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The Belief Elenent in Jiidf;;ment 

Thoma.?. Al"!':ert Lev/ is 

A Dii>sfert,aticn 
Sn1->nitted to t'l- Beard cf University Studie; 
of the 
Johni> Hopkins Unlverr^itty 
In conformity v/ith the requirements 
for trie de£;ree cf 
Doctor cf P^'iilciicphy 

June, 1910. 

ir<f.i v-i 

?, (5. 

Go:: tent a . 
CliCiP t e r , 3v.oj e c t . 

I. Inti'od'jctory : The Prcllera a,nd Method 

II. ilistorical 

. . Secti';n i: Belief a.c vivCccity of idei 

1- 4. 

" i: " " inseparc^lle is-ssccio-tion 

of ideas 10-13. 

" iii: " " uluir'iL.te c-ssent 15-17. 

" - : " " action 17-LO. 

III. P^-cliologicci:!.: 21-49. 

Secticn i: Descriptive: 21-38. 

A) Belief with Jeelinf paramoiint 21-2''. 

2) " " Co,^nitiori as an 

indispensaole element 26-38. 

Sectior. ii: Patholofiical 39-45. 

" iii: Experi'-iental 43-49. 

lY. Criticicri 50-53. 

Y. Quasi -Belief and AssnTipLion : 58-'=^''". 

YI. Belief and Ji-idgment : 

Section i: Direct evider.'ce, Dtje.ctive • 59-76. 

" ii: " " subjective 76-78. 
" iii: Indirect " Interpireta- 

tion rf the ITepative ''B-BO. 
" jv: Indirect evidence: Ar.fument 

fro- Pr-- atis- 80-84. 

Conclv.L'icn 85-86. 

Biopraphical STcetc'i 87. 

The Belief Elernent in JTidgrnerit . 

Chapter I. 

Introductory: The Proble;?! and Method. 


■Whether '■■elief ia contained intrinsically i-, every ,jUu> ::.:n ^ , is 
a salient qrestion in present lorical and epistemo logical discussion. 
There is a rro^vinr suspicion and conseqi-ently a rrovwin-^- i.avestiration 
o:f the loric that i.ransc,ends the individual and his e:-cperience , and 
forms a closed sj'-stem of thoup-ht Vkrhich s\:>stains itself or; a priori 
principles. It is arpued arainst this type of lorical theory that 
it detaches itself cor.pletely fro?n the life of feelinr, conation, 
and int-arest. To lock further into the frrounds of this suspicion 
and argutnent, and see if there may he mors evidence for transplanting 
judgment from the arid plain of fcrnal lopic to the fertile fields 
of experience, is the aiTi of this study. 

The in-"-estigation thu.s ^notived is that of linding v/he ther a 
judgment (or a proposi tion--v\/hich is hut a judgment in ccn-nunication ) 
may he merely- a matter of content, which initiates cr has inherently 
its o\k'n worth and reality, and does not have to draw them from more 
ultima.te sources or controls; or v/hether every judfraient must necess- 
arily, at least, implicate existence as a presupposed control; must 
he always the deliverance of a subjective interest v/hich it serves; 
must, in s'lort, emhody ^■'elief. If judment and "^elief should be 
found alv/ays leagiied togefner., this fact v/ould furnish stronf' evid- 
ence that thought, no less than perception ai-^d desire, is indigenous 
to experience; it would show that thought has its stimulus in an oh- 
jecti"e situation tha- arouses the interest to knov»---not at large, 
either, "but to some particular end, f^at of enlarging the objective 
world of experience and reality. 


But v.-e cannot trace a frieaninr liefore we h-ive oriented it* If, 
therefore, we are to -malce an intellirent pearch for T-ielief in ,1ndg- 
ment, v/e rniist first fix upon what is f'eneral''y conceived to he its 
nature, 'moreover, should heTief he found in .ludpnent; if it doss for 
judfment what we have a-suj'ned; if, that is, it shows that thinking 
hiis for its whole hiu-inei^s the "illunininr of the particulc-.r phenome- 
non of investigation ; "° then, it inplies a reference to reality, and 
Tn.ear)S a.t the sane tinie the satisfaction of some inner demand--GOme 
demand of the Ero . How, indeed, would it alter ahstract, harren 
thouc"ht to find it contained 'relief, if heliex had its whole meaning 
in an immediate experience? It v>?ould afford no proof that thcup;ht 
accomm.odates itself to rrowinr e^rperience, and is not made up of 
static universals that ■"■-esp al'-of from developing nature. Were it 
all told v/hen we say that helief is a feelinr or sensation, then, 
helief would have no sirnific&nce in .-Jvidrment one wty cr the other, 
either ratlonall;:^ or empirically. 

The fact that the investigation whether helief is an element 
in judrment, had thus to v/ait upon an investigation into the real 
nature and conditions of helief, demanded a certain method of pro- 
cedure. It was necessary first to pro throtigh the literature on the 
suh.lect (■'■^oth the historical and psyclioloci cal--lncludinr under the 
lotter, general, pathological, and experlmentyl) and to search with 
unwear2/-ing scrutiny for the marks that most "oersistently identified 
themselves Vi^ith helief; to search, indeed, for the marks that escaped 
m.ost sieves cif criticism, and that Cc*me ultimately to he held hy a 
majority of writers. The n9::t thing to do, in accordi-nce wit:-i our 
m.ef^od, was to take account of the qualities or conditions which 
history and psvcholory had decided to he indispensahle to helief, 

Hihhen, "The ^hilosop'-jical Aspects of ^'volution; 

Philosophical Review, ^^arch, 1910, 


and see if these were such as wou.ld na>:e helief any vital hear- 
inc; upon judgriient, A criticism and comparison of the results ob- 
tained in' this review of f^eories, revealed ainple reasons for con- 
tinuing our investip-ation ; the hurden of evidence indicated that 
helief--whatever other attributes it nip-ht have-~has t}i.epe two: an 
objective reference to rea.lity, and a subjective reference to self. 

An epistenoloffj col study of the de'^'elopnent of the belief-con- 
sciousness further corroborated the doiO^'le nature of belief, and at 
the BS'-ne tine led up to a leadinp: argunent for the conjtmction of 
.jud-ment and belief. In its first mode, ''^elief appears as reality- 
■feelinp"; consciousness is here a-dualistic, and flows on in unthink- 
ing presumption that all is a.s it seems. But after a time contrary 
conditions bring disaprjointment and doubt, and reality-feeling is 
displaced by u.nreality-f eelir.p. Conscicusne;:s breaks ut) into a 
dualism of the inner and outer, and objects, being no longer immedi- 
ate, as they were in the earlier a-duc-ilistic experience, the indi- 
vidual must seek a new criterion of reality, 'i'o do this, he r sorts 
to experimentation or schen.atism, a process of the imagination which 
makes it possible for consciousness to rive to an object a meaning 
bejrond what it already has. In this power of the psychic to release 
objects from, their sense-control, and thus to develop their possi- 
bilities, is seen, in emphatic distinctness, th'.t inner active nature 
which an object 'nur^.t satisfy "^efore there is an expression of belief. 
And true to its dou.ble nature, belief does not yet apT)ear in this 
mode, where the object is only assumed; instead, v/e have quasi-belief 

Having found that reality-feelinp is conjoined with presumption 
and quasi-be''.ief with assTJmption, it v;:ie next a question of belief 
and jud'n'ient : Are they joined toget^^er? To ansv/er this question in 
the affirmative, there would have to appear in judgment both an ob- 


jecti-^e and a siJ''"i,1scti-ve c^iaranter . In o"f^ier words, it was necessary 
to investi^n-ate judp^ient 'hof'^ ar? to un e-i stence-f actor and as to a 
personal factor. 

That .iudgment has an existenti;il reference, was found to ''oe at- 
tested hy increasinp- arp;iiment ; ar(=;i;.rnent , too, that represents several 
points of view. It is supported hy Baldwin frcTi f^e p-enetic and 
epistei^olorical point of visv/; hy Meinonp, fron a seni-renetic and 
epistenolorical ; hy Bradley, from f'^e lop;ical; and hy I'rent^no, frorn 
the psycholorical . That the personal factor oh^ains in .iudproent, 
as it does in ''■•^elief, and. appears in .judnrient as personal indorse^.ent 
and is never suh-'ner^-ed into content th; t is without conation or inter»« 
est, is evidenced ^or.t e^iph-.ti cally hy the pra~natic "love'^ient , which 
tends throurhout to nap-nify the personal ele^^.ent in judpr-^-ent; and 
also, >y recent v/orth-theory , which finds a residue of an evaluating 
nature fhat the concept cannot render. 

As a final argu^nent that .iudgrnent ernhodies in overt expression 
the dual nature of helief , a s^ort criticis'n is "lade of hare negation, 
the e"iptiness of which is easily explained upon this theory; and s. 
lor.rer criticisn cf ■nra,r"iatis'''!, whio>" especially supports f-^e view 
of this raper ; for, in failing- to reach ''^elief, the pragraatist also 
fails to reac2a .iudrment, thus stopping at what Meinong, Urhan and 
Baldwin call assu'nwtion . 

#5. Chapter II. 

;-^ection I: Belief as Vivacity of Idea.. 

V^,,at is meorit "by H'-.^ne's theory, f'--at ""belief is a lively idea 
related to or anrcciated with a present inpre: sion , " v/ill he most 
quickly, as well as most clearly hrougl?it out if we hegin hy set'. ing 
forth the author's point of view. Perhaps t:- e leadinr cr'.aracteristic 
of Hiime's p'-^ilosophy is his skepticism; ;t any rate, v\fe rtir y he cer- 
tain t^-'at in '"is treatnent of helief, this rictlve leads. Heason is 
declared to he impotent as scon as it presumes upon its reputed 
authority; it is then no lonrer ahle to produce conviction. Outside 
of denorstrative ind intuitive proporitionn , there is no sucli thing 
as certain knowledge. As soon as we at .empt to rain truth inductive- 
ly, we land in the hog of "natter of faGt,"° where knowledge can 
find no footing, and helief goes dov;n in dcuht. Keason is c/a.ined 
to skepticisra, e.nd in spite of jierself , she ~ust give aid to her 
rival. The relation hetween helief and rea-son, as Hujne regarded it, 
is vu-ell put in th.e following passage: "V.hen I reflect on tl'.e natural 
f all ihili t^y of ny ,1udgnent, I have lees ccnficence in my opinions 
than v/^en I only consider f-e oh.^'ects concerning which I rea.r,cn; and 
when I proceed still further tc turn the scrutiny aga.inst every suc- 
cessive estimate I nuke of my faculties, all the riiles of logic re- 
quire a continual dinlnution, and at last, a total extinction of 
helief i-nd evidence. " (+) 

This hrlef considercitior of t'.e fvndamertal assumption of Kune 's 
system of philosophy hrings us withoi't su.rpriee, — in fact, pretty 
m'jch as a natter of course, to the statement that helief is not de- 
TTxOnstrahle , is not a state of mind "grcimded in evidence." The 
more thoug'ttt strives after judfTnents that give conviction of truth, 
the less the conviction grows. Por ahstruse and tortuous thinking 

° Kvme: "A Treatise on Kuma,n liature: t).477. ( + ) ihid. t).474. 


serves only to drain away assurance. "It is net in ''''e peculiar 
natvre of oi:r ideas or in t'~eir order th.-t we find l-ielief." T:-e 
imapinetion v^'itli all its rer.o";rces is net a"hle so to join ideas 
that the fnind will "he moved, to ar5fert foe reality f'^e;^ pretend. Ko- 
thinp l3Ut arti-'^icial e'-'ptiner>s can c'er result fron the vain ahstrac- 
ticns of f-e dogmatist. If v/e ':ave conviction al'cvt natters of faCt, 
they are to he credited to the natural v.orkinp of experience; to 
ha'i'it. The writer is quite explicit on this point. "All reasonings 
concerning caiises and ef'^'eots," he asserts, "ere derived from nothing 
hut cnstoT., fend helief is jxf piore ^n act of f e sensitive than of the- 
corniti-'e part of cur n:ti;re.""' And arain: "If >ielief v.ere a simple 
act of tho-'ap;]"t, without any peculiar rneirner of conception or tne ad- 
dition of a force and vivacity, it must infalli'':)ly destroy itself, 
and in every case, terninate in a total suspense of judrnieni;. " ( + ) 
The fselint of conviction is, accordingly, a "sort of automatic 
fTOvernor',' with which nature has provided the human mind to save iz 
from, the despair of utter douht. The n;-tu.ral flow of life's happen- 
infrs hreeds in us unavoidahly the lively concept of an unquestioning 
judgrrnent . 

We h ve thus far found the pioneer student of t'-^e "nature of 
tliat c<ct of mind v/hich persuades of the truth of v;h£,t v.e conceive," 
to he quite consistent in his conclu.sions . Belief is simple and 
spontaneous, like sensition, and it is r;o more to he had hy a quest 
into f- e land of ahstract tliinkirr than is se^-isation. It is the 
"superior force or vivacity or solidity or firmness or steadiner-s" 
an idea h^s fro'n 'ei'-if connected v/ith the present impression; in 
fi'-'e, T-'Clief is, for Hume, a prscipitate of cu.stcm. 

** Ihime : "A Treatise on Hunan Ni.ture: p. 475. 
( + ) i- id. 


When, liowever, undertt^kes to dir^cover the causes of Tr;elief, 
he seeiri!:;. forced to enlarpre on his earlier conception of it. In ohis 
cornecticn, Carve t'l Read ohaerves that "Hirne'e next remark takes us 
deeper; an impression of the senses co->nunicates itr. vivacity and 
force to all t; e ideas related to it. Hence, memory is distinguished 
from ioiapination hy its greater vivacity and also hj'- the fixity c-nd 
order cf its ideas, derived from the oi'der of the oripinal impress 
sions. Further, t!-e vifror and vivacity of jnental processes, t.nd 
t'erefors of -elief, is fcvored hy the attention; hy the associative 
principles of reseirf^lanoe and contiguity; and :-:icre especially, "by 
causation and hy repetition ::j.:\d custoiii. Even ^n idea of which we 
liave forgotten the correspondent ii-.apressicn may itself heccrie the 
ground of "belief and inference; hecause whatever firmness or vivacity 
it has it he ahle to ";)estow on whatever is related to it. 'Of 
these ripressicns or ideas of memory, -we for^n a. kind cf system, cot.ii- 
prehending whatever we retuemher to oeen present, either to our 
internal p£;rception or senses; and every particular of thit sj/stem, 
joined to t!ie pre'sent im'oressions , we are pleased to ca"_:l reality . 
But the mind stops not here. Por, finding that with this system of 
perceptions, there is another connected 'ny custo^i, or if you will, 
hy fhe relation of c^use and effect, it proceeds to the consideration 
of their ideas; and as it feels th.t it is in a ma,nner necessarily 
determined to view these pcrticr.lar ideas, and thict the custom or 
relation hy wl.ich it is determined, admits not of the least change, 
it fori'is them into a new S3"stem, v/hicii it like\;ise dignifies Virith 
the title cf realitie s . The first cf the systems is the ohject 
of m.emory and f- e senses; the iL.ecc"'d, of the judgment. 'Tia the 
latter principle which peoples the world, and hrings us acquainted 
with such existences as, 'Dy their removal in time and place, lie 


l:'eyond t' e reach of ;-.en3es and menory. Hence, y'lthcvr-'L ...-.e :_ubt;iciia 
and excitenent of poetry una oratory, 1)y ii:creasing the force and 
vivacity of ideas, inflr.ence our "beXiefs, " '^ , " :' reflection and 
general rules, t^ e understanding corrects .■ e ap.'^earances of the 
senses,' and determines the judgLient , 'even contrary to preserit 
ohserviation and experience.' Thus, in reviev;ing the causes of ;-jxic; 
Hu'ie , starting I'rom sensution as its oririn, has effected a transi- 
tion to science as still -lore coercive."** 

T^cit Carveth Read is justified in t/;is criticism of Kujne , is 
quite manifest. Hurae could not cive a full exposition of 'nelief 
\iuithout incorporatino- in it, c.n ele^'ient of cognition. And, :iiGreover, 
there is yst further evide-ce that "oelief functions only in cognitive 
situations. We have refei'ence to t>:e way Hume accounts for t'r?e be- 
lief in the physical world. By a ^propensi ty of the imagination, lie 
exiolair.s , perceptions that are cont-tant and perceptions thab are co- 
herent are rn&de a sufficient excuse for setting up extra-mental ex- 
istence. We nay turn our hacks upon a. tree or a house or the sin, 
cut th^t does not destroy these oh.jects, for, turning ahout, v»e find 
them still. They are constant. Or again, if our experience has to 
do with oh.iects that sufl'er .change in a short lapse of time, v/e find 
tT'.at such ohjects vary as v;e corjie hack to therp, as in the case of a 
fire burning in t/ie grate; hut that the change is coherent. Froiii zlie 
constancy of the perception of the sun, and the coherence in the 
perceptions of "C'^e fire, it is hut a step to t]' e positing of inde- 
pendent existence; a.nd the imagination takes thit step — the unautlaor- 
iaed 3tep--which gains "a soul and self and suhstance. " (+) But this 
i-T.agi nation, this galley v/hich after t?e oars cf constancy and co- 
herence have ceased to j?ly , carries on its course without any new' 

° Carveth Read: Metaphysics of Nature: pp. 9-lO. (+) ioid. p.4&4. 


impulse--Vir'!iut is it "but re&aon, 'uakitig infe^'ence heyond what is 
directly experienced; and what is the result but l:;eliel is u 
conviction of active thought, and r;ot of passive senaation? T.H.- 
Green at this point criticises Kume as follov/s: "7/?iat ■ then is the 
impression and vmat the associated idea? 'As the propensity to 
feifn tlie continued existence of r. ensi'ile objects s.rises from some 
lively impressions of the memory, it hestov/s a vivacity on that 
fiction; or, in other words, 'nakes us ; elieve a continued existence 
of body.' V/ell and good, but this onl5^ answers the first part of 
our question; it :;ells us w i.t are the iuroressions in the supposed 
cause of belief, but not \r :-,z is the associated idea to which their 
liveliness is communicated. To say the t it arises from & propensity 
to feign, strong in proportion to the liveliness of ohe supposed 
im.rressions of memory, does not tell us of vv"' at impression it is a 
copy. Sucb a propensity indeed would be an impreEsicn of reflection, 
but tb.e fiction itself is neitber t"-.e prcpentuty nor a copy of it. 
T'^^e only possible supposition left for Hiune VLfOuld be that it is a 
'compound idea;' but v.'hat combinhition of 'p- rceptions ' can amount to 
-he existence of perceptions when they are not perceived?"° 

In explaining t' e cause of cur belief in independent existence, 
Hume plainly resorts to mental processes that are more than mere 
sensations or feelings; the "propensity of the imagino tion" is not a 
passive inference, but an active one. Tvvo "perceptions" in memory 
may resemble each ofi ^r so closely that the second "fits v;ith ease 
into tbe mold of the first;" or agt^in, two perceptions may rest ujion 
each ot''-;er in a dependence that makes the second &eem a continuation 
of the first; bi't nothing short of thinking can relate the sinrle 
perceptions, and by processes of discrimin ticn, comparison tnd asso- 
ciative integration, identify theia r-.s being of one ob.iect. Wjien 


tc.lcen o.""!,iectiye].3'', not bs nerely psycholorical Drcceay, 'iielief is 
found really to have neant for fli-'ie, rot simply ti i;entitiient , Lut v/hat 
Carve th B-eud calls "the sifoj ectii'^e anoepti^nce of reality." 

Section II: Belief as an InyepcLrcMe Association of Ide=s. 

Atip.ociation , wiacli in Hu-iie modestly su^rested i^yelf as rnerely 
one of the ff^ctors in helief , prcclai'-is itself in James Mill to be 
bhe sole cause of all human convictions. Belief is redr.ced to mere 
mechanisTji, is ultra-rational, and het'-ides, lacking attention, vi'hich 
alone gives an outlet for psychic control, is harren of a"l sponta- 
neity of feelinr, of e-nction or of action. This theory in the hcuds 
of Mill is made to explain Vi/it'-i ease and admira'ole simplicity all 
cases of helief from that in sensation to that in jud^Tnent. For 
these plienonena . re each a comhination of parts. A sensatiori indeed 
is sOTTiewhere and for sc:-neone. A present sensation, of its very 
nature, i^iahes the mind v^rhich Vas it sbcy , "I have it; it'.s there; and 
it's one." V^ithin this complex of ele-ients (the ideas of position, of 
unity. and of nj'-self) there ohtain indissoluhle rel^:-ticns, and chere, 
ex hypothesi, helief. Thvis, t'^e a'athor remarks, "v^rhen I say, 'I have 
a sensation,' and say, 'I helieve that I have it,' I do net express 
tv.'o stater of conrxicusness , hut one and the same styte."° 

So much for simple cases, ""where helief consists of sensation 
alone or idea.s alone," "but v;hat of helief in the ricre ccnpliccted (+) 
cases, where "sensaticnL': , ideas and associations are comhined?" How 
for exaraple is our helief in the existence of o"h,1ectE presert to the 
•senses, accounted for ty the irresis title connection cl' ideas? H:re, 
c^2 vve Siu^ll find, the theory of inseparanle association completely 

° Ja'ries uili: Analysis of the Human Mind: vol. i, p. o42. 
( + ) i'.id. p. 377. 


expands itt^elf. In goinp from loelief in the iscli^ted senscvticn cr 
idea to 'belief in the o''\iect cf tr is ;;ensation or idea, consciousneas 
finds the v/ay lonf. Bu'c che disto.nce is aade less hy heinp 
"broken up into parts. The first pirt of this course through experi- 
ence serves to orinf the different serise activities top:ether, and 
thu.B to ?nake possible tiiat coalescence which incorporates into one 
sensation (usually, that of sipht) the con.v-equences of the rest; and 
Vv'ith the concrete result that in subsequent ti^ie, when the eye 
catches sifrht of a "rose," it is not T^erely a sensation of color that 
is had in conr.ciousness , hut also an anticipcttion, hy instanecus in- 
ference, of tlie feel of the rose; of its disi...nce away; of its 
sr;iell or Laste, etc., --all t"-- ese correlated experiences sprinpinp up 
with the color experience hjr association. In t}i.e larfruage of tbe 
author, "v/e believe we should have these /other/ sensations. ■ That 
is, we liave the idea of tbese sensaticis inseparably united one Vvith 
the other, and inseparably u.nited v;ith ourselves as ha-"inft them."*' 

At t/e end of cur first advance toward the realization oi a 
belief in the "existence of external objects present to the senses," 
we have the "co::-viction th;.it, in such and such circumstances, we 
should h^ave such and c"Jch sensations." But. the mind does not stop 
here. TV.e sensation tbat, under certain co-c;itions, I believe I 
may have, is an effect that owes its existence to a still acre funda- 
mental existence actinf- as its cause. And by association which ob- 
tains irresistibly between cause and effect, v,e are carried beyond 
tbe sensations th'-t fiAse to mike the rose of cur ideas, to the cor- 
responding qualities t: .t cause these sensations, and that inhere in 
a sinrle ob.iect or substrattim th- t unites tbem as tb e nind did tbe 
sever-.l sensations, but v;ith/ the result that we have a real objective 
rose. That this is the e-enesis and essence of a sense object, and a 

n-r f-Vc. T^Tii^-v, r,; 


siiff i cient apology for oi-r urdent 'belief in it, Mill £;t.,nds ready 
to prove wi !..;!. t'.:.e 1:est of illustrations. 

Belief in r^.ernory or testiraony , in f"L'ti"'e ever:tc:, cirid in a 
proposition, Mill "ba^es li!:ev/:Ee on u r.iech>i,nical linking together 
of ideas. ° And it nay ^e said "both of these phenonena and of those 
of the external senue, thut the conviction they elr'cit is explained 
hy this theor-'', not erroneously, 'oii'. rather insufficiently. M\ scv.lar 
resistance and uncontrollableness are of ccu.rse the chief factors in 
our belief in external reality. And*E "lively idea relcited to 
or acsociated with a present impression" explains "better our belief 
in nerncry. Mill in fact bags the q^iestion, as Adarason charges, when 
jie states that t.he idea of a past e::perienc8 and of myself as h^vVing 
had the experience, r;ives r^ie-niory its certainty; for that contains in 
itself the very element which is supposed to "•:^e gotten out cf their 
conjunction. Of expectation, Ada!nscn remarks that ideas irresist- 
ibly £\it;:;ested by present experience are not necessarily helieved, 
and that ixianj'' of our heliefs do not arise from such asscciation.® 
Again, belief in testimony is in reality belief in an event which 
is inseparably associated as consequent to the testimony as antecedr- 
ent. J. S. ".Till takes issue with his father' at this poir.t, touching 
both testiTr.on3'' and prox'osition, the latter "being for Jeunes Kill hut 
the automatic coupling of two clusters of ideas V'v-t stand for the 
shTie thing; us for example, "man and rational animal." Every asser- 
tion concerning tilings, vrtiether in concrete or in abstract language," 
r^ns the criticism, "is an assertion that some fact, or group of 
facts, has "been, is, or may fee expected to he, found wherever a 
cer-tain other fact, or group of facts is found. "(+) 

o Analysis of the Human Mind; pn. 3r2-9. . @ Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 9th edition: Article "Of Belief." '(+) J. S. Mill: 
Critical notes to James Mill's Analysis — : vol. ', :. 41''. 

ifl7> . 

In oonclup-ion, it suffices to repeat that the "aasoci i. tion 
theory" is toe narrov.- for the faous; that hellef in physical objects 
vvould Boarcely come if tTere v«ere only the intimate conjunction of 
ideas "in our heads," a?id no £;tuhhorn, involuntary, obatructinp; 
nature to hrinp it; that h^elief in pbst or future events scarcely 
derives itt; feeling-force from such, a nech^anictl operation j and that 
to consider helief in an a.nsertion as h: lief that two names are natnes 
of the nanie thing, is, e.s J. S. Mill r^rotests, to rive an inadequate 
explanation of t^ie imriort cf any asMerticn except those that are 
classed as merely ver'^^al.*' Thoup-h helief is, as we are endeavcrine: 
to estcihlish., always cognitive, it ir not to h-; considered as only 
cognitive; assccistion is harren unles.s rooted in arperceptiO'-^ or a 
c;..u.sal activity on the part of t?ie psj'-chological su.h,iect. 
Section III: Belief as ultimate assent. 

What is to he said of John Stuart Mill's conception cf the 
nature and cause of helief, is bJ.l iriplied in V- e following short 
hit of criticism, which is suhstantially his: "We do not helieve 
whatever iistc cur head.--. ."( + ) "Tliat all cases of helief are 
simply casas of indissoluhle association; that there is no generic 
diffe>'ence, hut only a difference in the strength of the association, 
hetvveen a case of hslief and a case of mere iino.gination ; that to "be- 
lieve a succession or co-existence between two facts is only to hi.-ve 
the ideas of z''-:e two facts so strongly and closely associated, th^-t 
we cannot help having the one idea when we have the other;"© these 
were the claims of f- e "association psychology" Vir/:ich Joh.n Stuart 
-.^ill had to face when he came to consider the suhiect cf helief, and 

° Critical Notes to James Mill's "tnalysis--" vol. i p. 417. 
(+) ihid. TD. 40','. © ihjd. v. 402. 


to them it war. fiv t he opposed tlie pointed objection the t we do not 
attach reality-cirnif 3 cance to v/h. tever ideas h:-ve an attraction 
between them. "Assuredly, an association, however close, betv/een 
two ideas, is not a sufficient ground of >'elief ; is not evidence that 
the corresponding facts are united in external nature. The tlieory 
seems to annihilate all distinction ' etween the lelief of the ^vise, 
and the " eli"f of fools."'' 

In sense-experience "insep -ralole associations do not s.l./ays 
generate belief, nor does belief clvvays reqixire as one of i':S condi- 
tions, an inseparable association; we can lielieve th:,t to be true 
whic}i v.e tre c pable of conceivi r or representing to ourselves ccS 
false; and false, what we are capa^'ile of representing to ourselves 
as true."(+) To explain and at the sar,.e time to enforce this argu- 
ment, the writer calls attention to t~'e ccrrr-.ion cbserv--tion, that when 
one rail\i.'ay train in motion is passing another at rest, we are able, 
by witholdir.g our vision from any third object, to imagine the motion 
in either train. That of two contradictory associations, v/e may be- 
lieve either, is also attested, Mill thinks, by the fact that astro- 
ncmsrs and edi.icaied persons, though convinced that the earth moves about 
the sun, are able to see "sunset either as the earth tilting i^bove 
th.e sun, or the sun diprdng belov the earth." Again, men v/ho have 
studied Berkeley do not believe they .see the magnitude of an object.® 

If association fails to prove its claim as being th'e source of 
our Rense assurance, it is next a (luet-tion' of hov.' it vindicates 
itself in memory and in judgment. That consciousness distinguishes 
betv^een the ideas of meocry and the ideas of imagin£ction, Jairies Mill 

° Critical Hotes co Ju.mes Ilill's "AualvBife--" p. '1-07. 
(+) ibid. 418. @ icid 40^-11. 


thinks to oe explicable on tv.c n-i'ouncit; . In the I'irat r.lace, r.e 
says it may "be Justly su:ipose(l t)-it.t the distinction wliich is orif/in- 
ally made oetvyeen t'-^e sen.sittion £-.rd the idea V;Ci.ild carry en into 
memory; and in the second place, the idea of t^elf, which in all 
memory . forms part of ore complex: idea, Deta in contrast the memory 
of sensation und the memory of a mere idea hy entering into the 
former as a "sentient self;" and into the latter as a "conceptive 
self;" and "myself percipient, and myself imarinin,-; or conceivinf-, 
are tv^o very different states of consciousness. "° J. S. Mill ti;clces 
exception to this, and protests that he can form, hy force cf crec-.- 
tive ti"ouf-ht, O.S vivid an idea of '..imBelf en the field of Shrevvshury, 
listeninf: to Pals^aff in his "cliaracteriGtic soliloquy over the hody 
of Kotsp-J-r, cts he can of himself in the presence of General LaPayette, 
v.hcm he once met. And as to rdemory and iiiic,f ination oeing distingu- 
ished, so to speak, hefore ffiey ■'orn, i.e., in their protot;>'pal 
sensations a,nd ideas, such a hut passes the dif f icLd-Gy to 
the other hand; there is no scluticn to he found in the distinccion 
hetween the oririnal sensation and th.e idea (mere fiction of t— e mint} 
-nless it he that the distinction between memory and imaf-ination is 
also primordial. (-♦-) But such an explanation reduces association 
to a vu'ork of supereroc-ation. 

In tlie case of the jud^rment, of helief in the validity of evi- 
dence, the younrsr i'ill comes at once into close quarters with the 
elder ^-.y conveying his criticiHm of association throug/i the very 
example \vhich his father used tc corroborate association; the exaTiple, 
numely, of t]ie sailors, s" ipwrechvd on a remote isl-.nd, trying to 

" Critical Notes to James Mill's "Analysis--" p. -^20. 
(+) ibid. p. 422-3. 


decide virhethsr the foot-step in t]\e sar.d were thtt of a. men or a 
monkey. Tj-.eir decision would T.e nade, said Janes Mill, only when 
t; e evidence v/as stronr eno^inh one way or the other to resist all 
contradictory evidence, and to clinch its complex of idear. in an 
indisscluhle union. But uhis irresist.irle co:'.lescer:ce of ideas is 
not ..nsolircely efn'.er v.i,.l for a judp-ment, says J. S. Mill in reply, 
hecause, even after p:aining concli;.si\''e evidence th:,t the footprint 
was that of a laonkey, it would "be possit.'le for the sailors to asso- 
ciate it with a man as having :rxade i'-.° Accordinprly , the question 
still reinains , Wliat is "belief? "'7'rhat is the difference to our miiids 
■fcetween "cliinlcinp- of reality, and representing to ourselves an imagin- 
ary picture?" And this question Jo'-'n Stuart I'.'ill does not attempt 
to, if to answer !aeans to explain in terras of so~nethinr else. 
He sinply sa^z-s : "I confess that I can ■■ erceive no esc&pe fron the 
opinion that the distiricticn is ultima.te and primorditl . " ( + ) 

Of John Stuart Mill . e na;^ concli.'ide, as we heran, hy saying that 
"oelief (at least, of the educated) is not "ta"i^:en in" ''oy every acci- 
dent:! union of ideas in the mind, however close th t i.mion ra&y he. 
ITot t"!^at we are never influenced in .-•lakinr up our convictions and 
"ivinr cur assent, hy the mechanic^;! of cur thought, hut 
that the po\.er of these associations is not ahcolute ; helief is 
l&.rr^er t>'a.n association. "We pin our faith, not to association, he 
would say, for it maj'' he nade to fluctuate; hut to the uncerlying 
uniformity of nature;" and to it we risk our all, h-elieving that 
consequent will invariably follow c^ntecedent .© 

° Critical Hotes to Janies Twill's "Analysis--" p. 454. 
(+) ihid. 412. 
® ihid. 436. 


Section IV: I^elief cS Action. 

T'Tiether it is that new facts are ever cominft abo^^e the horizon 
of hiisian experience, and indeed, of reality, and ccnfoundinjf old 
tf^eories; or simply t?'.at t]'e fbcte existing are of too vast a number 
(even t^ie representative ones) to he hrought v.'ithin the ken of a 
single lii'e, is a question tlut is again in mind as we come to the 
study of Alexander Bain. Phenomena that ought to he classed under 
helief were ru.nning v.ild he;/ond the confines of "sentir]ent or feel- 
ing," or of "inseparal-le association," or even of "ultimate assent." 
It v;as Sain's cJihiticn to project a theory th&.t would he thoroughly 
comprehensive. He accordingly declared that at hottom, helief is 
action; "action is the hasis and ultinate criterion of r^aliti' ."^ 

To say with Jajaes --ill that conviction is an association of 
ideas, is to reduce helief, Bain argued, to a mental state that is 
ultra-rational and static; it is to forget that "■^eli^f is a motor 
phenomenon, and tl^^t it expresses i'-self in attitude or T.over.ient ; it 
is to make the mistake of thinking to find a true resultant v/hen one 
component, and th^^t, the main one, is left out. The correct view 
of the question Is to he hL,d from the ride, not of £tntecedent, hut 
of consequent. We h-,.ve the clue to the real character of helief in 
the connection het-.veon faith and v;ork£. "The practical test applied 
to a man's helief in a certain matter is ?:is acting vipon it."'(+) 
This conc^-ption of t; e nati^re and origin of hvma.n assurance, explainst?. 
as it is hy the working of our own experience, had likewise no need 
for an a priori principle, vvhether tijA-t principle he a. .lively idea 
or an ultimate assent, 

o Bain: The ^notions and the Will: 4th edition, 'p. 506. 
(+) ihid. 505. 


Bain's position nieana more than tliat a. cor.viction tenas to-- 
or doeS'-manif est itself in an ciit\/ard action, if the exciting situa- 
tion per'uits; it is no such tempered view as that; it means that 
there is no conviction hut has its essence in an accorapanying thought 
of possible or i'mneditte acticr. , hovv^ever reracte or indirect the lat- 
ter may "be. "If I an thirsty, I may say tiiat I helieve myself to be 
thirsty, because I act accordingly; I cannot assure myself or any 
other person thb.t I am not under a dreara, an ima,?;ination, or a hallu- 
cination, in any other way than hy a course of voluntary exertion 
corresponding to the supposed sensation."*" The author's determina-' 
tion to prove action indispensable to belief dppears still more bold- 
ly in a second case. Fe believes that he yesterday ran up against 
a Vifall to Iceep out of the way of a carriage. There is no disposition 
to do anytJiing in consequence of this memory, 3^et, it is a conviction. 
And this because, says Bain, "I feel that if th'^re were any likeli- 
hood of i^'eing jaiTimed nvj in that spot again, I should not go that way 
if I could help it,"(+) It is a readiness to act that makes belief 
"something more than fancy," Jlven t>ie conviction that obtains in 
the highest theoretical knowledge is amenable to the action-theory. 
T"-e reason that such knowledge is seldom redt..ced to action is "not 
Vifant of fc..ith, but want of opportunity. "<p^ 

Such stress as we have found Bain laying upon the action element 
in belief is almost enough to eclipse from view any other ele-^'ent 
(or elements) it may have; as^-surance attaches to voluntary activity; 
it attaches also to spontaneous activity. "Our natural state of 
mind; our prim.itive start, is tantamount to full confidence;" "in its 

° Emotions and the V'ill: 4th edition, p. 508. (+) i'id. 
@ ibid. p. 507 


essential character, "!;elief is ct p.iase of cut uct.jve nut'ire."" But 
we are lucfeily saved from siich a raicunder^^tandin^ of the author by 
coming upon 3tate?nents that definitely disr-lain place for experience 
in a primordial impulse; mtre persistence in action t}'at is hrin^^ing 
pleasure or alleviating pain, has no accompanying state of confidence 
Activio^/ that is itself its ov/n end, gives no "basis for the expecta- 
tion of cittaini'ig something remote, l)}' t certain mean-s; and for Bain 
the only kind of confidence posaihle is confidence in 'neans to an 
end. ( + ) It is "a fiction or a to speak of ": i lief in a 
present reality, "(f? . The author accordingly remarks that "vvhile, 
therefore, acion is the hasis and ultimate criterion of "belief, 
f^ere enters irfto it as a necessary ele'ent some cognizance of the 
order of nati.vre, of the co-rse of the vvorld. (#) 

By the cognitive constituents necessarily present in all Velief , 
is not meant, hov/ever, a reasoning state of ?aind; i.e., not this 
alone. Fe do not wbtit for the reflections of experii-nce and the 
consequent inseparable association before vve launch our trust; ""be- 
lief fellows the absence o:;' contra.diction. " "The natural mind has 
a predetermined bias to action," bu.t let thoiAght open ever so sm.all 
an outlet, action breaks forth into belief.' Belief at its maximum, 
too, for larger experience brit sets u.p checks and indicates the 
dir^sction of safe travel. Thus, althougli convictions function only 
where there is some knowledge, the amount required at the beginning 
is remarkabl2;- meager--juDt a mere observation of some sequence in, such as is seen, for example, in a young child which, given 
sv;cltmeats at one time, expects the same again upon the second ap- 

*> ITotes to Mill's "Analysis:" pp. 394-96. ( + ) Emotions and 
Will: pp. 505-G. <?) Notes to Mill's Analysis: p. 342. (#) Emo- 
tion and Vill: p. SO-. . 


peararice of the doner. This nice "b^^lunce lor cctiori, for motor 
response, seen in its siiaplicit.y in animals, children r -^d savagea, 
Pain considers: the leading f ct in "belief; a fact vvhich he tcrins 
"Primitive Credulity," or "^n impotence of thou.f^^lib ; " the latter, 
because, "without some positive interference from without, there' is 
no oti^er v/ay of doing or thinking ."° 

There is no need for words concerning thq importance of the 
"action theory." Itr, is attested hy th« ploce it occupies, 
more or less modified, in the theories of today. This conception 
of belief ^ives a jvist and needed emphasis to the practical aspect 
or human experience. It suggests the "p^.ssional n:. t\re" of .Taraes , 
and the "notor attitude or ■.■.ccommodation" of Baldvidn. Moreover, the 
cognitive element which attaches to helief justifies the statement 
that for !Bain h.elief was of reality. To have helief in water as 
"being of a certain compound neans , he says, that I helieve I should, 
if I analyzed water, find those elements. 

° Emotions and "^.^i^l: p. 537. 


Chaptei- III. 
Psyci'olo; ical . 

In this division, we shall pursi-e the came Tnethod as in the 
precedinr one; ^he dif::'erent writers tc "be treated v. ill be presented 
hcth constrv.c'oively and critically. TaxI v-hereas in the foregoing 
chapter, vve liave heen ccnridsring theory as at Lacliing Lc a particular 
individLial, \ve shall now cO!isider t-e vario^'S theories of V;elief ah 
represefted 'oy a numher of i-idividiuils . This ■^as its advantiares, 
and c:..n really "be done in a t-;eneral way; for yres^ent tr^eories of 
i-.elief can scarcely resis; clascif ication under feelinr, inosllec iion 
or will. A second variation on i.he procedure of the first division _ 
wi'.l "be the suppleinenting of the mere general psychological treatment 
of "oelief with hrief reports of t' e liruited dbta vvhich. h.ave "been 
p-athered :".n patholorical and experimental investigations. 
F-ecticn I: Descrip'-ive Psychology. 

A) .Belief with Peeling ■J)aramount, 

Falter Bage>'ct and Professor William James nu.y he looked upon 
as continuing in a .'Modified and developed form the theory of Kuu-ie, 
with t ■ e important di^'ference, l"cv;ever, that while assigning to the 
intellect and the active nature a sh_are in th.e determination of 'oe- 
lief, they nevertheless assign the leading role tc feeling. 

Ealief is recognised hy Bagehot as having an intellectual a.o 
well as an emotional element ;° hut not having such a preponderating 
intellectva,! eler.ent as the "quiet, careful people who have v.ritten 
our treatises" give it. And it is to hring forward the enctional 
sice of the s^'hj ect that the v/riter expresses himself so etnphc=.tically 
in defining; belief as "e?notional conviction." "Pr';"-ahly , " he fore- 

** Bageho^ : The Emotion of Conviction; Literary Studies. 


casts, "when the suh.ject is thorouftkly eyamined, 'ccnvi cticn ' »vill 
he proved to he one of t'^e iritensest of human einotions." Indeed, 
sone such viev/ of assurance see'is necessary to e:':plain the tenacity 
or "burning certainty of thcr.e convictions that assert themselves 
after the intellec t^.a! incentive has rone, or that transcend that 
incentive. Only tVi^s could t^^e author himself account for the-- f: ct 
that he ?till remained susceptihle to the conviction that he should 
he "sien-iher for Kridgewater , " v/hen years "-"ad passed sir:ce "^'is defeat. 
And only thus can v/e account for pvch conduct a? that of Calif Omar, 
v/ho hx.irnt the Alexandrian lihrarj^ upon the flimsy pretext t.iat, "All 
hooks which contain v\?hi. t is net in the Koran are dangerous; all 
those which contain wV'at is in the Korean are ur.eless." 

The -.-riter thinks his position, that helief is not "a purely 
intellectual matter," further estahlished hy our experience in dreams 
"where v/e are always helieving, hut scarcely ever arguing;" and hy 
the ahnormal helief that the insane suffer as fixed illusions, a 
helief that has a degren of intensity never reali:;:ed h^'' the sane, 
But the argujnent he makes the most of in thic connection is f^^at h^'" 
v.'h-ch he endeavors to shov/ that certain ideas possess of themselves 
the pov/er to generate assurance without the exercise of t!e intel- 
lectual process; the ideas, namel;/, that are clear, or intense, or 
const, nt, or interesting. These ideas are designated ar> tendencies 
to irrational conviction and 'adhesive states of consciousness. 

Theee four groups of ic^eas, moreover, -"ive Ba^-ehot a hasis of 
attack on Bain's sweeping assertion that helief is identical v.-ith 
cur "activity or active dis^posit ion , " and support his assumption 
that children are horn helieving, an'- hecome skeptical onl;* .vith the 
checks and disappointments of hard, non-acquiescing experience. 
Dou-'^t is defined .'.s "hesitation (in these ideas/ produced h; colli- 


sion." This collision, hovk'ever, never pi'.ts us fully on our guard 
againct tl-.ece insidious idear. , and thus, v/e retain ever in our adult, 
hesitating stape , "vestifes of our primitive, all-^elievinp- st.v,te." 

Mirs Fttie Stetthei-ner , in "A Crit^'cul Study," entitled, "The 
V'ill to Believe a.e a Basis for a Defense of Religious raith,"«» quot- 
ing from Hans Corneiiui:, says: "There are two pccsitle inethcds for 
a research into the conditions of helief. One rii^y start with a 
fixed definition of the real, and then deduce from it v/h..t marks our 
ideas '^ust show in order to he characterized as real; or, one inay 
proceed inductively, and search for the co^n^^on qr;alities of those 
idea^ v/hich are generally'' "'relieved, and thus deter^iine the r.c ture of 
reality." She then roes on to say that Janiet:.' attempts to carry 
through the second of these Tnethods. And her chservation is as ser- 
viceahle as it is true. Por to gain any comprehension of Professor 
James' treatment of helief v/ithout first placing one's self on the 
side of the Ego (the common-sense Egc), so one can see v/hat ideas it 
chooses as real, would he a thing as impossihle as undertaking to 
make the cart pull f^e horse; hecciuse the force that deoides reality 
is not external, hut internal. 

Bi;.t even this suggestion to guide, the reader through the 
chapter on the "Perception of Piealit;/, " ( +) he yet neets with diffi- 
culties. One such perplexity is as to the way the exp-^rience of 
douht coi'ld ever arise to vex the Ego, if the Ego decided the truth 
of things v/holly 'oy the postulate of its own inner nature. It is 
quite natural for the nev^-horn m.ind to tr-'.rn the hallucinatory c-ndle 
into a realitj', since there is no other ohject present in conscious- 

° Archives of Pl'.ilosophy , edited hy Frederick J. E. Woodhridge, 

No. 2, Decemher, I'r'C ; p. 64 

(+) Janes: Principles of Psychology: vol. ii , p. 315. 


ness to protest. But it is quite different w'-.en the v;orld ha.s grown 
hard and stern, ar.d cqiiarely contri.dicts the child in las natvra.1 
conceit; the tahlee are then turned. And it is in such and only such 
a situation that the conrenital tendency to accept without question 
anything and everything, heccnes tempered with ci'rhir-j'; dcubtt;. Hav- 
ing found the di.nfer of a passive acquiescence in t?'.e lead of the 
emotions or active nature, t:'-:.e child no longer trusts everything; 
ahout sone things he takes a second thought. Vithout recognizing 
stuhhorn controlling facto over against us, it is a mysterj'" why the 
hoy with his winged horse should ever neet v/ith contradicting con- 
ditions. Indeed, Professor James, as T'-'iss Stettheimer asserts, does 
seeTi almost forced to declare for space-reality, a v/orld extra Tnentem^ 
simply to have something for helief to go out upon. She refers to 
the passage in the Principles of Ps;:'-chology vvhere he speaks of the 

candle existing "over there /in/cp^ce, related to other 

reals. "° And follovi'ing this out logicall;^ one could say of the 
illusory candle that it "became u.nre:,l for the experience having it, 
onl-y v/hen it was found not to exist in real space alongside of other 
reals . 

If, however, there are times when the a'i.ithor's presentation of 
belief as tlie "mental stcite, or function of reality," (+) ^ries com- 
prehension even "beyond its capacity, there are times, and many 
of them, when the understanding moves along v/ith facility. The con- 
sideration of "belief as an emotion furnishes an example of the lat- 
ter. In this., James agrees with Bagehot, and says that "in its inner 
nature, helief, or the sense of reality, is a sort of feeling allied 
to t}'e emotion more tht,n to anything else."© But it is concerning 

o p. 69. (+) ihid. 283. <^ ihid. 


the circumstc-.nces "in wliich v/e think things real," that Profeueor 
Jamec carries on •nest of his investigation; for t-hout all f"al can 
he said of ""lelief as the "sense of reality," is that it is a state 
of consciousness sui peneris, a feeling that feels like itself. How 
i^nportant a part is accorded the emr^tions in t"'-e matter of conviction 
may "be seen from tv.o or three quotations. "Everv exciting thoup;ht 
in the natural man carries credence v^ith it.° "The vvlLcle history of 
v;itchcraft and medicine is a coT-ientary en the facility i/.ith '»vhich 
anythinp; which chances to be conceived is believed the nonent the 
helief chimes in -with the emotional mood." ".Belief consists in the 
emotional reaction of V:e entire nan upon an chject." Mere appear- 
ance, hare appeal to the intellect, is not enouf-h to "stine-"^us with 
assurance. In order to move us to T^elief, an object must he inter- 
esting and important; it must cone to the mind, as Hume said, as a 
lively and active idea. This is attested hy "oi?r everlasting par*' 
tialit;/ to the sense-world , or the vv'orld of ov^r practical life."( + ) 
"^"ren, at their height, emotion>? lead us *o ''^elieve the first thing 
that comes to mind, we have a fact instanced hy the unreasoned con- 
viction of th'j- moh. 

In the first paragraph of this hrief review of Janes' theory of 
belief, it was said that the onl;' way to compass the author's meaning 
is by way of the Egc. Let us then adopt that course. We are immedi- 
ately met with the assertion that the "fens et origo of all reality 
is the Self." ^.Q-.ile Stout and Bo.ldv»'in posit tv/o controls, inner c.ct*- 
ivity -nd ou^ter limitation, James would place the v;hole matter in 
the hands of one control--the Self. He might be considered c.s say- 
ing in Shakesperian style, "It is not in our objects, but in ourselves 

® Principles of Psychology, p. 285 ff. 
(+) ibid 294 f 

t?x t vve are "-".elievery. " " postr-latis ^re given in our nature; 
and whiatever satisfies thoise postulates is treated as if real."" 
This prero^i^tive of t;' e Ego reac- es its climax at the end of the 
chapter or. "Perception of Reility," and "belief and v;ill are said to 
he exactly'- the same states of mind. "Will end Belief, in short, 
meaning a certain relation hetv.-een o'b.lectL: and the Self, tv/o 
n:.r.:es for one and the si. me psychological phenomenon. " (+) The only 
difference between them is physiological; \v' ich seems to mean thi t 
in hoth these phenomena there is a "consent" to the existence of the 
object, a tnrning to it in an interested, actiYe, emotional way, but 
that in V'ill there is added a nev/ physiologicc'l ele.ment, that of 

Professor James svynmarizes his v/l-<ole position in one short 
sentence, as follows: "TV'e most compendioiJs possible formula, psr- 
hatjs, -vvould be that our belief and attention are the same fact."@ 
Ke off ■ rs t"-is definition vfith the hope of incorporating into a 
single view all the earlier Yiev\s that persist each hy virtue of a 
certain truth, but a partial truth; the view of Ja les Mill, of Bain 
and of Sully. "Por the moment, what we attend to is reality; atten- 
tion is a motor reaction, and we are so made t'"at sensations force 
attention from us." 

B) -i^elief with Cognition as an indispensable 

As representative of those w'^-o consider that belief can exist 
cnlj' on so.iie kind of cognitive basis, we sh-till examine the views of 
Sully, Stout i.nd Baldwin alone. These v.riters, coming s.t the problem 
from, tv/c different directions, hringing evidence from both the ana- 

° Principles of Ps'-chology: vol. ii, n. 317. ( + ) ibid. p. 321. 
®. ibid. p. 322. 


lytic and the f-er^ex-ic sources, and findirf: in it all a unit-sirnif ic- 
ation, are a'le to present argument of dovi'ble v/eirht. And for them, 
"belief has emphatically a reference to an extra-T^ental reality, to a 
reality heyond the mere idea;- th t are in consciousness; helief for 
them has its roots, at least its m&in roots, in the representb.tive- 
ness of Icnovvledf'ie. They do net say, however, that belief is Tcnov*- 
ledpe and nothinf- else; that it has no intrinsic nature of its own, 
hii : is wholly a reflicticn of "knov/ledge ; they contend only th: t^ be- 
lief ...nd cognition cperi^te always in conjunction. vie:Vv does 
not underrate conviction in its ir.-er active nature; its impulse, 
its propelling; spontaneity, its character as the foc- 1 expression of 
all that is creative in ccnscicais life; it simply pives ground upon 
which ccnvicticn c-.n suprort itself. If belief spun its object out 
cf its own nature, then there would be neither object nor belief, for 
all vvou.ld be an objectless immediacy. 

Sully's point of vie\- toward belief is best set forth in his 
work, "Senr-ation and Intuition," in the chapter, "Belief: Its Varia- 
tions and its Conditions." In this chapter he takes up trie subject 
in an acute and exhaustive m.anner , working out, perhaps, the most 
complete psycholoric^^l research yet made in this field. His prim.arj'' 
assum.pticn is that "every idea involves a mental impulse to realize 
the cor>"espondinf^ sensation," and that this psychic fact is the last 
"inaccessyble stage" in the history of 'relief. ° 33y notable skill at 
choosing pertinent illustrations, he is .hie to marshal 8.n array of 
evidence sufficient to turn his assumption into a vei-y credible the- 
ory. The experience ^f certainty has thus, even in its germ form, an 
objecti'"-e mark or condition. Assurance when in its erabryo- state gives 

o Sully: Sensation and Intuitjcn; p. Bl . 


pro'^ise of that o"'"','' ective deyelopment expressed "by the v/riter in 
these words: "To "believe •neans to Relieve in so^^ething; ard in orde 
to do t-'-is, a definite ideei of the thinr >^elieved in is necessary."® 
Or ajTcin, "^^y sayinc th..t "the r'^f ::'rence of thought heyond itself to 
a real chject is u. part, and a ver^- important part, of •Ai^at is n^ant 
M' "belief." (-4-) 

That the exercir;e of cognition is a prerequisite condition of 
any and ever;'" experience of conviction, "beccnes niore and more mani- 
fest as helief, risnnj^ our of nere ohjective tendency, i.e., unv/it- 
tinr acceptance, develops from simple expectation and refl'frctive 
anticipation to logical conviction. As experience unfolds in growt?., 
it defines, differentiates and mac'ifies itself; features that v/ere 
at first vjit-^ue and indistinct hscome inarked and positive. If we 
trace "briefly t}-.e genetic investigation Sully Tn-'.kes of helief in the 
chapter referred to, we shall meet results that show the relation 
"betv/een knov/ing and h-lieving to he ver;'" intimeite. 

Fe rememher an earlier statement of the author's assumption with 
respect to f-e origin of hujnan cer'ar'nty and confidence: "Ev-ry idea 
involves a mental impul?-, e to realise the corresponding sensaticn." 
But it may he v/ell to emphc^sise another: "belief arises," we read, 
"from the inJierent tendency of the idea to approximate in character 
and intensity to t'-^^e sensation of v/hich it is the of f t^pring. "© "In 
the instinctive transitions of mind from a recurring idea to the 
acti'.al senoation typified ''oy it, there seem to present them.selves 
the first awlcif: rd , hut necessary, trials of hujian faith. "(#) A 
simple and unique mental force is here posited, bi't it is attached 
to the idea as a sort of craving for the "real" which the idea Icnov/s 
ahcu.t, hut confesses not to have. And that this is not a fancy "::"ut 
a f..ct is strikingly attested, as Sully points out, hy the conduct 

O Stv^c, u-nn Ti^fn-ifirun* -n. 

(=^) ) }]\}r.Vc.n M^nd, p«6' . 

'■<-'. ( +) V(Mr,^.■.r^ "J.finrl_ T..APA. <P> ih. 83. 


of hjp-Ve- ani;n::l5, of children, of uncliitured -nen i'.nd of savage 
races. The .yoiinp; mind easily yieldr to illrsicn; it in constantly 
talcing Yivid ideas for JnpresBions. And the sav&ce cannot resist 
attri>^v'tinf; personal life to stvmps ^.nd recks and logs of human 
fern. Conditions of nind th..t in the mc.ture life can he hrovght 
about only hy i.rtificiL,! means, >y sone drp.g;, siich as an opiate, 
occur in ear^y life quite ncturally, and for the reason the t sensa- 
tion und idea are net far fron each ot'-'er in intensity. At this iTn- 
:7iati)re stage, we are told, cor-'sciousness has not yet really ohlecti- 
fied its experiences; not divided r.pace and time into segments or' 
points cf refei^ence; not even ~iade the grand divisions of Icnov/n and 
unknown; past and present; actual and possi"'"Ie. 

To this first level of i-^elief, Bain oh,:ected, and criticise'd 
Sully for not taking account of ths order and sequence in n&ture-- 
facts which the fomer thinks essentials, and correlates of all as- 
surance. It is true that to think of an experience having none of 
those large orienting categories, is to t:!-Link of an experience set 
afloat, so to speak, v/ithout any hearings. But that nay he for the 
reason that ..'e are looking hack froni the high ground of logical or- 
ganization. At any rate, Sully rr.aintained tl-st these "hearings" take 
on definite c'-aracter onl;;- v/ith the further development of experi- 
ence; only, th t is, v/ith the arrival of anticipation and its conse- 
quent disappointment. And certainly that argument is difficult of 
refutation which holds that disappointed expectation precedes and 
provokes reflection upon f^^e, upon the r-'rltion cf antecedent 
to cons'^quent . As long as the child is not deceived in his expecta- 
tions, hut always finds an orange the tv^ing "•-is idea pictured, j"ust 
so long is he going to he ignorant of sequence in nature, and happy 
in his ignorance. It is onljr wh.en the orange proves to he, not an 
orc^.nge, hut a painted hall, which is not constituted of j'^icy hites, 



that the child hegins to ccnitinice its chape, colcr, texture a-nd 
other attrihutes. Nothinr hut tVe thwartjnf^ of credv;.loitE erpectatior! 
will driAT-e the yor'ng- mind to consider the hasis of his definite an- 
ticipation, and f^ive h-.m incentive to lock into the deeper sicnifi- 
cance of antecedent and conceqvent, 'whicl:: Bain calls the correlate 
of assurance. ° It alone will awaken this "conceptive faculty or 
imapin^tion ," whicj- is the other f';rand ini'luence (hesid^is disappoint- 
5ient) in trann forming our first over-^eening trust into deliberate 
conclusions of reason, and which transforms an indettr^iini. te, form- 
less "world into a world having all the form and meaning given hy the 
great categories of co-existence, sequence and perma.'e^.t er/istence. 
Our st'-'dy of Jc^mes Sully thus far may' he sujnj-'i:.-,.ri2ed hy saying 
that helief dem.snds as the necessary condition of its advent into 
life, some rudim.entary experience, "more especially some sensation," 
( + ) and that this meager experience heccmes in m:', helief , defin- 
ite, ohjective f:ct, existing for presentation as permanent, inde- 
pendent oh^iect-. This in psychological helief is the same as in 
logical. "Belief in a proposition," he sa3'-s, "is a helief in its 
truth; th:.,t is, in its correspondence vv-j.f-' the actual rels.tion of 
things.*® Bu.t the question we virarit to raise -now is, '?/ of incepara- 
h-le as<^>ociaticns , em.otion, actlon--does Sully count them as condi- 
ticis of helief? The answer is short; he does, hut not as indispens- 
ahle conditions. He accept? J. S. Mills' criticism of inseparahle 
association (it does not account for our choosing hetv/een m.em.ory .^ nd 
imagination) . against identifying helief with em.otion. He r-.asons 
thus: "The mode o"' its /^^elie^'s/ origin, the impartial range of 

o Human Mind: p. 93. .:^ Outlines of Psychology, p. 39c 
( + ) Hiiman Mind,, p. 81. ^ 

its objects, cind the fact ti^at it holds ccmnion relation to all the 
emotions pro-''ierl-'- so called, renders it very v.nder. irahle to classil'y 
them'^er . "° Fi th respect to t/ie claim of the action-theory to 
accoimt for i=ill hiirian conviction, he remonstrates t^at there in 
our experience neliefs thi..t cannot posr:ihly he explained on the hasis 
of action; as for example, the case when the expectation of coming 
harm heco'ies paralyzing terror. The raw material of helief is not 
to he found in feelinjr, er'otion or action; belief is ultim&te. Feel- 
ing and action, however, have an effect on asrurance, hi't not direct- 
13'-; only mediately, through ideas, v^^hich alone "• ave a direct hearing 
upon conx'iction. Comprehensively and comi'actly put, helief at its 
full includes for this author intellectual representav.ion , feeling 
and active impulse, and if it he of the ideal kind, also a certain 
amount of restraining Vvill. 

Stou.t undertalres an explanation of i^elief from an analj/tical 
point of view, e^nd v/or*""?! out a tlieory of inuch I'^readth, This theory 
is siif f icien tly compreher.'-ive to include hoth the a.ction-tr.eorj'' of 
Bain and the association theory of Janes Mill. Bain held that the 
"relation of helief to activity is expressed oy saying that w"''at we 
helieve, '-e act upon." This Stout approves. There is no question 
that a confident state of mind tends to express itself in action; 
conviction and activity are really correlated to each other. Bain's 
mistake was not that he made his theorj^ too sweeping, hu.t that he did 
not make it sweeping enough. Limiting action to phenomena extrinsic 
to the mind,v;as where he made his mistake. "Ke considers only trdns 
of muscvilar movements, producing a corresponding train of effects in 
the material environment. But even where such trains exist, the 

° Sensation and Inti'ition: p. 100. 


cental action v/ith v/' ich ■" elief ir> connected, does not conL^ist in 
th-eee o-""ert nove-nentt , "i^iit in the prior procers of franinf^ a plan. 
But there is no essential differr-nce hetween this inv/ard process, 
and that "by v/hich we work oT'.t a theoretical resrilt without r^;ference 
to external action. "° And so, w'''^eti:er t^-^e experience hf- theoretical 
or practical, it rit.kes no difference; the same principle appli'-r' in 
one case as v.'ell as in the ot'ner; confidence and action are corre-- 
lat = s. In eit/ier case, 'we act onl-'- hecaiise we are thp.s triJcting the 
means to the end. The actj o n- theory, --nade thus thoroufh-co3 njr, he- 
comes iririune to a l-.rt^^e part of the criticism that proved t}:e posi- 
tion of Bain vulnerahle; siich criticism, for example, as that "psych- 
ical cictivity seems physiologically'' to consist in muscular c:ctivity," 
and "that it will ra3 n trmorrow /seems almcst/ the sam.e as tuying 
an umhrella today. "( + ) In t'.e opinion of Stout, "it is needless to 
say that the theoretical series must he through and through constit- 
uted hy h°liefs; and t'at oi^r confidence in the result depends on 

cur confidence in the antecedent steps The vi^hole hody 

of heliefs forms a system of interdependent parts; it is the coher- 
ence of the system whic-: cc-nst i ti; hes the poscJ '^i li t;/ of its com'pcnent 
elements. "@ 

It is, of cc'jrse, plainly to >-■ seen that t^is active aspect 
of helief is in intimate relation wj t?: the author's "Conative and 
Cognitive Synthesis." We see it in the follov/ing st.r.tem.ents : "A 
practical need is one x.-hich demands for its ultimate satisfaction an 
actual change produced in the environm.ent , or in the relation of the 
organism to the environment; or at least, in the consciousness of the 

° Stou.t : Analytical Psychology: vol. ii, p. 237. 
(+) Bradley: Logic: pp. IS, 20. © Stout: Analytical Psychology: 

vol ii, p 23'^. 


power to prod 'ce bvcIi change. Thecretica.1 needs,- on the contr&r;'-, 
require for their ultJTn:..te satisfe^ct ion only an extension of know^ 
ledge c:!\d reniovctl cf doubt v;ithout alteration in the things kricwn." 
And ^f^ain: "In the "beginning of mer.i'^1 life, prL.ctical needs 
para:7iount. Purely intellecti;ul c^iriosity disengages itself from 
•these hy a prucees of gradual evolution."** The fact that "the grov;th 
of our nature consists in the groviring definiteness and 
determinateness: of our 'active' nature, "( + ) is a presupr^osi t :^" on of 
all helief , is quite manifest fro^. the criticism which Stout prefers 
against Bain when he, perhaps in an attempt to take account cf posi- 
tive convictions, modifies his original .theorj;- of the nature of 
"belief, and declc.res the correct viev; to he "t}-:at helief is a primi- 
tive disposition to follow out any seni^ence that has once heen ex- 
perienced, and to expect results,"® Stout's ohjection is that this 
state-nent implies "a theoretical interest which has no existence in 
the rudim-ertarj-- stages of mental life." The h: sic fact that we have 
to rememher as v.e cross over to the "passive aspect" of the theory in 
hand, is that hoth tlie practical ^rid th^eoretical activity'- is dirticted 
to an end, and upon the condition of confidence in the intervening 
steps or m.eans; that as practical conation is solely directed to the 
effecting of an unchstructed course for trains of extrixisic changes, 
mediating a desired ohject, just so theoretical conation is solely 
directed to the attainment of an unohstructed course for trains of 
thought, likewise mediating a desired end. 

Belief as limitation of activity, and helief as a condition of 
activity, m.t, intained hy Stout to he co-extensive and interdepend- 

o Analytical Psychology: vol. ii, < r> . 93 f. ( + ) ivid. n. 237. 
@ ihid. 238. 


ent. They are the two sides of the sa>ne shield. Indeec , 
wonld he an irnpossihility hut for the restraining circiinstc.nces set 
up hy n:iti'.re, reqiiirin^; definite means to reach a definite end. It 
is as rnrich a truth that we cannot experience conviction ''oy force of 
IrTiiting conditions as it is t^.at \je cannot walk without Vi/alking 
upon scnethinr. "The steps of a rirocesb, issuing in a given result, 
are fixed independently ' cf us. In disvising meanr- to an end, there- 
fore, v/e are not free to nake what ?nental comhinations v/e v/ill."" 

Limitation of suhjective activity, t];en, as v.e c^re distinctly 
told, is an iridispensahle factor in assurance. But vvhat does this 
impl^y-? Hov; helief leads to action, v/e know, hut here the situation 
is reversed, and helief follows action. Tl-ie ansv/er, hov/ever, is not By the li'riitative , or passive aspect of truth, is meant 
si'nply t" e recognition of an ohjectlve control. The control ty which 
vie lay hold of the raeans, and hring ourselves to a desired end is an 
inner control; '^m.t the control v^^hich makes us consider means, hring- 
ing i.'s up with a tug when we neglect such consideration, and w'l^iich 
early convinces credulous ntitures that "wishing is rot '-.^ving," that 
control is outer. But outer does not mean something th^t is foreign 
to our su.hjectjve eyperjence; on ■tl'.e contrary, it is c. very present 
fact, which asserts its rights both t o presentat ion and representa- 
tion, directly, as sense oh.iects, or indirectly, as determining ideas 

"The limitation of suhjective activity," the autlnor writes, 
"may take two distinct forms. We find ourselves forced to think in 
a given manner, in spite of an at'.empt to think otherv/ise. In this 
case, the limitation is an actual opposition or ohstruction. This 

o Analytical Psycholocy: vol. ii, p. 239. 


happens v/■^^enever ''-Vie mind entertciins ti-e posBil'ility of iin alter- 
native which it is ultimately driven to reject. On f^ e other hand, 
there nay he no ytLempt to think otherwise. ° As a typical example 
of the latter, we nay think of a r^c^r, feeling the noon-day si^n heating 
upon his head. T' e mind }''ere entertains no possihility of an alter- 
native. "There is no question that the sun is shining." The forr/ier 
type of limitation — that of opposition or ohstruction to suhjective 
activit;/, is instanced hy the child sucking at an empty hottle, or 
hy the inability of the schoolhoy to "tJiink '5 + 6 = 12* if he 
separates the '6' into its units, and a^^^ds trem, one hy one, tc '5'." 
( + ) In hroad outline the fiyldi^ represented hj^ theye three: illus- 
trations (which- shov/ the signif :■ cance of t'le passive ride of helief) 
are as fellows: "Impressional Experience," "Physical Resistance," 
"In;:eparahle Association," and indirtrjctlj^, "Desire" and "Imagination." 

A striking feature of Bi^,ldwin's treatment of helief, is Ids en- 
dea\'"cr tc give the phenomenon full cognitive standing hy eliminating 
its unde""eloped or gem-forms, and segregating them under a separate 
name: "Reality-Peeling." ±^^Ab represents; a distinction in helief 
phenomena th^t for a long time has heen coming. And the distinction 
is an important one. For, as long as the term Belief v^-as allowed 
to continue its old significance, and tc include a range and divers- 
ity of meaning that no single word could ccmpiss, there was no hope 
of keeping ^ ny fences in the field; destri ctive criticism had too 
much license. 

Definite treatment of the "Reality-Feeling" is deferred to a 
later chapter, v;here it v/ill he taken up more specifically. The 
treatm.ent here vvill he f^eneral, onlj- so much as is required to make 

° Analytical Ps:'chology : vol. ii, p. 239. 
(+) ihid. "43. 


the a\.ithor's t'^.eory cleur in its other parts. There is a similarity 
■■!etv«een the inport of r"ality-f eelini: :.rid f;e import of an earlier 
expression v/e cane iipon ir. cf "Primitive Cred\;ll t;;,- . " I:: 
Sully, also, v.-e found belief-phenomena of a nature resemhling thisj 
it is the p''eno"-iena that appear in the r.iental life of the child 
"before he has heccne, through disapooir.ted anticipations, skeptical 
and reflective; it mif^ht >e called the p'^enomena of the pre-helief 
period, the stase of natural -tnipt and of unthinking confidence. 
But real it:''--f eel ing, thouf-h it has protot^'pes, is not v/ithout v£tria- 
ticn upon these prototj'pes. The phrases-, "prr'Tni tive start , ""cvir- 
weeninp: confidence," "pristine assi'.rance," used as synonwis for 
"pri'^itive credulity," are Goarcel;-- synoncmous with the sense cf the 
follcwirg: "T'^-e p":rac8, reality feelinf^, denotes the fundamental 
\iodif ica ''ion of corBciou^jnesj: which s^ttaches to the prerent-i tive 
side of r-ensational sta.tes; the feeling' which neans, as the child 
af terwr-rds learns, that an ohject ir; really there .... th.e idea v/hich 
has the reality feelinr Tiay h" said to hhve its own guarantee of its 
reality; it is a 'j-,-iven' and ny feeling of i' is direct acquaintance 
with it."® There is here so'^ething hesides Bain's restless impulse 
toward the rea.1; there is also a passive ss of the real. 
"Realit2^-f e'jling at this early stage is sinioly the fact of feeling.. 
...Existerce is siinply Prese-'ce; hut Presence is Existence,* and 
whatever is in ocnscic'sness is real. ( + ) Physiolcg:' cally explained, 
reality-feeling (and also, unr ■ ality-f esling, or ahsence-f eeling, 
■which is the negative pole) neans that "any sensory process has its 
feeling of reality/ eler.ent; and c<.v.y tendency to Tricvement has its un- 
reality-f eelinr in the sensory process which sa.ti.sfies it."® 

o B^adwi-: Feeling and V.'ill , p. 149. (+) Und. p. 150. 
<^ V^id. p lo3 


A second ca'ient ch^^rccterirtic , perhaps t e most fu.ndamsnt-.l 
in B^lciv/in'G system, ic liic "Co-efficient cf Rec^lity." The ~;eaning, 
taken in its f;eneral signif ic.r.ce , denc-^.es any oTojectlve ctimulvs, 
in Vv' atever realn, '; :-it, ocmlnfr in conjunction v/ith Bcme impulre cr 
desire or erpectation, fives to cor.scimisnesD a feeli;.^^'- of catisfi-^c- 
tion and conviction cf reality; wliile, in pcrticul- r tpplicatnon, 
it neans &. real, sensory o'bject, a?id net a phantom; an honest act, 
a.nd not a h^'-pocrii-i cal one \ a picture thct proves to he heautjful, 
as anticipated, and not unattractive; or, it rneans that mark hy v/hich 
I reco;:"nize an imaf.e as i^epresenting a former stivte of consciousness, 
or belief, in a thought th^t has "consistyncy , or the ahsence cf pre- 
sentational or concept ional contradiction," 

Through the memory co-efficient of reality (also, that of 
thOT-'pht, ac we shall see l:-ter), Baldwin has teen a.hle to free him- 
self fro'i. f'-ie sense-vi'orld , v^hich ''".:£ alv;aye lorded it over those who 
would not forsaice t'-'e particular. Contri-ry to Stout, he holds that 
it is through meriory , and not through the direct impression of the 
senses, th^t we ohtain our knowledge of ricre than the ^<ere resistance 
cf an chject; that is to '.-ay, of its independent persistence. "To 
a cri='at; re without neraory, reality v/ould he- sirriply successive re- 
sistances; hi.^t with memory as recognition, comes also p rsistence."*" 
Baldwin v/ould include in his "co-efficient of externality," more than 
Stout's sensational test, and more also then the possihilitj' (memcrj'-) 
test cf .T. S. T.iill. Either of these positions taken alorie is inade- 
quate. He writes: "An adequate formula, tc do justice to "'oth, 
v»ould }-ave to run soaiewhat like thic. : '"elief in e>:ternal reality 
is a feeling of the necessary character of censaticns cf resict&nne, 
and of my ahility to get such sensations z^gain at any time."( + ) Bald- 

*» Peeling and Will, p. 166. ( + ) Mind: O.S., vol. xvi . 


v.'in thus o'bta.ins tv/o kir.dc-; of pres-ent reality: "Preirent external 
reality, guaranteed "hy its independence of my Vy'i""!; and present 
ruenory reality, p;Uoiranteed "by suToj erticn to my Vv'i^l.'"* 

IFor the theory'- now "before us, "belief prop'.-rly so called, is 
l"^receded "by disappointment and doiii i. It cnrrerponds to those 
"later '^.odes of conviction" Vv'?-ich Sully found to come into con- 
sciousness only with chaf;rined expectation, and with the development 
of the conceptive fctculty or iaaf^ir.ation. To saj'' that helief follow 
doul:t--f cllc'vvs , that is, upon its resolution, is to &ay that the 
"feeling of "belief is a feeling; the^t attaches to the representative 
faci'.lty primaril:'. " (+) The naive faith that once trusted everything 
and every"body, having "been deceived once too often, has turned skep- 
tical, and nere impressions and ideac; are no longer ctraightwa;'' ac- 
cepted as havinr sufficient credentia^ls in their ovm ir'Tmediate pres- 
ence; they nust support t-'eir claim "by a relia"ble escort, or "by 
directl^'^ convincing the senses. And if they can satisfy the rer'uire- 
ments , ccruciousness at once consents, and the nev; candidate enters 
the world of reality. To represent exactly what goes on in experi- 
ence in the interval "betvjeen the arising of dcu"bt i^nd its solution, 
this figure would have to "oe extended. We .Vvould l-; to ccnt.ider 
consciousr-ess, not cnly as passing upon the eligiT-dlity of irapressiors 
and ideas, l~ut as oeing in want of Just such "real as these 
promise of supplying. How near such a fjgure comes to giving the 
meaning of Dr. Baldwin's theory may he ceen "liy comparison with his 
most complete definition of helief: "Belief in anything. ... is the 
consciousness of the presence of th: t tiling 1.6 fit to satisfy a 
need. "@ 

o Peeling and VMll, :;. 165. ( + ) ihid. p. 155. © ihid. p. 171. 


Section II: Putholofi cal . 

It seo!^r. fair to ?a:' of t'-e pathological investip"&ticn of "belief 
or of tiie "feeling of reality," that it has not adv:;.nced far e-^oii.rh 
in experiment and oh^servation to find a hasis s\af :'ic3 ertly hroad to 
support a theory. T'-e acquisition of fc.cts haa not reached f^at 
derree of accivrmilstion -v/here the c}i.ief demcind is for a theory to 
interpret f'-:eir significance. Per this rear en, Janet ic found urging 
that most stress he laid, not on hy-^otheses , hut on tine ohservation 
of facts.** But though the results arrived at in pathological study 
of the n-t'ore and cause of hi.'nian certainty fall short of the amount 
necesst:ry to justify more than tentative conclutjions , these conclu- 
sions t re , nevertheless, not to he disregarded; and for the old 
reason that a mental function which resists comprehension when in 
normal conditio;:, may v;hen an abnormal state hecome amenacle to the 

To the question as to v/hat new fact the pathologicd investiga- 
tion has dircovered, th.e onl;-' safe reply would seem to he that path.o- 
logy has discox^ered no new fact, hut only emphasized an old one: 
namely, that helief is intimately cor.nected with the actii'-ity-sources 
in our nature. The feeling of certainty, ae also the feeling of 
reality, ]ias no a p^-iori guarantee to fall hack upjon, h^xt like health 
or disease, m.unt depend upon hiological conditions. Confidence 
springs from all parts of f^ie self. It is not something which has 
its origin in a corner of our n: ture ; say, t'- e intellectual corner. 
As professor -Tames says, "the mere fact of appearing as an ohject at 
all is not enough to constitute reality. " (+) 

° Prom Dr. Hoch's paper, helo\'.'. 

(+) James: Principles of Psychclcgy: vol. ii, p. 293. 


V/hat thoce who h-^ve L-tudied the patholcc3'" of helief, cr of tlae 
feeling; of reality, think c.hout the two Buhj^cts, is '"^riefly l.i t 
representatively given in two articles: one, a revievv, and tr:e ot^er, 
a Carefully argn.ed theory. The former ie hy Dr. August Hoch ("A 
review of some recent pa^ners upon the loss of the feeling; of reality, 
and Tcindred p;nnp tonti" ) ** . T>!. e latter is hy C, Bos ( " de la 
Croyance .")( + ) . Dr Iloch reports thtit t> e loss of the feeliric of 
reality is con^'-only for.nd in one or another of three sp?ieres of ex- 
istence: that relating to the individu&,l.'s ovm activities or thoughts 
or the, t relating to the outside Vv'or-ld or to t?ie hod:-. A patient '.vill 
say t>iat vision is cut off, that the e.-^es do not rei-ch out; that food 
has no taste; that hearing is not clear; or complain of inaliility to 
feel the various pi.rts of '.he hod:,-; or say that he has "no thoughts," 
asserting that the mind is v»rithout content, except as it comes from 
the conversation of another. In attempting an explanation of the 
loss of tjie sense of value or appreciation of the facts of experience, 
it has hoen found that these s,".-mptor:is :;.re present v^-hen it is impcssi- 
hle to demonstrate onjectively any sensory disorders, except, per- 
haps, fleeting chc.nges v/hi ch may ohtain "in grave cases, where the 
somc'to-psycriic alterations are most marked.", Dr. Hoch thinks more 
studies are needed to decide this point. Janet is inclined to oppose 
the idea that the loss of th feeling of reality has any connection 
with disorders of organic sent'ation, and to regard the common factors 
in these cases as heing a peculiar sense of incomplei.eness in regard 
to perceptions, emotions and actions. "The mind does not carry out 
its processes to their completion." He therefore ventures to 
relats the "unreality" experience to "a lo.ering of cerebral activ- 
ity."'^ Storch and his f:llo./ers, hov;ev-r, /icld to :i thecr*/ of e>.- 

° Psychological Bulletin, 1?0.^, . ( + ) Revue Philosophic, Iviii 
<n) iQc. cAt. ?,"';-. 

planation wh.ic?i contrasts v/ith V'-'at of Janet. I!, is 'oased upon the 
claim that the "feelinf cf the reality ci" external cojects, and the 
O projection into space, depend upon the aBSociation of rnii.sele senya- 
tions v.ith space perceptions."" This viev/ asserts tfi^.t the change 
which causes the feeling of unreality is to he found "pri'ny.ri ly in a 
disorder of tlie consciousness of the "'^ody, and inBu.fficlent valuation 
of organic sensations; and secondtrily, in a dif;order of the con- 
scioiisness of tlie external world." The qiiestion at; to the unr.;ality 
of ideas is explained ty the f^^-ct that they consist of memories of 
ssnse-i~ipresEions and organic sensations. This theory agrees with 
that of Janet in not ■m...,king unreality-feeling depend upon disorders 
of organic sensations; its changes may "be regarded like the agnosia, 
as association-disorders, and not as anaesthesia. ( + ) Bvrt it ih also 
to he noted that in ":is reviev;, T>r , Hoc'" mentions the fact that the 
symptoms attending the loss of the feeling of reality present a close 
relation to e^-iotional changes, v/hich may both succeed and precede 
tliem. And the fac'. thot tl^ese changes are of Vie depressive kind, 
suggests t'-e fact that even in the "assccic-vtion-explanation, " mental 
'-veaknesa may have a part. 

C. Bos in ""is paper, "Pathologie de la .Croj-ance , " traces every 
irregularity of oelief to a common cause. If^'.ether, he says, the 
alteration he hallucination, credulity, incredulity or doubt, the 
caiise is the same: a pov/erlessness or vvea.k.neBS of the mental activ- 
ity. Hallucination, "the simplest kind of illusory oelief," is for 
Bos a case where the vveakneas of the mind is over-run "oy the image. 
And credulity, vvhich parallels hallu.cination, differs from it only 
in the fact that t?:e illusion is hrought aoout, not hy an image, hut 

° Psychological Bulletin, 190 5: r. 237. (+) i'oid. p. 238. 
® iiiid. 


by an idea; the credulouE vifelco-iie t..n idea as the. cne suffering hallu- 
cirid-tion v.elcome tin imctce . These tv.'o illusory states of conscious- 
ness, hc'i/ever, fall pi'ey to deception from the satne incapacity: they 
laclc v;hat the v/riter calls "the second moment." V.laen the iiiidge or 
idea first comes into the range of attentio.-i ("the first moraent") the 
atl:itude toward it is the same in the mind silject to hallucination 
or credulity, as in the r-crmal or mature mir.d; at this stage, the 
presentation is before the mind simply as a certain content. But 
this period of agreement is of short duration. The "second moment" 
comes quickly, and in that the sane and tempered individual considers 
(unconsciously, most often) the escort of the presented iTiage or 
idea--the time and place asccciates, etc., and It.ter, comes to a 
conclusion. Bi,t into the mind open to hallucination or credulity, 
this jcrutinizing, saving, "second momerit" dees not enter. It is 
this inability to overhaul his ideas that makes the creduloris person 
helieve suc"*^ unreasonable things as that the President (of Prance) is 
to he prej-ent at a village fsJte, or that a certain neighbor is four 
hundred old. The mind of such an individual is able only to 
svggest the bare idea; for t'-ie rest, aill is passiveness and ps3'"chic 
poverty. There is no energy left from the '"first moment" to give to 
the "second moment." 

With the incredulous or negative-minded, there is the same 
falling off of mental H^ctivity; t:ne same lack or insufficient buoy- 
ancy of thought. In the case of the "negator," there is, though, 
more effort required t>'an in the case of the credulous, for only in 
the second moment can there be denial. But this denial is forced 
03'- fixed ideas that play the role of Cerebr.s, and reprslse before ex- 
amination any idea? not like themselves. This f ac ' explains such 
condu.ct as thcit displa:.'ed by a person v/ho refuses +0 go to bed be- 
cause thei'e is no nirbt; or '^-v the 3::ck "•'^'rson who refuses to believe 


that there is cannoneidinf in t're city, l'.ect.Tse -e frdnks it a preteyt 
■1 to keep hi'n shut p.p. Incredihility, or -egativity cf nind, if; 
plainly an ohstinncj'", a contradiction, an &rrest frcr-v cramp or 
i::i-^iohility . 

Dor^>t ib dvo a ■^•.cult oT diminis-ed mental activ':. . ^ .e 
illusions cf hallucination and credrlity are traced only indi ^^ectly 
to niental weakness, hut douht is traced directly. Though there is a 
hlind automatis": in credulity, and ir dor<ht great intellectual 
development, yet there is ultiinatel3v'- no difference in the Uw for.mB 
cf illusion. The douhter cannot triu'nph over his distr' st and in- 
hihit the impulse to dishei.ieve, any more than the individual at the 
plo.y of credulity or ha"' lucination can master his overvveening trust, 
and inhihit the im.pulse to helisve. Belief and will ^.re hoth trouh- 
led 03/- douht. This fact is seen in c:,ses where :"esitation reaches 
the stare of deliriam, as for example in the case that wou.ld not eat, 
for tryinf^ to decide wheth-r "one ea-tv. to live," and who died v.ith 
the question -unsolved. The vvill cannot cut the Gordian knov/. Since, 
therefore, will and he-lief are identified even in doubt, C. Bos is 
per-^itted to draw f! e {general conclusion that all alteratiors of 
helief have a common character, "which is a powerlessness or weakness 
of the merital activity under its higher form." 
Section III: Experimental, 
Professor Titchener, in his recent hook of lectures en "Experi- 
mental Psychology of the Thoi-ght Processes," remarks that "the experi- 
mental technique for '.j^e study of judcment in particular, has not 
yet V'een perfected."" And of the "feeling of reality," he says that 

"Titchener, E. B.: Experimental Psychology of the Thought Pro- 
cesses: "^j . 51. 

#44 . 

he hrts "not yet carr'ied Lhe qiiestjon into the Ic^horatcry. "^ Hor 
does he in hie criticism of the different explanations of tliia feel- 
ing;; TTiention anyone who has made any Ichoratory inveoti gaticn direct- 
ly "bearinfi: en the sv'bject. Indeed, thic field of research se-^ns to 
awa-'t the coming of the experimentdlist ; and accordingly, any inyight 
into the nature or origin of helief or kindred phenomena thtt coTiea 
from this scarce, may he expected to co^ie onlj"" indirectly--that is 
to say, h;-- a stv.dy of the lahoratcry work on jiidcment, which is at 
present heinf car>-ied on hj*- the "method of examination" (ansfrage- 
experimente) , and pur tici'larly , that dene hy the experimentalists of 
t h e Wf r z "" ■ '. r :: school. 

The qiiestjon for the psycholcnists to decide in the matter of 
relief is w}iat particular mental content the individual has at the 
time he is experiencing the feelinr of certainty. Or, to state the 
sa"ie thing fr-om a poi.-t of view strictly Jud;;;mental, the question is 
as to the nature of "]3evvusstseinlace , " which Professor i'itchener 
trfc-r:slates as "meaning something like posture, or of con- 
sciousness ." (+) The latter question is t? e one dealt with in the 
experimentation on the thought-processes. To find v/hat interpreta- 
tion t'-e experimentalists give the "attitude" (Eewusstseinlage) shall 
accordingly he the chiect of this section. Bvi hefcre vie turn cur- 
selves to that question, it will he necessary to give attention to 
another v/hich naturi'.lly takes precedence: the question of the prohlem 
or Au.f frahe . 

By Aufgahe is meant an influence that determines the covrse 
of conscioi's experience. Titchener is speaking of the Atif-rahe (in 
its general signification) v.hen he says that "this notion of the 

*' Experimental Psychology of t- e Thor.ght Processes*, p. 255. 
(+) ihid. p. 100. 


exterr:al and. precedent ion cf conscioi.i.enesi; , cc^.es into 
experiTiertul psycVolony ^W hints and partial recof:nitions in the lat=:' 
'P.O's of f .Q ?. ast cen+^;ry."*' And cltjo, when If says t^at "experiment- 
•.:il results in general are seer, to ''-'e fvncticr.s '■. ' nctrnct :i ens 
£i-:en." {+) T.ze enplo:.c-.ient of hypnotism in the peycholosical lalDora- 
tor;' is a of t"i e "problem" at iti3 .Tiaximuni.© On this suDject, 
Watt is quoted a^ follows: "Vfnat tr-rr'sf orns into judf?nents the mere 
seoj^-erce of experiencen that \r/e discover #hen we analj'"2e the process 
es of judrnient, and what distinguishes a j-odgment frcn a nere frequence 
of e:"p rieroes , is the pro^ilem. " (-■^) It is a further opinion of Watt 
that tlie prchlen need not alwa^rs he in consciousness, hut may some- 
ti-nes have what Messer ca"'l.s the 'character of the chvious.' The 
adji'stinentn cf the hody to a stimulus, though at fr'rst conr-ciously 
made, na;.', as the reacting :mind hecomes Ticre accustomed to the condi- 
tions, lapse into a.n nnconscioi'S procedure; paralleling in the sphere 
of thought v/hat we find in the sphere of action, in the case of the 
skilled pianist v/ho plays automatically notes t?'.at he once pla^/ed 
calci^latinglj'-. A proolem of this kind is th t of the "cognition of 
real thinrs--that is, of giving such a form to our perception, 
ti-'ougyt and speech that tliey are eideqi-ate tO' real th:ngs, whether we 
are concerned v/ith the persistence, properties, rtates, changes, 
relations or value of the r'-al."(-) VJith this last re'iiark in ex- 
planation of t;.e Auf gahe , .,e come naturally to the question of the 
attitude (Bevmsstseinla-e ) and the feeling of realness or oelicf. 

The "proolem" may he con;;idered the drive-wheel, which starts 
conscio'snese off, and the attitude or postures, the accompanying 

° Experimental Psj'-chology of fie Thought Processes: p. 163. 

( + ) ihid. p. 1^2. ^ ihid. p. 120. (f) i-id. ( = ) i^rid. p. 124. 


phenc""iena or necininc. In ^Tesser 's thought, a.t: Titchener £ti;.tes him, 
"the ohcerver i- ir;iver a certain proTilem. The prchlem finds repres- 
entation in conscioi'S'-ie'-'S , verhal or; the observer underct: rids 
it, has t'^^'e attitude or Bewi.n'steeinlare , of neanin;::; and has the i',006. 
will to fellow irstructior 3. "° It will save going into useless de- 
tail if \;e q^ote an-ajn at this point from Titchener. He says that 
"Messer''3 intellectual attitudes correspond to Ach's awareness of 
neaning, ajid T.Iesser's encticnal attitudes, to Ac) 's awareness of re- 
lation; anc^ f'Mj.s , to f' e oripiinal Bev;uj--Etseinlar;en of I'arhe and 
Ort"i."( + ) !Tov/, ]'e:-ser'c ir.tellectual attitudes and Ach's awc'.reness 
of meaning are "raat'ers of ■'rderstandinf, pure and simple,"® and so, 
need not detain i-s. It is the others v/ith which we are co^'cerned. 
They "^rinfi; into experience affective and volitioiial elements, v;hich 
are reported ny the suh.jects most frequ.ently as si^rprise, perplexity, 
hesitation, u»-certainty , douht ; or their cpposites: Sii.ti5fccCticrx, 
certaint}.-, relief, assert, convictior. It is si.rnificant that the 
Bevmsstseinlar:e is found V' Titchener to resemhle James* "fringes," 
H?;ffdin.^'s "quality of fariiliarity , " and nany of Wundt's feelings, 
especially, f-at "feelinf: which is the pioneer of lcncv;ledg5 . " (#) 
This talces us hack to helief as Vi^e saw it in Jajnes, v/ho said tliat the 
"real" is a "fr-'n. -r?." We r'-ne'":iher th e criticism against this posi- 
tion; it wa?; declined to lack the ohjective factor of, outer control; 
to have the active principle of ^elief, hut not its counterpart; and 
to he inconprehensi-'^le , how the fringe could >e the ohjective meaning 
of the psvc'^^ic ohject of which it is the fringe. 

The (iuestion of a'ttitude (Bewu-stseinlage ) thus narrowing itself 

® JSxperinental fsyclolory of the ihought Prccesse;^; p. I'lO. 
(+) 10, . m ihid. p. 10(.. (#) iV,id. pp. 102 f. 


down to a natter of hov* one idea, (friage) can "be- the jieu..Ji:g of 
another, presents us oiir pro'Mem in V'cld simplicity. Titchener, 
linitiDg the inentc.l elements to tvvo--seriSc<.ticn o.nd feelinf;, finds 
thc^t one idea, (lilce Junies ' fringe) muy £:ive meaning to e-r.other idea; 
the fon.ier idea heing the context of t^ie lw,tter. Of the context he 
writes: "I understand ^y context simply the mental prccesG or com- 
plex of T'lentdl processes, v/hic'': accrues to the cri^'inal idea t;TOU£'h 
the situation in v/hi ch the organism finds itself."° And hy 'situa.-' 
lion' he means "any forn of AufcaY)e that is nomal to the particular 
crranisr^.," and not "a tciek or prohlem /whicli/ may Tje set to any 
organism prepared or unprepured." Ws inay now cOTnprehend the cause 
and 'meaning of his opinion on the su"^^ject of Vjelief, or the feeling 
of certainty: "The feelings of realit,y /seem to he/ alvvays of an 
er.otive character, inplyinrr affective process in connection with 
kinaesthetic or other orroiuic sensations, and running their course 
under the influence of an Auf gabe , or Einst ellun.r (predisposition)". 
(+) We have these feelings of reality, Titchener indicat-s, "v^hen 
we find that the hrccch we have piched up is real gold, and tliat 
the ta'le we h.:ve spied in the second-hand store, real mahogany; /or/ 
when, t-fter plowing throvigh fne intrcdiictorv pages , "»ve cc -.e to the 
real point in a scientific paper."® Likewise, an unexpected meeting 
vi^ith a friend is said to ;-ive us the saT'e feeling. That the feeling 
ofi reality does coae into our experie'-.ce just as Titchener portrays 
it, ou.r "flesh and hlocd" stard readj'- to witness; v^e are h:~ving just 
such feelings e\rerj day. It is a question, however, whether ?iis con- 
ceptio?! of the nature of helief is suffici^eif tly comprehensive; 
Vi'hether his feelings of reality, though having .'".arks of helief, • 

° Exp. Psych, of the Tho-^ght Processes: ■: . l"^?. ( + ) ihid. p. 
2 55. @ p. 2~4 

all the nic^rks. Por Mitio Calki'is, l.-eliel' is ";\i idea distiriguislied 
Tooth "by the feeling of realnens, and "by the /'relcit icnul/ feelinc 
cf coHt^ruence , "° The Wf'.rshiirg sohcc.l {a& we have c-.lready set^n) mean 
"!ore h;'- their BewusLitseinlaf^e (attitudes, includinj^ certainty and 
conviction) than just sensation and feeling. Messer, in fact, goes 
t'le length of maintain inj' for .liidfTrient (helief) the "chjective re- 
ference of the Aii.strian scli.ool." "In the everyday life of mind," 
he a.scerts, "our ej-perience is i'.tentional , directed upon cljects." 
And "the ps^'chologist Vk'ho should sv.ppoDe that perception and thought 
may "be adequately characterized "by the simple ascertaininent of th^e 
sensations and ideas present in consciousness v;ould hie lihe a man 
who shoi'ld se^k to apjirehend the real nature of money, hy simply in- 
vest if;;>a,ting the materials ov.t of which m.oney is m.ade."( + ) 

. Without fiirther review of t^'e matter, it is clear that the 
center around which diccr-ssion gathers, is thct cf deciding v/hat are 
the component parts of the meaning that constitutes z. "belief-situa- 
tion. Is this meaning exhausted hy reading off an "emotive charac- 
ter," "affective processes," "kinaesthetic and other cr,;anic sensa- 
tions," and an "Auffc;ahe" to give direction and motive?© Or will it 
he found that "lelief is represented in consciousness primarily hy a 
relatio>-al character; the relation hetvj-een idea and object? (#) With 
f^ese questions holding the field t^.ere Js u.ot much chance for posi- 
tive concl-'^sions . This much, hcv^ever, may he said: the experiment- 
alists consider 1 he eyiste'ce of feelings of reality (or helief) to 
he hej'-ond q'estion; and also consider it c. possi^ilit^r that they may 
"include an unanalyza'hle core or residuum, a non-sensational and 

° Ce.lkins: Introd'.icticn to Psychology: p. 124. (+) Titfherer 
Experimental Psychology cf the- Thought Processes: p. 133. 
<® i-id. p. 25?. (#) ihid. p. 253. 


non-affective eler.entary proceDf.; and /thut/ this core or reBidu.-aa "be their ecceritial un reality-f eelijif,^ . "° rintilly, we maj- say 
that, though i;r.decided ahovt the nati;re of ''■elief, e::periToental 
psycholocy is net withor'.t eves for ar; epis temological study of the 
ciihjsct, and nay he fov.nd tr ^ixe cv-ppcrt to the viev/ nairita,ined 
lute,r jr. this na^er. 

Experir.isnlal Pc^-'cholOKy of tho£:ht PrcceL^sec: p, 256. 


Chapter IV: Cri'. icicin. 

As, at the snd of cur coerce, we Icck T)aclc voov ^.Le sinuob-S 
Pw' . ^'■e In trying to follow f roiigh the diverse interpreta- 
tions of l^elief some thread (or 'hreads) of meaning iin>'roken, v/e 
cannot dcu'h't thftt interpretation often misled vs\ that is was fre- 
quently nisinterpretation , A:;d 3"et, the light" of theory/ v«hich we 
chose as j-uide in our search for the neanirig of helief, was not a 
will c' the wisp; it alY/a;'-s -hroi;ght us--in ti;ne--to ccie frviitful 
end. Of the theories of belief thut have passed hefcre ns in reviev/, 
none was whollj?- without sif^nifj canoe ; ec-.cli of t; em had at leant one 
of those feati:res v;e ha'^'e seon standing oiit hcldiy and recurring in 
following theories. That is tc .^ay, we found no t" eery "but related 
>elief to feelin.f':, or to cognition (v\Aith reference to reali.ty) , or 
to a.ct"ion; and sonetines, "belief v/as rel&ted to all three p-enoniena. 

Belief seems "both to he and to h? ir:f I'^enced >y feeling; it 
appears to he dependent upion the cognition of reality, 
and it hiis intinate relhticn to cur active disposition. The e^.rliest 
explanation of hslief, as has heen einphasized, an attempt to 
identif;'' conviction with feeling; with the vivacit;/ of ideas. Hi^iae 
ccni^idered that in the last analysis, the only qualit;^ of mind essen- 
tially necensary to constitute hu.rian confidence, v/as feeling; just 
that feeling which is intrinsic to helief , and not any extra,neous 
feeling. Bain h.ter identified helief v/ith the active phase of cur 
nature, and SuJly, with the cognitive. Baldv/i:", and Stoi't have so far 
corrohorated Sully as to assert that helief necessarily implies the 
cof-nition of reahity; and pathologj"" has taken its stand v;ith Bain, 
holding that helief has its roots in th_e activity-soi-rces of our 
--^eing, Hiime at Vr_e same time has his st^ppcrters. Bagehct and Ja:::eE 
have strongly advocated t'-e view that conviction is feeling or emo- 
tion. Belief, they say, is more like a feeling than anything else. 


Pinally, I've have the v/itness of experimental ps^'^cholog;- a? EDAreh in 
the thoiTght proGSSsec. The evidence liere is rather incomplete, hi^t 
what there is, fa.v^rs the viev/ that helJef requires over und ahove 
:"'.3 inherent f eelin^-natvre, h. certain attitiide of relation, perhaps 
including that hetvveen idea and its object. 

Manifestly, "'belief y.s thus defined, lins ^neaning to confusion; 
it neans everything; it incli-des in so e v.ay the whole of conscious- 
ness. But how can helief "^^e feeling, cof.nition and action, all 
three? This question presents an insurmountahle difficult;/- if we 
turn f-e v;ay of the psychology which reduces all tc content. Por, 
considered mainly as content, how represented in consciousness, 
whether with a quality that is simple, or one that is co-iplex, helief 
refuses to comprehend tl:e entire riind; it prefers tc he thought of tis 
a feeling that feels like itself; that must he felt to "'■.■>e knov/n; or 
as a feeling that cosihines tv*ro qualities: tliat of realness and that 
of congru.ity; or ;''et, as a feeling having an emotive c^'-aracter, and 
implying affecti'^re processes in connection with certain organic 
sensations. If, hov;ever , we approach helief hy another wa;r, looking 
upon it '.s the mental state or function of cognizing reality, or as 
heing the consciousness of the fersonal indorsement of reality; that 
is, looking upon it as a pheno?.ienon arising out of the acconmcdation 
of V.1Q Self to its environment, then, the difficulty is no longer 
i nsurmounta'iile. Por, from, this point of view, ^^elief is not emhar- 
assed hy its manifold interpretation; feeling, cognition of realr'ty, 
action — all -lay he considered as influences in hring helief ahout ; 
they fijrnish, indeed, the necessarv and only conditions of its genera- 

In speaking of feeling and cognition (or repre:-ent:.tive knov/- 
ledre) and. action as the onl;- factors that will produce " u."ian corifi- 
de>ice, it v/as not said th.t each factor was indispensahle to the 


prodTi.ct. The najori'y of V'->e leading theorJea of- be-lief renurd it 
■^Q insepara'ily lel&ted to representative Icr.ovl'sdf^e ; cer- tairity is 
certainty only with regard to the tri;th of some obj ct or event t,r_at 
iius been, is or may be in experience as a fact. It was held a{..ainst 
Hume that he Was unable ^o carry his theorj- through until he had set 
lip (by a "propensity of tlie imacinaticr'" — thai it?, by reflectiori) an 
objective v;orld for belief to believe in. Bagehot ar.d James as suc- 
cessors of Hiine, in advocating the view that co::viction is of the 
feelinrs (emc ticnc) enlarfe upon Hume at this point. Bagehot is posi- 
tively of t"-e opinion that primitive, naive trust is transformed by 
the hccrdships of experience into a trust that waits upon delibera- 
tion, and that is anchored in objective reality. Professor James is 
less positiA'-e, but he does seem to saj^, certainly, at times, that 
assurance is of an object that exists as a "real" and that is repre- 
sented to us as an idea. That conviction depends upon thought to 
bring it to its object, and thns, for its being, is so manifestly 
the viev/ of Ja"'es Mill, his son, J. S. Mil], Siaiy, Stoi-t and Bddwin 
that merelj- to mention tlie foict is enough. And ao for Bain, v/e re- 
membt^r that he declared belief to be an incident of cognitJon. With 
this ari'ciy of evidence we can scarcely.' restrain ourselves from Join- 
ing Sully in his st&,terrient that the "primal source of belief lies in 
t]e relation, of representative ideation to actual presentation." 

We •lay nov tr,rn to the question whether feeling or action is a 
necessar;/ condition for tn.e experience of conviction. It has been 
K-aid already- that belief in itself is perhaps of the es^^ence of feel- 
ing, bi,it of the other sorts of feelin.g — such as emotional excitement, 
it is generally agreed to have no vital relevance. Wyien Bain a-d- 
var:ced the idea that action is the bcisis and ultimate criterion of 
belief, it was argued rigainst hi?d that in jaany cases, as, for ex=.mple 


thvt of fri e highest theoretical icriovvledge , frere is no ©ctive dis- 
position aroused. Bv't Stout disams this criticism hy countinr: act- 
ion in thought as a condii.ioh of 'lelief in theoretical ends. T-a.t 
there is activity of scrie ki d, physical or mental, x-^'^sent in 
appreciation of reality or of truth, is attested hy the pathologists 
when they talk of mental weakness cai-sirig "i allucination, credulity, 
incredulity and ; and of the Ichs of reality-feeling depending 
upor the lovvering of cerehral activity. We fi'd the saiue meaning 
expressed hy Royce. "IDefinite helief in external reality is pcssi-L. 
hie," he writes, "only triroiigh this active /modiiyir:-g and construct- 
ing/ addition of something of cur ov/n to the ir-pressions thc.t are 
actually'" given to us." There is no question hi.\t v/ithin us an 
activity'-, an a^-preciation, a conscio-s purpose, a psychonomic con- 
trol, a sort of ■"■^0 tor-conticiousness , that takes a hand in shaping 
the v.orld o*" experience, and "by virtue of that act, feels that world 
to he r' This fact will receive e?:phasis in the chapter on 
A:? sumption. 



Chctpter V. 
Reality-Peelin--: -cad Presumption. 

It Was no'ced on page 35 t?Lcvt fiie raeanlng; iTiplie.d ""oy Vie tervi 
reality-f eellnc 'las r.iore or less prevalence in most theories of 
>eli2f . Tii.e references given there «vere few, and they were given 
v;i!:j:/ the proniiee of raore when we should coc.e to this chapter. This 
pro lise we shall now endeavor to fulfil, ard for a doi-hle reason: 
na'''iely, to impress the fact that this emhryo type of helief is re- 
cognized '^y a-.thorities, and to e^-plain its neanin^. 

Frorn Bain, v/ho hlazed the v/ay into this new territory, we have 
the follo./ing: "The "belief in teBtimonj'- is derived from the primary 
credulity of the mind in certain instances left intact under the 

wear -.-nd tear of adverse experience It never occurs to the crtild 

to question any statement rnade to it, until scie rjositive force on 
the side of skepticism has heon developed." This statenent hy Eain 
is fcllo>/fcd v-p "i;/ Bagehot, who giA'^es it yet rnore emphatic form. He 
writes: "Bu.-t though it is certain that a child '''■elieves all o.r-ser- 
tions nade to it, it:is not certain that the child so Relieves in 
conseqier;ce of a special intu.itive disposition, restricted to such- 
assertions; it iuay he tha'^ this indiscriminate helief in all sa^'ings 
is hut a relic of an omnivorous acquiescence in all states of con- 
sciovjsnes- , v/hich is only just extinct when childhood is X'^^^in enough 
to he understood, or old enough to he rememhered." Bagehot in arioth- 
er place in his essay expresses the view that we are horn believing 
and would continu.e responding to the "strong rush of confidence" 
(his emotional helief) just as we do in dreariic, if we we -e not there- 
by brought into contention v/ith the world. Sully does net sa.y that 
we are horn believing; in fact, he 3a;^s v/e are not; and that a cer- 
tain amount of experience .-.-lUst precede ccr.lidence; hut he reckons low 


tine length of tine that elapses l-;ei"ot"e a sijfficient e>;rjerience h&.s 
co-ne to set up the earliest forLi of l"el:'ef: "'■."■.e tri^nsition from 
densation to idea."° Of :his early ccnl'idence , he speaks as fcllov.'s: 
"Fnen t.-.e infant mind, in drean-like thought, had not yet learnt to 
mark off the present and the past, it might not iraprohahly even then 
have vaguely felt the strange likeness and unlikeness be'tv/een the 
f -int f'igitive idea aiu" ' tense ahsorhing sensation. Now, in 
this curious .rientt.l event, the partial rejiroduction of the past 
sensation hy the medium of a present Idea felt to ''•■;e one like it, 
one se";rris to find the origin of the oldest and nest simple form of 
lelief ."(+) "If the Infant cculd fully describe to us its state of 
mind, it would do so cy saying, 'there is something in my mind that 
carries thought away to anof'-^er thing "brighter and "better than itself 
which thinf" is not exactly'' in my mind ncv.', "Hut seems ready to enter 
it.*" As to this early, or germ form of ">^eli ef or reality-f e'^ling, 
James expresses himself throi;gh the illustration of fne child and the 
hallucinatory'' ca,ndle. To the onlcoking psj^chologist , this candle 
exists only in the individual m.iri.d ; has no statu.s among other facts, 
etc. But the new horn mind, entirely "'-'lank, a^i.d viraitin.-- for evrperi- 
erce to hegin, reacts dif f erentl^,"- to it, "It oar spin no such con- 
siderations as these /the ahove/ ahout it, for of ct}-er facts, actual 
or poscihle, it has no inkling whatever. The candle is its all, its 
Ahsolute. Its entire faculty of attention is ahsor'bed "by it; it is j 
it is th^t ; it is t'-.ere. No other possihle candle cr quality of this 
c-:-''dle; no of'-'er place or possihle o"'ject in this place; no alter- 
native, in shorti, surgests itself as even conct^ivahle ; so, hcv. can 
the mind help "Relieving the candle real?" Professor J" has the 

° Sully: Scr-.-ation and Intuition: n. 82. (+) i^id. 

feeling of reality excited y^y Vr^e \rery first ol)ject that enters the 
nind, "w^-'ile Si.-ll;.- ccsiderri tT'at a se'-ir.ation and its idea must have 
paesed throiir- --'^-e nind often enox'f^h to Vie noticea'ly distinruished 
■before trere Cc^n he anjr reali t^'^-f eelinf;. This contradictiorj , hcvv- 
ever, ir hi;t a qrestion ct v/hen pri-'^itive trrist starts; each writer 
eovally corro'''Orating such an emhryo faith, or i-mdiff erantiated suh- 
st.nce cf " elief . As fvr'her evidence for tris i.inreasoninc;; naturbl 
cO'-f j de^^'ce , vi/e may tnrn to Stout, v/hc speahB of it in these Viiords: 
"A pre-f orr-ied anticipation rnay he destroyed ^r,y collision v/ith fb.cts. 
It ie f^'rouph such experiences tha.t the 'anquesticninf credence of 
primitive lielief rradually fives place to a coraparativelj-^ tentative 
and skeptical ?ia" i t of 'nind," 

This series of quotations, thoujrh representing a variety of 
points of viev'/, reveals a marhed unity of rifjnif ication. They are 
all of one accord in recoj-nizing that childhood he,; ins v.i t?io\it skep- 
ticism, and v\rith utmost confidence; without douht, and v^rith r>erfect 
cerlainty; without distrust, itnd vvil.h simple reliance. The first 
feelin,<;^ is not of i-Uiretility, hu.t of reality. We have hy instirjct 
enough confidence in t^^ings to start us off on t"' e long road of 
acconimodciti on to the environment, vjithout tlie least uncertainty or 
"visgiving. This wholej-ale way the young life h- s of conferring real- 
ity upon everything that touc^'es it, has suggested a motor explana- 
tion. Baldvifin relates t]:e reality-feeling to grose attention; the 
attehticn v;ith the large open rnav/ ready to devour vvVatever in 
reach. According to this conception, we apprecis.te as real whatever, 
eif-er hy force of external ccnditioris or ''ny force cf inner organic 
\fvants, we tc^l-e into our experience hy acconmcdatior . It is not a 
Ccise of . recognitive "helief, "l^ut of ass^'milative incorporation; w.e 
live here "hy faitl'. , and not >.y sight. 

Realit^'-f eeli:-:;: 'nay "be fvrt.her desicna'^ed. as thc.t sta^e in tl\e 
genetic p'^of rers J on of cor.''cicv£:n'='SS that precede^' c^iJ-: p' oirtnent 
and doi;"t't; it is the eta^e cf pre:;uinpticn cr the taking of thinc^s 
as heinc what they first appe^i^" to >ie . It is vv^ell reprerented hy 

^ dreams, for in them we jro alone, accepting one thir.^ after another, 
in v,'"'ateY3r order th.e thin^B co^ne and 3"C', ever disparate and discon- 
nected they are, a .d r.'^ver experience a single lapse in cur ren^'e 
thst all is real. This i;.ndisti-rhed flov« cf simple credi'lit;'- that 
runs t' rcu^li orir dreaTis with never a rift in its course, does cc, 
dou'i^tless, >>ecc-use neither external facts nor internal associations 
are there to contradict. Ve presume on t} e realit}'- of what we dream, 
just as the child presr^ines upon what it exp riences. In "hoth cases, 
there is the pri'-mrj^, undistn.rhed presumption cf r-ality th&.t Ur>an 
spe;ihs cf biS r"vin£ a realitj;- in v;hich the mere specific e: istence- 

j meaning;*' has not 3-et been difl'e^-entist^c , and as meaning the mere 
act of acceptance, tahing for granted, prior to fi- e explicit tiking 
up of the ch,iect into a predetermined sphere cf reality through the 
existence predicate. "I", contrast with any meaning cf reality la'^er 
to arise and attach to an ohject," v/rites Baldwin, "we may say that 
it is here simpljr presum.ed, taken for grajited that the oV^iect is 
real. T'ere is a presumption of the dependahleness of the thing." (+) 

<* Ur'^an: Valu:-tion: Its Uature and Laws: p. 4o. 
(+) Baldwin: Genetic Logic: vol. ii, p. 22. 

#5 8. VI. 
Q,na8i-Belief and Aasi'.mption . 
In t::at period of childhood which v;e have designuted hy the 
term, "retility-f eeling , " conscionsneEG proceeds on its v;ay of cer- 
tainty and confidence vifith an even tenor. "Pi^re experience," or im- 
'rediacy of feeling, or simple expectaticr, had net as yet "been so 
seriously dist-iu-hed th:.t it sought support in memory, and thu.s tranc- 
foiTied itself into ref lec":ive anticipation. "Collision with fact" 
(collision with the ph;^si-cul and socif.l ta>l'?s that for Bagehot girec 
do'j'rt, had not occurred, or at least had net prcd-.ced a ,%=.r sufii- 
cient to av;?>er childhood out of its conatose co-dition of irpmediate 
assurance. Brt disturhinr circumsta.nceB were destined sooner or 
later to "break down t?ois original eQuillhrium, and to provolce unwary 
confidence into doi.'ht and alert incviry. That this second stage in 
the progression of relief-conscici'sress does arire, b.-d is a real 
fact in the frowth of experience, is clearly the oj^inion of many 
writers. Bagehot refers to this period as a time in which ""born- 
helief" crosses over to the helj ef of deli Deration and evidence, ° 
Bain is evidently speaking of it when he sa2'S that "many of our pri'n- 
itive er.'pectaticns suffer shipwreck in the contradictions that they 
enconntsr . " ( + ) Sulli'- refers 'to this period in the life of ccvjEcious- 
ness as tVat in which the inind locks hack upon the past before it 
acts; that is, looks into memory to see what hasis anticipation has. 
It is distinctly the sr''^~Ject of the following passage from Stort: "A 
pre-formed anticipation may ■'•^- destroj-ed hy collision with facts. I 
is tnroiigh such experience th^t tZie unqu.estioned credence of 'ori"!i- 
tive "belief gradually gives place to a comparatively'- tentative and 

o Emotion a:id Will: p. 51'. ( + ) Analytical P;.ychology: vol. ii, 
T-.. 240. 

siceptical ha "hit of nind."" Bt^ldwin reco^-nizeE Birch a stafe and dC- 
coiints for it Vy the failure of Uia "co-efficients of reality" to 
satisfy. "I doulit an image, a statemert , a law, becai'se it doey not 
meet f^e demands trat I have a rlrht to infilce of it, if its claim "be 
trr.e. ( + ) 

further references are not r.eeded to sl.ow that there is strong 
support for the viev/ that the naive faith of earliest experience is 
turned ^o disappointment and uou-'bt. Tl^e protlem that chiefly ccncernj 
us is not whether the individual comes into this stage of erabarass- 
ment and skepticism, hut rather, v-.s to the v/ay he gets out of it; it 
heing admitted that he dceE--if of normal energy, so'-iehow r-^et cut of 
his particular douhts, and deep not accept his lot in careless uncon- 
cern. This prchiem leads us into epi3temolo'''-y--intc a study of the 
"development of knowledge as controlled hy facts. "@ Havinr: lo&t its 
first grasp on reality, hov: new does f e mind regain its hold? Thes-; 
are the questions which most of all lay claim to ci;r attention. But 
the:.'- have a rolution, surjrested hy the term, Assu-mpticn, as that ter- 
is employed in current discussion of the fi,eory of hnov/ledre and 
helief . 

Assumption denotes active disposition, participation, on f' e 
part of t>-e inner; it denotes si;"' j ective control; ny assumption, the 
psj^chic experience functions as a selective agenc3% and, equally vvith 
oV.jective fact, sets vt> certain requirements for the acceptance of 
the new materials into experience. T]\e individual, v;}iatever interest 
im.pels him, v/hether practical, theoretical or aesthetic, is ever 
striving': to enlarge upon the present; at one tim.e, he is iinknotting 
a practicEl predicament; at :;<.nof"_er time, in a sort of spciitaneous 

o Stc-'t: Analytical Psychology: vol. ii, p. 240. ( + ) Feelin. 
and Will, p. 153. @ Genetic Loric: vol. ii, p. 331. 


striving, he is nakinf: conquest of tho fi'tnre 'b;'- vi'eavinf i-ntiges of 
farcy or "'i;/ action in play or art; and at yet anot};.er time, he is 
strivinf; to encompass externc,! fact, to find the that is hidden 
in things; to penetrate into ohject-'ve existence an a seeker for the 
worthful, the fulfilling, the real. 

Baldwin's own view of assumption is given in the stateinent that 
by assumption, "an established recognitive context, accepted for what 
it io, ic_ -dip read, for wha t it mav, be c_oi!;e . " ° Assujnption ifi for him 
the only way the mind has of rn.aking anj'' advance upon its present 
status, of gaining an;/ new tri.ith, of enlarging the world of reality. 
T'^is schematisT'i furnishes the moving princix)le that enaVles cognition 
to go in and possess the land. (+) It is this principle that gives 
ri.nity to the v/hole of his genetic logic. Urban corroborates tL.e 
position of Baldwin, and says that "in the making of assumption, the 
act is detf- rmined by a subjective factor, a deniand arising from al- 
ready existing dispositions and interest s."P Royce also reg-^rds 
ccssumption as the inner asserting its rights as a joint owner in the 
world of experience. T-'^at the mind thus actively tctkes a hand in 
the v,/eavi^g of life and its objects, is strongly argued in his book, 
"T"' e Religious Aspect of Philoso^h:'. " In the chapter on "Postulates" 
(v;hich, as we shall see later, are a species of assvunption) Profest^or 
Ro:'ce says that' "Postulutes are voluntary a.ssumptions of a risk, for 
the sake of a higher end T};ey are deliberate and courageo'j.s voli- 
tions." "The postulate says'. 'I dare be responsible for ass'iming.'" 
"We all post\ilate that our lives cire worth the trouble, yet we all 
know perfectly woll that manjr just such postu.latep must in 'the nature 

° Genetic Logic, vol. ii, p. 11. @ ibid. p. 44. 
{+) cf. C. H. Williams: The Sche^iatism in Baldvvin's Logic: Ph. 

Review, January, 1?10. 

of thinrs "be "blv-nders, K't they inirly, not irlind fuith, >.ut t^ctive 
faith. Blind ft^ith is the ostrich "behind the Ijvich; the postvl-.te 
stu.\dG li"'.ce the lion a^r^ainst the hunters. The "^ise s'^ll live hy 
postiilatep . "° T'-e pran^atists, likev/ire, emphasize (indeed, over- 
e'lphasi^e) the ftict that c^spi'mption is a svihjective demand. In 
r.C.S .Sch.iller 's essay on "Axic.:r.s a?. Pcytulotes , " there are many 
passages like the following:: "Theoretic truths are the children cf 

poEt\-.lates Wiohoxjt pvtrposive activity there v.'ould "be no know- 

lid^e, no order, no rational e:-perience, nothinf to explain, and nc 
means of explciining an^rfHing. " "For, ever v.eiore the eyes, of }:im 
whose vvisdc'i dares to postulate, vviM float ir. clearer or ohcc^-rer 
O'jtline the "beatific vision of that perfect harmon;'' of all experience 
»vhich he in all his stren.ucus stru'-rles is .striving to attain. And 
instead cf iTnclctting his v«h-'le life to the enerv&tinr sophisn that 
it is all an 'appearance to he transcended h;,' tn unattaina'^le real- 
ity, ' let him hold rather that there can he for him no reality hut 
t>'at to v/hich he wins his wa?/ thrciif/i and hy ''neans of the appearances 
v.hich sre its presage. "( + ) The saiie a^'gressiveness of spirit is see^.. 
in tlaTies • essaj'' on "T'e Will to Believe." It is /;ere paid thc^t "f-e 
intellect, even wit^ truf' directly in its grasp, rnay have no infalli- 
ble signal for knowing wheth-r it he truth or no."'^ And so he I'rings 
in the "v.'illing nature"--Dy \<ih.ich is ncant not only tv.cii deliherate 
volitions as may have set up hahits of >'elief that we cannot now 
escape ,(/ -11 such factors of lelief as fear and hope, pre- 
judice and passion, iiiiitaticn and partisanship, the circu'ir-tc-iices of 
cur cast and set."(#) T!:en in natural sequence to these staterr'ents 

o Reyes: The Religious Aspects of F:iloscT-~y : p. 29", 
(+) Sch.iller, F.C.S.: Personal Idealisrn: -. 121. 
<^ Ja'nes: The Will to Believe, etc.: p. I'i, 
(#) i'^^id. p. 9. 


V.8 have the 1 ollov/ir-fj one: "lb niait'rs net to cin ernpiriciat fror. 
at q\iarter a hypotheris may ccne to him; he mt-.y have acquired it, 
hj'' fair means or "by fo'.il; passion ■.na;.'' have whispered, or .iccident 
si':-;':ested it; Tmt if tl:8 total drift cf thinlcinf; continues to confirm 
it, thut is what he 'neans hy its "being true."° Plainly the pracniat- 
ist is ready to af;;ree t-:,<.t the suhjec'^ive is a potent factor in de- 
cidlnc what tliincE shall "be true. Bn.t still there is evidence for a 
positive, af-grescive, inner control, which dem£i.nd2 satisfaction for 
our interests, whet}ier those interests he the undifferentiated inter- 
ests of the pre-lorical sta^e, when the individi^al is tryinri; to find 
so'ue /ground that is safe frc^i the flood cf dcvnt, or v/hether they he 
t'-e individual interests (the practical, intellectual or aesthetic) 
of the logical '•node. This further evidence is found in Meinong. In 
his tv;o hcolcs on assujnption ("Anua^j:ien" and "Ueher annahjnen") and in 
Bertrand Ruifsell's revievi/ e^nd interpretation cf them, there are pass- 
ages t},j.t support the viev/ t' ;nption niedii.tes a. goal in hehalf 
of the subjective. Take for example the followinr' (^ translation hy 
Russell from the 3d chapter of "UcVm-.t anr,ahjnen"--a chapter enumerci.t- 
ing t>ie most fainiliar instances of assumption): "The hypothesis cf 
matheraaiiical proposii-icns , literary v/crks of art, children's prepens- 
es, lies, and the theories of philosophers, can none cf them he 
understood without assumptions. Vr^en &n arpument "begins v»ith 'Let a 
right-angled oriangle he given, having one of its sides dcuhle the 
other,' we have uo do with a proposition vriich is net asserted; nence, 
we have an as.s'.imption , and not a Judgment. Scientific hypotheses 
again, at least; in Lheir inception, are unasserted, and afi'ord in- 
stanres of assumption. ''1'hen children preter;d, it is quite :;lain that 

° The Vill to Believe: p. 1':. 


they cue not taken in 'oy i-ireir Ov/n fancies; o>i.e'i;e fconciess constitute 

a.savjiiptions ; and the stjne applies; to reading a r.ovel. A liar vvishes 

to produce in another belief in a propcsii-ion which he hinself does 

not 'believe; if he is to he successful, he v.ill have to entertain 
the asaiiription of the proposition in question. And thitj is why liars 

tend to helieve their ov/n lies A qi;fcstion expresses, if the 

ansv/er to it is yes or riO, the deuire to huve an i;.ssur?ipticn turned 
into t>.e corresponding iudpnent or Its opposite. Ar.d in all desirt, 
since the op/'osition of yes or no occurs in -the ohject of desire, 
we are necessarily concerned with an assunption; for mere presenta- 
tion iG inadequate, a^ d the truth of Vifhat is desired is obviously no 
part of desire. "° Again, in the fifth chapter, which treats of the 
ps;rchic ar.d its nature, as having objects (GegenstSndlichkeit ) , as- 
sumption ap- ears ¥;ith the savie peculiar power to project objects and 
withold belief; with the sarne privilege of transcending presentation; 
of transcending the thing of present knowledge. This ch.;.pter focus- 
es on the question as to how presentation that is pure, and judgment 
that is negative, can have an object. A judrrnent tht.t is true pro- 
vokes no question as to i^-s object; because the very fact that it is 
a true judf^ment, settles the natter; it }>.as an object, eith-.r an ex- 
istinr or a subsisting object. But v/heth-r tlie judgment is a true 
negative or a false affirmative, we co:ue upon a difficulty. These 
judgments cannot have the objects they would have if true and affirm- 
ative. Suc/i judgments, it would se-j.m, must then fall bc<,ck upon 
presentaiion for their objects. But presentation usually does not 
have an object; in fact, pure presentation has only tr^.e capacity for 
an object, as in the case of the memory of a melody, one does not 
have the laelody. ""^r^en /t/ierefore/ ..e seem to perceive direction to 

° T'lind: Hew Serie;-:, vol. xiii, p. 340. 

an ol)ject, this i^risec through the preserice of an affirmative acsump- 
tion; the oloject is prer.en ted 'as if i '>- were realt'" Still a-ain, 
this sane interpretation cf arsunption is implied ty Meinong in his 
"Annahinen," u'here he co'-siders tVie dif f fcTf.-ice between assiimption and 
jv.demsnt to he a ma'vter only of attitude tov/ard the "coiective . " In 
this connection, Rvsaell trarislates '^''einonf; as pointing out that 
"Judgment h.c b two elements: (l) conviction and (2) affirmation, or 
denial; and ~hat in a large class of conimon facte, which are called 
assu-nptions , t' e second witho'.'.t the first. "° V/e find this 
same thought in "Ueher Annal'Tnen," it heirtg there arrived that aseurap- 
tion is more t].an mere presentation and less than judpnient; it 
holds a sort of middle ground Detv/een judgment and presentation . (+) 
In the lig}:.t of the foregoing views, assumption may he sii!r',"it.r- 
ized somewhat as follo.-s: Ic is the intrinsic power che tuind has of 
leading experience into loxger fields ol .iieariing, hy expanding liic 
'is' into the 'may-he'; of discounting the future to meet present 
'«*ants and interests. Bu.t it is important to go yet farther into the 
suh.iect of assumption, to take account indeed of distinctions made 
within the meaning itself--distinctic!is discovt-red hy the application 
of the genetic method to coi.sciousness . In rocent psychological 
literature on z'/ie cognitive consciousness, one is frequently meeting 
with such terms as "pre-discursive" and "post-discursive;" "pre- 
judgaiental" arid "post- judgmental ; " "pre-logical" and "post-" or 
"l.yper-lcgiccAl. " It is upon this division as a hasis that the dis- 
tinction in assumption rests. W'e hay^ seen that credulous reality- 
feeling and unthinking presu-mption were saved from destroying douht 
and led away toward the high ground cf logical convic ion and judg- 

° loc. cit. aViove, p. 20 ■ , 

( + ) 'Meinong: Uehsr Ar.nahmen: . .'1. 


nient. Bi't with .iiidrrnent re^xhed, all dc;;>;t does r:ot ceciue. Co.v- 
scioV'Sness ne.y?^r attains such e. derreo of present sv^f i'iciencj'- that 
it has no need cf assiV'T ticn to bridge it over some irxtorcepting' 
douht or 'want. According to this view, Vifhich is !. 'e one maintained 
";:y Baldv/ir. in his Genetic Lo^iic, and hy T. M. Urban in Ids hook on 
Valuation, there are two kinds of assujnption, najaed in order of 
appearance, louer assiimption and higher i..ssiimption ; or, just assump- 
tion and postu.l--.tion. B:,ldwin explains the tvvo meanings as fcllovis: 
"Over against this /presu^.ption/, also in the pr-j-logical modes, 
there is, '^c'er-Hr, the contra,sted attitude toward what is not pre- 
sumed hut assumed — ^.ade scherootic for further determination. The 
•assumption '■ is the use of a meaning in a control or with a reference 
thcit is not yet established, not yet presum-otion. Wv.en a child, for 
example, cries for an ohicct in the next rcorn, he 'presumes' its 
existence and availability in the world cf his practical interests; 
but when he goes through the process ol" 'feeding i~is toy dog, ' he 
'assumes' a sphere that he does not r-gularly 'presume.'" "In the 
logical -- ■"lode, t"--f^ existence-marks harden jnto a dualism of spl'.eres 
/mind and body/ and the intent of existence or con':rcl becomes itself 
a separable or predicable meaning. And this Qxis^snce, or rsality- 
meaning, may bs again ent-^rtained in tv/o ways: it may be specilicall:' 
asserted in a Judgment of existence, or taken for granted as some- 
thing capable cf such assertion; or it may be set up h;;^othetically 
and schematically. These two attitudes are for the logical iiode 
what the 'presumption' and the 'assiijaption ' are for the pre-logic- 
al."° Urban writes corroborating Baldwin, as follows: "Assumption as 
a cop-nitive attit'.;de hss two meanings. According to its first mean- 

° Baldvvin : Genetic Logic: vol. ii, p. 12. 


ing, it is an acceptance, a takinr as existent of em object when 
there is an underlying sense of ti.e poycil^ility of its "being non- 
existent. In this sense, it is a hall-v/ay stare he^v/een the primi- 
tive presumption of reality, and t?.e existential judgment. In t? 
sense also it is a secondary novement or act of ccgniLicn, v;ithin a 
developing sphere of r- ality, hounded hy the primitive presi'mption 
of reality, and the existential Judgment, affir:mative or negative. 
From the point of viev/ of conation, it is an act determined hy the 
momenbi.«n of t?).e suhjectivt disposition cr interest. In its second 
meaning, it is net pre- Judgmental, hut post- Juagmental ; that is, a 
permanent assumption is created hy hahitual Judg):nent; it pre-suppcses 
dispositions created hy acts of Judg:r;ent, and is derived froin the 
Judgmentratti ti'.de . "" 

Such a distinction v/ithin assuniptiori ■ac.kes it all the more evi- 
dent that this c'ctivity is the fioving principle in mental development 
and in the growth of e>.perience; it is the fi!nctior! of growt":'. iri dl 
modes of cognition. Assumption is the active nature or inner control 
vvhich helief must satisfy v/hen it comes. Until then, assumption 
remains quasi-be lief--i. e. , it acts tcvvard the object as if it were 
real . 

° Urban: Valuation: Its T'lature and Laws: p. 46. 


Chapter VI. 
Belief and Ji.dgncii o . 

In the liis ucrical aj^id psyclioloeical diviaions oi this discussion 
it was found that belief is in intimate and esciential relation tc 
the cognition of reality, and to the active disposition. Th:^.t its oo 
say, celief, whether considered from a philosophical or a ps;, cholo^;- 
ical point of view, always appears to be recti d in a reference tc 
reality, arid at the sa'ie ti;:ie, to take its lire from the inner acco:'!- 
modatinr: and asserting po'.<ers of our nature. Thus at the end of 
Chapters i and ii, our investip;ation hroufht us to this conclusion: 
objectively taken, belief raeans belief in something--sc!nething that 
is real; siibjectively taken, it 'neans ar; activity/ that expresses and 
satisfies the whole self. And nov;, since in the genetic study we 
have arain come to this subject, v/e must enter af-:ain upon its con- 
sideratio!'. It is a qi-esticn this tine of finding whether belief, 
when regarded from a genetic cind epistemological point cf view, has 
the sane character as tlnat when regarded from a logical or psycho- 
logical point of view; whether, that is, vre shall continue to iind 
belief in essential conjunction with the cognitive and the active 
phases of our nature. 

AssumiJtion is, as \Je hive seen, c. vital factor in the growth of 
consciousness; in fi-^ct, it is a question whether, without it, life 
would not be static and stagnant. It seems that without assi-mption 
thought would be shut in by an impassable wall-- the wall cf h..,bit; 
with it, thought can push out into new e>T-erience, and thus satisfy 
the de;riands of positive interests--interests t}i;-^.t cf their own n .ture 
seek satisfaction in objects or ends. Assumption is the genetic 
interpretation of Professor Royce's statement that "at every moment, 
we are not merely receiving, at^endinr, recognising, but we are 


constri'.ctinp."^ Assumption is the indiv j.diial in taction; productive, 
cognitive ac~ion; the, peeking a clearer insight into 
nature, clinhing to a hir' er f:round ol outlo-^l:, infusing nev; meaning 
into life. Assuiiiption Ic the spontaneous, initiative energy of 
ccnscioi'.s life, expressing itself through cognition. But in addition 
to this, it should ht- noted that its oh,;'ect is tentative. When uiak- 
ing an assunption, the is v;ell aware that the assumed ob- 
ject na;/ fail to fit the conditions thi^t test its reality; that he 
may have chosen the v/rong alternative. There is no taking for grant- 
ed here as t}ere was in "presu.rnption , " i-.nd as there is in "presuppos- 
ition," in rerlective experience. Belief is suspended. But sii.spend- 
ed for w'^at reason? T'or the reason simpl;' that it has not found a 
co-efficient that will satisfy the demands of reality. And v/henevar, 
through the creative function cf ^.ssujnption , consciousness succeeds 
in setting up an ©"^.lect that gains objective sanction, all vv'ill he 
well, and helief will no longer hold hack, hut go forth m unreserved 
and final indorsement of t>-;..t c'-TJect as real; the two controls--thc. t 
of the inner and that of zhe outer, will be satisfied in a mutual 

Bti.t v*-his,t is neam; hy saying that quasi-.helief passes into hu- 
lief proper when the schematic object of assumption v.'ins the approval 
of the objective? Does it mean that assumption has become judgment? 
If judgment has reference to existence or r ality, and is not mere 
ideas that have Lheir truth in a sort of a priori consistency, and if 
it is a construction that mediatss the Self, then the cominr of be-, 
lief does mean the cominr of judgment; and from this conclusion, it 
follows thci'. , if all judgment is existential, and at the sa'ne time 
incorporates our evaluating personal nature, chen all judgment has a 

*• Royce: Religious Aspects of Philosophy: p. 321. 

"belief element; w'""ic''''' iv cur ■^'eris. 

Section I: Direct Evidence--fron cT\jective point cf view. 

Frcm a frenetic and epistemolor^ical point of view, Bdldv^iin finds 
thi. t judfient in every instance takes ccrnizance, explicitly or im- 
plicitly, of existence; and Urbcm in las Viook, "Ve-luation: its Nature 
and LavAS," accepts and utilises B;ld\vin's; reneral conclusions. Mein- 
onr, "by a ene tic and episternological investin;ation cf exper'i- 
ence, copies likewise to the concl'anicn that "Judfment is transcend- 
ent." Bradley, thongh approaching^ the subject from a yet different 
side--the lof^ical--cor.ies to maintain that all judgment is in the 
end sxistentio.l. And arain, from the psychologic£-l point of view, 
•v^e h^ve Brentano strongly declarinr the same fact. 

To appreciate fuller the force of Bddwin's argvjjnent (Genetic 
Loric, vols, i and ii) for "she existential nature of Jud^Tnent, it is 
necessary to ta.^-ce account cf assumption .at its tv/c different levels 
of ccp-nitive progression; to take account ho'.h of assumption and 
posti.ilaticn (these terns heinp understood as meaning respectively 
lovier and higher assumption). Sc}iem.atisra is the general term which 
includes hoth meanings. Assumption as serious experimentation v^ith 
psychic o"'.\iects--that is, &s instri'm.ental knowledge, grows cut of 
the seml'lant or play consciousness. "In experimentation, play merges 
into earnest, and throtir'h i ;s demand for control, issues in ad.just- 
icent and discovery."** Play, or semhlance (or rather, earliest sem- 
blance, for art too is sem'^lance) is described as a "mode cf recon- 
ciliation and merjring of two sorts of contrcl." It, is nei'^her ir.r^er 
nor outer control exclusively; that is, the play object is neither a 
£ense-o'''^j ect nor a f ctncy-object , but an object swinging between and 
partaking of the rsture of both. It is in this pc'-,er cf the mind to 

** i^rene tic Logic: vol. ii, rni, 119 fi'. 


semlsle, to conbtruct an oTcject partly free fro'-i tie old controls of 
cense and fincy, that Baldwin finds tl'ie firpt movements cf t}.i^t pro- 
cess w]iicli is to prove cf s'jcli vdde-reachinf importance" to the mind 
in its career; the procee.s, na:iely, of experimentation. Experi::ienta- , 
tion at this stage, hovvever, does not issne in anything that the in- 
divi'ducil can indorse and believe; it here reaches no I'inal conclusion. 
The serahlant ohject wheii tested »i??:ply becoLies either a, fcexjse-ohject 
or a f ancy-oh,1ect ; v/ith the result, though, that "the ftreat distinc- 
tion between the inner and outer realm is extended and made more de- 
finite." consciousne;-s has a long coirse to run before reaching 
that stars in cognitive development in v;hich exr.eriment<a.tion eventu- 
ates in the exrerience cf an ordered system of objects individuated 
as particulars under a general, ar.d riven «ieanir'.gs "necessary" and 
" v.'i thou excep t i on . " 

To attain such e::po;-ience or objective content, semblance oper- 
ates in yet way by actual experimentation; that is, by 
the process called "sem"'-ling ; " v;hat Li^rps ca^ls "I.inf ulung. " 
charac car of tlie semblant object, which is i.apiica"ced in c-.e inner 
nature of the entire construction, is especially germinal to reflec- 
tion. B;^ this "innocent loolcing process," an object has a greater 
or 1-^ss degree of subjective control attributed to it. T:r..iis process 
"implies tliat all tb^e objects so tr-.ated are alread;- materials of the 

i jner life as sizcli. It i-.iplifes that any material of the inner 

life nny be so treated It vaeans finally that any such bit of 

'sembled' or- 'semblable' p3:-chic stuff has its two opposed meanings; 
on the one hand, that of the object pure and simple, existing under 
the co-efficient reinstated by the semblance; and on the other, that 
of a pelf-detcrr^ined v»hole, free from. tVese co-efficients so long ci.s 
it itself doet^ not terminate its fre^ dcm, and fulfilli'-r its role 

c-imply "by "oeing in this vi prating ceml^lant r>iode This ;.iode cf 

co'ifrtri'ction, 'noreoyer, constM.^'tec any content in t'lrn, .either su}? - 

Ject c r Ql'.iect t In so far as it /the content/ it; itself held in 

control hy 'oi'/^er' co-ef ricierts of thic sort or that, in so far it 
is set up £;B a psychic o"bj e ct i hut whenever in turn it is used as 
inner means of cont:-ol to other contents, it has a semhled inner life 
of its own and hecorri'i^s suhiect * This is the rudiment, or first sug- 
g-esticn, of that hig'ier rnode-- Reflection . "° Thus v.e see the import- 
ance of seT'i'^ling. In reflectio-i , the ir.rer life of the- different 
ccitents that are their ov;n siihjects, is pooled in one inner control-^ 
the Sulg ect , or |V--£« And that part of the content which was held in 
control Vy outer co- : ff icients of "this sort or that" is still under 
cc-ef f iclents of control, novv existence control, as ps3/chic objects. 
But all th^se objects are of inner e •perience--are objects of thought 
--in short, are ideas. 

This exa"iination of t?/. outer . (experimental) and inner (sembl- 
ing) nature of the pla;'' mode reveals clearl\^ the chari.cter and si^:- 
nificL-ince of assumption, and, at the same time, opens the way for a 
rapid advance to the judgment mode. Play experimentation, developing 
into serious experimentation (under the motive fiirnished by the 
problems set '••'y the ■'■-ody in taking an ambiguous position in experi- 
ence and refusing- to be permanently either inner or outer, either 
internal or external) comes soon, through the pressure of nerative 
experience — through unreality-feeling, which is the "renetic impulse" 
to further ':?etermination--to the stape of disjunctive cr alter>^ative 
meanin'~s--this or t>^:it.( + ) '±><e early distinction of the hypothetical 

° Ge'^etic Lor-ic: vol. ii, v. 124. (+) ibid. p. 21". 

or assumpti-"-e neaninr' thus approac^hes the true rener&l, for the alter:- 
native T^eaninr ir, a stajre in the passing cf a semhlant schema into 
a ren eral concept. "The alternative epec'ation has so c^eteriiined 
experience that the issue will i.t; one of f^-e tvvo." The nep-ative 
^.eaninr Vias thus parsed froin the privation of all ot?'.er to t' e exper- 
iiiental inclusion cf this other. With the next novement of cognitive 
grovi/'th, the ohject ceases to '^-e a mere make-up that only EuhsistB;° 
it instead a real, self-sufficient ol'.iect. hy individuation 
t>^e oh.iect is transferred from the rroup that says other cases mirht 
have done, to t'-^e class that says w'''at other cases Kiijp'ht have done; 
( + ) fhe se'n'-lc.nt object, in s''''ort, hardens into a meaning that is 
necessary and without exception, and is "passed T.'ack into f'e sphere 
of existence of f^e co-efficients of fact and external con- 
trol." Of t>as oiitco"ie of asf'UTnption , Baldwin writes as folTovs: 
"T'-e uncertainty which nade its /the assr^nptive ohj ect 's/ meaninp- 
h.j'pothetical, now disappears, f' eref ore , and a positive construction 
stands firn, no longer open to question. The msaninf of definiteness 
and relation attac^eG to the fir;ished, Tnade-up t> j np , cf vi'hich there 
is no further event. T'le control, now external, has issued once 
for all, In t his neaning and no othe r. The 'note has heen converted 
into the r old coin of existence, v.'hich is to he circi-lsted wit"!: a 
valve t'lrt is C'ce for all estahlished. "@ 

With the di~covery of existence and Tudr:'nent, the rrcwing world 
of experience te'-^is to end in a fixed and final reality; hut this is 
onlj?" in seeTninr, for th-e schematic development of existence (ncv/ of 
Ticre existence) still roes on. Vith the ccninr of judgment, assump- 
tion did not disappear hy heing extinguished, hut hy heing trans- 
formed into a ^rocesT:; of a hirher nature; f-ft is, i-^to nostulaticn . 

° Genetic Loric: vol. ii, o. l'^'^. ( + ) i>ud. p. 221. <^ ih. p. 22,4. 

In postnli.tion, t]ieoretical ir'terer.t firds ittself , and corscionsly 
see'ks satisfaction "hy enlarging the "boundaries of experience. Ae 
it wa the function rf assumption to "brinr determirp tion into an 
inrleterninate world, so it is f^.e function of pcetulation, usinr the 
chart thus drafted >y assumption, to nake definite, forepTanned 
proopectinp trips "beyond f^-e hounds of "known experience. Postulation 
that proA'"er> true, ends in presupposed exietence--exiptence v/''^ich may 
then "'^e '^ade explicit in an existential .iudfrment . That postulation 
thus eve'tuates if it enters the sphere of judrment is shcwTi "■• y the 
following example: "T.'hen Gol'xmhT-'s sailed weptWrird, he postulated 
a world in which certai-^! astronomical and pecj^'raphical relations 
''.eld. Lvclzily, he found a putron Vifillinr to nostuli-.te it with him. 
Since he disco^'^ered it, ho ever, all sailors presuppc e the world -he 

"einonr"'s s'^stem of ej)iste"iolopy, while verj"" difficult of ccm- 
pre''"ension in detail, dees st:nd cut in sone of its larper features 
rather clearl;/", Judf^ient, he evidentl;'' holds, means more than the 
m.ere ideas of which it is composed; it has not simpler an ooject 
(using t"'-e author's tf^rminolory) ; it includes also an 'G"b.iective ; ' 
that is, a transcende^ital reference to something which is 'k:r!0wn--this 
of course, provided the judrment he true. In Chapter vi. Section 34, 
which treats of the "thetic and synthetic" function of judgTaer.t and 
assumption, Meinonr criticises Srentano's effort to reduce all .ludg- 
ment to the existential, and argues that "besides the "f'-ietic" jvidgmeit 
there is also a "s3'nt?ietic" .ju.dpment. But in this criticism., he 
does not deny V' e existential import of judp'^en t. On the contrary, 
he refers transcendence to hoth tjTies ; f^^e transcendence of the 
former, he ca''-ls ahsolvite trarscenc'ence ; a'-id that of f- e latter, re- - 

° Paldv/in: Genetic Lofic: vol. ii, p. 110. 


latix'^e transcendence, .'^.eaPxinf 'bj'- the ad.iective rela'ive, th.:.t through 
such a recornition, neithe-- ter'n of a syntJ'etio jrdr'nent is ta,"!cen 
for itself alone, "hut each om'^y rel^.ti-'re to t^-e other. "Thut sorrow 
is a feelinp-" has as rmich V-.e ohjective reference ( Clerichtetsein) as 
does "there is sorrow."® 

Th.Kt 'leinonr holds to t"'e exi.-tence-inpcrt of ,1udr'~ient , seems 
to he the opinion also of I^ertrand Ri'sc^ell (in the articles already 
Tientioned) and of Urnan (Valuation). Russell interprets h.einon' as 
follows: "In fact, relations, cittrihutes and all coinple>es require 
Ohiectives, which, occur everAnivliere except in the simple, or speaking 
not quite "orecisely, in cases of complete intt'itiveness and mere 
presentation. It is always Ohjec tiy es--i . e . , that so'iethinp should 
exist or should net exist, that v;e dosire, and to which we attach 
value. "(+) Ur'an's interpretation is, of course, from the side of 
worth, hut it is especially in point on account of the fact that '-e 
finds Meinonp standing on ahout the same jud'"mental has is v/ith him- 
self; v/hich is, as was indicated aVove, an existential hasis. Worth 
for hoth rests upon some univer se of reality , which is presupposed 
in .iudpmients that assert existence-;, either catercricall;-', hypothetic- 
allj'-, or disjunctively.® 

i'he positicr:s cf Sri-.dley and Brentano v/ith regard to t--e exist- 
ence-import of Judfment, ere too v.ell Icnovm to need more trian mere 
mention. Por Bradley, the corainr of ideas th^t eyist only as they 
mean something else, marks rathe'^ a decline in extierience than a 
rise. Thor,e ideas, in fact, signify that consciousness lic-.s ft!.l':en 
from its first estate of immediate intuition of reality'-, and is at- 

° Meinong: Ueher Annahjien : p. 14^. ( + ) Urhan: Valuation--: 
p. 352. ^, ihid. p. 42. 


temptinff to nain w' tit it lost. Idea? , iVc^dley declares, are them- 
selves no Pert ol rei-ility; they hut q'.'alify, siean, tsymholize , real- 
ity; and to e>;i:ect to find reality in them or i.hrouFli them is to r-ieet 
the pane disarnointnent that x&.ntalue 'let in the ancient fa'nle , for 
reality recedes hefore cur ide; s, just as the water from his touch. 
The si.ih.iect of everv- judrrner t is reality, v/hicl' is individual &nd 
ti-^eless, &nd v/hich, accordinf^lj/, no jud-^ient ever exprescet:, Vut 
only qualifies. 

This notion, thtit judr^'.ent cannot ret down to true heing, that 
it is neither ima^e nor fact, hut mutilated content, receives further 
emphasis frcrn his trecitnert of these peculiar ideas, the "real" and 
the "thif?." "The idea of reality, lil<e ohe reality of 'this' is not," 
Brccdley states, "an ordinary sjinholic consent, to "^e iised \vithout 
any regard to its existence. "° Th.ese ideas are of facts imrediately 
present to sense; they elenents in aotu.i.l existence, which we 
encoumter directly, and car;not in .iudpment he removed from this and 
transferred to another rea.lity. In these instances, the "particuli.r" 
is pre-ent in I'aot, and it is idle to have an idea of it. This 
"particular" of presentsiticn-- trie "real',' ,iudi:nnent, heinf discursive, 
cannot contain, and it must therefore look heyond itself for the 
existence it af'.f>erts. 

Brentano decls. res for the existential reference of judr^nent on 
the pirounds of a fundamential distinction 'Detv/een ■■resentation and 
judrment. They are, he says, intrinsically dil'ferent classes of 
psychic phenonena. "nothinp, indeed, is judped, which is not pree- 
e'lted, hut v/e maintain that, v/hile the oh.iect of a presentation he- 
ccnes oh.iect of an acknov/ledring or re.jectinr iudprnent, consciousnes.- 
steps into a completely new feind of reltition to it. It is then 

° En^dley: Lo-^ic : p. 80. 

#'^6. taken up in consciovisness iS presented and. fa-r: '"^eld for trvie 

or as denied. "° 

This n evv relation tht'. t cons^scionsnesE- taker, to tT\e ol\iect of 
presentation v/hen it lieccnies t>i e cl^iect cf judrnent, Brentano explaire 
as "beinp a matter of the existence or non-existence of an ohject. 
All ji7dr"'ent hi<s just this difference from presentation, for in no 
ot>^er rRspect--nei '.her in intensity nor kind of ©"bject, is there any 
differejice in these tv/o phencznena. Jx.idninent is not distinruished 
from presentation ^y a\ relatior'al cliaracter; it is an £,s£;ertion or 
denial cf exii^tence. In anreeirent v/ith Bradley, he cays that ,n;.dg- 
rnent is a sinrle idea. This position argued thronf-lr for the existen- 
tial proposition, holds in natural ccurr^.e for the catercrical and 
hj'-pothetical propositions, for the latter are reducihle to the former. 

Section II: T)irect eYi:-,ence--frcm the suhjective point cf vi 

Erom t'-'e oh.iective siff-e, there is rrowinr evidence that helief 
is an element in judprr'ent, ] what of the evidence from the suh.iect- 
ive side? Does it also shovir that .iudrrnent is -nore than mere consent; 
that ,it is also control? That there is nc "that" v/h.ich is not also 
a "what ; " tha t "is" a Iwa ys '^ e an s " ex i s t s ? " If a th i nr , to ex i s t , 
must exist somevv'here, necer-sarily it m\ist exist for scmehody. Ex- 
istence im.plies a,n inner control. But the question here is v/hether 
there is direct evidence that judfrnent conta.ins that inrer force 
v/hich seems to he ore of the er-sential conditions of heinf. 

T'-'-'at the inner active nature of the individual m-ust net he 
counted a cero, hut a real factor, in the production cf reality, has 
hecome in recent literati.ire a m.ost patent fact. To dissuade the mind 
of itn old 'i^.e hias for a''^stract, c?ianrelese reality, and to implant 
instead a conception of reality that is concrete, livinr, frov^inr:; 
that includes the purposes, in-,ererts and activities of ^^ersons, is 

the central motive in the pragmatic reri-e. Kcality, the prai'^natiotij 
sav, is in us, and we are in it, ind. all is a flux of experience. 
"thinrs are si'r charged valuations, and consciousnec:s is ways and ends 
of "believinr and dishelievinr . "^ J-^rute fact could not "be real with- 
out conscioiisnesB , any more than consciousness could he real without 
hrute fact. "The world has meaninc only as soTTiehodj'^ 's , just as a 
ca!<eds -ad only hy the eating of it." Reality is net sornethinf in a, fixed and finished form, which mind must keep "h^-.ds off" 
and .iudre only at a distance; hut reality is a flux and "specific 

conscious heings exerc'se influence upon its character and 

existence ." ( + ) Tlie flux '^as a.n imer life with which concepts quite 
fiai"". to co-'T-ect US. © 

Wcrf-i-f'ieory vif^s with prai^^riatisra in putting emphasis upon the 
potenc}'' of the conatiYe in determining reality. Consider for a 
mc"ent \/h:it Ur"''"an says in Vis chapter on "Valuation and Eval'aation" 
in comparing the meanings of truth and value, or of existence smd 
reality. These meanings, he concludes, have a "relative indifference' 
to each other; there is "merely a partial identity of normative with 
factual, and truth ohji ectivity. " Truth and value seem, to ne not 
identical; v; lue jt'd^ments do not throughout have presuppositions 
that can "ce expressed in retrospective and logical term.s. Just 
on the plane of scientific thourht the principle of psycho-physical 
parallelism forhids the redT'ction of the psychical to t>^e physical 
or the physical to the psi'chical, so elIso on the plan^ of the axic- 
lo&ical, the principle of relative indifference forhids cur reducing 
all values to factual .nd trutJi-oh.iectivity ; all worth experiences 
to mev'e effects of social processes or means to social ends.Cfr) 

° Deive:^: Seliefs and Realities: Presidential Address, 1895: p. 
114. (+) Ihid. @ James : Pluralistic Universe: p. 246. Urhan : 
V.-.luation — : p. 424, 




T'-e insuff iciercy of the concept of e?;ister!ce and truth, to 
exhaust all worth experience, indicates an intrinsic nnture that will 
not h~ ^. ftered hy thowpht as content, hut laaters thoup:ht ufj con- 
trol. In this nati're orifinate the ever-v/idening circles cf growth 
f^st expand into increased experience and r-^ality; and thcurh it 
■-. t i^ccrportite this ohjective expanse into itself, yet it is not 
lest in the expanse, '-v.t rernair.s the sovrce of the creative interests 
that make irapossihle a stagnant v.orld; it is the "alcrical," the 
"center of activity," and the source of experi?nentatinn. This is the 
principle that even in the mcst ahstract at'd formal reasoning, sus- 
tair.s reflection .as its prepuppcsit ion. ° 

V,']-.ether, t'len, v.'e a^"roach judg'-ient from the oh^ective side or 
the svh.iective, it is found to he more than mere co"tent--it has con- 
trols in reality to v/hich it is anchored as a nedii.ting context. 
Judrraent mediates the real hoth as ohjective reference and as per- 
sonal satisfaction, liiit these are the rnarl-cs we found attachiag to 
belief af^ its accepted criteria. If, therefore, 'we correctly inter- 
pret the dif:>r9nt v^rrlters to v/hc^n we refer, a-nd make correct deduct- 
ior.s fro>-' these different interpretations, then, it must he conclvded 
as a matter of course, that judgment, whatever else it may m.ean, 
means heliaf . But there are two facts that have a special significa- 
tion in cuhstantiating this view of judgment. There is first, the 
qu'^'stion of hare denieil; and secondly, there ir the question of 
whether prarmatism, denyir.^- retrospective thought, and allovving 
only prospective or instrumenti-^l thought, ever ohtains real helief. 

Section III: Indirect evidence: Interpretation of iv'egative. 

Bradley declares that a judgment which is merely a negation of 
an affirmative, is a judgment without a qiialitj^; it in no wa^'' quali- 

° Bald'vvin: Genetic Logic: vol. ii, p. 328. 


fies reality. P-iit Ke^'nes and Sirwart take nn opposite viev/, and 
maintain ti^e ultility of such a ,1ud/?;rieri t . A judp;ment of "bare nera- 
ticn in, accordjnr to thsir ezplar&tion, a judgment that has itc 
pround of denial, net ir opposition, "hr't ir a deficiencjr. But hov; 
can t'-ere he denial except throurh the contrary? This is an old 
question, with a "hip; history. Ovr interest, hov.'ever , is siriply to 
contrast in a hrief way the nature of denial that is "based upon 
judrnent-helief with hare denial, w^'-n.c'''' is hased on formcl iurlrTnf^nt . 
Several examples of a nerative ,iudrrient of efficienc3'" are offered 
hy thes'e writers. It si'.f^Dces to critici^-e hut one of thern---th;-,t of 
Keynes, where he i^a"jnes a search for a nan supncsed to ^'e en a 
certain train to ha^''e ended finall;'' with f'-e discovery that he was 
Ijot there. "I ha"^e arrived at the conclusion that a man did net 
start hy a rri^^en train hecau^e I searched the train through hefcre 
its departure," he saA''s , "and did not find him ther^. " "I have 
grained no positi^-e Icncwledre cf the v/here£.''nouts of the man in ques- 
tioTi /hj/ the case of Vare denial/ "i-ut surely it cannot he seriously 
maintained that the denial is meaninrless or useless, say to a 
detective."" But wo^Jld not a detectiA'e, it may he asked, in search- 
inr for a man, set up som.e ^jounds to his searc''"? He surely would not 
search without some alternative or alternatives in inind, which would 
profit "^y the denial. If the man is not en that train, he has taken 
to the woods, is heing -i&.rhored hy some friend, etc. This is ahci">t 
what would he the thourhts of a real detective in such circumstances. 
He would, in ether words, presuppose a larper sphere of he lief , and 
the nerative would issue only as it took impulse from a positive 
amhition to find which of the possihle alternatives in the sphere 
which they altopef'jer exhaust, is true. V'ith helief as an element 

** Keynes: Logic: p. 123. 


in .ludrnent, the "bare nepative v/ould he meaninplesc , a,nd that because 
such ,nidr''ien t v/ould refer to univerceri of reality that are real ex- 
istence-spheres, and would he necessarily an expression of s one in- 
terest. H.v^B. -Joseph, in "An introduction to Lor;ic (p. 161)," main- 
taininr the existential viev/ of judrnent, states there is al- 
ways a positive character as the pround of nepation. 

Section I^: Indirect evidence: Arrument froin Pra.rmatic^.. 
To cone nov; to f-e prohlen whether prarTiatis:a is equally imma- 
ture in ■'"elief and judprnent. It is a fact of commcn Icnov/ledpe that 
the prarmtitists do net limit the helief-function to acquiescence. 
Take for example James in his "Will to Believe," and Dev/ey, in his 
Presidsrtiul address (1905), "Beliefs and Realities." In the first, 
we read that there are "passional tendencies and volitions which r^m 
hefore, and others v/hic'i come after ' elief , and it is only^ the latter 
that are too l?'te for the fair; ana they are not too late when the 
previous passional v/orlc has heen i-.lready in their own direction." 
An h^nsothesis th^at is living, forced and inomentcus, we read ^.rain, 
means "v/illinpness to act," and this Jc^mes declares to mean belief, 
for "there is always helisvinr tendenc:/ where there is willingness to 
act." Belief is, in 'act, hut the "haclcing of an hypothesis arainst 
t'le field," hecause "no hell in rs tolls to tell us for certain what 
■truths are in our prasp." Dewey is in apreem.ent with these expres- 
sions of Ja'-^es, and sa-.'s that "helisfs are willful; are "adventurous J' 
are "worhinp h'.'potheses . " 

If we t'-irn to the pragmatic theory of judgment, do we not find 
thi? sai'ie hypothetical chciracter? Judgment is prospective; instru- 
mental. It is i; quiry. Thought as logical process las truth and. 
validity only as a medit-.ting function; only, that is, as it stretch- 
es forv\fard to som.e poal. And this means that truth arid validity 


never are, ''out are to "be, realised. Indeed, what place for the "will 
to "believe" is there in thourht nnleES the thoi-irht he schematic and 
experiTiental ; unless, thc<.t is, it las its ch.iect still anena^'le to 
f'.'.rther manipulation hy suhjective clioice? If thoug'it should pass 
from tl-e plastic state of "tentative, prospective plan the 
crystallized state of oT\iective, retrospective fact, "it vyould '"e 
with the result, certainly, of faa&inr t]:e will to helieve a "fifth 
wheel to the coach," for in that event, h&lief would he no longer a 
matter of taste and privative choice, hut of acquiescinf: in what 
has heen found to hold finally in :.'ie nature of thinf^s, and what has 
taken a set heyond tVie power of will or v/ish to change. The praginat- 
ist will concede no world of o'jjective existence that is mediated in 
a context of thought, and t} forms a dualism with the suhjective 
which is mediated in the sane context. for him never neans 
a finished experience; it cones to no end after its ov/n kind, cut 
only a practical end. That is to say, thought is p^lways instrumental 
and never acts for itself. He denies that it ever exercises itself 
within a sphere of estahlisl.ed and universalized meanings, hy making 
new arrangements in co-ordination, suhcrdinaticn, etc., as it is said 
to do in hiG-her mathematics and in logic. 'He denies that by t/ie use 
cf the syllorisn vife rain insipit into experience 3'e t unknown, hy 
takin.r: stock of v*rhc t we have, and ~'ciy 'weighing its significance. The 
pragn.atist will not permit thought to o e iijs own guarantee. "Triith" 
must at)ply to "rood" for its credentials; the only worth is practical 

Purti'.er, if all thought is only inquiry, instr',.'''mental to an end 
it never reaches as thourht, f^.en, it is T)ut assumption. It has 
not yet cone to maturity in the logicrtl mode, where, as jiudg?nent, 
it reduces, ^-y a redistrihuticn of all earlier meanings, a world of 


experience fr.ut ic. undifferentiated and uncer'-.ciin, to. a. v/crld tliw.t is 
systenatized and held under definite controls. It is not thought 
that by an intent of hc-lief has referred its ohjects to existence- 
spheres in which o-'M'ects once universcilized ttnd classified are held 
secure aainst inpulse and desire, ari.d in v;hich chanfe is allov.ed 
only vv'-^en new facts arise that demand a resetting of old concepts — 
a of extension and intension — in order to incorport-te 
thern.° The prag^natist , in his attempt to escape the dualism of 

.3r.t and its ohject steps tZ-iought tefore it gets to judgment, 
and disperses it in t'le feeling of practical satir.f action th^ t comes 
with a redintegration of Experience , 

That the pragmatic theory tiius dv/arfs thought in its growth 
is evident from the illustration which such theory holds to "be t^q)- 
ical of all thoug?it, and which is intended to shovv how judgment is 
instru-iental to life---the illustration, ncTiely, of the man lost in 
the woods and trying to find his way hone. The prohlera is to de- 
termine the natu-e of the cognitive processes that ret the nan home, 
and to deter'^ine alpo how these processes terminate, i.e., what makes 
t'"'em true. The pratnaatist 'c solution is as follov/s: Thought, if it 
is to mean more than "facts qua pre.:;entation or existences," 'nust 
look f orvvard--never haclavard. Per the lost man, thoug'it has hut one 
r-?f er8r"ce--t'-^3 fcrv.'ard reference; it is a "plan," a wcrlcir- h-^j-pct/.e- 
sis. Thus far, the solution is qu.ite acceptal:le, for until the man 
finds his way out of the woods, thought is certainly schematic- -that 
is to say, it is an assi rapticr; . But v;hat of tl-'-.e solution given the 

° Biildwin: Ge-e'ic Lo'-ic: vcl,. ii, p. 194. Hihten; The Philo- 
sop/iical Aspects of Evolution: Philccophical Keviev/: March, '10. 


second pl:.a;-ie of tlie prolile:'n--the truth of the plan; hov/ do the facts 
t'-at are "novir dc'-''-tfTil qua neaniiig" la.ter eecvre position and rela- 
tionship in experience? In ansv.erirf^ this question, praprnatisra roes 
awry; for it hcldB o'-: t it is .::e practical recrranizacion of dis- 
rupted experience t'-..^ gives tn;!th to thought, and not that it it; uhe 
truth of thought (plan) that makes such reorgani::ation ijossihle. 
lAOien the man finds his way. home, the ideac th^t rneant--thct -r.ediuted 
--something, have found triat something, declcires the prag^'iatist , in 
a r:ended and enriched whole of experience. But thought cannot live 
to enjoy its ov/n -fruits, for t""e redintegrated exicrience is an im- 
mediacy — a w'^-ole of experience that Icnows no dualism; "thought must 
lose its life to find it."o Just as thought would •',css over into 
the lorical ricde ..and come to full realization in an ob.iect that is 
no longer schematic, hut universal, the pragmatist springs a trap, 
and thoi.ight drops into an immediacy of feeling. Of judgment it 
must oe said that it can never have more titan a tentative meaning, 
and that hslief remains alv;a:/G in suspense. In such judgment the 
individual v/ould never reach' t'ne point where personal satisfaction 
goes out upon an ohject as having found admission into ohjective 
experience ar & real, exictinr- fact~-a fact that has v;ithin its very 
make-up f-e categories of identity and non-contradiction. 

i"'b.t pra^-T;iatism stops s^'crt of judgment, and ct.lso of '-alief, is 
riven fu.rt>:er empliasis hy maldng a turn upon the aoove illustration. 
Let us supoose the person lost in the vvoods is a child, c.nd not 
a man, a i^ too cloudy to see the sun. After repeated 

failure to get his . he happens to notice e trees 
have moss on one side, and tentativel:'- concli:.des th^t tl'^is side of 

° Mocre : Psychological Buhletir.: vol. , p. 415. 


the tre;:s is opposite ti'e sun. He proc'^'eds upori r.\iAt- . . i ■: .^i , 

and reuc'-iiti hone. It certainly cannc . ■ ^ si reac.]^^ .." 

ho'ne /lade iL true that noss frov;s rr: yide of trees, but 

en t" e ot/ier hcxnd, iz certainly can he said th t the sclief^ia'cic judf- 
ment, "Moso rrows on the norf; ride cl' trees," though held only l.s 
an ass'jraption--a tentc-tive hclief, v/as even then true in the sense 

It was destined not to contradict, hut to agree Virith, and at 
the sane tijie, extend earlier oh;;ectJ lied, estahlished experience or 
realitj^, hy heing classifiahle as u.niversalized n^eanirj^ , and reler- 
ahie hy helief-intent to an existence-sphere. 

A further ar^uwerit s/iowing that though.t, which is instruinenial, 
has not reached i':s culmination, is furnis/.'.ed liy science. It is a 
f ar-f etc};ed conclusion f- at holds the prohlems in the lahcratory to 
"l-e set for science v/'-iolly by practical exifericy. Sucb a conclusion 
is too '3uch like sayinp that the mind t th^nk until it has iir&t 
Bet for itself practical altern^.tives . Evidently there is in sci- 
ence a theoretical interest. The end and aim of science--unless it 
is an experinerto:l sta':.ion--is the ohject itself--the huildinr up of 
an oh,iective sphere of truth. 



The ain of this essay, as indicated in the i:.'^i .u..u--^.i , v/as 
to investicate the phenomena of helief and of judf^jment, for the pur- 
pose of finding whether the relation "netv.-een these two series of 
psychic facts is as intimate as one night infer from reading ceriain 
vi/rit'srs on lof^ical theory. Should helief (in its most generally 
accepted senr>e, as rneani ir ohjective reference to reality and suh- 
.iective reference to person) he found to be in jjerpetual lean;^--e v/ith 
,iudp-Tner;t, it would afford sup-port to the view that judfTnent operates 
in and for experience, and not hej'-ond experience as a play of empty 
and irresponsi'i^le 'forms . 

IP'^eV'er our investi'^acion has contri nuT.ea si.^ch support, it is 
noz for us ^o decide, hut v/e niay at least state our case as it stands. 
^Briefly put, tl.e evidence that '-.lahes for 'an insepar^r/le relation 
betvveen belief and judrnenL is as lollov/s: (l) That judr^ient agrees 
with belief in referrir^g to objective reality, is attested by the • 
increasing inves tiration of "existential theory." (2) That it agrees 
with btlief in involving an inner control, is shown oy prannatism 
and certain worth- theories , in tb-e f&ct that both maintain the 
presence snd operation of an appraising, evaluating Self. (3) In- 
direct testimony, corroborating the view that judgment embodies 
belief, presents itself in t?:e Tery fact that a belief-view of judg- 
ment gives significance to the negative. (4) Finally, there is the 
indirect but valuable evidence that grcvv's cut of the prevailing 
criticism of the pr-igi.iatic theory of judgment, and of thie pragma L^ist's 
conception of belief: the criticism that the pr£.gmatist atcempts to 
make judgment subser"':ient as m.eans to the practical as er^d, and the 
criticis)!! that belief is not a matter of v/ill or '.vish. Turned into 
argument for the point of view here urged, "this criticism would read 

thuo : In .'; jurbT-ment insti'unental and r.chena.tic, a nsre inquiry, 
the pramatist linits '-^elief to what are here and elsewhere called 
ass'imption. But t'-^is procedure of identifyinf- >;elief and asfiiimption 
only shows t]iat judrnent n'?""-er withoiAt helief, and that it is 
through the presence of t-. e element of "bftlief that jiidrnen"c is ahle 
to provide the ohjects with which it operates. 

#57. Bioj:rap?:ical Sketch. 

The v.'riter of this dis; ertcitiori , Thcmas Albert Lev.i?, i.vas 
"borri M:.,roh 17, 1578, in Livingston Cov'.nty, in the state of M:' bsou- 
ci . He received his preliminary education in the piihlic schools 
o! his Tc ■ i-"e cou.nty and in a private normal school. After a year's 
teaching in district schools, he matricvlated at Wjlliar-! Jewell 
Coll'jge, Liherty, Misaouri, in 1899, where he graduated v;ith the 
degree Bac/.elor rf Arts Jn 1-0?. 

At the conclusion of his college coiiriie t^e aixthor resumed- 
teaching, as princiral of the pu'blic schools at Polo, Miscouri. He 
resirr.ed this position at the close of the first year in order to 
take up worK in the Johns Hopkins University as a fraduate student. 
He chose Philosophy as his principal, and Experimental Ps^rchology 
and Biolofy as his suVtordinit te suhjects. He held the Pellov/ship in 
Philosophy and Psyc^-iolor-y , 1909-10. 

The vvriter has attended t'-^.e lectures of Professors Baldwin, 
Stratton, Grif:'"in, Buc>^ne-r and Andrev/s, and Doctors Dunlap and Furry, 
to all of v'^o^ he is deenly indehted for the inspiration of their 
teaching and for their helpful interest. He v/ould express an 
especial indebtedness to Professor Buchner and Doctor Purry for the 
sncourareraent and sj^nipathetic criticism they have given hira in the 
writing of this dissertation. 






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