, in
order that they may afterwards turn their arms
against Russia."
"But," said Baron Beyens, "the French fron-
tiers are sufficiently extended to enable one to
avoid passing through Belgium. "
"They are too strongly fortified. Moreover,
what is it we are asking of you? Simply to allow
us a free passage without destroying your railways
To Be or Not To Be 65
or your tunnels and to allow us to occupy the
fortified places of which we have need. "
"There is," replied the Belgian Minister at once,
"a very easy way of formulating the only reply
of which such a question admits, and that is to
imagine that France had addressed to us the same
invitation and that we had accepted it. Would not
Germany have said that we had betrayed her in
a cowardly manner?"
As the Secretary of State gave no reply to this
very direct question. Baron Beyens continued.
''At least," he asked, ''have you anything with
which to reproach us? Have we not always, for
three-quarters of a century, fulfilled, with regard
to Germany as with regard to all the Great
Guaranteeing Powers, all the duties of our neu-
trality? Have we not given Germany tokens of
loyal friendship? How does Germany propose to
pay us for that? By making Belgium a European
battle-field. And we know what devastations and
calamities modem war brings in its train. . . ."
"Germany has nothing with which to reproach
Belgium, and the attitude of Belgium has always
been perfectly correct."
"You must recognize then," replied Baron
Beyens, "that Belgium cannot give you any other
reply than that which she has now given you
66 The War of 1914
without losing her honour. It is with nations as
with individuals: there are not different codes
of honoiir for peoples and for private persons.
You must recognize," insisted Baron Beyens,
**that the reply was bound to be what it is."
"As a private person I do recognize it, but
as Secretary of State I have no opinion to
express."
There was no more to be said on either side.
However, the Belgian Minister added that in his
opinion Germany was deceiving herself. She
was provoking a war with England, and further,
the German troops would not pass by Li^ge as
easily perhaps as she imagined. When the Minis-
ter intimated that he would no doubt ask for his
passports, Herr von Jagow protested, saying:
*'Do not go yet. Perhaps we shall still have
reason to talk." "What is going to happen,"
said Baron Beyens finally, " depends on neither of
us. Henceforth the decision rests with the Bel-
gian Government. "
Every word uttered during this important
exchange of ideas is of equal weight. I desire,
however, to dwell for a moment on the explanation
given as to the passage of German armies through
Belgium. It happened that the Secretary of
State had an opportunity of repeating this ex-
To Be or Not To Be 67
planation in the conversation which he had the
same day with the British Ambassador.
If Germany [he then said] is obliged to take this
step, it is because she had to advance into France
by the quickest and easiest way so as to be able to
get well ahead with the operations and endeavour to
strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It
was a matter of life and death for them, as if they
had gone by the more sudden route they could not
have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the
strength of the fortresses, to have got through with-
out formidable opposition entailing great loss of
time. This loss of time would have meant time
gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops
to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the
great German asset, while that of Russia was an
inexhaustible supply of troops.^
In the course of a second interview with the
same Ambassador a few hours later, the Secretary
of State thus summarized his arguments:
The safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely
necessary that the Imperial troops should advance
through Belgium.*
The Chancellor himself was still more categor-
ical again the same day at the sitting of the
Reichstag :
Our troops have occupied Luxembourg and have
» Blue Book, No. i6o. » Ihid,
68 The War of 1914
perhaps already entered Belgian territory. That is
a breach of International Law. . . . Thus we were
forced to ignore the rightful protests of the Govern-
ments of Luxembourg and Belgium. The wrong —
I speak openly — the wrong we thereby commit
we will try to make good as soon as our military
aims have been attained.
He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his
highest possession, can only consider how he is to
hack his way through. . . . We are in a state of
necessity and necessity knows no law. Notkennt
kein Gehot!
The Chancellor thought that he could thus
justify injustice by invoking the excuse of neces-
sity; that is to say, force majeure or legitimate
defence. Let us examine for a moment this
method of reasoning.
With regard to the saying ^' Not kennt kein
Gehot!'' one might point out how unreal was the
peril with which Germany pretended that she was
menaced. One might also indulge in subtle j udicial
controversies and formulate rash analogies be-
tween private and public law.^ But it is on an
altogether different ground that the discussion
must take place.
It is not in fact a case of deciding whether in
extreme circimistances a State may be excused
^ See, for example, the articles of the Kblnische Zeitung, Nos.
995 and 1019, where are to be found references to Von Liszt,
Rivier, and Von UUmann.
To Be or Not To Be 69
for violating an engagement; the duty of self-
preservation may, if we may believe Rivier, for
example, override every other duty.' Nor is it
a question of determining whether every engage-
ment entered into by a State must always be ob-
served by that State, even if the circumstances
which exist at the time of that engagement should
be suddenly and completely changed; that would
be, according to Gladstone, who in 1870 adopted
the view of Lord Aberdeen and of Lord Palmerston,
"a rigid and impracticable view of the guar-
antee."
No! the question here can be put in terms
infinitely more simple. In 1839, Prussia, whose
obligations Germany accepted, contracted never
to violate Belgian territory. This obligation is
precise and definite. It means that Germany
promised never to be induced by a strategic
necessity to pass through Belgium.
The obligation means this — or it means nothing
at all. One cannot imagine, for example, that it
could be formulated in the following manner:
"Germany engages never to enter Belgium with
her armies except when she considers it necessary ! "
It is self-evident that the object of the neutraliza-
tion treaty is precisely to forbid each one of the
^ Principes du droit des gens, ii., p. 103.
70 The War of 1914
contracting parties to make use of the neutral-
ized territory for strategical purposes in any cir-
cumstances whatever; that is to say, that each of
the contracting parties must organize its own
defence without in any way making use of that
territory. To permit one of them to invoke the
necessity of violating a territory the inviolability
of which he has guaranteed, would be literally to
stultify the treaty. Such was exactly the opinion
expressed by Talleyrand concerning the neutraliza-
tion of Switzerland. * ' Through this resolution [he
wrote in his Memoir Sy edited by de Broglie, second
volume], the means of defence for France, Ger-
many, and Italy have been increased and the
means of attack reduced. . . . The neutrality of
Switzerland gives to France an impregnable bul-
wark along the only border where she is weak and
unfortified."
Perhaps Germany was wrong in 1839 to guaran-
tee Belgian neutrality. Perhaps she would have
done better to consider at that time, as Bemhardi
did in 191 1, that the conception of a permanent
neutrality is political heresy. Perhaps, even, she
might have been able to realize her error between
1839 ^"^^ 19 14 3-nd to convoke a new diplomatic
conference with a view to deneutralizing Belgium.
But the fact remains that in 1839 she signed a
To Be or Not To Be 71
treaty of neutralization, that in 1870 she referred
to it with emphasis in order to attest her desire
to respect the Belgian frontier, and, finally,
that in 1907 she signed the first article to The
Hague Convention which lays it down that the
territory of neutral Powers is inviolable. She
could not but have thought of those neutral States
par excellence, Belgium, Switzerland, and the
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the inviolability of
which she had been herself safeguarding for so
many years.
Consequently, in 1914, the engagement into
which Germany entered remained intact, solemn
and categorical, and it is merely a political sophism
to pretend to assert that she was forced to break
this engagement under the constraint of necessity.
The Chancellor was more happily inspired when,
carried away in the midst of a diatribe against
England, he exclaimed to the British Ambassador
at Berlin:*
Just for a word "neutrality," — a word which in
war time had so often been disregarded — just for a
scrap of paper. . . .
Undoubtedly, however, the Chancellor had not
in his mind, on that day, certain words which his
< Blue Book, No. i6o.
72 The War of 191 4
illustrious predecessor Bismarck pronounced in
the Reichstag on May 2, 1871, after the creation
of the German Empire:
There could be no question for us [Bismarck then
explained] of forming Alsace and Lorraine into a
neutral country like Belgium and Switzerland, for
that would have erected a barrier which would have
made it impossible for us to attack France. We are
accustomed to respect treaties and neutralities.
In 19 14, on the contrary, the Reichstag heard
the Chancellor explain, that Germany, determined
to conquer both France and Russia, had simply
adopted the plan which appeared to her to offer
most chances of success or, briefly stated, that she
was violating right for strategical expediency.
Nay more, this violation was premeditated.
It was not in a moment of anguish that, un-
expectedly menaced in her national existence, the
German Empire had recourse to a desperate
resolve and exposed Belgium, a loyal friend, to
all the consequences of her crime. For no person
of good sense will believe that the sudden and
formidable invasion which spread over Belgian
territory with a method and rapidity which have
won the admiration of military critics of all coun-
tries, was unprepared. To assume that would be
an insult t9 Germany's power of organization which
To Be or Not To Be 73
she would rightly resent with indignation. The
invasion of Belgium was so much one of the ele-
ments of the plan of campaign in case of war that
on July 31st, in a conversation with the British
Ambassador, the German Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs declared that it was not possible
to speak of what would be the attitude of Ger-
many with regard to Belgian neutrality, for that
would be revealing her strategical plans.' Obvi-
ously, it was necessary to keep the plan secret in
order to ensure its success.
This being so, how valueless appear, then, the
official assurances given at various times* by the
representatives of Germany, with a view to
attesting her unaltered intention to respect, in
conforming with her engagements, the neutrality
of Belgium!
Was Belgium wrong in placing confidence in
such assertions? Were they not, on the con-
trary, in perfect accord with the general state
of the relations between the two countries and
with the whole ensemble of facts which we have
attempted frankly to outline in the first pages of
this narrative?
What then are we to conclude?
Are we to think that the conduct of Germany's
* Blw Book, No. 122. ^ See pp. 17-19.
74 The War of 1914
foreign affairs was without unity or consistency,
that her diplomacy was sincere but was thwarted
by influences which rendered its power and au-
thority unstable? Was the premeditation rather
of a military than a political character, and does
the feeling of uneasiness — I had almost said of
awkwardness — which the "Very Confidential
Note" leaves, betray a conflict of tendencies at
the end of which correctitude, honesty of inten-
tion, and regard for right gave way to unscrupu-
lousness and to a total misapprehension of the
moral principles of life?
Or must we really believe that the extremely
reassuring declarations made by Germany had
no other object than to lull public opinion in
Belgium into a sense of security while German
influences were being systematically made to
infiltrate into the sphere of national activity
with the object of preparing militant sym-
pathies, or passive indifference, against the day
when the powerful Empire would solicit the
good- will of the little kingdom? Did Germany
really return in cold hypocrisy all that Belgium
had given her out of her candid and honest
loyalty?
The German Note was handed in on Sunday,
August 2d, at 7 P.M. At 9 o'clock a Council of
i
To Be or Not To Be 75
Ministers, attended by the Ministers of State, was
held under the presidency of the King. During
the night the following reply was drawn up and
handed the following morning, Monday, August
3d, to the German Legation at Brussels. '
The German Government stated in their note of
August 2, 1 9 14, that according to reliable informa-
tion French forces intended to march on the Meuse
via Givet and Namur and that Belgium, in spite
of the best intentions, would not be in a position to
repulse without assistance an advance of French
troops.
The German Government therefore considered
themselves compelled to anticipate this attack and
to violate Belgian territory. In these circumstances
Germany proposed to the Belgian Government to
adopt a friendly attitude towards her and under-
took on the conclusion of peace to guarantee the
integrity of the kingdom and its possessions to
their full extent. The Note added that if Belgium
put difficulties in the way of the advance of the
German troops, Germany would be compelled to
consider her as an enemy and to leave the ultimate
adjustment of the relations between the two States
to the decision of arms.
This Note has made a deep and faithful impres-
sion upon the Belgian Government. The inten-
tions attributed to France by Germany are in
contradiction to the formal declaration made on
August I st in the name of the French Government.
« Grey Book, No. 22.
76 The War of 1914
Moreover, if contrary to her expectations Belgian
neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium
intends to fulfil her international obligations and
the Belgian Army would offer the most vigorous
resistance to the invader.
The Treaties of 1839, confirmed by the Treaties
of 1870, vouch for the independence and neutrality
of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers and
notably of His Majesty the King of Prussia.
Belgium has always been faithful to her ^inter-
national obligations. She has carried out her duties
in a spirit of impartiality and she has left nothing
undone to maintain and enforce respect for her
neutrality.
The attack upon her independence with which
the German Government threatened her, consti-
tutes a flagrant violation of international law.
No strategic interest justifies such a violation of
law.
The Belgian Government, if they were to accept
the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice
the honour of the nation and betray their duty
towards Europe.
Conscious of the part which Belgium has played
for more than eighty years in the civilization of
the world, they refuse to believe that the independ-
ence of Belgium can be preserved only at the price
of the violation of her neutrality. If this hope is
disappointed, the Belgian Government are firmly
resolved to repel by all the means in their power
every attack upon their rights.
At the same time on Monday, August 3d, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the repre-
To Be or Not To Be 77
sentatives of Belgium abroad by telegraph of the
demand made by Germany and of the reply which
had been given to it.
The French Minister in Brussels, when in-
formed of these events, went immediately to
make the following declaration to the Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs^:
Although I have received no instructions to make
a declaration from my Government I feel justified,
in view of their well-known intentions, in saying
that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to
the French Government as one of the Powers
guaranteeing their neutrality, the French Govern-
ment would at once respond to Belgium's appeal.
If such an appeal were not made, it is probable that,
unless of course exceptional measures were rendered
necessary in self-defence, the French Government
would not intervene until Belgitun had taken some
effective measure of response.
The Belgian Minister thanked him but declined
the support that France had been good enough to
offer in case of need and told him that the Govern-
ment were making no appeal at present to the
guarantee of the Powers, and that they would
decide later what ought to be done.^
What does this mean? It is sufficient to re-
fer to the explanations which have been given
^ Grey Book, No. 24. » Ibid,
78 The War of 1914
above with regard to the notion of Permanent
Neutrality in order to show the true significance of
this step and the reply which it provoked. France
acts in conformity with the obligation in which
she finds herself to intervene in order to safeguard
her own rights and those of Belgium, violated by
the German invasion. If Belgium demands it,
France will intervene at once; if not, France will
wait until Belgium has actually offered resistance
to the passage of German troops. Belgium
chooses without hesitation the second alternative.
She does not accept France's offer. She is confi-
dent of the justice of her cause; she intends to
keep her hands free and will see later on what
circimistances dictate to her.
The circumstances now rapidly took a critical
turn. During the night information reached
Brussels that left no doubt concerning Germany's
intentions, and in the early hours of the morning,
August 4th, the Government received the follow-
ing letter from the German Minister at Brussels':
In accordance with my instructions I have the
honour to inform Your Excellency that in conse-
quence of the refusal of the Belgian Government
to entertain the well-intentioned proposals made to
them by the German Government, the latter, to
* Grey Book, No. 27.
To Be or Not To Be 79
their deep regret, find themselves compelled to take,
if necessary hy force of arms, those measures of defence
already foreshadowed as indispensable in view of
the menace of France.
A few moments later the Belgian Staff announced
that territory had been violated at Gemmenich.^
The die was cast. Germany intended to cross
Belgium by brute force.
A Council of Ministers was immediately held
to consider whether it was opportune to appeal to
the intervention of the Guaranteeing Powers or
at least the three Powers, England, France, and
Russia, whose co-operation it was permissible to
hope for. With absolute disinterestedness, and
without desiring to take any security for the
future, a simple decision in the affirmative was
taken and the appeal drawn up in these terms
was sent in the evening of August 4th =^:
The Belgian Government regret to have to an-
nounce to Your Excellency that this morning the
Armed Forces of Germany entered Belgian territory
in violation of treaty engagements.
The Belgian Government are firmly determined to
resist by all the means in their power.
Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and
Russia to co-operate, as Guaranteeing Powers, in
the defence of her territory.
» Grey Book, No. 30, " Ihid.^ No. 40.
8o The War of 1914
There should be concerted and joint action to
oppose the forcible measures taken by Germany
against Belgium and at the same time to guarantee
the future maintenance of the independence and
integrity of Belgium. Belgium is happy to be able
to declare that she would undertake the defence of
her fortified places.
From this moment it is on another scene of
action that we must follow the vicissitudes of the
events which have so unexpectedly come to pass.
Ill
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe
81
Ill
BELGIAN NEUTRALITY BEFORE EUROPE
We have seen how the permanent neutrality of
Belgium had been created in 1839 by five Powers.
This expedient had been thought out by Talleyrand
as early as January, 1831, and had been strongly
supported by Lord Palmerston in order to avoid
the difficulties which the Belgian revolution had
raised for the Powers, divided as they were by
jealous rivalry.^ The agreement was made pre-
cisely because the arrangement which neutralized
Belgian territory neutralized at the same time
the influences from which each of the Powers
sought to shield the new State. The terms in
which the neutrality was defined show clearly the
scope of the convention. The Powers represented
the declaration of neutrality as
a solemn manifestation, a clear proof of the firm
determination which they had not to seek either
in the arrangements with regard to Belgium or in
^ Memoirs, edited by de Broglie, vol. iv.
83
84 The War of 1914
any circumstances which might arise in the future,
any increase of territory, any exclusive influence, any
separate advantage, and of giving to this nation,
as well as to all the States surrounding it, the best
guarantees for peace and security.
I would emphasize one passage in this declaration.
The signatory Powers engage themselves solemnly
never to seek with regard to Belgium any exclusive
influence or separate advantage. This can only
mean that each of the five guaranteeing Powers pre-
cluded itself from exercising on Belgium any kind of
action calculated to attach in any way the destiny
of Belgium to its own. Any attempt, direct or
indirect, to render her dependent must therefore
put the other Powers on their guard and provoke
their suspicions. The equilibrium of influences
established in 1839 is an equilibrium of interests.
On the surface it has as a safeguard the fidelity of
each of the Powers to its solemn engagements and
the feeling of national honour possessed by the
Governments of each; but the real strength of the
arrangement lies none the less in the interest of
each Power that it should endure.
The war which broke out in 1870 between
France and Germany furnished a perfect example
of the delicacy of the equilibrium obtained by the
neutralization of Belgium. The revelation by
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe 85
Bismarck on July 25, 1870, of the plan against
Belgium which Napoleon III. had proposed to
him in 1866 caused a deep sensation in Great
Britain. The British Government feared that
a French victory would arouse the covetousness
of the Emperor, and, in order to prevent any
surprise, they inquired of the two belligerents
whether they were prepared to respect Belgian
neutrality. Each party entered into a separate
obligation, and these were embodied in the treaties
of August 9 and 11, 1870, which simply reproduced
the fundamental undertakings of 1839.
I cannot refrain from quoting here the striking
remark that Bismarck made on this occasion to
the Belgian Minister, Baron Nothomb. In a
private letter he gave him a fresh assurance that
Prussia would not violate the neutrality of Bel-
gium and he added: "I am astonished that a
man of your shrewdness should think that Bis-
marck would be so simple as to throw Belgium
into the arms of France." In another letter he
formulated an official declaration, which, he
added, was superfluous in view of the existing
treaties.
This intervention on the part of Great Britain
was natural. Great Britain was a neighbour of
Belgium and her special interest in the neutrality
86 The War of 1914
of the coast and of the maritime port of Antwerp
was obvious. She was driven to take this atti-
tude by "due regard to the country's honour and
to the country's interest," to quote the words of
Lord Granville on August 8, 1870, in the House
of Lords. Gladstone laid special stress on the
latter. "There is also," he explained in the House
of Commons, "this further consideration the
force of which we must all feel most deeply, and
that is, the common interests against the unmeas-
ured aggrandizement of any Power whatever."
In 1 91 4 the situation was in no way different
from that of 1870 and so England was perfectly
justified in renewing the inquiry made to Germany
and France in 1870 in identical circumstances.
It was on July 31st that this step was taken—
the same day in which, as we have already seen
(page 29), the British Minister brought it to the
knowledge of the Belgian Government.
The telegram sent by Sir Edward Grey, Minister
for Foreign Affairs in Great Britain, to the
Ambassadors at Berlin and at Paris runs thus^:
I still trust that situation is not irretrievable,
but in view of prospect of mobilization in Germany
it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government,
in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French
^ Blue Book, No. 114.
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe 87
(German) Government are prepared to engage to
respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other
Power violates it.
A similar request is being addressed to German
(French) Government. It is important to have an
early answer.
In order to appreciate in all its bearings the
significance of this double request, it is neces-
sary to visualize the positions occupied at this
moment by the pieces on the European chess-
board. I will, therefore, try, by extracts from
the diplomatic "books" published by the several
Governments, to trace roughly the course of
events, and will attempt to bring out from this
dense tangle of letters and telegrams the points
which especially concern Belgium.
The "not irretrievable situation" of which
Sir Edward Grey speaks, is that resulting from
the diplomatic struggle caused in Europe by the
Ultimatum addressed by Austria-Hungary to
Servia as a result of the assassination of the
Hereditary Archduke. "The bolt once fired,"
to use an expression of the German Ambassador
in one of his interviews at the Foreign Office at
Paris, ^ "Germany was perfectly aware that a
warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Ser-
* Orange Book, No. 19.
88 The War of 191 4
via might bring Russia upon the field, and in
this way involve Germany in a war in accordance
with her duty as ally."^ To prevent "the posi-
tion of the Teutonic race from becoming un-
tenable in Central Europe, Germany permitted
Austria a completely free hand."^ Thencefor-
ward she was inclined to consider that the ques-
tion was of interest only to Austria and Servia,
but that by her aggressive intervention Russia
had changed the venue of the dispute; action for
the purpose of avoiding a war ought therefore to
be taken at St. Petersburg. ^
Opposed to this argument was that put forward
by Russia, who declared that she could not re-
main indifferent to a conflict which threatened
to destroy the sovereignty of Servia. -* Since the
threat came from Austria it was at Vienna that
action for the purpose of avoiding a war should
be taken. France supported Russia.
In face of such a divergence of views, no media-
tion had any chance of success. It was not so
much a question as to the possibility or the ex-
tent of any action in the direction of mediation, it
was a question as to the place where the action
should be taken.
» White Book, English edition, p. 2. ' Ibid.
3 Orange Book, pp. 40 to 53. * Cf. Blue Book, No. 17.
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe 89
Now, it was England who was taking action
in the direction of mediation.
She had resisted the various requests which
urged her to take her place on the side of Russia
either directly, or indirectly by joining France.
*'If England took her stand firmly with France
and Russia there would be no war," the British
Ambassador in Russia had telegraphed to Sir Ed-
ward Grey on July 25th.' Sir Edward Grey had
in his answer shown marked regard for public opin-
ion which in England always has such weight in
diplomatic decisions. "I cannot promise any-
thing of the sort, " he said, "and I do not consider
that public opinion here would sanction that Great
Britain should go to war over a Servian quarrel." ^
On July 27th, the British Ambassador returned
to the subject of the refusal of Great Britain to
join with France and Russia.
It would not be a way to advance the cause of
peace [he added], for it is a mistake to believe that
if Germany learned that Great Britain had joined
France and Russia she would adopt a more concilia-
tory attitude; the contrary would be the case.^
On the 28th a similar communication was made
at Paris, ^ and in order to confirm his attitude Sir
» Blue Book, No. 17; see also No. 6. ' Ibid., No. 24.
3 Ibid., No. 44; see also No. 47. ■♦ Ibid., No. 59.
90 The War of 1914
Edward Grey on the next day gave very cate-
gorical explanations to the French Ambassador at
London :
The friendly tone of their conversations should
not lead to any mistake and should not cause France
to think that Great Britain would be on the side
of France if her efforts to preserve peace should
fail. Public opinion in England approached the
present difficulty from quite a different point of
view from that taken during the difficulty as to
Morocco a few years before. Even the question of
the supremacy of Teuton or Slav in the Balkans
would not change our passive attitude. If Germany
became involved and France became involved,
Great Britain would have to consider what to do,
but she was free from all engagements and would
have to have regard to her own interests.^
On July 30th, the President of the French Re-
public again urged this point of view upon the
British Ambassador at Paris.
Peace is in the hands of Great Britain [he said].
If she announced that she would come to the aid of
France in the event of a conflict between France
and Germany, Germany would at once modify her
attitude.^
The Ambassador resisted; it would be very diffi-
cult for the British Government to make such an
announcement.^
' Blue Book, No. 87. » Ibid., No. 99. ' Ibid.
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe 91
While Russia and France thus urged her to
declare her attitude, Germany also suddenly added
her \irgent solicitation':
The Imperial Chancellor on July 29th explained
to the British Ambassador at Berlin that the
conflagration was threatening. France would be
drawn into it by her obUgations towards Russia.
Germany knew that Great Britain would never
stand by and allow France to be crushed; that,
however, was not the object at which Germany
aimed. She was ready to give Great Britain every
assurance that if she proved victorious in any war
that might ensue she would not annex any part of
French territory, but she could only give these assur-
ances in exchange for a promise of British neutrality.
"What would happen to the French colonies?"
asked the Ambassador. The Chancellor answered
that he could not give the same assurance with
regard to them.
"And as to Holland?"
Germany will respect her integrity and her
neutrality as long as her enemies do the same.
" And as to Belgitun? "
It will depend on the action of France what
operations Germany may be forced to undertake
in Belgium, but after the war Belgium will maintain
her integrity if she does not take sides against
Germany.
The British Ambassador merely replied that he
did not think that in the present state of affairs
' Blue Book, No. 85.
92 The War of 1914
his Government would wish to bind themselves
by any engagement.
This is the first time that the name of Belgium
is mentioned with reference to the Austro-Servian
dispute, and it is well to mark this moment. On
July 29th, Germany confessed that thereafter
the fate of the little nation that she has guaranteed
would be at the mercy of military operations.
Moreover she took care to tell her nothing about
it and not to disturb the confident calm which
she herself had encouraged by many reassuring
declarations.
Almost at the same moment that this interview
was taking place in Berlin, Sir Edward Grey saw
the German Ambassador in London and made to
him a declaration similar to that which he had
just made to the French Ambassador':
Germany shotild not be misled by the friendly
tone of the negotiations; the situation was very
grave. Great Britain might be involved in order
to defend her interests. She makes this frank
declaration so that Germany shall not say later
that if she had known it, the course of affairs
might have been different.*
On July 30th, Sir Edward Grey hastened to
reply to the suggestions of Germany with reference
» See page 89. =• Blue Book, No. 89.
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe 93
to the conditions of British neutrality in the course
of the coming conflict. It is a non possumus,
but the answer opens the door to future agree-
ments. The text of this telegram is so im-
portant for the purpose of defining the attitude
of Great Britain, especially in so far as Belgium
is concerned, that I think it well to print it here in
full'
His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment
entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should
bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.
What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand
by while French colonies are taken and France
is beaten so long as Germany does not take French
territory as distinct from the colonies.
From the material point of view such a pro-
posal is unacceptable, for France, without further
territory in Europe being taken from her, could
be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great
Power, and become subordinate to German policy.
Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace
for us to make this bargain with Germany at the
expense of France, a disgrace from which the good
name of this country would never recover.
The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain
away whatever obligation or interest we have as
regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not
entertain that bargain either.
Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine
* Blue Book, No. loi.
94 The War of 191 4
whether the prospect of a future general neutrality
agreement between England and Germany offered
positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for
tying our hands now. We must preserve our full
freedom to act as circtmistances may seem to us to
require in any such unfavourable and regrettable
development of the present crisis as the Chancellor
contemplates.
You should speak to the Chancellor in the above
sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of
maintaining the good relations between England and
Germany is that they should continue to work
together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we
succeed in this object the mutual relations of Ger-
many and England will, I believe, be ipso facto
improved and strengthened. For that object His
Majesty's Government will work in that way with
all sincerity and goodwill.
And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can
be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed,
my own endeavour will be to promote some ar-
rangement to which Germany could be a party, by
which she could be assured that no aggressive or
hostile policy would be pursued against her or her
Allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or
separately. I have desired this and worked for it,
so far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis,
and, Germany having a corresponding object, our
relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto
been too Utopian to form the subject of definite
proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more
acute than any that Europe has gone through for
generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the
relief and reaction which will follow may make
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe 95
possible some more definite rapprochement be-
tween the Powers than has been possible hitherto.
On the next day, July 31st, while Sir Edward
Grey spared no steps in order to bring his pro-
jects for mediation to a successful issue, he
received from Berlin and St. Petersburg, succes-
sively, news of preparations for mobilization.
Nevertheless he used very energetic language in
speaking to the French Ambassador at London.
The British Cabinet [he said] had come to the
conclusion that they could not give any pledge at
the present time. Up to the present moment
neither the government nor public opinion felt that
any treaties or obligations of Great Britain were
involved. Further developments might alter this
situation. The preservation of the neutrality of
Belgiiun might be an important but not a dedsive
factor in determining our attitude. In any case
Parliament would wish to know the situation with
regard to the neutrality of Belgium. In spite of
the repeated requests of the French Ambassador,
Sir Edward Grey refused to undertake any definite
engagement with regard to France.^
It was then that, although he did not yet
consider the situation " irretrievable," Sir Edward
Grey addressed to Germany and France his de-
mand with reference to respecting Belgian neu-
^ Blue Book, No. 119.
96 The War of 1914
trality,' and to Belgium his demand concerning
the defence of her neutrality. =* On the same
evening France answered as follows ^i
The French Government are resolved to respect
the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in
the event of some other Power violating that neu-
trality that France might find herself under the
necessity, in order to assure the defence of her own
security, to act otherwise.
This assurance has been given several times.
The President of the Republic spoke of it to the
King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at
Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance
to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.
The following telegram was received from
Berlin 4:
I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me
that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancel-
lor before he could possibly answer. I gathered
from what he said that he thought any reply they
might give could not but disclose a certain amount
of their plan of campaign in the event of war en-
suing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether
they would return any answer at all. His Excel-
lency, nevertheless, took note of your request.
It appears from what he said that German
Government consider that certain hostile acts have
already been committed by Belgium. As an instance
' See page 86. ' See page 29.
3 Blue Book, No. 125. 4 Jbid., No. 122.
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe 97
of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Ger-
many had been placed under an embargo already.
I hope to see His Excellency to-morrow again to
discuss the matter further, but the prospect of
obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.
In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it
clear that Germany would in any case desire to
know the reply returned to you by the French
Government.
I do not dwell for the moment on the allusion
made by the Secretary of State to an incident
concerning a consignment of corn. I shall have
occasion to show later by documentary evidence
that in this unimportant affair Belgium had, on
the contrary, tried to do everything in order to
satisfy Germany.' Furthermore, as we shall see,
at Brussels the request for information sent by
the German Minister was most courteous, while to
England this insignificant incident was represented
as "many hostile acts."
As soon as Sir Edward Grey was in possession
of the telegram from Berlin, received in the morn-
ing of August 1st, he hastened^ to have an in-
terview with the German Ambassador, and he
communicated a precis of the interview to the
British Ambassador at Berlin. The reader will
observe the insistence with which the Minister
» See pages 129 et seq. * Blue Book, No. 123., ,
^>i -Si
98 , The War of 1914
speaks of public opinion : British diplomacy, more
than any other, tries carefully to follow its trend.
I told the German Ambassador to-day that the
reply of the German Government with regard to
the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very
great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium
affected feeling in this country. If Germany
could see her way to give the same assurance as
that which has been given by France it would
materially contribute to reUeve anxiety and tension
here. On the other hand, if there were a violation
of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant
while the other respected it, it would be extremely
difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.
I said that we had been discussing this question at a
Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to tell
him this I gave him a memorandum of it.
He asked me whether, if Germany gave a pro-
mise not to violate Belgium neutrality, we would
engage to remain neutral.
I replied that I could not say that; our hands
were still free, and we were considering what our
attitude should be. All I could say was that our
attitude would be determined largely by public
opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium
would appeal very strongly to public opinion here.
I did not think that we could give a promise of
neutrality on that condition alone.
The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could
formulate conditions on which we would remain
neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of
France and her colonies might be guaranteed.
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe 99
I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any
promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I
could only say that we must keep our hands free.
It is to be noted that this precis in the English
Blue Book agrees absolutely with the German
version of the same interview sent to Berlin by the
Ambassador, the text of which is to be found in
the semi-official article of the Norddeutsche Allge-
meine Zeitung of September 6th. The German
Ambassador gives even more details concerning
Belgium:
Sir Edward Grey [he says] turned again and
again to Belgian neutrality and was of opinion
that this question would also play a great part. »
One passage of the report of the interview at
London should be remembered. The German
Ambassador asked whether, if Germany gave a
promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, Great
Britain would engage to remain neutral. The
Minister replied that he could not promise any-
thing. Several publicists have tried to find in
this reply substance for a controversy with regard
to the designs of English policy.^
* White Paper, edition v. Massow, p. 88.
2 For example, Kolnische Zeitung, No. 886, August 5th, and No.
996, September 6th; see also the speech of the Dutch professor
d'Aubiis de Bourrouil in the Kolnische Zeitung, No. 1205, No-
vember 3d.
100 The War of 1914
I am not in the least concerned here with an
analysis of English policy; I am trying to discover
the intentions of Germany with regard to Belgium
in order to clear up the events which resulted from
it. Now the offer of Germany shows that in the
coming conflict the neutrality of Belgium was for
her not a sacred obligation but merely a pawn in
her game, which she intended to bargain away.
England was a formidable adversary; she was
interested in the independence of Belgium. The
problem, therefore, for Germany could be stated
as follows: "By means of what arrangements, of
which Belgium will be the basis, can we purchase
the abstention of England and buy her complicity ? ' *
During the whole of the day of August 1st
very urgent telegrams were again exchanged by the
several chancelleries, with a view to discovering
possible common ground for mediation in the
Austro-Servian dispute. But the question of Bel-
gium was not raised ; as far as she was concerned
the reply of Germany was awaited.
On August 2d, Sir Edward Grey saw the
French Ambassador in the morning; he reports
as follows the interview that he had with him, in
the course of which the position of Belgium was
considered':
* Blue Book, No. 148.
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe loi
After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cam-
bon the following memorandum :
** I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the
German fleet comes into the Channel or through the
North Sea to undertake hostile operations against
French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give
all the protection in its power.
" This assurance is of course subject to the policy
of His Majesty's Government receiving the support
of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding
His Majesty's Government to take any action until
the above contingency of action by the German
fleet takes place."
I pointed out that we had very large questions
and most difficult issues to consider, and that
Government felt that they could not bind them-
selves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if
war broke out between France and Germany to-
morrow, but it was essential to the French Govern-
ment, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the
Mediterranean, to know how to make their disposi-
tions with their north coast entirely undefended.
We therefore thought it necessary to give them this
assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with
Germany unless the German fleet took the action
indicated, but it did give a security to France that
would enable her to settle the disposition of her own
Mediterranean fleet.
M. Cambon asked me about the violation of
Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point
laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in
1867. He asked me what we should say about the
violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that
was a much more important matter; we were con-
102 The War of 191 4
sidering what statement we should make in Parlia-
ment to-morrow — in effect, whether we should
declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a
casus belli. I told him what had been said to the
German Ambassador on this point.
During the course of August 3d, Sir Edward
Grey learned that the German Note to Belgium
had been sent, without however being put in
possession of the text by the Belgian Lega-
tion. Shortly afterwards the King of England
received from the King of the Belgians a telegram
worded as follows :
Remembering the ntimerous proofs of your Maj-
esty's friendship and that of your Majesty's pre-
decessors as well as the friendly attitude of Great
Britain in 1870 and of the proof of sympathy she
has just given us again, I make a supreme appeal
to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's
Government to safeguard the neutrality of Belgium.
This supreme appeal was only too well justified.
Three days before, on July 31st, the King of
the Belgians had also addressed a personal letter
to the German Emperor,' and on that same day
the Government of the King had been informed
by the British Minister at Brussels of the simul-
taneous demands which Great Britain had ad-
» See page 31.
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe 103
dressed to Germany and to France, thus renewing
in 19 14 the proof of sympathy which she had given
to Belgium in 1870.
On this same day, August 3d, Sir Edward Grey,
with inadequate information at his disposal, went
down to the House of Commons. He there
made a speech, which is a sort of public self-
examination, during the course of which he com-
municated to the members, who he no doubt felt
were in a state of some hesitation, the considera-
tions which moved him. As the Oxford historians
have remarked in their recent pamphlet, we should
not forget that Great Britain has a responsible Cab-
inet and a responsible Parliament ; before an Eng-
lish Minister can act in a question of international
importance, he must convince his colleagues and
they must convince a democracy which is essen-
tially pacifist, prudent, and slow to move. I will
only reproduce here from the speech of Sir Edward
Grey some of the passages which deal with Bel-
gium, according to the text which appeared as an
appendix to the English edition of the Blue Book,
especially pages 93-96. There is to be noted the
double thread which had marked already in 1870
the speeches of Lord Granville and of Gladstone
— the interests of Great Britain and her honour.
Sir Edward Grey began by recalling what had
104 The War of 1914
passed in 1870 and he obsen^ed that Germany,
represented by Prince Bismarck, had at that time
perfectly recognized the inviolabiHty of the
Treaties of 1839, ^^^ ^^^ again guaranteed the
permanent neutrality of Belgium. Then, coming
to the request which the King of the Belgians had
addressed to the King of England, he said:
The King of the Belgians has made a supreme
appeal to our diplomatic intervention. Diplomatic
intervention took place last week on our part.
What can diplomatic intervention do now? We
have great and vital interests in the independence —
and integrity is the least part — of Belgium. Ger-
many sounded us in the course of last week as to
whether, if a guarantee were given that, after the
war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that
would content us. We replied that we could not
bargain away whatever interests or obligations we
had in Belgian neutrality. If Belgium is compelled
to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of
course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement
she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is
clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller
States in that region of Europe ask but one thing.
Their one desire is that they should be left alone and
independent. The one thing they fear is, I think,
not so much that their integrity but that their
independence should be interfered with. If in this
war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of
those countries is violated, if the troops of one of
the combatants violate its neutrality and no action
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe 105
be taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever
the integrity may be, the independence will be gone.
No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been any-
thing in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium,
asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality,
whatever may have been offered to her in return,
her independence is gone if that holds. If her in-
dependence goes, the independence of Holland will
follow. I ask the House, from the point of view of
British interests, to consider what may be at stake.
If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death,
beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great
Power, becomes subordinate to the will and power
of one greater than herself — consequences which I
do not anticipate, because I am sure that France
has the power to defend herself with all the energy
and ability and patriotism which she has shown so
often — still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium
fell under the same dominating influence, and then
Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr.
Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to
us there would be a common interest against the
unmeasured aggrandizement of any Power?
This statement of the problem by Sir Edward
Grey shows a perfect grasp of the situation, for
if, forgetting the actual crisis, we place our-
selves before the realities of the future, we see
that the simple question is whether the hegemony
of the German Empire will be established over
Central Europe and whether the small nations
will only escape conquest by accepting vassal-
io6 The War of 1914
age. The Germans — with the exception perhaps
of my colleague, Professor Werner Sombart,
who, if you please, considers Belgium as a po-
litical abortion' and the Belgian nation as an
object for gentle mirth =* — are doubtless the first
to understand that other nations, while thoroughly
recognizing how wonderful many realizations of
Germany are, cherish their autonomy and strive
with all their might towards a future based on
their own traditions and their own patrimony.
Now, if military interests are alone to influence
the relations between States, is it not obvious
that the supremacy of the strongest military State
will be assured, since the small nations, even if
united, would not be able to withstand her power?
Raising the debate to a higher plane. Sir Edward
Grey continued :
I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone:
"We have an interest in the independence of Bel-
gium which is wider than that which we may have
in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found
in the answer to the question whether, under the
circumstances of the case, this country, endowed
as it is with influence and power, would quietly
stand by and witness the perpetration of the
direst crime that ever stained the pages of history,
and thus become participators in the sin."
* Eine Missgehurt der Politik.
* Berliner Tageblatt, November 2d, No. 557.
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe 107
It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand
aside, husband our strength, and that, whatever
happened in the course of this war, at the end of it
intervene with effect to put things right, and to
adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis
like this, we run away from those obligations of
honour and interest as regards the Belgian treaty,
I doubt whether, whatever material force we might
have at the end, it would be of very much value in
face of the respect that we should have lost. We
should have sacrificed at the same time our repu-
tation before the world and our most important
economic interests.
Nevertheless Sir Edward Grey suspended any
decision until he should receive precise information
with regard to the natiire of the demand addressed
to Belgium by Germany for permission to pass
through Belgium, and he finished by recalling the
fact that he merely wished to explain to the House
the attitude of the Government and to put it in
possession of all the vital facts.
But later in the coiirse of the same day he again
spoke and announced that he had just received
from the Belgian Legation the exact text of the
Note telegraphed in the morning by the Belgian
Government' and in conclusion said simply:
I can only say that the Government are prepared
to take into grave consideration the information
* See page 76.
io8 The War of 191 4
which they have received. I make no further
comment upon it.*
The Cabinet met shortly afterwards and as a
result of the meeting Sir Edward Grey informed
the Belgian Minister at London that "if Bel-
gian neutrality is violated it means war with
Germany."^
On the next day, the 4th of August, in the
morning, Sir Edward Grey sent to Berlin this
telegram which contains the result of the delibera-
tions of the evening before ^i
The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to
His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on
behalf of Belgium in the following terms:
"Remembering the numerous proofs of your
Majesty's friendship and that of your Majesty's
predecessors, as well as the friendly attitude of
Great Britain in 1870 and the proof of sympathy
she has just given us again, I make a supreme
appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your
Majesty's Government to safeguard the neutrality
of Belgium. "
His Majesty's Government are also informed that
the German Government have delivered to the
Belgian Government a note proposing friendly
neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian
territory, and promising to maintain the independ-
« Blue Book, p. 97. « Grey Book, No. 26.
3 Blue Book, No. 153.
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe 109
ence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions
at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of
refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer
was requested within twelve hours.
We also understand that Belgium has cate-
gorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the
law of nations.
His Majesty's Government are bound to protest
against this violation of a treaty to which Germany
is a part in common with themselves, and must
request an assurance that the demand made upon
Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her
neutrality will be respected by Germany. You
should ask for an immediate reply.
Shortly afterwards the news was telegraphed by
the British Minister at Brussels that a second
German Note had been presented announcing
that troops were about to cross the frontier in
spite of the refusal of Belgium.' Sir Edward
Grey immediately telegraphed the following Note
to the Ministers in Belgium, in Holland, and in
Norway^:
Please declare that Great Britain expects that
these three kingdoms will resist German pressure
and observe neutrality. Should they resist they
will have the support of Great Britain, who is ready
in that event, should the three above mentioned
Governments desire it, to join France and Russia,
; « See page 78. » Grey Book, No. 37.
no The War of 1914
in offering an Alliance to the said Governments for
the purpose of resisting the use of force by Germany
against them, and a guarantee to maintain the future
independence and integrity of the three kingdoms.
With regard to Belgium this proposal was made,
as Sir Edward Grey explained to the Belgian
Minister at London, in case the neutrality of the
kingdom should be violated.' As we shall see,
however, it was cancelled soon afterwards.
Scarcely had this Note been sent when there
arrived in quick succession telegrams from Berlin
and Brussels; the latter announced the violation
of the frontier at Gemmenich^; the former, sent
by the Chancellor to the German Ambassador,
dealt exclusively with Belgium. It is of the
greatest importance in the panorama of events
with which we are now dealing. ^
Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on
the part of the British Government with regard to
our intentions, by repeating most positively formal
assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict
with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence
whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of
this declaration is borne out by the fact that we
solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to
respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could
» Grey Book, No. 137. » Blue Book, No. 158.
» Ibid., No. 157.
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe iii
not profitably annex Belgian territory without
making at the same time territorial acqtiisitions
at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E.
Grey that the German army could not be exposed
to French attack across Belgium, which was planned
according to absolutely unimpeachable informa-
tion. Germany had consequently to disregard
Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life
or death to prevent French advance.
The passage in which Germany affirms that in
case of armed conflict with Belgium she will imder
no pretence whatever annex Belgian territory
should be carefully noted. It means that Ger-
many will respect the territorial integrity of
Belgium but enters into no engagement with
reference to the political or economic independence
of that country.
But a little later in the course of the same day,
the 4th of August, the Imperial Chancellor, in his
official declaration to the Reichstag, went a step
further.
We have given [he said] an assurance to Great
Britain that so long as she remains neutral we shall
respect the territorial integrity and independence
of Belgium. This declaration I renew here publicly
before the whole world.
This promise, like the one formulated in the
telegram, was unconditional so far as Belgiimi was
112 The War of 1914
concerned; whether she resisted or not, not only
her integrity, but even her independence ought to
be guaranteed.
We must lay stress on this point, for it clearly
shows the real attitude of Germany in considering
Belgian neutrality, as I have already stated above,
not as a sacrosanct thing defended by a solemn
guarantee, but as a pawn with which she might
bargain.
Let us first compare this declaration of the 4th
of August with the offer made on July 29th
by the Imperial Chancellor that the integrity of
Belgium would be respected if she did not side
against Germany. Then let us recall the terms
of the Very Confidential Note of August 2d:
Germany fully guaranteed the integrity and
independence of the country if Belgium received
in a friendly spirit the German armies in their
march towards France; she did not guarantee
anything if Belgium opposed their passage. We
see how the conditions of the bargain which
Germany forced upon Belgium were modified
during the five days. Those formulated in ex-
tremis on the afternoon of the 4th of August, when
the firm attitude of Great Britain had already
been made clear, are more favourable than those of
the morning of August 4th, which were already
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe 113
more favourable than those of the 2d of August,
which, in their turn, were more favourable than
those of the 29th of July.
The bidding was not to stop even at the pro-
posals of August 4th. Anticipating the chrono-
logical course of events I will here remark that on
August 9th new proposals were sent to Belgium.
This time the Belgian army had — these are the
very words of this new German Note — "just
upheld the honour of its arms in the most brilliant
manner by its heroic resistance to very superior
force. ' ' ' Li^ge had just been occupied . Germany
then tiumed to Belgium and said in a tone of far
greater deference than that of the Very Confiden-
tial Note of August 2d:
The German Government most deeply regrets
that bloody encounters should have resulted from
the Belgian Government's attitude towards Ger-
many. Germany is not coming as an enemy into
Belgiimi. It is only through the force of circtmi-
stances that she has had, owing to the military
measures of France, to take the grave decision of
entering Belgium and occupying Liege as a base
for her further military operations. The German
Government beg the King of the Belgians and the
Belgian Government to spare Belgium the horrors
of war. The German Government are ready for
* Grey Book, No. 62.
^
114 The War of 1914
any compact with Belgium which can in any way be
reconciled with their arrangements with France.
Germany gives once more her solemn assurance
that she has not been animated by the intention of
appropriating Belgian territory for herself, and that
such an intention is far from her thoughts. Ger-
many is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as
the state of war will allow her to do so.
This time we have reached the highest bid.
Let us return along the course we have traversed.
Belgium had two alternatives. She could either
allow the German troops to pass, or could oppose
them with an armed resistance. She chose the
second alternative. This attitude meant for her:
On July 29th, the loss of her integrity and no
guarantee with regard to her independence;
On August 2d, a fate depending on the force of
arms;
On August 4th, in the morning, the preservation
of her integrity, without any guarantee as to her
independence;
On August 4th, in the afternoon, the preserva-
tion of her integrity and of her independence;
On August 9th, when she had already taken up
this attitude, it meant for her all the guarantees
which she might desire so long as they were
compatible with the Franco-German dispute.
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe 115
We can now see clearly the nature of Germany's
action.
She not only violated the neutrality of Belgium
in spite of treaties signed by her; she really con-
spired against her very existence; she attempted
the life of this little nation.
Indeed, to cross territory which is inviolable is
one thing; but to rob an innocent country of her
integrity and her independence is quite another
thing!
Germany declared to Switzerland, on August
4th, that she was convinced that ''the Swiss Con-
federation, with the support of her strong army
and the indomitable will of the entire Swiss people,
will repel every attempt to violate her neutrality"'
and to Belgium, neutral like Switzerland, she
announced on August 26.^ that if she dared to
defend herself against the German armies, her
fate would be left to the decision of arms !
To this threat Belgium answered with dignity^
that she refused to believe that her independence
could only be maintained at the price of the
violation of her neutrality. What would she have
said had she but been aware of the plot hatched
against her during the past five days?
Why did not Germany, from the first day on
^ See page 49. ' See page 39. » See page 75.
ii6 The War of 1914
which she dragged Belgium into the European
conflict, act honestly, turn to her frankly, and
say that in no case, whether she resisted or
did not resist, would any attempt ever be made
against her independence or her integrity or any
of her international prerogratives? Instead of
acting thus honestly, on July 29th she gave Eng-
land, whose inaction she wished to purchase
and whose complicity she wished to seciure, to
understand that Belgium would only remain
intact if she did not resist. She thus began to
bargain about Belgium behind Belgium's back
and five days before communicating with her,
while at Brussels she was still lavishing upon her
tokens of confidence and sympathy !
What does all this mean? Did Germany wish
to annex the whole or part of Belgium? Did she
want Antwerp? Did she want the coast? Did
she wish to fetter the independence of the nation?
On August 4th she stated' that in order * 'pro-
fitably" to annex Belgian territory she would
have to make territorial acquisitions at the expense
of Holland, which she did not wish to do. Was
Belgium then really nothing more than an object
of greed and covetousness? Had then the march
across Belgium, simply undertaken in order to en-
'See pp. iio-iii.
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe 117
siire the sectirity of the Empire, changed into a
war of subjection? Was Maximilian Harden right
when he wrote:
Noble Germanism must conquer new provinces
here. . . . Antwerp, not in opposition to but side
by side with Hamburg and Bremen; Li^ge side
by side with the armour works of Hesse, BerHn,
and Swabia; Cockerill alUed with Krupp; Belgian
and German iron, coal, and cloth under the same
directorship. . . . From Calais to Antwerp, Flan-
ders, Limburg, and Brabant, up to the line of
fortresses of the Meuse, all Prussian!'
Was this then the plain meaning of the offer
which on July 29th, amid the silence of the
chancelleries, was commtmicated to England?
And was it a finesse on Germany's part, in order
to create an excuse for the subjugation of Belgium,
to drive her to a resistance which Germany knew
was inevitable — since she congratulated Switzer-
land on organizing a precisely similar resistance?
This diplomatic manoeuvre would certainly be
particularly clever. It is a threefold manoeuvre.
In any case England was intimidated; if Belgium
resisted she wotdd be brought into subjection;
and if, contrary to expectation, she decided not
to resist, the road to France was open.
* Zukunft, October 17th.
ii8 The War of 191 4
And so from the first moment that Germany
mentioned the name of Belgium, in a dispute
which did not concern this Httle nation, she
formed her plan: "To force Belgium to defend
herself and, in order to punish her for having done
her duty, to bring her into subjection."
Truly in the face of such evidence, the violation
of Belgian neutrality falls into the background and
there appears on the foreground an implacable
Plot Against Belgium.
No mention of any of these machinations was
made by the Imperial Chancellor or the German
White Book: when a public justification had to
be made, and the Chancellor had to recognize
on two separate occasions in the Reichstag that
Germany was committing a wrong law, {Ein
Unrecht) he was content to hide behind the maxim
Not kennt kein Gebot, "Necessity knows no law!"
The excuse of necessity ! I have already shown '
that only by a mere political sophism covdd this
excuse be made in the case of the violation of Bel-
gian neutrality. But this does not matter here.
The point of the argument is that during a diplo-
matic dispute Germany made bargains at the ex-
pense of Belgium. The necessity of her strategic
convenience could only force Germany to pass
* See page 69.
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe 119
through Belgium, and nothing more. And if it is
true that the only thought in the violation of
Belgian neutrality was care for the safety of the
Empire, why try to tear Belgium's sovereignty to
shreds or allow her to maintain it only at the
expense of compliant submission to outrage?
Do not the best friends of Germany, and even
those Germans themselves who know during the
poignant time which their country is going through
how to maintain their critical judgment, feel in
face of these facts very uncomfortable and, in
short, filled with remorse? Do they not bow
before the indignation which stirred the Bel-
gians to action in the hour when they were
attacked, and still makes them shake with sup-
pressed wrath, cut off as they are from the world
in the land of their birth, which is occupied by
an invader?
When Sir Edward Grey received the telegram
from Germany on August 4th he cancelled by
telegram his communication to Belgium, Holland,
and Norway,^ and he replied to Berlin repeating
his request for a formal undertaking to respect
Belgian neutrality.*
» Grey Book, No. 43. *Blue Book, No. 159.
I20 The War of 1914
We hear that Germany has addressed a note to
Belgian Minister for Foreign Ajffairs stating that
the German Government will be compelled to carry
out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures
considered indispensable.
We are also informed that Belgian territory has
been violated at Gemmenich.
In these circumstances, and in view of the fact
that Germany declined to give the same assurance
respecting Belgium as France gave last week in
reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin
and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask
that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram
of this morning be received here by 12 o'clock to-
night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your
passports, and to say that His Majesty's Govern-
ment feel bound to take all steps in their power to
uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observ-
ance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a
party as ourselves.
In the afternoon the British Ambassador, in
accordance with his instructions, called upon the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and en-
quired whether his Government would respect
Belgian neutrality.
*' I am sorry to say * No,' *' answered the Secre-
tary of State, "as, in consequence of the German
troops having crossed the frontier already, Belgian
neutrality has been already violated."'
» Blue Book, No. i6o.
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe 121
The strategic reason for the crossing of the
frontier was then given in the words which have
aheady been quoted above. ' There is no need to
repeat them here. But it is useful to make some
quotations from the conversation which the
British Ambassador had on the same evening
with the Imperial Chancellor. The points of
view of Germany and England are there con-
trasted in a striking manner. I take them from
the report sent to Sir Edward Grey by the British
Ambassador at Berlin =" :
I found the Chancellor very agitated. His
Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted
for about twenty minutes. He said that the step
taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible
to a degree; just for a word — "neutrality," a word
which in war time had so often been disregarded —
just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to
make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing
better than to be friends with her. All his efforts
in that direction had been rendered useless by this
last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew,
he had devoted himself since his accession to office
had timibled down like a house of cards. What we
had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a
man from behind while he was fighting for his life
against two assailants. He held Great Britain re-
sponsible for all the terrible events that might
« See page 67, « Bltie Book^ No. 160.
122 The War of 1914
happen. I protested strongly against this statement
and said that, in the same way as he and Heir von
Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical
reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany
to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's
neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that
it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for
the honour of Great Britain that she should keep
her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend
Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn
compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence
could anyone have in engagements given by Great
Britain in the future? The Chancellor said: "But
at what price will that compact have been kept?
Has the British Government thought of that?'*
I hinted to His Excellency as plainly as I could that
fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an
excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but His
Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome
by the news of our action, and so little disposed
to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to
the flame by further argument. As I was leaving
he said that the blow of Great Britain joining
Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost
up to the last moment he and his Government had
been working with us and supporting our efforts to
maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I
said that this was part of the tragedy which saw
the two nations fall apart just at the moment when
the relations between them had been more friendly
and cordial than they had been for years. Unfor-
tunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain
peace between Russia and Austria, the war had
spread and had brought us face to face with a
I
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe 123
situation which, if we held to our engagements, we
could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately
entailed our separation from our late fellow- workers.
He would readily understand that no one regretted
this more than I.
What an impression of sombre grandeur emerges
from the picture here outlined. How well we
realize the earnestness of the dramatic duologue.
Nothing is omitted, nothing is glozed over, in this
encounter. Both men tremble before the frightful
responsibility which they are undertaking. The
deep impulses which animate them, the secret
driving power of their thoughts, alone dominate
them at this moment. The interview was "some-
what painful,'* the Ambassador said simply in
his report, and we can feel the pent-up emotion
which this word enshrines for him.
This interview sheds a strong light on the at-
titudes of Germany, Great Britain, and Belgium,
not only in the conflict which was about to break
out, but also during all the preceding period. I
will here sum up briefly the main features of these
attitudes.
Great Britain, as we have seen, had refused the
urgent entreaties of Russia and France to place
herself at their side. She had also flatly refused
to enter into any undertaking with Germany to
124 The War of 191 4
remain outside the conflict on condition that she
should be satisfied with certain guarantees as to
the future position of Belgium, if, as was prob-
able, the German armies were to violate Belgian
territory.
Germany had hoped that as soon as she gave
this assurance to Great Britain the latter would
think that the risk of war with Germany was too
high a price to pay for the protection of Belgian
neutrality. And so, after having reconnoitred
the British position on July 29th, Germany had
put off from day to day her answer to the invita-
tion of Sir Edward Grey that she should enter
into a formal undertaking to respect the treaties.
In the meantime she had made a higher bid than
that which she first offered and she had succes-
sively reduced her demands, until on August 4th
she guaranteed the integrity and independence of
Belgium even if the latter were to offer resistance
to the German troops. Germany had thereby re-
vealed her fixed intention to take as much from
Belgium as Great Britain would allow her to take,
and she had shown that she really considered Bel-
gian neutrality merely as an object for bargaining.
Belgium, now — I think I have proved this in
the preceding pages — waited until the last possible
moment before asking for any help. She knew
F
Belgian Neutrality Before Europe 125
(and this was a sad conviction for a nation which
was conscious of having worthily maintained the
place which elder nations had made for her) that
her neutrality was the creation of others, that
she was in the hands of others, that all her
thoughts, all her riches, all that made her what
she was scarcely counted at this supreme crisis;
and she did not ask for help for fear of awaking
susceptibilities or of not keeping full liberty of
action. When the German menace rose before
her she came to her decision alone, without taking
advice from any one, without furnishing explana-
tions or excuses to any one because she was not
bound to any one, or rather because she was
equally bound to all by an equal respect for her
obligations. Even in this tragic moment she was
willing to rely on the sense of justice of her guaran-
tors— all her guarantors. She limited herself to
pointing out to them the unexpected danger
which threatened them at the same time as herself.
She refused the military help which France offered
her. Her king, remembering what Great Britain
had spontaneously done in identical circtimstances,
asked her — for what? For arms to repel the
invader? For pledges, before exposing his little
nation to the worst calamities? No, for diplo-
matic intervention in order to safeguard her
126 The War of 191 4
neutrality, which the Powers had mutually given
a solemn promise to respect. And Belgium
awaited the "act of war" before asking her
guarantors, as late as on August 4th, to co-operate
for the defence of her territory.
I refrain here from passing any judgment on the
European policy of any of the Great Powers.
But one thing I must do, as must every honest
man, and that is to affirm, without any fear of
contradiction, the absolute loyalty of Belgium
during the course of all the negotiations which
preceded the war.
IV
The Imputations against the Loyalty of
Belgium
"7
IV
THE IMPUTATIONS AGAINST THE LOYALTY OF
BELGIUM
On August 4th one point seemed to be clear,
namely the admission by Germany that she only
violated the neutrality of Belgium because forced
to do so by necessity. Whether the necessity was
to anticipate the presumed intentions of France,'
or the necessity of insuring a military success,
which might have been jeopardized by adopting
any other route than that through Belgium,^ does
not matter: the point is that Germany did not at
that moment make any accusation against Belgium.
The "Very Confidential Note" paid tribute to the
"utmost good will" of Belgium, ^ and the German
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had declared
to the Belgian Minister, "The correctness of your
country's attitude has been perfect: Germany
can have no complaint against her."^
' See pp. 39, 60. " See pp. 64-65, 67.
3 See p. 39. * See pp. 65-66.
9 129
I30 The War of 1914
But from the first day of hostilities a curious
change came over the German attitude.
On the one hand the public were left in ignorance
of facts which must have presented Belgian
politics in their true light. Thus the Kolnische
Zeitung never published the text of the Belgian
reply to the "Very Confidential Note" any more
than it published the text of the speech of King
Albert to Parliament. Thus again in the German
White Book, Belgium is never once mentioned,
and in particular no reference is made to such
typical interviews as those of July 29th and 30th
at Berlin.' And, what is more, it was only on
August 8th that the Frankfurter Zeitung pub-
lished a telegram of the Wolff Agency giving
the text of the "very confidential note" of the
2d, and — I would call the reader's particular
attention to this — the text was followed by this
sentence: *'This note remained unanswered"
{Auf diese Note erfolgte keine Antwort).^ Of all
that Belgium had said, of all that she had done,
not one word — except a flagrant untruth.
The order was thus given to conceal the loyalty
of Belgium from the German public. At the same
time imputations suddenly sprang up on all sides;
» See pp. 91, 92
' Urkunden, Depeschen und Berichte der Frankf. Ztg., p. 87.
Imputations against Belgium 131
a savage attack was made on the good name of the
little country which Germany's troops were in-
vading. The most harmless incidents were ex-
aggerated; the most upright intentions furnished
matter for suspicion. Germany seemed gradually
to make the discovery that the deed she had done
was justifiable on grounds quite different from
those which she had invoked: that, after all, Bel-
gium had been guilty, while she had been thought
to be innocent. Why this talk of the violation of
Belgian neutrality? The neutrality of Belgium
had vanished ; it had been conjiured away by Bel-
gium herself. False to all her duties, this ob-
structive country had, before the war, parted
with her freedom for the benefit of Germany's
enemies. Forgetting that her neutrality imposed
on her the obligation to hold aloof from the com-
plications of international politics, she had, behind
the back moreover of some of her guarantors,
put her hand to engagements which could not
be tolerated. Therefore Belgium's fate was just
retribution; her cause deserved neither interest
nor sympathy. Even — and this argument has
been much more widely echoed in neutral countries
than common sense would have led one to expect
— ^it was Germany, not Belgium, who found herself
menaced :
132 The War of 191 4
Ought we to have waited [wrote a correspondent
of the Kolnische Zeitung^ to some Dutch friends]
until Belgium and the Allies into whose hands she
had long since willingly delivered herself had given
Aix-la-Chapelle over to the flames? Or ought we
to have marched boldly into Belgium?
As a matter of fact, even if we supposed that
all these accusations had been substantiated, not
one of which either the German Government or
the Imperial Chancellor or the Secretary of State
thought of putting forward between the 2d and the
4th of August, this would not lighten by a single
grain Germany's load of moral responsibility.
She tried to buy another nation's complicity in
her political ends at the price of Belgium's very
existence. All that she said and did remains
said and done.
But Belgium does not intend to be accused
without defending herself with the firm deter-
mination to make the truth known.
We must therefore recapitulate patiently the
charges made, either against the Government or
against the people of Belgium. I will class them
under three heads :
Hostile acts before the war;
Subservience to France;
Subservience to England.
»No. 1 188, October 30th.
Imputations against Belgium 133
I must however at the outset refute two impu-
tations which are independent of the events of
the present war and which are designed to shake
the general confidence that can be placed in the
honesty of Belgium's political relations.
It has been said that Belgium' had already
failed to respect her international engagements
when it was a question of observing the obligations
of the Treaty of Berlin with regard to freedom of
trade and suppression of slavery in the Congo.
The answer is easy.
Opinion may differ as to the administration of
the former Congo Free State, but one thing i$
certain: it was the administration of that State
and in no way that of Belgiimi. When Belgiimi
acquired sovereignty over the Congo she intro-
duced prompt and radical changes into the econo-
mic administration. The annexation dates from
Novem.ber, 1908, the Reform Decrees from 1910,
and the new administration conformed so exactly
with the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, and
the confidence of the Powers in the manner in
which Belgium observed treaty obligations was so
great, that all of them recognized the annexa-
tion, and Germany herself was the first to do so.
The accusation is therefore without any founda-
^ Kolnische Zeitung, No. 1028, November 15th.
134 The War of 191 4
tion. It forms the ground, I may add, of an
opinion which has been fostered in certain German
circles, and to which Bernhardi in particular gave
expression in the work from which I have already
quoted. ^ Belgium had, he said, profoundly changed
the neutrality guaranteed to her by the Treaties of
1839 because, since then, she had annexed the
Congo. This point of view omits to take into
consideration one single factor, but it is one of
capital importance. This is precisely the fact
that the guarantor Powers recognized the annexa-
tion without formulating any reservations. This
was clear evidence that they did not consider that
the equilibriimi of interests established by the
Treaties of 1839 or the guarantees that they had
assumed were impaired by the constitution of the
Congo into a Belgian Colony.
A second proof of the inability of Belgium to
carry out her international obligations is to be
found, according to some, in the inadequacy of
her military organization.*
It is wholly erroneous to suppose that Belgium,
even before the recent reorganization of her army,
had neglected the duties of defence. On the
» DeutscUand und der nachste Krieg (6th edition, p. 123).
2 See for instance von Blume, Die helgische Neidralitdt und Wir^
in Das Grossere Deutschland, 1914, pp. 1041 and onward.
Imputations against Belgium 135
contrary, she possessed a well-ordered system of
strategic protection. The fortress of Antwerp,
which formed an entrenched camp of the first
order, the fortifications of Liege and Namur,
which served as places d' arret, bridgeheads, and
points d'appui, and the field army supplemented
by the fortress army, these three elements to-
gether formed a defensive organization capable of
holding the army of an invading country in check
pending the intervention of the other guarantor
countries.
The expenditure sanctioned for fortifications
had been considerable. To quote only the most
recent one, an extraordinary vote of £2,520,000
was granted for the erection round Antwerp on
both banks of the Scheldt of thirteen new forts
and twelve new redoubts in the exterior line, for
the completion of the twelve existing forts in the
interior line, and the erection of two new forts for
the defence of the lower Scheldt. A short time
afterwards the expenditure was still further in-
creased by another £160,000. The defences of
the Meuse forts had meanwhile been completely
equipped.
As to the effective strength of the army, it had
consisted of 180,000 men until the reform of
1909-13; that is to say, sufficient, in the opinion
136 The War of 1914
of the most competent military authorities, to
play the part necessitated by the various require-
ments of the defence of the cotmtry as a whole.
But since the modifications introduced in the
strategic disposition of the neighbouring countries
it had been manifestly insufficient. The Belgians
did not hesitate to respond to the appeals made
to them by their sovereigns. A campaign of
public opinion was organized and the country
accepted without demur the increase of army
expenditure. In this way the effective strength of
the first line, independently of the reserves, was
to be doubled.
The ordinary annual expenditure on the army
had risen from about £2,750,000, the average of
the first decade of the present century , to £3,500,000
for the year 19 13, an increase of approximately
thirty per cent., due largely to the reform which,
from 1909 onwards, had established the rule of
every family providing a son for the military
duties, and in 19 13 had imposed general service.
The organization of the higher commands of the
army had at the same time imdergone some
important alterations.
Moreover, the experience of the present war
shows sufficiently what the Belgian army was
capable of.
Imputations against Belgium 137
In the first place it was concentrated and ready
for action in so short a time and such perfect
order that the German mihtary attache congratu-
lated the permanent Secretary of the War Office
on the performance. All the services were set up
in less than five days from the time when the
mobilization order was issued, with the result
that the German troops, sudden as was their
attack (the note of August 26. preceded the viola-
tion of the frontier by only thirty-six hours), were
not able to throw the organization of the defence
out of gear, and found themselves face to face
with an army fully prepared. The destruction of
bridges and tunnels which might have been useful
to the enemy was completed, and all communica-
tions with the rear were secured.
As to the active part played by the army,
from the very commencement of hostilities it has
compelled the admiration even of the Germans.
Alike in the sectors of the forts, in trenches in the
open, and on the main lines of communication,
rivers, canals, or railways whose passage had to be
resisted, Belgian soldiers have sustained an unequal
combat with a valour, bravery, and endurance
worthy of the highest praise. And it is really
farcical to denounce the military weakness of a
country of which Germany had on August 9th
138 The War of 1914
officially to acknowledge "the heroic resistance
against considerably superior forces."^
But none could foresee, that, under the fire of
the heavy Krupp guns, concrete forts would form
a less durable barrier than trenches in the ground,
and when Antwerp was spoken of by the greatest
experts as "the impregnable city" they did not
think that they were using merely an empty
phrase.
This fable of Belgium^s being oblivious of her
military duties must therefore be silenced once
and for all.
But there is one aspect of the charges made by
von Blume which is particularly ridiculous. How
could one admit that Germany should have chosen
for her chastisement of Belgium the very year in
which the final reform of the Belgian army, already
greatly strengthened since 1909, was to be com-
pleted? Germany never addressed any diplomatic
remonstrances to Belgium on this subject ; on the
contrary, in 19 12 the Emperor showed astonish-
ment at the measures of defence taken by the
Belgian Government when he received at Aix-la-
Chapelle the Belgian General who had been sent
to welcome him on behalf of the King. The truth
is that Germany knew that Belgium had voted
» See page 1 13.
Imputations against Belgium 139
very considerable sums for her fortifications and
military organization, and she was not unaware
of the significance of this expenditure.
In this connection the Prime Minister, M. de
Broqueville, described very clearly the meaning
of Belgium's continued efforts, at the sitting of the
Chamber on November 30, 191 1, when he said:
Our forts and our army are the expression of our
immutable resolve to remain a free and independent
people. They are, as it were, the assertion of our
national pride and the earnest of Belgium's partici-
pation in the task of maintaining the integrity of her
territory as well as of her independence and national
safety. We would scorn to lend ourselves to any
arrangement that could be open to suspicion. We
Belgians mean to remain Belgians, and for that very
reason we mean to remain always loyal and honest
patriots.
But I must waste no more time in coming to the
specific allegations made against Belgium.
Hostile Acts before the War
Before the opening of hostilities no complaint
was addressed directly to Belgium.
However, on July 31st, the German Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, in conversation
with the British Ambassador at Berlin, gave the
I40 The War of 191 4
latter to understand that hostile acts had been
committed by Belgium before that date. "For
instance," he said, "a consignment of corn for
Germany has been placed under an embargo
already." Apart from this *' instance" no other
fact had then, or afterwards, been adduced.
On the same day on which this so-called hostile
act was denounced at Berlin, the German Min-
ister at Brussels addressed the following friendly
request to the Minister for Foreign Affairs*:
I am informed from Antwerp that the Customs
have forbidden the despatch of vessels containing
cargoes of grain for Germany.
In view of the fact that it is not in this case a
question of the export of grain, but of grain in transit^
the goods in question having been merely trans-
shipped at Antwerp, I have the honour to ask your
good offices in order that the vessels in question
may be allowed to leave for Germany.
At the same time I beg your Excellency to inform
me if the port of Antwerp is closed for the transit of
those goods specified in the Moniteur of to-day.
On the following day, August 1st, the Belgian
Minister replied*:
In reply to your Excellency's note of July 31st, I
have the honoiur to inform you that the Belgian
» Grey Book, No. 79, Annex 2.
^ Ibid., AnnQXS-
Imputations against Belgium 141
decree of July 30th concerns only the export and
not the transit of the products mentioned.
I at once communicated your note to the Minister
of Finance and begged him to issue precise instruc-
tions to the customs officials in order that any error
in the application of the above-mentioned decree
might be avoided.
And on the same day, so anxious were the Bel-
gian Government to do nothing that could lend
any colour to the suggestion that they were not
friendly disposed, the liberation of the consignment
of com was authorized. The delay was due to
a pure misimderstanding, and, moreover, as the
Minister explained in a further letter to the Ger-
man Minister, ' it was merely a matter of customs
formalities: there was no intention to hinder in
any way the transit of the goods. The measures
taken by the Belgian Government at this time
merely constituted elementary precautions which
it is the right and the duty of every State to take
in such exceptional circumstances.
The "hostile act" therefore really reduces itself
to a mark of "good offices," to use the very ex-
pression that was employed by the German
Minister.
But this did not prevent the Kolnische Zeitung —
that important newspaper whose correspondents
* Grey Book, No. 79, Annex 2.
142 The War of 1914
have always received the most cordial hospitality
at Brussels — from publishing on August loth, ^ an
article headed "Belgian Neutrality*' from which
I quote the following extracts :
Our enemies allege that in entering Belgium we
violated the so-called Belgian neutrality. What this
so-called neutrality has really been is plainly shown
by a series of actions of which the following is an
instance.
Here follows a flagrantly misleading accoimt of
the incident, and the article concludes :
This violation of international law occurred on
Friday, July 31st, two days before Germany sent
her ultimatum to Belgium. The first act of illegal-
ity and of unfriendliness in the highest degree {wider-
rechtlich und im hochsten Grade unfreundlich) was
therefore committed not by Germany but by
Belgium.
To quote another charge, it is hardly necessary
to point out the fantastic natiu^e of the other as-
sertion made by a well-known German Member of
Parliament, Herr Erzberger^:
In the morning of August 2d, the Landsturm at
Aix-la-Chapelle were called out. The troops fought
all day and all night against the French and Belgian
soldiers who on Sunday were already advancing
* No. 901.
" See extract from the Tag reprinted in the Berliner TageblaU
of October 7th.
Imputations against Belgium 143
through our woods as far as the road called chemin
des Prussiens.
When it is remembered — among a hundred other
things — that on the night of August 2d-3d the
German Minister at Brussels had not been able to
furnish the General Secretary of the Department
of Foreign Affairs with anything more than very
vague indications of an alleged violation of frontier
committed by French troops in Germany, when
it is remembered that the first act of war took
place at Gemmenich in Belgium on the morning
of August 4th, one wonders which is the more
astonishing, Herr Erzberger's powers of imagina-
tion or the tenacity of the Berliner Tagehlatt which
still publishes this story on October 7th, two
months after the outbreak of hostilities.
Similarly it has been alleged that various
measures taken before there was any question of a
threat from Germany reveal the warlike intentions
of Belgium.
This is what the Kolnische Zeitung of August
28th' calls a "proof" {ein Beweis):
A Proof of Belgian Neutrality
A non-commissioned officer who accompanied a
convoy of Belgian prisoners to Munster has sent us
» No. 967.
144 The War of 1914
a coloured chart given to him by a prisoner. In
this chart are shown, standing fraternally side by
side, in three rows, Belgian, French, and British
soldiers of all arms in coloured uniform. The Bel-
gian prisoner assured our informant (who guarantees
the accuracy of his story) that these charts had been
distributed to all Belgian soldiers three days before
the official mobilization, with instructions that they
should study them carefully. The French and
British soldiers, with whose appearance they were to
familiarize themselves from the pictures, were to be
their allies in the coming war.
I am sorry for the sake of the man who "guar-
anteed" the accuracy of this story, to have to
assure him, on the authority of official information,
that the charts in question were first distributed
in the course of the second week of the month of
August. I will further inform him that at the
same time pictures showing the differences between
the various types of aeroplanes were distributed
and posted up in a similar way.
Then there is another little episode, the story of
which was sent on September 9th to the Nord-
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung by a gentleman of
responsibility whom I should never have thought
likely to consecrate to this purpose the time that
he lately used to employ more worthily when he
won general popularity as Director of the German
School at Antwerp.
Imputations against Belgium 145
I learn from Mme. Fr., wife of the Oberlehrer of that
name, who did not leave Antwerp until the begin-
ning of the month, that all the rooms of the German
school, including the director's apartments, are used
as barracks for the Belgian army. This leads me to
communicate to you a fact which is perhaps not
without political importance. About the middle of
June of this year a police officer came to the school
and at the beginning of July an officer of the Belgian
army also came (in each case in the absence of the
director) to inspect the rooms in the school. In
answer to an enquiry from us, the reply was given
on both occasions that it was a question of deciding
how many soldiers could be billeted in the school.
At the second visit, the statement was made that
the school could house a battalion, including the
regimental staff. In the course of the twelve and
a half years of my work at Antwerp, such a thing
has never happened before at the school. It is a
curious coincidence that these enquiries should have
been made, the first six weeks and the second four
weeks, before war broke out, and one which admits
of the inference that in Belgium the authorities
already reckoned on war and on the occupation of
the school by troops.
The gentleman who makes this grave disclosure
perhaps did not know that a census is made
periodically of places available for billeting troops
in case of war. If — to his knowledge at any rate —
his school had not before been included in the
census, this was because, in consequence of the
146 The War of 191 4
reform of the army and the marked increase in its
strength in 19 13, the need arose to make more
extensive accommodation available and a new
general census became necessary.
Another correspondent of the Kolnische Zeitung
discovered^ that, during the course of last June, the
authorities made an investigation at Antwerp as
to what places could be used by the various
branches of the public service in case the Govern-
ment had to take up its quarters there. Perfectly
true: this operation, called "civil mobilization,"
had been arranged long beforehand and was the
subject of a very complete dossier in the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs which had given rise from time
to time to various practical steps for the execution
of the plan.
The readers of the great Rhenish newspaper
will also learn with interest that long before the
Austro-Servian dispute, the Belgian General Staff
had studied the possibilities of provisioning the
town of Antwerp on the hypothesis that it might
become the seat of Government in time of war.
Innumerable other matters had also been the
object of study long before with a view to pre-
paring the fortress of Antwerp, in time of peace,
to play the part that had been assigned to it in the
* No. 1046, September 20th.
Imputations against Belgium 147
plan of defence of the country. None of these
studies had any connection with the war that
broke out last year. They merel}'- represent
measures of precaution which must be taken by
every government that is anxiousHo ensure that
its country shall not be caught unprepared in a
war, and, moreover, they prove once more how
unjust is the complaint made nowadays against
Belgium that she did not take sufficient precau-
tions for the defence of her neutrality.
It is incredible that such measures could furnish
grounds of complaint against a country which,
after all, has not been put in tutelage, and remains
mistress in her own house.
Subservience to France
In the proclamation addressed to the Belgians
on August 4th by General von Emmich, Com-
mander-in-Chief of the German Army of the Meuse,
at the moment when his troops crossed the frontier,
the violation of the territory is justified by quite
a new reason. It will be remembered that the
"Very Confidential Note" of August 2d alleged
the concentration near Givet of masses of French
troops whose advance it was necessary for Ger-
many to anticipate. Nor on the other hand will
the categorical explanation be forgotten that was
148 The War of 191 4
given by the Secretary of State at Berlin : Germany,
threatened simultaneously by France and Russia,
had to choose the easiest route in order to gain
time, and this route was through Belgium.
The proclamation says something different :
I feel the greatest regret that the German troops
find themselves obliged to cross the frontier of
Belgium. They act according to the dictates of
inevitable necessity, Belgian neutrality having
been already violated by French officers, who, dis-
guised, crossed Belgian territory in a motor car in
order to penetrate into Germany.
A variant is given on August 9th by General
von Bulow, Commander-in-Chief of the Second
German Army. The following is the text :
We have been obliged to enter Belgian territory
in order to safeguard the interests of our national
defence.
We are fighting the Belgian army solely to force a
passage towards France which your Government has
wrongfully refused to us although they have allowed
the French to make a military reconnaissance, a
fact which your papers have concealed from you.
No particulars are given, it is all bare assertion.
Similar wanton statements are made in the
official communique (amtlich) of Quartermaster-
General von Stein on August i8th':
^See, for instance, Leipziger Neueste Nachrichkn Sender
Ausgabe.
I
Imputations against Belgium 149
We have received information that before the
war French officers and perhaps also soldiers were
sent to Liege to instruct the Belgian army in work-
ing the forts. Before the commencement of hostili-
ties there would be nothing to criticize in this, but
after the outbreak of the war it constituted a viola-
tion by France of Belgian neutrality. Also we had
to act quickly.
The futility of this accusation is obvious to
any one. Belgium had had modem fortifications
and military engineers of European reputation for
long enough not to need to have recourse to
foreign instructors. But it is always only a ques-
tion of bare assertion not open to any critical test.
The only corroborative details adduced at a
later date by the Kolnische Zeitung of August
26th,' at a time when almost the whole of Bel-
gium was occupied, are as follows. I reproduce
them textually.
Belgian Neutrality
We have received the following letter from a firm
at Cologne:
" I am in a position to communicate to you a fact
which shows the curious conception that the Bel-
gians in general have of their neutrality. Their
formula is 'Our sympathies draw us towards
France,' an expression that I heard over and over
again at the end of July from the lips of business
* No. 959.
150 The War of 1914
friends. On the evening of Sunday the 2d inst.,
about 8 or 9 o'clock, when Belgium had already
been mobilizing for some days, I met in the neigh-
bourhood of Charleroi station Monsieur D., of the
firm A. Ch. He told me in confidence that he had
just seen at the station arriving from Namur a
military motor car containing five or six French
officers, in uniform, looking greatly upset. They had
got into the nine o'clock train for France. To my
remark that these officers ought to have been ar-
rested since a state of mobilization existed, he made
some vague response, but he admitted in a some-
what veiled way that if these officers had been
German they would have met with short shrift.
"We would point out to you particularly that the
gentleman in question is a person of most upright
character so that we can guarantee the genuineness
of the communication. We have not given the
names in full, but they are at your disposal if you
wish."
This information is second-hand. But the
Norddeutscher Allgemeine Zeitung has published
seven depositions made by witnesses before Ger-
man judges, and these were reproduced in the
Journal of the War.^ These seven depositions
are in agreement on one point, namely, the presence
of French officers or soldiers in Belgium at a
period anterior to the war — even as far back as
191 1. But they vary as to places and circum-
' November number, pp. i6 and 17.
I
Imputations against Belgium 151
stances. One says Charleroi, another Erquelines,
another the Ougree road, another Brussels, another
Quievrain. I do not wish to suggest that the
witnesses whose declarations are reported did not
say what they thought to be the truth, but various
facts within my knowledge lead me rather to the
conclusion that mistakes have arisen. Thus at
Gand, in the first days of August, a Belgian
barrister thought he saw French officers in a motor
car; as a matter of fact these were officers of the
*' Marie Henriette" regiment of Brussels mounted
civic guard. Another resident at Gand, whom I
know personally, mistook two officers of the Bel-
gian Military Engineers for two French officers.
In fact the uniforms of troops quartered in unusual
places were largely unfamiliar to the public. At
Brussels on August 3d — that is to say after the
German Note — a French soldier on furlough who
had been recalled by mobilization orders was car-
ried in triumph by the crowd on the Boulevard
Anspach: of course he was unarmed. The day
before, some French soldiers, also on furlough — as
is usual each year at the time of the national
holidays, when the sons of the numerous French
families visiting in Brussels are coming home —
had been cheered by the French " habitues " of a
cafe on the Boulevard Anspach on their way to
152 The War of 1914
the Southern Station, where they took the train
for France. Similarly, at Brussels the French
Military Attache continued to walk about in uni-
form. Lastly, Belgian soldiers of the regiments of
Guides wear red trousers and are hardly known
at all except to the people of Brussels. It is
obvious that many other similar confusions may
have arisen.
The official communique (Amtliche Mitteilung)
sent from Berlin on August 3d to the German
press looks more serious. ^ It contains the follow-
ing sentence which essays yet another different
justification of the violation of Belgian territory
by Germany:
French bomb-throwing aeroplanes have violated
Belgian neutrality and flew over Belgian territory
yesterday (Sunday, August 2d) evening on their way
to the Rhine Province to destroy our railway lines.
The communique went the round of the press to
such good effect that in the pamphlet Die Wahrheit
ilber denKrieg C'The Truth about the War"), pub-
lished by a body of well-known men, one may read
to-day^ that masses of French aeroplanes {Massen
von franzosischen Fliegern) flew over Belgium.
* See, for instance, the Kolnische Zeitung, No. 882 of the 4th of
August.
' Second edition, p. 28.
Imputations against Belgium 153
Although it did not receive the seal of official
authority another imputation made by the Kol-
nische Zeitung^ is none the less worth quoting:
We learn from an eyewitness that before the issue
of the ultimatum, a French aeroplane came to
ground at Antwerp without being seized by the
Belgians.
The gravity of these assertions had demanded
clear and precise details, with the mention of
localities, hours, witnesses, the circumstances in
which they assured themselves of the presence of
aviators, the proofs that they had of their French
nationality, etc. A comparison may usefully be
made with the very vague text of the curious
declaration that the German Minister at Brussels
made on the night of August 2d-3d to the Gen-
eral Secretary of the Department of Foreign
Affairs. ^^
Now, the Government of the French Republic,
in their official statement of August 4th to the
Chamber of Deputies, gave a categorical denial to
the German communique. "At no time has any
French aviator penetrated into Belgium," runs
the statement read by the President of the
Council.
» No. 901, August loth.
» See p. 61.
154 The War of 191 4
So true is this that the French Minister at
Brussels went on August 4th in the afternoon to
the Ministry for War, after having already received
news of the violation of the Belgian frontier by
German troops, to ask permission for French Mili-
tary aviators to fly over Belgium. It was not
until the day after that a definitive reply could
be given to him, after the appeal was sent by
Belgium to her guarantors. At this time, how-
ever, the violation of the frontier was already an
accomplished fact.
Here is another series of imputations. They
have an aim which is altogether beside the ques-
tion, namely, to justify the action of Germany by
adducing facts which are supposed to have taken
place before the opening of hostilities but could not
have been known to the German authorities at
the time when the "Very Confidential Note" of
August 2d was presented. These facts are wholly
irrelevant and I only recall them here in order to
show the pains that the organs of German public
opinion take to defend the violation of Belgian
neutrality. Moreover one date dominates all these
allegations. It was on July 29th that the Imperial
Chancellor, in his conversation with the British
Ambassador at Berlin, announced for the first
time that, in the event of a conflict with France
Imputations against Belgium 155
Germany would only respect the integrity of
Belgium if she did not resist the free passage of
German troops across her territory. There was no
question then of reprisals against Belgium any
more than there was any question of them in the
very clear explanations given by the Secretary of
State to the Belgian Minister at Berlin on the
day of the rupture of diplomatic relations. '
The Berliner Tagehlatt, quoted by the Kolnische
Zeitung,^ asserts that there existed at the British
Foreign Office evidence that the plans of French
mobilization indicated an accord between Belgium
and France by the terms of which Belgium was to
grant to France free passage for her troops in
order that they might penetrate into the heart of
Germany.
And in support of this unsubstantiated assertion
the Berlin newspaper reports such gossip as the
following :
France and Belgian Neutrality
A German who has lived fifteen years at Paris
and is thoroughly familiar with the distinctive signs
of the French Army, assures me of the following fact,
which he is ready to repeat if desired. On the
morning of August 3d, that is to say the day before
the expiry of the German ultimatum to Belgium,
* See p. 64.
" No. 793, September 8th.
156 The War of 191 4
some acquaintances of his told him that they had
seen some French troops in the early morning at
the Southern Railway Station at Brussels. Since
this seemed to him incredible, my informant, who
guaranteed the authenticity of the story, went
himself at 3 o'clock in the afternoon to the same
place and actually saw two French infantry regi-
ments encamped there.
Evidence of a similar occurrence on the same day
in another part of Belgitun has been given by a
young German governess who had a situation with
a Belgian family on an estate situated beside the
railway line from Bouillon to Paliseul, and therefore
near the French frontier in the neighbourhood of
Sedan. This governess, as well as the German
nurse who accompanied her with the children, on
this same morning of August 3d, about 9 o'clock,
saw a French cavalryman asking the inhabitants
what was the nearest village. Two hours later a
young dairymaid came from the village to the
estate and announced that French troops had al-
ready entered the village. I can give at any time
the names and addresses of these witnesses, with
their consent. These two pieces of evidence show
clearly that neutrality had been violated on the
side of Belgium even before the expiry of our
ultimatum. Thus do the proofs of the illegal
acts committed by Belgium and her accomplices
accumulate.
The Kolnische Volkszeitung returns to the charge
two days later. '
^ No. 799, September loth.
»
Imputations against Belgium 157
Belgian Neutrality
We have received the following letter:
^' While ... I have had frequent occasion
recently to question refugees on their lot and on the
situation in Belgian villages, a lady of position told
me among others that, as early as August 2d,
French officers were at Brussels in great numbers.
On my objecting that she might have made a
mistake and taken Belgian officers for French
officers, she replied emphatically that that was quite
impossible. In consequence of her residence of
many years duration in Belgium and in particular
at Brussels, as well as by reason of her position in
society, she was sufficiently well informed on the
subject to appreciate the difference. Besides, the
presence of the officers had caused a sensation
among the populace, a fact which excluded all
possibility of her story being based on a mistake.
Unfortunately, in the whirl of events, the name of
this lady has escaped me. If these lines come now
to her notice, she will do a service to the country if
she will personally relate the facts given above to
the responsible authority."
The reader who has noted carefully the succes-
sion of events, only culminating on August 4th in
an appeal for the intervention of the guarantor
Powers, will have already done justice to these
figments of the imagination of the correspondents
of the two German newspapers. In particular he
will remember the refusal by Belgitmi of the
158 The War of 191 4
French offer of military assistance on August 3d —
which took place, by the way, on the very day on
which the time limit fixed by the German Note
expired, and not the day before, as stated by the
correspondent. On this day the German Minister
and the German Military Attache were still at
Brussels. I suppose I can hardly appeal to their
honesty to bear out the complete inaccuracy of
every allegation designed to establish the presence
of French regiments or officers at the Southern
Railway Station or elsewhere.
The Kblnische Zeitung leaves its readers in ig-
norance of the real facts, and, on September 12th,
it still contents itself with the categorical assertion
that Belgium had long ago opened her fortresses
to French soldiers and her frontiers to the General
Staffs of the Republic. '
I am almost ashamed to reproduce so puerile a
document as the following.^
An Interesting Communication
A correspondent writes:
"Before the outbreak of war I was for three and
a half months in Belgium as a voluntary worker
in the office of a barrel manufactory at Tournai, a
town which is situated near the French frontier
' No. 1019.
* Kolnische Zeitung, No. 972, August 30th.
Imputations against Belgium 159
and not far from Lille. About the middle of June
the mattre d'armes of the garrison of this town (of
about 3000 soldiers) came and asked to speak
privately to our Chief. Afterwards the latter told
the office with much amusement that the mattre
d'armes had asked him whether he would be willing
to sharpen the swords of the garrison by means of
his machine for sharpening his saws, whether it
could be done quickly, how many swords cotild be
sharpened a day, and what the cost would be. The
Chief had refused. It was thought in the office that
this might be an indication that war was certain,
anyhow from this time onwards there was frequent
talk of the possibility of a war.
* ' This is yet another proof that war was not made
inevitable by ' Germany's unbridled aggression' but
was arranged long before by our enemies."
That such nonsense could be accepted by an
organ of authority really passes all understanding.
And I will not prolong this disquieting catalogue
by quoting the statement of the Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung of November 17th regarding the
sitting of the Municipal Council of Onnain, near
Valenciennes.
Once and for all let it be considered as estab-
lished, in the eyes of every honest person, that
before the evening of August 4th there was no
question, either immediate or remote, either in
word or in deed, of admitting French officers or
soldiers onto Belgian territory. It was only then
i6o The War of 191 4
that the Permanent Secretary of the Belgian War
Office asked the French MiHtary Attache to ar-
range without delay for the French troops to es-
tablish contact and to co-operate with the Belgian
troops, and it was then only that the order was
given to the military governors of the provinces
not to regard the movements of French forces on
Belgian territory as acts of violation of neutrality. '
Moreover — and this is conclusive — Belgium had
drawn the scheme for concentrating her army with
strict regards to the obligations of her neutrality,
namely one division facing England, two divisions
facing France, owing to the length of the French
frontier, and one facing Germany. Now the army
kept these positions until the night of August
3d-4th, when it became certain that Germany
meant to force a passage through Belgium, viz.,
more than twenty-four hours after the reception
of the German Note.
But it is alleged that long before the present war
Belgium had come to an understanding with
France with a view to military operations against
Germany {sich schon seit Jahren zum Nachteil
Deutschlands mit Frankreich ins Einvernehmen
gesetzt hatte^). In particular, evidence of this is
' Blue Book, p. 98.
" Kolnische Zeitung, No. 1260, November 19th.
I
Imputations against Belgium i6i
thought to be found in a remark made by the
Belgian Minister for War, M. de Broqueville, in
the course of the secret session of Parliament to
which I have already alluded.^ After having
pointed out the dangers by which Belgium was
threatened, the Minister said:
Those are the reasons why we must beware of
Germany. ... I have no fear of a violation of
Belgian neutrality on the part of France; but she is
bound to make dispositions to meet the contingency
of the passage of the Germans through Belgium.
' ' There," cries the Kolnische Zeitung, "is another
link in the chain of evidence" {Ein died mehr in
der Kette der Anzeichen). But the newspaper
passes lightly over the sentence which followed
immediately after that quoted above, and which
serves to focus what was in the mind of the
Minister:
In order to anticipate every possibility we must
make preparations on both sides and must make
them quickly.
There is one typical fact which might be set
against the imputations that aim at representing
Belgiimi as having a military accord with France
before the present war. Why has the German
press never pointed out that all Belgium's supply
'P. 22.
II
i62 The War of 19 14
of artillery, both guns and ammunition, as well as
part of her other war materiel ^ comes from Ger-
many ? At the most the Krupp works allowed some
Belgian factories to co-operate in the manufacture
of certain guns and projectiles. At the time of the
outbreak of war delivery was awaited of a con-
siderable part of the following orders which had
been entrusted to Krupps with the co-operation of
Belgian firms:
30,000 universal shells (7.5 cm.).
18,000 fuses with detonators.
70,000 double-acting fuses.
4 eclipse guns (28 cm.)
4 embrasure guns (28 cm.)
In addition various orders had been placed with
other German firms such as Werner, Siemens &
Halske, Siemens & Schuckert, Ehrardt, etc.
If Belgium had contemplated military co-opera-
tion with France, would she not have given her
orders to French firms? Moreover, during the
course of the war, a^ highly critical situation arose
for the Belgian army. Not having received from
Germany all the expected deliveries, and, on the
other hand, having been obliged to transfer into
France its base of operations together with all its
elements of production, it found itself amongst
ammunition of a quite different type from its
Imputations against Belgium 163
own. And it was only after serious study of the
matter by Belgian and French engineers that a
way was found of solving the complicated problem
of supplying the Belgian army, equipped with
German materiel, with munitions of a somewhat
modified French type.
A similar difficulty presented itself as regards
rifle equipment. Taken by surprise, in the middle
of a complete army reorganization, Belgium did
not possess a sufficient number of rifles at the
moment of the outbreak of hostilities. This
shortage led her to make demands on France,
after the war had begun, notably for 10,000 Lebel
rifles and 1000 rounds of ammunition per rifle.
These rifles were distributed among the soldiers
of the fortress of Antwerp. This circumstance
affords a very simple explanation of a fact that has
been construed against Belgium by the Tdglische
Rundschau of October 15th. The Germans had
found a French rifle in the hands of a Belgian
soldier; they proceeded to allege that the "Belgian
cartridges," carried by the soldier, corresponded
with the bore of the ** French rifle" and drew the
conclusion from all this that an agreement ex-
isted between Belgium and France. The Belgian
Government issued in November a formal dementi
in a communication made by their Minister at
i64 The War of 191 4
The Hague: all the cartridges with which the
Belgian troops were armed at the time of the out-
break of war were of Belgian manufacture and
none of them corresponded with the bore of the
French Lebel rifle, which they obviously did not
fit.
As regards the question of military relations
between Belgium and France, it is perhaps worth
while to recall a small point here. Two years ago
the scheme of the annual manoeuvres of the Civic
Guard in Ghent was based on the hypothesis that
a French army which had violated the Belgian
frontier was marching on the town. And many
other tactical schemes worked out by the General
Staffs of the Army or the Civic Guard implied a
similar contingency.
Moreover, from the day on which the Franco-
German conflict broke out, the Belgian authorities
took many additional measiu-es which testify to the
complete independence of Belgium in her relations
with France, no less than in her relations with
Germany. On Sunday, August 2d, before the
"Very Confidential Note" was known, the Belgian
Government ordered the seizure of a Brussels
newspaper, Le Petit Bleu, which had published an
article entitled "Long live France! Down with
German barbarism!" the Brussels correspondent
r
Imputations against Belgium 165
of the Kolnische Zeitung himself reported the
fact.'
In another telegram sent to that German paper
by the same correspondent, an order of the Burgo-
master of Brussels was quoted to the effect that
all manifestations either of sympathy or of hostility
were forbidden; and during the afternoon of the
same day some people who went about the streets
of the capital waving a French flag and singing
the Marseillaise were at once dispersed by the
poHce.
Again, on the day before these occurrences, that
is to say August ist, the circular given below was
telegraphed to the Governors of Provinces as a
result of a meeting of the General Secretaries of
the various Government Departments.
In the midst of the events that are imminent,
Belgium has determined to defend her neutrality.
That neutrality ought to be respected, but it is the
duty of the nation to take for this end all measures
that the situation requires. It is important there-
fore that the populace should join their efforts to
those of the Government in avoiding any manifesta-
tion of feeling of such a nature as would be likely
to involve the country in difficulties with one or
the other of its neighbours. To this end it is desir-
able that Mayors should immediately issue notices
forbidding all meetings which could have for their
» No. 879.
i66 The War of 1914
object the manifestation of sympathy or antipathy
towards one country or the other. It is equally
important that, by the application of Article 97
of the Communal Law, Boards of Mayors and
Aldermen should prohibit all cinematograph enter-
tainments showing military scenes of a kind cal-
culated to excite the passions of the people and to
provoke popular excitement that would endanger
public order. Governors will kindly take immediate
steps to have these instructions carried out without
delay.
It is not only from the military point of view
that Belgium and France are said to have thrown
in their lot together. The Kolnische Zeitung in its
issue of October 23d denounces an economic
agreement :
Since the spring of 191 3 French agents in Belgium
have been draining away all coin and have been
offering notes in exchange on advantageous terms.
It was in consequence of these measures that the
Belgian Government found themselves compelled
to issue five-franc notes. We have seen a specimen
bearing date July i, 19 14.
The Belgian Government have .done nothing to
check the drain of silver money and have thus
financially facilitated the military preparations of
France.
This piece of news is the result of putting
in juxtaposition several facts, each of which is
Imputations against Belgium 167
quite accurate, but it is none the less quite false as
a whole.
First, it is true that during the period pre-
ceding the war a drain of five-franc pieces from
Belgium to France took place on a large scale.
Secondly, it is also true that the coins thus
drained were replaced in circulation by bank notes.
Lastly, it is true that the first five-franc notes
issued by the National Bank with the sanction of
the Belgian Government bore date July i, 1914.
But. . . .
If there was a flow of five-franc pieces from Bel-
gium to France, the reason was simply the altera-
tion of the rate of exchange between the two
countries. This curious traffic, well known to those
who are familiar with financial and money mat-
ters, has now been going on for a long time, as it
went on in Switzerland about 1900. It is quite
natural that it should be accentuated when the
rate of exchange moves against Belgium. It costs
the National Bank a sum amounting to several
millions of francs a year to get five -franc pieces
back into the country. Also it has constantly been
the Belgian policy to put every possible obstacle in
the way of dealing in five-franc pieces. And if
any distinction can be drawn between the period
that preceded the war and other periods, it lies
i68 The War of 1914
precisely in the exceptional revival of such preven-
tive measures. By virtue of a provision of 1822, a
Royal decree of February 27, 19 14, prohibited the
export of silver coins otherwise than by railway;
a customs duty of 5% has been imposed on their
export, the amount of which absorbed all profit
on the deal; petty inconveniences were multiplied
in the hope that those responsible for the drain
might get tired of the business. This contest of
ingenuity between the State and the dealers filled
the Press and cannot have escaped the attention
of the Brussels correspondents of the great Ger-
man newspapers.
This disposes of the first point. Let us now
pass to the second.
What took the place of the five-franc pieces was
in no case notes of the same amount, for there were
none in circulation, but Belgian notes of various
denominations, twenty francs and upwards, which
those who were responsible for the drain pre-
sented at the counters of the National Bank in
order to obtain the coveted coins.
As to the third point, it is an open secret that
for some years past the Directors of the National
Bank have been apprehensive of the possible
consequences of a European conflagration on the
Belgian coin circulation. Since 1870 an important
Imputations against Belgium 169
step had been taken : the free coinage of silver was
suspended and the Latin Convention was con-
cluded. This situation necessitated new precau-
tions which it was not necessary to consider in
1 870-71 . At the time of the Morocco crisis of 1906
the question of making five-franc notes was
considered. But Government sanction had not
yet been given. Two lines of thought became
manifest on the subject, apart from the private
apprehension of the Directors of the National
Bank. On the one hand the public wanted five-
franc notes to be put into circulation, precisely
because of the continued scarcity of the coins and
also on account of the latter's practical incon-
venience. On the other hand experts in financial
and monetary problems opposed this desire,
basing their attitude on considerations of indis-
putable weight. Under the pressure of these
divergent tendencies it was decided at the end of
the first six months of 19 14 to arrange for an issue
of five-franc notes. A first Royal decree sanc-
tioned the making of the notes with the stipulation
that a second decree must be obtained at the time
when the Bank considered that it was advisable to
put them into circulation. The events of August
2d and 3d brought matters to a head and a new
decree was at once obtained to sanction the issue.
170 The War of 1914
The notes which had been made were undated,
on account of the provisional nature of the first
decree, and it was decided to print on them the
date of July ist, so as to take into account the
approximate average time necessary for their
manufacture. Exactly the same thing has
happened in Switzerland, where five-franc notes,
bearing date August i, 1913, were put into
circulation at the beginning of the war.
The facts to which the German newspaper
calls attention really form an entirely different
concatenation of events from that in which they
are presented, and, as a matter of fact, do not
give any ground for the slightest criticism or the
faintest suspicion of the Belgian Government.
Those who know the economic history of the
last few years, moreover, will not fail to remember
that, at the time when Belgium was accused of
having thrown in her lot with France, the fact was,
on the contrary, that certain grievances had just
created a coldness between the Belgians and their
neighbours. On March 29, 191 o, the French
Government passed a law revising the customs
tariff then in force and raising the import duties
by an appreciable amount on a number of manu-
factured articles. These protectionist measures
directly affected a large number of Belgian indus-
Imputations against Belgium 171
tries. Also they deeply stirred public opinion in
the country and gave rise to real discontent. The
Press took up the question and a campaign was
undertaken with the object of inducing the
Government to take reprisals. In particular it was
suggested that duties should be raised so as to hit
French wines, books, and newspapers for which
there is a large market in Belgium. It was even
said that a bill was under consideration and was to
be introduced at once. Although this bill never
saw the light, the excitement created in industrial
circles continued unabated for some time and only
subsided very slowly.
Subservience to England
The German press like, in the polemics that
they are carrying on, to draw a distinction between
the Belgian people and their Government. The
latter, they say, yielded to England's overtures
and misled public opinion in order to make herself
an accomplice of the British nation, who, accord-
ing to Germany, instigated the coalition.
On August 2 1st Quartermaster-General von
Stein explained in an official communique that the
offer of an understanding made to Belgium after the
battle of Liege constituted a new effort to ** bring
back Belgian public opinion, which had been led
172 The War of 191 4
astray. " On the same day the Lokal Anzeiger of
Berlin said:
The Belgian Government have now received the
punishment of their obstinacy. They obeyed the
orders of England and preferred bloodshed on an
awful scale, while England kept carefully out of the
way, to a friendly understanding with Germany.
Belgium has got her reckoning; John Btdl will have
his very soon.
The same note is struck by Professor Hamack,
amongst others, in a letter reprinted by the
Siiddeutsche Nachrichtenstelle fur die Neutralen,
and by Professor A. Loffler of Vienna in various
articles,^ as well as by the Norddeutsche Alle-
gemeine Zeitung,^ and on October 20th by a cor-
respondent of the Berliner Tagehlati, who, after
describing the lamentable condition of the in-
habitants of a region devastated by the war, adds :
"Poor people, whose country proved a step-mother
to them."
It would be easy to meet this way of presenting
the case by pointing to the enthusiastic unanimity
of Belgian public opinion in the decision to resist.
No one in this country would ever have thought it
possible that there should be agreement so spon-
* See, for instance, "Neue Freie Presse of October 19th, Volksrecht
of November 17th, and Neues Wiener Tagi/a// of November 29th.
»No. 250, October 13th.
Imputations against Belgium 173
taneous — and, let us add, j&ve months after the
opening of the war, a so lasting one — among people
of every shade of opinion. There was nothing
forced or artificial in this irresistible manifestation
of feeling ; the Nation was moved to the very-
depths of its being.
But let us get to closer grips with this charge.
England is held responsible for the Belgian resist-
ance and in particular for the vigorous attitude of
King Albert. The allegation even goes into detail
and the name of Lord Curzon is given as that of
the intermediary between the British Government
and the King. Actually, Lord Curzon did not
communicate with King Albert until the day after
that on which a Zeppelin dropped bombs on Ant-
werp in the proximity of the Royal Palace. He
then wrote a letter to the King offering one of
his residences for the Royal family; he sent a
picture of it accompanied by a description pub-
lished in an English magazine. It is simply and
solely the announcement in the Belgian press of
this kind action on the part of Lord Curzon that
has led certain German newspapers to attribute
a political r61e to Lord Curzon.
None of these hypotheses will stand an impartial
examination of the facts.
So far was England from holding the strings of
174 The War of 1914
a conspiracy in which Belgium was to have been
one of the puppets, so far was she from urging
Belgium to resistance that, on July 31st, at the
time of the visit paid by the British Minister at
Brussels to the Belgian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, ' the former was surprised at the prompt-
ness with which Belgium had put her mobilization
in train. The Belgian Minister reports the incident
in the following words ^:
In the course of the ensuing conversation, Sir
Francis seemed to me somewhat surprised at the
speed with which we had decided to mobilize our
army. I pointed out to him that the Netherlands
had come to a similar decision before we had done
so, and that, moreover, the recent date of our new
military system, and the temporary nature of the
measures upon which we then had to decide, made
it necessary for us to take immediate and thorough
precautions. Our neighbours and guarantors should
see in this decision our strong desire to uphold our
neutrality ourselves.
Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply,
and stated that his Government were awaiting this
reply before continuing negotiations with France
and Germany, the result of which would be com-
municated to me.
There is another fact which is still more con-
clusive.
We have seen^ that from July 29th England
» See p. 29. 2 Grey Book, No. ii. ' Page 91.
Imputations against Belgium 175
was aware of the unfavourable attitude of Ger-
many towards Belgium. She said nothing about it
to Belgium. She informed her, as we have seen,
that she was continuing to negotiate with France
and with Germany and that she would make a
point of communicating the result to her. Would
she have acted with this discretion if a convention
or an entente or any arrangement whatever had
existed between the two countries? It was only —
this point should be noted — on August 5th, after
the request for intervention addressed by Belgium
to England as a guarantor Power that the latter
replied' that she
considered joint action with a view to resisting Ger-
many to be in force and to be justified by the Treaty
of 1839.
Later, on August loth, after the occupation of
Liege, when Belgium had already received from
Germany the invitation to an understanding to
which we have already had occasion to refer, ^ no
one dictated to Belgium the negative reply that she
gave. Keeping strictly and exclusively to the point
of view of loyalty to her international obligations,
she refused to consider the suggestions that were
submitted to her. To enter into negotiations with
^ Grey Book, No. 48.
* See p. 113,
17^ The War of 1914
the Power who had violated her neutrality to the
detriment of those Powers who had respected that
neutrality would have been in manifest contradic-
tion to the cardinal rule of Permanent Neutrality.
To consent to discuss matters with the Power who
had played fast and loose with the very life of the
nation in order to satisfy her own political am-
bitions would have roused the country's sense of
right into an outburst of popular indignation.
Having thus adopted, in the exercise of unfettered
sovereignty, the attitude dictated by the sense
alike of their obligations and of their dignity, the
Belgian Government proceeded, as a matter of
courtesy, to impart their intentions to the Powers
who had responded to their appeal. On the same
day, August loth, the Minister of Foreign Affairs
at Brussels made the following statement to the
British, French, and Russian Ministers ' :
I have the honour to inform your Excellency that
the Belgian Minister at The Hague, at the request
of the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs,
has forwarded to us the following proposal from the
German Government.
The Belgian Government propose to return the
following reply to this communication :
"The proposal made to us by the German Govern-
ment repeats the proposal formulated in their
I Grey Book, No. 65.
Imputations against Belgium 177
tiltimatmn of August 2d. Faithful to her inter-
national obligations, Belgium can only reiterate her
reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since August
3d her neutrality has been violated, a distressing
war has been waged on her territory, and the
guarantors of her neutrality have responded loyally
and without delay to her appeal. "
I'he Belgian Government consider that the
Powers guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium
should have cognizance of these documents.
On the following day, August nth, the British
Minister handed in at Brussels the following
note, simply recording the approval of his Gov-
ernment :
I have telegraphed to Sir E. Grey the German
communication and the draft reply.
I have been instructed to express to Your Ex-
cellency the entire approval of His Britannic
Majesty's Government. That Government cannot
but declare themselves in accord with the terms of
the reply that the Belgian Government propose to
give to an effort to sow disunion among the coun-
tries now united for the defence of the treaties
yiolated by Germany.
The simple record of events in their chronologi-
cal order is therefore sufficient to demonstrate how
baseless is the opinion inaccurately reprinted in
the Kolnische Zeitung of October 23d after a
Dutch paper.
178 The War of 1914
Three days before the beginning of the war Sir
E. Grey gave the Belgian Government to under-
stand that he hoped they would do all in their
power to ensure the observance of their neutrality.
He promised the support of England and the Allies
as soon as Germany entered Belgian territory, on
condition that Belgium would participate in com-
mon action with a view to resist the violation of
neutrality. Belgium accepted. From that moment
she formed part of the Entente; she was no longer
fighting exclusively for herself.
All this is literally contrary to the facts :
(i) It was on August 4th, the day of the first
act of war in Belgium and not "three days before
the beginning of the war," that Sir E. Grey in-
formed Belgium of the intentions of England. '
(2) This proposal was made equally and at the
same time to Holland and Norway. ^
(3) It was made to Belgium with the reserva-
tion that it was only applicable in the event of the
neutrality of that country being violated. ^
(4) It was cancelled by England almost im-
mediately after being formulated, as soon as she
learned of the violation of Belgian neutrality by
Germany and so Belgium had neither to refuse
nor to accept it."*
(5) England did not define her attitude to-
^ See p. 109. 2 /^_
3 See p. no. ^ See p. 119.
p
Imputations against Belgium 179
wards Belgium until after the latter had, on
the evening of August 4th, asked for the in-
tervention of the Powers on whom she could still
rely. '
(6) From this moment, it is said, Belgium
formed part of the Entente. Not in the least.
She has never ceased to fight for the vindication
of her own outraged rights. If to-day Belgium is
fighting side by side with England and France,
that is because the aggression of which she was
the victim has welded their cause to her own.
That was in the very nature of things, for, to
quote the striking words of Rivier, "a guarantee
treaty ipso facto implies a contingent alliance.*'^
The new President of Switzerland, M. Motta,
who was elected in December, 19 14, expressed a
similar sentiment when he said in a recent inter-
view published in the Swiss press on December
27th:
From whatever side an attack may come, if it is
to come, Ijie aggressor will be the enemy of all the
Swiss, and the Swiss Army will at once go to swell
the ranks of those who are already fighting against
the aggressor whoever it may be.
' See p. 79.
' Principes du droit des gens, vol. ii., p. loi. See also Heffter,
translation in French by Bergson, Droit international public de
I'Europe, § 145, and Westlake, Notes sur la neutralite permanente
in the Revue de Droit international, 1901, pp. 390, 395.
i8o The War of 191 4
The argument here discussed has as little sub-
stance as one to which a German newspaper, the
Vossische Zeitungy gave circulation. According
to the argument of the latter, participation in an
international conflict would be inconsistent with a
state of permanent neutrality.
To maintain that Belgium is participating to-day
in an international conflict is a complete distortion
of facts. The Belgian army has defended and is
defending the national territory; in this defence
she is, in the nature of things, led to "concerted
and joint action"' with the armies whose object
it is to repel the invader. This seems, indeed, to
be axiomatic.
Further, the intervention of England in the
European conflict, and her relations with Belgium,
formed the subject of a very frank statement by
the British Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, in the
course of the sitting of the House of Commons on
August 6th. After recalling the attitude of Ger-
many towards Belgium as explained on July 29th
by the Imperial Chancellor to the British Am-
bassador at Berlin, ^ Mr. Asquith said^ :
Let the House observe the distinction between
those two cases. In regard to Holland it was not
*See p. 80. "See p. 91.
5 Blue Book, p. 100.
Imputations against Belgium i8i
only independence and integrity but also neutrality ;
but in regard to Belgium, there was no mention of
neutrality at all, nothing but an assurance that
after the war came to an end the integrity of Bel-
gium would be respected. And these assurances
the Chancellor hoped might form the basis of an
understanding between England and Germany.
What does that amount to? Let me just ask the
House. I do so, not with the object of inflaming
passion, certainly not with the object of exciting
feeling against Germany, but I do so to vindicate
and make clear the position of the British Govern-
ment in this matter. What did that proposal
amount to? In the first place, it meant this: That
behind the back of France — they were not made a
party to these communications — we should have
given, if we had assented to that, a free license to
Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war,
the whole of the extra-European dominions and
possessions of France. What did it mean as
regards Belgium? When she addressed, as she has
addressed in these last few days, her moving appeal
to us to fulfil our solemn guarantee of her neutrality,
what reply should we have given? What reply
should we have given to that Belgian appeal? We
should have been obliged to say that, without her
knowledge, we had bartered away to the Power
threatening her our obligation to keep our plighted
word. The House has read, and the cotmtry has
read, of course, in the last few hours, the most
pathetic appeal addressed by the King of Belgium,
and I do not envy the man who can read that appeal
with an unmoved heart. Belgians are fighting and
losing their lives. What would have been the posi-
i82 The War of 1914
tion of Great Britain to-day in the face of that
spectacle, if we had assented to this infamous
proposal?
This shows a very clear grasp of the situation.
Mr. Asquith was right in saying that the Belgians
would have resisted the German invasion whether
England had agreed to intervene or refused to do
so. The King's appeal for the diplomatic inter-
vention of the British Government was sent at a
time when Germany had already been notified of
the refusal of the proposal of August 2d. The
appeal of the Government for the military co-
operation of the British, French, and Russian
forces was sent after the violation of Belgian
territory at a time when the Belgian army was
already in action, and I know from an authorita-
tive source — I give my word of honour for this —
that at this moment there was the most poignant
anxiety in governing circles in Belgium while
they wondered what the reply from London was
going to be. . . . Thirty-one German professors
whose names are very well-known in the scientific
world, at the same time that they renounced the
honorary degrees conferred on them by British
universities, asserted^ that if Belgium had not
been assured of the assistance of England she
' Letter published by the Kolnische Zeitung, September 7th.
Imputations against Belgium 183
would never have dared to resist Germany. I
beg them to believe that they are absolutely
mistaken.
Mr. Asquith continued :
And what are we to get in return for the betrayal
of our friends and the dishonour of our obligations?
What are we to get in return? A promise — nothing
more; a promise as to what Germany would do in
certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed — >
I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon
record — given by a Power which was at that very
moment announcing its intention to violate its
own treaty and inviting us to do the same.
And the Prime Minister ended this part of his
speech by recalling once again the two motives
^ that ought to govern the policy of England on this
question.
I can only say, if we had dallied or temporized,
we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves
with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the
interests of this country, of which we are trustees.
Then summing up the situation he defined what
was at stake in the war.
If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in
two sentences. In the first place to fulfil a solemn
international obligation, an obligation which, if it
had been entered into between private persons in the
ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded
i84 The War of 191 4
as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which
no self-respecting man could possibly have repudi-
ated. Secondly, we are fighting to vindicate a
principle: in these days when force, material force,
sometimes seems to be the dominant influence
and factor in the development of mankind, we are
fighting to vindicate the principle that small
nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of
international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a
strong and overmastering Power. The mainten-
ance of these principles is vital to the civilization
of the world.
No imputation can stand up against the accumu-
lative force of the facts which mark the various
aspects of the relations between Belgium and
Great Britain. It is in vain that attempts have
been made to find a weak link in the chain ; there
is none.
Germany realizes this, and is anxious to discover
some evidence that will compromise Belgium.
As a matter of fact Germany is now under the
impression that she is in possession of a series of
sensational pieces of documentary evidence.
On October 13th the Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung announced that there had just been
found in the archives of the War Office at Brussels
a dossier containing a record of the agreements con-
cluded between Belgium and England. The same
newspaper returned to this discovery on November
Imputations against Belgium 185
24th when it published the facsimile of a report.
A dementi had already been issued by the Belgian
Government of the incorrect interpretation that
the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung had put on
this document. But in view of the persistence of
the German press it seems worth while to go into
this matter in detail.
In 1906, the British Military Attache, Colonel
Bamardiston, had a series of interviews with
General Ducame, Chief of Staff of the Belgian
army. These interviews began in the month of
January by a preliminary conversation of which
the general purport was as follows :
"The situation is critical," said the Military
Attache, ''the tone of the press warrants every
apprehension. Is Belgium ready?"
"Certainly," replied the General, "all our
arrangements are made. Our fortifications are
prepared. Antwerp faces England, Liege faces
Germany, and Namur faces France. "
"Yes, but it is Germany who must be regarded
with the greatest suspicion to-day. If she were
ever to violate your neutrality England would
come to your help and it would be appropriate
that technical arrangements should be made from
the military point of view for such an eventuality."
"From the military point of view," replied the
i86 The War of 1914
Belgian General, * ' this contingent intervention of
England could not be anything but favourable.
But this question has also a political side, so that
I ought to communicate with the Minister of War
on the subject. "
The discussion then proceeded and was followed
by others. Various technical aspects of the ques-
tion were examined one by one. The General
drew up a report for his Minister. It is the draft
of this document that has been found. I will only
examine here a few salient passages. The full text
is given as an appendix. ^
In the first place what was it that led the Mili-
tary Attache to take this step? ''The preoccupa-
tions of the British General Staff. "^
What people were aware of it? "The British
Minister and the Chief of the British General Staff
were the only persons then aware of the matter"^;
the Attache laid great stress on this point. ^
What was the subject of the discussion? " Com-
bined military operations in certain hypotheses. "^
What were these hypotheses? Generally speak-
ing, "in the event of Belgium being attacked."^
In particular, "in the event of a German attack
directed against Antwerp, "^ and "the hypothesis
» See p. 301. " Ibid. ^ P. 303. < Ibid.
s P. 306. ^ P. 302. 7 p. 306.
Imputations against Belgium 187
of Belgium being crossed in order to reach the
French Ardennes. " '
When were the British forces to intervene?
*'The entry of the British into Belgium would take
place only after the violation of our neutrality
by Germany."^
This last phrase would of itself be sufficient to
put an end to all discussion, but in the report it is
written in the margin and connected with the
text by an asterisk. For this simple reason the
Norddeutsche has omitted to translate it and gives
it in French at the end of the published report as
if it were a "marginal addition" independent of
the text: Auf dem Schriftstiick findet sich noch der
folgende Randvermerk. Not at all! The sentence
forms part and parcel of the report itself. The
idea that it expresses so entirely dominates the
General's mind that it came quite naturally to
his pen but, as will be seen from the facsimile on
page 188, the General made corrections and ad-
ditions freely in drawing up his report, and having
no space to insert a seventeen-word phrase in the
text, he most naturally added it by means of a
reference on the side of his paper.
Also the Norddeutsche allowed itself another
liberty in translation. In the very important sen-
* P. 306. ' P. 302.
filii'tl {H.lf
18$
Imputations against Belgium 189
tence, "Our conversation was absolutely con-
fidential,** the word "conversation" has become
Ahkommen which means "convention.** Later,
after the falsification was denounced, the real
translation was printed in further editions, and it
was argued, what is in fact untenable, viz., that
it was a misreading.
All that tampering with the text shows con-
clusively that not even in the eyes of those who
found the docimient had it any value as it stood,
and that it was necessary to give it a manufactured
value.
Since all the evidence establishes the fact that
the hypothesis of a previous violation of neutrality
was postulated, no one can take offence at the
technical conversations which took place at
Brussels. Was the violation of the Belgian fron-
tier by Germany one of the possibilities by which
Belgium was threatened or was it not? If it was,
was it not the duty of the Belgian General Staff
to bear carefully in mind the information that the
Military Attache gave them on this possibility as
on all others? What a simpleton the German press
must suppose Belgium to be if it thinks that
country capable of remaining in ignorance of the
writings of German generals and of the secret
strategical dispositions of that country, which go
I90 The War of 191 4
to suggest — especially since 1895, to be exact —
the possibility of the passage of German armies
through Belgium.
I am pleased to be able to mention here a fact
which I am sure is little known. A short time
after the steps taken in 1906 by the British Mil-
itary Attache one of the periodical tours of the
officers of the Belgian General Staff was arranged.
Now, which was the object of this tour? To travel
over Flanders in order to study there the disposi-
tions to be made against a supposed landing of a
British force. No one thought then, and no one
would think to-day, of alleging that these tactical
exercises argued the existence of an agreement
against England.
But, says the German press, we have other
documents.
In the first place, the Norddeutsche published at
the same time as the Ducarne report a copy of a
letter from the Belgian Minister at Berlin, Count
Greindl, who in 191 1 communicated to Brussels
his advice on the subject of a plan of defence of one
part of Belgium. It should be noted that the
document found at Brussels in a room at the
Foreign Office is a "copy" and not the original
letter; that is to say that the original of this letter,
as well as the original document annexed, were
Imputations against Belgium 191
not filed with the copy which was discovered.
The latter was detached from the dossier in order
to complete a file made up in another Department.
The Norddeutsche remains therefore ignorant of the
past history of the matter. If one consults the
dossier itself what is found there? The first docu-
ment on the file is a memorandum drawn up by a
high official under the title: "What would Belgium
do in the event of a Franco-German war?" This
memorandum goes back to 1910-1911. It goes
into all the points that were within the competence
of the official who wrote it. The Minister happened
to submit this minute to Count Greindl, whose
judgment was highly thought of, and to whom
documents regarding the international situation of
the country were often communicated. Count
Greindl expressed his views very clearly; the
following is the substance of them: The writer of
the memorandum started from the hypothesis of
Belgian neutrality being violated by Germany;
that is one hypothesis, but there are others, and
similar memoranda ought to be undertaken to
deal with them : our country ought to fortify herself
against all dangers from whatever quarter they
may come. The Norddeutsche thought it proper
to present these views as a sort of criticism by
Count Greindl on his Government. I would
192 The War of 191 4
explain, therefore, that, on the contrary, in that
circumstance. Count Greindl was expressing ex-
actly the opinion of those responsible for the direc-
tion of Belgian policy, and that as far back as 1906
this community of views had been apparent in
their diplomatic correspondence. Moreover, the
Norddeutsche itself has recently (August, 191 5)
published some diplomatic reports of the Belgian
Ministers abroad to their government, and it
would be really beyond human understanding to
qualify as anti-German the tendency of the Bel-
gian foreign policy as outlined by these reports.
Then there is yet another document relating to
a further conversation which took place in 19 12
between another British Military Attache, Lieu-
tenant Colonel Bridges, and the Chief of the Bel-
gian General Staff, General Jungbluth. "Now,"
says the German press (for example the Nord-
deutsche, December 24th), "this time it was stated
that England would effect her landing even if
Belgium did not ask for it."
What is there surprising in this ? Every guaran-
tor Power has not only the right but also the obliga-
tion to defend a violated neutrality, not only
without waiting to be invited by the neutralized
State, but ex officio and even against the wish of
that State. We have seen above that this obliga-
Imputations against Belgium 193
tion is of the very essence of the idea of Permanent
Neutrality.' Nevertheless, Belgium had ever
been very scrupulous and always considered that
her previous consent would be necessary.
Indeed, General Jungbluth replied as follows
to the British Military Attache :
/'But you are well aware that the permission of
Belgium is indispensable. "
"Yes," replied the other, "but you would not
be in a position to stop the Germans in their march
through Belgium" (in the German version this is
clearly translated nicht im Stande seien, die Deut-
schen ahzuhalten durch Belgien zu marschieren).
It will readily be seen how definitely this last
sentence, which the German press leaves in the
background, visualizes the hypothesis which
formed the whole basis of the discussion, namely,
the previous violation of Belgian neutraHty by
Germany.
There is another point to be noted.
Everyone knows that it is not within the com-
petence of a military attache to carry on authori-
tative conversations on matters of policy with a
government, and that governments cannot be
held responsible for any undertakings into which
military attaches may enter. This was pointed out
* Seep. 51.
13
194 The War of 191 4
moreover by General Ducame himself at the time
of the first interview in 1 906. It is therefore wholly
inaccurate to represent the British Military
Attache as an authorized agent or a plenipoten-
tiary,— ein Bevollmdchtigte, to quote the expression
used by Professor Bematzik of Vienna in his
article in the Neues Wiener Tagblatt.^ The dis-
tinction is vital and, not being able to meet the
point, Herr Bematzik is led to formulate conclu-
sions like the following:
If the British Government were really ignorant of
the negotiations entered into by their plenipoten-
tiary they had only to avail themselves of this
pretext for annulling the convention made with
Belgium {den Vertrag Belgien gegeniiher zu annulieren)
and to reprimand their plenipotentiary for having
exceeded his authority {seinen Bevollmdchtigien
wegens Mandatsilherschreitung zu bestrafen) .
Thus the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung once
more brandishes before the eyes of its readers a
document of no importance whatever.
Above all it must not be supposed that the
Belgian Government abandoned its political and
military archives to the mercy of the invader;
they are in a safe place and it was merely by
accident that the Germans were able to put their
hands on certain stray documents at Brussels.
* November 29th.
Imputations against Belgium 195
But I can assure the Norddeutsche that there
are in these archives numerous dossiers which
prove as clearly as can be wished how keenly-
sensitive the Belgian Government always were to
the delicacy of the situation, and how steadfast
was their determination, as regards all the Powers
without distinction, to defend the neutrality of
their country completely and unconditionally in
the strictest spirit of loyalty to treaties.
All the dossiers of which I speak bear witness
to an excess of scruple rather than to any sub-
servience whatever. Every time that any incident
occurred the Belgian Government were at pains
carefully to weigh its significance, with imremitting
anxiety lest some Power might be able to take
offence, and they never allowed any indiscretion
or excess of zeal to be hushed up.
For instance when after 191 2 inaccurate rumoiu-s
gradually spread on the subject of the part played
by the two British Military Attaches, some appre-
hension was at once openly expressed in Belgium.
This came to the knowledge of Sir Edward Grey
and, so loyal were the political relations between
the two countries, that he hastened to write, on
April 7, 1913, a letter to the British Minister
at Brussels, who forwarded a copy to the Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
196 The War of 191 4
This letter demolishes once and for all the
construction put on the affair by the German
press. It might have been published as soon as
the German press campaign began. The Belgian
Government refrained from doing so with that
scrupulous discretion which has always charac-
terized their policy. It was not until December
7th last that Sir Edward Grey communicated the
text to the British press. It runs as follows :
In speaking to the Belgian Minister to-day I said,
speaking unofficially, that it had been brought to my
knowledge that there was apprehension in Belgium
lest we should be the first to violate Belgian neu-
trality. I did not think that this apprehension
could have come from a British source.
The Belgian Minister informed me that there had
been talk, in a British source which he could not
name, of the landing of troops in Belgium by Great
Britain, in order to anticipate a possible despatch
of German troops through Belgium to France.
I said that I was sure that this Government would
not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium,
and I did not believe that any British Government
would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion
here ever approve of it. What we had to consider,
and it was a somewhat embarrassing question, was
what it would be desirable and necessary for us, as
one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do if
Belgian neutrality was violated by any Power.
For us to be the first to violate it and to send troops
into Belgium would be to give Germany, for instance,
Imputations against Belgium 197
justification for sending troops into Belgium also.
What we desired in the case of Belgium, as in that of
other neutral countries, was that their neutrality
should be respected, and as long as it was not
violated by any other Power we should certainly not
send troops ourselves into their territory.
Summing up all this, we may conclude that
Belgium cannot be accused of having concealed
from Germany understandings or conventions
which never existed.
And, after all, perhaps Germany was not alto-
gether ignorant of these matters. Gossip says
that the interviews of the British Military At-
taches had excited the lively interest of the Ger-
man Military Attach^ at Brussels, Staff-Major
Renher, and indeed of the German Minister Herr
von Flotow. Those two gentlemen must both be
greatly surprised at the fuss that their Government
are now making about the conversations of which
they in former times made so light. . . .
It is true that there are still some other docu-
ments of the same kind but they are less interesting.
I refer to the English edition of the map of the Bel-
gian General Staff, and the series of English mili-
tary manuals, not to mention the discovery of some
requisition forms at the house of an English agent.*
^ Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, November 6th.
198 The War of 191 4
The map was drawn and printed in England
from the Belgian map, but it is alleged that this
cannot have been done except with the co-opera-
tion of Belgium "for the English edition was found
also at the Belgian Ministry of War."' I confess
that I am quite unable to see any point in this
remark. Perhaps the writer of the article was
ignorant of the fact that the German troops who
entered Belgium were in possession of copies of
the Belgian staff maps reprinted in Germany with
marginal notes in German. For instance, a detach-
ment of Uhlans who went about the middle of
September by Oost-Roosebeke near Roulers left a
map of the district beside a hedge.
The English military manuals were denounced
by the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (December
1st), and the principal German newspapers at once
followed suit. These manuals give a detailed de-
scription of various districts of Belgium with mi-
nute information regarding everything that could
be of interest in military operations; the German
newspaper in its criticism pays nevertheless high
tribute to the care with which these manuals were
compiled. They bear the inscription "Confiden-
tial; the property of the British Government." I
^ See for instance the German Journal of the War, for October,
1 9 14, edited by Herr Berg of Berlin.
Imputations against Belgium 199
do not know what the Norddeutsche finds surpris-
ing in this inscription. And after all what does
the evidence of the English manuals amount to?
That the British General Staff had considered the
possibility of having to conduct a war in Belgium ;
in which, as experience has proved, they showed
themselves remarkably well advised. It is Ger-
many herself who is to blame in the matter. Her
plans of campaign involved attacking France by
way of Belgium. England was aware of these
plans. It was of vital importance to her that
Belgium should remain inviolable; she took her
precautions accordingly. What complaint can
be made of Belgium's conduct in all this?
The Norddeutsche on the contrary hails this
with triumph. Such a work it says would not
have been possible without the co-operation of the
Belgian Government and officials of the Army
administration; it is certain, according to that
newspaper, that official information was used.
The conclusion is drawn that "in both. political
and military matters Belgium was neither more
nor less than a vassal of England" {nichts anderes
als ein Vasall Englands) . Well, the connection be-
tween the conclusion and the premises is indeed
flimsy. Do the German newspapers seriously think
that in order to obtain full information about a
200 The War of 191 4
country it is necessary to apply to official sources?
Do they think even that it is the most practical
method? What would they say if they were in a
position to reveal to the world that innumerable
Englishmen who had settled in Belgium as elec-
tricians, chemists, engineers, clerks, workmen,
employees, or even as dealers in scythes or razors,
had left the country at the opening of hostilities,
only to return to it in uniform, eager to furnish
to their superiors information of every sort which
they had collected when they were enjoying the
hospitality of Belgium? Well, this is exactly what
did happen — except that these people were Ger-
mans, not Englishmen.
Belgium has been the chosen land of spies of
every nationality, and a short time before the
war, the Government had formed a definite in-
tention to introduce a bill on the subject.
Why may there not have been in this candid
country English spies just as there were German
and French spies ? And why may not these secret
agents, some of whom apparently divided their
time between shooting and fishing, have furnished
Great Britain with documents of no very remark-
able importance indeed, such as information about
Belgian mobilization, circulars sent to Belgian
high commands, notes of a sitting of the Belgian
Imputations against Belgium 201
Commission appointed to inquire into the ques-
tion of the provisioning of Antwerp, reports
from the Belgian gendarmerie on the concentra-
tion of French rolhng stock at Maubeuge ? The
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung announced that
all this has been found out at the British Lega-
tion at Brussels and it says solemnly that "this
new revelation adds overwhelming evidence of
the Anglo-Belgian conspiracy."
To any one who has preserved any critical sense
all that this "revelation " proves is that England —
like all the neighbouring Powers of Belgium — main-
tained a secret service in that country. So far were
the Belgian Government from giving facilities to
this secret service, either overtly or tacitly, that
they were actually wholly ignorant of its existence.
That is the long and short of the matter.
And the list of "revelations" will no doubt
increase still further. If I were not afraid of
spoiling the appearance of these pages I should
leave here some blank spaces in order that they
might be used to keep pace with fresh efforts of
the German press to surpass itself in publishing
new evidence of the conspiracy between Belgium
and England, and even to present them (as for in-
stance does the Kolnische Zeitung of December 24th)
as confirming some grounds of suspicion that the
202 The War of 191 4
Germans already had in their possession before
the war. We may await them with equanimity.
Nothing can ever prevail against this simple
truth: the Belgian State adopted an attitude
that was scrupulously correct and never asked or
accepted anything from England, either interfer-
ence or joint action.
One word more.
The time at which the Norddeutsche presumes
that an Anglo-Belgian Convention was concluded
is very badly chosen. It is a matter of common
knowledge that about 1906 the long-standing
sympathetic relations between England and Bel-
gium became somewhat strained. The incidents
of the Boer War, the attempt of a half-witted boy
at Brussels to assassinate the then Prince of Wales,
who was soon after to become Edward VII., the
Morel campaign against the administration of the
Congo, all this had tended to produce a certain
coldness between the two nations.
It is also a matter of common knowledge that
since the beginning of the twentieth century the
pivot of Belgian diplomatic activity has been the
Congo Free State. If Germany would think for a
moment she would realize that it is certainly not
the case that her interest during these critical
Imputations against Belgium 203
years had been sacrificed to British interest in the
Belgian Congo and that it was certainly not in
England that the companies founded by King
Leopold II. had sought the protection of the law.
Why labour all these points?
I need not tell my readers that on July 28th last,
when the international situation became grave,
the instructions given to the Belgian administra-
tion of the Congo indicated the precautions which
should be taken against a possible blockade of the
river by France and England acting in common,
just as much as against a violation of the frontier
of the colony by Germany. It was only after the
rupture with Germany that orders were given to
concentrate all efforts on the one side only.
And it is scarcely necessary to point out, merely
for the sake of adding to the mass of evidence,
that up to the time of the war the Belgian Royal
Family had not yet paid an official visit to the King
and Queen of England, though they had already
visited Berlin and Vienna.
Next, the facts are here, and they make all
discussion superfluous. In August, 1 9 14, Ger-
many violated Belgian neutrality for the sake of
her strategic interests and the march of her armies
corresponded exactly with the plans that she was
known to have made. In August, 1914, Great
204 The War of 191 4
Britain waited for a fait accompli before announc-
ing her intention to intervene, and her troops only
entered Belgium eighteen days later.
Nothing more need be said.
Belgium was not bound to England by any
bargain or any tmderstanding, expressed or tacit.
In her relations with England, as in her relations
with France and Germany, she was in August, 19 14,
as she had been for the last seventy -five years:
free of all engagements, upright, and xmswervingly
loyal.
To put it blimtly, it is a thoroughly base slander
to make unfavourable comparisons (as does a
communique of the Wolff Agency in the Neue
Ziircher Zdtung of November 4th) between the
impartial policy of Switzerland and the policy of
Belgium, who is said to have destroyed her own
neutrality by becoming the military ally of France
and England.
Such is the material, flimsy, rotten, and specious,
which forms the basis of the indictment for treason
that German public opinion wishes to bring against
Belgium.
A campaign of defamation has followed the
campaign of arms. Slander continues remorse-
lessly. Does Germany wish to try to minimize
Imputations against Belgium 205
her crime before her judges by behttHng her
victim? Or does she perhaps wish to prepare
men's minds to accept the conquest of a country
that had lost its claim to respect.
It does not matter. One thing remains, and
it was a Swiss, the great poet of the German lan-
guage, Carl Spitteler, who had the courage to
declare it':
After the deed was done, that the stain of his
guilt might less appear, Cain has besmirched the
fair name of Abel. . . . Surely it was amply
sufficient to have cut his throat. To slander him
afterwards was going too far.
I will only add one line to these noble words.
There is no justification whatever for the assump-
tion by Germany of the r61e of a judge whose
sternness is mingled with compassion. ' ' Already, ' '
wrote the Lokal Anzeiger of Berlin of August 21st,
"Belgium has been crushed and has fallen on her
knees. "
On her knees!
For what crime is this poor little country paying
the penalty, except that of remaining loyal? And
is it not a last outrage to her dignity to deem her
capable of assuming the attitude of suppliant
before her persecutor?
^ Neue Ziircher Zeitung, December i6th.
German Rules of War and Their
Application to Belgium
2Q7
GERMAN RULES OF WAR AND THEIR APPLICA-
TION TO BELGIUM
In the proposal for an entente which Germany
addressed to Belgium after the battle of Liege the
following passages ^ have already been quoted :
The German Government most deeply regret
that bloody encounters should have taken place.
Germany is not coming as an enemy into Belgium.
. . . The German Government beg the King of
the Belgians and the Belgian Government to spare
Belgitun the horrors of war.
These words have the appearance of being
inspired by a feeling of sincere pity. When
Germany resolved to give over to the horrors of
war a country for which she professed every
sympathy, one might have expected her to enjoin
a certain m^oderation on her officers. Without
compromising the success of military operations
she might have disclosed to her armies the fact
^ Page 113.
lA 209
210 The War of 191 4
that she had not even declared war on Belgium,
but that, to quote the second Note, ^ ''the Emperor
found himself compelled to take — if necessary by
force of arms — measures of defence." Without
disregarding the laws of war, the German authori-
ties might have instilled principles of equity into
those whose duty it was to apply those laws. It
may even be said that this was the elementary
duty of Germany at a moment when she had
only been able to plead "necessity'* to excuse her
conduct. According to the statement that she
made to the world she was passing through Bel-
gium only because strategic necessity compelled her
to do so : she was wronging an innocent country,
and necessity alone was the excuse for this wrong;
in the Notstand everything which is not absolutely
necessary is criminal. But the truth, as we have
seen, was different. It was the subjugation of
Belgium that was being aimed at, and from the
very beginning of hostilities events proved that
war was to be conducted in Belgium with syste-
matic and cruel vigour. The German Government
itself on August 14th informed the Belgian Govern-
ment in an official note that the war would assume
"a cruel character" {einen grausamen Charakter),
Belgium, they continued, would bear the re-
^ Belgian Grey Book, No. 27.
German Rules of War 211
sponsibility for this {Belgien tragi die Schuld),
The Note stated in effect :
1. That numerous civilians had taken part in
the fighting around Liege ;
2. That civihans had ill-treated the wounded;
3. That the civilian population at Antwerp had
destroyed the property of Germans and had brutally
massacred {in hestialischer Weise niedergemetzeli)
women and children.
Moreover, the Emperor himself actually ad-
dressed the following message to the President of
the United States in which he said :
The Belgian Government has openly encouraged
the Belgian population to take part in the war, and
it has for a long time been preparing with care for
this participation. The cruelties committed in this
guerilla war on soldiers, doctors, and ambulance
men, even by women and priests, have been such
that my generals have been finally obliged to have
recourse to the most severe measures in order to
chastise the culprits and to spread terror in a popu-
lation thirsting for blood, to prevent the continuance
of their murders and abominations.
Now, it is beyond question that the informa-
tion received by the German Government was in-
accurate and misleading and they may, without
exaggeration, be accused of having lightly given
credit to slanderous tales.
212 The War of 191 4
It is premature to attempt to arrive at a final
conclusion on this matter, which demands dis-
passionate consideration, as at the present moment
it is difficult to assume the good faith of witnesses
as a matter of course. It is our duty nevertheless
to clear the data on which public opinion is formed
of a number of elements which certainly have no
foimdation in fact. From this point of view, I will
briefly examine the three accusations directed
against the inhabitants of invaded Belgium.
I. The Participation of Civilians
The Emperor and the whole of the German press
have accused the Belgian Government of having
actively or tacitly favoured resistance on the part
of civilians. For example, several papers stated
that the Government had taken no steps to instruct
civilians with regard to their obligations towards
enemy troops or that they had only intervened
tardily or weakly. It was even stated in a note
to the German Consul at Geneva that :
A general rising of the people against the enemy
had been organized long beforehand ; depots of arms
had been set up in which every rifle was marked
with the name of the civilian for whom it was
intended.
German Rules of War 213
It is scarcely necessary to refute this last ac-
cusation. What certain Germans had taken for
depots of arms, placed by the Belgian Government
at the disposal of civilian inhabitants, were merely
the places in which the local authorities, as a
measure of precaution, had ordered the firearms
of private individuals as well as those of the civic
guards to be collected. As is well known, in
Belgium all citizens between the ages of twenty and
forty are liable for service in the Civic Guard. Only
two exceptions are made, first, when a citizen has
already done his military service, and secondly
when he has not sufficient money to pay for his
equipment. Each member of the guard keeps his
arms and his uniform at home. At the central
depot, a full register is kept of all the names and
addresses of the members, with an indication of
the numbers of their arms. At these central
depots, or in some other local building, the arms
had been deposited in those communes in which
the members of the guard, notably those of the
special reserve, had been disarmed.
The correspondent of a German paper in Belgium
even alleged that in order to be able to distribute
such a vast quantity of arms to the population,
the Belgian Government must have collected
a considerable stock with a view to war. As a
214 The War of 191 4
matter of fact the situation was entirely different.
The "Very Confidential Note" of August 2d
found the Belgian Government about to reor-
ganize the army and in the throes of the upheaval
consequent on so radical a reform. The increase
of effectives and armament was to be spread over a
period of five years. This reform could not there-
fore produce full results until the expiration of
that period. With regard to armament in par-
ticular, a serious shortage of rifles made itself felt,
so that, so far from being able to distribute arms
to the civilian population, the Government found
themselves unable immediately to call to the
colours the classes of 19 14 and 19 15.
Far from having prepared in any way whatso-
ever for armed resistance, the Belgian Govern-
ment at the very beginning of the war, on August
4th, issued to the administrative authorities of the
2600 communes of the country a circular of which
the following are the extracts relevant to the
point in question; certain parts are taken textu-
ally from The Hague Convention.'
Hostile Acts. By the laws of war, hostile acts,
that is, armed resistance or attack, the use of arms
against detached soldiers of the enemy, and direct
^ For example the third paragraph which reproduces Articles
of the rules contained in an appendix of the Convention.
German Rules of War 215
interference in battles or chance encounters are
forbidden to those who are neither in the army or
civil guard nor members of a voluntary corps ob-
serving military laws under the command of a chief
and wearing a distinctive and recognizable badge.
Those who are authorized to perform hostile acts
are called "belligerents": when they are taken
prisoner or have laid down their arms they have the
right of treatment as prisoner of war.
If the population of a territory which has not
been occupied by the enemy spontaneously take
up arms on the approach of the invader without
having had time to organize themselves in a military
manner, they will be regarded as belligerents if they
carry arms openly and if they respect the laws and
customs of war.
Any individual, not being classed under any of
the foregoing categories, who commits a hostile act,
would not be considered a belligerent; if he were
taken prisoner, he would be treated with greater
severity than a prisoner of war, and he might even
be put to death.
It is even more imperative that the civilian
population should abstain from acts which are pro-
hibited to soldiers; these acts are principally: the
use of poison or poisoned weapons ; to kill or wound
treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile
nation or army; to kill or wound an enemy who,
having laid down his arms or having no longer
the means of defending himself, has surrendered at
discretion.
It must be borne in mind on the one hand that
the administrative organization of Belgium is very
2i6 The War of 1914
complete, and on the other hand that at the moment
when the circular note was sent with as much
despatch as possible the territory was, with the
exception of a few localities, still free of the enemy.
The administrative machinery was therefore able
to work perfectly, and the instructions from head-
quarters reached almost instantly their various
destinations all over the country. These instruc-
tions were posted in all the commimes without
exception and in several places in each of them.
This is the general rule in Belgium for ofBcial
injunctions. I myself have actually seen this
notice posted up in the towns and villages of
Flanders, and personal friends of mine have seen
the same in various parts of the country. This
posting was carried out with the utmost celerity.
At Liege, for example, it was placarded on the
walls as early as August 5th; the Germans must
have read it when they entered the town. Simi-
larly at Aerschot, a little town which suffered a
terrible fate, the Germans were able to see on their
entry, posters of the burgomaster calling upon his
fellow-citizens to abstain from any hostile acts in
case of invasion. When Professor C. Wegener'
states that similar steps were taken at Rheims, he
cannot help expressing his admiration. Why has
* In the Kolnische Zeitung of September 15th, No. 1025.
German Rules of War 217
the German press never acknowledged the same
careful precautions taken by the communal
magistrates in Belgium?
The Minister of the Interior did not content
himself with this step alone. At the very begin-
ning of August, he asked the principal papers to
publish either every day, or from time to time,
the following injimctions, which request was
faithfully carried out.
To Civilians.
The Minister of the Interior advises civilians, if
the enemy appears in their district :
Not to fight.
Not to try any abuse or threats.
To keep indoors and shut their windows, so that
it will be impossible to say that any provocation was
given.
If soldiers occupy a house or an isolated village
for purposes of defence, to leave it at once in order
that the allegation may not be made that civilians
have fired.
An act of violence committed by a single civilian
will be a crime legally punishable by law, for it may
serve as a pretext for a bloody repression, pillage
and massacre of innocent population, women and
children.
The communal authorities also enjoined the
inhabitants to get rid of their arms. I myself have
read these posters in many little places and I will
2i8 The War of 1914
merely give here as an example the text of the
poster which was placarded in Brussels over the
signature of the Burgomaster.
The laws of war prohibit the civil population from
taking part in hostilities, and as any failure to ob-
serve this rule may cause reprisals, many of my
citizens have expressed to me a desire to rid them-
selves of the firearms that they possess.
These arms may be deposited at police stations,
where a receipt will be given for them. They will
be put in safety in the central arsenal at Antwerp
and will be restored to their owners at the end of
hostilities.
The instructions in the Circular of August 4th
to the communal authorities were subsequently
repeated on various occasions. Some of these
instructions were sent to the authorities with a
German translation,
in order [as the Minister wrote] that local ad-
ministrations may eventually show the German
authorities the instructions followed by those
administrations in conformity with the rules laid
down by The Hague Convention to which the
German Empire subscribed.
In the light of these known facts, it is possible
to state in the most emphatic manner that the
Belgian Government deliberately organized the
non-resistance of the population in order that
II German Rules of War 219
even in the hour of wild indignation it should
remain faithful to the tenets of international
conventions. What conclusions can we draw then
from an article which appeared in the Kotnische
Zeitungy No. 967, of August 28th?
The attitude of the Belgian population is incom-
prehensible, but that of the Belgian Government is
still more so. With them rests the responsibility
for the destruction of Belgian towns and villages.
... In the first place the Belgian Government
encouraged armed resistance by the diffusion of
gross calumnies about our troops. They then had
arms distributed, and now that this resistance is on
the wane they are stirring it up again, instead of
putting an end to it once and for all by issuing a
vigorous statement.
It would have been easy for a paper which had
at its command as reliable sources of information
as were available to the Kotnische Zeitung to
verify such grave statements before publishing
them. But reasoned criticism is helpless before
the comments that the newspaper makes on this"
statement :
Here is a certain proof which will convince the
entire world, that before the war the resistance of the
population was counted on and had been prepared.
On October 19, 191 3, the Annates of Paris expressed
lively approval of the suggestion of a Belgian officer
to militarize the population of the provinces of
220 The War of 19 14
Luxemburg with a view to resisting a contingent
invasion by guerilla warfare. This idea emanated,
then, from a Belgian and was approved of and
spread by a Frenchman. We thus catch the
accomplices in full collusion in support of the idea
of a war oifrancs-tireurs!
If the Kolnische Zeitung will take the trouble to
re-read the papers of that date, it will easily find
that this idea, which was started without any
success by two members of Parliament, contem-
plated the formation in the provinces of Lux-
emburg of a corps similar to that of the chasseurs
alpins. As for the rest, the arguments of
the Kolnische Zeitung are too childish to be
discussed.
But since I am on the subject of astounding
statements, I will add some more.
First this news in the Hamburger Nachrichten
reproduced in the pamphlet entitled Die Wahrheit
iiber den Krieg, "The Truth about the War"^:
Here [at Louvain] the fagades of many houses
are prepared with a view to a war of francs-tireurs.
They have openings through which the barrel of a
rifle can be thrust and which can be shut by means
of movable metal plates. These were made by
experts with a view to the systematic organization
of such warfare.
* Secx)nd edition, page 60.
German Rules of War 221
No, my worthy correspondent, experts con-
structed them with the very inoffensive object of
holding the pieces of wood necessary to support
scaffolding when repairs are being done to the
fagade.
Secondly the following story related in the
Leipziger Taghlatt and contained on page 38 in the
pamphlet entitled Die helgischen Greueltaten to
which I shall refer again later.
According to a postcard sent by a soldier to his
parents at Possneck, the Belgian Government had
promised the civil population a reward of fifty
francs for every German soldier killed. This is
further confirmed in a letter of a reserve lieuten-
ant to his parents at Leutenberg. The latter writes
that he found on the body of a franc-tireur who
had been killed, a note in which the French Govern-
ment recognized him as a franc-tireur and allocated
to him a monthly pay of fifty francs".
Comment is superfluous.
The term francs-tireurs has just been used.
It has had an extraordinary vogue in Germany.
Under the denomination of francs-tireurs the
Germans have included bands of men, either in
uniform or in peasant blouses, as well as isolated
individuals whom they accuse of having fired on
their troops. I will first consider the case of armed
bands.
222 The War of 191 4
The Germans met in certain localities com-
batants who were differently equipped from the
Belgian troops. They were soldiers of the Civic
Guard which I have already mentioned. '
As Professor P. Errera explains in his Traite de
droit public beige the Civic Guard was created by
the Congres National of 1830 to establish harmony
between the public force and the fundamental
principles of government. Examples proved the
great influence which the executive power wields
over the army itself, as it is placed in the hands
of that power. The Congres thought it necessary
to create by the side of the army another military
force which would better represent, especially by
its method of recruitment and the designation of
its officers, the entire nation, and which would
defend constitutional liberties equally against
menaces from outside and against dangers from
within.
It is necessary [said the report of the Central
Section of the Belgian Chamber, in 1831] to create
a counterpoise in favour of the country. It is there-
fore indispensable to organize a military force which,
if necessary, might become an army capable of
maintaining our institutions.*
^ See page 213.
' Report of January 24, 1831 ; Huyttens, Discussions du Congrbs
National, vol. iv., p. 108.
German Rules of War 223
This is the spirit which inspired the subsequent
laws with regard to the Civic Guard and which re-
asserted itself in the Law of September 9, 1897,
which is actually in force.
The object of the Civic Guard is determined
by Article i of this Law:
The duty of the Civic Guard is to maintain law
and order, to preserve national independence, and
the territorial integrity of the country.
The duty of the Civic Guard in time of war was
clearly stated during the preliminary discussions
of the Law of 1897. The Minister for War himself
said that the Civic Guard was to assume the
auxiliary services of the army — that is, garrison
service in the forts, miscellaneous services in the
rear of the army, and the protection of communica-
tions between garrison troops and the armies in
the field, etc.
The Civic Guard is therefore very similar to the
German Landsturm whose r61e is defined by the
Law of February 11, 1888.'
The Civic Guard has the same cadres as the
army. In fact it is commanded by officers the
majority of whom are ex-army officers. The result
is that both by its composition and by the nature
^ Paragraph 23.
224 The War of 1914
of its functions the Civic Guard constitutes one of
the two elements of the public forces. This is
known to all those who have studied Belgian
law.
The Civic Guard is either "active" or "non-
active." It is "active," unless the Government
has issued instructions to the contrary, in all
localities in which the population exceeds ten
thousand inhabitants and in those localities which
are fortified or protected by a fort. In other
localities it is "non-active." It can, however,
be called into activity by a Royal Decree, on the
demand of the local council, or if such a step is
considered desirable in the interests of order and
public safety in that locality. *
At the outbreak of the present war the Govern-
ment considered it urgent to call into activity the
Civic Guard in all localities : the uniforms of the
members of the Civic Guard thus called out con-
sisted of a blue blouse, a tricolour cockade, and a
brassard of the same colour. They carried arms
openly, and in perfonPxing their duties conformed
to the laws and customs of war. The Government
extended this measure so as to include the officers
and personnel of two great public services who
wear uniform in the normal course of their duties,
' Article 4 of the said Law.
German Rules of War 225
namely the customs officials, and the guards of
forests.
These decisions were in strict and complete
accordance with the prescriptions of The Hague
Conference, and the Belgian Government hastened
to give notice of them on August 8th to the German
Government through the diplomatic intermediary
of the Spanish Minister at Brussels.
Subsequently, and for piu-ely internal reasons,
other circulars were issued which partly annulled
these decisions. It is nevertheless a fact that in
the places in which German troops met these Civic
Guards in one of the uniforms described above, or
in their blouses, they had no right to consider or
to treat them as francs-tireurs inasmuch as they
fell in every respect within the terms of the four
conditions stated at the head of the rules annexed
to The Hague Convention. ^
1. That of being commanded by a person re-
sponsible for his subordinates ;
2. That of having a distinctive emblem fixed
and recognizable at a distance ;
3. That of carr^nng arms openly ; and
4. That of conducting their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war.
A German magazine published, under the
heading of The War of Francs-Tireurs, a picture of
» Article i.
IS
226 The War of 191 4
the Civic Guard wearing their blouses. Numerous
articles in the German press give the impression
that voluntary troops of civilians had taken part
in the fighting, harassing the German colimins,
and carrying on a guerilla warfare.
Now, it is absolutely certain that never in Bel-
giiim have any acts of this sort taken place.
But there is a very active press campaign in
Germany to establish other contentions.
What are the German grounds of complaint?
Their troops while going through villages are
supposed to have been fired at from certain houses ;
German columns marching on high roads are
supposed to have been fired at from neighbotuing
thickets ; detachments of German troops occupying
certain localities are supposed to have been fired
at suddenly from cellars and windows.
Instead of confining itself to definite facts, the
German press immediately generalized and repre-
sented the entire population as given over to this
war of francS'tireurs. On the strength of these
statements, certain admirers of the Belgians ac-
tually gave them credit for a kind of heroism
which would have been absolutely contrary to
the laws of modem warfare.
The Belgian nation, it is true, has given proof of
German Rules of War 227
its courage ; but, at the same time it has not for a
moment lost its dignity. In less than a fortnight
about twenty thousand volunteers from the highest
to the humblest ranks of society answered the noble
appeal of King Albert. Regardless of all parties,
the people mustered enthusiastically round the
tricolour standard. In opulent cities, just as in
poorer villages, cheers were given for the soldiers
who, in the defence of their country, were obliged
to blow up bridges, raze houses to the ground,
devastate fields, shut up factories, block roads,
tear up railway lines or open sluices. It is thus,
and not by rifle shots from behind walls, that the
Belgians received the Germans.
How then can it be said in Germany,^ "There
is not a single Belgian who is not a jranc-tireur ! " ?
In his answer to Romain RoUand, Herbert
Eulenberg^ went so far as to write:
From the very outbreak of hostilities a systematic
(planmdssig) war of francs-tireurs was begun in
Belgium against the Germans. The Belgians
behaved like Paris Apaches {Pariser Apachen) and
the heroic Flemish Lion has nothing in common with
the Jackals of Flanders of to-day.
Herbert Eulenberg describes himself at the
head of his article as a mouthpiece of German
» As for instance the Kolnische Zeitung, No. 967, of August 28th.
^Kolnische Zeitung, September 17th, No. 1035.
228 The War of 191 4
contemporary thought {ein Vertreter des heutigen
geistigen Deutschlands) . Does German thought,
which has filled human souls with so many serene
truths and so many great ideas, so forget itself as
to slander a whole people without giving its insults
even the appearance of justification? What are
the real facts within the knowledge of Herbert
Eulenberg? If his pen did not hesitate before
writing this is it really still the pen of a thinker?
Did not also the pen of Max Hochdorf tremble
when he wrote that the francs-tireurs, who, accord-
ing to him, were particularly numerous between
Louvain and Tirlemont, were peasants whose
judgment had long since been destroyed by alco-
holism and religious fanaticism?' Max Hochdorf
knows me; he has had his workroom at the Sol-
vay Institute in Brussels. He will, I hope, be-
lieve me, when I tell him that I am painfully
astounded to see him father this story of drunken
and fanatical Belgians. Let him mark on a map
of Belgium in great stains the burnings and de-
vastations of which the only pretext was reprisals
against the inhabitants. Would he maintain that
in the vicinity of Liege, in South Luxemburg, at
Dinant, Andenne, Tamines, the population is
made up of fanatics and drunkards? Has he for-
' Berliner TageUatt, September 9th.
German Rules of War 229
gotten that a number of these localities are centres
of higher popular education, and that at Wavre,
for example, where one of his colleagues of the
Kolnische Zettung^ states, without any proof, that
street fights took place against the francs-tireurSf
there flourishes one of the most active committees
of the University Extension at Brussels?
The German socialist deputy, R. Fischer, has
also repeated this story of ignorant fanatical
Belgians in a letter to the Volksrecht of Ziuich.*
Does he not think that in stating that **the
population was incited by priests who feared that
they would lose their privileges " he is reducing the
argtiment to a very degraded level? I can assure
him that, from the very beginning of August, the
priests, in conformity with the express instructions
of their bishops, preached in the churches, on the
one hand, the patriotic duty of voluntary enlist-
ment in the ranks of the army, and on the other
hand, the abstention of civilians from all military
operations.
In fact it is absolutely certain that no concerted
resistance on the part of the population has ever
taken place. Weapons had been given up to the
local authorities, and the latter had enjoined
^ September 22d, No. 1050.
" September 5th.
230 The War of 191 4
absolute calm everywhere. Inhabitants of towns
and villages, terrified by the unexpected calamity
which befell them, had other thoughts than of
waging a war of francs-tireurs.
What, then, is the origin of the German state-
ments?
After having read and re-read everything that
has been written for and against this allegation,
and after having spoken with soldiers who have
taken part in the campaign, and with people who
had returned from invaded districts, and after
having deeply thought the matter over, I have
come to the conclusion that there are many widely
different circimistances which explain the belief in
Belgian francs-tireurs which to-day is held as an
established article of patriotic faith in Germany.
First, I am perfectly ready to admit that cer-
tain exceptional isolated cases actually did take
place. Trustworthy friends, for example, have
told me how in two villages poachers hid in the
woods, or spent the night in ambush, in order
to fire on German soldiers. I do not attempt to
deny this, and I even add that it may have taken
place elsewhere. These men, who carry arms as
well in self-defence against gamekeepers and gen-
darmes as to kill game with, may have escaped
the preventive and repressive regulations of the
German Rules of War 231
authorities and kept their arms, when they had
been ordered to give them up, and may have at-
tacked the troops when they had been definitely
forbidden to do so.
But apart from these local and exceptional
cases, I surmise that the very large majority of
other cases, have been mere coincidences.
In this connection I should like to ask all those
people who, in Germany and elsewhere, have
placed their names and social position at the
service of this campaign of defamation against
the inhabitants of Belgium, to consider dis-
passionately the following few facts, the truth of
which can at any time be checked. Their only
importance is that they show with what reserve
the allegation of this firing on the part of civilians
should be accepted and how easy it is for mistakes
to be made. I am compelled, from motives which
will readily be understood, to refrain from giving
certain names.
During the month of September on the Brussels-
Mons line, a German train near Jurbise exploded
a detonator used for signalling purposes on the
line. The soldiers in the train on hearing the
explosion immediately concluded that an attack
had been made by francs-tireurs. They seized
some peasants who were working nearby and shot
232 The War of 191 4
them on the spot. When at last they were
made to understand the cause of the explo-
sion, they expressed regret and continued on their
journey. ^
On September 25th in a village in Hainaut, a
similar incident nearly took place. A detachment
of Belgian soldier cyclists had been sent across
the enemy's lines to cut the communications by
destroying bridges. The cycHsts hid behind
bushes and crossed into a park forming part of
the property of M. X., whom I know person-
ally. The park was situated near the railway
line on which the Belgian soldiers had to carry
out their work. German soldiers were guarding
the line. They were surprised by the fire of the
cyclists, and as they were more than seventy
kilometres from the Belgian lines they thought
that this was an attack oifrancs-tireurs. M. X. was
arrested and only escaped thanks to his knowledge
of German which enabled him to explain what had
happened and ask for an inquiry to be held.
Along the road from Brussels to Termonde a
few gendarmes^ were ambushed behind two farms.
They were waiting for a German patrol, and when
it passed fired without coming out of cover. The
German soldiers took note that the shots were
* Gendarmes form part of the regular army.
f
German Rules of War 233
fired from the two farms. Shortly afterwards
these were both burnt.
A similar occurrence took place near the little
Flemish town of Waereghem, except that in this
case it was a detachment of infantry who crawled
along beside the houses to fire.
During the days between September 29th
and October 3d, part of the commune of Wet-
teren situated on the left bank of the Scheldt
was put into a state of defence to cover the retreat
of the cavalry division which made daily recon-
naissances on the right bank. In each of the
houses which face the Scheldt, most of which had
not been evacuated by the inhabitants, a machine-
gun had been placed on the first floor. The in-
fantry of the Civic Guard occupied the groimd
floor. If the enemy had appeared during these
days they would have been received with rifle and
machine-gun fire, and if they had managed to
carry the place, the Belgians would have been
able to escape by the gardens of the houses which
protected them, and reach Lokeren or Ghent by
way of Laeme or Destelbergen without being seen
by the Germans. The latter would have doubtless
been under the impression that this resistance had
been organized by the civilian population.
During the whole period of the operations at
234 The War of 191 4
Antwerp, detachments of Belgian soldiers, not
working on any preconcerted plan, but left to their
own initiative, carried on a guerilla war against
the German army. Protected by the woods, or
vmder cover of night, small bodies of them ad-
vanced as far as possible, often behind the enemy's
lines. These little bands of brave men harassed
the German communications. The Belgian
General Staff encouraged these expeditions which
worried the enemy and completely upset their
calculations as to our operations.
The tactics of the Belgian army, with its obvious
numerical inferiority, frequently took the form of
this constant harassing of the enemy. A great
number of patrols were left in the rear and spread
about in the villages through which the German
troops were to pass, with orders to harass them
and then rejoin their column. These tactics be-
wildered the enemy greatly. A German engineer
of the corps of officers, who was billeted at Ghent
on one of my friends, expressed his surprise to him :
" In what a curious way your army wages war,"
he said one day, "your soldiers are never where
we suppose them to be or they appear on the scene
when they are least expected. A detachment ap-
pears to be the advance guard of an important
column : steps are consequently taken to meet the
I
German Rules of War 235
situation, and we suddenly discover that we have
before us a mere patrol which disappears as we
advance." It can easily be imagined how these
tactics make the German command nervous and
foster the belief in francs-tireurs. Appearing in
districts where the Germans thought themselves
entirely protected, these detachments, although
composed of Belgian regular soldiers in uniform,
often caused the enemy to believe that they were
the victims oi francs-tireurs.
At Aerschot, on the very morning of the sack
of the town, the Germans entered after having
met with a somewhat severe resistance on the
part of a Belgian detachment. The fighting took
place between six and eight o^clock. A Belgian
witness stated to the Commission of Inquiry that
that afternoon a soldier, who had taken refuge in a
house, left it, rifle in hand, after having taken off
his uniform and put on civilian clothes. Assuming
that he was neither a drunkard nor a madman, and
supposing that he did fire a shot as the German
commandant asserts, could the act of a single
individual be imputed as a crime to the whole
population of a town?
At Dinant, according to the statement of the
correspondent of the Berliner Tagehlatty^ the in-
^ September 26th.
236 The War of 191 4
habitants fired on the German soldiers during the
night. "They were," says this correspondent,
"supported by French soldiers who were hiding in
'certain houses.*" The question arises as to how
it was possible during the night to distinguish
whether the shots from the windows were actually
fired by the inhabitants and not by the French
soldiers.
At Tamines, machine guns had been placed in
two houses which overlooked the bridge over the
Sambre. French soldiers were concealed there.
The Germans probably thought that the shots
had been fired by the inhabitants, and who knows
whether the terrible fate which befell the little
town was not due to a mistake of this sort?
Lastly here are two incidents from which I
should be reluctant to generalize but which never-
theless are of importance in the chain of evidence.
The German army, just like any other army, is
liable to include in its ranks individuals of doubt-
ful character whose criminal propensities find an
opening in the manifold and varying cricumstances
of war.
In a Walloon town, the Burgomaster was ar-
rested because a German officer had been shot.
The inhabitants were accused of this. "Shoot me, "
answered the Burgomaster, "but I first demand
German Rules of War 237
a post-mortem examination of the victim.*' A
German bullet was found in the body.
At Herve, during the scenes of burning and
devastation of which the Kolnische Zeitung^ of
September loth has sketched the lamentable
sequel, Madame Y., fifty years old, the aunt of
one of my colleagues at the Brussels University,
saw from her window a German non-commissioned
officer fire a revolver from the window of a neigh-
bouring house. He then rushed downstairs and
called out to his men, ' * A shot was fired from here ! "
I have given my reason for relating all these
episodes. My object is simply to show how, in the
course of the innumerable events of daily life, some
commonplace circumstances may arise which may
lead to fatal mistakes.
Now I must dwell upon this circumstance, that
generally speaking, no inquiry is held; guilt is as-
sumed as a matter of course, and reprisals take
place at once — sofort as the German accounts say
so often; that is to say without giving time for
possible mistakes to be corrected or for responsi-
bility to be determined.
Thus with regard to Louvain, a German tele-
gram runs^:
» No. 1009.
* Kolnische Zeiiung, No. 967, August 28th.
238 The War of 19 14
The movement was crushed at once (sofort) and
the punishment inflicted without pity (unerbittlich).
At Namur, a correspondent of the same paper
relates what he has just learned :
At a given moment a violent fire was opened on
the Grand' Place on our troops. As this could not
have come from a single fanatic, steps were im-
mediately taken {alsbald ereilt) to inflict a well-
deserved punishment. Both sides of the Place were
set on fire.
Referring to Tamines, another correspondent
writes in the Kolnische Zeitung':
Then, not being able to reach those who had fired,
the rage of our troops vented itself on the little
town. Without pity it was given up to the flames
and became a heap of ruins.
The depositions collected by the Belgian Com-
mission of Inquiry on the violation of the rules of
international law confirm these accotmts of Ger-
man origin. In the Third Report, page 2, 1 find :
The inhabitants were indiscriminately arrested
and shot without trial and without apparent reason.
Sometimes, even as in the case of the unfortun-
ate town of Aerschot, it was chance that deter-
mined who should be the victims. I have taken
« No. 968.
* No. 1009 of September loth.
German Rules of War 239
this passage from the Fourth Report. It is vouched
for by M. Orts, Counsellor of Legation, whose
good faith nobody who knows him could attempt
to question:
After some searching I found at the foot of a
bank the spot where fell these innocent victims.
Black clots of blood still marked, on the stubble, the
place occupied by each of them under the fire of the
executioners. These blood stains are two yards
distant from each other, which confirms the testi-
mony of the witnesses according to which, at the
last moment, the executioners took from the ranks
two out of every three men, chance, in default of
any sort of inquiry, pointing out those who had
to die.
Really, in these circumstances, how could it be
hoped that officers in command of troops could
distinguish between the apparent and the real
cause, between simple coincidence and governing
fact? And on what a portentous chain of excep-
tional circumstances does bare justice depend.
Above all, the cardinal fact must not be over-
looked that the soldiers, non-commissioned officers,
and officers of the German army, in their training
for war, are obsessed with the idea of armed
civilians and haunted by visions of francs-tireurs,
I was told of the case of German soldiers in Hai-
naut, whose only knowledge of French consisted of
240 The War of 191 4
the words '' Civils out tire.'' Again, a certain re-
servist of the 137th Infantry Regiment, on August
29th, twice wrote down in his notebook "Fra-
diroer." Professor Hauser stated in the Temps on
this subject that the German officers seemed to
develop systematically in their men ''une sorte
d'hypnose particuliere.'' The fact that officers
and men practically expected to be fired at by
civilians caused their minds to be centred round
franc s-tireurs as their one preoccupation.
When a body of men are haunted by this idea,
and incidents occur which shake their nerves and
induce contagious excitement, all the elements are
present for a confusion that is likely to end in
tragedy. It is impossible not to be struck by
the fact pointed out by many observers, notably
in the evidence taken by the Belgian Commis-
sion of Inquiry, that reprisals for ''tir des civils''
often took place either after the Germans had
suffered checks in engagements with the Belgian
troops or in parts of the country where the Ger-
mans had met with a military resistance which
irritated them and ill-disposed them against the
inhabitants. I have heard this explanation given
of the difference between the northern and south-
ern regions of the province of Luxemburg. In
the south numerous villages have been devastated
German Rules of War 241
or burnt : there French regiments had opposed the
advance of the Germans whereas in the north their
progress was unimpeded.
A correspondent of the Kolnische Zeitung"- has
himself pointed out the contrast between these
two neighbouring regions, one of which had been
spared and the other devastated. He infers that
this difference of treatment is due to a difference
in the attitude of the inhabitants. This inference
is very rash, all the other circimistances being
obviously far from equal. Further, these contrasts
are noticeable not only as between neighbouring
regions but even as between places quite close to
one another. Common sense forbids us to suppose
that the inhabitants showed themselves violently
hostile in one place and in another extended a
peaceful welcome, and this fact lends great prob-
ability to other explanations. In any case, as the
German correspondents themselves admit, this
fact destroys the hypothesis of a general and
systematic armed resistance on the part of the
Belgian civilian population.
Therefore when four American journalists, after
travelling through Belgium, signed on September
3d a declaration in which they stated on their
honour that they were unable to find a single case
• No. 1035, September 17th.
16
242 The War of 1914
in which these reprisals were not the result of
provocation' they do not throw any light on the
point as to whether the Belgian population really
did organize an armed resistance. In the minds of
those who ordered them, these reprisals were of
course undertaken with good cause. It is quite
another matter as to whether this was actually the
case.
It has been undeniably proved [wrote Professor
Stier-Somlo in the Kolnische ZeitungY (es steht
unumstosslich fest)] that the civilian population in
Belgium has fired in ambush from houses, cellars,
windows, and hedges, on the German troops and
even on convoys of wounded and on doctors, that
they killed a number of them, and that they
poured boiling oil on our brave soldiers.
I have been accustomed to a stricter sense of
scientific documentation and argument on the
part of my colleague, and I have no doubt that he
would be the first to demand the proofs which logic
requires to arrive at complete certainty. In parti-
ctdar, I hope that he did not base his conviction
with regard to boiling oil on the account written by
a Dutch joiu-nalist of the attitude of the population
of Herstal, near Liege. Men, women, and children
^ Propaganda Pamphlet, No. 3, of the Bureau des Deutschen
Handelstages.
» No. 977, September ist.
German Rules of War 243
were supposed to have thrown themselves before
the German troops ; every kind of projectile was
said to have been made use of; boiling oil to
have been poured and the place to have been given
over to wholesale pillage. A few days after the
publication of this terrifying account, it was learnt
from an official soiu-ce that nothing, absolutely
nothing, had happened at Herstal and moreover
that there had not been the slightest reprisals.
I will not add anything further, and I think I
may draw the conclusion that the detractors of the
Belgian people have, to say the least of it, shown a
lack of the most elementary critical sense.
I find a further proof of this in a German
pamphlet. It is one of those innumerable propa-
ganda publications which flow ceaselessly from all
parts of Germany. This particular one was pub-
lished at Leipzig by Zehrfeld, and is entitled Die
Belgischen Greueltaten (Belgian atrocities) and the
sub-title is Amtliche und glauhenswilrdige Berichte
(official and trustworthy reports) . The inference
is that the contents are taken partly from official
sources and partly from trustworthy sources.
The object of the pamphlet seems to be to col-
lect in a sort of compendium the more character-
istic accounts of the acts of cruelty of which the
Belgian population is accused. A special chapter
244 The War of 191 4
is of course devoted to Der Franktireur-Krieg (the
war of francs-tireurs) .
What do we read in these pages?
Three of these accounts relate to the ill-treat-
ment said to have been inflicted on German soldiers
by the civilian population after a battle. This
question is discussed in the next section. I will
therefore only treat here of the statements with
reference to the participation of the civilian popula-
tion in hostilities.
Six of the accounts emanated from journalists'
who on their own admission were not eye-wit-
nesses of the facts they report. Further, they
make no mention whatever of the sources from
which the facts are drawn; the six accounts do
not therefore carry any weight. The same can be
said of seven other declarations which are supposed
to have been made by eye-witnesses, but these are
described in so vague a manner^ that it is impos-
sible to check them. It should also be said that, in
most of the facts reported, the narrators do not
even give the names of the places in which they
are supposed to have taken place.
^ Gottfried Traub and the war correspondents of B. Z. am
Mittag, Berliner Lokal Anzeiger, Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten^
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, and Leipziger Tageblatt.
' A Dominican, two Swedish women, and four soldiers.
German Rules of War 245
Finally there is one declaration in which the
author states his name and in which verification
is therefore possible. It was made by Alexander
Berg, a barrister, to the Frankfurter Zeitung, and
refers to the destruction of the town of Andenne.
M. Berg alleges that the night attack, which was
made on his company while they were going
through Andenne, was carried out by francs-
tireurSj but he does not state any fact to justify
this allegation and excludes the hypothesis, which,
however, is just as probable, that the assailants
might have been Belgian soldiers and not civilians.
We shall see below* how a quite recent German
dementi has proved M. Berg's account to be false
in an essential particular.
Such is the net result of this pamphlet.
Is it not obvious that the accusations made
against the Belgians have been accepted by Ger-
mans with inexcusable readiness?
2. The Treatment of the Wounded
The allegation with regard to the treatment of
wounded put forward in a note of protest on
August I4th^ was repeated officially on two other
occasions.
^ P. 288. » Pp. 210-21 1.
246 The War of 191 4
On September 6th, the Chancellor of the German
Empire stated in a communication to x the repre-
sentatives of the great American Press agencies :
What you were not told is that on the fields of
battle young Belgian girls gouged out the eyes of
our wounded.
One of Germany's highest officials therefore
accepted and gave his warranty to an infamous
accusation which the entire press of his country
had been pleased to propagate. The German
Government even invoked this allegation during
November as a pretext for refusing to allow the
daughter of General Leman, the hero of the army
of Liege, whose bravery the German Note of
August 9th' was forced to admit, to visit her
sick father who was a prisoner in Germany.
Such a proceeding would, said the answer, deeply
wound the feelings of the German people, for relia-
ble witnesses had stated that German wounded and
prisoners of war had been in Belgium the victims
of treatment which was not only contrary to inter-
national law, but also a disgrace to civilization.
To refute these "reliable witnesses" I could
quote the Kolnische Volkszeitung, or the Vorwdrts
which, in articles which I have before me, have
^ S9« p. 113.
German Rules of War 247
themselves been obliged to admit that facts which
had been considered as established were in reaHty
pure fiction. '
I could also tell how the first German wounded
picked up in Belgium on the battlefields were sent,
by the express wish of our Queen, to the ambulance
of the Royal Palace in just the same way as the
Belgian wounded.
But I prefer to allow a document which is based
on observation made by the Germans themselves
to speak for itself.
Two official commissions have been instituted
in Germany, one civilian and the other military,
separately charged with the duty of holding an
inquiry into all acts of cruelty alleged against
belligerents.
As to the question of the gouging out of eyes, it
has been stated that in all the cases reported in the
papers or by private individuals, witnesses have
been found and questioned. It has been stated
before the Civilian Commission, that in a great
many cases, not to say in nearly all, these witnesses
admitted that they only possessed hearsay evi-
' See especially the Vorwdrts of October 22d and the heading
"Das Marchen von den ausgestochenen Augen" (The Legend of
the Gouged-Out Eyes), which this paper introduced in order to
collect evidence from German sources in refutation of the accu-
sations made against the Belgians.
248 The War of 191 4
dence of the facts; other witnesses declined to
make their depositions and did not appear. The
finding was that it had not been proved that
Belgian women had gouged out the eyes
of wounded or of prisoners of war and that
in no single case had this fact been stated
officially.
The German Commission explained that this
story must have arisen from the fact that a great
number of wounded had their eyes put out by
fragments of shrapnel which burst about a man's
height from the ground and often hit men in the
eyes.
The story still persists in spite of these find-
ings and declarations. But in official circles
these acts of cruelty alleged against the Bel-
gians are formally denied. The Civilian Com-
mission was positive and unanimous on this
point.
The Military Commission arrived at the same
conclusions.
We now see what is left of the rash statements
of German officials and the German Press. The
unfortunate thing is that, during long months,
this defamation has accomplished its evil work
and that we are now witnessing its deplorable
effects.
German Rules of War 249
3. The Treatment of Foreigners
If we can believe the note of protest^ and the
German Press which commented upon it with pain-
ful insistence, the German residents in Belgium on
their departure met with inhuman treatment at
the hands of the inhabitants of the large towns,
especially at Brussels and Antwerp.^ Nor did
Austrians escape the hatred of the populace; in
fact, Austria-Hungary thought fit to justify her
declaration of war against Belgium on August
28th by the statement that
Austrian and Hungarian nationals in Belgium have
had to submit, under the very eyes of the Belgian
authorities, to treatment contrary to the most
primitive demands of humanity, and inadmissible
even towards subjects of an enemy State.
I will quote a statement spontaneously sent by
a German on September loth to the Kolnische
Zeitung.^ I will give it in detail because it
shows in a remarkably clear light both the irre-
proachable conduct of the inhabitants as of the
Belgian authorities, and also the inevitable ex-
cesses of that part of the population which is ever
ready to join in disorderly expressions of popular
^P. 211.
' See, for example, Kolnische Zeitung, Nos. 896, 900, 901, 937,
948. 3 No. 799.
250 The War of 191 4
feeling. That windows were broken, German beer
advertisement boards smashed to pieces, people
in the street jeered at and even jostled, cannot
cause any surprise, but these were isolated cases
which were vigorously checked by the police,
severely punished by the Belgian Courts, and dis-
avowed, in short, by everybody. I will let the
correspondent of the Kolnische Volkszeitung tell
the story :
For the past fortnight, the German Press has been
full of accounts of acts of brutality committed by
the Belgians against our fellow-countrymen, and it
would seem as if all Belgians are cut-throats from
whom Germans can only escape with their lives
by some piece of good fortune.
The author of these lines has no intention of
casting any doubt as to the truth of the numerous
incidents which have been reported. He himself
witnessed the way in which the population of the
centre of Brussels, stirred by the news of Germany's
first steps, gave vent to its anger by attacking
German restaurants and shops. He heard that
Germans were severely handled, and he is far from
wishing to condone such behaviour. He merely
wishes to show that these outbursts were the work
of a disorderly crowd recruited from the dregs of
the people.
The author of this account was obliged to leave
Brussels with his family on Friday, August 7th, at
daybreak. He had to spend the Thursday night
I
German Rules of War 251
at the German Constilate which was already under
American protection. About three thousand of our
fellow-countrymen had arrived there with their
wives and children, taking with them the bare
necessities of life, in order to escape from personal
danger, and to return to their country under official
protection.
I met several families of foreigners there, who had
fled from the French frontier. They had already
spent two days and two nights without undressing,
and had had very little food. Huddled up together,
at the German Consulate, we sat on the floor, in the
corridors, and on the stairs. It was decided about
midnight — probably on account of the serious
danger of keeping so great a number of people in a
relatively small and ill-lit house — to transport us to
the Cirque Royal. This is a big building belonging
to the town, very roomy and well-ventilated, and
only a few minutes distant. During this transfer,
as indeed afterwards in the Cirque itself, and at
dawn the next day on the way to the station,
the Civic Guard watched over us, and showed
such consideration that one felt as if their duty
had rather been protection than surveillance. It
was certainly a lamentable sight to see these in-
numerable fugitives with their wives and children,
and, in spite of the early hour, we heard exclama-
tions of pity from the inhabitants as they gazed at
us from their windows. The soldiers were just as
sorry for us; they, one and all, by look or gesture,
expressed pity for us. Several Civic Guards came
to the help of those who were in the sorriest plight,
by carrying their bags or their children. The
burgomaster himself, Mr. Max, arrived at two
252 The War of 191 4
o'clock in the morning in a motor to see that every-
thing went smoothly. In the Cirque, the soldiers
themselves looked after the children, giving them
milk and food. An eye-witness told me that he had
seen the soldiers make a collection among them-
selves for the benefit of a destitute family. An
officer on duty, who happened to be a friend of
mine, left me no peace until I had entrusted my wife
and children to him so that he might take them to
his own house not far off. During the hours of
waiting in the Cirque, the soldiers whose duty it was
to collect all weapons, did their utmost to speak
German as best they could. In a word, each one did
all that was in his power to succour the fugitives. »
This account, written from the heart, fully con-
firms what I know and what is indeed a matter of
general knowledge. On page 14 of the pamphlet
I have already mentioned, Die Belgischen Greuel-
tatetiy it is stated that, at Brussels, between August
6th and 8th, two women were so beaten that one
of them died in consequence; that two children
between the ages of three and five were, in two
different streets, thrown out of second-fioor win-
dows, and one of them subsequently beaten to
death; finally that several men had their eyes
gouged out and their ears cut off, and that a
* See also Kolnische Zeitung, No. 901 of August loth, which
contains a similar account.
I
I
German Rules of War 253
butcher was disembowelled, and that at Antwerp,
the hotel -keeper Weber was murdered.
There is not a word of truth in all this.
It is to be noted that at Antwerp, an official
inquiry, undertaken by the Bench itself, found that
no offence had been committed against Germans
or Austrians either on August 6th, or at any other
date; as for the hotel -keeper Weber, he went to
Holland where he lived for a long time in perfect
health.
Nevertheless, it is not for inaccuracy of state-
ment or exaggeration of facts that I find fault with
the authors of this propaganda pamphlet, who
prefer to remain anonymous. They have doubtless
received from various sources the information
which they print. Their mistake lies in forgetting
that passion and supposition are liable both to
distort and to exaggerate impressions received in a
moment of panic. Their crime, an unpardonable
one, has been to spread, in an official guise, un-
truths of this nature, and to exploit them with a
view to exciting resentment both between individ-
uals and between nations.
I have taken the trouble to examine these three
categories of accusations, whose systematic dif-
fusion has had the disastrous result that, in the
254 The War of 191 4
greater part of Central Europe, the people of my
country, so honest, so industrious, so hospitable,
so good, are to-day held up by public opinion to the
execration of the civilized world. The result is
that there has been added to the undeserved
disasters with which the German invasion has
overwhelmed Belgium the moral torture of know-
ing herself calumniated, and suffering the defile-
ment of her name.
But I might have abstained from this painful
discussion.
For if war has been waged in Belgium in the
manner in which everyone knows it has been
waged, it is not in expiation of any presumed
crime: it is in conformity with a code; it is in
accordance with all the precepts of the special
code of war which Germany has set up for herself.
Although a party to the international conven-
tions signed at The Hague in 1899 and confirmed
in 1907, Germany has in fact preserved a collec-
tion of rules of war which, both in the spirit and
the letter, are far removed from those laid down
by The Hague Convention, which has been
called the charter of the law of nations in time
of war.
It is this German war code that I propose to
examine here. It is material to show that the
I
German Rules of War 255
acts which have aroused the public conscience in
the course of the hostilities carried on in Belgium
are not by any means accidental; they are not a
matter of personal, temporary, or local circum-
stances. They arise from a system, from a doc-
trine, and are what that system and doctrine
required them to be.
There exists in Germany a manual of the laws
of war on land. ' This manual, which dates from
1902, was published by the historical section of
the Grand General Staff in a compilation of studies
prescribed for officers. It is therefore entitled to
be considered, as the French translator of the
manual, Paul Carpentier, rightly said, as is the
nature of instructions emanating directly and
officially from the German higher command.
The chief impression left in the mind of a reader
of this code is that the German Grand General
Staff has set its face against the modem tendencies
which would confine the unchained passions of war
within limits prescribed by the requirements of
law and humanity.
From the very outset the manual contrasts the
true characteristics of war with the conceptions of
it formed by the conscience of our times. '
^ Kriegsgebrauch im Landkriege.
• The German War Book, Professor Morgan's translation, p. 54.
256 The War of 191 4
But since the tendency of thought of the last
century was dominated essentially bj?" humani-
tarian considerations which not infrequently de-
generated into sentimentality and flabby emotion
{Sentimentalitdt und weichlicher Gefuhlschwdrinerei)^
there have not been wanting attempts to influ-
ence the development of the usages of war in a way
which was in fundamental contradiction with the
nature of war and its object. Attempts of this
kind will also not be wanting in the future, the more
so as these agitations have found a kind of moral
recognition in some provisions of the Geneva Con-
vention and the Brussels and Hague Conferences.
Moreover the officer is a child of his time. He
is subject to the intellectual tendencies which in-
fluence his own nation ; the more educated he is the
more will this be the case. The danger that, in this
way, he will arrive at false views about the essential
character of war must not be lost sight of. The
danger can only be met by a thorough stud}^ of war
itself. By steeping himself in military history an
officer will be able to guard himself against excessive
humanitarian notions.
In many passages the manual refers to the
violent contradictions between the opinions of
professors of international law and those of the
military. '
All juristic demands to the contrary are as a
matter of principle to be repudiated as being in
fundamental conflict with the principles of war.
' The German War Book, p. 80.
German Rules of War 257
And again:.
The claims to the contrary put forward by some
jurists are completely inconsistent with war and
must be repudiated by soldiers.^
A propos of a particular question, the manual
also reproduces a characteristic passage of a
German treatise on the law of war, prefacing it
with a few lines in which it again marks the
contrast which I have just pointed out. ^
As regards the admissibility of reprisals, it is to
be remarked that these are objected to by numerous
teachers of international law on grounds of human-
ity. To make this a matter of principle, and apply
it to every case exhibits, however, a misconcep-
tion due to intelligible but exaggerated and unjusti-
fiable feelings of humanity, of the significance, the
seriousness, and the right of war. It must not be
overlooked that here also the necessity of war and
the safety of the State are the first consideration,
and not regard for the unconditional freedom of
prisoners from molestation.
Finally the general principle which, according
to this German code, ought to dominate all modern
war is clearly stated in these sentences which the
jurists of the Grand General Staff put in the intro-
duction to their work^:
» The German War Book, p. 78.
' Ibid., p. 74. J Ibid.^ p. 52.
17
258 The War of 191 4
A war conducted with energy cannot be directed
merely against the combatants of the Enemy State
and the positions they occupy, but it will and must
in like manner seek to destroy the total intellectual
and material resources of the latter. Humanitar-
ian claims such as the protection of men and their
goods can only be taken into consideration in so far
as the nature and object of the war permit.
It is quite categorical. In war, everything must
be subordinated to the achievement of the main
end.
Against the law of war the German code op-
poses the object of w^ar. As arbitrary as the
object of the State the object of war takes into
consideration only what will forward the realiza-
tion of the plan formed by the belligerent. It
allows them "to have recourse to all means
which enable it to attain the object of the war."'
This rule admits in practice of certain limita-
tions, but they are all governed by "one's own
interest,"^ by "the rec(|gnition of one's own
advantage,"^ to which one may add "Chiv-
alrous feelings. Christian thought, higher civ-
ilization."''
Moreover — let there be no mistake — these re-
strictions are far from constituting a law of war :
' The German War Book.
« Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.
German Rules of War 259
. . . They have in the course of the nineteenth cen-
tury often led to attempts to develop, to extend, and
thus to make universally binding these pre-existing
usages of war; to elevate them to the level of laws
binding nations and armies, in other words to
create a codex belli, a law of war. All these attempts
have hitherto, with some few exceptions to be
mentioned later, completely failed. If, therefore,
in the following work the expression "the law of
war" is used, it must be understood that by it is
meant not a lex scripta introduced by international
agreements, but only a reciprocity of mutual agree-
ment; a limitation of arbitrary behaviour, which
custom and conventionality, human friendliness,
and a calculating egotism have erected, but for the
observance of which there exists no express sanction,
but only "the fear of reprisals" decides/
It will be seen that the tendencies revealed by
these comments are hardly in accord with the
preamble which the Powers, including Germany,
prefixed to the ''Convention of July 29, 1899,
regarding the laws and customs of war on land."
According to the view of the High Contracting
Parties, these provisions, the wording of which has
been inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of
war, so far as military necessities admit, are in-
tended to serve as general rules of conduct for
belligerents. It could not be intended by the
High Contracting Parties that the cases not pro-
^ The German War Book,
26o The War of 191 4
vided for should, for want of a written provision, be
left to the arbitrary judgment of military com-
manders.
Until a more complete code of the laws of war
can be issued, the High Contracting Parties think
it expedient to declare that in cases not included
in the Regulations adopted by them, populations
and belligerents remain under the protection and
rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they
result from the usages established between civilized
nations, from the laws of humanity, and the require-
ments of the public conscience. '
It is apparent that the two documents are not
inspired by the same spirit. The divergence was
so clear that it was intended to discuss the matter
at the second Hague Conference in 1907.
As M. Louis Renault recently explained at the
Institut de France^:
The Conference was concerning itself with induc-
ing the Germans to give an explanation of the spirit
of this manual, when a rather dramatic incident oc-
curred. The German delegates made a proposal
with the object of providing a sanction for the rules
of the Convention. According to this proposal,
slightly amended, and embodied as Article 3 of the
Convention "a belhgerent party which violates the
provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case
demands, be liable to make compensation. It shall
* Pearce Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences, p. 209.
" Le Temps, October 27th.
German Rules of War 261
be responsible for all acts committed by persons
forming part of its armed forces.*'
The Treaty is obligatory since the party who
violates it is bound to make good the damage
caused by the violation. The Conference took into
consideration that the terms of the Convention in
question should be observed not only by the com-
manders of the belligerent armies, but generally by
all the officers, non-commissioned officers, and sol-
diers ; thus possibly extending to international law,
in all cases of violation, the principle of private law
that the principal is responsible for his agents.
Some have wished to interpret the "dramatic
incident, " of which M. Renault spoke, as tactics
with the object of evading the awkward questions
which it was proposed to put to the German
delegates. For my part I only wish to see in it
evidence of the importance of the engagements
made at The Hague by the forty -four Powers, and
of the solemn adherence given to them by the
German Empire.
Nevertheless the German code of 1902 has
continued in force. Not only has the Grand
General Staff modified nothing in it, but various
jurists of authority in Germany have not hesitated,
both to defend it and to denounce the divergence
which separates it from The Hague Convention.
These jurists cannot conceive of a law of war
262 The War of 19 14
not subject to modification by a "state of neces-
sity" {Notstand) and we shall see what remains of
the law when so modified.
There is no violation of the law of war [writes
Meurer] when an act of war is necessary for the
maintenance of troops or for their defence against a
danger which cannot be avoided by any other means,
or to attain or consolidate the success of a military
operation not in itself prohibited. '
A similar impression is obtained from the perusal
of a work which has just appeared and in which
one of the editors of Jahrbuch des Volkerrechts,
Dr. Karl Strupp, surveys in detail the law of war
on land.^ In his introduction he freely develops
the idea that there can never be any question of
limiting the freedom of the command and that
above all law of war is always placed the object of
war. 3
Strupp, moreover, takes great care^ to discover
in the proceedings of The Hague Conference the
notion of "a state of necessity." This notion,
he says, appears there, as distinct from the "mili-
tary objective" and more comprehensive than it.
Thus the destruction of enemy property is per-
' Die Haager Friedenskonferenz, II. Band, p. 14.
* Das Internationale Laitdkriegsrecht, 1914.
» Ibid., p. 5. 4 Ihid., pp. 7-8.
German Rules of War 263
mitted by Article 23 (g) of The Hague Convention
in exceptional cases when it is urgently dictated
by the necessities of war; for example, in order to
reach hostile positions artillery may bombard an
intermediate village. Here there is present a
** military objective" imposed by the technical
conditions of war. But "the state of necessity"
would include, in a general way, all cases which
can arise in the course of the operations :
Thus troops may be obliged to allow prisoners
to die of hunger, if the Command deems that that is
the only means of carrying out an order which it has
received. For example, to reach at the proper time
a position indispensable for the success of the
operations, ' . . . the provisions of the laws of war
can be disregarded whenever a violation appears to
be the only means of carrying out an operation of
war or assuring its success, or even of preserving
the armed forces, even if only a single soldier is
concerned. *
Uncertain as some of the provisions of inter-
national law may be at the present day — as
Professor Max Huber has shown with reference
to the idea of necessity in war^ — it is not possible
that such interpretations should meet with the
approval of those who concluded The Hague
* Das Internationale Landkriegsrecht, 1914, p.7. 'Ibid., p. 8.
> Zeitschrift fiir Volkerrecht, vol. vii., p. 363.
264 The War of 191 4
Convention of 1899, and solemnly renewed it in
1907. And if these interpretations are to prevail
it would be more dignified on the part of certain
Powers not to associate themselves at all with a
work which really becomes merely a hypocritical
parody of law.
The general spirit of the German code is appar-
ent in every one of its particular rules and the
result is a striking unity of conception which
cannot fail to leave a decisive imprint on the
training of officers.
Thus the application of the various methods of
war is governed by the following principle^ :
What is permissible includes every means of
war without which the object of the war cannot be
obtained; what is reprehensible on the other hand,
includes every act of violence and destruction which
is not demanded by the object of war.
The idea that the end in view must be the
governing — if not the exclusive — consideration is
found in the commentary on this rule^:
As a supplement to this rule, the usages of war
recognize the desirability of not employing severer
' The German War Book, Professor Morgan's translation, p. 64.
» Ibid., p. 65.
German Rules of War 265
forms of violence if and when the object of the war
may be attained by milder means, and furthermore
that certain means of war which lead to unnecessary
suffering are to be excluded.
It follows from these general propositions that
all devastation, destruction, and injury is per-
missible whenever it is demanded by the necessi-
ties of war. '
No harm must be done, not even the very
slightest, which is not dictated by military consid-
eration ; every kind of harm may be done, even the
very utmost, which the conduct of war requires or
which comes in the natural course of it.
Ultimately, the application of these rules rests
upon the absolute power of the command. *
Whether the natural justification exists or not is
a subject for decision in each individual case. The
answer to this question lies entirely in the power of
the Commanding Officer, from whose conscience
our times can expect and demand as far-reaching
humanity as the object of .war permits.
Further, as another passage says,^
wide limits are set to the subjective freedom and
arbitrary judgment of the Commanding Officer.
... If in the following pages, we develop briefly
' The German War Book, p. 124 or again p. 125.
^ Ibid., p. 125. 3 Ibid., p. 64.
266 The War of 191 4
the principles ... it must none the less be clearly
emphasized that the necessities of war not only
allow a deviation from these principles in many
cases but in some circumstances make it a positive
duty of the Commander.^
It is appropriate to emphasize the consequences
which the German conception of "the necessities
of war" imposes on a commander of troops.
The first of these consequences clearly ap-
pears in the quotations which we have just given ;
it is the consecration of arbitrary rule. The
command may proceed to the violation of the pro-
visions of the most solemn treaties, "if it thinks
it necessary."
I have no wish to discuss here the validity of the
supreme principle of necessity; I will limit myself
to the remark that it should be well understood and
judiciously applied. It is a dangerous principle;
necessity has never been in the eyes of jurists a
matter of justification except in the case of a really
inevitable necessity, a necessity which is absolute.
But subjected to the interpretation of a military
commander this so-called necessity is inevitably
transformed into mere expediency.
Now the point is just the danger that the prin-
ciple of necessity in practice often degenerates
» See pp. 147-148.
German Rules of War 267
easily into a mere rule of expediency; and what
is still worse, of an immediate expediency. It
cannot be otherwise when its application is en-
trusted to men such as the commanders of troops,
whom quickness of action and self-confidence are
specially apt to lead to fling all scruples aside.
Moreover in every sphere the principle of im-
mediate expediency is subversive of all law and
all morality. Law and morality have as their
function the repelling of appeals to egoism and
personal necessity. To say to a military command-
er that he can put a man to death without trial,
that he can shoot the mayor of a locality because
an inhabitant has fired on a soldier, that he can
for the same reason shoot one inhabitant out of
ten, that he can set fire to a defenceless village,
if these things are necessary, allows in fact this
military commander to commit all these acts
every time he thinks it useful ; that incites him to
the violation of all treaties, and of all rules of in-
ternational law. It is expedient, it is "neces-
sary" to place before troops a human barrier
formed of civilians if one wishes to prevent the
troops from being destroyed ; the enemy will not
dare to fire, or he will fire less, and the lives of the
German soldiers will be spared. It is expedient,
it is "necessary" to reduce a village or a town to
268 The War of 191 4
ashes if the civilians there have fired; for such
treatment, to be repeated if necessary, has the
result of preventing any one laying hands on the
German soldiers whose life and well-being are
"necessary" to the defence of the Fatherland. I
said, "Reduce a town to ashes, because civilians
have fired," but the application of the principle
of necessity is even worse ; one reduces a town to
ashes because one believes, because one has reason
to believe, because one is pleased to believe, that
civihans have fired.
I will go back for a moment, and emphasize
here that it is just this military conception of the
principle of necessity which inspired the Imperial
Chancellor to make his famous exclamation, ''Not
kennt kein Gebof' ("Necessity knows no law").
The Chancellor was not then speaking the lan-
guage of a statesman, otherwise he would have
perceived that his declaration was the very ne-
gation of the solemn engagements of Germany.^
It was the war-men who expressed themselves
through his mouth, and who suggested to him
the dangerous dialectic of the military theory
of the principle of necessity. Who can believe
to-day that to pass through Belgium and Luxem-
burg was a "necessity" for Germany, that, in
* See p. 69.
German Rules of War 369
other words, it was the one and only means of
carrying on a victorious struggle against her ene-
mies? In what in fact did the occupation of
Belgium end? In the occupation of Belgium, and
not in the destruction of the French forces. Who
could have asserted, in July or in the first days of
August, that it was an absolute certainty that in
concentrating all her efforts against the French
barrier on the west, the German army would not
have succeeded in effecting a breach with the
help of those great guns, of the existence of which
foreign countries as yet knew nothing? Who
could assert indeed that there were not other pos-
sible plans of campaign? . . . The fact is that
the German General Staff had chosen that which
appeared to it the best. But that which appears
to be the best is not therefore "necessary."
And if the military authorities made light of this
embarrassing but elementary distinction, it was the
duty of the political authorities to refuse to follow
them.
Returning to the German rules of war, it is well
known that the events in Belgium have afforded
abundant evidence that in the course of military
operations the military command had no scruples
whatever, in its blind application of the rule of
necessity. I will quote by way of example cer-
270 The War of 191 4
tain passages of the proclamation displayed at
Grivegnee, near Liege, by Major Commandant
Dieckmann :
By September 6, 1914, at four in the afternoon,
all arms, munitions, explosives, and fireworks, still
in the possession of citizens must be delivered up at
the Chateau de Bruyeres. Any one who does not
do so will be liable to the death penalty. He will be
shot at sight, or bayoneted, unless he proves that
he was not at fault.
All the inmates of inhabited houses in the locali-
ties of Beyne-Heusay, Grivegnee, Bois-de-Breux
must be at home by nightfall.^ The said houses
must be illuminated as long as any one in them is up.
The outer doors must be locked. Any one who does
not conform to these rules will expose himself to
severe penalties. Any resistance whatever to these
orders involves death.
The Commandant must not meet with any
difficulty in his domiciliary visits. Everybody is re-
quested without special demand to show every room
in the house. Any one who resists will be severely
punished. . . .
I require that all civilians who move about in
my area, and especially those of the localities of
Beyne-Heusay, Fleron, Bois-de-Breux, Grivegnee,
show respect to German officers by taking off their
hats, or by carrying their hand to their head as for
the military salute.' In case of doubt, every German
soldier should be saluted. Any one who does not do
* Now 7 P.M. German time.
German Rules of War 271
this may expect the German soldiery to exact re-
spect by any means in their power.
The German soldiery may inspect vehicles,
packages, etc., of all the inhabitants of the neigh-
bourhood. Any resistance in this matter will be
severely punished.
Any one who has knowledge that quantities of
more than one hundred litres of petrol, benzine,
benzol, or other similar liquids exist in a place
within the above-mentioned districts, and who has
not reported them to the military commander there
stationed, will, if there is no doubt as to the place
and the quantity, incur the penalty of death.
Quantities of one hundred litres are alone regarded.
Any one who disobeys a command to hold up his
hands, incurs the penalty of death.
Entry to the Chateau de Bruy^res or the roads of
the park is forbidden under pain of death from
dusk to dawn to all persons save soldiers of the
German army.
Any one who by the dissemination of false news
of a nature calculated to injure the morale of the
German troops, or any one who in any way seeks to
contrive against the German army, makes himself a
suspect, and incurs the risk of being shot at sight.
The death penalty for any one who fails to report
a petrol depot, — the death penalty for any one who
refuses to illuminate his house as long as any one
is up in it, — the death penalty for any one who
2^2 The War of 191 4
spreads news calculated to injure the morale of the
German troops : it is impossible to conceive a more
intolerable manifestation of arbitrary power.
But there is another consequence of the German
precepts as to the attitude of the command.
Having merely for its criterion of conduct the
object of the war, the command may have recourse
to methods far removed from the immediate exi-
gencies of military operations ; intimidation, terror-
ism, and, generally, any proceedings calculated to
engender fear or submissiveness are recognized, not
by way of defence or punishment, but with a view
to preventing hostile acts or their repetition.^
On this subject a particular rule is enunciated with
reference to the relations between the army oc-
cupying a territory and the inhabitants of the
territory^:
... to employ ruthlessly the necessary means of
defence and intimidation is obviously not only a
right but indeed a duty of the staff of the army.
Generally speaking, a commander should be
inspired by this sort of humanitarian paradox^:
. . . that certain severities are indispensable to
war, nay more, that the only true humanity very
often lies in a ruthless application of them.
» See The German War Book, p. 121.
» Ibid., p. lao. 3 Ibid,, p. 55.
German Rules of War 273
One can easily imagine the mentality of a
commander impregnated with such a spirit.
Always in fear of "yielding to the solicitations of
exaggerated sensibility," experiencing the weight
of the responsibility resting upon him if he neglects
to conform in all his relations with the necessities
of war, and impatient to arrive at his goal, he
chooses the most rapid way and excuses to himself
the harshness which his choice involves. As be-
tween two reports he is led to accept the worse;
pushed to action because he fears the consequences
of postponement he is little disposed to delay
punishment by the dilatoriness of trial. Removed,
in the midst of the realities of war, from all pres-
sure of public opinion, drawn on by the example
of others less scrupulous than himself, he is liable
to lose all critical sense and to found his judgment
on what is really mere coincidence.
Thus, for instance, a German detachment enters
a Belgian village; it finds a few peasants around a
newly made grave, some of them are still spade in
hand. Beside them is the corpse of a German
officer. The corpse is examined, the temple is
found to be pierced by a revolver bullet; the
wound is not one such as would be received in
battle. The clothes of the dead man are searched ;
the search discloses that all his personal belongings
18
274 The War of 191 4
have disappeared. ''These people have killed
and robbed our comrade, " cries the commander of
the detachment, ''punish the village! That will
serve as an example to others. " Eight farms are
burnt; the village is sacked, the soldiers take
money, valuables, clothes, and provisions; women
are violated; men are tied up, led to a field, in-
sulted and threatened with death. In the evening
fourteen people are killed. They are:
G. Deboetz, C. Bourguignon and his two sons,
J. Maillard, J. Jonniaux, A. Bitanne, J. Triffaux, L.
Divraad, E. Dalhe, H. Penhar, L. Desisans, E.
Jonniaux, and his wife L. Verdael.
Amongst them are the peasants of the morning.
The corpses are buried in a field by the Germans.
That which I have just described happened at
Linsmeau, a little village of the province of Bra-
bant, on Monday, August loth, a short time after
the occupation of Liege.
But I have not told the early part of the story,
which was not known to the commander of the
detachment.
On the morning of the fatal Monday, on the
high road of Linsmeau, some Belgian soldiers met
some German soldiers making a reconnaissance.
Shots were exchanged, and the German soldiers re-
German Rules of War 275
treated. An officer fell. The Belgians approached :
he was their first victim, never before had they
wounded or killed any one. Their commanding
officer did not conceal his emotion. They gathered
round the officer as he lay on the ground. Suddenly
he got up, seized his revolver, and threatened
those who stood around him. He defied them with
proud and wild words. One of the Belgians fired
and the bullet struck the officer on the temple:
he fell. Emotion choked them; before this inert
form their pity increased. ' ' Let us take his belong-
ings from him," said one of the men. *'We will
send them to his family." The objects were
collected and placed in a pocket handkerchief
with its comers tied up. The little packet was
taken to the Vicar of a neighbouring village and he
was told, ''When the Germans pass by give this to
an officer and ask him to have the contents sent
to the family of the man who lies dead up there. "
Then some peasants were called and asked to dig
a grave to bury the victim. The Belgian soldiers
went on their way; the peasants, talking over the
occurrence, slowly applied themselves to their sad
task. They were still busy with it when the
main body of the German detachment passed by
Linsmeau.
These facts, estabHshed by irrefragable proofs
2j6 The War of 191 4
which have been furnished to me, should suffice.
They axe a perfect illustration of the German
system of war and of the consequences which it
involves in the mentality of the officers. All that
I have said above is verified here to the letter.
But there is a practice of war wholly characteris-
tic of the German system which has received many
a sad application in Belgium; I mean that of
collective repression.
What is to be understood by "collective re-
pression" ? It is both defined and forbidden in the
text of Article 50 of the Second Hague Convention
with regard to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land.
No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, can
be inflicted on the population on account of the
acts of individuals for which it cannot be regarded
as collectively responsible. ^
This is clear and explicit.
If in any place some persons have been guilty of
unlawful acts, it is forbidden to punish the locahty
as a whole in any manner whatsoever.
Here also German lawyers who comment on the
code of 1902 and on the Hague Convention are
^ Higgins, p. 247.
German Rules of War 277
forced to restrict the application of Article 50 by
subtle dialectic. In particular Strupp, of whose
recent work I have spoken, writes with regard to
the events which have occurred in Belgium during
the present war':
These are intentional and deliberate infractions
of the laws of war, but they were nothing more than
a reaction against and a threat with regard to the
violations already committed by the enemy; in
spite of their horror they thus appear to us as having
been necessary measures and in conformity with
international law (vdlkerrechtsgemdss).
It has been seen in the preceding pages how lit-
tle foundation there is for the accusations made
against the Belgian population and how rash it
therefore is to try to find a justification for the
measures of reprisal taken by the German troops.
But even if outrages had been committed by
particular individuals, the population as a whole
cannot be considered as having a collective re-
sponsibility. Hence the Hague Convention should
have been observed. And it is not possible to
deprive it of force by distinguishing, as Strupp
does, ^ the passive responsibility of the authorities
from the active responsibility of the inhabitants,
' Das Internationale Landkriegsrecht, p. 9.
» Ibid., pp. 9 and 108.
278 The War of 191 4
for in Belgium the authorities — all the authorities
— so far from not intervening, had taken from
the very beginning, as I have explained, rigorous
measures to ensure complete calm.
But I do not wish to deal at greater length with
the controversies which have been raised in so
unexpected a manner by German lawyers, and I
return to cases of collective repression which in
Belgium has been applied both to localities and to
their inhabitants.
It will have been observed that the text of
Article 50 of the Hague Convention specially
mentions the infliction of a collective fine: in this
it hafs in mind a war contribution in so far as this
has the character of a collective repression.
Although it is forbidden by virtue of this Article
it has been several times applied in Belgium by
German commanders.
Thus the following words occur in the proclama-
tion posted up at Wavre on August 27th by
Lieutenant-General von Nieber:
On August 22, 1 9 14, the General Commanding
the Second Army, General von Biilow, imposed on
the town of Wavre a war-levy of frs. 3,000,000
(£120,000), payable up till September ist, to ex-
piate the heinous conduct, contrary to the Laws
of the Rights of Nations and the Customs of War,
German Rules of War 379
which they showed in making a surprise attack on
the German troops. ^
More characteristic still is the notice affixed in
Brussels on November ist by the Governor of
Brussels, Baron von Lutwitz:
The town of Brussels apart from its suburbs has
been punished, on account of the attempt com-
mitted by one police agent, de Ryckere, against a
German soldier, by the imposition of an additional
contribution of five million francs.
It will be observed that the same proclamation
states that the agent in question had been con-
demned to five years' imprisonment for the crime
mentioned above and for another offence. It will
be agreed that it would be difficult to find a more
complete transgression of the Hague Convention.
In other cases, much more numerous, the war
contribution imposed belonged to the class of
requisitions on the subject of which the Hague
Convention expressly stipulates^ that they should
only be claimed "for the needs of the army
occupying the country" and that they "should be
in conformity with the resources of the country.'*
It has not been possible for me to obtain a list
of the war contributions imposed in the various
* Sixth Report of the Belgian Committee of Inquiry.
« Article 52.
28o The War of 191 4
parts of the country, but, from what has been
established beyond all possible doubt, we may
assert that the two conditions just mentioned
have not in the least been the guiding principles in
Belgium. In the first place in nearly all cases it has
been a question of supplying the needs, not of
contingents occupying the country, but of armies
of invasion often engaged in the struggle against
France and England. Further — and this is the
most important point — the contributions imposed
were obviously disproportionate to the resources
of the locality. Sometimes instead of allowing
some sort of a composition for requisitions in kind,
these were imposed in addition without its be-
ing possible to ascertain even approximately the
principles of taxation.
But collective repression has taken many other
forms besides that of the imposition of fines and I
should like to deal at greater length with this ques-
tion by citing proclamations which have emanated
from German authorities in the localities occu-
pied. I emphasize the passages which imply col-
lective repression and give the original texts:
At Hasselt on August 17th:
Should the inhabitants fire on the soldiers of the
German army a third part of the male population
will be taken away.
German Rules of War 281
At Liege, August 22d':
The inhabitants of the town of Andenne, after
having asserted their pacific intentions, have
treacherously surprised our troops. ^
It is with my consent that the General in charge
has btuned the whole locality and that one hundred
persons have been shot.
I bring this fact to the knowledge of the town of
Li^ge in order that the inhabitants may realize the
fate with which they are threatened if they assume
a similar attitude.
At Namur, August 25 th ^ :
The people of Namur ought to understand that
there is no greater or more horrible crime than that
of endangering the existence of the town and the life
of the inhabitants by making attempts on the
German army.
At Wavre, August 27th ^:
On August 22, 1 9 14, the General commanding the
second army, M. de Biilow, imposed on the town
of Wavre a contribution of war of three million
francs payable before September ist as a punish-
ment for their indescribable conduct in violation of
international law and of the usages of war in attack-
ing German troops by surprise.^
' General von Bulow.
' This, according to the Sixth Report of the Commission of
Inquiry, is a mere assertion contradicted by the inhabitants.
3 General von Biilow.
" Lieutenant-General von Nieber.
sin reality the civil population did not take any part in the
282 The War of 191 4
The town of Wavre will be burned and destroyed
if the payment is not made in time, without respect
of persons ; the innocent will sufiEer with the guilty.
At Brussels, September 25th' :
It has recently happened in districts which are
not at present more or less strongly held by Ger-
man troops that supply columns or patrols have
been surprised and attacked by the inhabitants. I
draw the attention of the public to the fact that a
register of towns and of communities in the neigh-
bourhood of which such attacks have taken place is
kept, and that they must expect to be punished
when German troops are in their neighbourhood.
At Brussels, October 5th':
In the evening of September 25th the railway
line and the telegraph line have been destroyed
between Lovenjoul and Vertryck. In consequence
the two places mentioned have had, on the morn-
ing of October 3d, to give an account of this. In
future, places which lie nearest the spot where such
acts have taken place — whether they are accom-
plices or not — will be punished without pity.
The texts of these various proclamations will
no doubt cause surprise. They are nevertheless in
hostilities, a medical inquiry having proved that the German
soldier who was wounded had been wounded by a German bullet
(meeting of the Commission of Inquiry, September 7, 19 14,
third witness).
* Field-Marshal von der Goltz.
German Rules of War 283
complete conformity with the general dispositions
which the German war organization contem-
plates. Here also we are dealing with a system,
and it is the system of which it is important
to know much more than the incidents of its
appHcation.
In the work of Strupp of which I have spoken,
there appears in the appendix a model of a procla-
mation drawn up in view of the present war.
The following passage occurs in it': *'The whole
town is responsible for the acts of each of its
inhabitants."
I have before me a small book published at
Berlin in 1906 by Bath. It is the military phrase-
book intended for German officers acting as inter-
preters in countries where French is spoken. The
text-book, which has the sub-title Zum Gelrauch im
Feindesland, "For use in an enemy country,*'
contains, according to the introduction, the French
text of most of the documents, letters, proclama-
tions, and other papers which it may be necessary
to use in time of war.
Now among these documents there are to be
found ^ several models, which, taken together,
would constitute a complete text-book of collective
repression. I note, for example:
^P. 248. » P. 128 et seq.
284 The War of 191 4
A fine of 6oo,cx)o marks, 6wing to the attempted
assassination made by a ... on a German soldier
has been imposed on the town of O by order of . . .
Unavailing efforts have been made to postpone
the payment of this stim or to reduce it.
The period fixed for payment expires to-morrow,
Saturday, December 17th, at midday.
Bank notes, cash, and silver will be accepted.
In the following formula also the repression
takes the form of a pecuniary contribution and it
also has in view collective punishment for individ-
ual acts when there is no evidence of collective
responsibility.
The German authorities having demanded a
war contribution of two million francs from the
town of M. because the inhabitants shot on the
troops when entering the town, and the munici-
pality having declared that they do not possess the
necessary funds and that they cannot get the
money from the inhabitants, the German authori-
ties demand a settlement by means of letters of
exchange.
The following is the formula for burning down
whole localities :
I acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated
the 7th of this month notifying me of the great
difficulties which you believe you will experience in
obtaining contributions. ... I can only express
my regret at the explanations which you have
German Rules of War 285
thought it desirable to offer me on this matter.
The order in question emanating from my Govern-
ment is so clear and precise, the instructions which
I have received on this matter are so categorical,
that if the stmi of money due from the town of B.
is not paid it will be burned without mercy.
The following formula is even more characteris-
tic if one bears in mind what I have said above ^
about the very frequent cases where the destruc-
tion of bridges, railways, etc., in Belgium was due
not to civilians, but to small detachments or even
to isolated soldiers :
In consequence of the destruction of the bridge
of F.I order:
The district will pay an extraordinary contribu-
tion of ten million francs by way of a fine. This is
brought to the knowledge of the public who are
informed that the method of spreading this sum will
be indicated at a later date and that the payment of
the sum mentioned will be exacted with the great-
est severity. The village of F. has been at once
burned with the exception of some buildings re-
served for the use of the troops.
What can I add to this irrefutable evidence? Is
it necessary to give accounts of atrocities which
the reader dare not believe and which one can
only try to forget so shocking are they to modern
' P. 232.
236 The War of 1914
consciences disaccustomed to cruelty? The ac-
counts might be regarded with suspicion, they
might be accused of exaggeration. I prefer not to
dwell on them in these pages, whose main aim is to
consider the facts in their general relation to law.
The facts pass, the law remains. It need not
cause surprise therefore that I do not pause to
describe, as so many others have done, scenes of
destruction and incendiarism, or to find out how
many streets have been destroyed at Louvain or
how many persons shot at Dinant, or to discuss the
circumstances which may have led, here and there,
German commanders to think that civilians had
fired. Further, I do not say that wherever the
German troops have passed they have sown ruin
and desolation, nor do I say that they have sys-
tematically destroyed works of art. I will not
say this, because it is not true. But I do say that
the* German armies have a system of war which is
unjustifiable, that this system of war is applied in
an arbitrary manner, brutally and inconsiderately,
and that the acts to which it leads, far from be-
ing capable of denial, are the normal, inevitable,
automatic outcome of the system. This I say
because it is true.
Moreover all these accounts would weaken the
force that the official proclamations which I have
German Rules of War 287
reproduced derive from their conciseness. When
the General Commanding-in-Chief von Bulow
writes, "It is with my consent that the General
has burned the whole locality of Andenne and that
one hundred persons have been shot, " it is almost
superfluous to describe acts of incendiarism and
the shooting of civilians :
It was a vision of Hell [writes an eye-witness, who
deserves the fullest credence]. I seemed to see by the
light of the flames soldiers pushing back with the
bayonet people who wanted to escape from their
burning houses. Mingled with the sound of the
rifles were the sharp crackle of machine guns and
the explosions of bombs. A machine gun was
placed in a shop in the principal street and from
there was directed against the houses opposite.
It was a moving spectacle to see all these old
men, women, and children forced to march towards
La Place des Tilleuls, where the populace was be-
ing collected together. One paralytic was brought
there in a bath chair, others were carried. The
men were separated from the women and children.
It was at first proposed to shoot them all en masse
with machine guns, then to kill several at a time by
placing them one behind another in three ranks.
Finally they picked out three, who were executed
against the houses in the Place before the eyes
of everybody. The men were then divided into
various companies and were led, some towards the
Meuse to be shot there, others to be imprisoned as
hostages.
288 The War of 191 4
This is horrible, you say. Well, all horrors are
possible when free rein is given to soldiers. All
the victims were innocent? No doubt, but it is
just because they were innocent that they were
struck down. At the moment of writing these
pages, I read in the Frankfurter Zeitung of Janu-
ary 6th' that the account of the so-called fight-
ing of francs-tireurs of Andenne, given by the
correspondent whom I have already mentioned,^
is false in essential particulars. Oberlieu tenant von
Eulwege has in fact just replied to the Pax-Infor-
mationen that the vicar of Andenne did not excite
the populace to street fighting. "Moreover," he
adds, ''the greater part of the inhabitants were
not able to see anything because they were hidden
in their cellars. "
And these are the inhabitants whom General
von Billow accuses of having "treacherously sur-
prised the German troops."
But why discuss further? Lieutenant-General
von Nieber said to the town of Wavre: "The in-
nocent will suffer with the guilty, " and the
Governor-General in Belgium, Field-Marshal von
der Goltz, has confirmed this: "Localities will
be punished without mercy, it does not matter
whether they are accomplices or not." Thus a
^No. 6 AhendblatL ^P. 245.
German Rules of War 289
correspondent of the Kolnische Zeitung, speaking
of Tamines, can write with perfect sincerity;
Then, not being able to get at those who had fired,
the rage of our troops was directed against the Uttle
town. Without delay it was given over to the
flames and it has become a heap of ruins.
I have explained why I do not lay emphasis
here on the excesses committed in too many places
by German troops. I wish, however, to recount
how one of my old pupils of the University of
Brussels was killed when on his holidays at Fran-
corchamps, together with other persons as indis-
putably innocent as himself, when this little
picturesque village was put to the flames and
sacked.
Three shots were fired on Saturday August 8th
at half -past eight in the morning. By whom?
At whom? Why? For four days the German
columns had been passing in perfect tranquillity;
it was warm, and the peasants had put buckets of
water along the side of the road in order that the
German soldiers might be able to quench their
thirst; the officers were guests at the hotel; the
population of the village and the small colony of
people from Brussels spending their holidays there
were already becoming accustomed to the passage
19
290 The War of 191 4
of the troops. . . . But suddenly comes the
fatal cry, ''Man hat geschossenT' ("Someone has
fired ! ' *) . The innocent must pay for the guilty.
And suppose that no one was guilty ?
Now it happens that I am to-day in a position
to state precisely the origin of the three shots
heard on the morning of August 8th. Up till the
middle of August small detachments of Belgian
cavalry had pushed their reconnaissances behind
the German line under cover of the woods which are
very numerous round about Spa. Thus it happened
that on August 8th, early in the morning, two
gendarmes and two lancers were hidden in the
thickets of Francorchamps. Seeing the German
column resting they shot at them. The Germans,
on the other hand, not having met with any Bel-
gian troops in those parts since their entry into
the country, imagined that the shots could only
come from civilians, and at once, without any
inquiry, collective repression burst out without
mercy.
There was therefore no one guilty at Francor-
champs. In expiation of what crime was it then
that the peasants of the Ardennes and the holiday-
makers of Brussels were killed ?
That is indeed the true question which arises.
What is the real object of collective repression?
German Rules of War 291
What has been the object of the destruction of the
beautiful parts of Lou vain, of the sack of Dinant
and Aerschot, of the massacres of Tamines and
Andenne, of the devastation of the Ardennes and
the district between the Sambre and the Meuse,
the country of Wavre and Vilvorde, of the burning
of so many peaceful and prosperous villages? It
is not punishment, since in most cases there has
been no crime, and since in any case the punish-
ment is out of all proportion to the offence.
The inscriptions appearing in various places on
the houses which were spared during methodi-
cal pillage and incendiarism indicate, moreover,
how little attempt is made to base repression on
equitable grounds. "Good people: to be spared"
{Gute Leute; schonen). ''They gave us food to
eat." (Man hat uns zu essen gegeben). 'Toor
people who are ill." (Arme kranke Leute). "^
What is the meaning of these statements? At
what price have the inhabitants been able to pur-
chase the complaisance of the soldiers passing
through? Was there not one who was more dis-
posed than his comrades to mercy? Here it has
happened that someone in the house uttered a few
words of German ; there, that the nursemaid was a
German. What have these considerations to do
* See Kolnische Zeitung, September loth.
292 The War of 191 4
with the matter ? The only question of importance
is that of the innocence or guilt of the resident in
the house that is protected or the house that is
sacked? Why are such flimsy presumptions to
decide that one man will keep his life and a family
its home, while others lose them?
No! Collective reprisals on innocent people
are without any foundation in law. They have no
other object than that of sowing terror amongst
the inhabitants, whether with the object of facili-
tating the invasion of the territory or with a view
to intimidating the troops of the enemy and
preventing certain inconvenient operations. "Ex-
perience has shown," one finds for instance in the
code of war "that a contribution in money pro-
duces the greatest effect on the civil population."
And here we find the goal of the system of methodi-
cal terrorism which the German code of warfare
expounds.
That this system produces effective results is
sufficiently attested by various episodes observed
in Belgium. So far from there being any rising of
the populace against the invader, the mere news
of the approach of the German troops was suffi-
cient to cause the exodus of veritable crowds.
Thus according to an accoimt taken from the
Kolnische Zeitung of October 15th, not only did
German Rules of War 293
twelve scouts succeed in putting to flight the
whole population of Selzaete, but the inhabitants
were even seen calling upon the Belgian soldiers
not to fire at the invaders. In certain villages the
fear was so great that the inhabitants went so far
as to facilitate the passage of the German columns
in order to get them away as quickly as possible,
and so avoid incidents from which the worst form
of reprisals might arise. In Flanders, with a
Flemish and agricultural population, as well as in
Hainaut with a Walloon and industrial population,
the inhabitants hung up small white flags with
which to beg for mercy.
Such is the end that is deliberately pursued.
It is true that the inhabitants cannot be compelled
to co-operate directly in the action of the enemy
against their country.' But the same object can
be attained by' means of intimidation. Field-
Marshal von der Goltz knew what he was doing
when he issued his threatening notice to the in-
habitants of the districts bordering on the railway
line between Lovenjoul and Vertryck. It is true
that the rails and telegraph wires had been de-
stroyed on this line, but this destruction, as I
know, was deliberately carried out by Belgian
soldiers who had been entrusted with the duty
* Article 44 of The Hague Convention.
294 The War of 191 4
of cutting communications behind the lines
of the enemy. Decorations have indeed been
publicly granted to those who carried out these
exploits. Now by threatening a "punishment
without mercy" the German authorities aimed at
gaining the complicity of the civilian population
itself and using it as their informant, so that each
inhabitant of the villages was exposed to military
vengeance before the appalling alternative of
either pointing out a soldier who was going to ac-
complish his duty towards the common fatherland,
or of condemning to death his relatives, his
friends, his neighbours, who had been taken away
as hostages.
When, during the sack of Louvain, the tmfor-
tunate inhabitants were taken across the country
and were then made to travel in a famished condi-
tion into Germany, cooped up in cattle trucks, and
exposed to the insults of the populace, only to
be brought back again to Brussels and finally
set free after having been threatened over and
over again with being shot ; when sham executions
were indulged in before spectators who were
compelled to assist and even to applaud,^ can
there have been any other object than to sow
terror by a refinement of cruelty ?
' See Fifth Report of the Commission of Inquiry.
German Rules of War 295
Now, it is hardly necessary to point out that
though intimidation may assure to those in com-
mand the dociHty of the terrorized population,
such a result and many others would be much
more surely gained by an attitude of gentleness,
kindness, justice, and humanity. This attitude
provokes neither hatred nor resentment, but
creates without effort an atmosphere of calm,
however implacable the hostility of the people
may remain. Thus nothing justifies intimidation;
it is a baneful system, contrary to human hature.
The same must be said with regard to the taking
of hostages, a practice which has frequently oc-
curred in the course of the German occupation
of Belgium. Provision is clearly made for it in
the precepts contained in the military phrase-
book of which I spoke before.^ In Belgium
various proclamations of the leaders of the army
have formally authorized this taking of hostages^:
At Namur, August 25th ^:
All the streets will be occupied by a German
guard who will take ten hostages in each street
whom they will keep guarded. If any attack takes
place in the street the ten hostages will be shot.
» P. 255. See p. 129 of the book.
" I reproduce the original text.
3 General von Bulow.
296 The War of 1914
At Brussels, October 5th ' :
With this object hostages have been taken from
all places bordering on the railways which are threat-
ened with such attacks, and on the first attempt to
destroy the railway track, the lines of telegraph or
of the telephone, they will be at once shot.
At Grivegn6e, September 6th ^:
After 9 A.M. on September 7th, I will permit the
houses in Beyne-Heusay, Grivegnee and Bois-de-
Breux to be inhabited by the persons who lived in
them formerly, as long as these persons are not
forbidden to frequent these localities by official
prohibition.
In order that the above-mentioned permit may
not be abused, the Burgomasters of Beyne-Heusay
and Grivegnee must immediately prepare lists of
persons who will be held as hostages for twenty-
four hours each at Fort Fleron.
The life of these hostages depends on the popula-
tion of the above-mentioned Communes remaining
quiet in any circumstances.
From the list which is submitted to me I will
designate persons who shall be hostages from mid-
day till the following mid-day. If the substitute
is not there at the correct time, the hostage must
remain another twenty-four hours at the fort.
After these twenty-four hours the hostage will incur
the penalty of death, if the substitute has not
presented himself.
» Field-Marshal von der Goltz.
' Major Dieckmann.
German Rules of War 297
Priests, Burgomasters, and Members of the
Administration are to be taken first as hostages.
These examples will suffice; they could be in-
definitely multiplied.
Once again no surprise need be felt at the action
of the German armies in the field. The code,
whose spirit I have explained, sanctions these acts
in express terms.
The taking of hostages has become more rare
in contemporary wars, from which fact some pro-
fessors of international law have wrongly concluded
that it had disappeared from the laws of war among
civilized nations.
And after asserting that this practice was
current in various campaigns in the nineteenth
century, the author of the German manual adds:
We must accordingly reject the unfavourable
judgments expressed on the subject of the employ-
ment by the German army of this means of warfare
in isolated cases and for diverse reasons.
As a matter of fact it is by no means in isolated
cases that the German commanders have insisted
on the surrender of hostages, and the opinion of
the legal adviser of the Grand General Staff is
very far from being that of contemporary special-
ists on the laws of war. The rules annexed to The
298 The War of 191 4
Hague Convention do not deal with the question
of the taking of hostages, but the prohibition of
collective punishment in consequence of individ-
ual acts for which the group cannot be held
responsible, involves the condemnation of this
practice. Further, as the life of individuals must
be respected' there can be no question of de-
ciding to put hostages to death in those cases
where the conditions for which they are held
guarantors cannot be carried out. Even if hos-
tages were in the same position as prisoners of
war, they would have the right to their Hves.
This is the point of view assumed as early as 1863
in the Instructions for the Armies in the Field of the
United States of America. =*
The only explanation which is possible of this
persistence of a practice which is so little in con-
formity with the ideas of our time and with the
evolution of the laws of war, is to be found in the
fundamental principle which inspires the whole of
the German code: it is necessary above all things
so to act as to produce intimidation.
In the evening of August 27th, the day after
the devastation of Louvain, a wireless message
came from Berlin^:
* Article 46. ^ Article 54.
3 See The Times of August 29th.
German Rules of War 299
The only means of preventing surprise attacks
from the civil population has been to interfere with
unrelenting severity and to create examples which,
by their frightfulness, would be a warning to the
whole country.
This is precisely the same idea as a German,
Herr Bloem, expressed on February 10, 1915, in the
Kolnische Zeitung: measures of reprisal are much
less in the nature of punishments than in the nature
of warnings (Warnungsstgnale) :
There can be no doubt of this; the burning of
Baltice, Herve, Louvain, Dinant, was carried out
by way of warning. The inevitable incendiarism
and the blood poured out during the first days of
the war have deprived the great Belgian towns of
all temptation to assail the garrisons, necessarily
weak, which we left behind. If Brussels is occu-
pied by us, and if we move about there to-day as if
we were at home, can anyone doubt for a moment
that it is because the capital is afraid of us and
trembles before our vengeance {vor unserer Rache
zittert) ?
Such is the system of war which all-powerful
Germany has deliberately applied to Belgium, as
attested by the very people whose aims are to be
served by the adoption of such methods.
That a war so conducted is contrary "to the
laws of humanity and the requirements of the
300 The War of 1914
public conscience," to quote the terms of the rules
formulated at The Hague, must be obvious to
everyone. Be the aim of the war merely the
passage across neutral and friendly territory such
as Germany publicly proclaimed, or the complete
or partial subjection of Belgium such as she con-
fidentially confessed to Great Britain, — this war
is the last thing in the world that Belgium deserved.
Strong in her probity, her loyalty, and her
innocence, Belgium will never accept the verdict of
arms. Confident and resolute, she lays her cause
before the judgment of those nations who find
their highest pride in the sentiment of national
honour.
APPENDIX
Report of the Chief of the Belgian General
Staff Respecting the Confidential Inter-
views WITH THE British Military Attach^ in
1906.^
(Translation.)
Lettre d M. le Ministre de la
Guerre au sujet des Entre-
iiens confidentiels.
Letter to the Minister of War
respecting the confidential
Interviews.
(Confidentielle.) Bruxelles,
le 10 avril, 1906.
M. LE Ministre,
J'ai I'honneur de vous rendre
compte sommairement des en-
tretiens que j'ai eus avec le
Lieutenant-Colonel Bamardis-
ton et qui ont fait Tobjet de
mes communications verbales.
La premiere visite date de la
mi-janvier. M. Bamardiston
me fit part des preoccupations
de retat-major de son pays
relativement a la situation
politique g^n^rale et aux even-
tuality de guerre du moment.
^ I give the text of the Report textually as General Ducame
has drawn it himself, viz. ; introducing the additions and cor-
rections made by him, on the rough draft that was found in
Brussels.
301
(Confidential.)
Brussels, April 10, 1906.
Sir,
I have the honour to furnish
herewith a summary of the
conversations which I have
had with Lieutenant-Colonel
Bamardiston, which I have
already reported to you
verbally.
His first visit was in the
middle of January, Lieuten-
ant-Colonel Bamardiston told
me of the preoccupation of
the British General Staff con-
cerning the general political
situation and the existing
302
Appendix
Un envoi de troupes, d'un
total de 100,000 hommes en-
viron, 6tait projet^ pour le cas
oii la Belgique serait attaqu^e.
Le lieutenant-colonel m*-
ayant demand^ comment cette
action serait interpr6t^e par
nous, je lui r^pondis que, au
point de vue militaire, elle ne
pourrait qu'^tre favorable;
mais que cette question d 'in-
tervention relevait ^galement
du pouvoir politique et que,
d^s lors, j'^tais tenu d'en
entretenir le Ministre de la
Guerre.
M. Bamardiston me repon-
dit que son Ministre k
Bruxelles en parlerait a notre
Ministre des Affaires Etran-
g^res.
II continua dans ce sens : le
d^barquement des troupes ang-
laises se ferait sur la c6te de
France, vers Dunkerque et
Calais, de fagon h hdter le plus
possible le mouvement. L 'en-
tree des Anglais en Belgique
ne se ferait qu'apres la viola-
tion de notre neutrality par
1 'AUemagne. Le d^barque-
ment par Anvers demanderait
beaucoup plus de temps, parce
qu'il faudrait des transports
plus considerables et d 'autre
part la s^curit^ serait moins
complete.
Ceci admis, il resterait h
r^gler divers autres points.
possibilities of war. Should
Belgium be attacked, it was
proposed to send about 100,000
men.
The lieutenant-colonel
having asked me how we
should interpret such a step,
I answered that, from the
military point of view, it
could only be advantageous;
but that this question of inter-
vention had also a political
side, and that I must accord-
ingly consult the Minister of
War.
Lieutenant-Colonel Bar-
nardiston replied that his
Minister at Brussels would
speak about it to our Minister
for Foreign Affairs.
He continued as follows:
The disembarkation of the
British troops would take
place on the French coast, in
the neighbourhood of Dunkirk
and Calais, in such a manner
that the operation might be
carried out in the quickest
possible way. The entry of
the English into Belgium
would only take place after
the violation of our neutrality
by Germany. Landing at
Antwerp would take much
longer, as larger transports
would be required, and, more-
over, the risk would be greater.
This being so, several other
points remained to be decided,
Appendix
303
savoir: les transports par
chemin de fer, la question des
requisitions auxquelles Tarm^e
anglaise pourrait avoir recOurs,
la question du commandement
sup^rieur des forces alliees.
II s'informa si nos disposi-
tions etaient suffisantes pour
assurer la defense du pays
durant la travers6e et les
transports des troupes ang-
laises, temps qu'il evaluait k
une dizaine de jours.
Je repondis que les places de
Namur et de Li6ge etaient k
I'abri d'un coup de main et
que, en quatre jours, notre
armee de campagne, forte de
100,000 hommes, serait en
6tat d'intervenir. Apr^s avoir
exprim6 toute sa satisfaction
au sujet de mes declarations,
mon interlocuteur insista sur
le fait que : (i ) notre conversa-
tion etait absolument con-
fidentielle; (2) elle ne pouvait
Her son Gouvernement ; (3)
son Ministre, I'etat-major gen-
eral anglais, lui et moi ^tions
seuls, en ce moment, dans la
confidence; (4) il ignorait si
son Souverain avait ^t^ pres-
senti
Dans un entretien subse-
quent, le Lieutenant-Colonel
Bamardiston m'assura qu'il
n 'avait jamais regu de con-
fidences d'autres attaches mili-
taires au sujet de notre armee.
II pr^cisa ensuite les don-
viz., transport by rail, the
question of requisitions to
which the British Army might
have recourse, the question of
the chief command of the
allied forces.
He enquired whether our
arrangements were adequate to
secure the defence of the
country during the crossing
and transport of the British
troops — a period which he
estimated at about ten days.
I answered that the fort-
resses of Namur and Li^ge
were safe against a surprise
attack, and that in four days
our field army of 100,000 men
would be ready to take the
field. After having expressed
his entire satisfaction at what
I had said, my visitor em-
phasized the following points:
(i) Our conversation was
absolutely confidential; (2) it
was in no way binding on his
Government; (3) his Minister,
the British General Staff, he,
and myself were the only
persons then aware of the
matter; (4) he did not know
whether his Sovereign had
been consulted.
At a subsequent meeting
Lieutenant-Colonel Bamard-
iston assured me that he had
never received any confidential
information from other mili-
tary attaches about our army.
He then gave me a detailed
304
Appendix
n^es num^riques concemant les
forces anglaises ; nous pouvions
compter que, en douze ou treize
jours, seraient d^barqu6s : deux
corps d'arm^, quatre brigades
de cavalerie, et deux brigades
d'infanterie mont^e.
II me demanda d 'examiner la
question du transport de ces
forces vers la partie du pays ou
elles seraient utiles, et dans ce
but, il me promit la composi-
tion d^taillee de Tarm^e de
d^barquement.
II revint sur la question des
effectifs de notre arm^e de
campagne en insistant pour
qu'on ne fit pas de d^tache-
ments de cette arm^e k Namur
et a Li^e, puisque ces places
^taient pourvues de gamisons
suffisantes.
II me demanda de fixer mon
attention sur la n^cessit^ de
permettre a Tarm^e anglaise de
b^neficier des avantages pr^-
vus par le rfeglement sur les
prestations militaires. Enfin,
il insista sur la question du
commandement supreme.
Je lui repondis que je ne
pouvais rien dire quant k ce
dernier point, et je lui promis
un examen attentif des autres
questions.
Plus tard, I'attach^ militaire
anglais confirma son estima-
tion pr^^dente: douze jours
statement of the strength of
the British forces: we might
rely on it that, in twelve or
thirteen days, two army corps,
four cavalry brigades, and two
brigades of mounted infantry
would be landed.
He asked me to study the
question of the transport of
these forces to that part of the
country where they would be
most useful, and with this ob-
ject in view he promised me a
detailed statement of the com-
position of the landing force.
He reverted to the question
of the effective strength of our
field army, and considered it
important that no detachments
from that army should be
sent to Namur and Li^ge, as
those fortresses were provided
with adequate garrisons.
He drew my attention to
the necessity of letting the
British Army take full advan-
tage of the facilities afforded
under our regulations respect-
ing military requirements.
Finally, he laid stress on the
question of the chief com-
mand.
I replied that I could say
nothing on the latter point,
and I promised that I would
study the other questions with
care.
Later, the British military
attach^ confirmed his previous
estimate: twelve days at least
I
Appendix
305
seraient au moins indispen-
sables pour faire le d^barque-
ment sur la c6te de France.
II faudrait beaucoup plus
(un a deux mois et demi) pour
d^barquer 100,000 troupes a
Anvers.
Sur mon objection qu'il ^tait
inutile d'attendre I'acheve-
ment du debarquement pour
commencer les transports par
chemin de fer, et qu'il valait
mieux les faire au fur et k
mesure des arrivages, k la
c6te, le Lieutenant-Colonel
Bamardiston me promit des
donnees exactes sur I'^tat
journalier du debarquement.
Quant aux prestations mili-
taires, je fis part a mon inter-
locuteur que cette question
serait facilement reglee.
A mesure que les etudes de
1 'etat-major anglais avan-
gaient, les donnees du prob-
leme se precisaient. Le colonel
m'assura que la moitie de
I'armee anglaise pourrait ^tre
debarquee en huit jours, et que
le restant le serait a la fin du
douzieme ou treizieme jour,
sauf I'infanterie montee, sur la-
qtielle il ne fallait compter que
plus tard.
Neanmoins, je crus devoir
insister a nouveau sur la
n^cessite de connaitre le rende-
ment journalier, de fagon a
were indispensable to carry-
out the landing on the coast
of France. It would take
much longer (from one to two
and a half months) to land
100,000 men at Antwerp.
On my objecting that it
would be useless to wait
till the disembarkation was
finished, before beginning the
transport by rail, and that it
would be better to send on
the troops by degrees as they
arrived on the coast, Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Bamardiston
promised me precise details
of the daily disembarkation
table.
With regard to the question
of military requirements, I
informed my visitor that that
question would easily be ar-
ranged.
As the plans of the British
General Staff advanced, the
details of the problem were
worked out with greater pre-
cision. The colonel assured
me that half the British Army
could be landed in eight days,
and the remainder at the end
of the twelfth or thirteenth
day, except the motmted in-
fantry, on which we could not
count till later.
Nevertheless, I felt bound
once more to urge the necessity
of knowing the numbers to be
landed daily, so as to work
3o6
Appendix
r^gler les transports par chemin
de fer de chaque jour.
L 'attache anglais m'entre-
tint ensuite de diverses autres
questions, savoir: (i) n6cessit6
de tenir le secret des opera-
tions et d'obtenir de la presse
qu'elle Tobserv^t soigneuse-
ment; (2) avantages qu'il y
aurait a adjoindre un officier
beige k chaque 6tat-major
anglais, un traducteur h. chaque
commandant de troupes, des
gendarmes a chaque unit6
pour aider les troupes de police
anglaises.
Dans une autre entrevue, le
Lieutenant-Colonel Bamardis-
ton et moi examinees les
operations combindes dans le
cas d'une agression de la part
de I'Allemagne ayant comme
objectif An vers et dans I'hy-
poth^se d'tme travers6e de
notre pays pour atteindre les
Ardennes frangaises.
Par la suite, le colonel me
marqua son accord sur le plan
que je lui avais pr^sente et
m'assura de I'assentiment du
General Grierson, chef de
retat-major anglais.
D 'autres questions second-
aires furent ^galement regimes,
notamment en ce qui regarde
les officiers interm^diaires, les
traducteurs, les gendarmes,
les cartes, les albums des
uniformes, les tir^s a part tra-
duits en anglais de certains
out the railway arrangements
for each day.
The British attach^ then
spoke to me of various other
questions, viz.: (i) The neces-
sity of maintaining secrecy
about the operations, and of
ensuring that the Press should
observe this carefully; (2)
the advantages there would
be in attaching a Belgian
officer to each British staff, an
interpreter to each command-
ing officer, and gendarmes to
each unit to help the British
military police.
At another interview Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Bamardiston
and I examined the question
of combined operations in the
event of a German attack
directed against Antwerp, and
on the hypothesis of our
coimtry being crossed in order
to reach the French Ardennes.
Later on, the colonel signi-
fied his concurrence in the
scheme I had laid before him,
and assured me of the assent
of General Grierson, Chief of
the British General Staff.
Other questions of second-
ary importance were likewise
disposed of, particularly those
respecting intermediary offi-
cers, interpreters, gendarmes,
maps, illustrations of uniforms,
English translations of extracts
from certain Belgian regula-
Appendix
30f
r^glements beiges, le r^glement
des frais de douane pour les
approvisionnements anglais,
ITiospitalisation des bless^ de
rarm6e alli6e, &c. Rien ne
fut arr6t6 quant a Taction que
pourrait exercer sur la presse
le Gouvemement ou I'autorit^
militaire.
Dans les demieres rencontres
que j'ai cues avec I'attach^
anglais, il me communiqua le
rendement joumalier des de-
barquements a Boulogne, Cal-
ais et Cherbourg. L'doigne-
ment de ce dernier point,
impos6 par des considerations
d'ordre technique, occasionne
un certain retard. Le premier
corps serait debarqu6 le
dixieme jour, et le second
corps le quinzi^me jour. Notre
materiel des chemins de fer
ex^cuterait les transports, de
sorte que Tarriv^, soit vers
Bruxelles-Louvain, soit vers
Namur-Dinant, du premier
corps serait achevde le on-
zi^me jour, et celle du deux-
i^me corps, le seizi^me jour.
J'ai insiste ime demifere fois
et aussi ^nergiquement que je
le pouvais, sur la necessite de
h4ter encore les transports
maritimes de fagon que les
troupes anglaises fussent pr^
de nous entre le onzi^me et le
douzi^me jour ; les rfeultats les
tions, the regulation of customs
dues chargeable on the British
supplies, hospital accom-
modation for the wounded of
the allied army, &c. Nothing
was settled as to the possible
control of the Press by the
Government or the military
authorities.
In the course of the last
meetings which I had with
the British attach^ he com-
mimicated to me the daily
disembarkation table of the
troops to be landed at Bou-
logne, Calais, and Cherbourg.
The distance of the latter
place, included owing to cer-
tain technical considerations,
would cause a certain delay.
The first corps would be
landed on the tenth day, the
second corps on the fifteenth
day. Our railways would
carry out the transport opera-
tions in such a way that the
arrival of the first corps, either
towards Brussels-Louvain or
td^ards Namur-Dinant, would
be completed on the eleventh
day and that of the second
corps on the sixteenth day.
I finally urged once again,
as forcibly as was within my
power, the necessity of acceler-
ating the transport by sea in
order that the British troops
might be with us between the
eleventh and the twelfth day;
the very best and most favour-
30«
Appendix
plus heureux, les plus favor-
ables peuvent 6tre obtenus
par une action convergente et
simultan6e des forces alli6es.
Au contraire, ce sera un ^hec
grave si cet accord ne se
produit pas. Le Colonel Bar-
nardiston m'a assur^ que tout
sera fait dans ce but.
Au cours de nos entretiens,
j'eus Toccasion de convaincre
I'attach^ militaire anglais de
la volont^ que nous avions
d'entraver, dans la limite du
possible, les mouvements de
I'ennemi et de ne pas nous
refugier, des le debut, dans
Anvers. De son c6te, le
Lieutenant-Colonel Baraardis-
ton me fit part de son peu de
con fiance actuellement dans
I'appui ou I'intervention de la
Hollande. II me confia egale-
ment que son Gouvemement
projetait de transporter la
base d 'appro visionnemen ts
anglaise de la cdt6 frangaise a
Anvers, d^s que la mer du
nord serait nettoy6e de tous les
navires de guerre allemands.
Dans tous nos entretiens le
colonel me communiqua r^gu-
lierement les renseignements
confidentiels qu'il possedait
sur I'dtat militaire et la situa-
tion de notre voisin de Test,
&c. En m^me temps, il in-
sista sur la n^cessite imp^rieuse
pour la Belgique de se tenir au
able results would accrue from
the concerted and simultane-
ous action by the allied forces.
On the other hand, a serious
check would ensue if such
co-operation could not be
achieved. Colonel Bamardis-
ton assured me that every-
thing would be done with that
end in view.
In the course of our con-
versations I took the oppor-
tunity of convincing the mili-
tary attach^ of our resolve to
impede the enemies' move-
ments as far as lay within our
power, and not to take refuge
in Antwerp from the outset.
Lieutenant-Colonel Bamard-
iston, on his side, informed me
that he had at present little
confidence in the support or
intervention of Holland. He
likewise confided to me that
his Government intended to
move the British base of
supplies from the French coast
to Antwerp as soon as the
North Sea had been cleared
of all German warships.
At all our interviews the
colonel regularly communi-
cated to me any confidential
information he possessed re-
specting the military condition
and general situation of our
eastern neighbour, &c. At
the same time he laid stress
on the imperative need for
Appendix
309
courant de ce qui se passait
dans les pays rhdnans qui
nous avoisinent. Je dus lui
c»nfesser que, chez nous, le
service de surveillance au
del^ de la fronti^re, au temps
de paix, ne releve pas directe-
ment de notre ^tat-major;
nous n'avons pas d 'attaches
militaires aupr^s de nos lega-
tions. Je me gardai bien,
cependant, de lui avouer que
j'ignorais si le service d 'es-
pionage, qui est present par
nos reglements, etait ou non
prepare. Mais il est de mon
devoir de signaler ici cette
situation qui nous met en
etat d 'inferiority flagrante vis-
k-vis de nos voisins, nos
ennemis ^ventuels.
Le Gen6ral-Major, Chef d'-
E.-M. DUCARNE.
Note. — Lorsque je rencon-
trai le General Grierson a
Compi^gne, pendant les man-
oeuvres de 1906, il m'assura
que la reorganisation de
I'armee anglaise aurait pour
r^sultat non seulement d 'assu-
rer le debarquement de 150,000
hommes, mais de permettre
leur action dans un deiai plus
court que celui dont il est
question pr^cedemment.
DuCARNE.
Fin septembre 1906.
Belgium to keep herself well
informed of what was going
on in the neighbouring Rhine
country. I had to admit to
him that in our country the
intelligence service beyond the
frontier was not, in times of
peace, directly under our Gen-
eral Staff. We had no mili-
tary attaches at our legations.
I took care, however, not to
admit to him that I was im-
aware whether the secret ser-
vice, prescribed in the Belgian
military regulations, was or-
ganized or not. But it is my
duty here to call attention to
this state of affairs, which
places us in a position of glaring
inferiority to that of our neigh-
bours, our possible enemies.
Major-General^
Chief of General Staff.
DUCARNB.
Note. — When I met General
Grierson at Compi^gne at the
manoeuvres of 1906 he assured
me that the reorganization of
the British army would result
not only in ensuring the land-
ing of 150,000 men, but in
enabling them to take the
field in a shorter period than
had been previously estimated.
DuCARNE.
End of September, 1906.
INDEX
Aerschot. Circumstances of
the sack of the town, 235,
238 ; object of the massacres
and pillage, 291
Albert, King of the Bel-
gians. Present (before his
accession) at the banquet
organized by M. von Bary
in honour of the burgo-
masters of the Rhenish
towns, 8; accession (Decem-
ber, 1909), 10; relations with
the German Imperial family,
10; marriage, 10; visit to
Berlin Qune, 1910), 11;
toasts exchanged at a dinner
given during the visit, 11;
toasts exchanged at a dinner
given during the visit of the
German Emperor and Em-
press to Brussels (October,
1910), 12; visit to Paris
(July, 1910), 14; toasts
exchanged at a dinner given
during that visit, 14; applies
himself to the reorganization
of the army, 2 1 ; speech to
the Grenadier Regiment, 2 1 ;
visit to Switzerland, 22;
conversation with President
Poincare, 22; reception at
Potsdam (November, 19 13),
23; invited to the German
Imperial manoeuvres of
September, 19 14, 23; letter
to the German Emperor
(July 31st), 31, 102; tele-
gram to the King of England
(August 3d), 102; appeal to
the Belgian nation, 227
31
Andenne. Statement of A.
Berg to the Frankfurter Zei-
lung, 245; description of the
shooting and burning, 287;
object of the massacres, 291
AsQUiTH (British Prime Minis-
ter). The nature of the
intervention of Britain in
the European conflict and
her relations with Belgium
(speech of August 6th), 180
AULNIS DE BOURROUIL (Pro-
fessor d*). His interpreta-
tion of the refusal of Sir E.
Grey to promise to Germany
the neutrality of Great
Britain if the neutrality of
Belgium were not violated,
note, 99
Austria-Hungary. Ultima-
tum to Serbia (July 24th),
24; diplomatic conflict re-
sulting from that ultimatum,
87; declaration of war on
Serbia (July 28th), 27;
declaration of war on Bel-
gium (August 28th), 249
Barnardiston (Lieut.-Col.).
Formerly British Military
Attach^ at Brussels. Inter-
views with General Ducarne
(1906), 185, 301
Belgian Army. Reorganiza-
tion (1913), 21; decision to
place the army on a strength-
ened peace footing, 27;
mobilization Quly 31st), 30;
acknowledgment by Ger-
many of the heroism of the
312
Index
Belgian Army — Cont'd.
Belgian army at Liege, 113;
the defensive sj^tem of Bel-
gium, 135; condition of the
army at the beginning of
war, 163; tactics, 233
Belgian Clergy. Attitude
of, 229
" Belgischen Greueltaten "
(Die). The Belgian Govern-
ment said to have promised
to the civil population a
reward of 50 francs for
every German soldier killed,
221; the war of franc-tireurs
in Belgium, 244; the Ger-
mans resident in Belgium
said to have been maltreated
by the population, 252
Belgium. Dispositions to-
wards Germany before the
war: economic relations, i;
scientific relations, 5; Bel-
gian Government represent-
ed at the anniversary cere-
mony of the Norddeutscher-
Lloyd, 8; her confidence in
her neighbours, 15; proposed
expedition to China (1900),
16; far-reaching reform of the
army (1913), 21; cordiality
of relations with her neigh-
bours, 22; effect of the
Austro-Serbian conflict, 24;
notification to the Powers
that she intended to main-
tain and defend her neu-
trality (July 31st), 30;
origin of her permanent
neutrality, 41; the "Very
Confidential Note" (August
2, 1914), 39; attitude to-
wards the German demand
necessitated by her position
as a neutral State, 48; the
bargain offered by Germany,
55; the violation of her
neutrality was premeditated
by Germany, 72; reply
to the "Very Confidential
Note" (August 3d), 75;
reply to the offer of co-
operation from France, 78;
appeal to the guaranteeing
Powers (August 4th), 79;
Germany sees in Belgian
neutrality a pawn with
which she might bargain,
III; the stages of the bid-
ding, 112; acknowledgment
by Germany of the heroism of
the defenders of Li^ge, 113;
the plot against Belgium,
115; the German proposition
of August 9th, 113, 209;
resume of her attitude in the
European conflict, 124; said
to have not respected the
stipulations of the Treaty of
Berlin on the subject of the
Congo, 133; her military
organization said to have
been inadequate, 134; said
to have committed hostile
acts towards Germany before
the war, 140; said to have
taken measures indicatmg
warlike intentions before the
German menace, 143, 159;
alleged subservience to
France, 147; said to have
arranged with France before
the war to grant free passage
for troops to penetrate into
Germany, 155; orders for
arms and ammunition of
German manufacture, 162;
in the course of the war has
had to order materials and
munitions from France, 162;
circular from the Govern-
ment to the Governors of
Provinces (August ist), 165;
said to have come to
an economic understanding
with France, 166; alleged
subservience to England,
171; said to have been mis-
led by her Government at
the instigation of Britain,
Index
313
Belgium — Cont'd.
172; allegation that she
would not have resisted
Germany except under pres-
sure by Britain, 173; noti-
fied to the Powers the reply
that she intended to make
to the German proposition
of August 9th, 176; said to
have concluded a military
convention with Britain
against Germany before
being menaced by Germany,
178; participation in an in-
ternational conflict would be
contrary to a state of per-
manent neutrality, 180; re-
sistance to the German
invasion was not conditional
on the intervention of Great
Britain, 182; the dossiers of
the Minister for War, 184;
had considered the disposi-
tions to be made against an
imaginary landing of a
British force (1906), 190;
said to have furnished to
Great Britain the infor-
mation necessary for the
production of military maps,
manuals, and requisition
forms, 198; at the time when
she is said to have concluded
a mihtary convention with
England, the relations be-
tween the two States were
not very cordial, 202; the
Government of the Congo
were given instructions to
take the necessary steps to
guard against a possible
blockade of the river by
France and England as much
as against a violation of the
frontier by Germany, 203;
Germany had not declared
war on Belgium, 210; said
to have been responsible for
the cruel character of the
war on the part of Germany,
212; the participation of
civilians in military opera-
tions, 212; the allegation
that the Government had
beforehand organized a gen-
eral rising of the people
against the enemy, 212; that
the Government had estab-
lished depots of arms for use
by the civil population, 213;
circular from the Govern-
ment to the communal au-
thorities on the nature of a
belligerent, 214; recommen-
dation by the communal
authorities to civilians to
abstain from hostile acts and
to deposit their arms with
the police authorities, 217;
the Belgian Government
said to have mobilized the
population of Luxembourg,
220; the Belgian Govern-
ment said to have promised
a reward to the population
of 50 francs for every Ger-
man soldier killed, 22 1 ; the
call into activity of the non-
active civic guard, 224 ; noti-
fication to Germany (August
8th), 225; Belgian popula-
tion said to have subjected
wounded Germans to ill-
treatment, 245 ; Germans
and Austrians resident in
Belgium said to have been
ill-treated, 249
Berg (Alexandre). His de-
scription of the massacres
of Andenne, 245, 288
" Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger"
(Der). Belgium said to
have been misled by her
Government at the instiga-
tion of Great Britain, 172;
Belgium said to be on her
knees before Germany, 205
" Berliner Tageblatt ' '
(Das). The Belgian army
said to have invaded German
314
Index
Berliner — Cont'd.
territory as early as August
2d, 142; Belgium said to
have accorded free passage
to French troops to pene-
trate into Germany before
the German menace, 155;
Belgium said to have been
misled by her Government
at the instigation of Great
Britain, 171
Bernatzik (Professor). The
dossiers of the Belgian Min-
ister for War, 194
Bernhardi (General von).
Permanent neutrality, 20;
small States, 20; the advan-
tage to Germany of crossing
Belgium, 20
Bethmann-Hollweg (von).
Declaration in 191 1 that
Germany would respect the
neutrality of Belgium, 17;
speech to the Reichstag
(August 4th), 68, III; de-
claration to the British Am-
bassador at Berlin that the
fate of Belgium would de-
pend on the Franco-German
war (July 29th), 92; assur-
ance to the British Govern-
ment that, even in the case
of an armed conflict with
Belgium, Germany would,
under no pretext whatever,
annex any part of Belgian
territory, no; declaration
to the Reichstag that, so
long as Britain remained
neutral, Germany would re-
spect the territorial integrity
and independence of Bel-
gium (August 4th), III;
necessity knows no law, 118,
268; young Belgian girls
said to have gouged out the
eyes of wounded German
soldiers, 246
Beyens (Baron). Belgian
Minister at Berlin. Warn-
ing to the Belgian Govern-
ment of the gravity of the
political situation (July
27th), 26; informed his
Government that the Ger-
man Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs could not
reply to the question put by
Great Britain on the subject
of the neutrality of Belgium
(August I St), 33; interview
with Herr von Jagow
(August 3d), 64
Bismarck. Respect of treat-
ies and neutrality, 72;
letters addressed in 1870 to
Baron Nothomb, Belgian
Minister at Berlin, 85
Blume (von), Professor. At-
tempt to justify the violation
of Belgian neutrality, 134
Bluntschli. The right of
intervention of State guar-
anteeing neutrality, 52
BouRGET (Paul). King Albert
"the Honest Man," 54
Bridges (Lieutenant- Colonel).
British Military Attache at
Brussels. Conversations with
General Jungbluth (1912),
192
British Ambassador at Ber-
lin. Interviews with Herr
von Jagow (August 4th),
66, 121; interview with Herr
von Bethmann - Hollweg
91; informed his Govern-
ment that the German Sec-
retary of State could not
reply to the British demand
that Belgian neutrality
should be respected, 96
British Military Attache
AT Brussels. See Bar-
nardiston and Bridges
British Minister at
Brussels. Informed his
Government of the second
German note to the Belgian
Government (August 4th),
Index
315
British — Cont'd.
109; announcement to his
Government of the viola-
tion of the Belgian frontier
by German troops (August
4th), no; surprised at the
promptness of the Belgian
mobilization (July 31st), 174
Broqueville (de). Belgian
Minister for War. An-
nouncement to Parliament
on the subject of military
reform (1913), 22; descrip-
tion of the military efforts
of Belgium (November 30,
1911), 139; said to have
admitted the existence of a
Franco-Belgian understand-
ing against Germany, 161
Brussels. Proclamation of
the Governor, von Lutwitz
(November ist), 279; pro-
clamation of the Governor-
General, von der Goltz (Sep-
tember 25th), 282; proclama-
tion (October 5th), 282, 293;
the innocent are struck down
because they are innocent,
288; the taking of hostages,
295
BiJLOw (General von). Pro-
clamation to the Belgians
(August 9th): France the
first to violate the neutrality
of Belgium, 148; proclama-
tion posted at Lidge (August
22d), 281; proclamation
posted at Namur (August
25th), 281, 295
Bureau of Deutschen Han-
DELSTAGES. Statement by
American journalists that
they were unable to estab-
lish a single case in Belgium
in which reprisals were not
the result of provocation,
241
Burgomaster of Brussels.
Prohibition of the manifes-
tation of either sympathy
or hostility towards any of
the belligerents (August 2d),
165
Charles, King of Roumania.
His advice to Belgium, 20
Civic Guard. Its character
and organization, 213, 222;
its members have the charac-
ter of belligerents, 223; the
calling into activity of the
non-active civic guard; noti-
fication to Germany, 225
Collective Repression.
Meaning, 276; Hague Con-
vention on the laws and cus-
toms of war on land, 276;
German contemporary doc-
trine, 277; collective repres-
sion in Belgium, 278; the
"Military interpreter," 283;
the innocent are struck
down because they are inno-
cent, 288; object of collec-
tive repression, 291; the
result of the system of
methodical intimidation,
292. See also War Levy
Congo. Belgium said to have
failed to respect the stipula-
tions of the Treaty of Berlin
on the subject of the Congo,
33; influence of the dispute
relative to the independent
State of the Congo on the re-
lations between England and
Belgium, 202 ; instructions
given by the Belgian Govern-
ment to the administration
of the Congo relative to the
measures to be taken for
preparing a blockade of the
river in case of a violation of
the frontier by Germany, 203
Crown Prince of Germany.
Relations with the Belgian
royal family, 10; toasts
exchanged in course of the
visit of the Belgian sovereigns
at BerUn (June, 1910), il
3i6
Index
CuRZON (Lord). Said to have
been an intermediary be-
tween the British Govern-
ment and King Albert of
Belgium, 173
Descamps. The right of inter-
vention of States guarantee-
ing neutrality, 52
Despagnet and De Boeck.
The law of intervention of
States guaranteeing neutral-
ity, note, 52
DiECKMANN (Staff Major).
Proclamation posted at Gri-
vegn6e, 270 and 296
DiNANT. Circumstances of the
sack of Dinant, 235; object
of the massacres and devas-
tation, 291
DucARNE (General). For-
merly Chief of Staff of the
Belgian army. Interviews
with Lieut. -Col. Bamardis-
ton (1906), 185, 301
Elizabeth, Queen of Bel-
gium. Marriage, 10; visit
to Berlin (June, 19 10), 10;
visit to Paris (July, 19 10),
14; had the first wounded
Germans sent to the hospital
at the Palais Royal, 247
Emmich (General von). Pro-
/ clamation to the Belgians
(August 4th); France said
to have violated Belgian neu-
trality before Germany, 147
Entre - Sambre - et - Meuse.
Object of the devastation,
291
Errera (Paul). The civic
guard in Belgium, 222
Erzberger. The Belgian
army said to have invaded
German territory as early as
August 2, 1915, 142
Espionage. German, British,
and French spies in Belgium,
143
Eulenberg (Herbert). The
Belgians said to have sys-
tematically organized the
war of francs-tireurs, 227
Eulwege (von), Lieut.-Col.
Admission of the untruth of
the story, told by A. Berg,
of the massacres of Andenne,
288
Facsimile of a part of the
report of General Ducarne,
Belgian Chief of Staff, 188
Falli£:res (A.). Ex- President
of the French Republic.
Visit to Brussels (May, 1901 ),
15; toasts exchanged at the
dinner given during the
visit, 15
Fischer (R.). The Belgian
population said to have been
incited by the priests, 229
Flotow (von). Formerly Ger-
man Minister at Brussels.
Was aware of the interviews
of the British Military
Attaches with the Belgian
Chief of Staff, 197
Foreigners. Alleged ill-treat-
ment of German and Aus-
trian residents in Belgium,
249
France. Declared that she
would respect the neutrality
of Belgium, 28; repeated
that declaration when in-
terrogated by Britain
(August 1st), 32, 96; said to
have violated Belgian neu-
trality before Germany, 148;
official declaration that a
French aviator had not
flown over Belgium before
August 4th, 154; said to
have obtained free passage
through Belgium to attack
Germany, 155; said to have
concluded an economic ert'
tente with Belgium, 166;
the revision in 19 10 of the
Index
317
Prance — ConVd.
customs tariff and its efifect
on Belgium, 170
Francorchamps. C i r c u m-
stances of the massacres of
Francorchamps, 289
Francs-Tireurs. Belgium
said to have organized a war
of francs-tireurs, 226; the
existence and numbers of the
francs-tireurs said to have
been due to alcoholism and
religious fanaticism, 227;
exceptional cases of francs-
tireurs, 230; coincidences,
231; the tactics of the Bel-
gian army, 234 ; certain acts
attributed to francs-tireurs
were committed by German
soldiers, 237; immediate re-
prisals, without enquiry, for
acts attributed to francs-
tireurs, 237; the German
soldier obsessed by fear of
the francs-tireurs, 239; the
contrast between neighbour-
ing regions excludes the
hypothesis of a general and
organized armed resistance
of the civil population, 240;
no proof recorded of the
existence of francs-tireurs,
244; the massacres of An-
denne said to have been
reprisals in respect of acts of
francs-tireurs, 245; acknow-
ledgment by the German
authorities and the press of
the untruth of the story re-
garding Andenne, 288
*' Frankfurter Zeitung ' '
(The). Belgium said never
to have replied to the " Very
Confidential Note" of Au-
gust 2d, 130; the destruc-
tion of Andenne a reprisal
for acts of francs-tireurs, 245
French Minister at
Brussels. Offer of the
support of France if Belgium
wished for it (Augu«5t 3d),
77; reply of Belgium, 77
Geffcken. The duty of a
neutral state to oppose the
passage of belligerent armies
across its territory, 46
German Code of War. " The
laws of war on land." Its
tendencies and principles,
254; the purpose of war, 257 ;
there are no laws of war, 258 ;
opposition to the Hague
Convention of 1899 con-
cerning the laws and customs
of war on land, 260; German
code of war at the Hague
Conference of 1907, 261 ; con-
temporary doctrine, 261;
the application of the differ-
ent methods of war, 264;
the absolute power of the
command, 265; necessity
and utility, 266; the applica-
tion of these principles in
Belgium by the German
military authority, 269; in-
timidation and terrorism,
271; effect of the teaching
of the code on the mentality
of the German officer, 274;
definition of collective repres-
sion, particularly in regard
to the war levy, 292; the
taking of hostages, 297
German Military Attach^
AT Brussels. Statements
to The Twentieth Century
(August 2d), 35; congratu-
lates the Belgian Minister
for War on the rapidity of
Belgian mobilization, 137.
See also Renner
German Minister at Brus-
sels. Opinion as to the
security of Belgian neu-
trality (August 1st), 32;
demarche to the Belgian
Minister of Foreign Affairs
on the subject of the depar-
3i8
Index
German Ministry — Cont'd.
ture of mobilized Germans
(August 2d), 33 ; declarations
to Le Soir (August 2d),
34; reply to the "Very Con-
fidential Note" (August
2d), 39
Germany. Opposition to the
sending of a Belgian e;cpe-
ditionary corps to China
(1900), 16; declaration in
19 II that she had no inten-
tion of violating the neu-
trality of Belgium, 17; pro-
clamation of a state of
danger of war (July 31,
1914), 28; the "Very Con-
fidential Note" to Belgium
(August 2d), 39; reply to the
Swiss declaration of neu-
trality, 49, 115; the bargain
offered to Belgium, 55;
Germany's attempt to jus-
tify the terms of the bargain,
59; the violation of Belgian
neutrality was premedi-
tated, 72; Belgium's reply
to the "Very Confidential
Note" (August 3d), 75;
notification to the Belgian
Government of the decision
to violate the neutrality of
Belgium (August 4th), 78;
Germany's attempts to ob-
tain the neutrality of Eng-
land, 91; Germany sees in
Belgian neutrality a pawn
with which she may bargain,
III; stages of the bidding,
112; the proposition to Bel-
gium of August 9th, 113,
209; acknowledgment of the
heroism of the defenders of
Lidge, 113; plot against
Belgium, 115; necessity
knows no law, 118; resume
of her attitude in the Euro-
pean conflict, 123; until
August 4th Belgium had not
been accused, 129; efforts to
ignore the question of Bel-
gian neutrality, 130; the
people left in ignorance of
the reasons for Germany's
attitude towards Belgium,
130; statement that Bel-
gium did not reply to the
"Very Confidential Note,"
130; would have been ex-
pected to conduct military
operations in Belgium with
a certain moderation, 209;
had not declared war on
Belgium, 210; official an-
nouncement to Belgium
that henceforth the war
would be of a cruel charac-
ter (August 14th), 210;
pretence that Belgium was
responsible, 210; refusal to
allow authorization to the
daughter of General Leman
to see her father, who was
ill and a prisoner, 246;
official explanation of the
massacres at Lou vain, 298
Gladstone. The neutrality
of Belgium from the point
of view of Great Britain
(1870), 86
GoLTZ (Field Marshal von
der). Proclamation posted
at Brussels (September 25th)
note, 263 ; proclamation,
(October 5th), 282; the in-
nocent are struck down be-
cause they are innocent,
288 ; the taking of hostages,
295
Granville (Lord). The neu-
trality of Belgium from the
point of view of Great
Britain (1870), 86
Great Britain. Announces
that she relies on Belgium's
defending her neutrality
(July 31st), 29, 95; demand
to Germany and France to
pledge themselves to respect
Belgian neutrality (July
Index
319
Great Britain — Cont'd.
31st), 29, 86, and 95; reason
for watchfulness in regard
to the neutrality of Belgium
(1870), 85; mediatory action
in the Austro-Serbian con-
flict, 88; resume of Great
Britain's attitude in the
European conflict, 123; said
to have brought pressure
to bear on Belgium to per-
suade her to resist Germany,
173; nature of her inter-
vention in the European
conflict and relations with
Belgium (speech of Mr.
Asquith, August 6th), 180;
said to have concluded a
military convention with
Belgium against Germany,
184
Greindl (Count). Formerly
Belgian Minister at Berlin.
Letter to the Belgian Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs ( 1 9 11 ) ,
190
Grey (Sir E.). Statement to
the German Ambassador at
London that England might
be involved in the conflict
(July 29th), 92; refusal to
bargain with Germany re-
garding the obligations and
interests of England in re-
gard to Belgian neutrality
(July 30th), 93; refusal to
enter into any engagement
whatever against France
(July 31st), 95; discussion
with the French Ambassador
at London on the Belgian
situation (August 2d), 100;
speech in the House of
Commons (August 3d), 103;
announcement to the Bel-
gian Minister at London
that if Belgian neutrality
were violated war would
break out between Germany
and England (August 3d),
108; directed the British
Ministers at Brussels, The
Hague, and Christiania to
make it known to the
Governments to which they
were respectively accredited
that Great Britain expected
that they would resist Ger-
man pressure and that she
would give them support if
they desired it (August 4th),
108; directed the British
Ambassador at Berlin to
request immediately from
the German Government an
assurance that the demand
made to Belgium by the
"Very Confidential Note"
would not be carried into
effect (August 4th), 108;
directed the same Ambassa-
dor to repeat this request
and demand a reply before
midnight (August 4th), 120;
letter to the British Minister
at Brussels on the subject of
the landing of British troops
in Belgium (April 7, 19 13),
195
Grivegn^e. The proclama-
tion of Staff Major Dieck-
man, 252; the taking of
hostages, 296
Hagerup. The right of inter-
vention of States guarantee-
ing neutrality, 52
Hague Convention Con-
cerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land.
Preamble to the Convention
of July 29, 1899, 259; sanc-
tion established in 1907, 260;
collective repression, 276;
war levy, 279; inhabitants
not to be forced to co-operate
in the action of the ene-
my against their country,
293 ; the taking of hostages,
298
320
Index
Hague Convention on Neu-
trality. Resistance of a
State to a breach of its
neutrality, 44; passage of a
belligerent across neutral
territory, 47
"Hamburger Nachrichten"
(The). The frontages of the
houses at Louvain said to
have been prepared with a
view of a war of francs-
tireurs, 220
Harden (Maximilien). Bel-
gium must become Prussian,
117
Harnack. Belgium said to
have been misled by her
Government at the instiga-
tion of Great Britain, 1 72
Hasselt. Collective repres-
sion, 280
Heeringen (von). Formerly
Prussian Minister of War.
Declaration in 19 13 on the
subject of Belgian neutral-
ity, 18
Herstal. Alleged participa-
tion of the civil population
in the hostilities, 242
Herve. Circumstances of the
sack of the town, 237
Hochdorf (Max). War of
francs-tireurs said to have
been due to alcoholism and
religious fanaticism of the
Belgian peasants, 228
Hostages. Taking of hos-
tages in Belgium, 295; the
military interpreter, 295 ;
proclamation of army com-
manders, 295; the German
Code of War, 297; the
Hague Convention on the
Laws and Customs of War
on Land, 297; the Instruc-
tions for the Armies in the
Field of the United States of
America, 298
Hymans (Paul). Belgian
Minister of State. Article
in The Outlook (September
30, 1914), 24
" Instructions for the
Armies in the Field of
the United States of
America" (The). The
taking of hostages, 298
Jagow (von). German Secre-
tary of State for Foreign
Affairs. Declared, in 19 13,
that Germany intended to
respect Belgian neutrality,
18; interview with Baron
Beyens, Belgian Minister at
Berlin (August 3, 19 14), 64;
interviews with the British
Ambassador at Berlin
(August 4th), 66, 67, and
120; implies that Belgium
had committed hostile acts
against Germany before the
war (July 3d), 139
"Journal of the War."
France said to have violated
Belgian neutrality before
Germany, 150; Belgium said
to have furnished England
with information necessary
for the preparation of mili-
tary maps of Belgium,
198
Jungbluth (General). For-
merly Chief of Staff of
Belgian Army. Conver-
sations with Lieut.-Col.
Bridges (1912), 192
" Kolnische Volkszeitung ' '
(Die). Belgium said to have
accorded, before the war,
free passage to France to
penetrate into Germany,
156; denial that wounded
German soldiers had their
eyes gouged out by the
Belgian civil population,
246
Index
321
"KoLNiscHE Zeitung " (Die).
The way in which Germans
effected their departure
from Belgium on mobiliza-
tion, 34; interpretation of
the refusal of Sir E. Grey to
promise to Germany the
neutrality of Great Britain
in the case of Belgian neu-
trality not being violated,
99; pretence that Belgium
had menaced Germany, 131;
Belgium said to have not
respected the stipulation of
the Treaty of Berlin on the
subject of the Congo, 133;
Belgium said to have
stopped merchandise in its
transit to Germany before
the war, 141 ; to have taken
steps indicating belligerent
intentions before the German
menace, 143, 146, and 159;
France said to have violated
Belgian neutrality before
the war, 149, 152; Belgium
said to have accorded free
passage to France to pene-
trate into Germany before
the war, 155, 160; the Bel-
gian Minister of War said
to have admitted the exist-
ence of a Franco- Belgian
agreement against Germany,
161; the seizure of Le Petit
Bleu (August 2d), 164;
prohibition by the Burgo-
master of Brussels of mani-
festations of feeling in re-
gard to either of the bel-
ligerents, 166; Belgium said
to have concluded an eco-
nomic entente with France,
166 ; the Belgian Government
said to have organized a war
of francs-tireurs, 219; an al-
leged fight of francs-tireurs
at Wavre, 229 ; the contrast
between neighbouring dis-
tricts, 241; Germans resi-
dent in Belgium said to have
been ill-treated, 249; the
innocent are struck down
because they are innocent,
288; inscriptions on the
houses which were spared
at the time of the pillage,
291; result of the system of
methodical intimidation, 292
"Laws of War on Land"
(The). 5ec German Code of
War
Leopold II. King of the
Belgians. Relations with
the German Court, 10;
appeals to the Belgian
nation, 21
LifecE. Acknowledgment by
Germany of the heroism of
the defenders of Li6ge, 113
Linsmeau. Circumstances of
the massacres and sack of
Linsmeau, 274
Loffler (A.), Professor. ^ Bel-
gium had been misled by her
Government at the instiga-
tion of Great Britain, 172
LouvAiN. The frontages of
the houses said to have been
prepared with a view to a
war of francs-tireurs, 221;
the "chastisement" of the
inhabitants was sudden and
pitiless, 239; object of the
destruction of the finest
buildings, 291; description
of the devastation, 294;
official explanation by Ger-
many (August 27th), 298
LuTWiTZ (General von). Pro-
clamation posted at Brussels
(November ist), 279
Luxembourg (Grand Duchy
of). Its permanent neu-
trality, 45
Meurer (Professor). The
laws of war and the state
of necessity, 262
322
Index
*' Military Interpreter ' '
(The) . Collective repression ,
283; the taking of hostages,
295
Morocco. Effect on Belgium
of the Morocco crisis (191 1),
19
MoTTA. President of the
Swiss Confederation. Atti-
tude of Switzerland in the
case of the violation of her
neutrality, 179
Namur. The "chastisement"
of the inhabitants was im-
mediate, 232; proclamation
of General von Biilow
(August 25th), 281
Necessity (State of). The
state of necessity and the
laws of war, 262
NiEBER (Lieut.-General von).
Proclamation posted at
Wavre (August 27th), 278;
the innocent are struck
down because they are inno-
cent, 288
"NiEUWE Courant" (Die).
Belgium said to have con-
cluded a convention with
Britain against Germany
before being menaced by
Germany, 178
" Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung" (Die). Belgium
said to have taken measures
indicating belligerent inten-
tions before being menaced
by Germany, 144; France
said to have violated Bel-
gian neutrality before Ger-
many, 150; the dossiers of
the Belgian Minister for
War, 184; Belgium said to
have furnished to Britain
the information necessary
for the production of mili-
tary maps, manuals, and
requisition forms, 198
Nothomb (Baron). Ex-Bel-
gian Minister at Berlin.
Letters addressed to him by
Bismarck in 1870, 85
Orts (Councillor of Legation).
Report on the sack of
Aerschot, 238
"Outlook" (The). Article
by M. Paul Hymans (Sep-
tember 30, 1914), 24
" Pax-Informationen " (Die).
Acknowledges the untruth
of the story, told by A. Berg,
of the massacres of Andenne,
288
Permanent Neutrality.
Outline of the notion, 42;
its consequences for the
States which confer neu-
trality, 42; consequences for
neutral States, 44; the per-
manent neutrality of Bel-
gium, 43; a neutralized
State should hinder the
passage of belligerent troops
across its territory, 45; ne-
cessity for the absolute in-
dependence of a neutralized
State, 46; the right of inter-
vention of States which
confer neutrality, 52; the
equilibrium realized by the
permanent neutrality of Bel-
gium, 84; demonstration of
that equilibrium in 1870,
84; the participation of
Belgium in an international
conflict would be contrary
to a state of permanent
neutrality, 179
"Petit Bleu" (Le). Seiz-
ure on August 2d, 164
Poincar6 (Raymond). Presi-
dent of the French Republic.
Assured the King of Belgium
that France was peaceful
and had no intention of
violating Belgian neutrality,
22
Index
323
Reason of War. The reason
for war in the German code,
257; the reason for war in
the German contemporary
doctrine, 263
Renault (Louis). The Ger-
man Code of War at The
Hague Conference, 260
Renner (Commandant). For-
merly German MiHtary
Attach^ at Brussels. Know-
ledge of the conversations of
the British Military At-
taches with the Chiefs of
the Belgian Staff, 197
RiviER. The duty of a neutral
State to oppose the passage
of belligerent troops across
its territory, 45
Secretary to the King of
THE Belgians. His opti-
mism on August 2d, 36
Selzaete. The culmination
of the system of methodical
intimidation, 293
*'Soir" (I^e). Declaration of
the German Minister at
Brussels (August 2d), 34
Spitteler (Carl). Conference
at Zurich (December, 19 14),
205
Steepen (G. P.). Advice on
the attitude of Belgium, 50
Stein (Quartermaster-General
von). France said to have
violated the neutrality of
Belgium before Germany,
149; Belgium said to have
been misled by her Govern-
ment, 171
Stier-Somlo (Professor). The
participation of the Belgian
civil population in hostili-
ties, 242
Strupp (Karl). The reason of
war, force majeure and the
laws of war, 262; collective
repression, 277 and 283
Switzerland. Her perma-
nent neutrality, 48; declara-
tion of neutrality in the
European conflict: Ger-
many's reply, 48, 115; action
of Switzerland in case of the
violation of her neutrality
(declaration by M. Motta),
179
Tamines. Circumstances of
the massacres of Tamines,
236 ; the innocent are struck
down because they are
innocent, 288; object of
the massacres, 291
"Twentieth Century"
(The). Declaration of the
German Military Attache at
Brussels (August 2d), 35
Vilvorde (Environs of). Ob-
ject of the massacres, 291
"VoRWARTS." Denial that
the eyes of wounded Ger-
mans had been gouged out
by the Belgian civilian popu-
lation, 246
"VossiscHE Zeitung" (The).
The participation of Bel-
gium in an international
conflict would be contrary
to a state of permanent
neutrality, 180
" Wahrheit uber den Krieg"
(Die). France said to have
violated Belgian neutrality
before Germany, 151; the
frontages of the houses of
Louvain said to have been
prepared with a view to a
war of francs-tireurSf 220
War Levy. Application in
Belgium, 279; the object of
the war levy in the German
code, 291
Wavre. Alleged combats of
francs-tireurs, 229 ; procla-
mation by Lieut.-General
von Nieber (August 27th),
324
Index
Wavre— Con/*<f.
278, note 281; the innocent
are struck down because
they are innocent, 288; ob-
ject of the devastation, 291
Weber. Said to have been
assassinated at Antwerp by
the population, 253
Wegener (Carl). Congratu-
lations to the Mayor of
Rheims on his recommenda-
tions to the civil population,
216
William II. (Emperor of Ger-
many). Visit to Brussels
(October, 19 10), 12; toasts
exchanged during the visit,
12 ; surprised at the measures
of defence taken by Bel-
gium (1912), 138; message
to the President of the
United States on the parti-
cipation of the Belgian
population in the military
operations and their cruelty
towards the German soldiers,
211
Wolff Agency. Allegation
that Belgium had omitted
to reply to the " Very Con-
fidential Note" of August
2d, 130; contrasts the policy
of Belgium with that of
Switzerland, 204
Wounded. The Belgian popu-
lation said to have ill-
treated wounded Germans,
245
Germany, France, Russia
and Islam
By Heinrich von Treitschke
A series of essays, now translated for the first time, by
the great German historian, friend of Bismarck and
teacher of William II and Bernhardi. His works have
shaped the present policy of Germany in its attempt to
secure a dominating influence in Europe and throughout
the world.
ir. $L50
The Origins of the War
By J. Holland Rose, LittD.
Fellow of Christ's College and Reader in Modern History in the
University of Cambridge, Corresponding Member of the
Massachusetts Historical Society, Author of "De-
velopment of the European Nations," " The
Personality of Napoleon "
In this volume the author traces the course of the politi-
cal developments out of which the present war has arisen,
the subject being treated under the following headings:
"Anglo-German Rivalry" (1875-1888), "The Kaiser,"
"Germany's World-Policy," "Morocco," "The Bagdad
Railway," "Alsace-Lorraine," "The Eastern Question
(1908-1913)," " The Crisis of 1914," " The Rupture."
U\ $1.00
Can Germany Win?
By " An American "
The author of this illuminating work has spent many
years in a careful study of economic conditions in Ger-
many and his findings bear the stamp of authority.
12\ $1.00
New York G. P. Putliam^S SOIIS London
Treitschke
12\ $1.50
The Writings of Bemhardi's Teacher,
Heinrich von Treitschke, Together
with a Life, by His Close
Friend, Adolf Hausrath
The works of this great German historian
have shaped the present policy of Germany in
its attempt to secure a dominating influence in
Europe and throughout the world. The follow-
ing is a brief summary of the subjects presented
in this distinctive work :
I. Treitschke's Life and Work, by Adolf
Hausrath. 2. The Army. 3. International Law.
4. German Colonization. 5. The Two Emperors.
6. In Memory of the Great War. 7. Germany
and the Neutral States. 8. Austria and the
German Emperor. 9. Russia from the German
Point of View. 10. On Liberty.
Treitschke was a close friend of Bismarck, and
his list of pupils include the political and military
leaders of the present generation, such as the
Emperor William, Bernhardi, and others.
Lord Acton says of Treitschke: "He is the
one writer of history who is more brilliant and
more powerful than Droysen; and he writes
with the force and incisiveness of Mommsen,
but he concerns himself with the problems of
the present day, problems that are still demand-
ing solution."
New York G. P. Putnam's Sons London
Deutschland Uber Alles
Or Germany Speaks
A Collection of the Utterances of Representative
Germans — Statesmen, Military Leaders, Scholars, and
Poets— in Defence of the War Policies of the Fatherland.
Compiled and Analyzed by
John Jay Chapman
I6\ 75c.
Alsace and Lorraine
From Caesar to Kaiser. 58B.C.-1871 A.D.
A sketch of the political affiliations of the provinces
before the creation of the Reichsland of Elsass-
Lothringen.
By Ruth Putnam
Author of " A Mediaeval Princess," " Charles the Bold,"
" WilUam tiie Silent," etc
With Eight Maps. 8^. $!25
Alsace— Romans, Gauls, and Others on the Soil of
Alsace — ^The Treaties of Verdim and Other Pacts Affect-
ing Alsace — The Dream of a Middle Kingdom — ^The
People of Alsace in the 15th Century and After — The
Thirty Years of War and the Peace of Westphalia — ^Louis
XIV and Strasburg — ^Alsace after Annexation to France —
Lorraine in Several Phases of its History — Alsace-Lorraine,
1871-1914.
New York G. P. Putnam's SonS London
The Great Illusion
By Norman Angell
A Study of the Relation of Military Power to
National Advantage
Fourth Edition, Revised, v/ith Additional Material
Crown 8°. $1.00
Who will " win " in the present war ? Who will " lose " ?
And just what will they win and lose? Will Germany be
"destroyed"? Will England be "wiped out"? Wm
any of tiie countries " lose their colonies " ? And if so,
how much actual loss will it involve?
" These questions were all answered about four years
ago in a way that made the answerer, Norman Angell, im-
mediately famous. To-day, by virtue of those answers,
he is, in the mind of thousands of very keen thinkers,
a towering figure in international afifairs." — The World,
New York, September 13, 1914.
America and the New
World-State
12\ $1.25
In this volume Norman Angell turns his attention
to America. " This book is published," he writes, " in
the hope that it may contribute to forming on the part
of the American people that * will ' (without which no
* way * can be devised) to take the leadership in the
civilization of Christendom, for which its situation and
the happy circumstances of its history furnish so good
an opportunity."
Arms and Industry
By Norman Angell
Author of "The Great Illusion," etc.
12\ $1.25
A Study of the Foundations of International Polity.
New York G. P. Putnam'S Sons London
The Confessions of
Frederick the Great
and
Treitschke's "Life of Frederick"
Eldited, with a Topical and Historical Introduction, by
Douglas Sladen
The coupling of these two works in a single
volume has a significance apart from the fact that
they have bearing — the one as an intimate ex-
pression, the other as an able biographical sketch
— upon one of the great figures of Prussian and
world history. Treitschke strongly influences the
philosophy of war and the views regarding the
destiny of the German nation embodied in
Bernhardi's much discussed book, and Frederick's
CONFESSIONS, m the opinion of Mr. Sladen,
IS the soil from which the school of Treitschke
and Bernhardi drew sustenance.
New York G. P. Putnam's Sons London
The Real
^^ Truth About Germany ^^
From the English Point of View
By Douglas Sladen
Author of " Egypt and the English," etc.
With an Appendix
Great Britain and the War
By A. Maurice Low, M.A.
Author of " The American People," etc.
300 pages. 12\ ClotL SlOO
Mr. Sladen has taken as his text a pamphlet which, while not
formally published, has been widely circulated in the United States*
entitled The Truth About GermaoY. This pamphlet was prepared
in Germany under the supervision of a Committee of Repre-
sentative Germans, and may fairly be described as the "ofScial
justification of the War." Care has been taken to prevent copies
from finding their way into England, which has caused Mr. Sladen
to describe the pamphlet as The Secret White Paper. He has taken
up one by one the statements of the German writers, and has
shown how little foundation most of these statements have and
how misleading are others which contain some element of truth.
In answering the German statements, Mr. Sladen has naturally
taken the opportunity to state clearly the case of England. England
claims that it was impossible to avoid going into this struggle if
it was to keep faith with and fulfill its obligations to Belgium
and Luxemburg. Apart from this duty, it is the conviction of
England, that it is fighting not only in fulfillment of obligations
and to prevent France from being crushed for a second time, but
for self-preservation. The German threat has been made openly
" first Paris, then London."
In order that the case for England may be complete, the pub-
lishers have added an essay by the well-known historian, A. Maurice
Low. As the title. Great Britain and the War, indicates, England's
attitude toward the great conflict is clearly portrayed, and her
reasons for joining therein are ably presented.
New York G. P. Putoam's SoDS London
France Herself Again
By Ernest Dimnet
$2.50
The well-known historian, Abbe Ernest Dimnet, draws
a comparison between the demoralized France of 1870 and
the united France ot to-day. Headings : The Deterioration
of France; Under the Second Empire; Under the Third
Republic; The Return of the Light; Immediate Conse-
quences of the Tangier Incident; Intellectual Preparation
of the New Spirit; Evidences of the New Spirit; The
Political Problems and the Future; France and the War
of 1914.
The Monroe Doctrine
National or International ?
By WiUiam I. Hull, Ph.D.
Author of "The Two Hague Conferences," "The New
Peace Movement," etc.
75 cts.
The Doctrine has so widened its scope, so substantially
increased the rights and the responsibilities and the dan-
gers, involved in its enforcement, that some remedy must
be devised to limit its inherent peril. The true, effective,
and equitable basis on which the problem must be solved
is then set forth.
The World Crisis and the
Way to Peace
By E. Ellsworth Shumaker
Author of " God and Man"
I6\ 75cts,
Earnestly concerned over the crash of civilization, the
author believes that America must abandon its policy of
impotent waiting and do something to terminate hostihties.
New York G. P. Putnam'S Sons London
Why Europe is at War
The Question Considered from the Points of View of
France, En^^land, Germany, Japan, and
the United States
By Frederic R. Coudert, Fredericl? W. Whitridge,
Edmond von Mach, F. Ineyaga,
Francis Vinton Greene
With Portraits
The addresses presented in this volume were delivered
before the Civic Forum of Buffalo in February, 1915, and
the interest expressed by the public and the press was
evidence that the utterances were deserving of preservation
in book form.
Japan to America
Edited by
Professor Naoichi Masaoka
of Tokio
A Symposium of Papers by Statesmen and Other Leaders
of Thought in Japan
72°. $J.25
The book is issued under the auspices of the Japan
Society and contains an introduction by Lindsay Russell,
President of the Society. It gives first-hand information
as to present conditions in Japan, as to the ideals and
policies of Japanese leaders, and on the all-important
matter of the state of public opinion in Japan in regard to
the continuing interest of the Empire in maintaining
peaceful relations with the United States.
New York G. P. Putnam's Sons London
PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY
D
615
W584
Waxweiler, Emile
Belgium neutral and loyal
"
ii'lllllllilllllltllllHIIIII!!
ii
'(•'i"jr!i,
jiii
'•■
111
ii
|l,n.
,|lllll.
' ; i'i
.Ii
Live Music Archive
Librivox Free Audio
Metropolitan Museum
Cleveland Museum of Art
Internet Arcade
Console Living Room
Books to Borrow
Open Library
TV News
Understanding 9/11