Full text of "The works of the Most Reverend Father in God, John Bramhall, D.D., sometime Lord Archibishop of Armagh, Primate and Metropolitan of all Ireland"

THE

WORKS

OF THE

MOST REVEREND FATHER IN GOD,

JOHN BRAMHALL, D.D.

SOMETIME LORD ARCHBISHOP OF ARMAGH,
PRIMATE AND METROPOLITAN OF ALL IRELAND.

A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,

AND A COLLECTION OF HIS LETTERS.

VOL. IV.

OXFORD :

JOHN HENRY PARKER.
MDCCCXLIV.

OXFORD :

PRINTED BY I. SHRIMPTON.

PREFACE.

IN the volume now published will be found the whole of
Bramhall s Discourses against Hobbes, which form the third
part of his collected Works. An account of the controversy
that gave rise to them has been given in vol. i. pp. xxxi
xxxiii. A list of the tracts relating to it is here subjoined.

1 . A Discourse of Liberty and Necessity by John Bramhall
Bishop of Derry. Written, and sent to the (then) Marquis
of Newcastle to be transmitted to Hobbes, in 1645, after a
verbal discussion of the subject in the Marquis s presence;
but first published in 1655 with the two tracts to be next
mentioned.

i. Of Liberty and Necessity ; a Treatise wherein all Con
troversy concerning Predestination, Election, Free will,
Grace, Merit, Reprobation, &c., is fully Decided and
Cleared : in Answer to a Treatise by the Bishop of
Londonderry on the same Subject. Lond. 1654. 12mo.
by Thomas Hobbes. Written as a letter to the Marquis
of Newcastle, Aug. 20. 1645 a , from Rouen, in answer to

a The original edition of this letter (see p. 23 of the present volume), and

(in 1654) the present editor has not as the date of the letter as published in

seen; and Hobbes (Qu., Animadv. 1679 by Bp. Laney (see p. 19, note b

upon the Bp s. Epist. to the Reader, of this vol.) is as above given (viz.

p. 19) speaks of it as written in 1646 Aug. 20. 1645), it seems probable that

instead of 1645. But as Bramhall had Hobbes was himself mistaken, and that

had the MS. in his possession a con- 1645 is the true date,
siderable time so early as April 1646

PREFACE.

BramhaFs Discourse, and to be transmitted to him. It
was first published in 1654 without Hobbes s knowledge,
with the above title and a Preface, for neither of which
is Hobbes responsible, and with the erroneous date of
1652 b .

2. Defence of True Liberty from Antecedent Necessity,
&c. &c., by John Bramhall, D.D. and Lord Bishop of Derry.
In answer to the last named; written in 1646, and com
municated then to the Marquis of Newcastle and to Hobbes,
but first published in 1655 (8vo. Lond.), upon the appearance
of Hobbes s Letter just mentioned ; the original Discourse
and that Letter being divided into sections, and published
together in one volume, section by section, with Bramhall s
reply to each.

These three tracts, thus intermixed one with the other,
constitute the first Discourse in the present volume.

ii. The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and
Chance, clearly Stated and Debated between Dr. Bram
hall Bishop of Derry and Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury
(Lond. 4to. 1656). Containing all three of the above
named tracts, printed section by section, together with
Hobbes s rejoinder, in the shape of "Animadversions"
upon each section.

3. Castigations of Mr. Hobbes his last Animadversions in
the case concerning Liberty and Universal Necessity, by
John Bramhall, D.D. and Bishop of Derry (Lond. 8vo. 1657
1658). The second Discourse in the present volume.

4. The Catching of Leviathan or the Great Whale, &c. &c.,
by John Bramhall, D.D. and Bishop of Derry (Lond. 8vo.
1 658) : at first designed to form a part of the Castigations,

b Molesworth in his late edition of neous date of the original publication

s Works (vol. iv. p. 278) has in 1654: the case at best (i. e. sup-

:aken the matter altogether. He posing 1646 were the true date and not

rnagmes 1652 to be the correct date of 1645) being precisely the reverse,
the letter, and gives 1646 as the erro-

PREFACE.

but enlarged afterwards into a distinct tract, although still
printed as an appendix and continuation of that work. It is
professedly an exposure of the gross and dangerous errors of
Hobbes s Leviathan, but refers also to his book De Give and
to his Questions just now mentioned : and forms the third
Discourse in the present volume.

iii. An Answer to a Book published by Dr. Bramhall, late
Bishop of Deny, called The Catching of the Leviathan ;
together with an Historical Narration concerning Heresy
and the Punishment thereof: by Thomas Hobbes. Pub
lished at London in 1682 (8vo.) after the author s death,
but written (according to the Advertisement to the
Reader) ten years only after the publication of Bramhall s
book (which had not sooner come to the writer s know
ledge). This would mark its date to 1668, in which year
Hobbes was in great alarm lest legal measures should be
taken against him on account of his writings (see his Life
in the Biogr. Brit, note K).* Among other steps to justify
and protect himself, he appears to have composed this
tract; of which the first part is an " answer" (what
Hobbes at least called such) to the first chapter of the
Leviathan, that relating to his religious sentiments. To
the Castigations he made no reply, nor to the remainder
of BramhalFs attack upon his Leviathan.

Such was the course of the controversy, with which the
present volume is concerned ; from which Hobbes appears
to have come off with less loss of credit than from his
complete defeat he deserved (see, for instance, Brucker s ac
count of the matter). It is to be regretted, that Bramhall
should have been led to cast his thoughts upon such a sub
ject into the form of an answer to Hobbes s tracts. The
consequence is, that instead of a complete and connected
discussion of a very abstruse subject, such as his peculiar
talents and knowledge especially fitted him to produce, and

PREFACE.

of which passages in these tracts as they at present stand
afford a specimen, the course of his argument is now too often
broken off by the necessity of perpetual replies to the feeble
and perverse crotchets of his adversary : and the reader is
forced to conclude, that in this (as in nine-tenths of his other
writings) Bramhall s fame would have stood higher, had his
opponent been more worthy of him.

A. W. H.

August, 1844.

CONTENTS OP VOL. IV.

Page

Defence of True Liberty from Antecedent and Extrinsecal

Necessity ; Against Mr. Hobbes. Part iii. Discourse i. 3

Castigations of Mr. Hobbes his last Animadversions in the

Case concerning Liberty and Universal Necessity. Part iii.

Discourse ii. . . . . . .197

The Catching of Leviathan or the Great Whale. Part iii.

Discourse iii. . 507

THE WORKS

ARCHBISHOP BRAMHALL.

PART THE THIRD ;

CONTAINING

THE DISCOURSES AGAINST MR. HOBBES.

BRAMHALL.

DISCOURSE I.

A DEFENCE

TRUE LIBERTY

FROM

ANTECEDENT AND EXTRINSECAL NECESSITY;

BEING

AN ANSWER
TO A LATE BOOK OF MR. THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY

ENTITLED

A TREATISE OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

WRITTEN BY THE RIGHT REVEREND

JOHN BRAMHALL, D.D.

AND
LORD BISHOP OF DERRY.

B 2

CONTENTS.

Pago

[Epistle to the Marquis of Newcastle . .17

Advertisement to the Reader.] .... .19

[INTRODUCTION.]

NUMBER I.

J. D [Introduction of the subject.

T. H. Introduction of the subject.
J. D. s Reply.

T. H. s own words convict his theory of falsehood.] .

NUMBER II.

[T. H. s boast.

J. D. s Reply.] ... ib

NUMBER III.

[T. H. s Answer to J. D. s Preface. 27

Liberty to act does not imply liberty to will.
J. D. s Reply.

1. T. H. confounds liberty with spontaneity.

2. And hypothetical with antecedent necessity.

3. True liberty includes liberty to will.]

() CONTENTS.

Page

[THE STATING OF THE QUESTION.]
NUMBER IV.

j t 1). [True liberty, an universal immunity from all determination to one. 33

T. H. s Answer. ib -
J. D. s Reply.

Different senses of the word liberty explained. . ib.
Liberty of contradiction and of contrariety, of exercise and of speci
fication.] . 36

NUMBER V.

J. P. [Division of the argument. 37

T. H. s Answer. . ib.

J. D. s Reply.] . H&gt;.

T. PROOFS OF LIBERTY OUT OF SCRIPTURE.

NUMBER VI.

J. D. Argument 1. [That men have power of election, and therefore

true liberty. . . ib.

T. H. s Answer. . . . . . . .38

J. D. s Reply. . . . . . . ib.

1. Election is only of alternatives conceived possible. . . ib.

2. Universal consent. . . . . . .39

3. Holy Scripture.] . . .41

NUMBER VII.

[T. H. s assertion, that the last act of the reason necessitates the will. . ib.

J. D. s Reply. . . .42

1. The last act of the reason is itself an act of the will. . . ib.

2. It determines the will morally, not necessarily ; . . ib.

3. Nor yet to one course unalterably ; . . .43

4. Nor in such a way, that the will cannot suspend its own act ; . ib.

5. Nor antecedently or extrinsecally. .... ib.

6. T. H. s affectation of new terms of art. . . . 44

Further answer nf T. If. . . . . . . ib.

.1. D. s Reply.] . ib.

CONTENTS. 7

Page

NUMBER VIII.

[ T. H:S Further Answer . - 45

J. D. s Reply. . -47

1. T. H. mistakes the author s words. . . ib.

2. And contradicts himself. . . . ib.

3. Actions which proceed from fear, may or may not be spontaneous. 48

4. Definition of voluntary and involuntary acts. . . 49

5. Necessity and election inconsistent in the same act. . . ib.

6. Irrational beings neither deliberate nor elect. . . 50

7. Habitual actions voluntary. . .53

8. How they differ from actions done in passion.] . . ib.

NUMBER IX.

J. D. Argument 2. [That men may do many things and do them not,

and therefore have true liberty. . . . 54

T. H. s Answer. ..... -55

J. D. s Reply.] . . . . ib -

NUMBER X.

J. D. Argument 3. [That the interrogations, expostulations, and the like,

in Scripture, prove men to have true liberty. . 56

T. H. s Answer deferred. . . . . . .57

J. D. s Reply.] . . . . . - ib.

NUMBER XI.

J. D. Argument 4. [That every theory of necessity proves too much, in

proving Adam a necessary agent; which yet Necessitarians deny. 58

T. H. s Answer, ... . ib.

T. H. s own theory of necessity. . . ib.

Of the theories of necessity held by others. . ib.

Election as well as action necessary. . 59

J. D. s Reply. .... ib.

The decrees and foreknowledge of God. . . 60

The influences of the stars. ... . ib.

The concatenation of causes. . . . . . ib.

Physical and moral efficacy of objects. . . . .61

The last dictate of the understanding. . . ib.

Adam was a necessary agent if other men are. . . 62

Horrid consequences of the doctrine of necessity.] . 63

O CONTENTS.

Page

NUMBER XII.

J. D. Argument 5. [That the theory of Necessity leaves no room for

reward or punishment. . . . . * .64

T. H. s Answer. . . . . . . . ib.

St. Paul s argument in the Epistle to the Romans. . . . ib.

The power of God alone is sufficient to justify any action He doth. . 65
There is no difference between a will active and a will permissive, or a

will causing the act and a will causing the sin. . , ib.

J. D. s Reply. ... .66

The passage of St. Paul explained, as to its general scope. . 67
, in its particular passages. . ib.

1. How Jacob was loved and Esau hated. . . .68

2. Of the freedom of God s mercy. . . . ib.

3. In what sense God s glory is either the end or the consequence

of man s sin. . . . . . .69

4. In what sense God is said to harden men s hearts. . . ib.
There is a real difference between an operative and a permissive will. 71
How God is the cause of the act, yet not of the sin of the act. . 74
God s justice not measured by His power, but by His will, and that

the will of One Who is perfect. . . . . .75

The case of Job. ..... ..78

And of the blind man mentioned in St. John s Gospel. . . 79

And of the brute beasts . . . . . . ib.

Power to be regulated by justice, not justice by power. . . 80

T. H. s theory makes God inevitably the cause of sin.] . .81

II. PROOFS OF LIBERTY DRAWN FROM REASON.

NUMBER XIII.

J. D. Argument 1. [Story of Zeno : necessity of sin implies necessity

of punishment. . . . . .82

T. H. s Answer. ..... , ib.

J. D. s Reply.] ib |

NUMBER XIV.

J. D. Argument 2. [The doctrine of necessity overthrows the frame- work

of all human society. ... ,84

T. H. s Answer. 5

The law not unjust because the violation of it is necessary. . . ib.

Necessity does not supersede consultation. . . . .86

Nor admonition. . . . . . . ,87

Nor praise or dispraise. .... ib.

Nor the use of means. . ib.

J. D. s Reply. 88

^ CONTENTS. 9

, Page

T. H. s answer both irrelevant and untrue. . . . .88

Laws de facto may be unjust. . . . .89

Not all laws made by consent of those subject to them. . . 90

Punishment unjust for sin committed through antecedent necessity. . ib.

Temptation does not involve an antecedent necessity of sin. . 91

Law useless on the theory of necessity. . . . .92

Punishment vindicatory, not corrective only. . ib.

T. H. s inconsistencies. . . 93

Right and wrong antecedent to human pacts. . . .94

Consultation does imply liberty, and does not necessitate determination. 96

Admonitions do imply liberty, because they are addressed to those only

who are conceived to be free. . ... 98

Praise moral, although not praise metaphysical, does imply liberty. . ib.
Of rewards and punishments ; the parallel of brute beasts not re
levant. . .100

1. All the actions of brute beasts not necessary. . . . ib-

2. The terms reward and punishment applied to them by analogy
only. .101

3. They act in such cases, not from reason, but from sense of
present or memory of past joy or pain.] . ib.

NUMBER XV.

J. D. Argument 3. [The opinion of necessity inconsistent with piety. . ib.

T. Ws Answer. . . . -102

The opinion of necessity doth not involve impiety in right-minded men. . 103

Nor exclude repentance. . ib.

Nor prayer. . . . ib.

J. D. s Reply. . 104

T. H. mistaketh piety to be an act of the judgment. . ib-

And to respect God s power only. . . ib.

His opinion destroys the moral attributes of God. . . ib.

And the outward worship of God. . . 105

And repentance. . . . ib.

T. H. denieth prayer to be either a cause or a means of God s

blessings.] . . .107

NUMBER XVI.

. D Argument 4. [The opinion of necessity destroys the variety and per
fection of the universe. . . . 109
T. H. s Answer. . ib.
J. D. s Reply. .110
Hypothetical, distinct from antecedent, necessity. . ib.
Contingent events.]

10 CONTENTS.

Page

NUMBER XVII.

J. D. Argument 5. [If there be no true liberty, there is no formal sin. .112

T. H. s Answer. ... . ib -

J. D. s Reply.

Sin, to be sin, must be an act of a free will against a just law.] . 114

[III. DISTINCTIONS MADE BY NECESSITARIANS.]

NUMBER XVIII.

J. D. [ Distinction i. Between Stoical and Christian necessity. . .116

1. That the Stoics subject God to destiny, they subject
destiny to God. . . . . . . ib.

2. That the Stoics hold a necessary connection of causes,
they hold God to be the one pervading Cause. . . ib.

3. That the Stoics deny contingents, they admit them. . ib.
Distinction ii. Between the First Cause, which necessitates all things, and

second causes, which do not. . . . . .117

1. The two parts of this distinction contradict one another, ib.

2. The First Cause being necessary, second causes must

be so likewise. . . . . . . ib.

T. H. s Answer.] Certain distinctions, which he supposing may be

brought to his arguments, are by him removed. . .118

\_T. H. disavows both distinctions. . . . . . ib.

J. D. s Reply. . . . . . . . ib.

Christian necessity (so called) only disguised Stoical necessity. . ib.

The terms are employed by Lipsius. . . .119

The First Cause not a necessary cause of all effects.] . .120

NUMBER XIX.

J. D [Distinction iii. Between liberty from compulsion and liberty from
necessitation. . . . . . . . .121

Antecedent necessity involves compulsion. . . . ib.

Of the freedom of God, and of the good Angels. . . . ib.

T. H. s Answer. . . . . . . .122

Hypothetical necessity. . . . . . . ib.

Of God, and of the good Angels. . . . . . ih.

Degrees of liberty impossible. . . . . . .123

Liberty of exercise and liberty of specification cannot exist apart. . ib.

J. D. s Reply. . ...... 121

Actions proceeding from fear are not compulsory actions. . . ib.

CONTENTS. 11

Page

Proper compulsion extrinsecal. . 1 25

Men ordinarily, not always, free. . . ib.

Hypothetical necessity. ... . 1 26

Of God and of good Angels. . . . -127

Degrees of liberty possible. ... . ib.

Liberty of exercise not necessarily accompanied by liberty of specifi
cation. . . . . . . .128

T. H. s presumptuous censure of the doctors of the Church.] . ib.

NUMBER XX.

J. D. [Election opposed to coarctation as well as to coaction. . .130

Elicit acts of the will cannot be necessitated. . . ib.

T. H. s Answer. . . . . . . .131

Election not inconsistent with necessity. . . . . ib.

The distinction vain, between imperate and elicit acts of the will. 132

J. D. s Reply. .133

Compulsion and necessitation both opposite to liberty. . . ib.

Of mixed actions. . . . . . .134

Of fear and other passions. ... . ib.

Motives cannot compel the will. . . . .136

Liberty not ignorance of necessitation. .... 137

T. H. s impertinent instance of fire burning. . . . ib.

Distinction of imperate and elicit acts not improper. . .138

Nor unnecessarily obscure. . . . . .140

T. H. entirely mistakes the author s words.] . . . ib.

[IV. THEORIES CONCERNING THE CAUSE OF A SUPPOSED NECESSITY.]

NUMBER XXI.

J. D. [i. Astrology. . . . . . .141

ii. The complexion and temperature of the body. . . . 142

T. H. s Answer. . . . . . . . ib.

J. D. s Reply.] ....... ib.

NUMBER XXTI.

J. D. [iii. The moral efficacy of outward objects. . . . 143

Such efficacy partly our own fault. . . . ib.

not irresistible. . . . . ib.

may be overcome by a settled resolution. . 144

T. II. s Answer. ... . ib.

J. D. s Reply.] . . 145

12 CONTENTS.

Page

NUMBER XXIII.

j. D. [iv. The natural efficacy of the last dictate of the understanding. . 147
The case otherwise in point of fact.

Such a cause neither extrinsecal nor antecedent. . . ib.

The understanding may be equally balanced between two

alternatives. ... .148

T. H. s Answer. . . . . ib.

J. D. s Reply. . 149

The last feather breaketh the horse s back. . . .150

T. H. s example of a man that strikes. . .151

Of Medea s choice. . . . ib.

And Caesar s. .... . ib.

Affection sometimes prevails against reason.] . 152

NUMBER XXIV.

J. D. [v. The prescience and decrees of God. 153

Our ignorance a sufficient answer. . ib.

Futurity ever present to God. ib.

T. H. s Answer. ..... ib.

Events necessarily determined by antecedent and extrinsecal causes. . 154

Eternity not an indivisible point but a succession. . ib.

J. D. s Reply. ..... .155

A certain and received truth not to be deserted because it is hard to

be understood. .... . ib.

How contingent events are reconcileable with God s prescience and

decrees. . . . . . . .156

The aspect of God. .... . ib.

Necessity not identical with God s decrees. . ib.

Other explanations have been offered of the subject besides the

author s. . . . . . . .157

That eternity is not a succession but an indivisible point. . ib.

T. H. s boastful conclusion.] . . . . .159

[V. REMAINDER OF T. H/S ANSWER.]

NUMBER XXV.

T. H. My opinion about liberty and necessity. . . . ib.

[i. Of actions done without deliberation. . . . ib.

J. D. s Reply. . . . . . . 160

Of actions done in sudden passions. . . . .161

Of actions done without present deliberation. . . . 162

Actions done in passion justly punished, because done through past

or present choice.] . . . . . . ib.

NUMBER XXVI.

T. II. [ii. Of actions done with deliberation. . . .163

J. D. s Reply.] . . i 6 4

CONTENTS. 13

Pago

NUMBER XXVII.

T. II. [iii. The will the last step before action.
J. D. s Reply.

T. H. confounds the act of volition with the will itself.] . . ib.

NUMBER XXVIII.

H. [iv. A voluntary act free until deliberation ends. . 165

J. D. s Reply ] . ib -

NUMBER XXIX.

T. H. [v. Definition of liberty. 166

J. D. s Reply. . 16 ?

T. H. s definition one of negatives. ib.

His instances. ... . ib.

His definition far removed from the idea of moral liberty.] . 168

NUMBER XXX.

T. H. [vi. All things take their beginning from an antecedent and extrinsecal

cause. ..... ib.

J. D. s Reply. . .169

Nothing finite begins to be of itself. . . ib.

Many things begin to act of themselves. . . , ib.

The will is not a necessary cause of its particular acts.] . .170

NUMBER XXXI.

T. H. [vii. Every actual event hath a sufficient and therefore a necessary cause. 171

J. D. s Reply. ... . ib.

1. Causes singly insufficient which jointly are sufficient. . . ib.

2. That cause properly sufficient which produceth the effect intended. 172

3. A cause is sufficient in respect of its ability, not of its will, to act. ib.

4. A sufficient cause inclusive of will, only hypothetically necessary.] 1 73

14 CONTENTS.

NUMBER XXX1L

1\ ]f, [viii. Free agency a self contradiction, because it implies a sufficient

cause without an actual effect. . .173

J. D. s Reply. . ib -

Sufficient causes include not the actual determination of the will. . 174

. refer to the producibility, not to the production, of

an event.] .... . ib.

NUMBER XXXIII.

T. H. [Proof of necessity, from men s experience of their own weaning in the

use of words. . . . .175

J. D. s Reply. ... .176

Truth to be sought in reason, not in vulgar notions. . ib.

Men s experience contrary to T. H. s conclusions.] . 177

NUMBER XXXIV.

T. H. [Sufficient causes necessary causes. . . .180

Instance of throwing dice. . . . . . ib.

a shower of rain. . . . . .181

J. D. s Reply. . . . . ib.

Our question, of human actions, not of natural contingencies. . ib.

of absolute, not of hypothetical, necessity. . .184

Of T. H. s instance of the shower of rain. . . . .185

A contrary instance.] . . . . . . 187

NUMBER XXXV.

T. II. [A free agent impossible, because a sufficient must be a necessary cause. 188
J. D. s Reply.] . . ib.

NUMBER XXXVI.

T. H. [Of the inconveniency of denying necessity. . . . .189

J. D. s Reply. ........ ib.

Freedom of man not inconsistent with God s eternal decrees. . 190

Nor with His eternal prescience.] . . .191

CONTENTS.

Page

NUMBER XXXVII.

H. [Conclusion.
J. D. s Reply. .

Of T. H. s desire of secrecy.] . ib -

NUMBER XXXVIII.

T. H. Postscript. ... .193

[ The cause of the erroneous opinion of liberty. . ib.

J. D. s Reply.] ..... ib.

647 TO THE

EIGHT HONOURABLE

THE MARQUIS OE NEWCASTLE,

&c.

SIR,

IF I pretended to compose a complete treatise upon this
subject, I should not refuse those large recruits of reasons
and authorities, which offer themselves to serve in this cause,
for God and man, religion and policy, Church and common
wealth, against the blasphemous, desperate, and destructive
opinion of fatal destiny. But as mine aim, in the first dis
course, was only to press home those things in writing
which had been agitated between us by word of mouth (a
course much to be preferred before verbal conferences, as
being freer from passions and tergiversations, less subject to
mistakes and misrelations, wherein paralogisms are more
quickly detected, impertinencies discovered, and confusion
avoided), so my present intention is only to vindicate that
discourse, and together with it, those lights of the Schools,
who were never slighted but where they were not understood.
How far I have performed it, I leave to the judicious and
unpartial reader, resting for mine own part well contented
with this, that I have satisfied myself.

Your Lordship s most obliged

to love and serve you,

J. D.

BRAMHAT.L-

648 TO THE READER.

CHRISTIAN READER, this ensuing treatise was neither
penned nor intended for the press, but privately undertaken,
that by the ventilation of the question truth might be cleared
from mistakes 3 . The same was Mr. Hobbes his desire at that
time; as appeareth by four passages in his book, wherein
he requesteth and beseecheth that it may be kept private b .
But either through forgetfulness or change of judgment, he
hath now caused or permitted it to be printed in England c ,
without either adjoining my first discourse, to which he wrote
that answer, or so much as mentioning this reply, which he
hath had in his hands now these eight years d . So wide is the
date of his letter," in the year 1652 e ," from the truth,
and his manner of dealing with me in this particular from
ingenuity (if the edition were with his own consent). How
soever, here is all that passed between us upon this subject,
without any addition, or the least variation from the original.

a [For an account of the dispute to meet with the original edition of

which led to the publication of this and Hobbes Letter; but it appears from

the following tracts, see vol. i. pp. Hobbes reply to Bramhall s Defence

xxxi. xxxiii. of the present edition of (Animadv. on the Bishop s Epistle to

Bramhall s works, and the Preface to the Reader, p. 19), that it was printed

this volume.] in London without the author s know-

b pp. 18, 26, 35, and 80. [viz. of ledge or consent, by " an English young
Hobbes Letter to the Marquis of man," who had been allowed to trans-
Newcastle as first published, Lond. late it for the benefit of a French ac-
12mo. 1654: see below Numbers xi, quaintance of Hobbes , and who,
xiv, xv, xxxvii. The latter part of " being a nimble writer, took a copy of
Hobbes Letter, viz. from Numb. xxv. it also for himself." See also Bramhall s
inclusive to the end, was republished Castigations of the Animadversions
in 1676 (12mo. Lond.), with "Ob- (below p. 751, fol. edit), Disc. ii.
servations by a Learned Prelate of Pt. iii.]

the Church of England lately de- d [Scil. 16461654. See below

ceased," viz. Dr. Benjamin Laney, notes a, b. pp. 23, 24.]
who was Bishop of Peterborough, Lin- e [It appears by the passage of

coin, and Ely, successively from 1660 Hobbes reply to Bramhall s Defence

until his death in 1674 ; and the whole above quoted in note c, that the person

letter was published again, according who edited Hobbes Letter in the first

to Wood (Ath. Oxon., iii. 1212), in 1684 instance, mistook the date, and printed

(8vo., as the third edition).] it as "in 1652," instead of Aug. 20,

c [The present editor has been unable 1645, which was the true date.]

20 TO THE READER.

Concerning the nameless author of the preface*, who takes
upon him to hang out an ivy-bush before this rare piece
of sublimated stoicism, to invite passengers to purchase it, as
I know not who he is, so I do not much heed it, nor regard
either his ignorant censures or hyperbolical expressions.
The Church of England is as much above his detraction, as
he is beneath this question. Let him lick up the spittle of
Dionysius by himself, as his servile flatterers did, and protest
that it is more sweet than nectar g : we envy him not; much
good may it do him. His very frontispiece is a sufficient
confutation of his whole preface ; wherein he tells the world,
as falsely and ignorantly as confidently, that " all controversy
concerning Predestination, Election, Free-will, Grace, Merits,
Reprobation, &c., is fully decided and cleared 11 ." Thus he
accustometh his pen to run over beyond all limits of truth
and discretion, to let us see that his knowledge in theological
controversies is none at all, and into what miserable times we
are fallen, when blind men will be the only judges of colours.

" Quid tanto dignum feret hie promissor hiatu 1 ?"

There is yet one thing more, whereof I desire to advertise
the reader. Whereas Mr. Hobbes mentions my objections to
[A.D.1645] his Book De Cive^ } it is true, that ten years since I gave him
about sixty exceptions, the one half of them political, the
other half theological, to that book, and every exception
justified by a number of reasons; to which he never yet
vouchsafed any answer. Nor do I now desire it ; for since
that, he hath published his Leviathan

" Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum V

which affords much more matter of exception. And I am
informed, that there are already two, the one of our own
Church, the other a stranger m , who have shaken in pieces

f [Scil. to the surreptitious edition h [From the title-page, apparently,

of Hobbes Letter. Who this was does of the first edition of Hobbes Letter.]

not appear ; further than what has been i [Hor., A. P., 138.]

said above. For the style of his Pre- k p. 1. [of T. H. s Letter, ed. 1654.

face, see below in the Castigations of See below Numb.i. p. 23.]

Mr. Hobbes Animadversions, Answ. to 1 [Virg., jn., iii. 658.]

Animadvers. on the Bishop s Epistle m [See below, in the Preface to the

to the Reader, p. 751 (fol. edit.), Disc. Catching of Leviathan, p. 869 (fol.

" Pt - iii-] edit.), Disc. iii. Pt. iii.]

* [Athen. Deipnosoph. vi. 13.]

TO THE READER. 21

the whole fabric of his city, that was but builded in the air,
and resolved that huge mass of his seeming Leviathan into a
new nothing, and that their labours will speedily be ptib-
lished. But if this information should not prove true, I will
not grudge upon his desire, God willing, to demonstrate, that
his principles are pernicious, both to piety and policy, and
destructive to all relations of mankind, between prince and
subject, father and child, master and servant, husband and
wife; and that they, who maintain them obstinately, are
fitter to live in hollow trees among wild beasts, than in any
Christian or political society". So GTod bless us.

n [Vide The Catching of the Leviathan, &c., below, Disc. iii. Pt. iii., at the
end of this volume.]

DISCOUKSE I.

VINDICATION OP TRUE LIBERTY

FROM

ANTECEDENT AND EXTBINSECAL NECESSITY.

[FIRST PRINTED AT LONDON^ A.D. 1655.]
[INTRODUCTION.]

NUMBER I.

J. D. Either I am free to write this discourse for liberty DISCOURSE
against necessity, or I am not free. If I be free, I have ob- -^
tained the cause, and ought not to suffer for the truth. If I tion of the
be not free, yet I ought not to be blamed, since I do it not su jec
out of any voluntary election, but out of an inevitable neces
sity a .

T. H. Right Honourable, I had once resolved to answer [introduc-
J. D/s objections to my book De Give in the first place, as subject.] *
that which concerns me most, and afterwards to examine
this discourse of liberty and necessity, which (because I never
had uttered my opinion of it) concerned me the less. But
seeing it was both your Lordship s and J. D/s desire, that I
should begin with the latter, I was contented so to do. And
here I present and submit it to your Lordship s judgment.

J. D. The first day that I did read over T. H. his defence [Reply.]
of the necessity of all things, was April 20, 1646 : which pro-

a [The present "Discourse" is com- to this discourse, written also in 1645
posed of three several tracts, printed as a letter to the Marquis of Newcastle,

in successive portions: viz. 1. "a and surreptitiously printed in 1654;

liberty a
written by Bramhall in 1645 in con- answer, written also in 1645, and sent

discourse of liberty and necessity," and 3. BramhalPs reply to Hobhes

sequence of a conversation between at that time (through the Marquis) to

Hobbes and himself in the presence of Hobbes, but printed for the first time

the Marquis of Newcastle, but not (with his original discourse and Hobbes

printed until 1655 ; 2. Hobbes answer letter, as here reprinted) in 1655.]

24 A. VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART cecded not out of any disrespect to him b ; for if all his dis-
- courses had been geometrical demonstrations, able not only

to persuade but also to compel assent, all had been one to me ;
first my journey, and afterwards some other trifles (which we
call business), having diverted me until then. And then my
occasions permitting me, and an advertisement from a friend
awakening me, I set myself to a serious examination of it.
[T.H. sown "We commonly see those who delight in paradoxes, if
vict his they have line enough, confute themselves, and their specu-
fabehood.] latives and their practicks familiarly interfere one with
another. The very first words of T. H. his defence trip up
the heels of his whole cause ; " I had once resolved." To
"resolve" pre-supposeth deliberation; but what deliberation
can there be of that, which is inevitably determined by
causes without ourselves, before we do deliberate? Can a
condemned man deliberate whether he should be executed
or not ? It is even to as much purpose, as for a man to con
sult and ponder with himself whether he should draw in his
breath, or whether he should increase in stature. Secondly,
to " resolve" implies a man s dominion over his own actions, 650
and his actual determination of himself; but he who holds
an absolute necessity of all things, hath quitted this domi
nion over himself, and (which is worse) hath quitted it to
the second extrinsecal causes, in which he makes all his
actions to be determined. One may as well call again yester
day, as " resolve," or newly determine, that which is deter
mined to his hand already. I have perused this treatise,
weighed T. H. his answers, considered his reasons ; and con
clude, that he hath missed and misted the question, that the
answers are evasions, that his arguments are paralogisms,
that the opinion of absolute and universal necessity is but a
result of some groundless and ill-chosen principles, and that
the defect is not in himself, but that his cause will admit no
better defence ; and therefore, by his favour, I am resolved
to adhere to my first opinion. Perhaps another man, read
ing this discourse with other eyes, judgeth it to be pertinent
and well founded. How comes this to pass ? The treatise

b [Hobbes letter was dated Aug. had met Hobbes) to Brussels, which

20, 1645, from Rouen. The journey was his ordinary place of residence

of Bramhall alluded to appears to have from 1644 to 1648 : See above in vol. i.

been his return from Paris (where he p. x.j

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 25

is the same, the exterior causes are the same ; yet the resolu- DISCOURSE
tion is contrary. Do the second causes play fast and loose ? - : -
Do they necessitate me to condemn, and necessitate him to
maintain? What is it then? The difference must be in
ourselves; either in our intellectuals, because the one sees
clearer than the other, or in our affections, which betray our
understandings, and produce an implicit adherence in the
one more than in the other. Howsoever it be, the difference
is in ourselves. The outward causes alone do not chain me
to the one resolution, nor him to the other resolution. But
T. H. may say, that our several and* respective deliberations
and affections are in part the causes of our contrary resolu
tions, and do concur with the outward causes to make up
one total and adequate cause to the necessary production of
this effect. If it be so, he hath spun a fair thread, to make
all this stir for such a necessity as no man ever denied or
doubted of. When all the causes have actually determined
themselves, then the effect is in being ; for though there be
a priority in nature between the cause and the effect, yet
they are together in time. And the old rule is, " whatso
ever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is c ." This is no ab
solute necessity, but only upon supposition, that a man hath
determined his own liberty. When we question whether all
occurrences be necessary, we do not question whether they
be necessary when they are, nor whether they be neces
sary in sensu composite after we have resolved and finally
determined what to do, but whether they were necessary
before they were determined by ourselves, by or in the pre
cedent causes before ourselves, or in the exterior causes with
out ourselves. It is not inconsistent with true liberty to
determine itself, but it is inconsistent with true liberty to be
determined by another without itself.

T. H. saith further, that "upon your Lordship s desire
and" mine, he "was contented" to "begin with this dis
course of liberty and necessity," that is, to change his former
resolution. If the chain of necessity be no stronger but that
it may be snapped so easily in sunder, if his will was no

c ["T5 fj.*v e?j/oi TO %&gt;v 6rav fi, Kal TO TauToV fffri TO ov airav flvai e| avdyKrjs

P.TJ ^v IA)J eTi/ai 6rav ^ y, avdyicii ou ore eVri, KOI TO airXus clvai e| avdyKifjs."

fitvroi otfre TO %v airav avdyicr) flvai, Aristot., De Interpret., c. ix. 11.]
afire TO fji.ri i&j/ ai/dyKr) ^.77 eTycu* ou yap

26 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART otherwise determined from without himself but only by the
signification of your Lordship s " desire" and my modest
entreaty, then we may safely conclude, that human affairs
are not always governed by absolute necessity, that a man is
lord of his own actions, if not in chief, yet in mean, subordi
nate to the Lord Paramount of Heaven and Earth, and that
all things are not so absolutely determined in the outward
and precedent causes, but that fair entreaties and moral per
suasions may work upon a good nature so far, as to prevent
that which otherwise had been, and to produce that which
otherwise had not been. He that can reconcile this with an
antecedent necessity of all things, and a physical or natural
determination of all causes, " shall be great Apollo to me d ."

Whereas T. H. saith, that he "had never uttered" his
" opinion" of this question, I suppose he intends in writing.
My conversation with him hath not been frequent; yet I
remember well, that when this question was agitated be
tween us two in your Lordship s chamber by your command,
he did then declare himself in words, both for the absolute
necessity of all events, and for the ground of this necessity,
the flux or concatenation of the second causes.

NUMBER II.
[T. H. S T. H. And, first, I assure your Lordship. I find in it no

boast. ] J

new argument, neither from Scripture nor from reason, that
I have not often heard before ; which is as much as to say,
that I am not surprised.

[Reply.] J. D. Though I be so unhappy, that I can present no

novelty to T. H. yet I have this comfort, that if he be not 651
"surprised," then in reason I may expect a more mature
answer from him, and where he fails, I may ascribe it to the
weakness of his cause, not to want of preparation. But in
this case I like Epictetus 6 his counsel well, that the sheep
should not brag how much they have eaten, or what an
excellent pasture they do go in, but shew it in their lamb
and wool. Apposite answers and downright arguments

d ["Et eris mihi magnus Apollo." e [Vide Epicteti Enchirid., c. xlvi.

Virg., Eel, iii. 104.] 2. p. 222. ed. Schweigh.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 27

advantage a cause. To tell what we have heard or seen, is DISCOURSE
to no purpose. When a respondent leaves many things un- -
touched, as if they were too hot for his fingers, and declines
the weight of other things, and alters the true state of the
question, it is a shrewd sign, either that he hath not weighed
all things maturely, or else that he maintains a desperate
cause.

NUMBER III.

T. H. The preface is a handsome one, but it appears [Answer to
even in that, that he hath mistaken the question. For f ace ^
whereas he says thus " If I be free to write this discourse,
I have obtained the cause," I deny that to be true ; for tis
not enough to his freedom of writing, that he had not
written it unless he would himself. If he will obtain the
cause, he must prove, that before he writ it, it was not
necessary he should write it afterward. It may be, he [Liberty to
thinks it all one to say, I was free to write it, and, it was not J f^ y
necessary I should write it. But I think otherwise. For he lib . ert y to
is free to do a thing, that may do it if he have the will to do
it, and may forbear if he have the will to forbear : and yet,
if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to do it,
the action is necessarily to follow ; and if there be a neces
sity that he shall have the will to forbear, the forbearing
also will be necessary. The question therefore is not, whether
a man be a free agent, that is to say, whether he can write
or forbear, speak or be silent, according to his will; but
whether the will to write, and the will to forbear, come upon
him according to his will, or according to any thing else in
his own power. I acknowledge this liberty, that I can do if
I will; but to say I can will if I will, I take it to be an
absurd speech. Wherefore I cannot grant him the cause
upon this preface.

J. D. Tacitus speaks of a close kind of adversaries, which [Reply.]
evermore begin with a man s praise f . The crisis or the
catastrophe of their discourse is when they come to their
"but." As, he is a good natured man, but he hath a

f [Vide Agric. c. 11.]

28 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART naughty quality; or, he is a wise man, but he hath com-

mitted one of the greatest follies. So here, " The preface

is a handsome one, but it appears even in this, that he hath
mistaken the question." This is to give an inch, that one
may take away an ell without suspicion ; to praise the hand
someness of the porch, that he may gain credit to the vilify
ing of the house. Whether of us hath mistaken the ques
tion, I refer to the judicious reader. Thus much I will
maintain, that that is no true necessity, which he calls
necessity, nor that liberty which he calls liberty, nor that
the question which he makes the question.

i. [T. H. First, for liberty, that which he calls liberty is no true liberty,
liberty with For the clearing whereof it behoveth us to know the diffe-
sponta - rence between these three, necessity, spontaneity, and liberty.
Necessity and spontaneity may sometimes meet together,
so may spontaneity and liberty, but real necessity and true
liberty can never meet together. Some things are necessary
and not voluntary or spontaneous, some things are both
necessary and voluntary ; some things are voluntary and not
free, some things are both voluntary and free; but those
things which are truly necessary can never be free, and
those things which are truly free can never be necessary.
Necessity consists in an antecedent determination to one ;
spontaneity consists in a conformity of the appetite, either
intellectual or sensitive, to the object ; true liberty consists
in the elective power of the rational will. That which is
determined without my concurrence, may nevertheless agree
well enough with my fancy or desires, and obtain my subse
quent consent ; but that which is determined without my
concurrence or consent, cannot be the object of mine elec
tion. I may like that which is inevitably imposed upon
me by another ; but if it be inevitably imposed upon me by
extrinsecal causes, it is both folly for me to deliberate, and
impossible for me to choose, whether I shall undergo it or
not. Reason is the root, the fountain, the original of true
liberty; which judgeth and representeth to the will, whether
this or that be convenient, whether this or that be more
convenient. Judge, then, what a pretty kind of liberty it is
which is maintained by T. H. Such a liberty as is in little
children, before they have the use of reason, before they can 652

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 29

consult or deliberate of any thing. Is not this a childish DISCOURSE

liberty ? And such a liberty as is in brute beasts, as bees

and spiders, which do not learn their faculties as we do our
trades, by experience and consideration. This is a brutish
liberty. Such a liberty as a bird hath to fly when her wings
are clipped. Or (to use his own comparison s) such a liberty as
a "lame" man who hath lost the use of his limbs hath to walk.
Is not this a ridiculous liberty ? Lastly (which is worse than
all these), such a liberty as "a river" hath " to descend down
the channel *." What? Will he ascribe liberty to inanimate
creatures also, which have neither reason, nor spontaneity,
nor so much as sensitive appetite? Such is T. H. his liberty.

His necessity is just such another; a necessity upon suppo- [2. And
sition, arising from the concourse of all the causes, including ca i w jth
the last dictate of the understanding in reasonable creatures, necessity"]
The adequate cause and the effect are together in time ; and
when all the concurrent causes are determined, the effect is
determined also, and is become so necessary, that it is actu
ally in being. But there is a great difference between de
termining, and being determined. If all the collateral causes
concurring to the production of an effect, were antecedently
determined, what they must of necessity produce, and when
they must produce it, then there is no doubt but the effect is
necessary. But if these -causes did operate freely, or con
tingently, if they might have suspended or denied their con
currence, or have concurred after another manner, then the
effect was not truly and antecedently necessary, but either
free or contingent. This will be yet clearer by considering
his own instance of " casting ambs ace h " though it partake
more of contingency than of freedom. Supposing "the
posture of the party s hand" who did throw the dice, sup
posing the figure of the table and of the dice themselves,
supposing " the measure of force applied," and supposing all
other things which did concur to the production of that cast,
to be the very same they were, there is no doubt but in this
case the cast is necessary. But still this is but a necessity of
supposition; for if all these concurrent causes or some of
them were contingent or free, then the cast was not abso-

[See below T. H. Numb. xxix. h [See below T. H. Numb, xxxiv.
p. 715. fol. edit.] p. 722. fol. edit.]

30 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART lutely necessary. To begin with the caster ; he might have
- denied his concurrence, and not have cast at all ; he might

have suspended his concurrence, and not have cast so soon ;
he might have doubled or diminished his force in casting,
if it had pleased him ; he might have thrown the dice into
the other table. In all these cases what becomes of his
"ambs ace?" The like uncertainties offer themselves for
the maker of the tables, and for the maker of the dice, and
for the keeper of the tables, and for the kind of wood, and I
know not how many other circumstances. In such a mass
of contingencies, it is impossible that the effect should be
antecedently necessary. T. H. appeals to every man s ex
perience. I am contented. Let every one reflect upon him
self; and he shall find no convincing, much less constraining
reason, to necessitate him to any one of these particular acts
more than another, but only his own will or arbitrary deter
mination. So T. H. his necessity is no absolute, no antecedent,
extrinsecal necessity, but merely a necessity upon supposition.
3. [True Thirdly, that which T. H. makes the question, is not the
ciiuies u~ question. " The question is not," saith he, whether a man
berty to may " wr i te if fa w fll, an( } "forbear" if he will, "but whether
the will to write or the will to forbear come upon him
according to his will, or according to any thing else in his
own power." Here is a distinction without a difference. If
his will do not " come upon him according to his will," then
he is not a free, nor yet so much as a voluntary agent, which
is T. H. his liberty. Certainly all the freedom of the agent
is from the freedom of the will. If the will have no power
over itself, the agent is no more free than a staff in a man s
hand. Secondly, he makes but an empty show of a power
in the will, either to write or not to write. If it be precisely
and inevitably determined in all occurrences whatsoever,
what a man shall will and what he shall not will, what he
shall write and what he shall not write, to what purpose is
this power ? God and nature never made anything in vain ;
but " vain and frustraneous is that power, which never was
and never shall be deduced into act." Either the agent is
determined before he acteth, what he shall will and what he
shall not will, what he shall act and what he shall not act ;
and then he is no more free to act than he is to will : or else

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 31

he is not determined ; and then there is no necessity. No DISCOURSE

653 effect can exceed the virtue of its cause. If the action be L

free, to write or to forbear, the power or faculty to will or
nill must of necessity be more free. " Quod efficit tale illud
magis est tale 1 " If the will be determined, the writing
or not writing is likewise determined ; and then he should
not say, he may write or he may forbear, but he must write,
or he must forbear. Thirdly, this answer contradicts the
sense of all the world ; that the will of man is determined
without his "will," or without "any thing in his power." Why
do we ask men whether they will do such a thing or not? why
do we represent reasons to them ? why do we pray them ?
why do we entreat them ? why do we blame them ? if
their will "come" not "upon them according to their will."
" Wilt thou be made clean ?" said our Saviour to the paraly- John v. 6.
tic person ; to what purpose, if his will was extrinsecally j^ e a ] 6
determined? Christ complains, "We have piped unto you, Matt. xi. 17.
and ye have not danced." How could they help it, if their
wills were determined without their wills to forbear ? And,
" I would have gathered your children together as the hen Matt, xxiii.
gathereth her chickens under her wings, but ye would not." 37&lt;
How easily might they answer, according to T. H. his doc
trine, Alas ! blame not us ; our wills are not in our own
power or disposition ; if they were, we would thankfully em
brace so great a favour. Most truly said St. Austin, "Our
will should not be a will at all, if it were not in our power-"."
This is the belief of all mankind, which we have not learned
from our tutors, but is imprinted in our hearts by nature.
" We need not turn over any obscure books" to find out this
truth. "The poets chant it in the theatres, the shepherds
in the mountains ; the pastors teach it in their churches, the
doctors in the universities ; the common people in the
markets, and all mankind in the whole world, do assent unto
it k ;" except a handful of men, who have poisoned their intel-

1 [Aristot., Analyt. Poster,, lib. i. k [" Etiamne hi libri obscuri mihi

c. 2. 15. " Ai L b vrrdpxti fKaffrov, scrutandi erant, unde discerem, nemi-

e/cetVo yu.aAA.ov virapxei olov, Si ft &lt;/- nem vituperatione suppliciove dignum,

\ov/j.ev, e/ce?j/o juaAAoi/ &lt;/&gt;iAo*&gt;."] qui aut id velit quod justitia velle non

J De Lib. Arb., lib. iii. c. 3. [ 8 ; prohibet, aut id non faciat quod facere

Op. torn. i. p. 613. F. "Voluntas nos- non potest ? Nonne ista cantant et in

tra nee voluntas esset, nisi esset in nos- montibus pastores et in theatris poetse

tra potestate."] et indocti in circulis et docti in bi-

32 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART lectuals with paradoxical principles. Fourthly, this necessity
- which T. H. hath devised, which is grounded upon the neces-
sitation of a man s will without his will, is the worst of all
others; and is so far from lessening those difficulties and
absurdities which flow from the fatal destiny of the Stoics,
that it increaseth them, and rendereth them unanswerable.
No man blameth fire for burning whole cities ; no man tax-
eth poison for destroying men ; but those persons, who apply
them to such wicked ends. If the will of man be not in his
own disposition, he is no more a free agent than the fire or
the poison. Three things are required to make an act or
omission culpable : first, that it be in our power to perform
it or forbear it ; secondly, that we be obliged to perform it
or forbear it respectively; thirdly, that we omit that which
we ought to have done, or do that which we ought to have
omitted. No man sins in doing those things which he could
not shun, or forbearing those things which never were in his
power. T. H. may say, that besides the power, men have
also an appetite to evil objects, which renders them culpable.
It is true; but if this appetite be determined by another,
not by themselves, or if they have not the use of reason to
curb or restrain their appetites, they sin no more than a
stone descending downward according to its natural appetite,
or the brute beasts, who commit voluntary errors in follow
ing their sensitive appetites, yet sin not. The question then
is not, whether a man be necessitated to will or nill, yet free
to act or forbear. But, leaving the ambiguous acceptions of
the word "free," the question is plainly this whether all
agents, and all events, natural, civil, moral (for we speak not
now of the conversion of a sinner, that concerns not this ques
tion), be predetermined extrinsecally and inevitably without
their own concurrence in the determination ; so as all actions
and events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, nor
can be otherwise, after any other manner, or in any other
place, time, number, measure, order, nor to any other end,
than they are ; and all this, in respect of the Supreme Cause,
or a concourse of extrinsecal causes, determining them to one.
So my preface remains yet unanswered. Either I was

bliothecis et magistri in scholis et an- abus Animabus contra Manichaeos, c.xi.
tistites in sacratis locis et in orbe terra- 15; Op. torn. viii. pp. 85, F, G,
rum genus humanum ?" Aug., De Du- 86. A.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 33

extrinsecally and inevitably predetermined to write this dis~ DISCOURSE

course, without any concurrence of mine in the determination, L_

and without any power in me to change or oppose it, or I was
not so predetermined. If I was, then I ought not to be
blamed ; for no man is justly blamed for doing that, which
never was in his power to shun. If I was not so predeter
mined, then mine actions and my will to act are neither
654 compelled nor necessitated by any extrinsecal causes, but I
elect and choose, either to write or to forbear, according to
mine own will, and by mine own power. And when I have
resolved and elected, it is but a necessity of supposition,
which may and doth consist with true liberty, not a real
antecedent necessity. The two horns of this dilemma are so
strait, that no mean can be given, nor room to pass between
them. And the two consequences are so evident, that instead
of answering he is forced to decline them.

[THE STATING OF THE QUESTION.]

NUMBER IV.

^ J. D. And so to fall in hand with the question, without [TrueiiVr-
any further proems or prefaces. By liberty, I do understand, versai im-
neither a liberty from sin, nor a liberty from misery l , nor a Jv^ Si
liberty from servitude, nor a liberty from violence, but I determina-
understand a liberty from necessity, or rather from necessita- one.]
tion, that is, an universal immunity from all inevitability and
determination to one : whether it be of exercise only, which
the Schools call a liberty of contradiction 1 , and is found in
God, and in the good and bad angels ; that is, not a liberty
to do both good and evil, but a liberty to do or not to do this
or that good, this or that evil, respectively ; or whether it be
a liberty of specification and exercise also, which the Schools
call liberty of contrariety 1 , and is found in men endowed with
reason and understanding; that is, a liberty to do and not to do,
good and evil, this or that. Thus the coast being cleared, &c.

T. H. In the next place, he maketh certain distinctions of [Answer.]

liberty, and says, he means not " liberty from sin," nor

1 [" Est namque libertas arbitrii tri- of liberty of exercise, &c., see Bellarm.,

plex, scz. a necessitate, a peccato, et a Be Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, lib. iii. c.

miseria." Pet.Lomb.,Sent.,lib.II.dist. 3 ; Op. torn. iii. pp. 651. C, 654. A.]
xxv. qu. i. art 5. For the distinction

BRAMHALL. .

34 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART f rom servitude/ nor " from violence/ but " from necessity,
- necessitation, inevitability, and determination to one." It
had been better to define liberty than thus to distinguish ;
for I understand never the more what he means by liberty.
And though he says, he means " liberty from necessitation,"
yet I understand not how such a liberty can be. And it is
a taking of the question without proof ; for what else is the
question between us, but whether such a liberty be possible
or not ? There are in the same place other distinctions : as,
a liberty of " exercise" only, which he calls " a liberty of con
tradiction" (namely, of doing, not good or evil simply, but
of doing this or that good, or this or that evil, respectively),
and a liberty of " specification and exercise also," which he
calls " a liberty of contrariety" (namely, a liberty not only
to do or not do, good or evil, but also to do or not do, this
or that good or evil). And with these distinctions, he says,
he " clears the coast " whereas in truth he darkeneth his
meaning, not only with the jargon of (&lt; exercise only, specifi
cation also, contradiction, contrariety," but also with pre
tending distinction where none is ; for how is it possible for
the liberty of doing or not doing this or that good or evil,
to consist (as he says it doth in God and angels) without a
liberty of doing or not doing good or evil ?

[Reply.] J. D. It is a rule in art, that words which are homo-
nymous, of various and ambiguous significations, ought ever
in the first place to be distinguished. No men delight in
confused generalities but either sophisters or bunglers.
Vir dolosus versatur in generalibus deceitful men do not
love to descend to particulars / and when bad archers shoot,
[Different the safest way is to run to the mark. Liberty is sometimes

senses of , , . -,.. , n .

the word opposed to the slavery of sin and vicious habits, as Rom. vi.

plained??" ^2, " Now being made free from sin ;" sometimes to misery
and oppression, Isai. Iviii. 6, " To let the oppressed go
free;" sometimes to servitude, as Levit. xxv. 10, In the
year of jubilee "ye shall proclaim liberty throughout the
land / sometimes to violence, as Psalm cv. 20, " The
prince of his people let him go free." Yet none of all these
are the liberty now in question, but a liberty from necessity,
that is, a determination to one, or rather from necessitation,

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 35

that is, a necessity imposed by another, or an extrinsecal DISCOURSE

determination. These distinctions do virtually imply a de- .

scription of true liberty, which comes nearer the essence of it
than T. H. his roving definition ; as we shall see in due place.
And though he say that he (t understands never the more
what" I "mean by liberty/ yet it is plain by his own inge*-
nuous confession, both that he doth understand it, and that this
is the very question where "the water sticks" between us;
whether there be such a liberty, free from all necessitation
and extrinsecal determination to one. Which being but the
stating of the question, he calls it amiss the " taking of the
question." It were too much weakness to beg this question,
which is so copious and demonstrable. It is strange to see,
with what confidence now-a-days particular men slight all
the schoolmen, and philosophers, and classic authors of
former ages, as if they were " not worthy to unloose the [Mark i. 7.
655 shoe-strings" of some modern author, or did " sit in darkness rp^ cvii
and in the shadow of death," until some " third Cato dropped 10
down from heaven 1 "/ to whom all men must repair, as to the
altar of Prometheus, to light their torches. I did never
wonder to hear a raw divine out of the pulpit declaim against
school divinity to his equally ignorant auditors. It is but
as the fox in the fable, who having lost his own tail by a
mischance, would have persuaded all his fellows to cut off
theirs and throw them away as unprofitable burdens. But
it troubles me to see a scholar, one who hath been long
admitted into the innermost closet of nature, and seen the
hidden secrets of more subtle learning, so far to forget him
self, as to style school-learning no better than a plain
"jargon," that is, a senseless gibberish, or a fustian
language, like the clattering noise of sabots. Suppose
they did sometimes too much cut truth into shreads, or
delight in abstruse expressions; yet, certainly, this distinc
tion of liberty into " liberty of contrariety" and " liberty of
contradiction," or (which is all one) of "exercise only" or
" exercise and specification jointly," which T. H. rejects with
so much scorn, is so true, so necessary, so generally received,
that there is scarce that writer of note, either divine or
philosopher, who did ever treat upon this subject, but he

m [" Tertius e ccelo ceciclit Cato." Juv., ii. 40.]
D 2

36 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

P A RT useth it. Good and evil are contraries, or opposite kinds of
m - things : therefore to be able to choose both good and evil, is
ltradic / a liberty of contrariety or of specification. To choose this, and
contnrtv f not to cnoose tnis j are contradictory, or (which is all one) an
of exercise exercise or suspension of power ; therefore to be able to do
or forbear to do the same action, to choose or not choose
the same object, without varying of the kind, is a liberty of
contradiction, or of exercise only. Now man is not only able
to do or forbear to do good only, or evil only, but he is able
both to do and to forbear to do, both good and evil ; so he hath
not only a liberty of the action, but also a liberty of contrary
objects ; not only a liberty of exercise, but also of specification;
not only a liberty of contradiction, but also of contrariety.
On the other side, God, and the good angels, can do or not do
this or that good, but they cannot do or not do both good
and evil. So they have only a liberty of exercise or contradic
tion, but not a liberty of specification or contrariety. It ap
pears then plainly, that the liberty of man is more large in
the extension of the object, which is both good and evil, than
the liberty of God and the good angels, whose object is only
good. But withal, the liberty of man comes short in the
intension of the power. Man is not so free in respect of
good only, as God, or the good angels ; because (not to speak
of God, Whose liberty is quite of another nature) the under
standings of the angels are clearer, their power and dominion
over their actions is greater, they have no sensitive appetites
to distract them, no organs to be disturbed. We see, then,
this distinction is cleared from all darkness.

And where T. H. demands, "how it is possible for the
liberty of doing, or not doing, this or that good or evil, to
consist in God and angels without a liberty of doing or not
doing good or evil " the answer is obvious and easy, refe
renda singula smgulis rendering every act to its right object
respectively. God, and good angels, have a power to do or
not to do this or that good ; bad angels have a power to do
or not to do this or that evil ; so both, jointly considered,
have power respectively to do good or evil. And yet, accord
ing to the words of my discourse, God, and good, and bad
angels, being singly considered, have no power to do good or
evil, that is, indifferently, as man hath.

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 37

DISCOURSE

NUMBER V.

J. D. Thus the coast being cleared, the next thing to be [Division
done is to draw out our forces against the enemy. And be-
cause they are divided into two squadrons, the one of Chris
tians, the other of heathen philosophers, it will be best to
dispose ours also into two bodies, the former drawn from
Scripture, the latter from reason.

T. H. The next thing he doth after the clearing of the
coast, is the dividing of his " forces," as he calls them, " into
two squadrons," one of places of Scripture, the other of reasons ;
which allegory he useth, I suppose, because he addresseth
the discourse to your Lordship, who is a military man. All
that I have to say touching this, is, that I observe a great
part of those his forces do look and march another way, and
some of them do fight among themselves.

J. D. If T. H. could divide my forces, and commit them [Reply.]
together among themselves, it were his only way to conquer
656 them. But he will find, that those imaginary contradictions
which he thinks he hath espied in my discourse, are but fan
cies ; and my supposed impertinencies will prove his own real
mis takings.

I. PROOFS OF LIBERTY OUT OF SCRIPTURE.

NUMBER VI.

* J. D. First, whosoever have power of election have true Argument

I [that

liberty, for the proper act of liberty is election. A sponta- men have
neity may consist with determination to one : as we see in election,
children, fools, madmen, brute beasts, whose fancies are ^ ^ e -
determined to those things which they act spontaneously ; liberty.]
as the bees make honey, the spiders webs. But none of
these have a liberty of election; which is an act of judgment
and understanding, and cannot possibly consist with a deter
mination to one. He that is determined by something before
himself or without himself, cannot be said to choose or elect :
unless it be as the junior of the mess chooseth in Cambridge,

38 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART whether he will have the least part or nothing ; and scarcely
IIL so much. But men have liberty of election. This is plain,
Numb. xxx. 14 [13], If a wife make a vow, it is left to her
husband s choice, either to "establish it," or to " make it void."
And Josh. xxiv. 15, " Choose you this day whom ye will
serve," &c., " but I and my house will serve the Lord ;" he
makes his own choice, and leaves them to the liberty of
their election. And 2 Sam. xxiv. 12, "I offer thee three
things, choose thee which of them I shall do;" if one of
these three things was necessarily determined and the other
two impossible, how was it left to him to choose what should
be done ? Therefore we have true liberty.

[Answer.] T. H. And the first place of Scripture, taken from Numb.
xxx. 14 [13], is one of them that look another way. The
words are,, " If a wife make a vow, it is left to her husband s
choice, either to establish it or make it void." For it proves
no more but that the husband is a free or voluntary agent ;
but not that his choice therein is not necessitated, or not
determined to what he shall choose by precedent necessary
causes.

[Reply.] J. D. My first argument from Scripture is thus formed ;
Whosoever have a liberty or power of election, are not
determined to one by precedent necessary causes; but men
have liberty of election. The assumption, or minor proposi
tion, is proved by three places of Scripture ; Numb. xxx. 14
[13], Josh. xxiv. 15, 2 Sam. xxiv. 12. I need not insist
upon these; because T. H. acknowledgeth, that "it is clearly
proved that there is election in man n ." But he denieth the
major proposition, because (saith he) man is "necessitated,"
or " determined to what he shall choose by precedent neces
sary causes."

I take away this answer three ways.

tioS^oni ^ rst ^ by reason. Election is evermore either of things

of aiterna- possible, or at least of things conceived to be possible : that

ceived pos- ^ efficacious election, when a man hopeth or thinketh of

obtaining the object. Whatsoever the will chooseth, it

chooseth under the notion of good, either honest or delight-

[Below, T. H. at the end of Numb. vii. p. 44.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 39

ful or profitable; but there can be no real goodness ap- DISCOURSE

prehended in that which is known to be impossible. It -

is true, there may be some wandering pendulous wishes of
known impossibilities ; as a man who hath committed an
offence, may wish he had not committed it : but to choose
efficaciously an impossibility, is as impossible as an impossi
bility itself. No man can think to obtain that, which he
knows impossible to be obtained. But he who knows that
all things are antecedently determined by necessary causes,
knows that it is impossible for anything to be otherwise than
it is. Therefore to ascribe unto him a power of election, to
choose this or that indifferently, is to make the same thing
to be determined to one, and to be not determined to one ;
which are contradictories. Again, whosoever hath an elective
power, or a liberty to choose, hath also a liberty or power
to refuse. Isa. vii. 16, " Before the child shall know to
refuse the evil and choose the good." He who chooseth this
rather than that, refuseth that rather than this. As " Moses, Heb.xi.24,
choosing to suffer affliction with the people of God," did - 25 -^
thereby refuse "the pleasures of sin." But no man hath
any power to refuse that which is necessarily predetermined
to be : unless it be as the fox refused the grapes, which were
beyond his reach. When one thing of two or three is abso
lutely determined, the others are made thereby simply impos
sible.

Secondly, I prove it by instances, and by that universal 2. [Univer-
notion which the world hath of election. What is the diffe- sent ]""
rence between an elective and hereditary kingdom, but that
in an elective kingdom they have power or liberty to choose
657 this or that man indifferently, but in an hereditary king
dom they have no such power nor liberty? Where the
law makes a certain heir, there is a necessitation to one ;
where the law doth not name a certain heir, there is no
necessitation to one, and there they have power or liberty
to choose. An hereditary prince may be as grateful and
acceptable to his subjects, and as willingly received by them
(according to that liberty which is opposed to compulsion or
violence), as he who is chosen; yet he is not therefore an
elective prince. In Germany all the nobility and commons
may assent to the choice of the emperor, or be well pleased

40 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBEETY

PART with it when it is concluded ; yet none of them elect or

TIT

- choose the emperor, but only those six princes who have a
consultative,, deliberative, and determinative power in his
election. And if their votes or suffrages be equally divided,
three to three, then the king of Bohemia hath the casting
voice . So likewise in corporations or commonwealths,
sometimes the people, sometimes the common council, have
power to name so many persons for such an office, and the
supreme magistrate, or senate, or lesser council respectively,
to choose one of those. And all this is done with that cau-

. tion and secrecy, by billets or other means, that no man
knows which way any man gave his vote, or with whom to
be offended. If it were necessarily and inevitably predeter
mined, that this individual person and no other shall and
must be chosen, what needed all this circuit and caution, to
do that which is not possible to be done otherwise, which
one may do as well as a thousand, and for doing of which no
rational man can be offended, if the electors were necessarily
predetermined to elect this man and no other ? And though
T. H. was pleased to pass by my university instance, yet I
may not, until I see what he is able to say unto it. The
junior of the mess in Cambridge divides the meat into four
parts. The senior chooseth first, then the second and third
in their order. The junior is determined to one, and hath
no choice left ; unless it be to choose whether he will take
that part which the rest have refused, or none at all. It may
be, this part is more agreeable to his mind than any of the
others Avould have been, but for all that he cannot be said to
choose it, because he is determined to this one. Even such
a liberty of election is that which is established by T. H. : or
rather much worse, in two respects. The junior hath yet a
liberty of contradiction left, to choose whether he will take
that part or not take any part ; but he who is precisely pre
determined to the choice of this object, hath no liberty to
refuse it. Secondly, the junior, by dividing carefully, may
preserve to himself an equal share; but he who is wholly

[This is the account given by The- tracts in the beginning of Goldastus as

ocloric a Niem, as quoted by Schardius, just quoted, and Robertson s Hist, of

De Elect. Imper., c. i. inter Goldast. Charles V., Introd., Proofs and Illus-

Polit. Imper. p. 42 For a more cor- trations, note xli. 2.]
rect account of the matter, see the

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 41

determined by extrinsecal causes, is left altogether to the DISCOURSE
mercy and disposition of another.

Thirdly, I prove it by the texts alleged. Numb. xxx. 13 ;
" If a wife make a vow, it is left to her husband s choice,
either to establish it or make it void/ " But if it be pre
determined that he shall "establish it," it is not in his power
to "make it void." If it be predetermined that he shall
" make it void," it is not in his power to " establish it."
And howsoever it be determined, yet, being determined, it is
not in his power, indifferently, either to "establish it" or to
"make it void" at his pleasure. So Joshua xxiv. 15;
" Choose you this day whom ye will serve, . . but I and my
house will serve the Lord." It is too late to choose that
" this day," which was determined otherwise yesterday.
" Whom ye will serve, whether the gods whom your fathers
served, or the gods of the Amorites :" where there is an
election of this or that, these gods or those gods, there must
needs be either an indifferency to both objects, or at least a
possibility of either. "I and my house will serve the Lord :"
if he were extrinsecally predetermined, he should not say,
" I will serve," but, I must serve. And 2 Sam. xxiv. 12 ;
" I offer thee three things, choose thee which of them I shall
do." How doth God " offer three things" to David s choice, if
He had predetermined him to one of the three by a concourse
of necessary extrinsecal causes ? If a sovereign prince should
descend so far as to offer a delinquent his choice, whether he
would be fined or imprisoned or banished, and had under
hand signed the sentence of his banishment, what were it
else but plain drollery, or mockery ? This is the argument
which in T. H. his opinion "looks another way." If it do,
it is as the Parthians used to fight, flying p . His reason fol
lows next to be considered.

NUMBER VII.

T. H. For if there come into the husband s mind greater [That the
good by establishing than abrogating such a vow, the esta- the reason
blishing will follow necessarily. And if the evil that will ^g"*/rf e *
658 follow thereon in the husband s opinion outweigh the good,
the contrary must needs follow. And yet in this following

f [Justin., in Trog. Pomp. Hist, lib. xli. c. 2 &c,]

III.

42 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART of one s hopes and fears consistetli the nature of election. So
that a man may both choose this, and cannot but choose this.
And consequently choosing and necessity are joined together.

[Reply.] J. ). There is nothing said with more show of reason in
this cause by the patrons of necessity and adversaries of true
liberty than this, that the will doth perpetually and infallibly
follow the last dictate of the understanding, or the last
judgment of right reason. And in this, and this only, I con
fess T. H. hath good seconds 1 . Yet the common and approved
opinion is contrary. And justly. For,

i. [The First, this very act of the understanding is an effect of the

th? reason will, and a testimony of its power and liberty. It is the
will, which, affecting some particular good, doth engage and
command the understanding to consult and deliberate what
means are convenient for attaining that end. And though
the will itself be blind, yet its object is good in general,
which is the end of all human actions. Therefore it belongs
to the will, as to the general of an army, to move the other
powers of the soul to their acts, and among the rest the
understanding also, by applying it and reducing its power
into act : so as, whatsoever obligation the understanding doth
put upon the will, is by the consent of the will, and derived
from the power of the will ; which was not necessitated to move
the understanding to consult. So the will is the lady and
mistress of human actions ; the understanding is her trusty
counsellor, which gives no advice but when it is required by
the will. And if the first consultation or deliberation be not
sufficient, the will may move a review, and require the un
derstanding to inform itself better, and take advice of others,
from whence many times the judgment of the understanding
doth receive alteration.

Secondly, for the manner how the understanding doth
determine the will, it is not naturally but morally. The will
is moved by the understanding, not as by an efficient, having

*ariiy.] a causal influence into the effect, but only by proposing and
representing the object. And therefore, as it were ridiculous

i [E. g. Bellarmine, De Grat. et Lib. cessario ab ultimo judicio practice ra-
Arb., lib. iii. c . 8 ; Op. torn. iii. p. 667. tionis."]
C, &c. " Voluntatis clcctio pendet nc-

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 43

to say, that the object of the sight is the cause of seeing, so DISCOURSE
it is to say, that the proposing of the object by the under- -
standing to the will is the cause of willing. And therefore
the understanding hath no place in that concourse of causes
which according to T. H. do necessitate the will.

Thirdly, the judgment of the understanding is not always 3 ^^ ne
practice practicum*, nor of such a nature in itself as to oblige course un-
and determine the will to one. Sometimes the understand- a
ing proposeth two or three means equally available to the
attaining of one and the same end. Sometimes it dictateth,
that this or that particular good is" eligible or fit to be
chosen, but not that it is necessarily eligible or that it must
be chosen. It may judge this or that to be a fit means,
but not the only means, to attain the desired end. In these
cases, no man can doubt but that the will may choose or not
choose, this or that, indifferently. Yea, though the under
standing shall judge one of these means to be more expedient
than another, yet, forasmuch as in the less expedient there
is found the reason of good, the will in respect of that
dominion which it hath over itself may accept that which the
understanding judgeth to be less expedient, and refuse that
which it judgeth to be more expedient.

Fourthly, sometimes the will doth not will the end so effi- 4. [Nor
caciously, but that it may be, and often is, deterred from the
prosecution of it by the difficulty of the means ; and notwith-
standing the judgment of the understanding, the will may own act.]
still suspend its own act.

Fifthly, supposing but not granting, that the will did 5. [Nor an-
necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding, yet O r extrinse-
this proves no antecedent necessity, but co-existent with the
act ; no extrinsecal necessity, the will and understanding
being but two faculties of the same soul ; no absolute neces
sity, but merely upon supposition. And therefore the same
authors who maintain that the judgment of the understand
ing doth necessarily determine the will, do yet much more
earnestly oppugn T. H. his absolute necessity of all occur
rences. Suppose the will shall apply the understanding to
deliberate, and not require a review ; suppose the dictate of

r [See below in the Castigations of vii. p. 768 (fol. edit.) Disc. ii. Pt. iii.]
Mr. Hobbes s Animadversions, Numb.

A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART
III.

[6. T. H. s

affectation
of new
terms of
art.]

the understanding shall be absolute, not this or that indiffer
ently, nor this rather than that comparatively, but this posi- 659
tively, not this freely, but this necessarily ; and suppose the
will do will efficaciously, and do not suspend its own act ;
then here is a necessity indeed, but neither absolute, nor ex-
trinsecal, nor antecedent, flowing from a concourse of causes
without ourselves, but a necessity upon supposition, which
we do readily grant. So far T. H. is wide from the truth,
whilst he maintains, either that the apprehension of a greater
good doth necessitate the will, or that this is an absolute
necessity.

Lastly, whereas he saith, that " the nature of election"
doth " consist" in " following our hopes and fears," I cannot
but observe, that there is not one word of art in this whole
treatise which he useth in the right sense. I hope it doth
not proceed out of an affectation of singularity, nor out of a
contempt of former writers, nor out of a desire to take in
sunder the whole frame of learning, and new mould it after
his own mind. It were to be wished that at least he would
give us a new dictionary, that we might understand his sense.
But because this is but touched here sparingly and upon the
by, I will forbear it, until I meet with it again in its proper
place. And for the present it shall suffice to say, that hopes
and fears are common to brute beasts, but election is a
rational act, and is proper only to man, who is

" Sanctius his animal mentisque capacius altaeV

T. H. The second place of Scripture is Josh. xxiv. 15,
a TL] tne tm r d is 2 Sam. xxiv. 12 ; whereby tis clearly proved, that
there is election in man, but not proved, that such election
was not necessitated by the hopes, and fears, and considera
tions of good and bad to follow, which depend not on the
will, nor are subject to election. And therefore one answer
serves all such places, if they were a thousand.

[Reply.] J. D. This answer being the very same with the former,
word for word, which hath already been sufficiently shaken in
pieces, doth require no new reply.

* [Ovid., Mctam., i. 76.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 45

DISCOURSE
I.

NUMBER VIII.

T. H. Supposing, it seems, I might answer as I have [Further
done, that necessity and election might stand together ; and T. H.~\
instance in the actions of children, fools, and brute beasts,
whose fancies, I might say, are necessitated and determined
to one ; before these his proofs out of Scripture he desires to
prevent that instance, and therefore says, that the actions of
" children, fools, madmen, and beasts," are indeed " deter
mined," but that they proceed not from election, nor from
free, but from spontaneous agents ; as, for example, that the
bee when it maketh honey does it spontaneously, and when
the spider makes his web, he does it spontaneously, and not
by election. Though I never meant to ground any answer
upon the experience of what children, fools, madmen, and
beasts do, yet, that your Lordship may understand what can
be meant by spontaneous, and how it differs from voluntary,
I will answer that distinction, and shew, that it fighteth
against its fellow arguments. Your Lordship is therefore to
consider, that all voluntary actions, where the thing that in-
duceth the will is not fear, are called also spontaneous, and
said to be done by a man s own accord. As when a man
giveth money voluntarily to another for merchandise, or out
of affection, he is said to do it of his own accord ; which in
Latin is sponte, and therefore the action is spontaneous :
though to give one s money willingly to a thief to avoid kill
ing, or throw it into the sea to avoid drowning, where the
motive is fear, be not called spontaneous. But every spon
taneous action is not therefore voluntary : for voluntary pre
supposes some precedent deliberation, that is to say, some
consideration and meditation of what is likely to follow, both
upon the doing and abstaining from the action deliberated
of; whereas many actions are done of our own accord, and be
therefore spontaneous, of which nevertheless as he thinks we
never consulted, nor deliberated of in ourselves ; as when,
making no question nor any the least doubt in the world but
that the thing we are about is good, we eat, or walk, or in
anger strike or revile, which he thinks spontaneous but not
voluntary nor elective actions. And with such kind of actions

46 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PA R T h e gayg necessitation may stand, but not with such as are

voluntary, and proceed upon election and deliberation. Now
if I make it appear to you, that even these actions which he
says proceed from spontaneity, and which he ascribes only to
" fools, children, madmen, and beasts," proceed from deliber
ation and election ; and that actions inconsiderate, rash, and
spontaneous, are ordinarily found in those, that are by
themselves and many more thought as wise or wiser than
ordinary men are ; then his argument concludeth, that neces
sity and election may stand together, which is contrary to that
which he intendeth by all the rest of his arguments to prove.
And, first, your Lordship s own experience furnishes you
with proof enough, that horses, dogs, and other brute beasts, 66
do demur oftentimes upon the way they are to take. The
horse retiring from some strange figure he sees, and com
ing on again to avoid the spur. And what else does man
that deliberateth, but one while proceed toward action,
another while retire from it, as the hope of greater good
draws him, or the fear of greater evil drives him ? A child
may be so young as to do all which it does without all
deliberation; but that is but till it chance to be hurt by
doing somewhat, or till it be of age to understand the rod ;
for the actions wherein he hath once a check, shall be de
liberated on the second time. Fools and madmen mani
festly deliberate no less than the wisest men, though they
make not so good a choice, the images of things being by
diseases altered. For bees and spiders, if he had so little to
do as to be a spectator of their actions, he would have con
fessed not only election, but also art, prudence, and policy in
them, very near equal to that of mankind. Of bees, Aristotle
says, their life is " civilV He is deceived, if he think any
spontaneous action, after once being checked in it, differs
from an action voluntary and elective; for even the setting
of a man s foot in the posture of walking, and the action of
ordinary eating, was once deliberated how and when it should
be done ; and though it afterward become easy and habitual,
so as to be done without forethought, yet that does not
hinder but that the act is voluntary and proceeds from

1 [Hist. Animal., lib. I. c. i. 25. ylvcrai ^VTUV rb tpyov . . . ftrrt 51
noAmxa 5 terlv 3&gt;v eV n Ka l Koivbv roiov-rov &t&gt;0airos ieAj-rra," K. r. A.

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 47

election. So also are the rashest actions of choleric persons DISCOURSE
voluntary and upon deliberation : for who is there but very
young children, that has not considered, when and how far
he ought or safely may strike or revile ? Seeing then he
agrees with me, that such actions are necessitated, and the
fancy of those that do them is determined to the actions
they do, it follows out of his own doctrine, that the liberty of
election does not take away the necessity of electing this or
that individual thing. And thus one of his arguments fights
against another.

J. D. We have partly seen before, how T. H. hath coined [Reply.]
a new kind of liberty, a new kind of necessity, a new kind of
election ; and now, in this section, a new kind of spontaneity,
and a new kind of voluntary actions. Although he say, that
here is nothing " new u " to him, yet I begin to suspect, that
either here are many things new to him, or otherwise his
election is not the result of a serious mature " deliberation."

The first thing that I offer is, how often he mistakes my [i. T. H.
meaning in this one section. First, I make voluntary and Jheauthor s
spontaneous actions to be one and the same; he saith I dis- words -J
tinguish them, so as spontaneous actions may be necessary,
but voluntary actions cannot. Secondly, I distinguish be
tween free acts and voluntary acts. The former are always
deliberate, the latter may be indeliberate ; all free acts are
voluntary, but all voluntary acts are not free. But he saith
I confound them, and make them the same. Thirdly, he
saith, I ascribe spontaneity only to fools, children, madmen,
and beasts ; but I acknowledge spontaneity hath place in
rational men, both as it is comprehended in liberty, and as
it is distinguished from liberty.

Yet I have no reason to be offended at it ; for he deals no [2. And
otherwise with me than he doth with himself. Here he
tells us, that "voluntary presupposeth deliberation." But,
Numb, xxv, he tells us contrary; "that whatsoever follow-
eth the last appetite" is " voluntary, and where there is but
one appetite, that is the last;" and that "no action of a
man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so
sudden v " So, Numb, xxxiii, he tells us, that "by spon-

u [See above T. H. Numb. ii. p. 26.] v [Below, p. 712. fol. edit.]

48 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART taneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding, or else nothing is
- meant by it w :" yet here he tells us, that " all voluntary
actions" which proceed not from "fear," are "spontaneous;"
whereof many are deliberate, as that wherein he instanceth
himself, to give " money for merchandise." Thirdly, when
I said, that children before they have the use of reason, act
spontaneously (as when they suck the breast), but do not
act freely, because they have not judgment to deliberate or
elect, here T. H. undertakes to prove, that they do deliberate
and elect ; and yet presently after confesseth again, that
" a child may be so young, as to do what it doth without all
deliberation."

3. [Actions Besides these mistakes and contradictions, he hath other
ceed from r errors also in this section. As this, that no actions proceed-
^ rom "fear" are "spontaneous." He who throws his goods

be spon- m to the sea to avoid drowning, doth it not only " spontane
ously" but even freely. He that wills the end, wills the
means conducing to that end. It is true, that if the action
be considered nakedly without all circumstances, no man
willingly or spontaneously casts his goods into the sea. But
if we take the action as in this particular case invested with
all the circumstances, and in order to the end, that is, theGGi
saving of his own life, it is not only voluntary and spon
taneous, but elective and chosen by him, as the most
probable means for his own preservation. As there is
. an antecedent and a subsequent will, so there is an an
tecedent and a subsequent spontaneity. His grammatical
argument, grounded upon the derivation of spontaneous
from sponte, weighs nothing ; we have learned in the rudi
ments of logic, that conjugates are sometimes in name only,
and not in deed. He who casts his goods in the sea, may do
it of his own accord in order to the end. Secondly, he errs
in this also, that nothing is opposed to spontaneity but only
" fear." Invincible and antecedent ignorance doth destroy the
nature of spontaneity or voluntariness, by removing that
knowledge which should and would have prohibited the
action. As a man, thinking to shoot a wild beast in a bush,
shoots his friend, which if he had known, he would not have
shot. This man did not kill his friend of his own accord.

[Below, p. 719. fol. edit.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 49

For the clearer understanding of these things, and to DISCOUUSE
know what spontaneity is, let us consult awhile with the 4 ,- Defi
Schools x about the distinct order of voluntary or involuntary nitionof

voluntary

actions. Some acts proceed wholly from an extrmsecal ana in-
cause ; as the throwing of a stone upwards, a rape, or the act"] M
drawing of a Christian by plain force to the idol s temple.
These are called violent acts. Secondly, some proceed from
an intrinsecal cause, but without any manner of knowledge
of the end; as the falling of a stone downwards. These are
called natural acts. Thirdly, some proceed from an internal
principle with an imperfect knowledge of the end, where
there is an appetite to the object, but no deliberation nor
election ; as the acts of fools, children, beasts, and the in
considerate acts of men of judgment. These are called
voluntary or spontaneous acts. Fourthly, some proceed from
an intrinsecal cause with a more perfect knowledge of the
end, which are elected upon deliberation. These are called
free acts. So then the formal reason of liberty is election.
The necessary requisite to election is deliberation. Delibera
tion implieth the actual use of reason. But deliberation and
election cannot possibly subsist with an extrinsecal predeter
mination to one. How should a man deliberate or choose
which way to go, who knows that all ways are shut against
him, and made impossible to him, but only one ? This is the
genuine sense of these words "voluntary" and "spontaneous"
in this question. Though they were taken twenty other ways
vulgarly or metaphorically (as we say te spontaneous ulcers,"
where there is no appetite at all), yet it were nothing to this
controversy ; which is not about words, but about things, not
what the words voluntary or free do or may signify, but
whether all things be extrinsecally predetermined to one.

These grounds being laid for clearing the true sense of the [5. Neces-
words, the next thing to be examined is that contradiction e/JcUon

which he hath espied in my discourse, or how this argument inconsis
tent In the
" fights against its fellows." " If I," saith T. H., " make it same act.]

appear," that the spontaneous actions of " fools, children,
madmen, and beasts," do "proceed from election and de
liberation," and that " inconsiderate" and iudeliberate actions

x [Thorn. Aquin., Summ., Prim. Se- Aristot, Ethic., V. x. 69 ; Rhet, I.
cund., Qu. vi. artt. 1, 2. And compare x. 7, 8.]

BRAMHALL. E

50 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART are found in the wisest men, " then his argument concludes,
- that necessit and election ma}^ stand together j which is

contrary" to his assertion. If this could be made appear as
easily as it is spoken, it would concern himself much; who,
when he should prove that rational men are not free from
necessity, goes about to prove, that brute beasts do de
liberate and elect, that is as much as to say, are free from
necessity. But it concerns not me at all. It is neither my
assertion, nor my opinion, that necessity and election may
not meet together in the same subject. Violent, natural,
spontaneous, and deliberative or elective acts, may all meet
together in the same subject. But this I say, that necessity
and election cannot consist together in the same act. He
who is determined to one, is not free to choose out of more
than one. To begin with his latter supposition, that wise
men may do "inconsiderate" and indeliberate actions. I
do readily admit it. But where did he learn to infer a
general conclusion from particular premisses ? as thus, be
cause wise men do some indeliberate acts, therefore no act they
do is free or elective. Secondly, for his former supposition,
" that fools, children, madmen, and beasts, do deliberate
and elect." If he could make it good,.it is not I who contra
dict myself, nor "fight against" mine own assertion; but it
is he who endeavours to prove that which I altogether deny.
He may well find a contradiction between him and me ;
otherwise to what end is this dispute ? But he shall not be (;;
able to find a difference between me and myself. But the
truth is, he is not able to prove any such thing ; and that
brings me to my sixth consideration :

e. [lira- That neither horses, nor bees, nor spiders, nor children,

ings nei! no* 1 fools, nor madmen, do deliberate or elect. His first

liberate" ^stance is in the horse or dog, but more especially the

nor elect.] horse. He told me, that I divided my argument "into

squadrons," to apply myself to your Lordship, being " a mili

tary many ;" and I apprehend, that for the same reason he

gives his first instance of the horse with a submission to

your "own experience." So far well, but otherwise very

disadvantageous^ to his cause. Men use to say of a dull

fellow, that he hath no more brains than a horse. And the

[See above T. H. Numb. v. p. 37.]

AGAINST MR. IIOBBES. 51

Prophet David saith, " Be not like the horse and mule, which DISCOURSE
have no understanding/ 1 How do they " deliberate" without

Ps xxxii.9.

"understanding?" And Psalm xlix. 20, he saith the same
of all hrute beasts ; " Man being in honour had no under
standing, but became like unto the beasts that perish." The
horse " demurs upon his way." Why not ? Outward objects
or inward fancies may produce a stay in his course, though
he have no judgment either to deliberate or elect. He
" retires from some strange figure which he sees, and
comes on again to avoid the spur." So he may, and yet be
far enough from deliberation. All* this proceeds from the
sensitive passion of fear, which is "a perturbation arising from
the expectation of some imminent evil z ." But he urgeth,
"what else doth man that deliberateth ? " Yes, very much.
The horse feareth some outward object, but deliberation is a
comparing of several means conducing to the same end.
Fear is commonly of one, deliberation of more than one ; fear
is of those things which are not in our power, deliberation of
those things which are in our power 2 ; fear ariseth many
times out of natural antipathies, but in these disconveniences
of nature deliberation hath no place at all, In a word, fear [" Fear is
is an enemy to deliberation, and betray eth the succours of eke but a
the soul/ If the horse did deliberate, he should consult f thlsu!-
with reason, whether it were more expedient for him to go co , u
that way or not ; he should represent to himself all the son off* r-

J , . ... eth." Wisd.

dangers both ot going and staying, and compare the one with x \ii. 12.]
the other, and elect that which is less evil ; he should con
sider, whether it were not better to endure a little hazard,
than ungratefully and dishonestly to fail in his duty to his
master, who did breed him and doth feed him. This the
horse doth not ; neither is it possible for him to do it.
Secondly, for children, T. H. confesseth, that they may be so
" young," that they " do not deliberate at all." Afterwards,
as they attain to the use of reason by degrees, so by degrees
they become free agents. Then they do deliberate ; before,
they do not deliberate. The rod may be a means to make
them use their reason, when they have power to exercise it ;
but the rod cannot produce the power before they have it.

7 [""Etrrco 8)] 6 &lt;/&gt;&lt;4/3os \inrr) ris % ra- lib. II. c. v. 1. "Offa yiverai Si fyuaSi ,
fK fyavraffias ^4h\ovros KCMOV p.r] uxravrus 8 6et, Trepl TOVTGW fiov\ev6-
iKov $ Xvnrjpov." Aristot., Ilhct., ,ue0a," Id., Ethic., III. v. 8. j

E 2

52 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART Thirdly, for fools and madmen : it is not to be understood

of such madmen as have their lucida intervalla, who are mad

and discreet by fits ; when they have the use of reason, they
are no madmen, but may deliberate as well as others : nor
yet of such fools as are only comparative fools, that is, less
wise than others ; such may deliberate, though not so clearly
nor so judiciously as others : but of mere madmen, and mere
natural fools : to say that they, who have not the use of rea
son, do deliberate or use reason, implies a contradiction. But
his chiefest confidence is in his bees and spiders; of whose
" actions" (he saith) if I had been " a spectator," I " would
have confessed, not only election, but also art, prudence,
policy, very near equal to that of mankind ;" whose " life," as
"Aristotle saith, is civil." Truly I have contemplated their
actions many times, and have been much taken with their
curious works; yet my thoughts did not reflect so much upon
them, as upon their Maker, Who is "sic magnus in magnis? that
He is not "minor inparvis" "so great in great things, that He
is not less in small things." Yes, I have seen those silliest of
creatures ; and seeing their rare works, I have seen enough
to confute all the bold-faced atheists of this age, and their
hellish blasphemies. I see them, but I praised the marvel
lous works of God, and admired that Great and First Intel
lect, Who had both adapted their organs and determined
their fancies to these particular works. I was not so simple
to ascribe those rarities to their own invention, which I knew
to proceed from a mere instinct of nature. In all other
things they are the dullest of creatures. Naturalists write
of bees, that their fancy is imperfect, not distinct from their 663
common sense, spread over their whole body, and only per
ceiving things present. When Aristotle calls them " politi
cal" or sociable creatures 3 , he did not intend it really that they
lived a civil life, but according to an analogy, because they
do such things by instinct, as truly political creatures do out
of judgment. Nor when I read in St. Ambrose of their
" hexagonies" or sexangular cells b , did I therefore conclude,

a [" Uo\iriKd." Aristot, Hist. Ani- \ov." K. T. \.~\

mal., lib. I. c. i. 25. Compare his b [" Hexagonia cellularum." Am-

Politics, I. ii. 10: " Ai6ri Se iro- bros., Hexaem., lib. v. c. 21. 69 ; Op.

AiTticbj/ 6 foepuiros &ov Treurrjs ^Xlrr^s torn. i. p. 107. C.]
Kal iravrbs ayt\aiov &ov juaAAoj/, Srj-

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 53

that they were mathematicians. Nor when I read in Cres- DISCOURSE
pet, that they invoke God to their aid, when they go out of -
their hives, bending their thighs in form of a cross and
bowing themselves, did I therefore think, that this was an
act of religious piety, or that they were capable of "theological
virtues ;" whom I see in all other things, in which their
fancies are not determined, to be the silliest of creatures,
strangers not only to right reason but to all resemblances of it.

Seventhly, concerning those actions which are done upon 7. [Habitu-
precedent and past deliberations ; they are not only spon- voluntary. ]
taneous, but free acts. Habits contracted by use and ex
perience do help the will to act with more facility, and more
determinately ; as the hand of the artificer is helped by his
tools. And precedent deliberations, if they were sad and
serious, and proved by experience to be profitable, do save
the labour of subsequent consultations. " Frustra fit per
plura, quod fieri potest per pandora" Yet, nevertheless, the
actions which are done by virtue of these formerly acquired
habits are no less free, than if the deliberation were co
existent with this particular action. He that hath gained a
habit and skill to play such a lesson, needs not a new deli
beration how to play, every time that he plays it over and
over. Yet I am far from giving credit to him in this, that
walking or eating universally considered are free actions, or
proceed from true liberty ; not so much because they want a
particular deliberation before every individual act, as because
they are animal motions, and need no deliberation of reason ;
as we see in brute beasts. And nevertheless the same actions,
as they are considered individually, and invested with their
due circumstances, may be, and often are, free actions sub
jected to the liberty of the agent.

Lastly, whereas T. H. compareth the first motions or rash 3. [How
attempts of " choleric persons" with such acquired habits, it
is a great mistake. Those rash attempts are voluntary
actions, and may be facilitated sometimes by acquired habits :

c [" Virtutes Theologicse dicuntur, order of the Celestines at Paris, who

qua? ordinant nos ad Deum ;" scz. died in 1594, was author of a Summa

"Fides, Spes, Caritas :" as distin- Fidei Catholics, and of several mystical

guished from " moral " and " intellec- religious works, from one of which

tual" virtues. Thorn. Aquin., Summ. latter class the account in the text is

Prima Secund., Qu. Ixii. art. 2. 2. prohably taken. See Moreri, and the

Father Peter Crespet, a monk of the Biogr. Univ.]

54 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

p A R T but yet, forasmuch as actions are often altered and varied
- by the circumstances of time, place, and person, so as that act
which at one time is morally good, at another time may be
morally evil; and forasmuch as a general precedent deli
beration how to do this kind of action is not sufficient to
make this or that particular action good or expedient, which
being in itself good, yet particular circumstances may render
inconvenient or unprofitable, to some persons, at some times,
in some places; therefore a precedent general deliberation how
to do any act (as, for instance, how to write), is not sufficient to
make a particular act (as my writing this individual reply) to
be freely done, without a particular and subsequent delibera
tion. A man learns French advisedly, that is a free act.
The same man in his choler and passion reviles his friend
in French without any deliberation; this is a spontaneous
act, but it is not a free act. If he had taken time to advise,
lie would not have reviled his friend. Yet, as it is not free,
so neither is it so necessary, as the bees making honey ;
whose fancy is not only inclined but determined by nature to
that act. So every way he fails. And his conclusion "that
the liberty of election doth not take away the necessity of
electing this or that individual thing" is no consequent
from my doctrine, but from his own. Neither do my argu
ments " fight one against another," but his private opinions
fight both against me and against an undoubted truth. A
free agent endowed with liberty of election, or with an
elective power, may nevertheless be necessitated in some
individual acts ; but those acts wherein he is necessitated, do
not flow from his elective power, neither are those acts which
flow from his elective power necessitated.

NUMBER IX.

Argument J. D. Secondly, they who might have done, and may do,
men may many things which they leave undone, and they who leave
undone many things which they might do, are neither com-

not and 1 P elled nor necessitated to do what they do, but have true
therefore liberty. But we might do many things which we do not,

have true -, J

liberty.] ancl w e do many things which we might leave undone ; as is 664
plain, 1 Kings iii. 11, " Because thou hast asked this thing,

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 55

and hast not asked for thyself long life, neither hast asked DISCOURSE

riches for thyself, nor hast asked the life of thine enemies/

&c. God gave Solomon his choice. He might have asked

riches, but then he had not asked wisdom, which he did ask.

He did ask wisdom, but he might have asked riches, which

yet he did not ask. And Acts v. 4, "After it was sold, was it

not in thine own power?" It was in his own power to give it, and

it was in his own power to retain it ; yet if he did give it, he

could not retain it; and if he did retain it, he could not give it.

Therefore we may do, what we do not ; and we do not, what

we might do : that is, we have true^ liberty from necessity.

T. II. The second argument from Scripture consisteth in [Answer. }
histories of men, that did one thing, when if they would they
might have done another. The places are two : one is in the
1 Kings iii. 11 ; where the history says, God was pleased, that
Solomon, who might if he would have asked riches or
revenge, did nevertheless ask wisdom at God s hands : the
other is the words of St. Peter to Ananias, Acts v. 4, "After
it was sold, was it not in thine own power ?"

To which the answer is the same with that I answered
to the former places; that they prove there is election,
but do not disprove the necessity which I maintain of what
they so elect.

J. D. We have had the very same answer twice before d . [Reply.]
It seemeth, that he is well pleased with it ; or else he would
not draw it in again so suddenly by head and shoulders to
no purpose, if he did not conceive it to be a panchreston a
salve for all sores, or "dictamnum" sovereign " dittany e ," to
make all his adversary s weapons drop out of the wounds of his
cause, only by chewing it, without any application to the sore.
I will not waste the time to shew any further, how the mem
bers of his distinction do cross one another and one take away
another. To make every election to be of one thing imposed
by necessity, and of another thing which is absolutely impossi
ble, is to make election to be no election at all. But I forbear
to press that in present. If I maybe bold to use his own phrase,

u [Thrice; see above T. H., Numbers e [See Virg., /En., xii. 411419 ;
iii, vi, vii. pp. 27, 38, 41.] Plin., Nat. Hist., viii. 27. xxv. 8.]

56 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART his answer "looks" quite "another way f " from mine argu-
ment. My second reason was this j " They who may do, and
might have done, many things which they leave undone, and
who leave undone many things which they might do, are not
necessitated," nor precisely and antecedently determined, to
do what they do ; " but we might do many things which we
do not, and we do many things which we might leave
undone ;" as appears evidently by the texts alleged ; there
fore we are not antecedently and precisely determined nor
necessitated to do all things which we do. What is here of
" election" in this argument ? To what proposition, to what
term, doth T. H. apply his answer ? He neither affirms, nor
denieth, nor distinguisheth of anything contained in my
argument. Here I must be bold to call upon him for a
more pertinent answer.

NUMBER X.

Argument ~" J. D. Thirdly, if there be no true liberty, but all things
the in- at come to pass by inevitable necessity, then what are all those
interrogations, and objurgations, and reprehensions, and ex-

postuia- postulations, which we find so frequently in Holy Scriptures,

the like, in (be it spoken with all due respect) but feigned and hypocriti-

provefmen ca ^ exaggerations ? " Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I

t?ueT commanded that thou shouldest not eat?" Gen.iii. 11 ; and

berty.] verse 13, He saith to Eve, "Why hast thou done this?" and

this thou* 8 to Cain, " Why art thou wrath, and why is thy countenance

done?"] cast down ?" Anc l "Why will ye die, O house of Israel?"

[Gen. iv.e. Doth God command openly not to eat, and yet secretly by

xviii . 31 ; Himself or by the second causes necessitate him to eat ? Doth

!L J He reprehend him for doing that, which Hehath antecedently

determined that he must do ? Doth He propose things under

impossible conditions ? Or were not this plain mockery and

derision ? Doth a loving master chide his servant, because

he doth not come at his call, and yet knows that the poor

servant is chained and fettered, so as he cannot move, by the

master s own order, without the servant s default or consent ?

They who talk here of a twofold will of God, " secret" and

"revealed," and the one opposite to the other; understand

not what they say. These two wills concern several persons.

f [Sec above T. H. Numb. v. p. 37.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 57

The secret will of God is what He will do Himself; the re- DISCOURSE
vealed will of God is what He would have us to do. It may
6G5be the secret will of God to take away the life of the father;
yet it is God s revealed will, that his son should wish his
life, and pray for his life g . Here is no contradiction, where
the agents are distinct. But for the same person to com
mand one thing, and yet to necessitate him that is com
manded to do another thing ; to chide a man for doing that,
which he hath determined inevitably and irresistibly that he
must do ; this were (I am afraid to utter what they are not
afraid to assert) the highest dissimulation. God s chiding
proves man s liberty.

T. H. To the third and fifth arguments, I shall make but [The

answer
One answer. deferred.]

J. D. Certainly distinct arguments, as the third and fifth [Reply.]
are, the one drawn from the truth of God, the other drawn
from the justice of God, the one from His objurgations and
reprehensions, the other from His judgments after life, did
require distinct answers. But the plain truth is, that neither
here, nor in his answer to the fifth argument, nor in this
whole treatise, is there one word of solution or satisfaction to
this argument, or to any part of it. All that looks like an
answer is contained Numb, xii: "That which He does, is
made just by His doing ; just, I say, in Him, not always just
in us by the example ; for a man that shall command a thing
openly, and plot secretly the hindrance of the same, if he
punish him whom he commanded so for not doing it, is
unjust 11 ." I dare not insist upon it. I hope his meaning is
not so bad as the words intimate, and as I apprehend : that
is, to impute falsehood to Him that is Truth itself, and to
justify feigning and dissimulation in God, as he doth tyranny,
by the infiniteness of His power and the absoluteness of His
dominion. And, therefore, by his leave, I must once again
tender him a new summons for a full and clear answer to this
argument also. He tells us, that he was "not surprised 1 ."
Whether he were or not, is more than I know. But this I

g [From Anselm,, Lib. de Volunt. h [Below, T. H. Numb. xii. p. 65.]
Dei, Opusc. p. 85. M. fol. Paris. 1544.] l [Above, in Numb. ii. p. 26.]

58 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

!&gt; \ K r see plainly, that either he is not provided, or that his cause

- admits no choice of answers. The Jews dealt ingenuously,

when they met with a difficult knot which they could not

untie, to put it upon Elias ; " Elias will answer it when he

NUMBER XI.

Argument " J. D. Fourthly, if either the decree of God, or the fore-
every lh ^ knowledge of God, or the influence of the stars, or the con-
catenation of causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of

proves too objects, or the last dictate of the understanding, do take
proving away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true
itecessary liberty. For he was subjected to the same decrees, the same
which prescience, the same constellations, the same causes, the
Necessi- same objects, the same dictates of the understanding. But,

tarians J

deny.] " Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulus odiJ."

The greatest opposers of our liberty are as earnest main-
tainers of the liberty of Adam. Therefore none of these
supposed impediments take away true liberty.

l.-ittstccr.] T. H. The fourth argument is to this effect: "If the
decree of God, or His foreknowledge, or the influence of the
stars, or the concatenation of causes, or the physical or moral
efficacy of" causes, a or the last dictate of the understanding,"
or whatsoever it be, " do take away true liberty, then Adam
before his fall had no true liberty.

Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulus odiV "

[ 7 . //. .&lt; That which I saynecessitateth and determineth every action,
ofnwel^ tnat ne mav uo longer doubt of my meaning, is the sum
of all those things, which, being now existent, conduce and
concur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if
any one thing now were wanting, the effect could not be
produced. This concourse of causes, whereof every one is
determined to be such as it is by a like concourse of former
causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and
ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the
decree of God.
\ofthe But that the foreknowledge of God should be a cause of

theories of

J [Horat., A. P., 188. " Quodcunque doctrine, Calvin., Instit., lib. I. c. xv.
ostenrfts mihi sic," &c. And for the 8; Op. torn. viii. p. 44.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 59

anything, cannot be truly said; seeing foreknowledge is DISCOURSE
knowledge, and knowledge depends on the existence of the ; s sih
things known, and not they on it. *w %

The influence of the stars is but a small part of the whole
cause, consisting of the concourse of all agents.

Nor doth the concourse of all causes make one simple
chain or concatenation, but an innumerable number of chains
joined together, not in all parts, but in the first link, God
Almighty; and consequently the whole cause of an event
does not always depend upon one single chain, but on many
together.

Natural efficacy of objects does determine voluntary agents,
and necessitates the will, and consequently the action; but
for moral efficacy," I understand not what he means by it.
The last dictate of the judgment concerning the good or bad
666 that may follow on any action, is not properly the whole
cause, but the last part of it ; and yet may be said to produce
the effect necessarily, in such manner as the last feather
may be said to break a horse s back, when there were so
many laid on before as there wanted but that to do it.

Now for his argument, that if the concourse of all the [Election
causes necessitate that effect, that then it follows, Adam had altTannl
no true liberty. I deny the consequence: for I make not CCMar ^
only the effect, but also the election of that particular effect,
to be necessary ; inasmuch as the will itself, and each propen-
sion of a man during his deliberation, is as much necessitated,
and depends on a sufficient cause, as anything else whatso
ever. As, for example, it is no more necessary that fire
should burn, than that a man, or other creature, whose limbs
be moved by fancy, should have election, that is, liberty to
do what he has a fancy to, though it be not in his will or
power to choose his fancy, or choose his election or will.

This doctrine, because he says he "hates," I doubt had
better been suppressed ; as it should have been, if both your
Lordship and he had not pressed me to an answer.

J. D. This argument was sent forth only as an espy, to [Reply.]
make a more full discovery what were the true grounds of
T. H. his supposed necessity; which errand being done, and
the foundation whereupon he builds being found out, which

60 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART is, as I called it, " a concatenation of causes," and as he calls
it, " a concourse of necessary causes," it would now be a
superfluous and impertinent work in me to undertake the
refutation of all those other opinions, which he doth not
undertake to defend. And therefore I shall wave them for
the present, with these short animadversions.

[The de- Concerning the eternal decree of God, he confounds the
foreknow- decree itself with the execution of His decree. And concern-

f God, he confounds that speculative
knowledge, which is called the " knowledge of vision k ," which
doth not produce the intellective objects, no more than the
sensitive vision doth produce the sensible objects, with that
other knowledge of God, which is called the " knowledge of
approbation 1 "," or a practical knowledge, that is, knowledge
joined with an act of the will ; of which divines do truly say,
that it is the cause of things, as the knowledge of the artist

John i. [a is the cause of his work. God made all things "by His

2.] Word," that is, by His wisdom.

[The in. Concerning the influences of the stars, I wish he had ex-

tbe stars.] pressed himself more clearly. For as I do willingly grant,
that those heavenly bodies do act upon these sublunary
things, not only by their motion and light, but also by an
occult virtue, which we call influence, as we see by manifold
experience, in the loadstone, and shell-fish, &c. ; so, if he
intend, that by these influences they do naturally or physi
cally determine the will, or have any direct dominion over
human counsels, either in whole or in part, either more or
less, he is in an error.

[The con. Concerning the concatenation of causes, whereas he*makes

catenation i i /T

of causes.] not one chain, but "an innumerable number ot chains (1
hope he speaks hyperbolically, and doth not intend that they
are actually infinite), the difference is not material whether
one or many, so long as they are all joined together, both in
the first link, and likewise in the effect. It serves to no end,
but to shew what a shadow of liberty T. H. doth fancy, or
rather what a dream of a shadow. As if one chain were not
sufficient to load poor man, but he must be clogged with
innumerable chains. This is just such another freedom as
the Turkish galley slaves do enjoy.

k [Thorn. Aquin., Summ., P. Prima, Qu. xiv. artt. 8, 9.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 61

But I admire, that T. H., who is so versed in this ques- DISCOURSE
tion, should here confess, that he understands not the diffe- -
rence between physical or natural, and moral efficacy. And and moral
much more, that he should affirm, that outward objects do objectf.] f
" determine voluntary agents " by a " natural efficacy." No
object, no second agent, angel or devil, can determine the
will of man naturally; but God alone, in respect of His
supreme dominion over all things. Then the will is deter
mined naturally, when God Almighty, besides His general
influence, whereupon all second causes do depend as well for
their being as for their acting, doth moreover, at some times,
when it pleaseth Him, in cases extraordinary, concur by a
special influence, and infuse something into the will in the
nature of an act or a habit, whereby the will is moved and
excited and applied to will or choose this or that. Then the
will is determined morally, when some object is proposed to
it with persuasive reasons and arguments to induce it to will.
Where the determination is natural, the liberty to suspend
its act is taken away from the will ; but not so, where the
determination is moral. In the former case, the will is
667 determined extrinsecally, in the latter case, intrinsecally ; the
former produceth an absolute necessity, the latter only a
necessity of supposition. If the will do not suspend but
assent, then the act is necessary ; but because the will may
suspend and not assent, therefore it is not absolutely neces
sary. In the former case the will is moved necessarily and
determinately ; in the latter, freely and indeterminately.
The former excitation is immediate; the latter is mediate
mediante intellectu, and requires the help of the understand
ing. In a word, so great a difference there is between natu
ral and moral efficacy, as there is between his opinion and
mine in this question.

There remains only the last dictate of the understanding, [The last
which he maketh to be the last cause that concurreth to the t he under-
determination of the will, and to the necessary production of standin g- 1
the act ; " as the last feather may be said to break a horse s
back, when there were so many laid on before that there
wanted but that to do it." I have shewed (Numb, vii. 1 ), that
the last dictate of the understanding is not always absolute

1 [Above, pp. 42, 43.]

62 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART in itself, nor conclusive to the will ; and when it is conclu-
- sive, yet it produceth no antecedent nor extrinsecal necessity.
I shall only add one thing more in present, that by mak
ing the last judgment of right reason to be of no more
weight than a single feather, he wrongs the understanding as
well as he doth the will ; he endeavours to deprive the will of
its supreme power of application, and to deprive the under
standing of its supreme power of judicature and definition.
Neither corporeal agents and objects, nor yet the sensitive
appetite itself, being an inferior faculty, and affixed to the
organ of the body, have any direct or immediate dominion
or command over the rational will. It is without the sphere
of their activity. All the access which they have unto the
will, is by the means of the understanding, sometimes clear
and sometimes disturbed, and of reason either right or mis
informed. Without the help of the understanding, all his
second causes were not able of themselves to load the horse s
back with so much weight as the least of all his feathers doth
amount unto. But we shall meet with his horse-load of
feathers again Numb. xxiii. m

[Adam was These things being thus briefly touched, he proceeds to
ager^H? 317 his answer. My argument was this; If any of these or all of
other men t ^ ese causes f ormer ly recited do take away true liberty (that
is still intended, from necessity), then Adam before his fall
had no true liberty ; but Adam before his fall had true
liberty. He mis-recites the argument, and denies the conse
quence; which is so clearly proved that no man living can
doubt of it, because Adam was subjected to all the same
causes as well as we, the same decree, the same prescience,
the same influences, the same concourse of causes, the same
efficacy of objects, the same dictates of reason. But it is
only a mistake ; for it appears plainly by his following dis
course, that he intended to deny, not the consequence, but
the assumption. For he makes Adam to have had no liberty
from necessity before his fall ; yea, he proceeds so far as to
affirm, that all human wills, his and ours, and " each propen-
sion" of our wills, even "during" our "deliberation," are
" as much necessitated as any thing else whatsoever ;" that
we have no more power to forbear those actions which we do,

m [Below, p. 707. fol. edit.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 63

than the " fire" hath power not to " burn." Though I honour
T. H. for his person and for his learning, yet I must confess
ingenuously, I hate this doctrine from my heart. And I
believe both I have reason so to do, and all others who shall ^ doc- f

. of

necessity.]

seriously ponder the horrid consequences which flow from it. trine. of

It destroys liberty, and dishonours the nature of man. It
makes the second causes and outward objects to be the
rackets, and men to be but the tennis-balls, of destiny. It
makes the First Cause, that is, God Almighty, to be the in
troducer of all evil and sin into the world, as much as man ;
yea, more than man, by as much as the motion of the watch
is more from the artificer, who did make it and wind it up,
than either from the spring, or the wheels, or the thread. If
God by His special influence into the second causes did
necessitate them to operate as they did ; and if they, being
thus determined, did necessit?ite Adam inevitably, irresisti
bly, not by an accidental but by an essential subordination
of causes, to whatsoever he did ; then one of these two ab
surdities must needs folloAv ; either that Adam did not sin,
and that there is no such thing as sin in the world, because
668 it proceeds naturally, necessarily, and essentially from God ;
or that God is more guilty of it, and more the cause of evil,
than man, because man is extrinsecally, inevitably deter
mined, but so is not God ; and in causes essentially subordi
nate, the cause of the cause is always the cause of the effect.
What tyrant did ever impose law r s that were impossible for
those to keep upon whom they were imposed, and punish
them for breaking those laws which he himself had necessi
tated them to break, which it was no more in their power not
to break, than it is in the power of the "fire" not to "burn?"
Excuse me if I " hate" this doctrine " with a perfect hatred ;" [Ps
which is so dishonourable both to God and man, which 22
makes men to blaspheme of necessity, to steal of necessity,
to be hanged of necessity, and to be damned of necessity.
And therefore I must say, and say again,

" Quicquid ostendes milii sic incrcdulus odi."

It were better to be an atheist, to believe no God; or to
be a Manichee, to believe two Gods, a God of good, and a
God of evil ; or with the heathens, to believe thirty thousand
Gods ; than thus to charge the true God to be the proper

A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

a T cause and the true author of all the sins and evils which are
in the world.

^ NUMBER XII.

Argument J. D. Fifthly, if there be no liberty, there shall be no Day

f- _ I rpKof *

the theory of Doom, no Last Judgment, no rewards nor punishments after

death. A man can never make himself a criminal,, if he be
room for no t left at liberty to commit a crime. No man can be iustly

reward or

. .

punish. punished for doing that, which was not in his power to shun.
To take away
leaves no Hell.

To take away liberty, hazards Heaven ; but undoubtedly it

[Answer.] T. H. The arguments of greatest consequence are the
third and fifth, and fall both into one : namely, if there be
a necessity of all events, that it will follow, that praise and
reprehension, reward and punishment, are all vain and un
just; and that if God should openly forbid, and secretly
necessitate, the same action, punishing men for what they
could not avoid, there would be no belief among them of
Heaven or Hell.

[St. Pauls To oppose hereunto, I must borrow an answer from
a th e U Ephth St - Paul J Rom.ix. vers. 11. From the eleventh verse of the
totheRo- chapter to the eighteenth is laid down the very same objec
tion in these words. "When they" (meaning Esau and
Jacob) " were yet unborn, and had done neither good nor
evil, that the purpose of God according to election, not by
works but by Him that calleth, might remain firm, it was
said to her" (viz. to Rebekah), " that the elder shall serve
the younger 11 . . . And what then shall we say ? Is there in
justice with God? God forbid. . . It is not therefore in him
that willeth, nor in him that runneth, but in God, that
sheweth mercy. For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh, I have
stirred thee up, that I may shew My power in thee, and that
My name may be set forth in all the earth. Therefore, whom
God willeth, He hath mercy on, and whom He willeth He
hardeneth." Thus you see, the case put by St. Paul is the
same with that of J. D. ; and the same objection in these
[Rom. xi. words following, " Thou wilt ask me then, why will God yet

19.]

" [Hobbes has omitted herev. 13. and Esau have I hated."]
" As it is written, Jacob have I loved

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 65

complain, for who hath resisted His will?" To this there- DISCOURSE
fore the Apostle answers, not by denying it was God s will, -
or that the decree of God concerning Esau was not before he
had sinned, or that Esau was not necessitated to do what he
did, but thus, " Who art thou, O man, that interrogatest [Rom. xi.
God ? shall the work say to the workman, why hast thou
made me thus ? hath not the potter power over the clay, of
the same stuff, to make one vessel to honour, another to dis
honour ?" According therefore to this answer of St. Paul, I [The power
answer J. D. s objection, and say, the power of God alone, aioneis
without other help, is sufficient justification of any action He jj-jj^jj,^
doth. That which men make among themselves here by ^/on He
pacts and covenants, and call by the name of justice, and
according whereunto men are counted and termed rightly
just and unjust, is not that by which God Almighty s actions
are to be measured or called just ; no more than His counsels
are to be measured by human wisdom. That which He does
is made just by His doing ; just, I say, in Him, not always
just in us, by the example ; for a man that shall command a
thing openly, and plot secretly the hindrance of the same, if
he punish him he so commanded for not doing it, is unjust.
So also His counsels. They be therefore not in vain, because
they be His; whether we see the use of them or not. When
God afflicted Job, He did object no sin to him, but justified
that afflicting him by telling him of His power. " Hast [Job x. 9;
thou" (says God) "an arm like Mine ?" " Where wast thou &cj m
when 1 laid the foundations of the earth?" and the like. So [Johnix.a.]
our Saviour, concerning the man that was born blind, said, it
was not for his sin, nor his parents sin, but that the power
of God might be shewn in him/ Beasts are subject to
death and torment, yet they cannot sin. It was God s will it
should be so. Power irresistible justifieth all actions really
669 and properly, in whomsoever it be found. Less power does
not. And because such power is in God only, He must needs
be just in all His actions. And we, that not comprehending
His counsels call Him to the bar, commit injustice in it.

I am not ignorant of the usual reply to this answer, by dis- [ There is
tinguishing between will and permission : as, that God enc?T~
Almighty does indeed permit sin sometimes, and that He JSJ*" J$ fl
also foreknoweth that the sin He permitteth shall be com- a dl P er -

missive, or
BRAMHALL. TJ.

66 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART mitted, but does not will it, nor necessitate it. I know also
they distinguish the action from the sin of the action, saying,
God Almighty does indeed cause the action, whatsoever
action it be, but not the sinfulness or irregularity of it, that
is, the discordance between the action and the law. Such
distinctions as these dazzle my understanding. I find no
difference between the will to have a thing done, and the
permission to do it, when He that permitteth it can hinder
it, and knows it will be done unless He hinder it. Nor find
I any difference between an action that is against the law,
and the sin of that action ; as, for example, between the
[2Sam.xi.] killing of Uriah, and the sin of David in killing Uriah : nor
when one is cause both of the action and of the law, how
another can be cause of the disagreement between them ; no
more than how one man making a longer and shorter gar
ment, another can make the inequality that is between
them. This I know, God cannot sin, because His doing
a thing makes it just, and consequently no sin ; and because
whatsoever can sin, is subject to another s law, which God is
not. And therefore His blasphemy to say, God can sin. But
to say, that God can so order the world as a sin may be neces
sarily caused thereby in a man, I do not see how it is any dis
honour to Him. Howsoever, if such or other distinctions can
make it clear, that St. Paul did not think Esau s or Pharaoh s
actions proceeded from the will and purpose of God, or that,
proceeding from His will, [they] could not therefore without
injustice be blamed or punished, I will, as soon as I understand
them, turn unto J. D/s opinion. For I now hold nothing in
all this question between us, but what seemeth to me (not
obscurely but) most expressly said in this place by St. Paul.
And thus much in answer to his places of Scripture.

[Reply.] J. D. T. H. thinks to kill two birds with one stone, and
satisfy two arguments with one answer ; whereas in truth he
satisfieth neither. First, for my third reason. Though all
he say here, were as true as an oracle ; though punishment
were an act of dominion, not of justice, in God ; yet this is no
sufficient cause why God should deny His own act; or why He
should chide or expostulate with men, why they did that which
He Himself did necessitate them to do, and whereof He

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 67

was the actor more than they, they being but as the stone, but DISCOURSE
He the hand that threw it. Notwithstanding anything which
is pleaded here, this Stoical opinion doth stick hypocrisy
and dissimulation close to God, Who is the Truth itself.

And to my fifth argument, which he changeth and relateth [ The P as -

, . , . sage in St.

amiss, as by comparing mine with his may appear, his Paul
chiefest answer is to oppose a difficult place of St. Paul, Rom.
ix. 11. Hath he never heard, that to propose a doubt is not ralsc i 10 -]
to answer an argument ?

Nee bene respondet qui litem lite resolvit .

But I will not pay him in his own coin. Wherefore to
this place alleged by him I answer, the case is not the same.
The question moved there is, how God did keep His promise
made to Abraham, to be " the God of him and of his seed," [Gen. xvii.
if the Jews, who were the legitimate progeny of Abraham,
were deserted. To which the Apostle answers, that that verses 6, ?,
promise was not made to the carnal seed of Abraham,
that is, the Jews, but to his spiritual sons, which were
the heirs of his faith, that is, to the believing Christians ;
which answer he explicateth; first by the allegory of Isaac and
Ishmael, and after, in the place cited, of Esau and of Jacob.
Yet neither doth he speak there so much of their persons as of
their posterities. And though some words may be accommo
dated to God s predestination, which are there uttered, yet it
is not the scope of that text to treat of the reprobation of any
man to Hell-fire. All the posterity of Esau were not eternally
reprobated ; as holy Job, and many others. But this question
which is now agitated between us, is quite of another nature ;
how a man can be a criminal, who doth nothing but that
which he is extrinsecally necessitated to do ; or how God in
justice can punish a man with eternal torments, for doing
that, which it was never in his power to leave undone ;
that He who did impress the motion in the heart of man,
should punish man, who did only receive the impression from
Him. So his answer "looks another wayP."

But because he grounds so much upon this text, that if it [In its par-
670 can be cleared he is ready to change his opinion, I will examine
all those passages which may seem to favour his cause.

[" Nil agit exemplum litem quod v [See above, T, II. Numb. v. p. 37.]

lite resolvit." Horat., Sat, II. Hi. 103.]

F 2

68 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART First, these words, vers. 11," Being not yet born, neither

- having done any good or evil/ upon which the whole weight

jaeobwas of his argument doth depend, have no reference at all to

K 3nd those words &gt; vers 13 &gt; " Jacob have T loved and EsaU have l
hated.] hated;" for those words were first uttered by the prophet

Mai.i.2,[3.]Malachi, many ages after Jacob and Esau were dead; and
intended of the posterity of Esau, who were not redeemed
from captivity, as the Israelites were : but they are referred
to those other words, vers. 12, "The elder shall serve the

Gen. xxv. younger ;" which indeed were spoken before Jacob or Esau
were born. And though those words of Malachi had been
used of Jacob and Esau before they were born, yet it had
advantaged his cause nothing; for "hatred" in that text
doth not signify any reprobation to the flames of Hell, much
less the execution of that decree, or the actual imposition

[Gen. i. 31.] of punishment, nor any act contrary to love. "God saw
all that He made, and it was very good." Goodness itself can
not hate that which is good. But hatred there signifies com
parative hatred, or a less degree of love, or at the most a nega
tion of love. As Gen. xxix. 31, " When the Lord saw that
Leah was hated ;" we may not conclude thence, that Jacob
hated his wife. The precedent verse doth fully expound the

vers. 30. sense ; "Jacob loved Rachel more than Leah." So Matt. vi.
24, " No man can serve two masters, for either he will hate
the one and love the other." So Luke xiv. 26, " If any man
hate not his father and mother," &c., " he cannot be My dis-

Matt. x. 37. ciple." St. Matthew tells us the sense of it ; " He that
loveth father or mother more than Me, is not worthy of Me."

2. [Of the Secondly, those words, vers. 15, "I will have mercy on

God S m w h m I will have mercy," do prove no more but this, that

mercy.] the preferring of Jacob before Esau, and of the Christians
before the Jews, was not a debt from God, either to the one
or to the other, but a work of mercy. And what of this ?
All men confess, that God s mercies do exceed man s de
serts; but God s punishments do never exceed man s mis-

[i3 U i5 X ] deeds - As we see in tn e parable of the labourers ; " Friend,
I do tliec no wrong ; did not I agree with thee for a penny ? . .
Is it not lawful for me to do with mine own as I will ? Is
thy eye evil, because I am good ?" Acts of mercy are free,
but acts of justice are due.

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 69

That which follows, vers. 17, comes something nearer the DISCOURSE
cause ; " The Scripture saith unto Pharaoh, For this same - -
purpose I have raised thee up " (that is, I have made thee a senseGod s

king, or I have preserved thee), " that I might shew My
power in thee." But this particle" that" doth not always ^or the
signify the main end of an action, but sometimes only a con- quence of
sequent of it. As Matt. ii. [14,] 15; "He departed into" 1
Egypt, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the
Prophet, Out of Egypt have I called My son ; Jy without
doubt Joseph s aim or end of his journey was not to fulfil
prophecies, but to save the life of the Child ; yet, because the
fulfilling of the prophecy was a consequent of Joseph s jour
ney, he saith, " that it might be fulfilled." So here, "I have
raised thee up, that I might shew My power." Again, though
it should be granted, that this particle "that" did denote
the intention of God to destroy Pharaoh in the Red Sea, yet
it was not the antecedent intention of God, which evermore
respects the good and benefit of the creature, but God s conse
quent intention upon the prevision of Pharaoh s obstinacy,
that since he would not glorify God in obeying His word, he
should glorify God [in] undergoing His judgments. Hitherto
we find no eternal punishments, nor no temporal punish
ments, without just deserts.

It follows, vers. 18, "Whom He will He hardeneth." In- 4. [in what
deed hardness of heart is the greatest judgment that God is said to
lays upon a sinner in this life, worse than all the plagues of

raens

Egypt. But how doth God harden the heart? Not by a hearts -l

natural influence of any evil act or habit into the will, nor

by inducing the will with persuasive motives to obstinacy

and rebellion ; for " God tempteth no man, but every man is James i. 13,

tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed."

Then God is said to harden the heart three ways. 1. First,

negatively, and not positively ; "not by imparting wickedness,

but by not imparting grace q :" as the sun, descending to the

tropic of Capricorn, is said with us to be the cause of winter,

that is, not by imparting cold, but by not imparting heat.

1 [ " Nee obdurat Deus impartiendo sam excsecationis et indurationis posi-

malitiam sed non impartiendo miseri- tive (ut sic loquar), sed negative ; viz.

cordiam." Aug., Epist. cxiii, Ad Six- permittendo, deseremlo, non miseren-

tum, c. 3. 4; Op. torn. ii. p. 719. D. do." Bellarm., De Amiss. Grat. et

" Respondeo,ex communi sanctorum Statu Peccati, lib. ii. c. 14 ; Op. torn. iii.

Patrum sententia, Deum non esse caus- p. 177. C.]

70 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

ART It is an act of mercy in God to give His grace freely, but to
lll i Detain it is no act of injustice. So the Apostle opposeth

" hardening" to " shewing of mercy." To harden is as much
as not to shew mercy r . 2. Secondly, God is said to harden the 671
heart occasionally and not causally ; by doing good, which
incorrigible sinners make an occasion of growing worse and
worse, and doing evil : as a master, by often correcting an
untoward scholar, doth accidentally and occasionally harden
his heart, and render him more obdurate, insomuch as he
grows even to despise the rod ; or as an indulgent parent by
his patience and gentleness doth encourage an obstinate son
to become more rebellious. So, whether we look upon God s
frequent judgments upon Pharaoh, or God s iterated favours
in removing and withdrawing those judgments upon Pha
raoh s request, both of them in their several kinds were occa
sions of hardening Pharaoh s heart, the one making him
more presumptuous, the other more desperately rebellious.
So that which was good in it, was God s ; that which was
evil, was Pharaoh s. God gave the occasion, but Pharaoh
was the true cause of his own obduration. This is clearly
confirmed, Exod. viii. 15, "When Pharaoh saw that there
was respite, he hardened his heart ;" and Exod. ix. 34,
"When Pharaoh saw that the rain and the hail and the
thunders were ceased, he sinned yet more, and hardened his
heart, he and his servants." So Psalm cv. 25, " He turned
their hearts, so that they hated His people, and dealt sub-
tilly with them/ that is, God blessed the children of Israel,
whereupon the Egyptians did take occasion to hate them ; as
is plain, Exod. i. verses 7, 8, 9, 10. So God hardened Pha
raoh s heart, and Pharaoh hardened his own heart. God
hardened it by not shewing mercy to Pharaoh, as He did to
Nebuchadnezzar, who was as great a sinner as he ; or God
hardened it occasionally: but still Pharaoh was the true
cause of his own obduration, by determining his own will to
evil, and confirming himself in his obstinacy. So are all
&gt;. presumptuous sinners. Harden not your hearts, as in the
provocation, as in the day of temptation in the wilderness."
-3. Thirdly, God is said to harden the heart permissively, but

["Obduratio Dei est nolle mise- Simplicianum, lib. i. qu. 2. 15; Op.
Aug., De Divers. Qusest. Ad torn. vi. p. 96. E.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 71

not operatively, nor effectively ; as he who only lets loose a DISCOURSE
greyhound out of the slip, is said to hound him at the hare.
Will you see plainly what St. Paul intends by " hardening ?"
Read vers. 22; "What if God, willing to shew His wrath
and to make His power known" (that is, by a consequent
will, which in order of nature follows the prevision of sin),
"endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath
fitted to destruction; and that He might make known the
riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy," &c. There is
much difference between "enduring" and impelling, or in
citing, " the vessels of wrath." He. saith of " the vessels of
mercy," that God " prepared them unto glory ;" but of " the [Rom. ix.
vessels of wrath," he saith only, that they were " fitted to 2&lt; "
destruction," that is, not by God, but by themselves. St.
Paul saith, that God doth " endure the vessels of wrath with
much long-suffering." T. H. saith, that God wills and
effects by the second causes all their actions, good and bad ;
that He necessitateth them, and determineth them irresisti
bly to dp those acts which He condemneth as evil, and for
which He punisheth them. If doing willingly, and "endur
ing," if "much long-suffering" and necessitating, imply not
a contrariety one to another, "reddat milii minam Diogenes"
let him that taught me logic " give me my money again 8 ."

But T. H. saith, that this distinction between the operative [There is a
and permissive will of God, and that other between the ence be-
action and the irregularity, do " dazzle his understanding."

Though he can find no difference between these two, yet
others do 1 . St. Paul himself did : Acts xiii. 18, " About the will.]
time of forty years suffered He their manners in the wilder
ness ;" and Acts xiv, 16, "Who in times past suffered all
nations to walk in their own ways :" T. H. would make
"suffering" to be inciting, "their manners" to be God s
manners, "their ways" to be God s ways : and Acts xvii. 30,
"The times of this ignorance God winked at;" it was
never heard that one was said to " wink" or connive at that
which was his own act : and 1 Cor. x. 13, " God is faithful,
Who will not suffer you to be tempted above that you are

* [Cic., Lucull., xxx.] Summ., P. Prima, Qu. xx. art. 12:

1 [See Pet. Lomb., Sent, lib. i. dist. from Aug., Enchirid., c. xcv. 24, Op.
xlv. qu. 1. art. 3 ; and Thorn. Aquin., torn. vi. p. 231. E.]

72 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART able ;" to tempt is the devil s act, therefore he is called the
Tempter ; God tempts no man to sin, but He suffers them to
be tempted ; and so suffers, that He could hinder Satan, if
He would; but by T. H. his doctrine, to tempt to sin, and to
suffer one to be tempted to sin when it is in his power to
hinder it, is all one ; and so he transforms God (I write it with
horror) into the devil, and makes tempting to be God s own
work, and the devil to be but His instrument : and in that
noted place, Rom. ii. 4, [5], "Despisest thou the riches of
His goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering, not know
ing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance, but 672
after thy hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up unto
thyself wrath against the day of wrath, and revelation of the
righteous judgment of God/ here are as many convincing
arguments in this one text against the opinion of T. H.
almost as there are words ; here we learn, that God is " rich
in goodness/ and will not punish His creatures for that
which is His own act; secondly, that He "suffers" and
" forbears sinners long/ and doth not snatch them away by
sudden death as they deserve; thirdly, that the reason of
God s forbearance is to bring men to repentance/ fourthly,
that " hardness" of heart and " impenitency" is not causally
from God, but from ourselves ; fifthly, that it is not the in
sufficient proposal of the means of their conversion on God s
part, which is the cause of men s perdition, but their own
contempt and despising of these means; sixthly, that
punishment is not an act of absolute dominion, but an act
of " righteous judgment," whereby God renders to every man
according to his own deeds, " wrath" to them and only to
them who "treasure up wrath unto themselves," and
"eternal life" to those who "continue patiently in well
doing." If they deserve such punishment, who only neglect
the goodness and long-suffering of God, what do they who
utterly deny it, and make God s doing and His suffering to
be all one ? I do beseech T. H. to consider, what a degree of
wilfulnesa it is, out of one obscure text wholly misunderstood,
to contradict the clear current of the whole Scripture. Of
JJPet. the same mind with St. Paul was St. Peter:" The long-
suffering of God waited once in the days of Noah;" and,

ft P Account that the long-suffering of the Lord is salvation."

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 73

This is the name God gives Himself; "The Lord, the Lord DISCOURSE
God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering/ &c.

Yet I do acknowledge that which T. H. saith to be com- xxxiv. 6.
monly true, that he who doth permit anything to be done,
which it is in his power to hinder, knowing that if he do not
hinder it, it will be done, doth in some sort will it. I say, in
some sort ; that is, either by an antecedent will or by a con
sequent will, either by an operative will or by a permissive
will, or he is willing to let it be done but not willing to do
it. Sometimes an antecedent engagement doth cause a man
to suffer that to be done, which otherwise he would not suffer.
So Darius suffered Daniel to be cast into the lions den, to [Dan. vi.
make good his rash decree : so Herod suffered John Baptist [Ma\t? xiv.
to be beheaded, to make good his rash oath; how much more 9
may the immutable rule of justice in God, and His fidelity in
keeping His word, draw from Him the punishment of obstinate
sinners, though antecedently He willeth their conversion?
He loveth all His creatures well, but His own justice better.
Again, sometimes a man suffereth that to be done, which
he doth not will directly in itself, but indirectly for some
other end, or for the producing of some greater good ; as a
man willeth that a putrid member be cut off from his body,
to save the life of the whole ; or as a judge, being desirous to
save a malefactor s life, and having power to reprieve him,
doth yet condemn him for example s sake, that by the death
of one he may save the lives of many. Marvel not, then, if
God suffer some creatures to take such courses as tend to
their own ruin, so long as their sufferings do make for the
greater manifestation of His glory, and for the greater benefit
of His faithful servants. This is a most certain truth, that
God would not suffer evil to be in the world, unless He knew
how to draw good out of evil u . Yet this ought not to be so
understood, as if we made any priority or posteriority of time
in the acts of God, but only of nature. Nor do we make the
antecedent and consequent will to be contrary one to another;
because the one respects man pure and uncorrupted, the
other respects him as he is lapsed. The objects are the same,

u [" Neque enim Deus omnipotens, et bonus, ut benefaceret et de malo."

. . cum summe bonus sit, ullo modo Aug., Enchirid., c. xi. 3 ; Op. torn,

sineret mali aliquid esse in operibus vi. p. 199. A.]
suis, nisi usque adeo esset omnipotens

74 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART but considered after a diverse manner. Nor yet do we make
- these wills to be distinct in God ; for they are the same with
the Divine essence, which is one. But the distinction is in
order to the objects or things willed. Nor, lastly, do we
make this permission to be a naked or a mere permission.
God causeth all good, permitteth all evil, disposeth all things,
both good and evil.

[How God T. II. demands, how God should be the cause of the action
oVtbeTctT and 7 et not be the cause of the irregularity of the action. I
the "Sn of answer &gt; b ecause He concurs to the doing of evil by a general,
the act.] but not by a special influence. As the earth gives nourish
ment to all kinds of plants, as well to hemlock as to wheat,
but the reason why the one yields food to our sustenance, the
other poison to our destruction, is not from the general
nourishment of the earth, but from the special quality of the 673
root : even so the general power to act is from God, " In
[Acts xvii. Him we live and move and have our being " this is good ;
but the specification and determination of this general power
to the doing of any evil is from ourselves, and proceeds from
the free-will of man ; this is bad. And to speak properly,
the free-will of man is not the efficient cause of sin, as the
root of the hemlock is of poison, sin having no true entity or
being in it, as poison hath ; but rather the efficient cause.
Now no defect can flow from Him, Who is the highest per-
fection v . Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken, to make the
particular and determinate act of killing Uriah to be from
God. The general power to act is from God ; but the speci
fication of this general and good power to murder, or to any
particular evil, is not from God, but from the free-will of man.
So T. II. may see clearly if he will, how one may be the
cause of the law, and likewise of the action in some sort, that

* [" Nemo quaerat efficientem cans- tern," &c. Bellarm., De Amiss. Grat.

n mala; voluntatis ; non enim est et Statu Peccati, lib. ii. c. 17 ; Op. torn.

ed deficient quia nee ilia effec- iii. p. 207. B. Non est enim injusti-

sed defectio." Aug., De Civ. tia qualitas aut actio aut aliqua essen-

( , ,Yr X1 / : P : t0m&lt; viL p - 306 tia sed tantu m absentia debits justi-

is apertissima erit ratio cur tiae ; nee est nisi in voluntate. ubi clebet

&gt;n peccet neque peccati causa esse justitia." Anselm., De Concord.

ci possit, quamvis concurrat ad Prsescient. &c. cum Lib. Arb., c. i. p.

*tionem efficiendam qua homini 88. B. Opusc. fol. Paris. 1544-" Pec-

" quia Deus non catum nihil est, et nihil fiunt homines

t one,,, ,11am ut caussa particu- cum peccant." Aug., In Job. Evang.

ut caussa umvcrsalis, prsebens Tract, i. 13 ; Op. torn. iii. P. 2. p. 29 1,

et influxum quendam indifferen- D.1

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 75

is, by general influence, and yet another cause, concurring DISCOURSE
by special influence and determining this general and good -
power, may make itself the true cause of the anomy or the
irregularity. And therefore he may keep his " longer and
shorter garments" for some other occasion. Certainly they
will not fit this subject, unless he could make general and
special influence to be all one.

But T. H. presseth yet farther, that the case is the same, [ God s jus-
and the objection used by the Jews, vers. 19, " Why doth measured
He yet find fault ? who hath resisted His will?" is the very
same with my argument ; and St. Paul s answer, vers. 20,
" O man, who art thou that repliest against God ? shall the win of One
thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made f ec t.]
me thus ? hath not the potter power over his clay ?" &c.
is the very same with his answer in this place, drawn from
the irresistible power and absolute dominion of God, which
justifieth all His actions ; and that the Apostle in his answer
doth not deny, that it was God s will, nor that God s decree
was before Esau s sin. To which I reply :

1. First, that the case is not at all the same, but quite dif
ferent; as may appear by these particulars. First, those
words "Before they had done either good or evil" are not,
cannot be, referred to those other words "Esau have I
hated." Secondly, if they could, yet it is less than nothing ;
because, before Esau had actually sinned, his future sins were
known to God. Thirdly, by " the potter s clay" here is not
to be understood the pure mass, but the corrupted mass, of
mankind. Fourthly, the " hating" here mentioned is only a
comparative hatred, that is, a less degree of love. Fifthly,
the " hardening" which St. Paul speaks of, is not a positive,
but a negative obduration, or a not imparting of grace.
Sixthly, St. Paul speaketh not of any positive reprobation to
eternal punishment ; much less doth he speak of the actual
inflicting of punishment without sin ; which is the question
between us, and wherein T. H. differs from all that I re
member to have read, who do all acknowledge that punish
ment is never actually inflicted but for sin w . If the question

w ["Omnis pcena, si justa est, i. c. 9. .5 : Op. torn. i. pp. 631. B, 14.
peccati pcena est." Aug., De Lib. Arb., E.]
lib. iii. c. 13. 51; and Retract., lib.

76 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART be put, why God doth good to one more than to another, or

why God imparteth more grace to one than to another, as it

is there, the answer is just and fit, because it is His pleasure,

Matt. xx. and it is sauciness in a creature in this case to reply. " May
not God do what He will with His own?" No man doubteth
but God imparteth grace beyond man s desert. But if the
case be put, why God doth punish one more than another, or
why He throws one into Hell-fire and not another, which is
the present case agitated between us; to say with T. H., that
it is because God is omnipotent, or because His power is
irresistible, or merely because it is His pleasure, is not only
not warranted, but is plainly condemned, by St. Paul in this
place. So many differences there are between those two cases.
It is not therefore " against God" that I "reply," but against
T. H. I do not " call my Creator to the bar," but my fellow
creature. I ask no account of God s counsels, but of man s
presumptions. It is the mode of these times to father their
own fancies upon God, and when they cannot justify them

[Rom. xi. by reason, to plead His omnipotence, or to cry, " altitudo!"
that "the ways of God" are "unsearchable." If they may
justify their drowsy dreams because God s power and dominion
is absolute, much more may we reject such fantastical devices,
which are inconsistent with the truth, and goodness, and

-Rom. xv J ustice of God ; and ma ke Him to be a tyrant, who is "the

Father of mercies," and "the God of" all "consolation."

The unsearchableness of God s ways should be a bridle to

restrain presumption, and not a sanctuary for spirits of

error.

2. Secondly, this objection contained vers. 19, to which the 67
Apostle answers vers. 20, is not made in the person of Esau
or Pharaoh, as T. H. supposeth, but of the unbelieving Jews;
who thought much at that grace and favour which God was
pleased to vouchsafe unto the Gentiles, to acknowledge them
for His people, which honour they would have appropriated
to the posterity of Abraham. And the Apostle s answer is
not only drawn from the sovereign dominion of God, to
impart His grace to whom He pleaseth, as hath been shewed
already, but also from the obstinacy and proper fault of the
lews; as appeareth vers. 22, "What if God, willing" (that
w, by a consequent will) to shew His wrath, and to make

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 77

His power known, endured with much long-suffering the DISCOURSE
vessels of wrath fitted to destruction." They acted, God
"endured;" they were tolerated by God, but "fitted to
destruction" by themselves; for their much wrong doing,
here is God s "much long-suffering." And more plainly
vers. 31, [32;] "Israel hath not attained to the law of
righteousness ; wherefore ? because they sought it not by
faith, but as it were by the works of the law." This reason
is set down yet more emphatically in the next chapter,
vers. 3; "They" (that is, the Israelites), " being ignorant of
God s righteousness" (that is, by faith in Christ), " and going
about to establish their own righteousness" (that is, by the
works of the law), "have not submitted themselves to the
righteousness of God;" and yet most expressly chap. xi.
vers. 20, " Because of unbelief they were broken off, but thou
standest by faith." Neither was there any precedent binding
decree of God, to necessitate them to unbelief, and conse
quently to punishment. It was in their own power, by their
concurrence with God s grace, to prevent these judgments,
and to recover their former estate; vers. 23, " If they" (that
is, the unbelieving Jews) " abide not still in unbelief, they
shall be graffed in." The crown and the sword are immove-
able (to use St. Anselm s comparison), but it is we that
move and change places. Sometimes the Jews were under
the crown, and the Gentiles under the sword; sometimes the
Jews under the sword, and the Gentiles under the crown.

3. Thirdly, though I confess, that human "pacts" are not
the measure of God s justice, but His justice is His own immut
able will, whereby He is ready to give every man that which is
his own, as rewards to the good, punishments to the bad ; so,
nevertheless, God may oblige Himself freely to His creature.
He made the covenant of works with mankind in Adam; and
therefore He punisheth not man contrary to His own cove
nant, but for the transgression of his duty. And Divine
justice is not measured by omnipotence, or by " irresistible
power," but by God s will. God can do many things according
to His absolute power which He doth not ; He " could raise [Matt. iii.
up children to Abraham of stones," but He never did so. It
is a rule in theology, that God cannot do anything which
argues any wickedness or imperfection ; as, God " cannot 2 Tim. ii.

13.

78 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PA HT deny Himself," He " cannot lie." These and the like are

fiF7V~ fruits of im P tence not of P wer - So God cannot "destroy
Gen. xviii. the righteous with the wicked ;" He " could not" destroy
Gen. xix. Sodom whilst Lot was in it : not for want of dominion or
power, but because it was not agreeable to His justice, nor to
that law which Himself had constituted. The Apostle saith,
Heb. vi. " God is not unrighteous to forget your work." As it is a
good consequence to say, This is from God, therefore it is
righteous ; so is this also, This thing is unrighteous, therefore
it cannot proceed from God. We see how all creatures by
instinct of nature do love their young, as the hen her chickens;
how they will expose themselves to death for them : and yet
all these are but shadows of that love which is in God towards
His creatures. How impious is it then to conceive, that God
did create so many millions of souls to be tormented eternally
in Hell without any fault of theirs, except such as He Himself
did necessitate them unto, merely to shew His dominion, and
because His power is irresistible ! The same privilege which
T. H. appropriates here to " power absolutely irresistible," a
friend of his, in his book De Give (cap. vi. p. 70) x , ascribes to
power respectively irresistible, or to sovereign magistrates;
whose power he makes to be f( as absolute as a man s power
is over himself, not to be limited by any thing but only by
their strength." The greatest propugners of sovereign power
think it enough for princes to challenge an immunity from
coercive power, but acknowledge, that the law hath a directive
power over them. But T. H. will have no limits but their
strength. Whatsoever they do by power, they do justly.
j.The case But, saith he, " God objected no sin to Job, but justified His 675
afflicting him by His power." First, this is an argument from
authority negatively, that is to say, worth nothing. Secondly,
the afflictions of Job were no vindicatory punishments, to
take vengeance of his sins (whereof we dispute), but probatory
chastisements, to make trial of his graces. Thirdly, Job was
not so pure, but that God might justly have laid greater
punishments upon him, than those afflictions which he suf-
Job HI. 3. fered. Witness his impatience, even to the cursing of the

Job

xxxviii.4.

day of his nativity. Indeed God said to Job, "Where wast

1 [Elementorum Philosophise Sectio Tertia de Give, c. vi. 18. p. 70. first ed.
Pans, 4to. 16*2.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 79

thou when I laid the foundations of the earth ?" that is, how DISCOURSE
canst thou judge of the things that were done before thou
wast born, or comprehend the secret causes of My judgments?
and, " Hast thou an arm like God ?" as if He should say, job xi. p.
Why art thou impatient? dost thou think thyself able to
strive with God ? But that God should punish Job without
desert, here is not a word.

Concerning; the blind man. mentioned John ix. his blind- C And of ,

, . . , the blind

ness was rather a blessing to him than a punishment, being man men-
the means to have his soul illuminated, and to bring him to g t . John s
see the face of God in Jesus Christ. The sight of the body Gospel.]
is common to us with ants and flies, but the sight of the soul
with the blessed angels. We read of some, who have put out
their bodily eyes because they thought they were an impedi
ment to the eye of the soul. Again, neither he nor his
parents were innocent, being " conceived and born in sin and Psai. ii.5.
iniquity;" and, "In many things we offend all." But our Jam. Hi. 2.
Saviour s meaning is evident by the disciples question, vers. 2.
They had not so sinned, that he should be born blind ; or,
they were not more grievous sinners than other men, to de
serve an exemplary judgment more than they; but this corpo
ral blindness befell him principally by the extraordinary pro
vidence of God, for the manifestation of His own glory in re
storing him to his sight. So his instance halts on both sides ;
neither was this a punishment, nor the blind man free from sin.

His third instance, of the death and torments of beasts, is of [And of
no more weight than the two former. The death of brute beasts beasts.]
is not a punishment of sin, but a debt of nature. And though
they be often slaughtered for the use of man, yet there is a
vast difference between those light and momentary pangs,
and the unsufferable and endless pains of Hell ; between the
mere depriving of a creature of temporal life, and the sub
jecting of it to eternal death. I know the philosophical
speculations of some, who affirm, that entity is better than
non-entity ; that it is better to be miserable, and suffer the
torments of the damned, than to be annihilated, and cease to
be altogether. This entity which they speak of, is a meta
physical entity, abstracted from the matter ; which is better
than non-entity, in respect of some goodness, not moral nor
natural, but transcendental, which accompanies every being.

80 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART But in the concrete it is far otherwise ; where that of our
I1L Saviour often takes place," Woe unto that man by whom
xxV 24. the Son of Man is betrayed ; it had been good for that man,
that he had not been born." I add, that there is an analogi-
[Deutxxv. cal justice and mercy, due even to the brute beasts. " Thou
shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the
corn ;" and, A just man is merciful to his beast V
[Power to But his greatest error is that which I touched before, to
fctedfby" make justice to be the proper result of power. Power doth
justice b^ not measure ancl regulate justice, but justice measures and
power. ] regulates power. The will of God, and the eternal law which
is in God Himself, is properly the rule and measure of justice.
As all goodness, whether natural or moral, is a participation
of Divine goodness, and all created rectitude is but a par
ticipation of Divine rectitude ; so all laws are but participa
tions of the eternal law, from whence they derive their power.
The rule of justice then is the same both in God and us; but
it is in God, as in Him that doth regulate and measure ; in
us, as in those who are regulated and measured. As the will
of God is immutable, always willing what is just and right
and good, so His justice likewise is immutable. And that
individual action which is justly punished as sinful in us,
cannot possibly proceed from the special influence and de
terminative power of a just cause. See then how grossly
T. H. doth understand that old and true principle, that
" the will of God is the rule of justice ;" as if, by willing
things in themselves unjust, He did render them just, by
reason of His absolute dominion and irresistible power: as 6 76
fire doth assimilate other things to itself, and convert them
into the nature of fire. This were to make the eternal law a
Lesbian rule 2 . Sin is defined to be " that, which is done, or
said, or thought, contrary to the eternal law a ." But by this
doctrine nothing is done nor said nor thought contrary to
the will of God. St. Anselm said most truly, "Then the will
of man is good and just and right, when he wills that which
God would have him to will b ." But according to this doc-

" A righteous man regardeth the turn vel concupitum aliquid contra le-

fe of his beast." Prov. xii. 10.] gem jEternam." Aug., Cont. Faustum,

[Anstot , Eth. Nic. V. xiv. 7 ; see lib. xxii. c. 27 ; Op. torn. viii. p. 378. F.]

&gt;ve, m vol. ni. p. 303, note 1.] b [ Lib . de Voluntate Dei, Opusc. pp.

cccatum est dictum vel fac- 85. K, 86. A. ed. 1544.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 81

trine, every man always "wills that which God would have DISCOURSE
him to will." If this be true, we need not pray, {( Thy will be -
done in earth as it is in Heaven." T. H. hath devised a
new kind of Heaven upon earth. The worst is, it is a Heaven
without justice. Justice is a " constant and perpetual act of
the will to give every one his own c ;" but to inflict punishment
for those things which the Judge Himself did determine and
necessitate to be done, is not to give every one his own. Right
punitive justice is a relation of equality and proportion be
tween the demerit and the punishment d ; but supposing this
opinion of absolute and universal, necessity, there is no
demerit in the world. We use to say, that right springs
from law and fact : as in this syllogism ; Every thief ought
to be punished, there s the law ; but such an one is a thief,
there s the fact ; therefore he ought to be punished, there s
the right. But this opinion of T. H. grounds the right to
be punished, neither upon law, nor upon fact, but upon the
"irresistible power" of God. Yea, it overturneth as much
as in it lies all law : first, the eternal law ; which is the
ordination of Divine wisdom, by which all creatures are
directed to that end which is convenient for them 6 ; that is not,
to necessitate them to eternal flames : then, the law parti
cipated; which is the ordination of right reason, instituted
for the common good, to shew unto man what he ought
to do and what he ought not to do e ; to what purpose is it
to shew the right way to him, who is drawn and haled a
contrary way by adamantine bonds of inevitable necessity ?

Lastly, howsoever T. H. cries out that God cannot sin, yet [T. H. S
in truth he makes Him to be the principal and most proper Ufk
cause of all sin. For he makes Him to be the cause not only inevitably
of the law, and of the action, but even of the irregularity itself, of sin.]
and the difference between the action and the law ; wherein
the essence of sin doth consist. He makes God to determine
David s will, and necessitate him to kill Uriah. In causes
physically and essentially subordinate, the cause of the cause
is evermore the cause of the effect. These are those deadly
fruits which spring from the poisonous root of the absolute
necessity of all things ; which T. H. seeing, and that neither

r [" Perpetua et constans voluntas tit. i. lex 10.]

jus sumn unicuique tribuens." Thorn. d [Vide Aristot., Ethic., lib. V. c. iv.j

Aquin., Summ., Secund. Secund., Qu. e [Thorn. Aquin., Summ., Prima

Iviii. art. 1; from the Digest, lib. I. Secund., Qu. xci. art. 3, xciii. art. 1.]

BKAMHALL G

82 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PAR T the sins of Esau nor Pharaoh nor any wicked person do pro-

ceed from the operative but from the permissive will of God,

and that punishment is an act of justice, not of dominion only,

I hope that according to his promise he will change his opinion.

II. PROOFS OF LIBERTY DRAWN FROM REASON.

NUMBER XIII.

Argument J. D. The first argument is Herculeum or baculinum,
ofZeno 5 - drawn from that pleasant passage between Zeno and his

necessity of man&gt; The servant had committed some petty larceny, and
sin implies . . *

necessity of the master was cudgelling him well for it; the servant thinks

men?.]" to creep under his master s blind side, and pleads for himself,
that "the necessity of destiny did compel him to steal." The
master answers, The same necessity of destiny compels me to
beat thee f . He that denies liberty, is fitter to be refuted
with rods than with arguments, until he confess, that it is free
for him that beats him either to continue striking or to give
over ; that is, to have true liberty.

\_A,isu- er .] T. H. Of the arguments from reason, the first is that,
which he saith " is drawn" from Zeno s beating of his man,
which is therefore called argumentum " baculinum/ that is to
say, a wooden argument. The story is this : Zeno held, that
all actions were necessary; his man, therefore, being for
some fault beaten, excused himself upon the necessity of it ;
to avoid this excuse, his master pleaded likewise the neces
sity of beating him. So that, not he that maintained, but he
that derided, the necessity of things, was beaten ; contrary to
that he would infer : and the argument was rather with
drawn than " drawn" from the story.

[Reply.] J. D. Whether the argument be " withdrawn from the
story," or the answer withdrawn from the argument, let the
reader judge. T. H. mistakes the scope of the reason ; the
strength whereof doth not lie, neither in the authority of Zeno,
a rigid Stoic, which is not worth a button in this cause ; nor
in the servant s being an adversary to Stoical necessity, for it
appears not out of the story that the servant did "deride neces- 677
sity," but rather that he pleaded it in good earnest for his own

f [Diog. Laert., vii. 23.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 83

justification ; nor in the success of the fray -, we were told DISCOURSE

even now that no power doth justify an action but only that

which is " irresistible s," such was not Zeno s ; and therefore
it advantageth neither of their causes, neither that of Zeno,
nor this of T. H. What if the servant had taken the staff
out of his master s hand and beaten him soundly ; would not
the same argument have served the man as well as it did the
master ? that the necessity of destiny did compel him to
strike again. Had not Zeno smarted justly for his paradox?
And might not the spectators well have taken up the judges
apophthegm, concerning the dispute between Corax and his
scholar, "an ill egg of an ill bird h ?" But the strength of
this argument lies partly in the ignorance of Zeno, that great
champion of necessity, and the beggarliness of his cause,
which admitted no defence but with a cudgel. No man
(saith the servant) ought to be beaten for doing that which
he is compelled inevitably to do, but I am compelled inevita
bly to steal. The major is so evident, that it cannot be
denied. If a strong man shall take a weak man s hand per
force, and do violence with it to a third person, he whose
hand is forced is innocent, and he only culpable who com
pelled him. The minor was Zeno s own doctrine. What
answer made the great patron of destiny to his servant ?
Very learnedly he denied the conclusion, and cudgelled his
servant ; telling him in effect, that though there was no rea
son why he should be beaten, yet there was a necessity why
he must be beaten. And partly in the evident absurdity of
such an opinion, which deserves not to be confuted with rea
sons but with rods. There are four things, said the philoso
pher, which ought not to be called into question : first, such
things whereof it is wickedness to doubt ; as, whether the
soul be immortal, whether there be a God ; such an one
should not be confuted with reasons, but cast into the sea [Matt.xviii.
with a mill-stone about his neck/ as unworthy to breathe the
air or to behold the light : secondly, such things as are
above the capacity of reason; as, among Christians, the
mystery of the Holy Trinity : thirdly, such principles as are
evidently true ; as, that two and two are four, in arithmetic,
that the whole is greater than the part, in logic : fourthly,

[Above T. H. Numb. xii. p. 66.] Sext. Empir., Adv. Mathem., lib. ii.
h [" E/c KUKOV K6paKos Kanbv w6v." p. 81. C. fol. Colon. Allob. 1621.]

8A A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART such things as are obvious to the senses ; as, whether the snow
IH - be white. He who denied the heat of the fire, was justly
sentenced to be scorched with fire; and he that denied
motion, to be beaten until he recanted. So he who denies
all liberty from necessitation, should be scourged until he be
come a humble suppliant to him that whips him, and con
fess that he hath power either to strike or to hold his hand.

NUMBER XIV.

Argument J. D. Secondly, this very persuasion that there is no true
doctrine of liberty is able to overthrow all societies and commonwealths
overthrows m ^ ie wor ld- The laws are unjust, which prohibit that which
workofsdi a man cannot P oss ibly shun. All consultations are vain,
human if every thing be either necessary or impossible. Who ever
deliberated, whether the sun should rise to-morrow, or whether
he should sail over mountains ? It is to no more purpose to
admonish men of understanding than fools, children, or
madmen, if all things be necessary. Praises and dispraises,
rewards and punishments, are as vain as they are undeserved,
if there be no liberty 1 . All counsels, arts, arms, books, instru
ments, are superfluous and foolish, if there be no liberty. In
vain we labour, in vain we study, in vain we take physic, in
vain we have tutors to instruct us, if all things come to pass
alike, whether we sleep or wake, whether we be idle or
industrious, by unalterable necessity. But it is said, that
though future events be certain, yet they are unknown to us;
and therefore we prohibit, deliberate, admonish, praise, dis
praise, reward, punish, study, labour, and use means. Alas !
how should our not knowing of the event be a sufficient mo
tive to us to use the means, so long as we believe the event
is already certainly determined, and can no more be changed
by all our endeavours, than we can stay the course of heaven
with our finger, or add a cubit to our stature ! Suppose it
be unknown, yet it is certain ; we cannot hope to alter the
course of things by our labours. Let the necessary causes do
their work ; we have no remedy but patience, and shrug up
the shoulders. Either allow liberty, or destroy all societies.

l ", or&gt;rf te o!tTr ail , ol * rf ol yoi KaKids o&njy." Clem. Alex., Strom.,
i riuu O f,e at KoAa-rejs SiWcu,

lib. i. c . 17; On. torn. i. p. 3G8. fol.

"Xy txowys -n,v t^waiav TTJJ Oxon. 1715.1
Kal acf&gt;of&gt;/x?, s aAA* UKOUCTLOV T"/S

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 85

T. H. The second argument is taken from certain incon- DISCOURSE

veiiiences, which he thinks would follow such an opinion. It ^

is true, that ill use may be made of it ; and therefore your
678 Lordship and J. D. ought at my request to keep private that
I say here of it. But the inconveniences are indeed none :
and what use soever be made of truth, yet truth is truth ;
and now the question is not what is fit to be preached, but
what is true. The first inconvenience, he says, is this, that
" laws which prohibit" any action are then " unjust." The
second, that " all consultations are vain." The third, that
admonitions to " men of understanding" are of no more use
than to " fools, children, and madmen." The fourth, that
" praise, dispraise, reward and punishment," are in vain. The
fifth, that " counsels, arts, arms, books, instruments, study,
tutors," medicines, are "in vain." To which argument ex
pecting I should answer by saying, that the ignorance of the
event were enough to make us use means, he adds (as it were
a reply to my answer foreseen) these words, "Alas ! how
should our not knowing the event be a sufficient motive to
make us use the means !" wherein he saith right, but my
answer is not that which he expecteth. I answer,

First, that the necessity of an action doth not make the [ The law
law which prohibits it unjust. To let pass, that not the
necessity, but the will to break the law, maketh the action t
unjust, because the law regardeth the will, and no other
precedent causes of action ; and to let pass, that no law can
be possibly unjust, inasmuch as every man makes by his con
sent the law he is bound to keep, and which consequently
must be just, unless a man can be unjust to himself; I say,
what necessary cause soever precedes an action, yet, if the
action be forbidden, he that doth it willingly may justly be
punished. For instance, suppose the law on pain of death
prohibit stealing, and there be a man who by the strength of
temptation is necessitated to steal, and is thereupon put to
death : does not this punishment deter others from theft ?
is it not a cause that others steal not? doth it not frame
and make their will to justice ? To make the law is therefore
to make a cause of justice, and to necessitate justice, and
consequently it is no injustice to make such a law. The in
stitution of the law is not to grieve the delinquent for that

86 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART which is passed, and not to be undone, but to make him and
m - others just, that else would not be so ; and respecteth not the
evil act past, but the good to come : insomuch as without
this good intention of future, no past act of a delinquent
could justify his killing in the sight of God. But you will
say, how is it just to kill one man to amend another, if what
were done were necessary ? To this I answer, that men are
justly killed, not for that their actions are not necessitated,
but that they are spared and preserved, because they are not
noxious : for where there is no law, there no killing nor any
thing else can be unjust; and by the right of nature we
destroy, without being unjust, all that is noxious, both beasts
and men. And for beasts, we kill them justly, when we do
it in order to our own preservation ; and yet J. D. con-
fesseth, that their actions, as being only spontaneous and not
free, are all necessitated and determined to that one thing
which they shall do. For men, when we make societies or
commonwealths, we lay down our right to kill, excepting in
certain cases, as murder, theft, or other offensive actions : so
that the right which the commonwealth hath to put a man
to death for crimes, is not created by the law, but remains
from the first right of nature, which every man hath, to pre
serve himself; for that the law doth not take that right away
in case of criminals, who were by law excepted. Men are
not therefore put to death, or punished, for that their theft
proceedeth from election; but because it was noxious, and
contrary to men s preservation, and the punishment conducing
to the preservation of the rest : inasmuch as to punish those
that do voluntary hurt, and none else, frameth and maketh
men s wills such as men would have them. And thus it is
plain, that from necessity of a voluntary action cannot be
inferred the injustice of the law that forbiddeth it, or of the
magistrate that punisheth it.

Seconc Uyj I deny, that it makes consultations to be in
vam - It is the consultation that causeth a man and neces-
s itateth him to choose to do one thing rather than another ;
so that, unless a man say that cause to be in vain which
necessitated the effect, he cannot infer the superfluousness
of consultation out of the necessity of the election proceeding

from it. But it seems he reasons thus, If I must needs do

AGAINST MR. HOUSES. 87

this rather than that, then I shall do this rather than that, DISCOURSE

though I consult not at all ; which is a false proposition, a

false consequence, and no better than this, If I shall live till
to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though I run myself
through with a sword to-day. If there be a necessity that an
action shall be done, or that any effect shall be brought to
pass, it does not therefore follow, that there is nothing
necessarily required as a means to bring it to pass. And
therefore, when it is determined that one thing shall be
chosen before another, tis determined also for what cause
679 it shall be chosen ; which cause for the most part is delibera
tion or consultation. And therefore consultation is not in
vain : and indeed the less in vain, by how much the election
is more necessitated.

The same answer is to be given to the third supposed in- [Nor ad-
conveniency, namely, that admonitions are in vain ; for ad- m&lt;
monitions are parts of consultations, the admonitor being a
counsellor for the time to him that is admonished.

The fourth pretended inconveniency is, that praise and dis- [Nor praise
praise, reward and punishment, will be in vain. To which I ^/se"]
answer, that for praise and dispraise, they depend not at all
on the necessity of the action praised or dispraised. For
what is it else to praise, but to say a thing is good ? good,
I say, for me, or for somebody else, or for the state and com
monwealth. And what is it to say an action is good, but to
say, it is as I would wish, or as another would have it, or
according to the will of the state, that is to say, according to
law ? Does J. D. think, that no action can please me or him
or the commonwealth, that should proceed from necessity ?
Things may be therefore necessary and yet praiseworthy, as
also necessary and yet dispraised; and neither of both in
vain, because praise and dispraise, and likewise reward and
punishment, do by example make and conform the will to
good or evil. It was a very great praise in my opinion, that
Velleius Paterculus gives Cato, where he says, he was good by
nature, et quia aliter esse non potuit*

The fifth and sixth inconvenience, that " counsels, arts, [AW the.
arms, books, instruments," study, medicines, and the like, JJf

k [ " Qui nunquam recte fecit ut non poterat." Veil. Paterc., Histor.,
facere videretur, sed quia aliter facere lib. ii. c.,35.]

88 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART would be " superfluous," the same answer serves that to the

IIT - former ; that is to say, that this consequence if the effect

shall necessarily come to pass, then it shall come to pass

without its cause is a false one. And those things named,

" counsels, arts, arms," &c., are the causes of those effects.

iRepiy.] J. D. Nothing is more familiar with T. H. than to de
cline an argument. But I will put it into form for him.
The first inconvenience is thus pressed ; those laws are
unjust and tyrannical, which do prescribe things absolutely
impossible in themselves to be done, and punish men for not
doing of them ; but, supposing T. H. his opinion of the
necessity of all things to be true, all laws do prescribe abso
lute impossibilities to be done, and punish men for not doing
of them. The former proposition is so clear, that it cannot
be denied. Just laws are the ordinances of right reason ; but
those laws which prescribe absolute impossibilities, are not
the ordinances of right reason. Just laws are instituted for
the public good ; but those laws which prescribe absolute
impossibilities, are not instituted for the public good. Just
laws do shew unto a man what is to be done, and what is to
be shunned ; but those laws which prescribe impossibilities,
do not direct a man what he is to do, and what he is to
shun. The minor is as evident. For if his opinion be true,
all actions, all transgressions, are determined antecedently
inevitably to be done by a natural and necessary flux of ex-
trinsecal causes ; yea, even the will of man, and the reason
itself, is thus determined : and therefore, whatsoever laws
do prescribe any thing to be done which is not done, or to be
left undone which is done, do prescribe absolute impossibili
ties, and punish men for not doing of impossibilities. In all
his answer there is not one word to this argument, but only

[T. H. S an- to the conclusion. He saith, that " not the necessity, bnt

s\ver both , .,, *

irrelevant the will to break the law, makes the action unjust." I ask,
tLj n ~ what makes " the will to break the law ?" Is it not his "neces
sity ?" What gets he by this ? A perverse will causeth in
justice, and necessity causeth a perverse will. He saith,
" The law regardeth the will, but not the precedent causes of
action." To what proposition, to what term, is this answer?

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 89

He neither denies, nor distiiiguisheth. First, the question DISCOURSE

here is not what makes actions to be unjust, but what makes

laws to be unjust. So his answer is impertinent. It is like
wise untrue. For, first, that will which the law regards, is
not such a w r ill as T. H. imagineth. It is a free will, not a
determined, necessitated will ; a rational will, not a brutish
will. Secondly, the law doth look upon "precedent causes"
as well as the voluntariness of the action. If a child, before
he be seven years old, or have the use of reason, in some
childish quarrel do willingly stab another, whereof we have seen
experience, yet the law looks not upon it as an act of mur
der, because there wanted a power to deliberate, and conse
quently true liberty. Man-slaughter may be as voluntary as
murder ; and commonly more voluntary, because, being done
in hot blood, there is the less reluct ation. Yet the law con
siders, that the former is done out of some sudden passion
fiso without serious deliberation, and the other out of prepensed
malice and desire of revenge, and therefore condemns mur
der as more wilful and more punishable than man- slaughter.

He saith, that " no law can possibly be unjust ;" and I [Laws de
say, that this is to deny the conclusion, which deserves no"b e unjust]
reply. But to give him satisfaction, I will follow him in this
also. If he intended no more, but that unjust laws are not
genuine laws, nor bind to active obedience, because they are
not the ordinations of right reason, nor instituted for the
common good, nor prescribe that which ought to be done, he
said truly, but nothing at all to his purpose. But if he in
tend (as he doth), that there are no laws de facto, which are
the ordinances of reason erring, instituted for the common
hurt, and prescribing that which ought not to be done, he is
much mistaken. Pharaoh s law to drown the male children Exod.i. 22.
of the Israelites, Nebuchadnezzar s law, that whosoever Dan. m. 4-
did not fall down and worship the golden image which he *- 6 -
had set up, should be cast into the fiery furnace, Darius Dan. vi. 7.
his law, that whosoever should ask a petition of any God or
man for thirty days, save of the king, should be cast into
the den of lions, Ahasuerosh his law, to destroy the Jewish Esther in.
nation, root and branch, the Pharisees law, that whoso- j^n ix. 22.
ever confessed Christ should be excommunicated, were all
unjust laws.

90 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART The ground of this error is as great an error itself (such
n ii_ an art he hath learned of repacking paradoxes) ; which is
Emade this, that "every man makes by his consent the law which
oftiu&gt;sc ent he is bound to keep/ If this were true, it would preserve
subject to them, if not from being unjust, yet from being injurious ;
but it is not true. The positive law of God, contained in the
Old and New Testament ; the law of nature, written in our
hearts by the finger of God; the laws of conquerors, who
come in by the power of the sword ; the laws of our ances
tors, which were made before we were born; do all oblige us
to the observation of them : yet to none of all these did we
give our actual consent. Over and above all these excep
tions, he builds upon a wrong foundation, that all magis
trates at first were elective. The first governors were fathers
of families ; and when those petty princes could not afford
competent protection and security to their subjects, many of
them did resign their several and respective interests into
the hands of one joint father of the country. And though
his ground had been true, that all first legislators were elec
tive, which is false, yet his superstructure fails ; for it was
done in hope and trust, that they would make just laws. If
magistrates abuse this trust and deceive the hopes of the
people by making tyrannical laws, yet it is without their
consent. A precedent trust doth not justify the subsequent
errors and abuses of a trustee. He who is duly elected a
legislator, may exercise his legislative power unduly. The
people s implicit consent doth not render the tyrannical laws
of their legislators to be just.

But his chiefest answer is, that "an action forbidden,"
though it proceed from " necessary causes/ yet, if it were
" done willingly, it may be justly punished ;" which accord
ing to his custom he proves by an instance, " A man neces
sitated to steal by the strength of temptation/ yet, if he steal
"willingly/ is justly "put to death." Here are two things,
and both of them untrue.

M. Punish- First, he fails in his assertion. Indeed we suffer justly for
just for sin those necessities which we ourselves have contracted by our
through an- own & m \k, ^ )ut not for extrinsecal, antecedent necessities,

ncct"y.] Which wcrc im Ped upon us without our fault. If that law
do not oblige to punishment which is not intimated, because

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 91

the subject is invincibly ignorant of it ; how much less that DISCOURSE
law which prescribes absolute impossibilities ! unless perhaps - -
invincible necessity be not as strong a plea as invincible ig
norance. That which he adds, if it were done " willingly,"
though it be of great moment if it be rightly understood,
yet, in his sense, that is, if a man s will be not in his own
disposition, and if his willing do not " come upon him accord
ing to his will, nor according to anything else in his power 1 ,"
it weighs not half so much as the least feather in all his horse-
load. For if that law be unjust and tyrannical, which com
mands a man to do that which is* impossible for him to do,
then that law is likewise unjust and tyrannical, which com
mands him to will that which is impossible for him to will.

Secondly, his instance supposeth an untruth, and is a plain 2.[Tempta-

i P ,1 , -XT , n ti n does

681 begging of the question. No man is extrmsecally, antece- not involve
dently, and irresistibly " necessitated by temptation to steal." denuiece s-
The devil may solicit us, but he cannot necessitate us. He sity ofsin.]
hath a faculty of persuading, but not a power of com
pelling. " Nos ignem habemus, spiritus flammam ciet" as
Nazianzen m ; "he blows the coals, but the fire is our
own." Mordet duntaxat sese in fauces illius objicientem as
St. Austin 11 ; he bites not until we thrust ourselves into
his mouth/ He may propose, he may suggest, but he can
not move the will effectively. " Resist the devil and he will Jam. iv. 7.
fly from you." By " faith" we are " able to quench all the Eph. vi. IG.
fiery darts of the wicked." And if Satan, who can both
propose the object, and choose out the fittest times and places
to work upon our frailties, and can suggest reasons, yet cannot
necessitate the will (which is most certain), then much less
can outward objects do it alone. They have no natural
efficacy to determine the will. Well may they be occasions,
but they cannot be causes, of evil. The sensitive appetite
may engender a proclivity to steal, but not a necessity to steal.
And if it should produce a kind of necessity, yet it is but
moral, not natural; hypothetical, not absolute; coexistent,

1 [See above, T. H. Numb. iii. bolus) " nisi eum qui se ad ilium ultro

p. 27, and Numb. xi. p. 59.] mortifera securitate conjunxerit; . . la-

m ["Tb Trvp Trap r)fj.cav f) Se (f)\b TOV trare potest, sollicitare potest, mordere

Greg. Naz., Carm. xxxiii., non potest, nisi volentem." Pseudo- Aug.,

, v. 208 ; Op. torn. Serai, xxxvii., De David et Golia, () ;

ii. p. 608. ed. Bened.] Op. torn. v. Append, p. 74. F.]

n " Neminem potest

[" Neminem potest mordere" (Dia-

92 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART not antecedent; from ourselves, not extrinsecal. This neces
sity, or rather proclivity, was free in its causes. We ourselves,
by our own negligence in not opposing our passions when we
should and might, have freely given it a kind of dominion
over us. Admit, that some sudden passions may and do ex
traordinarily surprise us; and therefore we say, "motus primo
primio" "the first motions" are not always in our power, nei
ther are they free : yet this is but very rarely ; and it is our
own fault, that they do surprise us. Neither doth the law
punish the first motion to theft, but the advised act of
stealing. The intention makes the thief. But of this more
largely Numb. XXV.P

[Law use- He pleads, moreover, that the law is "a cause of justice,"
theory of that it "frames the wills" of men "to justice," and that "the
necessity.] puu i s } imcnt ^ O f one doth conduce to the preservation" of
many. All this is most true of a just law justly executed.
But this is no God-a-mercy to T. II. his opinion of absolute
necessity. If all actions and all events be predetermined
naturally, necessarily, extrinsecally, how should the law frame
men morally to good actions? He leaves nothing for the
law to do, but either that which is done already, or that which
is impossible to be done. If a man be chained to every
individual act which he doth, and from every act which he
doth not, by indissolvible bonds of inevitable necessity, how
should the law either "deter" him or "frame" him? If a
dog be chained fast to a post, the sight of a rod cannot draw
him from it. Make a thousand laws that the fire shall not
burn, yet it will burn. And whatsoever men do, (according
to T. H.) they do it as necessarily, as "the fire burnethV
Hang up a thousand thieves; and if a man be determined in
evitably to steal, he must steal notwithstanding.

Ktvtadi- He adds tllat the sufferin g s imposed by the law upon
t-atory, not delinquents, " respect not the evil act past, but the good to
come," and that the putting of a delinquent to death by the
magistrate for any crime whatsoever, cannot be justified
before God, except there be a real intention to benefit others
by his example. The truth is, the punishing delinquents by

[See below in the Cassations, p [Below, p. 714 (fol. edit.).]

Numh.vn., p. ,68. (fol. edit.) ; Disc.il. " [Above, T. H. Numb, xi., p. 59.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES.

law respecteth both "the evil act past" and "the good to come." DISCOURSE

The ground of it is " the evil act past ;" the scope or end of it

is "the good to come." The end without the ground cannot
justify the act. A bad intention may make a good action
bad; but a good intention cannot make a bad action good.
It is not lawful to " do evil, that good may come" of it; nor [Rom. iii.
to punish an innocent person for the admonition of others :
that is, to fall into a certain crime, for fear of an uncertain/
Again, though there were no other end of penalties inflicted,
neither probatory, nor castigatory, nor exemplary, but only
vindicatory, to satisfy the law, out of a zeal of justice, by
giving to every one his own, yet the action is just and
warrantable. Killing, as it is considered in itself without all
undue circumstances, was never prohibited to the lawful
magistrate, who is the vicegerent or lieutenant of God, from
Whom he derives his power of life and death.

T. H. hath one plea more. As a drowning man catcheth [T. H. sin-
at every bulrush, so he lays hold on every pretence to save a des./
desperate cause. But, first, it is worth our observation to see
how oft he changeth shapes in this one particular. First, he
told us, that it was the " irresistible power" of God that "justi-
C82 fies all His actions," though He command one thing openly
and plot another thing secretly, though He be the cause, not
only of the action, but also of the irregularity, though He
both give man power to act and determine this power to evil
as well as good, though He punish the creatures for doing
that, which He Himself did necessitate them to do r . But,
being pressed with reason, that this is tyrannical, first to
necessitate a man to do His will, and then to punish him for
doing of it, he leaves this pretence in the plain field, and
flies to a second; that therefore a man is justly punished for
that which he was necessitated to do, because the act was
voluntary on his part 8 . This hath more show of reason than
the former, if he did make the will of man to be in his own
disposition; but, maintaining, that the will is irresistibly
determined to will whatsoever it doth will, the injustice and
absurdity is the same : first, to necessitate a man to will,
and then to punish him for willing. The dog only bites the
stone which is thrown at him with a strange hand ; but they

* [See T. H. Numb, xii., above p. 66.] s [See above, p. 85.]

94 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART make the First Cause to punish the instrument for that which
_ 11L - is His own proper act. Wherefore, not being satisfied with
this, he casts it off, and flies to his third shift. "Men are not
punished" (saithhe) " therefore, because their theft proceeded
from election" (that is, because it was willingly done, for "to
elect and will," saith he, " are both one 4 ," is not this to
blow hot and cold with the same breath?), "but because it was
noxious, and contrary to men s preservation." Thus far he
saith true, that every creature, by the instinct of nature, seeks
to preserve itself. Cast water into a dusty place, and it con
tracts itself into little globes ; that is, to preserve itself. And
those who are "noxious" in the eye of the law, are justly
punished by them to whom the execution of the law is com
mitted; but the law accounts no persons "noxious" but those
who are noxious by their own fault. It punisheth not a
thorn for pricking, because it is the nature of the thorn, and
it can do no otherwise ; nor a child before it have the use of
reason. If one should take mine hand perforce and give
another a box on the ear with it, my hand is " noxious," but
the law punisheth the other who is faulty. And therefore he
hath reason to propose the question, " how it is just to kill
one man to amend another/ if he who killed did nothing but
what he was "necessitated" to do. He might as well de
mand, how it is lawful to murder a company of innocent
infants, to make a bath of their lukewarm blood for curing
the leprosy. It had been a more rational way, first, to have
demonstrated that it is so, and then to have questioned why
it is so. His assertion itself is but a dream ; and the reason
which he gives of it why it is so, is a dream of a dream.
[Right and The sum of it is this, that "where there is no law, there
no killing or anything else can be unjust ;" that before the
constitution of commonwealths every man had power to kill
another, if he conceived him to be hurtful to him ; that at
the constitution of commonwealths particular men " lay
down" this right in part, and in part reserve it to them
selves, " as in case of theft, or murder ;" that " the right
which the commonwealth hath to put" a malefactor "to
death, is not created by the law, but remaineth from the first
right of nature, which every man hath, to preserve himself;"

1 [See below, T. H. Numb. xx. p. 700 (fol. edit.).]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 95

that the killing of men in this case is as the killing of beasts DISCOURSE

"in order to our own preservation." This may well be called L_

stringing of paradoxes.

1. But, first, there never was any such time when man
kind was without governors and laws and "societies."
Paternal government was in the world from the beginning,
and the law of nature. There might be sometimes a root of
such barbarous thievish brigands, in some rocks, or deserts,
or odd corners of the world; but it was an abuse, and a
degeneration from the nature of man, who is a political
creature. This savage opinion reflects too much upon the
honour of mankind.

2. Secondly, there never was a time when it was lawful
ordinarily for private men to kill one another for their own
preservation. If God would have had men live like wild
beasts, as lions, bears, or tigers, He would have armed them
with horns, or tusks, or talons, or pricks ; but of all creatures
man is born most naked, without any weapon to defend him
self, because God had provided a better means of security for
him, that is, the magistrate.

3. Thirdly, that right which private men have, to preserve
themselves, though it be with the killing of another, when
they are set upon to be murdered or robbed, is not a re
mainder or a reserve of some greater power which they have

683 resigned, but a privilege which God hath given them, in case
of extreme danger and invincible necessity, that when they
cannot possibly have recourse to the ordinary remedy, that
is, the magistrate, every man becomes a magistrate to himself.

4. Fourthly, nothing can give that which it never had.
The people, whilst they were a dispersed rabble (which in
some odd cases might happen to be), never had justly the
power of life and death, and therefore they could not give it
by their election. All that they do is to prepare the matter;
but it is God Almighty, that irifuseth the soul of power.

5. Fifthly, and lastly, I am sorry to hear a man of reason
and parts to compare the murdering of men with the
slaughtering of brute beasts. The elements are for the
plants, the plants for the brute beasts, the brute beasts for
man. When God enlarged His former grant to man, and

gave him liberty to eat the flesh of the creatures for his sus- Gen. ix. 3.

96 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART tenancc, yet man is expressly excepted, " Whoso sheddeth

7 man s blood, by man shall his blood be shed ;" and the

reason is assigned, "For in the image of God made He

(Rom. v. man." Before "sin entered into the world/ or before any
creatures were hurtful or " noxious" to man, he had do
minion over them, as their lord and master. And though
the possession of this sovereignty be lost in part for the sin
of man, which made not only the creatures to rebel, but also
the inferior faculties to rebel against the superior (from
whence it comes, that one man is hurtful to another), yet
the dominion still remains : wherein we may observe, how
sweetly the providence of God doth temper this cross ; that
though the strongest creatures have withdrawn their obe
dience, as lions and bears, to shew that man hath lost the
excellency of his dominion, and the weakest creatures, as
flies and gnats, to shew into what a degree of contempt he is
fallen, yet still the most profitable and useful creatures, as
sheep and oxen, do in some degree retain their obedience.

[Consuita- The next branch of his answer concerns "consultations;"

tinn does . .

imply winch (saith he) are not superfluous, though all things come
tioel no?" to P ass necessarily, because they are " the cause which doth
&lt;"et c ermil lte necessitate the effect," and the "means to bring it to pass."
nation.] We were told Numb. xi. u , that the last dictate of right
reason was but as the last feather which breaks the horse s
back. It is well; yet that reason hath gained some command
again, and is become at least a quarter-master. Certainly, if
anything under God have power to determine the will, it is
right reason. But I have shewed sufficiently, that reason
doth not determine the will physically nor absolutely, much
less extrinsecally and antecedently; and therefore it makes
nothing for that necessity which T. H. hath undertaken to
prove. He adds further, that as the end is necessary, so are
the means ; and "when it is determined that one thing shall
be chosen before another, it is determined also for what cause
it shall be so chosen." All which is truth, but not the whole
truth. For, as God ordains means for all ends, so He adapts
and fits the means to their respective ends; free means to
free ends, contingent means to contingent ends, necessary
means to necessary ends: whereas T. H. would have all

n [Above p. 59.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 97

means, all ends, to be necessary. If God hath so ordered DISCOURSE
the world, that a man ought to use and may freely use those - :

means of good, which he doth neglect, not by virtue of God s
decree but by his own fault ; if a man use those means of
evil, which he ought not to use, and which by God s decree
he had power to forbear ; if God have left to man in part the
free managery of human affairs, and to that purpose hath en
dowed him with understanding; then consultations are of use,
then provident care is needful, then it concerns him to use
the means. But if God have so ordered this world, that a
man cannot if he would neglect any means of good, which by
virtue of God s decree it is possible for him to use, and that
he cannot possibly use any means of evil but those which are
irresistibly and inevitably imposed upon him by an antecedent
decree ; then not only consultations are vain, but that noble
faculty of reason itself is vain. Do we think, that we can
help God Almighty to do His proper work? In vain we
trouble ourselves ; in vain we take care to use those means,
which are not in our power to use or not to use. And this
is that which was contained in my prolepsis or prevention of
his answer, though he be pleased both to disorder it and to
silence it. We cannot hope by our labours to alter the
course of things set down by God. Let Him perform His
684 decree. Let the necessary causes do their work. If we be
those causes, yet we are not in our own disposition ; we must
do what we are ordained to do, and more we cannot do.
Man hath no remedy but patience, and shrug up the
shoulders. This is the doctrine [which] flows from this opinion
of absolute necessity. Let us suppose the great wheel of the
clock, which sets all the little wheels a going, to be as the
decree of God ; and that the motion of it were perpetual, in
fallible, from an intrinsecal principle, even as God s decree is
infallible, eternal, all-sufficient. Let us suppose the lesser
wheels to be the second causes; and that they do as certainly
follow the motion of the great wheel, without missing or
swerving in the least degree, as the second causes do pursue
the determination of the first cause. I desire to know in.
this case, what cause there is to call a council of smiths, to
consult and order the motion of that which was ordered and
determined before their hands ? Are men wiser than God ?

BRAMHALL.

98 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART Yet all men know, that the motion of the lesser wheels is a

necessary means to make the clock strike.

But he tells me in great sadness, that my argument is just
like this other, " If I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live
till to-morrow, though I run myself through with a sword to
day . which, saith he, is " a false consequence/ and " a
false proposition." Truly, if by " running through" he
understands killing, it is a "false," or rather a foolish propo
sition, and implies a contradiction. To live till to-morrow,
and to-day to die, are inconsistent. But, by his favour, this
is not my "consequence," but this is his own opinion. He
would persuade us, that it is absolutely necessary that a man
shall live till to-morrow, and yet that it is possible that he
may kill himself to-day. My argument is this ; If there be
a liberty and possibility for a man to kill himself to-day, then
it is not absolutely necessary that he shall live till to-morrow ;
but there is such a liberty ; therefore no such necessity. And
the "consequence" which I make here is this; If it be abso
lutely necessary that a man shall live till to-morrow, then it
is vain and superfluous for him to consult and deliberate,
whether he should die to-day or not. And this is a true con
sequence. The ground of his mistake is this, that though
it be true that a man may kill himself to-day, yet, upon the
supposition of his absolute necessity, it is impossible. Such
heterogeneous arguments and instances he produceth ; which
are half builded upon our true grounds, and the other half
upon his false grounds.

[Admoni- The next branch of my argument concerns admonitions; to
imply d which he gives no new answer, and therefore I need not

caShey" make any neW reply ; savin g Onl 7 to tel1 him, that he mis-
are ad- takes my argument. I sav not onlv, If all things be neces-

dressed to , . . " *

those only sary, then admonitions are in vain, but, If all things be

conceded necessary, then "it is to 110 more purpose to admonish men of

. be free.] understanding than fools, children, or madmen." That they

do admonish the one and not the other, is confessedly true ;

and no reason under heaven can be given for it but this,

that the former have the use of reason, and true liberty, with

a dominion over their own actions, which children, fools, and

madmen, have not.

n!S, e ai. Concerning praise and dispraise, he enlargeth himself.

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 99

The scope of his discourse is, that "things necessary" may DISCOURSE
be " praiseworthy." There is no doubt of it. But withal
their praise reflects upon the free agent, as the praise of a
statue reflects upon the workman who made it. "To praise
a thing" (saith he) is " to say, it is good." True : but this liberty.]
goodness is not a metaphysical goodness ; so the worst of
things, and whatsoever hath a being, is good : nor a natural
goodness ; the praise of it passeth wholly to the Author of
nature; "God saw all that He had made, and it was very [Gen. i.
good :" but a moral goodness, or a goodness of actions rather 31 ^
than of things. The moral goodness of an action is the con
formity of it with right reason. The moral evil of an action
is the deformity of it, and the alienation of it from right
reason. It is moral praise and dispraise which we speak of
here. To praise anything morally, is to say, it is morally
good, that is, conformable to right reason. The moral dis
praise of a thing is to say, it is morally bad, or disagreeing
from the rule of right reason. So moral praise is from the
good use of liberty, moral dispraise from the bad use of
liberty; but if all things be necessary, then moral liberty is
quite taken away, and with it all true praise and dispraise.
Whereas T. H. adds, that "to say a thing is good, is to say,
685 it is as I would wish, or as another would" wish, or as " the
state" would have it, or " according to the law" of the land,
he mistakes infinitely. He, and another, and the state, may
all wish that which is not really good but only in appearance.
We do often wish what is profitable or delightful, without
regarding so much as we ought what is honest. And though
" the will of the state" where we live, or the law of the land,
do deserve great consideration, yet it is no infallible rule of
moral goodness. And therefore to his question, whether
nothing "that proceeds from necessity can please" me, I
answer, yes. The burning of the fire pleaseth me when I am
cold ; and I say, it is good fire, or a creature created by God
for my use and for my good : yet I do not mean to attribute
any moral goodness to the fire, nor give any moral praise to
it ; as if it were in the power of the fire itself either to com
municate its heat or to suspend it : but I praise first the
Creator of the fire, and then him who provided it. As for
the praise " which Velleius Paterculus gives Cato," that

n 2

100 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART "he was good by nature, et quia aliter esse non potuit*" it

- hath more of the orator than either of the theologian or

philosopher in it. Man in the state of innocency did fall and

become evil ; what privilege hath Cato more than he ? No,

by his leave,

" Narratur et dii Catonis
Sffipe mero caluisse virtus V

But the true meaning, that he was naturally of a good
temper, not so prone to some kinds of vices as others were,
this is to praise a thing, not an action, naturally, not morally.
Socrates was not of so good a natural temper, yet proved as
good a man z . The more his praise ; by how much the difficulty
was the more to conform his disorderly appetite to right
reason.

[Ofrewards Concerning reward and punishment, he saith not a word,
nu-iuT; 1 " but only that they frame " and conform the will to good ;"
Sb5S? ld which hath been suffi ciently answered. They do so indeed;
beasts not but if his opinion were true, they could not do so. But

relevant.] . *

(because my aim is not only to answer T. H., but also to
satisfy myself) though it be not urged by him, yet I do
acknowledge, that I find some improper and analogical
rewards and punishments used to brute beasts ; as the hunter
rewards his dog, the master of the coy-duck whips her, when
she returns without company. And if it be true, which he
affirmeth a little before, that I have confessed, that "the
actions of brute beasts are all necessitated and determined to
that one thing which they shall do a ," the difficulty is increased.
i. [Ail the But, first, my saying is misalleged. I said, that some

actions of -i i /. , . 1-1

brute beasts kmQ s 01 actions, which are most excellent in brute beasts and
mrtnece - make t ] ie greatest snow of rcason ^ as fl^ ^ ees wor king their

honey and the spiders weaving their webs, are yet done
without any consultation or deliberation, by a mere instinct
of nature, and by a determination of their fancies to these
only kinds of works b . But I did never say, I could not say,
that all their individual actions are necessary, and antece
dently determined in their causes; as what days the bees
shall fly abroad, and what days and hours each bee shall keep

* [See above, p. 87. note c.] Fato, c. 5.1

at, Carm. III. xxL 11, 12. * [See above, T. H. Numb, viil,

&lt; f XT *- * j A ^ I O C C

Narratur et prisci Catonis," &c.l p 47.1

[Cic., Tusc. Quaest., iv. 37 ; De i [See i

[See in Numb, vi., above p. 37.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 101

in the hive, how often they shall fetch in thyme on a day, and DISCOURSE

from whence. These actions and the like, though they be

not free, because brute beasts want reason to deliberate, yet
they are contingent, and therefore not necessary.

Secondly, I do acknowledge, that as the fancies of some 2. [The
brute creatures are determined by nature to some rare and warcfand
exquisite works, so in others, where it finds a natural pro- ^
pension, art, which is the imitator of nature, may frame and ^
form them according to the will of the artist to some par- analogy
ticular actions and ends ; as we see in setting-dogs, and coy- r
ducks, and parrots : and the principal means whereby they
effect this, is by their backs or by their bellies, by the rod or
by the morsel, which have indeed a shadow or resemblance of
rewards and punishments. But we take the word here pro
perly, not as it is used by vulgar people, but as it is used by
divines and philosophers, for that recompense which is due to
honest and dishonest actions. Where there is no moral
liberty, there is neither honesty nor dishonesty, neither true
reward nor punishment.

Thirdly, when brute creatures do learn any such qualities, 3. [They
it is not out of judgment, or deliberation, or discourse, by cases, not
inferring or concluding one thing from another (which they Jj^jJJf"
are not capable of, neither are they able to conceive a reason from sense
of what they do), but merely out of memory, or out of a sensi- or memory
686 tive fear, or hope. They remember, that when they did after or patn. J ] y
one manner they were beaten, and when they did after another
manner, they were cherished; and accordingly they apply
themselves. But if their individual actions were absolutely
necessary, fear or hope could not alter them. Most cer
tainly, if there be any desert in it, or any praises due unto it,
it is to them who did instruct them.

Lastly, concerning arts, arms, books, instruments, study,
physic, and the like, he answereth not a word more than what
is already satisfied. And therefore I am silent.

NUMBER XV.
J. D. Thirdly, let this opinion be once radicated in the Argument

3. [The
opinion of

minds of men, that there is 110 true liberty, and that all

102 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART things come to pass inevitably, and it will utterly destroy the
study of piety. Who will bewail his sins with tears ? what
Jc C o e ns!s: w in become of that " grief/ that " zeal/ that " indignation/
piety j l 1 that holy "revenge/ which the Apostle speaks of? if men be
n.j^ V " once throughly persuaded that they could not shun what
they did. A man may grieve for that which he could not
help ; but he will never be brought to bewail that as his own
fault, which flowed not from his own error, but from an ante
cedent necessity. Who will be careful or solicitous to per
form obedience, that believeth there are inevitable bounds
and limits set to all his devotions, which he can neither go
beyond nor come short of? To what end shall he pray God to
avert those evils which are inevitable? or to confer those
favours which are impossible? We indeed know not what
good or evil shall happen to us ; but this we know, that if all
things be necessary, our devotions and endeavours cannot
alter that which must be. In a word, the only reason, why
those persons who tread in this path of fatal destiny do some
times pray, or repent, or serve God, is because the light of
nature and the strength of reason and the evidence of Scrip
ture do for that present transport them from their ill-chosen
grounds, and expel those Stoical fancies out of their heads.
A complete Stoic can neither pray nor repent nor serve God
to any purpose. Either allow liberty, or destroy Church as
well as commonwealth, religion as well as policy.

[Answer.] T. II. His third argument consisteth in other incon
veniences, which he saith will follow; namely, impiety, and
negligence of religious duties, repentance and zeal to God s
service. To which I answer, as to the rest, that they follow
not. I must confess, if we consider far the greatest part of
mankind, not as they should be, but as they are ; that is, as
men, whom either the study of acquiring wealth, or prefer
ments, or whom the appetite of sensual delights, or the im
patience of meditating, or the rash embracing of wrong
principles, have made unapt to discuss the truth of things ;
that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help
their piety. And therefore, if he had not desired this answer,
I would not have written it. Nor do I write it, but in hope
your Lordship and he will keep it in private. Neverthe-

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 103

less, in very truth, the necessity of events does not of itself DISCOURSE
draw with it any impiety at all. For piety consisteth only in - ^- r
two things : one, that we honour God in our hearts ; which ion ofne-

is, that we think of His power as highly as we can ; for to
honour anything is nothing else but to think it to be of great *P* et y i
power : the other, that we signify that honour and esteem by minded
our words and actions ; which is called " cultus" or worship "
of God. He therefore that thinketh, that all things proceed
from God s eternal will, and consequently are necessary, does
he not think God omnipotent ? does he not esteem of His
power as highly as possible ? which is to honour God as much
as can be in his heart. Again, he that thinketh so, is he not
more apt by external acts and words to acknowledge it, than
he that thinketh otherwise ? Yet is this external acknow
ledgment the same thing which we call worship. So this
opinion fortifieth piety in both kinds, externally, internally ;
and therefore is far from destroying it. And for repentance, [Nor ex-
which is nothing but a glad returning into the right way

vor
prayer ]

after the grief of being out of the way, though the cause
that made him go astray were necessary, yet there is no
reason why he should not grieve; and again, though the
cause why he returned into the way were necessary, there
remains still the causes of joy. So that the necessity of the
actions taketh away neither of those parts of repentance,
grief for the error, nor joy for the returning. And for [No
prayer, whereas he saith, that the necessity of things destroys
prayer, I deny it. For though prayer be none of the causes
that move God s will, His will being unchangeable, yet, since
we find in God s word, He will not give His blessings but to [Matt. vii.
those that ask them, the motive to prayer is the same. 7 - &c&lt; J
Prayer is the gift of God, no less than the blessings. And
the prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein
the blessing is decreed. Tis manifest, that thanksgiving
687 is no cause of the blessing past ; and that which is past is
sure, and necessary. Yet even amongst men, thanks is in use
as an acknowledgment of the benefit past, though we should
expect no new benefit for our gratitude. And prayer to God
Almighty is but thanksgiving for His blessings in general.
And though it precede the particular thing we ask, yet it is
not a cause or means of it, but a signification that we expect

104 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART nothing but from God, in such manner as He, not as we, will.

IIL And our Saviour byword of mouth bids us pray, "Thy will/

m-Luke not our will, "be done;" and by example teaches us the

iLukexxii. same &gt; for He P ra 7 ed thus &gt; "Father, if it be Thy will, let this

4 -- ] cup pass," &c. The end of prayer, as of thanksgiving, is not

to move, but to honour God Almighty, in acknowledging

that what we ask can be effected by Him only.

[Reply.] J. D. I hope T. H. will be persuaded in time, that it is
not the covetousness, or ambition, or sensuality, or sloth, or
prejudice of his readers, which renders this doctrine of ab
solute necessity dangerous ; but that it is in its own nature
destructive to true godliness. And though his answer con
sist more of oppositions than of solutions, yet I will not
[T. H. mis- willingly leave one grain of his matter unweighed. First, he
[fiety to be errs i* 1 making inward piety to consist merely in the estima-
?h e a |udg- tion of tlie judgment. If this were so, what hinders but that
incut.] the devils should have as much inward piety as the best
[James ii. Christians ? for they esteem God s power to be infinite " and
tremble." Though inward piety do suppose the act of the
understanding, yet it consisteth properly in the act of the
will ; being that branch of justice, which gives to God the
honour which is due unto Him c . Is there no love due to
[And to God, no faith, no hope ? Secondlv, he errs in making inward

respect

God s piety to ascribe no glory to God but only the glory of His
f.niy/l power or omnipotence. What shall become of all other the
Divine attributes ? and particularly of His goodness, of His
truth, of His justice, of His mercy ? which beget a more true
and sincere honour in the heart than greatness itself. " M ag-
[Hisopin- nos facile laudamus, bonos lubenter" Thirdly, this opinion of
stroy 8 e the absolute necessity destroys the truth of God ; making Him
btes of "" to comma nd one thing openly and to necessitate another
"&gt;&lt;*] privately, to chide a man for doing that which it hath deter
mined him to do, to profess one thing and to intend another.
It destroys the goodness of God ; making Him to be a hater
of mankind, and to delight in the torments of His creatures,
M-uke xvi. \vhcrcas the very dogs licked the sores of Lazarus in pity and
commiseration of him. It destroys the justice of God;
making Him to punish the creatures for that which was His

[Thorn. Aquin., Summ., Secund. Secund., Qu. Ixxxi. art. 5.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 105

own act, which they had no more power to shun than the fire DISCOURSE
hath power not to burn d . It destroys the very power of God ;
making Him to be the true Author of all the defects and
evils which are in the world. These are the fruits of im
potence, not of omnipotence. He who is the effective cause
of sin, either in himself or in the creature, is not almighty.
There needs no other devil in the world, to raise jealousies
and suspicions between God and His creatures, or to poison
mankind with an apprehension that God doth not love them,
but only this opinion ; which was the office of the serpent. Gen. m. 5.
Fourthly, for the outward worship of- God. How shall a man [And the
praise God for His goodness, who believes Him to be a greater worship of
tyrant than ever was in the world, Who creates millions to God ^
burn eternally without their fault, to express His power ? How
shall a man hear the word of God with that reverence and
devotion and faith which is requisite, who believeth, that God
causeth His Gospel to be preached to the much greater part
of Christians, not with any intention that they should be
converted and saved, but merely to harden their hearts, and
to make them inexcusable ? How shall a man receive the
blessed Sacrament with comfort and confidence, as a seal of
God s love in Christ, who believeth, that so many millions
are positively excluded from all fruit and benefit of the
Passions of Christ, before they had done either good or evil ?
How shall he prepare himself with care and conscience, who
apprehendeth, that "eating and drinking unworthily" is not [Seel Cor.
the cause of damnation, but because God would damn a man, xl
therefore He necessitates him to "eat and drink unworthily?"
How shall a man make a free vow to God, without gross
ridiculous hypocrisy, who thinks he is able to perform
nothing but as he is extrinsecally necessitated? Fifthly, for [And re-
repentance, how shall a man condemn and accuse himself pt
for his sins, who thinks himself to be like a watch which
is wound up by God, and that he can go neither longer
nor shorter, faster nor slower, truer nor falser, than he is
ordered by God ? If God sets him right, he goes right. If
688 God set him wrong, he goes wrong. How can a man be
said to " return into the right way," who never was in any
other way but that which God Himself had chalked out for

d [See above, T. H. Numb, xi., p. 59.]

106 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART him ? What is his purpose to amend, who is destitute of all
JI: _ power, but as if a man should purpose to fly without wings, or
a beggar who hath not a groat in his purse purpose to build
hospitals ? We use to say, " Admit one absurdity, and a thou
sand will follow 6 ." To maintain this unreasonable opinion of
absolute necessity, he is necessitated (but it is hypothetically,
he might change his opinion if he would) to deal with all
ancient writers, as the Goths did with the Romans ; who de
stroyed all their magnificent works, that there might remain
no monument of their greatness upon the face of the earth.
Therefore he will not leave so much as one of their opinions,
nor one of their definitions, nay, not one of their terms of art
standing. Observe what a description he hath given us here of
repentance : " It is a glad returning into the right way after
the grief of being out of the way." It amazed me to find
gladness to be the first w r ord in the description of repent
ance. His repentance is not that repentance, nor his piety
that piety, nor his prayer that kind of prayer, which the
Church of God in all ages hath acknowledged. Fasting, and
sackcloth, and ashes, and tears, and lmmicubations f , used to
be companions of repentance. Joy may be a consequent of
it, not a part of it. It is a te returning," but whose act is
this returning ? Is it God s alone, or doth the penitent per
son concur also freely with the grace of God ? If it be God s
alone, then it is His repentance, not man s repentance.
What need the penitent person trouble himself about it?
God will take care of His own work. The Scriptures teach

Vo 1 US otherwise &gt; tliat God expects our concurrence : " Be
zealous and repent ; behold, I stand at the door, and knock ;
if any man hear My voice, and open the door, I will come in
to him." It is " a glad returning into the right way ;" who
dare any more call that a wrong way, which God Himself
hath determined ? He that willeth and doth that which God
would have him to will and to do, is never out of his " right
way." It follows in his description, " after the grief," &c.
It is true, a man may grieve for that which is necessarily
imposed upon him ; but he cannot grieve for it as a fault of

Un absurdo sequuntur (r&lt;a/j.a.Tos, rr)v Si f^ayopeva-ews Kal art-

nill n

f r\ t \i p.oTfpas dywyris firavopQcvtriv." Greg.

&dcpua, ffTfvaynobs, dvoKku Naz., Orat. xl. in Sanct. Baptisma, Op.

, ., . . . ,

rtas, d-xpvwfas, TT}|, ^/ ux fj s Ka l torn. i. p. 642. B. fol. Paris. 1609.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 107

his own, if it never was in his power to shun it. Suppose DISCOURSE
a writing-master shall hold his scholar s hand in his, and -
write with it : the scholar s part is only to hold still his hand,
whether the master write well or ill; the scholar hath no
groimd, either of joy or sorrow, as for himself; no man will
interpret it to be his act, but his master s. It is no fault to
be out of the " right way/ if a man had not liberty to have
kept himself in the way.

And so from repentance he skips quite over new obedience, [T. H. de-
to come to prayer, which is the last religious duty insisted prayer to
upon by me here ; but according to his use, without either

C ause

answering or mentioning what I say : which would have
shewed him plainly what kind of prayer I intend, not blessings.]
contemplative prayer in general, as it includes thanksgiving,
but that most proper kind of prayer which we call petition,
which used to be thus defined, to be " an act of religion, by
which we desire of God something which we have not, and
hope that we shall obtain it by Him?." Quite contrary to
this T. H. tells us, that prayer "is not a cause nor a means"
of God s blessing, but only "a signification that we expect"
it from Him. If he had told us only, that prayer is not a
meritorious cause of God s blessings, as the poor man by
begging an alms doth not deserve it, I should have gone
along with him. But to tell us, that it is not so much as " a
means" to procure God s blessing, and yet with the same
breath, that God " will not give His blessings but to those"
who pray; who shall reconcile him to himself? The Scrip
tures teach us otherwise : " Whatsoever ye shall ask the John
Father in My name, He will give it you ;" " Ask, and it Matt.
shall be given you, seek and ye shall find, knock and it shall
be opened unto you." St. Paul tells the Corinthians, that
he was "helped" by their "prayers;" that s not all; that 2 Cor. i. u.
" the gift was bestowed upon him by their means :" so prayer
is a "means." And St. James saith, "The effectual fervent [James] v.
prayer of a righteous man availeth much :" if it be
" effectual," then it is " a cause." To shew this efficacy of [.Matt. vii.
prayer, our Saviour useth the comparison of a father towards Luke xT
his child, of a neighbour towards his neighbour ; yea, of an fl^g 3 ^
unjust judge, to shame those who think, that God hath not 6 8 -l

J J [Lukexviii.

8 [See Thorn. Aquin., Summ., Secund. Secund., Qu. Ixxxiii. art. 3.] 1 8-J

xvi.

108 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

I A H T more compassion than a wicked man. This was signified by 689
"?--.. Jacob s wrestling and prevailing with God. Prayer is like
[Gen.xii. the tradesman * s tools ^ wherewithal he gets his living for

himself and his family. But, saith he, God s " will" is " un
changeable." What then ? He might as well use this
against study, physic, and all second causes, as against
prayer. He shews even in this, how little they attribute to
the endeavours of men. There is a great difference between
these two; " mutare voluntatem"" to change the will h ,"-
Uamosi. (which God never doth, in Whom there is not the least
shadow of turning by change ; His will to love and hate was
the same from eternity, which it now is, and ever shall be ;
His love and hatred are immoveable, but we are removed ;

" Non tellus cymbam tellurem cymba reliquit ;")

and "velle mutationem" "to will a change 11 ;" which God often
doth. To change the will argues a change in the agent, but
to will a change only argues a change in the object. It is
no inconstancy in a man, to love, or to hate, as the object is
changed. " Prasta mihi omnia eadem et idem sum" Prayer
works not upon God but us. It renders not Him more
propitious in Himself, but us more capable of mercy. He
saith, this that God doth not bless us, except we pray is
" a motive to prayer." Why talks he of " motives," who
acknowledgeth no liberty, nor admits any cause, but abso
lutely necessary ? He saith, " Prayer is the gift of God no
less than the blessing" which we pray for, and contained
"in the same decree" with "the blessing." It is true, the
spirit of prayer is the gift of God; will he conclude from
thence, that the good employment of one talent, or of one
gift of God, may not procure another ? Our Saviour teach-
[Matt. xxv. eth us otherwise; "Come, thou good and faithful servant;
thou hast been faithful in little, I will make thee ruler over
much." Too much light is an enemy to the light, and too
much law is an enemy to justice. I could wish we wrangled
less about God s decrees, until we understood them better.
But, saith he, "thanksgiving is no cause of the blessing
past," and " prayer is but a thanksgiving." He might even as
well tell me, that when a beggar craves an alms, and when

h [Thorn. Aquin., Sunun., P. Prima, Qu. xix. art. 7.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 109

lie gives thanks for it, it is all one. Every thanksgiving is a DISCOURSE
kind of prayer ; but every prayer, and namely petition, is L
not a thanksgiving. In the last place he urgeth, that in our
prayers we are bound to submit our wills to God s will.
Who ever made any doubt of this ? We must submit to the
preceptive will of God, or His commandments; we must
submit to the effective will of God, when He declares
His good pleasure by the event or otherwise. But we deny,
and deny again, either that God wills things " ad extra"-
" without Himself" necessarily, or that it is His pleasure
that all second causes should act necessarily at all times;
which is the question, and that which he allegeth to the con
trary comes not near it.

NUMBER XVI.

J. D. Fourthly, the order, beauty, and perfection of the Argument
world doth require, that in the universe should be agents of opiniraof
all sorts, some necessary, some free, some contingent. He 51^?^
that shall make either all things necessary, guided by des- the variety
tiny, or all things free, governed by election, or all things tion of the
contingent, happening by chance, doth overthrow the beauty U1
and the perfection of the world.

T. H. The fourth argument from reason is this, "The [Answer.}
order, beauty, and perfection of the world requireth, that in
the universe should be agents of all sorts, some necessary,
some free, some contingent ; he that shall make all things
necessary, or all things free, or all things contingent, doth
overthrow the beauty and perfection of the world." In
which argument I observe, first, a contradiction. For, see
ing he that maketh anything, in that he maketh it, he mak-
eth it to be necessary, it followeth, that he that maketh all
things, maketh all things necessary to be. As, if a workman
make a garment, the garment must necessarily be; so, if
God make every thing, every thing must necessarily be.
Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth (though we know
it not), that some agents should work without deliberation,

110 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

p\ RT which he calls necessary agents; and some agents with deli-
beration, and those both he and I call free agents ; and that

some agents should work and we not know how, and their
effects we both call contingent. But this hinders not, but that
he that electeth may have his election necessarily determined
to one by former causes ; and that which is contingent and
imputed to fortune, be nevertheless necessary, and depend
on precedent necessary causes. For by contingent, men do
not mean that which hath no cause, but which hath not for
cause anything which we perceive. As, for example, when
a traveller meets with a shower, the journey had a cause, and
the rain had a cause, sufficient enough to produce it, but
because the journey caused not the rain, nor the rain the
journey, we say, they were contingent one to another. And
thus, you see, though there be three sorts of events, neces- 690
sary, contingent, and free, yet they may be all necessary
without the destruction of the beauty or perfection of the
universe.

[Reply.] J. D. The first thing he observes in mine argument is
"contradiction," as he calls it, but in truth it is but a de
ception of the sight ; as one candle sometimes seems to be
two, or a rod in the water shews to be two rods. " Quicquid
recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis" But what is this
" contradiction ?" Because I say, " he who maketh all
things, doth not make them necessary." What ? A " con
tradiction," and but one proposition ? That were strange. I
say, God hath not made all agents necessary ; he saith, God
hath made all agents necessary. Here is a " contradiction"
indeed, but it is between him and me, not between me and
myself. But yet though it be not a formal " contradiction,"
yet perhaps it may imply a contradiction in adjecto. Where
fore, to clear the matter, and dispel the mist which he hath
[Hypothe- raised. It is true, that every thing when it is made, it is
tinctfrom necessary that it be made so as it is; that is, by a necessity
SeSTne- of mfa l li bility, or supposition supposing, that it be so made ;
cecity, j but this is not that absolute, antecedent necessity, whereof
the question is between him and me. As, to use his own
instance, before t&gt;e garment be made, the tailor is free to

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. Ill

make it either of the Italian, Spanish, or French fashion in- DISCOURSE
differently; but after it is made, it is necessary that it be of
that fashion whereof he hath made it ; that is, by a necessity
of supposition. But this doth neither hinder the cause from
being a free cause, nor the effect from being a free effect;
but the one did produce freely, and the other was freely pro
duced. So the "contradiction" is vanished.

In the second part of his answer he grants, that there are [Contin-
some free agents, and some contingent agents ; and that events.]
"perhaps the beauty of the world" doth "require" it; but,
like a shrewd cow, which after she hath given her milk casts
it down with her foot, in the conclusion he tells us, that
nevertheless they are "all necessary." This part of his
answer is a mere logomachy (as a great part of the contro
versies in the world are), or a contention about words ; what
is the meaning of necessary, and free, and contingent actions.
I have shewed before, what free and necessary do properly
signify; but he misrecites it. He saith, I make all agents
which want "deliberation" to be "necessary;" but I ac
knowledge, that many of them are contingent. Neither do
I approve his definition of contingents, though he say, I con
cur with him ; that they are such agents as " work we know
not how." For, according to this description, many neces
sary actions should be contingent, and many contingent
actions should be necessary. The loadstone draweth iron,
the jet chaff, we "know not how;" and yet the effect is
necessary : and so it is in all sympathies and antipathies or
occult qualities. Again, a man walking in the streets, a tile
falls down from a house, and breaks his head. We know
all the causes, we know how this came to pass. The man
walked that way, the pin failed, the tile fell just when he was
under it. And yet this is a contingent effect. The man
might not have walked that way, and then the tile had not
fallen upon him. Neither yet do I understand here in this
place by contingents, such events as happen besides the
scope or intention of the agents ; as when a man, digging to
make a grave, finds a treasure; though the word be some
times so taken. But by contingents, I understand all things,
which may be done and may not be done, may happen or
may not happen, by reason of the indetermination, or acci-

112 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

dental concurrence, of the causes. And those same things
which are absolutely contingent, are yet hypothetically
necessary; as, supposing the passenger did walk just that
way, just at that time, and that the pin did fail just then,
and the tile fall, it was necessary that it should fall upon the
passenger s head. The same defence will keep out his
" shower of rain." But we shall meet with his " shower of
rain" again, Numb, xxxiv*; whither I refer the further ex
plication of this point.

NUMBER XVII.

Argument J. D. Fifthly, take away liberty, and you take away the
thenPbe verv nature of evil, and the formal reason of sin. If the
hand of the painter were the law of painting, or the hand of
there is no the writer the law of writing, whatsoever the one did write,
or the other paint, must infallibly be good. Seeing there
fore, that the First Cause is the rule and law of goodness, if
it do necessitate the will or the person to evil, either by itself
immediately, or mediately by necessary flux of second causes,
it will no longer be evil. The essence of sin consists in this,
that one commit that which he might avoid. If there be noc9i
liberty to produce sin, there is no such thing as sin in the
world. Therefore it appears, both from Scripture and reason,
that there is true liberty.

[Answer.] T. H. To the fifth argument from reason, which is, that
if liberty be taken away, the nature and formal reason of sin
is taken away, I answer by denying the consequence. The
nature of sin consisteth in this, that the action done proceed
from our will, and be against the law. A judge, in judging
whether it be sin or not which is done against the law, looks
at no higher cause of the action than the will of the doer.
Now when I say the action was necessary, I do not say it
was done against the will of the doer, but with his will ; and
so necessarily, because man s will, that is, every act of the

1 [Below, pp. 724, 725 (fol. edit.).]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 113

will, and purpose of man, had a sufficient and therefore a DISCOURSE
necessary cause; and consequently every voluntary action -
was necessitated. An action therefore may be voluntary and
a sin, and nevertheless be necessary. And because God may
afflict by right derived from His omnipotency, though sin
were not ; and the example of punishment on voluntary sin
ners is the cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin less
frequent ; for God to punish such sinners, as I have shewed
before k , is no injustice. And thus you have my answer to
his objections, both out of Scripture and reason.

J. D. " Sets tu simulare cupressum, quid hoc } ?" It was [Reply.]
shrewd counsel which Alcibiades gave to Themistocles, when
he was busy about his accounts to the state, that he should
rather study how to make no accounts 01 . So, it seems, T. H.
thinks it a more compendious way to baulk an argument, than
to satisfy it. And if he can produce a Rowland against an
Oliver, if he can urge a reason against a reason, he thinks he
hath quitted himself fairly. But it will not serve his turn.
And that he may not complain of misunderstanding it, as
those who have a politic deafness, to hear nothing but what
liketh them, I will first reduce mine argument into form, and
then weigh what he saith in answer or rather in opposition to
it. That opinion which takes away the formal reason of sin,
and by consequence sin itself, is not to be approved. This is
clear, because both reason and religion, nature and Scripture,
do prove, and the whole world confesseth, that there is sin.
But this opinion of the necessity of all things, by reason of a
conflux of second causes ordered and determined by the First
Cause, doth take away the very formal reason of sin. This
is proved thus. That which makes sin itself to be good and
just and lawful, takes away the formal cause, and destroys
the essence, of sin ; for if sin be good and just and lawful,
it is no more evil, it is no sin, no anomy. But this opinion
of the necessity of all things makes sin to be very good and
just and lawful : for nothing can flow essentially by way of
physical determination from the First Cause, which is the law

* [Above T. H. Numb. xiv. p. 85.] m [Plut, in Vita Alcib., torn. ii. pp.

1 [Horat, A. P., 19, 20.] 11, 12. ed. Bryant]

BRAMHALL.

114 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART find rule of goodness and justice, but that which is good and
IIL just and lawful ; but this opinion makes sin to proceed essen
tially by way of physical determination from the First Cause,
as appears in T. H. his whole discourse. Neither is it
material at all, whether it proceed immediately from the First
Cause, or mediately ; so as it be by a necessary flux of second
and determinate causes, which produce it inevitably. To
these proofs he answers nothing, but only by denying the
first "consequence," as he calls it; and then sings over his
[Sin, to be old song, that " the nature of sin consisteth in this, that the
i&gt;e the act action proceeds from our will, and be against the law:" which
a^inst a 11 m our sense is most true, if he understand a just law, and a
,/urfiaw.] f ree rational will; but supposing (as he doth), that the law
enjoins things impossible in themselves to be done, then it is
an unjust and tyrannical law, and the transgression of it is no
sin, not to do that which never was in our power to do ; and
supposing likewise (as he doth), that the will is inevitably
determined by special influence from the First Cause, then it
is not man s will, but God s will, and flows essentially from
the law of goodness.

That which he adds of a "judge," is altogether impertinent
as to his defence. Neither is a civil judge the proper judge,
nor the law of the land the proper rule, of sin. But it makes
strongly against him. For the judge goes upon a good ground.
And even this which he confesseth, that the judge " looks at
no higher cause than the will of the doer," proves, that the
will of the doer did determine itself freely, and that the
malefactor had liberty to have kept the law if he would.
Certainly, a judge ought to look at all material circumstances,
and much more at all essential causes. Whether every
"sufficient cause" be a necessary cause, will come to be
examined more properly Numb. xxxi. b For the present it 692
shall suffice to say, that liberty flows from the sufficiency,
and contingency from the debility, of the cause. Nature
never intends the generation of a monster. If all the causes
concur sufficiently, a perfect creature is produced; but by
reason of the insufficiency, or debility, or contingent aber
ration of some of the causes, sometimes a monster is pro
duced. Yet the causes of a monster were sufficient for the

6 [Below pp. 171173.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 115

production of that which was produced, that is, a monster ; DISCOURSE
otherwise a monster had not been produced. What is it Ij
then ? A monster is not produced by virtue of that order
which is set in nature, but by the contingent aberration of
some of the natural causes in their concurrence. The order
set in nature is, that every like should beget its like. But
supposing the concurrence of the causes to be such as it is in
the generation of a monster, the generation of a monster is
necessary ; as all the events in the world are, when they are;
that is, by a hypothetical necessity. Then he betakes him
self to his old help, that God may punish "by right of
omnipotence, though there were no sin." The question is
not now, what God may do, but what God will do, according
to that covenant which He hath made with man, " Fac hoc [Lev. xviii.
et vives" " Do this and thou shalt live/ whether God doth x .~5.] m
punish any man contrary to this covenant. " O Israel, thy Hosea xiii.
destruction is from thyself, but in Me is thy help." He that 9&lt;
" wills not the death of a sinner," doth much less will the
death of an innocent creature. By death or destruction in
this discourse, the only separation of soul and body is not
intended, which is a debt of nature, and which God, as lord
of life and death, may justly do, and make it not a punish
ment but a blessing to the party; but we understand the
subjecting of the creature to eternal torments. Lastly, he
tells of that benefit which redounds to others from exemplary
justice : which is most true, but not according to his own
grounds ; for neither is it justice to punish a man for doing
that which it was impossible always for him not to do, neither
is it lawful to punish an innocent person " that good may [Rom. in.
come" of it : and if his opinion of absolute necessity of all 8 ^
things were true, the destinies of men could not be altered,
either by examples or fear of punishment.

[DISTINCTIONS MADE BY NECESSITARIANS.]
NUMBER XVIII.

J. D. But the patrons of necessity being driven out of
the plain field with reason, have certain retreats or distinc
tions, which they fly unto for refuge.

i 2

116 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART 1 . First, they distinguish between Stoical necessity and
roistim " Christian necessity, between which they make a threefold
tion i. difference .

st e oaT"nd First, say they, the Stoics did " subject Jupiter to destiny,"
. but we "subject destiny to God." I answer, that the Stoical

anc ^ Christian destiny are one and the same; "fatum quasi
jeet God effatum Jovis" Hear Seneca ; " Destiny is the necessity of
they e sub? all things and actions, depending upon the disposition of
to C God S .] iny Jupiter d ," &c. I add, that the Stoics left a greater liberty to
Jupiter over destiny, than these Stoical Christians do to God
over His decrees; either for the beginnings of things, as
Euripides 6 , or for the progress of them, as Chrysippus f , or
at least of the circumstances of time and place, as all of them
generally. So Virgil, "Sect trahere et moras ducere*" &c.
So Osiris, in Apuleius, promiseth him to prolong his life
"ultra fato constituta tempora" " beyond the times set down
by the destinies 11 ."

2. [That the Next, they say, that the Stoics did " hold an eternal flux and

Stoics hold . p ,,, . , IT ,1 , /-, i

a necessary necessary connexion ot causes, but they believe that (jod
of causes? doth act "prater et contra naturam" "besides and against
they hold nature." I answer, that it is not much material, whether

God to be

the one they attribute necessity to God, or to the stars, or to a con-
cause.] nexion of causes, so as they establish necessity. The former
reasons do not only condemn the ground or foundation of
necessity, but much more necessity itself, upon what ground
soever. Either they must run into this absurdity, that the
effect is determined, the cause remaining undetermined,
or else hold such a necessary connexion of causes as the
Stoics did.

3. [That Lastly, they say, the Stoics did "take away liberty and
deny con- contingence," but they " admit" it. I answer, what liberty or

tliev^admit [ From Lipsius, De Constantia, e [See e. g. his Supplices, vv. 734

them.] lih - L c - 20 &gt; Op- torn. ii. p. 12. fol. 736. ed. Barnes ; &c.J

Lugd. 1613 : from whom what follows f [See Aul. Gell., vi. 2 ; and Euseb.,

in the text is taken.] Prep. Evang., lib.vi. c.7.pp. 255, B, C,

* [" Quid enim intelligis fatum? 257. C. fol. Paris, 1628 ; and Pint, De

existhno necessitatem rerum omnium Placit. Philos., 28, Op. Moral, torn.

actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat." iv. p. 376. ed. Wyttenb.]

Senec., Nat. Quaest., lib. ii. c. 36 ; s [" At trahere atque moras tantis

" Hunc cundem" (Jovem) " et fatum licet addere rebus." Virg.,jn.,vii.315.]

si dixeris non mentieris ; nam cum h [ Scies ultra statuta fato tuo

fatum nihil aliud sit quam series im- spatia vitam quoque tibi prorogare mihi

plexa causarum, ille est prima omnium tantum licere." L. Apul., Metam., lib.

causa, ex qua caeterae pendent." Id., xi. p. 367. in usum Delph." Osiris"

f Benef., lib. iv. c. 7.] in the text is a mistake for Isis."]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 117

contingence was it they admit, but a titular liberty, and an DISCOURSE
empty shadow of contingence ? who do profess stiffly, that -
all actions and events which either are or shall be, cannot
but be, nor can be otherwise, after any other manner, in any
other place, time, number, order, measure, nor to any other end,
693 than they are ; and that in respect of God, determining them
to one. What a poor ridiculous liberty or contingence is this !

2. Secondly, they distinguish between the First Cause and [Distinc-
the second causes. They say, that in respect of the second Between
causes many things are free, but in respect of the First Cause
all things are necessary 1 . This answer may be taken away

two Ways. all things,

First, so contraries shall be true together : the same thing causes,
at the same time shall be determined to one, and not deter- J^t!] c
mined to one ; the same thing at the same time must neces- 1 a [JjJ lwo
sarily be, and yet may not be. Perhaps they will say, not in this dis-
the same respect. But that which strikes at the root of this contradict

question is this ; if all the causes were only collateral, this
exception might have some colour ; but where all the causes,
being joined together and subordinate one to another, do
make but one total cause, if any one cause (much more the
first) in the whole series or subordination of causes be neces
sary, it determines the rest, and without doubt makes the
effect necessary. Necessity or liberty is not to be esteemed
from one cause, but from all the causes joined together. If
one link in a chain be fast, it fastens all the rest.

Secondly, I would have them tell me, whether the second 2. [The
causes be predetermined by the First Cause or not. If they

be determined, then the effect is necessary, even in respect of necessary,
the second causes. If the second cause be not determined, causes
how is the effect determined, the second cause remaining un- likewise.]
determined ? Nothing can give that to another which it
hath not itself. But, say they, nevertheless, the power or
faculty remaineth free. True, but not in order to the act, if
it be once determined. It is free in sensu diviso/ but not
in sensu composite. 3 When a man holds a bird fast in his
hand, is she therefore free to fly where she will, because she
hath wings ? Or a man imprisoned or fettered, is he there
fore free to walk where he will, because he hath feet and

i [L ; ps., De Const., lib. i. c. 19 ; Op. torn. ii. p. 11.]

]18 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART a locomotive faculty ? Judge without prejudice, what a
miserable subterfuge is this, which many men confide so

much in.

CERTAIN DISTINCTIONS WHICH HE SUPPOSING MAY BE BROUGHT
TO HIS ARGUMENTS ARE BY HIM REMOVED.

\Answer. T. H. He saith, a man may perhaps answer, that the
avowsbtfh necessity of things held by him is not a Stoical necessity,
distinc- ^^ a Christian necessity, &c. But this distinction I have
not used, nor indeed have ever heard before. Nor do I
think any man could make " Stoical" and " Christian" two
kinds of necessities, though they may be two kinds of doc
trine. Nor have I drawn my answer to his arguments from
the authority of any sect, but from the nature of the things
themselves.

But here I must take notice of certain words of his in this
place, as making against his own tenet. " Where all the
causes," saith he, "being joined together and subordinate one
to another, do make but one total cause, if any one cause
(much more the first) in the whole series or subordination of
causes be necessary, it determines the rest, and without doubt
maketh the effect necessary." For that which I call the
necessary cause of any effect, is the joining together of all
causes subordinate to the first into one total cause. If any
one of those, saith he, especially the first, produce its effect
necessarily, then all the rest are determined, and the effect also
necessary. Now it is manifest, that the First Cause is a neces
sary cause of all the effects that are next and immediate to
it j and therefore, by his own reason, all effects are necessary.
Nor is that distinction, of necessary in respect of the First
Cause, and necessary in respect of second causes, mine. It
does (as he well noteth) imply a contradiction.

[Reply.] J. D. Because T. H. disavows these two distinctions, I
[Christian have joined them together in one paragraph. He likes not
(so called) the distinction of necessity or destiny into Stoical and
guised 18 " Christian ; no more do I. We agree in the conclusion, but
necessity.] ur motives are diverse. My reason is, because I acknow
ledge no such necessity either as the one or as the other ; and
because I conceive, that those Christian writers, who do justly

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 119

detest the naked destiny of the Stoics, as fearing to fall into DISCOURSE
those gross absurdities and pernicious consequences which
flow from thence, do yet privily (though perhaps unwittingly),
under another form of expression, introduce it again at the
back door after they had openly cast it out at the fore door.
But T. H. rusheth boldly, without distinctions (which he
accounts but "jargon") and without foresight, upon the
grossest destiny of all others, that is, that of the Stoics.
He confesseth, that " they may be two kinds of doctrine."
" May be ?" Nay, they are, without all peradventure. And
he himself is the first who bears the faame of a Christian that
694 1 have read, that hath raised this sleeping ghost out of its
grave, and set it out in its true colours. But yet he likes
not the names of " Stoical" and " Christian" destiny (do not
blame him), though he would not willingly be accounted a
Stoic. To admit the thing, and quarrel about the name, is
to make ourselves ridiculous. Why might not I first call
that kind of destiny, which is maintained by Christians,
Christian destiny, and that other maintained by Stoics,
Stoical destiny? But I am not the inventor of the term. If
he had been as careful in reading other men s opinions as he
is confident in setting down his own, he might have found
not only the thing but the name itself often used. But if [The terms
the name of "fatum Christianum" do offend him, let him call elf by 1 !,?^"
it with Lipsius, "fatum verum :" who divides destiny into four sius -3
kinds; 1. "mathematical" or astrological destiny, 2. "na
tural" destiny, 3. " Stoical" or " violent" destiny, and 4.
" true destiny " which he calls ordinarily " nostrum" " our"
destiny, that is, of Christians, and "fatum pium" that is,
godly destiny, and defines it just as T. H. doth his destiny,
to be a " series or order of causes depending upon the Divine
counsel*." Though he be more cautelous than T. H. to decline
those rocks which some others have made shipwreck upon,
yet the divines thought he came too near them ; as appears by
his Epistle to the reader in a later edition 1 , and by that note in
the margent of his twentieth chapter, "Whatsoever I dispute

k [Lipsius,] De Const, lib. i. cc. 17, stantia mea Prsescriptio." He begins

18,19. [Op. torn. ii. pp. 10, 11. fol. with a complaint, that " Negant satis

Lugd. 1613.] pie hoc argumentum a me tractatum,

1 [In the 3rd edition, 8vo. Antwerp. negant locis aliquot satis vere."]
1586, headed " Ad Lectorem pro Con-

120 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART here, I submit to tlie judgment of the wise, and being ad-
- monished, I will correct it ; one may convince me of error, but

not of obstinacy 111 ." So fearful was he to overshoot himself; and
yet he maintained both true liberty and true contingency.
T. H. saith, he hath not sucked his answer from any " sect."
And I say, so much the worse. It is better to be the disciple
of an old sect, than the ringleader of a new.

[The First Concerning the other distinction, of liberty in respect of
nectary* the First Cause, and liberty in respect of the second causes,
effects ] aU though he will not see that which it concerned him to answer,
like those old Lamise, which could put out their eyes when
they list ; as, namely, that the faculty of willing, when it is
determined in order to the act (which is all the freedom
that he acknowledgeth), is but like the freedom of a bird,
when she is fast in a man s hand, &c., yet he hath espied
another thing wherein I contradict myself, because I affirm,
that " if any one cause in the whole series of causes, much
more the First Cause, be necessary, it determineth the rest;"
but, saith he, " it is manifest, that the First Cause is a neces
sary cause of all the effects that are next." I am glad; yet it
is not I who contradict myself, but it is one of his " manifest"
truths which I contradict, that " the First Cause is a neces
sary cause of all effects ;" which I say is a " manifest" false
hood. Those things which God wills without Himself, He
wills freely, not necessarily. Whatsoever cause acts or works
necessarily, doth act or work all that it can do, or all that is
in its power. But it is evident, that God doth not all things
without Himself which He can do, or which He hath power
Luke iii. s. to do. He could have raised up children unto Abraham of
the very stones which were upon the banks of Jordan, but
Matt. xxvi. He did not. He could have sent twelve legions of angels to
the succour of Christ, but He did not. God can make T. H.
live the years of Methuselah ; but it is not necessary that He
shall do so, nor probable that He will do so. The productive
power of God is infinite, but the whole created world is finite;
and therefore God might still produce more if it pleased
Him n . But this it is, when men go on in a confused way,
and will admit no distinctions. If T. H. had considered the

E* 12 ;,P - in marg - ed - 1613 -1 Prima Qu - xxv - art -

oee Thorn. Aquin., Summ.. P.

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 121

difference between a necessary being and a necessary cause, DISCOURSE

or between those actions of God, which are immanent within -

Himself, and the transient works of God, which are extrin-
secal without Himself , he would never have proposed such an
evident error for a manifest truth. " Qui pauca considerat,
facile pronuntiat"

NUMBER XIX.

J. D. 3. Thirdly, they distinguish between liberty from [Distinc-
compulsion, and liberty from necessitation. The will, say Between"

they, is free from compulsion, but not free from necessitation. Jjo
And this they fortify with two reasons : first, because it is puisionand
granted by all divines, that hypothetical necessity, or neces- from neces
sity upon a supposition, may consist with liberty ; secondly, S1
because God and the good angels do good necessarily, and
yet are more free than we.

To the first reason, I confess, that necessity upon a sup- [Antece-
position may sometimes consist with true liberty ; as when
it signifies only an infallible certitude of the understanding
695 in that which it knows to be, or that it shall be. But if the
supposition be not in the agent s power, nor depend upon
any thing that is in his power ; if there be an exterior ante
cedent cause, which doth necessitate the effect ; to call this
free, is to be " mad with reason p ."

To the second reason, I confess, that God and the good [Of the
angels are more free than we are ; that is, intensively, in the God, and
degree of freedom, but not extensively, in the latitude of the angels g l d
object ; according to a liberty of exercise, but not of specifi
cation. A liberty of exercise, that is, to do or not to do,
may consist well with a necessity of specification, or a deter
mination to the doing of good. But a liberty of exercise and
a necessity of exercise, a liberty of specification and a ne
cessity of specification, are not compatible, nor can consist
together. He that is antecedently necessitated to do evil, is
not free to do good. So this instance is nothing at all to the
purpose.

[See Cajetan s Comment, in Thorn. P [" Ut cum ratione insanias."
Aquin., Summ., P. Prima, On. xxvii. Terent, Eun., I. i. 18.]
art. 1.]

122 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART T. II. But the distinction of free into free from compul
sion and free from necessitation, I acknowledge. For to be

[Answer. ]

free from compulsion, is to do a thing so, as terror be not the
cause of his will to do it. For a man is then only said to be
compelled, when fear makes him willing to it ; as when a
man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself,
or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed. Thus all
men that do any thing from love, or revenge, or lust, are free
from compulsion : and yet their actions may be as necessary
as those which are done upon compulsion; for sometimes
other passions work as forcibly as fear. But free from neces-
sitation I say nothing can be ; and tis that which he under
took to disprove.

[Hypothe- This distinction, he says, useth to be " fortified " by ee two
sity.] reasons;" but they are not mine. The first, he says, is, that " it
is granted by all divines, that a hypothetical necessity, or neces
sity upon supposition, may stand with liberty." That you may
understand this, I will give you an example of hypothetical ne
cessity. If I shall live, I shall eat, this is a hypothetical neces
sity. Indeed it is a necessary proposition ; that is to say, it is
necessary that that proposition should be true, whensoever ut
tered : but tis not the necessity of the thing; nor is it therefore
necessary, that the man shall live, or that the man shall eat.
I do not use to " fortify" my distinctions with such reasons.
Let him confute them as he will, it contents me. But I
would have your Lordship take notice hereby, how an easy
and plain thing, but withal false, may be, with the grave
usage of such terms as hypothetical necessity and necessity
upon supposition, and such like terms of schoolmen, obscured
and made to seem profound learning.

and of t^ The second r eason, that may confirm the distinction of free
gomi from compulsion and free from necessitation, he says, is, that
" God and good angels do good necessarily, and yet are more
free than we." The reason, though I had no need of, yet I
think it so far forth good, as it is true, that " God and good
angels do good necessarily," and yet are "free ;" but because
I find not in the articles of our faith nor in the decrees of
our Church set down, in what manner I am to conceive God
and good angels to work by necessity, or in what sense they
work freely, I suspend my sentence in that point ; and am

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 123

content, that there may be a freedom from compulsion and DISCOURSE
yet no freedom from necessitation ; as hath been proved in -
that, that a man may be necessitated to some actions without
threats and without fear of danger. But how he can avoid
the consisting together of freedom and necessity, supposing
God and good angels are freer than men and yet do good
necessarily, that we must now examine.

"I confess" (saith he), "that God and good angels are [Degrees of

. . ., . i (. * liberty im-

more free than we ; that is, intensively, in degree ot tree- possible. ]
dom, not extensively, in the latitude of the object ; accord
ing to a liberty of exercise, not of specification." Again, we
have here two distinctions, that are no distinctions ; but
made to seem so by terms, invented by I know not whom to
cover ignorance and blind the understanding of the reader.
For it cannot be conceived, that there is any liberty greater
than for a man to do what he will, and to forbear what he
will. One heat may be more intensive than another, but
not one liberty than another. He that can do what he will,
hath all liberty possible; and he that cannot, has none
at all.

Also liberty (as he says the Schools call it) of " exercise," [Liberty of
which is (as I have said before q ) a liberty to do or not to ^ndiiberty
do, cannot be without a liberty (which they call) of " speci- ^^ c jf~
fication," that is to say, a liberty to do or not to do this or not exist
that in particular ; for how can a man conceive, that he has "*
liberty to do anything, that hath not liberty to do this or that
or somewhat in particular ? If a man be forbidden in Lent to
eat this and that and every other particular kind of flesh, how
can he be understood to have a liberty to eat flesh, more than
he that hath no licence at all ?

696 You may by this again see the vanity of distinctions used
in the Schools. And I do not doubt, but that the imposing
of them by authority of doctors in the Church hath been a
great cause that men have laboured, though by sedition and
evil courses, to shake them off : for nothing is more apt to
beget hatred, than the tyrannising over man s reason and
understanding ; especially when it is done, not by the Scrip
ture, but by pretence of learning and more judgment than
that of other men.

i [See above T. H. Numb. iv. p. 34.]

124 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART J. D. He who will speak with some of our great under
takers about the grounds of learning, had need either to

speak by an interpreter, or to learn a new language (I dare
not call it "jargon 1 "" or canting), lately devised, not to set
forth the truth, but to conceal falsehood. He must learn
a new liberty, a new necessity, a new contingency, a new
sufficiency, a new spontaneity, a new kind of deliberation, a
new kind of election, a new eternity, a new compulsion, and,
in conclusion, a new nothing. This proposition, The will
is free/ may be understood in two senses ; either that the
will is not compelled, or that the will is not always necessi
tated : for if it be ordinarily or at any time free from neces-
sitation, my assertion is true, that there is freedom from
necessity. The former sense that the will is not compelled
is acknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable.
" Voluntas non cogitur" For, if the will may be compelled,
then it may both will and not will the same thing at the
same time under the same notion ; but this implies a contra
diction. Yet this author (like the good woman whom her
husband sought up the stream when she was drowned, upon
pretence that when she was living, she used to go contrary
courses to all other people), he holds, that true compulsion
and fear may make a man will that which he doth not will,
that is, in his sense, may compel the will ; " as when a man
willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or
submits to his enemy for fear of being killed." I answer,
that T. H. mistakes sundry ways in this discourse,
i. [Actions First, he erreth in this, to think, that actions proceeding

proceeding / f

from fear irom tear are properly compulsory actions 3 ; which in truth are
compulsory not on ty voluntary but free actions, neither compelled, nor so
actions.] jnuch as physically necessitated. Another man, at the same
time, in the same ship, in the same storm, may choose, and
the same individual man otherwise advised might choose, not
to throw his goods overboard. It is the man himself, who
chooseth freely this means to preserve his life. It is true,
that if he were not in such a condition, or if he were freed
from the grounds of his present fears, he would not choose
neither the casting of his goods into the sea nor the submit
ting to his enemy. But considering the present exigence of

[See above T. H. Numb. iv. p. 31.] Secund., Qu. vi. art. 6.]
oee Ihom. Aquin., Summ., Prim. &lt;

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 125

his affairs, reason dictates to him, that of two inconveniences DISCOURSE
the less is to be chosen, as a comparative good. Neither -
doth he will this course as the end or direct object of his
desires, but as the means to attain his end. And what fear
doth in these cases, love, hope, hatred, &c., may do in other
cases ; that is, may occasion a man to elect those means to
obtain his willed end, which otherwise he would not elect.
As Jacob, to serve seven years more, rather than not to enjoy [Gen.xxix.
his beloved Rachel ; the merchant, to hazard himself upon "^
the rough seas, in hope of profit. Passions may be so
violent, that they may necessitate the will ; that is, when
they prevent deliberations ; but this is rarely, and then the
will is not free : but they never properly compel it. That
which is compelled, is against the will; and that which is
against the will, is not willed.

Secondly, T. H. errs in this also, where he saith, that " a 2. [Proper
man is then only said to be compelled when fear makes him Dextrin-
willing to" an action. As if force were not more prevalent seca1 -]
with a man than fear. We must know therefore, that this
word "compelled" is taken two ways: sometimes improperly,
that is, when a man is moved or occasioned by threats or
fear, or any passion, to do that which he would not have
done, if those threats or that passion had not been : some
times it is taken properly, when we do anything against our
own inclination, moved by an external cause, the will not con
senting nor concurring but resisting as much as it can ; as in a
rape, or when a Christian is drawn or carried by violence to the
idoFs temple, or as in the case of St. Peter " Another shall johnxxi.
gird thee, and carry thee whither thou wouldst not." This ia
is that compulsion which is understood when we say, the will
may be letted, or changed, or necessitated ; or that the im-
697 perate actions of the will (that is, the actions of the inferior
faculties which are ordinarily moved by the will 1 ) may be
compelled, but that the immanent actions of the will, that
is, to will, to choose, cannot be compelled, because it is the
nature of an action properly compelled to be done by an ex-
trinsecal cause without the concurrence of the will u .

Thirdly, the question is not, whether all the actions of a man 3. [Men or-

be free, but whether they be ordinarily free. Suppose some

free.]

1 [See below Numb. xx. pp. 130, u [Thorn. Aquin., Summ., Prim.
131.] Secund., Qu. vi. art. 4.]

126 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART passions are so sudden and violent, that they surprise a man,

II: and " betray the succours" of the soul, and prevent delibera-

as we see in some " motus primo primi" or antipathies,
how some men will run upon the most dangerous objects
upon the first view of a loathed creature, without any power
to contain themselves. Such actions as these, as they are not
ordinary, so they are not free ; because there is no delibera
tion nor election. But where deliberation and election are,
as when a man throws his goods overboard to save the ship,
or submits to his enemy to save his life, there is always true
liberty.

[Hypothe- Though T. H. slight the two reasons which I produce in
sity!] ne( S favour of his cause, yet they who urged them, deserved not to
be slighted, unless it were because they were Schoolmen.
The former reason is thus framed ; a necessity of supposition
may consist with true liberty, but that necessity which flows
from the natural and extrinsecal determination of the will is
a necessity of supposition. To this my answer is in effect,
that a necessity of supposition is of two kinds. Sometimes
the thing supposed is in the power of the agent to do or not
to do : as for a Romish priest to vow continence, upon sup
position that he be a Romish priest, is necessary, but because
it was in his power to be a priest or not to be a priest, there
fore his vow is a free act. So, supposing a man to have
taken physic, it is necessary that he keep at home ; yet, be
cause it was in his power to take a medicine or not to take it,
therefore his keeping at home is free. Again, sometimes the
thing supposed is not in the power of the agent to do or not
to do. Supposing a man to be extremely sick, it is necessary
that he keep at home; or supposing that a man hath a
natural antipathy against a cat, he runs necessarily away so
soon as he sees her. Because this antipathy and this sickness
are not in the power of the party affected, therefore these
[Numh ix ] aCtS are not free Jac( &gt;b blessed his sons; Balaam blessed
xxiii.xxiv.] Israel ; these two acts, being done, are both necessary upon
supposition : but it was in Jacob s power not to have blessed
his sons ; so was it not in Balaam s power not to have blessed
Israel. Jacob s will was determined by himself; Balaam s
will was physically determined by God. Therefore Jacob s
benediction proceeded from his own free election; and
Balaam s from God s determination. So was Caiaphas his

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 127

prophecy. Therefore the text saith, " He spake not of him- DISCOURSE
self." To this T. H. saith nothing : but only declareth by an

impertinent instance, what "hypothetical" signifies; and
then adviseth your Lordship to take notice, how errors and
ignorance may be cloaked under grave scholastic terms.
And I do likewise entreat your Lordship to take notice, that
the greatest fraud and cheating lurks commonly under the
pretence of plain dealing. We see jugglers commonly strip
up their sleeves, and promise extraordinary fair dealing,
before they begin to play their tricks.

Concerning the second argument/drawn from the liberty [Of God,
of God and the good angels, as I cannot but approve his angels.]
modesty in suspending his judgment concerning the manner
how God and the good angels do work, necessarily or freely,
because he " finds it not set down in the articles of our faith,
or the decrees of our Church ;" especially in this age, which
is so full of atheism, and of those scoffers which St. Peter
prophesied of, who neither believe that there is God or angels, 2 Pet. iii. 3.
or that they have a soul, but only as salt, to keep their bodies
from putrefaction ; so I can by no means assent unto him in
that which follows: that is to say, that he hath "proved"
that liberty and necessity of the same kind may "consist
together," that is, a liberty of exercise with a necessity of
exercise, or a liberty of specification with a necessity of
specification. Those actions, which he saith are necessitated
by passion, are for the most part dictated by reason, either
truly or apparently right, and resolved by the will itself.
But it troubles him that I say, that "God and the good
angels are more free than men intensively, in the degree
of freedom, but not extensively, in the latitude of the object,
69 8 according to a liberty of exercise but not of specification;"
which, he saith, " are no distinctions," but " terms invented
to cover ignorance." Good words. Doth he only see ? Are
all other men stark blind ? By his favour, they are true
and necessary distinctions. And if he alone do not conceive
them, it is because distinctions, as all other things, have
their fates according to the capacities or prejudices of their
readers.

But he urgeth two reasons. " One heat," saith he, " may [Degrees
be more intensive than another, but not one liberty than possible/]

128 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART another." Why not, I wonder. Nothing is more, proper to
a man than reason, yet a man is more rational than a child,
and one man more rational than another ; that is, in respect
of the use and exercise of reason. As there are degrees of
understanding, so there are of liberty. The good angels
have clearer understandings than we, and they are not
hindered with passions as we ; and, by consequence, they have
more use of liberty than we. His second reason is, " He
that can do what he will, hath all liberty, and he that cannot"
do what he will, "hath no" liberty. If this be true, then
there are no degrees of liberty indeed. But this which he
calls liberty, is rather an omnipotence than a liberty ; to do
whatsoever he will. A man is free to shoot or not to shoot,
although he cannot hit the white whensoever he would. We
do good freely, but with more difficulty and reluctation than
the good spirits. The more rational and the less sensual the
will is, the greater is the degree of liberty.

[Liberty of His other exception, against liberty of exercise and liberty
of specification, is a mere mistake ; which grows merely from
not ri g ntlv understanding what liberty of specification or

by liberty contrariety is. A liberty of specification, saith he, is " a

of specifi- J

cation.] liberty to do or not to do this or that in particular." Upon
better advice he will find, that this which he calls a liberty of
specification, is a liberty of contradiction, and not of speci
fication, nor of contrariety. To be free to do or not to do
this or that particular good, is a liberty of contradiction ; so
likewise to be free to do or not to do this or that particular
evil. But to be free to do both good and evil, is a liberty of
contrariety, which extends to contrary objects, or to diverse
kinds of things. So his reason to prove, that a liberty of
exercise cannot be without a liberty of specification, falls flat
to the ground; and he may lay aside his "Lenten licence"
for another occasion. I am ashamed to insist upon these
things ; which are so evident, that no man can question them
who doth understand them.

f)resum S )tu ^^ ^ ere ne ^ a ^ s m ^ another invective against distinctions,

cms censure and scholastical expressions, and the doctors of the Church,"

tors if the who by this means "tyrannised over the understandings" of other

:h -] men. What a presumption is this ! for one private man, who

will not allow human liberty to others, to assume to himself such

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 129

a licence, to control so magistrally, and to censure of gross DISCOURSE
"ignorance" and "tyrannising over men s judgments/ yea, -
as causes of the troubles and tumults which are in the world,
the " doctors of the Church" in general, who have flourished
in all ages and in all places, only for a few necessary and
innocent distinctions. Truly said Plutarch, that a sore eye
is offended with the light of the sun u . What then ? Must
the logicians lay aside their "first and second intentions,"
their "abstracts" and "concretes," their "subjects" and "pre
dicates," their " modes" and " figures," their " method
synthetic" and "analytic," their ^fallacies of composition
and division," &c. ? Must the moral philosopher quit his
ft means" and " extremes," his "principia congenita" and " ac-
quisita" his " liberty of contradiction" and " contrariety," his
"necessity absolute" and "hypothetical," &c.? Must the
natural philosopher give over his "intentional species," his
"understanding agent" and "patient," his "receptive and
eductive power of the matter," his " qualities," " infinite" or
" influxte" "symbols" or " dissymbola" his "temperament
ad pondus" and "adjmtitiam" his parts "homogeneous" and
" heterogeneous/ his " sympathies " and " antipathies," his
(&lt; antiperistasis," &c. ? Must the astrologer and the geo
grapher leave their "apogseum" and "perigseum," their
" arctic" and "antarctic poles," their "equator, zodiac,
zenith, meridian, horizon, zones," &c. ? Must the mathe
matician, the metaphysician, and the divine, relinquish all
their terms of art, and proper idiotisms, because they do not
relish with T. H. his palate ? But he will say, they are
" obscure" expressions. What marvel is it, when the things
themselves are more obscure? Let him put them into as
"plain English x " as he can, and they shall be never a whit the
better understood by those who want all grounds of learning.
Nothing is clearer than mathematical demonstration ; yet
699 let one who is altogether ignorant in mathematics hear it,
and he will hold it to be, as T. H. terms these distinctions, plain
fustian or " jargon y ." Every art or profession hath its proper
mysteries and expressions, which are well known to the sons

u [See the De Adulat. et AmiciDis- * [See below T. H. Numb. xxiv. in
crim., c. 28 ; Op. Moral., torn. i. p. 181. fin., p. 155.]
eel. Wyttenb.] 1 [See above, T. H. Numb. iv. p. 34.]

BRAMHALL.

130 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART of art, not so to strangers. Let him consult with military
IIL men, with physicians, with navigators, and he shall find this
true by experience; let him go on shipboard, and the
mariners will not leave their " starboard" and "larboard,"
because they please not him, or because he accounts it gib
berish. No, no ; it is not the School divines, but innovators
and seditious orators, who are the true causes of the present
troubles of Europe. T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his
book De Give cap. xii, that it is " a seditious opinion," to
teach, that " the knowledge of good and evil belongs to private
persons 2 ;" and cap. 17, that in "questions of faith" the
civil magistrates ought to consult with " the ecclesiastical
doctors," to whom " God s blessing is derived by imposition
of hands," so as " not to be deceived in necessary truths," to
whom "our Saviour hath promised infallibility a ." These are
the very men whom he traduceth here. There he ascribes
"infallibility" to them; here he accuseth them of gross
superstitious ignorance. There he attributes too much to
them ; here he attributes too little. Both there and here he

[Numb.xvi. " takes too much upon" him. " The spirits of the prophets

i co3. xiv. are subject to the prophets."

32. _

NUMBER XX.

[Election J- D. Now, to the distinction itself, I say first, that the
P r P er ac * ^ liberty is election, and election is opposed (not

as well as to on iy to coaction but also) to coarctation or determination to

coaction.l . . ...

one. N ecessitation or determination to one may consist with
spontaneity,. but not with election or liberty; as hath been
shewed. The very Stoics did acknowledge a spontaneity.
So our adversaries are not yet gone out of the confines of
the Stoics.

[Elicit Secondly, to rip up the bottom of this business. This I

win cannot take to De ^ ne dear resolution of the Schools. There is a
be neces- Double act of the will : the one more remote, called " im-

sitated.J

peratus" that is, in truth, the act of some inferior faculty,
subject to the command of the will; as to open or shut one s
eyes. Without doubt these actions may be compelled. The
other act is nearer, called "actus elicitus" an "act drawn out"

[De Give, c. xii. 1. title, p. 125. [Ibid., c. xvii. 28. p. 256.]
ed.

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 131

of the will; as to will, to choose, to elect b . This may be DISCOURSE

stopped or hindered by the intervening impediment of the

understanding, as a stone lying on a table is kept from its
natural motion; otherwise the will should have a kind of
omnipotence : but the will cannot be compelled to an act
repugnant to its inclination, as when a stone is thrown up
wards into the air; for that is both to incline and not to
incline to the same object at the same time, which implies a
contradiction. Therefore, to say the will is necessitated, is
to say the will is compelled so far as the will is capable of
compulsion. If a strong man, holding the hand of a weaker,
should therewith kill a third person, " hcec quidem vis est"
" this is violence ;" the weaker did not willingly perpetrate the
fact, because he was compelled. But now suppose this strong
man had the will of the weaker in his power as well as the
hand, and should not only incline but determine it secretly
and insensibly to commit this act, is not the case the same ?
Whether one ravish Lucretia by force, as Tarquin, or by
amatory potions and magical incantations not only allure her
but necessitate her to satisfy his lust, and incline her effectu
ally and draw her inevitably and irresistibly to follow him
spontaneously; Lucretia, in both these conditions, is to be
pitied, but the latter person is more guilty and deserves
greater punishment, who endeavours also so much as in him
lies to make Lucretia irresistibly partake of his crime. I dare
not apply it, but thus only ; take heed, how we defend those
secret and invincible necessitations to evil, though spon
taneous and free from coaction.
These are their fastnesses.

T. H. In the next place, he bringeth two arguments [Answer.]
against distinguishing between being free from compulsion
and free from necessitation. The first is, that " election is [Election
opposite, not only to coaction" or compulsion, "but also to SenTw
necessitation or determination to one." This is it he was to necessit y-]
prove from the beginning, and therefore bringeth no new
argument to prove it. And to those brought formerly, I
have already answered. And in this place I deny again, that

b [Thorn. Aquin., Summ., Prim. Ductor Dubit, bk. II. c. iii. contin.
Secund., Qu. vi. art. 4. And see Taylor, 1 ; Works, vol. xiii. pp. 1, 5.]

132 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART election is opposite to either. For when a man is compelled
(for example, to subject himself to an enemy or to die), he
hath still election left in him, and a deliberation to bethink
which of these two he can better endure. And he that is led
to prison by force, hath election, and may deliberate whether
he will be haled and trained on the ground, or make use of
his feet. Likewise, when there is no compulsion, but the 700
strength of temptation to do an evil action, being greater
than the motives to abstain, necessarily determine him to the
doing of it, yet he deliberates ; whilst sometimes the motives
to do, sometimes the motives to forbear, are working on him;
and, consequently, he electeth which he will. But commonly,
when we see and know the strength that moves us, we ac
knowledge necessity; but when we see not or mark not the
force that moves us, we then think there is none ; and that it
is not causes but liberty that produceth the action. Hence
it is, that they think he does not choose this, that of necessity
chooseth it ; but they might as well say, fire does not burn,
because it burns of necessity.

[ The dis- The second argument is not so much an argument, as a
vain,be- distinction ; to shew in what sense it may be said, that volun-
^raie nd ^^ ac tio ns are necessitated, and in what sense not. And
iU therefore ne allegeth, as from the authority of " the Schools"
and that which " rippeth up the bottom" of the question, that
"there is a double act of the will." The one, he says, "is
actus imperatus, an act done at the command of the will by
some inferior faculty of the soul, as to open or shut one s
eyes ; and this act may be compelled." The other, he says,
"is actus elicitus, an act allured, or an act drawn forth by
allurement, out of the will, as to will, to choose, to elect ; this,"
he says, "cannot be compelled." Wherein, letting pass
that metaphorical speech, of attributing command and sub
jection to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a common
wealth or family among themselves, and could speak one to
another, which is very improper in searching the truth of the
question, you may observe, first, that to compel a voluntary
act is nothing else but to will it ; for it is all one to say, my
will commands the shutting of mine eyes or the doing of any
other action, and to say, I have the will to shut mine eyes.
So that " actus imperatus" here, might as easily have been

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 133

said in English, a voluntary action ; but that they that DISCOURSE

invented the term, understood not anything it signified. :

Secondly, you may observe, that " actus elicitus" is exempli
fied by these words, " to will, to elect, to choose," which are
all one ; and so to will is here made an act of the will. And
indeed, as the will is a faculty or power in a man s soul, so to
will is an act of it according to that power. But as it is
absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or "drawn" by fair
means out of the ability to dance ; so it is also to say, that to
will is an act allured or "drawn out" of the power to will, which
power is commonly called the will. Howsoever it be, the
sum of his distinction is, that a voluntary act may be done
on compulsion, that is to say, by foul means, but to will that,
or any act, cannot be but by allurement or fair means.
Now, seeing fair means, allurements, and enticements, pro
duce the action which they do produce, as necessarily as
threatening and foul means, it follows, that to will may be
made as necessary as anything that is done by compulsion.
So that the distinction of "actus imperatus" and "actus
elicitus" are but words, and of no effect against necessity.

J- D. In the next place follow two reasons of mine own [Reply.]
against the same distinction ; the one taken from the former
grounds, that election cannot consist with determination to
one. To this (he saith) he hath " answered already." No,
truth is founded upon a rock ; he hath been so far from pre
vailing against it, that he hath not been able to shake it.
Now again he tells us, that " election is not opposite to [Compui-
either" (necessitation or compulsion). He might even as neces^tl
well tell us, that a stone thrown upwards moves naturally ; o^siteto
or that a woman can be ravished with her own will. Consent lib erty.]
takes away the rape. This is the strangest liberty that ever
was heard of ; that a man is compelled to do what he would
not, and yet is free to do what he will. And this he tells us
upon the old score, that he " who submits to his enemy for
fear of death, chooseth to submit." But we have seen for
merly , that this, which he calls compulsion, is not compul
sion properly, nor that natural determination of the will to
one, which is opposite to true liberty. He who submits to

c [Above T. H. Numb. xix. pp. 124, &c.j

134

A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART
III.

[Of mixed
actions.]

[Of fear,
and other
passions.]

[Dan. iii.
16-18.]

tDan. vi.
0.]

an enemy for saving his life, doth either only counterfeit ;
and then there is no will to submit ; this disguise is no more
than a stepping aside to avoid a present blow ; or else he
doth sincerely will a submission, and then the will is changed.
There is a vast difference between compelling and changing
the will. Either God or man may change the will of man,
either by varying the condition of things, or by informing the
party otherwise ; but compelled it cannot be : that is, it can
not both will this and not nill this, as it is invested with the
same circumstances, though, if the act were otherwise cir
cumstantiated, it might nill that freely which now it wills
freely. Wherefore these kind of actions are called mixed 701
action s d , that is, partly voluntary, partly unvoluntary. That
which is compelled, is a man s present condition or distress ;
that is not voluntary nor chosen. That which is chosen, is
the remedy of [his 6 ] distress; that is voluntary. So, hypothe-
tically, supposing a man were not in that distress, they are
involuntary ; but absolutely, without any supposition at all,
taking the case as it is, they are voluntary. His other in
stance, of " a man forced to prison," that he " may choose
whether he will be haled thither upon the ground or walk
upon his feet," is not true. By his leave, that is not as he
pleaseth, but as it pleaseth them who have him in their
power. If they will drag him, he is not free to walk ; and if
they give him leave to walk, he is not forced to be dragged.
Having laid this foundation, he begins to build upon it ;
that "other passions do necessitate as much as fear." But he
errs doubly ; first, in his foundation. Fear doth not deter
mine the rational will naturally and necessarily. The last
and greatest of the five terrible things f is death ; yet the fear
of death cannot necessitate a resolved mind to do a dishonest
action, which is worse than death. The fear of the fiery
furnace could not compel the three children to worship an
idol ; nor the fear of the lions necessitate Daniel to omit his
duty to God. It is our frailty, that we are more afraid of
empty shadows than of substantial dangers, because they are
nearer our senses ; as little children fear a mouse or a vizard,

III. i. 4, 6.]

u [""Offa Se Sta &lt;p6$ov ^i^6vuv
KO.KWV irpdrrfTai. 1) Sia KU\OV re, ...
p.iKTa.1 tlfflv at Toiavrai 7rpaejy, Eoiitafft
8e uaAAov eitovaiois." Aristot., Ethic.,

e [" its" in the original edition.]
{ [Soil. " A5ota, irevia, v6ffos, dt
edvaros." Aristot, Ethic., III. vi.

AGAINST ME. HOBBES. 135

more than fire or weather. But as a fit of the stone takes DISCOURSE

away the sense of the gout for the present, so the greater L

passion doth extinguish the less. The fear of God s wrath
and eternal torments, doth expel corporal fear. &lt;c Fear not Luke [xii.]
them who kill the body, but fear Him who is able to cast
both body and soul into Hell." "Da veniam imperator, tu
carcerem, Ille gehennam minatur" " Excuse me, O emperor,
thou threatenest men with prison, but He threatens me with
hell g ." Secondly, he errs in his superstruction also. There
is a great difference, as to this case of justifying or not justi
fying an action, between force, and fear and other passions.
Force doth not only lessen the sin, but takes it quite away.
He who forced a betrothed damsel was to die ; " but unto
the damsel" (saith He) "thou shalt do nothing, there isDeut. xxii,
in her no fault worthy of death." Tamar s beauty, or
Amnon s love, did not render him innocent ; but Amnon s [2 Sam.
force rendered Tamar innocent. But fear is not so prevalent
as force. Indeed, if fear be great and justly grounded, such
as may fall upon a constant man, though it do not dispense
with the transgression of the negative precepts of God or
nature, because they bind to all times, yet it diminisheth the
offence, even against them, and pleads for pardon. But it
dispenseth in many cases with the transgression of the posi
tive law, either Divine or human ; because it is not probable,
that God or the law would oblige man to the observation of
all positive precepts with so great damage as the loss of his
life. The omission of circumcision was no sin, whilst the [Josh. v.

2 7 "I

Israelites were travelling through the wilderness. By T. H.
his permission, I will propose a case to him. A gentleman
sends his servant with money to buy his dinner; some
ruffians meet him by the way, and take it from him by force ;
the servant cried for help, and did what he could to defend
himself, but all would not serve. The servant is innocent, if
he was to be tried before a court of Areopagites. Or suppose
the ruffians did not take it from him by force, but drew their
swords and threatened to kill him, except he delivered it
himself; no wise man will conceive, that it was either the
master s intention, or the servant s duty, to hazard his life, or
his limbs, for saving of such a trifling sum. But, on the

[Aug., De Verb. Dom., Serm. Ixii ; Op. torn. v. p. 362. F.]

136 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART other side, suppose this servant, passing by some cabaret or
m - tennis-court, where his comrades were drinking or playing,
should stay with them, and drink or play away his money,
and afterwards plead, as T. H. doth here, that he was over
come by the mere strength of temptation : I trow, neither
T. H. nor any man else would admit of this excuse, but
punish him for it ; because neither was he necessitated by
the temptation, and what strength it had, was by his own
fault, in respect of that vicious habit which he had con-
James i. 14. tracted of drinking or gaming. " Every man is tempted
when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed." Dis
ordered passions of anger, hatred, lust, if they be consequent
(as the case is here put by T. H.) and flow from deliberation
and election, they do not only not diminish the fault, but
they aggravate it, and render it much greater.

[Motives He talks much of " the motives to do, and the motives to
compel the f r ^ ear /^ now they "work upon" and determine a man: as if a 702
will ] reasonable man were no more than a tennis-ball, to be tossed
to and fro by the rackets of the second causes; as if the will
had no power to move itself, but were merely passive, like an
artificial popinjay removed hither and thither by the bolts of
the archers, who shoot on this side and on that. What are
" motives" but reasons or discourses framed by the under
standing, and freely moved by the will ? What are the will
and the understanding but faculties of the same soul ? And
what is liberty but a power resulting from them both ? To
say that the will is determined by these motives, is as much
as to say, that the agent is determined by himself. If there
be no necessitation before the judgment of right reason doth
dictate to the will, then there is no antecedent, no extrinse-
cal necessitation at all. All the world knows, that when the
agent is determined by himself, then the effect is determined
likewise in its cause. But if he determined himself freely,
then the effect is free. Motives determine not naturally,
but morally ; which kind of determination may consist with
true liberty. But if T. H. his opinion were true, that the
will were naturally determined by the physical and special
influence of extrinsecal causes, not only motives were vain,
but reason itself and deliberation were vain. No, saith he,
they are not vain, because they are the " means." Yes, if

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 137

the means be superfluous, they are vain. What needed such DISCOURSE
a circuit of deliberation to advise what is fit to be done, when - -
it is already determined extrinsecally what must be done ?

He saith, that the ignorance of the true causes and their [Liberty
power is the reason, why we ascribe the effect to liberty; but n cf of"
when we seriously consider the causes of things, we acknow- ]Jont] Slta ~
ledge a necessity. No such thing, but just the contrary.
The more we consider, and the clearer we understand, the
greater is the liberty, and the more the knowledge of our
own liberty. The less we consider, and the more incapable
that the understanding is, the lesser is the liberty, and the
knowledge of it. And where there is no consideration, nor
use of reason, there is no liberty at all, there is neither moral
good nor evil. Some men, by reason that their exterior
senses are not totally bound, have a trick to walk in their
sleep. Suppose such an one in that case should cast himself
down a pair of stairs, or from a bridge, and break his neck,
or drown himself, it were a mad jury that would find this
man accessary to his own death. Why ? Because it was
not freely done ; he had not then the use of reason.

Lastly, he tells us, that " the will doth choose of necessity," [T. H. s im-
as well as " the fire burns of necessity." If he intend no

more but this, that election is the proper and natural act of ? re bum -
the will, as burning is of the fire, or that the elective power
is as necessarily in a man as the ustive in the fire ; he speaks
truly, but most impertinently. For the question is not now
of the elective power " in actu primo" whether it be an essen
tial faculty of the soul ; but whether the act of electing this
or that particular object be free, and undetermined by any
antecedent and extrinsecal causes. But if he intend it in
this other sense, that as the fire hath no power to suspend
its burning, nor to distinguish between those combustible
matters which are put unto it, but burns that which is put
unto it necessarily if it be combustible, so the will hath no
power to refuse that which it wills, nor to suspend its own
appetite, he errs grossly. The will hath power either to
will, or nill, or to suspend, that is, neither to will nor nill
the same object. Yet even the burning of the fire, if it be
considered as it is invested with all particular circumstances,
is not otherwise so necessary an action as T. H. imagineth.

138 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART Two things are required to make an effect necessary : first,
that it be produced by a necessary cause, such as fire is ;
secondly, that it be necessarily produced. Protagoras, an
atheist, began his book thus, "Concerning the Gods, I have
nothing to say, whether they be, or they be not;" for
which his book was condemned by the Athenians to be
burned h . The fire was a necessary agent ; but the sentence
or the application of the fire to the book, was a free act ;
and therefore the burning of his book was free. Much more
the rational will is free; which is both a voluntary agent,
and acts voluntarily.

[Distinc- My second reason against this distinction of liberty, from
perate and compulsion but not from necessitation, is new ; and demon-
nothnpro- stra ^ es clearly, that to necessitate the will by a physical ne
per.] cessity is to compel the will so far as the will is capable of
compulsion; and that he, who doth necessitate the will to
evil, after that manner is the true cause of evil, and ought 703
rather to be blamed than the will itself. But T. H., for all
he saith he is " not surprised 1 ," can be contented upon better
advice to steal by all this in silence. And to hide this tergi
versation from the eyes of the reader, he makes an empty
show of braving against that famous and most necessary dis
tinction between the elicit and imperate acts of the will :
first, because the terms are improper/ secondly, because
they are obscure/ What trivial and grammatical objections
are these, to be used against the universal current of divines
and philosophers! "Verborum ut nummorum" it is "in
words, as it is in money :" use makes them proper and cur
rent. A " tyrant" at first signified a lawful and just prince ;
now use hath quite changed the sense of it, to denote either
an usurper or an oppressor. The word "prcemunire" is now
grown a good word in our English laws by use and tract of
time ; and yet at first it was merely mistaken for a " pramo-
nere." The names of Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, were de
rived at first from those heathenish deities, the sun, the
moon, and the warlike god of the Germans; now we use
them for distinction sake only, without any relation to their
first original. He is too froward, that will refuse a piece of

*[Cic.,DeNat. Deorumjib.i. c. 23; p. 319. B.; Diog. Laert,lib. ix. 51.]
ext. Empir., Adv. Mathem., lib. viii. * [See above, T. H. Numb. ii. p. 26.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 139

coin that is current throughout the world, because it is not DISCOURSE

stamped after his own fancy. So is he that rejects a good

word, because he understands not the derivation of it. We
see foreign words are daily naturalized, and made free deni
zens in every country. But why are the terms improper?
Because, saith he, it " attributes command and subjection to
the faculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth or
family among themselves, and could speak one to another."
Therefore he saith, " they who invented this term of actus
imperatus understood not any thing what it signified."
No? Why not? It seemeth to "me they understood it
better than those who except against it. They knew there
are mental terms/ which are only conceived in the mind, as
well as vocal terms/ which are expressed with the tongue.
They knew, that howsoever a superior do intimate a direction
to his inferior, it is still a command. Tarquin commanded
his son by only striking off the tops of the poppies, and was
by him both understood and obeyed k . Though there be no
formal " commonwealth" or " family," either in the body or
in the soul of man, yet there is a subordination in the body
of the inferior members to the headj there is a subordination
in the soul of the inferior faculties to the rational will. Far
be it from a reasonable man, so far to dishonour his own
nature, as to equal fancy with understanding, or the sensi
tive appetite with the reasonable will. A power of command
there is without all question, though there be some doubt in
what faculty this command doth principally reside, whether
in the will or in the understanding. The true resolution is,
that the directive command for counsel is in the understand
ing, and the applicative command, or empire, for putting in
execution of what is directed, is in the will. The same
answer serves for his second impropriety, about the word
elicit/ For, saith he, " as it is absurdly said, that to dance
is an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to
dance ; so it is absurdly said, that to will or choose is an act
drawn out of the power to will." His objection is yet more
improper than their expression. The art of dancing rather
resembles the understanding, than the will. That " draw
ing," which the schools intend, is clearly of another nature

k [Tit. Liv., i. 54.]

140 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART from that which he conceives. By " elicitation," he under-
IIL stands a persuading or enticing with flattering words, or
sweet alluring insinuations, to choose this or that. But that
" elicitation," which the Schools intend, is a deducing of the
power of the will into act ; that " drawing," which they men
tion, is merely from the appetibility of the object, or of the
end; as a man " draws" a child after him with the sight of a
fair apple, or a shepherd " draws" his sheep after him with
the .sight of a green bough; so the end " draws" the will to it
by a metaphorical motion. What he understands here by an
" ability to dance," is more than I know, or any man else,
until he express himself in more proper terms, whether he
understand the locomotive faculty alone, or the art or ac
quired habit of dancing alone, or both of these jointly. It
may be said aptly without any absurdity, that the act of
dancing is "drawn out" (" elicitur") of the locomotive fa
culty helped by the acquired habit. He who is so scrupu
lous about the received phrases of the Schools, should not
have let so many improper expressions have dropped from
his pen ; as, in this very passage, he confounds the " compel
ling of a voluntary action" with the commanding of a volun
tary action, and "willing" with "electing/ which he saith, 704-
"are all one." Yet to will properly respects the end; to
elect, the means.

[Nor unne- His other objection against this distinction of the acts of
otecurej the wiU into elicit and imperate, is "obscurity:" "Might
it not" (saith he) " have been as easily said in English a vo
luntary action." Yes, it might have been said "as easily," but
not as truly, nor properly. Whatsoever hath its original
from the will, whether immediately or mediately, whether it
be a proper act of the will itself, as to elect, or an act of the
understanding, as to deliberate, or an act of the inferior
faculties, or of the members, is a voluntary action ; but nei
ther the act of reason, nor of the senses, nor of the sensitive
appetite, nor of the members, are the proper acts of the will,
nor drawn immediately out of the will itself; but the mem
bers and faculties are applied to their proper and respective
acts by the power of the will.

&"m^~ And so he comes to cast up the total sum of my second
takes the reason, with the same faith that the unjust steward did make

author s

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 141

his accounts. "The sum of J. D. s distinction is" (saith he), DISCOURSE
"that a voluntary act may be done on compulsion" (just d * ,
contrary to what I have maintained), "that is to say, by foul Luke xvi.
means ; but to will that, or any act, cannot be but by allure-
ment or fair means." I confess the distinction is mine, be
cause I use it ; as the sun is mine or the air is mine ; that is,
common to me with all who treat of this subject. But his
mistakes are so thick, both in relating my mind and his own,
that the reader may conclude he is wandered out of his
known way. I will do my duty to shew him the right way.
First, no acts, which are properly s#id to be compelled, are
voluntary. Secondly, acts of terror (which he calls "foul
means"), which are sometimes in a large improper sense
called compulsory actions, may be, and for the most part are,
consistent with true liberty. Thirdly, actions proceeding
from blandishments or sweet persuasions (which he calls
"fair means"), if they be indeliberated (as in children, who
want .the use of reason), are not presently free actions.
Lastly, the strength of consequent and deliberated desires
doth neither diminish guilt, nor excuse from punishment; as
just fears of extreme and imminent dangers threatened by
extrinsecal agents often do : because the strength of the
former proceeds from our own fault, and was freely elected
in the causes of it ; but neither desires nor fears, which are
consequent and deliberated, do absolutely necessitate the will.

[iV. THEORIES CONCERNING THE CAUSE OF A SUPPOSED
NECESSITY.]

NUMBER XXI.

cklv disnelled. First, [i. A;

J. D. The rest are umbrages quickly dispelled. First, [i. Astro-

i it -i -I /i _.!_ i^gy. _

the astrologer steps up, and subjects liberty to the motions
of heaven, to the aspects and ascensions of the stars.

..." Plus etenim fati valet hora benigni,
" Quam si nos Veneris commendet epistola Marti 1 ."

I stand not much upon them, who cannot see the fishes

1 [Juv., xvi. 4, 5.]

142 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART swimming besides them in the rivers, yet believe they see

Ill those which are in heaven ; who promise great treasures to

others, and beg a groat for themselves. The stars, at the
most, do but incline, they cannot necessitate.

[ii. The Secondly, the physician subjects liberty to the complexion
SnTand*" and temperature of the body. But yet this comes not home
ture P o7the * a necessity. Socrates" 1 , and many others, by assiduous
botl &gt; -] care have corrected the pernicious propensions, which flowed
from their temperatures.

[Answer.] T. H. In the rest of his discourse he reckoneth up the
opinions of certain professions of men, touching the causes,
wherein the necessity of things, which they maintain, con-
sisteth. And, first, he saith, the astrologer deriveth his
necessity from the stars. Secondly, that the physician attri-
buteth it to the temper of the body. For my part, I am not
of their opinion; because neither the stars alone, nor the
temperature of the patient alone, is able to produce any
effect without the concurrence of all other agents. For there
is hardly any one action, how casual soever it seem, to the
causing whereof concur not whatsoever is " in rerum naturd"
Which, because it is a great paradox, and depends on many
antecedent speculations, I do not press in this place.

[Reply.] J. D. Towards the latter end of my discourse I answered
some specious pretences against liberty. The two first were
of the astrologer and the physician; the one subjecting
liberty to the motions and influences of the heavenly bodies,
the other to the complexions of men. The sum of my answer
was, that the stars and complexions do "incline/ but not at 705
all "necessitate" the will. To which all judicious astrono
mers and physicians do assent. And T. H. himself doth not
dissent from it. So as to this part there needs no reply.

But whereas he mentions a " great paradox" of his own,
that " there is hardly any one action, to the causing of which
concurs not whatsoever is in rerum naturd/" I can but
smile to see, with what ambition our great undertakers do

[See above, p. 100, note p.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 143

affect to be accounted the first founders of strange opinions ; DISCOURSE

as if the devising of an ill-grounded paradox were as great

an honour as the invention of the needle, or the discovery of
the new world. And to this paradox in particular: I meddle
not with natural actions, because the subject of my discourse
is moral liberty; but if he intend not only the kinds of
things, but every individual creature, and not only in natural
but voluntary actions, I desire to know, how Prester John,
or the Great Mogul, or the King of China, or any one of so
many millions of their subjects, do concur to my writing of
this reply. If they do not, among* his other speculations
concerning this matter, I hope he will give us some restric
tions. It were hard to make all the negroes accessary to all
the murders that are committed in Europe.

NUMBER XXII.

J. D. Thirdly, the moral philosopher tells us, how we are [Hi- The
haled hither and thither with outward objects. To this I cacyof

answer,-

First, that the power which outward objects have over us, [Such effi-
is for the most part by our own default; because of those our own
vicious habits which we have contracted. Therefore, though fault ^
the actions seem to have a kind of violence in them, yet they
were free and voluntary in their first originals. As a para
lytic man, to use Aristotle s comparison, shedding the liquor
deserves to be punished; for though his act be unwilling,
yet his intemperance was willing, whereby he contracted this
infirmity 11 .

Secondly, I answer, that concupiscence, and custom, and [Not irre-
bad company, and outward objects, do indeed make a procli- S1
vity, but not a necessity. By prayers, tears, meditations,
vows, watchings, fastings, humi-cubations, a man may get a
contrary habit ; and gain the victory, not only over outward
objects, but also over his own corruptions, and become the
king of the little world of himself.

[Vide Aristot, Ethic., III. vii. 15.]

144 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

p A R T "Si metuis, si prava cupis, si duceris ira,

III. " Servitii patiere jugum, tolerabis iniquas

" Interius leges. Tune omnia jure tenebis,
" Cum poteris rex esse tui."

[Maybe Thirdly, a resolved mind, which weighs all things judi-

byTse 6 ciously, and provides for all occurrences, is not so easily sur-

tied resoiu- p r i se( j w ith outward objects. Only Ulysses wept not at the

meeting with his wife and son p . "I would beat thee" (said

the philosopher), "but that I am angry q ." One spake lowest

[2 Sam when he was most moved. Another poured out the water

xxiii. 15, ^en he was thirsty. Another "made a covenant with"
[jobxxxi. hi s "eyes." Neither opportunity nor enticement could pre-
[Gen. vail with Joseph. Nor the music nor the fire with the three
xxxix. 7 c hiid ren . it is not the strength of the wind, but the light-
[Dan. in. ness o f the chaff, which causeth it to be blown away. Out-
^ ward objects do not impose a moral, much less a physical,

necessity; they may be dangerous, but cannot be destruc

tive, to true liberty.

[Answer.} T. H. Thirdly, he disputeth against the opinion of them
that say, external objects presented to men of such and such
temperatures do make their actions necessary ; and says, the
power that such objects have over us proceeds from our own
fault. But that is nothing to the purpose, if such fault of
ours proceedeth from causes not in our own power. And
therefore that opinion may hold true for all this answer.
Further he saith, " Prayer, fasting," &c. may alter our habits.
Tis true ; but when they do so, they are causes of the con
trary habit, and make it necessary ; as the former habit had
been necessary, if prayer, fasting, &c., had not been. Besides,
we are not moved nor disposed to prayer, or any other action,
but by outward objects ; as pious company, godly preachers,
or something equivalent. Thirdly, he saith, "a resolved mind
is not easily surprised " as the mind of Ulysses, who when
others wept, he alone wept not ; and of the philosopher that
abstained from striking, because he found himself angry ;

[2 Sam. and of him that poured out the water when he was thirsty ;

i 6 .] and the like. Such things, I confess, have or may have been

[Claudian., De IV. Consul. Hono- 1 [An anecdote told of Plato ; see
rn, Carm.viii. vv. 258261.] I&gt;iog. Laert., iii. 39.1

p [See the Odyss., xix. 201212.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 145

done ; and do prove only, that it was not necessary for DISCOURSE
706 Ulysses then to weep, nor for the philosopher to strike, nor
for that other man to drink ; but it does not prove, that it
was not necessary for Ulysses then to abstain as he did from
weeping, nor the philosopher to abstain as he did from strik
ing, nor the other man to forbear drinking. And yet that
was the thing he ought to have proved.

Lastly, he confesseth, that the disposition of objects " may
be dangerous to liberty, but cannot be destructive." To
which I answer, tis impossible : for liberty is never in any
other danger than to be lost ; and if it cannot be lost, which
he confesseth, I may infer it can be in no danger at all.

J. D. The third pretence was out of moral philosophy [Reply.]
misunderstood, that outward objects do necessitate the will.
I shall not need to repeat what he hath omitted, but only to
satisfy his exceptions. The first is, that it is not material,
though the power of outward objects do " proceed from our
own faults, if such faults of ours proceed not from causes in
our own power." Well, but what if they do proceed from
causes that are in our own power, as in truth they do ?
Then his answer is a mere subterfuge. If our faults proceed
from causes that are not and were not in our own power,
then they are not our faults at all ; it is not a fault in us, not
to do those things which never were in our power to do ; but
they are the faults of these causes from whence they do pro
ceed. Next, he confesseth, that it is in our power by good
endeavours to alter those vicious habits which we had con
tracted, and to get the contrary habit. " True" (saith he),
but then the contrary habit doth necessitate the one way, as
well as the former habit did the other way/ By which very
consideration it appears, that that which he calls a necessity
is no more but a proclivity. If it were a true necessity, it
could not be avoided nor altered by our endeavours. The
truth is, acquired habits do help and assist the faculty, but
they do not necessitate the faculty. He who hath gotten to
himself a habit of temperance, may yet upon occasion commit
an intemperate act ; and so on the contrary. Acts are not
opposed to habits, but other habits. He adds, that " we are
not moved to prayer or any other action but by outward

BRAMHALL.

146 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART objects ; as pious company, godly preachers, or something

-ill: equivalent/ Wherein are two other mistakes: first, to

make "godly preachers/ and "pious company/ to be "out
ward objects/ which are outward agents; secondly, to affirm,
that the will " is not moved but by outward objects." The
will is moved by itself, by the understanding, by the sensitive
passions, by angels good and bad, by men, and most
effectually, by acts or habits infused by God, whereby the
will is excited (extraordinarily indeed but) efficaciously and
determiiiately. This is more than "equivalent" with "out
ward objects."

Another branch of mine answer was, that a resolved and
prepared mind is able to resist both the appetibility of objects
and the unruliness of passions; as I shewed by examples.
He answers, that I prove Ulysses was not necessitated to
weep, nor the philosopher to strike, but I do not prove that
they were not necessitated to forbear. He saith true. I am
not now proving, but answering. Yet my answer doth suffi
ciently prove that which I intend ; that the rational will
hath power, both to slight the most appetible objects, and to
control the most unruly passions. When he hath given a
clear solution to those proofs which I have produced, then it
will be time for him to cry for more work.

Lastly, whereas I say, that " outward objects may be
dangerous, but cannot be destructive, to true liberty;" he
catcheth at it, and objects, that " liberty is in no danger, but
to be lost, but" I " say, it cannot be lost, therefore" he in
fers, that it is " in no danger at all." I answer, first, that
liberty is in more danger to be abused than to be lost ;
many more men do abuse their wits than lose them;
secondly, liberty is in danger likewise to be weakened or
diminished, as when it is clogged by vicious habits contracted
by ourselves, and yet it is not totally lost ; thirdly, though
liberty cannot be totally lost out of the world, yet it may be
totally lost to this or that particular man, as to the exercise
of it. Reason is the root of liberty ; and though nothing be
more natural to a man than reason, yet many, by excess of
study, or by continual gormandizing, or by some extravagant
passion, which they have cherished in themselves, or by doting
too much upon some affected object, do become very sots, and

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 147

deprive themselves of the use of reason, and consequently of DISCOURSE
liberty. And when the benefit of liberty is not thus univer

sally lost, yet it may be lost respectively to this or that parti-
707 cular occasion. As he who makes choice of a bad wife, hath
lost his former liberty to choose a good one.

NUMBER XXIII.
J. D. Fourthly, the natural philosopher doth teach, that [iv. The
the will doth necessarily follow the last dictate of the under-
standing. It is true, indeed, the will should follow the

direction of the understanding, but I am not satisfied that it th e under-
doth evermore follow it. Sometimes this saying hath place, [The case

" Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor r " As that great ?
Roman said of two suitors, that the one produced the better
reasons, but the other must have the office 8 ; so reason often
lies dejected at the feet of affection. Things nearer to the
senses move more powerfully. Do what a man can, he shall
sorrow more for the death of his child than for " the sin of [See Mi
nis soul ;" yet appreciatively, in the estimation of judgment, ca
he accounts the offence of God a greater evil than any tem
poral loss.

Next, I do not believe, that a man is bound to weigh the [Such a
expedience or inexpedience of every ordinary trivial action to ther extrin-
the least grain in the balance of his understanding, or to secal nor

. , . . antece-

run up into his watch-tower with his perspective to take dent.]
notice of every jackdaw that flies by, for fear of some hidden
danger. This seems to me to be a prostitution of reason to
petite observations ; as concerning every rag that a man
wears, each drop of drink, each morsel of bread that he eats,
each pace that he walks. Thus many steps must he go, not
one more, nor one less, under pain of mortal sin. What is
this but a rack and a gibbet to the conscience ? But God
leaves many things indifferent, though man be so curious he
will not. A good architect will be sure to provide sufficient
materials for his building ; but what particular number of
stones, or trees, he troubles not his head. And suppose he

r [Ovid., Metam., vii. 20, 21.] p. 165. ed. Bryant.]

s [Plut., in Vita Jul. Caesar., torn. iv.

148 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART should weigh each action thus, yet he doth not ; so still there
- is liberty.

[The un- Thirdly, I conceive it is possible, in this mist and weakness
of human apprehension, for two actions to be so equally cir-
cumstaiitiated, that no discernible difference can appear be-
between tween them upon discussion. As suppose a chirurgeon
natives.] should give two plasters to his patient, and bid him apply
either of them to his wound; what can induce his reason
more to the one than to the other, but that he may refer it
to chance, whether he will use ?

But leaving these probable speculations, which I submit to
better judgments, I answer the philosopher briefly thus :
admitting that the will did necessarily follow the last dictate
of the understanding, as certainly in many things it doth ;
yet, first, this is no extrinsecal determination from without,
and a man s own resolution is not destructive to his own
liberty, but depends upon it. So the person is still free.
Secondly, this determination is not antecedent, but joined
with the action. The understanding and the will are not
different agents, but distinct faculties of the same soul. Here
is an infallibility, or a hypothetical necessity ; as we say,
" Quicquid est, quando est, necesse est esse* :" a necessity of
consequence, but not a necessity of consequent. Though an
agent have certainly determined, and so the action be become
infallible, yet, if the agent did determine freely, the action
likewise is free.

[Answer. ] T. H. The fourth opinion which he rejecteth, is of them
that make the will necessarily to follow the last dictate of the
understanding. But it seems he understands that tenet in
another sense than I do. For he speaketh, as if they that
held it did suppose men must dispute the sequel of every
action they do, great and small, to the least grain; which
is a thing that he thinks with reason to be untrue. But
I understand it to signify, that the will follows the last
opinion or judgment immediately preceding the action, con
cerning whether it be good to do it or not ; whether he
hath weighed it long before or not at all. And that I take
to be the meaning of them that hold it. As, for example,

1 [See above, p. 25. note c.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 149

when a man strikes, his will to strike follows necessarily that DISCOURSE
thought he had of the sequel of his stroke immediately before

the lifting of his hand. Now, if it be understood in that
sense, the last dictate of the understanding does certainly
necessitate the action ; though not as the whole cause, yet as
the last cause ; as the last feather necessitates the breaking
of a horse s back, when there are so many laid on before as
there needeth but the addition of that one to make the
weight sufficient. That which he allegeth against this, is,
first, out of a poet, who in the person of Medea says, " Video
meliora proboque, deteriora sequor." But the saying (as pretty
as it is) is not true ; for though Medea saw many reasons to
forbear killing her children, yet the last dictate of her judg
ment was, that the present revenge of her husband out
weighed them all. And thereupon that wicked action fol
lowed necessarily. Then the story of the Roman, that of
708 two competitors said, one had the better reasons, but the
other must have the office. This also maketh against him ;
for the last dictate of his judgment that had the bestowing of
the office, was this, that it was better to take a great bribe
than reward a great merit. Thirdly, he objects, that "things
nearer the senses move more powerfully than reason." What
followeth thence but this, that the sense of the present good
is commonly more immediate to the action, than the fore
sight of the evil consequents to come ? Fourthly, whereas
he says, that " do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for
the death of his son than for the sin of his soul " it makes
nothing to the last dictate of the understanding, but it
argues plainly, that sorrow for sin is not voluntary : and, by
consequence, repentance proceedeth from causes.

J. D. The fourth pretence alleged against liberty was, [Reply.]
that the will doth necessarily follow the last dictate of the
understanding. This objection is largely answered before in
several places of this reply; and particularly, Numb. vii. u
In my former discourse, I gave two answers to it : the one
certain and undoubted, that supposing the last dictate of the
understanding did always determine the will, yet this deter
mination being not antecedent in time, nor proceeding from

u [Above pp. 4244.]

150 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART extriiisecal causes, but from the proper resolution of the
agent, who had now freely determined himself, it makes 110
absolute necessity, but only hypothetical, upon supposition
that the agent hath determined his own will after this or
that manner. Which being the main answer, T. H. is so
far from taking it away, that he takes no notice of it. The
other part of mine answer was probable : that it is not always
certain, that the will doth always actually follow the last
dictate of the understanding, though it always ought to follow
it. Of which I gave then three reasons. One was, that
actions may be so equally circumstantiated, or the case so
intricate, that reason cannot give a positive sentence, but
leaves the election to liberty or chance. To this he answers
not a word. Another of my reasons was, because reason doth
not weigh, nor is bound to weigh, the convenience or incon
venience of every individual action to the uttermost grain in
the balance of true judgment. The truth of this reason is
confessed by T. H.; though he might have had more abettors
in this than in the most part of his discourse that nothing
is indifferent, that a man cannot stroke his beard on one
side, but it was either necessary to do it, or sinful to omit it :
from which confession of his it follows, that in all those
actions, wherein reason doth not define what is most con
venient, there the will is free from the determination of the
understanding, and by consequence the " last feather" is
wanting, " to break the horse s back." A third reason was,
because passions and affections sometimes prevail against
judgment, as I proved by the example of Medea and Caesar,
by the nearness of the objects to the senses, and by the esti
mation of a temporal loss more than sin. Against this rea
son his whole answer is addressed.

[The last And, first, he explaineth the sense of the assertion by the
breaketh comparison of the " last feather," wherewith he seems to be
delighted, seeing he useth it now the second time x . But let
him like it as he will, it is improper, for three reasons. First,
the determination of the judgment is no part of the weight,
but is the sentence of the trier. The understanding weigheth
all things, objects, means, circumstances, convenience, incon
venience ; but itself is not weighed. Secondly, the sensitive

* [See above, Numb. xi. p. 62 ; and T. H. Numb. xi. p. 59.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 151

passion in some extraordinary cases may give a counterfeit DISCOURSE
weight to the object, if it can detain or divert reason from -
the balance ; but ordinarily the means, circumstances, and
causes concurrent, they have their whole weight from the
understanding ; so as they do not press " the horse s back"
at all until reason lay them on. Thirdly, he conceives, that
as each feather hath a certain natural weight, whereby it
concurs not arbitrarily but necessarily towards the over
charging of the horse, so all objects and causes have a natural
efficiency, whereby they do physically determine the will;
which is a great mistake. His* objects, his agents, his
motives, his passions, and all his concurrent causes, ordi
narily do only move the will morally, not determine it natu
rally; so as it hath in all ordinary actions a free dominion
over itself.

His other example, of a man that strikes, " whose will to [T. H. s ex-
strike followeth necessarily that thought he had of the sequel man that
of his stroke immediately before the lifting up of his hand/ stnkes -J
as it confounds passionate, indeliberate thoughts, with the
dictates of right reason, so it is very uncertain ; for between
the cup and the lips, between the lifting up of the hand and
the blow, the will may alter, and the judgment also : and,
709 lastly, it is impertinent ; for that necessity of striking pro
ceeds from the free determination of the agent, and not from
the special influence of any outward determining causes.
And so it is only a necessity upon supposition.

Concerning Medea s choice, the strength of the argument [ofMe-
doth not lie either in the fact of Medea, which is but a fie- choice.]
tion, or in the authority of the poet, who writes things rather
to be admired than believed, but in the experience of all
men, who find it to be true in themselves : that sometimes
reason doth shew unto a man the exorbitancy of his passion,
that what he desires is but a pleasant good, that what he
loseth by such a choice is an honest good, that that which is
honest is to be preferred before that which is pleasant ; yet the
will pursues that which is pleasant, and neglects that which
is honest. St. Paul saith as much in earnest as is feigned of Rom. vii.
Medea ; that he " approved not that which" he " did," and 1
that he " did that which" he " hated." The Roman story is [And
mistaken ; there was no bribe in the case but affection.

152 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART Whereas I urge, that those things which are " nearer to the
senses/ do " move more powerfully," he lays hold on it ; and

without answering to that for which I produced it, infers,
" that the sense of present good is more immediate to the
action than the foresight of evil consequents :" which is true,
but it is not absolutely true by any antecedent necessity.
Let a man do what he may do, and what he ought to do ;
and sensitive objects will lose that power which they have by
his own fault and neglect. Antecedent or indeliberate con
cupiscence doth sometimes (but rarely) surprise a man, and
render the action not free. But consequent and deliberated
concupiscence, which proceeds from the rational will, doth
render the action more free, not less free ; and introduceth
only a necessity upon supposition.

[Affection Lastly, he saith, that a man s mourning " more for the loss
^ ^ s cn ild than for his sin, makes nothing to the last dictate
of the understanding." Yes, very much. Reason dictates,
that a sin committed is a greater evil than the loss of a child,
and ought more to be lamented for ; yet we see daily, how
affection prevails against the dictate of reason. That which
he infers from hence, that " sorrow for sin is not voluntary,
and by consequence that repentance proceedeth from causes,"
is true, as to the latter part of it, but not in his sense.
The "causes" from whence repentance doth proceed, are
God s grace preventing, and man s will concurring. God
prevents freely, man concurs freely. Those inferior agents,
which sometimes do concur as subordinate to the grace of
God, do not, cannot, determine the will naturally. And there
fore the former part of his inference, that " sorrow for sin
is not voluntary," is untrue, and altogether groundless.
That is much more truly and much more properly said to be
voluntary, which proceeds from judgment, and from the
rational will, than that which proceeds from passion, and
from the sensitive will. One of the main grounds of all
T. H. his errors in this question is, that he acknowledgeth
no efficacy but that which is natural. Hence is this wild
consequence "repentance hath causes," and therefore it "is
not voluntary." Free effects have free causes; necessary
effects necessary causes ; voluntary effects have sometimes
free, sometimes necessarv causes.

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 153

NUMBER XXIV. D T""

J. D. Fifthly, and lastly, the divine labours to find out a [v. The
way, how liberty may consist with the prescience and decrees
of God. But of this I had not very long since occasion to
write a full discourse, in answer to a treatise against the pre
science of things contingent. I shall for the present only
repeat these two things.

First, we ought not to desert a certain truth, because we [Our igno-
are not able to comprehend the certain manner. God should
be but a poor God, if we were able perfectly to comprehend swer O
all His actions and attributes.

Secondly, in my poor judgment, which I ever do and ever [Futurity
shall submit to better, the readiest way to reconcile contin- sent tcT"
gence and liberty with the decrees and prescience of God, God&lt; ^
and most remote from the altercations of these times, is to
subject future contingents to the aspect of God, according to
that presentiality which they have in eternity. Not that
things future, which are not yet existent, are co-existent with
God : but because the infinite knowledge of God, encircling
all times in the point of eternity, doth attain to their future
being ; from whence proceeds their objective and intelligible
beingy. The main impediment which keeps men from sub
scribing to this way is, because they conceive eternity to be
710 an everlasting succession, and not one indivisible point. But
if they consider, that " whatsoever is in God is God," that
there are no accidents in Him, for that which is infinitely
perfect cannot be further perfected ; that as God is not wise
but wisdom itself, not just but justice itself, so He is not
eternal but eternity itself: they must needs conclude, that
therefore this eternity is indivisible, because God is indivisi
ble : and therefore not successive, but altogether an infinite
point, comprehending all times within itself.

T. H. The last part of this discourse containeth his opi- \_Ansiver. }
nion about reconciling liberty with the prescience and decrees
of God, otherwise than some divines have done, against whom
he had formerly written a treatise, out of which he only " re-
peateth two things." One is, that " we ought not to desert

y [So Boethius, De Consolat., lib. v. Prosa 6.]

154 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART a certain truth for not being able to comprehend the certain

manner" of it. And I say the same ; as, for example, that

he ought not to desert this certain truth, that there are

certain and necessary causes, which make every man to will

what he willeth, though he do not yet conceive in what

[Events manner the will of man is caused. And yet, I think, the

"determined manner of it is not very hard to conceive ; seeing that we see

b denTand ^ity, tliat P ra i se j dispraise, reward, punishment, good and

extrinsecal evil, sequels of men s actions retained in memory, do frame

and make us to the election of whatsoever it be that we

elect; and that the memory of such things proceeds from

the senses ; and sense from the operation of the objects of

sense, which are external to us, and governed only by God

Almighty ; and by consequence, all actions, even of free and

voluntary agents, are necessary.

[Eternity The other thing he repeateth is, that the best way "to
dfofeftfo"* reconcile contingency and liberty with the prescience and
point but a decrees of God, is to subject future contingents to the aspect

succession.] " x

of God." The same is also my opinion, but contrary to what
he hath all this while laboured to prove ; for hitherto he held
liberty and necessity, that is to say, liberty and the decrees
of God, irreconcileable : unless "the aspect of God" (which
word appeareth now the first time in this discourse) signify
somewhat else besides God s will and decree, which I cannot
understand. But he adds, that we must subject them " ac
cording to that presentiality which they have in eternity ;"
which he says cannot be done by them that " conceive eter
nity to be an everlasting succession," but only by them that
conceive it an " indivisible point." To this I answer, that as
soon as I can conceive eternity "an indivisible point," or
any thing but "an everlasting succession," I will renounce
all I have written in this subject. I know St. Thomas Aqui
nas calls eternity " nunc stans" "an ever abiding now 2 ;"
which is easy enough to say, but though I fain would, I
never could conceive it. They that can, are more happy
than I. But in the mean time he alloweth hereby all men
to be of my opinion, save only those that conceive in their
minds a "nunc stans" which I think are none. I under
stand as little how it can be true, that " God is not just but

1 [Summ., P. Prima, Qu. x. art. 2.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 155

justice itself, not wise but wisdom itself, not eternal but eter- DISCOURSE
nity itself;" nor how he concludes thence, that eternity is a
point indivisible, and not a succession ; nor in what sense it
can be said, that an infinite point, &c., wherein is no succes
sion, can comprehend all times though time be successive.

These phrases I find not in the Scripture. I wonder there
fore, what was the design of the School-men, to bring them
up ; unless they thought a man could not be a true Chris
tian, unless his understanding be first strangled with such
hard sayings.

And thus much in answer to his discourse, wherein I
think not only his " squadrons a ," but also his reserves of dis
tinctions, are defeated. And now your Lordship shall have
my doctrine concerning the same question, with my reasons
for it, positively and briefly as I can, without any terms of
art, in plain English.

J. D. That poor discourse which I mention was not writ- [Reply.]
ten against any " divines," but in way of examination of a
French treatise, which your Lordship s brother b did me the
honour to shew me at York. My assertion is most true, [A certain
that " we ought not to desert a certain truth because we are ceived"

not able to comprehend the certain manner." Such a truth
is that which I maintain, that the will of man in ordinary ^d be-
actions is free from extrinsecal determination ; a truth de- hard to be
monstrable in reason, received and believed by all the world, stood.]
And therefore, though I be not able to comprehend or ex
press exactly the certain manner how it consists together
with God s eternal prescience and decrees, which exceed my
weak capacity, yet I ought to adhere to that truth which is
manifest. But T. H. his opinion of the absolute necessity of
all events, by reason of their antecedent determination in
their extrinsecal and necessary causes, is no such certain
truth, but an innovation, a strange paradox, without proba
ble grounds, rejected by all authors, yea, by all the world.
Neither is the manner how the second causes do operate, so
obscure, or so transcendent above the reach of reason, as the

a [See above, Numb. v. p. 37.] 1653, and was buried at Bolsover (Col-

b [Sir Charles Cavendish of "Walling- lins Peerage by Sir E. Brydges, vol. i.

ton, the brother of the Marquis (after- p. 317). Bramhall was at York with

wards Duke) of Newcastle, died Feb. 4, the Marquis from 1642 to 1644.]

156 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART eternal decrees of God are. And therefore in both these 71 1
-H: respects he cannot challenge the same privilege. I am in
possession of an old truth derived by inheritance or succes
sion from mine ancestors. And therefore, though I were not
able to clear every quirk in law, yet I might justly hold my
possession until a better title were shewed for another. He
is no old possessor, but a new pretender; and is bound to
make good his claim by evident proofs, not by weak and in
consequent suppositions, or inducements, such as those are
which he useth here, of " praises, dispraises, rewards, punish
ments, the memory of good and evil sequels, and events;"
which may incline the will, but neither can nor do necessi
tate the will; nor by uncertain and accidental inferences,
such as this, " the memory of praises, dispraises, rewards,
punishments, good and evil sequels, do make us" (he should
say, dispose us) " to elect what we elect, but the memory of
these things is from the sense, and the sense from the opera
tion of the external objects, and the agency of external ob
jects is only from God, therefore all actions, even of free and
voluntary agents, are necessary." To pass by all the other
great imperfections which are to be found in this sorites, it
is just like that old sophistical piece, he that drinks well
sleeps well, he that sleeps well thinks no hurt, he that thinks
no hurt lives well, therefore he that drinks well lives well.
[How con- In the very last passage of my discourse I proposed mine
evcfnts are own private opinion, how it might be made appear, that the
abuTwith eternal prescience and decrees of God are consistent with
sdence P and true libert ^ and contingency. And this I set down in as
decrees.] plain terms as I could, or as so profound a speculation would
permit ; which is almost wholly misunderstood by T. H., and
many of my words wrested to a wrong sense. As, first,

[" Intuit where I speak of " the aspect of God," that is, His view, His
knowledge, by which the most free and contingent actions

Heb.iv.i,3. were manifest to Him from eternity, " All things are naked
and open to His eyes ;" and this not discursively, but intui
tively, not by external species, but by His internal essence ;
he confounds this with the will and the decrees of God.
Though he "found not the word aspect before in this dis-

not e kiemi y course &gt;" he mi S nt have found prescience. Secondly, he

c [Thorn. Aquin., Sunim., P. Prima, Qu. xiv. art. 13 ; and see also art. 7.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 157

chargeth me, that hitherto I have maintained, that " liberty DISCOURSE

and the decrees of God are irreconcileable." If I . have

said any such thing, my heart never went along with my God s de-

pen. No ; but his reason why he chargeth me on this cr

manner, is because I have maintained, that " liberty and

the absolute necessity of all things are irreconcileable."

That is true indeed. What then? ff Why" (saith he), " ne

cessity and God s decrees are all one." How? "All one?" That

were strange indeed. Necessity may be a consequent of

God s decrees; it cannot be the decree itself. But to cut

his argument short. God hath decreed all effects which

come to pass in time; yet not all after the same manner,

but according to the distinct natures, capacities, and condi

tions of His creatures, which He doth not destroy by His

decree : some He acteth, with some he co-operateth by spe

cial influence, and some He only permitteth. Yet this is no

idle or bare permission; seeing He doth concur, both by

way of general influence, giving power to act, and also by

disposing all events, necessary, free, and contingent, to His

own glory. Thirdly, he chargeth me, that I " allow all men to [other ex-

be of" his opinion, save only those that conceive in their have been

minds a nunc stans, " or how eternity is an indivisible point, the subject

rather than an everlasting succession. But I have given no
such allowance. I know there are many other ways pro- thor s.]
posed by divines for reconciling the eternal prescience and
decrees of God with the liberty and contingency of second
causes; some of which may please other judgments better
than this of mine. Howsoever, though a man could compre
hend none of all these ways, yet remember what I said, that
" a certain truth ought not to be rejected," because we are
not able, in respect of our weakness, to understand "the
certain manner," or reason of it. I know the load-stone
hath an attractive power to draw the iron to it ; and yet I
know not how it comes to have such a power.

But the chiefest difficulty which offers itself in this section [That eter-
is, whether eternity be " an indivisible point" (as I maintain suScesSon a
it) or "an everlasting succession" (as he would have it). Risible 1 "
According to his constant use, he gives no answer to what point.]
was urged by me, but pleads against it from his own incapa
city ; " I never could conceive," saith he, " how eternity

158 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART should be an indivisible point." I believe, that neither we
nor any man else can comprehend it so clearly as we do

these inferior things. The nearer that any thing comes to 71 2
the essence of God, the more remote it is from our appre
hension. But shall we therefore make potentialities, and
successive duration, and former and latter, or a part without
a part (as they say), to be in God ? Because we are not able
to understand clearly the Divine perfection, we must not
therefore attribute any imperfection to Him.

He saith moreover, that he " understands as little how it
can be true which" I " say, that God is not just but justice
itself, not eternal but eternity itself." It seems, howsoever
he be versed in this question, that he hath not troubled his
head overmuch with reading School- divines, or metaphysi
cians ; if he make faculties or qualities to be in God really
distinct from His essence. God is a most simple or pure act,
which can admit no composition of substance and accidents.
Doth he think, that the most perfect essence of God cannot
act sufficiently without faculties and qualities ? The infinite
perfection of the Divine essence excludes all passive or recep
tive powers, and cannot be perfected more than it is by any
accidents. The attributes of God are not diverse virtues or
qualities in Him, as they are in the creatures; but really
one and the same with the Divine essence, and among them
selves. They are attributed to God, to supply the defect of
our capacity, who are not able to understand that which is
to be known of God under one name or one act of the under-
standing d .

Furthermore he saith, that he "understands not how" I
" conclude from hence, that eternity is an indivisible point,
and not a succession." I will help him. The Divine sub
stance is indivisible; but eternity is the Divine substance.
The major is evident : because God is " actus simplicissimus"
" a most simple act ;" wherein there is no manner of compo
sition, neither of matter and form, nor of subject and acci
dents, nor of parts, &c. ; and by consequence no divisibility 6 .
The minor hath been clearly demonstrated in mine answer

d [See Pet. Lomb., Sent., lib. I. dist. e [See Pet. Lomb., Sent., lib. I. dist.

viii. qu. iv. tit. " Qualiter, cum Deus viii. qu. iv.art. 1 ; and Aug., De Trin.,
: simplex, multiplex tamen dicatur."] lib. v. c. 1. 2, Op. torn. viii. p. 833.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 159

to his last doubt, and is confessed by all men, that "what- DISCOURSE
soever is in God, is God f ."

Lastly, he saith, he "conceives not how it can be said,
that an infinite point, wherein is no succession, can compre
hend all time, which is successive." I answer, that it doth
not comprehend it formally, as time is successive, but emi
nently and virtually, as eternity is infinite. To-day all eter
nity is co-existent with this day. To-morrow all eternity
will be co-existent with to-morrow. And so in like manner
with all the parts of time, being itself without parts. He
saith, he "finds not these phrases in4he Scripture." No, but
he may find the thing in the Scripture ; that God is infinite
in all His attributes, and not capable of any imperfection.

And so, to shew his antipathy against the School-men, that [T. H. s
he hath no liberty or power to contain himself, when he conciu-
meets with any of their phrases or tenets, he falls into an- Slon&gt;]
other paroxysm or fit of inveighing against them; and so
concludes his answer with a plaudits to himself, because
he hath defeated both my "squadrons" of arguments, and
" reserves of distinctions."-

" Dicite, lo paean ; et io, bis dicite, paean ."

But because his eyesight was weak, and their backs were
towards him, he quite mistook the matter. Those whom he
see routed and running away, were his own scattered forces.

[V. THE REMAINDER OP T. H/S ANSWER.]

NUMBER XXV.

MY OPINION ABOUT LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

T. H. First, I conceive that when it cometh into a man s [i. ofac-
mind, to do or not to do some certain action, if he have no ^houTde-
time to deliberate the doing or abstaining, [he] necessarily liberation.]
followeth the present thought he had of the good or evil
consequence thereof to himself. As, for example, in sudden

f [" Hujus autem" (Dei) " Essentiae Pet. Lomb., Sent., lib. I. dist. viii. qu. v.

simplicitas ac sinceritas tanta est, quod tit. " QUOD NON EST IN DEO ALIQUID

non est in Ed oliquid quod non sit Ipsa ; QUOD NON SIT DEUS."]

sed idem est habens et quod habetur." [Ovid., Art. Amat, ii. 1.]

160 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART anger the action shall follow the thought of revenge, in
- sudden fear the thought of escape. Also when a man hath
time to deliberate, but deliberates not, because never any
thing appeared that could make him doubt of the conse
quence, the action follows his opinion of the goodness or
harm of it. These actions I call voluntary. He, if I under
stand him aright, calls them spontaneous. I call them volun
tary, because those actions that follow immediately the last
appetite are voluntary. And here, where there is one only
appetite, that one is the last.

Besides, I see tis reasonable to punish a rash action, which
could not be justly done by man, unless the same were volun
tary : for no action of a man can be said to be without de
liberation, though never so sudden, because tis supposed he
had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his life,
whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence
it is, that he that killeth in a sudden passion of anger, shall 7 13
nevertheless be justly put to death, because all the time
wherein he was able to consider, whether to kill were good or
evil, shall be held for one continual deliberation, and con
sequently the killing shall be judged to proceed from election.

[Reply.] J. D- This part of T. H. his discourse hangs together like
a sick man s dreams. Even now he tells us, that " a man
may have time to deliberate, yet not deliberate ;" by and by
he saith, that " no action of a man, though never so sudden,
can be said to be without deliberation/ He tells us, Numb,
xxxiii, that the scope of this section is to shew what is spon
taneous 11 . Howbeit he sheweth only what is voluntary, so
making voluntary and spontaneous to be all one ; whereas
before he had told us, that every spontaneous action is not
voluntary, because indeliberate, nor every voluntary action
spontaneous, if it proceed from fear 1 . Now he tells us,
that " those actions which follow the last appetite, are volun
tary, and where there is one only appetite, that is the last."
But before he told us, that "voluntary presupposeth some
precedent deliberation and meditation of what is likely to
follow, both upon the doing and abstaining from the action- 1 ."

h [Below, p. 175.] j [Ibid.]

1 [Above, Numb. viii. p. 45.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 161

He defines liberty, Numb, xxix, to be " the absence of all ex- DISCOUUSE
trinsecal impediments to action k ." And yet in his whole dis- -
course he laboureth to make good, that whatsoever is not
done, is therefore not done, because the agent was necessitated
by extrinsecal causes not to do it. Are not extrinsecal causes,
which determine him not to do it, extrinsecal impediments to
action ?" So no man shall be free to do anything but that
which he doth actually. He defines a free agent to be "him, who
hath not made an end of deliberating" (Numb, xxviii 1 ), and
yet defines liberty to be " an absence of outward impediments."
There may be "outward impediments," even whilst he is
deliberating ; as a man deliberates whether he shall play at
tennis, and at the same time the door of the tennis-court is
fast locked against him. And after a man hath ceased to de
liberate, there may be no outward impediments ; as when a
man resolves not to play at tennis, because he finds himself
ill disposed, or because he will not hazard his money. So the
same person, at the same time, should be free and not free,
not free and free. And as he is not firm to his own grounds,
so he confounds all things, the " mind" and the " will/ the
" estimative faculty" and the " understanding," " imagina
tion" with "deliberation," the end with the means, "human
will" with the "sensitive appetite," "rational hope or fear"
with " irrational passions," " inclinations" with "intentions," a
" beginning of being " with a " beginning of w r orking," " suf
ficiency" with " efficiency ;" so as the greatest difficulty is to
find out what he aims at : so as I had once resolved not to
answer this part of his discourse; yet, upon better advice, I will
take a brief survey of it also, and shew how far I assent unto,
or dissent from, that which I conceive to be his meaning.

And, first, concerning sudden passions, as anger or the like. [Of actions
That which he saith, that " the action doth necessarily follow
the thought," is thus far true, that those actions, which are
altogether undeliberated and do proceed from sudden and
violent passions, or motus primo primi, which surprise a man,
and give him no time to advise with reason, are not properly
and actually in themselves free, but rather necessary actions ;
as when a man runs away from a cat or a custard, out of a
secret antipathy.

k [Below p. 166.] 1 [Below p. 165.]

BRAMHALL.

162

A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PA RT
III.

[Of actions
done with
out present
delibera
tion. ]

[Actions

done in

passion

justly

punished,

because

done

through

past or

present

choice.]

Secondly, as for those actions, " wherein actual deliberation
seems not necessary, because never anything appeared that
could make a man doubt of the consequence/ I do confess,
that actions done by virtue of a precedent deliberation, with
out any actual deliberation in the present when the act is
done, may notwithstanding be truly both voluntary and free
acts ; yea, in some cases, and in some sense, more free, than if
they were actually deliberated of in present : as one who hath
acquired, by former deliberation and experience, a habit to
play upon the virginals, needs not deliberate what man or
what jack he must touch, nor what finger of his hand he must
move, to play such a lesson ; yea, if his mind should be fixed
or intent to every motion of his hand, or every touch of a
string, it would hinder his play, and render the action more
troublesome to him. Wherefore I believe, that not only his
playing in general, but every motion of his hand, though it be
not presently deliberated of, is a free act, by reason of his
precedent deliberation. So then (saving improprieties of
speech, as calling that voluntary which is free, and limiting
the will to the last appetite, and other mistakes, as that no act
can be said to be without deliberation), we agree also for the 714
greater part in this second observation.

Thirdly, whereas he saith, that " some sudden acts, pro
ceeding from violent passions which surprise a man, are justly
punished." I grant they are so sometimes, but not for his
reason because they have been formerly actually deliberated
of, but because they were virtually deliberated of, or because
it is our faults, that they were not actually deliberated of;
whether it was a fault of pure negation, that is, of not doing
our duty only, or a fault of bad disposition also, by reason of
some vicious habit, which we had contracted by our former
actions. To do a necessary act is never a fault, nor justly
punishable, when the necessity is inevitably imposed upon us
by extrinsecal causes. As if a child before he had the use of
reason shall kill a man in his passion, yet, because he wanted
malice to incite him to it, and reason to restrain him from it,
he shall not die for it in the strict rules of particular justice,
unless there be some mixture of public justice in the case.
But if the necessity be contracted by ourselves, and by our
own faults, it is justly punishable. As he who by his wanton

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 163

thoughts in the day-time, doth procure his own nocturnal DISCOUUSE
pollution. A man cannot deliberate in his sleep, yet it is
accounted a sinful act, and consequently a free act, that is,
not actually free in itself, but virtually free in its causes ; and
though it be not expressly willed and chosen, yet it is tacitly
and implicitly willed and chosen, when that is willed and
chosen from whence it was necessarily produced. By the
Levitical law, if a man digged a pit, and left it uncovered, so [Exod.
that his neighbour s ox or his ass did fall into it, he was bound x
to make reparation ; not because he did choose to leave it un
covered on purpose that such a mischance might happen, but
because he did freely omit that which he ought to have done,
from whence this damage proceeded to his neighbour.
Lastly, there is great difference between the first motions,
which sometimes are not in our power, and subsequent acts
of killing or stealing or the like, which always are in our
power, if we have the use of reason, or else it is our own fault
that they are not in our power. Yet to such hasty acts, done
in hot blood, the law is not so severe, as to those which are
done upon long deliberation and prepensed malice, " unless"
(as I said) "there be some mixture of public justice in it." He
that steals a horse deliberately may be more punishable by the
law, than he that kills the owner by chance-medley. Yet the
death of the owner was more " noxious" (to use his phrase),
and more damageable to the family, than the stealth of the
horse. So far wasT. H. mistaken in that also, that the right
to kill men doth proceed merely from their being (&lt; noxious" 1 ."

NUMBER XXVI.

T. H. Secondly, I conceive, when a man deliberates [H. Ofac-
whether he shall do a thing or not do a thing, that he does * t
nothing else but consider, whether it be better for himself to Deration.]
do it or not to do it; and to consider an action is to ima
gine the consequences of it, both good and evil : from whence
is to be inferred, that deliberation is nothing but alternate
imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action, or

m [T. H.] Numb. xiv. [above, p. 86.]
M 2

164 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART (which is the same thing) alternate hope and fear, or alternate
appetite to do or quit the action of which he deliberateth.

[Reply.] J. D. If I did not know what deliberation was, I should
be little relieved in my knowledge by this description. Some
times he makes it to be a consideration, or an act of the under
standing ; sometimes an imagination, or an act of the fancy ;
sometimes he makes it to be an alternation of passions, hope
and fear ; sometimes he makes it concern the end ; sometimes
to concern the means. So he makes it I know not what.
The truth is this, in brief: deliberation is an inquiry made
by reason, whether this or that, definitely considered, be a
good and fit means, or, indefinitely, what are good and fit
means, to be chosen for attaining some wished end".

NUMBER XXVII.

[iii. The T. H. Thirdly, I conceive, that in all deliberations, that is

te P before* * sav &gt; ^ n au alternate succession of contrary appetites, the

action.] i as t- i s ^hat w hi cn we call the will, and is immediately before

the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it become

impossible. All other appetites to do and to quit, that come

upon a man during his deliberation, are usually called inten

tions and inclinations but not wills, there being but one will ;

which also in this case may be called last will, though the

intention change often.

[Reply. J. D. Still here is nothing but confusion. He confounds
foundsThe tne faculty of the will with the act of volition ; he makes the 715
ttonwuh li " wil1 to be the last P art of deliberation; he makes the inten-
* t * n w ^ ich is a most P r P er and elicit act of the will, " or a
willing of the end, as it is to be attained by certain means ,"
to be no willing at all, but only some antecedaneous " incli
nation" or propension. He might as well say, that the un
certain agitation of the needle hither and thither, to find out
the pole, and the resting or fixing of itself directly towards

" Bov\fv6fj.e6a, . . 0/j.fi/oi rf\os fTnre\ov/jLfi/ov irus 8t& TOVTOV

n, irus Kal 5io rivuv f&lt;rrat, . . K al Sta Aristot., Ethic., III. v. 11.]

ir\fi6vwv i^v tya.ivoiJ.evov yivcffOai 5ict [Thorn. Aquin., Summ., Prim.

rlvos tfo-Ta Kal K d\\ t( rra . . Si tvbs V Secund., Qu. xii. art. 1. Ad quartum.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 165

the pole, were both the same thing. But the grossest mistake DISCOURSE
is, that he will acknowledge no act of a man s will to be his
will, but only the last act, which he calls the "last will." If the
first were no will, how comes this to be the " last will ?" Ac
cording to this doctrine, the will of a man should be as un
changeable as the will of God ; at least so long as there is a
possibility to effect it. According to this doctrine, concu
piscence with consent should be no sin, for that which is not
truly willed is not a sin ; or rather should not be at all, unless
either the act followed, or were rendered impossible by some
intervening circumstances. According to this doctrine, no
man can say, this is my will, because he knows not yet
whether it shall be his last will. The truth is, there be
many acts of the will, both in respect of the means and of the
end. But that act, which makes a man s actions to be truly
free, is election, which is the deliberate choosing or refusing
of this or that means, or the acceptation of one means before
another, where divers are represented by the understanding V

NUMBER XXVIII.

T. H. Fourthly, that those actions, which man is said to [iv. A
do upon deliberation, are said to be voluntary, and done upon f
choice and election. So that voluntary action, and action
proceeding from election, is the same thing ; and that of a
voluntary agent, tis all one to say, he is free, and to say, he
hath not made an end of deliberating.

J. D. This short section might pass without an animad- [Reply.]
version but for two things. The one is, that he confounds a
voluntary act with a free act. A free act is only that which
proceeds from the free election of the rational will after
deliberation; but every act - that proceeds from the sensi
tive appetite of man or beast, without deliberation or
election, is truly voluntary. The other thing observable
is his conclusion, that " it is all one to say, a man is
free, and to say, he hath not made an end of deliberating."
Which confession of his overturns his whole structure of
absolute necessity : for if every agent be necessitated to act

P [Thorn. Aquin., Summ., P. Prima, Qu. Ixxxiii. art. 3.]

166 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART what he doth act by a necessary and natural flux of extrinse-
- cal causes, then he is 110 more free before he deliberates, or
whilst he deliberates, than he is after ; but by T. H. his con
fession here, he is more free whilst he deliberates than he is
after. And so, after all his flourishes for an absolute or ex-
trinsecal necessity, he is glad to sit himself down, and rest
contented with a hypothetical necessity, which no man ever
denied or doubted of; ascribing the necessitation of a man
in free acts to his own deliberation, and in indeliberate acts to
his last thought (Numb. xxv r ). What is this to a natural and
special influence of extrinsecal causes? Again, "liberty,"
saith he, is " an absence of extrinsecal impediments " but
deliberation doth produce no new extrinsecal impediments;
therefore (let him choose which part he will) either he is free
after deliberation by his own doctrine, or he was not free
before. Our own deliberation, and the direction of our own
understanding, and the election of our own will, do produce
a hypothetical necessity, that the event be such as the under
standing hath directed, and the will elected. But forasmuch
as the understanding might have directed otherwise, and the
will have elected otherwise, this is far from an absolute
necessity. Neither doth liberty respect only future acts, hut
present acts also. Otherwise God did not freely create the
world. In the same instant wherein the will elects, it is free,
according to a priority of nature though not of time, to elect
otherwise. And so, in a divided sense, the will is free, even
whilst it acts, though in a compounded sense it be not free.
Certainly, deliberation doth constitute, not destroy liberty.

NUMBER XXIX.

\io,^} fini T&gt; H ~~ Fifthlv ; I conceive liberty to be rightly defined in
liberty.-] this manner. Liberty is the absence of all the impediments
to action that are not contained in the nature and in the
intrinsecal quality of the agent. As, for example, the water
is said to descend freely, or to have liberty to descend by the
channel of the river, because there is no impediment that
way; but not across, because the banks are impediments.

r [Above, p. 160.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 167

And though water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants DISCOURSE
the liberty to ascend, but the faculty or power ; because the -
impediment is in the nature of the water and intrinsecal. So
also we say, he that is tied wants the liberty to go, because
7 16 the impediment is not in him but in his bands; whereas we
say not so of him that is sick or lame, because the impedi
ment is in himself.

J. D. How that should be a right definition of liberty [Reply
which comprehends neither the genus nor the difference, nitioifon
neither the matter nor the form of liberty, which doth not so ^n a ~
much as accidentally describe liberty by its marks and tokens;
how a real faculty, or the elective power, should be defined by a
negation, or by an " absence;" is past my understanding, and
contrary to all the rules of right reason which I have learned.
Negatives cannot explicate the nature of things defined. By
this definition, a stone hath liberty to ascend into the air,
because there is no outward impediment to hinder it ; and so
a violent act 8 may be a free act. Just like his definition are his [His in-
instances, of the liberty of the water to descend down the sti
channel, and a sick or a lame man s liberty to go. The latter
is an impotence, and not a power or a liberty. The former is
so far from being a free act, that it is scarce a natural act.
Certainly, the proper natural motion of water, as of all heavy
bodies, is to descend directly downwards towards the centre ;
as we see in rain, which falls down perpendicularly. Though
this be far from a free act, which proceeds from a rational
appetite, yet it is a natural act, and proceeds from a natural
appetite, and hath its reason within sen 7 . So hath not the
current of the river in its channel; which must not be ascribed
to the proper nature of the water, but either to the general
order of the universe, for the better being and preservation of
the creatures, otherwise the waters should not move in seas
and rivers as they do, but cover the face of the earth, and
possess their proper place between the air and the earth,
according to the degree of their gravity, or to an extrinsecal
principle, whilst one particle of water thrusteth and forceth
forward another, and so comes a current, or at least so comes

s [" H 8e ava-ykt] SITTT) ^ /x/ yap &vo&gt; &lt;ppfrai, ctAA. ou 5i& TT
Kara, tyvffiv KCU rr)j/ 6p/j.rjv, f) Se fiia f) Trapa avdyKf)v." Aristot., Anal. Poster., II.
T^V 6p/j.r)V &o"rrep \i9os Kal Ka.ru nal xi. 9.]

168 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART the current to be more impetuous ; to which, motion the
position of the earth doth contribute much, both by restrain
ing that fluid body with its banks from dispersing itself, and
also by affording way for a fair and easy descent by its pro
clivity. He tells us sadly, that " the water wants liberty to
go over the banks, because there is an extrinsecal impediment;
but to ascend up the channel it wants not liberty, but power."
Why ? Liberty is a power : if it want power to ascend, it
wants liberty to ascend. But he makes the reason why the
water ascends not up the channel to be intrinsecal, and the
reason why it ascends not over the banks to be extrinsecal ;
as if there were not a rising of the ground up the channel, as
well as up the banks, though it be not so discernible, nor
always so sudden. The natural appetite of the water is as
much against the ascending over the banks, as the ascending
up the channel. And the extrinsecal impediment is as great
in ascending up the channel as over the banks, or rather
greater, because there it must move, not only against the
rising soil, but also against the succeeding waters, which
press forward the former. Either the river wants liberty for
both, or else it wants liberty for neither.

[His deft- But to leave his metaphorical faculties," and his catachres-
remive? ticsl liberty ; how far is his discourse wide from the true
(Sea of G moral liberty, which is in question between us ! His former
iTbert description of a free agent, that is, "he who hath not made an
end of deliberating 1 ," though it was wide from the mark, yet
it came much nearer the truth than this definition of liberty :
unless perhaps he think that the water hath done deli
berating whether it will go over the banks, but hath not done
deliberating whether it will go up the channel.

NUMBER XXX.

conceive, nothing taketh beginning from
itself, but from the action of some other immediate agent
without itself. And that, therefore, when first a man had an
a PP etite or wil1 to something, to which immediately before he
had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will is not the will
itself, but something else, not in his own disposing. So that,

1 [Above, T. H. Numb, xxviii. p. 165.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 169

whereas it is out of controversy that of voluntary actions the DISCOURSE
will is a necessary cause, and (by this which is said) the will
is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not, it
followeth, that voluntary actions have all of them necessary
causes, and therefore are necessitated.

J. D. This sixth point doth not consist in explicating of [Reply.]
terms, as the former, but in two proofs, that voluntary actions
are necessitated. The former proof stands thus, " Nothing
takes beginning from itself, but from some agent without
itself, which is not in its own disposing ; therefore," &c.
717 Concedo omnia I grant all he saith. The will doth not " take
beginning from itself." Whether he understand by " will" the
faculty of the will, which is a power of the reasonable soul, it
" takes not beginning from itself," but from God, who created
and infused the soul into man, and endowed it with this
power; or whether he understand by "will" the act of
willing, it " takes not beginning from itself," but from the
faculty, or from the power of willing, which is in the
soul. This is certain, finite and participated things can- [Nothing
not be from themselves, nor be produced by themselves. g^fto be
"What would he conclude from hence? that therefore the of itself&gt; J
act of willing takes not its beginning from the faculty of
the will? or that the faculty is always determined antece
dently, extrinsecally, to will that which it doth will ? He
may as soon " draw water out of a pumice u ," as draw any
such conclusion out of these premisses. Secondly, for his
" taking a beginning." Either he understands " a beginning
of being," or " a beginning of working and acting." If he
understand a beginning of being, he saith most truly, that
nothing hath a beginning of being in time from itself. But
this is nothing to his purpose. The question is not between
us, whether the soul of man or the will of man be eternal.
But if he understand " a beginning of working or moving
actually," it is a gross error. All men know, that when a [Many
stone descends, or fire ascends, or when water that hath been g^ n n f s ^
heated returns to its former temper, the beginning or reason
is intrinsecal, and one and the same thing doth move and is
moved in a diverse respect. It moves in respect of the form,

u [Plaut, Pers., I. i. 42.]

170 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART and it is moved in respect of the matter. Much more man,
who hath a perfect knowledge and prenotion of the end, is

most properly said to move himself. Yet I do not deny but
that there are other beginnings of human actions, which do
concur with the will : some outward, as the First Cause by
general influence, which is evermore requisite, angels or
men by persuading, evil spirits by tempting, the object or
end by its appetibility, the understanding by directing ; so [me
inward, as] passions and acquired habits. But I deny,
that any of these do necessitate or can necessitate the will of
man by determining it physically to one, except God alone,
Who doth it rarely in extraordinary cases : and where there
is no antecedent determination to one, there is no absolute
necessity, but true liberty.

[The win His second argument is ex concessis. " It is out of con-
necessary troversy," saith he, " that of voluntary actions the will is a
articuiar tS necessarv cause." The argument may be thus reduced ;
acts.] necessary causes produce necessary effects; but the will is a
necessary cause of voluntary actions. I might deny his
major. Necessary causes do not always produce necessary
effects, except they be also necessarily produced ; as I have
shewed before in the burning of Protagoras his book x . But I
answer clearly to the minor, that the will is not a necessary
cause of what it wills in particular actions. It is without
"controversy" indeed; for it is without all probability. That
it wills when it wills, is necessary; but that it wills this or
that, now or then, is free. More expressly; the act of the will
may be considered three ways ; either in respect of its nature,
or in respect of its exercise, or in respect of its object. First,
for the nature of the act. That which the will wills is neces
sarily voluntary, because the will cannot be compelled ; and
in this sense, " it is out of controversy, that the will is a
necessary cause of voluntary actions." Secondly, for the
exercise of its acts, that is not necessary. The will may
either will or suspend its act. Thirdly, for the object ; that is
not necessary but free. The will is not extrinsecally deter
mined to its objects. As, for example, the Cardinals meet in
the conclave to choose a Pope. Whom they choose, he is
necessarily Pope. But it is not necessary, that they shall

x [Above Numb. xx. p. 138.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 171

choose this or that day. Before they were assembled, they DISCOURSE
might defer their assembling ; when they are assembled, they -
may suspend their election for a day or a week. Lastly, for
the person whom they will choose, it is freely in their own
power ; otherwise, if the election were not free, it were void,
and no election at all. So that which takes its beginning
from the will is necessarily voluntary, but it is not neces
sary that the will shall will this or that in particular ; as it
was necessary, that the person freely elected should be Pope,
but it was not necessary, either that the election should be at
this time, or that this man should be*elected. And therefore
voluntary acts in particular have not necessary causes, that
is, they are not necessitated.

NUMBER XXXI.

T. H. Seventhly, I hold that to be a sufficient cause, to [vii. Every
718 which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of TatTaTuffi.
the effect. The same is also a necessary cause : for if it be c [ ent " nd

therefore a

possible that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the necessary
effect, then there wanted somewhat which was needful to the C
producing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient. But if
it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the
effect, then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause ; for that is
said to produce an effect necessarily that cannot but produce
it. Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced is
produced necessarily ; for whatsoever is produced, hath had a
sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had not been. And
therefore also voluntary actions are necessitated.

J. D. This section contains a third argument to prove [Reply.]
that all effects are necessary ; for clearing whereof, it is need
ful to consider how a cause may be said to be sufficient or
insufficient.

First, several causes singly considered may be insufficient, i. [Causes
and the same taken conjointly be sufficient, to produce an
effect : as two horses jointly are sufficient to draw a coach,
which either of them singly is insufficient to do. Now, to sufficient,]
make the effect, that is, the drawing of the coach, necessary,

173 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART it is not only required that the two horses be sufficient to
: draw it, but also that their conjunction be necessary, and

their habitude such as they may draw it. If the owner of
one of these horses will not suffer him to draw ; if the smith
have shod the other in the quick, and lamed him; if the
horse have cast a shoe, or be a resty jade and will not draw
but when he list ; then the effect is not necessarily produced,
but contingently, more or less, as the concurrence of the causes
is more or less contingent.

2. [That Secondly, a cause may be said to be sufficient, either be-
perfysuffil cause it produceth that effect which is intended, as in the
dent generation of a man, or else because it is sufficient to pro-

which pro- . i i

duceth the duce that which is produced, as in the generation of a
tended?] monster. The former is properly called a sufficient cause,
the latter a weak and insufficient cause. Now, if the debility
of the cause be not necessary but contingent, then the effect
is not necessary but contingent. It is a rule in logic, that
the conclusion always follows the weaker part. If the pre
misses be but probable, the conclusion cannot be demonstra
tive. It holds as well in causes as in propositions. No effect
can exceed the virtue of its cause. If the ability or debility
of the causes be contingent, the effect cannot be necessary.

3. [A cause Thirdly, that which concerns this question of liberty from
in S respect nt necessity most nearly is, that a cause is said to be sufficient
t f "nofof" * n res P ect f tne ability of it to act, not in respect of its will
its win, to to act. The concurrence of the will is needful to the produc-

act.] .

tion of a free effect ; but the cause may be sufficient though
the will do not concur : as God is sufficient to produce a
thousand worlds, but it doth not follow from thence, either
that He hath produced them, or that He will produce them.
The Blood of Christ is a sufficient ransom for all mankind ;
but it doth not follow, therefore, that all mankind shall be
actually saved by virtue of His Blood. A man may be a
sufficient tutor, though he will not teach every scholar ; and
a sufficient physician, though he will not administer to every
patient. Forasmuch therefore as the concurrence of the will
is needful to the production of every free effect, and yet the
cause may be sufficient in sensu diviso, although the will do
not concur; it follows evidently, that the cause may be
sufficient, and yet something which is needful to the produc-

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 173

tion of the effect may be wanting, and that every sufficient DISCOURSE

cause is not a necessary cause. ?!

Lastly, if any man be disposed to wrangle against so clear 4. [A suffi-
light, and say, that though the free agent be sufficient in Ss^e* 6
sensu diviso. yet he is not sufficient in sensu composite, to of , will

only hypo-
produce the effect without the concurrence of the will, he theticaiiy

says true : but, first, he bewrays the weakness and the fallacy m
of the former argument, which is a mere trifling between
sufficiency in a divided sense and sufficiency in a com
pounded sense : and seeing the concurrence of the will is
not predetermined, there is no antecedent necessity before
it do concur ; and when it hath concurred, the necessity is but
hypothetical, which may consist with liberty.

NUMBER XXXII.

T. H. Lastly, I hold, that the ordinary definition of a free [viii. Free
agent, namely, that a free agent is that, which, when all 2pXa-
things are present which are needful to produce the effect, f^ulTit /m-

can nevertheless not produce itv, implies a contradiction, and P l . ies a su ffi-

cient cause

is nonsense ; being as much as to say, the cause may be without an
"sufficient/ that is, " necessary," and yet the effect not follow, e^f]

719 J. D. This last point is but a corollary or an inference [Reply.]
from the former, doctrine, that " every sufficient cause pro-
duceth its effect necessarily ;" which pillar being taken away,
the superstructure must needs fall to the ground, having
nothing left to support it. " Lastly, I hold," saith he (what
he is able to prove is something ; so much reason, so much
trust ; but what he " holds," concerns himself not others ;
but what holds he ? " I hold," saith he)," that the ordinary
definition of a free agent implies a contradiction, and is non
sense." That which he calls the " ordinary definition" of
liberty, is the very definition which is given by the much
greater part of philosophers and schoolmen. And doth he
think that all these spake " nonsense ?" or had no more judg
ment than to contradict themselves in a definition ? He
might much better suspect himself, than censure so many.

y ["Ilia est potentia libera, quae, Bellarm.,De Grat. et Lib. Arb., lib. iii.
omnibus positis quae requiruntur ad c. 7 ; Op. torn. iii. p. 663. B.]
agendum, potest agere et non agere."

174 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART Let us see the definition itself: "A free agent is that, which,
when all things are present that are needful to produce the
effect, can nevertheless not produce it." I acknowledge the
old definition of liberty, with little variation : but I cannot
see this " nonsense," nor discover this " contradiction " for
in these words, " all things needful," or " all things requisite,"
[Sufficient the actual determination of the will is not included. But
dudTnot by " all things needful or reqiu site," all necessary power,
Iietermifna- G ^ er operative or elective, all necessary instruments and
ttonofthe adjuments extrinsecal and intrinsecal, and all conditions, are
intended. As he that hath pen, and ink, and paper, a table,
a desk, and leisure, the art of writing, and the free use of his
hand, hath all things requisite to write if he will, and yet he
may forbear if he will. Or as he that hath men, and money,
and arms, and munition, and ships, and a just cause, hath all
things requisite for war, yet he may make peace if he will.
Matt. xxii. Or as the King proclaimed in the Gospel, "I have pre
pared My dinner, My oxen and My fatlings are killed, all
things are ready, come unto the marriage." According to
T. H. his doctrine, the guests might have told him, that he
said not truly, for their own wills were not ready. And
indeed, if the will were (as he conceives it is) necessitated ex-
trinsecally to every act of willing, if it had no power to forbear
willing what it doth will, nor to will what it doth not will,
then, if the will were wanting, something requisite to the
producing of the effect was wanting. But now, when science
and conscience, reason and religion, our own and other men s
experience, doth teach us, that the will hath a dominion over
its own acts to will or nill without extrinsecal necessitation ;
if the power to will be present in actu primo, 3 determinable
by ourselves, then there is no necessary power wanting in
this respect to the producing of the effect.

[And refer Secondly, these words to act or not to act, to work or
ducibiiity, n t to work, to produce or not to produce/ have reference to
production, tlie en?ect ; not as a thing which is already done or doing, but
** a thin to ke done - Tne y im ply not the actual produc
tion, but the producibility, of the effect. But when once the
will hath actually concurred with all other causes and con
ditions and circumstances, then the effect is no more possible
or producible, but it is in being, and actually produced.

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 175

Thus he takes away the subject of the question. The ques- DISCOURSE
tion is, whether effects producible be free from necessity.
He shuffles out effects producible/ and thrusts in their
places l effects produced/ or, which are in the act of pro
duction/ Wherefore I conclude, that it is neither "non
sense" nor "contradiction" to say, that a free agent, when
all things requisite to produce the effect are present, may
nevertheless not produce it.

NUMBER XXXIII.

T. H. For my first five points, where it is explicated, first, [Proof of
what spontaneity is ; secondly, what deliberation is ; thirdly, r
what will, propension, and appetite is; fourthly, what a free

agent is ; fifthly, what liberty is; there can be no other proof meanin g in
offered but every man s own experience, by reflecting on words. ]
himself, and remembering what he useth to have in his mind,
that is, what he himself meaneth, when he saith, an action is
spontaneous., a man deliberates, such is his will, that agent
or that action is free. Now he that so reflect eth on himself
cannot but be satisfied, but that " deliberation" is the con
sidering of the good and evil sequels of the action to come ;
that by " spontaneity" is meant inconsiderate proceeding (for
else nothing is meant by it) ; that "will" is the last act of
our deliberation ; that a " free agent" is he that can do if he
will, and forbear if he will ; and that " liberty" is the absence
of external impediments. But to those that out of custom
speak not what they conceive but what they hear, and are
not able, or will not take the pains, to consider what they
think when they hear such words, no argument can be suf
ficient; because experience and matter of fact is not verified
720 by other men s arguments, but by every man s own sense and
memory. For example, how can it be proved, that to love a
thing and to think it good are all one, to a man that does
not mark his own meaning by those w r ords ? Or how can it
be proved, that eternity is not " nunc stans" to a man that says
these words by custom, and never considers how he can con
ceive the thing itself in his mind ? Also the sixth point, that

176

A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART
III.

a man cannot imagine anything to begin without a cause,
can no other way be made known but by trying how he can
imagine it. But if he try, he shall find as much reason (if
there be no cause of the thing) to conceive it should begin at
one time as another ; that is, he hath equal reason to think
it should begin at all times, which is impossible. And there
fore he must think there was some special cause, why it began
then rather than sooner or later, or else that it began never,
but was eternal.

[Reply.]

[Truth to
be sought
in reason,
not in
vulgar
notions.]

J. D. Now at length he comes to his main proofs. He
that hath so confidently censured the whole current of school
men and philosophers of " nonsense," had need to produce
strong evidence for himself. So he calls his reasons (Numb.
xxxvi 2 ) "demonstrative proofs." All demonstrations are
either from the cause or the effect, not from private notions
and conceptions, which we have in our minds. That which he
calls a demonstration/ deserves not the name of an intimation.
He argues thus : That which a man conceives in his mind
by these words, spontaneity, deliberation, &c., that they are/
This is his proposition, which I deny. The true natures of
things are not to be judged by the private ideas or conceptions
of men, but by their causes and formal reasons. Ask an
ordinary person what " upwards" signifies, and whether our
antipodes have their heads upwards or downwards ; and he
will not stick to tell you, that if his head be upwards, theirs
must needs be downwards. And this is because he knows
not the formal reason thereof; that the heavens encircle the
earth, and what is towards heaven is upwards. This same
erroneous notion of "upwards" and " downwards," before the
true reason was fully discovered, abused more than ordinary
capacities ; as appears by their arguments of " penduli homines"
and " pendula arbores*." Again, what do men conceive
ordinarily by this word " empty," as when they say an empty
vessel; or by this word "body," as when they say, there is
no body in that room ? They intend not to exclude the air
either out of the vessel or out of the room. Yet reason tells

[Below p. 189.]

OCOoo

pp. 288, 289. ed. Oxon. 1684 ; and see

Aug., De Civ. Dei, lib. xvi. c. 9, Op.

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 177

us, that the vessel is not truly empty, and that the air is a DISCOURSE
true body. I might give a hundred such like instances. He
who leaves the conduct of his understanding to follow vulgar
notions, shall plunge himself into a thousand errors : like him,
who leaves a certain guide to follow an ignis fatuus, or a will-
with- the- wisp. So his proposition is false. His reason,
" that matter of fact is not verified by other men s arguments,
but by every man s own sense and memory," is likewise
maimed on both sides. Whether we hear such words or not,
is matter of fact, and sense is the proper judge of it ; but
what these words do or ought truty to signify, is not to be
judged by sense, but by reason. Secondly, reason may and
doth oftentimes correct sense, even about its proper object.
Sense tells us, that the sun is no bigger than a good ball ; but
reason demonstrates, that it is many times greater than the
whole globe of the earth. As to his instance, (t How can it
be proved, that to love a thing and to think it good is all
one, to a man that doth not mark his own meaning by these
words?" I confess it cannot be proved, for it is not true.
Beauty, and likeness, and love, do conciliate love as much as
goodness. Cos amoris amor* Love is a passion of the will, but
to judge of goodness is an act of the understanding. A father
may love an ungracious child, and yet not esteem him good.
A man loves his own house better than another man s, yet he
cannot but esteem many others better than his own. His
other instance, " How can it be proved, that eternity is not
{ nunc stans, to a man that says these words by custom, and
never considers how he can conceive the thing itself in his
mind ?" is just like the former ; not to be proved by reason,
but by fancy, which is the way he takes. And it is not un
like the counsel, which one gave to a novice about the choice
of his wife, to advise with the bells : as he fancied, so they
sounded, either take her or leave her.

Then for his assumption, it is as defective as his proposition ; [Men s ex-
that by these words, spontaneity, &c., men do understand contrary* to
as he conceives. No rational man doth conceive a " spon-
taneous" action and an " indeliberate" action to be all one.
Every " indeliberate" action is not " spontaneous." The fire
721 considers not whether it should burn, yet the burning of it is
not "spontaneous." Neither is every " spontaneous" action

BRAMHALL.

178 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART " indcliberate ;" a man may deliberate what he will eat, and
yet eat it "spontaneously." Neither doth "deliberation"
properly signify the "considering of the good and evil sequels
of an action to come ;" but the considering whether this be a
good and fit means, or the best and fittest means, for obtain
ing such an end. The physician doth not deliberate whether
he should cure his patient, but by what means he should cure
him b . Deliberation is of the means, not of the end c . Much
less doth any man conceive, with T. H., that deliberation is
an " imagination," or an act of fancy, not of reason, common
to men of discretion with madmen and natural fools and
children and brute beasts. Thirdly, neither doth any under
standing man conceive, or can conceive, either that the " will
is an act of deliberation," the understanding and the will
are two distinct faculties, or that " only the last appetite is to
be called our will." So no man should be able to say, this is
my will ; because he knows not whether he shall persevere in
it or not. Concerning the fourth point, we agree, that " he
is a free agent, that can do if he will and forbear if he will."
But I wonder how this dropped from his pen. What is
now become of his absolute necessity of all things ? If a man
be free to do and to forbear anything, will he make himself
guilty of the "nonsense" of the Schoolmen, and run with
them into " contradictions" for company d ? It may be he will
say, he can do if he will, and forbear if he will, but he cannot
will if he will. This will not serve his turn : for if the cause
of a free action, that is, the will, be determined, then the
eifect, or the action itself, is likewise determined; a deter
mined cause cannot produce an undetermined effect : either
the agent can will, and forbear to will, or else he cannot do,
and forbear to do. But we differ wholly about the fifth point.
He who conceives " liberty" aright, conceives both a " liberty
in the subject" to will or not to will, and a " liberty to the
object" to will this or that, and a "liberty from impediments."
T. H., by a new way of his own, cuts off the "liberty of the
subject;" as if a stone was free to ascend or descend, because
it hath no outward impediment : and the " liberty towards

1 [Aristot., Ethic., III. v . 11.] ibid.]

J= [" Bov\fv6^9a V ov irepl rS&gt;v re- d [See above, T. H. Nximb. xxxii. p.

Aa* aAAa ir f p\ r &gt;i&gt; irpbs TO. Tf\r}." Id., 173.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 179

the object ;" as if the needle touched with the loadstone were DISCO URSK
free to point either towards the north or towards the south, -
because there is not a barricado in its way to hinder it : yea,
he cuts off the " liberty from inward impediments" also ; as if
a hawk were at liberty to fly when her wings are plucked,
but not when they are tied. And so he makes " liberty from
extrinsecal impediments" to be complete liberty ; so he
ascribes " liberty" to brute beasts, and "liberty" to rivers;
and by consequence makes beasts and rivers to be capable of
sin and punishment. Assuredly, Xerxes, who caused the
Hellespont to be beaten with so many stripes 6 , was of this
opinion. Lastly, T. H. his reason, that "it is custom, or
want of ability, or negligence, which makes a man conceive
otherwise," is but a begging of that which he should prove.
Other men consider as seriously as himself, with as much
judgment as himself, with less prejudice than himself, and
yet they can apprehend no such sense of these words. Would
he have other men feign that they see fiery dragons in the
air, because he affirms confidently that he sees them, and
wonders why others are so blind as not to see them ?

The reason for the sixth point is like the former, a fantas
tical, or imaginative reason : how can a man imagine any
thing to begin without a cause ? or if it should begin without
a cause, why it should begin at this time rather than at
that time ? He saith truly, nothing can " begin without a
cause," that is, to be ; but it may " begin" to act of itself
without any other cause. Nothing can begin without a
cause, but many things may begin, and do begin, without
necessary causes. A free cause may as well choose his time
when he will begin, as a necessary cause be determined ex-
trinsecally when it must begin. And although free effects
cannot be foretold, because they are not certainly predeter
mined in their causes, yet, when the free causes do determine
themselves, they are of as great certainty as the other ; as,
when I see a bell ringing, I can conceive the cause of it
as well why it rings now, as I know the interposition of the
earth to be the cause of the eclipse of the moon, or the most
certain occurrent in the nature of things.

And now that I have answered T. H. his arguments drawn

[Herod., vii. 35.]

180 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART from the private conceptions of men concerning the sense of
- words, I desire him seriously, without prejudice, to examine
himself, and those natural notions which he finds in himself,
not of words, but of things ; these are from nature, those are
by imposition : whether he doth not find by experience, that 722
he doth many things which he might have left undone if he
would, and omits many things which he might have done if
he would; whether he doth not some things out of mere
animosity, and will, without either regard to the direction of
right reason, or serious respect of what is honest or profit
able, only to shew that he will have a dominion over his own
actions ; as we see ordinarily in children, and wise men find
at some times in themselves by experience, and I appre
hend this very defence of necessity against liberty to be
partly of that kind : whether he is not angry with those
who draw him from his study, or cross him in his desires ;
if they be necessitated to do it, why should he be angry with
them, any more than he is angry with a sharp winter, or a
rainy day that keeps him at home against his antecedent
will : whether he doth not sometime blame himself, and say,
O what a fool was I to do thus and thus ! or wish to himself,
O that I had been wise ! or, O that I had not done such an
act ! If he have no dominion over his actions, if he be irre
sistibly necessitated to all things what he doth, he might as
well wish, O that I had not breathed ! or blame himself for
growing old, O what a fool was I to grow old !

NUMBER XXXIV.

[Sufficient T. H. For the seventh point, that all events have neces-

causes ne
cessary sary causes, it is there proved, in that they have sufficient

causes. Further, let us in this place also suppose any event
[instance never so casual, as, for example, the throwing ambs-ace upon

of throwing . ,.

a pair 01 dice, and see if it must not have been necessary be
fore it was thrown : for, seeing it was thrown, it had a begin
ning, and consequently a sufficient cause to produce it, con
sisting partly in the dice, partly in the outward things, as
the posture of the party s hand, the measure of force applied
by the caster, the posture of the parts of the table, and the
like. In sum, there was nothing wanting that was necessa-

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 181

rily requisite to the producing of that particular cast ; and, DISCOURSE
consequently, that cast was necessarily thrown. For if it
had not been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite
to the throwing of it, and so the cause had not been suffi
cient. In the like manner it may be proved, that every other
accident, how contingent soever it seem, or how voluntary
soever it be, is produced necessarily ; which is that J. D. dis
putes against. The same also may be proved in this manner. [And of a
Let the case be put, for example, of the weather. Tis neces- rafnT J
sary, that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain. If therefore it
be not necessary it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not
rain. Otherwise it is not necessary, that the proposition it
shall rain, or it shall not rain should be true. I know there
are some that say, it may necessarily be true that one of the
two shall come to pass, but not singly that it shall rain or it
shall not rain. Which is as much as to say, one of them
is necessary, yet neither of them is necessary ; and therefore
to seem to avoid that absurdity they make a distinction,
that neither of them is true determinate but indeterminate;
which distinction either signifies no more than this, one of
them is true, but we know not which, and so the necessity
remains, though we know it not : or if the meaning of the
distinction be not that, it has no meaning. And they might
as well have said, one of them is true Tityrice, but neither
of them Tupatulice.

J. D. His former proof, that all sufficient causes are [Reply.]
necessary causes, is answered before, Numb. xxxi. f And
his two instances, of casting ambs-ace, and raining to-mor
row, are altogether impertinent to the question now agitated
between us : for two reasons.

1. First, our present controversy is concerning free actions, jJJj r &lt;rf Ues ~
which proceed from the liberty of man s will : both his in- human ac-

, . , - p , -i tions, not

stances are of contingent actions, which proceed from the m- O f natural
determination, or contingent concurrence, of natural causes.
First, that there are free actions, which proceed merely from
election without any outward necessitation, is a truth so
evident as that there is a sun in the heavens; and he that
doubteth of it, may as well doubt whether there shall be " a

f [Above pp. 171173.]

182 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART shell without the nut, or a stone within the olive s" A man
- proportions his time each day, and allots so much to his
devotions, so. much to his study, so much to his diet, so
much to his recreations, so much to necessary or civil visits,
so much to his rest ; he who will seek for I know not what
causes of all this without himself, except that good God
Who hath given him a reasonable soul, may as well seek for a
cause of the Egyptian pyramids among the crocodiles of
Nilus. Secondly, for mixed actions, which proceed from the
concurrence of free and natural agents, though they be not
free, yet they are not necessary : as, to keep my former in
stance, a man walking through a street of a city to do his
occasions, a tile falls from a house and breaks his head ; the 723
breaking of his head was not necessary, for he did freely
choose to go that way without any necessitation, neither was
it free, for he did not deliberate of that accident, therefore it
was contingent, and by undoubted consequence there are
contingent actions in the world which are not free. Most
certainly, by the concurrence of free causes, as God, the good
and bad angels, and men, with natural agents, sometimes on
purpose and sometimes by accident, many events happen
which otherwise had never happened, many effects are pro
duced which otherwise had never been produced. And
admitting such things to be contingent, not necessary, all
their consequent effects, not only immediate but mediate,
must likewise be contingent ; that is to say, such as do not
proceed from a continued connexion and succession of neces
sary causes : which is directly contrary to T. H. his opinion.
Thirdly, for the actions of brute beasts, though they be
not free, though they have not the use of reason to restrain
their appetites from that which is sensitively good by the
consideration of what is rationally good, or what is honest,
and though their fancies be determined by nature to some
kinds of work, yet to think that every individual action of
theirs and each animal motion of theirs, even to the least
murmur or gesture, is bound by the chain of unalterable
necessity to the extrinsecal causes or objects, I see no

[Matt. x. ground for it. Christ saith, "one of these sparrows doth
not fall to the ground without your Heavenly Father,"

f [" Nil intra est oleam, nil extra est in mice duri." Hor., Epist, II. i. 31.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 183

that is, without an influence of power from Him, or ex- DISCOURSE
empted from His disposition ; He doth not say, Which your -
Heavenly Father casteth not down. Lastly, for the natural
actions of inanimate creatures, wherein there is not the least
concurrence of any free or voluntary agents, the question is
yet more doubtful ; for many things are called contingent in
respect of us, because we know not the cause of them, which
really and in themselves are not contingent, but necessary.
Also many things are contingent in respect of one single
cause, either actually hindered, or in possibility to be hin
dered, which are necessary in respect of the joint concur
rence of all collateral causes. But whether there be a neces
sary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning, so
as they must all have concurred as they have done, and in
the same degree of power, and have been deficient as they
have been, in all events whatsoever, would require a further
examination, if it were pertinent to this question of liberty ;
but it is not. It is sufficient to my purpose to have shewed,
that all elective actions are free from absolute necessity;
and moreover, that the concurrence of voluntary and free
agents with natural causes, both upon purpose and acciden
tally, hath helped them to produce many effects which other
wise they had not produced, and hindered them from pro
ducing many effects which otherwise they had produced;
and that if this intervention of voluntary and free agents
had been more frequent than it hath been (as without doubt
it might have been), many natural events had been other
wise than they are. And therefore he might have spared his
instances of casting ambs-ace and raining to-morrow. And
first for his casting ambs-ace. If it be thrown by a fair
gamester with indifferent dice, it is a mixed action. The cast
ing of the dice is free, but the casting of ambs-ace is contin
gent : a man may deliberate whether he will cast the dice or
not, but it were folly to deliberate whether he will cast ambs-
ace or not, because it is not in his power, unless he be a
cheater, that can cog the dice, or the dice be false dice ; and
then the contingency or the degree of contingency ceaseth,
accordingly as the caster hath more or less cunning, or as
the figure or making of the dice doth incline them to ambs-
ace more than to another cast, or necessitate them to this

184 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART cast and no other. Howsoever, so far as the cast is free, or
contingent, so far it is not necessary; and where necessity
begins, there liberty and contingency do cease to be. Like
wise, his other instance, of raining or not raining to-morrow, is
not of a free elective act, nor always of a contingent act. In
some countries, as they have their "stati venti" their "certain
winds " at set seasons, so they have their certain and set rains.
The Ethiopian rains are supposed to be the cause of the cer
tain inundation of Nilus. In some eastern countries they
have rain only twice a year, and those constant, which the
[Deut. xi. Scriptures call " the former and the latter rain." In such
remTv 6 24. pl aces &gt; n t only the causes do act determinately and necessa-
&c.] r jiy^ Du t a i so the determination or necessity of the event is

foreknown to the inhabitants. In our climate the natural 724
causes, celestial and sublunary, do not produce rain so neces
sarily at set times ; neither can we say so certainly and infal
libly, it will rain to-morrow, or it will not rain to-morrow.
Nevertheless it may so happen, that the causes are so dis
posed and determined, even in our climate, that this proposi
tion, it will rain to-morrow, or it will not rain to-morrow,
may be necessary in itself; and the prognostics or tokens may
be such in the sky, in our own bodies, in the creatures, ani
mate and inanimate, as weather-glasses, &c., that it may be
come probably true to us that it will rain to-morrow, or it
will not rain to-morrow. But ordinarily it is a contingent
proposition to us. Whether it be contingent also in itself, that
is, whether the concurrence of the causes were absolutely
necessary, whether the vapours or matter of the rain may not
yet be dispersed, or otherwise consumed, or driven beyond
our coast, is a speculation which no way concerns this ques
tion. So we see one reason, why his two instances are alto
gether impertinent, because they are of actions which are
not free, nor elective, nor such as proceed from the liberty of
man s will.

[And of 2. Secondly, our dispute is about absolute necessity ; his

notof hy- P r oofs extend only to hypothetical necessity. Our question

necessity.] * s wnetner tne concurrence and determination of the causes

were necessary, before they did concur or were determined.

He proves, that the effect is necessary after the causes

have concurred and are determined. The freest actions

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 185

of God or man are necessary by such a necessity of sup- DISCOURSE

position ; and the most contingent events that are : as :

I have shewed plainly, Numb. iii h , where his instance of
ambs-ace is more fully answered. So his proof " looks
another way" from his proposition. His proposition is,
that the casting of ambs-ace was "necessary before it was
thrown." His proof is, that it was necessary when it was
thrown. Examine all his causes over and over, and they will
not afford him one grain of antecedent necessity. The first
cause is in " the dice :" true ; if they be false dice there may
be something in it, but then his contingency is destroyed ; if
they be square dice, they have no more inclination to ambs-
ace than to cinque and quater, or any other cast. His se
cond cause is " the posture of the party s hand :" but what
necessity was there that he should put his hand into such a
posture ? None at all. The third cause is " the measure of the
force applied by the caster." Now, for the credit of his cause,
let him but name, I will not say a convincing reason, nor so
much as a probable reason, but even any pretence of reason,
how the caster was necessitated from without himself to
apply just so much force, and neither more or less. If he
cannot, his cause is desperate, and he may hold his peace for
ever. His last cause is " the posture of the table." But tell
us in good earnest, what necessity there was why the caster
must throw into that table rather than the other, or that the
dice must fall just upon that part of the table "before" the
cast "was thrown." He that makes these to be necessary
causes, I do not wonder if he make all effects necessary effects.
If any one of these "causes" be contingent, it is sufficient to
render the cast contingent ; and now that they are all so con
tingent, yet he will needs have the effect to be necessary. And
so it is when the cast is thrown, but not before the cast was
thrown, which he undertook to prove. Who can blame him
for being so angry with the Schoolmen, and their distinc
tions of necessity into absolute and hypothetical, seeing they
touch his freehold so nearly ?

But though his instance of raining to-morrow be imperti- [Of T. H. s
nent, as being no free action, yet, because he triumphs so the shower
much in his argument, I will not stick to go a little out of ofrain -]

h [Above, pp. 29, 30.]

186 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART my way to meet a friend. For I confess, the validity of the
reason had been the same, if he had made it of a free action :
as thus, either I shall finish this reply to-morrow, or I shall
not finish this reply to-morrow, is a necessary proposition.
But because he shall not complain of any disadvantage in
the alteration of his terms, I will for once adventure upon
his shower of rain. And, first, I readily admit his major, that
this proposition (either it will rain to-morrow, or it will not
rain to-morrow) is necessarily true ; for of two contradictory
propositions the one must of necessity be true, because no
third can be given. But his minor, that "it could not be
necessarily true, except one of the members were necessarily
true," is most false. And so is his proof likewise ; that ( if
neither the one nor the other of the members be necessarily
true, it cannot be affirmed that either the one or the other is
true." A conjunct proposition may have both parts false, and
yet the proposition be true ; as, If the sun shine it is day, is a
true proposition at midnight. And T. H. confesseth as much 725
Numb. xix. " If I shall live I shall eat, . . is a necessary pro
position, that is to say, it is necessary that that proposition
should be true whensoever uttered ; but it is not the neces
sity of the thing, nor is it therefore necessary that the man
shall live, or that the man shall eat 1 ." And so T. H. pro
ceeds, " I do not use to fortify my distinctions with such rea
sons J." But it seemeth he hath forgotten himself, and is
contented with such poor fortifications. And though both
parts of a disjunctive proposition cannot be false, because if
it be a right disjunction the members are repugnant, whereof
one part is infallibly true; yet vary but the proposition a
little to abate the edge of the disjunctions, and you shall find
that which T. H. saith to be true, that " it is not the necessity
of the thing" which makes the proposition to be true. As, for
example, vary it thus : "I know that either it will rain to-mor
row, or that it will not rain to-morrow," is a true proposition :
but it is not true, that I know it will rain to-morrow, neither
is it true, that I know it will not rain to-morrow ; wherefore
the certain truth of the proposition doth not prove, that either
of the members is determinately true in present. Truth is a
conformity of the understanding to the thing known, whereof

! [Above p. 122.] J [Ibid.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 187

speech is an interpreter. If the understanding agree not DISCOURSE
with the thing, it is an error; if the words agree not with
the understanding, it is a lie. Now the thing known is
known either in itself or in its causes. If it be known in it
self, as it is, then we express our apprehension of it in words
of the present tense ; as, The sun is risen. If it be known in
its cause, we express ourselves in words of the future tense ;
as, To-morrow will be an eclipse of the moon. But if we nei
ther know it in itself nor in its causes, then there may be a
foundation of truth, but there is no such determinate truth
of it that we can reduce it into a true ^proposition. We cannot
say, it doth rain to-morrow or it doth not rain to-morrow.
That were not only false but absurd. We cannot positively
say, it will rain to-morrow ; because we do not know it in its
causes, either how they are determined, or that they are de
termined. Wherefore the certitude and evidence of the dis
junctive proposition is neither founded upon that which will
be actually to-morrow, for it is granted that we do not know
that ; nor yet upon the determination of the causes, for then
we would not say indifferently, either it will rain, or it will
not rain, but positively it will rain, or positively it will not
rain : but it is grounded upon an undeniable principle, that
of two contradictory propositions the one must necessarily be
true. And therefore to say, either this or that will infallibly
be, but it is not yet determined whether this or that shall be,
is no such senseless assertion that it deserved a " Tityrice Tu-
patulice" but an evident truth, which no man that hath his
eyes in his head can doubt of.

If all this will not satisfy him, I will give one of his own [A con-
kind of proofs ; that is, an instance. That which necessitates
all things, according to T. H., is the decree of God, or that
order which is set to all things by the eternal cause (Numb.
xi.) k . Now God Himself, Who made this necessitating decree,
was not subjected to it in the making thereof, neither was
there any former order to oblige the First Cause necessarily
to make such a decree ; therefore this decree, being an act ad
extra, was freely made by God without any necessitation.
Yet nevertheless this disjunctive proposition is necessarily
true, Either God did make such a decree or He did not

k [Above pp. 58, 59.]

188 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART make such a decree. Again, though T. H. his opinion were
-- IL true that all events are necessary, and that the whole Chris
tian world are deceived, who believe that some events are
free from necessity, yet he will not deny, but if it had been
the good pleasure of God, He might have made some causes
free from necessity, seeing that it neither argues any imper
fection, nor implies any contradiction. Supposing, therefore,
that God had made some second causes free from any such
antecedent determination to one, yet the former disjunction
would be necessarily true : either this free undetermined
cause will act after this manner, or it will not act after this
manner. Wherefore the necessary truth of such a disjunc
tive proposition doth not prove, that either of the members of
the disjunction, singly considered, is determinately true in
present, but only that the one of them will be determinately
true to-morrow.

NUMBER XXXV.

[A free T. H. The last thing, in which also consisteth the whole

wlsibi^ be- controversy, namely, that there is no such thing as an agent,
Relent 1 m/st wmch wnen U things requisite to action are present, can
be a neces- nevertheless forbear to produce it, or (which is all one) that

sary cause.] ,-, .

mere is no such thing as freedom from necessity, is easily 726
inferred from that which hath been before alleged. For if it
be an agent, it can work ; and if it work, there is nothing
wanting of what is requisite to produce the action ; and con
sequently the cause of the action is sufficient ; and if suffi
cient, then also necessary, as hath been proved before.

[Reply.] J- D. I wonder that T. H. should confess, that the whole
weight of this controversy doth rest upon this proposition,
" That there is no such thing as an agent, which, when all
things requisite to action are present, can nevertheless for
bear to act/ and yet bring nothing but such poor bulrushes
to support it. " If it be an agent," saith he, " it can work."
\&gt; hat of this ? A posse ad esse non valet argumentum ;" from
"can work" to "will work," is a weak inference: and from
"will work" to "doth work upon absolute necessity," is
another gross inconsequence. He proceeds thus : " K it

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 189

work, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to pro- DISCOURSE
duce the action." True, there wants nothing to produce -
that which is produced, but there may want much to produce
that which was intended. One horse may pull his heart out,
and yet not draw the coach whither it should be, if he want
the help or concurrence of his fellows. " And consequently,"
saith he, "the cause of the action is sufficient." Yes, suffi
cient to do what it doth, though perhaps with much prejudice
to itself, but not always sufficient to do what it should do, or
what it would do : as he that begets a monster should beget
a man, and would beget a man if he* could. The last link of
his argument follows : " And if sufficient, then also neces
sary." Stay there. By his leave there is no necessary con
nexion between sufficiency and efficiency, otherwise God
Himself should not be all-sufficient. Thus his argument is
vanished. But I will deal more favourably with him, and
grant him all that which he labours so much in vain to prove,
that every effect in the world hath sufficient causes. Yea
more, that supposing the determination of the free and con
tingent causes every effect in the world is necessary. But
all this will not advantage his cause the black of a bean, for
still it amounts but to a hypothetical necessity, and differs
as much from that absolute necessity which he maintains, as
a gentleman who travels for his pleasure differs from a
banished man, or a free subject from a slave.

NUMBER XXXVI.

T. H. And thus you see, how the inconveniences, which [Of the in-
he objecteth must follow upon the holding of necessity, are o^den^/
avoided, and the necessity itself demonstratively proved. To necessit y-^
which I could add, if I thought it good logic, the incon-
veniency of denying necessity : as, that it destroys both the
decrees and prescience of God Almighty ; for whatsoever God
hath purposed to bring to pass by man as an instrument, or
foreseeth shall come to pass, a man, if he have liberty such as
he affirmeth from necessitation, might frustrate and make not
to come to pass ; and God should either not foreknow it and
not decree it, or He should foreknow such things shall be as
shall never be, and decree that which shall never come to pass.

190 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

p A R T J. D. Thus he hath laboured in vain, to satisfy my reasons
[Re l and to prove his own assertion; but for demonstration/ there
is nothing like it among his arguments. Now he saith, he
"could add" other arguments if he "thought it good logic."
There is no impediment in logic, why a man may not press
his adversary with those absurdities which flow from his opi
nion. * Argumentum ducens ad impossibile, 3 or ad absurdum
is a good form of reasoning. But there is another reason of
his forbearance, though he be loth to express it. " Hceret
lateri let kalis arundo\" The arguments drawn from the at
tributes of God do stick so close in the sides of his cause, that
he hath no mind to treat of that subject. By the way, take
notice of his own confession, that he " could add other reasons
if" he "thought it good logic." If it were predetermined in
the outward causes that he must make this very defence and
no other, how could it be in his power to add or substract
any thing ? Just as if a blind man should say in earnest,
I could see if I had my eyes. Truth often breaks out
whilst men seek to smother it. But let us view his argu
ment.

If a man have liberty from necessitation, he may frustrate
the decrees of God and make His prescience false.
[Freedom First, for the decrees of God ; this is His decree, that man
1 should be a free agent. If he did consider God as a most

God Teter s ^ m P^ e act without priority or posteriority of time, or any
nai de- composition, he would not conceive of His decrees as of the
laws of the Medes and Persians, long since enacted, and
passed before we were born, but as co-existent with our- 727
selves, and with the acts which we do by virtue of those
decrees. Decrees and attributes are but notions to help the
weakness of our understanding to conceive of God. The de
crees of God are God Himself, and therefore justly said to
be before the foundation of the world was laid ; and yet co
existent with ourselves, because of the infinite and eternal
being of God. The sum is this : the decree of God, or God
Himself, eternally constitutes or ordains all effects which
come to pass in time, according to the distinct natures or ca
pacities of His creatures. An eternal ordination is neither
past nor to come, but always present. So free actions do pro-

1 [Virg. JEn., iv. 73.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 191

ceed as well from the eternal decree of God as necessary, DISCOURSE
and from that order which He hath set in the world.

As the decree of God is eternal, so is His knowledge ; and, j^or with
therefore, to speak truly and properly, there is neither fore- nai pre-
knowledge nor after-knowledge in Him. The knowledge of sc
God comprehends all times in a point, by reason of the emi
nence and virtue of its infinite perfection. And yet I confess,
that this is called foreknowledge in respect of us. But this
foreknowledge doth produce no absolute necessity. Things
are not therefore because they are foreknown, but therefore
they are foreknown because they shall come to pass. If any
thing should come to pass otherwise than it doth, yet God s
knowledge could not be irritated by it ; for then He did not
know that it should come to pass as now it doth, because
every knowledge of vision necessarily presupposeth its object.
God did know, that Judas should betray Christ ; but Judas
was not necessitated to be a traitor by God s knowledge. If
Judas had not betrayed Christ, then God had not foreknown
that Judas should betray Him. The case is this : a watch
man standing on the steeple s top, as it is the use in Germany,
gives notice to them below (who see no such things), that
company are coming, and how many. His prediction is most
certain, for he sees them. What a vain collection were it for
one below to say, what if they do not come, then a certain
prediction may fail. It may be urged, that there is a differ
ence between these two cases. In this case the coming is
present to the watchman, but that which God foreknows is
future. God knows what shall be ; the watchman only knows
what is. I answer, that this makes no difference at all in the
case, by reason of that disparity which is between God s
knowledge and ours : as that coming is present to the watch
man which is future to them who are below, so all those
things which are future to us are present to God, because His
infinite and eternal knowledge doth reach to the future being
of all agents and events. Thus much is plainly acknowledged
byT.H. (Numb.xi. m ), that "foreknowledge is knowledge, and
knowledge depends on the existence of the things known,
and not they on it." To conclude : the prescience of God
doth not make things more necessary than the production of

m [Above p. 59.]

192

A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

PART
III.

the things themselves; but if the agents were free agents, the
production of the things doth not make the events to be abso
lutely necessary, but only upon supposition that the causes
were so determined. God s prescience proveth a necessity of
infallibility, but not of antecedent extrinsecal determination
to one. If any event should not come to pass, God did never
foreknow that it would come to pass ; for every knowledge
necessarily presupposeth its object".

[Conch
sion. ]

[Reply.
OfT. H. s
desire of
secrecy.]

NUMBER XXXVII.

T. H. This is all that hath come into my mind touching
this question, since I last considered it : and I humbly beseech
your Lordship to communicate it only to J. D. And so,
praying God to prosper your Lordship in all your designs, I
take leave, and am, my most noble and obliging Lord,

Your most humble servant, T. H.

J.D. He is very careful to have this discourse kept secret, as
appears in this section, and in the fourteenth and fifteenth sec
tions . If his answer had been kept private, I had saved the
labour of a reply ; but hearing that it was communicated, I
thought myself obliged to vindicate both the truth and myself.
I do not blame him to be cautious ; for in truth this assertion
is of desperate consequence, and destructive to piety, policy,
and morality. If he had desired to have kept it secret, the
way had been to have kept it secret himself. It will not
suffice to say, as Numb. xiv p , that " truth is truth " this is the
common plea of all men : neither is it sufficient for him to
say, as Numb. xv&lt;J, that " it was desired" by me. Long before
that he had discovered his opinion by word of mouth ; and
my desire was, to let some of my noble friends see the weak- 728
ness of his grounds, and the pernicious consequences of that
opinion. But if he think that this ventilation of the question
between us two may do hurt, truly I hope not. The edge of
his discourse is so abated, that it cannot easily hurt any
rational man, who is not too much possessed with prejudice.

n [See the passages from the Fathers o [Ahove pp. 85, 102. And see also

collected in Bellarmine, De Grat. et T. H. Numb, xi, above p. 60.]

Lib. Arb., lib. iv. cc. 9, 13; Op. torn. P [Above p. 85.]

m. pp. 726729, 738.] q [Above p. 102.]

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 193

DISCOURSE

NUMBER XXXVIII. _JL_

POSTSCRIPT.

T. H. Arguments seldom work on men of wit and [The cause

, . of the erro-

learning, when they have once engaged themselves in a neous op i.
contrary opinion. If anything do it, it is the shewing of J^r^f]
them the causes of their errors : which is this. Pious men
attribute to God Almighty, for honour 3 sake, whatsoever
they see is honourable in the world, as seeing, hearing,
willing, knowing, justice, wisdom* &c., but deny Him such
poor things as eyes, ears, brains, and other organs, without
which we worms neither have nor can conceive such faculties
to be : and so far they do well. But when they dispute of
God s actions philosophically, then they consider them again
as if He had such faculties, and in that manner as we have
them ; this is not well : and thence it is they fall into so many
difficulties. We ought not to dispute of God s nature; He is no
fit subject of our philosophy. True religion consisteth in
obedience to Christ s lieutenants, and in giving God such
honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their
several lieutenancies shall ordain.

J. D. Though sophistical captions do c&lt; seldom work on [Reply.]
men of wit and learning/ because by constant "use they
have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil;" Heb. v. 14.
yet solid and substantial reasons work sooner upon them
than upon weaker judgments. The more exact the balance
is, the sooner it discovers the real weight that is put into
it; especially if the proofs be proposed without passion or
opposition. Let sophisters and seditious orators apply them
selves to the many-headed multitude, because they despair of
success with " men of wit and learning." Those whose gold
is true, are not afraid to have it tried by the touch. Since
the former way hath not succeeded, T. H. hath another, to
"shew us the causes of our errors;" which he hopes will prove
more successful. When he sees he can do no good by fight,
he seeks to circumvent us under colour of courtesy. " Fistula
duke canit volucrem dum decipit auceps r . }) As they who behold

r [Dionys. Caton., Distich., lib. i. (list. 27.]

BRAMHALL.

194 A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

themselves in a glass, take the right hand for the left, and the
left for the right (T. H. knows the comparison) ; so we take
our own errors to be truths, and other men s truths to be
errors. If we be in an error in this, it is such an error as we
sucked from nature itself; such an error as is confirmed in
us by reason and experience ; such an error as God Himself
in His sacred Word hath revealed ; such an error as the
Fathers and Doctors of the Church of all ages have delivered ;
such an error wherein we have the concurrence of all the
best philosophers, both natural and moral ; such an error as
bringeth to God the glory of justice, and wisdom, and good
ness, and truth ; such an error as renders men more devout,
more pious, more industrious, more humble, more penitent
for their sins. Would he have us resign up all these advan
tages to dance blindfold after his pipe ? No ; he persuades
us too much to our loss. But let us see what is the imagi
nary cause of an imaginary error. Forsooth, because we
" attribute to God whatsoever is honourable in the world, as
seeing, hearing, willing, knowing, justice, wisdom ; but deny
Him such poor things as eyes, ears, brains :" and " so far," he
saith, "we do well." He hath reason ; for since we are not able
to conceive of God as He is, the readiest way we have is by
removing all that imperfection from God which is in the
creatures, so we call Him infinite, immortal, independent ;
or by attributing to Him all those perfections which are in
the creatures after a most eminent manner, so we call Him
best, greatest, most wise, most just, most holy. But, saith he,
"when they dispute of God s actions philosophically, then they
consider them again as if He had such faculties, and in the
manner as we have them." And is this the cause of our error?
That were strange indeed ; for they who dispute philosophi
cally of God, do neither ascribe faculties to Him in that man
ner that we have them, nor yet do they attribute any proper
faculties at all to God. God s understanding and His will is
His very essence, which for the eminency of its infinite perfec
tion doth perform all those things alone, in a most transcendent
manner, which reasonable creatures do perform imperfectly
by distinct faculties. Thus to dispute of God with modesty
and reverence, and to clear the Deity from the imputation of 729
tyranny, injustice, and dissimulation, which none do throw

AGAINST MR. HOBBES. 195

upon God with more presumption than those who are the DISCOURSE
patrons of absolute necessity, is both comely and Christian. -
It is not the desire to discover the original of a supposed
error, which draws them ordinarily into these exclamations
against those who dispute of the Deity. For some of them
selves dare anatomise God, and publish His eternal decrees
with as much confidence as if they had been all their lives of
His cabinet council. But it is for fear, lest those pernicious
consequences which flow from that doctrine essentially, and
reflect in so high a degree upon the supreme goodness, should
be laid open to the view of the world; just as the Turks
do, first establish a false religion of their own devising,
and then forbid all men, upon pain of death, to dispute
upon religion ; or as the priests of Molech (" the abomina- [ i Kings
tion of the Ammonites") did make a noise with their timbrels x1 5 7
all the while the poor infants were passing through the fire
in Tophet, to keep their pitiful cries from the ears of their
parents : so they make a noise with their declamations
against those who dare dispute of the nature of God, that is,
who dare set forth His justice, and His goodness, and His
truth, and His philanthropy, only to deaf the ears and dim
the eyes of the Christian world, lest they should hear the
lamentable ejulations and bowlings, or see that rueful spec
tacle, of millions of souls tormented for evermore in the
flames of the true Tophet, that is, Hell, only for that which
according to T. H. his doctrine was never in their power to
shun, but which they were ordered and inevitably necessi
tated to do ; only to express the omnipotence and dominion,
and to satisfy the pleasures, of Him Who is in truth the " Fa- [2 Cor. i.
ther of" all "mercies," and the " God of" all "consolation." ^. 5.f
"This is life eternal," saith our Saviour, to "know the only johnxvii.
true God, and Jesus Christ, Whom He hath sent." " Pure ja mes i.
religion and undefiled before God and the Father, is this, to 27
visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep
himself unspotted from the world," saith St. James. " Fear Eccies.
God and keep His commandments, for this is the whole duty xu "
of man," saith Solomon. But T. H. hath found out a more
compendious way to Heaven. " True religion," saith he, " con-
sisteth in obedience to Christ s lieutenants, and giving God
such honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their

196

A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY, &C.

PART
III.

several lieutenancies shall ordain." That is to say, be of the
religion of every Christian country where you come. To
make the civil magistrate to be " Christ s lieutenant" upon
earth for matters of religion, and to make him to be su
preme judge in all controversies, whom all must obey, is a
doctrine so strange, and such an uncouth phrase to Chris
tian ears, that I should have missed his meaning, but that I
consulted with his book De Cive, c. xv. sect. 16 s , and c. xvii.
sect. 28*. What if the magistrate shall be no Christian
himself? What if he shall command contrary to the law of
Acts [v.] 29. God or nature ? Must we " obey him rather than God ?" Is
[i Tim. iii. the civil magistrate become now the only " ground and pillar
of truth ?" I demand then, why T. H. is of a different mind
from his sovereign, and from the laws of the land, concern
ing the attributes of God and His decrees? This is a new
paradox, and concerns not this question of liberty and neces
sity. Wherefore I forbear to prosecute it further, and so
conclude my reply with the words of the Christian poet ;

" Caesaris jussum est ore Gallieni

" Princeps quod colit ut colamus omnes.

" JEternum colo Principem, dierum
" Factorem, Dominumque Gallieni 1

ir*

(p. 173) runs thus, "In regno Dei
naturali civitatem posse cultum Dei
instituere arbitrio suo."]

1 [pp. 254256 : and the title (p.
215), " Christianam civitatem Scrip-
turas interpretari debere per pastores
Ecclesiasticos."

[Prudent., ITept STC^CI/COI/, Hymn,
in honor. Fructuosi, &c., vv. 41 45.

This quotation as printed in the original
edition of 1655, contained several mis
prints ; and among others, " colemus"
for " colo" in the third line : see below
p. 502. Bramhall seems also to have
followed the punctuation of the older
editions of Prudentius in vv. 3, 4; viz.
" Principem dierum, Factorem Domi
numque Gallieni :" which after all
seems the better reading of the two.]

DISCOURSE II.

CASTIGATIONS

MR. HOBBES

HIS LAST ANIMADVERSIONS

IN THE CASE

CONCERNING LIBERTY AND UNIVERSAL NECESSITY;

WHEREIN

ALL HIS EXCEPTIONS ABOUT THE CONTROVERSY
ARE FULLY SATISFIED.

JOHN BRAMHALL, D.D,

AND
BISHOP OF DERRY.

" THE LIP OF TRUTH SHALL BE ESTABLISHED FOR EVER, BUT A LYING
TONGUE IS BUT FOR A MOMENT." PrOV. xii. 19,

CONTENTS.

Page

An Answer to Mr. Hobbes his npoAeyo/iew : and first to his
Epistle to the Reader.

Mr. Hobbes his mistake of the question.

Mr. Hobbes his principles refuted by his practice.

Freedom to do and not to will refuted.

An Advertisement from the Author to the Reader. . 213

An Answer to [Mr. Hobbes] his relation of the occasion of

the Controversy. . 215

Eleven gross mistakes in a few lines.

[Concerning the old philosophers.

the primitive Christians.

St. Paul. . 217

, the doctors of the Roman Church. ib.

_ the Reformed Churches.

Arminius.] .

Concerning the Stating of the Question. . .219

The conversion of a wilful sinner concerneth not this question.
A wilful cavil. 22

Difference between natural and moral efficacy.
Not to will is a mean of abnegation between willing and nilling.
His distinction between free to will and free to do, confuted. .

[Holy Scripture.] .
The sensual and rational appetite very different.

An Answer to his Fountains of Arguments in this Question. . 226

Mr. Hobbes his nourish. ib -

His presumption. . 22 &lt;

The attributes of God argumentative. . . 228
His texts of Scripture cited impertinently.

All his arguments out of Scripture answered. . ib.

[Gen. xlv. 5. . 230

Of God s hardening the heart. . ib.

200 CONTENTS.

Page

Of Shimei s cursing David. . . 230

Jobxii. 14; &c.] . 231

Jerem. x. 23. ... ... ib.

John vi. 44. .. . . ib.

[1 Cor. iv. 7. . 232

xii. 6. ....... ib.

How we are God s workmanship. . . . . . ib.

Texts attributing the will to do good works to God.] . . ib.

How sinners are said to be dead. ..... 233

Man is more free to will than to do. . . . . 234

His second sort of texts do confute him unanswerably. . . 235

T. H., [in his third sort of texts,] first woundeth the Scripture, and

then giveth it a plaster. . . . . . . ib.

God s prescience doth not necessitate. . . ... 236

Yet is infallible. . . . . . . . ib.

[Of Joseph s brethren. . . . . . . ib.

How God is the cause of corporal motions.] . . . 237

Hardness of heart not derived from God s permission. . . ib.

God s hand in good and evil actions. .... 238

God s revealed will, and His secret will, not contrary. . . ib.

[Inconveniences of] the doctrine of universal necessity. . . 240

[It] taketh away all care of doing well. . . . . ib.

That which shall be shall be, a poor fallacy. . . .241

T. H. his confession, that no man is justly punished but for crimes
he might have shunned. . ... 242

[What holds good of punishments, holds good of rewards also.] . 243
No proper punishment but for sin. . . . . . ib.

Why God did not make man impeccable. . . 244

Punishments of the damned are eternal. .... 246

God s prescience proveth infallibility, not necessity. . . ib.

[T. H. s invectives against unsignificant words. . . . 249

His confusion between willing and thinking.] . . . ib.

An Answer to the Animadversions upon the Epistle to my Lord

of Newcastle. . 250

An Answer to the Animadversions upon the Bishop s Epistle to

the Reader. . . . . . . .251

[T. H. s Epistle surreptitiously printed. . . . . ib.
The author s exceptions to T. H. s book De Give. . . . 252
valediction defended.] . . . . ib.

An Answer to his Animadversions upon my Reply; NUMBER I. 253
[Difference between diversion and determination.] . . . ib.

CONTENTS. 201

Page

Resolution proveth election and liberty. .... 254

[T. H. s objections answered.] ..... 256

What is necessary. ....... 257

An Answer to his Animadversions upon the Reply ; NUMBER II. 259

Chance is from accidental concurrence, not from ignorance. . . ib.

[Suarez. . . . . . . . . ib.

Epictetus.] . . . . . . . .261

An Answer to the Animadversions upon NUMBER III. . 262

Exact definitions not frequent. . . . . . ib.

What liberty is. . . . . . . . ib.

What is spontaneity. ....... 263

What is necessity. ....... 264

Necessity of being and acting distinguished. . . . ib.

[T. H. confoundeth liberty and will. .... 265

His presumptuous rejection of received terms of art.] . . ib.

Necessity upon supposition, what it is. . . . . . 266

Man is not a passive instrument, as the sword in his hand. . . 268

[Of contingent and free causes.] ..... 269

The instance in ambs-ace hath lost T, H. his game. . . . 270

[T. H. confoundeth absolute and hypothetical necessity.] . .271

T. H. his will is no more than the bias of a bowl. . . . ib.

[His absurd presumption.] . . . . . .272

St. Austin more to be credited than T. H. . . . 273

To give liberty to two, and limit to one, is a contradiction. . . ib.

[He who is free to act, is much more free to will.] . . . 274

According to T. H. his principles all persuasions are vain. . .275

[Upon his principles] we can blame no man justly. . . . ib.

A lame comparison. . . . . . . 276

T. H. maketh himself no better than a wooden top. . . . 277

An Answer to his Animadversions upon NUMBER IV. . 278

[Liberty of exercise and of specification.] . . . . ib.

T. H. his deep skill in logic. ..... 279

His silly definitions. . . . . . . ib.

Meditation little worth without making use of other men s experience. . 281
Terms of art are ungrateful to rude persons. .... 282

[Of Luther and Melancthon, and the Schoolmen.] . . ib.

Castigations upon the Animadversions ; NUMBER V. . 283

202

CONTENTS.

Page

Castigations upon the Animadversions ; NUMBER VI. . 283

[Scripture proof, that men have power of election.] . . . ib.

Freedom to do if one will, without freedom to will, a vain distinction. . 28-4
And maketh T. H. a degree worse than the Stoics. . . . 287

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER VII. . 288

[How the will followeth the judgment of reason. . . . ib.

The will and the understanding explained.] . . . . ib.

" Judicium practice practicum" explained. .... 289

How the object is, and how it is not, the cause of seeing. . . 291

Castigations of his Animadversions ; NUMBER VIII. . 292

[All T. H. s contention is about terms, not things.] . . ib.

Spontaneity. . . . . . . . .293

Conformity signifieth agreeableness as well as likeness. . ib.

A.vr6/j.ara, what they are. .... . 294

A true will may be changed. .... . 296

[T. H. s contradictions.] .... ib.

Voluntariness doth not depend on the judgment of others. . . . 297

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER IX. . 300

1 Kings iii. 11. [explained.] . . . . . . ib.

Election, of more than one. ..... ib.

Acts v. 4. " Was it not in thy power" explained. . . .301

Castigations upon the Animadversions ; NUMBER X. . 302

Out of hatred to true liberty T. H. makes God hypocritical. . ib.

God s secret and revealed will not contrary ; and why. . . . 304

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XI. . 305
[T. H. s most ridiculous presumption.] ..... 306

Occult virtue or influence. . . . . . . ib.

[T. H. reduced to an absurdity.] ...... 307

Castigations upon the Animadversions ; NUMBER XII. . 308

It is blasphemy to say, that God is the cause of sin. ib

Or to say, that sin is efficaciously decreed by God. . ib.

God s permission no naked permission. . . 310

The difference between general and special influence. . . .311

[Case of David and Uriah. . . . . . 3 i 2

The true question between T. H. and the author. . . . .813

The Jews might recover their former estate.] .314

CONTENTS. 203

Page

God may oblige Himself. . .315

God cannot do any unrighteous thing. . . . ib.

[T. H. s irrelevant instance of the brute beasts.] . . .317

It is just to afflict innocent persons for their own good. . . .318

Sin is properly irregularity. . . ib.

God no cause of irregularity. . .319

[Castigations upon the Animadversions;] NUMBER XIII. 320

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XIV. . ib.

*
Laws may be unjust. . . .... 321

Impossibilities made by ourselves may be justly imposed, [but] not impos
sibilities in themselves. . .... 322

Proper punishment is ever vindictive in part. .... 324

Yet further of unjust laws. . ... 325

The authority of the Scriptures not dependent on the printer. . . 327

[ How they are a law to us. ..... 328

Their Divine authority. . . , . . . ib.

The law of nature coincident with them. . . . ib.

Their antiquity. . ...... 329

Catholic consent for them. . . . 330

T. H. his standard of religious truth is the civil magistrate. . . ib.

Law of conquest] ... .331

T. H. a fit catechist for disloyal and unnatural persons. . . . ib.

[Not all lawgiver selective. ...... 332

A just law justly executed a cause of justice.] . . . . 333

Mankind never without laws. ...... 334

Never lawful for private men ordinarily to kill one another. . . 335

T. H. attorney-general for the brute beasts. .... 339

Seen and unseen necessity. . . . . . 341

If all things be absolutely necessary, admonitions are all vain. . . 343

A litter of absurdities. . ...... 344

What is morally good. ...... 345

Rewards of brutes and men differ. . 347

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XV. . 348

[T. H. s impertinencies.] . . . . . . ib.

What it is to honour God. . ..... 350

What are devils in his judgment. . . . . .351

[The attributes of God not all included in His omnipotence. ] . . 352

God doth not hinder privately what He commands openly. . . ib.

His opinion destroyeth the truth of God. . . . . ib.

And His goodness. ....... 353

And His justice. . ...... 354

And [His] omnipotence, [by] making [Him] the cause of sin. . . 355

Aright Hobbist cannot praise God. ..... 356

204 CONTENTS.

Page

Nor hear the Word or receive the Sacrament worthily. . .357

Nor vow as he ought. . ..... 358

Nor repent of his misdeeds. . , . . . ib.

What repentance is. . 359

Man s concurrence with God s grace. .... 360

Confidence in prayer, and the efficacy of it. . . . . 362

Castigations of the Animadversions; NUMBER XVI. . 363

T. H. still mistaketh necessity upon supposition. . . . 364

There is more in contingency than ignorance. . . . 365

[T. H. s definition of contingents. . . . . . ib.

Indetermination of causes.] ...... 366

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XVII. . ib.

[The opinion of necessity taketh away the nature of sin.] . . ib.

Sin in the world before the civil law. . 3(J8

[The true nature of sin.] . ..... 369

To command impossibilities is unjust. . . . . . ib.

[T. H. s instance of a civil judge.] ..... 370

Yet further against his silly distinction, free to do if he will, not free to will.371
Ofmonsters. ..... . 372

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XVIII. . 373

[Lipsius.] . . . ..... ib.

What is said to be " in Deo," and what " extra Deum." . , . 374

[Free acts of God extra Deum; Creation and Government.] . . 375

To will and do, in God, the same thing. He willeth not all He could will. 376

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XIX. . 377

T. H. makes the will to be compelled. . . . ib.

[What is properly compulsion.] ... . 373

Motus primo primi, and antipathies. . . t 379

To search too boldly into the nature of God is a fault. . . . 380

But the greater fault is negligence. . . . . ib.

T. H. his liberty, omnipotence in show, in deed nothing. . .381

He dare not refer himself to his own witnesses. . . 382

Terms of art. . ... ib.

A contradiction. .... . 386

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XX. . 387

Election and compulsion inconsistent.
[T. H. s instance of a stone falling.]
There arc mixed actions.

CONTENTS. 205

Page

[Election of one out of more, inconsistent with determination to one.] . 389
Rational will. . . ... ib.

Passive obedience. . . ..... 390

Compulsion, what it is. . . . . . .391

Fear of hurt doth not abrogate a law. ..... 392

Natural agents act determinately ; ..... 393

Not voluntarily. . . ..... ib.

[The more reason, the more liberty. ..... 394

True liberty, a freedom from necessity as well as from compulsion.] . 395

T. H. maketh God the cause of sin. ..... 396

Six witnesses for universal necessity answered. .... 397

[Elicit and imperate acts of the will.] ..... 399

Mental terms. . . ..... ib.

Metaphorical drawing. . ..... 400

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XXI. . ib.

Paradoxes, what they are. . ..... ib.

[T.H. s subtlety, that everything is a cause of everything.] . . 402

Whether a feather make a diamond yield. . . . . ib.

Or a falling drop move the whole world. .... 404

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XXII. . 405

Power of objects concerneth the moral philosopher. . . . ib.

Still he seeketh to obtrude hypothetical necessity for absolute. . . ib.

Hearing and speaking all one with T. H. . . . . . 406

There are other motions than local. ..... 407

Spirits moved as well as bodies. . . . . . . ib.

Both bodies and spirits move themselves. .... 408

Quality infused by God. . . . . . . ib.

[T. H. s reiterated paradoxes.] ... . 409

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XXIII. . 410

The understanding and will two powers of the reasonable soul. . . ib.

[Election doth not necessarily follow the last judgment] . .411

Man s willing is not like a falling stone. . . . . ib.

Absolute necessity admitteth no contrary supposition. . . .412

A man may will contrary to the dictate of reason. . . . ib.

An erroneous conscience obligeth first to reform it, then to follow it. . 413

Reason is the true root of liberty. . . . . . ib.

Actions may be equally circumstantiated. . . . . .414

Passions often prevail against reason. . . . . . 415

Man was created to be lord of the creatures. . . . .416

How the understanding giveth to objects their proper weight. . .417

206 CONTENTS.

Page

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XXIV. . 418

Blasphemy in the abstract and in the concrete differ much. . . ib.

A man may know a truth certainly, yet not know the manner. . .419
The doctrine of liberty an ancient truth. .... 420

Liberty to will more reconcileable with prescience than liberty to do. . 421

How the will of God is the necessity of all things. . . . 422

"What it is to permit only and to permit barely. . . .423

[Universals nothing but words, according to T. H.] . . . 424

Eternity is no successive duration. . . . . . ib.

[T. H. s show of confidence.] ... . 425

Why God is said to be justice itself, &c. ... . ib.

God is indivisible. ..... . 426

God is eternity itself. ..... . 427

[Eternity a " nunc stans."] .... . ib.

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XXV. . 428

What a judge judgeth to be indeliberate, is impertinent. . . ib.

And his assertion false. ... , ib.

A man cannot predeliberate perfectly of contingent events. . . 429

[Spontaneity. .... . ib.

Liberty.] . . . . . . . .430

Endeavour is not of the essence of liberty. . . . . ib.

There may be impediments before deliberation be done. . .431

And liberty when it is ended. ... , ib.

[Secret sympathies and antipathies. ... , ib.

Habits facilitate actions.] ... . 432

Some undeliberated actions may be punishable. . . . ib.

Virtual deliberation. . . . . .433

Children not punishable with death. .... 434

[Private and public justice.] . . . .435

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XXVI. . ib.

He knoweth no reason but imagination. . . . . ib.

[And this upon the ground of imagination.] . . . 436

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XXVII. . 438
The faculty of willing is the will. . . . ib.

Of concupiscence. ... .439

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XXVIII. . 440

Of the intellectual and sensitive appetite. . . . . ib.

Not the same thing. . . ib

His deliberation is no deliberation. . . 441

His liberty no true liberty. 442

CONTENTS. 207

Page

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XXIX. . 443

His definition of liberty. . . ib.

Analogical matter. . . 445

By his definition a stone is free to ascend. . . 446

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XXX. . 447

Beginning of motion from the mover. . . . . . ib.

The same faculty willeth or nilleth. . . . 448

[Matter and power indifferent to contrary forms.] . ib.

Other causes concur with the will. . . ib.

Necessary causes do not always act necessarily. . . 449

[The will not a necessary cause of its particular acts. . . 450

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XXXI and
NUMBER XXXII 451

Two sorts of sufficiency. . . . . . ib.

[A sufficient cause not a necessary cause. ..... 453

T. H. s mistakes.] ....... 455

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XXXIII. . 456

Our conceptions are not the touchstone of truth. . . . . ib.

His gross mistakes about eternity. . . . 460

[Of spontaneity.] .... . ib.

What is his deliberation. .... . 461

Man is free to will, or he is not free to do. . . 462

He maketh a stone as free to ascend as descend. . ib.

A hawk, saith he, is free to fly when her wings are plucked. . 463

A beginning of being and acting. ... . 464

His answer to some demands. . ib.

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XXXIV. . 466

[T. H. s boasts and blunders. . . ib.

Four sorts of actions. ..... . 467

1. The acts of free agents.] ... . ib.
Free to do if he will, yet not free to will, is against law and logic. . ib.

2. [Concerning mixed actions.] ... . 468
A necessary effect requires all necessary causes. . . ib.

3. [The individual acts of brute beasts not antecedently necessitated. . 469

4. The natural acts of inanimate creatures necessary.] . . 470
His instance of ambs-ace. .... 471
His other instance of raining or not raining to-morrow. . . 473
God s decree considered act[ive]ly and passively. 476
God knows all future possibilities. . . . .477

208 CONTENTS.

Page

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XXXV. . 478
His argument to prove universal necessity answered. . . . ib.

Possible and impossible all one with T. H. . . . . 479

Remote causes are not together with the effect. .... 480
Nor doth all time make one instant. . . . .481

Castigations upon the Animadversions ; NUMBER XXXVI. 482
T. H. admitteth no absurdities but impossibilities. . . . ib.

Castigations of the Animadversions ; NUMBER XXXVII. 483
[Little harm in the publication of T. H. s arguments.] . . . ib.

Abuses do not flow essentially from good doctrines, as [they do] from
universal necessity. ....... 484

Castigations of the Animadversions upon the Postscript ;

NUMBER XXXVIII. . . . .485

Solid reasons work soonest upon solid judgments. . . . ib.

Three sorts of men. ..... . 48(5

The doctrine of liberty maketh no man careless or thankless. . 487

God hath no faculties. .... . ib.

God is incomprehensible. .... . 489

Yet, so far as we can, we are obliged to search after Him. . . ib.

To admit that God is infinite, is enough to confute T. H. . . 490

Tophet. 491

True religion consisteth not in obedience to princes. . . . ib.

Active and passive obedience. .... . 493

Universal practice against him. .... . 499

The just power of princes. ..... ib.

He confesseth that ecclesiastical persons have a privilege above himself. . 500

[The primitive Christians obeyed God rather than man. . . . 502

T. H. s wise principles. ... . ib.

His postscript.] . . . 503

AN ANSWER

MR. HOBBES HIS

AND FIRST

HIS EPISTLE TO THE READER.

CHRISTIAN READER, thou hast here the testimony of Mr. Mr. Hobbes
Hobbes, that " the questions concerning necessity, freedom, of toques 6
and chance/ are " clearly discussed" between him and me, tion -
in that little volume which he hath lately published 8 . If
they be, it were strange; whilst we agree not much better
about the terms of the controversy, than the builders of [Gen. xi.
Babel did understand one another s language. A necessity *
upon supposition (which admits a possibility of the contrary)
is mistaken for an absolute and true necessity. A freedom
from compulsion is confounded with a freedom from necessi-
tation. Mere spontaneity usurpeth the place of true liberty.
No chance is acknowledged, but w r hat is made chance by our
ignorance or nescience, because we know not the right
causes of it. I desire to retain the proper terms of the
Schools ; Mr. Hobbes flies to the common conceptions of the
vulgar; a way seldom trodden but by false prophets and
seditious orators. He preferreth their terms as more intelli
gible ; I esteem them much more obscure and confused. In
such intricate questions, vulgar brains are as uncapable of the

a [Epistle to the Reader, prefixed which the whole of Bramhall s Defence

to " The Questions concerning Liberty, (Disc. i. Pt. iii.), viz. all the three

Necessity, and Chance, clearly stated tracts contained in it, was reprinted,

and debated between Dr. Bramhall with Hobbes " Animadversions " upon

Bishop of Derry and Thomas Hobbes each number successively.]
of Malmesbury," 4to. Lond. 1656. in

BRAMHALL.

210 EPISTLE TO THE READER.

PART things, as of the terms. But thus it behoved him to prevari-
nl - cate, that he might not seem to swim against an universal
stream; nor directly to oppose the general current of the
Christian world. There was an odd fantastic person in our
times, one Thomas Leaver b , who would needs publish a logic
in our mother s tongue. You need not doubt but that the
public good was pretended. And because the received terms
of art seemed to him too abstruse, he translated them into
English; styling a subject an inholder, an accident an in-
beer, a proposition a shewsay, an affirmative proposition a
yeasay, a negative proposition a naysay, the subject of the
proposition the foreset, the predicate the backset, the conver
sion the turning of the foreset into the backset and the back
set into the foreset. Let Mr. Hobbes himself be judge, whe
ther the common logical notions or this new gibberish were
less intelligible.

" Haec a se non multum abludit imago ."

Mr. Hobbes But, reader, dost thou desire to see the question discussed

pieVrefuted c l ear ty to thy satisfaction ? Observe but Mr. Hobbes his prac-

k vhis P rac - tics, and compare them with his principles, and there needs

no more. He teacheth, that all causes and all events are

absolutely necessary ; yet, if any man cross him, he frets and

fumes and talks his pleasure ;

" Jussit quod splendida bilis d ."

Doth any man in his right wits use to be angry with
causes that act necessarily ? He might as well be angry
with the sun, because it doth not rise an hour sooner; or
with the moon, because it is not always full for his pleasure.
He commands his servant to do thus to as much purpose, if
he be necessitated to do otherwise, as Canutus commanded
the waves of the sea to flow no higher 6 . He punisheth him,
if he transgress his commands, with as much justice, if he
have no dominion over his own actions, as Xerxes com-

b ["The Arte of Reason, rightly than those quoted in the text: e. g. a

termed WITCRAFT, teaching a perfect definition is a " say-what," a category

way to argue and dispute: Made by is a " storehouse," a mood is a " seat,"

Raphe Lever :" 8vo. Lond. 1573 : in &c.]

four books, pp. 233, with "A note to c [Horat., Sat., II. iii. 320.]
understand the meaning of neue de- d [Id., ibid., 141.]
vised Termes" subjoined. 3ramhall s e [See Sharon Turner, Hist, of An-
recollection of the book is substantially glo-Saxons, bk. vi. c. 11. vol. ii. pp.
accurate. The other " new devised 342 344. 8vo. edit. ; from Matt. West-
terms" are if possible more ludicrous mon., Henry of Huntingdon, &c.]

EPISTLE TO THE READER. 211

manded so many stripes to be given to the Hellespont for DISCOURSE

breaking down his bridge f . He exhorts him, and reprehends -i

him ; he might as well exhort the fire to burn, or reprehend
it for burning of his clothes. He is as timorous in a thunder
or a storm, as cautelous and deliberative in doubtful causes,
as if he believed that all things in the world were contingent,
and nothing necessary. Sometimes he chideth himself;
" how ill advised was I, to do thus or so \" " O that I had
thought better upon it!" or "had done otherwise!" Yet
all this while he believeth, that it was absolutely necessary
for him to do what he did, and impossible for him to have
done otherwise. Thus his own practice doth sufficiently con
fute his tenets. He will tell us, that he is timorous and soli
citous because he knows not how the causes will determine.
To what purpose ? Whether their determination be known
or unknown, he cannot alter it with his endeavours. He
will tell us, that deliberation must concur to the production
of the effect. Let it be so ; but if it do concur necessarily,
why is he so solicitous and so much perplexed? Let him
sleep or wake, take care or take no care, the necessary causes
must do their work.

Yet from our collision some light hath proceeded towards Freedom
the elucidation of this question ; and much more might have not to will
arisen, if Mr. Hobbes had been pleased to retain the ancient refuted -
734 School terms ; for want of which his discourse is still ambi
guous and confused. As here he tells thee, that we " both
maintain, that men are free to do as they will, and to for
bear as they will g ." My charity leads me to take him in the
best sense, only of free acts, and then with dependence upon
the First Cause, That man who knows not his idiotisms,
would think the cause was yielded in these words, whereas in
truth they signify nothing. His meaning is, he is as free to
do and forbear, as he is free to call back yesterday. He may
call until his heart ache, but it will never come. He saith, a
man is free to "do" if he will, but he is not free to "will" if
he will h . If he be not free to will, then he is not free to do.
Without the concurrence of all necessary causes it is impos
sible that the effect should be produced. But the concur-

f [Herod., vii. 35.] a, p. 209, Epist to Reader.]

g [Questions &c., as quoted in note " [Ibid.]

212 EPISTLE TO THE READER.

PART reiice of the will is necessary to the production of all free or
- voluntary acts. And if the will be necessitated to nill, as it
may be, then the act is impossible; and then he saith no
more in effect but this a man is free to do if he will that
which is impossible for him to do. By his doctrine, all the
powers and faculties of a man are as much necessitated and
determined to one, by the natural influence of extrinsecal
causes, as the will. And therefore, upon his own grounds, a
man is as free to will as to do.

The points wherein he saith we disagree are set down
loosely in like manner. What our tenets are, the reader
shall know more truly and distinctly by comparing our writ
ings together, than by this false dim light which he holds
out unto him.

He is pleased, if not ironically, yet certainly more for his
own glory than out of any respect to me, to name me a
" learned school divine 1 ;" an honour which I vouchsafe not
to myself. My life hath been too practical to attend so
much to those speculative studies. It may be, the School
men have started many superfluous questions, and some
of dangerous consequence; but yet I say, the weightier
ecclesiastical controversies will never be understood and
stated distinctly without the help of their necessary distinc
tions k .

Reader, I shall not in this rejoinder abuse thy patience
with the needless repetition of those things which thou hast
seen already, nor quest at every lark which he springs ; but
wheresoever he hath put any new weight into the scale,
either in his answers or objections, I shall not omit it in due
place.

i [Questions &c., Epist to Reader.] c. vii ; above in vol. iii. pp. 567, 568,
k [Compare the Vindic. of Grotius note a, Disc. iii. Pt. ii.]
and Episcop. Divines against Baxter,

AN ADVERTISEMENT 3 FROM THE AUTHOR
TO THE READER.

MARCH 11, 1658. STILO NOVO.

CHRISTIAN READER, by the slowness of this edition, and
by the errors of the press, which do ordinarily happen to
authors that are absent, thou mayest judge of the difficulties
and r amor as which we meet withal in such occasions. The
greatest part of the errata are obvious to an intelligent
reader ; I intreat thee to correct them with thy pen. Some
of the chiefest (which did seem to alter or obscure the sense)
I have collected, and appointed them to be set down at the
foot of this advertisement; so many as I could observe in
once reading over the copies cursorily, for I have had no
more time since I received them.

Be pleased further to take notice, that yesterday came to
my hands a copy of Mr. Serjeant s treatise called Schism
Dispatched b , written against Doctor Hammond and myself, it
being the first time that I have viewed it. I wish I had had a
graver adversary in this cause, who had consulted more with
his own judgment and experience, and less with passion and
prejudice. The contention is not equal, between an ancient
doctor and a young prevaricator, whose office is to make
freshmen laugh and gape c . When Mr. Serjeant hath wea
ried himself twenty or thirty years longer in the study of
theology , he will grow less impetuous and censorious,

a [The Castigations were first printed two after the Answ. to the UpoX

in 1657, as appears by a title-page to containing the above Advertisement

the tract, which to half the impression and a Table of Errata. In other re

forms the only title, and which bears spects, the several copies of this the

this date. The work of printing the original edition, one or two trifling cor-

book however lasted until 1658 ; when rections excepted, are identically the

four leaves were added to the remain- same.]

ing copies ; two before the original b [Schism Dispatch t, or, A Re-

title-page, containing a new title-page, joynder to the Replies of Dr. Ham-

dated 1658, as follows Castigations of mond and the Ld. of Derry, by S. W.

Mr. Hobbes his last Animadv. in the 8vo. n. p. 1657. See above in vol. ii.

case concerning Liberty and Univ. Ne- Preface, and pp. 358. note j, 363. note

cessity, with an Appendix concerning a ; and vol. i. p. xxviii.]

the Catching of Leviathan or the Great [Sec above in vol. ii. pp. 356. note

Whale, the other leaf being blank; b, 358. note j.J

214 ADVERTISEMENT.

PART but more judicious and discreet ; and of so much more value

: in the eyes of others as he setteth a less value upon himself.

Now I have a copy, if God bless me with life and health, I

shall endeavour in a short time to let the world see, that my

religion is as much better than his ; as my charity is greater.

735

DISCOURSE II.

CASTIGATIONS

MR. HOBBES ANIMADVERSIONS.

[FIRST PRINTED IN LONDON, A.D. 1657 1658.]

AN ANSWER TO HIS RELATION OF THE OCCASION OF
THE CONTROVERSY.

1. HERE is nothing of moment to advantage his cause. An- Eleven

, . -. . gross mis-

other man would say, here is nothing alleged by him which is takes in a
true. Whereas he saith, that the " question disputed among

the old philosophers" was, "whether all things that come th

to pass proceed from necessity, or some from chance a ," it sophers.]
was as well debated among the old philosophers, whether
all things come to pass by chance, and nothing proceed from
necessity, and likewise, whether some events proceed
from necessity, and some come to pass by chance, as that
which he mentions, " whether all events proceed from ne
cessity, or some" come to pass "by chance." That is the
first error.

2. His second error is, that he opposeth "chance" to "neces-
sity b " as if all things came to pass by necessity, which come
not to pass by chance : whereas those ancient philosophers
(of whom he speaks) did oppose contingency to necessity,
and not chance alone. Chance is but one branch of contin
gency. Free acts are done contingently, but not by chance.

3. Thirdly, he is mistaken in this also, that he saith, those
ancient philosophers did never " draw into argument the al
mighty power of the Deity c ." For we find in Tully d , and in

a [Questions &c., Occas. of Controv., c [Ibid.]

p. i.] d [Cic., De Divin., lib. i. cc. 55, 56.]

Ibid.]

216 CASTIGATIONS OF

PART Chrysippus (as he is alleged by Eusebius 6 ), that one of the
main grounds of the Stoics was the prescience of God ; and

that the predictions of their oracles and prophets could not
be certain, unless all things came to pass by inevitable
necessity.

4. Fourthly, he erreth in this, that liberty is a " third way
of bringing things to pass, distinct from necessity and con
tingency f ." For liberty is subordinate to contingency. They
denned contingents to be those things which might either
come to pass or not come to pass; that is, either freely or
casually: and in all their questions of contingency, liberty
was principally understood.

5. His fifth error is, that "free will is a thing that was
never mentioned among thems." I believe it was never
mentioned by them in English, by the name of " free will "
but he may find " avre^ovcnov" and " Trpoaipeaw." Let him
read Aristotle alone ; and he shall find not only this free
elective power of the will, but also the difference between
voluntary or spontaneous (which is all the liberty he admit-
teth), and free or that which is elected upon deliberation 11 . 736
Hear Calvin, "Semper apud Latinos liberi arbitrii nomen
extitit, Gr&cos vero non puduit arrogantius usurpare vocabu-
lum, siquidem avret; ovviov dixerunt*"

[Concern- 6. Sixthly, he erreth yet more grossly in saying, that " free

primitive wn "l was never mentioned by Christians in the beginning

Christians.] o f Christianity," but " for some ages [past] " brought in

by " the doctors of the Roman Church k ." Whereas it is

undeniably true, that sundry ancient Fathers have written

whole treatises expressly of free will 1 ; that there is scarcely

one Father that doth not mention it ; and sundry of the first

e [Chrysipp., ap. Euseb.,] De Pros- de Lib. Arb.), St. Chrysostom (Ora-

par. Evang., lib. vi. c. 11. [p. 287. fol. tiones V. de Provid. et Fato), St. Au-

Paris. 1628.] gustin (De Lib. Arb., lib. iii., and De

f [Qu., Occ. of Controv., p. 1. " dis- Gratia et Lib. Arb.), St. Prosper (Epist

tinct from necessity and chance."] de Grat. et Lib. Arb. ad Ruffinum), St.

g [Ibid.] Anselm (Lib.de Concord. Gratiaeet Lib.

h [Aristot.,] Ethic., lib. III. cc. iii, Arb., and Dial.de Lib. Arb.), St. Bernard

iv, v. (Tractat. de Grat. et Lib. Arb.) ; and of

1 [Calvin,] Instit., [lib.] II. c. ii. Fathers who have treated the subject

sect. 4. [Op. torn. ix. p. 62. ed. Amst] incidentally, Origen (De Princip., lib.

k [Qu., Occ. of Controv., p. 1.] iii.), Eusebius (Praep. Evang., lib.

[Compare the list given by Bellar- vi.), St. John Damascene (De Fide

mine in c. 1. bk. iii. of his Treatise De Orthod., lib. ii. c. 25, sq.), Boethius

Grat. et Lib. Arb. : viz. St. Basil (Serm. (De Cousolat. Philosoph., lib. v.), &c.]

MR. HOBBES ANIMADVERSIONS. 217

heretics, as Simon Magus m , the Manichees, the Marcionites, DISCOURSE
&c. n , and their followers, have been condemned for maintain- -
ing absolute necessity against free will.

7. His seventh error is, that tf St. Paul never useth the [Concern-
term of free will, nor did hold any doctrine equivalent" to it , pfui.j
Hear himself; "Am I not an Apostle ? am I not free ? .
have we not power to lead about a sister, a wife, as well as
the other Apostles ? . . or I only and Barnabas, have not
we power to forbear working ?" St. Paul did those things
freely upon his own election, which he was not necessitated
to do; and did forbear those things* freely, which he was not
necessitated to forbear. This doctrine is te equivalent" to ours,
of the freedom of the will from necessitation. Take another
place, wherein you have both the name and the thing;
" Nevertheless, he that standeth steadfast in his heart, having
no necessity, but hath power over his own will." The words
in the original are a plain description of the old " avre^ovonov"
(which name Calvin did so much dislike) or free will;
11 egovalav Be e^et Trepl rov IStov Oekrjjjbaro^. 3 Here is not
only freedom, but power and dominion. Mr. Hobbes
teacheth us, that a man is free to do, but not free to will.
St. Paul teacheth us, that a man " hath pOAver over his own
will." Then he is free to will ; then his will is not extrinse-
cally predetermined.

8. Eighthly, he wrongs the doctors of the Roman Church, [Concern-
as if they "exempted the will of man from the dominion of
God s will?." They maintain, that the freedom of the will of

man is expressly from the will of God, Who made it free.
They teach, that God can suspend the act of the will, can
determine the will, can change the will, doth dispose of all
the acts of the will, can do anything but compel the will,
which implieth a contradiction^.

9. Ninthly (to let us see what a profound clerk he is in
ecclesiastical controversies), Mr. Hobbes thinks he hath hit
the nail on the head, of the difference between the Church of

m [See Vincent of Lerins, Commonit., 17. C, D), and for the Marcionites,

p. 313. 4to.Bremae 1688. " Quis ante Irenseus, Adv. Hasres., lib. i. c. 29 (p.

Simonem Magum . . auctorem malo- 104. ed. Grabe).]

rum, id est, scelerum, impietatum, fla- [Q,u., Occ. of Controv., p. 1.]

gitiorumque nostrorum,ausus est dicere p [Ibid. pp. 1, 2.]

Creatorem Deuin?"] 1 [See Bellarm., De Gratia et Lib.

n [See for the Manichees, Aug. Lib. Arb., lib. iv. cc. 14 16; Op. torn. iii.

de Hseres., c. xlvi. (Op. torn. viii. p. pp. 710 753.]

218 CASTIGATIONS OF

PART Rome and us concerning free will, in this disputation 1 . Just
- as the blind senator in Juvenal made a large encomium of the
goodly turbot which lay before Csesar, but (as ill luck would
have it) turned himself the quite contrary way :

"... At illi dextra jacebat"
"Bellua 8 . . . ."

The controversy lies on the other side ; not about the free
dom of the will in natural or civil actions, which is our
question, but (if it be not a logomachy) about the power of
free will in moral and supernatural actions without the
assistance of grace.

[Concern- 10. In the tenth place, he misinforms his readers, that
formed ^ " this opinion" (of freedom from necessitation and deter-
Churches.] m i nat i on to one ) was cast Qut by the R e f orme( i Churches

instructed by Luther, Calvin, and others 4 ." Where have the
Reformed Churches, or any of them, in their public confes
sions, cast out this freedom from necessitation whereof we
write ? Indeed Luther u was once against it, and so was
Melancthon x ; but they grew wiser, and retracted whatsoever
they had written against it y . And so would Mr. Hobbes do
likewise, if he were well advised. Either he did know of
Luther s retraction, and then it w r as not ingenuously done to
conceal it ; or (which I rather believe) he did not know of it,
and then he is but meanly versed in the doctrine and affairs
of the Protestants.

[Concern- 11. Lastly, he accuseth " Arminius" to have been a re-
storer or " reducer" of the Romish doctrine of free will 2 by
a postliminium. I do not think that ever he read one word
of Arminius in his life, or knoweth distinctly one opinion
that Arminius held. It was such deep controvertists as him-

r [Qu., Occ. of Controv., pp. 1, 2.] Arb., as it stands in the first edition of

* [Juv.,iv. 120, 121.] the book, P2mo. 1521: and Bellarm.,

t [Qu., Occ. of Controv., p. 2.] De Grat. et Lib. Arb., lib. iv. c. 5, Op.

u [See the Assert. Omn. Art. D. M. torn. iii. pp. 718, 719.]

Lutheri a Leone X. Damnat, art. 36; * [By Luther, in his Liber de] Visitat.

inter Opera M. Lutheri, tom.ii. pp. 310. Saxon., [viz. his Apolog. pro Confess.

b, & c . fol. Jena?, 1561; and the Aug., A.D. 1538, Artie, de Lib. Arb. ;

Quaestio de Viribus et Voluntate Ho- Op. torn. iv. p. 248]. [By Melanch-

minis sine gratia, disputata Wirtem- thon, in his] Loci Commun., [artt. De

bergae Anno 1516, Conclus. ii. Coroll. Lib. Arbit. etde Caussa Peccati,] edit.
1 ; ibid. torn. i. p. 1, a; and the cele- * poster, [scil. 12mo. 1546. The book

brated tract De Servo Arbitrio, 8vo. was first published in 1521, and the

Witemb. 1526.] first article of those just referred to was

[See his Annot. on the Epist. to almost wholly rewritten for the later

the Romans, c. viii. (p. 50. 8vo. 1523) ; edition.]
and his Loci Communes, art. de Lib. * * [Q u . Occ. of Controv., p. 2.]

219

self that accused the Church of England of Arminianism, for DISCOURSE

holding those truths which they ever professed before ~-

Arminius was born. If Arminius were alive, Mr. Hobbes,
out of conscience, ought to ask him forgiveness. Let him
speak for himself : De liber o hominis arbitrio ita sentio,"
&c. ; "in statu vero lapsus" &c. " This is my sentence of free
737 will, that man . . . fallen can neither think, nor will, nor do
that which is truly good, of himself and from himself; but
that it is needful that he be regenerated and renewed in his
understanding, will, affections, and all his powers, from God,
in Christ, by the Holy Ghost, to understand, esteem, con
sider, will, and do aright, that which is truly goodV It was
not the speculative doctrine of Arminius, but the seditious
tenets of Mr. Hobbes, and such like, which opened a large
window to our troubles.

How is it possible to pack up more errors together in so
narrow a compass ? If I were worthy to advise Mr. Hobbes,
he should never have more to do with these old philosophers
(except it were to weed them for some obsolete opinions,
Chrysippus used to say, he sometimes wanted opinions but
never wanted arguments b ), but to stand upon his own
bottom, and make himself both party, juror, and judge in
his own cause.

CONCERNING THE STATING OF THE QUESTION.

The right stating of the question is commonly the midway The con-
to the determination of the difference ; and he himself con-
fesseth, that I have done that more than once ; saving that he
thinketh I have done it over cautiously, with as much this ques-
caution as" I would draw up " a lease ." Abundant caution

a Declar. Sententise Arminii ad Ord. et a seipso, quod quidem vere bonum est,

Hollandise, [pp. 121, 122. inter Op. neque cogitare, neque velle, aut facere

Jac. Arminii, Lugd. Bat. 4to. 1629. posse; sed necesse esse ut a Deo in

11 De libero arbitrio hominis ita sentio; Christo per Spiritum Sanctum Ipsius re-

hominem in primo statu creationis suae generetiir et renovetur in intellectu, affcc-

ejuscemodi notitia, sanctitate, iisque tionibus sive voluntate, omnibusque viri-

viribus instruction fuisse, ut verum bus, ad id quod vere bonum est recte

bonum intelligere, sestimare, consi- intelligendum, cestimandum, consideran-

derare, velle, et perficere valuerit, prout dum, volendum, et faciendum."]
quidem ei mandatum erat ; sed hoc b [Diog. Laert, vii. 179.]
tamen non nisi cum auxilio gratis Dei : c [Qu., State of Quest., p. 3.]

hoc b [Diog. Laert, vii. 179.]
ei :
in statu vero lapsus et peccati, ex seipso

220 CAST1GAT10NS OF

PART was never thought hurtful until now. Doth not the truth
_ require as much regard as " a lease ?" On the other side, I
accuse him to have stated it too carelessly, loosely, and con
fusedly. He saith, he understands not these words, " the
conversion of a sinner concerns not the question 6 ." I do
really believe him. But in concluding, that whatsoever he
doth not understand is unintelligible, he doth but abuse
himself and his readers. Let him study better what is the
different power of the will in natural or civil actions, which is
the subject of our discourse, and moral or supernatural acts,
which concerns not this question ; and the necessity of add
ing these words will clearly appear to him.

A wilful Such another pitiful piece is his other exception, against
these words, "without their own concurrence 1 ";" which, he
saith, are " unsignificant, unless" I "mean that the events
themselves should concur to their own production g ." Either
these words were " unsignificant," or he was blind, or worse
than blind, when he transcribed them. My words were
these, " whether all agents and all events be predetermined 11 :"
he fraudulently leaves out these words, "all agents," and
makes me to state the question thus, " whether all events
be predetermined without their own concurrence [ ;" whereas
those words " without their own concurrence" had no
reference at all to "all events" but to "all agents;" which
words he hath omitted.

Difference The state of the question being agreed upon, it were vanity
naturaUnd anc ^ mere beating of the air in me, to weary myself and the
moral effi- re ader with the serious examination of all his extravagant
and impertinent fancies : as this, " whether there be a moral
efficacy which is not natural k ;" which is so far from being
the question between us, that no man makes any question of
it, except one, who hath got a blow upon his head with a mill-
sail. Natural causes produce their effects by a true real in
fluence, which implies an absolute determination to one : as
a father begets a son, or fire produceth fire. Moral causes
have no natural influence into the effect, but move or induce

e [Qu., State of Quest., p. 3." Not * [Ibid.]

intelligible, is, first, that the conver- h [Defence,] Numb. iii. [above, p.32.]

sion, " &c. from the Defence, Numb. j [Qu., State of Quest., p. 2.]

iii. above p. 32, Disc. i. Pt. iii.j k [Ibid., p. 3.J

f [Ibid., from the Defence, ibid.]

221

some other cause without themselves to produce it : as when DISCOURSE
a preacher persuadeth his hearers to give alms ; here is no Hi_
absolute necessitation of hearers, nor anything that is opposite
to true liberty.

Such another question is that which follows, " whether
the object of the sight be the cause of seeing 1 ;" meaning (if
he mean aright) the subjective cause : or, how "the under
standing" doth "propose the object to the will m ;" which
though it be blind, as philosophers agree, yet not so blind as
he that will not see, but is ready to follow the good advice of
the intellect. I may not desert that which is generally ap
proved, to satisfy the fantastic humour of a single conceited
person. No man would take exceptions at these phrases,
"the will willeth," "the understanding under standeth n ," the
former term expressing the faculty, the latter the elicit act,
but one who is resolved to pick quarrels with the whole world.

" To permit a thing willingly to be done" by another , that Not to will
is evil, not for the eviPs sake which is permitted, but for that of abnega-
good s sake which is to be drawn out of it, is not to will it

positively, nor to determine it to evil by a natural influence ; ing and
which whosoever do maintain, do undeniably make God the
author of sin. Between positive willing, and nilling, there is
a mean of abnegation, that is, not to will.

738 That "the will" doth " determine itself P," is a truth not to
be doubted of. What different degrees of aid or assistance
the will doth stand in need of in different acts, natural, moral,
supernatural; where a general assistance is sufficient, and
where a special assistance is necessary q ; is altogether imper
tinent to this present controversy, or to the right stating of
this question.

In the last place, he repeateth his old distinction, between Hisdistinc-
a man s freedom " to do" those things which are " in his t ween free

power," if he "will," and the freedom "to will" what he
will r ; which he illustra teth (for similitudes prove nothing) confuted
by a comparison drawn from the natural appetite to the
rational appetite ; " will is appetite," but " it is one ques
tion, whether he be free to eat that hath an appetite; and

1 [Qu., State of Quest, p. 4. [Ibid.]

" Cause that it is seen."] v [Ibid.]

" [Ibid.] &gt; [Ibid.]

[Ibid.] [Ibid.]

222 CASTIGATIONS OF

PART another" question, " whether he be free to have an appetite 8 ."
IIL " In the former," he saith, he " agreeth with" me, that a man
is "free to do what he will 1 ." " In the latter," he saith, he
" dissents" from me, that a man is not "free to will u ." And
(as if he had uttered some profound mystery) he addeth in a
triumphing manner, that "if" I "have not been able to dis
tinguish between those two questions," I "have not done
well to meddle with either ;" and " if" I " have understood
them, to bring arguments to prove that a man is free to do if
he will, is to deal uningenuously and fraudulently with" my
" readers x ."

Yet let us have good words. " Homini homo quid pr^stat^"
"what difference is there between man and man?" That
so many wits before Mr. Hobbes in all ages should beat their
brains about this question all their lives long, and never meet
with this distinction, which strikes the question dead. What
should hinder him from crying out " evprj/ca, evprj/ca" " I
have found it, I have found it z ?" But stay a little; the
second thoughts are wiser ; and the more I look upon this
distinction, the less I like it. It seemeth like the log in the
fable, which terrified the poor frogs with the noise it made at
the first falling of it into the water, but afterwards they in
sulted over it, and took their turns to leap upon it. Some take
it to be pure nonsense; "whether a man be free in such things
as be within his power a ;" that is, whether he be free wherein
he is free, or that be within his power which is in his power.

I have formerly shewed 5 , and shall demonstrate further as
there is occasion, that this distinction is contradictory and
destructive to his own grounds; according to which all the
other powers and faculties of a man are determined to one
by an extrinsecal flux of natural causes, equally with the will ;
and therefore a man is no more necessitated to will or choose
what he will do, than to -do what he wills. Secondly, I have
shewed , that this distinction is vain -and unuseful, and doth
not hold off so much as one blow from Mr. Hobbes and his

[Qu., State of Quest., p. 4.] docetur ne suaviter quidem vivi posse

[Ibid.] secund. Epicuri decreta, c. xi ; Op.

[Ibid.] Moral., torn. v. p. 311. ed. Wyttenb.]
[Ibid.] [Q u&gt;&gt; State of Quest, p. 4.]

[Terent, Eun., II. ii. 1.] i&gt; [Defence, Numb. iii. above, p. 30.]

[Arcbunedes,ap. Plut., Disput.qua [Ibid., p. 32.]

223

bleeding cause. All those gross absurdities which do neces- DISCOURSE
sarily follow the inevitable determination of all actions and

events by extrinsecal causes, do fall much more heavily and
insupportably upon the extrinsecal determination of the will.
So he sticks deeper by means of this distinction in the same
mire. All the ground of justice that he can find in punish
ments,, is this ; that though men s actions be necessary, yet
they do them willingly 11 . Now if the will be irresistibly de
termined to all its individual acts, then there is no more jus
tice to punish a man for willing necessarily than for doing
necessarily. Thirdly, I have shewed already 6 in part, that
this distinction is contrary to the sense of the whole world,
who take the will to be much more free than the perform
ance : which may be thus enlarged. Though a man
were thrust into the deepest dungeon of Europe, yet in
despite of all the second causes he may will his own
liberty. Let the causes heap a conglomeration of diseases
upon a man, more than Herod had ; yet he may will his [Acts xii.
own health. Though a man be withheld from his friend
by seas and mountains, yet he may will his presence. He
that hath not so much as a cracked groat towards the pay
ment of his debts, may yet will the satisfaction of his creditors.
And though some of these may seem but pendulous wishes
of impossibilities, and not so compatible with a serious de
liberation, yet they do plainly shew the freedom of the will.
"In great things" (said the poet) "it is sufficient to have
willed f " that is, to have done what is in our power. So we
say, " God accepteth the will," that which we can, " for the
deed," that which we cannot. " If there be first a willing 2 Cor. viii.
mind, it is accepted according to that a man hath" (that is,
to will), " and not according to that he hath not" (that is,
7 39 to perform). And yet more plainly, "To will is present Rom.vii. is.
with me, but how to perform that which is good, that find I
not." Yet saith T. IL, " a man is free to do what he wills,"
but not "to will" what he will do g .

To come yet a little nearer to T. II. For since he refuseth [Holy
all human authority, I must stick to Scripture. It is called Scn i jture -J

d [See above in the Defence, T. H., f [" In magnis et voluisse sat est."

Numb. xiv. p. 85.] Propert, Eleg., II. x. 6.]

e [Defence, Numb. iii. above p. 31.] * [Qu., State of Quest, p. 4.]

CASTIGATIONS OF

PART a man s " own will," and his " own voluntary will." If it be de
termined irresistibly by outward causes, it is rather their

andxix. 5. "own will" than his "own will." Nay, to let him see, that
the very name of " free will" itself is not such a stranger in

Ezravii.is. Scripture as he imagineth, it is called a man s " own free
will." How often do we read in the books of Moses, Ezra,
and the Psalms, of " free will offerings." This free will is

phiicm. u. opposed not only to compulsion, but also to necessity; "not
of necessity but willingly ;" and is inconsistent with extrin-
secal determination to one, with which election of this or that

Gen. xiii.9. indifferently is incompatible. " Is not the whole land before
thee ?" said Abraham to Lot ; " if thou wilt take the left hand,
then I will go to the right ; or if thou depart to the right

[2 Sam. hand, then I will go to the left." God said to David, "I

xxiv 12 1

offer thee three things, choose one of them ;" and to Solomon,
[i Kings " because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked long
[Mark vi. life," or " riches."- And Herod to his daughter, " Ask of me

[Matt. whatsoever thou wilt." And Pilate to the Jews, " Whether of
xxvii. 21.] the twain win ye that j re i ease mito you r &gt; An a St p au i

[ i Cor. iv. unto the Corinthians, " What will ye ? shall I come unto you
with a rod, or in love ?" Both were in their choice. Yet
T. H. doth tell us, that all these were free to do this or that
indifferently, if they would, but not free to will. To choose
and to elect, is, of all others, the most proper act of the will.
But all these were free to choose and elect this or that indif
ferently, or else all this were mere mockery. And therefore
they were free to will. The Scripture knoweth no extrinsecal
determiners of the will, but itself. So it is said of Eli s sons,

i Sam. ii. " Give flesh to roast for the priest, for he will not have sodden
flesh of thee, but raw," and "if thou wilt not give it, I will
take it by force."

" Sic volo, sic jubeo ; stat pro ratione voluntas V

Here was more will than necessity. So it is said of the
Luke xii. rich man in the Gospel ; " What shall I do ? . . this I will
do, I will pull down my barns and build greater, and there
will I bestow all my fruits and my goods ; and I will say to
my soul, . . take thine ease, eat, drink, and be merry." Both
his purse and person were under the command of his will.

11 [Juv. vi. 223. " Hoc volo, sic jnbeo, *//" &c.]

MR. HOBBES ANIMADVERSIONS. 225

So St. James saith, " Go to now, ye that say, To-day or to- DI
morrow we will go into such a city, and continue there a year, _

-[15.]

SCOURSK
II.

and buy, and sell, and get gain; whereas ye know not what JT 1V ]

shall be to-morrow," &c. ; " for that ye ought to say, If the

Lord will, we shall live, and do this or that." The defect was

not in their will to resolve, but in their power to perform. So

T. H. his necessity was their liberty, and their liberty was his

necessity. Lastly, the Scriptures teach us, that it is in the

power of a man to choose his own will for the future : " All Josh. i. i&lt;&gt;,

that thou commandest us, we will do; and whithersoever [1

thou sendest us, we will go : as we hearkened unto Moses in

all things, so will we hearken unto thee." So saith St.

Paul; "What I do, that I will do;" and in another place, 2 Cor. xi. 12.

" I do rejoice, and I will rejoice ;"and, " They that will be i^Ym.Vi 8

rich." When Christ inquired of His disciples, "Will ye also pjj^ v ..

go away," according to T. H. his principles, He should have &&amp;lt;]

said, Must ye also go away/

We have viewed his distinction, but we have not answered The sensu-

-i . . cc -TTr-n ,., ,, n (, .. . al and ra-

hlS comparison. Will is an appetite :" and " it is one tionai ap-

question, whether he be free to eat that hath an appetite, and Afferent ry
another, whether he be free to have an appetite." Com
parisons are but a poor kind of reasoning at the best, which
may illustrate something, but prove nothing. And of all
comparisons this is one of the worst ; which is drawn from the
sensual appetite to the rational appetite. The rational appe
tite and the sensual appetite are even as like one to another
as an apple and an oyster. The one is a natural agent, the
other is a free agent. The one acts necessarily, the other
acts contingently (I take the word largely). The one is de
termined to one, the other is not determined to one. The
one hath under God a dominion over itself, and its own acts ;
the other hath no dominion over itself, or its own acts. Even
the will itself, when it acts after a natural manner (which is
but rarely, in some extraordinary cases, as in the appetite of
the chiefest good, being fully revealed, or in a panical terror,
which admitteth no deliberation), acts not freely but neces
sarily. How much more must agents merely natural, which
have neither reason to deliberate, nor dominion or liberty to
elect, act necessarily and determinately ? So, to answer a
740 comparison with a comparison, his argument is just such

BRAMHALL. Q

226 CASTIGATIONS OF

PART another as this ; The galley-slave, which is chained to the
- oar, is a man, as well as the pilot that sits at the stern ; there
fore the galley-slave hath as much dominion in the ship as
the pilot, and is as free to turn it hither and thither. So
falls this dreadful engine all in pieces, which should have
battered down the fort of liberty.

His gentle reprehension, that "if" I "have not been
able to distingu